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ill  in  HI 


107  146 


CITE    BY    TITJL-IT    A2STD 

s    §    22 


CORPUS  JURIS 
SECUNDUM 

A  COMPLETE  RESTATEMENT  OF  THE  ENTIRE 

AMERICAN  LAW 

AS  DEVELOPED  BY 

ALL  REPORTED  CASES 


By 

The  Editorial  Staffs 

of 
THE  AMERICAN  LAW  BOOK  CO. 

and 
WEST  PUBLISHING  CO. 


VOLUME   XLIX 

Kept  to  Date  by  Cumulative  Annual  Pocket  Parts 


Brooklyn,  N.  Y. 
The  American  Law  Book  Co. 


The   Amerioa.n   Law   Boole 


EXPLANATION 


r  I  MrlE  object  in  view  in  preparing  Corpus  Juris  Secundiim  has  been  two- 
JL  fold :  First,  to  provide  a  complete  encyclopedic  treatment  of  the  whole 
body  of  the  law,  which  means  that  it  must  be  based  upon  all  the  reported 
cases;  Second,  to  present  each  title  of  the  law  in  form  and  content  most  suit- 
able as  a  means  of  practical  reference  for  the  Bench  and  Bar. 

Corpus  Juris  Secundum  is  therefore  a  complete  restatement  of  the  entire 
"body  of  American  Law.  The  clear-cut  and  exhaustive  propositions  compris- 
ing the  text  are  supported  by  all  the  authorities  from  the  earliest  times  to  date. 
The  supporting  case  citations,  conspicuously  set  out  in  the  notes,  point  to  all 
decisions  handed  down  since  the  publication  of  Corpus  Juris.  When  the 
searcher  may  wish  to  consult  earlier  authorities,  a  specific  reference  to  Corpus 
Juris  makes  available  all  cases  back  to  1658. 

Each  title  is  preceded  by  a  complete  section  analysis,  greatly  simpli- 
fied to  facilitate  research.  Where  the  scope  of  any  section  is  such  as  to  re- 
quire it,  a  more  minute  analysis  is  found  thereunder  in  its  appropriate  place 
within  the  title  (see  Abatement  and  Revival,  Section  112).  The  convenience 
of  this  method — an  innovation  in  encyclopedic  writing — must  immediately 
commend  itself. 

A  concise  black-letter  summary,  indicative  of  its  scope,  precedes  the 
full  treatment  or  statement  of  the  law  under  each  section.  These  introduc- 
tory summaries,  concise  and  free  from  interlineation  of  authorities,  have 
proven  of  great  convenience  and  value  in  legal  research* 

An  index  is  found  in  the  back  of  each  volume  covering  the  titles  con- 
tained therein,  thus  providing  another  convenient  means  of  ready  access  to  the 
text  and  notes* 

Corpus  Juris  Secundum  is  kept  to  date  by  means  of  annual  cumula- 
tive pocket  parts  for  each  volume.  This  feature  of  supplementation  which 
has  proved  so  successful  in  modern  digests  and  statutes  conveniently,  and 
with  certainty,  keeps  each  title  constantly  to  date  through  current  cases  and 
new  precedents. 

Corpus  Juris  Secundum  represents  tbie  combined  product  of  the  high'est 
editorial  talent  and  manufacturing  skill  Its  many  excellent  editorial  features 
are  fittingly  accompanied  by  corresponding  innovations  and  improvements  in 
mechanical  arrangement,  typography,  and  design,  which  .the  publisher  believes 
will  commend 'themselves  to  the  profession  as  representing  a  new  standard 
in  legal  publications.  THE  puBLISHERS 


TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


REPORTS  AND  TEXTBOOKS 


A. 

Abb. 

Abb.Adm. 
Abb.App.Dec. 
Abb.Dec. 
Abb.N.Oas. 
Abb.Pr. 
Abb.Pr.N.S. 
A'Beck.Res. 
Judgm. 


[1018JA.O. 

Acton 
Adams 


A 

Atlantic  Reporter 

Abbott  (U.S.) 

Abbott's  Admiralty  (U.S.) 

Abbott's  Appeals  Decisions  (N.Y.) 

Abbott's  Decisions  (N.Y.) 

Abbott's  New  Cases  (N.Y.) 

Abbott's  Practice  (N.Y.) 

Abbott's  Practice  New  Series  (N.Y.) 

A'Beckett's      Reserved      Judgments 

15)17]  Appeal  Oases  (Can.) 
LW  Reports   [1918]  Appeal  Oases 


Add.EcdL 

A.&E. 

A.&K.Eac.L. 

A.&E.Enc.L.&Pr, 

Aik* 

A.K.Marsh. 

Ala. 

Ala.App. 

Alaska 

Alb.LJ. 

A.L.O. 

A1C.&N. 

Alc.Rog.Gas* 

Aleyn 

Alison  Pr, 

Allen 

Allen  (N.B.) 

Alta.L. 

A.L.R. 

Am.ltankr, 

Ambl. 

A.M.C. 

Am.Corp.Cas, 

Am.Or. 

Am.D. 

Am.&E.Corp.Cas. 

Am.&E.Corp.Cas. 

N»S» 

Am.&Eng.Ency. 
Law 

Am.&E.EqIX 

Am.&Eng.Pat 

Cas, 
Am.&Eng.R.R, 

Cas, 

Am.Electr.Cas. 
Am.&E.K.Cas. 
Am  &B.R.Cas.N 

S. 

AmJJntL. 

Am.L.J. 
AmJJ.J.N.8. 

Am.L.Rec. 
CJ.S. 


Acton  (Eng.) 

Adams  Reports  (N.H.) 

Addison  (Pa.) 

Addams'  Ecclesiastical  (Bng.) 

Adolphus  &  Ellis  (Bug.) 

American  &  English  Encyclopaedia  of 

Law 
American  &  English  Encyclopedia  of 

Law  &  Practice 
Aikens  (Vt) 
A.  K.  Marshall  (Ky.) 
Alabama 

Alabama  Appellate  Court 
Alaska 

Albany  Law  Journal 
American  Leading  Cases 
Alcott  &  Napier  (Eng.) 
Alcock's  Registry  Cases  (Bng.) 
Aleyn  (Eng.) 
Alison's  Practice  (Sc.) 
Allen  (Mass.) 
Allen,  New  Brunswick 
Alberta  Law 
American  Law  Reports 
American  Bankruptcy  (U.S.) 
Ambler  (Eng.) 
American  Maritime  Cases 
American  Corporation  Cases 
American  Criminal 
American  Decisions 
American    &    English    Corporation 

Oases 

American  &  English  Corporation 
Cases  New  Series 

American  and  English  Encyclopedia  of 
Law 

American  &  English  Decisions  in  Eq- 
uity 

American  and  English  Patent  Oases 

American  and  English  Railroad  Oases 
American  Electrical  Cases 
American  &  English  Railroad  Oases 

American  &  English  Railroad  Oases 

New  Series 
American    Journal  of  International 

American  Law  Journal  (Pa.) 
American  Law  Journal  New  Series 

American  Law  Record  (Ohio) 


Am.L.Reg. 
Am.L.Reg.N.S. 
Am.Law  Reg.(O. 

S.) 

Am.L.Rev. 
AmJUT.Bankr. 

Am.Law  lust 

Am.Negl.Cas. 

Am.NegLR, 

A.M.&0. 

Am.Prob. 

Am.Prob.N.S. 

Am.Pr. 

Am.R. 

Am.R.&Corp. 

Am.R.Rep. 

Am.S.R. 

Am.St.R.D, 

And. 

Andr. 

Ann.Cas. 

Ann.Oas.l912A 

Anstr. 

Anth.N.P. 

App.D.O. 

App.Oas. 

App.Div. 

Anz. 

Ark. 

ArkJust 

Arn. 

Arn.&H. 

Ashra. 

Aspin. ' 

Atk. 

Austr.C.L.R 

AustrJur. 
Austr.L.T. 


Bacon  Abr. 

BaiLEq. 

Bailey. 


B.&Ald. 

Baldw. 

BalfPr. 

Ball&B. 

Bank.&InsJa. 

Bann. 

Bann.&A. 

Barb. 

Barb.Oh. 

B.&Arn. 

Barn. 

Barn.0h. 

Barnes 

Barnes  Notes 

Batty 

B.£Aust 

Baxt 


B.O. 


American  Law  Register 

American  Law  Register  New  Series 

American  Law  Register  Old  Series 

American  Law  Review 

American  Law  Times  Bankruptcy  Re- 
ports 

American  Law  Institute, 
Restatement  of  the  Law 

American  Negligence  Cases 

American  Negligence  Reports 

Armstrong,  Macartney  &  Ogle  (Ir.) 

American  Probate 

American  Probate  New  Series 

American  Practice 

American  Reports 

American  Railroad  &  Corporation 

American  Railway  Reports 

American  State  Reports 

American  Street  Railway  Decisions 

Anderson  (Eng.) 

Andrews  (Eng.) 

American  &  English  Annotated  Oases 

American  Annotated  Oases  1912A,  et 
seq. 

Anstruther  (Eng.) 

Authors  Nisi  Prlug  (N.Y.) 

Appeal  Cases  (D.O.) 

Law  Reports  Appeal  Cases  (Eng.) 

Appellate  Division  (N.Y.) 

Arizona 

Arkansas 

Arkley's  Justiciary  (Sc.) 

Arnold  (Eng.) 

Arnold  &  Hodges  (Eng.) 

Ashmead  (Pa.) 

Aspinall's  Maritime  Oases  (Eng.) 

Atkyn  (Eng.) 

Commonwealth   Law   Reports,   Aus- 
tralia 

Australian  Jurist 

Australian  Law  Times 

B 

Bacon's  Abridgment  (Eng.) 

Bailey's  Equity  (S.O.) 

Bailey's  Law  (S.C.) 

Barnewall  &  Adolphus  (Eng.) 

Barnewall  &  Alderson  (Eng.) 

Baldwin  (U.S.)        ^  v 

Balfour's  Practice  (Sc.)  • 

Ball&Beatty  (Ir.) 

Bankruptcy  and  Insolvency  Reports 

(Eng.) 

Bannister  (Eng.) 
Banning  &  Arden  (U.S.) 
Barbour  (N.Y.) 
Barbour's  Chancery  (N.Y.) 
Barron  &  Arnold  (Eng.) 
Barnardiston  King's  Bench  (Eng.) 
Barnardiston  Chancery  (Bng.) 
Barnes'  Practice  Cases  (Eng.) 
Barnes'  Notes  (Eng.) 
Batty  (Ir.) 

Barron  &  Austin  (Eng.) 
Baxter  (Tenn.) 
Bay  (S.O.) 

Broderip  &  Binghaxn  (Eng.). 
British  Columbia 


Tin 


TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


B.&0. 

B.&MaoL 

B.D.&O. 

Beatty 

Beav. 

Beay.&WaIRy. 

Cas. 

Boav.R.&C.Cas. 
Beaw.Lex.Mer. 
Bee 
BelL 

Bell  App.Cas. 
Bell  Cas. 
Bell  C.C. 
Bell  Comra. 
Bell  Sc.Cas. 
Ben. 
BenL 
BenL&D. 
B.&H.O.Cas. 

Bibb 

Bing. 

Bing.N.Cas« 

Binn. 

Biss. 

BittW,&P. 

Black 

Blackf. 


Barnewall  &  Cresswell  (Eng.) 

Browne  &  Macnamara  (Eng.) 

Blackham,  Dundas  &  Osborne  (Ir.) 

Beatty  (Ir.) 

Beavan  (Eng.) 

Beavan  &  Walford's  Railway  and  Ca- 

ual  Cases  (Eng.) 
English  Railway  and  Canal  Cases 
Beawes  Lex  Mercatoria  (Eng.) 
Bee  (U.S.) 
Bellewe  (Eng.) 
Bell's  Appeal  Cases  (Sc.) 
Bell's  Cases  (Sc.) 
Bell's  Crown  Cases  (Bng.) 
Bell's  Commentaries  (Eng.) 
Bell's  Scotch  Court  of  Session  Cases 
Benedict  (U.S.) 
Benloe  (Eng.) 
Benloe  &  Dallison  (Eng.) 
Bennett  &  Heard  Leading 

Cases  (Eng.) 
Bibb  (Ky.) 
Bingbam  (Eng.) 
Bingbam's  New  Oases  (Eng.) 
Biiiney  (Pa.) 
BisseU  (U.S.) 
Bittleson,  Wise  &  Parnell  (Eng.) 


Criminal 


Black  (U.S.) 
Blackford  (Ind.) 


Blackstone  Comm.  Blacks  tone  Commentaries 


Bla.H. 

Blair  Co. 

Bland 

Bland's  Oh. 

BJatcbf. 

Blatckf.&H. 

Blatchf.PrizeCas. 

Bligh 

Blish  N.S. 

B.Mon. 

Bond 

Bouvier* 

Bovco 

B.&P. 

B.&P.N.B. 

Bract 

Bradf.Surr. 

Brayt. 

B.R.G. 

Brev. 

Brewst 

Brightly 

Brightly  El.Cas. 

Bro.Ch. 

Brock. 

Brock.Cas. 

Brod.&B. 

Brod.&Fr. 

Brodix  Am.&E. 

Pat.Cas. 
Bro.Just. 
Brook  Abr. 
Brook  N.Cas. 
Brooke  N.G. 
Bro.P.C. 
Brown  Adm. 
Brown,  Ch. 
Brown  Ecc. 
Brown  N.P. 
Brown,Parl.Cas. 
Browne 
Brown.&I». 
BrownL&G. 
Bruce 

Brunn.0oll.0as. 
B.&S. 
B.T.A. 
Buck 

Puller  NJP. 
Bulstr. 


Henry  Blackstone's  English  Common 
Pleas  (Eng.) 

Blair  County  (Pa.) 

Bland  (Md.) 

Bland  Chancery  (Md.) 

Blatchford  (U.S.) 

Blatchford  &  Howland  (U.S.) 

Blatchford's  Prize  Cases  (U.S.) 

Bligh  (Eng.) 

Bligh  New  Series  (Eng.) 

B.  Monroe  (Ky.) 

Bond  (U.S.) 

Bouvier's  Law  Dictionary 

Boyce  (Del.) 

Bosanquet  &  Puller  (Eng.) 

Bosanquet  &  Puller's  New  Reports 
(Eng.) 

Brae  ton  de  Legibus  et  Consuetudini- 
bus  AngliiB 

Bradford's  Surrogate  (N.Y.) 

Brayton  (Vt.) 

British  Ruling  Cases 

Brevard  (S.G.) 

Brews ter  (Pa.) 

Brightly  (Pa.) 

Brightly's  Election  Gases  (Pa.) 

Brown's  Chancery  (Eng.) 

Brockoiibrough  (U.S.) 

Brockenbrough's  Virginia  Cases 

Broderip  &  Bingham  (Eng.) 

Broderick  &  JTremontle's  Ecclesiasti- 
cal Coses 

Brodix's  American. &  English  Patent 

Cases 

Brouu's  Justiciary  (Sc.) 
Brook's  Abridgments  (Eng.) 

Brook's  New  Gases  (Eng,) 

Brooke's  New  Cases 

Brown's  Parliament  Oases  (Eng.) 

Brown's  Admiralty  (U.S.) 

Brown's  Chancery  Cases  (fing.) 

Brown  Ecclesiastical  (Eng.) 

Brown's  Michigan  Nisi  Prius 

Brown  Parliamentary  Cases  (Eng.) 

Browne  (Pa.) 

Browning  &  Lushinffton  (Bng.) 

Brownlow  &  Goldesborough  (Eng.) 

Bruce  (Sc.) 

Brunner's  Collective  Oases  (U.S.) 

Best  &  Smith  (Eng.) 

Board  of  Tax  Appeals  (U.S.) 

Buck  (Eng.) 

Buller's  Nisi  Prius  (Eng.) 

Bulstrode  (Eng.) 


Burn. 

Burr. 

Burr.S.Oas. 

Busb. 

Busb.Eq. 

Bush 

B.W.C.O. 


Bunbury 
Burnett 


isT) 


Cab.&E. 

Cai. 

Cai.Cas. 

Cal 

Cal.(2d) 

Cal.App. 

Oal.App.(2d) 

Cald. 

CaU 

Calthr. 

CaLUnrep.Cas. 

Cam.Cas. 

Campb. 

Canal  Zone 

Can.App.Cas. 

Can.Cr.Cas. 

Can.Exch. 

Cau.L.J. 

Can.LJ.N.S. 

Can.L.T.Occ. 

Notes 
Can.R.Cas. 
Can.S.C. 
Canc&L. 

Car.&K. 

Car.&M. 

Car.&P. 

Car.H.&A. 

Carp.P.O. 

Carter 

Garth. 

Cartwr.Cas. 

Gary 

Cas. 

Cas.tHardw. 

Cas.t.Holt 

Oas.tKing 

Gas.tTalb. 

O.B. 

C.B.N.S. 

C.O.A. 

O.O.PJL 

C«ntr.LJ. 

ri891]  Ch. 

Ghamb.Rcp. 

Chandl 

Charlt.R.M. 

Charlt.T.UJP. 

Chase 

Ch.0as. 

Ch.Chamb. 

CLOoLOp. 

Ch.D. 

GhestOo. 

Chev. 

Chit. 

Ohoyce  Cas.Ch, 

Oh.Rcp. 

Oh.Sent. 

Cinc.L.BuL 

Cinc.Super. 

City  Ct.R. 
City  Hall  Rec. 


._., 

Burrows  (Eng.) 
Burrows'  Settlement  Gas.  (Eng.) 
Busbee  (N.C.) 
Busbee  Equity  (N.O.) 
Bush  (Ky.) 

Butterworth's  Workmen's  Compensa- 
tion Cases  (Eng.) 


Oababe  &  Ellis  (Eng.) 

Games  (N.Y.) 

Games'  Cases  (N.Y.) 

California 

California  Reports,  Second  Series 

California  Appellate  Court 

California  Appellate  Reports,  Second 

Series 

Oaldecott  (Eng.) 
Call  (Va.) 
Calthrop  (Eng.) 
California  Uureported  Gases 
Cameron's  Gases  (Can.) 
Campbell  (Eng.) 
Canal  Zone  Supreme  Court 
Canadian  Appeal  Canes 
Canadian  Criminal  Coses 
Canadian  Exchequer 
Canada  Law  Journal 
Canada  Law  Journal  New  Serios 

Canadian  Law  Times  Occasional  Notes 

Canadian  Railway  Cases 

Canada  Supremo  Court 

Cane  &  Leigh  Crown  Cases  Reserved 

(Eng.) 

Carrington  &  Kirwan  (Bng.) 
Garrington  &  Marshman  (Eng.) 
Carrington  &  Payne  (Eng.) 
Carrow,  Hamcrton  &  Allen  (Eng.) 
Carpmacl  Patent  Gases  (Eng.) 
Carter  (Eng.) 
Oarthew  (Eng^) 
Oartwritfht's  Gases  (Can.) 
Gary  (lOng.) 
Casey  (Pa.) 

Gases  temp.  Hardwickc  (Eng.) 
Gases  tcrnp.  Molt  (Eng.) 
Cases  temp.  King  (En#.) 
Oases  temp.  Talbot  (Eng.) 
Common  Bench  (Manning,  Granger  & 

Scott)  (Eng.) 
Common  Bench  New  Series  (Manning, 

Granger  &  Scott  New  Series)  (Eng.) 
Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  (U.S.) 
Court  of  Customs  and 
Central  Law  Journal 
LAW  Reports  [1801]  Chancery  (Eng.) 
Chamber  (Ont.) 
Chandler  (Wis.) 
R.  M.  Gharlton  (Ga.) 
T.  U.  P.  Charlton  (Ga.) 
Chase  (U.S.) 
Gases  in  Chancery  (Eng.) 
Chancery  Chambers  (U.C.) 
Chalmers'  Colonial  Opinions 
Law     Reports     Chancery     Division 

(Eng.) 

Chester  County  (Pa.) 
Cheves  (S.O.) 
Chitty  (Eng.) 

Ghoyce  Oases  in  Ohancery  (Eng.) 
Chancery  Reports  (En#.) 
Chancery  Sentinel  (N.Y.) 
Weekly  Law  Bulletin  (Oh.) 
Cincinnati  Superior  Court  Reporter 

(Oh.) 

City  Court  Reports  (N.Y.) 
City  Hall  Recorder  (N.Y.) 


TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


Civ.ProoRep* 
C.J. 


C.J.S. 

C.&K. 

0.&L. 

CLApp< 

CLChT 

Clark  &F. 

Clark  &Fin,N.S. 

Clarke  

Clarke  &S.Dr.Cas.Clarke    & 

_(0nt.) 
Clarke  Ch. 
Clayt. 

C.L.Chamb. 

Glev.L.Rec. 

Clev.L.Rep. 

C1.&F. 

Clif.El.Cas. 

Cliff. 

C.L.R. 

C.&M. 

C.M.&R. 

Cockf&Rowe. 

Code  Rep. 

Code  Rep.N.S. 

Coff.Prob. 

Co.Inst. 

Coke 

CoLOas. 

CoL&O.Cas. 

Ool.C.O. 

Coldw. 

ColL 

CoLLJtep. 

GoLLaw  Review 

Coll.&E.Bank. 


Civil  Procedure  Reports  (N.Y.) 

Corpus  Juris 

Corpus  Juris  Annotations 

Corpus  Juris  Secundum 

Carrington  &  BSrwan  (Eng.) 

Connor  &  Lawson  (Ir.V 

Clark's  Appeal  Cases  (Eng.) 

Clarke's  Chancery  (N.Y.) 

Clark  &  Finnelly  (Eng.) 

Clark's  House  of  Lords  Cases  (Eng.) 

Clarke's  Chancery  (N.Y.) 

"    "       ~    Scully's   Drainage   Cases 


Colles 

Colo. 

Colo.App- 

Colq. 

Coltm. 

Comb. 

Com.Cas. 

Com.L. 

Gomptr.Treas. 

Dec. 
Comst 
Comyns 
Comyns  Dig1. 
Con.&Law. 
Conf. 
Conn. 
Conn.Surr. 
Const 
Cooke 
Cooke 
Cooke  &  A. 
Cook  Vice-Adm. 
Coop. 

Coop.Pr.Cas. 
Coop.tJBrough. 

Coop.tXJott. 

Coop.t.EHd. 

Co.P.0. 

Corb.&D. 

Court&MacL 

Cow. 

GowXJr-Rep. 

Cowp. 

Cox.Am.T.M.Cas. 

Cox  C.O. 

Cox  Oh. 

Cox  &Atk. 

G.&P. 

C.P.O. 

C.P.D. 


Clarke's  Chancery  (N.Y.) 

Clayton's     Reports,     York' 
(Eng.) 

Chamber's  Common  Law  (U.C.) 

Cleveland  Law  Record  (Oh.) 

Cleveland  Law  Reporter  (Oh.) 

Clark  &  Finnelly  (Eng.) 

Clifford's  Southwick  Election  Cases 

Clifford  (U.S.) 

Common  Law  Reports  (Eng.) 

Carrington  &  Marshman  (Eng.) 

Crompton,  Meeson  &  Roscoe  (Eng.) 

Cockburn  &  Rowe's  Election  Cases 

Code  Reporter  (N.Y.) 

Code  Reports  New  Series  (N.Y.) 

Coffey's  Probate  (CaL) 

Coke's  Institutes 

Coke  (Eng.) 

Coleman's  Cases  (N.Y.) 

Coleman  &  Caines'  Cases  (N.Y.) 

Collyer's  Chancery  Cases  (Eng.) 

Coldwell  (Tenn.) 

Collyer  (Eng.) 

Colorado  Law  Reporter 

Columbia  Law  Review 

Collier  and  Eaton's  American  Bank- 
ruptcy Reports 

OoUes*  Cases  in  Parliament  (Eng.) 

Colorado 

Colorado  Appeals 

Colquit 

Coltman  (Eng.) 

Comberbach  (Eng.) 

Commercial  Cases  (Eng.) 

Commercial  Law  (Can.) 

Comptroller  Treasury  Decisions 

Comstock  (N.Y.) 

Comyns  (Eng.) 

Comyns  Digest  (Eng.) 

Connor  &  Lawson  (Ir.) 

Conference  Reports  (N.C.) 

Connecticut 

Connolly's  Surrogate  (N.Y.V 

Constitutional  Reports  (N.C.) 

Cooke  (Eng.) 

Cooke  (Tenn.) 

Cooke  &  Alcock  (Ir.) 

Cook's  Vice-Admiralty  (L.C.) 

Cooper's  Chancery  (Eng.) 

Cooper's  Practice  Cases  (Eng.) 

Cooper's     Cases     temp.     Brougham 

(Eng.) 
Cooper's     Cases    temp.    Cottenham 

(Bng.) 

Cooper's  Cases  tempore  Eldon  (Eng.) 
Coke's  Reports  (Eng.) 
Corbett  &  DanielTs  Election 

(Eng.) 

Courtnay  &  Maclean  (Sc.) 
Cowen  (N.Y.) 
Cowen's  Criminal  (N.Y.) 
Cowper  (Eng.) 

Cox's  American  Trade-Mark  Cases 
Cox's  Criminal  Cases  (Eng.) 
Cox's  Chancery  (Bng,) 


Law  Reports  Common  Pleas  Division 
(Eng.) 


Orabbe 
Cranch 
Cranch  C.C. 
Cranch  PatDec* 
Cr^pp. 
Crawf.&D. 
Crawf.&DAbr* 
Cas. 

Cripp's  Ch.Cas. 

Cr.LMag. 

Cr.&Ph/ 


Cro.Car. 
Cro.Eliz. 
Cro.Jac. 

Cromp.&J. 
Cromp.&M. 
Crosw.Pat.Cas* 

Cr.&Ph. 

CtOL 

Ct.Cust.&Pat 

App. 
Cunn. 
Curt 
Curt.EccL 
Gush. 
Cust^A. 
Cyc. 


Dak. 
DaLQP* 
Dall, 
DalL 


Daly 

Dan. 

Dana 

Dane  Abr. 

Dans.&L. 

D'Anv.Abr. 

Dauph.Co, 

Dav.&M. 

Davys 


D.B.&M. 
D.C. 

D.Chipm. 
Deac. 
Deac.&O. 
Deady 
Dears.&B. 
Dears.C.C. 
Deas  &  A. 
De  Gex 
De  G.F.&J. 
De  G.J.&S. 
De  G.&J. 
De  GJtf.&G. 

De  a&Sm. 

Del. 

Del.Cn. 

Del.0o. 

Dem.Surr. 

Den!c.C. 

Desans.Bq. 

Dev.CtCL 

Dev.L. 

Dev.&BaL 

Dick. 

Dill. 

DirLDec. 

Disn. 


Crabbe  (U.S.) 

Cranch  (U.S.) 

Cranch's  Circuit  Court  (U.S.) 

Cranch's  Patent  Decisions  (U.S.) 

Criminal  Appeals   (Eng.) 

Crawford  &  Dix.Or.) 

Crawford   &  Dix's   Abridged   Case 


Crippfs  Church  and  Clergy  Cases 
Criminal  Law  Magazine 
Craig  &  Phillips  (Eng.) 
Christopher     Robinson's     Admiralt; 

(Eng.) 

Croke  Charles  (Eng.) 
Croke  Elizabeth   (Eng.) 
Croke's  Reports  tempore  James  (Ja 

cobus)  (Eng.) 
Crompton  &  Jervis  (Eng.) 
Crompton  &  Meesou  (Eng.) 
Croswell's  Collection  of  Patent  Case 

(U.S.) 

Craig  &  Phillips  (Eng.) 
Court  of  Claims  (U.S.) 

Court  of  Customs  and  Patent  Appeal 
Cunningham  (Eng.) 
Curtis   (U.S.) 

Curteis  Ecclesiastical  (Eng.) 
Gushing  (Mass.) 
United  States  Customs  Appeals 
Cyclopedia  of  Law  &  Procedure 
Cyclopedia  of  Law  &  Procedure  As 
notations 


D 

Dakota 

Dalison's  Common  Pleas   (Eng.) 

Dallaman's  Decisions  (Tex.) 

Dallas  (Pa.) 

Dallas  (U.S.) 

Dalrymple's  Decisions  (Sc.) 

Daly  (N.Y.) 

Daniell  (Eng.) 

Dana  (Ky.) 

Dane's  Abridgment 

Danson  &  Lloyd  (Eng.) 

D'Anver's  Abridgment  (Eng.) 

Dauphin  County  (Pa.) 

Davison  &  Merivale  (Eng.) 

Davys  (Ir.) 

Day  (Conn.) 

Dunlop,  Bell  &  Murray  (Sc.) 

District  of  Columbia 

D.  Chipman  (Vt) 

Deacon  (Eng.) 

Deacon  &  Chitty  (Eng.) 

Deady  (U.S.) 

Dearsley  &  Bell  (Eng.) 

Dearsley's  Crown  Cases  (Eng.) 

Deas  &  Anderson  (Eng.) 

De  Gex  (Eng.) 

De  Gex,  Fisher  &  Jones  (IBng.) 

De  Gex,  Jones  &  Smith  (Eng.) 

De  Gex  &  Jones  (Eng.) 

De    Gex.    MacNaghten    &    Gordo 

(Eng.) 

De  Gex  &  Smale  (Eng.)j 
Delaware 

Delaware  Chancery 
Delaware  County  (Pa.) 
Demarest's  Surrogate  (N.Y.) 
Denio  (N.Y.) 

Denison's  Crown  Cases  (Eng.) 
Desaussure  (S.O.) 
Devereux's  Court  of  Claims  (U.S.) 
Devereux  (N.C.) 
Devereux  &  Battle  (N.C.) 
Dickens  (Sc.) 
Dillon  (U.S.) 
Dirleton's  Decisions  (Sc.) 
Disney  (Oh.) 


TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


D.&L, 

Dods. 

Dom.L.R. 

Donnelly 

Dorion 

DougL 

Dougl. 

DougLELCas. 

Dow 

Dow&  OL 

Dow.&L. 

Dow.N.S. 

DowL 

Dowl.P.0. 
DowlJP.C.N.S. 

D.&R. 

Draper 

Drew. 

Drinkw. 

D.&R.Mag.Cas. 

D.&R.N.P. 

Dr.&Sm. 

Drury 

Dr.£WaL 

Dr.&War. 

D.&SW* 

Dud.Eq. 

DudL 

Duet 

Dunl.B.&M. 

Dunlop 

Dunn, 

Durie 

Durn.&E. 

Duv. 

Dyer 


East 

East.L.R. 

East  P.O. 

East.T. 

E.&B. 

E.B.&E. 

E.B.&S. 

E.O.L. 

Eden 

Edgar 

Edm.Sel.Oas. 

E.  D.  Smith 

Bdw. 

Edw. 

Edw.Abr. 

Edw.Adm. 
E.&E. 
Enc.Pl.&Pr. 
Ency.Law. 

Eng.Ad. 

Eng.C.O. 

Eng.Ch. 

Eng.Ecd. 

Eng.Ecc.R. 

Eng.Exch. 

Eng.L.&Eq. 

Eng.Eep.R. 

Eng.Ry.&O.Oas. 

Eng.&Ir.App. 

Eq.Oas.Abr. 

Eq.Rep. 

E.R.O. 


Dowling  £  Lowndes  (Eng.) 

Dodson's  Admiralty  (Eng.) 

Dominion  Law  Reports  (Can.) 

Donnelly  (Eng.) 

Dorion  (L.C.) 

Douglas  (Eng.) 

Douglass  (Mich.) 

Douglas'  Election  Cases  (Eng.) 

Dow  (Eng.) 

Dow  £  Clark  (Eng.) 

Dowling  £  Lowndes   (Eng.) 

Dowling.  New  Series  (Eng.) 

Dowlinrs  English  Bail  Court  (Prac 

tice)  Cases 

Dowling's  Practice  Cases  (Eng.) 
Dowling's  Practice  Cases  New  Series 

(Eng.) 

Dowling  £  Ryland  (Eng.) 
Draper  (U.C.) 
Drewry  (Eng.) 
Drinkwater  (Eng.) 
Dowling  £  Ryland's  Magistrate  Oases 

(Eng.) 

Dowling  &  Ryland's  Nisi  Prius  (Eng.) 
Drewry  £  Smale  (Eng.) 


Drury  (Ir.) 

Drury  £  Walsh  (Ir.) 

Drury  £  Warren  (Ir.) 


Deane  &  Swabey  (Eng.) 

Dudley  (S.O.) 

Dudley  (Ga.) 

Duer's  Superior  Oourt  (N.Y.) 

Dunlop,  Bell  &  Murray  (Sc.) 

Dunlop  (Sc.) 

Dunning  (Eng.) 

Durie  (Sc.) 

Durnford  £  East  (Eng.) 

Duvall  (Ky.) 

Dyer  (Eng.) 


E 

East  (Eng.) 

Eastern  Law  Reporter  (Can.) 

East's  Pleas  of  the  Crown  (Eng.) 

Eastern  Term  (Eng.) 

Ellis  £  Blackburn  (Eng.) 

Ellis,  Blackburn  &  Ellis  (Eng.) 

Ellis,  Best  £  Smith  (Eng.) 

English  Common  Law 

Eden  (Eng.) 

Edgar  (Sc.) 

Edmond's  Select  Oases  (N.Y.) 

E.  D.  Smith  (N.Y.) 

Edwards  (Eng.) 

Edwards'  Chancery  (N.Y.) 

Edwards'  Abridgment  of  Prerogative 

Court  Cases 

Edwards'  Admiralty  (Eng.) 
Elk's  £  Ellis  (Eng.) 
Encyclopedia  of  Pleading  &  Practice 
American  and  English  Encyclopaedia  of 

Law 

English  Admiralty 
English  Crown  Cases 
English  Chancery 
English  Ecclesiastical  Reports 
English  Ecclesiastical  Reports 
English  Exchequer  Reports 
English  LaV  &  Equity 
English  Reports,  Full  Reprint 
English  Railway  and  Canfel  Cases 
Law  Reports,  English  and  Irish  Appeal 


Euer 
Exch.  - 
Exch.Cas. 


Equity  Cases  Abridged  (Eng.) 
Equity  Reports  (Eng.) 
English  Ruling  Cases 
Espinasse's  Nisi  Prius  (Eng.) 
Euer  (Eng.) 
Exchequer  (Eng.) 
Exchequer  Oases  (Sc.) 


Ex.D. 
Eyre. 


Falc. 

Falc.&F. 

Far. 

F.Cas.No. 

F.(CtSess.) 

F. 

F.f2d) 

F.R.D. 

F.Supp. 

Ferg.Cons. 

F.&F. 

Fish.Pat.Cas. 

Fish.Pat.R. 

Fish.PmeCas. 

Fitzg. 

Fitzh. 

Fitzh.N.Br. 

Fla, 

Flipp. 

F1.&K. 

Fonb.Eq. 

Fonbl. 

Fonbl.R. 

Forbes 

Forr. 

Forrester 

Fortesc. 

Fost 

Fost. 

Fost&Fin. 

FountDec, 

Fox 

Fox  &  S. 

Freem. 

Freem. 

Frecm.K.B. 


Ga. 

Ga.App. 

Ga.Dec. 

Gale 

Gal. 

G.Ooop. 

G.&D. 

GehL&M. 

Gibb.Surr. 

Giffard 

Giff.&H. 

Gil. 

Gilb. 

Gilb.Cas. 

Gilb.C.P. 

Gilb.Exch. 

GUI 

Gffl&T. 

Gilm. 

Gilm.&Falc. 

Gilp. 

Glasc. 

Gljm&J. 

Godb. 

Godo. 

Goeb. 

Gosf. 

Gouldsb. 

Gow 

Gow  N.P. 

Grant 

Srant  Oh. 

Grant  Err.&App. 

Gratt 

Gray 


Law    Reports    Exchequer    Division 

(Eng.) 
Eyre's  Reports  (Eng.) 

F 

Falconer's  Court  of  Sessions  (Sc.) 

Falconer  &  Fitzherbert  (Eng.) 

Farresley  (Eng.) 

Federal  Cases  (U.S.) 

Fraser's  Court  of  Sessions  Cases  (Sc.) 

Federal  Reporter  (U.S.) 

Federal  Reporter  Second  Series 

Federal  Rules  Decisions 

Federal  Supplement 

Ferguson's  Consistory  (Eng.) 

Foster  &  Finlason  (Eng.) 

Fisher's  Patent  Cases  (U.S.) 

Fisher's  Patent  Reports  (U.S.) 

Fisher's  Prize  Cases  (U.S.) 

Fitzgfbbon  (Eng.) 

Fitzherbert's  Abridgment  (Eng.) 

Fitzherberf  s  Natura  Brevium .  (Eng.) 

Florida 

Flippin  (U.S.) 

Flanagan  &  Kelly  (Ir.) 

Fonblanque's  Equity  (Eng.) 

Fonblanque  (Eng.) 

Fonblanque's  English  Cases 

Forbes  (Eng.) 

Forrest  (Eng.) 

Forrester's  Cases  (Eng.) 

Fortescue  (Eng.) 

Foster  (Eng.) 

Foster  (N.H.) 

Foster  &  Finlason  (Eng.) 

FountainhalTs  Decisions  (Sc.) 

Fox  Reports  (Eng.) 

Fox  &  Smith  (Ir.) 

Freeman's  Chancery  (Eng.) 

Freeman's  Chancery  (Miss.) 

Freeman's  King's  Bench  (Eng.) 

G 

Georgia 

Georgia  Appeals 

Georgia  Decisions 

Gale  (Eng.) 

Gallison  (U.S.) 

G.  Cooper  (Eng.) 

Gale  &  Davidson  (Eng.) 

Geldart  &  Maddock  (Eng  ~ 

Gibbon's  Surrogate  (N.3 

Giffard  (Eng.) 

Giffard  and  Hemming  (Eng.) 

Gilfillan's  Edition  (Minu.) 

Gilbert's  (Eng.) 

Gilbert's  Cases  (Eng.) 

Gilbert's  Common  Pleas  (Eng.) 

Gilbert's  Exchequer  (Eng.) 

Gill  (Md.) 

GUI  &  Johnson  (Md.) 

Gilmer  (Va.) 

Gilmour  &  Falconer  (Sc.) 

Gilpin  (U.S.) 

Glascock  (Ir.) 

Glyn  &  Jameson  (Eng,) 

Godbolt  (Eng.) 

Godolphin's  Abridgment  of  Ecclcsias* 

Goebel's  Probate  Court  Oases 
Gosford  (Eng.) 
Gouldsborough  (Eng.) 
Gow  (Eng.)' 

Gow's  English  Nisi  Prius  Cases 
Grant's  Cases  (Pa.) 
Grant's  Chancery  (U.O.) 
Grant's  Error  &  Appeal  (U.C.) 
Grattan  (Va.) 
Gray  (Mass.) 


TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


Green  Or. 

Greene 

GwilLT.Cas. 


Hadd. 

Hagg.Adm. 

Hagg.Cons. 

Hagg.EccL 

Hailes  Bee. 

Hale      J 

Hale  Ecc. 

Hale  P.C. 

Hall 

Hall&T. 

Halsbury  L.Eng. 

Handy 

Han.(NJB.) 

Hard. 

Hardres 

Hare 

Harp.Eq. 

Harr. 

Harr.fDeL) 

Harr.  (Mich.), 

Harr.&G. 

Harr.Oh. 

Harr.&H. 

Harr.&J. 

Harr.&M. 

Harr.&B. 

Harr.&W. 

Hask.    . 

HaviL 

Hawaii 

HawaiLFed. 

Hawaiian  Hep. 

Hawk.P.O. 

Hay.Exch. 

Hayes    • 

Hayes&J. 

Hay&M. 

Hayw.- 


^ 
Hayw.&H. 

Haz.Beg. 

H.B1. 

H.&0. 

Head 

Heisk. 

Hem.&M. 

Hempst 

Hen.&M. 

Het. 

Het.C.P. 

H.&H. 

HiU 

HiU  S.C. 

Hill  &Den.     % 

Hill  &Den.  Supp. 


WIT. 

H.L.Cas. 

H.&N. 

Hob. 

Hodg.ESL 

Hocfees 

Uoffm. 

H-offm.Land  Gas. 

Ho*. 

Holmes 

golt  Adm.Oas. 
olt  Bq. 
Holt  K.B. 
Holt  N.P. 
Home 
Hope  Dec. 
Hopk. 
Hopk.Dec. 


Green's  Criminal  Law  (Eng.) 

Greene  (Iowa) 

Gwillim's  Tithe  Cases  (Eng.) 


Hac 

Haggard's  Admiralty  (Eng.) 
Haggard's  Consistory  (Eng.) 
Haggard's  Ecclesiastical  (Bng.) 
Hailes'  Decisions  (Sc.) 
Hale's  Common  Law  (Eng.) 
Hale's   Ecclesiastical    (Eng.) 
Hale's  Pleas  of  the  Crown  (Eng.) 
Hall's  Superior  Court  (N.Y.) 
Hall  &  TweUs  (Eng.) 
Halsbury's  Law  of  England 
Handy  (Oh.) 

Hannay's  Beports,  New  Brunswick 
Hardin  (Ky.) 
Hardres  (Eng.) 
Hare  (Eng.) 
Harper  (S.C.) 

Harrison's  Chancery  (Mich.) 
Harrington  (DeL) 

Harrington's  Michigan  Chancery  Be- 
ports 

Harris  &  Gill  (Md.) 
Harrison's  Chancery  (Eng.) 
Harrison  &  Hodgins  (U.C.) 
Harris  &  Johnson  (Md.) 
Harris  &  McHenry  (Md.) 
Harrison  &  Butherford  (Eng.) 
Harrison  &  Wollaston  (Eng.) 
HaskeU  (U.S.) 
Haviland  (PrJSdwJsL) 
Hawaiian 
Hawaiian  Federal 
Hawaii  Beports 

Hawkins*  Pleas  of  the  Crown  (Eng.) 
Hayes  Exchequer  (Ir.) 
Hayes  (Ir.) 
Hayes  &  Jones  (Ir.) 
Hay  &  Marriott  (Eng.) 
Haywood  (N.C.) 

Haywood  &  Hazelton  (U.S.) 

Hazard's  Register  (Pa.) 

Henry  Blackstone   (Eng.) 

Hurlstone  &  Coltman  (Eng.)  , 

Head  (Tenn.) 

HeiskeU  (Tenn.) 

Hemming  &  Miller  (Eng.) 

Hempstead  (U.S.) 

Henning  &  Munf ord  (Va.) 

Hetley  (Eng.) 

Hetley'e  Common  Pleas  (Eng.) . 

Horn  &  Hurlstone  (Eng.) 

HiU  (N.Y.) 

HiU  (S.C.) 

Hill  &  Denio  (N.Y.) 

Lalor's  Supplement  to  HOI  &  Denio's 

(N.Y.) 

Hilton  (N.Y.) 
HUaryTerm  (Eng.)      f^ 
House  of  Lords  Cases  (Eng.) 
Hurlstone  &  Norman  (Eng.) 
Hobart  (Eng.) 
Hodgins'  Election  (U.C.) 
Hodges  (Eng.)          ,-T_v 
Hoffman's  Chancery  (N.Y.) 
Hoffman's  Land  Cases  (U.S.) 
Hogan  (Ir.) 

Holmes  (U.S.)          .    ,      _. 
Holt's  English  Admiralty  Cases 

Holt's  King's  Bench  (Eng.) 
Holf  s  Nisi  Prius  (Eng.) 
Home  (Sa\  .  . 

Hope's  Decisions  (Sc.) 
Hopkins'  Chancery  (N.Y.) 
Hopkins'  Decisions  (Pa.) 


Hopw.&C.  Hopwood  &  Coltman  (Eng.) 

Hopw.&P.  Hopwood  &  Philbrick  (Eng.) 

Hosea  Hosea  (Ohio) 

Houst.  Houston  (DeL) 

Houst.Cr.  Houston's  Criminal  Cases  (DeL) 

How.  Howard  (U.S.) 

How.  (Miss.)  Howard  (Miss.) 

HowA.Cas.  Howard's  Appeal  Cases  (N.Y.) 

How.N.P.  HoweU's  Nisi  Prius  (Mich.) 

How.Pr.  Howard's  Practice  (N.Y.) 

How.Pr.N.&   .        Howard's  Practice  New  Series  (N.Y.) 

How.St.Tr.  HoweU's  State  Trials  (Eng.) 

Hud.&B.  Hudson  &  Brooke  (Ir.) 

Hughes  Hughes  (Ky.) 

Hughes  Hughes  (U.S.) 

Hume  Hume's  Decisions  (Sc.) 

Humphr.  Humphreys  (Tenn.) 

Hun  Hun  (N1Y.) 

Hurl.&Gord.  Hurlstoue  &  Gordon  (Eng.) 

HurL&W.  Hurlstone  &  Walmsley  (Eng.) 

Hutt.  Hutton  (Eng.) 


Idaho  Idaho 

Iddings  DJU).  Iddings  Dayton  Term  Beports 

HI.  Illinois 

IU.App.  Illinois  Appellate  Court 

El.Cfr.  lUinois  Circuit  Court 

Ind.  Indiana 

Ind.App.  Indiana  AppeUate  Court 

Ind.T.  Indian  Territory 

Jns.L.J.  Insurance  Law  Journal 

Int.Com.Commn.    Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

Int.ComJElep.  Interstate  Commerce  Beports 

Int.Rev.Rec.  Internal  Revenue  Record 

Iowa  Iowa 

[1891]  Ir.  Law  Beports  [1891]  Irish 

Ir.Ch.  Irish  Chancery 

Ir.C.L.  Irish  Common  Law 

Ir.EccL  Irish  Ecclesiastical  Beports 

Ired.  IredeU  (N.C.) 

Ir.Eq.  Irish  Equily 

Ir.LawBep.  Irish  Law  Reports 

IrXaw  &Eq.  Irish  Law  and  Equity  Beports 

Ir.B.1894.  Irish  Law  Beports  for  year  1894 

Ir.R.Clx  Irish  Beports  Common  Law 

Ir.R.Eq.  Irish  Beports  Equity 

Irv.Just.  Irvine's  Justiciary  Cases  (Eng.) 


Jae.  Jacob  (Eng.) 

Jac.&W.  Jacob  &  Walker  (Bng.) 

J.Bridgm.  John  Bridgman  (Eng.) 

J.&G.  Jones  &  Carey  (Ir.) 

Jebb  &B.  Jebb  &  Bourke  (Ir.) 

Jebb  O.C.  Jebb's  Crown  Cases  (Ir.) 

Jebb&S.  Jebb  &  Symes  (Ir.) 

Jeff.  Jefferson  (Va.) 

Jenk.  Jenkins  (Eng.) 

J.J.Marsh,  J.  J.  ^rshaU  (%•) 

J.&L.  Jones  &  La  Touche  (Eng.) 

Johns.  Johnson  (Eng.) 

Johns.  Johnson  (N.Y.) 

Johns.Cas.  Johnson's  Cases  (N.Y.) 

Johns.0h.  Johnsonfs  Chancery  (N.Y.)  * 

Johns.V.C.  Johnson's    English    Vice-ChanceUors 

(Eng.) 

Johns.&H.  Johnson  &  Hemming  (Eng.) 

Jones  Exch.  Jones  Exchequer  (Ir.) 

Jones  T.  Sir   Thomas   Jones'   English   King's 

Bench  Beports 

Jones  W.  Sir   William    Jones'    English   Kong's 

Bench  Beports 

Jones&Spen.  Jones  &  Spencer  (N.Y.) 

Jcmrn.Jur.  Journal  of  Jurisprudence  (Pa.) 

JP.  Justice  of  Peace  (Eng.) 

Jur.  Jurist  <Eng.)   m 

Jur.N.S.  Jurist  New  Series  (Eng.) 

JustLJEL  Justices'  Law  Reporter  (Pa.) 


XIT 


TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


K 

Leigh  &0. 
Leon. 

Kames  Dec. 
Kames  Eluckt 

Kames'  Decisions  (Sc.) 
Kames'  Elucidation  (Sc.) 

Lev. 
Lew.C.C. 

Kames  Rem.Dee. 

Kames'  Remarkable  Decisions  (Sc.) 

T^? 

Kames  SeLDec. 
Kan. 

Kames'  Select  Decisions  (Sc.) 
Kansas 

Liberian  L. 

T  H-4- 

Kan.Appv 

Kansas  Appeals 

JLtltt. 

Jjitt. 

Kay 
Kay&J. 

[1917JK.B, 

Kay  (Eng.) 
Kay  &  Johnson  (Eng.) 
Law  Reports    [1917]    King's  Bench 

Litt.Sel.Cas, 
L.JAdm. 

Keane  &Gr. 

(Eng.) 
Keane  &  Grant  (Eng.) 

L.J.Bankr. 

Keb. 

Keble  (Eng.) 

L.J.Ch. 

Keen 

Keen  (Eng.) 

Keilw. 
Kel.C.C. 

Keilway  (Eng.) 
Kelvng's  Crown  Cases  (Eng.) 

L.J.Ch.O.S. 

Kelly 
Kelyng,  J. 

Kelly  (Ga.) 
Kelyng's  English  Crown  Cases 

LJ.C.P. 

Kelynge,  W» 

Kelynge's  Chancery  (Eng.) 

T  TP  PO  S 

Koyes 

Keyes  (N.Y.) 

ij.u  .  v.Jr.\j«O< 

Keyl. 
K.&G. 

Keilwey  (Eng.) 
Keane  &  Grant  (Eng.) 

L.J.EccL 

Kilk. 

Kilkerran's  Decisions  (Sc.) 

T,  T  TfJ'e/»h 

Kirby 

Kirby  (Conn.) 

JLf.w  .JKAl.ll. 

Knapp 
Knajjp&O. 

Knapp  (Eng.) 
Knapp  &  Ombler  (Eng.) 

L.J.Exch.O.S. 

Kn.&Moo. 

Knapp  &  Moore  (Eng.) 

L.J.K.B. 

Knox 

Knox  (N.S.Wales) 

Kiiox&F. 
Kiiip 

Knox  &  Fitzhardinge  (JXT-S.  Wales) 
Kulp  (Pa.) 

L.J.K.B.O.S. 

Ky. 

Kentucky 

L.J.H.O. 

Ky.Dea 

Kentucky  Decisions 

Ky.L. 
ICy.Op. 

Kentucky  Law  Reporter 
Kentucky  Opinions 

L.J.M.C.O.S. 

L.J.P.C. 

L 

L.J.P.D.&Adnu 

L.J.P.&M. 

La. 

Louisiana 

La.App. 
La.A.  (Orleans) 

Louisiana  Court  of  Appeals 
Court  of  Appeal,  Parish  of  Orleans 

L.J.Q.B. 

T^  Arm. 

Louisiana  Annual 

L.J.Hop. 

Lab. 

Labatf  s  District  Court  (Cal.) 

Lack.Jur. 

Lackawanna  Jurist  (Pa.) 

iji  &(},t.y. 

Lack.Leg.N. 

Lackawanna  Legal  News  (Pa.) 

U.&W. 

Lack.Leg.Ree. 

Lackawanna  Legal  Record  (Pa.) 

L.&M. 

Lalor 

Lalor's  Supplement  to  Hill  &  Denio 

L.M.iV^P. 

(N.Y.) 

IJOC.GOV. 

Lanc.Bar 

Lancaster  Bar  (Pa.) 

I^olTt 

Lanc.L.Rev. 

Lancaster  Law  Review  (Pa.) 

Longf.&T. 

Land  Dec. 

Land  Decisions  (U.S.) 

Low.Cttn.Seignu 

Lane 
Lans. 

Lane  (Eng.) 
Lansing  (N.Y.) 

Lowell 
L.R. 

Lans.Ch. 

Lansing's  Chancery  Decisions  (N.Y.) 

L.R.A. 

Latch 

Latch  (Eng.) 

L.R.A.1915A. 

Law  Rep.N.8. 

Law  Reports  New  Series  (N.Y.) 

L.R.App.Cas. 

L.O. 

Lower  Canada 

L.&C. 

Leigh  &  Cave  (Eng.) 

L.R.A.&E. 

L.C.Jur. 

Lower  Canada  Jurist 

L.C.L.J. 

Lower  Canada  Law  Journal 

L.R.A.N.S. 

L.C.Rep.S.QtL 

Lower    Canada    Reports    Seignorial 

Questions 

L.R.C.C. 

L.D. 

Law  Dictionary 

L.R.Ch. 

Ld.Ken. 

Lord  Kenyon  (Eng.) 

Ld.Raym. 

Lord  Raymond  (Eng.) 

L.R.C.P. 

Lea 

Lea  (Tenn.) 

Leach  0.0. 
LJEd. 

Leach's  Crown  Cases  (Eng.) 
Lawyers'     Edition     United     States 

L.R.Eq. 
L.R.Exch. 

Supreme  Court 

L.R.H.JU 

Lee  EccL 

Lee's  Ecclesiastical  (Eng.) 

Lee  tHardw. 
Lef.Dec. 

Lee  temp.  Hardwicke  (Eng.) 
Lefevre's     Parliamentary     Decisions 

L.R.H.L.SC. 

Leg.Chron. 

(Eng.) 
Legal  Chronicle  (Pa.) 

L.R.Indian  App. 
L.R.Ir. 

Leg.Gaz. 

Legal  Gazette  (Pa.V 

L.R.P.O. 

Leg.&InsJR. 
LegJnt 
Leg.Op. 
Leg.Rec. 

Legal  &  Insurance  Reporter  (Pa.) 
Legal  Intelligencer  (Pa.) 
Legal  Opinions  (Pa.) 
Legal  Record  (Pa.) 

L.R.P.&D, 
L.R.Q.B. 

Lehigh  CO.LJ. 

Lehigh  County  Law  Journal  (Pa.) 

j.T. 

Lehigh  VaLLJEL 

Lehigh  Valley  Law  Exporter  (Pa.) 
Leigh  (Va.) 

iT.ols! 

Leigh  &  Cave's  English  Crown  Cases 

Leonard  (Eng.) 

Levinz  (Eng.) 

Lewin's  Crown  Cases  (Eng.) 

Ley  (Eng.) 

Law  Glossary 

Liberian  Law 

Littell  (Ky.) 

Littleton  (Eng.) 

Littell's  Select  Cases  (Ky,) 

Law  Journal  Admiralty  New  Series 


Law  Journal  Bankruptcy  New  Series 

(Eng.) 
Law  Journal   Chancery  New   Series 


(Eng.) 
Law   Journal 


Old    Series 


Chancery 

(Eng.) 
Law    Journal    Common   Pleas    New 

Series  (Eng.) 
Law    Journal    Common    Picas    Old 

Series  (Eng.) 
Law  Journal  JEcclesiastical  New  Series 


Law  Journal  Exchequer  New  Scries 

(Bng.) 
Law  Journal  Exchequer  Old  Series 

(Eng.) 
Law  Journal  King's  Bench  New  Series 

(Eng.) 
Law  Journal  King's  Bench  Old  Series 

(Eng.) 
Law  Journal  Magistrate  Cases  New 

Series  (Eng.) 
Law  Journal  Magistrate   Cases   Old 

Series  (Eng.) 
Law  Journal  Privy  Council  New  Series 

(Eng.) 
Law  Journal  Probate  Divorce  &  Ad- 

miralty  New  Series  (Jdng.) 
Law  Journal  Probate  &  Matrimonial 

New  Series  (Eng.) 
Law    Journal    Queen's    Bench    New 

Series  (Eng.) 

Law  Journal  Reports  (Eng.) 
Llo3rd  &  Goold  temp.  Plunket  (Ir.) 
Lloyd  &  Goold  temp.  Sugden  (Ir.) 
Lloyd  &  Welsby  (Eng.) 
Lowndes  &  Maxwell  (Eng.) 
Lowndes,  Maxwell  &  Pollack  (Eng.) 
Local  Government  (Eng.) 
Loffit  (Eng.) 

Longfield  &  Townsend  (Ir.) 
Lower  Canada  Seignorial  Reports 
Lowell  (U.S.) 
Law  Reports  (U.S.) 
Lawyers'  Reports  Annotated 
Lawyers'  Reports  Annotated  1015A 
English  Law  Reports,  Appeal  Cases 

Law  Reports  Admiralty  &  Ecclesias- 
tical (Ens.) 
Lawyers'    Reports    Annotated    New 

Series 

Law  Reports  Crown  Cases  (Hng.) 
Law  Reports  Chancery  Appeal  Cases 

(Eng.) 
Law  Reports  Common  Pleas  Cases 

(Eng.) 

Law  Reports  Equity  Casos  (Eng.) 
Law  Reports  Exchequer  Cases  "(Hug.) 
Law  Reports  House  of  Lords  (English 

&  Irish  Appeal  Cases) 
Law  Reports  House  of  Lords  (Scotch 

Appeal  Cases) 

Law  Reports  Indian  Appeals  (Eng.) 
Law  Reports  Irish 
Law  Reports  Privy  Council  (Eng.) 
Law    Reports    Probate    &    Divorce 

(Eng.) 
Law  Reports  Queen's  Bench  Oases 

(Eng.) 

Law  Times  (Pa.) 
Law  Times  New  Series  (Pa.) 
Law  Times,  Old  Series  (Eng.) 


TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


xni 


L.T.Rep.N.S.  Law    Times    Reports    New    Series 

(Bng.) 

Lush.  Lushington's  Admiralty  (Eng.) 

Lutw.  Lutwyche  (Bng.) 

Lutw.Reg.Oas.  Lutwyche's  Registration  Oases  (Eng.) 

Luz.Leg.Obs.  Luzerne  Legal  Observer  (Pa.) 

Luz.Leg.Reg.  Luzerne  Legal  Register  (Pa.) 

LyndJProv.  Lyndwood's  Provinciates 

M 

MacAPatOas.  MacArthur's  Patent  Cases  (D.O.) 

MacArth.  MacArthur's  District  of  Columbia  Re- 
ports 

MacAr.&M.  MacArthur  &  Mackey's  District  of  Co- 
lumbia Reports 

Maccl.  Macclesfield  (Bng.) 

MacFarL  MacFarlane  (Sc.) 

Mackey  Mackey's  Reports,  District  of  Colum- 
bia 

MacL&R.  Maclean  &  Robinson  (Bng.) 

Macn.&G.  Macnaghten  &  Gordon  (Eng.) 

Macph.  Macpherson  (Sc.) 

Macph.S.&L,  Macpherson,  Shirreff  &  Lee  (Sc.) 

Macq.  Macqueen's  Scotch  Appeal  Cases 

Madd.  Haddock  (Eng.) 

Madd.Ch.Pt.  Maddock's  Chancery  Practice  (Eng.) 

Malloy  Malloy  (Ir.) 

Man.  Manitoba  Law 

Man.El.Cas.  Manning's  Election  Cases  (Eng.) 

Man.Exch.Pr.  Manning's  Exchequer  Practice  (Eng.) 

Man.Gr.&S.  Manning,  Granger,  &  Scott  (Eng.) 

ManX.J.  Manitoba  Law  Journal 

Man.&Ry.  Manning  &  Ryland  (Eng.) 

Man.&Ry.Mag.  Manning  &  Ryland's  Magistrates'  Gas- 
Cas.  es  (Eng.) 

Man.&S.  Manning  &  Scott  (Bng.) 

Mann.Unrep.Oas.    Manning's  Unreported  Cases  (La.) 

Manson  Manson  (Bng.) 

Man.tWood  Manitoba  temp.  Wood 

March  March  (Bng.) 

Mar.Prov.  Maritime  Province  Reports  (Can.) 

Mars.Adm.  Marsden's  Admiralty  (Bng.) 

Marsh.  Marshall  (Bng.) 

MarshJ.J.  J.  J.  Marshall  (Ky.) 

Mart  Martin  Old  Series   (La.) 

Mart(N.S.)  Martin,  New  Series  (La.) 

Mart  Martin  (N.C.) 

Marv.  Marvel  (Deli 

MartN.S.  Martin  New  Series  (La.) 

Mart&Y.  Martin  &  Yerger  (Tenn.) 

Mason  Mason  (U.S.) 

Mass.  Massachusetts 

Maule  &S.  Maule  &  Selwyn  (Bng.) 
Maynard  (Eng.) 

McAllister  (U.S.) 

McO,  McCahon  (Kan.) 

McOielL  McClelland  (Eng.) 

McOlelL&Y.  McClelland  &  Younge  (Eng.) 

McCord,  McOord  (S.C.) 

McCrary  McCrary  (U.S.) 

McG.  McGloin(La.) 

McLean  McLean  (U.S.) 

McMuL  McMullan  (S.O.) 

Md.  Maryland 

Md.Cn.  Maryland  Chancery 

Me.  Maine 

Mees.&Ros.  Meeson  &  Boscpe  Wng.) 

Mees.&W.  Meeson  &  Welsby  (Eng.) 

Meg.  Megone  (Eng.) 

Meigs  Meigs  (Tenn.) 

Menzies    Cape 
Good  Hope 

Meriv. 

Mete. 

Mete. 

M.&G. 

M.&EL 

Mich. 

Mich.NJP. 

Mich.T. 

Miles 

Mill.  Const 


Menzies  Cape  of  Good  Hope 

Merivale  (Bng.) 

Metcalf  (Mass.) 

Metcalfe  (Ky.) 

Manning  &  Granger  (Bng.) 

Murphy  &  Hurlstone  (Eng,) 

Michigan 

Michigan  Nisi  Prius 

Michaelmas  Term  (Bng.) 

Miles  (Pa.) 

Mill's  Constitutional  (S.O.) 


Mill.Dec.  Miller's  Decisions  (U.S.) 

Mffls  Mills  (N.Y.) 

Milw.  Milward  (Ir.) 

Minn.  Minnesota 

Minor  Minor  (Ala.) 

Misc.  Miscellaneous  (N.Y.) 

Miss.  Mississippi 

Miss.Dec.  Mississippi  Decisions 

Miss.St.Cas.  Mississippi  State  Cases 

M.&M.  Moody  &  Malkin  (Bng.) 

Mo.  Missouri 

Mo.App.  Missouri  Appeals 

Moak  Moak  (Eng.) 

Mo.A.R.  Missouri  Appeals  Reporter 

Mod.  Modern  (Bng.) 

Mod.CasX.&Eq.  Modern   Cases   at  Law   and  Equity 
(Bng.) 

Molloy  Molloy  (Ir.) 

Mon.  Monaghan  (Pa.) 

Mont  Montana 

Mont  Montagu  (Bng.) 

Mont.Bank.Rep.  Montagu's   English  Bankruptcy  Re- 
ports 

Mont.L.R.  Montreal  Law  Reports  (Can.) 

Mont&A.  Montagu  &  Ayrton   (Bng.) 

Mont&B.  Montagu  &  Bligh  (Bng.) 

Mont&O.  Montagu  &  Chitty  (Bng.) 

Mont.D.&DeG.  Montagu,  Deacon  &  De  Gex  (Bug.) 

Montg.Co,  Montgomery   County   Law   Reporter 
(Pa.) 

Mont.&3iL  Montagu  &  McArthur  (Bng.) 

Montr.Oond.Rep.  Montreal  Condensed  Reports 

Montr.Leg.N.  Montreal  Legal  News 

Montr.QS.  Montreal  Law  Reports  Queen's  Bench 

Montr.Super.  Montreal  Law  Reports  Superior  Court 

Moody  C.C.  Moody's  Crown  Gases  (Eng.) 

Moore  C.P.  Moore's  Common  Pleas  (Eng.) 

Moore  Indian  App.Moore's  Indian  Appeals  (Eng.) 
Moore's  King's  Bench  (Eng.) 


Moore  K.B. 
Moore  P.O. 

Moore  P.C.N.S.      Moore's  Privy  Council  New   Series- 


Moore's    Privy    Council    Old    Series 


Moore&S. 

Moore&W. 

Mor.Min.Rep. 

Morr. 

Morr.Bankr.Oas. 

Morr.StOas. 

Mosely 

M.&P. 

M.&R. 

M.&Rob. 

M.&S. 

Mun.Corp.Cas. 

Munf. 

Murph. 

Murr. 

M.&W. 

Myl.&O. 

Myl.&K. 

MyrJProb, 


(Bng.) 
Moore  &  Scott  (Bng.) 
Moore  &  Walker  (Tei.) 
Morrison's  Mining  Reports 
Morris  (Iowa) 

MorrelTs  Bankruptcy  Cases  (Bng.) 
Morns'  State  Cases  (Miss.) 
Mosely  (Bng.) 
Moore  &  Payne  (Bng.) 
Manning  &  Ryland  (Bng.) 
Moody  &  Robinson  (Eng.) 
Maule  &  Selwyn  (Bng.) 
Municipal  Corporation  Cases 
Munford  (VaJ 
Murphey  (N.C.) 
Murray  (Sc.) 
Meeson  &  Welsby  (Bng.) 
Mylne  &  Craig  iBng.) 


Nat.Bankr.Reg. 

Nat.Corp.Rep. 

NatL-Rep. 

N.B. 

N.BenL 

NJBJBo. 

N.O. 

N.Ohipm. 

NGConf 

N  0  TJtek 


N.B.  (2d) 

Neb. 

Neb.(Uno&) 

Nels. 

NdLkbr. 


Mylne  &  Keen  (Bng.) 
Myrick's  Probate  (CaL) 

N 

National  Bankruptcy  Register  (U.S.) 
National  Corporation  Reporter 
National  Law  Reporter 
New  Brunswick 
New  Benloe  (Eng.) 
New  Brunswick  Equity 
North  Carolina 
N.  Chipman  (Vt) 
North  Carolina  Conference 
North  Carolina  Term  Reports 
North  Dakota 

North  Eastern  Reporter  . 

North  Eastern  Reporter  Second  Series 
Nebraska 

Nebraska  Unofficial 
Nelson  (Eng.)  ,     ^ 

Kelson's  Abridgment  of  the  Common 
Law 


TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


Nev.  ,  Nevada 

NewbAdm.  Newberry's  Admiralty  (U.S.) 

NewfoundL  Newfoundland 

Newf.Sel.Cas.  Newfoundland  Select  Cases 

New  Eep.  New  Reports  in  all  Courts  (Bng.) 

New  Sess.Cas.  New  Session  Cases   (Eng.) 

New  ZeaLL.  New  Zealand  Law 

N.H.  New  Hampshire 

N.J.Eq.  New  Jersey  Equity 

N.J.Law  New  Jersey  Law 

N.J.L.J.  New  Jersey  Law  Journal 

N.J.Misc.  New  Jersey  Miscellaneous 

N.M.  New  Mexico 

N.&M.  Nevile  &  Manning  (Eng.) 

N.&Macn.  Neville  &  Macnamara  (Eng.) 

Nolan  Nolan  (Eng.) 

North.  Northington  (Eng.) 

North.Go.  Northampton  County  Reporter  (Pa.) 

Northum.  Northumberland  County  Legal  News 

(Pa.) 
Northumb.Co.Leg.  Northumberland  County  Legal  News 


N. 

Notes  of  Cas. 
Nott  &  McC. 
Noy 
N.&P. 
N.S. 

N.S.Dec. 
N.S.Wales 
N.S.Wales  L. 


(Pa.) 

Notes  of  Cases  (Eng. 

Nott  &  McCord  (S.C.) 

Noy  (Eng.) 

Nevile  &  Perry  (Eng.) 

Nova  Scotia 

Nova  Scotia  Decisions 

New  South  Wales 

..  .         New  South  Wales  Law 

N.S.Wales  L.R.Eq.New  South  Wales  Law  Reports  Eq- 

uity 

N.W.  North  Western  Reporter 

N.Y.  New  York 

N.Y.Ann.Cas.          New  York  Annotated  Cases 
N.Y.City  Ct.  New  York  City  Court 

N.Y.Oity  Ct.Suppl.New  York  City  Court  Supplement 
N.Y.Civ.Proc.          New  York  Civil  Procedure 
N.Y.Civ.Pr.Rep.      New  York  Civil  Procedure  Reports 

N.S.°  6     eP°r  S'New  York  Code  Reports,  New  Series 
N.Y.Cr.  New  York  Criminal 

N.YXeg.Obs.          New  York  Legal  Observer 
N.Y.L.Rec.  New  York  Law  Record  t 

N.Y.Month.L.Bul.   New  York  Monthly  Law  Bulletin 


N.Y.S. 
N.Y.St. 
N.Y.Super. 
N.Y.Wkly.Dig. 


O.Ben. 
O.Bridgm. 
Off.Gaz. 
Ohio 

Ohio  App. 
Ohio  Cir.Ct. 
Ohio  Cir.Ct.N.S. 
Ohio  Cir.Dec. 
Ohio  Dec. 

(Reprint) 
Ohio  FJDec. 
Ohio  L.J. 
OhioN.P. 
Ohio  N.P.N.S. 
Ohio  O. 
Ohio  Prob. 
Ohio  S.&CJP, 

Ohio  St 

OkL 

OkLCr. 

Olcott 

Oliv.B.&Ii. 

0'M.£H. 

Ont. 

OntA. 

OntELCaS. 

OntL. 

OntLJ. 

OntL.J.N.S. 

OntPr. 


New  York  Supplement 
New  York  State  Reporter 
New  York  Superior  Court 
New  York  Weekly  Digest 

/ 

o 

Old  Benloe  (Eng.) 

Orlando  Bridginan  (Eng.) 

Official  Gazette 

Ohio 

Ohio  Court  of  Appeals 

Ohio  Circuit  Court 

Ohio  Circuit  Court  New  Series 

Ohio  Circuit  Decisions 

Ohio  Decisions  (Reprint) 
Ohio  Federal  Decisions 
Ohio  Law  Journal 
Ohio  Nisi  Prius 
Ohio  Nisi  Prius  New  Series 
Ohio  Opinions 
Ohio  Probate 

Ohio  Superior  &  Common  Pleas  Deci- 
sions 

Ohio  State 
Oklahoma 
Oklahoma  Criminal 
Olcott  (U.S.) 

Oliver,  Beavan  &  Lefroy  (Eng.) 
O'Malley  &  Hardcastle  (Ir.) 
Ontario 

Ontario  Appeals 
Ontario  Election  Cases 
Ontario  Law 
Ontario  Law  Journal 
Ontario  Law  Journal  New  Series 
Ontario  Practice 


Ont.W.N. 

Ontario  Weekly  Notes 

OntW.R. 

Ontario  Weekly  Reporter 

Op.Atty.-Gen. 

Opinions  of  Attorneys-General  (U.S.) 

Op.Sol.Dept 
Labor 

Opinions  of  the  Solicitor  for  the  De- 
partment   of    Labor    dealing    with 

Workmen's  Compensation 

Or. 

Oregon 

Orleans  App. 

Orleans  Appeals  (La.) 

Overt 

Over  ton  (Tenn.) 

Owen 

Owen  (Eng.) 

P 

p. 

Pacific  Reporter 

P.(2d) 

Pacific  Reporter  Second  Series 

[1S91]P. 

Law  Reports  [1891]  Probate  (Eng.) 

Pa. 

Pennsylvania  State 

Pa.Cas. 

Pennsylvania   Supreme   Court   Cases 

(Sadler) 

Pa.Co. 

Pennsylvania  County  Court 

Pa.C.PL 

Common  Pleas  (Pa.) 

Pa.Dist 

Pennsylvania  District 

Pa.Dist&Co. 
Paige 

Pennsylvania  District  and  County 
Paige's  Chancery  (N.Y.) 

Paine 

Paine  (U.S.) 

Pa.L.J. 

Pennsylvania  Law  Journal 

Pa.L.Rec. 
Pa.L.J.R. 

Pennsylvania  Law  Record 
Clark's    Pennsylvania    Law    Journal 

Reports 

Palm. 

Palmer  (Eng.) 

Park. 
Park.  Or. 

Parker  (Eng.) 
Parker's  Criminal  (N.Y.) 

Pnrk.Exch, 

Parker's  Exchequer  (Kng.) 

Park.Ins. 

Parker's  Insurance  (Eng.) 

Pars.Eq.Oas. 

Parsons'  Equity  Cases  (Pa.) 

Pa.Super. 
Paton  App.Cas. 

Pennsylvania  Superior  Court 
Paton's  Appeal  Cases  (fcte.) 

Patrick  El.Cas. 

Patrick's  Election  Cases  (Can.) 

Patt&EL 

Patton  &  Heath  (Va.) 

P.D. 

Law  Reports  Probate  Division  (EJng.) 

P.&D. 
Peake  N.P. 

Perry  &  Davison  (Eng.) 
Peake's  Nisi  Prius  (Eng.) 

Pearce  C.C. 

Pearce's  Reports  in  Dearsly's  (Bng.) 

Pearson 

Pearson  (Pa.) 

Peck 

Peck  (Tenn.) 

Peck,E1.0as. 

Peckwell's  Election  Cases  (Eng.) 

Pennew. 

Pennewill  (Del.) 

Ponuyp. 

Pennypackcr  (Pa.) 

Penr.&W. 

Penrose  &  Watts  (Pa.) 

Perry  &  BJDU 

Perry  &  Knapp  Election  Cases  (Eng.) 

Pet 
PetAdm. 

Peters  (U.S.) 
Peters'  Admiralty  (U.S.) 

PetO.C. 

Peters1  Circuit  Court  (U.S.) 

Phil. 

Phillips  (Eng.)       . 

Phil. 

Phillip  (N.C.) 

Phila. 

Philadelphia  (Pa.) 

Philippine 
Phillim. 

Philippine 
Phillimore  Ecclesiastical  (Eng.) 

Pick. 

Pickering  (Mass.) 

Pig.&R. 

Pigott  &  Rod  well  (Eng.) 

Pig.Rec. 

Pigolt's  Recoveries  (Eng.) 

Pinn. 

Pinney  (Wis.) 

Pittsb. 

Pittsburgh  (Pa.) 

Pittsb.Leg.J. 

Pittsb.Leg.J.N.S. 

Pittsburgh  Legal  Journal  (Pa.) 
Pittsburgh  Legal  Journal  New  Scries 

(Pa.) 

P.&K. 

Perry  &  Knapp  (Eng.) 

Plowd. 

Plowden  (Eng.) 

Pollexf. 
Poph, 

Pollexfen  (Eng.) 
Popham  (Eng.) 

Port 

Porter  (Ala.) 

Posey 

Posey's  Un  reported  Cnses  (Tex.) 

Puerto  Rico 

Puerto  Rico 

Puerto  Rico  Fed. 

Puerto  Rico  Federal 

Pow.Surr. 

Powers'  Surrogate  (N.Y.) 

P.R.&D.ELCas. 

Power,    Rodwell   &  Dew's    Election 

Cases  (Eng.) 

Prec.Oh. 

Precedents  in  Chancery  (Eng.) 

Pr.Edw.IsL 

Prince  Edward  Island 

Price 

Price  (Bng.) 

Price  Pr.Oas. 

Price's  Practice  Cases  (Eng.) 

Prid.&0. 

Pridcaux  &  Cole  (Eng.) 

Prob.  [1917] 

Law  Reports,  Probate  Division  (Eng.) 

TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


Prob.Rep. 

Pr.Rep. 

P.Wms. 

P.UJR. 

Pyke 


Q.B. 

[1S91]Q.B> 
Q.BJX 

Queensl.J.P. 

Queensl.L. 

Q  u  e  ensLLJT* 

Que.L. 

Que.Pr. 

Que.Q.B. 

Que.Rev.Jud. 
Que.Super. 

Quincy 


Rand.' 
Rap.Jud.Q.C.S. 

Rawle 
R.C.L. 
R.&Can.Cas. 
R.&Can.Tr.Cas. 

Redf. 
Redf.&B. 

Redf.R.Cas. 

Redf.Surr. 

Reeve  EngJj. 

Reports 

Reprint 

Rep.kFinch 

Rep.t.Hard. 

Rep.tHolt 
Res.&Eq.Judgm. 

Rev.Crit. 

Rev.de  Jur. 

Rev.de  Legis. 

Rev.Leg. 

Rev.Leg.N.S. 

Rev.Rep. 

R.I. 

Rice 

Rich. 

Rich.OP. 

Ridg. 

Ridg.Ap. 

Ridg.L.&S. 

Ridg.P.C. 

Ridg.t.Hardw. 

Riley 

R.&M. 

RJMCharlt 

Rob. 

Rob. 

Robb  PatCas. 

Robert.App.Cas. 

Rob.Eccl. 

Robin.App.Cas. 

Rob.Wm.Adm. 

Rolle 

Rolle  Abr. 

Rolls  Ct.Rep. 

Rom.Cas. 

Root 

49  C.J.S.— b 


Probate  Reports  (Eng.) 
Practice  Reports  (Eng.) 
Peere-Williams  (Eng.) 
Public  Utilities  Reports 
Pyke  (Can.) 


Q 


Queen's  Bench  (Adolphus  &  Ellis  New 


Series)  (Eng.) 
Law  Reports  [1891] 


Queen's  Bench 


Law  Reports  Queen's  Bench  Division 

(Eng.) 

Queensland  Justice  of  the  Peace 
Queensland  Law 
Queensland  Law  Journal 
Quebec  Law 
Quebec  Practice 
Quebec     Official     Reports     Queen's 

Bench 

Quebec  Revised  Judicial 
Quebec    Official    Reports     Superior 

Court 
Quincy  (Mass.) 

R 

Randolph  (Va.) 

Rapport's  Judiciaries  de  Quebec  Cour 

Superieure 
Rawle  (Pa.) 
Ruling  Case  Law 
Railway  &  Canal  Cases  (Eng.) 
Railway  &  Canal  Traffic  Cases  (Eng.) 
Redfield's   Surrogate    (N.Y.) 
Redfield  &  Bigelow's  Leading  Cases 

(Eng.) 

Redfleld's  Railway  Cases  (Eng.) 
Redfield's  Surrogate  (N.Y.) 
Reeve's  English  Law 
Reports  (Eng.) 
English  Reprint 
Cases  temp.  Finch  (Eng.) 
Lee's    Reports    tempore    Hardwicke 

(Eng.) 
Reports  tempore  Holt  (English  Cases 

of  Settlement) 
Reserved  &  Equity  Judgments  (N.S. 

Wales) 

Revue  Critique  (Can.) 
Revue  de  Jurisprudence  (Can.) 
Revue  de  Legislation  (Can.) 
Revue  Legale  (Can.)     . 
Revue  Legale  New  Series  (Can.) 
Revised  Reports  (Eng.) 
Rhode  Island 
Rice  (S.C.) 
Richardson  (S.C.) 
Richardson's  Practice  Common  Pleas 

(Eng.) 

Ridgeway's   Reports   tempore  Hard- 
wicke (Eng.) 
Ridgeway's  Appeal  (Ir.) 
Ridgeway,  Lapp  &  Schoale  (Ir.) 
Ridgeway's  Parliament  Cases  (Ir.) 
Ridgeway  temp.  Hardwicke  (Eng.) 
Riley  (S.C.) 
Ryan  &  Moody  (Eng.) 
R.  M.  Charlton  (Ga.) 
Robinson  (La.) 

Robinson  (Va.)  

Robb's  Patent  Cases  (U.S.) 
Robertson's  Appeal  Cases  (Sc.) 
Robertson's  Ecclesiastical  (Eng.) 
Robinson's  Appeal  Cases  (Sc.) 
William  Robinson's  Admiralty  (Eng.) 
Rolle  (Eng.) 

Rolle's  Abridgment  (Eng.) 
Rolls'  Court  Reports 
Romilly's  Notes  of  Cases  (Eng.) 
Boot  (Conn.) 


Rose 

Hoss  Lead.Cas. 

R.&R. 

Russ. 

Russ.&C.Eq.Cas. 

Russ.Eq.Cas. 
Russ.&Geld. 
Russ.&M. 
Ry.&M. 


Salk. 

Sandf. 

Sandf.Ch. 

Sask.L. 

Saund. 

Saund.&C. 

Sau.&Sc. 

S.AustrJi. 

Sav. 

Sawy. 

Saxt. 

[1907] S.C. 

Scam. 

S.C.Eq. 

Seh.&Lef. 

[1907]S.C.(J.) 

Sc.Jur. 

S.C.L. 

Sc.L.Rep. 

Scot  L.T. 

Scott 

Scott  NJR. 

ScrJML\ 

Sc.Sess.Cas. 

S.Ct- 

S.D. 

S.E. 

Searle  &  Sm. 

Sel.Cas.ClL 

Seld. 

Selden 

Selw. 

Serg.&R. 

Sess.Cas. 

Shan. 

Shaw 

Shaw&D. 

Shaw  Dec. 

Shaw,  Dunl.&B. 

Shaw&M. 

Sheld. 

Shep.Abr. 

Sheph.Sel.Cas. 

Show. 

Show.P.0. 

Sid. 

SilvA. 

.Silv.Sup. 

Sim. 

Sim.N.S. 

Sim.&St. 

Skin. 

Smale&G. 

Smith 

Smith 

Smith&B. 

Smith  K.B. 

Smith  Lead.Cas. 

Smith  Reg. 

Sm.&M. 

Sm.&M.Ch. 

Smythe 

Sneed 

So. 

SoLJ. 

Sp. 

Spinks 

Spinks 


Rose  (Eng.) 

Ross'  Leading  Cases  (Eng.) 

Russell  &  Ryan  Crown  Cases  (Eng.) 

Russell  (Eng.)  ^ 

Russell's  &  Chesley's  Equity  Cases 

Russell's  Equity  Cases  (N.S.)  . 
Russell  &  Geldert,  Nova  Scotia 
Russell  &  Hylne  (Eng.) 
Ryan  &  Moody  (Eng.) 


Salkeld  (Eng.)  /WVv 

Sandford*s  Supenor  Court  (N.Y.) 
Sandford's  Chancery  (N.Y.) 
Saskatchewan  Law 
Saunders  (Eng.) 
Saunders  &  Cole  (Eng.) 
Sausse  &  Scully  (Ir.) 
Soutjt  Australia  Law 
Savile  (Eng.) 
Sawyer  (U.S.) 
Saxton  (N.J.) 
Sayer  (Eng.) 
South  Carolina 
Court  of  Session  Cases  (Sc.) 
Scammon  (I1L) 
South  Carolina  Equity 
Schoales  &  Lefroy  (Ir.) 
Court  of  Justiciary  Cases  (Sc.) 
Scottish  Jurist 
South  Carolina  Law 
Scottish  Law  Reporter 
Scot  Law  Times 
Scott  (Eng.) 

Scott's  New  Reports  (Eng.) 
Scranton  Law  Times  (Pa.) 
Scotch  Court  of  Session  Cases 
-Supreme  Court  Reporter  (U.S.) 
South  Dakota 
South  Eastern  Reporter 
Searle  &  Smith  (Eng.) 
Select  Cases  in  Chancery  (Eng.) 
Selden's  Notes  (N.Y.) 
Selden  (N.Y.) 
Selwyn's  Nisi  Prius  (Eng.) 
Sergeant  &  Rawle  (Pa.) 
Court  of  Session  Cases  (Eng.) 
Shannon  (Tenn.) 
Shaw  (Sc.) 
Shaw  &  Dunlop  (Sc.) 
Shaw's  Digest  of  Decisions  (Sc.) 
Shaw,  Dunlop  &  Bell  (Sc.) 
Shaw  &  MacLean  (Sc.) 
Sheldon  (N.Y.) 
Sheppard  s  Abridgment 
Shepherd's  Select  Cases  (Ala.) 
Shower  (Eng.) 

Shower's  Parliament  Cases  (Eng*) 
Siderfin  (Eng.) 
Silvernail's  Appeals  (N.Y.) 
Silvernail's  Supreme  (N.Y.) 
Simons  (Eng.)     . 
Simons  New  Series   (Eng.) 
Simons  &  Stuart  (Eug.) 
Skinner  (Eng.) 
Smale  &  Giffard  (Eng.) 
Smith  (Ind.) 
Smith  (N.H.) 
Smith  &  Batty  (Ir.) 
Smith's  King's  Bench  (Eng.) 
Smith's  Leading  Cases  (Eng.) 
Smith's  Registration  (Eng.) 
Smedes  &  Marshall  (Hiss.) 
Smedes  &  Marshall  Chancery  (Miss.) 
Smythe  (Ir.) 
Sneed  (Tenn.) 
Southern  Reporter 
Solicitor's  Journal  (Eng.) 
Speers  (S.C.) 
Spinks  Admiralty  (Bng.) 
Spinks'  Ecclesiastical  and  Admiralty 
(Eng.) 


XVI 

Spinks,  P.O. 

Spottisw. 

Spottisw.Bq. 

Sprague 

Stair 

Stark. 

Stat.  at  L. 

Stew. 

Stew. 

Stew.&P. 

StocktVice-Adm. 

Story 

Str. 

Strob. 

Stuart  Vice-Adm. 

Stu.M.&P. 

Style 

Sumn, 

Susq.Leg.Chron. 

S.W, 

S.W.(2d) 

Swab. 
Swab.&Tr. 
Swan 
Swanst 


TamL 

Taney 

Tapp. 

Taunt 

Taylor 

T.B.Mon. 

Tenn. 

Tenn.Appt 

Tenn.Gas. 

Tenn.Oh. 

Tenn.Ch.A. 

Tenn.Civ.A. 

TerrJU 

Tex. 

Tex,App. 

Tex.A.Giv.Gas. 

Tex.Giv.App. 

TexXJr. 

Tex.Suppl. 

Tex.Unrep.Cas. 

Thach.Cr. 

Thomps.&0. 

Thomps.Gas. 

Tinw. 

T.Jones 

TXJEfc. 

T.M.R. 

T.&M. 

Toth. 

T.R. 

TranscrA. 

T.Raym. 

Tread.0onst 

TreasDec. 

Tr.&H.Pr. 

Trint.T. 

Truem.Bq.Oas. 

Tuck.Sel,Oas. 

Tuck.Surr, 

T,U.P.Charlt 

Turn.&R. 

Tyler 

Tyrw, 

Tyrw.&CL 


TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


Splnks'  Prize  Cases  (Eng.) 
Spottiswoode  (Sc.) 
Spottiswoode's  Equity  (Sc.) 
Sprague  (U.S.) 

Starkie  Nisi  Prius  (Eng.) 
United  States  Statutes  at  Large 
Stewart  (Ala.) 
Stewart's  Reports  (N.S.) 
Stewart  &  Porter  (Ala.) 
Stockton's  Vice-Admiralty  (N.B.) 
Story  (U.S.) 


Strange  (Eng.) 

Strobhart  (S.C.) 

Stuart's  Vice-Admiralty  (L.C.) 


Stuart,  Milne  &  Peddie  (Sc.) 


Style  (Eng.) 
Sumner  (U.S.) 
Susquehanna  Legal  ( 


Ter- 


.Cham. 

.OJP. 
U.C.E.&A. 
U.OJKJB. 


Sumner       ..          ^        .  ,    ,~   v 
Susquehanna  Legal  Chronicle  (Pa.) 
South  Western  Reporter 
South  Western  Reporter  Second 

Series 

Swabey's  Admiralty  (Eng.) 
Swabey  &  Tristram  (Eng.) 
Swan  (Tenn.) 
Swanston  (Eng.) 

T 

Tamlyn  (Eng.) 

Taney  (U.S.) 

Tappan  (Oh.) 

Taunton  (Eng.) 

Taylor  (N.C.) 

T.  B.  Monroe  (Ky.) 

Tennessee 

Tennessee  Appeals 

Unreported  Tennessee  Cases 

Tennessee  Chancery 

Tennessee  Chancery  Appeals 

Tennessee  Civil  Appeals 

Territories    Law    (Northwest 

ritories) 
Texas 

Texas  Court  of  Appeals 
White  &  Wilson's  Civil  Cases  (Tex.) 
Texas  Civil  Appeals 
Texas  Criminal 
Texas  Supplement 
Posoy's  Unreported  Cases  (Tex.) 
Thachor's  Criminal  Cases   (Mass.) 
Thompson  &  Cook  (N.Y.) 
Thompson's  Cases  (Tenn.) 
Tinwald  (Sc.) 
Thomas  Jones  (Eng. 
Times  Law  Reports  ,. 
Trade  Mark  Reports 
Temple  &  Mew  (Bng.) 
Tothill  (Eng.) 
Term  Reports    (Dnrnford  &  Bast) 

(Bng.) 

Transcript  Appeals  (N.Y.) 
Thomas  Raymond  (Bng.) 
Treadway  Constitutional   (S.C.) 
Treasury  Decisions  (U.S.) 
Troubat  &  Haly's  Practice  (Pa.) 
Trinity  Term  (Bng.) 
Trueman's  Equity  Cases  (N.B.)     ^ 
Tucker's  Select  Cases  (Newfoundland) 
Tucker's  Surrogate  (N.Y.) 
T.  U.  P.  Charlton  (Ga.) 
Turner  &  Russell  (Eng.) 
Tyler  JVt) 
Tyrwhitt  (Bng.) 
Tyrwhitt  &  Granger  (Bng.) 

u 

Upper  Canada 

Upper  Canada  Chancery 

Upper  Canada  Chamber 

Upper  Canada  Common  Pleas 

Upper  Canada  Error  and  Appeal 

Upper  Canada  King's  Bench  Reports 


U.C.Q.B.  Upper  Canada  Queen's  Bench 

U.C.Q.B.O.S.          Upper    Canada   Queen's    Bench 

Series 

U.S.  United  States 

U.S Aviation  Bep.  Aviation  Reports  (U.S.) 
U  S.CLA.  United  States  Code  Annotated 

Utah  Utah 


Va.  Virginia 

Va.0as.  Virginia  Cases 

Va.Ch.Dec.  Chaucory  Decisions  (Va.) 

Va.Dec.  Virginia  Decisions 
Van  Ness  Prize    „     „      ,.  .     ~        /TT « v 

Oas.  Van  Ness  Prize  Cases  (U.S.) 

Vaugh.  Vaughan  (Eng.) 

Vaux,  Vaux's  Decisions  (Pa.) 

Vent.  Ventris  (Bug.) 

Vern,  Vernon's  Cases  (EngJ 

Vern,Ch,  Vernon's  Chancery  (Eng.) 

Vern.&S.  Vernon  &  Scriven  (Ir.) 

Ves.  Vesey  Senior  (Eng.) 

Ves.&B.  Vesey  &  Beames  (JBng») 

VesJr.  Vesey  Junior  (Eng.) 

Vcs.»1r.SuppL  Vcscy  Junior  Supplement  (Eng.) 

VoH.SuppL  VcKoy  Senior  Supplement  (JWug.) 

Viet  Victorian 

Vict.L.  Victorian  Law 

VictL.T.  Victorian  T-AW  Times 

VictRep.  Victorian  Reports 

Vict.St.Tr.  Victorian  State  Trials 

Vin.Abr.  Viner's  Abridgment  (Bng.) 
Virgin  Islands        Virgin  Islands 

Vt,  Vermont 


Old 


Walk. 

Walk. 

Wall. 

Woll.0.0. 

WallJr. 

Wall.Sr. 

Wallis 

Ware 

Wash. 

Wash. 

Wash.St 

WasTi.C.O. 

Wash.T. 

Watts 

Watts&S. 

W.BL 

W.C.O. 

Wobb,A'B.&WJ. 
P.&M. 


WebPatCas. 

Welsh 

Wend. 

West 

AVestLJ. 

West.L.Month. 

West.L.R. 

WestL.T. 


.^ 
West  t.Hardw. 

ri917]West.Wkly, 
Whart 
Wheat. 
WhceLCr. 
WhiteATJOead. 
CasJEq. 

Whitm.PatOas. 

Wight 

Wilcox 

Willes 

Wilnu 

Wils. 


w 

Walker  (Pa.) 

Walker's  Chancery  (Mich.) 
Wallace  (U.S.) 
Wallace  (U.S.) 
Wallace  Junior  (U.S.) 
Wallace  Senior  (U.S.) 
Wallis  (Ir.) 
Ware  (U.S.) 
Washington 
Washington  (Va.) 
Washington  State 
Washington  Circuit  Court  (U.S.) 
Washington  Territory 
Watts  (Pa.) 
Watts  &  Sergeant  (Pa.) 
William  Blackstone  (Eng.) 
Mintou-  Sen  house's   Workmen's   Com- 
pensation Cases  (HSug.) 

Webb,  A'Beckett,  &  Williams'  Insol- 
vency, Probate,  and  Matrimonial  Re- 
ports (Victoria) 

Webster's  Patent  Cases  (Bng.) 

Welsh  Registry  Cases  (Ir.) 

Wendell  (N.Y.) 

West  (Eng.) 

Western  Law  Journal  (Oh.) 

Western  Law  Monthly  (Oh.) 

Western  Law  Reporter  (Can*) 

Western  Law  Times  (Can.) 

Western  Reporter 

West  temp.  Hardwicko  (Bng.) 

Western  Weekly  (Can.) 

£19171  Western  Weekly  (Can.) 

Wharton  (Pa.) 

Whoaton  (U.S.) 

Wheeler's  Criminal  (N.Y.) 

White  &  Tudor's  Leading  Cases  in  Eq- 
uity (Eng.) 

Whitman's  Patent  Cases  (U.S.) 
Wiffhtwicke  (Bng.) 
Wilcox  (Pa.) 
Willes  (Bng.) 
Wilmot's  Notes  (Bng.) 
Wilson  (Ind.) 


TABLE  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


XVII 


Wils.Cn. 
Wils.C.P. 


Wils.P.C. 

Wils.&S. 

Winch 

Winst. 

Wis. 

WJones 

W.KeL 

Wkly.L.Gaz. 

Wkly.N.C. 

Wkly.Rep. 

Wms.Saund. 

W.N. 

Wolf.&B. 

Wolf.&D. 

WolL 

Woodb.&M. 

Woods 

Woodw. 

Woolw; 

Words  &  Phrases 

Wright 


Wilson's  Chancery  (Bng.) 

Wilson's  Common  Pleas  (Eng.) 

Wilson's  Exchequer  (Eng.) 

Wilson's  Privy  Council  (Eng.) 

Wilson  &  Shaw  (Sc.) 

Winch  (Eng.) 

Winston  (N.C.) 

Wisconsin 

William  Jones  (Eng.) 

William  Kelynge  (E)ng.) 

Weekly  Law  Gazette  (Oh.) 

Weekly  Notes  of  Cases  (Pa.) 

Weekly  Reporter  (Eng.) 

Williams  Notes  to  Saunders'  Reports 

Weekly  Notes  (Eng.) 

Wolferstan  &  Bristow's  Election  Cas- 
es (Eng.) 

Wolferstan  &  Dew's  Election  Cases 
(Eng.) 

Wollaston  (Eng.) 

Woodbury  &  Minot  (U.S.) 

Woods  (U.S.) 

Woodward's  Decisions  (Pa.) 

Woolworth  (U.S.) 

Words  &  Phrases 

Wright  (Oh.) 


W.Rob. 

Wr.Pa. 

W.Va. 

W.W.Earr. 

W.W.&D. 

W.W.&H. 

Wyo. 

Wythe 

Wy.&W. 

Wy.W.&A'Beck. 


Yates  SeLCas. 

Y.B. 

Y.&C.Exch. 

Y.&C01L 

Yeates 

Yelv. 

Yerg. 

"V     0     T 

1.&J. 

York  Leg.Rec. 
Young  Adm. 
Younge 


William  Robinson's  Admiralty  (Eng.) 

Wright  (Pa.) 

West  Virginia 

W.  W*  Harrington 

Willmore,     Wollaston     &    Davidson 

(Eng.) 

Willmore,  Wollaston  &  Hodges  (Eng.) 
Wyoming 

Wythe's  Chancery  (Va.) 
Wyatt  &  Webb  (Viet.) 
Wyatt,  Webb  &  A'Beckett  (Vict> 


Yates  Select  Cases  (N.Y.) 

Year  Book  (Eng.) 

Younge  &  Collyer's  Exchequer  (Eng.) 

Younge  &  Collyer's  Chancery  (Eng.) 

Yeates  (Pa.) 

Yelverton  (Eng.) 

Yerger  (Tenru) 

Younge  &  Jervis  (Eng.) 

York  Legal  Record  (Pa.) 

Young's  Admiralty  Decisions  (N.S.) 

Younge  Exchequer  (Eng.) 


LAW  REVIEWS  AND  LAW  JOURNALS 


A.B.A.Jour. 
Am.J.IntXaw. 

Am.Law  S.Rev. 

B.U.L.Rev. 

Brooklyn  L.Rev. 

Calif.L.Rev. 

Camb.L.J. 

Chi-Kent  Rev. 

Cohun.L.Rev. 

Oom.L.J. 

Cornell  L.Q. 

Detroit  LJRev. 

DickJL.Rev. 

Fed.BJuJ. 

Fla.KJ. 

Pordham  L.Rev. 

Geo.Wash.L.Rey. 

GeoX.J. 

1-Iarv.L.Rev; 

Ia.L.Rev. 

Idaho  L.J* 

IlLL.Rev. 

Ind.L.J. 

J.Am.Jud.Soc. 

J.CompJjeg. 

J.N.A.Referees 

Bank. 
J.Soc.Pub.Teach. 

Law 
John  Marshall  L. 

Q. 
Kan.Gity  L.Rev. 


L.,7. 

L.Lib.J. 

Law  Ser.Mo.BuIL 

I/aw  SooJ. 


American  Bar  Association  Journal 

American  Journal  of  International 
Law 

American  Law  School  Review 

Boston  University  Law  Review 

Brooklyn  Law  Review 

California  Law  Review 

Cambridge  Law  Journal 

Chicago-Kent  Review 

Columbia  Law  Review 

Commercial  Law  Journal 

Cornell  Law  Quarterly 

Detroit  Law  Review 

Dickinson  Law  Review 

Federal  Bar  Association  Journal 

Florida  Law  Journal 

Fordham  Law  Review 

George  Washington  Law  Review 

Georgetown  Law  Journal 

Harvard  Law  Review 

Iowa  Law  Review 

Idaho  Law  Journal 

Illinois  Law  Review 

Indiana  Law  Journal 

Journal  of  the  American  Judicature 
Society 

Journal  of  the  Society  of  Comparative 
Legislation 

Journal  of  the  National  Association  of 
Referees  in  Bankruptcy 

Journal  of  the  Society  of  Pub.  Teach- 
ers of  Law 

The  John  Marshall  Law  Quarterly 

Kansas  City  Law  Review 

Kansas  State  Law  Journal 

Kentucky  Law  Journal 

Law  Journal 

Law  Library  Journal 

University  of  Missouri  Bulletin,  Law 

Series 
Law  Society  Journal 


Lincoln  L.Rev. 
Marq.L.Rev. 
Mass.L.Q. 
Mercer,  Beasley 

L.Rev. 
Mich.L.Rev. 
Minn.L.Rev. 
MissJLJ. 
Neb.L.B. 
N.J.L.J. 
N.J.L.Rev. 
N.Y.UJLQJtev. 


Lincoln  Law  Review 
Marquette  Law  Review 
Massachusetts  Law  Quarterly 


Mercer,  Beasley  Law  Review 

Michigan  Law  Review 

Minnesota  Law  Review 

Mississippi  Law  Journal 

Nebraska  Law  Bulletin 

New  Jersey  Law  Journal 

New  Jersey  Law  Review 

New  York  'University  Law  Quarterly 

Review 

Notre  Dame  Law.Notre  Dame  Lawyer 
N.C.L.Rev.  North  Carolina  Law  Review 

Okla.S.B.J.  Oklahoma  State  Bar  Journal 

Oreg.L.Rev.  Oregon  Law  Review 

PhiLLbJ.  Philippine  Law  Journal 

Rocky  Mt.L.Rev.    Rocky  Mountain  Law  Review    ' 
St.  John's  L.Rev.    St  John's  Law  Review 
St.  Louis  LJRev.    St.  Louis  Law  Review  (now  Washing- 
ton University  Law  Quarterly) 
So.Calif .L.Rev.       Southern  California  Law  Review 
Temp.L.Q.  Temple  Law  Quarterly 

Tenn.L.Rev.  Tennessee  Law  Review 

Tex.L.Rev.  Texas  Law  Review 

Tul.L.Rev.  Tulane  Law  Review 

U.CMX.Rev.          University  of  Chicago  Law  Review 
U.Cin.L.Rev.  University  of  Cincinnati  Law  Review 

U.Detroit  L. J*        University  of  Detroit  Law  Journal 
U.Pa.L.Rev.  University  of  Pennsylvania  Law  He- 

view 

U.  of  Pitts.LJElev.University  of  Pittsburgh  Law  Review 
U.Toronto  L.J.       University  of  Toronto  Law  Journal 
Va.L.Rev.  Virginia  Law  Review 

Wash.L.Rev.          Washington  Law  Review 
Wash.UX.Q,  Washington  University  Law  Quarterly 

W.Va.L.Q.  West  Virginia  Law  Quarterly  and  The 

Bar 

WisXJaev«  Wisconsin  Law  Review 

Yale  LJ.  Yale  Law  Journal 


LIST  OF  TITLES 

IN 

CORPUS  JURIS  SECUNDUM 


.Abandonment 

Abatement  and  Revival 

Abduction 

Abortion 

Absentees 

Abstracts  of  Title 

Accession 

Accord  and  Satisfaction 

Account,  Action  on 

Accounting 

Account  Stated 

Acknowledgments 

Actions 

Adjoining  Landowners 

Admiralty 

Adoption  of  Children 

Adulteration 

Adultery 

Adverse  Possessiofc 

Aerial  Navigation 

Affidavits 

Affray 

Agency 

Agriculture 

Aliens 

Alteration  of  Instruments 

Ambassadors  and  Consuls 

Amicus  Curias 

Animals 

Annuities 

Appeal  and  Error 

Appearances 

Apprentices 

Arbitration  and  Award 

Architects 

Army  and  Navy 

Arrest 

Arson 

Assault  and  Battery 

Assignments 

Assignments  for  Benefit  of 

Creditors 
Assistance,  Writ  of 


Associations 

Assumpsit,  Action  of 

Asylums 

Attachment 

Attorney  and  Client 

Attorney  General 

Auctions  and  Auctioneers 

Audita  Querela 

Bail 

Bailments 

Bankruptcy 

Banks  and  Banking 

Barratry 

Bastards 

Beneficial  Associations 

Bigamy 

Bills  and  Notes 

Blasphemy 

Bonds 

Boundaries 

Bounties 

Breach  of  Marriage  Promise 

Breach  of  the  Peace 

Bribery 

Bridges 

Brokers 

Building  and  Loan  Associations 

Burglary 

Business  Trusts 

Canals 

Cancellation  of  Instruments 

Carriers 

Case,  Action  on 

Cemeteries 

Census 

Certiorari 

Champerty  and  Maintenance 

Charities 

Chattel  Mortgages 

Citizens 

Civil  Rights 

Clerks  of  Courts 

Clubs 

XIX 


Colleges  and  Universities 

Collision 

Commerce 

Common  Lands 

Common  Law 

Common  Scold 

Compositions  with  Creditors 

Compounding  Offenses 

Compromise  and  Settlement 

Concealment  of  Birth  or  Death 

Conflict  of  Laws 

Confusion  of  Goods 

Conspiracy 

Constitutional  Law 

Contempt 

Continuances 

Contracts 

Contratos 

Contribution 

Conversion 

Convicts 

Copyright  and  Literary 

Property 
Coroners 
Corporations 
Costs 

Counterfeiting 
Counties 

Court  Commissioners 
Courts 

Covenant,  Action  of 
Covenants 
Creditors'  Suits 
Criminal  Law 
Crops 
Culpa 
Curtesy 

Customs  and  Usages 
Customs  Duties 
Damages 
Dead  Bodies 
Death 
Debt,  Action  of 


LIST  OF  TITLES 


Dedication 

Deeds 

Dependencies,      Colonies,     and 

British  Possessions 
Depositaries 
Depositions 
Deposits  in  Court 
Descent  and  Distribution 
Detectives 
Detinue 
Discovery 

Dismissal  and  Nonsuit 
Disorderly  Conduct 
Disorderly  Houses 
District    and    Prosecuting 

Attorneys 

District  of  Columbia 
Disturbance  of  Public  Meetings 
Divorce 
Domicile 
Dower 
Drains 
Druggists 
Drunkards 
Dueling 
Easements 
Ejectment 

Election  of  Remedies 
Elections 
Electricity 
Embezzlement 
Embracery 
Eminent  Domain 
Entry,  Writ  of 
Equity 
Escape 
Escheat 
Escrows 
Estates 
Estoppel 
Evidence 

Exchange  of  Property 
Exchanges 
Executions 

Executors  and  Administrators 
Exemptions 
Explosives 
Extortion 
Extradition 
Factors 

False  Imprisonment 
False  Personation 
False  Pretenses 
Federal  Courts 
Fences 


Ferries 

Finding  Lost  Goods 

Fines 

Fires 

Fish 

Fixtures 

Flags 

Food 

Forcible  Entry  and  Detainer 

Forfeitures 

Forgery 

Fornication 

Franchises 

Fraud 

Frauds,  Statute  of 

Fraudulent  Conveyances 

Game 

Gaming 

Garnishment 

Gas 

Gifts 

Good  Will 

Grand  Juries 

Ground  Rents 

Guaranty 

Guardian  and  Ward 

Habeas  Corpus 

Hawkers  and  Peddlers 

Health 

Highways 

Holidays 

Homesteads 

Homicide 

Hospitals 

Husband  and  Wife 

Improvements 

Incest 

Indemnity 

Indians 

Indictments  and  Informations 

Industrial   Co-operative 

Societies 
Infants 
Injunctions 
Innkeepers 
Insane  Persons 
Insolvency 
Inspection 
Insurance 

Insurrection  and  Sedition 
Interest 

Internal  Revenue 
International   Law 
Interpleader 
Intoxicating  Liquors 


Joint  Adventures 

Joint  Stock  Companies 

Joint  Tenancy 

Judges 

Judgments 

Judicial   Sales 
'  Juries 

Justices  of  the  Peace 

Kidnapping 

Landlord  and  Tenant 

Larceny 

Levees  and  Flood  Control 

Lewdness 

Libel  and  Slander 

Licenses 

Liens 

Limitations  of  Actions 

Lis  Pcndens 

Livery   Stable   Keepers 

Logs  and  Logging 

Lost   Instruments 

Lotteries 

Malicious  Mischief 

Malicious  Prosecution 

Mandamus 

Manufactures 

Maritime  Liens 

Marriage 

Marshaling  Assets  and 

Securities 

Master  and  Servant  ^ 
Masters*  and  Employers' 

Associations 
Mayhem 

Mechanics'  Liens 
Mercantile  Agencies 
Militia 
Mills 

Mines  and  Minerals 
Miscegenation 
Modern  Civil  Law 
Money  Lenders 
Money  Lent 
Money  Paid 
Money  Received 
Monopolies 
Mortgages 
Motions  and  Orders 
Motor  Vehicles 
Municipal  Corporations 
Names 

Navigable  Waters 
Ne  Exeat 
Negligence 
Neutrality  Laws 


LIST  OF  TITLES 


XXI 


Newspapers 

New  Trial 

Notaries 

Notice 

Novation 

Nuisances 

Oaths  and  Affirmations 

Obscenity 

Obstructing  Justice 

Officers 

Pardons 

Parent  and  Child 

Parliamentary  Law 

Parties 

Partition 

Partnership 

Party  Walls 

Patents 

Paupers 

Pawnbrokers 

Payment 

Penalties 

Pensions 

Pent  Roads 

Peonage 

Perjury 

Perpetuities 

Physicians  and  Surgeons 

Pilots 

Piracy 

Pleading 

Pledges 

Poisons 

Possessory  Warrant 

Post  Office 

Powers 

Principal  and  Surety, 

Prisons 

Private  Roads 

Prize  Fighting 

Process 

Profanity 

Prohibition 

Property 

Prostitution 

Public  Administrative  Bodies 

and  Procedure 
Public  Lands 
Public  Utilities 
Quieting  Title 
<Quo  Warranto 


Railroads 

Rape 

Real  Actions 

Receivers 

Receiving  Stolen  Goods 

Recognizances 

Records 

References 

Reformation  of  Instruments 

Reformatories 

Registers  of  Deeds 

Registration  of  Land  Titles 

Release 

Religious  Societies 

Removal  of  Causes 

Replevin 

Reports 

Rescue 

Review 

Rewards 

Right  of  Privacy 

Riot 

Robbery 

Sales 

Salvage 

Schools  and  School  Districts 

Scire  Facias 

Seals 

Seamen 

Searches  and  Seizures 

Seduction 

Sequestration 

Set-Off  and  Counterclaim 

Sheriffs  and  Constables 

Shipping 

Signatures 

Slaves 

Social  Security  and  Public 

Welfare 
Sodomy 

Specific  Performance 
Spendthrifts 
States 
Statutes 
Steam 

Stenographers 
Stipulations 
Street  Railroads 
Submission  of  Controversy 
Subrogation 
Subscriptions 


Suicide 

Summary;  Proceedings 

Sunday 

Supersedeas 

Taxation 

Telegraphs  and  Telephones 

Tenancy  in  Common 

Tender 

Territories 

Theaters  and  Shows 

Threats  and  Unlawful 

Communication 
Time 
Torts 
Towage 
Towns 
Trade-Marks,       Trade-Names, 

and  Unfair  Competition 
Trade  Unions 

Trading  Stamps  and  Coupons 
Treason 
Treaties 
Trespass 

Trespass  to  Try  Title 
Trial 

Trover  and  Conversion 
Trusts 

Turnpikes  and  Toll  Roads 
Undertakings 
United  States 

United  States  Commissioners 
United  States  Marshals 
Unlawful  Assembly 
Use  and  Occupation 
Usury 
Vagrancy 

Vendor  and  Purchaser 
Venue 
War 
Warehousemen  and  Safe 

Depositaries 
Waste 
Waters 
Weapons 

Weights  and  Measures 
Wharves 
Wills 
Witnesses 
Woods  and  Forests 
Work  and  Labor 
Workmen's  Compensation 


CORPUS  JURIS 
SEGUNDUM 


VOLUME  FORTY-NINE 


JUDGMENTS 

This  Title  includes  judicial  determinations  of  rights  of  parties  to  proceedings  in  courts  or  jusuc< 
in  general,  interlocutory  as  well  as  final;  rendition,  entry,  requisites,  and  validity  of  formal  judgments 
more  particularly  of  judgments  in  civil  actions,  and  amendment  and  correction  thereof;  operation  am 
effect  of  judgments  in  respect  of  persons  and' subject  matters  concluded,  and  of  property  bound  by  judg 
ments,  and  liens  created  by  entry,  docketing,  etc.,  of  judgments;  conclusiveness  of  judgments  as  agains 
collateral  attack;  direct  attacks  on  judgments  by  motions  in  arrest  or  to  open,  vacate,  etc.,  judgments 
writs  of  error  coram  nobis,  etc.,  or  by  actions  to  set  aside  or  restrain  enforcement  of  judgments  or  fo; 
other  relief  against  them  on  equitable  grounds;  assignment  of  judgments;  payment,  satisfaction;  an< 
discharge  of  judgments;  revival  of  judgments  by  scire  facias,  motion,  eta;  operation  and  effect  o 
judgments  of  courts  of  foreign  states  and  countries;  and  enforcement  of  judgments  in  general,  more  par 
ticularly  actions  on  judgments. 

Matters  not  in  this  Title,  treated  elsewhere  in  this  work,  see  Descriptive-Word  Index 

Analysis 
I  DEFINITION,  NATURE/AND  KINDS,  §§  1-12 

H.  ESSENTIALS  OP  EXISTENCE,  VALIDITY,  AND  REGULARITY  OP  JUDGMENT,  §§  13-6: 

A.  IN  GENERAL,  §§  13-22 

B.  PROCESS,  NOTICE,  oir  APPEARANCE,  §§  23-26 

C.  PARTIES,  §§  27-38 

D.  PLEADINGS,  ISSUES,  EVIDENCE,  VERDICT,  AND  FINDINGS  TO  SUSTAIN  JUDGMENT,  §§  39-45 

E.  CONFORMITY  TO  PRIOR  PROCEEDINGS,  §§  46-61 

m.  FORM  AND  CONTENTS  OP  JUDGMENT,  AND  RELIEF  AWARDED,  §§  62-86 
IV.  ARREST  OF  JUDGMENT,  §§  87-99 
V.  RENDITION,  ENTRY,  RECORD,  AND  DOCKETING,  §§  100-133  

"  See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

490.XS.-1  1 


JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.S. 

VI.  JUDGMENT  BY  CONFESSION,  §§  134-172 

A.  IN  GENERAL,  §§  134-145 

B.  REQUISITES  AND  VALIDITY  OP  CONCESSION  GENERALLY,  §§  146-151 
C    UNDER  WARRANT  OR  POWER  off  ATTORNEY,  §§  152-157 

D.    STATEMENT  OF  INDEBTEDNESS,  §§  15&-159 

K    PROCEDURE  IN  OBTAINING  OR  ENTERING  JUDGMENT,  §§  160-167 

F.  CONSTRUCTION  AND  OPERATION  OF  JUDGMENT,  §§  168-172 

VIL  JUDGMENT  ON  CONSENT,  OFFER,  OR  ADMISSION,  §§  173-186 

V3H  JUDGMENT  BY  DEFAULT,  §§  187-218 
'A.    IN  GENERAL,  §§  187-203 
B.    PROCEDURE  IN  TAKING  DEFAULT  AND  ENTERING  JUDGMENT,  §§  204-218 

IX.  JUDGMENT  ON  MOTION  OR  SUMMARY  PROCEEDINGS,  §§    219-227 

X.  AMENDING,  CORRECTING,  REVIEWING,  OPENING,  AND  VACATING  JUDGMENT,  §§ 

228-340 

A.  JURISDICTION  AND  POWER  GENERALLY,  §§  228-235 

B.  AMENDMENT  AND  CORRECTION,  §§  236-264 
C    OPENING  AND  VACATING,  §§  265-310 

1.  In  General,  §§  265-285 

2.  Proceedings  and  Relief,  §§  286-310 

D.  WRIT  OF  ERROR  CORAM  NOBIS,  §§  311-313 

E.  ACTION  TO  REVIEW  JUDGMENT,  §§  314-319 
R    CONFESSED  JUDGMENTS,  §§  320-^27 

G.  JUDGMENTS  BY  CONSENT,  OFFER  AND  ACCEPTANCE,  AND  ON  MOTION  OR  SUMMARY  PROOKKDINGS, 

§§  328-332 
H.    JUDGMENTS  BY  DEFAULT,  §§  333-340 

XL  EQUITABLE  RELIEF  AGAINST  JUDGMENT,  §§  341-400 

A.  IN  GENERAL,  §§  341-349 

B.  GROUNDS  FOR  RELIEF,  §§  350-376 
C    PROCOBSDURE,  §§  377-400 

XH.  COLLATERAL  ATTACK,  §§  401-435 

A.  IN  GENERAL,  §§  401-415 

B.  GROUNDS,  §§  416-435 

XTTT.  CONSTRUCTION  AND  OPERATION  OP  JUDGMENT,  §§  436-453 

A.  CONSTRUCTION,  §§  436-443 

B.  OPERATION  AND  EFFECT,  §§  444-453 

XIV.  LIEN  OP  JUDGMENT,  §§  454-511 
XV.  ASSIGNMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS,  §§  512-530 

XVI.  SUSPENSION  AND  REVIVAL  OP  JUDGMENT,  §§  531-549 

A.  IN  GENERAL,  §§  531-532 

B.  REVIVAL  OF  JUDGMENTS,  §§  533-549 

XVIL  PAYMENT,  SATISFACTION,  AND  DISCHARGE  OF  JUDGMENT,  §§  550-584 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

2 


49    C.J.S.  JUDGMENTS 

XVIH.  ENFORCEMENT  OP  JUDGMENTS,  §§  585-691 

Divisions  XIX  to  End  in  Volume  5O 
XIX.  RES  JUDIOATA,  |§  592-S48 

A.  GENERAL  PEINCTPLBS,  §§  592-597 

B.  MERGER  AND  BAR  off  CAUSES  OF  ACTION  AND  DEFENSES,  §§  598-685 

1.  General  Principles,  §§  598-602 

2.  Judgments  Operative  as  Bar,  §§  603-625 

3.  Decision  on  the  Merits,  §§  626-647 

4.  Causes  of  Action  Merged  or  Barred,  §§  648-680 

5.  Defenses  and  Counterclaims  Barred  by  Former  Judgment,  §§  681-685 

C.  CONOLUSIVENESS  OF  ADJUDICATION,  §§  686-736 

1.  General  Principles,  §§  686-711 

2.  Matters  Concluded  by  Judgment,  §§  712-736 

D.  JUDGMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR  CLASSES  OF  ACTIONS  OB  PROCEEDINGS,  §§  737-755 

E.  PERSONS  AFFECTED  BY  ADJUDICATION,  §§  756-821 

1.  Who  May  Take  Advantage  of  Bar,  §§  756-761 

2.  Persons  Concluded  by  Judgments,  §§  762-821 

F.  PLEADING  AND  PROVING  JUDGMENTS,  §§  822-848 

XX.  ACTION  ON  JUDGMENT,  §§  849-887 

A.  DOMESTIC  JUDGMENTS,  §§  849-S66  ^ 

B.  FOREIGN  JUDGMENTS,  §§  867-887  ^ 

XXL  FOREIGN  JUDGMENTS,  §§  888-906 

A.  JUDGMENTS  OF  COURTS  OF  SISTEB  STATES,  §§  888-898 

B.  JUDGMENTS  OF  STATE  AND  FEDEBAL  COUBTS,  §§  899-903 

.  C.    JUDGMENTS  OF  COUBTS  OF  FOBEIGN  COUNTBEBS,  §§  904-906 

XXIT.  JUDGMENTS  IN  REM,  §§  907-911 

Sub-Analysis 

t  DEFINITION,  NATURE,  AND  KINDS— p  25 

§    1.  Definitions— p  25 

2.  General  nature— p  26 

3.  Entirety  of  judgments-?-?  27 

4.  Distinguished  from  decisions  and  findings — p  28. 

5.  Distinguished  from  rules  and  orders— p  29 

6.  Judgments  as  contracts  or  obligations— p  30 

7.  Judgments  as  assignments  or  conveyances — p  32 

8.  Classification  and  kinds— p  32 

9.  Judgment  on  issue  of  law— p  33 

10.  Judgment  on  issue  of  fact — p  34 

11.  — —  Final  and  interlocutory  judgments — p  35 

12.  Judgments  in  rem  and  in  personam — p  40 

IL  ESSENTIALS  OP  EXISTENCE,  VALIDITY,  AND  REGULARITY  OF  JUDGMENT— ^ p  40 

A.      IN  GENEBAIr— p  40 

§  13.    General  statement— p  40 

14.  Statutory  provisions  and  what  law  governs— p  41 

15.  Duly  constituted  court— p  41 

16.    Time  and  place— p  41 

17.    Judges— p  42    ^ 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 


JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.S. 

EL  ESSENTIALS  OP  EXISTENCE,   VALIDITY,  AND  EECUJLAEITY  OP  JUDGMENT— Continued 

A.  IN  GENERAL — Continued 

§  18.  Formal  proceedings — p  44 

19.  Jurisdiction — p  45 

20.  Matured  cause  of  action — p  51 

21.  Definitiveness — p  51 

22.  Reasons  for  judgment — p  51 

B.  PROCESS,  NOTICE,  OB  APPEARANCE— p  52 

§  23.  Necessity— p  52 

24.  Sufficiency— p  54 

25.  Return  and  proof  of  service — p  65 

26.  Appearance — p  65 

C.  PARTIES— p  67 

§  27.  In  general— p  67 

28.  Judgment  for  or  against  one  not  a  party — p  68 

29.  Death  of  party— p  71 

30.  Joint  parties — p  74 

31.  Plaintiffs  generally— p  74 

.  32.  Relief  as  between  coplaintiffs— p  75 

33. .  Defendants  generally— p  75 

34.  Contract  actions — p  81 

35.  Tort  actions— p  83 

36.  Joint  or  several  judgments — p  84 

37.  Relief  between  codefendants— p  94 

38.  Nominal  parties — p  95 

D.  PLEADINGS,  ISSUES,  EVIDENCE,  VERDICT,  AND  FINDINGS  TO  SUSTAIN  JUDGMENT— p  95 

§  39.  Pleadings— p  95 

40.  Necessity  and  sufficiency — p  95 

41. Several  counts— p  100 

42.  Issues— p  101 

43.  Determination  of  all  issues — p  101 

44.  Evidence— p  103 

45.  Verdict  and  findings — p  105 

E.  CONFORMITY  TO  PRIOR  PROCEEDINGS — p  107 

§  46.  Conformity  to  process — p  107 

47.  Conformity  to  pleadings  aiid  proofs — p  108 

48.  General  rules— p  108 

49.  Limitation  to  relief  sought  by  pleadings — p  111 

50.  Limitation  and  conformity  to  issues — p  117 

51.  Applications  of  rules  in  general — p  119 

52. Nature  and  form  of  action — p  128 

53.  Grounds  of  action  or  defense — p  129 

54.  Amount  of  recovery — p  133 

55.«  Conformity  to  verdict,  decision,  and  findings  in  general — j>  138 

56.  For  and  against  whom — p  143 

57.  Amount — p  144 

58.  Interest— p  146 

59.  Judgment  non  obstante  veredicto— p  147 

60.  When  and  for  whom  granted — p  148 

61.  «— *  Motion  for  judgment — p  176 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 


49    C.7.S.  JUDGMENTS 

HI.  FORM  AND  CONTENTS  OP  JUDGMENT,  AND  BELIEF  AWARDED— p  180 

§  62.  In  general— p  180 

63.  What  law  governs — p  183 

64.  Necessity  of  writing — p  183 

65.  One  or  more  judgments  in  same  case— p  184 

66.  Several  causes  tried  together — p  186 

67.  Nature  and  extent  of  relief— p  186 

68.    Amount  of  recovery — p  188 

69.    Personal  judgment  in  proceedings  by  attachment  or  in  rem — p  188 

70.    Affirmative  relief  to  defendant— p  189 

71.  Recitals— p  189 

72.  Certainty— p  191 

73.  Conditional  judgments — p  192 

74.  Alternative  judgments — p  193 

75.  Designation  of  parties — p  194 

76.  Designation  of  amount — p  198 

77.    Interest— p  199 

78.    Costs,  allowances,  and  attorney's  fees — p  200 

79.    Medium  of  payment — p  201 

80.  Description  of  property — p  203 

81.  Date— p  204 

82.  Provisions  for  enforcement — p  204 

83.  Exceptions  and  saving  clauses — p  205 

84.  Surplusage— p  206 

85.  Signing  by  judge  or  clerk — p  206  * 

86.  Nonsuit  or  judgment  on  merits — p  207 

IV.  ARRBST  OF  JUDGMENT— p  209 

§  87.  Nature  of  remedy— p  209 

88.  Grounds  of  arrest— p  210 

89.  Jurisdiction  and  venue — p  211 

90.  Process— p  211 

91.  Parties— p  212 

924  Pleadings  in  general— p  212 

93.  Variance— p  215 

94.  Jury— p  215 

95.  Verdict  and  findings — p  216 

96.  Miscellaneous— p  217 

97.  Motions  in  arrest — p  218 

98.  Hearing  and  determination — p  220 

99.  Operation  and  effect  of  arrest — p  221 

V.  RENDITION,  ENTRY,  RECORD,  AND  DOCKETING— p  222 

§  100.  Rendition  generally— p  222 

101.  Authority  and  duty  of  court — p  223 

102.  Mode  and  sufficiency— p  224 

103.  Reading  in  open  court — p  225 

104.  Application  and  order  for  judgment — p  225 

105.  On  report  of  referee— p  227 

106.  Entry  generally— p  229 

107.  Necessity— p  230 

108.  Authority  and  duty— p  232 

109.  Sufficiency  and  contents;   defects  and  irregularities— p  234 

110.  Book  or  place  of  entry — p  235 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

5 


JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.S. 

V.  RENDITION,  ENTEY,  RECORD,  AND  DOCKETING— Continued 

§  111.    Signature  of  record — p  236 

112.  — -  Notice  of  entry— p  236 

113.  Time  of  rendition  and  entry — p  237 

114.    In  vacation — p  244 

115.    Pendency  of  motion  for  new  trial  or  in  arrest — p  245 

116.    Stay  of  proceedings — p  246 

117.  Nunc  pro  tune  entry — p  246 

118.  Power  to  order  and  grounds  therefor  in  general — p  247 

119.  Time  of  entry— p  252 

120.  Proceedings  to  obtain— p  253 

121.  Operation  and  effect— p  255 

122.  Judgment  roll  or  record — p  256 

123.    Time  of  making  and  filing — p  257 

124.    By  whom  made  and  filed — p  257 

125. Contents  and  sufficiency — p  258 

126.  Docketing— p  262 

127.    Book  or  place  of  entry— p  263 

128.    Index— p  263 

129.  Filing  transcript— p  263 

130.  Recording— p  266 

131.  Lost  or  destroyed  records — p  266 

132.  Verity  and  conclusiveness  of  record — p  267 

133.  Record  as  notice — p  268 

VL  JUDGMENT  BY  CONFESSION— D  268 

A.  IN  GENERAL— p  268 

§  134.    Definition,  nature,  and  distinctions — p  268 

135.  Classes— p  269 

136.    Confession  after  action  brought — p  269 

137.    Confession  without  action — p  271 

138.  Debts  or  claims  for  which  judgment  may  be  confessed— p  271 

139.  Debts  not  matured — p  272 

140.  Contingent  liabilities — p  272 

141.  Future  advances — p  272 

142.  For  tort— p  272 

143.  Who  may  confess  judgment — p  272 

144.    Joint  or  several  debtors  or  defendants — p  273 

145.  In  whose  favor  confessed — p  273 

B.  REQUISITES  AND  VALIDITY  OF  CONCESSION  GENERALLY — p  273 

§  146.  In  general— p  273 

147.  Compliance  with  statutory  provisions  generally — p  274 

148.  Consent  or  ratification  of  creditor — p  275 

149.  Process,  appearance,  and  pleading— p  275 

150.    Confession  after  action — p  275 

151.    Confession  without  action— p  276 

C    UNDER  WARRANT  OB  POWER  OB«  ATTOJ&NEY— p  276 
§  152.    In  general— p  276 

153.  Requisites  and  sufficiency  of  warrant  or  power— p  278 

154.  Construction  and  operation  of  warrant  or  power— p  280 

155.  Second  confession  under  same  power — p  288 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

6 


49    C.J.S.  JUDGMENTS 

VI.  JUDGMENT  BY  CONFESSION— Continued 

C.  UITDER  WARRANT  OR  POWER  OP  ATTORNEY — Continued 

§  156.    Revocation  and  defeasance— p  288 

157.    Confession  under  void  or  lost  warrant — p  289 

D.  STATEMENT  OF  INDEBTEDNESS — p  289 

§  158.    Nature  and  necessity— p  289 
159.    Requisites  and  sufficiency — p  290 

E.  PROCEDURE  IN  OBTAINING  OR  ENTERING-  JUDGMENT — p  294 

§  160.    In  general— p  294 

161.  Jurisdiction  and  authority — p  295 

162.  Necessity  and  sufficiency  of  proof — p  297 

163.    Affidavit  as  to  bona  fides  of  confession— p  298 

164.  Nature,  form,  and  requisites  of  judgment  in  general — p  299 

165.  Entry  of  judgment — p  300 

166.    Time  of  entry— p  301 

167.  Amount  of  judgment— p  303 

F.  CONSTRUCTION  AND  OPERATION  OP  JUDGMEMNT — p  304 

§  168.  In  general— p  304 

169.  As  release  or  waiver  of  defects — p  305 

170.  Presumptions  supporting  judgment — p  306 

171.  Effect  of  invalidity— p  306 

172.  Estoppel  to  deny  validity— p  307 

VET.  JUDGMENT  ON  CONSENT,  OFFEB>  OR  ADMISSION— p  308 

§  173.  Consent— p  308 

174.  Right  and  authority  to  consent — p  309 

175.  Sufficiency  of  consent  or  agreement — p  311 

176.  Entry  of  judgment— p  312 

177.  Form  and  sufficiency  of  judgment — p  313 

178.  Construction,  operation,  and  effect — p  314 

179.  Offer— p  317 

180.  Authority  to  offer— p  318 

181.  Form  and  sufficiency  of  offer — p  318 

182.  Acceptance  or  rejection,  and  withdrawal  of  offer — p  319 

183.  Entry  of  judgment— p  320 

184.  Construction,  operation,  and  effect — p  320 

185.  Admission  in  pleading — p  321 

186.  Submission  on  agreed  statement  of  facts — p  323 

VEX  JUDGMENT  BY  DEFAULT— p  324 

A.    Isr  GENEBAL— p  324 

§  187.  What  constitutes  judgment  by  default— p  324 

188.  Constitutional  and  statutory  provisions7-p  326 

189.  Actions  in  which  authorized — p  326 

190.  In  whose  favor  default  may  be  taken— p  327 

191.  Against  whom  default  may  be  taken — p  328 

192.  Jurisdiction  in  general — p  331 

193.  Pleadings  to  sustain  judgment — p  336 

194.    Amendment— p  340 

195.  Grounds  for  judgment— p  341 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

7 


JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.S. 

VHI.  JUDGMENT  BY  DEFAULT— Continued 

A.  IN  GENERAL — Continued 

§  196.  Default  of  appearance— p  341 

197.  Withdrawal  of  appearance— p  342 

198.  Absence  from  trial  or  other  proceeding — p  343 . 

199.  Default  in  pleading— p  343 

200.  Operation  and  effect  of  default  and  judgment — p  355 

201.    Default  as  admission — p  357 

202. Right  to  notice  of,  and  participation  in,  further  proceedings — p  360 

203.    Waiver  of  default— p  361 

B.  PBOCEDTTBE  IN  TAKING  DEFAULT  AND  ENTERING  JUDGMENT — p  362 

§  204.  Power  of  court  in  general— p  362 

205.  Authority  and  duty  of  clerk— p  363 

206.  Preliminary  entry  of  default — p  365 

207.  Time  for  taking  default  and  entering  judgment — p  366 

208.  Application  for  judgment — p  370 

209.  Bond  or  recognizance  on  taking  judgment — p  372 

210.  Evidence— p  372 

211.    Proof  of  jurisdiction*!  facts— p  373 

212.    Proof  of  default— p  373 

213.    Proof  of  cause  of  action— p  374 

214.  Hearing,  determination,  and  relief — p  376 

215.  Form  and  requisites  of  judgment — p  380 

216.    Final  or  interlocutory — p  381 

217.    Recitals  and  record— p  382 

218.  Office  judgments— p  384 

IX.  JUDCtMENT  ON  MOTION  OR  SUMMARY  PROCEEDINGS— p  385 

§  219.  In  general— p  385 

220.  Cases  in  which  allowed— p  388 

221.  Against  whom  judgment  may  be  rendered — p  406 

222.  Procedure  in  general — p  407 

223.  Notice— p  409 

224.  Motion— p  412 

225.  Affidavits  and  other  evidence — p  413 

226.  Hearing  and  determination;   relief  awarded — p  429 

227.  Form,  requisites,  and  entry  of  judgment — p  432 

3L  AMENDING,    CORRECTING,  REVIEWING,  OPENING,  AND  VACATING  JUDGMENT— p  433 

A.  JURISDICTION  AND  POWER  GENERALLY— p  433 

§  228.    In  general— p  433 

229.  During  term— p  436 

230.  After  expiration  of  term — p  438 

231.  Where  terms  abolished— p  445 

232.  At  chambers  or  in  vacation — p  445 

233.  Authority  of  clerk— p  446 

234.  Judgments  subject  to  amendment  or  vacation — p  446 

235.  Jurisdiction  of  particular  courts  and  judges — p.  447 

B.  AMENDMENT  AND  CORRECTION— p  447 

§  236.    In  general— p  447 
237.    Clerical  and  formal  changes — p  449 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

8 


49    C.J.S.  JUDGMENTS 

X.  AMENDING,  CORRECTING,  REVIEWING,   OPENING,  AND  VACATING  JUDGMENT— Con- 
tinued 

B.  AMENDMENT  AND  CORRECTION — Continued 

§  238.  Judicial  and  substantial  changes — p  451 

239.  Particular  amendments  and  corrections — p  455 

240.  Supplying  omissions  generally — p  455 

241.  Striking  out  improper  or  erroneous  entries — p  455 

242.  Recitals  in  general — p  455 

243.  Conforming  judgment  to  verdict  or  findings — p  456 

244.  Parties— p  457 

245.  Process  and  appearance — p  458 

246.  Relief  awarded  in  general — p  458 

247.  Amount  of  recovery  and  allowance  of  interest — p  459 

248.  Costs  and  allowances — p  461 

249.  Other  errors  or  defects— p  462 

250.  Procedure  and  reliefr— p  464 

251.  Jurisdiction — p  466 

252.  Time  for  application — p  466 

253.  Parties— p  467 

254.  Notice— p  467 

255.  Contents  and  sufficiency  of  application — p  469 

256.  Evidence;   source  of  amendment  or  correction — p  470 

257.  — —  Hearing  and  determination  in  general — p  472 

258.  Allowing  amendment  nunc  pro  tune — p  473 

259.  — —  Discretion  of  court— p  475 

260.  Imposition  of  terms — p  475 

261.  Order— p  476 

262.  Mode  of  making  amendments — p  476 

263.  Operation  and  effect  in  general — p  476 

264.  Rights  of  third  persons— p  477 

C.  OPENING  AND  VACATING — p  478 

1.    In  General— $  478 

§  265.  In  general— p  478 

266.  Right  to  and  grounds  for  relief — p  479 

267.  Invalidity  of  judgment  in  general — p  480 

268.  Irregularity  of  judgment  in  general — p  484 

269.  Fraud  or  collusion — p  486 

270.  Perjury— p  489 

271.  Violation  of  agreement — p  490 

272.  Defenses  to  action — p  491 

273.  Newly  discovered  evidence — p  493 

274.  Errors  of  law— p  493 

275.  Errors  of  fact— p  495 

276.  Defects  and  objections  as  to  parties— p  496 

277.  Defects  and  objections  as  to  pleadings — p  497  , 

278.  Unauthorized,  inadvertent,  improvident,  or  premature  entry— p  499 

,279.  Disobedience  of  order  of  court  or  other  misconduct  of  party  or  coun- 
sel—p  499 

280.  Mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  excusable  neglect,  casualty  or  misfor- 
tune— p  500 

281.  Other  grounds— p  510 

282.  Defenses  to  relief— p  511 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 
40  C.J.S.- 2  9 


JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.S. 

X.  AMENDING,  CORRECTING-,  REVIEWING,  OPENING,  AND  VACATING-  JUDGMENT— Con- 
tinued 

C    OPENING  AND  VACATING — Continued 

1.  In  General — Continued 

§  283.    Other  remedies  available— p  Sll 

284.    Waiver  and  estoppel — p  512 

285.    Assignment  of  judgment  or  rights  thereunder— p  513 

2.  Proceedings  and  Relief — p  513 

§  286.     Nature  and  form  of  remedy — p  513 

287.    Vacation  on  court's  own  motion — p  521 

288.  Time  for  application — p  523 

289.  Requisites  and  sufficiency  of  application — p  533 

290.    Meritorious  cause  of  action  or  defense  in  general— p  53S 

291.    Proposed  answer — p  539 

292.  Answer  and  other  pleadings — p  539 

293.  Parties;   persons  by  and  against  whom  proceedings  may  be  brought — p  539 

294.  Notice  or  process — p  543 

295.  Affidavits  on  application — p  544 

296.  Counter-affidavits — p  545 

297.  Evidence— p  545 

298.  Status  of  judgment  pending  application — p.  548 

299.  Hearing  and  determination  in  general — p  548 

300.    Discretion  of  court— p  552 

301.  Relief  awarded— p  554 

302.    Partial  vacation— p  555 

303.    Terms  and  conditions — p  555 

304.  Findings— p  556 

305.  Order— p  557 

306.    Operation  and  effect  in  general — p  557 

307.    Restitution— p  560 

308.  Objections  and  exceptions — p  560 

309.  Vacation  and  review  of  order — p  560 

310.  Liabilities  on  bonds  given  in  proceedings  to  vacate — p  561 

D.  WRIT  OF  ERROR  CORAM  NOBIS — p  561 

§  311.    In  general — p  561 

312.  When  writ  lies— p  562 

313.  Proceedings  and  relief — p  568 

E.  ACTION  TO  REVIEW  JUDGMENT — p  572 

§  314.  In  general— p  572 

315.  Grounds  of  action  and  judgments  re  viewable — p  574 

316.  Jurisdiction  and  procedure  generally — p  575 

317.  Pleading  and  evidence — p  575 

318.  Hearing,  determination,  and  relief — p  577 

319.  Review  and  costs — p  577 

F.  CONPBSSBD  JUDGMENTS — p  578 

§  320.    Amendment— p  578 

321.  Opening  and  vacating — p  578 

322.    Jurisdiction  and  authority — p  582 

323.    Grounds— p  583 

324.    Meritorious  defenses — p  586 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

10 


49    C.J.S.  JUDGMENTS 

X.  AMENDING,  CORRECTING-,  REVIEWING,  OPENING,  AND  VACATING  JUDGMENT--Con- 

tinued 

F.  CONFESSED  JUDGMENTS — Continued 

§  325.    Affidavits  and  other  evidence — p  589 

326.    Hearing,  determination,  and  relief — p  593 

327.    Operation  and  effect  of  opening  or  vacating— p  597 

G.  JUDGMENTS  BY  CONSENT,  OFFER  AND  ACCEPTANCE,  AND  ON  MOTION  OR  SUMMARY  PBQCEED- 

INGS — p  598 

§  328.    Consent  judgments — p  598 

329.    Amendment— p  598 

330.  Opening  or  vacating — p  599 

331.  Judgments  on  offer  and  acceptance — p  604 

332.  Summary  judgments — p  605 

H.    JUDGMENTS  BY  DEFAULT — p  605 

§  333.  Opening,  amending,  and  vacating  generally — p  605 

'  334.  Right  to  and  grounds  for  opening  or  vacating — p  608 

335.  Judgment  on  constructive  service — p  641 

336.  Showing  meritorious  defense — p  642 

337.  Procedure  and  relief — p  650 

338.  Proceedings  in  cause  operating  to  open  default — p  688 

339.  Proceedings  after  opening  default — p  688 

340.    Defenses  available— p  689 

XL  EQUITABLE  BELIEF  AGAINST  JUDGMENT— p  690 

A.  IN  GENERAL — p  690 

§  341.    Nature  of  remedy  and  right  to  relief  in  general — p  690 

342.  Jurisdiction — p  694    . 

343.    Existence  of  or  resort  to  other  remedy;  inadequacy  of  remedy  at  law — 

p  695 

344.  Persons  entitled  to  relief— p  700 

345.  Persons  against  whom  relief  available — p  701 

346.  Judgments  against  which  relief  may  be  granted — p  701 

347.    By  confession  or  on  consent  or  offer — p  703 

348.    By  default— p  703 

349.  Meritorious  cause  of  action  or  defense — p  703 

B.  GROUNDS  K>R  RELIEF — p  706 

§  350.    In  general— p  706 

351.  Invalidity  of  judgment — p  709 

352.    Want  of  or  defects  in  process  or  service— p  710 

353.    False  return  of  service — p  711 

354.    Unauthorized  appearance — p  712 

355.  Payment  or  satisfaction  of  judgment — p  712 

356.  Errors  and  irregularities — p  713 

357.  Defects  or  objections  as  to  parties  or  pleadings — p  714 

358.  Objections  to  evidence— p  715 

359.  Error  in  amount  of  judgment  or  relief  granted — p  715 

360.  Irregular  rendition  or  entry — p  716 

361.  Defenses  not  interposed  in  former  action — p  716 

362.    .Equitable  defenses— p  720 

363.  Excuses  for  not  defending— p  720 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

11 


JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.S. 

XI.  EQUITABLE  RELIEF  AGAINST  JUDGMENT— Continued 

B.  GROUNDS  FOR  RELIEF — Continued 

§  364.  Ignorance  of  facts  or  law — p  722 

365.  Mistake  or  surprise — p  723 

366.  Accident  or  misfortune — p  725 

367.  Excusable  neglect— p  726 

368.  Negligence  or  misconduct  of  counsel — p  727 

369.  Matters  determined  in  original  action — p  729 

370.  Compelling  set-off  or  reduction  of  damages — p  730 

371.  Fraud,  perjury,  collusion,  or  other  misconduct— p  732 

372.  Fraud  or  concealment — p  732 

373.  Collusion— p  745 

374.  Perjury  and  subornation  of  perjury — p  745 

375.  Violation  of  agreement — p  748 

376.  Newly  discovered  evidence — p  749 

C.  PROCEDURE — p  751 

§  377.  Form  of  proceedings — p  751 

378.  Conditions  precedent — p  753 

379.  Time  to  sue  and  limitations — p  754 

380.  Defenses— p  756 

381.    Laches— p  757 

382.  Jurisdiction  of  particular  courts — p  759 

383.  Venue— p  760 

384.  Parties— p  761 

385.  Process  and  appearance — p  764 

386.  Release  of  errors — p  764 

387.  Preliminary  or  temporary  injunction — p  765 

388.  Pleading— p  767 

389.  Bill  or  complaint — p  767 

390.  Exhibits— p  776 

391.  Answer,  motion  to  dismiss,  and  demurrer — p  776 

392.  Issues,  proof,  and  variance — p  777 

393.  Evidence— p  778 

394.    Pleadings  as  evidence — p  785 

395.  Trial  or  hearing— p  786 

396.  Dismissal — p  787 

397.  Judgment  or  decree,  and  relief  awarded — p  787 

398.  Review  and  costs— p  790 

399.  Operation  and  effect  of  injunction — p  790 

400.  Damages  on  dissolution  of  injunction— p  791 

XH.  COLLATBEAL  ATTACK— p  792 

A* "  IN  GENERAL— p  792 

§  401.    General  rule— p  792 

402.  To  what  judgments  and  courts  rule  applies— -p  798 

403.  By  confession  or  on -consent  or  offer — p  800 

404.  By  default— p  800 

405.  In  criminal  cases — p  801 

406.  Judgments  and  orders  in  special  proceedings — p  802 

407.  Judgments  of  particular  courts  or  tribunals— p  802 

408.  What  constitutes  direct  or  collateral  attack— p  805 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

12 


49     C:  J.  S.  JUDGMENTS 

XTL  COLLATERAL  ATTACK— Continued 

A.  IN  GENERAL — Continued 

§  409.     Proceedings  to  enforce  judgment — p  813 

410.  Proceedings  to  prevent  enforcement  of  judgment — p  814 

411.  Separate  action  against  party  or  officer — p  816 

412.  Parties  affected  by  rule  against  collateral  attack — p  817 

413.  Parties  and  privies — p  817 

414.  Third  persons  in  general — p  818 

415.  Creditors — p  820 

B.  GROUNDS — p  820 

§  416.  Invalidity  of  judgment  generally — p  820 

417.  Insufficient  or  illegal  cause  of  action — p  820 

418.  Legal  disability  of  parties— p  821 

419.  Death  of  party  before  judgment — p  821 

420.  Disqualification  of  judge — p  821 

421.  Jurisdictional  defects — p  822 

422.  Want  of  or  defects  in  process  or  service — p  828 

423.  Defects  in  return  or  proof  of  service — p  830 

424.  Unauthorized  appearance — p  831 

425.  Presumptions  as  to  jurisdiction — p  831 

426.  Recitals  of  Jurisdictional  facts — p  843 

427.  Decision  of  court  as  to*  its  own  jurisdiction — p  849 

428.  Errors  and  irregularities — p  851 

429.  Defects  and  objections  as  to  parties — p  853 

430.  Defects  and  objections  as  to  pleadings — p  854 

431.  Irregularities  in  procedure — p  855 

432.  Objections  to  evidence — p  856 

433.  —  Defects  in  entry  or  contents  of  judgment — p  857 

434.  Fraud,  collusion,  or  perjury — p  859 

435.  Defenses  available  in  original  action — p  862 

CONSTRUCTION  AND  OPERATION  OP  JUDGMENT— p  862 

A.  CONSTRUCTION — p  862 

§  436.  In  general— p  862 

437.  Recitals — p  869 

438.  Pleadings— p  870 

439.  Verdict  or  findings — p  871 

440.  Parties— p  871 

441.  Issues— p  872 

442.  Recovery  and  relief — p  873 

443.  Conflict  in  record — p  874 

B.  OPERATION  AND  EFFECT — p  875 

§  444.  In  general— p  875 

445.  Conflicting  judgments — p  876 

446.  Time  of  taking  effect— p  876 

447.  Conditions  and  alternative  provisions — p  877 

448.  Extraterritorial  operation — p  878 

449.  Void  and  voidable  judgments — p  878 

450.  Partial  invalidity— p  881 

451.  Validating  void  judgment — p  882 

452.  Ratification  and  estoppel — p  883 

453.  Acceptance  by  prevailing  party  of  part  of  judgment — p  884 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

13 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


33V.  LDSN  OP  JUDGMENT— p  884 

§  454.  In  general— p  884 

455.  Nature  of  lien— p  885 

456.  Control  of  lien— p  887 

457.  Amount  of  lien— p  887 

458.  What  judgments  create  lien— p  887 

459.  Decrees  in  equity— p  888 

460.  Organization  and  character  of  court— p  889 

461.  Statutory  requirements  in  general — p  889 

462.  Transcript  or  abstract— p  889 

463.  Recording,  docketing,  and  indexing  judgment— p  896 

464.  Indexing— p  898 

465.  Sufficiency  to  create  lien— p  898 

466.  Commencement  of  lien— p  902 

467.  Lien  of  transferred  judgment— p  904 

468.  Necessity  of  issue  of  execution — p  904 

469.  Judgment  or  amendment  nunc  pro  tune — p  905 

470.  Effect  of  stay  of  execution — p  906 

471.  Property  affected  by  lien — p  906 

472.  Nature  of  property — p  906 

473.  Location  of  property — p  908 

474.  Property  previously  transferred— p  909 

475.  Property  fraudulently  conveyed — p  910 

476.  Lands  instantaneously  seized — p  910 

477.  After-acquired  property— p  911 

478.  Estate  or  interest  affected  by  lien — p  912 

479.  Equitable  interests  in  general — p  916 

480.  Interests  of  parties  to  executory  contract  of  sale— p  918 

481.  Trust  estates  and  legal  titles— p  920 

482.  Leaseholds— p  922 

483.  Priority  of  liens— p  923 

484.  Between  judgments — p  923 

485.  Between  judgment  and  conveyances  and  other  liens — p  926 

486.  Postponement  of  lien— p  938 

487.  Proceedings  for  determination  of  priority — p  940 

488.  Transfer  of  property  subject  to  lien— p  941 

489.  Duration  of  lien— p  944 

490.  As  against  junior  judgments — p  946 

491.  Death  of  judgment  debtor— p  946 

492.  Extending  lien— p  947 

493.  Issue  and  levy  of  execution — p  947 

494.  Revival  of  judgment — p  948 

495.  Suit  to  enforce  lien  or  to  subject  property;   action  on  judgment— p  949 

496.  Absence  of  debtor  from  state — p  949 

497.  Agreement  of  parties — p  950 

498.  Matters  preventing  enforcement  of  judgment — p  950 

499.  Loss,  release,  or  extinguishment  of  lien — p  951 

500.  By  release— p  953 

501.  Payment  or  satisfaction  of  judgment— p  953 

502.  Sale  under  execution — p  954 

503.  Stay  of  execution — p  954 

504.  Injunction  against  judgment — p  955 

505.  Receivership— p  955 

506.  Opening  or  vacating  judgment — p  955 

See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

14 


9    C.J.S.  JUDGMENTS 

XIV.  LIEN  OF  JUDaMENT— Continued 

§  507.    Waiver  and  estoppel— p  955 

508.    Destruction,  removal,  or  concealment  of  property— p  956 

509.    Appeal  or  writ  of  error — p  956 

510.  Remedies  of  creditor  after  termination  of  lien— p  957 

511.  Enforcement  of  lien— p  957 

XV.  ASSIGNMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS— p  961 

§  512.  Assignability  of  judgments — p  961 

513.  Future  judgments— p  963 

514.  Persons  who  may  assign  or  purchase — p  963 

515.  Mode  and  sufficiency  of  assignment — p  964 

516.  Equitable  assignments— p  967 

517.  Consideration— p  968 

518.  Recording— p  969 

519.  Operation  and  effect — p  969 

520.  Partial  assignments— p  971 

521.  Rights  and  liabilities  of  parties— p  972 

522.  As  to  judgment  debtor  in  general— p  972 

523.  As  affected  by  notice  to  debtor— p  975 

524.  As  affected  by  equities,  defenses,  and  agreements  between  original  par- 
ties—p  976 

525.  As  between  assignor  and  assignee— p  977 

526.  As  to  third  persons— p  978 

527.  Rights  incidental  to  assignment— p  979 

528.  Effect  of  reversal  or  vacation  after  assignment— p  981 

529.  Priority  of  assignments— p  982 

530.  Setting  aside  assignment— p  983 

XVI.  SUSPENSION  AND  REVIVAL  OF  JUDGMENT— p  983 

A.  IN  GENERAL— p  983 

§  531.    Suspension  or  stay  of  proceedings— p  983 
532.    Dormant  judgments— p  984 

B.  REVIVAL  OF  JUDGMENTS— p  989 

§  533.    Necessity— p  989      . 

534.    Death  of  party— p  989 

535.  Right  to  revive— p  991 

535.  Grounds  for  revival— p  991 

537.  Who  may  revive— p  991 

538.  Against  whom  revival  may  be  .had— p  992 

539.  Judgments  which  may  be  revived— p  994 

540.  Defenses  or  grounds  of  opposition— p  995 

541.  Jurisdiction  and  venue— p  999 

542.  Time  for  revival— p  999 

543.  Mode  of  revival— p  1002 

544.  Action  to  revive— p  1003 

545.  Action  of  debt— p  1004 

546.  Motion  to  revive— p  1004 

547.  Summons  to  show  cause — p  1005 

548.  • Scire  facias— p  1005 

549.  Operation  and  effect  of  revival— p  1019 


See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 

15 


JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.S. 

XVH.  PAYMENT,  SATISFACTION,  AND  DISCHARGE  OP  JUDGMENT— p  1021 

§  550.  Persons  to  whom  payment  may  be  made — p  1021 

551.  Clerk  of  court  or  other  officer — p  1022 

552.  Mode,  medium,  and  sufficiency  of  payment — p  1022 

553.  Tender— p  1024 

554.  Payment  by  joint  party  or  third  person — p  1025 

555.  Payment  by  joint  debtor — p  1025 

556.  Payment  by  suretjr — p  1027 

557.  Payment  by  stranger — p  1027 

558.  Payment  by  officer— p  1028 

559.  Evidence  of  payment — p  1028 

560.  Payment  as  question  of  law  or  fact — p  1034 

561.  Merger  of  judgments — p  1035 

562.  Assignment  as  extinguishment — p  1037 

563.  Release  or  discharge — p  1037 

564.  Joint  debtors— p  1039 

565.  Agreement  to  release  or  satisfy — p  1040 

566.  Set-off  of  judgment  against  judgment — p  1041 

567.  Persons  entitled  to — p  1043 

568.  Judgments  subject  to— p  1043 

569.  Proceedings  to  obtain — p  1048 

570.  Operation  and  effect— p  1050 

571.  Set-off  of  judgment  against  claim — p  1050 

572.  Set-off  of  claim  against  judgment — p  1052 

573.  Satisfaction  by  execution  or  enforcement — p  1054 

574.  Other  means  of  satisfaction — p  1057 

575.  Satisfaction  of  one  of  several  judgments  on  same  cause  of  action — |p  1057 

576.  Against  different  persons — p  1058 

577.  Operation  and  effect  of  satisfaction— p  1058 

578.  Recovery  of  payments — p  1059 

579.  Entry  of  satisfaction— p  1059 

580.  Satisfaction  piece— p  1060 

581.  Proceedings  to  compel — p  1060 

582.  Actions  and  penalties  for  failure  to  satisfy — p  1065 

583.  Effect— p  1066 

584.  Vacation  or  correction — p  1066 

XVULL  ENFORCEMENT  OP  JUDGMENTS— p  1071 

§  585.  In  general— p  1071 

586.  Enforcement  at  law — p  1072 

587.  Enforcement  in  equity — p  1074 

588.  Scire  facias  to  enforce — p  1076 

589.  Scire  facias  to  obtain  new  execution — p  1076 

590.  Proceedings  to  make  parties — p  1076      r-~  -- 

591.  Scire  facias  on  justice's  transcript — p  1077 


See  also  descriptive  word  index  in  the  back  of  this  Volume 
§§  592  to  End  in  Volume  5O 


16-24 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 
L  DEFINITION,  NATTJUE,  AND  KINDS 


§1 


§  l.    Definitions 

A  judgment  may  be  broadly  defined  as  the  decision 
or  sentence  of  the  law  given  by  a  court  or  other  tribunal 
as  the  result  of  proceedings  instituted  therein;  in  this 
sense  a  decision  of  any  court  is  a  judgment,  including 
courts  of  equity,  and  in  a  criminal  case  a  sentence  Is  a 
Judgment. 

In  its  broadest  sense  a  judgment  is  the  decision  or 


sentence  of  the  law  given  by  a  court  of  justice  or 
other  competent  tribunal  as  the  result  of  proceed- 
ings instituted  therein,1  or  the  final  consideration 
and  determination  of  a  court  on  matters  submitted 
to  it  in  an  action  or  proceeding,2  whether  or  not 
execution  follows  thereon.3  More  particularly  it 
is  a  judicial  determination  that,  on  matters  submit- 


1.  N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dor- 
man  v.  Usbe  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n,  180  A.  413,  415,  115  N.J.Law 
837. 

Pa. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In  re 
Kruska's  Estate,  7  Pa.Dist  &  Co. 
273,  275,  7  Nor  thumb.  L.J.  281. 

33  C.J.  p  1047  note  1. 

Particular  kinds  of  judgments  see 
infra  §§  8-12. 

Similar  definitions 

(1)  The  affirmance  by  law  of  legal 
consequences  attending  a  proved  or 
admitted  set  of  facts. — Berg  v.  Berg, 
132  P.2d  871,  872,  56  Cal.App.2d  495. 

(2)  The  conclusion  of  law  on  facts 
found,  or  admitted  by  the  parties,  or 
upon   their  default  in  the  course  of 
the  suit. 

Ky. — Bell  Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth,  61 
S.W.2d  879,  880.  250  Ky.  21. 

N.J. — Ross  v.  C.  D.  Mallory  Corpo- 
ration, 37  A.2d  766,  768,  132  N.J. 
Law  1. 

N.C.— Eborn  v.  Ellis,  35  S.E.2d  238, 
240,  225  N.C.  386. 

Tex.— Williams  v.  Tooke,  Civ.App., 
116  S.W.2d  1114,  1116,  error  dis- 
missed. 

33  C.J.  p  1047  note  1  [b]   (7). 

(3)  The  Judicial  determination  or 
sentence    of    a    court    on    a   matter 
within  its  jurisdiction. 

U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Hark,  Mass.,  64  S.Ct. 

359,    361,    320    U.S.    531,    88    L.Ed. 

290. 
Md.— Schmeizl   v.   Schmeizl,   42  A.2d 

106,  112. 

(4)  The  final  decision  or  sentence 
of  the  law  rendered  by  a  court  with 
respect  to  a  cause  within  its  juris- 
diction   and    coming    legally    before 
it  as  the  result  of  proper  proceedings 
rightly  instituted. 

Mass. — Morse    v.    O'Hara,    142    N.E. 

40,  41,  247  Mass.  183. 
Okl.— Prayer  v.  Grain,  163  P.2d  966, 

968. 

(5)  The  final  determination  of  the 
rights  of  the  parties. 

Okl.— Protest  of  Gulf  Pipe  Line  Co. 
of  Oklahoma,  32  P.2d  42,  43,  168 
Okl.  136 — Dresser  v.  Dresser,  22 
P.2d  1012.  1025,  164  Okl.  94. 

Utah. — Patterlck  v.  Carbon  Water 
Conservancy  Dist.,  145  P.2d  502, 
507. 

(6)  The  final  sentence  of  the  law 
on  matter  at  issue  in  the  case  as 
presented    by    the    record. — G.    Am- 


sinck  &  Co.  v.  Springfield  Grocer  Co., 
C.C.A.MO.,  7  P.2d  855,  858. 

(7)  The  pronouncement  of  a  judge 
on    issues    submitted    to    him. — Bell 
Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth,  61  S.W.2d  879, 
880,  250  Ky.  21. 

(8)  What  the  court  pronounces. — 
Linton  v.  Smith,  154  S.W.2d  643,  645, 
137  Tex.  479 — De  Leon  v.  Texas  Em- 
ployers Ins.  Ass'n,  Tex.Civ.App.,   159 
S.W.2d  574,  575,  error  refused — Lew- 
is v.  Terrell,  Tex.Civ.App.,  154   S.W. 
2d  151,  153,  error  refused — Jones  v. 
Sun    Oil    Co.,    Civ.App,,    145    S.W.2d 
615,   619,   reversed  on  other  grounds 
153    S.W.2d   571,    137   Tex.   353— Cor- 
bett   v.    Rankin    Independent    School 
Dist.,   Tex.Oiv.App.,   100    S.W.2d   113, 
115. 

(9)  A  number  of  cases  have  fol- 
lowed   Blacks  tone's    definition    of    a 
judgment  as  the  sentence  of  the  law 
pronounced   by  the   court   upon   the 
matter  contained  in  the  record. 
U.S.— Karl  Kiefer  Mach.  Co.  v.  TJ.  S. 

Bottlers  Machinery  Co.,  108  F.2d 
469,  470. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Toman  v.  Crane, 
23  N.E.2d  337,  3'39,  372  111.  228— 
Blakeslee's  Storage  Warehouses  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  17  N.E.2d  1,  3,  369 
111.  480,  120  A.L.R.  715. 

Tex. — Williams  v.  Tooke,  Civ.App., 
116  S.W.2d  1114,  1120,  error  dis- 
missed. 

33  C.J.  p  1047  note  1  [a]. 

(10)  Other  similar  definitions. 
U.S. — Allegheny  County  v.  Maryland 

Casualty  Co.,  C.C.A.Pa.,  132  F.2d 
894,  897,  certiorari  denied  63  S.Ct 
981,  318  U.S.  787,  87  L.Ed.  1154. 

111. — General  Electric  Co.  v.  Gellman 
Mfg.  Co.,  48  N.E.2d  451,  318  111. 
App.  644. 

Ky. — Bell  Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth,  61 
S.W.2d  .879,  880,  250  Ky.  21. 

Miss.— Welch  v.  Kroger  Grocery  Co., 
177  So.  41,  42,  180  Miss.  89. 

N.C. — Lawrence  v.  Beck,  116  S.E. 
424,  426,  185  N.C.  196. 

Ohio.— State  ex  rel,  Curran  v. 
Brookes,  50  N.E.2d  995,  998,  142 
Ohio  St  107. 

Tex. — Jackson  v.  Slaughter,  Civ.App., 
185  S.W.2d  759,  761,  refused  for 
want  of  merit — Davis  v.  Hemphill, 
Civ.App.,  243  S.W.  691,  693. 

Wis. — In  re  Wisconsin  Mut  Ins.  Co., 
6  N.W.2d  33.0,  331,  241  Wis.  394, 
certiorari  denied  Hinge  v.  Duel,  63 

25 


S.Ct.    1157,   319  U.S.    747,'   87  L.Ed. 

1703. 

33  C.J.  p  1047  note  1  [b]. 
Synonymous  terms 

(1)  The  term  "judgment"  compre- 
hends  all   decrees  and   final    orders, 
rendered    by    a   court    of   competent 
jurisdiction,     which     determine     the 
rights  of  parties  affected  thereby. — 
In  re  Frey's  Estate,   40  N.E.2d  145» 
148,  139  Ohio  St.  354—33  C.J.  p  1047 
note  1   [c]   (5). 

(2)  Other     synonymous     terms. — 
Samuel  Goldwyn,  Inc.  v.  United  Ar- 
tists  Corporation,   C.C.A.Del.t   113   F. 
2d   703,    706—33   C.J.   p   1047   note   1 
CcL 

Mythical  case 

An  attempt  to  retain  the  right  to- 
pass  on  the  merits  of  a  mythical 
case  not  then  in  existence,  and  which 
will  exist  as  an  independent  suit,, 
when  and  if  it  comes  into  existence, 
is  not  a  "judgment"  as  that  term 
is  legally  defined. — Goldsmith  v. 
Salkey,  112  S.W.2d  165,  169,  131  Tex. 
139. 

2.  U.S.— Karl    Kiefer    Mach.    Co.    v. 
U.  S.  Bottlers  Machinery  Co.;  C.C. 
A.I11.,  108  F.2d  469,  470. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Toman  v.  Crane, 
23  N.E.2d  337,  339,  372  111.  228— 
Blakeslee's  Storage  Warehouses  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  17  N.E.2d  1,  3* 
369  111.  480,  120  A.L.R.  715— Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Klee  v.  Kelly,  32  N.E.2d 
923,  929,  309  111. App.  72— People- 
ex  rel.  Keeler  v.  Kelly,  32  N.E.2d 
922,  309  IlLApp.  133— People  ex 
rel.  Gallachio  v.  Kelly,  32  N.E.2d 
921,  909  IlLApp.  133— People  ex 
rel.  Clennon  v.  Kelly,  32  N.E.2oT 
921,  309  IlLApp.  133— People  ex 
rel.  Salomon  v.  Kelly,  32  N.E.2d 
920,  309  IlLApp.  133. 

Tex. — Fort  Worth  Acid  Works  v. 
City  of  Fort  Worth,  Civ.App.,  248: 
S.W.  822,  824,  affirmed  City  of  Fort 
Worth  v.  Fort  Worth  Acid  Works- 
Co.,  Cora.App.,  259  S.W.  919. 

Similarly  expressed 

Ohio. — State  ex  rel.  Curran  v. 
Brookes,  50  N.E.2d  995,  998,  142 
Ohio  St  107. 

Okl.— State  v.  Walton,  236  P.  629r 
632,  30  Okl.Cr.  416.  , 

33  C.J.  p  1047  note  1  [b3   (4). 

3.  pa,— Petition  of  Kariher,  181  X. 
265,  270,  284  Pa,  455. 


§1 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ted  to  a  court  for  decision,  a  legal  duty  or  liability 
does  or  does  not  exist,4  or  that,  with  respect  to  a 
claim  in  suit,  no  cause  of  action  exists  or  that  no 
defense  exists.5 

In  the  broad  sense  here  denned,  a  decision  of  any, 
court  is  a  judgment,6  including  courts  of  equity,7 
admiralty,8  and  probate.9  The  judgment  of  a  court 
of  equity  or  admiralty,  however,  as  distinguished 
from  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  common  law,  is 
generally  known  as  a  "decree."10  In  a  criminal 
case  a  sentence  is  a  judgment.11  In  a  narrower 
sense  the  term  "judgment"  is  limited  to  a  decision 
of  a  court  of  law.12 

Under  codes.  Under  most  codes  of  procedure, 
judgments  are  defined  in  substance  as  the  final  de- 
termination of  the  rights  of  the  parties  in  an  ac- 
tion or  proceeding.13  Under  codes  abolishing  the 
distinction  between  actions  at  law  and  suits  in  eq- 
uity, a  decree  is  included  in  the  code  definition  of 
a  judgment,  and  the  final  determination  of  a  cause 


is  a  judgment  whether  the  relief  granted  is  equita- 
ble or  legal.14  Indeed  the  terms  "judgment"  and 
"decree"  are  more  or  less  synonymous  and. inter- 
changeable in  code  practice.15 

An  "adjudication"  is  a  judgment  or  the  entry  of 
a  decree  by  a  court  with  respect  to  the  parties  in  a 
case.16 

§  2.    General  Nature 

A  Judgment  is  a  judicial  act  which  settles  the  is- 
sues, fixes  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties,  and 
determines  the  proceeding,  and  it  is  regarded  as  the 
sentence  of  the  law  pronounced  by  the  court  on  the  ac- 
tion or  question  before  it. 

A  judgment  is  the  judicial  act  of  a  court17  by 
which  it  accomplishes  the  purpose  of  its  creation.18 
It  is  a  judicial  declaration  by  which  the  issues  are 
settled19  and  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties 
are  fixed  as  to  the  matters  submitted  for  decision.20 
In  other  words,  a  judgment  is  the  end  of  the  law;21 
its  rendition  is  the  object  for  which  jurisdiction  is 


4.    Wash.— In  re  Clark,  IffS  P.2d  577, 

580. 
B.    Okl.— Frayer  v.    Grain,    163    P.2d 

966,  968. 

6.  111.— Patterson   v.    Scott,    33    111. 
App.  348,  affirmed  31  N.E.  433,  143 
111.  138. 

33  C.J.  p  1048  note  2. 

7.  Gal. — Coleman    v.     Los     Angeles 
County,  182  P.  440,  180  Cal.  714. 

33  C.J.  p  1048  note  3. 

8.  U.S. — IT.  S.  v.  Wonson,  C.C.Mass., 
28  F.Cas.No.16,750,  1  Gall.  5. 

9.  Ohio.— In  re  Frey's  Estate,  40  N. 
E.2d  145,   148,   139  Ohio   St.   354. 

33  C.J.  p  1048  note  5. 

10.  U.S. — Lamson  v.  Hutchings,  111., 
118  F.  321,  323,  55  C.C.A.  245,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  23  S.Ct.  853,  189  U. 
S.  514,  mem,  4  L.Ed  924. 

33  C.J.  p  1049  note  6.  . 

"Decree"  defined  see  Equity  §  580. 

11.  Wash.— In    re    Clark,    163    P.2d 
577,  581. 

33  C.J.  p  1049  note  8. 

12.  Cal. — Coleman    v.    Los    Angeles 
County,  182  P.  440,  180  Cal.  714. 

33  C.J.  p  1049  note  9. 

13.  U.S. — G.     Amsinck     &     Co.     v. 
Springfield    Grocer   Co.,    C.C.A.Mo., 
7  F.2d  855,  858. 

Ark. — Wann  v.  Reading  Co.,  108  S. 
W.2d  899,  901,  194  Ark.  541. 

Idaho.— State  v.  McNichols,  115  P. 
2d  104,  107,  62  Idaho  616. 

Iowa.— Whittier  v.  Whittler,  23  N*.W. 
2d  435,  440. 

Ky. — Bell  Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth,  61 
S.W.2d  879,  880,  250  Ky.  21.' 

I/a. — Lacour  Plantation  Co.  v.  Jewell, 
173  So.  761,  763,  186  La.  1055. 

Mont. — State  ex  rel.  Meyer  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fourth  Judicial  Dis- 
trict in  and  fof  Missoula  County, 


57  P.2d  778,  780,  102  Mont.  222. 
N.Y. — Wood  v.  City  of  Salamanca,  45 

N.E.2d    443,    445,    289    N.T.    279. 
N.D. — Universal  Motors  v.  Coman,  15 

N.W.Sd  73,  73  N.D.  337. 
33  C.J.  p  1049  note  10. 

14.  Mont. — Raymond  v.  Blancgrrass, 
93  P.  648,  36  Mont.  449,  15  L.R.A., 
tf.S.,   976. 

33  C.J.  p  1050  note  11. 

15.  Wash.— Smith  v.   Smith,   115  P. 
166,  167,  63  Wash.  288. 

33  C.J.  p  1050  note  12. 

16.  U.S. — Samuel    Goldwyn,    Inc.    v. 
United  Artists  Corporation,  C.C.A. 
Del.,  113  F.2d  703,  706. 

Hearing 

An  "adjudication"  essentially  im- 
plies a  hearing  by  a  court,  after  no- 
tice, of  legal  evidence  on  the  factual 
issue  involved. — Genzer  v.  Fillip, 
Tex.Civ.App.,- 134  S.W.2d  730,  732,  er- 
ror dismissed,  judgment  correct. 

17.  111. — People    ex    rel.    Toman    v. 
Crane,   23  N.E.2d  337,  339,   372  111. 
228 — Blakeslee's      Storage     Ware- 
houses v.  City  of  Chicago,  17  N.E. 
2d    1,    3,    369    111.    480,    120    A.L.R. 
715. 

N.J. — Dorman    v.    Usbe    Building    & 
Loan   Ass'n,   180   A.   413,   415,    115 
N.J.Law  337. 
Determination  of  Judge 

Judgments  are  the  solemn  deter- 
minations of  judges  on  subjects  sub- 
mitted to  them,  and  a  judgment  is 
not  what  may  be  rendered,  but  what 
is  considered  and  delivered  by  the 
court. — Eborn  v.  Ellis,  35  S.B.2d  238, 
225  N.C.  386. 
Fiat 

'A  judgment  is  a  fiat  of  a  court, 
settling  the  rights  of  the  parties, 
and,  however  unjust,  erroneous,  or 

26 


illegal  the  settlement  may  be,  the 
parties  can  claim  under  it  only 
that  which,  by  its  terms,  the  judg- 
ment awards. — Lacaze  v.  Hardee,  La. 
App.,  7  So.2d  719,  724. 

18.  Okl.— Protest  of  Gulf  Pipe  Line 
Co.   of  Oklahoma,  32   P.2d   42,   43, 
168  Okl.  136. 

Purpose 

(1)  Judgments    are    judicial    acts 
with  the  primary  objective  in  view 
of  concluding  controversies  with  as 
high  a  degree  of  exact  justice  as  it 
is  humanly  possible  to  do. — Jackson 
v.   Slaughter,   Tex.Civ.App.,  185  S.W. 
2d  759,  761,  refused  for  want  of  mer- 
it. 

(2)  Purpose    of    every    judgment 
should    be    to    limit    litigation    and 
clearly  establish  rights  of  parties  as 
found  by  courts. — Cameron  v.  Feath- 
er River  Forest  Homes,  33  P.2d  884, 
139  CaLApp.  373. 

19.  Tex. — Lewis  v.  Terrell,  Civ.App., 
154  S.W.2d  151,  153,  error  refused. 

Imposed  in  invitum 

A  judgment  is  usually  imposed  in 
invitum,  although  it  may  be  for  the 
enforcement  of  an  indebtedness  pre- 
viously contracted. — Cherey  v.  City 
of  Long  Beach,  26  N.E.2d  945,  282  N. 
T.  382,  127  A.L.R.  1210. 
Opinion  and  adjudication 

Judgment  reciting  in  substance 
that  court,  considering  proof  and 
pleadings,  was  of  opinion  and  so 
adjudged  that  defendant  was  indebt- 
ed to  plaintiff  in  certain  sum  with 
interest  and  costs  was  "judgment." — 
Bell  Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth,  61  S.W.2d 
879,  250  Ky.  21. 

20.  Utah. — Adams  v.  Davies,  156  P. 
2d  207,  209. 

21.  Kan.— Corpus    Juris    auoted    in 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


conferred  and  exercised,22  and  it  is  the  power  by 
means  of  which  a  liability  is  enforced  against  the 
debtor's  property.23  A  judicial  judgment  is  not 
necessarily  a  judgment  for  money  or  thing  enforce- 
able by  execution  or  other  process;  it  may  be  a 
final  and  conclusive  determination  of  a  status,  or  a 
right,  or  a  privilege,  or  the  basis  of  action.2*  A 
judgment  is  neither  an  action  nor  a  special  proceed- 
ing, but  is  the  determination  of  an  action  or  pro- 
ceeding.26 

A  judgment  is  the  sentence  of  the  law  on  the  ul- 
timate facts  admitted  by  the  pleadings  or  proved  by 
the  evidence.26  It  is  not  a  resolve  or  decree  of  the 
court,  but  the  sentence  of  the  law  prpnounced  by 
the  court  on  the  action  or  question  before  it.27  It 
must  be  based  solely  on  the  legal  rights  of  the  liti- 
gants and  not  on  the  result  of  the  litigation.28 

A  judgment  constitutes  the  considered  opinion  of 
the  court29  and  is  a  solemn  record30  and  formal  .ex- 


pression and  evidence  of  the  actual  decision  of  a 
lawsuit.31  The  precedent  or  draft  for  judgment 
may  not  be  treated  as  a  judgment.32 

Vested  right  of  property.  A  judgment  may  con- 
stitute a  vested  right  of  property  in  the  judgment 
creditor33  within  the  protection  of  constitutional 
provisions  discussed  in  Constitutional  Law  §§  271- 
272. 

§  3.    Entirety  of  Judgments 

A  judgment  is  an  entirety. 

It  has  generally  been  held  to  be  the  rule  that  a 
judgment  must  be  treated  as  an  entirety.34  The  ef- 
fect of  this  rule  as  requiring  that  a  judgment  stand 
or  fall  as  a  whole,  and  the  circumstances  under 
which  a  judgment  which  is  partially  invalid  may  be 
enforced  as  far  as  it  is  valid,  are  discussed  infra  § 
450. 


Kansas  City  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  An- 
thony, 52  P.2d  1208,  1211,  142  Kan. 
670. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Wil- 
liams v.  Tooke,  Civ.App.,  116  S.W. 
2d  1114.  1116,  error  dismissed. 

23  C.J.  p  1051  note  19. 

A  Judgment  is  the  law's  last  word 
in  a  judicial  controversy. 
U.S.— Karl    Kiefer    Mach.    Co.    v.    TJ. 

S.   Bottlers   Machinery  Co.,   C.C.A. 

111.,  108  F.2d  469,  470. 
Ala.— Hudson  v.  Wright,   51  So.  389, 

164  Ala.  298,  137  Am.S.R.  55. 
111. — People  ex  rel.  Toman  v.  Crane, 

28  N.B.2d  337,  339,  372  111.  228— 
,  Blakeslee's  Storage  Warehouses  v. 

City  of  Chicago,  17  N.B.2d  1,  3,  369 

111.  480,  120  A.L.R.  715. 
N.Y.— Steinberg  v.  Mealey,  33  N.Y.S. 

2d  650,  263  App.Div.  479. 

22.  Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Kansas  City  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  An- 
thony, 52  P.2d  1208,  1211,  142  Kan. 
670. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Wil- 
liams v.  Tooke,  Civ.App.,  116  S.W. 
2d  1114,  1116,  error  dismissed. 

33  C.OT.  p  1051  note  20. 

23.  Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    In. 

Kansas  City  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  An- 
thony, 52  P.2d  1208,  1211,  142  Kan. 
670. 

N.J.— Nichols  v.  Dissler,  81  N.J.Law 
461,  473,  86  AmJX  219. 

N.T.— Steinberg  v.  Mealey,  38  N.T.S. 
2d  650,  263  App.Div.  479. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Wil- 
liams v.  Tooke,  Civ.App.,  116  S.W. 
2d  1114,  1116,  error  dismissed. 

Existence  and  enforcement  of  indebt- 
edness 

Judgment  Is  credit,  chose  in  ac- 
tion, or  incorporeal  right,  which  de- 
clares existence  of  indebtedness, 


fixes  amount  due  and  owing,  and  pro- 
vides means  for  enforcing  payment 
thereof,  although  it  does  not  create, 
add  to,  or  detract  from  debt. — Salter 
v.  Walsworth,  La.App.,  167  So.  494. 

24.  U.S.— In  re  Frischer  &  Co.,   16 
Ct.gust.App.  191. 

Affirmation  of  liattlity 

A  judgment  is  merely  the  affirma- 
tion of  a  liability,  and  leaves  the 
parties  to  pursue  remedies  provided 
by  law. — San  Luis  Power  &  Water 
Co.  v.  Trujillo,  26  P.2d  537,  540.  98 
Colo.  385. 

25.  Iowa.— Gray    v.    Iljff,    30    Iowa 
195,  appeal  dismissed  14  S.Ct.  1168, 
154    U.S.    589,   38   L.Bd.   1088. 

"Action"  as  including  judgment  see 

Actions  §  1  a  (1)  (c). 
"Proceeding"       distinguished       from 

"judgment"  see  Actions  §  1  h  (1) 

(b). 

26.  Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Kansas  City  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  An- 
thony, 52  P.2d  1208,  1211,  142  Kan. 
670. 

N.C.— Lawrence  v.  Beck,  116  S.E.  424, 

185  N.C.  196. 

It  is  a  conclusion  of  law  from 
facts  proved  or  admitted  in  suit — 
Bell  v.  State  Industrial  Accident 
Commission,  74  P.2d  65,  157  Or.  653. 

27.  U.S. — G.     Amsinck     &     Co.     v. 
Springfield   Grocer   Co.,    C.C.A.MO., 
7  P.2d  855. 

33  C.J.  p  1051  note  24. 

It  applies  the  law  to  past  or  pres- 
ent facts 

U.S. — Oklahoma  City,  Okl.,  v.  Dolese, 
C.C.A.Okl.,  48  P.2d  734. 

Conn. — Eastern  Oil  Refining  Co.  v. 
Court  of  Burgesses  of  Wallingford, 
36  A.2d  586,  130  Conn.  606. 

27 


28.  R.I. — Cleveland   v.    Jencks   Mfg. 
Co.,   171  A.  917,  54  R.I.  218. 

Set-off  of  errors 

A  correct  judgment  cannot  be  pro- 
duced by  a  set-off  of  errors. — Eber- 
hardt  v.  Bennett,  137  S.E.  64,  163 
Ga.  796. 

29.  Tex. — Jackson  v.  Slaughter,  Civ. 
App.,   185  S.W.2d  759,  761,  refused 
jfor  want  of  merit. 

30.  N.J.— Dorman  v.  Usbe  Building 
&  Loan  Ass'n,  180  A.  413,  415,  115 
N.XLaw  -337. 

31.  Cal. — Gossman  v.   Gossman,   126 
P.2d    178,    185,    52   Cal.App.2d   184. 
"There  are  two  necessary  elements 

in  any  valid  judgment  or  order  of 
a  court;  (a)  The  court's  decision  or 
determination,  usually  evidenced  by 
some  oral  statement  or  pronounce- 
ment of  the  court,  but  often  by  a 
written  opinion,  direction  or  decree; 
and  (b)  the  enrollment  or  entry  by 
the  clerk  of  the  court's  action,  or 
the  essential  part  of  it,  upon  the 
order  book  or  record  of  the  court. 
The  first  element  is  judicial;  the 
latter  clerical.  The  former  involves 
discretion;,  the  latter  obedience." — 
Happy  Coal  Co.  v.  Brashear,  92  S.W. 
2d  23,  28,  263  Ky.  257. 

32.  Ark. — Wtann  v.  Beading  Co.,  108 
S.W.2d  899,  194  Ark.  541. 

33.  N.T. — Livingston  v.   Livingston, 
66  N.E.  123,  173  N.T.  377.  93  Am. 
S.R.  600,  61  L.R.A.  800. 

33  C.J.  p  1059  note  93. 

34.  111.— Holer  v.  Kaplan,   145  N.E. 
243,  31$  111.  448— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Coyle  v.  Velie  Motors  Cor- 
poration, 27  N.E.2d  60,  63,  305  111. 
App.  135. 

Mo. — Neal  v.  Curtis  &  Co.  Mfg.  Co., 

41    S.W.2d   543,    328   Mo.   389. 
33  C.J.  p  1051  note  25. 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  4.    — _  Distinguished  from  Decisions  and 
Findings 

As  a  general  rule,  decisions,  opinions,  findings,  or 
verdicts  do  not  constitute  a  judgment  or  decree  but 
merely  form  the  basis  on  which  the  Judgment  is  subse- 
quently to  be  rendered. 

As  a  general  rule,  the  decisions,  opinions,  or  find- 
ings of  a  court,35  referee,36  administrative  board,87 
or  committee58  do  not  constitute  a  judgment  or  de- 
cree, but  merely  form  the  basis  on  which  the  judg- 
ment is  subsequently  to  be  rendered.39  Under  some 


statutes,  however,  the  word  "decision"  is  used  as  the 
equivalent  of  "judgment"  and  "decree,"40  and  is 
distinguished  from  the  term  "opinion"  in  that  the 
latter  term  refers  to  a  statement  of  reasons  on 
which  the  decision  or  judgment  rests.41 

-  A  verdict  is  not  a  judgment,  but  only  the  basis 
for  a  judgment,  which  may,  or  may  not,  be  entered 
on  it.42  A  finding  is  not  a  judgment  any  more  than 
is  the  verdict  of  a  jury.43  Such  findings  or  deci- 
sion amount  only  to  an  order  for  judgment44  and 


35.  U.S.— -Baxter  v.  City  and  County 
of  Dallas  Levee  Improvement 
Dist.,  C.C.A.TCX.,  131  F.2d  434— 
G.  Amslnck  &  Co.  v.  Springfield 
Grocer  Co.,  C.C.A.MO.,  7  F.2d  855 
— McGhee  v.  Leitner,  D.C.Wis.,  41 
F.Supp.  674. 

Ala, — Cooper  v.  Owen,  161  So.  98,  230 
Ala.  316. 

Cal.— El  Centro  Grain  Co.  v.  Bank  of 
Italy  Nat.  Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n, 
11  P.2d  650,  123  Cal.App.  6G4— 
Hume  v.  Lindholm,  258  P.  1003,  85 
Cal.App.  80. 

Colo.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Mulich, 
266  P.  1110,  83  Colo.  518. 

Idaho. — Blaine  County  Inv.  Co.  v. 
Mays,  15  P.2d  734,  52  Idaho  381. 

Iowa.— Shaw  v.  Addison,  18  N.W.2d 
796 — Creel  v.  Hammans,  5  N.W.2d 
109,  232  Iowa  95 — In  re  Evans* 
Estate,  291  N.W.  460,  228  Iowa  908. 

La. — Delahoussaye  v.  I>.  M.  Glazer 
&  Co.,  App.,  182  So.  146,  reheard 
185  So.  644— Miller  v.  Morgan's  Da. 
&  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  1  La.App. 
267. 

Me. — Jones  v.  Jones,  8  A.2d  141,  136 
Me.  238. 

Mich.— Dolenga  v.  Lipka,  195  N.W. 
90,  224  Mich.  276. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  Con- 
way  v.  Fabian,  89  P.2d  1022,  1028, 
108  Mont.  287,  certiorari  denied 
Fabian  v.  Conway,  60  S.Ct  94, 
308  U.S.  578,  84  L.Ed.  484— State 
ex  rel.  King  v.  District  Court  of 
Third  Judicial  Dist.,  86  P.2d  755, 
107  Mont,  476 — Corpus  Juris  gnot- 
ed  in  Galiger  v.  McNulty,  260  P. 
401,  403,  80  Mont.  339. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited,  in,  Davis  v. 
Baum,  133  (P.2d  889,  891,  192  Okl. 
85 — Lee  v.  Epperson,  32  P.2d  309, 
168  Okl.  220. 

Tex.— Permian  Oil  Co.  v.  Smith,  73 
S.W.2d  490,  129  Tex.  413,  111  A.L. 
R.  1152,  rehearing  denied  107  S.W. 
2d  564,  129  Tex,  413,  111  A.L.R. 
1175— Davis  v.  Hemphill,  Civ.App., 
243  S.W.  691. 

33  C.J.  p  1052  note  33. 

"Decision"   and    "opinion"    of    court 
generally  defined  see  Courts  §  181 
a. 
The  mental  conclusion  of  the  judge 

presiding    at   a   trial,    the    oral   an- 
nouncement of  such  conclusion,  his 

written  memorandum  entered  in  the 

calendar,  or  the  abstract  entered  in 


the  judgment  docket  do  not  consti- 
tute a  judgment. — Ranee  v.  Gaddis, 
284  N.W.  468,  478,  226  Iowa  531— 
Lotz  v.  United  Food  Markets,  283  N. 
W.  99,  101,  225  Iowa  1397. 
Actual  sentence  of  law 

Judgment  purports  to  be  actual 
and  absolute  sentence  of  law,  as 
distinct  from  mere  finding  that  one 
of  parties  is  entitled  to  judgment,  or 
from  direction  to  effect  that  judg- 
ment may  be  entered. — American 
Motorists'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Central  Garage, 
169  A.  121,  86  N.H.  302. 

An,  orally  expressed  opinion,  or 
finding  by  a  judge  does  not  consti- 
tute a  judgment. — Moffott  v.  Lewis, 
11  P.2d  397,  123  Oal.App.  307—33  C. 
J.  p  1052  note  33  [c]. 
Inconsistency 

Decree  was  not  void  because  find- 
ings of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law 
were  inconsistent  with  decretal  por- 
tion since  findings  do  not  constitute 
the  judgment. — Higley  v.  Kinsman, 
Iowa,  216  N.W.  673. 

The  Judge's  minutes  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  the  judgment  or  decree 
rendered  by  the  court,  but  are  mere- 
ly a  memorandum  of  the  decision 
made  by  trial  judge  on  his  docket 
for  guidance  of  the  clerk  in  entering 
the  decree  on  the  journal. — Ex  parte 
Nikl'aus,  13  N.W.2d  655,  144  Neb.  503. 
38.  Fla. — Demens  v.  Poyntz,  6  So. 

261,  25  Fla.  654. 
33  C.J.  p  1053  note  34—53  C.J.  p  757 

notes  32-34* 

37.  Md. — Dal     Maso    v.     Board     of 
Com'rs  of  Prince  George's  County, 
34  A.2d  464,  182  Md.  200. 

38.  Conn. — Cothren   v.    Olms ted,    18 
A.  254.  57  Conn.  329. 

39.  U.S. — G.     Amsinck     &     Co.     v. 
Springfield    Grocer   Co.,    C.C.A.Mo., 
7  F.2d  855,  858— Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Roessler  &  Hasslacher  Chemi- 
cal  Co.  v.    U.    S.,    13   Ct.Cust.App. 
451,  455. 

D.C. — Lambros  v.  Young,  145  F.2d 
341,  79  U.S.App.D.C.  247.  . 

Idaho. — Blaine  County  Inv.  Co.  v. 
Mays,  15  P.2d  734,  52  Idaho  381. 

Mont.— Lewis  v.  Lewis,  94  P.2d  211, 
109  Mont.  42 — Corpus  Juris  quoted 
in  Conway  v.  Fabian,  89  P.2d  1022, 
1028,  108  Mont.  287,  certiorari  de- 
nied Fabian  v.  Conway,  60  S.Ct  94, 

28 


308  U.S.  578,  84  L.Ed.  484— Corpus 
Juris  Quoted  in  Galiger  v.  McNul- 
ty, 260  P.  401,  403,  80  Mont.  339. 
N.H. — American   Motorists'    Ins.    Co. 
v.  Central  Garage,  169  A.   121,   86 
N.H.  362. 
Okl. — Moronoy   v.    Tannehill,    215    P. 

938,  90  Okl.  224. 
33  C.J.  p  1053  note  36. 
"Decision"   synonymous  with  "opin- 
ion" 

"Decision,"  as  used  in  statute  pro- 
viding that  a  decision  of  a  depart- 
ment of  supreme  court  shall  not  be- 
come final  until  thirty  days  after  fil- 
ing thereof,  is  synonymous  with- 
"opinion." — In  re  Brown's  Guvardlan- 
ship,  107  P.2d  1104,  6  Wash.2d  215. 

40.  U.S.— Rogers    v.    Hill,    N.T.,    53: 
S.Ct.   731,   734,  289  U.S.   582,   77  L. 
Ed.  1385. 

41.  U.S. — Rogers  v.  Hill,  supra. 
Decision  based  on  findings 

Decision  of  court  based  on  findings- 
within  statute  requiring  such  deci- 
sion, when  filed,  amounts  to  a  rendi- 
tion of  a  judgment,  which  is  a  ju- 
dicial act. — McKannay  v.  McKannay, 
230  P.  218,  68  CaLApp.  709. 

42.  Del. — Nelson  v.  Canadian  Indus- 
trial Alcohol  Co.,  189  A.  691,  8  W. 
W.Harr.   165,  affirmed   197  A.  477,, 
9  W.W.Harr.  184. 

111. — People     ex     rel.     Wakcfield    v. 

Montgomery,  6  N.B.2d  868,  365  111.. 

478— Mitchell  v.  Bareckson,  250  111. 

App,  508. 
N.T. — Fuentes   v.    Mayorga,    7    Daly 

103,  104. 
Utah. — Ellinwood  v.  Bennion,  276  P. 

159,    73    Utah   563. 

43.  111. — Central    Republic    Bank    & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Bent,  281  111. App.  365. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gali- 
ger  v.    McNulty,    260   P.    401,   403, 
80  Mont.  229. 
Tex. — Davis    v.    Hemphill,    Civ. App.,. 

243  S.W.  691. 
33  C.J.  p  1053  note  38. 
Pact  findings 

Although  fact  findings  are  proper,, 
only  decretal  portion  of  decree  ad- 
judicates parties'  rights.— Higley  v« 
Kinsman,  Iowa,  216  N.W.  673. 

44.  Mont—Corpus   Juris   quoted   in. 
Galiger   v.    McNulty,    260    P.    401* 
403,  80  Mont.  229. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


are  subject  to  modification  or  change  until  embodied 
in  a  definitive  written  order  of  the  court.45 

§  5.    Distinguished  from  Rules  and  Or- 
ders 

Judgments  generally  are  distinguished  from  rules  or 
orders  in  that  a  judgment  is  the  final  determination  of 
the  rights  of  the  parties  ending  the  suit  whereas  a  rule 
or  order  is  an  interlocutory  determination  of  some  sub- 
sidiary or  collateral  matter,  not  disposing  of  the  merits. 

As  a  general  rule,  judgments  are  to  be  distin- 
guished from  orders  or  rules;  one  does  not  in- 
clude the  other.46  However,  certain  orders  have 
sometimes  been  denominated  as  judgments,47  and 
it  has  been  held  that  the  character  of  an  instru- 
ment, whether  a  judgment  or  an  order,  is  to  be  de- 
termined by  its  contents  and  substance,  and  not  by 
its  title.48  As  distinguished  from  a  judgment,  an 


order  is  the  mandate  or  determination  of  the  court 
on  some  subsidiary  or  collateral  matter  arising  in  an 
action,  not  disposing  of  the  merits,  but  adjudicating 
a  preliminary  point  or  directing  some  step  in  the 
proceedings;49  and  the  term  is  commonly  defined 
in  codes  of  procedure  as  every  direction  of  a  court 
or  judge,  made  or  entered  in  writing,  and  not  in- 
cluded in  a  judgment.50  A  judgment,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  the  determination  of  the  court  on  the  issue 
presented  by  the  pleadings  which  ascertains  and 
fixes  absolutely  and  finally  the  rights  of  the  parties 
in  the  particular  suit  with  relation  to  the  subject 
matter  in  litigation,  and  puts  an  end  to  the  suit51 
The  distinguishing  characteristic  of  a  judgment  is 
that  it  is  final,52  while  that  of  an  order,  when  it  re- 
lates to  proceeding  in  an  action,  is  that  it  is  inter- 
locutory,53 although  there  are  so-called  interlocu- 


Okl. — Lee   v.  Epperson,   32  P.2d  309, 

168  Okl.  220. 
33  C.J.  p  1053  note  39. 

45.  Okl. — Lee  v.  Epperson,  supra. 
33  C.J.  p  1053  note  40. 
Reversal  of  oral  decision 

Court  may  enter  formal  written 
order  contrary  to  prior  oral  decision. 
— State  ex  rel.  Mountain  Develop- 
ment Co.  v.  Superior  Court  for 
Pierce  County,  67  P.2d  861,  190 
Wash.  183. 

46.  Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Mt. 
Vernon-Woodberry  Mills   v.  Union 
Springs    Guano    Co.,    155    So.    716, 
717,  229  Ala.  91. 

III.— Robinson   v.    Steward,    252    HI. 

App.  203. 
Ohio.— McMahon  v.   Keller,   11   Ohio 

App.  410. 
Okl.— Foreman  v.  Riley,  211  P.  495, 

88  Okl.  75. 
33  C.J.  p  1053  note  41. 

Administrative  regulations  pursu- 
ant to  statutory  authority  are  gen- 
erally legislative  and  do  not  have  at- 
tributes of  judicial  judgment  or  de- 
cree.— Sparkman  v.  County  Budget 
Commission,  137  So.  809,  103  Fla.  242. 

47.  Mont. — State    ex   rel.    Meyer    v. 
District  Court  of  Fourth  Judicial 
Dist.  in  and  for  Missoula  County, 
57    P.2d   778,    102    Mont    222. 

Ohio.— Continental   Automobile   Mut. 

Ins..  Co.  v.  Jacksick,  188  N.E.  662, 

46  Ohio  App.  344. 
33  C.J.  p  1053  note  42. 

"Final  order"  as  defined  by  stat- 
ute is  comprehended  within  term 
"judgment."— -Continental  Automo- 
bile Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jacksick,  supra. 
Dismissal  for  failure  to  prosecute 
action 

An  order  dismissing  plaintiffs'  ac- 
tion for  failure  to  bring  it  to  trial 
within  five  years  after  filing  of  com- 
plaint was  a  judgment. — Colby  v. 
Pierce.  62  P.2d  778,  17  Cal.App.2d 


Final  disposition  of  cause 

First  order  containing  all  neces- 
sary recitals  which,  with  finality, 
disposes  of  cause,  is  regarded  as 
"judgment." — In  re  Method's  Es- 
tate, 21  P.2d  1084,  143  Or.  233. 

48.  Idaho.— State  v.  McNichols,  115 
P.2d  104,  62  Idaho  616. 

Mont.— State  ex  rel.  Meyer  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fourth  Judicial  Dis- 
trict in  and  for  Missoula  County, 
57  P.2d  778,  102  Mont.  222. 
Or.— In  re  McLeod's  Estate,  21  P.2d 
1084,  143  Or.  233. 

The  word  "judgment"  need  not  *be 
used  in  order  to  constitute  the  or- 
der a  judgment. — State  ex  rel.  Head- 
ley  v.  Industrial  Commission  of  Ohio, 
Ohio  App.,  67  N.E.2d  70. 

49.  Iowa.— Whit  tier  v.  Whittier,   23 
N.W.2d  435. 

Nev.— Elsman  v.  Elsman,  2  P.2d  139, 
54  Nev.  20,  rehearing  denied  3  P. 
2d  1071,  54  Nev.  20. 
33  C.J.  p  1053  note  43. 
"Order"    generally    defined    see    Mo- 
tions and  Orders  §  1,  also  42  C.J. 
p  464  note  9-p  465  note  13. 
Order  held  a  finding 

Order  for  "return  of  goods  irre- 
pleviable"  was  not  itself  a  judgment, 
but  was  a  finding  that  defendant  was 
entitled  to  return  of  automobile. — 
Commercial  Credit  Corporation  v. 
Flowers,  185  N.E.  30,  282  Mass.  316. 

50.  Iowa.— Whittier  v.  Whittier,   23 
N,W.2d  435.  .       M 

Okl. — Foreman  v.  Riley,  211  P.  495, 
88  Okl.  75. 

S.D.— Western  Bldg.  Co.  v.  J.  C.  Pen- 
ney Co.,  245  N.W.  909,  60  S.D.  630. 

Wis. — Newlander  v.  Riverview  Real- 
ty Co.,  298  N.W.  603.  610,  238  Wis. 
211,  135  A.L.R.  383. 

33  C.J.  p  1055  note  55. 

Order  as  to  title 
An  order,  adjudging  that  title  of 

mortgage     trustee     who     purchased 

mortgaged    property    at    foreclosure 

29 


sale  was  merchantable,  and  that  he 
recover,  from  person  with  whom 
he  entered  into  contract  for  sale  of 
premises,  damages  for  refusal  to 
complete  contract,  was  an  "order" 
in  a  "proceeding  at  the  foot  of  a 
judgment",  and  was  not  a  "judg- 
ment" under  statutory  definition. — 
Newlander  v.  Riverview  Realty  Co., 
supra. 

51.  Mo. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
Koch  v.  Meacham,  121  S.W.2d  279, 
281,  233  Mo.App.  453. 

33  C.J.  p  1054  note  44 — 42  CJ.  p  466 

note  34. 
"Judgment"     defined     generally    see 

supra  §  1. 
Order     granting     naturalization     as 

judgment  see  Aliens   §   140   c. 

52.  Nev. — Elsman   v.   Elsman,    2   P. 
2d  139,   54  Nev.   20,   rehearing  de- 
nied 3   P.2d   1071,   54   Nev.   20. 

N.Y. — In  re  Kennedy's  Estate,  281 
N.T.S.  278,  156  Misc.  166. 

Tex. — Vacuum  Oil  Co.  v.  Liberty  Re- 
fining Co.,  Civ.App.,  247  S.W.  597, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Key- 
stone Pipe  &  Supply  Co.  v.  Liber- 
ty Refining  Co.,  Com. App.,  260  S.W. 
1018. 

33  C.J.  p  1054  note  45. 

Determination  and  disposition  of 
ease 

An  order  which  has  effect  of  final- 
ly determining  rights  of  parties,  and 
finally  disposing  of  case  is  "judg- 
ment."— State  ex  rel.  Meyer  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fourth  Judicial  Dist. 
in  and  for  Missoula  County,  57  P.2d 
778,  102  Mont.  222. 

Tax  eale  judgment  was  held  "fiaal 
judgment,"  notwithstanding  recital" 
therein  that  judgment  "should  be 
rendered." — Griggs  v.  Montgomery, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  22  S.W.2d  688. 

53.  N.Y. — In    re    Kennedy's    Estate, 
281  N.Y.S.   278,   156   Misc.  166. 

&3  C.J.  p  1054  note  46. 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tory  judgments,  as  is  discussed  infra  §  11,  and  final 
orders,  as  is  discussed  in  -the  CJ.S.  title  Motions 
and  Orders  §  2,  also  42  CJ.  p  468  notes  65-74. 

A  decision  sustaining  or  overruling  a  demurrer 
ordinarily  is  an  order,  not  a  judgment,54  although 
there  is  also  some  authority  to  the  contrary.55  An 
order  or  rub  ordinarily  is  not  founded  on  the  whole 
record  in  the  case,  but  is  granted  on  a  special  appli- 
cation to  the  court  called  a  "motion;"  the  determi- 
nation of  such  motion  is  an  order,  not  a  judgment.56 
A  special  proceeding  regularly  terminates  in  a  final 
order,  not  a  judgment,57  although  the  final  order  in 
a  special  proceeding  is  in  effect  a  judgment  and  is 
sometimes  referred  to  as  such.58 

Order  for  judgment.  An  order  merely  directing 
or  authorizing  the  entry  of  judgment  in  the  case 
does  not  constitute  a  judgment;  to  have  this  effect 
it  must  be  so  worded  as  to  express  the  final  sentence 
of  the  court  on  the  matters  contained  in  the  record 
and  to  end  the  case  at  once,  without  contemplating 
any  further  judicial  action.59  Orders  for  judgment, 
however,  have  sometimes  been  deemed  sufficient  as 
judgments.60 


Order  for  an  execution.  An  order  of  a  judge  to 
the  clerk  to  issue  execution  for  a  specific  sum  with 
costs  has  been  held  equivalent  to  a  judgment,61  al- 
though there  is  also  authority  to  the  contrary.62 

§  6.    •         Judgments  as  Contracts  or  Obli- 
gations 

Although  Judgments  are  sometimes  regarded  as  con- 
tracts or  debts  of  record  and  as  obligations  enforceable 
by  contractual  remedies,  they  are  not  true  contracts  or 
debts  in  a  strict  sense,  and  are  Included  within  those 
terms  as  used  in  statutes  only  where  such  is.  the  intent 
of  the  statutes. 

Broadly  speaking,  a  judgment  is  an  obligation  for 
the  payment  of  money.63  Under  the  classification 
of  all  obligations  into  two  classes,  namely,  those 
arising  ex  contractu  and  those  arising  ex  delicto, 
and  the  further  division  of  obligations  ex  con- 
tractu into  simple  contracts,  contracts  under  seal 
or  specialties,  and  contracts  of  record,  it  has  been 
usual  to  classify  judgment  obligations  as  contracts 
of  record.64  Judgments  have  been  declared  to  be 
contracts,65  and,  likewise,  judgments  have  been  de- 


54.  Wyo. — Greenawalt     v,     Natrona 
Impr.  Co.,  92  P.  1008,  16  Wyo.  226. 

33  C.J.  p  1054  note  49. 
Interlocutory    judgments    on   demur- 
rer see  infra  §  11. 

55.  N.Y. — Bentley  v.  Jones,  4  How. 
Pr.  336,  3  Code  Rep.  37. 

33  C.J.  p  1054  note  50. 

56.  Mo. — Pence     v.     Kansas     City 
Laundry    Service    Co.,    59    S.W.2d 
633,  332  Mo.  930. 

Okl.— French  v.  Boles,  261  P.  196, 
128  Okl.  90-— In  re  Baptiste's 
Guardianship,  256  P.  520,  125  Okl. 
184. 

33  C.J.  p  1054  note  51. 

57.  N.Y.— People  v.  Moroney,  120  NT. 
B.  149,  224  N.Y.  114. 

Wls. — In  re  Wisconsin  Mut.  Ins.  Co., 
6  N.W.2d  330,  241  Wis.  394,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Hinge  v.  Duel,  63 
S.Ct.  1157,  319  U.S.  747,  87  L.Bd. 
1703. 

33  C.J.  p  1054  note  52. 

58.  N.Y. — In    re   Kennedy's   Estate, 
281  N.Y.S.   278,   156  Misc.   166. 

33  C.J.  p  1055  note  53. 

59.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  G. 
Amsinck  &  Co.  v.  Springfield  Gro- 
cer Co.,  C.C.A.MO.,  7  F.2d  855. 

Ariz. — Brewer  v.  Morgan,  26*3  P.  630, 
33  Ariz.  225. 

Cal.— Bastajian  v.  Brown,  120  P.2d  9, 
19  Cal.2d  209— Prothero  v.  Superi- 
or Court  of  Orange  County,  238  P. 
357,  196  Cal.  439— City  of  Los  An- 
geles v.  Hannon,  251  P.  247,  79 
CaLApp.  669. 

Okl.— Lee  v.  Epperson,  32  P.2d  309, 
168  Okl,  220. 


Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Loper 

v.     Hosier,    Civ.App.,     148     S.W.2d 

889,  891,  error  dismissed,  judgment 

correct. 
33  C.J.  p  1055  note  54,  p  1104  note 

33. 
Purport 

An  order  for  a  judgment  is  not  a 
judgment,  because  it  does  not  pur- 
port of  itself  to  determine  the 
rights  of  the  parties. — Erlcson  v. 
Steiner,  6  P.2d  298,  119  Cal.App.  305 
—33  C.J.  p  1104  note  32. 

An  entry  in.  the  record,  ordering 
that  plaintiff  recover  judgment  from 
defendant  in  the  amount  therein 
stated,  was  not  a  judgment,  but 
merely  an  order  for  judgment. — Illi- 
nois Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v.  Town 
of  Roscoe,  194  N.W,  649,  46  S.D.  477. 

Judgment  nisi  has  no  more  effect 
on  parties'  rights  than  verdict,  be- 
ing only  order  for  entry  of  effective 
judgment,  absent  intervening  pro- 
ceedings.— Hodgson  v.  Phippin,  150 
A,  118,  159  Md.  97—35  C.J.  p  1055 
note  54  [a]. 

60.  Ga.— Tift  v.  Keaton,  2  S.E.  690, 
78  Ga.  235. 

N.H. — Young   v.    Dearborn,    27   N.H. 
324. 

61.  Ga. — Klink  v.   The   Cusseta,   30 
Ga.  504. 

111.— Sears  v.  Sears,   8  111.  47. 

62.  Colo. — Hoehne     v.     Trugillo,     1 
Colo.  161,  91  Am.D.  703. 

33  C.J.  p  1104  note  36. 

63.  La. — Holland  v.  Gross,  App.,  195 
So.  828. 

N.Y.— Weinstein  v.  McBlligott,  10  N. 

30 


Y.S.2d    320,    256   App.Div.    307,    re- 
versed  on   other  grounds   22  NJB. 
2d  171,  281  N.Y.  605. 
33  C.J.  p  1056  note  63. 
New  obligation 

A  judgment  is  not  a  contract  or 
an  obligation 'of  a  contract  but  ift  a 
new  obligation  under  which  antece- 
dent rights  are  to  be  enforced. — 
Tradesmens  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Floyd,  39  A.2d  728,  731,  156  Pa. 
Super.  141. 
Recognition  of  obligation 

Judgment  is  the  recognition  of  tho 
preSxistence  of  a  debt  or  obligation. 
—Bailey  v.  Louisiana  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  105  So.  626,  159  La.  576— Hol- 
land v.  Gross,  La.App.,  195  So.  828. 

64.  Iowa.— Chader    v.    Wilkins,    284 
N.W.   183,   226  Iowa  417. 

33  C.J.  p  1056  notes  64,  67   [a]. 

65.  La. — Butler  v.  Bolinger,  133  So. 
778,  16  La.App.  397. 

33  C.J.  p  1056  note  65. 

Judgments  by  confession  see  infra  § 

134  et  seq. 

Whether  recovered  for  tort  or  on 
contract,  the  judgment  becomes  a 
debt  which  defendant  is  under  obli- 
gation to  pay,  and  tho  law  implies 
a  promise  or  contract  on  his  part 
to  pay  it. 
Cal. — Grotheer  v.  Meyer  Rosenberg, 

53  P.2d  99C,  11  Cal.App.2d  ii«8. 
N.Y.— Gutta  -Percha  &  Rubber  Mfg. 

Co.    v.    City  of  Houston,    15    N.B. 

402,   108  N.Y.    276,   2   Am.S.R.   412, 

14  N.Y.Civ.Proc.  19,  20  Abb.N.Cas. 

21$. 

Partition  Judgment  from  which 
parties  did  not  appeal  could  be  in- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§6 


clared  to  be  debts66  of  record,67  or  specialties.68  It 
is  only  by  a  legal  fiction,  however,  and  for  the  pur- 
pose of  enforcing  the  obligation  by  contractual  rem- 
edies, that  judgments  can  be  considered  as  con- 
tracts.69 Thus  an  action  on  a  judgment  is  an  ac- 
tion on  a  contract,™  irrespective  of  the  nature  of 
the  original  transaction  on  which  the  judgment  was 
founded,71  and  the  same  provisional  remedies  may 
be  had  as  in  an  action  on  an  express  contract.72 

On  the  other  hand,  the  essential  elements  of  ev- 
ery true  contract,  such  as  competent  parties  and 
assent,  are  often  wanting  in  judgments  which  usu- 
ally are  rendered  in  invitum,  and  often  against  in- 
fants, lunatics,  or  married  women.78  Accordingly  it 
has  also  been  declared  that  judgments  are  not  con- 
tracts74 or  debts76  in  the  strict  sense  of  these  terms. 

Withing  meaning  of  constitutional  and  statutory 


provisions.  The  fact  that  a  judgment  is  some- 
times regarded  as  a  contract  is  not  conclusive  on 
the  question  whether  it  is  a  contract  within  the 
meaning  of  that  term  as  used  in  particular  statutory 
or  constitutional  provisions,  and  in  all  such  cases 
the  intent  of  such  provisions  is  determinative.76 
Accordingly,  it  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  is  a 
contract  within  the  meaning  of  statutes  confer- 
ring77 or  limiting78  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  in  ac- 
tions on  contracts,  prohibiting  the  assignment  of 
choses  in  action  not  arising  out  of  contract,79  au- 
thorizing set-offs  and  counterclaims,80  making  joint 
contracts  joint  and  several,81  and  prohibiting  the 
issuance  of  process  against  the  body  in  an  action  on 
a  contract.82  On  the  other  hand,  a  judgment  is  not 
a  contract  or  debt  within  statutes  requiring  actions 
on  contracts  to  be  brought  in  the  name  of  the  real 
party  in  interest,88  or  making  trustees  or  stockhold- 


terpreted  as  contract  between  par- 
ties.— Frazier  v.  Hanlon  Gasoline 
Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  29  S.W.2d  461,  er- 
ror refused. 

Contracts  of  highest  character 
Va. — Barnes   v.   American  Fertilizer 
Co.,  130  S.E.  902,  144  Va.  692. 

66.  Iowa. — Chader    v.    Wilkins,    284 
N.W.  183,  226  Iowa  417. 

Mo.— Vitale  v.   Duerbeck,   92   S.W.2d 

691,  338  Mo.  556. 
33  C.J.  p  1056  note  66. 
Judgment  for  tort 

A  judgment  rendered  on  a  cause 
of  action  for  a  tort  is  nevertheless 
a  debt—State  v.  City  of  Mound  City, 
73  S.W.2d  1017,  "325  Mo.  702—33  C. 
J.  p  1056  note  66  [a],  [c]. 

A  judgment  is  an  evidence  of  debt. 
— Oil  Tool  Exchange  v.  Schuh,  153 
P.2d  976,  67  Cal.App.2d  288—33  C.J. 
p  1056  note  66  [e]. 

67.  Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State 
v.  City  of  Mound  City,  73  S.W.2d 
1017,  1020,  325  Mo.  702. 

33  O.J.  p  1056  note  67. 

68.  Conn. — Barber    v.    International 
Co.,    51    A.    857,    74   Conn.    652,   92 
Am.S.R.  246. 

33  C.J.  p  1056  note  68. 

69.  R.I.— Everett    v.    Cutler    Mills, 
160  A.  924,  52  R.I.  330. 

33  C.J.  p  1057  note  69. 

70.  Cal. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Grotheer  v.   Meyer  Rosenberg,   53 
P.2d    996,    999,    11   Cal.App.2d   268. 

Iowa. — Chader  v.  Wilkins,  284  N.W. 

183,  226  Iowa  417. 
33  C.J.  p  1057  note  71. 
Nature  and  form  of  action  on  judg- 
ment generally  see  infra  §  851. 
Assuntpsit  or  debt 

Instances  of  quasi  or  construc- 
tive contracts  include  judgments  on 
which  an  action  of  assumpsit  or  debt 
may  be  maintained,'  according  to  the 
circumstances,  because  of  a  promise 


to  pay  implied  by  law. — Corpus  Ju- 
ris quoted  in  Caldwell  v.  Missouri 
State  Life  Ins.  Co.,  230  S.W.  566, 
569,  148  Ark.  474—13  C.J.  p  245  note 
70. 

71.  Cal. — Corpus     Juris      cited     in 
Grotheer  v.   Meyer  Rosenberg,   53 
P.2d  996,  999,  11  Cal.App.2d  268. 

Iowa.— Chader  v.  Wilkins,  284  N.W. 

183,  226  Iowa  417. 
Okl.— Vaughn  v.  Osborne,  229  P.  467, 

103  Okl.  59. 
33  C.J.  p  1057  note  72. 

72.  N.Y.— Gutta    Percha    &   Rubber 
Mfg.   Co.   v.   City   of  Houston,   15 
N.E.  402,   108  N.T.   276,   20  Abb.N. 
Cas.  218,  14  N.T.Civ.Proc.  19. 

33  C.J.  p  1057  note  73. 

7a    U.S.— In  re  Ransford,  Mich.,  194 

F.  658,  115  C.C.A.  560. 
33  C.J.  p  1057  note  74. 

74.  RJ.— Everett    v.    Cutler    Mills, 
160  A.  924,  52  R.I.  330. 

33  C.J,  p  1057  note  75. 

Consent  decree  for  injunction  in- 
volving supervision  of  changing  con- 
ditions should  not  be  considered  con- 
tract.— U.  S.  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  App. 
D.C.,  52  S.Ct  460,  286  U.S.  106,  76 
L.Ed.  999. 

75.  La. — Holland  v.  Gross,  App.,  195 
So.  828. 

76.  U.S.— Metcalf  v.  City  of  Water- 
town,  Wis.,   9   S.Ct.   ITS,   128   U.S. 
586,  32  L.Ed.  543. 

33  C.J.  p  1058  note  77. 
Judgment  as  contract  or  debt  with- 
in: 

Constitutional: 

Provisions  prohibiting  statutes 
impairing  obligation  of  con- 
tracts see  Constitutional  Law 
§  350. 

Or  statutory  provisions  prohibit- 
ing imprisonment  for  debt  see 
Arrest  §  25  a,  Executions  § 
413  a,  i 

31 


Rules  as  to  joining  causes  of  ac- 
tion see  Actions  §  83. 

Statute  of  limitations  see  infra  § 
854. 

Statutes  regulating  rate  of  inter- 
est see  Interest  §  40. 

77.  Cal.— Wallace    v.    JSldredge,    27 
Cal.  498— Stuart  v.  Lander,  16  Cal. 
372,  76  Am.D.  538. 

Jurisdiction  of  courts  generally  see 
Courts  §  242. 

78.  N.Y.— Crane  v.  Crane,  19  N.Y.S. 
691. 

79.  Mo. — Corpus      Juris      cited      in 
State   v.    City   of  Mound   City,    78 
S.W.2d  1017,  1020,  325  Mo.  702. 

33  C.J.  p  1058  note  83. 
Assignment  of  judgments  see  infra 
§  512. 

80.  U.S. — Rose  v.  Northwest  Fire  & 
Marine    Ins.    Co.,    C.C.Or.,    71    F. 
649. 

33  C.J.  p  1058  note  84. 
Contrary  view 

(1)  A  contrary  rule  has  been  fol- 
lowed in  Illinois. — Rae  v.  Hulbert,  17 
111.  572. 

(2)  It  has  been  said,  however,  that 
"the  weight  of  authority  is  against 
the  view  taken  by  the  supreme  court 
of  Illinois." — Rose  v.  Northwest  Fire 
&  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  C.C.Or.,  71  F.  649, 
651. 

81.  U.S.— Belleville     Sav.     Bank    v. 
Winslow,  C.C.MO.,  30  F.  488. 

33  C.J.  p  1058  note  87. 

82.  Vt — Stoughton    v.    Barrett,    20 
Vt.    385— Sawyer  v.  Vilas,    19   Vt. 
43. 

!.    Ala.— Wolffe  v.  Eberlein,  74  Ala. 

99,  49  Am.R.  809. 
33  C.J.  p  1058  note  82. 
Plaintiffs  in  .action  on  judgment  see 

infra  §  857. 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ers  of  a  corporation  liable  for  its  debts,84  or  within 
the  meaning  of  married  women's  acts,85 

§  7.    Judgments  as  Assignments  or  Con- 
veyances 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  a  Judg- 
ment is  not  an  assignment  and  ordinarily  Is  not  effectual 
to  pass  the  title  to  land. 

A  judgment  is  not  an  assignment,86  even  when 
entered  on  confession,87  although,  by  statute,  judg- 
ments suffered  under  particular  circumstances  may 
operate  as  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  credi- 
tors.88 A  judgment  is  not  effectual  to  pass  the  title 
to  land,89  apart  from  statutory  provision  to  that 
effect,90  unless  it  substantially  undertakes  to  vest 
title,  as  by  declaring  that  it  shall  operate  as  a  deed 
of  conveyance,  in  a  case  where  the  court  has  juris- 
diction to  affect  the  title  to  land  by  a  judgment  or 
decree  operating  in  rem.91 

§  8.    Classification  and  Kinds 

Judgments  have  been  classified  with  reference  to 
the  state  of  the  pleadings  at  the  time  of  pronouncement, 
and  the  proper  style  of  the  Judgment  may  also  depend 
on  the  form  of  the  action. 

Under  common-law  practice,  judgments  usually 
are  classified  with  reference  to  the  state  of  the 
pleadings  at  the  time  judgment  is  pronounced,  un- 
der which  classification  they  fall  into  several  basic 
groups.92  The  proper  style  of  the  judgment  may  al- 


so depend  on  the  form  of  the  action,  immemorial 
custom  having  prescribed  the  formula  of  words  to 
be  employed  in  the  judgments  rendered  in  certain 
classes  of  proceedings.93 

The  form  of  judgment  granted  on  determination 
of  issues  of  law  or  fact  is  discussed  infra  §§  9,  10. 
Numerous  particular  kinds  of  judgments  are  defined 
infra  this  section,  and  there  may  be  found  elsewhere 
in  other  connections  a  consideration  of  judgments 
by  confession,  or  judgments  by  cognovit  actionem 
and  judgments  by  confession  relicta  verificatione, 
discussed  infra  §§  134-137,  judgments  on  consent, 
offer,  or  admission,  discussed  infra  §§  173-186, 
judgments  by  default  or  nil  dicit,  discussed  infra 
§  187,  judgments  of  dismissal,  discontinuance,  non- 
suit, or  retraxit,  discussed  in  Dismissal  and  Non- 
suit §§  1-5,  judgments  non  obstantc  vcredicto,  or 
judgments  notwithstanding  verdict,  discussed  infra 
§§  59-61,  judgments  mine  pro  tune,  discussed  infra 
§§  117-121,  and  judgments  on  the  pleadings,  dis- 
cussed in  the  C.J.S.  title  Pleading  §  511,  also  49  C 
J.  p  779  note  29-p  780  note  48. 

Irregular  or  erroneous  judgment.  An  irregular 
judgment  is  one  entered  contrary  to  the  course  of 
the  court,  that  is,  contrary  to  the  method  of  pro- 
cedure and  practice  allowed  by  law  in  some  mate- 
rial respect.94  An  erroneous  judgment  is  one  ren- 
dered according  to  the  course  and  practice  of  the 
court,  but  contrary  to  law.95 


84.  U.S.— Chase    v.    Curtis,   N.Y.,    5 
S.Ct.    554,    113    U.S.    452,    28    L.Ed. 
1038. 

Cal.— Larrabee   v.    Baldwin,    35    Cal. 
155. 

85.  N.Y.— White  v.  Wood,   2  N.Y.S. 
673,   49  Hun  381,   15   N.Y.Civ.Proc. 
187. 

86.  Pa.— Breading,  v.   Boggs,   20  Pa. 
•  33    37 

33  c'.J.  p  1059  note  95. 

87.  Pa, — Breading  v.   Boggs,   supra, 
Judgment    by    confession    see    infra 

§§  134-172. 

88.  Ky.— Laughlin     v.     Georgetown 
First  Nat.  Bank,  47  S.W.  623,  103 

.Ky.  742,  20  Ky.L.  354. 
33  C.J.  p  1059  note,97. 

89.  N.C.-^Proctor  v.  Ferebee,  36  N- 
C.  143,  36  Am.D.  34. 

33C.J.  p  1059  note  98. 

90.  N.J.— Price    v.    Sisson,    13    N.J. 
,Eq.  168. 

KG.— Morris  v.  White,  2  S.E.  254,  96 
N.C.  91. 

91.  Mich. — Simmons   v.   Conklin,    88 
N.W.  625,  129  Mich.  190. 

33  C.J.  P  1059  note  1. 

92.  U.S. — Derby    v.     Jacques,    C.C. 
Mass.,  7  F.Cas.No.3817,  1  Cliff.  425. 

33  C,J.  p  1059  note  3. 


Judgments   fall  into  four  groups 

under  Blacksione's  classification: 
First,  where  the  facts  are  agreed  by 
the  parties,  and  the  law  is  deter- 
mined by  the  court,  as  in  the  case  of 
judgment  on  a  demurrer;  second, 
where  the  law  is  admitted  by  the 
parties  and  the  facts  are  in  dispute, 
as  in  the  case  of  judgments  on  ver- 
dicts; third,  where  the  facts  and  law 
are  admitted  by  defendant,  as  in 
judgments  by  confession  and  de- 
fault; fourth,  where  plaintiff  is  con- 
vinced that  the  facts,  or  the  law, 
or  both,  are  not  sufficient  to  support 
his  action,  as  in  judgments  of  non- 
suit, retraxit,  and  discontinuance. — 
Derby  v.  Jacques,  C.C.Mass.,  7  F. 
Cas.No.3,817,  1  Cliff.  425. 
Judgment  against  plaintiff 

At  common  law  a  judgment 
against  plaintiff  was  on  a  retraxit, 
non  pros,  nonsuit,  nolle  prosequi, 
discontinuance  or  a  judgment  on  an 
issue  found  by  jury  in  favor  of  de- 
fendant or  on  demurrer. — Steele  v. 
Beaty,  2  S.E.2d  854,  215  N.C.  680. 

93.    111.— -Jackson   v.   Haskell,   3   111, 

565. 

33  -C.J.  p  1059  note  4. 
Debt 
111. — Jackson  v.  Haskell,  supra. 

32 


94.  N.M.— -EAly   v.    McGahon,    21    P. 
2d  84,  87,  37  N.M.  240. 

N.C. — Duplin    County    v.    Ksssscll,    27 

S.E.2d    448,    450,    223    N.C.    631— 

Wynne   v.   Conrad,   17    S.E.2d   514, 

518,     220     N.C.     355— Crowdcr     v. 

Stiers,    1    S.E.2d    353,    355,    216    N. 

C.   123— Dall  v.  Hawkins,  189  S.E. 

774,    211    N.C.    283— Hood    ex    rel. 

Citizens'    Bank    &    Trust    Co.    v. 

Stewart,    184    S.E.    36,    40,    209    N. 

C.  424 — Duffer  v.  Branson,  125  S.E. 

619,  620,  188  N.C.  789. 
33  C.J.   p  814  note  6—34  C.J.  p  508 

note  3. 
Irregular  or  erroneous  judgment  as 

void  or  voidable  see  infra  §  19. 
Operation    and    effect    of    void    and 

voidable   judgments   see    infra    §§ 

449-452. 

95.  N.M.— Ealy  v.  McG'ahen,  21  P*2d 
84,  87,  37  N.M.  246, 

N.C.— Wynne  v.  Conrad,  17  S.E.2d 
514,  518,  220  N.C.  355— Dail  v. 
Hawkins,  189  S.E.  774,  211  N.C.  283 
— Hood  ex  rel.  Citizens'  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Stewart,  184  S.E.  36, 
40,  209  N.C.  424— Herbert  B.  New- 
ton &  Co.  v.  Wilson  Furniture  Mfg. 
Co.,  174  S.E.  449,  450,  206  N.C.  533 
— Wellons  v.  Lassiter,  157  S.B. 
434,  436,  200  N.C.  474— Finger  v. 
Smith,  133  S.E.  186,  187,  191  N.C. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


A  judgment  on  the  merits  is  one  rendered  after 
argument  and  investigation  and  when  it  is  deter- 
mined such  party  has  a  right,  as  distinct  from  a 
judgment  rendered  on  some  formal  or  merely  tech- 
nical fault  or  by  default  without  trial.** 

Judgment  nihil  capiat  per  breve  or  per  bittam 
is  the  form  of  judgment  against  plaintiff  in  an  ac- 
tion either  in  bar  or  in  abatement;  literally,  "that 
he  taka  nothing  by  his  writ  or  declaration."97 

Judgment  nisi.  At  common  law,  a  judgment  nisi 
was  one  entered  on  the  return  of  the  nisi  prius  rec- 
ord, which,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  postea, 
was  to  become  absolute  unless  otherwise  ordered  by 
the  court  within  the  first  four  days  of  the  next  suc- 
ceeding term.98 

Judgment  of  non  pros,  or  non  prosequitur  is  a 
judgment  of  the  court  on  motion  of  defendant  in 
a  civil  action  in  case  plaintiff  do.es  not  file  his  decla- 
ration or  replication  in  due  time.99 
i 

Judgment  quod  bitta  cassetur  is  the  common-law 
form  of  judgment  sustaining  a  plea  in  abatement 
where  the  proceeding  is  by  bill,  that  is,  by  a  capias 
instead  of  by  original  writ;  literally,  "that  the  bill 
be  quashed."1 

Judgment  quod  eat  sine  die  is  the  old  form  of  a 


judgment   for   defendant;2    literally  "that  he  go 
without  day."8 

Judgment  quod  recuperet  is  a  judgment  in  favor 
of  plaintiff  rendered  when  he  has  prevailed  on  an 
issue  in  fact  or  an  issue  in  law  other  than  one  aris- 
ing on  a  dilatory  plea.* 

Judgment  respondeat  ouster  is  a  form  of  judg- 
ment for  plaintiff  on  an  issue  in  law  arising  on  a 
dilatory  plea.6  The  judgment  is  that  defendant 
answer  over,  and,  since  it  is  not  a  final  judgment, 
the  pleading  is  resumed  and  the  action  proceeds.5 

A  punitive  judgment  is  one  the  purpose  of  which 
is  to  inflict  a  penalty  or  punishment  as  distinguish- 
ment  from  one  granting  a  remedy.7 

A  self-executing  judgment  is  a  judgment  that  ac- 
complishes by  its  mere  entry  the  result  sought,  and 
requires  no  further  exercise  of  the  power  of  the 
court  to  accomplish  its  purpose.* 


§9- 


Judgment  on  Issue  of  Law 


A  judgment  on  a  demurrer  to  pleadings  Is  on  an 
Issue  of  law  and  Is  the  same  as  It  would  have  been  on 
an  issue  of  fact  between  the  parties,  but  a  judgment 
sustaining  or  overruling  a  demurrer  to  a  plea  In  abate- 
ment Is  not  of  a  final  nature. 

When  the  pleadings  terminate  in  a  demurrer  on 
either  side,  an  issue  of  law  is  presented,  and  a  judg- 
ment on  such  demurrer  is  on  an  issue  of  law.9  On 


818 — Duffer   v.    Branson,    125    S.E. 

619,  620,  188  N.C.  789. 
34  C.J.   p  508  note  4—21  C.J.  p  822 

note  86. 

When  court  lias  Jurisdiction  of  the 
subject  matter  of  the  action  and  of 
the  parties,  a  judgment  giving  to 
one  of  the  parties  more  than  he 
in  entitled  to  receive  is  an  erroneous 
judgment. — McLeod  v.  Hartman,  253 
P.  1094,  1095,  123  Kan.  110. 

96.  Xy. — Bell  Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth, 
61  S.W.2d  879,  880,  250  Ky.  21. 

97.  Black  L.D. 

98.  Black  L.D. 

33  C.J.  p  1059  note  4  [b]. 

It  is  otherwise  defined  as  "one 
that  is  to  be  valid  unless  something 
else  should  be  dene  within  a  given 
time  to  defeat  it."— U.  S.  v.  Win- 
stead,  D.C.N.6.,  12  F.  50,  51,  4 
Hughes  464. 

39.    N.C.— Steele  v.   Beaty.   2   S.B.2d 

854,  856,  215  N.C.  680. 
Pa.— Beverldge  v.  Teeter,  14  Pa.Dist. 

&  Co.  498,  45  York  Leg.Rec,  16,  26 

Luz.Lieg.Reg.  100. 
33  C.J.  p  1061  note  26. 
Nolle  prosegnl  dijrtingrnished 

(1)  Judgment  of  non  pros,  is  not 
to  be  confused  with  a  nol.  pros,  or 
nolle  prosequi,  by  which  plaintiff  or 
the  attorney  for  .the  state  voluntari- 

49  0.  J.S.-3 


ly  declares  that  he  will  not  further 
prosecute  a  suit  or  indictment,  or  a 
particular  count  in  either. — Common- 
wealth v.  Casey,  12  Allen,  Mass.,  214, 
218—33  C.J.  p  1061  note  26  [bj. 

(2)  "Nolle    proseaui"    defined    see 
Dismissal  and  Nonsuit  9  4. 

1.  Black  L.D. 

33  C.J.  p  1060  note  15  [a]. 

2.  Del.— Silver   v.    Rhodes,    2    Del. 
369,  374. 

N*.J. — Hale  v,  Lawrence,  22  N.JXaw 
72,  80. 

Form  of  judgment  generally  see  in- 
fra 5  62. 

8.    Black  L.D.,  sub  verbo  "Sine." 

4.  Ky. — Bell  Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth, 
61  S.W.2d  879,  880,  250  Ky.  21. 

As  proper  judgment  on  issues  of  law 
or  fact  see  infra  55  9,  10. 

5.  Black  L.D. 

33  C.J.  p  1060  note  13  M. 

6.  U.S.— (Philadelphia  &  R.    Coal   & 
Iron  Co.  v.  Kever,  N.T.,  260  F.  534, 
536,   171  C.C.A.   318,  certiorari  de- 
nied 40   S.Ct   13,   250   U.S.   665,   63 
L.Bd.  1197. 

7.  U.S.— In  re  Merchants'   Stock  & 
Grain   Co.,   Mo.,   32   S.Ct.   339,    223 
U.S.  639,  56  L.Ed.  584— In  re  Chris- 
tensen  Engineering  Co.,  N.Y.,  24  S. 
Ct.  729,  194  U.S.  458,  48  L.Ed.  1072. 

33 


Ga. — Hancock   v.    Kennedy,    95    S.EL 

735,  22  Ga.App.  144. 
&    Cal.— Feinberg   v.    Doe,    92    P.2d 

640,  642,  14  Cal.2d  24. 
Similarly  expressed 

(1)  One   where  no   process   is  re- 
quired in  order  to  fully  execute  it. 
— Jayne  v.  Drorbaugh,  17  N.W.  433, 
436,  63  Iowa  711—57  C.J.  p  108  note 
87. 

(2)  One  which  has  an  intrinsic  ef- 
fect.— Dulin  v.  Pacific  Wood  &  Coal 
Co.,  33  P.  123,  124,  98  Cal.  304. 

(3)  One  which  is  injunctions!  and 
prohibitive  or  which  adjudicates  the 
title  to  property  or  fixes  the  status 
of  a  party. — Haddlck  v.  Polk  County 
Dist  Ct.,  145  N.W.  943,  944,  164  Iowa 
417—57  C.J.  p  109  note  91. 

(4)  Other    similar    definitions    see 
57  C.J.  p  109  notes  89,  90. 

9.-  Wis. — Douville     v.     Merrlck,     25 

Wis.  688. 
Judgment  on: 
Demurrer  to: 

Evidence  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Tri- 
al  §    236,   also    64    C.J.   p   889 
note  46-p  390  note  58. 
Pleadings    see    the    C.J.S.    title 
Pleading  §  274,  also  49  C.J.  p 
461  note  94-p  465  note  81. 
Pleadings     see     the     C.J.S.     title 
Pleading   S   511,   also   49   C.J.   p 
779  note  29-p  780  note  48. 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


demurrer  to  any  of  the  pleadings  which  go  to  the 
action,  the  judgment  for  either  party  is  the  same  as 
it  would  have  been  on  an  issue  of  fact  joined  on 
the  same  pleading,  and  found  in  favor  of  the  same 
party.10  At  common  law  the  judgment  for  plaintiff 
on  a  demurrer  to  any  of  the  pleadings  in  chief  is 
quod  recuperet,  that  is,  that  he  recover;11  that  for 
defendant  is  quod  eat  sine  die,  that  is,  that  he  go 
hence  without  day.12  As  is  discussed  in  the  CJ.S. 
title  Pleading  §  274,  also  33  C.J.  p  1060  notes  10-12, 
and  49  C.J.  p  461  note  4-p  465  note  81,  the  judg- 
ment is  final  unless  leave  to  amend  or  to  plead  over 
is  given,  but,  since  the  granting  of  such  leave  is 
almost  a  matter  of  course,  it  is  not  now  usual  to 
enter  final  judgment  on  demurrer  unless  the  party 
fails  or  refuses  to  amend  or  to  plead  over,  as  the 
case  may  be. 

On  demurrer  to  a  plea  in  abatement,  if  the  de- 
murrer is  sustained,  the  judgment  is  not  final  but 
is  respondeat  ouster,  that  is,  that  he  answer  over;13 
final  judgment  is  rendered  only  on  failure  to  plead 
further.1*  If  the  demurrer  or  other  objection  is 
overruled,  and  the  dilatory  plea  is  held  sufficient  in 


law,  the  judgment  is  that  the  writ  or  declaration  be 
quashed,15  but  this  rule  of  the  common  law  has 
been  changed  by  some  statutes  permitting  plaintiff 
after  overruling  of  his  demurrer  to  take  issue  on 
the  facts.1* 

§  10.    Judgment  on  Issue  of  Fact 

Final  Judgment  on  an  issue  of  fact,  if  for  the  plain- 
tiff, is  that  he  recover,  but  Judgment  for  the  defendant 
on  a  fact  Issue  raised  in  a  plea  In  abatement  is  merely 
that  the  writ  or  declaration  be  quashed. 

The  final  judgment  on  an  issue  of  fact,  taken  on 
the  declaration,  or  a  plea  in  bar,  if  for  plaintiff,  is 
quod  recuperet,  that  is,  that  he  recover  j1*  if  for 
defendant,  the  judgment  is  nihil  capiat  per  breve  or 
per  billam,  that  is,  that  he  take  nothing  by  his  decla- 
ration or  writ.18  Where  an  issue  of  fact  on  a  plea 
in  abatement  is  found  in  favor  of  defendant,  the 
judgment  must  be  cassetur  breve  or  billa,  that  is, 
that  the  writ  or  declaration  be  quashed,  as  where  a 
demurrer  to  such  a  'plea  is  decided  in  his  favor ;  the 
judgment  cannot  be  nihil  capiat,  or  on  the  merits, 
because  the  plea  is  not  in  bar  of  the  action.19 


NX    N.J.— Hale  v.  Lawrence,  22  N.J. 

Law  72. 
JT.Y. — Nachod  v.  Hindley,  103  1T.Y.S. 

801,  118  App.Div.  658. 

11.  Wis.— Douvllle    v.    Merrlck,    25 
Wis.  688. 

33  C.J.  p  1059  note  8. 
"Judgment   quod   recuperet"    defined 
see  supra  5  8. 

12.  HI.— People,  for  Use  of  O'Far- 
rell  v.  Johnson,  215  IlLApp.  580. 

33  C.J.  p  1060  note  9. 

"Judgment  quod  eat  sine  die"  defined 

see  supra  §  8. 
Judgment  for  costs 

Where  the  petition  failed  to  state 
a  cause  of  action,  the  court  did  not 
err  In  sustaining  a  general  demurrer 
thereto  and  in  rendering  a  Judgment 
against  plaintiff  for  the  cost  of  the 
action. — Franks  v.  Adolph  Kempner 
Co.,  217  P.  848,  91  Okl.  289. 
Question  of  abatement 

Where  demurrer,  as  may  some- 
times be  done,  is  treated  as  plea  in 
abatement  on  ground  that  action  is 
prematurely  brought,  judgment 
should  show  that  decision  was  based 
on  Question  of  abatement,  otherwise 
it  will  be  presumed  to  be  a  decision 
on  merits.— Smith  v.  City  of  Daven- 
port, 201  N.W.  47,  198  Iowa  1295. 
13.  Ala.— Cravens  v.  Bryant  3  Ala. 

278— State  v.  Allen,  1  Ala.  442. 
Ark. — Fulcher  v.  Lyon,  4  Ark.  445 — 

Renner  v.  Reed,  3  Ark.  339. 
Conn. — Nichols   v.   Seacock,    1   Root 
286 — Fitch  v.  Lothrop,  1  Root  192 
DeL — Spencer  v.  Dutton,  1  Harr.  75, 
HL — Branigan  v.  Rose,  8  111.  123,  fol- 
lowed In  8  111.  130 — Bradshaw  v 


Morehouse,   6  111.  395— F.  H.  Earl 

Mfg.   Co.   v.   Summit  Lumber  Co., 

125  IlLApp.  391. 
Ind.— Clarke  v.  Kite,  5  Blackf.  167— 

Atkinson  v.  State  Bank,  5  Blackf. 

84— Lambert  v.   Lagow,   1  Blackf. 

388. 
Ky.— Hay  v.  Arberry,  1  J.J.Marsh.  95 

—Moore  v.  Morton,  1  Bibb    234. 
Me.— McKeen  v.  Parker,  51  Me.  389. 
Mass.— Parks  v.  Smith,  28  N.B.  1044, 

155  Mass.  26. 
Miss.— Drane  v.  Board  of  Police  of 

Madison  County,  42  Miss.  264— Lee 

v.  Dozier,  40  ^iss.  477— Besancon 

v.   Shirley,   17 'Miss.  457— Lang  v. 

Fatheree,   15   Miss.   404— Beaty  v. 

Harkey,  10  Miss.  563. 
Mo.— Wilson  v.  Atwood,  4  Mo.  366. 
N.H.— Trow  v.  Messer,  32  N.H.  361. 
N.X — Garr  v.  Stokes,  16  N.J.Law  403. 
N.C.— Casey  v.  Harrison,  13  N.C.  244. 
Pa. — Bauer   v.   Roth,    4   Rawle   83 — 

McCabe  v.  U.  S.,  4  Watts  325. 
Tenn. — Straus  v.  Weil,  5  Coldw.  120 

— Rainey  &  Henderson  v.  Sanders, 

4    Humphr.    447— McBee   v.    State, 

Meigs  122. 
Tex. — Ritter  v.  Hamilton,  4  Tex.  325. 
Wis. — Anderson  v.  Rountree,  1  Pinn. 

115. 

33  C.J.  p  1060  note  13. 
"Judgment    respondeat   -ouster"    de- 
fined see  supra  §  8. 

.  There  are  exceptions  to  the  rule 

where  the  plea  contains  matter 
pleadable  only  in  abatement  but 
commences  or  concludes  in  bar,  or 
where  matter  in  abatement  is  plead- 
ed puis  darrein  continuance.  In 
such  cases  the  judgment  is  final. — 
Turner  v.  Carter,  1  Head,  Tenn.,  520. 

34 


14.  Ala.— Massey  v.  Walker,  8  Ala. 
167. 

15.  Del.— Silver   v.    Rhodes,    2    Del. 
369. 

49  C.J.  p  244  note  7. 
'Judgment  quod  billa  cassetur"  de- 
fined see  supra  §  8. 
Suit  prematurely  "brought 

Trial  court,  after  sustaining  plea 
in  abatement  on  'ground  that  suit 
had  been  prematurely  brought,  com- 
mitted error  in  rendering  judgments 
that  plaintiff  take  nothing  by  the 
suit,  since  such  judgments  without 
restrictions  as  to  future  prejudice 
to  relitigate  the  same  subject  matter 
would  afford  a  basis  for  interposing 
a  plea  of  "res  judicata"  should  such 
suit  be  refiled  in  the  future  and 
proper  judgment  was  one  of  dismis- 
sal which  would  preclude  an  adjudi- 
cation on  the  merits. — Reed  v.  Sta- 
ley,  Tex.Civ.App.,  139  S.W.2d  851. 

16.  Ala.— Chilton  v.  Harbin,   6  Ala. 
171. 

17.  U.S.— National  Ace.  Soc.  v.  Spi- 
ro,  Tenn.,  78  F..774,  24  C.C.A.  334, 
certiorari  denied  18  S.Ct  944,  168 
U.S.  708,  42  L.Ed.  1211.  . 

33  C.J.  p  1060  note  18. 
"Judgment    quod   recuperet"    defined 
see  supra  §  8. 

18.  Black  L.D. 

19.  Fla. — McLendon       v.       Lurton- 
Hardaker  Co.,  91  So.  113.  83  Fla. 
263. 

33  C.J.  p  1060  note  20. 
Dismissal  of  cause 

When  a  plea  of  abatement  Is  sus- 
tained to  plaintiff's  action,  the  gen- 
eral order  is  one  dismissing  the 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§11 


Where,  however,  the  verdict  is  against  defendant, 
the  judgment  for  plaintiff  is  quod  recuperet,  or  that 
he  recover,  and  not  respondeat  ouster.20 

§11.    Final    and    Interlocutory    Judg- 
ments 

a.  In  general 

b.  When  judgment  becomes  final 

a.  In  General 

A  final  judgment  Is  one  which  disposes  of  the  cause 
both  as  to  the  subject  matter  and  the  parties  as  far  as 
the  court  has  power  to  dispose  of  It,  while  an  interlocu- 
tory Judgment  Is  one  which  reserves  or  leaves  some  fur- 
ther question  or  direction  for  future  determination;  but 


whether  a  Judgment  Is  flnat  depends  somewhat  on  the 
purpose  for  which,  and  the  standpoint  from  which,  It  Is 
being  considered. 

Judgments  may  generally  be  classified  as  either 
final  or  interlocutory.21  In  determining  whether  a 
judgment  is  "final,"  no  hard  and  fast  definition  or 
test  applicable  to  all  situations  can  be  given,  since 
finality  depends  somewhat  on  the  purpose  for 
which,  and  the  standpoint  from  which,  the  judgment 
is  being  considered,  and  it  may  be  final  for  one  pur- 
pose and  not  for  another.22  Generally,  however,  a 
final  judgment  is  one  which  disposes  of  the  cause 
both  as  to  the  subject  matter  and  the  parties  as  far 
as  the  court  has  power  to  dispose  of  it,23  while  an 


cause  and  the  dismissal  order  is  ef- 
fective only  as  long:  as  the  cause  of 
abatement  continues  to  exist. — Zar- 
sky  v.  Moss,  Teac.Civ.App.,  193  S.W. 
2d  245. 
Necessity  of  trial  on  facts 

Disposition,  on  pleas  in  abatement, 
of  claims  based  on  negligence  with- 
out a  trial  on  the  facts  was  error.— 
Rose  v.  Baker,  183  S.W.2d  438,  143 
Tex.  438. 

ao.    111.— F.  H.  Earl  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Sum- 
mit Lumber  Co.,   125  IlLApp.   391. 
Miss. — Coleman  v.    Bowman,    99    So. 
465,    135    Miss.    137— McNeely    v. 
Tazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  Co..  81  So.  641, 
119  Miss.  897. 
33  C.J.  P  1060  note  21—49  C.J.  P  244 

note  13. 
Liability  established 

The  court's  decision  overruling  de- 
fendant's plea  in  abatement  on  fact 
issue  establishes  defendant's  liabil- 
ity and  deprives  it  of  trial  on  mer- 
its, so  as  to  entitle  plaintiff  to  final 
judgment,  unless  Judge  permits  de- 
fendant to  answer  over  by  special 
order  or  action  equivalent  to  such 
order. — Krinsky  v.  Stevens  Coal 
Sales  Co.,  36  N.B.2d  411,  309  Mass. 
528. 

81.  Cal.— • Bakewell  v.  Bakewell,  180 
P.2d  975,  21  Cal.2d  224. 

Okl.— Consumers'  Oil  &  Refining  Co. 
v.  Bilby,  217  P.  484,  91  Okl.  282. 

Tenn. — Vineyard  v.  Vineyard,  170  S. 
W.2d  917,  26  Tenn.App.  232. 

Final  and  interlocutory  decrees  see 
Equity  §  582. 

Finality  of  determination  as  affect- 
ing conclusiveness  of  adjudication 
see  infra  §  699. 

22.  Cal. — Anderson  v.  Great  Repub- 
lic Life  Ins.  Co.,  106  P.2d  75,  41 
Cal.App.2d  181 — Howard  v.  How- 
ard, 261  P.  714,  716,  87  CaLApp. 
20. 

111.— Brauer  Machine  &  Supply  Co., 
for  Use  of  Bituminous  Casualty 
Corporation  v.  Parkhill  Truck  Co., 
50  N.B.2d  836,  383  111.  569,  148 
A.L..R.  1208. 


Different  meaningi 

Although  "final"  is  frequently  used 
with  "judgment"  to  distinguish  from 
interlocutory  orders  or  Judgments 
in  the  same  court,  "final  judgment" 
also  describes  a  determination  effec- 
tive to  conclude  further  proceedings 
.n  the  same  cause  by  appeal  or  oth- 
erwise, especially  where  time  within 
which  to  act  is  limited  to  run  from 
"final  judgment".— Northwestern 
Wisconsin  Blec.  Co.  v.  Public  Serv- 
ice Commission,  22  N.W.2d  472,  248 
Wis.  479. 

23.    Mich.— Wurzer  v.  Geraldine,  256 

N.W.    439,    441,   268    Mich.    286. 
Okl.— Consolidated   School   Dist   No. 
15  of  Texas  County  v.  Green,   71 
P.2d   712,    714,    180   Okl,   567. 
Pa.— Frank   P.    Miller   Paper   Co.   v. 
Keystone  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  118  A. 
565,  566,  275  Pa.  40. 
Tenn.— Vineyard  v.  Vineyard,  170  S. 

W.2d  917,  920,  26  TennJVpp.  232. 
Tex.— Lubell  v.  Button,  Civ.App.,  164 

S.W.2d  41,  44,  error  refused. 
Utah.— Hartford  Accident  &  Indem- 
nity Co.  v.  Clegg,  135  P.2d  919,  91 
103  Utah  414. 
Vt. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 
Green    Mountain    Power    Corpora- 
tion, 28  A.2d  698,  699. 
33  C.J.  p  1061  note  30. 

The  general  test  for  determining 
whether  a  judgment,  is  "final"  is 
that,  when  no  issue  is  left  for  future 
consideration  except  fact  of  compli- 
ance or  noncompliance  with  terms  of 
the  first  decree,  decree  is  final,  but, 
where  anything  further  in  the  nature 
of  judicial  action  on  the  part  of  the 
court  is  essential  to  a  final  deter- 
mination o?  the  rights  of  the  par- 
ties, the  decree  is  "interlocutory". — 
Bakewell  v.  Bakewell,  130  P.2d  975, 
978,  21  CaUd  224— Lyon  v.  Goss 
123  P.2d  11,  17,  19  Cal.2d  659. 
Similar  definitions 

(1)  A    "final    decree"    is    one    in 
which    nothing   in    the   case    is    re- 
served by  the  court  for  further  de- 
cision.— Sample  v.  Romine,  10  So.2d 
346,  193  Minn.  706. 

(2)  A  "final  judgment"  is  one  that 

35 


brings  suit  to  a  conclusion  and  bars 
recovery  in  any  other  litigation  be- 
.ween  the  same  parties  on  the  same 
slaim. — Ranallo  v.  Hinman  Bros. 
Const.  Co.,  D.C.Ohio,  49  F.Supp.  920, 
924,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  Buckeye  Union 
Casualty  Co.  v.  Kanallo,  135  F.2d 
921,  certiorari  denied  64  S.Ct.  47, 
320  U.S.  745,  88  L.Ed.  442. 

(3)  A    "final     judgment"     is     one 
which    finally    disposes    of    parties' 
rights   either  on   entire   controversy 
or    on    some    definite    and    separate 
branch  thereof. — Brauer  Machine  & 
Supply  Co.,   for  Use  of  Bituminous 
Casualty     Corporation     v.     Parkhill 
Truck  Co.,  50  N.B.2d  836,  840,  383  111. 
569,   148  A.L.R.   1208— General  Elec- 
tric Co.  v.  Gellman  Mfg.  Co.,  48  N.B. 
2d  451,  318  Ill.App.  644. 

(4)  A     "final     judgment"     is     one 
which   determines    and    disposes    of 
merits  by  declaring  that  plaintiff  is 
or  is   not  entitled  to   recover  by  a 
remedy  chosen. — Irving  Trust  Co,  v* 
Kaplan,  Fla.,  20  So.2d  351,  354. 

(5)  A    judgment    is    a    "final"   OP 
'definitive   Judgment"    when   it   set- 
tles the  issues  presented  in  the  main 
controversy  to  such  an  extent  that 
it  will  have  the  force  of  res  judicata 
if  it   is   not   reversed  on    appeal. — 
Metairie    Bank    in     Liquidation    v. 
Lecler,  La.App.,  4  So.2d  573,  575. 

(6)  "Final    judgments"    are    such 
as  at  once  put  an  end  to  the  action 
by  declaring  that  plaintiff  has  or  has 
not  entitled  himself  to  recover. 
Ky. — Faulkner  v.  Faulkner,  110  S.W. 

2d  465,  470,  270  Ky.  693. 
Pa.— Frank   P.   Miller   Paper  Co.  v. 
Keystone  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  118  A. 
565,  275  Pa.  40. 

(7)  There  must  be  findings  of  feet 
and  conclusions  of  law  to  constitute 
a  "final  judgment"  on  the  merits. — 
Hartford  Accident  &  Indemnity  Co, 
v.  Clegg,  135  P.2d  919,  922,  103  Utah 
414. 

(8)  Other  definitions. 

U.S. — In  re  Roney,  C.C.A.Ind.t  139 
F.2d  175,  177 — Karl  Kiefer  MacJb. 
Co.  v.  U.  S.  Bottlers  Machinery  Co., 


§11 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.& 


interlocutory  judgment  is  one  which  does  not  so 
dispose  of  the  cause,  but  reserves  or  leaves  some 


further  question  or  direction  for  future  determina- 
tion.2*   Under  the  definition  of  a  judgment  as  the 


l.,  108  F.2d  469.  470— Ross 
v.  International  Life  Ins.  Co.,  CO. 
A.Tenn.,  24  F.2d  345,  346 — G.  Am- 
sinck  &  Co.  v.  Springfield  Grocer 
Co.,  C.C.A.MO.,  7  F.2d  855.  858— 
Charles  Needing-  Trucking  Co.  v. 
U.  S.,  D.C.N.J.,  29  F.Supp.  637,  544. 

Ala,— Gandy  v.  Hauler,  16  So.2d  305, 
307,  245  Ala.  167. 

Cal. — Swarthout  v.  Gentry*  App.,  167 
P.2d  501,  503— Vallera  v.  Vallera, 
148  P.2d  694,  696,  64  Cal. App. 2d 
266 — Potvin  v.  Pacific  Greyhound 
Lines,  20  P.2d  129,  WO,  130  Cal. 
App.  610. 

Kan. — Smith  v.  Power,  127  P.2d  452, 
454,  155  Kan.  612. 

Ky. — Bell  Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth,  61 
S.W.2d  879,  880,  250  Ky.  ,21— Cau- 
dill  Coal  Co.  v.  Charles  Rosenheim 
&  Co.,  258  S.W.  315,  316,  201  Ky. 
758— Blackburn  v.  Blackburn,  254 
S.W.  915,  917,  200  Ky.  310. 

Me.— Sawyer  v.  White,  132  A.  421, 
422,  125  Me.  206. 

Mich.— Wurzer  v.  Geraldine,  256  N. 
W.  439,  446,  268  Mich.  286. 

Miss. — Johnson  v.  Mississippi  Power 
Co.,  196  So.  642,  643,  189  Miss. 
67. 

N.C.— Hanks  v.  Southern  "Public  Util- 
ities Co.,  186  S.E.  252,  257,  210  N. 
C.  312— Never  Fail  Land  Co.  v. 
Cole,  149  S.B.  585,  588,  197  N.C. 
452. 

Ohio. — State  ex  rel.  Curran  v. 
Brookes,  50  N.E.2d  995,  998,  142 
Ohio  St  107— Vida  v.  Parsley, 
App.,  47  N.B.2d  663,  665. 

Okl.— Methvin  v.  Methvin,  127  P.2d 
186,  188,  191  Okl.  177. 

Pa. — Sundheim  v.  Beaver  County 
Building  £  Loan  Ass'n,  14  A.2d 
349,  351,  140  Pa.Super.  529. 

Tex.— Lanier  v.  Parnell.  Civ.App., 
190  S.W.2d  421,  423— City  of  Gil- 
mer  v.  Moyer,  Civ. App.,  181  S.W. 
2d  1020,  1022— Garcia  v.  Jones, 
Civ.App.,  147  S.W.2d  925,  926,  er- 
ror dismissed,  judgment  correct — 
Railroad  Commission  v.  Humble 
Oil  &  Refining-  Co.,  Civ.App.,  119 
S.W.2d  728,  error  refused — Holmes 
v.  Klein,  Civ.App.,  59  S.W.2d  171, 
172,  error  dismissed — Dallas  Cof- 
fee &  Tea  Co.  v.  Williams,  Civ. 
App.,  45  S.W.2d  724,  728,  error  dis- 
missed. 

Va.— Williams  v.  Dean,  9  S.E.2d  327, 
329,  175  Va.  435. 

25  C.J.  p  1130  notes  54-56 — 33  C.J. 
p  1061  note  30  [a]. 

Synonymous  with,  "final   determina- 
tion" 
"Final    Judgment"    Is    synonymous 

with    "final     determination,*'    which. 

means  the  final  settling  of  the  rights* 

of  the  parties  to  the  action  beyond 

all    appeal. — Quarture   v.    Allegheny 

County,    14   A-2d   676t    578,   141   Pa, 

Super.  356,  J 


held 

(1)  Judgment  expressly  or  by  nee* 
essary   implication   disposing  of  all 
parties  and  issues  Is  final. — Southern 
Pac.  Co.  v.  TJlmer,  Tex.Com. App.,  286 
S.W.    193— Duke    v.    Gilbreath,    Tex. 
Civ.App.,    2    S.W.2d    324,    error    dis- 
missed— Adcock    v.     Shell,     Tex.Civ. 
App.,  273  S.W.  $00. 

(2)  A    judgment    may    be    "final" 
whether  it  is  based  on  a  determina- 
tion of  a  question  of  law  or  a  ques- 
tion of  fact.— McWilliams  v.  Black- 
ard,  COAJVrk.,  96  F.2d  43. 

(3)  Judgment    may    be    final    al- 
though It  fails  to  award  writ  of  exe- 
cution for  its  enforcement. — Reed  v. 
Bryant,   Tex.Clv.App.,    291  S.W.   605. 

(4)  Judgment  requiring  defendant 
to  pay  amount  into  court  to  await 
determination    of   conflicting   claims 
in  another  court  was,  as  between  the 
parties,   final. — Graham  Refining  Co. 
v.    Graham   Oil   Syndicate,    tex.Civ. 
App.,  262  S.W.  142. 

(5)  A  judgment  dismissing  cause 
as    to    one    defendant    after    giving 
peremptory  direction  to  find  for  such 
defendant    and    rendering    judgment 
for  plaintiff  against  another  defend- 
ant on  verdict  for  plaintiff  was  final 
disposition   of   issues   as   to   former 
defendant. — Newdiger       v.       Kansas 
City,  114  S.W.2d  1047,  342  Mo.  252. 

(6)  Where  a  plaintiff's  alternative 
plea  was  not  on  trial  and  was  effec- 
tually disposed  of  by  award,  on  her 
principal  cause  of  action,   judgment 
predicated  on  ultimate  issues  raised 
by  both  pleading  and  evidence  was  a 
"final  judgment." — Connor  v.  Buford, 
Tex.Civ.App.,    142    S.W.2d   592,   error 
dismissed,    judgment   correct. 

(7)  Other  judgments. 

U.S. — Ashwander  v.  Tennessee  Val- 
ley Authority,  D.C.Ala.,  19  *F.Supp. 
190,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
C.C.A.,  Alabama  Power  Co.  v.  Ten- 
nessee Valley  Authority,  92  F.2d 
412. 

Cal. — Ochoa  v.  McCush,  2  P.2d  357, 
216  Cal.  426— Griffith  v.  List,  9  P. 
2d  529,  122  Cal. App.  125. 

111.— Gunn  v.  Brltt,  39  N.E.2d  76,  78, 
313.  ULApp.  13. 

Ky.— Struve  v.  Lebus,  136  S.W.2d 
554,  281  Ky.  407— Crawford  v.  Rid- 
dle, 45  S.W.2d  463,  241  Ky.  839— 
First  State  Bank  v.  Thacker*s 
Adm'x,  284  S.W.  1020,  215  Ky.  186 
—Watts  v.  Noble,  262  S.W.  1114, 
203  Ky.  699. 

La. — Castelluccio  v.  Cloverland  Dairy 
Products  Co.,  115  So.  796,  165  La. 
606,  conformed  to  8  1/a.App.  723 
— Spence  v.  Spence,  107  So.  294, 
160  La.  430. 

Mo.— Chance  v.  Franke,  153  S.W.2d 
378.  348  Mo.  402— State  ex  reL 

36 


Maple  v.  Mulloy,  15  S.W.2d  809, 
322  Mo.  281. 

N.C.— Nash  v.  City  of  Monroe,  158 
S.B.  384,  200  N.C.  729. 

Okl.— Davis  v.  Baum.  133  P.2d  889, 
192  Okl.  85 — Consolidated  School 
Dist.  No.  15  of  Texas  County  v. 
Green,  71  P.2d  712,  714,  180  Okl. 
567 — Consumers'  Oil  &  Refining 
Co.  v.  Bilby,  217  P.  484,  91  Okl. 
282. 

S.D.— Western  Bldg.  Co.  v.  J.  C.  Pen- 
ney Co.,  245  N.W.  909,  60  S.D.  630. 

Tex.— Grayson  v.  Johnson,  Civ.App., 
181  S.W.2d  312— Doornbos  v.  Loon- 
ey,  Civ. App.,  159  S.W.2d  155,  error 
refused — Runyon  v.  Valley  Pub. 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  147  S.W.2d  521,  error 
refused — Pfeifer  v.  Johnson,  Civ. 
App.,  70  S.W.2d  203— Bell  v.  Rog- 
ers, Civ.App.,  58  S.W.2d  878— 
Stokes  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Kramer,  Civ. 
App.,  44  S.W.2d  822— Duke  v.  Gil- 
breath,  Civ.App.,  2  S.W.2d  324, 
error  dismissed— Phillips  v.  Jones, 
Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  298. 

Utah. — Logan  City  v.  Utah  Power  & 
Light  Co.,  16  P.2d  1097,  86  Utah 
340,  adhered  to  44  P.2d  698.  86 
Utah  354. 

33  C.J.  p  1061  note  30  [el. 

34.    Cal. — Swarthout.v.  Gentry,  App., 

167  P.2d  501,  503. 
Okl. — Consumers'  Oil  &  Refining  Co. 

v.   Bilby,   217   P.   484,   489,   91  Okl. 

282. 
Pa.— Frank    P.    Miller   Paper  Co.   v. 

Keystone  Coal  &  Coke 'Co.,  118  A. 

565,  566,  275  Pa.  40. 
Tex. — In  re   Greer,   TexCiv.App.,  41 

S.W.2d  351. 
33  C.J.  p  1061  note  30. 
Similar  definitions    ' 

(1)  An    "interlocutory    decree"    is 
one  that  Is  rendered  in  the  progress 
of  a  lawsuit,   or  between  the  com- 
mencement and  the  end  of  the  suit. 
—In  re  Byrne,  191  So.  729,  730,  193 
La.  566. 

(2)  It    is    a    judgment   made    for 
purpose  of  ascertaining  some  matter 
of    fact    or   law,    preparatory    to    a 
final   decree. — Vineyard  v.  Vineyard, 
170   S.W.2d  917,  26  Tenn.App.  232. 

(3)  An    "Interlocutory    judgment'* 
Is  one  which  determines   some  pre- 
liminary   or    subordinate    point    or 
plea,  or  settles  some  step,  question 
or   default    arising   in   the   progress 
of  the  cause,  but  does  not  adjudicate 
the  ultimate  rights  of  the  parties. — 
Consumers'  Oil  &  Refinkig  Co.  v.  Bll- 
by,  217  P.  484,  489,  91  Okl.   282. 

(4)  A    judgment    which    reserves 
for  adjudication  by  the  court  at  a 
later  date  some  Issues  between  the 
parties  to  the  action  and  only  .par- 
tially   or    incompletely   disposes   of 
the  parties  or  issues  is  an  "inter- 
locutory judgment" — Manley  v.  Ra- 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§11 


final  determination  of  the  rights  of  the  parties,  as 
discussed  supra  §  1,  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as 
an  interlocutory  judgment  in  the  strictly  technical 
sense  of  the  term ;  such  interlocutory  judgments  are 
in  fact  interlocutory  orders.26  The  term  "inter- 
locutory judgment"  is,  however,  a  convenient  one 
to  indicate  the  determination  of  steps  or  proceed- 
ings in  a  cause  preliminary  to  final  judgment,  and 
in  such  sense  the  term  is  in  constant  and  general 
use  even  in  code  states.26  In  determining  whether 
a  judgment  is  interlocutory  or  final,  it  should  be 


zien,  Tex.Civ.App.,  172  S.W.2d  798, 
799 — Lubell  v.  Sutton,  Tex.Civ.App., 
164  S.W.2d  41,  46,  error  refused. 

(5)  Judgment  is  "interlocutory" 
where  it  is  one  substantially  dispos- 
ing- of  merits,  ,but  leaving  issue  of 
fact  to  be  decided  or  some  condi- 
tion to  be  performed,  in  order  fully 
to  determine  the  rights  of  the  par- 
ties.— Security  State  Bank  v.  Monona 
Golf  Club,  252  N.W.  287,  289,  213 
Wis.  581. 

Judgments  held  interlocutory 

(1)  Judgments   based   on   citation 
by    publication    are    "Interlocutory" 
only  until  such  time  as  their  valid- 
ity is  actually  established  by  proper 
proceeding  in  court  of  competent  Ju- 
risdiction having  parties  in  interest 
before     it. — Seymour    v.     Schwartz, 
Tex.Civ.App.,   172   S.W.2d  138. 

(2)  A  judgment  which  recited  that 
the  court,   on  consideration  of  com- 
plaint, service  of  summons,  answer, 
and  evidence  introduced  by  plaintiffs, 
found  that  defendant  was  liable  to 
plaintiffs  in  amounts  "that  may  be 
adjudged  later  by  jury  properly  em- 
paneled to  hear  the  evidence  pertain- 
ing to  the  amount  of  damages",  etc., 
was  an  "interlocutory  judgment"  in 
which  defendant's  liability  was  prop- 
erly determined  and  amount  of  dam- 
ages  left    to   be   assessed. — Checker 
Gab  Co.  of  Hot  Springs  v.  Leeper, 
182  S.W.2d  871,  207  Ark.  799. 

(3)  A  decree  which  in  the  first  in- 
stance is  to  be  a  "decree  nisi"  but  is 
to  become  absolute  on  expiration  of 
stipulated  period  after  entry  thereof 
Is  deemed  an  "interlocutory  decree." 
— In  re  Hanrahan's  Will,  194  A.  471, 
109  Vt  108. 

(4)  Other  judgments. 

Ala.— Indian  Head,  Mills  of  Alabama 

v*  Ashworth,  110  So.  565,  215  Ala. 

348 — Blankenship  v.  Hail,  106  So. 

594,  214  Ala.   95— Hill  v.  Hill,  100 

So.  340,  211  Ala.  293. 
Nev.— Nevada    First    Nat    Bank    of 

Tonopah  v.  Lamb,   271  P.  691,  51 

Nev.  162. 
Pa.— Markofski  v.  .Tanks,  146  A.  569, 

297     Pa.     74 — Commonwealth     v. 

Provident  Trust  Co.,  92  Pittsb.Leg. 

J.  348,  58  York  LegJlec.  101. 
Tex. — Fisher    v.    Wilson,    Civ.App., 


185  S.W.2d  186,  affirmed  Wilson  v. 
Fisher,  Sup.,  188  S.W.2d  150— Kline 
v.  Power,  Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d  617 
— McCurley  v.  Texas  Indemnity 
Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  62  S.W.2d  992, 
error  refused. 
Vt.— Morgan  v.  Gould,  119  A.  517,  96 

Vt  275. 
Va.— Freezer  v.  Miller,  176  S.B.  159, 

163  Va.  180. 

33  C.J.  p  1061  note  30  [f]. 
Process  and  Jurisdiction 

To  render  interlocutory  Judgment, 
it  is  necessary  for  court  to  find  that 
process  had  been  served  on  defend- 
ant and  that  court  had  jurisdiction 
of  his  person. — Hart  v.  Foster,  109 
S.W.2d  504,  error  dismissed. 

25.  Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bar- 
low v.  gcott  85  S.W.2d  504,  519. 

N.D. — Universal    Motors    v.    Coman, 
15  N.W.2d  73,  73  N.D.  337. 

S.D.— Western  Bldg.  Co.  v.  J.  C.  Pen- 
ney Co.,  245  N.W.  909,  60  S.D.  630. 

33  C.J.  p  1062  note  32. 

Synonymous  terms 
Term  "interlocutory  Judgment"  Is 

synonymous    with    term    "order." — 

Sobieski  v.  City  of  Chicago,  241  111. 

App.   180,   error  dismissed   156  N.E. 

279,  325  111.  259. 

26.  Ark.— Checker  Cab   Co.   of  Hot 
Springs  v.  Leeper,  182  S.W.2d  871, 
207  Ark.  799. 

Conn. — Preston    v.    Preston,    128    A. 

292,  102  Conn.  96. 

C.J.  p  1062  note  33. 
Statutory  recognition 

(1)  Interlocutory  judgments  or  de- 
crees  are  expressly  recognized  un- 
der  some   statutory    provisions. — In 
re  Bailey,  40  N.T.S.2d  746,  749,   265 
App.Div.  758,  affirmed  50  N.E.2d  653, 
291  N.Y.  534—33  C.J.  p  1062  note  33 

(2)  The  legislative  purpose,  in  en- 
acting statute  authorizing  interlocu- 
tory judgment,  was  not  to  authorize 
a  mere  tentative  or  proposed  judg- 
ment  but.  one   which  would   finally 
dispose  of  a  portion  of  a  controver- 
sy.— Kickapoo  Development  Corpora- 
tion  v.    Kickapoo    Orchard   Co.,    285 
N.W.  354,  231  Wis.  458. 

27.  Tex. — Thomas    v.    International 
Seamen's  Union  of  America,  Civ. 
App.,  101  S.W.2d  328.  1 

37 


construed  in  accordance  with  the  conduct  of  the 
parties  and  the  intention  of  the  court  gathered 
from  the  language  of  the  judgment  or  decree.2? 

A  judgment  may  be  final  although  it  does  not  de- 
termine the  rights  of  the  parties,  if  it  ends  the  par- 
ticular suit,2*  such  as  a  judgment  of  dismissal,  non- 
suit,^ or  discontinuance,30  or  a  judgment  abating 
an  action.3i  Also  a  judgment  may  be  final  although 
further  directions  may  be  necessary  to  carry  it  into 
effect,32  although  further  proceedings  remain  to  be 
taken  in  court  to  make  the  judgment  effective,**  Or 

The  character  of  the  decree  or 
Judgment  is  an  important  factor  to 
be  considered.— Karl  Kiefer  Mach. 
Co.  v.  U.  S.  Bottlers  Machinery  Co., 
C.C.A.I11.,  108  F.2d  469. 

28.  Cal. — Fisch    &   Co.    v.    Superior 
Court    in    and    for    Los    Angeles 
County,  43  P.2d   855,   6  Cal.App.2d 
21. 

Tex.— Witty  v.  Rose,  Civ.App.,  148  S. 

W.2d   962,    error  dismissed. 
38  C.J.  p  1063  note  34. 

29.  Ariz. — Hartford  Accident  &  In- 
demnity  Co.   v.    Sorrellsi    69    P.2d 
240,  50  Ariz.  90. 

Cal.— Fisch  &  Co.  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Los  Angeles  County  43 
P.2d  855,  6  Cal.App.2d  21. 

Mass. — Sullivan  v.  Martinelli.  158  N 
E.  662,  261  Mass.  261. 

Tex.— Renfroe  v.  Johnson,  177  S.W. 
3d  600,  142  Tex.  251— Ley  v.  Ley. 
Civ.App.,  62  S.W.2d  503,  error  dis- 
missed. 

33  C.J.  p  1063  note  35. 

Dismissal  fop  failure  to  file  boad  for 
costs 

Tex— Witty  v.  Rose,  Civ.App.,  148 
S.W.2d  962,  error  dismissed. 

30.  Conn.— Foley      v.      George      A.  • 
Douglas    &    Bro.,    185    A.    70,    121 
Conn.  377. 

31.  Cal.— Watterson  v.  Owens  River 
Canal  Co.,  210  P.   625,  190  Cal.  88 
— San  Francisco  Breweries  v.   Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  City  and 
County   of   San   Francisco,    251  P. 
935,  80  CaLApp.  433. 

32.  U.S. — In  re  Casaudoumecq,  D.C. 
Cal.,  46  F.Supp.  718. 

Ind.— Rooker  v.   Fidelity  Trust   Co., 

151  N.E.   610,  198  Ind.  207. 

y.— Watts  v.  Noble,  262  S.W.  1114, 

203  Ky.  644. 
Mo.— State  ex  rel.  Maple  v.  Mulloy, 

15    S.W.2d   809,    322   Mo.   281. 
33  C.J.  p  1063  note  36. 

33.  U.S.— In  re  Casaudoumecct,  D,C. 
Cal.,  46  F.Supp.  718. 

Ky.— Alexander  v,  Tipton,   291  S.W. 

1019,  218  Ky.  666. 
Tex.— Lanier    v.    Parnell,     Civ.App., 

190  S.W.2d  421. 
Proceedings  incidental  to  execution 

(1)  Decree  may  be  partly  final  and 
partly  interlocutory;  final  as  to  de- 
termination of  all  issues,  and  inter- 


§11 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


although  the  court  reserves  the  right  to  modify  the 
judgment.8*  The  finality  of  a  judgment  is  not  af- 
fected by  the  fact  that  it  constitutes  an  erroneous 
decision  as  to  the  law  or  the  facts.36 

On  the  other  hand,  a  judgment  is  not  generally 
considered  final  where  further  judicial  action  is  nec- 
essary in  order  fully  and  finally  to  settle  the  rights 
of  the  parties,36  as  where  the  judgment  settles  only 
some  of  several  issues  of  law  or  fact,37  or  does  not 
dispose  of  the  case  as  to  all  the  parties  ;38  but  judg- 
ments determining  particular  matters  in  controver- 


sy, and  of  such  a  nature  that  they  could  be  imme- 
diately enforced  and  by  their  enforcement  deprive 
the  party  against  whom  they  were  rendered  of  any 
benefit  which  he  might  obtain  from  an  appeal  at  any 
subsequent  stage  of  the  proceedings,  have  been 
deemed  final.39  A  judgment  is  not  final  which  is  to 
become  effective  only  on  the  happening  of  a  future 
event  or  contingency40  or  which  is  made  subject  to 
revision  at  a  future  specified  date.41 

A  judgment  ordinarily  is  final  when  rendered  in 
pursuance  of  a  general  verdict,42  or  on  submission 


locutory  as  to  mode  of  execution. — 
Perry  v.  West  Coast  Bond  &  Mort- 
gage Co.,  29  P.2d  279,  136  Cal.App. 
557. 

(2)  A  Judgment  over  against  prin- 
cipal and  in  favor  of  surety  on  fidel- 
ity bond  was  "final",  notwithstand- 
ing it  was  made  contingent  on  pay- 
ment by  surety  of  primary  judg- 
ment against  it  on  the  bond,  since 
all  litigated  rights  relating  to  mat- 
ter involved  were  determined  and 
further  proceedings  required  in  com- 
plete satisfaction  of  decree  were 
merely  incidental  to  its  proper  exe- 
cution.— American  Employers'  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Dallas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  170  S.W.2d  546,  error 
refused. 

34.  Tex. — Graham  v.  Coolidge,  70  S. 
W.   231,   30   Tex.Civ.App.   273. 

35.  Cal. — In    re    Gardiner's  .Estate, 
114  P.2d  643,  45  Cal.App. 2 d  559. 

Tex. — Snell  v.  Knowles,  Civ.App.,  87 
S.W.2d  871,   error  dismissed. 

36.  Mo. — State   ex  rel.  and  to   Use 
of  Abeille  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sevier, 
73    S.W.2d    361,    335    Mo.    269,    cer- 
tiorari  denied  State  of  Missouri  ex 
rel.    and   to   Use    of   Abeille    Fire 
Ins.  Co.  of  Paris  v.  Sevier,  55  S. 
Ct.  99,  293  U.S.  585,  79  L.Ed.   680. 

Va. — Massanutten  Bank  of  Strasburg 
v.   Glaize,   14   S.B.2d   285,   177  Va, 
519. 
Reference  for  Judicial  purpose 

Generally  a  decree  fixing  liability 
and  rights  of  the  parties  and  refer- 
ring the  case  to  a  master  or  subor- 
dinate tribunal  for  a  judicial  pur- 
pose, such  as  the  statement  of  an 
account,  on  which  a  further  decree 
is  to  be  entered,.  Is  not  a  "final  de- 
cree."— Swarthout  v.  Gentry,  Cal. 
App.,  167  0?.2d  501. 

37.  Mo. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
Barlow   v.    Scott,    85    S.W.2d    504, 
519. 

Okl.— Hurley  v.  Hurley,  127  P.2d  147, 

191  Okl.  194. 
Tenn. — Vineyard    v.    Vineyard,     170 

S.W.2d  917,  26  Tenn.App.  232. 
Tex. — Wood  v.  Gulf  Production  Co., 

Clv.App.,    100    S.W.2d    412 — Harris 

v.  O'Brien,  Civ.App.,  54  S.W.2d  277  j 


—Duke    v.    Gilbreath,    Civ.App.,    2 
S.W.2d  324,   error  dismissed. 
33  C.J.  p  1063  note  38. 

"A  case  is  never  finally  determined 
when  any  controversial  matter,  a 
part  thereof,  is  open  and  undeter- 
mined."— In  re  Returns  From  Her- 
minle  Election  Dist.  of  Sewickley 
Tp.,  Westmoreland  County,  192  A. 
130,  132,  326  Pa,  321. 

Specific  disposition  unnecessary 

It  is  not  essential  to  the  finality  of 
a  Judgment  that  it  in  express  terms 
specifically  dispose  of  each  issue, 
since  the  fact  that  judgment  dispos- 
es of  a  particular  issue  may  be  in- 
ferred from  other  provisions  there- 
of, provided  such  inference  follows 
as  a  necessary  Implication. — Gamble 
v.  Banneyer,  151  S.W.2d  586,  137  Tex. 
7. 

Where  several  distinct  causes  of 
action  ore  united  in  the  same  suit, 
the  rule  that  a  judgment  to  be  final 
must  dispose  of  the  entire  case  does 
not  apply. — Shamburger  v.  Glenn, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  255  S.W.  815—33  C.J.  p 
1063  note  38  [d]. 

38.  Mo. — Corpus  Juris  Quoted  In 
Barlow  v.  Scott,  85  S.W.2d  604, 
519— Stelger  v.  City  of  Ste.  Gene- 
vieve,  141  S.W.2d  233,  235  Mo.App. 
579. 

Tex. — Gathings  v.  Robertson,  Com. 
App..  276  S.W.  218— Minnock  v. 
Garrison,  Civ.App:,  144  S:W.2d  328 
— Wood  v.  Gulf  Production  Co., 
Civ.App.,  100  S.W.2d  412— Duke  v. 
Gilbreath,  Civ.App.,  2  S.W.2d  324, 
error  dismissed. 

33  C.J.  p  1063  note  39. 

Real  parties 

A  judgment  that  fails  to  dispose 
of  the  real  parties  to  the  litigation, 
either  expressly  or  by  necessary  im- 
plication, is  not  final. — Wilson  v. 
Cone,  Tex.Civ.App.,  179  S.W.2d  784. 

Disposal  by  implication 

A  Judgment,  to  be  "final,"  must 
dispose  of  all  parties  and  issues  In 
the  case,  but  disposal  of  parties  need 
not  be  by  name,  necessary  implica- 
tion being  sufficient. — Texas  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Miller,  Tex.Clv.App.,  114  S.W. 
2d  600. 

38 


39.  Cal. — Perry  v.  West  Coast  Bond 
&  Mortgage  Co.,  29  P.2d  279,   136 
CaLApp.  557. 

Ky.— Watts  v.  Noble,  262  S.W.  1114, 

203  Ky.  644. 
Ohio.— Speidel  v.  Schaller,  55  N.E.2d 

346,  73  Ohio  App.  141. 
Tex. — Seby   v.    Craven   Lumber    Co., 

Civ. App.,  259  S.W.  1093. 
33  C.J.  p  1063  note  40. 
Portion  of  land 

Judgment  awarding  half  of  land 
in  controversy  to  defendant  without 
determining  ownership  of  the  other 
half  was  final  as  to  half  awarded. — 
Duval  v.  Duval,  291  S.W.  488,  816 
Mo.  626. 

40.  Tex. — Echols     v.     Echols,     Civ. 
App.,  168  S.W.2d  282,  error  refused 
— Dodd  v.  Daniel,   Civ.App.,   89   S. 
W.2d  494. 

Conditional  judgments  generally  see 
infra  §  73. 

Compliance  with  conditions 

A  judgment  granting  plaintiff  an 
injunction,  but  which  requires  him 
to  comply  with  certain  conditions 
imposed  within  a  certain  number  of 
days,  and  provides  that,  in  the  event 
of  plaintiff's  failure  so  to  comply, 
the  judgment  shall  be  for  defend- 
ants, is  not  a  final  decree. — Consum- 
ers' Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v.  Bilby,  217 
P.  484,  91  Okl.  282. 
Judgment  held  not  contingent 

Agreed  provisions  in  judgment  for 
suspension  and  postponement  of  is- 
suance of  order  of  sale  under  Judg- 
ment until  judgment  debtor's  de- 
fault in  payment  of  any  stipulated 
installment  of  judgment  debt  to 
court  clerk  did  not  render  judgment 
indefinite,  or  prevent  it  from  being 
"final  judgment"  after  its  proper  en- 
try on  payment  of  first  installment 
as  there  was  no  further  contingency 
on  happening  of  which  court  might 
properly  be  required  to  perform  any 
further  judicial  function  in  connec- 
tion with  case. — Grayson  v.  Johnson, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  181  S.W.2d  312. 

41.  Tex. — Echols     v.     Echols,     Civ. 
App.,    168    S.W.2d    282,    error    re- 
fused. 

42.  Mo.— State    v.    Riley.    118    S.W. 
647,  219  Mo.  667. 

Pa.— In  re  Fulton,   51  Pa.  204. 


49 


JUDGMENTS 


§11 


of  the  entire  case  to  the  court,4*  or  on  submission 
for  decision  on  the  pleadings.44  A  judgment  or  de- 
cree by  consent  may  constitute  a  final  disposition  of 
a  cause.45  Judgment  upon  demurrer  to  any  of  the 
pleadings  in  chief  is  generally  final  unless  leave  to 
amend  or  to  plead  over  is  given,4«  in  which  case 
the  judgment  is  interlocutory.47  A  judgment  or  de- 
cree for  an  accounting  is  interlocutory  in  charac- 
ter.48 The  question  whether  a  particular  order  or 
judgment  is  final  or  interlocutory  most  frequently 
arises  as  a  question  of  appealability,  and  these  cas- 
es are  discussed  in  Appeal  and  Error  §§  94-108. 

b.  When  Judgment  Becomes  Final 

A  Judgment  Is  generally  considered  final  and  en- 
forceable as  soon  as  It  is  entered,  read,  and  signed  in 
open  court,  but  for  some  purposes  It  may  not  be  final 
until  a  later  time. 

For  most  purposes  a  judgment  will  be  considered 
final  and  enforceable  by  appropriate  writ  as  soon  as 


it  is  entered,  read,  and  signed  in  open  court,49  not- 
withstanding a  motion  for  new  trial  remains  undis- 
posed of,5<>  that  the  judgment  is  still  subject  to 
appellate  review,51  or  that  an  appeal  is  actually 
pending.52  A  judgment  is  not  "final"  for  some  pur- 
poses, however,  merely  because  execution  may  be 
issued  on  it,53  and  it  has  been  variously  held  that 
finality  attaches  to  the  judgment  only  at  the  end 
of  the  term  of  court  at  which  it  was  entered,54  or  at 
the  end  of  a  specified  period  of  time  after  the  date 
of  its  rendition,55  or  after  the  time  for  filing  mo- 
tions to  prevent  entry  of  judgment  has  expired  with- 
out such  motions  being  filed,  or,  if  filed,  after  they 
are  determined.56  It  has  also  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment becomes  final  only  after  expiration  of  the  time 
allowed  by  law  for  appeal  therefrom,  or,  if  an  ap- 
peal is  perfected,  after  the  judgment  is  upheld  in 
the  appellate  court,5?  but  this  rule  is  inapplicable 
if  the  judgment  is  not  subject  to  review.58 


43.  111.— Pease  v.  Roberts,  9  BLApp. 
132. 

33  C.J.  p  1063  note  42. 

44.  Wis.— Sanderson  v.  Herman,   85 
N.W.  141,  108  Wis.  662. 

33  C.J.  p  1063  note  43. 

45.  Ala. — Payne  v.  Graham,  102  So. 
729,    20   Ala-App.   439. 

Colo.— Heil   v.   Hubbell,   252   P.   343, 

80  Colo.  452. 
Ga.— Baker  v.  McCord,  162  S.B.  110, 

173  Ga.  819. 

46.  Ark.— Smart  v.   Alexander,    158 
S.W.2d  924,  203  Ark.  1147. 

Del.— Hazzard  v.  Alexander,   178   A. 

873,  6  W.W.Harr.  512. 
33  C.J.  p  1063  note  44. 

Provision  permitting  fiUaff  excep- 
tions or  statement  of  facts  did  not 
avoid  implication  that  judgment  dis- 
posed of  case  on  general  demurrer 
rather  than  on  the  merits. — Wells  v. 
Stonerock,  Teac.Com.App.,  12  S.W.2d 
961. 

The  ruling1  of  the  court  on  a  de- 
murrer is  not  a  final  order  unless 
final  judgment  is  entered  thereon. — 
Cooper  v.  Knuckles,  279  S.W.  1084, 
212  Ky.  608. 

47.  xj.s.— Morris  v.  Dunbar,  Pa,,  149 
F.  406,  79  C.C.A.  226. 

33  C.J.  p  1063  note  45. 

48.  Kan.— City  of  Eureka  v.  Kansas 
Electric  Power  Co.,  3  P.2d  484,  133 
Kan.  708. 

33  C.J.  P  1063  note  46. 

49.  Ind.— Whinery  v.  Kozacik,  22  N 
E.2d  829,  216  Ind.  136. 

Mass. — In  re  Keenan,  47  N.E.2d  12 

313  Mass.  186. 
Time   of  taking  effect  of  Judgmen 

see  infra  §  446. 
Signing  held  necessary 

It  has  been  held  that  a  judgmen 
is  not  final  until  it  is  signed.— Rive 


&  Rails  Terminals  v.  Louisiana  Ry. 

&  Nav.  Co.,  103  So.  331,  157  La.  1085 

— Young  v.   Geter,   La.App..   187   So. 
30. 

a  Ind.— Whinery  v.  Kozacik,  22  N. 
E.2d  829,  216  Ind.  13.6. 

Finality  of  determination  as  affect- 
ed by  proceedings  for  relief 
against  judgment  see  infra  §§  622, 
623.  700-702. 

L    Ohio.— Shoup  v.  Clemans,  App., 
31  N.E.2d  103. 

52.  U.S. — In  re  Maryanov,  D.C.N.Y., 
20  F.2d  939. 

tf.Y.— In  re  Bailey,  40  N.Y.S.2d  746, 
265  App.Div.  758,  affirmed  50  N.E. 
2d  653,  291  N.Y.  534. 

53.  Okl. — Methvin    v.    Methvin,    127 
P.2d  186,  191  Okl.  177. 

54.  TT.S.— Reed    v.     South    Atlantic 
S.    S.    Co.    of   Delaware,    D.C.Del., 
2  F.R.D.  475. 

Pa,— Salus  v.  Fogel,  153  A,  547,  302 
Pa.  268. 

55.  Fla. — Mabson  v.  Christ,  119  So. 
131,  96  Fla.  756. 

Ky.— Yumg  v.  Yung,  171  S.W.2d  1017, 
294  Ky.  369. 

Tex. — Gillette  Motor  Transport  Co, 
v  Wichita  Falls  &  Southern  R- 
Co.  Civ.App.,  170  S.W.2d  629,  man- 
damus denied  Wichita  Falls  &  S 
R.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  174  S.W.2d 
951,  141  Tex.  555. 

Va. — Carney  v.  Poinderter,  196  S.E 
639,  170  Va.  233. 
judgment  rendered  on  constructive 

service  does  not  become  final  unti 

two   years  from   rendition.— TrujilK 

v.  Piarote,   53   S.W.2d  466,   122  Tex. 

173. 

56.    U.S. — Moss  v.  Kansas  City  Lif 
Ins.    Co.,    C.C.A.MO.,    96    F.2d    10$ 

Mo— Lee's  Summit  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Cross,  134  S.W.2d  19,  34 

39 


Mo.     501— Williams    v.     Pemiscot 
County,    133    S.W.2d   417,    345    Mo. 
415 — Melenson  v.  Howell,  130  S.W. 
2d  555,  344  Mo.  1137. 
BSotton  for  new  trial 

(1)  Text  rule  applies  with  respect 
o  pendency  of  motion  for  new  trial. 

Fla,— Cole  v.  Walker  Fertilizer  Co., 
for  Use  and  Benefit  of  Walker,  1 
So.2d  864,  147  Fla.  1. 

Mo.— Cox  v.  Frank  L.  Schaab  Stove 
&  Furniture  Co.,  58  S.W.2d  700, 
332  Mo.  492,  transferred,  see  App., 
67  S.W.2d  790. 

Tex.— Rabinowitz  v.  Darnall,  Com. 
App.,  13  S.W.2d  73. 

(2)  Where   motion   for  «xew  trial 
was  never  heard,  the  motion  was  au- 
tomatically   overruled    at    the    end 
of  the  next  succeeding  term,  and  the 

udgment  then  became  final. — Kinney 
v.  Toelin  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.,  220 
P.  998,  74  Colo.  295. 

An  unauthorized  motion  will   not 
suffice  to  postpone  finality  of  a  ju- 
dicial   decision.— Lindsay   v.    Evans, 
Mo.App.,  174  S.W.2d  390. 
57.    Ga,— Powell  v.   Powell,   37   S.E. 

2d  191— Aud  v.  Aud,  35  S.E.2d  198, 

199  Ga.  714— Twilley  v.  Twilley,  24 

S.E.2d  46,  195  Ga,  297. 
Okl.— Methvin  v.   Methvin,   127  P.2d 

186,  191  Old.  177. 

judgment  is  final  when  defendant 
fails    to    perfect    appeal    therefrom 
within    time    prescribed   by   law. 
La.— Robinson  v.  Weiner,  105  So.  35, 

158    La.    979 — Albritton   v.    Nauls, 

App.,  15  So.2d  126,  128. 
Pa. — H.    Miller   &    Sons'    Co.   v.    Mt. 

Lebanon  Tp.,   163   A.   511;   309  Pa. 

221. 
Tex.— Bound  v.  Dillard,  Civ.App.,  140 

S.W.2d  520. 
58.    U.S.— In   re    Tapp,    D.C.Ky.,    61 

F.Supp.  594. 


§  12 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  12.    Judgments  in  Rem'  and  in  Per- 

sonam 

A  Judgment  in  rem  Is  an  adjudication  pronounced  on 
the  status  of  some  particular  subject  matter,  while  a 
judgment  In  personam  is  In  form  and  substance  between 
the  parties  claiming  the  right  in  controversy  and  does 
not  directly  affect  the  status  of  the  res. 

Judgments,  for  certain  purposes,  are  divided  into 
three  classes  designated  as  "judgments  in  perso- 
nam" or  "personal  judgments,"  "judgments  in  rem/' 
and  "judgments  quasi  in  rem/'65  A  judgment  or 
decree  in  rem  is  an  adjudication  pronounced  on  the 


status  of  some  particular  subject  matter  by  a  tri- 
bunal having  competent  authority  for  that  pur- 
pose.60 It  differs  from  a  judgment  or  decree  in 
personam  in  this,  that  the  latter  is  in  form  as  well 
as  in  substance  between  the  parties  claiming  the 
right  in  controversy,  and  does  not  directly  affect 
the  status  of  the  res,  but  only  through  the  action  of 
the  parties.61  Judgments  quasi  in  rem  are  rendered 
in  proceedings  quasi  in  rem  and  affect  not  only  title 
to  the  res,  but  likewise  the  right  in  and  to  it  pos- 
sessed by  individuals.62 


H.  ESSENTIALS  OP  EXISTENCE,  VALIDITY,  AND  REGULARITY  OP  JUDGMENT 

A.  IN  GENERAL 


§  13.    General  Statement 

It  Is  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  Judgment  that  It 
be  based  on,  and  be  in  conformity  with,  recognized  prin- 
ciples and  fundamentals  of  law. 

It  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  judgment  that 
it  be  based  on,  and  be  in  conformity  with,  recog- 


nized principles  and  fundamentals  of  law.68  Where 
statutory  powers  are  conferred  on  a  court  of  in- 
ferior jurisdiction,  and  the  mode  of  executing  those 
powers  is  prescribed,  the  course  pointed  out  must 
be  substantially  pursued,  or  the  judgments  of  the 


59.  Kan,— Union   Central   Life   Ins.  | 
Co.  v. 'Irrigation  Loan  &  T.  Co.,  73  ; 
P,2d  72,  146  Kan.  550. 

Ky. — Combs  v.  Combs,  60  S.W.2d 
368,  249  Ky.  155,  8D  A.L.R.  1095. 

Actions  In  rem  and  in  personam  see 
Actions  $52. 

60.  111.— McCormick  y.    Blaine,    178 
N.B.  195,  197,  345  111.  461,  77  A.L. 
R.   1215— Wilson  v.  Smart,  155  N. 
B.  288,  291,  324  IH.  276— Austin  v. 
Royal  League,   147  N.E.   106,   109, 
316  111.  188. 

Ky. — Gayle  v.  Gayle,  192  S.W.2d  821; 
822— Booth  v.  Copley,  140  S.W.2d 
662,  666,  283  Ky.  23— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Combs  v.  Combs,  60  S.W. 
2d  368,  369,  249  Ky,  156,  89  A.L.R. 
1095. 
Nev. — Perry  v.  Edmonds,  84  P.2d  711, 

713,  59  Nev.  60. 
33  C.J.  p  1063  note  48—34  C.J.  P  1171 

note  89. 

Judgments  in  rem  generally  see  in- 
fra §§  907-911. 

A  "special"  Judgment  is  a  judg- 
ment in  rem. — Smith  v.  Colloty,  55 
A.  805,  806,  69  N.J.Law  365. 

Judgments  held  not  in  rem 

(1)  Generally. 

Conn. — Whipple    v.    Fardig,    146    A. 

847,  109  Conn.  460. 
Iowa.— Ryke  v.  Ream,  234  N.W.  196, 

212  Iowa  126. 

(2)  In  equity  action  by  assignee 
of   insured's   creditor   to  have   pro- 
ceeds  of   life   policies   subjected  to 
creditor's  claim,  that  proceeds  of  one 
policy  were  on  deposit  in  bank  in  an- 
other state  did  not  make  the  decree 
«ne  in  rem  rather  than  in  personam. 


—In  re  Hazeldine's  Estate,  280  N.W. 
6C8,  225  Iowa  369. 

61.  Ky.— Gayle  v.  Gayle,  192  S.W.2d 
821,  822 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Combs  v.  Combs,  60  S.W.2d  "368, 
369,  249  Ky.  155,  89  A.L.R.  1095. 

33  C.J.  p  1064  note  49. 

The  term  "general  judgment"  has 
been  used  as  synonymous  with 
"judgment  in  personam." — Smith  v. 
Colloty,  55  A.  805,  806,  69  N.J.Law 
365. 

Judgment   held  in  personam 
Miss. — Jones  v.  McCormick,  110   So. 
591,  145  Miss.  566. 

Judgment  held  not  in  personam 
U.S.— Atchison,   T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 

v.   Wells,   C.C.A.Tex.,    285    F.    369, 

reversed  on  other  grounds  44  S. 

Ct.  469,  265  U.S.  101,  68  L.Ed.  928. 

The  inclusion  of  costs  in  judgment 
against  a  nonresident  did  not  render 
it  void  as  a  personal  judgment, 
where  the  judgment  recited  that  de- 
fendant was  duly  cited. — Reitz  v. 
Mitchell,  Tex.Civ.App.,  256  .S.W.  697. 

Equity  decrees  operate  in  person, 
am  and  at  most  only  collaterally  in 
rem. — McKixmey  v.  Mires,  26  P.2d 
169,  95  Mont  191. 

62.  Ky.— Combs  v.  Combs,   60   S.W. 
2d    363,    249    Ky.    155,    89    A.L.R. 
1095. 

63,  IT.S.— Duwamish  v.  TT.  S.,  79  Ct. 
Cl.  530,  certiorari  denied  55   S.Ct. 
913,  295  U.S.  755,  79  L.Ed.  1698. 

Utah.— Stockyards  Nat.  Bank  of 
South  Omaha  v.  Bragg,  245  P.  966, 
67  Utah  60. 

.      40 


Bond 

Judgment  Is  not  bad  because  trial 
judge  refuses  to  fix  amount  and  con- 
ditions of  supersedeas  bond. — Mc- 
Cann  v.  Proskauer,  112  So.  621,  93 
Fla.  383. 

Judgment  obtained  at  variance 
with  practice  of  court  or  contrary 
to  well  recognized  principles  and 
fundamentals  of  law  must  fall. — 
Stockyards  Nat.  Bank  of  South  Oma- 
ha v.  Bragg,  245  P.  966,  67  Utah  60. 

Legality 

The  requirement  that  Judgment  to 
be  valid  must  be  one  which  tho  court 
could  legally  render  means  only  that 
judgment  must  be  one  which  could 
have  been  legally  rendered  on  the 
issue  shown  by  the  pleadings  and 
evidence. — Wall  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Yavapai  County,  89  P.2d  024,  63  Ariz. 
344. 

Judgment  rendered  on  proceeding 
improperly  commenced  is  void. — Mu- 
tual Life  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York  v. 
Prever  Lumber  Co.,  3  N.Y*.S.2d  642, 
167  Misc.  662,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  6  N.7.S.2d  28,  168  Misc.  358. 

Unauthorized  practice  of  law 

Fact  that  judgments  were  procur- 
ed by  one  engaged  in  the  illegal 
practice  of  law  did  not  render  them 
void  or  voidable. — Bump  v.  Barnett, 
Iowa,  16  N.W.2d  579. 

Upholding  judgment 

Sound  public  policy  demands  that 
judgments  be  upheld,  where  it  can 
be  done*  without  violating  any  stat- 
ute or  settled  principle  of  law. — Bet- 
sill  v.  Betsill,  196  S.E.  381,  187  8.CL 
50. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§16 


court  will  be  void.**    A  cotirt  shoald  act  render 
a  decree  which  is  void  for  constitutional  reasons.65 

§  14.    Statutory  Provisions  and  What  Law 
Governs 

The  validity,  force,  and  effect  of  a  Judgment  must 
be  determined  by  the  laws  In  force  at  the  time  and  in 
the  jurisdiction  where  It  was  rendered. 

The  validity,  force,  and  effect  of  a  judgment  must 
be  determined  by  the  laws  in  force  at  the  time66 
and  in  the  state  or  country  where  it  was  rendered.67 

§  15.    Duly  Constituted  Court 

It  Is  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  judgment  that 
It  be  the  sentence  or  adjudication  of  a  duly  constituted 
court  or  judicial  tribunal. 

It  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  judgment  that 
it  be  the  sentence  or  adjudication  of  a  duly  consti- 
tuted court  or  judicial  tribunal.68  Judicial  powers 
are  sometimes  conferred  on  tribunals  not  techni- 
cally courts,  and  decisions  by  such  tribunals,  in  the 


64.  Wis. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
State  ex  rel.  Lang1  v.  Civil  Court  of 
Milwaukee  County,   280  N.W.  847, 
849,  228  Wis.  411. 

Wyo. — State  v.  District  Court  of 
Eighth  Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for 
Natrona  County,  238  P.  545,  83 
Wyo.  281. 

33  C.J.  p  1064  note  58. 

Exercise  of  statutory  Jurisdiction 
only  as  statute  directs  see  Courts 
5  89. 

65.  Colo. — In     re     Special     Assess- 
ments for  Paving  Dist.  No.  3,   In 
City   of  Golden,   95   P.2d  806,   105 
Colo.  158. 

66.  Cal.— Lake  v.   Bonynge,    118  -P. 
535,  161  Cal.  120. 

83  C.J.  p  1064  note  59. 

67.  Mont — Swift  &  Co.  v.  Weston, 
289  P.  1035,  88  Mont  40. 

33  C.J.  p  1064  note  60. 
Foreign  judgments  see  Infra  55  888- 
906. 

68.  Ark, — Chapman  &  Dewey  Lum- 
ber   Co.    v.    A-ndrews,    91    S.W.2d 
1026,  192  Ark.  291. 

Mass. — Carroll    v.   Berger,   150   N.E. 

870,  255  Mass.  132. 
33  C.J.  p  1064  note  61. 
Judgment  on  motion  or  summary 

proceedings  see  infra  S  219. 
Rendition    of    judgments    generally 

see  infra  §§  100-105. 

Nullity  of  Judgment  results  from 
a  want  of  a  legally  organized  court 
or  tribunal. 
Cal. — Hunter   v.    Superior   Court    in 

and  for  Riverside  County,  97,  P.2d 

492,  36  Cal.App.2d  100. 
Tex. — San  Jacinto  Finance  Corpora- 


exercise of  powers  thus  conferred,  are  considered 
as  judgments.69 

Judgments  of  de  facto  courts.  On  principles  of 
public  policy  and  for  the  security  of  rights  it  has 
been  held  that  the  regular  judgments  of  a  de  facto 
court,  whose  existence  has  afterward  been  pro- 
nounced unconstitutional  and  void,  are  nevertheless 
valid  and  conclusive.70 

§  16.    Time  and  Place 

a.  In  general 

b.  At  chambers 

a.  In  General 

It  has  been  held  to  be  essential  to  the  validity  of  a 
judgment  that  it  be  rendered  by  a  court  sitting  at  the 
time  and  also  In  the  place  authorized  by  law. 

According  to  some  authorities,  it  is  essential  to 
the  validity  of  a  judgment  that  it  be  rendered  by  a 
court  sitting  at  the  time71  and  also  in  the  place72 
authorized  by  law,  the  tribunal  not  being  otherwise 
a  court  in  any  legal  sense,7*  and  the  proceedings 


v.  Perkins,  CivJLpp.,  94  S.W. 

2d  1213. 

Judgments  hold  not  void 
Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Aquamsi  Land  Co. 

v.    Hostetter,    79    S.W.2d   463,    336 

Mo.  391. 
Tex. — Hudson  v.  Norwood,  Civ.App., 

147    S.W.2d    826,    error   dismissed, 

judgment  correct 

69.  Me.— Longfellow  v.  Quimby,  29 
Me.  196,  48  Axn.D.  525. 

33  C.J.  p  1065  note  67. 

Allowance  of  claim  by  assignee  for 
benefit  of  creditors  as  equivalent 
to  judgment  see  Assignments  for 
Benefit  of  Creditors  S  321. 

7a    Minn. — Burt  v,  Winona  &  St  P. 

R.  Co.,  18  N.W.  285,  81  Minn.  472. 
33  C.J.  p  1070  note  2. 
De  facto  courts  generally  see  Courts 

§  144. 

71.  Ala. — Polytinsky  v.  Johnston,  99 
So.  839,  211  Ala.  99. 

Ark. — Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v. 
Saunders,  94  S.W.2d  703,  192  Ark. 
783. 

Ga.— Hicks  v.  Hicks,  27  S.E.2d  10, 
69  Ga.Afcp.  870. 

HI.— -Wallace  Grain  &  Supply  Co.  v. 
Gary,  24  N.E.2d  907,  308  ULApp. 
221,  reversed  on  other  grounds  28 
N.B.2d  107,  374  111.  57. 

Tex—British  General  Ens.  Co.  v. 
Ripy,  106  S.W.2d  1047,  130  Tex. 
101— Glasscock  v.  Pickens,  Civ. 
App.,  73  S.W.2d  992— Sinclair  Re- 
fining Co.  v.  McElree,  Civ.App.,  52 
S.W.2d  679 — Engelman  v.  Ander- 
son, Civ.App.,  244  S.W.  650. 

33  C.J.  p  1065  note  72. 

Validity  of  judgment  on  holiday  see 
Holidays  S  5  d. 


Validity  of  Judgment  on  Sunday  see 
the  C.J.S.  title  Sundays  §  53,  also 
60  C.J.  p  1146  note  57-p  1147 
note  70. 

72.  Ala.— Polytiosky  v.  Johnston,  99 
So.  839,  211  Ala.  99. 

OkL— City  of  Clinton  ex  rel.  Rich- 
ardson v.  Keen,  158  P.2d  104,  192 

.  Okl.  382— City  of  Clinton  ex  rel. 
Richardson  v.  Cornell,  132  P.2d 
840,  191  Okl.  600. 

Tex.— British  General  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Ripy.  106  S.W.2d  1047,  130  Tex.  101 
— Ferguson  v.  Ferguson,  Civ.App., 
98  S.W.2d  847. 

33  C.J.  p  1066  note  73. 

District 

(1)  Ordinarily,  a  judgment  cannot 
be    rendered    out    of   the    district.-^ 
Killiam  v.  Maiden  Chair  Co.,  161  S. 
E.  546,  202  N.C.  23. 

(2)  This  rule  has  been  held  inap- 
plicable  where    the    parties   consent 
thereto,  although  the  consent  should 
be    in    writing. — Killiam    v.    Maiden 
Chair  Co.,  supra. 

Signing  judgment  in  another  county 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment rendered  at   the   close  of  the 
evidence  at  the  place  of  trial  is  not 
rendered  invalid  because  it  was  sign- 
ed out  of  the  county  where  trial  was 
had,  under  a  statute  providing  that 
judgment  or  decree  may  be  rendered 
by.  the  judge  at  any  place  in  his  dis- 
trict— Swanson  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 
219  P.  784,  74  Colo.  135. 

(2)  Other  cases  see  33  C.J.  p  1066 
note  73*  [b]. 

73.  Ariz. — Meade  v.  Scribaer,  85  P. 
729,  10  Ariz.  33. 

33  C.J.  p  1066  note  74. 


§  16 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


being,  therefore,  coram  aon  judioe.74  In  some  cas- 
es, however,  it  has  been  held  that  the  fact  that  a 
term  of  court  at  which  a  judgment  was  rendered 
was  held  at  a  time  other  than  that  prescribed  or 
authorized  by  law,  while  rendering  the  judgment 
erroneous  and  constituting  ground  for  its  reversal, 
does  not  render  the  judgment  void;7*  but  a  con- 
trary view  has  also  been  taken  and  a  judgment  ren- 
dered under  such  circumstances  has  been  held  to  be 
void.™  It  has  been  held  that  the  mere  fact  that 
the  court  was  held  at  a  place  other  than  that  di- 
rected by  law  will  not  of  itself  render  the  judg- 
ment void,7?  as  where  the  court  errs  with  respect 
to  the  location  of  the  county  seat78 

The  proper  time  for  the  rendition  and  entry  of 
judgment  is  discussed  infra  §§  113-116. 

b.  At  Chambers 

Judgments  should  be  rendered  In  open  court  and  not 
in  chambers. 

Judgments  should  be  rendered  in  open  court  and 
not  in  chambers,79  and  it  has  been  held  that  judg- 
ments rendered  in  chambers  are  void,80  in  the  ab- 


sence of  statutory  or  constitutional  provisions  au- 
thorizing such  action  at  chambers.81 

§  17.    Judges 

a.  In  general 

b.  Disqualified  judge 

c.  De  facto  judge 

d.  Special  judge 

a.  In  General 

Illegal  constitution  of  the  court  with  respect  to  the 
Judge  or  judges  sitting  renders  the  Judgment  absolutely 
void. 

Illegal  constitution  of  the  court  with  respect  to 
the  judge  or  judges  sitting,  as  distinguished  from' 
mere  disqualification  of  one  or  more  of  such  judg- 
es, renders  the  judgment  absolutely  void.82 

b.  Disqualified  Judge 

In  the  absence  of  a  constitutional  or  statutory  provi- 
sion forbidding  a  disqualified  Judge  from  acting,  a  Judg- 
ment rendered  by  a  disqualified  judge  is  voidable  but 
not  void. 

Where  a  judge  is  forbidden  to  act  in  a  case  when 
he  is  disqualified,83  as  by  reason  of  interest,84  re- 
lationship to  parties,85  having  acted  as  counsel,86 


74.    Gau— Hicks  v.  Hicks,   27   S.E.2d 

10,  69  Ga.App.  870. 
33  C.J.  p  1066  note  75. 

76.  S.D. — Lockard  v.  Lockard,  110 
N.W.  1C4,  21  S.D.  134. 

33  C.J.  P  1066  note  76. 

Court  held  under  color  of  law 

This  view  has  been  adopted  where 
the  court  was  held  under  color  of 
law  at  a  particular  time,  but  at  time 
other  than  that  actually  fixed  by  law. 
there  having  been  a  change  in  the 
law  which  was  unknown  or  overlook- 
ed.—Venable  v.  Curd,  2  Head,  Tenn., 
682. 
78.  Ala. — State  v.  Thurman,  88  So. 

61,  17  Ala.App.  592. 
33  C.J.  p  1066  note  78. 

77.  Minn.— In  re  Ellis,  56  N.W.  1056, 
55   Minn.  401,   43  Am.S.R.  514,   23 
L.R.A,  287. 

33  C.J.  p  1066  note  79. 

78.  111. — Robinson  v.  Moore,  25  HI. 
185. 

79.  Tex. — Bridgman    v.    Moore,    183 
S.W.2d  705,  143  Tex.  250. 

33  O.J.  p  1070  note  96. 
Term  ttxne  * 

It  has  been  held  that,  if  the  judg- 
ment Is  entered  In  term  time,  it  is 
immaterial  whether  court  perform- 
ed act  of  rendering  Judgment  in 
private  office  or  courtroom. — Doep- 
penschxnidt  v.  City  of  New  Braun- 
fels,  Tex.Civ.App.,  289  S.W.  425. 
Boom  of  courthouse 

Judgment    by    superior    court    in 
room  In  courthouse  at  county  site 


other  than  regular  courtroom  has 
been  held  not  void,  where  no  legal 
or  constitutional  right  of  defendant 
was  infringed,  and  no  substantial  in- 
jury to  him  has  been  done.— Walton 
v.  Wilkinson  Bolton  Co.,  123  S.E.  103, 
158  Ga.  13. 
Signing  judgment 

Whether  judgment  was  signed  at 
chambers  or  in  open  court  was  im- 
material, since  the  signing  of  judg- 
ment involves  no  judicial  considera- 
tion.—Baldwin  v.  Anderson,  13  P.2d 
650,  52  Idaho  243—33  C.J.  p  1070 
note  96  [e]. 

80.  Colo.— Scott  v.  Stutheit,  121  P. 
151,  21  Colo.App.  151. 

Neb.— Shold  v.   Van  Treeck,   117  N. 

W.  113,  82  Neb.  99. 
33  C.J.  p  1070  note  96—15  C.J.  p  815 

note  25. 

Under  statute  requiring  Judgments 
to  be  read  in  open  court,  a  judgment 
read  or  signed  in  chambers  without 
authorization  of  counsel  or  litigants 
is  a  nullity. — Hammond  Box  Co.  v. 
Carmello  Musso  &  Co.,  La.App.,  172 
So.  790— Green  v.  Frederick,  136  So. 
783,  17  La,App.  605—33  C.J.  p  1070 
note  96  [g]. 

81.  Wash.— Williams  v.  Briley,  242 
P.  370,  137  Wash.  262. 

33    C.J.   p    1070    note   97—15   C.J.   p 
826  note  26. 

82.  IU.-<!obb  v.  People,  84  HL  511- 
33  C.J.  p  1070  note  7. 

33.    Cal.— Glometti  v.  Etienne,  28  P. 
2d  913,  219  Cal.  687— Cadenasso  v. 

42 


Bank  of  Italy,  6  P.2d  944,  214  Cal. 

562. 
Or.— Western      Athletic      Club      v. 

Thompson,   129   P.2d   828,   169   Or. 

514. 
Tex.— Williams     v.     Sinclair-Prairie 

Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,   135   S.W.2d   211, 

error  dismissed,  judgment  correct 

—Weil  v.  Lewis,  Civ.App.,  2  S.W. 

2d  566. 
33  C.J.  p  1071  note  9. 

84.  Mont. — Gaer  v.  Bank  of  Baker, 
107  P.2d  877,   111  Mont.  204. 

33  C.J.  p  1071  note  9. 

Judge  who  is  stockholder  of  plain- 
tiff bank  is  disqualified,  and  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  render  judgment 
which,  if  rendered,  is  void. — Cade- 
nasso v.  Bank  of  Italy,  6  P.2d  944, 
214  Cal.  562, 

85.  Tex.— Postal  Mut.  Indemnity  Co. 
v.  Ellis,   169   S.W.2d  482,  140  Tex, 
570— Weil  v.  Lewis,  Civ.App.,  2  S. 
W.2d  566 — Stephenson  v.  Kirkham, 
Civ.App.,  297  S.W.  266. 

33  C.J.  p  1071  note  9. 

Void  as  to  other  defendants 

Judgment  void  as  to  one  defendant 
because  of  judge's  relationship  was 
void  as  to  other  defendants. — Weil 
v.  Lewis,  Tex.Civ.App.,  2  S.W.2d  566. 

*.  Tex.— Williams  v.  Sinclair-Prai- 
rie Oil  Co.,  Civ.Ap.p.,  135  S.W.2d 
211,  error  dismissed,  judgment  cor- 
rect. 

33  C.J.  p  1071  note  9  [c]. 

Issistant  county  attorney 
Where  a  county  judge  hearing  sec- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  17 


or  prejudice,87  any  judgment  by  him  in  disregard 
of  the  prohibition  is  void.  Consent  of  parties  can- 
not confer  jurisdiction  in  such  cases,88  unless  the 
statute  excepts  from  its  prohibition  cases  where 
the  parties  consent,  in  which  event  consent  of  par- 
ties removes  the  disqualification  to  act,89  as  would 
be  the  case  in  the  absence  of  any  express  prohibi- 
tion to  act.90 

Where  there  is  no  absolute  prohibition  of  his  act- 
ing, the  mere  fact  that  the  judge  is  disqualified  does 
not  render  the  judgment  void,  although  it  may  ren- 
der it  voidable  or  reversible.91  There  is  authority, 
however,  holding  that  such  judgments  are  void  even 
in  the  absence  of  any  statutory  prohibition.92 

While  it  has  been  held  that,  where  several  judges 
constitute  the  court,  and  one  of  them  is  disquali- 
fied, the  judgment  is  void,  if  such  disqualified  judge 
participated  in  the  hearing  and  determination,93 
there  is  also  authority  to  the  contrary.94  In  some 
cases  it  has  been  held  that  a  disqualified  judge  may 


sit,  pro  forma,  to  make  a  quorum  without  invali- 
dating the  judgment,  provided  he  does  not  otherwise 
participate  in  the  proceedings;96  but  there  is  also 
authority  to  the  contrary.96  It  has  been  held  that 
two  judges  of  an  appellate  court  may  render  a  valid 
judgment  where  the  third  judge  has  disqualified 
himself.97 

Entry  of  formal  judgment.  A  judge  who  is  dis- 
qualified in  a  cause  may  enter  a  formal  judgment 
directed  by  the  appellate  court,  as  in  such  case  he 
is  not  required  to  exercise  any  judgment  or  dis- 
cretion.98 

c.  De  Facto  Judge 

A  Judgment  rendered  by  a  Judge  de  facto  Is  valid. 
A  judgment  rendered  by  a  judge  de  facto  is  val- 
id.99 On  this  principle,  it  has  been  held  that  a 
judgment  rendered  by  a  properly  elected  judge  be- 
fore the  legal  commencement  of  his  term  of  office,1 
or  after  the  expiration  of  his  term,2  is  valid 


ond  liquor  prosecution  was  disquali- 
fied because  he  had  been  assistant 
county  attorney  at  time  of  first  pros- 
ecution, judgment  rendered  on  sec- 
ond prosecution  was  void. — Woodland 
v.  State,  178  S.W.2d  528,  147  Tex.Cr. 
84. 

87.  Ohio.— Wendel  v.  Hughes,  28  N. 
E.2d  686,  64  Ohio  App.  310. 

Or. — -Western  Athletic  Club  v. 
Thompson,  129  P.2d  828,  169  Or. 
514. 

88.  Vt. — Watson   v.   Payne,   111   A. 
462,  94  Vt.  299. 

83  C.J.  p  1071  note  10, 

89.  Okl.— Holloway  v.  Hall,   192  P. 
219,  79  Okl..l63. 

38  C.J.  p  1071  note  12. 
Knowledge  of  facts 

Where  parties  to  proceedings  to 
set  aside  orders  in  statutory  rehabil- 
itation proceeding  stipulated  to 
waiver  of  disqualification  of  judge 
whose  sister  owned  stock  in  delin- 
quent insurer  under  statute  relating 
to  disqualification  of  judges,  and 
waiver  was  not  specifically  limited 
to  ownership  by  sister  of  stock,  un- 
awareness  of  plaintiff  when  signing 
stipulation  that  sister  was  a  mem- 
ber of  two  stockholders'  committees, 
one  of  which  was  a  party  to  proceed- 
ings to  set  aside  orders,  did  not  ren- 
der judgment  void.— Neblett  v.  Pa- 
cific Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  California, 
139  P.2d  934,  22  Cal.2d  393,  certiorari 
denied  64  S.Ct.  428,  320  U.S.  802, 
88  L.Ed.  484. 

90.  N.H.— Stearns  v.  Wright,  51  N. 
H.  600. 

33  C.J.  p  1071  note  18. 

91.  Ala.— Phillips  v.  State,  App.,  24 
So.2d  226. 

Ind. — State  ex  rel.  Krodel  v.  Gilkison, 
198  N.E.  323,  209  Ind.  213. 


Ohio.— Tari  v.  State,  159  N.B.  594,  | 
117  Ohio  St.  481,  67  A.L.R.  284. 

Okl.— Mansfield,  Sizer  &  Gardner  v. 
Smith,  16  P.2d  1066,  160  Okl.  298— 
Dancy  v.  Owens,  258  P.  879,  126 
Okl.  37— State  v.  Davenport,  256  P. 
340,  125  Okl.  1. 

S.C.— Sandel  v.  Crum,  125  S.B.  919, 
130  S.C.  317. 

33  C.J.  p  1071  note  14. 

At  common,  law 

U.S.— Crites  v.  Radtke,  D.C.N.T.,  29 
F.Supp.  970— In  re  Fox  West  Coast 
Theatres,  D.C.Cal.,  25  F.Supp.  250, 
affirmed,  C.C.A.,  88  F.2d  212,  cer- 
tiorari denied  Tally  v.  Fox  Film 
Corporation,  57  S.Ct.  944,  301  U.S. 
710,  81  LJEd.  1363,  rehearing  de- 
nied 58  S.Ct  7,  302  U.S.  772,  82 
L.Ed.  598. 

Ind.— State,  ex  rel.  Krodel  v.  Gilki- 
son, 198  N.E.  323,  209  Ind.  213. 

92.  Ky.— Hall   v.    Blackard,    182    S. 
W.2d  904,   298  Ky.   354— Common- 
wealth v.  Murphy,  174  S.W.2d  681, 
295    Ky.    466— Coquillard    Wagon 
Works    v.    Melton,    125    S.W.    291, 
137  Ky.  189. 

93.  N.T.— Oakley  v.  Aspinwall,  8  N. 
T.  547. 

33  C.J.  p  1071  note  16. 

JtLdge  necessary  to  make  quorum 

The  judgment  is  void  if  the  dis- 
qualified judge  is  necessary  to  make 
a  quorum. — Stockwell  v.  White  Lake, 
22  Mich.  341. 

94.  N.D.— State  v.  Kositzky,  166  N. 
W.  634,  «8  N.D.  616. 

"The  mere  presence  of,  and  par- 
ticipation by,  a  member  of  a  judicial 
body  disqualified  to  act  in  a  par- 
ticular case,  does  not  necessarily  in- 
validate the  proceedings  and  judg- 
ment of  that  body.  Particularly  is 
this  true  if  his  presence  is  not  nee- 

43 


essary  to  constitute  a  quorum,  or  his 
vote  does  not  determine  the  result" 
—State  v.  Kositzky,  166  N.W.  534, 
535,  38  N.D.  616,  L.R.A.1918D  237. 

95.  Utah. — Nephi  Irr.  Co.  v.  Jenkins, 
32  P.  699,  8  Utah  452. 

Wis. — Rogan  v.  Walker,  1  Wis.  597. 
Fro  tempore  member 

A  decision  of  district  court  of  ap- 
peal was  not  void  because  the  judge 
who  tried  the  case  appealed  from 
was  a  member  of  appellate  tribunal 
pro  tempore  and  sat  on  the  bench 
when  case  was  argued,  where  such 
judge  did  not  participate  in  decision 
and  specifically  disqualified  himself. 
— Bracey  v.  Gray,  Cal.App.,  162  P.2d 
314,  motion  granted  and  certiorari 
denied  Gray  v.  Bracey,  66  S.Ct.  961. 

96.  Wis.— Case  v.  Hoffman,  72  N.W. 
390,    100   Wis.    314,    44    L.R.A.   728, 
vacated  74  N.W.  220,  100  Wis.  314, 
44    L.R.A.    728,    reheard    75    N.W. 
945,  100  Wis.  314,  44  L.R.A.  728. 

97.  Tex. — Marshburn     v.      Stewart, 
Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  679. 

98.  U.S. — Clarke   v.    Chicago,    B.  '& 
Q.  R.  Co.,  CC.A.Wyo.,  62  F.2d  440, 
certiorari  denied  54  S.Ct  49,  three 
cases,  290  U.S.  629,  78  L.Ed.  54$. 

33  C.J.  p  1072  note  21. 

Entry   generally   see   infra   §    106. 

99.  Colo. — Rude    v.     Sisack,     96    P. 
976,  44  Colo.  21. 

N.T.— McLear  v.  Balmat,  223  N.T.S. 
76,  129  Misc.  805,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  230  N.T.S.  259,  224  App. 
Div.  306,  modified  231  N.T.S.  581, 
224  AppJDiv.  366. 

Ohio. — Demereaux  v.  State,  172  NJ33. 
551,  35  Ohio  App.  418. 

33  C.J.  p  1072  note  23. 

1.  Va,— McCraw    v.     Williams,     83 
Gratt  510,  74  Va.  510. 

2.  Cal.— Merced  Bank  v.  Bosenthal, 


§  17 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


d.  Special  Judge 

A  Judgment  rendered  by  a  special  or  substitute  Judge 
Is  valid  where  such  a  Judge  has  been  duly  appointed 
and  Is  authorized  to  act. 

A  judgment  rendered  by  a  special  or  substitute 
judge  is  valid  where  such  a  judge  has  been  duly 
appointed  and  is  authorized  to  act8  A  judgment 
rendered  by  a- special  judge  without  proper  author- 
ity is  a  nullity,4  as  where  the  appointment  of  a  spe- 
cial judge  was  unauthorized.5 


§  18.    Formal  Proceedings 

It  Is  essential  to  the  existence  and  validity  of  a 
Judgment  that  the  decision  shall  have  been  rendered  In 
an  action  or  proceeding  before  the  court,  In  some  form 
recognized  and  sanctioned  by  law. 

It  is  essential  to  the  existence  and  validity  of  a 


judgment  that  the  decision  shall  have  been  rendered 
in  an  action  or  proceeding  before  the  court,6  in 
some  form  recognized  and  sanctioned,  by  law.?  The 
established  modes  of  procedure  must  be  followed,8 
although  mere  irregularities  in  the  proceedings  will 
not  necessarily  invalidate  the  judgment.9  Accord- 
ingly, a  judgment  in  a  court  of  record  must  be 
based  on  definite  and  regular  proceedings,  which 
the  record  must  disclose.10  Likewise,  as  a  general 
rule,  before  a  valid  judgment  may  be  rendered 
against  a  defendant,  he  must  be  accorded  an  op- 
portunity to  be  heard  and  present  his  defense,11  and 
for  this  purpose,  as  discussed  infra  §  23,  he  must 
be  given  notice  of  the  action  or  proceeding  against 
him.  It  has  been  held  that  it  is  not  essential  to  the 
validity  of  a  judgment  against  a  defendant  in  a 
civil  action  that  he  be  present  at  any  of  the  pro- 


si  P.  849,  99  Cal.  39,  reheard  33  P. 
732,  99  Cal.  39. 
33  C.J.  p  1072  note  25. 

3,  Ariz, — Payne  v.  Williams,   56   P. 
2d  186,  47  Ariz.  396. 

Ark. — Moffett    v.    Texarkana    Forest 

Park    Pavtog,    Sewer,    and   Water 

Dist.    No.    2,    26    S.W.2d    589,    181 

Ark.  474. 

N.D.— Olson   v.   Donnelly,    294   N.W. 

666,  70  N.D.  370. 

Tex. — Boone  v.   Likens-Waddill  Mo- 
tor Co.,  Civ.App.,  49  S.W.2d  979. 
Power  of  successor  judge  to  render 
judgment  in  proceeding  begun  be- 
fore predecessor  see  Judges  §  56. 
Entry  on  record  of  agreement  of 
counsel  for  appointment  of  judge  ad 
litem  has  been  held  not  essential  to 
validity  of  judgment.— TT,  S.  Fidelity 
&   Guaranty  Co.  v.   Tucker,  159  So. 
787,  118  Fla.  430. 
Failure  to  take  oath 

The  failure  of  a  special  Judge  to 
take  oath  of  office  has  been  held  not 
to  render  his  judgments  void. 
Kan, — In   re    Hewes,    62    P.    673,    62 

Kan.  288. 
W.Va.— Tower  v.  Whip,  44  S.E.  179, 

53  W.Va,  158,   63  L.R.A,  937. 
Judge  pro  tempore 

Where  Judge  pro  tempore  was  se- 
lected by  agreement  of  parties  after 
disqualification  of  district  Judge  by 
affidavit  of  prejudice,  Judgment  of 
judge  pro  tempore  was  as  valid  and 
as  binding  on  parties  as  though  it 
had  been  rendered  by  presiding 
Judge  of  district — Moruzzi  v.  Fed- 
eral Life  &  Casualty  Co.,  75  P.2d 
320,  42  N.M.  35,  115  A.L.R.  407. 
Waiver,  of  irregularity 

It  has  been  held  that,  where  de- 
fendants waived  an  Irregularity  in 
the  appointment  of  a  special  judge, 
a  judgment  rendered  by  sudh  judge 
is  not  void. — Winters  v.  Allen,  62 
S.W.2d  51,  166  Tenn.  281. 

4.  Fla. — Sapp    v.    McConnon  &  Co., 
169  So.  622,  124  Fla.  879. 


111.— Healy  v.   Mobile   &  O.   R.   Co., 

161  IlLApp.  138. 

Ind.— Herbster  V;  State,  80  I-nd.  484. 
Ky.— Ooleman   v.    Mullins,    288    S.W. 

701,  216  Ky.  761. 
Mo.— Cook  v.   Cook,    68   S.W.2d  900, 

228  Mo.App.  478. 

Tex*— Younger  Bros.  v.  Turner,  Civ. 
App.,  132  S.W.2d  632— Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Painter,  Civ.App., 
64  S.W.2d  828 — Clements  v.  Fort 
Worth  &  D.  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Civ.App., 
7  S.W.2d  895. 
Signing  at  chambers 

Special  judge,  unless  duly  commis- 
sioned to  hold  and  holding  court  in 
county  or  courts  of  Judicial  district 
when  signing  judgment  at  chambers, 
was  without  authority  in  premises. — 
Bohannon  v.  Virginia  Trust  Co.,  153 
S.E.  263,  198  N.C.  702. 

5.  Ky. — Bark  v.  Springton  Coal  Co,, 
124  S.Wl2d  760,  276  Ky.  501. 

Tex— Bailey  v.  Triplett  Bros;,  Civ. 
App.,  278  S.W.  250. 

33  C.J.  p  1072  note  28. 

&  N.Y. — Booth  v.  Kingsland  Ave, 
Bldg.  Ass'n,  46  N.T.S.  457,  18  App. 
Div.  407,  408. 

33  C.J.  p  1072  note  29. 

7.  Colo. — O'Brophy  v.  Bra  Gold  Mln. 
Co.,    85   P.    679,   36  Colo.   247. 

Mo.— In  re  Buckles,  53  S.W.2d  1055, 

331  Mo.  405. 
33  C.J.  p  1072  note  30. 

8.  Me.— Ex  parte  Davis,  41  Me.  38, 
58. 

33  C.J.  p  1072  note  31* 

9.  Failure  to  give  notice  adjourn- 
ing   ease    was    a   mere   irregularity, 
not  invalidating  judgment. — Intercity 
Carnival   Co.   v.    niions,    239    N.T.S. 
128,  136  Misc.  56. 

10.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in, 
City  of  Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P. 
418,  429,  147  dkl.  179. 

33  C.J.  p  1132  note  79. 

11.  U.S.— Sylvan  Beach  v.  Koch,  C 

44 


C.A.Mo.,  140  F.2d  852— In  re  Noell, 
C.C.A.MO.,  93  F.2d  5— Smith  v. 
Stark  Trucking,  D.C.Ohio.  53  F. 
Supp.  826 — Fisher  v.  Jordan,  D.C. 
Tex.,  32  F.Supp.  608,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  C.C.A.,  116  F.2d  198, 
certiorari  denied  Jordan  v.  Fisher, 
61  S.Ct.  734,  312  U.S.  697,  85  U 
Ed.  1132. 

Cal.— Gray  v.  Hall,   265  P.  246,   203 

Cal.  306. 
D.C. — IT.  S.  ex  reL  Ordmann  v.  Cum- 

mings,    85    F.2d    273.    66    App. B.C. 

107. 
Ga.— Elliott  v.  Adams,  160  S.E.  336, 

173  Ga.  312— Walton  v.  Wilkinson 

Bolton   Co.,   123   S.E.   103,   158   Ga, 

13. 
111.— Alward  v.  Borah,  44  N.E.2d  865, 

381  111.  134— Hauser  v.  Power,  183 

N.E.  580,  351  111.  36— In  re  Shanks' 

Estate,  282  IlLApp.  1. 
Ky.— Jasper  v.  Tartar.  7  S.W.2d  236, 

224  Ky.  834. 
Mo.— Ex  parte  Irwin,  6  S.W.2d  597, 

320  Mo.  20— State  ex  reL  National 

Lead  Co.  v.  Smith,  App.,  134  S.W. 

2d  1061. 
N.J. — Redzlna  v.  Provident  Inst.  for 

Savings  in  Jersey  City,  125  A.  133, 

96  N.J.EQ.  346. 
N.T. — Rochester  Sav.  Bank  v.   Mon- 
roe   County,    8    N.Y.S.2d    107,    169' 

Misc.  526. 
N.D.— Baird    V.    Ellison,     293    N.W. 

794,  70  N.D.  261. 
Or.— Kerns  v.  Couch,  17  P.2d  323,  141 

Or.  147. 
Pa.— In    re    Galli's  Estate,    17   A.2d 

899,  340  Pa.  561. 
Tex. — Bozeman  v.  Arlington  Heights 

Sanitarium,    Civ.App.,    134    S.W.2d 

350,    error    refused — Moorhe-ad    v. 

Transportation    Bank   of   Chicago, 

111.,   Civ.App.,   62  S.W.2d   184. 
Va.— Moore  v.   Smith,  15   S.E.2d  48, 

177  Va.  621. 
Wash.— Morley  v.  Morley,  230  P.  645, 

131  Wash.  540. 
33  CJ.  p  1080  note  96. 


49    C.J.S. 


.JUDGMENTS 


§  19 


ceedings  following  a  proper  summons  to  bring  him 
before  the  court.12 

§  19.    Jurisdiction 

a.  In  general 

b.  Jurisdiction  of  person 

c.  Jurisdiction  of  subject  matter  or  cause 

of  action 

d.  Jurisdiction    of   question   determined 

and  relief  granted 


a.  In  General 

A  judgment  rendered  by  a  court  having  no  Jurisdic- 
tion Is  a  mere  nullity. 

A  judgment  rendered  by  a  court  having  no  ju- 
risdiction is  a  mere  nullity,  and  will  be  so  held  and 
treated  whenever  and  for  whatever  purpose  it  is 
sought  to  be  used  or  relied  on  as  a  valid  judg- 
ment.1^  Where  a  court  is  without  jurisdiction,  it 
is  generally  irregular  to  make  any  order  in  the 


12.  Ariz. — Potter  v.  Home  Owners' 
Loan  Corporation,  72  P.2d  429,  50 
Ariz.  285. 

Necessity  of  presence  of  parties  at 
trial  generally  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
Trial  §  40,  also  64  C.J.  p  69  note 
90-p  70  note  3. 

13.  U.S.— Green  v.   City  of  Stuart, 
C.C.A.Fla.,  101  F.2d  309,  certioraii 
denied  59   S.Ct   827,   307  U.S.   626, 
83   L.Ed.   1510— Albion-Idaho  Land 
Co.    v.    Naf    Irr.    Co.,    C.OA.Utah, 
97  F.2d  439 — In  re  Lake  Champlain 
Pulp    &    Paper    Corporation,    B.C. 
N.Y.,  20  F.2d  425. 

Cal.— In  re  Gardiner's  Estate,  114 
P.2d  643,  45  Cal.App.2d  559. 

Colo.— Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Fremont 
County,  87  P.2d  761,  95  Colo.  435. 

D.C. — U.  S.  ex  rel.  Tungsten  Reef 
Mines  Co.  v.  Ickes,  84  F.2d  257,  66 
App.D.C.  3. 

Fla. — Mai  one  v.  Meres,  109  So.  677, 
91  Fla.  709. 

Ga.— City  of  Albany  v.  Parks,  5  S. 
E.2d  680,  61  GeuApp.  55. 

Idaho. — East  Side  Lumber  Co.  T. 
Malmgren,  277  P.  554,  47  Idaho 
560 — Williams  v,  Sherman,  212  P. 
971,  36  Idaho  494. 

111.— Atkins  v.  Atkins,  65  N.E.2d  801, 
393  111.  202— Martin  v.  Schillo,  60 
N.E.2d  392,  389  111.  607,  certiorari 
denied  65  S.Ct  •  1572,  325  U.S.  880, 
89  L.Ed.  1996— Sharp  v.  Sharp,  164 
N.B.  685,  333  111.  267— People  v. 
Brewer,  160  N.B.  76,  328  111.  472— 
Albers  v.  Bramberg,  32  N.E.2d  362, 
308  Ill.App.  463— Jardine  v.  Jar- 
dine,  9  N.E.2d  645,  291  Ill.App.  152 
— Webster  Grocer  Co.  v.  Gammel,  1 
N.E.2d  890,  285  IlLApp.  277— Eddy 
v.  Dodson,  242  Ill.App.  508 — Gary  v. 
Senseman,  215  Ill.App.  232. 

3towa. — Stier  v.  Iowa   State  Travel- 
in?   Men's    Asa'n,    201    N.W.    328, 
199   Iowa  118,  59  A.L.R.   1384. 
:Ky.— Thacker  v.  Phillips'  Adm'r,  281 
S.W.  831,  213  Ky.  687. 

;La. — Whitney  Central  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank  v.  Norton,  102  So.  306, 
157  La,  199— Smith  v.  Shehee, 
App.,  143  So.  339,  amended  144  So. 
750. 

iMe.— In  re  Williams'  Estate,  41  A. 

2d    825,    141    Me.    219— Appeal    of 

Kelley,   1  A.2d  183,   136  Me.  7. 

:*ld. — Fooks*  Ex*rs  v.   Ghingher,   192 

A.  782,  172  Md.  612,  certiorari  de- 


nied Phillips  v.  Ghingher,  58  S.Ct. 
47,  302  U.S.  726,  82  L.Ed.  561. 

Mass.— Holt  v.  Holt,  153  N.B.  397, 
257  Mass.  114. 

Mich.— Ward  v.  Hunter  Machinery 
Co.,  248  N.W.  864,  263  Mich.  445. 

Mo.— In  re  Buckles,  53  S.W.2d  1055, 
331  Mo.  405— State  ex  rel.  Hogan 
v.  Meyers,  App.,  26  S.W.2d  816. 

Mont — Oregon  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Kun- 
neke,  245  P.  539,  76  Mont.  117. 

N.J.— Giresi  v.  Giresi,  44  A.2d  345 
— Kaufman  v.  Smathers,  166  A. 
453,  111  N.J.Law  52— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in,  Keller  v.  American  Cya-n- 
amid  Co.,  28  A.2d  41,  46,  132  N.J. 
Bq.  210.  . 

N.T. — Oberlander  v.  Oberlander,  89 
N.T.S.2d  139,  179  Misc.  459 — Cor- 
pus Juris  quoted  in  Van  Buren  v. 
Harrison,  299  N.Y.S.  485,  486,  164 
Misc.  774 — Clarke  v.  Carlisle  Foun- 
dry Co.,  270  N.T.S.  351,  150  Misc. 
710. 

N.C.— Ward  v.  Agrillo,  139  S.B.  451, 
194  N.C.  321— Clark  v.  Carolina 
Homes,  128  S.E.  20,  189  N.C.  703. 

Ohio. — Sampliner  v.  Bialosky,  25 
Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  161. 

Okl.— O.  C.  Whitaker,  Inc.,  v.  Dil- 
lingham,  152  P.2d  371,  194  Okl.  421 
— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Fltzsim- 
mons  v.  Oklahoma  City,  135  P.2d 
340,  342,  192  Okl.  248— Hinkle  v. 
Jones,  66  P.2d  1073,  180  Okl.  17— 
St  Louis-San  Francisco  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Bayne,  40  P.2d  1104,  170  Okl. 
542 — Henson  v.  Oklahoma  State 
Bank,  23  P.2d  709,  165  Okl.  1— 
Tulsa  Terminal,  Storage  &  Trans- 
fer Co.  v,  Thomas,  18  P.2d  891, 
162  OkL  5. 

Pa. — In  re  Patterson's  Estate,  19  A. 
2d  165,  341  Pa.  177— Mamlin  v. 
Tener,  23  A.2d  90,  146  BauSuper. 
593-t-Mintz  v.  Mlntz,  83  Pa.Super. 
85. 

S.D. — Hurley  v.  Coursey,  265  N.W.  4, 
64  S.D.  131— In  re  Schafer's  Estate, 
209  N.W.  355,  50  S.D.  232,  adhered 
to  In  re  Schafer's  Estate,  216  N. 
W.  948,  52  S.D.  182. 

Tenn. — Johnson  v.  White,  106  S.W, 
2d  222,  171  Tenn.  536— Ward  v. 
Lovell,  113  S*W.2d  759,  21  Tenn. 
App.  560— Western  Automobile 
Casualty  Co.  v.  Burnell,  71  S.W.2d 
474,  17  Tenn.App.  687. 

Tex.— Conn  v.  Campbell,  24  S.W.2d 
813,  119  Tex.  82— Leslie  v.  Griffin, 

45 


Com. App.,  25  S.W.2d  820 — Renshaw 
v.  Wise  County,  Civ.App.,  142  S.W. 
2d  578 — Green  v.  Duncan,  Civ. App., 
134  S.W.2d  744 — Galley  v.  Hedrick, 
Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  978— Askew 
V.  Roundtree,  Civ.App.,  120  S.W. 
2d  117,  error  dismissed — Fowzer 
v.  Huey  &  Philp  Hardware  Co., 
Civ.App.f  99  S.W.2d  1100,  error 
dismissed — Westerly  Supply  Cor- 
poration v.  State,  Civ. App.,  89  S.W. 
2d  244— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Wil- 
kinson v.  Owens,  Civ.App.,  72  S.W. 
2d  330,  335— King  v.  King,  Civ. 
App.t  291  S.W.  645— Glenn  v.  Dal- 
las County  Bois  D'Arc  Island 
Levee  Dist,  Civ.App.,  282  S.W.  339, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Dallas 
County  Bois  D'Arc  Island  Levee 
Dist  v.  Glenn,  Com.App.,  288  S.W. 
165. 

Va. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bray  v. 
Landergren,  172  S.B.  252,  257,  161 
Va.  699. 
Vt— Roddy    v.    Fitzgerald's    Estate, 

35  A,2d  668,  113  Vt.  472. 
Wash.— Parr  v.  City  of  Seattle,  84  P. 

2d  375,  197  Wash.  53. 
W.Va.—Perkins    v.    Hall,    17    S.E.2d 
795,   123  W.Va.   707— Corpus  Jurto 
cited  i»  Pettry  v.  Shi-nn,  196  S.E. 
385,  386,  120  W.Va.  20. 
33  C.J.  p  1073  note  33. 
Jurisdiction  generally  see  Courts  55 
15-119. 

"A  judgment  rendered  without  Ju- 
risdiction is  a  nullity  and  the  party 
against  whom  it  is  entered  may 
Ignore  it  and  proceed  as  though  no 
attempt  had  ever  been  made  to  ren- 
der it" — Moeur  v.  Ashfork  Livestock 
Co.,  61  P.2d  395,  897,  48  Ariz.  298. 

Other  statements  of  rule 

(1)  Where   a   court   acts   without 
authority,   its   judgments  are  nulli- 
ties. 

D.C. — TJ.  S.  ex  rel.  Ordmann  v.  Cum- 

mings,    85    F.2d    273,    66    App.D.C. 

107. 
Fla. — Malone  v.  Meres,   109   So.   677* 

91  Fla.  709. 
N.M.— State  v.   Patten,    69   P.2d   931, 

41  N.M.  395. 

(2)  Judgment   is   void   where   ju- 
risdictional    fact    on    which    court's 
authority  to  act  depends  is  absent — 
Turk  v.   Turk,   18   S.W.2d   1003.   230 
Ky.  191. 

(8)  "Without  jurisdiction  there  ia 
no  validity  or  vitality  to  the  'Judg- 


§  19 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


cause  except  to  dismiss  the  suit**  The  validity  of 
a  judgment  depends  on  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
before  rendition,  not  on  what  may  occur  subse- 
quently.16 It  has  been  stated,  however,  that  it 
cannot  be  broadly  asserted  that  a  judgment  is  al- 
ways a  nullity  if  jurisdiction  of  some  sort  or  other 
is  wanting.1** 

Loss  of  jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction  which  has  once 
attached  may  be  lost,  and  thereby  the  court  may 
be  deprived  of  the  authority  to  make  any  further 
order  or  judgment,17  as  where  the  case  has  been 
taken  up  on  appeal  or  error,1*  or  duly  removed 
from  a  state  court  to  a  federal  court.19  So  juris- 


diction may  be  lost  and  the  authority  of  the  court 
terminated  by  the  expiration  of  the  term  without 
judgment  rendered  and  without  a  proper  continu- 
ance.20 

Error  in  exercise  of  jurisdiction.  Want  of  ju- 
risdiction must  be  distinguished  from  error  in  the 
exercise  of  jurisdiction.21  Where  jurisdiction  has 
once  attached,  mere  errors  or  irregularities  in  the 
proceedings,  however  grave,  although  they  may  ren- 
der the  judgment  erroneous  and  subject  to  be  set 
aside  in  a  proper  proceeding  for  that  purpose,  will 
not  render  the  judgment  void,22  and,  as  discussed 
infra  §  449,  until  set  aside  it  is  valid  and  binding 


."— Carroll  v.  Berber,   150  N.B. 
870,  872.  255  Mass.  132. 

(4)  A    judgment    rendered    by    a 
court  without  Jurisdiction  is  not  a 
final  and  binding  judgment. — In  re 
Waters'   Estate,    Mo.App.,    153    S.W. 
2d  774. 

(5)  A   court   cannot   render   valid 
judgment  In  case  of  which  it  has  no 
potential  jurisdiction.—- Kirk  v.  Head, 
152  S.W.2d  726,  187  Tex.  44. 

(6)  Where     court     is     inherently 
without  power  to  hear   and   deter- 
mine,  any   judgment  rendered  is   a 
mere      nullity. — United      Production 
Corporation  v.   Hughes,   152    S.W.2d 
327,  137  Tex.  21. 

14.  U.S.— New  Orleans  Mail  Co.  v. 
Flanders,  La.,  12  Wall.  ISO,  20  L. 
Ed.  249. 

38  C.J.  p  1074  note  37. 

15.  Tex.— Hicks    v.    Sias,    Civ.App., 
102  S.W.2d  460,  error  refused. 

16.  U.S.— -Carter  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.Ala., 
135  F.2d  858. 

Necessity  of  record 

A  judgment  is  not  void  in  the 
legal  sense  for  want  of  jurisdiction 
unless  its  invalidity  and  want  of 
Jurisdiction  appear  on  the  record, 
but  is  merely  voidable.— ^Tupe  v. 
Home  Owners  Loan  Corp.,  Okl.,  167 
P,2d  46— Edwards  v.  Smith,  142  P. 
302,  42  Okl.  544. 
Jurisdictional  defects  as  grounds  for 

collateral  attack  on  judgments  see 

infra  §§  421-427. 

17.  HI.— People    ex    rel.    Waite    v, 
Bristbw,    62    N.E.2d    545,    391    ffl. 
101— Watkins  v.  Dunbar,  149  N.B 
14,  318  I1L  174. 

Ky.— Combs  v.  Beaton,  251  S.W.  638 

199  Ky.  477. 
Wis.— State    ex    reL    Lang   v.    Civil 

Court   of   Milwaukee   County.   280 

N.W.  347,  228  Wis.  411. 
33  C.J.  p  1074  note  38. 
Ancillary  matter 

Where    jurisdiction    to    render 
judgment  is   ended,   no   jurisdiction 
remains  as  to  matter  purely  ancil 
lary  to  that  object, — Cutrone  v.  Cut 
rone,  29  N.T.S.2d  405,  176  Miac,  988 


affirmed   80    N.T.S.2d   813,    262   App. 
Div.  992. 

18.  Mass.— Boynton     v.     Foster,     7 
Mete.  415. 

19.  Minn. — Roberts   v.   Chicago,   St. 
P.   M.  &  O.   R.   Co.,   51  N.W.  478, 
48  Minn.  521. 

20.  Wis.— Witt  v.   Henze,    16   N.W. 
609,  58  Wis.  244. 

Rendition  of  judgment  during  term 
see  supra  8  16  b. 

21.  Mich.— Corpus   Juris    quoted  i» 
Jackson  City  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Frederick,  260  N.W.  908,   910,  271 
Mich.  538.  ' 

Wash. — In  re  Waters  of  Doan  Creek, 
299  P.  383.  162  Wash.  695. 

22.  Ala. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
James  v.   State,  181   So.  709,  712, 
28  Ala. App.  225. 

Ark.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Ex  parte 
O'Neal,  87  S.W.2d  401,  403,  191 
Ark.  696. 

Fla.— Childs  v.  Boots,  152  So.  212, 
112  Fla.  277— Malone  v.  Meres,  109 
So.  677,  91  Fla.  709. 

Ga. — Lester  v.  Southern  Security  Co., 
147  S.B.  529,  168  Ga,  307— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Georgia  Power  Co.  v. 
Friar,  171  S.B.  210,  214,  47  Ga.App. 
675,  affirmed  175  S.B.  807,  179  Ga. 
470. 

Idaho.— Baldwin  v.  Anderson,  299  P. 
341,  50  Idaho  606,  certiorari  grant- 
ed American  Surety  Co.  of  New 
York  v.  Baldwin,  52  S.Ct.  499,  286 
U.S.  536,  76  L.Ed.  1275,  and  certio- 
rari dismissed  American  Surety 
Co.  v.  Baldwin,  53  S.Ct.  98,  287  U. 
S.  166,  77  L.Ed.  231,  86  A.L.R. 

HI. — Heitman  Trust  Co.  v.  Parlee,  40 
N.E.2d  732,  314  IlLApp.  83— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in.  Hampton  v.  Grissom, 
4  N.B.2d  895,  287  IlLApp.  294— 
Seither  &  Cherry  Co.  v.  Board  of 
Education  of  District  No.  15,  Town 
of  La  Harpe,  283  IlLApp.  892— 
Knapik  v.  Stefek,  274  IlLApp.  19 

Ind. — Freimann  v.  Gallmeier,  App., 
63  N.E.2d  150. 

Ky.— Stewart  v.  Sampson,  148  S.W.2d 
278,  285  Ky.  447— Henderson  v. 
Commonwealth,  251  S.W.  988,  199 
Ky.  795. 

46 


Mich.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Jack- 
son City  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Frederick,  260  N.W.  908,  910,  271 
Mich.  538. 

N.C.— Fowler  v.  Fowler,  130  S.B.  815, 
190  N.C.  536. 

Okl. — Protest  of  St.  Louis-San  Fran- 
cisco Ky.  Co.,  26  P.2d  212,  166  Okl. 
50. 

Or. — Lytle  v.  Payette-Oregon  Slope 
Irr.  Dist,  152  P.2d  934,  156  A.L.R. 
894. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Texas 
Employers*  Ins.  Ass'n  v.  Bzell, 
Com.App.,  14  S.W.2d  1018,  1019, 
rehearing  denied  16  S.W.2d  528 
— Waples  Platter  Co.  v.  Miller, 
Civ.App.,  139  S.W.2d  833— Ameri- 
can Law  Book  Co.  v.  Dykes,  Civ. 
App.,  278  S.W.  247. 

Wash. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 
Waters  of  Doan  Creek  in  Walla 
Walla  County,  299  P.  883,  162 
Wash.  695. 

Wyo. — State    v.    District    Court    of 
Eighth   Judicial   Dist.   within   and 
for  Natrona  County,  260  P.  174,  37 
Wyo.  169. 
33  C.J.  P  1079  note  82—34  C.J.  p  508 

note  7. 

Operation  and  effect  of  void  and 
voidable  judgments  see  infra  55 
449-452. 

Other  statements  of  rule 

(1)  A  Judgment  is  <not  void,  even 
though  it  may  be  erroneous  if  court 
had  jurisdiction  of  person  of  defend- 
ant and  of  the  subject  matter  of  the 
suit  and  had  power  to  render  par- 
ticular Judgment  which  it   entered, 
and  such  a  Judgment  is  valid  until 
reversed. — People   ex  rel.   Merrill  v. 
Hazard,  196  N.E.   827,  361  HI.   60. 

(2)  Where  court  of  general  Juris- 
diction  has   Jurisdiction    of   subject 
matter  and  parties,  «no  Judgment  it 
may  render  within  the  issues  is  void, 
however  erroneous  it  may  be.— City 
of  Huntington  v.  Northern  Indiana 
Power  Co.,  5  N.B.2d  889,  211  Ind.  502, 
dissenting  opinion  6  N.B.2d  335,  211 
Ind.  502. 

(3)  Where  a  court  has  Jurisdiction 
over    the    person    and    the    subject 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


19 


for  all  purposes.  Error  in  the  determination  of 
questions  of  law  or  fact  on  which  the  court's  ju- 
risdiction in  the  particular  case  depends,  the  court 
having  general  jurisdiction  of  the  cause  and  the 
person,  is  error  in  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction.23 


1>.  Jurisdiction  of  Person 

A  judgment   in   personam   Is  void  unless  the  court 
has  jurisdiction  of  the  persons  Involved. 

A  judgment  in  personam  is  void  unless  the  court 
has  jurisdiction  of  the  persons  involved.24     The 


matter,  no  error  in  the  exercise  of 
such  jurisdiction  can  make  the  judg- 
ment void  even  if  there  is  a  funda- 
mental error  of  law  appearing  on  the 
face  of  the  record  and  such  judgment 
is  valid  until  avoided.— Mahaffa  v. 
Mahaffa,  298  N.W.  916,  230  Iowa  679. 

(4)  A  judgment  is  never  void  for 
error,  provided  the  court  rendering 
it  had  jurisdiction  over  the  person 
of  the  defendant  and  the  subject 
matter  of  the  action. — Sheridan  v* 
Sheridan,  4  N.W.2d  785,  218  Minn.  24. 
Property  rights 

Where  a  court  in  the  exercise  of 
its  jurisdiction  enters  a  decree  af- 
fecting property  rights  contrary  to 
statute,  the  court  is  guilty  of  error 
of  judgment,  but  such  error  does  not 
render  the  decree  void,  nor  does  the 
fact  that  the  error  may  appear  on 
the  face  of  the  decree  itself  indi- 
cate its  nullity. — In  re  Gardiner's 
Estate,  114  P.2d  648,  45  Cal.App.2d 
659. 

23.  Ala.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
James  v.   State,   181   So.   709,  712, 
28  Ala.App.  225. 

Ariz. — Wall  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Tavapai  County,  89  P.2d  624,  58 
Ariz.  344. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Jack- 
son City  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Frederick,  260  N.W.  908,  910,  271 
Mich.  588. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Fergu- 
son v.  Ferguson,  Civ.App.,  98  S.W. 
2d  847,  850. 

33  C.J.  p  1079  note  88. 

24.  U.S.— Buss    v.    Prudential    Ins. 
Co.    of    America,    COAJowa,    126 
F.2d    960— Mulcahy    v.    Whitehill, 
D.C.Mass.,    48    F.Supp.   917— In   re 
American  Fidelity  Corporation,  D. 
C.Cal.,    28   F.Supp.   462— Baskin  v. 
Montedonico,  D.CTenn.,  26  F.Supp. 
894,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  115  F.2d  837 
— U.  S.  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guar- 
anty Co.,  D.C.Okl.,  24  F.Supp.  961, 
modified  on  other  grounds,  C.C.A., 
106    F.2d    804,    reversed   on   other 
grounds  60  S.Ct  653,  309  U.S.  506, 
84  L.Bd.  894. 

Ala.-— Farrell  v.  Farrell,  10  So.2d  153, 
243  Ala.  389— Ex  parte  Kelly,  128 
So.  443,  221  Ala.  339— Corpus  JHxi» 
cited  in  Ex  parte  Whitehead,  199 
So.  876,  878,  29  Ala,App.  583,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  199  So.  879,  240 
Ala.  447. 

Alaska.— In  re  Young's  Estate,  9 
Alaska  158. 

Ariz.— Varnes  v.  White,  12  P.2d  870, 
40  Ariz.  427. 

Cal. — Hunter   v.    Superior   Court   in 


and  for  Riverside  County,  97  P.2d 
492,  36  Cal.App.2d  100— Northing- 
ton  v.  Industrial  Accident  Commis- 
sion, 72  P.2d  909,  23  Cal.App.2d 
255— Ex  parte  Cohen,  290  P.  512, 
107  CaLApp.  288— Jellen  v.  O'Brien, 
264  P.  1115,  89  CaLApp.  505. 

Conn. — O'Leary  v.  Waterbury  Title 
Co.,  166  A.  673,  117  Conn.  39. 

D.C. — U.  S.  ex  rel.  Ordmann  v.  Cum- 
mings,  85  F.2d  273,  66  App.D.C. 
.107. 

Fia,— United  Brotherhood  of  Car- 
penters and  Joiners  of  America  v. 
Graves  Inv.  Co.,  15  So.2d  196,  153 
Fla.  529 — Skipper  v.  Schumacker, 

169  So.  58,  124  Fla.  384,  appeal  dis- 
missed   and    certiorarl    denied    57 
S.Ct    39,    299    U.S.    507,    81    L.Ed. 
376— Coslick  v.  Finney,  140  So.  216, 
104  Fla.  394. 

Ga.— McKnight  v.  Wilson,  122  S.E. 
702,  158  Ga.  153— W.  T.  Rawleigh 
Co.  v.  Greenway,  26  S.K2d  458,  69 
Ga.App.  590 — Anderson  v.  Turner, 
133  S.E.  306,  35  Ga.App.  428. 

HI.— People  ex  reL  Fisher  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.,  61  N.E.2d  382, 
390  111.  389— Heitman  Trust  Co.  v. 
Parlee,  40  N.E.2d  732,  314  Ill.App. 
83 — Sunbeam  Heating  Co.  v.  Cham- 
bers, 38  N.E.2d  544,  312  Ill.App. 
382— Davis  v.  Oliver,  25  N.E.2d 
905,  304  IlLApp.  71— In  re  Shanks' 
Estate,  282  Ill.App.  1. 

Ind. — Calumet  Teaming  &  Trucking 
Co.  v.  Young,  33  N.B.2d  109,  218 
Ind.  468,  rehearing  denied  33  N.E. 
2d  583,  218  Ind.  468. 

Ky.— Hill  v.  Walker,  180  S.W.2d  93, 
297  Ky.  257,  154  A.L.R.  814— Gover 
v.  Wheeler,  178  S.W.2d  404,  296 
Ky.  734 — Max  Ams,  Inc.,  v.  Barker, 

170  S.W.2d  45,  293  Ky.  698— Wag- 
ner v.   Peoples   Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n,  167  S.W.2d  825,  292  Ky.  691 
— Lowther  v.  Moss,  39  S.W.2d  501, 
239  Ky,  290— Lorton  v.  Ashbrook, 
295  S.W.  1027,  220  Ky.   830. 

Mass. — Carroll  v.  Berger,  150  N.E. 
870,  255  Mass.  132. 

Mo. — State  ex  reL  National  Lead  Co. 
v.  Smith,  App.,  134  S.W.2d  1061. 

N.Y. — Carbone  v.  Carbone,  2  N.T.S. 
2d  869,  166  Misc.  924— Corpus  Jo- 
ris  quoted,  in  Universal  Credit  Co. 
v.  Blfoxderman,  288  N.T.S.  79,  80, 
158  Misc.  917— In  re  Killough's  Es- 
tate, 265  N.Y.S.  301,  148  Misc.  73— 
Shaul  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland,  227  N.Y.S.  163,  131  Misc. 
401,  affirmed  230  N.Y.S.  910,  224 
App.Div.  773. 

N.C.— Clark  v.  Carolina  Homes,  128 
S.B.  20,  189  NXX  703. 

Ohio. — Terry  v.  Claypool,   65  N.E.2d 

47 


883,  77  Ohio  App.  77— Ruckert  v. 
Matil  Realty,  App.,  40  N.E.2d  688 
— Sampliner  v.  Bialosky,  25  Ohio 
N.P..N.S.,  161. 

Okl. — Fitzsimmons  v.  Oklahoma  City, 
135  -P.2d  340,  192  Okl.  248— Okla- 
homa City  v.  Robinson,  65  P.2d 
531,  179  Okl.  309— Moroney  v.  State 
ex  reL  Southern  Surety  Co.,  31  P. 
2d  926,  168  Okl.  69— Henson  v.  Ok- 
lahoma State  Bank,  23  P.2d  709, 
165  Okl.  i — State  v.  Armstrong,  13 
P.2d  198,  158  Okl.  290. 

Tex. — Kuteman  v.  Ratliff,  Civ.App., 
154  S.W.2d  684 — Olton  State  Bank 
v.  Howell,  Civ.App.,  105  S.W.2d 
287 — San  Jacinto  Finance  Corpo- 
ration v.  Perkins,  Civ.App.,  94  S. 
W.2d  1213— Simms  Oil  Co.  v. 
Butcher,  Civ.App.,  55  S.W.2d  192, 
error  dismissed — Reed  v.  State, 
Cr.,  187  S.W.2d  660. 

Va. — Robertson  v.  Commonwealth, 
25  S.E.2d  352,  181  Va.  520,  146 
A.L.R.  966. 

33  C.J.  p  1074  note  43. 

Other  statements  of  ruU 

(1)  Jurisdiction   of   the  person   is 
essential  to  the  rendition  of  a  valid 
judgment. 

Cal.— Jellen  v.  O'Brien,  264  P.  1115, 
89  CaLApp.  505. 

Fla. — Arcadia  Citrus  Growers  Ass'n 
v.  Hollingsworth,  185  So.  431,  135 
Fla.  322. 

Mich. — Ward  v.  Hunter  Machinery 
Co.,  248  N.W.  864,  263  Mich.  445. 

N.M. — State  ex  rel.  State  Tax  Com- 
mission v.  Chavez,  101  P.2d  889, 
44  N.M.  260— In  re  Field's  Es- 
tate, 60  P.2d  945,  40  N.M.  423. 

Tex. — -Commander  v.  Bryon,  Civ.App., 
123  S.W.2d  1008. 

Vt.— In  re  Hanrahan's  Will,  194  A. 
471,  109  Vt  108. 

(2)  Jurisdiction  of  the  party,  ob- 
tained by  the  court  in  some  way  al- 
lowed by  law,  is  essential  to  enable 
the  court  to  give  a  valid  judgment 
against  him. — Powell  v.   Turpin,    29 
S.E.2d  26,  224  N.C.  67— City  of  Mon- 
roe v.  Niven,  20   S.E.2d   311,   221  N. 
C.    362— Casey  v.   Barker,   14   S.E.2d 
429,  219  N.C.  465. 

(3)  It  is  essential  to  the  efficacy 
of  a  judgment  that  the  court  have 
jurisdiction  over  the  person. — Crab- 
tree  v.  ^Btna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  S.W. 
2d  103,  341  Mo.  1173. 

A  judgment  or  portion  thereoi 
which  attempts  to  settle  rights  of 
parties,  over  whom  the  court  has  no 
jurisdiction,  is  void  as  to  such  par- 
ties.— Barrett  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Tulsa  County,  90  P.2d  442,  185  Okl. 
111. 


§  19 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


court  must  have  jurisdiction  of  plaintiff  or  the 
person  in  whose  favor  it  is  rendered,26  and  also  of 
defendant  or  the  person  against  whom  it  is  ren- 
dered.26 Accordingly  a  judgment  for  or  against 
one  who  for  any  reason  is  no  longer  before  the 
court  is  wholly  void.27  Where  a  statute  requires 
that  certain  actions  shall  be  brought  only  in  the 
district  or  county  where  defendant  resides,  it  has 
been  held  that  no  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  de- 
fendant can  be  obtained  in  any  district  or  county 
other  than  the  one  in  which  he  resides,  if  defendant 
stands  on  his  privilege,  and  a  judgment  against  Mm 
in  such  other  district  or  county  is  void  for  want  of 
jurisdiction.2* 

Consent.  Where  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  the 
subject  matter  or  cause  of  action,  jurisdiction  of  the 
parties  may  be  conferred  by  their  consent,  and  in 
such  cases  the  judgment  is  valid,2&  as  where  de- 


fendant waives  an  exemption  from  suit  and  consents 
to  be  sued,80  or  waives  the  privilege  of  being  sued 
only  in  a  particular  place,  county,  or  district,  and 
consents  to  be  sued  in  some  other  place,  county,  or 
district,31  except  where  the  rights  of  other  persons 
would  be  prejudiced32  or  some  rule  of  public  pol- 
icy requires  that  defendant  shall  be  sued  only  in  a 
designated  place.88 

c.  Jurisdiction  of  Subject  Matter  or  Cause  of 
Action 

A  court  cannot  render  a  valid  Judgment  unless  ft 
has  Jurisdiction  over  the  subject  matter  of  the  litiga- 
tion or  the  cause  of  action. 

Even  with  fuir  jurisdiction  over  the  parties,  no 
court  can  render  a  valid  judgment  unless  it  also  has 
jurisdiction  over  the  subject  matter  of  the  litiga- 
tion or  the  cause  of  action.84  A  judgment  is  whol- 
ly void  in  cases  where  the  subject  matter  is  with-. 


25.    N.Y.— In  re  Clark's  Witt,  8  N.Y. 

S.2d    364,    166    Misc.    909— Corpus 

Juris   quoted  in   Universal   Credit 

Co.  v.   Binderman,   288   N.Y.a   79, 

80,  15  Misc.  917. 
38  C.J.  p  1075  note  44. 
28.    Iowa,— Allen  v.  Allen.  298  N.W. 

869.  230  Iowa  504,  136  A.L.R.  617. 
Miss.— Bank  of  Richton  v.  Jones, 

121    So.    823,   153   Miss.    796. 
Mo.— Noll    v.    Alexander,    App.,    282 

S.W.  739. 
Neb.— Hassett   v.   Durbin,    271   N.W. 

867,  132  Neb.  315. 
Teat. — Maury    v.    Turner,    Cora.App., 

244  S.W.  809. 
Va. — Drewry  v.  Doyle,  20  S,E.2d  548, 

179  Va.  715. 
Wash.— Colby  v.  Hiraes,  17  P.2d  606, 

171  Wash.  83. 
33  C.J.  p  1075  note  45. 

27.  N.T. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Universal  Credit  Co.  v.  Binderman, 
288  N.T.S.  79,  80,  15  Misc.  917. 

33  C.J.  p  1075  note  48. 

28.  La.— Alter    v.    Pickett,    24    La. 
Ann.  513. 

33  C.J.  p  1075  note  51. 

29.  Md. — C.    L    T.    Corporation    v. 
Powell,    170   A.    740,   166   Md.   208. 

33  C.J.  p  1078  note  77. 

33.    Mass.— Hall   v.   Young,   8   Pick. 

80,  15  Am.D.  180. 
33  C.J.  p  1078  <note  78. 

31.  Tex. — Lloyds    Casualty    Co.    of 
New  York  v.  Lena,  Civ.App.,  62  S. 
W.2d  497,  error  dismissed. 

33  C.J.  p  1078  note  79. 

32.  Ga. — Raney   v.    McRae,    14    Ga. 
589,  60  Am.D.   660. 

33  C.J.  p  1078  note  80. 

33.  Ga. — Central  Bank  t.  Gibson,  11 
Ga.  453. 

Creditors 

Where  neither  of  defendants  was 
domiciled  in  the  county  in  which 
suit  was  brought,  a  judgment  in  fa- 


vor  of  a  creditor  has  been  held  void 
as  to  other  creditors. — Anthony  v. 
Bobo,  81  S.E.  128,  141  Ga.  440. 

34.  U.S. — Kerna/n  v.  Campbell,  C.C. 
A.N.Y.,  45  F.2d  123— In  re  Ameri- 
can Fidelity  Corporation,  D.C.Cal., 
28  F.Supp,  462— U.  S.  v,  U.  S.  Fi- 
delity &  Guaranty  Co.,  D.C.Okl., 
24  F.Supp.  961,  modified  on  other 
grounds,  C.C.A.,  106  F.2d  804,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  60  S.Ct 
654,  -309  U.S.  506,  84  L.Ed.  894. 

Ala.— Farrell  v.  Farrell,  10  So.2d 
153,  243  Ala.  389— Ex  parte  Kelly, 
128  So.  443,  221  Ala.  339. 

Ariz.— Varnes  v.  White,  12  P.2d  870, 
40  Ariz.  427. 

Ark. — Axley  v.  Hammock,  50  S.W. 
2d  608,  185  Ark.  939. 

Cal. — Northington  v.  Industrial  Acci- 
dent Commission,  72  P.2d  909,  23 
Cal.App.2d  255 — Ex  parte  Cohen, 
290  P.  512,  107  CaLApp.  288— Jel- 
len  v.  O'Brien,  264  P.2d  1115,  89 
Cal.App.  505. 

Conn. — O'Leary  v*  Waterbury  Title 
Co.,  166  A,  673,  117  Conn.  39. 

Flo. — United  Brotherhood  of  Carpen- 
ters and  Joiners  of  America  v. 
Graves  Inv.  Co.,  15  So.2d  196,  153 
Fla.  529 — Arcadia  Citrus  Growers 
Ass'n  v.  Hollingsworth,  185  So. 
431,  135  Fla.  322 — Skipper  v.  Schu- 
macker,  169  So.  58,  124  Fla.  384, 
appeal  dismissed  and  certiorari  de- 
nied 57  S.Ct.  39,  299  U.S.  507,  81 
L.Bd.  376— Coslick  v.  Finney,  140 
So.  216.  104  Fla.  394. 

Ga. — Deans  v.  Deans,  137  S.E.  829, 
164  Ga.  162 — McKenzie  v.  Perdue, 
19  S.B.2d  765,  67  Ga.App.  202,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  Perdue 
v.  McKenzie,  21  S.B.2d  705,  194 
G*a.  356,  vacated  McKenzie  v.  Per- 
due, 23  S.E.2d  183,  68  Ga.App. 
498 — Robinson  v.  Attapulgus  Clay 
Co.,  189  S.E.  555,  55  Ga.App.  141— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Georgia 

48 


Power  Co.  v.  Friar,  171  S.E.  210, 
214,  47  Ga.App.  675. 

Hawaii.— Meyer  v.  Territory,  36  Ha- 
waii 75 — Wong  Kwai  Tong  v.  Choy 
Yin,  31  Hawaii  603. 

111.— -People  ex  rel.  Fisher  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.,  61  N.E.2d  382, 
390  111.  389— Martin  v.  Schillo,  60 
N.E.2d  392,  389  111.  697,  certiorari 
denied  65  S.Ct  1572,  325  U.S.  880, 
89  L.Ed.  1996 — Herb  v.  Pitcaim,  61 
N.B.2d  277,  384  HI.  237,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  65  S.Ct  954,  325 
U.S.  77,  89  L.Ed.  1483,  rehearing 
denied  65  S.Ct  1188,  325  U.S.  8-93, 
89  L.Ed.  2005.  Opinion  supple- 
mented 64  N.E.2d  318,  392  HI. 
151 — Werner  v.  Illinois  Cent  R. 
Co.,  42  NJS.2d  82,  379  HI.  559— 
Heitman  Trust  Co.  v.  Parlee,  40 
N.B.2d  732,  314  Ill.App.  83— Sun- 
beam Heating  Co.  v.  Chambers,  38 
N.B.2d  544,  312  IlLApp.  382— Davis 
v.  Oliver,  25  N.B.2d  905,  304  111. 
App.  71,  transferred,  see  20  N.E.2d 
582,  371  111.  287— In  re  Shanks' 
Estate,  282  Ill.App.  1. 

Ind. — Calumet  Teaming  &  Trucking 
Co.  v.  Young,  33  N.E.2d  109,  218 
Ind.  468,  rehearing  denied  33  N.E. 
2d  583,  210  Ind.  468— Brown  v. 
State,  37  N.B.2d  73,  219  Ind.  251, 
137  A.L.B.  679. 

Kan.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Starke 
v.  Starke,  125  P.2d  738,  740,  155 
Kan.  331— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
.Board  of  Commissioners  of  Craw- 
ford County  v.  Radley,  8  P.2d  386, 
387,  134  Kan.  704. 

Ky. — -Max  Ams,  Inc.  v.  Barker,  170 
S.W.2d  45,  293  Ky.  698— Wagner 
v.  Peoples  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n, 
167  S.W.2d  825,  292  Ky.  691— 
Lowther  v.  Moss,  89  S.W.2d  501, 
239  Ky,  290 — Lorton  v.  Asbrook, 
295  S.W.  102?,  220  Ky.  830. 

La. — Jones  v.  Crescent  City  Ice  Mfg. 
Co.,  -3  La.App.  7 — State  ex  rel. 
FOUXTOUX  v.  Board  of  Directors  of 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


19 


held  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  particular  court,  or 
is  placed  within  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  anoth- 
er court,85  or  where  the  jurisdiction  depends  on  a 
statute  which  was  repealed  before  suit.86  Where 
the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  depends  on  the  amount 
in  controversy,  a  judgment  for  a  sum  in  excess  of 
the  amount  over  which  the  court  has  jurisdiction  is 
void.87 

Consent  of  parties.  Since  the  agreement  or  con- 
sent of  the  parties  cannot  give  the  court  the  right 
to  adjudicate  on  any  cause  of  action  or  subject  mat- 
ter which  the  law  lias  withheld  from  its  cogni- 


zance, any  judgment  rendered  in  such  a  case  is  void 
notwithstanding  such  consent  or  agreement.88 

<L  Jurisdiction  of  Question  Determined  and  Be- 
lief Granted 

It  Is  necessary  to  the  validity  of  a  Judgment  that 
the  court  should  have  jurisdiction  of  the  question  which 
its  judgment  assumes  to  decide,  and  jurisdiction  to  ren- 
der a  judgment  for  the  particular  remedy  or  relief  which 
the  judgment  undertakes  to  grant. 

In  addition  to  jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and  the 
subject  matter,  it  is  necessary  to  the  validity  of  a 
judgment  that  the  court  should  have  jurisdiction  of 


Public  Schools  of  Jefferson  Parish, 
3  La,App.  2. 

Mass. — Carroll  v.  Berger,  150  N.B. 
870,  255  Mass.  132. 

Mich. — Ward  v.  Hunter  Machinery 
Co..  248  N.W.  864,  263  Mich.  445. 

Mo. — Crabtree  v.  .SDtna  Life  Ins.  Co., 
Ill  S.W.2d  103,  341  Mo.  1173— 
State  ex  rel.  National  Lead  Co.  v. 
Smith,  App.,  134  S.W.2d  1061 — 
Noll  v.  Alexander.  App.,  282  S.W. 
739. 

N.J.— Fidelity  Union  Trust  Co,  v. 
Ackerman,  191  A.  813,  121  N.J.BQ. 
497.  modified  on  other  grounds 
199  A.  379,  123  N.J.Eq..  556. 

N.M. — State  ex  rel.  Slate  Tax  Com- 
mission v.  Chavez,  101  P.2d  389, 
44  N.M.  260 — In  re  Field's  Estate, 
60  P.2d  945,  40  N.M.  423. 

N.T. — Anonymous  v.  Anonymous,  22 
N.Y.S.2d  598,  174  Misc.  906— Cor- 
pus  Juris  quoted  In  Van  Buren  v. 
Harrison.  299  N.Y.S.  485,  486,  164 
Misc.  774— Universal  Credit  Co.  v. 
Blinderman,  2*8  N.T.S.  79,  158 
Misc.  917 — MacAffer  v.  Boston  & 
M.  R.  R.,  273  N.Y.S.  679,  242  App. 
Div.  140.  affirmed  197  N.E.  328,  268 
N.Y.  400— Shaul  v.  Fidelity  &  De- 
posit Co.  of  Maryland,  227  N.Y.S. 
163.  131  Misc.  401,  affirmed  230  N. 
Y.S.  910,  224  App.Div.  773. 

N.C.— Clark  v.  Caroltea  Homes.  128 
S.E.  20,  189  N.C.  703. 

Ohio.— Ruckert  v.  Matil  Realty  Co., 
App.f  40  N.E.2d  688 — Sampliner  v. 
Bialasky,  25  Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  161. 

Okl. — Fitzsimmons  v.  Oklahoma  City, 
135  P.2d  340,  192  Okl.  248— Okla- 
homa City  v.  Robinson,  65  P.2d 
531,  179  Okl.  309— Moroney  v.  State 
ex  rel.  Southern  Surety  Co.,  31  P. 
2d  926,  168  Okl.  69— Henson  v. 
Oklahoma  State  Bank,  23  P.2d  709, 
165  Okl.  1— State  v.  Armstrong.  18 
P.2d  198,  158  Okl.  290. 

8.C.— Betsill  v.  Betsill,  196  S.E.  381, 
187  S.C.  50. 

8.D.— Reddin  v.  Frick,  223  N.W.  50, 
54  S.D.  277. 

Teun. — Manning  v.  Feidelson,  186  S. 
W.2d  510,  175  Ten*.  676. 

Tex. — Campsey  v.  Brumley,  Com, 
AppM  55  S.W.2d  810— H,  H.  Wat- 
son Co*  v.  Cobb  Grain  Co.,  Com. 
App.,  292  S.W.  174— Maury  v.  Tur- 
ner. CbnuApp.,  244  S.W.  809 — 

49  C.J.S.-4 


Kuteman  v.  Ratlin!,   Civ.App.,   154 

S.W.2d  864 — Commander  v.  Bryan, 

Civ.App.,    123    S.W.2d    1008— Olton 

State  Bank  v.  Howell,  Civ.App.,  105 

S.W.2d  287— Reed  v.  State,  Cr.,  187 

S.W.2d  660. 
Va. — Robertson     v.     Commonwealth, 

25   S.E.2d  852,  181  Va.  520,  146  A. 

L.R.  966 — Drewry  v.  Doyle,  20  S.E. 

2d    548,    179    Va.    715— Barnes    v. 

American   Fertilizer  Co.,   130    S.E. 

902,  144  Va.  692. 
Vt. — In  re  Hanrahan's  Will,   194  A. 

471,  109  Vt.  108. 
Wash.— Colby  v.  Himes,  17  P.2d  606, 

171  Wash.  83. 
W.Va. — Corpus   Juris   cited  in  Hus- 

tead    v.    Boggess,    12    S.E.2d    514, 

515,  122  W.Va.  493. 
33  C.J.  p  1075  note  61. 

Nullity  of  judgment  results  from 
want  of  jurisdiction  over  the  sub- 
ject matter. 
Cal. — Hunter    v.    Superior    Court    In 

and    for   Riverside   County,    97   P. 

2d    492,    36    CaI.App.2d    100. 
Tex. — San  Jacinto  Finance  Corpora- 
tion v.  Perkins,  Civ.App.,   94  S.W. 

2d  1213. 
General  and  special  jurisdiction. 

The  rule  that  jurisdiction  is  of 
two  kinds,  jurisdiction  of  the  sub- 
ject matter  and  jurisdiction  of  the 
person  and  that  both  must  concur 
or  judgment  will  be  void  in  any 
case  in  which  court  has  assumed  to 
act,  refers  to  general  jurisdiction 
vested  in  court  and  applies  to  spe- 
cial jurisdiction  only  to  extent  court 
exceeds  special  jurisdiction  granted. 
—Herb  v.  Pitcairn,  64  N.E.2d  519, 
392  111.  138. 

35.  U.S. — Woods  Bros.  Const  Co.  v. 
Yankton   County,  C.C.A.S.D.,  54  F. 
2d   304— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  U. 
S.   v.   Turner,   C.C.A.N.D.,    47   F.2d 
86,  89. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Board 
of  Commissioners  of  Crawford 
County  v.  Radley,  8  P.2d  386,  887, 
134  J£an.  704. 

33  C.J.  P  1076  note  62. 

36.  Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Board  of  Commissioners  of  Craw- 
ford County  v.  Radley,  8  P.2d  S86, 
387,  134  Kan.  704. 

49 


Neb. — Omaha  Coal,  Coke  &  Lime  Co. 
v.  Suess,  74  N.W.  620,  54  Neb.  879. 

37.  Tenn. — Reynolds  v.  Hamilton,  77 
S.W.2d  986,  18  Tenn.App.  380. 

Tex. — Davis  v.  Jordan,  Civ.App.,  151 

S.W.2d  291. 
33  C.J.  p  1076  note  68. 
Separation,  of  single  cause  of  action 

Judgments  rendered  in  a  court  of 
limited  jurisdiction  in  separate  ac- 
tions brought  by  landlord  for  sepa- 
rate past-due  installments  of  rent, 
the  total  of  which  installments  ex- 
ceeded the  jurisdiction  of  the  court, 
was  void  for  want  of  Jurisdiction, 
Jn  view  of  attempted  separation  of 
single  cause  of  action. — F.  W.  Wool- 
worth  &  Co.  v.  Zimmerman;  17$  A. 
474,  13  N.J.Misc.  505. 

38.  Ala.— Ex  parte  Phillips,  165  So. 
SO,  231  Ala.  364— Crabtree  v.  Mil- 
ler,  155   So.   529,   229   Ala.   103. 

Ark. — Hendricks  v.  Henson,  92  S.W. 

2d  867,  192  Ark.  544. 
La. — Walker  v.   Fitzgerald,  App.,  24 

So.2d  263. 
Mo.— In  re  Buckles,  53  S.W.2d  1055, 

331  Mo.  405. 
N.J.— Fidelity    Union    Trust    Co.    v. 

Ackerman,    191    A.    813,    121    N.J. 

Eq.  497,  modified  on  other  grounds 

199  A.  379,  123  N.J.B<i.  556. 
N.Y.— In  re  Brerman's  Estate,  221  N. 

Y.S.  462,  129  Misc.  283. 
Ohio.— Bobala    v.    Bobala,     33    N.E. 

2d  845,  68  Ohio  App.  63. 
Va. — Nolde  Bros.  v.  Chalkley,  35  S. 

B.2d  827. 
W.Va. — Corpus    Juris    cited   in    BXi- 

stead   v.    Boggess,    12    S.E.2d    514, 

615,  122  W.Va.  493. 
33  C.J.  p  1077  note  75. 
Estoppel 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  when- 
ever there  is  want  of  authority  to 
hear  and   determine   subject   matter 
of    controversy,    an   adjudication    on 
merits   is   null,   and  does   not  estop 
even  assenting  party. — Cooper  v.  Da- 
vis, 248  N.Y.S.  227,  231  App.Div.  527. 

(2)  It    has    been    held,    however, 
that  one  who   invokes  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  court  cannot  object  to  a 
judgment    on    the    ground    that    the 
court  had  n«  jurisdiction  of  defend- 
ant.— Fostoria   v.   Fox,   54   NJE.   370, 
60  Ohio  St.  340. 


19 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  question  which  its  judgment  assumes  to  de- 
cide,39 and  jurisdiction  to  render  a  judgment  for 
the  particular  remedy  or  relief  which  the  judg- 


ment undertakes  to  grant.40    Where  the  court  does 
not  have  such  jurisdiction,  the  judgment  is  void.41 


39.  Idaho.— Corpus  Juris   guoted  in 
Banbury    v.    Brailsford,    158    P.2d 
8*26,    886— Corpus   Juris   quoted  in 
Baldwin  v.  Anderson,   8  P.2d  461, 
462,     51    Idaho     614— -Maloney    v. 
Zipf,     287    P.     632,     41     Idaho     30. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  gaoted  in  Board 
of  Commissioners  of  Crawford 
County  v.  Radley,  8  P.2d  386,  387, 
134  Kan.  704. 

Mo.—State  ex  rel.  National  Lead  Co. 
v.  Smith,  App.,  134  S.W.2d  1061— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Mesendleck 
Grain  Co.  v.  Folz,  50  S.W.2d  159, 
161,  227  Mo.App.  24. 

Ohio. — Sampliner  v.  Bialasky,  25 
Ohio  N.P..N.S.,  161. 

N.M. — State  ex  rel.  State  Tax  Com- 
mission v.  Chavez,  101  P.2d  389, 
44  N.M.  260— In  re  Field's  Estate, 
60  P.2d  945,  40  N.M.  423. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hinkle 
V.  Jones,  66  P.2d  1073,  1076,  180 
Okl.  17— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Oklahoma  City  v.  Robinson,  65  P. 
2d  531,  533,  179  Okl.  309— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Whltehead  v. 
Bunch,  272  P.  878,  879,  134  Okl. 
63. 

Va.— Hubbard  v.  Davis,  25  S.B.2d 
256,  181  Va.  549— Drewry  v.  Doyle, 
20  S.B.2d  548,  179  Va,  715. 

33  C.J.  p  1076  note  70. 

Determination  of  Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction  to  render  judgment  in 

particular  action  must  be  determined 

and   tested  by  pleadings  and  relief 

sought. — Borfcng   v.    Dodd,    217   N.W. 

580,  116  Neb.  336. 

40.  U.S.— U.  S.  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  Co.,  D.C.OkL,  24  F.Supp. 
961,  modified  on  other  grounds  106 
F.2d      804,      reversed     on      other 
grounds  60  S.Ct.  653.  309  U.S.  506, 
84  L.Ed.   894. 

Ariz. — Wall  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Yavapal  County,  89  P.2d  624,  53 
Ariz.  344— Hill  v.  Favour,  84  P. 
3d  675,  52  Ariz.  561— Varnes  v. 
White,  12  P.2d  870,  40  Ariz.  427 
— Arizona  Land  &  Stock  Co.  v. 
Markus,  296  P.  251,  37  Ariz.  530 
— Western  Land  &  Cattle  Co.  v. 
National  Bank  of  Arizona  at  Phoe- 
nix, 239  P.  299,  29  Ariz.  61. 

Cai.— Jellen  v.  O'Brien,  264  P.  1115, 
89  CaLApp.  505. 

Colo. — Williams  v.  Hankins,  225  P. 
243,  75  Colo.  136 — People  v.  Burke. 
212  P.  837,  72  Colo.  486,  30  A.L.R. 
1085. 

Fla, — United  Brotherhood  of  Carpen- 
ters and  Joiners  of  America  v. 
Graves  Inv.  Co.,  15  So.2d  196,  153 
Fla.  529 — Arcadia  Citrus  Growers 
Ass'n  y.  Hollingsworth,  185  So. 
431,  135  Fla.  322— Skipper  v. 
Schumacher,  169  So.  58,  124  Fla. 
384,  appeal  dismissed  and  certio- 
rari  denied  57  S.Ct  39,  299  U.S. 


507,  81  L.Ed.  376— Chllds  v.  Boots, 
152  So.  212,  112  Fla,  277— Coslick 
v.  Finney,  140  So.  216,  104  Fla, 
394. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ban- 
bury  v.  Brailsford,  158  P.2d  826, 
836 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bald- 
win v.  Anderson,  8  P.2d  461,  462, 
51  Idaho  614— Maloney  v.  Zipf,  237 
P.  632,  41  Idaho  30. 

111.— Hummel  v.'Cardwell,  62  N.B.2d 
433,  390  111.  5-26,  certiorari  denied 
66  S.Ct.  819,  three  oases — Toman 
v.  Park  Castles  Apartment  Bldg. 
Corporation,  31  N.E.2d  299,  375  111. 
293 — Mclnness  v.  Oscar  F.  Wilson 
Printing  Co.,  258  Ill.App.  161. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Board 
of  Commissioners  of  Crawford 
County  v.  Radley,  8  P.2d  386,  387, 
134  Kan.  704. 

Ky. — Lowther  v.  Moss,  39  S.W.2d 
501,  239  Ky.  290. 

Mass. — New  England  Home  for  Deaf 
Mutes  v.  Leader  Filling  Stations 
Corporation,  177  N.E.  97,  276  Mass. 
153. 

Okl. — Fitzslmmons  v.  Oklahoma 
City,  135  P.2d  340,  192  Okl.  248— 
Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hfeikle  v. 
Jones,  66  P.2d  1073,  1076,  180 
Okl.  17 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Oklahoma  City  v.  Robinson,  65  P. 
2d  531,  533,  179  Okl.  309— Henson 
v.  Oklahoma  State  Bank,  23  P.2d 
709,  165  Okl.  1 — Corpus  Juris  quot- 
ed in  Whitehead  v.  Bunch,  272  P. 
878,  879,  134  Okl.  63. 

Tex. — Nymon  v.  Eggert,  Civ.App., 
154  S.W.2d  157. 

Utah. — Hampshire  v.  Woolley,  269 
P.  135,  72  Utah  106. 

Va. — Drewry  v.  Doyle,  20  S.B.2d  548, 
179  Va.  715— Hubbard  v.  Davis,  25 
S.E.2d  256,  181  Va.  549— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  .astna  Casualty  & 
Surety  Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors  of  Warren 
Co.,  168  S.E.  617,  626,  160  Va. 
11. 

33  C.J.  p  1076  note  71. 

Court  of  general  Jurisdiction 

Even  a  court  of  general  jurisdic- 
tion has  no  power  to  render  any 
judgment  affecting  persons  or  prop- 
erty, unless  the  particular  judgment 
is  brought  within  court's  jurisdic- 
tion according  to  law. — Herb  v.  Pit- 
cairn,  51  N.B.2d  277,  384  111.  237, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  65  S.Ct 
954,  326  U.S.  77,  89  L.Ed.  1483,  re- 
hearing denied  66  S.Ct.  1188,  325  U. 
S.  893,  89  L.Ed.  2005.  Opinion  sup- 
plemented 64  N.E.2d  318,  392  111. 
151. 

Jurisdiction  or  power  to  render  a 
particular  judgment  does  not  mean 
that  the  judgment  rendered  must  be  j 
the  one  that  should  have  been  ren-  I 
dered,  since  the  power  or  jurisdic-  J 

50 


tion  to  decide  carries  with  it  the 
power  or  jurisdiction  to  decide 
wrong  as  well  as  to  decide  right. — 
U.  S.  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty 
Co.,  D.C.Okl.,  24  F.Supp.  961,  modi- 
fied on  other  grounds,  C.C.A.,  106  F. 
2d  804,  reversed  on  other  grounds  60 
S.Ct  653,  309  U.S.  506,  84  L.Ed.  894. 

41.  Cal. — Hunter  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Riverside  County,  97 
P.2d  492.  36  Cal.App.2d  100. 

Ky. — Lortoh  v.  Ashbrook,  295  S.W. 
1027,  220  Ky.  830. 

Mo.—State  ex  rel.  National  Lead  Co. 
v.  Smith,  App.,  134  S.W.2d  1061 — 
Mesendieck  Grain  Co.  v.  Folz,  50 
S.W.2d  159,  161,  227  Mo.App.  24. 

N.T. — Lynbrook  Gardens  v.  Ullmann, 
36  N.T.S.2d  888,  179  Misc.  132,  af- 
firmed 37  N.T.S.2d  671,  265  App. 
Div.  859,  reversed  on  other 

.  grounds  53  N.E.2d  353,  291  N.Y. 
472,  152  A.L.R.  959,  certiorari  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct.  1144,  322  U.S.  742, 
88  L.Ed.  1575. 

Okl.— Sabin  v.  Levorsen,  145  P.2d 
402,  193  Okl.  320,  certiorari  denied 
64  S.Ct.  205,  320  U.S.  792,  88  L.Bd. 
477,  rehearing  denied  64  S.Ct.  368, 
320  U.S.  815,  88  LJEd.  4*2— Fitz- 
simmons  v.  Oklahoma  City,  135  P. 
2d  340,  343,  192  Okl.  248— Moroney 
v.  State  ex  rel.  Southern  Surety 
Co.,  31  P.2d  926,  168  Okl.  69— State 
v.  Armstrong,  13  P.2d  198,  168 
Okl.  290— Blake  v.  Metz,  276  P. 
762,  136  Okl.  146,  followed  in  276 
P.  765,  136  Okl.  150— Askew  v.  Ter- 
rell, 243  P,  495,  113  Okl.  206— Vann 
v.  Adklns,  234  P.  644,  169  Okl.  12 
— Burris  v.  Straughn,  232  P.  294, 
107  Okl.  299— Ex  parte  Dawes,  239 
P.  689,  31  Okl.Cr.  397. 

Tex. — San  Jacinto  Finance  Corpora- 
tion v.  Perkins,  Civ.App.,  94  S.W. 
2d  1213— Reed  v.  State,  Cr.,  187  S. 
W.2d  660. 

Wyo. — State  v.  District  Court  of 
Eighth  Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for 
Natrona  County,  238  P.  545,  33 
Wyo.  281. 

33  C.J.  p  1077  note  72. 

A  decision,  whether  correct  or 
wrong,  made  by  a  court  in  excess  of 
its  jurisdiction  and  power  is  void. 
—Spencer  v.  Franks,  195  A.  306,  173 
Md.  73,  114  A.L.R.  263. 

Manner  forbidden  by  law 

A  judgment  is  void  when  the  court 
proceeds  without  authority  and  in 
a  manner  forbidden  by  law  with  re- 
spect to  matter  being  adjudicated, 
although  it  may  have  jurisdiction  of 
parties  and  subject  matter.— Wagner 
v.  Peoples  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n, 
167  S.W.2d  825,  292  Ky.  691— Jones 
v.  Keen,  160  S.W.2d  164,  289  Ky.  779 
— Soper  v.  Foster,  51  S.W.2d  927.  244 
Ky.  658. 


49    C.J.S. 

§  20.    Matured  Cause  of  Action 

It  Is  essential  to  the  validity  and  regularity  of  a 
judgment  that  the  demand  whereon  it  is  rendered  shall 
have  existed  as  a  matured  cause  of  action  at  the  time 
the  action  was  commenced. 

It  is  essential  to  the  validity  and  regularity  of  a 
judgment  that  the  demand  whereon  it  is  rendered 
shall  have  existed  as  a  matured  cause  of  action  at 
the  time  the  action  was  commenced,42  it  being  a 
general  rule  that  a  party  must  recover  according  to 
his  legal  rights  at  the  commencement  of  the  ac- 


JUDGMENTS 


§  22 


§  21.    Definitiveness 

A  judgment  must  be  definitive* 

A  judgment  must  be  definitive.44  By  this  is 
meant  that  the  decision  itself  must  purport  to  de- 
cide finally  the  rights  of  the  parties  on  the  issue 
submitted,  by  specifically  denying  or  granting  the 


remedy  sought  by  the  action.45  The  converse  of 
this  proposition  is  also  true,  and  every  definitive  de- 
termination of  the  rights  of  the  parties  in  a  pro- 
ceeding before  a  competent  tribunal  is  a  judg- 
ment46 

§  22.    Reasons  for  Judgment 

OrdlnarHy  the  reasons  assigned  by  the  court  for 
the  Judgment  rendered  do  not  constitute  a  part  of  the 
judgment. 

Although  it  has  been  said  that  every  court  should 
state  on  the  record  the  legal  grounds  for  its  judg- 
ment,47 the  reasons  assigned  by  the  court  for  the 
judgment  rendered  do  not  constitute  a  part  of  the 
judgment.48  Also  if  the  judgment  given  is  correct, 
it  is  immaterial  whether  the  reasons  adduced  for 
giving  such  a  judgment  are  correct.49  Therefore  a 
judgment  or  decree  of  the  court  controls  the  writ- 
ten opinion,  and  if  they  are  at  variance,  the  former 
prevails  and  determines  the  rights  of  the  parties.60 


Not  a  Judgment 

When  judgment  roll  on  its  face 
shows  that  court  was  without  juris- 
diction to  render  the  particular  judg- 
ment, Its  pronouncement  Is  not  In 
fact  a  judgment. — Hodson  v. 
O'Keeffe,  229  P.  722,  71  Mont.  322. 
Belief  denied  "by  law 

A  Judgment  granting  relief  which 
the  law  declares  shall  not  be  grant- 
ed is  void. — Moroney  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Southern  Surety  Co.,  31  P.2d  926,  168 
Okl.  69— State  v.  Armstrong,  13  P. 
2d  198,  158  Okl.  290. 
Special  statutory  powers 

Where  court  is  exercising  special 
statutory  powers,  Judgment  in  ex- 
cess of  statutory  authority  Is  void. 
— uEtna  Casualty  &  Surety  Co.  of 
Hartford,  Conn.,  v.  Board  of  Sup'rs 
of  Warren  County,  168  S.E,  617,  160 
•Va.  11. 
Transcending  Jurisdiction, 

Where  court,  after  acquiring  Ju- 
risdiction of  a  subject  matter,  tran- 
scends the  limits  of  Jurisdiction  con- 
ferred, its  Judgment  Is  void. — Flake 
v.  Pretzel,  46  N.B.2d  375,  381  HI. 
498. 

42.  Wash, — Mondiolf     v.     American 
Bldg.  Co.,  145  P.  577,  83  Wash.  584. 

33  C.J.  p  1097  note  9. 

43.  N.Y.— -Fults   v.   Munro,    95   N.E. 
23,  202  N.Y.  34,  87  KILA..N.S.,  600, 
Ann.Cas.l912D  870. 

33  C.J.  p  1097  note  10. 

Death  rendering-  decree  timely 

However,  where  testatrix  devised 
realty  in  trust  for  benefit  of  hus- 
band during  his  life,  the  trust  to 
terminate  at  husband's  death,  and 
husband  who  elected  to  take  against 
the  will  died  during  pendency  of  de- 
fendants' appeal  in  husband's  parti- 
tion suit,  realty  was  to  be  distribut- 
ed by  trustee  as  directed  by  will 


and  decree,  and  order  directing  sale 
of  property  and  that  trustee  dis- 
tribute proceeds,  if  premature  when 
entered,  was  held  to  be  rendered 
timely  by  husband's  death. — Flynn 
v.  Bryan,  Mo.,  154  S.W.2d  773. 

44.  Cal.— Kosloff  v.   Kosloff,  154  P. 
2d  431,  67  Cal.App.2d  374— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Makzoume  v.  Mak- 
zoume, 123  P.2d  72,  74,  50  CaLApp. 
2d  229. 

33  C.J.  p  1103  note  29. 

45.  CaL— Kosloff  v.   Kosloff,   154   P. 
2d  431,   67  Cal.App.2d  374— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Makzoume  v.  Mak- 
zoume, 123  P.2d  72,  74,  50  CaLApp. 
2d  229. 

N.Y.— Lowe  v.  Lowe,   192  N.E.    291, 

265  N.Y.  197. 
33  C.J.  p  1104  note  30. 

Judgment  determining  nothing 
and  leaving  parties  where  they 
started  is  wholly  ineffective. — Per- 
mian Oil  Co.  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  47 
S.W.2d  500,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  73  S.W.2d  490,  129  Tex.  413, 
111  AL.R.  1152,  rehearing  denied 
107  S.W.2d  564,  129  Tex.  413,  111  A. 
L.R.  1175. 

46.  Cal.— Kosloff  v.   Kosloff,   154   P. 
2d  431,  67  Cal.App.2d  374— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Makzoume  v.  Mak- 
zoume,   123    P.2d    72.    74,    50    Cal. 
App.2d  229. 

33  C.J.  p  1104  note  31. 

47.  N.Y.— Newman  v.  Mayer,   65  N. 
T.S.    294,   52   App.Div.   209,    7   N.Y. 
Ann.Cas.   497. 

Va.-— Preston  v.  Auditor,  1  Call.  471, 

5  Va.  471. 

Construction   of  Judgments   In   gen- 
eral see  infra  §  436. 
Constitutional  requirement 

(1)  Where  a  constitutional  provi- 
sion requires  the  court  to  state  its 
reasons  for  the  Judgment  rendered, 

51 


and  this  is  not  done,  the  Judgment 
must  be  reversed. — Dorr  v.  Jouet,  20 
La.Ann.  27—33  C.J.  p  1105  note  48. 
(2)  The  constitutional  mandate 
that  Judges  shall  refer  to  law  and 
adduce  reasons  on  which  definitive 
Judgments  are  founded  refers  only 
to  cases  wherein  real  controversies 
or  claims  are  decided  or  adjudicated 
and  not  to  rule  taken  by  wife  for 
issuance  of  writ  of  fieri  facias  on 
Judgment  for  amount  of  past-due 
and  exigible  alimony  payments  pre- 
viously ordered  by  Judgment  in  her 
suit  for  separation  from  bed  and 
board. — Erdal  v.  Brdal,  La.App.,  26 
So.2d  377. 

48.  Cal. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Martin   v.    Board   of   Trustees   of 
ILeland  Stanford  Jr.  University,  99 
P.2d  684,  686,  37  Cal.App.2d  481. 

Ga.— Bales  v.  Wright,   200  S.E.  192, 

59  Ga.App.  191. 
Mo. — Smith  v.  Travelers'  Protective 

Ass'n  of  America,    6   S.W.2d   870, 

•319  Mo.  1120. 
N.C. — Gettys  v.  Town  of  Marion,  10 

S.B.2d  799,  218  N.C.  266. 
Okl.— McGann    v.    McGann,    87    P.2d 

939,  169  Okl.  515. 
Tex. — Davis    v.    Hemphlll,    ClvJLpp., 

243  S.W.  691. 
33  C.J.  p  1104  note  38. 

49.  Minn. — Kipp  v.  Clinger,   106  N* 
W.  108,  97  Minn.  135. 

33  C.J.  p  1105  note  40. 

50.  Iowa. — In  re  Evans'  Estate,  291 
N.W.  460,  228  Iowa  908. 

N.Y. — People     ex    rel.     Metropolitan 

Trust  Co.  of  City  of  New  York  v. 

Travis,    176  N.Y.S.    765,   107  Misc. 

377,    affirmed    180    N.Y.S.    659,    191 

App.Dlv.  129, 
Wash.— Reagh  v.  Shalkenbach,  56  P. 

2d  673. 
33  C.J.  p  1104  note  39. 


1  23 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


If  the  judgment  is  one  which  the  court  had  power  i  jurisdiction  because  it  is  based  or  made  on  an  im- 
to  make  on  any  ground,  it  is  not  void  for  want  of  |  proper  ground.51 

B.  PROCESS,  NOTICE,  OE  APPEARANCE 


§  23.    Necessity 

A  valid  judgment  may  be  rendered  against  a  defend- 
ant only  where  he  has  been  given  notice;  and  accord* 
tngly  a  judgment  which  is  rendered  without  any  notice 
to,  or  service  of  process  on  the  defendant,  and  without 
his  voluntarily  appearing,  is  generally  void  for  want  of 
Jurisdiction. 

As  a  general  rule,  before  a  valid  judgment  may  be 
rendered  against  a  defendant,  he  must  be  accorded 


an  opportunity  to  be  heard,  as  discussed  supra  § 
18,  and  for  this  purpose  he  must  be  given  notice 
of  the  action  or  proceeding  against  him,52  and  this 
notice  cannot  constitutionally  be  dispensed  with.53 
Accordingly  a  judgment  which  is  rendered  without 
any  form  of  notice  to,  or  service  on,  defendant  is 
wholly  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,54  unless  he 
voluntarily  appears,  as  discussed  infra  §  26,  or 


Operation  and  effect  of  opinions  gen- 
erally see  Courts  §  222  b. 
''Decision" 

In  case  of  a  variance  between  the 
"'Judgment"  and  the  "decision,"  the 
"'judgment"  controls.— Wo  Kee  &  Co. 
v.  U.  S.,  28  C.C.P.A.Customs  272— 
U.  S.  v.  Penn.  Commercial  Corpora- 
tion of  America,  15  Ct.Cust.App.  206 
— Roessler  &  Hasslacher  Chemical 
Co.  v.  U.  S.,  13  CtCustApp.  451. 

51.  U.S. — Converse  v.  Stewart,  C.C. 
3ST.T.,   192   F.   941.  affirmed  197  F. 
1S2,  118  C.C.A.  212. 

52.  U.S. — Sylvan  Beach  v.  Koch,  C. 
C.A.MO.,    140    F.2d    852— Smith    v. 
Stark    Trucking,    D.C.Ohio,    63    F. 
Supp.   826 — Fisher  v.  Jordan,  D.C. 
Tex.,   32  F.Supp.  608,  reversed  on 
other  grounds   116   F.2d  183,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Jordan  v.  Fisher,  61 
S.Ct.    734,    812    U.S.    697,    85    L.Ed. 
1132. 

Cal.— Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246,  203 
Cal.  306. 

Ga.— Elliott  v.  Adams,  160  S.E.  336, 
173  Ga.  312. 

N.Y. — Rochester  Sav.  Bank  v.  Mon- 
roe County,  S  N.Y.S.2d  107,  169 
Misc.  526— Cipperly  v.  Link,  237 
N.Y.S.  106,  135  Misc.  134. 

N.D. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Baird 
v.  Ellison,  293  N.W.  794,  801,  70 

*    N.D.  261. 

Okl. — St.  Louis-San  Francisco  By. 
Co.  v.  Bayne,  40  P.2d  1104,  170  Okl 
542. 

Pa.— In  re  Galli's  Estate,  17  A.2d 
893,  340  Pa.  561 — In  re  Komara's 
Estate,  166  A.  677,  311  Pa.  135. 

Va.— Moore  v.  Smith,  15  S.E.2d  48,' 
177  Va.  621. 

Wash.— Morley  v.  Morley,  230  P.  645, 
131  Wash.  540. 

33  C.J.  p  1080  BOte  96. 

53.  Gal.— Baker  v.   O'Riordan,   4   P. 
232,  65  Cal.  368. 

Minn. — Bardwell  v.  Collins,  46  N.W. 
315,  44  Minn.  97,  20  Am.S.R.  547, 
9  L.R.A.  152. 

33  C.J.  p  1079  note  93. 

Process   or  notice   as   essential  ele- 
ment of  due  process  of  law  see 
Constitutional  Law  5  619. 
Begardless  of  statutory  provision 

with  respect  to  issuance  and  service 


of  process,   no  judgment,   order,   or 
.decree   is   valid   or   binding   on   the 
party   who    has    no    notice   of   pro- 
ceeding   against    him,    since    court 
must  have  jurisdiction  of  tlie  person 
as  well  as  of  the  subject  matter  and 
legislature   is  without  power  under 
constitution  to  dispense  with  notice 
either  actual  or  constructive. — Mad- 
do*  v.  Bush,  4   So.2d  302,  191  Miss. 
748— Jack  v.  Thompson,  41  Miss.  49'. 
54.    U.S. — Pen-Ken   Gas  &  Oil  Cor- 
poration v.  Warfield  Natural  Gas 
Co.,   C.C.A.Ky.,   137  F.2d   871,  car-, 
tiorari  denied  64  S.Ct.  431,  320  U. 
S.  800,  88  L.Ed.  483,  rehearing  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct.  634,  321  U.S.  803,  88 
L.EdL    1089 — Mason    v.    Royal    In- 
demnity  Co.,    D.CGa.,    35    F.Supp. 
477,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  123  F.2d  335. 
Ala. — Standard     Cooperage     Co.     v. 
Grant,  117   So.  31,   217  Ala.  667— 
Farmers'  Union  Warehouse  Co.  v. 
Burnett  Bros.,  116  So.  810,  22  Ala. 
App.     524,     certlorari    denied    118 
So.  286,  218  Ala.  165. 
Ariz. — Lore  v.  Citizens  Bank  of  Win- 
slow,   75  R2d  371,  51  Ariz.  191. 
Cal. — Balaam  v.  Perazzo,  295  P.  330, 
221  Cal.  375— Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P. 
246,    203   Cal.    306— In   re   Ivory's 
Estate,  98  P.2d  761,  37  Oal.App.2d 
22— Jones  v.  Noble,  39  P.2d  486,  8 
Cal.App.2d  316. 
D.C.— Wise  v.  Herzog.  114  F.2d  486, 

72  APP.D.C.  335. 

Gtau — TOnn  v.  Armour  &  Co.,  193  S. 
R  447,  184  Ga.  769— Henry  &  Co. 
v.  Johnson,  173  S.E.  659,  178  Ga. 
641— Williams  v.  Batten,  119  S.E. 
709,  156  Ga.  620— Cherry  v.  Mo- 
Cutchen,  23  S.E.2d  587,  68  Ga. 
App.  682. 
Hawaii. — Kim  Poo  Kum  v.  Sugi- 

yama,  33  Hawaii  545. 
111. — Schuster  v.  Eisner,  250  IlLApp. 

192. 

Ind. — Montgomery  v.  Marks,  46  N.E. 
2d  912,  221  Ind.  223—Celiha  Mut 
Casualty  Co.  v.  Bpldridge,  12  N.E. 
2d  258,  213  Ind.  198. 
Iowa.— Woodmen  Accident  Co.  v. 
District  Court  in  and  for  Marshall 
County,  260  N.TIf.  713,  219  Iowa 
1326,  9£  A.L.R.  1431— Bes  Mofaes 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Marks  Inv.  Co., 
195  N.W.  597,  197  Iowa  589,  opin-  , 

52 


ion  modified  on  rehearing  197  N. 
W.  628,  187  Iowa  589. 

Ky.— Gayle  v.  Gayle,  192  S.W.2d  821 
— Parrish  v.  Ferriell,  186  S.W.2d 
625,  299  Ky.  676— Jones  v.  Fuller, 
134  S.W.Sd  240,  280  Ky.  671— 
Gardner  v.  Lincoln  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  64  S.W.2d  497,  251  Ky.  109 
—Ely  v.  U.  S.  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  49 
S.W.2d  1021,  243  Ky.  725— Rex 
Red  Ash  Coal  Co.  v.  Powers,  290 
S.W.  1061,  218  Ky.  93— Farmers' 
Bank  of  Salvisa  v.  Riley,  272  S.W. 
9,  209  Ky.  54. 

La.— In  re  Webster's  Tutorship,  177 
So.  688,  188  La.  623— Lacour  Plan- 
tation Co,  v.  Jewell,  173  So.  761, 
186  La.  1055— Logwood  v.  Log- 
wood, 168  So.  310,  185  La.  1— No- 

.  Ian  v.  Schultze,  126  So.  513,  169 
La.  1022— Gahn  v.  Brown,  107  So. 
576,  160  La.  790— Nicol  v.  Jacoby, 
103  So.  33,  157  La.  757— Smith  v. 
Crescent  Chevrolet  Co.,  App.,  1  So. 
2d  421 — Key  v.  Jones,  App.,  181  So. 
631— R.  P.  Ffcrnsworth  &  Co.  v. 
Estrade,  Cotton  &  Fricke,  App., 
166  So.  676— McClelland  v.  District 
Household  of  Ruth,  App.,  151  So. 
246 — Richardson  v.  Trustees'  Loan 
&  Guaranty  Co.,  132  So.  387,  15  La. 
App.  645 — Spillman  v.  Texas  &*P. 
Ry.  Co.,  120  So.  905,  10  LfcuApp. 
379. 

Md. — Piedmont-Mt   Airy  Guano   Co. 

of  Baltimore  y.  Merritt,  140  A.  62, 

154  Md.  226. 
Mich.— Hafner  T.  A.  J.  Stuart  Land 

Co.,   224   N.W.   630,   246  Mich.   465. 
Minn. — Beede  v.  Nldes  Finance  Cor- 
poration, 296  N.W.  413,  209  Minn. 

354.' 
Miss. — Eastman     Gardiner     Lumber 

Co.  v.  Carr,  166  So.  401,  175  Miss. 

36 — Bank  of  Richton  v.  Jones,  121 

So.  823,  153  Miss.  796. 
Mo. — State  eat  rel.  Keller  r.  Porter- 
field,  App.,  283  S.W.  59. 
Mont— Novack   v.    Pericich,    300    P. 

240,   90   Mont   91-r-Holt  v.  Sather, 

264  P.  108,  81  Mont  442. 
K.M. — Bourgeious  v.  Santa  Fe  Trail 

Stages,   95  P.2d  284,  43  N.M.  453. 
N.Y.— Friedman  v.  Blatt,  27  N.Y.S.2d 

102,  176*Misc.  401— Rochester  Sav. 

Bank  v.  Monroe  County,   8  N.T.S. 

2d    107,    169    Misc.    526— Baumaa 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  23 


otherwise  waives  service  of  process,55  or  authorizes 
its  acceptance;56  and  in  some  states  this  rule  ob- 
tains by  statutory  provision.57  However,  the  prin- 
ciple that  a  judgment  obtained  without  service  of 
process  or  voluntary  appearance  is  void  for  lack  of 
the  court's  jurisdiction  does  not  apply  to  a  deci- 
sion on  a  collateral  question,  in  a  case  where  the 
parties  are  before  the  court  ;58  and  a  failure  to  give 
notice"  to  a  party  who  has  no  concern  or  interest  in 
the  question  decided  does  not  affect  the  validity  of 
the  judgment.59  A  judgment  which  merely  deter- 


mines rights  may  be  conclusive  without  the  service 
of  any  process  for  its  enforcement.60 

After  amended,  supplefnental,  or  cross  pleading. 
A  judgment  is  void  where  it  is  rendered  without  the 
service  of  process,  waiver,  or  entry  of  appearance, 
on  an  amended  complaint  or  petition,  which  changes 
the  cause  of  action,61  or  on  an  amended  or  supple- 
mental pleading  filed  by  defendant,62  or  on  a  plea 
of  intervention.63  Likewise,  where  a  new  or  ad- 
ditional process  is  required  when  a  cross  pleading 
is  filed,  a  judgment  rendered  on  such  pleading 


Rubber  Co.  v.  Karl  Light  &  Sons,  • 
244  N.T.S.  448,  137  Misc.  258. 

N.C.— Powell  v.  Turpin,  29  S.E.2d 
26,  224  N.C.  67— City  of  Monroe 
v.  Niven,  20  S.E.2d  311,  221  N.C. 
362— Hood  v.  Holding,  171  S.E. 
633.  205  N.C.  451— Crocker  v. 
Van-n,  135  S.E.  127,  192  N.C.  422 
— Clark  v.  Carolina  Homes,  128  S. 
E.  20,  189  N.C.  703. 

N.D. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Baird 
v.  Ellison,  293  N.W.  794,  801,  70 
N.D.  261— Gallagher  v.  National 
Nonpartisan  League,  205  N.W.  674, 
53  N.D.  238. 

Okl. — American  Exchange  Corpora- 
tion v.  Lowry,  63  P.2d  71,  178  Okl. 
433 — St.  Louis-San  Francisco  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Bayne,  40  P.2d  1104,  170  Okl. 
542— Chicago,  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Excise  Board  of  Oklahoma 
County,  33  P.2d  1081,  168  Okl.  428 
— Protest  of  Chicago.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  2  P.2d  935,  151  Okl.  129 
— Noel  v.  Edwards,  260  P.  58,  127 
Okl.  163— Oklahoma  City  v.  Me- 
Williams,  236  P.  417,  108  Okl.  268 
— Abraham  v.  Homer,  226  P.  45, 
102  Okl.  12. 

Pa. — In  re  Honiara's  Estate,  166  A. 
577,  311  Pa,  135— In  re  Gallagher's 
Estate,  167  A.  476,  109  Pa. Super. 
304. 

R.I. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Sahagian 
v.  Sahagian,  137  A.  221,  222,  48 
R.L  267. 

Tex. — Pure  Oil  Co.  v.  Reece,  78  S. 
W.2d  932,  124  Tex.  476— State 
Mortg.  Corporation  v.  Tray  lor,  36 
S.W.2d  440.  120  Tex  148— Levy  v. 
Roper,  256  S.W.  251,  113  Tex.  356 
— Burrage  v.  Hunt,  Civ.App.,  147 
S.W.2d  532,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Freeman  v.  B.  F. 
Goodrich  Rubber  Co.,  Civ.App.,  127 
S.W.2d  476,  error  dismissed  by 
agreement— Olton  State  Bank  v. 
Howell,  Civ.App.,  105  S.W.2d  287 
— Goodman  v.  Mayer,  Civ.App., 
105  S.W.2d  281,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  128  S.W.2d  1156,  133  Tex. 
319 — Coker  v.  Logan,  Civ.App.,  101 
S.W.2d  284 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Associated  Indemnity  Corporation 
v.  Baker,  Civ.App.,  76  S.W.2d  153, 
158 — Wilkinson  v.  Owens,  Civ. 
App.,'  72  S.W.2d  330— Christie  v. 
Hudspeth  County  Conservation 
and  Reclamation  Dist.  No.  1,  Civ. 


App.,  64  S.W.2d  978— Texas  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Bankers'  Life  Co., 
Civ.App.,  43  S.W.2d  631,  error  re- 
fused— Lipscomb  v.  Japhet,  Civ. 
App.,  18  S.W.2d  786— Belt  v.  Mc- 
Gehee,  Civ.App.,  9  S.W.Sd  407— 
Adamson  v.  Collins,  Civ.App.,  286 
S.W.  598— Cook  v.  Liberty  Pipe 
Line  Co.,  Civ.App.,  281  S.W.  221 
— Watson  Co.,  Builders,  v.  Blee- 
ker,  Civ.App.,  269  S.W.  147. 
Utah. — Parry  v.  Bonneville  Irr. 

Dist.,  235  P.  751,  71  Utah  202. 
Va. — Preston  v.  Legard,  168  S.E.  445, 
160    Va.    364 — Johnson    v.    Burson, 
129  S.E.  251,  143  Va.  57. 
Wash. — State  v.  Fishing  Appliances, 

16    P.2d   822,   170  Wash.   426. 
W.Va. — Hayhurst  v.  J.  Kenny  Trans- 
fer  Co.,    158    S.E.    506,    110   W.Va. 
395 — Robertson     Grocery     Co.     v. 
Kinser,  116  S.E.  141,  93  W.Va.  172. 
33  C.J.  p  1079  note  94—34  C.J.  p  533 
notes  38,  39—15  C.J.  p  798  note  64. 
Default    Judgment    without    process 

see  infra  §  191. 
Judgment     by     confession     without 

process  see  infra  §  151. 
Service    of   process    as    essential    to 

Jurisdiction  see  Courts  §  83. 
Service  of  process  on  Joint  defend- 
ants see  infra  $  33. 
As  otherwise  stated,  unless  a  de- 
fendant has  been  brought  into  court 
in  some  way  sanctioned  by  law,  or 
has  made  a  voluntary  appearance 
in  person  or  by  attorney,  a  Judgment 
rendered  against  him  is  void  for 
want  of  Jurisdiction. — Casey  v.  Bar- 
ker, 14  S.E.2*  429,  219  N.C.  465— 
Groce  v.  Groce,  199  S.E.  388,  214 
N.C.  398 — Denton  v.  Vassiliades,  193 
S.E.  737,  212  N.C.  513— Downing  v. 
White,  188  S.E.  815,  211  N.C.  40. 

For  judicial  action  to  affect  vested 
rights,  it  must  be  based  on  notice  or 
process  whereby  interested  parties 
are  brought  within  court's  Jurisdic- 
tion.— Parry  v.  Bonneville  Irr.  Dist., 
263  P.  751,  71  Utah  202. 
55.  Ga.— Henry  &  Co.  v.  Johnson, 

173  S.E.  659,  178  Ga.  541. 
Hawaii.— Kim    Poo    Kum    v.     Sugi- 

yama,  33  Hawaii  545. 
La. — Key  v.  Jones,  App.,  181  So.  631. 
Okl.— Protest    of    Chicago,    R.    I.    & 
P.   Ry.   Co.,    2    P.2d    935,    151   Okl. 
129. 

53, 


W.Va, — Hayhurst  v.  J.  Kenny  Trans- 
fer Co.,  158  S.E.  606,  110  W.Va. 
395 — Robertson  Grocery  Co.  v. 
Kinser,  116  S.E.  141,  93  W.Va.  172. 

34  C.J.  p  5*33  note  40. 

56.  W.Va. — Hayhurst    v.    J.    Kenny 
Transfer  Co.,  158  S.E.  506,  110  W. 
Va.  395. 

57.  Ark. — Arkansas    State    Highway 
Commission    v.    Hammock,    148    S. 
W.2d  324,  201  Ark.  927. 

58-  Cal.— Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246, 
20$  Cal.  306. 

59.  Ohio. — Cunningham  v.  Bessemer 
Trust  Co.,   178   N.E.    217,    39    Ohio 
App.  535. 

60.  N.H.— Faulkner      v.       City      of 
Keene,   155   A.   195.    85   N.H.   147— 
Walker    v.    Walker,    63    N.H.    321, 
56  Am.R.  514. 

Declaratory  Judgments  generally  see 
Actions  §  18  d  (14)  (g). 

61.  Ohio. — Ohio  Electric  Ry.  Co.  v. 
U.  S.  Express  Co.,  137  N.E.  1,  105 
Ohio  St.  331. 

Tex. — Nuckles  v.  J.  M.  Radford  Gro- 
cery Co.,   Civ.App...   72   S.W.2d   652. 
Rule  not  applicable  where  amend- 
ed pleading  states  no  new  cause  of 
action. 
Okl.— City  of  Tulsa  v.  Peacock,  74  P. 

2d  359,  181  Okl.  383. 
Tex. — Nathan  v.  Brashear,  Civ.App., 
105    S.W.2d    328— Henson   v.   C.  C. 
Slaughter  Co.,   Civ.App.,    206    S.W. 
375. 
33  C.J.  p  1081  note  97  [d]. 

62.  Tex— Davis    v.    Wichita    State 
Bank   &   Trust   Co.,    Civ.App.,    286 
S.W.  584. 

Flea  for  affirmative  relief 

Where  defendant  files  pleading 
asking  for  affirmative  relief  after 
plaintiff  has  taken  nonsuit,  citation 
is  necessary  to  sustain  Judgment 
for  him.— Davis  v.  Wichita  State 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  286 
S.W.  584. 
judgment  improper 

Entry  of  Judgment  after  overrul- 
ing plea  of  privilege,  without  notice 
or  hearing  of  controverting  plea,  Is 
improper. — Galbraith  v.  Bishop,  Tex 
Com.App.,  287  S.W.  1087. 

63.  Tex.— State   v.   Bagby's    Estate, 
_Civ.App.,  ,126    S.W.2d    687. 


§  24 


against  the  original  plaintiff,64  or  a  codefendant,65 
without  the  service  of  process  on,  or  appearance  or 
waiver  by,  such  plaintiff  or  defendant,  is  void,  as 
where  the  cross  petition  is  filed  after  the  expiration 
of  the  time  for  such  defendant  to  plead.66 

§  24.    Sufficiency 

a.  In  general 

b.  Personal  service 

c.  Substituted  and  constructive  service; 

publication 

d.  Extraterritorial  service 

e.  Nonresidents 

f .  Attachment  and  garnishment 


g.  Defective  process 
h.  Defective  service 

a.  In  General 

Formal  process  or  notice  served  In  the  manner  au- 
thorized or  required  by  law  is  essential  to  support  a 
judgment. 

Formal  process  or  notice  served  in  the  manner 
authorized  or  required  by  law  is  essential  to  sup- 
port a  judgment;67  mere  informal  knowledge  of 
the  pendency  of  the  action  is  not  sufficient68  Thus 
a  judgment  is  a  mere  nullity  where  service  is  made 
on  a  third  person,  who  is  not  authorized  to  accept 
service,  instead  of  on  the  actual  defendant,69  not- 


Wbere  intervention  was  filed  after 
service  of  citation  had  been  had  on 
defendants  and  intervener  did  not 
cause  citation  to  issue  on  Its  cause 
of  action  and  defendants  made  no 
appearance,  trial  court  was  without 
Jurisdiction  to  enter  judgment  for 
intervener  against  defendants.— 
State  v.  Bagby's  Estate,  Tex.  Civ. 
App.,  126  S.W.2d  687. 

64.  Tex. — Early  v.  Cornelius,   39   S. 
W.2d   6,   120   Tex,   335— Holmes  v. 
Klein,    Civ.App.f    59    S.W.2d    171— 
National    Stock   Tards   Nat    Bank 
v.   Valentine,    Civ. App.,    39    S.W.2d 
907 — Southern    Equipment    Co.    v. 
Hallman  Electric  Co.,  Civ. App.,  10 
S.W.2d  261 — Scarborough  v.  Brad- 
ley,  Civ.App.,    256    S.W.    349— Jar- 
ratt  v.  McCarty,   Civ.App,,   209   S. 
W.  712. 

Necessity  of  process  after  filing 
cross  pleading  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
Process  §  4,  also  50  C.J.  p  448 
note  48-p  449  note  60. 

65.  CaL— Balaam  v.  Perazzo,  295  P, 
330,  221  CaL  375. 

Ky. — Carter  v.  Capshaw,  60  S.W.2d 
959,  249  Ky.  483— Lorton  v.  Ash- 
brook,  295  S.W.  1027,  220  Ky.  830. 

Tex. — Holmes  v.  Klein,  Civ. App.,  59 
S.W.2d  171,  error  dismissed — Flagg 
v.  Matthews,  Civ.App.,  287  S.W. 
299. 

Effect  of  appearance  generally  see 
infra  §  26. 

66.  Okl.— Blakeney   v.    Ashford,    81 
P.2d  309,   188   Okl.   213— Vinson  v. 
Oklahoma  City,    66   P.2d   933,   179 
Okl.    590-^Central    Nat.    Bank    of 
Okmulgee   v.    Sharp,    34    P.2d   241, 
168   Okl.   616 — O'Reilly   v.   Schuer- 
meyer,  9  P,2d  923,  156  Okl.  167— 
Wood  v.  Speakman,  5  P.2d.  121,  153 
Okl.   180 — Poster  v.   Comaway,  251 
P.  59,  122  Okl.  80. 

67.  U.S. — Rettig  Beverage  Co.  v,  IT. 
S..  C.C.A.Pa.,  13  F.2d  740. 

Ala. — Sovereign  .Camp,  W.  O.  W.,  v. 

Partridge,    127    So.    505,    221   Ala. 

75. 
Ark. — Gainsburg  v.  Dodge,  101  S.W. 

2d  178,  193  Ark.  473.     , 


Colo. — Younge    v.    Button,    61    P.2d 

1370,  99  Colo.  254. 
Fla.— McAllister  v.  McAllister,  3  So. 

2d  351.  147  Fla,  647. 
Ky. — Corpus   Taxis   cited   in   Ely  v. 

XI.  S.  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  49  S.W.2d 

1021,  1025,  243  Ky.  725. 
Mo. — In    re    Waters'    Estate,    App., 

153  S.W.2d  774. 
Neb.— Coffin  v.  Maitland,   20  N.W.2d 

310. 
N.J.— Hinners    v.    Banville,    168    A. 

618,  114  N.J.Eq.  348. 
N.T.— Universal  Credit  Co.  v.  Blind- 

erman,    288    N.T.S.    77,    159    Misc. 

802. 
N.D. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Balrd 

v.   Ellison,   293   N.W,    794,   801,    70 

N.D.  261. 
Okl.— State  v.  City  of  Tulsa,  5  P.2d 

744,   153   Okl.  262— Oklahoma  City 

v.  McWilliams,  236  P.  417,  108  Okl. 

268. 
Pa. — In  re  Murray's  Estate,  Super., 

45    A.2d    411 — Johnston  v.   Ameri- 
can    Casualty     Co.,     Com.Pl.,     23 

WestCo.  178. 
Tenn. — Hunter    v.    May,    25    S.W.2d 

580,  161  Tenn.  155. 
Tex. — Jenness    v.    First   Nat.    Bank, 

Civ.App.,  256  S.W.  634. 
33  C.J.  p  1081  note  97. 
Service    of    process    in    general   see 

the  C.J.S.  title  Process  §  25  et  sea, 

also  50  C.J.  p  467  note  86  et  sea. 

Formal  issuance  of  order  to  show 
cause  and  appropriate  service  there- 
of on  defendant  was  such  reasona- 
ble notice  of  pendency  of  suit  as  to 
bring  it  within  Jurisdiction  of  court 
and  bind  defendant  to  order  or  de- 
cree.— Doan  v.  OollinB-Doan  Co.,  194 
A.  254,  122  N.J.Eq.  399. 

'Corporation,  and  stockholders 

Where  court  had  jurisdiction  over 
subject  matter  of  suit  against  cor- 
poration, and  president  of  corpo- 
ration was  served  with  citation, 
stockholders  were  not  "necessary 
parties"  or  "proper  parties"  to  suit, 
and  hence  notice  of  suit  and  serv- 
ice on  them  was  not  reauired  for 
rendition  of  valid  judgment  against 
corporation  and  stockholders. — Cruse 

54 


v.    Mann,    Tex.Civ.App.,    74    S.W.2d 
545,  error  dismissed. 

68.  Cal.— Peabody  v.  Phelps,  9  CaL 
213. 

N.D. — Corpus  Jxtcis  quoted  la  Baird 
v.  Ellison,  293  N.W.  794,  801,  70 
N.D.  261. 

Ohio.— Haley  v.  Hanna,  112  N.E,  149, 
93  Ohio  St.  49. 

33  C.J.  p  1081  note  97. 

69.  Ky. — Missouri-Kansas  Pipe 
Line    Co.    v.    Hobgood,    51    S.W.2d 
920,  244  Ky,  570. 

La.— Waddill  v.  Payne,  23  La,Ann. 
773— Jones  v.  Jones,  23  La.Ann. 
304. 

N.T. — Building  Trades  Service  Bu- 
reau v.  S.  W.  Straus  Investing 
Corporation,  272  N.T.S.  73,  241 
App.Div.  869— Universal  Credit 
Co.  v.  Blinderman,  288  N.T.S.  77, 
159  Misc.  802. 

Wash. — Wheeler  v.  Moore,  36  P. 
1053,  10  Wash.  309. 

W.Va,— State  v.  A,  R.  Kelly  &  Co.* 
33  S.E.2d  230— Nicholas  Land  Co. 
v.  Crowder,  32  S.E.2d  563. 

33  C.J.  p  1081  note  98. 

Class  representative 

(1)  Conditions    under    which    de- 
fendants   may    be    bound    by    judg- 
ments in  "class  suits,"  and  in  other 
cases  in  which  doctrine   of  virtual 
representation  is  applied,  constitute 
exceptions    to    statutory    provisions 
making  service  of  process  a  condi- 
tion precedent  to  rendition  of  judg- 
ment.— Southern     Ornamental     Iron. 
Works  v.  Morrow,  Tcx.Civ.App.,  101 
S.W.2d  336. 

(2)  However,    the    equitable    doc- 
trine  of   class    representation    does 
not  permit  a  plaintiff  to   designate- 
certain    parties    as    representatives 
of    other    numerous    members    of   & 
voluntary  unincorporated  association 
in    order    to    obtain   personal    judg- 
ments as  to  members  not  properly- 
served  in  action  on  alleged  indebted- 
ness   of    the    association. — Webb    & 
Martin    v.    Anderson-McG-rift    Hard- 
ware Co.,  3  S.E.2d  882,  188  Ga,  291. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  24 


withstanding  defendant  had  knowledge  of  the  ac- 
tion and  the  attempted  service.70  The  service 
must  be  accomplished  by  a  method  which  gives  de- 
fendant actual  or  constructive  notice,71  and  is  rea- 
sonably calculated  to  afford  him  the  constitutional 
protection  of  due  process  of  law.72  It  must  apprise 
defendant  of  what  is  required  of  him  and  of  the 
consequences  which  may  follow  if  he  neglects  to  de- 
fend the  action.78 

b.  Personal  Service 
A  personal  Judgment  which  Is  rendered  without  serv- 


ice of  process  on,  or  legal  notice  to,  defendant  Is  void  In 
the  absence  of  a  voluntary  appearance  or  waiver. 

A  personal  judgment  rendered  against  a  defend- 
ant without  service  of  process  on  him,  or  other  suf- 
ficient legal  notice  to  him,  is  without  jurisdiction 
and  void,74  unless  he  has  appeared  voluntarily,  as 
discussed  infra  §  26,  or  otherwise  has  waived  per- 
sonal service,75  or  has  acknowledged  service,76  or 
has  authorized  its  acceptance  in  his  behalf.77  In  a 
proceeding  in  rem,  or  quasi  in  rem,  a  valid  per- 
sonal judgment  cannot  be  rendered  against  de- 
fendant without  personal  service  of  process  on  him, 
in  the  absence  of  his  voluntary  appearance.78 


70.  Ariz.— National     Metal     Co.     v. 
Greene  Consol.   Copper  Co.,  89   P. 
535,  11  Ariz.  108. 

33  C.J.  p  1081  note  98. 

71.  N.Y. — In  re  Renard's  Estate,  39 
N.Y.S.2d  968,   179  Misc.   885. 

Pa. — In  re  Komara's  Estate,  166  A. 

577,  811  Pa.  135. 
Constructive    service    generally    see 

infra  subdivision  c  of  this  section. 

72.  D.C.— Wise  v.  Herzog,  114  F.2d 
486,  72  App.D.C.  335. 

N.Y.— -Standish  v.  Standish,  40  N.Y. 
S.2d  538,  179  Misc.  564. 

73.  Cal.— Peabody  v.  Phelps,  9  Cal 
213. 

33  C.J.  p  1081  note  1. 

Process  and  service  sufficient  to 
support  default  Judgment  see  in- 
fra §  191. 

74.  U.-S. — Griffin  v.  Griffin,  App.D.C., 
66  S.Ct.  556,  rehearing  denied  66  8. 
Ct   975— In  re   Gayle,  C.C.A.Canal 
Zone,   136    F.2d   973,   petition   dis- 
missed 64  S.Ct   157,  320  U.S.   806, 
88  L.Ed.  487. 

.Ala. — Morrison  v.  Covington,  100  So. 

124.    211    Ala.    181— Corpus    Juris 

cited  in  Ex  parte  Whistler,  199  So. 

876,  878,  29  Ala.App.  583. 
Ariz.— Blair  v.   Blair,    62   P.2d   1321, 

48  Ariz.  501. 
Jowa, — Stier  v.  Iowa  State  Traveling 

Men's    Ass'n,    201    N.W.    328,    199 

Iowa  118,   59  A.L.R.  1384. 
;Kan. — Gibson  v.  Enright,  9  P.2d  971, 

135  Kan.  181. 
ZKy.— Hughes    v.    Hughes,    278    S.W. 

121,  211  Ky.  799. 
Mo.— Noell  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 

74  S.W.2d  7,  335  Mo.  687,  94  A.L.R. 

684,  followed  in  74  S.W.2d  14. 
:Mont.— Holt  v.  Sather,  264  P.  108,  81 

Mont  442. 
;N.J.— Baker    v.    Josephsota,    44    A.2d 

909,   137  N.J.Eq.  377,   reversed  on 

other  grounds  46  A.2d  904,  138  N. 

J.BQ.  107. 
:.N.M. — State  ex  rel.  Truitt  v.  District 

Court  of  Ninth  Judicial  Dist,  Cur- 
ry County,    96    P.2d  710.   44   N.M, 

16,  126  A.L.R.  651. 
~N.Y. — In  re  Galvin's  Estate,  274  N 

Y.S.  846,  153  Misc.  11. 
:N.C.— Dunn  v.  Wilson,  187  &E,  802 

210  N.C.  493. 


sr.D. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ellison 
v.  Baird,  293  N.W.  793,  794,  70  N. 
D.  226— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dar- 
ling &  Co.  v.  Burchard,  284  N.W. 
856,  862,  69  N.D.  212. 

Ohio.— In  re  Blue's  Estate,  32  N.R2d 
499,  67  Ohio  App.  37. 

Okl.— Skipper  v.  Baer,  277  P.  930, 
136  Okl.  286. 

Pa.— Potter  v.  Potter,  Pa.,  42  Dist 
&  Co.  42. 

Tenn. — Dickson  v.  Simpson,  113  S. 
W.2d  1190,  172  Tenn,  680,  116  A.L. 
R.  380. 

Va,— Lockard  v.  Whitenack,  144  S*E. 
606,  151  Va,  143. 

W.Va. — Hayhurst  v.  X  Kenny  Trans- 
fer Co.,  158  S.E.  506,  110  W.Va, 
395. 

Wis.— Saric  v.  Brlos,  19  N.W.2d  903, 
247  Wis.  400. 

33  C.J.  p  1082  note  4 — 34  C.J.  p  533 
note  39. 

Service  within  state  see  infra  subdi- 
vision d  of  this  section. 

What  constitutes  personal  service 
see  the  C.J.S.  title  Process  §§  25- 
42,  also  50  C.J.  p  468  <note  9-p  490 
note  62. 

"Jurisdiction,  of  the  person"  is  ob- 
tained, so  that  a  valid  judgment  may 
be  rendered,  when  prescribed  notice 
has  been  given  to  litigant  proceed- 
ed against  to  enable  him  to  appear 
and  make  defense. — Wagner  v.  Peo- 
ples Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  167  S. 
W.2d  825,  292  Ky.  691. 

It  is  not  within  the  power  of  any 
tribunal  to  make  a  binding  adjudica- 
tion of  the  rights  in  personam  of 
parties  not  brought  before  it  by  due 
process  of  law. — National  Licorice 
Co.  v.  National  Labor  Relations 
Board,  60  S.Ct  569,  309  U.S.  350, 
84  L.Ed.  799. 

Actions  affecting  title  to  property 
within  court's  jurisdiction,  but  not 
seized  or  otherwise  brought  under 
court's  direct  control  for  disposi- 
tion, and  involved  only  incidentally 
because  of  effect  on  its  title  of  de- 
cree or  judgment  entered,  are  usual- 
ly held  to  be  in  personam,  so  as  to 
require  personal  service  of  process 
on  defendants.— State  ex  rel.  Truitt 
v.  District  Court  of  Ninth  Judicial 

' 


Dist,  Curry  County,  96  P.2d  710,  44 

.  16,  126  A.L.R.  651. 
Personal  judgment  on  cross  petition 

held  void 
Ky.— Capper  v.  Short,  11  S.W.2d  717, 

226  Ky.  689. 

75.  N.T.— In  re  Galvin's  Estate,  274 
N.Y.S.  846,  153  Misc.  11.  . 

W.Va.— Hayhurst  v.  J.  Kenny  Trans- 
fer Co.,  158  S.E.  506,  110  W.Va. 
395. 

76.  N.J.— Fidelity   Union  Trust  Co. 
v.  Union  Cemetery  Ass'-n,  40  A.2d 
205,    136    N.J.Eq.    15,    affirmed    45 
A.2d   670,   137  N.J.Ea.   455,  and  45 
A.2d  698,   137  N.J.EQ.   456. 
Acknowledgment   of   service  after 

appearance  term  has  been  held  too 
late  to  preserve  suit  as  pending  ac- 
tion, and  judgment  rendered  in  suc- 
ceeding term  without  other  process 
was  void.— Bolton  v.  Keys,  144  S.B. 
406,  38  Ga.App.  573. 

77.  W.Va.— Hayhurst    v.    J.    Kenny 
Transfer  Co.,  158  S.E.  506.  110  W. 
Va.  395. 

78.  Ga,— Corpus     Juris     quoted    la 
Webb   &   Martin  v.   Anderson-Mc- 
Griff  Hardware  Co.,   3  S.E.2d  882, 
885,  188  Ga,  291. 

111. — Barnett  v.  Cook  County,  26 
N.E.2d  862,  373  111.  516 — Griffin  v. 
Cook  County,  16  N.E.2d  906,  369 
111.  380,  118  A.L.R.  1157. 

Kan. — Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Irrigation  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  78  P. 
2d  72!  146  Kan.  550. 

Ky. — Kitchen  v.  New  York  Trust 
Co.,  168  «S.W.2d  5,  292  Ky.  706 — 
Bond  v.  Wheeler,  247  S.W.  708,  197 
Ky.  437. 

N.M.— State  ex  rel.  Truitt  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Ninth  Judicial  Dist, 
Curry  County,  96  P.2d  710,  44  N.M. 
16,  126  A.L.R.  651. 

N.T.— In  re  Galvin's  Estate,  274  N. 
T.S.  846,  153  Misc.  11. 

Tenn. — Commerce  Union  Bank  v. 
Sharber,  100  S.W.2d  243,  20  Tenn. 
App.  451. 

33  C.J.  p  1084  note  15. 

Extent  of  jurisdiction  of  court  In 
absence  .  of  personal  service  of 
process  see  Courts  §  83  b  (1). 

Judgment  in  rem  see  infra  I  908; 


§  24 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.& 


Substituted  and  Constructive  Service;  Pub- 
lication 


Ordinarily  no  valid  personal  Judgment  may  be  ren- 
dered against  a  defendant  on  whom  the  service  of  proc- 
ess was  merely  constructive  or  by  publication  and  who 
did  not  appear. 

It  has  been  held  that  a  state  has  the  right  to  pre- 
scribe the  mode  of  serving  the  process  of  its  own 
courts  on  its  own  resident  citizens,  and  that  a  judg- 
ment is  valid,  at  least  until  set  aside  in  a  direct 
proceeding  for  that  purpose,  when  based  on  such 
a  form  of  citation  as  the  law  authorizes,  although 
without  actual  notice  to  defendant79  However,  a 
personal  judgment  on  merely  constructive  service  is 
not  entitled  to  full  faith  and  credit  in  the  courts  of 
another  state,  under  the  constitutional  provision  in 
that  regard,80  and  the  weight  of  authority  is  to  the 
effect  that  no  valid  personal  judgment  may  be  ren- 


79.  U.S. — Santiago  v.  Nogueras, 
Puerto  Rico,  29  S.Ct  608,  214  TJ.S. 
260,  58  L.Ed.  989. 

Ga. — Benton  v.  Maddox,  192  S.E.  316, 
56  Ga.App.  132. 

HI. — Barnett  v.  Cook  County,  26  N.E. 
2d  862,  373  III.  516— Griffln  v.  Cook 
County,  16  N.E.2d  906,  869  111.  380, 
118  A.L.R.  1167. 

Ind.— Pattison  v.  Grant  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Co.,  144  N.B.  26,  195  Ind.  313. 

Me.— Jordan  v.  McKay,  165  A.  902, 
132  Me.  55. 

Minn.— Murray  v.  Murray,  198  N.W. 
307,  159  Minn.  111. 

Mont.— Holt  v.  gather,  264  P.  108, 
81  Mont.  442. 

N.Y.— Continental  Nat.  Bank  of  Bos- 
ton v.  Thurber.  26  N.Y.S.  956,  74 
Hun  632,  affirmed  Continental  Nat 
Bank  of  Boston  v.  United  States 
Book  Co.,  37  N.E.  828,  143  N.Y. 
648 — In  re  Auto  Mut.  Indemnity 
Co.,  14  N.Y.S.2d  601. 

33  C.J.  p  1083  note  9. 

Substituted  service  see  the  C.J.S. 
title  Process  §§  43-53,  also  50  C. 
J.  p  490  note  64-p  496  note  99. 

Judgment  rendered  on  substituted 
or  constructive  service  is  as  con- 
clusive on  residents  of  state  not 
residents  of  county  of  suit  as  one 
rendered  on  personal  service. — Wer- 
ner v.  W.  H.  Shons  Co.,  173  N.E.  486, 
341  HI.  478* 

Compliance  with  statute 

Where  jurisdiction  is  obtained  by 
a  prescribed  form  of  constructive 
notice,  the  statutory  conditions  on 
which  the  service  depends  must  be 
strictly  construed,  and  unless  stat- 
ute has  been  complied  with  court 
has  no  jurisdiction  to  render  judg- 
ment— Pinon  v.  Pollard,  158  P.2d 
254.  69  Oal.App.2d  129. 

Service  held  insufficient  to  support 

judgment 

(1)  On  tenant  of  apartment  house 
.  by  leaving  copy  of  papers  in  outer 


hall.-<!lover  v.    Urban,    142  A.   389, 
108  Conn.  13. 

(2)  Leaving-  process  at  apartment 
from  which  defendant  had  previous- 
ly moved  to  another  state. — Rogan 
v.  Liberty  Mut  Ins.  Co.,  25  N.E.2d 
188,  305  Mass.  186. 

80.  Ga. — Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 
Webb   &   Martin  v.   Anderson-Mc- 
Griff  Hardware  Co.,  3   S.E.2d  882, 
885,  188  Ga,  291. 

33  C.J.  p  1083  note  10. 

81.  U.'S. — Pennoyer  v.  Neff,  Or.,   95 
U.S.   714,    24  L.Ed.   565— Barter  v. 
Continental    Casualty    Co.,    C.C.A. 
Mo.,  48  F.2d  467,  appeal  dismissed 
52   S.Ct.   2.  284   U.S.  578,   76  L.Ed, 
502. 

Cal.— Williams  v.  Williams,  213  P. 
508,  60  Cal.App.  675. 

Ga. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Webb  & 
Martin  v.  Anderson-McGrin?  Hard- 
ware Co.,  3  S.E.2d  882,  885,  188  Ga. 
291— B.  Miflin  Hood  Brick  Co.  v. 
Mangham,  131  S.E.  172,  161  Ga. 
457 — Sweet  v.  Awtry,  30  S.B.2d 
799,  71  Ga.App.  341. 

Iowa. — Security  Sav.  Bank  v.  Cimp- 
rich,  203  N.W.  24,  199  Iowa  1061. 

Ky. — Bond  v.  Wheeler,  247  S.W.  708, 
197  Ky.  437. 

La.— Liles  v.  Barnhart,  93  So.  490, 
152  La.  419. 

Md. — Ortman  v.  Coane,  31  A.2d  320, 
181  Md.  596,  145  A.L.R.  1388. 

N.J.— Reichert  v.  United  Brother- 
hood of  Carpenters  and  Joiners  of 
America,  183  A.  728,  14  N.J.Misc. 
106. 

N.M.-7-State  ex  rel.  Truitt  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Ntoth  Judicial  Dist., 
Curry  County,  96  P.2d  710,  44 
N.M.  16,  126  A.L.R.  651. 

N.Y.— Matthews  v.  Matthews,  219  N. 
Y.S.  333,  128  Misc.  309. 

Utah.— Ricks  v.  Wade,. 93  P.2d  479, 
97  Utah  402. 

Wyo. — Kimbel  v.  Osborn,  156  (P.2d 
279. 

33  C.J.  p  1083  note  11. 

56 


dered  against  a  defendant  on  whom  the  service  of 
process  was  merely  constructive  and  who  did  not 
appear.81 

d.  Extraterritorial  Service 

Service  of  process  on  a  nonresident  beyond  the  ter- 
ritorial Jurisdiction  of  the  court  from  which  the  process 
issued  will  not  support  a  personal  Judgment  against  the 
nonresident.  It  has  also  been  held  that  extraterritorial 
service  on  a  resident  will  not  support  a  personal  Judg- 
ment against  him. 

It  is  a  fundamental  principle  that  a  judgment  af- 
fecting personal  rights  must  be  founded  on  service 
of  process,  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  on  the  party  to  be  affected.82  Accordingly,  a 
valid  personal  judgment  cannot  be  rendered  against 
a  nonresident  based  on  process  served  on  him  be- 
yond the  limits  of  the  state  from  whose  courts  the 
process  issued,83  and  such  a  judgment  cannot  be 

As  to  nonresidents  see  infra  subdi- 
vision e  of  this  section. 
Under    a    statute    providing-    for 
service    by   publication   on    nonresi- 
dents only,  a  Judgment  on  such  serv- 
ice against  a  resident  is  void. — Main 
v.  Kick,  161  N.W.  711,  180  Iowa  50— 
Oziah  v.  Howard,  128  N.W.  864,  140 
Iowa  199. 

82.  U.'S.— Sugg    v.    Hendrix,    C.CLA. 
Miss.,  142  F.2d  740— De  Bouchel  v. 
Candler,   D.C.Ga.,   296   F.   482,   485. 

Ariz.— Blair  v,   Blair,   62    P.2d   1321, 

48  Ariz.  501. 
Ky. — Kitchen    v.    New    York    Trust 

Co.,  1C8  S.W.2d  5.  202  Ky.  706. 
Mo. — Noell  v.  Missouri   Pac.  R.  Co., 

74  S.W.2d  7,  335  Mo.  687,  94  A.L.R. 

684,  followed  in  74  S.W.2d  14. 

83.  TJ.-S. — Oxley  v.  Sweetland,  CCA* 
W.Va.,    96    P.2d    53 — Campbell    V. 
City   of  Hickman,   D.C.Ky.,    45    V. 
Supp.  517. 

Ark.— Miller  v.  Maryland  Casualty 
Co.,  180  S.W.2d  581,  207  Ark.  812. 

Del. — Webb  Packing  Co.  v.  Harmon, 
196  A.  158,  9  W.W.Harr.  22. 

Fla.— Newton  v.  Bryan,  194  So.  282, 
142  Fla.  14. 

111.— Wickiser  v.  Powers,  57  N.E.2d 
522,  324  IlLApp.  130. 

Iowa. — 'Sloan-Pierce  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Gardiner,  8  N.W.2d  531,  281  Iowa 
1194— Fisher  &  Van  Gilder  v.  First 
Trust  Joint-Stock  Land  Bank  of 
Chicago,  231  N.W.  671.  210  Iowa 
531,  69  A.L.R.  1340. 

La. — Evans  v.  Evans,  116  So.  831. 
166  La.  145. 

Md. — Ortman  v.  Coane,  $1  A.2d  320,. 
181-  Md.  596,  145  A.L.R.  1388. 

N.Y. — Bank  of  New  Tork  v.  Leg- 
get,  46  N.Y.S.2d  465,  267  App. 
E>iv.  875,  appeal  denied  50  N.E.2* 
173,  268  App.Div.  779,  appeal  dis- 
missed 56  N.B.2d  115,  29*  N.Y. 
702,  appeal  dismissed  57  N.&2& 
838,  293  N.Y.  759— Maguire  v.. 
Blodgett,  41  N.Y.S.2d  130,  265 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  24 


authorized  constitutionally  even  by  express  stat- 
ute.84 However,  such  service  may  be  sufficient  to 
support  a  judgment  in  rem,  or  quasi  in  rem,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  §§  908,  911.  Although  there  is  author- 
ity to  the  contrary,85  it  has  been  held  that  extra- 
territorial service  on  a  resident  of  the  state  will  not 
support  a  personal  judgment,86  and  that,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  statute,  a  personal  judgment  is  void,  even 
where  it  is  based  on  the  service  of  process  within 
the  state,  but  beyond  the  limits  of  the  county  or  dis- 
trict, which  comprise  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of 
the  court.*7 


4.  Nonresidents 

A  vatid  personal  Judgment  may  be  rendered  against 
a  nonresident  only  where  he  is  brought  within  the  Juris- 
diction of  the  court  by  the  service  of  process  or  notice 
on  him  within  its  territorial  Jurisdiction,  or  by  his  vol- 
untarily appearing  and  submitting  to  Its  Jurisdiction. 
Mere  constructive  or  substituted  service  Is  not  sufficient. 

A  valid  persona;!  judgment  may  be  rendered  against 
a  nonresident  only  where  he  has  been  brought  with- 
in the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  by  the  service  of 
process  or  notice  made  on  him  within  its  territorial 
jurisdiction,88  or  by  such  service  on  some  one  au- 


Div.  $70,  affirmed  50  N.E.24  800, 
290  N.T.  907— Heilbrun  v.  Kellogg, 
1  N.T.S.2d  193,  253  App.Div.  753, 
motion  denied  16  N,E.2d  104,  278 
N.Y.  564,  motion  granted  18  N.B.2d 
312,  279  N.T.  683,  affirmed  18  N. 
B.2d  861,  279  N.T.  773— Gore  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  259  N.T.S. 
410,  144  Misc.  639,  affirmed  260  N. 
T.S.  941,  236  App.D*v.  881— Engel 
v.  Engel,  22  N.T.S.2d  445-— Merkle 
v.  Sable,  197  N.T.S.  576. 

N.C.— Casey  v.  Barker.  14  S.E.2d  429, 
219  N.C.  465. 

N.D. — Darling  &  Co.  v.  Burchard, 
284  N.W.  856,  69  N.D.  212. 

Ohio.— Ades  v.  Ades,  45  N.E.2d  416, 
70  Ohio  App.  487. 

Okl.— Royal  Neighbors  of  America 
v.  Fletcher,  227  P.  426,  99  Okl. 
297. 

Or. — Mt.  Vernon  Nat.  Bank  v.  Morse, 
264  P.  439,  128  Or.  64. 

Fa.— Vaughn  v.  Love,  188  A.  299, 
324  Pa.  276,  107  A.L.R,  1336— 
Potter  v.  'Potter,  42  Pa.Dist  &  Co. 
42 — Evans  v.  Todd,  Com.Pl.,  35 
Luz.Leg.  Reg.  102. 

Tenn. — Dickson  v.  Simpson,  113  S. 
W.2d  1190,  172  Tennu  680,  116  A. 
L.R.  380— -Commerce  Union  Bank 
v.  Sharber,  100  S.W.2d  243,  20 
Tenn.App.  451. 

Tex. — Bradshaw  v.  Peacock,  Civ. 
App.,  191  S.W.2d  698— Knox  v. 
Quinn,  Civ.App.,  164  S.W.2d  580 
— Eaton  v.  Husted,  Civ. App.,  163 
S.W.2d  439,  affirmed  172  S.W.2d 
493,  141  Tex.  349— Hicks  v.  Sias, 
Civ.App.,  102  S.W.2d  460,  error  re- 
fused— Steger  v.  Shofner,  Civ.App., 
54  S.W.2d  1013— Blair  v.  Carney* 
Civ.App..  44  S.W.2d  1031,  error  re- 
fused— Wilson  v.  Beck,  Civ.App., 
286  S.W.  315. 

Utah.— Ricks  v.  Wade,  93  P.2d  47$, 
97  Utah  402. 

Wash. — State  v.  Plummer,  226  P. 
273,  130  Wash.  135. 

33  C.J.  p  1084  note  17. 

In  equity  see  Equity  fi  175  b. 

Extraterritorial  service  generally  see 
the  C.J.S.  title  Process  §  32,  also 
50  C.J.  p  474  note  76~p  476  note 
25. 

Personal  service  out  of  state  in  lieu 
of  publication  see  the  C.J.S.  title 


Process   §§   73,   74,  also  50   C.J.  P 
542  note  80-p  545  note  54.  , 

Courts  exercise  utmost  care  and 
good  faith  in  dealing  with  nonresi- 
dents against  whom  personal  judg- 
ment is  sought  oh  notice  served  out- 
side state.— Fidelity  &  Casualty  Co. 
of  New  York  v.  Bank  of  Plymputh, 
237  N.W.  234,  213  Iowa  1058. 

84.  U.S. — Pennoyer  v.  Nefl,   Or.,    95 
U.S.  714,  24  L.Ed.  565. 

Iowa.— Allen  v.  Allen,  298  N.W.  869, 
230  Iowa  504,  136  A.L.R.  617. 

33  C.J.  p  1085  note  18. 

Under  "due  process"  clause  see  Con- 
stitutional Law  §  619. 

85.  Tex. — Becker    v.     Becker,     Civ. 
App.,   218  S.W.   542— McCaulley  v. 
Western  National  Bank,  Civ.App.f 
173  S.W.  1000. 

8&    Cal.— Pinon  v.  Pollard,  158  P.2d 

254,  69  Cal.App.2d  129. 
111. — Barnett  v.  Cook  County,  26  N. 

E.2d  862,  373  111.  516. 
33  C.J.  p  1085  note  23. 
By  publication  and  mail 

'  Service  of  summons  on  a  resident 
of  state  absent  therefrom  by  pub- 
lication and  mailing  of  copy  of  sum- 
mons and  complaint  to  defendant's 
address  outside  the  state  did  not 
give  court  jurisdiction  to  enter  mon- 
ey judgment  against  defendant  in 
personal  injury  action. — Pinon  v. 
Pollard,  158  P.2d  254,  69  Cal.App.2d 
169. 

87.  Neb.— Braun  v.  Quinn,  199  N.W. 
828,    112   Neb.   485,   39   A.L.R.   411. 

33  C.J.  p  1085  note  27. 

88.  U.S.— Wilson  v.  •Seligman,   Mo., 
12  S.Ct  541,  144  U.S.  41,  36  UEd. 
338— McQuillen   v.    National   Cash 
Register   Co..   C.C.A.Md.,    112   F.2d 
877,  certiorari  denied  61  S.Ct.  140, 
311    U.S.    695,    85    L.Ed.    450,    re- 
hearing denied  61  S.Ct.  316,  -311  U. 
S.    729,    85    L.Ed.    474— McQuillen 
v.  Dillon,  C.C.A.N.T.,  98  F.2d  726, 
certiorari  denied  59  S.Ct  251,  305 
U.S.    655,    83   L.Ed.    424— Oxley   v. 
Sweetlaud,    C.C.A,W.Va.,    94    F.2d 
33— Chicago     Joint     -Stock     Land 
Bank  v.  Minnesota  Loan  &  Trust 
Co.,     C.C.A.Minn.,     57     P.2d     70— 
Beaver  Board  Cos.  v.  Imbrie,  D.C. 
N.T.,  47  P.2d  271. 

57 


Ala.— Campbell  v.  State,  5  So.2d  466, 
242  Ala.  215— Naff  T.  Fairfleld- 
American  Nat  Bank,  165  So.  224, 
231  Ala,  388. 

Ark. — Sinclair  Refining  Co.  v. 
Bounds,  127  S.W.Sd  629,  198  Ark. 
149— Gainsburg  v.  Dodge,  101  S.W. 
2d  178,  193  Ark.  473. 

D.C. — Densby  v.  Acacia  Mut.  Life 
Ass'n,  78  P.2d  203,  64  App.D.C. 
319,  101  A.L.R.  863. 

Del.— Webb  Packing  Co.  v.  Harmon, 
196  A.  158,  9  W.W.Harr.  22. 

Ga. — Blount  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  9  S.E.2d  65,  190  Ga.  301 
— I^in  v.  Nix,  7  S.E.2d  733,  189 
Ga.  772— Coral  Gables  Corporation 
v.  Hamilton,  147  S.E.  494,  168  Ga. 
182— Wyse'v.  McKinney,  179  S.E. 
860,  51  Ga-App.  204. 

111. — Dunham  v.  Kauffman,  52  N.E. 
2d  143,  385  lit  79.  154  A.L.R.  90. 

Iowa. — McGaffin  v.  Helmts,  230  N.W. 
532,  210  Iowa  108. 

Ky.— Kitchen  v.  New  Tork  Trust 
Co.,  168  S.W.2d  5.  292  Ky.  706. 

Md. — Employers'  Liability  Assur. 
Corporation  v.  -Perkins,  181  A.  43$. 
169  Md.  269. 

Mass. — Harvey  v.  Fiduciary  Trust 
Co.,  13  N.E.2d  299,  299  Mass.  457 
— Durfee  v.  Durfee,  200  NJ33.  395, 
293  Mass.  472— Schmidt  v. 
Schmidt,  182  N.E.  374,  280  Mass. 
2-16— Kling  v.  McTaraahan.  178  N. 
E.  8*1.  277  Mass.  886. 

Mich. — -Stewart  v.  Eaton,  283  N.W. 
651,  287  Mich.  466,  120  A.L.R.  1354. 

N.M.— State  ex  rel.  Truitt  v.  District 
Court  of  Ninth  Judicial  Dist.,  Cur- 
ry County,  96  P.3d  710,  44  N.M. 
16,  126  A.L.R.  651. 

N.T.— Jackson  v.  Jackson,  49  N.B.2d 
988,  290  N.T.  512,  147  A.L.R.  668 
—Geary  v.  Geary,  6  N.E.2d  67,  272 
N.T,  330,  108  A.L.R.  1293— Gar- 
fein  v.  Mdnnls,  162  N.E.  73,  248 
N.T.  261— Kittredge  v.  Grannis, 
155  N.E.  93,  244  N.T.  182— Stoltz 
v.  Stoltz,  238  N.T.S.  207,  1S5  Misc. 
713— In  re  Auto  Mut  Indemnity 
Co.,  14  N.T.S.2d  601— Rodier  v. 
Fay,  7  N.T.S.2d  744. 

N.C.—: Adams  &  Childers  v.  Parker 
&  Harrison,  138  S.E.  405,  194  N. 
C.  48, 

Tex.— Adam  v.  Saenger,  Civ.App./ 
101  S.W.2d  1046,  certiorari  granted 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


iorized  to  accept  service  in  his  behalf,**  or  by  his 
voluntary  appearance  or  submission  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  court,90  or  by  his  otherwise  waiving 
lack  of  service  or  jurisdiction.91  A  personal  judg- 


ment rendered  without  such  service  of  process  or 
notice  on  the  nonresident,  or  his  voluntary  appear- 
ance or  waiver,  is  void,92  even  though  he  had 
knowledge  of  the  pendency  of  the  action  or  pro- 


58  S.Ct.  28,  302  U.S.  668,  82  L. 
Ed.  515,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
58  S.Ct.  454,  303  U.-S.  59,  82  L.Ed. 
649,  rehearing  denied  58  S.Ct.  640, 
303  U.S.  666,  82  L.Ed.  1123,  cer- 
tlorari  denied  Saenger  v.  Adam,  59 
<3.Ct  832,  307  U.S.  628,  83  L.Ed. 
1511— Steger  v.  Shofner,  Civ.App., 
54  S.W.2d  1013— Flinn  v.  Krot2, 
Civ.App.,  293  S.W.  625. 
Wyo. — Closson  v.  Closson,  215  P. 

485,  30  Wyo.  1,  29  A.L.R.  1371. 
33  C.J.  p  1085  note  29,  p  1086  note 

33,  p'l075  note  58. 

Extraterritorial  service  as  insuffi- 
cient see  supra  subdivision  d  of 
this  section. 

Joint  defendants  see  infra  S  83. 
Jurisdiction   of  nonresidents   gener- 
ally see  Courts  §§  88-87. 
A  state  has  power  to  provide  for 
notice   of   actions    against   nonresi- 
dents  found   within   its   borders   in 
such  manner  as  it  may  see  fit  and 
to      render      personal      judgments 
against    them    based    thereon,    pro- 
vided method   employed   gives   rea- 
sonable notice  and  affords  fair  op- 
portunity to  be  heard  before  Issues 
are   decided. — Taplin   v.    Atwater,   8 
N.E.2d  786,  297  Mass.  302. 
Sufficiency  of  service 

A  nonresident  defendant  who  is 
served  in  person  in  commonwealth 
with  notice  of  pendency  of  action 
warning  defendant  to  appear  and 
show  cause  why  judgment  should 
not  be  rendered  against  him  is  a 
party  to  action  so  that  a  binding 
personal  judgment  may  be  rendered 
against  him,  since  notice  itself  is 
"process"  within  statute  permitting 
personal  action  to  be  maintained 
against  nonresident  who  has  been 
served  with  process  in  common- 
wealth,—Taplin  v.  Atwater,  8 
786,  297  Mass.  302. 
Service  anywhere  in  state  mfflcient 
La. — Roper  v.  Brooks,  9  3o.2d  485, 
201  La.  135— Union  City  Transfer 
v.  Fields,  App.,  199  So.  206. 
A0  against  heirs 

Where  no  personal  judgment  had 
been  obtained  against  nonresident 
for  lack  of  personal  service  within 
state,  complainants  acquired  no 
greater  rights  against  resident  heirs 
of  nonresident  where  nonresident 
died  pending  appeal— Commerce  Un- 
ion Bank  v.  Sharber,  TennApp.,  100 
S,W.2d  243. 

89.    Ark.— Sinclair    Refining   Co.   v. 
Bounds,  127   S.W.2d  629,   198  Ark. 
149. 
Del.— Webb  Packing  Co.  v.  Harmon, 

196  A.  158,  9  W.W.B3arr.  22. 
La.— Mitchell  v.  Ernesto,  App.,  141 
So.  818. 


Md.— Employers'  Liability  Assur. 
Corporation  v.  Perkins,  181  A. 
436,  169  Md.  269. 

Attorney's  acknowledgment  of  serv- 
ice 

Ga.— Davis  v.  Davis,  21  S.E.  1002, 
96  Ga.  136. 

Notice  to  attorney,  as  required  toy 
statute 

Ala. — Timmerman  v.  Martin,  176  So. 
198,  234  Ala.  622. 

Service  on  truck  driver  insufficient 

Ark. — Coca-Cola  Bottling  Co.  of 
Southeast  Arkansas  v.  O'Neal,  104 
S.W.2d  808,  19-3  Ark.  1143. 

9a  U.S.— Wilson  v.  Seligman,  Mo., 
12  S.Ct.  541,  144  U.S.  41,  36  L. 
Ed.  "338— McQuillen  v.  National 
Cash  Register  Co.,  C.C.A.Md.,  112 
F.2d  877,  certiorari  denied  61  S. 
Ct.  140,  311  U.S.  695,  85  L.Ed.  450, 
rehearing  denied  61  S.Ct  316,  311 
U.S.  729,  85  L.Ed.  474— Oxley  v. 
Sweetland,  C.C.A.W.Va.,  94  F.2d 
33 — Chicago  Joint  Stock  Land 
Bank  v.  Minnesota  Loan  &  Trust 
Co.,  aC.A.Minn.,  57  F.2d  70. 

Ala.— Naff  v.  Fairfleld-American  Nat. 
Bank,  165  So.  224,  231  Ala.  388 
— Stoer  v.  Ocklawaha  River  Farms 
Co.,  138  So.  270,  223  Ala.  690. 

Ark. — Gainsburg  v.  Dodge,  101  S.W. 
2d  178,  193  Ark,  473. 

Cal.— Pinon  v.  Pollard,  App.,  158  P. 
2d  254. 

Ga.— Fain  v.  Nix,  7  S.E.2d  733,  189 
Ga.  772— Peeples  v.  Mullins,  168  S. 
E.  785,  176  Ga.  743— Irons  v. 
American  Nat  Bank,  165  S.E.  738, 
175  Ga.  552,  followed  in  165  S.E. 
741,  175  Ga.  558— Coral  Gables 
Corporation  v.  Hamilton,  147  S.E. 
494,  168  Ga.  182— Wyse  v.  McKin- 
ney,  179  S.E.  860,  51  Ga.App.  204 
— Rhodes  v.  Southern  Flour  & 
Grain  Co.,  163  S.E.  237,  45  GaApp. 
13. 

Ky.— Kitchen  v.  New  Tork  Trust 
Co.,  168  S.W.2d  5,  292  Ky.  706— 
Dean  v.  Stillwell,  145  S.W.2d  830, 
284  Ky.  639. 

Md.— Employers'  Liability  Assur. 
Corporation  v.  Perkins,  181  A,  436, 
169  Md.  269. 

Mass.— Harvey  v.  Fiduciary  Trust 
Co.,  13  N.E.2d  299,  299  Mass.  457 
—Schmidt  v.  Schmidt  182  N.E. 
374,  280  Mass.  216. 

Mich.— Stewart  v.  Eaton,  283  N.W. 
651,  287  Mich.  466,  120  A.L.R.  1354. 

Mo.— Publicity  Bldg.  Realty  Corpo- 
ration v.  Thpmann,  183  S.W.2d  69, 
353  Mo.  493— Hoffman  v.  Mechan- 
ics-American Nat.  Bank  of  St 
Louis,  App.,  287  S.W.  874. 

N.T.-^Jackson  v.  Jackson,  49  N.E.2d 
988,  290  N.T.  512,  147  A.L.R.  668 
—Geary  v.  Geary,  6  N.E.2d  67, 

58 


272  N.T.  390,  108  AL.R.  1293— 
Kittredge  v.  Grannis,  155  N.E.  93, 
244  N.T.  182— Rodier  v.  Fay,  7  N. 
T.S.2d  744. 

N.C.— Southern  Mills  v.  Armstrong, 
27  S.E.2d  281,  2£3  N.C.  495,  148  A. 
L.R.  1248— Bridger  v.  Mitchell,  121 
S.E.  661,  187  N.C.  374. 

Tex. — Adam  v.  Saenger,  Civ.App.,  101 
S.W.2d  1046,  certiorari  granted  58 
S.Ct.  28,  302  U.-S.  668,  82  L.Ed. 
515,  reversed  on  other  grounds  58 
S.Ct  454,  303  U.S.  59,  82  L.Ed.  649, 
rehearing  denied  58  S.Ct  640,  303 
U.S.  666,  82  L.Bd.  1123,  certiorari 
denied  Saenger  v.  Adams,  59  S.Ct. 
832,  307  U.S.  628,  83  L.Ed.  1511 
—Flinn  v.  Krotz,  Civ  App.,  29« 
S.W.  625. 

33  C.J.  p  1085  note  30,  p  1086  note 
33,  p  1075  note  58. 


Where  nonresident  defendant 
represented  by  curator  only  and 
there  was  no  personal  appearance, 
no  judgment  could  be  rendered 
against  him. — Robinson  v.  U.  S.,  D. 
C.La,,  33  F.2d  545,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  C.C.A.,  U.  S.  v.  Robinson, 
40  F.2d  14. 
Special  appearance 

If  defendant  appearing  specially 
was  nonresident  at  time  of  service 
of  writ  no  judgment  could  be  ren- 
dered against  him. — Bay  State 
Wholesale  Drug  Co.  v.  Whitman,  182 
N.E.  361,  280  Mass.  188. 

Judgment   on  cross   demand   may 
be   rendered   against   a   nonresident 
plaintiff    submitting    to    the    juris- 
diction of  the  court  by  the  institu- 
tion of  the  suit.— Andrews  v.  White- 
head,  Tex.Civ.App.,  60  S.W.  800. 
93*    U.S.— Wilson  v.  Seligman,  Mo., 
12    S.Ct.    541,   144   U.S.   41,   36   L. 
Ed.  338. 

Ga.— Blount  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  9  S.E.2d  65,  190  Ga.  301 
— Coral  Gables  Corporation  v. 
Hamilton,  147  S.E.  494,  168  Ga. 
182. 

Md.— Employers'     Liability     Assur. 
Corporation  v.  Perkins,  181  A.  436, 
169  Md.  269. 
33  C.JT.  p  1086  note  34. 
92.    U.S.— Commonwealth    of    Ken- 
tucky, for  Use  and  Benefit  of  Kern 
v.  Maryland  Casualty  Co.  of  Bal- 
timore,   Md.,    C.C.A.Ky.,    112    F.2d 
352 — Beaver  Board  Cos.  v.  Imbrie, 
D.C.N.T.,  47  F.2d  271. 
Ala.— Ex  parte  Luther,  168  So.  59  6, 
232    Ala.    518— Ex   parte   Halsten, 
149  So.  213,  227  Ala,  183— Ex  parte 
Cullinan,  139  So.  255,  224  Ala.  263, 
81  A.L.R.  160— Stoer  v.  Ocklawaha 
River  Farms  Co.,  138  So.  270,  223 
Ala.  690. 
Del.— Hall    v.    Trans-Lux    Daylight 


49    C  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  24 


ceeding.93  It  has  been  held  that  the  fact  that  de- 
fendant is  domiciled  within  the  state  does  not  jus- 
tify the  rendition  of  a  judgment  in  personam  against 
him,  where  the  only  service  of  process  is  by  publi- 
cation, and  he  is  without  the  territorial  limits  of  the 
state  and  does  not  appear.94 

Constructive  or  substituted  service  alone,  will  not 
support   a  personal   judgment  against  a  nonresi- 


dent,95 unless  he  can  be  deemed  to  have  assented  to 
such  -mode  of  service.96,  A  statute  purporting  to 
authorize  a  judgment  against  nonresidents  on  con- 
structive or  extraterritorial  service  has  been  held 
to  that  extent  unconstitutional  and  void.97  Flow- 
ever,  it  has  been  held  that  constructive  service,  as 
by  publication,  will  give  the  court  such  jurisdiction 
over  a  nonresident  that  its  judgment,  although  not 


Picture    Screen    Corporation,    171 

A.  226,  20  Del.Ch.  78. 
Ga. — Ford  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  125 

S.E.  479,  33  Ga.App.  24. 
La. — Krotz    Springs    Oil    &    Mineral 

Water  Co.   v.    Shirk,  116   So.   488, 

165  La.  1005. 
Mass. — Commissioner    of    Banks    v. 

Cosmopolitan  Trust  Co.,   148   N.B. 

609,  253  Mass.  205,  41  A.L.R.  658. 
Miss.— Hume  v.  Inglis,  122  So.  535, 

154  Miss.  481. 
N.T. — Sweeney    v.    National    Assets 

Corporation,    246    N.T.S.    315,    139 

Misc.  223. 
N.C.— Bizzell    v.    Mitchell,    142    S.E. 

706,      195     N.C.     484— Bridger     v. 

Mitchell,    121    S.E.    661,    187    N.C. 

374. 
Tex. — Hicks  v.  -Sias,  Civ.App.,  102  S. 

W.2d    460,    error    refused — Steger 

v.    Shofner,    Civ.App.,    54    S.W.2d 

1013. 

"A  person  residing  outside  the 
state  is  not  required  to  come  within 
its  borders  and  submit  his  contro- 
versy to  its  courts  because  of  notice 
of  the  suit  at  the  place  of  his  resi- 
dence, and  an  ordinary  personal 
judgment  for  money,  invalid  for 
want  of  service  amounting  to  due 
process  of  law,  Is  as  ineffective  in 
as  outside  the  state." — Common- 
wealth of  Kentucky,  for  Use  and 
Benefit  of  Kern  v.  Maryland  Casu- 
alty Co.  of  Baltimore,  McU,  C.C.A. 
Ky.,  112  P.2d  352,  555. 

Judgment  on  cross  petition  against 
nonresident    defendants,    where    no 
process  was  issued  on  cross  petition, 
is  void. 
Ky. — Carter  v,  Capshaw,  60  S.W.2d 

959,  249  Ky.  483. 

Tex. — Adam  v.  Saenger,  Civ.App., 
101  S.W.2d  1046,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  58  S.Ct.  454,  303  U.S. 
59,  82  L.Ed.  649,  rehearing  denied 
58  S.Ct  640,  303  U.S.  666,  82  L.Ed. 
1123,  certiorari  denied  Saenger  v. 
Adam,  59  'S.Ct.  832,  307  U.S.  628,* 
83  L.Ed.  1511. 

Unauthorized   appearance   l>y   attor- 
ney 

Appearance   of  attorney  for  non- 
resident  does   not  give  court  juris- 
diction  over   nonresident,   and   per- 
sonal    Judgment     obtained     against 
nonresident  is  void  ab  initio,  if  ap- 
pearance was  unauthorized. 
N.T. — Amusement   Securities    Corpo- 
ration   v.    Academy   Pictures   Dis- 
tributing  Corporation,    295    N.Y.S. 


436,  251  App.Div.  227,  affirmed  294 
N.T.S.  305,  250  App.Div.  710  and 
294  N.T.S.  306,  250  App.Div.  710, 
motions  denied  295  N.T.S.  472,  250 
App.Div.  749,  affirmed  13  N.E.2d 
471,  277  N.T.  557,  reargument  de- 
nied 14  N.E.2d  383,  277  N.T.  672. 
Okl.— Hatfleld  v.  Lewis,  236  P.  611, 
110  Okl.  98. 

93.  Mich.— Stewart  v.  Baton,  283  N. 
W.   651,  287  Mich.  466,  120  A.L.R. 
1354. 

94.  Cal. — De  La  Montanya  v.  De  La 
Montanya,  44  P.  -345,  112  CaL  101, 
53  Am.S.R.  165,  82  L.R.A.  82. 

Or. — Laughlin  v.  Hughes,  89  P.2d 
568,  161  Or.  295. 

95.  U.S. — Warmsprings  Irr.  Dist  v. 
May,  C.C.A.Or.,  117  F.2d  802— Mc- 
Quillen    v.    Dillon,    C.C.A.N.T.,    98 
F.2d  726,  certiorari  denied  59  S.Ct 
251,    305   U.S.    655,    83    L.Ed.   424— 
Hamilton  Michelsen  Groves  Co.  v. 
Penney,   C.C.A.Fla.,   58   F.2d   761— 
Campbell  v.  City  of  Hickman,  D. 
C.Ky.,  45  F.Supp.  517. 

Cal. — Comfort  v.  Comfort,  112  P.2d 
259,  17  Cal.2d  736— Glaston  v. 
Glaston,  160  P.2d  45,  69  Cal.App.2d 
787,  certiorari  denied  66  S.Ct  484 
— Pinon  v.  Pollard.  158  P.2d  254, 
69  Cal.App.2d  129. 

Fla. — Newton  v.  Bryan,  194  So.  282, 
142  Fla.  14— Harris  Inv.  Co.  v. 
Hood,  167  So.  25,  123  Fla.  598. 

Ga. — Hirsch  v.  Northwestern  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  13  S.E.2d  165,  191 
Ga.  524 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Webb  &  Martin  v.  Anderson-Mc- 
Griff  Hardware  Co.,  3  S.E.2d  882, 
885,  188  Ga.  291— Peoples  v.  Mul- 
lins,  168  S.E.  785,  176  Ga.  743— 
Edwards  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hood,  145  S. 
B.  87,  167  Ga.  144— Ford  v.  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  125  S.E.  479,  33  Ga. 
App.  24. 

111. — Bank  of  Edwardsville  v.  Raf- 
faelle,  45  N.E.2d  651,  381  111.  486, 
144  A.L.R.  401— Barnett  v.  Cook 
County,  26  N.E.2d  862,  373  111. 
516 — Griffin  v.  Cook  County,  16 
N.E.2d  906,  369  HI.  380,  118  A.L.R. 
1157— Austin  v.  Royal  League,  147 
N.E.  106,  316  111.  188. 

Ind. — Pattison  v.  Grant  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Co.,  144  N.E.  26,  195  Ind.  813. 

Ky.— Dean  v.  Stillwell,  145  S.W.2d 
830,  284  Ky.  639. 

Miss. — Hume  v.  Inglis,  122  So.  535, 
154  Miss.  481. 

Mo.— "HoflCuaan    v.    Mechanics- Am  gri- 

59 


can  Nat  Bank  of  St  Liouis,  App., 

287  S.W.  874. 
Nev.— Perry  v.  Edmonds,  84  P.2d  711, 

59  Nev.  60. 
N.T.— Kellogg  v.    Kellogg,    203   N.T. 

S.  757,  122  Misc.  734. 
N.C.— Southern  Mills  v.   Armstrong, 

27    S.E.2d    281,    223    N.C.    495,    143 

A.L.R.    1248— Bridger   v.    Mitchell, 

121   S,E.   661,   187   N.C.   374. 
Okl.— Royal  Neighbors  of  America  v 

Fletcher,  227  P.  426,  99  Okl.  297. 
Or.— Laughlin  v.  Hughes,  89  P.2d 

568,  161  Or.  295. 
Pa.— Atlantic  Seaboard  Natural  Gas 

Co.  v.  Whitten.  173  A.  305,  315  Pa. 

529,     93     A.L.R.     615— Hughes    V. 

Hughes,  158  A.  874,  306  Pa,  75. 
Tenn. — Lawson  v.  American  Laundry 

Machinery  Co..  54  S.W.2d  712,  165 

Tenn.  ISO — Commerce  Union  Bank 

v.    Sharber,    100    S.W.2d    243,    20 

Tenn. App.  451. 
Tex. — Steger  v.  Shofner,  Civ.App.f  54 

S.W.2d   1013— First   Nat.   Bank   v. 

C.  H.  Meyers  &  Co.,  Civ.App.,  283 

S.W.  265 — People's  Guaranty  State 

Bank  v.    Hill,    Civ.App.,    256    S.W. 

683. 
Wis.— Riley    v.    State    Bank    of    De 

Pere,  269  S.W.  722,  223  Wis.  16. 
Wyo. — Fremont  Consol.  Oil  Co.  v. 

Anderson,    12    P.2d    369,    44    Wyo. 

313. 
33  C.J.  p  1085  note  31. 

Service    by   registered   mail   insuffi- 
cient 
Ala.— Campbell  v.  State,  5  So.2d  466, 

242  Ala.  215. 

Miss. — Cudahy  Packing  Co.  v.  Smith, 
2  So.2d  347,  191  Miss.  31. 
Contractual  rights  cannot* be  liti- 
gated cm  constructive  notice  against 
nonresidents. — McKleroy  v.  Dishxnan, 
142  So.  41,  225  Ala.  131. 
On  cross  bill 

A  cross  bill  stands  as  original  suit 
after  dismissal  of  original  bill,  so 
that  judgment  thereon  against  non- 
resident on  notice  only  by  publicar 
tion  is  void. — Lawson  v.  American 
Laundry  Machinery  Co.,  54  S.W.2d 
712,  165  Tenn.  180. 

96. .  Fla.— Newton  v.  Bryan,  194  So. 
282,  142  Fla.  14. 

97.  U.S.— Cella  Commn.  Co.  v.  Boh- 
linger,  Ark.,  147  F.  419,  78  C.CJL 
467,  8  L.R.A.,N.S.,.637. 

33  C.J.  p  1086  note  35. 

Under  "due  process"  clause  see  Con- 
stitutional Law  §  619, 


§  24 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


enforceable  beyond  the  state,  may  be  satisfied  out 
of  any  property  of  defendant  found  within  the 
state,98  and  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court," 
and  to  that  extent  he  is  bound  by  the  judgment, 
provided  all  the  precedent  proceedings  relating  to 
such  service  strictly  conform  to  the  law.1  Never- 
theless, the  generally  prevailing  rule  is  that  a  per- 
sonal judgment  against  a  nonresident  rendered  on 
constructive  service  is  void  for  all  purposes,  even 
within  the  state  where  it  has  been  rendered,2  un- 
less defendant  appears,8  or  unless  specific  property 
within  the  state  has  been  attached,  and  thus  sub- 
jected to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.4  Where  nei- 
ther person  nor  property  of  a  nonresident  is  found 
within  the  state,  a  judgment  with  respect  to  the 
rights  or  obligations  of  the  nonresident  is  without 
jurisdiction  and  wholly  void.5 

f .  Attachment  and  Garnishment 

A    valid    Judgment    in    person  am    may   be    rendered 


against  a  defendant  In  an  action  begun  by  attachment 
or  garnishment  only  where  he  has  been  personally  served 
with  process  within  the  territorial  Jurisdiction  of  the 
court  or  has  voluntarily  appeared  and  submitted  to  Its 
Jurisdiction. 

Where  jurisdiction  of  an  action  is  acquired  by 
attachment  or  garnishment  of  defendant's  property 
or  credits,  although  the  property  or  credits  so  at- 
tached or  garnished  may  be  subjected  to,  and  bound 
by,  a  judgment  rendered  in  such  action,  as  a  judg- 
ment in  rem,  or  quasi  in  rem,  as  discussed  infra  §§ 
908,  911,  a  valid  general  judgment  in  personam  may 
be  rendered  against  defendant  only  where  he  has 
been  personally  served  with  process,6  or  where  he 
voluntarily  appears  in  the  action  and  thus  subjects 
himself  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,7  as  where 
he  files  a  forthcoming  or  replevy  bond.8  Under 
some  statutes,  if  defendant  is  about  to  remove  the 
property  from  the  state  with  the  intent  to  hinder 
or  delay  creditors,  arid  all  the  parties  are  before 
the  court,  a  personal  judgment  may  be  rendered 


98.  Ala.— Turnipseed    v.    Blan,    148 
So.  116,  226  Ala,  649. 

Tex. — People's  Guaranty  State  Bank 

v.  Hill,  Civ.App.,  256  S.W.  683. 
33  O.J.  p  1086  note  36. 

Ownership  of  notes  and  checks 
follows  domicile  of  their  owner,  and 
the  notes  and  checks  do  not  con- 
stitute "money"  or  "effects"  with 
situs  independent  of  owner's  domi- 
cile.— Steger  v.  Shofner,  TexiCiv. 
App.,  54  S.W.2d  1013, 

99.  Ind.— Clark  v.   Clark,    172   N.E. 
*  124,  202  Ind.  104, 

Tenn. — Commerce     Union     Bank    v. 

Sharber,  100  S.W.2d  243,  20  Tenn. 

App.  451. 
Tex.— Wilson  v.  Beck,  Civ. App.,  286 

S.W.  315. 
Wyo. — Fremont  Consol.  Oil  Co.  v. 

Anderson,    12    P.2d    369,    44    Wyo. 

313. 

1.  Miss.— Mercantile          Acceptance 
Corporation  v.  Hedgepeth,  112  So. 
872,  147  Miss.  717. 

33  O.J.  p  1088  note  57. 

2.  N.T.— Geary  v.  Geary,  6  N.E.2d 
67,  272  N.Y.  300,  108  A.L.R.  1293— 
Forster  v.  Forster,  46  N.Y.S.2d 
320,  182  Misc.  382. 

33  C.J.  p  1087  note  37. 

&    N.Y. — Forster  v.  Forster,  supra. 
3*  C.J.  p  1087  note  38. 

4L  U.S. — Pexmoyer  v.  Nefl,  Or.,  95 
S.Ct  714,  24  L..Ed.  565— Heyde- 
mann  v.  Westinghouse  Electric 
Mfg.  Co.,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  80  F.2d  837. 

Ariz.— Porter  v.  Duke,  270  -P.  625, 
34  Ariz.  217. 

Mass. — Roberts  v.  Anheuser  Busch 
Brewing  Ass'n,  102  N.E.  8' 16,  215 
Mass.  341. 

K.Y.— Haase  T.  Michigan  Steel  Boat 
Co.,  132  N.Y.S.  1046,  148  AppJDiv. 
298,  appeal  dismissed  104  NJE. 


1131,  210  N.Y.  602— Forster  v. 
Forster,  46  N.Y.S.2d  320,  182  Misc. 
382/ 

N.C.— Adams  &  Childers  v.  Packer  & 
Harrison,  138  S.E.  405,  194  N.C.  48. 
Judgment  in  action  begun  by  at- 
tachment or  garnishment  general- 
ly see  infra  subdivision  f  of  this 
section. 

Judgment  held  void,  on  service  by 
publication,  after  attachment  of  sup- 
posed interest  in  realty,  which  did 
not  in  fact  exist. — Matthews  v,  Cur- 
tis, 151  N.E.  778,  20  Ohio  App.  209. 
After  dissolution  of  the  attach, 
ment,  there  can  be  no  judgment 
against  defendant,  where  the  juris- 
diction in  attachment  was  obtained 
by  constructive  service  only. — Theo. 
Ascher  Co,  v,  Dougherty,  114  S.W. 
1111,  134  Mo.App.  511. 

5.  Ariz. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Smith  v.  Normart,  75  P.2d  38,  41, 
51  Ariz.  134. 

33  C.J.  p  1087  note  41. 

a    Ala. — Oliver    v.    Klnney,    56    So. 

203,  173  Ala.  593. 
Ariz. — Brown  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of 

Winslow,    129    P.2d    664,    59    Ariz. 

392. 
Fla. — Johnson  v.  Clark,  193  So.  842, 

145  Fla.  258. 
Ga. — Collins     v.     Southern     Finance 

Corporation,    180   S.E.   744,  51   Ga. 

App.  400. 

111.— Bloom  v.  Kahl,  255  Ill.App.  456. 
Xja. — Silvennan  v.   Grinnell,   115    So. 

789,  165  La.  587. 
K.Y.— Swedosh    v.    Belding    Hosiery 

Mills,    6    N.Y.S.2d    532,    168    Misc. 

673. 
Okl. — Davies  v.  Thompson,  160  P.  75, 

61  Okl.  21,  L.BJL1917B  395. 
Tex. — 'Big  Four  Shoe   Stores  Co.   v. 

Ludlaaa,  O.V.APP.,  63  S.W.2d-8S5. 

60 


Va. — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v.  Par- 

rish,  143  S.E.  7.50,  150  Va.  473. 
33  C.J.  p  1088  notes  4§,  51 — 6  C.J.  p 

473  note  43. 
Process  or: 

Appearance  in  garnishment  pro- 
ceeding generally  see  Garnish- 
ment §  123. 

Notice  in  main  action  In  general 

see  Attachment   5§   482-490. 
Judgment  for  excess 

In  order  to  warrant  recovery  In 
attachment  proceeding  exceeding 
value  of  property  impounded  by 
writ,  there  must  be  valid  personal 
service  of  summons. — Purnell  v. 
Morton  Live  Stock  Co.,  1  S.W.2* 
1013,  156  Tenn.  383. 

Statutory  notice  to,  and  service 
on,  defendant  In  attachment  take 
place  of  process  and  service  in  com- 
mon-law actions,  both  of  which  sub- 
ject him  personally  to  court's  juris- 
diction and  render  him  liable  to 
judgment  binding  all  his  property. — 
Peacock  v.  J.  L  Case  Co.,  162  S.BL 
30G,  44  GaJLpp.  499. 

7.  Ala. — Oliver    v.    Kinney,    56    So. 
203,  173  Ala,  593. 

Ga. — Collins    v.     Southern     Finance 

Corporation,   180   S.E.   744,   51   Ga. 

App.  400. 
Va. — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v.  Par- 

rish,   143  S.E.  750,  150  Va.  473. 
33  C.J.  p  1088  note  5-3— 6  OJ.  p  478 

notes  12,  13. 

8.  Ga. — Collins  v.  -Southern  Finance 
Corporation,   ISO   S.E.    744,   61    Ga. 
App.  400— Blakely  Milling  A  Trad- 
Ing  Co.  v.  Thompson,  128  S.E.  688, 
34  Ga.App.  129— HensJey  v.  Mine- 
han,  114  S.E.  647,  29  Ga.App.  251. 

33  CJ.  p  1088  note  53  [d],  [e]. 

Effect  of  filing  bond  on  right  to  pro- 
ceed to  judgment  see  Attachment 
5  313  b  (3). 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


against  him  without  the  issuance  of  new  process.9 
Nonresidents.  The  same  rules  apply  where  de- 
fendant in  such  an  action  is  a  nonresident;  a  val- 
id personal  judgment  may  be  rendered  against  him 
only  where  he  has  been  personally  served  with 
process,  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,10  or 
has  voluntarily  appeared  and  submitted  to  the  ju- 
risdiction of  the  court,11  or  acknowledges  service 
of  the  writ  and  waives  the  benefit  of  the  statutes 
respecting  absent  defendants  ;12  and,  in  the  absence 
of  such  service  or  appearance,  a  judgment  although 
expressed  in  general  terms  will  be  effective  only 
against  the  property  so  attached,  as  discussed  infra 
§§  908,  911.  It  cannot  be  made  the  basis  of  further 
proceedings  in  personam  against  defendant.13 


g.  Defective  Process 

A  Judgment  is  void  if  it  is  based  on  a  process  which 
is  so  radlcaliy  defective  as  to  be  equivalent  to  no  proc- 
ess; but  may  be  merely  voidable  if  the  defect  is  a  mere- 
irregularity  which  does  not  prevent  the  process  from 
constituting  legal  notice  to  defendant. 

A  judgment  is  void  where  it  is  based  on  process 
which  is  so  radically  defective  as  to  be  equivalent  to 
no  process,14  and  this  rule  applies  with  respect  to- 
such  a  defect  in  the  issuance  of  an  alias  or  pluries 
writ.15  A  defective  process,  however,  may  be  suf- 
ficient to  constitute  legal  notice  and  support  the 
judgment,16  and  if  the  process,  although  imperfect 
or  irregular  in  some  particulars,  is  sufficiently  com- 
plete to  constitute  a  legal  notice  to  defendant,  and 
to  inform  him  of  the  essential  facts  he  is  entitled  to 
know,  the  consequent  judgment  is  not  void,17  par- 


9.  Ark.— Hutchison    v.    First    Nat. 
Bank,  24$  S.W.  484,  156  Ark.  142. 

10.  Ga.— Chastain  v.  Alford.  20  S.E. 
2d  150,  67  Ga.App.  316. 

Idaho.— Sunderlln  v.  Warner,  246  P. 

1.  42  Idaho  479. 
111.— Hogue    v.    Corbit,    41  N.E.   219, 

156  111.  540,  47  Am.S.R.  232. 
Iowa. — Darrah   v.  Watson,    86   Iowa 

116. 

La.— -Pelican  Well  &  Tool  Supply  Co. 
v.  Johnson,  195  So.  514,  194  La. 
987 — Latham  v.  Glasscock,  108  So. 
1"00,  160  La.  1089 — Whitney  Central 
Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v.  Norton, 
102  So.  306,  157  La.  199. 
Miss.— Sellers  v.  Powell,  152  So.  492, 
168  Miss.  682 — Clark  v.  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.,  130  So.  302,  158  Miss. 
287. 

Mo.— State  ex  reL  Ferrocarriles  Na- 
clonales  Be  Mexico  v.  Rutledge,  56 
S.W.2d  28,  331  Mo.  1015,  85  A.L.R. 
1375,  certiorari  denied  Ferrocar- 
riles Nacionales  De  Mexico  v.  Rut- 
ledge,  53  S.Ct.  689,  289  U.S.  746, 
77  L.Bd.  1492. 
Tex. — Colby  v.  McClendon,  dv.App., 

116  S.W.2d  505. 
83  C.J.  p  1089  note  59. 
Judgment  not  "personal" 

In  action  on  note  and  open  ac- 
count accompanied  by  on  attach- 
ment of  land  of  nonresident  defend- 
ant, Judgment  ordering  sale  of  the 
attached  property  and  appropriation 
of  the  proceeds  to  payment  of  the 
debt  sued  on  was  not  erroneous  as 
a  "personal  judgment"  against  the 
nonresident— Hall  v.  Bradley,  160 
S.W.2d  641,  290  Ky.  120. 

Where  garnishment  is  filed  against 
resident  garnishee,  the  court  ac- 
quires jurisdiction  over  the  gar 
nlshee  and  the  nonresident  defend- 
ant to  the  extent  of  the  value  of  the 
property  in  the  hands  of  the  garoi- 
shee,  and  the  court  may  then  pro 
ceed  to  a  trial  of  the  issues,  and  i 
court  finds  that  the  gaxnishee  is  <nof 
indebted  to  defendant,  power  of  th 


ourt  further  to  proceed  against  de- 
endant  is  ended.— Colby  v.  McClen- 
don,  Tex.Civ.App.,  116  S.W.2d  505. 

.„    Del.— Teatman  v.  Ward,  Super., 

36  A.2d  (855. 
Ga. — Chastain   v.    Alford,    20    S.E.2d 

150,  67  Ga.App.  316. 
ni.— Kerr  v.  Swallow,  33  111.  379. 
Miss.— Sellers  v.  Powell,  152  So.  492, 

168  Miss.  682— Clark  v.  Louisville 

&  N.  R.  Co.,  130  So.  302,  158  Miss. 

287. 
Tex.— Minero  v.  Ross,  Civ.App.,  138 

S.W.  224. 
Special  appearance 

Nonresident  defendant's  appear- 
ance for  sole  purpose  of  dissolving 
attachment,  if  sustained,  defeats 
court's  Jurisdiction.— Adams  v.  Ross 
Amusement  Co.,  161  So.  601,  182  La. 
252. 
12.  Mass. — Richardson  v.  Smith,  11 

Allen  134. 

18.  U.S.— Salmon  Falls  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Midland  Tire  &  Rubber  Co.,  C.C.A. 
Ohio,  285  F.  214. 

33  C.J.  p  1089  note  60. 

14.  Fla.— Seaboard  All-Florida  Ry. 
v.  Leavitt,  141  So,  886,  105  Fla. 
600. 

Ky.— Richardson  v.  Webb,  185  S.W. 
2d  861,  281  Ky.  201. 

La. — Dickey  v.  Pollock,  App.,  183  So. 
48— 'Longino  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  of 
New  York,  138  So.  687,  18  La.App. 
680. 

tf.Y.— Greater  New  York  Export 
House  v.  Hurtig,  267  N.Y.S.  173 
2139  App.Div.  183,  appeal  dismissed 
Greater  New  York  Export  House 
v.  Peirson,  196  N.E.  290,  265  N.Y 
500. 

S.D.— Corpus  Jtols  quoted  in  Jacobs 
v.  Queen  Ins.  Co.  of  America,  213 
N.W.  14,  51  S.D.  249. 

Tex.— Wise  v.  Southern  Rock  Islanc 
Plow  Co..  Civ.App.,  85  S.W.2d  257 
—Cheshire  v.  Palmer,  Civ.App.,  44 
S.W.2d  438— Ross  v.  Sechrist,  Civ 
App.,  275  S.W.  287— Lepp  v.  Ward 

61 


County  Water  Improvement  Dist. 
No.   2,  Civ.App.,   257   S.W.   916. 
3  C.J.  p  1090  note  67—34  C.J.  p  5S& 
notes  45,  46. 
Fatal  defects 

(1)  Failure  to  state  the  time  and 
lace   for   defendant's  appearance. — 

Venetsianos  v.  Tamasoff,  197  A.  885, 
W.W.Harr.,    Del.,    180—33    C.J.    P 
090  note  67  [b]  (14). 

(2)  Making  return  day  an  impos- 
sible date. — Empire  Gas  &  Fuel  Co. 

'.  Albright,  87  $.W.2d  1092,  126  Tex. 
485—33  C.J.  p  1090  note  67   [b]   (1). 

(3)  Omission   or   misstatement   of 
date  of  filing  of  petition,  as  required 
by  statute. — Wise  v.  Southern  Rock 
Island  Plow  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  85  S. 
W.2d  257— State  v.   Buckholts  State 
Bank,  Tex.Civ.App.,   193   S.W.   730. 

(4)  Requiring  appearance  on  a  day 
subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  ren- 
dition  of   the    Judgment. — Moore   v. 
Smith,   15   S.B.2d  48,   177  Va.   621. 

(5)  Other  fatal  defects  see  88  C- 
J.  p  1090  note  67  [bj. 

15.  Mich.— Rood  v.  McDonald,  7  N. 
W.2d  95,  <303  Mich.  634. 

o. — Weaver  v.  Woodling,  272  S.W*  ' 
373,  220  Mo.App.  970. 

16.  Tenru — Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
Hunter  v.  May,  25  S.W.2d  580,  581, 
161  Tenn.  155. 

17-  Iowa, — Swan  v.  McGowan,  231 
N.W.  440,  212  Iowa  631. 

Minn. — Peterson  v.  W.  Davis  &  Sons, 
11  N.W.2d  800,.  216  Minn.  60. 

N.C.— Nail  v.  McConnell,  •  190  S.B. 
210,  211  N.C.  258. 

Oti. — Texas  Title  Guaranty  Co.  Y- 
Mardis,  98  P.2d  598,  186  Okl.  433. 

Tex. — Rhoads  v.  Daly  General  Agen- 
cy, Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  461— 
Weaver  v.  Garrietty,  Civ.App.,  84 
S.W.2d  878. 

33  C.J.  P  1091  note  68—34  C.J.  p  534 
note  43. 

As  not  subject  to  collateral  attack 
see  infra  §  422. 


§24 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ticularly  where  defendant  has  waived  such  defects 
in  the  process.**  Although  there  is  also  authority 
to  the  contrary,1*  it  has  been  held  that  the  omission 
of  a  proper  seal  from  the  process,  or  the  use  of  an 
improper  seal,  merely  renders  the  judgment  defec- 
tive, and  not  void,20  particularly  where  service  has 
teen  accepted  and  defendant  has  voluntarily  ap- 
peared.21 

Designation  of  parties.  Process  which  is  radical- 
ly defective  with  respect  to  the  designation  of  the 
names  of  the  parties,**  either  plaintiff**  or  defend- 
ant,24 will  not  support  a  judgment.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  validity  of  the  judgment  is  not  affected 
by  an  inaccuracy  in  the  designation  of  a  party  in 


Opening  and  vacating  Judgment  for 
defects  in  process  see  infra  S  267. 
•The  object  of  "smnanons"  is  to 
apprise  defendant  that  plaintiff 
seeks  judgment  against  defendant, 
and,  when  defendant  is  apprised  of 
such  fact  and  summons  does  not  so 
far  vary  from  the  statutory  form 
as  to  deprive  defendant  of  any  sub- 
stantial right  the  court  acauires  ju- 
risdiction to  render  judgment,— 
Barth  v.  Owens,  35  N.T.S.2d  632,  178 
Misc.  628. 
Errors  or  defects  not  fatal 

(1)  As  to  return  day. 

Ark.— United  Order  of  Good  Samar- 
itans v.  Brooks.  270  S.W.  955,  168 
Ark.  570. 

Okl.— Jones  v.  Standard  Lumber  Co., 
249  P.  343,  121  Okl.  186. 

33  C.J.  p  1091  note  68  [b]. 

(2)  Erroneous   direction  to  wrong 
sheriff,  who  by  indorsement  on  sum- 
mons appointed  sheriff  to  whom  It 
•should  have  been  directed,  and  was 
properly  served  by  latter  sheriff.— 
Whiteker  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  231  P. 
691,  32  Wyo.  288. 

(3)  Misnaming  the  county  seat  of 
•county  in  which  action  was  filed. — 
Tyler  Boat  Works  v.  Schreiner,  153 
P.2d  1004,  194  Okl.  601. 

(4)  Other    errors    or    defects    not 
fatal  see  33  C.J.  P  1091  note  68  [a]. 
•Mutilation  of  record 

Where  summons  was  properly  ls- 
.sued  and  served  and  made  returna- 
'ble  to  a  term  subsequent  to  the 
service,  the  unauthorized  act  of  some 
•one  after  final  judgment  in  mutilat- 
ing the  record  so  as  to  indicate  that 
It  was  returnable  to  a  prior  term, 
•could  not  deprive  the  court  of  juris- 
diction or  render  the  judgment  in- 
valid.—Henneke  v.  Strack,  Mo.App., 
101  S.W.2d  74*. 
13.  N.C.— Moseley  v.  Deans,  24  S.B. 

2d  630,  222  N.C.  781. 
•General  appearance  as  waiver  of  de- 
fects In  process  see  Appearances  S 
17. 

Time  for  objections  for  defects  in 
process,  and  waiver  or  cure  there- 


the  process  if  the  real  party  intended  is  not  misled 
thereby.25  With  regard  to  misnomer,  it  has  been 
held  that  if  process  is  really  served  on  the  person 
intended  to  be  sued,  although  a  wrong  name  is  given 
him  in  the  writ  and  return,  and  he  suffers  a  de- 
fault, or  omits  to  plead  the  misnomer  in  abatement 
he  is  bound  by  the  judgment  rendered  against  him.26 
A  similar  rule  applies  in  the  case  of  a  misnomer  of 
plaintiff.27 

h.  Defective  Service 

A  judgment  bashed  on  a  service  of  process  which 
is  so  defective  as  to  amount  to  no  service  at  all,  has 
been  held  void.  If,  however,  the  service,  although  de- 
fective, Is  sufficient  to  give  the  defendant  notice  of  the 

Baker,  Bccles  &  Co.,  173  S.W.  109, 
162  Ky.  683,  L.B.A.1917C  171— War- 
rick  v.  McCormick,  150  S.W.  1027, 
150  Ky.  800. 

25.    Okl. — Glenn  v.  Prentice,  12  P.2d 

170,  158  Okl.  73. 
Tex.— Gillette   Motor   Transport   Co. 

v.  Whitfield,  Civ.App.,   160   S.W.2d 

290 — Belknap    Hardware    &    Mfg. 

Co.  v.  Ughtfoot,  Civ.App.,  75  S.W. 

2d  481 — Beaumont,  S.  Lu  &  W.  R. 

Co.   v.   Daniel,   Civ.App.,   186   S.W. 

383. 

Designating-  defendant  toy  trade, 
name  rather  than  real  name. — 
Belknap  Hardware  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Lightfoot,  75  S.W.2d  481. 


of,  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Process  § 
113,  also  50  C.J.  P  595  note  50- 
p  599  -note  4. 

19.  Ark.— Woolford     v.     Dugan,     2 
Ark.  131. 

Tex. — Line  v.  Cranfall,  Civ.App.,  37 
S.W.  184. 

33  C.J.  p  1090  note  67  [c]. 

20.  Ark. — Oliver  v.  Routh,  184  S.W. 
84'3,  123  Ark.  189— Rudd  v.  Thomp- 
son, 22  Ark.  363. 

BTa. — Benedict  v.  W.  T.  Hadlow  Co., 
42  So.  239,  52  Fla.  188. 

Tex.— Rhoads  v.  Daly  General  Agen- 
cy, Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  461. 

34  C.J.  P  534  note  43  [f]. 

21.  N.C.— Moseley  v.  Deans,  24  S.B. 
2d  630,  222  N.C.  731. 

22.  Tex.— Delaware  Western  Constr. 
Co.  v.  Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Nat 
Bank  of   Gilmer,   77   S.W.   628,   33 
TeX.Civ.App.  658. 

33  C.J.  p  1090  note  67  [e]. 

Designation  of  parties  in  process 
generally  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Proc- 
ess §  15,  also  50  C.J.  p  458  note  36 
-p  459  note  49. 

23.  Fla. — Western  Union  Telegraph 
Co.  v.  Hiscock,  96  So.  407,  85  Fla. 
480. 

N.Y.— Durst  v.  Ernst,   91  N.T.S.   13, 

45  Misc.  627. 
SS  C.J.  P  1090  note  67  [gL 


24.    Mass.— F.  H.  Hill  &  Co.  v.  Doe, 

189  N.B.   583,   286   Mass.  187. 
Tex. — Maier   v.    Davis,    Civ.App.,    72 

S.W.2d  308. 
W.Va.— New  Eagle  Gas  Coal  Co.  v. 

Burgess,    111   S.E.    508,    90   W.Va, 

541. 
33  C.J.  P  1090  note  67  [f],  [h],   [13. 

p  1092  note  72  [a]. 

Warning  order 

An  affidavit  for  a  warning  order 
in  a  verified  petition,  alleging  that 
defendant  was  a  nonresident  and  giv- 
ing his  postoffice  address,  but  not  al- 
leging a  belief  that  he  was  then 
absent  from  the  state,  does  not  war- 
rant the  issuance  of  a  warning  or- 
der, and  a  judgment  rendered  there- 
on is  void.— Leonard  v.  Williams,  265 
S.W.  618,  205  Ky.  218— Baker  v. 

62 


26.    Colo. — Van  Buren  v.   Posteraro, 
102  P.  1067,  45  Colo.  588,  132  Am. 
S.R.  199. 
111.— Feld  v.  Loftis,  88  N.E.  281,  240 

111.  105. 
Mo. — Kronski    v.    Missouri    Pac.    R. 

Co.,  77  Mo.  362. 
Neb. — Jones   v.   Union  Pac.   R.   Co., 

120  N.W.  946,   84  Neb.  121. 
N.Y.— Morison  v.   Laing,   117  N.T.S. 

416,  132  App.Div.  689. 
Tex. — Adams  v.  Consolidated  Under- 
writers, 124  S.W.2d  840,   133  Tex. 
26— Abilene     Telephone     &     Tele-    • 
graph   Co.   v.   Williams,    229    S.W. 
847,  111  Tex,  102— McGhee  v.  Ro- 
matka,  45  S.W.  552,  92  Tex.  38— 
Maier  v.-  Davis,  Civ.App.,  72  S.W. 
2d  308. 
33  C.J.  p  1092  note  72. 

Xa  future  litigation,  defendant  may 
be  connected  with  the  judgment  by 
proper  averments,  which,  when  made 
and  proved,  conclude  such  person  to 
the  same  extent  as  though  he  had 
been  named  and  served  in  his  true 
name. 

Neb.— Jones    v.   Union   Pac.   R.   Co., 
120  NJW.  946,  84  Neb.  121. 
x. — Adams  v.  Consolidated  Under- 
writers,  124  S.W.2d  840,   133  Tex. 
26. 

27.    Mass.— U,   S.  National  Bank  v. 
Venner,  52  N.E.  543,  172  Mass.  449. 
33  C.J.  p  1092  note  73. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§2* 


action  or  proceeding,  a  Judgment  bated  thereon  has  been 
held  merely  voidable. 

Where  the  service  of  process  on  a  defendant  is 
so  defective  as  to  amount  to  no  service  at  all,  a 
judgment  based  thereon  has  been  held  to  be  void,28 
notwithstanding  he  had  knowledge  of  the  suit29  A 
judgment  against  defendant  is  void,  in  the  absence 
of  appearance,  where  it  is  based  on  the  service  of 
process  on  another  than  defendant,  the  person 
named  in  the  process,80  although  the  person  served 
bears  the  same  name.31  A  judgment  has  also  been 
held  void  where  the  service  of  process  on  a  non- 
resident, within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  was 
obtained  by  fraud,  as  where  he  was  induced  by 
fraud  to  come  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court, 
where  he  was  .served  with  process.82  A  judgment 
is  also  void  where  process  directed  to  the  sheriff 
of  one  county  was  served  by  the  sheriff  of  another 
county.88 

A  defective  service,  however,  may  be  sufficient  to 


constitute  legal  notice  and  support  a  judgment.8* 
If  the  service  is  merely  irregular,  but  actually  gives 
defendant  notice  of  the  action  or  proceeding,  a 
judgment  based  thereon  has  been  held  not  void, 
but  at  most  merely  voidable,85  as  where  there  is  a 
mere  defect  or  irregularity  as  to  the  time  of  serv- 
ice86 or  in  failing  to  serve  a  copy  of  the  com- 
plaint;87 and,  moreover,  the  judgment  is 'not  even 
voidable  if  the  defect  or  irregularity  has  been 
waived.88 

Substituted  or  constructive  service.  In  accord- 
ance with  the  rule  requiring  the  statutory  provi- 
sions relating  to  substituted  or  constructive  service- 
of  process  to  be  strictly  applied,  unless  defendant 
has  appeared  or  pleaded  in  the  case89  a  judgment 
has  been  held  void  where  it  is  based  on  substituted 
or  constructive  service,  or  service  by  publication, 
which  is  not  mads  in  strict  compliance  with  the 
essential  statutory  requirements  relating  thereto,4(> 
provided,  under  some  statutes,  the  failure  to  com- 


28.  Fla. — State  ex  reL  Gore  v.  Chil- 
lingworth,    171    So.    649,    126    Fla, 
645. 

Ga. — Rhodes    v.    Southern    Flour    & 

Grain  Co.,  163  S.E.  237,  45  Ga.App. 

13. 

111. — Sunbeam  Heating  Co.  v.  Cham- 
bers,   53    N.E.2d    294,    321    Jll.App. 

629. 
La. — Fullilove  v.  Central  State  Bank, 

107  So.  590,  160  La.  831— Quinn  v. 

O'Neil,  121  So.  377,  10  La.App.  121. 
Mo. — Coerver  v.  Crescent  Lead  & 

Zinc  Corporation,   286  S.W.   3,   315 

Mo.  276. 
33  C.J.  p  1092  note  76—34  C.J.  p  685 

note  47. 
Opening-   or    vacating   Judgment   for 

defective  service  see  infra  §  267. 
Defects  of  service  held  fatal 

(1)  Service   by   deputy  sheriff  be- 
yond territorial  confines  of  his  own 
parish.— Adams    v.     Citizens'    Bank, 
1*6    So.    107,    17   La.App.   422. 

(2)  Service  on  nonresident  suitors 
and  witnesses  in  attendance  on  trial 
and   immune   from   process. — North- 
western   Casualty   &   Surety   Co.    v. 
Conaway,    230    N.W.    548,    210    Iowa 
126,  68  A.L.R.  1465. 

(3)  Other  fatal  defects  and  irreg- 
ularities of  service  see  83  C.J.  p  1093 
note  77. 

Judgment  merely  voidable 

It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment 
of  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction 
is  merely  voidable,  where  service 
has  not  been  obtained  in  the  re- 
quired manner,  or  defendant  has 
been  denied  day  in  court  by  lack  of 
proper  service. — Lynch  v.  Collins, 
233  P.  709,  106  Okl.  133. 

29.  111. — Sunbeam    Heating    Co.    v. 
.  Chambers,   53   NJS3.2d  294,   321  111. 

App.  629. 


Ohio.— Haley  v.  Hanna,  112  NJB.  149, 
93  Ohio  St.  49. 

30.  U.S.— Elliott   v.   Holmes,    C.C.I11., 
8  F.Cas.No.4,392,  1  McLean  466. 

Cal. — Adams  &  Co.  v.  Town,  3  Cal. 

247. 
Tex.— Barnett  v.  Tayler,  30  Tex.  453 

— Booth  v.   Holmes,   2  TexUnrep. 

Gas.  232. 

31.  Tex. — State    Mortgage    Corpora- 
tion   v.    Traylor,    36    S.W.2d    440, 
120  Tex.  148. 

32.  U.S. — Wyman  v.  Newhouse.  C.C. 
A.N.Y.,     93    F.2d    313,    115    A.L.R. 
460,  certiorari  denied  58  S.Ct  831, 
303  U.S.  664,   82  LJSd.  1122. 

Iowa,— Miller  v.  Acme  Feed,  293  N. 
W.  637,  228  Iowa  861. 

33.  Ga,— W.     T.    Rawleigh    Co.     v. 
Greenway,    26    S.E.2d    458,    69    Ga. 
App.  590 — Strauss  v.  Owens,  65  S. 
E.  161,  6  Ga.App.  415. 

Ky.— Foster  v.  Hill,   138  S.W.2d  495. 

282  Ky.  -327. 
Tex.— Hitt  v.   Bell,   Civ.App.,   Ill   S. 

W.2d  1164. 

34.  Tenn. — Hunter  v.  May,  25  S.W. 
2d  580,  161  Texm.  155. 

35.  Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Gore  v.  Chil- 
llngworth,    171    So.    649,    126    Fla. 
645 — Voorhies  v.  Barnsley,  156  So. 
234,  116  Fla,  191— Walker  v.  Car- 
ver,  112   So.   45,   93   Fla.    337. 

Ky. — Ely  v.  U.  S.  Coal  &  Coke  Co., 

49   S.W.2d  1021,  243  Ky.  725. 
Miss. — Mclntosh    v.     Munson    Road 

Machinery    Co.,    145    So.    731,    167 

Miss.  546. 
Neb. — Campbell    'Printing    Press     & 

Mfg.   Co.  v.  Marder,   Luse  &  Co., 

69  N.W.  774,  50  Neb.  283,  61  Am. 

S.R.  573. 
Va.— Wood    v.    Kane,    129    SJS.    327, 

143  Va.  281. 

63 


Wash.— Atwood  v.   McGrath,    242   P. 

648,  137  Wash.  400. 
33  C.J.  p  1092  note  76,  p  1093  note- 

78. 
Collateral  attack  see  infra   §   422. 

36.  N.C.— Nail  v.  McConnell,  190  S. 
B.  210.  211  N.C.  258. 

Okl.— Goldsmith   v.    Owens,    68   P.2A 

849,  180  Okl.  268. 
Tex. — Florence    v.    Swails,    CIvJLpp., 

85  S.W.2d  257. 

33  C.J.  p  1093  note  78  [a], 

37.  Wash. — Munch    v.    McLaren,    38- 
P.  205,  9  Wash.  676. 

34  C.J.  p  534  note  44  [dj. 

38.  Fla. — Voorhies  v.   Bamsley,   15£ 
So.  234,  116  Fla.  191. 

General  appearance  as  waiver  of  de- 
fects in  service  of  process  see  Ap- 
pearances §  17. 

Waiver  of  defects  in  service  of  proc- 
ess generally  see  the  C.J.S.  title- 
Process  §  113,  also  50  C.J.  p  59$ 
note  59-p  599  note  11. 

39.  Fla.— McGee  v.  McGee,  22  So.2d. 
788 — United   Brotherhood    of   Car- 
penters and  Joiners  of  America  v. 
Graves  lav.  Co.,  15  So.2d  196,  153: 
Fla.  529. 

Kan. — Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Irrigation  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  42" 
P.2d  566,  141  Kan.  675. 

40.  U.S. — Pen-Ken   Gas   &  Oil   Cor- 
poration  v.   Warfield  Natural   Gas. 
Co.,   <XC.A.Ky.,   137   F.2d   871,   cer- 
tiorari denied  64  S.Ct.   431,  320  U. 
S.  800,  88  L.Ed  483,  rehearing  de- 
nied   64    S.Ct.    634,    321    U.S.    803;. 
88  L.Ed.  1089. 

Fla.— >McGee  v.  McGee,  22  So.2d  78& 
— United  Brotherhood  of  Carpen- 
ters and  Joiners  of  America  v.. 
Graves  Inv.  Co.,  15  So.2d  196,  1.5$ 
Fla.  529— Klinger  v.  Milton  Hold- 
ing Co.,  186  So.  526,  136  Fla.  50— 


24 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ply  with  the  statute  appears  on  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord or  judgment  roll.41  A  judgment  based  on  serv- 
ice by  publication  has  been  held  void  where  the 
requirements  of  the  statute  were  not  complied  with, 
with  respect  to  the  time  of  publication  of  the  proc- 
ess,42 or  with  respect  to  the  affidavit  for  the  or- 
der of  publication,48  or  with  respect  to  posting  or 


mailing  a  copy  of  the  summons,  complaint,  and  or- 
der to  defendant.44  However,  the  mere  fact  that 
the  affidavit  is  defective  in  the  method  of  stating 
the  facts,  or  in  the  degree  of  proof,  has  been  held 
to  make  a  judgment  based  thereon  merely  void- 
able.45 


Stern  v.  Raymond,  116  So.  $.   95 
Fla,  410. 

111.— Martin  V.  Schillo,  60  N.E.2d  392, 
389  111.  607,  certiorarl  denied  65 
S.Ct  1572,  325  U.S.  880,  89  L.Ed. 
1996. 

Kan. — Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Irrigation  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  42  P. 
2d  566,  141  Kan.  675. 

La.— Richardson  v.  Trustees'  Loan  & 
Guaranty  Co.,  132  So.  (387,  15  La. 
App.  645. 

Mo. — Davison  v.  Arne,  155  S.W.2d 
155,  348  Mo.  790— Dent  v.  Invest- 
ors* Sec.  Ass'n,  254  S.W.  1080,  300 
Mo.  552— Williams  v.  Luecke,  App., 
152  S.W,2d  991— Haake  v.  Union 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  App.,  54  S.W. 
2d  459. 

N.C.— Guerin  v.  Guerin,  181  S.E.  274, 
208  N.C.  457. 

Okl.— Locke  v.  Gilbert,  271  P.  247, 
133  Okl.  93— Dow  v.  Cowley-Frye 
Lumber  Co.,  247  P.  1109,  119  Okl. 
60. 

Or. — Okanogan  State  Bank  of  River- 
side, Wash.  v.  Thompson,  211  P. 
933,  106  Or.  447. 

Tex.— Smith  v.  Commercial  Credit 
Corp.,  Civ.App.,  187  S.W.2d  360, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Com- 
mercial Credit  Corp.  v.  Smith,  187 
S.W.2d  363,  143  Tex.  612— Perez 
v.  B.  P.  Lipscomb  &  Co.,  Civ.App. 
267  S.W.  748. 

33  C.J.  p  1093  note  80. 

Strict  compliance  with  statute  as 
to  substituted  service  or  service 
by  publication  generally  see  the 
C.J.S.  title  Process  §§  43,  55,  also 
50  C.J.  p  490  note  77-p  491  note 
81,  p  497  note  17-p  498  note  28. 

Tender  wcoastita,tional  statute 

Service  of  summons  on  alleged 
resident  agent  of  nonresident  indi- 
vidual  would  not  warrant  rendition 
of  judgment  against  the  individual 
as  such,  where  the  statute  author- 
izing service  on  agent  of  nonresi- 
dent individuals  engaged  to  business 
within  the  state  is  unconstitutional. 
-Clones  v.  Fuller,  134  S.W.2d  240, 
280  Ky.  671. 

Defects  held  fatal 

(1)  Service    by    publication   when 
defendants   were  residents   of  state 
at   date   of   service   and   their  resi- 
dence known  to  plaintiff. — 'Perez  v. 
B.  P.  Lipscomb  &  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App., 
267  S.W.  748. 

(2)  Service   by   publication  tinder 
order  not  based  on  affidavit  for  at- 
tachment,    stating-    that    defendant 
was  nonresident*  but  solely  on  alle- 


gation or  finding  that  she  could  not 
be  summoned. — Haake  v.  Union  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  MO.APP.,  54  S.W.2d 
459. 

(3)  Leaving:     summons     at    place 
which  was  not  defendant's  last  and 
usual    place    o€   abode.— P.   H.    Hill 
Co.  v.  Doe,  1-89  N.B.  588,  286  Mass. 
187. 

(4)  Leaving  citation  at  house   in 
which    nonresident    defendant    had 
resided,    but   which  was   no   longer 
his  domicile.— Williams  &  Miller  v. 
Jones,  La.App.,  180  So.  140. 

(5)  Service  by  mail. — Estok  v.  Bs- 
tok,  157  A.  356,  102  Pa.Super,  604— 
Skrynski  v.  Zeroka,  98  PaJSuper.  469. 

(6)  Service   on   one   not  living  at 
defendant's  domicile. — Richardson  v. 
Trustees1  Loan  &  Guaranty  Co.,  132 
So.  387,  15  La.App.  645. 

(7)  Service  on  director  of  corpo- 
ration Instead  of  on  person  named 
in  statute. — State  v.  District  Court 
of  Seventh  Judicial  Dist,  in  and  for 
Mineral  County,  273  P.  659,  51  Nev. 
206,  followed  in  273  P.  661,  51  Nev. 
214,  and  rehearing-  denied  275  P.  1, 
51  Nev.  3SO. 

(8)  Service  on  agent  or  attorney 
of  a  nonresident  defendant 

Ala. — Woodfln  v.  Curry,  153  So.  620, 

228  Ala.  436. 
Ky.— -Jones  v.  Puller,  184  S.W.2d  240, 

280  Ky.  671. 
S.C. — Matheson  v.  McCormac,  195  S. 

B.  122,  186  S.C.  93.      • 

(9)  Other    defects    see    33    C.J.    p 
1093  note  80  [a]. 

41.  U.S.— Pen-Ken  Gas   &  Oil  Cor- 
poration v.  Warfleld  Natural  Gas 
Co.,   CXJJLKy.,   137  P.2d   871,   cer- 
tiorari  denied  64  'S.Ct  431,  320  U. 
S.  800,  88  L.Ed.  483,  rehearing  de- 
nied   64    S.Ot    634,    321    U.S.    803, 
88  L.Ed.  1089. 

Okl.— Locke  v.  Gilbert,  271  P.  247. 
133  Okl.  93. 

42.  Ariz.— Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v..  Meldrum,  50  P.2d  570, 
46  Ariz.  295. 

Tex.— Mitchell  v.  Reitz,  Civ.App.,  269 
S.W.  279. 

43.  U.S.— Butler    v.    McKey,    C.OA. 
CaL,    138   P.2d   373,   certiorari   de- 
nied   64    S.Ct    636.    321    U.S.    780, 
88  L.Ed.  1073. 

Colo. — Federal  Farm  Mortg.  Corpo- 
ration v.  Schmidt,  126  P.2d  1086. 
109  Colo.  467. 

Okl.— Robins  y.  Lincoln  Terrace 
Christian  Church,  75  *P.2d  874.  181 

64 


Okl.   615 — Morgan  v.  Stevens,   22S 

P.  365,  101  Okl.  116. 
Or. — Laughlin    v.    Hughes,    89    P.2d 

568,  161  Or.  295. 
S.C.— Ray  v.  Pilot  Fire  Ins.  Co..  121 

S.B.  779,  128  S.C.  323. 
34  C.J.  p  536  note  61. 

Validity  of  Judgment  rendered  on 
citation  by  publication  depends,  not 
on  fact  that  an  affidavit  in  proper 
form  was  filed,  but  rather  on  truth 
of  grounds  set  up  as  basis  for  Is- 
suance and  service  of  citation  by 
publication. — Smith  v.  Commercial 
Credit  Corp.,  Civ.App.,  187  S.W.2d 
360,  reversed  on  other  grounds  Com- 
mercial Credit  Corp.  v.  Smith,  187  S. 
W.2d  363,  143  Tex.  612. 
Affidavits  held  fatally  defective 

(1)  Affidavit     based    on     hearsay 
that     defendant    cannot     be    found 
within  state  or  conceals  himself  to 
avoid   service    of    summons. — Butler 
v.   McKey,   C.C.A.CaL,   138   F.2d  373, 
certiorari   denied    64   S.Ct    636.   921 
U.'S.  780,  88  L.Bd.  1073. 

(2)  Other  affidavits  see  33  OJ.  p 
1093  note  80  [b]. 

44.  N.Y. — B.  Berman,  Inc.  v.  Amer- 
ican   Fruit    Distributing    Co.,    186 
N.T.S.  376,  114  Misc.  345, 

33  C.J.  p  14)93  note  80  Cc]. 

45.  U.S. — Thompson    v.    Thompson, 
App-D.C.,  33  S.Ct  129,  226  U.S.  551. 
57  L.Ed.  347. 

Neb.— Atkins  v.  Atkins,  2  N.W.  466, 

9  Neb.  191. 

N.Y.— Smith  v.  R.  B.  t  Bldg.  Cor- 
poration,   215   N.T.S.   1,   126   MlfiKS. 

826. 
Okl.— Frost  v.   Bavis,   79   P.2d   800, 

182  Okl.  593.    . 
Utah.— Salt  Lake  City  v.  Salt  Lake 

Inv.  Co.,  134  P.  603,  43  Utah  181. 
33   C.J.  P   1091  note   68    [i],   p   1093 

note    80    [b]    (9)— 34    C.J.    p    536 

notes  53,  59. 
Improvidently  made 

The  fact  that  (affidavit  supporting 
request  for  issuance  of  citation  by 
publication  on  ground  that  defend- 
ant's residence  was  unknown  had 
been  improvidently  made,  if  estab- 
lished, would  not  render  Judgment 
in  the  proceedings  void. — Commer- 
cial Credit  Corp.  v.  Smith,  187  S.W. 
2d  863,  143  Tex.  &L2. 
"WHeseabouts"  Instead  of  "resi- 
dence" 

The  use  of  the  word  "where- 
abouts" in  an  affidavit  for  service  J>y 
publication  which  states  that  th,e 
"whereabouts"  of  defendant  U  TO- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  26 


§  25.    Return  and  Proof  of  Service 

A  valid  judgment  ordinarfty  may  fee  rendered  only 
where  due  service  of  process  is  shown  by  a  return  or 
other  proof. 

Although  the  validity  of  a  judgment  rests  on  the 
service  of  process  rather  than  on  the  return,  which 
is  simply  evidence  in  respect  of  the  process,46  a 
proper  return,  showing  that  process  has  been  duly 
served,  is  ordinarily  necessary  in  order  that  a  valid 
judgment  may  be  rendered.47  Accordingly  a  judg- 
ment has  been  held  void  where  the  return  or  other 
proof  is  so  faulty  or  defective  as  not  to  show  a  le- 
gal service  of  process,48  although  mere  irregulari- 
ties in  the  return  or  proof  will  not  vitiate  the  judg- 
ment.49 If  the  nonservice  of  process  appears  on 
the  face  of  the  papers  or  is  discernible  from  an  in- 
spection of  the  record,  the  judgment  may  be  treated 


as  a  nullity,50  and  it  has  been  held  that  the  judgment 
is  void  whether  such  lack  of  jurisdiction  appears 
on  the  face  of  the  record  or  is  shown  aliunde.51 

§  26.    Appearance 

A  judgment  bas?d  on  the  voluntary  general  appear- 
ance by  or  on  behalf  of  the  defendant  is  valid. 

A  voluntary  general  appearance  in  an  action  is 
a.  waiver  of  a  want  of  process,  or  of  any  defects 
in  the  process  or  its  service,  or  return,  and  gives 
the  court  full  jurisdiction  over  his  person,  as  dis- 
cussed in  Appearances  §  17,  and  accordingly,  al- 
though a  defendant  has  not  received  any  notice,  or 
proper  process  or  service  thereof,  a  judgment  in 
personam  against  him  is  valid  and  binding  if  a 
general  appearance  has  been  entered  by  him  or  on 
his  behalf.52  However,  a  judgment  in  personam 


known,  Instead  of  the  word  "resi- 
dence," which  is  used  in  the  statute, 
is  a  mere  irregularity  which  will  not 
render  an  attachment  judgment  void. 
— Fisher 'v.  Jordan,  C.C.A.Tex.,  116  F. 
2d  183,  certiorari  denied  Jordan  v. 
Fisher,  61  S.Ct.  734,  312  U.S.  697,  85 
L.Bd.  1132. 

46.  La. — Adler   v.    Board    of   Levee 
Com'rs  of  Orleans  Levee  Dist.,  123 
So.    605,    168    La,    877— Dickey    v. 
Pollock,  App..  183  So.  48. 

"The  citation  itself  is  the  im- 
portant legal  fact  upon  which  the 
validity  of  the  judgment  rests,  while 
the  return  is  simply  evidence  in  re- 
spect to  that  fact.  The  citation  in 
a  case  must  not  be  confounded  with 
the  sheriff's  return,  which  recites 
his  own  actions  in  the  matter  of  the 
service  thereof.  The  citation  may 
be  good,  though  the  return  for  some 
reason  be  irregular;  while  the  re- 
turn may  be  perfect  in  its  recitals, 
yet  the  citation  be  null." — Adler  v. 
Board  of  Levee  Com'rs  of  Orleans 
Levee  Dist.,  123  So.  605,  606,  168  La. 
877. 

47.  Chau— Elliott   v.    Porch,   200    S.E. 
ISO,     59     Ga.App.     181— Benton    v. 
Maddox,    192   S.E.  316,   56  Ga.App. 
132. 

Miss. — Ex  parte  Latham,  136  So.  625, 

1C1  Miss.  243. 
Tex. — Wagner    v.     Urban,    Civ.App., 

170  S.W.2d  270. 
33  C.J.  p  1094  note  83. 

In  absence  of  return  of  service, 
there  is  nothing  to  show,  in  support 
of  Judgment,  that  court  had  juris- 
diction, since  court  should  not  pro- 
ceed in  absence  of  service. — Benton 
v.  Maddox,  192  S.E.  316,  £6  Ga.App. 
132. 

Judgment  is  valid  on  f ace,  where 
return  of  service  is  made  in  manner 
required  by  law. — Hanna  v.  Allen, 
279  P.  1098,  153  Wash.  485. 

48.  Colo. — Gibbs    v.    Slevin,    212    P. 
826.  72  Colo.  690. 


Tex. — Remington-Rand    Business 

Service    v.    Angelo    Printing    Co., 

Civ.App.,  31  S.W.2d  1098. 
Wash. — Title  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Colum- 
bia  Basin    Land    Co.,    238    P.    992, 

136  Wash.  63. 
33  C.J.  p  1094  note  84. 
As     invalidating    default     judgment 

see  infra  §  192. 

A  deputy  sheriff's  individual  re- 
turn to  a  writ  of  summons  directed 
to  his  superior,  is  void,  and  a  judg- 
ment predicated  thereon  is  likewise 
null  and  void. — Stuckert  v.  Thomp- 
son, 164  S.W.  692,  181  Mo.App.  518. 
Inability  to  find  citation 

Proof  that  attorney  was  unable 
to  find  original  citation  in  clerk's  of- 
fice insufficiently  supported  allega- 
tion that  judgment  was  void  for 
want  of  legal  citation. — Thompson- 
Ritchie  Grocery  Co.  v.  Gary,  135  So. 
707,  17  La.App.  270. 
Publication 

Nonresident  defendants,  whose 
post  office  addresses  were  not  shown 
by  proof  of  publication  of  notices 
to  them,  were  not  in  court,  which 
had  no  power  to  render  judgment 
or  apply  testimony  against  them. — 
Sellers  v.  Powell,  152  So.  492,  168 
Miss.  682. 
Substituted  service 

A  return  of  process  disclosing 
substituted  service  is  insufficient  to 
confer  jurisdiction  over  person  of 
defendant  unless  return  affirmative- 
ly shows,  under  strict  construction 
and  unaided  by  reference  to  statute, 
compliance  with  all  essential  re- 
quirements of  statute  authorizing 
such  service.  * 

Mo.— Crabtree  v.  ^2tna  Life  Ins.  Co., 

Ill    S.W.2d    103,    341    Mo.    1173— 

State  ex  rel.  Adler  v.   Ossing,   79 

S.W.2d  255,  SS6  Mo.  391. 
Va.— Washburn   v.   Angle   Hardware 

Co.,  132  S.E.  810,  144  Va.  508. 

49.    Fla. — Walker  v.  Carver,  112  So. 
45,  93  Via.  337. 

65 


Ky. — Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Love  v. 

Reynolds,   146   S.W.2d  41,   284  Ky. 

809. 
La. — Adler  v.  Board  of  Levee  Com'rs 

of  Orleans  Levee  Dist.,  123  So.  605, 

168  La.  877. 
Mo. — McEwen     v.      Sterling      State 

Bank,    5    S.W,2d    702,    222    Mo.App. 

660. 
Ohio. — Paulin   v.    Sparrow,    110   N.E. 

528,  91  Ohio  St.  279. 
Pa.— Podol    v.    Shevlin,    130    A.    264, 

284   Pa.    32 — Wood  v.   Kuhn,   Com. 

PI.,  22  Brie  Co.  236. 
33  C.J.  p  1095  note  85. 

A  ruling-  of  the  court  that  the 
service  was  valid,  even  though  the 
ruling  was  erroneous,  does  not  show 
that  the  court  was  without  jurisdic- 
tion to  proceed  since  it  did  not  ap- 
pear that  service  was  not  waived. — 
Pratt  v.  Rosa  Jarmulowsky  Co.,  170 
S.E.  365,  177  Ga.  522. 
Irregularities  not  affecting-  judg- 
ment 

(1)  Failure    to     file    affidavit    of 
mailing   notice   to    defendant   served 
by  publication,  prior  to  rendition  of 
Judgment. — Young    v.    Campbell.    16 
P.2d  65,  160  Okl.  265. 

(2)  Failure  to  file  proof  of  serv- 
ice on  defendant  outside  state  until 
entry  of  judgment — Winter  v.  Win- 
ter, 175  N.E.  533.  256  N.T.  113.     - 

(3)  Failure    to    show    competency 
of  process  server. — State  v.  Fergus 
County  Tenth  Judicial  Dist.  Ct.,  179 
P.  831,  55  Mont.  602. 

(4)  Other  irregularities  see  33  C. 
J.  p  1091  note  68  [f]. 

50.  N.C.— Dunn  v.  Wilson,  187   S.E. 
802,  210  N.C.  493— Graves  v.  Relds- 
ville  Lodge  No.   2128,   109  S.E.  29. 
182  N.C.  530. 

51.  Tex. — Olton  State  Bank  v.  How- 
ell,  Civ.App.,  105   S.W.2d  2*7. 

52.  U.S. — In   re    Gayle,    C.C.A.Canal 
Zone,    1*36    F.2d    973,    petition    dis- 
missed  64   S.C.   157,   320   U.S.   806, 
88  L-Ed.  4*7. 


26 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


against  defendant  is  not  validated  by  his  special  ap- 
pearance for  the  purpose  of  objecting  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  by  taking  advantage  of  a  fail- 
ure of  notice  or  defective  service,63  or  for  some 
other  special  purpose.54 

By  attorney.  An  appearance  for  defendant  by 
his  authorized  attorney  is  sufficient  to  support  a 
judgment  against  defendant.65  If,  however,  the 
appearance  was  in  fact  unauthorized,  a  judgment 
based  thereon  has  been  held  voidable,56  and  accord- 
ing to  some  decisions  the  judgment  is  wholly  void57 
and  subject  to  collateral  attack,  as  discussed  infra 
§  424.  It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  rendered 


on  the  appearance  of  an  attorney,  who  has  acted 
without  authority,  is  regular  and  valid,58  the  sole 
remedy  being  an  action  for  damages  against  the 
attorney,  as  discussed  in  Attorney  and  Client  §  147. 
If  there  was  due  service  of  process  sufficient  to 
support  the  judgment,  as  discussed  supra  §  24,  the 
validity  of  the  judgment  is  not  affected  by  lack  of 
authority  of  the  attorney  who  appeared  and  made 
defense.5** 

Appearance  by  plaintiff.  As  a  rule,  if  plaintiff 
fails  or  refuses  to  appear  and  present  his  case,  the 
court  may  dismiss  the  action  for  want  of  prosecu- 
tion, as  explained  in  Dismissal  and  Nonsuit  §  65  a, 


Ala. — Morrison  v.  Covington,  100  So. 
124,  211  Ala.  181. 

Ariz. — Lore  v.  Citizens  Bank  of  Win- 
slow,  75  P.2d  371,  51  Ariz.  191— 
Blair  v.  Blair,  62  P.2d  1821,  48 
Ariz.  501. 

Cal.— -Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246,  203 
Cat  306. 

Ga.— Cherry  v.  McCutchen,  23  S.E.2d 
587,  68  Ga.App.  682. 

Hawaii. — Kim  Poo  Kum  v.  Sugi- 
yama,  33  Hawaii  545. 

Ind. — -Montgomery  v.  .Marks,  46  N.E. 
2d  912,  221  Ind.  223 — Celi-na  Mut 
Casualty  Co.  v.  Baldridge,  12  N.E. 
2d  258,  213  Ind.  198. 

Ky.-^Tones  v.  Fuller,  134  'S.W.2d  240, 
280  'Ky.  671 — Black  v.  Elkhorn 
Coal  Corporation,  26  iS.W.2d  481. 
233  Ky.  588. 

La.— Nolan  v.  Schultze,  126  So.  513, 
169  La.  1022— Gferfin  v.  Brown,  107 
So.  576,  160  La.  790. 

Md. — Piedmont-Mt.  Airy  Guano  Co. 
of  Baltimore  v.  Merritt,  140  A.  62, 
154  Md.  226. 

Mont. — Novack  v.  Pericich,  300  P. 
240,  90  Mont.  91. 

N.Y. — Bauman  Rubber  Co.  v.  Karl 
Light  &  Sons,  244  N.Y.S.  448,  137 
Misc.  258. 

N.C.— Powell  v.  Turpin,  29  S.E.2d 
26,  224  N.C,  67— City  of  Monroe 
v.  Niven,  20  S.E.2d  '311,  221  N.C. 
362— Casey  v.  Barker,  14  S.E.2d 
429,  219  N.C.  465— Dunn  v.  Wilson, 
187  S.E.  802,  210  N.C.  493— Hood 
v.  Holding,  171  S.E.  633,  205  N.C. 
451. 

N.D.— Baird  v.  Ellison,  293  N.W. 
794,  70  NJD.  261. 

Okl. — Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Excise  Board  of  Oklahoma  County, 
33  P.2d  1081,  168  Okl.  428— Protest 
of  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
2  P.2d  935,  161  Okl.  129— Skipper 
v.  Baer,  277  -P.  930,  136  Okl.  286. 

Or. — (Mt.  Vernon  Nat.  Bank  v,  Morse, 
264  P.  439,  128  Or.  64. 

Pa.— In  re  Komara's  Estate,  166  A. 
577,  311  Pa.  135 — In  re  Gallagher's 
Estate,  167  A.  476,  109  Pa. Super. 
304. 

R.I. — Corpus  Juris  died  la  'Sahagian 
v.  Sahagian,  137  A,  221,  222,  48 
R.I.  267.  i 


Tenn. — Dicfcson  v.  Simpson,  113  S.W. 

2d  1190,  172  Tenn.  680,  116  A.L.R. 

'380 — Commerce     Union     Bank     v. 

'  Sharber,  100  S.W.2d  243,  20  Tenn. 

App.  451. 

Tex.— Pure  Oil  Co.  v.  Reece,  78  S.W. 
2d  932,  124  Tex.  476— State  Mortg. 
Corporation  v.  Traylor,  36  S.W.2d 
440,  120  Tex.  148 — Levy  v.  Roper, 
256  S.W.  251,  =113  Tex.  356— Eaton 
v.  Husted,  Civ.App.,  163  S.W.2d 
439,  affirmed  172  S.W.2d  493,  141 
Tex.  349— Stone  v.  Miller,  Civ.App., 
134  S.W.2d  862,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct — Goodman  v. 
Mayer,  Civ.App.,  105  'S.W^d  281, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  128  S. 
W.2d  1156,  1*33  Tex.  319— Coker  v. 
Logan,  Civ.App.,  101  S.W.2d  284, 
error  refused — Glass  v.  Kottwitz, 
Civ.App.,  297  S.W.  573. 

Va. — Lockard  v.  Whitenack,  144  S. 
E.  606,  151  Va.  143— Beck  v.  Sem- 
ones'  Adm'r,  134  S.E.  677,  145  Va. 
429. 

Wis.— Saric  v.  Brlos,  19  N.W.2d  903, 
247  Wis.  400. 

33  C.J.  p  1095  note  89—34  C.J.  p  533 
note  40. 

Appearance  as  validating  judgment: 
Against  nonresident  see  supra  § 

24  e. 

In  action  begun  by: 
Attachment  or  garnishment  see 

supra  §  24  f. 

Substituted  or  constructive  serv- 
ice see  supra  §  24  c. 

Appearance  after  judgment 
Where  a  judgment  in  rem  has  been 

rendered  without  the  appearance  of 

defendant,      his      appearance     after 

judgment  for  the  purpose  of  moving 

for  a  new  trial  does  not  render  the 

judgment  a  personal  one. — Mayfleld 

v.  Bennett,  48  Iowa  194. 

53.  Md. — Ortman  v.  Coane,  31  A.2d 
320,  181   Md.   596,  145  A.L.R.  1388. 

Wash. — State    v.    Plummer,    226    P. 

273,  130  Wash.  135. 
33  C.J.  p  1095  note  93. 

54.  Or. — Cram  v,  Tippery,  155  P.2d 
558. 

litre  physical  presence  by  a  party 
when  a  judgment  is  rendered  against 
him  does  not  make  the  judgment 

66 


binding  on  him,  if  he  had  no  notice 
or  opportunity  to  be  heard. — Elliott 
v.  Adams,  160  S.E.  3*36,  173  Ga.  312. 

55.  Mich. — Hempel    v.    Bay    Circuit 
Judge,    193    N.W.    281,    222    Mich. 
553. 

N.C.— Hood  v.  Holdingf,  171  S.E.  633, 

205  N.C.  451. 
33  C.J.  p  1096  note  94. 
Presumption  of  authority  to  appear 
see  Attorney  and  Client  §  73  a. 
Where    defendants'    attorney    was 
in  open  court  when  plaintiff  request- 
ed leave  to  amend  petition  to  state 
new   cause  of  action,   notwithstand- 
ing   defendants    subsequently    with- 
drew their  answer  and  were  not  cit- 
ed   on    filing    of    amended    petition, 
court     had     jurisdiction     to     render 
judgment    against    them    thereon. — 
Phillips  v.   The  Maccabees,   Tex.Civ. 
App.,  50  S.W.2d  478. 

56.  N.T.— Wiley  v.  Moses,  42  N.T.S. 
2d  4.  266  App.Div.  801,  reargument 
and  appeal  denied  In  re  Less*  Es- 
tate, 44  N.T.S.2d  686,  266  App.Div. 
968. 

33  C.J.  p  1096  note  95. 

Unauthorized  appearance  as   ground 

for: 

Equitable  relief  see  infra  §  354. 
Opening  and  vacating  see  infra  § 
267. 

57.  N.D.— Taylor  v.  Oulie,  212  N.W. 
Wl.  55  N.D.  253. 

Okl.— ^Street  v.  Dexter,  77  P.2d  707, 
182  Okl.  360— Hatfield  v.  Lewis, 
236  P.  611,  110  Okl.  98. 

Tex.-^Stack  v.  Ellis,  Civ.App.,  291 
S.W.  919. 

33  C.J.  p  1096  note  97. 

58.  Miss.— Shirling     v.     Scites,     41 
Miss.  644. 

33  C.J.  p  1096  note  2. 

59.  N.C.— Hatcher  v.  Faison,  55  S.E. 
284,  145  N.C.  364. 

33  C.J.  p  1096  note  1. 
Neither  void  nor  voidable 

Appearance  by  an  unemployed  at- 
torney does  not  make  a  judgment 
void  or  -voidable,  where  the  case 
would  otherwise  go  to  judgment 
since  such  attorney  has  no  power  to 
waive  any  rights. — Lockard  v. 
Whitenack,  144  S.K  606,  151  Va.  143. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  27 


but  it  can  render,  no  judgment  against  plaintiff60 
unless  defendant  has  filed  a  cross  action  or  request, 
ed  affirmative  relief.61  On  the  other  hand,  if  plain- 


tiff appears  and  answers  a  cross  action,  a  judgment 
may  be  entered  thereon,  although  defendant  did  not 
serve  him  with  notice  of  the  cross  action,62 


C.  PARTIES 


§  27.    In  General 

Parties  whose  rights  are  determined  are  essential  to 
a  Judgment. 

An  essential  element,  implied  in  all  the  definitions 
of  a  judgment  which  have  been  given,  is  that  there 
must  be  parties  whose  rights  are  determined  by  the 
adjudication.6*  A  valid  judgment  cannot  be  ren- 
dered where  there  is  a  want  of  necessary  parties,64 
and  a  court  cannot  properly  adjudicate  matters  in- 
volved in  a  suit  when  necessary  and  indispensable 
parties  to  the  proceedings  are  not  before  it65  The 
absence  of  persons  necessary  to  a  complete  settle- 
ment of  the  entire  controversy,  however,  will  not 
prevent  the  rendition  of  a  valid  judgment  where 
their  interests  are  so  separable  that  a  judgment  may 


be  rendered  between  the  parties  before  the  court 
without  affecting  the  rights  of  persons  who  are  not 
parties.66  A  judgment  which  is  a  mere  negation  of 
plaintiff's  asserted  claim  is  not  erroneous  for  want 
of  necessary  parties.67 

In  the  case  of  ex  parte  proceedings  there  are  par- 
ties on  only  one  side,  as  discussed  in  Ex  32  CJ.S. 
p  1145  note  75-p  1146  note  80.  In  the  case  of  pro- 
ceedings in  rem,  the  parties  on  one  side,  at  least, 
consist  merely  in  the  personification  of  a  res,  but  the 
determinations  in  this  class  of  cases  are  nevertheless 
judgments,  as  considered  infra  §  907. 

To  enable  a  judgment  to  be  rendered  the  litigants 
must  have  the  capacity  to  stand  in  judgment68  The 


60.  Tex.— Parr  v.  Chittim,  Com. 
App.,  231  S.W.  1079— Dalton  T. 
Davis,  Civ.App.,  294  S.W.  1115, 
reversed  on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App,  1  S.W.2d  571— -Scarborough 
v.  Bradley,  Civ.App.,  256  S.W.  349. 

61*  Tex.— Wadell  Connally  Hard- 
ware Co.  v.  Brooks,  Civ.App.t  275 
S.W.  168. 

62.  Tex. — Hall  v.  Morton,  Civ.App., 
39  S.W.2d  903,  error  refused. 

63.  Kan.— Corpus    Juris    quoted   in 
City    of    Independence    v.    Hinde- 
nach,    61   P.2d   124,   129,   144   Kan. 
414. 

M0nt— ^State    v.    District    Court    of 
Fifteenth. Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for 
Musselshell  County,  300  P.  235,  89 
Mont  5-31,  82  A.L.R.  1158. 
33  C.J.  P  1105  note  45. 
Amendment  of  judgment  as  to  par- 
ties see  infra  §  244. 
Conformity  to: 
Pleadings  and  proofs  as  to  parties 

see  infra  §  51. 
Verdict  or  findings  as  to  parties 

see  infra  §  56. 

Designation  of  parties  see  infra  5 
75.  t  . 

Parties  to  judgment  by  or  against 
executor  or  administrator  see  Ex- 
ecutors and  Administrators  §  793. 
Advewary  proceedings  required 

Where  real  party  in  interest  is 
both  plaintiff  and  defendant,  no  Is- 
sue is  presented  and  decree  or  judg- 
ment based  on  such  action  is  null 
and  void.— O'Donnell  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A, 
Cal.,  91  F.2d  14,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  U.  S.  v.  O'Donnell,  58  S.Ct 
708,  303  U.S.  501,  82  Ii.Ed.  980. 
64.  Tex. — Belt  v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ, 
App.,  175  S.W.2d  622,  error  refused 
— Beeier  r.  Loock,  Civ-App^  135 


S.W.2d  644,  error  dismissed— Gen- | 

era!  Exchange  Ins.  Corporation  v. 

Collins,  Civ.App.,  110  S.W.2d  127. 
xreoessary  parties 

Grantee's  heirs  are  necessary  par- 
ties to  enable  court  to  adjudicate 
whether  paper,  in  form  a  deed,  is 
an  absolute  conveyance,  or  only  a 
power  of  attorney.— Wingo  v.  Par- 
ker, 19  S.C.  9. 

65.    Fla. — Fain   v.   Adams,    121    So. 

562,  97  Fla.  517. 
111.— Hansen  v.  Swartz,  178  N.E.  246, 

345  111.  609. 
Mass.— Dietz  v.  New  Tork  Life  Ins. 

Co.,  191  N.E.  875,  287  Mass.  398. 
N.Y.— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co. 

v.    Triborough    Bridge    Authority, 

48  N.T.S.2d  16,  affirmed  59  N.Y.S. 

2d   291,   269   App.Div.    978,   motion 

granted  59  N.Y.S.2d  627,  270  App. 

Div.  754. 
N.D.— Underwood     State     Bank     v. 

Weber,  193  N.W.  602,  49  N.D.  814. 
W.Va.— McDonald  v.  Bennett,  152  S. 

E.  533,  108  W.Va.  666. 
Wis. — Riedel   -v.    Preston,    246   N.W. 

569,  211  Wis.  149. 
Proper  procedure 

The  court  should  require  the  ab- 
sent persons  to  be  made  parties  to 
the  proceeding  or  dismiss  it  with- 
out prejudice.— White  v.  Walker,  10 
S.W.2d  1071,  226  Ky.  326. 
Sum  held  by  stranger 

The  district  court  erred  In  includ- 
ing in  amount  of  money  judgment 
sum  shown  by  parties'  stipulation  to 
be  held  la  Judgment  debtor's  name 
by  corporation  not  party  to  suit 
wherein  judgment  was  rendered. — 
CyMeara  v.  Williams,  Tex.Civ.App,, 
137  S.W.2d  66,  error  dismissed,  Judg- 
ment correct. 

67 


66.  Cal. — Bank    of    California    Nat. 
Ass'n  v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for 
City  and  County  of  San  Francisco, 
106   P.2d  879,   16   Cal.2d  516. 

Tex.— State    Mortg.    Corporation    v. 

Garden,  Civ.App.,  11  S.W.2d  212. 
Person  held  not  a  necessary  party 

JSTonresidence  of  party  claiming 
interest  did  not  impair  validity  of 
decree  approving  release  of  rights 
in  estate,  nonresidents  not  being 
necessary  parties  to  decision  of 
question. — Denny  v.  Searles,  148  S.E. 
484,  150  Va.  701. 

67.  Proceeding  to  terminate  rights 
under  deed 

A  judgment  in  an  administrator's 
suit  to  terminate  defendant's  rights 
under  a  deed  from  his  Intestate  is 
not  erroneous  for  want  of  necessary 
parties  because  intestate's  heirs 
were  not  parties  to  the  suit,  where 
it  is  a  mere  negation  of  plaintiff's 
asserted  claim. — Jones  v.  Gibbs,  130 
S.W.2d  265,  133  Tex.  627,  motion 
overruled  T31  S.W.2d  957,  133  Tex. 
627. 

68.  La.— Roe    v.    Caldwell,    70    So. 
548,   138  La.  652— Miles  v.  Recla- 
mation Oil  Producing  Ass'n,  3  La. 
App.  746. 

nprisonment  of  defendant  pending 


civil  suit 
Where,  pending  a  civil  cause,  de- 
fendant is  arrested  and  confined  in 
jail  by  virtue  of  a  warrant  issued 
for  a  criminal  offense  at  the  in- 
stance of  a  third  person  not  in  col- 
lusion with,  or  instigated  by,  plain- 
tiff, plaintiff  is  entitled  to  proceed 
with  his  cause  to  judgment,  and 
such  judgment  will  not  be  set  aside 
as  irregular. — Peterson  v.  C.  A.  Mar- 


§  28 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


rules  governing  judgments  with  respect  to  persons 
under  a  disability  are  discussed  in  Husband  and 
Wife  §§  447-457,  Infants  §§  120-124,  and  Insane 
Persons  §  151.  Also  the  rules  applicable  to  judg- 
ments relative  to  persons  whose  personality  is  or 
has  been  suspended  for  juristic  purposes  are  con- 
sidered in  titles  wherein  the  law  relative  to  such 
persons  is  treated,  such  as  Bankruptcy  §§  489-491, 
Convicts  §  7,  Insolvency  §  17  a  (2),  and  Slaves  § 
7,  also  58  CJ.  p  758  note  59;  and  in  titles  dis- 
cussing particular  kinds  or  classes  of  actions  and 
proceedings  are  considered  the  rules  particularly  ap- 


plicable to  parties  to  judgments  or  decrees  in  such 
actions  or  proceedings. 

§  28.    Judgment  for  or  against  One  Not  a  Par- 
ty 

A  Judgment  can  be  rendered  only  for  or  against  a 
party  to  the  action  or  proceeding  and  not  for  or  agafnct 
one  not  a  party:  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  persons  not 
parties  cannot  be  adjudicated. 

In  general  a  judgment  can  be  taken  only  for  or 
against  a  party  to  the  action  or  proceeding.^  It 
cannot  properly  be  rendered  for  or  against  one  who 
is  not  a  party  thereto,70  or  against  one  who  is  not 


tin  Furniture  Co.,   86  S.B.   1099,   144 
Ga.  316. 

69.  Mont. — Moore    v.     Capital     Gas 
Corp.,  158  P.2d  302. 

Jurisdiction  In  personam  as  essen- 
tial to  validity  of  judgment  see 
supra  §  19. 

Service  or  process  or  appearance  as 
essential  to  validity  of  judgment 
see  supra  §§  23,  26. 

70.  U.S. — Southwell    v.     Robertson, 
D.CPa,,  27  F.Supp.  944. 

Ark.— Bryan  v.  Akers,  7  S.W.2d  32$, 
177  Ark.  681,  58  A.L.R.  1124. 

Cal. — Hutchinson  v.  California  Trust 
Co.,  Ill  P.2d  401,  43  Cal.App.2d 
571— Lloyd  v.  Los  Angeles  County, 
107  P.2d  .622,  41  Cal.App.2d  808— 
Overell  v.  Overell,  64  P.2d  483,  18 
Cal.App.2d  499— Nordin  v.  Eagle 
Rock  State  Bank,  App.,  49  P.2d 
336— McDonald  v.  Richards,  248  P. 
1049,  79  CaLApp.  1. 

Colo. — J.  I.  Case  Threshing  Mach. 
Co.  v.  Packer,  254  P.  779,  81  Colo. 
195. 

Ga. — Webb  &  Martin  v.  Anderson- 
McGriff  Hardware  Co.,  8  S.E.2d 
882,  188  Ga.  291. 

111.— Schrei  v.  Van  Alyea,  247  HL 
App.  440. 

Ind.— Kist  v.  Coughlin,  57  N.E.2d 
586,  222  Ind.  639. 

Ky.— City  of  Hazard  v.  Gay,  113  S. 
W.2d  467,  271  Ky.  818— Farmers' 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Jones,  28  S.W.2d  787, 
234  Ky.  591,  70  A.L.R.  335— Ford 
v.  Consolidated  Grocery  Co.,  17 
S.W.2d  448,  229  Ky.  510. 

La. — Succession  of  Arnold,  152  So. 
•322,  178  La.  658— Erskine  v.  Gard- 
iner, 110  So.  97,  162  La,  83. 

Mich.— Smith  v.  Switzer,  287  N.W. 
416,  290  Mich.  158. 

Neb.— Clark  v.  Clark,  297  N.W.  661, 
139  Neb.  446— Southern  Nebraska 
Power  Co.  v.  Village  of  Deshler, 
264  N.W.  462,  130  Neb.  133. 

N.Y.— Clark  v.  Seligman,  296  N.T.S. 
98,  163  Misc.  533— Quinn  v.  Er- 
showsky,  245  N.T.S.  398,  138  Misc. 
15. 

Ohio. — Eac  parte  Eastman,  155  N.E. 
578,  23  Ohio  App.  2T3. 

Or* — Niedermeyer,  Inc.,  v.  Fehl,  83 
P.2d  960,  148  Or.  16,  followed  In 


Niedermeyer,  Inc.  v.  Pacific  Record 
Pub.  Co.,  33  P.2d  966,  147  Or.  528, 
and  motion  denied  Niedermeyer, 
Inc.,  v.  Fehl,  35  P.2d  477,  148  Or. 
16. 

Pa. — In  re  McGuigan's  Estate,  37  A. 
2d  717,  349  Pa.  581— Chiswell  v. 
Campbell,  150  A.  90,  300  Pa,  68. 

R.I.— Lawton  v.  Fox,  133  A.  348,  47 
R.I.  359. 

Tenn. — American  Nat.  Bank  v.  Brad- 
ford, App.,  188  S.W.2d  971. 

Tex. — Thomas  v.  Mullins,  Civ.App., 
127  S.W.2d  559,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  Mullins  v.  Thomas,  150  S. 
W.2d  83,  136  Tex  215— Edwards 
v.  Hatch,  Civ.App.,  106  S.W.2d  741 
—Baker  v.  Reed,  Civ.Ap&.,  54  S.W. 
2d  214 — Underwood  v.  Jefferson 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  Civ.App.,  35  S. 
W.2d  766 — Cunningham  v.  Koons, 
Civ.App.,  33  S.W.2d  761 — Jessen  v. 
Scott,  Civ.App.,  14  S.W.2d  290— 
Cook  v.  Liberty  Pipe  Line  Co., 
Civ.App.,  281  S.W.  221— Moses  v. 
Chapman,  Civ.App.,  280  S.W.  911 
— Tomerlin  v.  Krause,  Civ.App., 
278  S.W.  501. 

W.Va.— Milam  v.  Settle,  32  S.E.?d 
269. 

33  C.J.  p  1106  note  58. 

Injunction: 

In  federal  court  as  binding  on 
parties  defendant  and  those  rep- 
resented by  them  or  subject  to 
their  control  or  in  privity  with 
them  see  Federal  Courts  §  144  d. 
Not  granted  against  persons  not 
parties  to  suit  see  Injunctions  § 
214. 

Judgment  in: 

Favor  of  partner  not  party  to  ac- 
tion see  the  C.J.S.  title  Partner- 
ship §  235,  also  47  C.J.  p  1011 
note  15. 

Replevin  not  proper  against  one 
not  party  to  action  see  the  C. 
J.S.  title  Replevin  S  242,  also  54 
C.J.  p  588  note  25. 

Necessity  that  judgment  correspond 
to  pleadings  with  respect  to  par- 
ties see  infra  §  51. 

Relief  against  person  not  party  not 
granted  in  mandamus  proceeding 
see  the  C.J.S.  title  Mandamus  § 
341,  also  38  C.J.  p  926  note  12. 

68 


Opportunity  to  "be  heard 

(1)  Person  must  have  opportunity 
of  being  heard  before  court  can  ren- 
der judgment  against  him. 

111.  —  Hansen     v.     Swartz,    178    N.E. 

246,  345  111.  609. 
Mont—  Mitchell   v.    Banking   Corpo- 

ration   of    Montana,    22    P.2d    155, 

94  Mont  183. 

(2)  Notice  and  opportunity  to  be 
heard    before    being    concluded    by 
judgment  as  essential  to  due  proc- 
ess of  law  see  Constitutional  Law 
§§  569  c  (2),  619,  322. 
Unauthorized  proceeding 

(1)  Judgment  is  void  in  action  in- 
stituted   in    plaintiff's    name    by    a 
stranger    without   authority. 

U.S.  —  Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Isa- 
bel, CC.A.OkL,  129  F.2d  111. 

Okl.—  Steen  v.  Williams,  12  P.2d  888, 
158  OkL  147. 

(2)  Judgment       against       alleged 
ward  on  cross  petition  in  proceeding 
brought  by  alleged  guardian  acting 
under    wholly   void    court    order    is 
erroneous.  —  Ruckert  v.  Moore,  295  S. 
W.  794,  317  Mo.  228. 

(3)  Other  cases  see  33  C.J.  p  1106 
note  58  [e], 

Judgment  for  plaintiff  as  trustee 
for  one  not  a  'party  to  the  action  is 
erroneous.  —  Rush  v.  Curtiss-Wright 
Export  Corporation,  31  N.T.S,2d  550, 
263  App.Div.  69,  appeal  denied  32 
N.Y.S.2d  1016,  263  App.Div.  868. 
motion  denied  41  N.B.2d  173,  287 
N.Y.  849. 
Xodividual  sued  in  representative 


In  suit  against  state  superintend- 
ent of  insurance,  to  recover  a  fund 
in  his  possession  officially,  in  which 
the  superintendent  as  an  individual 
defendant  was  stricken  out,  the  ju**. 
risdiction  of  the  court  is  limited  to 
the  res,  and  it  has  no  power  to 
charge  defendant  with  interest  be- 
yond what  he  actually  received.  — 
Porter  v.  Beha,  D.C.N.Y.,  8  F.2d  65, 
affirmed,  C.C.A.,  12  F.2d  513. 
Unknown  or  wuuuned  parties 

Law  court  cannot  enter  judgment 
for  unknown  and  unnamed  parties, 
nor  has  it  ancillary  jurisdiction  to 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  28 


subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.71  A  judg- 
ment so  given  is  void  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  the 
person  improperly  included  in  it,72  whether  or  not 
such  person  is  sui  juris  or  under  disability,78  and, 
according  to  some  authorities,  is  a  mere  nullity  as 
to  all  the  parties  to  it,74  although  other  cases  hold 
that  it  is  not  void  as  to  those  who  were  actually 
parties  to  the  suit.76  A  judgment  for  one  not 
formally  a  party  has  been  held  proper,  however, 
where  the  case  was  tried  and  the  parties  acted  on 
the  understanding  that  such  person  was  a  party.76 
It  has  been  held  that  mere  service  of  process  on  a 
stranger  to  the  proceedings  will  not  support  a  judg- 
ment against  him.77 


Where  he  is  not  a  party  to  the  action,  judg- 
ment cannot  properly  be  rendered  for  or  against  an  f 
assignor,78  an  employee  in  an  arbitration  proceed- 
ing between  his  employer  and  labor  union,79  an 
insurance  company  in  an  action  against  the  state 
superintendent  of  insurance  in  whose  hands  it  has 
been  placed  for  liquidation,80  an  insurer  of  defend- 
ant, even  though  insurer's  attorney  took  over  the  de-  { 
f ense  and  participated  in  the  trial  as  fully  as  though 
insurer  had  been  a  party,81  .an  officer  of  a  defendant 
county,82  an  officer,  agent,  representative,  or  legal 
assign  of  a  defendant  corporation,83  a  party's  attor- , 
ney,8*  a  witness,86  or  a  member  of  a  class.86    How- 
ever, there  is  authority  which  holds  that,  in  a  rep- 


determine  the  parties  entitled  to  the 
benefit    of    such    a    judgment — Mc- 
Nary  v.  Guaranty  Trust  Co.  of  New 
York,    D.C.Ohio.   <>    F.Supp.    616. 
Judgment  held  not  in  favor  of  one 

•  not?  a  party 

Judgment  that,  as  between  plain- 
tiff and  defendant,  plaintiff  is  liable 
for  payment  of  note  to  bank  is  not 
a  judgment  against  plaintiff  in  favor 
of  the  bank,  which  was  not  a  party 
to  the  action. — Nants  v.  Doherty,  262 
S.W.  979.  203  Ky.  596. 

71.  111. — Austin    v.    Royal    League, 
147   N.B.    106,    316   III.   188. 

N.Y.— NtecAffer   v.    Boston   &  M.   R. 

R.,  197  N.B.  328,   268  N.T.  400. 
Ohio.— Cahill  v.  Fidelity  &  Casualty 

Co.,  175  N.E.  39,  "37  Ohio  App.  444. 
Where  plaintiff  not  in  court 

Judgment  on  merits  cannot  be  ren- 
dered where  action  fails  because  no 
plaintiff  is  in  court  against  whom 
judgment  can  be  rendered. — MacAf- 
fer  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.,  197  N.E. 
328,  268  N.T.  400, 

72.  U.S. — Hanover  Fire  Ins.   Co.  v. 
Isabel,     C.C.A.Okl.,     129    F.2d    111 
— U.  S.  v.  Lee,  D.C.Okl.,  48  F.Supp. 
63. 

Cal. — Pennell  v.  Superior  Court  In 
and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  262 
P.  48.  87  Cal.App.  375. 

111. — Newberry  Library  v.  Board  of 
Education  of  City  of  Chicago,  55 
N.B.2d  147,  387  111.  85. 

Ky. — Chapman  v.  Blackburn,  175 
S.W.2d  26,  295  Ky.  606— Rapp 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Smith,  48  S.W.2d 
17,  243  Ky.  317. 

Mont. — Moore  v.  Capital  Gas  Corp., 
158  P.2d  302. 

N.C.— Powell  v.  Turpin,  29  S.B.2d 
26,  224  N.C.  $7— Downing  v.  White, 
188  S.B.  815,  211  N.C.  40. 

Tenn.— Charles  A.  Hill  &  Co.  v.  Bel- 
mont  Heights  Baptist  Church,  69 
<5.W.2d  612,  17  Tean.App.  603. 

Tex — Shaw  v.  Cunningham,  Civ. 
App.,  42  S.W.2d  685,  error  refused 
— Butman  v.  Jones,  Civ.App.,  24 
aw.2d  796—Lipsitz  v.  First  Nat 
Bank,  CivJLpp.,  288  S.W.  609,  af- 
firmed, Com.App..  293  S.W.  563, 


modified  on  other  grounds  296  S. 
W.  490. 
W.Va.— Russell  v.  Carpenter,  23  S.B. 

2d  920,  125  W.Va.  51. 
33  C:J.  p  1106  note  58. 
Validity  of  judgment  or  decree  for 
or  against  person  not  party  to  par- 
tition proceeding  see  the  C.J.S,  ti- 
tle Partition  §  112,  also  47  C.J.  p 
435  notes  93,  94. 
Bnle  in  misnomer  inapplicable 

-The  rule  that  the  judgment  con- 
cludes the  person  intended  -  to  be 
sued  where  he  is  actually  served 
with  process,  even  under  a  wrong 
name,  is  inapplicable  where  judg- 
ment is  rendered  against  a  person 
not  a  party  to  the  suit — Gofl  v. 
Will  County  Nat  Bldg.  Corporation, 
35  N.B.2d  718,  811  IlLApp.  207. 

73.  Ky.— Proctor  v.  Mitchell,  194  S. 
W.2d  177. 

74.  Colo.— Archuleta    v.    Archuleta, 
123  P.  821,  52  Colo.  601. 

33  C.J.  p  1107  note  59.    - 

75.  Mo. — Pacific     Express .   Co.     Y. 
Bmerson,  74  S.W.  132,  101  Mo.App. 
62. 

33-  C.J.  p  1107  note  60. 
7ft,    Wash.— Bleiler  v.  Wolff,  161  P. 
2d  145,  23  Wash.2d  368. 

77.  Ga. — Shearouse  v.  Wolfe,   86  S. 
B.  923,  111  Ga.  859. 

33  C.J.  p  1106  note  58  [b]. 

78.  U.S.— Illinois  Surety  Co.   v.   U. 
S.,  C.C.,  36  S.Ct  321,  240  U.S.  214, 
60  L.Ed.  609. 

79.  N.T.— Steinberg  v.  D.  L.  Horo- 
witz,   Inc.,    25    N.Y.S.2d    630,    261 
App.Div.  1380. 

80.  U.S. — Southwell    v.    Robertson, 
D.C.Pa.,  27  F.Supp.  944. 

81.  Tex.— Rio  Grande  Valley   Tele- 
phone  Co.    v.    Hocut,   Civ.App.,    93 
S.W.2d   167,    error   dismissed. 

82.  Gal. — Lloyd     v.     Los     Angeles 
County,  107  P.2d  622,   41  CaLApp. 
2d  808. 

83.  Tefc. — Toakura  Mill  &  Elevator 
Co.   v.    Byars,    Civ. App.,    262   5.W. 
.226. 

84.  Cal.— Sullivan    v.    Gage.    79    P. 

69 


537,  145  Cal.  770— In  re  Levinson's  , 
Estate,   41   P.   483,   42   P.    479,   108 
Cal.  450— Overell  v.  Overell,  64  P. 
2d  483,  18  Cal.App.2d  499— Pennell  | 
v.  -Superior  Court  in  and  for  Los 
Angeles  County,  262  P.  48,  87  Cal. 
App.    375 — Chavez    v.    Scully,    216 
P.  46,  62  CaLApp.  6.  j 

Attorney's  right  to  summary  reme- 
dy in  cause  for  payment  of  fees 
earned  therein  see  Attorney  and 
Client  §  194. 

85.  Pa.— Bell  v.  Feeney,  Cora.PL,  59 
Montg.Co.  279. 

86.  N.C.— Williams  v.  Williams,   74 
N.C.  1. 

33C.J.  pl!06  note  58  [f]. 
Judgment  for  member 

(1)  In    representative    action    on 
behalf  of  all  similarly  situated,  only 
those   named  as  plaintiffs  and  who 
enter    the    action    before    judgment 
may    share   in    recovery. — Atkins    v. ; 
Trowbridge,  148  N.Y.S.  181,  162  App. 
Div.  629— Hendry  v.  Title  Guarantee 
&    Trust    Co.,    300    N.Y.S.    741,    165 
Misc.  349,  modified  on  other  grounds 
8    N.Y.S.2d    164,    255    App.Div.    497,' 
affirmed  21  NJB.2d  515,  280  N.Y.  740. 

(2)  In  class   suit  under  Fair.  La- 
bor' Standards  Act  by  employee  as 
representative  of  class  of  employees 
to   which  he  belongs,   no  judgment 
could    be    entered   in    favor   of   any 
employee  against  employer  for  any 
specific  sum  of.  money  unless  such 
employee  was  either  a  party  to  the 
suit,    or    had    expressly    designated 
some   one  to   represent   him.  in   the 
suit,  or  bad  intervened  in  the  suit 
— Brooks   v.   Southern  Dairies,   D.C. 
Fla.,  38  F.Supp.  588. 

Judgment  against  member 

(1)  The  equitable  doctrine  of  class 
representation  does  not  permit  a 
plaintiff  to  designate  certain  par- 
ties as  representatives  of  other  nu- 
merous members  of  a  voluntary  un- 
incorporated association  in  order 
to  obtain  personal  -judgments  as  to 
members  not  named.— Webb  &  Mar- 
tin v.  Anderson-McGriff  Hardware 
Co.,  3  S.E.2d  882,  188  Ga.  291.  ., 


§  28 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


resentative  or  class  suit,  where  tihose  joined  as  par- 
ties fairly  represent  those*  not  joined,  and  their  in- 
terests are  the  same,  a  judgment  entered  as  in  a 
class  suit  will  be  binding  on  all  members  of  the 
class.*? 

In  general  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  persons  not 
parties  to  the  action  cannot  be  adjudicated  there- 
in,*8  since  a  court  should  not  adjudicate  the  rights 


or  liabilities  of  a  person  unless  he  is  actually  or 
constructively  before  it89  Title  to  property  of  one 
not  a  party  may  not  be  determined,90  or  a  lien  es- 
tablished and. foreclosed  against  one  not  a  party,91 
or  the  right  to  the  proceeds  of  taxes  levied  to  pay 
bonds  determined  in  a  suit  to  which  bondholders 
are  not  parties,92  or  a  contract  with  one  not  a  party 


(2)  In  bondholder's  suit  to  enforce 
trust  and  alleged  lien  against  state 
and  numerous  owners  of  lands, 
where  such  owners  were  designated 
as  a  class  but  not  actually  made 
parties,  the  court  had  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  enter  decree  against  them 
or  their  lands. — State  v.  Woodruff, 
150  So.  760,  170  Miss.  744. 

87.  111. — Newberry  Library  v.  Board 
of  Education  of  City  of  Chicago, 
55   N.E.2d   147,   387   111.    85. 
Persons    hound    by    Judgment    by 

reason  of  privity  or  representation, 
although  not  formal  parties,  may  be 
subjected  to  the  judgment  by  rule. 
—Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Schmidt, 
Ky.,  20  S.Ct  620,  177  U.S.  230,  44  L. 
Ed.  747. 

Administrators  acting1  as  plaintiffs 
.  Where  in  suit  by  stockholders  the 
recovery  was  purely  representative, 
it  was  held  immaterial  that  certain 
of  the  plaintiffs  held  only  as  admin- 
istrators.— 'Stearns  Coal  &  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Van  Winkle,  C.C.A.Ky.,  221 
P.  590,  137  C.C.A.  314,  certiorari  de- 
nied -36  SXJt  554,  241  U.S.  670,  60 
L.Ed.  1230. 

88,  U;6. — Dewalt     v.     State     Farm 
Mut.      Automobile      Ins.     Co.      of 
Bloomington,  111.,  C.C.A.MO.,   99  7. 
2d    846,     certiorari    denied    State 
Farm  Mut.  Automobile  Ins.  Co.  of 
Bloomington,    111.    v.    Dewalt,    59 
S.Ct    583,    306    U.S.    644,    88    L.Ed. 
1043. 

Ala. — Continental    Ins.    Co.    of   New 

York  v.  Rotholz,  133   So.  587.  222 

Ala.  574. 
CaL— Potter  v,  Lawton,   5   P.2d  904, 

118  CaLApp.  558— Moakley  v.  Los 

Angeles  Pac.  Ky.  Co.,   277  P.  883, 

99  CaLApp.  74— O'Neil  v.  Ross,  277 

P.  123,  98  CaLApp.  306. 
Conn. — Lunde  v.  Minch,   136  A.  552, 

105  Conn.  657. 
Fla. — Coral    Bealty   Co.    v.    Peacock 

Holding  Co.,  1*38  So.  622,  103  Fla. 

916. 
Ga. — Ware  County  v.  Cason,  5  S.E.2d 

597,  61  Ga.App.  15. 
Karf.— Kansas    Utilities   Co.    v.    City 

of    Burlington,    44    P.2d    223,    141 

Kan.   926,   appeal   dismissed  56   S. 

Ct.  81,  296  U.S.  658,  80  KEO.  469. 
Mass. — Bancroft  v.  Cook,  162  N.B. 

691,  264  Mass.  343. 
Mich.— Royal    Oak    Tp.    v.    City    of 

Ferndale,  15  K,W.2d  707,  309  Mich. 

458 — Capitol  -Savings   &  Loan  Co. 

v.  Standard  Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n 


of  Detroit,  Mich.,  250  N.W.  309, 
264  Mich.  550— Washburn  v. 
Waite,  250  N.W.  306,  264  Mich. 
557. 

Mo. — Jenkins  v.  John  Taylor  Dry 
Goods  Co.,  179  S.W.2d  54,  352  Mo. 
660 — McClure  v.  Wilson,  App.,  185 
S.W.2d  878— Hocken  v.  Allstate 
Ins.  Co.,  147  S.W.2d  182,  235  Mo. 
App.  991 — Stevens  v.  Hurley,  279 
S.W.  723,  220  Mo.App.  1050. 

N.J. — Trenton  Potteries  Co.  v.  Black- 
well,  43  A.2d  831,  137  N.J.Eq.  113 
— Breitman  v.  Jaehnal,  132  A.  291, 
99  N.J.Eq.  243,  affirmed  Breitman 
v.  Jaehnel,  135  A.  915,  100  N.J.Eo;. 
559. 

N.M.— Scudder  v.  Hart,  110  P.2d  536, 
45  N.M.  76. 

N.T.— Sunshine  v.  Marsh,  38  N.T.S. 
2d  562,  265  App.Div.  927,  affirmed 
50  N.E.2d  105,  290  N.Y.  775— Nor- 
man v.  General  American  Transp. 
Corporation,  47  N.T.S.2d  390,  181 
Misc:  233,  affirmed  45  N.Y.S.2d 
929,  267  App.Div.  758. 

Ohio. — National  Surety  Co.  v.  Bohn, 
182  N.E.  506,  125  Ohio  St  537. 

Okl.— Town  of  Buffalo  v.  Walker,  257 
P.  766,  126  Okl.  -6. 

Pa.< — 'Pleska  v.  Farley,  Com.Pl.,  40 
Lack.Jur.  152. 

S.C.— Holt  v.  Calhoun,  179  S.E.  501, 
175  S.C.  481. 

S.D.— Boots  v.  Null,  238  N.W.  307, 
59  S.D.  109. 

Tex — General  Exchange  Ins.  Cor- 
poration v.  Young,  Civ.App.,  143 
S.W.2d  805— Sparks  v.  Mince,  Civ. 
App.,  138  S.W.2d  203— Beeler  v. 
Loock,  Civ.App.,  135  S.W.2d  644, 
error  dismissed — Employers'  Lia- 
bility Assur.  Corporation  v.  Neely, 
Civ.App.,  60  S.W.2d  836,  error  dis- 
missed—•'Stewart  v.  Rockdale  State 
Bank,  Civ.App.,  52  S.W.2d  915,  af- 
firmed 79  S.W.2d  116,  124  Tex.  431 
—Scaly  v.  Scott,  Civ.App.,  11  S.W. 
2d  605. 

Utah. — Tanner  v.  Provo  Reservoir 
Co.,  103  P.2d  134,  99  Utah  158. 

Wash.— Bayha  v.  Public  Utility  Dist. 
No.  1  of  Grays  Harbor  County,  97 
P.2d  614,  2  Washed  85— Cooney 
v.  Cooney,  8  P.2d  540,  164  Wash. 
553. 

Wis. — Madden  Bros.  v.  Jacobs,  235 
N.W.  780,  204  Wis.  376. 

Adjudication  in  partition  proceeding 
of  rights  of  person  not  party 
thereto  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Parti- 

70 


'tion  §  112,  also  47  C.J.  p  4*35  note 
92. 

In  proceeding  in: 
Admiralty  see  Admiralty  §  157. 
Equity  see  Equity  §  601. 
Judgment    as    binding    only    parties 
and  privies   see  infra   §§    762-821. 
Persons     subject    to     ouster     under 
judgment  of  ejectment  see  Eject- 
ment §  122  e. 

Rights  of  persons  not  parties  not 
determined  in  mandamus  pro- 
ceeding see  the  C.J.S.  title  Man- 
damus §  334,  also  38  C.J.  p  923 
note  53. 
Cannot  divest  rights 

When  a  person  is  not  made  a  party 
to  the  suit,  the  court  has  no  juris- 
diction to  divest  him  of  a  vested 
right— Alward  v.  Borah,  44  N.E.2d 
865,  381  111.  134. 
Establishment  of  parish  boundary 

In  hypothecary  action  involving 
land  alleged  by  defendants  to  be 
situated  in  another  parish  than  that 
in  which  suit,  to  which  neither  par- 
ish was  party,  was  brought,  decree 
cannot  establish  boundary  between 
parishes. — Commercial  Bank  v. 
Meaux,  La.App.,  158  So.  688, 

Judgment's  effect  on  third  person 
not  party  to  the  action  will  not  be 
determined  by  the  court  rendering 
it— Williams  v.  Pease,  43  P.2d  22, 
181  Wash.  388—33  C.J.  p  1106  note 
58  [a]  (2). 

89.  D.C. — Ducker  v.   Butler,    104   P. 
2d  236,  70  App.D.C.  103. 

La.— Collins  v.   Cliff  Oil  &  Gas  Co., 

App.,  177  So.  120. 
Wash.— Bayha  v.  Public  Utility  Dist. 

No.  1  of  Grays  Harbor  County,  97 

P.2d  614,  2  Wash.2d  85. 

90.  Gal. — City    of    Los    Angeles    v. 
Knapp,  70  P.2d  643,  22  Cal.App.2d 
211. 

La. — Esparros  v.  Vicknair,  17  So.2d 
924,  205  La.  699. 

91.  Tex. — Gholson       v.       Northside 
Chevrolet  Co.,  Civ.App.,   90  S.W.2d 
579. 

92.  U.S. — Boynton  v.  Moffat  Tunnel 
Improvement  Dist,  C.C.A.Colo.,  57 
F.2d  772,   certiorari  denied  Moffat 
Tunnel      Improvement      Dist.      v. 
Boynton,  53  S.Ct.  20,  287  U.S.  620, 
77  L.Ed.  638— St  Louis-San  Fran- 
cisco  Ry.  Co.  v.  Blake,  C.C.A.Okl., 
36  F.2d  652. 

Colo. — Denver  Land  Co.  v.  Moffat 
Tunnel  Imp.  Dist,  284  P.  339,  87 
Colo.  1. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


29 


to  the  action  rescinded,93  or  a  note  or  note  and 
mortgage  canceled  as  to  a  person  who  is  not  a 
party  to  the  action,94  or  a  lien  claim  released  as  to 
members  of  a  class  who  did  not  join  as  plaintiffs  in 
the  proceeding,95  or  a  deed  set  aside  where  all  per- 
sons interested  are  not  parties  to  the  proceeding,96 
or  a  sale  of  property  of  one  not  a  party  to  the  ac- 
tion ordered,97  even  though  the  owner  is  a  corpo- 
ration owned  by  another  corporation  whose  shares 
are  in  suit.98  However,  the  validity  of  mortgage 
bonds  owned  by  cross  defendants  dismissed  from 
the  action  may  be  adjudicated  where  the  plaintiff  in 
the  action  represents  cross  defendants  as  a  trustee 
of  such  bonds.99  Specific  performance  will  not  be 
decreed  against  a  person  not  a  party  to  the  pro- 
ceeding.1 A  judgment  against  a  person  attempted 
to  be  made  a  party  by  motion  after  the  conclusion 
of  the  trial  is  erroneous.2 

§  29.    Death  of  Party 

a.  In  general 

b.  Joint  parties 

a.  In  General 
Ordinarily    a    judgment    rendered    subsequent    to    a 


party's  death  Is  erroneous.  If  the  party  died  prior  to 
the  commencement  of  the  action  the  judgment  is  abso- 
lutely void,  if  he  died  subsequent  to  its  institution  the 
judgment  is  generally  held  to  be  voidable,  but  if  he  died 
after  verdict  or  decision  the  Judgment  is  generally  held 
toH>e  valid. 

Ordinarily  a  judgment  should  not  be  entered  for 
or  against  a  party  after  his  death  ;3  and  if  the  ac- 
tion is  continued  or  revived  thereafter  the  judg- 
ment should  be  for  or  against  his  representative.4 
A  judgment  for  or  against  a  person  who  was  dead 
at  the  time  the  action  was  instituted  is  at  least  er- 
roneous.5 If  the  defendant  was  dead  at  the  time 
the  action  was  commenced  the  judgment  will  be  ab- 
solutely void;6  and  like  rule  has  been  applied  where 
one  named  as  plaintiff  died  before  commencement  of 
the  action,7  although  there  is  other  authority  which 
holds  that  a  judgment  rendered  in  an  action  begun 
after  plaintiff's  death  is  not  void  but  voidable.8 

Where  the  court  has  acquired  jurisdiction  of  the 
subject  matter  and  the  person  during  the  lifetime 
of  a  party,  the  prevailing  rule  is  that  a  judgment 
rendered  for  or  against  him  after  his  death,  al- 
though erroneous  and  liable  to  be  set  aside,  is  not 
void  but  voidable  ;9  but  there  is  substantial  author- 
ity to  the  effect  that  such  a  judgment  is  absolutely 


93.  Term.— Hawkins  v.  Byrn,  261  S. 
W.  980.  150  Term.  1. 

94.  Ark.— Peebles  Garage  v.  Down- 
ey, 111  S.W.2d  454,  195  Ark.  31. 

Wis.— In  re  Peterson's  Estate,  8  N. 
W.2d  266,  242  Wis.  448. 

Want  of  necessary  parties  as  pre- 
cluding: Judgment  or  decree  of  can- 
cellation see  Cancellation  of  In- 
struments §  52. 

95.  Idaho.— Brown    v.    Twin    Falls 
Canal    Co.,    276    P.    305,    47    Idaho 
402. 

d&  Conn.— Delaney  v.  Kennaugh, 
186  A.  108,  105  Conn.  557. 

Mich.— Goldberg  v.  Goldberg,  295  N. 
W.  194,  295  Mich.  380. 

Necessary  parties  in  action  to  quiet 
title  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Quieting 
Title  §  53,  also  51  C.J.  p  206  note 
18-p  208  note  41. 

Validity  of  Judgment  in  action  to 
quiet  title  where  owners  of  land 
not  parties  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
Quieting  Title  S  103,  also  51  C.J. 
p  282  note  25. 

97.  U.S. — Gammon  v.  Ramsey,  C.C. 
A.N.J.,  13  F.2d  743. 

Wyo.— State  v.  District  Court  of 
Ninth  Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for 
Fremont  County,  292  P.  897,  42 
Wyo.  214,  71  A.L.R.  993,  substitu- 
tion of  parties  denied  1  P.2d  74, 
4-3  Wyo.  173. 

96.  U.S. — Gammon  v.   Ramsey,  C.C. 
A.N.J.,  18  F.2d  74"3. 

99.  Tex.— Fidelity  Trust  Co.  of 
Houston  v.  Highland  Farms  Cor- 


poration,     Civ.App.,      109      S.W.2d 
1014,  error  dismissed. 

1.  B.C. — Thalis    v.    Wurdeman,    121 
F.2d    70,    73    APP.D.C.    322. 

Decree  in  proceeding  for  specific  per- 
formance not  operative  as  to  per- 
son not  party  or  privy  to  pro- 
ceeding see  the  C.J.S.  title  Specific 
Performance  §  168,  also  58  C.J.  p 
1273  notes  25-26. 

2.  Tex.— Rio    Grande    Valley    Tele- 
phone   Co.   v.   Hocut,    Civ.App.,    93 
S.W.2d  167,  error  dismissed. 

33  C.J.  p  1106  note  58  [c]. 

3.  N.T.— In  re  Van  Nostrand's  Will, 
29  N.Y.S.2d  857,  177  Misc.  1. 

Pa. — Bautsch  to  Use  of  Schlear  v. 
Bubbenmoyer,  Com.Pl.,  32  Berks 
Co.L.J.  233. 

4.  Pa.— Aiken  v.    Use   of  Mayberry 
v.   Mayberry,   198  A.    874,   128   Pa. 
Super.  15. 

Erroneous  determination,  as  to  per- 
son in  whose  name  the  action  should 
be  revived  was  held  not  to  render 
judgment  void. — Griffin  v.  Proctor, 
14  So.2d  116,  244  Ala.  537. 
Failure  to  make  substitution  error 

Where  parties  to  suit  died  before 
entry  of  decree  failure  to  make  sub- 
stitution for  them  was  error. — Smith 
v.  Schmitt,  231  P.  176.  112  Or.  687. 

5.  N.C. — Hinkle  v.  Walker,  197  S.E. 
129,  213  N.C.  657. 

6.  CaL — Conlin  v.  Blanchard,  28  P. 
2d  12,  219  CaL  632 — In  re  Parsell's 
Estate,  213   ?.  40,  190  Cal.  454,  25 
A.L.R.  1561— Jones  v.  Walker,  118 

71 


P.2d  299,  47  Oal.App,2d  566 — Cor- 
pus  Juris  cited  in  Garrison  v. 
Blanchard,  16  P.2d  273,  274,  127 
CaLApp.  616 — Hogan  v.  Superior 
Court  of  California  in  and  for 
City  and  County  of  San  Francisco, 
241  P.  584,  74  CaLApp.  704. 

Conn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
O'Leary  v.  Waterbury  Title  Co., 
166  A.  673,  676,  117  Conn.  39. 

HI. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State 
Bank  of  Prairie  du  Hocher  v. 
Brown,  263  IlLApp.  312,  315. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Jacobs  v.  Trimble, 
274  S.W.  1075,  310  Mo.  150— Wicoff 
v.  Moore,  257  S.W.  474. 

Tex. — Bdens  v.  Grogan  Cochran 
Lumber  Co.,  Civ.App.,  172  S.W.2d 
730,  error  refused — State  Mortg. 
Corporation  v.  Affleck,  Civ.App.,  27 
S.W.2d  548,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com.App.,  61  S.W.2d  274. 

Va.— Rennolds  v.  Williams,  136  S.E. 
597,  147  Va.  196. 

33  C.J.  p  1108  note  69— «4  C.J.  p 
555  note  70. 

7.  Minn. — Poupore  v.  Stone-Ordean- 
Wells  Co.,  157  N.W.  648,  132  Minn. 
409. 

Pa. — Lynch  v.  Kerns,  10  Phila.  335. 

8.  W.Va.— McMillan  v.,  Hickman,  14 
S.B.  227,  85  W.Va,  705. 

33  C.J.  p  1109  note  71—34  C.J.  p  555 
note  69. 

9.  U.S.— Corpus      Juris      cited     in 
Streeter  v.  Chicago  Title  &  Trust 
Co.,  D.C.ni.,  14  F.2d  331. 

Cal. — Liuzza  v.  Bell,  104  P.2d  1095, 
40  CaLApP<2d  417— Corpus  Juris 


29 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


void,10  even  though  the  party  died  after  trial.11  If, 
however,  plaintiff12  or  defendant1*  dies  after  ver- 
dict or  decision  it  is. generally  held  that  a  proper 
and  valid  judgment  may  be  rendered  on  the  verdict 
or  decision.  Also  under  statutes  expressly  so  pro- 
viding a  valid  judgment  may  properly  be  entered 
in  cases  where  a  party  dies  after  verdict,  decision, 
or  report,  or  after  an  accepted  offer  to  allow  judg- 
ment to  be  taken.14  Although  such  statutes  have 
been  held  to  be  in  derogation  of  the  common  law,16 
they  have  also  been  declared  to  be  declaratory  of 
the  common  law,  which  never  allows  a  delay  by 
the  court  to  change  the  condition  of  a  suit.1*  A 
judgment  rendered  subsequent  to  the  death  of  a 
party  after  verdict  or  decision  may  properly  be 
entered  mine  pro  tune  as  of  the  date  of  the  verdict 
or  decision,  as  considered  infra  §  118;  and  in  ju- 


risdictions where  a  judgment  rendered  after  the 
death  of  a  party  by  a  court  which  has  acquired  ju- 
risdiction of  the  parties  and  subject  matter  is  not 
void  but  voidable,  a  judgment  entered  as  of  the 
actual  date  when  rendered,  at  a  time  subsequent  to 
plaintiffs  death  after  verdict  or  decision,  is  not 
void.17  Under  a  statute  authorizing  a  judgment 
subsequent  to  a  party's  death  after  verdict  or  de- 
cision if  the  court  renders  its  opinion  and  directs 
judgment  in  plaintiff's  favor  prior  to  defendant's 
death  it  may,  after  defendant's  death,  order  the 
findings  filed  nunc  pro  tune  as  of  the  date  of  the 
opinion,  as  considered  in  the  CJ.S.  title  Trial  § 
645,  also  64  C.J.  p  1271  note  78,  and  enter  judgment 
against  decedent  on  such  findings  ;18  or,  if  no  find- 
ings are  required  because  the  case  was  submitted 
on  an  agreed  statement  of  facts,  the  court  may  ren- 


oited  in  Garrison  v.  Blanchard.  16 
P.2d  273,  274,  127  Gal.App.  616— 
Hogan  v.  -Superior  Court  of  Cali- 
fornia in  and  for  City  and  County 
of  San  Francisco,  241  P.  584,  74 
CaLApp.  704. 

Ky.— Mosely  v.  Morgan,  252  S.W. 
117,  199  Ky.  845. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Adams 
v.  Carson,  25  P.2d  653,  657,  165 
Okl.  161. 

Pa.— Klemstine  v.  Allen,  16  PaJ>ist 
&  Co.  221. 

Tex.— -Garcia  v.  Jones.  Civ.App.,  155 
S.W.2d  671,  error  refused. 

33  C.J.  p  1107  note  68— 34  C.J.  p  555 
note  67. 

Effect  of  death  of  party  on  admiral- 
ty proceeding  see  Admiralty  5  97. 

10.  Ala. — Griffin  v.  Proctor,  14  So. 
2d  116,  244  Ala.  8*  7— Corpus  Jtu 
ris  cited  in  Martin  v.  Cothran,  200 
So.  609,  610,  240  Ala.  619— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  McDonald  v.  Wo- 
mack,  107  So.  812,  818,  214  Ala. 
309. 

La.— West  v.  Green,  131  So.  595,  15 
La.  App.  216. 

Mo.— De  Hatre  v.  Ruenpohl,  108  S. 
.W.2d  357,  341  Mo.  749,  transfer- 
red, see,  App.,  123  S.W.2d  243*- 
Carter  v.  Burns,  61  S.W.2d  933,  332 
.  Mo.  1128 — Cole  v.  Farkei>Wash- 
ington  Co.,  207  S.W.  749,  276.  Mo. 
220,  -overruling  State  v.  Riley,  118 
S.W.  647,  219  Mo.  667,  and  Coleman 
v.  McAnulty,  16  Mo.  173,  57  Am. 
D.  229. 

N.Y. — In  re  Hirnschall's  Estate,  265 
N.Y.S,  36,  147  Misc.  897. 

33  C.J.  P  1107  note  66—34  C.J.  p  555 
note  68. 

Abatement  and  revival  after  death 
of  party  see  Abatement  and  Re- 
vival §5  114-186. 

Effect  of  dissolution  of  corporation 
on  judgment  for  or  against  it  see 
Corporations  .§§  17!35-1786. 

afiortrar*  foreclosure 

N.J.— In  re  Admiral  Sampson  Bldg. 


&  Loan  Ass'n  of  Newark,  41  A.2d 

378,  136  N.J.EQ;.  292. 
Successor  in.  interest 

Judgment  rendered  after  death  of 
party  should  not  bind  those  suc- 
ceeding to  rights  of  action  or  prop- 
erty of  deceased. — MacAffer  v.  Bos- 
ton &  M.  R.  R.,  197  N.E.  328,  268 
N.Y.  400. 

11.  La.— West  v.  Green,  131  So.  595, 
15  La~kpp.  216. 

Judgment  for  costs 
Kan. — Jones  v.   Jones,  167  P.2d  634, 
161  Kan.  284. 

12.  W.Va Lively  v.  Griffith,  99  S. 

E.  512,  84  W.Va,  393. 

33  C.J.  p  1109  note  72. 

13.  Or.— Adams  v.   Perry.   Ill  P«2d 
838,  168  Or.  132. 

33  C.J.  p  1109  note  74. 

14.  Cal. — Fox   T.    Hale   &  Norcross 
Silver  Min.  Co.,  41  P.  328,  108  Cal. 
478— Liuzza  v.  Bell,  104  P.2d  1095, 
40  Cal.App.2d  417— Copp  T.  Rives, 
217   P.    813,   62   CaLApp.    776. 

Mo. — In   re   Thomasson,    159    S.W.2d 

626 — Homer  v.  Nicholson,  56  Mo. 

220. 
N.Y.— In  re  Taylor's  Estate,  33  N.Y. 

S.2d  584,  178  Misc.  217. 
Va.— Green's    Ex'rs    v.    Smith,    132 

S.E.    839,    146    Va.   442,    44   A.L.R. 

1175. 
33  C.J.  p  1109  note  75—34  C.J.  p  76 

note  67  [a]. 
Purpose  of  statute 

(1)  Its  purpose  is  to  permit  entry 
of  judgment  where  merits  of  contro- 
versy have,  in  substance,  been  pass- 
ed on  before  death  of  party. — Davis 
v.    Ross,    20   N.Y.S.2d    375,    259    App. 
Div.  577,  reargument  denied  21  N.Y. 
S.2d   391,    259   App.Div.   1029— In  .re 
Taylor's   WiU,   33   N.Y.S.2d   584,   178 
Misc.    217— Nicholson    v.    McMullen, 
28   N.Y.S.2d  287,  176   Misc.   693. 

(2)  It  was  never  intended  to  al- 
low    a     judgment     to     be     entered 
against    deceased    which    could    not 

72 


have  been  entered  in  his  lifetime. — 
Nicholson  v.  McMullen,  supra. 
Actions   to   which   applicable 

(1)  The   statute  applies   generally 
to  all  ordinary  civil  actions,  whether 
involving  equitable  or  legal  rights. 
--State  v.  Stratton,  19  S.W.  803,  110 
Mo.  426. 

(2)  The  statute  applies  only  to  ac- 
tions not  abating  on  death. — Grotsch 
v.  KGassey,  231  N.Y.S.  469,  133  Misc. 
373— J34   C.J.  p  76  note   67    [a]    (1), 
(3). 

Accepted  offer  to  allow  Judgment 

A  judgment  by  default  is  not  an 
"accepted  offer  to  allow  judgment." 
—Nicholson  v.  McMullen,  28  N.Y.S. 
2d  287,  176  Misc.  693. 

Verdict,  decision,  or  report  held 
made  i 

N.Y.— Davis  ,v.  Ross,  20  N.Y.S.2d 
375,  259  App.Div.  577,  reargument 
denied  21  N.Y.S.2d  391,  259  App. 
Div.  1029— In  re  Taylor's  Will,  33 
N.Y.S.2d  584,  178  Misc.  217. 

Judgment  held  act  proper 

(1)  Generally. — Nicholson    v.    Me-. 
Mullen,    28   N.Y.S.2d  287,   176   Misc. 
693. 

(2)  Where  facts  concerning  alleg- 
ed settlement  were  in  dispute. — (Mer- 
rill v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.,  282  N.Y. 
S.  574,  246  App.Div.  541. 

15.  N.Y.— -Nicholson     v.     McMullen, 
28  N.Y.S.2d  287,  17$  Misc.   693. 

16.  Mo. — Homer    v.    Nicholson,    §6 
Mo.  220. 

S3  C.J.  p  1109  note  76. 

17.  Mass.— Reid     v.     Holmes,     1*7 
Mass.  326. 

33  C.J.  p  1109  note  78. 

18.  Cal. — Fox   v.    Hale   &  Norcross 
Silver    Min.    Co.,    41    P.    328,    108 
CaL    478— Copp    v.    Rives,    217    P. 
813,  62  Gal.App.  776. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


29 


der  judgment  .after  defendant's  death  where  it  was 
submitted  prior  thereto.19 

A  judgment  entered  nunc  pro  tune  after  the  death 
of  plaintiff  and  at  a  time  when  a  substitution  of 
parties  for  decedent  had  not  been  made  has  been 
held  void.20 .  In  some  jurisdictions  where  defendant 
dies  before  judgment  the  court  is  without  juris- 
diction as  to  him  until  the  action  is  revived  and  his 
representatives  are  brought  before  the  court,21  and 
in  other  jurisdictions  service  of  notice  on  all  per- 
sons interested  in  the  estate  of  the  deceased  defend- 
ant is  prerequisite  to  a  valid  judgment.22 

A  judgment  erroneous  because  rendered  for  or 
against  a  dead  person  may  be  reversed  on  appeal  if 
that  fact  appears  on  the  record.2^  If  such  fact 
must  be. shown  by  evidence  aliunde,  the  remedy  is 
by  writ  of  error  coram  nobis,  or  by  motion  or  peti- 
tion in  the  cause.24  The  right  to  impeach  in  a  col- 
lateral proceeding  a  judgment  rendered  subsequent 
to  the  death  of  a  party  is  considered  infra  §  419. 

Terminated  trust.  A  judgment  cannot  bestow  on 
retiring  trustees  of  a  terminated  testamentary  trust 
continuing  power  to  control  and  manage  the  real 
estate  of  the  trust,25  even  though  all  the  benefici- 
aries under  the  will  acquiesced  in  or  expressly  con- 
sented thereto.26 

b.  Joint  Parties 

Whether  or  not  a  judgment  for  or  against  Joint  par- 
ties, rendered  after  the  death  of  one  of  them,  Is  void  or 
voidable  depends  on  the  rule  followed  In  the  particular 


jurisdiction  as  to  the  effect  of  the  death  of  a  party  be- 
fore  judgment,  and  on  whether  or  not  the  judgment  Is 
an  entirety. 

Under  the  rule,  considered  infra  §  33  b,  that  a 
judgment  for  or  against  several  parties  is  an  en- 
tirety and  either  good  or  bad  as  a  whole,  and  where, 
as  discussed  supra  subdivision  a  of  this  section,  the 
death  of  a  party  before  judgment  renders  the  judg-  ! 
ment  void,  a  judgment  for  or  against  several  parties 
jointly  after  the  death  of  one  of  them  is  void  as  to 
all  of  them;27  but  where  such  death  renders  the 
judgment  merely  erroneous  and  voidable,  a  judg- 
ment for  or  against  several  parties  jointly  after  the 
death  of  one  of  them,  while  not  void,  is  erroneous 
and  voidable  as  to  all  of  them.28  On  the  other 
hand,  in  jurisdictions  where  a  judgment  for  or 
against  several  parties  is  not  necessarily  good  or 
bad  as  an  entirety,  considered  infra  §  33  b,  the 
death  of  one  of  such  parties  before  judgment  will 
render  the  judgment  void,29  or  merely  erroneous 
and  voidable,30  as  to  such  deceased  party,  according 
to  the  locally  prevailing  rule,  considered  supra  sub- 
division a  of  this  section;  but  it  will  not  affect  the 
validity  or  regularity  of  the  judgment  as  to  thfc 
other  parties.81 

In  jurisdictions  where  judgment  may  be  taken 
for  or  against  one  or  more  of  several  defendants, 
judgment  may  be  taken  against  the  surviving  de- 
fendant or  defendants  in  an  action  against  several 
defendants,  one  or  more  of  whom  dies  prior  to 
judgment.32  The  rule  that  judgment  may  be  ren- 
dered against  a  party  who  dies  after  verdict  but 


19.  Cal. — Copp   v.   Rives,    supra. 

20.  Cal. — Boyd  v.   Lancaster,   90   P. 
2d  317,   32  Cal.App.2d  574— Maacon 
v.  Avery,  89  P.2d  684,  32  CaLApp. 
2d   300— Scoville   v.   Keglor,   80  P. 
2d   162,    27  Cal.App.2d  17. 

21.  Ky.— "Murphy    v.    Blackburn,    16 
S.W.2d  771,  229  Ky.  109. 

22.  Me. — Consolidated         Rendering 
.    Co.  v.  Martin,  145  A.  896,  128  Me. 
1    96,  64  A.L.R.  790— Trask  v.  Trask, 

3  A.   37,   78   Me.  103— Bridgham  v. 
Prince,  33  Me.  174. 

23.  Cal.— Liuzza    v.    Bell,    104    P.2d 
1095,    40    Cal.App.2d   417— Boyd  v. 
Lancaster,  90  P.2d  317,  82  CaLApp. 
2d  574. 

La. — Muller  v.   Davis-Wood  Lumber 

Co.,   2  La.App.  359. 
33  C.J.  p  1109  note  77. 
Judgment  for  heir 

Judgment  against  lessee  in  favor 
of  lessors  individually  and  as  heir 
at  law  of  a  deceased  lessor  is  error, 
where  Jt  appears  of  record  that  les- 
sor died  after  filing  of  suit  and  there 
was  neither  pleading  nor  proof  as 
to  condition  of  deceased's  estate  or 
that  administration  was  pending,  or 


that  none  was  necessary. — Levine  v. 
Finfcelstein,  Tex.Civ.App.,  80  S.W. 
2d  360. 

24.     HI.— Claflin   v.    Dunne,    21   N.E. 
834,    129   111.   241,    16   Am.S.R.   263. 
33  C.J.  p  1110  note  78. 
Judgment     subsequent     to     party's 

death  as  ground  for: 
Motion  or  petition  to  vacate  judg- 
ment: 

Generally  see  infra  §   276. 
By  confession  see  infra  5  323. 
Writ  of  error  coram  nobis  see  in- 
fra $  312. 

25-    N.Y.— In    re    Miller's   Will,    178 
N.B.  555,  2&7  N.Y.  349. 

26.  N.Y.— In  re  Miller's  Will,  supra, 

27.  La. — McCloskey  v.  Wingfield,  29 
La.Ann.  141. 

33  C.J.  p  1110  note  82. 
Judgment  after  death  of  principal  in 
action  against  principal  and  sure- 
ty see  the  C.J.S.  title  Principal 
and  Surety  §  277,  also  50  C.J.  p 
223*  notes  5-6. 

Judgment  by  confession  -against 
several  parties  jointly,  .rendered  aft- 
er the  death  of  one,  of  them,  is  void 
as  to  all. — State  Bank  of  Prairie  du 
Rocher  v.  Brown,  263  Ill.App.  312. 


28.  111.— Claflin    v.    Dunne,    21    N.B: 
834,    129   111.    241,    16   Am.S;R.    263. 

33  C.J.  p  1101  note  84. 
Bringing-  in  representatives 

In  action  claiming  undivided  inter- 
est in  land,  there  could.be  no  proper 
judgment  as  to  all  defendants  after 
death  of  one  defendant  subsequent 
to  submission  of  case  without,  bring- 
ing In  deceased's  representatives. — 
Murphy  v.  Blackburn,  16  S.W.2d  771, 
229  Ky.  109. 

29.  N.Y.— Hawkes  -v.   Clatty,  107  3ST. 
T.S,   534,   122  App.Div.  546,  ; 

30.  Ohio. — Swasey    v.'    Antram, '  24 
Ohio  St.  87.       '  , 

33  C.J.  p  1110  note  87." 

31*  Ga. — Sanders  v. ,  Etcherson,  96 
Ga,  404— Hardwick  v.  Hatfleld,  119 
S-B.  430,  30  Ga.App.  7$0. 

33  C.J.  p  1110  note  89. 

Death  of  costipulator  as  not.  affect- 
ing right  to  judgment  against 
stipulator  in  admiralty  proceeding 
see  Admiralty  I  161. 

32.  Cal, — Sham  v.  Forbes,  23  P. 
198,  82  Cal.  577— Howe  v.  Chand- 
ler, 1  Cat  167.  "  .-,]"".. 


30 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


before  judgment  has  been  applied  where  one  of  two 
joint  parties  die  after  verdict33  In  an  action  by 
several  plaintiffs,  the  death  of  a  plaintiff  whose 
cause  of  action  dies  with  him  does  not  abridge  the 
court's  right  to  enter  judgment  in  favor  of  the 
surviving  plaintiffs.34  Plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to 
judgment  against  a  defendant  as  to  whom  the  ven- 
ue was  proper  only  during  the  time  a  codefendant, 
who  died  during  the  pendency  of  the  action  without 
its  revival  against  his  administrator,  was  a  party 
to  the  action.35 

§  30.    Joint  Parties 

Under  the  codes  and  practice  acts  the  Judgment 
may  determine  the  ultimate  rights  of  all  parties. 

Under  various  codes  and  practice  acts  the  court, 
in  rendering  judgment,  may  determine  the  ultimate 
rights  of  all  the  parties  to  the  controversy,36  and 
may  render  as  many  judgments,  joint,  separate,  and 
cross,  as  may  be  necessary  to  adjust  the  rights  of 
the  several  parties.87 

§  31.    Plaintiffs  Generally 

At  common  law  where  several  plaintiffs  Join  in  an 
action  all  must  recover  or  none;  but  under  the  various 
statutes  and  practice  acts  Judgment  is  authorized  in  fa- 
vor of  such  plaintiffs,  as  show  themselves  entitled  to  re- 
cover, although  others  fail. 

At  common  law,  and  in  the  absence  of  statute 
changing  the  rule,  where  several  plaintiffs  join  in  a 


common-law  action,  all  must  recover  or  none,  and 
if  only  some  of  the  plaintiffs  have  a  right  of  ac- 
tion, the  suit  must  fail  as  to  all.38  The  rule  ap- 
plies to  actions  on  obligations  alleged  to  be  due 
plaintiffs  jointly,39  and  in  some  jurisdictions  has 
been  limited  to  actions  in  which  plaintiffs  assert  a 
joint  right  or  title.40  It  has  been  applied  to  ac- 
tions ex  contractu  in  which  a  joint  obligation  or  in- 
debtedness to  all  plaintiffs  is  alleged,4*  to  actions 
for  contribution,42  and  to  actions  to  recover  land 
in  which  a  joint  title  is  alleged  in  the  plaintiffs,43 
such  as  actions  in  ejectment.44  Qn  the  other  hand, 
judgment  has  been  permitted  in  favor  of  fewer  than 
all  the  plaintiffs  in  actions  founded  on  tort,  as  an 
action  for  conversion,45  in  proceedings  to  cancel  a 
chattel  mortgage,46  and  in  ejectment  where  the 
plaintiff  entitled  to  recover  is  trustee  of  his  co- 
plaintiffs47  or  where  a  plaintiffs  right  to  recover 
is  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations.48 

Under  the  various  codes  and  practice  acts  judg- 
ment is  authorized  in  favor  of  any  plaintiff  who 
shows  himself  entitled,  although  the  others  may 
fail,49  as  where  the  claims  of  the  several  plaintiffs 
are  distinct,  although  sufficiently  united  by  a  com- 
mon interest  to  authorize  their  joinder  in  a  single 
suit;50  and,  even  though  the  coplaintiffs  are  enti- 
tled to  share  in  the  recovery,  a  judgment  awarding 
the  entire  recovery  to  one  plaintiff  alone  is  not 


33.  N.T.— Long:  V.    Stafford,    8   N.E. 
522,  103  N.Y.  274. 

84  C.J.  p   76  note  67   [a]    (5). 

34.  Cal.— Liuzza   v.    Bell,    104    P.2d 
1095,  40  Cal.App.2d  417. 

35.  Ark.— Murrell       v.       Exchange 
Bank,    271   S.W.   21,   168   Ark.    645, 
44  A.L.R.  1391. 

36.  Neb.— Whaley  v.  Matthews,  287 
N.W.  205,  1-86  Neb.  767, 

Death  of  one  Joint  party  see  supra 
5  29. 

37.  Miss.— Aven  v.  -Singleton,  96  So. 
165,  132  Miss.  256. 

38.  Ala.— Sharpe    v.    McCloud,    199 
So.  848,  240  Ala.  499. 

Fla. — Sahlberg  v.  J.  A.  Teague  Fur- 
niture Co.,  130  So.  432,  100  Fla. 
972. 

Oa. — Powell  v.  Porter,  5  S.B.2d  884, 
189  Ga.  440. ' 

HI.— Misek  v.  Village  of  La  Grange, 
239  I11.APP.  360. 

Mo.— Tore  v.  Tore,  144  S.W.  847,  240 
Mo.  451. 

33  C.J.  p  1110  note  92. 

Conformity  to  pleadings  with  re- 
spect to  parties  see  Infra  §  51. 

38.  Mo.— Dietrich  v.  Mothershead, 
App.,'150  S.W.2d  565— McLaran  v. 
Wilhelm,  50  Mo.App.  658. 


40.  Ala.— Henderson  v.  J.  B.  Brown 
Co.,  28  So.  79,  125  Ala.  566. 

33  C.J.  p  1110  note  92  [a]. 

41.  Fla,— Sahlberg  v.   J.  A.   Teague 
Furniture  Co.,  130  So.  482,  100  Fla. 
972— Edgar  v.  Bacon,  122  So.  107, 
97  Fla.  679. 

42.  Ala. — Gafford  V.  Tittle,   141  So. 
653,  224  Ala.  605. 

Mo.— Tore    v.    Tore,    144    S.W.    847, 
240  Mo.  451. 

43.  Ga£ — Guess  v.   Morgan,   26  S.E. 
2d    424,    196    Ga.    265— Powell    v. 
Porter,   5   S.E.2d   884,  189   Ga.   440 
— Burton  v.  Patton,  1*34  S.E.  603, 
162  Ga.  610. 

44.  Ala.— Sharpe    v.    McCloud,    199 
So.    848,   240   Ala.   499— McLeod   v. 
Adams,  118  So.  636,  218  Ala.  424— 
Crow  v.  Smith,  92  So.  905,  207  Ala. 
311— Salter  v.  Fox,  67  So.  1006,  191 
Ala.    34— Whitlow    v.    Echols,    78 
Ala.  206. 

Ga. — Guess  v.  Morgan,  26  S.E.2d  424, 

196  Ga.  265. 
19  C.J.  p  1092  note  2,  p  1217  note  50. 

45.  Mo.— Walker    v.    Lewis,    124    S. 
W.  567,  140  Mo.App.  26. 

46.  Mo. — Harrety   v.    Kontos,    App., 
184  S.W.2d  195. 

47.  Ind.— Adler   v.    Sewell,    29   Ind. 
598. 

74 


48.  Ga.— Pendergrast  v.  Gullatt,  10 
Ga.  218. 

49.  Cal.— Liuzza   v.    Bell,    104    P.2d 
1095,  40  Cal.App.2d  417— Wiseman 
v.  -Sklar,  285  P.  1081,  104  CaLApp. 
369— Curtis  v.  Nye  &  Nissen,  261 
P.  747,  86  CaLApp.  507. 

Ind. — Rohan    v.    Gehring,    137    N.E. 

288,  80  IndApp.  46. 
Miss. — Aven  v.  Singleton,  96  So.  165, 

132  Miss.  256. 
Neb.— Hoffman  v.   Geiger,    279   N.W. 

350,  1<34  Neb.  643,  modified  on  oth- 
er grounds  281  N.W.  625,  135  Neb. 

349. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  City  of 

Sapulpa  v.  Toung,  296  P.  418,  430, 

147  Okl.  179. 
Tex — South    Dakota^Texas    Oil    Co. 

v.   Hackworth,  Civ.App.,    248   S.W. 

813,  error  dismissed. 
33  C.J.  p  1110  note  93. 
Equitable  precedents  controlling 

The  code  provisions  are  in  sub- 
stance enactments  of  rules  of  equi- 
ty pleading  and  practice  and  equita- 
ble precedents  control  their  con- 
struction or  effect. — Bonde  v.  Stern, 
14  N.W.2d  249,  73  N.D.  273. 

50.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
City  of  Sapulpa  v.  Toung,  296  P. 
418,  430,  147  Okl.  179. 

33  C.J.  p  1111  note  94. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


void.51  The  authorization  for  such  a  judgment  has 
been  held  to  apply  in  all  actions,  whether  in  law  or 
equity,52  and  in  actions  ex  contractu53  and  in  eject- 
ment.54 In  equity,  the  common-law  rule  has  no 
application,  and  a  decree  may  be  rendered  for  one 
or  more  joint  plaintiffs  and  against  others,  as  jus- 
tice and  equity  in  the  particular  case  may  require, 
as  discussed  in  Equity  §  601. 

A  judgment  against,  coplaintiffs  is  void  as  to  a 
plaintiff  over  whom  the  court  does  not  have  juris- 
diction;55 but  in  jurisdictions  where  a  judgment  is 
not  regarded  as  an  entirety,  which  is  either  good  or 
bad  as  to  all,  the  invalidity  of  a  judgment  as  to  one 
of  two  or  more  coplaintiffs  against  whom  it  is  ren- 
dered will  not  vitiate  it  as  to  the  others.56  Where 
an  action  should  have  been  dismissed  as  to  one  of 
two  defendants  on  plaintiff's  motion  therefor,  it  has 
been  held  that  a  judgment  entered  on  the  other  de- 
fendant's cross  bill  cannot  determine  issues  between 
plaintiff  and  the  defendant  as  to  whom  the  action 
should  have  been  dismissed.57 

Joint  or  several  judgment;  separate  judgments. 
A  judgment  in  favor  of  joint  plaintiffs  should  be 
joint  if  their  cause  of  action  is  joint;58  but  if  their 
cause  of  action  is  several  the  judgment  should  be 
several.^9  Thus  a  joint  recovery  on  separate,  sev- 
eral, and  independent  causes  of  action  in  favor  of 
separate  plaintiffs  is  improper;60  in  such  case  a 
judgment  which  does  not  preserve  the  separate 
rights  of  each  in  the  total  recovery  is  illegal.61 
However,  the  failure  to  designate  the  amount 


awarded  to  each  of  the  plaintiffs  has  been  held  .not 
to  be  error  where  only  one  plaintiffs  cause  was 
actually  tried  and  the  judgment  is  for  plaintiff,  in 
the  singular.62  In  some  jurisdictions  a  judgment 
which  does  not  dispose  of  the  case  as  to  all  the 
plaintiffs  is  erroneous;63  but  under  some  statutes 
the  common-law  restriction  against  the  rendition  of 
more  than  one  judgment  in  an  action  has  been 
changed  so  as  to  permit  the  rendition  of  as  many 
separate  judgments  as  are  necessary  to  adjust  the 
rights  of  the  several  plaintiffs.64 

§  32.    Relief  as  between  Coplaintiffs 

Under  various  statutes  a  judgment  determining  the 
ultimate  rights  of  the  plaintiffs  as  between  themselves 
is  authorized. 

Under  the  statutes  and  practice  acts  in  a  num- 
ber of  jurisdictions  the  judgment  may  determine 
the  ultimate  rights  of  the  plaintiffs  as  between 
themselves.65 

§  33.    Defendants  Generally 

a.  In  general 

b.  Entirety  of  judgment 

c.  Process  against  joint  defendants 

a.  In  General 

The  common -law  rule  requiring  Judgment  fn  an  ac- 
tion against  several  defendants  to  be  against  all  or  none 
has  generally  been  changed  by  statute  so  as  to  permit 
judgment  against  some  or  all  of  the  defendants. 

*^a 
At  common  law,  and  in  the  absence  of  statute 


51.  Tex.— Chandler  v.  Stewart,  Civ. 
AppM    90    S.W,2d    590,    error    dis- 
missed. 

52.  N.D.— Bonde  v.  Stern,  14  N.W.2d 
249,  73  N.D.  273. 

53.  Ind.— Rohan  v.  Gehring,  137  N. 
E.  288,  80  Ind.App.  46. 

N.Y. — Comerford  v.  Fahy  Market, 
198  N.T.S.  3-53,  204  App.Div.  533. 

54.  Tenn. — Ferguson  v.  Prince,  190 
S.W.  548, 136  Tenn.  543. 

19  C.J.  p  1092  note  1,  p  1217  notes 
51  [b],  52. 

66.    Cal.— Tracy  v.  Maclntyre,  84  P. 

2d   526,    29   Cal.App.2d   145. 
Plaintiff  not  notified 

A  judgment  against  coplaintiffs 
for  attorney  fees  of  an  attorney  dis- 
missed on  a  motion  to  substitute  at- 
torneys is  void  as  to  a  plaintiff  who 
was  not  notified  of  and  did  not  ap- 
pear at  the  hearing  on  the  motion. — 
Tracy  v.  Maclntyre,  supra. 

66.  CaL — Tracy  v.  Maclntyre,  su- 
pra, 

57.  U.S.— «auter  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 
C.C.A.I11.,  8  F.2d  121. 

Effect  of  dismissal  or  nonsuit  on  de- 
fendant's right  to  affirmative  re- 


lief see  Dismissal  and  Nonsuit  § 
39  b. 

Plaintiff's  right  to  dismiss  as  to  one 
or  more  codefendants  see  Dismiss- 
al and  Nonsuit  §§  30-32. 
58,    Ind. — Wheeler    v.    Hawkins,    19 

N.B.  470,  116  Ind.  515. 
33  C.J.  p  1126  note  22. 
$9.    Cal. — Emery  v.  Pacific  Employ- 
ers  Ins.  Co.,   67  P.2d   1046,  8  Cal. 
2d  663. 

33  C.J.  p  1126  note  22. 
Action  under  Pair  labor  Standards 

Act 

In  action  by  employees  on  behalf 
of  themselves  and  other  employees 
similarly  situated  to  recover  over- 
time compensation  under  Fair  Labor 
Standards  Act,  a  joint  judgment  may 
not  be  had. — Smith  v.  Stark  Truck- 
Ing,  D.C.Ohio,  53  F.Supp.  826. 
60.  Teac. — First  Nat  Bank  v.  Cros- 

sett,  Civ.App.,  268  S.W.  997. 
Wyo. — Taylor   v.   Stockwell,    145    P. 
743,  22  Wyo.  492,  rehearing  denied 
147  P.  3-28,  22  Wyo.  492. 
33  C.J.  p  1111  note  94  [a]. 

«L  N.J.— Musto  v.  Mitchell,  146  A. 
212,  105  NJT.Law  575— Wilson  v. 
Deschner,  167  A.  670,  11  N.J.Miac, 

75 


609 — Warner  v.  Public  Service  Co- 
ordinated Transport,  153  A..  711,  9 
N.J.Misc.  328. 

62.  N.J.— Melber   v.    Great  Atlantic 
&  Pacific  Tea  Co.,  167  A.   746,   11 
N.J.Misc.  635. 

63.  Colo.— -Shaw   v.    Brady,    251    P. 
532,  80  Colo.  337. 

64.  Miss. — Aven  v.  Singleton,  96  So. 
165,  132  Miss.  256. 

Rendition     of    separate     judgments 
against  several  defendants  see  in- 
fra §  36  c. 
Plaintiff  suing  ia  double  capacity 

Where  same  party  suing  Individ* 
ually  and  as  administratrix  in  one 
action  recovers  both  for  death  ben- 
efits payable  to  her  and  sick  bene- 
fits payable  to  decedent,  judgments 
for  the  death  benefits  should  be  en- 
tered in  her  own  name,  and  judff^ 
ment  for  sick  benefits  entered  sepa* 
rately  in  her  representative  capaci- 
ty.—Wallace  v.  Patriotic  Order  Sons 
of  America,  Washington  Camp  No. 
50,  189  A.  712,  125  Pa, Super.  268. 

66.    Cal.-— Curtis   v.   Nye   &   Nissen, 

261  P.  747,  '86  Cal.App.  507.      * 
In  eaulty  see  Equity  $603. 


33 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


changing  the  rule,  if  several  defendants  are  joined 
in  an  action  recovery  ordinarily  must  be  for  or 
-  against  all  or  none,66  at  least  in  an  action  in  which 
the  liability  asserted  is  joint67  In  many  states, 
however,  under  the  codes  and  practice  acts  therein 
or  authorized  rules  of  court,  judgment  may  be  given 
for  or  against  one  or  more  of  several  defendants, 
and  in  an  action  against  several  defendants  the 
court  may  in  its  discretion  render  judgment  against 
one  or  more  of  them,  leaving  the  action  to  proceed 
against  the  others  whenever  a  several  judgment  is 
proper.68  Such  statutes  were  intended  to  create  a 
common  procedure  for  both  actions  ex  contractu 
and  ex  delicto,69  and  to  apply  to  all  actions  founded 
on  contract  the  same  rule  with  regard  to  the  right 
of  recovery  against  some  of  the  defendants  which 
prevails  at  common  law  in  the  case  of  actions  found- 
ed on  torts,70  or,  as  some  authorities  say,  to  adopt 
the  rule  prevailing  in  equity  as  to  joint  defend- 
ants.71 

Under  such  statutes  the  court  possesses  chancery 
powers  and  may  adapt  its  judgment  to  the  rights  of 


the  parties  as  found  from  the  facts  established  from 
the  evidence.72  If  a  plaintiff  sues  two  or  more  de- 
fendants on  a  liability  alleged  to  be  joint,  or  joint  - 
and  several,  he  is  no  longer  compelled  to  establish 
a  joint  cause  of  action  against  all,  but  a  judgment 
may  be  taken  against  the  party  or  parties  shown  to 
be  liable,  when  the  others  are  not  liable,78  and  in 
favor  of  defendant  or  defendants  found  not  liable.74 
Plaintiff  is  not  required  to  elect  before  completion 
of  the  trial  whether  he  will  ask  for  a  joint  judgment 
against  all  the  defendants  sued  or  a  several  judg- 
ment against  one  of  them.75 

A  statute  which  authorizes  judgment  against  such 
defendants  as  are  defaulted  or  on  trial  are  found 
liable  has  been  held  not  to  enable  the  court,  on 
sustaining  a  demurrer  as  to  one  defendant,  to  pro- 
ceed to  trial  and  enter  judgment  against  the  re- 
maining defendants.76  Since  an  amendment  cannot 
be  made  which  effects  an  entire  change  of  parties 
defendant,  as  discussed  in  the  CJ.S.  title  Parties  §§ 
72,  85,  also  47  CJ.  p  131  note  28,  p  161  note  20- 
p  162  note  37,  if  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover 


66.  Fla. — Harrington     v.     Bowman, 
US  So.  651,  106  Fla.  86. 

67.  Pa. — Bauman  v.   Blttner,   33  A. 
2d  273.   152   Pa.Super.   628. 

68.  Ala.— Pollard  v.  Rogers,  173  So. 
881,  234  Ala,  92. 

Ariz. — Bracker  Stores  v.  Wilson,  103 

P.2d  253,  55  Ariz.  403. 
Cal.— Trans-Pacific    Trading    Co.    v. 

Patsy  Frock  &  Romper  Co.,  209 
i  P.  357,  189  Cal.  509— Weisz  v.  Mc- 
1  See,  87  P.2d  379,  31  Cal.App.2d 
1  144,  rehearing  denied  88  P.2d  200, 

31  Cal.App.2d  144. 
Colo.— Beatty    v.    Resler,    118    P.2d 

1084,  108  Colo.  434. 
Conn. — Woodruff  v.   Perroti,    122   A, 

452,  99  Conn.  639. 
Ind.— Fidelity     &     Deposit     Co.     of 

Maryland  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  199 

N.E.  169,  101  Ind.App.  301. 
Mich. — Rimmele  v.  Huebner,  157  N. 

W.  10,  190  Mich.  247. 
Neb.— Whaley  v.   Matthews,   287   N. 

W.^205,  136  Neb.  767. 
N.J. — Ordinary  of  State  v.  Bastian,  5 

AJ2d  463,  17  N.J.Misc.  105. 
NT.— Reeve  v.  Cromwell,   237  N.T. 

S.  20,  227  App.Div.  32. 
OkL— Corpus   Juris   quoted  in  City 

of  Sapulpa  v.  .Young,  296  P.  418, 

431,.  147  Okl.  179. 
Or, — Anderson    y.    Maloney,    225    P. 

318,  111  Or.  84— Fischer  v.  Bayer, 

216   P.    1028,   108   Or.  311. 
Tex. — Shaw    v.    Whitfleld,    Civ.App., 
.  3-5  S.W.2d  1115— Collins  v.  Stiiger, 

CivJVjpp.,  253  S.W.  572. 
S3  C.J.  p  1115  note  21. 
Additional  defendants 

The  statute  applies  to  additional 
defendants  brought  on  the  record  by 
scir-e  facias  proceeding-  where  "the 


original  defendant  alleges  that  they 
are  Jointly  liable  with  him.— Carroll 
v.  Kirk,  19  A.2d  584,  144  Pa.Super. 
211. 

69.  Ark. — OBerryman       v.       Cudahy 
Packing    Co.,    87    S.W.2d    21,    191 
Ark.  533. 

70.  Ind.— Brandt    v.    Hall,    82    N.E. 
929,  40  Ind.App.  651. 

33  C.J.  p  1117  note  25. 
Common-law  rule  in  actions  of: 

Contract  see  infra  §  34. 

Tort  see  infra  §  35. 

71.  N.D.— Bonde  v.   Stern,   14  N.W. 
2d  249,  73  N.D.  273. 

33  C.J.  p  1117  note  26. 

72.  Cal. — Fageol    Truck     &    Coach 
Co.  v.  Pacific  Indemnity  Co.,.  117  P. 
2d  669,  18  Cal.2d  748. 

Ind.— Fidelity     &    Deposit     Co.     of 
Maryland  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  199 
N.B.   169,    101   Ind.App.  301. 
Differentiation    of    liability    of    de- 
fendants 

In  action  against  principal  and 
guarantor  who  did  not  guarantee  en- 
tire debt,  judgment  which  allowed 
greater  recovery  against  principal 
than  against  guarantor  was  not 
duplicitous. — Baten  v.  Thornhill,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  145  S.W.2d  608,  srror  re- 
fused. 
Where  only  one  satisfaction .  per. 

mitted 

(1)  Decree  ordering  enforcement 
of  mortgage  debt  out  of  various 
properties  of  different  defendants 
but  providing  for  only  one  satisfac- 
tion of  the  debt  was  not  contradic- 
tory.— Gray  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Chicago,  51  N;R2d  797,  320  IlLApp. 

76 


682,    reversed   on    other    grounds   57 
N.B.2d  363,  388  111.  124. 

(2)  Judgment  permitting  note 
holder  to  recover  from  maker  and 
maker's  debtor  was  not  objectiona- 
ble as  allowing  double  recovery, 
where  judgment  provided  for  credit- 
ing maker  with  amount  collected 
from  his  debtor.  —  J.  C.  Whaley  Dum- 
ber Co.  v.  Citizens'  Nat  Bank  of 
Lubbock,  Tex.Civ.App.,  57  S.W.2d 
637. 

73.    Ga.  —  Farley  v.   Groover,  3  S.E. 

2d  135,  60  Ga.App.  169. 
Iowa.  —  Lull  v.  Anamosa  Nat.  Bank, 

81  N.W.  784,  110  Iowa  -537. 
La,—  Raphiel    v.    Louisiana    Ry.    & 

Nav.  Co.,  99  So.  459,  155  La.  590. 
Mass.  —  Mackintosh  v.  Chambers,  190 

N.E.  38,  285  Mass.  594. 
Nev.  —  Ward  v.  -Scheeline  Banking-  & 

Trust  Co.,  22  P.2d  358,  54  Nev.  442. 
Or.  —  Fischer  v.  Bayer,  210  P.  453, 

108  Or.  311. 
Vt—  C.  B.  Johnson  &  Co.  v.  Marsh, 

15  A.2d  577,  111  Vt.  266,  131  AJU 

R.  '502—  F.  S.  Fuller  &  Co.  v.  Mor- 

rison, 169  A.   9,  106  Vt.  22. 
33  C.J.  p  1115  note  24. 
In  actions  against  partners  see  the 

C.J.S.  title  Partnership  §  235,  also 

47  C.J.  p  1010  note  l-s>  1011  note 

11. 


74.    Mo.—  Wippler  v.  Hohn,  110 

2d  409,  341  Mo.  780: 
33  £.J.  p  1127  note  26. 


76.    Mich.  —  Rimmele      v.      Huebner, 
157  N.W.  1$,  190  Mich.  247. 

76.    Mass.—  Riley  v.  Burns,  22  NJEB. 
2d  761,  304  Mass.  15. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  33 


against  the  original  defendant  judgment  cannot  be 
had  against  a  new  defendant  brought  into  the  case, 
unless  he  consents  thereto.77 

Abatement  as  to  some  of  defendants.  In  an  ac- 
tion against  several  defendants  on  a  joint  obliga- 
tion a  judgment  in  abatement  in  favor  of  one  of 
the  defendants  on  his  plea  of  privilege  as  to  venue, 
applicable  to  himself  alone,  has  been  held  to  be  er- 
toneous.78 

b.  Entirety  of  Judgment 

In  some  jurisdictions  a  judgment  against  several  de- 
fendants is  an  entirety,  and  if  erroneous  or  void  as  to 
any  of  them  is  equally  so  as  to  all;  but  In  other  Ju- 
risdictions the  rule  I*  otherwise. 

According  to  some  authorities  a  judgment  against 
two  or  more  defendants  jointly  is  regarded  as  an 
entirety,79  whether  rendered  in  a  contract  or  tort 
action,80  so  that,  if  it  is  irregular  or  erroneous81 
or  void82  as  to  any  of  the  defendants,  it  is  equally 
so  as  to  all.  According  to  other  authorities,  how- 
ever, a  judgment  against  two  or  more  defendants 
is  not  regarded  as  an  entirety,8^  and  a  judgment 
may  be  valid  and  enforceable  as  to  one  or  some  of 
defendants,  although  voidable  or  void  as  to  oth- 
ers,84 at  least  in  actions  ex  delicto.85  Decisions 
even  within  the  same  jurisdiction  are  sometimes  in 


conflict  as  to  the  entirety  of  judgments.88  In  some 
of  the  decisions  it  has  been  stated  that  the  com- 
mon-law rule  that  judgments  are  entireties  is  ef- 
fective only  in  exceptional  cases,87  that  the  rule 
has  been  relaxed  in  some  cases  in  the  interest  of 
justice  where  error  is  found  as  to  one  party  only,88 
and  that  the  rule  is  not  applicable  to  judgments  in 
actions  in  rem.89 

c.  Process  against  Joint  Defendants 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Resident  and  nonresident  joint  de- 

fendants 

(3)  Statutory  joint  judgment 

(4)  Statutory  separate  judgment 

(1)  In  General 

In  an  action  against  several  defendants,  only  some 
of  whom  were  duly  served  with  process,  Judgment  against 
all  is  void  as  to  the  defendants  not  served;  and,  un- 
less the  rule  is  changed  by  statute,  it  Is  void  as  to  the 
others  If  the  Judgment  Is  considered  as  an  entirety.  If 
judgment  is  rendered  against  only  the  defendants  served 
with  process,  it  is  erroneous  or  voidable  where  the  ac- 
tion is  on  a  Joint  contract,  unless  the  statutes  provide 
otherwise. 

In  general,  as  discussed  supra  §§  19,  23,  a  judg- 
ment against  persons  over  whom  the  court  has  not 
acquired  jurisdiction  is  void.  Accordingly,  if  there 


77.  Ala. — Covington  v.   Robinson,    6 
So.2d  421,  242  Ala.  337— McKelvey- 
Coats  Furniture  Co.  v.  Doe,  198  So. 
128,  240  Ala.  135— Roth  v.  Scruggs, 
106  So.  182,  214  Ala.  32. 
Situation  does  not  arise  until  the 

evidence  is  in  If  the  plaintiff  con- 
tends that  both  parties  are  liable. 
-— McKelvey-Coats  Furniture  Co.  v. 
Doe,  199  So.  128,  240  Ala.  135. 

78.  Fla, — Universal    Credit    Co.     v. 
Beckwith,    172    So.    -358,    126    Fla. 
865. 

Necessity  for  two  or  more  defend- 
ants to  plead  grounds  of  abate- 
ment separately  or  jointly  seel 
Abatement  and  Revival  §  188  c. 

79.  111.— State   Bank  of  Prairie   du: 
Bocher  v.  Brown,  263  Ill.App.  312 
— Sergo  v.  Bloch,  263  llLApp.  198. 

Mo.— Neal  v.  Curtis  &  Co.  Mfg.  Co., 
41  S.W.2d  543,  328  Mo.  389. 

33  C.J.  p  1130  note  59. 

Entirety  of  judgments  generally  see 
supra  §  3. 

.80.    111.— State   Bank  of  Prairie   du 
Rocher  v.  Brown,  263  Ill.App.  312. 

81.  111.— Fredrich  v.  Wolf,  50  N.E.2d 
755,  383  111.  638— Sergo  v.  Bloch, 
263  Ill.App.  198. 

Mo.— Neal' v.  Curtis  &  Co.  Mfg.  Co., 

„  41   S.W.2d  543,   328  Mo.  389. 

33  C.J.  p  1130  note  59. 

Death  of  party  see  supra  §  29. 

Reversal  as  to  some  of  the  parties 
and  affirmance  as  to  others  on  ap- 


peal or  writ  of  error   see  Appeal 
and  Error  §§  1919-1922. 

82.  111.— State    Bank   of   Prairie    du 
Rocher  v.  Brown,   263  ULApp.  312 
— Berkemeier  v.  Dormuralt  Motor 
Sales,    263    ULApp.    211— Singer  v. 
Cross,  257  IlLApp.  41. 

Me. — Consolidated  Rendering  Co.   v. 

Martin,    145    A.    896,    128    Me.    96, 

64  A.L.R.  790. 
33  C.J.  p  1119  note  37,   p  1130  note 

59. 

83.  .  Ky. — Reed  v.  Runyan,   10   S.W. 
2d  824,  226  Ky.  261. 

Miss. — Bank  of  Philadelphia  v.  Pos- 
ey,  92  So.  840,  130  Miss.  530,  sug- 
gestion of  error  sustained  on  oth- 
er grounds  95  So.  134,  130  Miss. 
825. 

33  C.J.  p  1130  note  60. 

84.  Ky. — Reed   v.  Runyan,    10    S.W. 
2d  824,  226  Ky.  261. 

Okl.— Bledsoe  v.   Green,    280   P.   301, 

138  Okl.  15. 
Pa. — Merchants    Banking   Trust   Co. 

v.  Klimosky,  9  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  143, 

23  Sch.Leg.Rec.  78. 
Tex.— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co. 

v.  Richey,  Civ.App.,  18  S.W.2d  231, 

error  refuser'. 
33  C.J.  p  1130  note  60. 

85.  Minn. — Engstrand    v.    Kleftman, 
90    N.W.    1054,    86    Minn.    40-3,    91 
Am.S.R.  359. 

86.  Mo.— Mclntosh  v.  Wiggins,   191 
S.W.2d    637,    certiorari    denied    66 
S.Ct    1015— Neal   v.   Curtis '&  Coil 

77 


Mfg.   Co.,   41   S.W.2d   543,    328   Mo. 

389. 

33  C.J.  p  1131  note  61. 
In  Mississippi' 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment at  law  is  an   entirety  and  is 
valid  or  invalid  as  a  whole. — Bout- 
well  v.  Grayson,  79  So.  61,  118  Miss. 
80— Carrollton    Hardware    &    Imple- 
ment Co.  v.  Marshall,   78   So.  7,   117 
Miss.  224 — Comenitz  v.  Bank  of  Com- 
merce, 38  So.  35,  85  Miss.  662— Weis 
v.    Aaron,    21   So.    763,    75   Miss.    138, 
65  Am.S.R.  594. 

(2)  These     cases,     however,    have 
been    overruled. — Bank   of   Philadel- 
phia v.  Posey,   92  So.  840,  130  Miss. 
530,  suggestion  of  error  sustained  on 
other  grounds  95  So.  134,  130  Miss. 
825. 

(3),  The  overruled  decisions  will 
control  the  validity  of  a  judgment 
which  affects  property  rights  where 
it  was  rendered  prior  to  the  time 
they  were  overruled. — Bank  of  Phil- 
adelphia v.  Posey,  95  So.  134,  130 
Miss.  825. 

8(7.    Mo. — State  v.  Blakemore,  205  S. 
W.  626,  275  Mo.  695. 

88.  Mo.— Neal  v.  Curtis  &  Co.  Mfg. 
Co.,   41   S.W.2d  543,   328  Mo.   389— 
Stotler  v,  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  98 
S.W.  509,  200  Mo.  107. 

89.  Mo.— Mclntosh  v.  'Wiggins,   191 
S.W.2d    537,    certiqrarj    denied    66 
S.Ct.  1015. 


33 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


are  several  defendants,  all  must  be  served  with 
process  or  appear  in  the  action  in  order  to  warrant 
a  judgment  against  all;9^  and,  where  none  was 
properly  served  with  process  or  made  an  appear- 
ance in  the  action,  a  personal  judgment  against 
such  defendants  is  void,91  A  judgment  against  all 
the  defendants,  some  of  whom  were  not  served  with 
process  and  did  not  appear  in  the  action,  is  void  as 
to  the  absent  defendant  or  defendants,92  and  at  com- 
mon law  and  in  the  absence  of  statute  changing  the 
rule  is  at  least  erroneous  and  voidable  as  to  all  the 
defendants.93  In  jurisdictions  where  a  judgment  is 
considered  as  an  entirety  and  if  void  as  to  one 
party  is  void  as  to  all,  discussed  supra  subdivision 
b  of  this  section,  such  a  judgment  is  absolutely  void 
as  to  all.94  However,  in  jurisdictions  where  judg- 
ments are  not  considered  as  an  entirety,  such  a 
judgment  is  at  most  voidable  and  not  void  as  to  the 
defendants  who  were  served  with  process  or  ap- 
peared;95 and  in  some  jurisdictions  if  the  action  is 
ex  delicto  the  judgment  is  valid  and  binding  against 
the  defendants  served  with  process.96  Under  the 
codes  and  practice  acts  in  various  jurisdictions  the 
judgment  is  valid  and  binding  against  parties  over 
whom  the  court  had  jurisdiction  by  proper  service 
of  process  or  appearance,97  or  at  least  it  is  an  er- 
ror or  irregularity  of  which  the  defendants  served 
cannot  complain.98 

f 

90.    I1L— Werner  v.  W.  H.  Shons  Co- 
173  N.B.  486,  341  111.  478. 


At  common  law  and  in  the  absence  of  statute 
changing  the  rule,  a  judgment  against  only  the  de- 
fendants served  with  process  or  appearing  is  er- 
roneous and  voidable  as  to  them  in  an  action  on  a 
joint  contract  against  several  defendants,  some  of 
whom  were  not  subjected  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  by  due  service  of  process  or  appearance,99 
it  having  been  the  rule  under  the  early  common 
law  that,  where  several  defendants  were  sued  on  a 
joint  contract,  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  judg- 
ment against  any  of  them,  until  all  were  served 
with  process,  or  until  those  not  served  were  prose- 
cuted to  outlawry.1  Under  some  statutes  the  fail- 
ure to  obtain  service  of  process  on  some  of  sev- 
eral defendants  will  not  affect  the  validity  of  a 
judgment  against  the  others  in  an  action  on  a  joint 
and  several  obligation;2  and  under  others  it  has 
been  held  that  in  an  action  against  several  defend- 
ants on  a  joint  obligation  judgment  may  properly 
be  taken  against  one,  or  fewer  than  all,  where  the 
other  defendants  were  nonresidents  not  served  with 
process.3  A  voluntary  general  appearance  for  de- 
fendants not  served  will  confer  jurisdiction  and  per- 
mit a  judgment  against  all.4  Statutes  in  derogation 
of  the  common  law,  and  authorizing  judgment 
jointly  against  all  defendants  on  process  served  on 
only  some  of  them,  discussed  infra  subdivision  c 
(3)  of  this  section,  or  a  several  judgment  against 


91.  Ky.— Viall   v.   Walker,   58   S.W. 
2d  415,  248  Ky.  197. 

In  discovery  proceeding1  after 
judgment,  however,  the  court  under 
some  statutes  has  been  held  to  have 
Jurisdiction  to  render  personal  judg- 
ment on  service  of  summons  against 
defendants  out  of  county,  even 
though  none  resided,  or  was  served, 
within  county. — Viall  v.  Walker,  su- 
pra. 

92.  Ga. — Hicks  v.  Bank  of  Wrights- 
ville,  194  S.B.  892,  £7  Ga.App.  233. 

Ky.— Capper  v.  Short,  11  S.W.2d  717, 
226  Ky.  689. 

Miss.— Bank  of  Philadelphia  v.  Pos- 
ey,  92  So.  840,  130  Miss.  530,  sug- 
gestion of  error  sustained  on  oth- 
er grounds,  95  So.  134,  1-30  Miss. 
825. 

N.C.— Crocker  v.  Vann,  135  S.E.  127, 
192  N.C.  422. 

Okl.— Bledsoe  v.  Green,  280  P.  301, 
138  Okl.  15. 

Tenn.— Ridgeway  v.  Bank  of  Ten- 
nessee, 11  Humph.  523 — Galbraith 
v.  Kirby,  109  S.W.2d  1168,  21  Tena 
App.  303. 

33  C.J.  p  1118  note  34. 

Statutory  joint  judgment  see  infra 
subdivision  c  (3).  of  this  section. 


93.  Ky.—  Capper  v.  Short,  11  S.W.2d 
717,  226  Ky.  689. 

33  C,J.  p  1119  note  35. 

94.  Me.  —  Buffum    v.    Ramsdell,    65 
Me.  252,  92  Am.D.  589. 

33  C.J.  p  1119  note  36. 

95.  Ky.  —  Capper  v.   Short,    11   S.W. 
2d  717,  226  Ky.  689. 

83  C.J.  p  1119  note  38. 

96.  Minn.  —  Engstrand    v.    Kleffman, 
90    N.W.    1054,    86    Minn.    40.3,    91 
Am.S.R.  359. 

97.  Fla.—  Street  v.   Crosthwait,   183 
So.  820,  134  Fla.  158,  modified  on 
other  grounds  186  So,  516,  136  Fla. 
327. 

Miss.  —  Bank  of  Philadelphia  v.  Pos- 
ey,  92  So.  840,  130  Miss.  530,  sug- 
gestion of  error  sustained  on  other 
grounds  95  So.  134,  130  Miss.  825. 

Mo.—  Nations  v.  Beard,  267  S.W. 
19,  216  Mo.App.  33. 

Okl.—  Bledsoe  v.  Green,  280  P.  301, 
138  Okl.  15. 

Tex.  —  Taylor  v.  Hustead  &  Tucker, 
Civ.  App.,  248  S.W.  766,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  Com.  App.,  257  S.W. 
232. 

98.  Go.—  Hicks  v.  Bank  of  Wrights- 
ville,  194  S.E.  892,  57  Ga.App.  233. 

Mo.  —  State    ex    rel.    Cunningham   v. 
Haid,  40  S.W.2d  1048,  828  Mo.  208. 
33  C.J.  p  1119  note  40. 


99. 


Fla.  —  Harrington 

78 


v.     Bowman, 


136  So.  229,  102  Fla.  339,  modified 

on  other  grounds  143  So.  <651,  106 

Fla.  86. 

33  C.J.  p  1118  note  33. 
Process  or  appearance  see  supra  §5 

23-26. 

1.  Fla. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Har- 
rington v.   Bowman,   143   So.    661, 
653,  106  Fla.  86. 

33  C.J.  p  1118  note  81. 

2.  Ga.— Hicks  v.  Bank  of  Wrights- 
ville,  194  S.E.  892,  57  G*a.App.  233. 

3.  Mass.— Alfred      J.       Silberstein, 
Inc.,    v.   Nash,    10   N.B.2d    65,    298 
Mass.   170 — Lennon  v.  Cohen,   16-3 
N.E.  63,  264  Mass.  414. 

4*    Ala.— Eaton   v.    Harris,    42    Ala. 

491. 

33  C.J.  p  1119  note  41. 
Collateral  attack  where  appearance 

unauthorized  see  infra  §  424. 
Unauthorized  appearance 

Judgment  against  nonresident  de- 
fendant on  demurrer  filed  by  other 
defendants  and  purporting  to  include 
him  was  void  where  he  had  not  been 
served  with  process,  had  not  volun- 
tarily appeared  or  authorized  any 
attorney  to  appear  for  him,  and  had 
not  authorized  any  of  codefendants 
or  other  persons  to  employ  counsel 
for  him. — Street  v.  Dexter.  77  P.2d 
707,  182  Okl.  360. 


49 


JUDGMENTS 


§  33 


only  those  served,  discussed  infra  subdivision  c  (4) 
of  this  section,  must  be  strictly  construed  and  fol- 
lowed; judgment  is  authorized  only  in  cases  falling 
within  the  statute  as  thus  construed.* 

.  Construction  of  judgment.  Where  process  is 
served  only  on  some  of  the  defendants,  and  judg- 
ment is  taken  against  "defendants"  without  naming 
them,  and  without  any  appearance  of  those  not 
served,  the  judgment  will  be  understood  to  be  only 
against  those  who  were  duly  served.6 

(2)  Resident  and  Nonresident  Joint  Defend- 
ants 

In  the  absence  of  a  compliance  with  statutory  re- 
quirements, a  judgment  against  Joint  defendants,  resi- 
dents of  different  counties  or  districts,  Is  void  as  to  the 
nonresident  defendants. 

Under  statutes  authorizing  the  venue  of  actions 
against  several  defendants,  who  are  properly  joined 
as  such,  although  residents  of  different  counties,  to 
be  laid  in  the  county  where  one  of  them  resides  or 
is  summoned,  discussed  in  the  C.J.S.  title  Venue  §§ 
93-98,  also  67  CJ.  p  101  note  22-p  118  note  27, 
and  permitting  in  such  actions  the  issuance  and 
service  of  process  on  the  nonresident  defendants, 
discussed  in  the  C.J.S.  title  Process  §§  8,  32,  also  SO 
CJ.  p  451  notes  6-12,  p  475  note  1-p  476  note  13, 
a  judgment  taken  against  a  nonresident  of  the  coun- 
ty of  venue  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  the  stat- 
ute is  void  as  to  him;7  but  in  jurisdictions  where 
judgments  are  not  considered  as  an  entirety,  dis- 
cussed supra  subdivision  b  of  this  section,  it  is  not 
thereby  made  void  as* to  parties  who  were  properly 


served  with  process.*  Thus  a  judgment  against  a 
defendant  who  was  not  summoned  in  the  county  of 
venue  is  void  as  to  him  where  the  resident  and  non- 
resident defendants  were  improperly  joined  in  the 
action;9  and  it  is  likewise  void,  where  a  statute 
prohibits  judgment  in  such  case,  if  the  action  is 
discontinued  or  dismissed  as  to,10  or  judgment  is 
not  rendered  against,11  the  defendant  or  defend- 
ants residing  or  served  in  the  county  of  venue.  If, 
however,  the  nonresident  defendant  appears  and 
contests  the  court's  jurisdiction  over  him,  or  other- 
wise enters  his  appearance,  a  judgment  against  him 
is  at  most  erroneous  or  voidable.12 

(3)  Statutory  Joint  Judgment 
Under  various  joint  debtor  acts  a  Judgment  in  form 
against  all  the  defendants  may  be  rendered  In  an  action 
on  a  Joint  obligation  against  several  defendants,  some 
of  whom  were  not  served  with  process,  which  Is  good 
as  a  personal  Judgment  against  the  defendants  served 
and  enforceable  against  their  separate  property  and  the 
Joint  property  of  all,  located  within  the  state,  but  not 
against  the  individual  property  of  those  not  served. 

Under  a  class  of  statutes  commonly  known  as 
"joint  debtor  acts,"13  which  have  been  sustained  as 
essentially  constitutional,1*  and  which  were  enacted 
to  supersede  the  necessity  of  proceeding  to  outlawry 
against  one  not  found  or  brought  into  court,15  it 
has  been  held  that,  where  one  or  more  defendants 
are  sued  on  a  joint  obligation,  and  process  is  served 
on  one  or  more  but  not  on  all  defendants,  plaintiff 
may  proceed  against  those  served,  unless  the  court 
otherwise  directs,1*  and,  if  successful,  recover  a 
judgment  in  form  against  all  the  defendants,17 
which  is  good  as  a  personal  judgment  against  de- 


5.  Fla.— Davis  v.   First  Nat.   Bank 
&   Trust   Co.   of  Orlando,    150   So. 
633,    112    Fla.    485— Harrington    v. 
Bowman,   143  So.   651,   106  Fla,  86. 

33  C.J.  p  1119  note  45. 

6.  Ark.— Neal  v.  Singleton,  26  Ark. 
491. 

33  O.J.  p  1119  note  46. 

7.  Ky. — Hays   v.   Baker,    35    S.W.2d 
296,  237  Ky.  265. 

8.  Ky. — Reed  v.  Runyon,  10  S.W.2d 
824,  226  Ky.  261. 

9.  Ky. — Ramey  v.  Weddington,   105 
S.W.2d    824,    268    Ky.    675— Willis 
v.  Tomes,   132   S.W.  1043,   141  Ky. 
431. 

Collusive  Joinder  of  defendants  for 
the  sole  purpose  of  bringing  suit 
against  a  nonresident  of  the  county 
of  venue  will  render  judgment 
against  nonresident  void. — Wistrom 
v.  Forsling,  9  N.W.2d  294,  143  Neb. 
294,  rehearing  denied  and  opinion 
modified  on  other  grounds  14  N.W. 
2d  217,  144  Neb.  638. 
Joint  liability  not  shown 
Ky. — Ramey  v.  Weddington,  105  S. 

W.2d  824.  268  Ky.  675. 


10.    Ark. — Stiewel  v.  Borman,   37  S. 

W.  404,  .63  Ark.  30. 
Ky.— Ramey  v.   Weddington,   105    S. 

W.2d  824,  268  Ky.  675. 
67  C.J.  p  110  note  1   [b]    (3). 

lli    Ky. — Ramey  v.  Weddington,  su- 
pra. 
3d  C.J.  p  1085  note  26  [a]. 

12.  Ky. — Ramey  v.  Weddington,  su- 
pra—Hays   v.    Baker,     35    S.W.2d 
296,  237  Ky.  265. 

13.  U.S.— Hall  v.   Lanning,    HL,    91 
U.S.    160,   168,    23    LJBd.    271. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  City  of 
Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P.  418,  431, 
147  Okl.  179. 

Judgment  in  action  on  partnership 
obligation  where  some  of  partners 
not  served  with  process  see  the 
C.J.S.  title  Partnership  S  235,  also 
47  C.J.  p  1011  note  22-p  1013  note 
31. 

Sufficiency  of  service  of  process  on 
part  of  several  executors  or  ad- 
ministrators see  Executors  and 
Administrators  §  753. 

79 


14.  Okl.— Corpus    juris     quoted    in 
City  of  Sapulpa  v.  Young,   296  P. 
418,  431,  147  Okl.  179. 

33  C.J.  p  1119  note  48. 

15.  OkL — Corpus     Juris    quoted    in 
City  of  Sapulpa  v.  Young,   296  P. 
418,  431,  147  Okl.  179. 

33  CJ.  p  1119  note  49. 

le.    U.S.— Hall    v.    Lanning,    HL,    91 

U.S.'l'SO,  2i3  L.Ed.  271. 
Okl.— Corpus  JurU  quoted  in  City  of 

Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P.  418,  431, 

147  Okl.  179. 
Or.— Chagnot  v.  Labbe,   69  P.2d  949, 

157  Or.  280. 
33  C.J.  p  1120  note  50. 

17.    U.S.— Hall   v.    Lanning,    111.,    91 

U.S.  160,  23  L.Bd.  271. 
N.Y.— Kittredge   v.    Grannis,    165   N. 

B.    9S,    244    N.Y.    182— Kirsten    v. 

Chrystmos,    14   N.Y.S.2d   442. 
Okl.— Corpus  Juris  quoted,  in  City  of 

Capulpa  v.  Young,  296  P.  418,  431, 

147  OkL  179. 
Or. — Chagnot  v.  Labbe,   69  P.2d  949, 

157  Or.  280. 
33  C.J.  p  1120  note  51. 


33 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


f endants  who  were  served,  or  who  appeared,  and  is 
enforceable  against  their  separate  property,18  and 
the  joint  property  of  them  and  the  absent  defend- 
ant19 located  within  the  state,20  but  not  against  the 
latter's  individual  property.21 

Judgment  under  the  statute  is  not  authorized  un- 
less the  obligation  sued  on  is  the  joint22  contractu- 
al23 obligation  of  all  defendants.  A  judgment 
against  only  the  defendant  or  defendants  served  is 
erroneous.24  Nonresident  joint  debtors  are  within 
the  operation  of  the  statute,  and  property  within 
the  state  owned  jointly  by  nonresident  and  resident 
defendants  may  be  subject  to  the  judgment,25  but 
a  judgment  under  the  statute  against  a  citizen  of 
another  state,  as  an  absent  joint  debtor,  is  wholly 
void  in  every  other  state,  and  will  not  be  enforced 
or  given  any  effect.26  Other  similar  statutes  lim- 
ited to  particular  classes  of  cases,  such  as  actions 
on  bills  or  notes,  or  other  designated  instruments, 
have  been  enacted  from  time  to  time  in  different 
jurisdictions.27 

Such  a  judgment  is  not  good  and  binding  as  a 
personal  judgment  against  the  absent  defendant,28 
unless  made  so  by  the  statute,  in  which  event  it 
may  operate  as  a  personal  judgment  within  the  state 
where  rendered,29  subject  to  the  right  of  the  absent 


defendant  to  show  that  he  was  not  in  fact;  a  joint 
debtor,  and  that  therefore  the  judgment  against  him 
was  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  being  unauthor- 
ized by  statute.30  It  has  been  held  that  such  a  judg- 
ment will  not  support  an  action  against  him  on  the 
judgment  in  the  state  where  the  judgment  was  ren-' 
dered,31  although  the  rule  is  otherwise  under  some 
statutes,32  and  especially  not  in  the  courts  of  anoth- 
er state,33  and  is  not  entitled,  under  the  constitu- 
tion, to  full  faith  and  credit  in  other  states.34  It 
will  not  stop  the  running  of  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions in  favor  of  the  absent  defendant,35  or  merge 
or  bar  the  original  cause  of  action,36  at  least  not 
in  other  states,37  although  it  may  so  operate  in  the 
state,  where  rendered  if  the  statute  so  provides.38 
Such  judgments  have  no  other  force  or  effect  than 
such  as  has  been  expressly  given  to  them  by  the 
statutes,39  which  may,  and  sometimes  do,  make  the 
judgment  prima  facie  evidence  against  the  absent 
defendant,  reserving  to  him  the  right  to  contest  the 
merits  and  show  that  he  ought  not  to  have  been 
chargfed,40  while  under  other  statutes  the  judgment 
is  not  even  prima  facie  evidence  of  indebtedness.41 
A  joint  defendant  not  served  has  a  right  to  appear 
voluntarily  in  the  action  against  plaintiffs  objec- 
tion.42 A  statute  providing  that,  when  defendants 


18.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
City  of  Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P. 
418,  431,  147  Okl.  179. 

33  C.J.  p  1120  note  52. 

19.  N.Y.— Kittredge  v.  Grannis,  155 
N.B.  93,  244  N.Y.  182. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  City  of 
Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P.  418,  431, 
147  Okl.  179. 

33  C.J.  p  1120  note  52. 

20.  Okl.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    la 
•City  of  Sapulpa  v.  Young,   296  P. 
418,  431,  147  OkT;  179. 

33  C.J.  p  1120  note  €3. 

21.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    to 
City  of  Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P. 
418,  4-31,  147  Okl.  179. 

33  C.J.  p  1120  note  54. 

22.  N.Y.— Kittredge  v.  Grannis,  155 
N.E.  93,  244  N.Y.  182. 

Or. — Chagnot  v.  Labbe,  69  P.2d  949, 

157  Or.  280. 
33  C.J.  p  1121  note  55. 

23.  N.Y.— Kittredge  v.  Grannis,  155 
N,E.  93,  244  N.Y.  182. 

Claim  held  not  within  statute 

Claim  of  record  holder  of  bank 
stock  against  partnership  as  subse- 
quent purchaser,  for  indemnity  on 
account  of  assessment,  was  held  not 
claim  for  joint  indebtedness  on  con- 
tract, such  as  warranted  judgment 
against  both  debtors  where  only  one 
was  served. — Broderick  v.  Adamson, 
265  N.Y.S.  804,  148  Misc.  353,  revers- 
ed on  other  grounds  268  N.Y.S.  7*66, 


240  App.Div.  229,  and  modified  on 
other  grounds  269  N.Y.S.  700,  240 
App.Div.  202,  motion  denied  193  N. 
B.  287,  265  N.Y.  495,  and  affirmed 
196  N.B.  568,  267  N.Y.  538.  Affirmed 
277  N.Y.S.  951,  243  App.Div.  692,  and 
279  N.Y.S.  732,  244  App.Div.  707, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  200  N. 
B.  811,  270  N.Y.  260.  Affirmed  279 
N.Y.S.  753,  244  App.Div.  708,  affirm- 
ed 200  N.B.  797,  270  N.Y.  228.  Mod- 
ified on  other  grounds  285  N.Y.S. 
294,  246  App.Div.  268.  Affirmed  in 
part  287  N.Y.S.  322,  247  App.Div. 
711,  reversed  on  other  grounds  5 
N.B.2d  838,  272  N.Y.  816. 

24.  Wis.— Brawley    v.    Mitchell,    66 
N.W.  799,  92  Wis.  671. 

33  C.J.  p  1121  note  56. 

25.  N.Y.— -Kittredge  v.  Grannis,  155 
N.E.  93,  244  N.Y.  182. 

33  C.J.  p  1121  note  57. 

26.  U.S. — Gojdey  .v.  Morning  News, 
N.Y.,    15    S.Ct    559,    156   U.S.  .518, 
39  L.Ed.  517. 

33  C.J.  p  1121  note  58. 

27.  111. — Neal  v.  Pennington,  6"5  HI. 
App.  68. 

33  C.J.  p  1121  note  61. 

28.  U.S.— Hall  v.   Lanning,   HL,    91 
U.S.  160,  23  L.Bd.  271. 

33  C.J.  p  1121  note  62. 

29.  N.J.— Harker  v.  Brink,  24  N.J. 
Law  W. 

33  C.J.  p  1121  note  63. 

3a    N.J. — Harker  v.  Brink,  supra. 

80 


31.  Cal.— Tay  v.  Hawley,  39  Cal.  93. 
33  C.J.  p  1121  note  65. 

32.  N.Y. — Townsend    v.    Carman,    € 
Cow.     695,     affirmed     Carman     v* 
Townsend,  6  Wend.  206. 

33  C.J.  p  1121  note  66. 

33.  U.S.— Hall   v.    Lanning,   I1L,    91 
U.S.  160,  2«  L.Bd.  271. 

33  C.J.  p  1121  note  67. 

34.  U.S. — Hall  v.  Lanning,  supra. 
3-3  C.J.  p  1121  note  68. 

35.  N.Y.— Maples  v.  Mackey,   89  N. 
Y.  -146— Lane  v.  gaiter,  51  N.Y,  1. 

36.  N.Y.— Oakley    v.    Aspinwall,    4 
N.Y.  513. 

37.  Mass. — Odoiri  v.  Denny,  16  Gray 
114. 

38.  U.S. — D'Arcy   v.   Ketchum,    La., 
11  How.   1-65,  13  L.Ed.   648. 

39.  N.Y.— Oakley  v.  Aspinwall,  4  N. 
Y.  513, 

35  C.J.  p  1121  note  76. 

40.  U.S. — D'Arcy   v.   Ketchum*   La., 
17  How.  165,  13  L.Bd.  648. 

N.Y. — Townsend  v.  Carman,  6  Cow., 
695,  affirmed  Carman  v.  Townsend, 
6  Wend.  206. 

41.  N.Y.— -Morey  v.  Tracey,  92  N.Y. 
581. 

33  C.J.  p  1122  note  75. 

42.  N.Y.— McLoughlin  v.  Bieber,  51 

N.Y.S.  805,  26  Misc.  143. 
33  C.J.  p  1122  note  74. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  34 


are  joint  and  solidary  obligors,  they  may  be  cited 
at  the  domicile  of  any  one  of  them  does  not  give 
the  court  jurisdiction  to  render  a  judgment  in  per- 
sonam  against  a  nonresident  not  found  within  the 
state.43 

(4)  Statutory  Separate  Judgment 

Under  various  statutes  in  a  Joint  action  against  sev- 
era)  defendants,  some  of  whom  were  not  served  with 
process,  Judgment  may  be  rendered  against  those  served, 
excluding  the  others,  provided  the  statutory  conditions 
precedent  thereto  are  shown,  which  serrate  Judgment 
binds  the  Joint  property  of  all  the  defendants  and  the 
Individual  property  of  those  served. 

Under  statutes  so  providing  if  two  or  more  per- 
sons are  sued  in  a  joint  action,  plaintiff  may  pro- 
ceed against  any  one  or  more  of  them  on  service  of 
process  on  them,  notwithstanding  there  may  be 
others  not  served,  and  recover  a  judgment  against 
those  served,  excluding  the  others,44  provided  it  is 
shown  that  defendants  not  brought  in  cannot  be 
found  or  that  it  is  impossible  to  serve  process  on 
them,45  and  that  there  is  a  joint  liability  or  joint 
cause  of  action  against  all,46  and  notation  of  the 
fact  of  nonservice  on  the  absent  defendant  is  made 
to  appear  in  the  judgment,47  where  the  statute 
makes  such  facts  conditions  precedent.48  Such  sep- 
arate judgment  binds  the  joint  property  of  all  the 
defendants  and  the  individual  property  of  the  de- 
fendants served.49  A  several  judgment  may  be 


rendered  against  only  defendants  served  where  the 
liability  is  joint  and  several,60  or,  in  some  juris- 
dictions, even  though  it  is  joint51 


§  34. 


Contract  Actions 


At  common  law  and  In  the  absence  of  a  statute 
changing  the  rule,  a  Judgment  in  an  action  ex  contractu 
against  several  defendants  must  be  in  favor  of  all  de- 
fendants or  none,  unless  a  defendant  pleads  matter  which 
goes  to  his  personal  discharge  or  an  unnecessary  and 
improper  party  was  Joined  as  defendant.  Under  various 
codes  and  practice  acts,  however,  Judgment  may  be 
taken  against  the  party  or  parties  found  liable  and  in 
favor  of  those  found  not  liable. 

At  common  law,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  statute 
changing  the  rule,  if  several  defendants  are  joined 
in  an  action  ex  contractu,  and  all  are  brought  be- 
fore the  court  by  service  or  appearance  plaintiff 
must  recover  against  all  or  none,  and  it  is  not  com- 
petent to  enter  a  judgment  in  favor  of  one  defend- 
ant and  against  another.52  Under  codes  and  prac- 
tice acts  authorizing  judgments  to  be  rendered  for 
or  against  one  or  more  of  several  defendants,  dis- 
cussed generally  supra  §  33  a,  which  are  applica- 
ble in  actions  ex  contractu,53  including  actions  on 
quantum  meruit,54  judgment  in  an  action  against 
several  defendants  on  a  joint,  or  joint  and  several, 
obligation  may  be  taken  against  the  party  or  par- 
ties shown  to  be  liable,  when  the  others  are  not 
liable,55  and  in  favor  of  defendant  or  defendants 


43.  La. — Klotz  v.  Tru-Fruit  Distrib- 
utors, App.,  173  So.  S92. 

44.  Cal.— Merchants'   Nat.    Bank  of 
Los   Angeles  v.   Clark-Parker  Co., 
9  P.2d  826,  215  Cal,  296,  81  A.L.R. 
778. 

Fla. — Davis  v.  First  Nat  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  Orlando,  150  So.  633, 
112  Fla.  485 — Harrington  v.  Bow- 
man, 143  So.  £51,  106  Fla.  86. 

Ohio. — Hoyt  v.  Geo.  W.  Stone  Co.,  27 
Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  5-33. 

33  C.J.  p  1122  notes  77,  78. 

45.  Ind. — Hunt   v.  Adamson,  4  Ind. 
108. 

33  C.J.  p  1122  note  79. 

46.  111. — Cassady    v.    School    Trus- 
tees, 105  111.  560. 

33  C.J.  p  1122  note  80. 

47.  Fla.— Davis  v.  First  Nat  Bank 
&    Trust   Co.   of  Orlando,   150   So. 
633,  112  Fla.  485. 

48.  Fla,— Davis   v.  First  Nat   Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  of  Orlando,  supra. 

33  C.J.  p  1122  note  81. 

49.  Ga.— Wright   v.   Harris,    24    Ga. 
415 — Denton    v.    Hannah,    77    S.B. 
672,  12  Ga.App.  494. 

50.  N.M.— Leusch  v.  Nickel,   113  P. 
595,  16  N.M.  28. 

33  aj.  p  1122  note  83. 

51.  Cal.— Merchants'   Nat.    Bank   of 
Los   Angeles  v.   Clark-Parker  Co., 

49C.J.S.-6 


9  «P.2d  826,  215  Cal.  296,  81  A.L.R. 
778. 

52.  Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Beatty  v.  Resler,  118  P.2d  1084, 
1085,  108  Colo.  434— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  Townsend  v.  Heath,  103 
P.2d  691,  692,  106  Colo.  273. 
Fla.— Davis  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  in  Orlando,  150  So.  £33, 
112  Fla.  485— Jones  v.  Griffin,  138 
•So.  38,  103  Fla.  745— Harrington 
v.  Bowman,  1-36  So.  229,  102  Fla. 
339,  modified  on  other  grounds  143 
So.  651,  106  Fla.  86— Merchants'  & 
Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Sample,  124 
So.  49,  98  Fla.  759,  rehearing  de- 
nied 125  So.  1,  98  Fla.  759. 
Mass. — Riley  v.  Burns,  22  N.B.2d 

761,  304  Mass.  15. 
33  C.J.  p  1111  note  98. 
Conformity   to   pleadings   and  proof 

see  infra  §§  47-64. 
Judgment  against: 
One  or  more: 
Coparties  in  action: 
Before  justice  of  the  peace  see 
the   C.J.S.    title   Justices   of 
the  Peace  §  110,.  also  35  C.J. 
p  674  notes  87-93. 
Of  debt  see  Debt,  Action  of  $ 

16. 

Partners  see  the  C.J.S..  title 
Partnership  §  235,  also  47  C. 
J.  p  1010  note  2-p  1011  note 
11. 

81 


Principal  and  surety  see  the  C. 
J.S.  title  Principal  and  Surety 
§  277,  also  50  C.J.  p  223  notes 
96-1. 

Defense  "by  one  party 

Where  one  defendant  or  several 
joint  defendants  maintain  defense 
which  negatives  plaintiff's  right  to 
recover  against  any  defendant, 
plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  judgment 
against  any  defendant,  although  par- 
ticular defendant  does  not  appear 
or  plead  such  defense. — Mackintosh 
v.  Chambers,  190  N.B.  38,  285  Mass. 
594. 

68.  Ariz. — Bracker  Stores  v.  Wilson, 
10-3  P.2d  253,  55  Ariz.  403. 

Iowa. — Lull  v.  Anamosa  Nat.  Bank, 
81  N.W.  784,  110  Iowa  537. 

33  C.J.  p  1115  note  22. 

54.  Or. — Fischer    v.    Bayer,    210    P. 
452,  108  Or.  311. 

55.  Ariz. — Bracker  Stores  v.  Wilson, 
103    P.2d   253,    55    Ariz.    403— Reid 
v.  Topper,  259  P.  397,  32  Ariz.  381. 

Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Beatty 
v.  Resler,  118  P.2d'1084,  1085,  108 
Colo.  434. 

Conn. — Woodruff  v.  Perrotti,  122  A. 
452,  99  Conn.  639. 

Ind.^rFidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  199 
NJL.  169,  101  Ind.App.  301. 


§  34 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


found  not  liable.56  However,  as  discussed  infra 
§  36,  such  statutes  do  not  permit  the  rendition  of  a 
several  judgment  on  a  joint  cause  of  action.  If 
plaintiff  sues  on  and  shows  only  a  joint  obligation, 
judgment  must  be  against  all  jointly  liable  or 
none,57  except,  under  some  statutes,  where  the  oth- 
er joint  obligors  are  not  served  with  process,  as 
discussed  supra  §  33  c;  but  if  the  proofs  show  a 
several  obligation,  or  a  joint  obligation  as  to  two 
or  more  defendants  fewer  than  all,  a  recovery  may 
be  had  against  those  shown  to  be  liable  regardless 
of  the  fact  that  only  a  joint  obligation  was  al- 
leged.58 In  an  action  on  a  contract  which  at  com- 
mon law  would  have  been  joint  only,  but  which  by 
force  of  statute  is  joint  and  several,  as  considered 
in  Contracts  §  355  a  (2),  judgment  may  be  had 
against  him  or  those  of  the  obligees  sued  who  are 
shown  to  be  liable.59  In  an  action  on  a  contract 
judgment  may  run  against  a  party  who  is  not  a 
party  to  the  contract  but  is  liable  on  an  independ- 
ent agreement  to  pay  the  amount  due  under  the 
contract60 


Exceptions  to  common-law  rule.  Although  the 
common  law  rule  has  been  long  and  well  estab- 
lished, it  is  not  universal,  whenever  a  defendant 
pleads  matter  which  goes  to  his  personal  discharge, 
or  any  matter  that  does  not  go  to  the  nature  of  the 
writ,  or  pleads  or  gives  in  evidence  a  matter  which 
is  a  bar  to  the  action  against  himself  only,  and  of 
which  the  others  could  not  take  advantage,  judg- 
ment may  be  for  such  defendant  and  against  the 
rest.61  In  such  case  judgment  in  favor  of  a  de- 
fendant relying  on  a  defense  personal  to  himself 
does  not  discharge  the  other  joint  obligors.62  It  is 
essential  to  the  operation  of  this  exception  that  a 
defense  insisted  on  by  one  of  several  joint  debtors 
be  personal  to  him,  and  not  one  of  which  the  oth- 
er defendants  could  take  advantage.63  Personal 
defenses  within  the  exception  to  the  rule  include 
a  discharge  in  bankruptcy64  or  insolvency;65  the 
defense  of  the  statute  of  limitations;66  a  release 
of  an  obligor,  with  a  reservation  of  the  right  to 
proceed  against  the  remaining  obligor  or  obligors  ;67 
personal  disability  to  contract,68  such  as  infancy,69 


'  Me.— Arnst  v.  Estes,  8  A.2d  201,  136 

Me.  272. 
Mass.— Dindio  v.  Meshaka,   175  N.E. 

170.  275  Mass.  112. 
Mich.— Waller    v.    -Sloan,    196    N.W. 

347,  225  Mich.  600. 
Mo. — Welch-Sandier    Cement    Co.    v. 

Mullins,  App.,   31   S.W.2d   86. 
N.Y.— Reeve   v.   Cromwell,    287   N.Y. 

S.  20,  227  App.Div.  32. 
Ohio.— Maus  v.  Jones,   172  N.E.  157, 

122  Ohio  St.  459. 
Okl. — Corpus   Juris    quoted   in   City 

of   Sapulpa  v.  Young,   296  'P.  418, 

431,  147  Okl.  179. 
33  C.J.  p  1115  note  24. 
In  actions    on   bills   and   notes   see 

Bills  and  Notes  §  718  b. 
Contribution,  'between,  defendants 

If  defendant  against  whom  judg- 
ment is  entered  is  required  to  pay 
more  than  his  proportionate  share 
of  the  judgment  he  may  seek  contri- 
bution from  the  others. — Smude  v. 
Amidon,  7  N.W.2d  776,  214  Minn. 
266. 

56.  Mich.— Waller  v.   Sloan,  196  N. 
W.  347,  22;5  Mich.  600. 

57.  Colo. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in 
Beatty   v.    Resler,    118    P.2d    1084, 
1085,  1086,  108  Colo.  434. 

Mass. — Mackintosh  v.  Chambers,  190 

N.E.  38,  285  Mass.  594. 
Mich.— Penfold  v.   filyfield,    68   N.W. 

226,  110  Mich.  343. 
N.T. — Giventer    v.    Antonofsky.    205 

N.Y.S.  287,   209  App.Div.   679. 
Okl.— Corpus   Juris    quoted   in    City 

of  Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P.  418, 

431,  147  Okl.  179. 
33  C.J.  p  1117  note  27. 


58.  Colo. — Corpus   Juris    quoted    in 
Beatty   v.    Resler,    118    P.2d   1084, 
1085,  1086,  108  Colo.  434. 

Mass.— Alfred  J.  Silberstein,  Inc.  v. 

Nash,  10  N.E.2d  65,  298  Mass.  170. 
Mo.— Welch-Sandier  Cement  Co.  v. 

Mullins,  App.,   31  6.W.2d  86. 
Mont.— McCay    v.    Butler,    114    P.2d 

517,  112  Mont  249. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  City  of 

Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P.  418,  431, 

147  Okl.  179. 
Or. — Hamm  v.  Basche,  80  P.  501,  22 

Or.  613. 
Pa. — Smith  v.  Walat  &  Stutzman,  99 

Pa.  Super.  147. 
33  C.J.  p  1117  note  27. 

59.  Mo. — Thomas  v.  Schapeler,  App., 
92  S.W.2d  982. 

Oral  contracts  have  been  except- 
ed  from  the  rule. — Townsend  v. 
Heath,  103  P.2d  691,  106  Colo.  273— 
Exchange  Bank  of  Denver  v.  Ford, 
3  P.  449,  7  Colo.  314. 

60.  Conn. — Meyers  v.  Arm,  13  A.2d 
507,  126  Conn.  679. 

Liability  of  third  person  assuming 
indebtedness  under  contract  see 
Contracts  §  520. 

61.  Fla. — Davis  v.  First  Nat.  Bank 
&  Trust   Co.   of  Orlando,    150   So. 
6-33,    112    Fla.    485 — Harrington   v. 
Bowman,   143  <So.   651,  106  Fla.  86 
— Corpus  Juris   cited  in  Jones  v. 
Griffin,  138  So.  38,  39,  103  Flo.  745. 

Mass.—- Riley    v.    Burns,    22    N.E.2d 

761,    304   Mass.   15— Mackintosh  v. 

Chambers,  190  N.E.   38,  285  Mass. 

594. 
Pa. — Baldwin  v.  Ely,  19-3  A.  299,  127 

Pa.-Super.  110. 
33  C.J.  p  1112  note  99. 

62.  Pa. — Baldwin  v.  Ely,  supra. 

82 


63.  Ark.— State  v.  Williams,  17  Ark. 
•371. 

33  C.J.  p  1113  note  1. 

64.  Mass.— Riley  v.   Burns,   22  N.E. 
2d  761,  304  Mass.  15. 

33  C.J.  p  1113  note  2. 

In  action  against  general  and  spe- 
cial partners  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
Partnership  §  486,  also  47  C.J.  p 
1316  note  21. 

65.  Fla,— Corpus     Juris      cited     in 
Jones  v.  Griffin,  138  So.  38,  39,  105 
Fla.  745. 

33  C.J.  p  1113  note  «. 

66.  Minn. — Town   v.    Washburn,    14 
Minn.   268,    100   Am.D.   219. 

33  C.J.  p  1113  note  8  [c]. 

Recovery  against  defendants  where 
action  against  codefendants  is 
barred  by  limitations  generally 
see  the  C.J.S.  title  Limitations  of 
Actions  §  212,  also  37  C.J.  p  1003 
notes  73-79. 

67.  Pa.— Baldwin  v.  Ely,  193  A.  299, 
127  Pa.Super.  110. 

68.  Fla. — Jones   v.    Griffin,    138    So. 
38,  103  Fla.  745. 

69.  Fla. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Jones    v.    Griffin,    138    So.    38,    39, 
103  Fla.  745. 

Mass.— Riley    v.    Burns,    22    N.E.2d 

761,  304  Mass.  15. 
P&.— Wharen  v.  Funk,  31  A.2d  450, 

152  Pa. Super.  133. 
3-3  C.J.  p  1113  note  5. 
Invalidity  of  judgment  as  to  infant 

as  not  rendering  it  void  as  to  his 

adult  codefendants  see  Infants   § 

122  a. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


35 


insanity,70    or   coverture;71    and  other  like  mat- 
ters.72 

The  rule  has  no  proper  application  to  an  action 
against  administrators  as  such  on  a  contract  alleged 
to  have  been  made  with  decedent,73  or  where  some 
of  defendants  are  not  served  with  process  and  do 
not  appear,74  or  where  the  statement  of  claim  shows 
a  several  liability  against  one  defendant,  and  the 
action  is  dismissed  as  to  the  other  joint  defendants 
before  submission  to  the  jury.75  Another  exception 
to  the  rule  arises  when  one  who  is  an  unnecessary 
or  improper  party  is  joined  as  a  defendant.76 

§  35.    Tort  Actions 

In  tort  actions  Judgment  ordinarily  may  be  rendered 
for  or  against  one  or  more  of  several  defendants. 

In  actions  for  tort  against  several  defendants  it 
has  generally  been  held  that  judgment  may  be  ren- 
dered against  one  or  as  many  of  defendants  as  the 
proof  shows  were  guilty  of  the  wrong,  and  in  favor 
of  those  as  against  whom  the  proof  fails,77  or 
against  some  of  defendants  shown  to  be  liable  where 


plaintiff  waives  his  right  to  recover  against  the 
others,78  although  there  formerly  was  some  au- 
thority to  the  effect  that,  in  an  action  against  two 
or  more  for  a  joint  tort,  recovery  was  required  to 
be  against  all  or  none.79  This  is  also  true  under 
codes  and  practice  acts  authorizing  judgments  to 
be  rendered  for  or  against  one  or  more  of  several 
defendants,  as  considered  generally  supra  §  33  a, 
which  are  applicable  in  actions  for  tort,80  as  are 
rules  of  court  to  the  same  effect.81 

If  it  appears  during  the  course  of  the  proceed- 
ings that  a  defendant  is  not  liable,  the  court  may 
render  judgment  in  his  favor  and  allow  the  case  to 
proceed  against  the  others,82  and  the  court's  dis- 
charge of  some  of  defendants  in  an  action  charg- 
ing concurrent  wrongful  acts  or  omissions  will  not 
preclude  judgment  against  the  others.83  Even  after 
verdict,  where  a  joint  liability  has  been  found  to 
exist,84  or  where  several  damages  have  been  given 
by  the  jury,85  judgment  may  be  rendered  against 
one  defendant  alone.  In  jurisdictions  where  it  is 
proper  to  grant  a  new  trial  as  to  part  of  the  par- 


70.     Fla.— -Corpus     Juris      cited     to 

Jones  v.  Griffin,  138  So.  38,  39,  103 

Fla.  745. 

111.— Aten  v.  Brown,  14  IlLApp.  451. 
Validity  of  judgment  against  insane 

person  see  Insane  Persons  §  151  b. 
71*     Fla.— Corpus      Juris     cited     to 

Jones    v.    Griffin,    158    So.    38,    39, 

103  Fla.  745. 
33  C.J.  p  1113  note  7. 

72-  Fla.— <!orpus  Juris  cited  to 
Jones  v.  Griffin,  138  So.  38,  «39,  103 
Fla.  745. 

33  C.J.  p  111*  note  8. 

73.  Ala,— Gray  v.  White,  5  Ala.  490. 

74.  Me.— Dennett    v.    Chick,    2    Me. 
191,  11  AmJX  59. 

33  C.J.  p  1113  note  10. 

75.  111.— Wilson     v.     Johnson,     178 
IlLApp.  385. 

•to    m. — Mayer'  v.  Brensinger,  54  N. 

B.    159,    180    111.    110,    72    Am.S.R. 

196. 
3$  C.J.  P  1113  note  12. 

77.  Ala.— Alabama  Power  Co.  v. 
Talmadge,  93  "So.  548,  207  Ala.  86, 
error  dismissed  42  S.Ct  463,  259 
U.S.  575,  66  L.Ed.  1071. 

B.C. — Ewald  v.  Lane,  104  F.2d  222, 
70  App.D.C.  89,  certiorari  denied 
Lane  v.  Ewald,  60  S.Ct  81,  308  U 
S.  568,  84  L.Bd.  477— Gale  v.  Inde- 
pendent Taxi  Owners  Ass'n,  84  F< 
2d  249,  65  App.D.C.  $96. 

Fla.— Dr.  F.  Phillips  &  Sons  v.  Kil- 
gore,  12  So.2d  465,  152  Fla.  578 — 
Stanley  v.  Powers,  166  -So.  843,  123 
Fla.  359— Seaboard  Air  Line  By. 
Co.  v.  Ebert  1«*  So.  104. 

Ga. — Joyce  v.  City  of  Dalton,  App., 
36  S.K.2d  104. 


111.— Minnis  v.  Friend,  19-6  N.E.  191, 
360  111.  328— Rome  Soap  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  John  T.  La  Forge  &  Sons,  54 
N.B.2d  252,  322  HlJLpp.  281— Koltz 
v.  Jahaaske,  38  N.B.2d  973,  312 
IlLApp.  $23— Skala  v.  Lehon,  258 
IlLApp.  252,  affirmed  175  N.B.  832, 
343  111.  602— Bunyan  v.  American 
Glycerin  Co.,  230  IlLApp.  351— Hi- 
bernian Banking  Ass'n  v.  True, 
228  IlLApp.  194. 

Ind. — Inter  State  Motor  Freight  Sys- 
tem v.  Henry,  38  N.E.2d  909,  111 
Ind.  App.  179— Indianapolis  Trac- 
tion &  Terminal  Co.  v.  Holtsclaw, 
81  N.B.  1084,  40  Ind.App.  311. 

La. — Overstreet  v.  Ober,  130  So.  648, 
14  La.App.  63$. 

Mich. — Anderson  v.  Conterio,  5  N.W. 
2d  572,  303  Mich.  75— Walton  v. 
Hymans,  4  N.W.2d  640,  302  Mich. 
256. 

Mo.— Raleigh  v.  Raleigh,  App.,  5  S. 
W.2d  689. 

Ohio.— Smith  v.  Fisher,  App.,  82  N". 
B.2d  561— Ohio  Power  Co.  v.  Fit- 
tro,  173  N.E.  35,  36  Ohio  App.  186. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  to  City  of 
Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P.  418,  430, 
431,  147  Okl.  179. 

Tex. — San  Antonio  Gas  Co.  v.  Sin- 
gleton, 59  S.W.  920,  24  Tex.Civ. 
App.  $41,  error  refused. 

33  C.J.  p  1113  note  13. 

79.    Tex. — Taylor  Water  Co.  v.   Dil- 

lard,    29   S.W.   6-62,   9   Tex.Civ.App. 

6*7. 
79.    La.— Loussade   v.    Hartman,    16 

La,  117. 

33  C.J.  p  1114  note  16  [a]. 
Prior  to  statutory  change 
Pa. — Polls  v.  Heizmann,  120  A.  269, 

276  Pa.  315,  27  A.L.R.  948. 

83 


80.  Ala.— Sloss-Sheffield  Steel  & 
Iron  Co.  v.  Wilkes,  181  So.  276,  236 
Ala.  173— Pollard  v.  Rogers,  173 
So.  881,  234  Ala.  92— Sloss- Shef- 
field Steel  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Wilkes, 
165  So.  764,  231  Ala.  511,  109  A.L. 
R.  385. 

Cal. — Rocca  v.  Steinmetz,  208  P.  964, 
189  Cal.  42*6. 

Iowa. — Lull  v.  Anamosa  Nat.  Bank, 
110  Iowa  537,  81  N.W.  784. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  City 
of  Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P.  418, 
431,  147  Okl.  179. 

Or. — Anderson  v.  Maloney,  225  P. 
•318,  111  Or.  84. 

Pa.— Stone  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 
15>3  A.  550,  302  Pa.  840— Gable  v. 
Yellow  Cab  Co.,  150  A.  162,  300 
Pa,  37— Carroll  v.  Kirk,  19  A.2d 
584,  144  Pa.Super.  211— Mullen  v. 
McGeagh,  88  Pa.  Super.  381 — Cairns 
v.  Spencer,  87  Pa.Super.  126 — 
Brown  v.  George  B.  Newton  Coal 
Co.,  Com.PL,  28  DeLCo.  23. 

Wash. — Eyak  River  Packing  Co.  v. 
Huglen,  255  P.  123,  143  Wash.  229, 
reheard  257  P.  638,  143  Wash.  229. 

35  C.J.  p  1115  note  22. 

8L  Mich. — Kolehmainen  v.  B.  B. 
Mills  Trucking  Co.,  S  N.W.2d  298, 
301  Mich.  340 — Barkman  v.  Mon- 
tague, 298  'N.W.  273,  297  Mich.  638. 

82.  Cal. — Rocca  v.  Steinmetz,  208  P. 
964,  189  Cal.  426. 

Me.— Arnst  v.  Estes,  8  A.2d  201,  186 
Me.  272. 

83.  Mich. — Barkman     v.     Montague, 
298  N.W.  273,   297  Mich.  538. 

84.  ni.— Minnis  v.  Friend,  196  NJB. 
191,  "360  I1L  328. 

35.  iu.— Koltz  v.  Jahaaske,  38  N.B. 
2d  973,  312  IlLApp.  628. 


§  35 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ties,  as  considered  in  the  CJ.S,  title  New  Trial  § 
12,  also  46  C.J.  p  78  note  31-p  80  note  55,  the  court 
may  grant  a  new  trial  to  one  or  more  of  several 
defendants  if  satisfied  that  they  were  wrongly  con- 
victed, and  render  judgment  on  the  verdict  as  to 
the  remainder.86 

The  common-law  rule  which  requires  judgment 
against  all  joint  defendants  or  none  in  actions  on 
contracts,  as  considered  supra  §  34,  has  no  appli- 
cation to  actions  for  torts,87  except  where  the  ac- 
tion is  for  a  negligent  performance  of,  or  a  neg- 
ligent failure  to  perform,  a  duty  arising  out  of  a 
contract,  in  which  case  the  rule  is  the  same  as  in 
actions  on  contract,  and,  if  a  joint  contract  and  lia- 
bility are  alleged,  a  joint  liability  must  be  shown.88 
However,  where  the  relation  of  the  parties  is  such 
that  an  issue  found  for  one  defendant  necessarily 
inures  to  the  benefit  of  his  codefendant,89  as  where 
a  defendant's  culpability  is  the  sole  predicate  for 
his  codefendant's  liability,90  judgment  cannot  be 
entered  for  the  former  and  against  the  latter;  but 
this  rule  has  no  application  where  each  defendant 
is  charged  with  acts  of  negligence  resulting  in  the 
injury.91 

In  jurisdictions  where  there  is  a  statutory  right 
to  contribution  between  joint  tort-feasors  who  are 
codefendants  in  judgment,  as  considered  in  Con- 
tribution §  11  b  (5),  it  has  been  held  that,  where 
plaintiff  has  consented  to  a  voluntary  nonsuit  as  to 
one  of  two  defendant  joint  tort-feasors,  it  is  er- 
roneous to  render  judgment  against  the  other,92  al- 
though, if  the  jury  exculpate  one  of  two  joint 
tort-feasors  sued  jointly,  judgment  may  be  rendered 
against  the  other.93  In  an  action  for  fraud  against 


defendants  jointly  and  severally  liable  therefor  it  is 
unnecessary  for  the  judgment  to  provide  that  re- 
covery be  first  had  as  far  as  possible  out  of  the 
defendant  primarily  liable  where  he  is  hopelessly 
insolvent.94 

It  has  been  held  that  the  judgment  should  be 
against  all  defendants  shown  to  be  jointly  liable  for 
the  tort;95  and  in  some  jurisdictions  it  has  been 
held  that  judgment  must  be  against  all  joint  tort- 
feasors  who  are  not  discharged.96  On  the  other 
hand  a  joint  judgment  against  joint  defendants, 
some  of  whom  are  not  guilty,  is  erroneous;97  but 
there  is  authority  which  holds  that  as  to  defendant 
or  defendants  actually  liable  for  the  tort  the  judg- 
ment is  not  invalid  or  improper.98  Under  some 
statutes,  where  the  original  defendants  bring  addi- 
tional defendants  into  the  action,  asserting  that  they 
are  primarily  liable,  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  judgment 
against  them  the  same  as  though  they  had  been  di- 
rectly sued  by  him.99 

In  an  action  for  ejectment  based  on  a  tort,  judg- 
ment may  be  rendered  against  defendants  served 
who  appeared,  even  though  a  default  could  not 
properly  be  entered  against  defendants  who  did 
not  appear  because  of  plaintiff's  failure  to  comply 
with  a  statute  requiring  him  to  file  an  affidavit  that 
they  were  not  in  the  military  service.1 

§  36.    Joint  or  Several  Judgments 

a.  In  general 

b.  Under  codes  and  practice  acts 

c.  Disposition  of  case  as  to  all  parties; 

separate  judgments 


86,  111.— Pecararo  v.  Halberg,  92  N. 
E.  600,  246  111.  95. 

33  C.J.  p  1114  note  14. 

87,  in.— Skala  v.  Lehon,  258  Ill.App. 
252,     affirmed    175    N.E.    832,     343 
111.  602. 

Me.— Arnst  v.  Estes,  8  A.2d  201,  136 

Me.  272. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  City  of 

Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P.  418,  430, 

431,  147  Okl.  179. 

88,  Ala. — Hackney  T.  Perry,  44  So. 
1029,  152  Ala.  626. 

33  C.J.  p  1114  note  17. 

89,  Okl. — Anthony  v.  Covington,  100 
P.2d  461,  187  Okl.  27. 

33  C.J.  p  1115  note  18. 

Contract  and  tort  natality  based  on 

same  act 

Where  liability  of  one  defendant 
for  negligence  and  of  another  for 
breach  of  warranty  were  both  predi- 
cated on  the  same  tortious  act,  a 
judgment  against  defendant  sued  for 
negligence  and  in  favor  of  defendant 


sued  for  breach  of  warranty  was 
inconsistent  and  -erroneous. — Lang- 
san  v.  Loft's  Inc.,  25  N.Y.S.2d  318. 

90.  111. — Bunyan   v.   American   Gly- 
cerin Co.,   230    Ill.App.    351. 

Okl. — Anthony  v.  Covington,   100   P. 

2d  461,  187  Okl.  27. 
Va. — Barnes    v.   Ashworth,    153    S.E. 

711,  154  Va.  218. 
33  C.J.  p  1115  note  18  [a]   (3),  (4). 

91.  111. — Bunyan  v,   American   Gly- 
cerin Co.,  230  Ill.App.  351. 

92.  N.Y.— -Dee  v.  Spencer,   251  N.Y. 
S.  311,  233  App.Div.  217,  followed 
in    251    N.Y.S.    864,    233    App.Div. 
894. 

93.  N.Y.— -Price   v.   Byan,    173    N.E. 
907,   255   N.Y.  16,  followed  in  175 
N.E.  297,  265  N.Y.  524. 

94.  N.Y.— Martin    v.    Gotham    Nat 
Bank,  221  N.Y.S.  661,  220  App.Div. 
541,  modified  on  other  grounds  1*62 
N.B.  91,  248  N.Y.  313,  reargument 
denied  164  N.E.  565,  249  N.Y.  513. 

84 


95.    La. — Collins    v.    Huck,    109    So* 
341,  161  La.  641. 


6.    Mo. — Delay    v. 
164  S.W.2d  154. 


Douglas,    App., 


97.  Fla. — Joseph  v.  Maxwell,  104  So. 
584,  89  Fla.  396. 

98.  Mo. — Hatton    v.    Sidman,    App., 
169  S.W.2d  91. 

99.  Pa. — Sullivan  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
burgh,  27  A.2d  270,   150   Pa.Super. 
252— Ford  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 
24  A.2d  746,  148  Pa.Super.  195. 

Original    defendant's    secondary   lia- 
bility immaterial 

The  presence  or  absence  of  the 
original  defendant's  secondary  lia- 
bility cannot  affect  the  liability  of 
the  additional  defendants  to  plaintiff 
as  found  by  the  jury  at  the  trial. — 
Sullivan  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  27 
A.2d  270,  150  PaJSuper.  252, 

1.  Cal.— B.  £  B.  Sulphur  Co.  v, 
Kelley.  141  -P.2d  908,  61  Cal.App.2d 
3, 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


a.  In  General 

At  common  law  and  in  the  absence  of  statute  chang- 
ing the  rule  a  joint  judgment  is  the  only  proper  judg- 
ment in  an  action  brought  as  a  joint  suit  against  sev- 
eral defendants;  but  a  joint  Judgment  cannot  be  ren- 
dered against  defendants  whose  liability  is  several  and 
not  Joint  or  who  are  not  ail  liable. 

At  common  law  and  in  the  absence  of  statute 
changing  the  rule  only  a  joint  judgment  may  be 
rendered  in  an  action  brought  as  a  joint  suit,2  as  an 
action  ex  contractu  against  several  defendants.3 
On  the  other  hand,  a  joint  judgment  may  not  be 
rendered  against  defendants  who  are  severally  and 
not  jointly  liable,4  or  where  each  defendant  is  not 
liable  to  the  full  extent  of  the  verdict.5  Also  a 
joint  judgment  against  two  or  more  defendants,  one 
of  whom  is  not  liable,  is  erroneous.6 

In  actions  at  common  law  for  tort,  while  judg- 
ment may  be  entered  against  certain  defendants, 
and  in  favor  of  others,  as  discussed  supra  §  35,  the 
judgment  must  be  a  joint  judgment  for  one  single 
amount  against  all  found  liable,7  and  cannot  exceed 
in  amount  that  for  which  judgment  could  have  been 
rendered  under  a  verdict  returned  against  a  partic- 
ular defendant8 

What  constitutes.  In  determining  the  character 
of  a  judgment  as  joint,  several,  or  joint  and  sev- 
eral, the  circumstances  with  respect  to  the  case  may 
be  considered,9  and  recourse  may  be  had  to  the 
pleadings  on  which  the  judgment  is  base<i10  The 
identity  of  issues  as  between  plaintiff  and  the  vari- 


ous defendants  does  not  determine  the  character  of 
the  judgment11  Ordinarily  it  is  determined  by 
the  nature  of  the  liabilities  or  interests  involved 
in  the  litigation,12  and  this  is  true,  although  in  form 
the  judgment  includes  several  defendants  under  the 
form  of  a  joint  judgment.18  Thus  judgments  have 
been  held  to  be  several  where  the  liabilities  of  de- 
fendants were  several;14  and  as  joint  and  several 
where  their  liabilities  were  joint  and  several,15  al- 
though there  is  other  authority  to  the  effect  that 
a  judgment  against  several  defendants  in  an  ac- 
tion on  a  joint  and  several  obligation  is  joint  and 
not  joint  and  several  as  to  all  defendants  therein.16 
A  judgment  that  plaintiff  recover  of  two  or  more 
named  defendants  a  specified  sum  of  money  is  in 
form  a  joint  judgment,17  and  a  judgment  against 
two  or  more  named  defendants,  and  each  of  them, 
constitutes  a  joint  and  several  judgment18  How- 
ever, there  is  authority,  particularly  in  jurisdictions 
where  by  statute  joint  contracts  have  been  made 
joint  and  several  and  authority  given  to  proceed 
against  one  or  more  of  those  liable  on  a  joint  ob- 
ligation, to  the  effect  that,  although  a  judgment  is 
rendered  against  two  or  more  parties  jointly,  the 
judgment  itgelf  is  a  joint  and  several  obligation.19 

b.  Under  Codes  and  Practice  Acts 

In  general  under  the  various  codes  and  practice  acts 
the  judgment  should  be  joint,  several,  or  joint  and  sev- 
eral, according  as.  the  liability  of  the  defendants  against 
whom  judgment  .Is  rendered  Is  joint,  several,  or  joint  and 
several. 


2.  Fla. — Harrington  v.  Bowman,  148 
So.    651,    106   Fla.   8*6. 

Conformity    to    verdict    or    findings 

see  infra '§§  55-58. 
Joint  or  several  judgment  in  action 

against: 

Executor  or  administrator  and 
other  party  see  Executors  and 
Administrators  §  793. 
Principal  and  surety  see  the  C.J. 
S.  title  Principal  and  Surety  § 
277,  also  50  C.J.  p  223  notes  2- 
4. 

Necessity  for  judgment  to-be  either 
for  or  against  all  plaintiffs  see  su- 
pra §  31. 

3.  Fla. — Edgar    v.    Bacon,    122    So. 
107,    .97     Fla.     679,     followed     in 
Wright   v.   Tatarian,   131  So.   183, 
100  Fla.  1366. 

4.  Md. — Union   Trust  Co.   of  Mary- 
land    v.    Poor   &    Alexander,    Inc., 
177  A.  923,  168  Md.  400. 

6.  M<L — Union  Trust  Co.  of  Mary- 
land v.  Poor  &  Alexander,  Inc., 
supra. 

6.  111.— Sergo  v.  Bloch,  263  Ill.App. 
198. 

7.  Mass.— Contakis  v.  Flavio,  108  N. 
E.  1045,  221  Mass.  259. 

33  C.J.  p  1124  note8. 


Judgment  should  be  joint  and  sever- 
al in  civil  action  for  conspiracy 
see  Conspiracy  §  32. 

8.  Mass. — Brooks  v.  Davis,  1  N.E.2d 
17,  294  Mass.  236. 

9.  Neb.— Whaley   v.    Matthews,    287 
N.W.  205,  136  Neb.  767. 

N.T.— Schultz  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  Co.,  94  N.E.  601,  201 
N.T.  230. 

Judgment  held  not  joint 

Neb.— Whaley  v.  Matthews,  287  N. 
W.  205,  13-6  Neb.  767. 

10.  Tex.— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty 
Co.  ,v.    Richey,   Civ.App,,    18    S.W-, 
2d  231,  error  refused. 

11.  N.T. — -St  John  v.  Andrews  Inst. 
for    Girls,    85    N.E.    143,    192    N.T. 
882. 

12.  N.T.— Schultz  v.  U.   S.   Fidelity 
&  Guaranty  Co.,   94  N.E.   601,  201 
N.T.  230. 

33  C.J.  p  1126  note  18. 

13.  -Conn. — Gruber  v.  Friedman,  132 
A.  395,  104  Conn.  107. 

N.T.— Schultz  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  Co.,  94  NJE.  601,  201  N. 
T.  230. 


14.  Conn. — Gruber  v.  Friedman,  132 
A.  395,  104  Conn.  107. 

33  C.J.  p  1126  note  18  [b]. 

15.  Tex.— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaran- 
ty Co.  v.  Kichey,  Civ.App.,  18  S.W. 
2d  231,  error  refused. 

33  C.J.  p  1126  note  18  [a3   (2). 

16.  Mich. — Rohrabacker    v.    Walsh, 
135  N.W.  907,  170  Mich.  59. 

17.  Neb. — Farney        v.        Hamilton 
County,  75  N.W.  44t  54  :Neb.  797. 

33  C.J.  p  1126  note  16. 

18.  OkL— Tucker  v.  Gautier,  164  P. 
2d  613. 

Double  recovery  not  indicated 

Judgment  that  plaintiff  recover  of 
defendants,  "and  each  of  them," 
did  not  signify  that  full  amount  of 
recovery  might  be  twice  collected 
from  defendants,  but  simply  indicat- 
ed joint  and  several  character  of  de- 
fendant's liability.— Watson  v.  Hil- 
ton, 166  S.E.  589,  203  N.C.  574, 

19.  Kan. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Sloan   v.    Sheridan.    168    P.2d   545, 
546. 

33  C.J.  p  1126  note  20. 

Judgment  as  contract  within  statute 

making   joint '  contracts   joint  and 

several  see  supra  5  6. 


85 


36 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


In  general  tinder  the  various  codes  and  practice 
acts  in  an  action  against  several  defendants,  a  joint 
judgment  is  proper  against  defendants  whose  lia- 
bility is  joint  or  arises  out  of  joint  conduct;20  but 
it  is  improper  against  defendants  whose  liability 
is  not  joint,  although  each  may  be  severally  lia- 
ble,21 or  where  the  liability  of  defendants  and  the 
measure  of  recovery  are  proportional.22 

A  several  judgment  is  not  ordinarily  proper 
against  defendants  whose  liability  is  on  a  joint  ob- 
ligation or  other  joint  cause  of  action;23  but  such 
a  judgment  is  proper  in  an  action  against  several 
defendants  who  are  liable  on  a  joint  and  several  ob- 
ligation, or  on  a  cause  of  action  where  each  de- 
fendant is  liable  only  for  his  own  acts,  or  for  his 
proportionate  share  of  the  total  damage,  or  in  a 
different*  amount  from  his  codefendants*,  or  in  any 
case  where  separate  actions  might  properly  have 
been  maintained.24  The  test  as  to  whether  a  sev- 
eral judgment  may  be  had  is  whether  a  separate 
action  could  have  been  maintained.26 

A  joint  and  several  judgment  is  proper  against 
defendants  whose  liability  is  joint  and  several,26 


but  not  against  defendants  who  are  individually 
and  solely  liable  on  different  items  of  the  total 
amount  demanded.27 

Where  the  items  of  damages  are  distinct,  a  joint 
judgment  cannot  be  entered  unless  each  defendant 
is  liable  to  the  full  extent  of  plaintiffs  demand  or 
recovery.28  If  defendants  are  not  all  liable  to  the 
same  extent  on  the  liability  sued  on,  the  judgment 
may  be  for  different  amounts  against  them;29  and, 
where  one  of  the  several  defendants  is  not  liable 
for  all  the  items  of  damage  for  which  recovery  is 
allowed,  a  judgment  against  all  defendants  which 
does  not  segregate  the  damage  is  erroneous,30  at 
least  as  to  the  party  not  liable  for  the  full  amount.31 
However,  in  an  action  ex  contractu  a  joint  judg- 
ment has  been  held  proper  against  defendants  who 
are  liable  for  the  same  demand;32  and,  if  the  ac- 
tion is  on  a  joint  contract  or  obligation  against  sev- 
eral defendants  who  plead  and  defend  jointly,  the 
judgment  against  them  must  be  joint  and  not  sev- 
eral.33 

Where  some  defendants  are  liable  individually, 
while  others  are  liable  only  in  a  representative  ca- 


20.  Mo. — Kunst  v.  Walker,  App.f  43 
S.W.2d  886. 

Severance   of  actions   as   to   several 
parties    defendant    see    Actions    § 
119  b   (2). 
Discovery  of  assets 

In  action  by  administrators  to 
discover  assets,  joint  judgment  was 
proper  against  defendants  in  joint 
possession  of  the  concealed  assets. 
— Kunst  v.  Walker,  supra. 

21.  Ohio. — Larson  v.   Cleveland  Ry. 
Co.,    50    N.E.2d    163,    142    Ohio    St 
20. 

Pa. — First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kendrew, 
160  A.  227,  105  Pa.Super.  142. 

Wash.— Argo  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Parker,  100 
P.  188,  52  Wash.  100. 

33  C.J.  p  1125  notes  11,  12. 

Harmless  error 

(1)  Joint    judgment    against    de- 
fendants   severally   and   not    jointly 
liable  is  harmless  error. — Decker  v. 
Trilling,  24  Wis..610,  615—33  C.J.  P 
1126  note  13. 

(2)  In  action  against  two  defend- 
ants who  are  each  liable  on  different 
causes  sued  on,  one  a  tort  and  the 
other    an    agreement    of    indemnity 
against    damages    from   the   tort,    a 
joint    judgment    against    them    for 
an   amount   not   in   excess   of  what 
they  would  have  been  liable  for  if 
sued  in  separate  actions  is  not  prej- 
udicial  to    the   rights    of   either   so 
as  to  warrant  a  reversal. — Adams  v. 
National  Automobile  Ins.  Co.,  133  P. 
2d  657,  56  Cal.App.2d  905. 

22.  Mass. — Foote  v.   Cotting,   80  N. 
B.   600,  195  Mass.  55,  15  L.R.A.,N. 
3.,  -693. 


23.  Colo. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Beatty   v.    Resler,    118    P.2d    1084, 
1085,  1086,  108  Colo.  434. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  City  of 
Sapulpa  v.  Young,  296  P.  418,  431, 
147  Okl.  179. 

33  C.J.  p  1117  note  27,  P  1124  note 
10. 

Joint  or  several  judgment  in  action 
against  stockholders  for  corporate 
debt  see  Corporations  §  702. 

24.  Gal. — Bakersfleld    Impr.    Co.    v. 
Bakersfield  Theater  Co.,  181  P.  851, 
40  Cal.App.  703. 

33C.J.  p  1125  note  11. 
Double  recovery 

Judgment  against  treasurer  and 
surety  for  treasurer's  failure  to  pay 
unsecured  deposit  in  insolvent  state 
bank  and  against  bank  and  banking 
commissioner  for  such  deposit  un- 
der guaranty  depository  law  was 
held  not  erroneous  as  allowing  dou- 
ble recovery. — Bolton  v.  City  of  De 
Leon,  Tex.Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  213. 

25.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris    guoted    in 
City  of  Sapulpa  v.  Toung,  296  P. 
418,  431,  147  Okl.  179. 

33  C.J.  p  1118  note  28,  p  1125,  note 
11  [a]. 

26.  Cal. — Gist  v.   Security  Trust  & 
Savings    Bank,    24    P.2d    153,    218 
Cal.  581. 

Tex. — Murchison  v.  Ballard,  Civ, 
App.,  178  S.W.2d  554,  error  re- 
fused— Dunning  v.  Badger,  Civ. 
App.,  74  S.W.2d  151,  error  dis- 
missed— Danciger  v.  Smith,  Civ. 
App.,  286  S.W.  635,  error  refused 
289  S.W.  679,  116  Tex.  269,  affirm- 

86 


ed   48    S.Ct.    344,    276   U.S.    542,   72 

L.Bd.  691. 

In  action  against  carriers  for  in- 
Jury  to  property  where  there  was 
evidence  of  damage  while  it  was 
in  possession  of  either  one  of  de- 
fendants, and  neither  offered  ex- 
planation of  how  or  when  damage 
occurred,  judgment  against  them 
jointly  and  severally  was  without 
error.— St  Louis,  S.  F.  &  T.  By.  Co. 
v.  J.  G.  Henderson  Cut  Stone  Co., 
Tex.Civ.App.,  275  S.W.  603. 
Solidary  judgment 

In  an  action  against  several  de- 
fendants on  an  obligation  in  solido, 
a  solidary  judgment  against  them 
is  proper.— E.  George  Rogers  &  Co. 
v.  Black,  La.App.,  155  So.  403. 

27.  Tex.— ^Btna  Casualty  &  Surety 
Co.  v.  State  for  Use  and  Benefit 
of    City    of    Dallas,    Civ.App.,    8-6 
S.W.2d   826,   error   dismissed. 

28.  Vt.— Murray  v.  Mattison,  32  A. 
479,  67  Vt.  553. 

33  C.J.  p  1126  note  14. 

29.  Or. — Closset  v.  Portland  Amuse- 
ment Co.,   293  P.   720,   134  Or.  414. 

30.  Cal.— Bloom    v.    Coates,    214    P. 
260,  190  Oal.  458. 

31.  N.M.— Niblack  v.  Seaberg  Hotel 
Co.,    76   P.2d   1156,   42   N.M.    281. 

32.  Tex. — Weimer      v.      Prince      & 
Prince,   Civ.App.,    246    S.W.    666. 

33.  Colo.— Beatty  v.  Resler,   118  P. 
2d  1084,  108  Colo.  434. 

u— Byrd  v.  Babin,  200  So.  294,  196 
La.  902. 
33  C.J.  p  1124  note  8. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


36 


pacity,  the  judgment  against  them  should  be  sever- 
al34 or  joint  and  several.35  In  an  action  to  impose 
liability  on  heirs  or  devisees  of  a  decedent  for  a 
liability  of  decedent,  the  judgment  should  be  sev- 
eral against  each  defendant  for  the  amount  received 
by  him  from  decedent,  not  to  exceed  the  sum  to 
which  plaintiff  is  entitled  ;8«  and  it  has  been' held 
proper  to  make  the  judgment  collectable  in  full  from 
any  of  several  defendants  who  received  that  amount 
or  more  from  the  estate  and  to  limit  it  as  to  de- 
fendants who  received  less  to  the  amount  each  re- 
ceived.3? 

Under  statutes  in  Louisiana  providing  therefor, 
a  joint  judgment  against  several  defendants  in  a 
suit  on  a  joint  obligation  must  be  against  each  de- 
fendant separately  for  his  proportion  of  the  debt,38 
which  is  determined  by  the  number  of  obligors;39 
and,  where  only  one  of  several  joint  obligors  is 
sued,40  or  the  court  erroneously  rejects  plaintiffs 
demand  against  all  the  joint  obligors,  except  one,41 
the  judgment  against  him  must  be  for  his  aliquot 
portion  of  the  obligation  and  not  the  entire  amount 
thereof. 

Actions  ex  delictu.    In  an  action  of  tort  against 


several  defendants,  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  joint 
judgment  if,  and  only  if,4*  he  shows  a  joint  tort43 
or  single  cause  of  action  against  them,44  even 
though  one  of  defendants  owed  plaintiff  a  higher 
degree  of  care  than  did  the  other;45  and,  if  de- 
fendants plead  jointly,  and  a  joint  verdict  is  given 
against  them,  the  judgment  must  be  joint  and  not 
several.46  It  has  also  been  held  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions that  defendant  tort-feasors  must  be  in  pari 
delicto  as  to  the  tortious  act  and  each  responsible 
for  the  entire  damage  for  a  joint  judgment  against 
them  to  be  proper;47  and,  where  a  primary  liabil- 
ity for  the  injury  rests  on  one  defendant  and  a  con- 
structive or  secondary  liability  on  another  defend- 
ant, and  their  breaches  of  duty  to  plaintiff  are  not 
through  concert  of  action  or  independent  but  con- 
current action,  a  joint  judgment  may  not  be  ren- 
dered against  them.48 

If  the  liability  of  defendants  is  joint  and  sev- 
eral, the  judgment  should  be  joint  and  several ;4d 
but  a  joint  and  several  judgment  should  not  be  ren- 
dered unless  it  is  established  that  defendants  were 
joint  tort-feasors,50  and  is  improper  where  it  ap- 
pears that  defendants  are  not  liable  on  the  same 
torts  but  are  solely  and  independently  liable  on  dif- 


34.    Ky.-^Gray  v.   McDowell,  5  T.B. 

Mon.  501. 

33  C.J.  p  1126  note  15. 
3&i    Cal. — Gist  v.  Security  Trust  & 

Savings    Bank,    24    P.2d    153,    218 

Cal.  581. 

36.  Ky. — Ransdell    v.    Threlkeld,    4 
Bush  347. 

33  C.J.  p  112S  note  11  [h]  (1),  (2). 

37.  Ky. — Clark's  Adm'x  v.  Callahan, 
288   S.W.   301,   216  Ky.   674. 

38.  La. — Loussade    v.    Hartman,    16 
La.  117 — Hagedorn  v.  Klotz,  App., 
185   So.   658— Simon  v.  Selber,  1*30 
So.  £45,  14  La.App.  642. 

39.  La. — Loussade    v.    Hartman,    16 
La.  117. 

Obligor's  portion. 

Each  obligor  answers  for  an  equal 
part  of  the  debt,  unless  the  parties 
have  expressed  a  different  intention. 
— EDagerdorn  v.  Klotz,  La.App.,  185 
So.  658. 

40.  La. — Hagedorn   v.  Klotz,   supra. 
Plaintiff  must  show  other  obligors 

where  he  sues  joint  obligor  sepa- 
rately, in  order  that  the  judgment 
may  fix  the  proportion  of  the  debt 
for  which  each  defendant  is  con- 
demned.— Hagerdorn  v.  Klotz,  supra. 

41.  La. — Simon    v.    Selber,    190    So. 
645,  14  La.App.  642. 

42.  Fla. — Gulf  Refining  Co.  v.  Wil- 
kinson, 114  So.  503,  94  Fla.  664. 

33  C.J.  p  112*6  note  24. 
lEssential  requirement* 

A  "joint  judgment"  against  two  or 


more  tort-feasors  is  proper  only 
where,  because  of  their  relationship, 
concert  of  action,  or  independent  but 
concurrent  action,  each  is  vicarious- 
ly responsible  for  wrongful  act  of 
the  others  to  extent  of  entire  dam- 
age.— Larson  v.  Cleveland  Ry.  Co., 
50  N.E.2d  163,  142  Ohio  St.  20. 
Permissive  joinder  JinmtHoieut 

The  permissive  joinder  of  defend- 
ants is  not  enough  to  warrant  a 
"joint  judgment"  against  tort-fea- 
sors unless  they  are  joint  tort-fea- 
sors.— Larson  v.  Cleveland  Ry.  Co., 
supra. 

43.    N.J.— Mogab    v.    Antrim    Motor 

Co.,  143  A.  864,  7  N.XMisc.  15. 
Pa.— Moraski   v.  'Philadelphia  Rapid 

Transit   Co.,    142   A.    276,    293   Pa. 

224. 

33  C.J.  p  1126  note  2-3. 
Immaterial  injury  by  individual 

Where  seepage  causing  injury 
came  principally  from  canal  operat- 
ed for  joint  benefit  of  irrigation  dis- 
tricts, joint  judgment  was  proper, 
although  slight  damage  may  have 
been  caused  by  seepage  from  reser- 
voir owned  by  only  one  district — 
Ketcham  v.  Modesto  Irr.  Dist.,  26  P. 
2d  87«,  135  CaLApp.  180. 

Concert  of  action,  by   tort-feasors 
makes  joint  judgment  against  them 
proper. — Fahrer   v.   Blumenthal,    190 
A.  206,  125  Pa.Super.  568. 
Joint  employer 

In  action  against  two  companies 
for  injuries  caused  by  person  who 

87 


was  employee  of  both,  judgment 
holding  both  companies  liable  in 
solido  was  proper. — Anderson  v. 
George  A.  Hormel  &  Co.,  136  So.  906, 
18  La.App.  398. 
44.  Ohio. — Larson  v.  Cleveland  Ry. 

-Co.,    50    N.E.2d    163,    142    Ohio    St 

20. 

46.  Pa.— Moraski  v.  Philadelphia 
Rapid  Transit  Co.,  142  A.  276,  293 
Pa.  224. 

46.  Fla.— Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Ebert,  138   So.   4,  102  Fla.   641. 

33  C.J.  p  1127  note  28. 

Judgment    held    against    join*    tort- 

feasors 

Findings  showing  that  defendants 
by  themselves  and  agents  acted  so 
negligently  that  plaintiff  had  judg- 
ment showed  judgment  against  joint 
tort-feasors. — Salter  v.  Lombard!,  8 
P.2d  38,  116  CaLApp.  602. 

47.  Ohio. — Larson  v.  Cleveland  Ry. 
Co.,    50    N.B.2d    163,    142    Ohio    St 
20. 

48.  Ohio. — Larson  v.  Cleveland  Ry. 
Co.,  Supra. 

Joint  judgment  held  improper 
Ohio. — Larson  v.   Cleveland  Ry.  Co., 
supra. 

49.  Cal. — Phipps  v.   Superior   Court 
In  and  for  Alameda  County,  89  P. 
2d   698,    32   CaLApp. 2 d   371. 

La.— Williams  v.  Pelican  Natural 
Gas  Co.,  175  So.  28,  187  La.  462. 

60.  Tex. — American  Mortg.  Corpo- 
ration v.  Dunnam,  Civ.App.,  59  S. 
W.2d  1095,  error  dismissed. 


36 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


ferent  torts  alleged.51  A  joint  judgment  has  been 
held  proper  against  defendants,  each  of  whom  is 
responsible  for  the  same  sum  of  money,52  or  whose 
independent  tortious  acts  produced  a  single  injury, 
objections  to  the  trial  in  one  proceeding  having 
been  waived.58 

Since  joint  tort-feasors  are  each  individually  lia- 
ble to  the  party  injured  for  the  full  extent  of  the 
damage  done,  and  not  only  for  a  proportionate  part, 
as  considered  in  the  CJ.S.  title  Torts  §  34,  also  62 
CJ.  p  1131  notes  52,  S3,  ordinarily  the  judgment 
cannot  segregate  or  apportion  the  liability  of  the 
joint  tort-feasors;54  but  it  must  be  in  one  amount55 
and  jointly  and  severally56  against  each  and  all  of 
defendants  against  whom  a  joint  liability  is  estab- 
lished.57 However,  any  statutory  limitation  of  lia- 
bility applicable  to  any  defendant,  as  distinguished 
from  the  full  liability  of  other  defendants,  may  and 
should  be  incorporated  in  the  judgment  entered  on 
the  verdict;58  and,  where  a  joint  and  several  lia- 
bility is  established  as  to  some  of  the  defendants 
and  a  separate  liability  for  only  a  portion  of  the  to- 
tal against  others,  the  judgment  may  run  against 
the  various  defendants  in  the  amounts  and  accord- 
ing to  the  liabilities  established.59  Where  the  lia- 


bility of  defendant  tort-feasors  is  direct  and  sev- 
eral, as  well  as  joint,  a  judgment  for  different 
amounts  against  the  various  defendants  has  been 
held  not  improper.60 

If  the  jury,  without  fixing  the  total  amount  of 
plaintiffs  recovery,  returns  several  verdicts  or  in 
one  verdict  assesses  each  defendant  separately,  it 
has  been  held  that,  if  the  same  Amount  was  assessed 
against  each  defendant,  a  joint  judgment  should  be 
entered  against  all  defendants  for  that  amount,  not 
the  total,61  or,  if  different  amounts  were  assessed 
against  the  various  defendants,  plaintiff  may  enter 
a  joint  judgment  against  all  defendants  for  the 
largest  amount  found  against  any  of  them.62  There 
is  other  authority,  however,  which  holds  that,  where 
separate  verdicts  for  different  amounts  are  re- 
turned against  joint  tort-feasors,  the  lesser  amount 
being  against  defendant  who  actively  committed  the 
wrong  and  on  whose  culpability  the  other  defend- 
ant's liability  is  predicated,  the  judgment  should  be 
for  such  lesser  amount63  It  has  also  been  held 
that,  in  an  action  on  a  joint  tort,  if  the  verdict 
assesses  each  defendant  separately  for  different 
amounts,  judgment  cannot  be  rendered  against  all 
the  defendants  for  the  total  of  the  different 
amounts.64 


51.  Wis.— Hall    v.    Frankel,    197   N. 
W.  820,  ia3  Wis.  247. 

52.  Ga.-— Regal  Textile  Co.  v.  Fell,  6 
•S.E.2d  908,  189  Ga.  581. 

Corporation  and  stockholders 

Joint  judgment  against  corpora- 
tion and  stockholder  or  officer  who 
appropriated  all  of  corporation's  as- 
sets for  amount  of  overpayment 
made  to  corporation  is  proper.— 
Regal  Textile  Co.  y.  Fell,  supra. 

53.  Mo.— Stein  v.  Rainey,  286   S.W. 
63,  315  Mo.  535. 

54.  Cal. — Phipps   v.    Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Alameda  County,  89  P. 
2d   698,    32   Cal.App,2d   371— Curtis 
v.  San  (Pedro  Transp.  Co.,  62  P.2d 
528,   10  Cal.App.2d  547, 

111.— Koltz    y.    Jahaaske,    38    N.E.2d 

973,  312  IlLApp.  62-3. 
Mo. — Polkowski  v.  fit   Louis  Public 

Service    Co.,    68    S.W.2d    884,    229 

Mo.App.  24. 
Tenn. — Donegan  v.  Beasley,  181  S.W. 

2d  379,  27  Tenn.App.  369. 
33  C.J.  P  1127  note  30. 

55.  111.— Koltz  v.  Jahaaske,  <38  N.E. 
2d   973,  <312   IlLApp.    623. 

Mo. — Brown  v.  Reorganization  Inv. 
Co.,  166  S.W.2d  476,  350  Mo.  407— 
Electrolytic  Chlorine  Co.  v.  Wal- 
lace &  Tiernan  Co.,  41  S.W.2d  1049, 
328  Mo.  782,  78  A.L.R.  930— Delay 
v.  Douglas,  App.,'  164  S.W.2d  154 
— Polkowski  v.  St.  Louis  Public 
Service  Co.,  68  S.W.2d  884,  229  Mo. 
App.  24. 


Tenn. — Donegan  v.  Beasley,  181  S.W. 

2d  379,  27  Tenn.App.  369. 
Tex. — Callihan    v.    White,    Civ.App., 

139  S.W.2d  129. 

56.  Mass. — Gross-Loge     Des     Deut- 
schen    Ordens    Der   Harugari   Des 
Staates    Massachusetts   v.    Cusson, 
17  N.E.2d  316,   301  Mass.  '332. 

Tex. — Callihan    v.    White,    Civ.App., 

139  S.W.2d  129. 
Double  liability  not  imposed 

Decree  requiring  defendant  part- 
ner and  an  attaching  creditor  to  pay 
value  of  partnership  assets  wrong- 
fully attached  did  not  amount  to 
imposition  of  double  liability. — Boy- 
er  v.  Bowles,  37  N.E.2d  489,  310 
Mass.  134. 

57.  Mass. — Gross-Loge     Des     Deut- 
schen    Ordens    Der    Harugari    Des 
•Staates  Massachusetts   v.   Cusson, 
17  N.B.2d  -316,  301  Mass.  332.      - 

Mo. — Electrolytic     Chlorine     Co.     v. 

Wallace    &   Tiernan   Co.,    41    S.W. 

2d    1049,    328    Mo.    782,    78    A.L.R. 

930. 
Tenn, — Donegan  v.  Beasley,  181  S.W. 

2d   -379.    27   Tenn.App.    369. 
Tex. — Burd  v.  San  Antonio  Southern 

Ry.  Co.,  Com.App.,   261   S.W.  1021. 

58.  Cal. — Sparks    v.    Berntsen,    121 
P.2d  497,  19  Cal.2d  308-^Phipps  v. 
Superior  Court  in  and  for  Alameda 
County,    89    P..2d   698,    32   Cal.App. 
2d  <371. 

59.  Mass. — Gross-Loge  *  Des     Deut- 
schen    Ordens    Der   Harugari   Des 

83 


•Staates   Massachusetts  v.   Cusson, 
17   N.E.2d   316,    301   Mass.   332. 
GO.    Cal. — Guberman    v.    Weiner,    51 
P.2d  1141,  10  Cal.App.2d  401. 

61.  N.T. — Farber  v.  Demino,  173  N. 
E.  223,  254  N.T.  363,  followed  in  G. 
A.  Baker  &  Co.  v.  Polygraphic  Co. 
of  America,  193  N.B.  265,  265  N.T. 
447,    reargument   denied    193    N.E. 
294,  265  N.T.  508. 

62.  Cal. — Curtis      v.       San      Pedro 
Transp.   Co.,   52   P.2d  528,   10  Cal. 
App.2d  547. 

N.T.— Berber    v.    Demino,    173    N.E. 
k     223,  254  If.T.  363,  followed  in  G.  A. 
Baker  &  Co.  v.  Polygraphic  Co.  of 
America,    193    N.E.    265,    265    N.T. 
447,    reargument    denied    193    N.E. 
294,  2-65  N.T.  508— Polsey  v.  Wal- 
dorf-Astoria,   214    N.T.S.    600,    216 
App.Div.  86. 
33  C.J.  p  1127  note  31. 

On  consolidation  for  trial  of  sep- 
arate actions  against  master  and 
servant  for  tort,  the  judgment 
against  each  defendant  should  be 
for  the  highest  of  different  amounts 
assessed  against  the  different  de- 
fendants by  the  jury. — Kinsey  v. 
William  Spencer  &  Son  Corporation, 
300  N.T.S.  391,  165  Misc.  143,  affirm- 
ed 8  N.T.S.2d  529,  255  App.Div.  995, 
affirmed  22  N.E.2d  168,  281  N.T.  601. 

63.  Ark.— Wear-tJ-Well   Shoe   Co.  v. 
Armstrong,  3  S.W.2d  698,  176  Ark. 
592. 

64.  Miss.— Gillespie  v.  Olive  Branch 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


36 


Under  some  statutes  several  judgments  may  be 
rendered  against  joint  tort-feasors  for  separate  or 
proportionate  amounts,65  at  least  where  defendants 
have  severed  in  their  defense,  and  separate  verdicts 
have  been  found  against  them.6^ 

In  ejectment  it  has  been  held  that,  if  there  are 
several  defendants,  there  may  be  a  joint  judgment 
against  all,67  although  they  are  severally  in  exclu- 
sive possession  of  different  parts  of  the  premises, 
no  request  for  a  several  judgment  being  made;68 
but  there  is  other  authority  to  the  effect  that  a  joint 
judgment  is  not*  proper  against  defendants  who  oc- 
cupy or  claim  separate  and  distinct  portions  of  the 
realty  involved,69  and  that,  if  plaintiff  is  not  re- 
quired to  elect  which  of  several  defendants  in  sep- 
arate possession  he  will  proceed  against,  judg- 
ment may  be  rendered  against  each.70  Where  de- 
fendants plead  jointly  in  trespass  for  mesne  profits 
but  separate  verdicts  are  found,  there  may  be  a 
judgment  against  one  and  nolle  prosequi  as  to  the 


other.71  Where,  however,  one  defendant  enters 
subsequent  to  another  it  is  error,  in  a  joint  action 
of  ejectment  and  for  mesne  profits,  to  render  a 
joint  judgment  against  both  from  the  time  of  the 
entry  of  the  latter.72 

c.  Disposition  of  Case  as  to  All  Parties;  Sep- 
arate Judgments 

At  common  law  and  under  statutes  so  providing  only 
one  final  Judgment,  which  must  dispose  of  the  case  as 
to  all  the  parties.  Is  proper  In  an  action;  but,  under 
permissive  statutes,  separate  judgments,  may  be  ren- 
dered at  the  same  time  or  different  times  against  the 
various  defendants  in  actions  in  which  several  Judg- 
ments are  proper. 

At  common  law,  and  in  the  absence  of  statute 
changing  the  rule,  and  under  statutes  expressly  so 
providing,  only  one  final  judgment  may  be  entered 
in  an  action,  as  discussed  infra  §  65,  which  must 
completely  dispose  of  the  whole  case  as  to  all  the 
parties.73  The  rule  is  applicable  in  tort  actions74 


Building  &  Lumber  Co.,  164  So.  42, 
174  Miss.  154. 

65.  Oa. — Gormley   v.    Slicer,    172    S. 
E.  21,  178  Ga.  85,  answer  conform- 
ed to  172  S.E.  575,  48  Ga.App.  177. 

33  C.J.  p  1127  note  32. 

Widow  and  heirs  of  tort»f easor 

Judgment  against  widow  and  heirs 
of  deceased  tort-feasor  should  be 
against  each  separately  for  his  pro- 
portion of  damages,  but  it  may  be 
against  them  in  solido  for  costs. — ' 
Hunter  v.  Laurent,  104  So.  747,  158 
La.  874. 
Counterclaim  in  favor  of  defendant 

Where  defendants  are  all  liable 
for  full  amount  of  damages  estab- 
lished and  one  defendant  is  enti- 
tled to  judgment  on  a  counterclaim 
against  plaintiff,  Judgment  against 
all  defendants  for  full  amount  of 
damages  established  will  be  award- 
ed plaintiff,  and  also  judgment  will 
be  entered  against  plaintiff  in  favor 
of  the  defendant  entitled  to  the 
counterclaim  for  the  amount  there- 
of.— Bandych  v.  Ross,  26  N.Y.S.2d 
830. 

66.  Tex. — Rowan  v.  Daniel,  49  S.W. 
686,  20  Tex.Civ.App.  321. 

33  C.J.  .p  1127  note  33. 

67.  Dal. — Ellis  v.  Jeans,  26  CaL  272. 

68.  CaL— Ellis  v.  Jeans,  supra, 

69.  Ind. — Kennedy    v.    Christian,    2 
Ind.  503. 

70.  Mo.— Norton  v.  Reed,   161  S.W. 
842,  253  Mo.  236. 

71.  Pa. — Chambers    v.     Lapsley,     7 
Pa.  24. 

72.  Fla, — Ashmead    v.    Wilson,     22 
Fla,  255. 

73.  Fla. — Merchants'    &    Mechanics' 
Bank  v.  Sample,  124  So.  49,  94  Fla, 


759,    rehearing   denied   125    So.    1, 
98  Fla.  759. 

Mo. — Electrolytic  Chlorine  Co.  v. 
Wallace  &  Tiernan  Co.,  41  S.W.2d 
1049,  328  Mo.  782,  78  A.L.R.  930 
— Neal  v.  Curtis  &  Co.  Mfg.  Co., 
41  S.W.2d  543,  328  Mo.  389— State 
ex  rel.  Cunningham  v.  Haid,  40 
S.W.2d  1048,  328  Mo.  208— Ex 
parte  Fowler,  275  S.W.  529,  310 
Mo.  339— Baker  v.  St.  Louis,  88 
S.W.  74,  189  Mo.  375— Hatton  v. 
Sidman,  App.,  169  S.W.Sd  91— 
A.  M.  Legg  Shoe  Co.  v.  Brown 
Leather  Co.,  -  App.,  249  S.W.  147. 
Tex. — Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Ulmer, 
Com. App.,  28-6  S.W.  193 — Edmond- 
son  v.  Carroll,  Civ.App.,  134  S.W. 
2d  378,  error  dismissed,  judgment 
correct— Texas  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Miller,  Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d  600— 
Pfeifer  v.  Johnson,  Civ.App.,  70 
S.W.2d  203. 
33  C.J.  p  1128  note  86. 
Retention  of  separate  character  for 
purposes  of  judgment  of  actions 
tried  together  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
Trial  §  6,  also  64  C.J.  p  37  note 
81. 

Single  or  separate  judgment  in  con- 
solidated action  see  Actions  §  113 
a  (5). 

Defendant  is  entitled  to  a  judg- 
ment that  will  finally  settle  the 
claims  of  all  plaintiffs  and  bind  all 
parties,  so  that  no  suit  may  there- 
after be  made  on  the  same  cause 
of  action. — Caniano  v.  Dependable 
Amusement  Co.,  8  A.2d  830,  123  N.J. 
Law  419. 

Invalidity  as  to  person*  not  parties 
Invalidity  of  portion  of  judgment 
purporting  to  determine  rights  of 
persons  not  parties  to  the  action 
would  not  affect  part  dealing  with 
defendants  who  were  before  the 


court  so  as  to  render  it  interlocu- 
tory and  not  final. — Wood  v.  Gulf 
Production  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  100 
S.W.2d  412. 

Judgment  held  to  dispose  of  case  as 
to  all  parties 

(1)  Generally. 

Mo. — Lochmoeller  v.  Kiel,  App.,  137 

S.W.2d  625. 
Tex, — Pfeifer   v.    Johnson,    Civ.App., 

70    S.W.2d    203 — State    v.    Harvey, 

Civ.App.,  15  S.W.2d  82. 

(2)  A  judgment  which  disposed  of 
all  parties  named  in  amended  plead- 
ings on  which  the  trial  was  had  was 
a    final    judgment,    even    though    it 
failed   to   dispose  of  parties   named 
in  supplemental  pleadings  who  were 
dismissed  from  the  cause  by  failure 
to  name  them  in  the  amended  plead- 
ings subsequently  filed. — Brennan  v. 
Greene,  Tex,Civ.App.,  154  S.W.2d  528, 
error  refused. 

74.    Cal. — Phipps   v.    Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Alameda   County,   89 
P.2d   698,  32  Cal.App.2d  371. 

Ind. — Indianapolis  Traction  &  Ter- 
minal Co.  v.  Holtsclaw,  81  N.B. 
1084.  40  Ino^App.  311. 

Mo. — Brown  v.  Reorganization  Inv. 
Co.,  166  S.W.2d  476,  350  Mo'.  407 
— Electrolytic  Chlorine  Co.  v.  Wal- 
lace &  Tiernan  Co.,  41  S.W.2d  1049, 
328  Mo.  782,  78  A.L.K.  930— Pol- 
kowskl  v.  St.  Louis  Public  Service 
Co.,  68  S.W.2d  884,  229  Mo.App. 
24. 

Pa, — MacHolme  v.  Cochenour,  167 
A.  647,  109  Pa.Super.  563. 

Tenn. — Donegan  v.  Beasley,  181  S.W. 
2d  -879,  27  Tenn.App.  569. 

One  Judgment  record 
There    can   be   but   one   judgment 

record  which  must  include  both  the 

judgment     in     favor     of     plaintiff 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


against  joint  tort-feasors,75  and  in  actions  on  joint 
and  several  obligations  which  plaintiff  has  elected 
to  enforce  as  a  joint  obligation.76  It  applies,  even 
though  the  rights  or  liabilities  of  a  particular  de- 
fendant or  defendants  appear  from  the  proceedings 
or  are  determined  prior  to  the  completion  of  the 
case,77  where  the  cause  of  action  is  joint  and  sev- 
eral and  defendants  answer  jointly,78  and  however 
independent  of  each  other  the  respective  defenses 
of  the  various  defendants  may  be.79  Each  suit 
which  may  be  brought  on  the  individual  liability 
of  a  number  of  persons  jointly  and  severally  liable 
on  an  obligation  constitutes  a  separate  cause  within 
the  rule  against  more  than  one  final  judgment  in 
an  action.8** 

Judgment  should  be  entered  as  to  all  the  defend- 
ants.81 If  a  final  judgment  does  not  dispose  of  the 
case  as  to  all  the  defendants,  it  is  erroneous;82 
and  in  spme  instances  it  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment which  does  not  do  so  is  not  a  final  judg- 


ment83 but  remains  under  the  control  of  the  court.84 
However,  it  has  been  held  that  in  tort  actions  such 
a  judgment  against  some  only  of  defendants  is  at 
most  a  harmless  irregularity,  even  as  to  defendants 
against  whom  alone  it  is  rendered.85  An  addi- 
tional judgment  entered  against  other  defendants 
after  final  judgment  was  entered  against  a  default- 
ing defendant  has  been  held  to  be  merely  errone- 
ous and  voidable,  and  not  void.86  It  is  unnecessary 
for  the  judgment  specifically  to  dispose  of  the  rights 
of  all  the  parties,  but  it  is  sufficient  if  the  rights 
of  those  not  specifically  disposed  of  are  disposed  of 
by  implication.87 

Ordinarily  the  entry  of  judgment  against  one  or 
more  joint  defendants  in  jurisdictions  where  only 
one  final  judgment  in  an  action  is  proper  operates 
as  a  discontinuance  of  the  case  as  to  all  the  others, 
and  merges  the  cause  of  action  in  the  judgment, 
preventing  further  prosecution  of  it  against  the  oth- 
ers in  the  same  or  subsequent  actions.88  Thus,  if 


against  defendants  found  liable  and 
that  in  favor  of  defendants  found 
not  liable. — Hundhausen  v.  Bond,  36 
Wis.  29. 
75.  Mo. — Barr  v.  Nafziger  Baking 

Co..  41  :S.W.2d  559,  328  Mo.  423. 
78.    Pla. — Merchants'    &    Mechanics' 

Bank  v.  Sample,  124  So.  49,  98  Fla. 

759,  rehearing  denied  125  So.  1,  98 

Fla.  759. 

77.  Cal. — Hanna  v.  De  Garmo,  73  P. 
830,  140  Cal.  172. 

33  C.J.  p  1128  note  36  [a],  [d]. 

78.  N.Y.— Reade  v.   Halpin,   167  N. 
Y.S.  482,  180  App.Div.  161. 

79.  Tex. — Wooters   v.    Kauffman,    3 
S.W.    465,    67    Tex    488— Kline   v. 
Power,  Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d  617— 
Texas  Cities  Gas  Co.  v.  Dickens, 
Civ.App.t   133   S.W.2d  810. 

80.  Tex. — Comer    v.     Brown,    Com. 
App.,  285  S.W.  807. 

81.  Cal.— Rubin  v.  Platt  Music  Co., 
268  P.  396,  92  Cal.App.   203. 

82.  Mo.— -Cox  v.    Frank   L.    Schaab 
Stove  &  Furniture  Co.,  58  -S.W.2d 
700,  -332  Mo.  492,  transferred,  see, 
App.,  -67  S.W.2d  790— Strawhun  v. 
Farrar,  App.,  296  S.W.   191 — Crow 
v.   Crow,   100   S.W.   im,  124  Mo. 
App.  120, 

33  C.J.  p  1128  note  37. 
Oodefandant'g  plea  in  issue 

Judgment  against  one  in  action  on 
note  against  defendants  jointly,  tak- 
en while  other's  plea  of  payment 
was  on  file,  was  erroneous. — Mer- 
chants' &  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Sam- 
ple, 124  So.  49,  98  Fla.  759,  rehear- 
ing denied  125  So.  1,  98  Fla.  7-69. 

83.  Mo. — State    v.    Canterbury,    101 
S.W.  678,  124  Mo.App.  241. 

Tex. — Martin  v.   Crow,    28    Tex.   613 
— Gathings    T.     Robertson,    Com. 


App.,     276     S.W.     218— Pfeifer    v. 
Johnson,   Civ.App.,   70   S.W.2d  203. 

84.  Tex. — Martin   v.   Crow,    28   Tex. 
613 — Gathings   v.    Robertson,   Civ. 
App.,    264    S.W.    173,    reversed   on 
other  grounds,  Com.App.,  276  S.W. 
218. 

85.  Me.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Hincks  Coal  Co.  v.  Milan,   193  A. 
243,  245,  135  Me.  203. 

Mo. — Jackson    v.     City    of    Maiden, 

App.,  72  S.W.2d  850. 
33  C.J.  p  1128  note  39. 
Beason  for  role 

There  is  no  contribution  between 
tort-feasors. — Davis  v.  Taylor,  41 
111.  405—33  C.J.  p  1128  note  40. 

86.  Fla. — Merchants'    &    Mechanics' 
Bank  v.  Sample,  124  So.  49,  98  Fla. 
759,  rehearing  denied  125  So.  1,  98 
Fla.  759. 

87.  Tex. — Texas    Life    Ins.    Co.    v. 
Miller,  Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d  600— 
Traders  &  General  Ins.  Co.  v.  <Pool, 
Civ.App.,    105    S.W.2d    492,    error 
dismissed. 

&t  action  "by  husband  and  wife 

Judgment  for  wife  alone  for  per- 
sonal injuries  to  her  is  final,  being 
against  husband  by  necessary  im- 
plication.— Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Ul- 
mer,  Tex.Civ.App.,  282  S.W.  305,  af- 
firmed, Com. App.,  286  S.W.  193. 
Judgment  held  by  implication 

(1)  Generally. — Miller     v.     Texas 
Life   Ins.   Co.,    Tex.Civ.App.,    123    S. 
W.2d  756,  error  refused. 

(2)  There   was   in   effect  a  judg- 
ment for  defendant  bank,  the  judg- 
ment entry  showing  that  complaint 
was  amended  by  striking  It  out  as 
defendant,  leaving  only  an  individual 
defendant,    and    judgment    rendered 
being  against   him   alone. — Richard- 

90 


son  v.  Stinson,  100  So.  209,  211  Ala. 
254. 

(3)  Where  subject  matter  in  con- 
troversy is  awarded  to  some  of  par- 
ties, fact  that  one  or  more  of  them 
get  nothing  is  tantamount  to  judg- 
ment   against    each    of   them. — Roe- 
denbeck  Farms  v.  Broussard,  127  S. 
W.2d  168,  133  Tex.   12-6,  appeal  dis- 
missed 60  S.Ct.  145,  308  U.S.  -514,  84 
L.Ed.  4*38,  and  Christie  v.  Broussard, 
60  -S.Ct.   145,   308  U.S.   514,    84  L.Ed. 
438— Whitmire   v.   Powell,    125    S.W. 
889,   103   Tex.    232— Pfeifer  v.   John- 
son, Tex.Civ.App.,  70  S.W.2d  203. 

(4)  Effect    of    judgment    against 
only  one  defendant  is  to  hold  others 
not    liable. — Obermeier   v.    Mortgage  . 
Co.    Holland-America,    259    P.    1064, 
123     Or.     469,     modified     on     other 
grounds    260    P.    1099,    123    Or.    469, 
costs  retaxed  262  P.  261,  123  Or.  469. 

88.    Miss. — Daves    v.    Mahorner,    41 

Miss.  552. 
N.J.— Coles  v.  McKenna,   76  A.   344, 

80    N.XLaw   48— Turk  v.    Leitner, 

194  A.  619,  15  N.J.Misc.  '664. 
33  C.J.  p  1129  note  42. 

Continuation  of  cause  to  final 
judgment,  with  concurrence  of  all 
parties  except  those  whose  pleas  of 
privilege  to  be  sued  in  the  county  of 
their  residence  had  been  sustained, 
amounted  to  abandonment  of  cause 
of  action  against  them  and  their 
dismissal  from  suit. — Brown  v.  Gor- 
man Home  Refinery,  Tex.Civ.App., 
276  S.W.  787,  affirmed  Comer  v. 
Brown,  Com. App.,  285  S.W.  307. 
In  tort  actions 

A  separate  judgment  against  one 
or  more  of  several  defendants 
amounts  to  an  informal  dismissal 
of  the  action  as  to  the  other  defend- 
ants.— Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co,  v. 


49    O.J1S. 


JUDGMENTS 


36 


final  judgment  is  entered  against  a  defaulting  de- 
fendant,8^  or  against  a  defendant  who  admits  his 
liability  on  certain  items,90  it  is  improper  to  proceed 
with  the  trial  and  render  another  and  additional 
judgment  against  other  defendants. 

If  the  rights  or  liabilities  of  a. particular  defend- 
ant or  defendants  appear  from  the  proceedings  or 
are  determined  prior  to  the  completion  of  the  case, 
final  judgment  as  to  such  defendant  or  defendants 
will  not  be  entered  in  the  action  at  that  time,  but 
it  will  be  held  in  abeyance  until  proper  disposition 
of  the  entire  cause  has  been  determined  when  final 
judgment  as  to  all  the  parties  will  be  entered.91  If, 
in  such  case,  however,  plaintiff  desires  to  take  judg- 
ment against  defendants  whose  liability  has  been 
made  to  appear,  he  should  obtain  a  severance  of  the 
action  into  two  actions,  enter  judgment  in  one,  and 
proceed  with  the  other  to  judgment  against  the 
defendants  in  that  action,  as  discussed  in  Actions  § 
119  b  (2)  ;  and,  if  judgment  is  entered  against  one 
of  the  parties  prior  to  severance,  plaintiff  must  ob- 
tain a  vacation  of  the  judgment  and  severance  of 
the  action  before  he  may  proceed  with  the  action 


and  obtain  judgment  against  the  other  defendant 
or  defendants*9^ 

Separate  and  distinct  judgments  cannot  be  ren- 
dered against  defendants  sued  jointly,93  even  where 
the  action  is  on  a  contract  which  is  both  joint  and 
several.94  Where  several  defendants  are  all  liable, 
but  for  different  amounts,  plaintiff  must  elect  or 
the  court  order  which  of  them  shall  be  discharged.95 
In  such  case  judgment  should  not  be  entered  against 
some  only  of  the  several  defendants,  unless  plaintiff 
has  previously  discontinued  against  the  other  de- 
fendant or  defendants.96 

Wlwre  statutes  authorise  separate  judgments. 
Separate  and  distinct  judgments  may  be  rendered 
against  the  several  defendants  under  statutes  which 
provide  that  more  than  one  judgment  or  separate 
judgments  may  be  rendered  in  the  same  cause,97 
or  that,  when  a  several  judgment  is  proper,  judg- 
ment may  be  given  for  or  against  one  or  more  of 
defendants,98  or  that  judgment  may  be  rendered 
against  any  of  defendants,  severally,  when  plaintiff 
would  be  entitled  to  a  judgment  against  such  de- 
fendants if  the  action  had  been  against  them  sev- 


Evert,  138  So.  4,  102  Fla.  641—18  O. 

J.    p    1166    note   44—33   C.J.   p   1129 

note  41. 

39.  Colo. — Exchange  Bank  of  Den- 
ver v.  Ford,  8  P.  449,  7  Colo.  314. 

Fla.— Merchants'  &  Mechanics'  Bank 
v.  Sample,  124  So.  49,  98  Fla.  759, 
rehearing-  denied  125  So.  1,  98  Fla. 
769. 

N.J.—Coles  v.  McKenna,  76  A.  344, 
80  N.J.Law  48 — Turk  v.  Leitner, 
194  A.  619,  15  N.J.Misc.  664. 

Right  to  enter  judgment  against 
thos*  defendants  only  who  have 
defaulted  see  infra  5  191. 

90.  Vt.— F.  S.  Fuller  &  Co.  v.  Mor- 
rison, 169  A.  9,  106  Vt  22. 

Trustee  of  codefendant 

Judgment  is  unauthorized  against 
trustee  of  codefendant  against  whom 
Judgment  on  remaining  items  is  un- 
authorized.—F.  S.  Fuller  &  Co.  v. 
Morrison,  supra. 
Subsequent  procedure 

Oodefendant's  motion  to  dismiss 
action  as  against  him  should  be 
granted  and  judgment  entered  in 
his  favor  to  recover  his  costs,  since 
jurisdiction  of  court  over  action  is 
exhausted. — F.  S.  Fuller  &  Co.  v. 
Morrison,  supra. 

91.  N.T. — Bacon    v.    Comstock,     11 
How.Pr.  197,  199. 

83  C.J.  p  1128  note  86  [a],  [dj. 

Right  to  enter  interlocutory  judg- 
ment of  default  where  some  only 
of  defendants  default  see  infra  § 
191. 

92.  H.Y.— Kriser  v.  Bodgers,  18-6  N. 


Y.S.  316,  195  App.Div.  894— Circle 
Cab  Corporation,  v.  Rizzuto,  295  N. 
T.S.  185,  162  Misc.  547— Donner  v. 
White,  268  N.Y.S.  56,  149  Misc.  709. 
Bight  of  final  judgment  In  each  of 
separate  actions  after  severance 
see  Actions  S  122. 

93.  Ind. — Indianapolis     Traction     & 
Terminal  Co.  v.  Holtsclaw,   81  N. 
E.  1084,  40  Ind.App.  -311. 

Md. — Union   Trust   Co.   of  Maryland 

v.  Poor  &  Alexander,  Inc.,  177  A. 

923,  168  Md.  400. 
Pa. — MacHolme  y.  Cochenour,  167  A. 

647,  109  Pa.Super.  563. 
Tenn. — Ponegan   y.    Beasley,    181    S. 

W.2d   379,   27  Tenn.App.   369. 
Vt. — F.  S.  Fuller  &  Co.  v.  Morrison, 

169  A.  9,  106  Vt  22— Metropolitan 

Washing   Machine    Co.    v.    Morris, 

39  Vt  393. 
33  C.J.  p  1124  note  98. 

94.  Mass. — New  York  Trust   Co.   v. 
Brewster,  134  N.E.   616,  241  Mass. 
155. 

33  C.J.  p  1124  note  99. 

96.  Vt. — F.  S.  Fuller  &  Co.  y.  Mor- 
rison, 169  A.  9,  106  Vt.  22— Mc- 
Kane  y.  Gordon  &  Hoar,  81  A.  637, 
85  Vt.  253— Powers  v.  Thayer,  30 
Vt.  361. 
Election  shown 

Verdict  for  specified  total  sum  and 
apportioning  specific  amount  against 
each  of  several  defendants  does  not 
authorize  separate  judgment  against 
each  defendant,  and  plaintiff  by 
marking  satisfied  the  verdict  as  to  a 
defendant  who  paid  the  amount  as-. 

91 


sessed  against  her  elected  to  have 
judgment  entered  against  such  de- 
fendant and  hence  judgments  as  to 
the  others  could  not  stand. — Mac- 
Holme  y.  Cochenour,  167  A.  647,  109 
Pa.  Super.  563. 

96.  Mass. — Brooks  y.  Davis,   1  NJB3. 
2d  17,  294  Mass.  236. 

97.  HI.— Kulesza  y.  Alliance  Print- 
ers  &   Publishers,    47   N.E.2d    547, 
318    IlLApp.    2-31 — Shaw   v.    Court- 
ney,   46    N.E.2d    170,     317    Ill.App. 
422,    affirmed    53    N.E.2d    432,    385 
111.  559. 

Miss. — Aven  v.  Singleton,  96  So.  165, 

132  Miss.  256. 

Dismissal,       discontinuance,       nolle 
proseaui,  or  nonsuit  as  to  some  of 
several  codefendants  see  Dismiss- 
al and  Nonsuit  §§  30-32,  52,  77  a. 
Actions  in  which  statute  applicable 
Statute  authorizing  more  than  one 
judgment     in     action     on     contract 
against  several   defendants   is  Inap- 
plicable   to    action    against    several 
defendants  based  on  theory  of  tort 
liability. — Springer   Transfer   Co. .  y. 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Bernalillo  Coun- 
ty,  94   P.2d   977,   43  N.M.   444. 
On  New  trial 

Separate  judgments  may  be  enter- 
ed against  several  defendants  on 
new  trial  after  judgment  entered 
against  them  as  a  unit  has  been  set 
aside.— Fredrich  v.  Wolf,  50  N.B.2d 
755,  -383  I1L  638. 

98.  Ariz. — Bracker    Stores    v.    Wil- 
son, 103  F.2d  253,  55  Ariz.  403. 


§  36 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


erally."  Also,  where  the  statutes  provide  therefor, 
the  court,  in  its  discretion,  may  render  judgment 
against  one  or  more  of  several  defendants,  leaving 
the  action  to  proceed  against  the  others,  whenever 
a  several  judgment  may  be  proper.1  A  statute  au- 
thorizing judgment  against  fewer  than  all  of  sev- 
eral defendants  sued  does  not  authorize  the  entry 
of  separate  and  distinct  judgments  against  the  vari- 
ous defendants.2 

Under  statutes  authorizing  separate  judgments, 
where  it  appears,  either  from  the  proceedings  or 
during  the  progress  of  the  case,  that  a  several  judg- 
ment is  proper  as  to  one  or  more  defendants,  the 
court  may  render  a  judgment  for  or  against  him 
or  them,  in  advance  of  the  final  trial,  leaving  the 
action  to  proceed  against  the  other  defendants,8 
including  defendants  who  were  not  served  with 
process  at  that  time,4  and  defendants  as  to  whom 
an  appeal  against  an  improper  dismissal  is  pend- 
ing.5 If  no  sufficient  case  is  stated  against  one  of 
several  defendants,  a  final  judgment  may  be  en- 
tered disposing  of  the  case  as  to  him;6  or  separate 
judgments  may  be  entered  at  the  conclusion  of  the 


trial  against  defendants  who  could  have  been  sued 
severally.7  If  the  action  is  such  that  a  several 
judgment  would  be  proper,  as  where  it  is  brought 
to  enforce  liability  for  tort,8  or  on  a  contract  which 
is  both  joint  and  several,**  judgment  may  be  ren- 
dered against  any  one  or  more  of  defendants  sued, 
without  affecting  or  barring  the  remedy,  at  what- 
ever stage  of  the  case  their  several  liability  is  made 
to  appear,  as  where  such  party  suffers  a  default,  as 
discussed  infra  §  191,  or  submits  to  judgment  by  an 
offer,  infra  §  184,  or  consent,  infra  §  178,  or  con- 
fesses judgment,  infra  §§  144,  164,  or  where  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  such  judgment  on  the  allegations 
and  admissions  in  the  pleadings,  as  discussed  in  the 
CJ.S.  title  Pleading  §  433,  also  49  CJ.  p  676  notes 
89,  90.  Also,  under  various  statutes,  it  has  been 
held  proper  to  render  separate  judgments  against 
each  defendant  where  each  is  liable  for  only  a  pro- 
portionate amount  of  the  total  recovery,10  or  where 
the  liability  of  each,  as  expressed  in  the  contract 
sued  on,  is  several  and  differs  in  extent  propor- 
tionate to  the  respective  and  different  interests  of 
each,11  or  where  independent  acts  of  tort-feasors 


99.    Ind.— Hassler  v.   Hefele,   50   N. 
E.  361.  151  Ind.  391. 

1.  Cal. — Trans-Pacific    Trading    Co. 
v.  Patsy  Frock  &  Romper  Co.,  209 
P.  357,  189  Cal.  509— Weisz  v.  Mc- 
Kee,    87    P.2d    379,    31    Cal.App.2d 
144,  rehearing  denied  88  P.2d  200, 
31      Cal.App.2d     144 — Huntoon     v. 
Southern  Trust  &  Commerce  Bank, 
290   P.   86,    107   CaLApp.   121. 

N.J. — Ordinary  of   State   v.  Bastian, 

5   A.2d   463,   17   N.J.Misc.   105. 
Okl. — Howell  v.  Hart,    69  'P.2d  1043, 
180  Okl.  397— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Corley  v.  French,  293  P.  177,  178, 
146  Okl.  29. 
Or. — Fischer   v.    Bayer,    210   P.   452, 

108  Or.  311. 
33  C.J.  p  1129  note  4-3. 
In  Iroulsiana 

Where  two  parties  are  sued,  one 
for  the  payment  of  a  note  as  maker, 
and  the  other  for  illegally  retaining 
it,  the  causes  of  action  being  dis- 
tinct, judgment  may  well  be  had 
against  one  and  the  case  continued 
as  to  the  other. — Regillo  v.  Lorente, 
7  La.  140. 

2.  Pa. — MacHolme     v.      Cochenour, 
167  A.  647,  109  Pa.Super.  563. 

Vt. — Metropolitan   Washing  Machine 
Co.  v.  Morris,  39  Vt  393. 

3.  Cal. — Trans-Pacific    Trading    Co. 
v.  Patsy  Frock  &  Romper  Co.,  209 
OP.    357,    189   Cal.    609 — Huntoon   v. 
Southern  Trust  &  Commerce  Bank, 
290  P.  86,  107  CaLApp.  121— Park- 
er v.  Hardistfr,  202  P.  479,  54  Cal. 
App.  628. 

Ga.— Bank  of  Madison  v.   Bell,   118 
S.E.  439,  30  GteuApp.  458. 


Minn. — Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Smith, 

59  N.W.  311,  57  Minn.  374. 
N.J. — Ordinary   of  State  v.   Bastian, 

5  A.2d  463,  17  J^.J.Misc.  105. 
Okl. — Howell  v.  Hart,  -69  P.2d  1043, 

180  Okl.  397. 
33  C.J.  p  1129  note  44. 
Subsequent    judgment    under    cross 

petition 
Ky. — Culton  v.  Couch,  20  S.W.2d  451, 

230  Ky.  586. 

Specific    order   for    continuance    un- 
necessary 

The  court  need  not  specifically  re- 
serve its  Jurisdiction  as  to  other  de- 
fendants as  to  whom  judgment  is 
not  rendered,  but  such  Jurisdiction 
continues  automatically. — Howell  v. 
Hart,  69  P.2d  1045,  180  Okl.  397. 

Action  on  contractor's  bond 

Under  Heard  Act  which  contem- 
plates presentation  of  all  claims  un- 
der a  contractor's  bond  in  a  single 
action,  which  is  to  proceed  as  a  sin- 
gle case,  separate  final  judgments 
may  be  entered  on  the  claims  of 
the  different  claimants  where  so  to 
enter  them  cannot  prejudice  the  oth- 
er claimants  or  the  surety,  as  where 
the  total  of  all  the  claims  does 
not  exceed  the  penalty  of  the  bond. 
— Royal  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Woodbury 
Granite  Co.,  101  F.2d  689,  69  App.D. 
C.  364,  certiorari  dismissed  60  S.Ct. 
63,  308  U.S.  628,  84  L.Bd.  524. 

4.    Cal. — Corbin   v.   Howard,   215   P. 

920,  61  CaLApp.  715. 
Minn.— First  Nat.  Bank  of  Wabasha 

v.     Burkhardt,     73    N.W.     858,    71 

Minn.  185. 


Okl.— Howell  v.  Hart,  69  P.2d  1043, 
180  Okl.  397. 

5.  Ark. — Berryman  v.  Cudahy  Pack- 
ing   Co.,    87    S.W.2d    21,    191    Ark. 
533. 

Statute  held  inapplicable 

Statute  providing  that,  in  actions 
other  than  on  contract  wherein  sum- 
mons has  been  served  on  some  only 
of  defendants,  plaintiff  may  demand 
a  trial  as  to  only  some  of  defend- 
ants on  discontinuing  action  as  to 
others  does  not  apply  to  prevent 
judgment  against  defendant  after 
reversal  on  appeal  of  erroneous  or- 
der quashing  service  of  process  as 
to  him,  where  judgment  was  taken 
against  his  codefendant  pending  the 
appeal. — Berryman  v.  Cudahy  Pack- 
ing Co.,  supra. 

6.  Cal.— Weisz    v.    McKee,    87    P.2d 
379,  rehearing  denied  88  P.2d  200, 
31     Cal.App.2d     144— Huntoon     v. 
Southern  Trust  &  Commerce  Bank, 
290  P.  86,  107  CaLApp.  121. 

7.  S.D. — Western      Twine      Co.      v. 
Wright,  78  N.W.   94$,  11  S.D.  521, 

.44  L.R.A.  438. 

8.  Cal. — McNeely    v.     Los    Angeles 
County  Super.  Ct,   173   P.   102,   36 
Cal.App.  602. 

9.  N.J. — Ordinary  of  State  v.   Bas- 
tian,  5  A.2d  46-3,  17  N.J.Misc.  105. 

33  C.J.  p  1129  note  47. 

10.  Ark.— Fidelity  OPheniac  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Friedman,  174  S.W.  215,  117 
Ark.  71. 

11.  Colo.— Irwiu  v.  Wood,  4  P.  783, 
7  Colo.  477. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


36 


have  combined  to  cause  plaintiffs  injury  and  sep- 
arate verdicts  against  each  for  varying  amounts 
have  been  returned.12 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  cause  of  action  sued 
on  is  such  that  the  judgment  must  be  joint  and 
under  the  circumstances  the  case  is  not  a  proper 
one  to  go  to  judgment  against  one  of  the  defend- 
ants liable,  the  court  cannot  properly  render  judg- 
ment against  any  of  those  defendants  whose  lia- 
bility has  been  made  to  appear,1^  although  the  en- 
try of  judgment  as  to  some  of  the  defendants  prior 
to  final  trial  is  not  error  of  which  the  other  de- 
fendants may  complain,  where  it  does  not  prejudice 
any  defense,  set-off,  or  counterclaim  of  theirs.14  It 
has  also  been  held  that  separate  judgments  are  per- 
missible only  where  the  substantive  law  controlling 
the  case  is  such  as  to  impose  several  separable  and 
different  respective  liabilities  on  defendants.15 

The  entry  of  a  separate  judgment  against  one  or 
more  defendants,  under  a  statute  authorizing  it, 
does  not  merge  the  cause  of  action,  as  at  common 
law,  and  prevent  the  further  pursuit  of  judgment 
against  the  other  defendants.16  It  is  not  binding 
on  the  other  defendants  ;17  but  it  operates  as  a  sev- 
erance of  the  cause  of  action,  and  after  such  judg- 


ment the  issues  made  by  the  remaining  defendants 
are  to  be  heard  and  determined  as  if  they  had  been 
sued  alone.18  On  such  final  trial,  a  judgment  may 
be  rendered  against  the  remaining  defendant  for  the 
whole  or  such  part  of  the  cause  of  action  as  may 
be  proved  against  him.19  It  is  no  objection  that 
the  various  judgments  are  for  different  amounts.20 
Separate  judgments  against  different  defendants 
have  been  converted  into  one  judgment  against  all 
the  defendants  in  solido  in  order  to  fix  the  obliga- 
tion inter  se.21 

On  new  trial  as  to  some  of  codefendants.  In  ju- 
risdictions where  separate  judgments  against  code- 
fendants are  authorized,  separate  judgments  may 
be  recovered  where  some  of  the  defendants,  after  a 
joint  judgment  against  them,  obtain  a  new  trial;22 
but,  in  jurisdictions  where  only  one  final  judgment 
may  be  entered  in  an  action,  it  has  been  held  that, 
where  a  new  or  further  trial  is  found  necessary  as 
to  one  defendant  and  the  case  has  been  correctly 
tried  as  to  another,  the  case  will  be  held  in  abey- 
ance as  to  the  latter  until  after  the  new  trial  and 
then  one  final  judgment  entered,23  or  it  will  be  re- 
tried as  to  such  defendant  on  the  issue  of  amount 
of  liability  only.24 


12.  111.— Martin  v.  Blackburn,  38  N.  ] 
B.2d  939,  312  IlLApp.  549. 

13.  Mich. — Rimmele  v.  Huebner,  157 
N.W.  10,  190  Mich.  247. 

33  C.J.  p  1129  note  45. 

In  action  on  contract  which  is 
joint  only,  and  not  joint  and  several, 
a  several  judgment  against  some  of 
defendants  cannot  be  rendered  be- 
fore final  trial,  as  it  cannot  be  de- 
termined until  such  trial  whether 
or  not  a  several  judgment  is  proper. 
— Hempy  v.  Hansom,  33  Ohio  St. 
312— Aucker  v.  Adams,  23  Ohio  St. 
543. 

14.  Ohio. — Hempy    v.    Ransom,    83 
.      Ohio  St.  -312. 

33  C.J.  p  1128  note  38. 

15.  Miss.— Gillespie  v.  Olive  Branch 
Building  &  Lumber  Co.,  164  So.  42, 
174  Miss.  154. 

16.  N.J. — Ordinary  of  State  v.  Bas- 
tian,  5  A.2d  463,  17  N.J.Misc.  105. 

33  C.J.  p  1129  note  54. 
Stockholders  statutory  liability 

(1)  In  an  action  against  the  reg- 
istered owner  of  stock  of  an  in- 
solvent bank  to  enforce  the  stock- 
holder's statutory  liability  for  the 
bank's  debts,  judgment  may  be  ob- 
tained against  one  discovered  to  be 
the  real  owner  of  the  stock  after 
judgment  had  been  rendered  against 
the  registered  owner,  where  the 
court  had  reserved  jurisdiction  of 
the  cause. — Reconstruction  Finance 
Corporation  v.  Pelts,  0,<VUU.,  123 


F.2d   503,  certiorari  denied  Pelts  v.  ( 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation, 
62   S.Ct   796,   315  U.S.   812,   86  L.Ed. 
1210 — Ericson   v.    Slomer,    C.C.A.I11., 
94  F.2d  437. 

(2)  The  relationship  between  the 
real  owner  and  the  registered  own- 
er of  the  stock  is  that  of  trustee 
and  cestui  due  trust  and  not  that 
of  undisclosed  principal  and  agent. — 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation 
v.  Pelts,  C.C.A.I11.,  123  F.2d  503,  ceT- 
tiorari  denied  Pelts  v.  Reconstruc- 
tion Finance  Corporation,  62  S.Ct. 
796,  315  U.S.  812,  86  L.Ed.  1210. 

17.  Kan.— Davis  v.  Deal,  222  P.  68, 
115  Kan.  12. 

18.  Ohio.— Hempy    v.     Ransom,    33 
Ohio  St.  3JL2. 

Character  of  proof  required 

Plaintiff  must  establish  the  alle- 
gations of  his  petition  by  proof  of 
the  same  character  and  of  the  same 
degree  as  though  each  of  defendants 
were  defending. — Davis  v.  Deal,  222 
P.  68,  115  Kan.  12. 

19.  Iowa. — Smith  v.  Coopers,  9  Iowa 
376. 

Ohio. — Hempy    v.    Ransom,    33    Ohio 
St  312. 

20.  Cal.— Cole   v.    Roebling    Constr. 
Co.,    105   P.   255,   156   CaL   443. 

21.  La.— Rosenberg   v.    Derbes,    109 
•So,  841,  161  La.  1070. 

22.  Cal.— Knight  v.   Gosselin,  12   P. 
2d  454,  124  CaLApp.  #90. 

33  C.J.  p  1126  note  19. 

93 


No  double  obligation 

The  second  judgment  does  not 
create  a  double  obligation. — Knight 
v.  Gosselin,  supra. 

23.    Mo. — Electrolytic    Chlorine    Co. 

v.  Wallace  &  Tiernan  Co.,  41  S.W. 

2d    1049,    328    Mo.    782,    78    A.L.R. 

930— Neal    v.    Curtis    &    Co.    Mfg. 

Co.,   Mo.,   41   S.W.2d   543,    328   Mo. 

389. 
Tex. — Alexander    v.    Meredith,     Civ. 

App.,      154    S.W.2d     920,     certified 

questions     dismissed     152    S.W.2d 

732,  137  Tex.  37. 
Right   of  appellate   court   to   affirm 

as    to    some    defendants    and    re- 
verse as  to  others  see  Appeal  and 

Error  §§  1919-1922. 
Retrial  on  reversal  as  to  some  of  de- 
fendants 

Where,  on  appeal,  a  case  is  affirm- 
ed as  to  some  of  defendants  and  re- 
versed and  sent  back  for  retrial  as 
to  others,  the  judgment  on  the  first 
trial,  as  it  was  affirmed,  and  the 
judgment  on  the  retrial  have  been 
held  to  constitute  one  final  judgment 
so  as  not  to  violate  the  statute 
against  more  than  one  final  judg- 
ment in  a  case. 
Mo.— Snuff  v.  Kansas  City,  282  S.W. 

128,  221  Mo.App.  505. 
Tex. — Compton  v.   Jennings   Lumber 

Co.,  Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  308.     - 

24.  Mo. — Barr  v.  Nafzlger  Baking 
Co.,  41  S.W.2d  559,  328  Mo.  423 — 
Polkowski  v.  St,  Louis  Public 


§  36 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Interested  person  not  a  party  litigant.  The  mere 
fact  that  a  judgment  is  not  res  judicata  to  an  inter- 
ested person  who  is  not  a  party  litigant  does  not 
prevent  the  court  from  rendering  a  judgment  which 
is  final  and  res  judicata  as  to  all  the  parties  to  the 
proceeding.2^ 


§  37. 


Relief  between  Codefendants 


Judgment  determining  the  ultimate  rights  of  de- 
fendants as  between  themselves  Is  authorized  under  va- 
rious codes  and  practice  acts,  but  such  a  judgment  is  not 
authorized  at  common  law. 

At  common  law,  and  in  the  absence  of  statute 
changing  the  rule,  one  defendant  to  a  suit  cannot 
recover  a  judgment  against  a  codefendant,  because 
the  issue  is  as  to  the  liability  of  defendants,  or  ei- 
ther of  them,  to  plaintiff,  and  not  as  to  the  liability 
of  defendants  as  between  themselves;26  if  one  de- 
fendant is  entitled  to  contribution,  indemnity,  or 
other  relief  against  his  codefendant,  it  must  be 
obtained  in  an  independent  action.2?  As  between 
codefendants,  nothing  is  adjudicated  by  a  joint 
judgment  against  them,  as  considered  infra  §  440, 
although  in  equity  a  decree  between  codefendants 
may  be  rendered  in  proper  cases,  as  considered  in 
Equity  §  603. 

Under  codes  and  practice  acts,  affirmative  relief 
may  be  granted  as  between  defendants  in  relation 
to  the  subject  matter  of  the  action,28  on  proper 
pleadings  and  procedure  in  accordance  with  the 


statute,29  it  being  usually  provided  that  a  judgment 
may  determine  the  ultimate  rights  of  the  parties  on 
the  same  side  as  between  themselves.30  Such  relief 
may  be  granted,  even  though  as  between  the  vari- 
ous litigants  the  issues  are  contractual  as  to  one  and 
tortious  as  to  the  other.31 

Such  a  statute,  however,  does  not  make  codefend- 
ants adversaries.32  It  permits  the  determination  of 
questions  of  primary  and  secondary  liability  between 
joint  tort-feasors,33  but  it  does  not  authorize  judg- 
ment as  to  matters  not  connected  with  the  subject 
of  plaintiffs  action.34  The  judgment  authorized 
is  only  such  as  is  responsive  to  the  issues  in  plain- 
tiffs action  and  incidental  to  defendant's  defense 
therein,36  as  a  defendant  is  not  authorized  to  in- 
ject into  plaintiff's  suit  an  independent  suit,  either 
at  law  or  in  equity,  against  his  codefendant,  not 
necessary  or  germane  to  his  defense  to  plaintiffs 
suit,36  unless  a  statute  authorizes  the  determination 
of  particular  issues.37  Under  some  statutes,  where 
a  defendant  is  impleaded  as  being  ultimately  liable, 
the  judgment  against  such  defendant  should  be  in 
favor  of  the  original  defendant  and  not  in  favor 
of  plaintiff,  whose  judgment  should  be  against  the 
original  defendant.38  Service  of  process,  or  notice 
of  some  sort,  as  by  service  of  a  copy  of  the  answer 
or  cross  complaint  praying  such  relief,  is  essential 
to  the  validity  and  regularity  of  a  judgment  in  fa- 
vor of  one  defendant  against  his  codefendant.39 


Service    Co.,    68    S.W.2d    884,    229 
Mo.App.  24. 

25.  La. — Parish      of     Jefferson     v. 
Texas    Co.,    189    -So.    580,    192    La. 
934,  certiorari  denied  Texas  Co.  v. 
•Parish  of  Jefferson,   «0   S.Ct.   138, 
308  U.S.  601,  84  L.Ed.  503. 

26.  Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Cauble  v.  Cauble,  Cir.App.,  283  S. 
W.  914,  919,  920. 

33  C.J.  p  1131  note  63. 

27.  Tex. — Corpus    Juris    Quoted    In 
Cauble    v.    Cauble,    Civ.App.,    28S 
S.W.  914,  919,  920. 

33  C.J.  p  11-31  note  64. 
Right  to  judgment  for: 
Contribution     between     defendant 
tort-feasors    see   Contribution    § 
13  g. 
Indemnity  see  Indemnity  §  28. 

28.  Mo. — Merz     v.      Tower      Grove 
Sank  &  Trust  Co.,  130  S.W.2d  611, 
344  Mo.  1150. 

N.Y. — Weiner  v.  Mager  &  Throne,  3 
N.Y.S.2d  918,  167  Misc.  338— Cohen 
v.  Dugan  Bros.,  235  N.T.S.  118,  134 
Misc.  155. 

Pa.— -Ford  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  24 
A.2d  746,  148  Pa.Super.  195. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Cauble 


v.   Cauble,  Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  914, 
919,  920. 
33  C.J.  p  1131  note  67. 

29.  Mo.— Scheer  v.  Trust  Co.  of  St. 
Louis,  49  S.W.2d  135,  330  Mo.  149. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  guoted  in  Cauble 
v.  Cauble,  Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  914, 
919,  920. 

30.  N.C. — Montgomery  v.  Blades,   9 
S.B.2d  397,  217  N.C.  654. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Cauble 
v.  Cauble,  Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  914, 
919,  920. 

31.  N.Y. — Weiner      v.      Mager      & 
Throne,   3  N.Y,S.2d  918,   167  Misc. 
5'38. 

32.  Mo.— Merz  v.  Tower  Grove  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,   130   S.W.2d   611,   344 
Mo.  1150. 

33.  N.C. — Montgomery  v.   Blades,    9 
S.E.2d  397,  217  N.C.  654. 


34.    N.C. — Montgomery     v. 
supra. 


Blades, 


35.  Mo. — Merz  v.  Tower  Grove 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  130  S.W.2d  611, 
344  Mo.  1150 — Missouri  Dist  Tel- 
egraph Co.  v.  Southwestern  Bell 
Telephone  Co.,  79  S.W.2d  257,  336 
Mo.  453 — Scheer  v.  Trust  Co.  of 

94 


St  Louis,   49  S.W.2d   135,   330   Mo. 

149. 
Relief  not  authorized 

In  innocent  holder's  suit  on  note, 
makers  could  not  obtain  relief  for 
payments  made  to  payees  and  not 
credited  on  note. — Cohen  v.  Daily, 
Mo.App.,  52  S.W.2d  199. 

36.  Mo. — Merz     v.      Tower      Grove 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  130  S.W.2d  611, 
344  Mo.   1150— Missouri  Dist  Tel- 
egraph Co.   v.    Southwestern   Bell 
Telephone  Co.,  79  S.W.2d  257,  3'36 
Mo.  453. 

Equities  not  affecting'  plaintiff's 
tights  cannot  be  adjudicated. — Cohen 
v.  Daily,  Mo.App.,  52  S.W.2d  199. 

37.  Mo. — Early    v.    Small  wood,    256 
S.W.  1053,  302  Mo.  92. 

38.  N.T. — Otis  Elevator  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler,  216  N.Y.S.  320,    127  Misc.  421. 

39.  Tex. — Stokes    Bros.     &     Co.    v. 
Kramer,  Civ.App.,  44  S.W.2d  822 — 
Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Cauble  v. 
Cauble,     Civ.App.,     283     S.W.     *14, 
919,  920. 

33  C.J.  p  1152  note  70. 
Process,    notice,    or   appearance    see 
supra  §§  23-26. 


49    C.J.S. 

§  38.     Nominal  Parties 

Ordinarily  Judgment  should  be  fn  the  name  of  a 
nominal  or  formal  party,  but  It  Is  proper  to  show  there- 
in the  real  party  In  Interest. 

In  general  judgment  must  be  entered  in  the  name 
of  plaintiff,  although  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  an- 
other,4^  and,  if  entered  in  favor  of  the  beneficiary 
alone,  it  is  irregular  and  erroneous.41  Where  the 
real  parties  in  interest  will  be  estopped  from  again 
asserting  the  claim  in  suit,  judgment  in  the  name  of 
a  nominal  party  is  not  error.42  However,  under 
statutes  requiring  that  actions  be  .prosecuted  in  the 
name  of  the  real  party  in  interest,  it  has  been  held 
that  judgment  may  not  be  rendered  in  favor  of  a 


JUDGMENTS 


§  40 


plaintiff  who  fails  to  show  any  remedial  interest 
in  himself,  even  though  defendant  has  contested 
the  case  on  the  merits.43  It  has  been  held  that  a 
pro  forma  plaintiff  cannot  recover.44  Judgment 
may  be  rendered  against  a  defendant,  although  he 
is  only  a  nominal  or  formal  party,45  but  the  judg- 
ment properly  should  discriminate  between  the  ac- 
tual defendants  charged  with  liability  and  mere 
nominal  or  unnecessary  defendants  not  under  any 
liability  to  plaintiff.46  In  an  action  against  a  hus- 
band in  which  his  wife,  without  having  been  served 
with  a  summons,  was  made  a  nominal  party  defend- 
ant on  plaintiff's  motion,  a  judgment  against  her  is 
voidable.4? 


D.  PLEADINGS,  ISSUES,  EVIDENCE,  VERDICT,  AND  FINDINGS  TO  SUSTAIN  JUDGMENT 
§  39.     Pleadings 


The  necessity  and  sufficiency  of  pleadings 
port  a  judgment  are  considered  infra  §§ 

Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 

§  40.    Necessity  and  Sufficiency 

a.  Necessity 

b.  Sufficiency 


to  sup- 
40,  41. 


a.  Necessity 

Subject  to   certain   exceptions,    pleadings   have  been 
held  essential  to  the  regularity  of  a  Judgment. 

While  exceptions  may  occur  in  respect  of  judg- 
ments by  confession  or  consent,  under  principles 
discussed  infra  §§  ISO,  151,  174,  as  a  general  rule 
pleadings  are  essential  to  support  the  judgment  of 
a  court  of  record,48  and  are  as  necessary  a  basis  for 
a  valid  judgment  as  is  evidence.4^  In  this  connec- 


40.  HI.— McCormick    v.    Fulton,    19 
111.  570. 

83  C.J.  p  1132  note  72. 

41.  111.— -Hobson  v.  Mc'Cainbridge,  22 
N.B.  823,  1-30  111.  -367. 

42.  Okl. — American    Surety    Co.    of 
New  York  v.  Marsh,   293  P.   1041, 
146  Okl.  261. 

Wash. — Weaver    v.    Heaton,    4    P.2d 
521,  164  Wash.  674. 

43.  Alaska. — In  re  Nagao,  4  Alaska 
678. 

Ky.— Lytle  v.  Lytle,  2  Mete.  127. 

44.  Tex. — Lucas    v.    Dallas   County, 
Civ.App.,    138    S.W.2d   179-r Hill   v. 
Kelsey,    Civ.App.,    89    S.W.2d    1017 
— Avenel  v.  Iskovitz,  Civ.App.,  50 
S.W.2d  895. 

45.  Tex. — Harris    v.    Musgrove,    59 
Tex.  401. 

46.  Ky. — Cincinnati  H.  &  P.  B.  Co. 
v.  Spratt,  2  Duv.  4. 

La.— Morries  v.  Zelter,  4  La.A.,  Or- 
leans, 411. 

47.  .(Pa. — Rawlings  v.  Lewert,  9  Pa, 
Disk   &  Co.    701,   28   Lack.Jur.   15, 
75  Pittsb.Leg.J.  111. 

48.  Ala. — Brue  v.  Vaughn,   2   So.2d 
396,  241  Ala.  322. 

Ky. — Howard  v.  Howard,   94  S.W.2d 

652,  264  Ky.  311. 
l£u — Bank  of  White  Castle  v.  Baker, 

139   So.   648,  174  La.   17. 
Or.— Haberly  v.  J>armers'  Mut  Fire 

Relief   Ass'n,    294   P.    5$4,    13    Or. 

32. 
Tex. — City  of  Fort  Worth  v.  Gause, 


101  S.W.2d  221,  129  Tex.  25— Coh- 
en v.  City  of  Houston,  Civ.App., 
185  S.W.2d  450 — Ston«  v.  Boone, 
Clv.App.,  160  S.W.2d  578,  error  re- 
fused—Knox  v.  Lyarels,  Civ.App., 
155  S.W.2d  435,  error  refused- 
Thomas  v.  Mullins,  Civ.App.,  127 
S.W.2d  559,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  Mullins  v.  Thomas,  150  S. 
W.2d  83,  136  Tex.  215— Vassiliades 
v.  Theophiles,  Civ.App.,  115  S.W. 
2d  1220,  error  dismissed — Texas 
&  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Whisenant,  Civ. 
App.,  105  S.W.2d  706— Harris  v. 
Goodloe,  Civ.App.,  58  S.W.2d  156, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Goodloe 
&  Meredith  v.  Harris,  94  S.W.2d 
1141,  127  Tex.  -583— Bstes  v.  Hart- 
ford Accident  &  Indemnity  Co., 
Civ.App.,  46  S.W.2d  413,  error  re- 
fused— Matrimonial  Mut  Ass'n  of 
Texas  v.  Rutherford,  Ctv.App.,  41 
S.W.2d  719,  error  dismissed — Cisco 
&  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Ricks,  Civ.App., 
3«3  S.W.2d  878 — Smoot  &  Smoot  v. 
Nelson,  Civ. App.,  11  S.W.2d  578— 
Connellee  v.  Witty,  Civ. App.,  246 
S.W.  715. 

Utah. — Upper  Blue  Bench  Irr.  Dist. 
v.  Continental  Nat  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  72  P.2d  1048,  93  Utah  325— 
Stockyards  Nat.  Bank  of  South 
Omaha  v.  Bragg,  245  P.  966,  67 
Utah  60. 

Va.— Porks  v.'  Wiltbank,  14  S.E.2d 
281,  177  Va.  461. 

Wis.— Stellmacher  v.  •Sampson,  219 
N.W.  343,  195  Wis.  635. 

33  OT.  p  1132  note  80.      '-•  " 

95 


"There  is  no  principle  better  set. 
tied  than  that  a  judgment  or  decree 
cannot  he  entered  in  the  absence  of 
pleadings  upon  which  to  found  the 
same." — Rhodes  v.  Sewell,  109  So. 
179,  180,  21  Ala^App.  441. 

Matters  occurring*  pendent*  lite 
are  not  adjudicated  by  the  judgment 
unless  brought  before  the  court  by 
supplemental  pleading. — Grand  Un- 
ion Hotel  v.  Industrial  Accident 
Commission,  226  P.  948,  67  CaLApp. 
123. 

Where  no  pleading's  were  filed  in 
"behalf  of  Interveners,  a  judgment  in 
their  favor  could  not  be  sustained 
on  direct  atta-ck  on  appeal. — Howe  v. 
Keystone  (Pipe  &  Supply  Co.,  274  S. 
W.  563,  115  Tex.  158,  motion  for  re- 
hearing overruled  278  S.W.  177,  115 
Tex.  158. 

49.  Ky. — Consolidation  Coal  Co.  v. 
King,  244  S.W.  303,  196  Ky.  54. 

Tenn. — Poster  v.  Andrews,  189  S.W. 
2d  580. 

Tex. — Street  v.  Cunningham,  Civ. 
App.,  156  S.W.2d  541— Lone  Star 
Gas  Co.  v.  Holifleld,  Civ.App.,  160 
S.W.2d  282— Birdville  Independent 
School  Dist.  v.  Deen,  Civ.App.,  141 
•S.W.2d  680,  affirmed  Deen  v.  Bird- 
ville Independent  School  Dist.,  159 
S.W.2d  111,  138  Tex.  339— Adams 
v.  Impey,  Civ.  App.,  i31  S.W.2d 
288 — Shell  Petroleum  Corporation 
v.  Liberty  Gravel  &  Sand  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  128  S.W.2d  471— Forman  v. 
Barron,  CivJLpp.,  120  S.W.2d  827. 


§  40 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tion  it  has  been  said  that  courts  have  no  power  to 
render  judgment  until  their  action  is  called  "into 
exercise  by  pleadings,60  that  the  court  lacks  juris- 
diction of  the  subject  matter  or  controversy  in  the 
absence  of  pleadings,51  and  that  a  judgment  ren- 
dered without  pleadings  in  support  thereof  is  funda- 
mentally erroneous,52  a  nullity,63  and  void64  rather 
than  voidable.65  Where  pleadings  are  lost,  judg- 
ment should  not  be  rendered  until  they  have  been 
restored.66 

A  declaration,  petition,  or  complaint  is  essential  to 
the  regularity  of  a  judgment,57  and  it  has  been  held 
that  such  a  pleading  is  essential  to  the  court's  ju- 


risdiction to  enter  judgment,68  and  that  its  absence 
will  render  the  judgment  void,59  although  objection 
to  the  absence  of  such  a  pleading  may  be  waived.60 
Aside  from  judgments  by  confession,  consent,  or  de- 
fault, as  discussed  infra  §§  150,  151,  174,  199,  a 
plea  or  answer  may  be  essential  to  the  regularity  of 
a  judgment.61  Where  the  initial  pleading  has  been 
filed  in  one  division  of  a  court,  and  the  answer  is 
filed  in  a  different  division,  the  former  has  been 
held  to  lack  jurisdiction  to  enter  judgment.62 

b.  Sufficiency 

The   pleadings   should   be   sufficient   to   support  the 


error  refused — Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.  of  Maryland  v.  Citizens  Nat. 
Bank  of  Lubbock,  Civ.App.,  120  -S. 
W.2d  113,  error  dismissed — Shack- 
elford  v,  Neilon,  Civ.App.,   100   S. 
W.2d   1037— Shambaugh  v.  Ander- 
son, Civ.App.,  92  -S.W.2d  530,  error 
dismissed — Traders  &  General  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Lincecum,  Civ.App.,  81  S.W. 
2d  549,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
107  -S.W.2d  585,  130  Tex.  220— Karr 
v.  Cockerham,  Civ.App.,  71  S.W.2d 
905,  error  dismissed — Texas  Co.  v. 
Wright,  Civ.App.,   47   S.W.2d  487 — 
Gause-Ware  Funeral  Home  v.  Mc- 
Ginley,    Civ.App.,    41    S.W.2d    433, 
error    refused— Casualty    Recipro- 
cal   Exchange   v,    Allesandro,    Civ. 
App.,    34   S.W.2d   636— Humble   Oil 
&    Refining    Co.    v.    Southwestern 
Bell    Telephone    Co.,    Civ.App.,    2 
S.W.2d    488— Flagg    v.    Matthews, 
Civ.App.,  287  S.W.  299. 
Va.— Potts      v.      Mathieson      Alkali 
Works,   181  S.E.  521,  165  Va.  196. 
33  C.J.  p  1141  note  54. 
Evidence    as    essential    to    support 
judgment  see  infra  §  44. 
A  judgment  cannot   rest  on  evi- 
dence  alone   unsupported   by   plead- 
ing, unless  there  has  been  a  waiver 
by  opposite  party. — Howard  v.  How- 
ard, 94  S.W.2d  652,  264  Ky.  311. 
Proof   cannot    supply    omissions   in 

allegations 

Ala. — Brue  v.  Vaughn,  2  So.2d  396, 
241  Ala.  322. 

A  Judgment  entered  on  evidence 
without  pleadings  is  as  fatally  de- 
fective as  a  judgment  on  pleadings 
without  supporting  evidence. — Stone 
v.  Boone,  Tex.Civ.App.,  160  'S.W.2d 
578,  error  refused — -Rudolph  v. 
Smith,  Tex.Civ.App..  148  -S.W.2d  225. 

50.  Ala.— Rhodes  v.  Sewell,  109  So. 
179,  21  Ala.App.  441. 

Tex. — Dunlap  v.  Southerlin,  63  Tex. 
38— Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Citizens  Nat.  Bank  of 
Lubbock,  Ci<v.App.,  120  S.W.2d  113, 
error  refused— Continental  South- 
land Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Pan- 
handle Const.  Co,,  Civ.App.,  77  S. 
W.2d  896,  error  refused — Moore  v. 
Jones,  Civ.App.,  278  S.W.  326 — Con- 


nellee  v.  Witty,  Civ.App.,  246  S.W. 
715. 

51.  Mo. — Owens  v.  McCleary,  App., 
273   S.W.  145. 

XJtah.— Cooke  v.  Cooke,  248  P.  83,  67 

trtah  371. 

'It  is  fundamental  that  a  petition 
or  pleading  of  some  kind  is  the  ju- 
ridical means  of  investing  a  court 
with  Jurisdiction  of  subject-matter 
to  adjudicate  it." — Stockyards  Nat. 
Bank  of  South  Omaha  v.  Bragg,  245 
P.  966,  973,  67  Utah  60. 

52.  Tex.— City    of    Fort    Worth    v. 
Gause,    101    S.W.2d    221,    129    Tex. 
25 — Rudolph    v.    -Smith,    Civ.App., 
148    S.W.2d   225— Williams  v.   Sin- 
clair-Prairie Oil  Co.,  Civ. App.,   135 
S.W.2d  211,  error  dismissed,  judg1- 
ment  -correct — State  v.  Howe,  Civ. 
App.,    91    S.W.2d    487— Penrod    v. 
Von    Wolff,     Civ.App.,     90     S.W.2d 
859 — Jones  v.  Womack-Henning  & 
Rollins,    Civ.App.,    53    S.W.2d    635 
— Short  v.    Stephens,   Civ.App.,   44 
S.W,2d  466. 

63.  Utah.— Cooke  v.  Cooke,  248  P. 
83,  67  Utah  371. 

54.  Ala.— Rhodes  v.  Sewell,  109  So. 
179,  21  Ala.App.  441. 

Colo. — Hough  v.  Lucas,  230  P.  789, 
76  Colo.  94. 

Fla.— Lovett  v.  Lovett,  112  So.  768, 
93  Fla.  611. 

Mont. — Oregon  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Kun- 
neke,  245  P.  539,  76  Mont.  117. 

Tenn. — Lewis  v.  Burrow,  127  S.W.2d 
795,  23  Tex.App.  145. 

Tex. — Jackson  v.  Slaughter,  Civ.App., 
185  S.W.2d  759,  refused  for  want 
of  merit — Ritch  v.  Jarvis,  Civ. 
App.,  64  S.W.2d  831,  error  dis- 
missed— Davis  v.  Sloan  Lumber 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  37  S.W.2d  225— Mills 
v.  Moore,  Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  297 
—Hart  v.  Hunter,  114  S.W.  882, 
52  Tex.Civ.App.  75. 

Va.— 'Potts  v,  Mathieson  Alkali 
Works,  181  S.E.  521,  165  Va.  196. 

W.Va. — Kesterson  v.  "Brown,  119  S. 
B.  677,  94  W.Va,  447— Waldron  v. 
Harvey,  46  S.E.  603,  54  W.Va.  608, 
102  Am.S.R.  959. 

33  C.J..  p  1132  note  83—34  C.J.  p  561 
note  7. 

96 


55.  W.Va. — Kesterson  v.  Brown,  119 
S.E.    677,    94   W.Va.    447— Waldron 
v.   Harvey,   46   S.B.   60-3,  -54   W.Va. 
608,  102  Am,S.R.  959. 

56.  Tex. — Watson   Co.,    Builders,    v. 
Bleeker,  Civ.App.,  285  S.W.  637. 

33  C.J.  p  1133  note  94. 

57.  Tex. — Safety    Casualty    Co.     v. 
McGee,    Civ.App.,    93    S.W.2d    519, 
affirmed  127  S.W.2d  176,   133  Tex. 
233,  121  A.L.R.  126Q— Kentucky  Oil 
Corporation    v.    McCandless,    Civ. 
App.,  300  S.W.  972. 

33  C.J.  p  1132  notes  85,  87. 

58.  Utah.— State  v.  Cragun,  20  P.2d 
247,  81  Utah  457. 

Wis. — Nehring   v.    Niemerowicz,    276 
N.W.  325,  226  Wis.  285. 

59.  Iowa. — Jordan  v.  Brown,  32  N. 
W.  450,  71  Iowa  421. 

33  C.J.  p  1132  note  86. 

60.  Neb.— Heater  v.  Penrod,   89   N. 
W.  762,  2  Neb.Unoff.  711. 

33  C.J.  p  1133  note  89. 

61.  W.Va. — Cline    v.    Star    Coal    & 
Coke  Co.,  153   S.B.  148,  109  W.Va. 
101— Del-Carbo   Coal    &   Coke    Co. 
v.  Cunninghame,    116   S.B.   719,   9*3 
W.Va.  12. 

Vnpleaded  defense 

A  judgment  based  on  an  unplead- 
ed  defense  that  money  sought  to  be 
garnished  was  exempt  because  con- 
stituting proceeds  of  insurance  pol- 
icy on  household  goods  held  void, 
as  being  unsupported  by  pleadings. 
— Sorenson  v.  City  Nat.  Bank,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  273  S.W.  638. 
Declinatory  exceptions 

Where  citations  to  a  defendant  are 
served  on  the  secretary  of  state,  and 
defendant  challenges  the  validity  of 
the  service  and  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court  through  declinatory  excep- 
tions, but  at  no  time  files  an  answer 
or  suffers  judgment  to  be  taken  by 
default,  judgment  against  defendant 
on  the  merits  has  been 'held  void. — 
Rector  v.  Allied  Van  Lines,  L/a.App., 
198  So.  £16. 

62.  Mo. — Owens  v.  McCleary, 
273  S.W.  145. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


40 


Judgment,  and  a  judgment  rendered  on  a  complaint  fail- 
ing to  state  a  cause  of  action  has  been  held  erroneous. 

As  a  general  rule,  pleadings  must  be  sufficient 
to  support  the  judgment;63  they  should  be  of  such 
a  character  that  a  final  judgment  will  be  sustained 
by  findings  thereon.64  While  mere  generality  of 
the  allegations  is  not  of  itself  fatal  to  the  validity 
of  a  judgment,65  a  judgment  cannot  be  sustained 
by  allegations  which  are  only  conclusions  of  law 
rather  than  averments  of  fact.66  Pleadings  have 
been  held  substantially  defective  where  oral,67  and 


facts  presented  by  an  unauthorized  pleading  do  not 
afford  a  proper  predicate  for  judgment.68 

In  determining  the  sufficiency  of  the  pleadings  to 
support  the  judgment  it  has  been  said  that  the- court 
will  consider  the  pleadings  of  both  parties,69  and 
that  facts  pleaded  by  the  adverse  party  are  available 
to  either  party  in  support  of  the  judgment70  In 
testing  the  sufficiency  of  the  complaint  as  a  basis 
on  which  to  rest  the  judgment,  averments  unsup- 
ported by  the  proof  should  be  eliminated.71  A  judg- 
ment must  be  based  on  material  allegations  in  the 


63.  Ariz.— Wallace  r.  Chappelle,  39 
P.2d  935.  45  Ariz.  $5. 

CaL — »Kreling  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Los  Angeles  County,  118  P.2d  470, 
18  Cal.2d  884 — Stesel  v.  Santa  Ana 
River  Water  Co.,  94  P.2d  1052,  85 
Cal.App.2d  117. 

Ky. — Mclntosh  v.  Clark,  Thurmund 
&  Richardson,  177  S.W.2d  155,  296 
Ky.  858— Bank  of  Tollesboro  v. 
W.  T.  Rawleigh  Co.,  291  S.W.  1089, 
218  Ky.  516— National  Surety  Co. 
v.  Daviess  County  'Planing  Mill 
Co.,  281  S.W.  791,  213  Ky.  670— 
Elkhorn  Coal  Corporation  v.  Case, 
278  S.W.  570,  212  Ky.  146— Frick 
Co.  v.  Salyers,  258  S.W.  3-10,  201 
Ky.  763— Consolidation  Coal  Ca.  v. 
King,  244  S.W.  303,  19*  Ky.  54. 

Neb. — Domann  v.  Domann,  208  N.W. 
669,  114  Neb.  563. 

Okl.— Central  Nat  Oil  Co.  v.  Conti- 
nental Supply  Co.,  249  P.  347,  119 
Okl.  190. 

Or.— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  O. 
v.  Zidell-Steinberg  Co.,  HO  P.2d 
584,  151  Or.  5*38,  modified  on  other 
grounds  51  P.2d  687,  151  Or.  588. 

Tenn. — Hunt  v.  National  Linen  Serv- 
ice Corporation,  157  S.W.2d  608, 
178  Tenn.  262.- 

Tex. — John  B.  Quarles  Co.  v.  Lee, 
Com.App.,  58  &W.2d  77,  costs  re- 
taxed  67  &W.2d  607— Cohen  v. 
City  of  Houston,  Civ.App.,  185  S. 
W.2d  450— Wi'ehlta  Falls  &  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hesson,  Civ.App.,  151  S.W.2d 
270,  error  dismissed,  judgment 
correct — Pine  v.  Pratt,  Civ.App., 
150  S.W.2d  80!8— Ray  v.  Fowler, 
Civ.A.pp.,  144  S.W.2d  665,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Lone 
Star  Finance  Corporation  v.  Schel- 
ling,  Civ.App.,  80  S.W.2d  368— San- 
er-Ragley  Lumber  Co.  v.  Sp*vey, 
CiY.App.,  255  S.W.  193,  modified 
on  other  grounds  Spivey  v.  Saner- 
Ragley  Dumber  Co.,  Com.App.,  284 
S.W.  210. 

Pleadings  impliedly  wiffloieut 

The  entry  of  a  judgment  implies 
that  the  pleadings  were  sufficient  to 
sustain  the  Judgment — Wistrom 
Forsling,  14  N.W.2d  217,  144  Neb. 
638. 

Description  of  property 

In   so    far  as   the  description   of 
property  in  the  pleadings  is  insuf- 

49  C.J.S.-7 


flcient  to   describe  any  property,   a 
Judgment  based  thereon  is  invalid. 
Col. — Birkhauser  v.  Ross,  283  P.  866, 

102  CaLApp.  582. 
Mo. — Barrie    v.    Ranson,    46    S.W.2d 

186,  226  Mo.App.  554. 

Contradictory  allegations 

A  pleading  alleging  that  acts  for 
results  of  which  the  recovery  of 
damages  was  sought  were  malicious 
and  grossly  negligent,  and  pleading 
alleging  that  acts  were  malicious, 
wrongful,  willful,  and  wanton,  were 
insufficient  to  authorize  judgment 
based  on  negligence,  or  willful  mis- 
conduct because  pleadings  were  con- 
tradictory.— Michels  v.  Boruta,  Tex. 
C*v.App.,  122  S.W.2d  216. 

Pleading*  held  sufficient 
(1)  Generally. 

U.S.— State  Bank  of  New  York  v. 
Henderson  County,  Ky.,  C.C.A.Ky., 
•35  F.2d  859,  certiorari  denied  Hen- 
derson County,  State  of  Kentucky, 
v.  State  Bank  of  New  York,  50 
S.Ct  245,  281  U.S.  728,  74  L.Bd. 
1144,  1145. 

HI. — Oberman  v.  Camden  Fire  Ins. 
Ass'n,  145  N.E.  351,  314  111.  264 
— Christenson  v.  Board  of  Chari- 
ties of  Illinois  Conference  of  Ev. 
Lutheran  Augustana  Synod,  253 
Ill.App.  $80. 

Ky.— Small  v.  Minton,  192  S.W.2d 
184— Carter  v.  Templeman,  182  S. 
W.2d  241,  298  Ky.  272— United 
Mine  Workers  of  America,  Local 
Union  6659,  v.  Jones,  162  S.W.2d  17, 
290  Ky.  569— Guinn  v.  Cross,  147 
S.W.2d  375,  285  Ky.  571— Feltner 
v.  Smith,  143  S.W.2d  505,  283  Ky. 
783— Carter  v.  Harlatji  Hospital, 
128  S.W.2d  174,  278  Ky.  84— Rob- 
bins  v.  Hopkins,  65  S.W.2d  54,  251 
Ky.  413— McKinney  v.  Knapp,  258 
S.W.  '314,  201  Ky.  768. 

Mo.— Women's  Christian  Ass'n  of 
Kansas  City  v.  Brown,  190  S.W.2d 
900 — Jones  v.  Campbell,  App.,  189 
S.W.2d  124. 

Neb.— Hardt  v.  Orr,  6  N.W.2d  589, 
142  Neb.  460-JProkop  v.  Mlady, 
287  N.W.  55,  186  Neb.  644. 

Tex. — Joyce  v.  Anderson-Bledsoe 
Stave  Co.,  Civ. App.,  173  S.W.2d 
315-^Sparrow  v.  Tinman,  Civ.App., 
283  S.W.  877— Gulf,  C.  &  &  F.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Kempner,  Civ.App.,  275  S. 

97 


W.  459,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  282  S.W.  795. 

(2)  Allegations  as  to  negligence. 
I1L — Belcher  v.   Citizens   Coach  Co., 

App.,  64  N.B.2d  747. 
Ky.— Hurley    v.    Greif,    115    S.W.2d 
284,  272  Ky.  741. 

(3)  Averments  as  to  contributory 
negligence. — Posey      v.      Board      of 
Councilmen    of    City    of    Frankfort, 
184    S.W.2d    970,    299    Ky.    210— Na- 
pier  v.   Hurst-Snyder  Hospital  Co., 
130  S.W.2d  771,  279  Ky.  378. 

(4)  Description  of  property. 

Ga. — Cason  v.  United  Realty  &  Auc- 
tion Co.,  151  S.B.  161,  161  Ga.  374. 

Ky.— Sapp  v.  Likens,  192  S.W.2d  394 
— Souleyette  v.  McKee,  178  S.W.2d 
833,  296  Ky.  868. 

64.  Nev. — Edmonds  v.  Perry,  140  P. 
2d  566. 

65.  Conn. — Corden  v.  Zoning  Bd.  of 
Appeals  of  City  of  Waterbury,  41 
A.2d  912,  131  Conn.  654. 

Ky. — S.  K.  Jones  Const  Co.  v.  Hend- 
ley,  5  S.W.2d  482,  224  Ky.  83. 

66.  Ky.— -Murphy   v.    Blackburn,    16 
S.W.2d    771,    229    Ky.    109— S.    K. 
Jones    Const    Co.    v.    Hendley,    5 
S.W.2d  482,  224  Ky.  83. 

Tex.— Wichita  Falls  &  Southern  R. 
Co.  v.  Anderson,  Civ.App.,  144  S. 
W.2d  441,  error  dismissed,  Judg- 
ment correct 

67.  Tex.— Holloway  v.   Miller,  Civ. 
App.,  272  S.W.  562. 

68.  Ky.— Wells  v.  West,  15   S.W.2d' 
531,  228  Ky.  737. 

Substitute  pleading  filed  without 
proper  procedure,  as  where  the  orig- 
inal petition  was  lost  and  a  substi- 
tute was  filed  without  notice  to  de- 
fendant and  hearing  as  required  by 
statute,  afforded  insufficient  basis 
for  judgment  and  a  judgment  based 
thereon  was  illegal. — Whorton  v. 
Nevitt,  Tex.Civ.App.,  42  S.W.2d  1056. 

69.  Tex.— HaU  v.  Collins,  Clv.App., 
167  S.W.2d  210,  affirmed  Collins  v. 
Hall,  174  S.W.2d  50,  141  Tex.  433. 

70.  Tex.— Bagby  v.  Bagby,  Civ.App., 
186  S.W.2d  702. 

71.  Cal.— White    v.    Covell,    227    P. 
196,  66  CaLApp.  732. 


40 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


pleadings.72  Under  some  practice  a  judgment  may 
not  be  entered  on  a  cause  of  action  asserted  by  re- 
ply,73 Error  in  asserting  the  amount  due  in  a 
counterclaim  and  cross  action  should  be  corrected 
by  amendment  thereof  rather  than  by  asserting  the 
correct  amount  in  reply,  and  a  judgment  based  on 
the  reply  stating  the  correct  amount  cannot  stand.74 

Defects  in  form;  irregularities.  A  pleading 
which  is  merely  deficient  in  form  has  been  held  not 
to  render  the  judgment  void,75  but  only  voidable.76 
Thus  mere  defects  and  irregularities  in  the  plead- 
ings will  not  invalidate  the  judgment,77  at  least 
where  no  timely  objection  thereto  has  been  raised,78 
and,  even  though  a  petition  does  not  perfectly  state 
a  cause  of  action,  a  valid  judgment  may  be  entered 
thereon.™  A  petition  cannot  be  said  to  be  so  de- 
fective that  no  legal  judgment  may  be  entered  there- 
on where  the  defect  is  amendable,80  but  a  judgment 
has  been  held  void  where  the  petition  was  not 
amendable.81  A  judgment  may  be  sustained  de- 


spite defects  in  the  pleadings  on  which  it  is  based 
where  the  case  falls  within  the  purview  of  statu- 
tory provisions  designed  to  protect  judgments,  such 
as  statutes  requiring  a  liberal  construction  of  plead- 
ings,82 or  statutes  of  jeofails.83 

Sufficiency  of  pleadings  as  basis  of  judgment  for 
defendant.  If  a  petition  or  similar  pleading  is  in- 
sufficient as  a  basis  for  judgment  in  favor  of  plain- 
tiff, it  is  also  insufficient  to  serve  as  the  basis  for 
a  judgment  for  defendant.84  Where  plaintiff  fails 
to  amend,  the  proper  judgment  to  enter  is  one  sim- 
ply of  dismissal,85  and  the  fact  that  the  pleading 
fails  to  state  a  cause  of  action  will  not  prevent  ren- 
dition of  a  judgment  of  dismissal.86  When  issues 
are  framed  on  a  plea  in  abatement  and  those  issues 
are  found  for  defendant,  resulting  in  a  judgment 
for  him,  such  judgment  has  been  held  not  void  even 
though  a  demurrer  to  the  complaint  was  sustained, 
since  in  such  a  case  the  judgment  is  not  dependent 
on  a  complaint  to  give  it  effect,  but  is  dependent 


72.  HI.— National  Can  Co.  v.  Weir- 
ton    Steel   Co.,    145    N.E.    389,    314 
111.  280. 

73.  Ky. — Conley  v.  Coburn,  179  S.W. 
2d    668f    297    Ky    292— Connecticut 
Fire    Ins.    of   Hartford,    Conn.,   v. 
Baker,    153    S.W.2d    9.38,    287    Ky. 
395. 

Mont. — Armstrong-  v.  Butte,  A.  &  P. 
R.  Co.,  99  P.2d  223,  110  Mont  133 
— Stillwater  County  v.  Kenyon, 
297  P.  453,  89  Mont  354. 

74L  Ky. — Rogers  v.  Boiling,  1  S.W. 
2d  989,  222  Ky.  561. 

75.  Ala. — Agee  v.  Agee's  Cash  Store 
No.  2,  10.0  So.  809,  211  Ala.  422. 

Utah. — People's    Bonded    Trustee    v. 

Wight  272  P.  200,   72  Utah  587. 
Jurisdiction  of  court 

Where  the  nature  of  the  suit  in- 
vokes the  actual  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  rendering  the  judgment  and 
the  petition  is  merely  lacking  in 
allegations  as  to  the  fullness  of 
'  facts,  it  presents  a  matter  for  deter- 
mination by  the  trial  judge  and 
any  error  committed  in  rendering 
the  judgment  on  insufficient  facts 
does  not  render  the  judgment  void. 
— Rice  v.  Mercantile  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  Texas,  Tex.Civ.App.,  86  S.W. 
2d  .54. 

76.  Tex. — Jackson  v.  Slaughter,  Civ. 
App.,   185   S.W.2d  759,  refused  for 
want    of    merit — Ritch    v.    Jarvis, 
Civ. App.,  64  S.W.2d  831,  error  dis- 
missed— Hart  v.  Hunter,  114  S.W. 
882,  52  Tex.Civ.App.  75. 

77.  U.S.— The     Amaranth,    C.C.AJNT. 
Y.,  68  F.2d  893. 

Al<au — John  33.  Ballenger  Const.  Co. 
v.  Joe  P.  Walters  Const  Co.,  184 
So.  275,  236  Ala.  548. 


Ariz. — Mosher  v.  Way  land,  158  P.2d 
654,  appeal  dismissed  66  -S.Ct.  58. 

Cal.— Russell  v.  Ramm,  254  P.  532, 
200  Cal.  348— Goatman  v.  Fuller, 
216  P.  35,  19i  Cal.  245— In  re 
Dam's  Estate,  14  P.2d  162,  126 
CaLApp.  70 — Shupe  v.  Evans,  261 
P.  492,  86  CaLApp.  700. 

111. — Fleming  v.  City  of  Chicago,  260 
Ill.App.  496. 

Kan. — Goodman  v.  Cr etcher,  294  P. 
868,  132  Kan.  142. 

Ky.— Lorton  v.  Ashbrook,  295  S.W. 
1027,  220  Ky.  830. 

Mich. — Auditor  General  v.  Oleznic- 
zak,  4  N.W.2d  679,  302  Mich.  336. 

Mo. — Breit  v.  Bowland,  App.,  127  S. 
W.2d  71. 

Okl. — Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Excise  Board  of  Oklahoma  County, 
3'3  P.2d  1081,  168  Okl.  428— Kansas 
City  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Excise 
Board  of  Le  Flore  County,  33  P. 
2d  493,  168  Okl.  408. 

Utah. — Gray's  Harbor  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Burton  Lumber  Co.,  236  P.  1102, 
65  Utah  333,  followed  in  Califor- 
nia Pine  Box  Distributors  v.  Bur- 
ton Lumber  Co.,  236  P.  1106,  65 
Utah  332. 

33  C.J.  p  1134  note  1,  p  1144  note  73. 

ZTanie  of  plaintiff 

Mo. — La   Forge   Undertaking  Co.   v. 

Bader,    App.,    15    S.W.2d   945. 
33  C.J.  p  1134  note  1  [b]. 

Improper  designation  of  court 

While  a  judgment  on  petition 
which  fails  properly  to  designate 
court  in  which  it  is  filed  and  in 
which  judgment  is  asked  is  void, 
nevertheless  an  error  or  mistake  in 
addressing  a  petition  to  the  wrong 
court  can  be  cured  by  supplemental 
or  amended  petition  filed  before  is- 
sue joined  and  giving  the  proper 

98 


name  and  title  of  the  court  and  in 
such  case  the  petition  will  support 
the  Judgment — Kunnes  v.  Kogos, 
123  So.  122,  168  La.  682,  65  A.L.R. 
706. 

78.  Fla. — Harris  v.   Smith,    7   So.2d 
343,  150  Fla.  125. 

N.C.— Hinton  v.  Whitehurst,  4  S.E.2d 

507,  216  N.C.  241. 
Tex.— Kirkpatrick  v.  Neal,  Civ.App., 

153  S.W.2d  519,  error  refused. 

79.  Okl.— Protest    of    St.   Louis-San 
Francisco    Ry.    Co.,    38    P.2d    954, 
170  Okl.  11. 

80.  Ga. — S  towers  v.  Harris, '22  S.E. 
2d  405,  194  Ga.  636. 

Okl.— Wetzel  v.  Evans,  147  P.2d  133, 
194  Okl.  20— Latimer  v.  Haste, 
223  P.  879,  101  Okl.  109. 

Tex. — Sovereign  Camp,  W.  O.  W.  v. 
Piper,  Civ.App.,  222  S.W.  649. 

Utah.— State  v.  Cragun,  20  P.2d  247, 
81  Utah  45,— People's  Bonded 
Trustee  v.  Wight,  272  P.  200,  72 
Utah  587. 

81.  Ga.— Deck  v.  Shields,  25  S.E.M 
514,  195  Ga.  697. 

82.  Or. — Siddons  v.  Lauterman,  109 
P.2d  1049,  165  Or.  668. 

33  <C.J.  p  1134  note  5. 

83.  Mich— Ferton     v.     Feller,     33 
Mich.  199. 

34  C.J.  p  510  note  35. 

84.  Tex.— Stewart    v.    Collatt,    Civ. 
App.,   Ill   S.W.2d  1131— JCollins  v. 
Lowe,  Civ.App.,   5    S.W.2d   872. 

85.  Tex. — Collins  v.  Lowe,  supra. 

86.  Ky.— Wilson  v.  Louisville  &  N. 
R.    Co.,    77    S.W.2d    416,    257    Ky. 
144,     . 


49    C.J.8. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  40 


only  on  the  continued  existence  Of  the  cause  in 
court.87  While  defendant's  pleadings  must  be  suf- 
ficient to  support  the  judgment  rendered,88  they 
may  be  sufficient  although  defective  if  the  defect  is 
amendable.89  It  has  been  held  that  affirmative  re- 
lief cannot  be  granted  a  defendant  on  the  basis  of 
his  answer,  but  that  a  judgment  for  affirmative  re- 
lief must  be  supported  by  a  counterclaim.90 

Defects  in  petition  or  complaint.  As  a  general 
rule,  where  plaintiffs  declaration  or  complaint  is 
defective  in  substance,  to  the  extent  of  failing  to 


make  out  a  cause  of  action,  it  cannot  support  a 
judgment  in  his  favor,  and  such  judgment  will  be 
erroneous  and  reversible91  notwithstanding  no  de- 
murrer was  filed,92  or,  if  filed,  was  overruled,  and 
defendant  has  answered  over.93  It  has  been  held 
that  failure  of  plaintiff's  initial  pleading  to  state  a 
cause  of  action  is  not  a  jurisdictional  defect,94  and 
that,  except  where  the  complaint  shows  that  the 
court  has  no  jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and  the  sub- 
ject matter95  or  fails  to  show  affirmatively  that  the 
court  has  such  jurisdiction,96  a  judgment  rendered 


87.  Ala. — Box  v.   Metropolitan   Life 
Ins.  Co.,  168  So.  216,  232  Ala.  1. 

88.  Fla.— Smith    v,    Pattishall,    173 
So.  355. 

Case  not  terminated 

In  action  on  note,  where  defend- 
ant's   pleas    failed    to    set    out    any 
sufficient  legal  defense,  a  judgment 
rendered  for  defendant  did  not  con- 
stitute  a   legal    termination   of   the 
case. — A.    W.    Muse   Co.    v.    Collins, 
199  S.R  856,  58  Ga.App.  753. 
Flea  or  answer  held  sufficient 
Cal.— Valentine  v.    G.    S.    Donaldson 
Inv.   Co.,    260  (P.  *05,   86    Cal.App. 
142. 
Ohio. — Thacker  v.   Matthews,   43  N. 

E.2d    108,    70   Ohio   App.   314. 
Plea  or  answer  held  insufficient 
Fla. — Merchants  &  Bankers  Guaran- 
ty Co.  v.  Downs,  175  So.  704,  128 
Fla.  767. 

89.  Tex.— Gilbert  v.  T.  B.   Allen  & 
Co.,   Civ.App.,    16   S.W.2d   377,   er- 
ror refused. 

90.  N.J.— Kraft  v.   Fassitt,   30  A.2d 
574,   132   N.J.Ea.  603.  reversed  on 
other  grounds  28  A,2d  537,  132  N. 
J.Eq.  625. 

91.  U.S. — Barnes    v.    Boyd,    D.C.W. 
Va.,    8    F.Supp.    584,  affirmed.   C.C. 
A.,    73   F.2d   910,   certiorari  denied 
55  S.Ct.  550,  294  U.S.  72'3,  79  L.Ed. 
1254,  rehearing  denied  55  S.Ct.  647, 
295  U.S.   768,  79  L.Ed.  1708. 

Ala. — John  E.  Ballenger  Const.  Co. 
v.  Joe  F.  Walters  Const.  Co.,  184 
So.  275,  236  Ala.  548— Rhodes  v. 
Sewell,  109  So.  179,  21  Ala.App. 
441. 

Ark.— Wilson  v.  Overturf,  248  S.W. 
898,  157  Ark.  385. 

Cal. — Kreling  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Los  Angeles  County,  118  P.2d  470, 
18  Cal.2d  884 — Birkhauser  v.  Ross, 
283  P.  866,  102  Cal.App.  582. 

Fla. — McDougald  v.  Couey,  200  So. 
391,  145  Fla.  689— Oorpus  Juris 
cited  in  East  Coast  Stores  v.  Cuth- 
bert,  133  So.  863,  865,  101  Fla.  25 
— Porter  v.  Sprague,  126  So.  759, 
99  Fla.  371. 

Idaho.— Stanger  v.  Hunter,  291  P. 
1060,  49  Idaho  723. 

Ky.— Hardin  Oil  Co.  v.  Spencer,  266 
S.W.  654,  205  Ky.  842. 

Miss. — Smith  v.   Peas,  130   So.   105, 


158  Miss.  Ill— Carrier  Lumber  & 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Quitman  County,  124 
So.  437,  156  Miss.  396,  66  A.L.R. 
614,  suggestion  of  error  overruled 
125  So.  416,  156  Miss.  396,  66  A. 
L.R.  614,  followed  in  Matthews  v. 
Quitman  County.  127  So.  305. 

Mont — Lindsey  v.  Drs.  Keenan,  An- 
drews &  Allred,  165  P.2d  804— 
Montana  Auto  Finance  Corpora- 
tion v.  British  &  Federal  Under- 
writers of  Norwich  Union  Fire 
Ins.  Socy  232  -P.  198,  72  Mont  69, 
36  A.L.R.  1495. 

Neb.— Sallander  v.  Prairie  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  200  N.W.  844,  112  Neb.  629. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In  re 
Field's  Estate,  60  P.2d  945,  950, 
40  N.M.  423. 

Pa. — Greenberg  v.  Goldman  Stores 
Corporation,  178  A.  528,  117  Pa. 
Super.  559. 

Tex. — Stovall  v.  Finney,  Civ.App., 
152  S.W.2d  887— -Fort  Worth  & 
Denver  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reid,  Civ. 
App.,  115  S.W.2d  1156— Bell  v. 
Beckum,  Civ.App.,  44  S.W.2d  389— 
Wichita  County  v.  Allred,  Civ. 
App.,  27  S.W.2d  653— Trail  v.  Ma- 
phis  &  Day,  <3iv.App.,  25  S.W.2d 
627 — Texas  Electric  Service  Co.  v. 
Perkins,  CivJLpp.,  11  S.W.2d  643, 
affirmed,  Com. App.,  23  S.W.2d  320, 
followed  in  Texas  Electric  Service 
Co.  v.  Bradford,  Civ.App.,  26  S.W. 
2d  339— West  Texas  Utilities  Co. 
v.  Nunnally,  Civ.App.,  10  S.W.2d 
391— Austin  v.  Fields,  Civ.App., 
300  S.W.  247 — Texas  Employers' 
Ins.  Ass'n  v,  Wright,  Civ. App.,  297 
S.W.  764,  modified  on  other 
grounds,  Com.App.,  4  S.W.2d  31, 
motion  denied  7  S.W.2d  72— Hollo- 
way  v.  Miller,  Civ.App.f  272  S.W. 
562. 

38  C.J.  p  1183  note  95,  p  1144  note 
68. 

Allegation  of  liability 

(1)  A  petition  or  similar  pleading 
which  fails  to  allege  some  liability 
against  a  defendant  does  not  state 
a  cause  of  action  within  the  rule 
requiring  written  pleadings  in  sup- 
port of  a.  judgment  of  a  court  of 
record.— Woodward  v.  Acme  Lumber 
Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  103  S.W.2d  1054— • 
Fisk  v.  Warren,  Tex.Civ.App.,  248 
S.W.  406. 

99 


(2)  In  an  action  on  notes  signed 
jointly  by  a  husband  and  wife,  a 
petition  stating  only  that  the  for- 
mer is  the  husband  of  the  latter,  and 
not  that  he  executed  and  delivered 
the  notes,  is  insufficient  to  sustain  a 
judgment  against  him. — Fisk  v. 
Warren,  supra. 
Cause  of  action  in  alternative 

A  pleading  stating  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion against  two  parties  in  the  al- 
ternative is  insufficient  to  sustain  a 
judgment  against  either. — Hartzell 
v.  Bank  of  Murray,  277  S.W.  270,  211 
Ky.  26-8. 
Jurisdiction 

The  sufficiency  of  a  petition  in  a 
court  of  record  is  not  the  test  of 
jurisdiction,  since  the  court  may 
commit  an  error  in  holding  it  suffi- 
cient— In  re  Warner's  Estate,  288  N. 
W.  39,  137  Neb.  25. 

92.  Ala. — St  .Clair  County  v.  Smith, 
20  So.  584,  112  Ala.  347. 

93.  Iowa. — Brown    v.    Cunningham, 
48  N.W.   1042,   82  Iowa  512,  12  L. 
R.A.  583. 

94.  Cal.— In    re   Keel's   Estate,   100 
P.2d  1045,  15  «Cal.2d  328. 

'Okl.— Noel  v.  Edwards,  260  P.  58, 
127  Okl,  163 — Abraham  v.  Homer, 
226  P.  45,  102  Okl.  12. 

95.  Cal. — Moran   v.   -Superior   Court 
in  and  for  Sacramento  County,  96 
P.2d  193,  36  Cal.App.2d  629. 
"The  law  makes  a  distinction  be- 
tween a  complaint  which   does  not 
state  a  cause  of  action  by  reason 
of  defects  in  the  allegations  therein 
contained,  where   the   court  has  ju- 
risdiction  of  the   subject-matter  of 
the  action,  and  cases  where  the  court 
has   no  jurisdiction   of  the   subject- 
matter.    If  it  appears  from  the  com- 
plaint that  the  court  had  no  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  subject-matter,  the  judg- 
ment of  course  is  void,  but  if  the 
court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  subject- 
matter,  its  rulings  upon  demurrer  as 
to   the  sufficiency  of  the   complaint 
constitutes  only  errors  in  procedure 
in   the   trial." — Behrens   v.    Superior 
Court  in  and  for  Tuba  County,  23  P. 
2d   428,    429,    132   Cal.App.    704. 

96.  Tex. — Smith    v.     Pegram,     Civ. 
App.,  80  S.W.2d  354,  error  refused 
— Randals  v.  Green,  Civ.App.,  258 
S.W.  628. 


§41 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


thereon  is  not  void  merely  because  the  complaint 
fails  to  state  a  cause  of  action,9?  as  long  as  it  ap- 
prises defendant  of  the  nature  of  plaintiffs  de- 
mand.98 In  this  connection  it  has  been  said  that 
jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  render  judgment  does 
not  depend  on  the  sufficiency  or  fullness  of  a  cause 
of  action  pleaded,99  and  that,  if  a  cause  is  pleaded 
belonging  to  a  general  class  over  which  the  court's 
authority  extends,  jurisdiction  attaches,  and  the 
court  has  power  to  determine  whether  the  pleading 
is  good  or  bad  and  to  decide  on  its  sufficiency  as  a 
statement  of  a  cause  of  action.*  On  the  other  hand, 
it  has  been  broadly  stated  in  some  decisions  that, 
where  a  complaint  or  similar  pleading  fails  to  state 
facts  constituting  a  cause  of  action,  the  court  lacks 
jurisdiction  to  render  a  judgment  thereon,2  and  that 
a  judgment  rendered  thereon  is  ordinarily  void,3 
at  least  where  it  rests  solely  on  allegations  of  a 
complaint  so  deficient -in  substance  as  conclusively 
to  negative  the  existence  of  a  cause  of  action  at  the 
time  of  its  rendition.4  Where  the  facts  stated  in 
the  pleadings  do  not  justify  the  judgment  entered, 
the  latter  is  coram  non  judice,5  and  where  a  plead- 
ing is  so  drawn  as  'to  show  that  the  court  can 


have  no  jurisdiction  of  the  controversy,  or  is  a  nul- 
lity, any  judgment  rendered  thereon  is  void.6 


§41. 


Several  Counts 


The  more  modern  rule,  prevailing  under  statute,  gen* 
erally  regards  a  judgment  on  a  general  verdict  as  re* 
ferable  to  good  counts  in  a  pleading  and  valid  despite  the 
existence  of  bad  counts  therein. 

At  common  law,  and  in  the  absence  of  statute 
changing  the  rule,  where  the  verdict  is  general,  and 
one  of  the  counts  is  bad,  the  judgment  has  been  re- 
garded as  erroneous,7  except  where  all  the  counts 
relate  to  the  same  cause  of  action,  in  which  case  it 
has  been  held  that  the  rule  does  not  apply.8 

The  modern  rule,  however,  usually  applied  by  vir- 
tue of  statute,  holds  a  judgment  valid  under  such 
circumstances  where  there  is  one  good  count  in 
the  declaration  or  complaint,9  the  judgment  being 
referable  to  the  good  count,10  unless  it  affirma- 
tively appears  that  the  verdict  and  judgment  are 
based  only  on  the  defective  counts.11 

It  has  been  said  that  failure  to  require  a  party  to 
exercise  his  right  of  election  as  between  tort  and 
contract  counts  in  his  pleading  is  at  most  a  mere 


jurisdiction  to  enter  a,  Judgment 
Is  dependent  on  a  complaint  show- 
Ing  such  jurisdiction. — U.  S.  Nat. 
Bank  of  Portland  v.  Humphrey,  288 
P.  416,  49  Idaho  8.63. 

97.  Cal.— Moran   v.   Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Sacramento  County,  96 
P.2d    198,    (35    Cal.App.2d    629— Ex 
parte  Sargren,  27  P.2d  407,  135  Cal. 
App.     402 — Behrens     v.     Superior 
Court  in  and  for  Tuba  County,  28 
P.2d  428,   132   CaLApp.   704— Asso- 
ciated  Oil   Co.   Y.   Mullin,    294   P.' 
421,  110  Cal.App.  385. 

Mo. — Meierhoffer  v.  Kennedy,  263  8. 

W.  416,  504  Mo.  261. 
Neb. — Wistrom  v.  Porsling,  14  N.W. 

2d  217,  144  Neb.  638. 
N,M, — Corpus  Juris   cited  in  In  re 
Field's    Estate,    60    P.2d    945,    951, 
40  N.M.  423. 

Okl. — Raymer  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  87 
(P.2d    1097,    184    Okl.    392— -Protest 
of  Stanolind  Pipe  Line  Co.,  32  P. 
2d    869,    168    Okl.    281— Fowler  V. 
Margruret   Pillsbury   General   Hos- 
pital,   229    P.    442,    102    Okl.    203. 
33  C.J.  p  1133  note  96. 
Absence  of  affirmative  showing- 
Judgment  of   court   having  Juris- 
diction  of   subject    matter   and   of 
parties  is  not  void  on  ground  that 
petition  failed  to  state,  or  defective- 
ly stated,  cause  of  action,  unless  it 
affirmatively   appears   from   petition 
that  no  valid  cause  of  aetlon  could 
be  stated.— Schmid  v.  Farris,  07  P. 
2d  596,  169  Okl.  445. 

98.  Cal. — Trans-Pacific  Trading  Co. 
•  v.  Patsy  Frock  &  Romper  Co.,  209 

P.  357,  189  Cal.  509— Moran  v.  Su- 


perior Court  in  and  for  Sacramen- 
to County,  96  P.2d  193,  35  CaLApp. 
2d  629— Associated  Oil  Cd.  v.  Mul- 
lin, 294  P.  421,  110  CaLApp.  385 
— Sheehan  v.  All  Persons,  etc., 
252  P.  337,  80  CaLApp.  393— Roe- 
mer  v.  Nunes,  238  P.  820,  73  Cal. 
App.  -368. 

Okl. — Bynum  v.  Strain,  218  'P.  883, 
95  Okl.  45. 

Or.— Walling:  v.  I*ebb,  15  P,2d  370, 
140  Or.  691. 

33  C.J.  p  113*3  note  96  [a]   (3). 

99.  Mont.— State  ex  rel.  Cook  v. 
District  Court  of  Ninth  Judicial 
Dist  in  and  for  Glacier  County, 
69  P.2d  746,  105  Mont  72— State 
ex  rel.  Delmoe  v.  District  Court  of 
Fifth  Judicial  Dist,  46  P.2d  39, 
100  Mont  131. 

1.  Mont — State    ex  reL   Delmoe   v. 
District    Court    of    Fifth    Judicial 
Dist,   46   P.2d   39,   100   Mont.   131. 

2.  Mont. — Hodson   v.    O'Keeffe,    229 
P.  722,  71  Mont  322. 

3.  U.S. — McLellan     v.      Automobile 
Ins.  Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  CJC.A. 
Ariz.,  80  F.2d  344. 

Ala.— Rhodes  v.  Sewell,  109  So.  179, 

21  Ala.App.  441. 
Idaho. — Jensen  v.  Gooch,  211  P.  551, 

36   Idaho    457— Howell   v.   Martin, 

211  OP.  528,  36  Idaho  468. 
Miss.-— U.    <S.    Fidelity    &    Guaranty 

Co.  v.  Plumbing:  Wholesale  Co.,  166 

So.  529,  175  Miss.  675. 
Tex. — Wright  v.   Shipman,   Civ.App., 

279  S.W.  296. 

4.  Mont — State    ex  rel.  Delmoe   v. 
District    Court    of   Fifth    Judicial 
Dist.,   46   P.2d   39,    100  Mont  131. 

100 


5.    Tenn. — State  v.   Collier,   53   S.W. 

2d  982,  164  Tenn.  163. 
6*    Tex. — -White   v.  Baker,    Civ.App., 

118  S.W.2d  -319. 

7.  N.H.— Glines   v.    Smith,    48   N.H. 
259. 

33  C.J.  p  1134  note  7. 

8.  N.H. — Glines   v.   Smith,   supra. 
33  C.J.  p  1134  note  9. 

9.  CaL— -Martin    v.     Pacific    South- 
west  Royalties,    106   P.2d   443,    41 
Cal.  App.  2d     161— Worthington     v. 
People's  State  Bank  of  Chula  Vis- 
ta, 288  P.  1086,  106  CaLApp.  238. 

111. — Standard   Oil   Co.    v.    Town    of 

(Patterson,    21   N.B.2d   12,    300   111. 

App.     $85 — Moore     v.     Jansen     & 

Schaefer,   265   IlLApp.   459. 
Ind. — Carter  v.  Thomas,  3  Ind.  213. 
Iowa. — McCornack  v.    Pickerell,    294 

N.W.  746,  229  Iowa  4-57. 
Tex. — Schaff    v.    Sanders,    Civ.App., 

257  S.W.    670,   affirmed,   Com. App., 

2e9  S.W.  1034. 
33  C.J.  p  1134  note  10. 
Statutory    change    of    common-law 

rule  discussed 
Miss.— Scott  v.  Peebles,  10  Miss.  546, 

561. 

10.  Ala. — Andalusia    Motor    Co.    v. 
Mullins,   18'3    So.    456,    28   Ala.App. 
201,  certtorari  denied  183  So.  460, 
236  Ala.  474. 

33  C.J.  p  1134  note  10  [a]. 

11.  TT.S. — Scull  v.  Roane,  Ark. Super., 
21    F.Cas.No.l2,570c,    Hempst    103. 

111. — Western  Stone  Co.  v.  Whalen, 
51  Ill.App.  512,  affirmed  38  N.& 
241,  151  111,  472,  42  Am.S.R,  244. 

33  C.J.  p  1134  note  11. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


irregularity  which  will  render  the  judgment  void- 
able rather  than  void.12  If  there  was  a  demurrer 
to  a  defective  count,  which  was  erroneously  over- 
ruled, the  judgment  is  invalid  where  the  record 
does  not  show  affirmatively  that  the  judgment  rests 
exclusively  on  the  good  counts;18  but  all  counts 
must  be  bad,  however,  to  establish  invalidity  where 
there  was  no  demurrer.1*  Where  the  verdict  is 
special,  and  responsive  to  a  good  count,  a  judg- 
ment thereon  is,  of  course,  unobjectionable.^ 
Where  all  the  counts  show  a  good  cause  of  action, 
the  judgment  is  not  bad  because  it  was  general,  al- 
though, on  the  evidence,  plaintiff  was  not  entitled 
to  recover  on  some  of  the  counts.1^ 

§  42.    Issues 

Ordinarily  the  pleading*  In  a  cause  must  evolve  an 
Issue  of  law  or  fact  before  a  Judgment  can  regularly  be 
rendered. 

Subject  to  exceptions  which  may  occur  in  the 
case  of  judgments  by  confession,  consent,  or  de- 
fault, as  discussed  infra  §§  150-151,  174,  193,  or 


following  submission  on  an  agreed  rtatement  of 
facts  under  principles  considered  infra  §  186,  it  is 
a  general  rule  that  the  pleadings  in  a  cause  must 
evolve  an  issue  of  law  or  fact  before  a  judgment 
can  regularly  be  rendered.17  A  judgment  rendered 
without  issue  joined  or  waived  is  erroneous,18  some 
authorities  holding  that  such  a  judgment  is  void19 
and  others  that  it  is  merely  voidable.2**  When  an 
issue  is  tried  which  is  not  within  the  pleadings,  no 
duty  rests  on  the  trial  court  to  render  judgment 
thereon  and  its  failure  or  refusal  to  do  so  is  not 
erroneous.21 


§43. 


Determination  of  All  Issues 


Generally  a  Judgment  must  dispose  of  all  Issues  In 
the  case,  either  expressly  or  by  necessary  Implication. 

The  prevailing  rule  under  common  law  and  stat- 
utes declaratory  thereof  requires  a  judgment  to  de- 
termine all  issues22  among  all  the  parties,23  except 
such  issues  as  are  waived  or  abandoned  on  the  trial 
of  the  case.24  So  the  judgment  must  be  as  broad 
as  the  issues  and  must  respond  to  all  the  issues  both 


18.  Cat.— Bank  of  America  Nat 
Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Hill,  71 
P.2d  258,  9  CaL2d  495. 

13.  111.— Lake    Shore   &   M.   S.   Ry. 
Co.  v.  Barnes,  76  N.E.  629,  166  Ind. 
7,  3  L.R.A.,N.S.,  778. 

88  O.J.  p  1185  note  12. 

14.  Ind. — Kelsey  v.  Henry,  48  Ind. 
37— Dice  v.  Morris,  82  Ind.  288. 

15.  Pa. — McCredy      v.      James,      6 
Whart.  547, 

Va.— Binns  v.  Waddill,  82  Gratt.  588, 
73  Va.  €88. 

16.  Ala. — Jones    v.    Belue,    200    So. 
886,  241  Ala.  22. 

88  C.J.  p  1185  note  15. 

17.  W.Va, — Kinder  v.   Boomer  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.,  95  S.B.  580,  82  W.Va. 
82. 

83  C.J.  p  1155  n«te  21. 
Disposition  of  issues  presented 

In  the  interest  of  certainty,  Ju- 
dicial Judgments,  should  be  limited 
strictly  to  disposition  of  issues  ac- 
tually presented. — Singer  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
National  Labor  Relations  Board,  C 
C.A.,  119  F.2d  181,  certiorari  denied 
61  S.Ct.  1119,  818  U.S.  595,  85  1*. 
Ed.  1549,  rehearing  denied  62  S.Ct 
55,  314  U.S.  708,  86  L.E3d.  565. 
Record  held  to  show  Joinder  of  is- 
sue 

Ala. — Denhaxn  v.  Tancey,  95  So.  201, 
19  Ala.App.  45,  certiorari  denied 
Ez  parte  Denhaxn,  95  So.  202,  208 
Ala.  637. 

18.  W.Va.— CUne    y.    Star    Coal    & 
Coke  Co.,  153  S.E.  148,  109  W.Va. 
101. 

83  C.J.  p  1135  note  22. 

19.  La. — Lacour   Plantation   Co.    v. 
Jewell,  173  So.  761,  186  La.  1055, 


— Rector  v.  Allied  Van  Lines,  App., 
198  So.  516 — Robinson  v.  Enloe, 
121  So.  320,  10  La.App.  435. 

Ohio. — Binns  v.  Isabel,  12  Ohio  Supp. 
115,  affirmed  51  N.B.2d  501,  72 
Ohio  App.  222. 

33  C.J.  p  1135  note  24. 

20.  Tenn. — Doyle  v.  Smith,  1  Coldw. 
15. 

21.  Neb.— Bowman  v.  Cobb,  258  N. 
W.  535,  128  Neb.  289. 

22.  Cal.— Mather  v.  Mather,   140  P. 
2d   808,   22  Cal.2d   713— Nakamura 
v.  Kondo,  223  P.  425,  65  CaLApp. 
211. 

Ga, — South  View  Cemetery  Ass'n  v. 
Hailey,  34  S.E.2d  863,  199  Ga. 
478. 

Mo.— Ex  parte  Fowler,  275  S.W.  529— 
Gay  v.  Kansas  City  Public  Service 
Co.,  App.,  77  S.W.2d  133— Nokes  v. 
Nokes,  App..  8  S.W.2d  879— Spring- 
field Gas  &  Electric  Co.  y.  Frater- 
nity Bldg.  Co.,  App.,  264  S.W.  429. 
N.Y.— Water  Right  &  Electrical  Co. 
v.  Rockland  Light  &  Power  Co., 
280  N.T.S.  317,  245  App.Div.  739— 
Maclvor  v.  -Schwartzman,  260  N.T. 
S.  707,  237  App.Div.  825. 
OkL-r Hurley    v.    Hurley,    127    P.2d 
147,  191  Okl.  194— Foreman  v.  Ri- 
ley,  211  P.  495,  88  Okl.  75. 
Tex.— Southern   Pac.    Co.   v.    Ulmer, 
ConuApp.,  286  S.W.  193 — Harris  v. 
O'Brien,   Civ.App.,    54    S.W.2d   277. 
Wyo. — Norris     v.     United     Mineral 

Products   Co.,    158    P.2d   679. 
33  C.J.  p  1135  note  26. 
Disputed  items;  remission 

(1)  In  action  on  note  and  open  ac- 
count, Judgment  cannot  be  entered 
for  admitted  indebtedness  reserving 
disputed  items  for  subsequent  trial,, 

101 


as  this  would  result  in  two  Judg- 
ments in  one  action. — Lakin-Allen 
Electric  Co.  v.  Lamb,  226  N.W.  229, 
247  Mich.  590. 

(2)  If  defendant  tenders  Judgment 
for  a  confessed  amount,  however, 
plaintiff  may  take  Judgment  for  such 
amount,  and  thereby  remit  amount 
in  dispute. — Grand  Dress  v.  Detroit 
Dress  Co.,  227  N.W.  723,  248  Mich. 
447. 

Eitner  party  may  complain  of  and 
have  reversal  of  Judgment  which 
does  not  have  effect  of  determining 
sole  •  issue  as  to  existence  of  con- 
tract on  which  plaintiff  seeks  to  re- 
cover.— McKeel  v.  Mercer,  29  P.2d 
939,  167  Okl.  413. 

23.  Mo.— Electrolytic    Chlorine    Co. 
v.  Wallace  &  Tiernan  Co..  41  S.W. 
2d    1049,    328    Mo.    782,    78    A.L.R. 
930— Neal  v.  Curtis  &  Co.  Mfg.  Co., 
41  S.W.2d  543,  328  Mo.  389. 

Tex.— Patton    v.    Mitchell,    CivJlpp., 
13  .S.W.2d  146. 

24.  D.C. — Anderson    v.    Mackey,    16 
D.C.  335. 

Ky.— Hurley  v.  Hurley.  127  P.2d  147, 

191  Okl.  194. 
Okl.— Foreman  v.  Riley,  211  P,  495, 

88   Okl.   75— Wells  v.   Shriver,   197 

P.  460,  81  Okl.  108. 
33  C.J.  p  1136  note  28. 
Counterclaim 

In  absence  of  showing  that  de- 
fendants pressed  counterclaim,  de- 
fendants will  be  held  to  have  ac- 
quiesced in  rendition  of  Judgment 
dismissing  petition  without  dispos- 
ing of  counterclaim,— <Jity  of  St 
Louis  ex  reL  and  to  Use  of  Sears 
v.  (Clark,  Mo.App.,  $5  S.W.2d  980. 


§  43 


JUDGMENTS 


49  .C.J.S. 


of  law  and  fact,25  and  it  must  dispose  of  the  entire 
subject  matter  of  the  litigation26  and  conclude  all 
further  inquiry  into  the  issues  joined  by  the  plead- 
ings, leaving  nothing  further  to  be  done  except  to 
carry  the  judgment  into  execution.27  In  rendering 
judgment  the  court  may,  however,  properly  disre- 
gard an  immaterial  issue.28  A  judgment  will  be 
held  sufficient  if  it  disposes  of  material  issues  by 
necessary  implication  even  though  it  does  not  do  so 
in  formal  terns,29  and  as  a  rule  it  will  be  presumed 
that  the  court  passed  on  all  questions  properly  pre- 
sented which  under  its  own  ruling  it  was  possible 
for  it  to  adjudge.30 

Ordinarily  judgment  should  not  be  rendered  with- 


out disposing  of  matters  raised  by  defendant's 
pleadings,31  such  as  a  counterclaim82  or  cross  com- 
plaint,33 unless  the  determination  of  the  issue  on 
which  the  judgment  is  based  is  necessarily  decisive 
of  the  whole  case34  or  the  actions  have  been  sepa- 
rated under  statutes  or  court  rules  permitting  such 
practice.35  An  answer  filed  by  one  of  several  de- 
fendants, which  may  be  or  become  common  to  all, 
and  which  goes  to  the  right  of  plaintiff  to  recover, 
precludes  judgment  against  a  codefendant  until  the 
issues  have  been  disposed  of  by  the  court.36  It  has 
been  held  improper  to  render  judgment  on  an  inter- 
vention without  at  the  same  time  acting  on  the  prin- 
cipal action.37 


25.  Mo. — Magee  v.   Mercantile-Com- 
merce Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  98  S.W. 
2d   614,   839   Mo.    559 — Lummi  Bay 
Packing*  Co.  v.   Kryder,   App.,    1 
S.W.  543. 

Pa, — Thompson  v.  Emerald  Oil  Co., 
123  A.  810,  279  Pa.  321. 

Tex. — Standard  Motor  Co.  v.  Witt- 
man,  Civ.App.,  271  S.W.  186— Fort 
Worth  Acid  Works  v.  City  of 
Tort  Worth,  Oiv.App.,  248  S.W. 
822,  affirmed  City  of  Fort  Worth 
v.  Fort  Worth  Acid  Works  Co., 
Com.App.,  259  S.W.  919. 

33  C.J.  p  1136  note  27. 

26.  Tex. — Southern   Trading   Co.   of 
Texas  v.   Feldman,  Com. App.,   259 
S.W.  566— Patton  v.  Mitchell,  Civ. 
App.,    13    S.W.2d    146 — Lindsey   v. 
Hart,  Civ.App.,  260  S.W.   286. 

27.  Okl. — Foreman  v.  Riley,   211  P. 
495,  88  Okl.  75. 

28.  Tex. — Miller     v.     Lemm,     Com. 
App.,  276  S.W.  211. 

29.  Ga. — Pittman  Const.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Marietta,  172  S.E.  644,  177  Ga. 
573. 

Tex. — Medearis  v.  Buratti,  Civ.App., 
275  S.W.  617— Panhandle  Grain  & 
Elevator  Co.  v.  Dowlin,  Civ.App., 
247  S.W.  873. 

Judgment  upheld  as  sufficiently  dis- 
posing' of  all  issue* 

Mo.— Saxbury  v.  Coons,  98  S.W.2d 
$62. 

Tex. — Whisen-ant  v.  Cole,  Civ.App., 
285  S.W.  835— Mathis  v.  Overland 
Automobile  Co.  of  Dallas,  Civ. 
App.,  265  S.W.  1069. 

30.  Ga. — South       View       Cemetery 
Ass'n    v.    Hailey,    34    S.E.2d    863, 
199  Ga.  478. 

Tex. — Cramer    v.    Cornell,    Civ.App., 
108  S.W.2d  1115,  reversed  on  oth- 
er   grounds    130    S.W.2d    1023,    134 
Tex.  17. 
Effect  of  recital 

Recital  in  judgment  that  issues 
were  found  for  defendant  means  all 
essential  issues,  including  those 
raised  by  denial.— Di  Blasi  v.  Di 
Blasi,  163  A.  473,  116  Conn.  699.  , 


Irrespective  of  whether  or  not 
pleaded,  on  the  basis  of  Inescapable 
inherency,  it  may  be  assumed  that 
the  court  passed  on  a  constitutional 
question  involved  in  the  'decision 
rendered.—- State  ex  rel.  Rose  v. 
Webb  City,  64  S.W.2d  597,  333  Mo. 
1127,  transferred,  see,  App.,  74  S.W. 
2d  45. 
31.  Ky. — Jones  v.  Stearns,  260  S.W. 

375,  202  Ky.  598. 
S.C.— Watson    v.    Matley,    114    S.E. 

412,  121  S.C.  482. 
W.Va. — Rosier  v.   McDaniel,   28   S.E. 

2d  908,  126  W.Va.  434. 
33  C.J.  p  1156  note  29. 
Equitable  defense 
Ky. — Jones  v.  Stearns,  260  S.W.  373, 

202  Ky.  598. 
Flea  of  privilege 

Trial  court  was  unauthorized  to 
render  Judgment  on  merits  until  it 
had  finally  disposed  of  plea  of  priv- 
ilege; and  a  controverting  affidavit 
to  plea  of  privilege  presents  real  is- 
sues which  must  be  tried  and  dis- 
posed of  before,  or  at  time  of,  dis- 
position of  main  cause,  unless  waiv- 
ed.— Smith  v.  Watson,  Tex.Civ.App., 
44  S.W.2d  815. 
312.  Ky.— Great  Atlantic  &  Pacific 

Tea  Co.   v.  Lexington-Hazard  Ex- 
press   Co.'s    Receiver,    64    S.W.2d 

631,  246  Ky.  102. 
Mo. — Liepman  v.  Rothschild,  262   S. 

W.  685,  216  Mo.App.  251. 
3a    Cal. — Browne  v.  T.  J.  Lawrence 

Co.,   268   P.   631,   204  Cal.    424. 

34.  Ky. — Haywood  v.  Gooch,  86  S. 
W.2d  665,  260  Ky.  667. 

Mo. — City  of  St.  Louis  ex  rel.  and 
to  Use  of  Sears  v.  Clark,  App.,  35 
S.W.2d  986. 

Tex. — Threadgill  v.  Fagan,  Civ.App., 
64  S.W.2d  405— Williams  v.  Walk- 
er, Clv.App.,  290  S.W.  299— Po- 
mona Mut  Oil  Syndicate  v.  Wil- 
liamsport  Wire  Rope  Co.,  Civ.App., 
282  S.W.  958. 

33  C.J.  p  1136  note  -30. 

Necessary  implication 

(1)  Set-off    or    counterclaim    need 

not  be  expressly  mentioned  in  judg- 

102 


ment,  provided  it  is  disposed  of  by 
necessary  implication. — 'Prim  v.  La- 
tham, iTex.Civ.App.,  6  S.W.2d  175, 
error  refused. 

(2)  Judgment  for  plaintiff  for 
amount  sued  for  without  mention- 
ing cross  action  by  necessary  impli- 
cation disposes  of  entire  case. — Pan- 
handle Compress  &  Warehouse  Co. 
v.  Best,  Tex.Civ.App.,  58  S.W.2d  140. 
Unliquidated  amount 
.  Where  plaintiffs'  claim  was  par- 
tially unliquidated  and  defendants' 
counterclaim  was  also  for  unliqui- 
dated amount,  judgment  was  in 
proper  form  and  not  for  an  impos- 
sible amount,  judgment  must  be  af- 
firmed, even  though  no  reference 
was  made  therein  to  the  counter- 
claim.— Zappolo  v.  Lanigan,  285  N. 
Y.S.  863,  246  App.Div.  443,  affirmed 
4  N.E,2d  815,  272  N.Y.  584. 

35.  Tex. — Latshaw    v.    Barnes,   Civ. 
App.,  170  S.W.Sd  531. 

Segregation    under    civil    procedure 

rule 

Where  court,  under  civil  procedure 
rule,  segregated  cause  of  action  aris- 
ing on  petition  of  intervention  and 
tried  that  cause  separate  from  orig- 
inal cause  of  action  and  cross  ac- 
tions, court  was  authorized  to  enter 
separate  and  final  Judgment  on  such 
petition  without  finally  disposing  of 
issues  raised  by  original  suit  or 
cross  actions. — Latshaw  v.  Barnes, 
supra. 

36.  Ky.— Rucker  v.  Baker,  177  S.W. 
2d  878,  296  Ky.  505. 

37*    La. — T  i  c  k  f  a  w   Homegrowers' 
Ass'n  v.  Gallodoro,  132  So.  767,  15 
I/a, App.  686. 
Garnishment 

Judgment  awarding  plaintiff  in 
garnishment  suit,  two  interveners 
and  garnishee  amounts  totaling  less 
than  sum  shown  by  garnishee's  an- 
swer to  be  due  third  intervener  on 
judgment,  claimed  by  latter  to  be  ex- 
empt from  garnishment,  held  not  er- 
roneous as  failing  to  dispose  of 
amount. in  controversy,  remainder  of 
funds  in  g»arnishee's  hands  being 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  44 


A  failure  to  pass  on  a  motion  is  immaterial,  as 
the  entry  of  judgment  is  in  effect  a  final  disposition 
of  motions  previously  filed.38 

Partial  judgment  under  statute  or  ride.  Under 
statutes  or  court  rules  providing  that,  where  .after 
answer  part  of  plaintiff's  claim  is  admitted  or  tin- 
contested,  plaintiff  may  have  judgment  for  so  much 
of  his  claim,  subject  to  such  terms  as  may  be  just, 
the  intent  is  to  enable  the  court  of  first  instance 
to  clear  away  portions  of  a  claim  or  defense  not 
involving  disputed  questions  of  fact  by  entering  a 
partial  judgment  thereon.3^  Such  a  statute  should 
not  be*  so  construed  as  to  permit  a  judgment  on 
.  part  of  a  cause  of  action  where  the  part  is  an  in- 

in  effect  awarded  to  third  interven- 
er  as  exempt  without  necessity  for 
rendition  of  Judgment  in  his  favor 
for  such  amount — Coles  v.  Pewel, 
Teac.Civ.App.,  80  S.W.2d  323,  error 
dismissed. 

38.  111.— Washington   Park  Club  v. 
Baldwin,  59  111.  App.  61. 

33  C.J.  p  1137  note  85. 

39.  'N.J.— Warren  Balderston  Co.  v. 
Ivory,    16    A.2d    617,    125   N.J.Law 
469. 

40.  N.Y.— Lowe  v.  Lowe,   192  N.E. 
291,  265  N.T.  197. 

41.  Cal. — Sheeny  v.  Roman  Catholic 


complete  fragment  of  an  entire  claim  which  cannot 
be  thus  divided  without  mutilation.40 

§  44.    Evidence 

As  a  general  rule  a  Judgment  must  be  supported  by 
legally  adduced  evidence  of  a  substantial  and  sufficient 
character,  and  a  judgment  may  not  rest  on  mere  specu- 
lation, surmise,  or  suspicion. 

.While  exceptions  may  occur  in  respect  of  judg- 
ments by  confession  or  consent,  or  those  entered  on 
admissions  or  default,  under  principles  discussed  in- 
fra §§  162,  174,  185,  210-213,  as  a  general  rule  the 
evidence  must  sustain  the  judgment,41  proof  being 
as  essential  to  the  support  of  a  judgment  as  plead- 
ing.42 The  evidence  must  be  of  a  substantial  char- 
acter,^ sufficient  to  support  the  judgment  ren- 
dered.44 The  judgment  must  be  founded  on  suffi- 


Archbishop  of  San  Francisco,  122 
P.2d  60,  49  Cal.App.2d  537. 

HI. — Oak  Park  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank  v.  Soulias,  3  N.E.2d  159, 
284  Ill.App.  646. 

Ky.— Producers'  Coal  Co.  of  Ken- 
tucky v.  Barnaby,  275  S.W.  625, 
210  Ky.  244— City  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  Hopkinsville  v.  Dark  To- 
bacco Growers'  Co-op.  Ass'n,  272 
.S.W.  751,  209  Ky.  830. 

Mo. — American  Extension  School  of 
Law  v.  Ragland,  112  S.W.2d  110, 
232  Mo.App.  763— Brie  City  Iron 


Works   v.    Ferer,   App., 
1008. 


263    S.W. 


N.X— Automobile  Ins.  Co.  of  Hart- 
ford, Conn.  v.  Conway,  158  A.  480, 
109  N.J.EQ.  628— Rich  v.  Inter- 
City  Transp.  Co.,  165  A.  296,  11 
N.J.Misc.  243. 

N.T. — Sabl  v.  Laenderbank  Wien  Ak- 
tiengesellschaft,  80  N.T.S.2d  608, 
opinion  supplemented  33  N.T.S.2d 
764. 

Or.— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co. 
v.  Zidell-Steinberg  Co.,  50  P.2d 
584,  151  Or.  5<38,  modified  on  other 
grounds  51  P.2d  687,  151  Or.  538. 

S.B.— Morrison  v.  Connery,  229  N.W. 
392,  56  S.D.  469. 

Tex. — Cohen  v.  City  of  Houston,  Civ. 
App.,  185  S.W.2d  450— Shackelford 
v.  Neilon,  Civ.App.,  100  S.W.2d 
,  io37 — Motley  v.  Tom  Green  Coun- 
ty, Civ.App.,  93  S.W.2d  768,  re- 


versed on  other  grounds  Tom 
Green  County  v.  Motley,  118  S.W. 
2d  306,  132  Tex.  54— Matrimonial 
Mut  Ass'n  of  Texas  v.  Rutherford, 
Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d  719,  error  dis- 
missed— Gilmer  v.  Graham,  Civ. 
App.,  26  S.W.2d  687,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  Com.App.,  52  S.W. 
2d  263— National  Life  &  Accident 
Ins.  Co.  of  Tennessee  v.  Wash- 
ington, Civ.App.f  295  S.W.  204 — 
Austin  Bros.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Road 
Dist  No.  -3  of  Liberty  County, 
Civ.App.,  247  S.W.  674. 
Conformity  of  judgment  to  proof 

generally  see  infra  §§  47-54. 
Arbitrary  declaration,  if  without  evi- 
dence 

A  Judgment,  entered  without  hear- 
ing evidence  on  basic  issues  of  fact, 
is  only  arbitrary  declaration  of 
judge,  having  no  reference  to  liabili- 
ty involved,  even  though  purporting 
to  be  judicial  determination  of  judg- 
ment creditors'  rights. — Burket  v. 
Reliance  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  11  N.E. 
2d  6,  367  111.  196. 

42.  Ky.— ^Consolidation  Coal  Co.  v. 
King,  244  S.W.  303,  196  Ky.  54. 

Tenn. — Poster  v.  Andrews,  189  S. 
W.2d  580. 

Tex. — Birdville  Independent  School 
Dist  v.  Deen,  Civ.App.,  141  S.W.2d 
680,  affirmed  Deen  v.  Birdville  In- 
dependent School  Dist,  159  S.W.2d 
111,  138  Tex,  3-39— Forman  v.  Bar- 
ron,  Civ.App.,  120  S.W.2d  827,  er- 
ror refused— Shackelford  v.  Nei- 
lon, Civ.App.,  100  S.W.2d  1037 — 
Traders  &  General  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Lincecum,  Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  549, 
reversed  oil  other  grounds  107  S. 
W.2d  585,  130  Tex.  220— Karr  v. 
Oockerham,  Civ.App.f  71  S.W.2d 
905,  error  dismissed — Morten  Inv. 
Co.  v.  Trevey,  Civ.App.,  8  S.W.2d 
527,  error  dismissed— Humble  Oil 
&  Refining  Co.  v.  Southwestern 
Bell  Telephone  Co.,  Civ.App.,  2  S. 
W.2d  488. 

33  C.J.  p  1142  note  59. 

103 


43,  U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Perry,  C.C.A.Ark., 
55  F.2d  819. 

Miss.— Moore  v.  Sykes'  Estate,  149 
So.  789,  167  Miss.  212. 

Mont — Ashley  v/ Safeway  Stores,  47 
P.2d  53,  100  Mont.  312. 

N.M. — Jones  v.  Jernigan,  223  P.  100, 
29  N.M.  399. 

44*  Ark. — Brunson  v.  Teague,  186  S. 
W.  78,  123  Ark.  594. 

Fla. — Blue  Lake  Celery  Co.  v.  Pey- 
ton-Lofberg  Live  Stock  Co.,  94  So. 
862,  84  Fla.  675. 

Ga. — Georgia  Power  Co.  v.  Woodall, 
172  S.E.  76,  48  Ga.App.  85. 

Idaho.— Muckle  v.  Hill.  187  P.  943, 
32  Idaho  661. 

HI. — Hopper  v.  Hopper,  41  N.E.2d 
786,  -314  IlLApp.  572. 

Ky.— Jordan  v.  City  of  Olive  Hill, 
162  S.W.2d  229,  290  Ky*  828. 

Neb. — Macumber  v.  Thomas,  207  N. 
W.  31,  114  Neb.  290. 

N.Y.— Samuel  Strauss  &  Co.  v.  Katz, 
206  N.Y.8.  246,  210  App.Div.  405 
— Raby  v.  Greater  New  York  De- 
velopment Co.,  135  N.Y.S.  813, 
151  App.Div.  72,  affirmed  104  N. 
E.  1139,  210  N.Y.  586— Phelan  v. 
New  York  Central  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
115  N.Y.S.  35— Putzel  v.  Fargo, 
103  N.Y.S.  766— Simon  v.  Danziger, 
98  N.Y.S.  674. 

OkL— Steiner  v.  Steiner,  10  (P.2d  641, 
156  OkL  255 — Barstow  v.  Chattee, 
239  P.  622,  112  Okl.  81. 

Pa. — Pennsylvania  Labor  Relations 
Board  v.  Kaufmann  Department 
Stores,  29  A.2d  90,  345  Pa,  398. 

Tex. — Ketch  v.  Weaver  Bros.,  Com. 
App.,  276  S.W.  676— Cohen  v.  City 
of  Houston,  Civ. App.,  185  S.W.2d 
450— Spradlin  v.  Gibbs,  Civ.App., 
159  S.W.Bd  246 — Corona  Petroleum 
Co.  v.  Jameson,  Civ. App.,  146  S. 
W.2d  512,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment  correct — Christie  v.  Hud- 
speth  County  Conservation  and 
Reclamation  Dist.  No.  1,  Civ.App., 
64  S.W.2d  978^-Carpenter  v.  Par- 
mer  County,  OV.APP.,  61  S.W.2d 


§  44 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


cient  facts  legally  ascertained,4*  and  cannot  rest  on 
evidence  of  an  incompetent  character,46  or  which 
was  never  adduced  in  court,47  such  as  matters  not 
put  in  evidence  of  which  the  court  took  judicial 
notice.48  A  judgment  may  not  rest  on  conjecture 
and  speculation49  or  on  mere  surmise  or  suspi- 
cion,50 nor  may  a  judgment  find  support  in  assump- 
tions51 or  in  possibilities  or  probabilities  falling 
short  of  actual  proof.52  While  an  inference  of  the 


truth  of  facts  essential  to  a  cause  of  action  will  sup- 
port a  judgment  rendered  in  accordance  with  such 
facts,53  the  court  should  not  base  its  judgment  on 
a  state  of  facts  so  inadequately  developed  that  it 
cannot  be  determined  where  inference  ended  and 
conjecture  began.54  However,  it  is  not  essential  to 
the  validity  of  a  judgment  that  it  rest  entirely  on 
uncontradicted  evidence,55  and  it  is  not  fatal  that  a 
different  conclusion  might  have  been  reached  on  all 


Wash. — Johnson  v.   Goo'denough,   175 

OP.  306.  103  Wash.  625. 
83  C.J.  p  1141  note  57,  p  1142  note 

58,  p  1164  note  96—47  C.J.  p  1009 

note  88. 
Prlma  facie  ca*« 

Even  though  defendant  flies  no 
answer,  plaintiff  in  civil  proceeding, 
whether  summary  or  ordinary,  must 
at  least  make  out  prima  facie  case 
before  being  entitled  to  Judgment. 
— Grosjean  v.  Wallace  Johnson  Mo- 
tor Co.,  La.App.,  171  So.  184. 
Evidence  held  sufficient  to  support 

(1)  Generally. 

U.S. — State  Bank  of  New  York  v. 
Henderson  County,  Ky.,  C.C.A.Ky., 
35  F.2d  859,  certiorari  denied  Hen- 
derson County,  State  of  Kentucky, 
v.  State  Bank  of  New  York,  50  S. 
Ct.  245,  281  U.S.  728,  74  L.Ed.  1144, 
1145. 

Ky.— Small  v.  Minton,  192  S.W.2d 
184. 

Tex. — St.  Louis  -Southwestern  Ry. 
Co.  of  Texas  v.  Neely,  Civ.App., 
•296  S.W.  948. 

(2)  Judgment  foreclosing  mechan- 
ics'  liens  held  not   objectionable  as 
rendered    on    unverified    account    to 
admissibility    of    which    defendants 
excepted,  where  other  facts  showed 
amount  due. — Boozer  v.  Smith,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  36  S.W.2d  10S4,   error  dis- 
missed. 

(3)  A    judgment    which    did    not 
state  whether  it  <was  based  on  one  or 
both     counts     of     declaration    was 
without   error  if  evidence  sustained 
either   count. — Yeats   v.   Moody,   175 
So.  719,  128  Fla.  658. 

(4)  Judgment    solely    on    evidence 
prior  to  .filing  of  amended  pleadings 
bringing    in    new.  parties    held   not 
erroneous  where  court  prior  to  judg- 
ment ordered  dismissal  of  new  par- 
ties and  no  new  issue  was  raised  .by 
amendment. — McCreary   v.   Falconer, 
44  P.2d  303,  S  Cal.2d  335. 

45.  Tex. — Motley     v.     Tom     Green 
County,    Civ,App.,    93    S.W.2d    768, 
reversed    on    other    grounds    Tom 
Green  County  v.  Motley,  118  S.W. 
2d    306,    132    Tex.    54— Blalock   v. 
Jones,  Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  400,  er- 
ror dismissed* 

46.  Mich* — Refrigerating  Equipment 
Co.   v.    Finch,   242   N.W.   217.   257 
Mich.  023. 


Tex.— -Hood   v,   Robertson,    Civ.App., 

33  S.W.2d  £82. 
W.Va. — Board  of  Trustees  of  Lewis 

Pilchard  Charity  Fund  v.  Mankin 

Inv.   Co.,   193   S.E.   805,   119  W.Va. 

391. 
Unlawful  search  and  seizure 

A  civil  judgment,  in  the  procure- 
ment of  which  evidence  obtained 
through  unlawful  search  and  seizure 
in  violation  of  the  Fourth  Amend- 
ment to  federal  Constitution  is  used, 
is  invalid.— -Rogers  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.R. 
I.,  97  F.2d  691. 
Evidence  as  to  unpleaded  matters 

(1)  Evidence    not    based    on    any 
pleadings    is    incompetent   and    will 
not  support  a  judgment,  even  though 
admitted  by  court  without  objection. 
— Stone  v.   Boone,   Tex.Civ.App.,   160 
S.W.2d  578,  error  refused. 

(2)  Evidence  adduced  on  an  issue 
not  made  by  the  pleadings  will  not 
support    a    judgment. — Mullinax    v. 
Snorgrass,    Tex.Civ.App.,    83    S.W.2d 
1080,  error  refused. 

(3)  Necessity     of     pleadings     as 
well   as   evidence    to    support  judg- 
ment see  supra  §40. 

Evidence  which  has  been  stricken 
will  not  sustain  a  judgment. — In  re 
Jolly's  Estate,  229  IlLApp.  508. 

47.  Mo.— State      ex     rel.     National 
Lead  Co.  v;  Smith,  App.,  134  S.W. 
2d  1061. 

Pa.— Riedrich    v.    Riedrich,     62    Pa. 

Super.  189. 
Tex. — Church    v.    Western    Finance 

Corporation,    Civ.App.,    22    S.W.2d 

1074. 

TTnoffered  exhibits 
Mo. — Carroll  v.  Carroll,  App.,  237  S. 

W.  843 — Taylor  v.  Fuqua,  219  S.W. 

971,  203  Mo.App.  581. 

48.  Mo.— -Hume  v.  Wright,  274  S.W. 
741— State    ex   rel.    National   Lead 
Co.    v.    Smith,    App.,    134    S.W.2d 
106-1. 

49.  U.S. — Deposit  Guaranty  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.   v.   U.    S.,  D.aMlss.,   48 
F.'Supp.    869 — Orrill   v.   Prudential 
Life  Ins.  Co.  of  America,  D.C.Cal., 
44    FjSupp.    902 — Greenwood  Com- 
press &,  Storage  Co.  v.  Fly,  D.C. 
Miss.,  24  F.Supp.  168,  reversed  on 
other    grounds,    C.C.A.,    102    F.2d 
600. 

Ky.-r-Central  Kentucky  Natural  Gas 
Co.  v.  Williams,  60  S.W.2d  580, 
249  Ky.  242. 

104 


Mich.— Michigan  Aero  Club  v.  Shel- 
ley, 278  N.W.  121,  283  Mich.  401. 

Miss. — Blizzard  v.  Fitzsimmons,  10 
So.2d  343,  193  Miss.  484— Furr  v. 
Brookhaven  Creamery,  192  So.  838, 
188  Miss.  1. 

Mo. — Locke  v.  Warden,  App.,  '179  S. 
W.2d  624 — Brinker  v.  Miller,  App.. 
162  S.W.2d  295— Bauer  v.  Wood, 
154  S.W.2d  356,  2-36  Mo.App.  26«6. 

Nev. — Richards  v.  Vermilyea,  175  P. 
188,.  42  Nev.  294,  rehearing  denied 
180  P.  121,  42  Nev.  294. 

50.  Cal.— -De  Hart  v.  Allen,  111  P.2d 
342,  43  Cal.App.2d  479. 

Miss.— Blizzard   v.   Fitzsimmons,    10 

So.2d  343,  193  Miss.  484. 
Existence  of  fact 

If  evidence  raises  only  a  surmise 
or  suspicion  of  the  existence  of  a 
fact  sought  to  be  established,  a 
judgment  will  not  be  permitted  to 
rest  on  such  fact — Shell  Oil  Co.  v. 
Howth,  159  S.W.2d  483,  138  Tex. 
357. 

51.  La. — Cali    v.    Cloverland    Dairy 
Products    Co.,   App.,   21   So.2d   166. 

Nev. — Richards  v.  Vermilyea,  175  P. 
188,  42  Nev.  294,  rehearing  denied 
180  P.  121,  42  Nev.  294. 

52.  La. — Evans    v.    Campbell,    App., 
9  So.2d  91. 

Mich.— Michigan  Aero  Club  v.  Shel- 
ley,  278  N.W.    121,   283   Mich.   401. 
Miss. — Furr   v.    Brookhaven    Cream- 
ery,  192   So.   838,   188  Miss.  1. 
Pa.— Winograd  v.   Coombs,    20   A,2d 

315,  342  Pa.  268. 
What  might  have  been 

Judgments  cannot  be  rendered  on 
what  might  have  been,^  but  there 
must  be  proof  fairly  tending  to  e&- 
tablish  fact  alleged. — Salaban  'v. 
East  St.  Louis  &  Interurban  Water 
Co.,  1  N.E.2d  731,  284  Ill.App,  358. 

53.  Cal. — Gish  v.  Los   Angeles   Ry. 
Corporation,   90   P.2d   792,   13  Cal. 
2d  570. 

54.  Miss.— Moore  v.  Sykes*  Estate, 
149    So.   789,   167   Miss.   212. 

55.  Okl.— -Bradley  v.  Little,  134  P.2d 
126,  192  Okl.  121. 

Function  of  Jury 

Trial  court  is  under  no  duty  to  de- 
termine by  its  judgment  truth  or 
talsity  of  evidentiary  facts,  which 
is  for  jury  incidentally  as  a  means 
of  determining  its  verdict. — South- 
ern Pine  Lumber  Co.  v.  Whiteman, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§45 


the  evidence  adduced;56  but  a  valid  judgment  may 
not  be  predicated  on  evidence  that  cannot  be  true.57 

The  insufficiency  of  supporting  evidence  has  in 
some  instances  been  held  to  render  a  judgment 
void,5'8  but  in  others  it  has  been  regarded  as  render- 
ing the  judgment  merely  erroneous  but  not  void.59 
It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  is  not  rendered 
void  by  irregularities  in  the  taking  of  proof,6**  or  by 
perjured  testimony.61 


§  45.    Verdict  and  Findings 

A  valid  Judgment  must  be  predicated  on  the  deci- 
sion, findings,  or  verdict  of  the  trial  court  OP  Jury. 

The  issues  raised  by  the  pleadings,  whether  of 
law  or  fact,  must  be  determined  in  favor  of  one 
party  or  the  other  before  judgment  can  be  entered; 
there*  must  be  either  decision  or  findings  by  the 
court  or  referee62  or  the  verdict  of  a  jury.63  Where 
a  case  is  tried  to  the  court  and  a  jury  is  called  to 


TexJCiv.App..   104  S.W.*d   635.   error 
dismissed. 

56.  Okl.—  Bradley  v.  Little,  134  P.2d 
126,  192  Okl.  121. 

57.  U.S.  —  V.    W.   Woolworth   Co.   v. 
Davis,     C.C.A.Okl.,     41     F.2d     342, 
certiorari   denied  51   S.Ct   33,   282 
U.S.  859.  75  LJEd.  760. 

Total  disability 

Evidence  that  an  insured  was  to- 
tally disabled  within  the  meaning  of 
a  war  risk  insurance  policy  could 
not  support  a  judgment  on  the  poli- 
cy where  such  evidence  could  not 
have  been  true  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  it  was  conclusively  shown  that 
during  the  period  of  alleged  total 
disability  insured  continuously  fol- 
lowed a  substantially  gainful  occu- 
pation. —  U.  S.  v.  Perry,  .C.OA.Ark., 
55  F.2d  *19. 

58.  La,  —  Fields   v.  McAdams,   App., 
15  So.2d  24$. 

N.J.  —  Gimbel   Bros  v.  Corcoran,  192 

A.  715,  15  N.J.Misc.  5*8. 
Tenn.—  -Lewis  v.  Burrow,  127  S.W.2d 

795,  23  Tenn.App.  145. 


error 


A  judgment  unsupported  by  testi- 
mony is  fundamentally  erroneous.  — 
Norvell-Shapleigh  Hardware  Co.  v. 
Lumpkin,  Tex.Civ.App.,  150  S.W. 
1194. 

59.    Ky.—  -  Starbird  v.  Blair,  12  S.W. 

2d  693,  227  Ky.  258—  Reed  v.  Bun- 

yan,    10   S.W.2d   824,    226  Ky.   261 

—  Sizemore    v.    Hunter,    269    S.W. 

542.  207  Ky.  453—  Spencer  v.  Mil- 

liken,  4  Ky.L.  856. 
N.T.  —  Jordan  v.   Van  Epps,   85   N.T. 

427—  In  re  Jenkins,  117  N.T.S.  74, 

132  App.Div.  339. 
Term.  —  Globe  &  Republic  Ins.  Co.  of 

America  v.  Shields,  96  S.W.2d  947, 

170  Tenn.  485. 
33  C.J.  p  1141  note  57   [a]—  34  C.J. 

p  563  note  S3. 
Secondary  evidence 

Judgment  based  on  secondary  evi- 
dence is  not  within  itself  void.  — 
Busby  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  68  S.W.2d  328,  error  dis- 
missed. 

80.    Ky.—  -Haddix  v.  Walter,   266   S. 
W.  631,  205  Ky.  740. 


Failure  to  take  down  testimony  in 
writing  and  file  it  was  held  not  to 
render  decree  void. — Malone  v. 
Meres,  109  So.  677.  91  Fla.  709. 

61.  Colo. — Hunt  v.  Hunt,  264  P.  662, 
83    Colo.    282,    error   dismissed    49 
S.Ct.    186,    278   U.S.    583,    73    L.Ed. 
519. 

B.C.— Hodge  v.  Huff,  140  F.2d  686,  78 
U.S.App.D.C.  329,  certiorari  denied 
64  S.Ct  946,  322  U.S.  733,  88  L. 
Ed.  1567. 

Perjury  as  ground  for: 
.Collateral  attack  see  infra  S  434. 
Equitable  relief  against  judgment 

see  infra  §  374. 
Opening    and    vacating    Judgment 

see  infra  §  270. 

62.  Cal. — Easterly  v.  Cook,   85  P.2d 
164,  140  CaLApp.  115. 

Ga. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Holton 
v.  Lankford,  6  S.E.2d  304,  310, 
189  Ga.  506. 

Md. — Carozza  v.  Brannan,  46  A.2d 
198. 

N.T.— Fuller  v.  Galeota,  51  N.T.S.2d 
101,  268  App.Div.  949— Donate  v. 
Granite  State  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  288 
N.T.S.  639,  248  App.Div.  736— 
Flagg  v.  Moses,  225  N.T.S.  508, 
222  App.Div.  762,  motion  denied 
226  N.T.S.  392,  222  App.Div.  821, 
and  affirmed  162  N.E.  504,  248  N. 
T.  509— Abell  v.  Hunter,  207  N.T. 
S.  203,  211  App.Div.  467,  affirmed 
148  N.E.  766,  240  N.T.  702— Shaul 
v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of  Mary- 
tend.  227  N.T.S.  16-3,  131  Misc.  401, 
affirmed  230  N.T.S.  910,  224  App. 
Div.  773. 

Pa.— Massachusetts  Bonding  &  In- 
surance Co.  v.  Johnston  &  Harder, 
16  A.2d  444,  840  Pa.  253. 

S.D. — Central  Loan  &  Investment 
Co.  v.  Loiseau,  239  N.W.  487,  59 
S.D.  255. 

Utah. — Beneficial  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Mason,  160  P.2d  734— Mason  v. 
Mason,  160  P.2d  730 — Evans  v. 
Shand,  280  <P.  239,  74  Utah  451. 

Vt. — Town  of  Randolph  v.  Lyon,  175 
A.  1,  106  Vt  495. 

33  C.J,  p  1137  note  37—64  C.J.  p  1223 
note  32. 

Finding*  as  equivalent  to  verdict 
.For  the  purposes  of  judgment,  the 

trial    court's   findings   of   fact   have 

the   effect   of   a   "verdict"-— Watson 

105 


v.   Missouri-Kansas-Texas  R.   Co.   of 
Texas,  Tex.Civ.App.,  173  S.W.2d  357. 

When  finding's   unnecessary 

Findings"  of  fact  by  the  court  have 
been  held  unnecessary  where  there 
is  a  verdict. — Dye  v.  Russell,  40  N. 
W.  416,  24  Neb.  829. 

Conclusions  inconsistent 

If  findings  support  judgment,  in- 
consistencies between  conclusions 
are  immaterial  and  do  not  vitiate 
judgment. — Klein  Norton  Co.  v.  Co- 
hen, 290  P.  61*,  107  CoLApp.  325. 

63.  U.S. — Connally  v.  Louisville  & 
N.  R.  Co.,  C.C.A.Miss.,  297  F.  180. 

Ala.— Scott  v.  Parker,  113  So.  495, 
216  Ala.  321. 

Cal.— Vitimtn  Milling  Corporation  v. 
Superior  Court  In  and  for  Los  An- 
geles County,  33  P.2d  1016,  1  CaL 
2d  116. 

Ga.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Holton  v. 
Lankford,  6  S.R2d  304,  310,  189 
Ga.  506. 

Mo. — Newdiger  v.  Kansas  City,  App., 
106  S.W.2d  51,  affirmed  114  S.W.2d 
1047,  342  Mo.  252. 

N.C.— Miller  v.  Dunn,  124  S.E.  746, 
188  N.C.  397. 

Tex. — American  Nat  Ins.  Co,  T. 
Points,  Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  762, 
error  dismissed — Dallas  Coffin  Co. 
v.  Teager,  Civ.App.,  19  S.W.2d  156, 
error  dismissed — Cisco  Building 
&  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Mason,  Civ.App., 
12  «S.W.2d  1106— TTair  v.  Wichita 
Valley  Ry.  Co..  Civ.App.,  274  S.W. 
247— Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Lowrie,  CivJLpp^  271  S.W.  268. 

Va.— Scheckler  v.  Andersom,  29  an 
2d  867,  182  Va,  701. 

35  C.J.  p  U37  note  38. 

Indispensable  step 

Where  there  was  no  waiver  of  ft 
trial  by  jury,  its  verdict  was  an  in- 
dispensable step  in  the  proceedings, 
and  trial  court  was  without  powqr 
to  enter  a  final  judgment  in,  absence 
thereof.— Heath  v.  Moers,  199  S.E. 
519,  171  Va,  397. 

Approval  of  verdict 

The  trial  court  must  .approve  a 
verdict  before  a  judgment  can  be 
based  on  it — Fraka*  v.  Travelers 
Mut  Casualty  Co.,.  84  P.24  871,  148 
Kan.  637. 


§  45 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


make  findings  as  to  certain  issues,  judgment  should 
be  rendered  on  the  basis  of  findings  of  the  jury  ac- 
cepted by  the  court,  plus  findings  of  fact  made  by 
the  court  on  other  issues  and  conclusions  of  law 
based  on  all  such  findings.64 

A  valid  judgment  must  rest  on  findings,  express 
or  implied,  on  all  material  issues.65  The  findings 
of  the  court66  or  the  findings  or  verdict  of  the  ju- 
ry67 must  be  of  a  character  sufficient  to  support  the 


judgment  rendered,  and  ordinarily  the  latter  may 
not  be  aided  by  intendment  or  reference  to  extrinsic 
facts.68  Although  it  has  been  held  that  it  must  ap- 
pear that  there  was  a  direct  and  affirmative  finding 
on  every  issue  of  fact  essential  to  recovery,6^  it 
has  also  been  held  that,  where  the  court  fails  to 
make  formal  findings,  every  finding  justified  by  the 
record  and  necessary  to  support  the  judgment  will 
be  implied,70  and  that  a  general  judgment  is  deemed 


64.  Cal. — Alphonzo  B.  Bell  Corp.  v 
Listle,  App.,   169   P.2d  462. 

Matter  Juriidictional 

Findings  on  issues  other  than 
those  specifically  found  by  jury  in 
answer  to  special  interrogatories  be- 
ing necessary  to  support  Judgment, 
matter  held  jurisdiction^,  findings 
not  having  been  waived. — Central 
Loan  &  Investment  Co.  v.  Loiseau, 
239  -N.W.  487,  59  S.D.  265. 

65,  Mont. — Blaser  v.  Clinton  Irriga 
tion  Dist,  53  OP.2d  1141,  100  Mont 
459. 

N.C.— Bborn  v.  Ellis,  85  S.B.2d  -288 

225  N.C.  386. 

Tex. — English     v.     Blackwood,     Civ. 
App.,    128    S.W.2d   895,    error    dis- 
missed Judgment  correct 
Wis.— Witt  v.  Wonser,  219  N.W.  844, 
195  Wis.  593. 

Omnibus  Hading  that  material  al- 
legations in  named  paragraphs  of 
defendant's  affirmative  defense  were 
not  proved  was  insufficient  to  sup- 
port Judgment— Gordon  v.  Beck,  239 
P.  309.  196  Cal.  768. 
General  verdict 

(1)  Judgment  cannot  be  supported 
by  jury's  determination  on  isolated 
issues  in  answer  to  special  interrog- 
atories   without    general    verdict — 
Central   Loan   &   Investment  Co.   v. 
Loiseau,   239   N.W.   487,   59   &D.   255. 

(2)  In  action  on  disability  clause 
of  group  life  and  health  policy,  ver- 
dict for  insured  for  total  amount  of 
his  certificate  held  "general  verdict" 
which  could   serve  as   proper  basis 
for    judgment — Eauitable    Life    As- 
sur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.  v.  Goble,  72  S,W^2d 
35,  254  Ky.  614. 

Special  verdict 

Where  special  verdict  contains  no 
finding  on  vital  issue  of  fact  con- 
cerning which  testimony  is  conflict- 
ing, it  will  not  support  judgment  for 
plaintiff.— Hintz  v.  Jackson,  198  N. 
W.  475,  51  N.D.  13. 

Verdict  requiring  entry  of  Judgment 
Although  jury  need  not  in  all  cas- 
es answer  all  issues  presented,  be- 
fore judgment  can  be  entered  for 
either  party,  the  verdict  must  be 
such  as  to  require  the  entry  of  a 
judgment. — Bowen  Motor  Coaches  v. 
Young,  Tex.Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d  145. 
When  there  wag  no  finding  on 
certain  evidence,  judgment  could  not 
be  held  to  have  been  based  thereon. 


— Willard  v.  Glenn-Colusa  Irr.  Dist     N.H. — Holman  v.  Kingsbury,  4  N.H. 
258  P.  959,  201  Cal.  726.  104. 


Judgment  on  merit* 

Fact  findings   are  made  by  court 
only   on  issues   raised  by  pleadings 
and  evidence  produced  on  trial,  and 
Judgments-   on    merits    are    entera 
only  on  findings  so  made,  rulings  on 
demurrer  when  pleading  over  is  not 
served,   or  motion  for  Judgment  on 
pleadings,  agreed  case,  or  consent  of 
party    against   whom    it   runs.r—An- 
gers    v.   Sabatinelli,    1   N.W.2d    765 
239  Wis.  S  64 — Luebke  v.  City  of  Wi 
tertown,  284  N.W.  519,  230  Wis.  512. 

66-    CaL — Winstanley   v.    Ackerman, 

294    P.   449,    110   CaLApp.   641. 
Mo. — Buschow    Lumber   Co.    v.    Un- 
ion Pac.  H.  Co.,  276  S.W.  409,  220 
Mo.App.  743— Kentling  &  Kentling 
v.  Magers,  App.,   256  S.W.  528. 
N.J.— Motor  Finance   Corporation  v. 
Tar  Asphalt  Trucking  Co.,  21  A.2d 
350,  127  N.J.Law  60. 
N.Y.— Sutphen  v.  Morey,   212  N.Y.S. 

43,  214  App.Div.  164. 
Or.— State  v.  Warren  Const  Co.,  276 

P.  260,  129  Or.  58. 
83  C.J.  p  964  note  60. 
Finding-  supported  by  inadmissible 

evidence 

Judgment  based  on  finding  sup- 
ported by  inadmissible  evidence  is 
erroneous. — Donnell  v.  Baker,  Tex. 
Civ. App.,  15  S.W.2d  120,  error  dis- 
missed., 

Judgment  held  sufficiently  supported 

(1)  Generally. 

Cal. — Arena  v.  Bank  of  Italy,  228  P. 

441,  194  Cal.  195. 
Vt-^Campbell  v.  Ryan,  22  A.2d  502, 

112  Vt  238—<3ooley  v.  Hatch,  124 

A,  589,  97  Vt  484. 

(2)  It  has  been  held  that  a  decree, 
finding   that   certain   of   the   parties 
to  the  suit  are  owners  of  the  real 
estate  in  controversy,  fixing  the  in- 
.eres't   of   each,   and   decreeing   par- 
:ition   accordingly,    is  not   defective 

because  without  general  findings  of 
''act. — Rackemann  v.  Tllton,  86  N.E. 
68,  236  111.  49. 

67.    Colo. — -fflStna  Casualty  &  Surety 

Co.  v.  Finance  Service  Corporation, 

2-26  P.  153,  75  Colo.  432. 
HL— -War-field   v.    Patterson,   135   IlL 

App.  307,  appeal  dismissed  84  N. 

E.  176,  233  III.  147. 

106 


Tex. — Houston,  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Browder,  Com. App.,  283  S.W. 
154 — Union  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Col- 
orado Nat.  Bank,  Civ.App.,  38  S.W. 
2d  257— -Ratcliffe  v.  Ormsby,  Civ. 
App.,  298  S.W.  930,  error  denied 
Ormsby  v.  Ratcliffe,  1  S.W.2d  1084, 
117  Tex.  242— Jaco  v.  W.  A.  Nash 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  269  S.W.  1089. 

Wash. — Bino  v.  Veenhuizen,  250  P. 
450,  141  Wash.  18,  49  A.L.R.  1297. 

Advisory  verdict 

Jury  verdict,  effect  of  which  is  ad- 
visory only,  will  not  support  Judg- 
ment—Central Loan  &  Investment, 
Co.  v.  Loiseau,  239  N.W.  487,  59 
S.D.  255. 

Support  by  evidence     • 

Unless  Jury's  finding  is  supported 
by  evidence,  judgment  should  not  be 
entered  thereon. — Houston  &  T.  C. 
R.  Co.  v.  Pruitt,  Tex.Civ.App.,  293 
S.W.  627. 

Judgment    sufficiently   supported   1)7 

Jury  findings  or  verdict 
Cal. — Fairbanks     v.     Macready,     268 

P.  947,  92  Cal.App.  156~<Jadwalla- 

der  v.  Martin,  257  P.  638,  83  Cal. 

App.  666. 

Okl.— Houser  v.  Ivey,  249  P.  141.  119 

Okl.  42. 
Tex.— Martin   v.   Hays,   Civ.App.,    86 

S.W.2d    796,    error   refused. 

68.  Ala.— Capital  Cab  Co.  v.   Mont- 
gomery Fair,  104   So.  891,   20  Ala. 
App.     648,    certiorari     denied     Ex 
parte  Capital  Cab  Co.,  104  So.  892, 
213  Ala.  429. 

69.  Ala.— Capital  Cab  Co.  v.  Mont- 
gomery Fair,  104   So.  891,  20  Ala. 
App.     648,     certiorari     denied    Ex 
parte  Capital  Cab  Co.,  104  So.  892. 
213  Ala.  429. 

Conclusion  of  ultimate  fact 

A  statement  in  judgment  or  de* 
cree,  entered  after  hearing  conflict- 

ng  evidence,  may  be  regarded  as 
conclusion  of  ultimate  fact  or  at 

east  of  mixed  law  and  fact,  even 
though  same  allegation  in  pleading 
might  be  construed  as  conclusion  of 

aw. — Label  v.  Sullivan,  165   S.W.2d 

39,  350  Mo.  286. 

0.    Mont — Blaser    v.    Clinton    Irr. 
Dist.  53  P.2d  1141.  100  Mont  459. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§46 


to  include  a  special  finding  on  all  issues  necessary 
to  sustain  k.7*  While  a  valid  judgment  may  not 
be  based  on  findings  or  verdict  as  to  an  immaterial 
issue,72  where  the  judgment  otherwise  finds  suffi- 
cient support,  the  fact  that  some  of  the  findings  are 
immaterial  or  without  the  issues  will  not  invalidate 
it.73  The  failure  to  find  as  to  a  particular  issue  of 
fact  is  immaterial  where  the  fact  is  admitted.74 

A  judgment  rendered  without  either  verdict  or 
findings  is  irregular  and  erroneous,7^  and  has  been 
held  premature  and  void  ;76  but  the  more  generally 
accepted  view  is  that  such  a  judgment  is  merely 
voidable  and  is  not  absolutely  void77  and  that  fail- 
ure of  verdict  and  findings  to  support  the  judgment 


is  a  defect  subject  to  waiver.78  Since  the  power 
to  decide  includes  the  power  to  decide  erroneously, 
a  judgment  is  not  void  because  of  an  erroneous 
finding  of  fact,79  especially  where  such  error  was 
inadvertent  and  harmless  and  not  determinative  of 
the  main  issue.80 

Decision  in  writing  as  basis  for  judgment.  Ordi- 
narily a  judgment  should  be  entered  on  the  basis 
of  a  decision  in  writing,81  and  may  not  be  predicat- 
ed merely  on  the  opinion,82  oral  direction,83  or 
unsigned  memorandum84  of  the  court,  or  on  an  en- 
try in  the  minutes  of  the  clerk;85  but  absence  of 
a  decision  in  due  form  has  been  held  not  fatal  to  a 
judgment.86 


E.  CONFORMITY  TO  PRIOR  PROCEEDINGS 


§  46.    Conformity  to  Process 

A  Judgment  should  conform  to  the  process  served,  as, 
for  example,  with  respect  to  parties  and  'the  amount  of 
the  recovery. 

A  judgment  should  conform  to  the  writ  or  proc- 
ess served.87  Accordingly,  where  process  is  di- 
rected to,  and  served  on,  a  party  as  an  individual, 


judgment  may  not  be  rendered  against  him  in  a 
representative  capacity,  and  vice  versa.88  Likewise, 
process  addressed  to,  and  served  on,  an  individual 
is  not  sufficient  on  which  to  base  a  judgment  against 
•a  corporation.89 

The  amount  of  recovery  must  conform  to,  and  is 


71.  Mass. — In  re  Rothwell's  Estate, 
186   N.E.   662.   28-3   Mass.   563— An- 
derson v.  Bean,  172  N.E.   647,  272 
Mass.  432,  72  A.L.R.  959. 

Okl.— Riddle  v.  Brann,  131  P.2d  999, 
191    Okl.   596— Stan er  v.   McGrath, 
51  P.2d  795,  174  Okl.  454. 
Delay  in  instituting-  stilt 

A  judgment  for  plaintiff  in  action 
for  accounting  and  to  recover  her 
one-sixth  interest  in  proceeds  of 
sale  of  mining  property  was  a  find- 
ing against  her  alleged  unneces- 
sary delay  to  instituting  action. — 
Scott  v.  Symons,  216  P.  604,  191  Cal. 
441. 

72.  Fla.— Merchants       &      Bankers 
Guaranty   Co.    v.   Downs,    175    So. 
704,  128  Fla.  7*7. 

N.J. — Motor   Finance  Corporation  v. 

Tor  Asphalt  Trucking  Co..  21  A.2d 

350,  127  N.J.Law  60. 
N.T. — Miller  v.  Union  Indemnity  Co., 

204  N.TjS.  7<30,  209  App.Div.  455. 
Tex.— Texas  &  N.  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Shaw, 

Civ.App.,  284  S.W.  600. 

73.  Mont— Huffine    v.    Lincoln,    287 
P.  629,  87  Mont  267. 

74.  N.C. — Seawell   v.    Person,    76   S. 
E.  2,  160  N.C.  291. 

33  C.J.  p  1138  note  42. 

75.  Cal.— Easterly  v.  Cook,   35   P.2d 
164,  140  Cal.App.  115. 

Ga. — Corpus    Juris    cited   In   Holton 

v.    Lankford,    6    S.E.2d    304,    310, 

189  Ga.  506. 
Tex. — American  Rio  Grande  Land  & 

Irrigation    <Jo.    v.    Bellman,    Civ. 

App.,  272  S.W.  550. 


Vt— Town    of    Randolph    v.     Lyon, 

175  A.  1,  106  Vt.  495. 
33   C.J.   p   964   note   57,   p  1138   note 

39,  p  1170  note  37. 

76.  Cal. — Casner  v.  Daily  News  Co., 
106   P.2d  201,  16  Cal.2d  410— Viti- 
min  Milling  Corporation  v.  Superi- 
or Court  in  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,     SiS    P.2d    1016,    1    Cal.2d 
116— In   re   Dodds'   Estate,    126    P. 
2d  150,  52  Cal.App.2d  287— Easter- 
ly v.   Cook,   35    P.2d   164,   140  Cal. 
App.  115. 

77.  N.C.— Ellis  V.  Ellis,   130   S.B.   7, 
190  N.C.  418. 

Okl.— Mid-Continent    Pipe    Line.  Co. 

v.  Seminole  County  Excise  Board, 

146  P.2d  996,  194  Okl.  40. 
Or. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Glickman 

v.  Solomon,  12  P.2d  1017,  1018,  140 

Or.  358,  followed  12  P.2d  1018,  140 

Or.    364,    overruling    Frederick    & 

Nelson  v.  Bar£,  134  P.  318,  66  Or. 

259,   and  Clackamas   Southern  Ry. 

Co.  v.  Vick,  144  P.  84,  72  Or.  580. 
Wyo. — Garber  v.  Spray,   164   P.  840, 

25  Wyo.  52. 
33  C.J.  p  1138  note  40,  p  1170  note 

38. 

78.  N.Y. — Corn    Exchange    Bank   v. 
Blye,    28   N.E.    805,    119    N.T.    414. 

79.  U.S.— Jack  y.  Hood,   CXLA.OkL. 
39  F.2d  594. 

Findings  contrary  to  evidence 
have  been  held  not  to  render  the 
judgment  void. — In  re  Gardiner's  Es- 
tate, 114  P.2d  645,  45  CaLApp.2d 
559. 
80-  U.S.— Jack  v.  Hood,  COA-Okl., 

39  F.2d  594. 

107 


81.  S.D. — Sinclair    Refining    Co.    v. 
Larson,  214  N.W.  842,  51  SJX  443. 

82.  N.Y. — Reynolds    v.    -3Btna    Life 
Ins.  Co.,  39  N.T.S.  885,  6  App.Div. 
254. 

Utah. — Wasatch  Oil   Refining   Co.  V. 

Wade,  63  P.2d  1070,   92  Utah  50. 
Wash. — Adams  v.  Ernst,  95  P.2d  799, 

1  Wash.2d  254. 
33  C.J.  p  1137  note  87  [b],   [c], 

83.  N.T.— Shaul   v.    Fidelity   &   De- 
posit Co.   of  Maryland,  227  N.T.S. 
163,  131  Misc.  401,  affirmed  230  N. 
T.S.  910,  224  App.Div.  773. 

84.  N.T.— Corley  v.   Spitzer,   255  N. 
T.S.   601,   235   AppJMv.   703— Torge 
V.  Loomis,  21-3  N.T.S.  924;  215  App. 
Div.   862— Woolf  v.   Woolf,   215  N. 
T.S.  89,  126  Misc.  868. 

85.  N.T.— Electric  Boat  Co.  v.  How- 
ey,  89  N.T.S.  210,  96  App.Div.  410. 

33  OX  p  1137  note  37  [b]. 

86.  N.T. — Lyon  v.  Water  Com'rs  of 
City    of    Binghamton,    232    N.T.S. 
26,  224  App.Div.  568. 

87.  U.S. — Hughes  v.  Union  Ins.  Co., 
Md.,   8  Wheat.  294,   5  L.Ed    620. 

33  C.J.  p  1138  note  44. 

88.  Fla. — Fllmi  v.   Lisenby,  1-36  So. 
599,  102  Fla.  777. 

Divestiture  of  title 


Where,  in  trespass  to  try  title, 
defendant  was  served  as  individual 
only,  judgment  divested  him  of  title 
individually,  but  not  as  trustee. — 
Blair  v.  Carney,  Tex.Civ.App.,  44  S. 
W.2d  1031,  error  refused. 
89.  La. — Norwich  Union  Indemnity 

Co.  v.   Judlln  &  WMtmire,   7  La. 

App.  879. 


§47 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.& 


limited  by,  the  writ9*  Accordingly,  where  the 
judgment  is  by  default,  the  amount  of  recovery  is 
limited  to  the  sum  specified  in  the  summons  or  in- 
dorsed  on  the  copy  served,91  and  a  judgment  for 
a  greater  sum  has  b^en  held  absolutely  void,92 
although  such  judgment  has  also  been  held  to  be 
regular  and  valid  if  it  is  within  the  sum  demanded 
in  the  declaration.93  Where,  however,  defendant 
appears  and  answers,  the  judgment  is  not  limited  to 
the  amount  indorsed  on  the  summons.94 

§  47.    Conformity  to  Pleadings  and  Proofs 

The  rules  respecting  conformity  of  judgments  to 
the  pleadings  and  proofs,  and  the  applications  of 
such  rules,  are  considered  in  detail  infra  §§  48-54. 


Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 


§48. 


General  Rules 


A  Judgment  should  be  supported  by  both  the  plead- 
ings and  the  proofs,  although  in  this  connection  substan- 
tial accordance  is  sufficient,  and  the  pleadings  are  to 
be  taken  as  a  whole. 

A  court  may  not  properly  put  on  its  record  a 
judgment  which  is  not  a  proper  sequence  to  the 
pleadings,95  at  least  without  the  consent  of  all  per- 
sons affected.96  It  is  a  general  rule  that  a  recovery 
must  be  had,  if  at  all,  on  the  facts  alleged  in  the 
pleadings;  the  judgment  must  conform  to,  and  be 
supported  by,  the  pleadings  in  the  case.97  It  is 
likewise  a  general  rule  that  facts  proved  but  not 


Party  against  whom  process  may  is- 
sue In  actions  against  corporations 
see  Corporations  §  1308. 

90.  Ala,— Carroll   y.    Milner,    9    So. 
221,  93  Ala.  301. 

33  C.J.  p  1138  note  45. 

91.  N.J.— Rips   v.    Levitan,    130    A. 
882,    3  N.J.Misc.   1166,   motion  de- 
nied  132   A.    926,   4   N.J.Hisc.   314. 

33  C.J.  p  1139   note   46. 

92.  Kan.— -Basset  v.  Mitchell,  19  P. 
671. 

33  C.J.  p  1139  note  47. 

93.  111.— Plato  v.  Turrill,  18  HI.  273. 
33  C.J.  p  11-39  note  48. 

94.  N.Y.— Valencia    Realty    Co.    v. 
Seely,  192  A.  717,  15  N.J.Misc.  520. 

33  C.J.  p  1139  note  49. 

95.  Ind. — Indianapolis    Real    Estate 
Board  v.  Willson,  187  N.E.  400,  98 
Ind.App.  72. 

Mo. — Owens  v.   McCleary.   App.,    273 

S.W.  145. 
Tex. — Automobile     Finance     Co.     v. 

Bryan,    Civ. App.,    <3    S.WV2d    835 — 

•Smith  v.  Scott,  Civ.App.,  261  S.W. 

1089. 
Va.— Dulaney  v.  Smith,  149  S.E.  441, 

153  Va.  118. 
3i3  C.J.  p  1139  note  51. 

A  court  of  record,  in  order  to  act, 
must  find  a  basis  in  the  pleading 
for  its  action. — Green  v.  Duncan, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  1-34  S.W.2d  744. 

96.  TJ.-S, — Sylvan  Beach  v.  Koch,  C. 
C.A.MO.,  140  F.2d  852. 

S3  C.J.  p  11*39  note  51  [a}. 
Issues  broadened  by  consent  see  in- 
fra §  50, 

The  rule  cannot  be  circumvented 
by  allowing  amendments  to  the 
pleadings  to  change  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion after  judgment,  or  by  giving 
notice  of  the  entry  of  judgment,  or 
by  entertaining  motions  to  vacate 
a  judgment  after  it  has  been  enter- 
ed.— Sylvan  Beach  v.  Koch,  supra. 

97.  US.— Mutual    Life    Ins.    Co.    v. 
Bingley,  Wash.,  100  F.  408,  40  C. 
C.A.   459,   49  UR.A.   132,  reversed 
.on  other  grounds  22  S.Ct  937,  184 


U.S.  695,  46  L.Bd.  763— U.  S.  v. 
E.  H.  Bailey  &  Co.,  32  C.C.P.A. 
Customs  89. 

Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Chand- 
ler v.  IPrice,  15  So.2d  462,  463,  244 
Ala,  667. 

Ariz.— White  v.  Hamilton,  299  P.  124, 

38  Ariz.  256. 

Cal.— Paulin  v.  Paulin,  102  P.2d  809, 

39  Cal. App. 2 d  180. 

Ga.— Westberry  v.  Reddish,  172  S.B. 
10,  178  Ga.  116 — Davis  v.  Mowers, 
114  S.B.  200,  154  Ga.  260. 

111.— -Continental  111.  Nat  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  "Chicago  v.  Sever,  65 
N.E.2d  385,  393  111.  81. 

Ind. — Earl  Park  -State  Bank  v.  Low- 
mon,  161  N.B.  675,  92  Ind.App.  25 
— Chicago,  T.  H.  &  S.  B.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Collins/  142  N.B.  634,  82  Ind. 
App.  41,  modified  on  other  grounds 
143  N.E.  712,  82  Ind.App.  41. 

&y. — Cawood  v.  Cawood's  Adm'x, 
147  S.W.2d  88,  285  Ky.  201— City 
of  Owingsville  v.  Ulery,  86  S.W. 
2d  706,  260  Ky.  792— Ratliff  v.  Sin- 
berg,  79  S.W.2d  717,  258  Ky.  203 
— Corpus  Jails  cited  la  Barnett 
v.  Robinson,  79  S.W.2d  699,  700, 
258  Ky.  225— McGill  v.  Dunaway, 
71  S.W.2d  4-35,  254  Ky.  234— Wak- 
enva  Coal  Co.  v.  Johnson,  28  S.W. 
2d  737,  234  Ky.  558. 

Mass. — Coughlin  v.  Coughlin,  45  N. 
B.2d  '388,  312  Mass.  452— Geffien  v. 
Paletz,  43  N.B.2d  133,  312  Mass. 
48. 

Miss. — Holmes  v.  Ford,  176  So.  524, 
179  Miss.  673— Newell  Contracting 
•Co.  v.  Flynt,  161  So.  298,  172  Miss. 
719,  motion  overruled  161  So.  743, 
172  Miss.  719. 

Mo. — Grafeman  Dairy  Co.  v.  North- 
western Bank,  288  'S.W.  359,  315 
Mo.  849— McCaskey  v.  Duffley,  78 
S.W.2d  141,  229  MoApp.  289,  trans- 
ferred; see  73  S.W.2d  188,  1335  Mo. 
•38-3 — Texas  Empire  (Pipe  Line  Co. 
v.  Stewart,  App.,  35  S.W.2d  627, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  55  S. 
W.2d  283,  331  Mo.  525— Lewis  v. 
Scholl,  Appw  244  S.W.  90. 

Mont— Alley   v.    Peeso,    290   P.  ^238, 

108 


88  Mont  1— Welch  v.  All  Persons, 
Etc.,  254  P.  179,  78  Mont  370. 

Neb. — Fidelity  Finance  Co.  v.  West- 
fall,  254  N.W.  710,  127  Neb.  56— 
Domann  v.  Domann,  208  N.W.  669, 
114  Neb.  563. 

0kl.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Okla- 
homa City  v.  Robinson,  65  P.2d 
531,  533,  179  Okl.  309. 

Pa. — Bowman  v.  Gum,  Inc.,  184  A. 
258,  321  (Pa.  516. 

Tenn.— Fidelity-Phenix  Fire  Iris.  Co. 
of  New  York  v.  Jackson,  181  S. 
W.2d  625,  181  Tenn.  453— Phifer  v. 
Mutual  Ben.  Health  &  Accident 
AssM,  148  S.W.2d  17,  24  Tenn.App. 
600. 

Tex. — Wilke  v.  Finn,  Com. App.,  39 
S.W.2d  836— Nalle  v.  Harrell,  12 
S.W.2d  550,  118  Tex.  149— Queen 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 
Ry.  Co.,  Com. App.,  296  -S.W.  484, 
reheard  «  B.W.2d  419—JPhelps  v. 
Connellee,  Com.App,.,  285  S.W.  1047 
— Johnson  Aircrafts  v.  Wilborn, 
Civ.App.,  190  S.W.2d  426-JClty  of 
Beaumont  v.  Calder  Place  Corpo- 
ration, 180  S.W.2d  189,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  183  S.W.2d  713,  143 
Tex.  244 — -Doughty  v.  DeFee,  Civ. 
App.,  152  S«W.2d  404,  error  refused 
— Rudolph  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  148 
S.W.2d  225— Butler  v.  Price,  Civ. 
App.,  138  S.W.2d  301— De  Walt  v. 
Universal  Film  Exchanges,  Civ. 
App.,  132  S.W.2d  421,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Rob- 
bins  v.  Robtoins,  Civ.App.,  125  S.W. 
2d  666 — Fort  Worth  &  Denver  City 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Reid,  Civ.App.,  115  S.W. 
2d  1156— City  of  Floydada  vt  Gil- 
liam,  Civ.App.,  Ill  S.W.2d  761 — 
Jones-O'Brien,  Inc.,  v.  Lloyd,  Civ. 
App.,  106  'S.W.2d  1069,  error  dis- 
missed— Hartford  Accident  &  In- 
demnity Co.  v.  Moore,  Civ.App., 
102  S.W.2d  441,  error  refused — 
Houston  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Sprad- 
lin,  Clv.App.,  55  S*.W.2d  1086— 
American  Surety  Co.  of  New  Totfc 
v.  Alamo  Iron  Works,  Civ. App.,  29 
S.W.2d  493,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com. App.,  36  S.W.2d  714 
—House  v.  Rogers.  Civ.App.,  23 


49    C.J.S, 


JUDGMENTS 


§  48 


pleaded  will  not  support  the  judgment,98  and  this  is 
true,  even  though  such  facts  are  found  by  verdict 
or  finding.^  An  affirmative  defense  not  pleaded  is 


dence  adduced,2  in  connection  with  facts  admitted 
by  the  parties  in  the  pleadings  or  otherwise,8  and 
facts  pleaded  but  not  proved  or  admitted  on  the 


unavailable  to  support  the  judgment1  *•  *     •«  •   <  AH       -   .     , . 

**  ju-ugmcuu  ^^  ^  not  support  a  judgment,4  although  in  this 

A  judgment  must  also  be  sustained  by  the  evi-     connection  allegations  not  necessary  to  the  state- 


SW.2d  414,  affirmed,  Com.App., 
Rogers  v.  House,  39  S.W.2d  1111— 
Bray  v.  Bray,  Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d 
525 — Bitter  v.  Bexar  pounty,  Civ. 
App.,  266  S.W.  224,  reversed  on 
other  grounds.  Com.App.,  11  S.W. 
2d  163 — Stevenson  v.  Baisrow,  Civ. 
App.,  265  S.W.  602— Metting  v. 
Metting,  Civ.App.,  261  S.W.  151. 
modified  on  other  grounds  262  S. 
W.  188— Scott  v.  Lott,  Civ.App., 
247  S.W.  685— Scott  v.  State,  102 
S.W.2d  434,  132  Tex.Cr.  79. 

Utah.— Jeffries  v.  Third  Judicial 
Dist.  Court  of  Salt  Lake  County, 
63  P.2d  242,  90  Utah  525— Stevens 
&  Wallis  v.  Golden  OPorphyry 
Mines  Co.,  18  P.2d  90S,  81  Utah 
414 — People's  Bonded  Trustee  v. 
Wright,  272  P.  200,  72  Utah  587. 

Vt.— Ackerman  v.  Carpenter,  59  A.2d 
922,  113  Vt  77.  • 

W.Va.— George  v.  Male,  153  S.E.  507, 
109  W.Va.  222. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Urbach 
v.  Urbach,  7-3  F.2d  958,  962,  52 
Wyo.  207,  113  A.L.R.  889. 

13  C.J.  p  798  note  65—19  C.J.  p 
1209  note  20,  p  1240  note  19— 
24  C.J.  p  884  note  44—26  C.J.  p 
570  note  23—33  C.J.  p  144  note  83, 
p  1139  note  52,  p  1141  note  53, 
p  1156  note  58—42  C.J.  p  142  note 
48—47  C.J.  p  430  note  63,  p  1009 
note  87—51  (XJ.  p  360  note  70. 

"Unwarranted  conclusion  of  law 

A  judgment  cannot  be  based  on  a 
pleaded  conclusion  of  law  not  war- 
ranted by  the  facts  pleaded. — Hurst 
v.  Crawford,  Tex.Civ,App.,  216  S.W. 
284. 

Elimination  of  aspect  of  bill 

After  complainant  has  been  forced 
by  demurrer  to  eliminate  aspect  of 
bill,  he  cannot  be  required  to  accept 
decree  under  that  aspect.— Kelly  v. 
Carmichael,  129  So.  81,  221  Ala.  371. 

When,  rule  inapplicable 

"The  rule  that  Judgment  must  be 
in  accordance  with  the  allegations 
contained  in  the  pleadings  does  not 
apply  when  the  evidence,  though 
admitted  to  prove  these  allegations, 
shows  beyond  dispute  that  a  party 
is  responsible  for  a  wrong  or  has  a 
right  which  is  not  alleged,  and 
that  'further  opportunity  to  defend 
would  be  futile  and  a  source  only 
of  delay  and  possible  injustice."— 
Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S. 
v.  Kevitt,  54  N.YJ3.2d  6413,  $50. 
Order  void  on  its  face, 

It  has  been  held  that  an  order 
is  not  void  on  its  face  merely  be- 
cause it  is  not  in  accordance  with 
the  petition  on  which  it  is  based.— 


Mueller  v.   Elba   Oil   Co.,   130   P.2d 
961,  21  Cal.2d  188. 

9&  Conn.— De  Lucia  v.  Valente,  75 
A.  150,  $3  Conn.  107. 

Fla.— Vance  v.  Bliss  Properties,  149 
So.  870,  109  Fla.  388. 

ia— Walsh  v.  Walsh,  24  N.B.2d  341, 
372  111.  254— Rolinitfs  v.  Rolinitis, 
167  N.B.  68,  335  111.  260. 

Mo. — Massey-Harris  Harvester  Co. 
v.  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Kan- 
sas City,  48  S.W.2d  158,  226  Mo. 
App.  916. 

Tenn.— Furst  &  Furst  v.  Freels,  9 
Tenn.App.  423— HarreU  v.  Alabama 
Great  Southern  R.,  5  Tenn.App. 
471. 

Tex.— Starr  v.  Ferguson,  166  S.W.2d 
130,  140  Tex  80— Liner  v.  U.  S. 
Torpedo  Co.,  Com.App.,  12  S.W.2d 
552,  reheard  18  S.W.2d  519— Dalton 
v.  Davis,  Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  571 
—Austin  Bros.  v.  Patton,  Com. 
App.,  294  S.W.  537— Murphy  v. 
Bain,  Civ.App.,  142  S.W.2d  598— 
Texas  Employers'  Ins.  Ass'n  v. 
Jenkins,  Civ.App.,  63  S.W.2d  563 
— American  Surety  Co.  of  New 
York  v.  Alamo  Iron  Works,  Civ. 
App.,  29  &W.2d  493,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  Com. App.,  36  S.W. 
2d  714 — Baptist  Missionary  and 
Educational  Convention  of  State 
of  Texas  v.  Knox,  Civ.App.,  23 
S.W.2d  781— Globe  Laundry  v.  Mc- 
Lean, Civ.App.,  19  «.W.2d  94— 
National  Rys.  of  Mexico  v.  Escon- 
trias,  Civ.App.,  19  S.W.2d  75— 
Brewton  v.  Butler,  Civ. App.,  12 
S.W.2d  228 — San  Antonio  Machine 
&  Supply  Co.  v.  Allen,  Civ.App., 
268  S.W.  532— Schaff  v.  Perdue, 
Civ.App.,  254  S.W.  151— Griffith  v. 
Gohlman,  Lester  &  Co.,  Civ.App., 
25-3  S.W.  591— Flemtog-Stitzer 
Road  Bldg.  Co.  v.  Boyett,  Civ.App., 
253  S.W.  561. 

W.Va. — Bringardner  v.  Rollins,  185 
S.E.  665,  102  W.Va.  584. 

33  C.J.  p  1141  note  54. 

99.  Conn. — Farnham  v.  Schreiber, 
149  A.  393,  111  Conn.  38. 

N.C. — Simms  v.  (Sampson,  20  SJ3.2d 
554,  221  N.C.  379. 

Tex. — Butler  v.  Price,  Clv^App.,  138 
S.W.2d  301— National  Life  &  Ac- 
cident Ins.  Co.  v.  Casas,  Civ.App., 
36  S.W.2d  523— Dickson  v.  Kilgore 
State  Bank,  CivJVpp.,  244  S.W.  892, 
reversed  on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  257  S.W.  867. 

133  C.J.  p  1141  note  55. 

Mass. — Nashua  River  Paper  Co. 
v.  Lindsay,  136  N.E.  358,  242  Mass. 
206. 
33  C.J.  p  1144  note  75. 

109 


"When  reoonventloiL&l  demand  unnec- 
essary 

Where  a  court  is  authorized  to 
grant  the  relief  prayed  for  either 
absolutely  or  on  a  condition,  the 
granting  of  the  relief  only  on  con- 
dition is  a  mere  refusal  to  grant 
plaintiff  the  full  measure  of  relief 
prayed  for,  and  no  reconventional 
demand  on  the  part  of  defendant  is 
needed  to  authorize  such  judgment. 
— Francez  v.  Francez,  94  So.  203, 
152  La.  666. 

2.  Colo. — -Minchew  v.  West,   241  P. 
541,  78  Colo.  254. 

111. — Brock  v.  Pomeroy,  27  NJE.2d 
56,  305  ULApp.  127— Pley  v.  Lav- 
ette,  167  IlXApp.  494. 
La.— Thompson  v.  State  Assur.  Co., 
Limited,  of  Liverpool,  England, 
107  So.  489, 160  La.  683. 
N.T.— Claris  v.  Richards,  183  NJBL 
904,  260  N.Y.  419— Antonacchio  V. 
Consolidated  Foreign  Exchange 
Corporation,  197  N.T.-S.  150,  203 
App.Div.  621. 

S.C.— Blease  v.  Charleston  &  W.  C. 
Ry.  Co.,  144  S.E.  233,  146  S.C.  496. 
Tex.— City  of  Beaumont  v.  Calder 
Place  Corporation.  Civ.App.,  180 
S«W.2d  189,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  183  S.W.2d  713,  143  Tex. 
244 — Riggle  v.  Automobile  Finance 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  276  S.W.  439— Ben- 
son v.  Adams,  Civ.App.,  274  S.W. 
210,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Cozn.App.,  285  S.W.  818— R.  B. 
George  Machinery  Co.  v.  Spear- 
man, Civ.App.,  273  S.W.  640. 
Wyo. — Finance  Corporation  of  Wyo- 
ming v.  Commercial  Credit  Co.,  283 
P.  1100,  41  Wyo.  198. 
13  C.J.  p  798  note  65—19  C.J.  p  1210 
note  21,  p  1240  note  20—24  C.J.  p 
885  note  45—26  C.J.  p  570  note  24 
—33  C.J.  p  1141  note  57—47  C.J. 
p  430  note  64. 
Terms  of  unambiguous  contract 

Judgment  on  an  unambiguous 
written  contract  should  be  rendered 
according  to  its  terms,  although  evi- 
dence is  admitted  to  explain,  add  to, 
and  vary  its  meaning. — Cease  v.  De 
Hek,  253  P.  232,  122  Kan.  699. 

3.  N.T. — J.    D.    L.     Corporation    v. 
Bruckman,    11    N.T.S.2d    7'41,    in 
Misc.  3. 

Tex.— Baker  v.  Rose,  CivJV.pp.,  179 
S.W.2d  339,  modified  on  other 
grounds  183  &W.2d  438,  143  Tex. 
438. 

33  C.J.  p  1142  note  58.  . 

4.  £y<— Wunderlich  v.  Ecott,  46  S. 
W.2d  -753,  242  Ely.  481. 

La.— Pitre  v.  Guidry,  Ajpp.,  147  So, 
767. 


§  48 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ment  of  a  cause  of  action  and  constituting  mere 
surplusage  need  not  be  proved,  it  being  sufficient 
that  the  judgment  is  supported  by  proof  of  the 
essential  allegations.*  In  other  words,  the  judg- 
ment must  conform  to,  and  be  supported  by,  both 
the  pleadings  and  the  proofs,6  and  be  in  accordance 
with  the  theory  of  the  action  on  which  the  plead- 
ings are  framed  and  the  case  was  tried.7  This  rule 
is  of  universal  application,  and  whether  the  ac- 


tion or  suit  is  at  law,  in  equity,  or  under  the  code, 
the  judgment  must  be  secundum  allegata  et  proba- 
ta.8  Where  the  facts  pleaded  and  proved  by  plain- 
tiff constitute  a  cause  of  action,  a  judgment  may  be 
rendered  in  his  favor,9  notwithstanding  some  of  the 
allegations  made  by  him  are  not  found  to  be  true.10 

A  judgment  inconsistent  with  admitted  or  con- 
clusively established  facts  is  erroneous;11   a  valid 


NVT. — Klepper     v.     Seymour    House  j 

Corporation  of  Ogdensburg,  209  N. 

T.S.    67,    212    App.Div.    277. 
Tex.— New  Amsterdam  Casualty  Co. 

v.    Harrington,    Com.App.,    290    S. 

W.    726-r Sproles    v.    Rosen,    Civ. 

App.,  47  S.W.2d  Ml,  affirmed  84  S. 

W.2d  1001,  126  Tex  51. 
33  C.J.  p  1142  note  59. 
Verified  account 

In  an  action  based  on  an  itemized 
account  the  correctness  of  which  is 
duly  verified,  and  under  a  statute 
providing  that  to  the  absence  of  a 
verified  denial  the  account  should  be 
taken  as  true,  it  *s  not  necessary 
to  the  validity  of  a  judgment  oa 
the  account,  where  the  required  de- 
nial has  not  been  made,  that  other 
evidence  be  introduced.— Cusack  v. 
McMasters,  279  P.  329,  137  Okl.  278. 

5.  Mo.— Campbell  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
B.  Co.,  25  S.W.  936.  121  Mo.  340, 
42  Am.S.R.  530,  25  L.R.A.  175. 

33  C.J.  p  11*44  note  74. 

e.  U.S.— Webster  Bisenlohr,  Inc.,  v. 
Kalodner,  C.C.A.Pa.,  145  P.2d  316, 
certiorari  denied  Kalodner  v.  Web- 
ster Bisenlohr,  Inc.,  65  S.Ct.  1404, 
325  U.-S.  867,  89  L.Ed.  1986— Dry- 
brough  v  Ware,  C.C.A,Ky.,  Ill  F. 
2d  548. 

Cal.— Pacific  Mortg.  Guaranty  Co.  v. 
Rosoff,  67  P.2d  110,  20  Cal.App.2d 
383. 

Conn. — Tress  v.  Pivorotto,  133  A.  85, 
104  Conn.  -389. 

Fla.— Corpus  JtuAs  quoted  in  Edgar 
v.  Bacon,  122  So.  107,  109,  97  Fla. 
679,  followed  in  Wright  v.  Tatari- 
an,  181  "So.  133,  100  Fla.  1366. 

Ga.— Griffeth  v.  Haygood,  161  S.B. 
831,  174  Ga.  22. 

m._Wood  v.  Wood,  64  N.E.2d  385, 
327  111. App.  557 — Kohler  v.  Kohler, 
61  N.B.2d  687,  326  IlLApp.  105— 
First  Trust  Joint  Stock  Land 
Bank  of  Chicago  v.  Cutler,  12  N.E. 
2d  705,  293  Ill.App.  354. 

Iowa.— Bennett  v.  Oreenwalt,  286  N. 
W.  122,  226  Iowa  1113. 

Ky.— Wunderlich  v.  Scott,  46  S.W.2d 
753,  242  Ky.  481— Phelps  v.  Phelps, 
24  S.W.2d  584,  232  Ky.  685— Ad- 
Idas  v.  Pikeville  Supplying  & 
Planing  Mill  Co.,  295  S.W.  440,  220 
Ky.  476 — Lassiter  v.  Farris,  259  S, 
W.  696,  202  Ky.  330. 

3£iss. — Kennington-Saenger  Theatres 
*.  State  ex  reL  Disk  Atty.,  18  So. 


2d  433,   196  Miss.   841.   153  A.L.R. 
883. 

Mo.— Sinclair  Refining  Co.  v.  W]yatt, 
149  'S.W.2d  -358,  347  Mo.  862— Frie- 
del  v.  Bailey,  44  S.W.2d  9,  829  Mo. 
22. 

Mont.— tSecurity      State      Bank      of 
Havre  v.  Mariette,   223  P.  114,  69 
Mont.  536. 
Neb.— Coleman    v.    Beck,    5    N.W.2d 

104,  142  Neb.  13. 

N.J. — Gunther  v.  Morey  Larue  Laun- 
dry Co.,  29  A.2d  713,  129  N.J  Law 
345,  affirmed  33  A.2d  893,  130  N.J. 
Law  557 — Sivak  v.  City  of  New 
Brunswick,  «  A.2d  566,  122  N.J. 
Law  197. 

N.T.— Lifton  v.  Title  Guarantee  & 
Trust  Co.,  31  N.T.S.2d  94,  26-3  App. 
Div.  3 — Electric  Equipment  Cor- 
poration v.  Delco  Appliance  Corpo- 
ration, 297  N.T.S.  498,  252  App.Div. 
1— Dobbins  v.  Pratt  Chuck  Co.,  206 
N.Y.S.  5,  210  App.Div.  278,  revers- 
ed on  other  grounds  151  N.E.  1-46, 
242  N.T.  106— People  v.  Roney,  230 
N.T.S.  583,  132  Misc.  746. 
Pa.— In  re  Miller,  Com.Pl.,  32  Del. 

Co.  566. 

S.C. — Jones  v.  Blbert,  34  'S.E.2d  796, 
206  S.C.  508— Parker  Peanut  Co. 
v.  Felder,  34  S.E.2d  488,  207  S.C. 
€3 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Little 
v.  Rivers,  185  S.E.  174,  175,  180  S. 
C.  149. 

Tenn.— Dixie  Ohio  Exp.  Co.  v.  But- 
ler, 166  S.W.2d  614,  179  Tenn.  358. 
Tex. — -Page  v.  Key,  Civ.App.,  175  S. 
W.2d  443,  error  refused — Street  v, 
Cunningham,  Civ.App.,  156  S.W.2d 
541-r-Day  v.  Grayson  County  -State 
Bank,  Civ.App.,  ISS  S.W.2d  599— 
Barrett  v.  Commercial  Standard 
Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  145  S.W.2d  -315 
—Southern  Underwriters  v.  Blair, 
Oiv.App.,  144  S.W.2d  641— Guthrie 
v.  Gossett,  Civ.App.,  142  S.W.2d 
410— American  Nat  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Sutton,  Civ.Aipp.,  130  S.W.2d  441 — 
Humble  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v.  Ow- 
ings,  Civ.App.,  128  S.W.2d  67— 
Railroad  Commission  of  Texas  v. 
Royal  Petroleum  Corporation,  Civ. 
App.,  93  S.W.2d  761,  error  dismiss- 
ed— Penrod  v.  Von  Wolff,  Civ.App., 
90  S.W.2d  859— Barnhart  Mercan- 
tile Co.  v.  Bengel,  Civ.App.,  77 
S.W.2d  295— Perkins  v.  Campbell, 
Civ.App.,  63  S.W.2d  567— Farm  & 
Home  Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n  of 
Missouri  v.  Muhl,  Civ.App.,  37  S 
W.2d  316,  error  refused — Sibley  v, 

no 


Perkins  Bros.  Dry  Goods  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  12  S.W.2d  601— Hall  v.  Brad- 
ley, Civ.App.,  282  S.W.  874 — Grif- 
fith v.  Gohlman,  Lester  &  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  253  <S.W.  591. 
Vt.— In  re  Prouty's  Estate,  165  A. 

566,  105  Vt  66. 

Va. — Richmond  Engineering  &  Mfg. 
Corporation  v.  Loth,  115  S.E.  774, 
135  Va.  110.  • 

1  C.J.  p  1009  note  7—33  C.J.  t>  1142 
note  60 — 42  C.J.  p  1287  note  14 
—51  C.J.  p  269  note  25. 
Belief  not  dependent  on  arguments 
"It  is  the  pleadings  and  the  de- 
veloped facts  within  the  pleadings 
that  courts  are  obliged  to  follow  and 
to  which  the  parties  and  counsel 
must  be  held;  not  arguments." — 
Mississippi  Power  &  Light  Co.  v. 
Pitts,  179  So.  363,  365,  181  Miss.  344. 

7.  Fla. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Edgar  v.  Bacon,   122   So.   107,  109, 
97  Fla.  679,  followed  in  Wright  v. 
Tatarian,    131    So.    r33,    100    Fla. 
1366. 

Iowa. — Bennett  v.  Green  wait,  286  N. 

W.  722,  226  Iowa  1113. 
S.C. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Little 

v.    Rivers,    185    S.E.   174,    175,    180 

S.C.  149. 
33  C.J.  p  1143  -note  61. 

8.  Fla. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Edgar  v.  Bacon,  122   So.   107,  109, 
97  Fla.  679,  followed  in  Wright  v. 
Tatarian,    131    So.    133,    100    Fla. 
1366. 

33  C.J.  p  1143  note  62. 

9.  Miss. — Southeastern  Exp.   Co.  v. 
Namie,  181  So.  515,  182  Miss.  447. 

Wash. — Exeter  Co.  v.  Holland  Corpo- 
ration, 23  P.2d  864,  172  Wash.  323. 
33  C.J.  p  1143  note  67. 

In  courts  where  written  pleadings 
are  not  required,  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  any  appropriate  relief  on  facts 
established,  unless  on  the  trial  he 
has  adopted  and  insisted  on  a  con- 
trary theory  of  the  case. — Troxler 
v.  Bevlll,  3  S.E.2d  8,  215  N.C.  640. 

10.  Cal. — Herman  v.  Glasscock,  155 
P.2d  912,  38  Cal. App. 2 d  98. 

11.  Cal.— California  Stearns   Co.   v* 
Treadwell,  256  P.  594,  83  CaLApp. 
69. 

Kan.— Wright  v.  Jenks,   261  «P.   840, 

124  Kan.  604. 
Ky. — Quaack  v.  Kentucky  Title  Trust 

Co.,  106  S.W.2d  589,  268  Ky.  498. 
N.Y.— Weiss  v.  McKinner,  59  N.Y.S.2d 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


49 


judgment,  inconsistent  with  his  own  allegations  and 
admissions,  cannot  be  rendered  for  a  party.1*  If 
defendant  admits  liability  for  a  particular  sum, 
judgment  should  be  rendered  against  him  for  at 
least  such  sum,  and  a  judgment  of  nonsuit,  dis- 
missal, or  the  like  is  erroneous.13  A  judgment  for 
a  defendant  who  fails  to  answer  a  complaint  stat- 
ing a  cause  of  action  is  erroneous,  because  the  de- 
fault admits  the  case  alleged.1*  A  judgment  is  void 
for  inconsistency  where  it  grants  relief  both  to 
plaintiff  and  to  defendant  on  inconsistent  grounds.15 

In  determining  whether  or  not  the  pleadings  sup. 
port  the  judgment,  they  must  be  taken  as  a  whole,16 
and  construed  so  as  to  support  the  judgment,  if 
capable  of  such  a  construction.1?  Substantial  ac- 
cordance is  sufficient;18  and  to  upset  a  judgment 
for  variance  between  it  and  the  pleadings  in  a  con- 
tested case,  it  has  been  held  that  there  must  be  an 
entire  abandonment  of  the  very  substance  of  the 
dispute  to  which  defendant  was  summoned,  and  the 
substitution  of  another  which  he  could  not  have 
anticipated,  and  which  he  had  no  opportunity  to 
meet19  If  defendant  merely  files  an  answer  and 


defaults  thereafter,  a  closer  registry  between  plead- 
ing and  judgment  is  exacted  than  after  a  contested 
trial.20  The  presumption  is  that  the  relief  granted 
is  authorized  by  the  pleadings,  and  the  burden  is  on 
him  who  attacks  the  judgment  to  show  that  it  was 
not.21 


§  49.    Limitation  to  Relief  Sought  by 

Pleadings 

a.  In  general 

b.  Affirmative  relief  to  defendant 

a.  In  General 

As  a  general  rule  the  relief  awarded  should  conform 
to  that  sought  by  the  pleadings.;  but  this  rule  does  not 
always  apply,  particularly  where  there  is  a  prayer  for 
general  relief  or  where  the  statutes  have  broadened  the 
scope  of  permissible  relief,  and  In  many  cases  the  court 
has  power  to  grant  any  relief  within  the  issues  formed 
by  the  pleadings  and  justified  by  the  evidence,  regard- 
less of  the  specific  relief  demanded. 

Ordinarily,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the 
contrary,  the  relief  to  be  awarded  by  a  judgment 
should  be  consistent  with,  and  limited  to,  that  sought 


659— Levlne  v.  Weiss,  16  N.Y.S.2d 

1003. 
Tex. — Dashiel  v.  Lott,  ConouApp.,  243 

S.W.    1072,    rehearing:    denied    246 

S.W.     xvi — Great     Southern     Life 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Dorough,  Civ.App.,  100 

S.W.2d  772. 
33  C.J.  p  1143  note  63. 
Legal  effect  of  admitted  facts 

Where  all  the  material  foots  are 
established  by  admissions  in  the 
pleadings,  the  Judgment  must  be  In 
accordance  with  the  legal  effect  of 
such  facts  regardless  of  the  testi- 
mony on  other  issues,  unless  by  ac- 
tual or  implied  consent  the  parties 
have  tried  the  case  on  other  sub- 
stituted issues.— Reiff  v.  Mullholland, 
62  N.E.  124,  65  Ohio  St.  178—83  C. 
J.  p  1143  note  $5. 
Indebtedness  of  plaintiff 

(1)  In      action      by      borrowers 
against  lender  of  money,  where  un- 
controverted      proof     showed     that 
plaintiffs   were   indebted   to   defend- 
ants in  excess  of  their  claim,  enter- 
ing judgment  for  plaintiff  was  error. 
— Brecht   v.    Bankers'    Sec.   Co.,    1«33 
S.E.  79,  101  W.Va.  533. 

(2)  In  action  to  have  chattel  mort- 
gage   declared   void,    court   properly 
gave  defendant  judgment  for  amount 
of   debt   which   plaintiff  admitted.— 
Wilson    v.    Standard    Fertilizer   Co., 
166  S.E.  76,  203  N.C.  359. 

12.  Mo. — Drecksbage  v.  Dreckshage, 
176  -S.W.2d  7,  352  Mo.  78. 

33  C:J.  p  1156  note  59. 

13.  U.S. — Southern  Pac,  Co.  v.  Van 
Hoosear,  C.OA.Cal.,  72  F.2d  908. 


Ky.— Olark  v.  Mason,  95  S.W.2d  292, 

264  Ky.  683. 
N.C.— Penn  v.  King,  162  S.B.  376,  202 

N.C.  174. 
Tex— Illinois    Bankers'    Life    Ass'n 

v.  Floyd,  Com.  App.,  222  S.W.  967. 
33  C.J.  p  1143  note  63  [a],  [b]. 

14.  Tex.— Miller    v.     Nichols,     Civ. 
App.,  258  S.W.  855. 

3-3  C.J.  p  1143  note  $4. 

15.  Mo. — King   v.    Brockschmidt,    3 
Mo.App.  571. 

33  C.J.  p  1168  note  29. 

16.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Oklahoma   Gas   &   Electric   Co.  v. 
Busha,    66    P.2d    64,    67,    179    Okl. 
505. 

•S.C.— Little  v.  Rivers,  185  SJ3J.  174, 

180  S.C.  149. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris   cited  in  Cavers 

v.  Sioux  Oil  &  Refining  Co.,  Com. 

App.,  49  S.W.2d  862,  868. 
Utah.— La  Bee  v.  Smith,  229  P.  88,  64 

Utah  242.  ' 
33  CJ.  p  1144  note  77. 
Pleadings  of  lota  parties 

In  determining  the  relief  which 
may  be  accorded,  it  is  proper  to 
take  into  consideration  the  plead- 
ings of  both  parties. — Buchanan  v. 
Davis,  Tex.Com.App.,  60  S.W.2d  192 
— Cavers  v.  Sioux  Oil  &  Refining  Co., 
Tex.Com.App.,  49  S.W.2d  862— New 
Home  Sewing  Mach.  Co.  v.  Withrow, 
TexCiv.App.,  143  S.W.2d  971— Orms- 
by  v.  Ratcliff,  Tex.Civ.App.,  22  S.W. 
2d  504,  affirmed  Ormsby  v.  Ratcliffe, 
Com.App.,  36  S.W.2d  1005—33  C.J,  P 
1168  note  28  [a]  (2). 

Ill 


Adverse  interest*  between  code, 
fendants  may  be  passed  on,  and  a 
decree  rendered  between  them 
grounded  on  the  pleadings  and  proof 
between  plaintiff  and  defendants  and 
founded  on  and  connected  with  the 
subject  matter  in  litigation  between 
plaintiff  and  one  or  more  of  defend- 
ants, even  though  no  cross  pleadings 
be  filed,  especially  where  the  rights 
as  between  plaintiff  and  one  of  the 
defendants  cannot  be  adjudicated 
without  determining  rights  as  be- 
tween codefendants, — Gillam  v.  Co- 
line  Oil  Co.,  277  P.  639,  136  OkL 
257. 

17.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Oklahoma   Gas   &   Electric  Co.   v. 
Busha,    66    P.2d    64,    67,    179    OkL 
505. 

S.C.— Little  v.  Rivers,  185  S.E.  17-4, 

180  S.C.  149. 
33  C.J.  p  1144  note  78. 

18.  S.C. — Little  v.   Rivers,   supra. 
33  C.J.  p  1144  note  79. 

19.  U.S. — Armand    Co.    v.     Federal 
Trade  Commission,  C.CJL,  84  P.2d 
97-3,  certiorari  denied  56  S.Ct  309, 
296  U.-S.  650,  80  L.Ed.  463,  certio- 
rari denied  57  S.Ct  189,  299  U.S. 
597,  81  L.Ed;  440,  rehearing  denied 
57  S.Ct  234,  299  U.S.  623,  81  L.Ed. 
459. 

20.  U.S.— Armand    Co.     v.    Federal 
Trade  Commission,  supra,         ' 

21.  Iowa. — American   Emigrant    Co. 
v.  Fuller,  50  N.W.  48,  83  Iowa  599. 

33  C.J.  p  1144  note  80. 


49 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


by  the  pleadings22  or  incidental  thereto.23  Where 
plaintiff  has  asked  only  for  specific  relief,  or  relief 
as  to  a  specific  subject  matter,  usually  no  more  ex- 
tensive or  different  relief  may  be  accorded  to  him.24 
However,  particularly  under  statutes  or  codes  in 
effect  so  providing,  the  demand  or  prayer  for  relief 
does  not  always  or  necessarily  determine  or  limit 


the  relief  which  may  be  granted,25  and  in  many  cas- 
es the  rule  is  stated  more  broadly  to  the  effect  that 
any  relief  fairly  within  the  issues  formed  by  the 
pleadings  and  justified  by  the  evidence  may  be  giv- 
en, regardless  of  the  specific  relief  asked  or  the 
form  of  the  action.26  Accordingly  it  has  been  held 
that,  notwithstanding  a  pleading  asks  for  the  wrong 


22,  tr.S.— iSylvan  Beach  v.  Koch,  C. 
C.A.MO.,  140  F.2d  852. 

Ariz. — Wall  v.  Superior  Court  of  Ya- 
vapai  Comity.  89  P.2d  624,  63  Ariz. 
344. 

Gad.— Lewis  V.  Kohls,  App..  1-60  P. 
2d  199. 

Conn. — Shaw  T.  Sj>elk«,  14T  A.  675, 
110  Conn.  208. 

Fla. — G-ralynn  Laundry  T.  Virginia 
Bond  &  Mortgage  Corporation,  163 
So.  706,  121  Fla.  812. 

Ga.— Burton  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  172  S.E.  41,  177.  Ga.  899, 
transferred,  see  173  S.E.  922,  48 
GauApp.  828. 

Idaho.— Mason  v.  Pelkes,  59  P.2d 
1087,  57  Idaho  10,  certiorarl  denied 
Pelkes  T.  Mason,  67  S.Ct.  319,  $99 
U.S.  615,  81  LJEd.  4&3— Angel  v. 
Mellea,  285  P.  461,  48  Idaho  750. 

I1L— (Barker  T.  Gray,  148  N.E.  325, 
317  111.  468— Wood  v.  Wood,  64 
N.E.2d  -385,  327  IlLApp.  «57. 

Iowa. — Federal  Land  Bank  of  Omaha 
v.  Jefferson,  295  K.W.  855,  229 
Iowa  1054,  1*32  A.L.R.  1282— In  re 
Collicott's  Estate,  283  N.W.  869, 
226  Iowa  106. 

Ky.— Jones  v.  York,  185  S.W.2d  40«4, 
299  Ky.  30«, 

La. — Mente  &  Co.  v.  Roane  Sugars, 
6  So.2d  731,  199  La.  636— Peters  v. 
Norris,  185  So.  481,  191  La.  436— 
Le  Blanc  v.  Cristlna,  140  So.  149, 
19  La.App.  397. 

Miss. — Kennlngton-Saenger  Theatres 
v.  State  ex  rel.  District  Attorney, 
18  So.2d  488,  196  Miss.  841r  153  A. 
L.R.  883. 

Mo.— Brown  v.  Wilson,  1S5  6.W.24 
176,  348  Mo.  658— -Hecker  v.  Bleish, 
3  S.W.2d  1008,  319  Mo.  149. 

N.M.— Van  Sickle  v.  Keck,  81  P.2d 
707,  42  N.M.  450. 

Pa. — Eddy  v.  Borough  of  Ashley,  125 
A.  308,  281  Pa.  4. 

Tex. — Grain  v.  Adams,  dv.App.,  120 
S.W.2d  290— Hake  v.  Dilworth, 
Civ.App.,  96  S:W.2d  121,  error  dis- 
missed—Lokey  T.  Elliott.  Civ.App,, 
88  S.W.2d  126— Elgin  v.  Banks, 
Civ.App.,  38  S.W.2d  149— Faison  T. 
Faison,  Civ.App.,  31  S.W.2d  828, 
error  dismissed — Community  Nat- 
ural <3a«  C*.  T.  Northern  Texas 
Utilities  Co.,  Civ.App.,  13  -S.W.2d 
194,  error  dismissed — Smith  v. 
Miller,  Civ.App.,  300  fi.W.  95"3— 
Creager  T.  Beamer  Syndicate,  Civ. 
App.,  274  S.W.  323. 

Utah.— Voyles  v.  Straka,  292  P.  913, 
77  Utah  171. 

Wis.—In  re  Kehl's  Estate,  254  N.W. 
639,  215  Wis>  353* 


Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Urbach 

v.    Urbach,    73    P.2d    953.    963,    62 

Wyo.  207,  113  A.L.R.  889. 
33    C.J.    p    1144    note    82—42   C.J.   P 

142  note  B3— 47  C.J.  P  430  note  69 

— 51  C.J.  p  270  note  33. 
Conformity   of  default  Judgment  to 

pleadings   and   proof  see   infra   § 

214. 
Relief  m  equity  as  limited  by  prayer 

for  relief'  see  Equity  §  607. 

"It  may  be  that  in  some  cases  a 
court  is  warranted  in  decreeing  to 
litigants  .rights  not  specifically  ask- 
ed for  in  the  prayer,  but  we  know 
of  no  rule  which  requires  a  trial 
court  to  render  a  judgment  in  favor 
of  a  litigant  who  does  not  plainly 
set  out  in  some  portion  of  his  plead- 
ing the  relief  which  he  desires  and 
to  which  he  deems  himself  entitled 
under  the  law.** — City  of  Floydada 
v.  Gilltem,  Tex.Civ.App.,  Ill  S.W.2d 
761,  763. 

23.  Ark. — Bentonville     v.     Browne, 
158   S.W.   161,   108   Ark.  306. 

33  C.J.  p  1145  note  83. 

Incidental  relief  in  foreclosure  suit 

(1)  It  is  within  the  power  of  the 
court  in  a  foreclosure  suit  to   give 
relief  as   to   incidental   matters   not 
specified    in   the    prayer,   where   the 
mortgage  stipulates  for  such  relief. 
— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Heachem,  Tenn. 
Ch.,  36  S.W.  724—42  C.J.  p  143  note  54. 

(2)  Such  relief  may  also  be  given 
where    complainant    was    excusably 
ignorant  as   to   his   right  thereto. — 
Clark  v.  Mackin,  95  N.Y.  3-46—42  C 
J.  p  143  note  55. 

24.  La.— New    Orleans    Silica  Brick 
Co.  v.   John   Thatcher  &  Son,   107 
So.  236,  160  La.  392. 

Tex, — Railroad  Commission  of  Texas 
v.  Royal  Petroleum  Corporation, 
Civ.App.,  93  S.W,2d  761,  error  dis- 
missed-^Smith  v.  Jaggers,  Civ. 
App.,  16  S.W.2d  969,  error  dis- 
missed. 

33  C.J.  p  1148  note  2. 

25.  Ark. — Morgan     v.     Scott-Mayer 
Commission    Co.,    48    S.W.2d    838, 
185  Ark.   637. 

Cal. — Holmes  v.  Anderson,  265  .0?. 
1010,  90  CaLApp.  276. 

Colo.— Snell  v.  Public  Utilities  Com- 
mission, 114  P.2d  563,  108  Colo.  162 
— >Speyer  v.  School  Dist.  No.  1, 
City  and  County  of  Denver,  261  P. 
859,  82  Colo.  534 — Pomponio  v. 
Larsen,  251  P.  534,  80  Colo.  318. 

Ga. — Anderson  v.  Fulton  County 
Home  Builders,  92  S.E.  934,  147 
Ga,  104, 

112 


Idaho.— Schlieff  v.  Bistline,  15  P.2d 
726,  52  Idaho  353. 

Ill.-^Pure  Oil  Co.  v.  -Byrnes,  57  N.E. 
2d  356,  388  111.  26— Swofford  v. 
Swofford,  63  N.B.2d  615,  527  111. 
App.  25. 

Ind.— Rooker  v.  Leary,  149  N.B.  358, 
84  Ind.  App.  77 — Montgomery  v. 
Montgomery,  140  N.B.  917,  81  Ind. 
App.  1. 

Mo. — Homa-n  v.  Employers  Reinsur- 
ance Corporation,  136  S.W.2d  289, 
345  Mo.  650,  127  A.L.R.  163— Ben- 
trup  v.  Johnson,  14  S.W.2d  537,  223 
Mo.App.  299. 

Mont. — Malvaney  v.  Yager,  64  P.2d 
135,  101  Mont.  331. 

N.Y. — In  re  Feuer  Transp.,  65  N.B. 
2d  178,  295  N.Y.  87,  reargument 
denied  Feuer  Transp.  v.  Local  Un- 
ion No.  445  of  International  Broth- 
erhood of  Teamsters,  66  N.E.2d 
590,  295  N.Y.  821,  motion  denied 
66  N.B.2d  593,  295  N.Y.  825— 
Brown  Packing  Co.  v.  Lewis,  58 
N.Y.S.2d  443,  185  Misc.  445. 

Okl.— Reynolds  v.  Wall,  72  P.2d  505, 
181  Okl.  110,  113  A.L.R.  417— 
Owens  v.  OPurdy,  217'  P.  425,  90 
Okl.  256. 

Tenn. — Central  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Conn.  264  S.W.  641,  150  Tenn.  375. 

Utah. — Bolognese  v.  Anderson,  90 
P.2d  275,  97  Utah  136— Jeffries  v. 
Third  Judicial  Dist.  Court  of  Salt 
Lake  County,  63  P.2d  242,  90  Utah 
525. 

Prayer  not  determinative  of  right  to 

recover 
The  right  to  recover  depends,  not 

on  the  prayer,  but  on  the  scope  of 

the  pleadings,  and  the  issues  made, 

or    which    might   have    been    made, 

under    them. — Paulsen    v.    Western 

Electric  Co.,  171  P.  38.   67  Okl.  809. 

General  law  as  to  framing  of  judg- 
ment 
Where  the  general  law  prescribes 

the  manner  of  framing  a  judgment 

and  carrying  it   into  execution,   the 

court  '  may     follow     that     manner, 

whether  or  not  expressly  prayed  for. 

—Ex  parte  Weiler,   289   P.   645,    106 

Cal.App.  485. 

20.  Ark. — Albersen  v.  Klanke,  6  6. 
W.2d  292,  177  Ark.  288. 

Cal. — O'Melia  v.  A<3kins,  App.,  166  P. 
2d  298— Erskine  v.  Upham,  132  P. 
2d  210,  56  Cal.App.2d  235—80^ 
nicksen  v.  So'nnicksen,  113  OP.2d 
495,  45  Cal.Appv2d  46 — Zimmer  v. 
Gorehiik,  109  P.2d  34,  42  Cal.App. 
2d  440 — Lorraine  v.  Lorraine,  48 
P.2d  48,  8  Cal.App.2d  687— Masero 


t9    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  49 


•elief,  or  for  relief  which  cannot  be  granted,  the 
;ourt  may  grant  other  and  appropriate  relief.27 
\.  party  is  not  deprived  of  all  right  to  relief  merely 
>ecause  he  has  sought  more  than  he  is  entitled  to, 
ind  judgment  for  less  relief  than  demanded  may 
>e  given  when  sustained  by  the  pleadings-  and 
>roof.28 

A  judgment  which  grants  relief  of  a  character 
lot  sought  is  not  for  that  reason  void  ;29  at  most  it 


s  erroneous.30 

v.  Bessolo,  262  P.  61,  87  CaLApp. 
262. 

3olo. — Bncll  r.  Public  Utilities  Com- 
mission, 114  P.2d  563,  108  Colo. 
162. 

11. — Yakich  v.  Smietanka,  63  N.E.2d 
718,  392  111.  53. 

Can. — Eberhardt  Lumber  Co.  v.  I*e- 
cuyer,  110  P.2d  757,  153  Kan.  386 
— Shelley  v.  Sentinel  Life  Ins.  Co., 
69  iP.2d  737,  146  Kan.  227. 

JLo. — Merz  v.  Tower  Grove  Bank  & 
Trust  Co,,  130  S;W.2d  611,  344  Mo. 
1150 — Jones  v.  Campbell,  App.,  189 
S.W.2d  124. 

tfont. — Malvaney  v.  Yager,  5'4  P.2d 
135,  101  Mont.  331— Outlook  Farm- 
ers' Elevator  Co.  v.  American 
Surety  Co.  of  New  York,  223  P. 
905.  70  Mont.  8. 

*.Y.— Hells  tern  v.  Hellstern,  18  N. 
E.2d  296,  279  N.Y.  327— New 
Chester  Theatre  Corporation  v. 
Bischoff,  205  N.Y.S.  641.  210  App. 
Div.  125— Allen  v.  Mattison,  14  N. 
Y.S.2d  711. 

*.C.— Lockman  v.  Lockman,  16  S.E. 
2d  670,  220  N.C.  95— Dry  v.  Board 
of  Drainage  Com'rs  of  Gabarrus 
County,  Drainage  Dist  No.  6,  11 
S.E.2d  143,  218  N.C.  356— Troacler 
v.  Bevill,  3  S.E.2d  8,  215  N.C.  640 
—Virginia  Trust  Co.  v.  Webb,  173 
S.E.  598,  206  NjC.  247. 

3kl.WTucker  v.  Porter,  72  R2d  388, 
181  Okl.  30 — Harmon  v.  Hines,  16 
P.2d  94,  160  Okl.  120— Page  v.  Ok- 
lahoma City,  263  OP.  448,  12J9  Okl. 
28— Rose  v.  Firat  Nat  Bank,  219 
P.  715,  93  Okl.  120. 

3.C.— Palmetto  Compress  &  Ware- 
house Co.  v.  Citizens  &  Southern 
Nat.  Bank,  20  S.E.2d  232,  200  S.C. 
20 — Youmans  v.  Youmans,  121  SJB3. 
674,  128  S.C.  31. 

Tex. — Honaker  v.  Guffey  Petroleum 
Co.,  294  S.W.  259. 

{3  C.J.  p  1149  note  5,  p  1150  note  7. 

Amendments  to  prayer 

(1)  In  a  proper  case  the  court  will 
illow  amendments  to  be  made  to 
the  prayer  in  order  to  justify  a 
judgment  affording  appropriate  re- 
lief.—Burd  v.  Downing,  213  P.  287, 
30  Cal.App.  493. 

(2)(  It  has  also  been  held,  how- 
ever, that  an  amendment  to  the 
prayer  of  the  petition  is  not  a  pre- 
requisite to  such  relief. — Snehoda  v. 

49  C.J.S.-8 


In  contested  cases,  or  cases  in  which  an  answer 
has  been  filed  the  relief  which  may  be  granted  is 
not  limited  to  that  demanded  in  the  complaint  or 
specifically  prayed  for,  particularly  under  statutes 
in  effect  so  providing;31  the  court  may  grant  any 
relief  which  is  consistent  with  the  case  made  by  the 
pleadings  and  proofs,  and  embraced  within  the  is- 
sues.32 The  effect  of  a  statute  providing  that, 
where  defendant  appears  and  answers,  plaintiff  shall 


First  Nat   Bank  in  Wichita,   224   P. 
91*4,  115  Kan.  836. 

27.  Ariz. — -Keystone  Copper  Min.  Co. 
v.  Miller,  164  P.2d  603. 

Cal. — Bank  of  America  Nat.  Trust 
&  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Gillett,  97  P.2d 
875,  36  Cal.App.2d  453— Neblett  v. 
Neblett,  66  P.2d  969,  13  Cal.App. 
2d  304. 
Colo.— Pope  v.  Parker,  271  P.  1118, 

84  Colo.  535. 

La. — Prejean   v.   East   Baton   Rouge 
Parish  Democratic  Executive  Com- 
mittee, 19  So.2d  376,   206  La.  658. 
Mo. — Rains    v.    Moulder,    90    S.W.2d 

81,  338  Mo.  275. 

N.T.— Lonsdale  v.  Spever,  291  N.Y. 
$.  495,  249  App.Dlv.  133— Seedman 
v.  Benenson  Realty  Co.,  60  N.Y.S. 
2d  341,  185  Misc.  769— Brown 
Packing  Co.  v.  Lewis,  58  N.Y.S.2d 
443,  185  Misc.  445. 

Erroneous  prayer  for  eq.uita'ble  relief 
If  complaint  states  facts  showing 
cause  of  action  at  law,   court  will 
disregard  prayer  for  equitable  relief 
and  give  plaintiff  appropriate  reme- 
dy in  law, — Welsh  v.  Markham,  210 
N.W.  70-6,  191.  Wis.  310. 
Compliance  with  statutory  require- 
ments 

Where  the  allegations  of  a  com- 
plaint under  statute  are  sufficient 
to  satisfy  the  statutory  require- 
ments, it  is  immaterial  that  the 
prayer  for  relief  is  inappropriate. — 
Hamilton  v.  Hamilton,  139  N.Y.-S. 
1095,  78  Misc.  557. 

28.  Ind.— State    ex    rel.    Mavity   v. 
Tyndall,  66  N.R2d  755. 

Ky. — Cooper  v.  McWilliams  &  Rob- 
inson, 298  S.W.  961,  221  Ky.  320. 

La. — Martinez  v.  Orleans  Parish 
School  Board,  98  So.  860,  155  La. 
116— Harries  v.  Courcier,  119  So. 
90S,  16  La.App.  22. 

N.Y.— Vickers  v.  Tickers,  282  N.Y.S. 
422,  156  Misc.  724. 

-Wash.— Washington  Pulp  &  Paper 
Corporation  v.  Robinson,  6  P.2d 
e32,  166  Wash.  210. 

Wyo.~ Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ur- 
bach  v.  Urbach,  73  P.2d  953,  962, 
52  Wyo.  207,  113  A.L.R.  889. 

33  C.J.  p  1145  note  84. 

interest  than  entire  ownership 
Appropriate     pleading     of     entire 

ownership  in  property  sued  for  will 

authorize  recovery  of  a  less  interest, 

113 


where  warranted  by  the  proof. — Gay 
v.  Jackman,  TexjCom.App.,  254  S.W. 
927—51  C.J.  p  270  note  38  [a], 

29.  Cal. — Luekey  v.   Superior  Court 
in    and   for   Los   Angeles    County, 
287  P.  450,  209  Cal.  360. 

Ky, — Middleton  v.  Graves,  17  S.W.24 

741,  229  Ky.  640. 
33  C.J.  p  1148  note  2  [b]. 

However,  it  has  also  been  held 
that  a  judgment  in  an  action  to  de- 
termine adverse  claims  to  vacant 
and  unoccupied  lands,  awarding  re- 
lief -beyond  the  scope  of  the  com- 
plaint,  is  not  a  mere  irregularity,, 
but  extrajudicial  and  void. — Hurr  v. 
Davis,  193  N.W.  94-3,  155  Minn.  456. 
rehearing  denied  194  N.W.  379,  155 
Minn.  456,  certiorari  denied  44  S.Ct. 
36,  263  U.S.  709,  68  L.Ed.  518,  and 
error  dismissed  45  S.Ct.  227,  267  U.S. 
572,  69  L.Ed.  794. 
Unsupported  portion 

Where  the  pleadings  do  not  war- 
rant a  decree  or  part  of  a  decree  en- 
tered, and  the  decree  or  such  part 
of  it  is  clearly  and  unmistakably 
beyond  the  scope  of  the  pleadings, 
then  the  decree  or  such  part  of  it  is 
void  and  not  merely  erroneous.— 
Simmons  v.  Yoho,  115  S.E.  851,  92 
W.Va.  703. 

30.  Ky.— (Middleton  v.  Graves,  17  S, 
W.2d  7-41,  229  Ky.  640. 

31.  Cal. — Estrin   v.    Superior   Court 
in  and  for  Sacramento  County,  96 
iP.2d  340,   14   Cal.Sd   670— Pedro  v. 
Scares,  64  P.2d  776,  18  Cal.App.23 
600. 

La.— Clesi  v.  National  Life  &  Acci- 
dent Ins.  Co.,  App.,  193  So.  89 7t 
affirmed  197  So.  413,  195  La.  736.. 

Minn. — La  Rue  Iron  Mining  Co.  v. 
Village  of  Nashwauk,  222  N.W.. 
527,  176  Minn.  117. 

Tex. — Duncan  v.  Green,  Civ.App.t. 
113  S.W.2d  656,  error  dismissed. 

33  C.J.  p  1146  notes  89,  92^5}  C.J., 
p  270  note  35. 

32.  Cal. — Estrin   v.   (Superior  Court, 
in  and  for  Sacramento  County,  96; 
P.2d  540,   14   Cal.2d   670 — Zumwalt 
v.  Hargrave,  App.,  162  P.2d  957 — 
Davis   v.   -Stewart,    127   P.2d   1014,. 
53   CaLApp.2d.  439— York  v.   Beck.. 
App.,  118  P.2d  316— Martin  v.  Pa- 
cific  Southwest   Royalties,   106  P. 
2d    44-3,    41    Cal.App.2d    161 — Allen 
v.     California    Mut.     Building    &- 


§  49 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S 


not  be  confined  to  the  relief  demanded  is  merely  to 
relieve  plaintiff  from  any  technical  objection  that 
he  has  not  prayed  for  the  precise  relief  to  which,  on 
the  trial,  he  may  seem  entitled;  and  the  relief  to  be 
granted  must  still  conform  to,  and  be  consistent 
with,  the  case  made  by  the  pleadings  and  proof.83 
A  demurrer  has  been  held  not  an  answer  within  the 
meaning  of  such  a  statute;34  but  there  is  also  au- 
thority to  the  contrary.35  Defendant's  election  to 
stand  on  the  sufficiency  of  his  answer,  after  a  de- 
murrer thereto  has  been  sustained,  is  not  equiva- 


lent to  withdrawal  of  the  answer,  with  respect  to 
whether  or  not  relief  may  be  granted  exceeding 
that  demanded  by  the  complaint** 

Prayer  for  general  relief.  Where  «a  prayer  for 
general  relief  is  added  to  the  demand  of  specific 
relief,  the  court  is  not  limited  to  the  specific  de- 
mand, but  may  grant,  particularly  under  code  prac- 
tice, such  other  appropriate  relief  as  may  be  con- 
sistent with  the  allegations  and  proofs  and  neces- 
sary to  adjust  fully  the  equities  of  the  case,37  at 


Loan  Ass'n,  104  P.2d  851,  40  Cal. 
App.2d  374 — Pedro  v.  Scares,  64  P. 
2d  776,  18  Cal.App.2d  600— Sam- 
uels v.  Singer,  86  P.2d  1098,  1  Cal. 
App.2d  545,  amended  and  rehear- 
ing denied  37  P.2d  1050,  1  Cal.App. 
2d  545— «intzel  v.  Wagner,  6  P.2d 
29*,  119  CaLApp.  335— Murdock  v. 
Fisher  Finance  Corporation,  251  P. 
319,  7-9  CaLApp.  787-^Takovich  v. 
Romer,  240  P.  39,  74  CaLApp.  333. 
Idaho.— Schlieff  v.  BIstline,  15  P.2d 

726,  52  Idaho  35*3. 

3STev.— Buaas  v.  Buaas,  147  P.2d  495, 
62  Nev.  232 — Keyes  v.  Nevada  Gas 
Co.,  38  P.2d  661,  55  Nev.  431. 
N.C. — Simms  v.   Sampson,   20  S.B.2d 

55*.  221  N.C.  «79. 

N.D. — Jacobson  v.  Mutual  Ben. 
Health  &  Accident  Ass'n,  296  N.W, 
545,  70  N.D.  566. 

Tex. — Hubb  Diggs  Co.  v.  Fort  Worth 
State  Bank,  298  8.W.  419,  117  Tex 
107. 
33  C.J.  p  1146  note  91,  p  1150  note  6 

—51  C.J.  p  270  note  38. 
"Issue" 

Word  "issue,"  as  used  in  statute 
providing  that  court  may  grant 
plaintiff  any  relief  embraced  within 
issue,  is  broader  than  complaint, 
where  answer  enlarges  the  same  by 
introducing  new  matter. — 'McAllister 
v.  Union  Indemnity  Co.,  42  P.2d  305, 
2  Cal.2d  457. 

Granting  divorce  on  complaint  ask- 
ing separation 

Even  though  husband's  complaint 
asked  only  for  separation  and  gen- 
eral relief,  and  no  statute  permits 
him  to  bring  separation  action,  yet, 
where  it  alleged  acts  of  cruelty  en- 
titling him  to  divorce,  it  was  held 
sufficient  for  that  purpose,  on  de- 
fendant answering. — Slettebak  v. 
Slettebak,  201  N.W.  716,  48  S.D.  51. 

33.  Ky.— Perkins   v.    Hardwick,    121 
S.W.24  20,  275  Ky.  182. 

33  C.J.  p  1146  note  90. 

34.  Nev.— Mariner  v.  Milisch,  200  P. 
478,  45  Nev.  193. 

33  C.J.  p  1148  note  96. 

35.  N.T.— Pearce  v.  Knapp,  127  N.Y. 
S.  1100,  71  Misc.  324. 

Wis.— Tiles  v.  Green,  64  N.W.  856, 
91  Wis.  217. 

3$.    Wis. — Numbers  v.  Union  Mortg. 


Loan  Co..  247  N.W.  442,  211  Wis. 
30. 

37.  Ark.— Realty  Inv.  Co.  v.  Hig- 
gins,  91  S.W.2d  1030,  192  Ark.  423 
— Morgan  v.  Scott-Mayer  Commis- 
sion Co.,  48  S.W.2d  838,  185  Ark. 
637. 

Cal. — Martin  v.  Hall,  26  P.2d  288,  219 
Cal.  334— Knox  v.  Wolfe,  App.,  167 
P.2d  3— Rinker  v.  McKinley,  149  P. 
2d  859,  65  Cal.App.2d  109— Brskine 
v.  Upham,  132  P.2d  219,  56  Cal. 
App.2d  235 — Sonnicksen  v.  Son- 
nicksen,  113  P.2d  495,  45  Cal.App. 
2d  46. 

Fla. — Semple  v.  -Semple,  105  So.  134, 
90  Fla.  7. 

Ga. — Taylor  v.  Cureton,  25  S.E.2d 
815,  196  Ga.  28— Matson  v.  Crowe, 
19  <S.E.2d  288,  195  Ga.  578— Bleck- 
ley  v.  Bleckley,  5  S.R2d  206,  189 
Ga.  47 — Bowers  v.  Dolen,  1  S.E.2d 
734,  187  Ga,  653-^Monroe  v.  Dia- 
mond Match  Co.,  185  S.E.  814,  182 
Ga.  438 — Sanders  v.  Jones,  142  S. 
E.  680,  166  Ga.  18-6— Broderick  v. 
Reid,  1«9  S.B.  18,  164  Ga.  474. 

Idaho. — Barker  v.  McKellar,  296  P. 
196,  50  Idaho  226. 

111.— Updike  v.  Smith,  39  N.B.2d  325, 
378  111.  600 — Browning  v.  Brown- 
ing, 46  N.E.2d  101,  317  IlLApp. 
372,  transferred,  see  39  N.E.2d 
375,  379  HI.  29— Kaifer  v.  Kaifer, 
3  N.E.2d  886,  286  IlLApp.  433. 

Iowa. — Wagner  v.  Northern  Securi- 
ties Co.,  284  N.W.  461,  226  Iowa 
568. 

Kan.— Katschor  v.  Ley,  113  P.2d  127, 
153  Kan.  569. 

Ky.—Bevins  v.  Ford,  194  «S.W.2d  657, 
302  Ky.  346— National  Savings  & 
Building  Ass'n  v.  Hutchinson,  144 
S.W.2d  1029,  284  Ky.  408— Dotson 
v.  Peoples  Bank,  27  iS.W.2d  673, 
234  Ky.  138. 

La. — Abadie  v.  Gluck's  Restaurant 
Corporation,  121  So.  757,  168  La. 
241 — Lyons  Planning  Mills  v. 
Guillot,  App.,  146  So.  700— Harris 
v.  Henderson  Land,  Timber  &  In- 
vestment Co.,  119  So.  893,  9  La. 
App.  279. — Buckley  v.  Lindsey  Mer- 
cantile Co.,  5  La.  App.  467 — De 
Bellevue  v.  Couvillion,  3  La.App. 
568 — Levy  v.  Ebeyer  &  Winteler, 
3  La.App.  500. 

Mass.— J.  Abrams  &  Co.  v.  Clark,  11  I 
N.EL2d  449,  298  Mass.  542— Har-l 

114 


vey  v.  Crooker,  166  N.E.  828,  267 
Mass.  279. 

Mich. — People's  Mortg.  Corporation 
v.  Wilton,  208  N.W.  60,  234  Mich. 
252. 

Mo. — Homan  v.  Employers  Reinsur- 
ance Corporation,  136  S.W.Sd  289, 
•345  Mo.  650,  127  A.L.R.  163— Rains 
v.  Moulder,  90  S.W.2d  81,  338  Mo. 
275 — State  Bank  of  Willow 
Springs  v.  Lillibridge,  293  S.W. 
116,  316  Mo.  968— Breit  v.  Bow- 
land,  App.,  127  S.W.2d  71 — Cun- 
ningham v.  Kinnerk,  74  S.W.2d 
1107,  2-30  Mo.App.  749— Kreger 
Glass  Co.  v.  Kreger,  App.,  49  S.W. 
2d  260. 

Mont. — Torelle.  v.  Templeman,  21  P. 
2d  60,  94  Mont.  149. 

Neb. — Van  Steenberg  v.  Nelson,  22 
N.W.2d  414 — Johnson  v.  Radio 
station  W  O  W,  14  N.W.2d  666, 
144  Neb.  406,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  Radio  Station  WOW 
v.  Johnson,  65  SjCt  1475,  326  tT.S. 
120,  89  L.Ed.  2092,  mandate  con- 
formed to  19  N.W.2d  £53,  -motion 
denied  66  S.Ct.  11— School  Dist. 
No.  70,  Red  Willow  County,  v. 
Wood,  13  N.W.2d  153,  144  Neb.  241 
— Copass  v.  Wilborn,  296  N.W.  565, 
1-39  Neb.  124— Hilton  v.  Clements, 
291  N.W.  483,  137  Neb.  791,  138 
Neb.  143 — Burnham  v.  Bennison, 
236  N.W.  745,  121  Neb.  291. 

OkL— Tucker  v.  Porter,  72  OP.2d  388, 
181  OkL  30— Brown  v.  Privette, 
234  P.  577,  109  Okl.  1— Owens  v. 
Purdy,  217  P.  425,  90  Okl.  256. 

Or.— McCredie  v.  McCredie,  294  P. 
361,  134  Or.  517 — Kerschner  v. 
Smith,  256  P.  195,  121  Or.  469 — 
Wm.  H.  Taylor  Finance  Corpora- 
tion v.  Oregon  Logging  &  Timber 
Co.,  241  P.  388,  116  Or.  440. 

Tex. — Starr  v.  Ferguson,  166  S.W.2d 
1-30,  140  Tex.  80 — George  v.  Wil- 
liamson, Com. App.,  23  S.W.2d  675 
— 'Morris  v.  Biggs  &  Co.,  Civ.App., 
165  S.W.2d  915,  error  dismissed — . 
Railroad  Commission  of  Texas  v. 
Royal  Petroleum  Corporation,  Civ. 
App.,  93  S.W.2d  761,  error  dismiss- 
ed— Great  Southern  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Williams,  Civ.App.,  77  S.W.2d 
900— Blair  v.  Bird,  Civ.App.,  20 

'  S."V^.2d  8"43 — Sabens  v.  Cochrum, 
Civ.App.,  292  S.W.  281— Hinn  v. 
Forbes,  Civ.App.,  264  S.W.  190— 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  49 


least  where  a  defense  has  been  made.88  A  general 
prayer  for  relief  is  not,  however,  a  coverall,3^  and 
even  under  such  a  prayer  the  court  cannot  grant  re- 
lief inconsistent  with,  or  entirely  different  from, 
that  which  is  specifically  prayed  for,40  or  which  is 


beyond  or  inconsistent  with  the  allegations  of  the 
pleadings  or  the  facts  proved.41 

Materiality  of  variance.  A  material  variance  be- 
tween the  relief  sought  and  that  awarded  has  been 
held  fatal  to  the  judgment;42  but  it  is  otherwise 
where  the  variance  is  immaterial  and  so  slight  that 


Mima  v.  Hunken,  Civ.App..  262 
S.W.  930,  error  dismissed  Nation- 
al Compress  Co.  v.  Hamlin,  269 
S.W.  1024,  114  Tex.  375— Coward 
v.  Booth,  Civ.App.,  251  S.W.  650, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Booth 
v.  Coward,  Com.App.t  265  S.W. 
1026. 
Utah.— Walker  v.  Singleton,  225  P. 

81,  63  Utah  283. 

W.Va. — Bowman  v.  Hartford  Fire 
Ins.  Co.,  169  S.E.  443,  113  W.Va, 
784. 

33  C.J.  p  1148  note  3—42  C.J.  p  143 
note   57—47   C.J.   p  430   note  71— 
51  C.J.  p  271  notes  42,  43. 
Belief    allowable    in    equity    under 
prayer  for  general  relief  see  Equi- 
ty §  607  b. 
Avoidance  of  circuit?  of  action 

Under  prayer  for  general  relief, 
court  may  render  such  judgment  as 
would  be  given  in  new  suit  to  avoid 
circuity  of  action. — Harsh  v.  Avegno, 
3  La.App.  294. 

Judgment    for   possession   in   eject- 
ment action 

There  may  be  a  judgment  for  pos- 
session in  an  ejectment  action  al- 
though there  is  no  specific  prayer 
therefor,  where  the  complaint  con- 
tains proper  averments,  a  general 
prayer  for  relief,  and  there  is  a 
finding  for  possession. — Evans  v. 
Schafer,  21  N.E.  448,  119  Ind.  49. 
Cancellation  of  instruments  and  res- 
titution of  money  paid 
In  suit  by  vendee  for  rescission 
of  a  contract  of  purchase  of  land,  a 
prayer  for  general  relief  was  held 
to  justify  decree  of  canceling  con- 
tract and  notes  and  ordering  restitu- 
tion of  the  money  paid  by  purchas- 
er on  the  property. — Loughry  v. 
Cook,  Tex.Civ.App.,  2fr3  S.W.  333. 

88.  Ky. — Perkins  v.  Hardwick,  121 
S.W.2d  20,  275  Ky.  182— Hickman 
County  Board  of  Drainage  Com'rs 
v.  Union  Stock  Land  Bank,  8*3  S. 
W.2d  511,  259  Ky.  823— Young  v. 
Barnett,  80  S.W.2d  16,  258  £y.  330 
— Lincoln  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Ar- 
nold, 75  S.W.2d  751,  256  Ky.  80-r- 
Farley  v.  Gibson,  30  S.W.2d  876, 
235  Ky,  164. 

La. — Muse  v.  Sharp,  App.,  155  So. 
300. 

Mo. — Southwest  Pump  &  Machinery 
Co.  v.  Forslund,  29  S.W.2d  165, 
225  Mo.App.  262. 

39.  Ky. — Oawood        v.        Cawood's 
Adm'x,  147  S.W.2d  88,  285  Ky.  201. 

40.  U.S. — In  re  Wesley  Corporation, 
D.C.Ky.,  18  FJSupp.  347.  ,  \ 


Ga.— Brockett  v.  Maxwell,  35  S.E.2d 
906 — Christopher  v.  Whitmire,  34 
S.E.2d  100,  199  Ga.  280— Taylor 
v.  Cureton,  25  S.R2d  815,  196 
Ga.  28. 

Iowa.— Davis  v.  Davis,  229  N.W.  855, 
209  Iowa  1186; 

Ky.-JCawood  v.  Cawood's  Adm'x, 
147  S.W.2d  88,  285  Ky.  201— Jame- 
son v.  Jameson,  133  S.W.2d  923, 
280  Ky.  554. 

La, — Stubbs  v.  Imperial  Oil  &  Gas 
Products  Co.,  114  So.  595,  164  La. 

.  689. 

Or.— Wm.  H.  Taylor  Finance  Corpo- 
ration v.  Oregon  Logging  &  Tim- 
ber Co.,  241  OP.  388,  116  Or.  4'40. 

Tex. — Jennings  v.  Texas  Farm 
Mortg.  Co.,  80  S.W.2d  9-31,  124  Tex. 
593— San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Collins,  Com.App.,  61  S.W.2d  84 
— Ellzey  v.  Allen,  Civ.App.,  172 
S.W.2d  70*3,  error  dismissed — Tabb 
v.  City  of  Mt.  Pleasant,  Civ.App.. 
12  S.W.2d  831— Vanlandingham  v. 
Terry,  Civ. App.,  293  S.Wt  252. 

Va.— Winston  v.  Winston,  130  S.B. 
784,  144  Va.  848. 

33  C.J.  p  1149  note  4. 

Specific  performance  in  suit  for  re- 
scission 

A  purchaser  of  land  whose  suit 
for  rescission  and  recovery  of  pur- 
chase price  was  barred  was  not  en- 
titled to  specific  performance  under 
his  prayer  for  general  relief,  since 
right  to  specific  performance  was 
inconsistent  with  right  to  rescind 
and  might  depend  on  wholly  differ- 
ent facts.— Wall  v.  Zynda,  278  N.W. 
66,  283  Mich.  260,  114  A.L.H.  1521. 

41.  U.S. — In  re  Wesley  Corporation, 
DJC.Ky.,  18  F.Supp.  347. 

Cal. — -Morrow  v.  Morrow,  105  P.2d 
129,  40  Cal.App.2d  474— Petition 
of  Furness,  218  P.  61,  62  CaLApp. 
753. 

Ga. — Comstock  v.  Tarbush,  37  S.B. 
2d  148,  transferred  see,  APP-.  37 
S.E.2d  -925— Christopher  v.  Whit- 
mire,  34  S.B.2d  100,  199  Ga.  280— 
Taylor  v.  Cureton,  25  S.B.2d  815, 
196  Ga.  28. 

Ind. — Denney  v.  Peters,  10  N.B.2d 
754,  104  Ind.App.  504. 

Iowa. — Manassa  v.  Garland,  206  N. 
W.  38,  200  Iowa  1129. 

Ky.—Cawood  v.  Cawood's  Adm'x,  147 
S.W.2d  88,  285  Ky.  201— Jameson 
v.  Jameson,  133  S.W.2d  923,  280 
Ky.  554. 

Mass. — Harbour  v.  Sampson,  165  K. 
B.  14,  266  Mass.  180. 

Minn. — Briggs    v.    Kennedy    Mayon- 

115 


naise  Products,  297  N.W.  342,  209 
Minn.  312. 

Miss. — Kennington-Saenger  Theatres 
v.  State  ex  rel.  Dist.  Atty.,  18  So. 
2d  483,  196  Miss.  841,  153  A.L.H. 
883. 

Mo.— Barlow  v.  Scott,  85  S.W.2d 
504— Fielder  v.  Fielder,  App.,  6  S. 
W.2d  968. 

Nev.— Buaas  v.  Buaas,  147  P.2d  495, 
62  Nev.  232. 

Or. — Wm.  H.  Taylor  Finance  Corpo- 
ration v.  Oregon  Logging  &  Tim- 
ber Co.,  241  P.  388,  116  Or.  440. 

Tenn.— Merritt  v.  Merritt,  10  Tenn. 
App.  369. 

Tex. — Starr  v.  Ferguson,  166  S.W.2d 
130,  140  Tex.  80— Verschoyle  v. 
Holifield,  123  S.W.Sd  878,  132  Tex. 
516 — Adleson  v.  B.  F.  Dittmar  Co., 
80  S.W.2d  939,  124  Tex.  564— Jen- 
nings v.  Texas  Farm  Mortg.  Co., 
80  S.W.2d  9/31,  124  Tex.  593— Ar- 
rington  v.  McDaniel,  14  S.W.2d 
1009,  questions  answered  25  S.W. 
2d  295,  119  Tex.  148. 

51  C.J.  p  271  note  41. 

'specific  performance  in  suit  to  quiet 

title 

Prayer  for  general  relief  in  peti- 
tion to  quiet  title  containing  no  al- 
legation for  affirmative  equitable  re- 
lief does  not  authorize  judgment  for 
specific  performance. — Congregation 
B'Nai  Abraham  v.  Arky,  20  S.W.2d 
899,  323  Mo.  776. 

Personal  Judgment  in   stockholder's 

representative  action 
"General  relief"  in  a  representa- 
tive action  by  a  stockholder  does  not 
comprehend  a  personal  judgment  In 
favor  of  stockholder  against  corpo- 
ration based  on  debt  or  other  liabil- 
ity either  as  part  of  his  cause  of 
action  against  corporation  entitling 
him  to  sue  as  its  representative  or 
the  corporation's  cause  of  action 
against  the  wrongdoer. — Briggs  v. 
Kennedy  Mayonnaise  Products/  297 
N.W.  342,  209  Minn.  312. 

Foreclosure  of  lien  in  tort  action 

Under  prayer  for  general  relief  in 
action  based  on  alleged  tort  and 
wherein  relief  sought  was  by  way 
of  damages,  plaintiff  was  held  not 
entitled  to  foreclosure  of  lien,  where 
there  was  no  alternative  prayer  for 
foreclosure. — McKee  v*  Mathias,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  83  S.W.2d  744,  error  dis- 
missed. 

42.  HL— Condit  v. 'Stevenson,  13  111. 
App.  417.  . 


§  49 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


plaintiff  would  be  permitted  to  amend  at  any  time 
without  costs.48 

Alternative  relief.  A  judgment  for  alternative 
relief  is  sometimes  proper  where  demanded,44  but  it 
is  not  proper  if  not  asked  for  in  the  pleadings.45 
Where  relief  on  two  counts  is  sought  in  the  alterna- 
tive, it  has  been  held  that  judgment  should  not  be 
rendered  on  both  counts.4* 

b.  Affirmative  Belief  to  Defendant 

In  general,  an  answer  which  has  demanded  no  af- 
firmative relief,  such  as  an  answer  setting  up  merely  a 
defense,  will  not  support  a  judgment  granting  affirma- 
tive relief  to  the  defendant.  On  proper  pleadings  and 
proof,  however,  a  defendant  may  have  affirmative  re* 
lief  in  accordance  with  that  demanded  by  him. 


It  is  a  general  rule  that  where  the  answer  prays 
for  no  affirmative  relief,  defendant  can  have  none, 
and  a  judgment  granting  affirmative  relief  in  such 
cases  is  erroneous  because  not  in  conformity  with 
the  issues  raised  by  the  pleadings.4*  An  answer 
which  sets  up  merely  a  defense  will  not  support  a 
judgment  giving  defendant  affirmative  relief  ;4$  but 
the  fact  that  pleadings  are  defensive  in  their  nature 
does  not  mean  that  they  may  not  also  be  used  as  a 
basis  for  affirmative  relief,  where  the  facts  pleaded 
are  sufficient  to  entitle  the  pleader  to  affirmative  re- 
lief, and  where  there  is  a  prayer  for  such  relief.49 
An  affirmative  judgment  for  defendant  is  proper 
where  it  is  justified  by  the  pleadings  and  proof,50 
particularly  under  codes  and  practice  acts  provid- 


43.  Mass. — Hargrave     v.     American 
Steel  &  Wire  Co.,  106  N.E.  637,  219 
Mass.  6. 

33  C.J.  p  1145  note  87. 

44.  Okl. — Steiner    v.    TTrquart,    225 
P.  695,  99  Okl.  60. 

45.  Tex. — Jennings  v.   Texas   Farm 
Mortg.    Co.,    80    S.W.2d    931,     124 
Tex,  593. 

46.  Mo. — Schroll   v.   Noe,   App.,    297 
S.W.    99*9,   Quashal   of  opinion  de- 
nied State  ex  rel.  Noe  v.  Cox,  19 
S.W.2d  695,  323  Mo.  520. 

Ohio. — Priller  v.  Auglaize  Hotel  Co., 
App.,  36  N.E.2d  1019.  , 

47.  Conn. — Switzer  v,  Turansky,  124 
A.  720,  101  Conn.  60. 

Ga, — Greenwood  v.  Greenwood,  160 
S.E.  392,  173  Ga.  348. 

Iowa. — Liscomb  IS  tat  e  Sav.  Bank  v. 
Leise,  207  N.W.  330,  201  Iowa  353. 

Kan. — Burgner-Bowman  Lumber  Co. 
v.  McCord-Kistler  Mercantile  Co., 
216  P.  815,  114  Kan.  10,  35  A-L.R. 
242. 

gy.— Jacobs  T,  Wells,  111  S.W.2d 
5?4,  271  Ky.  82 — Dunn  v.  Cham- 
pion, 99  S.W.2d  813,  266  Ky.  757. 

La. — David  v.  Guilbeau,  App.,  180  So. 
850— Stafford  v.  Tolmas  Realty 
Co.,  App.,  146  So.  61,  transferred, 
see  139  So.  766,  174  La.  83— Hal- 
pern  v.  Cornelison,  133  So.  898, 
16  La.App.  344. 

Mich.— McCaslin  v.  Schouten,  292  N. 
W.  696,  294  Mich.  180— Reich  Y. 
Schmidt,  218  N.W.  671,  242  Mich. 
130. 

Miss. — Hayes  v.  National  Surety  Co., 
153  So.  515,  169  Miss.  676. 

Mo.— Friedel  v.  Bailey,  44  S.W.2d 
9,  '32-9  Mo. '22— «3tate  ex  rel.  Dura- 
flor  Products  Co.  v.  Pearcy,  29  S. 
W.2d  83,  32.5  Mo.  835— Chilton  v. 
Chilton,  App.,  297  S.W.  457. 

N.T. — Studebaker  .Corporation  of 
America  v.  Silverberg,  199  N.Y.S. 
190. 

Okl. — Reinauer  v.  Davis,  130  P.2d 
91,  191  Okl.  366. 

Pa. — The  Maccabees  v.  Cappas,  43  A. 
2d  538,  157  Pa.Super.  481. 


R.I.— Si-ravo  v.  Whitman,  151  A.  893, 

51  R.L  102. 
Tex. — Smith    v.    Blancas,     Civ.App., 

87     S.W.2d    781,     error    refused— 

Gaulden   v.   Antone,    Civ.App.,    279 

iS.W.    560 — Chapman    v.    Sunshine 

Oil   Corporation,    Civ.App.,    256    S. 

W.  327— Moulton  v.  Deloach,  Civ. 

App.,  253  S.W.  303. 
33  C.J.  p  1150  notes  8,  9. 
Abandonment  of  cross  action 

Where  cross  action  was  set  up  in 
original  ,  and  second  amended  an- 
swer, but  not  mentioned  in  subse- 
quent amended  answers,  such  cross 
action  was  abandoned,  and  judgment 
in  favor  of  cross  defendant  on  his 
cross  action  was  erroneous. — Hink- 
ley  v.  Brewer,  Tex.CivJV.pp.,  274  S.W. 
227. 
Overpayments 

In  an  action  for  the  balance  due 
on  the  purchase  price  of  property,  or 
on  a  contract,  defendant  cannot  re- 
cover an  overpayment  which  the 
evidence  shows  he  made,  where  he 
has  not  interposed  a  counterclaim 
or  asked  for  such  relief. 
Ky. — Runyon  v.  Runyon,  251  S.W. 

173,  199  Ky.  878. 
Tex.— Branch  v.  Smith,  Civ.App..  245 

S.W.  799. 

Pailure  of  plaintiff  to  appear  at 
the  trial  does  not  warrant  affirma- 
tive relief  in  favor  of  defendant 
where  there  is  no  plea  or  other  de- 
fense by  defendant  in  the  nature  of 
a  cross  action  against  plaintiff. — 
Ellard  v.  Simpson,  142  S.E.  855,  166 
Ga.  278. 
33  C.J.  p  1150  note  8  [a]. 

Alternative  reconveutional  demands 
Where  particular  relief  in  recon- 
vention  is  demanded  by  defendant 
only  in  .the  event  that  certain  other 
relief  is  decreed,  and  such  other  re- 
lief is  not  decreed,  the  reccmventdon- 
al  demands  of  defendant,  made  in 
the  alternative,  necessarily  fall  and 
drop  out  of  the  xjase.— Tyson  v.  Surf 
Oil  Co.,  196  So.  336,  195  La.  2-48. 

4&    111.— Whitaker    Paper     Co.     v., 

116 


Galesburg  Mail  Co.,  238  Hl.App. 
600. 

Ind. — Johnson  v.  Collins,  1  Blackf. 
166. 

Tex. — Dean  v.  Maxwell,  Civ.App.,  173 
S.W.2d  246— Scales  r.  Lindsay, 
Civ.App.,  43  S.W.2d  286,  error  dis- 
missed. 

Wash. — City  Bond  &  Share  v.  Kle- 
ment,  5  P.2d  523,  165  Wash.  408. 

Wis.— Marshall  v.  Marshall,  284  N. 
W.  541,  230  Wis.  504. 

33  C.J.  p  1151  note  16. 

49.  Tex. — R.    R.     Stolley    Corpora- 
tion   of   Austin,    Tex.,    v.    Quebe- 
deaux,    Civ.App.,    70    S.W.2d    266, 
error  dismissed. 

50.  Ky. — Wagner  v.  Swoope,   64   S. 
W.2d  395,  246  Ky.  19. 

Mo. — Missouri  Lumber  &  Mining  Co. 
v.  Hassell,  298  S.W.  47 — Brown  v. 
Wilson,  App.,  131  S.W.2d  848, 
quashed  on  other  grounds  State 
ex  rel.  Brown  v.  Hughes,  137  'S.W. 
2d  54*4,  345  Mo.  958*. 
Mont — Mather  v.  Musselman,  278 

P.  998,  85  Mont.  552. 
Okl.— Watts  v.  Meriwether,   84  P.2d 

643,  184  Okl.  (32. 
S.C.— Little  v.  Rivers,  185  S.E.  174, 

180  S.C.  149. 

Tex — Bustamante    v.    Haynes,    Civ. 
App.,    55    S.W.2d    137,    error    dis- 
missed— Ruby  v.   Davis,   Civ.App., 
277  S.W.  430. 
33  C.J.  p  1150  note  10. 
Accounting- 

Defendant  may  be  entitled  to  an 
accounting,  notwithstanding  the  ab- 
sence of  a  demand  therefor  in  his 
pleading,  where  the  circumstances 
warrant  an  accounting  and  defend- 
ant has  been  led  to  believe  through- 
out the  trial  that  an  accounting 
would  be  had. — Pearson  v.  Juarez, 
248  P.  278,  78  CaLApp.  122. 
Damages 

(1)  In  a  proper  case,  damages 
may  be  awarded  to  defendant  al- 
though he  has  not  specifically 
prayed  for  such  relief. 
ArK.— Albersen  v.  Klanke.  6  S.W.2d 
292,  177  Ark.  288. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  50 


ing  that  the  judgment  may  grant  to  defendant  any 
affirmative  relief  to  which  he  may  be  entitled.51 
Ordinarily  a  judgment  granting  defendant  affirma- 
tive relief  must  be  founded  on,  and  be  responsive 
to,  his  pleadings,  and  cannot  rest  on  the  pleading 
of  some  other  party;52  but  a  defendant  may  some- 
times have  affirmative  relief  against  a  codefendant 
notwithstanding  he  has  served  no  pleading  enti- 
tling him  to  such  relief,  where  the  facts  justifying 
such  relief  are  set  forth  in  the  complaint.53 

In  general,  any  affirmative  relief  to  a  defendant 
should  be  in  conformity  with  that  demanded  by 
him.54  The  prayer  for  relief,  however,  does  not 
necessarily  determine  the  relief  to  which  defendant 
is  entitled,55  and  under  some  circumstances  defend- 


ant's failure  to  ask  for  affirmative  relief  will  not 
preclude  final  adjudication  of  the  respective  rights 
of  the  parties.56 

§  50.    Limitation  and  Conformity  to  Is- 
sues 

Judgments  ordinarily  must  be  responsive  to  the  Is- 
sues presented  in  the  pleadings,  and  it  has  frequently 
been  held  that  Judgments  beyond  such  issues  are  void. 
The  issues  may  be  broadened  by  consent  of  the  parties, 
however,  in  which  case  the  judgment  may  embrace  the 
issues  actually  litigated. 

Judgments  must  be  responsive  to  the  issues  pre- 
sented in  the  pleadings  or  litigated  between  the  par- 
ties, and  issues  not  so  raised  may  not  be  deter- 
mined.57 Where  there  are  several  good  pleas  in 


Ind. — Yellow  Mfg.  Acceptance  Cor- 
poration v.  Linsky,  192  N.E.  715, 
99  Ind.App.  691. 

(2)  Defendant's  right  to  recover 
damages  may  be  settled  in  same  ac- 
tion in  which  plaintiff  asserts  right 
to  damages  against  defendant,  when 
both  claims  Involve  determination 
of  same  questions  of  fact  and  con- 
sideration of  same  evidence,  whether 
or  not  cross  action  is  involved. — Op- 
pie  v.  Bay,  195  N.B.  81,  208  Ind. 
450. 
Counterclaim  as  sole  defense 

Where  a  counterclaim  is  the  only 
defense  set  up,  a  judgment  for  de- 
fendant must  necessarily  allow  the 
counterclaim. — Wise  v.  Rosenblatt, 
12  N.Y.S.  288,  16  Daly  496. 

51.  N.Y. — Clegg  v.  American  News- 
paper Union,   60  How.Pr.  498,  af- 
firmed 82  Hun  162,  66  HowJPr.  411. 

33  C.J.  p  1151  note  15. 

52.  Tex.— Lee  v.   British  &  Ameri- 
can- Mortg.  Co.,   40  S.W.   1041,    16 
Tez.Civ.App.  671. 

83  C.J.  p  1151  note  14. 

53.  S.C. — Toumans  v.  Toumans.  121 
S.E.  674,  128  S.C.  31. 

admission    of    allegations    of    com- 
plaint 

In  action  by  insured  on  policy  con- 
taining5 provision  that  any  loss 
was  payable  to  mortgagee  as  his 
interest  might  appear,  mortgagee, 
who  was  made  party  defendant  and 
filed  answer  admitting  allegations  of 
complaint,  was  entitled  to  propor- 
tionate share  of  insurer's  liability 
notwithstanding  his  failure  to  file 
affirmative  pleading  or  prayer  for 
affirmative  relief,  since  judgment 
was  bar  to  any  further  right  mort- 
gagee .  might  assert — Commercial 
Union  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York  v. 
Wade,  8  N.E.2d  1009,  103  Ind.App. 
461. 

54.  La.— Succession     of     Markham, 
156  So.  225,  180  La.  211. 

Tex. — Wilkirson  v.  Yarbrough,  Com. 
App.f  257  S.W.  535— Golden  West 


Oil  Co.  No.  1  v.  Golden  Rod  Oil 
Co.  No.  1,  Civ.App.,  285  S.W.  631, 
affirmed  Golden  Hod  Oil  Co.  No.  1 
v.  Golden  West  Oil  Co.  No.  1,  Com. 
App.,  293  S.W.  167. 
Failure  to  demur  to  or  answer 

counterclaim 

Plaintiff,  although  not  having  filed 
any  demurrer  or  answer  to  counter- 
claim, could  attack  those  portions  of 
final  decree  granting  relief  on  coun- 
terclaim beyond  scope  of  the  plead- 
ings, since,  even  if  counterclaim 
had  been  taken  for  confessed,  it 
would  not  support  a  decree  beyond 
scope  of  relief  sought. — Medlinsky 
v.  Premium  Cut  Beef  Co.,  57  N.B.2d 
31,  317  Mass.  25. 
Possession  granted  tinder  prayer  for 

general  relief 

Defendant's  claim  of  ownership  of 
house,  with  prayer  for  general  re- 
lief, was  held  sufficient  to  sustain 
Judgment  for  its  possession. — Olcott 
v.  Reese,  Tex.Civ.App.,  291  S.W.  261. 
In  ejectment,  where  the  court  finds 
for  defendant  on  all  the  issues  a 
decree  should  be  entered  as  prayed 
in  the  answer. — Chouteau  Land  & 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Chrisman,  72  S.W. 
1062,  172  Mo.  610— 19"  C.J.  P  1210 
note  25. 

55.  Mo. — Eckhardt    v.    Bock,    App., 
159  S.W.2d  395. 

T.Y. — Home   Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Klein. 
25  N.Y.S.2d  215. 

56.  Wash. — Pratt  v.  Rhodes,   253  P. 
640,    142    Wash.    411,    reheard    256 
P.  503,  142  Wash.  411. 

57.  U.S. — Sylvan  Beach  v.  Koch,  C. 
CJLMo.,   140   F.2d  852— Deitrick  v. 
Standard   Surety   &   Casualty   Co. 
of   New   York,   C.C.A.Mass.,    90   P. 
2d   862,  affirmed   58   S.Ct.   696,   303 
TLS.   471,   82   L.Ed.    962,   rehearing 
denied  58   S.Ct.   948,   304  U.S.   588, 
82    L.Ed,    1548 — Goodrich    Transit 
Co.   v.  City  of  Chicago,   C.C.A.I1L, 
4  P.2d  636 — Ortlieb  v.  Baumer,  D. 

,  C.N.Y.,  6  F.Supp.  58. 
Ala.— Pridgen  v.   Shadgett,   12   So.2d 
395,    244   Ala.   167— Alabama  Pow- 

117 


er  Co.  v.  Owens,  181  So.  283,  236 
Ala.  96. 

Ariz. — Wall  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Yavapai  County,  89  (P.2d  624,  53 
Ariz.  344, 

Ark.— Evans  v.  U.  S.  Anthracite  Coal 
Co.,  21  !S.W.2d  952,  180  Ark.  578. 

CaL — Ayoob  v.  Ayoob,  App.,  168 
P.2d  462— Hyde  v.  Hagen,  App., 
161  P.2d  242— Berg  v.  Berg,  132  P. 
2d  871.  56  Cal.App.2d  4-95— Wallace 
v.  Otis,  119  «P.2d  195,  47  Cal.App.2d 
814— Dreifus  v.  Marx,  104  P.2d 
10SO,  40  Cal.App.2d  461— Overell  v. 
Overell.  64  »P.2d  483,  18  Cal.App.2d 
•499. 

Conn. — Spitz  v.  Abrams,  20  A.2d  616, 
128  Conn.  121 — Hill  v.  Employers' 
Liability  Assur.  Corporation,  188 
A.  277.  122  Conn.  193— O'Hara  v. 
Hartford  Oil  Heating  Co.,  138  A. 
458,  106  Conn.  468. 

Fla. — Gruber  v.  Cobey,  12  So.2d  461, 

152  Fla.  591— East  Coast  Stores  v. 
Cuthbert,  133  So.  863,  101  Pla.  25. 

Hawaii. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pires 
v.  Pires,. 29  Hawaii  849,  852. 

Idaho.— Nielson  v.  Garrett,  43  P.2d 
380,  55  Idaho  240— Angel  v.  Mellen, 
285  P.  461,  48  Idaho  750. 

Ind. — Old  First  Nat,  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  Fort  Wayne  v.  Snouffier,  192 
N.E.  369,  99  Ind.App.  325— Fox  v. 
Wallace,  151  N.E.  835,  88  Ind.App. 
235. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ray- 
burn  v.  Maher,  288  N.W.  136,  142, 
227  Iowa  274 — Bennett  v.  Green- 
wait,  286  N.W.  722,  226  Iowa  1113 
— Wagner  v.  Northern  Securities 
Co.,  284  N.W.  461,  226  Iowa  568 
—Fidelity  &  Casualty  Co.  of  New 
York  v.  Bank  of  Plymouth.  237 
N.W.  234,  213  Iowa  1058. 

Kan.— Penn .  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Tittel,  111  P.2d  1116,  153  Kan. 
530,  rehearing  denied  114  P.2d  312, 

153  Kan.  7'47 — Leshure  v.  Zumalt, 
100  P.2d  643,  151  Kan.  737— Baird 
v.  Bureman,  26  P.2d  272,  138  Kan. 
381 — Devlin  v.  City  of  Pleasanton, 
288  P.  595,  130  Kan.  766 — Herring 
v.  Blue  Mound  Mining  Co.,  257  P. 
955,  124  Kan.  171. 


§  50 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


bar  to  the  whole  cause  of  action,  plaintiff  cannot 
recover  unless  he  succeeds  on  all  the  issues.58  A 
judgment  should  not  limit  rights  of  the  parties 
which  are  not  involved  in  the  action  and  which  may 
arise  or  be  interfered  with  in  the  future,  especially 
when  uncertainty  or  confusion  would  result;^  and 
if,  under  the  pleadings,  the  court  is  without  juris- 
diction to  determine  particular  issues,  it  is  without 
jurisdiction  to  reserve  such  issues  for  future  deter- 
mination.60 


A  judgment  on  issues  not  made  by  the  pleadings 
is  at  least  erroneous,  and  may  be  set  aside  or  re- 
versed in  a  proper  proceeding  for  that  purpose  ;W 
but  many  cases  go  further,  and  hold  that  judg- 
ments based  on  issues  not  made  by  the  pleadings  or 
litigated  by  the  parties  are  coram  non  judice  and 
void,  at  least  in  so  far  as  they  go  beyond  such  is- 
sues,'62 on  the  theory  that  a  court  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  pass  on  questions  not  submitted  to  it  for 


Ky.— Newsom  v.  Damron,  193  S.W.2d 

643. 

Mich.— -Ward  v.  Hunter  Machinery 
Co.,  248  N.W.  864.  26i3  Mich.  445. 
Mo.— Brandt  v.  Fanners  Bank  of 
Chariton  County,  182  S.W.2d  281, 
353  Mo.  25$ — Brown  v.  Wilson,  155 
$.W.2d  176,  348  Mo.  658— In  re 
Ermeling's  Estate,  119  S.W.2d  755, 
transferred,  see,  App.,  131  S.W.2d 
912 — Unrig  v.  Hill-Behan  Lumber 
Co.,  110  SS.W.2d  412,  341  Mo.  851— 
Rains  v.  Moulder,  90  S.W.2d  81, 
3.38  Mo.  275 — Davis  v.  Johnson,  58 
S.W.2d  746,  332  Mo.  417.  trans- 
ferred, see,  APP.,  47  S.W.2d  121— 
Friedel  v.  Bailey,  44  S.W.2d  9, 
329  Mo.  22— Congregation  B'Nai 
Abraham  v.  Arky,  20  S.W.2d  899, 
323  Mo.  776— Ex  parte  Fowler,  275 
S.W  529,  310  Mo.  339— Smith  v. 
Smith,  App.,  192  S.W.2d  691,  fol- 
lowed in  192  S.W.2d  700— Riney  v. 
Riney,  App..  117  5S.W.2d  698— 
Burns  v.  Ames  Realty  Co.,  App.,  31 
S.W.2d  274— Fielder  v.  Fielder. 
App.,  6  S.W.2d  968. 
Mont.— Wallace  v.  Goldberg,  231  OP. 

56,  72  Mont.  234. 
Neb. — Bowman    v.    Cobb,    258    N.W. 

535,  128  Neb.  28-9. 

NT. — Helfhat  v.  Whitehouse,  179 
N.E.  493,  258  N.T.  274— Interna- 
tional Photo  Recording  Machines 
v.  Microstat  Corp.,  56  N.T.S.2d 
277,  269  App.Div.  485— In  re  Goe- 
bel's  Estate,  33  N.Y.S.2d  549,  263 
App.Div.  5'1 6— People  v.  Ribas,  276 
N.T.S.  551,  153  Misc.  703. 
Ohio.— Licht  v.  Woertz,  167  NJ3.  614 

32  Ohio  App.  HI. 

Or.— Reed  v.  Hollister,  212  P.  367,  106 

Or    407,  error  dismissed  Hollistei 

v.  Reed,  44  S.Ct.  333,  264  U.S.  599 

68  L.Ed.  869. 

Pa.— Bradford  Gasoline  Co.  v.  Han 

ley  Co.,  173  A.  401,  815  Pa.  441. 
S.C.— Parker    Peanut   Co.   v.    Felder 

34    S.E.2d    488,    207    S.C.   6-3. 
S.D.-^Severson    v.    Bide,    216    N.W 
581,  52  S.D.  20 — Deming  v.  Nelson 
210  N.W.  726,  50  S.D.  .484. 
Tex. — Price  v.   Seiger,   Com.App.,   4 
S.W.2d  729— De  Walt  v.  Universa 
Film  Exchanges,   Civ. App.,   132   S 
W.2d   421,    error   dismissed,   Judg- 
ment   correct — Lewis    v.    Gamble 
Civ.App.,    -113    S.W.2d    659— Texas 
&  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris,  Civ.App 
101  S.W.2d  640,  error  dismissed— 
Owen  v.  King,  Civ-App.,  84  S.W.2 


743,  reversed  on  other  grounds  111 
S.W.2d  695,  130  Tex.  614,  114  A. 
L.R.  859— Mutual  Life  Ins.  Ass'n 
v.  Smelley,  Civ.App.,  68  S.W.2d 
1106— American  Rio  Grande  Land 
&  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Bellman,  Civ. 
App.,  272  S.W.  550. 
Va.— Drewry  v.  Doyle,  20  S.E.2d  54-8, 
179  Va.  715. 


Wash.— Beadle    v.    Barta,    123    P.2d 
761,  13  Wash.2d  67. 
C.J.  p  798  note  65—19  C.J.  p  1210 
note   21 — 33  C.J.  p  1151  notes  17, 
19—42  C.J.  p  1287  note  14. 
"There  is   no  principle  better  es- 
tablished than  what  is  not  juridical- 
y    presented    cannot    be    juridically 
lecided." — Cooke    v.    Cooke,    248    P. 
13,  104,  67  Utah  371. 

Character  of  lane 

Where  pleadings  do  not  raise  is- 
sue, court  should  not  determine 
whether  or  not  lane  over  which 
>laintin?s  claim  means  of  access  is 
jublic  or  private.— ^Lathrop  v.  Gary, 
232  N.W.  $97,  202  Wis.  237. 

Failure  to  demur  will  not  justify 
judgment  on  issue  not  Within  plead- 
ing.— Farnham  v.  Schreiber,  149  A. 
393,  111  Conn.  38. 
Immaterial  or  unsupported  issues 


(1)  The  court  may  ignore  an  im- 
material   issue    in    rendering    judg- 
ment—Walton   v.    Stinson,    Tex.Civ 
App.,   140   S.W.2d  497,  error  refused. 

(2)  In    rendering    judgment    the 
court  may  ignore  an  issue  not  sup- 
ported  by    evidence. — Goff    v.    Jane 
way,   99   S.W.  -602,   30  Ky.L.   705— -28 
C.J.  p  1056  note  55. 

Irrelevant  abstract  queries 

Judgments    may    not    be    founded 
on   issues   outside   the   pleadings   in 
answer  to   solicitation  on  irrelevan 
abstract  legal  queries  propounded  bs 
the    parties    and    argued    in    thei 
briefs.— Raymond     v.      State     Clvi 
Service  Commission,  32  P.2d  331,  10  * 
Colo.  4'58. 

Scope  of  InjTULctive  relief 

In  suit  for  injunction,  growing  ou 
of  labor  dispute,  as  defined  in  stat 
ute,  no  acts  should  be  enjoined  oth 
er  than  those  mentioned  in  the  com 
plaint. — Boise  Street  Car  Co.  v.  Vi 
Avery,  103  P.2d  1107,  61  Idaho  502. 

58.    Ala. — Horan  v.  Gray  &  Dudle 

118 


Hardware  Co.,  48  So.  1029,  159  Ala. 

159. 

3  C.J.  p  1168  note  31. 
9.    Cal.— Cameron  v.  Feather  River 

Forest    Homes,    33    P.2d    884,    189 

CaLApp.  373. 

60.  U.S.— Osage  Oil  &  Refining  Co, 
v.   Continental  Oil  Co.,   C.C.A.Okt, 

34  F.2d  585. 

61.  Conn.— Shaw  v.    Spelke,    147   A. 
675,  110  Conn.  20'8. 

d. — Fisher  v.    Rosander,    151   N.E. 

12,  84  Ind.App.  694. 
owa.— Corpus    Juris    cited   in,   Ray- 
burn  v.  Maher,  288  N.W.  136,  142. 

•227  Iowa  274. 
tfeb. — Green   v.   Axtell   Lumber  Co., 

-213   N.W.    401,    116   Neb.    603. 
Okl. — Bishop  v.  Franks,  107  P.2d  358, 

188   OkL   196 — Holshouser  v.   Hol- 

shouser,  26  P.2d  189,  16-6  Okl.  45. 
Tex.— National   Union   Fire   Ins.   Co. 

of    Pittsburgh    v.    Richards,    Civ. 

App.,    278    -S.W.    488— Williams    v. 

Borchers,  Civ.App.,  244  S.W.  1053. 
33  C.J.  P  1152  note  21. 

62.  U.S. — Corpus     Juris     cited     In 
Osage  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v.  Con- 
tinental  Oil  Co.,   C.'C.A.Okl.,   34   F. 
2d  585,  588. 

Cal.— .Wallace  v.  Otis,  119  P.2d  195, 
47  Cal.App.2d  814. 

Kan. — Southern  Kansas  Stage  Lines 
Co.  v.  Webb,  41  P:2d  1025,  141 
Kan.  476. 

Ky.— Covington  Trust  Co.  of  Cov- 
ington  v.  Owens,  129  S.W.2d  18-6, 
278  Ky.  695— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Dotson  v.  People's  Bank,  27  S.W. 
2d  -673,  674,  234  Ky.  138— Lincoln 
County  Board  of  Education  v. 
Board  of  Trustees  of  Stanford 
Graded  Common  School  Dist,  7 
S.W.2d  499,  225  Ky.  21. 

Mich. — Hartley  v.  A.  I.  Rodd  (Lum- 
ber Co.,  276  N.W.  712,  '2-S2  Mich. 
652. 

Mo.— Riley  v.  La  Font,  174  S.W.2d 
S57— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Weath- 
erford  v.  Spiritual  Christian  Un- 
ion Church,  163  S.W.Sd  916,  918— 
Brown  v.  Wilson,  155  -S.W.2d  176, 
348  Mo.  -658— State  ex  rel.  Fidelity 
&  Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland  v.  Al- 
len, 85  S.W.2d  455— State  ex  reL 
Gatewood  v.  Trimble,  62  S.W.2d 
756,  833  Mo.  207 — -Button  v.  Ander- 
son, 31  S.W.2d  1026,  3-2*  Mo.  304 
— Hecfcer  v.  Bleish,  3  S.W.2d  1008, 
$19  Mo.  149— Brandt  v.  Farmers 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  51 


decision.68  If  the  excessive  part  of  the  judgment 
cannot  be  readily  separated  from  that  which  is  with- 
in the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  by  virtue  of  the 
pleadings  and  proof,  the  entire  judgment  has  been 
held  to  be  void.64 

Issues  broadened  by  consent.  Parties  may,  if 
they  so  elect,  depart  from  the  issues  made  by  the 
pleadings,  and  try  other  questions  relating  to  the 
merits  of  the  controversy  by  consent  or  acquies- 
cence, and  in  such  cases  the  judgment  is  regular 
and  binding  on  them,65  the  court  treating  as  hav- 
ing been  made  the  amendment  which  ought  to  have 
been  made  conforming  the  pleadings  to  the  proof,66 
notwithstanding  no  formal  amendment  of  the  plead- 
ings has  been  filed;67  but  a  mere  agreement  that 
a  pleading  shall  be  amended  in  a  certain  particular 
does  not  alter  the  issues  until  the  amendment  is 
in  fact  made.68 

When  an  issue  is  tried  which  is  not  within  the 
pleadings,  no  duty  rests  on  the  court  to  render  a 
judgment  thereon,  and  a  refusal  or  failure  to  do 
so  is  not  error.69  Mere  stipulations  as  to  the  facts 
of  a  case,  or  the  evidence  of  facts,  cannot  make  a 


case  broader  than  it  appears  by  the  allegations  of 
the  pleadings,  and  do  not  entitle  a  party  to  any  re- 
lief beyond  that  to  which  the  averments  entitle 
him.70  Evidence  which,  although  received  without 
objection,  has  no  legitimate  relation  to  the  issues 
which  form  the  basis  of  the  action,  or  is  in  abso- 
lute conflict  with  the  cause  of  action  which  is  set 
out  in  the  complaint,  may  not  be  deemed  to  sup- 
port a  judgment  at  variance  with  the  pleadings.71 

§  51.    Applications  of  Rules  in  General 

a.  Parties 

b.  Property  affected 

c.  Quieting  title 

d.  Other  applications 

a.  Parties 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Personal  or  representative  capacity 

(1)  In  General 

The  judgment  must  follow  the  pleadings  and  proof 
with  respect  to  the  particular  plaintiffs  and  defendants 
for  and  against  whom  It  Is  rendered. 


Bank  of  Chariton  County,  App., 
177  S.W.2d  667,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  182  S.W.2d  281,  353  Mo. 
259— Dickey  v.  Dickey,  App.,  132 
S.W.2d  1026 — Schell  v.  F.  E.  Ran- 
som Coal  &  Grain  Co.,  App.,  79  S. 
W.2d  543 — Texas  Empire  Pipe 
Line  Co.  v.  Stewart,  App.,  35  S. 
W.2d  627,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  55  S.W.2d  283,  331  Mo. 
'525 — Burns  v.  Ames  Realty  Co., 
App.,  '31  S.W.Sd  274 — Owens  v.  Mc- 
Cleary,  App.,  273  S.W.  145 — Raney 
v.  Home  Ins.  fio.,  246  S.W.  57,  213 
Mo.App.  1. 

!Nev. — Schultz  v.  Mexican  Dam  & 
Ditch  Co.,  224  P.  804,  47  Nev.  453. 

2O. — Trenton  Trust  Co.  v.  Gane,  6 
A.2d  112,  125  N.J.Bd.  389,  affirmed 
8  A.2d  708,  126  N.J.EQ.  273— Hacfc- 
ensack  Trust  Co.  v.  Kelly,  180  A. 
621,  118  N.J.Eq.  587,  affirmed  187 
A.  195,  120  N.J.Ea.  596. 

Okl.— Hinkle  v.  Jones,  -66  P.2d  1073, 
ISO  Okl.  17 — Fuqua  v.  Watson,  46 
P.2d  486,  172  Okl.  624-Oity  of 
Seminole  v.  Fields,  43  P.2d  64,  172 
Okl.  167 — Electrical  Research 
Products  Y.  Haniotis  Bros.,  39  P. 
2d  42,  170  Okl.  150— Winters  v. 
Birch,  36  P.2d  907,  169  Okl.  237-^ 
State  ex  rel.  Shull  v.  Moore,  27  P. 
2d  1048,  167  Okl.  28— Henson  v. 
Oklahoma  State  Bank,  23  P.2d  709, 

165  Okl.    1— Wright    v.    Farmers' 
Nat  Bank  of  Oklahoma  City,  243 
P.    512,    116    Okl.    74— Hoffman   v. 
Webb,  -240   P.   104,    113   Okl.   150— 
Le  Clate  v.  Calls  Him,  233  P.  1087, 

166  Oia  247. 

Or.— Doan  v.  Dean,  300  P.  1027,  136 
Or  £94,  8-6  ULL.R.  79. 


Tex — Edinburg  Irr.  Co.  v.  Ledbetter, 

Civ.App.,    247    S.W.    335,    modified 

on   other   grounds,    Com. App.,    286 

S.W.  185. 

Wis. — Nehring    v.    Niemerowicz,    276 

N.W.  325,  226  Wis.  285. 
33  C.J.  p  1152  note  22—51  C.J.  p  270 

note  26. 

Question  within  court's  general  Ju- 
risdiction 

A  judgment  which  determines  ques- 
tions not  within  the  court's  juris- 
diction, because  not  in  issue,  is  to 
that  extent  void,  although  the  ques- 
tion decided  may  be  within  the  gen- 
eral jurisdiction  of  the  court — Hall- 
gren  v.  Williams,  Neb.,  20  N.W.2d 
499—Patersen  v.  Dethlefs,  2*3  N.W. 
155,  139  Neb.  572. 

63.  Conn. — Corpus    Juris     cited    in 
Spitz  v.  Abrams,  20  A.2d  $16.  6i'7, 
128  Conn.  121. 

33  C.J.  p  1153  note  25. 

64.  OkL— Central    Nat    Oil    Co.    v. 
Continental  Supply  Co.,  249  P*  347, 
119  Okl.  190. 

65.  CaL — Drullinger      v.       Hrskine, 
App.,  163  P.2d  48. 

Conn. — Corpus'  Juris  cited  in  Spitz 
v.  Abrams,  20  A.2d  616,  617,  128 
Conn.  121. 

Ga. — Southern  (Lumber  Co.  v.  Ed- 
wards, 117  S.E.  252,  30  Ga.App. 
223. 

Ky. — Lodge  v.  Williams,  243  S.W. 
1011,  195  Ky.  773. 

La.— W.  J.  &  C.  Sherrouse  v.  Phenix, 
128  So.  536,  14  La.App.  629. 

Mont — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Wal- 
lace v.  Goldberg,  231  P.  56,  57,  72 
Mont  234. 

119 


Neb. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Clark 

v.    Clark,    297   N.W.    661,    $64,   139 

Neb.  446. 

KM.— Davis  v.  Savage,  158  P.2d  851. 
N.T.— Claris    v.    Richards,    183    NJBL 

904,  260  N.T.  419.  ' 

Tenn. — East  Lake  Lumber  Box  Co. 

v.  Simpson,  5  Tenn. App.  51. 
33  C.J.  p  1154  note  56. 
Injection  of  issue  at  own  peril 

Party  who  injects  into  action  is- 
sues not  covered  by  pleadings  does 
so  at  peril  of  any  judgment  he  may 
obtain.— Perez  v.  Wilson,  260  P.  838, 
8-6  C&LApp.  28«. 

68;    U.S. — Reynolds   v.    Stockton,    11 

S.Ct    773,    140    U.S.    254,    35    LJEd. 

464,  27  Abb.N.Cas.,N.Y.,  112. 
Neb. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Clark 

v.   Clark,    297   N.W.    661,    664,   139 

Neb.  446. 
N.M.— In  re  Field's  Estate,  -60  P.2d 

945,  40  N.M.  423. 

67.  OkL — Berglan  v.  Kuhlman,  T7  P. 
2d  47,  182  Okl.  168. 

68.  N.J. — Jones  v.  Davenport  17  A. 
570,  45  N.J.Eq.  77,  reversed  on  oth- 
er   grounds   19    A.    22,    46   N.J.Eq. 
237. 

69.  Neb. — Bowman  v.  Cobb,  253  N. 
W.  535,  128  Neb.  289% 

70.  U.S. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 

Walling     v.      Paramount-Richards 
Theatres,   D.C.La.,  61  F.Supp.  290, 
304. 
CaL— Hicks  v.  Murray,  43  CaL  515. 

71.  CaL — Gwinn  v.  Goldman,  134  P.  • 
2d  915,  54  CaLApp.2d  393. 


§  51 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


The  judgment  must  correspond  with  the  plead- 
ings and  proof  with  respect  to  the  parties  for  and 
against  whom  it  is  rendered.72  A  judgment  for 
plaintiff  alone  cannot  be  sustained  where  the  com- 
plaint or  proof  shows  that  he  is  not  the  sole  owner 
of  the  claim  or  property  involved,  but  that  others 
are  joint  owners  thereof.73  A  judgment  against 
a  defendant  concerning  whom  no  allegations  are 
made  in  the  declaration  or  complaint,  or  against 
whom  no  relief  or  judgment  is  sought,  ordinarily 


is  unauthorized.74  Where  the  complaint  asks  dif- 
ferent relief  as  against  the  different  defendants,  or 
alleges  only  a  partial  liability  on  the  part  of  each 
of  them,  there  cannot  be  a  general  judgment  against 
one  or  all  of  them  for  the  entire  claim  or  demand7^ 
A  judgment  against  a  principal  may  be  proper  on 
allegations  and  proof  of  acts  of  his  agent;76  but 
such  a  judgment  cannot  be  rendered  in  the  absence 
of  any  proof  of  the  alleged  agent's  authority.77 

Under  appropriate  pleadings  and  prayers,  relief 


73.  Ala.— Milbra  v.  Sloss-Shefneld 
Steel  &  Iron  Qo.,  62  So.  176,  182 
Ala.  622,  46  L.R.A.,N.S,,  274. 

111.— Russell  v.  Ortseifen,  54  N.E.2d 
612,  322  IlLApp.  695 — Thomas  v, 
Morris,  41  N.E.2d  990,  314  Ill.App. 
570. 

Iowa, — O.  H.  Dunlap  &  Son  v.  Marek, 
209  N.W.  295. 

Ky. — Universal  Credit  Co.  v.  Hib- 
bard,  117  S.W.2d  583,  273  Ky.  -507 
— Barnett  v.  Robinson,  79  S.W.2d 
699,  2-5S  Ky.  2C5. 

Mont. — Montana  Auto  Finance  Cor- 
poration v.  British  &  Federal  Un- 
derwriters of  Norwich  Union  Fire 
Ins.  Soc.,  232  P.  198,  72  Mont  -69, 
36  A.L.R.  1495. 

N.J.— Kienle  v.  MacFulton,  Inc.,  174 

A.  349,  12  N.J.Misc.  697. 

N.Y.— Kittredge    v.    Grannis,    155   N. 

B.  93,    244    N.T.    182— Wheeler   v. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  of  New  York,  263 
N.Y.S.    272,    237    App.Div.    765,   re- 
versed on  other  grounds  IS 8  N.R 
148,  263  N.Y.  34. 

Or.— Chagnot  v.  Labbe,  69  P.2d  949, 

157  Or.  2'80. 

Tex. — Gillette  Motor  Transport  Co. 
v.  Whitfteld,  Civ.App.,  160  S.W.2d 
290 — Travelers  Ins.  Co.  v.  Key, 
Civ.App.,  146  S.W.2d  £13— Hous- 
ton Oxygen  Co.  v.  Davis,  Civ.App., 
145  S.W.2d  300.  reversed  on  other 
ground*  161  S.W.2d  474,  339  Tex.  1, 
140  A.L.R.  868—- Corpus  Juris  cited 
la  Eil wards  v.  Hatch,  Civ.App.,  106 
S.W.2d  741,  742— Superior  Fire 
•  Ins.  Co.  v.  C.  S.  Lee  Grain  &  Eleva- 
tor Co.,  Civ.App.,  261  S.W.  212— 
Hardin  v.  Palm,  Civ.App.,  253  S. 
W.  94S— Mullin  v.  Nash-El  Paso 
Motor  Co.,  Civ.App.,  2*0  S.W.  472. 
Utah. — Garner  v.  Anderson,  243  P. 

-496,  67  Utah  653. 

33  C.J.  p  1154  note  31,  p  1200  note  19. 
Impropiioty  of  Joint  Judgment 

In  an  action  against  a  bank, 
brought  Jointly  by  two  persons  for 
whom  money  jhad  been  deposited  in 
trust,  where  a  judgment  for  plain- 
tiffs Jointly  would  not  accord  with 
the  proof,  the  fact  that  the  bank  at 
the  trial  made  no  objection  to  the 
Joint  action  cannot  enable  the  court 
to  enter  a  Judgment  which  the  law 
does  not  warrant. — Ellison  v.  New 
Bedford  Five  Cents  Sav.  Bank,  130 
Mass.  48. 


Failure  of  oodefendant  to  file  coun- 
terclaim 

Where  only  one  of  two  codefend- 
ants  has  filed  counterclaim.  Judg- 
ment for  both  defendants  on  coun- 
terclaim is  error  as  to  defendant 
who  did  not  file  any  counterclaim. — 
C.  I.  T.  Corporation  v.  Watkins,  181 
S.E.  270,  208  N.C.  448. 
"Hairs'*  as  Including  "descendants" 

A  pleading  seeking  to  bring  In 
"heirs"  of  certain  persons  as  a  class 
was  held  sufficient  to  make  decree 
binding  on  descendants. — Swoope  T. 
Darrow,  188  So.  879,  £37  Ala.  602. 
Xntervener 

In  suit  to  recover  on  contract 
where  there  was  no  plea  of  inter- 
vention by  an  assignee  who  claimed 
a  sum  to  be  due  him  from  plaintiffs, 
judgment  in  favor  of  plaintiffs  and 
ordering  defendants  to  pay  inter- 
vener  and  deduct  the  amount  from 
that  due  plaintiffs  is  unsupported  by 
pleading. — Home  Ins.  Co.,  New  York, 
v.  Privttt,  Tex.Civ.App.,  120  S.W.2d 
294,  error  dismissed. 

Exemplary   damages  against  princi- 
pal or  sureties 

In  an  action  against  the  principal 
and  sureties  on  a  bond,  a  Judgment 
for  exemplary  damages  against  the 
principal  only  Is  not  erroneous  be- 
cause the  prayer  asked  such  damag- 
es against  principal  and  sureties, 
and  the  verdict  was  general,  where 
such  damages  could  not  be  had 
against  the  sureties. — Emerson  v 
Skidmore,  25  S.W.  671,  7  TexXJiv. 
App.  641. 

Municipal  officials 

Where  owner  of  land  taken  by  city 
brought  action  for  value  thereof 
against  city  officials  In  their  official 
capacity,  without  attempting  to 
state  cause  of  action  against  them 
as  individuals,  and  city  entered  liti- 
gation as  plaintiff  in  consolidated 
condemnation  proceeding,  Judgment 
against  city  and  officers  was  held 
valid  as  against  city,  but  void  on 
face  of  Judgment  roll  in  so  far  as 
purported  to  be  against  individual 
officers. — City  of  Seminole  v.  Fields, 
43  P.2d  64,  172  OkL  167. 

73.    CaL — -Woodson  v.  Torgerson,  291 

P.  663,  108  Cal.App.  386. 
133  O.J.  p  1154  note  33. 

120 


74.  Ohio.    Fourth   &   Central   Trust 
Co.  v.  Aker  Bros.,  177  N.B.  602,  S* 
Ohio  App.  247. 

Tex. — O'Brien  v.   Greene   Production 
Co.,    Civ.App.,     151     S.W.2d    900— 
Earnhardt  Development  Co.  v.  Ray, 
Civ.App.,  SI  S.W.2d  732. 
33  C.J.  p  11  ITS  note  37. 
Judgment  for  or  against  one  not  par* 

ty  see  supra  $28. 
Judgment    against    firm 

Where  individuals  of  firm  onljr 
were  sued,  and  cause  of  action  was 
not  alleged,  or  relief  sought,  against 
firm.  Judgment  against  the  firm  and 
individuals  as  partners,  as  well  as 
against  individuals,  was  unauthor* 
ized. — Lingwiler  v.  Anderson,  Tex* 
Civ.App.,  270  S.W.  1052. 

Husband's  Joinder  in  answer 

Where  defendant's  husband  Joined 
in  answering  suit  for  injuries,  it  was 
held  that  Judgment  might  be  ren- 
dered against  him,  although  no  relief 
was  asked  against  him  by  plaintiff. 
— Dickey  v.  Jackson,  Tex.Civ,App., 
293  S.W.  5*84,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  577.  . 

75.  Neb.— Trester  v.  Pike,  S3  N.W* 
•676,  60  Neb.  510. 

33  C.J.  p  1155  note  34. 

Belief  soufflkt  only  la  alternative 

Where  Judgment  against  a  defend- 
ant  is  sought  only  in  the  event  it  is 
found  that  he  was  not  authorized  to 
represent  a  codefendant,  and  it  is 
found  that  he  had  such  authority, 
judgment  on  such  cause  of  action 
cannot  be  rendered  against  both  de- 
fendants.— Saner-Ragley  Lumber  Co. 
v.  Spivey,  Tex.Civ.App..  255  S.W.  193, 
judgment  modified  on  other  grounds 
Com.App.,  Spivey  y.  Saner-Ragley 
Lumber  Co.,  284  S.W.  210. 

Judgment   against   single   defendant 

held  proper 

A  complaint  alleging  performance 
of  services  for  defendant  and  others 
at  their  request  and  an  agreement 
of  defendant  to  .pay  therefor,  sup- 
ports a  Judgment  against  him  alone. 
— Delafleld  v.  San  'Francisco  <fe  S.  M. 
R.  Co.,  40  P.  358,  5  Sal.tlnrep,  73L 

78.    Wash. — Reed   v.    National    Gro- 
cery Co.,  238  P.  890,  186  Wash.  7. 

77.     La. — Melde  Tile   Hoofing  Co.   v. 
Martinez,  139  So,  72,  19  LauApp.  91. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  51 


may  be  granted  to  one  defendant  as  against  a  co- 
defendant  ;7^  but  the  court  should  not  go  beyond 
the  pleadings  to  decree  relief  as  between  codefend- 
-ants.79 

The  principle  of  idem  sonans  may  be  invoked  to 
obviate  a  variance  in  the  names  of  the  parties,80 
and,  where,  on  an  inspection  of  the  whole  record, 
the  identity  of  the  parties  named  in  the  judgment 
and  the  pleading  is  clear,  the  apparent  variance  will 
be  held  to  be  a  clerical  misprision  and  immaterial, 
or  at  least  amendable,81  A  variance  may  be 
waived.82 

Ejectment..  A  judgment  in  ejectment  must  con- 
form to  the  pleadings  and  proofs  with  respect  to 
the  parties  involved.83  This  applies  where  the  ac- 
tion is  predicated  on  a  joint  demise,84  and  whether 
the  action  is  the  statutory  or  the  common-law  ac- 
tion of  ejectment.85  A  judgment  for  all  the  plain- 
tiffs cannot  be  given  where  the  proof  shows  title 
in  some,86  or  title  in  part  of  the  premises  in  one  ;87 
and  it  has  been  held  that,  if  the  proof  does  not 
show  a  joint  interest  in  all  who  join  as  plaintiffs, 
the  action  must  fail  as  to  all,88  although  it  has  al- 
so been  held  that  this  rule  does  not  apply  where  an 
equitable  defense  has  been  filed.89  In  some  juris- 
dictions, however,  a  failure  to  prove  title  as  to  some 
of  the  plaintiffs  will  not  prevent  a  recovery  by  the 


others  in  whom  title  is  shown.**  A  judgment  for 
plaintiffs  may  be  predicated  on  a  declaration  al- 
leging that  the  lessors  jointly  and  severally  de-- 
mised,  and  proof  of  a  tenancy  in  common,  there 
being  nothing  impracticable  in  joint  and  several  de- 
mises of  the  same  land.91 

A  judgment  may  be  rendered  for  or  against  one 
or  more  or  all  codefendants,  in  so  far  as  the  issues, 
proof,  and  record  may  justify  it92 

(2)  Personal  or  Representative  Capacity 

Judgment  for  or  against  a  party  ordinarily  must  be 
In  the  capacity,  personal  or  representative,  In  which  he 
sues  or  is  sued. 

Generally  the  judgment  should  be  for  and  against 
the  parties  in  the  capacity  in  which  they  sue  and 
are  sued.93  Where  an  individual  cause  of  action  is 
alleged,  but  plaintiff  describes  himself  as  suing  in 
a  representative  capacity,  he  may  nevertheless  re- 
cover in  his  individual  right  on  proof  of  the  indi- 
vidual cause  of  action  alleged,  the  allegations  as  to 
his  representative  character  being  rejected  as  mere 
descriptio  persons.94  Where,  however,  plaintiff  al- 
leges a  cause  of  action  accruing  to  him  only  in  a 
representative  capacity,  and  sues  in  such  a  capacity, 
proof  of  a  cause  of  action  belonging  to  him  as  an 
individual  is  a  variance,  amounting  to  a  failure  of 


78.  S.C. — Youmans  v.  Yownans,  121 
S.E.  674,  128  S.C.  31. 

Tex. — McCart  v.  Scruggs,  Civ.App., 
26  S.W.Sd  173,  modified  on  other 
grounds,  Com.App.,  '-28  S.W.2d  637. 

79.  Idaho— Van  -Sicklin  v.  Mayfield 
Land  &  Livestock  Co.,  241  P.  1022, 
41  Idaho  673. 

S.D.— Barry  v.  G.  OU  Wood  .Farm 
Mortg.  Co.,  211  N.W.  688,  50  S.D. 
652. 

Tex.— Galloway  v.  Moeser,  Civ.App., 
*2  S.W.2d  1067— Douglas  Oil  Co.  v. 
State  (California  Case),  Civ.App., 
70  S.W.2d  452— Western  Medical 
Arts  Bldg.  Corporation  v.  Bryan, 
Civ.App.,  5  S.W:2d  862,  error  dis- 
missed— San  Antonio  Southern  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Burd,  Civ.App.,  246  S.W. 
1060,  modified  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  Burd  v.  San  Antonio 
Southern  R.  Co.,  -261  S.W.  1021. 
Absence  of  claim  of  adverse  title 

A  decree  was  held  void  In  so  far 
as  it  awarded  rights  in  land  to  some 
defendants  as  against  other  defend- 
ants, where  they  had  not  claimed 
any  title  adverse  to  each  other. — 
Deming  v.  Nelson,  210  N.W.  726,  50 
S.D.  484. 

80.  Iowa. — Mallory  v.  Riggs,   30  N. 
W.  S86,  76  Iowa  743. 

33  C.J.  p  1201  note  20. 

81.  OkL — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Sorter   v.    Newton   State   Bank  & 


Trust   Co.,    OkL,    295    P.    209,    210, 

147  Okl.  136. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Greene 
v.  Elerding,  Civ.App.,  £91  S.W. 
271,  272— Robinson  v.  Watkins, 
Civ.App.,  271  S.W.  288. 

Wash.— Wetzel  v.  Clise,   26«  P.   161, 

148  Wash.  75. 

33  C.J.  p  1201  note  21,  p  1168  note  28 

Cb]  (1). 

Entry  of  Judgment  in  correct  corpo- 
rate name 

If  corporation  were  known  by  an- 
other name  than  that  set  forth  in 
pleadings,  or  were  mistakenly  named 
in  pleadings,  there  being  no  corpo- 
ration of  the  name  set  forth,  Judg- 
ment against  corporation  in  its  cor- 
rect name  would  be  warranted. — 
Wichita  Falls  &  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Foreman,  Tex.Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d 
549. 

82.  HL— Edwards    v.    Warner,     111 
ULApp.  -32. 

33  C.J.  p  1201  note  2*2. 

83.  Ga. — Shaddix  v.   Watson,    61   S. 
E.  828,  130  Ga.  764. 

19  C.J.  p  1209  note  20  [f]. 

94.    U.S.— Garrard  v.  Reynold,  Ky.,  4 

How.  123,  11  LuEd.  903. 
19  C.J.  p  1217  note  52%. 

85.     Ga. — Callaway  v.  Irvin,  51  S.B. 

477,  123  Ga.  344. 
19  C.J.  p  1217  note  52%. 

121 


86.  Cal. — Tormey  v.  Pierce,  42  CaL 
S3*. 

19  C.J.  p  1217  notes  62%,  «2%. 

87.  Mich.— Lynch  v.  Kirby,  36  Mich. 
238. 

SB.     Ga. — McQlamory   v.    McCormick, 

24  S.E.  941,  99  Ga.  14$. 
19  C.J.  p  1217  note  52#. 

89.  Ga. — Milner  v.  Vandivere,   12   S* 
E.  879,  86  Ga.  540. 

90.  111.— Whitham  v.  Ellsworth,  102 
N.E.  223,  259  lit  243. 

13  C.J.  p  1217  note  52%. 

91.  Ky. — Courtney  v.  Shropshire,   3 
Litt.  265. 

19  C.J.  p  1217  note  52*io. 

92.  Ala. — Simmons  v.  Sharpe,  42  <So. 
441,  148  Ala.  217. 

19  C.J.  p  1217  note  55. 

93.  U.S. — Gonzalez  v.  Roman  Cath- 
olic   Archbishop    of    Manila,    Phil. 
Islands,  50   S.Ct  5,   280  U.S.  1,   74 
L.Ed.  131. 

Minn. — Briggs  v.  Kennedy  Mayon- 
naise Products,  297  N.W.  -842,  209 
Minn.  312. 

Tex. — Rockhold  v.  Lucky  Tiger  Oil 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  4  S.W.2d  1046,  error 
dismissed. 

33  O.J.  p  1155  note  39. 

94.  U.S. — Newberry  v.  Robinson,   C. 
C.N.Y,,  36  F.  841. 

33  C.J.  p  1155- note  40. 


§  51 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


proof,  and  it  has  been  held  that  he  cannot  recov- 
er,95 Similarly,  where  plaintiff  sues  in  his  individu- 
1  al  capacity  and  the  proof  shows  a  right  to  recover 
only  in  a  representative  capacity,  it  has  been  held 
that  there  is  a  fatal  variance.96  A  defense  good 
against  plaintiff  in  his  individual  capacity  is  not 
necessarily  a  bar  to  a  judgment  for  plaintiff  in  his 
representative  capacity.97 

A  personal  judgment  against  a  defendant  who  is 
sued  only  in  his  official  or  representative  capacity,98 
or  a  judgment  against  one  in  his  representative  ca- 
pacity when  he  is  sued  only  in  his  individual  capac- 
ity,99 is  defective.  Where  the  pleadings  are  ambig- 
uous as  to  the  capacity  in  which  plaintiff  sues,  or 
defendant  is  sued,  the  theory  on  which  the  case  was 
tried  controls  the  judgment.1 

Executors  and  administrators.  It  has  been  held 
that,  if  an  executor  or  administrator  sues  as  such, 
he  cannot  recover  in  his  individual  right;2  but 
there  are  also  cases  in  which  an  individual  recovery 
by  one  who  sued  as  executor  or  administrator  has 
been  regarded  as  permissible.8  If  a  person  sues  in- 
dividually, he  cannot  recover  as  executor  or  admin- 


istrator.4 If  an  action  is  brought  against  a  person 
individually,  judgment  cannot  be  rendered  against 
him  as  the  personal  representative  of  another.5 
Similarly,  as  a  general  rule,  where  one  is  sued  as 
executor  or  administrator,  no  personal  judgment 
may  be  rendered  against  him,6  although  there  are 
cases  in  which  it  has  been  regarded  as  permissible 
to  render  a  personal  judgment  against  one  so  sued.7 

A  plaintiff  cannot  object  to  a  decree  because  it 
was  rendered  against  him  in  the  name  and  capacity 
in  which  he  sued.8  Where  a  party  is  sued  as  per- 
sonal representative,  any  judgment  in  his  favor 
should  be  in  his  representative,  rather  than  in  his 
individual,  capacity.9 

b.  Property  Affected 

A  Judgment  affecting  property  should  be  limited  to 
that  described  In  the  pleadings  and  proof,  and,  accord- 
ing to  some  authorities,  a  Judgment  affecting  other 
property  is  void. 

A  judgment  affecting  property  should  be  limited 
to  the  property  described  in  the  pleadings,10  and 
judgments  affecting  other  property  have  been  held 


96.    111.— Stokes    v.    Riley,    11    N.E. 

877,  121  111.  166. 
33  CJ.  p  1153  note  41. 

96.  Mo.-— Vaughan  v.  St  Louis  &  S. 
F.   R.  -Co.,    164   S.W.    144,   177   Mo. 
App.  155. 

33  C.J.  p  1155  note  42. 

97.  N.Y.— Scranton    v.    Farmers'    & 
Mechanics'  Bank,  33  Barb.  527,  af- 
firmed 24  N.T.  424. 

98.  Cal.— Reed  v.   Molony,   101  P.2d 
175,  38  Cal.App,2d  405. 

Mo.— Baird  v.  National  Health  Foun- 
dation, 144  -S.W.2d  «50,  235  Mo. 
App.  694. 

33  CJ.  p  1155  note  44. 

99.  Conn.— Joseph   v.    Donovan,    164 
A.  498,  116  Conn.  160. 

33  C.J.  p  1155  note  45. 

3^  U.S. — Fortier  v.  New  Orleans 

Nat  Bank,  La.,  5  S.Ct.  234,  112  U. 

S.  439,  28  L.Ed.  764. 
33  C.J.  P  1155  note  46. 

2.  Cal.— Rogers     v.     Schlotterback, 
138  P.  728,  167  Cal.  35. 

24  C.J.  p  885  note  49. 

3.  La.-JChildress   v.    Davis,    15  iLa. 
49*2. 

24  C.J.  P  885  note  50,  33  C.J.  P  H'55 
note  40. 

4.  Me. — Hayes   v.    Rich,   64  A.   659, 
101  Me.   314,   11'5  Am.S.R.  314. 

24  C.J.  P  #85  note  51. 

&    Ala.— Singleton  v,  Gayle,  *  Port. 

270. 
24  C.J.  p  885  note  52. 

€.    Neb.— Burton  v.  Williams,  88  N. 

W.  765,  63  Neb.  431. 
24  C.J.  p  885  note  53. 


7.     Tenn. — Braden  v.  Hollingsworth, 

$  Humphr.  19. 
24  C.J.  p  88-6  notes  64,  55. 

a    Vt.— Sowles    v.    Sartwell,    56    A. 
282,  76  Vt.  70. 

9.  La. — Succession  of  Moore,   App., 
193  So.  222. 

10.  U.S.— Baten    v.    Kirby    Lumber 
Corporation,    C.C.A.Tex.,    103    F.2d 
272. 

Ala.— Alford  v.  Rodgers,  6  So.2d  409, 

242  Ala.  370 — Parker  v.  Duke,  157 

So.  43-6,  229  Ala.  361. 
Ariz.- Williams    v.    Earhart,    278    P. 

728,  34  Ariz.  -565. 
Cal.— Alpha  Stores  v.  Croft,   140   P. 

2d  688,   60  Cal.App.2d  349— Judson 

v.  Herrington,  150  P.2d  802,  55  Cal. 

App.2d  476. 
Ga.— Tinsley    v.    Commercial    Credit 

Co.,  164  S.E.  454,  45  Ga.App.  297. 
Idaho.— Nielson   v.    Garrett,   43    P.2d 

380,  55  Idaho  240. 
Mo.— Pioneer  Cooperage  Co.   v.  Dil- 

lard,  '59  S.W.2d  642,  332  Mo.  798— 

Wilkinson  v.   Lieberman,    37   S.W. 

3d   6(33,    327   Mo.  420— Garrison  v. 

City  of  Ozark,  App.,  248  S.W.  975. 
Tex.— Martin  v.  Abbott,  Civ.App.,  24 

S.W.2d  488 — Stevenson  v.   Barrow, 

Civ.App.,  285  S.W.  840,  reversed  on 

other  grounds,  Com. App.,  291  S.W. 

1101— Holasek   v.   Jahek,   Civ.App, 

244    S.W.    285. 
W.Va.— George  v.  Male,  153  S.E.  507, 

109  W.Va,   222. 
19  C.J.  p  1209  note  20  [a],  [b]— 33  C. 

J.   p   1168   note  32 — 47  C.J.   p   430 

note  65—51  C.J.  p  269  note  25  [c], 
[d]. 

122 


Judgments  held  proper 

(1)  Where  there  was  no  question 
as  to  what  land  was  in  dispute  and 
land  was  fully  described  in  the  de- 
cree   covering   land    in    controversy, 
decree    was    not    erroneous    because 
not  in  conformity  with  pleadings. — 
Arnd  v.   Harrington,    2*87    N.W.    292, 
227  Iowa  43. 

(2)  In  action  to  establish  title  to 
strip  of  land  between  fence  and  al- 
leged true  boundary  line  inside  fence, 
a  judgment  embracing  less  land  than 
that  claimed  in  pleadings  was  prop- 
er, where  land  recovered  was  locat- 
ed   precisely    as    contended    for   by 
plaintiffs'  petition,  except  as  respects 
width  of  strip.— Humble  Oil  &  Re- 
fining Co.   v.    Owings,    Tex.Civ.App., 
128  S.W.2d  6-7. 

(3)  A  judgment  providing  for  the 
return  of  certain  tires  was  held  prop- 
er under  pleadings  dealing  with  the 
"equipment"    of    a    certain    gasoline 
station. — Haley    v.    Traeger,    268    P. 
459,  92  Cal. App.  360. 

(4)  Where  description  of  land  in 
decree  vesting  title   did  not   follow 
that    in    the   bill,   but   included    the 
tract  in  question  and  land  could  be 
ascertained,  there  was  held  to  be  a 
sufficient      description. — Gaylor       v. 
Gaylor,  1  Tenn. App.  645. 

(5)  Other  cases. 

Ga.—Cason  v.  United  Realty  &  Auc- 
tion Co.,  in  S.B.  161,  161  Ga,  374. 

Tex.— Wells  v.  Laird,  Civ.App.,  57 
S.W.*2d  3*95,  error  refused — Steven- 
son v.  Barrow,  Civ. App.,  285  S.W. 
840,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  291  S.W.  1101. 


49.   C..J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§'51 


to  be  void11  although  as  to  this  there  is  ajso  author-  ! 
ity  to  the  contrary.12  It  has  been  held  that 'the  fact 
that  a  description  in  a  judgment  fixing  the  bounda- 
ries of  land  involved  in  a  litigation  differed  from 
the  description  in  the  pleadings  was  immaterial 
where  there  was  evidence  to  support  the  descrip- 
tion in  the  judgment.13 

A  judgment  should  also  be  supported  by  the  proof 
as  to  the  property  involved,14  and  hence  a  judg- 
ment following  a  description  in  the  complaint  which 
is  not  supported  by  the  evidence  cannot  stand.16 

c.  Quieting  Title 

Actions  to  quiet  title  are  governed  by  the  general 
rules  with  respect  to  conformity  of  the  judgment  with 
the  pleadings  and  proofs,  including  the  rules  as  to  the 
granting  of  affirmative  relief  to  a  defendant. 

The  rule  requiring  the  relief  afforded  by  the  judg- 
ment to  conform  to  the  case  made  out  by  the  plead- 
ings and  proofs  has  been  applied  in  actions  to  quiet 


title.16  It  is  error  to  grant  a  decree  quieting  plain- 
tiffs title  on  proof  of  facts  showing  merely  a  right 
to  specific  performance,17  and,  where  the  bill  con- 
tains only  statutory  averments,  relief  cannot  be 
granted  on  general  principles  of  equity.18  Under 
the  broad  provisions  of  some  statutes,  plaintiff  may 
so  frame  his  petition  as  to  authorize  either  legal 
or  equitable  relief.1^ 

Affirmative  relief  not  authorized  by  the  pleadings 
and  proof  cannot  be  granted  to  defendant,20  and 
in  some  jurisdictions  it  has  been  held  that  the 
court  cannot  decree  that  defendant  has  the  su- 
perior title  where  he  files  no  cross  complaint21 
and  does  not  pray  for  such  relief;22  but  in  others  it 
has  been  held  that  defendant's  title  may  be  declared 
superior  if  the  facts  justify  it,  although  he  files  no 
cross  complaint  or  otherwise  asks  for  such  relief.23 
If  defendants  set  up  equities  and  pray  for  judg- 
ment and  for  general  relief,  an  award  of  affirmative 


11.  Tenn.— Central     Sav.     Bank    v. 
Carpenter.    37   S.W.   278,   97   Tenn. 
4'37. 

33  C.J.  p  1168  note  S3. 

12.  Tex.— Williamson   V.   Wright,    1 
Tex.Unrep.Cas.  711. 

33  C.J.  P  1169  note  34. 

13.  Cal. — Dreyer  v.  Cole,  292  P.  123, 
210  Cal.  3:39. 

14.  111. — Osmonson  v.  Buck,   162  N. 
E.  142,  331  111.  25. 

Concession  by  party 

A  judgment  awarding  plaintiff 
land  to  which  he  concedes  he  is  mak- 
ing no  claim,  and  to  which  defend- 
ant appears  to  have  a  better  title,  is 
erroneous. — Hecker  v.  Bleish,  8  S. 
W.2d  1008,  319  Mo.  149. 

15.  Neb.— Cashing  v.  Conness,  95  N. 
W.  855,  4  Neb.   (Unoff.)  66-8. 

ia  Cal.— Baar  v.  Smith,  255  P.  827, 
201  Cal.  87— Bartholomae  Oil  Cor- 
poration v.  Delaney,  296  P.  690, 
112  CaLAfcp.  314. 

Mo. — Congregation  B'Nai  Abraham  v. 

Arky,   20  S.W.2d  899,  323  Mo.  776. 

N.M. — Otero   v.  Totl,   273  P.   917,   33 

N.M.  613. 
N.C. — Johnston    v,    Johnston,    12    S. 

B.2d  248,  218  N.C.  706. 
Utah. — Bolognese  v.  Anderson,  90  P. 
2d  275,   97  Utah  136 — Bertolina  v. 
Frates,  57  P.2d  346,  89  Utah  238. 
51  C.J.  p  2*9  note  25  [a]-[g]. 
Jurisdiction*!  facts 

Although  defendant's  occupancy  of 
the  land  was  not  alleged  in  the 
pleadings,  it  was  nevertheless  juris- 
dictional,  and  the  court  having  found 
as  a  fact  that  defendant  was  in  acitu- 
al  possession  when  the  suit  was 
commenced,  the  bill  was  properly 
dismissed.— Dolph  v.  Norton,  123  N. 
W.  13,  158  Mich.  417. 


Taxes,  penalties,  and  costs 

In  action  for  possession  of,  and  to 
Quiet  title  to,  realty,  portion  of  Judg- 
ment allowing  personal  recovery 
against  defendant  for  accumulated 
taxes,  penalties,  and  costs,  an£  de- 
creeing lien  against  property,  was 
held  void  where  Issue  as  to  such 
part  of  judgment  was  not  raised  by 
pleadings  or  evidence.  —  Fuqua  v. 
Watson,  46  P.2d  486.  172  Okl.  624. 

Cancellation  of  deed  as  cloud  on  ti- 
tle 

Where  the  clear  purpose  of  a  bill 
is  to  relieve  plaintiff's  land  from  the 
incubus  of  a  mortgage  foreclosure 
sale,  allegations  which  show  the  in- 
validity of  the  sale  as  against  plain- 
tiff, coupled  with  a  prayer  for  gen- 
eral relief,  are  sufficient  to  war- 
rant cancellation  of  the  deed  as  a 
cloud  on  title,  although  the  special 
prayer  was  for  redemption  and  re- 
conveyance to  the  mortgagor.  —  Dixie 
Grain  Co.  v.  Quinn,  61  So.  886,  181 
Ala.  208. 

TTnder  statute  authorizing-  determin- 
ation. of  adverse  claims 

Where  the  complaint  embraces  ev- 
ery averment  necessary  to  sustain 
an  action  to  Quiet  title  under  the 
general  provisions  of  the  -statute  re- 
lating to  such  actions,  a  judgment 
quieting  title  is  proper,  although  the 
action  was  brought  under  another 
statute  authorizing  an  action  to  de- 
termine adverse  claims  by  one  in  ad- 
verse possession  of  the  property  who 
has  paid  taxes  thereon  during  a  des- 
J4ro*±*d  period^—Bmst  v.  Tiel,  197 
P.  «U9,  «1  CaLApp,  747. 


Judgments  Held 
issues 

Cal.  —  District   Bond   Co.   v.   Pollack, 
121  P.2d  7,  19  CaL2d  304* 

123 


o.— Ebbs    v.    Neff,    30    S.W.2d    616, 

325  Mo.  1182. 
Mont — Thomson  v.  Nygaard,  41  P.2d 

1,  98  Mont  529. 
Okl. — -'Simmons    v.    Howard,    27-6    P. 

71*8,  136  OkL  118, 

17.  Mo. — Congregation    B'Nai    Abra- 
ham  v.   Arky,   20   S.W.2d   899,   823 
Mo.  776. 

Utah. — Hennefer  v.  Hays,   47  P.  90, 
14  Utah  324. 

18.  Ala. — First   Ave.   Coal   &  -Lum- 
ber Co.    v.   King,    69    So.    549,    193 
'Ala.  438 — Fowler  v.  Alabama  Iron 
&  Steel  Co.,   45   So.    635,  154  Ala. 
497. 

19.  Mo. — Murphy  v.  Barren,   205  & 
W.  49,  275  Mo.  282. 

51  C.J.  p  270  note  29. 

20.  N.D. — Brown    v.    "Comonow,    114 
N.W.  728,  17  N.D.  84. 

51  C.J.  p  276  note  30. 

21.  CaL — Hungarian      Hill      Gravel 
Min.   Co.   v.   Moses,   58   Cal.   168. 

Ky.— Spradlin    v.    Patrick,    64    S.W. 
•840,    23   Ky,L.    1156. 

22.  Tex.— State   v.    Black,    297    S.W. 
213,  118  Tex.  615,  53  A.L.R.  1181. 

51  C.J.  P  276  note  32. 

23.  Mich.— Miller  v.    Steele,   109  N. 
W.  37,  14*  Mich.  123. 

51  C.J.  p  276  note  33. 
Belief  "based  on  plaintiff's  pleading 
Where  the  statute  authorizes  the 
court  to  determine  the  title  and  in- 
terests of  all  the  parties,  and  plain- 
tiff's prayer  asks  that  this  be  done, 
it  is  proper  for  the  court,  if  title  is 
found  to  be  in  defendant,  so  to  de- 
tervtine,  without  any  prayer  on  the 
tetter's  part. — Himmelberger-Harri- 
son  Lumber  Co.  v.  Jones,  119  S.W. 
366,  220  Mo.  190—51  C.J.  p  276  not* 
34. 


51 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


relief  is  proper,  without  a  prayer  for  "affirmative 
relief  in  those  terms.24 

d.  Other  Applications 

The  rules  governing  conformity  of  Judgments  with 
the  pleadings,  Issues,  and  proofs  have  been  applied  In  a 
great  variety  of  cases,  the  propriety  of  the  particular 
relief  granted  depending  on  all  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances. 

The  rules  with  respect  to  the  necessity  that  judg- 
ments conform  to,  and  be  sustained  by,  the  plead- 
ings and  proofs,  the  relief  sought,  and  the  issues, 
have  been  applied  in  numerous  cases  in  addition  to 


those  already  considered;  and,  following  such  rules, 
the  relief  granted  under  the  circumstances  has  been 
held  proper  in  actions  or  judgments  for  or  relating 
to  accounts  or  accounting,26  annulment  of  mar- 
riage,26 antenuptial  agreements,27  attorney's  fees,23 
bonds,29  breach  of  marriage  promise,30  building 
contracts,31  cancellation  of  instruments,32  commis- 
sions,33 deeds,34  dower,35  easements,3*  ejectment,3* 
establishment  or  priority  of  liens,38  executors  and 
administrators,39  foreclosure,^  improvements,41  in- 


24.  Tex.— McCullough     v.      Rucker, 
115   S.W.    323,  53   Tex.Civ.A-pp.    89. 

25.  Cal. — Nelson  v.  Abraham,  App., 
162    P.2d   333— Sly'  v.   Abbott,   264 
P.   507,   89  CaLApp.   209— Miller  v. 
Superior  Court  of  California  in  and 
for   ILos    Angeles   County,    210   P. 
832,  :59  CaLApp.  340. 

Ga.— Grant   v.   Hart,    80    S.E.2d    271, 

197  Ga.  6-62. 
Mo.— Welch-Sandier    Cement    Co.    v. 

Mullins,  App.,  31  S.W.2d  86— Loge- 

man  Mfg.   Co.   y.   Logernan,  App., 

298  S.W.  1040. 
Xex. — Zimmerman     v.     Millan,     Civ. 

App.,   141  'S.W.2d  3-94— Samuels  v. 

Finkelstein,    Qiv.App.,     25     S.W.2d 

•923,  error  dismissed. 

26.  CaL-JFigoni    v.    Figoni,    295    P. 
•339,  211  Cal.  354. 

27.  111.— Parker   v.   Gray,   148   N.B. 
323,  317  111.  468. 

Kan.— Baldwin   v.   Baldwin,    98   P.2d 
614,  150  Kan.  507. 

28.  Cal. — Martin    v.    Pacific    South 
west   Royalties,    106    P.2d  443,    41 
Cal.App.2d  161. 

La, — -Wild  v.  Standard  General  Real 
ty  Co.,   App.,   145    So.   58,  affirmed 
149  'So.  114,  177  La.  664. 

Tex.— Rychener     v.     McGuire,     Civ 
App.,  66  'S.W.'2d  418. 

29.  Tex. — I>e     Zavala     r.     Scanlan 
Com.App.,  65  S.W.2d  489. 

30.  Tenn. — Poster  v.   Andrews,    18 
S.W;2d  580. 

31.  Cal.— Karlik   v.    Peters,    288   P 
•»63,  106  CaLApp.  126. 

9  C.J.  p  892  note  51. 

32.  Cal. — Empire   Lease   &   Royalt 
Co.  v.  Jones,  8  P.2d  512,  121  Cal 
APp.  23. 

Ga.— Cason  v.  United  Realty  &  Auc 

tton  Co.,  131  S.B.  161,  161  Ga.  374 
Mich.— Drinski   v.    Drinski,    15   N.W 

•2d  714,  309  Mich.  479. 
Okl.— Exchange    Bank    of   Perry   v 

Nichols,  164  P.2d  867. 
Tex.— Sabens   v.    fiochruxn,   dv.App 

292  S.^.  281.  -    ' 


Fraud  as  "actual"  or  "constructive" 
Where  petition  for  cancellation  of 
ease  recited  facts  and  prayed  for  a 
ecree  declaring  the  lease  to  be  il- 
egal  and  void  because  of  fraud,  and 
rdering     cancellation    thereof    and 
or  such  other,  further,  and  differ- 
nt    relief    as    equity    and    justice 
might   require,   a  holding  that  con- 
tructive   fraud   existed  was  within 
petition,    although    neither    "actual" 
ior  "constructive"  was  used  in  con- 
aection  with  charge  of  fraud. — John- 
son v.  Radio  Station  W  O  W,  14  N. 
W.2d  '$66,  144  Neb.  406,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  65  <S.Ct.  147-5,   32*  IT. 
S.  120,  8'9  L.B?d.  2092,  motion  denied 
66  S.Ct  11. 
Inability  to  surrender  stock 

Where  a  petition  for  the  cancella- 
tion of  stock  contained  a  prayer  for 
general  relief,  it  authorized  a  judg- 
ment for  the  value  of  the  stock 
which  a  stockholder  was  ordered  to 
surrender  for  cancellation,  but  which 
le  was  unable  to  surrender  because 
tie  had  transferred  it  to  a  brokerage 
. — McCombs  Producing  &  Refin- 
ing Co.  V.  Ogle,  254  S.W.  4'25,  200  Ky. 
208. 

33,  Ark.— Core  v.  Henley,  16  S.W.2d 
579,  179  Ark.  488. 

Conn. — Nocera  v.  La  Mattina,  145  A. 
271,  109  Conn.  5*89. 

Tex.— Murchison  v.  Ballard,  Civ. 
App.,  17*  S.W.2d  554,  error  re- 
fused— Jones  v.  Bledsoe,  Civ.App., 
293  S.W.  204. 


.    Adams,    117    S.B. 

335,  30  Ga.App.  197. 
HI. — Burroughs  v.   Mefforfl,   5-6   N.B. 

2d  845,  387  111.  461— Hayes  v.  Min- 

iter,  139  N.m  74,  308  111.  22. 
Mo.— Presbyterian      Orphanage      of 

Missouri  v.  Fitterling,  114  S.W.2d 

1004,    342    Mo.    299— Mayberry    v. 

Clark,   297   S.W.   39,  317  Mo.  442. 
rpex. — Green  v.  Duncan,  CivJV.pp.,  134 

S.W.2d  744. 

35(i    Ark.— Less    v.    Less,    249    S.W. 

583,  158  Ark.  25-5. 
36.    111. — Stowell  v.  Prentiss,  154  N. 

El  120,  323  111.  309,  50  A.L.R.  584. 
Ky.— Wilson  v.  Trent,  38  S.W.2d  429, 

23*  Ky.  551. 

124 


37.    Ariz.— Keystone  Copper  Min.  Co. 

v.  Miller,  164  P.2d  603. 
Ky.— Parkey    v.    Arthur,    $3    S.W.2d 

921,  245  Ky.  525. 
j£0. — Marsden  v.  Nipp,  30  S.W.23  77, 

525  Mo.  822. 
Application  of  rules  with  respect  to 

parties  in  action  of  ejectment  see 

supra    subdivision   a    (1)    of    this 

section. 

5.    Idaho.— Gillette   v.    Oberholtzer, 

264  P.  229,  45  Idaho  571. 
Iowa.— Holden  v.  VoeHcer,   293  N.W. 

32,  228  Iowa  589. 
Ky.— Smith  v.  Sellers,  284  S.W.  1*34, 

215  Ky.  181. 

39.  Cal.— Tarien    v.    Katz,    1*5    P.2d 
493,  216  Cal.  5-54,  85  AL.R.  334. 

Ga. — Sangster  v.  Toledo  Mfg.  Co.,  1> 

S.B.2d  723,  193  Ga.  685. 
Mo.'— Reed   v.    Tedford,    App.,    72    S. 

W.2d  207. 

2-4  C.J.  p   884  notes  44    [a]-[e3. 
Personal  or  representative  capacity 

see    supra    subdivision    a    (2)    of 

this  section. 

40.  Ga.— Ten-Fifty   Ponce   de   Leon 
Co.   v.   Citizens'   &  Southern  Nat. 
Bank,   153    S.B.   751,    170   Ga.    642. 

Tex — Stoutz    v.    Amarillo    Bank    & 

Trust  Co.,  Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  778, 

error  dismissed 
Utah. — Meissner  v.  Ogden,   L.   &  1. 

Ry.  Co.,  233  IP.  569,  65  Utah  1. 
Wash.— Beadle    v.    Barta,    123    P.2d 

761,  13  Wash.2d  67. 
42  C.J.  p  142  note  53  [fj»  P  143  note 

57  [a],  [b]. 
Bights  of  purchaser  at  foreclosure 

Where  there  was  an  actual  con- 
troversy before  the  court  as  to  the 
rights  of  purchaser  in  property  pur- 
chased at  foreclosure  sale,  judgment 
declaring  purchaser  at  foreclosure 
sale  to  be  the  owner  of  the  property 
subject  only  to  right  of  redemption, 
and  that  his  title  thereto  subject 
to  such  right  be  Quieted  against  any 
and  all  claims  of  perseas  claiming 
property  by  adverse  possession,  was 
proper.-HSnyder  v.  Pine  Grove  Lum- 
ber Co.,  105  P.2d  369,  40  Cal.App.2d 
660. 


1.    Mo. — Sutton  v.  Anderson,  31  S. 
W.2d  10*26,  (326  Mo.  804. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  51 


junctive  relief,42  insurance,4^  leases  or  rents,44 
notes,4*  oil  or  gas  leases  or  royalties,46  partner- 
ships,47 partition,4*  patents,49  personal  injuries,50 


quo  warranto,51  rescission,5^  services  rendered,53 
specific  performance,54  trespass,55  trusts,56  and  oth- 
er matters.57 


42.  Cal.— Knox  v.  Wolfe,  App.,  167 
P.2d  3— Sharp  v.  Big  Jim  Mines, 
103  P.2d  430,  39  Cal.App.2d  435. 

Mo. — Meder  v.  Wilson,  App.,  192  S. 

W.2d  606. 
TTse  of  private  way 

Decree  enjoining  use  of  a  private 
way  over  defendants'  land  connect- 
ing plaintiffs'  tracts  was  not  beyond 
pleading  of  injunction  suit  where 
decree  only  determined  plaintiffs'  ti- 
tle to  an  easement  and  not  title  to 
a  fee.— Fassold  v.  Schamfcurg.  166 
S.W.2d  571,  i350  Mo.  464. 

43.  Kan. — Dobrauc      v.      Concordia 
Fire    Ins.    Co.,    10    P.2d    875,    135 
Kan.  297. 

La. — Richmond    v.    New   York   Life 

Ins.  Co.,  App.,  25  So.2d  94. 
Mo. — Homan  v.  Employers  Reinsur- 
ance  Corporation,   136  S.W.Sd  289, 
845  Mo.  650,  127  A.L.R.  163— Nick 
v.    Travelers    Ins.   Co.,    App.,    185 
•     S.W.2d     326— De    Mott    v.     Great 
American   Ins.   Co.   of  New  York, 
181    S.W.2d   64,   234   Mo.App.  31. 
N.Y. — Borszewski   v.   Bukowski,    260 

N.Y.S.  643,  145  Misc.  680. 
Tex. — Georgia    Home     Ins.     Co.     v. 
Trice,  Civ.App.,  70  «S.W.2d  356,  er- 
ror     dismissed — Northern     Assur. 
Co.  v.  Herd,  Civ.App..  27*  S.W.  884. 
33  C.J.  p  144  note  83  [a]. 
Change  of  beneficiary 

Allegation  that  change  of  benefi- 
ciary of  life  policy  was  inequitable, 
unjust,  voidable,  and  ought  to  be  set 
aside  was  held  sufficient  to  support 
decree  for  first  beneficiary  as  against 
contention  that  decree  did  not  con- 
form to  pleadings  because  no  fraud 
was  found. — Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Gebo,  170  A.  917,  106  Vt  155. 

44.  La. — Chambers  v.  Vega,  137  So. 
879,  18  La.App.  756. 

N.Y. — Longo  v.  Sparano,  196  N.Y.&. 

344,  119  Misc.  402. 
S.C. — Stackhouse  v.  (Pure  Oil  Co.,  180 

S.E.  188,  176  6.C.  318. 

45.  Iowa. — Iowa  State  Sav.  Bank  of 
Malvern  v.  Young,   244   N.W.   271, 
214     Iowa    1287,    84    A.L.R.    1400, 
rehearing  denied  245  N.W.  864,  84 
A.L.R.  1400. 

Kan. — Illinois  Life  Ins.  Co.  v* 
Young,  235  P.  104,  118  Kan.  308, 
certiorari  denied  Young  v.  Still- 
well,  46  «S.Ct  21,  269  U.S.  560,  70 
L.Ed.  412. 

Ky. — Board  of  Education  of  Pulaski 
County  v.  Nelson,  88  S.W.ifd  17, 
261  Ky.  466. 

Or. — Boyce  v.  Toke  Point  Oyster  Co., 
Consol.,  25  P.2d  930,  145  Or.  114. 

Tex. — Dashiel  v.  LOtt,  Com.App.,  243 
S.W.  1072. 

Alternative    prayer   for   balance   on 

open  account 
In  action  on  notes,  where  evidence 


showed  payment  of  notes  but  exist- 
ence of  undisputed  balance  due 
payee  on  open  account,  payee  was 
entitled  to  judgment  for  balance  on 
open  account  under  amended  com- 
plaint praying  for  such  relief  in  al- 
ternative.— Federal  Rubber  Co.  v.  M. 
M.  5Stewart  Co.,  41  P.2d  158,  180 
Wash.  625. 

mdividtifll  obligation  of  codef  endant 
Where  petition  in  action  against 
defendants,  as  partners,  on  a  note 
executed  by  codef  endant  and  payable 
to  plaintiff,  copied  the  note  in  hsec 
verba  and  contained  prayer  for  gen- 
eral relief,  and  petition  showed  on 
its  face  that  note  as  drawn  was  an 
individual  obligation  of  codefendant, 
petition  was  sufficient  to  support  a 
judgment  against  codefendant. — 
Poynor  v.  Adams,  Tex.Civ.App.,  135 
S.W.2d  722. 

46.  Kan.— Flitch  v.   Boyle,    89   (P.2d 
909,   0.49   Kan.    884— McDermed   v. 
Ackley,  44  P.2d  27-4,  141  Kan.  818. 

Tex.— Caldwell-Guadalupe.  Pick-Up 
Stations  v.  Gregg,  Civ.App.,  276  <3, 
W.  3-42,  modified  on  other  grounds 
Gregg  v.  Caldwell-Guadalupe  Pick- 
Up  Stations,  Com. App.,  286  S.W. 
1083. 

47.  La. — Blanchard     v.      Patterson, 
119    So.   902,    9  La.App.    706. 

48.  Ky. — Howard  v.  Carmichael,  55 
S.W.2d  852,  237  Ky.  462. 

Mo.— Virgin   v.   Kennedy,   32   S.W.2d 

91,  326  Mo.  400. 
Tex. — Bowles  v.  Bryan,  Civ. App.,  277 

S.W.  760. 

49.  U.S. — General   Motors    Corpora- 
tion v.  Leer  Auto  Supply  Co.,  C. 
C.A.N.Y.,  60  F.2d  902. 

50.  Ala. — City    of    Birmingham    v. 
Smith,  163  So.  611,  231  Ala.  95. 

Ky. — Harmon  v.  Rose,  32  -S.W.2d  67, 

235  Ky.  701. 
Tex. — Caddo  Warehouse  &  Transfer 

Co.    v.   Riley,   Civ.App.,    7    S.W.2d 

137,  error  dismissed. 

51.  Fla.— City     of     Auburndale     v. 
State  ex  reL  Landls,  184  So.  787, 
135  Fla.  172. 

52.  La. — Houston-Long  Co.  v.  Fair- 
cloth,  137  So.  594,  18  La.App.  423, 
Judgment  fiadag  damages  to  ven- 
dor for  failure  of  consideration  may 
be  entered  under  complaint  for  re- 
scission and  evidence  showing  value 
of  property  and  consideration. — Mas- 
ero   v.    Bessolo,    262    P.    61,    87   Cal. 
App.  262. 

53.  Cal.— Maxwell  v.  Jimeno,  265  P. 
885,    89   CaLApp.    612 — Rosener   v. 
Hanlon  Dry  Bock  &  Shipbuilding 
Co.,  236  (P.  183,  71  CaLApp.  767. 

La. — McCook    v.    Comegys,    125    So. 

134,  169  La,  312. 
Tex. — Reymershotter    v.    Ray,    Civ. 

125 


App.,    85    S.W.2d    1102,    error   re- 
fused. 

54.  Cal. — Roark  v.   Southern   Trust 
&  Commerce  Bank,  288  (P.  110,  105 
CaLApp.  521. 

Wis.— In  re  Shinoe's  Estate.  250  N. 

W.  505,  212  Wis.  481. 
Option  to  purchase 

A  Judgment  decreeing  specific  per- 
formance of  tan  option  to  purchase 
contained  in  a  lease  was  not  void 
merely  because  complaint  failed  spe- 
cifically to  allege  that  option  speci- 
fied adequate  consideration  or  that 
the  contract  was  fair,  where  issue 
of  adequacy  was  conceded  by  the 
conduct  of  defendants  at  the  trial 
and  findings  of  adequacy  and  fair- 
ness were  supported  by  evidence. — 
Drullinger  v.  Erskine,  CaLApp.,  16& 
P.2d  48. 

55.  Ky.— Siler  v.  Cannon,   130   S.W. 
2d  742,   279  Ky.   328— Chapman  v. 
Majestic  Collieries    Co.,    288    S.W. 
299,  216  Ky.  652. 

56.  Cal.— Webb    v.    Vercoe,    258    P. 
1099,  201  Cal.  754,  54  A.L.R.  1200. 

57.  TLS. — Municipal    Excavator    Co. 
v.    Siedhoff,    C.OA.Kan.,    15    F.2d 
10. 

Ariz.— Betts  v.  Lightning  Delivery 
Co.,  22  P.2d  827,  42  Ariz.  105. 

Cal. — Estrin  v.  Superior  Court  in  and 
for  Sacramento  County,  96  F.2d 
340,  14  Cal.2d  670— (Peak  v.  Repub- 
lic Truck  Sales  Corporation,  230  P. 
948,  194  Cal.  -782— Wiley  v. 
Wright,  79  P.2d  196,  26  CaLApp* 
2d  305— Burd  v.  Downing,  213  P. 
287,  60  CaLApp.  493. 

Conn. — Heneault  v.  Papas,  121  A.  273, 
99  Conn.  164. 

Ga.— Phillips  v.  Whelchel,  170  S.E. 
480,  177  Ga.  489— Stover  v.  Atlan- 
tic Ice  &  Coal  Corporation,  125  S.E. 
837,  159  Gku  357— Powell  v.  Black- 
stock,  13  S.E.2d  503,  6'4  Ga.App. 
442. 

Idaho.^-Angel  v.  Mellen,  285  (P.  461, 
48  Idaho  750. 

HL — Johnson  v.  Watson,  33  N.E.2S 
130,  .309  IlLApp.  440— Martin  J. 
Hecht,  Inc.,  v.  Steigerwald,  24  N. 
E.2d  394,  302  IlLApp.  556. 

Ind. — Hosanna  v.  Odishoo,  193  NJ3L 
599,  208  Ind.  132,  rehearing  denied 
195  N.E.  72,  208  Ind.  132— Wag- 
goner v.  Honey,  169  N.BL  349,  91 
Ind.App.  $1. 

Ky. — Ben  Humplch  ISand  Co.  v» 
Moore,  69  S.W.2d  396,  253  Ky. 
667 — Consolidation  Coal  Co.  v. 
Riddle,  248  S.W.  530,  198  Ky.  256. 

La. — Sanders  De  Hart  v.  Continental 
Land  &  Pur  Co.,  17  So.2d  827,  205 
La.  569. 

Mass.— Gallup  v.  Barton,  47  N.E.2d 
921,  313  Mass.  -379. 

Mich. — Wesorick  v.  Winans,  269  N. 
W.  609,  277  Mich.  589— Hogan  v. 


I  51 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


On  the  other  hand,  following  the  rules  with  re- 
spect to  conformity  of  judgments  with  the  plead- 
ings, proofs,  and  issues,  particular  relief  has  been 
held  improper  in  actions  or  judgments  for  or  re- 


lating to  accounting,58  adverse  possession,59  attor- 
neys' fees,60  cancellation  of  instruments,61  checks,62 
commissions,6^  condemnation  of  property,6*  conver- 
sion,65 deeds  and  conveyances,66  ejectment,67  exec- 


Whltcomb,  206  N.W.  328,  233  Mich. 

403. 
Minn. — Child    v.    "Washed     Sand     & 

Gravel    Co.,     233     N.W.     586,    181 

Minn.  559. 
Mo. — Timmonds  v.  Wilbur,  260  S.W. 

1004— Fielder    v.    Fielder,    App.,    6 

S.W.2d     968 — Sanders     v.    "Sheets, 

App.,    287    S.W.    1069 — Menefee    v. 

Scally,    App.,   247    S.W.    259. 
•Okl.— Cusa'ck   v.    McMasters,    279   P. 

329,  tt<37  Okl.  278. 
S.C.— In   re   Sugg's   Estate.    51   S.B. 

263,  71  S.C.  439. 
Utah.— Jeffries     v.     Third     Judicial 

Dist.  Court  of  Salt  Lake  County, 

63  P.2d  242,  90  Utah  525. 
Wash.— Robinson   v.    Puget   Electric 

Welding  Co.,  299  P.  405,  162  Wash. 

626. 

33  C.J.  p  1168  note  28   [a]   (1),  [b]. 
•Reformation 

•It  has  been  held  that  reformation 
need  not  have  been  asked  for  spe- 
cifically in  the  pleading  to  permit 
the  court  to  enforce  a  contract  as 
.•actually  made,  although  not  in  a,c- 
•cordance  with  a  copy  attacked  as 
fraudulent. — Hornick  v.  Union  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  118  P.  60,  85  Kan.  568,  38 
X,.R.A.,N.S.,  826,  Ann.Cas.l913A  208. 

S8.  Conn. — "Steinmetz  v.  Steinmetz, 
7  A.2d  915,  125  Conn.  663. 

«Fla.— Garden  'Suburbs  Golf  &  Coun- 
try Club  v.  iPruitt,  24  So.Sd  898, 

Mo.-^Palnier  v.  -Marshall,  App.,  24 
S.W.2d  229. 

N.Y.— Hauenstein  v.  Fisher,  34  N.Y. 
S.2d  902,  264  App.Div.  825— Clark- 
son  v.  Lusher,  5  N.Y.S.2d  631,  255 
App.Div.  705,  resettled  In  re  Lush- 
ex's  Will,  7  N.Y.S.2d  1012,  255 
App.Div.  860. 

Okl. — Bishop  v.  Franks,  107  P.2d  358, 

188  oki.  iae. 

Profit  from  resale 

Where,  at  the  time  a  suit  against 
.a  company  and  some  of  its  stock- 
holders for  accounting  was  Institut- 
ed, erne  defendant  had  not  yet  ac- 
quired a  deed  of  trust  to  the  cor- 
poration's property,  and  no  supple- 
mental bill  was  filed,  it  could  not 
Tiave  been  contemplated  by  the 
pleadings  that  the  holder  of  the 
trust  deed  should  be  reauired  to  ac- 
count for  any  profit  from  resale 
.after  foreclosure,  and  a  Judgmen^ 
requiring  him  to  so  account  was 
without  the  scope  of  the  pleadings 
and  void. — Lewis  v.  School,  Mo.App. 
244  .S.W.  90. 
[Personal  Judgment  against  corporate 
director 

Where  complaint  by  stockholders 
^alleged  that  director  flailed  to  ac 
•count  for  proceeds  of  stock  and  ap- 
propriated other  money  of  corpora- 


tion and  prayed  an  accounting,  per- 
sonal judgment  against  director  ex- 
ceeded  relief   prayed  for. — Angel   v. 
Mellen,  285  P.  461,  48  Idaho  750. 
Claim  not  referred  to  in  complaint 

In  action  for  accounting  by  land- 
owner on  contract  for  building  hous- 
es, judgment  in-eluding  amount  bas- 
ed on  claim  not  referred  to  in  com- 
plaint could  not  be  sustained. — Aus- 
tin v.  Harry  E.  Jones,  Inc.,  44  P. 
2d  667,  6  Cal.App.2d  493. 

59.  Tex. — Stevenson  v.  Barrow,  Civ. 
App.,  265  S.W.  602. 

60.  Cal.— Swanson     v.     Hempstead, 
149    P.2d   404,    64    Cal.App.2d    681. 

Tex. — Thompson  v.  Kleinman,  Civ. 
App.,  259  S.W.  593. 

61.  Ala.— «mith   v.    Smith,    114    So. 
192,  216  Ala.  570. 

Ga, — Land  Development  Corporation 
v  Union  Trust  Co.  of  Maryland, 
180  S.E.  836,  180  Ga.  785— De 
Loach  v.  (Purcell,  145  S.E.  424, 
166  Ga,  562. 

.— Denney   v.    Peters,    10    N.E.2d 
754,  104  Ind.App.  504. 
y. — In-ez   Deposit   Bank   v.    Pinson, 
122  S.W.2d  1031,  276  Ky.  84. 
La. — Switzer   v.    Driscoll,    App.,    183 

So.  57. 
Mo.— McKay   v.   «Snider,    190    S.W.2d 

886. 

Tex.— Dallas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 
v.  King,  Civ.App.,  167  S.W.2d  245, 
error  refused — Home  Ben.  Ass'n 
v.  Allee,  Civ.App.,  128  S.W.2d  417 
— -Armstrong  v.  Murray  Tool  & 
Supply  Co.,  Civ.App.,  31  S.W.2d 
1101. 
Bar  of  future  action 

A  recital  In  a  Judgment  denying 
plaintiff's  claim  for  forfeiture  and 
cancellation  of  lease  that  it  should 
not  be  a  bar  to  any  future  action 
for  damages  or  specific  performance, 
being  an  adjudication  of  a  matter 
not  presented  by  the  pleadings,  is 
erroneous. — Masterson  v.  Amarillo 
Oil  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  253  S.W.  908 
Money  damages  held  improper 

Where  wife,  prior  to  divorce,  con- 
tracted with  husband  and  executed 
deed  of  community  property  to  him 
and  after  divorce  Instituted  action 
to  annul  contract  and  deed  for  fraud 
a  judgment  awarding  plaintiff  mon- 
ey damages  and  directing  defendan1 
to  pay  plaintiff  support  money  for 
child  was  void,  as  without  the  Is- 
sues.— Stanley  v.  McKenzie,  240  P 
103)3,  29  Ariz.  288. 
Cancellation  not  sought 

Where  both  parties  to  suit  sough 
construction    and    specific    perform- 
ance   of    contract,    and    neither    at 
tacked    its    validity   nor   sought   its 
cancellation,   court   erred  In  cancel 

126 


ng   It.— Kentucky   &.  West  Virginia 
>ower  Co.  v.  Gilllam,   276  S.W.  983, 

210  Ky.  820. 

Establishment     and    foreclosure    o* 


In  suit  to  cancel  purported  deed 
on  ground  it  was  In  fact  a  mort- 
gage, that  part  of  judgment  which 
fixed  a  tax  lien  and  foreclosed  it 
and  foreclosed  a  vendor's  Item,  was 
erroneous,  where  neither  party 
sought  the  fixing  of  tax  lien  or  fore- 
closure of  tax  lien  and  vendor's  lien. 
— Duncan  v.  Green,  Tex.Civ.App., 
113  S.Wj2d  656,  error  dismissed, 

62.  Mo. — Massey-Harris      Harvester 
Co.    v.    Federal    Reserve    Bank   of 
Kansas    City,    48    S.W.2d    158,    226 
Mo.App.  916. 

Tex. — Street    v.    Cunningham,     Civ. 

App.,  156  S.W.2d  541. 
notice  of  dishonor 

Judgment  based  on  holding  that 
failure  to  give  notice  of  dishonor  of 
checks  was  fatal  to  recovery  was 
properly  reversed,  where  no  plea 
raised  question  of  discharge  by  flail- 
ure  to  give  notice  of  dishonor. — 
Comer  v.  Brown,  Tex.Com.App.,  283 
S.W.  307. 

63.  Tex.— McClory      v.       Schneider, 
Civ.App.,  51  S.W.2d  738,  error  dis- 
missed— Smyth     v.     Conner,     Civ. 
App.,    280    S.W.    600— John  Christ- 
ensen  &  Co.  v.   McNeil,   Civ.App., 
251  S.W.  351. 

64.  Ky.— City  of  Owingsville  v.  TJ1- 
ery,  86  S.W.2d  706,  260  Ky.  792. 

65.  Tex. — Lewis     v.     Gamble,     Civ. 
App.,    113    S.W.2d    659— Meador   v. 
Wagner,  Civ.App.,    70   S.W.2d   794, 
error  dismissed. 

66.  R.L— Nelson  v.    Streeter,   13   A. 
2d  256,  65  R.'I.  1*3. 

Tex.— Long  v.  McCoy,  Civ.App.,   294 
S.W.  6-33,  affirmed  McCoy  v.  Long, 
Com.App.,   15   -S.W.2d   234,   rehear- 
ing denied  17  S.W.2d  783. 
Absence   of  interest  in  land 

Where  only  issues  before  court 
were  existence  of  alleged  indebted- 
ness and  whether  quitclaim  deed 
was  intended  as  mortgage,  portion 
of  judgment  adjudging  that  plaintiff 
had  no  Interest  whatever  in  land 
was  held  void.— State  ex  rel.  Shull 
v.  Moore,  27  P.2d  1048,  167  Okl.  28. 

67.  Mo. — Riley  v.  La 'Font,  174  S.W. 
2d  857 — Brown  v.  Wilson,  155  S.W. 
2d  176,  348  Mo.  658. 

19  C.J.  P  1209  note  20  Dc]-[e],  p  1240 

note  19  [a]. 
Improvements 

Adjudication  that,  defendant  to 
ejectment  is  entitled  to  nothing  for 
improvements  is  erroneous,  where 
no  such  issue  is  made  by  pleadings. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  51 


utors  and  administrators,68  fixtures,69  foreclosure,70 
foreign  judgments,71  forfeiture,™  gifts,™  guaran- 
ties,74 injunctive  relief,75  insurance,76  interplead- 


er,77 leases  or  rents,78  notes,™  partition,80  partner- 
ships,81 personal  injuries,82  quo  warrantors  receiv- 


— Lester   v.    Tyler,    Mo.,    69    S.W.2d 
633. 

68.  Ky. — Stlmson's   Ex'x  v.    Tharp, 
144  S.W.2d  1031,   284  Ky.  389. 

24  C.J.  p  884  note  44  [a]. 

Personal   or  representative   capacity 

see    supra    subdivision    a    (2)    of 

this  section. 

69.  Ky.— Tabor  v.   Tabor,   280   S.W. 
1S4,  213  Ky.  312. 

70.  N.Y.— Brockport    Nat.    Bank    v. 
Webaco    Oil   Co.,    12   N.T.S.2d   65-2, 
257    App.Div.    68,    reargument    de- 
nied 14  N.Y.S.2d  495,  257  App.Div. 
1043. 

N.C.-- Richardson  v.  Satterwhite,  150 

$.E.  116,  197  N.C.  609. 
Ohio.— Lebanon     Production     Credit 

Ass'n  v.  Feldhaus,  App.,  34  N.E.2d 

463. 
Tex. — Smith  v.  Jaggers,  Civ.App..  16 

S.W.2d   9ff9,    error  dismissed. 
Vt — Freedley  v.  Edwin  Shuttleworth 

Co.,  130  A.  691,  99  Vt.  25. 
33  C.J.  p  1139  note  52   [b]    (1),   [e] 

— 42   C.J.   p   142   notes  48,   53    [c], 

[e]. 
Extent  of  interest  foreclosed 

In  action  to  foreclose  vendor's 
lien  where  only  evidence  of  defend- 
ant's interest  was  in  deed  from 
plaintiff  to  defendant,  Judgment 
foreclosing  an  interest  less  than  de- 
scribed in  deed  was  error. — Smith  v. 
Totton,  Civ.App.,  98  S.W.2d  1019.  af- 
firmed Totton  v.  -Smith,  113  S.W.2d 
517,  131  Tex.  219.  • 
TL  Oal.— Morrow  v.  Morrow,  105  P. 

2d    129,    40   Cal.App.2d   474. 
7S.    111.— Penkala    v.    Tomczyk,    148 

N.E.  64,  317  111.  356. 
7a    Mo.— Riney  v.  Riney,  App.,   117 
S.W.2d  698. . 


74.  La.— Exchange    Nat    Bank    of 
Shreveport  v.  Holomon  Bros.,   123 
So.  603,  168  La.  870. 

75.  Cal.— Sharp  v.  Big  Jim  Mines, 
103    P.2d    430,    39    Cal.App.2d    435. 

Idaho.— Boise  Street  Car  Co.  v.  Van 

Avery,  103  P.2d  1107,  61  Idaho  502. 
Mich.— Ottney  v.   Taylor,   13  N.W.2d 

280,  308  Mich.  252. 
Mo— Finley    v.    -Smith,    178    S.W.2d 

326,  552  Mo.  465— Fugel  v.  Becker, 

2  S.W.2d  743. 
Neb.— Hallgren   v.   Williams,    20   N. 

W.2d  499. 
Pa.— Ebur  v.  Alloy  Metal  Wire  Co., 

155  A.  280,  304  Pa.  177. 
Vacation  of  Judgment 

In  suit,  to  enjoin  enforcement  of 
Judgment,  court's  attempt  to  vacate 
Judgment  was  held  nugatory,  since 
it  was  unauthorized  by  pleadings.— 
Baria  v.  Taylor,  57  IS.W.2d  858. 
Personal  Judgment;  order  of  »ale 

In  suit  to  restrain  sale  under  trust 
deed,    judgment    against    mortgagor 


personally    and    ordering    sale    was 
held  not  warranted  under  pleadings. 
— Farm  *&   Home    Savings    &    Loan 
Ass'n  of  Missouri  v.  Muhl,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  37  S.W.2d  516,  error  refused. 
76.    Ky. — London  &  Provincial  Ma- 
rine  &   Fire   Ins.   Co.   of  London, 
England,  v.  Mullins.  95  «S.W.2d  588, 
264    Ky.    780— Fidelity    Mut.    Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Hembree,  41  S.W.2d  649, 
240  Ky.  97. 

Mo.— Smith  v.  Smith,  App.,  192  S. 
W.2d  691,  followed  in  192  S.W.2d 
700. 

N.J.~^Magliano  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  34  A.2d  296,  21  N.J.Misc. 
394. 

Tex. — Drane  v.  Jefferson  Standard 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  161  S.W.2d  1057, 
139  Tex  101— Home  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Scott,  Civ-App.,  152  S.W.2d  413, 
error  dismissed — Snyder  N  Local 
Mut  Life  Ass'n,  Group  One,  v.  Le- 
mond,  Civ.App.,  116  S.W.2d  829, 
error  refused— National  Aid  Life 
Ass'n  v.  Bailey,  Civ.App.,  54  S.W. 
2d  206— Fidelity  Union  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Barnes,  Civ.App.,  293  S.W. 
279. 

Wis.— Schmidt  v.  La  Salle  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  of  New  Orleans,  245  N.W.  702, 
209  Wis.  576. 

33    C.J.   P  1139   note  52    [b]    (3),   P 
1168    note   28    [c]— 57    C.J.    P    656 
note  13. 
Disability 

Where  an  accident  policy  provides 
indemnity  for  partial  and  total  dis- 
ability, if  insured  sues  for  the  in- 
demnity payable  for  a  total  disabil- 
ity he  cannot,  in  the  same  action, 
recover  indemnity  for  a  partial  disa- 
bility which  succeeded  his  total  dis- 
ability.— Rayburn  v.  Pennsylvania 
Casualty  Co.,  54  S.E.  283,  1-41  N.C. 
425. 


Pa.— Normile  v.  Martell,  96  Pa.Super. 

139. 
Tex. — Wafford  v.   Branch,   Com.App.» 

267  S.W.  260 — Gulf  Refining  Co.  T. 

Smith,  Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  155. 


Fraud 

Where  issue  of  fraud  was  irrele- 
vant because  not  pleaded,  finding 
thereon  for  insurer  sued  for  pre- 
miums would  not  support  Judgment 
for  insurer.  —  American  Nat  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Villegas,  Tex.Civ.App.,  32  S.W.2d 
1109. 


77,  Cal.—  Van  Orden  v.  Golden  West 
Credit  &  Adjustment  Co.,    9   P.2d 
572,  122  CaLApp.  132. 

78.  Ky.—  Key  v.   Hays,   166   S.W.2d 
850,  292  Ky.  423. 

La.—  Harper  v.   Sid  iSimmons   Drill- 

ing Co.,   114   So.   647,  164  La.  767. 
H-e.—  Bemis  v.  Bradley,   133   A.   593, 

126  Me.   462,   69  A.L.R.  1399. 
Mo.—  Dreckshfcge  v.  Dreckshage,  176 

S.W.2d   7,    352   Mo.    78—  McCaskey 

v.  Duffley,  78  S.W.2d  141,  229  Mo. 

App.  289. 
N'T.—  Kilmer    Park    Const    Co.     v. 

Lehrer,   270  N.Y.S.   156,   150  Misc. 

673. 

127 


In  action  against  lessor  and  les- 
see for  damages  to  nearby  property, 
lessor  was  not  entitled  to  Judgment 
over  against  lessee  on  ground  that 
lease  contained  an  indemnification 
clause  in  its  favor,  where  the  plead- 
ings raised  no  such  issue. — Boyle  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  31  A.2d  89.  34* 
Pa.  602. 

79.    Ky. — Beaver    Petroleum    Corpo- 
ration v.  ,Whitney,    278   S.W.   565, 
212  Ky.  222. 
La.— W.  J.  &  C.   Sherrouse  v.  Phe- 

nix,  128  So.  536,  14  La.App.  629. 
Tex. — Chastain  v.  Gilbert,  Civ.App., 
145  iS.W.2d  938 — Butler  v.  Price, 
Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d  301— Metropo- 
lis Co.  v.  Texas  Publication  House, 
Civ.App.,  44  S.W.2d  403— Stack  v. 
Ellis,  Civ.App.,  2-91  S.W.  919— 
Standard  Motor  Co.  v.  Wittman, 
Civ.App.,  271  S.W.  186— Blanken- 
beckler  v.  Kuykendall,  Civ.App., 
256  S.W.  323. 
Material  alteration 

Where  notes  were  rendered  voia 
by  material  alteration  by  payee, 
Judgment  in  amount  of  notes  was 
held  erroneous,  since  there  was  no- 
pleading  or  claim  based  on  original 
obligation  evidenced  by  the  notes. — 
Jones  v.  Jones,  71  S.W.2d  999,  25-4 
Ky.  475. 

&,    Qa. — Hatton  v.  Johnson,  121  S» 
E.  404,  157  Ga.  313. 
Tex.— Johnson   v.    Bussey.    Civ.App... 
95   S.W.2d  990,   error  refused — Se- 
curity Realty  &  Development  Co- 
v.  Jenkins,  Civ.App.,  80  S.W.2d  999- 
— Vanlandingham    v.    Terry,    Clw 
.App.,  293  S.W.  252. 
47  C.J.  p  430  note  69. 
31.    Mo.— McCrosky      V.      Burnhamr 
App.,  282  S.W.  158. 
Personal   Judgment   against   man- 
ager of  partnership  was   unauthor- 
ized, where  complaint  did  not  allege 
that  he  was  a  partner  or  that  he  had 
any  interest  in  business  and  asked, 
for    no    relief    against    him    except 
that    any    interest    he    might    have- 
should  be  foreclosed. — State  ex  rel- 
Yeatch  v.  Franklin,  98'CP.2d  724.  163 
Or.  500. 


82.  Tex.— St.    Louis,    B.    &   M.    Ry- 
Co.    v.   (Price.    Civ.App.,    244    S.W- 
642,   affirmed,   ConLApp.,   269   -S.W- 
422.     . 

83.  Corporate  nature  of  body 

A  Judgment  in  QUO  warranto  can- 
not be  sustained  where  it  is  againat 
respondents  as  officers  of  an  unin- 


§51 


JUDGMENTS. 


crs,84  recovery  of  purchase  price  of  property,85  re- 
plevin,86 rescission,87  services  rendered,88  specific 
performance,89  statutory  penalties,90  taxes  or  as- 
sessments,91 trespass,92  trusts,98  wages  and  penal- 
ties,94 workmen's  compensation,96  and  other  mat- 
ters.9« 


§  52. 


49    C.J.S, 
Nature  and  Form  of  Action 


In  general  the  Judgment  is  limited  by  the  nature  of 
the  action;  but  In  code  states,  where  the  common- 1  aw 
forms  of  pleading  have  been  abolished,  the  form  or 
name  of  the  action  does  not  control  the  relief  which  may 
be  granted. 

In  general  the  scope  of  the  judgment  is  limited 
by  the  nature  or  character  of  the  action.9?     At 


corporated  body  and  the  issue 
raised  by  the  pleadings  is  whether 
the  relators  are  entitled  to  the  offl 
ces  in  an  incorporated  body  which 
are  claimed  and  held  by  respondents 
— Commonwealth  v.  Grim,  9*9  A.  166 
255  Pa.  40. 

84.  Tex. — Commercial  Standard  Ins 
Co.  v.   Moeller.  Civ.App.,   78  S.W 
2d  2  83. 

85.  Cal.— -Young    v.    !Lial,    17    P.2d 
170,  128  Cal.App.  246. 

Ga:— Whitten  v.  McMillan,   128   S.B 

211,  34  €tauApp.  33. 
La. — Stafford  v.  Tolmas  Realty  Co. 
App.,  1-46  So.  61 — Jackson  v.  Har- 
ris, 1S6  So.  166,  18  La.App.  484, 
reinstated  137  60.  655,  18  La.App, 
484. 

Tex. — Bancroft   v.    Brown,    Civ.App, 

285  fl.W.  206— Holloway  v.  Miller, 

Civ.App.,  272  S.W.  562. 

Return  of  property 

In  an  action  for  the  balance  due 
on  the  purchase  price  of  property  in 
which  defendant  asks  only  for  dam- 
ages, or  for  a  return  of  payments 
made,  and  in  which  the  only  issue 
is  whether  there  should  be  a  money 
Judgment  in  favor  of  one  party 
against  the  other,  a  money  Judgment 
for  defendant  coupled  with  an  ad- 
judication that  the  property  be  re- 
turned to  plaintiff  is  improper.- 
Cresci  v.  Gandy,  124  A,  68,  99  N.J. 
Law  417 — Union  Garage  Co.  v.  Wil- 
ner,  120  A.  4,  98  N.J.Law  441. 
Balance  due  seller 

In  seller's  action  for  purchase 
price,  verdict  for  buyer  on  his  coun- 
terclaim for  fraud  was  unwarranted, 
where,  if  utmost  amount  shown  as 
damages  were  subtracted  from  price 
remaining  unpaid,  there  would  still 
be  a  remainder  in  seller's  favor. — 
Gross  v.  Reiners,  124  A.  811,  100 
Conti.  732. 

86.  Tenn.— Sartain  v.  Dixie  Coal  & 
Iron  Co.,  266  S.W.  313,  150  Tenn. 
633. 

33  C.J.  p  1139  note  52  [b]  (2),  (4). 

87.  Tex. — Bailey  v.  Mann,  Civ.App., 
248  S.W.  469. 

88.  Tex.— Burnell   v.   -Schmidt,   Civ. 
App.,    104     S.W.2d    551— Barnhart 
Mercantile  Co.  v.  Bengal,  Civ. App., 
77  S.W.2d  295. 

89.  La. — Derbes  v.  Rogers,  110  So. 
84,  162  La.  49. 

90.  Tex. — Jennings  Y«   Texas  Farm 
Mortgage  Co.,   80  S.W.2d  931,  124 
Tex.    593— Gibson    T.    Hicks,    Civ. 


A.pp.,  47  S.W.2d  691,  error  refused 
— National  Casualty  Co.  v.  Ma- 
honey,  Civ.App.,  296  S.W.  335. 

91.  TLS3. — Degener  v.  Anderson,  C.C. 
A.N.Y.,  77  F.2d  85-9. 

La. — State  ex  rel.  Porterie  v.  Gulf, 

Mobile  &  Northern  R.  Co.,  -184  So. 

711,  191  La.  163. 
Mo. — State   ex   rel.    Kansas    City  v. 

School    Dist.    of   Kansas    City,    62 

•S.W.2d  813,  £3(3  Mo.  288. 
Tex — Ostrom  v.  State,  Civ.App.,   88 

S.W.2d  1084. 

92.  La. — Bruning    v.    City    of   New 
Orleans,  115  So.  733,  165  La.  511. 

Tex. — Dalton  v.  Davis,  Com.App.,  1 
S.W.2d  -571 — Martin  v.  Grogan- 
Cochran  Lumber  Co.,  Civ. App.,  176 
S.W.2d  780— First  State  Bank  in 
Caldwell  v.  Stubbs,  Civ.App.,  48  S. 
W.2d  446. 

93.  Cal. — Juranek  v.  Juranek,  84  P. 
2d   195,    29   Cal.App.2d   276. 

Conn. — Waterbury  Trust  Co.  v.  Por- 
ter, 38  A.2d  598,  131  Conn.  206— 
Zitkov  v.  Gorsky,  137  A.  751,  106 
Conn.  287. 

S.D. — Colteaux  v.  First  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank,  218  N.W.  151,  52  S.D. 
443. 

Tex. — Norris  y.  •Stoneham,  Civ.App., 
46  S.W.2d  S63. 

94«  Kan. — Southern  Kansas  Stage 
Lines  Co.  v.  Webb,  41  P.2d  1025, 
141  Kan.  '476. 

95.  La. — Prudhome'v.  Cedar  Grove 
Refining  Co.,  App.,  157  So.  158. 

98.  Ariz.— Price  v.  Sunfleld,  112  P. 
2d  210,  57  Ariz.  142. 

Ark, — Hunt  v.  Road  Improvement 
Dist.  No.  12  of  Woodruff  County, 
270  S.W.  961,  168  Ark.  266. 

Colo. — Buchhalter  v.  Myers,  276  (P. 
972,  85  Colo.  419. 

Ga.— Ramey  v.  McCoy.  179  <3.E.  730, 
DL80  Ga.  521. 

111.— Kohler  v.  Kohler,  61  N.E.2d 
687,  326  001.  105— Baxter  v.  Conti- 
nental Illinois  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  Chicago,  26  N.E.2d  179,  304 
IlLApp.  117. 

Kan. — Old  (Peoples  Home  of  Illinois 
Conference  of  Methodist  Episcopal 
Church,  Quincy,  111.,  v.  Miltner,  89 
P.2d  874,  149  Kan.  847. 

Ky.— Braun  v.  ©naith,  178  S.W.2d 
940,  297  Ky.  162— Key  v.  Hays, 
166  e.W.2d  8*0,  292  Ky.  423— 
Jameson  v.  Jameson,  133  S.W.2d 
923,  280  Ky.  654— Berry  v.  Riess, 
121  S.W.2d  942,  276  Ky.  114-<!hes- 
apeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Olive  ECiU,  21  S.W.2d  127,  231  Ky.  I 

128 


65— Rex    Red    Ash    Coal    Co.    T. 
Powers,  290  S.W.  HO 61,  218  Ky.  93. 

Mo. — Verdon  v.  Silvara,  274  S.W.  79, 
308  Mo.  607, 

N.T.— Claris  v.  Richards,  183  N.R 
904,  260  N.T.  419. 

Or. — City  of  (Portland  v.  Hurst,  28 
P.2d  217,  ,145  Or.  415— Robinson 
v.  Oregon  City  Sand  &  Gravel  Co., 
20  OE>2d  1073,  143  Or.  177. 

S.C.— Griggs  v.  Griggs,  19  S.B.2d 
477,  199  S.C.  295. 

S.D.— Hunt  v.  Dolphin,  223  N.W.  84, 
54  3.D.  261. 

Tex. — Neyland  v.  Brown,  170  S.W.Sd 
207,  141  Tex.  253,  modified  on  oth- 
er grounds  172  S.W.2d  89,  141  Tex. 
253 — Saner- Whit eman  Lumber  Co. 
v.  Texas  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.,  Com. 
App.,  288  S.W.  (127,  rehearing  de- 
nied 288  S.W.  1068— Spradlin  v. 
Gibbs,  Civ.App.,  159  S.W.2d  246 — 
International  Order  of  Twelve 
Knights  and  Daughters  of  Tabor 
v.  Fridia,  Civ.App.,  91  S.W.2d  404 
— W.  L.  Moody  Cotton  Co.  v.  IPol- 
ley,  Civ.App.,  66  S.W.2d  807— Card- 
er v.  Knippa  Mercantile  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  1  S.W.2d  462,  error  dismiss- 
ed—San Antonio  Southern  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Burd,  Civ.App.,  246  -S.W.  1060, 
modified  on  other  grounds  Burd 
v.  San  Antonio  Southern  R.  Co., 
Com.App.,  261  S.W.  1021. 

33  C.J.  p  1139  note  52  [b],  p  1151 
note  17  [b],  [c],  19  [a],  p  1152 
note  21  [a],  [c]. 

97.    Ky. — Commonwealth  v.  Kentuc- 
ky   Jockey   Club,    58    S.W.Sd    987, 
238  Ky.  7-39. 
Tex.— Forman   v.    Barroti,    Civ.App., 

120   S.W.2d   827,   error  refused. 
Tort  or  contract  see  infra  $  5-3. 
In  rein  or  in.  personam 

An  action  in   rem  will   not  sup- 
port a  judgment  in  personam. 
N.T.— Sturcke   v.   Link,    26   N.T.S.2d 

7-48,  176  Misc.  93. 
S.C. — Parker   Peanut   Co.   v.   Felder, 

34   S.E.2d   488,   207  S.C.   63. 
Aflsnmpsit;  moneys  had  and  received 
Where    an    action    in    assumpsit 
would  not  lie,  judgment  for  plaintiff 
could  not  be  supported  by  count  for 
moneys  had  and  received.-— Schweit- 
zer v.  Bank  of  America  N.  T.  &  S,  A., 
109  P.2d  441,  42  Cal.App.2d  636. 
Goods  sold  and  delivered*   indebita- 

tos  assunpsit 

The  fact  that  the  declaration 
sought  to  recover  for  goods  sold  and 
delivered  did  not  prevent  recovery 
in  indebitatus  assumpsit,  where  it 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  53 


common  law  a  judgment  must  be  warranted  by  the 
form  of  the  action.98  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  a 
judgment  in  debt  is  erroneous  where  the  declara- 
tion is  in  assumpsit"  or  in  case,1  or  in  replevin;2 
and  similarly  that,  where  the  declaration  is  in  debt, 
a  judgment  in  assumpsit8  or  in  damages4  is  er- 
roneous; but,  by  the  practice  of  the  majority  of 
states,  a  judgment  in  damages  on  a  declaration  in 
debt  will  be  good,  the  objection  being  merely  techni- 
cal,5 and,  vice  versa,  a  judgment  entered  in  debt 
instead  of  in  damages  is  good.6  On  a  declaration  in 
trespass,  a  recovery  in  case  has  been  permitted.7 

In  code  states,  the  common-law  forms  of  plead- 
ing having  been  abolished,  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
courts  to  give  such  judgment  as  the  pleadings  and 
evidence  warrant,  without  regard  to  the  form  or 
name  of  the  action.8 


§  53.    Grounds  of  Action  or  Defense 

As  a  general  rule,  a  Judgment  for  a  plaintiff  must 
be  based  on  the  cause  of  action  which  he  has  alleged, 
and  not  on  some  theory  Inconsistent  with,  or  totally  dif- 
ferent from,  that  suggested  in  his  pleading.  Similarly, 
a  defendant  ordinarily  must  prevail  according  to  the  case 
made  by  his  answer. 

Relief  to,  or  a  recovery  by,  plaintiff  must  be 
based  on,  and  justified  by,  facts  alleged  in  his  plead- 
ing.9 Unless  defendant,  by  his  silence  or  conduct, 
has  acquiesced  in  the  trial  of  the  new  and  different 
cause  of  action  on  which  the  judgment  proceeded, 
as  discussed  supra  §  50,  a  plaintiff  ordinarily  must 
recover,  if  at  all,  on  the  cause  of  action  which  he 
has  alleged,  and  a  judgment  in  his  favor  must  be 
based  on  the  theory  or  ground  of  liability  on  which 
in  his  pleadings  he  has  placed  his  right  to  recover.10 


also  alleged  that  plaintiff  paid  out 
money  at  defendant's  request,  which 
was  supported  by  the  evidence  intro- 
duced.—Campbell  v.  Willis,  290  F. 
271,  53  AppJXC.  296. 

98.  Minn.-— GervaJs    v.     Powers.     1 
Minn.  45. 

33  C.J.  p  1155  note  48. 

99.  Ark.— Jones  v.  Robinson,  8  Ark. 
484. 

33  C.J.  p  1155  note  49. 

1.  Ky. — Lynch     v.     Freeland,     Ky. 
Dec.  269. 

2.  R.I.— Warren  v.  Letter,  52  A.  76. 
24  R.I.  {36. 

33  'C.J.  p  1155  note  51. 

3.  Colo. — Anderson  v.  Sloan,  1  Colo. 
484. 

33  C.J.  p  1155  note  52. 

4.  111.— Ross  v.  Taylor,  68  111.  215. 
33  C.J.  p  1155  note  53. 

5.  Vt.— Carver  v.  Adams,  40  Vt.  552. 
33  C.J.  p  1156  note  54. 

6.  Ala.— iPerdue  v.  Burnett,  Minor  p 
138. 

Ky.— Jenkins  v.  Teates,  2  J.J.Marsh. 
48. 

7.  Pa.— Miller  v.  Lehigh  County.  5 
Pa.Dist.  588. 

33  C.J.  p  1156  note  56. 

8.  U.S. — Lumbermen's  Trust  Co.  v. 
Town  of  Ryegate,  C.OA.Mont.,   61 
F.2d  14. 

Conn.— Makusevich  v.  Gotta,   13-9  A. 

780,  107  Conn.  207. 
Or.— Weith  v.  Klein,  2SS  P.  902,  136 

Or.  201. 
Tex. — Dittmar  v.  Alamo  Nat  Co.,  118 

S.W.2d  298,  132  Tex.  44. 
33  C.J.  p  1156  note  57. 

9.  Ariz.— White  v.  Hamilton,  299  P. 
124,  38  Ariz.  256— City  of  Yuma  v. 
English,   226   P.   531,   26  Ariz.   438. 

Cal. — Bridge  v.  New  Amsterdahi 
Casualty  Co.,  19  'P.2d  76,  129 
Cal.App,  35-5— Westervelt  v.  Mc- 
Cullough,  228  P.  734,  68  CaLApp. 
198— Imperial  Water  Co.  No.  4  v 

49  C.  XS.-9 


Meserve,   217  IP.   553,    62   CaI.App.  j 
603. 

Conn.— Masterton  v.  Lenox  Realty 
Co.,  15  A.2d  11,  127  Conn.  25— 
Frosch  v.  Sears,  Roebuck  &  Co., 
199  A*  646,  124  Conn.  300— <Maz- 
ziottl  v.  Di  Martino,  130  A.  844, 
103  Conn.  491. 

Ga. — Mendel  v.  Converse  &  Co.,  118 
S.E.  586,  30  Ga,App.  5*49. 

Ind.— Indianapolis  Real  Estate 
Board  v.  Willson,  187  N.E.  400,  $8 
Ind.  App.  72. 

Minn.— Hurr  v.  Davis,  198  N.W.  943, 
155  Minn.  456,  rehearing  denied 
194  N.W.  379,  155  Minn.  456,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  44  S.Ct  36,  263  U.S. 
709,  68  L.Ed..  518,  and  error  dis- 
missed 45  S.Ct  227,  267  U.S.  572, 
69  L.Ed.  794. 

Mo. — Bragg  v.  Specialty  Shoe  (Ma- 
chinery Co.,  84  <S.W.2d  184,  225 
Mo.App.  902. 

Mont.— Kramlich  v.  Tullock,  277  P. 
411,  84  Mont.  601. 

N.Y.— Garflnkel  &  Steinberg  Corpo- 
ration v.  Bandlers  Sutphin,  Inc., 
299  N.Y.-S.  536,  252  App.Div.  858 
— Blackwell  v.  Glidden  Co.,  203 
N.Y.S.  380,  208  App.Div.  317,  af- 
firmed 147  NJB.  188,  239  N.T.  5'45 
— MacLeold  v.  Miller,  201  N.Y.S. 
108. 

N.C.— Barron  v.  Cain,  4  S.E.2d  618, 
216  N.C.  282. 

Tenn. — Polk  v.  Chattanooga  Wagon 
&  Body  Co.,  2  Tenn.App.  415. 

Tex.— Jackson  v.  Cloer,  Civ.  App.,  9$ 
S.W.2d  353 — Smoot  &  Smoot  v. 
Nelson,  Civ.App.,  11  S.W.2d  578— 
Hall  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  Civ.App., 
252  S.W.  328,  modified  on  other 
grounds  254  S.W.  522. 

Utah. — Stevens  &  Wallis  v.  Golden 
Porphyry  Mines  Co.,  18  P.24  303, 
81  Utah  414. 

33  O.J.  P  1156  note  60,  p  1157  note 
61. 

Cause  or  theory  asserted  in  reply 
(1)     Ordinarily    a    judgment    may 

129 


not  be  rendered  on  a  cause  of  action 

asserted  in  a  reply. 

Ky. — Hacker  v.  Clay  County,  165  S. 

W.2d  172,  291  Ky.  614. 
Mo.— Regal  Realty  &  Investment  Co. 

v.  Gallagher,  188  S.W.  151. 
33  C.J.  p  1156  note  60  [d]. 

(2)     Where   plaintiff   in  his   com-    • 
plaint   sought   recovery    of    land    on 
the  theory  that  a  deed  to  him  was  an 
absolute  .conveyance,   and  defendant 
In  his  answer  claimed  that  the  deed 
was  in  fact  a  mortgage,  and,  where 
plaintiff  in  his  reply  sought  foreclo- 
sure' if  the  deed  were  found  to  be  a 
mortgage,  it  was  held  that  a  judg- 
ment directing  foreclosure  was  Jus-, 
tified  where  the  court  found  that  the 
deed    was    a    mortgage. — Church    v. 
Brown,  272  P.  511,  150  Wash.  173. 
New  complaint 

If  court  permits  filing  of  new  com- 
plaint to  conform  to-  proof,  judgment 
should  relate  to  new  pleading. — Bak- 
ersfield  Sandstone  Brick  Co.  v.  Cas- 
cade Oil  Co.,  23  P.2d  423,  132  CaL 
App.  633. 
liability  as  indorser 

Defendants  could  not  be  held  as 
indorsers  on  note  where  pleading 
showed  that  action  was  not  brought 
on  note. — Kern  v.  Henry,  31  P.2d  454, 
138  CaLApp.  46. 
10.  U.S.— State  Street  Trust  Co.  v. 

U.    S.,    D.C.Mass.,    37    F.Supp.    846. 

affirmed,    C.C.A.,    U.    S.    v.    State 

Street  Trust  Co.,  124  !F.2d  948. 
Ala. — Chandler  v.  Price,  15  So.M  462, 

244  Ala.  667. 
Ariz. — Jones  v.   Stanley,  233  P.  698, 

27  Ariz.  381. 
HI. — Wood  v.  Wood,  App.,  -64  N.E.2d 

385-^First  Trust  Joint  Stock  Land 

Bank  of  Chicago  v.  Cutler,  12  N.E. 
'    2d   705,   293   IlLApp.    354 — Streeter 

y.  .Humrichouse,  261  IlLApp.  556. 
Ind. — City   of   Muncie   v.   Horlacher, 

53  N.B.3d  631,  222  Ind.. 302. 
La.— Hope  v.   Madison,   183  So.  711, 

192  (La.  59$, 


§  53 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Plaintiff  cannot  set  up  one  cause  of  action  in  his 
complaint  and  recover  on  proof  of  another  and  a 
different  cause  of  action;  nor  can  he  recover  on 


some  theory  not  suggested  in  his  declaration  or  com- 
plaint.11    It  is  particularly  true  that  recovery  on 


Me. — Morrison  v.  Union  Park  Ass'n, 
149  A.  804,  129  Me.  S8. 

Minn. — Consumers'  Grain  Qo.  v.  Wm. 
Lindeke  Roller  Mills,  190  N.W.  65, 
153  Minn.  231. 

Mo.— Pinet  v.  Pinet,  App.,  191  S.W.Sd 
362 — Palmer  v.  Marshall,  App.,  2-4 
S.W.2d  229. 

N.Y. — Jno.  Dunlop's  "Sons  v.  Alpren, 
212  N.Y.S.  307,  214  App.Div.  339— 
Varda  v.  Lynch,  19-6  N.Y.S.  641, 
203  App.Div.  53*9 — -Carroll  v.  Dryo- 
lin  Corporation,  45  N.Y.S.2d  77,  182 
Misc.  260 — Rochester  Poster  Adv. 
Co.  T.  Sm'lthers,  224  N.Y.'S.  711, 
130  Misc.  676,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  231  N.Y.S.  315,  2'24  App. 
Div.  435— Siegler  v.  Bischof,  53  N. 
Y.S.2d  657— Kirkpatrick  Home  for 
Childless  Women  v.  Kenyon,  196 
N.Y.S.  475,  affirmed  199  N.Y.S.  '851, 
206  App.Div.  728. 

N.C.— Balentine  v.  Gill,  11  S.E.2d  456, 
218  N.C.  496— Wallace  v.  Wallace, 
188  S.B.  96.  210  N.C.  656. 

Ohio. — Thompson  v.  Thompson,  181 
N.E.  272,  42  Ohio  App.  164. 

Pa.— In  re  Miller,  Com.Pl.,  32  Del. 
'Co.  'Se*. 

Tex. — Nu-Enamel  Paint  Co.  of  Texas 
v.  Culmore,  Civ.App.,  T2  S.W.2d 
390 — Tinsley  v.  Metzler,  Civ. App., 
44  S.W.2d  820,  error  dismissed — 
Gibbs  v.  Corbett,  Civ.App.,  292  S. 
W.  260 — Superior  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
C.  S.  Lee  Grain  &  Elevator  Co., 
Civ.App.,  261  S.W.  212— Trott  v. 
Flato,  Civ.App.,  244  S.W.  1085. 

33  C.J.  p  1157  note  62,  p  1158  note 

66,  p  1159  note  67. 

« 
Estoppel 

Where  a  complaint  failed  to  allege 
facts  constituting1  an  estoppel,  a 
Judgment  on  that  ground  cannot  "be 
upheld,  whether  a  cause  of  action 
could  or  could  not  have  been  main- 
tained, had  it  been  pleaded. — Gibral- 
tar Realty  Co.  v.  Security  Trust  Co., 
1.36  NiE.  636,  192  Ind.  502. 

Pailnre  of  consideration, 

In  action  by  purchaser  for  rescis- 
sion of  contract,  relief  could  not  be 
granted  for  failure  of  consideration 
where  such  failure  was  not  pleaded. 
— Clancy  v.  Becker-Arbuckle-Wright 
Corporation,  29  P.2d  868,  137  Cal. 
App.  43. 
Interest  in  land 

Petition  alleging  an  agreement  to 
purchase  land  and  divide  profits  on 
resale,  but  not  alleging  that  plain- 
tiff was  to  have  any  interest  in  the 
land,  would  not  support  a  judgment 
for  a  portion  of  the  land  still  un- 
sold.— Carothers  v.  Creighton,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  101  S.W.Sd  631. 
11.  U.S. — Storm  Waterproofing  Cor- 
poration v.  Li.  Sonneborn  Sons,  D. 
CDel.,  28  F.2d  115— Durabilt  Steel 


iLocker  Co.  v.  Berger  Mfg.  Co.,  D. 
O.0hio,  21  F.2d  139. 

Colo. — Rio  Grande  Fuel  Co.  v.  Col- 
orado Central  Power  Co.,  63  P. 
2d  470,  99  Colo.  395. 

Conn. — Conzelman  v.  City  of  Bristol, 
188  A.  -659,  122  Conn.  218. 

Fla. — Gruber  v.  Cobey,  12  So.2d  461, 
152  Fla.  591— Foye  Tie  &  Timber 
Co.  v.  Jackson,  97  So.  517,  '86  Fla. 
97. 

Ga. — Southern  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ed- 
wards, 117  S.E.  252,  30  Ga.App. 
223. 

111. — Jacksonville  Hotel  Bldg.  Corpo- 
ration v.  Dunlap  Hotel  Co.,  264  111, 
App.  279,  modified  on  other 
grounds  183  N.E.  397,  550  111.  451. 

Ind. — Gibraltar  Realty  Co.  v.  Se- 
curity Trust  Co.,  136  N.E.  636,  192 
Ind.  '502 — Denney  v.  Peters,  10  N. 
E.2d  7-54,  104  Ind.App.  504— Nes- 
bitt  v.  Miller,  188  N.E.  702,  98  Ind. 
App.  195. 

Kan. — Harveyville  State  Bank  v.  Lee, 
234  P.  982,  118  Kan.  269. 

Ky.— Smith  v.  Collins,  '251  S.W.  979, 
199  Ky.  T70. 

Me. — Page  v.  Bourgon,  22  A.2d  577, 
138  Me.  113. 

Mo.— Smith  v.  Thompson,  161  'S.W. 
2d  232,  349  Mo.  396— State  ex  rel. 
Kennedy  v.  Remmers,  101  S.W.2d 
70,  540  Mo.  126 — Zamora  v.  Wood- 
men of  the  World  Life  Ins.  Soc., 
App.,  157  S.W.2d  601 — Wasson  v. 
Dow/ App.,  251  S.W.  69. 

Mont. — Outlook  Farmers'  Elevator 
Co.  v.  American  'Surety  Co.  of  New 
York,  223  P.  905,  70  Mont.  «. 

N.Y. — Kew  Gardens  Corporation  v. 
Ciro's  Plaza,  26  N.Y.S.2d  553,  2-61 
App.Div.  5*76 — Douglass  v.  Wolcott 
Storage  &  Ice  Co.,  295  N.Y.S.  675, 
251  App.Div.  79 — Berger  v.  Eichler, 
207  N.Y.S.  147,  211  App.Div.  479— 
Security  Bank  of  New  York  v. 
Finkelstein,  145  N.Y.S.  5,  160  App. 
Div.  315,  affirmed  112  N.B.  1076, 
217  N.Y.  707— Bernstein  v.  East 
167th  Street  Corporation,  293  N. 
Y.S.  109,  161  Misc.  836?— Rosen- 
blum  v.  Pas  Holding  Corporation, 
28  N.Y.S.2d  '589. 

Or. — McCann  v.  Oregon  Scenic  Trips 
Co.,  209  P.  483,  105  Or.  213,  fol- 
lowed in  'Smith  v.  Oregon  Scenic 
Trips  Co.,  209  P.  486,  10'5  Or,  222. 

S.D. — Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Frick,  245  N.W.  921,  -61  S.D.  9. 

Tex. — Johnson  Aircrafts  v.  Wilborn, 
Civ.App.,  190  S.W.2d  426— City  of 
Temple  v.  Mitchell,  Civ.App.,  180 
S.W.2d  959— City  State  Bank  in 
Wellington  v.  Wellington  Inde- 
pendent School  Diet,  Civ.App.,  173 
S.W.2d  738,  affirmed  178  S.W.2d 
114,  142  Tex.  344— Chamblin  v. 
Webb,  Civ.App.,  155  S.W.2d  676— 
Strack  v.  Strong,  Ctv.App.,  114  S. 

130 


W.2d  313,  error  dismissed — Stuard 
v.  Vick,  Civ.App.,  9  S.W.2d  494, 
error  dismissed — Rockhold  v. 
Lucky  Tiger  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  4 
S.W.2d  1046,  error  dismissed — 
American  Law  Book  Co.  v.  Dykes, 
Civ.App.,  4  S.W.2d  630— First  State 
Bank  of  Wortham  v.  Bland,  Civ. 
App.,  291  S.W.  650— C.  A.  Bryant 
Co.  v.  Hamlin  Independent  School 
Dist.,  Civ.App.,  274  S.W.  266. 
Wis. — Lee  v.  Pauly  Motor  Truck  Co., 

190  N.W.  '819,  179  Wis.  139. 
33  C.J.  p  1157  note  62,  p  1159  note  67. 
Public  or  private  way 

In  a  suit  brought  on  the  theory  of 
the  existence  of  a  private  way,  judg- 
ment cannot  be  based  on  the  theory 
that  the  road  or  way  was  a  public 
one. 
Cal.— Hare  v.  Craig,  276  P.  336,  206 

Cal.  753. 

Utah. — Thornley    Land    &    Livestock 
Co.  v.  Morgan  Bros.  Land  &  Live- 
stock Cd,  17  P.2d  '826,  81  Utah  817. 
Contract  as  oral  or  written 

(1)  Judgment  on  wholly  written 
contract  has  no  support  in  pleadings 
declaring  on  partly  written  contract. 
— C.  A.  Bryant  Co.  v.  Hamlin  Inde- 
pendent School  Dist.,  Civ.App.,  IS  S. 
W.2d     750,     certified    questions    an- 
swered 14  S.W.2d  53,  118  Tex.  255. 

(2)  In  suit  to  recover  for  inter- 
ference with  contract,   where   plain- 
tiff  alleged   a   contract    in   writing, 
plaintiff   was   not   entitled   to   relief 
for   interference   with  an   oral   con- 
tract collateral  to  written  contract. — 
Tompkins  v.  Sullivan,  48  N.E.2d  15, 
313  Mass.  459. 

Negligence;   trespass 

(1)  Where    the    allegations    and 
trial    are   based    exclusively   on   the 
theory  of  negligence,  recovery  on  a 
ground  other  than  negligence  is  not 
permissible. 

Conn. — Epstein  v.  City  of  New  Ha- 
ven, 132  A.  467,  104  Conn.  283. 

N.Y. — Rock  v.  Radice  Electric  Co., 
223  N.Y.S.  659,  131  Misc.  51. 

33  C.J.  p  1158  note  66  [a]  (1),  (5), 
C7),  p  1159  note  67  [a]  (2). 

(2)  A   judgment   based  on   negli- 
gence   is    not   supported    by   allega- 
tions solely  of  trespass. 

Mo.— Mawson  v.  Vess  Beverage  Co., 

App.,  173  S.W.-2d  606. 
Tex. — Michels    v.    Crouch,    Civ.App., 

122  S.W.2d  '211. 

53  C.J.  p  1159  note  67  [a]  (10),  (11). 
ISTature  of  tenancy 

Where  plaintiffs  alleged  and  trial 
proceeded  on  theory  that  defendants 
were  hold-over  tenants  for  one  year, 
it  was  error  to  grant  judgment  for 
plaintiffs  on  ground  that  tenancy 
was  from  month  to  month  and  that 
proper  notice  of  intention  to  quit 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


53 


an  inconsistent  theory  will  not  be  permitted.12  In 
some  jurisdictions,  however,  a  party  is  entitled  to 
any  relief  appropriate  to  the  facts  alleged  and 
proved,  irrespective  of  the  theory  on  which  they 
may  be  alleged  j1*  and  the  fact  that  a  party  has 
pleaded  an  erroneous  theory  does  not  bar  him  from 
recovering  if  the  facts  he  has  pleaded  support  a 
proper  theory  of  recovery.** 

Proof  of  a  different  cause  of  action  from  that  al- 
leged in  the  declaration  or 'complaint  amounts  to  a 
failure  of  proof,  and  is  not  a  mere  variance;15 
but,  where  the  substantial  facts  creating  the  liabili- 


ty are  alleged  and  proved,  a  recovery  may  be  had, 
although  they  are  alleged  inaccurately  in  detail,  be- 
cause this  does  not  amount  to  a  change  of  theory 
or  a  recovery  on  grounds  not  alleged.16  Where  re- 
covery is  sought  on  several  grounds,  a  judgment 
supported  by  one  of  the  grounds  is  proper  notwith- 
standing the  failure  to  establish  the  other  grounds 
of  liability;17  but  in  such  case  the  judgment  must 
be  supported  by  all  the  elements  of  at  least  one  of 
the  different  grounds  of  recovery.18 

Ordinarily  defendant  must  prevail,  if  at  all,  ac- 
cording to  the  case  made  by  his  answer  ;19  but  this 


had    not    been    given. — McAuley    v. 

Cresci,  19  N.Y.S.2d  221. 

Recovery   wider   different    statutory 

provision, 

(1)  Plaintiff   cannot  sue   on   one 
statute   and   sustain   verdict  Justifi- 
able only  on  different  statute. — Bat- 
terton   v.   Pima  County,  271  P.  720, 
34  Ariz.  347. 

(2)  However,       although       facts 
proved  did  not  make  out  breach  of 
warranty  under  subdivision  of  stat- 
ute   on    which    plaintiff   relied,    but 
made  out  breach  of  warranty  under 
another    subdivision,    plaintiff    was 
held  entitled  to  judgment — Ryan  v. 
Progressive-Grocery  Stores,  175  N.E. 
105.  255  N.T.  3'88,  74  A.L.R.  339. 
Retention  of  property 

Buyer's  complaint  to  recover  price 
of  property  after  rescission  for 
breach  .of  warranty  and  offer  to  re- 
turn did  not  authorize  judgment 
based  on  breach  of  warranty  per- 
mitting buyer  to  keep  the  property. 
— Schmelzer  v.  Winegar,  216  N.Y.S. 
507,  217  App.Div.  194. 
12.  Ark. — H.  V.  Beasley  Music  Co. 

v.   Cash,    262    S.W.    656,    164   Ark. 

572. 
Colo. — Cattell  v.  Denver  State  Bank, 

225  P.  271,  75  Colo.  150. 
N.Y.— Lunger  v.  New  York  Life  Ins. 

Co.,   225   N.Y.S.  730,  131  Misc.  42. 
33  C.J.  p  1160  note  68. 
Affirmance    of   contract 

Where  purchaser  elected  to  affirm 
contract  and  sued  for  damages  for 
breach,  the  court  was  without  au- 
thority to  render  judgment  for  can- 
cellation of  deed  and  a  return  of  the 
purchase  price. — Freeman  v.  Ander- 
son, Tex.Civ.App.,  119  S.W.2d  1081. 
Rescission;  fraud 

Decree  for  rescission  of  sale  of 
stock  was  unauthorized  where  pur- 
chaser sued  for  damages  for  fraud. 
— Bondurant  v.  Raven  CJoal  Co.,  Mo. 
App.,  25  S.W.2d  566. 
Property  as  community  or  separate 

Judgment  for  plaintiff  on  finding 
that  property  awarded  her  was  sep- 
arate property  required  reversal, 
where  her  pleadings  alleged  that  it 
was  community  property. — Bray  v. 
Bray,  Tex.Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  625. 


13L  CaL — Estrin  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Sacramento  County,  96 
P.2d  340,  14  Cal.2d  670— Lucas  v. 
Assodacao  Protectora  Uniao  Mad- 
eirense  Do  Estado  Da  California, 
143  P.2d  53,  61  Cal.App.2d  344— 
Bank  of  America  Nat  Trust  & 
Savings  Ass'n  v.  Casady,  59  P.2d 
444,  15  Cal.App.2d  163— Lacey  v. 
McConnell,  48  P.2d  161,  9  Cal.App. 
2d  6. 
Accounting1 

If  plaintiff  has  a  cause  of  action 
of  which  court  has  jurisdiction,  and 
accounting  is  necessary  to  determine 
his  rights,  accounting  will  be  or- 
dered "  regardless  of  erroneous  legal 
theory  on  which  the  action  is  based. 
— Nelson  v.  Abraham,  CaLApp.,  162 
P.2d  833. 

14.  Cal.— Mannon  v.  Pesula,  139  P. 
2d  336,  59  Cal.App.2d  597. 

15»     Wash. — McLachlan    v.    Gordon, 

150  P.  441,  86  Wash.  282. 
33  C.J.  P  1158  note  64. 

10.    Va. — Lawson  v.  Conoway,  1-6  S. 

E.  564,  37  W.Va,  159/18  L.R.A.  G27, 

35  Am.S.R.  17. 
33  C.J.  p  1160  note  69. 
Actions  on  notes 

(1)  Judgment    for    plaintiff    was 
not  erroneous  on  ground  that  plain- 
tiff declared  on  promissory  note  £.nd 
proved   defendant  Indebted  on   bills 
of  exchange. — ^tna  Inv.  Corporation 
v.   Barnes,   Mo.App.,   52   S.W.2d  221. 

(2)  Where   complaint   was   based 
on  note  given  for  money  loaned,  con- 
tention  that  judgment   was   entered 
for  money  loaned,  and  hence  was  im- 
proper, was  without  merit. — Casset- 
ta  v.  Bairaa,  288  P.  330,  106  CaLApp. 
196. 

17.  Ala. — Robinson  v.  Solomon  Bros. 
Co.,  155  So.  553,  229  Ala.  137. 

Ind. — American   Carloading  Corpora- 
tion   v.     Gary    Trust    &    Savings 
Bank,  25  N.E.2d  777,  216  Ind.  649. 
y.— Peck  v.  Trail,  65  S.W.2d  83,  2-51 
Ky.  377. 

Wis. — Krier  Preserving  Co.  v.  West 
Bend  Heating  &  Lighting  Co.,  225 
N.W.  200,  198  Wis.  595. 

18.  Tex.— West  Texas  Utilities  Co. 

131 


v.    Dunlap,    Civ.App.,    175    S.W.2d 
749. 

19.  U.S. — El  Dorado  Terminal  Co.  v. 
General  American  Tank  Car  Cor- 
poration, C.C.A.Cal.,  104  P.2d  903, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  60  S.Ct 
325,  308  U.S.  422,  84  L.Ed.  361,  re- 
hearing denied  60  S.Ct  4-65,  309 
U.S.  694,  84  L.Ed.  1035. 

CaL— -Brown  v.  Sweet,  272  P.  614,  95 
CaLApp.  117. 

Ga. — Alliance  Ins.  Co.  v.  Williamson, 
137  S.E.  277,  36  Ga.App.  497— 
Stewart  v.  Hardin,  101  S.E.  716,  24 
Ga.App.  611. 

111. — Rosenthal  v.  Board  of  Educa- 
tion of  City  of  Chicago,  110  N.E. 
579,  270  111.  380— Thulin  v.  Ander- 
son, 154  Ill.App.  41. 

Iowa. — Hornish  v.  Overton,  221  N.W. 
483,  206  Iowa  780. 

La. — Homes  v.  James  Buckley  &  Co., 
116  So.  218,  165  La.  874. 

Mass. — Shattuck  v.  Wood  Memorial 
Home,  66  .N.E.2d  568— Pollard  v. 
Ketterer,  108  N.B.  1086,  221  Mass. 
317. 

Mo.— Lebrecht  v.  New  State  Bank, 
Woodward,  OkL,  205  S.W.  273,  199 
Mo.App.  -642— White  v.  United 
Brothers  and  Sisters  of  Mysteri- 
ous Ten,  App.,  180  S.W.  406. 

N.Y.— Marshall  v.  Sackett  &  Wil- 
helms  Co.,  151  N.Y.S.  1045,  166 
App.Div.  141— Continental  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  New  York  v.  Good- 
ner,  49  N.Y.S.2d  747 — Junco  v.  La 
Cabana,  Inc.,  20  N.Y.S.2S  781,  af- 
firmed 25  N.Y.S.2d  779,  261  App. 
Div.  803. 

Or.— Wolf  v.  Hougham,  12*5  P.  801, 
62  Or.  264. 

Pa. — Gliwa  v.  U.  S.  Steel  Corpora- 
tion, 185  A.  $84,  322  Pa.  225,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  57  S.Ct  117,  299 
U.S.  593,  81  L.Ed.  437— McCormick 
v.  Harris,  196  A.  885,  130  Pa.Super. 
175. 

Tex. — Dashiel  v.  Lott,  Com.App.,  243 
S.W.  1072— Ohastain  v.  Gilbert, 
Civ.App.,  145  S.W.Sd  938— Wardy 
v.  Casner,  Civ.App.,  108  S.W.2d  772,~ 
error  dismissed— Sproles  v.  Rosen, 
Civ.App.,  47  S.W.2d  331,  affirmed  84 
S.W.2d  1001,  126  Tex.  51— Bennett 
V.  Giles,  Civ.App.f  12  S.W.2d  843— 


§  53 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


is  not  unqualifiedly  true,20  and,  where  the  burden  of 
proof  is  on  plaintiff,  defendant  is  entitled  to  take 
advantage  of  a  failure  of  proof,  regardless  of  the 
pleadings.21 

Tort  or  contract.  A  pleading  sounding  in  tort 
will  not  support  a  judgment  based  on  a  contract,22 
and  conversely,  under  a  pleading  on  a  caiise  of  ac- 
tion sounding  in  contract,  a  recovery  as  for  a  tort 
is  erroneous.2*  it  has  been  held  that  these  rules 
have  not  been  changed  by  code  provisions;24  but 
it  has  also  been  held  that,  under  statutes  abolish- 
ing forms  of  action  and  requiring  that  merits  only 
shall  be  considered,  recovery  may  be  had  in  con- 
.  tract,  if  the  allegations  and  proof  support  such  a 
right,  although  the  declaration  sounds  in  tort.25 
Where  a  pleading  sets  forth  two  causes  of  action, 
one  in  contract  and  the  other  in  tort,  and  defendant 
has  not  requested  a  separation  of  the  causes,  plain- 


Oscar  v.    Sackville,    Civ.App.,    253 

'S.W.  651. 

33  C.J.  p  1161  note  75. 
Failure  of  consideration;   fraud 

Where  defense  pleaded  in  an  ac- 
tion on  contract  was  failure  of  con- 
sideration, but  case  was  submitted 
to  jury  on  theory  of  fraudulent  rep- 
resentations whereby  defendant  was 
fraudulently  induced  to  execute  con- 
tract sued  on,  judgment  for  defend- 
ant could  not  stand.— Chamblin^v. 
Webb,  Tex.Civ.App.,  155  S.W.2d  676. 

Bight  of  way 

In  action  to  Quiet  title  to  land  en- 
cumbered with  right  of  way,  judg- 
ment for  designated  defendants 
could  not  be  sustained  on  ground 
that  suit  established  way  of  neces- 
sity, where  such  right  was  not  al- 
leged or  adjudicated.— Bertolina  v. 
Frates,  57  P.2d  346,  89  Utah  238. 
Deduction  of  premium 

Insurer,  defending  on  single  the- 
ory that  policy  was  void,  was  not  en- 
titled to  deduction  for  unpaid  premi- 
um—Masson  v.  New  England  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  260  P.  367,  85  CaLApp. 
633. 
go,  K.Y.— Whiting  v.  Glass,  111 

IB.  1082,  217  N.Y.  335. 
33  'C.J.  p  H61  note  76. 
Inability  to  plead  laches 

Where  the  theory  that  plaintiff's 
case  was  based  on  fraud  was  flrsi 
disclosed  by  his  reply  and  was  noi 
indicated  by  the  complaint  so  that 
defendant  could  not  plead  laches,  al- 
though he  was  entitled  to  do  so,  de- 
fendant was  nevertheless  entitled  to 
insist  on  such  defense  if  there  was 
evidence  to  support  it.— -Crosby  v 
Bobbins,  182  P.  12-2,  66  Mont.  179. 
21.  Wash.— Easter  v.  Hall,  40  P 

728,  12  Wash.  160. 
33  C.J.  P  H61  n°te  77. 


tiff  may  recover  on  either  one  which  he  may 
prove,2*  although  he  may  not  recover  on  both.27 

General  and  special  assumpsit.  Plaintiffs  who 
sue  on  a  special  or  express  contract  ordinarily  can- 
not recover  on  an  implied  contract,  such  as  a  quan- 
tum meruit,  and  vice  versa,28  although  in  some  cas- 
es such  recovery  has  been  permitted.29  Where  the 
declaration  or  complaint  contains  counts  or  allega- 
tions seeking  recovery  on  an  implied  contract  apart 
from  the  special  contract,  a  recovery  thereon  may 
be  had.80  Under  the  common  counts  no  recovery 
may  be  had  for  breach  of  a  special  contract.31 

Legal  or  equitable.  Under  codes  and  practice  acts 
it  has  frequently  been  made  the  duty  of  the  court 
to  grant  such  relief  as  the  complaint  and  the  proof 
thereunder  show  plaintiff  entitled  to  receive,  with- 
out any  distinction  between  law  and  equity.32  The 
relief  granted,  however,  must  nevertheless  be  con- 
sistent with  the  case  made  by  the  complaint.33  If 

Recovery  Held  proper 

A  contract  to  act  as  defendant's 
business  agent,  although  not  con- 
templating lawsuits,  necessarily  in- 
cluded services  in  connection  there- 
with if  necessary,  as  in  procuring 
witnesses,  and  hence  recovery  for 
such  services  was  on  the  express 
contract  pleaded  aJid  not  on  an  im- 
plied contract — Crawford's  Adm'r  v. 
Ross,  186  S.W.2d  797,  -299  Ky.  664. 


22.    U.S.-^Tohnston   v.   Venturing   C. 

€.A.Pa.,  -294  P.  S3 6. 
Tex.— Joe  B.   Winslett,   Inc.  v.  City 

of    Hamlin,    Civ.App.,    "56    S.W.2d 

237— McFaddin    v.    Sims,    97    S.W. 

335,    45    Tex.Civ.App.   598. 
33  C.J.  p  1161  note  73. 
Fraud 

Judgment   cannot   be   rendered   as 
on   contract  or  in  assumpsit  where 
the  complaint  is  in  fraud.  . 
Mich. — Barber   v.    Kolowich,    277   N. 

W.  189,  283  Mich.  97. 
N.Y.— Smith  v.  Cohen,  175  N.E.  361, 

'256  N.Y.  33. 
33  C.J.  p  1161  note  78  [b]. 
Conversion 

Plaintiff  electing  to  sue  In  con 
version  could  not  recover  in  as- 
sumpsit for  money  had  and  received. 
— Maxol  Syndicate  v.  N.  T.  Hege- 
man  Co.,  245  N.Y.S.  99,  158  Misc. 
179. 

23.  Tex._joe    B.    Winslett,    Inc.    v. 
City  of  Hamlin,  Civ.App.,  56  S.W. 
2d  237. 

33  C.J.  p  1161  note  79. 

24.  N.Y.— Degraw  v.  Elmore,  50  N 
Y.  1. 

33  C.J.  P  H62  note  80. 

25.  Miss.^Southeastern  Exp.  Co.  v 
Namie,  181  So.  515,  182  Miss.  447 

23.  Colo.— Erisman  v.  McCarty,  236 
P.  ?77,  77  Colo.  289. 

27.  Colo. — Erisman  v.  McCarty,  su- 
pra. 

281     Ind. — Indianapolis    Real    Estat 

Board  v.  Willson,  187  N.E.  400,  9 

Ind.App.  72. 
Me. — Dufour  v.  Stebbins,  145  A.  893 

128  Me.  133. 
N.Y.-^Sears    v.    Hetfield,    221   N.Y.S 

494,  220  App.Div.  725. 
33  C.J.  p  1160  note  70. 


29.  CaL— Warder  v.  Hutchison,   231 
P.  563,  69  CaLApp.  291, 

33  C.J.  P  1161  note  71. 

30.  S.C.— Cleveland  v.  Butler,  78  S. 
E.  SI,  94  S.C.  406. 

!  -C.J.  p  1161  note  T2. 

31.  Mich.— £5ook  v.  Bade,   158  N.W. 
175,  191  Mich.  561. 

53  C.J.  p  11-61  note  73. 

32.  Cal.— Waters  v.  Woods,  42  P.2d 
1072,    5    Cal.App.2d    483— Arbucklo 
v.  Clifford  F.  Reid,  Inc.,  4  P.2d  978, 
118  CaLApp.  272. 

Okl. — Fernow    v.    Gubser,    162    P.2d 
529 — Owens  v.   Purdy,   217  P.   425, 
90  Okl.  2'56. 
33  C.J.  p  1162  note  83. 
Enforcement  of  legal  right*  accord. 

Ing  to  rules  of  law 
Where,  although  plaintiff  asks 
equitable  relief,  he  alleges  and 
proves  only  such  facts  as  entitle  him 
to  strict  legal  rights,  court  will  en- 
force his  legal  rights,  but  only  ac- 
cording to  strict  rules  of  law. — 
Grant  v.  Hart,  14  S.B.2d  860,  192  Ga. 
153. 

33.  MO.— Congregation   B'Nai   Abra- 
ham  v.   Arky,   20  S.W.2d  1899,   323 
Mo.  '776— Bragg  v.   Specialty  Shoe 
Machinery  Co.,  54  S.W.2d  1*4,  225 
Mo.App.  90*2. 

33  C.J.  p  1162  note  84. 


132 


49    G.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


|54 


the  complaint  is  framed  solely  for  equitable  relief, 
even  under  the  code,  where  the  same  court  admin- 
isters both  systems  of  law  and  equity,  the  party 
must  maintain  his  equitable  action  on  equitable 
grounds  or  fail,  even  though  he  may  prove  a  good 
cause  of  action  at  law  on  the  trial84  Averment 
of  an  equitable  cause  of  action  and  proof  of  only 
a  legal  cause  of  action  has  been  held  to  be  a  vari- 
ance amounting  to  a  failure  of  proof;85  but,  where 
an  equitable  cause  of  action  is  established,  the  judg- 
ment may  award  legal  relief,  as  for  example,  by 
way  of  damages,  in  lieu  of  equitable  relief  which 
in  the  particular  case  is  impracticable  or  inequita- 
ble.86 Where  the  facts  alleged  will  support  either 
legal  or  equitable  relief,  or  both,8?  or  where,  by  ac- 
quiescence and  failure  to  object,  the  issues  have 
been  broadened  so  as  to  include  the  legal  cause  of 
action,88  a  judgment  on  the  legal  cause  of  action 
is  proper,  although  the  equity  fails.  Where  the 
complaint  alleges  only  a  cause  of  action  at  law, 
and  the  proof  fails  to  establish  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion alleged,  equitable  relief  ordinarily  will  not  be 


awarded,  although  it  appears  that  plaintiff  would 
be  entitled  thereto  on  a  properly  framed  com- 
plaint;89 but  equitable  relief  may  be  granted,  al- 
though only  legal  relief  is  prayed,  where  both  the 
allegations  and  the  proofs  show  that  plaintiff  is  en- 
titled to  equitable  relief.40 

§  54.    Amount  of  Recovery 

a.  In  general 

b.  Interest 

a.  In  General 

The  judgment  must  conform  to  the  pleadings  and 
proof  with  respect  to  the  amount  of  the  recovery,  al- 
though a  recovery  for  more  than  the  sum  demanded  may 
be  proper  where  permitted  by  statute,  or  where  by  con- 
sent  of  the  parties  the  pleadings  have  been  enlarged  by 
the  evidence.  An  excessive  judgment,  although  erro- 
neous and  subject  to  correction,  Is  not  on  that  account 
void. 

In  amount,  as  in  other  respects,  a  judgment  must 
conform  to,  and  be  supported  by,  the  pleadings41 
and  the  proof.42  A  judgment  for  more  than  the 


34.  Or. — McCann    v.    Oregon    Scenic 
Trips  Co.,  209  P.  483,  105  Or.  213, 
followed  in  Smith  v.  Oregon  Scenic 
Trips  Co.,  209  P.  486,  105  Or.  222. 

33  C.J.  p  1162  note  85. 

35.  N.Y.-- Jackson  v.  Strong  118  N. 
E.  512,  222  N.T.  149. 

33  C.J.  p  1163  note  86. 

36.  111.— Stella    v.    Mosele,    27   N.B. 
2d  559,  305  111.  App.  577, 

33  C.J.  p  1163  note  87. 

Retention    of  jurisdiction  by   equity 

to  afford  legal  relief  see  Equity  § 

69. 

37.  U.S. — Hagar   v.    Townsend,    C.C. 
N.T.,   $7   •P.    433,   affirmed   72   Fed. 
949,   19  C.C.A.  256. 

33  C.J.  p  1163  note  89. 

38.  N.Y. — Fairchild  v.  -Lynch,  42  N. 
Y  Super.  265. 

33  C.J.  p  1163  note  90. 
Issues  broadened  by  consent  see  su- 
pra $50. 

39.  N.C.— McParland  v.  Cornwell,  66 
S.E/454,  1-51  N.C.  42'8. 

33  C.J.  p  1163  note  92. 

40.  N.Y.— Hale  T.  Omaha  Nat.  Bank, 
49  N.Y.   626. 

33  C.J.  p  1163  note  93. 

41.  Ky. — Asher  v.  Pioneer  Coal  Co., 
283   S.W.   954,  214  Ky.  505. 

La. — Ethrldge-Atkins  Corporation  v. 
Abraham,  App.,  160  So.  817— Unity 
Plan  Finance  Co.,  v.  Green,  App., 
148  So.  297,  annulled  on  other 
grounds  151  So.  85,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  155  So.  900,  179 
La.  1070 — Bird  v.  Johnson,  133  So. 
516,  16  La.Ajpp.  155. 

N.Y. — Universal  Steel  Export  Co.  v. 
N.  &  G.  Taylor  Co.,  203  N.Y.&  331, 


'208  App.Div.  308,  affirmed  147  N.E. 
209,  239  N.Y.  '594. 

N.C. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Slmms 
v.  Sampson,  20  S.E.2d  554,  559, 
221  N.C.  379. 

Pa. — Zuber  v.  Rinko,  Com.Pl.,  10  Sch. 
Reg.  159.  •  . 

Tex.— New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Eng- 
lish, 72  S.W.  58,  9-6  Tex.  268— 
Kaufman  Oil  Mill  v.  Republic  Nat. 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  Civ. App.,  43  S. 
W.2d  269. 

33  C.J.  p  1163  note  95. 

Absence  of  issue  limiting-  plaintiffs' 

interest 

Where  defendant  had  withdrawn 
an  answer  alleging-  as  a  pro  tanto 
defense  that  the  two  plaintiffs  were 
not  the  only  heirs  of  the  ancestor 
under  whom  they  claimed,  without  re- 
iterating- that  allegation  in  the 
amended  answer,  the  court,  on  find- 
ing for  plaintiffs,  properly  adjudged 
them  to  be  the  owners  of  the  entire 
interest  in  the  property  involved, 
since  there  was  no  Issue  limiting 
their  interest— Asher  v.  Gibson,  248 
S.W.  862,  198  Ky.  285. 
m  partition 

(1)  As    a    general    rule    plaintiff 
should    not    be    awarded    a    greater 
share  of  the  property  than  he  claims. 
— Carr  v.  Langford,  Civ. App.,  144  "S. 
W.2d  612,  affirmed  Langford  v.  Carr, 
159   S.W.2d  10*7,  138  Tex.  330 — 47  C. 
J.  p  430  note  66. 

(2)  However,  the  fact  that  com- 
plainant alleges  himself  to  be  enti- 
tled to  a  smaller  interest  in  the  lands 
than  that  to  which  he  is  really  enti- 
tled under  the  facts  alleged  by  him 
has  been  held  to  be  no  bar  to  a  de- 
cree vesting  in  him  his  proper  share. 

133 


Ky. — King  v.  Middlesborough  Town- 
lands  Co.,  50  S.W.  37,  106  Ky.  73, 
20    Ky.L.    1859,    rehearing    denied 
and   opinion   extended   106   Ky.   73, 
50  S.W.  1108,  20  Ky.L.  1859. 
N.Y.— Lamb  v.  Lamb,  14  N.Y.S.  206, 
affirmed  -30  N.E.  133,  131  N.Y.  227. 
Reservation,  of  issue  for  further  de- 
termination 

Where    determination    of    lessors' 
liability  for  sublessee's  trespass  was 
reserved    for    further    adjudication, 
amount  of  lessors'  liability  was  not 
limited  by  amount  sought  in  origi- 
nal and  amended  petition. — Davis  v. 
Kentland  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,   57  S.W. 
2d  542,     247  Ky.  642. 
Judgments  held  proper 
Conn. — Winsor  v.   Hawkins,    37   A.2d 

222,  130  Conn.  669. 
Tex. — Shropshire  v.  Jones,   Civ.App., 
129    S.W.2d    4SO— Hill    v.    Willett 
Civ.App.,    281    S.W.    1110 — Decatur 
[Land,  Loan  &  Abstract  Co.  v.  Rut- 
land, Civ.App.f  185  S.W.  1064. 
42.    N.C. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Simms  v.  Sampson,  20  S.E.2d  554, 
559,  221  N.C.  379. 

Tex. — Zaunbrecher      v.      Trim,      Civ. 
App.,   31  S.W.2d  *839 — Fidelity  Un- 
ion Fire  Ins.   Co.   v.   Barnes,   Civ. 
App.,  293  S.W.  279. 
W.Va, — De  Stubner  v.  United  Carbon 

Co.,  28  S.B.2d  59-3,  126  W.Va,  3«63. 
33  C.J.  p  1164  note  96. 
Erroneous  basis  of  value 

Judgment  In  amount  based  on 
price  contended  for  by  neither  par- 
ty to  action  for  balance  due  on  mer- 
chandise sold  at  price  to  be  fixed  on 
future  date  was  erroneous,  legal 
rights  of  parties  and  interest  of  pub- 
lic at  large  demanding  finding  on 


i  54 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


.mount  admitted  or  established  to  be  due  cannot 
tand.43  Ordinarily  a  judgment  cannot  properly  be 
•endered  for  a  greater  sum,  whether  by  way  of  debt 
>r  damages,  than  is  claimed  or  demanded  by  plain- 


tiff in  his  declaration  or  complaint,44  plus,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  subdivision  b  of  this  section,  interest 
in  proper  cases,  and  costs,45  notwithstanding  the  ev- 
idence may  prove  a  greater  debt  or  a  greater 


)asls  of  value  in  keeping-  with  con- 
;ention  of  one  side  or  other. — Max- 
yell  Planting  Co.  v.  A.  P.  Loveman 
&  Co.,   102   So.   45.  212  Ala.  228. 
Rents  or  damages 

(1)  A    judgment    awarding    rents 
3r  substantial  damages  in  an  action 
Df    ejectment    should    be    based    on 
testimony  as  to  their  value. — Hahn  v. 
Cotton,    37   S.W.   919,   136   Mo.   216— 
19  C.J.  p  1240  note  IB. 

(2)  However,    in    some    jurisdic- 
tions, it  seems,  no  further  proof  is 
required,  where  an  allegation  of,  and 
claim  for,  damages  in  a  verified  com- 
plaint  is   not   controverted. — Patter- 
son v.  Ely,  19  Cal.  28. 

43.    Cal. — King  v.  San  Jose  Keystone 

Mining  Co.,   127   P.2d   286,   53   Cal. 

App.2d  40 — Robinson  v.  Arthur  R. 

Lindburg,   Inc.,    3'5   P.2d   1057,    140 

Cal.  App.  669. 
Ga. — Fred     Didschuneit     &.    Son     v. 

Enochs  -Lumber  &  Mfg.  Co.,  156  S. 

B.  720,  42  Ga.App.  527. 
Ky.— Equitable    Life    Assur.    Soc.    of 

U.  S.  v.  Austin,  72  S.W.2d  716,  255 

Ky.  23. 
Mo. — Hecker  v.  Bleish,  3  S.W.2d  1008, 

319  Mo.  149— Vogt  v.  United  Rys. 
'•Co.    of  St.   Louis,   App.f    251   S.W. 

416. 

N.Y. — Nassau  Suffolk  Lumber  &  Sup- 
ply Corporation  v.  Bruce,  '3'8  N.Y. 

S.2d   75,   265   App.Div.   879,   appeal 

denied   39    N.Y.S.2d    618,    2-65    App. 

Div.  1002. 
N.C. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Simms 

v.     Sampson,    20    S.E.2d    554,    559, 

221  N.C.  379. 
Or. — Olds  v.  Von  der  Hellen.  270  P. 

497,  127  Or.  276. 
Tex. — Leftwich     v.     Summers,     Civ. 

App.,    89    S.W.2d   1091— Southwest- 
ern Bell  Telephone  Co.  v.  Burris, 

Civ.App.,  68  S.W.2d  542. 
Wash.— Babare    v.    Rodman,    226    P. 

1015,  130  Wash.  317. 
33  C.J.  p  1164  note  97—19  C.J.  p  1240 

note  16. 
Agreed  valuation 

Where  the  agreed  valuation  of  loss 
of  goods  sustained  by  a  shipper  was 
a  certain  amount,  it  was  error  to  en- 
ter judgment  for  a  larger  amount. — 
Lancaster  v.  Houghton,  Tex.Civ.App., 
249  S.W.  1103,  error  dismissed  45 
S.Ct.  194,  266  U.S.  590,  69  L.Ed.  456. 

Mortgage     as     security    for    future 

debts 

In  absence  of  proof  of  agreement 
to  'make  the  mortgage  security  for 
debts  subsequently  contracted,  in 
awarding  decree  for  amount  of  the 
mortgage  only  there  was  no  error. — 
Hoy  v.  Biladeau,  223  P.  241,  110  Or. 
591. 


Judgments  held  not  excessive 

Cal. — Estrin  v.  Fromsky,  12'7  P.2d 
603,  '0*3  Cal.App.2d  253— Du  Pont  v. 
Allen,  294  P.  409,  110  CaLApp.  -541. 

111. — Simpson  v.  Heberlein,  259  111. 
App.  -579. 

Tenn.— Gore  v.  McDaid,  178  S.W.2d 
221,  27  Tenn.App.  111. 

Tex.— Dallas  Coffin  Co.  v.  Roach,  Civ. 
App.,  93  S.W.2d  548,  error  dis- 
missed— Stephens  v.  Reik,  Civ. 
App.,  247  S.W.  627. 

44.  U.S. — Williamson  v.  Chicago 
Mill  &  Lumber  Corporation,  C.C.A. 
Ark.,  59  F.2d  918— Brown  v.  Minn- 
gas  Co.,  D.C.Minn.,  51  F.Supp.  363. 

Ala. — Wyatt  v.  Drennen  Motor  Co., 
125  So.  -649,  220  Ala.  413— Gowan 
v.  Wisconsin- Alabama  Lumber  Co., 
110  So.  31,  215  Ala.  231. 

Cal. — Merced  Irr.  Dist.  v.  San  Joa- 
quin  Light  &  Power  Corporation, 
29  P.2d  843,  220  Cal.  196— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Meisner  v.  Mcln- 
tosh,  269  P.  612,  205  Cal.  11— Frost 
v.  Mighetto,  71  P.2d  932,  22  CaL 
App.2d  612 — Monterey  Park  Com- 
mercial &  'Savings  Bank  v.  Bank  of 
Hollywood,  13  P.2d  976,  125  'Cal. 
App.  402 — Adjustment  Corporation 
v.  Marco,  279  P.  1006,  100  CaLApp. 
•338 — Capitol  Woolen  Co.  v.  Berger, 
262  P.  351,  87  CaLApp.  500. 

111.— Klatz  v.  Pfeffer,  164  N.E.  224, 
333  I1L  90— Shealy  v.  Schwerin,  46 
N.E.2d  184,  317  111. App.  375— Burns 
v.  Kaylor,  264  IlLApp.  469. 

Ky.— Fidelity  &  Casualty  Co.  of  New 
York  v.  Breathitt  County,  123  S. 
W.2d  250,  276  Ky.  173. 

La,— Reimers  v.  Hebert,  111  So.  91, 
162  La.  772— Cuba  v.  iLykes  Broth- 
ers-Ripley  S.  S.  Co.,  App.,  193  So. 
411 — Huff  v.  Fitzsimmons,  132  So. 
257,  15  La.App.  441. 

Miss.— Watkins  v.  Blass,  145  So.  348, 
1-64  Miss.  325. 

Mont. — Clifton,  Applegate  &  Toole  v. 
Big  Lake  Drain  Dist.  No.  1,  Still- 
water  County,  267  P.  207,  '82  Mont. 
312— Harbolt  v.  Hensen,  253  P.  257, 
•78  Mont.  228. 

Nev. — Donohue  v.  Pioche  Mines  Co., 
277  P.  980,  Si  Nev.  403,  rehearing 
denied  279  P.  759,  51  Nev.  402. 

N,J. — Goldberger  v.  City  of  Perth 
Amboy,  197  A.  267,  16  N.J.Misc.  84 
— Bozza  v.  Leonardis,  131  A.  27, 
3  N.J.Misc.  1186. 

N.Y. — Cavagnaro  v.  Bowman,  34  N. 
Y.S.2d  637,  264  App.Div.  118,  ap- 
peal denied  36  N.Y.S.2d  187,  264 
App.Div.  853 — Smith  v.  Dairymen's 
League  "Co-op.  Ass'n,  58  N.Y.S.2d 
376. 

Or. — Leonard  v.  Bennett,  106  P.2d 
542,  165  Or.  157— Haberly  v.  Farm- 
ers' Mut  Fire  Relief  Ass'n,  293  P. 

134 


590,    135    Or.    32,   rehearing  denied 
294  P.  594,  135  Or.  32. 
Pa. — Porter  v.  Zeuger  Milk  Co.,  7  A. 

2d  77,  136  Pa.Super.  48. 
Tenn. — Mullins      v.      Greenwood,      6 

Tenn.App.  327. 

Tex. — Denman  v.  Stuart,  17-6  S.W.2d 
730,  142  Tex.  129— Savage  Oil  Co.* 
v.  Johnson,  Civ.App.,  141  S.W.2d 
994,  error  dismissed,  judgment  cor- 
rect— Federal  Underwriters  Ex- 
change v.  Popnoe,  Civ.App.,  140  S. 
W.2d  484,  error  dismissed — Dallas 
Ry.  &  Terminal  Co.  v.  Wells,  Civ. 
App.,  60  S.W.2d  485,  error  refused 
— Bell  v.  Beckum,  Qiv.App.,  44  S. 
W.2d  389 — Dalton  v.  Realty  Trust 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  13  S.W.2d  398 — Os- 
ceola  Oil  Co.  v.  Stewart  Drilling 
Co.,  '  Civ.App.,  246  S.W.  698,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com.App., 
258  S.W.  806. 
Wis.— In  re  Kehl's  Estate,  254  N.W. 

639,  21'5  Wis.  353. 
19  C.J.  p  1240  note  1€— 33  C.J.  p  1164 

note  1—42  'C.J.  p  1300  note  83. 
Double  indemnity 

Where  an  insurance  policy  pro- 
vides for  the  payment  of  a  double  in- 
demnity for  injuries  sustained  under 
specified  conditions,  the  double  In- 
demnity cannot  be  recovered  unless 
specially  claimed  in  the  complaint. — 
Crowder  v.  Continental  Casualty  Co., 
91  'S.W.  1016,  115  Mo.App.  -535. 
•Cumulative  recovery 

(1)  In  a  suit   on  a  contract  for 
cutting    and    loading    timber,    where 
plaintiffs  alleged  that  they  were  to 
pay  the  expense  out  of  their  profits, 
a  recovery  of  both  profits  and   ex- 
penses was  erroneous  as  cumulative. 
— Branson  v.  Hamilton  Ridge  Lum- 
ber Corporation,  115  S.B.  624,  122  S. 
C.  436. 

(2)  In  proceeding  under  writ   of 
seizure,  where  judgment  is  taken  for 
amount  sued  for  with  interest,  and 
property  seized  was  valued  in  judg- 
ment at  such  amount,  rendering  fur- 
ther judgment  for  damages  for  de- 
preciation  of  property  was   error. — 
Willsford    v.    Meyer-Kiser    Corpora- 
tion,   104    So.    29'3,   139   Miss.    387. 

45.     Tex. — Christian       v.        Parmer 

County,  Civ.App.,  293  S.W.  234. 
33  C.J.  p  1166  note  3. 
Absence  of  specific  claim  for  costs 

(1)  The   costs   that  are   properly 
recovered  as  such  in  the  judgment 
as  an  incident  to  the  main  adjudica- 
tion  are  ordinarily  not   required   to 
be  specifically  claimed  in  the  plead- 
ings.— State  v.  Barrs,  99  So.  668,  -87 
Fla.  1-68. 

(2)  A     statutory     allowance     as 
costs  may  be  included  in  the  judg- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  54 


amount  of  damage  than  was  alleged  by  plaintiff.46 
A  judgment  for  more  than  the  amount  originally 
claimed  or  demanded,  however,  may  be  proper 
where  by  consent  or  without  objection  of  the  par- 
ties the  pleadings  are  enlarged  by  the  evidence  and 
are  deemed  amended  so  as  to  conform  to  the  testi- 
mony;47 and,  where  the  averment  of  the  amount  of 
damages  is  deemed  immaterial  or  surplusage,  the 
judgment  may  exceed  the  damages  claimed.48  Fur- 
ther, under  some  statutory  provisions,  where  de- 
fendant has  appeared  and  answered,  the  amount  of 


the  judgment  may  be  greater  than  the  sum  demand- 
ed, should  the  case  justify  it.49  A  judgment  which 
includes  an  item  of  damages  not  within  the  issues 
raised  by  the  pleadings50  or  established  by  the  evi- 
dence51 is  erroneous.  Where  a  bill  of  particulars 
is  filed,  a  recovery  is  in  general  limited  by  the 
amount  therein  specified.52 

The  validity  of  a  judgment  usually  is  not  affected 
by  the  mere  fact  that  recovery  is  for  a  sum  less 
than  the  claim  originally  asserted.5^  Thus  single 
damages  are  recoverable,  although  the  declaration 


ment,  although  not  claimed  in  the 
declaration. — Paddock  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  60  Mo.App.  328. 
Costs  held  improper 

(1)  Plaintiff,    in    action    to    fore- 
close land  contract,  who  prayed  for 
possession    and    foreclosure    of    de- 
fendant's rights  and  for  "such  other 
and  equitable  relief  as  may  be  just 
and  equitable/'  was  held  under  stat- 
ute not  entitled  to  recover  costs  of 
defendant  who  put  in  appearance  but 
made  no  defense. — Doolittle  v.  High- 
lands  Sheep  Co.,   200   N.W.   381,   184 
Wis.  625. 

(2)  In    suit    to    set    aside    deed, 
court  erred  in  taxing  costs  against 
defendant,    although  plaintiff   recov- 
ered a  money  judgment,  where  such 
judgment  was  proved  solely  by  con- 
cessions of  defendant  as  a  witness, 
no   costs   were   incurred  therein,   no 
claim  had  been  made  for  it  in  peti- 
tion, and  no  dispute  had  existed  be- 
tween   parties    over   it— Dunning  v. 
Benson,  204  N.W.  260,  200  Iowa  121. 

46.  Cal.— Brown  v.  Ball,  12  P.2d  28, 
123  Cal.ApD.  758; 

La, — Vincent  *v.  Cooper,  App.,  24  So. 
2d  503— Nona  Mills  Co.  v.  W.  W. 
Gary  Lumber  Co.,  App.,  127  So. 
425,  annulled  132  So.  257,  15  La. 
App.  560. 

S.C. — Carolina  Veneer  &  Lumber  Co. 
v.-  American  Mut  Liability  Ins. 
Co.,  24  S.E.2d  153,  202  S.C.  103. 

Tex. — Hartford  Accident  &  Indemni- 
ty Co.  v.  MQpre,  Civ.App.,  102  S. 
W.2d.  441,  error  refused — Traders 
&  General  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lincecum, 
Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  549,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  107  S.W.2d  585, 
130  Tex.  220. 

33  C.J.  p  1166  note  5. 

47.  CaL— Yule  v.  Miller,  252  P.  733, 
80  CaLApp.  609. 

La.— Ethridge-Atkins  Corporation  v. 
Abraham,  App.,  160  So.  817. 

Tex. — Foxworth-Galbraith  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Southwestern  Contracting! 
Corporation,  Civ.App.,  165  S.W.2d 
221,  error  refused. 

Issues  broadened  by  consent  see  su- 
pra §  50. 

43.     Mont — Loeb  v.  Kamak,  1  Mont* 

152. 
33  C.J.  p  1166  note  4. 


49.    Idaho. — Berg  v.  Aumock,   59   P. 

2d  726,  56  Idaho  798. 
Mo. — Bieser    v.    Woods,    150    S.W.2d 

524,   236  Mo. App.  126,  transferred, 

see  147  S.W.2d  656,  347  Mo.  437. 
Wis.^-City  of  Wauwatosa  v.  Union 

Free   High  School  Dist.   of  Town 

and  City  of  Wauwatosa,  2-52  N.W. 

351,  214  Wis.  35. 
33  C.J.  p  1166  note  10. 
Limitation   of   default   judgment    to 

amount  demanded  see  infra  §  214. 

Amendment  increasing  amount 

Where,  in  an  action  on  a  policy, 
plaintiff  filed  an  amended  petition 
increasing  the  original  amount  sued 
for,  it  was  held  not  error  to  permit 
recovery  in  the  increased  amount, 
defendant  having  admitted  that 
plaintiff's  claim  amounted  to  such 
sum. — Investors'  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Ma- 
rine &  Motor  Ins.  Co.  of  America, 
99  So.  486,  155  La.  627. 

Statutory  double  damages 

In  an  action  brought  under  a  stat- 
ute allowing  double  damages,  where 
plaintiff  alleges  that  he  has  been 
damaged  in  a  certain  amount  for 
which  he  asks  judgment  and  for  all 
other  and  proper  relief  according  to 
the  statute,  the  court  may  render 
judgment  for  double  the  actual  dam- 
ages assessed  by  the  jury,  although 
there  was  no  formal  prayer  in  the 
complaint  for  double  damages. — Car- 
penter v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  95  S. 
W.  985,  119  Mo.App.  204. 

In  California 

(1)  The   supreme   court  has  held 
that    recovery    in     excess    of    the 
amount  demanded  in  the  complaint 
is  unauthorized,  although  an  answer 
has    been    filed. — Meisner    v.    Mcln- 
tosh,  269  -P.   612,   205   Cal.   11. 

(2)  However,  there  is  some  lower 
court  authority  holding  that  a  judg- 
ment in  excess   of  the  amount   de- 
manded is   not   erroneous   where  an 
answer  has  been  filed. — McKesson  v. 
Itepp,   217  P.  802,   62  CaLApp.   619 — 
Kimball  v.  Swenson,   196  P.  781,   51 
CaLApp.  361. 

(3)  Amount  erroneously  demanded 
in  cross  complaint  was  held  immate- 
rial, where  relief  granted  was  con 

s  .s tent  with  law  and  embraced  with*  I 

135 


in  issues. — Du  Pont  v.  Allen,  294  OP. 
409,  110  CaLApp.  541. 

50.  Idaho. — Independent       School 
Dist.  No.  22  of  Washington  Coun- 
ty   v.    Weiser    Nat.    Bank,    263   P. 
997,  45  Idaho  554. 

Ky, — Johnson  v.  Bngle,  67  S.W.2d 
938,  252  Ky.  634. 

Mo. — Zweifel  v.  Lee-Schermen  Real- 
ty Co.,  App.,  173  S.W.2d  690. 

Okl. — Electrical  Research  Products 
v.  Haniotis  Bros.,  <39  P.2d  42,  170 
Okl.  150. 

Tex. — Albaugh-Wright  Lumber  Co. 
v.  Henderson,  Civ.App.,  33  S.W.2d 
228. 

Particular  items  held  not  allowable 

(1)  Loss  of  rent. — Love  v.  Nash- 
ville Agr.  &  Normal  Inst,   6  Tenn. 
App.  104. 

(2)  Uncollected   premiums. — Fidel- 
ity-Phenix    Fire    Ins.    Co.    of    New 
York  v.  Jackson,  181  S.W.2d  625,  181 
Tenn.  453. 

(3)  Market  value  of  accessories. — 
Brooks    -Supply    Co.    v.    First    State 
Bank   of   Blectra,    Tex.Civ.App.,    292 
S.W.   631. 

51.  Mo. — Zweifel    v.    Lee-Schermen 
Realty  Co.,  App.,   173  -S.W.2d   690. 

52.  Fla.— Florida    East    Coast    Ry. 
Co.    v.    Acheson,    140    So.    467,    102 
Fla,   15,  certiorari  denied  52   S.Ct. 
407,    285    U.S.    551,    76    L.Ed.    941. 

111.— McNeff  v.  White  Eagle  Brewing 
Co.,  13  N.E.2d  493,  294  Ill.App. 
37. 

33  C.J.  p  1166  note  8. 

53.  Ala. — Jones    v.    Belue,    200    So. 
886,  241  Ala.  22. 

Cal. — Marsh  v.  Arch  Rib  Truss  Co., 

133  P.2d  412,  56  Cal. App. 2 d  811. 
111. — Yellow  Cab  Co.  v.  Newberry 

Library,   252  IlLApp.    5 84. 
Recovery  for  partial  loss 

Recovery  may  be  had  for  a  par- 
tial insurance  loss,  although  the  dec- 
laration claims  for  a  total  loss  and 
there  is  no  proof  of  an  abandonment. 
—Watson  v.  Insurance  Co.  of  North 
America,  4  Dall.,  Pa,,  283,  1  L.Ed. 
835. 
Recovery  pro  tanto 

Where  part  of  charge  set  forth 
in  the  declaration  and  proved  shows 
•ight  of  fiction,  plaintiff  is  entitled 
_o  recover  pro  tanto. — Pickett  v. 


§  54 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


or  complaint  improperly  claims  treble  damages  tin- 
der a  statute.54  A  judgment  for  less  than  the  prcv>f 
requires,  however,  is  erroneous,55  and,  where  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  the  entire  amount  sued  for  or 
else  to  nothing  at  all,  a  judgment  for  a  part  only 
is  erroneous.56 

Ad  damnum  clause.  According  to  some  authori- 
ties, the  amount  of  recovery  is  limited  by  the  ad 
damnum  clause  of  the  pleading.57  According  to 
others,  a  judgment  for  the  amount  shown  due  by  the 
declaration  or  petition  may  be  given,  although  it  is 
greater  than  the  damages  laid  in  the  ad  damnum 
clause  proper.5*  Where  the  judgment  is  greater 
than  the  amount  shown  due  by  the  pleading,  it  is 
erroneous,  although  within  the  amount  laid  in  the 
ad  damnum  clause.59 

Attorney's  fees.  An  allowance  of  attorney's  fees 
must  be  supported  by  the  pleadings60  and  proof.61 
Even  where  an  allowance  for  attorney's  fees  is 


proper,  the  allowance  should  not  be  in  excess  of 
the  amount  demanded  or  prayed,62  and  in  any  event, 
where  attorney's  fees  are  not  involved  in  the  action 
or  embraced  by  the  pleadings,  the  judgment  should 
not  award  as  such  fees  more  than  the  amount  re- 
quired to  be  taxed  as  costs.63 

Installment  payments.  In  a  suit  on  an  obligation 
payable  in  installments,  a  judgment  awarding  re- 
covery for  installments  falling  due  between  the 
filing  of  the  suit  and  the  date  of  the  judgment  must 
be  supported  by  the  pleadings  ;64  but,  under  appro- 
priate pleadings,  the  inclusion  of  such  installments 
in  the  judgment  has  been  held  proper.65 

Set-off  or  counterclaim.  In  the  absence  of  an 
agreement  by  the  parties,66  the  court  should  not 
allow  set-offs,  credits,  or  deductions  because  of 
matters  not  pleaded  or  litigated.67  The  amount  of 
a  set-off  or  counterclaim  asserted  by  defendant  can- 
not exceed  that  set  forth  or  claimed  in  his  plead- 


Kuchan,    1A8   N.E.    667,    323    111.    138, 
49  A.L.R.  499. 

54.  Colo. — Cramer  v.  Oppenstein,  27 
P.  713,  16  Colo.  495. 

33  C.J.  p  1166  note  12. 

55.  Mo.— Cable  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  128  S.W.2d  1123,  233  Mo. 
App.  1093. 

N.C.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Simms 
v.  Sampson,  20  S.E.2d  554,  559, 
221  N.C.  -379. 

35  C.J.  p  1164  note  98. 

56.  N.Y. — Community     Oil     Co.     v. 
Guido,  62  N.Y.S.2d  465. 

33  C.J.  p  1164  note  99. 

57.  Fla.—Woods-Hoskins- Young  Co. 
v.   Stone  &  Baker  Const   Co.,  114 
So.  366,  94  Fla.  586. 

Mass. — Sullivan  v.  Jordan,  86  N.E.2d 

387,  310  Mass.  12. 
Mich. — Detroit   Trust   Co.  v.   Lange, 

255     N.W.     320,     267     Mich.     69— 

Daines  v.  Tarabusi,   229  N.W.  422, 

250  Mich.  217. 

58.  Ky. — Gilbert   v.    Berryman,    255 
S.W.  839,  200  Ky.  824. 

Tex. — Cretien  v.  Kincaid,  Civ.App., 
84  "S.W.2d  109"4,  affirmed  Kincaid  v. 
Cretien,  111  -S.W.2d  1098,  130 
Tex.  513— Goodrich  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank,  Civ.App.,  70  -S.W.2d  609,  er- 
ror refused. 

33  C.J.  p  1166  notes  4  [a]  (2),  6. 

59.  U.S. — H.    H.'   Hornfeck   &   Sons 
v.    Anderson,    C.C.A.N.Y.,    60    F.2d 
38. 

Mich. — Walz  v.  Peninsular  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  191  N.W.  230,  221 
Mich.  326,  reheard  194  N.W.  124, 
22#  Mich.  417. 

33  C.J.  p  1166  note  7* 

60.  Cal.— Atkins  v.  Hughes,  282  P. 
787,      208     Cal.      508— McCain     T. 
Burch,  267  OE>.  748,  92  CaLApp.  141. 

HI.: — 'Peterson  v.  'Evans,  6  N.E.2d 
520,  288  ULApp.  623. 


La.— Huff  v.  Fitzsimmons,  132  So. 
257,  15  La.App.  441. 

Mo. — Burns  v.  Ames  Realty  Co., 
App.,  31  S.W.2d  274. 

.Tex.— Himes  v.  Himes,  Civ.App.,  55 
S.W.2d  .181. 

Utah.— Skeen  v.  Smith,  286  P.  633,  75 
Utah  464. 

33  C.J.  p  1164  note  1  [d]. 

Attorney's   fees    held  proper 

Idaho.-nColorado  Nat.  Bank  of  Den- 
ver v.  Meadow  Creek  Live  Stock 
Co.,  211  P.  1076,  36  Idaho  509. 

Tex.— East  Texas  Title  Co.  v.  Parch- 
man,  Civ.App.,  116  S.W.2d  497,  er- 
ror dismissed. 

33  C.J.  p  1166  note  13  [a]. 

61.  Fla. — Jackson    v.    Walker,     126 
So.  7(46. 

Mo. — Globe  American  Corporation  v. 

Miller,    131    S.W.2d    340,    2:34    Mo. 

App.  25;3. 
33  C.J.  p  1164  note  1  [d]  (4). 

62.  Cal.— Hartke  v.  Abbott,   6  P.2d 
•578,  119  CaLApp.  439. 

Kan.— Wellington  v.  Mid-West  Ins. 
Co.,  212  P.  892,  112  Kan.  687. 

63.  Ky. — Logan  County  Fiscal  Court 
v.  Childress,  243  S.W.  1038,  196  Ky. 
1. 

64.  Tenn.— OPhifer    v.  .Mutual    Ben. 
Health  &  Accident  Ass'n,  148  S.W. 
2d  17,  24  Tenn.App.  600. 

65.  Wis. — Numbers  v.  Union  Mortg. 
Loan  Co.,  247  N.W.  442,  211  Wis. 
30. 

Payment  of  annuity  until  satisfac- 
tion of  judgment 

Where  insured  prayed  for  monthly 
annuity  accruing  until  Judgment  and 
for  general  relief,  court  could  prop- 
erly direct  that  insurer  pay  until 
satisfaction  of  judgment— Manuel  v. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  LeuApp., 
13*9  So.  548. 

136 


66.  Minn.— Oolby  v.   Street,   195   N. 
W.  34,  155  Minn.  157. 

Offer   by   plaintiff   to   make    deduc- 
tion 

Although  defendant,  sued  for 
wrongful  detention  of  an  automobile 
repaired  by  him,  did  not  counter- 
claim for  the  amount  due  for  re- 
pairs, but  plaintiff  offered  to  deduct 
such  amount  from  the  damages  al- 
lowed, the  amount  due  for  repairs 
should  be  deducted  from  the  judg- 
ment.—Ledwell  v.  Entire  Service 
Corporation,  2-31  N.Y.S.  565,  224  App. 
Div.  43i3,  affirmed  170  N.E.  188,  252 
N.Y.  548. 

67.  Oal.— Hesse       v.       Commercial 
Credit  Co.,  275  P.  970,  97  Cal.App. 
600. 

Minn.— Colby    v.    Street,    19-3    N.W. 

.34,  155  IMinn.  157. 
Miss.— S.  M.  Weld  &  Co.  v.  Austin, 

65  So.  247,  107  Miss.  279. 
N.J.— Automobile  Ins.   Co.   of  Hart- 
ford, Conn.  v.  Conway,  ,158  A.  480, 
109  N.J.Eq.  628. 

Teac. — Moss   v.    Thompson,    Civ.App., 
72   S.W.2d  •'875-^American  Grocery 
Co.  v.  Union  Sugar  Co.,  Civ.App., 
246  S.W.  418. 
Credit  for  payment  by  codefendant 

In  conversion,  where  a  third  par- 
ty's lien  on  converted  chattel  is 
paid  by  codefendant  of*  converter, 
such  payment  cannot  be  credited  to 
converter,  where  pleadings  authorize 
no  such  relief.— Brooks  Supply  Co. 
v.  Gallinger,  Tex.Civ,App.,  279  S. 
W.  524. 
Damage  not  shown 

Judgment  authorizing  defendants 
to  set  off  against  notes  for  pastur- 
age shortage  in  acreage  must  be  re- 
versed, in  absence  of  evidence  of 
damage  by  shortage.— Hutchison  v. 
Hamilton,  Tex.ConouApp.,  14  S.W.2d 
823. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


ings,68  notwithstanding  the  proof  shows  that  he  is 
entitled  to  more.69 

Effect  of  excessiveness;  correction.  A  judgment 
which  is  merely  excessive  under  the  pleadings  and 
proofs,  although  erroneous  and  liable  to  be  re- 
versed, is  not  on  that  account  void,70  and,  where 
the  excess  is  very  small,  the  maxim  de  minimis  non 
curat  lex  applies.71  An  excessive  judgment  may 
generally  be  corrected  by  modification  either  in  the 
trial  court  or  on  appeal,72  and  usually  the  party  re- 
covering an  excessive  judgment  is  permitted  to  re- 
mit the  excess  and  take  a  judgment  for  the  proper 
amount.7** 

b.  Interest 
An  allowance  of  Interest  should  be  supported  by  the 


pleadings  and  proof;  but  In  some  Instances  Interest  has 
been  held  allowable,  although  the  complaint  contained 
no  prayer  therefor  and  the  judgment  was  thereby  brought 
above  the  ad  damnum  clause.' 

In  order  that  a  party  may  be  entitled  to  interest, 
he  should  make  such  a  case  by  his  pleadings  and 
proof  as  calls  for  its  allowance.74  Where  such  a 
case  is  made  out,  however,  an  allowance  of  interest 
is  proper  ;?5  and  it  has  been  held  that,  where  in- 
terest is  allowable,  judgment  therefor  may  be  ren- 
dered, although  interest  is  not  demanded  or  prayed 
for  in  the  complaint,76  thereby  bringing  the  judg- 
ment above  the  ad  damnum  clause.77  A  judgment 
allowing  interest  must  be  in  conformity  with  the 
pleadings  and  proof  with  respect  to  the  rate  of  in- 
terest78 and  the  date  from  which  it  is  to  be  comput- 
ed.™ 


68-    Ala. — Bradford  v.  Lawrence,  94 

So.  103,  208  Ala,  248. 
N.J. — Metropolitan    Lumber    Co.    v. 

Mullor,  129  A.  148. 

A    reconventional   demand    cannot 
be  allowed  in  an  amount  exceeding 
that     claimed. — Continental     Supply 
Co.    v.    Hoell,    129    So.    522,    170   La, 
898 — Homes    v.    James    Buckley    & 
Co.,   116   So.  218,  165  La.   874— Lady 
Ester    Lingerie    Corp.    v.    Goldstein, 
La.App.v  21  So.2d  398. 
Judgment  held  proper 
N.C. — Casper    v.    Walker,    188    S.E. 

99,  210  N.C.  838. 

69.  Ky. — Pictorial     Review    Co.     v. 
Smith,  300  S.W.  871,  222  Ky.  323. 

70.  U.S.— Huddleston  v.  Dwyer,  C.C. 
A.OkL,  145  F.2d  ail. 

Ga. — Lang  v.  South  Georgia  Inv.  Co., 

U44  S.E.  149,  38  Ga.App.  430. 
Mass.— Sullivan  v.  Jordan,  36  N.B.2d 

387,  310  Mass.  12. 
Mich. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Baran- 

cik    v.    Schreiber,    224    N.W.    848, 

349,  246  Mich.  361. 
Mont. — Thompson  v.  Chicago,   B.   & 

Q.    R.    Co.,    25i3    P.   813,    78    Mont 

170. 
Mo. — Drake    v.    Kansas   City   Public 

Service    Co.,    41    S.W.2d   1066,   226 

Mo.App.    365,   rehearing  denied  54 

S.W.2d  427. 
Vt. — Santerre    v.    Sylvester,    189    A. 

159,  108  Vt  435. 
33  C.J.  p  1167  note  14. 
Hot  jurisdictional 

Error  in  granting  judgment  In  ex- 
cess of  amount  alleged  in  ad  dam- 
num clause  of  declaration  is  not  ju- 
risdfetional. — Detroit  Trust  Co.  v. 
Lange,  255  N.W.  320,  267  Mich.  69. 

71.  Mich. — Bowen  v.  Rutland  School 
Dist  No.  9,  36  Mich.  149. 

33  C.J.  p  1167  note  16. 

72.  Ala.— 'Lister   v.   Vowell,    25    So. 
564,  122  Ala.  264. 

33  C.J.  p  1167  note  18. 

73.  Mass. — Sullivan    v.    Jordan,    36 
N.E.2d   387,   810   Mass.   12. 


Tex. — Hartford  Accident  &  Indem- 
nity Co.  v.  Moore,  Civ.App.,  102  S. 
W.2d  441,  error  refused. 

33  C.J.  p  1167  note  20. 

74.  La.— Crowe    v.    Equitable    Life 
Assur.  8ot>.  of  U.   S.,   154   So.   52, 
179  La.  444 — Roussel  v.  Railways 
Realty   Co.,   115   So.    742,    165    La. 
556 — Merchants'  &  Farmers'  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Hammond  Motors 
Co.,  113  So.  763,  164  La,  57. 

Mo. — Kansas  City  v.  Haivorson,  177 

S.W.2d    495,    352    Mo.    280— Motor 

Acceptance  v.   Clayton,   App.,   119 

S.W.2d  996. 

Nev.^Gray    v.    Coykendall,    6    P.2d 

442,  53  Nev.  466. 

Okl.-^Central  Nat  Oil  Co.  v.  Conti- 
nental Supply  Co.,  249  P.  347,  119 
Okl.  1-90. 

Tex.— West  Lumber  Co.  v.  Hender- 
son, Com.App.,  252  S.W.  1044 — 
Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Llde,  Civ. 
App.,  U44  S.W.2d  685,  error  dis- 
missed—Lone Star  Finance  Corpo- 
ration v.  Schelling,  CivJLpp.,  80  S. 
W.2d  358 — Berryman  v.  Norfleet, 
Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d  722,  error  dis- 
missed—Humble Oil  &  Refining 
Co.  v.  Kishi,  Civ.App.,  299  S.W.  687 
— Brooks  Supply  Co.  v.  First  State 
Bank  of  Electra,  Civ.App.,  292  S. 
W.  631 — Sparrow  v.  Tillman,  Civ.. 
App.,  283  S.W.  877— Kuehn  v. 
Kuehn,  Civ.App.,  259  S.W.  290. 
33  C.J.  p  1168  note  26. 
failure  to  attach  note  or  pray  for 

interest  thereon 

Judgment  should  not  include  in- 
terest where  note  sued  on  was  not 
attached  to  petition,  it  was  not  al- 
leged that  note  bore  interest,  and 
no  interest  was  prayed  for. — Sentney 
v.  Sinclair,  286  P.  269,  130  Kan.  360. 

75.  U.S.— Anglo      California      Nat 
Bank  of  San  Francisco  v.  Dazard, 
C.C.A.Cal.,  106  F.2d  693,  certiorari 
denied  60   S.Ct.   379,   308   U.*S.  624, 
84    L.Ed.    521—Brown   Paper   Mill 
Co.  v.   Frazier,   C.C.A.La.,   76   F.2d  | 
65 — Alabama  Chemical  Co.  y.  In- 1 

137 


ternational  Agr.  Corporation,  C.C. 
A.Ala.,  35  F.2d  907,  certiorari  de- 
nied 50  S.Ct  240,  281  U.S.  727,  74 
L.Ed.  1144. 

Ga. — Lang  v.  South  Georgia  Inv.  Co., 
144  S.B.  149,  38  Ga.App.  430. 

Tex.— Leath  v.  Prince,  Civ.App.,  278 
S.W.  865. 

33  C.J.  p  1166  note  2. 

76.  Cal. — Deaux  v.  Trinidad  Bean  & 
Elevator  Co.,   47   P.2d  535,   8  Cal. 
App.2d  149. 

Mich. — Hollingsworth      v.      Liberty 
Life  Ins.  CO.  of  Illinois,  127  N.W. 
908,  241  Mich.  675. 
Where  an  answer  has  been  filed, 
the    court    may    allow    interest    al- 
though it  was  not  prayed  for  In  the 
complaint,   if   it   is   consistent  with 
the  case  made  by  the  complaint  and 
embraced    within    the    issues.— Per- 
ry v.  Magneson,  279  P.  650,  207  Cal. 
617. 

77.  Mich. — Thomson     Spot     Welder 
Co.  v.  Oldberg  Mfg.  Co.,  2^0  N.W. 
93,    256    Mich.    447— Hollingsworth 
v.  Liberty  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Illinois, 
217  N.W.  908,  241  Mich.  675. 

78.  Mo. — Krause  v.  Spurgeon,  App., 
256  S.W.  1072. 

Tex. — Douglas    v.    Smith,    Civ.App., 

2-97  S.W.  767. 
33  C.J.  p  1168  note  26  tb]. 

79.  Ky. — Furnace   Gap    Coal   Co.   v. 
White,   74   S.W.2d   4,   255  Ky.   351. 

Mo. — Von  Schleinitz  v.  North  Hotel 

Co.,  23  S.W.2d  64,  i323  Mo.  1110. 
S.C. — Molony  &  Carter  Co.  v.  Pennell 

&   Harley,    169    S.E.   283;   169   S.C. 

462. 

C.J.  p  1'168  note  26  CbL 
Due  date 

Where  petition  alleged  sale  of 
stock  of  goods  on  specified  date,  and 
that  balance  due  was  to  be  paid  a 
certain  number  of  days  thereafter, 
judgment  allowing  interest  from  the 
date  payment  was  to  be  made  was 
in  accord  with  pleadings.— rKavune- 
das  v.  Long,  265  S.W.  790,  205  Ky. 
321. 


555 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  55.    Conformity  to  Verdict,  Decision,  and 
Findings  in  General 

a.  In  general 

b.  Special  verdict,  decision,  or  findings 

a.  In  General 

A  Judgment  must  be  supported  by,  and  conform  to, 


the  verdict,  decision,  or  findings  In  all  substantial  par, 
tlculars. 

It  is  a  well-established  principle  of  law,  applica- 
ble to  both  cases  tried  by  the  courtso  and  cases  tried 
by  a  jury,81  that  the  judgment  must  be  supported 
by,82  and  conform  to,8*  the  verdict,  decision,  or 
findings  in  all  substantial  particulars.  In  accord- 


so,    N.Y.— Troughton      v.      Digmore 

Holding   Co.,    173    N.T.S.    659,    105 

Misc.  638. 
Tex.— El    Continental    Pub.    Co.    v. 

Blumenthal,    Civ.App.,    63    S.W.2d 

1056. 

81.  Constitutional  guaranty  of  Jury 
trial    is    violated    if    the    judgment 
does   not  conform  to  the  verdict. — 
North  v.  Atlas  Brick  Co.,  Tex.Com. 
App.,   15  S.W.2d  59,  motion  granted 
in  part  16  S.W.2d  519. 

82.  U.S. — HI  Dorado  Terminal  Co.  v. 
General  American   Tank  Oar  Cor- 
poration,  C.OA.CaL,   104  P.2d  903, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  60  S.Ct. 
325,  308  U.S.  422,  84  L.Ed.  361,  re- 
hearing denied  60  S.Ct.  465,  309  U. 
S.  694,  84  L.Ed.  1035. 

Cal.— Berg  v.  Berg,  132  P.2d  871, 
56  Cal.App.2d  495— Alphonzo  B. 
Bell  Corporation  v.  Listle,  130  P. 
2d  251,  55  Cal.App.2d  300— Mar- 
desich  v.  C.  J.  Hendry  Co.,  125  P. 
2d  595.  51  Cal.App.2d  567— Kittle 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Davis,  47  P.2d  1089, 
8  Cal.App.2d  504 — Magarian  v. 
Moser,  42  P.2d  385,  5  Cal.App.2d 
208— Mitchell  v.  Rasey,  $3  P.2d 
1056,  13-9  CaLApp.  350— Cameron 
v.  Feather  River  Forest  Homes, 
33  P.2d  884,  159  Cal.App.  373— 
Nestor  v.  Burr,  12  P.2d  479,  124 
CaLApp.  369— McCain  v.  Burch, 
267  P.  748,  92  CaLApp.  141. 

Conn. — Gulf  Oil  Corporation  of  Penn- 
sylvania v.  Newton,  31  A.2d  462 
130  Conn.  37. 

Fla. — Hoyt  v.  Evans,  109  Bo.  311,  91 
Fla,  1053. 

Idaho. — Hand  v.  Twin  Falls  County 
236  P.  536,  40  Idaho  638. 

Ind.— Gibraltar  Realty  Co.  v.  Secur- 
ity Trust  Co.,  136  N.E.  636,  192 
Ind.  502— Indianapolis  Real  Estate 
Board  v.  Willson,  187  N.E.  400,  98 
Ind.App.  72. 

Mass.-rPerkins  v.  Becker's  Conserv- 
atories, 61  N.B.2d  833. 

N.T. — J.  C.  Whritenour  Co.  v.  Co 
lonial  Homes  Co.,  205  N.T.S.  299 
209  App.Div.  676. 

NX.— Glenn  v.  Gate  City  Life  Ins 
Co.,  18  S.E.2d  113,  220  N.C.  672. 

UP. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Miel 
carek  v.  Riske,  21  N.W.2d  218,  221 

Okl.— Winters  v.  Birch,  36  P.2d  907 
169  Okl.  237. 

Or. — Maeder  Steel  Products  Co.  v 
Zanello,  220  P.  155,  109  Or.  56 

Tex. — City  of  Temple  v.  ^itchel 
Civ.App.,  180  S.W.2d  959— Brad 
dock  v.  Brockman,  Civ. App.,  29  S 


W.2d  811— Weathered"  v.  Meek,  Civ. 
App.,  268  S.W.  516. 

3  C.J.  P  1170  note  37. 
The  pleadings  may  "be  considered 

n  connection  with  the  verdict,  and 

acts  admitted  therein  may  be  con- 

idered  in  aid  of  the  verdict  in  or- 
der to  support  the  judgment.— Law 
v.  Coleman,  159  S.E.  679,  173  Ga,  68 

C.J.  p  1174  notes   66,   67. 
Judgments  held  supported  *y  verdict 
or  findings 

Cal. — Mirich  v.  Underwriters  at 
Lloyd's  London,  149  P.2d  19,  64 
Cal.App.2d  522— Smoll  v.  Webb, 
130  P.2d  77-3,  55  CaLApp.2d  456— 
Honsberger  v.  Durfee,  130  P.2d 
189,  55  Cal.App.2d  68— Murray  v. 
Babb,  86  P.2d  146,  30  Cal.App.2d 
301— Easterly  v.  Cook,  35  P.2d 
164,  140  CaLApp.  115— McCon- 
ville  v.  Superior  Court  within  and 
for  Los  Angeles  County,  248  P. 
553,  78  CaLApp.  203— Rosener  v. 
Hanlon  Dry  Dock  &  Shipbuilding 
Co.,  236  P.  183,  71  CaLApp.  767 
— Munford  v.  Humphreys,  229  P. 
860,  68  CaLApp.  530. 

Conn.— Butler  v.  Solomon,  18  A.2d 
685,  127  Conn.  613. 

Ga._- Odom  v.  Attaway,  162  IS.E.  279, 
173  Ga.  883— Cason  v.  United  Real- 
ty &  Auction  Co.,  0.31  S.E.  161,  161 
Ga.  374. 

Ind.— Peru  Heating  Co.  v.  Lenhart, 
95  N.E.  680,  48  Ind.App.  "319. 

Ky.— Asher  v.  Gibson,  250  S.W.  860, 
199  Ky.  175. 

N.C— In  re  Escoffery,  3  S.B.2d  425, 
216  N.C.  19. 

Tex. — Starr  v.  Schoellkopf  Co.,  113 
S.W.2d  1227,  131  Tex.  263. 

83.  U.S. — Mutual  Ben.  Health  &  Ac- 
cident Ass'n  v.  Thomas,  C.C.A. 
Ark.,  123  F.2d  353--Manjon  v.  Le 
bron,  C.C.A.Puerto  Rico,  23  F.2d 
266. 

Alaska. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Mitchell  v.  Beaver  Dredging  Co. 
8  Alaska  566,  582. 

Ariz. — Rodriauez  v.  Childress,  27 
P.  921,  «4  Ariz.  489. 

Ark. — Missouri  Pacific  Transp.  Co 
v.  Sharp,  108  S.W.2d  579,  194  Ark. 
405— ^Powers  v.  Wood  Parts  Corpo 
ration,  44  S.W.2d  324,  184  Ark. 
1032. 

Cal. — Prothero  v.  Superior  Court  o 
Orange  County,  238  P.  357,  19 
Cal.  43'9— Cappelmann  v.  Toung 
App.,  165  P.2d  950— Berg  v.  Berg 
132  iP.2d  871,  56  Cal.App.2d  495— 
Gossman  v.  Gossman,  126  P.2 
178.  52  Cal.App.2d  184— Phipps  v 

138 


Superior  Court  in  and  for  Alameda 
County,  89  P.2d  698— Leeper  v. 
Ginsberg,  85  P.2d  548,  29  CaLApp. 
2d  722— Magarian  v.  Moser,  42  P. 
2d  -385,  5  Cal.App.2d  208— Nestor 
V.  Burr,  12  P.2d  479,  124  Cal.App. 
369— Holland  v.  Bank  of  Italy  Nat. 
Trust  &  (Savings  Ass'n,  1  'P.2d 
10-31,  115  CaLApp.  472— Slater  v. 
Mayzie,  230  «P.  453,  69  CaLApp.  87. 
Colo. — Mooney  v.  Carter,  160  P.2d 
390— Meyer  v.  Milliken,  76  P.2d 
420,  101  Colo.  564,  certiorari  de- 
nied Milliken  v.  Meyer,  59  S.Ct  63, 
305  U.S.  598,  83  L.Ed.  379,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  61  S.Ct.  339,  311 
U.S.  457,  84  L.Ed.  278,  132  A.L.R. 
1395,  rehearing  denied  61  S.Ct. 
548,  312  U.S.  712,  85  L.Ed.  1143, 
mandate  conformed  to  HI  P-2d 
2>32,  107  Colo.  295. 

(ja. — Gray  v.  Junction  City  Mfg.  Co., 
22  S.E.2d  847,  195  Ga.  -33— Law  v. 
Coleman,  159  S.E.  679,  173  Ga.  68 
— Dinsmore  v.  Holcomb,  144  S.E. 
780.  167  Ga.  20 — Belts  v.  Mathews, 
34  S.E.2d  729,  72  Ga.App.  678— 
Frank  E.  Wood  Co.  v.  Colson,  158 
S.E.  533,  43  Ga.App.  265— Georgia 
Motor  Bales  v.  Wade,  138  S.B. 
797,  37  Ga.App.  24. 
Idaho. — Radermacher  v.  Eckert,  123 

P.2d  426,  63  Idaho  531. 
HL— De  Leuw,  Cather  &  Co.  v.  City 

of  Joliet,  App.,  64  N.E.2d  779. 
Ind.— Scheiring  v.  Baker,  177  N.E. 
866,  202  Ind.  678 — Elliott  v.  Gard- 
ner, 46  N.E.2d  702,  -113  -Ind.App. 
47 — Feuerstein  v.  Baumeister,  8 
N.E.2d  412,  108  Ind.App.  4"32— 
Fisher  v.  Rosander,  151  N.E.  12,  8*4 
Ind.App.  694— Mansfield  v.  Hinckle, 
139  N.B.  700,  81  Ind.App.  6. 
y.— Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.  of 
U.  S.  v.  Goble,  72  S.W.2d  35,  254 
Ky.  614— Meraman  v.  Caldwell,  8 
B.Mon.  32,  46  Am.D.  537. 
Mont— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Morse  v.  Morse,  154  P.2d  982,  984. 
Neb.— Crete  Mills  v.  Stevens,  253  N. 

W.  453,  120  Neb.  794. 
N.T.— In  re  Braasch's  Ex'rs,  202  N. 
T.S.  844,  208  App.Div.  745— Brown 
v.  Shyne,  206  N.Y.S.  310,  123  Misc. 
851— Basile  v.  Basile,  197  N.T.S. 
668,  120  Misc.  63 — Troughton  v. 
Digmore  Holding  Co.,  173  N.T.S. 
65*9,  105  Misc.  638. 
.C.-— White  v.  Dixie  Fire  Ins.  Co., 
Greensboro,  36  S.E.2d  923 — Tan- 
cey  v.  North  Carolina  State  High- 
way and  (Public  Works  Commis- 
sion, 19  6.E.2d  489,  221  N.C.  185— 
(Page  Supply  Co.  v.  Horton,  17  S. 
E.2d  <«*.  220  N.C.  STS— Sitterson 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  55 


ance  with  this  principle  it  has  been  held  that,  where 
the  verdict  grants  alternative  forms  of  relief,  the 
judgment  must  make  like  provision.84  So,  where 
the  verdict  is  joint,  the  judgment  must  be  joint85 
unless  plaintiff  remits  the  damages  as  to  one  of  de- 
fendants86 or  dismisses  the  action  as  to  him,8?  or 
the  court  grants  him  a  new  trial  ;88  and,  where  the 
verdict  is  several,  the  judgment  must  be  several.89 

As  a  qualification  of  the  rule  it  may  be  stated 


that  the  judgment  should  conform  to  the  real  and 
substantial  finding  rather  than  to  the  literal  form 
of  expression  of  the  verdict90  Where  the  finding 
reported  could  not  possibly  be  arrived  at  without  al- 
so finding  another  fact  not  expressed  but  necessarily 
included  in  the  verdict,  judgment  can  be  rendered 
as  though  that  fact  had  been  positively  found.91 
Superfluous  matter  in  a  verdict  may  be  disregard- 
ed ;92  and,  where  the  verdict  or  finding  is  on  an 


v.  Sitterson,  131  S.B.  641,  191  N. 
C.  319,  51  A.L.R.  760— -Durham  v. 
Davis,  88  S.E.  435,  171  N.C.  308. 

N.D. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in,  Miel- 
<sarek  v.  Riske,  21  N.W.2d  218,  221. 

Okl.— Winters  v.  Birch,  36  P.2d  907, 
169  Okl.  237— Kuhl  Motor  Co.  v. 
Wade,  1  P.2d  704,  151  Okl.  83. 

Or. — Maeder  Steel  Products  Co.  v. 
Zanello,  220  P.  155,  109  Or.  562. 

Tenn.— 'Allen  v.  Melton,  99  S.W.2d 
219,  20  Tenn.App.  387. 

Tex. — Totton  v.  Smith,  113  S.W.2d 
517,  131  Tex.  219— North  v.  At- 
las Brick  Co.,  Com.App.,  13  S.W. 
2d  59,  motion  granted  in  part  16 
S.W.2d  519— Deal  v.  Craven,  Com. 
App.,  277  -S.W,  1046— St.  Louis 
Southwestern  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas 
v.  Seale  &  Jones,  Com.App.,  267  S. 
W.  676 — Johnson  Aircrafts  v.  Wil- 
borh,  Civ.App.,  190  S.W.2d  426 — 
Hamill  &  Smith  v.  Ogden,  Civ.App., 
163  S.W.2d  725— Day  v.  Grayson 
County  State  Bank,  Civ. App.,  153 
S.W.2d  599 — Southern  Underwrit- 
ers v.  Blair,  Civ.App.f  144  S.W.2d 
641 — Taylor  v.  Jones,  Civ.App.,  135 
S.W.2d  767,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment  correct— JStrack  v.  Strong, 
Civ.App.,  135  S.W.2d  754,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Chaffin 
v.  Drane,  Civ.App.,  131  S.W.2d  672 
— Friske  v.  Graham,  Civ.App.,  128 
S.W.2d  139— Humble  Oil  &  Refin- 
ing Co.  v.  Owings,  Civ. App.,  128  S. 
W.2d  67— Ostrom  v.  Jackson,  Civ. 
App.,  127  S.W.2d  987 — Jones- 
O'Brien,  Inc.,  v.  Loyd,  Civ.App., 
106  S.W.2d  1069,  error  dismissed 
— Southern  Underwriters  v.  Garie- 
py,  Civ.App.,  105  S.W.2d  760.  er- 
ror dismissed — Southern-  Pine 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Whiteman,  Civ. 
App.,  104  S.W.2d  635,  error  dis- 
missed— Boyle  v.  Fisher,  Civ.App., 
10-3  S.W.2d  866,  error  dismissed— 
Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris, 
Civ.App.,  101  S.W.2d  640,  error 
dismissed — Farmers  &  Merchants 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Arrington,  Civ.App., 
98  «S.W.2d  378— Amarillo  Transfer 
&  Storage  Co.  v.  De  Shong,  Civ. 
App.,  82  S.W.2d  -381— ^Parks  v. 
Hines,  Civ.App.,  68  S.W.2d  364,  af- 
firmed Hines  v.  (Parks,  96  S.W.2d 
970,  128  Tex.  289— Smith  v.  El 
Paso  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  Civ.A#p.,  67 
S.W.2d  362,  error  dismissed— Citi- 
zens' Nat  Bank  v.  E.  V.  Graham 
&  Co.,  Civ.App.,  25  S.W.2d  636 — 
Sociedad  Union  Mexicans,  La  Con- 


structora  v.  De  Orona,  Civ.App., 
288  S.W.  1111— Rogers  v.  City  of 
Port  Worth,  Civ.  App.,  275  S.W. 
214— Standard  Motor  Co.  v.  Witt- 
man,  Civ.App.,  271  S.W.  186— 
Sctoaff  v.  Wilson,  Civ.App.,  269  S. 
W.  140 — Brown  v.  Knox,  Civ.App., 
261  S.W.  791,  affirmed  Knox  v. 
Brown,  Com. App.,  277  S.W.  91 — 
Metting  v.  Metting,  Civ.App.,  261 
S.W.  151,  reheard  262  S.W.  188— 
Weathered  v.  (Meek,  Civ.App.,  258 
S.W.  516. 

Vt. — Ackerman  v.  Carpenter,  29  A.2d 
922,  113  Vt.  77— <Scampini  v.  Rizzi, 
172  A.  619,  106  Vt  281. 

13  C.J.  p  798  note  66—19  C.J.  p  1210 
notes  26,  27,  30,  p  1240  note  21 — 
24  C.J.  p  885  note  47—26  C.J.  P 
570  note  25—28  C.J.  p  1036  note 
54—33  C.J.  p  144  note  84,  p  1169 
note  36—38  C.J.  p  1190  note  6— 
42  C.J.  p  142  note  51,  p  1287  note 
15 — 47  C.J.  p  430  notes  74,  76,  77, 
p  1009  note  87. 

When  intention  of  Jury  is  clear 
from  language  of  verdict  considered 
in  connection  with  pleadings  and 
evidence  the  court  must  make  the 
judgment  conform  thereto. — Yeoman 
r.  Sherry,  52  P.2d  555,  10  CaLApp. 
2d  567 — Curtis  v.  San  Pedro  Transp. 
Co.,  52  P.2d  528,  10  Cal.App.2d  547. 

Tlie  form  of  the  verdict  as  re- 
corded, rather  than  the  verdict 
which  the  Jury  actually  returned  in- 
to court,  governs  in  determining 
whether  or  not  the  judgment  con- 
forms to  the  verdict. — Grammer  v. 
Wiggins-Meyer  S.  S.  Co.,  270  P.  759, 
126  Or.  694. 

Judgment*    held    in    conformity    to 
verdict  or  findings 

(1)  Generally. 
Ala. — Lawler  v.   Hyde,   161  So.   523, 

230  Ala.  467. 
Ariz.— Golden     Eagle-Bobtail     Mines 

v.  Valley  Nat  Bank,  138  iP.2d  289, 

60    Ariz.    400 — Holcomb   v.    Clark, 

234  'P.  1075,  27  Ariz.  573. 
Cal. — Gray    v.    Magee,    292    P.    157, 

108  Cal.App.   570— Fink  &  Behind- 

ler  Co.  T.   Gavros,   257  P.   156,   83 

Cal.App.  582. 
Ga.— Brown  v.  O'Neal,  1  S.E.2d  601, 

59  Ga.App.  560. 
Mass. — Birnbaum    v.    Pamoukis,     17 

N.B.2d   885,    301   Mass.    559. 
Tex. — Tipton  v.  Tipton,  Civ. App.,  140 

S.W.2d  865,  error  dismissed,  Judg- 
ment correct 

139 


Wash. — Deming  v.  Jones,  24  P.2d  85, 
173    Wash.    644— Rich    v.    Kruger, 
22S  P.  1012,  130  Wash.  656. 
33  C.J.  p  1169  note  36  [c], 

(2)  Where  jury  found  two  sepa- 
rate verdicts,  one  for  plaintiff  on  its 
complaint  and  the  other  for  defend- 
ant on  her  counterclaim,  court's  ac- 
tion in  subtracting  judgment  based 
on  verdict  rendered  for  defendant  on 
counterclaim  from  judgment  in  fa- 
vor of  plaintiff  and  rendering  cor- 
rected judgment  for  the  difference 
held  proper  as  against  contention 
that  the  judgment  was  unwarranted 
because  not  based  upon  a  verdict  of 
the  jury. — Creek  v.  Lebo  Inv.  Co.,  48 
P.2d  792,  97  Colo.  250. 

84.  Cal. — Benson  v.  Olender,  246  P. 
345,  77  Cal.App.  287. 

85.  Ark. — Spears   v.    McKinnon,   270 
S.W.  524,  168  Ark.  357. 

Tex. — Citizens'  Railway  &  Light  Co. 

v.  Case,  Civ.App.,   138  S.W.   621. 
33  C.J.  p  1171  note  40. 

86.  Ala.— Golding   v.    Hall,    9    Port. 
169. 

87.  111.— Siltz  v.   Springer,    85   N.B. 
748,  236  111.  276. 

88.  Iowa. — Terpenning  v.   Gallup,    8 
Iowa  74. 

33  C.J.  p  1171  note  43. 

89.  Colo. — Bartlett      v.      Hammond, 
230  P.  10-9,  76  Colo.  171. 

Pa. — Wise  v.  Frey,  Com.Pl.,  22  West 

CO.L.J.  176. 
19  C.J.  p  1210  note  29—33  C.J.  p  1171 

note  44. 

90.  Tex. — F.    H.    Vahlsing;    Inc.,   v. 
Hartford   Fire    Ins.    Co.,    Civ.App., 
108  S.W.2d  947,  error  dismissed. 

33  C.J.  p  1174  note  62. 

A  trifling  variance  will  not  vitiate 
the  judgment. — Camden  v.  Haskill,  -8 
Rand.  462,  24  Va.  462. 

Fact  that  ultimate  fact  was  con- 
tained in  "conclusions  of  law,"  rath- 
er than  "findings  of  fact,"  held  im- 
material.— Bogan  v.  Hynes,  C.C.A. 
Cal.,  65  F.2d  52)4,  certiorari  denied 
54  S.Ct.  126,  290  U.S.  690,  78  LJEd. 
594. 

91.  Ga. — Gray     v.      Junction     City 
Mfg.   Co.,    22    S.E.2d    847,    195    Ga. 
33. 

33  C.J.  p  1174  note  63. 

92.  Cal.— Slayden  v.   O'Dea,   218  P. 
395,  191  Cal.  785. 


§  55 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


immaterial  issue93  or  an  issue  of  law,84  judgment 
need  not,  and  should  not,  be  rendered  thereon.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  validity  of  a  judgment  will  not 
be  affected  by  incorporating  immaterial  matters 
therein.95 

One  real  exception  to  the  rule  that  judgments 
must  conform  to  the  verdict  or  findings  consists  of 
cases  where  a  judgment  is  rendered  non  obstante 
veredicto,  discussed  infra  §§  59-61.  Another  ex- 
ception exists  in  cases  where  trial  by  jury  is  not 
a  matter  of  right  and  the  verdict  or  findings  of  a 
jury  are  merely  advisory,9^  as  in  equity  cases.97 

Failure  of  the  judgment  to  conform  to  the  ver- 
dict has  been  held  not  to  render  the  judgment  void 
or  inoperative,88  and  the  proper  remedy  in  such 
case  is  by  a  motion  to  modify  the  judgment,"  or 
according  to  some  authority,1  but  not  other,2  by  ap- 
peal or  writ  of  error. 


After  direction  of  a  verdict,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  court  may  render  the  judgment  demanded  by 
the  undisputed  evidence,  even  though  the  directed 
verdict  is  insufficient  to  support  the  judgment.8 

Conformity  to  conclusions  of  law.  While  it  has 
been  held  that  the  trial  court's  conclusions  of  law 
must  be  predicated  on,  and  find  support  in,  the 
court's  fact  findings,  and  the  judgment  must  follow 
the  conclusions  of  law,4  it  has  also  been  held  that 
the  judgment  need  not  conform  to  findings  or  con- 
clusions of  law,5  except  where  it  is  entered  by  the 
clerk  on  a  decision  without  further  judicial  action 
by  the  court6 

Conformity  to  report  of  referee.  If  the  report 
of  a  referee  or  master  is  accepted  by  the  court,  or 
sustained  against  exceptions,  or  judgment  is  en- 
tered thereon  pursuant  to  statute,  the  judgment 
must  conform  to  its  findings  and  conclusions;  to 


Ind.— Mullet    v.    Blaine,     16    N.B.2d 

981,  105  Ind.App.  666. 
Ohio. — Seal  v.  Gobel,  SI  Ohio  Cir.Ct. 

286. 
33  C.J.  p  1174  note  64. 

Attempted  apportionment  of  dam- 
ages, following  lump-sum  verdict 
against  defendants  jointly  liable, 
treated  as  surplusage. 
111. — Fitzgerald  v.  Davis,  237  Ill.App. 

488. 
Mont. — Bowman   v.   Lewis,    102   GP.2d 

1,  110  (Mont.  435. 

»ecital  that  third  party  was  en- 
titled to  part  of  recovery  held  not 
required  to  be  included  in  judgment. 
— Gosnell  v.  Camden  Fire  Ins.  Ass'n 
of  Camden,  N,  J.,  Mo.App.,  109  S.W. 
2d  59. 
Matter  not  properly  disregarded 

Where  judgment  ordered  that  the 
verdict  on  specified  issues  should  be 
set  aside  and  that  verdict  on  all  re- 
maining Issues  should  be  undisturb- 
ed and  allowed  to  stand,  If  the  court 
intended  merely  to  strike  out  an- 
swers to  the  specified  issues  and  to 
hold  as  matter  of  law  that  they 
were  surplusage,  it  failed  to  do  so. — 
Page  Supply  Co.  v.  Horton,  17  S.E. 
3d  493,  220  N.C.  (373. 

93.  Tex. — St.    Paul    Fire    &   Marine 
Ins.  Co.   v.   Huff,   Civ.App.,   172   S. 
W.  755. 

33  C.OT.  p  1174  note  69. 

Immaterial    findings    do    not    affect 

Judgment 
Mont. — Rutherford  v.  J.  B.   Long  & 

Co.,   240  P.   821,  74  Mont.   4-20. 

94.  Tex. — Sovereign  Camp  W.  O.  W. 
V.     Wagnon,     Civ.App.,     164     S.W. 
1082. 

95.  Mich.— Burkle    v.    Ingham    Cir. 
Judge,  4  N.W.  192,  42  Mich.  513— 
Taylor  v.   Gladwin,   40   Mich.   232. 
The  mere  addition  of  descriptive 

matter  not  found  in  the  verdict  is 


surplusage  and  immaterial?. — Oliver's 
Garage  v.  Lowe,  103  So.  586,  212  Ala. 
602—33  C.J.  p  1174  note  65. 

96.  N.Y.— McClave    v.    Gibb,    52  N. 
B.    186,    157    N.T.    413 — People  ex 
rel.    Flannery  v.  Worthing,   31  N. 
Y.S.-2d  79,  177  Misc.  545. 

97.  Wyo. — Jones  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 
R.  Co.,  147  P.  508,  23  Wyo.  148. 

33  C.J.  p  1174  note  60. 
Effect  of  jury  verdict  in  equity  see 
Equity  §  510. 

9a  Ala.— Herren  v.  Shelnutt,  110 
So.  697,  -21  Ala.App.  589,  certiorari 
denied  110  So.  699,  215  Ala.  355. 

N.'M.— In  re  Field's  Estate,  60  P.2d 
945,'  40  N.M.  423. 

N.T. — Corn  Exch.  Bank  v.  Blye,  23 
N.E.  805,  119  N.T.  414. 

The  defect  may  be  waived 

N.T. — Corn  Exch.  Bank  v.  Blye,  su- 
pra. 
Pailure  to  conform  to  verdict  and 

complaint  held  to  affect  validity  of 

judgment  so  as  to  preclude  appeal 

thereon. — Spears  v.  Wise,  65  60.  786, 

187    Ala.    346—19    C.J.    p  1210    note 

31. 

99.  Ind. — Elliott  v.  Gardner,  46  N.E. 
2d  7012,  119  'Ind.App.  47— S.  J.  flPea- 
body  Lumber  Co.  v.  Northam,  184 
N.E.  794,  96  Ind.App.  197— Tri 
Lake  Const.  Co.  v.  Northam,  184 
N.E.  792,  96  Ind.App.  18*3. 

N.M.— In  re  Field's  Estate,  60  (P.2d 
945,  40  N.M.  423. 

N.T.— Kenney  v.  Apgar,  93  3ST.T.  539. 

19  C.J.  p  1211  note  37—33  C.J.  p 
1170  note  37  CdL  p  1171  note  45. 

Amendment  of  judgment  to  conform 
to  verdict  or  findings  see  infra  § 
243. 

l.    Ky. — Lykins  v.  Hamrick,   137  S. 

W.  8-52,  144  Ky.  80. 
N.M. — In  re  Field's  Estate,   60  P.2d 

945,  40  N.M.  >42i3. 

140 


2.  N.T.— Kenney  v.  Apgar,   93  N.T. 
'539— People   v.    Goff,    52   N.T.    434. 

3.  Tex. — Zachary  v.  City  of  Uvalde, 
ConuApp.,  42  S.W.2d  417 — Zachary 
v.  Home  Owners  'Loan  Corporation, 
Civ.App.,  117  S.W.2d  15-3,  error  dis- 
missed. 

4.  Utah. — Mason   v.    Mason,    160    P. 
2d  730 — Beneficial  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Mason,  160  P.2d  734 — Parrott  Bros. 
Co.  v.   Ogden  City,  167  P.  -807,  -50 
Utah  512. 

3'3  C.J.   p  1173  note   53    [c]. 

5.  Cal.— Mason   v.    Del   Valle,    1    P. 
2d    419,     213    Cal.     30— Liuzza    v. 
Bririkerhoff,   $3    P.2d    976.    29    Cal. 
App.2d     1 — Delmuto     v.     Superior 
Court    in    and    for    San    Joaquin 
County,  -6   P.2d  1007,   119  CaLApp. 
590. 

33  C.J.  p  1173  note  S3. 

Findings  of  fact  will  prevail  over 
conclusions  of  law. — Mount  v.  Dillon, 
138  S.W.2d  59,  200  Ark.  153. 
Erroneous  conclusions  of  law 

A  judgment  supported  by  the  facts 
found  will  not  be  reversed  because 
not  in  conformity  with  erroneous 
conclusions  of  law. — Freeman  v. 
Robinson,  1'31  N.E.  75,  238  Mass.  449 
—33  C.J.  p  1173  note  55. 
Finding  on  mixed  question  of  law 
and  fact 

(1)  The  jury's  finding  on  a  mixed 
question  of   law  and  fact  has   been 
held  to  be  binding  on  the  court  in 
rendering  judgment. — Lemm  v.  Mil- 
ler,   Tex.Civ.App.,    245    S.W.    90,    re- 
versed   on    other   grounds    Miller   v. 
Lemm,   ConxApp.,   276   S.W.   211. 

(2)  However,    the    contrary    has 
also   been   held. — Hubert  v.   Collard, 
Tex.Civ.App.,    141  B.W^d   677,    error 
dismissed,    judgment    correct. 

8.    Cal. — Broder    v.    Conklin,    83    P. 
211,  98  Cal.  360. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


55 


depart  from  it  in  any  essential  matter  will  be  re- 
versible error.7 

b.  Special  Verdict,  Decision,  or  Findings 

Whenever  the  Judgment  Is  based  on  a  special  ver- 
dict, decision,  or  findings,  they  must  be  sufficiently  com- 
prehenslve,  certain,  and  consistent  to  sustain  the  judg- 
ment and  justify  It  as  a  matter  of  law. 

Whenever  the  judgment  is  based  on  a  special  ver- 


dict, decision,  or  findings,  they  must  be  sufficiently 
comprehensive,  certain,  and  consistent  to  sustain  the 
judgment  and  justify  it  as  a  matter  of  law.8  As 
a  general  rule  special  findings  cannot  be  aided  by 
the  evidence,9  and  the  court  cannot  render  a  judg- 
ment on  an  issue  submitted  to  the  jury  but  not  de- 
termined by  their  verdict,10  no  matter  how  clear 
and  undi§puted  the  evidence  may  be;11  where  the 
issues  submitted  to  the  jury  are  not  determinative 


7.  Ga. — Owen  v.  S.  P.  Richards  Pa- 
per Co.,  3  S.E.2d  660,  188  Ga,  258. 

Mass. — Battlsta  v.  F.  W.  Woolworth 
Co.,  57  N.E.2d  552,  317  Mass.  179. 

Tex.— Farley  v.  Ward,  1  Tex.  646. 

24  O.J.  p  88'5  note  48—33  C.J.  p  117* 
note  58 — 34   C.J.  p  237  note  8. 
Judgment   held  9  properly  rendered 

in  accordance  with  findings. — Levoy- 

sky   v.    Horvitz,    30   N.B.2d  411,    307 

Mass.  475. 

S.     U.S.— United  Gas  Public  Service 
Co.    v.   Pardue,   C.'C.A.La,,   78   F.2d 
929. 
Kan. — Hajny    v.     Robinson    Milling 

Co.,  134  P.2d  398,  156  Kan.  506. 
.N.C. — Morris  v.  Y.  &  B.  Corporation, 
153  S.B.  3'35,  198  N.C.  719— Mer- 
chants' Nat.  Bank  v.  Carolina 
Broom  Co.,  125  S.B.  12,  IBS  N.C. 
508. 

Tex.— International-Great  Northern 
R.  Co.  v.  Casey,  Com.App.,  46  S.W. 
2d  669 — Rodriguez  v.  Higginboth- 
am-Bailey-Logan  Co.,  Civ.App., 
144  S.W.2d  993,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  160  S.W.2d  234,  138  Tex. 
476 — Kimbrow  v.  Fort  Worth  & 
D.  C.  R.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  86  S.W.2d 
78,  affirmed  Fort  Worth  &  D.  C. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Kimbrow,  112  S.W.2d 
712.  131  Tex.  117— Parks  v.  Hines, 
Civ.App.,  68  S.W.2d  364,  affirmed 
Hines  v.  Parks,  96  -S.W^d  970,  12* 
Tex.  289— Tips  v.  Barneburg,  Civ. 
App.,  276  -S.W.  932. 
33  C.J.  p  1171  note  47. 

Finding's  should  be  liberally  con- 
strued to  support  the  judgment,  if 
possible. — Clavey  v.  Loney,  251  P. 
2-32,  80  CaLApp.  20—33  C.J.  p  1172 
note  50  [b]. 

Where  the  findings  are  ambigu- 
ous, the  court  is  authorized  to  ex- 
amine not  only  the  charge,  but  the 
pleadings  and  evidence,  and  if,  by 
-an  examination  of  the  record,  the  in- 
tention of  the  verdict  can  be  ascer- 
tained such  verdict,  so  construed, 
constitutes  the  proper  basis  for 
Judgment. — Vincent  v.  Bell,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  22  S.W.2d  753,  error  dismissed. 
^Inconsistent  findings 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment cannot  be  based  on  inconsist- 
ent findings. 

Oal. — Los  Angeles  &  Arizona  Land 
Co.  v.  Marr,  200  P.  1051,  187  Cal. 
127. 

Tex. — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v. 
Howie,  Civ.App.,  94  S.W.2d  220, 


error  dismissed — Schaff  v.  Wilson, 
Civ.App.,  269  S.W.  140— First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Chapman,  Civ.App.,  255  S. 
W.  807. 

(2)  However,  in  cases  of  equita- 
ble cognizance  it  has  been  held  that 
the  decree  rendered  will  be  upheld, 
even  though  findings  are  inconsist- 
ent, if  one  or  more  supports  the  de- 
cree.—State   ex   rel.   Corbett  v.   Su- 
perior Court  for  King  County,  De- 
partment No.  10  thereof,  48  P.2d  617, 
183  Wash.  373— Ingle  v.  Ingle,  48  P. 
2d  576,  183  Wash.  234— Silverstone  v. 
Hanley,  104  P.  767,  55  Wash.  458— 
Howey   v.    Bingham,    44   P.    886,    14 
Wash.  450. 

(3)  Separate    findings    should    be 
considered  together  as  being  the  ag- 
gregate finding  of  facts,  where  such 
consideration  will  tend  to  eliminate 
apparent   inconsistency   between   the 
findings.— Pryor  v.    Pryor,    Okl.,    168 
P.2d  375. 

Verdict  or  findings  held  sufficient 

Cal. — Matmor  Olive  Co.  v.  Du  Bois, 
150  P.2d  816,  $5  Cal.App.2d  467— 
Mirlch  v.  Underwriters  at  Lloyd's 
London,  149  P.2d  19,  64  Cal. App. 2d 
522— Klutts  v.  Rupley,  137  P.2d 
496,  58  Cal.App.2d  560 — Gordon  v. 
Santa  Cruz  Portland  Cement  Co., 
App.,  130  P.2d  232— Winchester  v. 
General  Cab  Co.,  57  P.2d  206,  1-3 
Cal.Aj>p.2d  551— Metcalf  v.  Metro- 
politan Life  Ins.  Co.,  37  P.2d  115, 
1  Cal. App.  2d  481,  rehearing  denied 
38  P.2d  401,  1  Cal.Apfe.2d  481— 
Kohner  v.  National  Surety  Co.,  287 
P.  510,  105  CaLApp.  430— Merkle 
v.  Merkle,  258  P.  969,  85  CaLApp. 
87. 

Ga. — Songster  v.  Toledo  Mfg.  Co.*  19 
<S.K2d  723,  193  Ga.  685. 

Ind. — Menser  v.  Marshall  Farmers' 
Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  121  N.E.  831, 
70  Ind.App.«  211. 

Mo. — Spallo  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  (Lim- 
ited, of  Liverpool,  App.,  125  S.W. 
'2d  967 — Cantley  v.  American  Sure- 
ty Co.  of  New  York,  38  S.W.2d  739, 
225  Mo.App.  1146. 

Tex. — American  Nat.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Hammond,  Civ.App.,  91  S.W.2d  432, 
error  dismissed — Hartford  Acci- 
dent &  Indemnity  Co.  v.  -Shaw.  Civ. 
App.r  8  S.W.2d  196,  error  dis- 
missed. 

Wis.— State  ex  rel.  Litzen  v.  Dillett, 
7  N.W.2d  599,  242  Wis.  1CT7,  re- 
hearing denied  9  N.W.2d  50,  242 

141 


Wis.  107— Delap  v.  Liebenson,  208 
N.W.  937,  190  Wis.  T3. 
Verdict  or  findings  held  insufficient 

(1)  Generally. 

CaL— Rossini  v.  St.  Paul  Fire  &  Ma- 
rine Ins.  Co.  of  St  Paul,  Minn., 
188  P.  564,  182  Cal.  4115— Smith  v. 
Young,  122  P.2d  624,  50  CaLApp.2d 
152. 

Tex. — Neyland  v.  Brown,  170  S.W.Sd 
207,  141  Tex.  253,  modified  on  other 
grounds  172  S.W.2d  39,  141  Tex. 
*253 — Robertson  v.  Connecticut 
General  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  140 
S.W.2d  936 — Federal  Underwriters 
Exchange  v.  Dorman,  Civ.App., 
137  S.W.2d  100,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct — American  Nat. 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Briggs,  Civ.App.,  90  S. 
W.2d  602,  error  dismissed — Wag- 
staff  v.  North  British  &  Mercantile 
Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  88  S.W.2d  550, 
error  dismissed— "Connecticut  Gen- 

•  eral  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lockwood, 
Civ. App.,  34  S.W.2d  245,  error  dis- 
missed—Huey  v.  American  Nat. 
Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  340, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Ameri- 
can Nat.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Huey,  Com. 
App.,  66  S.W.2d  690— Harris  v. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  281  S.W.  877 — Compton  v. 
Jennings  Lumber  Co.,  Civ.A'pp.,  266 
S.W.  569 — Kansas  City  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Jinkens,  Civ.App.,  20*2  S.W. 
772. 

(2)  In    view    of    inadequate    in- 
struction.— Humbird    Cheese    Co.    v. 
Fristad,  242  N.W.  158,  208  Wis.  283 

Statement  in  Judgment  that  no 
satisfactory  evidence  was  offered 
why  attorney's  lien  should  be  can- 
celed was  held  conclusion  not  over- 
coming finding  that  attorney  par- 
ticipated in  satisfaction  of  judgment, 
destroying  lien. — Holbrook  v.  McKee, 
266  P.  187,  147  Wash,  388. 

9.    Tex. — Southern  Pine  Lumber  Co. 

v.  Whiteman,  Civ~App.,  104  S.W.2d 

635,      error      dismissed — Tips      v. 

Barneburg,  Civ. App.,  276  S.W.  932. 
•33  C.J.  p  1171  note  48. 
ia    Tex. — Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v. 

Connellee,     Com.App.,     14     S.W.2d 

10*20. 
33  C.J.  p  1171  note  49. 

Theory  of  case  not  passed  on.  by 
Jury  held  not  to  afford  basis  for  ren- 
dering   judgment. — Baker    v.    Reed, 
Tex.Civ.App.,   54   S.W.2d  214. 
11.    CaL — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 


§  55 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


of  the  controversy,  a  judgment  rendered  thereon  is 
erroneous.12 

If  the  special  verdict,  decision,  or  findings  are 
sufficient,   the  judgment  must  follow  and  accord 


with  them,18  and,  as  a  general  rule,  cannot  go  be- 
yond them  in  awarding  relief  or  settling  the 'rights 
of  the  parties.14  This  rule  has  been  held  to  apply 
even  though  the  special  verdict,  decision,  or  findings 


Slater  v.   Mayzle,   230  P.   4-53,   455, 
69  CaLApp.  87. 
33  C.J.  p  1171  note  49. 

12.  N.C. — Brown  v.   Daniel,   13   S.E. 
2d  623,  219  N.C.  349. 

13.  U.S. — Texas    Compensation    Ins. 
Co.   v.   Heard,   C.C.A.Tex.,    9*3   P.2d 
54  g — Great    Lakes    Boat    Building 
Corporation    v.    Jasperson,    C.C.A. 
111.,  71  F.2d  415. 

Cai. — Cappelmann  v.  Young,  App., 
165  P.2d  950— People  v.  Robin,  133 
P.2d  436,  56  Cal.App.2d  S'SS— Hall 
v.  Citizens  Nat.  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  128  P.2d 
545,  53  Cal.App.2d  625— Hogberg  v. 
Landfield,  278  P.  907,  99  CaLApp. 
360.  - 

C010. — Meyer  v.  Milliken,  76  P.2d  420, 
101  Colo.  564,  certiorari  denied 
Milliken  v.  Meyer,  59  S.Ct.  63,  305 
U.S.  598,  S3  L.Ed.  379,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  61  S.Ct.  3-39,  311  U. 
S.  457,  84  L.Ed.  278,  132  A.L.R. 
1395,  rehearing  denied  61  S.Ct.  548, 
312  TJ.-S.  712,  8*5  L.Ed.  1143,  man- 
date conformed  to  111  P.2d  232,  107 
Colo.  '295. 
Ga. — Fleming  v.  Collins,  9  S.E.2d  T57, 
190  Ga.  210 — Law  v.  Coleman,  159 
S.E.  679,  173  Ga,  68— Hill  v.  Farm- 
ers' Bank  of  Forsyth,  121  S.E.  682, 
1-57  Ga,  457. 

Idaho. — Boise  Street  Car  Co.  v.  Van 

Avery,  103  P.2d  1107,  61  Idaho  502. 

Ind.— City    of   Muncie    v.    Horlacher, 

53  N.E.2d  631,  222  Ind.  -302. 

Kan. — Lawson    v.    Lawrence    Oil    & 

Gas  Co.,  12  P.2d  711,  135  Kan.  740 

— Black  v.  Black,  256  P.  995,  123 

Kan.  608 — Custer  v.  Royse,  204  P. 

995,  110  Kan.  397. 

Miss. — McCraven    v.    Doe,    23    Miss 

100: 
Mo. — Bondurant  v.    Raven   Qoal  Co. 

App.,  25  S.W.2d  566.  ! 

N.C. — Twitty  v.  Cochran,  199  S.E.  29 

214  N.C.  265. 

Okl.— Pryor  v.  Pryor,  168  P.2d  875 
—Davis  v.  Mose,  239  P.  447,  112 
Okl.  38. 

Tex.— Edmiston  v.  Texas  &  N.  O.  R. 
Co.,  138  S.W.2d  526,  135  Tex.  67— 
North  v.  Atlas  Brick  Co.,  Com. 
App.,  1*3  S.W.2d  59,  motion  grant 
ed  in  part  16  S.W,2d  519— Prideaux 
v.  Roark,  Com.App.,  291  S.W.  868 
—Hart  v.  Wilson,  Com.App.,  288 
S.W.  133 — Deal  v.  Craven,  Com 
App.,  277  S.W.  1046— Knox  v 
Brown,  Com.App.,  277  -S.W.  91,  mo- 
tion overruled  277  S.W.  619— Mas- 
sie  v.  Hutcheson,  Com. App.,  270  S 
•yy.  544 — Barton  v.  Wood,  Civ.App. 
162  S.W.*2d  147,  error  refused- 
Texas  Employers  Ins.  Ass'n  v 
Schaffer,  Civ.App.,  161  S.W.2d  328 
error  refused— Weston  v.  Duggan 


CivJlpp.,    160   S.W.2d   1010— Rodri- 
guez   v.    Higginbotham-Bailey-Lo- 
gan  qo.,  Civ.APp.,  144  S.W.2d  993, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  160  S. 
W.2d    234,     138    Tex.    476— Pearl- 
stone-Ash  Grocery  Co,  v.  Rembert 
Nat.   Bank  of  Longview,  Civ.App., 
135    S.W.2d    559,    error    refused- 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Wheel- 
er, Civ.App.t  132  S.W.2d  456,  error 
dismissed,       Judgment      correct — 
American  Nat.  Ins.   Co.  v.   Sutton, 
Civ.App.,    130   S.W.2d   441— McCray 
Refrigerator  'Sales   Corporation  v. 
Johnson,  Civ.App.,  121  S.W.'2d  410, 
error    dismissed— Traders   &   Gen- 
eral Ins.  Co.  v.  Milliken,  Civ.App., 
110  S.W.2d  108 — Hartford  Accident 
&    Indemnity    Co.    v.    Moore,    Civ. 
App.,  102  S.W.2d  441,  error  refused 
—Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris, 
Civ.App.,     101     S.W.2d    640,  -error 
dismissed — Southern  Old  Line  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Mims,  Civ.App.,  101  S. 
W.2d  396,   error  dismissed — Garcia 
v.  Garcia,  Civ.App.,   94   S.W.2d  864 
— Johnson  v.  Washington  Nat  Ins. 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  78  S.W.2d  696— Barn- 
hart  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Bengel,  Civ. 
App.,     '77     S.W.2d     295— Means    v. 
Floyd  West  &  Co.,  Civ.App.,  74  S. 
W.2d    518— Parks    v.    Hines,    Civ. 
App.,  68  S.W.2d  364,  affirmed  Hines 
v.   Parks,   96   S.W.2d  970,   128  Tex. 
289 — Texas      Interurban      Ry. 
Hughes,  Civ.App.,   34   S.W.2d  1103, 
affirmed  Texas  Interurban  Ry.  Co. 
v.    Hughes,    Com.App.,    53    S.W.2d 
448— J.  R.  Milam  Co.  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank,  Civ.App.,  29   S.W.2d  480,  er- 
ror    dismissed — Vincent    v.     Bell, 
Civ.App.,  22  S.W.2d  753,  error  dis- 
missed—Maledon     v.     Texas     Em- 
ployers'   Ins.    Ass'n,    Civ.App.,    11 
S.W.2d     627,     reversed    on     other 
grounds     Texas     Employers'     Ins. 
Ass'n  v.  Maledon,  Com.Ap,p.,  27  S. 
W.2d  151 — Perez  v.  Houston  &  T. 
C.  R.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  5  S.W.2d  782— 
Sociedad  Union  Mexicana  La  Con- 
structora    v.    De    Orona,    Civ.App. 
288   S.W.   1111— Rumbo  v.   Rumbo 
Civ.App.,  2*6  S.W.  957— S.  T.  Mat- 
thews &  Son  v.  Manning,  Civ.App. 
284  S.W.  314 — JefEers  v.  Dent,  Civ 
App.,    280    S.W.    347— Fulwiler    v 
Daniel,    Civ.App.,    279    S.W.    603— 
Connellee    v.    Magnolia   Petroleum 
Co.,    Civ.App.,    279    S.W.    597,    re- 
versed on  other  grounds  Magnolia 
Petroleum  Co.  v.   Connellee,   Com 
App.,    11    S.W.2d   158,    followed  in 
Magnolia   Petroleum   Qo.    v.   Akin 
11  S.W.2d  1113,  and  rehearing  de- 
nied   14    S.W.2d    1020    and    20    S 
W.2d  758 — Rogers  v.  City  of  Fort 
Worth,    Civ.App.,    275    S.W.    21 
Liverpool  &  London  &  Globe  Ins. 

142 


•Co.  v.  Cabler.  Civ.App.,  271  S.W. 
441— Dowd  v.  Klock,  Civ.App.,  268 
S.W.  234,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  Klock  v.  Dowd,  Com.App., 
280  S.W.  194— Davis  v.  Morris,  Civ. 
App.,  2t5'7  S.W.  328,  corrected  on 
motion  to  recall  mandate  259  S. 
W.  !592,  and  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com.App..  272  S.W.  HOS 
— St  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Huff,  Civ.App.,  172  S.W.  755. 

Utah.— Beneficial  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Mason,  160  P.2d  734 — Mason  v.  Ma- 
son, 160  P.2d  730. 

Wis. — State  ex  rel.  Litzen  v.  Dillett, 
9  N.W.2d  80,  242  Wis.  107 — State 
ex  rel.  Litzen  v.  Dillett  7  N.W.2d 
599,  242  Wis.  107,  rehearing  de- 
nied 9  N.W.2d  80,  242  Wis.  107. 

33  C.J.  p  1172  note  50. 

Informal  statements  of  court 

(1)  A  Judgment  need  not  conform 
to  informal  statements  of  the  court 
if  it  conforms  to  its  formal  findings. 
—O'Brien  v.  Quirk,  204  IlLApp.  448. 

(2)  Court's     informal     statement 
held  not  necessarily  at  variance  with 
finding    in    decree. — Manney    v.    Mc- 
Clure,  233  P.  158,  76  Qolo.  539. 

Judgments  held  to  conform  to  find- 
ing's, etc. 

Ark.— Sinclair  Refining  Co.  v.  Hen- 
derson, 122  S.W.2d  580,  197  Ark. 
319. 

l. — Matmor  Olive  Co.  v.  Du  Bois, 
150  P.2d  816,  65  Cal.App.2d  467— 
Honsberger  v.  Durfee,  130  P.2d 
189,  55  Cal.App.2d  68— Clavey  v. 
Loney,  251  P.  232,  80  CaLApp.  20. 

G-a. — Sangster  v.  Toledo  Mfg.  Co.,  19 
S.B.2d  723,  193  Ga.  685 — Bank  of 
Louisville,  Ga.,  v.  Wheeler,  134 
S.E.  753,  162  Ga.  635. 

OkL— <3hurchill  v.  Roberts,  22>5  P. 
535,  98  Okl.  295. 

Or.— Myers  v.  Olds,  252  P.  342,  121 
Or.  249. 

Tex.— Sfcroles  v.  Rosen,  84  S.W.2d 
1001,  126  Tex.  51 — Alexander  v. 
Stock  Yards  Nat.  Bank  of  Fort 
Worth,  Civ.App.,  154  S.W.2d  997, 
error  refused — Jackson  v.  Wolff  & 
Marx  Co.,  Civ.App.,  11-6  S.W.2d 
467— Merritt  v.  King,  Civ.App.,  65 
S.W.2d  464,  error  refused — First 
State  Bank  of  Three  Rivers  v. 
Petrucha,  Civ.App.,  38  S.W.2d  138, 
error  dismissed — 'Seale  v.  Schultz, 
Civ.App.,  3  S.W.2d  563,  error  dis- 
missed—Jones v.  Bledsoe,  Civ. 
App.,  293  S.W.  204— Casey  v.  State, 
Civ.App.,  289  S.W.  42'8. 

Wash. — Shockley  v.  Travelers  Ins. 
Co.,  137  P.2d  117,  17  Wash.2d  7'36. 

34.  (ja. — Fleming  v.  Collins,  9  S.B. 
2d  157,  190  Ga.  210. 

Idaho. — Boise  Street  Car  Co.  v.  Van 


i9    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


56 


were  against  the  undisputed  proof  or  without  evi- 
dence to  support  them.15  The  rule  does  not,  how- 
ever, require  that  judgment  be  rendered  in  accord- 
ance with  immaterial  findings,  or  findings  on  facts 
not  within  the  issues  raised  by  the  pleadings;16 
nor  does  it  require  that  no  judgment  be  rendered 
unless  the  verdict  contains-a  finding  of  all  the  facts 
on  which  it  may  be  based.17  On  the  contrary,  the 
judgment  may  be  based  on  the  verdict  rendered  by 
the  jury  on  the  special  issues  submitted  to  it,  to- 
gether with  the  facts  admitted  in  the  pleadings,  or 
established  by  the  undisputed  evidence,18  and  such 
facts  as  are  incident  to  the  issues  on  which  the  jury 
made  findings  which  have  support  in  the  evidence.19 


Where  tJiere  is  loth  a  general  and  a  special  ver- 
dict, judgment  should  be  rendered  on  the  general 
verdict20  unless  the  special  findings  are  inconsistent 
therewith.21 

§  56.    For  and  Against  Whom 

With  respect  to  the  parties  fop  and  against  whom 
It  Is  given,  a  judgment  must  follow  and  conform  to  the 
verdict,  decision,  or  findings. 

With  respect  to  the  parties  for  and  against  whom 
it  is  given,  as  in  other  particulars,  a  judgment  must 
follow  and  conform  to  the  verdict,  decision,  or 
findings,22  according  to  the  decisions  on  die  ques- 


Avery,    103    P.2d    1107,    61    Idaho 
502. 
N.C.— Sparks  v.  Sparks,  140  S.E.  300, 

194  N.C.  809. 
Ohio. — Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Vitti, 

146   N.E.    94,    111   Ohio   St    670. 
Tex. — Magnolia     Petroleum     Co.     v. 
Connellee,     Com.App.,     14     S.W.2d 
1020 — McCuistion    v.    James,    Civ. 
AP&.,  46  S.W.2d  717. 
33  C.J.  P  1172  note  51. 

Court  cannot  render  judgment  on 
different  theory  from  that  submit- 
ted to  Jury. — Great  American  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Marbury,  Tex.Civ.App.,  -297  S. 
W.  584. 

15.  Tex.— Edmlston  v.  Texas  &  N. 
O.  R.  Co.,  138  S.W.2d  526,  135  Tex. 
57 — Massle  v.  Hutcheson,  Com. 
App.,  2*70  S.W.  544 — Texas  Em- 
ployers Ins.  Ass'n  v.  Schaffer,  Civ. 
App.,  161  S.W.2d  328,  error  refused 
— -Weston  v.  Duggan,  Civ. App.,  1-60 
S.W.2d  1010— Traders  &  General 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Milliken,  Civ.App.,  110 
S.W.2d.  108— Liverpool  &  -London 
&  Globe  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cabler,  Civ. 
App.,  271  S.W.  441— TT.  S.  Fidelity 
&  Guaranty  Co.  v.  Dowdle,  Civ. 
App.,  269  S.W.  119. 
33  C.J.  p  1172  note  50  [d]. 

If  the  verdict  is  also  without  sup- 
port in  the  pleadings  of  the  party  in 
whose  favor  it  is  rendered,  as  well 
as  without  support  in  the  evidence, 
then  the  court  may  disregard  it  and 
enter  a  Judgment  contrary  thereto. — 
Johnson  v.  Breckenridge-Stephens 
Title  Co.,  Tex.Com.App.,  257  S.W. 
22-3— Rogers  v.  City  of  Fort  Worth, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  2?5  S.W.  214. 

18.  CaL — Berg  v.  Berg,  132  P.2d  871, 
56  Cal.App.2d  495. 

Tex.— Sproles  v.  Rosen,  84  S.W.2d 
1001,  126  Tex.  51— Magnolia  Pe- 
troleum Co.  v.  Connellee,  Com. 
App.,  11  S.W.2d  158— Miller  v. 
Lemm,  Com. App.,  276  S.W.  211 — 
Allied  Underwriters  v.  Harrell, 
Civ.AjM>..  143  S.W.2d  621,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Kim- 
brow  v.  Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co., 
Civ.App.,  86  S.W.2d  78,  affirmed 
Fort  Worth  &  3>.  C,  Ry.  Co.  v. 


Kimbrow,  112  S.W.2d  712,  131  Tex. 
117— Barnhart  Mercantile  Co.  v. 
Bengel,  Civ.Aj>p.,  77  S.W.2d  295— 
Atlas  Brick  Co.  v.  North,  Civ.App., 
2  S.W.2d  980,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  North  v.  Atlas  Brick  Co., 
Com.App.,  13  S.W.2d  59,  motion 
granted  in  part  16  S.W.2d  519— 
Casey  v.  State,  Civ.App.,  2-89  S.W. 
428— Battle  v.  Wolfe,  Civ.App.,  283 
S.W.  1073 — Liverpool  &  London  & 
Globe  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cabler,  Civ.App., 
271  S.W.  441— Crowley  v.  Chap- 
man, Civ.App.,  260  S.W.  231— 
Smith  &  Lawson  v.  Taylor,  Civ. 
App.,  249  S.W.  519— Baker  v.  Cole- 
man  Abstract  Co.,  Civ.App.,  248  S. 
W.  412 — Ferguson  v.  Kuehn,  Civ. 
App.,  246  S.W.  674— Dickson  v.  Kil- 
gore  State  Bank,  Civ.App.,  244  S. 
W.  392,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  257  S.W.  867— Stark  v. 
George,  Civ.App.,  237  S.W.  948,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  252  S.W.  1053. 
•33  C.J.  p  1172  note  52. 
Finding*  held  not  immaterial 
Tex. — Hart  v.  Wilson,  Com.App.,  288 
S.W.  133. 

Findings  without  support  in  evi- 
dence and  outside  issues  held  not  to 
afford  basis  for  valid  judgment. — 
Devlin  v.  City  of  Pleasanton,  288  P. 
595,  130  Kan.  76*6. 

17.  Ga.— Allen    v.    Allen,    31    S.B.2d 
483,  198  Ga.  269— Law  v.  Coleman, 
159  S.B.  679,  173  Ga.  68. 

18.  Ga.— Allen    v.    Allen,    31    S.E.2d 
483,  198  Ga.  269— Law  v.  Coleman, 
159  S.B.  679,  173  Ga,  68. 

Tex.— Southern  Pine  Lumber  Co.   v. 
Whiteman,    Civ.App.,    104    S.W.2d 
635,     error    dismissed — Richardson 
v.  Kent,  Civ.App.,  47  S.W.2d  420— 
Great  American   Ins.   Co.'  v.   Mar- 
bury,    Civ.App.,    297    S.W.    684. 
Judgment  based  on  issue  not  sub- 
mitted to  jury  and  not  controverted 
held   not   erroneous. — Graham   Hotel 
Co.  v.  Garrett,  Tex.Civ.App.,  'SS  S.W. 
Sd  522,  error  dismissed. 

19.  Tex. — Richardson  v.  Kent,  Civ. 
App.,  47  S.W.2d  420. 

143 


An  implied  •"•**H™g  on  an  issue  sub- 
mitted to,  and  not  determined  by, 
the  jury  cannot  be  made  the  basis  of 
judgment.— J.  R.  Milam  Co.  v.  First 
Nat  Bank,  Tex.Civ.App.,  29  S.W.2d 
480,  error  dismissed. 

20.  Idaho. — Geddes  v.  Davis,  210  P. 
584,  36  Idaho  201. 

33  C.J.  p  1173  note  56. 

21.  Ind.— Earl   Park   State   Bank  v. 
Lowmon,  161  N.E.  675,  92  Ind.App. 
25— Scottish  Union  &  National  Ins. 
Co.  v.  B.  R  Linkenhelt  &  Co.,  121 
N.E.   373,  70  Ind.App.  324. 

, — Behymer  v.  Milgram  Food 
Stores,  101  P.2d  912,  151  Kan.  921 
— Hogan  v.  Santa  Fe  Trail  Transp. 
Co.,  85  P.2d  28,  148  TCan.  720,  120 
A.L.R.  521. 
33  C.J.  p  1173  note  56. 

Court  looks  to  pleadings,  general 
verdict,  and  jury's  answers  to  inter- 
rogatories in  determining  what  is 
proper  judgment. — Earl  Park  State 
Bank  v.  Lowmon,  161  N.E.  675,  92 
Ind. App.  25. 

Facts  found  held  not  inconsistent 
with  general  verdict. 
Ind.— L.  S.  Ayres  &  Co.  v.  Hicks,  40 
N.E.M  '334,  220  Ind.  86,  rehearing 
denied  41  N.E.2d  195,  356,  220  Ind. 
86. 

Kan. — Preston  v.  Kansas  Central  In- 
demnity Co.,  243  P.  300,  120  Kan. 
297. 

22.  Cal. — Header  v.  Parsons,  19  Cal. 
294 — Tarpey  v.  Curran,  228  P.  62, 
67  CaLApp.  575. 

Conn. — Endut  v.  Borodenko,  145  A. 
27,  109  Conn.  677. 

Ind. — Feuerstein  v.  Baumelster,  8  N. 
E.2d  412,  103  Ind.App.  432. 

Mo. — White  v.  Meiderhoff,  App.,  281 
S.W.  98. 

Ohio. — State  ex  rel.  Fulton  v.  Ach,  £4 
N.E.2d  462,  62  Ohio  App.  439 — 
Spieker  v.  Board  of  Rapid  Transit 
Com'rs  of  City  of  Cincinnati,  174 
N.E.  15,  37  Ohio  App.  102. 

Tex. — Peveto  v.  Smith,  133  S.W.2d 
572,  134  Tex.  308 — Fleming  Oil  Co. 
v.  Watts,  Civ.App.,  193  S.W.2d  979 
-—Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Walker  v. 
Taylor,  Civ.App.f  56  S.W.2d  251, 


§  56 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tion,  as  reasonably  construed23  in  the  light  of 
the  pleadings  and  evidence  and  settled  principles  of 
law.24  The  judgment  must  be  rendered  in  favor  of 
the  party  indicated  by  the  verdict  provided  his 
pleadings  are  sufficient  to  sustain  it.25  A  judgment 
must  be  for  plaintiff  on  a  finding  in  his  favor,26 
and  for  defendant  on  a  finding  in  his  favor.27 
Where  the  finding  is  against  all  defendants,  the 
judgment  must  be  entered  against  all,28  except  those 
properly  dismissed  from  the  action  after  verdict,29 
and,  where  it  is  in  favor  of  all  defendants,  the 
judgment  likewise  must  be  entered  in  favor  of  them 
aIL«° 

Although  there  is  also  contrary  authority,81  it  has 
been  held  that  a  verdict  against  one  or  more  of 
several  defendants  authorizes  the  entry  of  a  judg- 
ment in  favor  of  defendants  not  mentioned  in  it,32 
and  a  verdict  in  favor  of  a  defendant  charged  as 
primarily  liable  has  been  held  to  authorize  a  judg- 
ment in  favor  of  defendants,  secondarily  liable.38 
When  the  verdict  is  for  plaintiff  on  one  count  only, 


a  judgment  for  defendant  on  the  other  counts  has 
been  held  proper.84  In  designating  the  parties  the 
use  of  the  singular  for  the  plural  or  vice  versa  will 
not  amount  to  a  variance  between  the  verdict  and 
judgment,  where  it  is  evidently  a  mistake  and  does 
not  cast  obscurity  on  the  decision,35  but  the  use  of 
the  plural  to  designate  all  the  parties  on  one  side 
requires  the  entry  of  a  judgment  in  favor  of  all 
such  parties,  and  a  judgment  in  favor  of  only  one 
of  them  is  erroneous.86  An  obvious  misnomer  in 
the  verdict  may  be  corrected  in  the  judgment  with- 
out constituting  a  variance.87  So  a  party  described 
in  the  pleadings  as  a  corporation  may  be  so  de- 
scribed in  the  judgment,  although  the  verdict  fails 
to  do  so.88 


§  57. 


Amount 


Generally    a    Judgment    must    be    rendered   for   the 
amount  indicated  by  the  verdict  or  findings. 

A  judgment  must  be  rendered  for  the  amount  in- 
dicated by  the  verdict  or  findings,89  in  the  absence 


252— First    Nat    Bank    v.    Harris 

Bros.    Grain   Co.,  Civ.App.,   254   S. 

W.  119 — Branch  v.  Smith,  Civ.App., 

245  S.W.  799. 
Wash. — Shew  v.  Hartnett,  208  P.  60, 

121  Wash.  1. 
33  C.J.  p  1174  note  71. 

Judgment    heia    not    inconsistent 
with  verdict,   decision,   or   findings. 
Cal.— Taylor  v.   Odell,   122   P.2d  919, 

50  Cal.App.2d  115. 
Tex. — Burd  v.  San  Antonio  Southern 

Ry.  C.o.»  Com.App.,  281  $.W.  1021. 
Dismissal  as  to  one  plaintiff 

Under  verdict  for  plaintiffs,  except 
named  plaintiff,  defendant  was  enti- 
tled to  dismissal  of  complaint,  as 
against  such  named  plaintiff. — 
'Eclipse  Lumber  Co.  v.  Davis,  207  N. 
W.  238,  201  Iowa  1283,  opinion  cor- 
rected on  other  grounds  209  N.W. 
307. 

23.  Ohio. — Spieker  v.  Board  of  Rap- 
id Transit  Com'rs  of  City  of  Cin- 
cinnati, 174  N.BL  15,  37  Ohio  App. 
102. 

Wash.— Shew  v.  Hartnett,  208  P.  60, 

121  Wash.  1. 

Verdict  against  one  defendant 
acting  as  agent  of  co defendant  held 
to  authorize  judgment  against  both 
in  view  of  instructions. — Mixon  v. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  138  S.E.  45,  1'39 
S.C.  343. 

24.  Cal. — Curtis      Y.       San      Pedro 
Tranap.   Co.,   52   P.2d  528,   10   Cal. 
App.2d  547. 

25.  Cal. — Metropolis    Trust    &  -Sav- 
ings Bank  v.  Monnier,  147  P.  265, 
1C  9  Cal.  592. 

33  C.J.  p  1174  note  "72. 

T7here  plaintiff's  attorney  admit- 
ted failure  to  make  out  case  against 


certain  defendants,  and  as  to  them 
consented  to  dismissal,  judgment 
against  such  defendants  on  general 
verdict  for  plaintiff  was  erroneous. — 
Hanson- Jacobs-  Co.  v.  Schlesinger, 
206  N.Y.8.  277,  210  App.Div.  434. 
29.  111.— -Rose  v.  Meyer,  25  N.B.2d 

413,  303  IH.App.  365. 
33  C.J.  p  1175  note  73. 
27.  HI.— Leon  v.  Mutual  Ben. 

Health  &  Accident  Ass'n,  55  N.B.2d 

557,  323  IlLApp.  203. 
33  C.J.  p  11*75  note  74. 

If  only  conclusion  deduoible  from 
foots  found  calls  for  judgment  for 
defendant,  Judgment  for  plaintiff  is 
erroneous  as  a  matter  of  law. — En- 
dut  v.  Borodenko,  145  A.  £7,  109 
Conn.  -577J 
23.  Ala.— Harris  v.  White,  101  So. 

751,  212  Ala.  54. 
Ind. — Feuerstein  v.  Baumeister,  8  N. 

E.2d  41*2,  103  Ind.App.  432. 
33  C.J.  p  1175  note  75. 

Judgment  held  not  objectionable 
as  not  being  in  accordance  with  ver- 
dict against  all  defendants. — Tomer- 
lin  v.  Krause.  Tex.Civ.App.,  278  S. 
W.  501. 
Defect  held  not  to  void  judgment 

In  an  action  against  defendants 
jointly  and  severally  liable,  a  judg- 
ment on  a  verdict  for  plaintiffs  mis- 
takenly entere4  against  only  one  of 
the  defendants  has  been  held  not 
void. — Power  v.  Crown  Stage  Co., 
256  P.  457,  82  Cal.App.  660.  * 

29.  Tex. — Johnson     v.     Moss,     Civ. 
App.,    108  S.W.2d   1110,   error  dis- 
missed. 

30.  Cal. — Butler   v.    Estrella  'Raisin 
Vineyard  Co.,  56  P.  1040,  134  Cal. 
239.  I 

144 


31-    Cal.— Keller  v.    Smith,    19    P.2d 

541,  130  CaLApp.  128. 
38.    Pa.— Carroll    v.    Kirk,    19    A.2d 

•584,  144  Pa.Super.  <211. 
33  C.J.  p  1175  note  77. 

33.  B.C. — Hoagland      v.      Chestnut 
Farms  Dairy,  72  F.2d  729,  63  App. 
D.C.  357. 

34.  Mo.— Buckman  y.  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  R.  Co.,  T3  S.W.  270,  100  Mo.App. 
30. 

35.  Ark. — Missouri    Pacific    Transp. 
Co.  v.  'Sharp,  108  S.W.2d  579,  194 
Ark.  405. 

Pla. — Davis  v.  Ivey,  112  So.  .264,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  MeUon  v.  Ivey,  48 
S.-Ct.  17.  275  U.S.  526,  72  L.Ed.  407. 

Mo.— Mehlstaub  v.  Michael,  287  S.W. 
1079,  221  Mo.App.  807. 

33  C.J.  p  1175  note  79. 

36.  Fla. — Baker  &  Holmes  Co.  v.  In- 
dian River  State  Bank,  55  So.  836, 
61  Fla.  106. 

37.  Ky.— Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.   I* 
R.  Co,  v.  Darlington,  111  S.W.  3-60, 
129  Ky.  266,  33  Ky.L.  818. 

38.  Ala. — Oliver's   Garage   v.   Lowe* 
103  So.  586,  212  Ala.  602. 

39.  Cal. — San       Francisco       Credit 
Clearing  House  v.  MacGowan,  -24  6 
P.  347,  77  CaLApp.  308. 

N.Y.— Costello  v.  New  York  qent.  & 

H.  R.  R.  Co.,  144  N.H.  514,  238  N.Y. 

240. 
N.C. — Johnson   v.   Metropolitan   'Life» 

Ins.  Co.,    14   S.B.2d  405,   219   N.C. 

445. 
Tex. — Prideaux  v.   Roark,  Com.App., 

291  S,W.  868. 
33  C.J.  p  1175  note  83. 

Judgments  held  in  conformity 
with,  or  supported  by,  verdict  or 
findings* 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


57 


of  a  statute  permitting  the  court  to  disregard  the 
verdict  or  findings,40  and  a  judgment  for  either  a 
greater41  or  a  smaller42  amount  than  indicated  by 
the  verdict  or  findings,  without  the  consent  of  the 
party  adversely  affected,43  is  erroneous  unless  there 
is  a  mere  error  in  computation  of  the  amount,  and 
sufficient  data  is  given  from  which  the  court  may 
compute  the  correct  amount,44  or  the  pleadings  and 
evidence  are  insufficient  to  support  the  verdict  or 
findings,45  or,  according  to  some  cases,  where  the 
jury  have  mistakenly  failed  to  follow  the  instruc- 
tions given  them,46  although  as  to  this  there  is  also 
authority  to  the  contrary.4?  A  small  variance  in 
amount  between  the  verdict  and  the  judgment  may, 
however,  be  disregarded  as  immaterial.4*  Ordi- 
narily a  judgment  for  a  specified  amount  cannot  reg- 


ularly be  entered  on  a  verdict  which  does  not  as- 
sess the  amount;49  but  where  the  amount  can  be 
ascertained  by  mere  computation,  or  is  undisputed, 
it  is  not  reversible  error  for  the  court  to  make  the 
computation  and  to  enter  judgment  on  the  verdict 
for  the  amount  thus  ascertained.50 

Excessive  verdict.  Where  the  verdict  is  support- 
ed in  some  amount,  it  has  been  held  that  the  court 
must  enter  judgment  on  the  verdict,  even  though  it 
considers  the  amount  unjust  or  excessive.51  It  has 
also  been  held,  however,  that  if  the  verdict  is  ex- 
cessive and  the  excess  is  remitted,  judgment  for  the 
residue  may  be  entered  on  the  verdict.52 

Attorney's  fees.  Where  the  obligation  sued  on 
provides  for  the  payment  of  a  definite  sum  as  at- 


Cal. — Llano  Inv.  Co.  v.  Minton,  214 
P.  855,  190  CaL  T52— Churchill  v. 
Peters,  134  P.2d  841,  57  Cal.App.2d 
521 — State  Compensation  Ins. 
Fund  v.  Rothwell,  284  P,  943,  103 
Cal.App.  607. 
Or. — Grammer  v.  Wiggins-Meyer  S. 

S.  Co.,  270  P.  759,  126  Or.  694. 
40.  Only  on  motion  and  notice  can 
the  court  disregard  the  jury's  find- 
ing under  a  statute  so  providing.— 
St  t-ouis,  B.  &  M.  Ry.  Qo.  v.  Sim- 
monds,  Civ.App.,  50  S.W.2d  343,  mod- 
ified on  other  grounds  Simmonds  v. 
St.  Louis  B.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  91  S.W.2d 
332,  127  Tex.  23. 

41-  U.S.— Mutual  Ben.  Health  &  Ac- 
cident Ass'n  v.  Thomas,  C.C.A. 
Ark..  1'23  F.2d  353— Detroit  City 
Gas  Co.  v.  Syme,  C.C.A.Mieh.,  109 
F.2d  366. 

Ark. — Powers  v.  Wood  Parts  Corpo- 
ration,   44    S.W.2d    324,    184    Ark. 
1032. 
Colo.— Greenwald   v.    Molloy,    166   P. 

2d  983. 
Ga. — Mercer  v.   Nowell,   175  S.B.   12, 

179  Ga.  37. 
111.— Koltz    v..  Jahaaske,    38    N.E.2d 

973,  312  IlLApp.  -623. 

Ind.— Wisconsin   Nat.    Life    Ins.    Co. 

v.    Meixel,   51  N.B.2d  78,  221   Ind. 

650. 

Mich.— Dirkes    v.    Lenzen,    214    N.W. 

81,  239  Mich.  270. 
Miss.— Tonkel  v.  Moore,  137   So.  189, 

162  Miss.   83. 

N.Y.— -Stern  v.  Rona,  61  N.T.S.2d  563 

—La   Valley   v.   Stanford,    56   N.Y. 

S.2d  359. 

Tex. — Bridwell  v.  Bernard,  Civ.App., 
159  S.W.2d  981,  error  refused— 
Rountree  Motor  Co.  v.  Smith  Mo- 
tor Co.,  Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d  296, 
error  dismissed — Barnhart  Mer- 
cantile Co.  v.  feengel,  Civ.App.,  77 
S.W.2d  295-— Magnolia  Petroleum 
Co.  v.  Dodd,  Civ.App.,  52  S.W.2d 
670,  set  aside  on  other  grounds  81 
S.W.'2d  653,  125  Tex.  125— Si 
Louis,  B.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sim- 
monds, Civ.App.,  50  S.W.2d  343 

49  C.J.S.-10 


modified    on    other    grounds    Sim- 
monds v.  St.  Louis  B.  &  M.   Ry. 
Co.,    91   S.W.2d   332,   127   Tex.   23— 
Southwest  Nat.  Bank  of  Dallas  v. 
Hill,  Civ.App.,  297  S.W.  1096. 
33"C.J.  p  1175  note  84. 
Judgment  for  future  payments   au- 
thorized 

In  action  on  disability  clause  of 
insurance  policy,  judgment  award- 
ing plaintiff  amount  found  -by  Jury  to 
be  then  due  and  directing  future 
payments  as  long  as  disability  con- 
tinued, the  case  being  retained  on 
the  docket  for  further  proceedings, 
held  authorized  as  against  conten- 
tion that  judgment  was  not  In  con- 
formity with  verdict. — Mutual  Life 
Ins.  Co.  of  New  Tork  v.  McBlrath, 
87  S.W.2d  619,  261  Ky.  321— Eauita- 
ble  Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.  v.  aoble, 
72  S.W.2d  -35,  254  Ky.  614. 

Costs  held  improperly  incorporat- 
ed in  judgment. — Jay-Em  Service 
Stations  v.  Watts,  8  N.T.S.Sd  489, 
255  App.Div.  995. 

42.  Cal. — Corpus     (Taxis      cited     in 
Cappelmann  v.  Young,  App.,  165  P. 
2d     950,     954— Harlow     v.     Motor 
Coach  Co.,    17    P.2d   748,    128    CaL 
App.  487. 

111. — Koltz    v.    Jahaaske,    88    N.E.2d 

973,  312  IlLApp.  -623. 
Minn.— Rieke  v.  St  Albans  Land  Co., 

231  N.W.  222,  180  Minn.  540. 
Ohio.— Weinberg  v.   Schaller,   171  N. 

B.  346,  34  Ohio  App.  464. 
. — Hawkeye  Securities  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Cashion,   Civ.App.,    278    S.W.   298— 

Owenwood      Oil      Corporation      v. 

Sweet,   Civ.App.,   263    S.W.    641. 
33  C.J.  p  1176  note  85. 

Defendant  held,  not  entitled  to 
complain  of  such  Judgment. — Schaff 
v.  Lynn,  Tex.'Civ.App.,  253  S.W.  590 

43.  in.— Koltz  v.   Jahaaske,  38  N.E 
2d  973,  312  IlLApp.  623. 

33  C.J.  p  1176  note  86. 

44.  Ind.— Dawson   v.    Shirk,    1   N.E. 
392,  102  Ind.  184. 

33  C.J.  p  1176  note  87. 

145 


45.  Tex.— Twichell    v.    Klinke,    Civ. 
App.,  272  S.W.  283. 

Where  the  verdict  is  greater  than 
the  amount  alleged,  it  has  been  held 
that  Judgment  should  be  entered  for 
the  latter  sum. — Dorsett  v.  Crew,  1 
Colo.  18—33  C.J.  p  1176  note  90.  ' 

46.  Wis.— Schweitzer  v.  Connor,   14 
N.W.  92*2,  57  Wis.  177. 

33  C.J.  p  1176  note  8*8. 

47.  Ky. — Dunn  v.  Blue  Grass  Realty 
Qo.,  173  S.W.  1122,  163  Ky.  384. 

33  C.J.  p  1176  note  89. 

48.  Tex.— Brown      v.      Montgomery, 
Civ.App.,  31  S.W.  1079. 

33  C.J.  p  1176  note  91. 

49.  Ohio.— Worst    v.    Colonial    Sav. 
Bank   &  Trust  Co.,    11   Ohio   App. 
308. 

Pa.— Allen  v.   Slock,   2   Penr.   &  W. 

159. 
33  C.J.  p  1176  note  92. 

50.  Ga.— Mercer    v.    Nowell,    175    S. 
B.  12,  179  Ga,  37— Rich  v.  Belcher, 
158  S.E.   643,   43  Ga.App.  377. 

Kan.— Gartner    v.    Hays,    222    P.    72, 

115  Kan.  88. 
Wis.— Feelyater  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 

P.  Ry.  Co.,  190  N.W.  193,  178  Wis. 

362. 
33  C.J.  P  1176  note  93. 

Judgment  for  amount  shown  by 
uncontradicted  evidence  should  be 
rendered  by  court  where  jury  falls 
to  bring  verdict  in  such  amount. — 
Bllerson  Floral  Co.  v.  Chesapeake  & 
O.  Ry.  Co.,  141  S.EL  834,  149  Va.  809. 

In  an  action  on  a  liquidated  <je- 
mond  a  general  verdict  for  plaintiff 
supports  a  Judgment  for  the  full 
amount  sued  for. — Rogers  v.  Bryan, 
Tex. Civ. App.,  270  S.W.  1066. 

51.  Minn.— Rieke  v.  St.  Albans  Land 
Co.,  231  N.W.  222,  ISO  Minn.  540. 

52.  Kan.— Traders    State    Bank    of 
Glen    Elder   v.   Wooster,    154   P.2d 
1017,  159  Kan.  337. 

Wash. — Young  v.   Rummens,   210   P. 

198.  121  Wash.  63$. 
33  C.J.  p  1176  note  95. 


§  58 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


torney's  fees,  on  a  verdict  in  favor  of  plaintiff  for 
the  principal  and  interest  it  has  been  held  that  it 
is  not  error  for  the  court  in  rendering  judgment  to 
add  the  attorney's  fees  provided  for  in  such  obli- 
gation.53 


§  58. 


Interest 


As  a  general  rule  the  Judgment  must  be  supported 
by,  and  conform  to,  the  verdict,  decision,  or  findings, 
with  respect  to  the  allowance  of  interest  and  the  amount 
thereof. 

As  a  general  rule  the  judgment  must  be  support- 
ed by,  and  conform  to,  the  verdict,  decision,  or  find- 
ings with  respect  to  the  allowance  of  interest  and 
the  amount  thereof,54  and  if  the  jury  do  not  allow 
interest  in  their  verdict  the  court  cannot  allow  it.55 
Also,  where  the  date  from  which  interest  runs  is 
a  matter  for  the  jury  to  determine,  if  the  jury, 
while  allowing  interest,  fail  to  fix  the  date  from 
which  it  is  to  run  the  court  cannot  do  so.56  Inter- 
est may  be  allowed,  however,  on  the  verdict  from 
the  time  of  its  return,57  and,  where  statutory  au- 


thority therefor  exists,  on  the  judgment,  even 
though  the  verdict  is  silent  thereon.58 

The  rule  barring  the  inclusion  of  interest  in  the 
judgment  where  the  verdict  fails  to  allow  it  has 
been  held  to  apply  even  where  the  issue  of  interest 
is  not  submitted  to  the  jury.5^  It  has  been  held, 
however,  that  where,  no  issue  as  to  interest  is  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury  and  the  right  thereto  exists  as  a 
matter  of  law,  and  there  is  no  dispute  as  to  the 
amount  thereof,  the  court  may  allow  interest  in  its 
judgment  even  though  the  verdict  is  silent.60 
Where  there  is  no  issue  as  to  the  date  from  which 
interest  is  to  run,  it  has  been  held  that  the  court  in 
its  judgment  may  fix  such  time  in  accordance  with 
the  rules  of  substantive  law.61 

Interest  may  be  included  in  the  judgment  where 
the  verdict  or  finding  with  regard  to  it  is  sufficient- 
ly certain  and  definite  as  to  amount,62  or  if,  with- 
out specifying  the  amount  of  the  interest  allowed, 
it  contains  data  .  from  which  it  can  be  calculated 
with  certainty  and  precision;63  but  where  the 
amount  is  not  definite  and  certain,64  and  cannot  be 
made  certain,65  the  court  is  not  authorized  to  render 


53.  Okl. — Hope   v.    Gordon,    50   P.2d 
669,  174  Okl.  368. 

54.  Ga. — Ivester  v.  Brown,   121  S.B. 
241,  157  Ga,  376. 

Mo. — Meffert    v.    Lawson,    28*7    S.W. 

610,  315  Mo.  1091. 
33  C.J.  p  1177  note  99. 
Date  from  which  interest  runs 

Where  .  verdict  allowed  "interest 
from  date,"  judgment  should  allow 
Interest  only  from  date  of  verdict. — 
Miller  v.  Farmers'  Mut.  Fire  Ins. 
Ass'n  of  North  Carolina,  155  S.E. 
2-54,  199  N.C.  594. 

55.  Ala. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  W. 
T.  Raleigh  Co.  v.  Harmon,  22  So.2d 
603,  605. 

Fla.— Shoup  v.  Waits,  107  So.  769,  91 
Fla.  378. 

Ky. — Parsley  v.  Parsley,  6  S.W.'2d 
234,  224  Ky.  254— Wright  v.  Har- 
lan  Fuel  Co.,'283  S.W.  944,  214  Ky. 
602. 

Mo. — Meffert  r.  Lawson.  #87  S.W. 
610,  315  Mo.  1091. 

N.C.— Davis  v.  Doggett,  194  S.B.  288, 
212  N.C.  589. 

Tex. — Bain  Peanut  Co.  of  Texas  v. 
Pinson,  Com.  App.,  29*2  S.W.  203, 
set  aside  on  other  grounds  294  S. 
W.  536 — St.  Louis  Southwestern 
Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  -Seale  &  Jones, 
Com~Aupp.,  267  S.W.  676 — Lone  Star 
Finance  Corporation  v.  Schelling, 
Civ.App.,  80  S.W.2d  35'8 — Buelin  v. 
Smith,  Civ.A-pp.,  294  S.W.  317,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  Bulin  v. 
Smith,  Com.  App.,  1  S.W.2d  591 — 
Brooks  Supply  C|o.  v.  First  State 
Bank  of  ElectraV  Civ.App.,  292  S. 
W.  6$1— Williams  v.  Walker,  Civ. 
App.,  290  S.W.  299 — Lancaster  v. 


Norris,  Civ.App.,  271  S.W.  401,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  Norris  v. 
Lancaster,  Com.App.,  280  S.W.  574 
— Gamer  Paper  Co.  v.  Tuscany, 
Civ.App.,  264  S.W.  132 — Joseph  v. 
Bostick,  Civ. App.,  264  S.W.  129,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  276  S.W.  6'72— Mack  Interna- 
tional Motor  Truck  Corporation  v. 
Coonrod,  Civ.App.,  264  S.W.  129. 
33  C.J.  p  1177  note  1. 
Rule  held  applicable  to  special  issue 

verdicts 

Tex.— ^Atkinson  v.  Jackson  Bros.,  Civ. 
App.,  2-59  S.W.  280,  modified  on 
other  grounds,  Com. App.,  270  S.W. 
348. 

Interest  is  presumed  to  be  includ- 
ed in  a  general  verdict  for  a  gross 
sum  where  the  question  of  interest 
was  not  reserved  by  the  court  and 
there  is  nothing  in  the  record  to  in- 
dicate that  the  jury  omitted  inter- 
est, and  the  court  cannot  in  such 
case  add  it. — Enterprise  Seed  Co.  v. 
Leonard  Seed  Co.,  220  P.  633,  96  Okl. 
12"2. 

58.  N.C. — Acme  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Queen, 127  S.E.  246,  189  N.C.  311. 

57.  Ky.— Wright     v.     Harlan     Fuel 
Co.,    283    S.W.    944,    214   Ky.    602. 

33  C.J.  p  1177  note  2. 

58.  Ga. — Lang     v.  .  South     Georgia 
Inv.  Co.,   144   S.E.   149,   38   Ga.App. 
4*30. 

59.  Tex.— Davis     v.     Morris,     "Com. 
App.,   272  S.W.  1103 — Thompson  v. 
Van  Natta,  Civ.App.,  277  S.W.  711 
— Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.   Co.  v. 
Ryan,    Civ.App.,    271    S.W.    '397. 

146 


60.  Ga.— Allen    v.    Allen,    81    S.E.2d 
483,  198  Ga.  269. 

Miss.— Collins  v.  Carter,  125  So.  89, 
15*5  Miss.  600. 

Tex. — Ewing  v.  Foley,  Inc.,  280  S. 
W.  499,  115  Tex.  222,  44  A.L.R.  62-7 
—Shield  Co.  v.  Carter,  qiv.App.,  5'8 
S.W.2d  1068 — Acme  Brick  Co.  v. 
Turjpin.  Civ.App.,  22  S.W.2d  322, 
error  dismissed— Automobile  Un- 
derwriters of  America  v.  Radford, 
Civ.App.,  293  S.W.  869,  affirmed, 
Com.App.,  299  S.W.  852— Miller  v. 
Miller,  Civ.App.,  292  S.W.  917. 

Wis. — In  re  Draper's  Estate,  203  N. 
W.  360,  187  Wis.  347. 

61.  Ky.— Hack  v.  Lashley,  -245  S.W. 
851,  197  Ky.  117. 

62.  Mich. — Bell    v.    ArcUs,    38    Mich. 
609. 

63.  Iowa. — Grimes  Sav.  Bank  v.  Mc- 
Harg,  236  N.W.  418,  213  Iowa  969, 
certiorari       denied       McHarg       v. 
Grime.9  Sav.  Bank,  53  S.Ct.   5,  287 
U.S.  599,  77  L.Ed.  522. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Fletcher 
v.  Allen,  157  P.-2d  452,  453,  195  Okl. 
307. 
33  C.J.  p  1177  note  3. 

A  general  verdict,  such  as,  "We 
the  jury  find  for  plaintiff,"  has  been 
held  sufficient  to  support  a  Judgment 
for  interest  in  an  action  on  a  con- 
tract.— Darden  v.  Matthews,  22  Tex. 
320— West  v.  L.  W.  Sweet,  Inc.,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  292  S.W.  251. 

64.  Mich. — Bell   v.    Ardis,    38    Mich. 
609. 

65.  Okl. — Fletcher  v.   Allen,    157   P. 
2d  4>52,  195  Okl.  307. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


59 


a  judgment  for  interest  If  the  specification  of 
interest  is  insufficient,  a  judgment  for  the  principal 
amount  found,  without  interest,  is  supported  by  the 
verdict.66  Error  in  calculation  of  interest  may 
generally  be  corrected  by  amendment  or  modifica- 
tion of  the  judgment  in  the  trial  court  or  on  ap- 
peal.6? 

§  59.    Judgment  Non  Obstante  Veredicto 

A  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  Is  a  Judgment 
given  for  one  party  notwithstanding  the  finding  of  a 
verdict  in  favor  of  the  other  party,  and  a  motion  for 
judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  means  a  motion  for 
judgment  notwithstanding  the  entire  verdict,  the  pur- 
pose being  to  avoid  a  new  trial  and  to  secure  a  final 
judgment  in  favor  of  the  movant. 

In  its  broadest  sense  a  judgment  non  obstante 


veredicto  is  a  judgment  given  for  one  party  not- 
withstanding the  finding  of  a  verdict  in  favor  of 
the  other  party.6*  A  motion  for  judgment  non  ob- 
stante veredicto  means  a  motion  for  judgment  not- 
withstanding the  entire  verdict.6^  The  purpose  of 
the  motion  is  to  avoid  a  new  trial  and  to  secure  a 
final  judgment  in  favor  of  the  movant.70  The  mo- 
tion is  wholly  separate  and  distinct  from  a  motion 
for  a  new  trial,71  and  it  has  been  distinguished  from 
a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment.72  Moreover  it  is 
not  construable  as  a  motion  to  amend  the  verdict.73 

Although,  as  discussed  infra  §§  60-61,  the  prac- 
tice with  respect  to  granting  judgment  non  ob- 
stante veredicto  is  general  and  well  settled,  in  a 
few  jurisdictions  it  is  narrowly  limited  in  applica- 
tion.74 


63.  Neb. — Wiseman  v.  Ziegler,  $0 
N.W.  320,  41  Neb.  886. 

67.  Ala. — Spence    v.     Rutledge,     11 
Ala.  590. 

33  C.J.  p  1177  note  7. 

68.  Ind. — Inter  State  Motor  Freight 
System   v.    Henry,    38  N.E.2d   909, 
111     Ind.App.  179. 

33  C.J.  p  1178  note  9. 

Judgment  on  special  findings  against 

general    verdict    distinguished   see 

infra  §  60  e. 

Particular  Judgment  construed  as 
not  a  judgment  non  obstante  ver- 
odicto  authorized  by  statute,  where 
judgment  and  motion  showed  that 
judgment  was  rendered  on  verdict 
notwithstanding  jury's  failure  to  an* 
swer  issue. — Davis  v.  Bond,  158  S. 
W.2d  297,  138  Tex.  206. 

69.  Tex. — Myers    v.    Crenshaw,    137 
S.W.2d  7,  1-34  Tex.  500. 

7Q.  Iowa. — Miller  v.  Southern  Sure- 
ty Co.,  229  N.W.  909,  209  Iowa 
1221. 

71.  Iowa. — Miller  v.  Southern  Sure- 
ty   Co.,    supra — Cownie    v.    Kopf, 
202   N.W.   517,   199   Iowa  737. 

Alternative    motion    for    new    trial 

see  infra  §  61  a. 
Motion   for  new  trial   generally  see 

the  C.J.S.  title  New  Trial  §§  139- 

146  also  46  C.J.  p  314  note  58  et 

sea. 

72.  Mo. — King   v.    Kaw-Mo    Whole- 
sale  Grocer   Co.,   175   S.W.   77,   188 
Mo.App.  235,  839. 

33  C.J.  p  1178  note  9  [b]. 
Arrest  of  judgment  generally  see  in- 
fra §§  87-99. 
Distinction. 

."It  is  true  that  in  some  respects 
the  two  motions  are  similar.  For 
example,  both  are  directed  only  to 
material  defects  in  the  record. 
However,  there  are  also  Important 
distinctions.  The  party  filing  a  mo- 
tion for  judgment  notwithstanding 
the  verdict  asks  the  court  to  do 
something  more  than  merely  to  ar- 


rest the  judgment.  Such  a  motion 
requests  the  court  to  go  farther  and 
render  judgment  in  plaintiffs  favor 
notwithstanding  the  verdict  which 
has  been  found  against  him.  A  par- 
ty filing  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judg- 
ment does  not  ask  the  court  for  a 
judgment  in  his  favor,  but  only 
asks  that  the  judgment  be  arrested, 
and  alleges  that  the  party  In  whose 
favor  the  verdict  was  rendered  is 
not  entitled  to  the  judgment  of  the 
court  because  of  some  insufficiency 
in  the  record  proper." — First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Dunbar,  72  S.W.2d  '821,  824, 
230  Mo.App.  687. 

73,  Mo.— Meffert  v.  Lawson,  287  S. 
W.  610,  315  Mo.  1091. 

74.  Puerto  Rico. — Erwin  v.  Nater,  6 
Puerto  Rico  Fed.  690. 

33  C.J.  p  1178  note  11. 

Judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  in 

federal  courts  see  Federal  Courts 

§  144  f. 

XXL  action  under  Federal  Employ- 
ers'  Liability  Act   state   court  may 
render      judgment      notwithstanding 
verdict. 
Minn. — Robertson  v.   Chicago,   B.   I. 

&  P.   Ry.    Co.,   2*30   N.W.   585,   180 

Minn.   578,  certiorari  denied  51   S. 

Ct   31,  282  U.S.   854,   75  L.Bd.   756 

—Marshall  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

R.   Co.,    157   N.W.    6-38,    133    Minn. 

460. 
Pa. — Casseday  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 

Co.,  22  AJ2d  -663,  343  Pa,  342. 
Xa.  Missouri 

Motion  for  judgment  notwith- 
standing verdict,  despite  code,  is  not 
obsolete,  nor  is  it  regulated  by  stat- 
ute regarding  motions  for  new  trial 
and  in  arrest  of  judgment,  but  rath- 
er by  rules  of  common  law. — Meffert 
v.  Lawson,  287  S.W.  610,  315  Mo. 
1091— #3  C.J.  p  1178  note  11  [b]. 
la  Texas. 

(1>  Under  the  former  practice 
the  judgment  was  required  to  fol- 
low the  verdict,  and  the  court  was! 

147 


without  "power  to  render  judgment 
notwithstanding  the  verdict  "on  a  ma- 
terial issue. — Vogel  v.  Allen,  13  S. 
W.2d  340,  118  Tex.  196 — Fitch  v. 
Lomax,  Com.App.,  16  S.W.2d  -530,  66 
A.L.R.  758— North  v.  Atlas  Brick 
Co.,  Com.App.,  13  S.W.2d  59,  motion 
granted  in  part  16  S.W.2d  519— Mag- 
nolia Petroleum  Co.  v.  Connellee, 
Com.App.,  11  S.W.2d  15*8,  followed  in 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Akin,  11 
S.W.2d  1113,  and  rehearing  denied 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Connel- 
lee, 14  S.W.2d  1020,  and  20  S.W.Sd 
758— Morris  v.  Jackson,  Com.App., 
296  S.W.  486 — Deal  v.  Craven,  Com. 
App.,  277  S.W.  1046— Nalle  v.  Walen- 
ta,  Civ. App.,  102  S.W.24  1070— Mag- 
nolia Petroleum  Co.  v.  Beck,  Civ. 
App.,  41  S.W.2d  488,  error  dismissed 
— Bertrand  v.  Mutual  Motor  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  38  S.W.2d  417,  error  refused — 
Westex  Theaters  v.  Williams,  Civ. 
App.,  35  S.W.2d  253 — Jones  v.  Prine, 
Civ.App.,  29  S.W.2d  446— Carter  v. 
Portwood,  Civ.App.,  26  S.W.2d  422, 
error  dismissed — Peeler  v.  Smith, 
Civ.App.,  18  S.W.2d  938,  affirmed 
Smith  v.  Peeler,  Com. App.,  29  S.W. 
3d  975 — Murray  Tool  Co.  v.  Root  & 
Fehl,  Civ.App..  16  S.W.2d  316,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  Root  &  Fehl 
v.  Murray  Tool  Co,,  Com.App.,  2-6 
S.W.2d  189,  75  A.L.R.  902— South- 
west 'Nat.  Bank  of  Dallas  v.  Hill, 
Civ.App.,  '297  S.W.  1096— Garrison 
Tie  &  Timber  Co.  v.  Parrott,  Civ. 
App.,  293  S.W.  701— Sorenson  v.  City 
Nat  Bank,  Civ.App.,  "293  S.W.  638— 
Potomac  Ins.  Co.  v.  Easley,  Civ. 
App.,  293  S.W.  346,  reformed  and  af- 
firmed, Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  263 — 
Reese  v.  Reese,  Civ.App.,  289  S.W. 
1023 — Lyon  v.  Gray,  Civ.App.,  288  S. 
W.  54-5— Rogers  v.  City  of  Fort 
Worth,  Civ.App.,  275  S.W.  214— 
Dowd  v.  Klock,  Civ.App.,  268  S.W. 
234,  reversed  on  other  grounds  Klock 
v.  Dowd,  Com.App.,  «280  S.W.  194 — 
Bateman  v.  Cleghorn,  Civ.App.,  266 
S.W,  422— Branch  r.  Watford,  Civ. 
App.,  254  'S.W.  389,  affirmed  Wafford 


§  60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  60.    When  and  for  Whom  Granted 

a.  In   general;    pleading   as  basis    for 

judgment 

b.  Evidence  as  basis  for  judgment 

c.  On  motion  to  disregard  special  issue 

jury  finding 

d.  On  point  reserved 

e.  On   special   findings   against  general 

verdict 

f.  In  particular  proceedings 

g.  Amount  of  verdict 
h."  Party  entitled 

i.  Waiver  and  estoppel 

a.  In  General;    Pleading  as  Basis  for  Judg- 
ment 

At  common  law,  and  in  the  absence  of  statute  pro- 


viding otherwise,  a  Judgment  notwithstanding  the  ver- 
dict may  be  rendered  when,  and  only  when,  the  plead- 
Ings  entitle  the  party  against  whom  the  verdict  is  ren- 
dered to  a  Judgment  and  where  the  party  against  whom 
such  Judgment  Is  rendered  is  precluded  from  recovery 
by  some  matter  not  subject  to  amendment,  or  which 
could  not  be  supplied  on  a  new  trial. 

Originally,  at  common  law,  a  judgment  non  ob- 
stante  veredicto  could  be  entered  only  when  the 
plea  confessed  the  cause  of  action  and  set  up  mat- 
ters in  avoidance  which  were  insufficient,  although 
found  true,  to  constitute  either  a  defense  or  a  bar 
to  the  action.75  In  such  a  case  plaintiff  was  enti- 
tled to  a  judgment  in  his  favor  notwithstanding  a 
verdict  for  defendant.78  Thus  a  judgment  non  ob- 
stante  veredicto  at  common  law  was  merely  one 
species  of  a  judgment  on  the  pleadings.77  Some 
statutes  expressly  provide  for  the  rendering  of 


v.    Branch,    Com:App.,    267    S.W.   26 
—Thornton    v.    Athens    Nat.    Bank 
Civ.App.,   252    S.W.   278 — Compton 
Skeeters,    Civ.App.,    250    S.W.    201— 
3-3  C.J.  p  1178  note  11  [fj. 

(2)    Court  could,  however,  ignor 
jury's  findings  where  under  no  view 
of  pleadings  and  evidence  was  plain 
tiff    entitled    to    recover. — Vogel    y 
Allen,  13  S.W.Ed  "340,  11'8  Tex.  196— 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.   v.   Connel 
lee,    Com.App.,    11    S.W.2d    158,    fol 
lowed  In  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v 
Akin,  11  S.W.2d  1113.  and  rehearing 
denied    Magnolia    Petroleum    Co.    v 
Connellee,    14    S.W.2d    1020,   and   2 
&W.2d  758— ®pence  v.  National  Life 
&  Accident  Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.f  59   S 
W.2d    212— -Ellis   County  v.    McKay 
Civ.App.§   '56   S.W.'2d  -310— Sproles  v 
ftosen,  Civ.App.,   47  S.W.2d  331,  af- 
firmed '84  -S,W.2d  1001,  T26  Tex  51 — 
Bertrand  v.  Mutual  Motor  Co.,  Civ 
Apjp.,  38  S.W.2d  417,  error  refused. 

(3)  Disregard  of  findings  on  im- 
material issues  was  not  violation  of 
mle  prohibiting  rendition  of  Judg- 
tnent  non  obstante  veredicto. — Klock 
v.  Dowd,  Com.App.,  280  S.W.  194— 
Chaison  v.  Stark,  Civ.App.,  20  S.W. 
2d  500,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
Stark  v.  Chaison,  Com.Ap'p.,  50  S.W. 
2d  776— Atlas  v.  Byers,  Civ.App.,  21 
S.W.2d  1080— <Long  v.  McCoy,'  Civ. 
App.,  294  S.W.  -eSS,  affirmed  McCoy 
v.  Long,  Com.App.,  15  S.W.2d  234, 
rehearing  denied  17  -S.W.2d  783— 
Tardley  v.  Houston  Oil  Co.  of  Texas, 
CJr.App.,  1288  S.W.  861— Sheek  v.  Tex- 
as Co.,  Civ.App.,  286  -S.W.  -336— Mc- 
Oee  v.  Cage,  Civ.App,,  283  S.W.  283. 

(4)  'Furthermore,  rule  prohibiting 
Judgments  non  obstante  veredicto 
was  not  violated  by  giving  of  sum- 
mary instructions  or  withdrawing 
case  from  jury.— Adams  v.  Houston 
Nat  Bank,  Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  878 
—Noble  v.  Empire  Gas  &  -Fuel  Co., 
Cir.App.,  20  S.W.2d  849,  affirmed  Em- 


pire Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Noble,  Qom 
App.,  36  B.W.2d  451. 

(5)  However,  the  Texas  practic 
has  been  modified  by  statute,  as  dis 
cussed  infra  §  60,  and  Judgment  not 
withstanding  the  verdict  is  author 
ized  in  certain  cases. 

xu  trtafc 

A  motion  for  Judgment  notwith 
standing,  the  verdict  Is  not  recog 
nized  as  proper. — Morrison  v.  Perry 
140  P.2d  772,  104  Utah  151— Kirk  v 
Salt  (Lake  City,  89  P,  45'8,  32  Utah 
143,  12  L.R.A.,N.S.,  1021. 

78.    Ariz.— Corpus    Juris    quote*    in 
Eads  v.  Commercial  Nat.  Bank  o 
Phoenix,  1266  P.  14,  15,  33  Ariz.  499 
62  A.L.R.  183. 

Fhu — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Dudte* 
v.  Harrison,  McCready  &  Co.,  173 
So.  820,  «2'3,  127  Fla.  687,  rehear- 
ing denied  174  So.  729,  128  Fla. 
•358— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Atlantic 
Coast  -Line  R.  Co.  v.  Canady,  165 
So.  629,  6aO,  122  Fla.  447— Corpus 
Jurl*  cited  in  Pillet  v.  Ershick, 
126  -So.  784,  788,  99  Fla.  433. 

Idaho. — Prairie  Flour  Mill  Co.  v. 
Farmers'  Elevator  Co.,  2-61  P.  673, 
45  Idaho  2*29. 

111. — Illinois  Tuberculosis  Ass'n  v. 
Springfield  Marine  Bank,  2S2  111. 
lApp.  14— Capelle  v.  CJhicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  280  IlLApp.  471 — Mod- 
era  Woodmen  of  America  v.  Blair, 
263  IU.App.  387— Manufacturers', 
.Finance  Trust  v.  Stone,  251  111. 
App.  414. 

Minn. — Anderson  v.  Newsome,  258  N. 
W.  157,  193  Minn.  157— Funkley  v. 
Ridgway,  197  N.W.  280,  158  Minn. 
265. 

Mo. — Meffert  v.  Lawson,  ^87  S.W. 
610,  3,15  Mo.  1091. 

ST.C.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Johnson 
v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  14 
S.B,2d  405,  406,  219  N.C.  445— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Jernlgan  v. 

148 


Neighbors,   141  S.B.   586,   195  N.C 
231. 

Okl.— Rohland  v.  International  Har- 
vester Co.  of  America,  76  P.2cl 
1078,  182  Okl.  200. 

Or.— Snyder  v.  Portland  Ry.,  Light  & 
Power  Co.,  215  P.  '887,  107  Or.  673. 

Pa.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Common- 
wealth v.  Heller,  24  A.-2d  460,  462, 
147  Pa.Super.  68. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  sited  in  Traders 
&  General  Ins.  Co.  v.  MHliken,  Civ 
App.,  110  S.W.2d  108-^Corpus  Ju- 
ris cited  in  Stallings  v.  Federal 
Underwriters  Exchange,  Civ. App., 
108  S.W.2d  449,  451— Spence  v.  Na- 
tional Life  &  Accident  Ins.  Co., 
Civ.App.,  59  S.W.Bd  212. 

33  C.J.  p  1178  note  12. 

76.  Ariz.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Bads  v.  Commercial  Nat  Bank  of 
Phoenix,    266    P.    14,    15,   33   Ariz. 
499,  62  A.L.R.  183. 

Minn.— Anderson  v.  Newsome,  258 
N.W.  157,  193  Minn.  157— Funk- 
ley  v.  Ridgway,  197  N.W.  280,  158 
Minn.  265. 

Pa,— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Common- 
wealth v.  Heller.  24  A.2d  460,  462, 
147  Pa.Super.  68. 

33  C.J.  p  1178  note  tt,  p  1179  note  13. 

77.  Colo. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Costilla  Coun- 
ty  v.   Wood,    250   P.   860,    861,   '80 
Colo.  279. 

Del. — Burton  v.  Delaware  Poultry 
Co.,  1'5  AJ2d  440,  2  Terry  68. 

Fla.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dudley 
v.  Harrison,  McCready  &  Co.,  173 
So.  820,  823,  127  -Fla.  687,  rehear- 
ing denied  174  So.  729,  12*8  Fla. 
338. 

Ga. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Snyder  v. 
Elkan,  1*99  S.B.  891,  894,  187  Ga. 
164. 

11.— Malewski  v.  Mackiewich,  282 
111. App.  1593 — Illinois  Tuberculosis 
Ass'n  v.  Springfield  Marine  Bank, 
282  IlLApp.  14— Capelle  v.  Chicago 
&  N.  W.  R.  Co..  280  IlLtApp.  47L 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


60 


judgment  on  the  pleadings 'irrespective  of  the  ver- 
dict,78 and  in  some  jurisdictions  the  right  to  file  a 
motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  is 
purely  statutory™  and  judgment  may  be  rendered 
only  after  full  compliance  with  the  statute.80 


In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise, 
such  a  judgment  may  be  rendered  only  when  the 
pleadings  entitle  the  party  against  whom  the  verdict 
is  rendered  to  a  judgment,81  and  only  where  the 


Ky.— Roe   T.    Gentry's    Ex'x,    162   S. 

W.2d  BO'S,  290  Ky.  598. 
Minn.— Anderson  v.  Newsome,  258  N. 
W.  157,  193  Minn.  157— Funkley  v. 
Ridgway.  197  N.W.  280,  158  Minn. 
265. 

N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Respond 
v.  Decker,  162  A.  725,  726,  109  N. 
J.Law  458. 

N.C. — Page  Supply  Co.  v.  Horton,  17 
S.E.2d  493,  220  N.C.  373-^Johnson 
v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  14 
S.B.2d  40-5,  219  N.C.  445— MacMil- 
lan  Buick  Co.  v.  Rhodes,  *2  8.E.2d 
699,  215  N.C.  595— Little  v.  Mar- 
tin Furniture  Co.,  158  S.E.  490,  200 
•N.C.  731 — Art  Bronze  &  Iron 
Works  v.  Beaman,  155  S.E.  166,  199 
N.C.  537. 

Ohio.— J.  &  P.  Harig  Co.  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati,  22  N.E.2d  540,  61  Ohio 
App.  "314 — Lehman  v.  Harvey,  187 
N.B.  28,  45  Ohio  App.  215,  petition 
dismissed  187  N.B.  201,  127  Ohio 
St.  159— Schmidt  v.  Austin,  159 
N.B.  -850,  26  Ohio  App.  240. 
Or. — -Snyder  v.  Portland  Ry.,  'Light 
&  Power  Co.,  215  P.  '887,  107  Or. 
673. 

Tenn. — Citizens'  Trust  Co.  v.  Service 
Motor  Car  Co.,  »297  S.W.  735,  154 
Tenn.  507 — Jamison  v.  Metropoli- 
tan Life  Ins.  Co.,  145  S.W.2d  553. 
24  Tenn.App.  398— National  Life  £ 
Accident  Ins.  Co.  v.  American 
Trust  Co.,  68  S.W.2d  971,  17  Tenn. 
App.  516. 

Vt.— Nadeau  r.  St  Albans  Aerie  No. 
1205  Fraternal  Order  of  Eagles,  26 
A.2d    93,   112   Vt    397— Johnson  v. 
Hardware  Mut  Casualty  Co.,  1  A. 
2d  817,  109  Vt  481. 
3-3  C.J.  p  1179  note  16. 
Judgment  on  pleadings  see  the  C.J. 
S.   title   Pleading  §§   424-449,  also 
49  C.J.  p  666  note  81  et  seq. 
Tested  by  pleadings 

Judgment  notwithstanding  verdict 
is  to  'be  tested  by  pleadings. — De 
Boer  v.  Olmsted,  260  P.  108,  82  Colo. 
369. 

78.    I1L — McNeill     v.     Harrison     & 
Sons,    2    N.E.(2d    959,    286    Ill.App. 
.120. 
Iowa.— Parriott   v.   Levis,    195  .N.W. 

STS,  196  Iowa  875. 

Or. — iSnyder  v.    Portland  Ry.,   Light 
'&  Power  Co.,  215  P.  887,   107   Or. 
6-73. 

33  C.J.  p  1179  note  18. 
Cause  of  action  arising'  prior  to  stat- 
ute 

The  amended  statute  providing 
that  when,  on  statements  in  the 
pleadings,  or  on  the  evidence  re- 
ceived on  the  trial,  one  party  is  en- 
titled,by  law -to  Judgment  in  his  fa-^ 


vor,  judgment  shall  be  so  rendered 
by  the  court,  although  a  verdict  has 
been  found  against  him,  determined 
the  procedural  rights  of  parties  in 
an  action  filed  after  the  statute's  ef- 
fective date,  even  though  the  cause 
of  action  arose  prior  to  the  effective 
date.— Miller  v.  Star  Co.,  15  N.E.2d 
151,  57  Ohio  App.  485. 
Common-law  practice  held  adopted 

by  statute 
Neb. — Hamaker  v.  Patrick.  244  N.W. 

420,  123  Neb.  809. 

Plaintiff's  objection  to  legal 
oiency  of  denial  in  answer  by  mo- 
tion for  Judgment  notwithstanding 
the  verdict  came  too  late,  and  the 
overruling  of  such  motion  by  the 
trial  court  did  not  constitute  error 
under  statute  authorizing  judgment 
notwithstanding  the  verdict  where, 
on  statements  in  pleading,  a  party 
is  entitled  by  law  to  judgment  in  his 
favor. — Shoemaker  v.  Standard  Oil 
Co.,  20  N.E.2d  520,  135  Ohio  St.  262. 
Statutes  held  mandatory 
Ky.— Ernst  v.  Pike,  «24  S.W.2d  553, 

232  Ky.  680. 
Ohio. — Central    Community   Chautau- 

qua  System  v.  Rentschler,   166  N. 

E.   698,  31  Ohio  App.   525. 
in  Plorida 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  grant- 
ing of  motions  for  judgments  non 
obstante  veredicto  is  governed  by. 
common-law  principles  and  statute 
providing  that  appellate  court  re- 
versing order  granting  new  trial 
should  direct  final  judgment  to  be 
entered  for  party  who  had  obtained 
Verdict,  unless  motion  for  judgment 
non  obstante  veredicto  should  be 
made  and  prevail,  did  not  change 
grounds  or  scope  of  motions  for 
judgments  non  obstante  veredicto  as 
they  existed  at  time  statute  was 
adopted. — Dudley  v.  Harrison,  Mc- 
Cready  &  Co.,  173  So.  820,  127  Fla. 
687,  rehearing  denied  174  So.  729, 
128  Fla.  338. 

(2)  Where,  however,  action  for 
injuries  to  child  at  railroad  crossing 
was  predicated  on  alleged  negligence 
of  railroad's  employees  and  evidence 
showed  that  employees  were  not  neg- 
ligent, refusal  to  sustain  defendant 
railroad's  motion  for  Judgment  not- 
withstanding verdict  for  child  was 
held  reversible  error. — Atlantic  Coast 
Line  R.  Co.  v.  Canady,  165  So.  629, 
122  Fla.  447. 
79.  Iowa. — In  re  Larimer's  Estate, 

283  N.W.  430,  235  Iowa  1067. 
Inapplicable  statutes 

The  act  of  1805  providing  for  the 
payment  of  a  jury  fee,  and  the  en- 

149 


try  of  judgment  on  a  verdict,  has  no 
reference  to  a  judgment  non  ob- 
stante veredicto  entered  directly  by 
the  court  under  the  Act  of  1905. — 
McClelland  v.  West  Penn  Appliance 
Co.,  1  A.2d  491,  132  Pa.Super.  471. 

8Q.    Tex. — Nalle     v.     Walenta,     Civ. 
App.,  102  S.W.2d  1070. 

81.     Ark. — Powers     v.    Wood     Parts 
Corporation,    44    iS.W.Sd    324,    184 
Ark.    1032— Corpus   Juris    cited   in 
Oil  Fields  Corporation  v.  Cubage, 
24  S.W.2d  328,  329,  ISO  Ark.  1018. 
Colo. — Corpus   Juris    oitsd  in  Board 
of    Com'rs    of   Costilla   County   v. 
Wood,    250    P.    860,    861,    SO    Colo. 
279. 
Conn. — Gesualdi    v.    Connecticut   Co., 

41  A.2d  771,  131  Conn.  622. 
DeL — Burton    v.     Delaware    Poultry 

Co.,  15  A.2d  440,  2  Terry  68. 
Ga. — Corpus  Juris  citad  in  Snyder  v. 
Elkan,    199  -S.E.    891,   S94,    187  Ga. 
164. 

Iowa.— K.  O.  Lee  &  Son  Co.  v.  Sund- 
berg,  291  N.W.  146,  227  Iowa  137'5. 
Ky.— Roe  v.  Gentry's  Ex'x,  162  S.W. 
2d  208,  '290  Ky.  598— World  Fire  & 
Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tapp,  151  S.W. 
2d  42S,  286  Ky.  650— Stone  v. 
Smith,  151  S.W.2d  71,  286  Ky.  46S 
— Wheeldor.  v.  Regenhardt  Const. 
Co.,  145  S.W.2d  527,  284  Ky.  603 
— Slusher  v.  Hubble,  72  S.W.2d  59, 
•254  Ky.  595— Auto  Livery  Co.  v. 
Stone,  36  S.W.2d  349,  237  Ky.  686 
—Sachs  v.  Hensley,  294  S.W.  1073, 
220  Ky.  226— Insurance  Co.  of 
North  America  v.  Gore,  284  S.W. 
1107,  215  Ky.  4'S7. 
Minn. — Timmins  v.  Pfeifer,  230  'X. 

W.  260,  ISO  Minn.  1. 
Mo.— Thomas    v.     Land,     30     S.W.2d 

1035,  "225  Mo.App.  216.  - 
Neb.— Wolfinger  v.  Shaw,  287  N.W. 
63,  1*36  Neb.  604— Winterson  v. 
Pantel  Realty  Co.,  282  N.W.  393, 
135  Neb.  472— Le  Bron  Electrical 
Works,  Inc.  v.  Pizinger,  270  N.W. 
683,  132  Neb.  164. 

N.C. — Little  v.  Martin  Furniture  Co., 
158  S.E.  490,  200  N.C.  731— Art 
Bronze  &  Iron  Works  v.  Beaman, 
155  S.B.  166,  199  N.C.  537— Cor- 
pus  Juris  cited  in  Jernigan  v. 
Neighbors,  141  S.E.  586,  195  N.C. 
231. 

Ohio. — Matcoski  v.  City  of  Canton, 
6  N.E.2d  795,  54  Ohio  App.  234— 
Lehman  v.  Harvey,  187  K.E.  28, 
45  Ohio  App.  215,  error  dismissed 
187  N.E.  201,  127  Ohio  St  159. 
Or.— Clarkson  v.  Wong,  42  P.2d  763, 
150  Or.  406,  motion  denied  45  P. 
2d  914,  150  Or.  406— Bernstein  v. 
Berg,  262  P.  247,  123  Or.  343. 


§  60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


party  against  whom  such  judgment  is  rendered  is 
precluded  from  recovery  by  some  matter  not  sub- 
ject to  amendment,  or  which  could  not  be  supplied 
on  a  new  trial,82  and  where  the  defect  in  the  plead- 
ing was  not  cured  by  the  verdict;83  but  under 
such  circumstances  it  is  proper  to  enter  judgment 
for  the  party  entitled  notwithstanding  the  verdict 
against  him.84  A  proceeding  for  a  motion  non  ob- 
stante  veredicto  must  be  founded  on  substantial  in- 
sufficiency of  the  pleading  on  which  the  verdict 


surely  rested,86  and  the  defect  must  be  such  that 
no  cause  of  action  or  defense  is  stated  in  the  plead- 
ing.86 

When  rendered  for  plaintiff.  A  judgment  non  ob- 
stante  veredicto  may  be  rendered  for  plaintiff  where 
the  issue  determined  for  defendant  is  immaterial,87 
provided  the  case  is  not  one  calling  for  a  repleader, 
within  the  rules  discussed  hereinafter  in  this  sub- 
section, and  where  the  plea  or  answer  sets  up  facts 
insufficient  in  law  to  constitute  a  defense,88  or 


Tenn. — Stevens  v.  Moore,  139  S.W.2d 
"^   710,  24  Tenn.App.  61. 
W.Va. — Clise  v.  Prunty,  163  S.E.  864, 
112    W.Va.    181— Gray   v.   Norfolk 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.,  130  S.E.  1'39,  99  W. 
Va.  575— Zogg  v.  Kern  Oil  &  Gas 
Co.,    117    S.E.    620,    94   W.Va.   17— 
Dunbar  Tire  &  Rubber  Co.  v.  Cris- 
sey,  114  S.E.  804,  92  W.Va.  419. 
33  C.J.  p  H80  note  BO. 
Verdict  responsive  to  pleadings 

In  ejectment  action,  where  de- 
fendant entered  plea  of  not  guilty 
and  special  plea  of  adverse  posses- 
sion of  part  of  premises,  verdict 
for  plaintiff  as  to  part  described  in 
the  special  plea  was  responsive  to 
the  plea  of  general  issue  as  limited 
by  the  second  plea,  and  hence  would 
not  furnish  basis  for  judgment  non 
obstante  veredicto  on  ground  that 
verdict  was  on  special  plea  only  and 
that  special  plea  was  bad.— Wicker 
v.  Williams,  189  So.  30,  137  Fla.  752. 
Defects  cored  "by  adverse  pleading" 

Judgment  on  pleading,  notwith- 
standing verdict  not  stating  facts 
warranting  recovery,  is  unauthorized 
unless  defects  are  cured  by  ad- 
verse party's  pleading.— Ernst  v. 
Pike,  -24  S.W.2d  553,  2-32  Ky.  680. 
In  Oklahoma 

The  trial  court  is  without  jurisdic- 
tion to -enter  judgment  non  obstante 
veredicto  unless  the  party  in  whose 
favor  such  judgment  is  rendered 
would  be  entitled-  to  judgment  on 
the  pleadings  or  the  jury  has  return- 
ed special  findings  of  fact  contrary 
to  the  general  verdict — Garrett  v. 
Kennedy,  145  P.2d  407,  193  Okl.  605 
—National  Mut  Casualty  Co.  v.  Har- 
mon, 113  P.2d  597,  189  Okl.  53— 
Mason  v.  McNeal,  100  P.2d  451,  187 
Okl.  31— Martin  v.  National  Bank 
of  Claremore,  77  P.2d  40,  182  Okl. 
217— Rohland  v.  International  Har- 
vester Co.  of  America,  76  P.2d  1078, 
18-2  Okl.  200 — Dunham  v.  Chemical 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  71  P.2d  468,  180 
Okl.  537— Myrick  v.  City  of  Tulsa, 
54  P.2d  330,  175  Okl.  647— Queen  Ins. 
Co.  of  America  v.  Baker,  50  P.2d 
371,  174  Okl.  273— Diamond  v.  Enid 
Milling  Co.,  299  P.  440,  149  Okl.  61 
— Beesley  v.  Wm.  A.  Nicholson  Co., 
298  P.  607,  148  Okl.  270-^City  of 
Ardmore  v.  Hill,  293  P.  554,  146  Okl. 
200— State  v.  Hinkle,  287  P.  7«22, 
143  Okl.  =33 — St  Louis-San  Francisco 


Ry.  Co.  v.  Eakins,  284  P.  866,  H41 
Okl.  256 — Spruce  v.  Chicago,  R.  I. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  586,  159  Okl. 
123— Eldridge  v.  Vance,  280  P.  5.70, 
138  Okl.  201— Beard  v.  W.  T.  Raw- 
leigh  Co.,  277  (P.  657,  136  Okl.  165 
— Thompson  v.  Florence,  274  P.  671, 
135  Okl.  116— St.  Louis-San  Fran- 
cisco Ry.  Co.  v.  Bell,  273  P.  243, 
134  Okl.  2151— Bartels  v.  Suter,  266 
P.  753,  1-30  Okl.  7— First  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Russell,  262  P.  205,  1!28  Okl.  222 
—Garble  Sav.  Bank  v.  First  State 
Bank  of  Vanoss,  261  P.  913,  128  Okl. 
165 — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v.  Bal- 
lard,  259  P.  528,  126  Okl.  270— Odom 
v.  Cedar  Rapids  Sav.  Bank,  244  IP. 
758,  114  Okl.  126— Stapleton  Motor 
Sales  Co.  v.  Oates,  255  P.  513,  109 
Okl.  173— Schaap  v.  Williams,  2-25 
P.  910,  99  Okl.  21— Montie  Oil  Co. 
v.  Nichols,  224  P.  542,  98  Okl.  75 
—Dill  v.  Johnston,  222  P.  507,  94 
Okl.  264— McAlester  v.  Bank  of  Mc- 
Alester,  218  P.  839,  95  Okl.  193— 
Hanna  v.  Gregg,  217  P.  434,  92  Okl. 
3»4 — Hyatt  v.  Vinita  Brass  Works, 
214  (P.  706,  89  Okl.  in— First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Ball,  -209  P.  322,  87  Okl. 
162—33  C.J.  p  1180  note  20. 

82.  Ariz. — Bads  v.  Commercial  Nat 
Bank    of   (Phoenix,    266    P.    14,    33 
Ariz.  499,  62  A.L.R.  183. 

Cal.— Gallagher  v.  California  Pacific 

Title    &    Trust   Co.,    57    P.2d    195, 

13  Cal.App.2d  482. 
Conn. — Gesualdi   v.   Connecticut  Co., 

41   A.2d    771,    131   Conn.    622. 
Fla. — Johnston     v.     Campbell,     129 

So.  765,  100  Fla.  393. 
Minn. — Anderson    v.    Newsome,    258 

N.W.  157,  193  Minn.   157— Dreelan 

v.  Karon,  254  N.W.  4i33,  191  Minn. 

3:30 — Nadeau  v.  Maryland  Casualty 

Co.,  21*2  N.W.  595,  170  Minn.  326. 
N.T. — Soper  v.  Soper,  5  Wend.  112. 
Pa. — Hawck  v.  Scranton  Real  Estate 

Co.,    44    Pa.Co.    $21,    17   Lack.Jur. 

90. 
33  C.J.  p  1180  note  21. 

83.  Ariz. — Eads  v.  Commercial  Nat 
Bank   of    Phcenix,    266    P.    14,    33 
Ariz.  4*99,  62  A.L.R.  183. 

Ky. — Forsythe   v.   Rexroat,   27    S.W. 

2d  69(5,  234  Ky.  173. 
33  C.J.  p  1180  note  22. 

84.  Conn. — Gesualdi   v.   Connecticut 
Co.,  41  A.2d  771,  131  Conn.  622. 

Ky. — Brannon  v.    Scott,    156    S.W.2d 
164,  288  Ky.  3#4— Franklin  County 

150 


v.  Bailey,   63   S.W.2d  622,  250  Ky. 

528. 
Ohio. — Workman  v.  Thompson,  47  N. 

E.2d  996,  141  Ohio  St  287— Frank 

v.  Cincinnati  Traction  Co.,  7  Ohio 

N.P.,N.S.,  1143. 
Okl,— Hiebert    v.    Koenig,    138    P.2d 

534,   192   Okl.  376— Montie   Oil   Co. 

v.    Nichols,    224    P.    542,    98    Okl. 

75— Dill   v.    Johnston,    222    P.    507, 

94      Okl.      264— Hyatt     v.      Vinita 

Brass  Works,   214  P.   706,   89  OkL 

171. 
>Tenn. — Wood  v.  Imperial  Motor  Co., 

5    Tenn.App.     246 — Elbinger    Shoe 

Co.  v.  Thomas,  1  Tenn.App.  161- 
33  C.J.  p  1180  note  23. 

Motion  held  properly  denied  where 
sufficiency  of  affidavit  of  merits,  at- 
tacked by  motion  for  judgment  not- 
withstanding verdict,  following  va- 
cation of  judgment  by  confession, 
was  not  before  court  when  motion 
was  heard. — Renfrew  v.  Kramer,  173", 
N.E.  390,  341  111.  398. 

85.  Ala. — City    of    Birmingham    v. 
Andrews,  132  So.  877,  222  Ala.  862. 

86.  Iowa. — Millard    v.    Herges,    236 
N.W.  89,  21i3  Iowa  279,  modified  on 
other  grounds  238  N.W.  604. 
Petition  held  to  state  cause  of  ac- 
tion as  against  motion  for  judgment 
notwithstanding   verdict. — Jensen    v. 
Incorporated  Town  of  Magnolia,  25  T 
N.W.  584,  219  Iowa  209. 

Answer  held  sufficient  on  motion 
for  judgment  notwithstanding  ver- 
dict.— Persia  6av.  Bank  v.  Wilson.. 
24-3  N.W.  581,  214  Iowa  993. 

87.  U.S. — Newton    v..  Glenn,    C.C.A.. 
Miss.,  14*9  F.2d  879.' 

Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  City  or 
Birmingham  v.  Andrews,  132  So* 
877,  878,  222  Ala.  362. 

Fla.— Bond  v.  Hewitt,  149  So.  6Q6,. 
Ill  Fla.  180. 

33  C.J.  p  1181  note  26. 

Right  of  a  plaintiff  to  a  judgment 
notwithstanding  the  verdict  see* 
infra  subdivision  h  of  this  section.. 

88.  Fla. — Norwich    Union    Indemni- 
ty Co.  v.  Willis,   168   So.  418,   1'24 
Fla.   137,    127   Fla.   288— Berger  v. 
Mabry,   151    So.   302,   113   Fla.    31*. 

Minn. — Funkley  v.  Ridgway,   197  N. 

W.  280,  1-58  Minn.  265. 
19  C.J.  p  1210  note  26   £e]    (1)— 3£ 

C.J.  p  1181  note  28. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


60 


where  on  the  whole  record  it  appears  that  the  right 
of  the  case  is  with  plaintiff.89  Where  there  is  a 
good  plea  or  answer  filed,  plaintiff  is  not,  under 
common-law  principles,  entitled  to  a  judgment  non 
obstante  veredicto.90 

When  rendered  for  defendant.  A  judgment  non 
obstante  veredicto  may  be  rendered  for  defendant 
where  plaintiff's  pleadings  are  insufficient  to  sup- 
port a  judgment  in  his  favor,  as  where  the  decla- 
ration states  no  cause  of  action,91  and  the  defect 
is  not  cured  by  the  answer,92  or  where  plaintiff  fails 
to  reply  to  a  good  plea  of  new  matter,93  or  where 
the  verdict  for  plaintiff  was  surely  on  a  count  which 
did  not  state  a  substantial  cause  of  action  ;9*  but 
it  has  been  held  that  defendant  is  not  entitled  to 
judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  where  a  demurrer 
to  the  petition  should  have  been  sustained  but  was 


overruled9*  Under  the  rule  that  a  motion  for 
judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  must  be  based 
on  the  pleadings,  defendant  is  not  entitled  to  such 
judgment  where  plaintiffs  pleadings  show  a  good 
cause  of  action  in  him,  and  avoid  the  defense  plead- 
ed.** 

Repleader.  A  party  is  not  entitled  to  a  judgment 
non  obstante  veredicto  in  every  case  where  the  is- 
sue determined  against  him  by  the  verdict  is  im- 
material. Thus  a  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  judgment 
non  obstante  veredicto  where  the  issue  is  immaterial 
or  the  plea  bad  only  where  a  repleader  is  unneces- 
sary to  do  justice  between  the  parties.97  A  judg- 
ment non  obstante  veredicto  is  always  on  the  mer- 
its, and  therefore  is  never  rendered  except  where 
it  is  clear  that  the  defense  is  without  merits  in 
whatever  form  pleaded.98  Such  a  judgment  will 


motion  held  equivalent  to  demurrer 

to  answer 
Ohio. — Commercial     Credit     Co.     v. 

Bishop,  170  N.E.  658.  34  Ohio  App. 
.  217. 

89.  U.S.— Newton    v.    Glenn.    C.C.A. 
Miss..  149  F.2d  879. 

33  C.J.  p  1181  note  29. 

90.  Minn.— Funkley  v.  Ridgway,  197 
N.W.  280,  158  Minn.  265. 

Mo.— Wilcox  v.  Erwin,  App.,  49  6. 
W.2d  677. 

Ohio. — Commercial  Credit  Co.  v. 
Bishop,  170  N.B.  658,  34  Ohio  App. 
217. 

Okl. — Dunham  v.  Chemical  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.,  71  P.2d  468,  180  Okl. 
537— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Savere, 
270  P.  33,  132  Okl.  191— Maryland 
Casualty  Co.  v.  Ballard,  25*9  P.  5-28, 
126  Okl.  270 — Odom  v.  Cedar  Kap- 
ids  Sav.  Bank,  -244  P.  758,  114  Okl. 
126. 

Or. — Snyder  v.  Portland  Ry.,  Light 
&  Power  Co.,  2H5  iP.  887,  107  Or. 
67-3. 

Tex. — Continental  Southland  Savings 
&  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Panhandle  Const. 
Co.,  Civ.App.f  77  S.W.2d  896,  error 
refused. 

•33  C.J.  p  1181  note  i30. 

Evidence  as  basis  for  Judgment  not- 
withstanding the  verdict  see  infra 
subdivision  b  of  this  section. 

•91.    Cal. — Galiano   v.   Pacific  Gas  & 

Electric  Co.,    67   P.2d  <388,   20   Cal. 

App.2d  534. 
Ky.— Slusher   v.   Hubble,    72   S.W.2d 

39,  254  Ky.  595. 
Pa. — Casseday  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 

Co.,  22  A.2d  663,  343  Pa.  342. 
•33  C.J.  p  1181  note  31. 
•Right  of  a  defendant  to  a  judgment 

notwithstanding    the    verdict    see 

infra  subdivision  h  of  this  section. 
Subject  to  general  demurrer 

The  statute  authorizing  trial  court 
to  render  Judgment  notwithstanding 
vthe  verdict  was  not  intended  to  en- 


able a  defendant  to  have  a  Judg- 
ment on  the  merits  of  a  cause  mere- 
ly because  plaintiff's  pleading  might 
be  subject  to  general  demurrer. — 
Citizens  State  Bank  of  Houston  v. 
Giles,  Tex.Civ.App.,  -145  S.W.2d  899, 
error  dismissed. 
In  Oregon 

(1)  There  is  authority  supporting 
the   text  rule.— Benicia  Agricultural 
Works  v.  Creighton,  -28  P.  775,  30  IP. 
676,  21  Or.  «495. 

(2)  But,   where   question   whether 
complaint  stated  facts   sufficient  to 
constitute  cause  of  action  was  raised 
by  objection  to  introduction  of  tes- 
timony, by  motion  for  nonsuit,  and 
by  motion  for  directed  verdict,  court, 
as   matter  of  practice,   should  have 
refused  to  entertain  motion  on  same 
ground  for  Judgment  notwithstand- 
ing   verdict — Borg    v.    Utah    Const. 
Co.,   242   P.    600,   117   Or.   22— Scibor 
v.  Oregon-Washington  R.  &  Naviga- 
tion Co.,  140  P.   629,   70   Or.   116. 

92.  Ky.— Slusher  v.  Hubble,  72  S.W. 
2d  39,  254  Ky.  695. 

93.  Ky.— Hack  v.  Lashley,  245  S.W. 
851,  197  Ky.  117. 

33  C.J.  p  1182  note  32. 
In  Florida 

The  rule  of  the  text,  while  recog- 
nized generally  as  the  prevailing 
frule,  was  not  held  to  be  applicable 
in  that  Jurisdiction.— Corpus  Juris 
Quoted  In  Dudley  v.  Harrison,  Mc- 
Cready  &  Co.,  173  So.  820,  822,  127 
Fla.  687,  rehearing  denied  174  So. 
729,  128  Fla.  338— Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co.  v. 
Canady,  165  So.  629,  630.  122  Fla. 
447 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Fillet  v. 
Ershick,  126  So.  784,  785,  788,  -99 
Fla.  483. 

94.  Ala. — City    of    Birmingham     v. 
Andrews,  132  So.  877,  222  Ala.  362. 

95.  Ky. — S.  K.  Jones  Const.  Co.  v. 

151 


Hendley,    5    S.W.2d   482,    484,    224 

Ky.  83. 
Reason  for  rale 

"It  is  readily  apparent  that  the 
trial  court  should  not  mislead  the 
appellee  [plaintiff]  by  overruling  the 
demurrer  to  the  petition  as  amended, 
thus  holding  it  to  be  sufficient,  and 
then  sustain  the  motion  for  a  ver- 
dict on  the  pleadings,  thus  holding 
it  to  be  defective.  This  court  is 
committed  to  the  doctrine  that  in 
this  situation  the  first  error  of  the 
trial  court  will  be  corrected  upon 
the  appeal.  Hence  the  Judgment 
must  be  reversed,,  with  direction 
that  the  demurrer  to  the  petition  as 
amended  be  sustained." — S.  K.  Jones 
Const.  Co.  v.  Hendley,  supra. 

96.  Iowa. — Crouch  v.  National  Live 
Stock  Remedy  Co.,  217  N.W.   657, 
205  Iowa  51. 

N.C. — Johnson  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  ft  ,S.B.2d  405,  219  N.C. 
445. 

OIsL— Myricfc  v.  City  of  Tulsa,  54 
P.2d  330,  175  Okl.  647. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Citi- 
zens' Trust  Co.  v.  Service  Motor 
Car  Co.,  297  'S.W.  7'35,  736,  154 
Tenn.  507. 

33  C.J.  p  1182  note  33. 

Evidence  as  basis  for  Judgment  not- 
withstanding  the  verdict  see  infra 
subdivision  b  of  this  section. 

97.  Mo.— Shreve    v.    Whittlesey,     7 
Mo.  473. 

Va. — Green  v.  Bailey,  5  Munf.  246, 
19  Va.  246. 

33  C.J.  p  1182  note  35. 

Rapleader  and  Judgment  non  ob- 
stante veredicto  distinguished 

N.Y. — Otis  v.  Hitchcock,  6  Wend. 
433,  434. 

33  C.J.  p  '1182  note  34  [a3- 

9&  Or.— Snyder  v.  Portland  Ky., 
Light  &  Power  Co.,  215  0?.  887,  107 
Or.  673. 

33  C.J.  p  1182  note  86. 


§  60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


not  be  rendered  where  there  is  substantially  a  ma- 
terial issue  or  a  good  defense,  although  the  plead- 
ing is  technically  defective."  If  the  finding  is  de- 
cisive of  the  merits,  it  cures  the  issue.1  Where  the 
pleading  contains  matters  which,  if  well  pleaded, 
might  form  a  good  bar  or  justification,  the  court 
will  not  give  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto,  but 
will  award  a  repleader.2 

Basing  motion  on  records  of  case.  At  common 
law  and,  in  the  absence  of  statutes  providing  oth- 
erwise, a  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  must  be 
based  solely  on  matters  appearing  on  the  record,8 
and  has  nothing  to  do  with  alleged  procedural  er- 
rors.4 It  cannot  be  granted  on  affidavit5  but  only 
on  the  face  of  the  pleadings,6  and,  as  shown  infra 
subdivision  b  (1)  of  this  section,  the  court  may  not 
look  to  the  evidence  in  determining  the  motion. 

Discretion  of  court.  The  granting  of  a  judgment 
notwithstanding  the  verdict  rests  very  much  in  the 
discretion  of  the  court.7 

Form  and  requisites  of  judgment.     The  judg- 


ment rendered  in  granting  the  motion  should  re- 
cite the  filing  of  a  proper  motion,  the  giving  of 
reasonable  notice,  that  hearing  was  had,  that  the 
parties  appeared  in  person  or  by  attorney,  the  ac- 
tion of  the  court  on  the  motion,  and  entry  of  judg- 
ment after  its  disposition.8 

b.  Evidence  as  Basis  for  Judgment 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Particular  matters  affecting  right  to 

remedy 

(3)  Scope  of  inquiry  in  general 

(4)  Consideration  of  evidence  in  passing 

on  motion 

(5)  Discretion  of  court 

(1)  In  General 

In  the  absence  of  statutes  providing  otherwise,  a 
judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  must  be  granted 
on  the  record,  and  the  court  may  not  look  to  the  evi- 
dence In  determining  a  motion  for  such  Judgment;  ac- 
cordingly such  a  Judgment  cannot  be  rendered  merely 
because  the  verdict  Is  against  the  weight  of  the  evidence. 
In  some  Jurisdictions,  however,  such  a  Judgment  may 


99.    Ala.-^Corptw  Juris  cited  in  City 

of    Birmingham    v.    Andrews,    132 

So.   877,    878,   222  Ala.   362. 
Conn. — Gesualdi  v.   Connecticut  Co., 

41  A.2d   771,   131   Conn.   622. 
Fla. — Johnston  v.  Campbell,  129  So. 

766,  100  Fla.  39*3. 
Ill, — -Modern    Woodmen    of    America 

v.  Blair,  263  Ill.App.  "387. 
Neb.— Hamaker    v.    Patrick.    24«4    N. 

W.  420,  123  Neb.  809. 
Or. — Clarkson  v.  Wong,  42  P.2d  763', 

150   Or.   406,   motion  denied  45   P. 

2d  914,  150  Or.  406. 
Tex. — Williams  v.  Texas  Employers 

Ins.    Ass'n,    Civ.App.,    135    S.W.2d 

262,  error  refused. 
33  C.J.  p  1182  note  37. . 

1.  111.-— Rothschild    v.    Bruscke,    23 
N.E.  4519,  131  HI.  265. 

2.  Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  City 
of   Birmingham    v.    Andrews,    132 
So.  877,  878,  222  Ala,  362. 

Conn. — Gesualdi  v.  Connecticut  Co., 
41  A.2d  771,  131  Conn.  622. 

Fla.— Bond  v.  Hewitt,  149  So.  606, 
111  Fla.  180 — Johnston  v.  Camp- 
bell, 129  So.  765,  100  Pla,  393. 

33  C.J.  p  1182  note  39. 

Repleader  generally  see  the  C.J.S. 
title  Pleading  §  338,  also  49  CJ. 
p  580  note  73  et  seq. 

3.  Fla.— Tolliver   v.    Loftin,    21    So. 
2d  359.  '    - 

111.— Modern  Woodmen  of  America  v. 

Blair,  263  IlLApp.  387. 
Kan. — Corpus    Juris   Quoted  in  Hoy 

v.    Griffin,    22    P.2d    449,    453,    137 

Kan.  872. 
Ky.— Wheeldon  v.  Regenhardt  Const 

Co.,  1145   S.W.2d  527,   284   Ky.   603. 
Ho.— Meffert    v.    Lawson,    287    S.W. 

610,  315  (Mo.  1091— First  Nat  Bank 


v.  Dunbar,  72  S.W.2d  821,  230  Mo* 

App.  687. 
Neb.— Hamaker  v.  (Patrick,  244  N.W. 

420,  123  Neb.  809. 
Ohio. — Board    of    Education    of    Ad- 

dyston     Village     School     Dist    v. 

Nolte  Tillar  Bros.  Const  Co.,   49 

N.B.2d  99,  71  Ohio  App.  469. 
Pa, — Hershberger  v.  Hershberger,  29 

A.2d   95,    345    Pa.    439— Murphy   v. 

Wolverine    Express,    38    A.2d    511, 

155    Pa.Super.    125^Columbia   Fur 

Co.  v.  Needro,  $7  Pa.  Super.  "389 — 

Maher    V.    Washington    Nat    Ins. 

Co.,  Com.Pl.,  29  Del.Co.  267— Maize 

v.  United  Ben.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Com. 

PI.,  94  tPittsb.Leg.J.  44. 
Tenn. — Stevens  v.  Moore,  139  S.W.2d 

710,  24  Tenn.App.  61. 
33  C.J.  p  1183  note  42. 

Entire  record  may  be  considered. 
— Paul  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of 
America,  Ohio  App.,  64  N.E.2d  124, 

4.  Mo.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dunbar, 
72  S.W.2d  821,  230  Mo.App.  687. 

Pa. — Hershberger  v.  Hershberger,  29 

A.2d   95,    345    Pa.   439— Murphy  v. 

Wolverine    Express,   58   A.2d    511, 

155  Pa.Super.  0.25. 
33  C.J.  p  143  note  80  [b]  (2),  p  1182 

note  36  [a]. 

5.  Kan.— Corpus    Juris    quotefl.    in 
Hoy  v.  Griffin,  22  «P.2d  449,  455,  137 
Kan.  872. 

!  C.J.  p  11 83  note  43. 

Refusal  to  consider  affidavits  ten- 
dered by  defendant  or  to  permit 
them  to  be  filed  after  continuance 
was  refused  was  not  error  where 
much  of  contents  of  affidavits  ap- 
peared to  be  amplification  of  affiants' 
testimony  given  at  trial. — Holler- 
Vandenboom  Lumber  Co.  y.  Bou- 

152 


dreau,  85  S.W.2d  141,  231  Mo.App. 
1127. 

6.  Fla. — Okeechobee    Co.,     for    Use 
and   Benefit   of   Hamrick,   v.   Nor- 
ton, 6  So.2d  632,  149  Fla.  651. 

111. — McNeill    v.    Harrison    &    Sons. 

2    N.E.2d    959,    286    lil.App.    120— 

Modern   Woodmen   of   America   v. 

Blair,  263  IlLApp.  387. 
Kan. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hoy  v. 

Griffin,  22  P.2d  449,  453,  157  Kan. 

872. 
Neb.— Hamaker  v.  Patrick,  244  N.W. 

420,  123  Neb.  809. 
Ohio, — Thompson  v.  Rutledge,  168  N. 

E.  547,  32  Ohio  App.  5«3T. 
Or. — Bernstein  v.  Berg,    262  P.   247, 

12'3  Or.   34$ — Borg  v.  Utah  Const. 

Co.,    242   P.    600,   (117    Or.    22. 
W.Va.— Clise  v.  Prunty,  163  S.E.  864, 

112  W.Va.  181— Gray  v.  Norfolk  & 

W.  Ry.  Co.,  130  S.E.  139,  99  W.Va. 

575 — Zogg  v.  Kern  Oil  &  Gas  Co., 

117  S.E.  620,  $4  W.Va.  17— Dunbar 

Tire  &  Rubber  Co.,  v.  Crissey,  114 

S.E.  804,  92  W.Va.  419. 
33  C.J.  p  1183  note  45. 

7.  Conn. — Gesualdi    v.     Connecticut 
Co.,  41  A.2d  771,  131  Conn.   622. 

35  C.J.  p  1H80  note  24,  p  1181  note 
25. 

Discretion  of  court  as  to  judgment 
based  on  evidence  see  infra  sub- 
division b  (5)  of  this  section. 

a.  Tex. — Hines  v.  Parks,  96  S.W.26* 
970,  128  Tex.  289— Gentry  v.  Cen- 
tral Motor  Co.,  Civ.App.,  100  S.W.. 
2d  215. 

Judgment  held  proper  in  form 
Tex. — Walters  v.  Southern  S.  S.  Co., 
Civ.App.,  115  S.W.2d  320.  error  dis- 
missed. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  60 


be  entered  on  undisputed  evidence  or  where  the  verdict 
Is  not  sustained  by  any  evidence;  and  the  common-law 
remedy  has  been  modified  and  extended  by  statutes  in 
some  jurisdictions. 

At  common  law  and  in  the  absence  of  statutes 
providing  otherwise,  a  judgment  non  obstante  vere- 
dicto  must  be  granted,  if  at  all,  on  the  record,  and 
the  court  may  not  look  to  the  evidence  "in  deter- 


mining a  motion  for  such  judgment9  The  proper 
remedy  for  a  wrong  or  mistaken  verdict  on  the 
facts  is  by  motion  for  a  new  trial,  not  by  motion 
for  a  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto.10  Accord- 
ingly such  a  judgment  cannot  be  rendered  merely 
because  the  verdict  is  against  Jhejvdght  of  the  evi- 
dence,11 although  there  are  intimations  that  such 
a  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  may  be  en- 


9.  Fla, — Tolliver  v.  Loftin,  21  So. 
2d  359 — Heuacker  v.  Farrelly,  176 
So.  98,  129  Fla.  2«9— Dudley  v. 
Harrison,  McCready  &  Co.,  173  So. 
820,  127  Fla.  687,  rehearing  denied 
174  So.  729,  128  Fla,  838. 

HI.— Malewski  v.  Mackiewich,  282 
IIl.App.  593 — Modern  Woodmen  of 
America  v.  Blair,  26*3  IIl.App.  387. 

Infl-JInter  State  Motor  Freight 
System  v.  Henry,  $8  N.E.2d  909, 
111  Ind.App.  179. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hoy 
v.  Griffin,  22  P.2d  449,  453,  187 
Kan.  872. 

Ky.— World  Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Tapp,  151  S.W.2d  428,  286  Ky. 
650 — Wheeldon  v.  Regenhardt 
Const.  Co.,  145  S.W.2d  527.  284 
Ky.  603. 

NeD. — LeBron  Electrical  Works  v. 
Pizinger,  270  N.W.  683,  132  Neb. 
164— Hamaker  v.  Patrick,  244  N. 
W.  420,  123  Neb.  809— Bielfeldt  v. 
Grand  Island  Transit  Co.,  243  N.W. 
76,  123  Neb.  368. 

Ohio. — Lehman  v.  Harvey,  187  N.B. 
28.  45  Ohio  App.  215,  petition  dii 
missed  187  N.B.  201,  127  Ohio  St 
159. 

Okl.— National  Mut.  Casualty  Co.  v, 
Harmon,  11«3  *P.2d  597,  189  Okl. 
53 — Martin  v.  National  Bank  of 
Claremore,  77  P.2d  40,  182  Okl. 
217— Hanna  v.  Gregg,  21-7  P.  434, 
92  Okl.  34. 

Term. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Citi- 
zens' Trust  Co.  v.  Service  Motor 
Car  Co.,  297  S.W.  7«35,  T36, 
Tenn.  507 — Stevens  v.  Moore,  !39 
S.W.2d  710,  24'Tenn.App.  6f— Dunn 
v.  Moore,  123  S.W.2d  1095,  22  Tenn. 
App.  412. 

W.Va, — Clise  v.  Prunty,  163  S.E.  864, 
112  W.Va;  181— Gray  v.  Norfolk 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.,  130  S.E.  159,  99  W. 
Va.  575— -Zogg  v.  Kern  Oil  &  Gas 
Co.,  117  S.E.  620,  94  W.Va,  17— 
Dunbar  Tire  &  Rubber  Co,  v,  Cris- 
sey,  114  -S.E.  804,  92  W.Va.  419 
overruling  Weeks  v.  Chesapeake 
&  O.  Ry.  Co.,  69  S.E.  805,  68  W.Va, 
284,  McMillan  v.  Middle  States  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.,  57  S.E. -129,  61  W.Va 
531,  11  L.R.A..N.S.,  840,  Ruffner 
Bros.  v.  Dutchess  Ins.  Co.,  53  S.E 
943,  59  W.Va.  432,  115  Am.S.R 
924,  8  Ann.Cas.  866,  Anderson  v 
Tug  River  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  53 
S.E.  713,  59  W.Va.  -801,  and  Mau 
pin  v.  Scottish  Union  &  National 
Ins.  Co.,  45  S.E.  1003,  53  W.Va, 
5'57. 
33  C.J.  p  1183  note  47. 


Reserving  questions  of  fact  see  in- 
fra subdivision  d  of  this  section. 

rinding  of  fact 
A    Judgment    notwithstanding   the 

•erdict   may   not   be    based   on   the 
-rial   court's    finding   of   fact. — Rice 

'.    Builders    Material    Co.,    2    S.E.2d 

27,    120    W.Va.    585— Sponduris    v. 
Rameih,    199    S.E.    457,    120    W.Va. 

36. 

10.  CaL— Silva  v.  Market  St  Ry. 
Co.,  128  P.2d  904,  50  Cal.App.2d 
796— Takahashi  v.  White  Truck  & 
Transfer  Co.,  59  P.2d  161,  15  CaL 
App.2d  107. 

Fla,— Okeechobee  Co.,  for  tTse  and 
Benefit  of  Hamrick,  v.  Norton,  6 
So.2d  632,  149  Fla,  651— Dudley  v. 
Harrison,  McCready  &  Co.,  173  So. 
820,  127  Fla,  687,  rehearing  denied 
174  So.  729,  128  Fla,  338. 
111. — Schwickrath  v.  Lowden,  46  N.E. 
2d  162,  317  Ill-App.  431— Pohl  v. 
Fazzi,  22  N.E.2d  402,  301  IlLApp. 
622. 

Kan.— Underbill  v.  Motes,  165  P.2d 
218 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Hoy 
v.  Griffin,  22  P.2d  449,  453,  1*7 
Kan.  872. 

Minn. — Manning-  v.  Chicago  Great 
Western  R.  Co.,  229  N.W.  566,  179 
Minn.  411. 

Neb.— Bielfeldt  v.  Grand  Island 
Transit  Co..  245  N.W.  76,  123  Neb. 
368. 

Ohio. — Holmes  v.  Employers'  Liabil- 
ity Assur.  Corporation,  Limited, 
of  London,  England,  4<3  N.E.2d  746, 
70  Ohio  App.  2-39— Kelley  v.  Co- 
lumbus Ry.,  Power  &  Light  Co., 
24  N.E.2d  290,  62  Ohio  App.  897. 
Pa.— Kindt  v.  Reading  Co.,  4*  A.2& 
14'6,  3«2  »Pa.  419— MacDonald  v, 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  36  A.2d  492, 
348  Pa,  558— 'Kotllkoff  v.  Master, 
27  A.2d  85,  345  Pa,  258— lacovino 
v.  Caterino.  2  A.2d  828,  832  Pa, 
555 — Osche  v.  New  York  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  187  A.  396,  «24  Pa.  1— Hartig 
v.  American  Ice  Co.,  187  A.  867, 
290  <Pa,  21 — Thomas  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.,  119  A.  717,  276  Pa. 
579 — Murphy  v.  Wolverine  Ex- 
press, 38  A.2d  511,  155  Pa,Super 
125 — Jann  v.  Linton's  Lunch,  29 
A.2d  219,  160  OPaJSuper.  663— Szidor 
v.  Greek  Catholic  Union  of  Rus- 
sian Brotherhoods  of  U.  S.,  21  A 
2d  104,  145  Pa.Super.  251— Pfordi 
v.  Educators  Beneficial  Ass'n,  14 
A.2d  170,  140  Pa,Super.  170— 
Adams  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins 

153 


Co.,  7  A.2d  544,  136  Pa.Super.  454 
— -Moore  v.  W.  J.  Gilmore  Drug 
Co.,  200  A.  250,  131  Pa.Super.  349 
— McCommon  vk  Johnson,  187  A. 
445,  123  PaSuper.  581— Evans  v. 
Stewart,  157  A.  515,  103  Pa.Super. 
549 — Carroll  v.  Reuben  H.  Don- 
nelly Corp.,  53  Pa,Dist  &  Co.  142— 
Piacine  v.  National  Life  Ins.  Co., 
14  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  21— States  v. 
Pappas,  9  Pa,Dist.  &  Co.  460r  18 
DeLCo.  106— Condel  v.  Savo,  Com. 
PI.,  46  Lack.Jur.  89— In  re  Dugh- 
laski's  Estate,  Orph..  29  North.Co. 
174. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Citi- 
zens' Trust  Co.  v.   Service  Motor  " 
Car    Co.,    297    S.W.    735,    756,    154 
Tenn.  507. 

Tex. — Casey  v.  Jones,  Civ. App.,  189 
S.W.2d  515— Ward  v.  Strickland 
Civ.App.,  177  S.W.2d  79,  error  re- 
fused—Wilson v.  Hagins,  Clv.App.. 
25  S.W.2d  916,  affirmed,  Com.App., 
50  S.W.2d  797— Atchison,  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hiac,  Civ.App.,  291  S. 
W.  281. 
Utah.— Buhler  v.  Maddison,  140  P.2d 

933,  105  Utah  39. 

Wash.— Moore  v.  Keesey,  163  P.2d 
164— Hayden  v.  Colville  Valley 
Nat.  Bank,  89  P.2d  376,  180  Wash. 
220,  rehearing  denied  43  P.2d  32. 
W.Va, — Clise  v.  Prunty,  163  S.E.  864, 
112  W.Va,  181— Gray  v.  Norfolk  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  130  S.B.  139.  99  W.Va. 
575 — Zogg  v.  Kern  Oil  &  Gas  Co., 
117  S.B.  620,  94  W.Va.  17— Bun- 
bar  Tire  &  Rubber  Co.  v.  Crissey, 
114  S.E.  804,  92  W.Va,  419. 
Wyo.— Caldwell  v.  Roach.  12  P.2d 

376,  44  Wyo.  319. 
S3  C.J.  p  1184  notes  49  [a],  50. 
Verdict  contrary  to,  or  not  sustained 
by,    evidence   as   ground   for  new 
trial  generally  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
New  Trial  §§  69-77,  also  46  C.J.  p 
170  note  41  et  secu 

ll«  Ariz. — Durham  v.  Firestone 
Tire  &  Rubber  Co.,  55  P.2d  648,  47 
Ariz.  580— Welch  v.  United  Mut 
Ben.  Ass'n,  36  P.2d  256.  44  Ariz. 
198. 

Cal.— Silva  v.  Market  St  Ry.  Co.,  123 
P.2d  90«4.  50  Cal.App.2d  796— Taka- 
hashi v.  White  Truck  &  Transfer 
Co.,  59  P.2d  161,  15  Cal.App.2d  107. 

Fla. — Tolliver.  v.  Loftin,  2tt  So.2d  359 
— Talley  v.  McCain,  174  &>.  841, 
128  Fla,  418 — Dudley  v.  Harrison, 
McCready  &  Co.,  173  So.  820,  127 
Fla.  687,  rehearing  denied  174  So. 


§  60  JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.S. 

tered  on  undisputed  evidence  or  where  the  verdict  |  is  not  sustained  by  any  evidence  whatever.5  2 


729,  128  Fla,  338— Corptw  Juris 
cited  in  -Fillet  v.  Ershick,  126  So. 
784,  788,  99  Fla.  483. 
111.— Neering  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co., 
50  N.E.2d  497,  383  111.  366,  man- 
date conformed  to  53  N.B.2d  271, 
321  IlLApp.  625— -Hunt  v.  Vermil- 
ion County  Children's  Home,  44  N. 
B.2d  609,  381  111.  29— Hedden  v. 
Farmers  Mut  Re-Ins.  Co.  of  Chi- 
cago, 111.,  60  N.E.2d  110,  325  111. 
App.  -335 — Schwickrath  v.  Lowden, 

46  N.E.2d    162,    317    IlLApp.    431— 
Gant  v.  McDowell,   38  N.E.2d  530, 
312  IlLApp.  378 — Gnat  v.  Richard- 
son,   35    N.B.2d    409,    311    IlLApp. 
242,    affirmed    39    N.E.2d    337,    378 
111.      626 — Modern      Woodmen      of 
America,  v.  Blair,  263  IlLApp.  387. 

Kan.— Underbill    v.    Moes.    165    P.2d 

218— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hoy 

v.    Griffin,    22'   P.2d    449,    45'3,    137 

Kan.  872. 
Xy.— Roe  v.  Gentry's  Ex'x,  162  S.W. 

2d  208,  290  Ky.  -598. 
N.H.— Bryson  v.  Carroll,  41  A.2d  240, 

93   N.H.   287— Exeter  Banking   Co. 

v.  Taylor,  160  A.  733,  85  N.H.  458. 
K.C. — Jernigan  v.  Neighbors,   141  S. 

B.  586,  195  N.C.  231. 
Ohio. — Wilkeson   v.   Brskine   &   Son, 

61  N.E.2d    201,    145    Ohio    St.    218 
— Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v.  Fred- 
erick Co.,  53  N.B.2d  795,  142  Ohio 
St.    605 — Workman    v.    Thompson, 

47  N.E.2d  996,   141  Ohio  St.   287— 
Beck  ,v.  Wuerdeman,   App.,    62   N. 
E.2d  516 — Kelley  v.  Columbus  Ry., 
Power  &  Light  Co.,  24  N.E.2d  290, 

62  Ohio  App.  397. 

Okl.— National  Mut  Casualty  Co.  v. 
Harmon,  1113  P.2d  597,  189  Okl.  53 
— Martin  v.  National  Bank  of 
Claremore,  77  P.2d  40,  182  Okl. 
217. 

Or. — Kelley  v.  Stout  Lumber  Co.,  263 
P.  881,  123  Or.  647. 

Pa. — Campdon  v.  Continental  Assur. 
Co.,  157  A.  464,  305  Pa,  253— Mur- 
phy v.  Wolverine  Express,  38  A. 
2d  511,  155  Pa,Super.  125— Blair 
to  Use  of  Davis  v.  Adam  chick,  21 
A.2d  107,  145  Pa.Super,  125— Rad- 
ziewicz  v.  Philadelphia  &  Reading 
Ry.  Co.,  94  Pa,Super.  827. 

Tenn.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Citi- 
^  zens'  Trust  Co.  v.  Service  Motor 
Car  Co.,  297  S.W.  7«35,  736,  154 
Tenn.  507 — Jamison  v.  Metropoli- 
tan Life  Ins.  Co.,  145  S.W.2d  653. 
24  Tenn. App.  398 — Dunn  v.  Moore, 
123  S.W.2d  1095,  22  TemuApp.  412 
— National  Life  &  Accident  Ins. 
Co.  v.  American  Trust  Co.,  68  S.W. 
2d  971,  17  Tenn.App.  516.  . 

Tex. — Deal  v.  Craven,  Com. App.,  277 
S.W.  1046— Johnson  .v.  Moody,  Civ. 
App.,  104  S.W.2d  583,  error  dis- 
missed— Spence  v.  National  Life  & 
Accident  Ins.  Co.,  Civ. App.,  59  S. 

.  W.2d  212. 

Wash. — Hayden  v.  Colville  Valley 
Nat  Bank,  39  P.2d  376,  180  Wash. 


220,  rehearing  denied  43  (P.2d  32— 
Lydon  v.  Exchange  Nat.  Bank, 
235  P.  27,  134  Wash.  188. 

W.Va.— Clise  v.  Prunty,  163  S.E. 
864,  112  W.Va.  181— Gray  v.  Nor- 
folk &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  130  S.B.  189, 
99  W.Va.  575— Zogg  v.  Korn  Oil  & 
Gas  Co.,  117  S.E.  620,  94  W.Va.  17 
— Dunbar  Tire  &  Rubber  Co.  v. 
Crissey,  114  S.E.  804,  92  W.Va, 
419. 

Wis.— Volland  v.  McGee,  294  N.W. 
497,  236  Wis.  358,  rehearing  denied 
295  N.W.  635,  236  Wis.  358— 
Viereg  v.  Southwestern  Wisconsin 
Gas  Co.,  248  N.W.  775,  212  Wis. 
394. 

33  C.J.  p  1183  note  48. 

Trial  liy  Judge 

Judge,  having  as  trier  of  fact 
found  for  plaintiff,  could  not,  al- 
though he  subsequently  changed  his 
mind  respecting  weight  of  evidence, 
enter  judgment  for  defendant,  unless 
plaintiff  was  contributory  negligent 
as  matter  of  law. — Evans  v.  Stew- 
art, 157  A.  515,  103  Pa,Super.  549. 

Correct  practice 

After  receiving  verdict,  entering 
judgment  notwithstanding  the  ver- 
dict, when  the  real  ground  of  the 
judgment  is  that  it  is  not  supported 
by  the  evidence,  is  not  strictly  cor- 
rect, since  a  motion  for  judgment 
notwithstanding  the  verdict  admits 
the  finding  of  the  verdict  to  be  true 
and  the  court  on  such  motion  grants 
judgment  on  grounds  other  than 
those  decided  by  the  jury.  In  such 
a  situation  the  strictly  proper  prac- 
tice is  to  move  to  set  aside  verdict 
because  not  supported  by  the  evi- 
dence, and  grant  judgment  on  ground 
that  motion  for  a  directed  verdict 
should  have  been  granted,  or,  if  no 
such  motion  was  made,,  on  ground 
that  the  evidence  failed  to  support  a 
cause  of  action. — Shumway  v.  Mil- 
waukee Athletic  Club,  20  N.W.2d  123, 
247  Wis.  393. 

12.  Gal.— In  re  Stone's  Estate,  138 
P.2d  710,  59  CaLApp.2d  263— -Mag- 
gini  v.  West  Coast  Life  Ins.  Co., 
29  P.2d  263,  136  Cal.App.  472— 
Perkins  v.  (Pacific  Fruit  Exchange, 
22  P.2d  035,  132  Cal.App.  278— 
'Peters  v.  California  Building-Loan 
Ass'n,  .2  P.2d  439,  116  Cal.App.  143. 

Colo. — Bashor  v.  Bashor,  85  -P.2d 
732,  103  Colo.  232,  120  A.L.R.  1507. 

Fla.— -Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co.  v. 
Canady,  165  So.  629,  122  Fla,  447. 

111. — Schneidennan  v.  Interstate 
Transit  Lines,  60  N.E.2d  908,  326 
IlLApp.  1— Gant  v.  McDowell,  38 
N.E.2d  530,  312  IlLApp.  378— Jen- 
kins v.  Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc. 
of  U.  S.,  27  N.E.«2d  877,  304  111. 
App.  633 — Root  v.  Wentworth,  27 
NJE.2d  651,  305  IlLApp.  493. 

Ban. — Corpus   juris  quoted  in  Hoy 

154 


v.    Griffin,    22    P.2d    4'49,    453,    137 
Kan.  872. 

Me. — 'Pierson  v.  Pierson,  178  A.  617, 
133  Me.  367. 

Mass. — Rose  v.  Silveira,  63  N.E.2d 
895. 

Mich. — First  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
of  Ann  lArbor  v.  Wuerth,  247  N.W. 
784,  262  Mich.  691— Peckinpaugh  v. 
H.  W.  Noble  &  Co.,  227  N.W.  540, 
248  Mich.  6-68— Wehling  v.  Linder, 
'226  N.W.  880,  248  Mich.  241— In  re 
Schulte's  Estate,  211  N.W.  56,  237 
Mich.  147. 

Minn.— Powell  v.  Turnlund,  221  N.W. 
241,  175  Minn.  361— Neal'is  v.  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  218  N. 
W.  125,  173  Minn.  587. 

Miss. — Boyle  Gin  Co.  v.  W.  F.  Moo- 
dy &  Co.,  193  So.  917,  18'8  Miss.  44. 

N.H.— Tufts  v.  White,  26  A.2d  679, 
92  N.H.  158. 

N.Y. — Dlckerson  v.  Long  Island  R. 
Co.,  42  N.T.S.'2d  335,  '266  App.Div. 
852,  appeal  denied  44  N.T.S.2d  344, 
266  App.Div.  921-^Clark  v.  Har- 
nischfeger  Sales  Corporation,  264 
N.T.S.  873,  23"8  App.Div.  49-3. 

N.D. — Ua  Bree  v.  Dakota  Tractor  & 
Equipment  Co.,  288  N.W.  476,  $9 
N.D.  5-61 — Snyder  v.  Northern  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  285  N.W.  450,  69  N.D. 
266 — Kron  v.  Boomer,  249  N.W. 
7T2,  63  N.D.  686 — Johnson  v.  Mau, 
236  N.W.  4'72,  60  N.D.  757— Odou 
&  Arnold  v.  Benson,  228  N.W.  '812, 
59  N.D.  101— Mercantile  Protec- 
tive Bureau  v.  Specht,  2'25  N.W. 
794,  '58  N.D.  239— Dahl  v.  Minne- 
apolis, St  P.  &  S.  S.  M.  Ry.  Co., 
223  N.W.  37,  57  N.D.  538— National 
•Cash  Register  Co.  v.  Midway  City 
Creamery  Co.,  22-2  N.W.  36,  57  N.D. 
356— Volk  v.  Hirning,  220  N.W. 
446,  56  N.D.  337— Northern  Trust 
Co.  v.  Havelock  Equity  Exch.  199 
N.W.  763,  51  N.D.  34-6. 

Ohio. — Workman  v.  Thompson,  47  N. 
E.2d  996,  141  Ohio  St.  287— Spann 
v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  App.,  62  N.B.2d 
676— Wilms  v.  Klein,  Ap«p.,  49  N. 
E.2d  76 — Brazis  v.  National  Tele- 
phone Supply  Co.,  App.,  48  N.E,2d 
8T3. 

Pa.— -Cutler  v.  Peck  Lumber  Mfg. 
Co.,  37  A.2d  739,  350  Pa,  8— Gour- 
ley  v.  -Boyle,  29  lA.'2d  523,  346  Pa, 
113— Master  v.  Goldstein's  Fruit  & 
Produce,  23  A.2d  443,  344  Pa.  1—  . 
Casseday  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co., 
22  A.2d  663,  343  Pa,  34'2— Borits  v. 
Tarapchak,  12  A.2d  910,  3*38  Pa, 
289 — Kennedy  v.  Southern  Penn- 
sylvania Traction  Co.,  3  A.2d  395, 
333  Pa,  406 — Golder  v.  Bogash,  198 
A.  149,  329  Pa,  '350— Richardson  v. 
Frick  Co.,  197  A.  151,  V29  Pa,  148 
— James  v.  Columbia  County  Agri- 
cultural, Horticultural  &  Mechani- 
cal Ass'n,  1'84  A.  447,  321  Pa,  465 
— Dangelo  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
152  A,  743,  301  Pa.  579^-Manning 
v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R,  Co.,  146  1A. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


60 


Moreover  the  common-law  remedy  has  been  mod-  j  ified  and  extended  in  some  jurisdictions  by  stat- 


30,  296  Pa.  380 — Gray  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.,  141  A.  621,  293  Pa. 
28— Muia  v.  Herskovltz,  128  A. 
828,  283  Pa.  163— Nolder  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.,  12-3  A.  507,  27'8  Pa. 
495 — Garland  v.  Craven,  41  A.2d 
140,  156  Pa.Super.  351 — Guyton  v. 
City  of  Pittsburgh,  38  AJ2d  383, 
155  Pa. Super.  76— Roslik  v.  City  of 
Pittsburgh,  38  A.2d  36-3,  155  Pa. 
•Super.  T50 — Dick  v.  West  Penn 
Rys.  Co.,  33  A.2d  792,  153  Pa.Su- 
per.  281 — Pischke  v.  Borough  of 
Dormont,  33  A.2d  480,  153  Pa.Su- 
per. 205 — Mayer  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
R.,  33  A.2d  474,  153  Pa. Super.  186 
—Williams  v.  Overly  Mfg.  Co.,  34 
A.2d  52,  153  Pa.Super.  -347— Bell  v. 
Anderson,  17  A.2d  647,  143  Pa.Su- 
per.  56 — Foell  Packing  Co.  v.  Har- 
ris, 193  A.  152,  127  Pa.Super.  494 
— Hahn  v.  Anderson,  187  A.  450, 
1'23  Pa.Super.  442,  modified  on  oth- 
er grounds  192  A.  489,  326  Pa.  463 
— RJittle  v.  Zeller,  100  Pa.Super. 
516— Sklaroff  v.  Philadelphia  Rap- 
id Transit  Co.,  100  Pa.Super.  237 — 
Feinstein  v.  Philadelphia  Rapid 
Transit  Co.,  100  Pa. Super.  182— 
Costolo  v.  School  Disk  of  -Spring- 
hill  Tp.,  99  Pa.Super.  259— Hatch 
v.  Robinson.  99  Pa.Su'per.  141 — 
Gottlieb  v.  Scranton  Ry.  Co./  99 
Pa.Super.  7 — Coleman  v.  City  of 
Scranton,  99  Pa.Super.  3 — Klein  v. 
City  of  Pittsburgh,  97  Pa.Super. 
56 — Pittsburgh  Transportation  Co. 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  96  Pa. 
Super.  302 — Brody  v.  Pittsburgh 
Rys.  Co.,  96  Pa.Super.  265— Siglin 
v.  Haiges,  9*5  Pa.Supe,r.  588— Walk- 
er v.  Reading  Transit  &  -Light 
Co.,  95  Pa.*Super.  461 — Kalter  y. 
Philadelphia  Rap'id  Transit  Co.,  95 
Pa.  Super.  11-6 — Gimbel  v.  ^E3tna 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  9'5  Pa.Super.  1 — 
Radzlewicz  v.  Philadelphia  &  Read- 
ing Ry.  Co.,  94  Pa.Super.  327 — 
Chachkin  v.  Accommodation  Ice  & 
Coal  Co.,  $2  Pa.Super.  416 — 
Thompson  v.  Hedrick,  91  Pa.  Super. 
41 — Fraser  v.  Freedman,  87  Pa.Su- 
per.  454— Highland  v.  Russell  Car 
&  Snow  Plow  Co.,  87  Pa. Super. 
235,  affirmed  135  A.  759,  28'8  Pa. 
230,  affirmed  49  S.Ct  314,  '279  U.S. 
253,  73  'L.Ed.  688— Wagner  v.  Lon- 
don Guaranty  &  Accident  Co.,  Lim- 
ited, 86  Pa.Super.  542 — Stone  v. 
Stone,  85  Pa.Super.  346 — Zieger  v. 
Philadelphia  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  *4 
Pa.  Super.  541 — Barshay  v.  Ameri- 
can Ice  Co.,  84  Pa.Super.  5*38 — 
Sussman  Bros.  v.  Meier,  80  Pa.Su- 
per. 78 — Meyercord  Co.  v.  P,  H. 
Butler  Co..  79  Pa.Super.  473— Mc- 
Bntee  v.  New  York  "Life  Ins.  Co., 
79  Pa.Super.  457— Wetzel  v.  Pitts- 
burg  Rys.  C|o.,  55  Pa.Super.  2'2— 
Cherry  v.  Mitosky,  53  Pa.Dist  & 
Co.  135 — Johnson  v.  Pittsburgh 
Rys.  Co.,  34  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  209,  86 
P.L.J.  585 — Schmuck  v.  Heilman,  14 


Pa.Dist  &  Co.  449,  44  York  Leg. 
Rec.  181,  affirmed  161  A,  420,  106 
Pa.  Super.  12 — MJiller  v.  Devine, 
Com.PL,  54  Dauph.Co.  418 — Myers 
v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Com. 
PL,  52  Dauph.Co.  318,  affirmed  33 
A.2d  253,  152  Pa.Super.  507— Tay- 
lor v.  Reading  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  51 
2>auph.Co.  69,  affirmed  '27  A.2d  901, 
149  Pa,Super.  171— Gates  v.  Finkel- 
stein,  Com.PL,  50  Dauph.Co.  361 — 
Buffington  v.  Snyder,  Com.Pl.,  48 
Dauph.Co.  -30— Porter  v.  Philadel- 
phia -Suburban  Transp.  Co.,  Com. 
PL,  28  DeLCo.  581— Lundy  v.  Dev- 
itt  Com.PL,  28  Del.  210— Theiss  v. 
Moreland,  Com.PL,  22  Brie  Co.  154 
— DiLorens  v.  Pittsburgh  &  L.  B. 
R.  Co.,  Coxn.Pl.,  8  Fay.L.J.  166— 
Keating  v.  Wagner,  Com.PL,  42 
Lack.Jur.  84 — Schenker  v.  Indem- 
nity Ins.  Co.  of  North  America, 
Com.Pl.,  2  Monroe  L.R.  141,  10 
Som.Leg.J.  180,  affirmed  16  A.2d 
304,  -340  Pa.  81— Leedom  v.  Phil- 
adelphia Transp.  Co.,  Com.PL,  58 
Montg.Co.  392 — Deiffenderfer  v. 
Weidner,  C.om.Pl.f  14  Northunib. 
Leg.J.  176-<!lark  v.  Pennsylvania 
Power  &  (Light  Co.,  Com.PL,  14 
Northumb.Leg.J.  29,  affirmed  -6  A. 
2d  892,  336  Pa,  75— Colella  v.  Bar- 
toletti.  Com.PL.  94  Pittsb.Leg.J. 
14'2 — Berger  v.  Roberts,  Com.PL,  93 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  473— Weldon  v.  Pitts- 
burgh Rys.  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  93  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  88 — Paradine  v.  Wynett, 
Com.Pl.f  93  Pittsb.Leg.J.  75— Rid- 
ley v.  Pucci,  Com.PL,  89  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  292 — Doerr  v.  Rands,  Com. 
PL,  8'S  Pittsb.Leg.J.  579,  affirmed 
16  A.2d  377,  -340  Pa.  183— Metz  v. 
Pittsburgh  Rys.  Co.,  Com.PL,  87 
PittsbXieg.J.  484,  affirmed  7  A.2d 
505,  135  Pa.Super.  '534— Dyer  v. 
Peoples  Natural  Gas  Co.,  Com.PL, 
87  Pittsb.Leg.J.  115— Qoral  Gables 
v.  Farrell,  Com.PL,  86  Pittarb.Leg. 
J.  623 — Carey  v.  Berwager,  Com. 
PL,  53  York  Leg.Rec.  203. 

S.D. — Christensen  v.  Krueger,  278  N. 
W.  171,  66  S.D.  66-^Larsen  v. 
Johnson,  197  N.W.  230,  47  S.D.  202. 

Vt — Nadeau  v.  St  Albans  Aerie  No. 
1205  Fraternal  Order  of  Eagles,  26 
AJ2d  93,  112  Vt  397— Farrell  v. 
Greene,  2  A.2d  194,  110  Yt  37— 
Johnson  v.  Hardware  Mut  Casual- 
ty Co.,  1  A.2d  817,  109  Vt  481— 
City  of  Rutland  v.  Town  of  Wal- 
lingford,  194  A.  360,  109  Vt.  186. 

Ya. — -Wade  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry. 
Co.,  193  S.B.  491,  169  Va,  448. 

Wis. — Patterson  v.  Chicago,  St.  P. 
M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  294  N.W.  63,  23-6 
Wis.  205 — McKee  v.  Oconto  Nat. 
Bank,  248  N.W.  404,  212  Wis.  351 
— Depner  v.  IT.  S.  Nat  Bank,  2 
•N.W.  851,  '20!2  Wis.  405 — First  Wis- 
consin Nat  Bank  of  Milwaukee  v. 
Town  of  Catawba,  197  N.W.  1013, 
183  Wis.,  220 — Twist  v.  Minneapo- 

155 


Us,  St  P.  &  S.  S.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  190 

N.W.  449,  178  Wis.  513. 
33  CJ.  P  1184  note  49—12  C.J.  p  369 

note  92. 

Trial   court's   finding,   notwithstand- 
ing   verdict,    held   justified    under 

evidence 
La.— Lehon   v.    New    Orleans    Public 

Service,    123    So.    172,    10    iLa.App. 

715. 
After  special  verdict 

<1)  A  judge  may  enter  judgment 
notwithstanding  the  verdict  after  a 
special  verdict,  since  such  motion 
must  be  considered  on  the  testimo- 
ny prior  to  submission  of  the  cause 
to  jury. — Dzikowski  v.  Michigan 
Cent  R.  R.,  276  N.W.  470,  2>82  Mich. 
337— In  re  Cotcher's  Estate,  264  N. 
W.  325,  274  Mich.  154 — Jacob  v. 
Gratiot  Central  Market  255  N.W. 
331,  237  Mich.  262. 

(2)  So,    where    defendant    moved 
for   directed  verdict,    and,   at   plain- 
tiff's request,  case  was  submitted  to 
jury  with  leave  to  defendant  to  move 
for   judgment    if  verdict   should  be 
otherwise  than  as  would  have  been 
directed,    and    general    verdict    was 
returned    for    plaintiff    and    special 
findings     were     made     favorable     to 
plaintiff,     defendant's     motion     for 
judgment    notwithstanding   the   ver- 
dict was  not  improperly  granted,  on 
ground  that  the  special  findings  were 
binding    on    defendant    because    the 
motion  was  directed  only  against  the 
general    verdict. — Jasper     v.    Wells, 
144  P.2d  50'o,  173  Or.  114. 

(3)  The    rule    that    motion    for 
judgment  notwithstanding  verdict  is 
usually    a    concession    that    special 
findings   are  supported  by  evidence, 
although    applicable    where    motion 
is  on  ground  that  verdict  was  con- 
trary to  special  answers,  would  not 
be  applicable  to  contentions  that  ev- 
idence   failed    to    establish    defense 
and    that    judgment    should    be    for 
plaintiff  under  the  law,  the  evidence 
and    the    admitted    facts. — Lewis    v. 
Dodson,  100  P.2d  640.  151  Kan.  6'32. 

Where  evidence  presented  ques- 
tions of  fact,  dismissal  of  complaint 
after  rendition  of  verdict  for  plain- 
tiff was  error. — Sullivan  v.  Central 
Hanover  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  63  N. 
B.2d  76,  294  N.Y.  497. 

In  Arkansas 

(1)  After  verdict  has  been  en- 
tered, but  before  entry  of  judgment 
if  court  finds  that  no  testimony  has 
been  offered  to  sustain  the  verdict, 
and  that  no  cause  of  action  has  been 
shown  to  exist  the  court  has  juris- 
diction so  to  declare  and  direct  judg- 
ment which  shall  be  entered. — Stan- 
ton  v.  Arkansas  Democrat  Co.,  106 
S.W.2d  584,  194  Ark,  135—33  C.J.  p 
1184  note  49. 

C2)     But  plaintiff  was  held  not  en- 


60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tites13  which  govern  the  entry  of  judgment  notwith- 
standing the  verdict,14  and  under  some  of  which  a 
judgment  may  be  entered,  notwithstanding  the  ver- 


dict, in  favor  of  the  party  who  was  entitled  to 
have  a  verdict  directed  in  his  favor  j1^  but  under 
such  statutes  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict 


titled  to  judgment  xxon  obstante  vere- 
dicto,  although  there  was  no  testi- 
mony to  sustain  verdict  for  defend- 
ant, where  verdict  was  not  special, 
and  case  was  not  reserved  by  court 
for  future  judgment  or  considera- 
tion, and  there  was  no  statement  in 
pleadings  to  justify  court  in  enter- 
ing judgment  in  favor  of  plaintiff, 
Crawford  &  M.  Dig.  §§  62*71,  6273, 
being  inapplicable. — Jackson  v.  Car- 
ter, 278  S.W.  32,  169  Ark.  1154. 
In  ETobraska 

Applying  the  rule  that  the  trial 
court  has  the  right  and  power  to  va- 
cate, set  aside,  amend,  or  correct 
any  judgments  or  orders  made  by  It 
at  the  same  term,  it  has  been  held 
that  where  court  overruled  plain- 
tiff's motion  for  directed  verdict  and 
submitted  case  to  jury  which  re- 
turned verdict  for  defendant,  and 
plaintiff  filed  motion  for  judgment 
notwithstanding  verdict,  court  had 
jurisdiction  at  same  term  to  sustain 
plaintiff's  motion  in  part  and  enter 
judgment  for  plaintiff  for  a  portion 
of  amount  claimed. — 'Leon  v.  Kitchen 
Bros.  Hotel  Co.,  277  N.W.  823,  134 
Neb.  137,  115  A.L.R.  1078. 

In  Oklahoma 

(1)  The  court  Is  not  authorized  to 
render  a  judgment   notwithstanding 
the  verdict  because  there  is  an  en- 
tire lack  of  evidence  to  justify  the 
verdict   in   favor   of   the   prevailing 
party. — St  Louis-San  -Francisco  Ry. 
Co.   v.   Eakins,   284  P.   866,  141  Okl. 
256 — Thompson   v.    Florence,    .274    P. 
671,     135     Okl.     116— St.     Louis-San 
Francisco  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bell,  273  P.  243, 
134  Okl.  251 — Odom  v.  Cedar  Rapids 
Sav.  Bank,  -244  P.  758,  114  Okl.  126— 
McAlester  v.  Bank  of  Me Al ester,  218 
P.  839,   9'5   Okl.   193— -Barnes  v.  Uni- 
versal Tire  Protector  Co.,  165  P.  176, 
63  Okl.  292. 

(2)  There  is  also,  however,  some 
authority   to   the   contrary. — Schafer 
v.  Midland  Hotel  Co.,  171  P.  337,  69 
Okl.  201. 

In  Washington 

(1)  The    trial    court    may    enter 
judgment    notwithstanding   the   ver- 
dict in  favor  of  either  party  where 
it  is   warranted   by   the    undisputed 
evidence. — Morris  v.  Chicago,  M.f  St 
P.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  97  P.2d  119,  1  Wash. 
2d  587,  opinion  adhered  to  100  P.2d 
19,  1  Wash.2d  587— Bobst  v.  Hardis- 
ty,   91  P.2d  567,  199  Wash.  304. 

(2)  A  motion  for  judgment  not- 
withstanding the  verdict  is  properly 
granted  where  as  a  matter  of  law 
there  is  neither  evidence  nor  reason- 
able inference  from  the  evidence  sus- 
taining the  verdict — Rlchey  &  Gil- 
bert   Co.    v.    Northwestern   Natural 
Gaa   Corporation,    134   P.2d   444,    IS 


Washed  $31 — Belcher  v.  Lenta  Hard- 
ware Co.,  125  P.2d  648,  13  Wash.2d 
523— Van  Nostern  v.  RJichey  &  Gil- 
bert Co.,  $9  P.2d  608,  2  Washed  663 
— Femling  v.  Star  Pub.  Co.,  84  P.2d 
1008,  19*5  Wash.  395— Turnquist  v. 
Rosaia  Bros.,  83  P.2d  353,  196  Wash. 
434— Steen  v.  Polyclmic.  '81  P.2d  846, 
195  Wash.  666 — Stevich  v.  Depart- 
ment of  Labor  and  Industries,  47  P. 
2d  32,  18'2  Wash.  401— Christiansen 
v.  Anderson,  37  P.2d  889,  179  Wash. 
368-^Clark  v.  King,  34  P.2d  1105,  178 
Wash.  421 — Hanson  v.  Washington 
Water  Power  Co.,  5  P.2d  10'25,  165 
Wash.  497— Wade  v.  North  Coast 
Transp.  Co.,  5  P.2d  985,  165  Wash. 
418— Dailey  v.  Phoenix  Inv.  Co.,  28'5 
P.  657,  155  Wash.  597— Birk  v.  City 
of  Bremerton,  '241  P.  678,  1'37  Wash. 
119 — Reynolds  v.  Morgan,  235  P.  800, 
134  Wash.  358— Maddux  v.  Gray,  2*22 
P.  470,  128  Wash.  149— Fortier  v. 
Robillard,  212  P.  1083,  12-3  Wash. 
599 — Rieper  v.  General  Cigar  Co., 
209  P,  849,  121  Wash.  427—33  C.J.  P 
1180  note  24  [a]. 

(3)  A  mere  scintilla  will  not  sup- 
port verdict  against  such  motion. — 
Kelly  v.  Drumheller.  -272  P.  731,  !50 
Wash.  185. 

(4)  -So,    where   there  Is  no   sub- 
stantial evidence  in  support  of  the 
verdict,    it   is   within   the   power   of 
the  court,  notwithstanding  the  ver- 
dict to  direct  a  judgment  in  favor 
of  any  or  all  of  the  parties  against 
whom  the  evidence  fails. — Eyak  Riv- 
er Packing  Co.  v.  Huglen,  2*55  P.  1'SS, 
143  Wash.  229,  affirmed  257  P.  638, 
143  Wash.  229. 

(5)  A  trial  court,  convinced  aft- 
er submission  of  supposed  fact  is- 
sues to  jury  and  return  of  verdict, 
that    there    was    no    disputed    fact 
question    for    jury,    may    not    only 
grant  (motion  for  judgment  notwith- 
standing verdict,  but  make  findings 
in  support  of  money  judgment  for 
moving  party,  if  such  judgment  is 
proper  under  undisputed  evidence.— 
W.  T.  Rawleigh  Co.  v.  Graham,  103 
P.2d  1076,  4  Wash.2d  407,  1'27  A.L.R. 
596. 

13.    Minn. — Wilcox    v.    Schloner,    23 

N.W.2d  19. 
33  C.J.  p   im  note  47   [d],  p  1184 

note  51. 

.  Idaho 

Judgment  notwithstanding  verdict 
was  not  permissible  prior  to  statute 
authorizing  practice. — Helgeson  v. 
Powell,  34  P.*2d  957,  54. Idaho  667— 
Prairie  Flour  Mill  Co.  v.  Farmers* 
Elevator  Co.,  '261  P.  673.  45  Idaho 
229. 
Xn.  Virginia 

(1)     Under  the  statute  empower- 
ing  the   court   to    enter   such   final 

156 


judgment  as  to  it  shall  seem  right 
and  proper  when  the  verdict  of  a 
jury  in  a  civil  action  is  set  aside 
as  contrary  to  the  evidence,  or  with- 
out evidence  to  support  it,  if  there  is 
sufficient  evidence  before  the  court 
to  decide  the  case  on  its  merits, 
the  trial  court,  in  determining- 
whether  the  jury's  verdict  should  be 
set  aside,  need  not  consider  evidence 
as  on  demurrer  thereto. — 'Flannagan- 
v.  Northwestern  Mut  Life  Ins.  Co., 
146  S.E.  358,  152  Va,  38. 

(2)  Evidence  and  reasonable  and 
proper  inferences  favorable  to  pre- 
vailing party,  however,  will  be  ac- 
cepted as  true. — Parsons  v.  Parker,. 
170  S.B.  1,  160  Va.  810— Bivens  v. 
Manhattan  for  Hire  Car  Corporation* 
159  S.E.  395,  156  Va.  483. 

(-3)  Where  there  is  nothing  inher- 
ently incredible  in  testimony  of  wit- 
nesses which  is  sufficient  to  take- 
case  to  jury,  trial  court  will  not  sub- 
stitute its  view  of  case  for  jury  and 
render  a  judgment  notwithstanding- 
the  verdict. — Hoover  v.  J.  P.  Neff  & 
Son,  31  S.B.'2d  26-5,  183  Va.  56— Par- 
sons r.  Parker,  170  S.B3.  1,  1-60  Va. 
810. 

(4)  Power  to  enter  judgment  not- 
withstanding    verdict     depends     on* 
there  being  certain  and  sufficient  ev- 
idence  in   case   to   decide  it   on   its 
merits. — Dexter-Portland  Cement  Co. 
r.  Acme  Supply  Co.,  133  S.B3.  788,  147 
Va.  758. 

(5)  Evidence  was  held  to  warrant 
trial  court  in   setting  aside  *  verdict 
as  plainly  contrary  to  evidence  and 
entering    judgment    notwithstanding 
the   verdict — Noland  v.    Fowler,    IS 
S.B.2d  251,  179  Va.  19— Vandenbergh 
&  Hitch  y.  Buckingham  Apartment 
Corporation,    128    S.BL    561,    142    Va. 
«97. 

14.  S.D.— Kerr  v.  Staufer,  -238  N.W. 
156,  59  S.D.  83. 

Tex— Happ  v.  Happ,  CiV-App.,  160  S. 
W.2d  227,  error  refused. 

15.  Ariz. — McCauley  v.  Steward,  164 
P.2d  465. 

Cal. — In  re  Leahy's  Estate,  54  P.2d 
704,  5  Cal.2d  301— Hunton  r.  Cali- 
fornia 'Portland  Cement  Co.,  122 
P.*2d  947,  50  CaLApp.23  684— Van 
Rennes  v.  Southern  Counties  Gas* 
Co.  of  California,  113  P.2d  '238,  44 
CaloApp.2d  880 — Scott  v.  George  A. 
Fuller  Co.,  107  P.'2d  55,  41  Cal. 
App.2d  501 — Goldenzwig  v.  Shad- 
dock, <88  P.2d  933,  31  Cal.App.2d 
719 — Hubbert  v.  Aztec  Brewing 
Co.,  80  P.2d  185,  26  Cal.  A  pp.  2  d  664, 
followed  in  Cerezo  v.  Aztec  Brew- 
ing Co.,  80  P.2d  198,  26  Cal.App.Sd 
754,  rehearing  denied  Hubbert  v. 
Aztec  Brewing  Co.,  *0  P.'2d  1016, 
26  CaLApp.2d  W4— -Galiano  v.  Pa- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  60 


ciflc  Gas  &  Electric  Co.,  67  P.*2d 
388,  20  CaLApp.2d  534-JCollins  v. 
Nelson,  61  P.2d  479,  16  Cal.App.2d 
535— In  re  Smethurst's  Estate,  59 
P.2d  830,  15  CaLApp.2d  322— 
Tracey  v.  L.  A.  Paving-  Co.,  41  P. 
2d  94*2,  4  Cal.App.2d  700— Kerby  v. 
Elk  Grove  Union  High  School 
Dist.,  36  P.2d  431,  1  Cal.App.Sd  246 
— Crone  v.  City  of  Bl  Cajon,  24  P. 
2d  846,  133  Cal.App.  624— <3Hy  and 
County  of  San  Francisco  v.  Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  City  and 
County  of  San  Francisco,  271  P. 
1-21,  94  CaLApp.  318— Waylanfl  v. 
•Latham,  264  P.  766,  89  CaLApp.  55. 

Colo. — First  Nat.  Bank  of  Denver  v. 
Kenning,  150  P.2d  790,  112  Colo. 
5*23 — Fincher  v.  Edwin  M.  Bos- 
worth  &  Co.,  2<38  P.  88,  77  Colo. 
496. 

Idaho. — Petersen  v.  Bannock  County, 
102  P.2d  £47,  61  Idaho  419— Hen- 
drix  v.  City  of  Twin  Falls,  29  P.2d 
352,  -54  Idaho  130. 

111.— -Carrell  v.  New  York  Cent  R. 
Co.,  52  N.-E.2d  201,  348  111.  599— 
Lathrop  v.  Goodyear  Tire  &  Rub- 
ber Co.,  60  N.E.24  41,  325  IlLApp. 
2S1 — Christensen  v*  Frankland,  58 
N.E.2d  289.  '3-24  IlLApp.  391— JEbert 
v.  City  of  Chicago,  58  N.E.2d  198, 
324  IlLApp.  31-5— Best  v.  Mid-West 
Const.  Corporation,  60  N.E.2d  867, 
320  IlLApp.  341 — Casper  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  50  NA^d  858,  320  IlLiApp. 
269 — Douglas  v.  Athens  Market 
Corporation,  49  N.E.2d  -834,  320 
IlLApp.  40— Haynes  v.  Holman,  49 
N.E.2d  324,  319  IlLApp.  396— 
Sturgeon  v.  Quarton,  44  N.'E.2d 
766,  316  IlLApp.  308— Bituminous 
Casualty  Corporation  v.  City  of 
Virginia,  41  N.E.'2d  342,  314  I1L 
App.  238 — Mader  v.  Handel  Bros. 
Dep't  Store,  41  N.E.2d  327,  314  I1L 
Ap.p.  263 — Kanne  v.  Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  34  N.H2d  732,  310 
IlLApp.  524 — Trust  Co.  of  Chicago 
v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  31 
N.E.2d  -3-28,  "308  IlLApp.  328— Mar- 
ley  v.  Henzler,  24  N.E.2d  587,  303 
IlLApp.  73 — Feinberg  v.  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  -21  N.E.2d  26,  300 
IlLApp.  278— "F&rrner  v.  Alton 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  13  N.E.2d 
652,  294  IlLApp.  206— Malewski  v. 
Mackiewich,  28-2  IlLApp.  593— Il- 
linois Tuberculosis  Ass'n  v. 
Springfield  Marine  Bank,  232  HL 
App.  14. 

Md. — Hajewski  v.  Baltimore  County 
Com'rs,  40  A.2d  316 — Clautice  v. 
Murphy,  26  A.2d  403,  180  Md.  558. 

Mich. — Blundy  v.  .SQtna  Life  Ins.  Co. 
of  Hartford,  Conn.,  11  N.W.Sfl  908, 
307  Mich.  332 — Ruby  v.  Buxton,  8 
N.W.2d  913,  305  Mich.  64— Merritt 
.v.  Huron  Motor  Sales,  276  N.W. 
464,  2'82  Mich.  3*22— In  re  Lane's 
Estate,  274  N.W.  714,  281  Mich.  70 
— Kriishew  v.  Meitz,  268  N.W.  736, 
276  Mich.  553 — In  re  Cotcher's  Es- 
tate, 264  N.W.  825,  274  Mich.  154 
— Richards  v.  F.  C.  Matthews  & 
Co.,  239  N.W.  381,  256  Mich.  159 


—King  v.  Bird,  *22  N.W.  183,  245 
Mich.  93 — West  v.  Detroit  Termi- 
nal R,  R.,  201  N.W.  *55,  229  Mich. 
$90. 

Minn.— Reiter  v.  Porter,  13  N.W.2d 
372,  "216  Minn.  479 — Krause  v.  Chi- 
cago, St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  290 
N.W.  294,  207  Minn.  175— Brulla  v. 
Cassady,  289  N.W.  404,  206  Minn. 
398— 'Selover  v.  Selover,  -277  N.W. 
205,  201  Minn.  '562— Slawson  v. 
Northern  States  Power  Qo.,  276  N. 
W.  275,  201  Minn,  313— Plotnik  Y. 
Lewis,  2-61  N.W.  867,  195  Minn. 
130— Paulson  v.  Fisk,  261  N.W. 
182,  194  Minn.  507— First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Fox,  254  N.W.  «,  191  Minn. 
318— ^Flower  v.  King,  250  N.W.  43, 
189  Minn.  461 — D'iddams  v.  Empire 
Milking  Mach.  Co.,  240  N.W.  895, 
185  M*nn..  '270 — Meisenhelder  v. 
Byram,  227  N.W.  426,  178  Minn. 
417— Street  v.  Rosebrock,  217  N. 
W.  939,  173  Minn.  522— Opperud  v. 
Byram,  217  N.W.  3T9,  175  Minn. 
378 — Hawley  Lumber  Co.  v.  Nord- 
ling,  209  N.W.  484,  I«  Minn.  70— 
Funkley  v.  Ridgway,  197  N.W.  2*80, 
158  Minn.  265 — Capretz  v.  Chicago 
Great  Western  R.  Co.,  195  N.W. 
Ml.  157  Minn.  29— Clough  v.  Chi- 
cago, M.  &  St  P.  Ry.  Co..  191  N.W. 
923,  1-54  Minn.  515. 

N.D. — Cunningham  v.  Great  North- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  14  N.W.;2d  T53,  73  N. 
D.  315 — Nelson  v.  Scherling,  300 
N.W.  803,  71  N.D.  337. . 

Ohio. — Magyar  v.  Prudential  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  15  N.E.2d  144,  1'33 
Ohio  St.  563 — Spann  v.  W.  U.  Tel. 
Co.,  App.,  62  N.E.2d  576— Brooks 
v.  Sentle,  58  N.E.2d  234,  74  Ohio 
App.  231 — Massachusetts  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hauk,  61  N.E.2d 
80,  72  Ohio  App.  131— Garber  v. 
Chrysler  Corporation,  App.,  "50  N. 
E.2d  416-— Arthurs  v.  Citizens'  Coal 
Co.,  App.,  47  N.E.2d  654— Kelley  v. 
Columbus  Ry.,  Power  &  Light  Co., 
24  N.E.2d  290,  62  Ohio  App.  397. 

Pa,— Rodia  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  47  A.2d  162— Garrett  v.  Moore- 
McCormack  Co.,  23  A.2d  503,  844 
Pa.  69,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
63  S.Ct  246,  317  U.S.  239,  87  L. 
Ed.  239— White  v.  Consumer's  Fi- 
nance Service,  15  A.2d  142,  339 
Pa.  417— In  re  Olshefskl's  Estate, 
11  A.2d  487,  337  Pa.  420— Summit 
Hotel  Co.  v.  National  Broadcast- 
tog  Co.,  8  A.2d  302,  336  Pa.  182, 
124  A.L.R.  968— McDonough  Y. 
Borough  of  Munhall,  200  A.  638, 
8311  Pa.  '468— Smith  v.  Penn  Tp. 
Mut  Fire  Ass'n  of  Lancaster 
County,  186  A.  ISO,  323  Pa.  93— 
James  v.  Columbia  County  Agri- 
cultural, Horticultural  &  Mechani- 
cal Ass'n,  184  A.  447,  321  Pa.  465— 
Shapiro  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  159 
A.  29,  306  Pa.  216 — Gray  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.,  141  A.  621.  293 
Pa.  28— West  v.  Manatawny  Mut. 
Fire  &  Storm  Ins.  Co.,  120  A.  763, 
277  »Pa.  102— Stierheim  v.  Bechtold, 
43  A.2d  916,  158  Pa.Super.  107 — 

157 


Schroeder  Bros.  v.  Sabeli,  40  A.2d 
170,  156  Pa.Super.  267— Hoefner  v. 
Franklin  Twist  Co.,  24  A.2d  457, 
147  Pa.Super.  4(W— Albright  v. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  17  A. 
2d  709,  143  Pa.Super.  158 — Roeper 
v.  Monarch  Life  Ins.  Co.,  11  A.2d 
184,  138  Pa.Super.  283— Mitchell 
v.  EUmaker,  4  A.2d  592,  134  flPa. 
Super.  583 — Arndt  v.  Brockhausen, 
191  A.  362,  126  Pa.Super.  269— 
Ellsworth  v.  Husband,  181  A.  90. 
119  Pa.'Super.  245 — Milano  v.  BVty- 
ette  Title  &  Trust  Co.,  96  Pa.Su- 
per.  310— Riddel  v.  Philadelphia 
Rapid  Transit  Co.,  94  Pa.Super. 
371 — Granato  v.  Wise,  94  Pa,Super. 
346 — Aaron  v.  Smith,  90  Pa.Super. 
565 — Hawk  v.  Hawk,  88  Pa, Super. 
581 — Camp  v.  Commonwealth  Ti- 
tle Insurance  &  Trust  Co.,  87  Pa. 
Super.  507 — Humbert  v.  Meyers,  83 
Pa.Super.  496 — Teller  v.  Hood,  81 
Pa.Super.  443— Tyrrell  v.  Philadel- 
phia Rapid  Transit  Co.,  79  Pa.Su- 
per.  346 — Landy  v.  'Philadelphia 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  78  Pa.Super.  «47— 
Wille  v.  London  Guarantee  &  Ac- 
cident Co.,  49  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  93, 
32  DeLCo.  18— Piacine  v.  National 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  14  PaJDist  &  Co.  21 
— Wanamaker  v.  Beamesderfer,  5 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  699,  26  Dauph.Co. 
120 — Kaylor  v.  Central  Trust  Co. 
of  Harrlsburg,  54  Dauph.Co.  366,. 
affirmed  36  A.2d  825,  154  Pa. Super. 
633 — Harper  v.  Trainer  Borough. 
Com.iPL,  33  DeLCo.  229 — Jacobs  v. 
Reading  Co.,  Com.PL,  31  DeLCo. 
449 — Hoover  v.  Montgomery,  Com. 
PL,  29  DeLCo.  466-^Soder  v.  Hay- 
ward,  Com.PL,  21  Erie  Co.  99,  5? 
York  Leg.Rec.  49 — Keating  v. 
Wagner,  Com.PL,  42  Lack.Jur.  8^ 
— Farrante  v.  Orrico,  Com.PL,  2f' 
Leh.L.J.  239,  affirmed  35  A.2d  575. 
154  Pa.Super.  165 — McCormack  v. 
Jermyn,  ComjPL,  37  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
295— Stein  v.  Taylor,  Com.PL,  5ff 
Montg.Co.  199 — Eyster  v.  Lehigh 
Valley  R.  Co.,  Com.PL,  14  North- 
umb.Leg.J.  153 — Pischke  v.  Bor- 
ough of  Dormont,  Com.Pl.,  91 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  559,  affirmed  33  A.2d 
480,  153  Pa.Super.  205— Seibert  v. 
City  of  'Pittsburgh,  Com.PL,  90 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  599.  34  Mun.L.R.  S& 
— Schupp  v.  Yagle,  Com.PL,  90 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  S89,  affirmed  27  A.2cl 
589,  H49  Pa.Super.  464— White  v. 
Oswald  Werner  &  Sons  Co.,  Com. 
PL,  88  Pittsb.Leg.J.  199 — Gaskins 
v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Com. 
PL,  7  Sch.Reg.  13 — Mammorella  v. 
Peca,  Com.Pl.,  4  Sch.Reg.  445,  52 
York  Leg.Rec.  8 — Rugens  v.  Jones, 
Com.PL,  54  York  Leg.Rec.  8. 

S.C. — Bohumir  Xryl  Symphony  Band 
v.  Allen  University,  12  S.E.2d  712, 
196  S.C.  173. 

S.D. — Deutscher  v.  Broadhurst,  12  N. 
W.2d  807 — Gordinier  v.  Continen- 
tal Assur.  Co.,  7  N.W.2d  298— 
Strain  v.  Shields,  25$  N.W.  268, 
63  S.D.  60— Kerr  v.  Staufer,  238 
N.W.  156,  59  S.D.  83: 


§  60 

Tex.— Yarbrough  v.   Booher,    174    S. 
W.-2d  47,  141  Tex.  420,   150  A.L.R. 
1369— Neyland  v.  Brown,  170  S.W. 
2d  207,   141   Tex.   253,   modified  on 
other  grounds   172   S.W.2d   89,   141 
Tex.     253— Super-Cold     Southwest 
Co.   v.   Elkins.   166   S.W.2d   97,   140 
Tex.  48— Rodriguez  v.  Higginboth- 
am-Bailey-Logan    Co.,    160    S.W.2d 
234,  138  Tex.  476 — Sovereign  Camp, 
W.    O.   W.   v.    Shuford,   124   S/W.2d 
344,  132  Tex.  376 — Green  v.  Ligon, 
Civ.App.,  •  190     S.W.2d    742,     error 
refused,    no    reversible    error — Mc- 
Kemie   v.    Waldrop,    Civ.App.,    190 
S.W.2d  -384 — Talley   v.   Bass- Jones 
Lumber  Co.,   Civ.App.,   173   S.W.2d 
276,    error   refused — Huie   v.    Lay, 
Civ.App.,    170    S.W.2d    823— D-Bar 
Pwanch   v.    Maxwell,    Civ.App.,    170 
S.W.2d    303,    error   refused — Smith 
v.  Safeway  Stores,  Civ.App.,  167  S. 
W.2d  1044— Gatlin  v.  Southwestern 
Settlement  &  Development  Corpo- 
ration,   Civ.App.f    166    S.W.2d    150, 
error  refused— Manley  v.  Holt,  Civ. 
App.,  161  S.W,2d  857,  error  refused 
— Boatman  v.  C.  S.  Hamilton  Mo- 
tor Co.,    Civ.App.,    152   S.W.2d   390 
— Carrell    v.    Dallas     Railway    & 
Terminal  Co,,  Civ.App.,  151  S.W.2d 
S69,     error     dismissed,     Judgment 
correct— Skelly    Oil    Co.    v.    John- 
ston,    Civ.App.,     151     S.W.-2d    863, 
error     refused — Barrett    v.    Com- 
mercial   Standard    Ins.    Co.,    Civ. 
App.,    145    S.W.2d    315— Heath    v 
Blliston,  Civ.App.,  145  S.W.2d  243 
error  dismissed,   judgment  correct 
—-Dallas    Ry.    &    Terminal   Co.    v 
Glenn,    Civ.App.,    144    S.W.2d    961 
error  dismissed,   Judgment  correct 
— Le  Master  v.  Fort  Worth  Trans- 
it   Co.,    Civ.App.,    142    S.W.2d    908 
reversed   on    other   grounds,    Sup. 
160    S.W.2d    224,    138    Tex.    512— 
Klmmell    v.    Tipton,    Civ.App.,   142 
S,W.2d  421— McAfee  v.  Travis  Gas 
•Corporation,    Civ.App.,    131   S.W.-2d 
139,  reversed  on  other  grounds  153 
S.W.2d  442,    187    Tex.    314— Moran 
v.    Stanolind   Oil   &   Gas  Co.,  Civ 
App.,    127  S.W.2d   1012,   error   dis- 
missed,   Judgment   correct — Gumm 
-v.  Chalmers,  Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d 
942,    modified    on    other    grounds 
Chalmers    v.    Gumra,    154    S.W.2c 
640,  :137  Tex.  467— Collins  v.  Grif 
flth,   Civ.App.,  125  S.W.2d  419,  er- 
ror refused — Whiteman  v.  Harris 
Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d  699,  error  re 
fused— Hamilton  v.  Travelers  Ins 
Co.,   av.App.,  116  S.W,2d  414,  er- 
ror refused— Walters  v.    Southern 
S.  S.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  113  S.W.2d  320 
error  dismissed — Sheppard  v.  City 
•and  County  of  Dallas  Levee  Im 
provement  Dist..   Civ.App.,   112    S 
W.2d    253 — Panhandle    Const.    Co 
v.   Continental   Southland  -Saving 
&  Loan  Ass'n,   Civ.App.,   110   S.W 
2d   632,    error   dismissed — Johnso 
v.    Moody,    Civ.App.,    104    S.W.2 
583,     error     dismissed — James 
Texas  Employers   Ins.  Ass'n,  Ci 
App.,   98   S.W.2d  425,  reversed  o 


JUDGMENTS 

other  grounds  Texas  Employers'! 
Ins.  Ass'n  v.  James,  118  S.W.2d 
293,  131  Tex.  605 — Jackson  v. 
Schoenmann,  Civ.App.,  94  S.W.2d 
225— Cain  v.  Dickson,  Civ.App.,  78 
S.W.2d  1095 — Bade  v.  Pickens, 
Civ.App.,  78  S.W.2d  260,  affirmed 
Pickens  v.  Backle,  104  S.W.2d  482, 
129  Tex.  610,  rehearing  denied  105 
S.W.2d  212,  129  Tex.  610— Acker- 
son  v.  Iferm  &  Home  Savings  & 
Loan  Ass'n  of  Missouri,  Civ.App., 
77  -S.W.2d  559,  error  refused- 
Freeman  v.  Schwenker,  Civ.App., 
73  S.W.2d  609 — Waitz  v.  XJvalde 
Rock  Asphalt  Co.,  Civ.App.,  58 
S.W.2d  884— Southern  Travelers' 
Ass'n  v.  Wright,  Civ.App.,  20  S. 
W.2d  1093,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com. App., '34  S.W.2d  823. 

Wyo.— O'Mally  v.  Eagan,  2  P.2d 
1063,  43  Wyo.  233,  77  A.L.R.  582, 
rehearing  denied  O'Malley  v.  Ea- 
gan, 5  P.2d  276,  43  •  Wyo.  350. 

33  C.J.  p  1185  note  52. 

Purpose  of  rule 

The  rule  permitting  Judgment  not- 
withstanding verdict  when  motion 
tor  directed  verdict  should  have 
been  sustained  has  for  its  purpose 
the  giving  of  an  opportunity  to  the 
;rial  court  to  correct  its  error  in 
Tailing  to  sustain  a  motion  for  a  di- 
rected verdict. — Friedman  v.  Colonial 
Oil  Co.,  Iowa,  18  N.W.2d  196. 
Incontrovertible  physical  facts  rule 
(1)  Where  physical  facts  are  such 
that  it  is  impossible  for  accident  to 
kiave  happened  in  manner  claimed, 
Judge  may  set  aside  verdict  for 
plaintiff  and  order  one  for  defend- 
ant. 

Mich. — Brenner  v.  Dykstra,  286  N. 
W.  623,  289  Mich.  301— Nelson  v. 
Linderman,  284  N.W.  693,  288 
Mich.  186 — Dzikowski  v.  Michigan 
Cent.  R.  R.,  276  N.W.  470,  A0° 
Mich.  337. 
Minn. — Karras  v.  Great  Northern 
Ry.  Co.,  208  N.W.  655,  167  Minn. 
140. 

Pa. — Weiner  v.  Philadelphia  Rapid 
Transit  Co.,  165  A.  252,  310  Pa. 
415 — Hawk  v.  Pennsylvania  R 
Co.,  160  A.  862,  307  Pa.  214— 
Adams  v.  Gardiner,  160  A.  589 
SO 6  Pa.  576 — Folger  v.  Pittsburgh 
Rys.  Co.,  139  A.  858,  291  Pa.  205 
—Brett  v.  Philadelphia  Transp 
Co.,  36  A.2d  230,  154  Pa.Super.  429 

(2)  The  rule  applies  only  in  clear- 
est of  cases  and  never  wherfc  there 
are  variable  and  doubtful  estimates 
and   where    testimony   of   witnesses 
is    needed    in    order    to    apply    evi 
dence  to  the  issue. — Mautino  v.  Pier- 
cedale   Supply  Co.,   13   A.2d  51,   33? 
Pa.  435. 

(3)  Testimony  of  plaintiff  in  au 
tomoblle  accident  case  as  to  respec 
tive  location  of  vehicles  before  col 
lision  was  held  not  to  warrant  Judg 
ment     notwithstanding    verdict,    on 
ground    of    opposition    to    incontro 
vertible   physical   fiacts,   in  view  o 

158 


49    O.J.S. 

different   testimony  given  by  plain- 
iff's  witnesses.— Hoff  v.  Tavani,  170 
,  -384,  111  Pa.Super.  567. 

Test  of  right  to  Judgment  notwith- 
tanding  verdict  is  whether,  at  close 
>f  trial,  trial  court  should  have  giv- 
jn  binding  instructions. — Pfeiffer  v. 
Kraske,  11  A.2d  555,  139  Pa.Super. 
2 — McDonough  v.  Borough  of  Mun- 
hall,  193  A.  326,  127  Pa.Super.  226, 
•eversed  x>n  other  grounds  200  A. 
138,  331  Pa,  468 — Hahn  v.  Anderson, 
_87  A.  450,  123  GPa.Super.  4142,  modi- 
fied on  other  grounds  192  A.  489, 
126  Pa.  463 — Lessy  v.  Great  Atlan- 
Jc  &  Pacific  Tea  Co.,  183  A.  657,  121 
Pa.Super.  440— Ellsworth  v.  Hus- 
band, 181  A,  90,  119  Pa.Super.  245. 
Failure  to  object  to  immaterial  tes- 
timony 

The  fact  that  there  was  no  ob- 
ection  made  to  certain  immaterial 
testimony  at  the  time  it  was  given 
would  not  preclude  the  trial  court 
Trom  sustaining  motion  for  Judg- 
ment non  obstante  veredicto. — In  r«» 
Rentfro's  Estate,  79  P.2d  1042,  103 

!olo.  400. 
Procedure  held  regular 

There  was  nothing  irregular  in 
trial  court's  procedure  in  receiving 
jury's  attempt  to  answer  three  spe- 
cial issues  of  fact,  in  discharging 
Jury,  which  had  answered  one  of 
the  inquiries  with  a  report  that  the 
others  could  not  be  agreed  on,  and 
in  then  granting  Judgment  non  ob- 
sta-nte  veredicto  in  plaintiff's  favor 
on  ground  that  plaintiff's  prior  mo- 
tion for  peremptory  instruction 
made  at  close  of  all  evidence  had 
been  well  taken  and  should  have 
been  granted  instead  of  overruled, 
and  Judgment  was  not  subject  to  ob- 
jection that  there  had  been  a  fur- 
ther trial  of  cause  in  the  sense  that 
additional  evidence  and  argument 
had  been  heard  by  court  subsequent 
to  discharge  of  Jury  and  that  court 
had  entered  Judgment  on  the  verdict. 
— Hutchison  v.  East  Texas  Oil  Co., 
Tex.Civ.App.,  167  S.W.2d  205,  error 
refused. 

Power  similar  to  that  of  appellate 
court 

Power  of  trial  court  to  render 
judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  is 
the  same  power  exercised  by  appel- 
late court  when  it  reverses  and  ren- 
ders a  case,  where  trial  court  errone- 
ously refuses  a  peremptory  instruc- 
tion.— Johnson  v.  Moody,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  104  S.W.2d  583,  error  dis- 
missed. 
Xn  Oklahoma 

The  court  is  not  authorized  to  ren- 
der a  Judgment  notwithstanding  the 
verdict  because  the  evidence  shows 
as  a  matter  of  law  that  the  court 
should  have  directed  a  verdict  in  fa- 
vor, of  the  losing  party.- St.  Louis- 
San  Francisco  Ry.  Co.  v.  Eakins, 
284  P.  866,  141  Okl.  256— Thomp- 
son v.  Florence,  27»4  P.  671,  135  Okl. 
lie — St.  Louis-San  Francisco  Ry. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


60 


is  not  warranted  merely  because  the  trial  cotirt,  in 
its  discretion,  ought  to  have  granted  a  new  trial.1^ 

(2)  Particular   Matters  Affecting  Right  to 
Remedy 

(a)  Motion  for  directed  verdict  as  pre- 

requisite to  relief 

(b)  Sufficiency  of  evidence  to  raise  jury 

question 

(c)  Other  matters 

(a)  Motion   for   Directed  Verdict  as  Pre- 
requisite to  Relief 
Under  some  statutes  it  Is  prerequisite  to  a  Judgment 


notwithstanding  the  verdict  that  the  moving  party  has 
moved  to  direct  a  verdict  In  his  favor  at  the  close  of  the 
testimony. 

It  is  a  prerequisite  to  a  judgment  notwithstand- 
ing the  verdict,  under  some  statutes,  that  the  mov- 
ing party  has  moved  to  direct  a  verdict  in  his  favor 
at  the  close  of  the  testimony,17  but  it  has  been  held 
that  the  motion  for  a  directed  verdict  need  not  be 
in  correct  technical  form,1*  although  a  mere  state- 
ment by  counsel  that  he  intended  to  ask  for  an  in- 
structed verdict1^  or  that  he  thought  a  motion  for 


Co.  v.  Bell,  273  -P.  243.,  134  Okl.  25 
— Odom  v.  Cedar  Rapids  Sav.  Bank 
244  P.  758,  114  Okl.  126— McAleste 
v.  Bank  of  McAlester,  218  P.  839 
95  Okl.  193. 

18.  Minn. — Building  Ass'n  of  Du 
luth  Odd  Fellows  v.  Van  Nispen 
20  N.W.2d  90— Mardorf  v.  Duluth 
Superior  Transit  Co.,  261  N.W.  177 
194  Minn.  537. 

33  C.J.  p  1186  note  58. 

17.  Cal.— In  re  Caldwell's  Estate 
16  P.2d  139,  216  Cal.  694— In  re 
Yale's  Estate,  4  P.2d  153,  '214  Cal 
115 — Cushman  v.  Cliff  House,  250 
P.  575,  79  CaLApp.  572—- Machado 
v.  Weston,  14  P.2d  907,  126  Cal 
App.  661 — In  re  Easton's  Estate,  5 
P.2d  635,  118  Cal.App.  659. 

Idaho.— Helgeson  v.  Powell,  34  P.2d 
957,  54  Idaho  667. 

Md.— Hajewski  v.  Baltimore  County 
Com'rs,  40  A.2d  316. 

Mich. — Forman  v.  Prudential  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  16  N.W.2d  696, 
310  Mich.  145. 

Minn. — Wilcox  v.  Schloner,  25  N.W. 
2d  19 — Johnson  v.  Whitney,  14  N. 
W.2d  765,  217  Minn.  468— Raspler 
v.  Sen*,  11  N.W.-2d  440,  215  Minn. 
596 — Callahan  v.  City  of  Duluth, 
267  N.W.  361,  197  Minn.  403— 
Gendler  v.  S.  S.  Kresge  Co.,  263 
N.W.  925,  195  Minn.  578— Olson  v. 
Heise,  260  N.W.  227,  194  Minn.  280, 
rehearing  denied  261  N.W.  476,  194 
Minn.  280 — Anderson  v.  Newsome, 
258  N.W.  157,  193  Minn.  157— Don- 
nelly  v.  Stepka,  257  N.W.  605, 
193  Minn.  11 — Romann  v.  Bender, 
252  N.W.  80,  190  Minn.  419— Kro- 
cak  v.  Krocak,  249  N.W.  671,  189 
Mi-nn.  346 — Timmins  v.  Pfeifer, 
230  N.W.  260,  180  Minn.  I—John- 
son v.  Hegland,  222  N.W.  272,  175 
Minn.  592— Wilcox  v.  Wiggins,  207 
N.W.  23,  166  Minn.  124— Tencho  v. 
Kruly,  197  N.W.  752,  158  Minn.  408 
— Friedland  v.  Hacking,  197  N.W. 
751,  158  Minn.  389— Funkley  v. 
Ridgway,  197  N.W.  280,  158  Minn. 
265— Young  v.  Yeates,  190  N.W. 
791,  153  Minn.  366. 
N.D.— Baird  v.  Stephens,  228  N.W. 
212,  58  N.D.  812— Gross  v.  MIlleT, 
200  N.W.  1012.  51  NJD.  755— Car-  j 


son  State  Bank  v.  Grant  Grain  Co 
197  N.W.  146,  50  N.p.  558— Enni 
v.  Retail  Merchants'  Ass'n  Mut 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  156  N.W.  234,  3 
N.D.  20. 

33  C.J.  p  1186  note  59. 
Counterclaim 

Plaintiffs'  motion  for  a  Judgmen 
notwithstanding    verdict    was    prop- 
erly granted  despite  plaintiffs'  fail- 
ure to  move  for  a  directed  verdict 
on    defendant's    counterclaim    since 
plaintiffs'  motion  for  a  directed  ver- 
dict   on   his    complaint   automatical 
Iy  included  the  counterclaim  pleaded 
by   defendant   as   a   defense    in   his 
answer,  and  there  is  no  requirement 
that  it  be  especially  mentioned  in  a 
motion  for  a  directed  verdict  made 
by  plaintiff  on  his  complaint.— Doyle 
v.   McPherson;   97  P.2d   2J49,   36   Cal 
App.2d  81. 
Motion  held  sufficient 


Cal.  —  In    re    Ross'    Estate,    22    P.2d 

l.  131  CaLApp.  635. 
Proposition  not  raised 
Where  plaintiff's  motion  for  Judg- 


ment   notwithstanding 
pursuant   to   rule   was 


the    verdict 
based    on   a 


proposition  not  raised  in  plaintiff's 
motion  for  a  directed  verdict,  situa- 
tion was  the  same  as  though  plain- 
tiff had  made  no  motion  for  a  direct- 
ed verdict  and  plaintiff  had  no  right 
to  the  remedy. — Friedman  v.  Colo- 
nial Oil  Co.,  Iowa,  18  N.W.2d  196. 

Judgment  held  erroneous  where 
record  disclosed  that  no  request  for 
peremptory  instruction  was  made.— 
Hall  v.  Barrett,  Tex.Civ.App.,  126 
S.W.2d  1045. 
In.  Pennsylvania 

(1)  Party    presenting    no    written 
point  for  binding   instructions   was 
n  no  position  to  move  for  judgment 
non   obstante  veredicto. — Roberts   v. 
Washington   Trust   Co.,    170  A.   291, 
13  Pa,  584,  certiorari  denied  54  S.Ct. 
78,    292    U.S.    608,    78    L.Ed.    1469, 
and   rehearing   denied   54    S.Ct.    857, 
92    U.S.    613,    78   L.Ed.    1472— Trad- 
es'  Securities  Co.  v.  Kalil,   162  A. 
99,     107     Pa.Super.     215 — Common- 
wealth v.  Keller,  162  A.  474,  106  Pa. 
Super.   458— Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
Osborn,    161    A.    756,    106    Pa.Super. 

159 


45— Carl  v.  Grand  Union  Co.,  161  A. 
429,  105  Pa.Super.  371— Smith  v. 
Graham,  101  Pa.Super.  604 — Good 
Fellowship  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n, 
v.  Crown  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n, 
101  Pa.Super.  393— Loder  v.  Hamil- 
ton Tp.,  100  Pa.Super.  103— Petro- 
leum Fuel  Engineering  Co.  v.  Hemp- 
hill,  94  Pa.Super.  362 — Thomas  F. 
Leonard  Co.  v.  Scranton  Coca-Cola 
Bottling  Co.,  90  Pa.Super.  360 — Pe- 
terson v.  Coles,  81  Pa.Super.  277— 
Ransberry  v.  Fuliner,  80  Pa.  Super. 
512 — Standard  Brewing  Co.  v.  Knapp 
Co.,  79  Pa.Super.  252 — Waugaman 
v.  Henry,  75  Pa.Super.  94 — Tomko 
v.  Union  Township,  44  Pa.Co.  631, 
12  Sch.Leg.Reg.  341 — Roney  v. 
Thompson,  Com.PL,  27  Del.Co.  589 
— Diehl  v.  Central  Printing  Co.,  Com. 
PL,  33  Luz.Leg.Reg.  430— Mammorel- 
la  v.  Peca,  Com.Pl..  4  Sch.Reg.  445, 
52  York  Leg.Rec.  S — Acks  v.  Axe, 
Com.Pl.,  52  York  Leg.Rec.  41. 

(2)  Defect  in  that  points  of  law 
on  which  motion  for  judgment  non 
obstante   veredicto   was    based   were 
presented    by    oral    request    is    not 
cured    by    order    correcting    record 
nunc  pro  tune. — Thomas  F.  Leonard 
Co.   v.    Scranton   Coca-Cola  Bottling 
Co.,  90  Pa.Super.  360. 

(3)  Motion   for   judgment   for   de- 
fendant, made  after  plaintiff  rested, 
and  followed  by  presentation  of  de- 
fendant's  case,   is  not  according  to 
statute.— Updegrave  v.  Alex,   94  Pa. 
Super.  29, 

(4)  Procedure  prescribed  by  stat- 
ute respecting  entry  of  judgment  on 
whole   record   was   not   intended   as 
substitute    for    nonsuit. — Updegrave 
v.  Alex  supra. 

(5)  Record    was   held    to    disclose 
hat,  as  basis  for  judgment  notwith- 
itanding  verdict,  defendant  had  sub- 
mitted   written    points    for    binding 

nstructions.— Weigand    v.    Standard 
Motor  Co.,  167  A.  493,  109  Pa,Super. 
56. 

8.  Md.— Atlantic    Refining    Co.    v. 
Forrester,    25    A.2d    667,    180    Md. 
517. 

9.  Cal.— In    re    Caldwell's    Estate, 
16  P.2d  139,  216  Cal.  694. 


§  60 


JUDGMENTS 


a  directed  verdict  would  be  in  order20  is  not  suffi- 
cient There  is  no  sufficient  compliance  with  the 
statute  where  the  motion  for  directed  verdict  was 
made,  over  objection  of  opposing  counsel,  after  the 
jury  had  returned  its  verdict;21  and  the  deficiency 
cannot  be  corrected  by  a  nunc  pro  tune  order.22 
A  requested  instruction  for  a  verdict  and  the  re- 
fusal thereof  are  not  equivalent  to  a  motion  for  a 
directed  verdict  and  an  order  denying  the  motion 
which,  by  statute,  are  made  prerequisite  to  a  judg- 
ment notwithstanding  the  verdict.28 


49    C.J.S. 

(b)  Sufficiency  of  Evidence  to  Raise  Jury 
Question 

A  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  will  not  be 
entered  where  the  evidence  raises  an  issue  for  the  Jury, 
as  where  there  is  evidence  reasonably  tending  to  sup- 
port the  verdict  or  where  there  Is  a  substantial  conflict 
in  the  evidence. 

A  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  will  not 
be  entered  where  the  evidence  raises  an  issue  for 
the  jury,24  as  where  there  is  evidence  reasonably 
tending  to  support  the  verdict  ;25  and  a  like  rule  ap- 


20.  Cal.— Hallinan  v.  Prindle,  29  P. 
2d  202,  220  Oal.  46. 

21.  Minn.— Wilcox    v.    Schloner,    23 
N.W.2d  19. 

22.  Minn. — Wilcox  v.   Schloner,   su- 
pra, 

23.  Cal.— Hallinan  v.  Prindle,  29  P. 
2d   202,    220    Cal.    46— In   re   Cald- 
well's    Estate.    16    P.2d    139,    2-16 
Cal.    694— Machado   v.   Weston,    14 
P.2d   907,   126  CaLApp.   661— In  re 
Easton's    Estate,    5    P.2d    685,    118 
CaLApp.  659. 

24.  U.S. — Shane  v.  Commercial  Cas- 
ualty Ins.  Co.,  D.C.Pa.,  48  F.Supp. 
151,     affirmed,     C.C.A.,     -Shane    v. 
Barger,  132  P.2d  644. 

Colo. — De  Boer  v.  Olmsted,  260  P. 
108,  82  Colo.  36-9. 

111. — Belcher  v.  Citizens  Coach  Co., 
57  N.B.2d  659,  324  IlLApp.  226— 
Vieceli  v.  Cummings,  54  N.E.2d 
717,  322  IlLApp.  559— Janelunas  v. 
John  Hancock  Mut  Life  Ins.  Co., 
9  N.E.2d  257,  291  IlLApp.  604 — 
Hicks  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  1  N.E.2d  918, 
285  IlLApp.  1. 

Mich.— Thelen  v.  Mutual  Benefit 
Health  &  Accident  Ass'n,  7  N.W. 
2d  128,  «0!4  Mich.  17 — Freedman 
v.  Burton,  274  N.W.  766,  281  Mich. 
208 — Davis  v.  Belmont  Creamery- 
Co.,  274  N.W.  749,  281  Mich.  165— 
In  re  Lane's  Estate,  274  N.W.  714, 
281  Mich.  70. 

Minn.— Solberg  v.  Minneapolis  St. 
Ry.  Co.,  7  N.W.2d  926/  214  Minn. 
274— Weber  v,  St  Anthony  Falls 
Water  Power  Co.,  7  N.W.2d  339, 
214  Minn.  1. 

N.D. — La  Bree  v.  Dakota  Tractor  & 
Equipment  Co.,  288  N.W.  476,  69 
N.D.  561 — Olstad  v.  Stockgrowers 
Credit  Corporation,  266  N.W.  109, 
66  N.D.  416. 

Ohio. — Flynn  v.  Sharon  Steel  Corpo- 
ration, -50  N.E.2d  519,  142  Ohio  St 
145 — Chenoweth  v.  Gary,  App., 
31  N.E.2&  716,  appeal  dismissed 
23  N.E.2d  949,  136  Ohio  St.  123. 

Or.— Parker  v.  Pettit,  138  P.2d  592, 
171  Or.  481. 

Pa. — Dempsey  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Scranton,  46  A.2d  160,  353  Ba.  473 
—Reiser  v.  Smith,  195  A.  56,  328 
Pa.  29-2 — Naugle  v.  Reading  Co., 
21  A.2d  109,  145  Pa.-Super.  341— 
Kissinger  v.  Pittsburgh  Rys.  Co.. 


180  A.  137,  119  Pa.Super.  110— 
Letvin  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co,,  87  Pa. 
Super.  402— Groskin  v.  Knight,  8 
PaJDist.  &  Co.  413,  affirmed  138  A. 
843,  290  Pa.  274— Bayer  v.  Cron- 
auer,  Com.PL,  37  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
261. 

S.D.— Mills  v.  Armstrong,  13  N.W.2d 
726. 

Tex.— Casey  v.  Jones.  Civ.App.,  189 
S.W.2d  51'5— Maryland  Casualty 
Co.  v.  Stewart,  Civ.App.,  164  S.W. 
2d  800,  error  refused — Johnson  v. 
Stickney,  Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  921 
—Citizens  State  Bank  of  Houston 
v.  Giles,  Civ.App.,  145^S.W.2d  899, 
error  dismissed — Barrett  v.  Com- 
mercial Standard  Ins.  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  145  S.W.2d  315— Gumm  v. 
Chalmers,  Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d 
942,  modified  on  other  grounds 
Chalmers  v.  Gumm,  154  S.W.2d 
640,  137  Tex.  467 — Johnson  v. 
Moody,  Civ.App.,  104  S.W.2d  583, 
error  dismissed — Christopher  v. 
City  of  El  Paso,  Civ.App.,  98  S.W. 
2d  394,  error  dismissed — Spence 
v.  National  Life  &  Accident  Ins. 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  59  S.W.2d  212. 

33  C.J.  p  1184  note  51  [c]  (2),  p 
1185  note  56. 

25.  Fla. — Norwich  Union  Indemnity 
Co.  v.  Willis,  168  So.  418,  124  Fla. 
137,  127  Fla.  238. 

Idaho. — In  re  Randall's  Estate,  70 
P.2d  389,  58  Idaho  1'43. 

111. — Berg  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co., 
62  N.R2d  676,  391  111.  52— Todd 
v.  S.  S.  Kresge  Co.,  52  N.E.2d  206. 
384  111.  524— Neering  v.  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  50  N.E.2d  497,  383 
111.  366,  mandate  conformed  to  53 
N.E.2d  271,  321  IlLApp.  625— Gnat 
v.  Richardson,  39  N.E.2d  837.  378 
111.  626— Walaite  v.  Chicago,  R.  I. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  33  N.E.2d  119,  376 
111.  59 — Anderson  v.  Krancic,  66  N. 
E.2d  316,  328  IlLApp.  364— Dickin- 
son v.  Rockford  Van  Orman  Hotel 
Co.,  63  N.E.2d  257,  326  IlLApp. 
686 — Hedden  v.  Farmers  Mut.  Re- 
Ins.  Co.  of  Chicago,  I1L,  60  N.E;2d 
110,  325  IlLApp.  335— Molitor  v. 
Chicago  Title  &  Trust  Co.,  59  N.E. 
695,  '325  IlLApp.  124— Hauck  v. 
First  Nat  Bank  of  Highland  Park, 
55  N.R2d  56'5,  323  IlLApp.  300— 
Bone  v.  Publix  Great  States  Thea- 
tres, 54  N.E.2d  98,  322  IlLApp.  178 

160 


— Leif  v.  Fleming,  52  N.E.2d  606, 
321  IlLApp.  297— Schwickrath  v. 
Lowden,  46  N.E:2d  162,  317  111. 
App.  431— Gleason  v.  Cunningham, 
44  N.E.2d  940,  316  IlLApp.  286— 
Lomax  v.  Brooks,  43  N.E.2d  421, 
315  IlLApp.  567— Gant  v.  McDow- 
ell, 38  N.E.2d  530,  312  IlLApp.  378 
— Ramming  v.  Belt  Ry.  Co.  of  Chi- 
cago, 36  N.E.2d  275,  311  Hl.App. 
367— Taylor  v.  Municipal  Em- 
ployes Ins.  Ass'n  of  Chicago.  34 
N.E.2d  126,  310  IlLApp.  *8S— 
Delling  v.  Lake  View  Hospital 
Ass'n  and  Training  School  for 
Nurses,  33  N.E.2d  915,  310  IlLApp, 
155 — Boyda  Dairy  Co.  v.  Continen- 
tal Casualty  Co.,  20  N.E.2d  339, 
299  IlLApp.  469— Delyda  v.  Metro 
politan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  18  N.E.Scl 
562,  298  IlLApp.  623— Gardiner  v. 
Richardson,  11  N.E.2d  824,  293  111. 
App.  40— McNeill  v.  Harrison  f- 
Sons,  2  N.E.2d  959,  286  IlLApp. 
120. 

Kan.— Underbill  v.  Motes,  165  P.2d 
218,  160  Kan.  679 — Groom  v. 
Bertoglio,  £4  P.2d  992,  143  Kan. 
296. 

Mich. — Richards  v.  F.  C.  Matthews 
&  Co.,  239  N.W.  381,  2'56  Mich.  159 
— Lewis  v.  Beaverton  Power  Co., 
204  N.W.  768,  231  Mich.  585— In 
re  Knox's  Estate,  190  N.W.  23S, 
220  Mich.  469. 

Minn.— Building  Ass'n  of  Duluth  Odd 
Fellows  v.  Van  Nispen,  20  N.W.2d 
90,  220  Minn.  504— Kundiger  v. 
Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of  America,  17 
N.W.2d  49,  219  Minn.  25— Kundi- 
ger v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co., 
15  N.W.2d  487,  218  Minn.  273— 
Eklund  v.  Kapetas,  11  N.W.2d  805, 
216  'Minn.  79— Solberg  v.  Minneap- 
olis St  Ry.  Co.,  7  N.W.2d  926,, 
214  Minn.  274— Goldfine  v.  John-' 
son,  294  N.W.  459,  208  Minn.  449 
— Peterson  v.  Minnesota  Power  & 
Light  Co.,  288  N.W.  588,  206  Minn. 
268 — Armstrong  v.  Brown  Bros., 
Kootz  &  Co.,  277  N.W.  348,  202 
Minn.  26 — Mardorf  v.  Duluth-Su- 
perior  Transit  Co.,  261  N.W.  177, 
194  Minn.  537— Olson  v.  Heise,  260 
N.W.  227,  194  Minn.  280,  rehearing 
denied  261  N.W.  476,  194  Minn. 
280— Kingsley  v.  Alden,  269  N,W. 
7,  193  Minn.  503— Stebbins  v. 
Friend.  Crosby  &  Go*  958  N.W. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§60 


824.  193  Minn.  44 6— Donnelly  v. 
Stepka,  257  N.W.  505,  193  Minn.  11 
—First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fox,  254  N, 
W.  8,  191  Minn.  318— Thorn  v. 
Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  252  N.W. 
660,  190  Minn.  622— Stritzke  v. 
Chicago  Great  Western  Ry.  Co., 
251  N.W.  532,  190  Minn.  323— 
Trovatten  v.  Hanson,  213  N.W. 
536,  171  Minn.  130 — Jepson  v.  Cen- 
tral Business  Men's  Ass'n,  209.  N. 
W.  487,  168  Minn.  19— Nelson  V. 
Johnson,  209  N.W.  320,  167  Minn. 
430 — Farmers'  &  Merchants'  State 
Bank  of  New  York  Mills  v.  Na- 
tional Surety  Co.,  203  N.W.  969, 
163  Minn.  257 — Automotive  Co.  v. 
National  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  Hart- 
ford, 202  N.W.  32,  162-Mlnn.  34— 
Dairy  Region  Land  Co.  v.  Paul- 
son, 199  N.W.  398,  160  Minn.  42— 
Thomas  Keating  Co.  v.  Inland 
Steel  Co.,  195  N.W.  1016,  157  Minn. 
243 — Stoneman  v.  Smyth,  190  N. 
W.  605,  15-3  Minn.  331. 

Mo. — American  Employers  Ins.  Co. 
of  Boston,  Mass.,  v.  Manufactur- 
ers &  Mechanics  Bank  of  Kansas 
City,  85  S.W.2d  174,  229  Mo.App. 
994. 

N.D. — Maloney  v.  City  of  Grand 
Forks,  1'5  N.W.2d  769,  73  N.D.  445 
— Equity  Elevator  &  Trading  Co. 
v.  Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Bank, 
250  N.W.  529,  64  N.D.  95— Hughes 
v.  Wachter,  238  N.W.  776,  61  N.D. 
513— McDonnell  v.  Monteith,  231 
N.W.  854,  59  N.D.  750— Vallely  v. 
Devaney,  19»4  N.W.  903,  49  N.D. 
1107. 

Ohio. — Wilkeson  v.  Erskin  &  Son,  61 
N.E.2d  301,  145  Ohio  St  213— Paul 
v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of  America, 
App.f  64  N.E.2d  124— Morgan  v. 
Hunsicker,  App.,  60  N.E.2d  509—» 
Reitenour  v.  McClain,  App.,  57  N. 
E.2d  78 — Wilms  v.  Klein,  App., 
49  N.E.2d  76 — Holmes  v.  Em- 
ployers' Liability  Assur.  Corpora- 
tion, Limited,  of  London,  England, 
43  N.E.2d  746,  70  Ohio  App.  239— 
Lehrer  v.  Cleveland  Ry.  Co.,  20 
Ohio  N.P.,N:S..  481. 

Okl.— Stanfield  v.  Lincoln,  1  P.2d 
387,  150  Okl.  289— Reid  v.  Reid, 
241  P.  797,  115  Okl.  58— Oklahoma 
Products  Co.  v.  Cotton  Products 
Co.,  239  P.  656,  111  Okl.  2-57. 

Or. — French  v.  State  Industrial  Ac- 
cident Commission,  68  P.2d  466, 
156  Or.  443. 

Pa. — Kummerlen  v.  Pustilnik,  45  A. 
2d  27— Cherry  v.  Mitosky,  45  A.2d 
23— Kindt  v.  Reading  Co.,  43  A. 
2d  1145,  352  Pa.  419— Garden  v. 
Philadelphia  Transp.  Co.,  41  A.2d 
667,  351  Pa.  407 — Young  v.  Brad- 
ford County  Telephone  Co.,  38  A. 
2d  47,  356  Pa.  62— MacDonald  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  -36  A.2d  492, 
348  Pa.  558— Ashworth  v.  Hannum, 
32  A.2d  407,  347  Pa.  893— Frew  v. 
Barto,  26  A.2d  905,  345  Pa.  217 
— Brown  v.  George,  25  A.2d  691, 
344  Pa. ,  39-9 — Wascavage  v.  Sus- 
queharma  Collieries  Co.,  23  A.2d 

49  C.  J.S.-11 


509,  343  Pa.  529— Srednick  v.  Sy- 
lak,  23  A.2d  333,  34.3  Pa.  486— Mor- 
ton v.  Borough  of  Dormont,  22  A. 
2d  738,  343  Pa.  432— Welch  v. 
Sultez,  13  A.2d  399,  338  Pa.  '583— 
Pearlman  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  9  A.2d  432,  336  Pa,  444— 
'Powell  v.  Ligon,  5  A.2d  373,  33'4 
Pa.  250 — Kennedy  v.  Southern 
Pennsylvania  Traction  Co.,  3  A.2d 
395,  333  Pa.  406 — lacovino  v.  Ca- 
terino,  2  A.2d  828,  332  Pa.  556— 
Voltz  v.  General  Motors  Accept- 
ance Corporation,  2  A.2d  697,  332 
Pa.  141 — Hahn  v.  Anderson,  192  A. 
489,  326  Pa."  465— Murray  v.  City 
of  Clairton,  191  A.  618,  326  Pa. 
180 — Smith  v.  Penn  Tp.  Mut  Fire 
Ass'n  of  Lancaster  County,  186 
A.  130,  323  Pa.  93— Majewski  v. 
Lempka,  183  A.  777,  321  Pa.  369 
— Walters  v.  Western  &  Southern 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  178  A.  499,  318  Pa. 
882 — Strong  v.  Jarka  Corporation 
of  Philadelphia,  176  A.  732,  817 
Pa.  317— Bi^yski  v.  Schreiber,  171 
A.  614,  314  -Pa.  35:3— Keck  v.  Phil- 
adelphia Rapid  Transit  Co.,  171  A. 
478,  3T4  Pa.  389— Ferguson  v. 
Charts,  170  A.  131,  313  Pa.  164— 
Vlasich  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co., 
161  A.  70,  307  Pa.  255— Guilinger 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  155  A.  293, 
304  Pa.  140— Kellogg  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.,  155  A.  296,  304  Pa, 
149 — Darlington  v.  Bucks  County 
Public  Service  Co.,  15'4  A.  501,  303 
Pa.  288 — Freedom  Oil  Works  Co.  v. 
Williams,  152  A.  741,  302  Pa.  51 
— Kuhns  v.  -New  York  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  147  A.  76,  297  Pa.  418— ^Statler 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  145  A.  861, 
296  Pa.  222— Kent  v.  General 
Chemical  Co.,  131  A.  588,  285  Pa. 
34 — Dunn  v.  Hatch  Motors  Co.,  126 
A.  349,  281  Pa.  224— Maisel  v. 
Patrick  Corr  &  Sons,  121  A.  61,  277 
Pa.  331 — Davis  v.  Carroll-Porter 
Boiler  &  Tank  Co.,  119  A,  T42,  276 
Pa,  71— Moyer  v.  Pittsburgh,  M. 
&  B.  Ry.  Co.,  119  A.  469,  275  Pa. 
363 — Ondo  v.  Greek  Catholic  Un- 
ion of  Russian  Brotherhoods  of 
U.  S.  A.,  38  A.2d  370,  155  Pa.Su- 
per.  492— Hindes  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
burgh, 38  A.2d  420,  155  Pa.Super. 
314— Holland  v.  Kohn,  38  A,2d  500, 
155  Pa.Super.  95— Dick  v.  West 
Penn  Rys.  Co.,  83  A.2d  792,  153  Pa. 
Super.  281 — Shugats  v.  Metropoli- 
tan Life  Ins.  Co.,  33  A.2d  650,  153 
Pa.Super.  51— Trostel  v.  Reading 
Steel  Products  Corporation,  31  A.2d 
909,  152  Pa.Super.  273— Gerber  v. 
Jones,  30  A.2d  534,  151  Pa.Super. 
489— Smith  v.  Coca  Cola  Bottling 
Co.,  33  A.2d  488,  152  PaJSuper.  445 
— Smolinsky  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  26  A,2d  131.  149  Pa.Super. 
72 — Moyer  v.  Reading  Co.,  24  A.2d 
48,  147  Pa.Super.  178— Watson  v. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  21  A.2d 
503,  145  Pa.Super.  86S— Blair,  to 
Use  of  Davis,  v.  Adamchick,  21  A. 
2d  107,  145  Pa.Super.  125— Szidor  v. 
Greek  Catholic  Union  of  Russian 

161 


Brotherhoods  of  U.  S.,  21  A.2d  104, 
145  Pa.Super.  251 — Steingart  v. 
Kaney,  19  A.2d  499,  144  Fa.Super. 
534 — Hanrahan  v.  John  Hancock 
Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.,  18  A.2d  512, 
T43  Pa.Super.  557— Willetts  v.  But- 
ler Tp.,  15  A.2d  392,  141  Pa.Super. 
394— Mitchell  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
7  A.2d  513,  136  Pa.Super.  467— 
Johnson  v.  Staples,  5  A.2d  433,  135 
Pa.Super.  274 — Qu inter  v.  Bloch, 
197  A.  539,  130  Pa.Super.  348 — 
Kovacs  v.  Ajhar,  196  A.  876,  130 
Pa.Super.  149 — Tomko  v.  Feldman, 
19«4  A.  338,  128  Pa.Super.  429— 
Lessy  v.  Great  Atlantic  &  Pacific 
Tea  Co.,  183  A.  657,  121  Pa.Super. 
440— Young  v.  Yellow  Cab  Co.,  180 
A.  63,  118  Pa.Super.  495 — Rzasa  v. 
Gorniak,  174  A.  659,  115  Pa.Super. 
47— Klein  v.  Weissberg,  174  A. 
636,  114  Pa.Super.  569— Williams 
v.  Southern  Mut  Ins.  Co.  of  -Lan- 
caster County,  164  A.  128,  108  Pa. 
Super.  148,  affirmed  166  A.  582, 
312  Pa.  114— Turner  v.  Philadel- 
phia Rapid  Transit  Co.,  100  Pa, 
Super.  291 — Loder  v.  Hamilton  Tp., 
100  Pa.Super.  103-^Smith  v.  Walat 
&  Stutznmn,  99  Pa.  Super.  147 — 
Columbia  Fur  Co.  v.  Needro,  97 
Pa.Super.  389 — Robert  M.  Green  & 
Sons  Co.  v.  Hazlett  &  Johnston,  96 
Pa.Super.  460 — Tompkins  v.  Head- 
ley,  96  Pa.Super.  133 — Wright  v. 
Borough  of  Belief onte,  95  Pa.Su- 
per. 196 — Kaufman  v.  Lehman,  94 
Pa.Super.  306 — Curry  v.  Wolsten- 
croft,  93  Pa.Super.  13 — Boley  £ 
Boley  v.  Borough  of  Glassport,  91 
Pa.Super.  247— Philadelphia  In- 
quirer Co.  v.  Sabia,  90  Pa.Super. 
266 — Donovan  v.  People's  Natural 
Gas  Co.,  84  Pa.Super.  51 — Jones 
v.  East  Fayette  Coal  Co.,  83  Pa. 
Super.  341 — Voltz  v.  Erie  County, 
81  Pa,Super.  467 — Harris  &  Konick 
v.  Gottlieb,  81  Pa.Super.  186— 
Molinaro  v.  Davis,  80  Pa.Super. 
597— Robert  J.  Ward  &  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler, 80  Pa.Super.  259 — Flood  v. 
Connor,  80  Pa.Super.  54 — Hawkins 
v.  Philadelphia  Rapid  Transit  Co., 
79  Pa. Super.  453 — Weaver  v.  Col- 
lins* Adm'x,  79  Pa.Super.  289— 
Harter  v.  Altoona  &  Logan  Valley 
Electric  Ry.  Co.,  79  Pa.Super.  25 
— Swartz  v.  Stein  &  Levy,  78  Pa, 
'Super.  515— Fissell  v.  Hines,  78 
Pa,Super.  179— Cloud  v.  Philadel- 
phia &  West  Chester  Traction  Co., 
78  Pa.Super.  85,  followed  in  78 
Pa.Super.  92f — Clark  v.  Neshan- 
nock  Stone  Co.,  41  Pa-Super.  34 
— Barnhart  v.  Herring,  54  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.  526 — DeCheck  v.  Clancy,  53 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  618,  93  Pittsb.Leg. 
J.  305,  59  York  Leg.Rec,  87— Ros- 
enberger  v.  Butz,  37  PaJDist.  & 
Co.  406,  18  Leh.L.J.  3S5 — Hones- 
dale  Nat  Bank  v.  Klein,  37  Fa. 
Diet  &  Co.  370,  41  Lack.Jur.  191 
— Wade  v.  Cleavenger,  34  FaJDist 
&  Co.  297,  86  Pittsb.Leg.J.  627 
— Dommes  v.  Zuroski,  Com.PL,  85 
Berks  Co.  429,  affirmed  98  A,2d  73, 


§60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    0.  J.  S. 


350  Pa,  206— Parsons  v.  Motor 
Freight  Express,  Com.Pl.,  35  Berks 
Co.  245 — Bekelja  v.  James  E. 
Strates  Shows,  Inc.,  Com.Pl.,  55 
Dauph.Co.  317 — Sanders  V:  Brown, 
Com.PL,  54  Dauph.Co.  272 — Ans- 
tine  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  Com. 
PI.,  62  Dauph.Co.  372— West  V, 
Morgan,  Com.Pl.,  52  Dauph.Co.  361, 
affirmed  27  A.2d  46,  345  Pa.  61— 
MoKenzie  Co.  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.  of  Maryland,  Com.PL,  52 
Dauph.Co.  210— Frew  v.  Barto, 
Com.Pl.,  52  Dauph.Co.  147,  affirmed 
26  A.2d  905,  345  Pa.  217— Greiner 
v.  Turby,  Com.Pl.,  52  Dauph.  Co. 
131 — McGarvey  v.  Mages,  Com.Pl., 
50  Dauph.Co.  128 — Pote  v.  Dauphin 
Deposit  Trust  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  49 
Dauph.Co.  307 — Eckenrode  v.  Pro- 
duce Trucking  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  49 
Dauph.Co.  271 — Weiser  v.  Michlo- 
vitz,  Com.Pl.,  48  Dauph.  106— Pen- 
nell  v.  Bainbridge,  Com.PL,  47 
Dauph.Co.  224 — Webb  v.  Hess, 
Com.Pl.,  46  Dauph.Co.  84— Stuart 
v.  Ashenfelter,  Com.Pl.,  46  Dauph. 
Co.  31 — McLaughlin  v.  Southern 
Pennsylvania  Traction  Co.,  Com. 
PL,  32  DeLCo.  252 — Freeman  v. 
MacDonald,  Com.Pl.,  31  Del.Co.  165 
—Fidelity-Philadelphia  Trust  Co. 
v.  Dreslin,  Com.PL,  30  DeLCo.  351 
— Bair  v.  Newgeon,  Com.PL,  29 
DeLCo.  544 — Hoover  v.  Montgom- 
ery, Com.PL,  29  DeLCo.  466— Maher 
v.  Washington  Nat.  Ins.  Co.,  Com. 
PL,  29  Del.Co.  267 — Struchen  v. 
Thomas,  Com.PL,  23  Brie  Co.  253 
— Trebucza  v.  Nelson,  Com.Pl.,  22 
Erie  Co.  «4 — Palmer  v.  City  of  Brie, 
Com.PL,  20  Erie  Co.  400,  affirmed 
9  A.2d  -378,  337  Pa.  5— Morrison 
v.  Gordon,  Com.PL,  20  Erie  Co. 
350— "Madigan  v.  H.  B.  Sproul 
Constr.  Co.,  Com.PL,  44  Lack.Jur. 
73,  4  Monroe  L.R.  123 — Grabin  v. 
Caffrey,  Com.PL,  42  Lack.Jur.  194 
— Keating  v.  Wagner,  Com.PL,  42 
Lack.Jur.  84— «nyder  v.  Passen, 
Com.PL.  42  Lack.Jur.  39 — Crystal 
&  Son  v.  Gerson,  Com.PL,  41  Lack. 
Jur.  185 — Glidden  Co.  v.  Sullum, 
Com.PL,  40  Lack.Jur.  191— Fegley 
v.  Vogel-Ritt,  Inc.,  Com.PL,  21 
Leh.L.J.  306 — Hamm  v.  Teyka, 
Com.PL,  18  Leh.L.J.  218— Palas- 
chak  v.  Borro,  Com.PL,  36  Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  361 — Fierro  v.  Friel,  Com. 
PL,  35  Luz.Leg.Reg.  186— Wildon- 
er  v.  Sutton,  Com.PL,  34  Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  118 — Szusta  v.  Krawiec,  Com. 
PL,  34  Luz.Leg.Re'g.  61,  affirmed 
19  A.2d  495,  W4  Pa,Super.  530— 
Watson  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  Com.PL,  33  Luz.Leg.Reg.  463 
— Morris  v.  White,  Com.Pl.,  33 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  4-37 — Wereszinski  v. 
Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of  America, 
Com.PL,  32  Luz.Leg.Reg.  412 — 
Harr  v.  G-aydos,  ConxPL,  82  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  169 — Schenker  v.  Indem- 
nity Ins.  Co.  of  North  America, 
Com.PL,  2  Monroe  L.R.  141,  10 
Som.Leg.J.  180,  affirmed  16  A.2d 
304,  340  Pa.  81 — Bruno  v.  Buffalo 


Amusement  Co.,  Com.PL,  £6  Montg. 
Co.  51 — Wissahickon  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Du  Bois,  Com.PL, 
54  Montg.Co.  404 — Silvaoao  v.  Met- 
ropolitan Life  Ins.  Co.,  Com.PL, 
14  Northumb.L.J.  321,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  5  A.2d  423,  135  Pa. 
Super.  260 — Diggan  v.  York-Buf- 
falo Motor  Express,  Com.PL,  13 
Northumb.Leg'.J.  381— Ciaffoni  v, 
Middlebrook,  Com.PL,  94  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  16 — Humenick  v.  Carfagna, 
Com.PL,  94  Pittsb.Leg.J.  6,  59 
York  Leg.Rec.  163 — Urben  v. 
Pittsburgh  Rys.  Co.,  Com.PL,  93 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  439— Kuhn  v.  Massa- 
chusetts Mut.  Life  Ins.,  Com.PL, 
89  Pittsb.Leg.J.  544— ^mith  v. 
Prudential  Ins.  Co.,  Com.  PL,  87 
PittsbXeg.J.  367— VaUino  v.  Klein, 
Com.PL,  87  Pittsb.Leg.J.  227— 
Wargovich  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  Com.PL,  86  Pittsb.Leg.J. 
459,  affirmed  7  A.2d  568,  136  Pa- 
Super.  421 — ©pern  v.  Globe  &  Re- 
public Ins.  Co.,  Com.PL,  85  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  774 — Hoy  v.  Wolfgang, 
Com.PL,  7  Sch.Reg.  77— Schulkind 
v.  Dropkin,  Com.PL,  7  Sch.Reg.  17 
— Gaidos  v.  McCans,  Com.PL,  22 
Wash.Co.  140 — Mellon  v.  Singer 
Sewing  Mach.  Co.,  Com.PL,  22 
Wash.Co.  75,  affirmed  25  A.2d  807, 
•344  Pa.  3'90— Mesko  v.  Prudential 
Ins.  Co.,  Com.PL,  20  Wash.Co.  133 
— Sutherland  v^  Bellairt,  Com.PL, 
20  Wash.Co.  103 — Stage  v.  Dailey, 
Com.PL,  20  Wash.Co.  51 — Kirr  v. 
Suwak,  20  Wash.Co.  1,  affirmed  9 
A.2d  735,  336  Pa.  561— Dinch  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  Com.PL,  19 
Wash.Co.  174 — Snee  v.  Dunn,  Com. 
PL,  19  Wash.Co.  94— Carnegie  v. 
Townsend,  Com.PL,  18  Wash.Co. 
190 — White  v.  Davies,  Com.PL,  18 
Wash.Co.  179— McElfresh  v. 
O'Brien,  Com.PL,  18  Wash.Co.  114 
— Dunmire  v.  Fitzgerald,  Com.PL, 
27  West.Co.  223 — Zuliskey  v.  Pru- 
dential Ins.  Co.  of  America,  Com. 
PL,  27  West.Co.  173— Bittner  v. 
Greensboro  Gfcas  Co.,  Com.PL,  27 
West. Co.  129 — Shaffer  v.  Johnston, 
Com.PL,  23  West.Co.  67 — Richey  v. 
York  County  Nat.  Bank,  Com.PL, 
53  York  Leg.Rec.  145,  affirmed  15 
A.2d  737,  1«42  Pa.Super.  236. 

S.C. — Cooper  &  Griffin  v.  Bridwell, 
181  -S.E.  56,  177  S.C.  219. 

Tex. — Neyland  v.  Brown,  170  S.W.2d 
207,  141  Tex.  253,  modified  on  oth- 
er grounds  172  S.W.2d  89,  141  Tex. 
253 — Dallas  County  v.  Miller,  166 
S.W.2d  922,  140  Tex.  242— Rodri- 
guez v.  '  Higginbotham-Bailey-Lo- 
gan  Co.,  160  S.W.2d  234,  138  Tex. 
476 — Le  Master  v.  Fort  Worth 
Transit  Co.,  160  S.W.2d  224,  138 
Tex.  512 — Dickson  v.  Kilgore  State 
Bank,  Com.App.,  257  S.W.  867— 
Barrick  v.  Gillette,  Civ.App.,  187 
S.W.2d  683 — Texas  Prudential  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Kaighten,  Civ.App.,  186  S. 
W.2d  843— Ward  v.  Strickland,  Civ. 
App.,  177  S.W.2d  79,  error  refused 
— Shield  Co.  v.  Cartwright,  Civ, 

162 


App.,  172  S.W.2d  108,  affirmed  177 
S.W.2d   954,   142  Tex.  324— Warren 
v.    Schawe,    Civ.App.,    163    S.W.2d 
415,  error  refused — Happ  v.  Happ, 
Civ.App.,  160  S.W.2d  227,  error  re- 
fused— Curington    v.     Parks,     Civ. 
App.,    158    S.W.2d    839— Elkins    v, 
Super-Cold     'Southwest     Co.,     Civ. 
App.,   157  S.W.2d  946,  reversed  on 
other    grounds    Super-Cold    South- 
west Co.  v.  Elkins,  166  S.W.2d  97, 
140     Tex.     48— Carrell     v.     Dallas 
Railway  &  Terminal  Co.,  Civ.App., 
151    S.W.2d    869,    error    dismissed, 
judgment  correct — Walker  v.  Tex- 
as  &  N.   O.    R.   Co.,   Civ.App.,   150 
S.W.2d  853,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Citizens  State  Bank 
of  Houston  v.  Giles,  Civ.App.,  145 
S.W.2d      899,      error      dismissed — 
Marlett     v.     Brownfleld,     Civ.App., 
145  S.W.2d  636— Heath  v.  Elliston, 
Civ.App.,     145     S.W.2d     243,     error 
dismissed,  judgment  correct — Jus- 
tiss  v.  Naqiuin,   Civ.App.,   137  S.W. 
2d    72,    error   dismissed,    judgment 
correct — Dutton     v.     Kinsey,     Civ. 
App.,    124    S.W.2d    446— Whiteman 
v.     Harris,     Civ.App.,     123     S.W.2d 
699,     error    refused — McCray    Re- 
frigerator    Sales     Corporation     v. 
Johnson,  Civ.App.,  121  S.W.2d  410, 
error       dismissed — Thompson       v. 
Jones,     Civ.App.,    116     S.W.2d    778 
— Arnim    v.    Rauch,    Civ.App.,    113 
S.W.2d  699,  reversed  by  agreement 
— Clark  v.   Price,   Civ.App.,    112   S. 
W.2d  256,  error  dismissed — Draper 
v.    Presley,    Civ.App.,    Ill    S.W.2d 
1124,  error  dismissed — Robinson  v. 
Fort     Worth     Hospitals     Holding 
Corporation,    Civ.App.,    109    S.W.2d 
1077,   error   dismissed — Johnson  v. 
Moody,    Civ.App.,    104    S.W.2d   583, 
error      dismissed — McClendon      v. 
Southwestern    Life    Ins.    Co.,    Civ. 
App.,    98    S.W.2d    866 — Mitchell    v. 
Heard,    Civ.App.,    98    S.W.2d    832 — 
Duvall    v.   Kansas    City    Life    Ins. 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  96  S.W.2d  793,  modi- 
fied on  other  grounds  and  rehear- 
ing denied  104  S.W.2d  10,  affirmed 
Kansas  City  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Duv- 
all,  104   S.W.2d  11,  129   Tex.   287 — 
J.  S.  Curtiss  &  Co.  v.  White,  Civ. 
App.,    90   S.W.2d  1095.     Error  dis- 
missed   by    agreement — Joiner    v. 
Joiner,  Civ.App.,  87  S.W.2d  903,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  112  S.W. 
2d    1019,     131    Tex.     27— Amarillo 
Transfer    &    Storage    Co.     v.    De 
Shong,    Civ.App.,    82    S.W.2d    381- 
St.  Louis,  B.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lit- 
tle, Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  122— New- 
ton v.   McCarrick,   Civ.App.,   75    S. 
W.2d    472,    error    dismissed— Free- 
man v.  Schwenker,  Civ.App.,  73  S. 
W.2d    609 — Guinn    v.    Coates,    Civ. 
App.,    67   S.W.2d   621— White   Sew- 
ing Mach.  Co.   v.  Armstrong,   Civ. 
App.,     30    S.W.2d    362,    error    dis- 
missed— Schwabe  v.  Kemp  &  Cold- 
well,  Civ.App.,  20  S.W.2d  273,  error 
refused — Jopling    v.    Caldwell-De- 
genhardt,    Civ.App.,    292    S.W.    958, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Benton 


49    C.  J.  S.  JUDGMENTS  §  60 

plies  where  there  is  a  conflict  in  the  evidence,26  j  even  though  the  conflict  is  such  that  the  trial  court 


Land  Co.  v.  Jopling,  Com.App.,  300 
S.W.  28 — Lee  v.  Lewis,  Civ.App., 
287  S.W.  115,  affirmed,  Com.App., 
298  S.W.  408. 

Vt.— Collins  v.  Fogg,  8  A.2d  684,  110 
Vt  465— Northeastern  Nash  Auto- 
mobile Co.  v.  Bartlett,  136  A.  697, 
100  Vt.  246. 

Va. — -standard  Dredging  Co.  v.  Bar- 
nalla,  163  S.E.  367,  158  Va.  367. 
Wash.— Carlson  v,  Wolski,  147  P.2d 
291,  20  Wash.2d  323— Ballard  v. 
Yellow  Cab  Co.,  14-5  P.2d  1019,  20 
Wash.2d  67— Flyzik  v.  Travelers 
Ins.  Co.,  145  P.2d  539,  20  Wash.2d 
35 — Codd  v.  Westchester  Fire  Ins. 
Co.,  128  P.2d  968,  14  Wash.2d  600, 
151  A.L.R.  316— Briggs  v.  United 
Fruit  &  Produce,  119  P.2d  687,  11 
Wash.2d  466 — Griffin  v.  Cascade 
Theatres  Corporation,  117  P.2d  651, 
10  Wash.2d  574— Moen  v.  Chest- 
nut, 113  P.2d  1030,  9  Wash.2d  93 
— Corbaley  v.  Pierce  County,  74  P. 
2d  993,  192  Wash.  688— De  Nune 
v.  Tibbitts,  73  P.2d  521,  192  Wash. 
279— Caylor  v.  B.  C.  Motor 
Transp.,  71  P.2d  162,  191  Wash. 
365— Young  v.  Smith,  7  P.2d  1, 
166  Wash.  411— Beglinger  v. 
Shields,  2  P.2d  681,  164  Wash.  147 
— Fleming  v.  Buerkli,  293  P.  462, 
159  Wash.  460— Collins  v.  Barmon, 
260  P.  245,  145  Wash.  .383— Ton- 
Icon  v.  Small,  255  P.  1033,  143 
Wash.  665— Wimmer  v.  Parsons, 
251  P.  868,  141  Wash.  422— Lian 
v.  Huglen,  251  P.  585,  141  Wash. 
369— Stickney  v.  Congdon,  250  P. 
32,  140  Wash.  670— Blouen  v. 
Quimpere  Canning  Co.,  247  P.  940, 
139  Wash.  436— Bridgeport  State 
Bank  v.  Union  Warehouse  &  Mill- 
ing Co.,  242  P.  13,  137  Wash.  190— 
Hudson  v.  Pacific  Northwest  Trac- 
tion Co.,  238  P.  982,  136  Wash.  4— 
Heaton  v.  Smith,  235  P.  958,  134 
Wash.  450,  reheard  240  P.  362,  136 
Wash.  695 — Lydon  v.  Exchange 
Nat.  Bank,  235  P.  27,  134  Wash. 
188— Hansen  v.  Sandvik,  222  P.  205, 
128  Wash.  60— Metropolitan  Club  v. 
Massachusetts  Bonding  &  Insur- 
ance Co.,  220  P.  818,  127  Wash. 
320 — Rieper  v.  General  Cigar  Co., 
209  P.  849,  121  Wash.  427. 
Wis.— Wisconsin  Tel.  Co.  v.  Russell, 
7  N.W.2d  825,  242  Wis.  247— Per- 
kie  v.  Carolina  Ins.  Co.,  6  N.W.2d 
195,  241  Wis.  378— Cranston  v. 
Railway  Express  Agency,  297  N. 
W.  418,  237  Wis.  479— Koscuik  v. 
Sherf,  272  N.W.  8,  224  Wis.  217— 
.  Scory  v.  La  Fave,  254  N.W.  643, 
215  Wis.  21— Twist  v.  Minneapolis, 
St.  P.  &  S.  S.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  190  N. 
W.  449,  178  Wis.  613. 
33  C.J.  p  1184  note  49  M.  P  1185 

note  56. 
Test 

Respecting  sufficiency  of  evidence, 
test  whether  evidence  supports  ver- 
dict or  requires  granting  judgment 


non  obstante  veredicto  does  not  dif- 
fer perceptibly. — Maylink  v.  Minne- 
haha  Co-op.  Oil  Co.,  291  N.W.  572, 
67  S.D.  187— Wolff  v.  Stenger,  2-39  N. 
W.  181,  59  S.D.  231. 
Verdict  representing-  sum  admitted- 
ly  due 

Refusal  to  enter  judgment  not- 
withstanding verdict  for  plaintiff 
was  not  error  where  part  of  amount 
of  judgment  for  plaintiff  was  admit- 
ted by  defendant  to  represent  sum 
admittedly  due. — Commonwealth 
Trust  Co.  of  Pittsburgh  v.  Hachmei- 
ster  Lind  Co.,  181  A.  787,  320  Pa, 
233. 

In,  negligence  action  which  was 
tried  by  judge  without  a  jury,  where 
testimony  in  the  record  might  have 
supported  a  finding  of  negligence  of 
defendant  or  a  finding  that  plaintiff 
was  contributorily  negligent,  court 
in  bane  was  without  authority  to  en- 
ter judgment  non  obstante  veredic- 
to in  favor  of  plaintiff. — Moore  v.  W. 
J.  Gilmore  Drug  Co.,  200  A.  250,  131 
Pa. Super.  349. 

In  California 

(1)  The  right  of  the  trial  court  to 
render  a  judgment   notwithstanding 
the  verdict  is  the  same  as  its  right 
to  grant  a  nonsuit. — In  re   Green's 
Estate,   154  P.2d   692,   25   Cal.2d  535 
— Neel  v.   Mannings,   Inc.,   122   P.2d 
576,    19    CaUd    647— In   re   Arnold's 
Estate,    107    P.2d   25,    16    Cal.2d   573 
-^In  re  Finkler*s  Estate,  46  P.2d  149, 

3  Cal.2d     584— Ferran     v.     South- 
ern Pac.   Co.,   44   P.2d  533,   8   Cal.2d 
350— Card  v.  Boms,   291   P.   190,  210 
CaL    200— McKellar    v.    Pendergast, 
156    P.2d    950,    68    CaLApp.2d    485— 
Megee  v.   Fasulis,   134  P.2d   815,   57 
Cal.App.2d  275 — In  re  Hettermann's 
Estate,   119   P.2d   788,   48   Cal.App.2d 
363 — Van  Rennes  v.  Southern  Coun- 
ties Gtes  Co.  of  California,  113  P.2d 
238,    44    Cal.App.2d    880— Funari    v. 
Gravem-Inglis  Baking  Co.,   104  P.2d 
44,  40  Cal.App.2d  25— Hubbert  v.  Az- 
tec Brewing  Co.,  80  P.2d  185,  26  Cal. 
App.2d    664,    followed    in   Cerezo    v. 
Aztec  Brewing  Co.,   80   P.2d  198,   26 
CaLApp.2d  754,  and  rehearing  denied 
Hubbert  v.  Aztec  Brewing  Co.,  80  P. 
2d  1016,  26  Cal.App.2d  664— Myers  v. 
Southern   Pac.   Co.,    58   P.2d   387,   14 
Cal.App.2d  287,  hearing  denied,  Sup., 
59   P.2d  1001— Boysen  v.  Porter,   52 
P.2d  582,  10  Cal.App.2d  431— Tracey 
v.    L.   A.   Paving   Co.,   41    P.2d    942, 

4  Cal.App.2d     700— Kerby     v.     Elk 
Grove   Union  High   School  Dist.,   36 
P.2d  431,  1  Cal.App.'2d  246— Tomlin- 
son    v.    Kiramidjian,    24    P.2d    559, 
13-3  Cal.App.  418. 

(2)  It  may  not  render  such  judg- 
ment if  there  is  any  substantial  evi- 
dence  in   support   of  the   verdict.— 
Brandenburg  v.  Pacific  Gas  &  Blec. 
Co.,  165  P.2d  41,  169  P.2d  909 — Rice 
v.  California  Lutheran  Hospital,  163 

163 


P.2d  860 — In  re  Green's  Estate,  154 
P.2d  692,  25  Cal.2d  535— Gray  v. 
Southern  Pac.  Co..  135  P.2d  593,  145 
P.'2d  561,  23  Cal.2d  632— Neel  v.  Man- 
nings, Inc.,  122  P.2d  576,  19  Cal.2d 
647 — In  re  Arnold's  Estate,  107  P. 
2d  25,  16  Cal.2d  573 — Anderson  v. 
I.  M.  Jameson  Corporation,  59  P.2d 
962,  7  Cal.2d  60 — Ferran  v.  South- 
ern Pac.  Co.,  44  P.2d  533,  8  Cal.2d 
350— Card  v.  Boms,  291  P.  190,  210 
Cal.  200 — McKellar  v.  Pendergast, 
156  P.2d  950,  68  Cal.App.2d  485— 
Lenning  v.  Chiolo,  1«47  P.2d  410,  63 
CaLApp.2d  oil— Sunseri  v.  Dime 
Taxi  Corporation,  135  P.2d  654,  57 
Cal.App.2d  926 — Megee  v.  Fasulis, 
134  P.2d  815,  57  Cal.App.2d  275— 
Shannon  v.  Thomas,  134  P.2d  522, 
57  Cal.App.2d  187 — Gardner  v.  Mar- 
shall, 132  P.2d  833,  56  Cal.App.'2d 
62— Pease  v.  San  Diego  Unified 
School  Dist.,  128  P.2d  621,  54  Cal. 
App.2d  20— Matherne  v.  Los  Feliz 
Theatre,  128  P.2d  59,  53  Cal.App.2d 
660 — Turner  v.  Lischner,  126  P.'2d 
156,  52  Cal.App.2d  273— Silva  v.  Mar- 
ket St.  Ry.  Co.,  123  P.2d  904,  50 
Cal.App.2d  796— In  re  Shields'  Es- 
tate, 121  P.2d  795,  49  Cal.App.2d  293 
—In  re  Bucher's  Estate,  120  P.2d  44, 
48  Cal.App.2d  465 — In  re  Hetter- 
mann's Estate,  119  P.2d  788,  48  Cal. 
App.2d  263 — Van  Rennes  v.  South- 
ern Counties  Gas  Co.  of  California, 
113  P.2d  238,  44  Cal.App.2d  880— 
Funari  v.  Gravem-Inglis  Baking  Co., 
104  P.2d  44,  40  Cal.App.'2d  25— Page 
v.  Cudahy  Packing  Co.,  87  P.2d  913, 
31  Cal.App.-2d  282 — Francesconi  v. 
Belluomini,  83  P.2d  298,  28  CaLApp. 
2d  701— Collins  v.  Nelson,  61  P.2d 
479,  16  Cal.App.2d  535— In  re  Bar- 
ton's Estate,  60  P.2d  471,  16  CaLApp. 
2d  246,  motion  denied  67  P.2d  695, 
20  Cal.App.2d  648— Myers  v.  South- 
ern Pac.  Co.,  58  P.2d  387,  14  Cal. 
App.2d  -287,  hearing  denied,  Sup.,  59 
P.2d  1001 — Lam  Ong  v.  Pacific  Mo- 
tor Trucking  Co.,  51  P.2d  1112,  10 
Cal.App.2d  3*29— Tracey  v.  L.  A.  Pav- 
ing Co.,  41  P.2d  942,  4  Cal.App.2d 
700— Kerby  v.  Elk  Grove  Union  High 
School  Dist,  36  P.2d  431,  1  CaLApp. 
2d  246— Crone  v.  City  of  El  Cajon,  24 
P.2d  846,  133  CaLApp.  624— Tomlin- 
son  v.  Kiramidjian,  2:4  P.2d  559,  133 
CaLApp.  418 — Landers  v.  Crescent 
Creamery  Co.,  5  P/2d  934,  118  Cal. 
App.  707— Callahan  v.  Harm,  277  P. 
5«29,  98  CaLApp.  568—33  C.J.  p  143 
note  80 '[b]  (3). 

26.  U.'S. — Shane  v.  Commercial  Cas- 
ualty Ins.  Co.,  D.C.Pa.,  48  F.Supp. 
151,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  Shane  v.  Bar- 
ger,  152  F.2d  544— Boult  v.  Mary- 
land Casualty  Co.,  aC.A.Miss.,  Ill 
F.2d  257,  certiorari  denied  Mary- 
land Casualty  Co.  v.  Boult,  61  S. 
Ct  35,  311  U.S.  672,  85  L.Ed.  432. 
Cal. — Hunt  v.  United  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  291  P.  184,  210  Cal.  108— 
Leplat  v.  Raley  Wiles  Auto  Sales, 


I  60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


vould  be  justified  in  granting  a  new  trial  notwith- 
tending  it27  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  to 
leprive  the  court  of  the  right  to  exercise  the  power 
:o  grant  a  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding 
:he  verdict  there  need  not  be  an  absence  of  con- 
flict, but  there  must  be  a  substantial  conflict  in  the 
evidence,28  and  that  the  motion  may  be  granted 
where  the  evidence  is  such  that  it  is  clearly  insuffi- 
cient to  support  the  verdict.29 

(c)  Other  Matters 

A  Judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  will  not  be 
entered  where  a  motion  for  a  directed  verdict  was  prop- 
erly denied,  or  for  a  variance  or  failure  of  proof  which 
may  be  remedied  If  a  new  trial  is  granted,  or  where  it 
is  not  clear  that  the  moving  party  Is  entitled  to  judg- 
ment as  a  matter  of  law  on  the  merits,  or  because  the 
verdict  is  tainted  with  prejudice  or  caprice. 

A  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  will  not 
ordinarily  be  entered  where  a  motion  for  a  directed 


verdict  was  properly  denied,80  although  such  a 
judgment  may  be  granted  where  a  directed  verdict 
was  properly  denied  because  the  grounds  therefor 
were  not  sufficiently  stated.31  Furthermore,  it  has 
also  been  held  that  a  motion  for  such  a  judgment 
may  not  be  granted  after  the  trial  court  erroneously 
denied  a  motion  for  a  peremptory  instruction,32  al- 
though this  rule  does  not  apply  where  the  court  of 
its  own  motion  entered  a  peremptory  instruction  and 
did  not  overrule  a  motion  for  a  peremptory  instruc- 
tion.3^  A  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict 
will  not  be  granted  for  a  variance  unless  it  appears 
that  an  amendment  of  the  complaint  cannot  prop- 
erly be  made,34  or  for  a  failure  of  proof,  where  it 
reasonably  appears  that  the  defect  in  proof  can  be 
remedied  if  a  new  trial  is  granted,35  or  where  it  is 
not  clear  on  the  whole  record  that  the  moving- 
party  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law,  on 


145  P.2d  3!50,  S2  Cal.App.2d  6-28— 
Van  Rennes  v.  Southern  Counties 
Gas  Co.  of  California,  113  P.2d 
238,  44  Cal.App.2d  880— In  re  Bar- 
ton's Estate,  60  P.2d  471,  16  CaL 
App.2d  2»46,  motion  denied  67  P.2d 
695,  20  GaLApp.2d  648. 

Colo. — De  Boer  v.  Olmsted,  260  P. 
108,  82  Colo.  369. 

D.C.— McWilliams  v.  Shepard,  127  F. 
2d  18,  75  U.S.APP.D.C.  334. 

111. — Hirning  v.  Contracting  &  Mate- 
rial Co.,  38  N.E.2d  793,  312  Ill.ApP. 
655. 

Mich. — Malone  v.  Newhouse,  227  N. 
W.  750,  248  Mich.  516 — Freeman  v. 
Millen,  205  N.W.  122,  23-2  Mich. 
271, 

Minn.— Wright  v.  Post,  208  N.W. 
538,  167  Minn.  130. 

N.D. — Froemke  T.  Otter  Tail  Power 
Co.,  276  N.W.  146,  68  N.D.  7. 

Ohio.— Magyar  v.  Prudential  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  15  N.E.2d  144,  133 
Ohio  St.  563— Lent  v.  New  York, 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  44  N.E.2d  295, 
69  Ohio  App.  514— Nobles  v.  Tole- 
do Edison  Co.,  36  N.E.2d  995,  67 
Ohio  App.  414. 

Pa_jSefton  v.  Valley  Dairy  Co.,  28 
A.'2d  313,  34'5  Pa.  324— Hostetler 
v.  Kniseley,  185  A.  300,  322  Pa.  248 
— Johnson  v.  Staples,  5  A.2d  433, 
135  Pa.'Super.  274— Swartz  v.  Stein 
&  Levy,  78  Pa.Super.Ct  515 — Pres- 
ton v.  Schroeder,  Com.Pl.,  27  Del. 
Co.  "350 — Landis  v.  Conestoga 

.  Trartsp.  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  48  Lanc.Rev. 
481,  11  Som.  302,  affirmed  36  A.2d 
465,  349  Pa.  97 — Kuhn  v.  Cones- 
toga  Transp.  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  48  Lane. 
Rev.  491,  affirmed  Landis  v.  Cones- 
toga  Transp.  Co.,  36  A.2d  465,  3*49 
Pa.  97 — Freas  v.  Campbell,  Com. 
PL,  48  Lanc.Rev.  464— Hershko- 
witz  v.  Atlantic  Refining  Co.,  Com. 
PL,  32  Luz.Leg.Reg.  367 — John  v. 
Pittsburgh  Rys.  Co.,  Com.PL,  92 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  585,  affirmed  36  A. 


2d  818,  349  Pa.  159— Smolinsky  v. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  7 
Schuyl.Leg.Reg.  276,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  26  A.2d  131,  149  Pa. 
Super.  72. 

Wash.— Wilcox  v.  Hubbard,  282  P. 
218,  15<4  Wash.  344— Duggins  v. 
International  Motor  Transit  Co., 
280  P.  50,  153  Wash.  549— Crary  v. 
Coffin,  268  P.  881,  148  Wash.  287 
— Ticknor  v.  Seattle-Renton  Stage 
Line,  247  P.  1,  139  Wash.  354,  47 
A.L.R.  252. 

27.  CaL— Hunt    v.    United   Bank    & 
Trust  Co.,  291  P.  184,  210  Cal.  108 
— Van   Rennes  v.  Southern   Coun- 
ties Gas  Co.  of  California,  113  P. 
2d   238,    44    Cal.App.'2d   880— In   re 
Barton's   Estate,    60    P.2d   471,    16 
Cal.App.2d   246,    motion   denied    67 
P.2d    695,    20    Cal.App.2d    648. 

111. — Pope  v.  Illinois  Terminal  R. 
Co.,  67  N.E.2d  284,  329  HLApp.  62. 

28.  <Jal. — In  re  Smethurst's  Estate, 
59  P.2d  830,   15  Cal. App. 2 d  322. 

29.  CaL — In  re  Smethurst's  Estate, 
supra, 

30.  CaL— Locke   v.   Meline,   48  P.2d 
176,    8    Cal.App.2d    482— Tracey   v. 
L.   A.   Paving  Co.,   41   P.2d   942,   4 
Cal.App.2d  700. 

Md.— Alexander  v.  Tingle,  30  A.2d 
737,  181  Md.  464. 

Minn. — Farm  Mortgage  &  Loan  Co. 
v.  Pederson,  205  N.W.  286,  164 
Minn.  425 — O'Halloran  v.  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  Co'.,  195  N.W.  144,  156 
Minn.  471. 

N.D.— Ennis  v.  Retail  Merchants' 
Ass'n  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  156  N. 
W.  234,  33  N.D.  20. 

S.C. — Bohumir  Kryl  Symphony  Band 
v.  Allen  University,  12  S.E.2d  712, 
196  S.C,  175. 

Tex. — Barrett  v.  Commercial  Stand- 
ard Ins,  Co.,  Civ.App.,  145  S.W.2d 
815. 

164 


31.  CaL — In    re    Fleming's    Estate. 
2*51  P.  637,  199  Cal.  750. 

32.  Ky. — Roe  v.  Gentry's  Ex's,   162 
S.W.2d  208,  290  Ky.  598— Franklin 
Fire    Ins.    Co.    of    Philadelphia   v. 
Cook's    Adm'r,    287    S.W.    553,    21C 
Ky.  15— Baskett  v.  Coombs'  Adm'r, 
247   S.W.  1118,   198  Ky.  17. 

33  C.J.  p  1184   note  50   [a]    (4). 

33.  Ky.— Weikel   v.    Alt,    27    S.W.2<I 
684,  234  Ky.  91. 

34.  Ky.— Old    76    Distillery    Co.    v. 
Morris,  28  $.W.2d  474,  234  Ky.  389. 

Pa. — American  Products  Co.  of 
Pennsylvania  v.  Franklin  Quality 
Refining  Co.,  119  A,  414.  275  Pa. 
33'2. 

33  C.J.  p  1185  note  54. 
Manner  of  raising  question 

Fact  that  defendant  made  a  mo- 
tion for  nonsuit  and  later  a  motion 
for  binding  instructions,  where  nei- 
ther contained  any  reference  to  va- 
riance, did  not  entitle  defendant  to 
raise   question  of  variance  for  first 
time    on    motion    for   judgment   non 
obstante  veredicto,  since  such  ques- 
tion must  be  specifically  raised,   ei- 
ther when  evidence  is  offered,  when 
motion  for  nonsuit  is  made,  or  point 
for  binding  instruction  submitted. — 
Sipior  v.  U.  S.  .Glass  Co.,  200  A-  93S, 
132  Pa.'Super.  208. 
Variance  held  not  fatal 
Ky.— Old   76    Distillery  Co.   v.   Mor- 
ris,  28  S.W.2d  474,  234  Ky.  389. 
36.     Minn. — Kundiger    v.    Prudential 
Ins.  Co.  of  America,  17  N.W.2d  49, 
219    Minn.    25 — Anderson   v.    New- 
some,  258  N.W.  157,  193  Minn.  157 
— Knight    Soda    Fountain    Co.    v. 
Dirnberger,     256     N.W.     657,     192 
Minn.   387 — Dreelan  v.  Karon,   254 
N.W.     433,    191    Minn.     330— First 
Nat  Bank  v.  Fox,  «254  N.W.  8,  191 
Minn.  318 — Drake  v.  Connolly,  235 
N.W.   614,   183   Minn.   89— Manning 
y.  Chicago  Great  Western  R.  Co., 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


60 


the  merits,86  or  where  any  other  reason  exists  pre- 
cluding a  binding  direction.37  The  moving  party 
is  not  required  to  offer  evidence  in  order  to  com- 
plain, by  motion  for  judgment  non  obstante  vere- 
dicto,  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  support 
the  verdict.38  The  fact  that  a  verdict  is  tainted 
with  prejudice  or  caprice  does  not  authorize  a  trial 
court  to  substitute  its  fact  findings  for  the  tainted 
jury  verdict  and  render  judgment  accordingly.89 

(3)  Scope  of  Inquiry  in  General 
On   a   motion   based   on  the  evidence  for  judgment 


notwithstanding  the  verdict,  the  only  question  presented 
Is  whether  or  not  the  evidence  is  sufficient  to  Justify 
the  verdict  on  any  theory,  and  the  scope  of  Inquiry  does 
not  reach  other  matters. 

Where  the  trial  court  in  passing  on  a  motion  for 
judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  may  consider 
the  evidence,  the  scope  of  inquiry  on  such  a  motion 
does  not  reach  a  defect  in  the  pleadings,40  or  the 
court's  rulings  on  the  admission  and  rejection  of 
evidence,41  or  the  manner  and  form  in  which  issues 


229  N.W.  566,  179  Minn.  411— Gar- 
bisch  v.  American  By.  Express  Co., 
225  N.W.  432.  177  Minn.  494— 
Nadeau  v.  Maryland  Casualty  Co., 
212  N.W.  595,  170  Minn.  326— 
Schendel  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  210  N.W.  70,  168  Minn. 
15«2 — Herman  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co., 
189  N.W.  934,  153  Minn.  195. 

JJ.D. — Nelson  v.  Scherling,  300  N.W. 
803.  71  N^D.  337— Olstad  v.  Stock- 
growers  Credit  Corporation,  266  N. 
W.  109,  66  N.D.  416— Donahue  v. 
Boynton,  242  N.W.  530,  62  N.D. 
182. 

S.D. — Froke  v.  Watertown  Gas  Co., 
1  N.W.2d  590,  68  S.D.  266. 

Wyo.— Caldwell  v.  Roach,  12  P.2d 
376.  44  Wyo.  319. 

33  C.J.  P  1185  note  55. 

Rule  recognized  and  held  inapplica- 
ble to  particular  case 

Minn.— Clough  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  191  N.W.  923,  154 
Minn.  515. 

36.  Cal.— Tracey  v.  L.  A.  Paving 
Co..  41  P.2d  942,  4  Cal.App.2d  700. 

Ky.— Pope  v.  Upton,  186  S.W.*2d  900, 
299  Ky.  690. 

Minn. — Manning  v.  Chicago  Great 
Western  R.  Co.,  229  N.W.  566, 
179  Minn.  411 — Neumann  v.  Inter- 
state Power  Co.,  228  N.W.  342,  179 
Minn.  46— Arcadia  Park  Ass'n  v. 
Anderson,  225  N.W.  441,  177  Minn. 
487— Nadeau  v.  Maryland  Casualty 
Co.,-  212  N.W.  595,  170  Minn.  326. 

N.D.— Sax  Motor  Co.  v.  Mann,  10  N. 
W.2d  242,  72  N.D.  595— Armstrong 
v.  McDonald,  4  N.W.2d  191,  72  N. 
D.  28— Sax  Motor  Co.  v.  Mann, 
299  N.W.  691,  71  N.D.  221— Olstad 
v.  Stockgrowers  Credit  Corpora- 
tion. 266  N.W.  109,  66  N.D.  416— 
Donahue  v.  Boynton,  242  N.W.  530, 
62  N.D.  182— First  Sec.  Bank  v. 
Bagley  Elevator  Co.,  2-37  N.W.  648, 
212  N.D.  227— Sheffield  v.  Stone- 
Ordean-Wells  Co.,  190  N.W.  315, 
49  N.D.  142. 

Or.— Bach  v.  Chezem,  124  P.2d  710, 
168  Or.  535. 

Pa. — Devling  Bros.  v.  Horn,  188  A. 
347,  324  Pa.  481— Roberts  v.  Wash- 
ington Trust  Co.,  170  A.  291,  313 
Pa.  584,  certiorari  denied  54  S. 
Ct.  778,  292  U.S.  608,  78  LJSd. 
1469,  and  rehearing  denied  54  S.Ct. 


857,  '292  U.S.  613,  78  L.Ed.  14T2— 
Mitchell  v.  City  of  New  Castle, 
119  A.  485,  2T5  Pa,  426— Meehan 
v.  Shreveport-Eldorado  Pipe  Line 
Co.,  164  A.  364,  107  Pa.Super.  580 
—McDonald  v.  Eiler,  81  Pa.Super. 
172 — Del  Vecchio  v.  Greco,  80  Pa. 
Super.  423 — iShatz  v.  American  Ry. 
Express  Co.,  80  Pa.'Super.  335 — 
Kline  v.  Moyer.  Com.Pl.,  32  Berks 
Co.  100— Webb  v.  Hess,  Com.Pl., 
46  Dauph.0o.  84— Bowhall  v.  Wool- 
eyhan  Transport  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  29 
DeLCo.  314 — Arnold  v.  Tokheim, 
Com.Pl.,  21  Erie  Co.  146— Palmer 
v.  City  of  Erie,  Com.Pl.,  20  Erie 
Co.  400,  affirmed  9  A.2d  378,  337 
Pa.  5 — Supervisors  of  Manheim 
Tp.  v.  Workman,  Com.Pl.,  48  Lane. 
Rev.  362,  affirmed  Supervisors  of 
Manheim  Tp.,  Lancaster  County  v. 
Workman,  35  A.2d  283,  154  Pa. 
Super.  146 — Peoples  Sav.  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Nescopeck  M.  F.  I.  Co.,  Com. 
PL,  38  Luz.Leg.Reg.  139— Edwards 
v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  Com. 
PI.,  3'7  Luz.Leg.Reg.  257— Miners 
Sav.  Bank,  Pittston  v.  Pace,  Com. 
PI.,  37  Luz.Leg.Reg.  241— Scranton 
Electric  Co.  v.  School  Dist  of 
Avoca,  Com.Pl.,  37  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
179,  affirmed  37  A.2d  725,  155  Pa. 
Super.  270 — Rinkievich  v.  Sover- 
eign Camp,  W.  O.  W.,  Com.PL,  84 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  387— Diehl  v.  Central 
Printing  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  33  Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  430 — Sell  v.  Pahs,  Com.PL, 
58  Montg.Co.  372— Zurawski  v.  Tp. 
of  Upper  Merlon,  Com.Pl.,  54 
Montg.Co.  396 — Seier  v.  Brunner, 
Com.PL,  28  NorthXJo.  81— Skinner 
v.  Koehler,  Com.Pl.f  9-3  Pittsb.Leg. 
J.  347 — Lane  v.  Samuels,  Com.Pl., 
92  Pittsb.Leg.J.  494,  affirmed  39 
A.2d  626,  350  Pa.  446— Sells  v.  City 
of  Pittsburgh,  Com.PL,  91  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  479— Perrus  v.  Cudahy 
Packing  Co.,  Com^PL,  90  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  59*5 — Samber  v.  Hahn,  Com. 
PL,  90  Pittsb.Leg.J.  465 — Arrow 
Press  Corporation  v.  Allegheny 
County,  Com.Pl.,  90  Pittsb.Leg.J. 
37 — Cashok  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  89  Pittsb.Leg.J.  579— 
Rebel  v.  Standard  Sanitary  Mfg. 
Co.,  Com.Pl.,  89  Pittsb.Leg.J.  17, 
affirmed  16  A,2d  534,  340  Pa.  313 — 
McBride  v.  Ault,  Com.Pl.,  88 

165 


Pittsb.Leg.J.  439 — Barna  v.  United 
Russian  Orthodox  Brotherhood, 
Co.,  88  Pittsb.Leg.J.  245— Automo- 
bile Finance  Co.  v.  Anderson,  Com. 
PL,  27  WestCo.  227— Shaw  v.  Ma- 
lone,  Com.PL,  55  York  Leg.Rec. 
150 — Zinn  v.  Bentz,  Com.Pl.,  55 
Tork  Leg.Rec.  149 — Wlldwood 
Strand  Realty  Co.  v.  Skipper,  Com. 
PL,  '54  York  Leg.Rec.  131. 

S.D.— Mills  v.  Armstrong,  13  N.W. 
2d  726. 

Tex. — Graves  v.  Hartford  Accident  & 
Indemnity  Co.,  Iffl  S.W.2d  464,  138 
Tex.  589— Ward  v.  Strickland,  Civ. 
App.,  177  S.W.2d  79,  error  refused 
— Happ  v.  Happ,  Civ.App.,  160  S. 
W.2d  227,  error  refused — Corona 
Petroleum  Co.  v.  Jameson,  Civ. 
App.,  146  S.W.2d  512,  error  dis- 
missed, Judgment  correct — Kaiser 
v.  Newsom,  Civ.App.,  108  S.W.2d 
755,  error  dismissed — Amarillo 
Transfer  &  Storage  Co.  v.  De 
Shong,  Civ.App.,  82  S.W.2d  381. 

33  C.J.  p  1180  note  57. 

37.  pa.— Hostetler  v.   Knlseley,    185 
A.   500,    322    Pa.    248— Johnson    v. 
Staples,  5  A.2d  433,  135  Pa.Super. 
274. 

38.  Tex.— Universal    Life    &    Acci- 
dent Ins.  Co.  v.  Beaty,  Civ.App., 
177  S.W.2d  244. 

39.  Tex. — Happ   v.   Happ,    Civ.App., 
160  S.W.2d  227,  error  refused. 

40.  Idaho. — Helgeson  v.    Powell,    34 
P.2d  957,  54  Idaho  667. 

111. — Farmer  v.  Alton  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n,  13  N.E.2d  652.  294  111. 
App.  206. 

Tex.— Shaw  v.  Porter,  Civ.App.,  190 
'S.W.2d  396. 

41.  111.— Farmer  v.   Alton   Building 
&  Loan  Ass'n,  18  N.E.2d  652,  394 
IlLApp.  206. 

Mich. — Finch  v.  W.  R.  Roach  Co., 
295  N.W.  324,  295  Mich.  589. 

Pa.— Magaro  v.  Metropolitan  Edison 
Co.,  197  A.  550.  130  Pa.Super.  323 
— Ozanich  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  180  A.  67,  119  Pa.Super. 
52,  reargument  refused  and  sup- 
plemented 180  A.  576,  119  Pa.Su- 
per.  5-2— Koller  v.  Benecassa,  14 
Po.Dist  &  Co.  474,  22  Berks  Co. 
299— Stepanavage  v.  Gibbs,  Com. 
PL,  36  Berks  Co.  233,  58  York  Leg. 


60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


rere  submitted,42  or  the  question  whether  plain- 
iffs  were  persons  authorized  to  bring  the  suit,43 
T  questions  not  raised  at  the  trial,44  the  only  ques- 
ion  presented  being  whether  or  not  the  evidence 
s  sufficient  to  justify  the  verdict  on  any  theory.45 
V.  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  ver- 
lict  has  been  held,  in  effect,  to  review  the  court's 
Tiling  in  denying  a  motion  for  a  directed  verdict.46 
Jnder  some  statutes  it  has  been  held  that  the  mo- 
ion  must  be  based  on  pleadings  and  evidence,47 
ind  not  on  arguments  made  by  counsel  to  the  jury.48 
The  court  does   not  determine  questions   of  -fact 
based  on  disputed  evidence;49    it  merely  reviews 
the  whole  case  on  the  record  and  does  subsequently 
what  it  would  have  been  proper  to  do  under  a  re- 
quest for  a  binding  direction.50 

(4)  Consideration  of  Evidence  in  Passing  on 

Motion 
Where,   In   passing   on   a  motion  for  Judgment  not- 


withstanding the  verdict,  the  trial  court  may  consider 
the  evidence,  it  may  not  weigh  ail  the  evidence  of  both 
sides  or  judge  of  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses,  but 
must  give  to  the  successful  party  at  the  trial  the  bene- 
fit of  every  favorable  fact  and  inference  fairly  deducible 
from  the  testimony,  and  accept  the  evidence  tending  to 
support  the  verdict  as  true. 

Where,  in  passing  on  a  motion  for  judgment  not- 
withstanding the  verdict,  the  court  may  consider 
the  evidence,  it  is  required  to  be  governed  by  the 
rules  which  govern  it  in  passing  on  a  motion  for  a 
directed  verdict;51  such  motions  have  the  same  ef- 
fect,52 and  the  power  of  the  court  is  the  same  in 
both  cases.53  These  motions  present  only  a  ques- 
tion of  law  as  to  whether  or  not,  when  all  of  the 
evidence  is  considered,  together  with  all  reasonable 
inferences  from  it  in  its  aspect  most  favorable  to 
the  party  against  whom  the  motion  is  directed,  there 
is  a  total  failure  or  lack  of  evidence  to  prove  any 
necessary  element  of  his  case  ;54  and  all  reasonable 


Rec.   95 — Smyth  v.  Bluestone,  Co., 

88  Pittsb.Leg.J.  597. 
Tex. — Shaw  v.  Porter,   Civ.App.,   190 

S.W.2d  -396. 
33  C.J.  p  1183  note  47  [b].  • 

Error  in  permitting-  plaintiff  to  re- 
fresh his  memory  from  records  made 
by  his  employees  before  testifying 
was  held  not  ground  for  judgment 
for  defendant  notwithstanding  ver- 
dict for  plaintiff. — Gordon  v.  Bliz- 
ard,  163  A.  43,  106  Pa.Super.  112. 

42.  Tex. — Griffay    v.    Bobbins,    Civ. 
App.,    91    S.W.2d    1160,    error   dis- 
missed. 

43.  Tex. — Chalmers    v.    Gumm,    154 
S.W.2d  640,  137  Tex.  467. 

44.  Pa. — Bowhall       v.       Wooleyhan 
Transport  Co.,  Com.Pl.t  29  Del.Co. 
-314 — Renfro  v.  Smith,  52  York  45, 
affirmed    7   A.2d    7,    135    Pa.Super. 
S78. 

Defense  of  laches  and  waiver 
could  not  be  raised  for  first  time  in 
defendants'  motion  for  Judgment 
non  obstante  veredicto. — Mesh  v. 
Citrin,  300  N.W.  870,  299  Mich.  527. 
Ultra  vires  contract 

Claim  made  for  first  time  on  mo- 
tion for  judgment  notwithstanding 
the  verdict  that  alleged  contract  was 
ultra  vires  was  held  not  entitled  to 
be  considered. — Yakiraa.  Fruit  Grow- 
ers' Ass'n  v.  Hall,  40  P.2d  123,  180 
Wash.  365. 

45.  Minn. — Fink    v.    Northern    Pac. 
Ry.   Co.,    203    N.W.   47,    162    Minn. 
365. 

Particular  questions  raised 

<1)  Where  seller's  action  against 
corporation  for  purchase  price  of 
goods  allegedly  bought  by  corpora- 
tion's agent  without  authority  was 
submitted  to  the  jury  solely  on  Ques- 
tion of  ratification,  corporation's  mo- 
tion for  judgment  notwithstanding! 


verdict  for  seller  raised  the  ques- 
tions both  of  ratification  and  of  es- 
toppel.— Cudahy  Bros.  Co.  v.  West 
Michigan  Dock  &  Market  Corpora- 
tion, 280  N.W.  93,  285  Mich.  18. 

(2)  Where  violation  of  statute 
respecting  automobile  lights  was  in- 
volved, but  no  calendars  were  of- 
fered in  evidence,  court,  on  motion 
for  judgment  non  obstante  vere- 
dicto, could,  in  Its  discretion,  permit 
question  whether  or  not  accident  oc- 
curred within  hour  after  sunset  to 
be  raised.-^-Kovalchik  v.  Demo,  94 
Pa/Super.  167. 

46.  N.D. — Bormann  v.   Beckman,   19 
N.W.2d  455,  73  N.D.  720— Olson  v. 
Ottertail  Power  Co.,  256  N.W.  246, 
65  N.D.  46,  95  A.L.R.  418— Ennis  v. 
Retail  Merchants'  Ass'n  Mut  Fire 
Ins.  Co.,  156  N.W.  234,  33  N.D.  20. 

47.  Pa. — Brown  v.   George,   25  A.2d 
691,  344  Pa.  399. 

48.  Pa. — Brown    v.    George,    supra. 

49.  Pa. — Hostetler  v.   Kniseley,   185 
A.  300,  322  Pa.  248. 

BO.  Pa. — Hostetler  v.  Kniseley,  su- 
pra. 

51.  OIL— Neering  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  50  N.E.2d  497,  383  111.  366, 
mandate  conformed  to  53  N.B.2d 
271,  321  IlLApp.  625— Merlo  v. 
Public  Service  Co.  of  Northern  Il- 
linois, 45  N.B.2d  66-5,  381  111.  300, 
followed  in  45  N.E.2d  677,  381  111. 
336— In  re  Klockowski's  Estate,  58 
N.E.2d  250,  324  IlLApp.  523— Berg 
v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  55  N. 
E.2d  -394,  323  IlLApp.  221,  affirmed 
62  N.E.2d  676,  391  111.  52— Kre- 
ger  v.  George  W.  Diener  Mfg.  Co., 
53  N.E.2d  26,  321  IlLApp.  302— 
Periolet  v.  City  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  Chicago,  53  N.E.2d  22,  321 
IlLApp.  303— Carrell  v.  New  York 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  47  N.E.2d  130,  317  j 

166 


IlLApp.  481,  affirmed  52  N.E.2d 
201,  384  111..  599— Sturgeon  v. 
Quarton,  44  N.E.2d  766,  316  111. 
App.  308 — Kaznowski  v.  City  of 
La  Salle,  43  N.E.2d  852,  316  111. 
App.  115 — Baker  v.  Granite  City, 
37  N.E.2d  -372,  311  IlLApp.  586— 
Geiselman  v.  •Strubhar,  23  N.E.2d 
383.  302  IlLApp.  23— Scherb  v. 
Randolph  Wells  Auto  Park,  22  N. 
E.2d  796,  301  IlLApp.  298— Le 
Menager  v.  Northwestern  Steel  & 
Wire  Co.,  22  N.E.2d  710,  301  111. 
App.  260 — Oliver  v.  Kelley,  21  N.E. 
2d  649,  300  IlLApp.  487— Boyda 
Dairy  Co.  v.  Continental  Casualty 
Co.,  20  N.E.2d  339,  299  IlLApp.  469 
—Wells  v.  Wise,  18  N.E.2d  750, 
298  IlLApp.  252— Emge  v.  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  17  N.E.2d  612,  297 
IlLApp.  344 — Farmer  v.  Alton 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  13  N.E.2d 
652,  294  IlLApp.  206— Gardiner  v. 
Richardson,  11  N.E.2d  m,  293 
IlLApp.  40— Illinois  Tuberculosis 
Ass'n  v.  Springfield  Marine  Bank, 
282  IlLApp.  14. 

52.  111.— Tidholm  v.  Tidholm,   62  N. 
E.2d  473,  391  111.  19— Weinstein  v. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.   Co.,    60   N. 
E.2d    207,     389    111.    571— Hunt    v. 
Vermilion        County        Children's 
Home,  44  N.B.2d  609,  381  111.  29 — 
Christensen  v.  Frankland,  58  N.E. 
2d  289,  32»4  IlLApp.  391— Larimore 
v.  Larimore,  '20  N.E.2d  902,  299  111. 
App.  547. 

Ohio. — J.  &  F.  Harig  Co.  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati,  22  N.E.2d  540,  61  Ohio 
App.  314. 

53.  111.— Merlo  v.  Public  Service  Co. 
of  Northern  Illinois,  45  N.E.2d  66'5, 
381    111.    300,   followed   in   45   N.E. 
2d  677,  381  111.  336. 

54.  111.— Berg  v.  New  York  Cent.  R. 
Co.,    62    N.E.2d    676,    391    111.    52 — 
Weinstein    v.     Metropolitan     Life 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


60 


doubts  must  be  resolved  in  favor  of  the  verdict.55 
Thus,  in  passing  on  the  motion,  the  trial  court  may 
not  weigh  all  the  evidence  of  both  sides  or  judge 
,of  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses,  as  it  may  do  on 
a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  but  must  give  to  the  suc- 


cessful party  at  the  trial  the  benefit  of  every  fa- 
vorable fact  and  inference  fairly  deducible  from 
the  testimony,  and  accept  the  evidence  tending  to 
support  the  verdict  as  true,56  unless  on  the  face  of 


Ins.  Co.,  60  N.E.2d  207,  389  111.  i 
571— Millikin  Nat  Bank  of  Deca- 
tur  v.  Shellatoarger  Grain  Prod- 
ucts Co.,  58  N.B.2d  892,  -389  111. 
196,  conformed  to  61  N.B.2d  589, 

326  IlLApp.     72 — Todd    v.     S.     S. 
Kresge    Co.,     52    N.B.2d    206,    384 
111.    524 — Neeringf  v.  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  50  N.B.2d  497,  -383  111.  366, 
mandate   conformed   to   53   N.B.2d 
271,   321   IlLApp.    625— Knudson  v. 
Knudson,    46   N.E.2d  1011,   382   111. 
492 — Merlo    v.    Public   Service   Co. 
of  Northern  Illinois,  45  N.E.2d  665, 
381  111.   300,  followed  in  4'5  N.E.2d 
C77,  381  111.  336— Walaite  v.  Chica- 
go, R.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  33  N.B.2d  119, 
376     111.     59 — Froehler    v.     North 
American  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Chicago, 
27    N.E.2d    833,    374    111.    17— Car- 
rell  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  52 
N.E,2d  201,  3-48  111.  599— Anderson 
v.  Krancic,  66  N.E.2d  316,  328  111. 
App.  364 — Yordy  v.  Farmers  Auto. 
Ins.  Ass'n,   65  N.E.2d  619,   328  111. 
App.  312 — De  Leuw,  Gather  &  Co. 
v.    City   of   Joliet,    64   N.E.2d   779, 

327  IlLApp.       4'53 — Huffman      v. 
Gould,    64  N.B.'2d  773,   327  IlLApp. 
428 — Dickinson    v.    Rockford    Van 
Orman   Hotel   Co.,    63   N.E.2d   257, 
326  IlLApp.  686— Hedden  v.  Farm- 
ers  Mut.   Re-Ins.   Co.   of  Chicago, 
111.,  60  N.E.2d  110,  325  IlLApp.  335 
— Wilkerson   v.    Cummings,    58   N. 
E.2d    280,    324    IlLApp.   -331— In    re 
Klockowski's     Estate,     58     N.B.2d 
250,  324  IlLApp.  523— Ebert  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  58  NJE.Sd  198,  324  X1L 
App.      815— Belcher     v.      Citizens 
Coach  Co.,  57  N.E.2d  659,  32'4  I1L 
App.  226 — Van  Hoorebecke  v.  Iowa 
Illinois  Gas  &  Electric  Co.,  57  N. 
E.2d  652,  324  IlLApp.  88— Hauck  v, 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Highland  Park, 
55    N.E.2d    565,    323   IlLApp.    300— 
Paolinelli  v.  Dainty  Foods  Manu- 
facturers,   54   N.E.2d   759,    322   I1L 
App.  586— Fitch  v.  Thomson,  54  N. 
E.2d  6'23,  322  IlLApp.  703— Bone  v, 
Publix   Great  States  Theatres,   54 
N.E.2d  98,  322  IlLApp.  178— GUI  v. 
Lewin,   53  N.E.2d  -336,  321  IlLApp. 
633 — Gomez   v.    Rosenblatt,    53    N. 
E.2d  279,  321  IlLApp.  631— Leif  v. 
Fleming,    52    N.E.2d    606,    321    I1L 
App.  297 — Collins  v.  City  of  Chica- 
go, 6'2  N.E.2d  473,  321  IlLApp.  73— 
Kouba  v.  City  of  Chicago,  51  N.E. 
2d    617,    320    IlLApp.    435— Best   v, 
Mid-West    Const    Corporation,    50 
N.E.2d     867,      320     IlLApp.     341— 
Campbell  v.  Goldblatt  Bros.,  49  N. 

%  E.2d  817,  820  IlLApp.  138— Hansen 
v.  Henrici's  Inc.,  49  N.E.2d  737,  319 
IlLApp.  458 — Egner  v.  Fruit  Belt 
Service  Co.,  47  N.E.2d  486,  318  111. 
App.  87— Schwickrath  v.  Lowden, 


46  N.E.2d  162,  317  IlLApp.  431— 
Zwierzycki  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  4'5  N.E.2d  76,  316  IlLApp. 
345— Gordon  v.  Peters,  39  N.E.2d 
680,  313  IlLApp.  261 — Crump  v. 
Montgomery  Ward  &  Co.,  39  X.E. 
2d  411,  313  IlLApp.  151— Morris  v. 
Silver,  38  N.E.2d  840,  312  IlLApp. 
472— Baker  v.  Granite  City,  37  N. 
E.2d  372,  311  IlLApp.  5S6— Reed  v. 
Lyford,  36  N.E.2d  610,  311  IlLApp. 
486 — Brumit  v.  Wasson,  33  N.E.2d 
740,  310  IlLApp.  264— Herb  v.  Pit- 
cairn,  29  N.E.2d  543,  306  IlLApp. 
583,  reversed  on  other  grounds  36 
N.E.2d  555,  377  111.  405— Russell  v. 
Richardson,  24  N.E.2d  185,  302  111. 
App.  589— Scherb  v.  Randolph 
Wells  Auto  Park,  22  N.E.2d  796, 
801  IlLApp.  298— Larimore  v.  Lar- 
imore,  20  N.E.2d  902,  299  IlLApp. 
547— Wells  v.  Wise,  18  N.E.2d  750, 
298  IlLApp.  252— Malewski  v. 
Mackiewich,  282  IlLApp.  593. 

55.  Minn.— Solberg    v.    Minneapolis 
St.    Ry.    Co.,    7    N.W.2d    926,    214 
Minn.  274. 

56.  U.S. — Palmer  v.  Moren,  D.C.Pa., 
44  F.Supp.  704. 

CaL— Brandenburg  v.  Pacific  Gas  & 
Elec.  Co.,  169  P.2d  909— In  re 
Green's  Estate,  154  P.2d  692,  25 
Cal.2d  .535— Neel  v.  Mannings,  Inc., 
122  P.2d  576,  19  Cal.2d  647— Fer- 
ran  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  44  P.2d 
533,  3  Cal.2d  350— McKellar  v. 
Pendergast,  156  P.2d  950,  68  CaL 
App.2d  485— Shannon  v.  Thomas, 
13>4  P.2d  522,  -57  Cal.App.2d  187— 
Gardner  v.  Marshall,  132  P.2d  833, 
56  Cal.App.2d  62— Pease  v.  San 
Diego  Unified  School  Dist.,  128  P. 
2d  621,  54  Cal.App.2d  20— Math- 
erne  v.  Los  Feliz  Theatre,  128  P.2d 
59,  53  Cal.App.2d  660 — Turner 
Lischner,  126  P.2d  156,  52  CaLApp. 
2d  273 — In  re  Bucher's  Estate,'  120 
P.2d  44,  48  CaLApp.2d  465— In  re 
Hettermann's  Estate,  119  P.2d  788, 
48  CaLApp.2d  263 — Van  Rennes  v. 
Southern  Counties  Gas  Co.  of  Cal- 
ifornia, 113  P.2d  238,  44  CaLApp. 
2d  880 — Bage  v.  Cudahy  Packing 
Co.,  87  P.2d  913,  31  CaLApp.2d  282 
—In  re  Barton's  Estate,  60  P.2d 
4T1,  16  Cal.App.2d  246,  motion  de- 
nied 67  P.2d  695,  20  Cal.App.2d  648 
— In  re  Smethurst's  Estate,  59  P. 
2d  830,  15  CaLApP.2d  322— Myers 
v.  -Southern  Pac.  Co.,  58  P.2d  387, 
14  Cal.App.2d  287,  hearing  denied 
Sup.,  59  P.2d  1001— Lam  Ong  v 
Pacific  Motor  Trucking  Co.,  51  P 
2d  '1112,  10  Cal.App.2d  329— Smyth 
.v.  Harris  &  Devine,  38  P.2d  862,  3 
CaLApp.2d  194— Kerby  v.  Elk 

167 


Grove  Union  High  School  Dist.r  S6 
P.2d  431,  1  CaLApp.2d  2*46. 

Idaho.— Carson  v.  Talbot,  129  P.2d 
901,  64  Idaho  198— Stearns  v. 
Graves.  Ill  P.2d  882,  62  Idaho  312 
— Hobbs  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  108 
P.2d  841,  62  Idaho  58 — Manion  v. 
Waybright,  86  P.2d  181,  59  Idaho 
643— Hendrix  v.  City  of  Twin 
Falls,  29  P.2d  352,  54  Idaho  130. 

HI.— Osborn  v.  Leuffgen,  45  N.E.2d 
622,  381  111.  295 — Pope  v.  Illinois 
Terminal  R.  Co.,  67  N.E.2d  284, 
329  IlLApp.  62— Berg  v.  New  York 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  55  N.E.2d  394,  323 
IlLApp.  221,  affirmed  62  N.E.2d 
676,  391  111.  52— Collins  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  52  N.E.2d  473,  321  HI. 
App.  73— Gill  v.  Lewin,  53  N.E.2d 

336,  321     IlLApp.     633 — Guess     v. 
New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  49  N.E.2d 
652,   319   IlLApp.    522— Jacobsen  v. 
Cummings,  48  N.E.2d  603,  318  111. 
App.  464 — Freeman  v.  Leader  Mer- 
cantile Co.,  40  NJE.2d  5148,   313  111. 
App.    652— Baker  v.   Granite    City, 
37    N.E.2d    372,    311    IlLApp.    586— 
Gnat  v.  Richardson,  35  N.E.2d  409. 
311  IlLApp.  242,  affirmed  39  N.E.2d 

337,  378  111.  626— Partridge  v.  En- 
terprise   Transfer    Co.,    30    N.E.2d 
947,    307   IlLApp.   386— Goodrich  v. 
Sprague,    26    N.E.2d    884,    304    111. 
App.      556,      reversed      on      other 
grounds    Sprague   v.    Goodrich,    32 
N.E.2d   897,   376  111.   80 — Cooper  v. 
Safeway  Lines,  26  N.E.2d  632,  304 
IlLApp.    302 — Geiselman   v.    Strub- 
har,  23  N.E.2d  383,  302  IlLApp.  23 
— Le     Menager     v.     Northwestern 
Steel   &  Wire   Co.,   22   N.E.2d  710, 
301   IlLApp.   260— Ruzgis  v.   Rich- 
ardson, 14  N.E.2d  968,  295  IlLApp. 
376— Gardiner  v.  Richardson,  11  N. 
E.2d     824,     293     IlLApp.     40— Mc- 
Carthy   v.    Rorrison,    283    IlLApp. 
129. 

Mich.— Jacob  v.  Gratiot  Central 
Market  .Co.,  255  N.W.  331,  267 
Mich.  262— West  v.  Detroit  Ter- 
minal R.  R.,  201  N.W.  955,  229 
Mich.  590— Butzin  v.  Bonk,  6  N. 
W.2d  765,  303  Mich.  522— Neesley  . 
v.  Lord,  297  N.W.  226,  297  Mich. 
163— Dzikowski  v.  Michigan  Cent 
R.  R.,  276  N.W.  470,  282  Mich.  337. 

Minn. — Johnson  v.  Evanski,  22  N.W. 
2d  213— Kundiger  v.  Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  15  N.W.2d  487,  218 
Minn.  273— Solberg  v.  Minneapolis 
St.  Ry.  Co.,  7  N.W.2d  926,  214 
Minn.  274 — Goldfine  v.  Johnson, 
2914  N.W.  459,  208  Minn.  449— 
Fredrickson  v.  Arrowhead  Co-op. 
Creamery  Ass'n,  277  N.W.  345,  202 
Minn.  12 — Mardorf  v.  Duluth-Su- 
perior  Transit  Co.,  261  N.W.  177, 
194  Minn.  637 — Thorn  v.  Northern 


§60 

Pac.    Ry.   Co.,    252   N.W.    660,   190 
Minn.  622. 

N" .D.— Nelson  v.  'Scherling,  300  N.W. 
803,  71  N.D.  337— La  Bree  v.  Dako- 
ta Tractor  &  Equipment  Co.,  288 
N.W.  476,  69  N.D.  561 — Olstad  v. 
Stockgrowers  Credit  Corporation, 
266  N.W.  109,  66  N.D.  416. 

Pa. — In  re  Stewart's  Estate,  47  A. 
2d  204 — Chidester  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
burgh, '47  A.2d  130— Heenan  v. 
Kelly,  46  A.2d  229,  359  Pa.  549— 
Luckenbaugh  v.  Haughawout,  46 
A.2d  163,  353  Pa.  528— Holstein  v. 
Kroger  Grocery  &  Baking  Co.,  34 
A.2d  491,  348  Pa.  183— Ashworth 
v.  Hannum,  32  A.2d  407,  3'47  Pa. 
393— Earll  v.  Wichser,  30  A.2d  803, 
346  Pa.  357— Rea  v.  Pittsburgh 
Rys.  Co.,  25  A.2d  730,  344  Pa.  421 
— Wascavage  v.  Susauehanna  Col- 
lieries Co.,  23  A.2d  509,  343  Pa. 
529— Wuerfel  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  22  A.2d  747,  3*43  Pa,  291 
— Snyderwine  v.  McGrath,  22  A.2d 
644,  343  Pa.  245— Mamie  v.  Pitts- 
burgh &  W.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  19  A.23 
404,  3*41  Pa.  4S6— Sorrentino  v. 
Graziano,  17  A.2d  373,  341  Pa.  113 
—Usher  v.  Pittsburgh  &  L.  E.  R. 
Co.,  16  A.2d  387,  340  Pa.  234— 
Hardiman  v.  Pittsburgh  Rys.  Co., 
14  A.2d  72,  339  Pa.  79— Welch  v. 
Sultez,  13  A.2d  399.  338  Pa.  583— 
lacovino  v.  Caterino,  2  A.2d  828, 
332  Pa.  556 — Lanciano  v.  Brown,  1 
.4.2d  246,  331  Pa.  497 — Derr  v. 
Rich,  200  A.  599,  331  Pa.  502— 
Shoemaker  v.  Williams,  200  A.  255, 
131  Pa.Super.  546— Carter  v.  Pitts- 
burgh Rys.  Co.,  194  A.  900,  327  Pa, 
586— Kline  v.  Moyer,  191  A.  43, 
325  Pa.  357,  111  A.L.R.  406— Delair 
v.  McAdoo,  1SS  A.  181,  324  Pa.  3 
— Vetter  v.  Great  Atlantic  &  Pa- 
cific Tea  Co.,  185  A.  613,  322  Pa. 
4-49 — O'Farrell  v.  Mawson,  182  A. 
538,  320  Pa.  31 C— Texas  Co. 
Bituminous  Service  Co.,  177  A. 
763,  318  Pa.  34— Haverkamp  v. 
Sussman,  176  A.  206,  317  Pa.  187— 
Bowman  v.  Press  Pub.  Co.,  175  A. 
483,  316  Pa.  631— Graff  v.  Scott 
Bros.,  172  A.  659,  315  Pa.  262— 
Christ  v.  Hill  Metal  &  Roofing  Co., 
171  A.  607,  514  Pa.  375— Kulka  v. 
Nemirovsky,  170  A.  261,  314  Pa, 
134 — Ferguson  v.  Charis,  170  A. 
131,  313  Pa.  164— Conley  v.  Sim- 
mons, 167  A.  575,  312  Pa.  249 — 
McCracken  v.  Curwensville  Bor- 
ough, 163  A.  217,  309  Pa.  98,  86 
A.L.R.  1379— Vlasich  v.  Baltimore 
&  O,  R.  Co.,  161  A.  70,  307  Pa.  255 
— Hawk  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
160  A.  862,  307  Pa.  214— Adams  v. 
Gardiner,  160  A.  589,  306  Pa.  576— 
Lasater  v.  Conestoga  Traction 
Co.,  160  A.  447,  306  Pa.  500— Si- 
mon v.  Philadelphia  Rapid  Transit 
Co.,  160  A.  Ill,  306  Pa.  466— Rod- 
gers  v.  Saxton,  158  A.  166,  305  Pa. 
479,  80  A.L.R.  280— Unterreiner  v. 
Borough  of  Turtle  Creek,  157  A. 
682,  305  Pa.  341— Galliano  v.  East 
Penn  Electric  Co.,  l&i  A.  805,  803 


JUDGMENTS 

Pa.  498— Sollenberger  Y.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.,  139  A.  127,  290  Pa. 
415— Roberts  v.  Freihofer  Baking 
Co.,  129  A.  574,  283  Pa.  '573— Mar- 
do  v.  Valley  Smokeless  Coal  Co., 
123  A.  779,  279  Pa.  209 — Kuneck  v. 
Conti,  121  A.  324,  277  Pa.  455— 
Kreuer  v.  Union  Nat.  Bank  of  Mc- 
Keesport,  119  A.  921,  276  Pa.  201— 
Davis  v.  Carroll-Porter  Boiler  & 
Tank  Co.,  119  A.  742,  276  Pa.  71— 
Vunak  v.  Walters,  43  A.2d  536,  157 
Pa.Super.  660 — Hindes  v.  City  of 
Pittsburgh,  38  A.2d  420,  155  Pa. 
Super.  314— Weismiller  v.  Farrell, 
34  A.2d  45,  153  Pa.Super.  366— 
Blair,  to  Use  of  Davis,  v.  Adam- 
chick,  21  A.2d  107,  145  Pa.Super. 
125— Steingart  v.  'Kaney,  19  A.2d 
499,  14'4  Pa.Super.  534— Adams  v. 
Armour  &  Co.,  16  A.2d  142,  142  Pa. 
"Super.  280 — Roncace  v.  Welsh,  14 
A.2d  616,  141  Pa.Super.  170— Mc- 
Candless  v.  Krut,  14  A.2d  181,  140 
Pa.Super.  183 — Frumkin  v.  Mayer, 
11  A.2d  767,  139  Pa.'Super.  139— 
Pfeiffer  v.  Kraske,  11  A.2d  555,  139 
Pa.Super.  92— Acton  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania-Reading Seashore  Lines, 
11  A.2d  203,  138  Pa.Super.  605 — 
Korenkiewicz  v.  Tork  Motor  Ex- 
press Co.,  10  A.2d  864,  138  Pa.Su- 
per.  210 — Bollver  v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia, 9  A.2d  193,  137  Pa.Super. 
437 — Adams  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  7  A.2d  544,  136  Pa.Super. 
454— Mitchell  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
7  A.2d  513,  136  Pa.Super.  467— 
Moore  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  7 
A.2d  162,  136  Pa.Super.  182— John- 
son v.  Staples,  5  A.2d  433,  135  Pa. 
"Super.  274 — Bateman  v.  Zorocoff, 
2  A.2d  574,  133  Pa.Super.  245— 
Pellegrini  v.  Coll,  2  A.2d  491,  133 
pa.Super.  294 — Marron  v.  Elm- 
quist,  200  A.  207,  132  PaJSuper.  12 
— Ross  v.  Pennsylvania  Under- 
writers Co.,  187  A.  62,  123  Pa.Su- 
per. 484 — Kovacs  v.  AJhar,  196  A. 
876,  130  Pa.Super.  149 — laquinto  v. 
Notarfrancesco,  195  A.  169,  129  Pa. 
Super.  121 — O'Brien  v.  Borough  of 
Jeannette,  194  A.  314,  128  Pa.Su- 
per. 443 — Peters  v.  Colonial  Life 
Ins.  Co.  of  America,  193  A,  460, 
128  Pa.Super.  21— Kreiu  v.  Stei- 
gerwald,  193  A.  390,  128  Pa.Super. 
51 — Fox  v.  Shoemaker,  193  A.  353, 
127  Pa.Super.  264 — McDonough  v. 
Borough  of  Munhall,  193  A.  326, 
127  Pa.Super.  226,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  200  A.  638,  331  Pa.  468 
—Bradley  v.  Rhodes,  188  A.  564, 
124  Pa,Super.  161— Hahn  v.  Ander- 
son, 187  A.  4'50,  123  Pa.Super.  442, 
modified  on  other  grounds  192  A. 
489,  326  Pa,  463— Lessy  v.  Great 
Atlantic  &  Pacific  Tea  Co.,  183  A. 
657,  121  Pa.'Super.  440— Morris  v. 
Kauffman,  182  A.  758,  120  Pa.Su- 
per. 515 — Hummel  v.  Quaker  City 
Cabs,  182  A.  658,  120  Pa.Super.  527 
— Kaminski  v.  Bradley,  182  A.  150, 
120  Pa.Super.  297 — Ford  v.  Rein- 
oehl,  182  A.  120,  120  Pa.Super.  285 
— Lawrence  v.  Winterbottom,  181 

168 


49    C.J.S. 

A.  852,  120  Pa.Super.  292 — Ander- 
son v.  Supplee  Wills  Jones  Milk 
Co.,  181  A.  368,  119  Pa.Super.  386— 
Martinez  v.  Pinkasiewicz,  180  A. 
153,  118  PaJSuper.  200— Kissinger 
v.  Pittsburgh  Rys.  Co..  180  A.  137, 
119  Pa.Super.  110— Young  v.  Yel- 
low Cab  Co.,  180  A.  63,  118  Pa. 
Super.  495— Zoeller  v.  Smallstig, 
179  A.  755,  118  Pa.Super.  265— 
Woodsum  v.  City  of  McKeesport, 
179  A.  891,  118  Pa.Super.  205— 
Dunn  v.  Dunn,  179  A.  795,  118  Pa. 
Super.  533 — James  v.  Columbia 
County  Agricultural,  Horticultural 
&  Mechanical  Ass'n,  178  A.  326,  117 
Pa.Super.  2*77,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  184  A.  447,  321  Pa.  465— 
McDougall  v.  Schaab,  178  A.  168, 
117  Pa.Super.  285— Magri  v.  Mc- 
Curdy,  177  A.  349,  117  Pa.Super. 
32— Haas  v.  Fitzpatrick,  177  A. 
326,  117  Pa.Super.  21— Smallberger 
v.  Carroll,  176  A.  867,  116  Pa.Su- 
per. 429— Beresin  v.  Pennsylvania 
R.  Co.,  176  A,  774,  116  PajSuper. 
291 — Lewin  v.  Freihofer  Baking 
Co.,  176  A.  58,  115  PaJSuper.  558— 
Glou  v.  Security  Ben.  Ass'n,  173 
A.  883,  114  Pa.Super.  139— Kelso 
v.  Philadelphia  Rapid  Transit  Co., 
170  A.  436,  112  Pa.Super.  124— 
Scull  v.  Moross,  170  A.  366,  111 
Pa.Super.  581— Brown  v.  Bahl,  170 
A.  346,  111  Pa.Super.  598— Taylor 
v.  Philadelphia  Rural  Transit  Co.,  - 
170  A.  327,  111  Pa.Super.  575 — 
Luft  v.  Da  Costa,  164  A.  137,  107 
Pa.Super.  553 — Hohman  v.  Bor- 
ough of  North  Braddock,  156  A. 
705,  102  Pa.Super.  330— Smart  v. 
Bell  Telephone  Co.  of  Pennsylva- 
nia, 83  Pa/Super.  419— Creavy  v. 
Ritter,  52  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  666,  46 
Lack.Jur.  109— Clime  v.  Prudential 
Ins.  Co.  of  America,  50  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  43'3 — Wool  v.  Johannes  Kel- 
ler Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n,  16  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  519,  affirmed  163  A. 
38,  106  PajSuper.  492— Kobylis  v. 
Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Pa. 
Dist  3,  affirmed  10-4  A.  595,  261 
Pa.  3'50 — Marko  v.  Henry,  Com.Pl., 
35  Berks  Co.  75 — Walborn  v.  Ep- 
ley,  Com.Pl.,  38  Berks  Co.  117,  af- 
firmed 24  A.2d  668,  148  Pa.'Super. 
417 — Municipal  Band  of  Harris- 
burg  v.  Aurand,  Com.Pl.,  54  Dauph. 
Co.  428 — Kaylor  v.  Central  Trust 
Co.  of  Harrisburg,  Com.Pl.,  54 
Dauph.Co.  366,  affirmed  36  A.2d 
825,  154  Pa.Super.  633— Taylor  v. 
Reading  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  "51  Dauph.Co. 
69,  affirmed  27  A.2d  901,  149  Pa. 
Super.  171 — Eckenrode  v.  Produce 
Trucking  Co.,  Com,Pl.,  49  Dauph. 
Co.  271— Ensinger  v.  Hetrick,  Com. 
PL,  49  DauphuCo.  135— Webb  v. 
Hess,  Com.Pl.,  46  Dauph.Co.  84— 
Harper  v.  Trainer  Borough,  Com. 
PI.,  33  DeLCo.  229— Hartley  v.  Na- 
vickis,  Com.PL,  33  DeLCo.  161— 
Guarente  v.  Long,  Com.PL,  33  Del. 
Co.  124 — Reese  v.  Jonas,  Com.PL, 
32  DeLCo.  582,  12  Som.  157— Yar- 
nail  v.  Railway  Express  Agency, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


60 


Com.PL,  32  DeLCo.  585— Pritchard 
v.  Philadelphia.  Suburban  Transp. 
Co.,  Com.Pl.,  32  DeLCo.  383— Kelly 
v.  Carpenter,  Com.Pl.,  32  Del.Co. 
277 — Rymer  v.  Devon,  Com.Pl.,  32 
Del.Co.  271— Wright  v.  Moyer, 
Com.Pl.,  32  Del.Co.  79— -Preas  B. 
Snyder  &  Co.  v.  Media-69th  St. 
Mortgage  Pool,  Com. PI.,  32  Del.Co. 
36 — Jacobs  v.  Reading  Co.,  Com.PL, 
31  Del.Co.  '449— Daly  v.  Yeadon 
Borough,  Com.Pl.,  31  Del.Co.  380 — 
Murray  v.  Finnigan,  Com.Pl.,  31 
*>el.Co.  186 — Freeman  v.  MacDon- 
ald,  Com.Pl.f  31  Del.Co.  165— Brad- 
ley v.  Yeadon  Borough,  Com.Pl.t 
SI  Del. Co.  142 — White  v.  Southern 
Pennsylvania  Bus  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  31 
Del.Co.  67— Hill  v.  Terrizzi,  Com. 
PI.,  30  Del.Co.  503 — Barbano  v. 
Barbano,  Com.PL,  30  Del.Co.  195, 
affirmed  16  A/2d  649,  142  Pa. Super. 
371 — Bair  v.  Newgeon,  Com.PL,  29 
Del.Co.  *54t4 — Hoover  v.  Montgom- 
ery, Com.PL,  29  Del.Co.  466 — Saba- 
telli  v.  Scull,  Com.Pl.,  29  Del.Co. 
456 — Bradley  v.  Harrison,  Com.Pl., 
29  Del.Co.  275— Koch  v.  Shillady, 
Com.Pl.,  29  Del.Co.  238— Johns  v. 
Foley,  Com.Pl.,  29  Del.Co.  38— Por- 
.ter  v.  Philadelphia  Suburban 
Transp.  Co.,  Com.PL,  28  DeLCo. 
581 — Phillips  v.  Aronimink  Transp. 
Co.,  Com.PL,  28  DeLCo.  467— York- 
shire Worsted  Mills  v.  National 
Transit  Co.,  Com.PL,  28  DeLCo. 
402 — Laycott  v.  McCready,  Com. 
PL,  28  DeLCo.  333— Berberian  v. 
Allsman,  Com.PL,  28  DeLCo.  374 — 
Turkington  v.  Jones,  Com.Pl.,  28 
DeLCo.  256 — Lundy  v.  Devitt, 
Com.PL,  28  DeLCo.  210 — Roney  v. 
Thompson,  Com.PL,  27  DeLCo.  589 
— Penn  Dairies  v.  Central » Drug, 
Com.PL,  27  Del.Co.  371 — Preston 
v.  Schroeder,  Com.PL,  27  DeLCo. 
350 — Randolph  v.  Freystown  Mut. 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  Com.PL,  27  DeLCo. 
285— Keller  v.  Mazzie,  Com.PL,  26 
Erie  Co.  318— Snyder  v.  Coleman, 
Com.PL,  26  Brie  Co.  234— Glover 
v.  Stoeltzlen,  Com.PL,  26  Erie  Co. 
178— Willman  v.  Peck,  Com.PL,  26 
Erie  Co.  156 — Cotterman  v. 
Hughes,  Com.PL,  23  Erie  Co.  341 
— Theiss  v.  Moreland,  Com.PL,  22 
Erie  Co.  154 — Graham  v.  Lee,  Com. 
•PL,  22  Erie  Co.  66— Fuller  v.  Hel- 
ler, Com.PL,  21  Erie  Co.  270— Shol- 
lenberger  v.  Werren,  Com.PL,  20 
Erie  Co.  33 — Murphy  v.  Wellbrock, 
Com.PL,  46  Lack.Jur.  277— Mc- 
Veigh v.  Scranton-Spring  Brook 
Water  Service  Co.,  Com.PL,  46 
Lack.Jur.  177 — Condel  v.  Savo, 
Com.PL,  46  Lack.Jur.  89— Walker 
v.  Hornbeck,  Com.PL,  45  Lack.Jur. 
257 — Cutler  v.  Peck  Lumber  Mfg. 
Co.,  Com.PL,  45  Lack.Jur.  25,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  37  A.2d 
739,  350  Pa.  8 — Weaver  v.  Scranton 
Bus  Co.',  Com.PL,  44  Lack.Jur.  233 
— Dickson  v.  Bliss,  Com.PL,  42 
Lack.Jur.  25 — Todd  v.  Pickel,  Com. 
PL,  49  Lanc.L.Rev.  139— Fegley  v. 
Vogel-Ritt,  Inc.,  Com.PLf  21  Leh. 


L.J.  306 — Bauer  v.  Finger,  Com.PL, 
19  Leh.L.J.  222— Piershalski  v. 
Croop,  Com.PL,  34  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
353— Hasker  v.  Mease,  Com.PL, 
59  Montg.Co.  364— Stein  v.  Taylor, 
Com.PL,  56  Montg.Co.  199— Valen- 
tine v.  Fisher,  Com.PL,  55  Montg. 
Co.  192 — Stewart  v.  Crawford, 
Com.PL,  55  Montg.Co.  164— Has- 
serick  v.  Walker,  Com.PL,  55 
Montg.Co.  60— National  Chair  Co. 
v.  Barrall,  Com.PL,  15  Northumb. 
L.J.  26,  affirmed  21  A.2d  36,  342 
Pa.  389 — Samber  v.  Hahn,  Com.PL, 
90  Pittsb.Leg.J.  465— Waldron  v. 
•Equitable  Life  Assur.  -Soc.,  Com. 
PL,  90  Pittsb.Leg.J.  335— 'Smolin- 
sky  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co., 
Com.PL,  7  Sch.Leg.Reg.  276,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  26  A. 
2d  131,  1'49  Pa.Super.  72— Howells 
v.  Reading  Co.,  Com.PL,  10  Sch. 
Reg.  179 — Murphy  v.  Fetter,  Com. 
PL,  7  Sch.Reg.  54— Mahmde  v. 
Reading  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  7  Sch.Reg. 
33 — Huey  v.  Blue  Ridge  Transp. 
Co.,  Com.PL,  24  Wash.Co.  147— 
Jones  v.  Davis,  Com.PL,  24  Wash. 
Co.  63r- Hall  v.  Spriggs,  Com.PL, 

22  Wash.Co.  166— Klosky  v.  Gow- 
ern,    Com.PL,    21    Wash.Co.    92 — 
Romonoski  v.  Harris,  Com.PL,   20 
Wash.Co.   8?— Kelly  v.  Ray,  Com. 
PL,     20    Wash.Co.     82 — Cullen    v. 
Keystone    Transfer    Co.,    Com.PL, 
19    Wash.Co.    192— Snee   v.   Dunn, 
Com.PL,    19    Wash.Co.    94— McEl- 
fresh  v.  O'Brien,  Com.PL,  18  Wash. 
Co.  114 — Slezycki  v.  Waitas,  Com. 
PL,  26  West.Co.  92— Wise  v.  Frey, 
Com.PL,     22    WestCo.     176— Cun- 
ningham v.   Pennsylvania  R.    Co., 
Com.PL,  58  York  Leg.Rec.  49— Mil- 
ler   v.    Stump,    Com.PL,    58    York 
Leg.Rec.  1 — !Shaw  v.  Malone,  Com. 
PL,  55  York  Leg.Rec.  150 — Zinn  v. 
Bentz,   Com.PL,   5*5   York  Leg.Rec. 
149— Arnold   v.   Frey,   Com.PL,    52 
York.Leg.Rec.  163. 

S.C.— Drag  v.  Ellis,   36  <S.E.2d  73. 

S.D.— Strain  v.  Shields,  256  N.W. 
268,  63  S.D.  60. 

Tex. — Traders  &  General  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Bass,  Civ.App.,  193  S.W.2d  848, 
refused  no  reversible  error — Shield 
Co.  v.  Cartwright,  Civ.App.,  172  S. 
W.2d  108,  affirmed  177  S.W.2d  954, 
142  Tex.  324 — Warren  v.  Schawe, 
Civ.App.,  163  S.W.2d  415,  error  re- 
fused. 

Wash.— Geri  v.  Bender,  168  P.2d  1'44 
— Ziniewiez  v.  Department  of  La- 
bor and  Industries,  161  P.2d  315, 

23  Wash,2d  436— Ruff  v.  Fruit  De- 
livery Co.,  157  P.2d  730,  22  Wash. 
2d   708— Mathers  v.   Stephens,   156 
P.2d  227.  22  Wash.2d  364— Omeitt 
v.  Department  of  Labor  and  Indus- 
tries, 152  P,2d  973,  21  Wash.2d  684 
— Carroll  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  146 
P.2d  813,   20  Wash.2d  191— White 
v.  Fenner,  133  P.2d  270,  16  Wash. 
2d  226 — Billingsley  v.  Rovig-Tem- 
ple  Co.,  133  P.2d  265,  16  Washed 
202 — Griffin    v.    Cascade    Theatres 
Corporation,     117     P.2d     651,     10 

169 


Wash.2d  574— Peterson  v.  May- 
ham,  116  P.2d  259,  10  Washed  111 
— Fosdick  v.  Middendorf,  115  P. 
2d  670,  9  Wash,2d  616— Morris  v. 
Chicago,  M.,  St  P.  &  P.  R.  Co., 
97  P.2d  119,  1  Wash.2d  587,  opin- 
ion adhered  to  100  P.2d  19,  1 
Wash.2d  587— Steen  v.  Polyclinic, 
81  P*2d  846,  195  Wash.  666— Ham- 
ilton v.  Cadwell,  81  P.2d  815,  195 
Wash.  683 — Corbaley  v.  Pierce 
County,  74  P.2d  993,  192  Wash.  688 
• — Caylor  v.  B.  C.  Motor  Transp.r 
71  P.2d  162,  191  Wash.  365— Chess 
v.  Reynolds,  66  P.2d  297,  189 
Wash.  547— Boyd  v.  Cole,  68  P.2d 
931,  189  Wash.  81— Mitchell  v. 
Cadwell,  62  P.2d  41,  188  Wash. 
257 — Larpenteur  v.  Eldridge  Mo- 
tors, 55  P.2d  1064,  185  "Wash,  530 
— Shumaker  v.  Charada  Inv.  Co., 
49  P.2d  44,  183  Wash.  521— Mitch- 
ell v.  Rice,  48  P.2d  9'49,  183  Wash. 
402— Hayden  v.  ColviUe  Valley 
Nat.  Bank,  39  P.2d  376,  180  Wash. 
220,  rehearing  denied  43  P.2d  32 
— Gaskill  v.  Amadon,  38  P.2d  229, 
179  Wash.  375 — Green  v.  Langnes, 
32  P.2d  565,  177  Wash.  536— Mu- 
tual Life  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York 
v.  Campbell,  16  P.2d  836,  170 
Wash.  485 — Hansen  v.  Continental 
Casualty  Co.,  287  P.  894,  156  Wash, 
691 — Marsten  v.  Bill  Warner,  Inc., 
254  P.  850,  148  Wash.  58— Metro- 
politan Club  v.  Massachusetts 
Bonding  &  Insurance  Co.,  220  P. 
818,  127  Wash.  320.  N 

Impeachment  of  witness 

(1)  In     passing     on     motion    for 
judgment     notwithstanding     verdict 
for  plaintiff,  court  had  no  right  to 
pass  on  credibility  of"  witnesses,  to 
consider    any     purported     impeach- 
ments, weight  thereof,  or  weight  of 
testimony. — Vieceli  v.  Cummings,  54 
N.E.2d   717,   322   IlLApp.   559. 

(2)  A    court    is    not    justified    in 
ignoring   a   verdict    merely   because 
witnesses    for    plaintiff    may    have 
made  contradictory  statements  as  to 
the  cause  of  results  established,  or 
because  experts  testified  that  death 
could  not  have  been  caused  as  con- 
tended    by     plaintiff. — Kundiger    v. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  16  N.W.2d 
487,  218  Minn.  273. 

(3)  However,  the  rule  that  explan- 
atory,   conflicting,    or    contradictory 
evidence  must  be  excluded  from  con- 
sideration in  passing  on  motion  for 
judgment     notwithstanding     verdict 
does  not  mean  that,  where  a  witness 
contradicts    himself    on    a   material 
point,  court  must  consider  only  that 
part  of  his  testimony  on  that  point 
which    favors    party    for    whom   he 
testifies. — Fitch  v.  Thomson,  54  N.E. 
2d  623,  322  IlLApp.  703. 
Uncorroborated  testimony     . 

In  passing  on  motion  for  judg- 
ment non  obstante  veredicto,  trial 
judge  could  not  disregard  witness' 
testimony  merely  because  it  was 
not  corroborated. — Szidor  v.  Greek 


60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ich  evidence  it  should  be  inherently  incredible;57 
nd  evidence  not  in  conflict  with  such  evidence,  and 
rhich  is  not  inherently  incredible,  will  also  be  ac- 
epted  as  true.58  The  successful  party  at  the  trial 
>  not  entitled  to  favorable  inferences  from  a  lack 
f  testimony,59  or  from  broad  general  statements 
rtiich  are  opposed  by  definite  evidence  from  his 
wn  witnesses.60 

If  there  is  in  the  record  evidence  which,  stand- 
ig  alone,  tends  to  prove  the  material  allegations 


of  the  pleadings  of  the  party  opposed  to  the  mo- 
tion, it  should  be  denied,  even  though  on  the  entire 
record  the  evidence  may  preponderate  against  the 
party  in  opposition  to  such  motion,  so  that  a  ver- 
dict in  his  favor  could  not  stand  when  tested  by  a 
motion  for  a  new  trial  ;61  and  no  contradictory  evi- 
dence of  any  kind  will  justify  a  judgment  notwith- 
standing the  verdict  for  plaintiff  except  uncontra- 
dicted  evidence  of  facts  consistent  with  every  fact 
which  his  evidence  tends  to  prove,  but  showing  af- 


Jatholic  TJnion  of  Russian  Brother- 
loods  of  U.  S.,  21  A.2d  104,  145  Pa. 
Super.  251— Jeske  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
>urgh,  168  A.  '323,  110  Pa.Super.  274. 

Pacts  found  "by  jury  admitted 

A  motion  for  judgment  notwith- 
standing verdict  admits  for  purpose 
)f  motion  the  existence  of  facts 
'ound  by  jury  and  asserts  that,  tak- 
ng  verdict  at  its  face,  judgment 
should  go  the  other  way. — -Wisconsin 
TeL  Co.  v.  Russell,  7  N.W.2d  825, 
242  Wis.  2<47— Volland  v.  McGee,  294 
NT.W.  497,  236  Wis.  3-58,  rehearing 
lenied  295  N.W.  635,  236  Wis.  358. 

Evidence   admitted  for  special  pur- 
pose 

Where  insurer  denied  liability  on 
life  policy  on  ground  of  insured's 
misrepresentation  in  application  that 
he  had  -not  been  attended  by  a  physi- 
cian during  previous  three  years, 
denial  of  motion  for  Judgment  not- 
withstanding verdict  for  beneficiary 
on  ground  that  proofs  of  death  fur- 
nished by  beneficiary  proved  falsity 
of  representation  was  held  not  error, 
where  proofs  were  offered  and  ad- 
mitted specially  and  not  as  truth 
of  matters  therein  asserted. — Fickes 
v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of  America, 
184  A.  754,  321  Pa,  474. 

Testimony  of  moving  party's  wit- 
ness cannot  be  used  as  basis  of 
judgment  notwithstanding  verdict. — 
Smith  v.  Penn  Tp.  Mut.  Pire  Ass'n 
of  Lancaster  County,  186  A.  130,  323 
Pa.  93. 

Evidence  adduced  by  movamt  favor* 

able  to  contestant 
The  party  contesting  a  motion  for 
judgment    notwithstanding   the   ver- 
dict is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  any 
favorable     evidence     introduced     by 
the  moving  party. 
CaL— -Card  v.  Boms,  291  P,  190,  210 

Cal.  200. 

111. — Relaco  Rosin  Products  v.  Na- 
tional Casein  Co.,  64  N.E.2d  243, 
327  IlLApp.  334— Fricke  v.  St.  Lou- 
is Bridge  Co.,  32  N.B.2d  1016,  309 
IlLApp.  279— Scherb  v.  Randolph 
Wells  Auto  Park,  22  N.E.2d  796, 
301  IlLApp.  298. 

Pa. — Cherry  v.  Mitosky,  45  A.2d  23, 
353  Pa.. 401— Holland  v.  Kohn,  38 
A.2d  500,  155  PttuSuper.  95— Berry 
v.  Eastman,  40  A.2d  102,  156  Pa.  | 


Super.  349 — Herchelroth  v.  Jaffe, 
35  A.2d  594,  15'4  Pa.Super.  54 
Dixon  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  7  A.2d  549,  136  PaJSuper.  573 
— HofC  v.  Tavani,  170  A,  384,  111 
Pa. Super.  567. 
Wash.~-Hurst  v.  Peterson,  64  P.2d 

788,  189  Wash.  169. 
Evidence  of  contestant  unfavorable 

to  him 

On  motion  for  judgment  notwith- 
standing the  verdict,  even  though 
contestant's  evidence  is  in  some  re- 
spects unfavorable  to  him,  he  is  not 
bound  by  unfavorable  part  thereof, 
but  is  entitled  to  have  his  case  con- 
sidered on  basis  of  evidence  which  is 
most  favorable  to  his  position. — 
Moen  v.  Chestnut,  113  P.2d  1030,  9 
Wash.2d  93. 

57.  Cal. — In    re    Hettermann's    Es- 
tate,   119   P.2d   788,   48   Cal.App.2d 
263. 

Evidence    that    has    no    probative 
force  may  not  be  considered  in  pass- 
ing  on   motion. — Knudson   v.   Knud- 
son,  46  N.E.2d  1011,  382  111.  492. 
Parts  of  evidence  unbelievable 

Where  trial  court  finds  that*  parts 
of  plaintiff's  testimony  are  wholly 
unbelievable,  the  court  should  grant 
new  trial  after  verdict  for  plaintiff 
instead  of  judgment  non  obstante 
veredicto. — Szidor  y,  Greek  Catholic 
Union  of  Russian  Brotherhoods  of 
U.  S.,  21  A.2d  104,  145  Pa.Super.  251. 

58.  Va. — Bivens    v.    Manhattan   for 
Hire  Car  Corporation,  159  S.E.  395, 
156  Va.  483. 

59.  Mich.— West   v.   Detroit  Termi- 
nal R.  R.,  201  N.W.  955,  229  Mich. 
590. 

60.  Mich.— West   v.   Detroit   Termi- 
nal R.  R.,  supra. 

61*  111. — Berg  v.  New  Tork  Cent  R. 
Co.,  62  N.E.2d  676,  391  HI.  52— 
Tidholm  v.  Tidholm,  62  N.B.2d 
473,  391  111.  19— Weinstein  v.  Met- 
ropolitan Life  Ins.  Co.,  60  N.E.2d 
207,  389  111.  571— Knudson  v. 
Knudson,  46  N.B.2d  1011,  382  HI. 
492 — Merlo  v.  Public  Service  Co. 
of  Northern  Illinois,  45  N.B.2d  665, 
381  111.  300,  followed  in  '45  N.B.2d 
677,  381  111.  336— Hunt  v.  Vermil- 
ion County  Children's  Home,  44  N. 
E.2d  609,  381  111.  29— Walaite  v. ; 

170 


Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  33  N.B. 
2d  119,  376  111.  59— De  Leuw,  Gath- 
er &  Co.  v.  City  of  Jolief,  64  N.E. 
2d  779,  327  IlLApp.  4-53— Anderson 
v.  Krancic,  66  N.B.2d  316,  328  111. 
App.  364 — Dickinson  v.  Rockford 
Van  Orman  Hotel  iCo.,  63  N.B.2d 
257,  326  IlLApp.  686— Hauck  v. 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Highland  Park, 
55  N.E.2d  565,  323  IlLApp.  300— 
Van  Hoorebecke  v.  Iowa  Illinois 
Gas  &  Electric  Co.,  57  N.E.2d  6'52, 
324  IlLApp.  88— Gill  v.  Lewin,  53 
N.E.2d  336,  321  IlLApp.  633— Han- 
son v.  Blatt,  53  N.E,2d  143,  321 
IlLApp.  364 — Guess  v.  New  Tork 
Cent  R,  Co.,  49  N.E.2d  652,  319 
HI. App.  522 — Egner  v.  Fruit  Belt 
Service  Co.,  47  N.E.2d  486,  318  HI. 
App.  37— Hohimer  v.  Fricke,  46  N. 
B.2d  169,  317  IlLApp.  372— Zwier- 
zycki  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co., 
45  N.E.2d  76,  516  IlLApp.  345— 
Adams  v.  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.,  '41 
N.E.2d  991,  314  IlLApp.  404— Free- 
man v.  Leader  Mercantile  Co.,  40 
N.B.2d  548,  313  IlLApp.  652— Bry- 
ant v.  Taylor,  40  N.E.2d  '545,  313 
IlLApp.  650 — Osborn  v.  Leuffgen, 
38  N.E.2d  370,  312  IlLApp.  251,  af- 
firmed 45  N.B.2d  622,  381  111.  29'5 
— Baker  v.  Granite  City,  37  N.E. 
2d  372,  311  IlLApp.  586 — Gnat  v. 
Richardson,  35  N.E.2d  409,  311  111. 
App.  242,  affirmed  39  N.E.2d  337, 
378  I1L  626— Kanne  v.  Metropoli- 
tan Life  Ins.  Co.,  34  N.E.2d  732, 
310  IlLApp.  524— Bru'mit  v.  Was- 
son,  33  N.E.2d  740,  310  IlLApp. 
264 — Cooper  v.  Safeway  Lines,  26 
N.E.2d  632,  304  IlLApp.  302— 
Fricke  v.  St.  Louis  Bridge  Co.,  32 
N.E.2d  1016,  309  IlLApp.  279— 
Roussin  v.  Kirkbride,  31  N.E.2d 
833,  308  IlLApp.  366— Rose  v.  Mey- 
er, 25  N.E.2d  413,  303  IlLApp.  365 
— Valant  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  23  N.E.2d  922,  302  IlLApp.  196 
. — Geiselman  v.  Strubhar,  23  N.B. 
2d  383,  302  IlLApp.  23— Le  Men- 
ager  v.  Northwestern  Steel  &  Wire 
Co.,  22  N.E.2d  710,  301  IlLApp.  260 
— Larimore  v.  Larimore,  20  N.E. 
2d  902,  299  IlLApp.  547— Wells  v. 
Wise,  18  N.B.2d  750,  298  IlLApp. 
252 — Gregory  v.  Merriam,  14  N.E. 
2d  268,  294  IlLApp.  483— Schiff  v; 
Peck,  6  N.B.2d  509,  288  IlLApp. 
625 — McCarthy  v.  Rorrison,  283  111. 
App.  129 — Capelle  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  280  IlLApp.  471. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


60 


firmatively  a  complete  defense.62  This  requires 
consideration  of  the  evidence,  but  precludes  any 
examination  of  the  weight  of  the  evidence  in  order 
to  determine  its  preponderance.63  It  is  wholly  im- 
material on  which  side  the  weight  of  the  evidence 
preponderates.64 

In  entering  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto,  it 
has  been  held  that  the  judgment  must  be  entered 
on  the  evidence  in  the  record  as  it  existed  at  the 
close  of  the  trial.65  Under  this  rule  the  trial  court 
may  not  on  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding 
the  verdict  eliminate  evidence  on  the  ground  that 
it  was  improperly  received  at  the  trial  and  then  dis- 
pose of  the  case  on  the  basis  of  the  diminished  rec- 
ord;66 neither  may  it  insert  offers  of  evidence 


which  should  have  been  admitted  but  were  exclud- 
ed,67 or  receive  evidence  on  the  hearing  of  the 
motion  which  was  not  offered  at  the  trial.68 

(5)  Discretion  of  Court 

Although  there  is  also  authority  to  the  contrary,  it 
has  been  held  that  the  granting  of  a  judgment  notwith- 
standing the  verdict  rests  very  much  in  the  discretion  of 
the  trial  court. 

Although  there  is  authority  holding  that  a  mo- 
tion for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  in- 
volves no  element  of  judicial  discretion,69  and  may 
not  be  granted  unless  the  court  can  say,  as  a  matter 
of  law,  that  there  is  neither  evidence  nor  reasonable 
inference  from  the  evidence  to  sustain  the  ver- 
dict,70 it  has  also  been  held  that  the  granting  of 


62.  I1L — Berg  v.  New  York  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  62  N.E.2d  676,  391  111.  52— 
Tidholm  v.  Tidholra,  62  N.B.2d  473, 
391  111.  19— Weinstein  v.  Metro- 
politan Life  Ins.  Co.,  60  N.B.2d 
207,  389  111.  571— Merlo  v.  Public 
Service  Co.  of  Northern  Illinois, 
45  N.E.2d  66-5,  381  111.  300,  followed 
in  45  N.B.2d  677,  381  111.  336— 
Hunt  v.  Vermilion  County  Chil- 
dren's Home,  44  N.E.2d  609,  381 
111.  29 — De  Leuw,  Gather  &  Co.  v. 
City  of  Joilet.  64  N.E.2d  779,  327 
IlLApp.  453 — Dickinson  v.  Rockford 
Van  Orman  Hotel  Co.,  63  N.B.2d 
257,  326  IlLApp.  686. 

C3.  111. — Knudson  v.  Knudson,  46  N. 
B.2d  1011,  382  111.  492— Van  Hoore- 
becke  v.  Iowa  Illinois  Gas  &  Elec- 
tric Co.,  57  N.B.2d  652,  324  111. 
App.  88— Gill  v.  Lewin,  53  N.B.2d 
336,  321  IlLApp.  633— Egner  v. 
Fruit  Belt  'Service  Co.,  47  N.B.2d 
486,  318  IlLApp.  37— Walaite  v. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  28  N. 
B.2d  149,  306  IlLApp.  5,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  33  N.B.2d  119, 
376  111.  59 — Russell  v.  Richardson, 
24.  N.B.2d  185,  302  IlLApp.  589— 
Valant  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  23  N.E.2d  922,  302  IlLApp.  196 
— Geiselman  v.  Strubhar,  23  N.B. 
2d  383,  302  IlLApp.  23— Scherb  v. 
Randolph  Wells  Auto  Park,  22  N. 
B.2d  796,  301  IlLApp.  298— Le  Men- 
ager  v.  Northwestern  Steel  &  Wire 
Co.,  22  N.E.2d  710,  301  IlLApp.  260 
—Oliver  v.  Kelley,  21  N.B.2d  649, 
300  IlLApp.  487— Painter  v.  Kee- 
shin  Motor  Express  Co.,  18  N.E.2d 
65,  297  IlLApp.  557— Emge  v.  Illi- 
nois Cent  R.  Co.,  17  N.E.2d  612, 
297  IlLApp.  344 — Farmer  v.  Alton 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  13  N.B.2d 
652,  294  IlLApp.  206— Gardiner  v. 
Richardson,  11  N.B.2d  824.  293  I1L 
App.  40 — Schiff  v.  Peck,  6  N.B.2d 
509,  288  IlLApp.  625— McNeill  v. 
Harrison  &  Sons,  2  N.B.2d  959,  286 
IlLApp.  120 — Illinois  Tuberculosis 
Ass'n  v.  Springfield  Marine  Bank, 
282  IlLApp.  14— Capelle  v.  Chicago 
&  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  280  IlLApp.  471. 


64.  111.— Merlo  v.  Public  Service  Co. 
of  Northern  Illinois,  45  N.E.2d  665, 
381  111.  300,  followed  in  45  N.E.2d 
677,  381  111.  336. 

65.  Pa. — Henry    Shenk   Co.    v.    City 
of  Erie,  43  A.2d  99,  352  Pa.  481— 
Kotlikoff   v.    Master,    27    A.2d    35, 
345  Pa._  258 — Heffron  v.  Prudential 
Ins.   Co.   of  America,    8   A.2d   491, 
137       Pa.Super.       69 — Toungwood 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Henry, 
8  A.2d  427,  137  Pa.Super.  124— Dix- 
on   v.   Metropolitan  Life  Ins.   Co., 
7    A.2d    549,    136    Pa.Super.    573— 
Huffman  v.  Simmons,   200  A.   274, 
131  Pa.Super.  370 — Moore  v.  W.  J. 
Gilmore  Drug  Co.,  200  A.  250,  131 
Pa,Super.  849 — Kuhn  v.  Conestoga, 
Transp.  Co.,  Com.PL,  48  Lanc.Rev. 
491,  affirmed  Landis  v.  Conestoga 
Transp.   Co.,  36  A.2d  465,   349   Pa. 
97 — Landis    v.    Conestoga    Transp. 
Co.,  Com.PL,  48  Lanc.Rev.  481,  11 
Som.  302,  affirmed  36  A.2d  465,  349 
Pa,   97 — In  re   Dughlaski's  Estate, 
Orph.,  29  North.Co.  174. 

66.  Pa. — Cherry  v.  Mitosky,  45  A.2d 
23,   353  Pa.  401— Henry  Shenk  Co. 
v.  City  of  Erie,  43  A.2d  99,  352  Pa. 
481 — Hershberger   v.    Hershberger, 
29  A.2d  95,  345  Pa.  439— Kotl^koff 
v.  Master,  27  A.2d  35,  345  Pa.  258 
— Stevenson  v.   Titus,   2  A.2d   853, 
332  Pa.  100 — Murphy  v.  Wolverine 
Express,  38  A.2d  511,  155  Pa, Super. 
125— Schock  v.  Penn  Tp.  Mut.  Fire 
Ins.  Ass'n  of  Lancaster  County,  24 
A.2d  738,    148   Pa.Super.   81— Heff- 
ron   v-     Prudential     Ins.     Co.     of 
America,  8  A.2d  '491,  137  Pa,Super. 
69 — Toungwood   Building   &  Loan 
Ass'n    v.   Henry,    8    A.2d    427,    137 
Pa.Super.  124 — Dixon  v.  Metropoli- 
tan Life  Ins.  Co.,   7  A.2d  549,  136 
Pa. Super.    573 — Huffman    v.    Sim- 
mons,   200    A.    274,    131    PajSuper. 
370 — Sauire   v.    Merchants'   Ware- 
house Co.,  196  A.  915,  130  Pa.Su- 
per.    g — Ozanich    v.    Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  180  A.  67,  119  Pa.Su- 

.per.    52,    reargument   refused   and 
supplemented  180  A.  576,  119  Pa. 

171 


Super.    52 — In   re   Dughlaski's  Es- 
tate, Orph.,  29  North.Co.  174. 

67.  Pa.— Henry    Shenk   Co.    v.   City 
of  Erie,  43  A.2d  99,  352  Pa.  481— 
Kotlikoff  v.  Master,  27  A.2d  35,  345 
Pa.    25 S — Youngwood    Building    & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Henry,   8  A.2d  427, 
137  Pa.Super.  124— Dixon  v.  Metro- 
politan Life   Ins.   Co.,   7  A.2d  549, 
136     Pa.Super.     573 — Huffman     v. 
Simmons,  200  A.  274,  131  PauSuper. 
370 — In     re     Dughlaski's     Estate. 
Orph.,    29    North.Co.    174. 

68.  Mich. — McGuire    v.    Armstrong, 
255  N.W.  7'45,  268  Mich.  152. 

69.  Wash.— Richey  &  Gilbert  Co.  v. 
Northwestern  Natural  Gas  Corpo- 
ration,   134    P.2d   444,    16   Washed 
631 — Wiggins      v.      North      Coast 
Transp.  Co.,  98  P.2d  675,  2  Wash. 
2d  446 — Knight  v.   Trogdon  Truck 
Co.,   71   P.2d   1003,   191   Wash.   646 
— Chess  v.  Reynolds,   66  P.2d  297, 
189  Wash.  547 — Lydon  v.  Exchange 
Nat.   Bank,    235   P.   27,   134   Wash. 
188. 

33  C.J.  p  1180  note  24  [a]. 

70.  Wash. — Moore  v.  Keesey,  163  P. 
2d    164 — Ziniewicz    v.    Department 
of  Labor  and  Industries,  161  P.2d 
315,    23  *Wash.2d    436 — Mathers   v. 
Stephens,  .156   P.2d   227,   22  Wash. 
2d  364 — Omeitt  v.   Department   of 
Labor    and    Industries,    152    P.2d 

.  973,  21  Wash. 2 d  684 — Simmons  v. 
Cowlitz  County,  120  P.2d  '479,  12 
Wash.2d  84 — Griffin  v.  Cascade 
Theatres  Corporation,  117  P.2d 
651,  10  Wash.2d  574 — Peterson  v. 
Mayham,  116  P.2d  259,  10  Wash. 
2d  111— Moen  v.  Chestnut,  113  P. 
2d  1030,  9  Wash.2d  93— Letres  v. 
Washington  Co-op.  Chick  Ass'n, 
111  P.2d  594,  8  Wash.2d  64— An- 
derson v.  Harrison,  103  P.2d  320,  4 
Wash.2d  265 — Wiggins  v.  North 
Coast  Transp.  Co.,  98  P.2d  675,  2 
Wash.2d  446— Pyle  v.  WUbert,  98 
P.2d  664,  2  Wash.2d  429— Gibson  v. 
Spokane  United  Rys.,  84  P.2d  349, 
197  Wash.  58— Steen  v.  PolycUnlc, 
81  P.2d  846,  195  Wash.  666— Lew- 


60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


such  a  judgment  rests  very  much  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court;71  and  accordingly  the  court  is  not 
bound  to  enter  such  judgment  in  every  case  in  which 
it  is  later  convinced  it  should  have  given  binding 
instructions  at  the  trial.72  Although  the  court  is 
under  a  duty  to  grant  judgment  notwithstanding  the 
verdict  when  the  right  to  such  a  judgment  is  clear,73 
judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  is  to  be 
granted  cautiously,74  and  only  when  it  clearly  ap- 
pears from  the  record  that  the  party  obtaining  the 
verdict  was  not  entitled  thereto.75  Where  justice 
will  be  promoted  thereby,  a  motion  for  such  judg- 
ment may  be  denied,  and  the  party  remitted  to  his 
remedy  by  motion  for  a  new  trial.76 


c.  On  Motion  to  Disregard  Special  Issue  Jury 
Finding 

Under  some  statutes  the  court  is  authorized  to  dis- 
regard any  special  Issue  Jury  finding  that  has.  no  sup- 
port In  the  evidence  and  thus  enter  Judgment  notwith- 
standing a  part  of  the  verdict;  but  the  right  may  be 
exercised  only  in  the  manner  and  under  the  circum- 
stances prescribed  by  the  statutes. 

Under  some  statutes  the  court  is  authorized  on 
proper  motion  to  disregard  any  special  issue  jury 
finding  that  has  no  support  in  the  evidence,77  but 
this  right  may  be  exercised  only  in  the  manner  and 
under  the  circumstances  prescribed  by  the  stat- 
utes.78 A  motion  to  disregard  one  or  more  of  the 


(s  v.  Coleman,  79  P.2d  633,  194 
•Wash.  674 — Corbaley  v.  Pierce 
County,  7»4  P.2d  993,  192  Wash. 
688 — Kedziora  v.  Washington  Wa- 
ter Power  Co.,  74  P.2d  898,  193 
Wash.  51— Knight  v,  Trogdon 
Truck  Co.,  71  P.2d  1003,  191  Wash. 
646— Gross  v.  Parttow,  68  P.2d 
1034,  190  Wash.  489-<5hess  v. 
Reynolds,  66  P.2d  297,  189  Wash. 
54T — Mootz  v.  Spokane  Racing  & 
Pair  Ass'n,  64  P.2d  516,  189  Wash. 
.225— Boyd  v.  Cole,  63  P.2d  931, 
189  Wash.  81 — Larpenteur  v.  El- 
dridge  Motors,  55  P.2d  1064,  1S5 
Wash.  530 — Shumaker  v.  Charada 
-Inv.  Co.,  49  P.2d  44,  183  Wash. 
521 — Engdal  v.  Owl  Drug  Co.,  48 
P.2d  232,  183  Wash.  100 — Stevich 
v.  Department  of  Labor  end  In- 
dustries, 47  P.2d  32,  183  Wash.  401 
— Tjosevig  v.  Butler,  38  P.2d  1022, 
180  Wash*.  151 — Green  v.  Langnes, 
32  P.2d  565,  177  Wash.  536— -Reeve 
r.  Arnoldo,  30  P.2d  943,  176  Wash. 
679— Hart  v.  Hogan,  2*  P.2d  99, 
178  Wash.  '598— Carroll  v.  'Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.,  17  P.2d  49, 
170  Wash.  600 — Sears  v.  Lydon,  13 
P.2d  475,  169  Wash,  92— Haydon 
v.  Bay  City  Fuel  Co.,  3  P.2d  98, 
167  Wash.  2l£— Nelson  v.  Booth 
Fisheries  Co.,  6  P.2d  388,  165 
Wash.  521 — Phelan  v.  Jones,  4  P. 
2d  616,  164  Wash.  640— Hopkins 
v.  Lotus  Cafe,  297  P.  178,  161 
Wash.  493— Haan  v.  Heath,  296  P. 
816,  161  Wash.  128— Fleming  v. 
Buerkli,  293  P.  462,  159  'Wash.  460 
— Dailey  v.  Phoenix  Inv.  Co.,  285 
P.  657,  155  Wash.  597— Wieber  v. 
City  of  Everett,  283  P.  1085,  165 
Wash.  167 — Lee  v.  Gorman  Pack- 
Ing  Corporation,  282  P.  205,  154 
Wash.  376 — Kelly  v.  Drumheller, 
272  P.  731,  150  Wash.  185— Crary 
v.  Coffin,  268  P.  881,  148  Wash.  287 
— Fisher  v.  Tacoma  Ry.  &  Power 
Co.,  468  P.  180,  148  Wash.  122— 
Cushman  v.  Standard  Oil  'Co.  of 
California,  260  P.  996,  145  Wash. 
481 — Chalenor-v.  Mutual  Life  Ins. 
Co.  of  New  York,  259  P.  383,  145 
Wash.  189 — Eyak  River  Packing 
Co.  y.  Huglen,  255  P.  123,  1'43 
Wash.  229,  reheard  257  P.  638,  143 


Wash.  229— White  v.  Rigg,  254  P. 
459,  143  Wash.  46— Stickney  v, 
Congdon,  250  P.  32,  140  Wash. 
670— Karr  v.  Mahaffay,  248  P.  801, 
140  Wash,  236— Allingham  v. 
Long-Bell  Lumber  Co.,  241  P.  298, 
136  Wash.  681 — Reynolds  v.  Mor- 
gan, 235  P.  800,  134  Wash.  358— 
Crooks  v.  Rust,  226  P.  262,  130 
Wash.  88— Fortier  v.  Robillard,  212 
P.  1083,  123  Wash.  599. 

38  C.J.  p  1180  note  24  [a]. 

71*  Conn. — Gesualdi  \c.  Connecticut 
Co.,  41  A.2d  771,  131  Conn.  622. 

Pa. — Klein  v.  F.  W.  Woolworth  Co., 
163  A.  532,  309  Pa.  320— Standard 
Oil  Co.  of  N.  J.  v.  Graham  Oil 
Transport  Corp.,  41  A.2d  414, 
157  Pa.  Super.  41 — Schroeder  Bros. 
v.  Sabeli,  40  A.2d  170,  156  Pa.Su- 
per..  267 — Bunn  v.  Furstein,  34  A. 
2d  924,  153  Pa.Super.  637--Schmidt 
v.  Pittsburgh  Rys.  Co.,  193  A.  67, 
127  Pa.Super.  161. 

Tex. — Spence  v.  National  Life  &  Ac- 
cident Ins.  Co.,   Civ.App.f   59  S.W. 
2d  212. 
;  C.J.  p  1180  note  24. 

72.  Pa.— Standard  Oil  Co.  of  N.  J. 
v.  Graham  Oil  Transport  Corp.,  41 
A.2d  414,  157  Pa.Super.  41-^Schroe- 
der  Bros.  v.   Sabelli,  '40  A.2d  170, 
156   Pa.Super.    267 — Bunn  v.  Fur- 
stein,    34   A.2d    924,   153   Pa.Super. 
637. 

73.  Minn.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fox, 
254  N.W.  8,  191  Minn.  318. 

Pa.— Schroeder  Bros.  v.  Sabelli,  40 
A.2d  170,  156  Pa.Super.  267. 

74.  Minn.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fox, 
254  N.W.  8,  191  Minn.  318. 

76.  Minn.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fox, 
supra. 

Pa. — Kissinger  v.  Pittsburgh  Rys. 
Co.,  180  A.  137,  119  PaJSuper.  110. 

76.  Pa. — Athas  v.  Fort  Pitt  Brewing 
Co.,  157  A.  677,  305  Pa.  350— Prin- 
gle  v.  Smith,  133  A.  33,  286  Pa.  152 
—March  v.  Philadelphia  &  West 
Chester  Traction  Co.,  132  A.  355, 
285  Pa.  413 — Schroeder  Bros.  v. 
Sabeli,  40  A.2d  170,  156  Pa.Super. 
267 — Bunn  v.  Furstein,  34  A.2d 
924,  153  Psu'Super.  637— Szidor  v.j 

172 


Greek  Catholic  Union  of  Russian 
Brotherhoods  of  U.  S.,  21  A.2d 
104,  145  Pa.Super.  251— Ellsworth 
v.  Husband,  181  A.  90,  119  Pa. 
Super,  245 — Blassottl  v.  Greens- 
boro Gas  Co.,  96  Pa.Super.  162 — 
Cameron  v.  Doyno,  10  Pa,Dist.  & 
Co.  593 — Rich  v.  Boguszinski,  10 
Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  217,  24  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
333 — Reick  v.  Maple  Hill  Cemetery 
Ass'n,  Com.PL,  31  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
213. 
33  C.J.  p  1181  note  25. 

77.  Tex. — Myers    v.    Crenshaw,   137 
S.W.2d   7,   13'4   Tex   600— Hearn  v. 
Hanlon-Buchanan,     Inc.,     Civ.App., 
179    SJW.2d    364,    error    refused- 
Smith  v.  Safeway  Stores,  Civ.App., 
167   S.W.2d   1044— Heath   v.   Ellis- 
ton,  Civ.App.,  145  S.W.2d  243,  error 
dismissed,      judgment       correct — > 
Ronsley   v.    City   of   Fort   Worth, 
Civ.App.,     140     S.W,2d    257,     error 
dismissed,       judgment       correct — 
Pearlstone-Ash     Grocery     Co.     v. 
Rembert  Nat.  Bank  of  Longview, 
Civ.App.,  135  S.W.2d  559,  error  re- 
fused—Jones v.  Liberty  Mut.  Ins. 
Co.,  Civ.App.,   131  S.W.2d  776,  er- 
ror dismissed,  judgment  correct — 
Foster    v.    National    Bondholders 
Corporation,   Civ.App.,    123    S.W.2d 
506,     error     dismissed — James     v. 
Texas  Employers'  Ins.  Ass'n,  Civ. 
App.,   98   S.W.2d  425,   reversed  on 
other    grounds    Texas    Employers' 
Ins.    Ass'n   v.    James,    118    S.W.2d 
293,  131  Tex  605— Beckner  v.  Bar- 
rett, Civ.App.,  81  B.W.2d  719,  error 
dismissed — Smith  Y.  El  Paso  &  N. 
E.  R.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  67  S.W.2d  362, 
error  dismissed — SprolesV.  Rosen, 
Civ.App.,    47   S.W.2d    331,   affirmed 
84  S.W.2d  1001,  126  Tex  51. 
Prior  to   statute  trial   court  was 

without  authority  to  set  aside  jury's 
finding  to  an  issue  raised  by  plead- 
ings, even  though  such  finding  was 
against  undisputed  proof  or  was  not 
supported  by  evidence. — Edmiston  v. 
Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.,  138  S.W.2d 
526,  135  Tex  67. 

78.  Tex. — Edmiston  v.   Texas  &  N. 
O.  R.  Co.,  supra— Hines  v.  Parks, 
96  S.W.2d  970,  128  Tex  289— Lath- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§60 


special  issue  jury  findings  is  of  a  character  sim- 
ilar to  that  of  a  motion  for  judgment  notwithstand- 
ing the  entire  verdict  ;?9  it  is  a  motion  for  judg- 
ment notwithstanding  a  part  of  the  verdict,80  and 
often  is  referred  to  as  a  motion  for  a  judgment  non 
obstante  veredicto.81 

d.  On  Point  Reserved 

Under  the  practice  In  some  jurisdictions  judgment 
notwithstanding  the  verdict  may  be  entered  according 
to  the  court's  decision  on  a  reserved  point  of  law. 

The  practice  prevails  in  some  jurisdictions  of  tak- 
ing a  verdict  subject  to  the  decision  of  a  reserved 
point  of  law  by  the  court;  the  judgment  is  then  en- 
tered for  one  party  or  the  other  according  to  the 
decision  of  the  reserved  point82  Where  the  ver- 
dict of  the  jury  and  the  decision  by  the  court  of 
the  point  reserved  are  both  in  favor  of  plaintiff, 
the  judgment  should  be  entered  for  plaintiff  on  the 
verdict,  and  not  on  the  point  reserved83  Where 
the  verdict  is  for  plaintiff,  and  the  reserved  point 
is  determined  for  defendant,  the  judgment  is  en- 
tered for  defendant  non  obstante  veredicto.8* 
Where  the  verdict  is  for  defendant,  a  judgment  can- 
not be  rendered  for  plaintiff,  although  the  point  re- 
served is  determined  in  his  favor,  as  in  such  case 
there  is  nothing  to  support  the  judgment,85  and  a 
fortiori  defendant  is  entitled  to  judgment  on  the 


verdict  where  the  point  reserved  is  also  determined 
in  his  favor.86  Where  it  is  uncertain  whether  the 
jury  found  their  verdict  on  the  facts  relating  to 
which  the  question  of  law  was  reserved  or  on  other 
facts  also  submitted  to  them,  a  judgment  non  ob- 
stante veredicto  may  not  be  rendered.87  A  statute 
providing  that,  where  a  party  requests  a  directed 
verdict,  the  court  may  reserve  its  decision  and  sub- 
mit the  case  to  the  jury  and  then  enter  a  judgment 
non  obstante  veredicto  if  the  verdict  is  against  the 
party  making  the  request  has  no  application  where 
the  verdict  is  for  the  party  making  the  request,  and 
an  order  granting  a  motion  for  judgment  non  ob- 
stante veredicto  in  such  case  is  a  nullity.88 

Nature  of  questions  reserved.  The  point  re- 
served must  be  solely  a  question  of  law,  and  a 
question  of  fact  or  a  mixed  question  of  law  and 
fact  may  not  be  reserved.89  The  question  whether 
there  is  any  evidence  in  the  case  to  support  a  re- 
covery is  a  question  of  law  and  may  be  reserved, 
but  the  question  whether  there  is  sufficient  evidence 
to  support  a  recovery  where  the  evidence  is  con- 
flicting may  not  be  reserved.90  The  reservation 
may  not  be  as  to  whether  on  the  whole  case  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  recover.91 

Sufficiency  of  reservation.  The  reservation  of 
controlling  legal  questions  should  always  be  made 


am  v.  Coca-Cola  Bottling  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  175  S.W.2d  426— Dedear  v. 
James,  Civ.App.,  172  S.W.2d  535, 
error  refused — Gatlin  v.  South- 
western .  Settlement  &  Develop- 
ment Corporation,  Civ. App.,  166  S. 
"W.2d  150,  error  refused — Walker 
v.  Scott,  Civ.App.,  164  S.W.2d  586, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Scott 
v.  Walker,  170  S.W.2d  718,  141  Tex. 
181— Bailey  v.  Walker,  Civ.App., 
163  S.W.2d  864,  error  refused — 
Perry  v.  Citizens  Life  Ins.  Co., 
Civ.App..  163  S.W.2d  743— Happ  v. 
Happ,  Civ.App.,  160  S.W.2d  227, 
error  refused — Rudolph  v.  Smith, 
Civ.App.,  1'48  S.W.2d  225— Jenni- 
•son  v.  Darnielle,  Civ. App.,  146  S. 
TV.2d  788,  error  dismissed — Corona 
Petroleum  Co.  v.  Jameson,  Civ. 
App.,  146  S.W.2d  €12,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Amer- 
ican Nat.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sutton,  Civ. 
App.,  130  S.W.2d  441— Phlying  v. 
•Security  Ben.  Ass'n,  Civ.App.,  129 
S.W.2d  358,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Friske  v.  Graham, 
•Civ.App.,  128  S.W.2d  139— Lewis  v. 
Martin,  Civ.App.,  120  S.W.2d  910, 
error  refused — Traders  &  General 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Milliken,  Civ.App.,  110 
;S.W.2d  108 — Howard  v.  Howard, 
•Civ.App.,  102  S.W.2d  473,  error  re- 
fused— Jordan  v.  City  of  Lub- 
•bock,  Civ.App.,  88  S.W.2d  560,  er- 
ror dismissed — Bell  v.  Henson,  Civ. 


App.,  74  S.W.2d  455,  error  dis- 
missed—Smith v.  El  Paso  &  N.  B. 
B.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  67  S.W.2d  362, 
error  dismissed — Coleman  v.  Hollo, 
Civ.App.,  50  S.W.2d  391,  error  dis- 
missed. 

79.  Tex. — Myers   v.    Crenshaw,    137 
S.W.2d  7, 134  Tex.  500. 

80.  Tex. — Myers    v.    Crenshaw,    su- 
pra. 

81.  Tex. — Myers   v.    Crenshaw,    su- 
pra. 

82.  Mich. — Forman     v.     Prudential 
Ins.    Co.    of    America,    16    N.W.2d 
696,  310  Mich.  145— Cullen  v.  Voor- 
hies,  205  N.W.  177,  232  Mich,  420. 

N.T.— Schaffer  v.  Schaffer,   269  N.*. 

S.  288,  241  App.Div.  687. 
Pa. — Bckenrode  v.  Produce  Trucking 

Co.,   Com.Pl.t   49    Dauph.Co.    271 — 

Wanamaker  v.  Beamesderf  er,  3  Feu 

Dist  &  Co.  6-99,  26  Dauph.Co.  120. 
33  C.J.  p  1186  note  60. 
Effect  of  finding1 

Jury's  finding  had  no  effect  on 
motion  for  judgment  notwithstand- 
ing verdict  where  motion  lor  direct- 
ed verdict,  reserved  under  statute, 
was  made  before  submission  to  jury. 
—King  v.  Bird,  222  N.W.  183,  245 
Mich.  93. 
Statute  authorizing  practice  held,  not 

repealed 
Mich.— Vandenberg  v.  Kaat,   233  N* 

W.  220,  252  Mich,  187. 

173 


83.  Pa. — Ringle  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.,    30    A.    492,    16»4    Pa.    529,    44 
Am.S.R.  628. 

83  C.J.  p  1186  note  61. 

84.  U.S.— Goehrig    v.    Stryker,    C.C. 
Pa.,  174  P.  897. 

Pa.— Hays  v.  Oil  City,  11  A.  63,  8  Pa. 
Cas.  185. 

85.  Pa. — Ringle  v.  Pennsylvania  It 
Co.,  30  A.  492,  164  Pa.  529,  44  Am. 
S.R.  628. 

33  C.J.  p  1186  note  63. 

86.  U.S.— Bohem  v.  Atlantic  City  R. 
Co.,  aC.Pa.,  174  F.  302. 

87.  Pa,— Keifer  v.  Bldred  Tp.,  20  A, 
'592,  110  Pa,  1. 

88.  Mich.— Jonescu  v.  Orlich,  189  N. 
W.  919,  220  Mich.  89. 

89.  U.S. — Casey      v.      Pennsylvania 
Asphalt  Pav.    Co.,  'C.CJ.Pa.,    109   F. 
744,  affirmed  144  F.  189,  52  C.C.A. 
145. 

Fla. — Corpus  Juris  cited,  la  Talley  v. 

McCain,  174  So.  8*41,  842,  128  Fla. 

418. 
33  C.J.  p  1186  note  66. 

90.  Pa.— Butts  v.  Armor,  30  A.  357, 
164  Pa.  73,  26  LJLA.  213. 

38  C.J.  p  1187  note  67. 

91.  Pa.— Keifer   v.    Bldred    Tp.t    20 
A.  592,  110  Pa.  1— Clark  v.  Wilder, 
25  Pa.  314. 

33  OJ.  p  1187  note  6*. 


60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


a  matter  of  record  at  the  time,  and  the  record  must 
show  the  question  of  law  distinctly  stated  and 
properly  reserved.^  The  facts,  as  well  as  the 
questions  of  law  arising  thereon  which  are  reserved, 
must  be  stated  in  the  record.93 

e.  On  Special  Findings  against  General  Ver- 

dict 

A  judgment  on  the  special  findings  of  a  jury,  but 
against  their  genera!  verdict,  is  not  really  a  judgment 
non  obstante  veredlcto,  although  often  inaccurately  so 
called. 

A  judgment  on  the  special  findings  of  a  jury,  but 
against  their  general  verdict,  is  not  really  a  judg- 
ment non  obstante  veredicto,  although  often  inac- 
curately so  called.  A  motion  for  judgment  non  ob- 
stante veredicto  is  a  motion  for  judgment  on  the 
pleadings  without  regard  to  the  verdict ;  but  a  mo- 
tion for  a  judgment  on  the  special  finding  of  the 
facts,  notwithstanding  the  general  verdict,  has  no 
reference  whatever  to  the  pleadings  in  the  cause, 
and  proceeds  on  the  theory  that  the  special  finding 
of  facts  by  the  jury  is  so  inconsistent  with  their 
general  verdict  that  the  former  should  control  the 
latter  and  the  court  should  give  judgment  accord- 
ingly.94  The  practice  in  respect  of  special  findings 
is  considered  in  the  CJ.S.  title  Trial  §§  563,  564, 
also  64  CJ.  p  1177  note  94  et  seq. 

f.  In  Particular  Proceedings 

The  rules  regulating  the  granting  of  motions  for 
judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  apply  generally  to 
proceedings  in  which  issues  were  submitted  to,  and  .de- 
termined by,  a  jury. 

The  rules  regulating  the  granting  of  motions  for 
judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  have  been 
held  to  be  applicable  to  probate  proceedings  tried 
before  a  jury95  and  to  condemnation  proceedings 


where  a  jury  was  demanded  and  not  waived,96  but 
they  have  been  held  not  to  apply  to  a  case  tried 
by  the  court  without  a  jury97  or  in  an  equity  suit 
with  respect  to  a  jury's  verdict  which  is  merely 
advisory,98  although  it  has  also  been  held  that 
judgment  in  an  equitable  action  submitted  on  the 
pleadings  should  go  for  the  party  entitled  thereto 
by  the  pleadings  notwithstanding  the  verdict  against 
him,99  and  that  the  trial  court  has  power  to  enter 
judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  in  a  law  ac- 
tion where  defendant  invoked  the  equity  powers  of 
the  court  so  that  the  jury's  verdict  was  merely  ad- 
visory.1 Also  the  rule  has  been  held  inapplicable 
to  issues  submitted  to,  but  not  found  by,  the  ju- 
ry,2 or  where  there  was  no  verdict,3  as  where  the 
court  rendered  judgment  after  the  jury  disagreed  as 
to  issues  submitted  to  them  and  were  discharged.4 
Where,  in  accordance  with  the  rules  stated  supra 
subdivision  a  of  this  section,  the  motion  is  based 
wholly  on  defective  pleadings,  a  motion  for  judg- 
ment notwithstanding  the  verdict  is  inappropriate 
in  a  proceeding  where  no  formal  pleadings  are  re- 
quired or  had,5  and  a  denial  of  the  motion  has  been 
held  not  to  be  error  in  a  case  in  which  a  general 
denial  to  allegations  of  a  claim  is  interposed  by  op- 
eration of 


g.  Amount  of  Verdict 

A  motion  for  Judgment  In  a  larger  amount  than  the 
verdict  Is  a  motion  non  obstante  veredicto  and  may  be 
granted  in  some  Jurisdictions  where  under  the  pleadings 
and  proof  the  plaintiff  i&  entitled  to  the  larger  amount 
if  entitled  to  recover  at  all;  but  the  fact  that  the  amount 
of  the  verdict  is  inadequate  or  excessive  does  not  war- 
rant judgment  for  the  opposite  party  notwithstanding 
the  verdict. 

A  motion  for  judgment  in  a  larger  amount  than 
the  verdict  is  a  motion  non  obstante  veredicto  al- 
though not  so  designated.7  At  common  law  and 


92.  Pa. — Buckley  v.  Duff,  8  A.  823, 
111  Pa.  223. 

33  C.J.  p  1187  note  69.       , 

93.  Pa, — Buckley  v.  Duff,  supra. 
33  C.J.  p  1187  note  70. 

94.  Conn. — Gesualdi   v.   Connecticut 
Co.,  41  A.2d  771,   131  Conn.   622. 

Kan. — Packer  v.  Fairmont  Creamery 
Co.,  146  P.2d  401,  158  Kan.  191. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Okla- 
homa Gas  &  Electric  Co.  v.  Busha, 
66  P.2d  64,  67,  179  Okl.  505. 

33  C.J.  p  1187  note  71. 

95.  Cal. — In    re    Hettermann's    Es- 
tate,   119    P.2d   788,   48    Cal.App.2d 
263. 

The  word  "Judgment"  in  rule  re- 
lating- to  judgment  notwithstanding 
verdict  has  no  narrow,  technical 
meaning,  and  it  includes  a  decision 
or  determination  on  issues  from 
orphans'  court  or  in  any  other  pro- 


ceeding at  law,  corresponding  to  a 
judgment  in  ordinary  action  at  law. 
— Schmeizl  v.  Schmeizl,  Md.,  42  A.2d 
1,06. 

90.  Cal. — City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco,  271  P.  121,  94  Cal.App. 
818. 

97.  111. — Heardon  v.  Abraham  Lin- 
coln Life  Ins.  Co.,  7  N.E.2d  388, 
288  Ill.App.  633. 

98;    111. — 'Shipman  v.  Moseley,  49  N. 

E.2d  662,  319  IlLApp.  4*43. 
Okl.— Luke    v.    Patterson,    139    P.2d 

175,    192    Okl.    631,   48   A.L.R.    679. 
S.D. — South  Dakota  Wheat  Growers' 

Ass'n  v.  Sieler,  230  N.W.  80$,  57  S. 

D.  101. 

99.  •  Ky. — First  Nat  Bank  of  Jack- 
son v.  Strong,  15  S.W.2d  477,  228 
Ky.  604.  * 

174 


1.  Neb. — Oft   v.    Dornacker,    269    N. 
W.  418,  131  Neb.  644. 

Wash. — Benedict  v.  Hendrickson,  143 
P.2d  326,  1-9  Wash.2d  452. 

2.  Tex. — Miller  v.  Fenner,  Beane  & 
Ungerleider,    Civ.App.,     89    S.W.2d 
506,  error  dismissed — Handy  v.  Ol- 
ney  Oil  &  Refining  Co.,  Civ.App., 
68  'S.W.2d  313,  error  refused. 

3.  Tex. — Fitts    v.     Carpenter,     Civ. 
App.,  124  S.W.2d  420. 

4.  Tex. — Slay  v.  Burnett  Trust,  187 
S.W.2d    377,    143    Tex,     621— Fitts 
v.  Carpenter,  Civ.App.,  124  S.W.2d 
420. 

5.  Mo. — Meffert  v.   Lawson,    287   S. 
W.  610,  315  Mo.  1091. 

6.  Iowa. — In    re    Larimer's    Estate, 
283  N.W.   430,   225   Iowa  1067. 

7.  Colo.— De  Boer   v..  Olmsted,    260 
P.  108,  82  Colo.  369. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


60 


under  some  statutes  plaintiff  who  has  recovered  a 
verdict  cannot  have  judgment  non  obstante  vere- 
dicto  for  a  greater  amount.8  Such  a  judgment  has 
been  held  proper,  however,  where  under,  the  plead- 
ings and  proof  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  the  larger 
amount  if  he  is  entitled  to  recover  at  all,9  but  the 
court  cannot  render  such  judgment  where  plaintiff 
is  not  entitled  under  the  pleadings  and  proof  to  re- 
cover the  larger  amount,10  it  being  held  that  such 
judgment  may  be  entered  only  where  the  evidence 
supporting  it  is  un contradicted  and  unimpeached 
so  that  a  verdict  could  have  been  entered  in  the  ex- 
act amount  of  the  judgment11  Failure  of  the  court 
to  grant  a  new  trial  has  been  held  to  furnish  no 
ground  for  entry  of  judgment  for  the  amount  of 
damages  claimed  notwithstanding  a  verdict  for  a 
smaller  amount.12 

The  fact  that  a  verdict  is  rendered  for  an  amount 
much  smaller  than  that  to  which  the  party  is  enti- 
tled, if  entitled  to  recover  at  all,  has  been  held  not 
to  be  sufficient  to  entitle  the  opposite  party  to  a 


judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  unless  such 
party  is  entitled  to  a  judgment  on  the  pleadings 
without  regard  to  such  verdict.18  The  fact  that 
the  verdict  is  excessive  does  not  warrant  judg- 
ment for  defendant  notwithstanding  the  verdict14 

h.  Party  Entitled 

At  common  law  only  the  plaintiff  could  move  for  a 
judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict,  but  under  the 
prevailing  modern  practice  either  the  plaintiff  or  the 
defendant  may  have  such  a  judgment  in  a  proper  case. 

At  common  law  a  judgment  non  obstante  veredic- 
to  could  be  entered  only  on  the  application  of  plain- 
tiff for  judgment  in  his  favor,  and  never  in  favor  of 
defendant.15  Where  plaintiffs  pleadings  would  not 
support  a  judgment  on  a  verdict  in  his  favor,  de- 
fendant's sole  remedy  was  by  motion  in  arrest  of 
judgment.16  By  virtue  either  of  statute  or  relaxa- 
tion of  the  early  common-law  rule,  however,  the 
generally  prevailing  rule  now  is  that  either  plaintiff 
or  defendant  may  have  a  judgment  non  obstante 
veredicto  in  a  proper  case.17 


8,  Or. — Snyder     v.     Portland     Ry., 
Light  &  Power  Co.,  215  P.  887,  107 
Or,  673. 

Interest 

(1)  In  the  absence  of  any  provi- 
sion   therefor    in    the    statutes    em- 
powering  the    court   to   enter  judg- 
ment   notwithstanding    the    verdict, 
the  court  is  without  power  to  en- 
ter    judgment      including     interest 
where  the  jury's  verdict  allowed  re- 
covery    without    interest. — Daly    v. 
Savage,   160  N.E.   881,   27  Ohio  App. 
133. 

(2)  Allowance  of  interest  general- 
ly see  supra  §  58. 

9,  Ariz. — Fornara  v.  Wolpe,   226   P. 
203,  26  Ariz.  383. 

111.— Paschall  v.  Reed,  51  N.E.2d 
842,  320  IlLApp.  390. 

N.D. — Fargo  Loan  Agency  v.  Lar- 
son, 207  N.W.  1003,  53  N.D.  621. 

Pa.— Stierheim  v.  Bechtold,  43  A.2d 
916,  168  Pa.Super.  107. 

10,  Ark. — Moore  v.   Rogers  Whole- 
sale   Grocery    Co.,    8    S.W.2d    457, 
177  Ark.  993— Fulbright  v.  Phipps, 
3   S.W.2d  49,   176  Ark.   356. 

Kan. — Manhardt    v.    'Sheridan's    Es- 
tate, 92  P.2d  76,  150  Kan.  264. 
Wash. — Richey     &     Gilbert     Co.     v. 
Northwestern  Natural  Gas  Corpo- 
ration,   134    P.2d   444,  16  Wash.2d 
631. 
Conflicting1  evidence 

Judgment  notwithstanding  verdict 
for  amount  larger  than  awarded 
plaintiff,  is  unauthorized  under  con- 
flicting evidence  sufficient  to  support 
verdict  for  either  party. — McGuire  & 
Cavender  v.  Robertson,  32  S.W.2d 
624,  182  Ark.  759. 

J.L  Colo. — Peterson  v,  Rawalt,  86 
P.2d  465,  95  Colo.  368. 


12.  'Ark. — Powers    v.    Wood     Parts 
Corporation,    44    S.W.2d    324,    184 
Ark.  1032. 

13.  Okl.— Dill   v.    Johnston,    222    P. 
507,   94   Okl.   264— Hyatt  v.  Vinita 
Brass  Works,   214  P.   706,   89   Okl. 
171. 

.14,  Pa.— Darlington  v.  Bucks  Coun- 
ty Public  Service  Co.,  154  A.  501, 
303  Pa.  288— Long  v.  Great  At- 
lantic &  Pacific  Tea  Co.,  Com.Pl., 
29  Del.Co.  512. 

33  C.J.  p  1184  note  50  [a]   (1). 

15.  U.S. — Newton  v.  Glenn,  C.C.A. 
Miss.,  149  F.2d  879. 

Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  City  of 
Birmingham  v.  Andrews,  132  So. 
877,  222  Ala.  362. 

Colo.— David  v.  Gilbert,  274  P.  821, 
85  Colo.  184. 

Fla.— Tolliver  v.  Loftin,  21  So.2d 
359 — Peavy-Wilson  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Baker,  4  So.2d  333,  148  Fla.  296— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dudley  v. 
Harrison,  McCready  &  Co.,  173  So. 
820,  823,  127  Fla.  687,  rehearing 
denied  174  So.  729,  128  Fla.  338 
— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Atlantic 
Coast  Line  R.  Co.  v.  Canady,  165 
So.  629,  630,  122  Fla.  447. 

111.— McNeill  v.  Harrison  &  Sons,   2 

,  N.B.2d  959,  .286  IlLApp.  120— Illi- 
nois Tuberculosis  Ass'n  v.  Spring- 
field Marine  Bank,  282  Ill.App.  14 
— Capelle  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  280  IlLApp.  471— Royal  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Garfield  Sanitary  Felt  Co., 
238  IlLApp.  425. 

Ind.— Inter  State  Motor  Freight  Sys- 
tem v.  Henry,  38  N.E.2d  909,  111 
Ind.App.  179. 

Mo.— Meffert  v.  Lawson,  287  S.W. 
610,  315  Mo.  1091— Blodgett  v. 
Koenig,  284  S.W.  505,  314  Mo.  262 

175 


—First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dunbar,  72 
S.W.2d  821,  230  Mo.App.  687. 

N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Respond 
v.  Decker,  162  A.  72S,  726,  109  N.J. 
Law  458. 

N.C. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Johnson 
v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  14 
S.E.2d  405,  406,  219  N.C.  445— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Jernigan  v. 
•  Neighbors,  141  S.B.  586,  195  N.C. 
231. 

Or. — Snyder  v.  Portland  Ry.,  Light 
&  Power  Co.,  215  P.  887,  107  Or. 
673. 

Vt.— Nadeau  v.  St  Albans  Aerie  No. 
1205,  Fraternal  Order  of  Eagles, 
26  A.2d  93,  113  Vt.  397— Johnson 
v.  Hardware  Mut.  Casualty  Co.,  1 
A.2d  817,  109  Vt  481. 

33  C.J.  p  1179  note  14. 

18.  U.S. — Newton  v.  Glenn,  C.C.A. 
Miss.,  1'49  F.2d  879. 

Fla. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Weis- 
Patterson  Lumber  Co.  v.  King, 
177  So.  313,  321,  131  Fla.  342— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dudley  v. 
Harrison,  McCready  &  Co.,  173  So. 
820,  823,  127  Fla.  687,  rehearing 
denied  174  So.  729,  128  Fla.  338. 

Ind. — Inter  State  Motor  Freight  Sys- 
tem v.  Henry,  38  N.B.2d  909,  111 
Ind.App.  179. 

Mo.— Blodgett  v.  Koenig,  284  «S.W. 
505,  314  Mo.  262— First  Nat  Bank 

•  v.  Dunbar,  72  S.W.2d  821,  230 
Mo. App.  687. 

N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Respond 
v.  Decker,  162  A.  725,  726,  109 
N.J.Law  458. 

33  C.J.  p  1179  note  15. 

Arrest  of  judgment  see  infra  §§  87- 
99. 

17.    Ala. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
City  of  Birmingham   v.   Andrews, 
.     132  So.  877,  222  Ala,  362. 


§60 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


Joint  defendants.  Where  there  is  a  verdict 
against  two  or  more  joint  defendants,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  court  may  enter  a  judgment  notwith- 
standing the  verdict  in  favor  of  one  of  them  and 
refuse  such  judgment  as  to  the  others.18 

i.  Waiver  and  Estoppel 

The  right  to  move  for  a  Judgment  notwithstanding 
the  verdict  may  be  waived. 

The  right  to  move  for  a  judgment  non  obstante 
veredicto  may  be  waived,19  as  by  failing  to  assert 
it,20  and  it  is  waived  where  a  material  issue  found 
by  the  verdict  was  litigated  by  acquiescence  or  con- 
sent, although  not  pleaded;21  but  it  is  not  waived 
by  failing  to  demur  to  an  insufficient  pleading,22 
by  asking  for  a  peremptory  instruction,2^  by  asking 
for  a  stay  of  proceedings  after  verdict,24  or  by  the 
filing  of  a  motion  for  a  new  trial.2**  Parties  re- 
questing submission  of  special  issues  are  not  es- 
topped to  urge  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto.26 

Ark. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in     Oil 

Fields    Corporation  v.  Cubage,   24 

S.W.2d   328,    329,    180   Ark.    1018. 
Conn. — Gesualdi   v.    Connecticut  Co., 

41  A.2d  771,  131  Conn.  622. 
111.— Farmer    v.    Alton    Building    & 

Loan  Ass'n,  13  N.E.2d  652,  294  111. 

App.      206— Illinois      Tuberculosis 

Ass'n  v.  Springfield  Marine  Bank, 

283    IlLApp.    14— Capelle    v.    Chi- 
cago &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  280  IlLApp. 

471, 
Ind.— Inter      State     Motor     Freight 

System  v.   Henry.   38   N.E.2d   909, 

111  Ind.App.  179. 
Minn.— Bolstad   v.   Paul  Bunyan  Oil 

Co.,  9  N.W.2d  346,  21'5  Minn.  166— 

Brossard  v.    Koop,   274   N.W.    241, 

200  Minn.  410. 
N.C. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Johnson 

v.    Metropolitan   Life   Ins.  Co.,    1'4 

S.E.2d    405,     406,    219    N.O.    445— 

Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Jernigan  v. 

Neighbors,    141   S.B.   586,   195  N.C. 

231. 
Ohio.— Miller  v.   Star  Co.,   15  N.E.2d 

151,   57   Ohio   App.   485— Thompson 

v.  Rutledge,  168  N.3D.  547,  32  Ohio 

App.  537. 
Vt— Nadeau  v.  St.  Albans  Aerie  No. 

1205,    Fraternal    Order    of   Eagles, 

26   A.2d   93,    112   Vt.   397— Johnson 

v.  Hardware  Mut.  Casualty  Co.,  1 

A.2d  817,  109  Vt.  481. 
33  C.J.  p  1179  note  17-p  1180  note  19. 
Circumstances  under  which  plaintiff 

or  defendant  may  have   judgment 

notwithstanding    the   verdict    gen- 
erally see  supra  subdivision  a  of 

this  section. 


§  61.    Motion  for  Judgment 

a.  In  general 

b.  Time  for  motion 

c.  Notice  of  motion  and  hearing  thereon 

d.  Form  and  requisites 

c.  Hearing  and  determination  of  motion 

a.  In  General 

A  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict 
must  be  made  In  the  trial  court  by  the  party  entitled 
thereto,  and  the  motion  may  request,  In  the  alternative, 
a  new  trial. 

A  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  ver- 
dict must  be  made  in  the  trial  court,27  by  the  party 
entitled  thereto,28  and  be  served  on  the  adverse 
party  in  accordance  with  statutory  requirements.29 
It  is  not  the  duty  of  the  court  so  to  reward  a  liti- 
gant on  its  own  motion,30  although  it  has  been  held 
that  the  trial  court  may  act  on  its  own  motion.31 


18.  Pa. — Lang  v.  Hanlon,  157  A. 
7S8,  305  Pa.  378,  followed  in  157 
A.  790,  two  cases,  305  Pa.  385,  and 
157  A.  791,  305  Pa.  385— Wright  v. 
City  of  Scranton,  194  A.  10,  128  Pa, 
Super.  185 — Brown  v.  George  B. 


Newton  Coal  Co.,  Com.PL,  28  Del. 
Co.  23. 

19.  Ky.— Hack  v.  Lashley,  245  S.W. 
851,  197  Ky.  117. 

OkL— Montie  Oil  Co.  v.  Nichols,  224 

P.  542,  98  OkL  75. 
33  C.J.  p  1183  note  40. 

20.  Ky.— Hack  v.  Lashley,  245  S.W. 
851,  197  Ky.  117. 

21.  Iowa. — Birmingham    Sav.    Bank 
of  Birmingham  v.  Keller,  215  N.W. 
649,  205  Iowa  271,  opinion  correct- 
ed on  other  grounds  on  rehearing 
217  N.W.  874,   206  Iowa  271, 

Kan. — Thogmartin  v.  Koppel,    65   P. 

2d  571,  145  Kan.  347. 
Neo. — Lebron    Electrical    Works    v. 

Pizinger,    270   N.W.   683,   132   Neb. 

164. 
Pa.— Ogden  v.  Belfield,  82  Pa.Super. 

534. 
33  C.J.  p  1183  note  41. 

22.  Iowa. — Persia  Sav.  Bank  v.  Wil- 
son,  243  N.W.   581,   214  Iowa  993. 

23.  Ky.— Roe  v.  Gentry's  Ex'x,  162 
S.W.2d  208,  290  Ky.  598. 

24.  Mich. — Powers    v.    Vaughan,    20 
N.W.2d  196,  312  Mich.  297. 

25.  Iowa. — Cownie  v.  Kopf,   202  N. 
W.  517,  199  Iowa  737. 

Ohio.— Massachusetts  Mut  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Hauk,  51  N.E.2d  30,  72 
Ohio  App.  131. 

26.  Tex. — HIghtower  v.  Pruitt,  Civ. 
App.,    77    S.W.Sd    754,    error    dis- 
missed. 

27.  N.D.— Coughlin    v.    -SEtna    Life 
Ins.    Co.,    194    N.W.    661,    49    N.D. 
948. 

Pa. — West  v.  Manatawny  Mut.  Fire 
&  Storm  Ins.  Co.,  120  A.  763,  277 
Pa.  102. 

Tex. — Edmiston  v.  Texas  &  N.  O.  R. 
Co.,  138  S.W.2d  526,  135  Tex.  67— 
Southland  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Barrett, 

176 


Civ.App.,  172  S.W.2d  997,  error  re- 
fused— D-Bar  Ranch  v.  Maxwell, 
Civ.App.,  170  S.W.2d  303,  error 
refused — Rudolph  v.  Smith,  Civ. 
App.,  148  S.W.2d  225— McCaskill  v. 
Davis,  Civ.App.,  134  S.W.2d  738 — 
Phlying-  v.  Security  Ben.  Ass'n, 
Civ.App.,  129  S.W.2d  358,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Texas 
Employers'  Ins.  Ass'n  v.  Bauer. 
Civ.App.,  128  S.W.2d  840,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Valley 
Dredging  -Co.  v.  Sour  Lake  State 
Bank,  Civ.App.,  120  S.W^d  875, 
error  dismissed — Buford  v.  Con- 
nor, Civ.App.,  118  S.W.2d  451— 
James  v.  Texas  Employers  Ins. 
Ass'n,  Clv.App.,  -96  S.W.2d  425, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Texas 
Employers'  Ins.  Ass'n  v.  James, 
118  S.W.2d  29-3,  131  Tex.  60S— 
Jordan  v.  City  of  Lubbock,  Civ. 
App.,  88  S.W.2d  560,  error  dismiss- 
ed— Amarillo  Transfer  &  Storage 
Co.  v.  De  Shong,  Civ.App.,  82  S.W. 
2d  381 — Coleman  v.  Hollo,  Civ. 
App.,  50  S.W.2d  391,  error  dis- 
missed. 

33  C.J.  p  1187  note  73. 

28-  Ky. — Hack  v.  Lashley,  245  Sj. 
W.  851,  197  Ky.  117. 

Party  entitled  see  supra   §   60  h. 

29.  Tex. — Seastrunk  v.  Walker,  Civ. 
App.,  156  S.W.2d  996,  error  refused 
—Citizens  State  Bank  of  Houston 
V.  Giles,  Civ.App.,  145  'S.W.2d  899, 
error  dismissed. 

30.  Ky.— Hack  v.  Lashley,  245  S.W. 
851,  197  Ky.  117. 

31.  Cat — Goldenzwig    v.     Shaddock,. 
88  P.2d  933,  31  Cal.App.2d  719. 

Ohio. — Brooks   v.    Sentle,    68.  NJB.2d 

234,  74  Ohio  App.  231. 
33  C.J.  p  1187  note  75. 
In  Texas 

(1)  The  court  is  not  authorized  to 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


Alternative  motion  for  new  trial  The  motion 
for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict  does  not 
take  the  place  of  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,32  al- 
though a  party  may  make  his  motion  in  the  al- 
ternative, for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict 
or,  in  case  that  is  denied,  for  a  new  trial.8*  A  mo- 
tion asking  for  a  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto 
and  for  a  new  trial  cannot  be  granted  in  the  same 
case  and  between  the  same  parties,  since  they  are 
mutually  exclusive,8*  such  a  motion  will  be  treated 
as  though  filed  in  the  alternative.8^  The  movant  Is 
entitled  only  to  alternative  relief,^  and  the  action 
of  the  trial  court  in  sustaining  a  motion  for  judg- 
ment notwithstanding  the  verdict  after  granting  a 
new  trial  is  erroneous,3?  for,  where  the  trial  court 
grants  a  new  trial,  the  verdict  ceases  to  exist  and 
a  motion  for  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  can- 


§  61 


render  a  judgment  notwithstanding 
the  verdict  unless  its  Jurisdiction  so 
to  do  is  invoked  by  motion. — Hen- 
derson v.  Soash,  Civ.App.,  157  "S.W 
2d  161 — Great  American  Indemnity 
Co.  v.  Dabney,  Civ.App./  128  S.W.2d 
496,  error  dismissed,  Judgment  cor- 
rect—Valley Dredging  Co.  v.  Sour 
Lake  State  Bank,  Civ.App.,  120  S 
W.2d  875,  error  dismissed — Copeland 
v.  Brannan,  Civ.App.,  70  S.W.2d  660 
(2)  However,  Judgment  for  plain- 
tiff notwithstanding  verdict  for  de- 
fendants was  held  authorized,  even  in 
absence  of  proper  motion  and  no- 
tice thereof,  where  defendants  had 
notice  of  motion,  plaintiff  sought 
to  exclude  evidence  of  parol  agree- 
ment as  contradicting  defendants' 
written  guaranty  contract,  and  Jury 
found  no  fraud  in  execution  and  de- 
livery of  such  contract — Frank  L. 
Smith  Tire  Store  v.  Firestone  Tire 
&  Rubber  Co.,  Civ.App.,  68  $,W.2d 
577,  error  refused. 

82.  Ala. — City    of    Birmingham    v. 
Andrews,    132    So.    877,    222    Ala. 
862. 

Motion  for  new  trial  following  mo- 
tion for  Judgment  non  obstante 
veredicto  generally  see  the  C.J.S. 
title  New  Trial  §  5,  also  46  C.J. 
P  66  notes  16-18. 

83.  Minn.— McManus  v.  Duluth,  179 
N.W.  906,  147  Minn.  200. 

33  C.J.  p  1188  note  79. 

34.  Pa. — Manone    v.    Gulp,    39    A.2d 
1,   SSO   Pa.   319 — Boushelle  v.  Bal- 
timore   &    Ohio    R.    Co.,    Com.Pl., 
28  Del.Co.  160. 

35.  Pa,— Manone    v.    Culp,    39    A.2d 
1,  350  Pa.  319. 

33,  Okl, — Spruce  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
P.  Hy.  Co.,  281  P.  586,  139  Okl. 
123. 

37.  Okl.-JSpruce  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  supra. 

38.  Pa.— Cimino    v.    Laub,    43    A,2d 
446,  157  Pa.Super.  371 — German  v. 

49  O.  J.S.— 12 


not  be  granted,85  Also,  if  there  is  no  abuse  of  dis- 
cretion in  granting  a  new  trial,  it  is  not  error  to 
refuse  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto.39  It  has 
been  held,  however,  that  where,  following  judgment 
for  plaintiff,  defendants  file  a  motion  for  judgment 
notwithstanding  the  verdict,  and  also  a  motion  for 
a  new  trial,  the  trial  court  should  pass  on  both  mo- 
tions.40 

b.  Time  for  Motion 

A  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict 
must  be  made  within  the  time  limited  by  statute,  and 
should  generaiiy  be  made  before  entry  of  judgment  on 
the  verdict. 

A  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  ver- 
dict must  be  made  within  the  time  specified  by  stat- 
ute;41 if  the  motion  is  not  filed  within  such  time, 
the  verdict  of  the  jury  must  stand.42  The  motion 


Riddell,  27  A.2d  680,  149  Pa,Super. 
647* 

39.  Pa.— Athas  v.  Fort  Pitt  Brewing 
Co.,  157  A.  677,  305  Pa,  350— March 
v.    Philadelphia   &    West    Chester 
Traction  Co.,   132   A.   355,    285   Pa. 
413 — Blassotti   v.    Greensboro   Gas 
Co.,  96  iPa.Super.  162. 

40.  111.— Dahlberg   v.    Chicago    City 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  33  N.B.2d  747, 
310   IlLApp.    231— Bruro't  v.   Was- 
son,    3-3    N.B.2d    740,    310    IlLApp. 
264. 

Pa.— Wolon  v.  Welsh,  No.  2,  19  Pa, 
Dist.  &  Co.  322. 

41.  111.— Kauders  v.  Equitable  Life 
Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  19  N.E.2d  630, 
299  IlLApp.  152. 

Iowa.— In  re  Larimer's   Estate,    283 

N.W.    430,    225    Iowa    1067— Miller 

v.   Southern  Surety  Co.,  229  N.W. 

909,  209  Iowa  1221. 

*.— ' Pyle  v.    Finnessy,    118  A.   568, 

275  Pa.  54. 
Wash. — Hinz    v.    Crown    Willamette 

Paper  Co.,  27  iP.2d  576.  175  Wash. 

J15. 

Finality  of  judgment 

(1)  Under  some  statutes  an  action 
is  terminated  when  the  time  for  an 
appeal   from  the  Judgment  has   ex- 
pired, and  the  trial  court  has  no  au- 
thority   thereafter    to     entertain     a 
motion   for   judgment   notwithstand- 
ing  the   verdict   over   the   objection 
of  the  adverse  party,  unless  the  final 
character    has    been    suspended    by 
proceedings    commenced    within   the 
:ime  allowed  by  law  for  appeal  from 

the  judgment. — Bratberg  v.  Advance- 
Rumely  Thresher  Co.,  238  N.W.  552, 
61  N.D.  452,  78  A.L.R.  1338— Cough- 
in  v.  ^Btna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  194  N.W. 
661,  49  N.IX  948. 

(2)  The.  final  character  of  a  Judg- 
ment   is    not    suspended    because    a 
motion    for    a    directed    verdict    Is 
made   on  the   trial   of  the   cause. — 
Coughlin    v.    ^Btna    Life    Ins.    Co., 
mpra. 

177 


Motion  held  timely  as  filed  and 
served  within  two  days  after  verdict 
within  statutory  requirement,  where 
alternative  motion  for  judgment  not- 
withstanding, verdict  or  new  trial 
was  filed  the  day  following  return  of 
verdict  and  on  the  same  day  a  copy 
of  motion  was  mailed  to  opposing 
counsel  who  had  returned  to  his 
home  in  another  town,  although  op- 
posing counsel  did  not  accept  serv- 
ice of  motion  until  third  day  after 
verdict. — 'Mathers  v.  Stephens,  156 
P.2d  227,  22  Washed  364. 
Subsequent  term 

(1)  In    action    for    personal   Inju- 
ries   in   which   actual   and    punitive 
damages  were  sought,  and  Jury  re- 
turned verdict  for  punitive  damages 
only  and  motion  for  new  trial  was 
marked    "heard"    by    consent,    court 
was    without    jurisdiction    to    grant 
motion   for  Judgment  notwithstand- 
ing verdict   at    subsequent   term   at 

J  which  motion  was  made  for  first 
time.— Burns  v.  Babb,  3  S.E.2d  247, 
190  SvC.  508. 

(2)  Date  of  rendition  of  Judgment 
being  that  of  entry  at  term  succeed- 
ing trial  term,  motion  for  judgment 
notwithstanding    verdict    was    held 
properly  made  at  succeeding  term. — 
State  v.  Scott,  247  P.  699,   35  Wyo. 
108. 

Time  for  setting  aside  verdict 

Where  plaintiff's  motion  for  Judg- 
ment notwithstanding 'verdict  which 
found  plaintiff  guilty  of  negligence, 
was  urged  on  ground  that  as  a  mat- 
ter of  law  plaintiff  was  not  guilty 
of  negligence  under  evidence,  the 
motion  was,  in  effect,  one  to  set 
aside  verdict  for  insufficiency  of 
evidence  and,  therefore,  under  stat- 
ute, it  could  not  be  granted  by  trial 
court  after  expiration  of  statutory 
time  for  setting  aside  verdict. — Vol- 
land  v.  McGee,  294  N.W.  497,  236 
Wis.  858,  rehearing  denied  295  N. 
W.  635.  236  Wis.  358. 
42.  Wash. — Corbaley  v.  Pierce 


$61 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


aay,  of  course,  be  made  after  verdict,43  and  must 
>e  made  before  entry  of  judgment  on  the  verdict,44 
mless  motion  after  entry  of  judgment  on  the  ver- 
lict  is  authorized  by  statute45  or  a  valid  order  of 
:he  trial  court.46  The  right  to  be  heard  on  the  mo- 
ion  is  not  barred,  however,  by  reason  of  a  judg- 
nent  having  been  inadvertently  and  prematurely 
entered,47  the  trial  court  being  authorized  to  set 
aside  such  judgment  for  the  purpose  of  considering 
the  motion;48  and  it  may  be  assumed  where  the 
motion  was  granted  after  judgment  on  the  verdict 
that  the  former  judgment  was  vacated.49  The  mo- 
tion should  be  made  before  a  motion  for  a  new 
trial.50  After  the  verdict  has  been  set  aside,  a  mo- 


tion for  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  is  too 
late.« 

c.  Notice  of  Motion  and  Hearing  Thereon 

Unless;  waived,  reasonable  and  timely  notice  of  the 
motion  and  hearing  thereon  must  be  given  the  adverse 
party,  and  the  time  for  hearing  must  be  set. 

When  required  by  mandatory  statute,  the  adverse 
party  must  be  given  reasonable52  and  timely58  no- 
tice of  the  motion  and  hearing  thereon,  and  the 
time  for  hearing  must  be  set  ;54  but  such  notice  may 
be  waived  by  the  parties  by  express  agreement  or 
conduct  expressing  waiver  or  acquiescence.55  Fail- 
ure to  file  a  duly  served  notice  of  motion  with  the 
clerk  until  after  the  hearing  of  the  motion  does  not 
affect  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  hear  the  mo- 


County,    74    P.2d    993,    192    Wash. 
688. 

43.  Ark.— Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Oil 
Fields   Corporation   v.    Cubage,    24 
S.W.2d    328,    329,    180   Ark.    1018. 

Mo.— Meffert    v.    Lawson,    287    S.W. 

610,  315  Mo.  1091. 
33  C.J.  p  1187  note  76. 

44.  Ark.— Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Oil 
Fields   Corporation   v.    Cubage,    24 
S.W.2d    328,    329,    180    Ark.    1018 — 
Chaney   v.    Missouri   Pac.    R.    Co., 
267   S.W.   564,  167  Ark.   172. 

Cal. — Machado  v.  Weston,  14  P.2d 
907,  126  CaLApp.  661 — Corpus  Ju- 
ris cited  la  Cushman  v.  Cliff 
House,  250  P.  675,  576,  79  Cal.App. 
572. 

Fla. — Tolliver  y.  Loftin,  21  So.2d 
359— Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Talley 
v.  McCain,  174  So.  841,  843,  128 
Fla.  418 — Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Ed- 
gar v.  Bacon,  122  So.  107,  109,  97 
Fla.  679,  followed  In  Wright  v. 
Tatarian,  131  So.  13-3,  100  Fla. 
1366. 

Iowa. — Cownie  v.  Kopf,  202  N.W.  517, 
199  Iowa  737. 

Mo.— Meffert  v.  Lawson,  287  S.W. 
610,  315  Mo.  1091— Brown  &  Bige- 
low  v.  J.  F.  Laughestd  &  Co.,  App., 
118  S.W.2d  74. 

N.D.— Lemke  v.  (Merchants  Nat. 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  262  N.W.  246, 
66  N.D.  48— Corpus  Juris  cited  la 
Olson  v.  Ottertail  Power  Co.,  256 
N.W.  246,  247,  65  N.D.  4«,  95  A. 
Li.R.  418. 

Okl. — Peoples  Electric  Co-op,  v. 
Broughton,  127  P.2d  850,  191  Okl. 
229. 

S.D. — First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Thompson, 
227  N.W.  81,  55  'S.D.  629. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Rowan 
v.  Allen,  Civ.App.,  113  S.W.2d  322, 
323,  reversed  on  other  grounds 

.  134  S.W.2d  1022,  1*34  Tex  215— 
Robbins  v.  Robbins,  Civ.App.,  125 
S.W.2d  666. 

S3  C.J.  p  1187  note  77. 

45.  Cal.— Sales  v.   Stewart,  26  P.2d 
44,  134  Cal.App.  661. 


111.— Denny  v.  Goldblatt  Bros.,  18  N. 

E.2d    555,    298    Ill.App.    325. 
N.D. — Lemke      v.      Merchants     Nat. 

Bank  &  Trust  Co.,   262  N.W.  246, 

66  N.D.  48. 

48.  Iowa. — Pomerantz  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania-Dixie Cement  Corporation, 
237  N.W.  443,  212  Iowa  1007. 

47.  Ark. — Stanton       v.       Arkansas 
Democrat  Co.,  106  S.W.2d  584,  194 
Ark.  135. 

Mich. — Powers  v.  Vaughan,  20  N.W. 
2d  196,  312  Mich.  297— Forman 
v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of  America, 
16  N.W.2d  696,  310  Mich.  145. 

48.  Mich. — Powers    v.    Vaughan,    20 
N.W.2d    196,    312    Mich.    297— For- 
man    v.    (Prudential    Ins.    Co.    of 
America,  16  N.W.2d  696,  310  Mich. 
145 — Strausser  v.  Sovereign  Camp, 
W.  O.  W.,  278  N.W.  101,  283  Mich. 
370 — Freedman   v.   Burton,   274  N. 
W.  766,  281  Mich.  208. 

Prior  Judgment  nullified 

Where  clerk  entered  judgment  for 
plaintiff  on  verdict  and  thereafter 
the  court,  which  had  reserved  de- 
cision on  motion  for  a  directed  ver- 
dict, had  a  judgment  entered  for  de- 
fendant non  obstante  veredicto,  the 
judgment  for  defendant  was  a  nul- 
lification of  that  entered  for  plain- 
tiff.— Stanaback  v.  McFadden,  196  N. 
W.  5*26,  225  Mich,  452. 

49.  Ariz.— Watson  v.  Southern  Pac. 
Co.,  1-52  P.2d  665. 

5Q,    111.— Blair  v.  Modern  Woodmen 

of  America,  271  Hl.App.  121. 
3-3  C.J.  p  1188  note  78. 

51.  Minn.— Hemstad  v.   Hall*,   66  N. 
W.  366,  64  Minn.  136. 

52.  N.D. — Bratberg      v.       Advance- 
Rumely    Thresher    Co.,    238    N.W. 
552,    61  N.D.    452,    78   A.L.R.    1338. 

Tex.— Wheeler  v.  Wallace,  Civ.App., 
167  S.W.2d  1043— Bright  v.  Wie- 
land,  Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  372,  er- 
ror refused  128  S.W.2d  1137,  133 
Tex.  323 — Copeland  v.  Lampton, 
Civ.App.,  125  'S.W.2d  1110— Kaiser 

178 


v.   Newsom,    Civ.App.,    108    S.W.2d 

755,     error    dismissed — Gentry    v. 

Central  Motor  Co.,  Civ.App.,  100  S. 

W.2d     215— Amarillo     Transfer    & 

Storage  Co.  v.  De  Shong,  Civ.App., 

82  S.W.2d  381. 
What   constitutes   reasonable   notice 

Reasonatle  notice  of  filing  of  mo- 
tion for  judgment  non  obstante  vere- 
dicto, required  by  statute,  is  not  re- 
stricted to  service  of  notice  by  sher- 
iff, constable,  or  other  person  com- 
petent to  testify,  as  provided  else- 
where in  statute,  although  service 
by  such  persons  would  be  reasonable 
as  a  matter  of  law;  and,  where  copy 
of  motion  for  judgment  non  obstante 
veredicto  was  transmitted  by  mail, 
accepted  by  opposing  parties  who 
agreed  to  the  date  for  hearing,  ap- 
peared, and  at  no  time  questioned 
the  sufficiency  of  notice  prior  to 
judgment,  or  that  they  should  have 
been  served  in  writing  by  the  sher- 
iff, as  provided  by  statute,  and  who 
were  fully  prepared  in  time  for  the 
hearing  and  did  not  claim  to  have 
been  injured,  notice  was  reasonable 
within  contemplation  of  statute. — 
Johnson  v.  Moody,  Tex.Civ.App.,  104 
S.W.2d  583,  error  dismissed. 

53.  N.D. — Bratberg      v.       Advance- 
Rumely    Thresher    Co.,    238    N.W. 
552,    61    N.D.   452,    78    A.L.R.    1338. 

Tex.— D-Bar  Ranch  v.  Maxwell,  Civ. 
App.,  170  S.W.2d  303,  error  re- 
fused. 

Where  motioa  Is  filed  aad  preseat- 
ed  oa  same  date  without  waiver  of 
notice  by  the  adverse  party,  a  mo- 
tion for  judgment  notwithstanding 
verdict  should  be  overruled. — Rowan 
v.  Allen,  Civ.App.,  113  S.W.2d  322, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  134  S.W. 
2d  1022,  134  Tex.  215. 

54.  Tex. — Kaiser    v.    Newsom,    Civ. 
App.,    108   'S.W.2d    755,    error   dis- 
missed. 

55.  Tex; — Johnson    v.    Moody,    Civ. 
App.,    104    S.W.2d   583,    error    dis- 
missed. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  61 


tion  where  both  parties  were  present  by  their  coun- 
sel and  took  part  in  the  hearing  without  objec- 
tion.56 

d.  Form  and  Requisites 

A  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict 
must  sufficiently  disclose  Its  nature  and  apprise  the  court 
and  the  adverse  party  of  the  grounds  therefor  and  state 
the  reason  why  it  should  be  granted. 

Although  no  special  form  of  motion  or  notice  is 
required,57  the  motion  should  be  in  writing58  and 
must  sufficiently  disclose  its  nature59  and  apprise 
the  court  and  the  adverse  party  of  the  grounds 
therefor  and  state  the  reason  why  the  motion  should 
be  granted.60  A  motion  to  disregard  special  issue 
jury  findings  should  designate  the  findings  which 
the  court  is  called  on  to  disregard.61  A  motion 
which  is  too  broad,62  or  which  fails  to  point  out 
clearly  the  alleged  defect  in  the  pleading,  as  re- 
quired by  statute,63  may  properly  be  denied.  A 
motion  filed  by  all  defendants  may  be  read  in  con- 
nection with,  and  aided  by,  a  motion  filed  by  one 
defendant  where  defendants  are  making  a  common 
defense  and  both  motions  are  presented  to  the  court 
at  the  same  time.64  The  motion  may  be  amended 
when  authorized  by  the  trial  court  in  the  exercise 
of  its  discretion.65 


e.  Hearing  and  Determination  of  Motion 

The  court  should  rule  on  a  motion  for  Judgment  not- 
withstanding the  verdict  with  reasonable  promptness, 
and  may,  in  its  discretion,  refuse  to  permit  a  continu- 
ance thereof.  Statutory  requirements  as  to  procedure 
should  be  observed. 

The  court  should  rule  on  a  motion  for  judgment 
notwithstanding  the  verdict  with  reasonable  prompt- 
ness66 and  before  the  expiration  of  the  time  for 
appeal  ;67  but  it  has  been  held  that  the  trial  court 
does  not  lose  jurisdiction  to  enter  a  judgment  non 
obstante  veredicto  by  its  failure  to  make  a  decision 
on  the  motion  until  after  the  time  limited  by  court 
rule.68  The  motion  should  be  disposed  of  before 
a  motion  for  a  new  trial.69  It  has  been  held  that 
the  motion  may  not  be  heard  in  vacation,  in  the 
absence  of  an  agreement  of  the  parties  to  that  ef- 
fect.70 Refusal  to  permit  a  continuance  of  the  mo- 
tion is  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  judge.71 
When  required  by  statute,  the  trial  court  should 
have  all  the  evidence  taken  on  the  trial  duly  certi- 
fied and  enter  such  judgment  as  should  have  been 
entered  on  that  evidence,72  but  irregularity  in  fail- 
ing to  have  such  evidence  certified  before  entry  of 
judgment  has  been  held  to  be  cured  by  subsequent 
certification,  reargument,  reconsideration,  and  court 
order  affirming  the  original  judgment.73  On  plain- 


56.  Minn.— Wenell    v.    Shapiro,    260 
N.W.  503,  194  Minn.  368. 

57.  Tex.— JSheppard     v.     City     and 
County  of  Dallas  Levee  Improve- 
ment   Dist.,    Civ.App.,    112    S.W.2d 
253— Parks  v.  Hines,  Civ.App.,   68 
S.W.2d     364,     affirmed    Hines     v. 
Parks,    96    S.W.2d    970,    128    Tex. 
289. 

58-  Tex. — Hines  v.  Parks,  96  S.W.2d 
970,  128  Tex.  289 — Amarillo  Trans- 
fer &  Storage  Co.  v.  De  8hong, 
Civ.App.f  82  «S.W.2d  381. 

59.  Tex.— Amarillo       Transfer       & 
Storage  Co.  v.  De  Shong,  Civ.App., 
82  «.W.2d  381. 

60.  Tex. — Aman    v.    Cox,    Civ.App.» 
164  S.W.2d  744— Amarillo  Transfer 
&  Storage  Co.  v.  De  Bhong,  Civ. 
App.,     82     S.W.2d    381— Parks     v. 
Hines,  Civ.App.,  68  S.W.2d  364,  af- 
firmed Hines  v.  Parks,  96  S.W.2d 
970,  128  Tex.  289. 

Motion  held  sufficient 

IU.—Bicek  v.  Royall,  30  N.B.2d  747, 
307  IlLApp.  504. 

Tex. — Myers  v.  Crenshaw,  137  S.W. 
2d  7,  134  Tex.  500 — Becker  v.  Lind- 
sley,  Civ.App.,  154  S.W.2d  892,  er- 
ror refused— Walker  T.  Texas  & 
N.  O.  K.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  150  *S.W.2d 
853,  error  dismissed,  Judgment  cor- 
rect—Landers v.  Overaker,  Civ. 
App.,  141  S.W.2d  451,  error  dis- 
missed, Judgment  correct— Waiters 
v.  Southern,©.  S.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  113 
S.W.2d  320,  error  dismissed— Cosey 


v.    Supreme    Camp    of    American 

Woodmen,    Civ.App.,     103     S.W.2d 

.1076,  error  dismissed. 
Motion,  held  insufficient 
Iowa. — Dailey  v.  Standard  Oil  Co., 

235  N.W.  756,   213   Iowa  244. 

*    Tex.— Hines  v.  Parks,  96  S.W.2d 

970,  128  Tex.  289. 

62.  Minn.— Glencoe    Bank    v.    Cain, 
95    N.W.    308,    89    Minn.    473. 

33  C.J.  p  1188  note  84. 

63.  Iowa.— In  re  Larimer's   Estate, 
283    N.W.    430,    "225    Iowa    1067 — 
Cownie  v.  Kopf,  202  N.W.  517,  199 
Iowa  737. 

64.  Tex.— Myers    v.    Crenshaw,    137 
S.W.2d  7,  134  Tex  500. 

65.  Tex.— Johnson    v.    Moody,    Civ. 
App.,    104   S.W.2d   583,    error   dis- 
missed. 

66.  Iowa.— Nelson    v.    Conroy    Sav. 
Bank,  194  N.W.  204,  196  Iowa  391. 

67.  Iowa.— Nelson    v.    Conroy    Sav. 
Bank,  supra. 

68.  Mich.— Hart    v.     Grand     Trunk 
Western  R.  Co.,  270  N.W.  704,  278 
Mich.  343. 

Rule  construed  to  accomplish  pur- 
pose of  encouraging  speedy  ending 
of  litigation,  instead  of  requiring  re- 
trial of  long  case,  because  of  non- 
compliance  therewith,  when  result 
must  be  same.— Culjen  v.  Voorhies, 
205  N.W.  177,  23'2  Mich.  420. 

Failure  to  make  decision  on  mo- 
tion.  to  direct  verdict  until  after  re- 

179 


quired  time  does  not  divest  circuit 
court  of  jurisdiction  to  order  Judg- 
ment non  obstante. — Sliwinski  v. 
Gootstein,  208  N.W.  47,  234  Mich.  74. 
Alternative  motion  held  timely 
Wash. — Lasher  v.  Wheeler,  87  P.2d 
982,  198  Wash.  205. 

69.    111.— Stein  v.   Chicago   &   G.   T. 

H.  Co.,  41  IlLApp.  38. 
Ky.— Marshall  v.  Davis,  91  S.W.  714, 

122  Ky.  413,  28  Ky.L.  1327. 
33  C.J.  p  1188  note  78. 

70L    Iowa. — Scribner    v.    Rutherford, 

22  N.W.   670,   65  Iowa  551. 
Effect  of  agreement 

Where  counsel  for  both  parties,  in 
accordance  with  county  court  rule, 
filed  praecipes  directing  case  to  be 
placed  on  argument  list  on  particu- 
lar date  in  vacation,  and  single 
judge  presiding  at  motion  court 
while  other  judges  were  on  vacation 
heard  arguments  on  the  rules  for 
Judgment  non  obstante  veredicto 
without  objection  by  either  counsel 
defendant  could  not  object  that  mo- 
tion was  not  heard  by  court  in  bane. 
— O'Hara  v.  City  of  Scranton,  19  A. 
2d  114,  342  Pa,  137. 

71.  Mo. — Moller-Vandenboom    Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Boudreau,  85  S.W.2d  141, 
231  Mo.App.  1127. 

72.  Pa.— Balch    v.    Shick,    24    A.2d 
548,  147  Pa.Super.  273. 

73.  pa.— Ellsworth  v.  Husband,  181 
A.  90,  119  Pa.Super.  245. 


§  62 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


iffs  motion  for  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto, 
t  has  been  held  that  the  court  will  not  consider  the 
evidence  and  charges  to  the  jury  further  than  to 
iscertain  whether  it  appears  clearly  from  the  entire 
:ase  that  the  verdict  was  surely  on  an  immaterial 
plea.74  No  motion  to  set  aside  the  verdict  is  re- 
quired before  entry  of  judgment  notwithstanding  the 
verdict  ;75  and  particularly  it  is  not  necessary  to  set 
the  verdict  aside  before  rendering  judgment  contrary 
thereto  when  the  case  is  submitted  on  special  is- 
sues, since  in  such  case  the  jury  finds  the  facts 
only,  and  does  not  find  a  verdict  for  either  party.76 
At  common  law  the  procedure  was  to  enter  the  ver- 


dict on  the  record,  and  then  to  enter  the  judgment 
non  obstante  veredicto;77  but  a  motion  for  judg- 
ment non  obstante,  although  not  specifically  passed 
on,  is  disposed  of  by  entry  of  judgment  on  the  ver- 
dict78 or  by  granting  a  new  trial.79  It  has  been 
held  that  the  trial  court  has  jurisdiction  to  pre- 
scribe conditions  with  reference  to  the  granting  or 
refusal  to  grant  the  motion  for  judgment  notwith- 
standing the  verdict.80  In  an  action  based  on  neg- 
ligence and  breach  of  implied  warranty,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  court  is  not  authorized  to  sustain  de- 
fendant's motion  as  to  all  negligence  counts  and 
overrule  it  on  the  question  of  implied  warranty.81 


ILL    POEM  AND  CONTENTS  OP  JUDGMENT,  AND  BELIEF  AWARDED 


§  62.    In  General 

a.  Form  and  contents  generally 

b.  Self-sufficiency 

c.  Language  of  judgment 

a.  Form  and  Contents  Generally 

Strict  formality  ordinarily  Is  not  essential  to  the 
validity  of  a  judgment,  and  substantial  compliance  with 
statutory  requirements  is  sufficient. 

The  form  of  a  judgment  ordinarily  is  regulated 
by  the  practice  of  the  court  in  which  the  judgment 
is  rendered,82  and  under  the  procedure  of  some 
courts  a  duty  rests  on  the  successful  litigant  to  see 
that  the  judgment  is  i  sufficient  in  form  and  sub- 
stance.83 


To  constitute  a  judgment  there  must  be  an  ex- 
press adjudication  to  that  effect,84  but,  subject  to 
the  requirements  of  statute  or  court  rule  or  prac- 
tice, no  particular  form  is  required  in  a  court  pro- 
ceeding to  render  its  order  a  judgment,8^  provided 
the  rights  of  the  parties  may  be  ascertained  there- 
from.86 

Generally  the  sufficiency  of  a  judgment  rests  in 
its  substance  rather  than  in  its  form,87  and,  al- 
though an  informal  judgment  may  be  open  to  criti- 
cism,88 strict  formality  ordinarily  is  not  essential  to 
the  validity  of  a  judgment,  and,  if  the  record  entry 
is  sufficient  in  substance,  mere  irregularity  or  want 
of  technical  form  will  not  render  it  invalid.89  Even 


74.  Ala. — City    of    Birmingham    v. 
Andrews,    132    So.    877,     222    Ala. 
362. 

75.  Tex. — James  v.   Texas  Employ- 
ers Ins,  Ass'n,  Civ.Afcp.,  98  S.W.2d 
425,    reversed    on    other    grounds 
Texas    Employers'    Ins.    Ass'n    v. 
James,    118   $.W.2d   293,    131   Tex. 
605. 

76.  Tex. — Smith  &  Larson  v.  Tay- 
lor, Civ.App.,  249  S.W.  S19. 

77.  U.'S. — -Newton    v.    Glenn,    C.C.A. 
Miss.,  149  F.2d  879. 

78.  Mich.— Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Verheyden,  220  N.W. 
750,  243  Mich.  544. 

Ohio.— Hard  v.  Harris,  24  Ohio  Cir. 
Ct.  714. 

79.  Ohio. — J.  &  P.  Harig  Co.  v.  City 
of    Cincinnati,    22    BT.E.2d    5*40.    61 
Ohio  App.  314. 

BO-  Wash. — Lasher  v.  Wheeler,  87 
P.2d  982,  .198  Wash.  205. 

S:L  111.— Haut  v.  Kleene.  50  N.E.2d 
855,  320  Ill.App.  273. 

82.  Ga. — Sullivan  v.  Douglas  Gib- 
bons, Inc.,  2  <S.E.2d  89,  187  Ga.  764. 

Form  and  contents  of  judgments  in 
federal  courts  see  Federal  Courts 
S  144  a. 


Form  and  sufficiency  of  judgment  on 
consent,  offer  or  admission  see  in- 
fra §  177. 

Court  has  power  to  control  the 
form  of  judgments. — Kau  v.  Manko, 
17  A.2d  4'22,  -341  Ffc.  17. 

"Irregular  Judgment"  is  one  ren- 
dered contrary  to  the  course  and 
practice  of  the  court.— Mitchell  v. 
Mitchell,  190  S.E.  487,  211  N.C.  308. 

83.  Mo.— Davis  v.   Cook,   85   S.W.2d 
17,   337  Mo.   33 — Commission  Row 
Club  v.  Lambert.  App.,  161  S.W.2d 
732. 

Application  relating  to  contents  of 
judgment  should  be  made  on  settle- 
ment of  judgment,  and  not  on  mo- 
tion for  separate  order. — Brown  v. 
O'Neil,  209  N.Y.S.  221,  124  Misc.  486. 

84.  Tex. — Bartlett  v.  Buckner,  Civ. 
App.,  295  S.W.  214. 

85.  111.— Gould  v.   Klabunde,    68   N. 
E.2d    258,    326    Ill.App.    643. 

Ind.— 43hafer  v.  «Shafer,  37  N.B.2d  69, 

219  Ind.  97.      ' 
Utah. — Ellinwood  v.  Bennion,  276  P. 

159,  73  Utah  663. 

Date  of  judgment  see  infra  §   81. 
Description    of    property    see    infra 

S  80. 

180 


Designation  of  amount  of  recovery 

see  infra  §§  76-79. 
Designation   of   parties   see   infra   § 

75. 
Signature  see  infra  §  95. 

Judgment  should  be  simple  sen- 
tence of  law  on  material  ultimate 
facts  admitted  by  pleadings  or  found 
by  court. — Scott  v.  Superior  Court 
within  and  for  Los  Angeles  County, 
256  P.  603,  83  Cal.App.  25. 

88.    Cal.— Pista   v.    Resetar,    270    P. 
453,  205  Cal.  197. 

87.  Cal.— Pista   v.    Resetar,    270   IP. 
45-3,  205  CaL  197— Avakian  v.  Dus- 
enberry,  58  P.2d  1306,  15  CaLApp, 
2d  55. 

Ind.— Chafer  v.  Shafer,  37  N.B.2d  69, 

21  Ind.  97. 
lowau— Whittier   v,   Whittier,    23   N. 

W.2d  435. 

88.  111.— People    v.    Miller,    144    I1L 
App.  630. 

89.  U.'S.— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaran- 
ty Co.  V.  Sanitary  Dist.  of  Rock- 
ford,    for   Use   of  Rockford  Lum- 
ber &  Fuel  Co.,  C.OA.111.,   63  F.2d 
827. 

Cal.— Pista  v.   Resetar.   270   P,   453, 
205  Cal.  197. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  62 


where  the  form  of  a  judgment  is  prescribed  by  stat- 
ute, a  departure  from  it  is  not  necessarily  fatal  to 
the  adjudication,^  a  substantial  compliance  with 
statutory  provisions  with  respect  to  form  being 
sufficient.91 

A  record  is  sufficient  as  a  judgment  provided  it 
appears  therefrom  that  it  was  intended  as  such,92 
and  corresponds  with  the  statutory  definition  of  a 
judgment,93  and  provided  it  appears  therefrom  that 
it  is  a  judicial  determination  or  act94  of  a  designat- 
ed court95  of  a  specified  term,96  and  if  the  time, 
place,  parties,  matter  in  dispute,  and  the  result  are 


clearly  stated,  or  may  be  certainly  ascertained  there- 
from.97 An  entry  lacking  these  essentials  is  a  mere 
nullity.9* 

Adjudication  of  issues.  To  be  sufficient  as  a 
judgment,  the  entry  must  show  that  the  issues  be- 
tween the  parties  have  been  adjudicated,99  and  show 
with  certainty  the  matters  determined.1 

Determining  provisions  in  advance.  Before  an 
action  is  ready  for  judgment  it  is  not  proper  to 
bind  the  court  by  an  order  granted  on  special  mo- 
tion requiring  it  to  enter  particular  provisions  in 
the  judgment.2  By  virtue  of  statute  or  rule  of 


<3a. — House    v.    Tennessee    Chemical 

Co.,    125    S.E.    446,    159    Ga.    306. 
33  C.J.  p  1188  note  87,  p  1191  note 

7. 
Caption, 

The  absence  of,  or  any  defect  in, 
the  caption  of  a  judgment  does  not 
invalidate  it. 
Ala. — Taunton  v.   Dobbs,   199   So.  9, 

240  Ala,  287. 
Tenn. — Phillips     v.     Cottage     Grove 

Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  8  TeniuApp.  98. 
Tex. — Whisenant  v.  Thompson  Bros. 

Hardware   Co.,   Civ.App.,  120   S.W. 

2d  316. 

Indorsement  on  back  of  Judgment 
is  not  an  essential  part  of  the  pro- 
ceedings.— Whisenant  v.  Thompson 
Bros.  Hardware  Co.,  supra. 

Mistake  in  official  designation  of 
Judgre   rendering   decree   was   an   ir- 
regularity not  affecting  its  validity. 
— House  v.  Tennessee  Chemical  Co., 
125  S.E.  446,  1-59  Ga.  300. 
Clear  meaning- 
Mere  clerical  errors  and  omissions 
in  judgment  are  not  fatal  if,  by  ref- 
erence   to    other    parts    of    record, 
meaning  is  clear.— -Smith  v.  Commis- 
sioner  of  Internal   Revenue,   C.C.A., 
67  F.2d  167. 
Motion 

Mere  irregularity  in  form  may  be 
taken  advantage  of  only  by  motion. 
— Bennett    v.    Couchman,    48    Barb., 
N.T.,  73. 
30.    Ga.— Lester    v.    Brown,    57    Ga. 

79. 
HI.— Olson    v.    WhifCen,    175    IlLApp. 

182. 
91.    Ala.— State  v.  Hasty,  63  So.  559, 

184   Ala.    121,    50    L.R.A.,N.S.,    553, 

Ann.Gas.l916B  703. 
S.D.— In  re  Mulligan's  Estate,  243  N. 

W.  102,  60  S.D.  74. 
33  C.J.  p  1189  note  89. 
32,    Ind.— <Shafer  v.   Shafer,  37  NJE. 

2d  6-9,  219  Ind.  97. 
Iowa.— Whittier.  v.    Whittier,    23    N. 

W.2d  435. 

33  C.J.  p  118-9  note  91. 
Sufficiency  and  contents  of  entry  of 

judgment  see  infra  $   109. 
98.    Ind. — Shafer  v.  Shafer,  37  N.B. 

2d  69,  219  Ind.  97. 


Iowa.— Whittier  v.  Whittier,  23  N. 
W.2d  435. 

94.  Ala.— Gandy  v.  Hagler,  16  So.2d 
305,  245  Ala.  167. 

Ind.-^Shafer  v.  Shafer,  37  N.R2d 
69,  219  Ind.  97. 

Ky. — Bell  Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth,  61 
S.W.2d  879,  250  Ky.  21. 

33  C.J.  p  1189  note  92. 

Necessity  for  rendition  of  judgment 
see  infra  §  100. 

Necessity  for  rendition  by  duly  con- 
stituted court  see  supra  §  15. 

Determination  of  rights  of  parties 

Iowa.— Whittier  v.  Whittier,  23  N. 
W.2d  435. 

95.  Ky. — Bell  Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth, 
61   S.W.2d  879,  250  Ky.   21. 

Wyo.— McDonald  v.   Mulkey,    210  iP. 

940,  29  Wyo.  99. 
33  C.J.  p  1189  note  93. 

96.  Wyo.— McDonald  v.  Mulkey,  su- 
pra. 

97.  Ala.— Taunton  v.  Dobbs,  199  So. 
9,  240  Ala,  287. 

Ky.-— Bell  Grocery  Co.  v.  Booth,  61 
S.W.2d  879,  250  Ky.  21. 

33  C.J.  P  1189  note  94. 

Certainty  in. judgments  see  infra  § 
72. 

Deftnitiveness  in  judgments  see  su- 
pra §  21. 

Summary  judicial  statements  of  role 

(1)  If  a  writing  claimed  to  be  a 
judgment  corresponds  with  the  stat- 
utory definition  of  a  judgment,  if  it 
appears   to   have    been   intended   by 
some  competent  tribunal  as  the  de- 
termination of  the  rights  of  the  par- 
ties to  an  action,  and  if  it  shows  in 
intelligent  language  the  relief  grant- 
ed, its  claim  to  confidence  will  not 
be    lessened    by    want    of    technical 
form,  or  by  the  absence  of  language 
commonly  deemed  especially  appro- 
priate  to  formal  judicial  records, 
Ind. — "Shafer  v.  Shafer,  37  NJB.2d  69, 

21fr  Ind.  97. 

Iowa.— Whittier  v.  Whittier,  23  N.W. 
2d  435. 

(2)  Other  statements   see   33   C.J. 
p  1189  note  94. 

Presumption  as  to  place 

A  judgment  which  showed  on  its 
face  that  it  was  rendered  in  a  des- 

181 


ignated  court  and  that  it  was  ren- 
dered, read,  and  signed  in  open 
court  was  not  void  because  it  did 
not  state  the  place  where  court  was 
held  or  where  judgment  was  signed, 
since  it  would  be  presumed  that  the 
court  was  held  at  the  place  fixed 
therefor  by  law. — Smith  v.  Crescent 
Chevrolet  Co.,  La.App.,  1  So.2d  421. 

Excerpts   from  minutes   need    not 
be  inserted  in  judgment. — Gettys  v. 
Town  of  Marion,  10  S.E.2d  799,  218 
N.C.  266. 
Sufficiency  for  review  purposes 

Decree  should  be  framed  so  as  to 
enable  aggrieved  party  to  prosecute, 
without  hindrance,  review  of  ad- 
verse provisions. — Ochoa  v.  McCush, 
2  P,2d  357,  216  Cal.  426. 

98.  111. — Fray  v.  National  Fire  Ins. 
Co.   of  Hartford,   255   I11.APP.   209, 
affirmed     173     N.E.     479,     341     111. 
431. 

TTyo.— State  v.  Scott,  2'47  P.   699,  35 

Wyo.  108. 

33  C.J.  p  1190  note  95,  p  1191  note  6. 
Insufficient  entries 

(1)  A  notation  on  municipal  court 
record  of  case,  "Motion  for  new  trial 
overruled.      Judgment    rendered    as 
per  finding  of"  certain  date,  did  not 
constitute  "judgment"  of  such  court ' 
— Mesloh  v.  Home  Furnace  Co.,  Ohio 
App.,  44  N.B.2d  379. 

(2)  Judge's  act  in  signing  journal 
entry  without  final  determination  of 
parties'    rights    does    not    constitute 
"judgment." — Abernathy    v.    Huston, 
26  P.2d  939,  166'Okl.  184. 

(3)  Recital  in  clerk's  minutes  that 
court  rendered  judgment  for  defend- 
ants as  per  journal  entry  to  be  filed 
and  transcribed  into  record  does  not 
constitute      judgment. — News      Dis- 
patch Printing  &  Audit  Co.  v.  Board 
of  Com'rs  of  Carter  County,  270  P.  2, 
132  Okl.  216. 

99.  Ark.— Melton  v.  St.  Louis,  1  M. 
&  <S.  R.  Co.,  139  S.W.  289,  99  Ark. 
433. 

33  C.J.  p  1190  note  1. 

1.  Or. — Dray  v.  Crich,  3  Or.   298. 
33  C.J.  p  1191  note  2. 

2.  N.Y.— Bast    River    Sav.    Inst    v. 
Bucki,   28  N.Y.S.  325,  77  Hun  329. 


§  62 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


court,  however,  an  interlocutory  judgment  may 
state  the  substance  of  the  final  judgment  to  which 
the  party  will  be  entitled,3  the  court  not  being  con- 
fined to  the  interlocutory  judgment,  or  foreclosed 
thereby,  in  directing  final  judgment.4 

Inferior  court  judgments.  A  much  smaller  de- 
gree of  technicality  and  formality  is  required  in 
judgments  of  inferior  courts  than  is  exacted  with 
respect  to  the  judgments  of  courts  of  record,5  and 
judgments  of  such  courts  are  scrutinized  with  less 
severity.6 

Order  or  memoranda  for  judgment.  It  must  ap- 
pear that  that  which  is  offered  as  the  record  of  a 
judgment  is  really  such,  and  not  an  order  for  a 
judgment  or  mere  memoranda  from  which  the 
judgment  is  to  be  drawn.?  The  question  whether 
remarks  made  by  the  court  at  the  conclusion  of  a 
trial  or  hearing  constitute  a  decision  on  the  matter 
before  it,  or  a  mere  announcement  or  memorandum 


of  the  decision  which  the  court  contemplates  mak- 
ing, depends  on  the  intention  of  the  court.8  Aft 
oral  statement  of  the  court  merely  intended  to  ac- 
quaint the  parties  of  views  intended  to  be  embodied 
in  the  judgment  is  not  the  pronouncement  of  a 
judgment,9  and  cannot  affect  the  correctness  or 
validity  of  the  judgment  as  rendered.10 

b.  Self-Sufficiency 

A  judgment  should  be  complete  in  itself. 

A  judgment  should  be  complete  in  itself11  and 
contain  within  its  four  corners  the  mandate  of  the 
court,12  without  extraneous  references,13  and  leav- 
ing open  no  matters  of  description  or  designation 
out  of  which  contention  may  arise  as  to  the  mean- 
ing.14 It  should  not  leave  open  any  judicial  ques- 
tion to  be  determined  by  others,15  and  must  con- 
tain sufficient  facts  to  enable  the  clerk  to  issue  an  ex- 
ecution thereon,  by  an  inspection  of  its  entry,  with- 
out reference  to  other  entries.16  To  be  complete, 


3.  N.Y.— Hebblethwaite  v.  Flint,  82 
N.YJS.   471,    8-8   App.Div.   163. 

33  C.J.  p  1193  note  34. 

4.  N.Y.— Hebblethwaite  v.  Flint,  su- 
pra. 

5.  111.— Johnson    v.    Gillett,    52    HI. 
358. 

33  C.J.  p  1190  note  96. 

6.  Idaho. — Cornell     v.     Mason,     26$ 
tP.  8,  46  Idaho  112. 

7.  Utah. — Ellinwood  v.  Bennion,  276 
P.  159,  73  Utah  563. 

33  C.J.  p  1190  note  97. 
Formal  decree   contemplated 

Clerk's  entry,  "The  court,  being 
fully  advised,  finds  for  plaintiff," 
was  held  not  to  be  a  final  decree,  in 
view  of  subsequent  proceedings 
showing  parties  contemplated  for- 
mal decree. — Shaw  v.  Morrison,  260 
P.  666,  145  Wash.  420. 

8.  Cal. — Wutchumna  Water  Co.   v. 
Superior  Court  in  and  for  Tulare 
County,  12  P.2d  1033,  215  Cal.  734. 

R5snm6  of  findings 

Where  court,  after  taking  case 
under  advisement  sent  counsel  a 
statement  containing  a  resume*  of 
court's  findings  informing  counsel 
what  the  findings  and  Judgment 
would  be,  such  statement  was  not 
a  copy  of  a  judgment. — Sloan  v. 
Dunlap,  Mo.,  194  S.W.2d  32. 

9.  Mo.— Marsden  v.  Nipp,  30  &W.2d 
77,  325  Mo.  822. 

Direction  to  reporter 

(1)  Court's  remark,  in  action  to 
remove  county  commissioner,  order- 
ing removal  of  defendant,  and  di- 
recting reporter  to  let  record  so 
show,  together  with  statement  that 
verdict  would  include  costs,  was 
held  not  to  constitute  Judgment  of 
removal  on  verdict,  where  verdict 


had  not  been  returned,  but  was 
merely  an  indication  of  what  it 
would  be.— State  v..  Scott,  247  P.  699, 
35  Wyo.  108. 

(2)  This  is  particularly  true  be- 
cause it  is  not  the  reporter's  duty 
to  record  Judgments,  and  he  has 
neither  custody  nor  control  of  offi- 
cial court  records  in  which  Judg- 
ments are  recorded. — State  v.  Scott, 
supra. 

ID.    Cal. — Gates  v.  Green,  90  P.  189, 

151  Cal.  65. 

Memorandum  opinion  which  was 
voluntary,  not  requested  by  either 
party,  and  not  made  in  pursuance  of 
statute,  is  no  part  of  Judgment  and 
cannot  be  used  to  impeach  its  suffi- 
ciency.— City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Senter 
Commission  Co.,  73  S.W.2d  389,  335 
Mo.  489. 

11.    Ala.— Gandy  v.  Hagler,  16  So.2d 

305,  2*45  Ala.  167— Jasper  Land  Co. 

v.   Biddlesperger,    140   So.    624,   25 

Ala.App.  45. 
Miss.— Berryhill  v.  Berryhill,  23  So. 

2d    889— Todd   v.    Todd,    Miss.,    20 

So.2d  827,  197  Miss.  819. 
Wash.— Andreas   v.   Bates,   128   P.2d 

300, 14  Wash.2d  322. 
33  C.J.  p  1190  note  98. 

Any  instructions  court  feels  Jus- 
tified in  giving  under  the  law  and 
facts  should  be  set  forth  in  the 
Judgment — Andreas  v.  Bates,  supra. 
Validity  of  Judgment 

(1)  A  Judgment   depends   for  va- 
lidity on  its  own  terms  and  extrane- 
ous documents  may  not  be  written 
into  it  by  inference  or  reference. — 
Edwards  v.  Edwards,  157   P.2d  616, 
113  Colo.  390. 

(2)  Imperfections    of    one    Judg- 
ment may  not  be  corrected  by  ref- 
erence to  another. — Hopkins  v.  Dug- 

182 


gar,  87  So.  103,  204  Ala.  626—33  C.J. 
p  1190  note  98. 

12.  Mass. — Carroll    v.    Hinchley,    56 
N.E.2d  608,  316  Mass.  724. 

13.  Miss.— Berryhill  v.  Berryhill,  23 
So.2d  889— Todd  v.  Todd,  20   So.2d 
827,  197  Miss.  819. 

Description  of  written  instrument 

Failure  to  describe  written  in- 
strument referred  to  in  Judgment, 
renders  Judgment  nonenforceable 
with  respect  to  such  instrument. — 
In  re  Kauff man's  Estate,  147  P.2d 
11,  63  Cal.App.2d  655. 
Memorandum  decision 

It  is  not  good  practice  to  attempt 
by  reference  to  incorporate  into  the 
Judgment  parts  of  a  memorandum, 
decision. — Andreas  v.  Bates,  128  P. 
2d  300, 14  Wash.2d  322. 
Reference  to  master's  report 

A  decree  enjoining  defendant  from 
interfering  with  rights  of  plaintiffs-, 
as  lot  owners  to  use  plot  on  lake 
as  park,  in  so  far  as  it  purported, 
to  incorporate  by  reference  a  lengthy 
master's  report,  was  improper. — Car- 
roll v.  Hinchley,  56  N.E.2d  608,  316 
Mass.  724. 

14.  Mass. — Carroll  v.  Hinchley,  su- 
pra. 

Miss.— Berryhill  v.  Berryhill,  23  So. 
2d  889— Todd  v.  Todd,  20  "So.2dl 
827,  197  Miss.  819. 

15.  Miss.— Berryhill  v.  Berryhill,  23 
So.'2d  889— Todd  v.  Todd,  20  So.2ff 
827,  197  Miss.  819. 

16.  Tenn. — The   Mollie  Hamilton  v. 
Paschal,   9   Heisk.   203— Boyken  v. 

" State,  3  Yerg.  426. 
33  C.J.  p  1190  note  99. 
Determination  of  rights 

A  Judgment  should  determine  the* 
respective  rights  of  the  parlies,  so» 
that  the  ministerial  offlc*n  can  with. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  64 


however,  it  has  been  held  that  the  judgment  need 
only  identify  the  parties  and  set  forth  the  relief 
granted,17  provided  it  also  appears  therefrom  to 
have  been  made  by  the  court  in  whose  records  its 
entry  is  written.18  It  has  also  been  held  that  ev- 
ery judgment  of  a  court  of  justice  must  either  be 
perfect  in  itself  or  capable  of  being  made  perfect 
by  reference  to  the  pleadings  or  to  the  papers  on  file 
in  the  case,  or  else  to  other  pertinent  entries  on  the 
court  docket.19 

c.  Language  of  Judgment 

Apart  from  statute,  no  particular  form  of  words  is 
necessary  to  constitute  a  Judgment,  although  the  Eng- 
lish language  ordinarily  Is  required  to  be  used. 

Although  it  has  been  held  that,  as  a  matter  of 
practice,  established  precedents  with  respect  to  the 
language  of  a  judgment  should  be  followed,20  apart 
from  statute  no  particular  form  of  words  is  nec- 
essary to  constitute  a  judgment,21  provided  the 
words  used  are  such  as  to  indicate  a  final  determi- 
nation of  the  rights  of  the  parties  and  the  relief 
granted  or  denied22  The  word  "recover"  is  not 
essential  to  the  existence  of  a  judgment,28  but  it  is 
the  appropriate  and  approved  w.ord  to  use.24  A 
judgment  for  defendant  may  be  sufficient  although 
it  fails  to  provide  that  defendant  go  without  day.25 
The  use  of  words  in  the  past  instead  of  the  pres- 
ent tense  in  entering  a  judgment  is  wholly  imma- 
terial.2? 


By  virtue  of  constitutional  or  statutory  provi- 
sions, judgments  ordinarily  are  required  to  be  ex- 
pressed in  the  English  language.27 

In  the  Philippine  Islands,  judgments  were  re- 
quired to  be  in  Spanish.28 

§  63.    What  Law  Governs 

The  form  of  a  judgment  is  governed  by  the  law  of 
the  state  in  which  It  Is  rendered. 

The  language  and  form  of  the  record  of  a  judg- 
ment are  regulated  by  the  law  of  the  state  and  the 
practice  of  the  court  in  which  it  is  rendered.29 
Hence  a  record  which  is  good  in  the  court  where 
rendered  is  sufficient  in  another  court,  although  it 
would  have  been  insufficient  had  it  been  rendered 
in  the  latter  court.30  The  operation  and  effect  of 
foreign  judgments  is  discussed  infra  §§  88&-906. 

§  64.    Necessity  of  Writing 

As  a  general   rule  a  judgment  must  be  reduced  to 
writing. 

Although,  as  discussed  infra  §  102,  a  judgment  is 
rendered  and  exists  as  such  when  it  is  orally  an- 
nounced from  the  bench,  and  before  it  has  been 
reduced  to  writing  and  entered  by  the  clerk,  as  a 
general  rule  a  judgment  must  be  reduced  to  writ- 
ing,31 and  cannot  exist  merely  in  the  memory  of 
the  officers  of  the  court.32  A  statutory  provision33 


•certainty  execute  the  judgment  with- 
out the  necessity  of  determining 
facts  not  stated  therein.— Hendryx  v. 
W.  L.  Moody  Cotton  Co.,  Teac.Civ. 
App.,  257  S.W.  305. 

17.  Miss.— JSimpson  v.   Phillips,  141 
So.  897,  164  Miss.  256. 

18.  Miss.— Simpson  v.  Phillips,   su- 
pra. 

.19.    Ala.— Burgin    v.    Sugg,    97    So. 

216,  210  Ala.  142. 
33  C.J.  p  1190  note  98  [a]  (2)-(5). 
.20.    Cal.— Hentig  v.   Johnson,   96   P. 

390,  8  Cal.App.  221. 
33  C.J.  p  1192  note  19. 
*Foxm  of  Judgment 

(1)  Judgment       for       plaintiffs. — 
Pierce  v.  Wilson,  48  Ind.  298—33  C. 
J.  p  1192  note  17. 

(2)  Judgment     for     defendants. — 
.Jones  v.  Hoppie,  9  Mo.  173 — 33  C.J.  P 

1192  note  18. 

(3)  Judgment    for    defendant    on 
demurrer. — Jasper  Mercantile  Co.  v. 
O'Rear,    20.  So.    583,    112    Ala.    247— 
33  C.J.  p  1192  note  18  [c]. 

.21.    Colo. — Scott   v.   Woodhams,    246 

P.   1027,   79  Colo.   528,  followed  in 

246  P.  1029,  70  Colo.  532. 
:Ind.— City  of  La  Porte  v.  Organ,  32 

N.E.  342,  5-  Ind. App.  369. 
Howa.— Whittier  v.  Whittier,  23 

2d  435. 


Utah.— Ellinwood  v.  Bennion,  276  P. 
159,  73  Utah  563. 

33   C.J.   p   1192   notes   20,   22. 

Judgment  on  motion  for  dismissal 
or  nonsuit  see  Dismissal  and  Non- 
suit §  72. 

22.  Cal. — Starr  Piano  Co.  v.  Hartin, 
7  P.2d  383,   119  CaLApp.  642. 

Utah. — Ellinwood  v.  Bennion,  276  (P. 

159,  73  Utah  563. 
"Ordered,  adjudged  and  decreed" 

(1)  Use  of  the  words  "ordered,  ad- 
judged  and    decreed"   will    be   suffi- 
cient.— Hentig  v.  Johnson,  96  P.  390, 
8  Cal.App.  221—33  C.J.  p  1192  note  21. 

(2)  "Adjudged,    ordered    and    de- 
creed" must  precede  final  action  of 
court   in    order    to    constitute   judg- 
ment by  decree. — Sussman  v.   Suss- 
man,   163  S.E.  69,  158  Va,  382. 

23.  Wis.— Potter  v.  Eaton,   26  Wis. 
382. 

33  C.J.  P  1192  note  23. 

24.  Ind.— Needham    v.    Gillaspy,    49 
Ind.    245— La   Porte   v.    Organ,    32 
N.E.  342,  5  Ind.App.  369. 

25.  Minn.— ^Btna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Swift, 
12  Minn.  437. 

33  C.J.  p  1193  note  25. 

26.  Ala. — Tankersley  v.  Silburn,  Mi- 
nor p  185. 

27.  I/a.— Maxent   v.    Maxent,    1   La. 
438. 

183 


Mo.-^State  v.  Cockrell,  217  S.W.  524, 

2SO  Mo.  269. 
33  C.J.  p  1193  note  30. 

28.  Philippine. — Gaspar  v.  Molina,  5 
Philippine  197. 

33  C.J.  p  1193  note  31. 

29.  U.S. — Woodbridge  &  Turner  En- 
gineering Co.  v.  Ritter,  C.C.Pa.,   70 

F.  677. 
33  C.J.  p  1191  note  9. 

30.  U.S. — Woodbridge  &  Turner  En- 
gineering Co.  v.  Ritter,  supra. 

111. — Schertz    v.    Chester    First    Nat. 
Bank,  47  IlLApp.  124. 

31.  Ga. — Hutcheson    v.    Hutcheson, 
30  S.B.2d  107,  197  Ga.  603— McRae 
v.    Smith,    137    S.E.    390,    164    Ga. 
23. 

Ohio. — Krasny  v.    Metropolitan   Life 

Ins.    Co.,    54   N.E.2d   952,    143    Ohio 

St.  284. 
Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Broad- 

way  Motor  Co.  v.  CPublic  Fire  Ins. 

Co.,   12  Tenn.App.   278,   280. 
33  C.J.  p  1191  note  13. 
Necessity  of  entry  see  infra   §  107. 

32.  Iowa.— Balm  v.  Nunn,  19   N.W. 
810,  63  Iowa  641. 

33  C.J.  p  1191  note  14. 

33.  Mo. — Young  v.   Young,    65    S.W. 
1016,  165  Mo.  624,  88  Am.S.R.  440. 

33  C.J.  p  1192  note  16. 


§  65 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


or  court  rule84  that  judgments  must  be  in  writing  is 
imperative,  and  a  decision  of  the  court,  not  reduced 
to  writing  or  entered  on  the  minutes,  is  not  effec- 
tive as  a  judgment. 

§  65.     One  or  More  Judgments  in  Same  Case 

Except  as  otherwise  permitted  by  statute  or  rule  of 
court,  there  can  be  only  one  final  Judgment  In  any  one 
action. 


In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary  it  is 
a  general  rule  that  there  can  be  only  one  final  judg- 
ment in  any  action35  at  law,36  and  that  is  the  one 
which,  in  effect,  ends  the  suit  and  finally  determines 
the  rights  of  the  parties  with  relation  to  the  matter 
in  controversy.37  The  rule  is  followed  no  matter 
how  many  counts  the  complaint  contains,38  and 
even  though  there  be  separate  hearings  on  different 


34.  Ariz. — American    Surety   Co.    of 
New  York  v.  Mosher,  64  P.2d  1025, 
48   Ariz.    652— Chiricahua  Ranches 
Co.  v.  State,  39  P.2d  640,  44  Ariz. 
559. 

Jury  and  nonjnry  cases 
Ariz. — Chiricahua     Ranches     Co.     v. 
State,  supra. 

Sufficiency 

Where  written  judgment  was  sign- 
ed by  trial  judge  and  filed  with  clerk 
on  same  day  that  judgment  was  ren- 
dered by  the  court,  rendition  of 
judgment  end  filing  of  formal  writ- 
ten judgment  were  "simultaneously" 
performed  within  requirement  of 
court  rule. — American  Surety  Co.  of 
New  Tork  v.  Mosher,  64  P.2d  1025, 
48  Ariz.  552. 

35.  Cal.— Nicholson     v.     Henderson, 
153  P.2d  945,  25  Cal.2d  375 — Bake- 
well  v.  Bakewell,  130  P.2d  975,  21 
Cal.2d  224— Bank  of  America  Nat 
Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Superior 
Court  of  Los  Angeles  County,  128 
P.2d  357,   20  Cal.2d   697— De  Tally 
v.    Kendall    De    Vally    Operalogue 
Co.,  32  tP.2d.638,  220  Cal.  742— Mid- 
dleton  v.   Finney,    6   P.2d  938,    214 
Cal.    523,    78    A.L.R.    1104— Nolan 
v.  Smith,  70  P.  166,  187  Cal.  360 — 
Stockton    Combined    Harvester    & 
Agricultural  Works  v.  Glens  Falls 
Ins.   Co.,   33   P.    633,   98   Cal.   577— 
Vallera  v.  Vallera,  148  P.2d  694,  64 
Cal.App.2d    266— Potvin    v.    Pacific 
Greyhound  Lines,  20  P.2d  129,  180 
Cal.App.  510. 

Mass. — Beauvais  v.  Springfield  Insti- 
tute for  Savings,  20  N.E.2d  957, 
303  Mass.  136,  124  A.L.R.  611. 

Mo. — Electrolytic  Chlorine  Co.  v. 
Wallace  &  Tieraan  Co.,  41  S.W.2d 
1049,  328  Mo.  782,  78  A.L.R.  930 — 
Barr  v.  Nafziger  Baking  Co.,  41 
S-W.2d  559,  328  Mo.  423— Neal  v. 
Curtis  &  Co.  Mfg.  Co.,  41  S.W.2d 
543,  328  Mo.  389 — State  ex  reL  Cun- 
ningham v.  Hald,  40  S.W.2d  1048, 
328  Mo.  20  8-— Hatton  v.  Sidman, 
App.,  169  £:W.2d  91— Ray  v.  Mis- 
souri Christian  College,  App.,  93 
S.W.2d  1030 — Gay  v.  Kansas  City 
Public  -Service  Co.,  App.,  77  S.W.2d 
13.3— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dunbar, 
72  S.W.2d  821,  230  Mo.App.  687 
—City  of  St.  Louis  ex  rel.  and 
to  Use  of  Sears  v.  Clark,  App.,  35 
S.W.2d  986— Springfield  Gas  & 
Electric  Co.  v.  Fraternity  Bldg. 
Co.,  App.,  264  S.W.  420— A.  M. 


Legg  Shoe  Co.  v.  Brown  Leather 
Co.,  App.,  249  S.W.  147. 

Nev.—  Nevada  First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Tonopah  v.  Lamb,  271  P.  691,  51 
Nev.  162. 

N.T.  —  Donner  v.  White,  268  N.T.S. 
56,  149  Misc.  709. 

Okl.—  Davis  v.  Baum,  133  P.2d  889, 
192  Okl.  85—  Methvin  v.  Methvin, 
127  P.2d  186,  191  Okl.  177. 

Or.  —  Durkheimer  Inv.  Co.  v.  Zell,  90 
P.2d  213,  161  Or.  434. 

Tex.  —  Comer  v.  Brown,  Com.App., 
2S5  'S.W.  "307  —  Stolpher  v.  Bowen 
Motor  Coaches,  Civ.App.,  190  S.W. 
2d  37-6  —  Lubell  v.  Sutton,  Civ.  App., 
164  S.W.2d  41,  error  refused  — 
Stout  v.  Oliveira,  Civ.  App.,  153  S. 
W.2d  59  0,  error  refused  —  Alexander 
v.  Meredith,  Civ.App.,  154  S.W.2d 
920,  certified  questions  dismissed 
152  S.W.2d  732,  137  Tex.  37—  Booth 
v.  Amicable  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  143  S.W.2d  836,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct  —  Kline 
v.  Power,  Civ.App.,  114  SJW.2d  617 
—  Leavens  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  104 
S.W.2d  534—  Dallas  Coffee  &  Tea 
Co.  v.  Williams,  Civ.App.,  45  S.W. 
2d  724,  error  dismissed  —  Colburn 
v.  Ward,  Civ.App.,  40  S.W.2d  878, 
error  dismissed. 

33  C.J.  p  1127  note  35,  p  1193  note  37. 

Joint  or  several  judgment  see  supra 

•  $  36. 


to  Judgment 


Where  judgment  disposed  of  plain- 
tiff merely  as  individual,  amendment 
disposing  of  him  both  personally 
and  as  trustee  constituted  part  of 
first  judgment,  and  did  not  create 
two  separate  judgments  against 
plaintiff.  —  Rachford  v.  Builders' 
Lumber  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  278  S.W. 
225. 

Piecemeal  determination  improper 

(1)  It  is  not  presumed  court  will 
dispose  of  case  piecemeal,  by  succes- 
sive   final    judgments.  —  Los    Angeles 
Auto   Tractor  Co..  v.  Superior  Court 
within  and  for  Los  Angeles  County, 
271  P.  3ff3,  94  CaLApp.  433. 

(2)  To  attempt  to  adjudicate  the 
•rights  of  one  party  by  a  single  judg- 
ment and  those   of  the  other  by  a 
separate    judgment,    when    the    con- 
troversy is  between  only  two  parties, 
and  concerns  only  a  single  piece  of 
property,    is    simply   an   attempt    to 
dispose  of  the  case  piecemeal,  which 
is     not     permissible.  —  Nicholson    v. 

184 


Henderson,    153   P.2d   945,    25    Cal.2d 

375. 

Merger  of  prior  orders 

In   proceeding  to   cancel  naturali- 
zation   certificate,    all    prior    orders 
were  merged  into  final  decree  which 
superseded    any    inconsistent    order 
or  provision  thereof. — Sourino  v.   U. 
S.,    C.C.A.Ga.,    86    F.2d    309,    certio- 
rari    denied    57    iS.Ct.    491,    300    U.S. 
661,  81  L.Ed.  869. 
Judgment  held  one  Judgment 
Cal. — Martin  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of 

Leland  Stanford  Jr.  University,  99 

P.2d  684,   37  Cal.App.2d  481. 

B6sum6  of  findings  informing- 
counsel  what  findings  and  judgment 
would  be  is  not  a  judgment  which) 
can  be  relied  on  in  connection  with 
judgment  subsequently  pronounced 
as  violating  the  rule. — Sloan  v.  Dun- 
lap,  Mo.,  194  S.W.2d  32. 

36,  Mass. — Noyes     v.     Bankers    In- 
demnity  Ins.    Co.,    30   N.E.2d    867,. 
307  Mass.  5-67. 

N.T. — Chippewa  Credit  Corporation, 
v.  Strozewski,  19  N.T.S.2d  457,. 
259  App.Div.  187— Kriser  v.  Rodg- 
ers,  186  N.T.S.  316,  195  App.Div. 
394. 

37.  Cal.— De   Vally   v.   Kendall    D* 
Vally  Operalogue  Co.,  &2  P.2d  638, 
220   Cal.    742— Nolan  v.   Smith,    70 
P.  166,  137  Cal.  360— Stockton  Com- 
bined  Harvester   and  Agricultural 
Works  v.  Glens  Falls  Ins.  Co.,   8* 
P.  633,  98  Cal.  577. 

After  judgment  of  nonsuit 

Order  granting  defendant's  mo- 
tion for  final  judgment  for  plaintiffs- 
failure  to  amend  declaration  within 
time,  entered  before  case  wherein 
plaintiff  had  been  granted  nonsuit 
was  reinstated,  was  held  invalid  as 
Judgment  on  merits  when  case  was. 
not  before  court. — Keith  v.  Tazoo  &- 
M.  V.  R.  Co.,  145  So.  227,  164  Miss. 
566. 
Disposition  by  implication 

Rule  requiring  only  one  "final 
judgment"  to  be  rendered  in  any 
cause  is  met  If  parties  and  issues 
are  disposed  of  by  necessary  impli- 
cation.— Pfeifer  v.  Johnson,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  70  S.W.2d  205. 

Order  noting  notice  of  appeal  was. 
not  a  final  judgment  within  rule. — 
Morris  v.  Hall,  Teac.Civ.App.,   248  S. 
W.  1100. 
3&    Cal.— Bank     of     America     Nat. 

Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Superior 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


65 


issues89  or  one  trial  and  separate  findings  on  the 
different  issues.40  The  rule  is  particularly  true 
where  one  judgment  is  all  that  is  necessary  to  dis- 
pose of  the  entire  controversy.41  It  follows  as  a 
necessary  consequence  of  the  general  rule  that, 
when  a  final  judgment  has  once  been  entered,  no 
second  or  different  judgment  may  be  rendered  be- 
tween the  same  parties  and  in  the  same  suit,  until 
the  first  shall  have  been  vacated  and  set  aside  or 


reversed  on  appeal  or  error.**  where  for  any  rea- 
son recovery  of  some  amount  is  had  by  both  par- 
ties, it  has  been  held  that  the  different  amounts 
should  be  set  off  against  each  other  and  but  one 
judgment  rendered  for  the  balance.43  It  has  been 
held,  however,  to  be  the  better  practice,  where  the 
court  has  sustained  a  motion  for  a  nonsuit  and  a 
motion  for  a  directed  verdict  on  a  counterclaim,  to 


Court  of  Los  Angeles  County,  128 
P.2d  357,  20  Cal.2d  697. 

39.  Mo. — McCreary    v.    Bates,   App., 
176  S.W.2d  298 — Springfield  Gas  & 
Electric    Co.    v.    Fraternity    Bldg. 
Co.,  App.,  2-64  S.W.  429. 
Judgment  on  first  and  second  tri- 
als together  was  held  to  constitute 
final     judgment — Compton    v.     Jen- 
nings Lumber  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  295 
S.W.  308. 

40.  Mo.— Springfield  Gtes  &  Electric 
Co.   v.   Fraternity  Bldg.  Co.,  App., 
264  'S.W.  429. 

41.  Cal.— Nicholson     v.     Henderson, 
153  P.2d  945,   25  Cal.2d  375. 

Disposition  of  case  as  to  all  parties 
by  same  or  different  judgments 
see  supra  §  36. 

42.  Ala.— Boshell  v.  Boshell,  118  So. 
553,  218  Ala.  350. 

Oa.— Loughridge   v.    City  of  Dalton, 

14'3  S.B.  393,  166  Ga.  323. 
Idaho. — Home  v.  Beaton,  269  P.  89, 

46  Idaho  541. 
Ind. — Southern    Colonization    Co.    v, 

Sanford,  149  N.E.  655,  S3  Ind.App. 

626. 
Kan.— Lervold  v.  Republic  Mut.  Fire 

Ins.  Co.,  45  P.2d  839,  142  Kan.  43, 

106  A.L.R.   673. 
Uy. — Hammonds   v.    Luster's   Adm'r, 

82  -S.W.2d  500,  259  Ky.  383. 
La.— Sentell  v.  Texas  &  !P.  By.  Co., 

App.,  146  So.  353. 
Mass. — Noyes  v.  Bankers  (Indemnity 

Ins.  Co.,  30  N.E.2d  8-67,  307  Mass 

567. 
Ho.— Irwin    v.    Burgan,    28    S.W.2d 

1017,     325     Mo.     309— Mitchell     v 

Dabney,     App.,     71     S.W.2d     165 

transferred,  see  58  S.W.2d  731,  33' 

Mo.  410. 
N.M.— Shortle  v.  McCloskey,  46  P.2d 

50,  39  N.-M.  273. 
N.Y. — Empire   Produce  Co.  v.    Ring 

232    N.Y.S.    82,    225    App.Div.    6- 

Kriser  v.  Rodgers,  186  N.T.'S.  316 

195  App.Div.  394. 
N-.C.— Nash  v.   City  of  Monroe,  15 

S.E.  384,  200  N.C.  759. 
Or. — Oxman    v.    Baker    County,    28 

P.  799,  115  Or.  436. 
Tex.— Bernstein   v.    Hibbs,    Civ.App 

20    S.W.2d   838,   error  dismissed. 
33  C.J.  p  1193  note  37. 
Operation    and    effect   of   confiictin 

judgments   see  infra  §   445. 
Reservation  of  power 

(1)  Reservation  of  power  to  enter 


uture  judgments  was  held  error, 
Lnce  action  must  be  concluded  by 
ingle  judgment. — Schwasnick  v. 
landin,  C.C.A.Vt.,  65  F.2d  354. 
(2)  However,  on  equity  principles, 
where  trustees  in  1911  sought  ju- 
icial  interpretation  of  will  and  an 
uthorization  to  retain  preferred 
tock  belonging  to  trust  estate  and 
ourt  granted  such  authority  and 
etained  Jurisdiction  of  matter,  sup- 
lemental  judgment  in  1915  author- 
zing  exchange  of  preferred  stock 
or  common  stock  of  another  corn- 
any  was  held  binding  on  answering 
lefendants. — In  re  Ferguson's  Will, 
58  N.W.  295,  193  Minn.  235. 
First  judgment  void 

(1)  The  entry  of  a  void  judgment 
has  been  held  not  to  limit  the  ju- 
risdiction of  court  to  treat  it  as  a 
nullity  and  proceed  to  enter  a  sec- 
ond  judgment.— Parrish   v.   Ferriell, 
186   S.W.2d  625,    299  Ky.   676— -33   C. 

'.  p  1193  note  37  [b]. 

(2)  Before    the    second    Judgment 
can  be  considered  valid  it  must  ap- 
pear   that    the    first    judgment    was 
void.— Mullins  v.   Thomas,   150  S.W. 
2d  83,  136  Tex.  215. 

(3)  Delay  in  filing  the  first  Judg- 
ment   until    date    on    which    second 
judgment  was  filed  was  held  not  to 
prevent   the   second   Judgment    from 
being  a  nullity. — Mullins  v.  Thomas, 
supra. 

Additional  judgment  for  costs  can- 
not be  entered  after  original  Judg- 
ment dismissing  complaint  without 
adjudication  of  costs. — Empire  Pro- 
duce Co.  v.  Ring,  232  N.T.S.  82,  225 
App.Div.  6. 
Legal  and  equitable  relief 

(1)  Where  Administratrix  brought 
action    based    on    fraud   which   had 
allegedly    induced    deceased    stock- 
holder to  assign  stock  and  a  money 
judgment  was   entered  on  an  addi- 
tional count  for  equitable  relief  lim- 
ited to  a  single  recovery,  such  pro- 
cedure   was    improper    since,    under 
the  blended  system  of  law  and  egui- 
ty    only  one  money   Judgment  was 
necessary.— Denefield      v.      Blockdel 
Realty  Co.,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  128  F.*d  85. 

(2)  Other    cases    involving    legal 
and   equitable   relief   see   33   C.J.    P 
1193  note  37  [d]. 

Single    adjudication    of    separate 
and   distinct   sums   does  not   create 

185 


separate  and  distinct  Judgment  as 
to  each  sum.— C.  T.  C.  Investment 
Co.  v.  Daniel  Boone  Coal  Corpora- 
tion. D.C.Ky.,  58  F.2d  305. 


Provision  for  enforcement 

(1)  In  proceeding  supplemental  to 
execution,  after  entry  of  original  de- 
cree, court  was  authorized  to  enter 
supplemental  decree  containing  addi- 
tional provisions  for  enforcing  it — 
Pappas   v.    Taylor,    244    P.    393,    138 
Wash.  31. 

(2)  Provision   for   enforcement   of 
judgment  generally  see  infra  8  82. 

43.  Tex. — General  Motors  Accept- 
ance Corporation  v.  Bodenheim, 
Civ.App.,  37  S.W.2d  312. 

33  C.J.  p  1194  note  38. 

Counterclaim 

(1)  Under  some  statutes  a  single 
judgment  should  be  rendered  where 
plaintiff  prevails  on  case  and  defend- 
ant on   counterclaim. — State   ex  rel. 
Duraflor  Products  Co.  v.  Pearcy,   29 
S.W.2d  83,  325  Mo.  835. 

(2)  Under   provisions    of   statutes 
providing  that,  where  a  counterclaim 
is  established  by  "defendant"  which 
is  less  than  plaintiff's  demand,  plain- 
tiff must  have  judgment  for  residue 
only,  the  word  "defendant"  means  a 
single  defendant— Bandych  v.  Ross, 
26  N.Y.S.2d  850. 

Effect  of  cross  action 

(1)  Cross  action  has  been  held  not 
an  ancillary  proceeding   but  an  in- 
dependent suit  in  which  a  final  judg- 
ment    could    be    rendered     without 
awaiting  a  decision  in  the  original 
suit— Adam     v.     Saenger,     Tex.Civ. 
App.,    101  «S.W.2d   1046,   reversed  on 
other   grounds   58   S.Ct   454,    303   U. 
S.  59,  82  L.Ed.  649,  rehearing  denied 
58   S.Ct    640,   303  U.S.   666,  82  L.Ed. 
1113,    mandate    conformed    to    Tex. 
Civ.App.,   119   S.W.2d   687.   certiorari 
denied    Saenger    v.    Adam,    59    B.Ct 

!2,  307  U.S.  628,  83  L.Bd.  1511. 

(2)  It  has  also  been  held,  howev- 
er, that  but  one  judgment  should  be 
entered  in  an  original  and  a  cross 
suit. 

IOTOL— Union      Mercantile     Co.      v. 

Chandler,    57    N.W.    695,    90    Iowa 

650. 
N-.T.— Simpson  v.  McKay,  3  Thomps. 

&  C.  65. 
33  C.J.  p  '1194  note  SS  [bj. 


§  65 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


enter  the  orders  separately  and  not  as  a  part  of 
the  judgment  for  defendant.44 

The  general  rule  has  been  held  to  have  applica- 
tion only  to  parties  to  an  action  whose  interests  are 
identical,45  and  not  to  prevent  the  court  from 
granting  judgment  to  plaintiff  in  an  action  and 
postponing  determination  of  claims  between  de- 
fendants which  do  not  affect  the  rights  of  plain- 
tiff.46 The  entry  of  an  interlocutory  decree  fol- 
lowed by  the  entry  of  a  decree  rendering  the  for- 
mer final  does  not  violate  the  rule.47 

Statutes  or  rules  of  court  in  a  number  of  juris- 
dictions permit  departure  from  the  general  rule,48 
as,  for  example,  statutes,  discussed  supra  §  36,  which 
permit  separate  judgments  to  be  entered  as  to  dif- 
ferent defendants.  Under  other  statutes,  where 
only  part  of  a  claim  is  controverted,  or  where  de- 
fendant admits,  or  offers  to  allow  judgment  as  to, 
part  of  the  claim,  judgment  may  be  entered  for 
such  part,  and  subsequently  another  judgment  may 
be  entered  for  the  amount  found  due,  if  any,  on  fur- 
ther litigation.4^  Where  separate  judgments  are 
properly  rendered  in  the  same  action,  the  fact  that 
they  are  written  on  the  same  paper  does  not  affect 
their  validity.50 

§  66.    Several  Causes  Tried  Together 

Where  several  causes  are  tried  as  one  action,  sep- 
arate Judgments  in  each  may  and  should  be  entered. 

Where  several  causes  are  tried  and  submitted  to- 


gether, it  is  not  proper  to  render  a  general  judg- 
ment, but  separate  judgments  should  be  entered  in 
the  separate  cases.51  In  a  penal  action  to  recover  on 
several  distinct  offenses,  judgment  must  be  ren- 
dered separately  on  each  specific  offense.52 

§  67.    Nature  and  Extent  of  Relief 

At  common  law  equitable  relief  cannot  be  award- 
ed in  an  action  at  law.  It  is  otherwise  in  jurisdictions 
in  which  law  and  equity  are  administered  by  the  same 
courts,  such  courts  having  a  broad  discretion  in  the 
manner  of  granting  relief  and  forming  their  decrees. 

A  court  can  render  only  such  judgment  in  a  case 
as  does  not  transcend  the  extent  and  character  of 
judgments  which  are  applicable  to  the  class  of  cas- 
es to  which  the  case  under  consideration  belongs.58 
However,  the  fact  that  relief  of  a  particular  sort 
has  not  been  given  previously  is  not  conclusive  that 
it  should  not  be  granted,  although  ordinarily  it  is 
highly  persuasive  to  such  effect.54  The  court  can- 
not by  its  judgment  give  one  of  the  parties  a  right 
which  he  did  not  otherwise  have.55 

As  a  general  rule,  specific  or  equitable  relief  can- 
not be  recovered  in  an  action  at  law  under  the  com- 
mon law  or  where  law  and  equity  are  administered 
as  separate  systems  of  jurisprudence.56  The  sole 
remedy  the  court  is  competent  to  give  is  a  judgment 
for  money  damages  as  a  recompense  for  the  injury 
suffered.57  On  the  other  hand,  in  jurisdictions  in 
which  the  formal  distinction  between  courts  of  law 
and  equity  has  been  abolished  by  code  or  practice, 


44.  Colo. — Charles  v.  Sprott,  224  OP. 
222,  75  Colo.  90. 

45.  Cal. — Howe      v.      Key      System 
Transit  Co.,  24-6  P.  39,  198  Cal.  525. 

46.  Cal.— Rowley    v.    Davis.    147    P. 
958,  169  Cal.  $78. 

Relief  between  codefendants  see  su- 
pra §  37. 

47.  Tex— Lubeli      v.      Sutton,      Civ. 
App.,  164  S.W.2d  41,  error  refused. 

48.  HI. — Zimmerman      v.       Bankers 
Life    &    Cas.    Co.,    58    N.E.2d    267, 
324   Ill-App.    370— Kuleza   v.    Alli- 
ance Printers  &  Publishers,  47  N. 
E.2d    547,    318    IlLApp.    231-^Shaw 
v.    Courtney,    46    N.E.2d    170,    317 
IlLApp.     422,     affirmed    53    N.E.2d 
432,  385  111.  559— National  Builders 
Bank  of  Chicago  v.  Simons,  31  N. 
E.2d   269,    307   Ill.App.    552. 
Legislature  has  power  to  author- 
ize the  rendition  and  entry  of  sepa- 
rate judgments. — Beauvals  v.  Spring- 
field Institute   for  Savings,   20  N.E. 
2d    957,    303    Mass.    136,    124    A.L.R. 
611. 

49.  111. — Zimmerman      v.      Bankers 
Life  &  Casualty  Co.,  58  N.B.2d  267, 
324  Ill.App.  370. 

Ky.— Weikel  v.   Alt,   27  S.W.2d   684, 
234   Ky.    91 — O'Connor  v.   Hender- 


son Bridge  Co.,   27  IS,W.   251,   985, 

95  Ky.  ess—Maxwell  v.  Dudley,  13 

Bush  403. 

33  C.J.  p  1194  note  39. 
Judgment  on: 

Admission  in  pleadings   see  infra 
§  185. 

Offer  see  infra   §§    179-184. 

50.  La.— Lay  v.   Pugh,   119   So.  456, 
9  La.App.  183. 

51.  Pa.— Fisher    v.    Biehl,    40    A.2d 
912,  156  iPa.Super.  476. 

33  C.J.  p  1194  note  40. 

Single  or  separate  judgments  on  con- 
solidation of  actions  see  Actions 
§  113  a  (5). 

Joinder  of  causes  under  statute 

The  authority  conferred  by  stat- 
ute to  Join  several  causes  of  action 
in  one  action,  as  discussed  in  Ac- 
tions §§  77-98,  has  been  held  to 
carry  with  it  the  authority  to  en- 
ter separate  judgments  in  such  an 
action.— Lewis  v..Bricker,  209  N.W. 
832,  235  Mich.  656. 
Judgment  on.  general  verdict 

Entry  of  judgment  on  general 
verdict  in  action  based  on  several 
causes  of  action  and  counterclaims 
thereto  is  not  error,  although  Jury 
might,  if  proper  instructions  were 

186 


asked  and  allowed,  have  returned 
separate  verdicts.— McGrew  Mach. 
Co.  v.  One  Spring  Alarm  Clock  Co., 
245  N.W.  '263,  124  Neb.  93. 

52.  N.J. — Bloodgood    v.    -Vandeveer. 
3  N.J.Law  928. 

53.  Ariz.— Bell  v.  Bell,  39  P.2d  629, 
44  Ariz.  520. 

Neb. — Boring  v.  Dodd,  2-17  N.W.  580, 
116  Neb.  366. 

54.  D.C. — Thomas  v.  Peyser,  118  F. 
2d  369,  73  App.D.C.  155. 

55.  Pa. — Koenig    v.    Curran's    Res- 
taurant &  Baking  Co.,  159  A.  553, 
306  Pa.  345. 

Action  on  contract 

Rights  of  litigants  in  suit  on  con- 
tract cannot  be  enlarged  by  court's 
judgment  order,  or  decree,  which  can 
only  adjudicate  relations  establish- 
ed by  parties  as  between  themselves. 
— Koenig  v.  Curran's  Restaurant  & 
Baking  Co.,  159  A.  553,  306  Pa.  345. 

56.  N.J. — Knight  v.  Electric  House- 
hold Utilities  Corporation,  30  A.2d 
585,  133  N.J.Ea.  87,  affirmed  36  A. 
2d  201,  134  N.XEq.  542. 

33  C.J.  p  1055  note  57. 

57.  Va. — Orange  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Ful- 
vey,    17   Gratt.   366,   58   Va.  366. 

C.J.  p  1056  note  57. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  67 


and  in  which  the  same  court  administers  law  and 
equity,  a  judgment  may  award  such  legal  and  eq- 
uitable and  specific  relief  as  the  case  warrants.58 
In  such  jurisdictions  the  court  possesses  a  broad  dis- 
cretion in  the  manner  of  granting  relief  and  form- 
ing its  decrees59  in  order  to  adapt  the  relief  tq  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case.60  It  will  ad- 
minister such  relief  as  the  exigencies  of  the  case 
demand61  as  of  the  close  of  the  trial62  or  entry  of 
the  decree,63  provided  a  sufficient  foundation  for 


the  suit  existed  at  the  time  when  it  was  com- 
menced.64 The  court  will  endeavor  to  dispose 
finally  of  the  litigation  so  as  to  preclude  further  lit- 
igation between  the  parties  on  the  same  subject  mat- 
ter.65 

While  plaintiff  may  be  entitled  to  several  or  dif- 
ferent' reliefs  in  one  cause  of  action,66  double  or 
excessive  relief  may  not  be  awarded.67  Ordina- 
rily the  court  will  not  hand  over  property  which  is 


58.  Ky. — Black  Motor  Co.  v.  Hens- 
ley,   98   S.W.2d  281,  1266  Ky.  110. 

Okl.— Wetzel  v.  Evans,  147  P.2d  133, 
194  Okl.  20 — Clark  v.  Armstrong  & 
Murphy,  72  flP.2d  362,  180  Okl.  514. 

Joinder  of  legal  and  equitable  caus- 
es under  code  practice  see  Ac- 
tions §  94. 

59.  111. — Quitman  v.  Dowd,  23  N.E. 
2d  207,  301  IlLApp.  403. 

Ind. — Newman  v.  Newman,  48  N.E.2d 

455,  221  Ind.  433. 
Wash.— Hanley    y.    Most,    115    P.2d 

933,  9  Washed  429. 

Alternative  relief  , 

Where  a  contractor  was  entitled 
to  relief  sought  in  its  complaint 
praying  for  a  refund  of  taxes  paid 
on  gasoline  used  in  trucks  not  ca- 
pable of  being  operated  upon  a  pub- 
lic highway,  and  prayer  for  relief 
was  in  the  alternative,  it  was  for 
the  trial  court  to  determine  in  what 
form  it  should  be  accorded. — Mason- 
Walsh-Atkinson-Kier  Co.  v.  Case,  97 
P.2d  165,  2  Wash.2d  33. 
Decree  pro  forma 

In  granting  or  refusing  pro  forma 
decree,  court  may  grant  or  dismiss 
petition  as  seems  best— In  re  Henry 
County  Mut.  Burial  Ass'n,  77  S.W. 
2d  124,  229  Mo.App.  300. 
Declaration  of  rights 

Where  plaintiff  sought,  among  oth- 
er things,  to  have  rights  of  parties 
declared,  and  declaration  of  rights 
appeared  in  findings,  judgment  was 
not  deficient  for  failure  to  disclose 
such  declaration  of  rights  on  its 
face,  since  findings  may  be  read  in 
connection  with  judgment— Am- 
puero  .v.  Luce,  157  P.2d  899,  68  Cal. 
AppJ2d  811. 

$0.    Pla. — Nichols  v.  Bodenheim,  146 

So.  86,  659,  107  Fla.  25. 
Ind. — Newman  v.   Newman,   48  N.B. 

2d  455,  221  Ind.  432. 
Minn.— Beliveau   v.    Beliveau,   14  N. 

W.2d  360,  217  Minn.  235. 
N.Y. — 'Shanik  v.  Empire  Power  Corp., 

58  N.Y.S.2d  17-6,  affirmed  62  N.Y.S. 

2d  760,  270  App.Div.  9-25. 
Preservation  of  rights 

Court  may  render  decree  saving 
rights  of  parties  not  before  it- 
Charles  A.  Hill  &  Co.  v.  Belmont 
Heights  Baptist  Church,  69  S.W.2d 
61'2,  17  Tenn.App.  603. 


61.    Kan.— Prey  v.  Willey,   166  P.2d 

659,  161  Kan.  196. 
La. — 'Mayer  Godchaux  Co.  v.  Regan, 

137  So.  547,  18  La.App.  579. 
N.Y. — Bloomquist  v.  Farson,  118  2*. 
B.  855,  222  KY.  375— Turner  v. 
Hygiene  Waterproofing  Co.,  5  N. 
Y.S.2d  689,  255  App.Div.  716,  af- 
firmed 23  N.E.2d  548,  281  N.Y. 
731— In  re  Beall's  Will,  54  N.Y.'S. 
•2d  869,  184  Misc.  881— Chase  Nat. 
Bank  of  City  of  New  York  v.  Ma- 
nila Electric  Co.,  40  N.Y.S.Sd  385, 
180  Misc.  483— Chemical  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Adam  Schumann  As- 
sociates, 268  N.Y.S:  674,  150  Misc. 
2121. 

Ohio.— State  ex  rel.  Ohio  Nat.  Bank 
of  Columbus  v.  City  of  Parma,  6 
N.E.2d  756,  132  Ohio  St  220,  257. 
Okl.— Doss  Oil  Royalty  Co.  v.  Texas 

Co.,  137  P.2d  934,  192  Okl.  359. 
Disposition  of  rights  of  parties 

Decree  or  judgment  disposes  of 
rights  of  parties  as  they  presently 
exist,  and  as  they  appear  from  evi- 
dence in  case. — (Ward  v.  Prospect 
Manor  Corporation,  206  N.W.  856,  188 
Wis.  534,  46  A.L.R.  364. 

Sanities  must  be  balanced  by  the 
court  in  determining  whether  equi- 
table relief  will  be  granted.— Folts 
v.  Globe  Life  Ins.  Co.,  223  N.W.  797, 
117  Neb.  72S. 

Interlocutory  judgment 

Judgment  in  action  to  establish  ti- 
tle to  realty  should  have  been  in- 
terlocutory, where  issue  tried  was 
whether  defendant  was  liable  to 
account  and  evidence  relating  to 
many  items  to  determine  amount  of 
recovery  was  lacking. — -Waters  v. 
Hall,  218  N.Y.S.  31,  218  App.Div. 
149. 

Relief  must  be  granted  or  denied 
according  to  the  facts  and  equitable 
considerations  presented  at  the  trial. 
— Devon  Knitwear  Co.  v.  Levinson, 
19  N.Y.'S.2d  102,  173  Misc.  779. 

Money  Judgment 

A  court  exercising  equitable  pow- 
ers has  power  to  render  a  money 
judgment  when  conditions  forbid 
the  enforcement  of  the  more  direct 
remedies  Invoked  in  the  equitable 
process.— In  re  Rubin's  Estate,  5  N. 
Y.S.2d  129,  168  Misc.  81. 

Court  is  not  bound  by  narrow  lim- 
itations, but  may  afford  relief  jus- 

187 


tified   by   facts. — Dolin    v.    Sussman, 
255   N.Y.S.    618,    143    Misc.    323. 

62.  X.Y.— Smith  v.  Bouton,  225  N.Y. 
S.    164,  -221   App.Div.    317 — City  of 
Glens  Falls  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  of 
New    York,     215     N.Y.S.     354,     127 
Misc.  104. 

63.  Mass. — Fashioncraft,      Inc.,      v. 
Halpern,    48    N.E.2d    1,    313    Mass. 
385. 

64.  N.Y.— City    of    Glens    Falls    v. 
Standard    Oil    Co.    of    New    York, 
215  N.Y.S.  354,  127  Misc.   104. 

Time  to  which  relief   in  equity  re- 
lates generally  see  Equity  §    600. 

65.  Cal. — Sonnicksen  v.   Sonnicksen, 
113   P.2d   495,    45    Cal.App.2d   46. 

N.Y. — Shanik  v.  Empire  Power  Corp., 

58   N.Y.'S.2d   176,   affirmed   62  N.Y. 

S.2d   760,    270   App.Div.   925. 
Wash.— Hanley    v.    Most,    115    P.2d 

933,  9  Washed  429. 
Adjudication  in  one  judgment 

All  controversies  of  parties  aris- 
ing out  of  a  particular  transaction 
may  be  adjudicated  in  one  judgment. 
— Mergenthaler  v.  Mergenthaler,  160 
P.2d  121,  69  Cal.App.2d  525— Dobbins 
v.  Horsfall,  136  :P.2d  35,  58  CaLApp. 
2d  23. 

Decree  determining  case 

Court  properly  rendered  decree 
determining  case,  tried  as  suit  in 
equity  after  defendants  set  up  that 
plaintiffs'  deed  to  land,  for  posses- 
sion of  which  action  was  originally 
commenced,  was  in  effect  a  mort- 
gage, as  there  was  nothing  further 
to  try  in  law  Action. — Colahan  v. 
Smyth,  81  P.2d  112,  159  Or.  569. 

66.  Utah. — Peay  v.  Gasav  of  Provo, 
Inc.,  39  P.2d  1041,  88  Utah  85. 

67.  Tex. — Jones  v.  Rainey,  Civ.App., 
168    S.W.2d    507,    error    refused — 
Wichita  Falls  Electric  Co.  v.  Huey, 
Civ.App.,  246  S.W.  69i2. 

Double  relief  iUTurtrated 

In  an  action  for  damages  for 
breach  of  contract  to  furnish  electric 
lighting  facilities  and  for  manda- 
mus to  compel  performance  of  such 
contract,  an  award  of  damages  bas- 
ed on  'a  continuing  and  indefinite 
failure  to  perform  and  grant  of 
mandamus  without  taking  it  into 
consideration  in  assessing  damages, 
was  erroneous  as  giving  double  re- 
lief.—Wichita  Falls  Electric  Co.  v. 
Huey,  supra. 


§  67 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  subject  of  a  suit  to  one  of  the  parties  to  col- 
lect and  distribute  among  the  interested  parties.68 

Unenforceable  judgments.  A  court  will  not  ren- 
der a  judgment  which  cannot  be  enforced  by  any 
process  known  to  law.69 

Specification  in  judgment.  The  entry  of  a  judg- 
ment must  show  the  nature  of  the  relief  granted70 
or  denied,71  its  extent,72  and,  as  discussed  infra  § 
75,  the  parties  for  and  against  whom  it  is  rendered. 
A  general  judgment  for  defendant  is  not  objection- 
able where  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  judgment  de- 
nies the  relief  sought73  It  is  improper,  however, 
for  the  judgment  to  purport  to  grant  relief  as 
prayed  for  in  the  petition  where  damages  were  also 
prayed  for  but  not  granted.74 

Prospective  damages.  A  judgment  in  an  action 
for  damages  reciting  that  plaintiff  had  been  dam- 
aged in  a  specified  amount  is  not  objectionable  as 
providing  for  prospective  damages.75 

§  68.    —  Amount  of  Recovery 

The  recovery  of  double  damages  Is  not  favored. 

The  recovery  of  double  damages  is  not  favored.76 
The  adding  of  interest  to  the  amount  of  a  verdict 
for  plaintiff  has  been  held  not  to  be  error  where 
the  court  has  reserved  for  itself  the  computation  of 
interest.77 


Designation  of  the  amount  of  the  recovery  is  con- 
sidered infra  §§  76-79. 

§  69.    ..       Personal  Judgment  in  Proceedings 
by  Attachment  or  in  Rem 

A  personal  or  general  judgment  cannot  ad  a  gen- 
oral  rule  be  effectively  rendered  in  a  proceeding  in  remr 
as  by  attachment,  unless  Jurisdiction  of  the  person  has 
also  been  obtained  by  personal  service  or  by  an  appear- 
ance. 

Although  some  statutes  contemplate  the  rendi- 
tion of  a  judgment,  personal  in  form,  even  where 
no  jurisdiction  has  been  obtained  over  defendant's 
person,78  as  a  general  rule,  in  a  proceeding  in  rem 
in  which  the  court's  jurisdiction  is  founded  solely  on 
the  presence  of  the  particular  thing  involved  in  the 
suit,  as  by  attachment,  no  personal  judgment  can  be 
rendered  against  the  owner  or  defendant  beyond  the 
property  involved.79  •  It  has  been  held,  however, 
that  a  personal  or  general  judgment  in  such  a  case 
is  not  absolutely  void,80  but  that  it  can  have  no  ef- 
fect further  than  to  bind  the  property  attached.81 

Where  jurisdiction  acquired  over  person.  Where 
the  court  has  acquired  jurisdiction  over  defendant's 
person  by  personal  service  or  his  voluntary  appear- 
ance it  is  usually  proper  to  render  a  personal  judg- 
ment against  him,82  even  though  the  writ  of  at- 
tachment issued  in  the  case  is  bad.83  If  the  par- 
ties are  before  the  court,  a  decree  in  personam 


68.  Mass. — National    Radiator    Cor- 
poration   v.    Parad,    8    N.E.-2d   794, 
297  Mass.  314. 

69,  Cal. — Johnson  v.   Malloy,   16   P. 
228,  74  Cal.  430. 

Mont.— Allen  v.  Montana  Refining 
Co.,  227  iP.  582,  71  Mont.  105. 

704  Tex. — Fair  v.  Miller,  Civ.App., 
69  'S.~W.2d  558,  error  dismissed. 

Utah. — Ellinwood  v.  Bennion,  276  P. 
159,  73  "Utah  563. 

33  C.J.  p  1191  note  8. 


71.     Utah. — Ellinwood 
supra. 


Bennion, 


72.  U.'S.— Smith  v.  Smith,  Colo.,  247 
F.  461,  159  C.C.A.  515.    . 

33  C.J.  p.  1191  note  4. 

73.  Mo. — Jones  v.   Reeves,  App.,  41 
S.W.2d  605. 

74.  Tex.— Fair    v.    Miller,    Civ.App., 
69  S.WJ2d  558,  error  dismissed. 

75.  Ohio. — Licht  v.  Woertz.  167  N.B. 
614,  32  Ohio  Afcp.  111. 

76.  Mass.— Lawrence  v.   O'Neill,    58 
N.E.-2d  140,  317  Mass.  893. 

Assessment  of  multiple'  damages  see 

Damages  §  195. 
Statutory    provisions     for    multiple 

damages  see  Damages  $   128. 


77.    Colo.— Wood  v.  Hazelet,   237   P. 

151,  77  Colo.  442. 
78-    Mich.— Hitchcock  v.  Hahn,  27  N. 

W.  600,  60  Mich.  459. 
6  C.J.  p  484  note  89. 

79.  U.'S.— The      Chickie,      C.C.A.Pa., 
141    F.2d    80 — Gershowitz   v.    Lane 
Cotton  Mills,   D.C.Tex.f   21  F.Supp. 
579. 

Ga.— Wilby  v,  McRae,  191  6.E.  662, 
56  Ga.App.  140. 

La. — Nottingham  v.  Hoss,  141  So. 
391,  19  La.App.  643. 

Okl. — Consolidated  Flour  Mills  Co. 
of  Kansas  v.  Sayre  Wholesale  Gro- 
cer Co.,  56  P.2d  78-1,  176  Okl.  482. 

Attachment  or  garnishment  as  basis 
for  judgment  generally  see  supra 
5  24. 

Jurisdiction  of  the  person  as  prereq- 
uisite to  Judgment  in  personam 
generally  see  supra  §  19. 

Costs 
Text  rule  applies  to  judgment  for 

costs.— The  Chickie,  CjC.A.'Pa.,  141  F. 

2d    80 — Gershowitz    v.    Lane    Cotton 

Mills,   D.C.Tex,  121  F.'Supp.   579. 

80.  Me.-JParker  v.    Prescott,   29   A. 
1007,  86  Me.  841. 

6  C.J.  p  484  note  90. 

81.  N.J.— Skratt  v.  Camera,   ITS  A, 
366,  12  N.J.Misc.  826. 

OkL — Consolidated    Flour    Mills    Co. 

188 


of  Kansas  v.  Sayre  Wholesale  Gro- 
cer Co.,  56  P.2d  781,  176  Okl.  482. 
6  C.J.  p  485  note  91. 
Effect  of  judgment  in  main  action  of 
attachment  proceeding  see  Attach- 
ment §  497  g. 

"A  judgment,  though  in  the  form 
of  a  personal  one,  against  the  de- 
fendant, has  no  effect  beyond  the 
property  attached.  No  suit  can  be 
maintained  on  the  judgment  in  any 
court;  nor  can  it  be  used  as  evi- 
dence in  any  other  proceeding  not 
affecting  the  property;  nor  can  the 
costs  ...  be  collected  out  of 
any  other  property." — Gershowitz  v. 
Lane  Cotton  Mills,  D.C.Tex.,  21  F. 
Supp.  579,  580. 

82.  Miss. — Travellers'    Ins.    Co.     v. 
Inman,   128   So.  877,  157  Miss.   810 
— Branham   v.   Drew   Grocery   Co., 
Ill   So.  155,   145  Miss.   627. 

6  C.J.  p  485  note  92. 

Process,    notice,    or    appearance    as 

essential    to    valid    judgment    see 

supra  §§  23-<26. 

ITotice  of  attachment  under  stat- 
ute confers  jurisdiction  to  grant  a 
personal  judgment. — Whitten  v.  Mc- 
Millan, U28  S.E.  211,  34  Ga.App.  33— 
Johnson  v.  Walter  J.  Wood  Stove 
Co.,  64  S.R.287,  6  Ga.App.  65. 

83.  Pa.— Linahan  v.  Lawson,  43  Pa. 
Co.  533. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  71 


may  be  rendered  and  obedience  thereto  enforced 
even  though  the  res  involved  in  the  suit  is  beyond 
the  court's  jurisdiction.84 

§  70.    Affirmative  Relief  to  Defendant 

As  discussed  supra  §  49,  affirmative  relief  cannot 
be  awarded  defendant  in  an  action  unless  he  has 
filed  an  appropriate  pleading  seeking  such  relief. 

Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 

§  71.    Recitals 

a.  In  general 

b.  Jurisdictional  recitals 

c.  Verdict  and  facts  or  findings 

a.  In  General 

A  judgment  does  not  reside  tn  Its  recitals.,  and  ordi- 
narily need  not  recite  on  Its  face  matters  which  appear 
from  other  parts  of  the  Judgment  roll. 

Mere  recitals  are  not  indispensable  parts  of  judg- 
ments.85 The  judgment  or  decree  does  not  reside 
in  its  recitals,  but  in  the  mandatory  or  decretal  por- 
tion thereof,86  which  adjudicates  and  determines 
the  issues  in  the  case  and  defines  and  settles  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  parties  as  far  as  they  re- 
late to  the  subject  matter  of  the  controversy.87 


Matters  which  appear  from  other  parts  of  the 
judgment  roll  need  not  be  recited  in  the  judgment 
itself.88  Hence,  while  as  discussed  supra  §§  47- 
58,  a  judgment  or  decree  must  conform  to  the  plead- 
ings and  findings  in  the  case,  if  it  does  so  conform 
a  statement  to  that  effect  in  the  decree  itself  is  not 
necessary,8^  nor  need  the  judgment  of  a  court  of 
record  recite  on  its  face  that  it  was  rendered  after 
due  proof.90  The  validity  of  the  judgment  is  not 
affected  by  recitals  which  precede  the  judgment.91 

If  reasons  and  rulings  are  required  to  be  incor- 
porated in  the  decree  in  the  interest  of  clarity,  they 
should  be  concisely  set  out.92 

b.  Jurisdictional  Recitals 

Except  as  statute  or  court  rule  may  otherwise  pro- 
vide, the  Judgment  of  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction 
need  not,  as  a  general  rule,  contain  a  recital  of  the 
Jurisdictional  facts. 

Except  as  statute  or  court  rule  may  otherwise 
provide,98  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  general  ju- 
risdiction is  not,  as  a  general  rule,  required  to  con- 
tain a  recital  of  the  Jurisdictional  facts,9*  and 
failure  of  such  a  judgment  in  an  ordinary  action 
at  law  to  contain  a  recital  of  such  facts  does  not 
vitiate  the  judgment,95  nor  does  error  in  the  recital 


84.  U.S.— Wallace    v.    Motor    -Prod- 
ucts   Corporation,    C.C.A.Mich.,    25 
F.2d  655,   certiorari  granted  49  -S. 
Ct   21,  278  TJ.S.  589,  73  L.Ed.  522, 
certiorari    dismissed   49   S.Ct   417, 
279    U:S.    859,    73   L.Ed.    999. 

Decree   does   not   operate  on  res 
U.S.— Wallace     v.     Motor     Products 
Corporation,  supra. 

85.  Cal. — Jacobs   v.   Norwich  Union 
^Fire  Ins.  Soc.,  40  «P.2d  89-9,  4  Cal. 

App.2d  1. 

Mich. — Ombrello  v.  Duluth,  6.  S.  & 
A.  Ry.  Co.,  233  N.W.  357,  252 
Mich.  396. 

86.  U.S. — McGhee    v.    Leitner,    B.C. 
Wis.,  41  F.Supp.  674 — Eckerson  v. 
Tanney,   D.C.N.Y.,   235   F.   415,  af- 
firmed '243  F.  1007,  156  C.C.A.  663. 

Iowa. — Creel  v.  Hammans,  5  N.W.2d 
169,  232  Iowa  95. 

Mich.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Om- 
brello v.  Duluth,  S.  S,  &  A.  Ry. 
Co.,  233  N.W.  357,  359,  252  Mich, 
396. 

Mont.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  to  Con- 
way  v.  Fabian,  89  P.2d  1022,  1028, 
108  Mont.  287,  certiorari  denied 
Fabian  v.  Conway,  60  S.Ct  94,  308 
U.S.  578,  84  LuEd.  484— Blaser  v. 
Clinton  Irr.  Dist.,  53  P.2d  1141, 
100  Mont.  459 — Corpus  Juris  quot- 
ed in  Galiger  v.  McNulty,  260  P. 
401,  80  Mont.  339. 

Wis.— -In  re  Corse's  Will,  '217  N.W. 
726,  195  Wis.  88. 


Construction  of  judgment  with  re- 
spect to  recitals  see  infra  8  437. 

87..  Iowa. — Creel  v.  Hammans,  5  N. 
W.2d  169,  232  Iowa  95. 

88.  Idaho.— Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
Karlson  v.  National  Park  Lumber 
Co.,   269  P.  591,  46  Idaho  595. 

33  C.J.  p  1194  note  42. 
Compliance  with  statute 

A  law  or  decretal  judgment,  based 
on  evidences  of  indebtedness  speci- 
fied in  statute  requiring  person 
bringing  suit  thereon  to  allege  or 
prove  that  such  instruments  have 
been  assessed  for  taxation,  is  nei- 
ther void  nor  voidable  merely  be- 
cause it  does  not  recite  that  statute 
has  been  complied  with. — Crickmer 
v.  Thomas,  200  S.E.  353,  120  W.Va. 
769— Newhart  v.  Pennybacker,  200 
S.E.  350,  120  W.Va.  774,  concurring 
opinion  200  S.E.  754,  120  W.Va.  774. 
Theory  of  damages 

A  statement  in  a  judgment  spec- 
ifying what  the  damages  awarded 
thereby  were  for  is  improper. — 
Brown  v.  Shyne,  '206  N.T.S.  310,  1'23 
Misc.  851. 

89.  Vt. — Ackerman  v.  Carpenter,  29 
A.2d  922,  113  Vt.  77. 

90-    Ga.— Wade  v.  Hurst,  84  S.E.  65, 

143  Ga.  26. 
Miss.— Simpson  v.  (Phillips,    141    So. 

897,  164  Miss.  256. 
91.    CaL— Potasz  v.  Potasz,  155  P.2d 

895,  68  CaLApp.2d  20. 

189 


92.  Mich. — Rhines     v.      Consumers'* 
Power  Co.,  242  N.W.  898,  '259  Mich. 
236. 

JVfaTrtTig  opinion  part  of  decree  was 
held   improper. — Rhines   v.   Consum- 
ers' Power  Co.,  supra. 
Errors  in  recitals  held  immaterial 
Ga.— Barber  v.  Smith,  26  «S.E.2d  478. 

69  Ga.App.  624. 
Mont. — Blaser  v.   Clinton  Irr.   Dist., 

53   P.2d  1141,   100  Mont.   459. 
N.C. — Richert  v.  James   Supply  Co.* 

138  S.B.  345,   194  N.C.  11. 

93.  Ala. — De   Jarnette   v.    Dreyfuss,. 
51  So.  932,  166  Ala.  138. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  47. 

94.  •  Ind. — Grantham    Realty    Corpo- 
ration  v.    Bowers,    22   N.B.2d   832, 
215  Ind.  672. 

95.  Wash. — 'In   re   Dingman,   188  P~ 
755,  110  Wash.  513. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  46. 
Besort  to  record 

(1)  Where   court   had  jurisdiction 
of  subject  matter  and  potential  ju- 
risdiction  of  parties,   and  judgment 
did    not    recite    service    of   process, 
entire  record  could  be  looked  to,  to 
ascertain  if  actual  jurisdiction  had; 
been     acquired. — Johnson     v.     Cole, 
Tex.Civ.App.,   138   -S.W.2d   910,    error 
refused. 

(2)  On  question  of  validity  of  the 
judgment,   recourse  may  be  had   to* 
affidavits  in  judgment  roll  to  deter- 
mine whether  showing  made  for  or- 


§  71 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


of  such  facts  have  such  effect.96  It  has  been  held 
that,  where  service  of  process  on  defendant  was 
constructive  only,  the  judgment  should  recite  facts 
sufficient  to  show  compliance  with  the  statute.97 

The  necessity  for  a  record  showing  of  jurisdic- 
tional  facts  in  courts  of  inferior  or  limited  juris- 
diction is  discussed  in  Courts  §  105. 

c.  Verdict  and  Facts  or  Findings 

As  a  general  rule  a  judgment  need  not  Incorporate 
in  its  recitals  the  verdict  or  findings  of  fact  on  which 
it  is  founded. 

While  a  judgment  ordinarily  should  refer  to,  and 
state  the  result  of,  the  verdict,  decision,  or  report 
which  authorizes  it,98  in  accordance  with  any  stat- 
ute or  rule  of  court,"  generally  it  is  not  necessary 
to  go  further  and  incorporate  in  the  recitals  of  the 


judgment  the  verdict,1  or  the  findings,2  or  the  evi- 
dentiary facts.3  It  is  sufficient  if  the  facts  essen- 
tial to  sustain  the  judgment  are  stated  in  the  plead- 
ings4 and  ascertained  by  the  judgment.5 

Mere  findings  or  conclusions  of  law  have  been 
held  to  have  .no  place  in  a  judgment  ;6  and,  even 
where  a  statute  requires  findings  and  conclusions 
to  be  made,  the  better  practice  is  to  include  them 
in  a  separate  instrument7  A  judgment  and  the 
findings,  however,  may  be  incorporated  in  the  same 
instrument  without  affecting  the  validity  of  the 
judgment8  where  no  separate  findings  or  conclu- 
sions are  requested  or  filed.9 

While  under  code  practice  a  recital  of  the  facts 
in  an  equitable  decree  is  usual  and  proper,10  only 
the  decretal  part  of  the  decree  determines  the  rights 


der  of  publication  of  summons  was 
sufficient  to  confer  Jurisdiction  on 
court. — Bell  v.  McDermoth,  246  P. 
805,  198  Cal.  594. 

96.  Mont. — Blaser    v.    Clinton    Irr. 
Dist.,  53  P.2d  1141,  100  Mont.  459. 

Tex. — Anderson  v.  Zorn,  131 '  S.W. 
835,  62  Tex.Civ.App.  547. 

97.  111.— Trevor  v.  Colgate,  54  N.E. 
909,  181  111.  129. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  53. 
38.    Tex. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Walker  v.    Taylor,    Civ.App.,   56   S. 
W.2d  251,  252. 
33  C.J.  p  1195  note  55. 
99.    Tex. — Doornbos  v.  Looney,  Civ. 
App.f    159    S.W.2d    155,    error    re- 
fused. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  54. 
Sufficiency  of  compliance 

(1)  Substantial  compliance  with 
the  rules  of  civil  procedure  requir- 
ing the  judgment  to  recite  carefully 
the  findings  on  which  it  is  based 
Tias  been  held  sufficient. — Doornbos 
v.  Looney,  supra. 

(-2)  It  has  also  been  held  that  the 
fact  that  a  judgment  did  not  recite 
the  findings  on  which  it  was  based 
did  not  render  judgment  defective 
where  the  matter  was  not  called  to 
trial  court's  attention  and  trial  court 
was  not  requested  to  file  findings  of 
fact  or  conclusions  of  law. — J.  R. 
Phillips  Inv.  Co.  v.  Road  Dist.  No.  1$ 
of  Limestone  County,  Tex.Civ.App., 
172  S.W.2d  707,  error  refused. 

1.     Tex. — Christner    v.    Mayer,    Civ. 
App.,    123    !S.W.2d    715,    error   dis- 
missed, judgment  correct. 
33  C.J.  p  1195  note  56. 

It  is  not  improper  to  copy  a  ver- 
dict in  the  judgment. — Christner  v. 
Mayer,  supra. 

.12.  Fla. — J.  Schnarr  &  Co.  v.  Vir- 
ginia-Carolina Chemical  Corpora- 
tion, 159  So.  39,  118  Fla.  258— 
Bowery  v.  Babbit,  128  So.  801,  99 
Fla.  1151. 


111.— Pease   v.    Kendall,    63   N.B.2d   2, 
391  111.  193 — Ritholz  v.  Andert,  33 
N.E.2d  632,   309   Ill.App.   576. 
Wyo. — State    v.     District    Court    of 
Eighth    Judicial    Dist.   within   and 
far    Natrona   County,    260   P.    174, 
37  Wyo.  169. 
33  C.J.  p  1195  note  57. 

However,  it  has  also  been  held 
that  a  judgment  should  specially  re- 
cite the  facts  on  which  it  is  predi- 
cated.—De  Santo  v.  De  Nicola,  12-2 
A.  708,  99  Conn.  717. 

Judgment  should  contain,  nothing 
but  a  statement  that  the  court  has 
made  its  findings  of  fact  and  con- 
clusions of  law  and  then  decree  the 
relief  to  which  the  plaintiff  is  enti- 
tled.— City  Bank  Farmers'  Trust  Co. 
v.  Cannon,  38  N.Y.S.2d  245,  1265  App. 
Div.  86-3,  affirmed  51  N.E.2d  674,  291 
N.Y.  125,  157  AX.R.  1424,  motion 
denied  59  N.E.2d  445,  293  N.T.  858. 
Where  Jury  trial  waived 
Fla. — J.  -Schnarr  &  Co.  v.  Virginia- 
Carolina  Chemical  Corporation,  159 
So.  39,  118  Fla,  258. 

3.  in. — Chicago    Title    &   Trust   Co. 
v.  Ward,  163  N.B.  319,  832  111.  126. 

Certificate  of  evidence 

It  is  not  necessary  that  there  be 
a  certificate  of  evidence  to  support 
decree. — Pease  v.  Kendall,  63  N.E. 
2d  2,  391  111.  193. 

4.  Tex. — Cook  v.   Hancock,  20   Tex. 
2. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  58. 

5.  111. — Gromer  v.  Molby,  52  N.E.2d 
772,    385   111.   283— Chicago  Title  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Ward,    163   N.E.   319, 
332  111.  126. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  58. 

6.  111.— Lazarus  v.  Allied  Finishing 
Specialties  Co.,  45  N.E.2d  516,  316 
IlLApp.  667. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Van 
Alstine  v.  Hartnett,  231  N.W.  448, 
449,  210  Iowa  999. 

N.Y.— Bianchi  v.  Leon,  112  N.E.  724, 
•218  N.Y.  647— Lehlgh  Valley  R. 

190 


Co.   v.   Canal   Board,    97   N.E.    964, 
204  N.T.  471,  Ann.Cas.l913C  1228 — 
City    Bank   Farmers    Trust    Co.    v. 
Cannon,   38  N.Y.S.2d  245,  265  App. 
Div.    863,    affirmed   51    N.E.2d  '674, 
291  N.Y.  125,  157  A.L..R.   1424,  mo- 
tion denied  59  N.E.2d  445,   293   N. 
Y.    858 — CPeople   v.   Reinforced   Pa- 
per  Bottle   Corporation,    27   N.Y.S. 
2d  14,  176  Misc.  268. 
Findings  which  are  not  conclusive 
between    the   parties   should   not   be 
contained  in   the  judgment. — Minne- 
apolis-Honeywell   Regulator    Co.    v. 
Thermoco,    Inc.,    C.C.A.N.Y.,    116    F. 
2d  845. 

Improper  form 

Judgment  incorporating  findings  of 
fact  preceded  by  words,  "it  is  order- 
ed and  decreed,"  was  not  in  proper 
form.— 'Seaside  Home  for  Crippled 
Children  v.  Atlantic  Beach  Associ- 
ates, 150  N.E.  650,  341  N.Y.  550. 

7.  S.D. — in    re    Mulligan's     Estate, 
243  N.W.  102,  60  S.D.  74. 

8.  Iowa. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 

Van  Alstine  v.  Hartnett,  231  N.W. 

448,  449,  210  Iowa  999. 
33  C.J.  p  1195  note  60. 

Error   with   respect   to    recital    of 
facts  does  not  vitiate  judgment. 
Iowa. — Woods  v.  Allen,  98  N.W.  499, 

122  Iowa  695. 
Mont.— Blaser   v.   Clinton   Irr.    Dist., 

53    P.2d   1141,    100    Mont.    459. 
Not  an  adjudication 

Finding  of  fact,  although  followed 
by  judgment,  is  not  binding  adju- 
dication of  court — In  re  Cohen's  Es- 
tate, 246  N.W.  780,  216  Iowa  649. 

9.  Tex. — Gillette  v.  Davis,  Civ.App., 
15     S.W.2d     1085— Cunningham    v. 
Buel,  Civ.App.,  287  S.W.   683. 

Error  in  finding 

Tex.— Gillette  v.  Davis,  Civ.App.,  15 
S.W.-2d  1085. 

10.  U.S. — McGhee    v.    Leitner,    D.C 
Wis.,  41  F.Supp.  674. 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  72 


of  the  parties  and  constitutes  the  final  judgment  in 
the  case.11 

§  72.    Certainty 

A  judgment  must  be  definite  and  certain. 
A  judgment  must  be  definite  and  certain12  in  it- 


self,13 or  capable  of  being  made  so  by  proper  con- 
struction.14 It  must  fix  clearly  the  rights  and  lia- 
bilities of  the  respective  parties  to  the  cause,15  and 
be  such  as  defendant  may  readily  understand  and  be 
capable  of  performing,16  and  such  as  to  admit  of 
enforcement,17  to  constitute  an  estoppel  between 
the  parties,18  to  enable  the  clerk  to  issue  execution 


11.  U:S. — McGhee  v.  Leitner,  supra. 
Construction    and    operation    of    re- 
citals in  judgment  see  infra  §  437. 

12.  U.S. — Wulfsohn    v.    Russo-Asia- 
tic  Bank,  C.C.A.China,  11  F.2d  715. 

Ark. — Brotherhood  of  Locomotive 
Firemen  and  Enginemen  v.  Sim- 
mons, 79  S.W.2d  419,  190  Ark. 
480. 

Idaho. — Vollmer  v.  Vollmer,  <273  P.  1, 
47  Idaho  135— Hand  v.  Twin  Palls 
County,  236  P.  536,  40  Idaho  638. 
Ky. — Alexander  v.  Hendricks,  258  S. 

W.  81,  201  Ky.  677. 
La.— -Simon    v.    Hulse,   124   So.    845, 

12  La.App.  450. 
Miss. — Nicholas    Bus   &   Trailer   Co. 

v.  Fuller,  22  So.2d  243. 
N.C.— Barham  v.  Perry,  171  S.B.  614, 

205  N.C.  428. 
Okl. — Moroney   v.   Tannehill,    215    P. 

938,  90  Okl.  224. 

Tex. — Thomas    v.    Mullins,    Civ.App., 

127  S.W.2d  559,  reversed  on  other 

grounds  Mullins  v.  Thomas,  150  S. 

W.2d  83,  136  Tex.  215. 

W.Va. — Barnhard    v.    Barnhard,    164 

S.E.  874,  109  W.Ya.  375. 
33  C.J.  p  1195  note  62. 
Certainty: 

In  description  of  property  see  in- 
fra §  SO. 
In  designation  of: 

Amount  see  infra  §§  76-79. 
Parties  see  infra  §  75. 
Of  decrees  see  Equity  §  598. 
Deflnitivenesa  see  supra  §  21. 

"At  least  reasonable  legal  cer- 
tainty" is  required. — Emery  v.  Suc- 
cession of  Martel,  La.App.,  10  So.2d 
267,  269. 

Judgments  held  invalid  for  uncer- 
tainty 

Ala. — Jasper  Land  Co.  v.  Biddlesper- 
ger,  140  So.  624,  25  AUuApp.  45. 

Tex. — City  of  Beaumont  v.  Calder 
Place  Corporation,  Civ.Afcp.,  180  S. 
W.2d  189,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  183  8*W.2d  713,  143  Tex. 
244 — Snowden  v.  Glaspy,  Civ.App., 
127  S.W.2d  508. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  62  [c]. 

Judgments  held  not  invalid  for  un- 
certainty 
(1)  Generally. 

U.S.— Mueller  v.  Mueller,  C.C.A-Ark., 
124  F.2d  544,  certiorari  dismissed 
62  S.Ct.  1288,  316  U.S.  649,  86  L. 
Ed.  1732. 

Ariz. — Peterson  v.  Overson,  79  P.2d 
958,  52  Ariz.  203. 

Cal.— Niles  v.  Louis  H.  Kapoport  & 
Sons,  128  P.2d  50.  53  Cal.App.2d 
644— Scott  v.  Allen,  41  P.2d  371, 


4  Cal.App.2d  621 — Straus  v.  Straus, 
41  P.2d  218,  4  Cal.App.-2d  461,  mod- 
ified on  other  grounds  and  rehear- 
ing denied  42  OP.2d  378,  4  CaLApp.  - 
2d  461— Williams  v.  Blue  Bird 
Laundry  Co.,  259  P.  484,  85  CaL 
App.  388. 

Colo. — Sherman  v.  Handle,  245  P. 
717,  79  Colo.  243. 

HI.— Little  v.  Chicago  Nat.  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  7  N.E.2d  326,  289  Ill.App.  433. 

Iowa. — Hansen  v.  Bowers,  223  X.W. 
891,  -208  Iowa  545. 

Ky. — Trivette  v.  Consolidation  Coal 
Co.,  177  S.W.2d  868,  296  Ky.  529 
—Kirk  v.  Cassady,  288  'S.W.  1045, 
217  Ky.  87. 

Tex. — Grayson  v.  Johnson,  Civ.App., 
181  S.W.2d  312— Reese  v.  Carey 
Bros.,  Civ.App.,  286  S.W.  307. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  62  [b]. 

(2)  A  judgment  was  not  unintel- 
ligible because  it  provided  in   sub- 
stance that  it  should  inure  to  heirs 
and   assigns   of  party   obtaining  it. 
— Wilson  v.  Cone,  Tex.Civ.App.,  179 
S.W.2d  784. 

(3)  Judgment     directing      escrow 
holder  to  deliver  on  payment  of  bal- 
ance  due   under  contract   was   held 
not  inconsistent  or  subject  to  charge 
of    favoring    both    parties. — Reid    v. 
Van  Winkle,  252  P.  189,  31  Ariz.  267. 

ia  Ala.— Gandy  v.  Hagler,  16  So.2d 
305,  245  Ala.  167— Jasper  Land  Co. 
v.  Riddlesperger,  140  So.  624,  25 
Ala.App.  45. 

Ga. — Hutcheson  v.  Hutcheson,  30  S. 
E.2d  107,  197  Ga.  603. 

Tex. — Burrage  v.  Hunt  Production 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  114  S.Ttf.2d  1228,  er- 
ror dismissed. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  62  [a]   (1). 

14,  Ga.— Hutcheson    v.    Hutcheson, 
supra. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  62. 

15.  Mass. — Johnson's  Case,  136  N.E. 
563,  242  Mass.  489. 

Okl. — Moroney  v.   Tannehill,    215   P. 

938,  90  Okl.  224. 
Pa.— In  re  Rockett's  Estate,  35  A.2d 

303,  348  (Pa.  445. 
Tex.— Steed    v.     State,    183    S.W.Sd 

458,  143  Tex.  82. 
33  C.J.  p  1195  note  62. 
Discretion  of  parties 

The  enforcement  of  a  judgment 
should  never  be  left  to  the  discre- 
tion of  the  parties  to  whom  it  is 
addressed,  or  of  the  law  officer 
charged  with  its  execution. 
Idaho. — People  v.  Cothern,  210  P- 

1000,  36  Idaho  340. 

191 


La. — Emery  v.  Succession  of  lUGartel,. 

App.,  10  So.2d  267. 
Judgment  held  sufficiently  certain, 
Cal. — Bacigalupi  v.  Western  Machin- 
ery Co.,  26  P/2d  701,  135  CaLApp. 
242. 

Public  interest  requires  that  ad- 
judications of  the  courts  shall  so 
completely  and  precisely  compose 
the  controversy  at  hand  as  to  dispel 
and  allay  misunderstanding,  discour- 
age litigation,  and  invite  repose. — 
Cundy  v.  Weber,  300  N.W.  17,  68  S. 
D.  214. 

Toe  rights  of  parties  under  man- 
datory  judgment,  whereby  they  may 
be  subjected  to  punishment  as  con- 
temnors  for  violation  of  its  provi- 
sions, should  not  rest  on  Implica- 
tion or  conjecture,  but  language  de- 
claring such  rights  or  imposing  bur- 
dens should  be  clear,  and  unequivo- 
cal.— Plummer  v.  Superior  Court  of 
City  and  County  of  San  Francisco, 
124  P.2d  5,  20  Cai.2d  158. 

Mo.— Stith  v.  J.  J.  Newberry 
Co.,  79  S.W.2d  447,  336  Mo.  467. 

Tex. — Wilson  v.  Cone,  Civ. App.,  179- 
S.W.2d  784. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  62. 

17.  Cal.— Morris   v.   George,    135    P- 
2d   195,   57  Cal.App.2d    665 — In   re- 
McDonald's    Estate,    99    P.-2d  1115, 
37  CaLApp.2d  521. 

y. — Alexander  v.  Hendricks,  258  S.. 
W.  81,  201  Ky.  677. 

Mass. — Johnson's  Case,  136  N.E.  563, 
242  Mass.  489. 

Mo. — Bishop  v.  Bishop,  App.,  151  <S. 
W.2d  553. 

N.C.— State  v.  Wilson,  4  S.E.2d  440, 
216  N.B.  130 — Barham  v.  Perry, 
171  S.E.  614,  205  N.C.  428. 

Tex. — City  of  Beaumont  v.  Calder 
Place  Corporation,  Civ.App.,  180 
S.W.2d  189,  reversed  on  other- 
grounds  183  S.W.2d  713,  143  Tex. 
244 — Johnson  v.  Stickney,  Civ. App., 
152  S.W.2d  921 — Thomas  v.  Mul- 
lins, Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  559,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  Mullins. 
v.  Thomas,  150  S.W.2d  83,  136  Tex. 
215 — Burrage  v.  Hunt  Production 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  114  S.W:2d  1228,  er- 
ror dismissed — Guerra  v.  Contrer-- 
as,  Civ.App.,  52  S.W.Sd  295. 

Utah. — Garrison  v.  Davis,  54  P.2d. 
439,  88  Utah  358— Ellinwood  v. 
Bennion,  276  P.  159,  73  Utah  563*. 

33  C.J.  P  1195  note   62   [a]    <2). 

18.  CaL — In  re  McDonald's   Estate,. 
99    P.2d    1115,    37    Cal.App.2d   52k. 

33  C.J.  p  1195  note  62  [a]  <S). 


§  73 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.  J.  S. 


thereon,19  and  to  enable  a  law  officer  to  levy  ex- 
ecution.20 Where  the  record  entry  is  wholly  un- 
certain, repugnant,  or  contradictory,  the  judgment 
is  at  least  erroneous,  and  it  may  be  void.21  An  ob- 
scure judgment  entry  may,  however,  be  construed 
with  reference  to  the  pleadings  and  record,  and, 
where  on  the  whole  record  its  sense  can  be  clearly 
ascertained,  the  judgment  will  be  upheld.22 

§  73.    Conditional  Judgments 

.  As  a  general   rule,   a  Judgment  must  not  be  condi- 
tioned   on    any   contingency;     but,    in    a   number   of  in- 


stances,   as  where   equitable    relief  Is   awarded,    condi- 
tional Judgments  have  been  sustained. 

A  conditional  judgment  is  one  whose  enforceabil- 
ity,  or  force,  depends  on  the  performance  or  non- 
performance  of  certain  acts  to  be  done  in  the  fu- 
ture by  one  of  the  parties,23  as  where  a  judgment 
is  given  for  plaintiff,  to  be  stricken  out  if  defend- 
ant pays  the  amount  named,  or  files  a  bond,  within 
a  certain  time.24 

It  is  a  general  rule  that  judgment  must  not  be 
conditioned  on  any  contingency,25  and  it  has  been 


19.  Mo. — Bishop    v.     Bishop.     App., 
151  S.W.2d  553. 

S3  C.J.  p  1195  note  62   [a]   (4). 

20.  Moss. — Johnson's    Case.    136    N. 
B.  563,  242  Mass.  489. 

Mo.— Bishop  v.  Bishop,  App.,  151  S. 

W.2d  553. 

Tex.— steed  v.  State,  183  S.W.2d  458, 
143  Tex.  82 — McCoznbs  v.  Red,  Civ. 
App.,  86  -S.W.2d  648,  error  dis- 
missed. 

41.  Cal. — Young  v.  Enfleld,  20  P.2d 
701,  217  Cal.  662 — Morris  v. 
George,  185  P.2d  195,  57  Cal.App. 
2d  665. 

Idaho.— Hand  v.  Twin  Falls  Coun- 
ty, -2-36  P.  536,  40  Idaho  638. 

Ky.— -Alexander  v.  Hendricks,  258  S. 
W.  81,  201  Ky.  677. 

Xev. — State  ex  rel.  Smith  v.  Sixth 
Judicial  Dist.  Court,  Humboldt 
County,  167  P.2d  648. 

N.C. — Barham  v.  Perry,  171  S.E.  614, 
205  N.C.  428. 

Pa. — In  re  Rockett's  Estate,  35  A. 
2d  303,  348  Pa,  445. 

Tex. — Hatton  v.  Burgess,  Civ.App., 
167  S.W.2d  260,  error  refused — 
Burrage  v.  Hunt  Production  Co., 
Civ.App.,  114  S.iW.2d  1228,  error 
dismissed — McCorabs  v.  Red,  Civ. 
App.,  86  $.W.2d  648,  error  dis- 
missed. 

Utah.— Garrison  v.  Davis,  54  P.2d 
439,  88  Utah  358, 

33  C.J.  p  1196  note  63. 

22.  Ala. — Floyd  v.  Jackson,  164  So. 
121,  26  Ala. App.  575 — Peppers  v. 
Agee  Mercantile  Co.,  149  So.  876, 
25  Ala. App.  548. 

Cal. — Vasiljevich  v.  Radanovich,  31 
P.2d  802,  138  Cal.App.  97. 

Ky. — Oglesby  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co. 
of  America,  82  jS.W.2d  824,  259 
Ky.  620 — Nunnelley  v.  Nunnelley, 
54  S.W.2d  931,  246  Ky.  250 — Dod- 
son  v-  Powell,  215  S.W.  82,  185  Ky. 
387. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In.  Flem- 
ing v.  Kemp,  178  S.W.fld  397,  399, 
27  Tenn. App.  150. 

Tex. — Banister  v.  Hades,  Civ.App., 
282  S.W.  351— (Prince  v.  Frost- 
Johnson  Lumber  Co.,  Civ.App.f  250 
S.W.  785, 

33  C.J.  P  1196  note  64. 

Construction  of  judgment  with  ref- 
erence to  pleadings  see  infra  5  438 


Date  of  Judgment  may  be  made 
certain  by  recitation  in  order  over- 
ruling motion  to  set  aside  judgment. 
— Eggleston  v.  Primrose  Petroleum 
Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  47  S.W.2d  359,  er- 
ror dismissed. 
Orders  or  papers  considered 

Only  orders  or  papers  in  cause 
that  may  be  consulted  to  supply 
omissions  in  final  judgment  to  ren- 
der it  sufficiently  certain  are  such 
parts  of  record  as  were  in  existence 
and  formed  part  of  it  at  time  judg- 
ment was  rendered. — Decker  v.  Ty- 
ree,  264  S.W.  726,  204  Ky.  302. 

23.    N.C.— Hagedorn     v.     Hagedom, 

185  S.E.  768,  210  N.C.  164— Killian 

v.  Maiden  Chair  Co.,  161  S.E.  546, 

20*2  N.C.  23. 
12  C.J.  p  406  note  90. 
Conditional  decrees  see  Equity  S  584. 
Conditional  judgment: 

Against  garnishee  see  Garnish- 
ment S  255. 

As  affecting  application  of  doc- 
trine of  res  judicata  see  infra 
§  621. 

In    criminal    cases    see    Criminal 

Law  §  1581. 

Deftnltiveness  see  supra  §  21. 
Judgment  nisi  see  supra  §§  5,  8. 
Elimination,  of  condition 

Where  a  judgment  contains  a  con- 
dition sure  to.  happen,  or  alterna- 
tives, one  or  the  other  of  which  a 
party  is  bound  to  elect,  the  happen- 
ing or  election  making  the  Judg- 
ment absolutely  certain  and  definite 
eliminates  the  condition. — Parish  v. 
McConkie,  35  P.2d  1001,  84  Utah 
396. 
Perfection  or  acquisition  of  title 

Where  enforceability  or  validity 
of  judgment  is  conditioned  on  plain- 
tiff's perfecting  or  acquiring  title  to 
property,  judgment  is  conditional. — 
Zintsmaster  v.  Werner,  G.CLA.P&.,  41 
F.2d  634. 
Judgments  held  not  conditional 

(1)  Permitting   company  to  with- 
draw petition  on  understanding  that 
it  would  abandon  claim  to  money  in 
hands  of  receiver  was  not  erroneous 
as  conditional  judgment. — Killian  v. 
Maiden  Choir  Co.,   161  S.E.   546,   202 
NVC.  23. 

(2)  Intimation  of  judge,  in  actioi. 

192 


for  damages  for  diverting  and  pol- 
iuting  water,  that  he  would  reduce 
or  set  aside  verdict,  if  defendant 
would  agree  to  install  sewerage  dis- 
posal plant,  did  not  constitute  judg- 
ment, signed  after  announcement 
that  defendant  could  not  accept 
court's  offer,  conditional. — Cook  v. 
Town  of  Mebane,  131  S.E.  407,  191' 
N.C.  1. 

(3)  Other  Judgments. — Grayson  v. 
Johnson,  Tex.Civ.App.,  181  S.W.2d 
31-2-H33  C.J.  p  1196  note  65  [aj. 

24.  N.C. — Hagedorn     v.     Hagedorn, 
185    S.E.    768,    210    N.C.    164— Kil- 
lain  v.  Maiden  Chair  Co.,   161  S.E. 
546,  202  N.C.  23. 

21  C.J.  p  406  note  90  [a]. 

25.  U.S. — Corpus     Juris      cited     in 
United     States    v.    Bauman,     D.C. 
Or.,  56  F.Supp.  109,  117. 

Ariz. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Peter- 
son v.  Overson,  79  P.2d  958,  959, 
52  Ariz.  203. 

Ark. — Brotherhood,  etc.,  v.  Simmons, 
79  S.W.2d  419,  190  Ark.  480. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bell  v. 
State  Industrial  Accident  Commis- 
.  sion,  74  P.2d  65.  57,  157  Or.  653. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dodd  v. 
Daniel,  Civ.App.,  89  S.W.2d  494, 
495. 

33  C.J.  p  1196  note  65—12  C.J.  P  406 
note  90  [a]. 

Pacts  as  of  time  of  rendition  con- 
trolling 

(1)  Judgments  take  their  validity 
and  binding  force  from  court's  ac- 
tion, based  on  facts  existing  at  time 
of    their   rendition,    not   from    what 
may  happen  in  the  future. — Brother- 
hood of  Locomotive  Firemen  &  En- 
ginemen  v.  Simmons,  79  S."WY2d  419, 
190  Ark.  480. 

(2)  It   would  be  an  anomaly   for 
the   court   to  mould  a  Judgment  so 
as   to   make  it-  binding  only  to  the 
extent    that    some    later    judgment 
or  verdict  might   determine. — Jarec- 
ky  v.  Arnold,  182  S.E.  66,  51  CteuApp. 
954. 

Interlocutory    requirement    of    pay- 

nxent 

Judgments  containing  interlocu- 
tory provisions,  requiring  payment 
of  money  and  maturing  before  main 
decree  can  be  reviewed,  are  not  fa- 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§74 


held  that  a  conditional  judgment  is  wholly  void.26 
It  has  been  said,  however,  that  modern  practice  has 
relaxed  this  rule,27  and  in  a  number  of  cases  con- 
ditional judgments  have  been  rendered  and  sus- 
tained,28 especially  when  there  is  an  equitable  phase 
of  the  action,29  or  where  equitable  relief  is  award- 
ed,30 or  where  it  is  necessary  to  protect  the  inter- 
ests of  defendant;31  and  a  court  has  been  held  em- 
powered to  direct  an  entry  of  a  judgment  "secured 
by  appeal"  on  such  terms  as  it  may  deem  fit.82 

§  74.    Alternative  Judgments 

As  a  general  rule  a  Judgment  should  not  be  In  the 


alternative,  although  under  some  circumstances,  such  as 
in  actions  for  the  specific  recovery  of  property,  an  al- 
ternative Judgment  may  be  proper. 

An  alternative  judgment  is  a  judgment,  for  one 
thing  or  another,  which  does  not  specifically  and  in 
a  definitive  manner  determine  the  rights  of  the 
parties,33  as  where  it  requires  one  of  the  parties  to 
perform  one  or  more  alternative  propositions.34  As 
a  general  rule  judgments  cannot  be  in  the  alterna- 
tive,35 and  it  has  been  held  that  an  alternative  judg- 
ment is  wholly  void,36  especially  where  further  ac- . 
tion  of  the  court  is  necessary.3?  It  has  also  been 
said,  however,  that  modern  practice  has  relaxed 
this  rule,38  and  it  has  been  held  that,  if  the  judg- 


vored,  since  they  place  the  losing 
party  at  -a  great  disadvantage. — Al- 
amitos  Land  Co.  v.  Shell  Oil  Co.,  17 
P.2d  998,  217  Cal.  213— Ochoa  v.  Mc- 
Cush,  2  P.2d  357,  216  Cal.  426. 

26.  Ariz. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Pe- 
terson v.  Overson,  79  P.2d  958,  959, 
52  Ariz.  203. 

N.C.— Hagedorn  v.  Hagedorn,  185  6. 
B.  768,  210  N.C.  164— Killain  v. 
Maiden  Chair  Co.,  161  S.B.  546,  202 
N.C.  2i3. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bell  v. 
State  Industrial  Accident  Commis- 
sion,   74   P.2d  55,   57,   157   Or.   653. 
Utah.— Parish  v.   McConkie,   35   P.2d 

1001,  84  Utah  396. 
33  C.J.  p  1196  note  66. 

Failure  to  object  to  a  conditional 
judgment  must  be  taken  as  an  ac- 
quiescence to  its  form. — Walters  v. 
.Munore,  17  Md.  501—33  C.J.  p  1197 
note  69. 

27.  Ariz. — Peterson    v.    Overson,    79 
P.2d  958,  52  Ariz.  203. 

Statutory  requirement  as  to  form 

Under  a  statute  providing  that 
the  judgment  shall  conform  to  the 
pleadings,  the  nature  of  the  case 
proved,  and  *  the  verdict,  and  be  so 
framed  as  to  give  the  party  all  the 
relief  to  which  he  may  be  entitled 
in  law  or  equity,  a  judgment,  al- 
though conditional  in  form,  is  suf- 
ficient, if  it  is  of  such  a  nature  that 
it  may  be  determined  therefrom  de*l 
nitely  what  rights  and  obligations 
pertain  to  the  respective  parties. — 
Peterson  v.  Overson,  supra. 

28.  Cal.— Fageol  Truck  &  Coach  Co. 
v.  Pacific  Indemnity  Co.,  117  P.2d 
669,  18  Cal.2d  748 — Seegar  v.  Odell, 
115    P.2d    977,    18    CaLSd   409,    136 
A.L..R.  1291. 

Mo.— Culver  v.  Smith,  82  Mo.App. 
390. 

Tex.— Rutt  v.  Cravens,  Dargan  & 
•Co.,  Civ.App.,  72  S,W.2d  312. 

33  C.J.  p  1197  note  70:, 

Compliance  with  terms  and  condi- 
tions see  infra  §  447. 

Subjection  to  rights  of  third  pen  on 
Judgment  for  defendant,  subject 

to  rights  of  third  person,  not  party 

to  action,  who  has  attached  funds  in 

49C.JJ5.— 13 


plaintiffs  hands,  was  not  erroneous, 
since  plaintiff  need  not  pay  judgment 
until  such  person's  rights  ere  ad- 
judicated.—Ward  v.  Blair,  21  S.W. 
2d  123,  231  Ky.  96. 

29.    OkL— Powell  v.  C.  L  T.  Corpo- 
ration, 142  P.-2d  976,  19<3  Okl.  292. 
Imposition  of  conditions  in  framing 

decree  see  Equity  §  602. 
Inherent  power 

A  court  has  been  held  to  have  in- 
herent power  to  make  proper  orders 
which  are  necessary  to  protect  its 
decrees,  and  under  this  power  a 
conditional  judgment  may  be  proper. 
Mo. — Benton  v.  Alcazar  Hotel  Co- 

194  S.W.2d  20. 

N.J.— Luparelli    v.    U.    S.    Fire    Ins. 
Co.,   188  A.   451,   117   N.J.Law  342, 
affirmed   194   A.   185,   118   N.J.Law 
565. 
Protection  against  lost  instrument 

"Such  is  the  character  of  the  trial 
court's  action  when  an  action  of  le- 
gal cognizance  is  based  upon  a  lost 
instrument  and  the  instrument  lost 
is  of  such  a  character  as  to  require 
indemnity  to  protect  against  it  if 
it  should  be  found  by,  or  otherwise 
fall  into  the  hands  of,  third  parties." 
— Powell  v.  C.  I.  T.  Corporation,  142 
P.2d  976,  977,  193  Okl.  292. 

30.  Cal.— Seegar  v.  Odell,  115  0?.2d 
977,  18  Cal.2d  409,  136  A.L.R.  1291. 

Pa—Clements  v.  Stoudt,  Com.Pl.,  26 
North.Co.  315. 

31.  Cal.— Seeger  v.   Odell,   115  iP.-2d 
977,  18  Cal.2d  409,  156  A.L.R  1291. 

Double  payment 

Defendant  may  be  protected 
against  danger  of  double  payment  by 
proper  conditions  in  judgment — 
Dunlevy  Packing  Co.  v.  Juderman, 
1  La.App.  476. 

32.  N.Y.— Bergen     v.     Stewart,     28 
How.Pr.  6. 

Compliance   with   terms    and   condi- 
tions see  infra  §  447. 

33.  N.C*— Corpus    Juris    quoted    In 
State  v.  Wilson,  4  SJB.2d  440,  442, 
216  N.C.  130. 

33  C.J.  P  1'197  note  71. 
Alternative  judgment: 

In  actions  for  exchange  of  prop- 

193 


erty  see  Exchange  of   Property 
8  16  e. 
In    garnishment    proceedings    see 

Garnishment  §  246. 
Definitiveness   see   supra   §    21. 
Imposition    of    alternative    sentence 

see  Criminal  Law  §  1581. 
Finding  of  court 

Where  the  finding  of  the  court  is 
alternative,  the  judgment  necessari- 
.y  partakes  of  the  same  character. — 
Battel  v.  Lowery,  46  Iowa  49. 

34.  N.C.— State  v.  Wilson,  4  SJL2d 
440,  -216  N.C.  130. 

35.  Ariz.— Corpus     J"ari»     cited     in 
Peterson  v.  Overson,  79   P.2d  958, 
959,  52  Ariz.  203. 

K.T.— Bandych  v.  Ross,  26  N.Y.S.2d 

830. 
N.C.— State  v.  Wilson,  4  S.B.  440,  216 

N.C.  130. 

Or. — Bell  v.  State  Industrial  Acci- 
dent Commission,  74  P.2d  55,  157 

Or.  653. 
Utah. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Parish 

v.   McConkie,    35    P.2d   1001,    1003. 

84  Utah  396. 
33    C.J.    p   1103   note   29    [b]    (2),   p 

1197  note  71. 

36.  Or.— Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Bell   v.    State   Industrial  Accident 
Commission,  74  P.2d  55,  57,  157  Or. 
653. 

33  C.J.  p  11013  note  29  [b]  (2),  P 
1196  note  66,  p  1197  note  71  [a] 
C2>. 

37.  Iowa.— Battel  v.  Iiowry,  46  Iowa 
49. 

Function  of  court 

Where  the  selection  of  alternative 
propositions  involves  a  function 
which  may  only  be  performed  by  the 
court,  it  is  incapable  of  enforce- 
ment—«tate  v.  Wilson,  4  S.B.-2d  440, 
216  N.C.  130. 

38.  Ariz. — Peterson   v.    Overson*   79 
P.2d  958,  52  Ariz.  203. 

Effect  of  statute 

"Under  a  statute  providing  that 
the  judgment  shall  conform  to  the 
pleadings,  the  nature  of  the  case 
proved,  and  the  verdict,  and  be  so 
framed  as  to  give  the  party  all  the 
relief  to  which  he  may  be  entitled 


75 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ment  is  definite  and  certain,  it  may  be  in  the  al- 
ternative,89 especially  in  actions  for  the  specific  re- 
covery of  property  where  the  judgment  may  be  for 
the  property  or  its  value,4  0  such  as  in  actions  in 
detinue,  discussed  in  Detinue  §  22  b  (1),  or  in  re- 
plevin, as  discussed  in  the  C J.S.  title  Replevin  § 
251,  also  54  CJ.  p  596  note  66. 

§  75.    Designation  of  Parties 

a.  In  general 

b.  Plaintiffs 

c.  Defendants 

d.  Names  and  misnomers 

a.  In  General 

A  Judgment  must  designate  the  parties  for  and 
against  whom  it  Is  rendered;  but  it  may  be  saved  from 
uncertainty  in  this  respect  by  reference  to  the  caption, 
record,  pleadings,  or  process. 

A  judgment  must  designate  the  parties  for  and 
against  whom  it  is  rendered,  or  it  will  be  void  for 
uncertainty;41  and  it  has  been  said  that  the  name 
of  the  person  intended  must  appear  by  appellation 
or  cognomen  on  the  face  of  the  judgment.42  The 
designation  of  the  parties  should  be  made  with  suf- 


ficient certainty  to  enable  the  clerk  to  issue  execu- 
tion;43 this  may  be  done  either  by  naming  them 
correctly  or  by  describing  them  in  such  terms  as 
will  identify  them  with  certainty.44 

The  parties  need  not  be  designated  by  name  in  the 
judgment  where  the  entry  of  judgment  in  connec- 
tion with  the  record  of  the  cause  leaves  no  doubt  as 
to  the  parties  for  or  against  whom  it  was  ren- 
dered,45 or  if  from  the  entire  judgment  roll  it  can 
be  determined  with  sufficient  certainty  against 
whose  property  execution  should  issue.46  Thus,  as 
discussed  in  subdivisions  b  and  c  of  this  section, 
a  judgment  expressed  to  be  merely  for  or  against 
"plaintiff"  or  "defendant"  will  be  sufficient  if  the 
names  of  the  parties  thus  designated  can  be  ascer- 
tained without  ambiguity  from  the  record.  Ref- 
erence may  be  made  to  the  caption,  record,  plead- 
ings, and  process,  in  aid  of  the  judgment,  so  as  to 
eliminate  uncertainty.47 

The  fact  that  a  descriptive  word  or  phrase  is  add- 
ed to  a  party's  name  in  a  judgment  neither  affects 
the  validity  of  the  judgment  nor  changes  the  legal 
rights  and  relations  which  it  engenders.48 


in  law  or  equity,  a  Judgment,  al- 
though alternative  in  form,  is  suffi- 
cient, where  rights  and  obligations 
may  be  definitely  determined  there- 
from.— Peterson  v.  Overson,  supra. 

39.  Miss.— Nichols  Bus  &  Trailer 
Co.  v.  Fuller,  22  So.2d  243. 

Tex. — Glenn  Nichols  Land  Co.  v. 
Prince,  Civ.App.,  262  S.W.  633. 

Choice  of  alternatives 

(1)  A  judgment  in  the  alternative 
may    give    the    right    of    option   to 
Judgment   debtor   to   do  e   specified 
act   or   suffer  Judgment  for  a   des- 
ignated sum. 

Utah.— OParish  v.  McConkie,   35   P.2d 

1001,  84  Utah  396. 
Wash.— «tate  v.  Smith,  167  P.  91,  98 

Wash.  100,  reheard  169  P.  468,  98 

Wash.  100. 

(2)  Effect  of  election  see  infra  $ 
447. 

Necessity  of  election 

Court  may  require  defendant  to 
elect  one  of  the  alternatives  if  he 
has  not  made  his  election  within  the 
prescribed  time. — Parish  v.  McCon- 
kie,  35  P.2d  1001,  84  Utah  396. 
Time  of  election 

(1)  Failure  of  judgment  debtor  to 
exercise  his  option,  within  time  fixed 
in  judgment,  constitutes  an  election 
to  keep  property  and  to  submit  to 
judgment  for  its  value. — State  v. 
Smith,  167  P.  91.  98  Wash.  100,  re- 
heard 169  P.  468,  98  Wash.  100. 

(-2)  Where  the  findings  order  a 
judgment  giving  one  party  an  al- 
ternative, such  party  need  not  indi- 


cate his  choice  of  alternatives  un- 
til the  judgment  is  entered.— Nation- 
al Council  K.  L.  S.  v.  Silver,  164  N. 
W.  1015,  138  Minn.  330. 
4<X    Miss.— Corpus    Juris     cited    i* 
Nicholas  Bus  &  Trailer  Co.  v.  Ful- 
ler, 22  So.2d  243,  244. 
Wash.— -State   v.    Smith,    167   P.    91, 
98  Wash.  100,  reheard  169  P.  468, 
98  Wash.  100. 
83  C.J.  p  1197  note  73. 

41.  Ariz.— tAckel    v.    Ackel,    110    P. 
2d  238,  57  Ariz.  14,  133  A.L.R.  549, 
rehearing  denied  111  P.2d  628,   57 
Ariz.    118,    13'3   A.L.R.    556— Brown 
v.    Brown,    300    iP.    1007,    38    Ariz. 
459. 

111. — City  of  Chicago  v.  Simon,  41 
N.B.2d  556,  314  Ill.App.  404— Fray 
v.  National  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  Hart- 
ford, 255  IlLApp;  209,  affirmed  173 
N.E.  479,  341  111.  4(31. 

Pa.— Clineffi  v.  Rubash,  190  A.  543, 
126  Pa.Super.  8-2. 

33  C.J.  p  1197  note  76. 

Certainty  generally  see  supra  §   72. 

Construction  of  judgment  with  re- 
spect to  parties  see  infra  §  440. 

Parties  to  judgments  generally  see 
supra  §5  27-38. 

42.  Cal. — Seaboard  Surety  Cdrpora- 
tion  of  America  v.  Superior  Court 
in   and   for   Los   Angeles   County, 
296  P.   633,  112  CaLApp.  248. 

Surety 

Judgment  in  claim  and  delivery 
against  "the  sureties  on"  undertak- 
ing, without  naming  surety,  was 
not  a  "judgment"  against  surety. — 
Seaboard  Surety  Corporation  of 

194 


America  v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for 
Los  Angeles  -County,  supra. 

43.  Ala. — Turner  v.  Dupree,  19  Ala. 
198. 

3-3  C.J.  p  1197  note  77. 

44.  La. — Frey   v.    Fitzpatrick-Crom- 
well  Co.,  32  So.  437,  108  La.  125. 

33  C.J.  p  1197  note  78. 

Clerical  error  in  the  title  of  a 
case  will  not,  however,  render  the 
judgment  invalid. — Ewing  v.  Hat- 
field,  17  Ind.  513. 

45.  Tex. — Rosser  v.  Hale,   Civ.App., 
255  S.W.  968. 

33  C.J.  p  1198  note  79. 

46.  Tex. — Bendy  v.  W.  T.  Carter  & 
Bro.,   Civ.App.,    5    S.W.2d   579,  af- 
firmed,   Com.App.,    14   S.W.2d    813. 

47.  Fla. — Brandt  v.  Brandt,  189  So. 
275,  138  Fla.  -243. 

111. — Goodman  v.  Tri-State  Mut.  Life 
Ass'n,  48  N.B.'2d  214,  318  Ill.App. 
388. 

Ely. — Reed  v.  Runyan,  10  S.W.2d  824, 
226  Ky.  261. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Wood  v. 
Gulf  Production  Co.,  Civ.App.,  100 
S.W.2d  412,  416—Smith  v.  Switzer, 
Civ.App.,  270  S.W.  879. 

3-3  C.J.  p  1198  note  81. 

43.  Pa.— Wilson  v.  Vincent,  150  A. 
642,  300  Pa.  321. 

Wash. — German-American  Mercan- 
tile Bank  v.  Ripley,  -214  P.  160, 
124  Wash.  322. 

33  C.J.  p  1199  note  93. 

Incorrect  designation  as   officer 
However,      judgment      in      actior 

against  named  person  designated  as 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§75 


b.  PlaSntiffs 

Plaintiff  must  be  designated  in  the  Judgment  with 
sufficient  certainty  to  permit  identification.  A  judgment 
for  or  against  "plaintiff,"  when  there  are  several  plain- 
tiffs, or  reciting  "plaintiffs"  when  there  Is  only  one,  is 
not  void  if  the  persons  Intended  can  otherwise  be  identi- 
fied. 

Plaintiff  must  be  designated  in  the  judgment 
with  sufficient  certainty  to  permit  of  his  identifica- 
tion, or  the  judgment  will  be  void.49  A  judgment 
expressed  to  be  merely  for  or  against  "plaintiff'  or 
"plaintiffs"  is  sufficient  if  the  names  of  the  parties 
thus  designated  can  be  ascertained  without  am- 
biguity from  the  record.50  A  judgment  for  or 
against  "plaintiff,"  when  there  are  several  plain- 
tiffs in  the  case,  or  one  which  describes  the  parties 
as  "plaintiffs"  when  there  is  only  one,  will  not  be 
void  if  the  record  shows  clearly,  and  without  doubt, 
for  and  against  whom  the  judgment  was  intended 
to  run.51  A  judgment  against  "plaintiffs"  is  good 
against  all  the  plaintiffs  against  whom  it  could  have 
been  properly  rendered;52  but,  where  there  are 
two  or  more  plaintiffs  in  the  action,  a  judgment  in- 
tended to  apply  to  fewer  than  all  must  specify 
which  one  is,  or  which  ones  are,  meant.53 

A  judgment  in  favor  of  the  individual  members 
of  a  firm  as  plaintiffs  is  not  voided  by  the  fact 
that  the  name  of  the  firm  is  misstated  therein.54 
Likewise,  a  judgment  for  plaintiffs  in  an  action  by 
a  partnership  is  not  void  for  failure  to  name  the 
partners,  their  names  not  being  in  the  petition;55 


nor  does  failure  of  a  judgment  on  a  claim  bond  to 
designate  whether  claimant  is  a  partnership  or  a 
corporation  render  the  judgment  invalid.56 

Representative  capacity.  Where  the  judgment  is 
for  or  against  a  plaintiff  in  a  representative  capac- 
ity, that  fact  must  be  sufficiently  indicated,57  and 
judgment  may  properly  be  entered  for  or  against 
him  in  his  representative  capacity.58  If  words  add- 
ed to  plaintiffs  name  are  merely  descriptio  per- 
sonae,  judgment  may  be  entered  for  or  against  him 
individually.59  In  a  suit  by  one  plaintiff  for  the 
use  of  another,  a  judgment  for  defendant  is  a  judg- 
ment against  plaintiff  of  record  only,  and  not 
against  the  use-plaintiff;60  and  a  judgment  in  favor 
of  a  nominal  plaintiff  for  the  use  of  the  estate  of  a 
named  deceased  will  not  be  set  aside  on  the  ground 
that  it  does  not  show  for  whom  it  was  rendered.61 

Judgment  in  the  name  of  a  public  official,  acting 
for  the  use  of  the  public,  has  been  held  not  to  be 
void  merely  because  he  ceased  to  hold  office  prior 
to  the  date  on  which  judgment  was  rendered.62 

Conformity  of  the  judgment  to  the  pleadings  and 
proof  with  respect  to  the  personal  or  representative 
capacity  of  the  parties  is  discussed  supra  §  51. 

c.  Defendants 

Mistakes  or  inaccuracies  In  designating  the  defend- 
ants will  generally  be  treated  as  mere  irregularities, 
not  Invalidating  the  Judgment,  where  the  persons  In- 
tended can  be  dearly  ascertained  from  the  record. 


director  general  of  railroads,  and 
who  was  neither  director  general 
nor  agent  of  president,  was  held 
void.— U.  S.  ex  rel.  Rauch  v.  Davis, 
8  F.2d  907,  56  App.3XC.  46,  certio- 
rari  denied  46  S.Ct.  852,  270  U.S. 
653,  70  L.Ed.  782. 
49.  Ala.— Patterson  v.  Mobile  Cir. 

Ct.,  11  Ala.  740. 
33  C.J.  p  1197  note  76. 
Ascertainment  from  record  see  su- 
pra subdivision  a  of  this  section. 
Error  in  entry   of  Judgment 

The  insertion  of  the  names  of 
the  parties  in  the  entry  of  the  final 
judgment  is  unnecessary  if  there  is 
enough  in  it  to  connect  it  with  the 
other  parts  of  the  record  in  which 
the  names  are  entered,  so  as  to  make 
the  judgment  a  part  of  the  record, 
and  hence,  if  the  clerk  in  making 
the  entry  errs  in  the  name  of  plain- 
tiff, it  will  be  immaterial,  and  the 
judgment  will  be  good.— Grimball 
v.  Mississippi  &  A.  R.  Co.,  11  Miss. 
38. 
Designation  a*  heirs,  descendants,  or 

legatees 

A  judgment  which  describes  the 
parties  plaintiff  as  the  heirs,  de- 
scendants, or  legatees  of  a  person 
named  is  not  void  for  uncertainty, 


although  they  are  not  named  indi- 
vidually, if  the  record  in  the  case 
shows  who  are  meant;  but  other- 
wise such  a  judgment  is  void  for 
uncertainty. — (Parsons  v.  Spencer,  85 
Ky.  1305— 3-3  C.J.  p  1199  notes  89,  90. 

50.  Tex.— Corpus     Juris     cited     In 
Wood  v.  Gulf  Production  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  100  S.W.2d  412,  416. 

33  C.J.  p  1198  note  80. 

51.  HI.— Lurie.  v.   Brewer,    248    HL 
App.  525. 

Or. — Johnson  v.  Shasta  View  Lum- 
ber &  Box  Co.,  265  P.  438,  130  Or. 
519. 

Tex.— Still  v.  Barton,  Civ.App.,  76 
8.W.2d  783,  error  dismissed. 

33  C.J.  p  1198  note  82. 

52.  CaL— Goland  v.   Peter  Nolan  & 
Co.,    60    P.2d    183,    15    CaLApp.2d 
696. 

53.  ni.— Aultman  v.  Wirth,   45   Ht 
App.  614. 

54.  Tex. — Bailey  v.  Crittenden,  Civ. 
App.,  44  SJW.  404. 

56.    Tex. — Corder    v.     Steiner,     Civ. 

App.,  54  S.W.  277. 
56.    Ala.— Keller  v.  Ray  Motor  Co., 

114   So.   422,   22  Ala.App.   252. 

195 


57.  Wis.— Prichard  v.  Bixby.   37  N. 
W.  228,  71  Wis.  422. 

33  C.J.  p  1199  note  91. 
Several  capacities 

Where  the  evidence  shows  that 
plaintiff  is  suing  in  several  capaci- 
ties, judgment  in  his  favor,  without 
designating  in  which  capacity  he 
recovered,  is  irregular  but  not  void. 
— Realty  Trust  Co.  v.  Koger,  Tex. 
Civ. App.,  70  S.WJ2d  448,  error  re- 
fused. 

58.  Conn.— Lamas   &   Nettleton   Co. 
v.  Isacs,   127  A.   6,  101  Conn.   614. 

Tex. — Miller    v.    Dunagan,    Civ.App.. 
99  S.W.2d  494. 

59.  m.— Wells  v.  George  W.  Durst 
Chevrolet    Co.,    173    MT.BL    92,    341 
111.  108. 

Tenn. — Lawhorn  v.  Wellford.  168  S. 
W.2d  790.  179  Tenn.  625. 

60.  Ky.-r Herdon  v,  Bartlett,  7  T.B. 
Mon.  449. 

Md.— Boor  v.  Wilson,  48  Md.  305. 

61.  Tex.— Dowell   v.   Mills,   32   Tex. 
440. 

Nominal  parties  generally  see  supra 
I  38. 

62.  CaL — Weadon  v.  Shahen,  123  P.. 
2d  88,  50  Cal.App.2d  254. 


§  75 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


It  has  been  held  not  to  be  mandatory  that  a 
judgment  specifically  name  defendants,63  and  fail- 
tire  to  state  their  names  has  been  held  an  irregular- 
ity that  may  be  removed  by  proof.64  Also,  a  judg- 
ment expressed  to  be  merely  for  or  against  "de- 
fendant" or  "defendants"  is  sufficient  if  the  names 
of  the  parties  thus  designated  can  be  ascertained 
without  ambiguity  from  the  record.65  The  errone- 
ous entering  up  of  a  judgment  against  one  of  sev- 
eral defendants  has  been  held  a  mere  clerical  mis- 
prision,66  and  a  judgment  for  or  against  "defend- 
ant," where  there  are  several,  or  one  reciting  "de- 
fendants," where  there  is  only  one,  has  been  held 
not  to  be  void,  if  the  record  as  a  whole  shows  clear- 
ly, and  without  doubt,  for  and  against  whom  the 
judgment  is  intended  to  be  rendered;67  but  in 
other  cases  a  judgment  against  "the  defendant," 
where  there  are  several,  has  been  held  to  be  bad  as 
to  all  for  uncertainty.68  Where  there  are  two  or 
more  defendants,  a  judgment  intended  to  apply  to 
fewer  than  all  must  specify  which  one  is,  or  which 
ones  are,  meant,  and  failure  to  do  so  will  invali- 
date it,69  except  where  the  record  shows  which  one 
of  the  several  is  meant.70 

A  judgment  against  "defendants"  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  against  all  the  defendants  against  whom 
it  could  have  been  properly  rendered,71  that  is,  it 
will  be  limited  to  those  defendants  who  have  been 
served  with  process,72  or  who  have  appeared,78 


63.  La. — Glen  Palls   Indemnity  Co. 
v.  Manning,  App.,  168  So.  787. 

Adjudication  against  defendant  not 
mentioned 

Where  a  judgment  does  not  men- 
tion one  of  several  defendants,  but 
adjudges  the  subject  matter  of  the 
controversy  to  others,  and  such  de- 
fendant g?ets  nothing,  it  is  in  effect 
a  judgment  against  him. — Whitmire 
v.  Powell,  125  S.W.  889,  103  Tex. 
232. 
Omitting'  name  of  cesttii  gue  trust 

Judgment  for  principal  defendant 
in  suit  to  set  aside  deeds  was  not 
invalid  for  omitting  name  of  minor 
defendant,  for  whom  principal  de- 
fendant was  trustee. — Bushman  v. 
Barlow,  15  SJWV2d  329,  -321  Mo.  1052. 

64.  Tex.— Smith    v.     Switzer,     Civ. 
App.,  270  S.W.  879. 

65.  Tex. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Wood  v.  Gulf  Production  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,   100   S.W.2d  412,  416. 

33  C.J.  p  1198  note  80. 

Designation  as  heir»f  descendants,  or 

legatees 

A  judgment  which  describes  de- 
fendants as  the  heirs,  descendants, 
or  legatees  of  a  person  Is  not  void 
.for  uncertainty,  although  they  are 
not  named  individually,  if  the  rec- 
ord in  the  case  shows  who  are 


meant  but  otherwise  such  a  Judg- 
ment is  void  for  uncertainty.— Ste- 
venson v.  Flournoy,  13  S.W.  210, 
89  Ky.  561,  11  Ky.L.  745— 38  C.J.  P 
1199  notes  89,  90. 

66.  Ala.— Russell  v.  Erwin,  41  Ala. 
292. 

33  C.J.  p  1198  note  79  [a]. 

67.  Mo. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Mehlstaub    v.    Michael,    287    8.W. 
1079,   1083,   221  Mo.Ap'p.    807. 

33  C.J.  p  1198  note  82. 
Beoital  as  to  citation 

Where  judgment  recited  that  "de- 
fendant" was  duly  cited,  but  after- 
ward plural  was  used  in  judgment, 
recitation  was  sufficient  to  show  that 
both  defendants  were  duly  cited. — 
Smith  v.  Switzer,  Tex.Civ.App.,  270 
S.W.  879. 

68.  Idaho.— Holt   v.    Gridley,   63   P. 
188,  7  Idaho  416. 

33  C.J.  p  1198  note  83. 

69.  Idaho. — Holt  v.   Gridley,   supra. 
111. — (People  v.  Jamison,  157  111. App. 

546. 
7<K    N.J. — Nbrdstrom  v.  Payne,  91  A. 

592,  86  N.J.L-aw  661. 
33  C.J.  p  1199  note  88. 
71*  Cal. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 

Minehan  V.   Silverla,   21  P.2d  617, 

618,  131  Cal.App.  317, 
33  C.J.  p  1198  note  84. 

196 


or  against  whom  the  verdict  was  found.74  A  judg- 
ment entered  against  a  named  defendant  "et  al.," 
and  based  on  a  decision  directing  judgment  against 
the  "defendant"  without  specifying  which  defend- 
ant was  intended,  is  fatally  defective.75 

A  statement  that  judgment  was  rendered  in  favor 
of  plaintiff  sufficiently  shows  that  it  was  rendered 
against  the  lone  defendant,76  and,  where  there  are 
more  than  one  defendant,  such  a  judgment  will  be 
presumed  to  be  against  all  the  defendants.77 

Representative  capacity.  Where  the  judgment  is 
for  or  against  a  defendant  in  a  representative  ca- 
pacity, that  fact  must  be  sufficiently  indicated,78 
Conformity  of  the  judgment  to  the  pleadings  and 
proof  with  respect  to  the  personal  or  representa- 
tive capacity  of  the  parties  is  discussed  supra  §  51. 

d.  Names  and  Misnomers 

A*  a  general  rule  each  party  to  a  Judgment  should 
be  designated  therein  by  his  full  Christian  name  and 
surname.  A  Judgment  may  be  vitiated  by  a  misnomer 
of  the  parties  therein,  which  renders  It  uncertain. 

As  a  general  rule,  each  party  to  a  judgment 
should  be  designated  therein  by  both  his  true 
Christian  name  and  surname  in  full.79  A  misnomer 
of  the  Christian  name  of  a  party  may  render  the 
judgment  erroneous,80  but  the  use  of  an  erroneous 
Christian  name  may  not  be  fatal  where  there  is  no 
uncertainty  as  to  the  person  intended.81  Likewise, 

72.  Old. — Hale  v.  Independent  Pow- 
der Co.,  148  P.  715,  46  Okl.  1-35. 

3$  C.J.  p  1199  note  85. 

73.  Ky. — Rosenberg  v.  Dahl,  172  <S. 
W.  118.  162  Ky.  92,  Ann.Cas.l916€ 
1110. 

33  C.J.  p  1199  note  85. 

74.  Miss. — Lamar   v.    Williams,    39 
Miss.  342. 

33  C.J.  p  1198  note  84,  p  1199  note 
86. 

75.  N.Y.— Mare  v.  Pinkard,  2-30  N.Y. 
S.  765,  133  Misc.  83. 

7&    Mich.— Aldrich    v.    Maitland,    4 
Mich.  205. 

77.  Tex. — International  &  Q.  N.   R. 
Co.  v.  Dawson,  Civ. App.,  195  S.W. 
1145. 

78.  Ga.— Wadley  v.  Oertel,   78  S.E. 
'     91*2,  140  Gfcu  >326. 

Tex. — Clapp  v.  Walters,  2  Tex.  130. 
33  C.J.  p  1199  note  91. 

79.  Mo. — State    v.    Johnson,    239    S. 
W.  844,  293  Mo.  302. 

33  C.J.  p  1200  note  99. 
Misnomer  of  corporation  see  Corpo- 
rations S  1341  a. 

80.  Ala. — Mosaic        Templars        of 
America  v.  Flanagan,  115  So.  860, 
22  Ala,App.  S77. 

81.  HI.— Lewis  v.  West  Side  Trust 
&  Savings  Bank  of  Chicago,  30  N. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§75 


the  omission  of  the  Christian  name  of  one  of  the 
parties  may  render  the  judgment  erroneous,82  but 
such  an  omission  is  not  necessarily  fatal  where  no 
uncertainty  results  therefrom.83 

A  judgment  may  be  vitiated  by  a  misnomer  of 
the  parties  therein,84  at  least  where  the  misnomer 
renders  it  uncertain,86  unless  the  defect  is  waived,86 
or  cured  by  other  parts  of  the  record.87  A  defend- 
ant who  is  sued  by  a  wrong  name,  but  with  due 
service  of  process  on  him,  who  fails  to  plead  the 
misnomer,  and  who  suffers  a  judgment  to  be  taken 
against  him  in  such  name,  may  be  connected  with 
the  judgment  by  proper  ^averments  and  will  be 
bound  by  it.88 

Assumed,  fictitious,  or' trade  names.  Since,  as 
discussed  in  the  CJ.S.  title  Names  §  9,  also  45  CJ. 
p  376  note  4,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  con- 
trary a  person  has  a. right  to  be  known  by  any  name 
he  chooses,  a  judgment  for  or  against  a  person  in 


an  assumed  or  trade  name  is  valid.39  Where  de- 
fendant is  equally  well-known  by  two  names,  a 
judgment  against  him  in  either  name  is  valid.90 
Since,  as  considered  in  the  CJ.S,  title  Parties  §  98, 
also  47  CJ.  p  175  note  93,  a  party  may  usually  be 
sued  in  a  fictitious  name  if  the  correct  name  is  un- 
known, and  if  the  complaint  is  amended  by  insert- 
ing his  true  name  when  discovered,  the  judgment 
following  it  will  be  valid.91 

Judgments  against  married  women  describing 
them  by  their  husbands'  initials  or  Christian  names, 
preceded  by  the  designation  Mrs.,  have  been  sus- 
tained.92 

Use  of  initials.  Initials  only  in  connection  with 
the  surname  may  be  insufficient  ;98  but  the  use  of 
initials  in  lieu  of  the  Christian  name  has  been  held 
to  render  the  judgment  merely  irregular,  and  not 
void,94  and  such  designation  may  be  sufficient  where 
the  party,  by  habitually  signing  his  name  in  that 


E.2d    767,    307   IlLApp.  473,   trans- 
ferred, see  25  N.E.24  818.  873  HI. 
245,  and  reversed  on  other  grounds 
36  N.E,2d  573,  377  111.  384. 
Tex.— Whittinghill     v.     Oliver,     Civ. 
App.,    38    S.W.2d    896,    error    dis- 
missed. 
33  C.J.  p  1200  note  2. 

Suing-  defendant  %y  wrong  name 
or  omitting  his  full  name  does  not 
render  a  subsequent  Judgment  void, 
if  defendant  was  served  with  proc- 
ess, the  mistake  or  omission  being 
matter  of  abatement  only.-^State  v. 
Collier,  23  S.W.2d  897,  160  Tenn.  403. 

82.  >pa.-lGeorge    v.    McCutcheon,    8 
Pa.Dist.  591. 

83.  Ind. — Meyer  v.  Wilson,   76  N.B. 
748,  166  Ind.  651. 

S3  C.J.  p  1200  note  1. 

34.    N.Y.— Wilber      v.      Widner,      1 

Wend.  55. 

The  misspelling  of  plaintiff's  name 
in  a  judgment  by  the  clerk  is  not 
fatal.— I.  Droege  &  Sons  Foundry  Co. 
v.  Robert  Fields  Sales  Agency,  104 
S.W.  1007,  31  Ky.L.  1247. 
VTonsuatole  entity 

Where  a  judgment  is  recovered  in 
the  name  of  and  only  against  a  so- 
called  defendant,  which  is  .a  nonsu- 
able  entity,  the  judgment  does  not 
only  not  operate  against  its  general 
manager,  but  is  void.— May  v.  Clan- 
ton,  95  So.  30,  208  Ala.  588. 

85.  Miss.— Delta  Cotton  Oil   Co.   v. 
Planters'    Oil    Mill,    107    So.    764, 
142  Miss.  591. 

86.  ill.— Edwards    v.    Warner,    111 
IlLApp.  32. 

87.  Tex.— Jones  v.  S.  G.  Davis  Mo- 
tor Car  Co.,  CivJ^pp^  224  S.W.  701. 

33  C.J.  p  1200  note  17. 

88.  Ala,— Corptt*    JurU    tnoted    J» 


Naftel  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Mitchell, 
101  So.  653,  654,  212  Ala.  32. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Mattocks 
v.  Iiloyd  Oil  Corporation  of  Texas, 
Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  440,  error  re- 
fused—Wieser  v.  Thompson  Gro- 
cery Co.,  Civ.App.,  8  S.W.2d  1100. 

33  O.J.  p  1200  note  18. 

89.  Ga.— Becker  v.  Truitt,   154  831. 
262,     170     Ga.     757— Bslinger     v. 
Heradon,  124  S.E.  169.  158  Ga.  823, 
dissenting    opinion    124    S.E.    900, 
158  Gte,  823— Executive  Committee 
of    Baptist    Convention    v.    Smith, 
161   S.E.   143,   44   Ga.App.   184,   af- 
firmed  165   -S.E.   573.   175    Ga.    543. 

Iowa. — Thompson  v.  Brownlee,  1  N. 

W.2d  239,  2-31  Iowa  406. 
Tex.— Hicks  v.  Glenn.   Civ.App.f   155 

S.W.2d  828. 
33  C.J.  p  1200  note  11. 
Doing  business  in  name  of  another 

Suit  in  which  petition  denominat- 
ed defendant  as  "J.  H.  Taylor,  Bro- 
ker, a  business  owned  and  operated 
by  B.  E.  Stinson,"  and  in  which  cita- 
tion was  served  on  R.  E.  Stinson, 
against  whom  Judgment  was  enter- 
ed, was  not  a  nullity,  and  R.  E> 
Stinson  could  not  escape  binding  ef- 
fect of  Judgment  because  of  such 
appellation:— Stinson  r.  King,  Tex. 
CivJ^pp.,  &8  S.W.2d  898,  error  dis- 
missed. 
True  owner 

In  order  to  secure  a  valid  Judg- 
ment against  the  true  owner,  when 
trading  under  an  assumed  name,  it 
has  been  held  that  the  pleadings 
should  aver  the  name  of  the  true 
owner,  the  proof  should  sustain  the 
allegation,  and  judgment  should  be 
entered  against  defendant  in  his  or 
Its  true  name.— Leckie  v.  Seal,  170  S. 
E.  844,  161  Va.  215. 

90.  Mich.— Field  v.  Plummer,  .42  N. 
W.  849,  75  Mich.  437. 

197 


N.Y.— Isaacs    v.     Mintz,     11 
423. 

91.  Cal.— City   and   County   of   San 
Francisco   v.    Burr,    36    P,    771,    4 
CaLUnrep.  634. 

33  C.J.  p  1200  note  14. 
Effect  of  appearance 

A  judgment  was  held  valid,  al- 
though defendant  was  designated  in 
the  summons  'by  a  fictitious  first 
name,  his  true  first  name  being  un- 
known, where  he  was  the  person  in- 
tended and  served,  and  he  appeared 
and  answered. — In  re  Dehnert,  D.C. 
N.Y.,  295  F.  763. 

92.  Pa.— Althouse  v.  Hunsberger,  6 
PfiuSuper.  160. 

33  C.J.  p  1200  note  99  [a]. 
Designation  as  "et  tut" 

The  designation  of  one  of  the  de- 
fendants, who  is  the  wife  of  the 
other  defendant,  as  "et  ux"  in  in- 
dorsements on  the  back  of  the 
judgment,  and  in  the  caption  of 
the  judgment,  does  not  render  the 
judgment  invalid. — Whisenant  v. 
Thompson  Bros.  Hardware  Co.,  Tex. 
Civ.App.f  120  S.W.2d  '-316. 
"Variance 

Since  petition  alleged  plaintiffs 
name  as  Mrs.  G.  C.  B.,  wife  of  G. 
C.  B.,  deceased,  contention  that  judg- 
ment should  not  be  entered  for  her 
for  the  reason  that  the  evidence 
showed  her  name  to  be  Ole  Mae  B., 
will  be  overruled. — Texas  (Power  & 
Light  Co.  v.  Bristow,  Tex.Civ.App., 
213  S.W.  702,  error  refused. 

93.  Del.— Dickerson  v.  Kelley,  50  A. 
512,  19  Bel.  69. 

Mo.— Vincent  v.  Means,   82  S.W.  06, 

184  Mo.  327. 
33  C.J.  p  1200  note  4. 

94.  Tex.— Wilson  v.   HaTnnrnn,   Civ. 
App.,  49  S.W.2d  991. 

S3  CUT.  p  1200  note  8. 


§  75 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


style,  has  made  it  his  business  name,'5  or  if  the  de- 
fect is  supplied  by  other  parts  of  the  record,96  or  if 
it  appears  that  there  is  no  other  person  of  the 
same  name  and  initials.97 

Since,  as  discussed  in  the  CJ.S.  title  Names  §  4, 
also  45  CJ.  p  369  note  35,  the  law  recognizes  only 
one  Christian  name,  as  a  general  rule  the  omis- 
sion of  a  party's  middle  name  or  initial,  or  a  mis- 
take with  regard  thereto,  is  immaterial,98  at  least 
if  the  identity  of  the  party  intended  is  satisfactorily 
established  and  it  is  shown  that  he  received  proper 
notice  of  the  action." 

§  76.    Designation  of  Amount 

The  amount  of  a  judgment  must  be  specified  with 
certainty  and  should  be  expressed  In  words  rather  than 
in  figures. 

A  judgment  for  money  must  specify  with  definite- 
ness  and  certainty  the  amount  for  which  it  is  ren- 
dered,1 and  should  be  so  worded  as  to  avoid  the 
possibility  of  a  double  recovery;2  there  can  be  no 


judgment  payable  by  installments.^  It  has  been 
said  that  a  judgment  includes  all  amounts  for  which 
execution  may  properly  issue.4  A  judgment  for  an 
amount  left  blank,5  or  otherwise  wholly  uncertain,6 
is  at  least  erroneous,  and  according  to  a  number  of 
decisions  such  a  judgment  is  void;7  but  according 
to  other  authority  failure  sufficiently  to  designate 
the  amount  renders  the  judgment  merely  irregular 
and  erroneous,  and  not  void.8 

Form  and  sufficiency  of  designation  generally.  A 
judgment  should  state  the  precise  amount  for  which 
it  is  rendered,  and  not  leave  it  to  be  ascertained  by 
calculation;  but  if  such  data  are  given  that  the 
amount  may  be  ascertained  with  certainty  the  judg- 
ment will  be  upheld.9  A  judgment  for  a  sum  to  be 
thereafter  ascertained  by  a  ministerial  officer  is  er- 
roneous10 except  where  the  reference  is  merely  to 
calculate  and  state  an  amount  already  definitely 
fixed  by  the  data  given  in  the  judgment.11  It  is 
sufficient  if  the  sum  recovered  can  be  definitely  as- 


95.  Neb.— Oakley    v.    Pegler,    46   N. 
W.  920,  SO  Neb.  628. 

33  C.J.  p  1200  note  S. 

96.  Ala, — Lampkin   v.    Louisville 
N.  R.  Co.,  17  So.  448,  106  Ala.  287. 

Neb.— Fisk  v.  Gulliford,  95  N.W. 
494,  1  Neb.,  Unoff.,  494. 

97.  Neb.— Oakley  v.    Pegler,    46    N. 
W.  920,  30  Neb.  628. 

98.  Ira. — Jaubert    Bros.    v.    Landry, 
App.,  15  So.2d  158. 

Minn. — Ueland  v.   Johnson,    80  N.W. 

700,  77  Minn.  543,  77  Am.S.R.   698. 
Tex. — Jeffus  v.  Mullins,  Civ.App.,  78 

S,W.2d  1023. 
33  C.J.  p  1200  note  10. 

99.  Oal.— Langley  v.  Zurich  General 
Accident  &  Liability  Ins.  Co.,  275 
P.  963,  97  Cal.  App.  4-34. 

Tenn.— Finley  v.  First  State  Bank, 
13  Tenn.App.  128. 

1.  U.-S. — Wulfsohn  v.  Russo-Aslatic 
Bank,  C.C.A.China,  11  F.2d  715— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  U.  S.  v.  Bau- 
man,  D.COr.,  56  F.Supp.  109,  117. 

Cal.— Wallace  v.  Wallace,  295  P. 
1061,  111  CaLApp.  500— D'Arcy  v. 
D'Arcy.  264  P.  497,  89  CaLApp. 
86. 

Ga. — Hutcheson  v.  Hutcheson,  30  S. 
B,2d  107,  197  Ga.  603. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hand 
v.  Twin  Falls  County,  236  (P.  536, 
5$8,  40  Idaho  638. 

Ind.— Kist  v.  Coughlin,  57  N.B.2d 
199,  222  Ind.  639,  modified  on  oth- 
er grounds  57  N.E.2d  586,  222  Ind. 
639. 

Or. — Bell  v.  State  Industrial  Acci- 
dent Commission,  74  P.2d  55,  157 
Or.  653 — Ex  parte  Teeters,  280  P. 
660,  130  Or.  631. 

33  C.J.  p  1201  note  2«. 


Judgments   held   sufficiently   certain 

(1)  A   judgment  holding  that  de- 
fendant was  liable   to  plaintiffs  for 
amount  of  premiums  paid  on  insur- 
ance policies  and  referring  cases  to 
clerk   to    determine    the  amount   of 
premiums,   was  not  void  for  uncer- 
tainty of  amount — Battle  v.  Nation- 
al Life  &  Accident  Ins.  Co.,  157  S.W. 
2d  817,  178  Tenn.  285. 

(2)  Other  Judgments. 

Cal.— Niles  v.  Louis  H.  Rapoport  & 
'Sons,  128  (P.2d  50,  53  Cal.App.2d 
644. 

La. — Paul  v.   Tabony,   5  La.App.   44. 

Tex. — Grayson  v.  Johnson,  Civ.App., 
181  S.W.Sd  312. 

33  C.J.  p  1201  note  23  [b]. 

Judgments  held  uncertain. 

(1)  Portion   of  judgment  ordering 
that  defendant  reimburse   codefend- 
ant   for  all  sums   expended  for  tax 
deed  described  in  complaint  and  sub- 
sequent taxes  thereon,  if  any,  with- 
out fixing  amount,  in  absence  of  any 
allegation,  proof,  or  finding  thereof, 
will    be   stricken    on   appeal   as   too 
indefinite    and    uncertain.— Hand    v. 
Twin  Falls   County,   236   P.   £36,    40 
Idaho  638. 

(2)  Other    judgments. — Guerra    v. 
Contreras,    Tex.Civ.App.,    52    S.W.2d 
295—33   C.J.    p    1501    note    23    [c]. 

2.  Tex. — National  Reserve   Ins.  Co. 
v.    McCrory,   Civ. App.,    160    S.W.2d 
972, 

Double  judgment  held  not  shown 
Cal. — Dodson    v.    Greuner,    82    GP.2d 
741,  28  iCal.App.2d  418. 

3.  U.S. — U.   S.   v.   Bauman,   D.COr., 
56  F.Supp.  109. 

4.  Del. — Nelson  v.  Canadian  Indus- 
trial Alcohol  Co.,  197  A.  477,  9  W. 
W.Harr.  184.  ,        I 

198 


5.  Or. — School    Dist.    No.    1    v.    As- 
toria  Constr.    Co.,    190   P.    969,    97 
Or.  2-38. 

33  C.J.  p  1202  note  24. 

6.  La.— Russo  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.,  56  So.  506,  129  La.  554. 

35  C.J.  p  L202  note  25. 

7.  Miss. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Harris   v.    Worsham,    143    So.    851, 
852,  164  Miss.  74. 

Tex. — McCombs  v.  Red,  Civ. App.,  86 

S.W.2d   648,   error  dismissed. 
33  C.J.  p  1202  note  26. 

8.  Iowa.— Lind  v.   Adams,   10   Iowa 
398,  77  Am.D.  123. 

33  C.J.  p  1202  note  27. 

9.  U.S. — Wulfsohn  v.   Russo-Asiatic 
Bank,  C.C.A.China,  11  F.2d  715, 

Ga. — Hutcheson  v.  Hutcheson,  30  S. 
B.2d  107,  197  Ga.  603— Moody  v. 
Muscogee  Mfg.  Co.,  68  S.E.  604, 
134  Ga.  721,  20  Ann.Cas.  301. 

Ky.— Caudill  Coal  Co.  v.  Charles 
Rosenheim  &  Co.,  .258  S.W.  315, 
201  Ky.  758. 

Tex. — Beam  v.  Southwestern  Bell 
Tel.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  164  S.W.2d  412, 
error  refused—  Corpus  Juris  cited 
in,  fioanlan  v.  Gulf  Bitulithic  Co., 
Civ.App.,  27  S.W.2d  877,  880,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  44  S.W.2d  967,  80  A.L.R.  852. 
J  C.J.  p  1202  note  28. 

Construction  as  to  amount  see  infra 
§  442. 

10.  Tex.— Hendryx  v.  W.  L.  Moody 
Cotton  Co.,  Ciy.App.,  257  S.W.  305. 
:  C.J.  p  120,2  note  29. 

11.  Tex. — Hendryx  v.  W.  L.  Moody  * 
Cotton  Co.,  supra. 

C.J.  p  1202  note  29,  p  1203  note  80. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  77 


certained  by  an  inspection  of  the  record,12  but  mat- 
ter dehors  the  record  cannot  be  considered.13  The 
amount  for  which  a  judgment  is  rendered  may  be 
fixed  by  reference  to  the  pleadings  in  the  case14  or 
to  the  verdict.15 

A  judgment  may  be  for  several  sums  separately, 
or  in  one  gross  sum  aggregating  all  the  items,18 
and  a  mere  error  in  aggregating  items  may  be  dis- 
regarded as  surplusage.17  A  judgment  for  one 
amount  to  be  discharged  by  the  payment  of  a  larg- 
er amount  is  erroneous,18  as  is  also,  except  in  the 
case  of  penal  bonds,  a  judgment  for  one  amount  to 
be  discharged  by  a  smaller  amount.15  Where  judg- 
ment is  recovered  for  compensatory  and  punitive 
damages,  the  court  is  not  required  to  specify  how 
much  is  for  the  one  and  how  much  for  the  other 
in  the  absence  of  a  statute  so  requiring.20 

Specifying  denomination.  In  specifying  the 
amount  of  recovery,  a  judgment  should  contain 
some  word  or  character  indicating  the  denomina- 
tion of  money  intended.21  Judgments  for  a  numeri- 
cal  anwunt  without  any  word  or  sign  indicating 
what  units  of  value  are  intended  have  been  held 
erroneous22  or  void,23  particularly  in  the  case  of 
judgments  for  taxes;24  but  in  some  states  such 
judgments  are  upheld  where  'it  appears  clearly  from 
the  record  what  was  intended.25 


Words  and  figures.  The  amount  of  a  judgment 
should  be  expressed  in  words  rather  than  figures,26 
as  being  less  liable  to  alteration  or  mistake,27  and 
it  has  been  held  insufficient  and  erroneous  to  enter 
the  amount  in  figures  ;2*  but  a  judgment  for  a 
sum  of  money  expressed  only  in  figures  has  been 
held  not  void,29  and  according  to  some  decisions 
not  even  erroneous.30 


§  77. 


Interest 


Where  Interest  Is  a  separate  part  of  the  Judgment, 
It  should  be  stated  with  certainty;  but  if  sufficient  data 
are  given  for  definite  calculation,  the  Judgment  will  be 
upheld. 

Ordinarily  interest  due  on  the  demand  on  which 
the  action  is  brought  should  be  calculated  and  the 
judgment  rendered  for  the  aggregate  amount  of 
the  demand  and  interest,31  and,  sometimes  by  virtue 
of  statutory  provisions,  the  fact  that  this  results 
in  allowing  compound  interest  has  been  held  no  ob- 
jection;32 but  where  the  recovery  of  interest  is  by 
way  of  damages  it  has  been  held  that  the  amounts 
of  the  debt  and  the  interest  shall  be  kept  separate 
and  apart  and  not  be  given  in  a  lump  sum  in  the 
judgment.33  Where  interest  enters  into  a  judg- 
ment as  a  separate  part  thereof,  it  must  be  stated 


!2.    U.S.— Pope   v.   IT.   S.,   CtCL,   65 

S.Ct   16,  323  U.S.   1,  89  L.Ed.  3. 
33  C.J.  p  IBOS  note  *1. 
13-    Miss.— Harris  v.  Worsham,  143 

So.  851,  164  Miss.  74. 
33  C.J.  P  1203  note  32. 
14.  Miss.— Ladnier  v.  ILadnier,  l.So. 

492,  64  Miss.  368. 
33  C.J.  p  1203  note  3*3. 

Where  action,  was  on  an  adjudk 
oated  liability,  the  clerk  properly  en- 
tered judgment  as  on  a  suit  for  a 
"liquidated  sum."— Whipple  v.  Mah- 
ler, 10  N.W.2d  771,  215  Minn.  578. 
15-  Al«u — Ellis  v.  Dunn,  3  Ala.  63<2. 
33  C.J.  P  1205  note  «4. 

16.  Cal.— Harvey  v.   De   Garmo,   18 
P.2d   971,   129   Cal.App.  487. 

33  C.J.  P  1203  note  35. 

17.  Cal.— Weadon  v.  Shahen,  12*  P. 
2d  88,  50  Cal.App.2d  254. 

33  C.J.  p  1203  note  36. 

18.  Ky. — Fowler  v.  Cowper,  Ky.Dec. 
58. 

19-    (Mo. — Steinback  v.    Lisa,    1   Mo. 

228. 
Va.— Ross  v.  Gill,  1  Wash.  87,  1  Va. 

87. 
Judgment  on  penal  bonds  see  Bonds 

§§  126-127. 
20.    Puerto   Rico.— Aviles   v.   Rafael 

Toro    Sons,   Ltd.,   27   Puerto   Rico 

616. 


R.I.— Hambly  v.  Hayden,  40  A.  417, 
20  R.I.  558. 

21.  Miss.— Carr     v.     Anderson,     24 
Miss.  188. 

33  C.J.  p  1203  note  41. 

22.  HI.— Avery   v.   Babcock,   35    HI. 
175. 

23.  111.— Carpenter  v.  Sherf y,  71  HL 
427. 

33  C.J.  p  1203  note  43. 

24.  U.S.— Woods  v.  Freeman,  HI.,  1 
WalL  398,  17  L.Ed.  543. 

33  C.J.  p  1203  note  44. 

25.  Iowa,— Therme    v.     Berthenoid, 
77  N.W.  497,  106  Iowa  697. 

3-3  C.J.  p  1203  note  45. 

26.  HI. — Linder   v.    Monroe,    35    HI- 
388. 

27.  Ala. — Tankersley      v.      Silburn, 
Minor  p  185. 

26.    N.JV— ^Smith  v.   Miller,   8  N.J.L. 

175,  14  Am.D.  418. 
33  C.J.  p  1204  note  48. 

29.  Ala.— Davis    v.    McCary.   13   So. 
665,  100  Ala,  545. 

33  C.J.  P  1204  note  49. 

30.  Iowa,— Therme    v.     Berthenoid, 
77  N.W.  497,  106  Iowa  697. 

33  C.J.  P  1204  notes  49,  50. 

31>  U.S.— Women's  Catholic  Order 
of  Foresters  v.  Special  School  Dist. 
of  North  Little  Rock,  Pulaski 
County,  C.C.A.Ark.,  105  F.2d  716 
— Laurent  v.  Anderson,  C.C.A.Ky., 

199 


70   F.2d   819— Wulfsohn   v.   Russo- 

Asiatic    Bank,    C.C.A.China,    11    F. 

2d  715. 
Mass. — Brennan  v.   Bonnoyer,   66  N. 

E.2d  17— Landry  v.  Gomes,  173  N. 

E.  428,  273  Mass.  225. 
Mo. — Fine  Art  Pictures  Corporation 

v.   Karzin,   App.,    29    S.W.2d   170. 
Okl.— Whale  v.  Rice,  49  P.2d  7-37,  ITS 

Okl.  530. 
Tex. — St     Louis    Southwestern    Ry. 

Co.  of  Texas  v.  Davy  Burnt  Clay 

Ballast    Co.,    Civ.App.,     288     S.W. 

855. 

I  C.J.  p  1204  note  52. 
Judgment  held  sufficiently  certain 
Tex. — Senterfltt  v.  Bradley,  Civ.App^ 

60  S.W.2d  815. 

32.  Ga.— Grant   v.    Hart,    30    S.E.2d 
271,  197  Ga,  662. 

Ind. — Stanton  v.  Woodcock,   19  Ind. 

273. 
Successive  decree* 

Carrying  prior  decree  into  final  de- 
cree with  interest  thereon  to  date  of 
latter,  resulting  in  compound  inter- 
est, held  improper. — Wollenberger  v. 
Hoover,  179  N.E.  42,  346  IlL  611. 

33.  HI.— (People  ex  rel.  Klee  v.  Kel- 
ly, 32  N.E.2d  923,  309  IlLApp.  72— 
People  ex  rel.  Keeler  v.  Kelly,  32 
N.E.2d  922,  309   IlLApp.   133— Peo- 
ple ex  rel.   Gallachio  v.  Kelly,   32 

'  N.E.2d  921,   309   DLApp.  133— Peo- 
ple ex  reL  Clennon  v.  Kelly,  82  N* 


§  77 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


with  definiteness  and  certainty,84  and  while  it  has 
been  held  that  the  exact  amount  should  be  stated 
in  the  judgment  in  dollars  and  cents,85  it  has  also 
been  held  that,  if  sufficient  data  are  given  for  its 
calculation  with  certainty,  the  judgment  will  be 
upheld.8*  Thus  it  has  been  held  sufficient  if  the 
amount  of  interest  in  the  judgment  can  be  definitely 
and  certainly  fixed  by  an  inspection  of  the  plead- 
ings87 or  the  record.88 

Although  it  has  been  held  that  the  rate  of  in- 
terest89 and  the  time  from  which  interest  begins 
to  run40  must  be  expressly  recited  in  the  judgment, 
it  has  also  been  held,  sometimes  by  virtue  of  statu- 
tory provisions,  that  a  provision  in  the  judgment 
for  interest  is  not  required,41  and,  therefore,  ordina- 
rily it  is  not  necessary  to  state  the  rate  of  inter- 
est,42 and,  of  course,  provisions  for  interest  in 
contravention  of  statute  are  erroneous.48 


Where  the  judgment  is  to  bear  the  same  rate  of 
interest  as  the  debt  on  which  it  is  founded,  it  is 
erroneous  to  fix  any  other  rate  of  interest;44  and 
usually  it  is  necessary  for  the  rate  to  be  expressed 
in  the  judgment,45  although  the  judgment  may  be 
aided  by  the  record  in  this  respect.46 

§  78.    Costs,  Allowances,  and  Attorney's 

Fees 

Usually  Judgment  Is  given  for  a  sum  certain,  with 
costs  to  be  taxed,  and  the  clerk  subsequently  taxes  the 
costs  and  Inserts  them  in  the  Judgment. 

Costs,  when  authorized,  are  a  part  of  the  judg- 
ment,47 and  judgment  usually  is  given  for  a  sum 
certain,  with  costs  to  be  taxed,  and  the  clerk  sub- 
sequently taxes  the  costs  and  inserts  them  in  the 
judgment,  in  a  blank  left  for  that  purpose,  or  in- 
dorses them  on  the  execution.48  Failure  to  fill  the 


E.5d  921,   309  IlLApp.   133— ^People  | 

ex  reL  Salomon  v.  Kelly,  32  N.E.2d 

920,    309    IlLApp.    13'3 — Spooner   v. 

Warner,  2  IlLApp.  240. 
3.3  C.J.  p  1204  notes  54-56. 
3*.  'Fla.— Skinner  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Dou- 

ville,  54  So.  810,  61  Fla.  429. 
33  C.J.  p  1205  note  63. 
Judgment  held  certain 
U:S.— Wulfsohn      v.      Russo-Asiatlc 

Bank,  C.C.A.China,   11  F.2d  715. 
85.    Mas*.— Boyer  v.  Bowles,  54  N.E. 

2d  925,  316  Mass.  90. 
Se.    U.S.— Wulfsohn    v,     Russo-Asi- 

atic    Bank,    C.C.A.China,    11    F.2d 

715. 
Del. — Nelson  v.   Canadian  Industrial 

Alcohol   CO.,    197    A.    477,    9   W.W. 

Harr.  184. 
33  C.  J.  P  1205  notes  «64,  67. 

37.  Tex.— Hill    v.    Lyles,    Civ.App., 
81  S.W.  559. 

38.  Ala. — Dinsmore   v.    Austlll,    Mi- 
nor p  89. 

N.H.— Wilbur  v.  Abbot,  58  N.H.  272. 

3d.  Kan.— Priest  v.  Kansas  City 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  230  P.  529.  117 
Kan.  1,  modified  on  other  grounds 
237  P.  938,  119  Kan.  23,  41  A.L.R. 
1100. 

33  C.J.  p  1205  note  65. 

40.    Kan. — Priest     v.     Kansas    City 
,     Life  Ins.  Co.,  supra. 
33  C.J.  p  1205  note  66. 
Judgment  held  not  void. 
Ky. — McKim    v.    Smith,    172    S.W.2d 

634,  294  Ky.  835. 
4L    cal.— Glenn  v.  Rice,  162  P.  1020, 

174  Cal.  269. 
Ohio.— Smith    v.    Miller,    22    N.E.2d 

846,  61  Ohio  App.  514. 
33  C.J.  p  1205  note  58. 
Insertion  by  ol«rk 

(1)  Jury  not  having  been  direct- 
ed by  court  to  add  interest  to  dam- 
ages found,  and  jury  not  having 


added  interest  from  date  of  writ 
clerk  was  unauthorized  to  add  Inter- 
est from  date  of  writ.— Landry  v. 
Gomes,  173  N.E.  428,  273  Mass.  225. 

(2)  interest  on  recovery  for 
breach  of  contract  prior  to  decision 
must  be  added  to  judgment  by  trier 
of  facts,  not  by  clerk.— Klausner  v. 
Queens  Fur  Dressing  Co.,  224  N.T.S. 
33.3,  130  Misc.  579. 

03)  Addition  by  clerk  of  court  of 
interest  on  judgment  for  time  from 
commencement  of  action  until  en- 
try of  judgment,  without  court  order 
or  adjudication,  held  error,  since 
only  interest  which  can  be  added  to 
costs,  -without  court  order,  is  that 
for  period  from  time  of  verdict  or 
report  until  judgment  Is  finally  en- 
tered.—Malllet  v.  Super  Products 
Co.,  259  N.W.  106,  218  Wis.  145. 

42.  Elan. — Simmons  v.  Garrett,  McC. 
p  82. 

33  C.J.  P  1205  note  59. 

43.  Kan. — Simmons  v.   Garrett,   s 
pra. 

3-3  C.J.  p  1205  note  60. 

44.  Tex.— Southland    Life    Ins.    Co. 
v.  Stone,  Civ.App.,  112  S.W.2d  336. 

45.  Ind. — Smith  v.  Tatman,  71  Ind. 
171. 

C.J.  P  1205  note  61. 

46.  Mo. — Catron  v.  Lafayette  Coun- 
ty,  28  S.W.   331,  125  Mo.   67. 

33  OJ.  P  1205  note  62. 

47.  N.T. — Steinberg  v.  Mealey,  SS  N, 
Y.S.2d  650,  263  App.Div.  479. 

Nature  of  costs  generally  see  Costs 
8  1. 
Costs  are  tout  an  incident  to  the 

judgment  and  do  not  add  to  its  force 

or  effect. 

U.S.— Silverman   v.    Central   Amuse- 
ment Co.,  D.C.D.C.,  49  F.Supp.  364 

Cal. — Slater    v.     Superior    Court    of 
Contra  Costa  County,  115  P-2d  32 

200 


45  Cal.App.2d  757,  rehearing  denied 
Slater  v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for 
Contra  Costa  County,  115  P.2d  865, 
45  Cal.App.2d  757. 
N.Y.— Steinberg  v.  Mealey.  ,»3  N.T.S. 

2d  650,  26-3  AppJDiv.  479. 
Two  trials 

Where,  after  a  finding  for  plaintiff 
in  an  action  in  assumpsit,  a  new 
trial  is  .granted  by  an  appellate 
court  and  the  case  Is  again  tried  in 
the  lower  court  within  a  year  after 
the  remittitur  is  filed,  resulting  in 
a  verdict  for  defendant,  it  is  not 
proper  for  defendant  to  enter  judg- 
ment twice,  once  for  costs  on  the 
ground  that  the  judgment  for  plain- 
tiff had  been  reversed,  and  the  other 
time  generally  on  the  basis  of  the 
second  trial,  the  latter  judgment 
being  sufficient  to  carry  with  it  any 
and  all  costs  allowed  by  the  vari- 
ous statutes  in  favor  of  defendant. — 
Cockcroft  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  31  PsuDist  &  Co.  159. 
Trial  and  appellate  courts 

The  statute  providing  for  inclu- 
sion of  costs  in  judgment  has  refer- 
ence to  judgments  of  both  the  trial 
and  appellate  courts.— Da  Rouch  v. 
District  Court  of  Third  Judicial 
Dist  in  and  for  Salt  Lake  County, 
79  P.2d  1006,  95  Utah  227,  116  A.L. 
R.  1147. 

48.    OkL— Bierschenk  v.  Klein,  S3  P. 

2d  .371,  183  OkL  494. 
33  C.J.  P  1206  notes  75,  76. 
Judgment  held  sufficient 

Judgment  that  defendant  recover 
amount  of  detinue  bond  from  plain- 
tiff and  his  sureties,  to  be  applied  on 
costs,  and  all  costs  exceeding  such 
amount  from  plaintiff,  will  support 
execution  as  to  latter,  even  though 
costs  are  divided  in  amount. — Clif- 
ton v.  Gay,  109  So.  1-68,  21  Ala.App. 
412,  certiorari  denied  109  So.  170,  215 
Ala.  22. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  79 


blank  for  costs  does  not  affect  the  regularity  of  the 
judgment  in  other  respects,49  or,  at  least,  it  is  only 
an  irregularity,  and  does  not  render  the  judgment 
void  or  inoperative.^  A  judgment  is  unaffected  by 
the  taxation  of  costs  until  the  actual  entry  of  the 
costs  therein.61  In  some  jurisdictions  the  amount 
of  the  costs  must  be  specified  in  the  judgment,52 
and,  where  the  space  for  the  amount  of  costs  is 
left  blank,  no  judgment  for  costs  is  rendered.63  It 
has  been  held  correct  to  enter  judgment  for  a  speci- 
fied amount,  including  costs,64  or  from  which  the 
other  party's  costs  have  been  deducted.65 

Where  the  right  to  costs  is  waived  or  lost,66 
or  there  is  no  court  order  or  direction  with  re- 
gard thereto,6?  the  clerk  has  been  held  to  have  no 
authority  to  insert  them  in  the  judgment  Judg- 
ment rendered  for  costs  only  has  been  held  not  a 
proper  judgment,6*  especially  where  the  space  for 
the  amount  thereof  is  left  blank.69  Allowances 
granted  by  the  judgment  must  be  certain  in 
amount60 

Allowances  for  fees  of  referees  and  stenogra- 
phers requiring  judicial  action  by  the  court  become 
component  parts  of  the  judgment  and  must  be  em- 
braced therein.61 

Attorney's  fees.  It  has  been  held  that  attorney's 
fees  or  commissions  should  be  entered  as  a  separate 
item  and  not  included  in  the  judgment  for  the  prin- 
cipal obligation.62  However,  an  attorney's  fee  or 
commission,  stipulated  for  in  the  contract  or  ob- 


ligation in  suit  is  part  of  the  principal  debt,  and 
may  be  incorporated  in  the  judgment  as  a  part  of 
the  recovery,63 

§  79.    Medium  of  Payment 

a.  Domestic  or  foreign  money 

b.  Coin  or  currency 

a.  Domestic  or  Foreign  Money 

A  Judgment  should  be  rendered  for  domestic  dollars 
and  cents,  and  not  for  foreign  money. 

A  judgment  should  be  rendered  for  domestic 
dollars  and  cents,  and  not  for  foreign  money.^* 
Foreign  currency  is  regarded  merely  as  a  commod- 
ity, and  in  an  action  on  a  demand  due  in  foreign 
currency  the  judgment  should  be  entered  for  its 
value  in  domestic  money.66 

t.  Coin  or  Currency 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Effect  of  contract 

(3)  Conformity  to  pleadings,  issues,  and 

verdict 

(1)  In  General 

In  the  absence  of  a  contract  stipulating  for  payment 
In  coin,  it  is  usually  held  that  the  judgment  should  be 
entered  generally,  and  that  a  Judgment  for  coined  dol- 
lars or  gold  Is  erroneous. 

In  the  absence  of  a  contract  stipulating  for  pay- 
ment in  coin,  it  is  usually  held  that  the  judgment 
should  be  entered  generally,  and  that  a  judgment 


49.  Mass. — East     Tennessee     Land 
Co.    v.    Leeson,    69    N.E.    S51.    185 
Mass.  4. 

33  C.J.  p  1206  note  78. 

50.  Ind. — Oauthorn  v.   Bierhaus,    88 
N.E.   314,  44  IncLApp.  262. 

83  C.J.  p  1206  note  79. 

51.  Minn.— Iieyde     v.     Martin,     16 
Minn.  <38. 

52.  Neb.— Kissinger    v.    Staley,    63 
N.W.  $5,  44  Neb.  78*. 

33  C.J.  p  1206  note  73. 
Piling  memorandum 

If  principal  debt  and  fees  are  com- 
bined in  judgment  entered  on  note, 
memorandum  should  be  filed  show- 
ing on  what  terms  and  conditions 
Judgment  is  entered. — Webster  v. 
People's  Loan,  Savings  &  Deposit 
Bank  of  Cambridge,  152  A.  815,  160 
Md.  57. 

53.  Kan. — Cotftello    v.    Wilhelm,    18 
Kan.  229. 

Or.— In  re  Toung,  116  P.  95,  59  Or. 
348,  Ann.Cas.l913B  1310,  rehearing 
denied  116  P.  1060,  59  Or.  348. 

64.    N.J.— Hay  v.  Imley,  *  N.J.Law 

401. 
33  C.J.  p  1205  note  71.  j 


Costs  merged  in  Judgment 

U.S. — Massachusetts  Bonding  ft  In- 
surance Co.  v.  Clymer  Mfg.  Co., 
C.C.A.Colo.,  48  F.2d  51*. 

Inclusion  presumed 

N.Y. — Great  American  Indemnity 
Co.  y.  Audlane  Realty  Corporation. 
296  N.Y.3.  455,  163  Misc.  501. 

55.  N.T.— Coatsworth  v.  Ray,  52  IT. 
T.S.   498,   28  N.Y.CivjProc.   6. 

33  C.J.  p  1206  note  72. 

56.  Idaho.— Cantwell  v.  McPherson, 
29  P.  102,  3  Idaho,  Hasb.,  221. 

57.  Wis. — Luebke  v.  City  of  Water- 
town,  284  N.W.  519,  230  Wis.  512. 

68.  HI. — Duncan  v.  National  Bank 
of  Decatur,  1  N.E.2d  902,  285  III. 
App.  1305. 

53.    Wyo. — Mosher  v.  Vinta  County, 

2  Wyo.  462. 
33  C.J.  p  1206  note  82. 

60.  Mo. — Garner  Y.  Hays,  5  Mo.  436. 
Tex. — Watson    v.    Williamson,    Civ. 

App.,  76  S.W.  793. 

61.  Mo. — Niedringhaus    v.    Wm.    F. 
Niedringhaus    Inv.    Co.,    App.,    64 
S.W^d  79,   transferred,  see  Nied- 
ringhaus v.  Niedringhaus,  52  S.W." 
2d  .395,  330  Mo.  1089,  and  certio- 

201 


rari  Quashed  State  ex  rel.  Williams 
v.  Daues,  66  S.W.2d  187,  '334  Mo. 
91. 

62.  Md. — Webster  v.  People's  Loan, 
Savings  &  Deposit  Bank  of  Cam- 
bridge, 152  A.  815,  160  Md.  57. 
"Together  •with"  as  used  in  Judg- 
ment awarding  to  plaintiff  principal 
sum   together   with   attorney's   fees 
in    designated    sum,    together    with 
plaintiff's    costs   and   disbursements, 
was  equivalent  of  "in  addition  to" 
and  judgment  awarded  plaintiff  at- 
torney's   fees    and    costs    over    and 
above    the    principal    sum. — Gray    v. 
Tarbox,    127    P.2d    669,    14    Washed 
237. 

63.  Ga. — Patterson        v.        Alapaha 
Bank,  99  S.B.  141,  23  GaJ^pp.  622. 

313  C.J.  p  1206  note  84. 

64.  Pa. — Pennsylvania     R.     Co.     v. 
Cameron,  .124  A.  638,  280  Pa.  468, 
33  A.L.R.  1281. 

Puerto   Rico.— Cayol   y.    Balseiro,    1 

Puerto  Rico  258. 
3-3  C.J.  p  1206  note  86. 

65.  U.S.— Thornton  v.  National  City 
Bank  of  New  York,  C.CJLN.Y,,  45 
F.2d  127. 

33  C.J.  p  1206  note  87. 


79 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


for  coined  dollars  or  gold  is  erroneous.66  Thus  it 
has  been  held  that,  in  actions  for  torts,  judgments 
for  damages  cannot  be  for  gold  coin,6?  unless  au- 
thorized by  statute.68  Where  gold  coin  is  lost  or 
converted,  it  has  been  held  in  some  cases  that  the 
judgment  should  be  entered  for  gold  dollars,69  while 
in  other  cases  it  has  been  said  that  the  judgment 
should  be  for  the  face  or  value  of  the  gold  coin 
in  currency.70 

Void  or  voidable.  A  judgment  for  gold  or  sil- 
ver coin  in  a  case  where  such  a  judgment  is  not 
authorized  is  irregular  and  erroneous,  but  it  is  not 
in  any  event  void.71 

Costs  and  interest.  It  has  been  held  in  several 
cases  not  involving  express  contracts,  that,  although 
judgment  for  the  principal  sum  is  properly  ren- 
dered payable  in  gold,  the  judgment  for  costs  must 
be  rendered  payable  in  currency;72  but  there  is 
authority  for.  the  rule  that,  where  a  contract  is 
made  payable  ,in  a  specific  kind  of  money,  the 
judgment  enforcing  it  may  enforce  the  payment 
of  costs  and  interest  in  the  kind  of  money  men- 
tioned in  the  contract,  for  the  reason  that  costs 
and  interest  become  a  component  part  of  the  judg- 
ment.73 

(2)  Effect  of  Contract 

Generally  Judgments  In  suits  on  contracts   payable 
in  coin  should  be  entered  for  coined  dollars. 

In  a  number  of  early  decisions  the  provision  in 
a  contract  for  payment  in  coin  or  a  particular  kind 
of  coin  was  held  to  be  of  no  effect,  and  contracts 
containing  such  provisions  were  held  to  amount  to 
nothing  more  than  contracts  to  pay  the  nominal  val- 
ue in  any  money  which  was  a  legal  tender,  and 
consequently  the  judgments  to  be  entered  thereon 
were  required  to  be  for  money  generally,  without 


specifying  the  kind.74  In  other  cases  it  was  held 
that  the  judgment  on  a  contract  calling  for  gold  or 
silver  should  be  for  the  value  of  the  coin  in  curren- 
cy,75 while  in  still  other  cases  it  was  held  that  the 
judgment  should  be  in  the  alternative,  for  the  coin 
or  its  value  in  currency.76 

Subsequently  the  validity  of  express  contracts  to 
pay  coined  dollars  of  a  kind  specified  was  sustained 
in  the  federal  courts  as  not  being  within  the  legal 
tender  acts,  and  the  doctrine  was  established  that 
such  contracts  can  be  satisfied  only  by  the  tender  or 
payment  of  coined  dollars  of  the  kind  specified,  and 
that  judgments  in  suits  brought  on  such  contracts 
should  be  entered  for  coined  dollars  and  parts  of 
dollars.77  These  decisions  of  the  United  States  su- 
preme court  are  controlling  on  the  state  courts,  and 
in  effect  overrule  all  previous  inconsistent  deci- 
sions.78 They  have  been  followed  in  practically 
every  state  decision  since  rendered,  and  the  rule  is 
now  well  established.79  The  rule  established  by  the 
foregoing  cases,  however,  does  not  prevent  the  ren- 
dition of  a  judgment  for  the  value  of  the  coin  in 
currency  where  the  creditor  consents  to  -or  seeks 
such  recovery.80 

Early  statutes.  Before  the  present  established 
doctrine  became  settled  by  the  decisions,  it  was  spe- 
cifically incorporated  in  die  statutes  of  some  of  the 
states  and  decisions  construing  and  applying  such 
statutes  are  considered  in  33  C.J.  p  1208  note  4. 

Coin  or  equivalent.  It  has  been  held  that  the 
judgment  on  a  contract  payable  in  coin  or  its  equiv- 
alent in  currency  should  be  in  the  alternative,  for 
coin  or  currency.81  In  other  cases  it  has  been 
held  that  the  judgment  should  not  be  rendered  in 
the  alternative  for  coin  or  currency,  but  should  be 
in  currency  for  an  amount  equal  to  the  face  value 
plus  the  premium  of  the  coin,82  while  in  still  other 


In  Philippine  islands 

(1)  Judgments     rendered    in    the 
Philippine     Islands     should     be     in 
Philippine   money.— Behn   v.    Rosat- 
zin,  5  Philippine  660 — Gaspar  v.  Mo- 
lina, 6  Philippine  197. 

(2)  If    rendered   in   Mexican    cur- 
rency it  may  be  changed  on  appeal 
to  Philippine  money. — Causin  v.  Ric- 
amora,    5   (Philippine    31,    4   OftGaz. 
218. 

88.  111.— Belford  v.  Woodward,  41 
N.E.  1097,  158  111.  122,  29  L.R.A. 
593. 

33  C.J.  p  1207  note  89. 

67.    Cal.— Livingston  v.  Morgan,   58 

Cal.  23. 
S3  C.J.  p  1207  note  90. 

08.    Nev. — Treadway    v.    Sharon,    7 

N*v.  37. 
33  C.J.  p  1207  note  91. 


G9,    Mass. — Independent   Ins.  Co.  v. 

Thomas,  104  Mass.  192. 
33  C.J.  p  1207  note  92. 

70.  Ind. — State  Bank  v.  Burton,  27 
Ind.  426. 

33  C.J.  p  1207  note  93. 

71.  Tex. — Flournoy     v.     Healy,     31 
Tex.  590. 

33  C.J.  p  1-209  note  19. 

7fc    CaL— More  v.  Del  Valle,  28  Cal. 

170. 
33  C.J.  p  1209  note  17. 

73.  Cal. — Carpentier  v.  Atherton,  25 
Cal.  664. 

74.  Ala.— Glover  v.  Bobbins,  49  Ala. 
219,  .20  Axn.R.  272. 

313  C.J.  p  1208  note  9-6. 

75.  Pa. — Dutton  v.  Pailaret,  52  Pa. 
109,   91  Am.D.   135,  affirmed  14   S. 
Ct  1200,  154  U.S.  563,  19  L.Ed.  165. 

33  C.J.  p  1208  note  97. 

202 


76.  Ky. — Glass    v.    Pullen,    6    Bush 
346. 

3d  O.J.  p  1208  note  98. 

77.  U.S.— Trebilcock       v.       Wilson, 
Iowa,  12  Wall.  687,  20  L.Ed.  460. 

.33  C.J.  p  1208  note  99. 

78.  U.S. — Trebilcock  v.  Wilson,  su- 
pra. 

3-3  C.J.  p  1208  note  1. 

79.  U.S. — Gregory  v.   Morris,   Wyo., 
96  U.S.  619,  24  L.Ed.  740. 

33  C.J.  p  1208  note  2. 

80.  U.S. — Gregory  v.  Morris,  supra. 
3i3  C.J.  p  1208  note  3. 

81.  Ga. — Atkinson  v.  Lanier,  69  Ga. 
460. 

3-3  C.J.  p  1209  note  6. 

82.  N.C. — Dunn  y.   Barnes,    73  N.C. 
273. 

33  C.J.  p  1209  note  7. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  80 


cases  it  has  been  held  that  the  judgment  should  be 
for  gold  alone,83  or  simply  for  the  amount  of  money 
found  due  without  specifying  the  kind  of  money  in 
which  payment  should  be  made.8* 

(3)  Conformity   to    Pleadings,    Issues,    and 
Verdict 

Judgments  for  a.  specific  kind  of  coin  must  conform 
to  the  pleadings,  verdict,  and  findings. 

Judgments  for  a*  specific  kind  of  coin  must  be 
supported  by  the  case  made  by  the  pleadings.85 
Where  the  pleadings  or  process  do  not  specify 
gold,  a  judgment  by  default  or  nil  dicit  for  gold  is 
erroneous,86  but  is  regular  and  proper  where  sup- 
ported .by  the  declaration  or  complaint87  A  coin 
judgment  must  likewise  be  sustained  by  the  verdict 
or  findings,88  and,  equally  so,  a  general  judgment89 
Where  the  verdict  is  for  gold  or  legal  tender  in  the 
alternative,  a  judgment  for  legal  tender  only  is  not 
in  accordance  with  the  verdict.90 


§  80.     Description  of  Property 

A  Judgment  affecting  the  title  to  property  must  de- 
scribe it  with  sufficient  certainty  to  identify  ft;  the  Judg- 
ment may  be  aided  by  in  tend  men  ts  and  additional  data 
drawn  from  the  record. 

Where  a  judgment  affects  the  title  to  property, 
real  or  personal,  the  property  must  be  described 
specifically  and  with  certainty91  to  enable  execu- 
tion of  the  court's  mandate;92  an  impossible,93 
wrong,94  or  uncertain95  description,  or  the  absence 
of  a  description,96  renders  the  judgment  errone- 
ous or  void.  Ordinarily  the  judgment  should  follow 
the  complaint  in  its  description  of  the  property  in- 
volved,97 but  variances  which  do  not  affect  the 
identity  of  the  property  are  immaterial.98  The  de- 
scription is  sufficient  where  the  property  which  is 
the  subject  of  the  judgment  is  described  with  suffi- 
cient certainty  to  identify  it99 

The  judgment  may  be  aided  by  intendments  and 
additional  data  drawn  from  the  pleadings  and  oth- 


83.  Cal. — Burnett     v.     Stearns,     $3 
Cal.  4*68. 

33  CJ.  p  1209  note  8. 

84.  Cal. — Reese  v.  Stearns,   29  CaL 
2T3. 

85.  111.— Belford    v.    Woodward,    41 
N.E.    1097,    158   111.   122,   29   L.R.A. 
593. 

3.3  C.J.  p  1209  notes  10,  11. 

86.  Cal. — Wallace    v.    Eldredge,    27 
Cal.    495— Lamping    v.    Hyatt,    27 
Cal.  99. 

111. — Belford  v.  Woodward,  41  N.E. 
1097,  158  111.  122,  29  L.R.A.  593. 

87.  Cal. — Harding'     v.     Cowing,     28 
Cal.    212— Wallace  v.  Eldredge,   27 
Cal.  498. 

88.  Cal.— McDonald  v.  Mission  View 
Homestead  Assoc.,  51  Cal.  210. 

3,3  C.J.  P  1209  note  14. 

89.  Cal. — Carpenitier    v.    Small,     35 
Cal.  346. 

33  C.J.  p  1209  note  15. 

90.  Mont — Knox    v.     Gerhauser,    $ 
Mont.  267. 

91-  Cal. — Corpus  JTnxi«  cited  In 
Newport  v.  Hatton,  231  P.  987, 
996,  195  Cal.  132. 

Ga.— Winslow  v.  O'Pry,  56  Ga.  138— 
Clinch  v.  Ferril,  48  Ga.  365. 

Ky. — Shaw  v.  McKnight-Keaton  Gro- 
cery Co..  21  S.W.2d  269,  2S1  Ky. 
223. 

Mo. — Tillman  v.  Hutcherson,  154  S. 
W.2d  104,  1348  Mo.  473— Williams 
v.  Pemiscot  County,  133  S.W.2d 
417,  =845  Mo.  415.  . 

33  C.J.  p  1209  note  20. 

Certainty  of  description  of  property 

in: 

Decree  see  EQiiity  S  598. 
Judgment  in: 

Detinue  see  Detinue  S  22  b  (1), 
Ejectment  see  Ejectment  8  112 
c. 


Forcible  entry  and  detainer  see 
Forcible  Entry  and  Detainer  § 
69. 

Quieting  title  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
Quieting  Title   §    103,  also   51 
C.J.  p  2&2  notes  31-35. 
Replevin  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Re- 
plevin $  241,  also  54  C.J.  p  587 
note  16-p  588  note  24. 
Trespass  to  try  title  see  the  C. 
J.S.  title  Trespass  to  Try  Title 
$  65,  also  63  C.J.  p  1203  notes 
32-46. 
Clarity  as  in  deed 

A  judgment  adjudicating  title  to 
realty  must  be  as  clear  and  explicit 
as  a  deed  which  purports  to  convey 
real  property. — People  v.  Rio  Nido 
Co.,  85  P.2d  461,  29  Cal.App.2d  486. 

92.  HI.— Gerlach   v.   Walsh,    41    IlL 
App.  88. 

Tex. — Humble  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v. 
Manziel,  Civ.App.t  187  S.W.2d  149, 
refused  for  want  of  merit. 

93.  Cal.— Corpus     Juris      cited     in 
Newport  v.  Hatton,  251  P.  987,  996, 
195  Cal.  1*2. 

HI.— Gerlach  v.  Walsh,  41  IlLApp. 
8>3. 

94.  CaL — Corpus     Juris      cited     in 
Newport    v.    Hatton,    231    P.    987, 
996,  195  Cal.  132. 

33  C.J.  p  1210  note  22. 

95.  Cal.— Oorptu     Juris      cited     in 
Newport    v.    Hatton,    231    P.    987, 
996,  195  CaL  132. 

3d    CJ.    p    1210    notes    23,    24. 
Judgment  good  unless  reversed 

"While  a  judgment  which  does  not 
fully  describe  the  land  may  be  re- 
versed as  erroneous  on  appeal,  such 
a  judgment,  if  the  land  is  so  de- 
scribed that  it  may  be  identified,  is 
good  until  reversed." — Grooms  v. 

203 


National   Bank  of  Kentucky,   292  S. 
W.  513,  515,  218  Ky.  846. 

96.  Cal. — Corpus     Juris      cited      in 
Newport    v.    Hatton,    231    P.    987, 
996,  195  Cal.  152. 

Ky.— Alexander  v.  Hendricks,  258  S. 

W.  81.  201  Ky.  677. 
33  CJ.  p  1210  note  23. 

97.  Tex. — Humble    Oil    &    Refining 
Co.  v.  Manziel,  Civ.App.,  187  S.W. 
2d  149,  refused  for  want  of  merit. 

•33  CJ.  p  1210  note  32. 

98.  Cal.— McLean  v.  Ladewig,  37  P. 
2d  502,  2  Cal.App.2d  21. 

33  CJ.  p  1210  note  33. 

99.  Cal.— People  v.  Rio  Nido  Co.,  85 
P.2d  461,   29  'Cal.App.2d  486. 

Ky. — Shaw  v.  McKnight-Keaton  Gro- 
cery Co.,  21  S.W.2d  269,  231  Ky. 
223. 

Tex. — Moore   v.    Unknown   Heirs    of 
Gilchrist,   Civ.App.,    273    S.W.   308. 
*3  CJ.  p  1210  note  25. 

The  office  of  description  in  a  judg- 
ment is  to  furnish  means  of  identi- 
fication of  the  land. — Greer  v.  Greer, 
Tex.,  191  S.W.2d  848— Trout  v. 
Grubbs,  Tex.Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  850, 
951. 
Test  of  uncertainty 

'<We  do  not  see  how  a  judgment 
can  be  pronounced  a  nullity  for  un- 
certainty of  description  unless  the 
court  can  see  that  nothing  is  de-- 
scribed.  Those  claiming  under  it 
must  rely  on  the  description,  it  is 
true,  but  whether  or  not  the  de- 
scription is  defective  must  be  test- 
ed by  rules  of  evidence  ordinarily 
applied  to  the  subject" — Newport  v. 
Hatton,  231  P.  987,  996,  195  CaL  132 
—McLean  v.  Ladewlg,  37  P.2d  502, 
504,  2  CaLApp.2d  21. 


§8X 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.& 


er  parts  of  the  record,1  or  even,  in  some  cases,  by 
extrinsic  documentary  evidence.2  Words  of  mis- 
description  may  be  rejected  as  surplusage,  if  the 
property  is  otherwise  sufficiently  identified.8  A  de- 
scription of  property  in  the  judgment  by  a  refer- 
ence to  the  pleadings  is  sufficient4  unless  the  ref- 
erence introduces  a  new  element  of  uncertainty5  or 
the  description  referred  to  is  itself  insufficient.6 
Such  a  reference  is  to  the  amended  complaint,  if 
there  is  one.7  A  reference  to  the  report  of  a  com- 
missioner for  a  description  may  be  sufficient8  In 
some  cases  a  description  by  reference  has  been  held 
insufficient9 

§  81.    Date 

A  judgment  should  show  with  certainty  the  time  of 
Its  rendition,  but  the  omission  of  a  date  does  not  render 
it  void. 

A  judgment  should  show  with  certainty  the  time 
of  its  rendition,1^  but  need  not  specify  the  particu- 
lar hour.11  The  omission  of  the  date,  however,  is 
a  mere  irregularity,  and  will  not  render  the  judg- 
ment void.12  A  clerical  error  may  be  shown  so  as 


to  support  the  judgment18  As  appears  infra  § 
113,  the  date  may  be  fixed  by  reference  to  the  rec- 
ord of  proceedings  in  the  case. 

§  82.    Provisions  for  Enforcement 

Ordinarily  a  Judgment  need  not  contain  provisions 
for  its  enforcement,  although  their  inclusion  does  not 
necessarily  invalidate  a  judgment. 

The  office  of  a  judgment  is  fully  performed  when 
it  declares  and  adjudicates  the  existence  or  nonex- 
istence  of  the  liability  sought  to  be  established; 
it  is  not  concerned  with  the  means  of  enforcing  the 
liability  declared,14  which  are  discussed  infra  §§ 
585-591.  Ordinarily  a  judgment  need  not  order 
execution  or  other  process  provided  by  law  for  its 
enforcement,16  although  to  do  so  does  not  neces- 
sarily render  an  otherwise  valid  judgment  void16 
or  erroneous  ;17  and  in  some  cases  the  clause  with 
regard  to  enforcement  may  be  disregarded  as  mere 
surplusage.18 

A  money  judgment  should  be  simply  that  one 
party  or  the  other  recover  the  amount  awarded, 


Description  of  land  held   sufficient- 
ly certain 

(1)  Generally. 

Ga.— Cason  v.  United  Realty  &  Auc- 
tion Co.,  131  S.E.  161,  161  Ga,  674. 

Ky. — Grooms  v.  National  Bank  of 
Kentucky,  292  S.W.  513.  218  Ky. 
•846. 

Tex. — Bearing  v.  City  of  "Port  Nech- 
es,  Civ.App.,  65  S.W.2d  1105,  er- 
ror refused. 

33  C.J.  p  1210  note  25  [a]. 

(2)  Fact    that    Judgment    incorpo- 
rated  two   descriptions   of  land  in- 
volved  in   suit   h«ld   not   reversible 
error    where    descriptions    in    judg- 
ment merely  followed  alternative  de- 
scriptions contained  in  plaintiffs  pe- 
tition.— -Wells  v.  Thompson,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  84  S.W.2d  -312,  error  dismissed. 

03)  Reference  to  mining  property 
by  its  popular  name,  "Good  Luck 
Mine,"  was  held  a  sufficient  descrip- 
tion.—'McLean  v.  Ladewig,  37  P.2d 
502,  2  Cal.App.2d  21. 
Description  of  land  held  insufficient 
Cal.— People  v.  Rio  Nido  Co.,  85  P. 

2d  461,  29  Col.App.2d  486. 
Mo. — Tillman  v.  Hutcherson,  154  6. 

W.2d  104,  348  Mo.  473. 
33  C.J.  p  1210  note  25  [b].     . 
Description   of   personalty   held   in- 

sufficient 
N.C.— Barham  v.  Perry,  171  S.B.  614, 

205  N.C.  428. 
33  C.J.  p  1210  note  25  \f\. 

1.  Ala.— tfloyd  v.  Jackson,  164  So. 
121,  26  Ala.APP.  575. 

CaL — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Newport 
v.  Hatton,  2*1  P.  987,  996,  195  Cal. 
132— Guthbert  Burrell  Co.  v.  Shir- 
ley, 148  P.2d  85,  64  Cal. App. 2 d  52 


—McLean  v.  Ladewig,  37  P.2d  502, 

2  Oal.App.2d  21. 
Ga. — Jones  v.  Empire  Furniture  Co., 

150  S.E.  563,  40  Ga.App.  556. 
Tex.— City  Nat.   Bank  of  San  Saba 

v.    Penn,   Civ.App.,    92   $.W.2d   532 

— -Moore  v.  Unknown  Heirs  of  Gil- 

christ,  CivJLpp.,  273  S.W.  308. 
33  C.J.  p  1210  note  29. 
Description  held  insufficient 
Cal.— People  v.  Rio  Nldo  Co.,  85  P.2d 

461,  29  Cal.App.2d  486. 
2.    Cal.— Corpus      Juris      cited     in, 

Newport  v.  Hatton,  251  P.  987,  996, 

195  Cal.  132. 
33  C.J.  p  1210  note  30. 
a    N.T.— Laverty  v.  Moore,  38  N.Y. 

658. 
313  C.J.  p  1210  note  22  [b]. 

4.  Iowa. — Foster  v.   Bowman,  7  N. 
W.  61-3,  55  Iowa  237. 

33  C.J.  p  1210  note  34. 

5.  Ky. — Lawless  v.  Barger,  9  Bush 
.  665. 

3.3  C.J.  p  1210  note  35. 

6.  La.— -Williams    v.    Kelso,    7    La. 
406.      - 

7.  Cal.— Kelly  v.  McKIbben,  54  Cal. 
192. 

a    Ky.— Four  Mile  Land  &  Coal  Co. 

v.    Slusher,  €5   S.W.   555,   107  Ky; 

664,      21     Ky.L.     1427— QPosey     v. 

Green,  78  Ky.  162. 
9«    Ky. — Neff  v.  Covington  Stone  & 

Sand  Co.,  55  S.W.  697,  108  Ky.  457, 

21  Ky.L.  1454,  56  S.W.  723t  22  Ky. 

L.  139. 

35  C.J.  p  1211  note  39. 
10,    Ind. — Bevington     v.     Buck,     18 

Ind.  414. 
3i3  C.J.  p  1211  note  41. 

204 


Presumption  as  to  date  of  entry  see 
infra  §  U3. 

11.  Del. — Wilson  Y.   Greenwood,    10 
Bel.  619. 

12.  Neb. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Martin  v.   Sanford,   261  N.W.   136, 
140,  129  Neb.  212. 

3(3  C.J.  p  1211  note  43. 

13.  Neb. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 

Martin  v.   Sanford,   261  N.W.   136, 
140,  129  Neb.  212. 

Tex. — Sloan  v.  Thompson,  2*3  S.W. 
615,  4  Tex.Civ.App.  419. 

14.  Cal. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Jordan  v.  Williams  Trr,  Disk,   57 
P.2d   566,    569,    13   Cal.App.2d    465. 

Ind.— 'Walters  v.  Cantner,  60  N.B.2d 

138. 
3*3  C.J.  p  1211  note  48. 

15.  Colo. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Scott  v.  Woodhams,   246   P.    1027, 
1028,  79  Colo.  528,  followed  in  246 
P.  1029,  79  Colo.  5«32. 

N.T.— Brown  v.  Father  Divine,  18  N. 
Y.S.2d  544,  1713  Misc.  1029,  af- 
firmed 213  N.T.S.2d  116,  260  App. 
Div.  443,  reargument  denied  24 
N.T.S.2d  991,  260  App.Div.  1006. 

Tex. — Darlington  v.  Allison,  Civ. 
App.,  12  SjW.2d  839,  error  dis- 
missed. 

33  C.J.  p  1211  note  49. 

16.  111.— McBane  v.   People,   -50    111. 
503. 

17.  Minn. — Belknap  v.  Van  Riper,  79 
N.W.  103,  76  Minn.  268. 

ia    Wis.— Sharpe      v.      First     Nat. 
Bank,  264  N.W.  245,  220  Wis.  506. 
^3  C.J.  p  1211  note  51. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


83 


without  any  direction  as  to  How  the  money  should 
be  paid  by  the  debtor  or  made  by  the  officer;19 
after  judgment  the  law,  and  not  the  court,  directs 
what  proceedings  shall  be  had  for  the  purpose  of 
satisfying  the  amount  adjudged  to  be  due.20  How- 
ever, a  judgment  may  be  adapted  to  the  propor- 
tionate liabilities  of  the  several  defendants  in  the 
action,21  or  may  direct  the  order  in  which  levy 
should  be  made  on  the  properties  of  several  parties 
defendant,22  or,  in  the  case  of  a  debt  payable  by 
installments,  the  judgment  may  be  so  framed  as  to 
provide  for  its  payment  at  successive  periods,  as 
the  installments  fall  due,23  or  may  order  the  pay- 
ment of  the  amount  presently  due,  with  leave  to 
plaintiff  to  take  out  executions  for  the  succeeding 
installments.24  Under  some  statutes,  in  cases  where 
defendant  is  subject  to  arrest  on  execution,  plaintiff 
is  entitled  to  have  the  judgment  state  that  fact  as 
the  basis  for  the  issuance  of  a  body  execution,25 
which,  as  discussed  in  Executions  §  417  b,  may  not 
otherwise  lawfully  issue;  but  even  so  it  has  been 
held  improper  to  insert  in  the  judgment  a  provi- 
sion for  the  issuance  of  an  execution  against  the 
person.26 

Limitation  to  particular  property.  A  general 
judgment  should  not  limit  its  collection  to  particular 
property  or  funds27  unless  the  contract  of  the  par- 
ties contemplates  such  limitation.28  Where,  howev- 
er, a  judgment  in  rem  or  quasi  in  rem  is  involved, 
enforcement  should  be  limited  to  the  particular 


property  in  question;29  where  property  is  in  cus- 
tody of  the  court  by  attachment  or  garnishment,  the 
judgment  may  provide  for  enforcement  out  of  such 
property.80 

Stay  of  execution.  A  judgment  may  provide  that 
execution  shall  be  stayed  in  a  proper  case.81  A 
stay,  furthermore,  may  be  written  into  a  judgment 
by  operation  of  law.32  However,  where  not  within 
the  power  of  the  court  to  make,  that  part  of  a  judg- 
ment staying  execution  has  been  held  void.88 

Waiver  of  statutory  benefits.  If  the  action  is  on 
a  written  obligation  which  waives  the  benefit  of 
valuation  or  appraisement  laws,  the  judgment  may 
contain  provisions  giving  effect  to  the  waiver;84 
where,  however,  there  was  no  statutory  authoriza- 
tion of  judgments  prohibiting  the  stay  of  execu- 
tion, a  waiver  of  the  stay  laws  has  been  disregarded 
by  the  court35 

Under  codes  and  practice  acts  it  may  be  proper 
to  insert  provisions  or  directions  as  to  perform- 
ance or  enforcement  of  the  judgment.36 

§  83.    Exceptions  and  Saving  Clauses 

A  judgment  on  the  merits  cannot  be  rendered  with- 
out prejudice  to  the  parties'  rights  to  bring  another  ac- 
tion on  the  same  grounds. 

A  judgment  on  the  merits  cannot,  and  should  not, 
purport  to  be  rendered  without  prejudice  to  the 
rights  of  the  parties  to  bring  another  action  on  the 


Id.    Del. — Sch wander  v.  Feeney's,  29 

A.2d  -369. 
33  C.J.  p  1211  note  52. 

20,  Tex.— Darlington      v.      Allison, 
Civ.App.,  12  S.W.2d  859. 

33  C.J.  p  1211  note  58. 
Xien  of  Judgment 

(1)  The   lien   of  a  Judgment  need 
not  be  declared  in  terms,  as  it  ex- 
ists   by    law    Independently    of   any 
provision  therefor  In  the  Judgment. 
— Nygren   v.    Nygren,    60   N.W.    885, 
42  Neb.  408—33  C.J.  p  1212  note  68. 

(2)  Lien    of    judgment    generally 
see  infra  5§  454-511. 

21.  Ind. — Douglass    v.    Howland,    11 
Ind.  654. 

Tex. — Eastland    v.    Puller,    dv.App., 

261  S.-W.  386. 
32.    Tex.-^City    Nat.    Bank    of    San 

Saba    v.    Penn,    Civ.App.,    92    S.Wt 

2d  5i32. 

23.  Ind.— Wolfe  v.   Wilsey,   28  N.B. 
1004,  2  Ind.App.  549. 

24.  N.Y.— Ltt>by    v.    Rosekrans,    W 
Barb.  202. 

33  C.J.  p  1211  note  56. 

35-    N.Y.— Rion    Co.    v.    Zuckerman, 
.  17   N.Y.S.2d  40,   175   Misc.   3— Wil- 
son   &   Co.,    Inc.,    v.    Hershkowitz, 


298    N.Y.S.     14,     163     Misc.     721— 

Pacific     Finance     Corporation,   v. 

Trombino,  24  N.Y.S.2d  297. 
33  C.J.  p  1211  note  59. 
Judgment  held  vnAoient 
I1L— Brandtjen  &  Kluge  v.  Forgue, 

20    N.E.2d   616,   299   ULApp.   585. 

26.  N.Y.— Curtiss  v.   Jebb,    96   N.E. 
120,  205  N.Y.  6138. 

27.  N.J.— Corpus     Jnxis     cited     In 
Justice    v.    Justice,    12    A.2d    893, 
894,  127  N.J.Eq.  874. 

3t3  C.J.  p  1212  note  62. 

28.  N.Y.—- Pellas  v.  Motley,  58  N.E. 
100,  14"3  N.Y.  657. 

33  C.J.  p  1211  note  54,  p  1212  note 

64. 

Transaction  held  not  to  contem- 
plate limitation  of  collection  to  par- 
ticular property. — Justice  v.  Jus- 
tice, 12  A.2d  895,  127  N.J.EQ.  574. 

29.  Mo.— State  v.  Vogel,  14  Mo.App. 
187. 

30.  Tex. — Studebaker  Harness  Co.  v. 
Gerlach   Mercantile   Go.,    Civ.App., 
192  S.W.  545. 

33  C.J.  P  1212  note  65. 

3L    Ala,— Corpus     Jtttis      cited     in 
Bailey    Realty    &    Loan    Co.    v. 

205 


Bunting,  19  So.2d  609,  610,  246  Ala. 
152. 

N.H.— Judkins  v.  Union  Mutual  Fire 
Ins.  Co.,  59  N.H.  172. 

32.  Ala.— Bailey  Realty  &  Loan  Co. 
v.  Bunting,   19  So.2d  609,  246  Ala. 
152. 

33.  Ark.— International   Shoe  Co.  v. 
Waggoner,  64  S.W.2d  82,  188  Ark. 
•59— Taylor   r.    O'Kane.    49    S.W.2d 
4'00,  186  Ark.  782. 

34.  Ind.— Shaw  v.  Tatham,   15  Ind. 
377. 

33  C.J.  p  1212  note  68. 
Waiver  of  appraisement  laws: 
By  debtor  see  Executions  §  106  b 

(2) 

In  mortgage  foreclosures  see  the 
Q.J.S.  title  Mortgages  §  722,  also 
42  C.J.  p  188  notes  14-17. 

35.  Ind.— McLane  v.  Elmer,   4  Ind. 
289— Develin  v.  Wood,  2  Ind.  102. 

36.  Iowa.— King  v.  Nelson,  94  N.W. 
1095,  120  Iowa  606. 

33  C.J.  p  1212  note  70. 

Provision,  held  unauthorized 

CaL— Niles  v.  Louis  H.  Rapoport  & 

Sons,    128    P.2d    50,    513    Cal.App.2d 

644. 


§  83 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


same  grounds.87  It  is  not  common  practice  to  in- 
clude words  indicating  that  a  judgment  in  an  action 
at  law  is  without  prejudice,  even  though  it  is  en- 
tered on  a  nonsuit  or  for  some  other  reason  is  not 
conclusive  of  the  merits  of  the  case.88 

The  reservation  of  control  over  equity  decrees  for 
the  purpose  of  enforcement  is  discussed  in  Equity  § 
616. 

§  84.    Surplusage 

Surplusage  In  a  Judgment  does  not  necessarily  ren- 
der It  Invalid. 

Surplusage  in  a  judgment,  whether  it  consists  of 
merely  superfluous  provisions  or  directions,39  or 
of  matters  which  follow  as  the  legal  consequences 
of  the  judgment,  whether  or  not  they  are  incor- 


porated in  it,40  or  of  unauthorized  provisions,41 
does  not  necessarily  invalidate  the  judgment. 

§  85.    Signing  by  Judge  or  Clerk 

Except  where  statute  or  rule  of  court  provides  oth- 
erwise, ordinarily  neither  the  judge  nor  the  clerk  of  the 
court  need  sign  a  judgment. 

While  it  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  need  not 
be  signed  by  the  judge  of  the  court  rendering  the 
judgment,42  and  that  his  failure  to  sign  the  judg- 
ment will  not  invalidate  it,48  it  has  also  been  held, 
sometimes  by  virtue  of  statutory  provisions,  that 
judgments  must  be  signed  by  the  judge,44  provided 
the  judgments  are  final  judgments.45  Although  it 
has  been  held  that  the  failure  of  the  judge  to  sign 
a  judgment  will  render  the  judgment  invalid  or  of 
no  effect,46  some  cases  have  held  that  statutes  re- 


37.  Ind. — Evans  v.  Schafer,  86  Ind. 
135. 

3i3  C.J.  p  1212  note  71. 

Bight  to  sue  for  attorney's  fees 

In  action  for  rent  of  lost  battery, 
recovery  being  rent  and  value  of 
battery,  court  erred  in  not  granting 
plaintiff's  prayer  for  reservation  of 
right  to  sue  for  attorney's  fees. — 
Chambers  v.  Ve^a,  137  So.  879,  18 
La.App.  786. 

38.  Mass. — Amory  v.  Kelley,  £4  N. 
E.2d  507,  309  Mass.  162. 

39.  Miss. — Sternberg    Dredging    Co. 
v.  Screws,  166   So.   754,   175   Miss. 
383— Jackson  v.   Redding,   139   So. 
317,  162  Miss.  £213,  overruling  sug?- 
gestion  of  error  138   So.   295,   162 
Miss.  52(3. 

Pa. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Altoona 
Trust  Co.  v.  Fockler,  165  A.  740, 
*  742,  ,311  QPa.  426. 

33  C.J.  p  1212  note  74. 

Harmless  error  in  judgments  as  sur- 
plusage see  Appeal  and  Error  § 
1794  a. 

Statements  treated  as  surplusage 

Wyo. — Holly  Sugar  Corporation  v. 
Fritzler,  296  P.  206,  42  Wyo.  446. 

40.  Pa. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
Altoona  Trust  Co.  v.  Fodder,  165 
A.  740,  742,  «11  £Pa,  426. 

33  C.J.  p  1212  note  74. 

41.  Cal. — In  re  San  Joaqutn  Light  & 
Power   Corporation,    127    P.2d    29, 
52  Cal.App.2d  814. 

111. — Schaefer  v.  People,   20  IlLApp. 

606. 
Ky.— JParrish  v.  Ferriell,  186  &W.2d 

625,  299  Ky.  676. 
Pa. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Altoona 

Trust  Co.  v.   Fockler,   165  A.  740, 

742,  )311  Fa,  426. 
35  C.J.  p  1212  note  74. 
Reference  to  party  as  "trustee" 

Where  pleadings  and  issues  did 
not  permit  of  reference  to  plaintiff 
as  fiduciary,  word  "trustee"  appear- 
ing after  plaintiff's  name  was  deem- 


ed mere  surplusage. — Greenwood 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Roberts,  44  N.B.2d 
1002,  112  Ind.App.  877. 

42.  Ga, — Corpus     Juris    quoted    in 
Sullivan  v.  Douglas  Gibbons,  Inc., 
2  S.E.2d  89,    90,   187  Ga,  764. 

33  C.J.  p  121-3  note  75. 
Signing  of  decree  in  equity  see  Equi- 
ty §  591. 
Approval  of  court 

Statute  requiring  full  entries  of 
orders  and  proceedings  of  courts  of 
record  to  be  read  in  open  court  con- 
templates that  judgments  entered  do 
not  become  pronouncements  of  court 
until  approved  by  court — Stanton  v. 
Arkansas  Democrat  Co.,  106  S.W.2d 
584,  194  Ark.  Il35. 

43.  U.S. — Hyman  v.  McLendon,  C.C. 
A.S.C.,  140  F.2d  76,  certiorari  de- 
nied   64   S.Ct    1055,   322    U.S.    759, 
88  L.Ed,  1572. 

Cal. — Brown  v.  Superior  Court  erf 
California  in  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  234  flE>  409,  70  CaLApp. 
732. 

Ga. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Sulli- 
van v.  Douglas  Gibbons,  Inc.,  2 
S.E.2d  89,  90,  187  Ga.  764. 

Ind.— Cadwell  v.  Teany,  157  N.E.  51, 
199  Ind.  634,  certiorari  denied  Cad- 
well  v.  Teaney,  48  S.Ct  601,  277 
U.S.  605,  72  LJEd.  1011. 

Neb.— Ex  parte  Niklaus,  18  N.W.2d 
655, 144  Neb.  *503. 

3-3  C.J.  p  1213  note  75. 

44.  Idaho. — Faris       v.       Burroughs 
Adding  Mach.  Co.,    282    P.   72,   48 
Idaho  310. 

Ky.— Clark  v.  Mason,  95  S,W.2d  292, 

264  Ky.  683. 
La,— Isom  v.  Stevens,  App.,  148  So. 

270. 

S3  C.J.  p  1213  note  76. 
Time  of  signing 

(1)  The  failure  of  party,  in  whose 
favor  court  decides,  to  file  formal 
written  Judgment  wtthjn  five  days 
after  decision,  as  required  by  court 
rule,  does  not  deprive  court  of  Ju- 

206 


risdiction  to  sign  judgment  after 
such  period,  but  merely  requires 
such  party  to  go  back  and  comply 
with  rule. — Cahn  v.  Schmitz,  108  P. 
2d  1006,  56  Ariz.  469.  ' 

(2)  -Statute  providing  for  signing 
of  Judgments  within  three  days  from 
date  of  rendition  held  to  contemplate 
that  Judgments  should  not  become 
effective  until  the  three  days  had 
expired,  or  until  application  for  new 
trial  filed  within  the  three  days 
had  been  denied. — Haas  v.  Buck,  162 
So.  181,  182  La.  566. 

(-3)  While  a  motion  for  new  trial 
is  pending,  Judge  is  without  right 
.to  sign  the  Judgment,  and,  if  he 
does  so,  his  action  is  without  legal 
effect. — Maison  Blanche  Co.  v.  Mef- 
sut,  La.App.,  177  So.  824. 
Sufficiency  of  signature 

(1)  A    Judge    ought    to    sign    his 
name,  and  not  write  his  Initials,  to 
indicate  a  Judgment  of  court— Volpe 
v.  Sensatini,  144  N.B.  104,  249  Mass. 
132. 

(2)  Capital    letter    "S"    held    not 
sufficient  signature  of  Judge  to  Judg- 
ment— Automobile    Sec.    Corporation 
v.  Vecino,  120  So.  427,  10  La.App.  10. 

(3)  Other   illustrations    see   33    C. 
J.  p  1213  note  76  [a], 

Place  of  signature 

Tex.— Bridgman  v.  Moore,  183  S.W. 
2d  705,  14'3  Tex  250. 

45.  La,— Viator  v.  Hetotz,  10  So.2d 
690,  -201  La.  884— River  &  Rails 
Terminals  v.  Louisiana  Ry.  &  Nav. 
Co.,  105  So.  .331,  167  La,  1085— 
State  v.  Johnson,  12  La.  547— Mos- 
sier Acceptance  Co.  v.  Moliere, 
App.,  181  So.  228— Hotard  v.  2>u- 
pont,  1  La* App,  646. 

33  C.J.  p  121i3  note  76  [c]. 

46-    111.— Miller  v.  Miller,  85  N.E.2d 

"I,  376  I1L  628. 
Ky.— Clark  v.  Mason,  95  S.W.2d  292, 

264  Ky.  68«— Shuey  v.  Hoffman,  81 

S.W.2d  727,  2S5  Ky.  490. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


86 


quiring  a  judge's  signature  are  directory  merely, 
and  not  mandatory,  and  that  a  failure  to  comply 
therewith  will  not  render  the  judgment  void.47 

The  absence  of  a  signature  may  be  cured  by  the 
signing  of  the  judgment  at  a  later  date,48  and,  as 
between  the  parties,  subsequent  proceedings  on  such 
judgment  are  valid.49 

Clerk's  signature.  In  absence  of  specific  provi- 
sion therefor,  by  statute  or  rule  of  court,  the  sig- 
nature of  the  clerk  is  not  required.50  It  is  required 
in  some  jurisdictions,  however,  that  judgments  shall 
be  signed  or  attested  by  the  clerk;51  but  the  omis- 
sion of  the  clerk  to  sign  the  judgment  is  a  mere  ir- 
regularity which  may  be  corrected  at  any  time,  and 
does  not  render  the  judgment  void.52 

§  86.    Nonsuit  or  Judgment  on  Merits 

Whether  a  Judgment  should  be  one  of  nonsuit  or  a 
judgment  of  dismissal  without  prejudice  or  whether  the 


Judgments  should  be  one  on  the  merits  depends  In  gen- 
eral on  whether  the  case  has  been  tried  and  submitted 
on  the  merits. 

The  phrase  "judgment  of  nonsuit"  is  frequently 
applied  to  the  disposition  of  a  case  by  nonsuit53 
In  general  such  a  judgment  decides  nothing  with 
respect  to  the  merits  of  the  claim  on  which  action  is 
brought,54  whether  or  not  the  judgment  contains 
a  reservation  of  the  right  again  to  sue  on  the  same 
cause  of  action,55  and  merely  leaves  the  situation 
with  respect  to  the  cause  of  action  involved  as 
though  no  suit  in  that  regard  had  ever  been 
brought.56  Accordingly,  in  general  it  is  not  prop- 
er, on  the  grant  of  a  nonsuit,  to  enter  a  judgment 
on  the  merits.57  So,  where  plaintiff  fails  to  prove 
his  case,  or,  in  other  words,  where  the  court  de- 
cides that  he  has  given  no  evidence  which  would 
warrant  a  verdict  or  finding  in  his  favor,  in  general 
the  proper  judgment  to  be  entered  is  one  of  non- 
suit,58 and  a  judgment  on  the  merits  is  improper 


La. — Succession  of  Meyers,   138   So. 

897,  16  La.App.  675. 
33  C.J.  p  1214  note  77. 
Judgment  confirming1  order 

Judgment,  not  appealed  from,  de- 
ciding that  Question  whether  order 
should  be  set  aside  was  res  judi- 
cata  under  previous  Judgments,  had 
effect  of  confirming  order,  even 
though  judgments  were  not  signed. 
— Succession  of  Harrison,  123  So. 
120,  168  La.  675. 

47.  Ind.— Bailer  v.  Dowd,  40  N.E.2d 
325,  219  Ind.  634. 

33  C.J.  p  1214  note  78. 

48.  Cal.— De  Arman,  v.  Connelly,  25 
P.2d   24,    134   CaLApp.   173. 

Ky. — Cunningham  v.  Grey,  111  S.W. 
2d  579,  271  Ky.  84— Shuey  v.  Hoff- 
man, «31  S.W.2d  727,  235  Ky.  490— 
Union  Gas  &  Oil  Co.  v.  Indian- 
Tex.  Petroleum  Co.,  263  S.W.  1, 
203  Ky.  521. 
Presumption 

It  would  be  assumed  that  record 
was  signed  by  Judge  either  at  same 
term  or  the  next  succeeding  one  as 
contemplated  by  statute.— Concan- 
non  v.  Blackman,  6  N.W.2d  116,  232 
Iowa  722. 
Signing  by  successor 

Action  of  succeeding  Judge  in 
signing  unsigned  judgment  of  dis- 
missal, written  by  predecessor  in  of- 
fice, who  presided  at  case,  was  au- 
thorized.-—Lee  v.  Lee,  11  S.W.2d  956, 
226  Ky.  776. 

49.  Ky. — Cunningham  v.   Grey,    111 
S.W.2d  579,   271  Ky.   84— Shuey  v. 
Hoffman,   51   S.W.2d   727,    235   Ky. 
490. 

50.  Cal.-nClink  v.  Thurston,  47  CaL 
21. 

33  C.J.  p  1214  note  81. 


N.T. 


51.  N.T. — Knapp  v.  Roche, 
366. 

33  C.J.  p  1214  note  79. 
Effect  of  clerk's  signature 

The  signature  of  the  clerk  to  the 
judgment   is    merely   his    certificate 
that  it  was  entered  by  the  court. 
Ga. — Sullivan    v.    Douglas    Gibbons, 

Inc.,  2  S.B.2d  89,   187  Ga.   764. 
Wis.— Egaard    v.    Dahlke,    85    N.W. 

369,  109  Wis.  366. 

52.  '-S.C.— Harclin  v.   Melton,   4    S.E. 
805,   28   S.C.  38,  rehearing  denied 
9  S.E.  423,  28  S.C.  38. 

33  C.J.  p  1214  note  80. 

58.    Mass.— Gill  v.  Stretton.  10  N.E. 

2d  185,  298  Mass.  342. 
Form  and  contents  of  judgment 

(1)  Where    a    nonsuit    is    allowed 
as  a  basis  for  a  writ   of  error,   a 
proper  form  of  entry  of  Judgment  is 
"that    the    plaintiff    being    solemnly 
called    came     not,     whereupon     the 
plaintiff  suffered  a  nonsuit;    and  it 
is  therefore  considered  by  the  Court 
that   the   plaintiff   take   nothing   by 
his  writ  and  that  the  defendant  go 
hence   without   day   and   recover  of 
the    plaintiff   his    costs." — Spiker   v. 
Hester,  135  So.  502,  101  Fla.  288. 

(2)  Order  reciting  in  court's  min- 
utes style  and  number  of  ease  fol- 
lowed with  term  "nonsuit"  has  been 
regarded    as    a    valid    judgment    of 
nonsuit — Keith  v.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R. 
Co.,  145  So.  227,  164  Miss.  566. 

(3)  Judgment  of  nonsuit  need  not 
adjudge    costs,    in   view   of   statute 
providing  that,   in  case   of  nonsuit, 
defendant  shall -recover  costs. — Keith 
v.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.,  supra. 

54.    La. — McCook   v.    Comegys,    125 

So.  134,  169  La.  312. 
Mont. — Roecher  v.   Commercial  Nat. 

Bank,  289  IP.  388,  87  Mont  570— 

207 


McKeon  v.  Kilduff,  281  P.  345,  85 
Mont  562. 

55.  La. — McCook    v.    Comegys,    125 
So.  134,  169  La.  312. 

Judgment  with  reservation  proper 

Judgment  of  nonsuit  in  an  ac- 
tion for  contract  price  of  certain 
article,  with  reservation  of  right  to 
sue  on  Quantum  meruit,  was  not 
error. — McCook  v.  Comegys,  supra. 

56.  La. — McCook  v.  Comegys,  supra. 

57.  Mont. — Roecher   v.    Commercial 
Nat   Bank,    289   P.   388,   87   Mont 
570— McKeon  v.  Kilduff,  281  P.  346, 
85  Mont.  562. 

Accord  and  satisfaction 

Where  complaint  alleged  an  oral 
contract  and  plaintiff  testified  that 
a  settlement  was  arrived  at,  by 
terms  of  which  plaintiff  was  to  re- 
ceive a  certain  sum,  which  was 
shortly  thereafter  paid,  and  plain- 
tiff's attorney  testified  to  an  agree- 
ment which  amounted  to  an  accord 
and  satisfaction,  a  nonsuit  was 
granted  on  the  merits  rather  than 
without  prejudice.— Will  v.  Will  & 
Baumer  Candle  Co.,  46  N.Y.S,2d  532. 

58.  La. — Anchor  Post  Fence  Co.  v. 
Watson,  154  So.  50,  179  La.  439— 
Bank   of   Bienville    v.    Fidelity   & 
Deposit  Co.   of  Maryland,   1'35   So. 
26,    172   La,    687— Maddox  v.  Rob- 
bert,    115    So.    905,    165    La,    694— 
Bayard    v.    Baldwin    Lumber    Co., 
103  So.  290,  157  La.  994— State  v. 
Bell,    96    So.    669,    153    La.    823— 
Young  v.  Thompson,  App.,  189  So. 
487 — Andrews  v.  Foster,  App.,  169 
So.  103,  amended  on  other  grounds 
170  So.  563— Elmwood  Land  Devel- 
opment Co.  v.  Verret  Lands,  App., 
159    So.    606— Brooks-Mays   &   Co. 
v.    Alfred,    140    So.    166,    19    La. 
App.    549— Kruebbe    Co.    v.    Kidd- 
Russ  Realty  Co.,    133   So.   462,   16 


86 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


where  there  has  been  no  real  consideration  and  de- 
termination, on  the  merits,  of  the  issues  involved.69 
However,  a  judgment  of  .nonsuit  is  not  the  proper 
judgment  and  there  should  be  a  final  judgment  for 
defendant  when  defendant  successfully  controverts 
plaintiffs  evidence,  or  proves  that  no  such  facts 
exist  as  are  alleged  by  plaintiff,60  or  where  plain- 
tiffs evidence  establishes  that  he  has  no  right  of 
action  against  defendant.61 

In  code  practice,  a  judgment  for  defendant  fre- 
quently takes  the  form  of  a  dismissal  of  the  action.62 
While  the  view  has  been  taken  that  a  judgment  is 
contradictory  in  terms  where  it  purports  to  deter- 
mine the  merits  and  also  to  dismiss  the  cause,68 


a  judgment  of  dismissal  expressly  providing  that 
the  dismissal  is  on  the  merits  usually  is  treated  as  a 
judgment  on  the  merits,  where  the  case  was  actu- 
ally submitted  and  tried  on  the  merits.64  In  gen- 
eral, a  judgment  of  dismissal  without  prejudice  is 
improper  where  the  cause  has  been  tried  and  sub- 
mitted on  the  merits.66  A  dismissal  based  on  find- 
ings of  fact,  made  contrary  to  plaintiff's  allegations, 
is  a  judgment  on  the  merits.66  So  a  judgment  for 
defendant  on  a  directed  verdict  may  properly  be 
a  judgment  on  the  merits.67  Under  various  other 
circumstances,  the  propriety  of  a  judgment  of  dis- 
missal with  prejudice  has  been  recognized.68 

Where  there  is  a  dismissal  which  is  not  based 


La.App.  121— Sarrett  v.  Globe  In- 
demnity Co.,  8  La.App.  824— Lou- 
isiana Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Lawrence, 
1  La.App.  440. 

N.T. — Jules   Maes   &   Co.    v.   W.   R. 
Grace  &  Co.,  147  N.E.  177,  239  N. 
T.  519 — Watkins  v.  Pacific  Finance 
Corporation,     20    N.Y.S.     599.    259 
App.Div.  685— Wagner  Trading  Co. 
V.  Radillo,  198  N.Y.S.  13,  205  APP- 
Div.  833— Leach  v.  Sibley,  Lindsay 
&  Curr  Co.,  15  N.Y-S.2d  287. 
33  C.J.  p  1214  note  82. 
Directed  verdict  improper 

Judgment  of  nonsuit,  instead  of 
directed  verdict  for  defendant, 
should  be  entered,  where  plaintiff 
fails  to  make  out  prima  facie  case. 
— Ross  v.  Durrence,  160  S.E.  •370, 
IT'S  Ga.  457— McCaskey  Cash  Regis- 
ter Co.  v.  Bank  of  Villa  Rica,  199  S. 
E.  828,  58  Ga.App.  676. 

59.  Tex. — Spann  Bros.  Anto  Supply 
Co.  v.  Miles,  Civ.App.,  135  S.W.2d 
1016. 

60.  La. — Robinson     v.    Washington 
Fidelity   Nat.    Life   Ins.    Co.,    134 
So.  115,  16  La.App.  280. 

Mo.-^St  Louis  Law  Printing  Co.  v. 

Aufderheide,    45    S.W.2d    54*,    226 

MO.APP.  680. 
Or.— Wolke   v.  Schmidt,   228  IP.  921, 

112  Or.  99. 
Wash.— Williams  v.   Pease,   4*  P.2d 

22,  181  Wash.  388. 
33  C.J.  p  1215  note  83. 
Failure  to  amend  pleading" 

Judgment  rejecting  plaintiffs  de- 
mands was  proper,  where  court 
found  that  accident  to  plaintiff  could 
not  have  occurred  as  alleged  and 
plaintiff  had  failed  to  change  her 
position  when  opportunity  was  given 
to  amend.— Phillips  v.  Shreveport 
Rys.  Co.,  La.App.,  163  So.  845. 
Reconventional  demand 

(1)  Where  the  issue  with  respect 
to  a  reconventional  demand  by  de- 
fendant was  fully  litigated  at  the 
trial  and  evidence  was  adduced 
thereon  by  both  parties,  trial  court 
should  have  made  a  definite  decision 
disposing  of  the  reconventional  de- 
mand, instead  of  rendering  judgment 


of    nonsuit. — Cardino    v.    Scroggins, 
La-App.,  185  So.  109. 

(2)  A  judgment  of  dismissal  of 
plaintiffs  action  making  no  mention 
of  reconventional  demand  of  defend- 
ant for  damage  to  truck  was  equiv- 
alent to  dismissal  of  such  demand. — 
Henderson  v.  Marmande,  La.App., 
177  So.  827. 

61.  La. — Lewis  v.  Young  Friends  of 
Hope  Benev.  Ass'n,  App.,  151  So. 
109. 

N.Y.— Scheuer  v.  Martin,  298  N.Y.S. 
558,  250  App.Div.  46— Tanner  v. 
Tennenbaum,  256  N.Y.S.  562,  2i35 
App.Div.  173— Hulse  v.  West,  203 
N.Y.S.  799,  122  Misc.  719,  affirmed 
207  N.Y.S.  854,  211  App.Div.  853— 
iLeach  v.  Sibley,  Lindsay  &  Curr 
Co..  15  N.Y.S.2d  287. 
After  election 

Where  plaintiff,  on  being  required 
at  trial  to  elect  between  inconsistent 
causes  of  actions  and  remedies,  was 
free  to  elect  either  to  rescind  con- 
tract or  to  sue  for  breach  and  elect- 
ed to  sue  for  rescission,  judgment 
correctly  dismissing  complaint  im- 
properly contained  provision  that 
judgment  was  without  prejudice  to 
right  to  commence  action  for  breach 
of  contract,  where  plaintiff  at  time 
of  election  had  knowledge  of  all 
facts  with  respect  to  defendants' 
conduct. — Scheuer  v.  Martin,  29i3  N. 
Y.S.  558,  250  App.Div.  46. 

62.  Ind. — Casto  v.  Eigeman,  70  N.B. 
807,  162  Ind.  606. 

33  C.J.  p  1215  notes  84,  85. 
Necessity   for   order   of  nonsuit   or 

dismissal 

Judgment  of  dismissal  can  be  en- 
tered only  on  order  of  nonsuit  or 
dismissal. — State  v.  District  Court 
of  Fifteenth  Judicial  Disk  in  and 
for  Musselshell  County,  300  P.  235, 
89  Mont.  531,  82  A.L.R.  1158. 

63.  Tex. — City  of  Abilene  v.  Fryar, 
Civ.App.,  143  S.W.2d  654. 

64.  Idaho.— Bentley  v.  gasiska*  288 
P.  897,  49  Idaho  416. 

208 


Dismissal   "with  prejudice" 

Or. — Roles  v.  Roles   Shingle  Co.,  81 

P.2d«180,  147  Or.  365. 
Recital  improperly  stricken 

Where  the  cause  was  actually  de- 
cided on  the  merits,  it  was  improp- 
er to  strike  from  a  judgment  re- 
citing that  the  action  "is  hereby 
dismissed  on  the  merits"  the  words 
"on  the  merits." — McElroy  v.  Board 
of  Education  of  City  of  Minneapo- 
lis, S3 8  N.W.  681,  184  Minn.  $57. 

65.  Cal.— Milo  v.  IPrior,  292  P.   647, 
210  CaL   569^SIack  v.   Metropoli- 
tan Trust  Co.  of  California,  48  P. 
2d  755,  9  Cal.App.2d  87. 

W.Va.— Parsons    v.    Riley,    10    S.B. 

806,  S«3  W.Va.  464. 
Effect  of  phrase  "without  prejudice" 

"Without  prejudice"  provision  in 
judgment  in  action  tried  and  sub- 
mitted on  merits  was  not  severa-ble 
from  entire  judgment  and  qualified 
every  part  thereof. — Milo  v.  Prior, 
292  P.  647,  210  CaL  569. 

66.  N.Y.— Oakes   Mfg.    Co.    v.    New 
York,  99  N.B.  540,  206  N.Y.  226. 

33  C.J.  p  1215  note  85. 

67.  Ga. — Morris   v.    Georgia    Power 
Co.,  15  S.E.2d  750,  65  Ga.App.  180. 

93  C.J.  p  1215  note  86. 

6&    Plea  of  res  judicata 

(1)  Where  defendant's  plea  of  res 
judicata  lies,  a  judgment  of  dismis- 
sal  with   prejudice   is   proper. — Sco- 
fleld  v.  Ssofield,  3  OP.2d  794,  89  Colo. 
409. 

(2)  The  view  has  been  taken  that 
where   plaintiff   sought  recovery   on 
two  contracts,   one  written  and  the 
other  oral,  and  a  plea  of  res  judicata 
was   properly    sustained   as   to    the 
written  contract  only,  and  it  appear- 
ed  that,   with    respect   to    the    oral 
contract,    the   amount   claimed    was 
below   the   jurisdiction  of  the  trial 
court,    the    judgment    should    have 
been   a   judgment   of   dismissal   for 
want    of    jurisdictions,    but   that    a 
Judgment  that  plaintiff  take  nothing  ^ 
by  his   suit  had  the  same  effect. —  * 
Baronian  v.  -Sealy  Oil  Mill  &  Mfg. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§87 


on  the  merits,  a  judgment  on  the  merits  is  not  prop- 
er,^ as,  for  example,  where  there  is  a  dismissal 
without  any  evidence  having  been  offered  and  with- 
out  the  submission  of  any  issues  for  determina- 
tion.™ Where  a  judgment  of  dismissal  is  granted 
merely  for  failure  of  plaintiffs  evidence,  in  gen- 
eral it  is  not  a  judgment  on  the  merits.?*  It  has 
been  held,  however,  that  a  judgment  of  dismissal 
with  prejudice,  instead  of  a  judgment  of  nonsuit, 
may  be  proper  where  plaintiff  has  introduced  all 


evidence  that  it  is  possible  for  him  to  offer,™  and 
that  it  is  permissible  to  render  a  judgment  for  de- 
fendant, on  deciding  the  cause  on  the  merits,  not- 
withstanding defendant's  motion  for  nonsuit  made 
at  the  close  of  plaintiffs  evidence  has  been  denied 
and  defendant  has  offered  no  evidence.73  On  dis- 
missal of  the  action  for  failure  of  plaintiffs  plead- 
ing to  state  a  cause  of  action,  it  ordinarily  is  not 
proper  to  grant  an  affirmative  judgment  on  the 
merits  in  favor  of  defendant7* 


IV.  ABBEST  OF  JUDGMENT 


§  87.    Nature  of  Remedy 

Arrest  of  Judgment  is  the  staying  of,  or  refusal  to 
render,  a  Judgment  after  verdict,  for  an  Intrinsic  mat- 
ter  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  record,  which  would 
render  the  Judgment,  if  given,  erroneous  or  reversible. 

Arrest  of  judgment  is  the  act  of  staying  a  judg- 
ment, or  refusing  to  render  judgment,  in  actions 


at  law  after  verdict,  for  some  matter  intrinsic,  ap- 
pearing on  the  face  of  the  record,  which  would  ren- 
der the  judgment,  if  given,  erroneous  or  reversi- 
ble.75 Usually  the  purpose  of  a  motion  in  arrest  of 
judgment  is  to  prevent  the  entry  of  judgment  on 
the  verdict  because  of  some  defect  in  the  record 
proper.?6  The  power  to  arrest  judgment  is  inherent 


Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  9  S,W.2d  292,  er- 
ror dismissed. 
Failure  to  remedy  defective  pleading 
Judgment  of  dismissal  with  prej- 
udice was  proper,  where  pleadings  i«n 
second  action  contained  same  de- 
fects which,  in  prior  action,  supreme 
court  had  pointed  out  but  which 
plaintiff  did  not  remedy. — Burson  v. 
Adamson,  25  P.2d  723,  93  Colo.  801. 

69.  N.Y. — Gaffey  v.  Newfield,  148  N. 
Y.S.  772,  163  App.Div.  66— Kilmer 
Park  Const.  Co.  v.  Lehrer,  270  N. 
Y.S.  156,  150  Misc.  673. 

33  C.J.  p  1215  note  87  [a]. 

Dismissal   for   failure   to   prosecute 

suit 
Tex.— Zachary  v.  Overton,   Civ.App., 

157    S.W.2d    405,    error    refused— 

Burton-Lingo  Co.  v.  Lay,  Civ.App., 

142  S.W.2d  448. 

70.  Cat— Campanella  v.  Campanella, 
269  P.  4i3i3,  204  Cal.  515. 

N.Y.— Freedman  v.  Sirota,  96  N.Y.S. 
812,  109  App.Div.  874— Kruger  v. 
Persons,  64  N.Y.S.  841,  52  App.Div. 
50. 

Counterclaim 

N.Y.— Roach  v.   Lorence,   150  N.Y.S. 

151,  164  App.Div.  733. 
33  C.J.  p  1215  note  87  [a]  (2). 


71.    N.D.— Williams  v.  City  of 

go,  247  N.W.  46,  $3  N.D.  182. 
Tex. — Reeves     v.     Bomar, 

157  S.W.  275. 
33  C.J.  p  1215  notes  87,  88. 
Dismissal    with    prejudice    improper 
Wash.— OLlnton     v.     State,     52    P.2d 

1237,  185  Wash.  97. 
In  equity 

(1)  If  a  bill  in  equity  is  not  dis- 
missed on  the  merits,  the  decree  of 
dismissal  should  contain  the  words 
"without  prejudice,**  in  order  to 
reserve  to  complainant  the  privilege  1 
49  C.  J.S.-14 


to  assert  his  right  In  a  subsequent 

suit. 

U.S.— Franz  v.  Buder,  C.C.A.MO.,  11 

P.2d  854,   certiorari   denied  Buder 

v.  Franz,  47  S.Ct  459,  275  U.S.  756, 

71  L.Ed.  876. 
Fla.— Bishpam  v.  Mayo,  151  So.  45, 

112  Fla.  115. 
Md,— Bailey  v.  Bailey,  30  A.2d  249, 

181  Md.  '385. 
Tex.— Texas     Employers'     Ass'n     v. 

Cashion,  Civ.App.,  130  S.W.2d  1112, 

error  refused. 
83  C.J.  p  1215  note  87  [b3. 

(2)  If  the  cause  has  not  been 
heard  on  the  merits  and  the  bill 
is  dismissed  under  a  rule  for  further 
proceedings,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
state  expressly  in  the  decree  that 
it  is  without  prejudice  to  the  rights 
of  complainant.— Bailey  v.  Bailey,  30 
A.2d  249,  181  Md.  «85. 

72.  Wash.— Caldwell     v.     Williams, 
60  -P.2d  28,  187  Wash.  501, 

Dismissal    without    requiring-   proof 

"by  defendant 

Court,  having  determined  that 
plaintiff  failed  to  make  case,  proper- 
ly entered  judgment  of  dismissal 
instead  of  putting  defendant  to 
proof.—'White-Dulany  Co.  v.  Craig- 
mont  State  Bank,  279  P.  621,  48 
Idaho  100. 

73.  Bea«on  for  vole 

In  upholding  judgment  for  defend- 
ant where  plaintiff  made  the  claim 
that  he  was  entitled  to  judgment  in 
view  of  defendant's  failure  to  offer 
evidence  after  the  motion  for  mon- 
suit  was  overruled,  the  court  pointed 
out  that,  in  ruling  on  a  motion  for 
nonsuit,  all  testimony  introduced  by 
plaintiff  must  be  taken  as  true, 
whereas  in  deciding  the  case  on  the  j 
merits,  -no  such  rule  prevails, — Price  ' 

209 


v.  Mason-«McDuffle  Co.,  122  P.2d  971, 
50  Cal.App.2d  320. 

74.  Mont. — Teters  v,  Montana  East- 
ern Pipe  Line  Co.,  159  P.2d  515. 

33  C.J.  p  1144  note  72. 
Where  contract  construed 

Where  complaint  set  out  contract 
relied  on  by  plaintiff  in  h«c  verba, 
court  was  obliged  to  construe  it  in 
measuring  sufficiency  of  complaint 
and  having  found  that  complaint 
stated  no  cause  of  action  because 
contract  was  not  open  to  construc- 
tion contended  for  by  plaintiff,  prop- 
erly entered  judgment  for  defend- 
ants on  merits,  instead  of  order  dis- 
missing action. — Teters  v.  Montana 
Eastern  Pipe  Line  Co.,  supra. 

75.  Ind. — Smith    v.    Dodds,    35    Ind. 
452. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Speer 
v.  -Pierce,  77  S.W.2d  77,  78,  18 
Tenn.App.  351. 

34  C.J.  p  31  note  2. 

Other  definitions 

Ind. — Smith  v.  Dodds,  35  Ind.  452* 
459. 

Xn  nature  of  general  demurrer 

"At  common  law,  a  motion  in  ar- 
rest of  judgment  was  In  the  nature 
of  a  belated  general  demurrer  based 
upon  unamendable  defects  appear- 
ing upon  the  face  of  the  pleadings.'* 
— Grogan  v.  Deraney,  143  S.E.  912* 
918,  38  Ga.App.  287. 

*.  Ga. — Underwood  v.  D.  C.  Heath 
&  Co.,  12  S.R2d  464,  &4  Ga,App. 
180 — Turner  v.  fihackleford,  158 
•S.E,  439,  43  Ga.App.  271 — Grogan 
v.  Deraney,  143  S.B.  912,  38  Ga* 
App.  287. 

Md. — Phoebus  v.  Sterling1,  198  A.  71 T* 
174  Md.  394. 

Mo.— Stephens  v.  D.  M.  Oberman- 
Mfg.  Co.,  70  S.W.2d  899,  334  Mo, 
1078 — Porter  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 


1  87 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


in  courts  of  general  common-law  jurisdiction,77  but 
in  some  jurisdictions  the  remedy  by  arrest  of  judg- 
ment no  longer  prevails  in  civil  cases,78  and  the 
use  of  this  remedy  is  sometimes  regulated  or  re- 
stricted by  statute  or  rules  of  court™ 

Other  motions  or  remedies  compared  and  distin- 
guished. A  motion  for  a  new  trial  differs  from  a 
motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  in  that  the  motion  for 
a  new  trial  is  based  on  the  facts  and  the  rulings  of 
the  court,  while  the  motion  in  arrest  is  based  on  the 
record,80  and  such  motions  are  also  distinguishable 
with  respect  to  the  purpose  of  each.81  A  motion 
for  a  venire  de  novo  has  been  compared  with,  and 
distinguished  from,  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judg- 
ment,82 from  a  motion  to  set  aside  a  judgment,83 


and  also  from  an  independent  proceeding  to  annul  a 
judgment  for  fraud.84  A  motion  in  arrest  does  not 
have  the  effect  of  a  demurrer  to  the  evidence.85 
A  motion  for  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  has 
been  distinguished  from  a  motion  in  arrest,  as  dis- 
cussed supra  §  59. 

§  88.    Grounds  of  Arrest 

In  general,  a  judgment  may  be  arrested  only  for  er- 
rors and  defects  which  are  apparent  on  the  face  of  the 
record  and  which  are  of  a  substantial  nature. 

As  a  general  rule,  judgment  can  be  arrested  only 
for  errors  or  defects  which  are  apparent  on  the  face 
of  the  record86  or  because  of  some  matter  which 
properly  should  appear  of  record  but  does  not.87 


R.  Co.,  28  S.W.2d  10i35,  '325  Mo.  '381 
—  Stevens  v.  D.  M.  Oberman  Mfg. 
Co.,  79  S.W.2d  516,  229  Mo.App 
627. 

77.  Ind.—  Pillsbury  Flour  Mills  Co 
v.  Walsh,  110  N.E.  96,  60  todjApp, 
76. 

54  O.J.  p  <31  note  $. 

78.  Ark.  —  Collier  v.  Newport  Water, 
Light  &  Power  Co.,  139  S.W.  635, 
100    Ark.    47,    Ann.Cas.l913D    458. 

34  C.J.  p  31  note  4. 

79.  Ga.  —  Grogan    v.     Deraney,     1-43 
S.E.  912,  .38  Ga.App.  287. 

Determination    as    to    character    of 

motion 

Where  the  statute  which  provides 
for  motion  in  arrest  does  not  define 
its  function,  the  common  law  must 
be  looked  to  for  the  purpose  of 
.determining  the  character  of  the 
motion.  —  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Senter 
Commission  Go.,  102  S.W.2d  103,  840 
Mo.  633. 

80.  Ga.  —  Underwood  v.  D.  C.  Heath 
&  Co.,    12   -S.E.2d  464,    64   Ga.App. 
180  —  Turner    v.    Schatskleford,    158 
S.E.  439,   4*3   Ga.App.   271—  Maddoac 
Coffee  Co.  v.  McHan,  95   S.E.  736, 
22  Ga.App.  198  —  Garfleld  Oil  Mills 
Co.  v.  Stephens,  85  S.E.  983,  16  Ga, 
App.  655. 

111.—  Wallace  v.  Curtice,  36  HI.  156. 
34   C.J.  p  51  note  2    [a]  —  46  C.J.  p 
65  note  5. 

81.  Ga.  —  Underwood  v.  D.  C.  Heath 
&  Co.,    12   S.E.2d  464,    64   Ga.App. 
180  —  Turner    v.    Schackleford,    158 
S.E.  439,  4J3  GajVpp.  271. 


82.  Ind.  —  Phillips    v.    Gammon,    124 
N.E.  699,  188  Ind,  497. 

64  C.J.  p  1102  note  71. 

Venire   de  novo   in  general   see  the 

C.J.S.  title  Trial  §  519,  also  64  C.J. 

p  1103  notes  64-88. 

83.  Mo,—  Gilstrap  v.   Felts,    50   Mo. 
428. 

34  C.J.  p  31  note  2  [a]. 
Motion  treated  as  one  in  arrest 
Mo.  —  Sutton  v.  Anderson,  31   S.W.2d 
1026,  '326  Mo.  304. 


N.J. — Morris  Plan  Industrial  Bank 
of  New  York  v.  Kemeny,  8  A.2d 
769,  12-3  N.J.Law  889. 

Time  for  motion 

(1)  Under  the  terms  of  some  stat- 
utes, a  motion  in  arrest  of  Judgment 
is  distinguishable  from  a  statutory 
motion  to  set  aside  a  judgment  in 
that  the  motion  in  arrest  must  be 
made  during  the  term  at  which  the 
judgment  is  obtained,  while  a  motion 
to   set  aside  may  be  made  at  any 
term   within   the   statute  .  of  limita- 
tions.— Artope     v.     Barker,     74     Ga, 
462 — J.    S.    -Schoffleld's    Sons    Co.    v. 
Vaughan,    150    S.E.    569,    40    Ga.App. 
568 — Grogan    v.    Deraney,    143    S.E. 
912,    58     Ga.App.    287— Garfleld    Oil 
Mills  v.  Stephens,  85  S.E.  98*3,  16  Ga. 
App.  655-^Maddox  Coffee  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Han,  95   S.E.   756,   22   Ga.App.  198. 

(2)  It  has  been  stated  that  a  peti- 
tion   to    set    aside    a    verdict    and 
judgment   based   on   alleged   defects 
appearing  on  the   face   of  the   rec- 
ord was  in  the  mature  of  a  motion 
in    arrest    of    judgment.— Oliver    v. 
Fireman's  Ins.  Co.,  155  S.E.  227,  42 
Ga.App.  99. 

84.  Ga.— Simpson   v.   Bradley,    5    S. 
E.2d    89)3,    189    Ga.    '316,    mandate 
conformed    to     6     S.E.2d    424,    61 
Ga.App.  495,  certiorari  denied  60  S. 
Ct.    1105,    310    U.S.    648,    84    L.Ed. 
1410,  rehearing  denied  61  S.Ct  56, 
511  U.S.   725,   85   LJSd.  472. 

85.  Mo. — Span   v.    Jackson,    Walker 
Coal  &  Mining  Co.,  16  S.W.2d  190, 
322  Mo.  158. 

86.  B.C.— Walls  V,  Guy,  4  F.2d  444, 
55  APP.D.C.  251. 

Fla. — 'Peavy-Wilson  Lumber  Co. '  v. 
Baker,  4  So.2d  333,  148  Fla.  296 
—Adams  v.  Elliott,  174  So.  '731, 
128  Fla.  79— Hull  v.  Lame,  173 
So.  701,  127  Pla.  433 — Harrington 
v.  Bowman.  136  So.  229,  102  Fla. 
339,  modified  on  other  grounds  143 
So.  651,  106  Fla,  86. 

111.— Smithers  v.  Henriquez,  15  N.E. 
2d  499,  «68  111.  58$— Welch  v.  City  i 

210 


of  Chicago,   154  N.E.   226,  323  HI. 
498. 

Mass. — Vallavanti  v.  Armour  &  Co., 
162  N.E.  689,  264  Mass.  337— 
Pizer  v.  Hunt,  148  N.E.  801,  253 
Mass.  321, 

Mo. — Span  v.  Jackson,  Walker  Coal 
&  Mining  Co.,  16  S.W.2d  190,  322 
Mo.  158— Meffert  v.  Lawson,  287 
S.W.  610,  315  Mo.  1091— Burman  v. 
Vezeau,  85  S.W.2d  217,  2i31  Mo. 
App.  1109. 

N.J. — Van  Denmrk  v.  Sartorius,  7  A. 
2d  168,  122  N.J.Law  503— Paradise 
v.  Great  Eastern  Stages,  176  A. 
711,  114  N.J.Law  365. 
Tenn. — Scott  v.  National  Life  &  Ac- 
cident Ins.  Co.,  64  S.W.2d  53,  16 
Tenn. App.  SI — Earheart  v.  Hazle- 
wood  Bros.,  15  Tenn.App.  454 — 
Highland  Coal  &  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Cravens,  8  Tenn.App.  419 — South- 
ern Ry.  Co.  v.  Bruback,  6  Tenn. 
App.  493 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Mosley  v.  Robert  Orr  &  Co.,  6 
Tenn.App.  24'3,  245 — Wood  v.  Im- 
perial Motor  Co.,  5  Tenn.App.  246 
— Elbinger  Shoe  Co.  v.  Thomas,  1 
Tenn.App.  161. 
Vt.— Raithel  v.  Hall,  124  A.  586,  97 

Vt.  469. 
34  C.J.  p  31  note  7. 

Motion  in  arrest  is  a  proper  meth- 
od for  attacking  errors  appearing  on 
the  face  of  the  record  proper. — La 
Rue  v.  Bloch,  255  S.W.  321,  215  Mo. 
App.  501. 
Xa  Connecticut 

(1)  Strictly   speaking,    motions    in 
arrest  of  judgment  are  for  matters 
appearing  on  the  record. — Pickens  v. 
Miller,   177  A.   573,   119  Conn.   553— 
Greco  v.  Keenan,  161  A.  100,  115  Conn. 
704—34  C.J.  p  31  note  7  [c]  (1). 

(2)  It  has  been  stated  that  a  mo- 
tion, called  a  motion  in  arrest,  lies 
to  set  aside  the  verdict  for  matters 
dehors     the     record. — Hamilton     v. 
Pease,   38   Conn.   115—34   C.J.   p   31 
note  7  [c]. 

87.    111. — Cella  v.   Chicago   &  W.   I. 

R.  Co.,  75  N.B.  373,  217  111.  326. 
34  C.J.  p  31  note  8. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


90 


A  judgment  after  verdict  can  be  arrested  only  for 
substantial  faults^  and,  where  substantial  justice 
has  been  done,,  and  the  reasons  urged  are  purely 
technical,  a  motion  in  arrest  will  not  be  granted.89 
It  is  a  general  rule  that  judgment  will  not  be  ar- 
rested for  mere  matters  of  form,90  clerical  errors,91 
or  defects  which  are  cured  by  the  verdict  or  by  the 
finding  of  the  court92  or  by  the  admissions  of  the 
adverse  party,93  or  which  have  been  waived  by  go- 
ing to  trial.94  It  has  been  stated  broadly 'that,  as 
a  general  rule,  judgment  cannot  be  arrested  if  it 
appears  on  the  whole  record  for  which  party  judg- 
.  ment  should  be  given.95 

In  some  jurisdictions  the  grounds  for  arrest  of 
judgment  are  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  covered  by 
statute  and  local  rules.96 

§  89.    Jurisdiction  and  Venue 

Want  of  Jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter  Is  ground 
for  arrest  of  Judgment. 

A  judgment  may  be  arrested  where  the  court  had 
no  jurisdiction,97  provided  the  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion is  apparent  on  the  record.98  In  general,  an 


objection  based  on  alleged  want  of  jurisdiction  over 
the  person  of  defendant  is  not  available  on  a  mo- 
tion in  arrest,  where  there  has  been  a  general  ap- 
pearance and  pleading  to  the  merits  by  him.99  A 
wrong  venue  merely  has  been  held  not  ground  for 
arresting  the  judgment,1  but,  in  an  action  against 
several  defendants,  only  one  of  whom  is  a  resident 
of  the  county  in  which  the  action  is  brought,  where 
a  verdict  is  returned  against  the  nonresident  de- 
fendants only,  judgment  against  such  defendants 
may  and  must  be  arrested.2 


§  90. 


Process 


A  fatal  defect  In  the  writ  or  process  may  be  ground 
for  arrest  of  Judgment,  but  a  mere  irregularity,  a  clerical 
mistake,  or  a  defect  which  is  waived  or  cured  by  subse- 
quent action,  has  been  held  not  ground  for  arrest  of 
Judgment. 

A  fatal  defect  in  the  writ  or  process  by  which 
the  suit  is  begun  may  be  taken  advantage  of  by 
motion  in  arrest,3  but  not  a  mere  irregularity  or 
clerical  mistake  in  the  process,*  or  such  a  defect  as 
may  be  waived  by  appearance  and  submitting  to 
trial5  or  such  as  is  cured  by  the  verdict6  or  judg- 
ment.7 Failure  duly  to  serve  defendant  with  proc- 


88.  111.— Pittsburg,   C.   C.   &   St   L. 
R.  .Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  144  HI. 
App.  29-3,  affirmed  89  N.B.  1022,  242 
111.  178,  134  lAjn.S.R.  316,  44  L.R.A., 
K'.S^  858. 

34  C.J.  p  32  note  1«. 

89.  Tenn. — 'Waterhouse  v.  fiterchi,  7 
Tenn.Civ.A.  483. 

90.  Mo.— Stid   v.    Missouri   OPac.   R. 
Co.,  109  S.W.  663,  211  Mo.  411. 

34  C.J.  p  32  note  9. 

91«    111.— Shipherd    v.   Field,    70    X1L 

438. 
34  C.J.  p  52  note  10. 

92.  Ind.— Powell  v.  Bennett,  80  N.B. 
518,  131  Ind.  465. 

34  C.J.  p  '32  note  11. 

93.  Ga.— Mobley  v.  Hansen,  106  S.E. 
'582,  26  Ga.App.  522. 

94.  Mo. — Howell  v.  Sherwood,  147  3. 
W.  810,  242  Mo.  513. 

34  C.J.  p  32  note  Ii3. 

95.  R.L — Cranstoln     Prob.      Ct     Y. 
•Sprague,  3  R.L  205. 

34  C.J.  p  32  note  14. 

96.  Fla. — Harrington     v.     Bowman, 
136  So.  229,  102  Fla.  3<39,  modified 
on  other  grounds  143  So.  651,  106 
Fla.  86. 

Ga. — Stowers  v.  Harris,  22  S.E.2d  405, 
194  Ga.  636— Wofford  v.  Vandiver, 
54    S.E.2d    579,    72    Ga.App.   62S— 
•Smith    v.    Franklin    Printing   Co., 
187  S.E.  904,  54  Ga.App.  904. 
34  C.J.  p  32  note  17. 
Defects  "before  verdict 

(1)  Under  the  terms  of  some  stat- 
utes a  judgment  may  not  'be  arrested 
for  any  defect  in  the  record  that  is 


aided  by  the  verdict  or  amendable  as 

a  matter  of  form. 

Ga.— Auld  v.  Schmelz,  34  S.B.2d  860, 

199  Ga.  633— Wrenn  v.  Allen,  180 

S.E.    104,    180    Ga.    61<3— Smith    v. 

Franklin  Printing  Co.,  187  S.E.  904, 

54  Ga.App.  904. 
Md. — Hajewski  v.  Baltimore  County 

Com'rs,  40  A.2d  316. 

(2)  A  statutory  provision  that  a 
judgment  shall  not  be  arrested  for 
a  cause  existing  before  the  verdict 
or  finding,  unless  such  cause  affects 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  does  not 
prevent  relief  of  surety  on  poor 
debtor's  recognizance  with  respect  to 
amount  for  which  execution  should 
issue  on  a  judgment  entered  on  debt- 
or's default  after  his  discharge  in 
bankruptcy. — Di  Ruscio  v.  Popoli,  169 
N.E.  548,  269  Mass.  482. 

97.    I-nd.— McClure  v.  White,  9  Ind. 

208. 
1  C.J.  p  «6  note  2*3—15  C.J.  p  826 

note  7 — 34  C.J.  p  32  note  19. 
Bight  to  arrest  not  shown 

In  an  action  to  establish  and  con- 
strue a  will  and  to  enjoin  defendants 
from  further  contesting  such  will, 
which  was  an  action  of  equitable  ju- 
risdiction and,  in  effect,  an  action  to 
quiet  title  of  plaintiffs  as  devisees 
and  legatees,  as  well  as  an  action  to 
construe  the  will,  it  was  held  that, 
where  it  was  necessary  to  determine 
heirship  of  certain  parties  in  order 
to  determine  such  parties'  relation  to 
the  action,  and  their  rights  under 
the  will,  defendants  and  contestants 
were  not  entitled  to  have  the  judg- 

211 


ment  arrested  because  of  the  alleged 
want  of  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
to  determine  heirship,  especially 
where  defendants  were  not  harmed 
by  such  determination. — Sager  v. 
Moltz,  139  N.E.  687,  80  Ind.App.  122. 

98.  Mass.— Roberts  v.  Fogg,  138  N. 
E.  3*33,  244  Mass.  310. 

99.  Ga.— Olshine  v.  Bryant,  189  S.E. 
572,  55  Ga.App.  90. 

34  C.J.  p  33  note  21. 

Effect   of   general   appearance   with 

respect  to: 

Jurisdiction  of  the  person  in  gen- 
eral see  Appearances  §  17. 
Validity  of  judgment  see  supra  § 
26. 

1.  Mass.— Gilbert       v.       Nantucket 
Bank,  5  Mass.  97. 

34  C.J.  p  33  note  22. 

2.  Ga.— Warren  v.  Rushing,  87  S.E, 
775,  144  Ga.   612— Pickron  v.  Gar- 
rett,   App.,  35    S.E.2d   540— Turner 
v.  Shackelford,  145  S.E.  913,  39  Ga. 
App.   49— CJhristian   v.   Terry,    138 
S.E.  244,  36  Ga.App.  815. 

3.  Ga.— Neal  v.  Gordon,  *0  Ga.  112 
— Hartridge   v.    McDaniel,    20    Ga 
398. 

4.  Mass. — 'Prescott  v.  Tufts,  7  Mass. 
209. 

34  C. J.  p  33  note  24. 

&    Mass. — Foot  v.  Knowles,  4  Mete. 

386. 

34  C.J.  p  $3  note  25. 
8.    N.C. — Dudley  r,  Carmolt,  5  NXJ. 

$39. 

7.    Ga.— Love    v.    National    Liberty 
Ins.  Co.,  121  S.E.  648,  157  Ga.  259. 


91 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ess  may  furnish  ground  for  a  motion  of  this  kind8 
unless  service  of  process  is  waived.9 


§91. 


Parties 


Motions  in  arrest  of  judgment  based  on  misnomer, 
misjolnder,  or  nonjoinder  of  parties  ordinarily  will  be 
denied. 

Motions  in  arrest  of  judgment  based  on  a  de- 
fect,10 such  as  a  misjoinder,11  misnomer,12  or  non- 
joinder13 of  parties,  ordinarily  will  be  denied. 
Where  misjoinder  of  parties,  however,  is  apparent 
on  the  face  of  the  record,  it  may  be  ground  for 
arresting  the  judgment,14  and  a  like  rule  applies 
where  there  is  a  nonjoinder  of  a  necessary  party.15 
As  a  general  rule  judgment  may  be  arrested  where 
the  record  shows  that  a  joint  owner  or  joint  ob- 
ligee or  obligor  has  not  been  joined,16  but,  under 
some  statutes,  this  may  be  a  defect  curable  by  ver- 
dict so  as  to  warrant  overruling  a  motion  in  ar- 
rest.1? 

Death  of  party.    The  death  of  one  of  several 


plaintiffs  or  defendants  before  judgment,  being  mat- 
ter dehors  the  record,  is  not  properly  matter  to  be 
moved  in  arrest  of  judgment18 

§  92.    —  Pleadings  in  General 

a.  General  considerations 

b.  Misjoinder  of  causes  of  action 

c.  Joinder  of  good  and  bad  counts 

a.  General  Considerations 

Failure  of  plaintiff's  pleading  to  allege  facts  essen- 
tial to  his  cause  of  action  may  be  ground  for  arrest  of 
Judgment. 

Except  where  such  defects  are  amendable,  cured, 
or  waived,  as  discussed  infra  this  section,  if  a  decla- 
ration or  complaint  entirely  omits  the  allegation  of 
facts  essential  to  plaintiffs  right  of  recovery,  or 
plaintiffs  title  or  cause  of  action  appears  from  the 
declaration  itself  to  be  defective  and  bad  in  law, 
so  that  his  pleadings  could  not  support  a  judg- 
ment in  his  favor,. the  judgment  may  be  arrested  on 
motion  of  defendant,19  even  though  the  objection  is 


3.  Mo. — State  v.  Fisher,  130  S.W.  35, 
230  Mo.  -325,  Ann.Cas.1912A.970. 

34  C.J.  p  33  note  27. 

Tailure  to  serve  one  of  several  joint 
defendants 

Fla. — Harrington  v.  Bowman,  143  So. 
651,  106  Fla.  86. 

9.  Ga. — Hendrix  v.  Cawthorn,  71  Ga. 
742. 

Matters  not  constituting  waiver 

It  has  been  held  that  failure  to 
serve  one  of  several  joint  defendants 
is  not  waived  by  the  other  defend- 
ants merely  by  Joining-  issue  or  fail- 
ing to  object  before  filing  motion  in 
arrest. — Harrington  v.  Bowman,  14'3 
So.  651,  106  Fla.  86. 

10.  Tenn. — Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bru- 
beck,  6  Tenn.App.  495. 

33  C.J.  p  S3  note  29, 

11.  D.C.— tF.   H.   Smith  Co.  V.  Low, 
18   F.2d   817,   57  App.D.C.   167. 

Ga. — Love  v.   National   Liberty  Ins. 

Co.,  121  So.  648,  157  Ga.  259. 
Iowa,— Miller  v.  Keokuk  &  D.  M.  R. 

Co.,  16  N.W.  567,  63  Iowa  680. 

34  C.J.  p  33  note  SO. 
Parties  and  causes  of  action 

It  has  been  held  that,  where  there 
Is  -a  misjoinder  both  of  causes  of  ac- 
tion and  of  parties,  the  defect  may 
be  taken  advantage  of  by  motion  in 
arrest,  if  facts  appear  in  the  peti- 
tion.— McPherson  v.  Commercial 
Building  &  Securities  Co.,  218  N.W. 
306,  206  Iowa  562. 

12.  Me.— State  v.  Knowlton,  70  Me. 
200. 

Tex. — Wieser  v.   Thompson   Grocery 

Co.,  Civ.\App.,  8  S,W.2d  1100. 
34  C.J.  p  3(3  note  81. 


13.  Tex. — De  Perez  v.  Everett,  11  S. 
W.  388,  73  Tex,  451. 

1  C.J.  p  127  note  90,  p  129  note  8, 
p  130  note  12 — 30  C.J.  p  1046  note 
92—34  C.J.  p  83  notes  32,  33  [a]. 

14.  Ala.— Poole   v.    Griffith,    ll2    So. 
447,  216  Ala.  120. 

Mass. — Clough  v.  Cromwell,  149  N.E. 

68G,  254  Mass.  132. 
30  C.J.  p  1046  aote  91—34  C.J.  p 

note  '34. 

15.  Mo. — Fenske  v.  Epperly,   282   S. 
W.  81,  222  Mo.App.  38. 

1  C.J.  p  125  note  80,  p  127  note  91, 

p  129  -note  9 — -34  C.J.  p  34  note  35. 
13.    Fla. — Langford  v.  King  Lumber 

&  Manufacturing  Co.,  181  So.  395, 

152  Fla,  143. 
N.  J. — Ordinary  of  State  v.  Bastlan,  5 

A.2d  463,  17  N.J.Misc.  105. 
1  OJ.  p  129  note  10—9  C.J.  p  89  note 

1,  p  92  note  56—44  C.J.  p  (33  note 

•33. 

17.  Ga. — Henderson  v.  Ellarbee,  131 
S.E.  524,  (35  Ga.App.  5. 

18.  Ark.— Crow  v.  State,  23  Ark.  684. 
34  C.J.  p  34  note  3«. 

19.  Ala. — Alabama    Power    Co.     v. 
Curry,  153  So.  634,  228  (Ala.  444. 

Fla. — Dudley  v.  Harrison,  McCready 
&  Co.,  173  So.  820, 127  Flu.  687,  re- 
hearing denied  174  So.  729,  128  Fla. 
338. 

Ga.— Auld  v.  Schmelz,  84  S.B.2d  860, 
199  Ga.  6-3-3 — Stowers  v.  Harris,  22 
S.E.2d  40'5,  194  Ga.  636— Wrenn  v. 
Allen,  180  S.E.  104,  180  Ga.  613— 
Smith  v.  Franklin  Printing  Co., 
187  S.E.  904,  54  Ga.App.  385. 

111. — Scott  v.  Freeport  Motor  Cas. 
Co.  of  Freeport,  58  N.E.2d  618,  324 
Ill.App.  529,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  64  N.E.2d  542,  392  111. 

212 


332 — Waxenberg  v.  J.  J.  Newberry 
Co.,  23  N.E.2d  574,  «02  Ill.App.  128 
— Randall  Dairy  Co.  v.  Pevely 
Dairy  Co.,  274  IlLApp.  474— Laugh- 
lin  v.  North  America  Benefit  Cor- 
poration, 244  I11.APP.  391— Misek 
v.  Village  of  La  Grange,  239  111. 
App.  360 — Harris  v.  Piggly  Wig- 
gly  Stores,  2«36  IlLApp.  892. 
Ind.— Sager  v.  Moltz,  1-39  N.E.  687, 
80  Ind.App.  122— City  of  Lafayette 
v.  West,  87  N.E.  550,  413  Ind.App. 
325. 

Iowa.— Millard  v.  Herges,   236  N.W. 
89,  213  Iowa  279,  modified  on  other 
grounds  2i38  N.W.  604. 
Me.— Milo  v.  Milo  Water  Co.,  152  A. 

616,  129  Me.  46-3. 

Mo.— Span  v.  Jackson,  Walker  Coal 

&  Mining  Co.,  16  S.W.2d  190,   322 

Mo.    158 — Gannaway    v.    Pitcairn, 

App.,  109  S.W.2d  78. 

Tenn.— Curtis   v.    Kyte,    106    S.W.2d 

234,  21  Tenn.App.  115. 
34  C.J.  p  34  note  38—19  C.J.  p  1212 

note  73  [a]. 
Sufficiency  of  defenses  as  ground  for 

motion  see  infra  §  96. 
Joint  liability 

In  suit  on  note  against  defendants 
jointly,  where  pleadings  do  not  show 
joint  liability  on  face,  motion  in  ar- 
rest of  judgment  on  joint  verdict 
should  -be  sustained. — Prosser  v.  Or- 
lando Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  Ill  So.  516, 
93  Fla.  177. 

Action  against  married  woman 

Where  the  liability  of  a  married 
woman  is  not  shown  in  the  plead- 
ings, the  defect  hiay  be  taken  advan- 
tage of  by  motion  to  arrest  Judg- 
ment.— Sheppard  v.  Kindle,  3 
Humphr.,  Tenn.,  80—30  C.J.  p  1046. 
note  89. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  92 


made  for  the  first  time  by  the  motion  in  arrest,20 
and,  under  some  statutes,  motions  in  arrest  are 
predicated  solely  on  defects  in  the  pleading.21 
Judgment  will  not  be  arrested  for  any  defect  in  the 
pleadings  which  would  not  have  been  fatal  on  gen- 
eral demurrer,22  but  not  every  defect  available 
on  demurrer  will  warrant  arresting  the  judgment; 
greater  strictness  is  shown  on  a  motion  of  this 
kind  than  on  a  demurrer,23  the  motion  being  denied 
if  the  issue  joined  is  such  that  the  court  can  pre- 
sume that  the  defects  or  omissions  were  supplied  by 
proof  at  the  trial.24  The  judgment  cannot  be  ar- 
rested because  the  complaint  fails  to  anticipate  and 
negative  defenses.26  The  question  of  the  propriety 
of  allowing  an  amendment  to  be  made  in  the  plead- 
ings cannot  be  raised  on  motion  in  arrest26  Du- 
plicity in  the  pleadings  is  not  ground  for  arrest,27 
and  mere  error  or  irregularity  with  respect  to  fil- 
ing or  serving  pleadings  is  not  ground  for  arrest- 
ing the  judgment.28  Taking  issue  on  an  immaterial 
allegation  is  not  ground  for  arrest  of  judgment.29 


Necessity  and  effect  of  demurrer.  In  some  ju- 
risdictions the  fact  that  defendant  does  not  demur 
to  plaintiffs  pleading  does  not  necessarily  preclude 
a  motion  in  arrest  based  on  defects  in  such  plead- 
ing,30 but  in  other  jurisdictions,  sometimes  by  vir- 
tue of  statutory  provision,  judgment  will  not  be 
arrested  for  any  defect  that  should  have  been  ob- 
jected to  by  demurrer.51  particularly  if  enough  ap- 
pears to  show  for  whom  the  judgment  should  be 
rendered.32  According  to  some  cases,  a  motion  in 
arrest  of  judgment  will  not  be  entertained  after  the 
overruling  of  a  demurrer  to  the  declaration,33  at 
least  where  the  motion  is  based  on  any  exceptions 
which  might  have  been  considered  on  the  demur- 
rer,34 and  a  fortiori  matter  which  was  objected  to 
by  demurrer  and  decided  on  cannot  afterward  be 
urged  in  arrest  of  judgment.35  It  has  been  held 
or  recognized,  however,  that  a  motion  in  arrest 
may  lie,  even  though  the  objection  relied  on  was 
raised  and  decided  on  a  prior  demurrer,36  or,  at 
least,  that  the  motion  may  lie  where  the  defect  on 


20.  Mo.— Mehlstaub  v.  Michael,  287 
S.W.  1079,  221  MO.APP.  807. 

21.  Iowa.— Millard  v.  Herges,  236  N. 
W.   89,   213  Iowa  279,  modified  on 
other  grounds  238  N.W.  604. 

22.  Mo. — Span    v.    Jackson,    Walker 
Coal  &  Mining  Co.,  16  S.W.2d  190, 
322    Mo.  158— Woods   v.   State,   10 
Mo.  43(3. 

yt. — Johnson  v.  Hardware  Mut.  Cas- 
ualty Co.,  1  A.2d  817,  109  Vt.  481 
— Raithel  v.  Hall,  124  A.  586,  $7 
Vt.  469. 

34  C.J.  p  35  note  42. 

23.  U.S.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Word,  111.,  61  -P.  927,  10  C.C.A.  166. 

Oa.— Rollins  v.  Personal  Finance  Co., 

175  S.B.  609,  49  Ga.App.  365. 
m.— Randall    Dairy    Co.    v.    -Pevely 

Dairy  Co.,  274  IlLApp.  474. 
Ind.— City  of  Lafayette  v.  West,  87 

N.E.  650,  45  Ind.App.  325. 
34  C.J.  p  34  note  41,  p  35  notes  4-3, 

44,  45   [a]. 
Liberal  construction  of  pleadings  see 

infra  5  98. 
Reason  for  rule 

Because  of  the  doctrine  of  aider, 
waiver,  and  amendments,  declaration 
which  might  be  bad  as  against  de- 
murrer is  not  necessarily  considered 
bad  on  motion  in  arrest  of  Judgment. 
—Fillet  v.  Brshick,  126  So.  784,  99 
Fla.  483. 

24.  N.H.— Smith  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.. 
35  N.H.  356. 

46  C.J.  p  35  note  44. 

25.  Tenn. — Allen       v.       Word,       6 
Humphr.  284. 

84  C.J.  p  36  note  51. 

.26.    Md.— Le    Strange    v.    State,    58 
Md.  26. 


27.  Mo.— Pickering     v.     Mississippi 
Valley  Nat.  Tel.  Co.,  47  Mo.  457. 

34  C.J.  p  36  note  54. 

28.  Fla.— Ball  v.  Holland,  79  So.  635, 
76  Fla.  268. 

34  C.J.  p  36  note  55. 

29.  Conn.— Robbins   v.    Wolcott,    19 
Conn.  356. 

34  C.J.  p  36  note  56. 

30.  Ga.— • Harbin    v.   Hunt,   105   S.E. 
842,  151  Ga.  60 — Rubenstein  v.  Lee, 
192  S.E.  85,  56  GfiuApp.  49. 

34  C.J.  p  36  note  59  [b]. 

31.  Ind.— Wright  v.  J.  R.  Watkins 
Co.,  159  N.E.  761,  86  Ind.App.  695— 
Ernsting  v.  Stegman,  156  N.E.  520, 
86    Ind.App.    213— Sager   v.   Moltz, 
139    N.E.    687,    80    Ind.App.    122— 
Malone  v.  Kitchen,   137  N.E.   562, 
79  Ind.App.  119. 

34  C.  J.  p  35  note  45. 

Departure 

Where  replication  and  bill  of  par- 
ticulars set  forth  facts  which  were 
in  accordance  with  subsequent  proof, 
but  which  were  at  variance  with 
facts  stated  in  the  complaint,  and 
there  was  no  demurrer,  the  judg- 
ment was  not  subject  to  arrest. — 
Belisomo  v.  Ceresa,  251  P.  531,  80 
Colo.  325. 

32.  Ohio. — Jordan  v.  James,  5  Ohio 
88. 

35  CXJ.  P  55  note  45. 

83.    Colo. — Freas   v.   Engelbreeht,    3 

Colo.  877. 
34  C.J.  p  36  note  57. 

34.  Vt — White  v.  Central  Vermont 
R.  Co.,  89  'A.  618,  87  Vt  330,  af- 
firmed Central  Vermont  R.  Co.  v. 

213 


White,   35   S.Ct   865,  238   U.S.   507, 
59  L.Ed.  1433,  Ann.Cas.l916B  252. 
34  C.J.  p  36  note  57. 

In  Illinois 

(1)  The  rule  stated  in  the  text  has 
been    recognized. — Langan    v.    Enos 
Fire  Escape  Co.,  84  N.E.  267,  233  111. 
308— Reed  v.  Zellers,  273  Ill.App.  18 
— 34  C.J.  p  36  note  57,  p  38  note  70 
[b]. 

(2)  According  to  some  cases,  how- 
ever, the  objection  that  the  declara- 
tion is   so   totally  defective  that  it 
does    not   support   the   Judgment   or 
that  the  declaration  does  not  state  a 
cause  of  action  may  be  availed  of 
by  a  motion  in  arrest,  even  after  a 
demurrer    has    been    overruled    and 
defendant  has   pleaded  over. — Grim- 
mer v.   Friederich,   45  N.E.   49S,   164 
111.  245— Steams  v.  Cope,  109  111.  340 
— Randall  Dairy  Co.  v.  Pevely  Dairy 
Co.,  274  Ill.App.  474. 

In  T^fll'V"*1- 

(1)  The  rule  has  been  recognized 
in  view  of  a  statutory  provision. — 
Hedekin    Land    &    Improvement    Co. 
v.  Campbell,  112  N.E.  97,  184  Ind.  643 
—34  C.J.  p  135  note  45. 

(2)  In  some  earlier  cases,  however, 
the  view  was  taken  that  a  motion  in 
arrest  would  lie  even  though  a  prior 
demurrer  had  been  overruled. — Stew- 
art v.  Terre  Haute  &  L  R.  Co.,  2  N.E. 
208,  103  Ind.  44— Newman  v.  Perrill, 
73  Ind.  153. 

35.  Md.— Davis  v.  Carroll,  18  A.  96S, 
71  Md.  568. 

34  C.J.  p  36  note  58. 

36.  Iowa. — Decatur   v.    Simpson,    88 
N.W.  839,  115  Iowa  348. 

34  CJ.  p  36  note  59. 


92 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


which  it  is  based  was  not  raised  by  the  prior  de- 
murrer.37 

Defects  amendable,  waived,  or  cured.  If  the  de- 
fect in  the  pleadings  is  merely  formal  and  there- 
fore amendable,  or  such  as  may  be  waived  by  going 
to  triaj  without  objection,  or  consists  only  in  a 
faulty  or  inartificial  manner  of  setting  out  a  title 
or  cause  of  action  or  defense  which  appears  to  be 
good  in  law,  it  cannot  be  reached  by  motion  in  ar- 
rest.38 A  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  will  not  be 
granted  because  of  any  failure  or  defect  in  the 
pleadings  which  could  have  been  amended,  the 
amendments  being  considered  as  made  for  the  pur- 


poses of  the  motion,8 9  or  for  any  defect  or  omission 
which  may  be  considered  as  having  been  waived  by 
defendant,40  or  cured  by  the  plea  or  answer41  or  by 
the  verdict  or  finding,42  the  general  rule  with  re- 
gard to  omissions  being  that  although  the  petition 
may  be  defective,  if  it  appears  that  the  verdict  could 
not  have  been  given  or  judgment  rendered  without 
proof  of  the  matter  omitted  to  be  stated,  the  defect 
will  be  cured  or  waived  and  the  judgment  will  not 
be  arrested.43  According  to  some  cases,  however, 
if  a  fact  essential  to  plaintiffs  right  of  action  is  nei- 
ther expressly  stated  nor  necessarily  implied  from 
the  facts  which  are  stated,  a  verdict  will  not  cure 
the  defect,  and  judgment  will  be  arrested,44 


37.  Tenn. — Hydes     Ferry     Turnpike 
Co.  v.  Tates,  67  S.W.  69,  108  Tenn. 
428. 

34  C.J.  p  36  note  59. 

38.  Iowa. — Kirchner    v.    Dorsey    & 
Dorsey,  284  N.W.  171,  226  Iowa  283 
— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pomerantz 
v.  "Pennsylvania-Dixie  Cement  Cor- 
poration,   2-37    'N.W.    443,    444,    212 
Iowa  1007 — Eilers  v.  Frieling,  234 
N.W.    275,    211    Iowa    841— Nelson 
v.  Higgins,  218  N.W.  509,  206  Iowa 
672. 

Mo.— Mehlstaub   v.    Michael,    287    S. 

W.  1079,  221  Mo.App.  807. 
34  C.J.  p  34  note  41. 

Negligence 

(1)  A   petition   containing-  a   gen- 
eral averment  of  negligence  is  good 
as  against  a  motion  In  arrest. 
Ind.— City  of  Lafayette  v.  West  87 

N.E.    550,    43    Ind-App.   ,325. 
Iowa. — Kirchner  v.  Dorsey  &  Dorsey, 
284  N.W.  171,   226  Iowa  28>3. 

(2)  A    general    averment    of   neg- 
ligence In  doing  or  omitting  a  par- 
ticular act,  unless  it  is  too  general 
to  give  defendants  reasonable  notice 
of    negligence    charged,    is    good   as 
against  a  motion  in  arrest  of  Judg- 
ment, since  under  those  allegations 
facts    constituting    negligence    may 
be  shown. — Bates  v.  City  of  McComb, 
179  So.  737,  181  Miss.  336. 

(3)  In  an  action  for  personal  inju- 
ries based  on  alleged  negligence  of 
defendant  a  declaration  which  states 
facts   fairly   raising  a  question  for 
decision  by  a  Jury  on  the  existence 
of  a   duty,   violation   of  that   duty, 
injury   to    plaintiff   because   of  that 
violation,   and  due  care  by  plaintiff 
is  a  sufficient  declaration  as  against 
a  motion   In   arrest   of  Judgment. — 
Paris  v.  Bast  St  Louis  Ry.  Co.,  275 
IlbApp.  241. 

Action  of  ejectment 

Motion  in  arrest  of  Judgment  be- 
cause the  ejectment  against  the  cas- 
ual ejector  was  wrongfully  entitled 
was  overruled  where  the  declaration 
to  which  the  real  defendant  pleaded 
was  properly  entitled. — Huidekoper  I 


v.   Burrus,  Pa.,  12  F.Cas.No.6,849,   1 

Wash.C,C.  257. 

Declaration,    petition,    or    complaint 

sufficient  as  against  motion  in  ar- 

rest 
Ala.  —  Drummonds    v.    Donahoo,    114 

So.  277,  22  Ala.App.  215. 
Del.—  Terry  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 

156  A.  787,  5  W.W.Harr.  1. 
Fla.—  Pillet     v.     Ershick,      126     So. 

784,  99  Fla.  483. 
Ga.  —  Stowers    v.    Harris,    22    S.E.2d 

405,    194    Ga.    6£6—  Rubenstein    v. 

Lee,   192    S.EL    85,    56   Ga.App.    49. 
111.—  Connett    v.    Winget,    30    N.R2d 

1,  374  111.  531,  mandate  conformed 

to  34  N.B.2d  878,  310   Ill.App.   533 

—  Powell    v.    'Myers    Sherman    Co., 

32    N.B.2d    663,    309    IlLApp.    12— 

Cohen  v.  Fineman,   13  N.E.2d  848, 

294  IlLApp.  606—  Paris  v.  East  St. 

Louis  Ry.  Co.,  275  IlLApp.  241. 
Ind.  —  Wright  v:   J.   R.  Watkins  Co., 

159    N.E.    761,    86    Ind.App.    695. 
Ky.—  Phillips   v.    Phillips,    7    B.Mon. 

268. 
Mo.—  Mehlstaub  v.  Michael,  287  S.W. 

1079,  221  Mo.App.  807. 
Vt.—  Ralthel  y.  Hall,  124  A,  586,  97 

Vt.  469. 

39,    Ga.—  Auld    v.    Schmelz,    34    S.E. 

2d    860,    199    Ga.    633  —  Stowers    v. 

Harris,  22  S.E.2d  405,  194  Ga.  636 
'  —  Wrenn    v.    Allen,    180    S.E.    104, 

180   Ga.   6113  —  Pattillo  v.  Mangum, 

177  S.E.  604,  179  Ga.  784—  Smith  v. 

Franklin  -Printing  Co.,  187  S.E.  904, 

54    Ga.App.    385  —  Oliver    v.    Fire- 

man's   Ins.    Co.,    155    S.E.    227,    42 

Ga.App.  99. 
Iowa.  —  Baehr-Shive     Realty    Co.     v. 

Stoner-McCray  System,    268   N.W. 

53,  221  Iowa  1186. 
34  C.J.  p  3'8  note  $9—  -30  C.J.  p  1046 

note  89  [b]. 
Informal  iv*^  y*  fl**n  ^nt 


U.S.—  U.  S.  v.  Trollinger,  C.C.A.Va., 
81  F.2d  167,  certiorari  dismissed 
Trollinger  v.  U.  S.,  57  S.Ct.  757, 
299  U.S.  617,  81  L.Ed.  455. 

Ga.  —  Guthrie  v.  Spence,  191  S.E. 
188,  55  Ga.App.  669  —  Oliver  v. 
Fireman's  Ins.  Co.,  155  S.E.  227, 
42  Ga.App.  99  —  Henderson  v.  Ellar- 
bee,  131  S.E.  524,  <35  Ga.App.  5. 

214 


Damages 

Where  a  general  cause  of  action 
is  set  out  and  not  demurred  to,  the 
Judgment  will  not  be  arrested,  al- 
though the  elements  of  damages  are 
insufficiently  alleged,  since  the  de- 
fect was  amendable. — Stowers  v. 
Harris,  22  S.E.2d  405,  194  Ga.  636— 
Moss  v.  Fortson,  27  S.E.  745,  99  Ga. 
496. 

40.  Ind.— Wright  v.   J.  R.   Watkins 
Co.,  159  N.E.  761,  86  Ind.App.  695. 

Iowa. — Nelson  v.  Higgins,   218  N.W. 

509,  206  dowa  672. 
Mo. — Gannaway  v.  Pitcairn,  App.,  109 

S.W.2d  78. 
Tenn. — Life  &  Casualty  Ins.   Co.   of 

Tennessee    v.    City    of    Nashville, 

137  S.W.2d  287,  175  Tenn.  688. 
34  C.J.  p  38  note  70. 

41.  Ohio. — McFeely    v.    Vantyle,    2 
Ohio  197. 

34  C.J.  p  34  notes  38,  59. 

42.  U.S.— New    York    Underwriters' 
Ins.    Co.    v.    Portwood,    C.C.A.MO., 
50  F.2d  897. 

Ga. — Auld  v.  iSchmelz,  34  S.E.2d  860, 
199  Ga.  633 — Stowers  v.  Harris,  22 
S.E.2d  405,  194  Ga.  636— Wrenn 
v.  Allen,  180  S.E.  104,  1-80  Ga.  613 
— OPattillo  v.  *  Mangum,  177  S.E. 
604,  179  Ga.  784— Rubens tein  v. 
Lee,  192  S.E.  85,  56  Ga.App.  49— 
Smith  v.  Franklin  Printing  Co., 
187  S.E.  904,  54  Ga.App.  385— 
Rollins  v.  Personal  Finance  Co., 
•175  S.E.  -609,  49  Ga^App.  365— 
McBride  v.  Sconyers,  167  SJB3.  809, 
46  Ga.App.  235. 

Me. — Inhabitants  of  Town  of  Milo  v. 
MIlo  Water  Co.,  152  A.  616,  129 
Me.  46.3. 

Tenn.— ^Curtis  v.  Kyte,  106  S.W.2d 
234,  21  Tenn.App.  115. 

24  C.J.  p  830  note  74—34  C.J.  p  38 
note  71. 

43*    Mo. — Gannaway      v.       Pitcairn, 

App.,  109  «.W.2d  78. 
34  C.J.  p  59  note  72. 

44.    Tenn.— Curtis  v.  Kyte,  106  S.W. 

2d    234,    21   Tenn.App.    115. 
34  C.J.  p  39  note  73. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  94 


b.  Misjoinder  of  Causes  of  Action 

Subject  to  various  qualifications  and  limitations,  a 
misjoinder  of  causes  of  action  may  be  ground  for  arrest 
of  judgment. 

Subject  to  statutory  provisions  changing  or  qual- 
ifying the  rule,45  a  misjoinder  of  counts  or  causes 
of  action,  with  damages  assessed  entire,  is  ground 
for  arresting  the  judgment,4^  but  it  is  otherwise 
where  one  of  the  counts  or  causes  so  joined  is 
stricken  out  or  withdrawn  from  the  jury,47  or  where 
the  damages  have  been  separately  assessed  on  the 
several  counts.48  Where  the  verdict  rests  wholly 
on  one  count,  the  judgment  will  not  be  arrested 
for  misjoinder  of  counts.49  Under  some  statutes, 
where  there  are  several  causes  of  action  stated  in 
one  count,  the  objection  must  be  taken  by  demurrer 
or  motion  to  strike,  or  it  will  be  considered  waived 
or  cured  by  verdict  and  cannot  be  raised  by  motion 
in  arrest  of  judgment.50 

c.  Joinder  of  Good  and  Bad  Counts 

Where  a  general  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  Is  taken 
on  several  counts,  judgment  will  not  be  arrested  if  there 
is  a  good  count  to  which  the  verdict  can  be  applied. 

At  common  law,  especially  in  various  earlier 
cases,  it  has  been  held  or  recognized  that,  if  a 
general  verdict  for  plaintiff  is  taken  on  several 
counts  in  plaintiffs  pleading,  and  one  of  the  counts 
is  fatally  defective,  the  judgment  will  be  arrested 
on  motion,  although  other  counts  not  subject  to  ob- 


jection were  covered  by  the  verdict.51  Under  the 
rule  now  quite  generally  prevailing,  however,  ei- 
ther by  virtue  of  statute  or  judicial  decision,  the 
judgment  will  not  be  arrested  if  there  is  one  good 
count  to  which  the  verdict  can  be  applied,  that  is,  a 
motion  in  arrest  will  not  prevail  unless  all  the 
counts  are  so  defective  as  not  to  have  been  cured 
by  the  verdict;52  and  a  like  rule  applies  where  the 
case  is  tried  before  the  court.53 

§  93.    Variance 

As   a  general   rule   a   motion  In   arrest  of  Judgment 
may  not  be  based  on  the  ground  of  an  alleged  variance. 

As  a  general  rule  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment 
may  not  be  based  on  the  ground  of  an  alleged  vari- 
ance,54 either  where  the  variance  is  between  the 
writ  or  prsecipe  and  the  declaration  or  complaint,55 
or  between  the  declaration  or  complaint  and  the 
proof.56  There  apparently  is  authority  for  the  view 
that  the  objection  that  a  judgment  does  not  con- 
form to  the  verdict  should  be  raised  by  a  motion  in 
arrest.57 


§  94. 


Jury 


A  judgment  may  be  arrested  on  the  ground  that  the 
jury  was  illegally  constituted,  but  not,  as  a  general  rule, 
for  objections  with  respect  to  qualification  or  competency 
of  jurors. 

A  judgment  may  be  arrested  where  the  jury  was 
illegally  constituted,58  but  not,  as  a  general  rule, 


45.    111. — Randall  Dairy  Co.  v.  Pev- 

ely  Dairy  Co.,  274  Ill.App.  474. 
34  C.J.  P  36  note  60. 

43.    Del.— Knight  v.  Industrial  Trust 

Co..  193  A.   72*3,   8  W.W.Harr.  480. 

Pa. — Pettit  v.  Sanger,  2  Pearson  84. 

34   C.J.   p   36  note   61,   p  87  note  67 

[a]   (2). 
Misjoinder  both  of  causes  of  action 

and  of  parties 

It  has  been  stated  that  misjoinder 
both  of  causes  of  action  and  par- 
ties may  be  taken  advantage  of  by 
.-motion  in  arrest  if  facts  appear  in 
petition. — McPherson  v.  Commercial 
•Building  &  Securities  Co.,  218  N.W. 
306,  206  Iowa  562. 

-47.    Mass. — Richmond  v.  Whittlesey, 

2  Allen  280. 
34  C.J.  p  137  note  62. 

.48.    Ky.— Louisville  &  (Portland  Ca- 
nal  Co.   v.   Rowan,  4  Dana  606. 
-Vt— Haskell   v.    Bowen,   44   Vt.   579. 

Cure  of  defect 
On  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment 

the  court,  if  holding  that  the  counts 
-were  -not  properly  joined,  might  cure 

the  defect  by  permitting  plaintiff  to 
-remit  damages  on  one  of  the  counts, 

where   special   verdict   rendered   the 
.  damages     separable. — Wilson     Bros. 


Garage  v.  Larrow,  98  A.  902,  90  Vt 
413. 

*9.    Conn.— Sellick  v.  Hall.  47  Conn. 

260. 
Pa.— Wenburg    v.    Homer,    6    Binn. 

307. 

50.  Mo.— Sebek  v.   Wells,    App.,    18 
S.W.2d  518. 

34  CJ.  p  37  -note  65. 

Duplicity  as  ground  for  motion  see 
supra  subdivision  a  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

51.  111. — St    Louis    Cons.    Coal    Co. 
v.  Scheiber,  47  N.E.   1052,   167  HI. 
539. 

34  C.J.  p  37  note  67. 

Husband  and  wife  as  Joint  parties 

Md.— Hemming  v.  Elliott,   7  A.  110, 

66  Md.  197. 
30  C.J.  p  1046  note  90. 

52.  111.— Randall  Dairy  Co.  v.  Pev- 
ely   Dairy   Co.,    274    Ill.App.   474— 
Fickerle  v.  Herman  Seekamp,  Inc., 
274  IlLApp.  310. 

Tenn.— Tallent   v.    Fox,    141    S.W.2d 

485,  24  Tenn.App.  96. 
34  C.J.  p  87  note  68. 
Ho   request  for  separate  verdict 
111. — Smithers   v.    Henriquez,   4   N.B. 

2d  793,  287  ULApp.  95,  affirmed  15 

N.E.2d  499,  368  111.  588. 

215 


In  an  action  of  ejectment  after 
issue  joined  on  the  title  only  and 
a  verdict  for  plaintiff  for  the  land 
on  one  of  the  counts  in  the  declara- 
tion mentioned,  it  was  no  ground  for 
arrest  of  Judgment  that  the  two 
counts  laid  demises  of  the  same  land 
to  different  persons. — Throckmorton 
v.  Cooper,  3  Munf.  9i3,  17  Va,  93. 

53.  Ind.— Lester  v.  Hinkle,  153  N.B. 
179,  90  Ind.App.  193. 

54.  111. — Donley    v.    Dougherty,    97 
IlLApp.  544. 

34  C.J.  p  39  note  81. 

55.  "W.Va. — Swindell   v.   Harper,    41 
S.B.  117,  51  W.Va.  381. 

34  C.J.  p  59  note  82. 

56.  Md. — Montgomery  Bus  Lines  v. 
Diehl,  148  A.  453,  158  Md.  233. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Mosley 
v.  Robert  Orr  &  Co.,  6  Tenn.App. 
243,  245. 

34  C.J.  p  39  note  8(3. 

57.  Mo.— Lee  v.  Wilkins,  79  Mo.App. 
159. 

Ground  for  arrest  not  shown 
Ga. — Atlantic  Coast   Line   R.    Co.   v. 
Morgan,  8  S.E.2d  393,  190  Ga.  98. 

53,    Mo. — Cox  v.  Moss,  53  Mo.  432. 
34  C.J.  p  39  note  85. 


§  94 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


for  objections  to  the  qualification  or  competency  of 
jurors59  or  because  of  the  misconduct  of  a  juror.60 
Where  an  issue  of  fact  is  tried  by  the  court  which 
regularly  should  have  been  tried  by  a  jury,  the  judg- 
ment will  be  arrested  unless  the  record  shows  that 
a  jury  was  waived.61 

In  Connecticut,  where  so-called  motions  in  ar- 
rest may  be  grounded  on  matters  dehors  the  rec- 
ord, as  discussed  supra  §  88,  judgment  may  be  ar- 
rested for  the  misconduct,  disqualification,  or  in- 
competency  of  a  juror,62  provided  the  objecting 
party  was  ignorant  of  the  matter  relied  on  until 
after  verdict,  and  therefore  did  not  waive  it  by 
going  on  with  the  trial  without  objection*63 


§  95. 


Verdict  and  Findings 


A  motion  In  arrest  of  Judgment  Is  a  proper  method 
of  raising  objections  based   on  defects  in  a  verdict  ap- 


pearing on  the  face  of  the  record;  but  such  a  motion 
does  not  reach  defects  or  irregularities  in  the  verdict 
which  are  merely  formal  or  inconsequential. 

In  general  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  is  a 
proper  method  of  raising  objections  based  on  de- 
fects in  a  verdict  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord.64 Such  a  motion  does  not,  however,  reach  a 
merely  formal  or  inconsequential  defect  or  irregu- 
larity in  the  verdict;65  but  it  will  reach  a  verdict 
which  appears  from  the  record  to  be  materially  de- 
fective.66 A  motion  in  arrest  may  be  based  on  the 
ground  that  the  verdict  is  not  responsive  to  the  is- 
sues, or  that  it  differs  in  a  material  respect  from 
the  pleadings  and  the  issues  formed  thereon,67  ex- 
cept where  the  part  of  the  issue  not  found  is  im- 
material or  bad.68  A  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment 
lies  where  the  verdict  is  rendered  on  an  immaterial 
issue,  not  decisive  of  the  merits  of  the  cause,69  or 


Number  of  Jurors 

(.1)  If  the  case  Is  tried  in  a  court 
of  record  -before  a  smaller  number  of 
jurors  than  the  party  is  entitled  to, 
and  his  consent  does  not  expressly 
appear  of  record,  he  may  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  objection  by  motion 
in  arrest. — Ray  v.  Collins,  Mo.App., 
274  S.W.  1098—84  C.J.  p  39  note  85 
[a]  (1). 

(2)  It  was  held,  however,  that  a 
recital  in  the  record  showed  that 
there  was  a  waiver  of  a  full  Jury. 
— Ray  v.  Collins,  supra. 

59.  Vt.— Atkinson  v.    Allen,    12   VL 
619,  (36  Am.D.  861. 

84  C.J.  p  40  note  87. 
Motion  properly  denied 
Fla.— Adams  v.  Elliott,  174  So.   731, 
128  Pla,  79. 

60.  Pa. — Hoar  v.  Flegal,  1  Pennyp. 
208. 

34  C.J.  p  ,40  note  88. 

61.  Mo'.— Dilly  v.   Omaha  ft  8t   I* 
R.  Co.,  55  Mo.App.  1213, 

34  C.J.  p  40  note  92. 

62.  Conn. — GaJligan  y.  City  of  Wa- 
terbury,  122  A.  119,  99  Conn.  164. 

34  C.J.  p  40  note  90. 
Matters    held    insufficient    basis    of 
motion, 

(1)  Motion  in  arrest  was  properly 
overruled,  where  finding:  showed  no 
misconduct    of    Juror    and    claimed 
misconduct  was  too  trivial  for  con- 
sideration,   was    not    occasioned    by 
prevailing-  party,  and  did  not  preju- 
dice appellant. — Wood  v.  Kenney,  182 
A.  451,  104  Conn.  738. 

(2)  Other     matters     regarded    as 
insufficient— 'Nichols    v.    Bronson,    2 
Day,  Conn.,  -211 — Apthorp  y.  Backus, 
Kirby,    Conn..    407,   1    AmJX    26—34 
C.J.  p  40  note  90  [a], 

63.  Conn. — Bailey   y,    Truznbull,    81 
Conn.  681. 

84  C.J.  p  40  note  91. 


64.  Fla. — Frost    v.    Durschlag,    157 
So.    T88,    117    Fla,    100— Fayter  y. 
Shore,    153   So.    511,    114   Fla.    115. 

Mo. — Midwest  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  (Parker  Corn  Co.,  245  S.W. 
217.  211  iMo.App.  418. 

65.  Ga. — Bishop  y.  iPendley  Lumber 
Co.,  82  S.B.  287,  141  Ga.  826. 

34  C.J.  p  40  note  94. 

Defendant  not  specifically  named  in 

verdict 

The  trial  court's  giving  of  per- 
emptory direction  to  find  for  one  of 
two  defendants  and  jury's  verdict  for 
plaintiff  disposed  of  all  issues  and 
parties,  although  such  direction  was 
not  submitted  to  jury  and  verdict 
did  not  specifically  name  other  de- 
fendant, where  Jury  was  instructed 
that  verdict  should  be  against  latter 
defendant,  if  certain  facts  were 
found,  so  that  court  did  not  err  in 
overruling  such  defendant's  motion 
in  arrest  of  judgment — Newdiger 
v.  Kansas  City,  IK  S.W.2d  1047, 
342  Mo.  252. 

66.  Md.— -Cohen  y.  Karp,  122  A.  524, 
143  Md.  208. 

Mo. — Caruthersville  Plumbing  &  Au- 
to Co,  v.  Uoyd,  Appn  279  &W. 
2(30. 

34  C.J.  p  40  note  95. 
Defect  not  appearing  of  record 

•In  a  case  in  which  the  rule  stated 
in  the  text  was  recognized,  it  was 
held  that  a  motion  for  an  order  set- 
ting aside  and  vacating  verdict  on 
ground  that  verdict  was  nullity,  in 
that  jury  had  not  unanimously 
agreed  thereon,  if  accorded  status 
of  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment, 
was  properly  denied,  where  alleged 
fault  on  which  it  was  based  did  not 
appear  on  face  of  record. — Van  De- 
mark  y.  Sartorius,  7  A.2d  168,  122 
N.J.L.aw  50i8. 

67.  Fla,-— Hull  v.  Laine,  17*  So.  701, 
127  Fla.  433. 

216 


Mo. — Boudreau  y.  Myers,  App.,  54 
S.W.2d  998^Caruthersville  Plumb- 
ing &  Auto  Co.  v.  Lloyd,  App.,  279 
S.W.  2'30. 

34  C.J.  p  40  note  96,  p  41  note  99. 
Issues  raised  by  counterclaim 

Motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  on 
verrlict  finding  issues  for  defendant, 
without  disposing  of  Issues  raised 
by  counterclaim,  was  properly  grant- 
ed.— Greco  v.  Keenan,  161  A.  100, 
115  Conn.  704. 
Several  defendants 

(1)  Motion  in  arrest  of  Judgment 
should   have   been   granted  where  a 
verdict  was  for  both  defendants  for 
the   excess   of   one   defendant's   sep- 
arate set-off  against  plaintiffs  joint 
and  several  demand. — Cohen  y.  Karp, 
122  A,  524,  1413  Md.  208. 

(2)  Other  cases   see  "34   C.J.  p  40 
note  96  [c]. 

Case  not  within,  role 

The  chancellor  did  not  err  in  over- 
ruling complainants'  motion  in  ar- 
rest of  judgment  on  the  ground  that 
verdict  and  judgment  on  issue  sub- 
mitted to  jury  were  not  responsive 
to  the  pleadings,  where  the  ques- 
tion thus  submitted  was  raised  in 
complainants'  bill  .and  denied  by 
the  answer. — Adams  v.  'Winnett,  156 
S.W.2d  35)8,  25  Tenn^App.  276. 

68.  Mo.— Moffett  y.  Turner,  23  Mo. 
App.  194. 

«4  C.J.  p  41  note  97. 

69.  Conn. — Palmer  v.  Seymour,  Kir*- 
by  139. 

34  C.J.  p  41  note  99. 

roability    to    determine    for    whom 

Judgment  to  be  given 
If  an  issue  is  so  immaterial  that 
the  court  cannot  determine  ftoxn  the 
finding  on  it  for  which  vasty  Judg- 
ment should  be  given,  the  judgment 
should  be  arrestedl — Scott  v.  Free- 
port  Motor  Cas.  Co.  of  Freeport,  58 
N.E.2d  618,  324  IlLApp.  529,  revers 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


96 


where  the  verdict  is  insufficient  to  sustain  a  judg- 
ment,70 According  to  some  cases,  a  general  verdict 
on  several  counts  or  pleas  properly  joined,  although 
erroneous  in  not  specifying  on  which  plea  it  is 
based,  or  in  not  stating  that  it  is  based  on  all  the 
pleas,  is  not,  in  the  absence  of  instructions  to  make 
separate  findings,  ground  for  arresting  judgment.71 

Failure  to  make  findings  where  findings  are  neces- 
sary is  ground  for  arresting  the  judgment,72  but  in 
some  jurisdictions  failure  of  the  jury  to  find  for 
defendant  on  common  counts  notwithstanding  the 
court's  direction  so  to  find  is  not  ground  for  arrest 
of  judgment  for  plaintiff  on  another  count.78 

§  95.    Miscellaneous 

Generally  speaking,  an  error  of  law  based  on  the  In- 
terpretation of  the  record  proper  Is  ground  for  arrest 
of  judgment,  but  ordinarily  a  matter  of  defense  which 
might  have  been  pleaded  is  not  a  basis  for  arrest. 

Broadly  speaking,  any  error  of  law  based  on  in- 
terpretation of  the  record  proper  may  be  reached  by 
motion  in  arrest.74  The  omission  of  steps  proper  or 
necessary  to  be  taken  before  the  trial,  but  which  do 
not  affect  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  in  general 
afford  no  ground  for  a  motion  in  arrest,75  nor  does 
the  denial  of  a  motion  for  a  continuance,  to  which 
no  exception  was  taken.™  Constitutionality  of  the 
statute  fixing  the  time  for  holding  a  term  of  court 
cannot  be  questioned  by  motion  in  arrest  after  ver- 


dict,77 and  a  like  rule  has  been  applied  with  respect 
to  the  constitutionality  of  a  statute  creating  the 
court  where  the  question  was  first  raised  by  the  mo- 
tion in  arrest78  In  some  jurisdictions  a  discontinu- 
ance which  is  evidenced  by  the  verdict  may  be 
reached  by  a  motion  in  arrest79 

Defenses.  Generally  speaking,  a  judgment  will 
not  be  arrested  because  of  any  matter  which  de- 
fendant might  have  pleaded  and  relied  on  as  a  de- 
fense to  the  action,  whether  by  plea  in  bar80  or  in 
abatement,81  except  such  as  go  to  the  jurisdiction, 
discussed  supra  §  89.  In  general,  on  a  motion  in 
arrest,  defendant  may  not  urge  matters  of  defense 
which  have  been  put  in  issue  and  have  been  passed 
on  by  the  court  and  jury82  or  which  do  not  appear 
on  the  face  of  the  record.83  Although,  where  the 
verdict  is  against  plaintiff,  a  motion  in  arrest  based 
on  the  alleged  insufficiency  of  defendant's  plea  has 
been  held  not  available  to  plaintiff,84  under  some 
statutes  it  has  been  held  that  a  motion  in  arrest  is 
available  to  plaintiff  to  test  the  sufficiency  of  a  de- 
fense pleaded  as  affirmative  matter.85 

The  premature  commencement  of  the  action86  or 
the  fact  that  the  cause  of  action  declared  on  ac- 
crued subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  writ87  has  been 
regarded  as  ground  for  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judg- 
ment unless  there  is  nothing  in  the  record  to  show 
prematurity.88  . 


«d  on  other  grounds   64  N.E.2d  542, 
392  111.  332. 

70.  Mo. — Wright  v.  Hannan  &  Ever- 
itt,    Inc.,    81    S.W.2d   303,    336   Mo. 
732. 

34  C.J.  p  41  note  1. 

71.  Ga.— Ball    v.    Powers,     62    Ga. 
757. 

Mass. — Richmond    v.    Whittlesey,    2 

Allen  230. 
Tex. — Byrne    v.   Lynn,   44   S.W.   311, 

544,  18  Tex.Civ.App.  252. 
gin  fling  on  all  issues  intended 

Motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  was 
properly  overruled  where,  by  the 
verdict,  a  finding  on  all  the  issues 
evidently  was  intended. — Hayes  v. 
Virginia  Mut  Protective  Ass'n,  76 
Va.  225. 

72.  Mo.— Winkelman  *v.  Maddox,   95 
S.W.  308,  119  Mo.App.  658 — Grimes 
v.  Sprague,  86  iMo.<App.  245. 

34  C.J.  p  41  note  2. 

78.     Md.— Rosenthal  v.  Heft,   150  A. 

850,  159  Md.  302. 
74.     Mo.— Reed  v.  Nicholson,  93  Mo. 

App.  29. 

34  C.J.  p  41  note  11. 
Attorney's  fees 

Where  a  judgment  includes  at- 
torney's fees  which  are  not  recov- 
erable in  the  action,  it  Is  not  error 
to  arrest  the  judgment  in  so  far  as 
It  provides  for  the  recovery  of  such 


fees.— Love  v.  National  Liberty  Ins. 
Co.,   121  S.E.   648,   157  Ga.  259. 
Ground  for  arrest  of  judgment  not 

Shown 
Ga.— Felker  v.  Johnson,  7  S.E.2d  668, 

189  Ga.  797. 
N.H.— (Lavigne    v.    Lavigne,    119    A. 

869,  80  N.H.  559. 
75*    Mo.— Gilstrap   v.   Felts,    50    Mo. 

428. 
84  C.J.  p  41  note  12. 

76.  Md. — Phoebus    v.    Sterling,    198 
A.  717,  174  Md.  894. 

77.  Mo. — Browning    v.    Powers,     44 
S.W.  2*24,  142  Mo.  322. 

78.  Mo.— Howell    v.    Sherwood,    147 
S.W.  810,  242  Mo.  513. 

79.  Fla. — Harrington     v.     Bowman, 
143  So.  651,  106  Fla.  86. 

SO.  Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  onoted  in 
Hammett  v.  Vogue,  Inc.,  165  S.W. 
2d  577,  579,  580,  179  Tenn.  224. 

34  C.J.  P  41  note  4. 

Defense  of  statute  of  limitations 
see  the  C.J.S.  title  Limitations  of 
Actions  §  451,  also  37  C.J.  p  1211 
note  26. 
Coverture  cannot  be  set  up  after 

judgment   in  arrest   thereof. — Smith 

v.   Pegram,   Tex.Civ.App.,    80   S.W.2d 

354,  error  refused. 

81*    Tenn. — Corpus  Juris   qu°*«d   in 

217 


Hammett  v.  Vogue,  Inc.,  165  S.W. 
2d  577,  579,  580,  179  Tenn.  284. 
34  C.J.  p  41  note  5. 

82.  Ga. — Olshine  v.  Bryant,  189  S.E. 
572,  55  Ga.App.  90. 

83.  D.C.— Walls  v.  Guy,  4  F.2d  444, 
55  APP.D.C.  251. 

84.  Tenn. — Wood  v.  Imperial  Motor 
Co.,     5     TeniuApp.     246— Blbinger 
Shoe   Co.  v.  Thomas,  1   Tenn.App. 
161. 

85.  111. — Scott    v.     Freeport     Motor 
Cas.  Co.  of  Freeport,  64  N.B.2d  542, 
392  ni.  632. 

86.  Iowa.— Reeves  v.   Lamm,   94   N. 
W.  839,  120  Iowa  283. 

34  C.J.  P  41  note  7. 

Action  on  insurance  policy 

Iowa. — .woodcock    v.    Hawkeye    Ins. 

Co.,   66   N.W.   764,   97   Iowa  562. 
26  C.J.  p  571  notes  S4,  35. 
Bight  not  waived 

Mere  silence,  when  making  other 
objections,  did  not  operate  as  a 
waiver  of  the  right  to  present  a  mo- 
tion in  arrest.— Woodcock  v.  Hawk- 
eye  Ins.  Co.,  66  N.W.  764,  97  Iowa 
562. 

87.  Ohio.— Chapline  v.  Tope,  Tapp.  p 
282. 

34  C.J.  P  41  note  8. 

88.  Mo. — Burman  v.  Vezeau,  85  S.W. 
2d  217,  231  Mo.App.  1109. 


§  96 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Evidence.  For  the  purpose  of  a  motion  in  arrest, 
the  record  does  not  include  the  evidence  taken  at 
the  trial,  as  discussed  infra  §  98,  and  it  is  no  ground 
for  arresting  a  judgment  that  there  was  error  in 
the  admission  of  evidence  at  the  trial,8^  or  that  the 
evidence  was  insufficient  to  sustain  the  verdict  or 
findings.90  The  fact  that  a  verdict  was  obtained  by 
perjury  is  not  ground  for  arrest  of  judgment,  where 
such  fact  does  not  appear  on  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord.** 

Trial  A  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  ordinarily 
cannot  be  based  on  any  matters  which  took  place  at 
the  trial  of  the  cause,  or  on  irregularities  or  failure 
to  follow  the  rules  of  procedure  in  the  conduct  of 
such 


§  97.    Motions  in  Arrest 

a.  General  considerations 

b.  Time  for  moving  and  for  deciding  mo- 

tion 

a.  General  Considerations 
Usually  a  motion  In  arrest  of  Judgment  It  made  by 


defendant.     The  motion  ordinarily  should  set  forth  the 
specific  grounds  on  which  It  Is  based. 

While  some  statutes  authorize  either  party  to 
make  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment,93  it  is  usu- 
ally made  by  defendant.94  The  motion  need  not 
be  made  in  writing95  unless  a  statute  or  court  rule 
so  requires.96  The  motion  should  point  out  the 
specific  grounds  on  which  it  is  based,97  although, 
according  to  some  cases,  this  is  not  indispensable.98 
The  motion  is  subject  to  amendment.99  No  plead- 
ing or  written  answer  is  required  in  opposition  to 
the  motion.1 

The  mere  fact  that  the  moving  party  denominates 
his  motion  a  motion  in  arrest  does  not  make  it  such 
a  motion.2  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  a  mo- 
tion is  denominated  a  motion  in  arrest  may  be  suf- 
ficient in  connection  with  other  supporting  facts  to 
show  that  the  motion  is  one  in  arrest.3  According 
to  some  cases,  a  motion  by  defendant  in  the  form  of 
a  motion  non  obstante  veredicto  may  be  treated  as 
a  motion  in  arrest  if  it  assigns  grounds  sufficient 
to  arrest  the  judgment.4  A  verdict  is  subject  to 
review  by  the  trial  court  pending  a  ruling  on  a  mo- 
tion in  arrest.5 


89.  TJ.S.— Clary  v.  Hardeeville  Brick 
Co..  C.CJS.C.,  100  F.  015. 

34  C.J.  p  39  note  77. 

90.  Conn.-- Pickens  v.  Miller,  177  A. 
5T3,  119  Conn.  553. 

111. — Smlthers  v.  Henriques,  15  N.B. 

2d  499,  3'6'8  HI.  588. 
Iowa.— Kirk    v.    Litterst,    32     N.W. 

106,  71  Iowa  71. 
Md. — Montgomery      Bus      Lines      V. 

IDfehl,  148  A.  455,  158  Md.  2=33. 
N.H.— Lowell  v.    Sabin,   15   N.H.    29. 
84  C.J.  p  39  -notes  78,  79. 

91.  Ga. — Grogan  v.  Deraney,  148  8. 
E.  912,  38  Ga.App.  287. 

92.  Vt — Boville    v.     Dalton    Paper 
Mills,  85  A.   6213,   86  Vt   305. 

34  C.J.  p  39  note  75. 
Defect  of  record 

In  view  of  a  statutory  provision 
that  either  party  may  move  in  ar- 
rest of  judgment  for  any  defect  not 
amendable  which  appears  on  the 
face  of  the  record  or  pleadings,  the 
overruling-  of  a  motion  in  arrest  of 
judgment  was  not  error  where  the 
motion  complained  of  alleged  errors 
committed  on  the  trial,  but  not  of 
any  defect  of  record  in  the  verdict 
and  decree, — Anderson  v.  G-armon, 
21  S.E.2d  61,  194  Ga.  128. 
Charge  to  jury 
Tenn. — Earheart  v.  Hazlewood  Bros., 

15  Tenn.App.  454. 

93.  111. — Scott    v.     Fneeport     Motor 
Cas.    Co.    of    Freeport,    68    NJD.2d 
618,   324   IlLApp.   529,   reversed  on 
other   grounds    64   N.E.2d   542,    392 
111.  382. 

94.  Ga. — J.  S.  Schofteld's  Sons  Co.  v.  j 


Vaughn,   150  S.E.    569,   40   Ga.App. 

568. 
34  C.J.  p  41  note  17. 

Except  in  oases  of  set-off  and 
counterclaim,  a  motion  in  arrest 
should  be  made  by  defendant. — Wood 
v.  Imperial  Motor  Co.,  5  Tienn.App. 
246— Elbinger  Shoe  Co.  v.  Thomas, 
1  Tenn.App.  161. 
Effect  of  statute 

At  common  law,  and  by  the  prac- 
tice which  prevailed  prior  to  the  en- 
actment of  the  Civil  Practice  Act, 
it  was  generally  considered  that  a 
motion  in  arrest  was  available  only 
to  defendant. — Scott  v.  Freeport  Mo- 
tor Casualty  Co.  of  Freeport,  64  N. 
E.2d  942,  392  111.  832. 

95.  Ind.— Fall  v.  Hazelrigg,  45  Ind. 
576,    15    Am.R.    278— Chicago   &  S. 
B.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheeler,  42  N.B.  489, 
14  Ind.App.   6*2. 

96.  Ind.— Nichols  v.   State,   68  N.E. 
785,  28  Ind.App.  674. 

34  C.J.  p  42  note  20. 

97.  111. — Edward  HInes  Lumber  Co. 
v.    Manta,    18   N.E.2d    761,    298   111. 
App.   624. 

Mo.— City    of    St.    Louis    v.    Senter 
Commission    Co.,    10-2    S.W.2d    103, 
J840  Mo.  6i33 — Tiefenbrunn  v.  Dick- 
erson,  App.,  161  S.W.2d  428. 
Pa. — Puritan    Rubber    Co.     v.    Brie 
Foundry  Co.,  ComJPl.,  24  Brie  Co. 
86,  56  York  Leg.Rec.  89. 
34  C.J.  p  42  note  21. 
Incorporation  by  reference 

Cl)  It  seems  that  the  motion  may 
be  sufficiently  definite  where,  by  ref- 
erence, it  incorporates  statements  i 

218 


contained  in  another  motion  present- 
ed to  the  court,  which  constitute  a 
sufficient  basis  of  a  motion  in  arrest. 
— Mosley  v.  Robert  Orr  &  Co.,  6 
Tenn. App.  243. 

(2)  Under  such  a  motion,  however, 
judgment  will  not  be  arrested  where 
the  other  motion  does  not  set  forth 
sufficient  grounds  for  arrest. — Scott 
v.  National  Life  &  Accident  Ins.  Co., 
64  S.W.2d  5«,  16  Tenn.App.  <31 — Ear- 
heart  v.  Hazlewood  Bros.,  15  Tenn. 
App.  454. 

98.  Ind. — Fall  v.  Hazelrigg,  45  Ind. 
576,  15  Am.R.  278. 

34  C.J.  p  42  note  22. 

99.  Fla,— Sedgwick   v.    Dawkins,    16 
Fla.  198. 

Ga. — Union   Compress  Co.  v.  Leffier, 

50  S.E.  48<3,  12'2  Ga.  640. 
34  C.J.  p  42  note  23. 

1.  Conn. — Raymond  v.  Bell,  18  Conn. 
81. 

34  C.J.  p  42  notes  19   [a],  24. 
Objection  improper 
111.— Reid   v.   Chicago   Rys,   Co.,    231 
IlLApp.  58. 

2.  Md. — Phoebus  v.  Sterling,  198  A. 
717,  174  Md.  394. 

3.  Mo. — Sutton   v.    Anderson,    31    S. 
W.2d  1026,  326  Mo.  1304. 

N.J. — Morris  Plan  Industrial  Bank 
of  New  York  v.  Kemeny,  8  A.fcd 
769,  12i3  N.J.Law  389. 

Vt. — Trow  v.  Thomas,  41  A.  652, 
70  Vt.  580, 
34  C.J.  p  42  note  21  [b]. 

5.  Iowa.— -Johnston  v.  Calvin,  5  N. 
W.2d  840,  2i32  Iowa  5'31. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§97 


There  can  be  only  one  motion  in  arrest  of  judg- 
ment as  of  right,6  unless  possibly  one  motion  has 
been  sustained,  and  thereafter  further  proceedings 
on  the  merits  are  had,7  although  the  court  may  con- 
sider a  secon<i  motion  if  it  chooses  to  do  so;8  but 
such  successive  motions  are  not  favored9 

b.  Time  for  Moving  and  for  Deciding  Motion 

A  motion  In  arrest  of  judgment  should  be  made  after 
verdict  and  before  Judgment  or  within  the  time  fixed  by 
statute  or  rule  of  court. 

The  proper  time  for  moving  in  arrest  of  judg- 
ment is  after  verdict  or  finding  and  before  judgment 
thereon,10  and  at  the  same  term  of  court,11  or  with- 
in the  time  fixed  by  statute  or  rule  of  court.12  As 
a  general  rule  the  motion  cannot  be  made  after  the 
end  of  the  term  of  court  at  which  the  verdict  was 
returned13  or,  under  some  statutes,  at  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered.14  Laches  may  bar  the  mo- 
tion.15 In  some  jurisdictions  a  motion  in  arrest 
may  be  sustained  only  after  the  verdict  has  been 
approved  or  after  the  time  for  making  objections  to 


the  verdict  has  elapsed.15  The  trial  court  should 
rule  on  the  motion  with  reasonable  promptness  and 
before  the  expiration  of  the  time  to  appeal.17 

It  has  been  held  or  recognized  that  a  timely  mo- 
tion in  arrest  of  judgment  may  be  made  after  a  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial  and  may  be  determined  after 
the  disposition  of  the  motion  for  a  new  trial.18 
Since,  however,  an  order  for  a  new  trial  vacates 
the  verdict,  as  shown  in  the  CJ.S.  title  New  Trial 
§  210,  also  46  CJ.  p  436  note  75,  thereafter  a  mo- 
tion in  arrest  is  ineffective,19  and  there  should  not 
be  a  ruling  on  such  motion.20  According  to  some 
cases  it  is  not  the  regular  or  correct  practice  to 
make  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  and  a  motion 
for  a  new  trial  at  the  same  time,21  but  it  has  also 
been  held  that  making  two  motions  at  the  same  time 
is  not  necessarily  improper  practice,22  and,  where 
the  two  motions  are  made  at  the  same  time,  it  is 
proper  to  determine  them  at  the  same  time,23  so 
that  the  order  in  which  they  may  be  considered  by 
the  court  becomes  immaterial,24  although  it  is  ap- 


6.  Mass. — Boston  Bar  Ass'n  v.  Cas- 
ey,  116   N.E.   541,   227  Mass.  46. 

7.  Mass. — Boston  Bar  Ass'n  v.  Cas- 
ey, supra. 

8.  Mass. — Boston  Bar  Ass'n  v*  Oas- 
ey,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  4'2  note  27. 

9.  Mass. — Boston  Bar  Ass'n  v.  Cas- 
ey, supra. 

10.  Fla.— Hull  v.  Laine,  175  So.  701, 
127   Fla.  4-3S — Harrington  v.  Bow- 
man,   136    So.    229,    102    Fte,    889, 
modified  on  other  grounds  143  So. 
6$1,  106  Fla.  86. 

Ind.— Phillips  v.   Gammon,  124  N.E. 

699,    188    Ind.    497-^McDaniels    v. 

McDaniels,  App.,   62  N.E:2d   876 — 

Oeyer    v.    Spencer,    192    N.E.    769, 

99  Ind.App.  418. 
tf.j. — corpus   Jtuls   cited  in  Morris 

Plan  Industrial  Bank  of  Nsw  York 

v.   Kemeny,    8   A.2d   769,   771,    128 

N.J.Law  389. 
314  CJ.  P  42  note  82. 
Motion  made  at  dose  of  plaintiff's 

.    evidence 

Failure  to  renew,  at  the  close  of 
all  the  evidence,  a  motion  which 
'was  made  at  the  close  of  plaintiff's 
evidence  and  which  was  called  a  mo- 
tion in  arrest  of  judgment  waived 
objections  based  on  the  ruling-  on 
the  motion  made  at  the  close  of 
plaintiffs  evidence.— Iiayne-Bowler 
Chicago  Co.  v.  City  of  Glenwood, 
C.A.Iowa,  134  F.2d  889. 

It,    Fla.— Hull  v.  Laine,  ITS  So.  701, 

127  Fla.  4'3S. 
Oa.— J.    S.    Schofield's    Sons    Co.   v. 

Vaujhn,   150  S.E.   669,  40  Ga.App. 


5  68 — Grogan  v.  Deraney,   1413  S.E. 
912,  38  Ga.App.  287. 
34  CJ.  p  42  note  32,  p  4.3  note  34. 

12.  Iowa. — Andrew    v.    Commercial 
State  Bank,  221  N.W.  809,  206  Iowa 
1070— Nelson  v.  Higgins,  218  N.W. 
509,  206  Iowa  672. 

Md. — Lichtenberg  v.  Joyce,  39  A.2d 

789,    183    Md.    689— Washington   & 

R.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  110  A,  478, 

1136  Md.  "202. 
Mo. — Button  v.  Anderson,  SI  S.W.2d 

1026,    826   Mo.    304— State    ex   rel. 

Conant  v.   Trimble,   277   S.W.   916, 

311  Mo.  128. 
Pa.— Fiscle  v.  Kissinger,    53   Pa.Su- 

per.     453— (Puritan     Rubber     Mfg. 

Co.  v.  Erie  Foundry  Co.,  Com.Pl., 

24  Erie  Co.   86,   56  York  Leg.Rec. 

89. 
Tenn. — Feldman  v.   Clark,    284   S.W. 

3513,  158  Tenn.  375. 
34  C.J.  p  42  note  83. 
Motion  held  ttmely 
Mo. — Toung  v.  Sangster,   16   S.W.2d 

92,  322  Mo.  802. 
Motion  held  not  timely 
Mo. — Schwettman  v.  Sander,  App.,  7 

S.W.2d  801. 

13.  Fla.— Hull  v.  Laine,  173  So.  701, 
127  Fla.  4138. 

34  C.J.  p  43  note  34. 

After  term  in  which  Judgment   en- 

tered 
111. — Osineski   v.    Consolidated    Coal 

Co.    of  St.  Louis,   227  IlLApp.   68. 

14.  Ga. — J.  S.   Schoffleld's  Sons  Co. 
v.  Vaughan,   150   S.E.   569,   40   Ga. 
App.  568— Grogan  v.  Deraney.  143 
S.E.  912,  88  iGteuApp.  287. 

34  C.J.  P  43  note  84. 

15.  Ga.— Raney   v.   McKae,    14    Ga. 
589,  40  Am.D.  660. 

34  C.J.  P  W  note  35. 

219 


16.  Mo. — Porter   v.    Chicago,    B.    & 
Q.  R.  Co.,  28  S.WJ2d  10135,  325  Mo. 
381. 

17.  Iowa. — Nelson    v.    Conroy    Sav. 
Bank,  194  N.W.  204,  196  Iowa  391. 

18.  Mo. — Porter    v.    Chicago,    B.    & 
Q.  R.  Co.,  28  S.W.2d  10i35,  325  Mo. 
381. 

Tenn. — Feldman  v.  Clark,  284  S.W. 
353,  158  Tenn.  873. 

34  C.J.  p  43  note  37 — 46  C.J.  p  65 
note  7  [a]. 

Whether  moving  in  arrest  of  Judg- 
ment waives  right  to  move  for  new 
trial  see  C.J.S.  title  New  Trial  I 
5,  also  46  C.J.  p  65  notes  6-10. 

19.  Mo. — Games  v.  Thompson,  48  S. 
W.2d  903 — Porter  v.  Chicago,  B.  & 
Q.  R.  Co.,  28  S.W.2d  1035,  325  Mo. 
381. 

No  basis  for  Judgment 

If  a  new  trial  has  been  granted, 
there  is  no  verdict  on  which  to  base 
a  judgment   to   which  a  motion   in 
arrest  might  apply. 
Ga. — Habersham   v.   Wetter,   59    Ga. 

11. 
Mo. — 'Porter  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 

Co.,   28   S.W.2d   1035,   325   Mo.   381. 

20.  Mo. — Games  v.  Thompson,  48  S. 
W.2d  903. 

21.  HI.— Wallace  v.  Curtiss,  36  HI. 
156. 

46  C.J.  p  65  note  14. 

22.  W.Va. — Gerling   v.    Agricultural 
Ins.  Co.,  20  S.E.  691,  89  W.Va.  689. 

46  C.J.  p  65  note  11. 

23.  W.Va, — Gerling   v.    Agricultural 
Ins.  Co.,  supra — Sweeney  v.  Baker, 
13  W.Va.  158,  31  Am.R.  757. 

24.  W.Va. — Gerling   v.    Agricultural 
Ins.  Co.,  20  S.E.  691,  89  W.Va,  689. 


§  97 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


patently  the  practice  of  some  courts  in  such  case 
to  hear  the  motion  in  arrest  first.26  In  some  ju- 
risdictions, where  a  motion  in  arrest  and  a  motion 
for  new  trial  are  filed,  neither  has  precedence  over 
the  other  in  any  respect,  so  that  they  may  both  be 
overruled  or  granted,  as  the  case  may  be,  at  one 
and  the  same  time.2^ 

Extending  time  for  filing.  A  motion  to  extend 
the  time  for  making  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judg- 
ment is  a  special  motion  which  is  subject  to  a  rule 
of  court  providing  that  orders  may  not  be  made 
on  special  motions  without  notice.27  An  order, 
made  while  a  motion  for  judgment  was  held  in 
abeyance,  extending  the  time  in  which  a  motion  in 
arrest  of  judgment  might  be  made  has  been  regard- 
ed as  a  nullity  on  the  ground  that,  when  such  order 
was  made,  there  was  no  entry  in  the  court  journal 
to  which  the  order  could  apply.28 


§  98. 


Hearing  and  Determination 


A  motion  In  arrest  of  Judgment  must  be  determined 
on  the  record  proper,  and  extraneous,  matters  will  not 


be  considered;    every  reasonable  Intendment  and  impli- 
cation will  obtain  in  favor  of  the  pleadings. 

A  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  serves  in  some 
measure  the  office  of  a  demurrer  and  ordinarily 
should  be  governed  by  the  principles  relating  to  a 
demurrer,29  even  when  made  after  default;  the 
default  admits  nothing  except  what  is  properly 
pleaded.30  The  motion  must  be  determined  on  the 
record  proper81  and  cannot  be  aided  by  extraneous 
matters;  affidavits,  evidence,  or  the  judge's  recol- 
lection of  the  course  of  the  trial  cannot  be  consid- 
ered.32 

Motions  in  arrest  are  not  favored,85  and  the  dec- 
laration, petition,  or  complaint  is  to  be  given  the 
benefit  of  a  liberal  construction84  to  cure  any  am- 
biguity or  looseness  of  description,85  and  every 
doubt  is  to  be  resolved  in  its  favor.86  Pleadings 
are  given  the  benefit  of  every  reasonable  intendment 
and  implication,87  and  the  courts  will  go  a  long  way 
in  sustaining  plaintiffs  pleading  as  against  a  mo- 
tion in  arrest.88  Also  the  verdict  is  to  be  given  the 
benefit  of  every  favorable  intendment89  As  a  gen- 


25.  tJ.S. — Turner  v.  Foxall,  D.C.,  2<4 
P.Cas.  No.   14,  255,  2  Cranch  C.C. 
324. 

26.  Tex. — Goodman  v.  Republic  Inv. 
Co.,   Civ.App.,    215    S.W.    468. 

27.  Mich. — McConnell     v.     Merriam, 
2013  N.W.   661,  231  Mich.  184. 

28.  Mich.— McConnell     v.     Merriam, 
supra. 

29.  Md. — Washington    &    Baltimore 
Turnpike    Road    v.    State,    19    Md. 
259,  affirmed  3  Wall.  210,  18  L.Ed. 
180— State  v.  Green-well,   4  Gill  & 
J.  407. 

30.  111. — Bragg    v.    Chicago,    73    HL 
152. 

34  C.J.  p  4<3  note  40. 

31.  HI. — Smithers   v.   Henriques,   15 
N.E.2d  499,  368  111.  588— Welch  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  154  N.E.  226,  323 
HI.  498. 

Mo.— McGannon  v.  Millers*  Nat.  Ins. 
Co.,  71  S.W.  160,  171  Mo.  14'3,  94 
Am.S.R.  778 — Tiefenbrunn  v.  Dick- 
erson,  App.,  161  S.W.2d  428. 
Tenn. — Speer  v.  Pierce,  77  S.W.2d 
77,  18  Tenn.App.  351 — Earheart  v. 
Hazlewood  Bros.,  15  Tenn.App. 
454. 

34  C.J.  p  43  note  41. 
Matters  included  in  record 

CD  Record  contains  process  and 
all  pleadings,  postea,  and  Judgment, 
but  does  not  include  court's  charge, 
bills  of  exceptions,  and  bills  of  par- 
ticulars.— Paradise  v.  Great  Eastern 
Stages,  176  A.  711,  114  N.J.Law  365. 
(2)  For  the  purpose  of  a  motion  in 
airest,  the  record  does  not  include 
the  evidence  taken  at  the  trial. 
HI. — Scott  v.  Freeport  Motor  Casual- 
ty Co.  of  Freeport,  64  N.E.2d  542,  j 


892    111.    382— Smithers   v.    Henrl- 
duez,  15  N.E.2d  499,  368  HI.  588— 
Welch  v.  City  of  Chicago,  154  N.E. 
226.  ,323  111.  .498. 
Md. — Montgomery      Bus     Lines     v. 

Diehl,  148  A.  45(3,  158  Md.  23-3. 
N.J. — Paradise     v.     Great     Eastern 
Stages,    176   A-    711,    114    N.J.Law 
365. 

Tenn. — Scott  v.  National  Life  &  Ac- 
cident Ins.  Co.,  64  S.W.2d  5«,  16 
Tenn.App.  81 — Earheart  v.  Hazle- 
wood Bros.,  15  Tenn.«App.  454 — 
Highland  Coal  &  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Cravens,  8  Tenn.App.  419 — Corpus 
Juris  cited  In  Moseley  v.  Robert 
Orr  &  Co.,  6  Tenn.App.  243,  245. 
34  C.J.  p  39  note  79,  p  43.  note  41. 

C3)  In  some  jurisdictions  the  ver- 
dict in  a  common-law  action  is  <a 
part  of  the  record  proper  for  pur- 
poses of  a  motion  in  arrest — Har- 
rington v.  Bowman,  143  So.  651,  106 
Fla.  86. 

32.    Conn. — Lentine  v.   McAvoy,   136 

A.  76,  105  Conn.  528. 
D.C.— -Walls   v.   Guy,   4   F.2d  444,   55 

App.D.C.  251. 
Mo. — Tiefenbrunn  v.  Dickerson,  App., 

161    S.W.2d    428— Ray    v.    Collins, 

App.,  -2714  S.W.  1098. 
N.J. — Paradise     v.     Great     Eastern 

Stages,    176   A.    711,    114    N.J.Law 

'•365. 

34  C.J.  p  43  note  41,  p  31  note  7  fa]. 
Affidavits    amplifying-   testimony   at 
trial 

Whether  certain  affidavits  should 
be  considered  was  regarded  as  a 
matter  within  the  sound  discretion 
of  the  trial  Judge,  and  refusing  to 
consider  such  affidavits  was  not  er- 
ror where  much  of  contents  of  affi- 

220 


davits  appeared  to  be  amplification 
of  affiants'  testimony  given  at  trial. 
— Moller-Vandenboom  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Boudreau,  85  S.W.2d  141,  231  Mo. 
App.  1127. 
33.  Fla. — Harrington  v.  Bowman, 

1*36  So.  229,  10*2  Fla,  339,  modified 

on  other  grounds  1413  So.  651,  106 

Fla.  86. 
Mass.— Piser  v.  Hunt.  148  N.E.  801, 

25,3  Mass.  1321. 
34  C.J.  p  4*3  note  42. 

.34.    Ga. — Stowers  v.  Harris,  22  S.B. 

2d  405,  194  Gfeu  6*36. 
111.— Randall    Dairy    Co.    v.    Pevely 

Dairy  Co.,    274   IlLApp.  474. 
Mo.— Mfihlstaub  v.  Michael,  287  8.W. 

1079,  221  <Mo.A*>p.  807. 

SB.    Md.— State  v.  Greenwell,  4  Gill 

&  J.  407. 
34  C.J.  p  ,36  note  47. 

36.  D.C. — Washington     Railway     & 
Electric  Co.  v.  Perry,  47  App.D.C. 
90, 

37.  Fla.— Pillett  v.  Ershick,  126  So. 
784,  99  Fla.  483. 

111. — Paris  v.  East  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co., 

'275  IlLApp.  241— Randall  Dairy  Co. 

v.   Pevely  Dairy  Co.,   274   IlLApp. 

474. 
Mo.— -Mehlstaub  v.  Michael,  287  S.W. 

1079,  221  Mo.App.  807. 
34  C.J.  p  36  note  48,  p  '43  note  4$. 

38.  Mo.— Mace    y.    Vendig,    23    Mo. 
App.  2513. 

S.C.— Jordan  v.  Boone,  39  S.C.L.  528. 
34  C.J.  p  -35  note  46. 

39.  U.S.— JCalvey  v.   U.   S.,    D.CPa., 
27  F.Supp.  359. 

Ga.— Rutxenstein  v.  Lee,  1*2  S.E.  85, 
5-6   Ga.App.   49 — David  v.   Marbut- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  99 


eral  rule  it  will  be  presumed  after  verdict  that  every 
material  fact  alleged  in  the  declaration,  or  fairly  in- 
ferable from  what  is  alleged,  was  proved  on  the 
trial,40  that  the  proof  was  confined  to  that  part  of 
the  declaration  which  supported  a  recovery,41  and 
that  the  verdict  was  for  such  damages  as  were  re- 
coverable under  the  declaration  ;42  but  it  cannot  be 
presumed  that  a  cause  of  action  was  proved  where 
none  was  stated,  and  where  a  material  fact  is  omit- 
ted, which  cannot  be  implied  in,  or  inferred  from, 
the  finding  of  those  which  are  stated,  the  verdict 
will  not  cover  the  defect48 

Granting  or  denying  a  motion  for  the  continuance 
of  the  hearing  of  a  motion  in  arrest  is  within  the 
sound  discretion  of  the  trial  judge.44  The  ruling 
of  the  court  should  be  decisive,  and  responsive  to 
the  motion.*3  If  several  defendants  join  in  the  mo- 
tion, in  general  it  must  be  sustained  or  overruled  as 
to  all.46  Where  the  judgment  is  not  an  entirety,  it 
may  be  arrested  in  part.47 

According  to  some  cases,  entry  of  judgment  oper- 
ates as  an  overruling  of  the  motion,  as  discussed 
infra  §  115. 


§  99.    Operation  and  Effect  of  Arrest 

An  amendment,  new  trial,  venire  de  novo,  or  re- 
pleader  may  be  permitted  after  the  grant  of  a  motion 
In  arrest  of  Judgment. 

The  granting  of  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  at 
common  law  has  been  held  to  prevent  the  entry  of 
a  final  judgment  in  the  cause,  unless  it  is  made 
conditional  on  an  amendment  or  such  other  action 
as  will  remove  the  cause  of  arrest,4*  and  to  operate 
as  a  discontinuance  and  dismissal  of  defendant.49 
However,  it  has  also  been  held  that  the  granting  of 
the  motion  does  not  terminate  the  case,50  and  that 
an  amendment,  new  trial,  venire  de  novo,  or  replead- 
er  may  be  granted,51  notwithstanding  the  order  in 
arrest  is  unconditional.52  Furthermore  it  has  been 
held  or  recognized  that,  where  judgment  has  been 
arrested,  and  plaintiff  feels  himself  aggrieved  and 
wishes  to  test  the  decision  of  the  court  thereon,  he 
may  move  for  a  judgment  against  himself  which 
will  be  ordered  as  a  matter  of  course,  on  which  he 
may  bring  his  writ  of  error.53 

It  has  been  held  that,  whether  or  not  the  judg- 
ment was  properly  arrested,  the  arrest  stands  as  the 


Williams  Lumber  Co.,  12?  S.B.  906, 
82  Ga.App.  157. 

40.  Ga. — Stowers  v.  Harris,  22  S.W. 
2d    405,    194    Ga.    686— Rollins    v. 
Personal  Finance  Co.,  175  S.B.  609, 
49  Ga.'App.  «65. 

34  C.J.  p  43  note  44. 

Defective  statement  of  cause  of  ac- 
tion 

If  averments  in  declaration  con- 
tain reasonable  certainty  of  meaning 
and  show  a  substantial,  although  de- 
fectively stated,  cause  of  action,  and 
defendant  does  not  demur  but  goes 
to  trial  under  general  issue,  defects 
in  averments  will  be  presumed  to 
have  been  supplied  by  the  proof. — 
Curtis  v.  Kyte,  106  S.W.2d  2*4,  21 
Tenn.App.  115. 

41.  Ind. — Hamm  v.  Romine,  98  Ind. 
77. 

84    C.J.    p   4@    note   45    [a]    (2). 

42.  Vt.— Packard  v.  Slack,  32  Vt  9. 
34  C.J.  p  43  note  43   [a]   (1). 

43.  N.H.— Bedell   v.    Stevens,    28  N. 
H.  118. 

34  C.J.  p  4i3  note  45. 

44.  Discretion  not  abased 

Mo. — Moller-Vandenboom  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Boudreau,  85  S.W.Sd  141,  2131 
Mo.App.  1127. 

45.  Conn.— Bird  v.  Bird,  2  Root  411 
— Worthington    v.    Dewlt,    1    Root 
182. 

34  C.J.  p  43  note  46. 


46.    Ind. — Van  Gundy  v.  Carrfgan,  SO  1 51.    Conn. — Betts  v.  Hoyt,  113  Conn. 


N.E.  983,  4  In<LApp.  $33. 
34  C.J.  p  43  note  47. 

47-    Ga.— Lester  v.  -Piedmont  &  Ar- 
lington Life  Ins.  Co.,  55  Ga.  475. 
34  C.J.  p  413  note  48. 

48.  Mo.— 'State   v.   Fisher,    ISO   S.W. 
35,     230    Mo.    325,    Ann.Oas.l912A 
970. 

3'4  C.J.  p  44  note  52. 

49.  Ala.— Corpus     Jttri«     cited     to 
City   of  Birmingham  v.  Andrews, 
1*2  So.  877,  222  Ala.  862. 

Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Foote  v. 
Larimer  County  Bank  &  Trust  Co., 
259  P.  1081,  1032,  82  Colo.  323. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Stephens 
v.  D.  M.  Oberman  Mfg.  Co.,  70 
aWV2d  899,  901,  3134  Mo.  1078. 

34  C.J.  p  44  note  54. 

Failure  to  appeal 

(1)  Where   motion    for   new    trial 
was  overruled,  and  defendant's  mo- 
tion in  arrest  of  judgment  was  sus- 
tained,   plaintiff's   failure    to    appeal 
from  latter  order  would  end  case. — 
Stephens  v.  D.  M.  Oberman  Mfg.  Co., 
70  S.W.2d  899,  384  Mo.  1078— Porter 
v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  28  S.W.2d 
10)35,  325  Mo.  381.    ' 

(2)  In  such  case,  under  some  stat- 
utes   plaintiff    might    commence    a 
new   action   within   one    year. — Ste- 
phens v.  D.  M.  Oberman  Mfg.  Co.,  su- 
pra. 

50.  Conn.— Greco  v.  Keenan,  161  A. 
100,  115  Conn.  704. 

221 


469. 

Fla,— Hull  v.  Laine,  173  So.  701,  127 
Fhu  433. 

HI. — Scott  v.  Freeport  Motor  Cas- 
ualty Co.  of  Freeport,  64  K.E.2d 
542,  392  HI.  332.  - 

Ind. — Bucklen  v.  Cushxnan,  44  NJ2. 
6,  145  Ind.  61. 

Mo. — O'Toole  v.  Loewenstein,  160  S. 
W.  1016.  177  Mo.App.  662. 

34  C.J.  p  44  note  53. 

Same  Judgment  entered 

Under  some  statutes  after  arrest 
of  Judgment  on  motion  of  defendant, 
plaintiff  may  amend  his  pleading  and 
have  the  same*  judgment  entered, 
where  a  cause  of  action  was  stated 
inaptly  or  imperfectly  and  the  same- 
amendment  might  have  been  made 
before  trial.— -Stephens  v.  D.  M.  Ober- 
man Mfg.  Co.,  70  S.W.2d  899,  354 
Mo.  1078. 

Defective  verdict,  constituting  bar- 
sis  of  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment* 
should  be  set  aside. — Greco  v.  Keen- 
an,  161  A.  100,  115  Conn.  704. 

52.  Mo.— Stephens    v.    D.    M.    Ober- 
man Mfg.  Co..   70  S.W.2d  899,  384 
Mo.  1078. 

53.  Ala.— -Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
City   of  Birmingham    v.   Andrews, 
132  So.  877,  222  Ala.  862. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juri*  cited  in  Stephens 
v.  D.  M.  Oberman  Mfg,  Co.,  TO  S* 
W.2d  899,  901,  '334  Mo.  1078. 

34  C.J.  p  44  note  56. 


§  100 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


order  of  court  until  modified  or  set  aside.54    It 
has  also  been  held,  however,  that  an  order  sustain- 


ing a  motion  in  arrest  after  the  verdict  has  been 
set  aside  is  ineffectual  for  any  purpose.55 


V.  RENDITION,  BNTEY,  RECORD,  AND  DOCKETING 


§  100.    Rendition  Generally 

The  rendition  of  a  Judgment  Is  the  Judicial  act  of 
tfr*  court  In  pronouncing  the  sentence  of  the  law  on  the 
facts  In  controversy  as  ascertained  by  the  pleadings  and 
verdict  or  findings,  as  distinguished  from  the  ministerial 
act  of  entering  the  Judgment. 


The  rendition  of  a  judgment  is  the  judicial  act 
of  the  court56  in  pronouncing  the  sentence  of  the 
law  on  the  facts  in  controversy  as  ascertained  by 
the  pleadings  and  verdict  or  findings,57  as  distin- 
guished from  the  entry  of  the  judgment,58  which,  as 


34.    Pa,— Myers    v.    Filley,    12    Pa. 

Dist.  562. 
34  C.J.  p  44  note  55. 

£5»  Mo.— Porter  v.  Chicago,  B.  & 
Q.  R.  Co.,  28  S.W.2d  1035,  325  Mo. 
381. 

56.    Ark.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    la 

McConnel  v.  Bourland,  299  S.W.  *44, 

48,  175  Ark.  253. 
Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hazzard 

v.  Alexander,  178  A.  8713,  875,  6  W. 

W.Harr.  512. 
HI.— Wallace  Grain  &  Supply  Co.  v. 

Gary,    24   N.E.2d   907,  80«   IlLApp. 

221,  reversed  on  other  grounds  28 

N.E.2d  107,  <374  111.  57. 
N.C.— Ebom  v.  Ellis,  35   S.E.2d  238, 

225  N.C.  -386. 
Okl.— Peoples     Electric      Co-op,      v. 

Broughton,  127  P.2d  850,  191  Old. 

•229. 
Or. — In  re  Gerhardus'  Estate,  23  9  P. 

829,  831,  116  Or.  118. 
Tex.— Hudgins  v.    T.   B.   Meeks  Co., 

Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  €81. 
33  C.J.  p  1064  note  62—34  C.J.  p  44 

note  57,  p  1181  note  80  [b]. 

.57.  U.S.— rContinental  Oil  Co.  v.  Mu- 
lich,  C.C.A.Kan.,  70  P.2d  521— Cor- 
pus Juris  cited  in  In  re  Hurley 
Mercantile  Co.,  C.C.A.Tex.,  56  F.2d 
102>3,  1024,  certiorari  denied  Atas- 
cosa  County  State  Bank  of  Jour- 
danton,  Texas,  v.  Coppard,  52  S.Ct 
580,  286  U.S.  655,  76  L.Ed.  1290, 

Ala.— Du  flPree  v.  Hart,  8  So.2d  183, 
'242  Ala.  690— «Mt  Vernon-Woodber- 
ry  Mills  v.  Union  -Springs  Guano 
Co.,  155  So.  710,  26  Ala.App.  136, 
certiorari  denied  155  So.  716,  229 
Ala.  91. 

Ariz. — American  Surety  Co.  of  Nsw 
York  v.  Mosher,  64  P.2d  1025,  48 
Aria.  552. 

Ark. — Corpus  Juris  auoted  in  McCon- 
nell  v.  Bourland,  299  S.W.  44,  48, 
175  Ark.  2513. 

Colo.— Sarchet  v.  Phillips,  78  P.2d 
1096,  102  Colo.  818. 

TDel. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hazzard 
v.  Alexander,  178  A.  878,  875,  6 
W.W.Harr.  512. 

.Ga.— Deck  v.  Deck,  20  S.B.2d  1,  193 
Ga.  739. 

111.— WIc&ser  v.  (Powers,  57  N.E.2d 
522,  3214  I11JV.PP.  130. 

Tnd. — State  ex  reL  Bernard  v.  Oeck- 
ler,  189  N.E.  842,  98  Ind.App.  4-36. 

Miss.-— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Welch 


v.  Kroger  Grocery  Co.,  177  So.  41, 
42,  180  Miss.  89. 

Neb.— Luikart  v.  Bredthauer,  271  N. 
W.  165,  1132  Neb.  62. 

N.H.— Tuttle  v.  Tuttle,  196  A.  624, 
89  N.H.  219. 

N.M.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 
Capital  City  Bank,  246  P.  899,  900, 
31  N.M.  430. 

N.T.— Vogel  v.  Edwards,  27  N.E.2d 
806,  28*3  N.T.  118— Application  of 
Gleit,  33  N.Y.S.2d  629,  631,  178 
Misc.  198 — Humnicki  v.  Pitkowa, 
277  -N.Y.S.  417,  154  Misc.  407— 
Langrick  v.  Howe,  212  N.T.S.  240, 
126  Misc.  256— Darvick  v.  Darvick, 
36  N.T.S.2d  58. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Taliafer- 
ro  v.  Batis,  252  OP.  845,  846,  1213 
Okl.  59. 

Or. — Jones  v.  Thompson,  164  P.2d 
718 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hab- 
erly  v.  Farmers'  (Mut  Fire  Relief 
lAss'n,  -287  P.  222,  223,  135  Or.  32. 

Tenn. — Jackson  v.  Jarratt,  52  S.W.2d 
137,  138,  165  Tenn.  76. 

Tex.— Iiinton  v.  Smith,  164  S.W.2d 
643,  137  Tex.  479— De  Leon  v.  Tex- 
as Employers  Ins.  Ass'n,  Civ.App., 
159  S/W.2d  574,  /error  refused — 
Lewis  v.  Terrell,  Civ.App,,  154  S. 
W.2d  151,  error  refused — Jones  v. 
Sun  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  145  S.W.2d 
615,  reversed  on  other  grounds  15'3 
S.W.2d  571,  157  Tex.  »5I3— Sloan 
v.  Richey,  Civ.App.,  143  S.W.2d 
119,  error  dismissed,  Judgment  cor- 
rect— Perry  v.  iPerry,  Civ.App.,  122 
S.W.2d  726— Cleburne  Nat  Bank  v. 
Bowers,  Civ.App.,  1H3  S.W.2d  578— 
Corbett  v.  Rankin  Independent 
School  Dist.,  Civ.App.,  100  S.W.Sd 
Ili3— Hudgins  v.  T.  B.  Meeks  Co., 
Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  681— Kittrell  v. 
Fuller,  CivoApp.,  -281  S.W.  575. 

Wash. — Beetchenow  v.  Bartholet,  298 
P.  3£5, 162  Wash.  119. 

Wis. — Netherton  v.  Frank  Holton  & 
Co.,  205  N.W.  388,  189  Wis.  461, 
order  denying  motion  to  dismiss 
appeal  vacated  on  other  grounds 
206  N.W.  919,  189  Wis.  461,  man- 
date  vacated  207  N.W.  953,  189 
Wis.  461. 

34  C.J.  p  44  note  57.       • 

Decision  or  findings  by  court  gen- 
erally see  the  C.J.S.  title  Trial  §§ 
602-606,  609-612,  also  64  C:J.  P 
122  note  28-p  12-27  note  98,  p  1227 
note  12-p  1231  note  69. 

Verdict  or  findings  by  jury  generally 

222 


see    the   C.J.S.    title    Trial    §    485, 

also  64  C.J.  p  10513,  note  53-p  1056 

note  20. 
58.    U.S. — Corpus  Juris   cited  in   U. 

S.  v.  Rayburn,  C.C.AJowa,  91  F.2d 

162,  164. 
Ala.— Du  Pree  v.  Hart,  8  6o.2d  18-3, 

242  Ala.  690. 
Ariz. — American  Surety  Co.  of  New 

York  v.  Mosher,   64  GP.Sd  1025,   48 

Ariz.  552. 
Ark. — Corpus  Juris  auoted  in  McCon- 

nell  v.  Bourland,   299   S.W.  44,  48, 

175  Ark.  253. 
Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hazzard 

v.  Alexander,  178  lA.  873,  875,  6  W. 

W.Harr.  512. 
Ga,— Deck  v.  Deck,  20  S.E.2d  1,  193 

Ga.  739. 
N.T.— Application  of  Gleit,  313  N.T.S. 

2d  629,  178  Misc.  198. 
Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Haberly 

v.  Farmers'  Mut.  Fire  Relief  Ass'n, 

287  P.  222,  223,  135  Or.  32— In  re 

Gerhardus'  Estate,  239  P.  829,  11-6 

Or.  113. 
Tenn. — Jackson  v.  Jarratt,  52  S.W.2d 

1'37,  165  Tenn.  76. 
Tex.— Sloan  v.  Richey,  Civ.App.,  143 

S.W.2d  119,  error  dismissed,  Judg- 
ment correct 
Wash. — Beetchenow  v.  Bartholet,  298 

P.  335,  162  Wash.  119. 
34  C.J.  p  45  note  58. 
Entry  not  included  in  rendition 

To  render  judgment  is  to  return  or 
give  judgment;  and  it  cannot  be  said 
that  the  phrase,  in  any  of  its  forms, 
includes  the  idea  of  making  a  writ- 
ten entry  or  record  of  a  judgment. 
— State  ex  rel.  Bernard  v.  Geckler, 
189  N.E.  842,  98  Ind.App.  436. 

Exercise  of  discretion 

Rendition  of  judgment  involves  ex- 
ercise of  discretion  as  to  its  terms, 
while  entry  of  judgment  is  ministe- 
rial function. — Lasby  v.  Burgess,  18 
P.-2d  1104,  93  Mont  3«49.  ' 

Rendition  of  Judgment  is  an  in- 
dependent fact,  distinct  in  point  of 
time  from  entry  of  judgment  in 
minutes  of  court,  and  from  order  of 
court  on  motion  for  new  trial. — Kit- 
trell v.  Fuller,  Tex.Civ.App.,  281  S. 
W.  575. 

Separate  acts 

•  Rendition  and  entry  of  a  judgment 
are  separate  acts  and  different  in 
their  nature. — Wallace  Grain  &  Sup- 
ply Co.  v.  Cary,  24  N.E.2d  907,  80® 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  101 


discussed  infra  §  106,  is  the  ministerial  act  of 
spreading  it  at  large  upon  the  record.  On  its  ren- 
cliticr,  and  without  entry,  a  judgment  is  final,  valid, 
and  enforceable,  as  between  the  parties,69  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  statute  to  the  contrary,6^  although  for 
many  purposes,  as  is  discussed  infra  §  107,  entry  of 
the  judgment  is  also  essential. 

§  101.    Authority  and  Duty  of  Court 

Where  the  cause  has  been  heard  and  determined  and 
the  case  is  ripe  for  judgment,  it  Is  the  duty  of  the  court 
to  render  judgment. 

Where  the  cause  has  been  heard  and  determined 
and  the  case  is  ripe  for  judgment,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  court  to  render  judgment,61  and  performance  of 
this  duty  may  be  compelled  by  mandamus,  as  dis- 
cussed in  the  C.J.S.  title  Mandamus  §  97,  also  38 
CJ.  p  634  note  43-p  636  note  68.  It  has  also  been 
held  that  a  court  has  no  discretion  to  refuse  to  give 
judgment  declaring  a  right  properly  pleaded  and 
well  established  by  the  evidence,62  since,  where 
good  grounds  exist  for  granting  relief,  judgment 
is  given  to  the  party  entitled  thereto  as  a  matter  of 
right  and  not  of  grace.63  Where  a  case  is  submit- 


ted to  the  jury  on  special  issues,  judgment  must  usu- 
ally be  rendered  on  the  verdict  returned,64  although 
the  court  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion  may  set 
aside  a  verdict  without  first  rendering  judgment.65 
Where  the  court"  tries  the  case  without  a  jury  and 
finds  facts  entitling  one  of  the  parties  to  a  judg- 
ment, he  has  the  right  to  have  such  a  judgment  ren- 
dered and  it  is  error  to  refuse  it.66  Similarly  it  is 
error  for  a  judge  to  refuse  to  enter  judgment  in 
accordance  with  his  decision  on  a  question  of  law, 
unless  the  entry  thereof  is  discretionary  for  some 
recognized  reason.67  The  authority  and  duty  of  the 
court  to  render  judgment  may  also  arise  by  reason 
of  the  confession,  default,  consent,  offer,  or  admis- 
sion of  the  parties,  discussed  infra  §§  134-218,  or 
the  report  of  a  referee  before  whom  the  cause  was 
tried,  discussed  infra  §  105. 

The  court  may  not  render  judgment  in  violation 
of  a  prescribed  mode  of  procedure,  as  against  prop- 
er and  timely  objection  ;68  and  statutory  procedure, 
made  a  condition  precedent  to  the  exercise  of  ju- 
dicial power,  is  mandatory,  governing  the  court's 
power  to  render  a  judgment.6^  Statutes  providing 


Ill.App.      221,      reversed      on      other, 
grounds  28  N.B.2d  107.  374  111.  57. 

59.  U.S. — Corpus   Juris   cited  in  TJ. 
S.    v.    Ray  burn,   C.C.A.Iowa,    91   F. 
2d  162,  164— Continental  Oil  Co.  v. 
Mulich,  C.C.A.Kan.,   70  F.2d  521. 

Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Du  Free 

v.  Hart,  8  So.2d  18<3,  186,  242  Ala. 

690. 
Ark. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  McCon- 

nell  v.   Bourland,   299   S.W.  44,  48, 

175  Ark.  255. 
Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hazzard 

v.  Alexander,  178  A.  873,  875,  6  W. 

W.Harr.  512. 
HI. — Wickiser  v.   'Powers,   57   N.B.2d 

522.  i324  IlLApp.  130. 
Miss.— Corpus  Juris   cited  in  Welch 

v.  Kroger  Grocery  Co.,  177  So.  41, 

42,  180  Miss.  89. 
Neb. — ipontiac    Improvement    Co.    v. 

Leisy,    >14    N.W.2d    884,    144    Neb. 

705. 
Or.— Corpus  Juris  auoted  in  Haber- 

ly   v.    Farmers'    Mut.    Fire    Relief 

Ass'n,   287  P.  222,   223,  1135  Or.  82. 
34  C.J.  p  45  note  60. 
Execution   before   entry   see  Execu- 
tions §  9. 

60.  Ark.— Corpus    Juris    guoted    in 
McConnell    v.    Bourland,    299    S.W. 
44,  48,  175  Ark.  253. 

Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hazzard 
v.  Alexander,  178  A.  873,  875,  6  W. 
W.Harr.  512. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Haber- 
ly  v.  Farmers'  Mut.  Fire  Relief 
Ass'n,  287  P.  222,  225,  185  Or.  «2. 

61.  Miss.— Mohundro    v.    Board    of 
Sup'rs   of  Tippah  County,   165   So. 
124,  174  Miss.  512. 

N.C.— Rutherford    Hospital   v.   Flor- 


ence Mills,   120   S.E.   212,  IS  6  N.C. 

554— Lawrence    v.    Beck,    116    S.E. 

424,  185  N.C.  196. 
Tex. — Brannon   v.   Wilson,   Civ,App., 

260  S.W.  201. 
33  C.J.  p  46  note  6I3. 
Ex  parte  entry 

Trial  court  was  without  author- 
ity to  authorize  an  ex  parte  entry 
of  judgment  against  defendant  on 
failure  to  fulfill  the  oral  terms  of 
settlement  entered  into  at  pretrial 
conference,  where  the  oral  terms 
did  not  include  stipulation  for  entry 
of  Judgment  without  notice  in  event 
of  such  failure. — Sonn  v.  Campbell, 
56  N.T.S.2d  286. 
Motions  toy  strangers 

The  trial  court's  power  to  render 
judgment  between  parties  properly 
before  it  is  not  affected  by  motions 
filed  in  the  cause  by  strangers  there- 
to.—-Pennington  Grocery  Co.  v.  Ort- 
weinf  88  P.2d  331,  184  Okl.  501. 

62.  Gal.— Majors    v.    Majors,    App., 
161  P.2d  494. 

Failure  to   comply  with   order 

Plaintiff,  although  no  longer  enti- 
tled to  costs  because  of  failure  time- 
ly to  comply  with  order  to  prepare 
and  cause  to  be  entered  a  judgment 
in  his  favor,  was  nevertheless  still 
entitled  to  the  Judgment  on  the  mer- 
its originally  awarded  by  the  court, 
and  court  erred  in  ordering  plaintiff's 
complaint  dismissed  on  the  merits. — 
Brunner  v.  Cauley,  22  N.W.Sd  481, 
248  Wis.  330. 

63,  Cal.— Majors    v.    Majors,    App., 
161  P.2d  494. 


64.  Kan.— Mitchell  v.  Derby  Oil  Co., 
2132  P.  224,  117  Kan.  520. 

Tex. — Simmonds  v.  St.  Louis,  B.  & 
M.  Ry.  Co.,  Com.App.,  29  S.W.2d 
989— Ellzey  v.  Allen,  Civ.App.,  172 
S.W.2d  703,  error  dismissed — Em- 
ployers Casualty  Co.  v.  Hicks  Rub- 
ber Co.,  Civ.App.,  160  S.W.Sd  96, 
error  granted — -Le  Master  v.  Fort 
Worth  Transit  Co.,  Civ.App.,  142 
S.W.2d  908,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  160  S.W.2d  224,  138  Tex. 
512 — Freeman  v.  Schwenker,  Civ. 
App.,  '  73  S.W.2d  609— Smith  v.  El 
Paso  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  Civ.App.f  67 
S.W.2d  862,  error  dismissed — 
Dowd  v.  Klock,  Civ.App.,  268  S.W. 
234,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
Klock  v.  Dowd,  Com. App.,  280  S.W. 
194. 
Arbitrary  refusal  improper 

Trial  judge  may  not  arbitrarily  re- 
fuse to  render  judgment  on  verdict 
on  special  issues  covering  all  facts 
necessary  for  judgment — Cortimeg- 
lia  v.  Davis,  292  S.W.  875,  116  Tex. 
412. 

65.  Tex.— Smith  v.  El  'Paso  &  N*.  E. 
R.    Co.,    Civ.App.,    67    S.W.2d   862, 
error  dismissed. 

66.  N.T. — Outwater  v.  Moore,  26  N. 
E.  -329,  124  N.Y.  66. 

Utah.— Parrott    Bros.    Co.    v.    Ogden 
City,  167  P.  807,  50  Utah  512. 

67.  Ohio. — Sanda   v.    Coverson,    171 
KB.  89,  122  Ohio  <St  258. 

68.  Fla. — Beverette  v.   Graham,   185> 
So.  8*47,  101  Fla.  566. 

69.  Okl.— Rock     Island     Implement 
Co.  v.  Pearsey,  270  (P.  346,  liSS  OkL 
1. 


223 


§  101 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


that  the  clerk  shall  enter  each  day's  proceedings  in 
the  order-book  of  the  court  and  that  the  judge  shall 
sign  them  have  been  held  not  to  limit  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  court  to  render  a  judgment  but  merely  to 
prescribe  the  manner  in  which  it  shall  be  recorded.70 

Who  may  render  judgment.  Since  the  rendition 
of  a  judgment  is  a  judicial  act  of  the  court,  as  dis- 
cussed supra  §  100,  as  a  general  rule  it  must  be 
performed  as  such  by  the  judge  or  magistrate  who 
holds  or  presides  in  such  court,  and  not  by  a  min- 
isterial officer  of  the  court.71  Thus,  in  the  absence 
of  statutory  provision  to  the  contrary,  the  decision 
must  be  rendered  by  the  judge  and  not  by  the  clerk 
of  the  court,  in  order  to  constitute  it  a  judgment.72 
In  some  jurisdictions,  however,  as  discussed  in 
Clerks  of  Courts  §  36,  the  clerks  of  certain  courts 
possess  statutory  authority  to  exercise  designated 
judicial  powers,  and  under  such  statutes  judgments 
rendered  by  clerks  have  all  the  force  and  effect  of 
judgments  rendered  by  the  judge  ;73  but  this  au- 
thority does  not  deprive  the  court  of  jurisdiction  to 
render  judgments  in  such  cases  since  the  authority 


of  the  derk  is  concurrent  with,  and  additional  to, 
that  of  the  judge.74 

§  102.    — -  Mode  and  Sufficiency 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  a  judg- 
ment Is  rendered  when  it  IB  orally  announced  by  the 
court,  or  where  a  general  verdict  is  returned  and  re- 
corded,  or  where  a  special  verdict  or  findings  are  re- 
turned, by  the  announcement  of  the  decision  and  its  en- 
try In  the  minutes. 

Statutory  provisions  with  respect  to  the  mode 
and  sufficiency  of  rendering  judgment  are  control- 
ling.75 Generally,  a  judgment  is  rendered  and  ex- 
ists as  such  when  it  is  orally  announced  from  the 
bench,  and  before  it  has  been  reduced  to  writing 
and  entered  by  the  clerk.™  The  custom,  however, 
of  drawing  a  formal  judgment  and  having  the  judge 
sign  it  is  usually  observed,77  particularly  where  it 
contains  special  provisions  requiring  settlement  by 
the  court  unless  agreed  on  by  the  parties  ;75  but,  un- 
less required  by  statute  or  rule  of  court,70  a  for- 
mal writing  is  unnecessary.80  Settlement  on  no- 


70.  Ind. — Bailer  v.  Dowd,  40  N.E,2d 
325,  219  Ind.  624. 

71.  N.C. — Eborn  v.   Bills,    95    S.13.2d 
238,  225  N.C.  386. 

3(3  C.J.  p  1064  note  63. 

72.  Pa. — School  Dist   of  Haverford 
Tp.,  to  Use  of  Tedesco  v.  Herzog, 
171  A.  456,  *14  Psu  161— Rhinehart 
v.  Jordan,  169  A.  151,  ai*  -Pa.  197. 

3(3  C.J.  p  1065  note  64. 

73.  N.C.— < Williams  v.  Williams.  130 
S.B.  113,  190  N.C.  478— Caldwell  v. 
Caldwell,    128    S.B.    529,    189    N.C. 
805. 

74.  N.C.— Caldwell  v.  CaldweU,  su- 
pra. 

75.  Wis.— Stahl  Y.  Gotzeaberger,  45 
Wis.  121. 

34  C.J.  p  46   note  75,  p  48  note  86. 

76.  Ariz.— Griffith     v.     State     MuL 
Building:   &   Loan   Ass'n,    51    P.2d 
246,  <46  'Ariz.  359— Kinnison  v.  Su- 
perior Court  of  Pima  County,   46 
P.2d   1087,  46  Ariz.   188— Maricopa 
County  Municipal  Water  Conserva- 
tion Dist.  No.  1  T.  Roosevelt  Irr. 
Disk,  6  P.2d  898,  39  Ariz.  357. 

Ind.— Bailer  v.  Dowd,  40  N.B.2d  8'25, 
219  Ind.  6134. 

lowsu— Street  v.  Stewart,  285  N.W. 
204,  226  Iowa  960. 

Kan.— Gates  v.  Gates,  16-3  P.2d  895, 
160  Kan.  428. 

Wis.— Zbikowski  v.  Straz,  294  N.W. 
541,  2!36  -Wis.  161— State  ex  rel. 
Wingenter  v,  'Circuit  Court  for 
Walwortli  County,  248  N.W.  41-8, 
211  "Wis.  661— Karshian  v.  Milwau- 
kee Electric  Ry.  &  Light  Co.,  212 
N.W.  6*3,  192  Wis.  269. 

33  C.J.  p  1191  note  15. 


Necessity   of   writing   generally   see 
supra  §  64. 

Completely  announced 

"A  Judgment  is  not  rendered  un- 
til it  has  been  completely  an- 
nounced."— Corder  v.  Corder,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  189  S.W.2d  100,  102,  error 
refused. 

77.  Ark.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in. 
McConnell    v.    Bourland,    299    S.W. 
44,  48,  175  Ark.  253. 

34  C.J.  p  46  note  73. 

Perusal  "by  Judge  or  counsel 

To  prevent  error,  a  trial  Judge 
should  either  peruse  a  decree  drawn 
by  counsel  or  have  It  done  by  oppos- 
ing counsel,  and  then  direct  its  en- 
try by  a  notation  thereon  signed  by 
him. — Vanderpool  v.  Stewart,  279 
S.W.  645,  212  Ky.  «7B. 

Duty  of  counsel 

(1)  The  duty  of  preparing  orders 
and  decrees  in  conformity  with  ju- 
dicial determinations  rests  on  coun- 
sel.—«Parmly  v.  Parmly,  1  A.2d  646, 
18  N.JJMisc.  447,  affirmed  5  A.2d 
789,  125  N.J.EO.  545. 

C2)  Entry  on  docket  by  trial  court 
was  held  not  to  constitute  "rendition 
of  judgment"  precluding  tried  court 
from  entering  Judgment  at  «,  subse- 
quent term,  where  at  time  of  making 
entry  Question  arose  as  to  what 
judgment  should  be  and  court  direct- 
ed counsel  to  prepare  decree  but  in- 
structed clerk  not  to  enter  it  In  or- 
der book  until  further  directed. — 
Doty  v.  Dowd,  tL5!3  N.E.  431,  85  Ind. 
App.  182. 

78,  Ark.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 

224 


McConnell   v.    Bourland,    299    S.W. 

44,  4*.  175  Ark.  253. 
34  C.J.  p  -46  note  74. 
Settlement  of  decrees  in  equity  see 

Equity  §  590. 
Settlement  of  orders   see  the  C.J.S. 

title  Motions  and  Orders  $  '58,  also 

42  C.J.   p  5132  note   82-p  533   note 

89. 

79.    Ark. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
McConnell    v.   Bourland,    299    S.W. 
44,  48,  175  Ark.  258. 
34  C.J.  p  46  note  75. 
Failure  to  file  Judgment 

The  failure  of  party,  in  whose  fa- 
vor court  decides,  to  file  formal  writ- 
ten judgment  within  five  days  after 
decision,  as  required  by  court  rule, 
does  not  deprive  court  of  Jurisdiction 
to  render  or  sign  judgment  after 
such  period,  but  merely  requires 
such  party  to  go  back  and  comply 
with  rule. — Cahn  v.  Schmitz,  108  P. 
2d  1006,  56'  Ariz.  469. 

SO.    Ark. — Corpus    JUtis    quoted    in. 

McConnell   v.    Bourland,    299    S.W. 

44,  48,  175  Ark.  258. 
34  C.J.  p  46  note  76. 
Signature  by  judge  see  supra  8  85. 

An  entry  in  minute  book  ordering 
that  cause  be  dismissed  is  real  judg- 
ment of  dismissal,  and  subsequent 
formal  Judgment  is  mere  memorial 
or  record  thereof,  irrespective  of 
judge's  signature  thereto. — E.  Clem- 
ens Horst  Co.  v.  Federal  Mut.  Liabil- 
ity Ins.  Co.,  71  P.2d  599,  22  CaLApp. 
2d  548. 

Entry  on  back  of  petition  was  held 
to  evidence  final  disposition  of  cause. 
— O'Connell  v.  Remington,  128  A. 
710,  102  Conn.  401. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  104 


tice  is  not  required  unless  specially  directed.8!  The 
return  and  recording  of  a  general  verdict  under  the 
direction  of  the  court  are  generally  a  sufficient  ren- 
dition of  judgment;  no  further  action  on  the  part 
of  the  court  is  necessary,82  and,  as  discussed  infra 
§  108,  it  is  the  ministerial  duty  of  the  clerk  to  en- 
ter the  proper  judgment  on  the  verdict  Where  a 
special  verdict  or  special  findings  are  returned,  the 
announcement  of  the  decision  in  open  court  and  its 
entry  in  the  minutes  constitute  the  rendition  of  the 
judgment.83 

Notice  of  rendition  of  judgment  is  unnecessary84 
except  where  required  by  statute.8^  The  purpose 
of  notice  required  by  a  statute  before  rendition  of 
judgment,  in  a  case  wherein  judgment  is  not  ren- 
dered at  the  hearing,  but  taken  under  advisement, 
is  to  give  an  opportunity  to  attorneys  to  make  ob- 
jections and  exceptions  to  the  decision.88  The  no- 
tice must  be  given  by  the  court,8?  which  has  au- 
thority to  direct  the  manner  of  service  not  incon- 
sistent with  existing  rules  made  by  paramount  rule 
making  authority.88  Where  this  power  has  not 
been  exercised,  it  has  been  held  that  the  statute  re- 
garding service  of  a  notice  of  a  hearing  of  any  kind 
rather  than  the  statute  relating  to  the  service  of 
pleadings  and  papers  is  applicable.89 

§  103.    Reading  in  Open  Court 

In   some  Jurisdictions  it  Is  required  that  all  Judg- 


ments be  read  and  signed  In  open  court,  but  failure  to 
comply  with  this  requirement  does  net  invalidate  the 
Judgment. 

In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  required  that  all  en- 
tries of  judgment  shall  be  read  in  open  court  be- 
fore being  signed  by  the  judge.90  It  is  not  neces- 
sary for  the  judgment  to  recite  that  it  was  read  in 
open  court,*1  but  that  fact  must  appear  affirmative- 
ly somewhere  on  the  record,92  although  it  has  been 
held  that,  in  the  absence  of  anything  appearing  to 
the  contrary,  it  will  be  presumed  in  support  of  the 
judgment  that  this  requirement  has  been  observed93 
Failure  to  comply  with  this  requirement,  however, 
does  not  invalidate  the  judgment,94  but  merely  holds 
it  in  abeyance  until  it  is  read  and  signed  and  made 
executory;95  and  a  judgment  not  read  and  signed 
may  be  made  final  and  definitive  by  its  voluntary 
execution  by  the  parties.96 

§  104.    — —  Application  and  Order  for  Judg- 
ment 

Unless  required  by  statute  no  special. application  and 
order  for  Judgment  are  necessary,  but  such  a  motion  Is 
not  improper  and  may  be  necessary  where  the  Judgment 
is  not  a  matter  of  course,  and  in  the  absence  of  stat- 
ute no  notice  of  such  a  motion  is  required.  The  order 
for  Judgment  should  direct  the  clerk  to  enter  a  Judgment 
in  the  form  and  terms  specified. 

At  common  law,  it  was  necessary  to  enter  a  rule 
nisi  for  judgment  on  the  verdict,  so  as  to  afford  an 


81.  Colo. — Graybill  v.  Cornelius,  246 
P.  1029,  79  Colo.  498. 

$4  C.J.  p  47  note  77. 

Notice  of  entry  see  infra  8  112. 

Submission  of  Journal  entry 

(1)  Defeated  litigant  is  not  enti- 
tled to   submission  of  formal  judg- 
ment   entry    to    him. — Hanson   v.    S. 
&   L.    Drug   Co.,    212   N.W.    7<31,    208 
Iowa  384. 

(2)  The  journal  entry  of  a  judg- 
ment is  not  reauired  to  be  submit- 
ted so  that  an  attorney  interested  in 
the   litigation   shall   thereby   be   in- 
formed   of   what   has   transpired   in 
the    lawsuit,    since   it   is   attorney's 
duty  to  keep  advised  of  the  trial  as 
it  proceeds  and  to  participate  in  it  to 
extent   of  interests  of  his   client. — 
Wiseman    v.    Richardson,    118    P.2d 
605,  154  Kan.  245. 

82.  Or. — Corpms     Juris     quoted     la 
Haberly  v.  Farmers'  Mut  Fire  Be- 
lief Ass'n,  287  P.  222,  223,  135  Or. 
•32. 

Tex.— Bridgman  v.  Moore,  183  S.W.M 

705,  143  Tex.  250. 
Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  State 

v.  Scott,  247  (P.  -699,  706,  95  Wye. 

108. 
34  C.J.  p  47  note  78. 

S3.    Cal. — Benway  v.  Benway,  159  P. 
2d    682,    €9    Cal.App.2d  S74— Goss- 

.  49  C.  J.S.-15 


man  v.  Gossman,  12 S  P.2d  178,  52 
Cal.App.2d  184— Lind  v.  Baker,  119 
P.2d  806,  48  Cal.ABP.2d  234— Maga- 
rian  v.  Moser,  42  P.2d  385,  5  Cat 
App.2d  208. 
34  C.J.  p  43  note  83. 
Necessity  of  findings 

Orally  ordered  judgment  entered 
in  minutes  was  not  rendition  of 
judgment  in  the  absence  of  the  find- 
ings required  by  statute,  and  court 
could  change  it— Tilden  Lumber  & 
Mill  Co.  v.  Bacon  Land  Co.,  «  P.2d 
350,  116  CaLApp.  689. 

84.  Mo.— Mc'Cormick     v.     Stephens, 
124  S.W.  1076,   141  Mo.App.  236. 

34  C.J.  p  47  note  77  [a],  p  611  note 
27* 

85.  N.M.— R.  V.  Smith  -Supply  Co.  v. 
Black,    88   P.2d  269,   413   N.M.   177. 

i34  C.J.  p  '61  note  26. 

86.  N.M.— R.   V.   Smith  Supply  €•• 
y.  Black,  supra. 

87.  N.M.— R.   V.   Smith  Supply   Co. 
Y.  Black,  supra. 

88.  N.M.— R.   V.   Smith  Supply, Co. 
v.  Black,  supra. 

89.  N.M.— R.   V.   Smith  Supply   Co. 
v.  Black,  supra. 

90.  In*.— Brant  v.  Lincoln  Nat.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  of  Fort  Wayne,  198  NJE. 
785,  209  Ind.  268. 

225 


La. — Jackson  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  App., 
151  So.  316. 

34  C.J.  p  48  note  87. 

Rendition  in  open  court  see  supra  § 
16. 

91«  La.— Woodlief  v.  Logan.  28  So. 
716,  50  LaAnn.  4'38. 

34  C.J.  p  49  note  88. 

Jurisdictional  recitals  see  supra  S 
7L 

92.  La. — Richardson  v.  Turner,  28 
So.  158,  52  La.Ann.  1613. 

34  C.J.  p  49  note  89. 

93-  Ind.— Indiana,  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bird,  18  NJBL  837,  116  Ind.  217,  9 
Am.S.E,  842. 

N.T.— Clapp  v.  Hawley,  97  N.Y.  610. 

Presumptions  as  to  jurisdiction  on 
collateral  attack  see  infra  §  425. 

94.  Ind.— Cadwell  V.  Teany,  157  N. 
B.  5tt,  199  Ind.  634,  certiorari  de- 
nied Cadwell  v.  Teaney,  48  S.Ct 
601,  277  U.S.  605,  72  L.Ed.  1011, 

La. — Jfeckson  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  App., 
151  So.  816. 

Statute  held  directory 

Ind. — Brant  v.  Lincoln  Nat  Life  Ins. 
Co.  of  Fort  Wayne,  19*  N.E.  785, 
209  'Ind.  268. 

96.  La,— Jackson  v.  Swift  &  Co., 
App.,  151  So.  816. 

96.  La, — Jackson  T.  Swift  &  Co.,  su- 
pra. 


§ 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


opportunity  to  move  for  a  new  trial  or  in  arrest87 
Usually  no  special  application  and  order  for  judg- 
ment are  now  necessary,98  unless  required  by  stat- 
ute," the  judgment  being  rendered  and  entered  as 
a  matter  of  course  on  the  verdict  or  decision.1  It 
is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  give  judgment  on  the 
verdict  or  decision  without  a  motion  for  that  pur- 
pose,2 even  in  the  case  of  a  special  verdict  or  spe- 
cial findings.8  A  formal  motion  for  judgment,  how- 
ever, even  if  not  necessary,  is  not  improper,4  par- 
ticularly where  it  is  to  be  entered  on  a  special  ver- 
dict or  special  findings,5  and,  where  the  judgment 
is  not  a  matter  of  course,  an  application  or  motion 
therefor  may  be  necessary.6  Both  parties  may  pre- 
sent motions  for  judgment  on  the  findings  in  a 
case  submitted  on  special  issues.7  The  party  de- 
siring to  show  cause  why  judgment  should  not  be 
entered  should  do  so  on  the  hearing  of  the  motion 
for  judgment.8 

Notice  of  application  or  motion.  Unless  required 
by  statute,  no  notice  of  application  for  judgment  is 
necessary,9  and  it  is  not  error  for  the  court  to  sign 
a  judgment  or  decree  without  notice  to  the  par- 
ties.10 An  application  for  judgment  is  not  a  mo- 
tion within  statutes  prescribing  the  notice  to  be 
given  on  a  motion.11  Where,  however,  a  motion 


for  judgment  is  necessary,  notice  thereof  is  usually 
required  to  be  given  to  the  opposite  party,12  al- 
though failure  or  insufficiency  of  the  notice  will 
not  vitiate  a  judgment  otherwise  regular,  to  which 
the  moving  party  was  clearly  entitled,13  and,  of 
course,  notice  may  be  waived  by  the  party  entitled 
thereto.1* 

Determination  of  application  or  motion.  Error 
prior  to  verdict  is  sufficient  ground  for  denial  of  a 
motion  for  judgment  on  the  verdict;16  and,  where 
the  record  does  not  show  a  rendition  of  a  verdict,  a 
judge,  not  in  office  at  the  time  of  the  supposed  pro- 
ceedings, may  properly  deny  a  motion  for  judgment 
on  the  verdict.1^  The  refusal  of  the  court  to  or- 
der judgment  on  special  jury  findings  which  are 
in  irreconcilable  conflict,  in  effect,  sets  the  verdict 
aside.17  A  motion  for  judgment  on  special  findings 
and  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  differ  both  as  to  con- 
tent and  relief  sought18  A  motion  for  a  new  trial 
does  not  waive  a  pending  motion  for  judgment  on 
the  verdict,19  or  concede  the  right  of  the  opposite 
party  to  a  judgment  on  the  verdict,  unless  a  new 
trial  is  granted.20  Under  some  statutes  a  trial  court 
has  no  power  to  render  judgment  on  a  jury's  special 
verdict  until  a  pending  motion  for  a  new  trial  has 
been  passed  on  and  overruled.21 


97.  Md.— Heiskell  v.  Rollins,  32  A. 
249,  81  Md.  -397. 

34  C.J.  p  49  note  91. 

On  report  of  referee  see  infra  §  105. 

98.  111.-— Woodward  v.  Ruel,  188  N. 
B.  911.  355  111.  16,3. 

S.C. — Joiner  v.  Bevier,  152  S.B.   652, 

155  S.C.  '340. 
Tex. — White  v.  Haynes»  Civ.App.,  60 

*S.W.2d    275,    error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  49  note  92. 

99.  N.P.— Gould  v.  Duluth  &  D.  El. 
Co.,   54  N.W.  1316,   8'N.D.  96. 

3*4  C. J.  p  49  note  93. 

1.    S.C. — Joiner  v.   Bevier,    152    S.B. 

652,  155  S.C.  340. 
34  C.J.  p  49  note  94. 
Entry  by  clerk  see  infra  §  106. 
Single  conclusion 

Where  verdict  was  interpretative 
of  but  single  conclusion,  motion  for 
judgment  was  not  essential  to  au- 
thorize court  to  render  necessary  or- 
der carrying1  verdict  into  effect. — 
White  v.  Haynes,  Tex.Civ.App.,  60 
S.W.2d  275,  error  dismissed. 
2-  Ind. — Masterson  v.  Southern  R. 

Co.,  App.,  81  N.B.  730. 
34  C.J.  p  49  note  95. 

3.  Ind. — Carthage  Tump.  Co.  v.  Ov- 
erman,   48   N.B.   '874,    875,   19   (End. 
App.  )309. 

34  C.J.  p  49  note  96. 

4.  Mich. — Knack     v,     Wayne     Cir. 
Judge,    111    N.W,    161,    147    Mich. 
485. 

34  C.J.  p  49  note  17. 


5.  Iowa.— Jolly  v.  Doolittle,  149  N. 
W.  890,  1-69  Iowa  658. 

34  C.J.  p  49  note  98. 

6.  N.Y.— Maicas  v.  Leony,  2  N.Y.S. 
831,  50  Hun  178,  22  AbbJN.Cas.   1, 
modified  on  other  grounds  20  N.B. 
586,    UlS   N.Y.    619,    2   S11V.A.    153. 
22  Abb.N.Cas.  465. 

34  C.J.  p  49  note  99. 
Motion   for   Judgment   non   obstante 
v.eredicto  see  supra  §  61. 

7.  Tex. — Cortimeglia  v.  Herron,  Civ. 
App.,  281  S.W.  305. 

8.  Mich. — McConnell     v.      Merrlam, 
203  N.W.   661,   231  Mich.  184. 

9.  111.— Woodward  v.  Ruel,  188  N.B. 
911,  -355  111.  163. 

84C.J.  p  50  note  2. 

ia    '111. — Woodward  v.  Ruel,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  50  note  3. 

Agreement  to  give  notice 

Fact  that  counsel  breached  alleged 
promise  to  notify  opposing  counsel 
with  respect  to  motion  for  Judgment 
did  not  impair  court's  Jurisdiction  to 
grant  motion. — Albright  v.  Moeckley, 
Iowa,  237  N.W.  309. 

11.  N.Y.— Parker  v.  Linden,  13  N.Y. 
&  95,  59  Hun  359. 

84  C.J.  p  50  note  4. 

Necessity  for  notice  of  motion  gen- 
erally see  the  C.J.S.  title  Motions 
and  Orders,  also  42  C.J.  p  480 
notes  73-77. 

12.  Wis.— Massing  v.  Ames,  36  Wis. 
409. 

54  C.J.  p  50  note  5. 

226 


Notice  held  sufficient 

Notice  that  contractor  would  move 
for  mandatory  injunction  for  pay- 
ment of  Judgment  was  sufficient  .to 
notify  that  city  contractor  would  ask 
for  Judgment  for  balance  due  under 
contract.— City  of  Owensboro  v.  No- 
lan, 46  -S.W.2d  490,  242  Ky.  <342. 

13.  Wis.— Pormann  v.  Frede,  59  N. 
W.  385,  72  Wis.  226. 

14.  Ky.— Millett    v.    Millett,    6    Ky. 
Op.  431. 

N.Y.— Bartlett  v.  Lundin,  169  N.T.S. 
$91,  182  AppJDiv.  117. 

15.  N.C.— Powers  v.  Wilmington,  99 
8.B.  102,  177  N.C.  -361. 

16.  W.Va.— Charleston  Trust  Co.  v. 
Todd,  H31   S.B.   638,  HOI  W.Va.  81. 

17.  Tex.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Chap- 
man, Civ.App.,  255  S.W.  807. 

18.  Tax. — Cortimeglia     v.     Herron, 
Civ.App.,  281  S.W.  805. 

19.  Ind.— Leslie  v.  Merrick,  99  Ind. 
180— Voris   v.    Star   City   Bldg.    & 
Loan  Ass'n,   50   N.B.   779,    20   Ind. 
App.  6'30. 

SO,  Ind.— Cincinnati,  L,  St.  L.  &  C. 
R.  Co.  v.  Grames,  34  N.B.  613,  8 
Ind.  A  pp.  112,  motion  for  leave  to 
withdraw  petition  granted  37  N.B. 
421,  8  Ind.App.  112. 

21.  Ohio. — Boedker  v.  Warren  B. 
Richards  Co.,  176  N.B.  660,  124 
Ohio  St.  12 — Globe  Indem.  Co.  v. 
Schmitt,  6(3  NJS3.2d  169,  76  Ohio 
App.  85. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


Order  for  judgment.  The  application  for  judg- 
ment, if  successful,  should  be  followed  by  an  or- 
der of  court  directing  the  clerk  to  enter  a  judgment 
in  the  form  and  terms  specified,^  taking  in  every 
phase  of  the  case  that  is  ripe  for  judgment^  and  a 
mere  expression  of  the  court's  opinion  that  a  des- 
ignated party  is  entitled  to  recover,  is  not  suffi- 
cient^ It  has  been  held  that  the  order  for  judg- 
ment does  not  become  final  until  signed  by  the 
judge,2^  but  according  to  other  authority  the  sig- 
nature of  the  judge  to  the  order  is  unnecessary.2* 


§  105 


§  105. 


On  Report  of  Referee 


Under  some  statutes  the  report  of  the  referee  direct- 
Ing  Judgment  constitutes  the  decision  and  Judgment  of 
the  court,  and  It  la  the  ministerial  duty  of  the  clerk  to 
enter  Judgment  precisely  in  accordance  with  the  direc- 
tions of  the  report;  but,  In  the  absence  of  statute  or  in 
cases  not  within  the  scope  of  the  statutory  authority, 
application  to  the  court  for  Judgment  on  the  report  must 
be  made. 


A  reference  is  a  mode  of  trial  authorized  in 
some  cases,  and  a  judgment  rendered  on  a  report 
of  a  referee  is  equally  valid  as  when  founded  on  a 
verdict  or  a  decision  of  the  court,27  although  it  has 
also  been  held  that,  in  the  absence  of  statutory  au- 
thority, a  judgment  must  be  rendered  on  the  deci- 
sion of  the  court  or  the  verdict  of  a  jury,  and  can- 
not be  based  on  the  report  of  a  referee,2*  and  that 
in  any  case  a  judgment  cannot  be  rendered  on  the 
report  of  a  referee  where  the  referee  is  not  given 
authority  to  hear  and  determine  the  issues  but  is 
simply  required  to  take  proof  of  all  the  material 
facts  and  to  report  them  to  the  court  with  his  opin- 
ion thereon.29 

Under  some  statutes,  where  a  reference  of  the 
whole  case  to  a  referee  to  hear  and  determine  is 
authorized,  the  report  of  the  referee  directing  judg- 
ment for  one  party  or  the  other  constitutes  the  de- 
cision and  judgment  of  the  court,8<>  and  it  is  the 


22.    Mass.— -Treblas    v.    New    York 

Life    Ins.   Co.,    196   NJB.    908.    291 

Mass.  IB  8. 
34  C.J.  p  50  note  11. 
Grant  of  stay 

An  oral  direction  by  the  Judge, 
granting  "ten  days'  stay,"  when  di- 
recting entry  of  Judgment  Is  gen- 
erally to  be  regarded  as  meaning 
merely  a  stay  of  execution. — Gers- 
man  v.  Levy,  108  N.Y.a  1107,  57 
Misc.  156. 
Judge's  findings  as  order 

Where,  after  an  order  of  Judgment 
for  defendant  was  reversed,  case  was 
heard  on  same  "statement  of  agreed 
facts/'  Judge's  finding  for  plaintiff 
and  assessing  damages  of  one  dol- 
lar would  be  regarded  as  an  order 
for  Judgment — King  Features  Syndi- 
cate v.  Cape  Cod  Broadcasting  Co., 
Mass.,  64  N.E.2d  925. 
Statute  held  inapplicable 

Statute  prohibiting1  actual  entry 
of  Judgment  until  pending  excep- 
tions are  disposed  of  is  inapplicable 
to  order  for  Judgment  pending  excep- 
tions to  refusal  to  recommit  audi- 
tor's reports. — Treblas  v.  New  York 
Life  'Ins.  Co.,  196  NM.  908,  291  Mass. 
138. 

Order  notwithstanding1  exceptions 

An  order  for  the  entry  of  Judg- 
ment on  finding  notwithstanding  ex- 
ceptions seasonably  filed,  but  not 
acted  on  by  Judge,  is  proper. — Bath 
Iron  Works  v.  Savage,  159  NJQ.  445, 
262  Mass.  1213. 

23.  Pa. — Federal  Land  Bank  of  Bal- 
timore v.  King,  1419  A.  500,  294  (Pa. 
86. 

24.  N.Y.— Hall  v.  Beaton,  41$  N.Y.S. 
304,  1<3  App.Div.  116. 

34  C.J.  p  50  note  12. 

25.  Ky. — Wolff  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins. 
Co.,   *2   S.W.2d  548,    236   Ky.   1. 


36.    Or. — Oxman    v.    Baker    County, 

2134  P.  799, 115  Or.  436. 
Pa. — Secretary  of  Banking  v.  Miller, 

Com.PL,  40  Lack.Jur.  17. 

27.  CaL— Sandoval  v.  Salazar,  207  P. 
9i37,  57  CaLApp.  756. 

Ga.— McCoy  v.  Johnson,  1*31  S.E.  475, 
161  Ga.  688. 

N.Y.— *n  re  National  Surety  Co.,  26 
N.T.S.2d  370,  17-6  Misc.  53— Feeter 
v.  Heath,  11  Wend.  477. 

Wash.— State  ex  rel.  Bloom  v.  Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  King  Coun- 
ty, 18  P.2d  510,  171  Wash.  586. 

34  C.J.  p  50  note  14. 

Operation  and  effect  of  report  of 
referee  generally  see  the  C.J.S. 
title  References  5  140,  also  58  C.J. 
p  757  note  30-p  758  note  43. 

Judgments  on  awards  see  Arbitration 
and  Award  §5  ,124,  129. 

Time  of  entry  of  Judgment  on  re- 
port see  infra  $  11£. 

Special  verdict 

(1)  Findings  of  referee  have  .effect 
of  special  verdicts  if  they  are  sus- 
tained by  trial  court,  and,  if  so  sus- 
tained, they  are  binding  if  there  is 
any  substantial  evidence  to  support 
them.— City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Parker- 
Washington   Co.,  196    S.W.   767,    271 
Mo.    229,    certiorari   denied  38    S.Ct. 
11,  245  U.S.   651,  62  I*Ed.  581— Rei- 
necke  v.  Jod,  56  Mo.  986. 

(2)  Statute  providing  that  on  con- 
firmation   of    the    report    Judgment 
may  be  entered  thereon  as  on  a  spe- 
cial verdict  does  not  apply  where  the 
court   does   not   confirm   the  report, 
but  sustains  exceptions  thereto  and 
makes    Independent    findings.— -State 
ex  rel.  KimbreU  v.  People's  Ice  Stor- 
age  &  Fuel  Co.,   151  S.W.   101,   246 
Mo.  168. 

If  the  report  is  lost,  Judgment  may 
be  rendered  on  a  copy  of  it — Little 

227 


v.    Gardner,    5   N.H.    415,    22   AxnJD. 

468. 

Form  of  action  immaterial 

Where  a  cause  is  tried  by  a  ref- 
eree, Judgment  must  be  rendered  ac- 
cording to  the  facts  reported,  regard- 
less of  the  form  of  action,  if  the 
court  can  allow  an  amendment  to  the 
declaration  which  will  adapt  it  to 
the  facts.— Camp  v.  Barber,  88  A. 
812,  87  Vt  235,  Ann.Cas.l917A  451. 
Entry  of  Judgment  on  report  held 
proper 

(1)  Generally.— Bank  of  Marlinton 
v.  >Pocahontas  Development  Co.,  106 
S.B.  881,  88  W.Va.  414. 

(2)  In  actions  not  referrable  under 
statute,  if  the  parties  refer  the  cause 
to    referees    by    stipulation,    and    if 
the  submission  provides  that  a  Judg- 
ment may  be  entered  on  the  report 
or  award,  and  Judgment  is  entered 
accordingly,  the  parties  are  conclud- 
ed by  their  agreement,   and   cannot 
be  heard  to  allege  that  the  reference 
and  Judgment  were  not  warranted  by 
law.— Green    v.    (Patchin,    N.T.,    1-3 
Wend.  298,  295— Tates  v.  Russell.  N. 
T.,  d7   Johns.   461 — Monroe  Bank  v. 
Widner,  N.Y.,  11  Paige  529,  413  Am. 
D.  7«68. 

88.  Ohio.— Bldridge  v.  Woolsey,  4 
Ohio  Dec.,  Reprint,  45,  Clev.L,.Rec. 
59. 

29-  N.T. — Sullivan  v.  Sullivan,  41 
N.Y.Super.  519,  52  How.Pr.  458. 

30.    N.T. — Ward  v.  Branson,  110  N. 

T.S.    $35,   126   App.Dlv.    508. 
34  C.J.  p  50  note  17. 
General  reference 

Where  a  reference  is  general,  find- 
ings in  report  of  referees  form  suf- 
ficient basis  to  support  the  Judgment 
of  the  court. — Blalock  v.  Dunger,  272 
P.  1048,  205  Cal.  782— Board  of  Edu- 
cation of  San  Pranclsco  United 


§  105 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ministerial  duty  of  the  clerk  to  enter  the  appropri- 
ate judgihent  thereon  without  confirmation  or  fur- 
ther directions  by  the  court,31  and  without  notice,32 
unless  notice  is  required  by  law,33  precisely  as  in 
the  case  of  a  general  verdict  by  a  jury,  or  the  de- 
cision of  the  court  in  a  case  tried  without  a  jury, 
as  discussed  supra  §  102.  In  form,  the  judgment 
is  to  be  entered  as  though  pronounced  by  the  court34 
.  and  must  be  precisely  in  accordance  with  the  direc- 
tions of  the  report,  as  discussed  supra  §  55. 

If  the  report  does  not  sufficiently  direct  the  par- 
ticular form  and  terms  of  the  judgment  to  be  en- 
tered, the  court  has  power  to  supply  the  deficien- 
cy,86 provided  the  referee  has  made  findings  ade- 
quate for  final  judgment,86  and  application  must  be 
made  to  the  court  to  frame  or  settle  the  judgment 
to  be  entered,37  because  the  clerk  cannot  act  judi- 
cially,38 and,  as  discussed  supra  §  101,  the  rendi- 
tion of  a  judgment  is  a  judicial  act  which  usually 
must  be  performed  by  a  judicial  officer  of  the  court 
In  such, cases  a  judgment  entered  by  the  clerk  on 
the  report  without  direction  of  the  court  is  wholly 
void,  and  not  merely  irregular.3* 


The  practice  of  entering  judgment  as  of  course 
by  the  clerk  on  the  report  of  a  referee  is  limited  to 
the  cases  in  which  it  is  authorized  by  statute,  and 
is  subject  to  all  statutory  exceptions,  qualifications, 
and  provisions.40    In  the  absence  of  statute  author- 
izing the  entry  of  judgment  by  the  clerk  on  the  re- 
port of  a  referee,  or  in  cases  not  within  the  scope 
of  the  statutory  authority,  the  proper  practice  is 
to  make  application  to  the  court  for  judgment  on 
the  report,  on  such  notice  as  may  be  required,  after 
exceptions  and  objections  to  the  report  have  been 
passed  on,  and  the  report  has  been  confirmed.41 
Thereupon  the  court  properly  pronounces  judgment 
on  the  report42    In  the  absence  of  statutory  au- 
thority therefor  the  referee  has  no  power  to  ren- 
der judgment4*    After  confirmation,  errors  of  the 
referee  cannot  be  considered  in  opposition  to  a  mo- 
tion for  judgment  on  the  report,  the  only  remedy 
for  such  errors  being  an  application  to  set  aside  the 
report  and  for  a  new  trial.44    The  judgment  framed 
or  settled  by  the  court  must  be  the  one  directed  in 
the  report  of  the  referee;  the  court  has  no  power 
or  authority  to  give  directions  which  require  the 
entry  of  a  judgment  substantially  different  from 


School   Dist.   v.    Mulcahy,    12$    P.2d 
114,  50  Cal.App.2d  518. 

31.  Cal. — Lewis  v.  Grunberg,  270  P. 
181,  205  CaL  158. 

N.Y. — Corr  v.  Hoffman,  176  N.E.  3&S, 

256  N.Y.  254. 
34  C.J.  p  50  note  17. 
Entry  by  clerk  see  Infra  9  106. 

32.  Colo. — Terpening  T.    Holton,    12 
P.  189,  9  Colo.  (806. 

34  C.J.  P  51  note  18. 

33.  N.D. — Gould    T.     Duluth    &    3D. 
El.  Co.,  54  N.W.  816,  3  N.D.  96. 

34  C.J.  p  51  note  19. 

34.  N.Y.— Hancock    v.    Hancock,    22 
N.Y.  568. 

35.  N.T. — In   re  Thompson,    288  N. 
Y.S.   897,   247  App.Div.  605. 

34  C.J.  p  51  note  24. 

Sufficiency  of  direction  of  Judgment 

in  report  of  referee  see  the  C.J.S. 

title  References  §  139,  also  53  C.J. 

p  754  note  97. 

36.  N.Y. — Hinds  v.  Kellogg,  13  N.Y 
S.   922,  affirmed  30  N.E.  1143,  133 
N.Y.  5136. 

S.C.— • Brown  v.  Rogers,   61  S.E.  440, 
80  S.C.  289. 

37.  N.Y.— Matter  of  Baldwin,  34  N, 
Y.S.  435,  87  Hun  1372. 

34  C.J.  p  51  note  2"6. 

38.  N.Y.— Matter  of  Baldwin,  34  N 
Y.S.  4-35,   87  Hun  <372,   25  N.Y.Civ 
Proc.   6,  2  N.Y.Ann.Cas.  187— Mai- 
cas  v.  Leony,  2  N.Y.S.  831,  50  Hun 
178,   22  Abb.N.Cas.  lf  modified  on 
other  grounds  20  N.B.  586,  113  N 
Y.  619,  2  SUV.A.  153,  22  AbTxN.Cas 
465. 


>.    N.Y.— Matter  of  Baldwin,  4  N.Y. 
•S.    372,    87    Hun    372,    25   N.Y.Civ. 
Proc.    6,    2   N.Y.Ann.Caa.   187. 
14  C.J.  p  51  note  29. 

40.  N.Y.— Matter  of  Potter,  8  N.Y.S. 
261,  44  Hun  197. 

34  C.J.  P  52  note  81. 

41.  N.J.— Clayton  v.  Levy,  9  X  755, 
49  N.J.Law  577. 

34  C.J.  p  52  note  32. 

Objections  and  exceptions  to,  and 
confirmation  of,  referee's  report 
see  the  C.J.S.  title  References  §§ 
150,  164,  195,  also  5-3  C.J.  p  768 
note  43-p  769  note  63,  p  772  note 
7-p  77!3  note  17,  p  786  note  20-p 
787  note  44. 

42.  Conn. — Di  Francesco   v.   Moom- 
jian,  14!3  A.  900,  108  Conn.  515. 

Mo.— O'Reilly  v.   Cleary,    8   Mo.App. 

186. 
N.Y.— Saal  v.  South  Brooklyn  R.  Co., 

106    N.Y.S.    996,    122   App.Div.  864 
Order  for  judgment 

(1)  Orders  held  proper. — Chehames 
v.   Lafayette  Square  Restaurant,   85 
N.B.2d  482,  306  Mass.  618— Walsh  v. 
Cornwell,   172    NJB.    855,    272    Mass. 
555. 

(2)  Where  cases  were  referred  to 
an  auditor  who   filed  a  report  anc 
it  was  stipulated  that  his  findings  of 
fact    should    be    final,    auditor's    re 
port  was  in  effect  a  "case  stated' 
and  action  of  judge  allowing  motion 
for  judgment  on  the  auditor's  report 
was  an  order  for  judgment  in  each 
case.— -Union  Old  Lowell  Nat  Bank 
v.  Paine,  Mass.,  61  N.B.2d  666. 

228 


Payment  of  claim* 

Where  an  audit  is  confirmed,  the 
approved  practice  is  also  to  pass  an 
order  to  pay  the  claims  wnich  were 
hereby  allowed;  but  the  judgment 
of  the  court  is  effectually  pronounced 
on  a  claim  by  confirming  the  audi- 
tor's report,  if  no  steps  are  taken  to 
revoke  or  overrule  it. — Lee  v.  Botel- 
er,  12  Oill  &  J.,  Md.,  2213. 

Supplemental  report 

In  action  for  damages,  where  case 
was  referred  to  an  auditor  whose 
findings  of  fact  were  to  be  final,  and 
auditor's  ultimate  finding  for  defend- 
ant in  supplemental  report  was  not 
vitiated  by  any  error  of  law  appear- 
ing on  face  of  supplemental  report 
or  on  as  much  of  original  report  as 
was  not  superseded  by  supplemental 
report,  the  ultimate  finding  "was  con- 
clusive that  plaintiff  did  not  prove 
that  it  had  a  cause  of  action,  and 
hence  ordering  judgment  for  defend- 
ant was  proper,  although  auditor's 
original  report  found  that  plaintiff 
could  recover.— Old  Mill  DPoint  Club 
v.  Paine,  33  N.B.2d  257,  808  Mass. 
505. 

Th*  party  in  whose  favor  the  ref- 
eree finds  is  entitled  to  have  judg- 
ment entered  on  the  report. — Holt  v. 
Kirby,  39  Me.  16<4. 

43.  Cal. — Sandoval   v.   Salazar,    207 
OP.  9,37,  57  CaLApp.  756. 

5i3  C.J.  p  742  note  69. 

44.  N.J. — Clayton  v.  Levy,  9  A.  755, 
49  N.J.I*aw  577, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


106 


that  prescribed  in  the  referee's  report45  without  set- 
ting aside  the  referee's  findings  and  making  a  find- 
ing of  fact  to  sustain  the  court's  judgment.4^ 

§  106.    Entry  Generally 

a.  General  statement 

b.  What  constitutes  entry 

a.  General  Statement 

Entry  of  Judgment  Is  the  ministerial  or  clerical  act 
of  spreading  the  Judgment  at  large  on  the  record  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  Judicial  act  of  giving  or  pronounc- 
ing Judgment. 

Although  it  has  been  said  that  courts  act  judi- 


cially in  entering  their  judgments,47  the  great 
weight  of  authority  is  that  the  entry  of  judgment  is 
a  ministerial  or  clerical  act,48  required  to  be  done 
by  the  clerk  of  the  court,  as  discussed  infra  §  108, 
and  consists  of  placing  a  judgment  previously  ren- 
dered on  the  record,49  by  which  enduring  evidence 
of  the  judicial  act  is  afforded.50  While  the  term 
"entry  of  judgment"  is  sometimes  used  in  a  general 
sense  so  as  to  include  rendition  of  judgment,51  it  is 
most  often  used  in  a  more  limited  and  precise  sense 
as  meaning  the  ministerial  act  of  spreading  the 
judgment  at  large  on  the  record  as  distinguished 
from  the  judicial  act  of  giving  or  pronouncing  judg- 
ment.52 There  must  be  a  compliance  with  statutes 


45.  N.Y. — In   re   Thompson,   288   N. 
T.S.  897,  247  App.Div.  605. 

34  C.J.  p  51  note  80.  / 

46.  N.C. — Greer  v.  Board  of  Oom'rs 
of  Watauga  County,  U85  S.E.  862, 
192  N.C.   714— Davis  v.  Davis.  113 
S.E.  61'3,  194  N.C.  108. 

Trial  or  another  reference 

After  setting  aside  a  referee's  re- 
port, it  has  been  held  that  the  court 
cannot  enter  a  judgment  without  a 
further  trial  or  another  reference. 
Iowa. — Lyons  v.  Harris,  34  N.W.  864, 

73  Iowa  292. 

Mich.— Rice  v.  Benedict,  18  Mich.  75. 
Okl. — Kingfisher  Imp.  Co.  y.  Board  of 

Coxn'rs  of  Jefferson  County,  168  Pi 

824,  825,  66  Okl.  220. 

47.  Miss. — Mohundro    v.    Board    of 
Sup'rs  of  Tippah  County,  165  So* 
124,  174  Miss.  512. 

48.  u.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  U. 
S.  v.  Rayburn,  C.C.A.Iowa,  91  F.2d 
162,  164. 

Ala.— Mt.  Vernon-Woodberry  Mills 
v.  Union  Springs  Guano  Co.,  155 
So.  710,  26  Ala.  App.  136,  certiorari 
denied  155  So.  716,  229  Ala.  91. 

Cal. — Brown  v.  Superior  Court  of 
California  in.  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  2134  P.  409,  70  CaLApp.  782. 

Fla.— St  Lucie  Estates  v.  Palm 
Beach  Plumbing  Supply  Co.,  133 
So.  841,  101  Fla.  205. 

Ga.— Deck  v.  Deck,  20  S.B.2d  1,  193 
Ga.  7139. 

111. — 'People  ex  rel.  Waite  v.  Bristow, 
62  N.E.2d  545,  391  HI.  101— Wal- 
lace Grain  &  Supply  Co.  v.  Cary, 
24  N.E.2d  907,  <303  IlLApp.  221,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  28  N.E.2d 
107,  374  111.  57. 

Mich.— Motyka  v.  Detroit,  G.  H.  & 
M.  Ry.  Co.,  244  N.W.  897,  260  Mich. 
396. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Welch 
v.  Kroger  Grocery  Co.,  177  So.  41, 
42,  180  Miss.  89. 

N.H.— Tuttle  v.  Tuttle,  196  A.  $2<4, 
89  N.H.  219. 

N.T.— Application  of  Gleit  S3  N.T.S. 
2d  629,  178  Misc.  198— In  re  Par- 
dee's  Estate,  16  N.Y.S.2d  10,  affirm- 


ed 18  N.T.S.2d  4118,  259  App.Div. 
101. 

Okl. — Peoples  Electric  Co-op,  v. 
Broughton,  127  P.2d  850,  191  Okl. 
229 — Abernathy  v.  Huston,  26  P.2d 
939,  166  OkL  184. 

Or. — Jones  v.  Thompson,  164  P.2d 
718. 

Term'. — Jackson  v.  Jarratt,  52  S.W. 
2d  137,  165  Tenn.  76. 

Tex.— Linton  v.  Smith,  154  S.W.2d 
645,  3J37  Tex.  479— Lewis  v%  Ter- 
rell, CivJLpp.,  154  S.W.2d  151,  er- 
ror refused — Jones  v.  Sun  Oil  Co., 
Civ.App.,  145  S.W.2d  61-5,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  153  S.W.2d  571, 
137  Tex.  353— Sloan  v.  Bichey,  Civ. 
App.,  143  S.W.2d  119,  error  dis- 
missed, Judgment  correct — Perry 
v.  'Perry,  Civ.App.f  122  S.W.2d  726 
— Cleburne  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bowers, 
Civ.App.,  1U3  S.W.2d  578,  conform- 
ing to  answer  to  certified  question 
112  S.W.2d  717,  130  Tex.  687— 
Corbett  v.  Rankin  Independent 
School  Dist,  Civ.App.,  100  S.W.2d 
US— Hudgins  v.  T.  B.  Meeks  Co., 
div.App.,  1  S.W.2d  681— Kittrell 
v.  Fuller,  Civ.App.f  281  S.W.  575 
—Ex  parte  McGraw,  277  S.W.  699, 
700,  102  Tex.Cr.  105. 

Wash.— Beetchenow  v.  Bartholet,  298 
P.  335,  162  Wash.  119. 

Wis.— Netherton  v.  Frank  Holton  & 
Co.,  205  N.W.  388,  189  Wis.  461,  or- 
der vacated  denying  motion  to  dis- 
miss appeal  206  N.W.  919,  189  Wis. 
461,  mandate  vacated  207  N.W.  953, 
189  Wis.  461. 

34  C.J.  p  55  note  60. 

Entry  and  enrollment  of  decrees  see 
Equity  %  592. 

Entry  of  judgments  in  federal  courts 
see  Federal  Courts  3  14'4  a. 

49.    U.S. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 

United  States   v.  Bayburn,  C.C.A. 

Iowa,  91  F.2d  162,  164. 
Ariz. — American  Surety  Co.  of  New 

York  v.  Mosher.  64  P.2d  1025,  48 

Ariz.  552. 
ni.— Wallace  Grain  &  Supply  Co.  v. 

Cary,   24  N.E.2d  907,  -303    IlLApp. 

221,  reversed  on  other  grounds  28 

N.B.2d  107,  874  111.  57, 
Mich,— Motyka  v.  Detroit,   G.  H.   & 

229 


M.  Ry.  Co.,  244  N.W.  897,  260  Mich. 

396. 
N.H.— Tuttle  v.  Tuttle,  196  A.  624,  89 

N.H.  219. 
Tex. — Ex   parte    McGraw,    277    S.W. 

699,  102  Tex.Cr.  105, 
34  C.J.  p  55  note  62. 
Eatry  as  to  invalidity 

A  court  entering  a  judgment  which 
is  void  for  want  of  Jurisdiction  has 
the  jurisdiction  to  journalize  the  in- 
validity of  the  judgment  by  appro- 
priate entry  without  being  moved 
to  do  so  by  anyone. — State  ex  rel. 
Ehmann  v.  Schneider,  Ohio  App.,  67 
N.E.2d  117. 

50.  Ala. — Mt         Vernon-Woodberry 
Mills  v.  Union  Springs  Guano  Co., 
155   So.  710,  26  Ala. App.   136,  cer- 
tiorari denied  155  So.  716,  229  Ala. 
91. 

D.C. — Conrad  v.  Medina,  MutuApp., 
47  A.2d  562. 

N.H.— Tuttle  v.  Tuttle.  196  A.  62*. 
625,  89  tt.EL  219. 

N.Y.— Application  of  Gleit,  33  N.Y.S. 
2d  629,  178  Misc.  198. 

Tex.— Linton  v.  Smith,  154  S.W.2d 
$43,  Ii37  Tex.  479— Lewis  v.  Terrell, 
Civ.App.,  154  S.W.2d  151,  error  re- 
fused—Jones v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  145  S.W.2d  615,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  15*3  S.W.2d  571,  137 
Tex.  353— Sloan  v.  Richey,  Civ. 
App.,  143  S.W.2d  119,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct-— Perry 
v.  Perry,  Civ.App.,  122  S.W.2d  726 
—Cleburne  Nat  Bank  v.  Bowers, 
Civ,App.,  113  S.W.2d  578,  conform- 
ing to  answer  of  certified  question 
112  S.W.2d  717,  1'30  Texi  6>37 — Cor- 
bett v.  Rankin  Independent  School 
Dist.,  Civ.App.,  100  S.W.2d  113— 
Hudgins  v.  T.  B.  Meeks  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  1  S.W.2d  681— Kittrell  v. 
Fuller,  Civ.App.,  281  S.W.  575. 

51.  Ohio. — Sanda   v.    Coverson,    171 
N.E.  89,  122  Ohio  St  238. 

Tex. — Smith  v.  El  Paso  &  N.  BL  R. 
Co.,    Civ.App.,    67    S.W.2*  362,   er- 
.   ror  dismissed. 

52.  Ark. — Corpus    Jnria    quoted    in 
McConnell  v.   Bourland,   299    S.W. 
44,  48,  ITS  Ark.  253. 


106 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


or  rules  of  court  regulating  the  entry  of  judg- 
ments.58 

t.  What  Constitutes  Entry 

A  Judgment  Is  entered  when  It  IB  spread  at  large  on 
the  record,  and  under  some  statutes  not  until  then,  but 
under  other  statutes  it  has  been  held  entered  when  a 
properly  formulated  entry  is  delivered  to  the  clerk  to  be 
entered,  although  it  Is  not  actually  transcribed  on  the 
record. 

A  judgment  is  entered  when  it  is  spread  at  large 
on  the  record,54  and  under  some  statutes  not  until 
then.55  Until  judgment  forms  signed  by  the  judge 
and  filed  with  the  clerk  are  recorded,  they  are  noth- 
ing more  than  directions  to  the  clerk  to  enter  judg- 
ment in  the  form  specified;  until  such  direction  is 
obeyed,  the  judgment  is  not  entered.58  A  fortiori, 
the  filing  of  a  mere  memorandum,  or  the  making  of 
a  skeleton  entry  in  the  minutes,  giving  the  terms  of 
the  judgment  directed,  does  not  constitute  entry  of 
the  judgment.57  Under  some  statutes,  however,  a 


judgment  is  entered  when  a  signed  copy  of  it  is  de- 
livered to  the  clerk  and  filed  by  him,  although  not 
actually  transcribed  on  the  record,58  or  when  the 
judgment  is  duly  signed  and  filed  by  the  clerk.59 
So  it  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  is  in  law  en- 
tered, at  least  for  some  purposes,  at  the  time  a  prop- 
er entry  thereof  is  formulated  and  given  to  the  clerk 
to  be  entered  of  record.60 


§  107. 


Necessity 


Although  as  between  the  parties  a  duly  rendered 
Judgment  may  be  valid  and  effective  without  entry,  and 
Its  enforcement  does  not  always  depend  on  its  entry, 
the  statutes  generally  require  Judgments  to  be  entered 
and  for  many  purposes  they  are  not  complete,  perfect, 
and  effective  until  this  Is  done. 

As  a  general  rule,  the  decisions  of  all  courts  must 
be  preserved  in  writing  in  some  record  provided  for 
that  purpose.61  Where  a  statute  so  requires,  judg- 
ments should  be  entered,62  and  for  many  purposes 
a  judgment  is  not  complete,  perfect,  and  effective 


Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hazzard 
v.  Alexander,  178  A.  873,  875,  6 
W.W.Harr.  512. 

IncL — State  ex  reL  Bernard  v.  Geck- 
ler,  189  N.E.  842,  98  Ind.App.  456. 

N.Y.— Langrlck  v.  Rowe,  212  N.Y. 
S.  240,  126  Misc.  256. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Haberly 
v.  Farmers'  Mut.  Fire  Relief  Ass'n, 
287  P.  222,  22S,  1«5  Or.  82— In  re 
Gerhardus'  Estate,  23 9  P.  829,  116 
Or.  113, 

Tex.— Kittrell  v.  Fuller,  Civ.ApP., 
281  -S.W,  575. 

34  C.J.  p  45  note  59,  p  52  note  39. 

53.  Ariz. — Southwestern  Freight 
Lines  v.   Shafer,   111   P.2d   625,  57 
Ariz.  111. 

54.  Iowa. — Lotz     v.     United     Food 
Markets,    288    N.W.    99,    225    Iowa 
1*397, 

34  C.J.  p  55  note  63. 

Form  and  contents  of  judgment  see 

supra  55  62-86. 

Mere  refusal  of  motion  for  judg- 
ment non  obstante  veredicto  was  not 
equivalent  to  entry  of  judgment  for 
prevailing  party,  since  judgment  on 
verdict  must  be  entered  by  court  or 
by  its  officer,  at  court's  express  direc- 
tion.— Lamberton  Nat.  Bank  of 
Franklin  v.  Shakespeare,  184  A.  669, 
321  Pa.  449. 

55.  Iowa.— Street  v.  Stewart  285  N. 
W.    204,    226    Iowa,    960— Lotz    v. 
United    Food    Markets,    28*    N.W. 
99,  225  Iowa  1397. 

34  C.J.  p  55  note  64. 
Book  or  place  of  entry  see  infra  S 
110. 

56.  Utah. — Ellinwood     v.     Bennion, 
27.6  P.  159,  7®  Utah  563. 

34  C.J.  p  55  note  65. 

Judge's  signature  to  blank  forms 
of  decree  was  at  most  order  that 


decree  be  entered  when  blanks  were 
filled  by  clerical  staff  of  registry  and 
before  such  filling  order  for  decree 
was  not  entered. — Ambrozewicz  v. 
Lane,  186  N.E.  51,  283  Mass.  141. 

57.  U.S. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Hargis    v.    Swope,   D.C.Ky.,    25    F. 
Supp.  166,  169. 

Oal. — Jackson   v.    Thompson,   110   P. 

2d  470,  43  Cal.App.2d  150. 
Iowa. — Street  v.   Stewart,   285   N.W. 

204,  226  Iowa  960. 
Wyo.— State  v.  Scott,  247  P.  699,  35 

Wyo.  108. 
34  C.J.  p  55  note  66. 
Order   or  memoranda   for  judgment 

see  supra  §  62. 

58.  N.Y.— Edelstein  v.  Oxman,  13  N. 
T.S.2d  95,  171  Misc.  552. 

'Wash. — Cinebar  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
Robinson,  97  P.2d  128,  1  Washed 
620— Mathison  v.  Anderson,  182  P. 
622,  107  Wash.  617. 

34  C.J.  p  56  note  68. 

59.  N.T. — Waterbury  v.  Nassor,  224 
N.T.S.  179,  180,  130  Misc.  200. 

Wis. — Netherton  v.  Frank  Holton  & 
Co.,  206  N.W.  919,  921,  189  Wis. 
461. 

60.  Ohio. — Hower  Corp.  v.  Vance,  59 
N.E.2d    377,     144    Ohio    St    443— 
Amazon  Rubber  Co.  v.  Morewood 
Realty  Holding  Co.,  142  N.E.   363, 
109  Ohio  St  291. 

34  C.J.  p  56  note  69. 

riling  of  Journal  entry,  approved 
by  judge  and  counsel  for  interested 
litigants,  is  an  entry  of  judgment, 
even  though  date  of  actually  spread- 
ing entry  on  journal  may  have  been 
some  time  thereafter. — Columber  v. 
City  of  Kenton,  145  N.E.  12,  13,  111 
Ohio  St.  21L 

Whenever  any  relief  other  than 
for  money  only  or  costs  or  that  there 

230 


be  no  recovery  is  granted,  a  form 
of  judgment  must  be  first  settled 
and  approved  in  writing  by  trial 
court,  and  such  judgment  becomes 
effective  on  its  filing  with  the  clerk 
for  recording  in  the  civil  order  book. 
— Southwestern  Freight  Lines  v. 
Shafer,  111  P.2d  625,  57  Ariz.  111. 

61.  Ala. — Mt         Vernon-Woodberry 
Mills  v.  Union  Springs  Guano  Co., 
155   So.   710,   26  Ala.Apt.   1#6,   cer- 
tiorari  denied  155  So.  716,  229  Ala, 
91. 

Fla. — Magnant  v.   Peacock,    24   So.2d 

(314. 
Ky.— National  Life  &  Accident  Ins. 

Co.  v.  Hedges,   27  S,W.2d  '422,  233 

Ky.  840. 
Miss.— Evans  v.   State,   108   So.   T25, 

144  Miss.  1. 
N.J.— Lyczak   v.    Marguilies,    151    A. 

64,    8    N.J.Misc.    549,    affirmed    162 

A.  590,  109  N.J.Law  852. 
34  C.J.  p  52  note  42. 
Necessity  for  entry  of  judgments  by 

confession  see  infra  §  165. 
Necessity   for  writing  see    supra    § 

64. 

Judgment  appearing  in  minutes 
signed  by  judge  is  that  of  which 
clerk  is  required  to  keep  record. — De 
Zavala  v.  Scanlan,  Tex.Com.App.,  65 
S.W.2d  489. 

62.  N.M. — Animas     Consol.      Mines 
Co.  v.   Frazier,   69  P.2d  9'27,   41  N. 
M.  389. 

N.T. — Cole^v.  Vincent,  242  N.Y.fl.  644, 

229  App.Div.  520. 
34  C.J.  p  53  note  47. 

One  of  the  purposes  of  statute 
relating  to  recordation  of  judgments 
is  to  preserve  by  putting  in  an  en- 
during form  that  which  has  been 
done.— Street  v.  Stewart,  285  N.W. 
204,  226  Iowa  960. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  107 


until  it  has  been  duly  entered.63  Thus  it  has  been 
broadly  held  that  judgments  take  effect  only  from 
the  date  of  entry,64  and  that  there  is  no  judgment 
until  it  is  entered  of  record.65 

Entry  of  a  judgment  is  generally  required  for  the 
purpose  of  initiating  the  right  to  take  an  appeal,  or 
to  sue  out  a  writ  of  error  to  review  such  judg- 
ment, and  of  limiting  the  time  within  which  such 
right  may  be  exercised,  as  discussed  in  Appeal  and 
Error  §  445,  or  within  which  the  judgment  may  be 
enforced,  as  considered  infra  §§  854,  871,  or  for 
the  creation  of  a  judgment  lien,  as  discussed  infra 
§  466.  A  judgment  is  not  final,  in  the  sense  that 
it  cannot  be  withdrawn  or  changed  by  the  court,  un- 
til it  has  been  entered;66  on  entry,  it  passes  beyond 


control  of  the  court,  except  to  vacate  or  modify  it 
in  accordance  with  the  usual  rules.67  After  a  judg- 
ment has  been  duly  rendered,  a  direction  to  the  clerk 
to  withhold  the  journal  entry  from  record  does  not 
vacate,  open,  or  modify  it.68  In  order  that  a  judg- 
ment may  be  admitted  as  evidence  in  another  ac- 
tion, it  is  necessary  that  it  should  first  have  been 
entered  of  record.69  Entry  of  the  judgment  is  also 
necessary  to  authorize  the  clerk  to  make  up  the 
judgment  roll,  and  to  docket  the  judgment,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  §§  123,  126. 

As  between  the  parties,  a  judgment  duly  rendered 
may  be  valid  and  effective,  although  not  entered, 
that  is,  the  neglect  or  failure  of  the  clerk  to  make  a 
proper  entry  of  the  judgment,  or  his  defective  or 


Statute  held  mandatory    . 

Ohio. — Brown  v.  L.  A.  Wells  Const. 

Co.,    56    N.E.2d   451,    143    Ohio    St. 

580. 

Statute  held  directory 
OkL— Ashinger  v.  White,  232  P.  850, 

106  Okl.  19. 
63.    U.S. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 

United   States  v.   Rayburn,  C.C.A. 

Iowa,  91  F.2d  162,  16*4. 
Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Du  Free 

v.  Hart,  8  So.2d  183,  186,  242  Ala. 

690— Lewis  v.  Martin,  98   So.  635, 

210  Ala.  401. 
Ark. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  McCon- 

nell  v.  Bourland,  299  S.W.  44,  48, 

175  Ark.  253. 
Cal.— Lind   v.   Baker,   119  «P-2d   806, 

48  Cal.App.2d  234. 
Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hazaard 

v.    Alexander,    1T8   A.    8713,    875,    6 

W.W.Harr.  512. 
Ga. — Hutcheson  v.  Hutcheson,  80  S. 

E.2d  107,  197  Ga.  603— Corpus  Ju- 
ris cited  in  Tanner  v.  Wilson,  192 

S.E.  425,  ¥28,  184  Ga.  628. 
Iowa,— Street    v.    Street,    285    N.W. 

204,  226  Iowa  960. 
Neb.— Luikart  v.  Bredthauer,  271  N. 

W.  165,  132  Neb.  62. 
Ohio. — Amazon  Rubber  Co.  v.  More- 
wood  Realty  Holding  Co.,  142  N.E. 

363,    109    Ohio    St.    291— State    ex 

rel.    Egbert   v.    Leiser,   36   N.E.2d 

874,  67  Ohio  App.  350. 
Or. — In  re  Gerhardus*  Estate,  289  P. 

829,  116  Or.  1113. 
3*3  C.J.  p  964  note  61—34  C.J.  p  54 

note  48. 
Attacking  void  Judgment 

A  void  judgment  may  not  be  at- 
tacked until  it  has  been  entered, 
since  a  court  may  *  speak  '  only 
through  its  records,  and  it  is  neces- 
sary to  enter  a  judgment  to  give  it 
vitality.— Prasse  v.  Prasse,  115  S.W. 
2d  807,  342  Ho.  388. 
64.  Ariz. — Southwestern  Freight 

Lines  v.  Shafer,  111  P.2d  625,  57 

Ariz.  111. 
Cal.—Lind   v.    Baker,    119   P.2d   806, 

48  Cal.App.2d  234— Marsh  Bros.  & 

Gardenler  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guar- 


anty Co.,   275   P.  886,   97  Cal.App. 

474. 
N.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 

Capital  City  Bank,  2*46  P.  899,  900, 

81  N.M.  4530. 
34  C.J.  p  55  note  57. 
Bate  of  judgment  see  infra  $  113. 

65.  U.S. — In  re  Ackermann,  C.C.A. 
Ohio,  32  F.2d  971. 

Cal.— Lane  v.  Pellissier,  283  P.  810, 
208  Cal.  590. 

Fla. — Magnant  v.  Peacock,  24  So.2d 
•314 — Foster  v.  Cooper,  194  So.  331, 
1*42  Fla.  148— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Dupree  v.  Elleman,  191  So.  65,  68, 
139  Fla.  809. 

N.M.— Quintana  v.  Vigil,  125  P.2d 
711,  46  N.M.  200— Animas  Con- 
sol.  Mines  Co.  v.  Frazier,  69  P.2d 
927,  41  N.M.  389— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  State  v.  Capital  City  Bank, 
246  P.  899,  900,  81  N.M.  430. 

N.D.— Groth  v.  Ness,   260  N.W.   700, 

65  N.D.  580. 

Ohio. — Hower  Corp.  T.  Vance,  59  N. 
E.2d  377,  144  Ohio  St.  4'43— Krasny 
v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  54 
N.E.2d  952,  143  Ohio  St.  284— Ama- 
zon Rubber  Co.  T.  Morewood  Real- 
ty Holding  Co.,  142  N.E.  36S,  109 
Ohio  St.  291— Cox  v.  Cox,  141  N. 
E.  220,  108  Ohio  St  478— State  ex 
reL  Merion  v.  Van  Sickle,  App.,  59 
N.E.2d  383— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Vance  v.  Hower  Corporation,  57 
N.E.2d  812,  815,  7«4  Ohio  App.  99— 
State  ex  ret  Egbert  v.  Leiser,  36 
N.E.2d  874,  67  Ohio  App.  350— In 
re  Lowry's  Estate,  35  N.E.M  154, 

66  Ohio  App.  487. 

Tex. — Sigler  v.  Realty  Bond  &  Mort- 
gage Co.,  1'38  S.W.2d  537,  135  Tex. 
76— Ex  parte  Rains,  257  &W.  217, 
118  Tex.  42-8. 
34  C.J.  p  55  note  58. 

A  vacation  decree  does  not  become 
effective  until  it  has  been  signed  and 
entered   of   record.— Jelks   v.   Jelks, 
181  S.W.2d  235,  207  Ark.  475. 
Entry  at  county  seat 

Judgment  and  findings  of  circuit 
judge  which  were  signed  in  cham- 
bers in  city  which  was  not  county 

231 


seat  were  not  effective  until  filed 
in  office  of  clerk  of  circuit  court  in 
county  seat  and  recorded  in  court's 
minutes. — State  ex  reL  Landis  T. 
City  of  Auburndale,  163  So.  698,  121 
Fla.  336. 
Neither  docket  entries  nor  affidavits 

are  effective 
Tex.— Hamilton   v.    Empire    Gas    & 

Fuel  Co.,  110  S.W2d  561,  134  Tex 

377. 

68.    Ariz. — Corpus    Juris    Quoted   in 

Brewer    v.    Morgan,    263    P.    630, 

632,  3>3  Ariz.  225. 
Cal.— Lind   v.    Baker,    119    P.2d   806, 

48     Cal.App.2d     234— Magarian    v. 

Moser,    42   P.2d   385,    5   Cal.App.2d 

208. 
Ga. — Blakely  Hardwood  Lumber  Co. 

v.  Reynolds  Bros.  Lumber  Co.,  160 

S.R  775,  IT'S  Ga,  602. 
Mass. — Ambrozewlcz  v.  Lane,  186  N. 

E.  51,  288  Mass.  141. 
N.M.— Quintana    v.    Vigil,    125    P.2d 

711,  46  N.M,  200. 
Tenn. — Broadway  Motor  Co.  v.  Pub- 
lic Fire  Ins.  Co.,  12  Tenn.App.  278. 
34  C.J.  p  54  note  52. 
Announcement  not  of  record 

Court  could  enter  decree  without 
formal  order  setting  aside  previous 
conclusion  announced  from  bench, 
but  not  included  in  record  of  case. — 
Rogers  v.  Shell  Petroleum  Corpora- 
tion, Tex.Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  743, 
error  dismissed* 

67.  Tenn. — Broadway  Motor   Co.   v. 
Public  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  12  Tenn.App. 
278. 

34  C.J.  p  54  note  53. 

68.  OkL— Taliaferro  v.  Batis,  252  (P. 
845,  12i3  Okl.  59. 

69.  Ala.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Mt 
Vernon-Woodberry  Mills  v.  Union 
Springs  Guano  Co.,  155  So.  716,  717, 
229  Ala.  91. 

Neb.— Luikart  v.  Bredthauer,  271  N. 

W.  165,  -133  Neb.  62. 
3f4  C.J.  p  54  note  54. 
Pleading  and  proving  judgment  see 

infra  S§  822-848. 


§  108 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


inaccurate  entry  of  it,  at  least  in  the  absence  of  stat- 
ute to  the  contrary,  will  not  deprive  it  of  the  force 
of  a  judicial  decision.™  The  enforcement  of  a 
judgment  does  not  depend  on  its  entry,71  or  dock- 
eting, as  discussed  infra  §  126;  and,  as  discussed  in 
Executions  §  9  if  the  judgment  has  been  duly  ren- 
dered, a  valid  execution  generally  may  be  issued 
and  levied,  without  either  entry  or  docketing  of  the 
judgment,  unless  specially  required  by  statute. 

§  108.    Authority  and  Duty 

a.  Of  clerk 

b.  Of  parties 

a.  Of  Clerk 

In  entering  Judgments  the  clerk  acts  merely  as  an 


agent  to  write  out  and  place  on  the  record  those  Judg- 
ments which  he  I*  authorized  and  required  by  law  to  en- 
ter,  and,  except  where  statutes  provide  otherwise,  he 
may  not  enter  Judgment  without  formal  Judicial  rendi- 
tion or  specific  direction  of  the  court. 

In  entering  judgments,  the  clerk  acts  In  a  purely 
ministerial  capacity,  and  exercises  no  judicial  func- 
tions ;?2  he  acts  merely  as  an  agent  to  write  out  and 
place  on  the  record  judgments  which  he  is  author- 
ized and  directed  by  law  to  enter.™  Provided  the 
cause  is  ripe  for  entry  of  judgment,  and  there  is  no 
stay  or  order  to  the  contrary,  the  clerk  is  author- 
ized, and  it  is  his  ministerial  duty,  to  enter  on  the 
record  all  judgments  rendered  by  the  court,™  and 
certain  judgments  authorized  by  statute  in  specified 


70.    U.S. — to   re   Ackermann,    C.C.A. 

Ohio,  82  F.2d  971— Continental  OH 

Co.   v.   Mulich,   C.OA-Kan.,   70   F. 

2d  521. 

Ark.— American  Inv.  Co.  v.  HiU,  292 

S.W.  675,  173  Ark.  468. 

Oal.— Brown    v.    Superior    Court    01 

California  In  and  for  Los  Angeles 

County,  2.34  P.  409, 70  Cal.App.  782. 

Conn.— D'Andrea   v.    Rende,    195    A. 

741,  123  Conn.  377. 
D.C.— Conrad    v.    Medina,    Mun.App., 

47  A.2d  562. 

Qa.— Deck  v.  Deck,  20  S.E.2d  1,  19* 
'     Ga.  739. 

HI..— people  ex  rel.  Waite  v.  Bristow, 
62  N.E.2d  54*5,  891  111.  101— Prange 
v.  City  of  Marion,  48  N.E.2d  980, 
319  I11.APP.  1«6. 

Iowa.— Hobson  V-  Dempsey  Const. 
Co.,  7  N.W.2d  896,  232  Iowa  1226, 
stating  Ohio  law. 

Miss.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Welch 
v.  Kroger  Grocery  Co.,  177  So.  41, 
42,  180  Miss.  89. 
Mfc. — Marsden  .  v.    Nipp,    30    S.  w.2d 

77,  -325  Mo.  822. 

Neb. — Luikart  v.  Bredthauer,  271  N. 
W.  165,  132  Neb.  62— Crete  Mills  v. 
Stevens,  285  NJW.  4513,  120  Neb, 
794. 

N.M.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 
Capital  City  Bank,  246  P.  899,  900, 
31  N.M.  4«30. 
N.Y.— Langrick  v.  Rowe.  212  N.T.S 

240,  126  Misc.  256. 
Ohio.— Hower  Corp  v.  Vance,  59  NJ32 
2d  377,  144  Ohio  St.  443— Amazon 
Rubber  Co.  v.  Morewood  Realty 
Holding  Co.,  142  N.E.  363,  109  Ohio 
St  291. 

Tex. — Sloan  v.  Richey,  Civ.App.,  14 
S.W.2d  119,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct— Perry  v.  Perry,  Civ 
App.,   122   S.W.2d  726— Corpus  Ju- 
ris cited  in  Turley  V.  Tobin,  Civ 
App.,  7  S.W.2d  949,  952,  error  re 
fused— Hudgins    v.    T.    B.    Meeks 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  681. 
Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Cine- 
bar  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Robinson 
97  P.2d  128,  131,  1  Washed  629. 


-flT.va.— Corpus  Juris   cited  in  Bea- 
com  v.  Board  of  Canvassers  of  Ca- 
bell    County,    10    S.K2d    793.    795, 
122  W.Va.  468. 
4  C.J.  p  52  note  43. 

Interest  on  Judgment 

Plaintiff  in  whose  favor  a  verdict 

«  returned  cannot  be  deprived  of  in- 
erest  on  his  Judgment  by  the  failure 

of  the  clerk  to  enter  the  Judgment 

as     the     law     directs.— Koontz     v. 

Weide,  208  P.  651,  111  Kan.  709. 

71.  Conn.— D'Andrea  v.   Rende,   195 
A.  741,  123  Conn.  877. 

Kan.— Gates  v.  Gates,  168  P.2d  895, 

160  Kan.  428. 
34  C.J.  p  53  note  4'4. 

Judgment  is  complete  when  signed 
by  court  and  passed  to  clerk  for  fil- 
ing or  to  some  other  person  to  be 
presented  to  clerk.— Beetchenow  v. 
Bartholet,  29-8  P.  335,  162  Wash.  119. 

72.  U.S.— In  re  Staples,  D.COkL,  1 
F.Supp.  620. 

CaL— Phipps    v.    Superior    Court    in 
and  for  Alameda  County,  89  P.2d 
698,  32  Cal.App.2d  371. 
Mont— Lasby   v.    Burgess,    18    P.2d 

1104,  93  Mont.  849. 
OM. — Moroney  v.   Tannehill,    215   P 

9-38,  90  OkL  224. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v, 
Tolls,    85    P.2d    366,    373,    160    Or 
1317,  119  A.L.R.  1370. 
Tex.— Gulf,    C.    &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.  v. 
Canty,  285  S.W.  296,  115  Tex.  6»37. 
34  C.J.  P  59  note  97. 
Authority  to  render.  Judgment  in  cer- 
tain cases  see  supra  S  101. 
Entry  in  vacation  see  infra  §  114. 
Several  Judgment 

Under  a  statute  providing  that, 
when  a  several  Judgment  is  proper, 
the  court  in  its  discretion  may  ren- 
der Judgment  against  one  or  more 
defendants,  leaving  the  action  to 
proceed  against  the  others,  the  dis- 
cretion is  a  Judicial  one,  to  be  exer- 
cised by  the  court  and  not  by  the 
clerk. — Trans-Pacific  Trading  Co.  v. 

232 


Patsy  Frock  &  Romper  Co.,   209   P. 

357,  189  CaL  509. 

73.    U.S.^In  re  Staples,  D.C.Okl.,   1 

F.Supp.  620. 
Okl. — Moroney  v.   Tannehill,   215   P. 

938,  90  Okl.  224. 
34  C.J.  p  59  note  98. 
Strict  conformity  to  statute 

(1)  Clerk   in   entering   final   Judg- 
ments  must  proceed  in   strict   con- 
formity to  statute, 

Fla.— St.  Lucie  Estates  v.  Palm 
Beach  Plumbing  Supply  Co.,  133 
So.  841,  101  Ftau  205— Kroier  v. 
Kroier,  116  So.  750,  95  Fla.  865. 

Utah. — First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Boley, 
61  P.2d  621,  90  Utah  341,  followed 
in  Boley  v.  District  Court  of  Sec- 
ond Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for  Mor- 
gan County.  61  P.2d  624,  90  Utah 
347. 

Wyo.— Kimbel  *.  Osborn,  156  P.2d 
279. 

(2)  TKftiere    record    failed    to    dis- 
close  that  clerk  notified   parties   of 
court's  determination  to  reserve  de- 
cision in  accordance  with  the  stat- 
utory mandate,  Judgment  and  subse- 
auent  Judgment  vacating  prior  Judg- 
ment  were   invalid,    and   hence   ag- 
grieved party  might  apply  to  court 
for  entry  of  Judgment  as   of  such 
date    subsequent    to    application    as 
court  might  determine.— Steinhauser 
v.  Friedman,  170  A.  630,  12  N.J.Misc. 
167. 

Surrender  of  obligation 

(1)  The  purpose  of  a  statute  pro- 
hibiting the  entry  of  Judgment  on  a 
written    obligation   unless    the   obli- 
gation is   surrendered  to   the   clerk 
is  to  retire  the  instrument  from  cir- 
culation.—Jensen  v.   Martinsen,   291 
N.W.  422,  228  Iowa  307. 

(2)  Clerk  was  authorized  to  enter 
Judgment  where  there  was  substan- 
tial compliance  with  such  a  statute. 
— Selby  v.  McDonald,  259  N.W.  485, 
219  Iowa  823. 

74.    CaL — Phipps  v.   Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Alameda  County,  89  P. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§108 


cases  where  judicial  action  is  not  necessary,  such  as 
judgments  by  confession,  default,  consent,  offer,  or 
admission,  as  discussed  infra  §§  161,  176,  183,  185, 
205.  Such  authority  extends  only  to  the  entering 
of  the  judgment  exactly  as  it  was  rendered  by  the 
court,  without  addition,  diminution  or  change  of 
any  kind;75  and  a  judgment  entered  by  a  clerk 
who  had  no  authority  to  enter  it  at  all,  or  to  enter 
it  in  the  form  in  which  it  was  enfered,  is  void.76 

Where  an  application  and  order  for  judgment  are 
necessary,  as  considered  supra  §  104,  the  clerk  has 
no  authority  to  enter  judgment  until  an  order  for 
judgment  has  been  made,  whereupon  it  becomes  his 
duty  to  enter  judgment  in  accordance  with  such  or- 
der.77 In  some  states  statutes  prescribing  the  pro- 
cedure on  the  coming  in  of  a  verdict  in  a  trial  by 
jury  expressly  make  it  the  duty  of  the  clerk  to  en- 
ter a  judgment  in  conformity  with  the  verdict,  un- 
less a  different  direction  is  given  by  the  court,  or  it 
is  otherwise  specially  prescribed  by  law.7*  Such 
entry  is  theoretically  in  accordance  with  the  direc- 


tion of  the  court,79  although  in  actual  practice  the 
entry  is  usually  made  by  the  clerk  without  any  spe- 
cific direction  of  the  court  to  that  effect.80  Such 
statutes  have  been  held  to  apply  only  to  legal  ac- 
tions, -where  the  verdict,  if  accepted  by  the  court, 
disposes  of  the  whole  case,  and  the  appropriate 
judgment  follows  as  a  matter  of  course ;  the  statute 
has  no  application  to  equitable  actions,  where  the 
court  must  specifically  declare  the  nature  of  the 
judgment  to  be  entered.81  Also,  where  a  special 
verdict  or  special  findings  are  returned,  the  clerk 
has  no  authority  to  enter  a  judgment  thereon ;  the 
court  must  first  render  the  proper  judgment  on  the 
facts  found,  as  a  judicial  act.82 

In  cases  tried  by  the  court,  a  decision  accompa- 
nied by  directions  for  entry  of  the  proper  judgment 
is  sufficient  to  authorize  entry  by  the  clerk  of  the 
judgment  directed;83  but  a  general  decision  or  find- 
ing not  embodying  such  specific  directions  is  not  a 
rendition  of  judgment  and  the  clerk  is  not  author- 
ized to  enter  judgment  thereon  until  the  court  has 


•     2d  698,   32  Cal.App.2d  871— Brown 

v.  Superior  Court  of  California  in 

and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  234 

P.  409,  70  CaLApp.  7,32. 
Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Welch 

v.  Kroger  Grocery  Co.,  177  So.  41, 

42,  180  Miss.  89. 
Tenn. — Wind  Bock  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 

v.   Robbins,  1  Tenn.App.  734. 
84  C.J.  p  55  note  61,  p  59  note  1. 

Bench,  note  on  verdict  impliedly 
directed  clerk  to  enter  judgment  on 
minutes  unless  otherwise  ordered  by 
court, — Mt  Vernon-fWoodberry  Mills 
v.  Union  Springs  Guano  Co.,  155  So. 
716,  229  Ala.  91. 
JToncomplianct  with  order 

Where  plaintiff  failed  to  comply 
with  order  to  prepare  and  cause  to 
be  entered  a  judgment  in  his  favor, 
circuit  court  clerk  could  prepare 
and*  enter  judgment  in  accordance 
with  order  but  without  costs  to  ei- 
ther party  and  circuit  court  could 
direct  clerk  to  do  so. — Brunner  v. 
Cauley.  22  N.W.2d  481,  248  Wis. 
,530. 

75.  Cal. — Phipps  v.   Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Alameda  County,  89  P. 
2d  698,  32  Cal.App.2d  871. 

N.Y. — Merchants'  Transfer  &  Stor- 
age Co.  v.  Lippman,  238  N.Y.S. 
•310,  135  Misc.  724— Marc  v.  Pink- 
ard,  230  N.Y.S.  765,  133  Misc.  83. 

Okl.— ^Moroney  v.  Tannehill,  215  P. 
9-38,  90  Okl.  224. 

3»4  C.J.  p  59  note  6. 

Amendment  to  cure  clerical  errors 
see  infra  §  237. 

76.  Ga.— Deck    v.    Deck,    20    S.E.2d 
1,  19*  Ga.  759. 

Idaho. — Stewart  Wholesale  Co.  v. 
Ninth  Judicial  District  in  and  for 


Bonneville  County,  240  P.  597,  41 
Idaho  572. 

N.C.— Moore  v.  Moore,  31  S.E.2d  690, 
224  N.C.  552. 

Okl. — Moroney  v.  Tannehill,  215  P. 
938,  90  Okl.  224. 

Pa. — Lamberton  Nat.  Bank  of  Frank- 
lin v.  Shakespeare,  184  A.  669.  321 
Pa.  449— School  Dist.  of  Haver- 
ford  Tp.,  to  Use  of  Tedesco  v.  Her- 

,  zog,  171  A,  455,  814  Pa.  1*1— 
Bhinehart  v.  Jordan,  169  A.  151, 
313  Pa.  197. 

34  C.J.  p  60  note  7. 

Previous  judicial  i 


A  purported  judgment  entered  by 
court  clerk  without  previous  judicial 
action  of  court  is  void. — City  of 
.Clinton  ex  reL  Richardson  v.  Cor- 
nell, 132  P.2d  340,  191  Okl.  600 — 
Abernathy  v.  Bonaparte,  26  P.2d  947, 
166  OkL  192— Abernathy  v.  Huston, 
26  P.2d  939, 166  OkL  184. 

77.  Pa.— Watkins  v*  Neff,  US 4  A.  625, 
287   Pa.   202— Oedrich  v.   Yaroscz, 
1!56  A.  575,  102  Pa.Super.  127— Gar- 
man  v.  Cambria  Title,  Savings  & 
Trust  Co.,   88  Pa.Super.  525. 

$4  C.J.  p  60  note  9. 
Whether  Judgment  shall  be  entered 
After  verdict  has  been  returned, 
but  before  entry  of  judgment  there- 
on, the  court  has  Jurisdiction  to  de- 
termine whether  or  not  judgment 
shall  be  entered  and  if  so  what  judg- 
ment—Stanton  v.  Arkansas  Demo- 
crat Co..  106  S.W.2d  584,  19*4  Ark. 
155. 

78.  Iowa.— Pease  v.  Citizens'  State 
Bank    of   Earlham,    228    N.W.    83, 
210  Iowa  1331. 

Kan,— Degnan  v.  Young  Bros.  Cattle 
Ox,  103  P.2d  918,  152  Enn.  250. 

233 


Neb.— Crete  Mills  v.  Stevens,  235  N. 

W.  453,  120  Neb.  794. 
Ohio. — State   ex    rel.   Van   Stone   v. 

Carey,  65  NJB.2d  166.  7*  Ohio  App. 

478. 
Okl. — Peoples     Electric     Co-op,     v. 

Broughton,  127  P.2d  850,  191  OkL 

229. 
Tex.— Bridgman  v.  Moore,  183   S.W. 

2d  705,  143  Tex.  250. 
34  C.J.  p  60  note  1JL 

79.  Or. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
Haberly  v.  Farmers'  Mut  Fire  Re- 
lief Ass'n,  287  P.  222,  223,  135  Or. 
32, 

Wyo.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  tax  State 
v.  Scott,  247  P.  699,  706,  35  Wyo. 
108. 

54  C.J.  p  47  note  80. 

80.  Or. — Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 
Haberly  v.  Farmers'  Mut.  Fire  Re- 
lief Ass'n,  287  P.  222,  223,  1S6  Or. 
82. 

Wyo.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  State 
v.  Scott,  247  P.  699,  706,  35  Wy* 
108, 

34  C.J.  p  47  note  81. 

81-  Idaho.— Stewart  Wholesale  Co. 
v.  District  Court  of  Ninth  Judicial 
Dist.,  in  and  for  'Bonneville  Coun- 
ty, 240  P.  597,  '41  Idaho  572. 

34  C.J.  p  60  note  12. 

88.  Ter.— Bridgman  v.  Moore.  183 
S.W.2d  705,  143  Tex  250— Conti- 
nental Casualty  Co.  v.  Simpson, 
Ctv.App.,  6  S.W.2d  387. 

Wyo.— -Corpus  Jurig  cited  la  state 
V.  Scott,  247  P.  «99,  70«,  «5  W*o. 
103. 

34  C.J.  p  47  note  82. 

83.    CaL— Beirway  v.  Benway,  159  P. 

2d   682,   69   Cal.App.2d  574. 
34  C.J.  j>  48  note  £4. 


§  108 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


judicially  declared  what   judgment   shall  be   en- 
tered.84   Some  statutes  provide  that  the  clerk  shall 
enter   all  judgments   under  the   direction  of  the 
.  judge.85 

Entry  of  judgment  on  noncompliance  with  condi- 
tional order.  Under  the  practice  of  some  courts 
the  clerk  has  power  to  enter  a  judgment  under  a 
conditional  order  of  the  court,  on  proof  of  a  non- 
compliance  with  the  condition.8^  However,  an  or- 
der of  the  court  declaring  that  judgment  will  be  en- 
tered unless  one  party  complies  with  certain  con- 
ditions within  a  specified  time  has  been  held  not  to 
authorize  judgment  by  the  clerk.87 

b.  Of  Parties 

Ordinarily  It  Is  the  right  and  duty  of  the  successful 
party  to  cause  judgment  to  be  entered,  and,  should  he 
neglect  this  duty,  the  unsuccessful  party  may  obtain  an 
order  directing  him  to  do  so. 

No  one  is  entitled  to  have  a  judgment  entered 
until  it  .has  been  rendered.88  The  party  in  whose 
favor  a  verdict  is  found  will  ordinarily  be  entitled 
to  the  entry  of  a  judgment  on  it,  after  the  time  al- 
lowed to  move  in  arrest  or  for  a  new  trial,  unless 
exceptions  or  points  of  law  have  been  reserved  for 
the  decision  of  the  court.89  Ordinarily  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  successful  party  to  cause  the  judgment 


to  be  entered,90  and  to  see  that  it  is  entered  cor- 
rectly.91 Where  the  successful  party  fails  to  enter 
judgment,  the  unsuccessful  party  may  obtain  an  or- 
der directing  him  to  do  so,92  or  the  court  may,  in 
its  discretion,  direct  that,  unless  judgment  is  so  en- 
tered within  a  time  specified,  the  defeated  party  may 
enter  it.93  The  exercise  of  such  discretion  is  not 
reviewable  on  appeal.94 

§  log.    Sufficiency  and  Contents;    De- 
fects and  Irregularities 

The  Journal  entry  of  judgment  should  show  the  court, 
the  term,  and  the  date  of  entry,  and  the  judgment  as 
entered  should  conform  to,  and  be  supported  by,  the 
Judgment  actually  rendered,  although  a  clerical  error, 
misdescrlption,  irregularity,  omission,  or  other  defect  not 
going  to  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  court  ordinarily  will  not 
vitiate  the  Judgment. 

As  a  general  rule,  the  journal  entry  of  judg- 
ment should  show  the  court,  the  term,  and  the  date 
of  entry,95  and  the  judgment  as  entered  should 
conform  to,  and  be  supported  by,  the  judgment  ac- 
tually rendered.96  In  the  entry  or  record  of  a  judg- 
ment, a  clerical  error,  misdescription,  irregularity, 
omission,  or  other  defect  not  going  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  will  not  vitiate  the  judgment  or 
give  it  an  effect  which  it  would  not  have  had  if 
correctly  entered,97  provided  there  is  enough  in 


84.  CaL — Wheeler  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco,  255  P.  275,  82  CaLApp. 
202. 

34  C.J.  p  48  note  85. 

85.  Tex.— Bridgman    v.    Moore,    1'83 
S.W.Sd   705,   183   Tex.    250. 

34  C.J.  p  60  note  13. 
Direction  for  entry 

Where  Judgment  was  one  for  the 
recovery  of  money  only,  any  formal 
written  Judgment  settled  and  signed 
by  the  trial  judge  was  mere  "sur- 
plusage," and,  where'  record  clearly 
showed  the  intention  of  trial  judge  to 
render  judgment  on  verdict,  court's 
attempt  to  follow  rule  no  longer  in 
'force  should  be  construed  as  direc- 
tion to  enter  judgment  for  money 
only.— Southwestern  Freight  Lines 
v.  Shafer,  111  P.2d  625,  57  Ariz.  111. 
Limitation,  on  authority  of  clerk 

Such  a  statute  does  not  deprive  the 
court  itself  of  power  to  enter  its  own 
judgment,  but  limits  the  authority  of 
the  clerk  to  .enter  a  judgment. — 
Dauphin  v.  Landrigan,  205  N.W.  557, 
187  Wis.  631 

86.  N.Y.— Hecla  Cons.  Gold  Min.  Co. 
V.   O'Neill,   22  N.Y.S.   130,   23  N.Y. 
Civ.Proc.  14-3,  affirmed  42  N.B.  723, 
148  N.Y.  724— Hanna  T.  Dexter,  1<5 
Abb.Pr.  136. 

87.  Pa. — Gedrich  v.  Yaroscz,  156  A. 
575,  102  Pa.Super.  127. 

88.  Cal. — San    Jose    Ranch    Co.    v. 


San  Jose  Land  &  Water  Co.,  58  P. 
824,  126  Cal.  322. 

R.I.— Girard  v.   Sawyer,  9  A.2d  854, 
64  R.I.  48. 

89.  Iowa. — Hanson  v.  6.  &  L.  Drug 
Co.,  212  N.W.  731,   203  Iowa  384. 

N.C.— ••Lawrence    v.    Beck,    116    S.B. 

424,  185  N.C.  196. 
Tex.— Gulf,    C.    &   S.   F.   By.   Co.   v. 

Canty,  285  S.W.  296.  115  Tex.  537. 
34  C.J.  p  46  note  65. 
Judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  on 

point  reserved  see  supra  §  -60  d. 
Pendency  of  motion  for  new  trial,  or 

in  arrest  of  judgment  see  infra  § 

115. 

90.  Mo.— Peterson    v.    City    of    St 
Joseph,    156   .S.W.2d    691.  «348   Mo. 
954. 

34  C.J.  p  60  note  16. 

91.  Pa. — Wood  v.  Reynolds,  7  Watts 
&  «.  406. 

34  C.J.  p  61  note  17. 

92.  Ark. — Herrod  v.  Larkins,  '36  S. 
W.2d  667,  1'83  Ark.  509. 

N.Y. — Herschcovitz  v.  Kleinman,  233 

N.Y.S.  285,  133  Misc.  685. 
34  C.J.  p  61  note  18. 

93.  N.Y.— Wilson  v.  Simpson,  84  N. 
Y.  674. 

Pa. — Bekelja    v.    James    -E.    Strates 
Shows,  Com.Pl.,  $4  Daujph.Co.  170. 
34  C.J.  p  61  note  19. 

94.  N.Y.— Wilson  v.  Simpson,  84  N. 
Y.  -674. 

234 


95.  Wyo.— McDonald  v.  Mulkey,  210 
P.  940,  29  Wyo.  99. 

9ft    Cal. — Platnauer    v.    Sacramento 
Super.  Ct.,  163  P.  237,  -32  CaLApp. 
463. 
Ga.— • Deck  v.  Deck,  20  S.E.'2d  1,  193 

Ga.  739. 

Sufficiency  of  judgment  entries  with 
respect  to  form  and  contents  see 
supra  §§  62-85. 

Amendment  and  correction  of: 
Judgment  see  infra  §§  236-264. 
Record  see  Courts   §§   231-236. 
The    entry    should    evidence    with 
clarity  the  action  taken  by  the  court. 
— General  Exchange  Ins.  Corporation 
v.  Appling,  Tex.Civ.App.,  144  S.W.2d 
699. 

Entry  held  in  conformity  with  judg- 
ment 

Cal. — Martin  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of 
Leland  Stanford  Jr.  University,  99 
P.2d   6S4,    37  Cal.App.2d  481. 
Entry  held  not  in  conformity  with 

judgment 

Where  order  for  judgment  set 
forth  amount  of  damages  each  plain- 
tiff was  to  recover,  judgment  lump- 
ing the  sums  together  was  errone- 
ous.— "Schwandt  v.  Milwaukee  Elec- 
tric Railway  &  Transport  Co.,  12  N. 
W.2d  18,  244  Wis.  251. 

97.  Ariz. — Intermountain  Building 
&  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Allison  'Steel  Mfg. 
Co.,  "22  P.2d  413,  42  Ariz.  51. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§110 


the  entry  or  record  to  constitute  a  judgment98 
Such  irregularities  may  be  waived  by  the  adverse 
party."  A  judgment  entry  showing  alterations,  in- 
terlineations, or  erasures  is  not  necessarily  void, 
particularly  in  the  absence  of  suspicious  circum- 
stances or  where  such  alterations,  interlineations,  or 
erasures  are  explained  by  other  parts  of  the  rec- 
ord.1 It  is  sometimes  provided  by  statute  that  in- 
formality in  entering  a  judgment,  or  in  making  up 
the  record,  shall  not  in  any  way  impair  or  affect 
the  judgment2 

A  judgment  should  be  entered  as  of  the  date,  or 
as  part  of  the  proceedings,  of  the  day  on  which  it 
was  rendered,8  notwithstanding  the  entry  is  not  ac- 
tually made  until  after  that  date  ;4  but  the  time  at 
which  the  record  is  actually  made  should  appear.6 


§  no. 


Book  or  Place  of  Entry 


Entry  must  be  made  In  the  book  of  record  desig- 
nated by  statute,  but  failure  to  do  so  will  not  Impair  the 
validity  and  operation  of  the  Judgment  as  between  the 
parties. 


As  a  general  rule,  entry  of  a  judgment  must  be 
made  in  the  judgment  book,  journal,  or  other  des- 
ignated book  of  record,6  in  accordance  with  the 
statutory  provisions  in  that  respect7  Where  the 
clerk  is  directed  by  law  to  keep  certain  books  for 
the  entry  of  judgments,  or  to  record  judgments  in 
a  book  specially  designated  by  statute  for  that  pur- 
pose, or  to  enter  different  kinds  of  judgments  or 
decrees  in  different  books,  and  deviates  from  the 
course  prescribed,  the  validity  and  operation  of  the 
judgment  are  not  impaired  thereby  as  between  the 
parties,8  although  it  may  be  otherwise  as  to  third 
persons  who  are  misled,  or  who  fail  to  receive  the 
notice  which  a  proper  entry  would  have  afforded 
them,8  and  as  discussed  infra  §  465,  entry  in  the 
wrong  book  may  prevent  the  judgment  from  be- 
coming a  lien* 

Statutes  providing  separate  books  for  different 
classes  of  entries  have  been  held  to  be  directory 
only,  and  a  judgment  entered  in  any  of  the  books 
of  record  of  the  court  is  valid.10  Under  a  statutory 


Pa._ Coral  Gables  v.  Kerl,  6  lA.2d 
275,  -334  Pa.  441,  122  A.L.R.  903— 
Casey  Heat  Service  Co.  v.  Klein, 
Com.Pl.,  46  'Lack.Jur.  257. 
Tex.— Panhandle  Const  Co.  v.  Lind- 
sey,  72  S.W.2d  1068,  123  Tex.  613 
—Sloan  v.  Richey,  Civ.App.,  143 
S.W.2d  119,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Corbett  v.  Rankin 
Independent  School  Dist.,  Clv.App., 
100  S.W.2d  113— City  of  Panhandle 
v.  Bickle,  Civ.App.,  31  S.W.2d  843, 
error  dismissed. 
Wyo.— McDonald  v.  Mulkey,  210  P. 

940,  29  Wyo.  99. 
34  C.J.  p  5-6  note  73. 
.Entry  In  .wrong  record  book  see  In- 
fra §  110. 

Failure  to  comply  with  court  roles 
prescribing  procedure  to  be  followed 
in  preparation  and  approval  of  jour- 
nal entries  and  recording  thereof 
does  not  nullify  valid  Judgment  once 
it  has  become  effective. — Gates  v. 
Gates,  163  P.2d  39-5,  160  Kan.  428. 
Description  in  Judgment  in  former 


Where  rights  of  respective  parties 
to  action  for  recovery  of  land  de- 
pended on  what  was  actually  de- 
creed in  a  former  case  instituted  in 
the  same  court,  and  there  was  a  ma- 
terial difference  in  the  description  of 
property  as  set  forth  in  original  pa- 
pers and  as  revealed  in  minutes,  the 
original  decree  and  not  what  ap- 
peared on  minutes  would  be  taken  as 
evidencing  what  actually  constituted 
the  pronouncement  of  the  court. — 
Deck  V.  Deck,  20  S.E.2d  1,  19-3  Ga, 
739. 

98.    Miss.— 'Davis  v.  Hoopes,  88  Miss. 
173. 


Sufficiency  of  entry  to  show  judg- 
ment see  supra  §  62. 

99.  N.Y.— White  v.  Bogart,  73  N.Y. 
256. 

1.  Ky.— Parrish   v.    Ferriel,    186    S. 
W.2d  625,  299  Ky.  676. 

34  C.J.  p  57  note  76. 

2.  N.Y.— New    York    City    Baptist 
Mission   Soc.    v.    Tabernacle    Bap- 
tist Church,  41  N.Y.S.  976,  10  App. 
Div.  288. 

34  C.J.  p  57  note  77. 

3.  Iowa. — Puckett   v.    Gunther,    114 
N.W.  34,  137  Iowa  647. 

34  C.J.  p  57  note  78. 

4.  Kan.— Miller   v.    Phillips,    141   P. 
297,  9*2  Kan.  662. 

Wyo. — Hahn  v.  Citizens*  State  Bank, 
171  P.  '889,  25  Wyo.  4-67,  petition 
denied  172  -P.  705,  25  Wyo.  467. 

&  Iowa.— Hoffman-Bruner  Granite 
Co.  v.  Stark,  108  N.W.  329,  132 
Iowa  100. 

34  C.J.  p  67  note  80. 

e.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  U.  S. 
v.  Rayburn,  C.C.A.Iowa,  fll  F.2d 
162,  164. 

Iowa. — Lotz  v.  United  Food  Mar- 
kets, 283  N.W.  99,  225  Iowa  1397. 

Ky.— Second  Nat  Bank  of  Paints- 
ville  v.  Blair,  186  ®.W.2d  796,  299 
Ky.  650— Gorman  v.  Lusk,  134  S. 
W.2d  598,  280  Ky.  692— National 
Life  &  Accident  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hedges, 
27  S.W.2d  422,  233  Ky.  840— Bwell 
r.  Jackson,  110  S.W.  «60,  129  Ky, 
•214,  83  Ky-L.  67*3. 

N.Y.— -Cole  v.  Vincent,  242  N.Y.S. 
644,  229  App.Div.  520. 

OkL— Wilson  &  Co.  Y.  Shaw,  10  P.2d 
448,  157  OkL  34. 

84  C.J.  P  «T  note  82. 

235 


Zkegal  evidence  of  Judgment 

Under  statute  requiring  that  all 
udgments  and  orders  be  entered  in 
record  book,  entry  made  by  clerk  in 
record  book  is  legal  evidence  of  judg- 
ment or  order. — Street  v.  Stewart, 
285  N.W.  204,  226  Iowa  960. 
7.  CaL— Lane  v.  Pellissier,  283  P. 

810,  '208  Cal.  590. 
Ind. — Brant  v.  Lincoln  Nat.  Life  Ins. 

Co.  of  Fort  Wayne,  198  N.«K  78-5, 

209  Ind.  268. 
lowa. — street   T.    Stewart    2>85   N.W. 

204,  226  Iowa  960. 
34  C.J.  p  55  note  64  [a],  J>  57  note 

83. 
Decisions  of  probate  court 

In  statute  governing  recitals  in, 
and  entry  and  filing  of,  "orders  end 
decrees"  of  probate  court,  the  quot- 
ed phrase  was  intended  to  cover  all 
decisions  of  the  probate  court  in  pro- 
bate proceedings  whether  technically 
referred  to  as  "orders,"  "decrees," 
or  "Judgments."— Oarroll  v.  Carroll, 
108  P.2d  420,  16  CaL2d  761,  certiorari 
denied  62  S.Ct  74,  314  U.S.  611,  51 
L.Ed.  491. 
&  Fla. — Foster  v.  Cooper,  194  So. 

3*31,  142  Fla.  148-JCorpus  Juri*  ott- 

ed  in  Dupree  v.  Blleman,   191  80. 

65,  *8,  139  Fla.  809. 
Kan. — Gates  v.  Gates,  163  P.2d  395, 

160  Kan.  428. 
Wis.— -Netherton  v.  'Frank  Holton  & 

Co.,  206  N.W.  919,  189  Wis.  461,  va- 
cated on  other  grounds  207  N.W. 

953,  189  Wis.  ±61. 
34  CJ.  p  57  note  84. 
9.  Utah.— Robinson  r.  Salt  t«ke 

City,  109  P.  817,  37  Utah  «20. 
34  C.J.  p  58  note  85. 
la    U.S.— Sprigg  v..  Stump.   C.C.QT., 
8  F.  207,  7  Sawy.  280. 


§  111 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


requirement  that  judgments  shall  be  entered  in  a 
"judgment  book,"  separate  books  are  not  required 
for  the  entry  of  judgments  in  legal  and  equitable 
actions.11  Separate  unbound  sheets  of  paper  may 
constitute  a  judgment  book  within  the  meaning  of 
the  statute;12  but  an  entry  in  books  which  are  not 
books  of  record  is  insufficient18  The  judgment 
"docket,"  as  discussed  infra  §  127,  is  not  the  judg- 
ment book  in  which  judgments  are  required  to  be 
entered.14  The  calendar  of  the  judge  or  trial  dock- 
et is  not  a  record  of  the  court,  and  an  entry  therein 
does  not  constitute  an  entry  of  judgment1* 


§  111. 


Signature  of  Record 


The  failure  of  the  Judge  to  sign  the  record  as  di- 
rected by  statute  has  been  held  not  to  make  the  Judg- 
ment a  nullity,  although  there  Is  also  authority  to  the 
contrary. 


Whifc  the  minutes  or  records  of  courts  are  gen- 
erally required  to  be  authenticated  by  the  signature 
of  the  judge,  as  discussed  in  Courts  §  226,  it  has 
generally  been  held  that  the  failure  of  the  judge  to 
sign  the  record  as  directed  by  statute  does  not 
make  the  judgment  a  nullity,  and  that  it  is  at  most 
irregular  and  erroneous,  but  not  void,1*  although 
it  has  also  been  held  that  no  judgment  has  any  force 
in  the  absence  of  an  official  signing  of  the  order 
book  by  the  judge.1* 

§  112.    Notice  of  Entry 

Notice  of  rendition  or  entry  of  Judgment  Is  not  es- 
sential to  Its  validity  or  regularity  unless  made  so  by 
statute  or  rule  of  court. 

As  a  general  rule,  notice  of  the  entry  of  a  judg- 
ment is  not  essential  to  its  validity  and  regularity,18 


Or.— State  v.   MacElrath,   89  P.  -803, 
49  Or.  294. 

11.  N.Y. — Whitney  y.  Townsend,  67 
N.Y.  40. 

34  O.J.  p  58  note  88. 

12.  CaLARp. — Corpus    Juris    quoted 
in  In  re  Hullen,  12  P.2d  487,  488, 
124  CaLApp.  271. 

'34  C.J.  T>  58  note  39. 

13.  Ark. — Holloway  v.  Berenzen,  188 
S.W.2d  298,   208  Ark.  *49. 

84  C.J.  p  58  note  90. 

14.  Iowa.— State  v.  Wieland,  251  N. 
W.  757,  217  Iowa  887. 

34  C.J.  p  5*8  note  92. 

16.    Ark.— Holloway  v.  Berenzen,  188 

S.W.2d   298,   208  Ark.  S49. 
Iowa. — Lotz  v.  United  'Food  Markets, 

283  N.W.  99,  225  Iowa  1397. 
34  O.J.  p  58  note  93. 
Memorandum  "book 

Under  statute  providing  that  Judg- 
ments and  orders  must  be  entered 
on  record  of  court,  judge's  calendar 
is  in  nature  of  memorandum  book 
designed  to  promote  convenience  of 
judge  and  clerk  and  is  not  place  for 
final  repose  of  judgments  and  orders. 
—Street  v.  Stewart,  285  N.W.  204, 
226  Iowa  960. 

Notation  in  judge's  trial  docket 
reading,  "Jury  verdict  on  special  is- 
sues, for  plaintiff/'  without  indication 
of  court's  approval,  is  not  tanta- 
mount to  entry  of  judgment.— Nevitt 
v.  Wilson,  285  S.W.  1079,  116  Tex  29, 
48  AX..R.  355. 

ia    OkL— Smith  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 

36  P.2d  27,  169  Okl.  90. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  ia  Orum 

v.  Fillers,   6  Tenn.At>p.  547,   558. 
34  C.J.  p  5*8  note  96. 
Signing   of   judgment    by   judge    or 

clerk  see  supra  §  85. 
Time  of  signing 

(1)  'Special  judge  may  at  any  time 
after  entering  judgment  sign  rec- 
ord, and,  if  he  refuses  to  do  so,  may 
toe  mandated. — Cadwell  y.  Teany,  157 


N.E.  51,  199  Ind.  634,  certiorart  de- 
nied Cadwell  y.  Teaney,  48  SXJt  601, 
277  U.S.  605,  72  KBd.  1011. 

(2)  Fact  that  judgment  file  was 
not  signed  until  judge  who  tried  case 
had  ceased  to  hold  office  was  imma- 
terial. —  Goldberg  y.  Krayeske,  128 
A.  27,  102  Conn.  137. 

17.  Ky.  —  Hazelip  y.  Doyel,  85  S.W. 
2d  685,  230  Ky.  -313—  National  -Life 
&  Accident  Ins.  Co.  y.  Hedges,  <27 
S.W.2d  4'22,  233  Ky.  '840—  Sublett  v. 
Gardner,  137  S.W.  864,  144  Ky.  190 
—  -Swell  v.  Jackson,  110  S.W.  860, 
129  Ky.  214,  -33  Ky.L.  673. 

Presiding  judge  or  his  successor 

It  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  a 
judgment  that  it  shall  be  entered  on 
the  order  book  provided  for  the  pur- 
pose and  signed  by  the  presiding 
judge  or  his  successor.  —  Gorman  v. 
Lusk,  134  S.W.2d  '593,  280  Ky.  692. 


flfll  place  of  signing 
(1)  A  special  judge  who  directed 
the  entry  of  a  judgment  and  signed 
the  order  -book  in  a  county  outside 
the  district  in  which  the  cause  was 
pending  has  the  authority  to  direct 
entry  of  judgment  "nunc  pro  tune," 
or  to  ratify  the  unauthorized  entry 
by  the  clerk  and  sign  the  order  book 
in  the  county  in  which  the  cause 
was  pending,  or  elsewhere  in  the 
district.  —  Gross*  Adm'x  v.  Couch,  166 
S.W.2d  879,  292  Ky.  '304. 

C2)  Where  Quarterly  court's  rec- 
ord showed  that  judgment  had  been 
rendered,  but  judge  failed  to  sign 
it,  and  present  judge  signed  judg- 
ment nunc  pro  tune,  it  became  valid 
judgment  effective  from  date  it  was 
rendered,  and  all  steps  taken  in  effort 
to  enforce  it  were  validated.  —  Hoff- 
man v.  Shuey,  2  «S.W.2d  1049,  223  Ky, 
70,  £8  A.L.R.  842. 

(3)  The  fact  that  judge  signed  all 
orders  entered  at  subsequent  term  of 
circuit  court,  relative  to  a  case,  did 

236 


not  validate  unsigned  judgment  en- 
tered on  order  book  at  preceding 
term. — Second  Nat.  Bank  of  Pa'ints- 
ville  T.  Blair,  184  S.W.2d  796,  299  Ky. 
650. 

(4)  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  also 
been  held  that,  where  presiding  judge 
did  not  sign  minutes  either  during 
or  on  last  day  of  regular  term  and 
minutes  were  not  signed  until  last 
day  of  second  extension  of  term,  final 
judgment  shown  on  minute  book  to 
have  been  rendered  during  regular 
term  was  invalid  and  case  remained 
on  docket  as  a  pending  and  untried 
case.— Jackson  v.  Gordon,  11  S*.2d 
901,  194  Miss.  268. 

IS.    U.S. — In    re    Anton,    DXIMinn., 

11  F.Supp.  345. 
Idaho.— Fite  v.  French,  30  P.2d  360, 

54  Idaho  104. 
Minn.— WUcox  v.  Hedwall,  243  N.W. 

709,  186  Minn.  504. 
Mo. — Nordquist  v.  Armourdale  State 

Bank,  19  S.W.2d  553,   225  Mo.App. 

18-6. 
Okl. — Moroney  v.   Tannehlll,  215   P. 

938,  90  Okl.  224. 
S.D. — Lasell  v.  Yankton  County,  7  N. 

W.2d  880. 

34  C.J.  j>  61  note  27. 
Notice  of  rendition  see  supra  §  102. 
Settlement    of   judgment    on    notice 

see  supra  5  102. 

In   absence   of  law  or  agreement 

requiring  it  proceeding  to  judgment 
without  notice  is  not  fraud. — Davis 
V.  qox,  Tex.Civ.App.,  4  S.W.2d  1008, 
error  dismissed. 

Court  role  held  inapplicable 

A  court  rule  requiring  all  "papers 
filed  in  a  cause"  to  be  served  on  at- 
torney for  adverse  party  or  party 
himself  did  not  use  quoted  words  as 
embracing  the  judgment  pronounced 
by  court,  and  hence  did  not  require 
service  of  copy  of  judgment  on  any- 
one.— Jones  T.  Thompson,  Or*  1-64 
P.2d  718. 


49    dJ.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  113 


unless  made  so  by  statute19  or  rule  of  court,20  al- 
though notice  may  be  required  for  certain  purposes, 
such  as  to  limit  the  time  for  appeal  or  writ  of  er- 
ror, as  considered  in  Appeal  and  Error  §  447.  Since 
parties  are  not  charged  with  notice  of  entry  of 
judgment  prior  to  the  term  to  which  the  cause  has 
been  definitely  continued,21  the  entry  of  judgment 
without  notice  prior  to  that  term  is  premature.22 

Where  notice  is  required,  it  must  be  sufficient  to 
comply  with  the  statute,28  and  it  has  been  held 
that  it  may  be  served  by  mail;2*  but  the  notice  has 
been  held  to  be  ineffectual  where  it  is  filed  before 
the  entry  of  judgment25  The  parties  may  waive 
their  right  to  notice.26 

§  113.    Time  of  Rendition  and  Entry 
a.  In  general 


b.  Prematurity 

c.  Delay 

4  Judgment  on  report  of  referee 
e.  Date  of  judgment 

a.  In  General 

In  some  jurisdictions,  Judgment  may  and  should  be 
entered  immediately  on  the  filing  of  the  decision  or  the 
return  of  the  verdict. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  should  be  rendered 
at  the  time  appointed  therefor.2?  The  time  of  en- 
tering judgment  is  a  matter  of  practice  within  the 
discretion  of  the  court28  The  entry  of  judgment 
immediately  or  forthwith  on  the  filing  of  a  decision 
or  the  return  of  a  verdict  is  contemplated  by  the 
statutes  or  practice  in  some  jurisdictions  ;29  and  in 


19.    Ky.— Parrisli  v.  Ferriell,  136  S. 

W.2d    625,    299    Kv.    676— Estea   v. 

Woodford,  55  S.W.2d  $96,  246  Ky. 

485. 

34  C.J.  p  61  note  26. 
Entry  ia  appearance  docket 

A  judgment  to  be  valid  must  first 
be  entered  in  the  appearance  docket 
so  as  to  provide  notice  to  other  -par- 
ty.—McClelland  v.  West  Penn  Ap- 
pliance Co.,  1  A.2d  491,  182  Pa.Su- 
per.  471. 

Order  for  Judgment  "by  nonresident 
judge 

Clerk  receiving  order  fop  Judgment 
in  case  tried  by  nonresident  Judge 
was  under  duty  to  notify  parties  end 
attorneys  and  enter  Judgment  ac- 
cordingly.— Brewer  v.  Morgan,  263  P. 
630,  33  Ariz.  225. 
30.  Ariz.— Davis  v.  Chilson,  62  P. 

2d  127,  48  Ariz.  366— Harrington  v. 

White,  -61  P.2d  39'2,  48  Ariz.  291— 

Ross  v.  White,  50  P.2d  12,  46  Ariz. 

304. 
judgments  to  which  applicable 

Rule  requiring  notice  applies  only 
to  Judgments  for  money  only  or 
costs  or  that  there  he  no  recovery. — 
Southwestern  -Freight  Lines  v.  Shaf- 
«r,  ill  P.2d  625,  57  Ariz.  111. 

21.  Mo. — Nordqulst    Y.    Armourdale 
State  Bank,  19  S.W.2d  5-53,  225  Mo. 
App.  186. 

22.  >Mo. — Nordduist    v.    Armourdale 
State  Bank,  supra. 

33.     K.T.— Murphy  v.  Hitchcock,  274 

N.Y.S.    386,    242    App.Div.    773. 
XTottce  held  sufficient 

(1)  Notice    Indorsed    on    copy    of 
Judgment  informing  defendants  that 
such  Judgment  was  entered  by  with- 
in   named    court    was     sufficient.-— 
Murphy  v.  Hitchcock,  sufera. 

(2)  Notice  that  plaintiff  would  at 
specified  time  and  J>lace  move  named 
Judge   of   circuit  court  to   enter  in 
designated  case  a  Judgment,  a  copy 


of  which  was  attached  to  notice, 
which  notice  was  served  on  counsel 
of  record  for  defendant  two  days  be- 
fore date  specified  for  entry  of  judg- 
ment satisfied  statutory  require- 
ments as  to  notice  of  entry  of  judg- 
ment at  term  time  or  in  vacation  at 
any  place  within  district— Parrish 
v.  Ferriell,  186  S.W.2d  625.  299  Ky. 
676. 

(3)  Where  record  showed  only  that 
service  of  notice  of  entry  of  judg- 
ment took  place  on  the  day  on  which 
judgment  was  entered  and  did  not 
disclose   the   hour   at  which   either 
event  took  place,  notice  of  entry  of 
Judgment   was   shown   not  to   have 
been  served  prematurely,  where  the 
substantial    rights    of    the    parties 
were  not  affected.— Kahn  v.   Smith, 
142  P.2d  13,  23  CaLSd  12. 
24.     CaL — Department       of      Social 
Welfare  v.  Gandy,  1«32  P.2d  241,  56 
Cal.App.2d    209— *Labarthe    v.    Mc- 
Rae,    97    P.2d   251,    85    CaLAp!p.2d 
734. 

36.  CaL — Jameson  v.  Warren,  267  P. 
372,  91  OaLApp.  590. 

26.  CaL — Prothero  v.  Superior  Court 
of  Orange  County,  238  P.  357,  196 
Cal.  439. 

y.— Lawrence  v.  First  State  Bank 
of  Dry  Bidge,  132  S.W.2d  -60.  279 
Ky.  775. 

27.  N.C.— Killian   v.    Maiden   Choir 
do.,    161    S.E.    546,    202    N.C.    23— 
State  v.   Humphrey,   120    S.E.    85, 
186  NJC.  533. 

Tex. — Bridgman  v.  Moore,  183  S.W. 
•2d  705,  1«3  Tex,  250— Rouff  v. 
Boyd.  Civ.App.,  1*  S.W.2d  408. 

Duly  constituted  court  as  essential 
to  validity  or  regularity  of  Judg- 
ment see  supra  §§  15-17. 

28.  Mich.— Harvey  v.  McAdams,  82 
Mich.  472. 

29.  Pa.— Bekelja      v.       James      B. 
Strates  Shows,  ConuPL,  $4  Dauph. 
Co.  170. 

237 


Wis. — Davison  v.  Brown,  67  N.W.  42, 

93  Wls.  85. 
34  C.J.  p  62  note  «2  [a],  p  64  note 

61  [e]   (1). 
Statute  of  limited  application. 

A  statute  providing  that,  when 
trial  by  jury  has  been  had.  Judg- 
ment shall  be  entered  by  the  clerk 
immediately  in  conformity  with  the 
verdict  does  not  apply  where  the 
court  withdraws  the  case  from  the 
jury.— Barth  v.  Harris,  16«3  P.  401,  95 
Wash.  166. 

Construction,  of  "forthwith" 

(1)  The     word     "forthwith,"     as 
used  in  such  statutes,  has  been  con- 
strued   to    mean    "instanter." — Hull 
v.  Mallory,  14  N.W.  3T4,  56  Wis.  *R. 

(2)  According  to  the  weight  of  au- 
thority, however,  the  word,  as  used 
in  such  statutes,  means  "in  a  rea- 
sonable time." — Sluga  v.  Walker,  81 
N.W.  282,  9  N.D.  108—26  C.J.  p  1000 
note    80    M— 34   C.J.   p    64   note   61 
[a]   (1). 

03)  Under  the  latter  construction, 
where  a  verdict  was  returned  be- 
tween noon  and  one  o'clock  P.  M.  on 
Saturday,  while  the  justice  was 
hearing  another  case,  a  rendition 
of  judgment  thereon  on  the  Monday 
morning  following  was  in  due  time. 
— Sorenson  v.  Swenson,  56  N.W.  650, 
55  Minn.  58,  43  Am.S.R.  472. 

Immediate  rendition  and  subsequent 

entxy 

In  some  Jurisdictions,  in  cases 
tried  before  a  Jury,  when  the  Jury 
returns  its  verdict,  the  rendition  of 
judgment  on  the  vesdict,  consisting 
of  'an  entry  by  the  trial  Judge  on 
the  trial  docket  of  a  memorandum 
of  the  verdict  and  Judgment,  fol- 
lows as  a  matter  of  course;  but 
the  minutes  of  the  court  evidencing 
the  Judgment  may  be,  and  usually 
are,  written  at  a  future  time  and 
dated  as  of  date  of  rendition  of 
judgment — Mt.  Teraon-Woodberry 


§  H3 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


such  jurisdictions  the  court  has  authority,80  or  the 
clerk  has  a  duty,81  to  enter  the  judgment,  and  the 
successful  party  is  entitled  to  have  the  judgment 
entered32  at  such  time,  provided  the  verdict  or  de- 
cision disposes  of  the  case,88  and  there  is  no  stay 
of  proceedings,84  or  direction  to  the  contrary  by  the 
court.85  Even  in  such  jurisdictions,  however,  a 
judgment  entered  at  a  later  date  is  not  necessarily 
invalid,  as  discussed  infra  subdivision  c  (1)  of  this 
section.  Some  statutes  contemplate  the  entry  of 
judgment  immediately  following  the  denial  of  a 
motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict.85 

A  statute,  supplementary  to  'other  statutes,87  and 
intended  to  speed  up  the  disposition  of  cases,88 
which  authorizes  a  judge  of  a  court,  not  of  con- 
tinuous session,  to  enter,  on  reasonable  notice  to 
the  parties,  a  judgment  in  any  proceeding  wherein  a 
trial  by  jury  is  not.  required,  is  of  limited  effect.89 
A  rule  of  civil  procedure,  adopted  under  statutory 
authority,  and  providing  for  entry  of  judgment  by 
the  clerk  forthwith  on  receipt  by  him  of  the  court's 
direction  to  enter  judgment  for  money  only,  or  that 


there  be  no  recovery,  is  accorded  effect  when  ap- 
plicable.40 

Validity  of  judgment  rendered  on  legal  holiday 
see  Holidays  §  5  d.  Validity  of  judgment  entered 
on  Sunday  see  the  CJ.S.  title  Sundays  §  S3,  also  60 
GJ.  p  1146  note  57-p  1147  note  70. 

b.  Prematurity 

A  Judgment  Is  premature  when  ft  Is  rendered  or  en- 
tered before  the  case  Is  ripe  for  final  Judgment.  A  Judg- 
ment so  rendered  or  entered  has  been  held  Improper  and 
erroneous,  but  not  void. 

It  is  improper  and  erroneous  to  render  or  enter 
judgment  prematurely,41  this  being  true  where  judg- 
ment is  rendered  or  entered  before  the  case  is  ripe 
for  final  judgment,  because  of  proceedings  remain- 
ing to  be  taken  or  matters  remaining  to  be  deter- 
mined before  the  judgment  can  be  put  in  its  final 
shape,42  or  where  there  is  a  violation  of  a  statute 
prohibiting  the  entry  of  judgment  until  a  certain 
time  after  the  commencement  of  the  action,  or  the 
reception  of  the  verdict,  or  the  filing  of  the  deci- 
sion, or  until  the  lapse  of  a  term  or  terms.48  How- 


Mills  v.  Union  Springs  Guano  Co., 
155  So.  710,  26  Ala.App.  136,  certio- 
rari  denied  155  So.  716,  229  Ala.  91. 
"Wlthia  the  day"  means  -within 

twenty-four  BOUT* 
Or.— Fuller    v.    Blanc,    77    P.2d    440, 

160  Or.  50. 

34  C.J.  p  64  note  61    [e]    (2). 
Judgment  notwithstanding  verdict 
Ohio. — J.  &  F.  Harig  Co.  v.  City  of 

Cincinnati,  22  N.E.2d  540,  61  Ohio 

App.  314. 

30.  111.— -Evaniski    v.    Mt    Olive    & 
Staunton  Coal  Co.,  223  IlLApp.  33. 

31.  Iowa, — Cox  v.   Southern   Surety 
Co.,  226  N.W.  114,  208  Iowa  1252. 

Kan,—- Koontz  v.  Weide,   208   P.   851. 

Ill  Kan.  709. 
Tenn. — McAlester  v.  Monteverde,  115 

S.W.2d  257,   22  Tenn.App.  14. 
34  C.JT.  p  62  note  32  [a]. 

32.  Conn.— Ireland     v.     Connecticut 
Co.,  152  A.  61-4,  112  Conn.  462. 

3-4  C.J.  p  62  note  313. 

33.  CaL-Xforpus     Jurla     cited     in 

Rosslow   v.   Janssen,    29   P.2d   287, 
288,   136   CaLApp.  467,   followed  in 
Rosslow  v.  Mulcrevy,  29  P.2d  289, 
1-36  CaLApp.  787. 
34  C.J.  p  62  note  134. 

Where  all  issue*  of  fact  have  Tbeeu 
determined  by  the  findings  of  the 
jury,  the  court  at  special  term  may 
grant  motion  for  Judgment  after  Jury 
verdict  at  trial  term  on  framed 
issues  submitted  by  special  term  jus- 
tice.— Burrows  v.  Oscar  Scherer  A 
Bros.,  235  N.Y.S.  24.  134  Misc.  147. 
X**ue*  not  affecting  plaintiff 

Plaintiff  was  entitled  to  Judgment 
on  jury's  verdict  for  him  without 


awaiting  determination  of  issues  be- 
tween defendants  and  tenant  im- 
pleaded  by  answers. — Schroeder  v. 
City  and  County  Sav.  Bank  of  Al- 
bany, 46  N.T.S.2d  46,  267  App.Div. 
206,  modified  on  other  grounds  57  N. 
E.2d  57,  293  N.Y.  370,  motion  denied 
57  N.E.2d  842,  29«3  N.Y.  764. 

34.  Wis.— Wheeler  v.  Russell,  67  N. 
W.  4S,  9*3  Wis.  1<35. 

34  C.J.  p  62  note  35. 

Stay  of  proceedings  see  infra  §  116. 

35.  Wis. — Davidson  v.  Brown,  67  N. 
W.  42,  93  Wis.  85. 

34  C.J.  p  62  note  37. 

Reservation  of  case  for  future  ar- 
gument or  consideration 

TTan. — Koontz  v.  Weide,  208  P.  651, 
111  Kan.  709. 

36.  Cal.— Woods  v.  Walker,   136   P. 
2d  72,  57   Cal.App.2d  968. 

37.  Ky. — Jackson  v.  Jackson,  179  S. 
W.2d  197,  297  Ky.  8*5. 

38.  Ky. — Jackson  v.  Jackson,  supra. 

39.  Ky.— Wright    v.    Owens,    122    S. 
W.2d  498,  275  Ky.  692. 

40.  Ariz. — Fagerberg  v.  Denny,   112 
P.2d  58-1,  57  Ariz.  188— Southwest- 
ern. Freight  Lines  v.  Shafer,  111  P. 
2d  625,  57  Ariz.  111. 

41.  Ark. — Stantou  v.  Arkansas  Dem- 
ocrat Co.,  106  SJW.2d  584,  194  Ark. 
1-35. 

Ky.— Blinn  v.  Blakeman,    71  S.W.2d 

961,  254  Ky.  416. 
Or. — Herrick  v.  Wallace,  286  P,  471, 

114  Or.  520. 
Reversal    of   judgment   prematurely 

rendered  see  Appeal  and  Error  S 

1892. 

238 


Setting  aside  judgment  prematurely 
entered  see  infra  §  278. 

48.  U.S. — Donnelly  Garment  Co.  v. 
National  Labor  Relations  Board, 
C.C.A.,  123  F.2d  215— Chidester  v. 
City  of  Newark,  C.C.A.N.J.,  117  F. 
2d  981. 

Ky.— Kim  v.  Smith,  172  S.W.2d  6-34, 
294  Ky.  835 — Horton  v.  Horton,  92 
S.W.2d  37«,  26-3  Ky.  413. 

Mass. — Barton  v.  City  of  Cambridge, 
61  N.E.2d  8130. 

Miss.— Schilling  v.  IT.  S.  Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  Co..  152  So.  887,  169 
Miss.  275. 

N.Y.—- Fuenteg  v.  Kosower,  25  N.Y.S. 
2d  586,  2.61  App.Div.  (378,  motion 
granted  27  N.Y.S.2d  46*3,  261  App. 
Div.  1057— O'Brien  v.  Lehigh  Val- 
ley R.  Co.,  27  N.Y.S.2d  6«40,  176 
Misc.  404. 

Pa. — Dunlap  Printing  Co.  v.  Ryan, 
119  A.  714,  275  Pa.  556. 

Wash. — Patterson  v.  Zuger,  60  P.2d 
69,  187  Wash.  285— Pelly  v.  Behne- 
man,  12  P.2d  422, 168  Wash.  465^ 

34  C.J.  p  63  notes  44-48. 

tTnexpired  continuance  or  adjourn- 
ment 

Mo. — Nordquist  v.  Armourdale  State 
Bank,  19  S.W.2d  55-3,  225  MoJLpp. 
186. 

34  C.J.  p  6<3  notes  44  [f],  47. 

Verdict  taken  subject  to  opinion  of 
court 

N.Y. — Jackson  v.  Fitzsimmons,  8 
IWend.  5*46. 

43.  Ky. — Stockholders  First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  First  Nat  Bank's  Receiv- 
er, 174  S.W.  473,  16-3  Ky.  790. 

34  C.J.  p  62  note  43. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  113 


ever,  the  mere  premature  entry  of  a  judgment  is 
not  a  jurisdictional  defect,44  and,  therefore,  does 
not  avoid  the  judgment,45  but  at  most  makes  it  ir- 
regular and  voidable,46  and  the  prematurity  may  be 
waived.47  According  to  some  authorities,  a  judg- 
ment rendered  before  the  appearance  term  is  a 
mere  nullity;48  but  it  has  also  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment entered  before  the  succeeding  term  at  which 
the  case  is  triable  is  merely  erroneous.49 

There  are  cases  in  which  judgments  are  claimed 
to  be  premature,  but  are  held  not  to  be  so.50  A  judg- 
ment on  a  verdict  disposes,  ipso  facto,  of  a  motion 
to  set  aside  the  verdict51 

Prior  to  last  day  of  term.  In  states  wherein,  as 
discussed  infra  subdivision  e  of  this  section,  a  judg- 
ment ordinarily  is  regarded  as  rendered  on  the  last 
day  of  the  term,  the  court  or  presiding  justice  may, 
notwithstanding  the  general  rule,  enter,  or  order 
the  entry  of,  judgment  at  any  time  after  the  deci- 
sion and  during  the  term.52 

Prior  to  determination  of  costs.  There  is  author- 
ity both  for  the  view  that  judgment  should  not  be 
entered  until  all  costs  are  taxed  and  properly  adjust- 
ed53 and  for  the  view  that,  costs  being  merely  inci- 


dent to  judgment,  a  controversy  over  disbursements 
should  not  delay  entry  of  judgment54 

c.  Delay 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Expiration  of  trial  term 

(3)  Expiration  of  judge's  term  of  office 

(1)  In  General 

Statutes  limiting  the  time  for  entering  Judgment 
are  directory  only,  and  a  failure  to  comply  therewith 
does  not  invalidate  a  Judgment  subsequently  entered. 
Except  In  a  few  states,  a  like  conclusjon  Is  reached  as 
to  constitutional  or  statutory  provisions  limiting  the  time 
for  rendering  Judgment. 

Where  the  constitution  or  a  statute  requires  ren- 
dition of  the  judgment  within  a  limited  time,  it  has 
been  held  that  the  court  loses  authority  over  the 
case  at  the  expiration  of  that  time,  so  that  a  judg- 
ment thereafter  rendered  is  void  for  want  of  juris- 
diction,55 as  in  the  case  of  a  failure  of  the  judge  to 
comply  with  a  statutory  direction  to  render  his  deci- 
sion within  a  certain  number  of  days  after  the  case 
is  submitted  to  him.5^  However,  it  has  also  been 
held  that  compliance  with  provisions  of  this  kind  is 
not  jurisdictional,57  that  such  a  provision  is  merely 


44.  Mont, — State   v.   District   Court 
of  Fourth  Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for 
Missoula   County   Department  No. 
2,   282  P.   1042,  88  Mont.  193. 

Kev.— Corpus  Jnrls  Vioted  la  State 
ex  rel.  Newitt  v.  Fourth  Judicial 
Dist.  Court  in  and  for  Blko  Coun- 
ty, 121  P.2d  442,  444,  61  Nev.  164. 

3'4  C.J.  p  63  note  50. 

Immunity  from  collateral  attack  see 
infra  8  4133. 

45.  Ky.— McKim  v.  Smith,  172  S.W. 
2d    634,    ,294    Ky.    835— Spencer   v. 
Martin  Mining  Co.,   83  S.W.2d  39, 
259  Ky.  697. 

Nev.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  State 
ex  reL  Newitt  v.  Fourth  Judicial 
Dist  Court  in  and  for  Blko  Coun- 
ty, 121  P.2d  442,  444,  61  Nev.  164. 
K.M.— Field  v.  Otero,  290  P.  1015, 
35  N.M.  68— Dallam  County  Bank 
v.  Burnside,  249  P.  109,  31  N.M. 
587. 

Okl.— Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Orr    v. 
Johnson,    149    P.2d    983,    994,    194 
Okl.  287. 
34  C.J.  p  .63  note  50. 

Where  court  has  jurisdiction,  pre- 
mature   entry    of    judgment    is    not 
void. — «Flinn  v.  Blakeman,  71  S.W.2d 
961,  25*4  Ky.  416. 
Subsequent  judgment 

Judgment  which  was  prematurely 
-entered  before  proof  had  been  tak- 
en on  issue  made  by  pleadings  would 
not  affect  validity  of  Judgment  sub- 
sequently entered  after  proof  had 
been  taken  on  issue. — Horton  v.  Hor- 
ton,  92  &W.2d  378,  263  Ky.  4X3, 


46.  Mich.— Wark-Gilbert       Co.       v. 
Lamb,  227  N.W.  723,  248  Mich.  581. 

Mont.— State  v.  District  Court  of 
Fourth  Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for 
Missoula  County  Department  No. 
2,  282  P.  1042,  86  Mont.  193. 

Nev. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  State 
ex  rel.  Newitt  v.  Fourth  Judicial 
Dist  Court  in  and  for  Blko  Coun- 
ty, 121  P.2d  442,  444,  61  Nev.  164. 

N.M.— Field  v.  Otero.  290  P.  1015,  35 
N.M.  63— Dallam  County  Bank  v. 
Burnside,  249  P.  109,  31  N.M.  537. 

Okl.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Orr    v. 
Johnson,  149  P.2d  993,  994,  194  Okl. 
287. 
C.J.  p  63  note  50. 

47.  Ky.-^Spencer  v.  Martin  Mining 
Co.,   8<3   S.W.2d   39,   259  Ky.   697. 

34  C.J.  P  63  notes  4i3  [i]   (3),  44  [c3. 

48.  Ga,— Napier  v.  Varner,  101  S.E. 
579,  149  Ga.  585. 

34  C.  J.  p  63  note  51. 

Third  party  claimants 

Where  proceeding  to  foreclose 
mortgage  and  to  renew  dormant 
judgment  was  filed  during  October 
term,  return  term  for  case  was  next 
term;  hence,  Judgment  rendered  in 
October  term  was  void  for  want  of 
jurisdiction  as  to  third  party  claim- 
ants to  mortgaged  land,  notwith- 
standing defendant  made  waiver 
with  reference  to  judgment  at  first 
term  and  process. — Penn  Mut.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Troup,  170  S.B.  359,  177 
Ga,  456. 

49.  Miss.— Willsford  v.  Meyer-Kiser 

239 


Corporation,  104  So.  2913,  139  Miss. 

*87. 
50L    Ariz. — Aldous   v.    Intermountain 

Building-  &  Loan  Ass'n  of  Arizona, 

284  P.  353,  36  Ariz.  225. 
Cal.— Lind   v.   Baker,    119   P.2d   806, 

48  Cal.App.2d  234. 
R.I. — Rhode    Island    Rug   Works    v. 

General  Baking  Co.,  128  A.   676. 
S.D. — Ryan  v.  Sioux  Gun  Club,  2  N. 

W.2d  681,  68  S.D.  345. 
Tex. — Smith  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,   186 

S.W.2d   287,    refused   for   want   of 

merit — Jones  v.  Bledsoe,  Civ.App., 

293  S.W.  204. 
34  C.J.  p  62  note  >38  [a];    p  6$  note 

44   [e],   [g],  p  64  note  61   [e]    (5). 

51.  111. — Home    Flax    Co.    v.    Beebe, 
48  111.  138. 

52.  N.H.— Tuttle   v.    Tuttle,    196    A. 
624,  89  N.H.  219. 

Vt— Downer  v.  Battles,  152  A.  805, 
103  Vt  201. 

53.  S.C.— Black    v.    B.    B.    Kirkland 
Seed    Co.,    161    S.E.    489,    163    S.C. 
222. 

54<    Or. — Lyon  v.  Mazeris,   132  P.2d 
982,  170  Or.  222. 

55.  Iowa. — Tomlinson    v.    Litze,    47 
N.W.  1015,  82  Iowa  i32,  -31  Am.S.R, 
458, 

34  C.J.  p  64  note  53. 

56.  Idaho.— McGary  v.  Steele,  119  P. 
'448,  20  Idaho  753. 

34  C.J.  p  64  note  54. 

57.  Ariz. — Johnson  v.  Johnson,  52  P. 
2d  1162,  46  Ariz.  535 — Williams  v. 
Williams,  243  P.  402,  29  Ariz.  5*8. 


§  113 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


directory,58  and  that  disregard  thereof  renders  the 
judgment  at  most  irregular  and  erroneous,  but  not 
void,59  and  that,  being  for  the  benefit  of  the  parties, 
it  may  be  waived  by  them.60  In  the  absence  of  such 
constitutional  or  statutory  directions  the  court  has 
authority  to  take  a  case  under  advisement  for  a  rea- 
sonable length  of  time  before  rendering  its  deci- 
sion,61 and,  while  it  is  under  a  duty  to  decide  a  case 
within  a  reasonable  time  after  submission,62  it  has 
jurisdiction  to  render  a  decision  at  whatever  time 
it  reaches  a  conclusion.68 

Entry  of  a  judgment,  considered  as  a  ministerial 
act,  may  be  made  after  the  time  fixed  by  statute  for 


rendition  of  a  judgment64  Statutes  relating  to  the 
time  of  entry  have  been  considered  as  directory,65 
so  that  the  validity  of  a  judgment  subsequently  en- 
tered is  not  affected  by  failure  to  comply  with  the 
statute.66  Judgment  may  be  entered  on  a  verdict 
or  decision  at  any  time  thereafter,67  and  it  is  the 
right  of  a  party  to  have  a  judgment  so  entered  un- 
less the  lapse  of  time  is  unreasonably  great,6*  or 
unless  some  independent  right  has  intervened,69  or 
the  adverse  party  has  suffered  damage  or  lost  a 
right  by  reason  of  the  delay,76  so  long  as  the  court 
has  not  lost  jurisdiction  of  the  case.71  Mere  de- 
lay does  not  work  a  loss  of  jurisdiction  to  render 
or  enter  a  judgment73  The  presumption  of  pay- 


Cal. — Farmers     &    Merchants 

Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Peterson, ! 

55  F.2d  867.  5  Cal.2d  601. 
N.D.— Bruegger  v.  Cartler,  126  N.W. 

491,  20  N.D.  72. 
Wash. — Bickford   v.   Eschbach,  9   P« 

2d  (376,  167  Wash.  857. 
34  C.J.  P  -64  note  55. 

58.  CaL — Farmers  &  Merchants  Nat. 
Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Peterson, 
55  P.2d  867,  5  Cal.2d  601— Sannes 
v.    McEwan,   10   P.2d    8-1,    122   CaL 
App.  265— City  of  Los  Angeles  v. 
Hannon,    251    P.    247,    79   CaLApp. 
669. 

Pa. — Huron  v.  Schomaker,  1  A-2d  537, 
Ii32  Pa.Super.  462. 

59.  Cal. — Farmers  &  Merchants  Nat. 
Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Peterson, 
5*5  P.2d  867,  5  Cal.2d  60-1. 

Conn.— Spelke  v.  Shaw,   169  A.   787, 

117  Conn.  6S9 — Borden  v.  Town  of 

Westport,    151   A.    512,    112   Conn. 

1€2. 
La.— Matthews   v.    Spears,    App.,    24 

So.2d  195. 
Nev.— Batliff  Y.  Sadlier,  299  P.  674, 

53  Nev.  292. 
N.D. — Bruegger  v.  Cartler,  126  N.W. 

•491,  20  N.D.  72. 
Or.— Kellogg  v.  Kellogg,  2,6"3  P.  885, 

123  Or.  639. 
3'4  C.J.  p  64  note  56. 

00,    N.Y.— Keating  v.  Serrell,  5  Daly 

278. 

34  C.J.  p  64  note  57. 
Consent  assumed 

Where  no  timely  advantage  Is 
taken  of  the  delay,  parties  will  be 
assumed  to  have  consented  thereto. 
—Borden  v.  Town  of  Westport,  151 
A.  512,  112  Conn.  152. 
'"Waiver  not  shown 

Failure  of  defendant  to  object  to 
further  consideration  of  case  after 
expiration  of  session,  or  to  claim 
lack  of  Jurisdiction  until  adverse 
Judgment  was  rendered  was  held 
not  waiver  of  error  in  rendering 
Judgment  during  session  next  follow- 
ing that  at  which  trial  was  com- 
menced.—Spelke  v.  Shaw,  169  A,  787, 
137  Conn.  639, 


6L    Mich.—  Krebs  v.  Sent*,  9«  N.W. 

875,  1>32  Mich.  346. 
34  C.J.  p  64  note  58. 

62.  111.—  Friend  v.   Borrenpohl,   161 
N.E.  110,  329  VOL  528. 

63.  U.S.—  Ewert  v.   Thompson,  C.C. 
A.OkL,  281  F.  44S. 

Okl.—  Moroney  v.   Tannehill,    215    P. 
9(38,  90  Okl.  224. 

64.  Utah.—  Kolb    v.    Peterson,    168 
P.  97,  50  Utah  450. 

34  C.J.  p  64  note  60. 

35.    caj,  —  Hume  v.  Lindholm,  258  P. 

1003,  85  CaLApp.  80. 
Colo.  —  General  Accident  Fire  &  Life 

Assur.    Corporation,    Limited,     of 

Perth,   -Scotland  r*   Cohen,   216   P. 

522,  7(3  Colo.  459. 
Idaho.  —  Glennon   v.   Fisher,    10  P.2d 

294,  51  Idaho  732. 
Mont.  —  Coover    v.    Davis,    121    P.2d 

985,  112  Mont  605. 
Or.—  Fuller   Y.   Blanc,    77   P.2d   440, 

160  Or.  50. 
34  C.J.  p  65  note  62. 


66.  Colo.—  General     Accident 

&  Life  Assur.  Corporation,  Limit- 

ed,  of  Perth,   Scotland,  v.  Cohen, 

216  P.  «22,  7=3  Colo.  459. 
Iowa.—  Selby  v.  McDonald,  259  N.W. 

485,  219  Iowa  823. 
Mont—  JCoover  v.  Davis,  121  P.2d  985, 

112  Mont  605. 
Or.—  Fuller    v.    Blanc,    77    P.2d    440, 

160  Or.  50. 
34    C.J.    p    64   note    61    [a]    (2),    [c] 

(3),   (4),   £e]    04),  p  65  note  62. 
Judgment  voidable 

A  Judgment  entered  after  time  re- 
Quired  by  law  has  been  held  void- 
able. —  Tanner  v.  Wilson,  192  SJS.  425, 
184  Ga.  628. 

67.  Minn.  —  Corpus   Juris   quoted  la 
Industrial  Loan  &  Thrift  Corpora- 
tion v.  Benson,  21  N.W.2d  99,  101. 

Ohio.—  Baylor  v,  Killinger,  186  N.B. 

512,  44  Ohio  App.  523. 
OkL—  Sloan  v.   Kohler,   88  P.2d  «44, 

184  Okl.  511. 
34  C.J.  p  66  note  63. 
During1  valid  extension  of  term 
Ely.  —  Ha-ppy    Coal    Co.    v.    Brashear, 

92   S.W.2d  2,3,   263  Ky.  257. 

240 


68.  Ariz.— Cahn  v.   Schmitz,    108   P. 
2d  1006,  56  Ariz.  469. 

Minn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In- 
dustrial Loan  &  Thrift  Corpora- 
tion v.  Benson,  21  N.W.Sd  99,  101. 

OkL— Dusbabek  v.  Bowers,  43  P.2d 
97,  17i3  Okl.  53,  rehearing  denied 
47  P.2d  141,  173  Okl.  5«. 

34  C.J.  p  65  note  6*4. 

Pressure  of  other  lra.siii.ewat  ot  eat. 
onse  for  further  delay 

TT.S,— In  re  Maxwell,  C.OA.Tex.,  100 
F.2d  749. 

69.  Minn. — Corpus  Juris   Quoted   to. 
Industrial  Loan  &  Thrift  Corpora- 
tion v.  Benson,  21  N.W.2d  99,  101. 

Okl.— Dusbabek  v.  Bowers,  43  P.2d 
97, 173  OkL  53,  rehearing:  denied  47 
P.2d  141,  17S  Okl.  53. 

Wash. — State  v.  French,  17%  P.  527, 
100  Wash.  552. 

70.  I1L — Wallace    Grain    &    Supply 
Co.  v.  Gary,  28  NJE.2d  107,  874  111. 
57. 

71.  Ariz.— Cahn  v.   Schmitz,   108   P. 
2d  1006,  3.6  Ariz.  469. 

Minn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In- 
dustrial Loan  &  Thrift  Corpora- 
tion v.  Benson,  21  N.W.2d  99,  101. 

34  C.J.  p  65  note  66. 

72.  Ariz.— Cahn  v.   Schmitz,   108   P. 
2d  1006,  56  Ariz.  469. 

HI. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Wallace 
Grain  &  Supply  Co.  v.  Cary,  28  N. 
B.2d  107,  108,  374 'HI.  57 — Siegle 
v.  Mitchell,  249  IlLApp.  V116. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Dusba- 
bek v.  Bowers,  4-3  P.2d  97,  173 
OkL  5*3,  rehearing:  denied  47  P. 
2d  141,  178  Okl.  5t3. 

Tex. — Public,       Service       Employees 
Credit  Union  v.  Procter,  Civ.App., 
1*55  S.W.2d  9413,  error  dismissed. 
34  CJ.  p  65  note  67. 
Entry    of    judgment    previously    or- 

dered 

Entry  in  December  of  judgment 
then  filed  may  be  deemed  entry  of 
the  judgment  ordered  in  preceding 
January  to  be  entered,  and  so  not 
beyond  jurisdiction  of  court. — Wix- 
om  v.  Davis.  246  P.  1041,  198  Cal. 
641. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  US 


ment  arising  under  the  statute  of  limitations  from 
expiration  of  the  statutory  period  relates  only  to 
the  remedy  by  action,  and  does  not  prevent  entry  of 
judgment  on  a  decision  or  verdict  after  expiration 
of  the  statutory  time.78 

Duly  constituted  court  as  essential  to  the  validity 
and  regularity  of  a  judgment  is  discussed  supra 
§§  15-17. 

A  rule  of  court  requiring  a  judgment  to  be  filed 
or  formally  written  out  at,  or  within,  a  prescribed 
time,  or  forbidding  the  rendition  of  judgment,  over 
objection,  within  a  designated  number  of  days  of 
the  close  of  the  term,  has  been  held  to  have  the 
force  of  law,74  and  should  be  complied  with,75  pro- 
vided it  is  in  effect  at  the  time,™  is  applicable,77 
and  has  not  been  waived,78  but  disregard  thereof 
has  been  held  not  to  make  the  judgment  void.79 

After  adjournment.  The  entry  of  an  order  ad- 
journing court  sine  die  does  not  prevent  the  entry 
of  judgment  on  a  subsequent  day  in  the  period  dur- 
ing which  the  court,  by  virtue  of  statute,  remains 
open  for  the  transaction  of  business.80  Under  a 


statute  expressly  so  providing,  judgment  on  a  ver- 
dict may  be  entered  within  a  prescribed  number  of 
days  after  adjournment  of  court81 

After  death  of  party.  If  the  court  renders  a 
judgment  during  the  lifetime  of  a  party,  the  clerk 
may  perform  the  ministerial  act  of  entering  it  and 
recording  it  after  his  death.82 

Death  of  a  party  as  affecting  the  validity  of  a 
judgment  generally  is  discussed  supra  §  29. 

(2)  Expiration  of  Trial  Term 

A  Judgment  may  not  be  Invalid  because  It  It  not 
rendered  or  entered  until  after  the  expiration  of  the  trial 
term. 

Where  regular  terms  are  provided  by  law,  judg- 
ments may  properly  be  rendered  only  during  such 
terms.88  While  there  is  authority  holding  that  a 
judgment  rendered  after  the  expiration  of  the  term 
is  void,84  it  has  also  been  indicated  that  such  a 
judgment  is  not  wholly  void,  but  only  irregular  or 
erroneous.85  It  has  been  held  that,  where  the  par- 
ties expressly86  or  impliedly87  consent,  a  judgment 
may  be  rendered  after  expiration  of  the  term;  but, 


Absence  of  prior  legal  Judgment 

Where  parties  by  stipulation  re- 
moved the  record  of  a  cause  from 
one  district  to  another,  and  after 
decision  at  trial  the  record  was  re- 
turned by  the  clerk  without  author- 
ity to  the  first  county,  and  on  mem- 
orandum thereon  judgment  was  en- 
tered, and  on  certiorari  it  was  de- 
termined that  it  was  entered  with- 
out authority,  on  recovery  of  the 
record  by  the  trial  district,  the  court 
did  not  lose  jurisdiction  to  enter 
judgment  on  its  decision  nine  months 
thereafter. — Morley  v.  McDonald,  118 
A.  582,  $8  N.J.Law  275. 

73.  Minn.— Corpus   Juris   quoted  ia 
Industrial    Loan   &   Thrift   Corpo- 
ration   v.    Benson,    21   3ST.W.2d    99, 
101. 

N.Y.— Puls  v.  New  York  L.  &  W. 
R.  Co.,  104  N.Y.S.  -374,  54  Misc. 
303. 

74.  Tex. — Rowe  v.  Gohlman,  98  S.W. 
1077,   44   Tex.Civ.App.  315. 

75.  Conn. — Appeal   of   Bulkeley,    B.7 
A.  112,  76  Conn.  454. 

34  C.J.  p  64  note  61  [d],  p  65  note 

70  [a]   (.3). 

Bule  held  sufficiently  complied  with 
Ariz.— Griffith  v.  State  Mut.  Building 

&  Loan  Ass'n,  51  P.2d  246,  46  Ariz. 

359. 

76.  Ariz.— Mosher  v.   Dye,  39    P.2d 
639,  44  Ariz.  555. 

77.  Tex. — -Richards  v.  Howard,  Civ. 
App.,  218  $.W.  95. 

84  C.J.  p  65  note  70  [a]  (2),  (4),  (6), 
(7). 

78.  Tex. — Rowe  v.  Gohlman,  98  S.W. 
1077,    44    Tex.Civ.App.   815. 

49  0.  J.S.-16 


79.    Tex.— Meredith  v.  Flanagan,  Civ. 
App.,  202  S.W.  787. 

BQ.    Ala, — Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Street,  176  So.  350,  234  Ala.  537. 

81.  Ga.— Sullivan   v.    Douglas    Gib- 
bons,   Inc.,    2    S.E.2d    89,    187    Ga. 
764. 

82.  Cal.— 'In  re  Cook's  Estate,  19  P. 
431,  77  Cal.  220,  11  Am.S.R*  2-67,  1 
L.R.A.  667— Franklin  v.  Meridfca,  50 
CaL  289* 

83.  Conn.— Whitaker      v.       Cannon 
Mills  Co.,  45  A.2d  120— Gruskay  v. 
Simenauskas,  140  A.  724,  107  Conn. 
380. 

33  C.J.  p  1067  note  81. 
Term  divided  into  sessions 

Where  a  term  of  court  is  divided 
into  sessions,  the  Judgment  must  be 
rendered  according  to  statute  at  the 
same  session  im  which  case  is  tried 
or  the  next  succeeding  one.— Whita- 
ker v.  Cannon  Mills  Co.,  Conn.,  45  A. 
2d  120. 
Entry 

It  has  been  held  that,  if  a  judg- 
ment is  ordered  and  its  terms  pre- 
scribed by  the  court  during  «.  term, 
it  is  a  judgment  rendered  in  term 
time,  although  the  entry  thereof  is 
not  in  fact  prepared  and  transcribed 
on  the  Journal  until  after  the  close 
of  the  term. — Hilt  v.  Arnott,  3  P. 
525,  SI  Kfm.  672— «3,C.J.  p  1067  note 
86. 

84.  Tex.— Glasscoek  v.  Pickens,  Civ. 
App.,   73   S.W.2d   992— Texas  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Ass*n  v.  Laster,  Civ  App., 
69  S.W.2d  496— Rouff  v.  Boyd,  Civ. 

241 


App.,  16  S.W.2d  403 — Engelman  v. 

Anderson,  Civ.App.,  244  S.W.  650* 
3*3  C.J.  p  1067  note  82. 

After  «cpiratioa  of  term  in  which 
case  in  tried,  court  ordinarily  lacks 
jurisdiction  to  proceed  further  with 
case,  and  any  judgment  it  renders  is 
void. — Foley  v.  George  A.  Douglas  & 
Bro.,  185  A,  70,  121  Conn.  377. 
Absence  of  order  extending  term 

A  judgment,  rendered  on  jury's 
verdict  at  second  term  after  that  at 
which  trial  began  and  verdict  was 
returned,  was  unauthorized,  in  ab- 
sence of  order  extending  term. — 
British  General  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ripy,  106 
S.W.2d  1047,  ISO  Tex.  101. 

85.  Conn. — Lawrence    v.    Cannavan, 
56  A.  55-6,  76  Conn.  -303. 

3*  C.J.  p  1067  note  83. 

A  constitutional  provision  requir- 
ing that  superior  courts  shall  be  at 
all  times  open  for  the  transaction  of 
business,  except  for  trial  of  issues 
of  fact  requiring  a  jury,  has  been 
held  not  to  invalidate  a  Judgment 
signed  and  entered  after  the  expira- 
tion ef  the  term. — Shackelford  v. 
Miller,  91  N.C.  181. 

86.  Conn, — Whitaker      v.       Cannon 
Mills  Co.,  45  A.2d  120. 

N.C.— KillfeLn   v.    Maiden   Chair   Co., 

161  S.B.  546,  202  N.C.  23. 
33  C.J.  p  1067  note  84. 
Form, 

Consent  to  entry  of  judgment  out 
of  term  should  be  in  writing. — Kil- 
lian  v.  Maiden  Chair  Co,,  161  S.B. 
546,  202  N,C.  23. 

87.  Conn. — Whitaker      T.       Cannon 

Co.,  45  A.2d  120. 


§  113 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


where  such  judgments 'are  deemed  absolutely  void, 
consent  cannot  confer  jurisdiction.88  It  has  been 
held  that  a  valid  judgment  may  be  rendered  at  a 
subsequent  term  under  some  circumstances,89  as 
where  the  court  takes  a  case  under  advisement  to 
the  next  succeeding  term.80 

Entry.  Although,  in  some  states,  or  under  some 
statutes,  -a  judgment  is  a  nullity  unless  entered  on 
the  records  of  the  court  during  the  term  at  which 
it  was  rendered,91  it  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment may  not  be  invalid  because  it  is  entered  after 
the  trial  term,92  as  where  it  is  entered  at  a  succeed- 
ing term93  and  no  final  judgment  has  been  previ- 
ously rendered94  or  entered*95  Also,  where  the 
clerk  failed  to  perform  his  ministerial  duty  of  en- 
tering on  the  record  the  judgment  on  a  verdict  or 
decision,  the  judgment  may  be  entered  at  a  sub- 


sequent term,96  it  being  permissible  for  the  court 
at  such  term  to  direct  entry  of  the  judgment,97  or 
the  duty  may  be  performed  by  the  clerk  at  his  own 
instance  at  any  time,98  except  in  some  jurisdictions 
wherein  the  clerk  has  no  authority  to  enter  a  judg- 
ment after  the  term  without  the  consent  or  order  of 
the  court,99  or  without  the  consent  or  agreement  of 
the  adverse  party  and  without  statutory  notice.1 

Where  a  judgment  has  been  continued  by  curia 
advisare  vult,  and  is  not  given  until  the  term  suc- 
ceeding that  at  which  the  verdict  was  rendered,  the 
judgment  must  not  only  be  signed,  but  must  be  en- 
tered, as  of  such  succeeding  term.2  Under  a  court 
rule,  a  judgment  awarded  after  the  expiration  of 
a  term  at  which  it  was  ripe  for  judgment  must  be 
entered  as  of  the  last  day  of  that  term.8 


N.C. — Molyneux  v,  Huey,  81  N.C. 
106. 

Waiver 

<1)  Lack  of  Jurisdiction  of  court 
to  render  judgment  after  expiration 
of  term  next  succeeding  term  at 
which  trial  was  commenced  does  not 
pertain  to  subject  matter  but  to  the 
parties,  and  hence  may  be  waived. — 
Whitaker  v.  Cannon  Mills  Co.,  Conn., 
45  A.2d  120. 

(2)  Defendant  who  filed  pleadings 
and  participated  in  further  hearing 
after  expiration  of  time  allowed  by 
statute  for  rendering  judgment 
waived  statutory  requirement,  and 
hence  could  not  claim  that  judgment 
was  invalid  for  lack  of  jurisdiction. 
— Whitaker  v.  Cannon  Mills  Co.,  su- 
pra. 

88.  Kan. — Packard  v.  Packard,  7  P. 
628,  (34  Kan.  53. 

89.  Tex. — Shellhammer  v.  Caruthers, 
Civ.App..  99  S.W.2d  1054,  error  dis- 
missed— White     v.     Haynes,     Civ. 
'App.,  60  «S.W.2d  275,  error  dismiss- 
ed— Spencer  v.  Citizens1  State  Bank 
of  Woodville,  Civ.App.,   28   S.W.2d 
•1104,   error  dismissed— Brannon  v. 
Wilson,  CivJV.pp.,  260  S.W.  201. 

33  C.J.  p  10,67  note  87. 
Retention  of  Jurisdiction 

A  judgment  rendered  at  a  .subse- 
quent term,  when  the  district  court 
has  retained  jurisdiction  to  dispose 
of  issues  not  determined  by  a  for- 
mer judgment,  is  valid. — Hoffman  v. 
Hoffman,  KS5  P.2d  887,  15.6  Kan;  647. 

90.  Iowa. — Bookhart    v.    New    Am- 
sterdam   Casualty    Co.,    286    N.W. 
417,  226  Iowa  1186. 

Kan. — Hoffman  v.  Hoffman,  1*5  JP.2d 
887,  156  Kan.  647. 

Tex,— Miller  &  Babbs  v.  Hall,  Civ. 
App.,  62  S.W.2d  165,  error  dismiss- 
ed. 

33  C.J.  p  1067  note  87. 


91.  Ala.— McBeod  v.  Home  Pattern 
Co.,  102  So.  597,  20  Ala.App.  430. 

34  C.J.  p  66  note  78. 
Time  for  rendition  of  judgment  gen- 
erally see  supra  §  16. 

92.  U.S. — Sourino    v.    U.    S.,    C.C.A. 
Ga,,  86  F.2d  309,  certiorari  denied 
57  S.Ct.  4frl.  800  U.S.  661,  81  KEd. 
869 — Wesrtchester  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Bringle,  C.C.iA.Tenn.,    86   F.2d  262. 

Colo. — Denver  -Nat.  Bank  v.  Grimes, 

47   P.2d   862,   97   Colo.   158,    100  A. 

I*R.  994. 
Fla. — Fawcett  v.  Weaver,  -16-3  So.  561, 

121  Fla.  245. 
Tex. — J.  G.  -Smith  Grain  Co.  v.  Payne, 

Civ.App.,  290  S.W.  841. 

Motion  to  enter  judgment  on  ver- 
dict could  be  entertained  by  court 
after  term  at  which  verdict  was  ren- 
dered, particularly  where  such  mo- 
tion was  a  renewal  of  motion  made 
at  term  at  which  verdict  was  ren- 
dered.— Hart  v.  National  Casket  Co., 
29«3  N.T.S.  155,  161  Misc.  728. 

93.  Ky. — Union  Gas  &  Oil  Co.  v.  In- 
dian-Tex  Petroleum  Co.,  263  S.W. 
1,  203  Ky.  521, 

Tex. — Scott  v.  Gardner,  Civ. App.,  159 

S.W.2d  121,  error  refused — Parnell 

v.  Barren,  Civ.App.,  261  S.W.  529. 

Case  taken  under  advisement 

U.S. — Fleischmann   Const.  Co.   v.   U. 

S.,  to  Use  of  Forsberg,  Va.,  4,6  S. 

Ct.  284,  270  U.S.  i349,  70  L.Ed.  624. 

Al«u — Edmonds  v.   Standard  Brands, 

171  So.  751,  2*313  Ala.  615. 
Part  of  issues  undecided 

Where  jury  answered  one  issue 
during  term,  but  court  had  not,  at 
end  of  term,  decided  Issues  with- 
drawn, court  could  enter  judgment 
at  following  term. — Atlas  v.  Byers, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  21  S.W.2d  1080. 

94.  Ala. — Edmonds       v.       Standard 
Brands,  171  So.  751,  2S3  Ala.  315— 
Ex  parte  French,  147  So.  Ml,  226 

297. 

242 


Order  sustaining"  demurrer 

Where  an  order  of  trial  court 
which  sustained  defendant's  demur- 
rer to  petition  was  not  final,  such 
court  had  power  to  enter  final  order 
or  judgment  at  the  same  or  in  sub- 
sequent terms.— Miracle  v.  Marshall, 
111  S,W.2d  399,  271  Ky.  18. 

95.  Tex.— Manley    v.     Razlen,    Civ. 
Afcp.,  172  S.W.2d  798. 

Where  court  cannot  enter  final 
Judgment  without  additional  parties 
and,  therefore,  retains  jurisdiction, 
court  may  at  subsequent  term  enter 
proper  judgment. — Marshall  v.  Mc- 
Neill,  S  P.2d  859,  13-4  Kan.  197. 

96.  Tenn. — McAlester   v.    Montever- 
de,  115    S.W.2d   257,    22   Tenn.App. 
14. 

97.  Tex. — Carwile    v.    Cameron,    114 
S.W.  100,  102  Tex.  171. 

84  C.J.  p  66  note  75. 

98.  111.— Wickiser  v.  Powers,   57  N. 
B.2d  522,  '324  Ill.App.  130. 

34  C.J.  p   66  note  76,  p   65   note  71 
Ca3. 

Directing*    Judgment   not   to    be    en- 
tered 

The  court  is  without  jurisdiction 
at  a  subsequent  term  to  direct  that 
the  judgment  shall  not  be  written 
up  by  the  clerk.— People  v.  Petit, 
107  N.B.  8«30,  266  111.  -628— Wickiser 
v.  Powers,  57  N.B.2d  522,  324  '111. 
App.  ISO. 

99.  Ky.-— Shepherd  v.  Shepherd,  107 
S.W.  27)3,  128  Ky.  «87,  132  Ky.L.  942. 

34  C.J.  p  6,6  note  77. 
Notice 

Ky.— Parrish  v.  Ferriell,  186  SJW.2d 
625,  299  Ky.  676. 

1.  Ky. — Green    v.    Blankenship,    91 
S.W.2fd  996,  26<3  Ky.  29— Lamereaux 
v.  Dixie  Motor  Co.,  91  S.W.2d  993, 
2613  Ky.  67. 

2.  N.J.— Thorpe  v.  Corwin,  20  N.J. 
Law  (311. 

3.  U.S. — U.  S.  Shipping  Board  Bmer- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  113 


(3)  Expiration  of  Judge's  Term  of  Office 

A  Judgment  entered  after  the  expiration  of  the  term 
of  office  of  the  Judge  who  rendered  It  may  be  valid  where 
there  was  a  valid  rendition  thereof  prior  to  the  expira- 
tion of  the  Judge's  term  of  office. 

Where  a  judgment  was  actually  rendered  before 
the  expiration  of  the  term  of  office  of  the  judge  try- 
ing the  case,  it  is  immaterial  that  it  was  not  entered 
of  record  until  afterward,  the  judicial  act  being  the 
rendition  of  the  judgment,  and  its  entry  being  mere- 
ly ministerial.4  However,  a  valid  decision  cannot 
be  entered  after  the  expiration  of  the  judge's  term,5 
and  the  invalidity  of  the  decision  is  not  affected  by 
the  fact  that  it  is  ordered  filed  by  his  successor  and 
is  filed,6  and  a  judgment  rendered  in  vacation  can- 
not be  made  binding  by  entry  after  death  of  the 
judge,  by  direction  of  his  successor.7  Under  a  stat- 
ute prohibiting  the  rendition  or  entry  of  judgment 
until  the  filing  of  a  decision,  a  judgment  is  invalid 
where  the  decision  and  judgment  pursuant  thereto, 
although  signed  before,  were  not  filed  until  after, 
the  expiration  of  the  judge's  term  of  office.8 

d.  Judgment  on  Beport  of  Referee 

The  time  for  rendition  or  entry  of,  or  making  a  mo- 
tion for,  judgment  on  the  report  of  a  referee  varies  un- 
der the  statutes  or  practice  of  particular  states. 

Statutes  limiting  the  time  within  which  a  motion 
for  judgment  on  a  referee's  report  may  be  made 
have  been  held  to  be  mandatory,  and  the  court  can- 


not extend  the  time.9  In  some  states,  the  successful 
party  is  entitled  to  judgment  at  once  on  the  report 
of  a  referee,10  but,  under  the  practice  of  a  particu- 
lar state,  judgment  on  the  report  of  referees  is,  in 
the  absence  of  exception  filed  to  the  report,  entered 
as  a  matter  of  course  at  the  term  succeeding  their 
appointment;11  and,  under  a  statute  providing  that 
judgment  shall  not  be  entered  on  the  report  until 
a  certain  number  of  days  have  elapsed,  a  judgment 
entered  within  that  time  is  irregular,12  although  not 
void.13  A  judgment  not  rendered  until  nine  days 
after  a  motion  to  modify  findings  of  the  referee  has 
been  held  not  premature.1* 

e.  Bate  of  Judgment 

As  a  general  rule  a  Judgment  takes  effect  from  the 
day  It  is  actually  rendered  or  entered. 

By  the  common  law,  followed  in  some  of  the 
states,  sometimes  by  virtue  of  statutory  provisions, 
all  judgments  rendered  at  a  given  term  of  court  are 
presumed  to  have  been  rendered  on  the  first  day  of 
that  term,15  and  at  the  earliest  possible  hour  of  that 
day  when,  according  to  the  course  of  the  court,  it 
might  have  been  rendered;16  but  this  rule  is  inap- 
plicable in  a  case  where  judgment  could  not  have 
been  rendered  on  the  first  day  of  the  term.1*  In 
other  states  a  judgment  is  regarded  as  rendered  on 
the  last  day  of  the  term  unless  the  contrary  is 
shown.18  In  still  another  state,  under  statutes  and 


gency  Fleet  Corporation  v.  Atlan- 
tic Corporation,  C.C.A.M2ass.,  '16  F. 
2d  27. 
Judgment  of  prior  term 

A  Judgment  In  a  case  heard  in 
January,  signed  Feb.  11,  194-1,  out 
of  term  and  out  of  county  by  con- 
sent of  the  parties,  and  which  was 
docketed  Febr.  14,  1941,  when  dock- 
eted, became  a  Judgment  as  of  the 
January  term,  1941.— Crow  v.  Mc- 
Cullen,  17  S.E.2d  107,  220  N.C.  306. 

4.  Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Watts  v.  Sand- 
ier, 1-99  So.  «56,  145  Fla,  «425. 

BT.Y.— Anstendig  v.  dDinnerson,  264  w. 

T.S.  680,  147  iMisc.  827. 
34  C.J.  p  67  note  96. 
After  death  of  Judge 

Ministerial  act  of  entering  Judg- 
ment on  record  may  be  performed 
after  death  of  judge  signing  Judg^- 
ment— Beetchenow  v.  Bartholet,  298 
P.  «3|85,  162  Wash.  119. 

5.  CaL— Connolly   v.    Ashworth,   83 
P.  60,  98  Cat  205. 

&    Cal^Connolly  T.  Ashworth,  su- 
pra. 

7.  Miss.— Wilson    v.    Rodewald,    61 
Miss.  228. 

8.  S.D.— Blundt  v.  Hemenway.   244 
N.W.  377,  60  SJ>.  248. 

9.  wis.— Miami  County  Nat   Bank 


105    N.W.    816,    126 


v.    Goldberg, 
Wis.  432. 
34  C.J.  p  69  note  22. 

10.  N.C.— Reed  v.  Farmer,   69  N.C. 
539. 

34  C.J.  p  70  note  28. 

11.  Del.— Georgetown   Trust   Co.   v. 
Marvel,   162   A.   859,   5  W.W.Harr. 
210. 

12.  S.D.— Wood    v.     Saginaw    Gold 
Min.  &  MUL  Co..  105  N.W.  101,  20 
S.D.  161. 

34  C.J.  p  70  notes  24  [b],  25. 

13*    N.T.— HiU  v.  Watson,  2  How.Pr. 

153. 
34  C.J.  P  70  note  25. 

14.  Or. — Trummer  v.  Konrad,  51  P. 
447,  8'2  Or.  54. 

15.  N.C.— Norwood  v.  Thorp,   64  N. 
C.  682. 

34  CJ.  p  70  note  27. 

16.  Miss. — Clark  v.  Duke,   59   Miss. 
•575. 

34  OJ.  p  70  note  S8. 

;    Va.— Withers  r.  Carter,  4  Gratt. 

407,  4'5  Va,  407,  50  Am.D.  78. 
34  C.J.  p  70  note  27  [a],  CD]. 
Judgment  mine  pro  tone 

Such  a  statute  does  not  apply  to 
a  judgment  signed  out  of  term  and  a 
judgment  mine  pro  tune,  although 

243 


by  agreement,  is  not  allowed  to  take 

effect  by*  relation  to  the  prejudice  of 

third  parties. — Con-Es-Tee  Chemical 

Co.  v.  Long,  114   S.E.   465,   184  N.C. 

898. 

18.    Vt.— Downer  v.   Battles,   152  A. 

805,  103  Vt.  201. 

84  C.J.  p  70  note  29,  p  58=3  note  63. 
Vaorlable  practice 

The   practice   of  having  only  one 
judgment  day  for  the   term,  is   not 
invariable.— Tuttle  v.  Tuttle,  196  A. 
624,  89  N.H.  219. 
Bule  of  court 

(1)  Under  a  rule  of  court,  where 
a  cause  was  ripe  for  judgment  at  a 
certain  term,  but  no  judgment  was 
entered  at  any  time  during  the  term, 
a  judgment  entered  after  the  term 
is  to  be  regarded  as  entered  as  of 
the    last    day    of   the    term. — TJ.    S. 
Shipping    Board    Emergency    Fleet 
Corporation  v.  Atlantic  Corporation, 
C.C.A.Mass.,  Ii6  F.2d  27. 

(2)  IA  rule  of  court,  providing  that 
"where   judgment   shall    be    omitted 
to  be  entered  upon  a  verdict  it  shall 
be  considered  as  entered  on  the  last 
day  of  the  term,"  can  have  no  appli- 
cation to  verdicts  incapable  of  sup- 
porting    judgments. — Pressed     Steel 
Car  Co.  v.  Steel  Car  Forge  Co.,  Pa., 
14*9  F.  182,  79  C.OA.  130. 


§  113 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


rules  of  court  directing  the  clerk  to  enter,  on  a  cer- 
tain day  in  each  week,  judgments  in  civil  actions 
and  proceedings  ripe  for  judgment,  a  case  goes  to 
judgment  automatically  on  tiie  first  judgment  day 
after  it  becomes  ripe  for  judgment,1*  and,  in  view 
of  the  law,  the  judgment  is  rendered  when  it  ought 
to  be  entered,20  even  though  the  clerk  fails  to  enter 
the  judgment  on  that  date.21 

In  a  majority  of  states,  however,  the  date  of  a 
judgment  is  the  day  on  which  it  is  actually  ren- 
dered22, or  entered;23  and  may  be  fixed  by  refer- 
ence to  the  record  of  the  proceedings  in  the  case,24 
or  extrinsic  evidence  may  be  given  of  the  day  on 
which  the  judgment  was  rendered.25  Under,  and 
in  accordance  with,  the  majority  rule,  a  judgment  is 
deemed  to  be  rendered  on  the  date  when  it  is  or- 
dered26 or  pronounced27  by  the  court,  or  when  the 
trial  judge  in  open  court  declares  his  decision  of 
law  on  the  matters  in  issue,28  or  when  a  formal  or- 
der granting  a  motion  for  judgment  on  the  verdict 


is  signed,2*  or,  in  the  absence  of  contrary  indication,, 
when  the  clerk  certifies  that  he  has  received  the 
judgment  for  record30  It  may  be  dated  back  to 
the  time  when  the  court  directed  judgment  to  be 
entered,51  but  is  not  valid  if  postdated,  at  least,  not 
until  the  arrival  of  the  day  named.32  A  judgment 
filed  out  of  office  hours  with  the  clerk  is  considered 
as  legally  and  properly  filed  in  "his  office  at  the  hour 
legally  fixed  for  the  opening  of  his  office  on  the 
following  business  day.33 

Time  of  rendition  or  entry  as  fixing  tune  lor  ap- 
peal is  discussed  in  Appeal  and  Error  §  44-5* 

§  114.    In  Vacation 

Unless  authorized  by  statute,  a  Judgment  rendered 
during  vacation  }»  void.  A  Judgment  properly  rendered 
generally  may  be  entered  by  the  clerk  In  vacation. 

Unless  authorized  by  statute,3*  a  judgment  ren- 
dered during  vacation  is  void  for  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion.85 Some  statutes  conferring  judicial  powers 


19.  Mass.— Petition  of  McGonigle, 
•57  N.E.2d  926,  317  Mass.  262— 
Home  Finance  Trust  v.  Hantoul 
Garage  Co.,  &  N.E.2d  153,  300 
Mass.  86. 

Conversely,  lack  of  ripeness  for 
judgment  prevents  the  case  from 
groins  to  judgment  automatically. — 
Barton  v.  City  of  Cambridge,  Mass., 
61  !N.R2d  830— Krlnsky  v.  Stevens 
Coal  Sales  Co.,  186  N.E.2d  411,  309 
Mass.  528 — Lynn  .Gas  &  Electric  Co. 
v.  Creditors'  Nat.  Clearing  House, 
1*30  N.E.  1-11,  2137  Mass.  505— Hosmer 
v.  Hoitt,  36  N.E.  S35,  161  Mass.  176 
— Norcross  v.  Crabtree,  86  N.E.  678, 
161  Mass.  55. 
Bipenesg  lor  judgment 

(1)  A  case  is   ripe  for  judgment 
within  contemplation  of  such  provi- 
sions  when,   under  last  entry,   case 
seems  to  have  been  brought  to  final 
determination  and  everything  seems 
to  have  been  done  that  ought  to  be 
done  before  the  entry  of  a  final  ad- 
judication on  the  rights  of  the  par- 
ties.— Home  Finance   Trust  v.   Ran- 
toul  Garage  Co.,   14  N.E.2d  153,   300 
Mass.     86-HAmerican     Woodworking 
Machinery  Co.   v.   Forbush,  79  N.E. 
770,  193  Mass.  455. 

(2)  A   case    is   normally  ripe   for 
judgment  when  all  a'ppears  to  have 
been  done  with  regard  to  the  action 
that  should  have  been  done. — Ahern 
v.    Towle,  <39   N.E.2d   561,    310   Mass. 
695. 

(3)  A  case  may  be  ripe  for  judg- 
ment even  though  there  are  undis- 
posed of  motions  on  the  files  of  the 
court. — Dalton-Ingersoll  Co.  v.  Fiske, 
55  N.E.  46-8,  175  Mass.  1*5. 

50.  Mass.— Sullivan    v.    Jordan,    36 
N.E.2d   387,  '310  Mass.   12. 

51.  Mass. — Hacking  v.  Co-ordinator 


of  Emergency  Relief  Dept.  of  New 
Bedford,  48  N,E.2d  41,  313  Mass. 
413 — Krinsky  v.  Stevens  Coal  Sales 
Co.,  46  N.E.2d  411,  309  Mass.  (52'8 
— Sullivan  v.  Jordan,  36  N.E.2d 
•387,  310  Mass.  12 — Home  Finance 
Trust  v.  Rantoul  Garage  Co.,  14 
N.E.2d  153,  '300  Mass.  86. 

22.  Fla.— State  ex  rel.  Watts  v. 
Sandier,  199  go.  356,  145  'Fla,  425. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  John- 
son v.  Mississippi  Power  Co.,  196 
So.  642,  643,  189  Miss.  67. 

34  C.J.  p  70  note  30. 

Time  when  judgment  takes  effect  see 
infra  $  446. 

33.  Iowa. — State  v.  Beaton,  178  N. 
W.  1,  190  Iowa  216,  rehearing  de- 
nied 180  N.W.  166,  190  Iowa  216. 

34  C.J.  p  55  note  57,  p  70  note  30. 

As   between   the   parties,   a  judg- 
ment   is    secured    when    the    entry 

thereof  is   made   in  the  appearance 

docket  of  the  court— Lynch  v.  Bish- 
op, 21  Pa,Dist  &  Co.  31«3. 

24.  Miss. — Johnson  v.  Mississippi 
Power  Co.,  196  So.  642,  18-9  Miss. 
67. 

Neb. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mar- 
tin v.  Sanford,  261  N.W.  136,  140, 
129  Neb.  212. 

U  C.J.  p  70  note  31. 

26.  Neb. — Corpus  Jari*  quoted  in 
Martin  v.  Sanford,  261  N.W.  1*36, 
140,  129  Neb.  212. 

34  C.J.  p  70  note  82. 

26.  Tenn. — (Southern  Mortg.  Guar- 
anty Corporation  v.  King,  77  S.W. 
•2d  810,  168  Tenn.  309. 

Bate  of  filing  of  memorandum  di- 
recting' judgment 

Conn. — Mazulis    v.    Zeldner,    164    A. 
713,  116  Conn.  314. 
When  the  order  book  is  signed,  the 

judgment  dates  back  to  the  time  of 

244 


entry. — Lawrence  y.  First  State  Bank 

of   Dry    Ridge,    1*2    S.W.2d    60,    279 

Ky.  775. 

87.  I1L — Cosgrove  v.  Highway  Com- 
missioner of  Town  of  Rockville, 
281  Ill.App.  406. 

Miss. — Johnson  v.  Mississippi  Power 
Co.,  196  So.  642,  189  Miss.  67. 

Tenn. — Southern     Mortg;     Guaranty 

'  Corporation  v.  King,  T7  6.W.2d 
$10,  168  Tenn.  309. 

2&  Tex.— Universal  'Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Cook,  Civ.App.,  188  S.W.2d  791. 

29.  Wis. — Osmundson  v.  Lang,    290 
N.W.  125,  -233  Wis.  591. 

30.  Tex.— City  of  Wichita  -B^lls   v. 
Brown,   CIV.Apfr.,    119   S.W.2d   407, 
error  dismissed. 

SL    N.Y.— Clark    v.    Clark,    34    N.B. 

513,  138  N.T.  053. 

VL— Starbird  v.  Moore,  21  Vt.  -529, 
32.    N.T.-^Sanith  v.'Coe,  '30  N.T.  477. 
83.    N.T.— Hathaway  Y.    Howell,    54 

N.T.  97. 
34  C.J.  p  62  note  41. 

34,  Vt — Leonard  v.  Willcox,  142  A. 
762,  101  Vt  195. 

33  C.J.  p  1068  note  89,  p  1069  note  90 

—15  C.J.  j>  S16  note  26. 
Za  Georgia 

The  judges  of  the  superior  court 
cannot  exercise  any  power  out  of 
term  time,  unless  the  authority  to  do 
so  is  expressly  granted  by  law,  or 
an  order  has  been  taken  in  'term  con- 
ferring authority  to  render  a  judg- 
ment in  vacation. — Sammons  v.  Na- 
bers,  197  S.E.  284,  1*6  Ga.  1-61— 
33  C.J.  <p  1068  note  89  [d]. 

35.  Ga. — Rogers    v.    Toccoa    Power 
Co.,   141   S.E.   517,  161  Ga.   5^,   44 
A.L.R.   «534— Walton   v.   Wilkinson 
Bolton  Co.,   123   S.E.   103,   158    Ga. 
13 — Wright    Y.    Cannon,    198    S.E. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  115 


on  judges  in  vacation  have  been  held  unconstitu- 
tional.*6 

In  some  jurisdictions  where  the  rendition  of  judg- 
ments in  vacation  is  not  authorized,  judgments  ren- 
dered at  such  a  time  have  been  held  void,  although 
the  parties  had  expressly  consented  to  such  rendi- 
tion.37 Under  some  statutes,  however,  where  the 
parties  to  the  action  consent,  a  judgment  may  be 
rendered  during  vacation.88  Where  this  is  the  case, 
a  judgment  so  rendered  by  consent  is  not  only  bind- 
ing on  the  parties,  but  is  valid  even  as  to  third  per- 
sons in  the  absence  of  proof  of  fraud  or  collusion.39 

Entry.  A  judgment  entered  in  vacation  by  a 
court  or  judge  has  been  held  a  nullity40  unless  its 
'  entry  at  sueh  time  by  the  court  or  judge  is  author- 
ized by  statute,41  the  power,  if  any,  of  a  court  or 
judge  to  enter  judgment  in  vacation  being  purely 
statutory.42  A  contention  that  the  court  was  with- 
out jurisdiction  to  enter  judgment  in  vacation  is 
•without  merit  where  the  record  does  not  disclose 
that  the  judgment  was  entered  in  vacation.43 

In  a  majority  of  jurisdictions,  a  judgment  prop- 
erly rendered  may  be  entered  by  the  clerk  in  vaca- 
tion,44 provided  the  clerk  does  not  act  merely  from 


his  own  recollection,  but  is  guided  by  some  memo- 
randa, such  as  the  minutes  and  docket  entries  of  the 
court's  proceeding.45  However,  a  judgment  neither 
rendered  by  the  court  nor  pronounced  by  law  at- 
tempted to  be  entered  by  the  clerk  in  vacation  is 
void46  as  being  an  attempted  exercise  of  judicial 
powers  by  a  ministerial  officer.47  In  some  jurisdic- 
tions, the  clerk  has  no  power  or  authority  to  enter 
a  judgment  in  vacation,48  although  duly  pronounced 
by  the  court  in  term  time,49  even  at  the  express  di- 
rection of  the  judge,50  or  even  in  cases  where  there 
is  a  docket  memorandum  sufficient  to  authorize  a 
judgment  nunc  pro  tune  at  a  subsequent  term.51 

§  115,    Pendency   of   Motion   for   New 

Trial  or  in  Arrest 

After  verdict,  It  Is  regular  In  some  Jurisdictions,  and 
Irregular  In  others,  to  enter  judgment  before  expiration 
of  the  time  for  applying  for  a  new  trial  or  pending  dis- 
position of  a  timely  motion  for  a  new  trial.  A  motion 
in  arrest  of  Judgment  should  be  disposed  of  before  ren- 
dition of  Judgment. 

At  common  law,52  and  under  the  statutes  or  prac- 
tice of  some  jurisdictions,53  a  judgment  after  ver- 
dict should  not  be  entered  before  expiration  of  the 


301,  58  Ga.App.  268— Kelley  v.  Paf- 
ford,  121  S.B.  866,  31  Ga.A-pp.  697. 

III. — Gary  v.  Senseman,  215  Ill.App. 
232. 

Miss. — Union  Motor  Car  Co.  v.  Farm- 
er, 11$  So.  425,  151  Miss.  734. 

Tex. — Sinclair  Refining  Co.  Y.  Mc- 
Elree,  Civ.App.,  52  S.W.2d  679. 

$3  C.J.  p  1067  note  88— 15  C.J.  p  815 
note  25. 

A  vacation  hearing  is  coram  non 
Jndioe  and  a  judgment  rendered 
thereat  in  void,  in  absence  of  any 
waiver  or  estoppel  or  an  order 
passed  in,  term  time  expressly  grant' 
ing  authority  to  render  a  Judgment 
in  vacation  or  the  giving  of  written 
notice  of  the  vacation  hearing. — 
Sammons  v.  Nabers,  197  S.E.  284,  186 
Ga.  161. 

.Judgment*  or  decree*  held  not  void 

(1)  Judgment   has   been   held   not 
invalid  because  rendered  in  vacation 
where  judgment  was  not  filed  or  en- 
tered until  court  reconvened,  which 
«ntry   amounted   to   confirmation   of 
findings  of  fact  and  law  in  vacation 
And  to  rendition  of  judgment  in  open 
•court. — Morrow   v.   Scroggins,    70    S. 
W.2d  5*51,  188  Ark.  1088. 

(2)  Where  district  court  kept  reg- 
ular term  open  by  specific  order  un- 
til adjournment  sine  die,  recess  be- 
tween meetings  during' term  was  not 
"vacation";     hence,    decree   was    not 
void  as  rendered  in  vacation. — Wal- 
lace  v.   Clements,   248  N.W.   58,   124 
Neb.  691. 


36.  Mo.— State  v.  Woodson,  -61  S.W. 
252,  161  Mo.  444. 

33  C.J.  p'1069  note  91. 

37.  Okl.— Dunn    v.    Qarrier,    135    P- 
337,  40  Okl.  214. 

33  C.J.  p  1069  note  92. 

38.  Tex.— Doeppenschmidt  v.  City  of 
New  Braunfels,  Civ.App.,  289  S.W. 
425. 

33  C.J.  p  1069  notes  93,  94. 

39.  La. — New     Orleans     v.     Gauth- 
reaux,  32  La. Ann.  1126. 

33  C.J.  p  1070  note  95. 

40.  Ind.— Isaacs  v.  Fletcher  Ameri- 
can  Nat.    Bank,    185   N.EL   154,    98 
Ind.App.  111. 

Vt— Saund  v.  Saund,  13-8  A,  867,  100 

Vt  387. 
Judgment  rendered  and  entered  in 

vacation 
Ky.— Beliles  v.  Whittaker,  251  S.W. 

190,  199  Ky.  431. 

41.  111. — 'Friend   v.    Borrenpohl,    161 
N.B.  110,  329  111.  528. 

Vt.— Morgan  v.  Gould,  119  A.  517,  96 
Vt  275. 

W.Va.— McGibson  v.  Roane  County 
Court,  121  S.K  99,  95  W.Va.  3'38. 

KTotice  to  parties 

Ky.— Lawrence  v.  First  State  Bank 
of  Dry  Ridge,  132  S.W.2d  60,  279 
Ky.  775 — City  of  Owenpb^ro  v.  No- 
lan, 46  S.W.2d  490,  242  Ky.  342. 

42.  Vt. — Saund  v.  Saund,  138  A.  867, 
100  Vt  -387. 

43.  I1L— Chicago  Title  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Cohen,  1  N.B.2d  717,  2S4  IlLApp. 
181. 

245 


44.  Colo.— Wilson   v.   Collin,    102   P. 
21,  45  Colo.  412. 

34  C.J.  p  &6  note  82. 
Judgment: 

By   confession   see   infra    §    166. 

By  default  see  infra  §  207. 

45.  Md. — Montgomery  v.  Murphy,  19 
Md.  576,  81  Am.D.  &52. 

34  C.J.  p  66  note  83. 

46.  Colo.— Sieber  v.  Frink,  2  P.  901, 
7  Colo.  148. 

34  C.J.  p  67  note  88. 

47.  CaL— 'Stearns  v.  Aguirre,  7  CaL 
44*. 

Colo.— Sieber  v.    Frinfc,    2   P.    901,   7 
Colo.  148. 

48.  Ala. — Campbell  v.  Beyers,  66  So. 
651,  189  Ala.  307. 

34  C.J.  p  67  note  90. 

49.  Ind.— Mitchell    v.    St.    John,    9Z 
Ind.  598. 

34  C.J.  p  -67  note  91. 

50.  Ind. — Passwater  v.  Edwards,  44 
Ind.  343. 

34  C.J.  p  67  note  92. 

51.  Ala. — Wynn  v.  McCraney,  46  So. 
854,  156  Ala.  630. 

52.  Ga. — City  of  Macon  v.  Herring- 
ton,   32  S.£.2d  517,  198  Ga.  576. 

34  C.J.  p  62  note  30. 

53.  Ohio.— Dellenbarger    v.    Hunger, 
24  Ohio  Cir.Ct  722. 

34  C.J.  p  68  note  6. 

Statute  applies  only  to  trial  by 
jury  or  by  the  court  where  a  jury 
is  waived. — Noonan  v.  Noonan,  Ohio 
APP.,  42  N.E.2d  671. 


§  115 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


time  within  which  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  may  be 
made,  and,  if  it  is  signed  or  entered  before  the  ex- 
piration of  such  time,54  or  pending  disposition  of  a 
timely  motion  for  a  new  trial,55  it  is  irregular,  but 
not  void.58  In  other  jurisdictions,  a  judgment  en- 
tered pending  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  or  before 
expiration  of  the  time  within  which  such  a  motion 
may  be  made,  is  in  all  respects  regular,  valid,  and  in 
accordance  with  the  customary  practice.57  Neces- 
sarily, a  judgment  before  disposition  of  a  timely  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial  is  at  most  a  mere  judgment 
nisi  and  is  not  final  until  the  motion  is  overruled.58 

Where  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  has  been  entered 
on  the  docket  and  a  time  fixed  for  filing  a  report 
of  the  evidence,  on  failure  to  file  the  report  of  evi- 
dence, the  case  may  be  stricken  from  the  law  dock- 
et, and  judgment  entered  on  the  verdict,5^  Also, 
where  judgment  has  been  withheld  pending  a  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial,  judgment  may  be  entered  up 
immediately  on  overruling  of  the  motion;60  but  the 
court,  having  granted  a  new  trial,  cannot  rescind 
the  order  and  render  judgment  on  the  verdict  at  a 
subsequent  term.61  When  an  order  is  entered  dis- 
pensing with  the  necessity  of  a  motion  for  a  new 
trial,  the  defeated  party  may  not  postpone  the  final 
determination  of  the  cause  by  filing  such  motion.62 

A  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  should  be  dis- 
posed of  before  rendition  of  judgment,63  but  failure 
to  do  so  is  harmless  error  where  the  motion  is  ill- 


founded,6*  and  entry  of  judgment  has  been  held 
to  be,  ipso  facto,  a  disposition  of  the  motion.65 

§  116.    Stay  of  Proceedings 

A  motion  to  stay  the  entry  of  Judgment  may  and 
should  be  denied  where  the  stay  Is  not  authorized  or 
warranted. 

Where,  apart  from  a  motion  for  a  stay  of  pro- 
ceedings, the  case  is  ripe  for  judgment,  such  mo- 
tion is  in  effect  a  motion  to  stay  the  entry  of  judg- 
ment.66 Unauthorized  opposition  to  a  motion  to 
stay  the  entry  of  judgment  is  not  a  sufficient  ground 
for  granting  the  motion  ;67  and  under  some  statutes 
a  stay  of  entry  of  judgment  on  a  verdict  until  de- 
termination of  an  appeal  from  an  order  denying  a 
motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict 
is  not  authorized68  where  the  case  is  not  reserved 
for  further  argument  or  consideration  and  the  ver- 
dict is  not  defective.69  It  is  irregular  to  render  a 
judgment  while  an  order  staying  proceedings  in  the 
case  remains  unrevoked  and  unexpired,  but  the 
judgment  is  not  for  that  reason  void.70 

§  117.    Nunc  pro  Tune  Entry 

The  object  and  .office  of  a  nunc  pro  tune  entry  of 
a  judgment  are  to  exhibit  correctly  on  the  record  a  Judg- 
ment previously  rendered  and  not  carried  Into  the  rec- 
ord or  not  properly  and  adequately  recorded. 

In  connection  with  judgments,  the  object  or  pur- 
pose, and  office,  function,  or  province,  of  a  nunc  pro 
tune  entry  are  to  make  the  record  speak  the  truth71 
by  recording  or  correctly  evidencing  an  act  done72 


54.  Md.— Heiskell  v.   Rollins,   32  A. 
249,  31  Md.  397. 

34  C.J.  ip  63  notes  4,  7. 

55.  Mo.— Stith    v.    J.    J.    Newberry 
Co.,   79  JS.W.2d  447,  336  Mo.  467. 

34  CJ.  p  68  note  8. 

Judgment    cannot    be    entered    until 

court    overrule*    motion 
Ohio. — State    ex    rel.    Van   Stone   v. 

Carey,  -65  N.B.2d  166,  76  Ohio  App. 

478. 

56.  Ohio. — M.   J.   Hose  Co.  v.   Boss, 
154  N.E.  346,  23  Ohio  App.  23. 

34  C.J.  .p  68  note  9. 

57.  Fla. — Winn    &    Lorett    Grocery 
Co.  v.  Luke,  24  So.2d  810. 

Ga.— National    Bank    of    Wilkes    v. 

Maryland   Casualty    Co.,    146    S.«E. 

739,  167  Ga.  737. 
N.Y.— O'Brien    v.    Lehigh   Valley   It 

Co.,  27  N.Y.'S.2d  540,  176  Misc.  404. 
34  C.J.  p  68  note  11. 

58.  (Fla.— Talley  v.  McCain,  174  Bo. 
841,  128  Fla,  418. 

Ind.— Kensinger  v.   Schaal,   161  N.B. 

262,    200    Ind.    275. 
Idu — Auto-(Lee    Stores    v.     Ouachita 

Valley  Camp  No.  10.  W.  O.  W.,  171 

So.  62,  185  La.  876. 
34  C.J.  p  6*8  note  11,  p  69  note  12. 


59.  Me.— Goodwin   v.    Small,    43    A. 
507,  92  Me.  588. 

60.  OkL — Thompson   v.    Nickle,    259 
P.  649,  113  Okl.  44. 

34  C.J.  p  69  note  1*5. 

Denial  of  new  trial  on  counterclaim 

Where  order  denying  new  trial  on 
counterclaim  was  not  and  could  not 
be  appealed  from,  verdict  for  plain- 
tiff on  counterclaim  was  held  in 
abeyance  awaiting  final  disposition 
in  trial  court  of  whole  case  after 
which  it  would  be  trial  court's  duty 
to  enter  proper  Judgment. — First 
Nat  Bank  v.  Dunbar,  72  S.W.2d  821, 
230  Mo.App.  687. 

61.  Ark. — Brooks    v.     Hanauer,     22 
Ark.  174. 

Tex.— Wells  v.  Melville,  25  Tex.  337. 

62.  Colo. — Dickson  v.  Horn,  1  P.  23 
•98,  39  Colo.  2'34 — Swanson  v.  First 
Nat    Bank,    219    P.    784,   74    Colo. 
135. 

Motion  properly  disregarded. 
Colo. — Swanson  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 
supra. 

63.  Ili. — Stevenson   T.   Sherwood,   22 
111.  238,  74  Am.D.  140. 

64L    Mo. — Warren   v.  Chicago,    B.   &, 

246 


Q.  R  Co.,  99  S.W.  16,  122  Mo.App. 
254. 
Ohio.— Young  v.  State,  6  Ohio  435. 

65.  Ill— Mclntyre  v.  People,   38  111. 
•514. 

34  C.J.  p  69  note  19. 

66.  Mass.— Henry  L.  Sawyer  Co.  v. 
Boyajian,  52  N.E.2d  851,  315  Mass. 
757. 

67.  Mass. — Henry  L.  Sawyer  Co.  v. 
Boyajian,  supra. 

68.  Cal.— Woods  v.  Walker,  136  P.2d 
72,    57    Cal.App.2d    968— -Woods    v. 
Rechenmacher,    127    P.2d    614,    53 
Cal.App.2d  '294. 

69.  CaL — Woods    T.    Rechenmacher,. 
supra. 

70.  Wis.— Davison  v.  Brown,   6*7  N. 
W.  42,  95  Wis.  85. 

34  C.J.  p  69  note  20. 

73-    Ariz. — American    Surety    Co.    of 

New  York  v.  Mosher,  64  P.2d  10*25, 

48  Ariz.  552. 
Ohio. — Herman  v.  Ohio  -Finance  Co., 

32  N.E.2d  28,   66  Ohio  App.   164. 
Minn.— Wilcox  v.  Schloner,  23  N.W. 

2d  19. 
Okl.— Hawks  v.  McCorraack,  71  P.2d 

724,  180  OkL  5-69. 
72.    Ga.— Chandler       v.       Haxnxnett, 


19    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  118 


:>r  judgment  rendered78  by  the  court  at  a  former 
time  and  not  carried  into  the  record,  or  not  properly 
Dr  adequately  recorded.74  It  is  not  the  object,  of- 
fice, or  province  of  such  an  entry  to  alter  a  judg- 
ment actually  rendered,75  or  to  correct  an  erroneous 
decision  or  judgment;76  and,  generally  speaking, 
the  object  or  office  of  the  entry  is  only  to  supply 
matters  of  evidence  or  to  correct  clerical  mispri- 
sions,77  and  not  to  supply  omitted  judicial  action;78 
but,  as  discussed  infra  §  118,  there  are  some  situa- 
tions in  which  a  judgment  may  be  rendered,  as  well 
as  entered,  nunc  pro  tune. 

Mere  delay  in  the  entry  of  a  judgment  as  of  the 
day  of  its  rendition  does  not  make  the  entry  nunc 
pro  tune  where  it  does  not  purport  to  be  a  nunc  pro 
tune  entry  and  it  is  made  before  the  dose  of  the 
term.79  Indeed,  it  has  been  held  that,  where  a  stat- 
ute contemplates  that  judgments  will  not  be  writ- 
ten by  the  clerk  during  the  term  of  court  at  which 
they  are  rendered,  a  judgment  rendered  on  a  cer- 
tain date,  and  properly  entered  in  the  minutes  of 
the  court  on  that  date,  is  in  no  sense  a  nunc  pro 
tune  judgment  because  it  is  not  formally  written  in 
the  record  by  the  clerk  until  several  months  there- 


after.80 However,  it  has  also  been  held  that,  where 
the  prevailing  party  was  entitled  to  have  the  judg- 
ment entered  when  a  motion  for  new  trial  was  de- 
nied, the  judgment  entered  at  a  subsequent  term  be- 
comes by  operation  of  law  a  judgment  nunc  pro 
tune  as  of  the  date  of  the  denying  of  the  motion  for 
new  trial,  if  the  order  denying  the  motion  was  en- 
tered in  term  time.81 

§  118.    Power  to   Order  and  Grounds 

Therefor  in  General 

a.  General  considerations 

b.  State  of  proceedings 

a  Death  of  party  or  dissolution  of  cor- 
poration 

a.  General  Considerations 

A!!  courts  of  record  possess  inherent  power  to  di- 
rect the  entry  of  Judgment  nunc  pro  tune  fn  proper 
cases;  and,  subject  to  certain  considerations,  the  exer- 
cise of  this  power  rests  largely  In  the  sound  discretion 
of  the  court, 

There  is  an  inherent  common-law  power  in  the 
courts,  independent  of  any  statute,  to  cause  the  en- 


App.,  36  S.m2d  184— Dunn  v. 
Southern  Bell  Telephone  &  Tele- 
graph Co.,  175  S.B.  261,  49  GkuApp. 
264. 

Ky. — Benton  v.  King,  250  S.W.  1002, 
199  Ky.  307. 

Va. — Gandy  v.  Elizabeth  City  Coun- 
ty, 19  -S.E.2d  97,  179  Va,  340. 

Wash.— State  v.  Melhorn,  82  P.2d 
15'8,  195  Wash.  690. 

34  C.J.  p  71  note  38  [a]  (1). 

73.  Ga. — Chandler       v.       Hammett, 
App.,  36  S.E.2d  184. 

Tex. — Universal  'Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cook, 
:  Civ. App.,  188  S.W.2d  791— Huggins 

v.    Johnston,    Civ.App.,    $    S.W.2d 

937,    affirmed    35    S.W/2d    638,    120 

Tex.  21. 

34  C.J.  p  71  note  3*8  [a]   (6). 
Proper    record    exhibition    of   judg- 
ment 

Object  of  nunc  pro  tune  entry  is  to 
have  judgment  properly  exhibited  of 
record  in  order  to  constitute  legal 
•evidence  thereof. — Harmon  v.  Hen- 
•son,  Tex.Civ.App.,  7  S.W.2d  613,  af- 
firmed, Com.App.,  15  S.W.2d  579. 
Putting  finding  ox  adjudication  on 
record 

Office  and  function  of  nunc  pro 
tune  judgment  are  to  put  on  record 
and  to  render  effective  finding  or  ad- 
judication of  court  actually  or  infer- 
entlally  made,  but  by  oversight  or 
evident  mistake  not  made  of  record. 
— Chariton  &  Lucas  County  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Taylor,  240  N.W.  740,  213 
Iowa  1206. 

74.  Kan. — State   ex  reL   Hedrick  v. 
Hartford  Accident  &  Indemnity  Co. 


of  Hartford,  Conn.,  114  P.2d  812, 
154  Kan.  79. 
75.    Kan.— Bush   v.    Bush,    150    P.2d 

168,  1<58  Kan.  760. 
Bate  of  opinion. 

Appellate  court  -will  require  decree 
enjoining  sale  of  medical  product  to 
be  construed  as  of  date  of  opinion, 
where  alleged  changes  in  formula 
making  product  substantially  differ- 
ent from  'that  alleged  to  be  infringed 
were  made  between  filing  of  opinion 
and  entry  of  final  decree. — Belmont 
Laboratories  v.  Heist,  154  A.  19,  303 
Pa,  7. 

Amendments  nunc  pro  tune  see  in- 
fra §  258. 

70.  Ga. — Chandler  v.  Hammett, 
APP.,  36  S.'E.2d  184— Dunn  v. 
Southern  Bell  Telephone  &  Tele- 
graph Co.,  175  S.E.  251,  49  Ga.App. 
264. 
Ohio. — Herman  v.  Ohio  Finance  Co., 

32  N,B.2d  28,  66  Ohio  App.  164. 
Judgment  correcting  erroneous  judg- 
ment distinguished 
A  Judgment  nunc  pro  tune  entered 
for  the  purpose  of  correcting  the 
court's  records  so  as  to  accord  with 
the  judgment  of  the  court  as  actu- 
ally rendered,  or  to  supply  a  rec- 
ord of  proceedings  actually  had  but 
omitted  from  the  records,  is  distin- 
guishable from  a  judgment  entered 
to  correct  an  erroneous  judgment. — 
Jones  v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  Civ, App.,  145 
S.W.2d  615,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  15'3  S.W.2d  571,  137  Tex. 
3*53. 
77.  CaL— Albori  v.  Sykes,  65  P.2d 

247 


84,    18    Cal.A-pp.2d    619 — Schroeder 

v.  Superior  Court  of  California  in 

and   for  Alameda  County,    239   P. 

65,  73  CalJVPP-  687. 
Purpose  in  merely  to  correct  record 

of  judgment 
Kan.— Bush  v.   Bush,    160   P.2d   168, 

15$  Kan.  760. 
Minn. — Hampshire  Arms  Hotel  Co.  v. 

Wells.    298    N.W.    452,    210    Minn. 

286. 

Office  in  to  supply  something  omit- 
ted from  record 
Wyo. — Barrett  v.  Whitmore,  '228   P. 

452,  31  Wyo.  301,  rehearing  denied 

22*  P.  502,  32  Wyo.  1. 
7a    Ga.— Chandler      v.       Hammett, 

App.,  &6  S.R2d  184, 
Minn. — Wilcox  v.  Schloner,  23  N.W. 

2d  19 — Hampshire  Arms  Hotel  Co. 

v.  Wells,  29*8  N.W.  452,  210  Minn. 

286. 
34  C.J.  p  71  note  -36  [a]   C2). 

79.  Mo. — Harrison  v.    Slaton,   49    S. 
W.2d  31. 

xniao  pro  tune  by  consent 

Where  judgment  was  tendered  by 
defendant  at  February  term,  but 
court  reserved  judgment  and  coun- 
sel agreed  that  judgment  might  be 
signed  at  later  date,  judgment  signed 
at  May  term  was  judgment  nunc 
pro  tune  by  consent  and  related 
back  to  February  term. — Sutton  v. 
Davis,  171  S.E.  738,  205  N.C.  464. 

80.  I1L — People    ex    rel.    Waite    v. 
Bristow,  62  N.E,2d  '545,  391  111.  101. 

81.  Fla. — Fawcett  v.  Weaver,  163  So. 
561,  121  Fla.  245. 


§  118 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


try  of  judgments  nunc  pro  tune82  in  proper  cases88 
and  in  furtherance  of  justice.84  This  power  be- 
longs to  all  courts  of  record,85  and  includes  appel- 
late courts  as  discussed  in  Appeal  and  Error  §  1956, 
as  well  as  trial  courts.86  However,  such  power 
must  be  exercised  by  the  court;87  it  does  not  apper- 
tain to  the  clerk  of  a  court,  who  has  no  authority 
to  enter  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tune  without  an  order 
of  court  to  that  effect88 

Where  the  court  is  without  jurisdiction  to  amend 
the  minutes  on  the  judge's  docket  nunc  pro  tune, 


it  is  likewise  without  jurisdiction  to  order  a  judg- 
ment nunc  pro  tune  in  conformity  with  an  amended 
minute  entry.8*  The  court  may  not,  by  a  nunc  pro- 
tune  judgment,  grant  relief  neither  sought  nor  given 
in  the  original  suit,90  nor  may  it,  in  entering  such 
judgment,  alter  the  record  so  as  to  show,  contrary 
to  the  truth,  that  certain  facts  existed  on  a  particu- 
lar date.^1  A  purported  nunc  pro  tune  entry  of 
judgment  is  erroneous  where  it  fails  to  disclose  the 
ground  on  which  the  court  acts  or  what  the  entry 
is  intended  to  correct92 


80.  U.S.— Miami  County  Nat  Bank 
of  Paola,  Kan.  v.  Bancroft,  C.C.A. 
Kan.,  121  F.2d  921. 

Cal.— Norton  v.  City  of  Pomona,  S3 
P.2d  952,  5  Cal.2d  54. 

Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Perdew 
V.  Perdew,  64  P.2d  602,  604,  99 
•Colo.  S44. 

I1L — Chicago  Wood  Piling-  Co.  v.  An- 
derson, 39  N.E.2d  702,  313  Ill.App. 
242. 

Iowa. — Hobson  y.  Dempsey  Const. 
Co.,  7  N.W.2d  896,  232  Iowa  12'26— 
Tost  v.  Gadd,  288  N.W.  667,  227 
Iowa  621 — Arnd  v.  Poston,  20*3  N. 
W.  260,  199  Iowa  931. 

Kan,— Bush  v.  Bush,  150  P.2d  168, 
158  Kan.  760— Elliott  v.  Elliott  114 
P.2d  838,  154  Kan.  145— Victory 
(Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Freeman,  65  P.2d 
559,  145  Kan.  296. 

Ky. — Benton  v.  King,  250  J3.W.  1002, 
199  Ky.  307. 

Ohio.— -National  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Kohn,  11  N.'B.2d  1020,  133  Ohio  St. 
Ill— Ruby  v.  Wolf,  1T7  NJB.  240, 
•39  Ohio  App.  144. 

Or.— In  re  Potter's  Estate,  59  P.2d 
253,  154  Or.  167. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 
C,  &  S.  IF.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  2"85 
S.W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  587— Dow- 
die  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty 
Co.,  Com.App.,  255  S.W.  "388 — 
Jones  v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  145 
S.W.2d  615,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  153  S.W.2d  571,  137  Tex. 
353— White  v.  Haynes,  Civ.App., 
60  S.W. 2 d  275,  error  dismissed. 

Wash.— Garrett  v.  Byerly,  284  P.  343, 
155  Wash.  351,  68  A.-L.R.  254. 

W.Va. — Chaney  y.  State  Compensa- 
tion Com'r,  33  -S.El.2d  2*84. 

34  C.J.  p  71  note  89. 

83.  CaL-^Corbett  v.  Corbett,  298  P. 
819,  113  CaLApp.  595. 

111.— Chicago  Wood  Piling  Co.  v.  An- 
derson, 39  N.E.2d  702,  313  Ill.App. 
•242. 

Ky. — Brannion  v.  Scott,  1*56  S.W.2d 
164,  '288  Ky.  334. 

Ohio.— r National  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Kohn,  11  N.E.2d  1020,  133  Ohio  St 
111— State  ex  rel.  Marzluf  y. 
Beightler,  App.,  '57  N.®.2d  180— 
Herman  v.  Ohio  Finance  Co.,  -32 
N.E.2d  28,  66  Ohio  App.  164. 

Olil.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Hawks 


v.   McCormack,   71  P.2d   724,   725, 

180  Okl.  569. 
Tenn. — Jackson  v.  Jarratt,  52  S.W.2d 

137,  16-5  Tenn.  76. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 

C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 

S.W.   296,  301,  115  Tex.  537— Kve- 

ton  v.  Farmers   Royalty  Co.,  Civ. 

App.,  161  S.W.2d  583— Matthews  v. 

Looney,  Civ.App.,  100  S.W.2d  1061, 

reversed  on  other  grounds  123  S. 

W.2d  '871,  132  Tex.  313. 
34  C.J.  p  71  note  39. 

84.  Cal.— Corpus    Juxis    quoted    in 
'  Corbett  v.  Corbett,  298  P.  819,  821, 

11-3  Cal. App.  595. 
Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Perdew 

v.    Perdew,    64    P.2d    602,    604,    99 

Colo.  544. 

111.— Chicago  Wood  Piling  Co.  v.  An- 
derson, 39  N.E.2d  702,  313  IlLApp. 

24*2. 
Minn. — Wilcox  v.   Schloner,  2$  N.W. 

2d  19 — Hampshire  Arms  Hotel  Co. 

v.  Wells,  298  N.W.  452,'  210  Minn. 

286. 
N.Y.— Karpuk  v.  Karpuk,  81  N.T.S.2d 

769,    177    Misc.  729. 
Ohio. — Brown  v.  L.  A.  Wells  Const. 

Co.,    56    N.*E.2d    451,    143   Ohio   fit 

580. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf,  C. 

&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  28-5  S. 

W.  29-6,  301,  115  Tex  537. 
34  C.J.  p  71  note  39,  p  7*  note  53. 

85.  U.S.— Miami  County  Nat  Bank 
of  Paola,   Kan.,   y.   Bancroft,  C.C. 
A-Kan.,  121  F.2d  921. 

Cal.— Corbett  v.  Corbett,  298  P.  819, 

113  CaLApp.  595. 
Kan.— Elliott  v.  Elliott,  114  P.2d  823, 

154  Kan.  145— Victory  Life  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Freeman,  65  P.2d  559,  145  Kan. 

296. 
Ky. — Vansant  v.  Watson,  19  S.W.2d 

994,  230  Ky.  316. 
Ohio. — Heacock    Y.    Byers,    169   N.E. 

295,  120  Ohio  St.  ttl. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hawks 

v.    McCormack,    71   P.2d   724,    725, 

180  Okl.  569. 
Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 

C.  &  !S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 

S.W.  296,  -301,  115  Tex.  537. 
34  C.J.  p  71  note  40. 
In    criminal   prosecution   see   Crim- 
inal (Law  §  1597. 

In  divorce  case  see  Divorce  §  163  d. 
Probate  court  see  Courts  $  '309. 

248 


8ft,  Cal.— Scoville  v.  Keglor,  80  P. 
2d  162,  27  Cal.App.2d  17,  motion 
denied  34  P.2d  212,  29  Cal.App.-2d 
66. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf. 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Canty,  285 
S.W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  71  note  40. 

87.  Ky.— Vansant   v.  Watson,   19   R. 
W.2d  994,  230  Ky.  31-6. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf. 

C,  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285  S. 

W.  296,  301,  US  Tex.  537. 
34  C.J.  p  71  note  41. 
Court  in  which  judgment  rendered 
Tex — Trotti  v,  Kinnear,  Civ.App.,  14* 

S.W.  326. 

Court  in  which  entry  is  to  be  made 
Ind.— Willard    v.    Loucks,    175    N.E. 

256,  97  IndApp.  131. 

Special  judge  or  successor 

(1)  A  special  judge,  who  directed 
the  entry  of  a  judgment  and  signed 
the  order  book  in  a  county  outside 
the  district  in  which  the  cause  was 
pending,  has  the  authority  to  direct 
entry  of  judgment  "nunc  pro  tune'*" 
or  to  ratify  the  unauthorized  entry 
by  'the  clerk  and  sign  the  order  book, 
in  the  county  in  which  the  cause  was 
pending,  or  elsewhere  in  the  district. 
—Gross*  Adm'x  v.  Couch,  166  S.W.'2d 
879,  292  Ky.  -304. 

(2)  The    successor    of    a    special, 
judge  who  rendered  a  judgment  but 
failed  to  sign  the  order  book  could 
validate  the  judgment  by  entry  of  a. 
signed  nunc  pro  tune  order. — Gorman 
V.  Lusk,  134  S.W.2d  598,  2*0  Ky.  692. 

88.  Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty, 
285  iS.W.  296,  301,  115  Tex  537. 

34  C.J.  p  71  note  41. 

89.  Mo. — Haycraft      y.       HaycrafU 
App.,  141  S.W.2d  170. 

90.  Tex.— Huggins  v.  Johnston,  Civ. 
App.,  3  S.W.2d  937,  affirmed  35  S. 
W.2d  688,  120  Tex.  -21. 

91.  Iowa.— Chariton  &  Li^cas  Coun- 
ty Nat.  Bank  v.  Taylor,  240  N.W.. 
740,  213  Iowa  1*206. 

Minn.— Wilcox  v.  Schloner,  23  N.W. 
2d  19. 

92.  Ohio. — Herman  v.  Ohio  Finance 
Co.,  32  N.B.2d  28,  66  Ohio  App.  164. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  118 


The  power  of  the  court  to  enter  judgment  nunc 
•pro  tune  should  be  used  sparingly98  and  only  when 
the  right  of  the  moving  party  to  ask  it  is  dear;*4 
Telief  by  entry  nunc  pro  tune  will  not  be  granted 
•where  the  failure  to  enter  the  judgment  at  the  prop- 
er time  was  due  to  the  party's  own  carelessness  or 
negligence.95  Since  the  object  of  allowing  entries 
nunc  pro  tune  is  the  furtherance  of  justice,  a  judg- 
ment ordinarily  will  not  be  directed  to  be  entered 
nunc  pro  tune  unless  it  is  shown  that  some  injury 
or  injustice  will  result  from  a  refusal  to  do  so,96 
and  particularly  not  to  enable  one  party  to  gain  an 
advantage  over  the  other  party  to  which  he  would 
not  have  been  entitled  at  the  proper  time  for  enter- 
ing the  judgment.9? 

So  too  such  an  entry  will  not  be  allowed  where  it 
will  prejudice  the  rights  of  third  persons  who  are 
without  notice  of  the  original  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment;98 and,  as  a  general  rule,  the  entry  of  a  judg- 
ment nunc  pro  tune  will  be  made  only  on  such  con- 
ditions, express  or  implied,  as  will  preserve  the 


rights  of  third  persons  who  have  no  notice.99  How- 
ever, it  does  not  lie  in  the  mouth  of  a  party  to  ob- 
ject on  the  ground  that  third  persons  will  be  af- 
fected;1 and,  an  entry  nunc  pro  tune,  within  the 
power  of  the  court  to  direct,  is  not  erroneous  where 
a  party  to  the  action  is  not  prejudiced  or  deprived 
of  any  legal  right2  and  intervening  rights  are  not 
disturbed  thereby.8  A  void  judgment  should  not  be 
entered  nunc  pro  tune.4  Subject  to  the  foregoing 
considerations,  a  motion  for  entry  of  judgment  nunc 
pro  tune  ordinarily  is  addressed  very  largely  to  the 
sound  discretion  of  the  court,5  and  should  be  grant- 
ed or  refused  as  justice  may  require  in  view  of  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case.8 

b.  State  of  Proceedings 

A  Judgment  can  be  entered  nunc  pro  tune  only  In  a 
case  which  was  ripe  for  judgment  at  the  date  to  which 
the  judgment  Is  to  relate  back.  A  Judgment  trtay,  If 
Justice  so  requires,  be  both  rendered  and  entered  nunc 
pro  tune. 

The  power  to  enter  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tune  can 


Order  for  entry  upheld 

Order,  directing  judgment  to  be 
entered  nunc  pro  tune,  which  was 
made  for  the  purpose  of  cleaning  up 
an  obvious  contradiction  and  equivo- 
cation in  the  court'*  minutes  and 
which  stated  that  earlier  minute  or- 
der was  inadvertently  made,  was  not 
required  to  state  that  minute  order 
failed  to  speak  truth,  where  it  was 
obvious  from  inspection  that  minute 
order  failed  to  speak  truth  and  to 
express  court's  intention. — Berkowitz 
v.  Wolfberg,  48  P.2d  7*3,  8  Cal.A|pp. 
2d  70S. 
98.  N.T.— Karpuk  v.  Karpuk,  81  N. 

Y.S.2d  769,   177  Misc.  729. 

94.  N.Y. — Karpuk  v.  Karpuk,  supra. 

95.  Cal.— Corbett  v.  Corbett  298  P. 
819,  113  CaLApp.  «9'5. 

Colo.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Perdew 

v.    Perdew,    64    P.2d    602,    604,    99 

Colo.  544. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 

C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  2-85  S. 

W.  296,   301,  115  Tex.  537. 
34  C.J.  p  73  note  52. 

96.  Tex.— Corpus    Juris    tfuoted 
Gulf,  C.  $  a  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty, 
285  S:W.  296,  301,  11*  Tex.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  71  note  4-2. 
Basis  of  entry 

(1)  Basis    of    entry   of   Judgment 
nunc  pro  tune  is  to  prevent  an  in- 
justice.—Gulf,  C.  ft  S.  F.  Ry.  Qo.  v, 
Canty,  285  S.W.  296,  115  Tex.  537. 

(2)  There  was  no  basis  for  a  nunc 
pro   tune   entry  of  Judgment  where 
the  antedating  was  not  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  the  fruits  of  the  litiga- 
tion which  would  otherwise  be  lost 
to   the  prevailing  party,  or  for  the 
correction  of  a  deficiency  in  recorda- 
tion  of  a  previous  decision. — Mather 


v.    Mather,   140   P.2d   808,  22  Cal.Sd 

713. 

97.    Ohio.— Johnson    v.    Harlan,    15 

Ohio  App.  247. 

Tenn.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  la  Jack- 
son v.  Jarratt  52  S.W.2d  137,  139, 

165  Tenn.  76. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 

<X  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 

S.W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  £37. 
34  C.J.  p  72  note  43. 
93.    CaL— Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 

Corbett  v.  Corbett  298  P.  819,  821, 

113  CaLApp.  59o. 
Tex. — Carpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 

C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty.  286  S. 

W.  296,  301,   115  Tex.  537. 
•34  C.J.  p  73  note  54. 
Tested  lights  of  innocent  persons 
Ky.— Benton  v.  King,  250  S.W.  1002, 

199  Ky.  307. 

99.  Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty, 
285  S.W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  537. 

34  C.J.  P  73  note  55. 

1.  Neb.— Hyde  v.   Michelson,  72  N. 
W.   1035,   52  Neb.  680,  66  Am.S.R. 
533. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 
S.W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  537. 

2.  N.D.— Stoddard  v.   Atchison,    210 
N.W.  *,  54  NJX  519, 

a,  Okl.— Tiger  T.  Coker,  68  P.2d  509, 
180  OkL  175. 

Judgment  actually  rendered  by  court 
but  not  entered  by  clerk  see  infra 
subdivision  b  of  this  section. 

4.  Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  .in 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty, 
285  3.W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  537— 
Lepp  v.  Ward  Qounty  Water  Im- 

249 


provement   Dist    No.    2,    Civ.App., 
257  S.W.  916. 
34  C.J.  p  72  note  44. 

5.  Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Perdew  v.  Perdew,  64  P.2d  602, 
604,  99  Colo.  544. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 
Kellam's  Estate,  53  S.W.2d  401. 
404,  227  Mo.App.  291. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Jack- 
son v.  Jarratt  52  S.W.2d  137,  139, 
165  Tenn.  76. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285  S. 
W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  72  note  46. 
Making1  or  refusing  of  order  for 

entry    of   nunc    pro    tune    Judgment 

rests    In    the    sound    discretion    of 

court— Mitchell     v.     Federal     'Land 

Bank  of  St  Louis,   174   S.W.2d  $71, 

206  Ark.  253. 

0.  Cal— Norton  v.  City  of  Pomona, 
-53  P.2d  952,  5  Cal.2d  '54. 

Mo.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 
Kellam's  Estate,  53  S.W.2d  401, 
404,  227  Mo.App.  291. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Jack- 
son v.  Jarratt  62  S.W.2d  137,  139, 
165  Tenn.  7-6. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  «Canty,  385 
S.W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  537* 

34  C.J.  p  72  note  47. 

Entry  of  Judgment  nunc  pro  tune 
held  proper 

CaL — Horton  v.  Horton,  116  P.2d  605, 
18  CaL2d  579. 

Colo.— Wright  v.  Muehlberg,  242  P. 
634,  78  Colo.  461. 

Tex. — Southern  Surety  Co.  v.  Texas 
Oil  Clearing  House,  Civ.App.,  183 
S.W.  220. 


§  118 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


be  exercised  only  in  a  case  where  the  cause  was 
ripe  for  judgment  at  the  date  to  which  the  judg- 
ment is  to  relate  back,  that  is,  where  the  case  was 
in  such  a  condition  at  that  date  that  a  final  judg- 
ment could  have  been  then  entered  immediately.7 

Prior  rendition  of  judgment.  In  the  exercise  of 
its  continuing  power  over  its  records,  and  its  un- 
questioned authority  to  make  them  speak  the  truth,8 
a  court  may  order  the  entry  nunc  pro  tune  of  a 
judgment  which  has  been  actually  rendered,  but  has 
not  been  entered  on  the  record,  in  consequence  of 


any  accident  or  mistake,  or  the  neglect  or  omission 
of  the  clerk,9  where  the  fact  of  rendition  is  satis- 
factorily established,10  the  position  of  the  parties 
has  not  changed,11  and  no  intervening  rights  will 
be  prejudiced.12  In  certain  classes  of  cases18  a 
judgment  nunc  pro  tune  presupposes  a  judgment 
actually  rendered  at  the  proper  time,  but  not  en- 
tered,14 and  it  is  a  general  rule  that  a  judgment 
nunc  pro  tune  cannot  regularly  be  entered  unless 
such  judgment  has  been  in  fact  previously  ren- 
dered.1* 


Discretion  held  not  abused 
OkL— Davis  v.  Ball,  96  P.2d  34,  136 
OkL  39. 

7.  Cal. — Corpus      Juris      cited     in 
Leavitt   v.    Gibson,    43    P.2d    1091, 
1098,    109'8,   3   Cal.2fc   1091— Corbett 
v.    Corbett,    298    P.    819,    113    CaL 
App.  595. 

Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Feuquay 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  111  P.2d 
901,  902,  107  Colo.  336. 
I1L — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in,  .Citizens' 
Securities    &    Inv.   Co.   v.   Dennis, 
236  IlLApp.  307,  309. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris   quoted  in  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  -P.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285  S. 
W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  537— Corpus 
Juris  guoted  in  Hannon  v.  Henson, 
Civ.App.,    7    S.W.2d    61-3,    -619,    Af- 
firmed, Com. App.,  15  S.W.2d  579. 
Wash. — Qarrett    v.    Byerly,    284    P. 
343,  1'5'5  Wash.  351,  68  A-l^B.  "254. 
34  C.J.  p  72  note  61. 
Nothing-   remaining-   to   be   done   toy 

court 

It  may  be  said  that  a  case  is  ripe 
for  judgment,  within  the  rule,  when 
nothing  remains  to  be  done  by  the 
court  that  rendered  the  judgment  to 
authorize  the  clerk  to  record  it  in 
the  minutes. — Hannon  v.  Henson, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  7  S.W.Sd  613,  affirmed, 
Com.App.,  15  S.W.2d  579. 

8.  OkL— Bowling    v.    Merry,   "217   P. 
404,  91  OkL  176. 

Tex.— Dowdle  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  Co.,  Com.App.t  255  S.W. 
388. 

34  C.J.  p   74   note  60. 

9.  U.S.— Wolfe    v.    Murphy,    C.C.A. 
Iowa,  113  F.2d  775,  certiorari  de- 
nied 61  act  138,   311  U.S.  200,  85 
L.'Ed.  454. 

Cal.— Corbett  v.  Corbett,  298  P.  819, 
113  CaLApp.  595. 

Ky. — Brannon  v.  Scott,  156  S.W.2d 
144,  2188  Ky.  334. 

Minn.— Wilcox  v.  Schloner,  23  N.W. 
2d  19. 

Mo.— Campbell  v.  Spotts,  5-5  S.W.!2d 
986,  331  Mo.  974. 

OkL — Woodmansee  v.  Woodmansee, 
278  P.  278,  137  OkL  112— Bowling 
v.  Merry,  317  P.  404,  91  OkL  176. 

Tenn.— Gillespie  v.  Martin,  109  S.W. 
2d  93,  172  Tenn.  ^8— Hedges- 
Walsh- Weidner  Co.  v.  Haley,  55  S. 
W.2d  775,  165  Tenn.  486— Jackson 


v.  Jarratt,  52  S.W.2d  137,  165  Tenn. 
7-6. 

Tex.— Dowdle  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  CJo.,  Com. App.,  255  S.W. 
338 — Turley  v.  Tobin,  Civ. App.,  7 
S.W.2d  949,  error  refused. 

Va. — Dickenson  County  v.  West  Dan- 
te Supply  Co.,  134  S,m  552,  14*5  Va. 
513. 

W.Va. — Chaney  v.  State  Compensa- 
tion Com'r,  33  -S.E.2d  284. 

34  aJ.  p  74  note  61. 
Prevailing1  party  lias  right  to  have 

judgment  entered  nunc  pro  tune  as 

of  the  day  of  its  rendition,  where  it 

has  been  rendered,  but  not  recorded. 

tnd.— In  re  Saric,  149  N.B.  434,  197 
Ind.  1. 

Tex.— Bowie  Sewerage  Co,  v.  Wat- 
son, Civ.App.,  274  S.W.  179. 

Id  Ky. — Gorman  v.  tLusk,  134  S.W. 
•2d  598,  280  Ky.  692— Happy  Coal 
Co.  v.  Brashear,  92  S.W.2&  23,  263 
Ky.  257 — Hazelip  v.  Doyel,  85  S. 
W.2d  685,  '260  Ky.  313. 

Tex. — Hannon  v.  Henson,  Com.App., 
15  S.W.2d  579. 

34  O.J.  p  74  note  61. 

Sufficiency  of  evidence  of  basis  for 
nunc  pro  tune  entry  see  infra  § 
120. 

11.  Tex.— Hudgins   v.   T.   B.   Meeks 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  681. 

12.  Ky. — Hazelrp  v.  Doyel,  85  "S.W. 
2d  685,  260  Ky.  313. 

Ohio. — Brown  v.  L.  A.. Wells  Const 
Co.,  56  N.E.2d  451,  14*3  Ohio  St  580. 

Tex. — Hannon  y,  Henson,  Com.Ap-p., 
15  S.W.2d  579— Hudgins  v.  T.  B. 

.     Meeks  Co.,  Civ.App.,  1  8.W.2d  681. 

34  C.J.  p  74  note  61. 

13.  Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty, 
2-85  S.W.  296,  301,  11*  Tex.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  71  note  38. 

14.  U.S. — The    Princess   Sophia,    D. 
C.Wash.,  3*  F.2d  591. 

Iowa. — Chariton  &  Lucas  County 
Nat  Bank  v.  Taylor,  240  N.W. 
740,  213  Iowa  1206. 

Ohio.— HeHe  v.  Public  Utilities  Com- 
mission of  Ohio,  161  N.B.  282,  118 
Ohio  St  434. 

OkL— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  McQuls- 
.  ton  v.  Tyler,  97  P.Sd  552,  554,  186 
OkL  315. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 

250 


S.W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  537— Han- 
non v.  Henson,  Com.App.,  15  S.W. 
2d  579 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Uni- 
versal Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cook,  Civ. 
App.,  188  S.W.2d  791,  792— King  v. 
Cash,  Civ.App.,  174  -S.W.!2d  -SOS- 
Stewart  v.  Gibson,  Civ.App.,  154 
'S.W.2d  1002 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Davis  v.  Moore,  Civ.App.,  131  S. 
W.2d  798,  801— Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Bussing,  Civ.App.,  1«30  S.W.2d 
416. 
34  C.J.  p  71  note  38,  p  72  note  48. 

15.    U.S.— Rardin  v.  Messlck,  C.C.A. 

111.,  78  F.2d  643. 
Ariz. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Stephens 

v.  White,  31  P.2d  921,  925,  46  Ariz. 

426. 
Colo.— Perdew  v.  Perdew,  64  P.2d  602, 

99  Colo.  544. 
Minn. — Hampshire  Arms  Hotel  Co.  v. 

Wells,    '298    N.W.    452,    210    Minn. 

286. 
Mo. — Cross  v.  Greenaway,  152  S.W.2d 

43,  347  Mo.  1103. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  McQuis- 

ton  v.  Tyler,  97  P.2d  552,  554,  186 

Okl.  315. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  guoted  in  Gulf, 

C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 

S.W.   296,  301,   115   Tex.  537— Cor. 

pus  Juris  cited  in  Universal  Life 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Cook,   Civ.App.,   18'S  S. 

W.2d  791,  792— Stewart  v.  Gibson, 

Civ.App.,  154   S.W.2d  1002— Corpus 

Juris  cited  in  Davis  v.  Moore,  Civ. 

App.,    131  S.W.2d   798,    801. 
Wash.— State    v.    Mehlhorn,    82    P.2d 

153,  195  Wash.  690.  . 
34  C.J.  p  72  note  48,  p  77  note  73. 
Restriction  to  Judicial  action,  actual- 
ly taken 

The  power  of  a  court  to  enter  a 
Judgment  nunc  *pro  tune  is  restrict- 
ed to  placing  in  the  record  evidence 
of  judicial  action  which  has  been 
actually  taken. 
Ky.— Benton  v.  King,  250  S.W.  1002, 

199  Ky.  307. 
Ohio. — Herman  v.  Ohio  Finance  Co., 

32  N.E.2d  28,  66  Ohio   App.  164. 
ZTnno  pro  tune  entry  at  subsequent 
term 

(1)  The  entry  of  a  judgment  nunc 
pro  tune  at  a  subsequent  term  is  not 
authorized  unless,  in  fact,  the  judg- 
ment waa  rendered  at  a  previous 
term. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  118 


There  are  other  cases,  however,  in  which  a  judg- 
ment may  be  both  rendered  and  entered  nunc  pro 
tune,16  an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  equally 
well  established,  being  that  a  judgment  may  be  both 
rendered  and  entered  nunc  pro  tune  where  the  de- 
lay was  caused  solely  by  the  court  itself,  or  by  the 
process  of  the  law,1?  and  not  by  the  fault  of  the 
prevailing  party.18    Stated  more  fully,  the  rule  re- 
specting delay  caused  by  the  court  is  that,  whenever 
delay  in  entering  a  judgment  is  caused  by  the  action 
of  the  court,  as  in  holding  the  case  under  advise- 
ment, judgment  nunc  pro  tune  will  be  allowed  as  of 
the  time  when  the  party  would  otherwise  have  been 
entitled  to  it,  if  justice  requires  it«    The  occasion 
for  the  application  of  this  rule  arises  most  frequent- 
ly where  a  party  dies  pending  the  delay,  discussed 
infra  subdivision  c  of  this  section,  but  other  cir- 
cumstances may  justify  and  require  rendition  and 
entry  nunc  pro  tune.20    Judgment  on  a  general  ver- 
dict may  be  rendered21  or  entered22  nunc  pro  tune. 


The  subsequent  amendment  or  correction,  in  re- 
spect of  either  clerical  or  judicial  errors,  of  a  judg- 
ment which  has  been  both  rendered  and  entered  is 
discussed  infra  §§  236-264. 

c.  Death  of  Party  or  Dissolution  of  Corpora- 
tion 

A  Judgment  may  be  entered  nunc  pro  tune  as  of  * 
date  anterior  to  the  death  of  a  party  or  the  dissolution 
of  a  corporation  which  was  a  party  where  the  case  had 
been  tried  and  was  ripe  for  judgment  at  the  time  of 
such  death  or  dissolution. 

If  judgment  on  a  verdict  is  delayed  by  a  motion 
in  arrest  of  judgment,  or  for  a  new  trial,  or  other, 
proceeding,  or  if  a  case  tried  by  the  court  is  held 
under  advisement,  or  delayed  by  exceptions,  and 
meanwhile  one  of  the  parties  dies,  the  court  may 
enter  judgment  nunc  pro  tune  as  of  a  time  when 
the  party  was  still  alive,2*  such  as  of  the  date  of 


111.— Wallace  Grain  &  Supply  Co.  v. 

Cary,    24   N.E.2d    907,  -303   IlLApp. 

221    reversed  on  other  grounds  2$ 

NE.2d  107,  -374  I1L   57— Brown  Y. 

Hamsmith,  247  Ill.A»pp.  358. 
Mo.— Campbell  v.  Spotts,  S'5  S.W.2d 

986,    331    Mo.    974^-State    ex   rel. 

Holtkamp    v.    Hartmann,    51    S.W. 

2d  22,  330  Mo.  586. 
Tex.— Universal    !Life     Ins.     Co.     v. 

Cook,    Civ.App.,   188    S.W.2d   791— 

Texas  &  P.  Ry*  Co.  v.  Bussing,  Civ. 

App.,  130  S.W.2d  416. 

(2)  This  is  true  of  a  judgment  on 
a    special    issue    verdict— Universal 
Life  Ins.   Co.  v.  Cook,  Tex.Civ.App., 
188  S.W.2d  *791— Waggoner  v.  Davis, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  261  S.W.  482. 

(3)  The   refusal   of  a  trial  judge 
to  enter  a  written  judgment  nunc  pro 
tune,    conformably    to    an    oral    an- 
nouncement rendered  at  a  previous 
term,  will  not  be  reversed,  since  such 
oral  announcement  does  not  consti- 
tute a  judgment.— Foy  v.  McCrary, 
121  S.E.  804,  157  Ga,  461. 

Brror 

It  was  erroneous  for  -the  court,  en- 
tering judgment  on  day  ^er  find- 
ings were  signed,  to  order  judgment 
entered  nunc  pro  tune  as  of  date 
case  was  submitted.— Sherwood  v 
Thomas,  12  P.2d  676.  124  CaLApp. 
450. 

Rendition  of  additional  judgment 
for  an  item  which  could  have  been 
included  in  the  judgment  originally 
rendered  is  not  authorized  as  a  nunc 
pro  tune  entry  after  the  original 
final  judgment  has  been  afflrmed  and 
remanded  for  execution.--State  v. 
Industrial  Commission  of  Ohio,  155 
N.B.  798,  116  Ohio  St.  261. 
16.  Colo.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Perdew  v.  Perdew,  64  P.2d  602,  604, 
99  Colo.  544. 


Tenn.— Jackson  v.  Jarratt,  52  S.W.2d 
137,  165  Tenn.  76. 

Tex.-0orpus  Juris  auoted  in  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 
S.W.  296,  -301,  115  Tex.  &37. 

W.Va.— Chaney  v.  State  Compensa- 
tion Com'r,  £3  S.R2d  284. 

17.  Okl.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
McQuiston  v.  Tyler,   97  P*2d  552, 
554,  186  Okl.  315. 

Tex.-<*>rpus  juris  quoted  in  Gult 
C  &  S  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 
s!w.  296,  301,  118  Tex.  537— Stew- 
art v.  Gibson,  Civ. App.,  -154  S.W. 
•3d  1002. 

18.  Cal.— Corbett  v.  Corbett,  298  P. 
819,  US  CaLApp.  595. 

Okl.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  McQu  s- 
ton  v.  Tyler,  97  P.2d  552,  554,  186 


Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 
C  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  28o 
s!w.  296,  301,  115  Tex  '537—  Stew- 
art v.  Gibson,  Civ.App.,  154  S.W. 
2d  -1002. 

34  C.J.  p  "72  note  50. 

19.  CaL—  Norton  v.  City  of  Pomona, 
53  P.2d  952,  '5  Cal.2d  54. 

Minn.—  Hampshire  Arms  Hotel  Co.  v. 
Wells,  298  N.W.  452,  210  Minn.  286. 

OkL-Oorpu.  Juris  cited  in  McQuis- 
ton V.  Tyler,  97  P.2d  552,  554,  186 


Juris  q.uotea 

C  &  S.  F.  By.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285  S. 
W.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  537. 
34  C.J.  P  7*3  note  57. 


result  of  mutual  understand*. 

in? 
Colo.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Perdew 

v    Perdew,    64    P.2d    60*2,    604,    99 

Colo.  «44. 

34  C.J.  p  74  note  59  [c]. 
Claim  of  exceptions 

Where  case  had  not  gone  to  Judg- 
ment because  defendant  had  filed 
claim  of  exceptions  which  was  pend- 
ing, judgment  could  be  entered  nunc 
pro  tune  when  time  for  filing  bill  of 
exceptions  expired,  as  of  time  when 
exceptions  ceased  to  have  vitality.— 
Patrick  v.  Dunbar,  200  N.EL  896,  294 
Mass.  101. 

21.  N.C.— La  Barbe  v.  Ingle,  161  S.E. 
486,  201  N.C.  814. 

22.  N.J. — Epps    v.    Bowen,    191    A. 
110,  11*  N.J.Law  50. 

Tenn.— Wind  Rock  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 

v.  Robbins,   1  Tenn.App.  734. 
34  C.J.  p  73  note  48  [c]. 

aa,    CaL— Norton  v.  City  of  Pomona, 

5-3    P.2d    952,    5    CaL2d   54— In   re 

Pillsbury's  Estate,   166  P.  11,   175 

Cal.  454,  3  A.L.R.  1396. 
Mass.— Noyes  v.  Bankers  Indemnity 

Ins.  Qo.,  30  N^E.'2d  '867,  307  Mass. 

567— Rosenblum   v.    Ginis,    9    N.E. 

2d  525,  297  Mass.  493— Fenelon  v. 

Fenelon,   138  N.B.   S34,   244  Mass. 

Minn.— Hampshire  Arms  Hotel  Co.  v. 
Wells,    298    N.W.    452,    210    Minn. 


20.  Tex.— Corpus  Juris  ftuoted  in 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  By.  Co.  v .C*nty, 
285  S.W.  296,  301.  115  Tex.  '537. 

34  C.J.  P  74  note  59,  p  76  note  67 
Cb3. 

Repeal  of  statute  alter  verdict 

S2L.-Flnnegan  v.  Checker  Taxi 
Co.,  14  N.E.2d  -127,  300  Mass.  62. 

34  C.J.  P  74  note  59  [al* 

251 


Or.— In  re  Potter's  Estate,  -59   P.2d 

253,  154  Or.  167. 
Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quotsd  in  Gulf, 

C    &  S    F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 

s!w.  29*  301,  115  Tex.  «7. 
Wash.— Garrett  v.  Byerly,  284  P.  343, 

155  Wash.  351,  *8  A.OUR.  254. 

i  c.J.  p  1109  note  72-^34  <XJ.  p  75 

note  62* 


§  118 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


submission,24  the  date  of  the  finding,^  Or  the 
date  of  the  order  for  judgment;26  but  it  is  essen- 
tial to  the  entry  of  judgment  nunc  pro  tune  as  of  a 
date  anterior  to  the  death  of  a  party  that  the  cause 
shall  have  been  ripe  for  judgment  at  the  time  of 
death  of  the  party,27  that  the  delay  shall  not  have 
been  due  to  the  fault  of  the  prevailing  party,28  that 
innocent  third  persons  acquiring  rights  since  the 
death  of  the  party  will  not  be  injured,25  and  that 
the  personal  representative  of  decedent  shall  have 
been  substituted  as  a  party.80  While  it  has  been 
held  that  this  practice  does  not  extend  to  cases  of 
tort  which  do  not  survive,31  the  better  opinion  is 
that  it  is  immaterial  whether  or  not  the  cause  of 
action  would  survive;  in  either  case  the  judgment 
may  be  rendered  nunc  pro  tune.8* 


Dissolution  of  corporation.  Where  a  corporation 
is  a  party,  and  it  is  dissolved,  or  its  charter  expires, 
after  the  action  has  been  tried  and  the  case  taken 
under  advisement  by  the  court,  the  judgment  may 
be  entered,  nunc  pro  tune,  as  of  a  time  prior  to  such 
dissolution.58 


§  119. 


Time  of  Entry 


Lapse  of  time  ordinarily  does  not  affect  the  exercise- 
by  the  court  of  its  power  to  direct  the  entry  of  a  judg- 
ment nunc  pro  tune. 

In  the  absence  of  statutory  limitations34  the  right, 
authority,  power,  or  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  di- 
rect entry  of  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tune  is  not  lost 
or  barred  by  lapse  of  time,  but  may  be  exercised 
at  any  time,86  unless  intervening  rights  are  affect- 


Svidence  received 

Trial  court  had  right  to  file  deci- 
sion for  plaintiffs  in  action  for  fraud 
nunc   pro    tune    as    of    date    before 
death,    of    one    defendant,    although, 
cause  was  not  actually  submitted  be- 
fore  such  date,   where  all   evidence 
had    been    received    and    plaintiffs' 
brief   and    defendants'    reply   served 
and  delivered  to  judge  an$  time  al- 
lowed  for  plaintiffs'   reply  had   ex- 
pired and  no  extension  of  time  was 
granted. — Leavitt    v.    Gibson,    43   P. 
2d  1091,  3  CaL2d  90. 
Judgment  after  death  of  party  gen- 
erally see  supra  $  29. 
Abatement  on   death  of  party  after 
verdict,   decision,   or   interlocutory 
Judgment   and    before   final   judg- 
ment see  Abatement  and  Revival  § 
126. 

24.  Iowa. — Chariton  &  Lucas  Coun- 
ty Nat  Bank  v.  Taylor,  240  N.W. 
740,  >243  Iowa  1206. 

25.  Mass. — Beacon     Trust     Co.     v. 
Wright,  192  N.B.  70,  288  Mass.  3L 

26L    ICal. — Norton  v.  City  of  Pomona, 
5-3  P.2d  952,  5  Cal.2d  54. 

27.    Cal. — Norton  v.  CSity  of  Pomona, 

supra — In    re    Pillsbury's    Estate, 

166   P.   11,   17-5    Cal.   464,  3  AJL.R. 

1396. 
111. — Citizens'   Securities  &  Inv.  Co. 

v.  Dennis,   236  IlLApp.  307. 
Or.— In   re  Potter's  Estate,  69   P.2d 

25*3,  154  Or.  167. 
Wash. — Garrett    v.    Byerly,    234    P. 

343,  155  Wash.  -351,  63  A.L.B.  454. 
Modification  of  role 

It  has  been  stated  that  modern 
practice  has  resulted  in  some  modi- 
fication of  the  rule,  but  this  state- 
ment was  made  in  a  case  where  the 
cause  was  in  a  condition  for  judg- 
ment at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the 
party.--Leavitt  v.  Gibson,  43  P.2d 
1091,  3  Cal.2d  90. 
Ripeness  for  judgment  as  necessary 

to  nunc  pro  tune  entry  generally 


see  supra  subdivision  b  of  this 
section. 

28.  Wash. — Barrett  v.  Byerly,  284  P. 
•343,  155  Wash.  351,  ff8  A.L..B.  254. 

2&  Wash. — Garrett  r.  Byerly,  su- 
pra, 

30.  Cal.— Boyd  v.  Lancaster,  90  P.2d 
317,  -32   Cal.A'pp^d  -574— Maxon  v. 
Avery,    89   P.2d  684,  32  Cal.Ajpp.2d 
300 — Scovtlle    v.    Keglor,   «0    P.2d 
1-62,   27  CaLApp.2d  17,  motion  de- 
nied 84  P.'2d  212,  29  Cal.A-pp.2d  66. 

Contra  Saddler  v.  California  Bank, 
242  P.  1035,  75  CaLApp.  488. 

31.  I1L — Wilcox      v.      International 
Harvester  Co.,    116   N.'B.    150,    273 
111.  465. 

32.  CaL— In   re    Pillsbury's   Estate, 
166  P.  11,  175  Qal.  454,  3  A.L.B. 
1396. 

Mass.— De  Marco  v.  Pease,  149  N.B. 

•208,  253  Mass.  499. 
34  C.J.  P  76  note  66. 

ages  * 

Entry  of  judgment  nunc  pro  tune 
after  death  of  one  of  defendants  was 
not  erroneous,  although  judgment  in- 
cluded exemplary  damages,  where,  at 
time  of  death,  cause  was  in  such 
condition  that  .judgment  could  have 
been  entered  against  defendants  both 
for  compensatory  and  exemplary 
damages. — Leavitt  v.  Gibson,  43  P. 
2d  1091,  3  CaL2d  90. 

33.  Wis. — Shakman  v.  IT.  S.  Credit 
System  Co.,  66  N.W.  €28,  92  iWis. 
366,  53  Am.S.R.  920,  32  L.B.A.  £8*3. 

34  C.J.  p  76  note  68. 

34.  Mo.~ Pepple  v.  Stacy,  Afcp.,  282 
S.W.  451. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 
S.W.  296,  SOI,  115  Tex.  5*7. 
34  C.J.  p  78  note  80. 
Entry  in  vacation. 

In  at  least  one  state,  by  reason  of 
statute,  a  judgment  cannot  be  en- 
tered after  adjournment  of  the  court, 

252 


nunc  pro  tune,  except  on  an  order 
of  the  court,  and  this  order  can 
be  made  only  at  a  subsequent  term 
of  the  court.  In  other  words,  a 
judge  has  no  authority  to  enter 
judgment  nunc  pro  tune  during  va- 
cation.— Stanolind  Oil  &  Gas  Co.  v. 
McKenzie,  TexjCiv.App.,  115  S.W.2d 
1204,  error  dismissed— 34  C.J.  p  78 
note  80  [c]. 

35-  Ind. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Miller  v.  Muir,  53  N.B.2d  496,  504, 
115  OndJApp.  435. 

Iowa. — Hobson  v.  Dempsey  Const. 
Co.,  7  N.rW.2d  896,  232  Iowa  1226 
—Tost  V.  Gadd,  288  N.W.  667,  227 
Iowa  621 — Arnd  v.  Poston,  203  N. 
W.  260,  199  Iowa  981. 
Neb. — Brandeen  v.  -Lau,  201  N.W. 

•565,  113  Neb.  84. 

N.C.— Ipock  v.  North  Carolina  Joint 

Stock  Land  Bank  of  Durham,  175 

S.E.  127,  206  NJC.  791. 

Okl. — 'Woodmansee    v.    Woodmansee, 

278  P.  278,   137  Okl.  112— Bowling 

v.  Merry,  217  P.  404,  91  Okl.  176. 

Term. — Wind  Bock  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 

v.    Bobbins,   1    Tenn.App.    7)34. 
Tex. — Murphy  v.    Boyt,    168    S.W.2d 
631,  140  Tex.  «82— Sigler  v.  Realty 
Bond  &  Mortgage  Co.,  1)38  S.W.2d 
537,    U35    Tex.    78— Corpus    Juris 
quoted  in  -Gulf,  C.  &  6.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.   Canty,    285    S.W.    29$,  401,    115 
Tex  537 — Kveton  v.  Farmers  Boy- 
alty    Holding    Co.,    Civ.App.,     161 
S.W.2d  6^3— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Nalle    Y.    Walenta,    Civ.App.,    102 
S.W.2d     107$,     1072— -Matthews    v. 
Looney,  dvJApp.,  100  -S.W.2d  1061, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  123   S. 
W.2d  871.  132  Tex.  513. 
34  C.J.  p  77  note  78. 
Entry  pending  appeal 
Mich.— Curth  v.  New  York  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  265  N.W.  749,   274   Mich.   5X3. 
34  C.J.  p  77  note  78  [a]. 

Case  is  regarded  as  pending  until 
judgment  rendered  is  correctly  re- 
corded.— Dunn  v.  Cravens,  Detrgan  & 
Ce.,  Tex.Civ.App,,  97  S.W.2d*242, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  120 


Thus  judgment  may  be  entered  mine  pro  tune 
even  after  the  term37  in  which  the  judgment  was 
rendered,88  or  at  a  subsequent  term,8^  without  any 
showing  of  diligence40  or  excuse  for  delay,41  al- 
though long  unexplained  delay  in  moving  may  be 
ground  for  denial  of  the  application  for  entry  nunc 
pro  tune.42  The  limitation  applicable  to  proceed- 
ings to  vacate,  correct,  or  modify  judgments  have 
no  application  to  a  motion  for  entry  of  a  judgment 
nunc  pro  tune.43 

§  120.     Proceedings  to  Obtain 

a.  In  general 

b.  Notice  of  application 

c.  Evidence 

a.  In  General 

An  order  for  the  entry  of  Judgment  nunc  pro  tune 
may  be  made  by  the  court  on  its  own  motion  or  on  a 


motion  or  other  proper  request  or  application  by  a  party 
or  Interested  person. 

The  entry  of  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tune  may  be 
ordered  by  the  court  on  its  own  motion44  or  on  a 
proper  request  or  application,45  such  as  a  motion,4* 
made  by  a  party47  or  any  interested  person,48  in 
the  court  of  original  jurisdiction.49  Persons  who 
are  not  parties  to  the  judgment  are  not  necessary 
parties  to  the  proceeding,60  and  they  will  not  be 
permitted  to  intervene  for  the  purpose  of  ques- 
tioning the  correctness  of  the  judgment61  Formal 
pleadings  are  unnecessary  and  inappropriate.52  The 
sufficiency  of  the  motion  cannot  be  tested  by  demui^ 
rer  or  motion  to  strike  out;53  but  a  demurrer  to 
an  answer  to  the  motion  is  properly  sustained  where 
the  answer  is  defective  and  subject  to  demurrer.54 

The  motion  should  be  determined  in  a  summary 
manner.65  The  case,  according  to  the  decisions 


33.    Ind.— In  re  Saric,  149  N.BJ.  484, 

.    197  Ind.  1. 

OkL — Woodmansee  v.  Woodmansee, 
278  P.  278,  1S7  Okl.  112— Bowling 
v.  Merry,  217  P.  404,  91  Okl.  176. 

Tex. — Kveton  v.  Farmers  Royalty 
Holding  Co.,  Civ.App.,  181  S.W.2d 
588-^Matthews  v.  Looney,  Civ.App., 
100  S.W.2d  10.61,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  1218  S.W.2d  871,  182 
Tex  I31«. 

87.  j£0. — In  re  Kellam's  Estate,  54 
S.W.2d  401,  227  Mo.App.  291— La- 
kin  v.  Blum,  App.,  48  S.W.2d  858. 

In  vacation 
Nunc    pro    tune   order  by   special 

judge   correcting  Judgment  was  not 

required    to    be    entered   in    regular 

term  time  or  at  a  time  when  there 

was  a  called  special  session.— O'Mara 

v.  Town  of  Mt  Vernon,  185   S.W.2d 

675,%299  Ky.  401. 

38. %  Kan.— Bush  v.  Bush,  150  P.2d 
168,  158  Kan.  760— Schneider  v. 
Schneider,  78  P.2d  16,  147  Kan. 
621. 

39.  Ind. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Miller  v.  Muir,  56  N.B.2d  <496,  504, 
11*5  Ind.App.  3<35. 

Neb.— Wescott  v.  'Mathers,  268  N. 
W.  2(31.  129  Neb.  846. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 
S.W.  296,  301,  115  Tex  537— Jones 
v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  145  S. 
W.2d  615,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  158  S.W.2d  571,  137  Tex. 
3&3. 

34  C.J.  p  78  note  79. 

40.  Iowa.— Risser  v.   Martin,   53   N. 
W.  270,  8*6  Iowa  892. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty,  285 
SjW.  296,  301,  115  Tex.  537. 

41.  Iowa.— Tost  v.  Gadd,  288  N.W. 
667,  227  Iowa  621. 

42.  Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 


Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty, 
285  S.W.  "296,  30-1,  115  Tex.  5137. 

34  C.J.  p  78  note  83. 

43.  Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Canty, 
285  S.W.  2*6,  SOI,  115  Tex.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  7*8  note  85. 

44-  Iowa.— Hobson  v.  Dempsey 
Const  Co.,  7  N.W.2d  896,  282  Iowa 
1226. 

Tex.— Dowdle  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  Co.,  Com. App.,  255  S.W. 
388— Kveton  v.  Farmers  Royalty 
Holding  Co.,  Civ.App.,  161  S.W.2d 
5813— Jones  v.  Sun  Oil  Co..  Civ. 
App.,  145  S.W.2d  615,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  15iS  S.W.2d  571t  1-37 
Tex  -3&3— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Nalle  v.  Walenta,  Clv.App.}  102  S. 
W.2d  1070,  1072— Matthews  v. 
Looney,  Clv.App.,  100  S.W.2d  1061, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  128  S. 
W.2d  871,  -U32  Tex  318— Martin 
v.  Abbott,  Clv.App.,  34  S.W.2d 
488. 

34  C.J.  p  78  note  86. 

45.  Tex.— Kveton  v.   Farmers   Roy- 
alty Holding  Co.,  Civ.App.,  16-1  S. 
W.2d    588— Matthews    v.    Looney, 
CivjApp.,  100  S.W.2d  1061,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  128   S.W.2d  871, 
132  Tex.  313. 

34  C.J.  p  78  note  87. 

46.  U.S.— Wolfe    v.    Murphy,    C.C.A. 
Iowa,  -1113  F.2d  775,   certiorari  de- 
nied 61  S.Ct  1»8,  311  U.S.  200,  85 
L.Ed.  454. 

Ind.— Miller  v.  Muir,  5S  N.B.2d  496, 

115  Ind.App.  $35. 

S.C.— -Brown  v.  Coward,   21  S.C.L.  4. 
34  C.J.  p  78  note  87. 

47.  U.S.— Wolfe   v.    Murphy,    CLOA. 
Iowa,  118  F.2d  775,  certiorari  de- 
nied *1  S.Ct  138,  811  U.S.  700,  85 
L.Ed.  454. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Nalle  v. 
Walenta,  dv-App.,  102  S.W.2d 

253 


1070,   1072— Martin  v.  Abbott,  Civ. 
App.,  24  S.W.2d  488. 
34  C.J.  p  78  note  88  [d]. 

48.  Ind.— Freestone  v.  State,   176  N. 
B.  877,  98  Ind.Apb.  523. 

34  C.J.  p  78  note  88. 

Person  holding1  under  purchaser  of 

property  involved 
Ga.— Ogletree  v.  Bray,  68  S.E.  7S9, 

1135  Ga.  34. 

49.  La. — Riecobono  v.  Kearney,  114 
So.  707,  164  La.  844. 

50.  Ind. — Urbanski     v.     Manns,     87 
Ind.  585. 

51.  Ala.— Hillens    v.     Brinsfteld,    21 
So.  208,  113  Ala.  804. 

52*    Ind. — Urbanski     T.     Manns,     87 

Ind.  585. 

34  C.J.  P  78  note  91. 
Complaint  will  be  treated  as  motion. 
Ind.— Miller  v.  Muir,  56  N.E.2d  496, 

115  Ind.App.  335. 
34  C.J.  p  77  note  78  [a], 

53.  Ind.— Latta   v.    Griffith,    57   Ind. 
•329. 

34  C.J.  p  79  note  92. 

54.  Ga. — Tanner  v.  Wilson,  198  S.E. 
77,  58  Ga-App.  229. 

55.  ^Ind.- Urbanski     v.     Manns,     87 
Ind.  585. 

Searing 

(1)  The    hearing    of    the    motion 
may  be  had  in  chambers  and  in  a 
county  different  from  that  In  which 
the  verdict  was  obtained. — Chapman 
v.  Chatooga  Oil  Mill  (Co.,  96  S.B.  579, 
22  Ga.App.  44*6. 

(2)  In  a  case  where  a  hearing  was 
held,  it  was  said  that  the  court  has 
power  to  enter  a  judgment  nunc  pro 
tune  without  a  hearing,  if  no  records 
are  changed  and  no  different  judg- 
ment is  entered. — Jones  v.   Sun  Oil 
Co.,    dv.App.,    145    S.W.2d    615,    re- 
versed on  other  grounds  153  S.W.2& 
571,  1*7  Tex.  i 


120 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


on  the  question,  is  not  to  be  retried,56  and  no 
inquiry  will  be  permitted  into  the  merits  of  the  orig- 
inal action  or  the  facts  already  established  by  the 
judgment.57  In  so  far  as  the  judgment  is  con- 
cerned, the  court  may  properly  inquire  only  as  to 
whether  any  judgment  was  pronounced  or  ren- 
dered,5fc  and,  if  it  was,  what  judgment  was,  rather 
than  what  judgment  might  or  ought  to  have  been, 
rendered,69  and  whether  it  was  omitted  from  the 
record.60  The  court  is  not  called  on  to  construe 
the  judgment,  but  only  to  enter  of  record  such  judg- 
ment as  was  formerly  rendered  and  not  entered  of 
record  as  rendered.61  Furthermore,  the  court  is 
without  authority  to  set  aside  the  judgment  or  pre- 
vent its  enforcement,  even  though  it  is  erroneous  as 
a  matter  of  law.62 

b.  Notice  of  Application 

The  practice  varies  In  different  jurisdictions  as  to 
requiring  the  giving  of  notice  of  an  application  for  en- 
try of  a  Judgment  nunc  pro  tune. 

In  some  jurisdictions  a  judgment  may  be  en- 
tered nunc  pro  tune  without  notice68  where  the  mo- 


tion is  based  on  matters  of  record,  which  cannot  be 
disputed  by  the  opposite  party,64  or  where  no  dif- 
ferent judgment  is  entered.65  However,  where  it 
becomes  necessary  to  look  beyond  the  record,  and 
hear  other  evidence,  notice  must  be  given  to  the 
adverse  party,66  and  the  customary  practice  in  a 
number  of  jurisdictions  is  to  require  the  giving  of 
notice  of  all  applications  for  entry  of  judgment  nunc 
pro  tune.67  It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  nunc 
pro  tune  directed  without  notice  to  anyone  is  not 
void;68  but  it  has  also  been  held  that  such  a  judg- 
ment entered  at  a  subsequent  term  is  invalid.69 

c.  Evidence 

An  order  for  entry  of  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tune  may 
be  authorized  or  justified  by  record  evidence;  and,  ac- 
cording to  the  generally  accepted  rule,  It  must  be  based 
on  some  entry,  note,  or  memorandum  in  the  records  or 
quasi  records  of  the  court. 

In  order  that  a  judgment  may  be  entered  nunc 
pro  tune,  it  is  necessary  that  there  be  evidence  that 
a  judgment  was  actually  rendered,70  except,  of 
course,  cases  where  the  judgment  may  be  both  ren- 
dered and  entered  nunc  pro  tune.71  Record  evi- 


(S)  In  another  case,  however,  one 
of  the  grounds  on  which  the  entry 
nunc  pro  tune  of  a  judgment  was 
held  erroneous  was  the  absence  of 
an  order,  setting"  the  motion  for 
hearing  at  a  future  date. — Merrick 
v.  Merrick,  71  S.W.2d  4,  254  Ky.  145. 
Submission  to  jury 

(1)  Court      generally     determines 
whether  judgment  sought  to  be  en- 
tered  nunc   pro   tune   was    actually 
made;   but  it  has  discretion  to  sub- 
mit the  question  to  a  jury. — Lum- 
mus  v.   Alma   State   Bank,   Tex.Civ. 
App.,  4  S.W.2d  195. 

(2)  Defendant  who,   in   contesting 
plaintiffs  motion  for  nunc  pro  tune 
Judgment,  failed  to  request  submis- 
sion  of   defensive   issue,    raised   by 
answer  waived   submission. — Martin 
v.    Abfoott,    Tex.Civ.App.,    24    S.W.2d 
488. 

56.  Tex. — Coast  v.  Coast,  Civ-App., 
135  S.W.2d  790. 

57.  N.C.— Creed  v.  Marshall,  76  S.B. 
270.  160  'N.C.  .394. 

34  C.X  p  79  note  94. 

£8.    Tex. — Matthews  v.  Looney,  Civ. 

App.,  100  S.W.2d  1061,  reversed  on 

other  grounds  12|3  S.W.2d  871,  1132 

Tex.  3H3. 
•59.    Tex. — Coleman  v.  Zapp,  151  -S.W. 

1040,  105  Tex.  49-1— Coast  v.  Coast, 

Civ.App.,  185  S.W.2d  790 — Dunn  v. 

Cravens,  Dargan  &  Co.,  Civ.App., 

97  S.'W.2d  242. 
«0.    Tex. — Hannon   v.    Henson,    Civ. 

App.,  7  S.W.2d  6118,  affirmed,  Com. 

App.,  15  S.'W.2d  579. 
41.    Ark. — Lourance  v.  Lankford,  153 

S.W.   592,    106   Ark.  470.  Ann.Cas. 

1915A  520. 


62.  Tex. — Hannon    v.    Henson,    Civ. 
App.,  .7  S.W.2d  6H3,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.,  15  S.W.2d  579. 

63.  Okl. — Mayer  v.   Keener,   168   P. 
2d  991,  195  Okl.  6*58. 

64.  Ala. — Morrison  v.  Covington,  100 
So.  124,  211  Ala,  181. 

Okl.— Mayer  v.  Keener,  168  P.2d  991, 

195  Okl.  ,658. 
34  C.J.  p  79  note  98. 

65.  Iowa. — Hobson       v.       Dempsey 
Const.  Co.,  7  N.W.Sd  896,  332  Iowa 
1226. 

Tex. — Jones  v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App., 
145  S.W.2d  615,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  15i3  S.W.2d  571,  137  Tex. 
858. 

66.  W.Va. — McClain  v.  Davis,  16  S. 
E.    '629,   <37   W.Va.    350,    18   L.R.A. 
6i34. 

34  C.J.  p  79  note  97. 

67.  Ind.— Miller  v.  Muir,  56  N.E.2d 
496,  115  Ind.App.  <3»35. 

U  C.J.  p  79  note  98. 

In  vacation 

Ky.— Merrick  v.  Merrick,  71  S.W.2d 

4,  254  Ky.  145. 
tfottoe  held  insufficient 
Cal.— Mather  v.  Mather,  140  P.2d  808, 

22  Cal.2d  7113. 
Summons  treated  as  notice 
Ind.— Miller  v.  Muir,  U  N.E.2d  496, 

115  Ind.App.  (335. 

lack  of  notice  1*  waived  by  ap- 
pearance.—Arnd  v.  Poston,  203  N.W. 
260,  199  Iowa  931—34  OJ.  p  79  note 
98  [cj. 

68.  Mo.— Smith  v.  Kiene,   132   S.W. 

1052,  231  Mo.  215.  j 

94  C.J.  p  79  note  99.  1 

254 


69.  Tex. — Henneman   Grain   &   Seed 
Co.    v.    Hill,    Civ.App.,    .68    S.W.2d 
525 — Stevenson   v.   Ftek,    Civ.App., 
65  S.W.2d  507. 

70.  Okl. — Corpus    Jails    quoted    in 
McQuiston   v.   Tyler,   97   P.2d   552, 
554,  186  Okl.  315. 

34  C.J.  p  79  note  1. 

Clear    and    convincing   proof   that 
the  judgment  which  it  is  sought  to 
have  entered  is  the  one  pronounced 
in    the    cause    is    necessary. — Wind 
Rock  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Bobbins,  1 
Tenn.App.  734. 
Evidence  held  sufficient 
Kan.— Elliott  v.  Elliott,  114  P.2d  82'3, 

154  Kan.  14*5. 
Tex.— Dunn    v.    Cravens,    Dargan'  & 

Co.,  Civ.App.f    97   S.W.2d   242. 
34  C.J.  p  79  note  1  [b]. 
Supplying  formality 

Where  a  judgment  for  plaintiffs 
entered  by  prothonotary  at  plain- 
tiffs' request  was  vulnerable  to  at- 
tack because  trial  court,  in  overrul- 
ing defendant's  motion  for  judgment 
non  obstante  veredicto,  failed  to  cer- 
tify the  evidence  and  direct  that 
judgment  be  entered  for  plaintiffs, 
and  thereafter  plaintiffs  applied  for 
a  rule  to  show  cause  why  judgment 
should  not  be  stricken  and  a  valid 
one  entered  nunc  pro  tune,  trial 
court,  in  passing  on  plaintiffs'  ap- 
plication, was  not  reviewing  the 
original  order  but  was  supplying  a 
required  formality  and  it  was  not  re- 
quired to  consider  the  evidence  or 
rehear  the  merits.— Balch  <v.  Snick, 
24  A.2d  548,  147  Pa.-Super.  273. 
71,  Okl.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 

McQuiston   v.   Tyler,    97   P.2d   552, 

554,  18*6  Okl.  315. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  121 


dence  may  be  sufficient  to  authorize  or  justify  the 
entry  of  judgment  nunc  pro  tune;72  and,  according 
to  the  generally  accepted  rule,  the  evidence  to  jus- 
tify the  entry  of  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tune  must  be 
record  evidence,  that  is,  some  entry,  note,  or  mem- 
orandum from  the  records  or  quasi  records  of  the 
court,  which  shows  in  itself,  without  the  aid  of 
parol  evidence,  that  the  alleged  judgment  was  ren- 
dered.73 However,  according  to  some  authorities, 
an  entry  nunc  pro  tune  may  be  ordered  on  any  evi- 
dence that  is  sufficient  and  satisfactory,  whether  it 
is  parol  or  otherwise.74  Other  authorities  have  held 
that,  when  the  fact  that  a  judgment  was  formerly 
rendered  is  established  by  record  evidence,  it  is 
proper  to  admit  parol  proof  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  its  date,  character,  and  terms,  and  the  re- 
lief granted.75 

Great  caution  will  be  exercised  in  basing  a  nunc 
pro  tune  entry  on  parol  evidence.76  Parol  evidence 
is  admissible  to  establish  extrinsic  facts  sufficient  to 


defeat  the  application.77  Both  parties  are  bound  by 
a  decision  of  the  trier  of  facts  resolving  a  conflict 
in  the  testimony  as  to  matters  alleged  in  opposition 
to  the  entry.7* 

An  order  for  nunc  pro  tune  entry  of  a  judgment 
need  not  set  out  the  evidence  on  which  it  is  based.7& 
The  presumption  is  that  such  an  order  made  at  a 
subsequent  term  was  based  on  competent  evidence.80" 

§  121.    Operation  and  Effect 

Except  as  to  the  rights  of  third  persons,  a  valid  Judg- 
ment which  is  properly  entered  nunc  pro  tune  Is  ret- 
rospective and  has  the  same  force  and  effect  as  though 
It  had  been  entered  at  the  time  when  the  Judgment  was 
originally  rendered. 

Except  as  to  the  rights  of  third  persons,  a  judg- 
ment nunc  pro  tune  is  retrospective,  and  has  the 
same  force  and  effect,  to  all  intents  and  purposes, 
as  though  it  had  been  entered  at  the  time  when  the 
judgment  was  originally  rendered.81  It  aids  and 


72.    Ky. — Gorman  v.  Lusk,  134  S.W. 

2d  598,  280  Ky.  692. 
Mo.— In  re  Kellam's  Estate,  53  S.W. 
2d  401,  227  Mo.App.  291— Pepple  v. 
Stacy,  App.,  282  S.W.  «451. 
Tenn. — Wind  Rock  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 

v.  Bobbins,  1  Tenn.App.   754. 
34  C.J.  p  79  note  8  [a]-[c],  [e],  [f]. 
Anything-  in  record 

Right  to  enter  a  nunc  pro  tune 
judgment  exists  when. there  is  any- 
thing in  record  which  shows  that  a 
Judgment  was  announced  by  court 
— Arnd  v.  Poston,  203  N.W.  260,  199 
Iowa  9l31. 
Entries  on  docket,  or  memoranda  on, 

minutes  of  Judge 

Ala.— Mt.  Vernon-Woodberry  Mills 
v.  Union  Springs  Guano  Co.,  155 
So.  710,  26  Ala.App.  136,  certiorari 
denied  155  So.  716,  229  Ala.  91. 
Tex.— Bradford  v.  Powell,  Civ.App., 
163  S.W.2d  684,  reversed  in  part  on 
other  grounds  166  S.W.2d  346,  1419 
Tex.  63  8— Community  Natural  Gas 
Co.  v.  Henley,  Civ.App.,  11  S.W.2d 
207,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  24  S.W.2d  10. 
34  C.J.  p  79  note  .3  [c]. 

Written  opinion 

Ky.— Lee  v.  Lee,  11  S.W.2d  956,  226 

Ky.  776. 

34  C.J.  p  79  note  «  [f]. 
Official    reporter's    shorthand   notes 

•wbicfc  are  part  of  record 
Iowa. — Arnd    v.    Poston,    203    N.W. 

260,  199  Iowa  951. 

73.  Ala.— Du  Pree  v.  Hart,  8  So.2d 
183,  242  Ala.  690. 

m.— Wallace  Grain  &  Supply  Co.  v, 
Gary,  24  N.B.2d  907,  303  H1.APP 
221,  reversed  on  other  grounds  28 
N.E.2d  107,  574  111.  57— Wiggins  v. 
Union  Trust  Co.  of  Bast  St.  Louis, 


266   IlLApp.   560— Brown  v.  Ham- 
smith,  247  'ULApp.  358. 
Ind.— Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Indian- 
apolis Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  LundQuist, 
53   N.B.2d  <338,   340,    222    Ind.    359. 
Ky.— Brannon   v.   Scott,    156    S.W.2d 
164,   288  Ky.  3»34— Bowling  v.  Ev- 
ans,   98    S.W.2d   916,    266   Ky.    242 
— Corpus  Juris  auoted  in  Hoffman 
v.  Shuey,  2  S.W.2d  1049,  1053,  22i3 
Ky.  70,  58  A.L.R.  842. 
Mo.— Campbell  v.  Spotts,   55   S.W.2d 

936,  &31  -Mo.  974. 
Tenn. — Gillespie  v.  Martin,  109  S.W. 

2d  9&,  172  Tenn.  28. 
34  C.J.  p  79  note  3. 

Oral  announcement  of  the  court's 
decision  or  Judgment  is  not  a  suffi- 
cient basis  for  the  entry  of  a  Judg- 
ment nunc  pro  tune. — Du  Pree  v. 
Hart,  8  So.2d  183,  242  Ala.  690—34 
C.J.  p  79  note  3  [i]. 
judge's  recollection 

An  entry  of  judgment  nunc  pro 
tune  cannot  be  made  simply  on  the 
Judge's  recollection  of  having  ren- 
dered such  a  Judgment,  or  of  its 
terms  or  amount. 
Ky.— Brannon  v.  Scott,  156  S.W.2d 

164,  288  Ky.  334. 
Mo.--Campbell  v.  Spotts,   55  S.W.2d 

98S.  0*1  Mo.  974. 

34  ,C.J.  P  79  note  3  [J]. 

74.    Ark.— Brooks  v.  Baker,  187  S.W. 

2d  169,   208   Ark.   654— Mitchell  v. 

Federal  Land  Bank  of  St   Louis, 

174   S.W.   671,  20:6  Ark.   253. 

Okl.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in    Mc- 

Quiston  v.  Tyler,  97  P.2d  552,  554, 

186    Okl.   315— Bowling  v.   Merry 

217  P.  404,  91  Okl.  176. 

Tex. — Jones  v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App. 

145  S.W.2d  615,  reversed  on  other 

grounds  15S   S,W.2d  571,  137  Tex 

•353. 

34  C.J.  P  81  note  4. 

255 


Agreed  Judgment 

Tex.— Kluck  v.   Spitzer,  Civ.App.,   54 
S.W.2d  1063. 

75.  N.H.— Frink   V.    Frink,    43    N.H. 
508,   80  Am.D.   189,   82  Am.D.   172.. 

34  C.J.  p  81  note  5. 

76.  Ark.— Brooks  v.  Baker,  187  S.W.. 
2d  169,   208   Ark.    654— Mitchell  v. 
Federal  Land  Bank  of   St.   Louis,. 
174  S.W.2d  671,  20$  Ark.  253. 

Okl.— Corpus    juris    quoted    in    Me- 
Quiston  v.  Tyler,  97  P.2d  552,  £54, 
186  Okl.  315. 
34  C.J.  p  81  note  6. 
Character  of  parol  evidence 

The  parol  evidence  should  be  dear, 
decisive,  unequivocal,  and  of  suffi- 
cient character  and  weight  to  over- 
come the  written  memorial. — Brooks 
v.  Baker,  187  S.W.2d  1«9,  208  Ark. 
654— Mitchell  v.  Federal  Land  Bank: 
of  St  Louis,  174  S.W.2d  671,  206  Ark. 
25,3— Midyett  v.  Kerby,  1«5  S.W.  674, 
129  Ark.  301. 

77.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in» 
McQuiston  v.  Tyler,   97   P.2d  552, 
554,  186  Okl.  315. 

3»4  C.J.  p  81  note  7, 
Want  of  Jurisdiction 

It  may  be  shown  that  Judgment, 
was  void  for  lack  of  Jurisdiction. — 
Coast  v.  Coast,  Tex.Civ.App.,  135  S. 
W.2d  790, 

78.  Tex.— <Joast  v.  Coast,  supra. 

79.  Mo.— Pepple  v.  Stacy,  App.,  28fr 
S,W.  451. 

80.  Okl.— Corpus    Juris    auoted    in. 
McQuiston   v.   Tyler,    97   P.2d   552, 
554,  1*6  Okl.  315— Bowling  v.  Mer- 
ry, 217  P.  404,  91  Okl.  176. 

34  C.J.  P  81  note  8. 

81.  U.S.— Wolfe   v.    Murphy,    C.C.A~ 
Iowa,  113  F.2d  775,  certiorari  de- 


§  121 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


cures  prpceedings  which  otherwise  would  be  defec- 
tive and  irregular  for  want  of  a  proper  entry  of 
judgment  to  sustain  them.82  A  nunc  pro  tune  en- 
try of  record  is  competent  evidence  of  the  facts 
which  it  recites,83  it  is  conclusive  on  any  other 
court  in  which  the  record  is  offered  in  evidence,84 
and  it.  cannot  be  impeached  collaterally,  as  discussed 
infra  §  402. 

The  effects  of  an  entry  nunc  pro  tune,  however, 
will  be  confined  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  the 
original  parties,  and  it  will  not  be  allowed  to  preju- 
dice the  intervening  rights  of  third  persons  without 
notice.85  Also,  where  a  judgment  is  void,  it  is  not 
validated  by  a  nunc  pro  tune  entry,86  and  the  court's 
approval  of  such  entry  is  of  no  effect.87  The  court 
may  not,  by  a  declaration  of  retrbactive  effect,  make 
a  judgment  take  effect  as  of  a  date  when  the  case 
was  not  ready  for  judgment;88  a  judgment  which, 
by  the  order  for  its  entry,  is  shown  to  have  been 
rendered  on  the  date  stated  therein,  cannot,  by  a 
subsequent  provision  of  the  order,  be  made  to  take 
effect  as  of  an  earlier  date;89  and  a  direction  of 
•  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tune  becomes  of  no  effect  when 
the  court,  in  rendering  the  judgment,  dates  the 


judgment  as  of  the  day  it  is  filed.90  A  final  judg- 
ment which  has  been  entered  is  not  affected  by  a 
subsequent  attempt  to  enter  a  different  judgment 
nunc  pro  tune.*1  It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment 
is  not  effective  as  of  the  date  to  which  it  expressly 
relates  back  if  such  effectiveness  would  deny  to  any 
proper  party  the  right  of  review  by  a  higher  court92 

§  122.    Judgment  Roll  or  Record 

The  filing  of  a  Judgment  roll  or  record  consisting 
of  a  more  or  less  formal  account  of  the  proceedings  is. 
generally  required  by  the  statutes  in  the  various  juris- 
dictions. 

The  ancient  common-law  method  of  perpetuating 
judgments  was  by  engrossing  the  proceedings  on 
parchment,  which  was  called  the  judgment  roll,  and 
constituted  the  record  and  the  only  evidence  of  the 
judgment98  This  practice  has  been  largely,  if  not 
entirely,  discontinued  and  other  methods  have  been 
adopted  in  the  various  jurisdictions.94  Under  some 
statutes  a  formal  judgment  roll  is  required  to  be 
made  up  by  attaching  together,  and  filing  with  the 
clerk,  the  necessary  papers.95  Under  others  a  judg- 
ment record,  which  is  substantially  equivalent  to  a 
judgment  roll,  is  required  to  be  made  up  by  copying 


.     nied  61  S.Ct  Ii38,  «11  U.S.  700,  85 

L.Ed.  454. 
Ala.— Poole  v.   Griffith,    112   So.   447, 

216  Ala,  120.' 
Cal.— Corbett  v.  Corbett,  298  P.  819, 

11*3  CaLApp.  595. 
Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dickson 

v.  Horn,  1  P.2d  96,  97,  -89  Colo.  2<34. 
Ind.— Miller  v.  Muir,  56  N.E.2d  496, 

115  Ind.App.  335. 
Iowa. — Arnd  v.  Poston,  205  NVW.  2'60, 

199  Iowa  931 — Brooks  v.  Owen,  202 

ST.W.  505,  200  Iowa  1151,  modified 

on  other  grounds  20-6  N.W.  149. 
Ky. — Gorman    v.    Lusk,    1-34    S.W.2d 

598,    280    Ky.    692— Corptis    Juris 

quoted  in  Hoffman  v.  Shuey,  2  S. 

W.2d   1049,    1052,    223   Ky.    70,    58 

AJi.Xfc.  #42. 
Okl. — In   re   Cannon's    Guardianship, 

77  P.2d  64,  182  Okl.  171. 
Term,— Corpus  juris  quoted  in.  Crum 

v.    Fillers,    6    Tenn.App.    547,    558. 
34  C.J.  p  81  note  9. 

82.  Ky. — Gorman  v.  Iiusk,  U34  S.W. 
2d  598,  280  Ky,  692— Corpus  Juris 
auoted  in,  Hoffman  v.  Shuey,  %  S. 
W.2d  1049,  1052,  22-3  Ky.  70,  58 
A.L..R.  842. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Crum 
v.  Fillers,  .6  Tenn.App.  547/558.  . 

34  C.J.  p  82  note  10  [a]. 

Validation  of  execution  see  Execu- 
tions \  9» 

83*  Ind.— Cogswell  v.  State,  65  Ind. 
1. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 
Cannon's  Guardianship,  77  P.2d  64, 
.66,  182  Okl.  171— Bowling:  v.  'Mer- 
ry, 217  P.  404,  91  OkL  176. 

84.    OkL — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 


In   re    Cannon's   Guardianship,    77 
P.2d  64,  66,  182  OkL  171. 
34  C.J.  p  82  note  13. 

85.  U.S. — In   re   Ackerznann,   CCA. 
Ohio,  82  F.2d  971. 

Ky. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hoff- 
man v.  Shuey,  2  SJW.2d  1049,  10(2, 
233  Ky.  70,  58  A.L.R.  842. 

N.C. — Con-Bs-Tee  Chemical  Co.  v. 
Long,  114  S.B.  465,  184  N.C.  -398. 

Tenn.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Crum 
v.  Fillers,  6  TennJlpp.  547,  558. 

Purchaser  or  encumbrancer  in  good 
faith 

(1)  In  general — Hobson  v.  t>emp- 
sey   Const    Co.,   7   N.W.2d   896,    2«2 
Iowa  1226. 

(2)  Person   perfecting  Hen   based 
on  preexisting  debt  between  time  of 
original  judgment  and  nunc  pro  tune 
entry  is  not  bona  fide  purchaser. — 
In  re  Ackermann,  CC.A.Ohio,   82  F. 
2d  971. 

Prejudice  to  intervening  rights  of 
third  persons  as  preventing  entry 
nunc  pro  tune  entirely  or  other- 
wise than  on  conditions  preserving 
such  rights  see  supra  $  118. 

86.  Ohio. — Ludlow    v.    Johnston,    3 
Ohio  55>3,  17  Am.D.  609. 

34  C.J.  p  82  note  10  [b]. 

87.  Pa. — Gedrich  v.  Yaroscz,  156  A, 
575,  102  Ra.Super.  127. 

88.  Va,— Gandy    T.    Elizabeth    City 
County,  19  S.E.Sd  97,  179  Va.  340. 

Ripeness  of  case  for  judgment  at 
date  to  which  judgment  is  to  re- 
late back  as  essential  to  nunc 
pro  tune  entry  see  supra  S  118  b. 

256 


89.  W.Va.— Baker  v.  Gaskins,   24   S. 
B.2d  277, 125  W.Ve.  326. 

90.  Cal.— Mather  v.  Mather,   140  P. 
2d  808,  22  Cal.2d  713. 

01.  Tex. — Brennan  v.  Greene,  Civ. 
App.,  154  S,W.2d  5213,  error  re- 
fused. 

Stated  otherwise,  and  more  broad- 
ly, a  nunc  pro  tune  order  is  inef- 
fective to  alter  as  of  a  prior  date 
the  action  then  taken. — State  ex  rel. 
Hedrick  v.  Hartford  Accident  &  In- 
demnity Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  114 
P.2d  $12,  154  Kan.  79. 

92.  Ohio.— Porter  v.  Iierch,  198  KJH. 
7.66,  129  Ohio  St  47. 

Harmless  error  in  entry  nunc  pro 
tune  see  Appeal  and  Error  §  1795. 

Nunc  pro  tune  entry  as  affecting 
commencement  of  limitation  for 
appeal  see  Appeal  and  Error  §445. 

93.  Ind. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
.    Town  of  Flora  v.  Indiana  Service 

Corporation,    58    N.R2d    161,    168, 

222  Ind.  25!3. 
N.T. — Croswell   v.   Byrnes,    9   Johns. 

287. 
Okl. — Dime  Savings  &  Trust  Co.  v. 

Able,  94  P.2d  834,  185  Okl.  461. 
54  C.J.  p  82  note  1«7. 
Court  records   generally  see   Courts 

55  225-237. 

94.  Cal.— Hahn  v.  Kelly,  <34  CaL  391, 
424,   94  Am.D.  742. 

95.  Idaho.— Witt   v.    Beals,    169    P. 
182,  '31  Idaho  84. 

34  C.J.  p  82  note  19. 
Contents   of  judgment   roll   see    in- 
fra §  125. 


49    G.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  124 


the  proceedings  with  more  or  less  detail  into  books 
kept  for  that  purpose.96  In  some  jurisdictions  nei- 
ther a  judgment  roll  nor  a  formal  judgment  record 
is  required,  and  the  record  of  the  judgment  con- 
sists of  the  filed  papers  supplemented  by  the  entries 
made  by  the  clerk.97  Even  very  informal  memo- 
randa by  the  clerks  have  in  some  instances  been 
deemed  sufficient  as  the  record  of  a  judgment;98 
and,  for  some  purposes  at  least,  the  clerk's  files  and 
minutes  have  been  held  to  constitute  the  record  un- 
til such  time  as  the  record  is  fully  extended  or  the 
judgment  roll  made  up." 

The  validity  of  a  judgment  does  not  depend  on 
making  up  the  formal  judgment  roll  or  judgment 
record,1  although  this  may  be  necessary  for  certain 
purposes,  such  as  to  enable  the  judgment  to  be  reg- 
ularly docketed,  as  discussed  infra  §  126,  so  as  to 
become  a  lien,  as  discussed  infra  §  463,  or  to  sup- 
port an  execution,  as  discussed  in  Executions  §  9, 
or  to  limit  the  time  for  an  appeal  or  writ  of  error, 
as  considered  in  Appeal  and  Error  §  445.  The  term 
"judgment  roll"  is  strictly  applicable  only  to  civil 
cases,2  although  the  term  has  been  applied  to  the 
.record  in  a  criminal  prosecution.8  In  probate  pro- 
ceedings there  is,  strictly  speaking,  no  judgment 
roll,4  but  whenever  proceedings  are  so  akin  to  a 
civil  action  as  to  necessitate  the  papers  which  are 
declared  by  a  statute  to  constitute  the  judgment  roll 


in  a  civil  action,  they  may  be  held  to  constitute  the 
judgment  roll  for  the  purpose  of  appeal.5 

§  123.    Time  of  Making  and  Filing 

Generally  the  clerk  Is  required  to  make  up  the  judg- 
ment roll  Immediately  after  entry  of  the  Judgment. 

Under  most  statutes  the  clerk  is  required  to  make 
up  the  judgment  roll  immediately  after  the  entry  of 
the  judgment6  Until  the  judgment  is  entered  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  rules  discussed  supra  §§  106-112, 
there  is  no  authority  to  make  and  file  a  judgment 
roll.? 

§  124.    By  Whom  Made  and  Filed 

The  duty  of  making  and  filing  the  Judgment  roll 
usually  rests  on  the  clerk,  but  the  attorney  for  the  suc- 
cessful party  may,  and  under  some  statutes  must,  pre- 
pare the  Judgment  roll  for  the  clerk  to  file. 

Although  the  making,  and  filing  of  the  judgment 
roll  is  usually  made  the  duty  of  the 'clerk,8  in  actual 
practice  it  is  generally  made  up  by  the  attorney  of 
the-  successful  party.9  Under  some  statutes  it  is 
the  duty  of  such  attorney  to  prepare  and  furnish 
the  judgment  roll  to  the  clerk,10  except  that  the 
clerk  must  attach  thereto  necessary  original  papers 
on  file;11  but  the  clerk  may,  at  his  option,  make  up 
the  entire  judgment  roll.12  In  the  absence  of  stat- 
ute so  requiring,  the  successful  party  cannot  be 
compelled  to  furnish  a  judgment  roll.13  In  any 
event,  when  properly  made  up,  the  judgment  roll 
must  be  filed  by  the  clerk.14 


96.  'Neb.— Colonial  &  W.  S.   Mortg. 
Co.    v.    Foutch,    47    N.W.    929,    31 
Neb.  282.  , 

3*4  C.J.  p  82  note  20. 
"Record"  defined 

"A  judicial  record  is  a  precise  his- 
tory of  a  suit  from  its  commence- 
ment to  its  termination,  including 
the  conclusion  of  law  thereon  drawn 
by  the  proper  officer  for  the  purpose 
of  perpetuating  the  exact  state  of 
facts." 
Neb.— Surge  v,  Gandy,  59  N,W.  359, 

41  Neb.  149. 
Old.— Dime   Savings  &  Trust  Co.   v. 

Able,    94    P.2d    884,    *35,    185    Okl. 

461. 

97.  111.— -Stevison  T.  Earnest,  80  HI. 
51.3. 

$4  C.J.  p  82  note  51. 

98.  U.S.— Cromwell     v.     Bank     of 
Pittsburgh,  C.C.Pa,,   6  F.Cas.NoJ3,- 
409,  2  WalLJr.  569. 

34  C.J.  p  83  note  22. 

99.  Ala.— Ansley  v.   Carlos,   9  Ala. 
97i3. 

34  C.J.  p  83  note  23. 

1.    S.C.— Connor  v.    McCoy,    65   S.B. 

257,  83  S.C.  165. 
34  C.J.  p  83  note  25. 

49  C.J.S.-17 


Necessity  of  entry  of  judgment  see 

supra  S  107. 
Effect  of  delay 

Where  a  memorandum  of  decision 
constitutes  a  judgment  of  the  court, 
the  subsequent  clerical  action  in 
writing  out  the  judgment  file  relates 
back  to  the  time  the  memorandum 
was  filed,  so  that,  no  matter  how 
long  such  action  is  postponed,  it 
cannot  be  regarded  as  the  rendering 
of  a  different  and  later  judgment. — 
Goldberg  v.  Krayeske,  128  A,  27,  102 
Conn.  137. 

2.  Wis. — Green     Lake     County     v. 
Waupaca    County,    89    N.W.    W9. 
113  Wis.  425. 

3.  U.S.— Ball  v.  U.  S.f  Alaska,  147  F. 
32,  78  C.C.A.  126. 

4.  Utah.— In  re  Kelsey,  4(3  P.  106, 
12  Utah  393. 

5.  Utah.— In  re  Xelsey,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  83  note  35. 

6.  Minn.— Rockwood    v.    Davenport, 
55  N.W.  377,  37  Minn.  PSS,  5  Am. 
S.R.  872. 

34  C.J.  p  83  note  36. 

•Undated  record  of  judgment  .is 
not  void,— McDonald  v.  Mulkey,  210 
P.  940,  29  Wyo.  99. 

257 


7.  Utah.— Robinson    v.     Salt    I^ake 
City,  109  P.  817,  37  Utah  520. 

34  C.J.  p  8>3  note  $8. 

8.  Minn. — Rockwood    v.    Davenport, 
35  NJW.  377,  £7  Minn.  5-33,  5  Am. 
S.R.  872. 

34  C.J.  p  83  note  39. 

9.  N.T.— Dailey    v.    Northern    New 
York  Utilities,   221  N.T.S.   52,   129 
Misc.  18:3. 

34  C.J.  p  83  note  40. 

10.  N.T.— Dailey   v.   Northern   New 
York  Utilities,  supra— McWilliams, 
Inc.    v.    ^Btna   Insurance  Co.,    198 
N.Y.S.    681,    120    Misc.    117. 

34  C.J.  p  8.3  note  41. 

11.  N.Y.— Knapp  v.  Roche,   82  N.Y. 
.366— Heinemann  v.  Waterbury,   18 
N.Y.Super.  686. 

12.  N.Y. — Knapp  v.  Roche,   82  N.Y. 
366 — Dailey  v.  Northern  New  York 
Utilities,   221  N.Y.S.  52,  129  Misc. 
1813. 

13.  N.Y.— Heinemann  v.  Waterbury, 
18  N.Y.Super.  686. 

14.  N.Y. — Dailey   v.   Northern  New 
York  Utilities,   221  N.Y.S.   52,  129 
Misc.  -183. 

W  C.J.  p  83  note  24, 


§  125 
§  125. 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


— —  Contents  and  Sufficiency 

a.  In  general 

b.  Particular  matters 

c.  Amendment  of  the  roll 

d.  Signature 


a.  In  General 

In  general  the  Judgment  roll  or  record  properly  In- 
cludes all  papers  necessary  to  support  the  judgment  or 
specified  by  statute,  and  any  matters  Involving  the  mer- 
its  of  the  action  and  necessarily  affecting  the  Judgment. 

The  record  proper,  or  technical  record,  corre- 
sponds with  the  common-law  judgment  roll,15  and 
a  judgment  roll  should  contain  only  such  papers  as 
constitute  a  part  of  that  record.16  Unless  a  par- 
ticular matter  is  in  its  nature  a  proper  matter  of 
record  in  the  case,  it  cannot  be  made  such  by  being 
inserted  in,  and  attested  as  part  of,  the  record,  or 
judgment  roll,  by  the  clerk.1?  In  a  general  sense, 
all  the  files  and  minutes  of  the  court  are  often 
spoken  of,  in  modern  times,  as  records  of  courts, 
and  this  use  of  the  term  tends  to  lead  to  a  confu- 
sion of  ideas.18  The  record  is  said  to  be  a  memori- 
al or  history  of  the  proceedings  in  a  cause,19  but 
this  is  not  to  be  taken  to  mean  that  such  record 


necessarily  or  usually  embraces  all  the  proceedings, 
for  there  are  many  proceedings  during  the  progress 
of  a  case  of  which  no  minute  or  record  is  made.20 

Generally  speaking,  it  may  be  said  that  the  judg- 
ment roll  or  record  properly  comprises  all  the  pro- 
ceedings on  which  the  judgment  is  founded  and  to 
which,  as  matter  of  record,  it  necessarily  refers.21 
It  includes  all  papers  necessary  to  support  the  judg- 
ment22 or  specified  by  the  statute,23  and  generally 
any  matters  involving  the  merits  of  the  action  and 
necessarily  affecting  the  judgment,24  but  not  inter- 
locutory rulings  or  the  proceedings  on  collateral  or 
incidental  issues  in  the  case25  unless  made  part  of 
the  record  by  bill  of  exceptions  which,  as  appears 
infra  subdivision  b  of  this  section,  constitutes  a 
part  of  the  judgment  roll  or  record,  or  by  order  of 
court26  Where  the  statute  specifies  the  contents 
of  the  judgment  roll,  matters  not  specified  form  no 
part  of  it,  and  need  not,27  and  should  not,28  be  in- 
cluded. On  the  other  hand,  failure  to  include  all 
the  necessary  or  proper  papers  does  not- affect  the 
validity  of  the  judgment.29 

Substantial  compliance  with  the  requirements  of 
the  statute  as  to  the  manner  of  making  up  and  filing 


15.  Idaho.— Evans  v.  District  Court 
of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist,  29$  P.  323, 
50  Idaho  60. 

Okl. — Dime  Savings  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Able,    94   P.2d    S34f    185    Okl.    461. 
34  C.J.  p  8i3  note  46. 

16.  Mont— Featherman    v.    Granite 
County,  72  P.  972,  28  Mont.  462. 

17.  Cal.— Colton  Land  &  Water  Co. 
v.  Swartz,  38  P.  878,  99  Cal.  278, 

34  C.J.  p  84  note  60. 

18.  Cal.— Hahn  v.  Kelly,  134  Cal  891, 
94  Am.D.  742. 

34  C.J.  p  84  note  52. 

13.    Okl.— -Dime  Savings  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Able,  94  P.2d  834,  185  Okl.  461. 
3«4  C.J.  p  84  note  68. 

20.    Conn.— Nichols     T.     Bridgeport 

27  Conn.  459. 
N.Y. — Hoe  v.  Sanborn,  24  How.Pr.  26, 

affirmed  36  N.T.  95. 
34  C.J.  p  84  note  54. 

81.  Fla.— St  Lucie  Estates  v.  Palm 
Beach  Plumbing  Supply  Co.,  1-35 
So.  841,  101  Fla.  205. 

Okl.— Sabin  v.  Levorsen,  145  P.2d 
402,  19i3  Okl.  520,  -certiorari  denied 
64  S.Ct  205,  320  U.S.  792,  88  L.Ed. 
477,  rehearing  denied  64  S-Ct  368, 
1320  U.S.  815,  88  L.Ed.  4*92— Dime 
Savings  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Able,  94  P. 
2d  8)34,  185  Okl.  461— Leonard  Y. 
s  Tulsa  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  88 
P.2d  875,  184  Okl.  558— Shaw  v. 
Grumbine,  278  P.  911,  1137  Okl.  95 
— State  Bank  of  Dakoma  v.  Wea- 
ber,  256  P.  50,  125  OkL  186— Le 
.  Clair  v.  Calls  Him,  233  P.  1087,  106 


P. 


Okl.  247— Mitchell  v.  White, 

74,6,  106  Okl.  218. 
34  C.J.  p  84  note  57. 
Record  held  sufficient 

Where  county  court's  record  show- 
ed on  its  -face  a  petition  stating  a 
cause  of  action,  a  waiver  of  sum- 
mons, and  a  voluntary  appearance  by 
defendant  recital  that  evidence  was 
heard,  and  a  judgment  against  de- 
fendant, record  was  sufficient  to 
show  jurisdictional  facts.— Wallace 
v.  Peterson,  284  NJW.  866,  136  Neb. 
39. 

A  placita  for  the  term  at  which 
judgment  was  entered  is  sufficient  to 
show  the  legal  organization  of  the 
court.— Calbreath  v.  Beckwith,  260 
IU.APP.  7— Leafgreen  v.  Leafgreen, 
127  IlLApp.  184. 

Errors  of  law  committed  by  court 
o$  general  jurisdiction  in  exercising 
jurisdiction  over  subject  matter  sub- 
mitted to  court  by  constitution  or 
statutes  are  not  reflected  in  judg- 
ment roll. — Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry* 
Co.  v.  Co-operative  Pub.  Co.,  247  P. 
974,  119  Okl.  76— Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Oklahoma  State  Bank 
of  Atoka,  247  P.  31,  118  Okl.  129. 

22.  N.Y. — Gerity  v.  Seeger  &  Guern- 
sey Co.,  57  N.E.  290,  163  N.Y.  119. 

34  C.J.  p  84  note  58. 

23.  OkL— Sabin  v.  Levorsen,  145  P. 
2d  402,  193  Okl.  i320,  certiorari  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct  205,  (320  U.S.  792,  88 
L.Ed.   477,  rehearing  denied  64   S. 
Ct  (368,.  820  U.S.  815,  88  L.Ed  492 
— Dime    Savings    &   Trust   Co.   v. 
Able,   94  P.2d   834,   185   OkL  461— 

258 


Leonard  v.  Tulsa,  88  P.2d  875,  184 

.  Okl.   558 — Shaw  v.   Grumbine,   278 

P.  311,  137  Okl.  95— State  Bank  of 

Dacoma  v.  Weaber,  256  IP.  50,  125 

Okl.   186— Le   Clair  v.  Calls   Him, 

2-3.3  P.  1087,  106  OkL  247— Mitchell 

v.  White,  233  P.  746,  106  Okl.  218. 

34  C.J.  p  84  note  59. 

24.  S.D.— Rapids     City    First    N<at, 
Bank  v.    McGuire,    80    N.W.    1074, 
12  S.D.  226,  76  Am.S.R.  598,  47  L.R. 
A.  41*. 

34  C.J.  p  85  note  60. 

25,  Idaho.— Biasing  v.   Biasing,   115 
P.  827,  19  Idaho  777. 

34  C.J.  p  85  note  61. 

26-    N.Y. — Dr.  David  Kennedy  Corp. 

v.  Kennedy,  59  N.E.  183,  165  N.Y. 

1353. 
34  C.J.  p  85  note  63. 

27.  CaL— Brown  v.  Caldwell,  108  P. 
874,  13  CaLApp.  29. 

34  C.J.  p  85  note  64. 

28.  N.Y. — Schrader  v.   Pranckel,   99 
N.Y.S.    137,    113   App.Div.   395. 

34  C.J.  p  85  note  65. 
Motion  to  strike 

The  unsuccessful  party  may  move 
to  strike  out  irrelevant  papers,  but 
he  should  specify  the  papers  claimed 
to  be  unnecessarily  included  in  the 
judgment  roll  and  point  out  where- 
in they  were  improperly  included. 
—Peters  v.  Berkeley,  219  N.Y.S.  709, 
219  App.Div.  261. 

29.  N.Y.— -Decker  v.  Dutcher,  28-1  N. 
Y.S.  897,  15,6  Misc.  488,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  289  N.Y.S.  55(3,  247 
App.Div.  689. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  125 


a  judgment  roll  is  sufficient,8**  but  necessary31. 
Provisions  regulating  the  mode  of  making  up  and 
filing  a  judgment  roll  have  been  deemed  merely  di- 
rectory.32 A  defective  judgment  roll  is  not  a  nul- 
lity,33 nor  does  it  invalidate  the  judgment,  which 
continues  to  be  supported  by  the  usual  presump- 
tions.34 A  variance  between  an  order  as  entered 
in  his  minutes  by  the  clerk  and  such  order  as  drawn 
up  and  inserted  in  the  judgment  roll  is,  it  has  been 
held,  a  matter  of  mere  irregularity.3^  Failure  to 
fasten  the  proper  papers  together,  as  required  by 
statute,  does  not  prevent  such  papers  from  consti- 
tuting the  judgment  roll.36  Ordinarily  copies  may 
be  used  in  lieu  of  original  papers  in  making  up 
judgment  rolls.37 

b.  Particular  Matters 

Whether  or  not  a  particular  matter  It  a  proper  or 
necessary  part  of  the  Judgment  roH  or  record  depends 
on  statutory  requirements  and  whether  or  not  It  Is  nec- 
essary to  support  the  Judgment. 


Whether  or  not  a  particular  matter  is  a  proper 
or  necessary  part  of  the  judgment  roll  or  record 
depends  on  statutory  provisions  and  on  whether  or 
not  such  matter  is  necessary  to  support  the  judg- 
ment.38 

Process,  proof  of  service,  and  appearance.  The 
writ,  summons,  or  original  process,39  together 'with 
the  necessary  indorsement  thereon,40  and  proof  of 
service,41  are  proper  and  necessary  parts  of  the 
judgment  roll  or  record,  at  least  where  there  is  a 
default  for  want  of  an  appearance  or  answer.42 
Proof  of  service  of  process,  however,  need  not  ap- 
pear in  the  roll  or  record  where  defendant  entered 
a  general  appearance  in  the  action,  or  pleaded  to 
the  declaration  or  complaint,43  or,  it  has  been  held, 
where  the  judgment  contains  a  recital  of  due  serv- 
ice.44 Where  the  service  is  by  publication,  neither 
the  affidavit  nor  the  order  for  publication  is  a  part 
of  the  judgment  roll  or  record,45  and  their  absence, 
therefore,  does  not  show  invalidity  of  the  judgment 


30.  N.Y.— Sean  T.  Bumham,  17  N. 
Y.  445. 

34  C.J.  p  85  note  66. 

31.  N.Y.— Townshend  v.  Wesson,  11 
N.Y.Super.  842. 

Wis.— Douvllle   v.   Merrlck,    25   Wis. 
688, 

32.  N.Y. — Stimson    v.    Hugging,    16 
Barb.  658,  9  HowJPr.  86. 

N.C.— Brown  v.  Harding,  89  S.B.  222, 
in  N.C.  686. 

33.  N.Y.— Miller  T.  White,  54  Barb. 
4S4,  10  Abb.Pr.,N.S.,  385,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  50  N.Y.  137. 

34.  Minn.— Herrick  v.  Butler,  14  N. 
W.  794,  30  Minn.  156. 

34  OJ.  p  85  note  72. 

35.  N.Y.— Martin  V.  Lett,  4  Abb.Pr. 
565. 

36.  S.C.— Melchers  T.  Moore,  40  S.E. 
773,  62  S.C.  386. 

34  C.J.  p  85  note  69. 

37.  Minn.— State  v.  Sargent,  177  N. 
W.  4313.  145  Minn.  448. 

38«    CaL— <k>pp  v.  Hives,  217  P.  8113, 

62  CaLApp.  776. 
34  C.J.  p  89  note  86. 
Matters   held  properly  included 

(1)  Return    by   proper   officer,    In 
cases    involving    validity    of    judg- 
ments.— Eidson  v.  McDaniel,  114  So. 
204,  2T6  Ala.  610. 

(2)  Award     of     arbitrators      and 
agreement  of  parties  owning  adjoin- 
ing lands  respecting  construction  of 
dam,  filed  in  court. — druse's  Bx'r  v. 
Haggard,  44  SJW.2d  290,  241  Ky.  442. 

03)  Motion  for  a  new  trial, — Qreen 
v.  Stevens,  1  Ky.Op.  36. 

(4)  Other    matters.— McDonald    v. 
Mulkey,    210    P.    940,    29   Wyo.    99— 
34  C.J.  p  89  note  #6  [a]. 
Matters  held  not  properly  included 

(1)  Motion  for  substitution  of  par- 


ties.— Savoy  Oil  Co.  T.  Emery,  277 
P.  1029,  Ii37  OkL  67. 

(2)  Motion  for  revivor.— Dime  Sav- 
ings &  Trust  Co.  v.  Able,  94  P.2d  834, 
185  Okl.  461— Adams  v.  Carson,  25  (P. 
2d  6513,  165  OkL  161— Savoy  Oil  Co. 
v.  Emery,  supra. 

03)  Motion  to  set  aside  default  and 
affidavits  in  support  thereof. — Mad- 
sen  v.  Hodson,  256  P.  792,  69  Utah 
527— Cornelius  v.  Mohave  Oil  Co., 
2*39  P.  475,  66  Utah  22. 

(4)  Notice    of   motion    to    dismiss 
declaratory    Judgment    action. — Sie- 
vers   v.   Pacific  Gas  &  Electric  Co., 
134  P.2d  850,   57  CaLApp.2d  455< 

(5)  Notation  on  back  of  record.— 
Grasso    v.    Frattolillo,    149    A.    838, 
111  Conn.  20*9. 

(6)  Mortgage  canceled  and  merged 
into    judgment. — Bledsoe    v.    Green, 
280  P.  301, 1*8  Okl.  15. 

(7)  Matter  of  beginning  and  end- 
ing  of  terms   of  court. — Salt   Lake 
City  v.  Industrial  Commission,  22  P. 
2d  1046,  812  Utah  179. 

(8)  Minutes   made   by   trial  judge 
on  his  trial  docket — Gates  v.  Gates, 
163  <P.2d  395, 160  Kan.  428. 

(9)  Other    matters. — Malaauias   v. 
Novo,    1)38    P.2d    729,    59    CaLApp.2d 
225—94  C.J.  p  89  note  $6    [b]. 
Notice  of  controverting  affidavit 

Failure  of  record  to  contain  copy 
of  service  on  defendant  of  notice  of 
affidavit  controverting  his  plea  of 
privilege  was  not  fatal  to  judgment 
overruling  plea  of  privilege  where 
judgment  disclosed  that  trial  court 
ffcund  that  attorney  appeared  for 
defendant  at  hearing  on  plea  of  priv- 
ilege.—Thomas  v.  Driver,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  55  S.W.2d  187,  error  dismissed. 


of  Commerce  and  Commercial  Bul- 
letin, 259  IU.App.  453. 

Ohio. — Terry  v.  Claypool,  .65  NJS.2d 
88i3,  77  Ohio  App.  77. 

Tex. — Litton  v.  Waters,  Civ.App.,  161 
S.W.2d  1095,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  85  note  77. 

40.  Va. — Nadenbush     v.     Lane.      4 
Rand.  4113,  25  Va.  41*. 

41.  Ohio. — Terry  v.  Claypool,  65  N. 
E.(2d  883.  77  Ohio  App.  77. 

34  C.J.  p  85  note  79. 

42.  N.Y.— -Issem  v.  Slater,  27  N.T.S. 
2d    871,    262   App.Div.   59,    reargu- 
ment  denied  29  N.Y.S.2d  505,   262 
App.Div.   8<34,  appeal  dismissed  37 
N.R2d  144,  286  N.T.  70S. 

34  C.J.  p  85  note  80. 
Amended  complaint 

Judgment  roll  must  disclose  that 
amended  complaint  was  served  or 
service  thereof  was  waived,  where 
judgment  was  by  default — Griffith  v. 
Montana  Wheat  Growers'  Ass'n,.24'4 
P.  277,  75  Mont.  466, 

43.  N.Y,— Issem  v.   Slater,   37  N.Y. 
S.2d  871,  2*62  App.Div.  59,  reargu- 
ment  denied  29   N.Y.S.2d  505,   262 
App.Div.   834,  appeal  dismissed  87 
N.E.2d  144,  286  N.Y.  708. 

<34  C.J.  p  85  note  82. 
Acceptance  of  service 

Where  defendant's  acceptance  of 
service  is  relied  on,  record  must 
show  that  court  ascertained  by  proof 
that  defendant  had  accepted  service 
of  summons  and  when. — Williams  v. 
Chase  Nat.  Bank  of  New  York,  174 
So.  788.  234  Ala.  238— Kent  v.  Kent, 
139  So.  240,  224  Ala.  183. 

44.  OkL — Weimer      v.      Augustana 
Pension    and    Aid   (Fund,    67    P.2d 
436,  179  Okl.  572. 


39.    HL— Sherman  &  Ellis  v.  Journal    45.    Utah. — Intermlll  v.  Nash,  75  P. 

259 


§  125 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


on  the  face  of  the  judgment  roll;46  and  even  if 
inserted,  they  could  not  be  considered.47  Where 
the  judgment  recites  that  service  was  proper,  proof 
of  mailing  copies  of  the  petition  and  notice  of  pub- 
lication to  defendant  is  not  a  necessary  part  of  the 
roll  or  record.48  The  affidavit  of  publication  of  the 
writ  or  summons  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  roll  or 
record,49  and  some  cases  hold  that  the  affidavit  and 
order  for  publication  must  also  be  included  as  con- 
stituting part  of  the  proof  of  service  of  process.50 
A  formal  appearance  filed  in  the  action  is  a  part  of 
the  record;51  but,  when  not  included  in  the  statu- 
tory enumerations  of  matters  forming  part  of  the 
judgment  roll,  a  notice  of  appearance  has  been  held 
to  be  not  a  part  of  such  roll.52 

Pleadings.  Both  under  express  statutory  provi- 
sion and  in  the  absence  thereof,  the  pleadings  in 
the  case,  or  copies  .thereof,  are  a  proper  and.  nec- 
essary part  of  the  judgment  roll  or  record.53  Thus 
the  declaration,  petition,  or  complaint,54  and  the 
plea  or  answer,55  or  demurrer,56  and  a  replication 
or  reply,57  are  parts  of  the  record  proper  and  should 
be  included  in  the  judgment  roll.  It  has  been  held, 
however,  that  the  omission  of  a  pleading,  while  an 


irregularity,  will  not  vitiate  the  judgment  or  exe- 
cution.58 Where  defendant  does  not  answer  or  oth- 
erwise plead  to  the  declaration  but  makes  def  auh, 
that  fact  must  appear.59  Pleadings  which  have  been 
withdrawn60  or  superseded  by  amended  pleadings61 
need  not  be  included  in  the  roll  or  record,  and  if 
improperly  incorporated  therein  may  be  stricken  out 
on  motion.62  It  is  not  necessary  to  include  in  the 
judgment  roll  the  answer  of  a  defendant  as  to  whom 
the  action  was  discontinued.68 

Bitt  of  particulars.  It  is  only  where  a  bill  of 
particulars  involves  the  merits,  or  of  necessity  af- 
fects the  judgment,  that  it  should  be  made  part  of 
the  judgment  roll.64 

Evidence.  In  common-law  cases,  the  evidence,, 
including  papers  acted  on  only  as  a  matter  of  evi- 
dence, unless  made  so  by  bill  of  exceptions  or  some 
substitute  therefor,  forms  no  part  of  the  record.65 

Orders.  Unless  they  involve  the  merits  of  the  ac- 
tion and  necessarily  affect  the  judgment,  or  are 
expressly  provided  for  by  statute,  orders  entered  in 
the  cause  are  not  properly  a  part  of  the  judgment 
roll  or  record,66  although  they  may  be  made  part 
of  the  record  by  direction  of  the  court67 


2d  157,   94  Utah  271— Hoagland  y. 
Hoagland,  '57  P.  20,  19  Utah  103. 
Si  C.J.  p  86  note  84. 

46.  Utah.— Intermill  Y.  Nash,  75  P. 
2d  157,  94  Utah  271. 

34  C.J.  p  86  note  85. 

47.  Gal. — People    v.    Temple,    -87    P. 
414,  103  Cal.  447. 

48.  Okl. — Washburn    v.    Culbertson, 
75  P.2d  190,  181  Okl.  476— -Weimer 
v.     Augustana    Pension    and    Aid 
Fund,    67  P.2d  436,  ,179   Okl.   572. 

49.  U.S. — Neffi  v.   Pennoyer,  C.C.Or., 
17    F.Cas.No.10,083,    <3    Sawy.    -274, 
affirmed  9'5  U.S.  714,  24  (L.Bd.  565. 

34  C.J.  p  86  note  87. 

50.  CaL— - People    v.    Herod,    295    P. 
38.3,  111  CaLApp.  246. 

34  C.J.  p  86  notes  $8,  89  [a]. 

51.  111.— Baldwin  v.   McClelland,   58 
N.B.  143,  152  111.  42. 

52.  Cal. — Lyons    v.    Roach,     23     P. 
1026,  84  Cal.  27. 

34  C.J.  p  86  note  91. 

53.  Cal. — Sievers   v.    Pacific   Gas  & 
Electric  Co.,  134  P.2d  850,   57  CaL 
Ap>p.2d  4'55. 

Tex. — Hatch  v.  Kubena,  Civ.App.,  190 
S.W.2d  175,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  Kubena  v.  Hatch,  Sup., 
193  S.W.2d  175. 

34  C.J.  p  86  note  92. 
A,    frivolous    pleading-    on    which 

judgment  is  ordered  is  not  stricken 

out,  but  remains  on  the  record  and 

becomes  a  part  of  the  judgment  roll. 

—Commercial  Bank  v.  Spencer,  76  N. 

Y.  155. 


54.  Okl. — Excise    Board    of    Carter 
County  T.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,    -3    P.2d    1037,    152    Okl.    120. 

34  C.J.  j>  86  note  94. 

55.  N.Y. — Hatcher  v.  Rocheleau,  18 
N.T.  8-6. 

34  C.J.  p  86  note  95. 

58.  N.Y.— Thornton   r.   St    Paul    & 
Chicago  R.  Co.,  6  Daly  511. 

34  C.J.  p  86  note  96. 

57.    N.Y.— Graham  y.  Schmidt  3  N. 

YJSuper.  74. 
34  C.J.'«p  86  note  97. 
68.    N.Y.— Renouil  v.  Harris,  4  N.Y. 

Super.  641,  3  Code  Rep.  71. 
'34  C.J.  p  86  note  99. 

59.  Idaho. — Harpold    v.    Doyle,    102 
P.  158,  16  Idaho  671. 

34  C.J.  p  86  note  2. 

60.  N.Y.— Hatcher  v.  Rocheleau,  18 
N.Y.  86. 

34  C.J.  p  8-6  note  3. 

61.  N.Y.— -Brown  v.  Saratoga  R.  Co., 
18  N.Y.  495. 

34  C.J.  p  87  note  4. 

62.  N.Y.— Dexter  v.  Dustin,  24  N.Y. 
$.  129,  70  Hun  51*. 

63.  N.Y. — BohnhofC   v.    Fischer,    IS  2 
N.Y.S.   603,   147  Ajyp.Div.   672. 

64.  N.Y. — Arrow  S.   S.  Co.  v.   Ben- 
nett,   26    N.Y.S.    948,    23    N.YXJiv. 
Proc.  234. 

34  O.J.  P  87  note  7. 

65.  Me.— Kirby  v.  Wood,  16  Me.  81. 
W.Va. — Anderson  v.  Doolittle,  18   S. 

B.  724,  -38  W.Va.  629. 

260 


66.  Cal.— Hogan   v.   Superior  Court 
of  California  in  and  for  City  and 
County   of  San   Francisco,   241   P. 
•584,  74  CaLApp.  704. 

34  C.J.  p  87  note  13. 

Orders  part  of  Judgment  roll  or  rec- 
ord 

(1)  Order    amending    a    pleading. 
— Borden    v.    Lynch,    87   P.   -609,    -34 
Mont.  503. 

(2)  Other  orders.— Powell  v.  May, 
74  P.   SO,   29  Mont.  71—34  C.J.  p  87 
note  16  [a]. 

Orders  not  part  of  Judgment  roll  or 
record 

(1)  Court's     order    confirming    or 
modifying  findings  of  referee  to  as- 
certain   fact   ^necessary     to     enable 
court   to   determine  action. — Nation- 
al   Brass   Works   v.   Weeks,    268   P. 
412,  92  Cal.App.  318. 

(2)  Minute  order  dismissing  fore- 
closure action  as  to  -plaintiff's  ven- 
dor.—Wendt    v.    Gates,    283    P.    313, 
.102  CaLApp.  342,  followed  in  Wendt 
v.  -Stump,   283   P.   313,   102  Cal.App. 
794. 

(3)  Other  orders. 

Cal.— Woods  v.  Hyde,  222  P.  16'8,  64 

CaLApp.  43-3. 
Utah. — Madsen    v.    Hodson,    256    P. 

792,  69  Utah  527. 
34  C.J.  p  87  note  16  [b], 

67.  N.Y. — Dr.  David  Kennedy  Corpv 
v.  Kennedy,  59  N.B.  133,  165  N.Y. 
353. 

34  C.J.  p  87  note  15. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§125 


The  verdict,  decision,  findings,  or  report  on  which 
the  judgment  is  founded,  is  a  proper  and  necessary 
part  of  the  judgment  roll  or  record,68  but  in  a  num- 
ber of  instances  exceptions  have  been  made  to  this 
rule.69  Where  defendant  in  an  action  has  appeared 
and  issue  has  been  joined,  it  must  appear  from  the 
judgment  roll  how  that  issue  has  been  disposed  of 
so  as  to  authorize  the  court  to  proceed  to  judg- 
ment.70 

A  bill  of  exceptions  constitutes  a  part  of  the 
judgment  roll  or  record  in  most  jurisdictions;71 
but  it  is  otherwise  under  some  statutes.72  Where 
the  statute  so  provides,  if  judgment  is  taken  after 
a  trial  the  judgment  roll  must  contain  "the  excep- 
tions or  case  then  on  file/'73 

Judgment.  The  judgment  roll  or  record  must 
contain,  of  course,  a  copy  of  the  final  judgment,74 
and  also  a  copy  of  any  interlocutory  judgment  ren- 
dered in  the  cause,76  unless,  by  amendment  of 
pleadings  or  otherwise,  the  interlocutory  judgment 
has  been  superseded  or  become  functus  officio.76 

Costs.  Papers  used  on  taxation  of  costs  do  not 
constitute  any  part  of  the  judgment  roll  or  record.77 

Appeal  papers  and  subsequent  proceedings.  Un- 
der a  statute  so  providing,  if  a  judgment  of  affirm- 


ance is  rendered  on  appeal  to  a  designated  appellate 
court,  the  judgment  roll  consists  of  a  copy  of  the 
judgment  annexed  to  the  papers  on  which  the  ap- 
peal was  heard.78 

c.  Amendment  of  the  Boll 

The  judgment  roll  may  be  corrected 'by  amendment 
or  by  the  addition  of  proper  papers. 

All  papers  incorporated  into  the  judgment  roll 
and  required  to  form  part  of  it  may  be  detached  by 
the  clerk,  and  any  amendments  made  which  are  nec- 
essary to  make  it  conform  with  accuracy  to  the  pro- 
ceedings that  have  been  had.79  If  necessary  or 
proper  papers  are  omitted  in  the  judgment  roll,  such 
papers  may  be  added80 

d.  Signature 

Failure  of  the  clerk  to  sign  the  Judgment  as  re- 
quired Is  at  most  an  Irregularity  which  does  not  af- 
fect the  validity  of  the  judgment  and  Is  subject  to  cor- 
rection. 

Although  the  clerk  of  the  court  should  attest  the 
judgment  roll  or  entry  by  his  signature,  his  failure 
to  do  so  is  at  most  an  irregularity,  and  does  not 
affect  the  validity  of  the  judgment81  It  is  a  cleri- 
cal error82  which  the  court  may  and  should  allow 
to  be  corrected  at  any  time  nunc  pro  tune.83  Un-. 


03.    Nev.— McGill   v.  'iLewis,   118   P. 

2d  702,  61  Nev.  40. 
8*  C.J.  p  1195  note  62  [c]— 84  C.J.  P 

87  note  17. 

69.    Findings  of  fact 

(1)  The    incorporation    of   court's 
findings  of  facts  into  Judgment  was 
unnecessary. — Wann  v.  Reading  Co., 
108  S.W.2d  899,  194  Ark.  541. 

(2)  Findings  form  no  part  of  the 
Judgment  roll  In  a  case  of  default. — 
Cook's  Estate,  17  P.  928,  77  Cal.  220, 
11  Am,S.R  267,  1  L.R.A.  567,  reheard 
19    P.    431,    77   Cal.    220 — Sheehan  v. 
All  Persons,  etc.,  252  P.  "337,  80  Cat 
App.  393. 

Conclusions  of  law  form  no  part  of 
the  Judgment  roll 
Ark.— Wann  v.   Beading  Co.,  108  S. 

W.2d  899,  194  Ark.  541. 
Cal.— Sheehan   v.   All   Persons,   etc., 

202  P.  337,  80  CaLApp.  39«3. 
Opinion 

(1)  Opinion  of  circuit  court  in  di- 
vorce proceedings  was  not  part  of 
the   Judgment  roll  and  was  not  an 
"order"  or  part  of  the  record.— Good- 
man v.  Goodman,  105  P.Sd  1091,  165 
Or.  141. 

(2)  Other'    holdings.— Werner     v. 
Babcock,  .116  P.  357,  24  Nev.  42—34 
C.J.  p  87  note  17  [d]. 

Verdict 

(1)  A  Judgment  is  not  void  merely 
because  the  roll  does  not  contain  a 
copy  of  the  verdict— Hoe  v.  Sanborn, 


24  How.Pr.  26,  affirmed  86  N.T.  93— 
34  C. J.  p  88  note  18. 

(2)  A  verdict  need  not  be  copied 
in   the   Judgment,   but   may   be    so 
copied,  and  in  such  case  is  evidence 
that  it  was  recognized  and  approved 
by   the   court. — Weathered   v.   Meek, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  258  S.W.  516. 

(3)  Other  holdings. — Empire   Coal 
Co.  v.  Goodhue,  76  So.  31,  200  Ala. 
265,  266— 64  CJ.  p  '87  note  17   [h]. 
70.    Ky.— Mead  v.  Nevill,  2  Duv.  280. 
N.T. — Thomas  v.  Tanner,  14  How.Pr. 

426. 
7L    Or.— Tatum  v.  Massie,  44  P.  494, 

29  Or.  140. 
34  C.J.  p  88  note  20. 
Bill  filefl  too  late 

A  bill  of  exceptions,  filed  after 
time  granted  for  preparation  and  fil- 
ing thereof,  is  not  part  of  record, 
where  no  extension  of  time  was 
prayed  for  or  granted. — Yuknavich 
v/Tuknavich,  58  N.E.2d  447,  115  Ind. 
Ap.p.  530. 

72.  Idaho.— Haas  v.  Teters,  113  P. 
96,  19  Idaho  182. 

34  C.  J.  p  '88  note  21. 

73.  N.Y.— Wilcox  v.  Hawley,  81  N. 
T.  648. 

-34  C.J.  p  88  note  22. 

7*4,    -Nev.— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Abel, 

41  P.2d  1061,  5-6  Nev.  6. 
34  C.J.  P  88  note  23. 
In  replevin  action 

Judgment  for  damages  for  deten- 

261 


tion  and  costs  only  need  be  entered 
on   court  rolls,   plaintiff  having  re- 
covered replevined  goods. — Crowe  v. 
Peaslee-Gaulbert  Co.,   37  F.2d  216. 
75.    CaL— In  re  Broome,  147  P.  270, 

169  CaL  604. 
34  C.J.  p  88  note  24. 
7&    N.T. — Kedman   v.    Hendricks,    3 

N.T.Super.  32. 
34  C.J.  p  88  note  25  [a]. 

77.  N.T.— Cook  v.  Dickerson,  8  N.T. 
Super.  679. 

34  C.J.  j?  88  note  26. 

78.  N.T.— Haydorn    v.    Carroll,    121 
N.B.  463,  225  N.Y.  84. 

34  CJ.  p  8S  note  27. 

79.  Conn. — Brown  v.  Woodward,   53 
A.  112,  75  Conn.  254. 

34  C.J.  p  83  note  30. 
Amending    Judgment    see    infra    §§ 
236-264. 

80.  N.T. — -Decker  v.  Dutcher,  2  SI  N. 
Y.S.  897,  156  Misc.  488,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  289  N.T.S.  5'53,  247 
App.Dlv.  689. 

34  C.J.  D  88  note  31. 

83-     N.T.— kythgoe    v.    Lythgoe,    41, 

N.E.  89,  145  N.T.  641. 
34  C.J.  p  «88  note  32. 

82.  N.T.— Van  Alstyne  v.  .Qook,  25 
N.T.  489 — Lythgoe  v.  -Lythgoe,  27 
N.T.S.  1063,  75  Hun  147,  affirmed 
41  N.E.  89,  145  N.T.  641. 

88.  N.T. — Van  Alstyne  v.  Cook,  S5 
N.T.  489. 


§  126 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


der  some  statutes,  signing  of  the  roll  by  the  clerk 
is  not  required84 

§  126.    Docketing 

In  most  Jurisdictions  the  clerk  Is  required  to  docket 
the  judgment  by  making  the  proper  entries  In  a  book 
alphabetically  arranged,  so  that  interested  third  per- 
sons may  have  official  notice  of  the  Judgment. 

The  docket  of  a  judgment  is  a  brief  writing  or 
statement  of  the  judgment  made  from  the  record 
or  roll,  kept  by  the  clerk  in  a  book  alphabetically 
arranged,  pursuant  to  statutory  requirements.85  As 
in  case  of  entry  of  a  judgment,  discussed  supra  § 
106,  the  docketing  of  a  judgment  is  a  ministerial  act 
to  be  performed  by  the  clerk,86  and  necessarily  im- 
plies the  preexistence  of  a  judgment  to  be  docket- 


It  is  the  duty  of  the  clerk  or  prothonotary  of  the 
court  to  docket  the  judgment  by  entering  it  in  the 
proper  book.88  It  is,  however,  the  duty  of  the  plain- 
tiff or  judgment  creditor  to  see  that  his  judgment 
is  properly  docketed.89  The  docket  is  no  part  of 
the  record  of  the  court,90  and  hence  does  not  im- 
port verity,91  as  in  the  case  of  the  judgment  roll  or 
record  proper,  discussed  infra  §  132;  a  docket  no- 
tation may  not  be  used  to  supply  a  deficiency  in  the 
record  of  the  court.92 

Purpose  and  necessity.    The  judgment  docket  is 


intended  to  afford  to  interested  persons  official  no- 
tice of  the  existence  of  judgments;93  As  discussed 
infra  §  463,  in  some  states  judgments  are  required 
to  be  docketed  in  order  that  they  may  attach  as 
liens,  and,  in  some  jurisdictions,  as  discussed  in 
Executions  §  9,  docketing  is  a  prerequisite  to  the 
issuance  of  an  execution.  The  failure  to  docket 
the  judgment,  however,  does  not  destroy  it,  or  de- 
prive it  of  the  usual  consequences  of  a  judgment,94 
and  erroneous  or  false  entries  made  by  the  clerk  do 
not  conclude  the  parties,  or  impair  the  validity  of 
the  judgment.95  An  undocketed  judgment  is  valid 
and  conclusive  as  between  the  parties96  and  may 
be  relied  on  as  an  estoppel.97 

Time  of  docketing.  The  test  of  the  right  to  dock- 
et a  judgment  is  the  right  to  issue  execution  on  it 
immediately,98  but  it  is  not  necessary  that  a  judg- 
ment should  be  presently  payable  in  order  to  per- 
mit of  being  docketed.99  As  a  general  rule,  a  judg- 
ment cannot  regularly  be  docketed  until  it  has  been 
entered  and  the  judgment  roll  filed.1  The  docket- 
ing without  a  preceding  entry  in  the  judgment  book 
is  of  no  avail,  even  though  a  judgment  roll  has  been 
filed  with  what  purports  to  be  a  copy  of  a  judgment 
in  it.2  For  some  purposes  a  judgment  may  be  dock- 
eted nunc  pro  tune,8  although,  of  course,  not  so  as 
to  prejudice  the  rights  of  innocent  third  persons.4 
Since  docketing  is  a  ministerial,  as  distinguished 


84.  N.Y.-— Goelet  v.  Spofford,  55  N.Y. 
647. 

85.  N.Y.— Cole  v.  Vincent,  242  N.Y. 
&  644,  229  App.Div.  520. 

34  CJ.  p  89  note  38. 

Docketing    Justices'    judgments    see 

the    C.J.S.    title    Justices    of    the 

Peace    §    125,    also    35   C.J.    p    709 

note  5-p  717  note  15. 
Filing  transcript  in  another  county 

see  infra  §  129  a. 

88.  N.Y.—Vogel  v."  Edwards,  27  N. 
E.2d  806,  283  N.Y.  118 — Humnicki 
v.  Pitkowa,  277  N.Y.S.  417,  154 
Misc.  407— Darvick  v.  Darvick,  <36 
N.Y.S.2d  58. 

$4  C.J.  p  89  note  41. 

8%    U.S. — In  re  Boyd,  CXJ.Or.,  $  F. 

iCas.No.1,746,    4    Sawy.    262. 
Cal.— Ridgley  v.   Abbott   Quicksilver 

Min.  Co.  of  Illinois,   79  P.  333,  7 

Cal.Unrep.Cas.  200. 
Docketing  of  decree 
'  The  determination  of  the  rights  of 
the   parties  to  a  special  proceeding 
in   a  surrogate's  court  is"  a  decree 
which,  when  docketed,  has  the  effect 
'of  a  judgment — In  re  Murray's  'Es- 
tate, 2-88  N.Y.S.  346,  248  Aap.Div.  167, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  5  N.E.2d 
717,  272  W.Y.  22-8. 
88.    N.Y.— Cole  v.  Vincent,  242  N.Y. 

S.  644,  229  App.-Div.  520. 
34  C.J.  p  90  note  64. 


>.    Pa. — Wood  v.  Reynolds,  7  Watts 

&  8.  406. 

34  CLJ.  P  90  note  -65. 
Delivery  of  transcript 

Where  a  money  judgment  is  to  be 
entered  in  judgment  docket  of  clerk 
of  court  rendering  judgment,  it  is 
unnecessary  for  judgment  plaintiff 
to  procure  from  clerk  a  certified  copy 
or  transcript  of  judgment  and  then 
deliver  it  back  to  clerk  for  entry  in 
judgment  docket. — Watson  v.  Strohl, 
46  N.E.2d  204,  220  Ind.  672. 

90.  Ark. — Holloway  v.  Berenzen,  188 
S.W.2d  298. 

Ind.— Pittsburgh,  C.,  C.  &  St  L.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Johnson,  93  N.E.  683,  49 
IrulA-pp.  126,  rehearing  denied  95 
N.E.  610,  49  Ind.App.  126. 

34  C.J.  p  89  note  4>3. 

91.  N.Y.— Booth  v.  Farmers'  &  Me- 
chanics'   National    Bank,    4    Lans. 
301,  reversed  on  other  grounds  50 
N.Y.  396. 

92.  Ark. — Holloway  v.  Berenzen,  188 
S.W.2d  298. 

93.  N.C.— Henry  v.   Sanders,   193   S. 
SL  15,  212  N.C.  239. 

34  C.J.  p  89  note  46. 

94.  N.Y. — Warren  v.  Garlifck,  $13  N. 
Y.S.  476,  126  Misc.  103,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  216  N.Y.S.  466,  217 
App.Div.  55. 

262 


N.C. — Henry  v.  Sanders,  193  S.-E.  15, 

212  N.C.  239. 
34  C.J.  P  89  note  49. 

95.  Pa. — In  re  Celenza's  Estate,  17 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  4,  4-6  York  Leg.Rec. 
141. 

34  C.J.  p  90  note  50. 

96.  Cal. — Hastings   y.    Cunningham, 
•39  CaL  157. 

34  C.J.  p  90  note  51. 

97.  N.Y.--Sheridan   v.   Andrews,   49 
N.Y.  478. 

93.    N.Y.— De   Agreda   v.   Mantel,    1 

Abb.Pr.  130. 
34  C.J.  p  90  note  53. 

99.    N.Y.— Harris  v.  Elliott,  57  N.E. 

406,  163  N.Y.  2-69. 
•34  C.J.  p  90  note  54. 

3L.  CaL— Ridgley  v.  Abbott  Quick- 
silver Min.  Co.  of  Illinois,  79  P. 
8»33,  7  Cal.Unrep.Cas.  200. 

34  C.J.  p  90  note  55. 

2.  Minn. — Rockwood    v.    Davenport, 
35  N.W.   377,  >37  Minn.  53*3,  5  Am. 
S.R.  «72. 

34  C.J.  p  90  note  56. 

3.  Wis. — Drake  v.   Harrison,    33   N. 
W.  81,   69  Wis.   99,  2  Am.S.R.  717. 

34  C.J.  p  90  note  57. 

4.  Pa. — Hickman's    Estate,    40    Pa. 
.     Super.  244. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  129 


from  a  judicial,  act,  a  judgment  may  be  docketed  on 
a  nonjuridical  day.5 

Sufficiency  of  entry.  In  determining  the  sufficien- 
cy of  a  docket  entry,  the  whole  entry  must  be  con- 
sidered, and  if  from  the  whole,  the  amount  and  date 
of  the  judgment,  the  parties  to  it,  and  the  court  in 
which  it  was  rendered,  appear,  the  entry  will  be 
held  sufficient6  Substantial  compliance  with  the 
statute  is  sufficient7 

§  127.    Book  or  Place  of  Entry 

A  judgment  Is  docketed  In  a  Judgment  docket  or 
"docket  book,"  which  Is  separate  and  distinct  from  the 
"Judgment  book"  in  which  Judgments  are  "entered." 

A  judgment,  in  order  to  be  docketed,  must  be  en- 
tered in  the  book  kept  for  that  purpose,  and  usu- 
ally known  as  the  judgment  docket  or  "docket 
book/'8  which  is  a  separate  and  distinct  book  irom 
that  known  as  the  "judgment  book,"9  in  which,  as 
appears  supra  §  110,  judgments  are  required  to  be 
entered. 


§  128. 


Index 


In  addition  to  docketing,  an  index  of  Judgments 
generally  required. 


It  is  usually  required  that,  in  addition  to  the  dock- 
et of  judgments,  there  shall  be  an  index  thereof,10 
and,  as  discussed  infra  §  464,  substantial  compliance 
with  such  requirement  is  generally  held  necessary 
to  constitute  the  judgment  a  lien  as  against  third 
persons. 

§  129.    Filing  Transcript 

a.  In  another  county  or  district 

b.  In  superior  court 

a.  In  Another  County  or  District 

A  transcript  of  a  Judgment  rendered  tn  one  county 
may  be  filed  In  another  county,  but  the  court  to  which 
the  Judgment  Is  thus  transferred  has  no  power  over  It 
except  to  enforce  It. 

For  certain  limited  purposes,  such  as  lien,  execu- 
tion, and  revival,  judgments  rendered  in  one  county 
may  be  in  effect  transferred  to  another  county  or 
counties  by  the  filing  of  a  transcript  of  the  record 
of  such  judgment  in  such  counties,  in  accordance 
with  statutory  provisions.11  A  transcript  thus  en- 
tered in  another  county  does  not  become  a  judg- 
ment of  the  Qourt  to  which  it  is  transferred,  but 
only  a  quasi  judgment  for  certain  limited  purposes, 
such  as  lien,  execution,  and  revival.12  The  merits 


5.  U.S. — In  .re    Worthington,    C.C. 
Wis.f    30    F.Cas.No.18,051,    7    Bias. 
455. 

6.  Wis. — Hesse    v.    Mann*    40    Wis. 
560. 

7.  KM.— Corpus     Taxis     cited     la 
Breece  v.  Gregg,  13  F.2d  421,  422, 
36  KM.  246. 

34  C.J.  p  90  note  66. 
"Name  at  lenfftb" 

A  statute  requiring  clerk  in  dock- 
eting Judgment  to  enter  "name  at 
length  of  the  Judgment  debtor/' 
merely  required  clerk  to  enter  name 
in  docket  book  as  he  finds  it  in  Judg- 
ment, without  abbreviations. — H.  B. 
&  C.  Co.  v.  Smith,  20*  N.Y.S.  396, 
212  Afcp.Div.  ITS.  affirmed  151  N.EL 
448.  242  N.Y.  2-67,  45  A.L.R  554. 

8.  N.Y.— Cole   v.    Vincent,    242   N.Y. 
S.  644,  229  App.Div.  520. 

33  C.J.  tp  '1040  note  19—84  CUT.  j>  90 

note  61. 
"Judgment  docket"  defined 

A  list  of  the  Judgments  entered 
in  a  given  court,  methodically  kept 
by  the  clerk  or  other  proper  officer, 
open  to  public  inspection  and  intend- 
ed to  afford  official  notice  to  interest- 
ed parties  of  the  existence  or  lien 
of  Judgments. — Black  !LJ>. 
"Docket  book"  defined 

A  docket  book  is  a  public  record 
prescribed  by  statute  for  the  express 
purpose,  among  other  things,  of  re- 
ceiving the  entry  of  Judgments. — 
Beuerlein  v.  Hodges,  10  N.Y.S.  506, 
50$. 


"Docket  entry*'  distinguished 

The  term  "docket  entry"  as  used 
in  statute  has  been  held  to  refer  to 
the  entries  in  the  minute  book  or 
docket  <that  the  clerk  is  required,  by 
statute,  to  keep,  and  not  the  entries 
in  a  judgment  docket  book  which  the 
clerk  was  not  required  to  keep,  but 
which  anight  properly  be  kept,  if  the 
Judge  so  ordered,  as  a  convenient  in- 
dex of  the  Judgment  debtors. — Funk 
v.  Lamb,  92  N.W.  8,  87  Minn.  348, 
#52. 

9.  N.Y.— Cole  v.  Vincent,  242  N.Y.S. 
644,  229  App.Div.  520. 

34  C.J.  p  90  note  62. 

10.  N.C.— Henry  v.  Sanders,  193  S. 
£L  15,  212  N.C.  239. 

34  C.T.  p  91  note  68. 
2Canner  of  indexing 

(1)  "It  is  the  county  clerk's  duty 
to  provide  books,  ruled  in  columns, 
convenient  for  making  the  entries 
under  the  initial  letter  of  the  sur- 
name, only,  of  the  Judgment  debtor. 
.  .  .  It  is  the  practice,  however, 
to  provide  books  with  columns  ap- 
propriate to  the  entry  of  Judgments 
in  accordance  with  the  initial  letter 
of  the  given  names  as  well  as  the 
surnames  of  Judgment  debtors. 
While  this  is  not  required  by  law,  if 
the  county  clerk  undertakes  to  do 
it,  he  must  use  reasonable  care  to 
index  such  given  name  in  its  proper 
column  so  that  no  one  may  be  mis- 
led -thereby.  Nevertheless  a  Judg- 
ment entered  in  accordance  with  the 
requirements  of  the  statute  is  a  suffi- 

263 


cient  and  legal  Judgment  though  the 
given  name  of  the  Judgment  debtor 
may  not  appear  in  the  proper  col- 
umn."—<Jole  v.  Vincent,  242  N.Y.S. 
644,  647,  229  App.Div.  520. 

(2)  Designation  of  parties  as  plain- 
tiff and  defendant  in  ad  sectam  in- 
dex should  coincide  with  order  for 
Judgment  not  entered  in  appearance 
docket. — Trestrail  v.  Johnson,  146  A. 
150,  297  Pa.  49. 
IL  TT.S.— Oil  Well  Supply  Co.  T. 

Wickwire,  DJC.I1L,  52  F.Supp.  921. 
Pa. — First  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 

Bethlehem  v.  Laubach,  5  A.2d  139, 

333   Pa,  344— Schmitt  v.  Wyoming 

Valley  Public  Service  Co.,    37   Pa. 

Dist   &   Co.    1*35,   £3    Liuz.L,eg.Jleg. 

302 — Price    v.    Adamkiewicz,   Com. 

PL,    34    Luz.Iieg.Beg.    464. 
Wash.— Cugini  v.  Apex  Mercury  Mm. 

Co.,  165  P.2d  82. 
34  C.  J.  p  91  note  74. 
Transcript  as  basis  of: 

Execution   see  Executions   |   64. 

iLien  see  infra  §  462. 
Xiaud  in.  several  counties 

Partition  of  lands  in  several  coun- 
ties must  be  recorded  in  each  county. 
— McCauley  v.    Brooks,    147   A.   898, 
84  N.H.  207. 
12.    OkL — Chandler  v.   Cummins,   81 

P.2d  £51.  183  Okl.  5-^McAusland  v. 

Williams,  54  P.2d  622,  177  CikL  25. 
Pa.— First  Nat  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 

Bethlehem  v.  iLaubach,  5  A.2d  139, 

<3£S    Pa.    344— Frew    v.   Heinbach, 

Com.PL,  9  Sch.Re«.  91. 
134  <OJ.  p  91  note  7*. 


§  129 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


or  validity  of  a  judgment  thus  transferred  cannot 
be  inquired  into  by  the  court  to  which  it  is  taken ; 
it  is  there  only  for  purposes  of  enforcement  and 
satisfaction.13  If  it  is  desired  to  enter  the  judg- 
ment in  a  third  county,  it  must  be  done  by  transcript 
from  the  original  judgment,  not  from  the  transcript 
entered  in  the  second  county.14  Generally  a  judg- 
ment must  have  been  docketed  or  recorded  in  the 
county  where  rendered,  in  order  to  be  entitled  to 
be  filed  or  docketed  in  another  county.15 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  clerk  of  the  county  where 
the  judgment  was  rendered,  on  request  and  payment 
of  fees,  to  furnish  a  transcript  containing  all  the 
facts  necessary  to  make  a  perfect  docket  of  the 
judgment,16  and  the  clerk  of  the  county  in  which 
such  transcript  is  presented  must  file  it  and  docket 
the  judgment.17  The  transcript  will  not  be  vitiated 
by  mere  clerical  errors,18  but  there  must  be  com- 
pliance with  statutory  requirements,19  and  the  tran- 
script must  be  sufficiently  full  to  give  reasonably 


certain  and  definite  information  to  subsequent  pur- 
chasers or  lienors.20 

b.  In  Superior  Court 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Operation  and  effect 

(1)  In  General 

In  many  Jurisdictions,  subject  to  statutory  require- 
ments and  limitations  as  to  the  mode  and  time  of  doing 
so,  a  transcript  of  a  Judgment  rendered  by  a  Justice  of 
the  peace  or  other  'inferior  court  may  be  filed  and 
docketed  in  a  superior  court. 

By  statute  in  many  jurisdictions,  and  subject  td 
the  statutory  requirements  and  limitations,  a  tran- 
script of  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  justice  of  the 
peace  or  other  inferior  court  may  be  filed  and  dock- 
eted in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of  a  superior  court.21 
If  the  statute  contemplates  the  filing  of  a  complete 
transcript  of  the  justice's  record,  it  is  not  satisfied 
by  a  mere  abstract  of  the  judgment;^2  but  other- 


Parent  Judgment  controls 

Where  judgment  is  entered  by  fil- 
ing of  exemplified  copy  of  judgment 
on  record  in  another  county,  defend- 
ant need  concern  himself  only  with 
validity  of  parent  judgment — Al- 
toona  Trust  Co.  v.  Fodder,  165  A. 
740,  311  Pa.  426. 
Salt  to  restrain  execution 

The  circuit  court  of  the  county  in 
which  the  transcript  of  a  judgment 
of  the  circuit  court  of  another  coun- 
ty was  filed,  and  in  which  the  cir- 
cuit clerk  issued  execution,  had  ju- 
risdiction in  action  by  Judgment 
debtor  to  restrain  execution,  as 
against  contention  that  circuit  court 
of  such  county  had  no  jurisdiction  to 
enjoin  or  stay  proceedings  on  judg- 
ment of  circuit  court  of  another 
county,  since,  when  transcript  of 
judgment  was  filed  with  cl'erk  of  cir- 
cuit court  of  county  in  which  action 
was  brought,  it  became,  at  least  for 
purposes  of  execution,  a  judgment  in 
such  county. — Brick  v.  Sovereign 
Grand  Lodge  of  Accepted  Free  Ma- 
sons of  Arkansas,  117  S.W.2d  1060, 
196  Ark.  -872. 

13.  Okl. — Chandler  v.   Cummins,    81 
P.2d  $51,  183  Okl.  -S—McAusland  v. 
Williams,  '54  P.2d  622,  177  OkL  25. 

Pa.— First  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Bethlehem  y.  Laubach,  5  A*2d  139, 
SSS  Pa.  344 — Taylor  v.  Tudor  & 
Free,  '81  PaJSuper.  i306— Hfcllinger 
v.  Breigner,  9  PaJMst  &  Co.  660, 
40  LanclL.Rev.  47,  139  York  (Leg. 
Bee.  176 — Price  v.  Adamkiewicz, 
Com.PL,  34  Luz.Leg.Reg.  464— 
Frew  v.  Heinbach,  Com.Pl.,  $  Sch. 
Reg.  91. 

34  C.J.  p  91  note  77. 

14.  Md. — Brunsman    v.    Crook-Kries 
Co.,  101  A.  1019,  130  Md.  661. 

34  C.J.  j>  91  note  7S- 


15.    N.C.— McAden  v.  Banister,  63  N. 
C.  478. 

le.    N.Y.— Sears  v.  Burnham,  17  N.Y. 
445. 

17.  N.Y. — Sears  v.  Burnham,  supra 
— People  v.  Keenan,  31  Hun  625. 

What  constitutes  filing 

Where  certified  transcript  of  judg- 
ment was  mailed  to  circuit  court 
clerk  of  another  county  for  filing, 
but  clerk  did  not  file  or  return  tran- 
script but  wrote  plaintiff's  attorney 
that  filing  fee  was  five  dollars,  and 
requested  attorney  to  take  care  of 
fee  as  soon  as  possible,  and  attor- 
ney immediately,  mailed  clerk  five 
dollars,  which  was  received  by  clerk 
two  days  after  first  letter  from  plain- 
tiff's attorney  and  clerk  then  in- 
dorsed transcript  as  "filed,"  tran- 
script was  not  filed  until  so  indorsed; 
hence  during  the  intervening  two 
days  transcript  was  not  "construc- 
tive notice"  to  assignees  of  oil  and 
gas  leases  from  judgment  debtor. — 
Oil  Well  Supply  Co.  v.  Wickwire,  D. 
C.I11.,  52  F.Supp.  921. 

18.  U.S. — Lamprey     v.     Pike,     C.C. 
Minn.,  28  F.  30. 

Pa. — Frew   v.    Heinbach,   Com.PL,    9 

Sch.Reg.  91. 
34  C.J.  p  92  note  82. 
Identical  language 

Transcript  of  justice's  judgment 
was  not  fatally  defective  because  not 
in  identical  language  of  justice's 
docket— Filbert  v.  Dean,  200  N.W. 
326,  199  Iowa  -321. 

19.  Pa. — Hollinger    v.    Breigner,     0 
Pa.DIst.  &  Co.  660,  40  Lanc.L.Rev. 
47,    39   York.Leg.Rec.   176. 

34  C-J.  p  92  note  83. 

264 


20i    Tex.— Gullett  Gin  Co.  v.  Oliver, 

14  S.W.  451,  78  Tex.  182. 
34  C.J.  p  92  note  84. 
Transcript  held  sufficient 

Where  a  judgment  foreclosing  a 
mechanic's  lien  is  entered  in  a  coun- 
ty other  than  the  one  in  which  the 
property  is  located,  and  such  judg- 
ment docketed  in  the  county  where 
the  property  is,  it  is  immaterial  that 
no  mention  of  the  lien  was  made  in 
the  docket  where  the  judgment  and 
the  decree  in  full  were  filed  in  the 
clerk's  office.— Sugg  v.  Pollard,  115 
S.-E.  1W,  184  N.C.  494. 
Interest  rate 

Where  transcript  of  judgment  of 
justice  of  peace  was  so  vague  and 
ambiguous  as  to  leave  doubt  wheth- 
er judgment  bore  interest  at  six  or 
eight  per  cent,  it  should  be  treated 
as  containing  no  recital  with  respect 
to  interest,  and  subject  to  legal  stat- 
utory rate. — Filbert  v.  Dean,  200  N. 
W.  326,  199  Iowa  321. 

21.  Ark. — Davis  v.  Bank  of  Atkins, 
167    S.W.2d   876,    205   Ark.    144. 

Mich. — De  Guzman  v.  Shepherd,  196 
N.W.  52(3,  225  Mich.  -606. 

N.J. — United  Stores  Realty  Corpora- 
tion v.  Asea,  142  A.  38,  102  N.J.EQ. 
600. 

N.C.— Essex  Inv.  Co.  v.  Pickelsimer, 
187  S.E.  813,  310  N.C.  541. 

Pa. — Sadrovitz  v.  Say  lor,  Com.Pl.,  20 
ireh.L.J.  37 — Berlin  v.  Denci,  Com.. 
PI.,  25  West.  117. 

Wash. — State  ex  rel.  Adjustment  De- 
partment of  Olympia  Credit  Bu- 
reau v.  Ayer,  114  P.2d  168,  9  Wash. 
2d  188. 

34  C.J.  p  92  note  -85. 

22.  Or. — White  v.  Espey,   28  P.   71, 
21  Or.  328. 

34  C.J.  p  92  note  89. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§129 


wise  the  transcript  is  sufficient  if  it  shows  all  the 
essential  elements  of  a  judgment,2*  and,  particular- 
ly the  jurisdiction  of  the  inferior  court!2*  the  date 
of  the  judgment,2*  the  names  of  the  parties,26  and 
the  amount  of  the  recovery.27  It  has  been  held  that 
several  judgments  may  be  embraced  in  one  tran- 
script, and  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  certify  each 
judgment  separately.2*  Only  the  judgment  debtor 
may  complain  of  inefficiency  or  irregularity  in  the 
filing  of  the  transcript;  a  stranger  to  the  action 
has  no  right  to  do  so.29 

Certificate  and  authentication.  It  is  necessary 
that  the  transcript  should  be  certified  as  correct  by 
the  justice  or  other  court  from  which  it  is  taken, 
and  authenticated  in  accordance  with  the  directions 
of  the  statute.8^ 

Time  for  filing.  Subject  to  any  statutory  restric- 
tion of  the  time  within  which  the  transcript  of  the 
judgment  of  an  inferior  court  may 'be  filed  in  a 
superior  court,3i  it  may  be  done  at  any  time  dur- 
ing the  effective  life  of  the  judgment.82  As  a  gen- 
eral rule  it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be  a  judg- 
ment actually  rendered  and  still  in  force,88  which 
has  not  become  dormant84  or  barred  by  the  statute 
of  limitations,85  and  is  not  so  old  as  to  be  invali- 
dated by  the  presumption  of  payment  after  twenty 
years.86  It  has  been  held  that  the  transcript  may 


be  filed  before  the  time  to  appeal  from  the  judg- 
ment has  expired,87  or  after  an  appeal  is  pending,88 
except  in  some  jurisdictions,  where  the  transcript 
may  not  be  filed  after  an  appeal  has  been  taken.89 

Affidavit  of  creditor.  The  effect  of  some  stat- 
utes is  to  require  the  judgment  creditor,  on  filing  a 
transcript  from  a  justice  or  other  inferior  court,  to 
make  and  file  an  affidavit  of  the  amount  remaining 
due  and  unpaid  on  the  judgment,  or  that  the  judg- 
ment is  due  and  unpaid,  and  that  it  cannot  be  sat- 
isfied from  the  goods  and  chattels  of  the  debtor; 
this  requirement  is  jurisdictional  and  the  affidavit  is 
indispensable.40 

(2)  Operation  and  Effect 

*  Transferring  a  Judgment  by  transcript  from  an  In- 
ferior  to  a  superior  court  makes  it  the  judgment  of  the 
latter  for  purposes  of  enforcement  and  with  respect  to 
remedies  by  direct  attack;  but  the  power  of  the  supe- 
rior court  extends  only  to  the  transcribed  Judgment  and 
the  lower  court  retains  some  control  over  its  own  Judg- 
ment. 

In  a  strict  sense,  the  transfer  of  a  judgment  from 
an  inferior  court  to  a  superior  court  by  the  filing 
of  a  transcript  or  abstract  does  not  actually  make 
the  judgment  "a  judgment  of  the  higher  court.41  It 
is  generally  held,  however,  that  a  transferred  judg- 
ment becomes  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  judg- 
ment of  the  superior  court,42  at  least  for  the  pur- 


23.  Ind. — Chicago    &   A.    R.    Co.    v. 
Summers,  14  N.E.  783,  113  Ind.  10, 
•3  Am.S.R.  616. 

34  £.J.  p  92  note  00. 

24.  Mich.—- Wedel  v.  Green,  38  N.W. 
638,  70  Mich.  642. 

34  C.J.  p  92  note  91. 

25.  Minn.~Fu.nk  v.  Lamb,  92  N.W. 
8,  87  Minn.  348. 

34  C.J.  p  92  note  92. 

28.    Minn. — Funk  v.  Lamb,  supra, 

34  C.J.  p  92  note  93. 

27.  Minn. — Funk  v.  Lamb,  supra, 
34  C.J.  p  92  note  94. 

28.  Mo.— Jeffries  v,  Wright,  51  Mo. 
215. 

Pa.— Williams  v.  McCandless,  14  Pa. 
185. 

29.  Colo. — Second  Industrial  Bank  v. 
Marshall,  289  P.  598,  87  Colo.  541. 

30.  Colo. — Ferrier  v.  Morris,  122  P. 
2d  880,  109  Colo.  154. 

$4  C.J.  p  9*3  note  96. 

31.  Statutes  construed 

The  statute  requiring  any  clerk  of 
city  court  of  Buffalo  to  Issue,  on  de- 
mand, a  transcript  of  a  judgment  at 
any  time  within  twenty  years  after 
its  rendition,  and  requiring  clerk  of 
Erie  County  to  docket  transcript 
thus  issued;  prevails  over  section  of 
justice  court  act  which  limits,  time 
for  issuing  and  filing  a  transcript  of 
a  justice  court  judgment  to  six  years 


after  Its  rendition. — Shackman  y.  Os- 
borne,  13  N.T.S.2d  854,  257  AppJDiv. 
1037. 

32.  N.Y. — Stanley  Funding  Corpora- 
tion v.  Kotcher,  41  N.Y.S.Sd  877. 

34  C.J.  p  93  note  98. 

33.  N.Y. — Stephens    v.    Santee,     51 
Barb.  582. 

34  C.J.  p  913  note  99. 

34.  Neb. — Farmers'   State    Bank   v. 
Bales,  90  N.W.  945,  64  Neb.  870. 

34  C.J.  *>  93  note  1. 

35.  'N.Y.— Matter  of  Murphy,  135  N. 
Y.S.  23,  150  App.Div.  460. 

34  C.J.  p  93  note  2. 

36.  Pa.— Light  v.  Steckbeck,  19  Pa. 
Co.  654. 

37.  111. — Dawson  v.  Cunning,  50  111. 
Aj>p.  28-6. 

Hiss. — Minshew  y.  Davidson,  38  So. 
315,  8-6  Miss.  354. 

38.  Wis. — Steckmesser    T.    Graham, 
10  Wis.  37. 

39.  Pa.— Vockroth  Y.  Thomas,  11  Pa. 
Disk  487. 

34  C.J.  p  93  note  6. 

40.  Mich. — Shepard  v.  Schrutt,  128 
N.JV.  772,  163  Mich.  485. 

34  C.J.  p  98  note  8. 

41.  Ark.— Miller  v.  Brown,  281  S.W. 
904,  170  Ark.*  949. 

N.T.— Wixom   v.   Randazo,   27S  N.T. 

S.  783,  152  Misc.  171. 
34  C.J.  p  93  note  10. 

265 


statntovy 
The  filing  of  a  transcript  in  the 
county  clerk's  office  does  not  make  a 
judgment  of  the  justice's  court  or 
any  inferior  court  a  judgment  ren- 
dered by  the  county  court,  but  only 
a  statutory  judgment  of  such  court; 
such  judgment  continues  to  be  not  a 
judgment  of  a  court  of  record. — -Dief- 
fenbach  v.  Roch,  20  N.E.  560,  112 
N.Y.  621,  2  L.R.A.  829— Quackenbush 
v.  Johnston,  293  N.Y.S.  123,  249  App. 
Dlv.  452— Agro  v.  Herman,  37  N.Y. 
S.2d  225,  179  Misc.  530— Tiffany  v. 
Mitchell,  26  N.Y.S.2d  551,  176  Misc. 
64. 

42.    U.S. — Paley  y.  Solomon,   D.C.3X 

C.,  59  F.Supp.  887. 
Ark.— Davis  v.  Bank  of  Atkins,   167 

S.W.2d   8T6,    205   Ark.    144. 
Mich. — Be  Guzman  y.  Shepherd,  196 

X.W.  523,  225  Mich.  606. 
Mo. — Mahen   v.   Tavern   Rock,   37   S. 

W.2d  562,  327  Mo.  391. 
N.Y.— Tiffany  v.  Mitchell,  2$  N.Y.S. 

2d    551,    176    Misc.    64— Lowry    v. 

Himmler,  239  N.Y.S.  347,  136  Misc, 

215. 
N.C.— Brooks    v.    Brooks,    16    S.EL2d 

403,  220  NXX  16— Essex  Inv.  JCo.  y. 

Pickelsimer,  187  S.E,  813,  210  N.C. 

541. 
Pa. — Caverly  v.  Helfrich,  Com.PL,  38 

Luz.Leg.Reg.  121. 
Wash.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  State 

ex  rel.  Adjustment  Department  of 


§  130 


JUDGMENTS 


C.J.S. 


pose  of  enforcement,48  and  with  respect  to  remedies 
by  direct  attack;44  and  the  higher  court  may  there- 
after issue  process  on  it,45  modify  it,  or  grant  other 
relief  against  it,46  vacate  it,  or  strike  it  off  the 
docket  for  cause  shown.4?  Such  power  is  limited 
to  the  transcript  judgment  and  record  in  the  su- 
perior court ;  the  superior  court  cannot  open  or  va- 
cate the  judgment  of  the  inferior  court,48  and, 
while  it  has  been  held  that  the  filing  of  the  tran- 
script divests  the  lower  court  of  all  jurisdiction 
over  the  case  and  the  judgment,49  so  that  no  fur- 
ther proceedings  for  the  enforcement  of  the  judg- 
ment may  be  taken  therein,6**  nevertheless  the  in- 
ferior court  does  retain  some  control  of  its  judg- 
ment,61 including  the  power  to  modify62  or  vacate63 
it,  notwithstanding  the  prior  filing  of  a  transcript 
of  it  in  a  superior  court  A  void  or  invalid  judg- 


ment of  an  inferior  court  cannot  be  validated  by  the 
filing  of  a  transcript  thereof  in  a  superior  court.64 

§  130.    Recording 

Under  some  statutes  Judgments,  or  certain  kinds  of 
judgments,  are  required  to  be  recorded. 

Under  some  statutes  judgments,  or  certain  kinds 
of  judgments,  are  required  to  be  recorded  in  the 
office  of  the  register  of  deeds,  or  other  like  officer.66 

§  131.    Lost  or  Destroyed  Records 

Lost  or  destroyed  court  records  may  be  restored, 
and  this  rule  applies  to  voidable,  but  not  to  void,  Judg- 
ments. 

Where  any  record  of  a  court  has  been  lost  .or  de- 
stroyed, such  court  has  jurisdiction  and  power  to  re- 
establish or  restore  it  in  proper  proceedings  for  that 
purpose.66  While  a  voidable  judgment  may  be 


Olympia    Credit    Bureau   T.    Ayer, 
114  P.2d  168,  170,  9  Wash.2d  1*8. 
34  O.J.  p  93  note  11. 

43.  Ark.— Miller  v.  Brown,  iftl  S.W. 
904,  170  Ark.  949. 

Mich.— De  Guzman  v.  Shepherd,  196 
N.W.  523,  225  Mich.  606. 

Minn.— Keys  v.  Schultz,  %  N.W.Sd 
549,  212  Minn.  109. 

N.T.— Gilmore  v.  De  Witt,  10  N.T. 
S.2d  90*3,  2-56  AppjDiv.  1046 — 
Quackenbush  v.  Johnston,  293  N.Y. 
S.  123,  249  App.Div.  452— Tiffany  v. 
Mitchell,  26  N.Y.S.2d  -551,  176  Misc. 
54 — Dunn  v.  Seidenschwarz,  18  N. 
Y.S.2d  264,  173  Misc.  495— Wixom 
v.  Randazo,  273  N.T.S.  783,  152 
Misc  171 — Ellias  v.  Thomas  Fur- 
niture Works,  212  N.T.S.  127,  125 
Misc.  683. 

Wash.— (Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  State 
ex  rel.  Adjustment  Department  of 
Olympia  Credit  Bureau  v.  Ayer, 
114  P.2d  168,  170,  9  Wash.2d  188. 

34  C.J.  p  94  note  12. 

44.  Mich. — De  Guzman  v.  Shepherd, 
•196  N.W.  523,  225  Mich.   606. 

45.  Minn. — Keys  v.  Schultz,  2  N.W. 
2d  549,  212  Minn.  109. 

B£0. — Mahen   v.   Tavern  Bock,  87  S. 

W.2d  56*2,  -327  Mo.  391. 
34  C.J.  P  94  note  13. 

46.  N.T. — Wixora  v.  Randazo,  273  N. 
Y.S.  783,  152  Misc.  171. 

Wash.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  State 
ex  rel.  Adjustment  Department  of 
Olympia  Credit  Bureau  v.  Ayer, 
114  P.2d  168,  170,  9  Washed  188. 

34  C.J.  P  94  note  14. 

47.  Del.— McCoy  v.  Hickman,   15  A. 
2d   427,    1    Terry   587— Commercial 
Realty    Incorporation    v.    Jackson 
166    A.    «657,    «    W.W.Harr.     395— 
Weintraub  v.  Rudnick,  143  A.  456 
4  W.W.Harr.  111. 

U.T. — Quackenbush  v.  Johnston,  293 
N.T.S.  12«3,  249  App.Div.  452— Agro 
v.  Herman,  37  N.T.S.2d  225,  179 


Misc.  $30— Lowry  v.  Himmler,  239 
N.T.S.    347,  13-6  Misc.  215. 
a.— Webber  v.  Dolan,  17  Pa.Dist  & 
Co.  93. 

Wash.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  State 
ex  rel.  Adjustment  Department  of 
Olympia  Credit  Bureau  v.  Ayer,  114 
P.2d  168,  170,  9  Wash.2d  1W. 

34  C.J.  P  94  note  15. 

N.T.— Norell  Holding  Corp.  v. 
Putter,  64  N.T.S.2d  474,  269  App. 
Div.  754 — Gilmore  v.  De  Witt,  10 
N.T.S.2d  903,  256  App.Div.  1046— 
Quackenbush  v.  Johnston,  293  N. 
T.S.  123,  249  -App.Div.  452— Agro 
v.  Herman,  87  N.T.S.2d  225,  179 
Misc.  5'30. 

Pa. — Taylor  v.  Tudor  &  Free,  81  Pa. 
Super.  506 — Sasso's,  Inc.  v.  Angelo, 
Com.Pl.,  88  Luz.iLefir.Reg.  142. 

34  «C.J.  p  94  note  17. 

49.  Ark.— Davis  v.  Bank  of  Atkins, 
167    S/WV2d    876,    205   Ark.    144. 

N,C — Essex  Inv.  Co.  v.  Pickelsimer, 
187  S.B.  813,  210  N.C.  541. 

Wash.— Corptis  Juris  quoted  in  State 
ex  rel.  Adjustment  Department  of 
Olympia  Credit  Bureau  v.  Ayer, 
114  P.2d  168,  170,  9  Wash.2d  188. 

34  C.J.  p  93  note  9. 

50.  Del.— McCoy  v.  Hickman,  15  A. 
2d  427,  1  Terry  587— Weintraub  v. 
Rudnick,  143  A.  456,  4  W.W.Harr. 
111. 

61.  U.S.— Paley  v.  Solomon,  D.C.D 
1C.,  59  F.Supp.  887. 

N.J.— Westfield  Trust  Co.  v.  Court  of 
Common  Pleas  of  Morris  County 
183  A.  165,  116  N.J.Law  191— 
Westfield  Trust  Co.  v.  Cherry,  183 
A.  165,  116  N.J.Law  190. 

52.  Pa.— In  re  Ashman,  -67  A,   842 
lift  Pa,  512. 

53.  Minn.— Keys  v.  Schultz,  1  N.W 
2d  549,  212  Minn.  109. 

84  C.J.  p  95  note  19. 

54.  Del. — McCpy  v.  Hickman,  15  A. 
2d  427,  1  Terry  587— Weintraub  v 

266 


Rudnick,  143  A.  456,  4  W.W.Harr. 

111. 
Mont— Novack   v.    Pericich,    300    P. 

240,  90  Mont.  91. 
N.T. — Lowry   v.   Himmler,    239   N.T. 

S.  347,  .136  Misc.  215. 

55.    U.S.— Clinchfield   Coal    Corp.    v. 

Steinman,  Va.,  213  F.  557,  130  C.C. 

A.  137. 

34  C.J.  P  9*5  note  20. 
Lien  as  dependent  on  recording  see 

infra  S  463. 
Two  sets  of  records 

Single  clerk  when  required  to 
serve  as  district  and  county  clerk 
must  keep  two  sets  of  records,  and 
record  of  judgment  in  minutes  of 
district  court  would  not  be  substan- 
tial compliance  with  statute  reauir- 
ing  it  to  be  recorded  in  office  of 
county  clerk. — Permian  Oil  Co.  v. 
Smith,  73  S.W.2d  490,  129  Tex.  413, 
111  A.L.R.  1152,  rehearing  denied 
107  S.W.2d  564,  129  Tex.  413,  111  A. 
L.R.  1152. 

58.    Ky. — Carter   v.   Capshaw,   '60   S. 

W.2d  959,  249  Ky.  483. 
Supplying  lost  or  destroyed  records 
generally  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Rec- 
ords  §§   42-52,   also  53   C.J.  j>   634 
note  59-p  642  note  39. 
Alleging  substance  of  lost  record 

A  motion  alleging  the  names  of 
the  parties  to  a  Judgment,  the  court 
in  which  and  the  date  when  it  was 
rendered,  the  amount  thereof,  that 
it  was  rendered  on  a  described  bond, 
and  that  the  record  of  the  Judgment 
was  destroyed  by  fire  sufllciently  al- 
leges the  substance  of  the  destroyed 
record. — Spears  v.  Work,  29  IniL  502. 
Notice 

Lost  or  destroyed  judgments  may 
be  restored  or  proved  at  common  law, 
but  in  every  such  case  the  opposite 
party  should  be  notified,  in  order 
that  he  may  appear  for  his  own  pro- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§132 


restored,57  there  is  authority  that  a  void  judgment 
should  not  be  restored  ;5$  and  it  has  been  held  that 
in  a  proceeding  to  restore  a  destroyed  judgment  it 
may  be  shown  that  there  was  a  good  defense  to  the 
original  action  and  that  defendant  was  deprived  of 
the  opportunity  of  asserting  it  without  fault  of  his 
own  and  by  reason  of  plaintiffs  fraud.5*  Under 
some  statutes  in  such  a  proceeding  the  judgment 
debtor  may  set  forth  any  new  matters  arising  sub- 
sequent to  the  judgment  which  operate  in  whole  or 
in  part  to  extinguish  or  set  it  aside.60  An  appli- 
cation to  supply  a  lost  record  cannot  be  made  the 
means  of  getting  on  the  record  a  judgment  or  de- 
cree which  never  was  entered  there,  or  of  complet- 
ing a  record  imperfectly  entered.61  To  establish  a 
destroyed  judgment,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the 
party  claiming  under  it,62  and  the  evidence  must 
be  clear  and  convincing.68 

§  132.    Verity  and'Conclusiveness  of  Record 

The  judgment  roll  or  record  proper  Imports  absolute 
verity  and  is  conclusive  evidence  of  Its  contents,  but 
such  records  are  not  evidence,  except  as  between  the 
parties  and  .their  privies,  of  the  facts  recited  therein. 

Although  the  judgment  record  is  occasionally  said 


to  be  presumptively  true,64  the  authorities  are  al- 
most universally  agreed  that  the  judgment  roll,  or 
record  proper,  is  of  such  uncontrollable  credit  and 
verity  as  to  admit  of  no  averment,  plea,  or  proof 
to  the  contrary;  it  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the 
facts  which  it  recites  and  cannot  be  contradicted65 
in  a  collateral  proceeding.66  Under  the  doctrine  of 
res  judicata,  discussed  infra  §  592  et  seq.,  only 
parties  and  privies  are  bound  by  a  judgment  as  an 
adjudication,  but  no  one,  whether  or  not  a  party 
or  a  privy,  may  impeach  the  record  of  a  judgment 
considered  simply  as  a  record.67  Thus  the  actual 
rendition  and  existence  of  a  judgment  are  conclu- 
sively shown  by  the  record  as  against  the  whole 
world.68  Beyond  this,  records  are  not  evidence  of 
the  facts  recited,  except  as  between  the  parties  or 
their  privies.69  A  question  as  to  a  matter  of  record 
must  be  tried  by  the  record  itself  if  in  existence.70 
If  the  record  is  of  the  same  court,  the  trial  is  on 
inspection  by  the  court,71  and  it  is  error  to  sub- 
mit the  question  to  a  jury.72  The  rule  that  record 
imports  absolute  verity  is  subject  to  the  qualifica- 
tions that  one  portion  of  a  record  may  be  limited, 
explained,  or  qualified  by  another  portion  thereof,73 


tection. — George  v.  Middough,  62  Mo. 

549. 

Restoration  of  whole  record 

It  is  not  sufficient  to  restore  a 
part  only  of  the  lost  record,  such  as 
the  final  judgment,  but  the  restora- 
tion must  be  of  the  whole  record,  in- 
cluding the  summons,  pleadings,  etc., 
as  the  court  can  determine  the  legal 
effect  of  a  judgment  only  from  an 
inspection  of  the  whole  record.— Vail 
v.  Iglehart,  69  I1L  332. 
Bight  to  apply 

Allegations  that  petitioner  is  de- 
scribed in  a  judgment,  sought  to  be 
restored  on  record,  as  the  person  in 
whose  favor  it  was  rendered,  suffi- 
ciently show  his  interest  and  right 
to  maintain  the  proceeding  to  restore 
the  record,  and  express  allegations 
that  failure  to  restore  the  record 
will  result  in  damage  to  the  petition- 
er is  not  necessary.-— Russell  v.  lifll- 
ja,  90  I1L  327. 

57.  I1L— Vail  v,  Iglehart,  supra. 

58.  I1L— Vail  v.  Iglehart,  supra, 
53  C.J.  p  641  note  17. 

59.  Ark. — Guess   v.   Amis,    14    S.W. 
900,  54  Ark.  1. 

53  C.J.  p  642  note  18. 

60.  Kan.— Davidson  v.  Beers,  £5  P. 
8*59,  45  Kan.  365. 

O.    Ala,— -Box  v.  Delk,  47  Ala,  729. 

62.  Ky.— Carter  v.  Capshaw,  -60  S. 
W.2d  959.  249  Ky.  483. 

63.  Ky.— Carter  v.  Capshaw,  supra, 

64.  Mo.—- Petet   T.    MoClanahan,    249 
S.W.  917,  297  Mo.  677— galnane  v. 


Calnane,   17   S.W.2d   566,   567,   223 

Mo.App.  381. 

"The  judgment  entered  in  the  rec- 
ord Is  presumed  to  be  the  one  actu- 
ally rendered  by  the  court,  and  this 
presumption  obtains  no  matter  how 
erroneous  the  judgment  so  entered 
may  be,  unless  such  presumption  be 
overcome  by  evidence"  in  the  record. 
— Calnane  v.  Calnane,  subra. 
65.  Ala.— Hopkins  T.  Poellnitz,  170 

So.    774,    233    Ala.    172— Ex   parte 

McDermott   141   So.   659,   224  Ala. 

684. 
Conn. — Varanelli  v.  Luddy,   32  A.2d 

81,  130  Conn.  74— Holtz  v.  Riddell, 

12-6  A.  <833,  101  Conn.  416. 
Fla.— Malone  v.  Meres,  109  So.  677, 

91  Fla,  709. 
Iowa.— Engelbercht   v.   Davison,    213 

N.W.  225,  204  Iowa  1394— Hanson 

v.  S.  &  L.  Drug  Con  212  N.W.  731, 

203  Iowa  384. 
KJ.— In  re  Schlemm's  Estate,  22  A. 

2d  364,  130  N.J.Ea.  295. 
N.T.— Franz  v.  Nigri,  249  N.T.S.  218, 

232  App.Div.  150. 
Tenn. — Page  v.  Turcott,  167  S.W.2d 

350,  179  Tenn.  491. 

Tex.— Gulf  ,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Can- 
ty,  285   S.W.   2?6,   115   Tex.   537— 

Cohen   v.    City   of   Houston,    Civ. 

App.,  185  S.W.2d  450. 
34  C.J.  p  95  note  22. 

Judge's  notes  cannot  be  used  to 
impeach,  journal  entry  of  judgment 
—Sparks  v.  Nech,  26  P.2d  586,  198 
Kan.  343. 
68.    Puerto  Rico.— Col6n  v.  Registrar 

of  CJaguas,  27  Puerto  Rico  519. 

267 


VL — Cootey  v.  Remington,  189  A*  151, 

108  Vt  441. 
34  C.J.  p  95  note  23. 
Collateral  attack: 

On  records  of  courts  generally  see 
Courts  §  237. 

Or  judgment  see  infra  §§  401-435. 

67.  Ala, — Simmons    v.    Shelton,    21 
So.    309,   112  Ala,   284,   57  Am.S.H. 
39. 

34  C.J.  p  9*6  note  25. 

68.  Vt-^Spencer  v.  Dearth,   4<3   Vt. 
98,  105. 

34  C.J.  p  96  note  26. 

69.  Ky.— Sublett  T.  Gardner,  137  B. 
W.  864,  144  Ky.  190. 

34  C.J.  p  96  note  27. 

"The  mere  clerical  act  of  enter- 
ing the  judgment  upon  the  minutes 
gives  it  no  additional  immunity  from 
an  attack  made  in  the  proper  man- 
ner and  at  the  proper  time." — Han- 
non  v.  Henson,  Tex.Civ.A'pp.,  7  S. 
W.*2d  613,  619,  affirmed,  Com.App.,  15 
S.W.2d  579. 

70.  Me. — Ames  T.  Young,  75  A.  66, 
105  Me.  543. 

Pa.— Adams  v.  Beta,  1  Watts  425,  28 
AmJ>.  79. 

71.  Pa,— Adams  v.  Betz,  supra. 

72.  Pa.— Adams  v.  Betz,  supra, 
34  C.J.  p  96  note  30. 

73.  Mo. — Halstead  v.  Mustion,  08  8. 
W.  25*8,  166  Mo.  48«. 

34  CJ.  ip  96  note  31. 
Conflict  in  record  generally  see  in- 
fra }  448. 


§  133 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


and  that  extraneous  evidence  is  admissible  to  point 
out  and  correct  a  clerical  mistake  in  the  record74 

§  133.    Record  as  Notice 

As  a  general  rule  the  record  of  a  Judgment  prop- 
erly entered  and  docketed  is  notice  of  that  which  it 
contains  or  recites,  as  well  as  of  facts  fairly  inferable 
from  its  recitals. 

Although  there  is  authority  to  the  contrary,75  the 
general  rule  is  that  the  record  of  a  judgment  prop- 


erly entered  and  docketed  is  notice  of  that  which 
it  contains  or  recites,76  as  well  as  of  such  facts  as 
may  be  fairly  inferred  from  its  recitals,77  to  the 
parties,7*  their  privies,79  and  to  third  persons.80 
The  notice  is  prospective  and  not  retrospective.81 
Unless  there  is  compliance  with  the  statutory  re- 
quirements as  to  the  record  or  docketing,  it  will  be 
ineffectual  as  notice,82  but  substantial  compliance 
is  sufficient,  and  mere  irregularities  do  not  affect  its 
operation  as  notice.85 


VI  JUDGMENT  BY  CONFESSION 
A.  IN  GENERAL 


§  134.    Definition,  Nature,  and  Distinctions 

Judgment  by  confession  Is  a  method  of  securing 
the  entry  of  Judgment  on  the  debtor's  or  obligor's  con- 
fession and  acknowledgment  of  his  liability,  without  the 
formalities  of  an  ordinary  proceeding. 

The  phrase  "judgment  by  confession"  or  "con- 
fession of  judgment"  has  a  popular  as  well  as  a 
technical  signification.84  As  popularly  understood, 
it  signifies  an  acknowledgment  of  indebtedness,  on 
which  it  is  contemplated  that  a  judgment  may  and 
will  be  rendered;85  the  entry  of  a  judgment  on  the 


admission  or  confession  of  a  debtor  or  obligor  with- 
out the  formality,  time,  or  expense  involved  in  an 
ordinary  proceeding.8^  It  is  riot  a  plea,87  but  is  an 
affirmative  act,  consented  to  by  defendant  in  per- 
son, or  by  his  attorney,  with  the  leave  of  the 
'court,88  and  is  essentially  a  voluntary  act;8$  it  is 
a  voluntary  submission  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court,  giving  by  consent  and  without  the  service  of 
process  what  could  otherwise  be  obtained  by  sum- 
mons and  complaint,  and  other  formal  proceed- 
ings,90 and  hence  an  admission  in  answer  in  inter- 


74.  Tex.— Groom  v.  Winston,   43  S. 
W.   1072,   IS  Tex.Civ.App.   1. 

34  C.J.  p  96  note  32. 
Amending  clerical  errors  see  infra  § 
237. 

75.  Wis.— R.  F.  Gehrke  Sheet  Metal 
Works  v.  Mahl,  297  N.W.  373,  237 
Wis.   414— Bartz  v.   Paff,    69   N.W. 

297,  95  Wis.  95,   37  L..R.A.,  848. 

76.  111.— Mitchell  v.  Mitchell,  159  N. 
R  274,  328  111.  136. 

34  C.J.  p  96  note  S3. 

77.  Ind. — Johnson  v.  Hess,   25  N.E. 
44'5,  126  Ind.  298,  9  L.R.A.  471. 

Mo.— Inter-River  Drainage  Dist.  of 
Missouri  v.  Henson,  App.,  99  S.W. 
2d  865. 

Pa. — corpus  Juris  quoted  in  (First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Walker,  145  A.  804, 
806,  296  Pa.  192— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  liambert  v.  K-Y  Transp. 
•Co.,  172  A.  180,  182,  113  Pa.Super. 
82. 

78.  111.— Mitchell  y.  Mitchell,  159  N. 
B.  274,  328  111.  136. 

34  C.J.  «p  96  note  35. 

79.  Idaho. — Smith  v.  Kessler,  127  P. 
172,  22  Idaho  589. 

80.  CaL — McGee  v.  Hoffman,  189  P. 

298,  46  Cal.App.  508. 

Va .—Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Manoni, 
76  Va.  802. 

81.  N.T. — Ackerman,   v.    Hunsicker, 
85  N.T.  43,  39  Am.R.  621. 

34  C.J.-p  96  note  38. 

82.  Tex. — Myers   v.  Crenshaw,   Civ. 


App.,  116  S.W.2d  1125,  affirmed  137 

•S.W.2d  7,  134  Tex.  500. 
34  C.J.  p  96  note  39. 

K.    S.D.— Muller  v.  Flavin,  S3  N.W. 

•687,  13  S.D.  595. 
34  C.J.  p  96  note  40. 
34.    Mich. — Kinyon    v.     Fowler,     10 

Mich.  16. 
Amendment,    opening,    and   vacating 

confessed  Judgments  see  infra  §§ 

320-327. 

i.    Va. — Bank  of  Chatham  v.  Aren- 

dall,  16  S.B.2d  352,  178  Va.  183. 
•34  C.J.  p  97  note  43. 
Confession  distinguished  from  Judg- 
ment 

The  expression  "confession  of 
Judgment"  as  used  in  the  statute  has 
reference  to  the  act  of  defendant 
whereby  he  admits  or  confesses  the 
right  of  plaintiff  to  take  Judgment 
against  him,  and  not  to  the  entering 
up,  or  rendition  of,  the  Judgment  it- 
self which  is  rendered  on  defendant's 
confession. — Thomas  v.  Bloodworth, 
160  S.EL  709,  44  Ga.App.  44. 

86.  -  Iowa. — Cuykendall   v.   ODoe,    105 
N.W.  $98,  129  Iowa  453,  113  AmS. 
B.  472,  3  L.R.A..N.S.,  449. 

12  C.J.  p  413  note  38. 

Confession  of  Judgment  distin- 
guished from  assignment  for  ben- 
efit of  creditors  see  Assignments 
For  Benefit  of  Creditors  §  4. 

87.  Que. — Fearing  Whiton  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Melzer,  15  Que.Pr.  414. 

88.  Md. — Montgomery  v.  Murphy,  19 
Md.  576,  81  Am.D.  6*52. 


Consent    or   ratification   of'  creditor 
see  infra  §  148.      ' 

>.     Miss.— Grand  Lodge  Colored  K. 
P.  v.  Barlow,  67  So.  152,  108  Miss. 
663. 
34  C.J.  p  97  note  47. 

90.    Kan. — Brooks  v.  National  Bank 

of  Topeka,  113  P.2d  1069,  153  Kan. 

831. 
34  C.J.  p  97  note  43. 

"A  confessed  Judgment  is  predi- 
cated upon  the  assent  of  the  parties. 
It  is  created  by  private  agreement 
without  the  intervention  of  the  nor- 
mal processes  of  litigation." — Amer- 
ican Cities  Co.  v.  Stevenson,  60  N. 
Y.S.2d  685,  688. 
Judgment  based  on  testimony 

A  Judgment  disclosing  on  its  face 
that  it  is  based  on  oral  testimony  of 
witnesses  sworn  and  examined  in 
open  court  is  not  a  Judgment  by  con- 
fession, despite  defendant's  acknowl- 
edgment of  service  and  offer  to  con- 
fess in  a  stated  sum  indorsed  on  the 
summons. — Smith  Perry  Electric  Co. 
v.  Beavers,  269  P.  320,  132  Okl.  44. 
Method  of  being  sued 

The  confession  of  a  Judgment  is 
but  one  of  the  ways  and  processes  by 
which  a  person  may  be  sued. — Com- 
monwealth ex  rel.  Bradford  County 
v.  Lynch,  23  A.2d  77,  146  Pa.Su'per. 
469— O'Hara  v.  Manley,  12  A.2d  820, 
140  Pa.Super.  39— Aid  -Soc.  of  Congre- 
gation of  Shomo  Habrith  v.  Fogel- 
man,  Pa.Com.PL,  35  Berks  Co.L.J. 
178. 


268 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  136 


rogatories  is  not  a  confession  of  judgment  since 
such  an  admission  is  not  a  voluntary  act.91  A 
judgment  for  want  of  a  sufficient  affidavit  of  de- 
fense is  not  a  judgment  by  confession.92 

Judgment  by  consent  distinguished.  A  judgment 
"by  consent  is  distinguished  from  a  judgment  by 
confession,  in  that  its  special  characteristic  is  the 
settlement  between  the  parties  of  the  terms,  amount, 
or  conditions  of  the  judgment  to  be  rendered  ;93  the 
first  presupposes  an  agreement  of  the  parties  as  a 
basis  for  it,  and  the  latter  an  act  of  defendant 
alone.94  They  also  differ  in  that  the  court  exer- 
cises a  certain  amount  of  supervision  over  the  en- 
try of  judgments  by  confession,  and  equitable  ju- 
risdiction over  their  subsequent  status.95 

Judgment  by  default  distinguished.  The  terms 
"judgment  by  default"  and  "judgment  by  confes- 
sion" are  not  synonymous.96  A  judgment  by  con- 
fession is  one  in  which  defendant  confesses  his  lia- 
bility, whereas  a  judgment  by  default  is  one  which 
results  from  the  fact  that  defendant  either  has  no 
defense  to  make,  or  does  not  appear  to  make  it.97 
In  effect,  however,  a  judgment  by  default  is  equiv- 
alent to  a  judgment  on  confession,98  and  plaintiff 
may  waive  a  judgment  by  default  and  substitute  a 
judgment  by  confession.99 

§  135.    Classes 

Judgments  by  confession  are  valid  at  common  law. 

Judgments  by  confession  are  recognized  at  com- 
mon law,1  and  such  judgments  have  been  held  to 
be  constitutional.2 

Confession  of  judgment  after  action  is  brought 
and  confession  without  action  are  discussed  in  the 
sections  immediately  following. 


§  136.    Confession  after  Action  Brought 

a.  In  general 

b.  By  cognovit  actionem 

c.  By  confession  relicta  verificatione 

a.  In  General 

Judgments  by  confession  after  action  brought  fall 
into  two  classes,  Judgments  by  cognovit  actionem  and 
Judgments  by  confession  relicta  verificatione. 

Judgments  by  confession  after  action  brought  are 
divided  into  two  classes,  the  one  a  judgment  by 
cognovit  actionem  and  the  other  a  judgment  by 
confession 'relicta  verificatione.3  In  either  of  these 
cases  the  judgment  must  be  tested  by  rules  and  prin- 
ciples known  to  the  common  law,  and  is  not  gov- 
erned by  the  statutes  authorizing  the  confession  of 
judgments  without  action,  so  that  if  good  at  com- 
mon law  it  is  not  impeachable  for  the  lack  of  an 
affidavit,  statement  of  the  origin  of  the  indebtedness, 
or  other  supports  required  by  those  statutes.4 

b.  By  Cognovit  Actionem 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Requisites  and  sufficiency  of  cogno- 
vit 

(1)  In  General 

At  common  law  and  under  statutes  declaratory  of 
the  common  law,  a  Judgment  by  cognovit  actionem  is  a 
Judgment  entered  on  the  defendant's  acknowledgment 
and  confession  of  the  Justness  of  plaintiff's  cause  of  ac- 
tion, such  confession  being  made  after  service  of  process 
and  before  entry  of  a  plea. 

At  common  law,  and  under  statutes  declaratory 
of  the  common  law,  in  the  case  of  a  judgment  by 
cognovit  actionem,  defendant  after  sen-ice  of  proc- 
ess, instead  of  entering  a  plea,  acknowledges  and 
confesses  that  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  is  just  and 


91.  La.— Hanna  v.  His  Creditors,  12 
•      Mart.  32. 

92.  Pa.— Abeles  v.  Powell,  *  Pa.Su- 
per.  123. 

93.  Ark. — Houpt    v.    Bohl,    75    S.W. 
470,  71  Ark.  330. 

•34  C.J.  p  97  note  54. 

Judgment  by  consent  generally  see 

infra  §5  173-188. 

A  stipulation  for  the  entry  of  Judg- 
ment was  not  a  "confession  of  Judg- 
ment."—Ray  v.  Ridpath,  291  P.  546, 
145  Okl.  69. 
Judgment  held  not  invalid 

In  suit  to  cancel  Judgment  pro- 
cured by  Small  Loan  Act  licensee  for 
violation  of  provision  prohibiting  li- 
censee from  taking  any  confession  of 
judgment,  recital  in  Judgment  that 
it  was  rendered  on  borrower's  con- 
sent and  motion  did  not  show  that 
Judgment  was  based  on  confession  of 
judgment— Nolan  v.  Southland  Ix>an 


&  Investment  Co.,  169  S.B.  3f70,  177 
Oa.  59. 

94.  N.C.— Oorpns     Juris     cited     in 
Farmers'  Bank  of  -Clayton  v.  Mc- 
Oullers,  160  S.E.  494,  496,  201  N.C. 
440. 

34  C.J.  p  97  note  55. 

95.  3ST.C.— Farmers'  Bank  of  Clayton 
v.  McCullers,  160  S.E.  494,  201  N. 
C.  440. 

96L  Ky.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Board  of  Supervisors,  CJity  of  Som- 
erset, v.  Pinnell,  166  -S.W.2d  882, 
S83,  292  Ky.  364. 

Pa.— Crider  v.  Cassell,  Com.PL,  59 
York  Leg.Rec.  182. 

Tenn. — Marshall  v.  Johnson  Hard- 
ware Co.,  5  Tenn.App.  '369. 

34  C.J.  p  97  note  56. 

97.    Mo.— Wade   v.    Swope,    81   S.W. 

471,  107  Mo.App.  375. 
34  C.J.  p  97  note  56. 

269 


Judgments  by  default  generally  see 
infra  §5  187-218. 

98.  'N.Y.— Kieley   v.    Reinhardt,    108 

N-.Y.S.  1012. 

34  C.J.  p  130  note  79. 

99.  Md.— Clammer  v.   State,   9   Gill 
279. 

1.  IlL— Lock  v.  Leslie,   248  IlLApp. 
.     438. 

2.  U.S. — Bower  v.  Casanave.  DJC.N. 
T..  44  P.Supp.  501. 

3.  Qa. — Information   Buying  Co.  v. 
MUler,    161   S..B.   617,    173    Ga.   786 
—Thomas  v.  Bloodworth,   1-60   S.EL 
709,  44  Ga.App.  44. 

34  C.J.  p  97  note  59. 

4.  La. — Goodwill  v.   Elkens,.  25   So. 
317,  51  La.Ann.  521. 

34  C.J.  p  97  note  60. 


§  136 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


rightful;5  and  such  a  judgment  may  be  entered  by 
cognovit  under  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess 
judgment,6  the  warrant  in  such  case  being  the 
means  by  which  the  power  to  confess  judgment  is 
given  the  attorney,  and  the  cognovit  the  instrument 
by  which  the  confession  is  made.7  In  modern  code 
practice,  the  only  method  of  obtaining  a  judgment 
by  confession  is  the  one  authorized  by  statute,8 
and  a  judgment  by  cognovit  entered  solely  by  au- 
thority of  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judg- 
ment has  been  held  to  be  void.5  As  discussed  in  the 
CJ.S.  title  Pleading  §  433,  also  49  CJ.  p  676  notes 
84-90,  an  answer  admitting  or  confessing  the  cause 
of  action  pleaded  in  the  complaint  is  authorized, 
and  will  support  a  judgment  on  the  pleadings ;  but 
such  judgment  on  the  pleadings  is  not  a  "judgment 
by  confession,"  except  in  a  loose  sense  of  the 
term.10  A  cognovit  may  be  good  as  an  admission  in 
pais.11  Under  some  statutes  a  cognovit  provision 
incorporated  in  a  bond,  note,  or  other  instrument 
evidencing  the  debt  or  obligation  is  valid  and  en- 
forceable.12 


Conditional  cognovit.  Entry  of  a  valid  judgment 
may  be  made  dependent  on  the  compliance  with  cer- 
tain conditions  mentioned  in  the  cognovit,18  such  as 
that  judgment  shall  not  be  entered  until  a  later 
term,14  although  it  has  been  held  that  in  such  a  case 
judgment  may  be  entered  at  the  present  term  with 
a  stay  of  execution  until  the  prescribed  time  has 
elapsed," 

(2)  Requisites  and  Sufficiency  of  Cognovit 

The  cognovit  must  sufficiently  show  confession  of 
the  Justice  of  the  claim  and  consent  to  the  entry  of 
Judgment,  must  be  certain  as  to  the  amount,  and  must 
be  properly  signed. 

The  cognovit  must  contain  sufficient  to  show  a 
confession  of  the  justice  of  plaintiffs  claim  and  that 
defendant,  either  expressly  or  impliedly,  consents 
to  the  entry  of  judgment  thereof,16  must  be  cer- 
tain and  specific  as  to  the  amount  confessed,17  and 
must  be  signed  by,  or  in  the  name  of,  the  attorney.18 
A  judgment  by  confession  is  not  affected  by  the 
fact  that  the  cognovit  was  prepared  before  the 


5.  Ga. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In- 
formation Buying  Co.  v.  Miller, 
161  S.B.  617,  819,  173  Ga.  786— 
Thomas  v.  Bloodworth,  160  SJBL 
709,  44  Ga.A'pp.  44. 

N.J. — Fortune  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
v.  Codomo,  7  A.2d  880,  122  N.J. 
Law  565. 

Pa.— Commonwealth  v.  Central  R. 
Co.  of  N.  X,  Com.PL,  57  Dauph.Co. 
255. 

Wis.— Park  Hotel  Co.  v.  Eckstein- 
Miller  Auto  Co.,  193  N.W.  998,  181 
Wis.  72. 

34  C.J.  p  97  note  51,  p  98  note  62— 
11  CJ.J.  p  949  notes  62,  63. 

"Warr  and  cognovit" 

(1)  The  "nan-  and  cognovit  law" 
authorizes  judgment  on  notes  by  at- 
torney's    confession     that     amount 
thereof,   together  with   interest  and 
costs,     constitutes     legal    and    just 
claim;    "narr"  is  an  abbreviation  of 
the    Latin    word,    "narratio,"   which 
means  the  complaint  or  petition,  and 
"cognovit"    is    also    Latin,   meaning 
that   defendant  has  confessed  judg- 

-ment  and  the  justice  of  the  claim.— 
Dyer  v.  Johnson,  Tex.Civ.App.,  19  -S. 
W.2d  421,  stating  Illinois  law,  error 
dismissed. 

(2)  The    only    difference    between 
"Judgment  on  narr  and  cognovit"  and 
one  in  suit  brought  by  summons  is 
that  in  former,  summons  is  unneces- 
sary because  maker  of  note  authoriz- 
es appearance  and  waives  summons. 
— Schwartz    v.    Schwartz,    8    N.R'2d 
6ff8,  36-6  HL  247,  112  A.L.R.  325. 

A  "statement  of  confession,"  or 
"cognovit,"  oftentimes  referred  to  as 
«.  "power  of  attorney,"  or  simply  as  a 
".power,"  is  the  written  authority  of 
the  debtor  and  his  Direction  to  the 


clerk  of  the  district  court,  or  Jus- 
tice of  the  peace,  to  enter  judgment 
against  debtor  as  stated  therein. — 
Blott  v.  Blott,  290  N.W.  74,  227  Iowa 
1103. 

a    HL— Sukowitz  v.  Hinko,  40  N.E. 

2d  345,  314  Ill.App.  195. 
N.C. — Bonnett-Brown  Corporation  v. 

Coble,  142  S.E.  772,  195  N.C.  491. 
34  C.J.  p  98?note  63. 
Warrant    or   power,  of  attorney    to 

confess  judgment  see  Infra  §§152- 

1«7. 
Distinction  stated 

"We  think  it  clear  that  in  this 
state  the  distinction  between  a  judg- 
ment on  cognovit  actionem  and  what 
is  colloquially  called  a  'confessed 
judgment'  is  that  in  the  former  case 
an  action  has  been  begun  in  invitum 
by  the  issue  of  process  at  the  very 
least  .  .  .  and  in  the  latter 
case,  L  e.,  'confession  of  judgment/ 
and  subject  to  the  statute  in  that 
regard,  judgment  is  entered  on  bond 
and  warrant  without  process."— 
Fortune  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v. 
Codomo,  7  A.2d  880,  881,  122  N.JjL. 
565. 

Amicable  actions  may  be  entered 
in  ejectment  and  judgment  entered 
thereon  under  power  of  attorney  on 
defendant's  confession. — Equipment 
Corporation  of  America  v.  Primos 
Vanadium  Co.,  182  A.  360,  285  Pa. 
432. 

7.  I1L— Campbell  v.  Goddard,  7  N.-B. 
640,  117  111.  251. 

34  C.J.  p  98  note  70. 

8.  Utah.— Utah  Nat  Bank  v.  Sears, 
44  P.  332,  18  Utah  172. 

Wis. — Park  Hotel  Co.  v.   Eckstein- 

270 


Miller  Auto  Co.,  193  N.W.  995,  T81 
Wis.  72. 

9.  Utah.— Utah  Nat  Bank  v.  Sears, 
44  -P.  *S2,  13  Utah  172. 

10.  Mo.— Aull  v.  Day,  34  S.W.  578, 
13-3    Mo.    337— Adler  v.    Anderson, 
42  Mo.App.  189. 

11.  Cal.— Hirschfleld  v.   Franklin,  '6 
Cal.  607. 

12.  Mo.— State     ex    rel.     Bobb     v. 
Shain,  149  S.W.M  812,  347  Mo.  92*8. 

Bffect 

The  cognovit  feature  inserted  in 
note  is  not  a  condition  affecting 
payment;  it  merely  applies  to  the 
means  of  collection. — Union  Proper- 
ties v.  McHenry,  App.,  44  N.H,2d  744, 
affirmed  50  N.E.2d  315,  142  Ohio  St. 
186. 

13.  S.«C.— Keep  v.  Leckie,  42  SXXL. 
164. 

34  C.J.  «p  98  notes  73,  74. 

14.  N.T.— Hecox  v.  Ellis,  19  Wend. 
.   157. 

34  C.  J.  p  9'8  note  75. 

15.  Iowa. — McClish   v.    Manning,    8 
Greene  223. 

16.  Ill— Keith   r.    Kellogg,    97    111. 
147. 

34  C.J.  p  98  note  78. 
Requisites  and  sufficiency  of  confes- 
sion generally  see  infra  §§  146-151. 

17.  (N.Y.— Nichols  v.  Hewit,  4  Johns. 
423. 

34  C.J.  p  98  note  79. 

18.  111.— Hall  v.  Jones,  *32  111.   38. 
Pa.— Philadelphia  v.  Toll,  2  Wkly.N. 

C.  226. 
34  C.J.  p  98  note  80. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  138 


cause  of  action  accrued,  where  the  judgment  is  not 
entered  until  after  accrual.1^ 

The  caption  of  a  cognovit  is  not  an  essential  part, 
and  if  defective  may  be  treated  as  surplusage,20 

c.  By  Confession  Eelicta  Verificatione 

A  confession  rellcta  veriflcatlone  occurs  where  a  de- 
fendant withdraws  or  abandons  a  plea  which  has  al- 
ready been  made  In  the  action,  and  confesses  the  just- 
ness of  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action. 

In  the  case  of  a  confession  relicta  verificatione, 
defendant,  after  pleading  and  before  trial,  both  con- 
fesses plaintiffs  cause  of  action  and  withdraws  or 
abandons  his  plea  or  other  allegation,  whereupon 
judgment  is  entered  against  him  without  proceed- 
ing to  trial.21  Where  such  a  confession  is  properly 
made,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  render  judg- 
ment on  it.22  Where  the  parties  appear  and  de- 
fendant withdraws  his  plea,  and  plaintiff  proves 
his  cause  of  action  and  a  judgment  is  thereupon 
rendered  in  his  favor,  it  is  a  judgment  on  proof 
of  the  cause  of  action  made  to  the  court  and  not  a 
judgment  on  confession.23 

Retraction  of  confession.  Where  such  confes- 
sion is  made  by  defendant  through  a  mistake  of 
fact  as  to  the  contents  of  the  pleadings  he  may,  on 
discovery  of  his  error,  retract  his  confession  at  any 
time  before  it  has  been  recorded.24 

§  137.    Confession  without  Action 

Under  appropriate  statutory  provisions,  a  Judgment 
by  confession  may  be  entered  without  any  action  or 
suit  having  been  instituted  against  the  confessor;  but 
such  practice  Is  unknown  at  common  law. 

Under  some  statutes  provision  is  made  for  the 
entry  of  a  judgment  by  confession  without  the  in- 
stitution of  an  action  or  suit  against  the  one  so 
confessing.25  These  statutes  have  no  application  to 


judgments  by  confession  made  after  action  has  been 
brought  and  process  has  been  regularly  served.26 
In  the  absence  of  such  a  statute,  a  confession  of 
judgment  cannot  be  entered  before  the  commence- 
ment of  an  action,27  confession  of  judgment  with- 
out an  action  being  unknown  at  common  law.2* 

§  138.    Debts  or  Claims  for  Which  Judgment 
.  May  Be  Confessed 

In  order  to  be  valid,  a  confession  of  Judgment  must 
be  for  a  debt  which  is  Justly  due  or  to  become  due. 

A  judgment  by  confession  cannot  be  entered  in 
any  case  where  a  statute  prescribes  a  different  and 
exclusive  form  of  proceeding  ;2&  and,  where  a  stat- 
ute prescribes  the  debts  or  claims  on  which  a  judg- 
ment by  confession  may  be  entered,  in  order  to  be 
valid  the  judgment  must  be  based  on  an  obligation 
falling  within  the  purview  of  the  statute.30  The 
confession  must  be  for  a  debt  which  is  justly  due 
or  to  become  due;81  but  although  the  debt  should 
be  a  legal  one,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  demand 
must  be  one  against  which  the  debtor  could  set  up 
no  defenses  in  an  action  at  law  brought  to  recover 
such  demand.82  Thus  it  is  no  objection  to  a  con- 
fessed judgment  that  the  claim  for  which  it  is  given 
is  barred  by  the  debtor's  discharge  in  bankruptcy,83 
and  even  though  a  part  of  the  claim  on  which  the 
judgment  is  confessed  is  founded  only  on  a  moral 
obligation,  such  as  an  oral  assumption  of  indebted- 
ness, which  under  the  statute  of  frauds  would  not 
be  enforceable  at  law,  the  judgment  is  nevertheless 
good.84 

Claim  barred  by  limitation.  If  the  claim  is  an 
honest  one,  it  is  no  objection  to  a  confessed  judg- 
ment that  the  claim  for  which  it  is  given  would  be 
barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations,35  since,  as  dis- 
cussed in  the  C.J.S.  title  Limitations  of  Actions  § 


19.  HL— Blake    v.     Freeport    State 
Bank,  52  N.E.  957,  178  I1L  182. 

34  C.J.  p  99  note  81. 

20.  111.— Oassen    v.    Brown,    74    BL 
App.    346— Browne  v.  Cassem,   74 
IlLApp.  305. 

ala    Ga. — information  Buying  Co.  v. 

Miller,    161  -S.-E.  W  173   Ga.  786 

—Thomas  r.  Bloodworth,  160  S.E. 

709,  44  Ga.App.  44. 
34  C.J.  p  99  note  «3. 
22.    Okl. — Towery   v.    Buck,   IS  6   P. 

693,  81  Okl.  -38. 


3.    W.Va.- 
Va.  2T6. 


-Holliday  v.  Myers,  11  W. 


24.  Ga. — Smith  v.  Simms,  9  Ga.  418. 

25.  pa.— Shure  y.  Goodinate  Co.,  14 
Pa.Dist.   &  Co.  209,  79  PittsbJLeg. 
J.  16,  affirmed  Shure  v.  Goodimate 
Co.,  15-3  A.  757,  302  Pa,  457. 


Tex. — Johnson  v.  Cole,  Civ.App.,  IS  8 
S,W.2d  910,  error  refused. 

26.  111.— Little  v.  Dyer,  27  N.B.  905, 
1138  111.  272,  82  Am.S.R»  140. 

34  C.J.  p  99  note  89. 

27.  Ga.— Whitley        v.        Southern 
Wholesale    Corporation,    (1.64    S.K 
9013,  <45   Ga.App.    445 — Information 
Buying  Co.  v.  Miller,  161  S.B.  617, 
17«  Ga.  786. 

Pa.— Commonwealth  v.  Central  R.  Co. 
of  N.  J.,  Com.PL,  57  Dauph.Co. 
255. 

28.  Ga.— Information  Buying  Co.  v. 
Miller,  161  S.E.  617,  173  Ga.  786. 

29.  m.— Wilier  v.    French,    VI   HL 
App.  76,  affirmed  0.8  N.E.  811,  12« 
HI.    611,   9   Am.S.B.   651,  2   L.TkA» 
717. 

34  C.J.  P  99  note  91. 

i.— Park  Hotel   Co.   v.   Eck- 

271 


stein-Miller    Auto    Co.,    193    NVW. 
998,  18.1  Wis.  72. 

31.  OkL— Western  Paint  &  Chemical 
Co.  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Garfield 
County,  18  -P.2d  888,  161  OkL  800. 

34  C.J.  p  99  note  0*2. 
Under  warrant  or  power  of  .attorney 
see  infra  S§  152-157. 

32.  La. — Kiernan  v.  Jackson,  35  So. 
798,  111  La.  645. 

34  C.J.  p  99  note  93. 

83.    N.Y.— Dewey  v.  Moyer,  72  tf.Y. 

70,  affirmed  1018  U.S.  (301,  26  KEd. 

894. 

34.  Pa.— Keen  v.   Kleckner,   42  Pa. 
529. 

35.  U.S.— Wright    v.    Wrigfht,    CC. 
Pa.,  CLOiS  P.  580. 

84  aX  P  99  note  96. 
Exercise  of  power  of  attorney  after 
claim  la  barred  see  infra  S 


139 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


24,  also  37  C.J.  p  721  note  15-p  722  note  38,  de- 
fendant is  not  obliged  to  interpose  the  statute,  but 
l\as  the  right  to  waive  such  defense, 

§  139.    Debts  Not  Matured 

Whether  Judgment  may  be  confessed  for  a  debt  not 
yet  matured  depends  on  the  language  of  the  statute  or 
constitutional  provision  under  which  such  Judgment  Is 
sought* 

Where  a  statute  provides  that  a  confession  of 
judgment  may  be  for  a  debt  due  or  to  become  due, 
judgment  may  be  confessed  on  a  debt  or  obligation 
which  is  existing  but  is  not  yet  payable  or  not  yet 
matured.86  Where,  however,  the  statutes  provide 
that  a  judgment  may  be  confessed  for  a  debt  justly 
due  and  owing,  the  debt  must  be  one  which  is  actu- 
ally existing  and  due  at  the  time  the  confession  of 
judgment  is  made.37  The  same  is  true  where  a  con- 
stitutional provision  prohibits  the  confession  of 
judgment  by  any  document  under  private  signature 
executed  before  the  maturity  of  the  obligation  sued 
on.38 


§  140. 


Contingent  Liabilities 


Judgment  may  be  confessed  to  secure  against  eon. 
tingent  liabilities  only  In  Jurisdictions  In  which  Judg- 
ment may  be  confessed  for  debts  not  yet  matured. 

Where  judgment  may  be  confessed  for  debts  due 
or  to  become  due,  as  discussed  supra  §  139,  a  judg- 
ment may  be  confessed  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
plaintiff  against  a  future  contingent  liability;^  and 
some  statutes  have  made  express  provision  for  such 
judgments.40  Where,  however,  a  confession  can  be 
only  for  an  existing  debt,  judgment  cannot  be  con- 
fessed to  secure  against  contingent  liabilities.41 

§  141.    Future  Advances 

A  Judgment  by  confession  to  secure,  future  advances 
is  valid  In  Jurisdictions  In  which  Judgment  may  be  con- 
fessed for  an  obligation  not  yet  due. 


In  those  jurisdictions  where  judgment  may  be 
confessed  for  an  obligation  not  yet  due,  discussed 
supra  §  139,  a  judgment  by  confession  may  be  made 
to  secure  future  advances  and  liabilities  agreed  to 
be  made  to  the  debtor  to  the  extent  of  the  amount 
or  the  judgment,42  where  this  arrangement  forms  a 
part  of  the  original  agreement  between  the  par- 
ties.48 Such  a  judgment  cannot,  as  against  third 
persons,  cover  new  and  distinct  engagements  subse- 
quently entered  into  by  the  parties,  and  not  includ- 
ed within  the  original  agreement  ;44  and  it  has  been 
held  that  it  will  not  cover  advances  made  or  re- 
sponsibilities incurred,  after  a 'subsequent  judgment 
has  intervened.45  Where  the  creditor  gives  out  a 
statement  of  the  amount  then  due,  to  enable  the 
debtor  to  borrow  from  another,  he  is  estopped  to 
claim  beyond  that  amount46 


§  142. 


For  Tort 


At  common  law  a  Judgment  on  a  tort  claim  may  be 
entered  by  cognovit  after  action  brought;  it  cannot  be 
entered  without  action  under  statute,  unless  expressly 
permitted  by  the  statute. 

A  judgment  by  confession  for  a  daim  arising  out 
of  a  tort,  at  common  law,  could  be  entered  by  cog- 
novit after  action  was  commenced,47  but  could  not 
be  entered  on  a  bond  and  warrant  of  attorney,  with- 
out process.48  Unless  included  in  the  provisions  of 
the  statute,  it  cannot  be  entered  under  a  statute 
which  provides  for  confessions  of  judgment  with- 
out action.49 

§  143.    Who  May  Confess  Judgment 

A  confession  of  Judgment  may  be  made  only  by  the 
defendant  himself  or  some  person  duly  authorized  to 
act  for  him  In  that  behalf. 

A  confession  of  judgment  may  be  made  only  by 
defendant  himself,50  or  by  some  person  duly  au- 


3ft,  Wis.— Port  Huron  Engine  & 
Thresher  Co.  v.  Clements,  39  N.W. 
160,  118  Wis.  249. 

34  C.J.  p  99  note  1. 

Time  for  exercising  warrant  or  pow- 
er of  attorney  see  infra  I  154  e. 

37.  N.J.— Modern    Security    Co.    of 
Philadelphia    v.    Fleming,    142   A. 
649,  6  N.J.Misc.  7130. 

34  C.J.  p  100  note  13. 

38.  La.— Phillips  v.  Bryan,  1&4   So. 
88,  172  La.  2*69— Taylor  v.  Shreve- 
port  Fertilizer  Works,  App.,  197  So. 
164. 

39.  (Pa. — Commonwealth      ex      rel. 
Bradford  County  v.  Lynch,  23  A.2d 
77,  146  Pa.Super.  469. 

34  C.J.  p  100  note  5. 


4fc    W.Y.— Marks    v.    Keynolds,    1* 

Abb.Pr.  402. 
34  C.J.  p  100  note  6. 

41.    N.X— Sterling  v.  Fleming,  24  A. 

1001,  53  N.J.Law  852. 
34  C.J.  p  100  note  7. 

42*  Md.— First .  Mortg.  Bond  Home- 
stead Assoc.  v.  (Mehlhorn,  105  A. 
526,  188  Md.  439,  S  A.L.B.  844. 

94  C.J.  p  100  note  9. 

43.  N.Y.-JTruscott  v.  King,  6  Barb. 
346,  reversed  on  other  grounds  6 
N.Y.  147. 

34  C.J.  p  100  note  10. 

44.  N.Y.— Averill  v.  Loucks,  6  Barb. 
19. 

45.  N.Y.— Br'inkerhott   v.   Martin,    5 
Johns.Cn.  1820. 

272 


46.    Pa,— Ter-Hoven  v.  Kerns,  2  Pa. 

96. 
47*    N.Y. — Burkham.v.  Van  Saun,  14 

Abb.«Pr.,N.S.,  110. 

48.  HL— Wilier  v.    French,    27    HI. 
App.  76,  affirmed  18  N.E.  811,  126 
HI.  -611,   9  Am.S.E.   651,   2   L.R.A. 
717. 

34  C.J.  p  100  note  15. 

Construction  and  operation  of  war- 
rant or  power  generally  see  infra 
§  154. 

49.  N.Y.— Burkham  v.  Van  Saun,  1'4 
Abb.Pr.,N.S.,  163. 

34  C.J.  p  100  note  16. 

50.  Pa.— Melnick    y.    Hamilton,    87 
Pa.Super.  575. 

•34  C.J.  p  100  note  18. 

Any  debtor  has  a  right  to  confess 
judgment  in  favor  of  his  creditor. — 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  146 


thorized  to  act  for  him  in  that  behalf,51  as  by  a 
warrant  or  power  of  attorney,  as  discussed  infra  § 
152  et  seq.  Defendant  will  not  be  bound  by  an 
unauthorized  confession  of  judgment  made  by  an- 
other on  his  behalf,52  unless  he  ratifies  it.53  It  is 
immaterial  to  the  validity  of  the  judgment  that 
defendant  confessing  it  is  an  officer  of  the  court  in 
which  it  is  entered;  a  judgment  against  himself 
may  be  confessed  by  the  clerk54  or  by  the  judge  of 
the  court.55 

The  authority  of  particular  representatives  to 
confess  judgment  for  another  is  treated  in  appropri- 
ate places  in  this  work;  thus  for  a  discussion  of 
confession  of  judgment  by  an  agent  generally  see 
Agency  §  117,  by  an  attorney  see  Attorney  and  Cli- 
ent §  86,  by  a  corporation  see  Corporations  §  1341 
b,  by  an  executor  or  administrator  see  Executors 
and  Administrators  §§  149,  794,  by  a  guardian  see 
Guardian  and  Ward  §  182,  by  a  married  woman  see 
Husband  and  Wife  §§  448,  552,  by  an  officer  or 
agent  of  a  corporation  see  Corporations  §  1067,  and 
by  a  partner  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Partnership  §  165, 
also  47  C  J.  p  880  note  70-p  881  note  95. 

§  144.    Joint  or  Several  Debtors  or  De- 
fendants 

One  of  several  joint  debtors  may  confess,  judgment 
for  himself  alone;  but,  if  he  attempts  without  author- 
Ity  to  confess  for  himself  and  others,  the  confession  of 
Judgment  is  void  as  to  the  others  although  valid  as  to 
him. 

A  judgment  by  confession  against  joint  debtors 


or  joint  defendants  must  be  joined  in  or  authorized 
by  all  of  the  debtors  or  defendants,  and  one  joint 
debtor  or  joint  defendant  cannot  confess  judgment, 
so  as  to  make  it  binding  on  a  codebtor  or  codefend- 
ant  who  does  not  properly  authorize  or  join  in  the 
confession.56  One  joint  debtor  or  joint  defendant, 
however,  may  confess  judgment  for  himself  alone,67 
provided  he  is  not  induced  to  do  so  by  any  improp- 
er motive,  or  by  any  intent  to  injure  or  embarrass 
his  codef endants  ;58  but  his  confessed  judgment  will 
remain  interlocutory  until  the  trial  and  determina- 
tion of  the  issues  as  to  the  other  defendants.59  Al- 
though a  confession  of  judgment  by  one  only,  for 
himself  and  others,  is  void  as  to  the  ones  who  do 
not  join  therein,  and  a  joint  judgment  cannot  be  en- 
tered on  it,60  it  has  been  held  valid  and  enforceable 
as  to  the  one  making  the  confession.61 

Several  liability.  Where  two  or  more  persons  are 
severally  liable  for  the  same. debt,  they  may  make 
several  confessions  of  judgment,62  but,  as  discussed 
infra  §  164,  a  joint  judgment  cannot  be  entered 
against  them  on  their  separate  confessions. 

§  145.    In  Whose  Favor  Confessed 

A  Judgment  may  be  confessed  in  favor  of  any  person 
who  Is  the  iegal  owner  of  the  debt  or  claim  in  question. 

A  judgment  may  be  confessed  in  favor  of  any 
person  who  is  the  legal  owner  of  the  debt  or  claim 
in  question,63  such  as  an  assignee  or  trustee  for 
the  benefit  of  various  creditors;6*  and  may  be  con- 
fessed in  favor  of  the  state  as  creditor  as  well  as 
an  individual.65 


B.  REQUISITES  AITD  VALIDITY  01  CONFESSION  QENEEALLT 


146.    In  General 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise,  any 


admission  of  the  plaintiff's  claim  that  leaves  no  Issue- 
to  be  tried  is  sufficient  to  constitute  a  confession  of 
Judgment.  . 


Knight  v.  Peoples  Nat  Bank  of 
Lynchburg,  29  S.B.2d  364.*  182  Va. 
380. 

51.  Pa, — Melnick    v.    Hamilton,     87 
Pa.Super.    575 — Commonwealth    v. 
Central  R.  Co.  of  N.  J..  Com.PL,  57 
DauphjCo.  255— Yellow  Mfg.  Credit 
Corporation  v.  Rooney,  Cora.PL,  9 
ScluReg.  119. 

«4  C.J.  p  100  note  19. 

52.  Neb.-HCuster  County  v.  Chicago, 
B.   &   Q.   R.   Co.,  «7   N.W.  1341,    62 
Neb.  657. 

54  C.J.  p  101  note  21. 

53.  Puerto   Rico. — Bias  v.  Colon,   8 
Puerto  Rico  76. 

54.  Va.— -Smith  v.  Mayo,  5  S.E,  276, 
S3  Va.  910. 

55.  *  Ga. — Thornton  v.  Lane,  11   Ga. 
45'9. 

56.  Pa,— Koenig  v.  Curran's  Rsstau- 
49O.J.S.— 18 


rant  &  Baking  Co.,  169  A.  553,  306 
Pa.  1345. 
34  C.J.  p  101  note  26. 

57.  pa.— Koenig  Y.  Curran's  Restau- 
rant &  Baking  Co.,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  101  note  27. 

58.  Va.— Virginia  &  T.  Coal  &  Iron 
Co.  v.  Pields,   26  S.B.  426,  94-  Va. 
•102. 

59.  W.Va.-— Hoffman  v.  Bircher,   22 
W.Va,  5«7. 

34  C.J.  p  101  note  29. 

60.  CaL— Chapin   v.    Thompson,    20 
Cal.  -681. 

34  C.J.  p  101  note  $0. 

61.  Pa.— Koenig  v.  Curran's  Restau- 
rant &  Baking  Co.,  159  A.  55)3,  306 
Fa.  #45. 

34  C.J.  p  101  note  31. 

62.  N.Y.— Kirby  v.  Fitzgerald,  81  N. 
•Y,  417. 

34  C.J.  p  101  note  32. 

273 


63«    HI— Shepherd  v.  Wood,   713  111.. 

App.  486. 

Confession  of  judgment  by  husband: 
In  favor  of  wife  see  Husband  and. 
Wife  §  160. 

For  whom  Judgment  may  be  confess- 
ed under  warrant  or  power  of  at-, 
torney  see  Infra  §  154. 
Accommodation,  signers  who  paid 
note  by  giving  payee  a  new  note  and 
took  assignment   of  old   note   could 
not    take    Judgment    by    confession, 
against  one  of  principals,  since  suit 
may  not  be  maintained  on  note  by- 
one  comaker  who  has  paid  note  or- 
to    whom    it    has     been    assigned, 
against    another    comaker. — Gillham-. 
v.  Troeckler,  26  N.B.2d  4113,  1304  HI. 
App.  59*6. 

64,  Pa.— Breading  v.  Boggs,  20  'Pav 
33. 

34  C.J.  p  101  note  36. 

65.  N.C.— State  v.  Love,  23  N.C.  264-., 


§  146 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Unless  required  by  statute,  no  particular  form  is 
necessary  to  a  confession  of  judgment;  any  admis- 
sion of  the  claim  that  leaves  no  issue  to  be  tried  is 
sufficient66  In  order  to  authorize  an  immediate 
judgment  thereon  the  confession  must  be  absolute 
and  unconditional;67  but  it  may  be  made  condition- 
al, and  in  that  case  it  can  be  enforced  only  on  com- 
pliance with  the  conditions  or  in  accordance  there- 
with.68 It  is  no  objection  that  several  different 
debts  to  the  same  creditor  are  included  in  the  one 
confession69  or  that  it  is  given  to  one  person  as 
trustee  for  numerous  small  creditors,  all  the  debts 
being  justly  due.70  It  has  been  held  to  be  essential 
that  defendant  confess,  or  authorize  his  attorney 
to  confess  for  him,  such  judgment  as  plaintiff  would 
be  entitled  to  recover  in  the  event  of  a  successful 
termination  of  similar  adverse  proceedings.71 

Good  faith.  A  confession  of  judgment  must  be 
made  in  good  faith;72  if  it  is  fictitious  and  fraud- 
ulent, and  does  not  affect  the  relation  of  the  par- 
ties, it  cannot  have  the  effect  of  a  confession  of 
judgment78 

§  147.    Compliance  with  Statutory  Provisions 
Generally 

Statutes  providing  for  the  confession  of  Judgments 
otherwise  than  at  common  law  are  to  be  strictly  con- 
strued and  there  must  be  a  strict  compliance  with  such 
statutes. 


The  subject  of  confession  of  judgments  is  now  to 
a  great  extent  regulated  by  statute,  and  where  these 
statutes  provide  for  the  confession  of  judgments 
without  action,  or  make  regulations  otherwise  than 
according  to  the  course  of  the  common  law,  they 
are  to  be  strictly  construed,  and  a  strict  compli- 
ance with  their  provisions  must  be  shown  in  order 
to  sustain  the  judgment,74  but,  where  there  has  been 
strict  compliance  with  the  statute,  nothing  further 
is  necessary  to  support  the  judgment.75  Thus  there 
must  be  a  strict  compliance  with  a  statutory  pro- 
vision that  the  confession  of  judgment  must  be 
signed  by  the  party  making  it  and  by  witnesses76  or 
that  the  debtor  shall  appear  in  person  and  confess 
the  judgment77  Where,  however,  the  statutory 
provision  is  merely  declaratory  of  the  common  law, 
only  a  substantial  compliance  therewith  is  re- 
quired;78 and  where  the  statute  provides  for  a  pro- 
ceeding in  a  court  having  general  common-law  ju- 
risdiction, but  does  not  give  the  details  and  particu- 
lars of  the  proceeding,  these  may  be  pursued  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  of  the  common  law.79  It 
has  also  been  held  that,  where  a  trial  court  has  ju- 
risdiction and  authority  to  give  the  relief  granted, 
and  where  without  the  filing  of  an  answer  the  par- 
ties appear  in  court  and  agree  as  to  what  the  judg- 
ment should  be,  the  judgment  is  not  void  even 
though  there  has  not  been  a  full  compliance  with  all 


68.  Ark.— -Firestone  Tire  &  Rubber 
Co.  v.  Webb,  i!82   S.W.2d  941,   207 
Ark.  &20. 

Pa.— R.  S.  Noonan,  Inc.,  v.  Hott,  188 
.   A.2d  58,  650  Ba.  295. 
34  C.J.  p  101  note  40. 
Nature,    necessity,     requisites,    and 
sufficiency  of  statement  of  indebt- 
edness see  infra  §§  158,  159. 
Confession  need  not  "be  in  writing:, 
where   summons   has   been   properly 
issued  and  served;   Judgment  render- 
ed on  defendant's  oral  statement  to 
go    ahead   and    take   judgment   con- 
stituted   Judgment   by   confession. — 
^ESolian   Co.    of  Missouri   v.    Smith- 
Medcalf    &   Co.,    Mo.App.,    7    S.W.2d 
447. 
67.    Ark. — Shepard  v.  Dudley,  201  S. 

W.  111%  132  Ark.  605. 
La. — State  v.  Judge  Fourth  Dist.  Ct., 

1  McG.  11. 
6a    N.G.— Wood  v.  Bagley,   34  N.C. 

as. 

34  C.J.  p  iai  note  42. 

69.  U.S.— Odell   v.    Reynolds,    Ohio, 
70  F.  656,  17  C.C.A.  «17. 

34. CJ.  p  101  note  4«. 

70.  Pa. — Breading  v.  Boggs,  20  Pa. 
&3. 

7L»  DPa. — Grakelow  v.  Kidder,  95  Pa. 
Super."  250 — Pittsburgh  Terminal 
Coal  Corporation  v.  Potts,  92  Pa. 
.Super.  1,  followed  in  Pittsburgh 


Terminal  Coal  Corporation  T.  Me- 
Clements,  92  Pa. Super.  29,  and 
Hlllman  Gas  Coal  Co.  v.  Bozice- 
vich,  92  (Pa.Super.  39. 

72.  N.J.— - Jones    v.    Naughright,    10 
N.J.EQ.  298. 

73.  Wash.T. — Connoly    v.    Cunning- 
ham, 5  P.  -47)3,  2  Wash.T.  242. 

84  C.J.  p  102  note  4*6. 

74.  Bel. — Farrell  v.  Maryland  Cred- 
it  Finance  Corporation   of  Mary- 
land, Thomas  Hughes,  Inc.,  127  A. 
879,  2  W.W.Harr.  569. 

Md. — Webster  v.  People's  Loan,  Sav- 
ings &  Deposit  Bank  of  Cambridge, 
152  A.  815,  160  Md.  57. 

N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Rollen- 
hagen  v.  Stevenson,  4t3  A.2d  173, 
174— Modern  Security  Co.  of  Phil- 
adelphia v.  Fleming,  142  A.  649,  6 
KJ.Misc.  750. 

N.Y.— Williams  v.  Mittlemann,  20  N. 
T.S.2d  690,  259  App.Div.  697,  ap- 
peal denied  22  N.T.S.2d  822,  260 
App.Div.  8H1 — American  Cities  Co. 
v.  Stevenson,  60  N.Y.S.'2d  685. 

Pa. — Kirk  Johnson  &  Co.  v.  Wilson, 
18  PaJDist.  &  Co.  672. 

Wis.— Chippewa  Vattey  Securities  Co. 
v.  Herbst,  278  N,W.  872,  227  Wis. 
422. 

84  C.J.  p  102  notes  60,  55. 

Repeal  by  implication 

The   statute   authorizing   recovery 

274 


of  deficiency  after  mortgage  fore- 
closure sale  and  authorizing  obligor 
on  bond  to  file  answer  in  suit  on 
the  bond  disputing  amount  of  de- 
ficiency did  not  repeal  statute  au- 
thorizing Judgments  by  confession. — 
Chambers  v.  Boldt.  8  A.2d  713,  123  N. 
J.Law  111. 

Process 

Statute  regulating  procedure  where 
Judgment  is  entered  without  the 
service  of  process  has  no  application 
to  a  Judgment  by  confession  en- 
tered in  a  proceeding  instituted  by 
the  service  of  process. — Johnson  v. 
Cole,  TexXJiv.App.,  1138  S.W.2d  910, 
error  refused. 

75.  Del.— Money  v.  Hart,  159  A.  4*37, 
5  WjW.Harr,  115. 

34  C.J.  p  10*2  note  51. 

76.  La.— Erwin   v.   Walton,    4   Rob. 
1328. 

Mich.— Beach  v.   Botsford,    1   Dougl. 
199,  40  Am.D.  145. 

77.  Ohio. — Rosebrough  v.  lAnsley,  85 
Ohio  St.  107. 

78.  Va. — Saunders  v.   Lipscomb,   19 
S.E.  450,  90  .Va.  €47. 

Statute  held  declaratory  of  common 

law 
•111. — May  v.  Chas.  O.  Larson  Co.,  36 

N.B.2d   139,   (304    IlLApp.    Ii37. 

79.  N.J.— Stewart  v.  Walters,  38  N. 
J.Law  274. 


49    C.J.S, 


JUDGMENTS 


§150 


the  statutory  requirements  as  to  the  confession  of 
judgments.***  Under  some  statutes  judgments  in 
amicable  actions  are  not  statutory,81  and  the  stat- 
utes relating  to  judgments  entered  by  the  prothono- 
tary,  discussed  infra  §  154  f,  are  inapplicable  to 
judgments  confessed  in  amicable  actions  in  which 
plaintiff  and  defendant  appear  by  counsel.82 

§  148.     Consent  or  Ratification  of  Creditor 

A  confession  of  Judgment  Is  not  binding  on  the  plain- 
tiff unless  he  consents  to  It  or  ratifies  It. 

In  order  that  a  confession  of  judgment  may  be 
binding  on  the  plaintiff,  it  is  essential  that  he,  ei- 
ther expressly  or  impliedly,  assent  thereto;83  if  it 
is  made  without  his  request,  knowledge,  or  consent, 
and  entered  at  the  instance  of  the  debtor  alone,  it 
will  have  no  validity  unless  the  creditor  ratifies  or 
accepts  it84  The  validity  of  the  judgment  dates 
only  from  such  acceptance,  and  therefore  it  will  not 
affect  the  priority  of  other  creditors  who  came  in 
between  the  entry  of  the  judgment  and  its  accept- 
ance.*5 Where  plaintiff  would,  under  no  circum- 
stances, be  entitled  to  any  judgment  different  from 
that  which  defendant  offers  to  confess,  which  offer 
he  rejects,  it  has  been  held  that  the  action  may  be 
dismissed.8^ 

Manner  of  consent  or  acceptance.  The  creditor's 
consent  to,  or  acceptance  of,  the  judgment,  if  not 
express,  may  be  implied  from  the  circumstances  of 
his  dealing  with  it,87  as  from  the  fact  that  he  at- 


tempts to  enforce  it.88  In  the  absence  of  anything 
appearing  to  the  contrary,  the  creditor's  consent 
may  be  presumed  from  the  record89  or  from  the  fact 
that  the  judgment  confessed  operates  to  his  bene- 
fit,^ but  the  creditor's  mere  silence  or  failure  to 
object  on  being  informed  of  the  judgment  does  not 
amount  to  an  acceptance  of  it,  although  it  is  ad- 
missible as  evidence  tending  to  prove  his  accept- 
ance.91 The  knowledge  and  consent  of  the  credi- 
tor's attorney,  hi  whose  hands  he  has  placed  the 
matter,  is  sufficient  to  make  it  binding  on  the  credi- 
tor.9* 

§  149.    Process,  Appearance,  and  Pleading 

The  requirements  as  to  process,  appearance,  and 
pleading  in  the  case  of  a  confession  after  action  is 
instituted  are  discussed  infra  §  ISO,  and  in  the  case 
of  a  confession  without  action  infra  §  151. 

Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 
§  150.    Confession  after  Action 

A  Judgment  of  confession  after  action  is  instituted 
must  be  based  on  the  service  of  process  on,  or  an  ap- 
pearance by,  the  defendant. 

It  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  confession  of 
judgment  after  action  brought  that  process  should 
have  been  regularly  served  on  defendant,  ou  service 
accepted  by  him,  or  that  an  appearance  should  have 
been  entered  by  him  in  person  or  by  a  duly  author- 
ized attorney  for  him,93  and  that  there  should  be 


80.  Kan.— Brooks  v.  National  Bank 
of  Topeka,  110  <P.2d  1069.  15-3  Kan. 
8*0. 

81.  Pa,— Peerless      Soda-    Fountain 
Service  Co.  v.  Lipsohutz,  101  Pa, 
Super.  568 — Vesta  Coal  Co.  v.  Stid- 
dard,  92  Pa.Super.  87— Vesta  Coal 
Co.  v.  Jones,  92  PaJSuper.  "30,  fol- 
lowed in  Chartiers  Creek  Coal  Co. 
v.  Bielski,  92  Pa.Super.  38-n Pitts- 
burgh  Terminal  Coal  Corporation 
v.  Potts,  92  (Pa,  Super.  1,  followed 
in  Pittsburgh  Terminal  Coal  Cor- 
poration v.  Mcdements,  92  Pa-Su- 
per. 29,  and  Hillman  Gas  Coal  Co. 
v.  Bozicevich,   92  FttuSuper.  89. 

Agreement  that  addon  be  amicable 

Defendant  in  amicable  action  must 
have  agreed  that  it  should  be  amicar 
ble  as  distinguished  from  adverse 
proceeding. — Grakelow  v.  Kidder,  95 
Pa.Super.  250 — Pittsburgh  Terminal 
Coal  Corporation  v.  Potts,  92  Pa.Su- 
per.  1,  followed  in  Pittsburgh  Termi- 
nal Coal  Corporation  v.  McClements, 
92  Pa,Super.  29,  and  Hillman  Gas 
Coal  Co.  v.  Bozicevich,  92  Pa.Super. 
39. 

82.  Pa,— Finance  &  Guaranty  Co.  v. 
Mittleman,  "913  Pa,Super.  277— Ves- 
ta   Coal    Co.   v.    Stiddard,    92   Pa. 
Super.  37— Vesta  Coal  Co.  v.  Jones, 


92  Pa,Super.  80,  followed  in*  Char- 
tiers  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  Bielski,  92 
PaJSuper.  88— Hillman  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  v.  Metcalfe,  92  Pa,Super.  14— 
Pittsburgh  Terminal  Coal  Corpora- 
tion v.  Potts,  92  iPa.Super.  1,  fol- 
lowed in  Pittsburgh  Terminal  Coal 
Corporation  v.  McClements,  92  Pa- 
Super.  29,  and  Hillman  Gas  Coal 
Co.  v.  Bozicevich,  95  Pa,Super.  89. 
Actions  are  not  statutory 

Actions  resulting  in  confessed 
Judgments  are  not  statutory.— Hill- 
man  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Metcalfe.  92 
Pa.  Super.  14. 

83.  Old.— Universal    Supply   &  Ma- 
chinery   Co.    v.    Construction  Ma- 
chinery Co.,  16  P.2d  865,  160  OkL 
209. 

34  C.J.  p  CL02  note  58. 

84.  Vt— Mason  v.  Ward,  67  A.  820, 
80  Vt.  290,   130  Am.S.B.  987. 

34  C.J.  p  102  note  59. 

85.  Ark. — Lowenstein  v.  Caruth,  28 
S.W.  421,  59  Ark.  588. 

34  C.J.  p  102  note  60. 

86.  Colo.— Denver  First  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Hotchkiss,  114  (P.  filO,  40  Colo. 
59)3. 

84  C.J.  P  10&  notes  67-69. 

275 


87.  Md.— Barker   v.    Ayres,    5    Md. 
202. 

34  C.J.  p  il02  note  61. 

88.  S.D.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Banton    v.    Dakota    Lodge    No.    1, 
L  O.  O.  F.,  Inc.,  202  N.W.  874.  «7 
S.D.  13133. 

34  CJT.  p  102  note  <62. 

89.  Ind. — Kennard  v.  Carter,  64  Ind. 
31. 

90.  Pa,— Olawson    v.    Elchbaum,    2 
Grant   130— MoCalmont  v.    Peters, 
13  Serg.  &  B.  196. 

91.  Ind. — Haggerty     v.     Juday,     58 
Ind.  154. 

34  C.J.  p  102  note  65. 

92.  Ind. — Chapin  v.   McLaren,   5  N. 
E.  688,  105  Ind.  563. 

93.  Gsu — Information  Buying  Co.  v. 
Miller,  161   S.E.  617,   178   Ga.  78S. 

N.J.— Fortune  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
v.  Codomo,  7  A.2d  880,  122  N.J.Law 
565. 

84  C.J.  p  103  note  71. 
SnbsecLuettfe  pxooess 

Where  plaintiff  failed  within  stat- 
utory time  to  file  bill  pursuant  to 
process  executed  on  defendant,  but 
later  filed  bill  and  matured  suit  on 
new  process  subsequently  issued,  and 
returned,  executed  on  same  defend- 


§151 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


an  appearance  by  plaintiff,  or  at  least  his  consent 
to  the  entry  of  judgment;94  and  although  a  decla- 
ration or  some  statement  of  plaintiffs  claim  should 
generally  be  filed,  before  or  at  the  same  time  as  the 
confession,95  in  some  jurisdictions,  where  a  writ 
is  properly  issued,  the  confession  may  be  founded 
thereon  and  a  formal  declaration  is  not  necessary.96 
It  has  also  been  held  that,  where  defendant  has 
agreed  to  the  commencement  of  an  amicable  action 
and  the  confession  of  judgment  therein,  the  method 
in  which  the  action  is  commenced  is  immaterial.97 

§  151.    Confession  without  Action 

Process,  appearance,  or  pleading  Is  generally  not  re- 
quired where  a  confession  of  Judgment  Is  made  without 
action. 

In  case  of  a  confession  without  action,  it  is  not 


necessary  that  any  process  should  be  issued  or 
served  on  defendant,  or  any  appearance  entered  by 
or  for  him  other  than  the  appearance  for  the  pur- 
pose of  confessing  the  judgment,98  but,  where  the 
statute  requires  defendant  to  appear  personally  in 
court  and  confess  judgment,  a  valid  judgment  can- 
not be  confessed  without  such  appearance.99 

As  a  general  rule  it  is  not  essential  to  such  a  con- 
fession that  a  declaration  or  complaint  should  be 
filed,1  and,  if  a  declaration  is  filed,  it  is  immaterial 
whether  or  not  it  will  stand  the  test  of  technical 
principles.2  On  the  other  hand,  under  some  stat- 
utes if  the  confession  is  made  under  a  warrant  of 
attorney  without  defendant  personally  appearing, 
a  declaration,8  which  under  some  statutes  should  be 
duly  verified,4  must  be  filed. 


UNDEE  WARRANT  OR  POWER  OF  ATTORNEY 


§  152.    In  General 

Subject  to  statutory  exceptions,  a  judgment  by  con- 
fession may  generally  be  entered  on  a  warrant  or  power 
of  attorney* 

In  most  jurisdictions  a  judgment  by  confession 
may  be  entered  on  a  written  authority,  called  a 


warrant  or  power  of  attorney,  by  which  the  debtor 
empowers  an  attorney  to  enter  an  appearance  for 
him,  waive  process,  and  confess  judgment  against 
him  for  a  designated  amount,6  and  such  practice 
is  not  regarded  as  being  against  public  policy,6  ex- 
cept in  a  few  jurisdictions.7  The  power  to  confess 


ant,  decree  pro  confesso  taken 
against  defendant  on  his  failure  to 
appear,  decree  will  not  be  disturbed 
on  bill  of  review  for  manner  in 
which  suit  was  instituted  and  pros- 
ecuted.—Watkins  v.  Watkins,  129  S. 
B.  3&o,  99  W.Va.  495. 
94.  111.— Thayer  v.  Finley,  «6  m. 

262. 
35.    111.— Desaoyers     Shoe     Co.     v. 

Litchfield  First  Nat  Bank,  58  N.E. 

994,  188  HI.  StlS. 
34  C.J.  p  1013  note  7|3. 
Pleadings  held  sufficient 

Pleadings  containing  allegations 
that  defendant  had  made  fraudulent 
representation  regarding  financial 
"backing  of  corporation,  thereby  in- 
ducing creditors  to  extend  credit  to 
corporation,  were  sufficient  to  sup- 
port confession  of  Judgment  against 
defendant — Deeds  v.  Gilmer,  174  S.E. 
37,  162  Va.  157. 

96.  U.S.— McNeil  v.  Cannon,   C.C.B. 
€.,   16  FvCas.No.8,91i8,   1  Cranch.C. 
C.  127. 

34  O.J.  p  10)3  note  74. 

97.  Pa.— Vesta  Coal  Co.  v.  Stiddard, 
92  Pa.Super.  37 — Vesta  Coal  Co.  v. 
Jones,  92  Pa.Super.  30,  followed  in 
Chartlers  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  Bielski, 
92  Pa.Super.  <38 — Hillman  Coal   & 
Coke  Co.  v.  Metcalfe,  92  Pa.Super. 
14 — Pittsburgh  Terminal  Coal  Cor- 
poration v.  Potts,  92  Pa,  Super.  1, 
followed   in    Pittsburgh    Terminal 
Coal  Corporation  v.  McClements,  92 


Pa.Super.  29,  and  Hillman  Gas  Coal 
Co.  v.  Bozicevich,  <92  Pa.Super.  39. 

98.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Fed- 
eral   Deposit    Ins.    Corporation    v. 
Steinman,  DjC.Pa.,  5*3  F.Supp.  644, 
651 — Bower  v.  Casanave,  D.C.N.Y., 
44  F.Supp.  501.  } 

111. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Lock  v. 

Leslie,  '248  Ill.App.  438,  <443. 
La. — Jeffcoat  v.  Haramons,  App.,  160 

So.  182. 
Mass. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ferran- 

ti  v.  Lewis,  171  N.E.  232,  234,  271 

Mass.  186. 
N.C. — Bonnett-Brown  Corporation  v. 

Coble,  142  S.B.  772,  195  N.C.  491. 
Pa. — Union  Acceptance  Co.  v.  Grant 

Motor  Sales  Co.,  5  PaJDist  &  Co. 

407,  23  Luz.Leg.Heg.  89,  2  Som.Co. 

Leg.J.   260,  39   York  Leg.Rec.   141 

— Colonial  Trust  Co.  v.  Crailsheim- 

er,  Com.Pl.,  87  Pittsb.Le^J.  207. 
34  C.J.  p  10(3  note  75. 

99.  Ohio. — Rosebrough  v.  Ansley,  35 
Ohio  St  107. 

34  C.J.  p  103  note  76. 

1.  Ind.— Agard   v.    Hawks,   24    Ind. 
276. 

Pa. — Melavage  v.  Akelaites,  8  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  Ill,  22  Sch.L.R.  201, 
40  Tork  Leg.Rec.  115 — Union  Ac- 
ceptance Co.  v.  Grant  Motor  Sales 
Co.,  5  PaX>ist  &  Co.  407,  23  Luz. 
Leg. Reg.  89,  2  Som.Co.Leg.J.  260, 
39  Tork  Leg.Rec.  141. 

34  C.J.  p  103  note  77. 

2.  -Ark.— Cheat  v.  Bennett,  11  Ark. 

276 


313 — Thompson  v.  Foster,   6  Ark. 
208. 

3.  111. — Shumway  v.   Shumway,   192 
N.B.  578,  1357  111.  "477. 

Declaration  held  sufficient 
111.— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Royer,  278 
ULApp.  158. 

4.  Ohio.— Sidney    First    (Nat    Bank 
v.  Reid,  31  Ohio  St.  435. 

34  C.J.  p  104  note  80. 

5.  U.B.— Withers  v.  Starace,  DJC.N. 
T.t  22  F.Supp.  77i3. 

Del.— Rhoads  v.  Mitchell,  Super.,  47 

A.2d  174. 
Md.— John  B.  Colt  Co.  v.  Wright,  159 

A.  7413. 
Pa.— Commonwealth  v.  Central  R.  Co. , 

of  N.  J.,  Cora.Pl.,  57  Dauph.Co.  255 

— Nash  Sales  &  Service  v.  Broody, 

33  Luz.Leg.Heg.  158,  9  Som.Co.Leg. 

J.  132-6.   • 
34  C.J.  p  104  note  82—67  C.J.  p  603 

note  29. 
Validity  of  warrant  executed  by  an 

infant  see  infants  S  23. 
Statute  held  valid 
N.J.— Levin  v.  Wenof,  14'6  A.  789,  7 

N.JJMisc.  60(3. 

6.  Pa. — Rochester      &      Pittsburgh 
Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  7  Pa.Dist  &  Co. 
312. 

34  C.J.  p  104  note  83. 

7.  W.Va. — Farquhar  v.  Be  Haven,  75 
.S.B.    65,    70    W.Va.    738,    Ann.Cas. 

1914A  640,  40  L.R.A.,N.S.,  956. 
34  C.J.  p  104  note  84. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  152 


judgment  by  warrant  of  attorney  comes  from  the 
common  law,8  and  is  governed  thereby  except  in 
so  far  as  the  old  rules  of  the  common  law  have 
been  modified  by  statute  and  the  decisions  of  the 
courts  of  last  resort.9 

The  legislature  has  the  power  to  determine  what 
judgments  may  be  entered  on  warrants  or  powers 
of  attorney.10  Thus,  under  some  statutes,  a  judg- 
ment by  confession  may  not  be  entered  on  a  power 
of  attorney  in  the  case  of  certain  obligations,11 
whereas  under  others  only  in  the  case  of  certain 
specified  obligations  may  a  judgment  by  confession 
be  entered  on  the  authority  of  a  power  of  attor- 
ney.12 


Nature  of  power.  In  its  infancy  such  a  warrant 
of  attorney  was  purely  a  question  of  practice,13 
which  prevailed  in  many,  if  not  most,  of  the  older 
states  from  an  early  day,14  but  in  later  times  it  has 
assumed  the  role  of  security  for  debt.15 

What  law  governs.  As  a  general  rule  the  valid- 
ity and  effect  of  a  power  of  attorney  to  confess 
judgment  are  governed  by  the  law  of  the  place 
where  the  power  is  given16  although  defendant  is  a 
resident  of  another  state  at  the  time  the  power  is 
executed.17  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  validity  and  effect  of  such  a  power  are  gov- 
erned by  the  law  of  the  place  of  performance18  or 
the  law  of  the  jurisdiction  where  the  judgment  is 


8.  Del. — Rhoads  v.  Mitchell,  Super., 
47  A.2d  174. 

111.-— Lock  v.  Leslie,  248  Hl.App.  4!3S, 

442. 
N.J. — Gotham   Credit  Corporation  v. 

Powell,  38   A.2d  700,  "22   N.J.Misc. 

301. 
Pa. — Automobile  Finance  -Co.  v.  Var- 

ner,  90  Pittsb.Leg.J.  169. 
34  C.J.  p  104  note  85. 
Instruments  under  seal 

Power  to  confess  judgment  under 
warrant  directed  to  attorney  is  con- 
fined to  instrument  under  seal  evi- 
dencing- debt  for  which  judgment  is 
confessed. — General  Contract  Pur- 
chase Corporation  v.  Max  Keil  Heal 
Estate  Co.,  170  A.  797,  5  W.-W.Harr. 
531. 

9.  Del. — General  Contract  Purchase 
Corporation  v.  Max  Keil  Real  Es- 
tate Co.,  170  A.  797,  5  W.W.Harr. 
5.31. 

Fla. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Carroll 
v.  Gore,  148  So.  6&3,  '686,  106  Pla. 
582,  89  A.L.R.  1495. 

Ill.~Book  v.  Ewbank,  (35  N.E.2d  961, 
1311  'Ill.App.  312— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Lock  v.  Leslie,  2*48  Ill.App. 
438,  442. 

Wis.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Chippe- 
wa  Valley  Securities  Co.  v.  Herbst, 
278  N.W.  872,  874,  227  Wis.  422. 

34  C.J.  p  104  note  86. 

10.  Wis. — Chippewa  Valley    Securi- 
ties Co.   v.   Herbst   278  N.W.   872, 
227  Wis.  422. 

11.  Ind. — American  Furniture  Mart 
Bldg.   Corporation  v.  IW.  C.   Red- 
mon,  Sons  &  Co.,  1  <N.E;2d  606,  210 
Ind.  112. 

34  C.J.  p  104  note  88. 
.Ascertainment  of  sum  due 
•  The  statutes  pertaining:  to  cognovit 
provisions  of  negotiable  instruments 
•disclose  a  legislative  intent  only  to 
void  provisions  giving  power  of  at- 
torney with  authority  to  confess 
judgment  on  such  instruments  for  a 
sum  of  money  to  be  ascertained  in 
a  manner  other  tftfr"  by  action  of 
court  on  a  hearing  after  proper  serv- 


ice  of   process. — Ritchey   v.    Gerard 
152  P.2dl394,  48N.M.  452. 
Validity  of  obligation 

The  cognovit  feature  of  a  mort- 
gage note  does  not  preclude  recovery 
on  mortgage,  where  mortgagee  does 
not  rely  on  note  or  cognovit  feature 
thereof. — Peoples  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  flPora,  9  N.E.2d  85,  212  Ind. 
468,  111  A.L.R.  1402. 

12.    Wis. — Shawano   Finance   Corpo- 
ration v.  Julius,  254  N.W.  355,  214 
Wis.  6137. 
Statute  held  valid 

A  statute  authorizing  a  Judgment 
on  a  warrant  of  attorney  only  on  a 
bond  or  note  did  not  deprive  a  seller, 
entering  Into  conditional  sale  con- 
tract after  enactment  and  construc- 
tion of  statute,  of  its  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law  or  unreasqn- 
ably  deprive  seller  of  the  right  to 
contract — Chippewa  Valley  Securi- 
ties Co.  v.  Herbst,  278  N.W.  872, 
227  Wis.  422. 
Conditional  sale  contract 

(1)  A  judgment  on  warrant  of  at- 
torney contained  in  conditional  sale 
contract   was    entered    without    au- 
thority  and   was   void,    in   view   of 
statute  authorizing  a  judgment  on  a 
warrant  of  attorney  only  on  a  bond 
or  note. — Chippewa  Valley  Securities 
Co.    v.    Herbst,    278    N.W.    872,    227 
Wis.   422 — Wisconsin  Sales  Corpora- 
tion v.  McDougal,   271  N.W.  25,   223 
Wis.    485— United   Finance   Corpora- 
tion v.  Peterson,  241  N.W.  $37,   208 
Wis.  104,  8-9  A.L.R.  1104. 

(2)  Whether  attachment  of  note  to 
conditional    sales    contract    takes    it 
out  of  the  definition  of  a  note  and 
the  statutes  providing  for  judgment 
by  cognovit  depends  on  parties'  in- 
tention as  manifested  by  entire  writ- 
ten agreement;    note   providing  for 
judgment  by  cognovit  and  separated 
from   conditional   sales    contract    by 
perforated  line  was  held  subject  to 
judgment  by  cognovit  where  parties 
contemplated  the  note's  negotiation, 
discount,  renewal,  or  extension  inde- 
pendently of  conditional   sales  con- 

277 


*ract. — Shawano  Finance  Corporation 
v.  Julius,  254  N.W.  «355,  214  Wis.  6-37. 

13.  Mo.— Kansas    City     First    Nat. 
Bank  v.  White,    120    S.W.    36,    220 
Mo.  717,  1!32  Am.S.R.  612,  16  Ann. 
Cas.  889. 

14.  Iowa. — Cuykendall    v.    Doe,    105 
N.TT.  698,  129  Iowa  453,  113  Am.S. 
R.  472,  3  L.R.A..N.S.,  449. 

15.  Pa.— Mellon  v.  Rltz,  2  A.2d  699, 
3^32  Pa.  97. 

34  C.J.  p  104  note  92. 
Future  obligations 

A  bond  or  other  obligation  may 
be  given  and  judgment  entered  by 
confession  on  warrant  of  attorney, 
to  cover  future  obligations. — Rhoads 
v.  Mitchell,  Del.Super.,  47  «A.2d  174. 

16.  U.S.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Monarch      Refrigerating      Co.      v. 
Farmers'    Peanut    Co.,    C.C.A.N.C., 
74  F.2d  790,   793,  certiorari  denied 
Farmers    Peanut   Co.    v.    Monarch 
Refrigerating    Co.,    55    S.Ct.     6413, 
295   U.S.   732,    79   L.Ed.  1680. 

Fla, — Corpus   Juris   cited  in  Carroll 

v.  Gore,  143  So.  633,  637,  106  Fla. 

582,  89  A.L.R.  1495. 
Iowa. — Acme  Feeds  v.  Berg,  4  N.W. 

2d  430,  231  Iowa  1271. 
34  C.J.  p  107  note  37. 
Renewal  nota 

Where  original  note  containing 
power  of  attorney  to  confess  judg- 
ment was  executed  in  Ohio,  and 
makers  subsequently  moved  to  Mich- 
igan, renewal  note,  which  contained 
same  power  and  was  mailed  to  mak- 
ers in  Michigan  and  was  signed  and 
returned  by  mail  to  payee,  an  Ohio 
bank,  was  an  "Ohio  contract'*,  and 
power  of  attorney  conferred  author- 
ity to  confess  judgment. — State  of 
Ohio  ex  rel.  Squire  v.  Eubank,  294 
N.W.  166,  295  Mich.  2(30. 

17.  -Iowa. — Cuykendall    v.    Doe,    105 
N.W.   698,   129   Iowa  4&S,   118   Am. 
S.R.   473,  3   L.R.A.,N.a;  449. 

34  C.J.  p  107  note  38. 

18.  Ind. — Bgley  v.  T.  B.  Bennett  & 
Co.,  145  N.B.  8130,  196  Ind.  50,  40  A. 

436. 


§  152 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


entered.19  If  the  power  is  valid  where  given,  gen- 
erally it  will  be  recognized  in  another  state,20  al- 
though it  is  invalid  under  the  laws  of  the  latter 
state  ;21  but  if  it  is  invalid  where  given  it  is  invalid 
in  another  state.22  Where  the  warrant  is  made  in 
one  state  for  use  in  andther,  the  law  of  the  latter 
state  has  been  held  to  govern  as  far  as  the  use  and 
effect  of  the  warrant  therein  are  concerned,23  ex- 
cept that  such  law  cannot  enlarge  the  authority  con- 
ferred by  the  warrant  so  as  to  bind  the  grantor  of 
the  power,  in  his  own  state,  to  terms  not  contained 
in  the  warrant  to  which  he  did  not  consent  and 
with  knowledge  of  which  he  was  not  charged.24 

A  warrant  of  attorney  must  be  executed  accord- 
ing to  the  requirements  of  the  law  in  force  when 
the  judgment  is  taken,  and  not  when  the  power 
was  given.25 

§  153.    Requisites  and  Sufficiency  of  Warrant 
or  Power 

A  warrant  or  power  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment 


should  contain  a  clear  grant  of  authority  and  should 
specify  the  amount  for  which  Judgment  is  to  be  cdn- 
fessed. 

A  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment  should 
conform  to  the  requirements  of  the  statute,  if  any, 
in  force  at  the  time;26  but,  in  the  "absence  of  spe- 
cific statutory  directions,  no  particular  form  of 
words  is  necessary,  if  it  contains  the  essentials  of 
a  good  power  and  clearly  states  its  purpose.27  In 
any  event  it  should  contain  a  grant  of  the  author- 
ity, in  clear  and  intelligible  terms  ;28  and,  unless  it 
is  accompanied  by  a  declaration  or  sworn  statement 
or  other  evidence  of  the  indebtedness,  it  should 
clearly  and  definitely  set  out  or  describe  the  na- 
ture of  the  liability  for  which  the  judgment  is  to 
be  rendered,29  and  should  either  clearly  state  the 
amount  for  which  judgment  is  to  be  confessed  or 
state  facts  and  figures  from  which  the  amount  can 
be  definitely  ascertained,30  and  it  is  invalid  if  it 
authorizes  a  judgment  for  an  indefinite  or  unliqui- 


19-  Ind.— <Paulausky  v.  Polish  Ro- 
man Catholic  Union  of  America, 
•39  N.E.2d  440,  219  Ind.  441. 

20.  Fla.— Carroll  v.  Gore,  tt«  So. 
638,  106  Fla.  582,  89  AJL..R.  1495. 

Ind. — American  Furniture  Mart  Bldg. 
Corporation  v.  W.  C.  Redmon,  Sons 
&  Co.,  1  N.E.2d  '606,  210  <Ind.  112. 

34  C.J.  p  107  note  39. 

ML  Fla. — Carroll  v.  Gore.  148  So. 
6313,  106  Fla.  682,  89  A.L.R.  1495. 

Ind. — American  Furniture  Mart  Bldg. 
Corporation  v.  W.  C.  Redmon,  Sons 
&  Co.,  1  N.E.2d  606,  -210  Ind.  112. 

Iowa. — Cuykendall  v.  Doe,  105  N.W. 
698,  129  Iowa  45>3,  11*  Am.S.R.  472, 
13  L.R.A..N.S.,  449. 

Cognovit  features  not  relied  on 
Recovery  may  be  had  on  contract 

containing1  cog-no vit  features,  if  it  Is 

valid  where  made  and  such  features 

are  not  relied  on  in  action  to  recover 

thereon. — Phro  miner  v.  Albers,  21  N. 

E.2d  72,  106  'In<LApp.  548. 

22.  Ala. — Monarch  Refrigerating  Co. 
v.  Faulk.   155  So.  74,  228  Ala.  554. 

34  C.J.  p  107  note  41. 

23.  N.J. — Gotham     Credit     Corpora- 
tion v.  Powell,  $8  A.2d  700,  22  N.J. 
'Misc.  801. 

34  C.J.  p  107  note  <42. 

24.  U.S. — Grover    &    Baker    Sewing 
Mach.  Co.  v.  Radcliffe,  Md.,  11  SXJt. 
92,  137  U.S.  287,  34  L.Ed.  670. 

34  C.J.  p  108  note  413. 

25-  Ind. — McPheeters  v.  Campbell, 
5  Ind.  107. 

26.  Cal. — General  Motors  Accept* 
ance  Corporation  v.  Codies*  21S  P. 
«8»3,  62  CaLApp.  117,  followed  in 
General  Motors  Acceptance  Cor- 
poration v.  Parker,  216  P.  684,  62 
CaLApp.  797. 


Minn. — Keyes  v.  Peterson,  260  N.W. 

518,  194  Minn.  1361. 
Ohio. — Corpus   Juris   quoted  in  Hill 

v.    Buchanan,    6    Ohio    Supp.    230, 

2&3. 
Pa. — Commonwealth   v!    tPrzekop,    25 

A.2d  776,   148   Pa.«uper.   385— Ber- 

gunder    v.     Cerc«o.     Com.PL,     91 

PiJttsb.Leg.J-.  576. 
34  C.J.  p  104  note  93. 
Necessity  of  indebtedness 

Director  who  executed  note  to  bank 
to  create  reserve  to  make  good 
bank's  losses,  which  note  contained 
a  warrant  for  confession  of  judg- 
ment, was  'Indebted  to  another0 
within  statute  providing  that  any 
person  being  indebted  to  another  per- 
son may  confess  judgment  by  virtue 
of  warrant  made  part  of  note  au- 
thorizing confession  of  judgment. — 
Spady  v.  Farmers  &  Merchants 
Trust  Bank,  190  S.E.  178,  168  Va. 
1413. 

27.  Ohio. — Corpus   JTuris    quoted   in 
Hill    v.    Buchanan,    6    Ohio    Supp. 
2.30,  2i38. 

34  C.J.  p  104  note  94. 

Authority  to   "enter"  instead  of  to 

"confess" 
HI. — Long    v.    Coffman,    2>30    Hl.App. 

527. 
3<4  OJ.  p  104  note  94  [a], 

28.  IlL — Webster     Grocer     Co.      v. 
.  Gammel,  1  N.H.2d  890,  285  Ill.App. 

277 — Sharpe  v.  Second  Baptist 
Church  of  Maywood,  274  IlLApp. 
374 — Hughes  v.  First  Acceptance 
Corporation,  260  IlLApp.  176. 

Ohio.— COrpng  Juris  anotefl  in  Hill  v. 
Buchanan,  6  Ohio  Supp.  2.30,  233. 

Pa. — Landow  v.  Bailinger,  1'69  A.  780, 
813  Pa.  18815 — Hogsett  v.  Lutrario,  't 

278 


13  A.2d  902,  140  iPa.Super.  419— 
Koruzo  v.  Ritenauer,  101  Pa.  Super. 
558 — General  Realty  Co.  v.  Gold,  9 
Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  682,  affirmed  142  A, 
279,  29-3  Pa.  260— Soklove  v.  Lali- 
tas,  Cora.Pl.,  SO  Del.Co.  370— Jar- 
zenbowski  v.  Dombrosky,  Com.Pl., 
"36  Luz.iLeg.Reg.  .65 — Graver  v. 
Hand,  ComjPl.,  58  York  Leg.Rec. 
180. 
34  C.J.  p  105  note  95. 

29.  Md. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in    C. 
X.    T.    Corporation    v.    Powell,    170 
A.   740,  742,  166  Md.   208— Vane   v. 
Stanley   Heating   Co.,    152   A.    Ml/ 
160  Md.  24. 

34  C.J.  p  105  note  97. 
Two  species  of  Judgments 

"There  are  at  least  two  species  of 
judgments  that  can  be  obtained  by 
confession  upon  warrants  of  at- 
torney, One  is  the  ordinary  judg- 
ment, where  the  obligation  is  to 
pay  a  specific  sum  determinate  from 
the  instrument,  and  judgment  is  en- 
tered for  the  amount  so  determined. 
Another  species  is  a  judgment  for  a 
condition  other  than  the  payment  of 
money,  or  where  judgment  is  en- 
tered for  a  penalty." — Rhoads  v. 
Mitchell,  DeLSuper.,  47  A.2d  174,  179. 

30.  DeL— Rhoada    T.    Mitchell,     su- 
pra. 

Pa. — Dime  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Pittston  v.  O'Boyle,  6  A,2d  106,  5134 
Pa.  500 — Finance  &  Guaranty  Co. 
v.  Mittleman,  93  Pa.Super.  277 — 
Wyoming  Valley  Trust  Co.  v. 
Tisch,  18  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  581,  27 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  277. 

Wash.— -Rubin  v.  Dale,  288  P.  228, 
156  Wash.  676. 

34  C.J.  p  105  note  98. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


153 


dated  amount81  or  if  the  amount  due  cannot  be  as- 
certained from  the  face  of  the  instrument.82 

Execution.  A  warrant  or  power  of  attorney  to 
confess  judgment  should  be  in  writing,88  and  must 
be  signed  by  all  the  persons  against  whom  the  judg- 
ment is  to  be  entered;84  and,  where  it  is  annexed  to 
the  obligation  to  be  confessed,  both  the  obligation 
and  the  warrant  of  attorney  must  be  signed  by  the 
same  person.85  Under  some  statutes  it  must  also 
be  attested  by  witnesses.8^  In  the  absence  of  a 
statute  to  the  contrary,8?  the  warrant  need  not  be 
under  seal.85 

Time  of  execution.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the 
warrant  of  attorney  should  be  given  at  the  same 
time  with  the  note,  bond,  or  other  evidence  of 
debt.89  At  common  law,  a  warrant  of  attorney  to 
confess  judgment  may  be  executed  before  the  bring- 
ing of  the  action  in  which  the  judgment  is  to  be 


confessed,40  but  under  some  statutes  a  power  of  at- 
torney to  confess  judgment,  made  before  action 
brought,  is  void;41  but  such  a  statute  does  not 
invalidate  a  warrant  of  attorney  given  after  the 
suit  has  commenced.42 

Executing  power  as  part  of  obligation.  Under 
some  statutes  the  warrant  or  power  of  attorney  to 
confess  judgment  must  be  conferred  by  some  prop- 
er instrument  distinct  from  that  containing  the  ev- 
idence of  the  debt  or  obligation  for  which  the  judg- 
ment is  confessed.48  In  the  absence  of  such  a  statu- 
tory restriction  the  warrant  or  power  of  attorney 
may  be  attached  to,  or  incorporated  in,  the  note, 
bond,  or  other  obligation,44  and  for  purposes  of 
construction  they  are  to  be  regarded  as  one  in- 
strument45 A  power  of  attorney  to  confess  judg- 
ment may  be  incorporated  in,  or  attached  to,  a  prom- 
issory note,  the  condition  being  the  nonpayment  of 


31.  HI.— Brown  v.  Atwood,  22*  HI. 
App.  77. 

34  O.J.  p  105  note  99. 

Where  amount  is  fixed  "by  law  or 
parties'  agreement,  claim  is  liqui- 
dated.— Monarch  Refrigerating:  Co.  v. 
Farmers'  Peanut  Co.,  C.C.A.N.C.,  74 
F.2d  790,  certiorari  denied  Farmers 
Peanut  Co.  v.  Monarch  Refrigerating: 
Co.,  55  <SXX  '643,  295  T7.S.  752,  79  L. 
Ed.  1680. 

Pact  that  payments  may  be  made 
before  maturity  does  not  avoid  con- 
fession.— Monarch  Refrigerating  Co. 
v.  Fanners'  Peanut  Co.,  C.C.A.N.C., 
74  F.2d  790,  certiorari  denied  Farm- 
ers Peanut  Co.  v.  Monarch  Refrig- 
erating Co.,  55  S.Ct  643,  295  U.S. 
732,  79  L.Ed.  1680. 

32.  DeL — Roman  Auto  Co.  v.  Miller, 
95  A.  654,  28  DeL  586. 

Pa. — Automobile  Banking  Corpora- 
tion v.  Duffy-Mullen  Motor  Co.,  85 
PfuSuper.  296 — Ixmgacre  v. 
Breisch,  2-2  <Pa,Dist  &  Co.  271,  84 
SctuL.R.  149,  2  Sch.Reg.  64. 

33.  Cal. — Siskiyou  County  Bank  v. 
Hoyt,  64  P.  118,  1132  CaL  81. 

(34  C.J.  p  105  note  2. 

34.  N.T. — Shenson  v.  OL    Shalnin   & 
Co.,    276   N.Y.S.    881,   243  App.Div. 
6<38,  affirmed  198  N.E.  407,  268  N.Y. 
567. 

Pa. — National  F.  0.  B.  Auction  Co.  v. 
United  Produce  Co.,  7  Pa,Dist  & 
Co.  .334,  73  Pittsb.Leg.J.  927,  89 
York  Leg.Rec.  Ii39. 

34  C.J.  p  105  note  8. 

35.  Pa.— Liberty  Grotto  No.  1  S.  & 
D.  A.  A.  v.  Meade,  11  (Pa.Co.  840. 

38.    La.— Bass  v.  Barthelemy,  64  So. 

126,  134  La.  (319. 
34  O.J.  p  105  note  6. 

37.  Del.— Rhoads  v.  Mitchell,  Su- 
per,, 47  A.2d  174— Slaughter  v. 


JProvident  Savings  Bank  of  Pres- 
ton, Md.,   80  A  243,   2  Boyce  33*. 

38*  Va, — Bank  of  Chatham  v.  Aren- 
dall,  16  S.E.2d  352,  172  Va.  18t3— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Johnson  v. 
Alvis,  165  S.E.  489,  159  Va,  229. 

<34  OJ.  p  105  note  7. 

3d.    Mich. — Trombly  r.  Parsons,   10 

Mich,  272. 
N.J. — Burroughs    v.    Condit,    6    N.J. 

Law  '300. 

40.  Fla, — Corpus     Juris     cited     i» 
Carroll  v.  Gore,  143  So.   6133,   636, 
106  Fla.  582,  89  A.L.R.  1495. 

Va, — Virginia  Ins,  ,Co.  v.  Barley.  16 
Gratt  863,  57  Va,  -363. 

41.  Fla.— Carroll    v.    Gore,    1<IB    So. 
633,   106   Fla,   582,   89  A.L.R.  1495. 

34  C.J.  p  106  note  18. 

42.  Ky.— Ward   v.   Curcier,    1   I.itt 
202. 

43.  Ind.— Paulausky   y.   Polish   Ro- 
man Catholic  Union  of  America,  39 
N.R2d  440,  219  Ind.  441— Egley  v. 
T.  B.  Bennett  &  Co.,  145  N.E.  $30, 
196  Ind.  50,  40  A.L.R.  4,36. 

34  C.J.  p  105  note  10. 
Purpose 

A  statute  invalidating  contract 
giving  power  of  attorney  with  au- 
thority to  confess  judgment  on  in- 
strument is  intended  to  prevent 
judgment  from  being  taken  without 
service  of  process  and  by  virtue  of 
power  of  attorney  executed  in  ad- 
vance, but  is  not  intended  to  enable 
person  to  escape  payment  of  honest 
debt— Peoples  Nat  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  IPora,  9  N.B.'2d  88,  212  Ind. 
468,  111  A.L.R.  1402. 

Statute  is  penal  and  must  be  con- 
strued strictly. — Simpson  v.  Fuller, 
51  N.B.2d  870,  11«4  InoLApp.  583. 

279 


Statute  prospective 
N.M— Hot  Springs  Nat  Bank  v.  Ken- 
ney,  48  P.2d  1029,  (3§  IN.M.  428. 

Negotiability  not  affected 

Statute  requiring  instrument  au-  . 
thorizing  attorney  to  confess  Judg- 
ment to  be  distinct  from  instrument 
evidencing  demand  was  not  repealed 
by  enactment  of  negotiable  instru- 
ments law  declaring  that  provision 
authorizing  confession  of  judgment 
should  not  render  instrument  nonne- 
gotiable,  since  such  statutory  pro- 
visions were  not  conflicting. — Keyes 
v.  Peterson,  260  N.W.  018,  134  Minn. 
361. 

Confession  incomplete   without   ref- 
erence to  note 

Where  instrument  authorizing  con- 
fession of  judgment  made  note  a  part 
thereof  by  referring  to  "the  forego- 
ing note"  and  "said  note"  without 
which  note  the  authorization  had  no 
meaning,  because  it  did  not  state 
amount  for  which  attorney  was  au- 
thorized to  confess  judgment,  judg- 
ment entered  by  confession  thereun- 
der was  void,  since  the  authorization 
of  confession  was  not  "distinct  in- 
strument" as  required  by  statute. — 
Keyes  v.  Peterson,  260  N.W.  518, 
194  Minn.  361. 

44.  Fla.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in. 
Carroll  v.   Gore,    143   So.   6133,  $37, 
106  Fla,   582,   89  A.L.R.   149*5. 

HI. — Ross  v.  Wrightwood-Hampden 
Bldg.  Corporation,  271  Ill~A.pp.  22. 

Mass.— Ferranti  v.  Lewis,  171  NJB. 
232,  271  Mass.  186. 

34  C.J.  p  105  note  11. 

45.  Fla, — Corpus     Juris     cited     In 
Carroll  v.  Gore,   14i3   So.  '653,   637, 
106  Fla,  582,  89  A.L.R.   1495. 

111.— Sharp  v.  Barr,  234  HLApp.  214. 
,  34  C.J.  p  105  note  12. 


§  153 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  note  at  maturity,  the  instrument  being  then  com- 
monly called  a  "judgment  note/'46 

Omission  or  insertion  of  words;  blanks.  Where 
the  meaning  of  the  power  can  be  ascertained  from 
a  consideration  of  the  entire  writing,  the  omission 
of  words  meant  to  be  inserted,  or  the  insertion  of 
words  evidently  not  intended,  will  not  be  permit- 
ted to  defeat  the  intention  of  the  parties.47  In 
accordance  with  this  principle,  blanks  in  a  warrant 
or  power  of  attorney  do  not  destroy  its  validity  if 
enough  remains  to  make  it  effective  as  a  power, 
and  if  they  do  not  render  the  instrument  so  ambig- 
uous that  its  meaning  cannot  be  determined.48 

Filing.  It  is  generally  required,  as  essential  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  enter  the  judgment, 
that  the  warrant  of  attorney  shall  be  filed  as  a  part 
of  the  record  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of  the  court 
in  which  the  judgment  is  entered,4**  and  no  valid 
judgment  can  be  entered  until  it  is  so  filed.50  It  is 
not  necessary  that  the  original  warrant  be  filed ;  the 
filing  of  a  copy  thereof  is  sufficient,51  but  a  mere 
statement  that  the  power  was  proved  is  not  suffi- 
,cient.52  If  the  warrant  is  filed  in  the  proper  of- 
fice before  the  perfecting  of  the  judgment,  the  va- 
lidity of  the  judgment  is  not  affected  by  the  fact 


that  it  is  not  properly  placed  on  the  file53  or  that 
the  clerk  neglects  to  indorse  the  filing  on  the  war- 
rant54 

§  154.    Construction  and  Operation  of  War- 
rant or  Power 

a.  In  general 

b.  For  whom  judgment  may  be  entered 

c.  Against  whom  judgment  may  be  en- 

tered 

d.  Place  of  exercising  power 

e.  Time   and  conditions   for  exercising' 

power 

f.  Who  may  exercise  power 

g.  Debt  or  claim   for  which  judgment 

may  be  confessed 

a.  In  General 

A  warrant  or  power  of  attorney  to  confess  Judgment 
must  be  strictly  construed  and  the  authority  conferred 
must  be  strictly  pursued. 

As  a  general  rule  a  warrant  or  power  of  attor- 
ney to  confess  judgment  is  to  be  construed  accord- 
ing to  the  rules  which  apply  to  other  written  con* 
tracts.55  Such  a  warrant  should  be  strictly  con- 


46.  HI.— Packer  v.  Roberts,  29  N.E. 
668,  140  111.  9. 

33  C.J.  p  1041  note  82—84  C.J.  p  106 
note  13. 

47.  111. — Harris    Trust    &    Savings 
Bank    v.    Neighbors,    222    Ill.App. 
201. 

34  C.J.  p  106  note  20. 
ITote  void  if  Wanks  filled 

Promissory  note  containing1  blanks 
at  time  of  delivery  which,  if  filled, 
would  make  it  cognovit  note,  cannot, 
in  absence  of  evidence  that  parties 
when  note  was  signed  gave  authority 
for  filling  blanks,  be  construed  as 
cognovit  note  and  hence  invalid. — 
Podor  v.  Popp.  178  N.B.  695,  9i3  Ind. 
App.  429. 

48.  I1L — Harris     Trust    &     Savings 
Bank    v.    Neighbors,    22*2    Ill.App. 
201. 

Pa.— William  B.  Rambo  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Dragone,  1K6  A.  -311, 
505  Pa.  24 — Park  Trading  Corp.  v. 
Kline,  Com.Pl.,  2il  Leh.L.J.  SO*. 

34  C.J.  p  106  note  21. 

Authority  to  fill  Wants 

(1)  Where  a  power  of  attorney  to 
confess  judgment  contains  a  blank, 
the  execution  of  the  instrument  and 
delivery  thereof  in  such  condition  is 
authority  to  the  holder  to  fill  in  the 
blank.— White  v.  Alward,  «5  ULApp. 
195. 

(2)  In  warrant  of  attorney  to  con- 
fess judgment,  blank  may  be  filled  in 
by  court,  where  it  is  clear  what  un- 
intentionally   omitted     words    were 


supposed  to  be.— William  B.  Rambo 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Dragone, 
156  A.  £111,  305  Pa.  24. 

C3)  Delivery  of  an  Instrument 
with  a  space  for  the  amount  left 
blank  is  grant  of  authority  to  plain- 
tin!  to  fill  the  blank  with  the  amount 
due  at  the  time  when  he  desires  to 
enter  judgment. — International  Ad- 
vertising Syndicate  v.  Quaker  Silk 
Mills,  8  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  23,  18  Berks 
CO.L.J.  65. 

49.  N.M. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    la 
Lockhart  v.  Rousault,  14  P.2d  268, 
270,  '3-6  N.M.  S10. 

Okl. — St.    Louis-San    Francisco    Ry. 

Co.  v.  Boyne,  40  OP.2d  1104,  170  OkL 

64'2. 
34  C.J.  p  106  note  23. 

50.  Pa. — Peerless      Soda      Fountain 
Service  Co.  v.  Hummer,  19  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  302,  46  York  Leg.Rec.  201. 

34  C.J.  p  106  note  24. 

51.  N.M.— Corpus     Juris     cited     i» 
Hot  Springs  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kenney, 
48  P.2d  1029,  (10*30,  ,39  N.M.  428. 

Pa. — Altoona   Trust   Co.   v.    Fockler, 
165   A.   740,   511   Pa.   426— Harr  v. 
Kelly,    ComJPL,    43    Lack.Jur.    221, 
56  York  teg.Rec.  151— H.  C.  Frick 
Coke  Co.,  for  Use  of  v.  Orzehowski, 
CoxruPl.,  24  West.Co.L.J.  191. 
34  C.J.  pfc!06  note  25. 
Production  of  original 

While  there  might  be  some  ques- 
tion as  to  the  validity  of  a  judg- 
ment if  it  were  confessed  on  a  copy 
of  warrant  of  attorney,  and  on  de-  j 

280 


mand  of  defendant  or  the  court  the- 
original  instrument  were  not  pro- 
duced, there  can  be  no  Question  as 
to  the  validity  of  the  judgment  after 
the  original  has  been  filed  with  the 
court — Commonwealth  v.  Dibble,  41 
Pa.Dlst.  &  Co.  20,6,  50  Dauph.Co.  «HO. 

52.  I1L— Durham  v.   Brown,    2"4   111. 
9-3. 

53.  N.Y. — Manufacturers'      &      Me- 
chanics' Bank  of  the  Northern  Lib- 
erties in  the  Co.   of  Philadelphia 
v.  St.  John,  5  Hill  497. 

54.  Ark. — Thompson    v.    Foster,     6 
Ark.  208. 

55.  111. — Farmers'    Exchange    Bank 
of   Blvaston    v.    Sollars,    187    N.E. 
289,   13513    111.    224— People  v.   Cody 
Trust  Co.,   2*3  N.B.2d.l70,  SOI  111. 
App.  '580 — Webster  Grocery  Co.  v. 
Gammel,  1  N.E.2d  890,  285  IlLApp. 
277. 

N.J. — American  Auto  Finance  Co.  v. 
Miller,  7  A.2d  828,  123  N.J.Law  *. 
Pa.— William  B.  Rambo  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Dragone,  156  A.  411, 
305  flPa.   24 — Stucker  v.   Shumaker, 
139   A.   114,  -290   Pa.   348— Automo- 
bile Finance   Co.  v.  Varner,  Com. 
PL,  96  Pittsto.Leg.J.  169. 
34  C.J.  p  10.6  note  29. 
Conflict  between  written  and  printed 

portions 

Where  a  printed  blank  is  used, 
written  portions  therein  .will  have 
greater  weight  in  interpreting  the 
instrument  than  the  printed,  if  the 
two  portions  are  not  harmonious. — 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


strued66  against  the  party  in  whose  favor  it  is  giv- 
•en,57  and  the  authority  thereby  conferred  must  be 
strictly  pursued,  and  cannot  be  extended  by  impli- 
cation or  inference  beyond  the  limits  expressed  in 
the  instrument5*  A  substantial  departure  from  the 
authority  conferred  will  render  the  confession 
void,59  but  this  rule  has  its  reasonable  limitations, 
and  must  not  be  applied  with  such  strictness  as  to 
defeat  the  obvious  intention  of  the  parties  and  make 
the  power  inoperative.6^ 

American   Express  Co.  v.   Pinckney, 
39  111.   392—434  C.J.  p  (107  note  35. 


As  waiver  or  release.  As  a  general  rule  a  war- 
rant or  power  of  attorney  by  its  own  terms  either 
includes,  or  operates  as,  a  waiver  of  process,61  and 
authorizes  a  judgment  to  be  confessed  in  accord- 
ance with  the  power  without  notice  to  the  gran- 
tor.62 Where  the  warrant  of  attorney  expressly 
waives  or  releases  all  errors  which  intervene  in  the 
entering  of  a  judgment,  it  operates  to  waive  or  re- 
lease all  errors  in  the  warrant  and  in  the  proceed- 
ings thereunder,6^  except  such  as  go  to  the  lack 


Where  wording1  of  warrant  is  clear, 
resort  may  not  be  had  to  any  other 
part  of  note  for  purpose  of  constru- 
ing the  warrant;  but  w^ere  warrant 
is  subject  to  construction  the  whole 
instrument  will  be  looked  to  in  order 
to  glean  its  meaning. — Irwin  v.  Raw- 
.  ling,  MojApp.,  141  S.W.2d  228. 

Perforated  document 

Where  conditional  sales  contract 
and  bond  and  warrant  were  printed 
on  the  same  sheet  of  paper  with  a 
line  of  perforations  between  them  to 
facilitate  physical  separation,  the 
two  instruments  were  separate  con- 
tracts and  any  obligation  under  the 
•contract  of  conditional  sale  to  resell 
in  order  to  lay  the  foundation  of  a 
suit  for  deficiency  thereunder  was 
irrelevant  to  the  definite  and  uncon- 
ditional obligation  to  pay  according 
to  the  terms  of  the  bond.— Fidelity 
Acceptance  Corporation  v.  Alloway, 
23  A.2d  294,  127  N.J.Law  450. 

modification  agreement 

Original  written  lease  and  sepa- 
rate instrument  reducing  monthly 
rental  but  providing  that  all  other 
terms,  etc.,  of  lease  should  remain  in 
full  effect  must  be  considered  togeth- 
er and  fact  that  they  were  separate 
instruments  did  not  preclude  entry 
•of  judgment  by  confession  under 
power  of  attorney  contained  in  origf- 
Inal  lease  for  rent  computed  under 
modification  agreement — Davidson  v. 
R.  G.  Lydy  (Parking  Co.,  57  N.E.2d 
419,  324  Ill.App.  84. 

56.  U.S.— Nardi  v.  'Poinsatte,  D.C. 
Ind.,  46  F.2d  $47— Bower  v.  Casa- 
nave,  D.C.N.Y.,  44  F.Supp.  501 — 
National  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Elvain,  D.C.Tex.,  21  F.Supp.  838. 

Bel.— Rhoads  v.  Mitchell,  Super.,  47 
A.2d  174. 

111. — Hughes  v.  First  Acceptance 
Corporation,  260  IlLApp.  176. 

Md. — John  B.  Colt  Co.  v.  Wright,  159 
A.  743,  162  Md.  <88-7. 

Mich.— Gordon  v.  Heller,  260  N.W. 
156,  271  Mich.  240,  certiorari  de- 
nied 56  S.Ct  140,  296  U.S.  613,  80 
L.Ed.  440. 

Mo. — Irwin  v.  Rawling,  App.,  141  S. 
W.2d  223 — George  Edw.  Day  Sons 
v.  Robb,  139  S.W.2d  5*33,  235  Mo. 
App.  834,  certiorari  .quashed  State  . 


ex  rel.  Robb  v.  Shain,  149  S.W.2d 
812,  347  Mo.  928. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Lock- 
hart  v.  Rouault  14  P.«2d  268,  270. 
136  NJM.  310. 

Ohio. — Saulpaugh  v.  Born,  154  N.E. 
16-6,  22  Ohio  App.  275— Kinsman 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Jerko,  25  Ohio  N.P., 
N.S.,  445. 

Pa. — Baldwin  v.  American  Motor 
Sales  Co.,  168  A.  507,  309  Pa.  275— 
William  B.  Bambo  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Dragone,  156  A.  311, 
<305  Pa.  24— Deibert  v.  Rhodes,  140 
A.  515,  291  Pa,  550— Hogsett  v. 
Lutrarto,  18  A.2d  902,  140  Pa.Su- 
per.  419 — Hooper  to  Use  of  v.  Ock- 
er,  50  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  390— Maricic 
v.  Slesser,  44  PaJMst  &  Co.  695, 
52  Dauph.Co.  185 — Jasuta  v.  Za- 
remba,  ConuFL,  47  Lack.Jur.  157 
— Burgunder  v.  Cerceo,  Com.Pl.,  91 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  576. 

Va. — Bank  of  Chatham  v.  Arendall, 
16  S.E.2d  352.  178  Va.  1813. 

34  C.J.  p  107  note  (30— 6  C.J.  p  646 
note  189. 

57«  Colo. — Stewart  v.  Public  Indus- 
trial Bank,  277  P.  782,  85  Colo. 
546. 

111. — Preisler  v.  Gulezynski,  264  HL 
App.  12. 

Ohio. — Kinsman  Nat.  Bank  v.  Jerko, 
25  Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,-4!45. 

Pa. — Baldwin  v.  American  Motor 
Sales  Co.,  103  A.  507,  -309  Pa.  275 
—William  B.  Rambo  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Dragone,  156  A,  311, 
505  Pa.  24. 

34  C.J.  p  107  note  31. 

68.  U.S.— Narda  v.  -Poinsatte,  D.C. 
Ind.,  46  F.2d  s347. 

111.— Holmes  v.  Partridge,  81  N.E.2d 
948,  375  HI.  5-21— Wells  v.  George 
W.  Durst  Chevrolet  Co.,  ITS  N.E. 
93,  541  111.  108— McFadden  v.  Lew- 
is, 27i3  IlLApp.  343— Berlin  v.  Udell 
iPrinting  Co.,  271  IlLApp.  464— 
Hymen  v.  Anschicks,  270  IlLApp. 
202— Doss  v.  Evans,  270  IlLApp. 
55. 

Ohio. — Kinsman  Nat.  Bank  v.  Jerko, 
25  Ohio  N.P..N.S.,  445. 

Pa. — Beers  v.  Fallen  Timber  Coal 
Co.,  t!61  A.  409,  307  Pa,  261— Wil- 
liam B.  Bambo  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Dragone,  166  A.  4U.1,  "305 
•Pa.  24— Boggs  v.  Levin,  1<46  A.  533, 
297  Pa.  1131— Dime  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  Pittston  v.  ManganieUo.  31 
A.2d  504,  152  Pa.Super.  270— Jor-, 

281 


dan  v.  Kirschner,  94  Pa,Super. 
252  —  Hooper  to  Use  of  v.  Ocker,  50 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  1390  —  Jasuta  v.  Za- 
remba,  Com.PL,  47  Lack.Jur.  157 

—  Yellow  Mfg.  Credit  Corporation 
v.  Rooney,  ComJPL,  9  Sch.Reg.  119 

—  Lawton   v.    Garrett,   ComJPL,   22 
Wash.  Co.  19S. 

W.Va,—  Perkins    v.    Hall,    17    S.R2d 

795,  123  W.Va.  707. 
34  C.J.  p  107  note  32. 


rent 

Lease  provision  authorizing  les- 
sor to  confess  judgment  for  damag- 
es for  breach  of  covenants  did  not 
authorize  confession  of  judgment  for 
rent  for  balance  of  term  payable  in 
advance.  —  General  Realty  Co.  v. 
Gold,  142  A.  279,  29«3  Pa.  260. 
Holdover 

(1)  Confession     of     judgment     in 
lease    does    not   authorize   judgment 
for    rent    after    expiration    of   term 
where  the  tenant  holds  over.  —  Weiss 
v.  Danilezik,  262  ULApp.  5-51. 

(2)  This  rule  applies  only  where 
the  term  definitely  expires.  —  Thomp-. 
son    v.    Cams,    93    Pa,  Super.    575  — 
Moorehead  v.  King,  Com.Pl.,  23  Erie 
Co.   366  —  Newswander  v.   Fox,   Com. 
PL,  86  Pittsb.Leg.J.  342. 

59.  N.M.—  Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Lockhart  v.  Rouault,   14   P.2d  2*68, 
270,  36  N.M.  810. 

Ohio.  —  Kinsman  Nat.  Bank  v,  Jerko, 

25  Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  445. 
Pa.  —  Beers    v.    Fallen    Timber    Coal 

Co.,   161   A.   409,   307   Pa.   261—  Es- 

srig  v.  Greenburg,  5  Pa.Dist  &  Co. 

189. 
34  <C.J.  p  107  note  33. 

60,  111.—  First    Nat    Bank    v.    Gal- 
braith,  2ffl  IlLApp.  240. 

N.J.  —  Gotham  Credit  Corporation 
v.  iPowell,  138  A.2d  700,  22  N.J,Misc. 
<301. 

34  C.J.  p  107  note  i3»4. 

6X,    Ala.  —  Bag-gelt  v.  Alabama  Chem- 

ical Co.,  47   So.  102,   156  Ala.   637. 
Fla.  —  Carroll   v.    Gore,    MS    So.    6313, 

106    Fla.    582,    89   A.L.R.    1495. 
N.J.  —  Gotham  Credit  Corporation  v. 

Powell,   38  A.2d   700,    22   N.J.Misc, 

301. 

34  C.J.  p  108  note  46. 
62,    Ala.  —  Hutchinson  v.  Balmer,  40 

So.  339,  147  Ala,  517. 

33.  111.—  First  Nat  Bank  v.  Royer, 
273  IlLApp.  15S. 


§154 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


of  jurisdiction  in  the  court  to  enter  the  judgment64 
or  lack  of  power  under  the  warrant  to  confess  the 
judgment;65  and  it  has  been  held  that  such  a  stip- 
ulation in  a  power  of  attorney  is  not  abrogated  by 
the  opening  of  the  judgment  for  the  purpose  of  al- 
lowing defendant  to  present  a  defense.66 

b.  For  Whom  Judgment  May  Be  Entered 

Judgment  may  be  confessed  only  In  favor  of  the  per- 
son specified  in  the  warrant,  who  may  be  the  holder  or 
assignee  of  the  obligation  the  warrant  was  given  to  se- 
cure. 

The  warrant  of  attorney  should  name  or  describe 
with  reasonable  certainty  the  person  in  whose  favor 
the  judgment  is  to  be  entered,67  and  judgment  can 
be  confessed  in  favor  only  of  the  person  named  or 
who,  from  a  construction  of  the  whole  instrument, 


it  is  evident  it  was  the  intention  that  judgment 
should  be  confessed.68 

Where  a  warrant  of  attorney  attached  to  a  bond 
or  note  authorizes  a  confession  of  judgment  in  fa- 
vor of  the  assignee  or  holder  thereof,  the  warrant 
is  regarded  as  security  and  authorizes  a  confession 
of  judgment  in  favor  of  one  to  whom  the  bond  or 
note  has  been  transferred,  and  who  is  the  holder 
thereof  at  the  time  judgment  is  confessed,69  al- 
though the  note  is  not  negotiable;70  and  a  judgment 
confessed  in  favor  of  one  who  at  the  time  is  not 
the  holder  of  the  note  is  void.71  Where  the  war- 
rant does  not  specify  the  person  in  whose  favor 
judgment  may  be  confessed,  it  has  been  held  that  it 
authorizes  the  confession  of  a  judgment  in  favor 
of  the  assignee  or  other  legal  holder  of  the  bond, 


Pa.— Kait  v.  Hose,  41  A.2d  750,  1851 
Pa.  5'60 — Peerless  Soda  Fountain 
Service  Co.  v.  Llpschutz,  101  Pa- 
Super.  568. 

34  C.J.  p  108  note  48. 

64i  111.— Krickow  v.  (Pennsylvania 
Tar  Mfg.  Co.,  87  IttApp.  65«. 

Pa,— Peerless  Soda  Fountain  Service 
Co.  v.  Lipschutz,  101  Pa.Super. 
5  6  8 — Advance-Rumely  Thresher 
Co.  v.  Frederick,  98  Pa,Super.  &60. 

65.  (Pa, — Boggs  v.  Levin,  146  iA.  5S3B, 
29T  Pa.  1J31 — Advance-Rumely 
Thresher  Co.  v.  Frederick,  98  Pa, 
Super,  560— MSarQuette  v.  McFar- 
land,  Com.Pl.,  133  Del.Co.  531— 
Benesch  &  Sons  Co.  v.  Dunlap, 
Com.Pl.,  41  Sch.L.R.  139— Noonan 
v.  Hoff,  Com.Pl.,  57  York  Leg.Rec. 
1113,  affirmed  R.  S.  Noonan,  Inc., 
v.  Hoff,  i38  A.2d  5(3,  SSO  Pa,  295. 

3*4  C.J.  p  108  note  50. 

6&    111. — Freeman   r.    Counsel!,    206 

Hl.App.  &3& 

Certificate  of  no  defense  in  nonne- 
gotiable  judgment  note  given  for 
price  of  furnace  was  held  not  to  es- 
top makers  setting  up  defense 
against  assignee  that  payee  failed  to 
perform  contract — Standard  Furnace 
Co.  v.  Both,  156  A.  '600,  102  PaiSu- 
per.  341. 
07*  Ohio. — Drake  v.  Simpson,  11 

Ohio  Dec.,  Reprint,  #54,  30  Cinc.L. 

Bui.  2(36. 

3<4  CJ,  y  108  note  5*. 
Alternative  payees 

A  warrant  of  attorney,  authoriz- 
ing confession  of  judgment  In  favor 
of  the  legal  holder  of  a  note,  author- 
ized the  entry  of  judgment  In  favor 
of  one  of  the  joint  payees  of  the 
note.— (Paluszewski  v.  Tomczak,  273 
IlLApp.  245. 

68.  HI.— Barkhausen  v.  Naugher, 
App.,  -64  NvE.2d'  561— Mutual  Real- 
ty v.  Gagidis,  0*  N.E.2d  248,  298 
ULApp.  419. 

Pa.— Ulick  v.  Vibration  Specialty  Co., 
S5  JL24  332,  *48  Pa,  241—£ogg»  T. 


Levin,  146  A.  $33,  297  Pa,  131— 
Hooper  to  TTse  of  v.  Ocker,  50  Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  390— Keystone  Trust 
Co.  v.  Aaronson,  Com.Pl.,  55  Dauph. 
Co.  144 — Soklove  v.  Lalitas,  Com. 
PI.,  30  DeLCo.  370— Merchants  Nat 
Bank  v.  Smulovitz,  Com.Pl.,  28  Brie 
Co.  29»3— Brown  v.  Mondeau,  Com. 
PI.,  39  Luz.Lreg.Reg.  3— Commercial 
Alliance  v.  Kelly,  Com.Pl.,  38  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  174— Burgunder  v.  Cer- 
ceo,  Com.Pl,,  91  Pittsb.Leg.J.  576 
— 'Benesch  &  Sons  Co.  v.  Dunlap, 
<2om.Pl.,  41  Sch.L.R.  139. 

W.Va.— Perkins  v.  Hall,  17  fi.E.2d 
795,  123  W.Va.  707. 

34  C.J.  p  108  note  $3. 

Agent 

(1)  Lease  entered  into  by  agent  as 
lessor     authorizing     confession     of 
judgment     against     lessee     permits 
judgment  in  name  of  agent  to  use  of 
owner  of  premises. — Boggs  v.  Levin, 
146  A.  533,  297  Pa,  131. 

(2)  Where   lease   described  lessor 
as  agent  and  provided  further  that 
term  "lessor"  should  include  owner, 
and  authorized  owner  to  proceed  in 
its  own  name  to  confess  judgment, 
corporation  not  named  in  lease,  but 
averring   that   it    was    true    owner, 
was  entitled  to  enter  confession  of 
judgment  in  its  name.— Metropolitan 
Life    Ins.    Co.    v.    Associated   Auc- 
tioneers,  177   A.   48*.   117   Pa-Super. 
242. 

Heirs     ' 

Where  there  was  nothing  in  lease 
authorizing  warrant  of  attorney  to 
confess  judgment  for  rent,  except 
in  favor  of  the  lessor,  lessor's  heirs 
could  not,  in  the  name  of  the  lessor's 
administrators,  exercise  the  warrant 
of  attorney  to  confess  judgment, 
since  a  warrant  to  confess  a  money 
judgment  is  not  a  "covenant  that 
runs  with  the  land,"  because  it  does 
not  directly  concern  or  touch  the 
land.— Hogsett  v.  Lutrario,  13  A.2d 
902,  140  PaJSuper.  419. 

Judgment  cannot  be  entered  in  fa- 
vor of  a  stranger  to  the  contract— 

282 


Ulick  v.  Vibration  Specialty  Co.,  35 
A.2d  332,  .348  Pa.  241— Boggs  v. 
Levin,  146  A.  5'33,  297  Pa,  131— 
Hogsett  v.  ILutrario,  13  A.2d  902,  140 
Pa.Super.  419— (DeBolt  v.  Fullem, 
Com.Pl.,  8  B^y.L.J.  ITS. 
Use-plaintiff 

Where  -proper  partiefe  to  agreement 
were  joined  as  parties  plaintiff,  it 
was  immaterial  that  use-plaintiffs 
were  added.— Wilson  v.  Vincent,  150 
A.  642,  300  Pa,  321. 

83.  Pa.— Oberlin  v.  Parry,  134  A. 
460,  -287  Pa,  224— Philadelphia 
Saving  »Fund  Society  v.  Orloff,  37 
Pa,Dist  &  Co.  '88— Marquette  v. 
McFarland,  Com.Pl.,  53  Del.Co.  531 
—DeBolt  v.  Fullem,  Com.PL,  '8 
Ifiay.L.J.  17*5 — Freeman  v.  Berger, 
Com.Pl.,  45  Lack.Jur.  269 — Bell  v. 
Lawler,  Com.Pl.,  45  Lack.Jur.  181 
— South  Side  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Scheuer,  Com.PL,  43  Lack.Jur.  95. 
34  C.J.  p  108  note  &4. 

Assignee  does  not  stand  in  bettor 
position  than  original  obligee;  his 
exercise  of  power  to  confess  judg- 
ment is  subject  to  same  conditions 
as  though  power  were  still  in  origi- 
nal obligee.— E.  Z.  Heating  Co.  v. 
Rubin,  m  A.  3-35,  107  Pa.Suj>er.  105. 
Assignment  for  benefit  of  creditors 
Where  note  authorizing  confession 
of  judgment  was  transferred  by 
•payee  to  trustee  pursuant  to  a  deed 
of  trust  for  benefit  of  payee's  credi- 
tors, trustee  stood  in  place  of  payee, 
and  legal  situation  of  parties  with 
regard  to  note  was  same  as  though 
payee  had  entered  judgment  by  con- 
fession on  note  against  makers. — 
Foland  v.  Hoffman,  Md.,  47  A.2d  62. 
Guarantor  of  note 
111. — Cohn  v.  Kraus,  255  IlLApp.  391. 

70.  Mass. — Richards  v.  Barlow,  6  N. 
EL  6*8, 140  Mass.  218. 

71.  Pa. — Dime  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Pittston   v:   Manganiello,   -31  A.2d 
564,.  152  Pa.Super.  270. 

34  C.J.  p  108  note  5*. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


154 


note,  or  obligation,  at  the  time  of  confession  ;** 
but  it  has  also  been  held  that  such  a  power  of  at- 
torney is  not  negotiable,  and  that,  when  the  bond 
or  note  is  transferred,  the  power  becomes  invalid 
and  inoperative.73 

A  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment  au- 
thorizes a  confession  in  favor  of  the  executor  or 
administrator  of  the  beneficiary  of  the  power,74  or 
of  his  legal  representative,  such  as  his  trustee.75 

c.  Against  Whom  Judgment  May  Be  Entered 
Judgment  may  be  confessed  under  a  warrant  of  at- 


torney against  such  persons  only  as  the  terms  of  the 
warrant  authorize. 

Judgment  may  be  confessed,  tinder  a  warrant  of 
attorney,  against  such  persons  only  as  the  terms  of 
the  warrant  authorize76  and  who  join  in  the  execu- 
tion of  the  warrant.77  A  power  of  attorney  to  con- 
fess judgment  is  not  available  against  one  who 
signs  it,  or  the  -  obligation  secured,  not  as  maker, 
but  only  in  the  character  of  a  surety75  or  guaran- 
tor,™ unless  the  terms  of  the  warrant  so  provide.80 

In  case  of  joint  debtors,  who  jointly  execute  the 
power  of  attorney,  a  judgment  may  be  confessed 
thereon  only  against  all  the  makers,81  and  not 


72.  lit — Sharp  v.  Barr,  284  HL'App. 
214. 

Pa.— Gluck  v.  PolakoflC,  17  PaJMfct.  & 
Co.  640 — Bautsch,  to  Use  of 
Schlear  v.  Bubbenmoyer,  CorauPL, 
32  Berks  CO.L.J.  *33— DeBolt  v. 
Pullera,  Com.Pl.,  3  Fay.L.J.  175. 

34  C.J.  p  109  note  57. 

73.  Ohio.— «pence  v.  Umerine,  21  N. 
2L  366,   46  Ohio  St  439,  15  Axn.8. 
R.  634. 

34  C.J.  p  109  note  58. 

74.  Ohio.— Drake     y.    Simpson,     11 
Ohio  Dec.,  Reprint,  854,  80  Cinc.&. 
BuL  236. 

34  C.J.  p  109  note  59. 

75.  Ohio.— Martin  T.  Belment  Bank, 
13  Ohio  250. 

Proof  of  authority 

Power  to  confess  Judgment  for 
voluntary  association  or  assignees 
did  not  authorize  recovery  of  Judge- 
ment by  individuals  describing  them- 
selves as  "trustees"  of  voluntary  as- 
sociation, but  not  establishing  right 
to  exercise  power.— Wells  v.  Georgre 
W.  Durst  Chevrolet  Co.,  173  N.B. 
92,  -341  I1L  108. 

76.  Pa. — Dime  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Pittston   v.    O'Boyle,    6   A-2d   10*6, 
«334    Pa.     500 — Southern    Lime    & 
Stone  Co.  v.  Baker,  127  A,  221,  281 
Pa.   587,  amended  127  A.  7W,  282 
Pa,  204. 

34  JC.J.  !P  109  note  61. 
Xassee's  successor  or 

(1)  Assignee's   agreement   to   per- 
form lease  was  held  not  to  authorize 
lessor  to  enter  Judgment  by  confes- 
sion against  assignee  under  warrant 
in  original  lease.— Ansley  v.  George 
Coal  Mining  Company,  -88  Pa.Super. 
40. 

(2)  Original   lessee  was  a  proper 
party    against    whom   Judgment   by 
confession  should  have  been  entered 
in  amicable  action  of  ejectment  pur- 
suant  to   warrant  of  attorney  con- 
tained in  written  lease  even  though 
lessee's  assignee,  who  was  not  a  par 
ty  to  lease  and  had  signed  no  war- 
rant of  attorney,  was  in  actual  phys 
teal  possession  of  the  premises,  re 


gardless  of  whether  such  assignee] 
if  lease  be  considered  an  assignee  or  j 

subtenant— Kait  v.  Rose,  41  A.2d 
50,  351  Pa.  560. 

77.  Pa.— McFadden  v.  Gohrs,  93  Pa- 
Super.  134 — Indiana  'Land  and  Im- 
provement Co.  v.  Ferrier  Bun  Coal 
Co.,  6  FSLDist  &  Co.  33,  39  York 
Leg.Rec.  -61. 

34  a  J.  p  109  note  62. 

Execution,  through  agent 

Under  statute,  the  prothonotary  of 
a  court  of  record  may  look  beyond 
the  instrument  in  which  judgment  is 
confessed  and  enter  Judgment 
against  the  person  or  persons  who 
executed  the  instrument,  and  that 
does  not  mean  that  he  may  enter 
Judgment  only  against  persons  who 
signed  the  instrument,  bat  partners 
and  principals  whose  agents  have 
signed  for  them  are  included.— 
Jamestown  Banking  .Qo.  v.  Conneaut 
Lake  'Dock  &  Dredge  Co.,  14  A.2d  325, 
3-39  Pa.  26. 
Hxecntion  by  corporation  official 

(1)  A   warrant   of   attorney   in 
note   signed  by  corporation  and  by 
its  president  in  his  official  capacity 
only,  which  authorized  confession  of 
Judgment  on  ntote  "against  the  under- 
signed," did  not  apply  to  president 
so  as  to  make  h*m  individually  liable, 
although  his  name  appeared  on  back 
of  note. — Dover  Motors  Corporation 
v.  North  &  South  Motor  (Lines.  19$ 
A.  592,  3  W.W.Harr.,  DeL,  467. 

(2)  A  Judgment  by  confession  on 
corporate  note  which  was  signed  on 
face  thereof  by  corporation's  presi- 
dent and  was  indorsed  by  the  presi- 
dent  personally,   was   not   void   be- 
cause power  of  attorney  did  not  au- 
thorize   a    confession    of    Judgmeni 
against  president  under  his  contrad 
of   guaranty,   where   note   contained 
warrant   of   attorney   expressly   au- 
thorizing entry  of  Judgment  against 
"makers,  endorsers  and  guarantors,' 
and  by  special  contract,  of  indorse 
ment  president  not  only  became  "a 
•party  to"  but  also  adopted,  agreed  to 
accept,  guaranteed,  and  assumed  al 
terms,  conditions  and  waivers  "con 
tained  in  the   note   on  the  reverse 

283 


ide  hereof."— ^National  Builders 
Bank  of  Chicago  v.  Simons,  31  N.E. 
>d  269,  307  IlLApp.  552. 

78.     HI.— Doss  v.  Evans,  270  IlLApp. 

55. 

34  C.J.  p  109  note  70. 
Point  maker  07  indorse* 

A  warrant  of  attorney,  for  confes- 
sion of  Judgment  contained  in  non- 
negotiable  note  was  binding  on  per- 
son whose  name  was  signed  on  the 
back  In  blank,  since  status  of  such 
person  was  that  of  a  Joint  maker 
notwithstanding  position  of  signa- 
ture.— Iglehart  v.  Farmers  Nat.  Bank 
of  Aana-polis,  Md.,  197  A.  133,  117  A. 
L.R.  667,  affirmed  200  A.  833,  117  A. 
L.H.  672. 

79b    Colo.— Sidwell     v.     First     Nat. 

Bank,  233  P.  153,  T6  Colo.  519,  41 

A.L.R.  1255. 
HL — Sharpe      v.       Second       Baptist 

Church   of  Maywood,    274   IlLApp. 

<374» 

80.  Md.— Johnson  v.  Phillips,  122  A. 
7,  143  Md.  16. 

Where  indorse?  assented  to  all 
terms  and  conditions  of  note,  provi- 
sion in  note  for  confession  of  Judg- 
ment was  applicable  to  both  maker 
and  indorser. — Rhoads  v.  National 
Bank  of  CockeysviUe,  190  A.  -750,  172 
Md.  123. 

81,  HL — Duggan  v.  Kupitz,  22  N.E. 
2d  392,  301  IlLApp.  230— Dulsky  v. 
Lerner,  223  IlLApp.  228. 

34  C.J.  p  109  note  63. 

judgment  on  a  partnership  note 
signed  in  the  firm  name  may  prop- 
erly be  confessed  against  the  firm 
and  also  against  the  members  of  the 
firm  individually. — Brumbaugh  v. 
Brumbaugh,  16  P«uDist.  &  Co.  281. 

Waiver 

Parties  executing  note,  authorizing 
entry  of  Judgment  thereon  after  de- 
fault, in  consideration  of  loan  to 
corporation  by  payee,  who  Joined  in 
execution  thereof,  waived  objection 
to  being  sued  Jointly  with  payee, 
who  was  also  plaintiff.— Koenig  v. 
Curran's  Kestaurant  &  Baking  Co., 
,  159  A*  553,  306  Pa.  "345. 


§  154 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


against  one  alone;82  and  in  case  of  the  death  of  one 
of  them  judgment  cannot  be  confessed  against  the 
survivors.83  Where  the  obligation  and  warrant  of 
attorney  are  joint  and  several,  a  joint  judgment  may 
be  confessed  against  all  the  makers84  or  the  sur- 
vivors of  them,85  or  a  several  judgment  may  be 
confessed  against  each  maker.86  A  joint  judgment 
cannot  -be  confessed  or  entered  on  separate  war- 
rants.87 

d.  Place  of  Exercising  Power 

Unless  restricted  by  the  terms  of  the  warrant,  the 
authority  to  confess  Judgment  may  be  exercised  In  a 
county  or  state  other  than  that  In  which  It  Is  executed. 

The  power  granted  in  a  power  of  attorney  to  con- 
fess judgment  may  be  exercised  in  a  county  or  state 
other  than  that  in  which  it  is  executed,  where  it  is 


not  restricted  in  this  respect,88  especially  where  it 
authorizes  judgment  thereon  "in  any  court  of  rec- 
ord ;"89  but,  where  it  is  apparent  from  the  face  of 
the  warrant  that  it  is  to  be  used  only  in  a  certain 
state,  it  cannot  be  used  in  another  stated0 

e.  Time  and  Conditions  for  Exercising  Power 

A  warrant  or  power  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment 
can  be  exercised  only  at  the  time  and  on  the  occurrence 
of  the  conditions  specified. 

A  judgment  by  confession  under  a  warrant  of 
attorney  can  be  taken  or  entered  only  at  such  time 
as  is  authorized  by  the  terms  of  the  warrant,91  and 
on  the  occurrence  of  the  conditions  specified  in 
the  warrant,  such  as  defendant's  default  on  the  obli- 
gation the  warrant  was  given  to  secure.92  Where 
the  warrant  is  without  limit  of  time  it  has  been 


82.  I1L— Holmes  v.  Partridge,  31  N. 
E.2d   948,    3T5    111.    521— First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Cullom  v.  Chandler,  35  N. 
E.2d  799,  311  TlLApp.  254— Duggan 
v.   Kupitz,   22   N.E.2d   392,  501  111. 
App.    230 — Dulsky   v.    lierner,    223 
IlLApp.  228. 

34  C.J.  p  109  note  «4. 

83.  111. — Genden  Y.   Bailen,   275   111. 
A-pp.  >382. 

Ohio.— -Saulpaugh  v.  Born,  154  N.E. 

1-66,  22  Ohio  App.  275. 
34  C.J.  >p  109  note  65. 
Death    as    revocation    of   power    to 

confess  Judgment  see  Infra  $  156. 

84.  Md.— Ig-lehart  v.    Farmers   Nat. 
•Bank  of  Annapolis,  197  A.  133,  117 
A.L.R.  667,  affirmed  200  A,  833,  117 
A-L.R.  672. 

Pa. — Quandel  v.  Orff,  Com.PL,  4  Sen. 

Beg.  322. 
34  C.J.  p  109  note  6$. 

85.  111. — Farmers'     Exchange    Bank 
of   Blvaston   v.    Sollars,    187   N.B. 
289,  "S'S'S   111.    224— Nash   v.  Clark, 
34   N.E.2d   876,    310    IlLApp.   437— 
People  T.  Cody  Trust  Co.,  23  N.E. 
2d  170,  301  IlLApp.  580. 

Mo. — Irwin  v.  Rawling,  App.,  141  S. 

W.2d  223. 
Ohio. — !Frey  v.  Cleveland  Trust  Co., 

55  N.E.2d  416,  143  Ohio  St.  319. 
Pa.— Williams  v.  Smith,   3=8  Pa.IMst. 

&  Co.  28-3,  7  Sch.Reg.  74,  10  Som. 

Co.Leg.J.   38— South  Side  Bank  & 

Trust  Co.  v.  Scheuer,  Com.Pl.,  43 

•Lack.Jur.  95. 
•34  C.J.  p  109  note  67. 

88.  U.S. — George  B.  Heater  Bank  v. 
•Straus,  C.C.Pa.,  170  F.  4'89. 

111.— Holmes  v.  Partridge,  31  N.B.2d 
948,  375  111.  521— Smith  v.  Roberts, 
24  NJBL2d  720,  30.3  IlLApp.  89— 
People  v.  Cody  Trust  .Qo.,  23  N.B. 
2d  170,  301  IlLApp,  S-80— Reitinger 
v.  Carlson,  272  IU.App.  104—Rich- 
man  v.  Menrath,  246  IlLApp.  1. 

Ohio. — Saulpaugh  v.  Born,  154  N.flBL 
1-66,  22  Ohio  App.  275. 

87.    Pa.— First   Nat.   Bank   v.    Ken- 


drew,    160    A.    227,    105    Pa.Super. 

142 — Pasco   Rural  Lighting  Co.  v. 

Roland.    88    Pa. Super.    245. 

34  C.J.  p  109  note  69. 

88.  Md.-^John  B.  Colt  Co.  T.  Wright 
159  A.  74*,  162  Md.  3S7. 

34  C.  J.  p  109  note  72. 

89.  Pa. — William   J,   Ryan,   Inc.,    to 
Use  T.   Bodek,    10  Pa.Dist.   &  Co. 
520. 

54  C.J.  p  109  note  73. 

90.  Ohio. — -Kinsman    Nat.    Bank    T. 
Jerko,  25  Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  445 

34  C.J.  p  109  note  74. 

91.  111. — Bankers  Bldg.  v.  Bishop,  61 
N.E.2d   2T-6,    326   IlLApp.   256,   cer- 
tiorari    denied   Bishop   v.   Bankers 
Bldg.,  66  S.Ct  1352. 

Pa. — Seltzer  v.  Novor  &  Israel,  12 
Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  -551 — Jasuta  v.  Zar- 
emba,  (Com.PL,  47  Lack.Jur.  157. 

34  C.J.  p  109  note  76. 

92.  IlL — Kaspar      American      State 
Bank  v.  Oul  Homestead  Ass'n, 
N.B.2d  785,  301  IlLApp.  326— Siben- 
aller  v.   Smock,   283  IlLApp.   452 — 
Berlin   v.    Udell   Printing  Co.,   271 
IlLApp.  -464— Baering  .v.  Bfpp,  247 
IlLApp.  51. 

Md.— <2ooke  v.  Real  Estate  Trust  Co., 
22  A.2d  5'54,  180  Md.  1<33. 

N.J.— Levin  v.  Wenof,  146  A.  789, 
7  N.J.Misc.  -603. 

Pa.— Mellon  v.  Ritz,  2  A.2d  699,  S32 
Pa.  97— 'Wilson  v.  Vincent,  150  A. 
642,  .300  Pa.  3  2  I—Mark  of  ski  v. 
Yanks,  146  A,  569,  297  Pa.  74— 
L  J.  Allen  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
v.  Barg,  183  A.  57,  120  Pa. Super. 
487 — Rome  Sales  &  Service  'Sta- 
tion v.  Finch,  183  A.  54,  120  Pa. 
Super.  402— Commonwealth  v. 
Eclipse  Literary  and  -Social  Club, 
178  A.  341,  117  Pa.Super.  339— 
Grant  Const  Co.,  for  Use  of  Home 
Credit  Co.,  v.  Stokes,  167  A.  64«3, 
169  Pa.Super.  421 — Arata  v. 
Wright,  101  Pa.Super.  576— Romm 
v.  ILobosco,  95  Pa.Super.  373 — 
Qoodis  y.  Stehle,  87  Pa.Super.  £3.6 

284 


— Baldwin  v.  American  Motor 
Sales  Co.,  19  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  850— 
Orner  v.  Hurwitch,  12  Pa.Dist.  & 
Co.  403,  affirmed  97  Pa.Super.  263 
— Qinter  v.  Bloser,  47  Pa.GDist.  & 
Co*  660 — Commonwealth  v.  Dib- 
ble, 41  FaJMst  &  Co.  206,  50 
Dauph.Co.  310— Siddall  v.  Burke, 
Com.PL,  29  DeLCo.  530— Kuhns  v. 
Chaffee,  Com.Pl.,  24  Erie  Co.  -6 — 
Automobile  Finance  Co.  v.  Varner. 
90  Pittsb.Leg.J.  169. 

34  C.J.  p  110  notes  77,  8-6—8  CJ.  p 
424  note  99. 

Acceleration  clause 

(1)  'Entering  judgment  by  confes- 
sion on  due  date  accelerated  by  non- 
payment,    according     to     provision 
therein,  was  proper. 

Colo. — Axelson  T.  Dailey  Co-op.  Co., 
298  P.  957,  88  Colo.  555. 

Pa. — 'Baldwin  v.  American  Motor 
Sales  Co.,  163  A.  507,  309  Pa,  275 
— Grant  Const.  Co.,  for  Use  of 
Home  Credit  Co.,  v.  Stokes,  167  A. 
643,  109  Pa.Super.  421. 

34  C.J.  «p  110  note  86  [a]. 

(2)  Where   lease  drawn  by  land- 
lords contained  provision  for  accel- 
erating entire  rent  on  certain   con- 
tingencies,   presumption   exists    that 
acceleration  was  not  intended,  with 
respect  to  provision  authorizing  con- 
fession of  judgment  on  tenant's  fail-, 
ure  to  pay  installments  of  rent  due 
and  silent  on  acceleration. — Baldwin 
v.  American  Motor  Sales  Co.,  supra. 

(-3)  Bailor  retaking  property  under 
bailment  lease  authorizing  confes- 
sion of  judgment  in  case  of  default 
can  recover  judgment  only  for  in- 
stallments of  rental  unpaid  at  time 
property  is  retaken.— Rome  Sales  & 
Service  Station  v.  !Pinch,  1&3  A.  54, 
120  Pa.Super.  402. 
After  banking1  hours 

Where  the  power  is  to  confess 
judgment  Immediately  on  default,  on 
a  note  payable  at  a  certain  bank  on 
a  certain  day,  judgment  may  be  en- 
tered after  banking  hours  on  the 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  154 


held  that  there  is  no  necessity  to  await  the  maturity 
of  the  obligation  before  the  entry  of  judgment,93 
although  execution  cannot  issue  until  there  has  been 
a  default  in  payment,94  especially  where  the  power 
contains  a  provision  to  that  effect  ;*5  but  it  has  also 
been  -held  that  judgment  cannot  be  confessed  under 
such  a  power  before  the  maturity  of  the  obliga- 
tion.96 If  the  warrant  authorizes  a  confession  "at 
any  term"  of  court,  judgment  may  be  entered  at 
the  present  term.9?  It  has  been  held  that  power 
to  confess  judgment  on  a  debt  or  claim  not  yet  due 
must  be  given  in  clear  and  precise  terms,98  but  there 
is  also  authority  holding  that  judgment  may  be  en- 
tered on  a  judgment  note  prior  to  maturity  unless 
there  is  a  restrictive  provision.99 

In  many  jurisdictions  it  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 


ment cannot  be  confessed  on  a  warrant  of  attorney 
executed  more  than  a  specified  time  before,  unless 
an  affidavit  is  filed  showing  that  the  maker  is  alive 
and  that  some  portion  of  the  debt  is  still  due,  and 
a  rule  of  court,  or  order  of  a  judge  in  vacation,  is 
obtained  granting  leave  to  enter  judgment;1  and 
in  some  jurisdictions,  after  twenty  years  without 
judgment  being  entered,  it  will  be  presumed  that 
the  warrant  of  attorney  has  been  revoked  ;2  but  it 
has  been  held  that  this  rule  does  not  apply  where 
the  power  is  coupled  with  an  interest  and  supported 
by  a  consideration,  and  is  necessary  to  effectuate 
the  security  to  which  it  is  attached.3  Moreover, 
the  rule  referred  to  does  not  go  to  the  question  of 
the  power  but  to  the  regularity  of  the  execution  of 
it;4  it  is  a  rule  of  presumption  which,  like  other 
presumptions,  may  be  rebutted.5 


day  named. — Osborn  v.  Rogers,  20  N. 
B.  365,  112  N.Y.  573. 
Place  for  demand 

A  lease  provision  authorizing1  the 
confession  of  a  judgment  In  eject- 
ment for  default  in  payment  of  rent 
is  available,  where  the  lease  does 
not  provide  a  place  at  which  the  rent 
is  payable,  only  if  the  landlord 
makes  demand  for  the  precise  rent 
due,  on  the  very  day  on  which  it  be- 
comes due,  and  on  the  most  notorious 
place  in  the  land. — Shapiro  v.  Malar- 
key,  122  A.  341,  278  Pa.  78,  29  A.L.R. 
1358. 

Failure  of  purchasers  of  land  to 
pay  taxes  was  held  not  to  authorize 
confession  of  judgment,  as  default 
in  payment  of  principal  or  interest — 
Hurley  v.  Henton,  142  A,  271,  293  Pa. 
289. 

Demand  note 

Demand  note  containing  warrant 
of  attorney  to  confess  judgment 
stipulating  that  judgment  should 
not  be  entered  except  in  default  of 
payment  authorized  entry  of  judg- 
ment only  after  demand  followed  by 
default  in  payment  and  on  averment 
of  such  demand  and  default,  but  de- 
mand note  which  did  not  require  that 
Judgment  be  entered  only  after  de- 
fault in  payment  of  note  could  be 
entered  in  judgment  before  default, 
since  entry  of  judgment  is  demand. — 
P.  Mfrmig  Co.  v.  Carter,  173  A.  726, 
11-3  Pa.Super.  231. 

Default  by  lessee 

Where  lessees,  under  a  lease  pro- 
viding that  in  case  the  property  be- 
came subject  to  levy  the  whole  rent 
should  be  payable,  delivered  automo- 
bile to  lessor  for  repairs,  and  while 
in  lessor's  possession  it  was  seized 
in  replevin  by  third  persons  claim- 
Ing  right  to  possession  paramount  to 
the  lessor,  and  assignee  of  the  lease 
obtained  possession  of  the  automo- 
bile and  entered  judgment  against 
defendants  by  confession,  alleging 


the  seizure  in  replevin  as  default  un- 
der the  lease,  the  assignee's  right  to 
enter  judgment  must  be  founded  on 
a  default  by  lessee,  and  not  on  acts 
or  default  by  lessor,  and,  the  lessee 
not  being  in  default  assignee  can- 
not confess  judgment  against  him. — 
Ferris  Motors  Corporation  v.  Lebe- 
gern,  120  A.  394,  27$  Pa.  395. 
Separate  contracts 

Where  it  appeared  that  conditional 
sales  contract  covering  automobile 
was  assigned  to  obligee  of  bond  and 
warrant  although  the  automobile 
was  repossessed  by  the  assignee,  ap- 
parently at  the  instance  of  the  buyer, 
and  there  was  nothing  to  show  that 
the  automobile  had  been  resold,  the 
assignee  could  confess  judgment  on 
the  bond  and  warrant  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  two  instruments  were 
separate  contracts. — Fidelity  Accept- 
ance Corporation  v.  AUoway,  23  A.2d 
294,  127  N.J.Law  450— Ryba  v.  At- 
las Automobile  Finance  Corporation, 
3  A.2d  447,  121  -N.J.Law  4T8. 

93.  Del.— Rhoads  v.  Mitchell,  Super., 
47  A.2d  174. 

HL— 'First  Nat  Bank  v.  Galbraith, 
271  IU.APP.  240— Handley  v.  Mo- 
burg.  266  ULApp.  356 — Great  West- 
ern Hat  Works  v.  Pride  Hat  Co., 
224  ULApp.  249. 

Md.— Hart  v.   Hart,   166  A.  414,   165 
Md.    77 — Johnson   v.    Phillips,    122 
A.  7,  143  Md.  16. 
Pa. — Dukas    v.    Cohen,    ConxPL,    33 

Luz.Leg.Reg.  163. 
•34  C.J.  p  110  note  '82. 
Right  to  confess  judgments  on  debts 
which  are  not  matured  see  supra 
§  159. 
Immediately  on  execution 

If  the  warrant  authorizes  a  con- 
fession "at  any  time  hereafter," 
judgment  may  be  entered  immediate- 
ly on  the  execution  of  the  power. — 
St  Clair  v.  Goldie,  244  ULApp.  357 
— ^34  C.J.  tp  110  note  79. 

94.  Pa.— Integrity    Title    Insurance, 

285 


Trust    Safe-Deposit    Co.    v.    Rau, 
26    A.    220,    153    Pa.    488— Miners 
Sav.  Bank  of  Pittston  v.  Falzone, 
Com.PL,  35  Luz.Leg.Reg.  315. 
34  C.J.  p  110  note  83. 

95.  Iowa. — Cuykendall    v.    Doe,    105 
2C.W.    698,   129   Iowa   453.   113   Am. 
S.R.  472,  '3  L.R.A.,N.S.,  449. 

Pa. — Pacific  Lumber  Co.  of  Illinois 
v.  Rodd,  135  A.  122,  28-7  Pa.  454— 
Shapiro  V.  Malarkey,  122  A.  341, 
278  Pa.  78,  29  A.L.R.  1358. 

96.  Wis.— Reid  v.  Southworth.  36  N. 
W.  866,  71  Wis.  288 — Sloane  v.  An- 
derson,  13  N.W.   684,   IS  N.W.   21, 
57  Wis.  123. 

97.  Pa.— Montellus      v.      Montelius, 
Brightly  79. 

98.  I1L — Webster     Grocery    Co.     v. 
Gammel,  1  N.-E.2d  890,  285  ULApp. 
277— Harris    v.    Bernfeld,    250    111. 
App.  446. 

34  C.J.  p  110  note  81. 

99.  Pa.— Mellon  v.  Ritz,  2  A.2d  699, 
3  £2  Pa,  97— Pacific  Lumber  Co.  of 
Illinois    v.    Rodd,    135    A.   122,    2S7 
Pa.    454— Chubb    v.    Kelly,   'SO    Pa. 
Super.  487 — Commonwealth  v.  Dib- 
ble, Pa.Com.PL,  41  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
206.    50    Dauph.Co.    «310— Lillis    v. 
Reed,  Com.Pl.,  21  Erie  Co.  8— Com. 
ex  reL  Argyle  v.  Jones,  Com.PL,  SO 
North.Co.  95. 

1.  Pa. — Grammes    v.    Haltzel,   Com. 
PL,  19  iLeh.L.J.  275. 

Wis.— Halfhill  v.  Halick,  129  N.W. 
1086,  145  Wis.  200. 

34  C.J.  p  110  note  87. 

Claim  barred  by  limitations  see  in- 
fra §  156. 

2.  -Del. — Parsons   T.    Cannon,    88   A. 
470,  27  DeL  298. 

3.  Wis.— Halfhill  v.  Malick,    129   N. 
W.  1086,  145  Wis.  200. 

4.  Wis.— Halfhill  v.  Malick,  supra. 

5.  HI.— Mitchell  v.  Comstock,  27  N. 
E.M   620,   305    ULApp.    360. 

Wis.— Halfhill  v.  Mallei?,  129  N.W. 
1086,  145  Wis.  200. 


§154 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


In  vacation.  A  warr*  it  for  the  confession  of 
judgment  "as  of  any  term,"  does  not  authorize 
judgment  to  be  entered  up  in  vacation;6  and  it  has 
been  held  that  a  warrant  to  confess  judgment  in 
any  court  of  record  does  not  authorize  a  confes- 
sion of  judgment  before  a  clerk  in  vacation,7  but 
if  the  warrant  is  indefinite  as  to  the  time,  or  does 
not  refer  to  the  terms  of  the  court,  the  judgment 
may  be  confessed  in  vacation  as  well  as  in  term 
time** 

f.  Who  May  Exercise  Power 

A  warrant  or  power  of  attorney  to  confess  Judgment 
can  generally  be  exercised  only  by  the  person  author- 
ized In  the  warrant. 

The  authority  of  a  person  confessing  a  judgment 
for  another  must  appear  on  the  record;9  and  a 
warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment  should 
regularly  designate,  either  by  name  or  description, 
the  person  who  is  authorized  to  make  the  confes- 
sion of  judgment,10  and  only  the  person  so  desig- 


nated or  described  can  do  so.11  Under  a  statute  so 
providing,  however,  a  prothonotary  may  enter  a 
judgment  by  confession  on  the  instrument  con- 
taining the  warrant  without  the  necessity  of  an  at- 
torney appearing  for  defendant,12  but  such  a  statute 
does  not  prevent  a  judgment  being  confessed  in  the 
usual  way  by  the  person  empowered  under  the  war- 
rant.18 'The  person  designated  as  attorney  in  the 
power  of  attorney  need  not  be  the  person  to  whom 
the  claim  or  obligation  confessed  runs,14  nor  is  it 
necessary  that  he  should  be  an  attorney  at  law,15 
nor  is  it  necessary  that  a  particular  attorney  be 
named  or  described;  the  warrant  may  run  to  "any 
attorney"  of  a  particular  court  or  to  "any  attorney 
of  any  court  of  record,"16  or  to  any  attorney  select- 
ed by  the  creditor17  or  to  any  prothonotary  or 
clerk;18  and  it  has  been  held  that  in  such  a  case 
defendant  has  no  standing  to  be  first  heard  before 
entry  of  judgment19  Where  the  power  runs  to 
any  attorney,  it  may  be  exercised  by  two  persons, 
acting  jointly  or  as  partners,  both  being  attorneys 


•6.     Va.— Bank  of  Marion  v.  Spence, 

154  S.E.  488,  155  Va.  51. 
34  -C.J.  p  111  note  93. 

7.  Tnd.— Wieler  v.   Diver,   134  N.B. 
495,  78  Ind.App.  26. 

34  C.J.  p  111  note  94.          * 

8.  Ill — Long-   v.    Coffman,    230    111. 
Aipp.  527. 

Iowa.-— Ouykendall  v.  Doe,  10S  N.W. 

•698,  129  Iowa  45-3,  113  Am.S.R  472, 

3  L.R.A..N.S.,  449. 
.34  C.J.  p  111  note  95. 

9.  N.J.— <Jade  v.  Young,   3  N.J.Law 
369-4Campbell    v.    Cooper,    6   N.J. 

,     Law  142. 

1Q.  Pa. — Vogt  Farm  Meat  Products 
Co.  v.  Egfan,  8  Pa.Dlst.  &  Co.  550, 
22  Sch.L.R.  220,  74  Pittsb.Leg.J. 
504. 

34  C.J.  p  111  note  97. 

11.  Tex, — Grubbs  v.  Blum,  62  Tex. 
426. 

la.  Pa,— R.  S.  Noonan,  Inc.,  T.  Hott, 
38  A.2d  53,  350  Pa.  295— Common- 
wealth v.  J.  &  A.  Moeschlin,  Inc., 
170  A.  119,  314  Pa.  34— Deibert  v. 
Rhodes,  140  A.  51<5,  291  Pa.  550— 
Hefer  v.  Hefner,  95  Pa.Super.  551 
—Miller  y.  Desher,  12  PsuDist  ft 
Co.  315,  41  Lanc.L.Rev.  «35— Wil- 
liam J.  Ryan,  Inc.,  to  Use  v.  Bod- 
ek,  10  PaJDist.  &  Co.  520— Union 
Acceptance  Co.  v.  Grant  Motor 
Sales  Co.,  5  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  407,  23 
Luz.iLeg.Reg.  $9,  2  Som.Co.Leg.J. 
260,  39  York  Leg.Rec.  141— Steel- 
ton  Finance  Co.  v.  Kireta,  Com. 
PL.  46  Dauph.Oo.  426— Morris  v. 
Chevalier,  Com.PL,  20  Leh.L.J.  133 
—^Citizens  Bank  of  Wind  Gap  v. 
Sparrow,  Com.Pl.,  27  North.Co.  213 
— Mutual  Loan  Co.  v.  Steiger,  Com. 
PL,  48  Lanc.li.Rey.  -60,  56  York 
Leg.Rec.  13. 

34  C.J.  p  120  note  74. 


Authority  of  nonjudicial  officers  to 
enter  judgment  by  confession  see 
infra  5  161  b. 

Prothonotary  may  enter  Judgment 
but  has  not  power  to  confess  judg- 
ment 

Pa.— Melnick  v.  Hamilton,  87  Pa.Su- 
per.  575. 

Strict  compliance  with  statute 

(1)  The  mode  of  procedure  desig- 
nated   in    the    statute    for    entering 
judgment  on  a  note  by  prothonotary 
is  mandatory. — Oberlin  v.  Parry,  134 
A.  460,  287  Pa.  224. 

(2)  The   statute   must  be   strictly 
construed. — 'Dime  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
of  Pittston  y.   O'Boyle,   6  A.2d  106, 
334  Pa,  500 — Oberlin  v.  Parry,  supra. 

(•3)  The  instrument,  to  authorize 
entry  of  judgment  by  the  prothono- 
tary, must  expressly  or  by  clearest 
implication  contain  provisions  bring- 
ing it  within  the  statute. — Romberg- 
er  y.  Romberger,  139  A,  159,  290  Pa. 
454 — Oberlin  v.  Parry,  supra. 

13.  Pa. — R.  S.  Noonan,  Inc.,  Y.  Hoff, 
3*8  A.2d  53,  3*50  Pa.  295. 

14.  3T.J.— Burroughs  y.  gondit,  *  N. 
J.Law  300. 

15.  Pa.— Melnick  v.  Hamilton,  87  Pa. 
Super.  575 — Jones  &  Sons  v.  Piont- 
kowski,   37   Pa.Dist.   &  Co.   504,  3-3 
Luz-'Leg.Reg.  329. 

Va. — Virginia  Valley  Ins.  Co.  y.  Bar- 
ley, 16  Gratt  <363,  57  Va.  363. 

16.  CaL— Carlton   v.   Miller,    299   P. 
738,  114  CaLApp.  272. 

!Fla. — Corpus   Juris   cited  in,  Carroll 

v.  Gore,  143  So.  6&3,  637,  106  Ela. 

582,  89  A.L.R.  1495. 
Ohio. — Dayton  Morris   Plan  Bank  v. 

Graham,    191    NVB.    817,    47    Ohio 

App.  310. 
Pa.— Shure  v.  Goodimate  Co.,  153  A. 

286 


757,  302  Pa.  457— Hebrew  Loan  So- 
ciety of  Wyoming  Valley  v.  Margo- 
lis,  CorauPL,   33  iLuz.Leg.Reg.   101. 
54  C.J.  p  111  note  2. 
Attorney-client   relationship 

The  relationship  existing  between 
one  who  authorizes  an  entry  of  judg- ' 
ment  by  confession  "by  warrant  of 
attorney  an4  the  attorney  confessing 
judgment  is  not  the  confidential  one 
existing  between  attorney  and  client, 
and  it  is  not  even  necessary  that  the 
one  so  authorizing  shall  know  the 
attorney. — Withers  v.  Starace,  B.C. 
N.Y.,  22  F.Supp.  773. 

Person  exercising  the  power  must 
be  an  attorney  or  an  attorney  of  a 
court  of  record  where  the  warrant 
authorizes  only  such  person  to  exer- 
cise the  power, — Kirk  Johnson  &  Co. 
y.  Wilson,  18  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  672. 

17.  Pa. — Shure  v.  Goodinate  Co.,  14 
PaJDist   &  Co.   209,   79  PittslxLeg. 
J.  1*6,  affirmed  Shure  y.  Goodimate 
Ck>.,  153  A.  757,  302  Pa.  457. 

Tex. — Mikeska  y.  Blum,  63  Tex.  44. 
Plaintiff's  attorney 

A  warrant  of  attorney  authorizing 
confession  of  judgment  by  any  New 
Jersey  attorney  authorized  confes- 
sion of  judgment  by  a  New  Jersey 
attorney  representing  the  plaintiff. — 
Withers  v.  Starace,  D.C.N.T.,  22  F. 
Supip.  773. 

Power  of  attorney  to  any  attorney 
or  officer  of  creditor  corporation  was 
not  too  general  or  indefinite.' — Clay 
v.  People's  Finance  &  Thrift  Co.,  25 
S.W.2d  578, 160  Tenn.  390. 

18.  Pa. — Auto  Transit  Co.  T.  Koch, 
71  Pa.Super.  171. 

19.  Pa. — Mulhearn  y.  Roach,  24  Pa. 
Super.  483. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  154 


of  the  court,2<>  or  by  the  payee  of  the  note,  being 
an  attorney,  in  favor  of  the  holder  to  whom  he  has 
transferred  it21 

g.  Debt  or  Claim  for  Which  Judgment  May  Be 
Confessed 

Judgment  may  be  confessed  only  for  the  debt,  Ha- 
bility,  or  claim  authorized  by  the  warrant  or  power  of 
attorney. 

The  judgment  may  be  confessed  only  for  the 
debt,  liability,  or  claim  set  forth  or  described  in 
the  warrant  or  accompanying  obligation;22  and  for 
such  amount  only,  and  not  for  any  greater  or  small- 
er amount  than  that  specified  in  the  warrant  or  in 
the  note  or  other  obligation  which  it  secures  ;23  but, 
where  a  judgment  entered  under  a  power  of  at- 
torney is  erroneously  confessed  for  an  excessive 
amount,  it  is  void  only  as  to  the  excess,  and  not 
in  toto,24  unless  such  excess  is  the  result  of  fraud.25 
A  judgment  entered  on  a  bond  and  warrant  of  at- 
torney is  not  void,  but  voidable  only,  where  the 
warrant  authorizes  a  confession  of  judgment  for 
the  sum  mentioned  in  the  condition  of  the  bond  and 
the  judgment  is  entered  for  the  amount  of  the  pen- 
alty,26 or  where  the  warrant  is  general,  and  judg- 
ment is  entered  for  a  specified  sum,  without  refer- 
ring to  the  bond,27  or  where  the  warrant  author- 
izes judgment  for  the  amount  of  the  penalty,  and 


judgment  is  entered  for  the  amount  of  the  real 
debt;28  and  if  in  such  case  the  record  shows  on 
its  face  the  amount  of  the  penalty,  and  the  amount 
owing  is  not  denied,  and  there  is  no  other  defense, 
the  court  will  permit  the  record  to  be  amended  so 
as  to  conform  to  the  proper  practice.29 

Where  the  warrant  authorizes  the  confession  of 
judgment  for  "such  amount  as  may  be  found  due" 
on  the  obligation  secured,  judgment  may  be  en- 
tered for  the  amount  actually  due  ;80  but  the  power 
of  the  attorney  is  not  complete  until  the  amount  due 
has  been  adjusted.31  Where  the  provisions  of  the 
power  are  severable,  and  judgment  only  for  an  as- 
certained amount  is  confessed,  such  judgment  is 
not  invalid  for  the  reason  that  the  power  of  attor- 
ney provides  also  for  the  confession  of  judgment 
for  an  unliquidated  amount32 

Interest  and  costs.  Where  the  warrant  author- 
izes it,  the  judgment  may  include  interest33  and 
costs.34 

Attorney's  fees.  'It  is  generally  held  that  a  war- 
rant of  attorney  to  confess  judgment  may  contain 
a  stipulation  for  the  payment  of  attorney's  fees,36 
and  a  judgment  entered  on  such  warrant  not  only 
may,  but  should,  include  proper  attorney's  fees,36 
except  where  the  fees  have  not  been  earned.37  A 


20.  111. — Kuehne  v.  Goit  54  Ill.App. 
596. 

Ind.— Patton  v.  Stewart,  19  Ind.  233. 

21.  Tex.— Parker  v.  Poole,   12  Tex. 
86. 

22.  111.— McFadden    v.    Lewis,     273 
Ill.Atfp.  543— Stead  v.  Craine,   25'6 
IlLApp.  445. 

Ohio.— Swisher  v.  Orrison  Cigar  Co., 
171  NVE.  92,  122  Ohio  St  195. 

Pa. — (Finance  &  Guaranty  Co.  v.  Mit- 
tleman,  95  Pa.Super.  277 — Seltzer 
v.  Novor  &  Israel,  12  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
551 — international  Advertising 
Syndicate  v.  Quaker  Silk  Mills,  8 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  23,  18  Berks  Co.!* 
j,  65— Pestcoe  v.  Brlick,  7  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.  589— Hunter  v.  Wertz,  Com. 
PL,  91  Pittsb.Leg.  J.  84'8,  57  York 
{Leg.Rec.  Ill — Noonan  v.  Hoff, 
Com.Pl.,  57  York  Leg.Rec.  113,  af- 
.  firmed  R.  S.  Noonan,  Inc.,  v.  Hoff, 
38  A.2d  53,  350  Pa.  295. 

34  C.J.  p  HI  note  10. 

Warrant  to  confess  judgment  in 
ejectment 

Pa. — Shappell  v.  Himelstein,  183  A. 
644,  121  Pa.Super.  418— Koruzo  v. 
Ritenauer,  101  Pa.Super.  558— An- 
derson v.  Dobkin,  81  Pa.Super.  416 
—Nash  Sales  &  Service  v.  Broody, 
Qom.Pl.,  33  Luz.Legr.Res.  158,  $ 
Som.Co.L.J.  1326— Klein  v.  'Lasko, 

.  Com.Pl.,  $-6  Pittsb.Leg.J.  457— 
News  wander  -v.  Fox,  Com.PLt  86 


Pittsb.Leg.J.  -342— Graven  v.  Hand, , 

Com.PL,  9  Sch.Reg.  154. 

L    Pa.— International      Advertising 

Syndicate  v.  Quaker  Silk  Mills,   8 

Pa.Dist  &  Co.  23,  18  Berks  Co.L. 

J.    65 — Empire    Furniture    Co.    v. 

Masaitis,  Com.PL,  38  LuzjLeg.Reg. 

409. 
Va.— (Deeds  v.  Gilmer,  174  <S.m  37,  162 

Va.  157. 
34  C.J.  p  111  note  11. 

24.  HI. — Larson  v.  Lybyer.  88  N.B. 
2d  177,  312  IlLApp.  188. 

Pa. — Jasuta  v.  Zaremba,  Com.PL,  47 

<Lack.Jur.  157. 
34  C.J.  p  111  note  12. 

25.  Ark. — Bryan-Brown  Shoe  Co.  v. 
Block,  12  S.W.  1073,  52  Ark.  458. 

<34  C.J.  p  112  note  13. 
26L    W.J.— <Den  v.  Zellers,  7  N.J.Law 
153. 

27.  N.J. — Den  v.  Zellers,  supra. 

28.  Pa.— Keech  Co.  T.  O'Herron,  41 
Pa.Super.  108. 

29.  Pa.^-Keech  Co.  v.  O'Herron,  su- 
pra. 

30.  IU.-^cott  v.  Mantonya,  45  N.EL 
377,  164  lit  473. 

Pa.— Cassalia    v.    Dushney,    84    Pa. 

Dist  &  Co.  503. 
34  C.  J.  p  112  note  18. 
Acceleration  clause 

Piling  note  with  prothonotary  ev- 
idenced holder's  election  under  accel- 

287 


eration  clause  and  authorized  confes- 
sion of  Judgment  for  entire  amount 
following  default  in  payment  of  in- 
stallment— Drey  St  Motor  -Co.  v. 
Nevling,  161  A.  880,  106  Pa.Super.  42. 

83L  Pa. — B.  P.  Wilbur  Trust  Co., 
now  to  Use  of  Federal  Deposit 
Ins.  Corporation,  v.  Eberts,  10  A. 
2d  397,  337  Pa.  161. 

Wis.— Dilley  v.  Van  Wie,  6  Wis.  209. 

32.    111. — Fortune   v.    Bartolomei,    45 

N.B.  274,  164  111.  51. 
34  C.J.  p  112  note  20. 

83.    Md.— Forwood   v.    Magness,    121 

A.  855,  142  Md.  1. 
34  C.J.  p  112  note  21. 

34.  I1L— Scott   v.    Mantonya,    45   N. 
•B.  977,  164  111.  473. 

34  C.J.  p  112  note  22. 

35.  Md.— Johnson    v.    Phillips,    122 
A.  7,  143  Md.  16. 

34  C.J.  p  112  note  2«. 

36.  Pa. — OPirst   Mortgage   Guarantee 
Co.   of  Philadelphia  v.  Powell,   98 
Pa.Super.   99 — First  Mtg.   Guaran- 
tee Co.  of  Philadelphia  v.  Powell, 
12   PaJMst   &  CO.    242,   77  Pittslx 
tLeg.J.   533,   43  York  Leg.Rec.   147, 
affirmed  98  Pa. Super.  99. 

34  <XJ.  p  112  note  24. 

37.  McL— Johnson  T.  Phillips,  122  A. 
7,  143  Md.  16. 

34  OJ.  p  112  note  25. 


§  155 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


stipulation  in  the  warrant  for  such  a  fee  rests  on 
a  valid  consideration  and  is  not  fraudulent  as  to 
other  creditors,  and  the  amount  specified  should  be 
allowed,88  unless  it  is  clearly  excessive  or  unrea- 
sonable, in  which  case  the  judgment  is  voidable  as 
against  other  creditors,  at  least  to  the  extent  of 
such  fee.39  If  the  amount  is  not  fixed,  but  the  stip- 
ulation is  for  a  "reasonable  attorney's  fee/*  it  is  for 
the  court  to  determine  what  is  a  reasonable  fee  un- 
der the  circumstances  ;40  and  hence  if  the  attorney 
fixes  the  amount  of  his  fee  and  confesses  judg- 
ment for  the  whole  amount,  without  the  interven- 
tion of  the  court,  the  judgment  is  void.41  It  has 
been  held  that  the  court  will  allow  only  a  reasonable 
fee,  even  though  there  is  a  stipulation  for  a  greater 
amount.42 

§  155.    Second  Confession  under  Same  Power 

A  warrant  or  power  of  attorney  to  confess  Judgment 
Is  generally  exhausted  by  Its  exercise,  and  a  second 
judgment  cannot  be  entered  by  virtue  of  the  same  pow- 
er. 

As  a  general  rule  a  power  of  attorney  to  confess 
judgment  is  exhausted  by  one  valid  confession,  and 
a  second  judgment  cannot  be  entered  by  virtue  of 
the  same  power.43  Where  a  judgment  by  confes- 
sion is  open  or  vacated  in  order  to  permit  defend- 
ant to  defend  the  claim  on  the  merits,  it  has  been 
held  that  plaintiff  cannot  proceed  under  the  warrant 
of  attorney  to  confess  judgment.44  Where  the  first 
judgment  is  vacated  or  reversed  for  error,  it  has 


been  held  that  the  attorney  may,  under  the  same 
power,  confess  a  correct  judgment,  his  power  not 
being  exhausted  by  the  first  act;45  but  there  is  also 
authority  to  the  contrary,46  it  being  held  that,  for 
errors  in  the  entry  of  the  first  judgment  or  for  the 
correction  of  clerical  mistakes,  application  should 
be  made  to  the  court  to  correct  such  judgment  so  as 
to  make  it  conform  to  the  facts,  and  not  to  enter 
a  new  judgment.47  It  has  also  been  held  that, 
where  a  judgment  by  confession  is  entered  in  one 
county,  a  second  judgment  on  the  same  warrant  in 
another  county  is  not  absolutely  void,  but  the  per- 
son entering  the  second  judgment  will  be  answer- 
able for  the  consequences.48 

§  156.    Revocation  and  Defeasance 

A  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  Judgment  (8  revoca- 
ble at  the  will  of  the  grantor,  except  where  it  Is  support- 
ed by  a  valuable  consideration  or  Is  coupled  with  an 
Interest  In  the  subject  matter.  Such  a  warrant  may  be 
revoked  by  the  death  of  the  grantor,  and  it  is  generally 
held  that  It  cannot  be  exercised  after  the  debt  Is  barred 
by  limitations. 

A  power  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment, 
like  other  powers  of  attorney,  is  revocable  at  the 
will  of  the  grantor,49  except  where  it  is  supported 
by  a  valuable  consideration,50  or  is  coupled  with 
an  interest  in  the  subject  matter,51  or  is  given  as 
a  security  or  to  render  a  security  effectual.52  Such 
a  warrant,  however,  is  terminated  by  the  payment 
or  extinguishment  of  the  debt  intended  to  be  se- 
cured.53 


38.  Md. — Johnson  v.  Phillips,  supra, 
•34  C.J.  p  112  note  26. 

39.  111.— Hulse  v.  Mershon,  17  N.EJ. 
50,  125  111.  52 — Homewood  v.  Stein, 
211  I11.A/PP.  359. 

40.  Md. — Johnson  T.  Phillips,  122  A. 
•7, 143  Md.  16. 

Pa,— Pittston  Chevrolet  Sales  Co.  v. 

Felax,    9    PajDist.   &   Co.    604,    24 

LiUZ.Lieg.Reg.  292. 
34  C.J.  p  113  note  23. 

Where  space  for  insertion  of 
amount  of  attorney's  fees  was  left 
blank  and  no  line  was  drawn  through 
the  provision  to  indicate  an  intention 
that  no  attorney's  fees  were  to  tie 
paid,  the  allowance  by  the  court  of 
attorney's  fees  in  a  reasonable 
amount  on  entry  of  Judgment  by 
confession  was  not  error. — -Spindler 
v.  McKay,  13  N.<E.2d  8-64,  294  IlLApp. 
610. 

41.  IlL-^Campbell  v.  Goddard,  7  N. 
B.  640,  117  111.  251,  followed  to  14 
KB.  261,  123  I1L  220. 

42.  Pa.-^alsburg  v.   Mack,  ai  Pa. 
Co.  408. 

43.  Pa. — Harr  v.   IFurman,    29    A.2d 
527,   346  Pa.  138,  144  A.-L.R.   828— 
Union     Bank     of     Nanty-Glo     v. 
Schnabel,  1-39  A*  *62,  291  Pa.  228 


"  — -S.  Jacobs  &  Son  v.  Busedu,  95 
Pa.Super.  1-32 — Commercial  Alli- 
ance v.  Plckett  50  PfiLDist  &  Co. 
556,  37  Luz.Leg.Reg.  185— Maricic 
v.  Slesser,  44  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  693, 
52  'Dauph.Co.  185 — Schwartz  v. 
Stein,  12  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  638,  43 
York  Leg.Rec.  155 — Schwartz  v. 
Stein,  12  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  229— Key- 
stone Trust  Co.  v.  Aaronson,  Com. 
PI.,  55  Dauph.Co.  144— Heller  v. 
Bloom,  Coxn.Pl,,  52  DauphXJo.  307 
— Mook  v.  Neuner,  £k>m.PL,  23 
Brie  Co.  340. 
34  C.J.  p  113  note  OL 
Different  powers 

Subsequent  judgment  against 
guarantors  of.  note,  pursuant  to  war- 
ranty, was  valid,  where  first  Judg- 
ment was  under  warrant  on  face  of 
note. — Union  Bank  of  Nanty-Glo  v. 
Schnabel,  1139  A.  862,  391  'Pa,  228. 

44.  111.— "Western  Cold  -Storage  Co. 
v.  Keeshin,  252  IlLApp.  1-6-5. 

45.  111.— Vandersall     T.     Goldsmith, 
231  IlLApp.  165. 

34  C.J.  p  113  note  32. 

4&  Pa.— -Hogsett  v.  -Lutrarlo,  13  A. 
2d  902,  140  Pa.Super.  419— S.  Ja- 
cobs &  Son  v.  Busedu,  95  Pa.<Super. 
132— Maricic  v.  Slesser,  44  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  693,  52  DauphXJo.  185 

288 


—Heller  v.  Bloom,  Coim.Pl.,  52 
DauphXJo.  «307 — Reid  v.  Pechersky, 
Com.PL,  87  PittsboLeg.J.  575. 

34  .C.J.  p  113  note  33. 

47.  Pa. — Hair  v.  Furman,  29  A.2d 
527,  346  Pa.  138,  144  A.L.R.  828— 
Pacific  Lumber  Co.  of  Illinois  v. 
Bodd,  135  A.  122,  287  Pa.  454— 
Mars  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hughes,  89  A. 
1130,  243  Pa.  223.  • 

4a  Pa.— NefiC  v.  Barr,  14  Serg.  &  R, 
166. 

•34  C. J.  #  113  note  35. 

49.  Ala. — Evans  v.  Fearne,  16  Ala. 
689,  50  Am.D.  197. 

N.Y. — Gale  v.  Chase,  3  Johns.   1-47. 

50u  Ark.-rRapley  v.  Price,  11  Ark. 
713. 

34  C.J.  p  113  note  39. 

51.  Ohio. — Swisher  v.  Orrison  tJigar 
Co.,  171  N.B.  92,  122  Ohio  St  *195. 

34  C.J.  p  113  note  40. 

52.  Tenn. — Hermitage    Loan    Co.    v. 
Daykin,   6'6   S.W.2d  164,  165   Tenn. 
503 — Clay   v.    People's    Finance    & 
Thrift    Co.,    25    S.W.2d    578,     160 
Tenn. 'i3  90. 

34  C.J.  p  11*3  note  41. 

53.  Iowa.— Cohn    v.    Bromberg.    170 
•N.W.  478, 185  Iowa  298. 

34  C.  J.  p  113  note  42. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  158 


Claim  barred  by  limitations.  Although,  as  dis- 
cussed supra  §  138,  defendant  himself  may  confess 
judgment  on  a  claim  which  has  been  barred  by  the 
statute  of  limitations,  it  has  generally  been  held 
that  a  power  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment  can- 
not be  exercised  after  the  debt  or  claim  is  thus 
barred;54  but  there  is  also  authority  to  the  con- 
trary.55 

Effect  of  alteration.  Where  a  power  of  attorney 
is  materially  altered  while  in  the  hands  of  the 
payee,  without  any  explanation  thereof,  the  altera- 
tion will  be  presumed  to  have  been  made  with  the 
consent  of  the  holder,  and  will  render  the  power 
void;56  but  the  mere  filling  of  blanks  which  ap- 
parently were  intended  to  be  filled  is  not  such  an 
alteration  as  will  invalidate  the  warrant57 

Death  of  parties.  As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment 
by  confession  cannot  be  entered  on  a  warrant  of 
attorney,  after  the  death  of  the  grantor.58  This 
rule,  however,  does  not  apply  where  the  judgment 
entered  on  such  warrant  can  be  made  good  by  rela- 
tion,59 as  where  the  grantor  dies  during  a  vaca- 
tion; at  common  law  a  judgment  may  be  entered 


against  him  during  the  same  vacation  as  of  the  pre- 
ceding term,80  or,  if  he  dies  during  the  term,  it 
may  be  entered  as  of  the  term  in  which  he  dies.61 

Insanity  or  incompetency  of  the  grantor  does  not 
revoke  a  warrant  or  power  to  confess  judgment.62 

§  157.     Confession  under  Void  or  Lost  War- 
rant 

A  Judgment  entered  on  a  void  warrant  or  power  of 
attorney  to  confess  judgment  is  void. 

A  judgment  by  confession  must  be  authorized  by 
the  warrant  on  which  it  is  based68  A  judgment  is 
a  nullity  which  is  confessed  under  a  power  of  at- 
torney which  is  void  or  does  not  conform  to  manda- 
tory statutory  requirements,64  as  where  the  judg- 
ment is  confessed  on  a  note  and  warrant  of  attor- 
ney which  have  been  forged65  or  fraudulently  ob- 
tained.66 However,  it  has  also  been  held  that  the 
judgment  is  not  void  although  the  letter  of  attor- 
ney is  void67 

Confession  on  lost  warrant.  A  judgment  may  be 
entered  on  a  note  and  warrant  of  attorney  duly  ex- 
ecuted, but  which  has  been  lost  or  stolen.68 


D.  STATEMENT  OF  INDEBTEDNESS 


§  158.    Nature  and  Necessity 

Under    statutes   so    providing,   a    person    confessing 
judgment,  without  action,  Is  required  to  file  a  written 


statement  designating  the  amount  for  which  the  Judg- 
ment Is  to  be  entered,  and  stating  concisely  the  facts 
out  of  which  the  indebtedness  arose,  and  authorizing 
entry  of  judgment  therefor. 


64.     Mich. — Gordon  v.  Heller,  260  N. 

W.    156,    271    Mich.    240,    certiorari 

denied   56   S.Ct  140,   296  U.S.   619, 

SO  Ij.Ed.  440. 
jq-.Y. — Arnold   v.    Bussmann,   29   N.Y. 

S.2d  155,  affirmed  34  N.T.S.2d  829, 

264  App.Div.  713. 
Ohio.— Roberts    v.    Davis,    35   NJE.2d 

609,  66  Ohio  App.  527— State  ex  reL 

Squire  v.  Winch,  32  N.E.2d  569,  66 

Ohio  App.  221. 
Tenn. — 'Williams   v.  Wilborne,   95  S. 

W.2d  41,  170  Tenn.  2f89. 
34  C.J.  p  11-3  note  44. 
Effect  of  lapse  of  time  on  exercise 

of   power    generally   see    supra    § 

154  e. 

55.  Ark. — Wassell    v.    Reardpn,    11 
Ark.  705,  44  Am.D.  245. 

56.  111.— Burwell  r.  Orr,  84  HL  465. 

57.  Wis.— Vliet    v.    Camp,    1«    Wis. 
198. 

sa    111.— Merrion   v.    O*Donnell,    279 

IlLApp.  435. 
Ohio.— Schuck  v.  McDonald,  16  N.E. 

2d  419,  58  Ohio  App.  394. 
Pa. — Stucker    v.    Shumaker,    139    A. 

114,  290  Pa.  348— "First  Nat  Bank 

v.  Crawford,  8  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  423. 
34  C.J.  p  113  note  49,  p  125  note  67. 
Judgment  held  Irregular 

A    Judgment    entered    after    the 

48  C.J.S.— 19 


death  of  the  promisor  and  without 
an  action  brought  in  the  lifetime  of 
such  party  is  irregrular  and  will  -he 
vacated  on  application  of  the  legal 
representatives  or  heirs  of  the  dece- 
dent—Kummerle  v.  Cain,  32  Pa.Su- 
per.  528. 
Wife  re-signing  ***•*  htuftaod's 

death 

Where  a  married  woman  who  had 
signed  a  note  as  security  for  her 
husband  signed  it  a  second  time  aft- 
er his  death,  Judgment  may  be  en- 
tered against  her  although  the  note 
under  her  first  signature  was  void  as 
to  her.— "First  Nat  Bank  v.  CJraw- 
ford,  3  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  423. 

59.  N.T.— 'Nichols    v.     Chapman,     9 
'  Wend.  452. 

60.  N.T.— Nichols  v.   Chapman,    su- 
pra. 

OU  N.T.— Nichols  v.  Chapman,  su- 
pra. 

Pa.— Felty  v.  Felty,  11  Pa.Dist  & 
Co.  186. 

02.  111.— Grimes  v.  Rodgers,  263  111. 
App.  429. 

Md.— Acker  v.  Cecil  .Nat.  Bank  of 
Port  Deposit  157  A.  897,  162  Md. 
1,  followed  in  Acker  v.  National 
Bank  of  Perryville,  157  A.  899, 
162  Md.  4. 

289 


Ohio. — Swisher  v.  Orrison  Cigar  Co., 
171  N.E.  92,  122  Ohio  St.  195. 

Wis. — In  re  Kohl's  Guardianship,  266 
N.W.  800,  221  Wis.  385. 
t.    I1L — Genden   v.    Bailen,    275    111. 
App.  382— Hughes  v.  First  Accept- 
ance Corporation,   2*80  IlLApp.  176. 

N.T.— Shenson  v.  X.  Shainin  &  Co., 
198  N.B.  -407,  2*8  N.Y.  $67. 

Pa.— Mahoney  v.  Collman,  143  A.  186, 
293  Pa.  478. 

04.  ^a.— United  Mercantile  Agen- 
cies v.  Bissonnette,  19  So.2d  466, 
155  A.&.R.  916. 

34  C.J.  p  114  note  53. 

85.  Del. — City  Loan  System  of  Dela- 
ware v.  Nordauist,  165  A.  341,  5  W. 
W.Harr.  371. 

111. — Bullen  v.  Dawson,  2S  N.E.  1038, 
139  HI.  6$3. 

Ky. — Anderson  v.  Reconstruction 
^Finance  Corporation,  136  S.W.2d 
741,  281  Ky.  531. 

Ohio.^Commercial  Qredit  Corp.  v. 
Wasson,  63  N.E.2d  560,  76  Ohio 
App.  181. 

66.  Tex.— Johnston  v.  ILoo-p,  £  Tex, 
3*1* 

6ff.     Mo.— Wood  v.  Ellis,  10  Mo.  383. 

as.  Pa.— Mahoney  v.  Collman,  143  A. 
186,  29<3  Pa.  478. 

34  CUT.  p  114  note  58. 


§  158 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Under  statutes  so  providing,  a  person  confessing 
a  judgment,  without  action,  is  required  to  file  a 
written  statement69  signed  and  verified,  as  discussed 
infra  §  159,  designating  the  amount  for  which  the 
judgment  is  to  be  entered,  and  stating  concisely 
the  facts  out  of  which  the  indebtedness  arose,70  and 
authorizing  the  entry  of  judgment  therefor.71  Such 
statutes  have  been  held  to  apply,  however,  only  in 
case  of  a  confession  of  judgment  without  action; 
and  they  are  not  applicable  where  a  suit  has  been 
begun,  process  served  or  waived  and  a  declaration 
filed,  and  defendant  then  confesses  judgment72 

§  159*    Requisites  and  Sufficiency 

a.  In  general 

b.  Degree  of  certainty  in  general 

c.  Allegation  of  amount  of  debt 

d  Allegation  that  debt  is  "justly  due" 

e.  Signature 

f.  Verification 

g.  Amendment  of  defective  statement 
h.  Particular  applications  of  rules 

a.  In  General 

The  statement  of -Indebtedness  required  to  accompa- 
ny a  confession  of  Judgment  is  sufficient  if  it  fairly  and 
substantially  complies  with  the  statutory  requirements 
therefor. 

Generally  speaking,  the  statement  of  indebtedness 
required  by  statute  in  many  jurisdictions  to  accom- 
pany a  confession  of  judgment,  as  discussed  supra  § 
158,  is  sufficient  if  it  fairly  and  substantially  com- 
plies with  the  statutory  requirements  therefor.73 
Technical  accuracy  in  the  description  of  the  liability 


or  cause  of  action  is  not  required.74  A  statement 
is  sufficient  if  it  sets  out  the  facts  out  of  which  the 
debt  for  which  judgment  is  confessed  arose  ;75  and, 
if  it  is  otherwise  sufficiently  regular  and  specific,  it 
is  not  invalid  merely  because  the  time  when  the 
debt  arose  is  not  definitely  stated,76  or  is  omitted  en- 
tirely.77 A  statement,  however,  which  does  not 
allege  the  fact  of  indebtedness,  either  directly  or  by 
necessary  implication,  will  not  support  a  judgment 
by  confession.7^ 

Referring  to  schedule.  The  statement  may  refer 
for  particulars  to  a  schedule  annexed,  but  in  that 
case  the  schedule  must  contain  all  the  necessary 
facts.79  A  failure  to  annex  the  schedule  referred 
to  does  not  invalidate  the  judgment  where  the  state- 
ment is  sufficient  without  the  schedule.80 

Partial  insufficiency.  A  statement  will  not  be 
held  insufficient  in  toto  merely  because  a  severable 
part  of  it  is  insufficient.81 

b.  Degree  of  Certainty  in  General 

The  statement  of  indebtedness,  required  to  support  a 
confession  of  judgment  should  be  so  precise,  in  stating 
the  debt  or  the  facts  out  of  which  the  debt  arose,  as  to 
apprise  all  persons  interested  of  the  nature  and  consid- 
eration of  the  debt  and  enable  them  to  Inquire  into  the 
transaction,  but  it  need  not  be  as  precise  as  a  bill  of 
particulars. 

The  statement  of  indebtedness  required  to  support 
a  confession  of  judgment  should  be  so  precise  and 
particular,  in  stating  the  debt  or  the  facts  out  of 
which  the  debt  arose,  as  to  apprise  all  persons  in- 
terested of  the  nature  and  consideration  of  the 
debt,82  and  give  assurance  that  the  consideration  is 
fair  and  honest,88  the  degree  of  particularity  re- 


09.  N.Y.— American  Cities  Co.  v. 
Stevenson,  60  N.Y.S.2d  685. 

N.-C. — Gibbs  v.  G.  H.  Weston  &  Co., 
18  S,E.2d  698,  221  N.C.  7— Farm- 
ers' Bank  of  Clayton  v.  McCullers, 
160  S.E.  494,  201  N.C.  440. 

34  C.J.  p  114  note  64. 

Consent  or  ratification  of  creditor  to 
entry  of  judgment  by  confession 
see  supra  §  148. 

70.  N.Y.— Keller  v.  Greenstone,  2  N. 
Y.S.2d  977,  253  App.Div.  573— P. 
A.  Starck  Piano  Co.  v.  O'Keefe,  208 
N.Y.S.  360,  211  App.-Dlv.  700— 
Johnston  v.  A.  L.  Erlanger  Realty 
Corporation,  29*6  N.Y.S.  89,  162 
Misc.  881. 

N.C.— Gibbs  v.  G.  H.  Weston  &  Co., 
18  S.E.2d  698,  221  N.C.  7— Farm- 
ers' Bank  of  Clayton  v.  McCullers, 
160  'S.E.  494,  201  N.C.  440. 

Okl. — Universal  Supply  &  Machinery 
Co.  V.  Construction  Machinery  Co., 
16  P.2d  365,  160  Okl.  209. 

34  C.J.  p  114  note  61. 

Effect  of  failure  to  comply  with  stat- 
ute see  infra  S  171. 


71.  N.C. — Farmers'  Bank  of  Clayton 
v.  McCullers,  160  S.E.  494,  201  N. 
C.  440. 

72.  Mo. — Aeolian  Co.  of  Missouri  v. 
Smith-Medcalf   &   Co.,   App.,    7    S. 
W.2d  447. 

34  C.J.  p  114  note  ftft. 

Requirement  that  confession,  lie  in 
writing1  held  not  to  apply  to  confes- 
sion after  action. — Aeolian  Qo.  of 
Missouri  v.  Smith-Medcalf  &  Co.,  su- 
pra— Wade  v.  Swope,  81  S.W.  471, 
107  Mo.A<pp.  375. 

73.  N.Y.— Clements  v.  Gerow,  1  Abb. 
Dec.  «70,  1  Keyes  297. 

34  C.J.  p  114  note  65. 
Captions  spirit 

In  determining-  whether  or  not  the 
statement  is  sufficient,  it  is  not  to 
be  interpreted  in  a  captious  spirit — 
Clements  v.  Gerow,  supra — Acker  v. 
Acker,  1  Abb.Dec.,N.Y.,  1,  1  Keyea 
291. 

7*    Ark.— Ex  parte  Hays,  6  Ark.  419. 
34  CJ.  p  114  note  37. 


Y.    417— Brosstedt    v.    Breslin,    42 

Hun  6-56,  5  N.Y.St.  67,  affirmed  13 

N.E.  931,  105  N.Y.  682. 
Statement  held  sufficient 
N.C.— {Farmers'  Bank  of  Clayton  v, 

McCuUers,    1-60   S.iB.   497,   201   N.C. 

412. 

76.  N.Y.— Harrison  y.  Gibbons,  71  N. 
Y.  58. 

77.  N.Y.— Keller  v.  Greenstone,  2  N. 
Y.S,2d  977,  253  App.Div.  573. 

78L     N.Y.— Citizens'  Nat  Bank  v.  Al- 
lison, 57  Hun  135. 

79.  N.Y.— Hamann   v.    Keinhart,    11 
Abb.Pr.  132. 

80.  N.Y. — Clements  v.  Gerow,  1  Abb. 
Dec.    «370,    1    Keyes    297 — Acker   v. 
Acker,  1  Abb.Dec.  1,  1  Keyes  291. 

81.  N.Y.— Frost    v.    Koon,    30    N.Y. 
423. 

34  C.J.  p  115  note  70  [a], 

82.  Iowa. — Briggs  v.   Yetzer,   72  N. 
W.  647,  103  Iowa  342. 

34  C.J.  p  115  note  79. 


18.    K.T.— Kirty  v.  Ittzgerald,  81  N.   83.    N.C.— Farmers'  Bank  of  qiayton 
290 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


159 


quired  depending,  to  a  large  extent,  on  the  circum- 
stances of  each  particular  case.84  It  is  not  re- 
quired that  the  statement  should  set  forth  sufficient 
of  the  transaction  out  of  which  the  indebtedness 
arose  to  enable  other  creditors  to  form  an  opinion 
from  the  facts  stated  as  to  the  integrity  of  the  debt- 
or in  confessing  the  judgment  ;85  but  it  is  sufficient 
if  it  states  enough  of  the  facts  to  identify  the  trans- 
action and  enable  creditors  and  others  interested  to 
inquire  into  the  transaction  and  investigate  the  bona 
fides  of  the  judgment.86  It  has  been  variously  stat- 
ed that  the  statement  is  sufficient  if  it  states  the 
transaction  creating  the  indebtedness  concisely,  and 
in  terms  which  will  make  known  to  the  ordinary  un- 
derstanding the  manner  in  which  the  indebtedness 
arose;87  or  if  it  indicates  the  facts  out  of  which 
the  indebtedness  arose,  with  reasonable  certainty,88 
or  with  certainty  to  a  common  intent;89  or  if  it 
complies,  with  the  requirement  of  a  statement  of 
facts  in  a  complaint,90  or  so  fixes  the  consideration 
of  the  judgment  as  •  to  prevent  the  parties  from 
shifting  it;91  and  that  a  statement  as  general  as 
the  common  counts  in  a  declaration  is  not  suffi- 
cient ;92  but  that  a  statement  as  precise  as  a  bill  of 
particulars  is  not  required.93  It  has  been  said  that 
the  statement  of  facts  should  be  so  definite  that  af- 
fiant would  be  exposed  to  punishment  for  perjury 
in  case  of  any  misstatement.94 

c.  Allegation  of  Amount  of  Debt 
The  statement  must  set  forth  explicitly  the  amount 


of  the  debt  for  which  judgment  is  confessed,  Indicating 
how  much,  If  any,  is  due  for  Interest. 

The  statement  must  set  forth  explicitly  the 
amount  of  the  debt  for  which  the  judgment  is  con- 
fessed,95 indicating  how  much,  if  any,  is  due  for 
interest.96  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  it  need 
not  set  out  in  precise  terms  that  the  indebtedness 
was  for  the  precise  Sum  for  which  the  judgment  is 
confessed,  where  such  fact  is  made  to  appear  by 
the  statement;97  and  a  mere  discrepancy  in  an 
item,  which  is  the  result  of  a  clerical  error,  does 
not  render  the  statement  invalid.98 

d.  Allegation  That  Debt  Is  "Justly  Due" 

Under  statutes  so  providing,  the  statement  must 
show  that  the  sum  confessed  Is  Justly  due,  or  to  become 
due. 

Under  some  statutes,  the  statement,  in  addition  to 
setting  forth  the  facts  on  which  the  indebtedness 
arose,  must  also  show  that  the  sum  confessed  is 
justly  due,  or  to  become  due.99  It  has  been  held, 
however,  that  this  does  not  require  the  confession 
to  state  in  terms  that  the  sum  for  which  the  judg- 
ment is  confessed  is  justly  due  or  to  become  due, 
if  such  fact  appears  from  the  other  facts  set  forth;1 
and,  where  the  statement  sets  forth  facts  showing 
a  just  debt  and  the  amount  thereof,  it  need  not  in 
terms  negative  that  it  has  been  paid  or  otherwise 
discharged.2  It  has  been  held  that  no  statement 
need  be  made  that  the  controversy  is  real  and  the 
proceedings  are  in  good  faith.8 


v.  McCullers,  160  S.B.  494,  201  N. 
C.  440. 

84.  Mo.— Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Mayer, 
6  -S.W.  237,  93  Mo.  417. 

85.  Minn,— Atwater    y.    Manchester 
Sav.  Bank,  48  N.W.  187,  45  Minn. 
341,  12  L.R.A.  741. 

N.Y.— McBowell  v.  Daniels,  38  Barb. 

143. 
88.    Minn.— Atwater    v.    Manchester 

Sav.  Bank,  48  N.W.  1*87,  45  Minn. 

341,  12  L.R.A.  741. 
27  C.J.  p  45'8  note  15—84  C.J.  p  115 

note  83. 

87.  Mo.— St.      Louis     Fourth     Nat 
Bank   T.   Mayer,   19   Mo.App.    517. 

34  C.  J.  p  115  note  82. 

88.  N.T.— Union    Bank  v.   Bush,    36 
N.T.    6*31,    3   Transcr.A.   235— Read 
v.  French,  28  N.Y.  285— Brown  v. 
Marrigold,  SO  How.Pr.   248. 

89.  N.T.— Harrison    v.    Gibbons,    71 
N.Y.  58. 

90.  N.Y.— Matter  of  Gray,  156  N.Y. 
S.    877,    172    App.Div.    884— Mather 
v.   Mather,  55  N.Y.S.  973,  38  App. 
Div.  «32. 

91.  Mo. — J.  H.  Teasdale  -Commix  Co. 
v.    Van    Hardenberg,    63    Mo.App. 
326. 


92.  N.Y.— Lawless    T.    Hackett,    1*6 
Johns.  149. 

34  C.J.  p  116  note  8-8. 

93.  Iowa.— Vanfleet   v.    Fhttlips,    11 
Iowa  558. 

27  C.J.  p  458  note  14—34  C.J,  p  116 
note  89. 

94.  N.Y.— Wood   v.   Mitchell,    22    N. 
•E.  1125,  117  N.Y.  439— Johnston  v. 
A.  Li.  Erlanger  Realty  Coloration, 
296  N.Y.S.  39,  162  Misc.  881. 

95.  N.Y.— Johnston  v.  A.  I*  Ertan- 
ger   Realty   Corporation,   296   'N.Y. 

.  3.  89,  162  Misc.  881. 

N.C.— ^Farmers'  Bank  of  "Clay  ton  v. 
McCullers,  160  S.B.  494,  201  N.C. 
440. 

34  C.J.  p  116  note  91. 

Necessity  of  stating  amount  general- 
ly see  supra  §  158. 

96.  N.Y.— Wood  v.  Mitchell,  22  N.E. 
1125,  117*  N.Y.  4'39 — Johnston  v.  A. 
tL,    Erlanger    Realty    Corporation, 
296  N.Y.S.  89,  162  Misc.  881. 

34  C  J.  p  116  note  92. 

97.  N.Y.— Clements     v.     Gerow,     1 
Abb.Dec.   370,  1  Keyes   297— Acker 
v.   Acker,   1   Abb.Dec.   1,   1  Keyes 
291. 

291 


98L    Mo. — Hard    v.    Foster,    11    S.W. 
760,  98  Mo.  297. 

99.     N.Y. — Johnston  v.   A   L*.  Erlan- 
ger Realty   Corporation,    296    N.Y. 

S.  89.  162  Misc.  881. 
N.C. — Farmers'   Bank   of  Clayton   v. 

McSCullers,    160    S.-E.   494,    201   N.C. 

440. 
OkL — Universal  Supply  &  Machinery 

Co.  v.  Construction  Machinery  Co.. 

1-6  P.2d  865,  160  Okl.  209. 
54  C.J.  p  116  note  97. 
Necessity  and  sufficiency  of  affidavit 

of  bona  fides  see  infra  §  163. 
A  confession  of  Judgment  doe*  not 

alone  import  consideration 
N.C. — Farmers'    Bank   of  Clayton   v. 

McCullere,*160    S.B.   494,   201  N.C. 

440. 

1.  N.C.— Merchants'    Nat.    Bank    of 
Richmond  v.  Newton  Cotton  Mills, 
20  S.-E.  765,  115  N.C.  507. 

34  C.J.  p  116  note  98. 

2.  N.Y. — Lanning    v.    Carpenter,    20 
N.Y.  447— Gandall  v.  -Finn,  2  Abb. 
Dec.  232,  1  Keyes  217,  33  How.Pr. 
444. 

3.  N.C, — Martin   v.   Briscoe,  55   S.EL 
782,  143  N.a  '353. 


159 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


e.  Signature 

Generally,  the  statement  on  which  a  Judgment  by 
confession  is  entered  must  be  signed  by  the  debtor  in 
person. 

It  is  generally  required  that  the  statement  on 
which  a  judgment  by  confession  is  entered  must  be 
signed  by  the  debtor  or  defendant  in  person,4  and  a 
signature  by  his  attorney  is  not  sufficient.5  Sign- 
ing the  affidavit  verifying  the  statement  is,  however, 
a  sufficient  signing  of  the  statement  itself,  espe- 
cially if  they  are  on  the  same  page  or  sheet6 
Where  the  confession  of  judgment  is  against  two 
or  more  persons,  the  statement  must  be  signed  by 
each  of  the  persons  against  whom  it  authorizes  the 
entry  of  judgment7 

f  .  Verification 

Generally,  the  person  making  the  statement  of  In* 
debtedness  must  swear  positively  to  the  truth  of  the 
facts  stated  as  far  as  they  are  within  his  own  knowledge. 

It  is  usually  required  by  statute  that  the.  state- 
ment of  indebtedness  be  sworn  to  by  the  party  mak- 
ing it,8  and  such  requirement  has  been  held  to  be 
jurisdictional  and  mandatory.9  He  must  swear,  not 
merely  that  he  believes  the  statement  to  be  true,  but 
positively  to  the  truth  of  the  facts  as  far  as  they 
are  within  his  own  knowledge.10  This  affidavit  may 
be  made  before  any  duly  qualified  officer,11  such  as 
a  notary  public;12  and  may  be  made  in  a  county 
other  than  that  in  which  the  judgment  is  rendered 
on  the  confession.1^  The  jurat  of  the  officer  tak- 
ing the  affidavit  should  be  in  due  form,14  but  a  for- 


mal defect  therein  will  not  so  far  invalidate  the 
judgment  as  to  lay  it  open  to  collateral  attack.15 
As  between  the  parties,  a  confession  of  judgment 
is  not  avoided  by  the  want  of  a  seal  to  the  notary's 
certificate  to  the  affidavit.16  Such  a  verification 
cannot  be  made  by  plaintiff*  s  attorney  under  a  pow- 
er of  attorney  to  confess  judgment1? 

Amendment.  An  unverified  statement  for  judg- 
ment by  confession  or  a  defective  verification  of 
such  statement  is  amendable.18 

g.  Amendment  of  Defective  Statement 

The  court  may,  In  its  discretion,  allow  a  defective 
statement  of  Indebtedness  to  be  amended  on  such  terms 
as  appear  just. 

The  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  allow  a  defec- 
tive statement  of  indebtedness  to  be  amended  on 
such  terms  as  appear  just,19  but,  as  a  general  rule, 
such  amendment  will  not  be  allowed  where  it  will 
affect  the  rights  of  subsequent  judgment  creditors 
which  may  have  attached  in  the  meantime,20  espe- 
cially where  they  have  begun  proceedings  to  avoid 
the  judgment  by  confession.21  It  has  been  held, 
however,  that  such  amendment  may  be  allowed  as 
against  subsequent  judgment  creditors  who  have  not 
sought  to  vacate  the  judgment22 

h.  Particular  Applications  of  Rules 

The  general  rules  governing  the  requisites  and  suf- 
ficiency of  the  statement  of  Indebtedness  required  to  ac- 
company a  confession  of  judgment  have  been  applied 
to  various  types  of  Indebtedness. 


4.    N.Y.— P.  A.  Starck  Piano  Co.  v. 

O'Keefe,  20'8  N.Y.S.  550,  211  App. 

I>iv.  700. 
N.C. — (Farmers*   Bank  of  Clayton  v. 

McCuUers,  160   S.BL   494,   201  N.C. 

440. 

•34  CJ.  p  118  note  29. 
6.    Oal. — Reynolds   v.    Lincoln,   9  P. 

176,  12  P.  449,  71  CaL  1*3. 
34  CJ.  p  118  note  30. 

Statement  signed  by  creditor's  at- 
torney,  acting  ostensibly  for  debtor 
under  authorization  to  confess  judg- 
ment, was  held  not  to  support  judg- 
ment.— P.  -A.  Starck  Piano  Co.  v. 
O'Keefe,  '208  N.Y.S.  350,  211  App. 
Div.  700. 

6.  N.Y.— Mosher    v.     Heydrick,     45 
Barb.  549,  30  How.Pr.  T61,  1  Abb. 

.   Pr.,N.S.,  26*8. 

34  CJ.  p  118  note  31. 

7.  U.S. — ITrench    v.    Edwards,    C.C. 
Cal.,  9  F.Cas.No.6,098,  5  Sawy.  266. 

•34  «C.X  p  118  note  32. 

8.  N.Y.— "Shenson  v.  Z.  Shalnin  &  Co., 
276   (N.YJ3.    881,    243   App.Div.    638, 
affirmed    19*8    N.B.    407,    26*8    N.Y. 
567— P.    A.    Starck    Piano    Co.    v. 
O'Keefe,   208  N.Y.S.  350,  211  App. 
Div.  700. 


N.C. — Gibbs  v.  Q.  H.  Weston  &  Co., 
18  S.E.2d  698,  221  N.C.  7— Farm- 
ers' Bank  of  Clayton  v.  McCuUers, 
160  S.E.  494,  201  N.C.  440. 

9.  N.C.— Gibbs   v.   G.  H.  Weston  & 
Co.,  18  S.'B.2d  -698,  221  N.C.  7. 

34  C.J.  p  ll'S  note  35. 

Before  Judgment  may  be  entered, 
an  affidavit  of  defendant  stating  con- 
cisely the  facts  on  which  the  indebt- 
edness arose  must  be  filed. — Univer- 
sal Supply  &  Machinery  Co.  v.  Con- 
struction Machinery  Co.,  16  <P.2d  865, 
160  OkL  209. 

10.  N.Y.— Ingrain  r.  Bobbins,  33  N. 
Y.  409,  8*  Am.D.  393. 

34  C.  J.  «p  118  note  «36. 

11.  N.Y.— Mosher    v.    Heydrick,    45 
Barb.    549,   1   Abb.Pr.,N.S.,   258,  (30 
How.Pr.  ItL 


12.  Iowa.— Vanfleet 
Iowa  558. 

.34  £.X.  p  118  note  38. 

13.  Iowa, — 'Frisbee 
Iowa  95. 


y.    Phillips,    11 


Seaman,    49 


14.  Iowa.— Brings  v.  Yetzer,  7%  N. 
W.  647,  103  Iowa  342—Grattan  v. 
Matteson,  6  N.W.  298,  54  Iowa  229. 

292 


15.  Iowa. — Grattan  Y.  Matteson,  su- 
pra. 

34  C. J.  p  118  note  41. 

16.  Iowa. — Thorp  v.  Platt,  34  Iowa 
314— Chase  v.  Street,  10  Iowa  59*3. 

17.  N.Y.— P.  A.  Starck  Piano  Co.  v. 
O'Keefe,  20'8  N.Y.S.  350,   211  App. 
Div.  700— United  States  'Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  Co.  v.  Shickler,  191  N.Y. 
S.  194,  199  Apsp.D*y.  74. 

18.  N.Y. — Shenson   y.    L   S  ha  in  in   & 
Co.,    2-76   N.Y.S.    881,   -2413   App.Div. 
638,  affirmed  1'98  N.B.  407,  268  N. 
Y.  567. 

34  C.  J.  p  119  note  45. 

19.  N.Y. — Symson   y.   Selheimer,    12 
N.«B.  31,  105  N.Y.  6^0— Johnston  v. 
A.  Ij.  Brlanger  Realty  Corporation, 
296  N.Y.S.  89,  162  Misc.  881, 

34  C.  J.  p  119  note  47. 
Amendment  of  defective  verification 
see  supra  §  159  f. 

20.  -Mo.— Bryan    v.    Miller,    28    Mo. 
32,  75  AmJX  107. 

34  C.J.  p  119  note  48. 

21.  Minn.— "Wells   v.   Gieseke,   8   N. 
W.  380,  27  Minn.  478. 

•34  C.J.  !p  119  note  50. 

22.  N.Y.— Bradley  v.  GlasB,  46  N.Y. 
S.  790,  '20  App.Div.  200.. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§159 


The  general  rules  governing  the  requisites  and 
sufficiency  of  the  statement  of  indebtedness  required 
to  accompany  a  confession  of  judgment,  discussed 
supra  subdivisions  a-g  of  this  section,  have  been 
applied  to  various  types  of.  indebtedness.28 

For  loans  and  advances.  A  statement  which  sets 
forth  facts  showing  that  the  indebtedness  accrued 
for  "borrowed  money,"  or  for  "money  loaned'5  or 
"advanced"  to  the  debtor,  sufficiently  states  the 
facts  out  of  which  the  indebtedness  arose,24  provid- 
ed there  is  no  uncertainty  as  to  the  amount  due.25 
It  has  generally  been  held  sufficient  to  allege  that 
the  money  was  loaned  or  advanced  to  defendant 
within  a  certain  year  or  years,  or  at  divers  times 
after  a  specified  day,26  or  from  time  to  time,27  or 
on  or  about  a  day  named.28  A  statement  has  been 
held  insufficient  which  does  not  state  the  aggre- 
gate amount  of  the  loans,  the  date  or  how  much  of 
the  amount  is  for  interest,  and  how  much  is  for 
principal,  and  does  not  give  any  data  from  which 
the  amounts  of  the  principal  and  interest  may  be 
ascertained.29 

For  goods  sold  and  delivered.  In  some  jurisdic- 
tions a  statement  for  a  confession  of  judgment  on 
an  account  of  goods  sold  need  not  contain  a  minute 
description  of  the  articles  sold,  but  is  sufficient  if  it 
is  declared  to  be  for  goods,  wares,  and  merchan- 


dise  sold  and  delivered.8*  In  other  jurisdictions, 
however,  the  statement  is  required  to  describe  the 
kind,  quantity,  and  price  of  the  goods  sold  and  de- 
livered.81 It  is  not  necessary  that  the  statement 
shall  allege,  in  terms,  that  the  goods  were  pur- 
chased by  defendant  from  plaintiff;  it  is  sufficient 
if  the  words  used  plainly  import  that  fact.82  The 
statement  need  not  describe  the  exact  time  of  the 
sale  or  sales;  it  is  sufficient  if  it  contains  merely  an 
approximate  description  of  the  period  at  or  within 
which  the  sales  took  place,38  such  as  during  a  cer- 
tain month,34  or  since  a  certain  day,35  or  during  a 
certain  year,86  or  within  a  certain  number  of 
years.87 

On  bills  and  notes.  A  statement  in  a  confession 
of  judgment  which  sets  forth  as  the  basis  of  the 
judgment  merely  the  execution  of  a  bill  or  note  by 
defendant  to  plaintiff  is  not  sufficient;88  it  should 
describe  the  consideration  for  the  bill  or  note  or 
should  set  forth  the  facts  out  of  which  the  indebt- 
edness arose  for  which  it  was  given.88  Thus  the 
statement  should  set  out  the  amount  for  which  the 
note  was  given,40  and,  where  it  was  given  for 
"goods  sold  and  delivered/'  or  for  "goods,  wares, 
and  merchandise,"  it  should  set  out  details  as  to 
the  date,  amount,  and  subject  of  the  sale  or  sales.41 
It  is  not  sufficient  to  state  that  the  note  was  given 


23.    Balance  of  account 

(1)  Where  there  have  been  numer- 
ous dealings  between  the  parties,  the 
statement  will  be  sufficient  if  it  sets 
forth    an    adjustment    of    accounts, 
with   exact   particulars   of  the  bal- 
ance    found     due     and     defendant's 
agreement   or   liability  to  pay  it — 
Critten  v.  Vredenburgh,  45  N.E.  952, 
151  N.Y.  536-^34  C.J.  p  115  note  76. 

(2)  It  has  been  held,  however,  that 
the  statement  should  allege  any  pay- 
ments made  and  how  such  balance 
was  ascertained. 

Mo.— Bryan  v.  Miller,  28  Mo.  32,  75 

Am.D.  107. 
N.Y. — Miller  v.  Barle,  24  N.T.  110. 

(3)  Statements  held  insufficient 

'  N.Y.— Hubbell   v.   Hardy,   357  N.Y.S. 

497,  93  Misc.  672,  modified  on  other 

grounds    and   affirmed   159    N.Y.S. 

1102,  174  App.Div.  857. 
N.C.— Farmers'   Bank  of  Clayton  v. 

McCullers,    160  8.BL   494,  201   NXX 

440. 
Contingent  liability 

(1)  Where  the  confession  is  to  se- 
cure a  contingent  liability,  the  state- 
ment   must    set    out    concisely    the 
facts     constituting    the     liability.— 
Farmers'    Bank   of   Clayton   v.   Mc- 
Cullers, supra— 34  C.  J.  p  115  note  "74. 

(2)  It   must   also    show  that   the 
sum   confessed  does  not  exceed  the 
liability. — Farmers'  Bank  of  Clayton 


v.    McCullers,    supra— 34   C.J.   p   115 
note  75. 

24.  Iowa.— Kendigr  v.  Marble,  12  N. 
W.  5S4,  58  Iowa  529. 

34  CJ.  P  117  note  23. 

25.  N.Y.— Flour  City  Nat   Bank  v. 
Doty,  41  Hun  76,  11  N.Y.Civ.Proc. 
141. 

84  C.  J.  p  11(8  note  24. 

26.  N.Y.— Lyon  v.  Sherman,  14  Abb. 
Pr.  393. 

34  C.J.  p  118  note  26. 

27.  N.Y.— Mather  v.   Mather,   55  N. 
Y.S.    973,    38   App.Div.   82. 

U    'N.Y.— Johnston  v.  McAusland,  9 
Abb.Pr.  214. 

29.  N.Y.— Wood  v.  Mitchell,  22  N.B. 
1125,  117  N.Y.  439. 

30.  Iowa.— Daniels     v.     Claflin,     15 
Iowa  152. 

S.C.— Ex  parte   Graham,   82  S.K  < 

54  SJC.  163. 
3X.     Wis.— Nichols  v.  Kribs,  10  Wis. 

76,  78  Am.D.  294. 
•34  C.J.  p  116  note  3. 

32.  tt.Y.— Read  v.   French,    28  N.Y. 
285. 

33.  N.Y.— Gandall   v.    Finn.    2    Abb 
Dec.  232,  1  Keyes  217,  33  How-Pr 
444. 

34  C.J.  p  116  note  5. 

34.  N.Y.— Delaware    v.    Bnsign,    21 
Barb.  8S. 


35.    N.Y.— Gandall   v.    Finn,    2   Abb. 

Dec.  232,  1  Keyes  217,  «33  How.Pr. 

444. 
38.    N.Y.— Read   v.   French,    23   N.Y. 

285. 

37.  N.Y. — Clements     <v.     Gerow,     1 
Abb.Dec.   370,  1  Keyes  297. 

38.  N.Y. — Keller  v.  Greenstone,  2  N. 
Y.S.2d  977,  253  App.Div.  573. 

34  C.J.  P  117  note  10. 

39.  N.Y. — Keller  v.   Greenstone,    su- 
pra. 

34  C.J.  p  117  note  11. 
Statements  held  sufficient 

(1)  Generally. — Keller     v.     Green- 
stone,   2    N.Y.S.2d   977,    253    App.Div. 
573. 

(2)  A  statement  is  sufficient  which 
sets  forth  that  the  Judgment  is  con- 
fessed to  secure  plaintiff  for  a  debt 
due  or  to  become  due  on  his  indorse- 
ment, as  the  surety  of  defendant  and 
for  his  benefit,  of  a  certain  note  or 
notes   fully   described  in  all   essen- 
tial particulars. — Dow  v.  Platner,  16 
N.Y.  562—34  C.J.  p  117  note  17. 

40.  N.Y, — Norris  v.  Denton,  30  Barb. 
117. 

34  C.J.  p  117  note  12. 

41.  Cal.— Cordier  v.  Schloss,  18  CaL 
34  C. J.  p  117  note  13. 


293 


§  159 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


for  a  balance  due  on  a  settlement  of  accounts,42 
unless  the  nature  of  the  dealing  out  of  which  the 
account  arose  is  described.48  It  is  not  necessary, 
however,  that  the  statement  should  give  all  the  cir- 
cumstances relating  to  the  debt  or  should  exclude 
all  possible  circumstances  which  may  affect  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  debt.44 

It  is  sufficient  to  state  that  the  note  was  given 
for  "money  loaned"  to  defendant,  or  "money  bor- 
rowed" by  him,  if  the  amount  and  time  of  the  loan 


are  given,  and  the  sum  is  alleged  to  be  justly  due;45 
the  terms  of  the  loan  are  not  required  to  be  stat- 
ed.46 Indeed,  it  has  been  held  that  failure  to  state 
the  time  of  the  loan  does  not  impair  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  statement.47  It  is  presumed  that  the 
loan  was  made  to  one  person  only,  and  it  is  not 
necessary  for  the  statement  to  negative  the  making 
of  the  loan  to  more  than  one  person.48  It  is  also 
presumed  that  only  one  sum  was  loaned,  and  that 
it  is  due.49 


E.  PROCEDURE  DT  OBTAINING  OR  ENTERING  JUDGMENT 


§  160.    In  General 

Generally  speaking,  a  Judgment  by  confession  may 
be  entered  only  in  conformity  with  the  terms  of  the  cog- 
novit, and  with  valid  statutes  and  rules  of  practice  gov- 
erning the  manner,  method,  and  conditions  of  entry. 

Generally  speaking,  a  judgment  by  confession 
may  be  entered  only  in  conformity  with  the  terms 
of  the  cognovit,50  and  with  valid  statutes51  and 
rules  of  practice52  governing  the  manner,  method, 
and  conditions  of  entry.  In  the  absence  of  a  statute 
providing  otherwise,  such  judgment  may  be  entered 


without  the  intervention  of  a  jury,53  or  the  direct 
adjudication  of  the  court  or  order  of  a  judge.54 
It  may  be  entered  without  a  declaration,55  or  prae- 
cipe,56  or  on  the  pracipe  of  plaintiffs  attorney.57 
Indeed,  it  may  be  entered  on  the  mere  oral  request 
of  plaintiff  or  of  anyone  acting  for  him.58  Under 
statutes  so  providing,  judgment  cannot  be  entered 
without  a  certificate  signed  by  the  judgment  credi- 
tor, or  his  duly  authorized  attorney  or  agent,  set- 
ting forth  the  precise  address  of  the  creditor  ;5d 
or  without  filing  in  the  county  clerk's  office  a  writ- 


42.  Iowa, — Bernard  v.  Douglass,  10 
Iowa  370. 

N.Y. — Dunham  v.  Waterman,  17  -N.Y. 
9,  72  Am.D.  406,  6  Abb.Pr.  365. 

43.  N.Y.— Acker   v.    Acker,    1    Abb. 
Dec.  1,  1  Keyes  291. 

44.  N.Y. — Acker  v.  Acker,  supra. 

45.  N.Y. — Keller  v.  Greenstone,  2  N. 
Y.S.2d  977,   253   App.Dlv.    57-3. 

34  C.J.  p  117  note  18. 

4ft,  N.Y.— Acker  v.  Acker,  1  Abb. 
Dec.  1, 1  Keyes  291. 

47.  N.Y.— Keller  v.  Greenstone,  2  N. 
Y.S.2d  977,  253  App.Div.  573. 

4&  N.Y.— Acker  v.  Acker,  1  Abb. 
(Dec.  1,  1  Keyes  291. 

49.  N.Y. — Acker  v.  Acker,  supra. 

50.  U.S.— Nardi    v.    Poinsatte,    D.C. 
Ind.,  46  F.2d  347. 

Del.— Money  v.  Hart,  159  A.  437,  5 
W.W.Harr..  11'5. 

Pa. — Pittsburgh  Terminal  Coal  Cor- 
poration v.  Potts,  92  Pa.Super.  1, 
followed  in  Hillman  Gas  Coal  Co. 
v.  Bozicevich,  92  Pa^Super.  39 — 
Pittsburgh  Terminal  Coal  Corpora- 
tion v.  Mc'Clements,  92  Pa. Super. 
29 — Medvidovich  v.  -Sterner,  50  Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  $90,  92  Pittsb.Leg.J. 
223 — Hettinger  v.  American  Veter- 
ans of  World  War  H,  Amvets, 
Reading  Post  No.  1,  Com.PL,  38 
Berks  Co.  109 — Donaghue  v.  Haupt, 
'  Com.Pl..  4  Sch.Reg.  '367. 

Form  of  judgment  as  following 
terms  of  cognovit  see  infra  $  164. 


Manner  of  confession  held  immateri- 
al 

Pa. — Walters  v.  Dooley,  Com.Pl.,  5 
Sch.Reg.  174. 

51.  111.— Bush  v.  Hanson,  70  111.  480. 
N.C.— Gibbs  v.  G.  H.  Weston  &  Co., 

18  S.ES.2d  .698,  221  N.C.  7— Farm- 
ers' Bank  of  Clayton  «v.  MoCullers, 
160  S.B.  494,  201  N.C.  440. 

52.  Pa. — Fox  v.  Boorse,  '81  Pa.  Super. 
211— Hunter   v.   Wertz,    91   Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  «348,  57  York  Leg.Rec.  111. 

53.  Ga.— Estes    v.    Estes,    14    SJEL2d 
681,  192  Ga.  94. 

Where  confession,  is  unconditional 
and  amount  certain,  a  jury  is  unnec- 
essary.— Allen  v.  White,  Minor,  Ala., 
365. 

Where  issues  arise  which  must  be 
determined  by  Jury,  a  rule  to  enter  a 
judgment  on  a  warrant  of  attorney 
should  be  discharged. — Handrick  v. 
Billings,  24  PaJCo.  '64—34  C.J.  p  119 
note  58. 

54.  Pa. — Equipment   Corporation   of 
America  v.  Primes  Vanadium  Co., 
132  A.  360,  285  Pa.  432. 

34  C.J.  p  119  note  53. 

Authority  of  nonjudiclal  officers  see 

infra  §  161. 

Rendition  of  Judgment  in  distinct 
office  of  court  not  to  be  confused 
with  the  ministerial  acts  of  filing 
and  docketing. — Gibbs  v.  G.  H.  Wes- 
ton &  Co.,  18  S.-E.2d  69'8,  221  N.C.  7. 

55.  Pa. — Union    Acceptance    Co.    v. 
Grant  Motor  Sales  Co.,   5  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.    407,    23   Luz.Leg.Reg.    89,    2 
Som.Leg.J.    260,   '39   York  Leg.Rec. 

294 


141 — Morris  v.  Chevalier,  Com.PL, 

20  Lehigh  Co.L.J.  1-33. 
Necessity    of    process    and    pleading 

generally  see  supra   §§    149-151. 

Where  confession  of  judgment  is 
express  and  unconditional,  a  state- 
ment of  cause  of  action  has  been 
held  unnecessary. — International  Ad- 
vertising -Syndicate  v.  Quaker  Silk 
Mills,  -8  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  23,  18  Berks 
65. 

Duly  verified  petition  held  Hied  as 
against  contention  that  statute 
barred  judgment  except  on  filing  of 
verified  petition. — Athens  First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Garland,  67  N.W.  5'59,  109 
Mich.  515,  63  Am.S.R.  597,  33  L.R.A. 

as. 

561  Pa. — Hefer  v.  Hefner,  95  Pa.Su- 
per.  551— Industrial  -Fibre  Products 
Co.  of  -Caldwell,  N.  J.  v.  Arters, 
49  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  304,  2*  Erie  Co. 
202 — Reinsmith  v.  McCready,  Com. 
PI.,  21  Lehigh  Co.L.J.  Ill,  58  York 
Leg.Rec.  187. 

57.  Pa. — Victor  v.  Johnson,  24  A. 
173,  148  Pa.  583 — Racunas  v. 
Vaughan,  29  Pa.Dist.  1058. 

sa  Pa. — Racunas  v.  Vaughan,  su- 
pra. 

59.     Pa.— Weisbrod  &  Hess  Brewing 
Co.  v.  Braverman,  149  A.  198,  299 
Pa.  "173— Weinstein   v.    Geller,    10 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  -132. 
The  purpose  of  the  statute  is  to 
furnish  information  to  the  taxing-  au- 
thorities.—'Deibert  v.  Rhodes,  140  A. 
515,    291    Pa.    5'50— New   Amsterdam 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Moyerman, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  161 


ten  notice  of  the  proposed  entry  on  a  bond  where 
a  mortgage  has  been  given  for  the  same  debt60 

The  formal  filing  or  recording  of  judgments  by 
confession  is  discussed  infra  §  165. 

Correction  of  defects  in  proceedings.  The  court 
may,  in  its  discretion,  allow  defects  in  the  pro- 
ceedings for  entry  of  judgment  by  confession  to  be 
corrected  on.  such  terms  as  appear  just.61 

§  161.    Jurisdiction  and  Authority 

a.  In  general 

b.  Authority  of  nonjudicial  officers 

a.  In  General 

It  Is  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  Judgment  by  con- 
fession that  the  court  have  jurisdiction  of  the  subject 
matter  and  of  the  parties,  the  court  which  has  Jurisdic- 
tion In  a  particular  case  being  dependent  on  local  prac- 
tice or  statutes. 

.  Although,  as  discussed  supra  §  160,  judgment  by 
confession  may  be  entered  without  the  direct  ad- 
judication of  the  court  or  the  order  of  a  judge, 
the  judgment  when  entered  is  the  judicial  act  of 


the  court,  as  discussed  infra  §  168,  and  it  is  essential 
to  the  validity  of  such  judgment  that  the  court  have 
jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter62  and  of  the  par- 
ties,63 and  a  judgment  entered  in  a  court  which 
does  not  have  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter,64 
or  of  the  parties,65  is  void.  A  valid  confession  of 
judgment,66  or  warrant  of  attorney  authorizing  an 
appearance  for  the  purpose  of  confessing  judgment 
and  an  appearance  thereunder,67  is  sufficient,  how- 
ever, to  give  the  court  jurisdiction  of  the  person 
of  defendant. 

The  court  which  has  jurisdiction  in  a  particular 
case  depends  on  the  local  practice  or  statutes.68 
In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise,  the 
entry  of  a  judgment  by  confession  has  been  held 
to  be  within  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  of  general 
jurisdiction.69  Under  some  statutes,  a  judgment  by 
confession  may  be  rendered  only  in  a  court  which 
has  jurisdiction  in  the  county  or  district  where  de- 
fendant resides,70  or  where  the  obligation  was  exe- 
cuted,71 and,  under  a  statute  so  providing,  a  judg- 
ment entered  by  any  court  in  any  other  county  or 
district  has  no  force  or  validity.72  It  has  been  held, 


95   Pa.  Super.   47 — Beltonen  T.  Gruca 
&  Cozel,  94  Pa.Super.  -32. 
Mandatory  or  directory 

Placing  on  record  with  Judgment 
address  of  creditor  is  mandatory* 
while  manner  of  its  appearance  is 
directory. — Defbert  v.  Rhodes,  140  A. 
515,  517,  291  Pa.  550— Silverstein  v. 
Qohen,  12  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  21'8,  21 
North.Co.  377— C.  Trevor  Dunham, 
Inc.  v.  Miller,  10  PaJDist  &  Co.  113, 
23  Sch.Leg.Rec.  167. 

The  prothonotary  or  his  deputy 
may  t>e  the  agent  of  the  judgment 
creditor  for  the  purpose  of  certifying 
the  latter'c  address,  and  it  will  be 
assumed  that  he  signed  the  certifi- 
cate as  the  creditor's  agent — Weis- 
brod  &  Hess  Brewing  Co.  v.  Braver- 
man,  149  A.  198,  299  Pa.  173. 

Sufficiency  of  address 

(1)  Information     sufficiently     def- 
inite to  enable  taxing  authorities  to 
locate  taxable  person  is  substantial 
compliance  with  such  statute. — New 
Amsterdam  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v. 
Moyerman,   95  Pa.Super.  47. 

(2)  It  is  not  necessary  to  give  the 
street    address.— Weisbrod    &    Hess 
Brewing   Co.   v.   Braverman,   149  A. 
198,    299    Pa.    173— New    Amsterdam 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Moyerman, 
supra — Beltonen   v.    Gruca  &  Cozel, 
94  Pa.  Super.  32. 

(3)  The  designation  of  ward  meets 
requirements    of    statute.— Beltonen 
v.  Gruca  &  Cozel,  supra. 

(4)  Where  the  creditor  is  a  non- 
resident of  the  state,  it  is  sufficient 
if  he  names  the  state  in  which  he  re- 
sides.— Pennsylvania  Buggies  Truck 


Sales  v.  Bocastow,  12  Pa,Dist.  &  Co. 

328. 
Xiease  signed,  by  creditor,  setting 

forth  his  address,  was  held  to  meet 

statutory         requirements. — General 

Finance    Co.    v.    Wasilowski,    5    Pa. 

Dist  &  Co.  274,  20  Sch.Leg.Rec.  219. 
N.J.— Gerstley   v.    Best,    151   A. 
•395,   8  N.XMisc.   661,  affirmed  156 
A.   377,   108  N.J.Law  189. 

ITotice  held  sufficient 

N.J. — Gerstley  v.  Best,  supra. 

81.  Pa.— Fox  v.  Boorse,  81  Pa.Su- 
per.  211— Parsons  v.  Kuhn,  Com. 
PL,  45  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  356. 

Amendment  or  correction  of  Judg- 
ment by  confession  see  infra  §  320. 

62.    111.— Stead    v.    Craine,    256    111. 

Ap-p.  44'5. 
Pa.— Oberlin  v.   Parry,    134   A.  460, 

287  Pa,  224. 

.— Rubin  v.   Dale.   288   P.   223, 

156  Wash.  -676. 
34  C.J.  p  119  note  -62. 
03.    111.— Duggan  v.  Kupitz,  22  N.E. 

2d  892,   301   IlLApp.   230— Stead  v. 

Craine,  256  IlLAjpp.  445. 

Without  a  confession  by  defend- 
ant or  his  attorney  the  court  has  no 
power  to  enter  Judgment  by  confes- 
sion.—Bernstein  v.  Qurran,  99  HI. 
App.  179— 34  C.J.  p  121  note  92. 
64.  Tnd.— Marsh  v.  Sherman,  12  Ind. 

358. 
•34  C.J.  p  119  note  63. 

85.    I1L— Duggan  v.  Kupitz,  22  N.E. 

2d  392,  301  I1LAPP.  230. 
68.    Kan.— Ritter  v.  Hoffman,  10  P. 

576,  35  Kan.  215. 

295 


67.  U.S. — Withers  v.  Starace,  3>.C.N. 
T.,  22  F.Supp.  773. 

111.— Lock  v.  Leslie,  248  IlLApp.  438. 
Place  of  residence  of  signer  of  the 
warrant  does  not  affect  the  validity 
of  his  consent  to  jurisdiction. — -With- 
ers v.  Starace,  (D.C.N.Y.,  22  F.Supp. 
773—34  C.J.  p  120  note  66. 

68.  N.J. — Vanderveere  v.  Gaston,  24 
N.J.Law  818. 

34  C.J.  p  120  note  94. 

69.  I1L — Schwartz  v.  Schwartz,  «  N. 
R2d     66'8,     366    111.     247— Bush    v. 
Hanson,  70  111.  480 — Moore  v.  Mon- 
arch   Distributing   Co.,    t32    N.E.2d 
1019,    309    IlLApp.    339— Stead    v. 
Craine.  256  IlLApp.  445. 

70.  111. — May  v.  Chas.  O.  Larson  Co., 
26  N.E  3d  139,   304  IlLAjpp.  137. 

34  C.J.  p  120  note  65. 

The  intention  of  defendant  is  not 
the  determining  factor  with  respect 
to  the  required  residence. — Zipper- 
man  v.  Wiltse,  47  N.B.2d  S&5,  317 
IlLApp.  654.  * 

Wife,  legally  separated:  from  her 
husband,  was  held  a  resident  of 
county  where  she  resided  and  had 
her  place  of  business. — Zipperman  v. 
Wiltse,  supra. 

71.  111. — May  v.  Chas.  O.  -Larson  Co., 
26  KB.2d  139.  i304  IlLApp.  137. 
Place  of  preparation  and  delivery 

held  place  of  execution,  although  ob- 
ligation was  signed  in  another  coun- 
ty.—Taylorville  Savings,  Loan  & 
Building  Ass'n  v.  McBride,  22  N.B.2d 
772.  301  IlLApp.  632,  transferred,  see, 
17  N.EL2d  221,  369  111.  544. 

72.  111. — Rixmann  v.  Witwer,   App., 


§  161 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


however,  that  such  statutes,*1  and  similar  statutes 
not  in  terms  limited  to  judgments  by  confession,74 
do  not  limit  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  of  general  ju- 
risdiction over  the  subject  matter  of  judgments  by 
confession,  but  merely  provide  the  method  by  which 
the  court  may  obtain  jurisdiction  over  the  person 
and  specify  the  venue  in  which  a  defendant  may 
be  sued,  and  objections  founded  thereon  may  be 
waived,75  if  not  raised  at  the  earliest  possible  mo- 
ment.76 Where  the  judgment  is  confessed  in  a 
court  of  limited  or  inferior  jurisdiction,  its  ju- 
risdiction must  appear  on  the  face  of  the  proceed- 
ings, and  the  record  must  show  that  there  has 
been  a  compliance  with  all  statutory  requirements.77 

The  consent  of  parties  cannot  confer  jurisdiction 
over  the  subject  matter,78  but,  where  the  subject 
matter  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  a 
judgment  entered  on  confession  without  excepting 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  person  has  been  held  to 
be  valid.™ 

b.  Authority  of  Nonjudicial  Officers 

Under  some  statutes,  the  prothonotary,  register,  or 
clerk  of  the  court  may  enter  judgment  by  confession, 
on  the  filing  in  his  office  of  the  necessary  papers,  with- 
out any  action  by  the  judge,  but  in  so  doing  he  acts 
merely  in  a  ministerial  capacity  and  must  follow  closely 
the  forms  provided  by  law  for  the  exercise  of  the  power 
conferred  on  him. 


Under  some  statutes,  the  prothonotary,  register, 
or  clerk  of  the  court  may  enter  a  judgment  by  con- 
fession, on  the  filing  in  his  office  of  the  necessary 
papers,  without  any  action  by  the  judge,80  and,  as 
discussed  supra  §  154  f,  without  the  agency  of  an 
attorney.  The  clerk's  act  in  entering  the  judgment 
is  not  judicial,  but  merely  ministerial,81  and,  when 
he  is  presented  with  what  purport  to  be  the  neces- 
sary papers,  it  has  been  held  that  he  cannot  ques- 
tion their  validity  or  sufficiency,82  but  must  enter 
judgment  thereon.88  He  must  follow  closely  the 
forms  provided  by  law  for  the  exercise  of  the  pow- 
er conferred  on  him;8*  and  any  directions  of  the 
statute  as  to  the  conditions  on  which  he  may  enter 
the  judgment  must  be  strictly  observed85  His  pow- 
er may  be  exercised  only  where  the  confession  is 
complete  and  unconditional.86  In  entering  judg- 
ment he  -must  follow  the  papers  filed,87  and  cannot 
insert  any  stipulation  in  the  judgment  which  is  not 
authorized  by  the  warrant  or  confession.88 

For  or  against  himself.  Where  a  clerk  of  court 
is  empowered  to  take  and  enter  confessed  judg- 
ments, he  may,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  enter  such 
a  judgment  in  his  own  favor8^  or  against  himself, 
as  discussed  supra  §  143. 

County  clerk.  The  word  "may*1  in  a  statute  pro- 
viding that  a  statement  of  confession  may  be  filed 
with  the  county  clerk  of  the  county  of  which  de- 


es N.E.2d  -607— Houston  v.  Ingels, 
48  NVE.2d  19$,  318  IlLApp.  383. 

73.  111.— May  v.  Chas.  O.  Larson  Co., 
2-6  10J.2d.189,  804  IlLApp.  137. 

74.  Md. — John  B.  Qolt  Co.  v.  Wright, 
159  A.  743,  162  Mi  387. 

75.  111. — May  v.  Chas.  O.  Larson  Co., 
26  N.E.2d  139,  304  IlLApp.  137. 

Md.— John    B.    Colt   -Co.    v.    Wright, 
159  A.  74'3,  162  Md.  ,OT. 

76.  111.— May  v.  Chas.  O.  Larson  Co., 
26  N.B.2d  139,  304  IlLApp.  137. 
General    appearance    under   which 

defendant  submitted  to   Jurisdiction 
of  court  to  contest  plaintiff's  claim 
on  the  merits,  praying  for  leave  to 
file  a  counterclaim,  was  held  waiver 
of  objection.— May  v.  Chas.  0.  Lar- 
son Co.,  supra. 
Objection,  held  not  waived 
111. — Rixmann  v.  Witwer,  App.,  63  N. 
B.2d  607. 

77.  Neb.— Howell  v.  Gilt  Edge  Mfg. 
Co.,  49  N.W.  704,  32  Neb.  627. 

34  C.J.  p  120  note  67. 

T&    CaL— Feillett  v.  Bngler,  8  Cal. 

7-6. 
N.C. — Slocumb  v.  Cape  'Fear  Shingle 

Co.,  14  S.B.  -622,  110.  N.C.  24. 
-79.    La.— Kelly  v.  Lyons,  4  So.  480, 

40  La.Ann.  498. 
S.C.— Martin   v.   Bowie,    21   S.CLaw 

22*5. 


80.  111.— Wilson   y.    Josephson,    244 
HLAfpp.  366. 

Pa.— Deibert  v.  Rhodes,  140  A.  515, 
291  Pa.  550— Oberlin  v.  Parry,  134 
A.  460,  287  Pa.  224— Hefer  v.  Hef- 
ner,   95    Pa.Super.    551— Miller   v. 
Desher,  12  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  315,  41 
Lanc.L.Rev.  935 — Morris  v.  Cheva- 
lier, Com.PL,.20  iLehigh  L.J.  133. 
34  C.J.  p  120  note  73. 
Authority  of  clerk  to  enter  in  vaca- 
tion see  infra  5  166. 
Authority     of     clerk     to     liquidate 
amount  of  judgment  see  infra   § 
167. 

In  pending  suit  or  action 
Va. — Deeds   v.   Gilxner,   174  S.R   87, 
162  Va.  .157. 

In  absence  of  trial  Judge  on  a  rule 
day  under  a  statute  so  providing, 
the  register  may  enter  a  decree  pro 
confesso. — 'Ex  parte  Anderson,  4  So. 
2d  420,  242  Ala.  81. 

Only  a  clerk  of  a  court  which  has 
Jurisdiction  of  the  cause  may  enter 
Judgment— Kirkbride  v.  Burden,  Pa., 
1  BalLJT.S.,  288,  1  L.BId.  141. 

The  court  cannot  make  such  judg- 
ment its  Judgment  by  action  taken 
at  a  subsequent  term,  so  as  to  alter 
the  time  when  the  lien  of  the  Judg- 
ment will  commence. — Russell  v. 
Geyer,  4  Mo.  -384. 

81.  111. — Houston  v.  Ingels,  48  N.EL 

296 


2d  196,   $1*8  IlLApp.  38^— Long  v. 

Coffman,   230   IlLApp.   527. 
N.C.— G.  H.  Weston  &  Ox,  18  S.B.2d 

69'8,  221  N.C.  7. 
84  C.J.  p  120  note  77. 

82.  I1L — Houston  <v.  Ingels,  48  N.B. 
2d  196,  «3I8   IlLApp.   38S— <Long  v. 
Coffman,  230  IlLApp.  527. 

83.  111. — Houston  v.  Ingels,  48  N.E. 
2d   196,    318   HLApp.   383— Long  v. 
Coffman,  230  HLApp.  527. 

Iowa.— Blott  Y,  Blott,  290  N.W.  74, 
227  Iowa  1108. 

84.  <3aL— - Old    Settlers'   Inv.    CJo.    v. 
White,  110  P.   922,  158  CaL'i36. 

Pa. — People's  Supply  Co.  v.  Goff,  25 
Pa.Co.  -651. 

85.  Pa, — Orner  v.  Hurwitch,  97  Pa. 
Super.  2-63 — Meyers  &  Joly  v.  Vei- 
ling, '31  PaJSuper.  116. 

34  C.J.  p  120  note  8*5. 

8&  Pa.— Richards  v.  Richards,  19  A. 
10*77,  135  Pa.  2-89 — Commonwealth 
V.  Brod,  22  PaJDist  501,  41  Pa.Co. 
194. 

87.  111.— Tucker  v.  Gill,  $1  111.  234. 
Necessity     of    Judgment     following 

cognovit    or    confession    generally 
see  infra  §  164. 

88.  Pa. — Rohrer  Y.  Rohrer,  14  Pa.Co. 
332. 

89.  S.C. — Moore  v.  Trimmier,  11  -S.JB. 
548,  552,  32  S.C.  511— Trimmier  v. 
Winsmith,  23  S.C.  44*. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  162 


f  endant  was  a  resident  at  the  time  of  making  such 
statement  has  been  held  to  mean  "must,"90  and,  as 
so  construed,  the  requirement  has  been  held  to  be 
jurisdictional.91 

§  162.    Necessity  and  Sufficiency  of  Proof 

a.  In  general 

b.  Proof  of  authority 

a.  In  General 

As  a  general  rule,  a  confession  of  Judgment  dispenses 
with  the  necessity  of  proving  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  ac- 
tion, except  to  the  extent  that  by  statute  he  is  required 
to  furnish  proof  of  certain  facts  or  to  the  extent  that  the 
right  to  enter  Judgment  depends,  on  a  condition  or  con- 
tingency, the  occurrence  of  which  Is  not  disclosed  by 
the  papers. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  confession  of  judgment  dis- 
penses with  the  necessity  of  proving  plaintiffs  cause 
of  action,92  except  to  the  extent  that  the  right  to 
enter  judgment  depends  on  a  condition  or  contin- 
gency, the  occurrence  of  which  is  not  disclosed  by 
the  papers,  in  which  case  the  occurrence  of  such 
condition  or  contingency  must  be  averred  and 
shown  by  affidavit  or  other  legal  proof,  before 
the  judgment  may  be  entered.98  An  affidavit,  un- 
less specially  required  by  statute,  is  not  necessary  if 


other  legal  proof  is  produced9*  Where  required 
by  statute,  however,  a  judgment  by  confession  must 
be  supported  by  an  affidavit  containing  all  facts  re- 
quired by  the  statute  to  be  embodied  therein.95 
Thus,  under  a  statute  so  providing,  a  judgment  by 
confession  must  be  supported  by  an  affidavit  stat- 
ing the  amount  due  or  to  become  due,96  or  the  true 
consideration  of  the  bond  or  other  obligation  on 
which  the  judgment  is  confessed,97  or  a  sufficient 
cause  of  action  which  may  be  the  subject  of  a 
judgment  by  confession.98 

b.  Proof  of  Authority 

Under  some  statutes  and  rules  of  practice,  where  a 
confession  of  Judgment  Is  made  under  a  power  of  at- 
torney, proof  of  due  execution  of  the  power  is  necessary 
before  entry  of  Judgment,  and  proof  thereof  by  affidavit 
is  generally  sufficient. 

Under  some  statutes  and  rules  of  practice,  where 
the  confession  is  made  under  a  power  of  attorney, 
it  is  necessary  that  proof  shall  be  made  of  the  due 
execution  of  the  warrant  or  power  before  the  judg- 
ment by  confession  is  entered,99  at  least  where  the 
judgment  is  entered  in  vacation  by  the  clerk  of  the 
court1  As  a  general  rule,  an  affidavit  showing  the 
execution  of  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judg- 


90.  N.T.— Williams    v.    Mittlemann, 
20  N.Y.S.2d  690,  259  App.Div.  697, 
appeal  denied  22  N.Y.S.2d  822,  260 
App.Div.  811. 

91.  N.Y.— Williams     T.     Mittleman, 
supra. 

92.  Iowa. — Edwards    v.    Pit2er,     12 
Iowa  607. 

N.J.— Baldwin  v.  Brown,  3  N.JJLaw 
533. 

83.     Pa.— Kolf  v.  Lieberman,  128  A. 
122,   282  Pa.1  479— Hogsett  v.  Lut- 
rario,    13   A.2d   902,    140   Pa.Super. 
419— Advance-Rumely   .     Thresher 
Co.  v.  Frederick,  98  PeuSuper,  560 
— Soklove   v.    Lalitas,   Com.PL,    30 
DeLCo.  370— Medvidovich  v.  Stern- 
er, Coxn.Pl.,  50  Pa-Dist  &  £o.  690, 
92  Pittsb.Leg-.jr.  223— Miller  v.  Mil- 
ler, Com.Pl.,  10  Sch.Reg.  10*9— Wal- 
ters v.  Dooley,  Com.PL,  5  "Sch.Reg. 
174 — Home   Protective   Savings   & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Kefalas,  48  Pa~Dist 
&  Co.  346,  6  Fay.L.J.  151,  91  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  -326. 
34  C.J.  p  121  note  89. 
Effect  of  failure  to  file  proper  affi- 
davit of  default  see  infra  §  171. 
Right  to  enter  Judgment  before  ma- 
turity of  debt  see  infra   §   166. 
If  right  -to  enter  Judgment  is  not 
dependent  on  occurrence  of  a  specific 
default,   an  averment  of  default  is 
not    necessary. — Harwood   v.    Bruhn, 
170    A.    144,    313   Pa.    337— Common- 
wealth   v.    McLaughlin    Contracting 
Co.  of  Pittsburgh,  142  A.  274,  29*  Pa. 
313— Pacific  Lumber  Co.  of  Illinois 


v.  Rodd,  135  A.  122,  287  Pa.  454— New 
Amsterdam  Building  &  <Loan  Ass'n 
v.  Moyerman,  95  Pa.Super.  47 — In- 
ternational Advertising  Syndicate  v. 
Quaker  Silk  Mills,  8  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
23,  18  Berks  Co.L.J.  65— General 
Finance  Co.  v.  Wasilowski,  5  PaJDist 
&  Co.  274,  24  Sch.Leg.Rec.  219— Bu- 
kas  v.  Cohen,  Pa.Com.Pl.,  '33  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  1'63 — Commonwealth  ex  reL 
Argyle  v.  Jones,  Pa.Com.Pl.,  30 
North.Co.  915— Donaghue  v.  Haupt, 
Pa.Com.Pl.,  4  Sch.Reg.  367— Interna- 
tional finance  Co.  v.  Barnes,  Pa. 
Com.PL,  86  Pittsb.(Leg.J.  44. 

Affidavit  of  default  held  insuffi- 
cient to  sustain  Judgment. — Com- 
monwealth v.  Przekop,  25  A.2d  776, 
148  PauSuper.  385— Home  Protective 
Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Kefalas,  48 
Pa,Dist.  &  Co.  -346,  6  Fay.L.  J.  151,  91 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  326. 

Affidavit  of  default  held  sufficient 
to  sustain  Judgment. — Common- 
wealth v.  J.  &  A.  Moeschlin,  Inc.,  170 
A.  119,  314  Pa.  34— Marshall  v.  Jack- 
son, 145  A.  584,  296  Pa.  1*~ Grant 
Const  Co.,  for  Use  of  Home  Credit 
Co.,  v.  Stokes,  167  A.  $43,  109  Pa. 
Super.  421— Home  Credit  Co.  v.  Pres- 
ton, 99  PtuSuper.  457— International 
Finance  Co.  v.  Barnes,  Pa.Com.PL, 
86  Pittsb.'Leg.J.  44. 

94.  Pa.— Sweeney  v.  McPonnell,  25 
PajSuper.  69 — Continental  Mining 
&  Smelting  Corp.  v.  Duncan,  Com. 
PL,  9  Fay.L.J.  95. 

34  C.J.  p  121  note  91. 

297 


95.  K.J. — Harrison    v.    Dobkln,    Cir. 
Ct,  168  A.  8-37,  11  H.J.Misc.  892. 

96.  Wis.— Reeves   v.    Kroll,   113   N. 
W.  440,  133  Wis.  196. 

34  C.J.  p  121  note  93. 

97.  N.J.— Knoettner      v.      Integrity 
Corporation  of  New  Jersey,  160  A, 
527,  109  <N.J.Law  186. 

34  C.J.  p  123  note  19. 
Affidavits  held  sufficient 
N.J.— Haddonfield  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hip- 
pie,   164   A.   575,   110  N.J.Law  271 
— Knoettner  v.  Integrity  Corpora- 
tion of  New  Jersey,  160  A.  527,  109 
N.J.Law    186— Huck-Gerhardt    Co. 
v.  Parreca,  154  A.  870,  9  N.J.MJsc. 
563, 
34  CJ.  P  125  note  19  [aj. 

Incorporation  of  contract  in  affida- 
vit held  unnecessary. — Huck-Ger- 
hardt Co.  v.  Parreca,  supra. 

98.  N.J.— Brandt  v.   Tartar,   145   A. 
225,  7  N.J.3kIisc.  229. 

99.  Okl. — St     Louis-San    Francisco 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Bayne,  40  P.2d  1104,  170 
Okl.  542 — Scanlon  v.  Klopfenstein, 
3  P.-2d  869,  152  Okl.  162. 

34  C.J.  p  121  note  97. 
Filing  of  warrant  or  power  of  at- 
torney see  supra  §  153. ' 

1.  HI.— Shumway  v.  Shumway,  192 
NJB3.  678,  £57  OIL  477— Hutson  v. 
Wood,  105  N.K  34*,  2613  HL  37ft. 

34  CJ.  p  121  notes  98,  1. 


§  162 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ment,  filed  with  the  warrant,  is  sufficient  proof  of  its 
execution.2  It  has  been  held  that,  where  the  record 
recites  that  the  execution  of  the  power  was  duly 
proved,  this  will  be  sufficient  on  error  brought,  al- 
though no  affidavit  was  filed.8 

Record.  It  has  been  held  that  the  fact  that  the 
execution  of  the  power  was  properly  proved  before 
the  confession  of  the  judgment  must  appear  on  the 
record,4  at  least  when  it  is  confessed  in  vacation 
before  the  clerk,5  and  evidence  aliunde  the  record 
is  inadmissible  to  prove  a  valid  affidavit.6  Other 
authorities,  however,  have  held  that  the  judgment 
is  sufficient  if  it  recites  the  power,  without  reciting 
its  contents  or  that  it  was  proved.7 

§  163.    Affidavit  as  to  Bona  Fides  of 

Confession 

Under  statutes  so  providing,  the  warrant  of  attor- 
ney or  statement  of  Indebtedness  must  be  accompanied 
by  an  affidavit  that  the  debt  Is  "Justly  due  and  owing" 
or  "Justly  due  or  to  become  due"  and  that  the  Judgment 
Is  not  confessed  for  the  purpose  of  defrauding  the  debt- 
or's creditors,  but  it  Is  not  necessary  that  the  affidavit 
be  In  the  precise  form  used  In  the  statute,  substantial 
compliance  being  sufficient: 
To  evidence  the  good  faith  of  the  transaction  and 


prevent  fraud,  it  is  commonly  required  by  statute 
that  the  warrant  of  attorney  or  statement  of  indebt- 
edness shall  be  accompanied  by  an  affidavit  that  the 
debt  is  "justly  due  and  owing"  or  "justly  due  or  to 
become  due,"  and  that  the  judgment  is  not  con- 
fessed for  the  purpose  of  defrauding  the  debtor's 
creditors.*  Under  some  of  these  statutes,  plaintiff, 
that  is,  the  party  taking  the  judgment  by  confes- 
sion,* or  his  attorney  or  agent,10  must  make  such 
affidavit.  Under  other  statutes,  defendant  or  debt- 
or, that  is,  the  party  confessing,  must  make  the 
affidavit11  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  such 
an  affidavit,  by  plaintiff,  is  not  necessary  where  de- 
fendant appears  under  process  and  files  an  answer 
admitting  the  debt  and  consenting  to  the  judg- 
ment12 

Sufficiency  It  is  not  essential  that  the  required 
affidavit  of  bona  fides,  whether  made  by  plaintiff 
or  by  defendant,  should  be  in  the  precise  form  of 
words  used  in  the  statute;  it  is  sufficient  if  it  sub- 
stantially complies  with  the  statutory  requirement13 
Where  a  complaint  is  filed  fully  describing  the  cause 
of  action,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  affidavit 
should  describe  it  ;14  nor  is  it  necessary  to  state  the 


2.  111.— Hutson  v.  Wood,  supra, 
34  C.J.  p  121  notes  99,  1. 

3.  111.— Iglehart   v.    Morris,    34   HI. 
501. 

4.  Ark.— Rapley    v.    Price.    9    Ark. 
428. 

34  C.J.  P  121  note  5. 

5.  in —Alton  Banking  &  Trust  Co. 
v.    Gray,    179    N.E.    469,    847    I1L 
99. 

34  C.J.  p  121  note  '8. 

Where  Judgment  Is  confessed  in 
term,  time,  it  has  been  held  that  it 
will  be  presumed  that  a  sufficient 
warrant  of  attorney  was  produced 
and  proved  to  the  court— Alton 
Banking  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Gray,  supra 
—34  C.J.  p  122  note  7. 

6.  111. — Hutson   v.   Wood,    105   N.E. 
343,    263    111.    376,    Ann.Cas.l915C 
587. 

7.  Tex.— Rankin   v.  Filburn,  1 
A-Civ.Cas.  {  797. 

34  C.J.  P  122  note  9. 

8.  N.J.— Fortune    Building   &   Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Codomo,   7  A.2d  880,  122 
N.J.Law      565— Haddonfleld      Nat. 
Bank  v.  Hippie,  164  A.  575,  110  N. 
J.Law  271 — Knoettner  v.  Integrity 
Corporation  of  New  Jersey,  160  A. 
527,  109  N.J.Law  186 — Modern  Se- 
curity Co.  of  Philadelphia  v.  Flem- 
ing, 142  A.  649,  6  N.J.Misc.  780. 

Allegation  that  debt  is  justly  due  in 
statement  of  indebtedness  see  su- 
pra §  159  d. 

Effect  of  failure  to  file  proper  affida- 
vit see  infra  §  171. 


'Justly  due  and  owing" 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  a  debt 
is  "justly  due  and  owing"  within  the 
meaning  of  such  statute  only  after 
the  date  of  payment  has  been  reach- 
ed.—American  Auto  Finance  Co.  v. 
Miller,  7  A.2d  828,  12-3  N.J.Law  1— 
Modern  Security  Company  v.  Flem- 
ing, 1'42  A.  649,  7  N.J.Misc.  730. 

(2)  However,     it    has    also    been 
held  that  the  words  "due"  and  "just- 
ly due  and  owing"  in  such  statute 
may  be  applied  to  an  indebtedness 
without  reference  to  the  time  of  pay- 
ment—Gaskill  &  Sons  v.  Buckman, 
116  A.  692,   95  N.J.Daw  14— Hoyt  v. 
Hoyt,  H'6  N.J.Law  138. 

Piling  wth  court 

Under  a  statute  so  providing,  such 
affidavit  should  be  filed  with  the 
court. — MdPheeters  v.  Campbell,  5 
Ind.  107-^4  C.J.  p  123  note  33. 

9.  N.J.— Knoettner  v.  Integrity  Cor- 
poration   of    New    Jersey,    160    A. 
•527,  109  N.J.Law  186. 

34  C.J.  p  122  note  11. 

Plaintiff  in  parson,  and  not  his 
attorney 'in  fact  or  agent  in  the  con- 
fessed judgment,  must  make  the  af- 
fidavit. 

Mo.— Bryant  v.  Harding,  29  Mo.  347. 
Tex. — Montgomery  v.  Barnett,  8  Tex. 

10.  N.J.— Knoettner      v.      Integrity 
Corporation  of  New  Jersey,  160  A. 
527,  109  N.J.Law  186. 

Sources   of  information  and  reason 

for  making 

It  has  been  held  that  an  affidavit 

made  by  an  attorney  must  disclose 

298 


the  sources  of  the  attorney's  infor- 
mation and  give  a  reason  why  it 
was  not  made  by  plaintiff  himself. 
—Rogers  v.  Cherrier,  4,3  N.W.  828, 
75  Wis.  54— Jewett  v.  Fink,  2  N.W. 
1124,  47  Wis.  446. 

11.  Ind.— Bible  v.  Voris,  40  N.B.  670, 
i!41  Ind.  569. 

34  C.J.  p  122  note  1«4. 

12.  Tex. — Lanier    v.     Blount,     Civ. 
App.,  45  S.W.  202. 

3m  C.J.  |p  122  note  15. 

13.  N.J.— Haddonfield  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Hippie,  164  A.  575,  110  N.J.Law  271 
—Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Harrison 
v.  Dobkin,  168  A.  837,  838,  11  N.J. 
Misc.  892. 

34  C.J.  p  122  note  18. 
Mortgage  deficiency 

Affidavit  for  Judgment  by  confes- 
sion on  bond  secured  by  mortgage 
need  not  state  that  mortgage  was 
foreclosed,  premises  sold,  and  notice 
of  intention  to  enter  judgment  for 
deficiency  filed. — Harrison  v.  Dobkin, 
168  A.  8-37,  11  NJT.Miss.  892— Levin 
v.  Wenof,  146  A.  789,  7  N.J.Misc. 
603. 

Affidavit  held  sufficient 
N.J. — Haddonfleld  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hip- 
pie,  164  A.   575,   HO   N.J.Law   271 
—Knoettner  v.  Integrity  Corpora- 
tion  of  New    Jersey,    160   A.    5-27, 
109  N.J.Law  186. 
Affidavit  held  insufficient 
N.J. — Harrison     v.     Dobkin,     Cir.Ct, 
168  A.  $37,  11  N.J.Misc.  892. 

14.    Ind. — Clouser  v.  March,  15  Ind/ 
82. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  164 


amount  due,  in  the  affidavit,  where  the  complaint 
states  such  amount  and  affiant  swears  that  the  facts 
alleged  in  the  complaint  are  true  to  his  knowledge.15 
The  affidavit  need  not  deny  in  specific  terms  that  the 
debt  has  been  paid,  released,  barred,  or  discharged.16 

§  164.    Nature,  Form,  and  Requisites  of  Judg- 
ment in  General 

A  judgment  rendered  on  the  confession  of  a  debtor, 
except  In  so  far  as  Its  form  and  requisites  are  governed 
by  special  statutory  requirements,  need  not  be  In  any 
special  form,  but  it  should  follow  closely  the  cognovit  or 
confession. 

A  judgment  rendered  on  the  confession  of  a  debt- 
or or  defendant,  except  in  so  far  as  its  form  and 
requisites  are  governed  by  special  statutory  require- 
ments,17 need  not.be  in  any  special  form,  as  its 
sufficiency  must  be  tested  by  its  substance  rather 
than  by  its  form.18  It  should,  however,  follow 
closely  the  cognovit  or  confession,1^  should  express 
the  particular  debt  or  obligation  for  which  it  is  giv- 
en,2(>  and  should  include  any  special  conditions  or 
stipulations  contained  therein,21  except  such  as  con- 
stitute no  part  of  the  judgment22  The  mere  filing 


or  recording  of  a  statement  or  confession  of  judg- 
ment in  the  clerk's  office  is  not  a  "judgment,"2*  es- 
pecially where  the  filing  is  done  at  a  time  when  by 
law  such  office  is  not  open  for  the  transaction  of 
business.24 

Surplusage.  The  presence  in  the  judgment  of 
merely  superfluous  provisions  or  directions,  or  of 
matters  which  follow  as  the  legal  consequence  of  the 
judgment  whether  or  not  they  are  incorporated  in 
it,  may  generally  be  disregarded  as  surplusage.25 

Parties.  A  judgment  by  confession  must  desig- 
nate the  parties  for  and  against  whom  it  is  rendered 
with  reasonable  certainty,  or  it  will  be  void  for  un- 
certainty.26 The  judgment  must  follow  the  confes- 
sion in  describing  the  parties  in  favor  of  whom,27 
or  against  whom,28  it  is  confessed.  Where  several 
defendants  confess  judgment  severally,  a  separate 
judgment  should  be  entered  against  each,29  and  a 
joint  judgment  may  not  be  entered  against  them.30 
On  the  other  hand,  in  case  of  joint  debtors  or  joint 
defendants,  it  has  been  held  that  a  joint  judgment 
must  be  entered  against  them  all,81  and  that,  if  in 


15.  Wis. — Rogers  v.  Cherrier,  48  N. 
W.  828,  75  Wis.  64. 

16.  N.Y. — Lanning  v.  Carpenter,   20 
N.Y.  447. 

17.  Judgment  held  to  comply  with 
statute    requiring    judgment    to    be 
substantially    in    form    set    forth. — 
Bank  of  Chatham  v.  Arendall,  16  S. 
B.2d  352,  178  Va.  188. 

18.  Va. — Bank  of  Chatham  v.  Aren- 
dall, supra. 

34  C.J.  p  1213  note  27. 

Entry  within  six  months  of  fore- 
closure sale  was  held  not  required 
by  statute  to  be  recited. — Gerstley  v. 
Best,  151  A.  *9S,  8  N.JJ£isc.  661,  af- 
firmed 156  A.  377,  108  N«J.Law  189. 

19.  Del. — "Dover  Motors  Corporation 
v.  -North  &  South  Motor  Lines,  19«3 
A.  592,  8  W.W-Harr.  467. 

111.— Sharpe      v.       Second      Baptist 

Church   of  Maywood,   274  Ill.App. 

374. 
Pa.— Grakelow  v.  Kidder,  95  Pa.Su- 

per.  250 — Seltzer  v.  Novor  &  Israel, 

12  PaJDist.  &  Co.  551. 
34  C.J.  p  1213  note  28. 

20.  Ooxm.— Wight    v.    Mott,    EM>y 
152. 

21.  Va.— Strode   v.   Head,   2   Wash. 
149,  2  Va.  149. 

22.  Pa.— Hope   v,   Everhart,    70  Pa. 
231. 

34  C.  J.  p  123  note  $1. 

23.  Iowa.— Blott  v.  Blott,  290  N.W. 
74,  227  Iowa  1108. 

34  C.J.  p  12>3  note  32. 
Record   entry   as  constituting  judg- 
ment see  infra  §  165. 


Statement,  recorded  on  the  Judg- 
ment docket  and  cross-indexed  as 
Judgments  are,  is  not  effective  as  a 
"Judgment" — Gibbs  v.  G.  H.  Weston 
&  Co.,  18  S.B.2d  698,  221  N.C.  7 — 
Farmers'  Bank  of  Clayton  v.  McCul- 
lers.  160  SJB.  494,  20ft  N.C.  440. 

24.  N.Y.— Hathaway   T.   Howell,    54 
N.Y.  97. 

25.  iPa. — Altoona  Trust  Co.  v.  Fock- 
ler,  1'65  A.  740,  «11  IPa.  426. 

Surplusage   in   Judgments    generally 

see  supra  §  84. 

What  action  was  denominated  In 
Judgment  was  held  immaterial. — Ru- 
bin v.  Dale,  288  P.  223,  156  Wash. 
676. 

8&    HL— Sproule  v.  Taffe,  13  N.R2d 
827,  294  Jll.'App.  374. 

27.  Del.— Dickerson  v.  Kelley,  50  A. 
512,  17  Del.  69. 

Initials  and  fall  name 

Where  the  payee  of  a  note  is  des- 
ignated merely  by  the  use  of  ini- 
tials, Judgment  may  be  entered 
thereon  in  favor  of  the  payee  by  the 
use  of  his  full  name. — Money  v. 
Hart,  159  A.  «4J37,  5  W.W.Harr.,  Del., 
115. 
Judgment  held  in  conformity  with 

declaration  and  cognovit 
I1L — Richman   T.   Menrath,    266    HI. 

App.  1. 

28.  Pa. — Freedman  for  TJse  of  Roth- 
bard   v>    Freedman-Smotkin,    Com. 
PL,  52  York  Leg.Rec.  17. 

34  C.J.  p  12/3  note  35. 

299 


Judgment   held  in  conformity  with 

declaration  and  cognovit 
HI.— Richman    v.    Menrath,    266    111. 

App.  1. 

29.  Va. — Richardson     v.     Jones,    12 
Gratt.  53,  53  Va.  53. 

34  C.J.  p  123  note  36. 

30.  (Pa. — Felger    v.     Jersey    Cereal 
Food  Co.,  141  A.  475,  292  Pa.  518— 
Romberger  v.    Romberger,    139    A. 
159,     290    Pa.     454— Peoples    Nat. 
Bank  of  Reynoldsville,  to  TJse  of 
Mottern,  v.  D.  &  >M.  Coal  Co.,  1ST 
A.    452,    124    !Pa.Super.     21— First 
Nat  Bank  v.  Kendrew,  160  A.  227, 
105  Pa.Super.  142. 

34  C.J.  p  123  note  37. 

As  between  makers  and  indorsers 
of  Judgment  notes,  liability  was  sev- 
eral, not  Joint — First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Kendrew,  supra. 
Judgment  made  regular 

Where  Joint  Judgment  against 
maker  and  indorser  of  note  was  orig  • 
inally  entered  on  two  separate  con-, 
fesslons,  but  by  agreement  Judgment 
as  to  indorser  was  stricken  off,  judg- 
ment against  maker  should  not  be 
disturbed. — Farmers'  &  Miners'  Nat 
Bank  of  Forest  City,  {Pa.,  v.  Taylor, 
173  A.  278,  «15  Pa.  4,18. 

31.  W.Va. — Snyder  v.  Snyder,  fr  W. 
Va,  415. 

34  C.J.  p  123  note  58. 

Where  wife  did  not  authorize  the 
signing  of  her  name  on  confession. 
Judgment  may  be  entered  only 
against  husband*  notwithstanding 
confession  purported  to  be  Joint,  and 
not  several. — Browning  v.  Spurrier, 
245  IlLApp.  276. 


§  164 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


such  case  plaintiff  accepts  the  confession  of  one  of 
the  defendants  and  takes  judgment  against  him  sep- 
arately, the  action  is  thereby  discontinued  as  to  the 
other  defendants.32 

After  assignment.  A  statute  requiring  actions  to 
be  prosecuted  in  the  name  of  the  real  party  in  in- 
terest has  been  held  to  require,  after  the  underlying 
obligation  has  been  assigned,  that  the  judgment  be 
confessed  in  the  name  of  the  assignee.88 

•  Entry  of  one  judgment  on  several  powers  of  at- 
torney. Where  several  powers  of  attorney  are  giv- 
en to  confess  judgment  on  several  debts  in  favor  of 
and  against  the  same  parties,  it  is  both  competent 
and  proper  for  the  court  to  consolidate  them  and 
enter  a  single  judgment84 

Election.  Generally,  where  the  terms  of  the  con- 
fession authorize  the  entry  of  two  distinct  forms  of 
judgment  embracing  different  forms  of  relief  for 
the  redress  of  a  given  wrong  or  the  enforcement  of 
a  given  right,  and  these  forms  of  judgment  or  re- 
lief are  based  on  inconsistent  theories,  the  creditor's 
election  to  enter  the  one  form  of  judgment  pre- 
cludes entry  of  the  other.35 

Signature.  Under  a  statute  so  providing,  the 
judgment  must  be  signed  by  a  judge  or  court  com- 
missioner,86 unless  the  statute  is  merely  directory.8? 

Alterations.  After  the  judgment  has  been  en- 
tered and  completed,  no  alterations  changing  its 
character  in  any  way,  whether  by  addition  or  oth- 
erwise, may  be  made  without  leave  of  the  court38 

Nature  of  judgment.  A  judgment  entered  on  the 
confession  of  defendant  is  in  general  final  and  not 


interlocutory,8*  and,  if  the  right  to  enter  the  judg- 
ment or  to  issue  execution  on  it  depends  on  the  hap- 
pening of  a  contingency,  the  court  should  determine 
the  matter  by  a  final  judgment4* 

§  165.    Entry  of  Judgment 

a.  In  general 

b.  Form  and  contents  of  record 

a.  In  General 

Generally,  a  confession  of  Judgment  does  not  have 
the  effect  of  a  Judgment,  at  least  as  against  other  credi- 
tors, until  It  Is  entered  by  the  clerk  in  the  proper  book 
or  record  of  the  court. 

As  a  general  rule,  in  order  that  a  confession  of 
judgment  may  have  the  validity  and  effect  of  a 
judgment,  at  least  as  against  other  creditors,  it 
must  be  entered  by  the  clerk  in  the  proper  book  or 
record  of  the  court,41  as  it  is  the  record  entry,  and 
not  the  confession,  that  constitutes  the  judgment,42 
although  there  are  decisions  to  the  effect  that  the 
clerk's  failure  to  enter  the  judgment  of  record  as 
directed  by  statute  does  not  invalidate  the  judg- 
ment.43 The  clerk  may  be  constrained  to  perform 
his  duty  in  this  respect  by  a  rule  or  motion,44  and 
mere  irregularities  in  entering  or  in  failing  to  enter 
the  judgment  may  be  corrected  by  an  entry,  made 
nunc  pro  tune,46  unless  the  defects  are  jurisdiction- 
al,  in  which  case  the  judgment  cannot  be  sustained, 
even  though  it  should  appear  that  the  amount  of 
the  judgment  was  justly  due,4*  Under  some  stat- 
utes, where  judgment  is  confessed  on  a  statement 
of  indebtedness,  the  clerk  of  the  court  must  indorse 
the  judgment  on  the  statement  filed  with  him,  and 
enter  it  in  the  judgment  book.47  It  has  been  held, 


32.  Ky.— Blledgre  v.  Bowman,  5  XX 
Marsh.  593. 

33.  DPa,— Market  St.  Trust  Co,  now 
for  Use  of  Swails  v.  Grove,  4'6  (Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.   605,  58  DauphjCo.  GL14 
— Reinsmith  v.  McCready,  Com.Pl., 
n  Lehigh  Co.L.J.  Ill,  5-8  York  Leg. 
Bee.  187. 

34.  N.J.—Levin    v.   Wenof,   146   A. 
789,  7  N.J.Mlsc.  60j3. 

34  C.J.  p  123  note  41. 

35.  Recovery  of  premises   and  fa- 
tore  rent 

Where  the  requisite  power  exists, 
a  lessor  may  enter  judgment  by  con- 
fession for  future  rent  accruing  un- 
der an  acceleration  clause,  or  for 
recovery  of  the  premises,  but  not 
fou  both. — Markeim-Chalmers-Lud- 
Ington,  Inc.,  v.  Mead,  14  A.2d  152,  1«40 
Pa.Super.  490-— Matovich  v.  Gradich, 
187  A.  65,  12i3  Pa,Super.  .SSS— Grake- 
low  v.  Kidder,  95  Pa. Super.  2$0. 

36.  Wis.— Wadsworth  v.  Willard,  22 
Wis.     258 — Remington     v.     Cum- 
xnlngs,  5  Wis.  138. 


37.  Iowa.— -Dullard    v.    Phelan,     50 
N.W.  204,  83  Iowa  471. 

38.  Bel. — Plach   y.    Temple,    45    A. 
5*39,  18  Del.  I'M. 

39.  ill. — Johnson   v.   Estabrook,    84 
111.  75. 

Md.~Huston  v.  Ditto,  20  Md.  305. 

40.  Ky.— -Bonta  v.  Clay,  0.  Litt.  27. 
Va.— Taylor  v.   Beck,  8   Band,   816, 

24  Va,  I3U6. 
4KU    Ga.— Whitley       v.        Southern 

Wholesale    Corporation,    164    S.B3. 

90(3,  45  Ga,App.  445. 
NXJ. — Farmers'   Bank  of  Clayton  v. 

MoCullers,  160   S.B.  49*4,   201  N.C. 

440. 

84  C.J,  p  124  note  46. 
42.    Ga.— Whitley       v.        Southern 

Wholesale    Corporation,    1*04    S.E. 

90S,  45  Ga,App.  445. 
34  C  J.  P  124  note  47. 
Filed  statement  or  confession  as  not 

constituting  judgment  see  supra  § 

1&4. 

Certificate  furnished  by  prothono- 
tary   to   one   entering  Judgment  by 

300 


confession  is  mere  memorandum,  and 
not  evidence  of  a  subsisting  obliga- 
tion.—In  re  Huberts  Estate,  98  (Pa. 
Super.  '5'e3. 

43.  Ya, — American    Bank    &    Trust 
Co.  T.   National  Bank  of  Suffolk, 
196SJ3.  6913,  170  Va,  1£9. 

34  C.X  p  124  note  48. 

The  failure  of  clerk  to  sign  cer- 
tificate, stating  that  judgment  was 
confessed  before  him  and  entered  of 
record,  did  not  invalidate  judgment, 
as  clerk's  duties  in  connection  with 
entry  and  recordation  of  confessed 
judgment  ore  "directory"  only,  not 
"mandatory/* — Bank  of  .Chatham  v. 
Arendall,  0.6  SJE.2d  <3'52,  178  Va.  183. 

44.  S.C.— Hall  v.  Moreman,   14  S.C. 
Law  «477. 

45.  Pa. — Gutekunst  v.  Huber,  -31  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  513,  44  Dauph.Oo.  300. 

34  C.J.  p  124  note  50. 

46.  Wis.— Sloane  v.  Anderson,  15  N. 
W.  *1,  57  Wis.  123. 

47.  N.C.— Glbbs  v.  G.  H.  Weston  & 
Co.,"  18    S-B^d    698.    221   N.C.    7— 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


166 


however,  that  the  clerk's  failure  to  make  such  in- 
dorsement does  not  affect  the  validity  of  a  judg- 
ment which  the  entry  on  the  judgment  docket  shows 
was  rendered  by  the  court48 

Restoration  of  record.  Where  the  record  of  a 
judgment  by  confession  has  been  lost  or  destroyed, 
it  may  be  restored  on  proper  application  stating  in 
substance  the  contents  of  the  missing  record.49 

b.  Form  aad  Contents  of  Record 

The  record  of  a  Judgment  by  confession  should  show 
all  the  facts  necessary  to  support  the  Judgment,  but  it 
need  not  include  matters  of  evidence  or  other  details 
which  do  not  affect  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  court. 

The  record  of  a  judgment  by  confession  should 
show  all  the  facts  necessary  to  support  the  judg- 
ment.60 The  warrant  or  power  of  attorney  author- 
izing a  confession  of  judgment  should  be  filed  as 
a  part  of  the  record,  as  discussed  supra  §  153,  and 
the  record  should  show  that  the  execution  of  the 
warrant  or  power  of  attorney  was  duly  proved,  as 
discussed  supra  §  162  b,  but  it  has  been  held  that  it 
need  not  appear  on  the  record  that  the  bond  and 
warrant  were  produced  at  the  time  of  entering  the 
judgment;51  nor  need  the  record  include  matters 
of  evidence  or  other  details  which  do  not  affect  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court.52  In  the  absence  of  a 
statute  providing  otherwise,  it  has-been  held  that 


the  note,  bond,  or  other  evidence  of  the  debt  need 
not  be  filed  with  the  confession.53  Where  the  judg- 
ment is  entered  as  collateral  security  for  an  ex- 
isting indebtedness,  or  as  security  for  future  ad- 
vances, the  substance  of  the  agreement,  or  at  least 
a  reference  thereto,  should  be  inserted  by  the  clerk 
in  his  memorandum.54 

§  166.    Time  of  Entry 

a.  In  general 

b.  In  vacation 

a.  la  General 

Generally  speaking,  a  Judgment  by  confession  may 
be  entered  at  such  time,  and  only  such  time,  as  is  au- 
thorized by  law  and  by  the  terms  of  the  confession. 

Generally  speaking,  a  judgment  by  confession 
may  be  entered  at  such  time,  and  only  such  time,  as 
is  authorized  by  the  terms  of  the  confession,55  and 
by  the  statutes  and  local  rules  of  practice.56  In  the 
absence  of  statute  providing  otherwise,  the  judg- 
ment need  not  be  entered  at  any  particular  time 
after  the  confession  and  statement  are  made.57 
Where  a  statement  is  presented  to  the  clerk  with 
a  request  to  enter  and  docket  a  judgment  by  con- 
fession thereon,  it  is  his  duty  to  comply  promptly 
with  the  request58 


Cline  v.  Cline.  18$  SJB.  904,  209  N. 
C.  931 — Farmers'  Bank  of  Clayton 
v.  McCullers,  160  S.E.  494,  201  N. 
C.  440. 
34  C.J:  V  124  note  52. 

48.  NX?.— Cline   v.    Cline,    18«    SJL 
904,  209  N.C.  531. 

Where  no  Judgment  was  rendered 
lay  the  court  and  the  clerk  failed  to 
make  such  indorsement,  the  judg- 
ment has  been  held  to  be  fatally  de- 
fective as  against  subsequent  judg- 
ment creditors. — Gibbs  v.  G.  H,  Wes- 
ton  &  Co.,  18  S.B.2d  6-98,  221  N.C.  7. 

49.  111.— Russell    T.    Liltf*.    90    111. 
327. 

£3  C.J.  p  038  note  87  [c]. 

50.  Pa. — Dime    Bank    &    Trust    Co. 
of  Pittston  v.  Manganiello,  61  A.2d 
564,     152     Fa.Su<per.    270— Indiana 
Land  and  Improvement  Co.  v.  Fer- 
rier  Bun  Coal  Co.,   6  <Fa.Dist  & 
Co.  83,  39  Tork  Leg.Rec.  60.— South 
Union   Tp.  School  Dist  v.  Mover, 
20  !Pa.Dist.  941. 

Contents  of  record  where  judgment 

entered: 
By  clerk  In  vacation  see  infra  §  166 

b. 
In  court  of  limited  jurisdiction  see 

supra  S  161  a, 
81.    N.J.— Burroughs  v.  Condit,  6  K. 

J.Law  «00. 
52.     Md.— Harris   v.   Alcock,   10   Gill 

&  J.  226,  (32  Axn.D.  158. 
34  C.J.  p  126  note  92. 


53.  N.C.—  Merchants'   Nat   Bank  v. 
Newton  Cotton  Mills,  .20  &E.  765, 
115  N.C.  507. 

34  C.J.  p  126  notes  9(3-95. 
Votes  held  part  of  record 
HL-rrShinnway  v.  Shumway,  192  N. 
EL  578,  557  HI.  477. 

54.  Md.—  First       Mortgage       Bond 
Homestead  Ass'n  v.  "Mehlhorn,  105 
A.  526,  11313  Md.  439,  3  A.L.R.  844. 

55.  Md.—  Hart  v.  Hart,  166  A.  414, 
165  Md.  77. 

Time  fdr  entering  judgment  under 
warrant  or  power  of  attorney  see 
supra  8  154  e. 


56-    Minn.—  Berg      v. 
Lumber   Co.,    2W 


Burkholder 
9*28,    *64 


N.T.—  American  Cities  Co.  T.  Steven- 

son, SO  N.T.S.2d  685. 
Pa.—  Hunter  v.  Wertz,  91  FittsbX^g. 

J.  348,  57  Tork  Le^Rec.  110. 
34  C.J.  p  124  notes  54,  55. 
Bight  to  enter  judgment  under  war- 

rant or  power  of  attorney  on  claim 

barred  by   statute    of   limitations 

see  supra  §  156. 

Until  "regularly  goed  out  and.  dock- 
•ted," 

(1)  Under  a  statute  so  providing, 
a  judgment  by  confession  cannot  be 
entered  up  unless  and  until  the  cause 
has  been  regularly  sued  out  and 
docketed  as  in  other  cases.  —  Thomas 

301 


v.  Bloodworth,  160  S.B.  709,  44  Ga. 
App.  44. 

(2)  Judgment  is  not  "entered  up" 
within  the  meaning  of  such  statute 
until  filed  in  court. — Thomas  v. 
Bloodworth,  supra.  - 

(8)  Although  judgment  may  be 
made  and  entered  on  the  petition 
before  the  petition  is  filed,  and  may 
be  filed  with  the  petition,  it  has  been 
held  that  it  is  thereby  entered  up 
simultaneously  with  the  filing  of  the 
petition  and  not  after  the  case  has 
been  regularly  sued  out  and  docket- 
ed.— Thomas  v.  Bloodworth,  supra. 

Forthwith  or  without  delay 

(1)  A  statutory  requirement  that 
judgments  by  confession  shall  be  en- 
tered  on  the   docket  forthwith   has 
been  held  to  mean  that  such  entry 
shall   be  made  within  a  reasonable 
time.— Burchett  v.  Casady,  18  Iowa 
342—84  C.J.  p  125  note  64. 

(2)  A  statutory  provision  that  the 
judgment  be  entered  without  delay 
has  been  held  to  be  merely  directory. 
— MoDowell  County  Bank  v.  Wood, 
55  SJB.  758,  «0  W.Va,  617. 

57.  Pa. — Oransky     v.     Stepanavich, 
155  A.  290,  S04  Fa.   84,   77  A.L.R. 
988.. 

84  C. J.  p  125  note  62, 

58.  Minn. — Whelan  v.  Reynolds,  112 
N.W.  223,  101  Minn.  290. 


166 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


A  judgment  by  confession  in  an  action  already 
pending  cannot  properly  be  entered  before  the  fil- 
ing of  the  agreement  to  confess  judgment,  where 
there  is  such  an  agreement,59  or  according  to  some 
authorities,60  but  not  others,61  before  the  return 
term  of  the  writ,  or  before  the  court  has  disposed 
of  the  issues  raised  by  an  answer  challenging  plain- 
tiff's right  to  recover.62 

Death  of  parties.  Although,  as  discussed  supra 
§  156,  as  a  general  rule  a  judgment  by  confession 
cannot  be  entered  on  a  warrant  of  attorney  after 
the  death  of  the  grantor,  where  the  judgment  con- 
fessed is  not  to  be  entered  until  the  happening  of  a 
contingency,  it  has  been  held  that  the  death  of  de- 
fendant after  the  happening  of  such  contingency 
does  not  prevent  the  mere  formal  entry  of  the  judg- 
ment.63 In  the  absence  of  statute,  a  confession  of 
judgment  in  a  pending  suit,  after  the  death  of  plain- 
tiff and  before  substitution  of  his  representative,  has 
been  held  void,  both  as  regards  the  representatives 
of  plaintiff  and  any  third  person  who  may  be  col- 
laterally interested  in  the  payment  of  the  same.64 
Under  a  statute  so  providing,  however,  judgment 
may  be  entered  on  a  cognovit  at  any  time  within 
two  terms,  notwithstanding  the  death  of  plaintiff, 
or  of  one  of  several  plaintiffs,  in  the  meantime.66 

Relation  back.  The  rule,  as  discussed  supra  § 
113,  that  judgments  of  a  court  of  record  relate  back 
to  the  term  in  which  they  are  rendered  applies  to 
judgments  by  confession.66  It  has  been  held  that  a 
judgment  on  -a  warrant  received  by  the  clerk  at  his 
residence  after  office  hours  may  be  docketed  the 
next  day  as  of  the  day  when  received.67 


b.  In  Vacation 

Under  a  number  of  statutes  authorizing  a  confes- 
sion of  Judgment,  judgment  may  be  entered  either  In 
term  time  or  In  vacation,  and  may  be  entered  in  vacation 
by  the  clerk  of  the  court  without  an  order  or  other  di- 
rection of  the  judge. 

Under  a  number  of  statutes  authorizing  a  confes- 
sion of  judgment,  the  judgment  confessed  may  be 
entered  either  in  term  time  or  in  vacation,68  and 
may  be  entered  in  vacation  by  the  clerk  of  the  court 
without  an  order  or  other  direction  from  the  court 
or  judge;69  and  under  some  statutes,  during  va- 
cation, the  judgment  must  be  entered  by  the  clerk 
and  cannot  be  entered  by  the  judge.70  The  act  of 
the  clerk  in  such  a  case  is  the  "entering"  rather 
than  the  "rendering"  of  a  judgment;71  but  the 
judgment  when  entered  becomes  the  judgment  of 
the  court  and  not  the  judgment  of  the  clerk.72  As 
such  an  entry  of  judgment  is  a  statutory  proceed- 
ing in  derogation  of  the  common  law,  it  is  not  valid 
unless  there  is  a  strict  compliance  with  the  require- 
ments of  the  law  authorizing  it;78  and  such  com- 
pliance must  appear  on  the  face  of  the  record.74 
Where  such  requirements  have  been  complied  with, 
the  clerk's  authority  to  enter  the  confession  is  de- 
rived solely  from  the  statute,  and  specific  authori- 
ty directed  to  him  as  clerk  to  make  the  entry  is*  not 
required.75 

Wliat  vacation  includes.  A  vacation  within  the 
meaning  of  this  rule  includes  the  morning  of  the 
first  day  of  the  term  of  court,  before  the  hour  for 
the  opening  of  court,76  and  also  includes  the  period 
of  an  adjournment  of  court  for  several  days  or 
weeks  during  the  term;77  but  not  the  period  be- 
tween adjournment  on  one  day  and  the  convening 


59-     Md. — Snowden  v.  Preston,  20  A. 
910,  73  Md.  261. 

60.  U.S.— Haden   v.   OPerry,   D.C.,   11 
F.Cas.No.5,89-3.   1   Cranch  C.C.    285 
—Askew  v.   Smith,   D.O.,   2  P.Cas. 
No.  588,  1  Cranch  «C.C.  159. 

61.  Mo.~ Hoppenbrook    v.   Dial,    119 
S.W.  '496,  1137  Mo.App.  75. 

34  C.J.  P  125  note  60. 

62.  Answer  'benefiting1  all  defendants 
Where  it  1$  sought  to  enter  judg- 
ment against   two   or  more   defend- 
ants, an  answer  filed  by  one  which 
may   be   or   become   common  to   all, 
and  which  goes  to  the  right  of  plain- 
tiff to  recover,  precludes  the  entry  of 
judgment  against  such  other  defend- 
ants until  the  issues  raised  by  such 
answer    have    been    disposed    of    by 
the  court. — Rucker  v.  Baker,  177  S. 
W.2d  878,  296  Ky.  505. 

63.  S.C.— Keep  v.  Leckie,  42  S.C.Law 
164. 

64.  Pa. — Finney     v.     Ferguson,     3 


Watts  &  S.  4U3 — Wentz  v.  Bealor, 
14  Pa.Co.  SI37. 

65.  N.Y.— Gilbert      v.     Corbin,     18 
Wend.  600. 

34  C.J.  p  125  note  71. 

66.  N.C.-— Farley  v.  Lea,  20  N.C.  807, 
32  Am.D.  680. 

67.  QPa. — Polhemus'    Appeal,    £2    Pa. 
328. 

68.  111. — Wilson    v.    Josephson,    244 
Ill.App.  i36«6 — Long  v.  Coffman,  2«30. 

IU.APP.  i. 

N.C. — Farmers'   Bank   of   Clayton   v. 

McCullers,    160    S.B.   494,   201   N.C. 

440. 
.Pa. — Wanner  v.   Thompson,  Com.Pl., 

27  Del.Co.  455. 
34  C.J.  p  125  note  74. 
Entry   in   vacation   under  power   or 

warrant  of  attorney  see   supra   9 

H-54. 

69.  NXX — -Farmers'  Bank  of  Clayton 
v.    HcCullers,    160    S.B.    494,    200. 
NXX  440. 

34  C.J.  p  125  note  75.    • 

302 


70.  111. — Wilson    v.    Josephson,    244 
IlLApp.  366. 

34  Or.  p  125  note  7«. 

71.  Colo. — Abbott  v.  Tuma  County, 
30    «P.    1031,    18    Colo.    6— Schuster 
v.  Rader,  22  P.   505,  US  Colo.  329. 

72.  Iowa.— Kendig  v.  Marble,  12  N. 
W.  584,  58  Iowa  529. 

34  C.J.  p  125  note  78. 

73«    111. — Rixman    v.    Witwer,    App., 

63  N.B.2d  607. 
34  C.J.  p  125  note  79. 

74,  111. — Riacmann  v.  Witwer,  supra. 

75,  Md. — Tyrrell    v.    Hilton,    48    A. 
55,  92  Md.  176. 

3*4  C.J:  p  126  note  80. 

76.  Va. — Brown  v.  Hume,  16  Gratt. 
456,  67  Va.  456. 

34  C.J.  p  126  note  81. 

77.  HI.— Ottawa  First  Nat  Bank  v. 
Daly,    134    IlLApp.    1713 — Jasper    v. 
Schleslnger,  22  IlLApp.  OT7,  affirm- 
ed  17  NJB.  718,  125  I1L  2130. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  167 


of  court  on  the  next,7*  or  the  period  pending  a  stay 
of  proceedings.79 

Confirmation  or  approval.  Where  the  statute  re- 
quires an  office  confession  of  judgment  to  be  con- 
firmed by  the  court,  its  incidents  as  a  judgment 
have  been  held  not  to  attach  until  the  date  of  such 
confirmation.80  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  a 
requirement  that  a  judgment  entered  by  the  clerk 
in  vacation  shall  be  approved  at  the  next  term  is 
merely  directory,  and  that  a  failure  to  make  such 
approval  will  not  avoid  the  judgment.81 

Relation  back.  It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment 
confessed  in  vacation  and  then  entered  up  by  con- 
sent as  of  the  preceding  term  is  void,  and  cannot 
be  validated  by  any  subsequent  act  of  defendant;82 
but  there  is  also  authority  to  the  contrary.83 

§  167.     Amount  of  Judgment 

A  Judgment  by  confession  should  be  entered  for  the 
amount  confessed,  and  only  for  such  amount,  and,  where 
the  confession  does  not  determine  the  extent  of  the  re- 
covery, and  It  is  not  ascertalnable  by  mere  calculation, 
it  must  be  liquidated  by  the  court,  and  not  by  the  clerk. 

A  judgment  by  confession  should  be  entered  for 
the  amount  confessed,  and  only  for  such  amount,84 
and,  as  discussed  supra  §  154,  where  it  is  entered 
under  a  warrant  of  attorney,  it  must  be  for  such 
an  amount  only  as  is  authorized  by  the  warrant. 
It  has  been  held,  however,  that  on  confession  of 


judgment  in  a  pending  action,  if  plaintiffs  demand 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  debt,  the  amount  of  which 
may  be  ascertained  by  calculation,  it  is  sufficient  to 
enter  judgment  generally,  which,  in  contemplation 
of  law,  is  for  the  amount  laid  in  the  declaration.85 
A  general  acknowledgment  of  indebtedness  will  not 
authorize  the  entry  of  judgment  for  a  specific 
sum.86  If  the  judgment  entered  is  for  a  greater 
sum  than  that  actually  confessed  or  due,  unless  the 
excess  was  fraudulently  included,87  the  judgment 
is  void  only  as  to  the  excess  and  not  in  toto;88  and 
the  irregularity  may  be  cured  by  plaintiff  remitting 
the  excess.89  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  a 
false  statement  as  to  the  amount  due  contained  in 
the  confession  of  judgment  renders  the ^  judgment 
void,  even  though  such  statement  is  not  intentional 
and  is  made  without  intent  to  defraud.90 

Certainty  of  amount.  Judgment  may  not  be  en- 
tered for  an  indefinite  or  unliquidated  claim  or 
amount.9* 

Interest.  The  judgment  may  include  interest  on 
plaintiffs  demand,  if,  and  only  if,  that  is  warranted 
by  the  terms  of  the  confession.92  The  fact  that 
judgment  is  confessed  for  a  greater  rate  of  interest 
than  is  allowed  by  the  debt  or  claim  on  which  the 
confession  is  made  will  not,  in  the  absence  of  fraud, 
vitiate  the  judgment,98  but  it  may  be  corrected  so 
as  to  allow  the  proper  rate.94 


78.  HI.— Wilson    v.    Josephson.    244 
IlLApp.  866. 

79.  N.Y.— Sacket's  Harbor  Bank  T. 
Martin,  2  How.Pr.  HI. 

80.  Miss.— Bass  v.   Estill,   50   Miss. 
'300. 

8l«    Iowa.— Vanfieet   v.   Phillips,    11 

Iowa  558. 
34  O.J.  P  1'26  note  8>5. 

32.  N.C. — Slocumb    v.    Anderson,    4 
3ST.C.  77. 

33.  N.Y.— King1   v.    Shaw,   13    Johns. 
142. 

34  C.J.  p  126  note  87. 

S4.  Iowa.— Fenley  v.  Phoenix  Ins. 
Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  247  NWV. 
665,  215  "Iowa  1369. 

Md.— Webster  v.  People's  Loan,  Sav- 
ings &  Deposit  Bank  of  Cambridge, 
152 'A.  815,  160  Md.  57. 

jq-.Y. — Keller  v.  Greenstone,  2 
2d  977,  253  App.Div.  S73. 

Pa.— Scholnick  v.  Canelos,  100 
Super.  6— Philadelphia  Sav.  Fund 
Soc.  v.  Stern,  41  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  461, 
affirmed  213  A.2d  «4H3,  3413  Pa,  5,34— 
Commonwealth  v.  Joyce,  18  Pa. 
Co  H9i3,  affirmed  18  Pa-Super.  609 
and  «  Pa.Super.  616— Thomas  v 
Brady,  Com.Pl.,  26  Brie  Co.  168 
—Morris  v.  Chevalier,  Com.Pl.,  20 
Lehigh  Co.L,J.  133— Dime  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  O'Boyle,  S3  Luz.Leg 


Reg.  185,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  Dime  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Pittston  v.  O'Boyle,  6  A.2d  106, 
334  Pa.  500 — Commonwealth  ex  rel. 
Argyle  v.  Jones,  Com.Pl.,  30  North. 
Co.  95. 
34  C.J.  p  126  note  98. 

Where  Judgment  is  confessed  for 
a  penalty,  at  common  law  and  in 
the  absence  of  a  statute  providing 
otherwise,  judgment  should  be  en- 
tered for  the  penalty  subject  to  the 
interference  of  a  court  of  eauity  if 
more  than  the  damages  actually  sus- 
tained is  sought  to  be  exacted. — 
Rhoads  v.  Mitchell,  Del.,  47  A.2d  1 
judgment  may  be  for  a  larger 
amount  than  that  indorsed  on  the 
process 
N.J.— Hunt  v.  Shivers,  4  N.J.Law  89. 

85.  jpa. — Commonwealth  v.  Baldwin, 
1  Watts  54,  26  Am.D.  33. 

34  C.J.  p  126  note  1. 

86.  N.J.— Vanderveer  v.  Ingleton,  7 
N.J.Law  140. 

87.  La.— McElrath  v.  Dupuy,   2  La, 
Ann.  520. 

Pa.— Jasuta  v.  Zaremba,  Com.Pl.,  47 
Lack.Jur.  157. 

88.  111.— Larson  v.  Lybyer,  38  NJB 
2d  177,  312  IlLApp.  188 

303 


N.J.— Huck-Gerhardt  Co.  v.  Parreca, 
154  A.  870,  9  N.JjMisc.  568. 

N".Y. — Keller  v.  Greenstone,  2  N.T.S. 
2d  977,  253  App.Div.  573. 

34  C.J.  p  126  note  5. 

89.  Ga.— Raney    v.    McRae,    14    Ga. 
589,  60  Am.D.  660. 

90.  N.Y.— Illinois      Watch      Co.      v. 
Payne,   57  N.Y.S.  308.  39   App.Div. 
521— Rutherford    v.    Schottman,    1 
N.Y.S.  741. 

91.  -111.— Hymen    v.    Anschicks,    270 
I11.APP.  202. 

34  C.J.  p  126  note  8. 

•ornpuljlished  award 

Conn. — Curtice  v.  Scovel,  0.  Root,  327. 

3*4  C.J.  p  1:27  note  9. 

92.  Iowa. — Fenley    v.    Phoenix    Ins. 
Co.    of  Hartford,   Conn.,    247  N.W. 
635,  215  Iowa  IS 6 9. 

X.Y. — Keller  v.  Greenstone,  2  N.Y. 
S.2d  977,  253  App.Div.  573. 

Pa.— Philadelphia  Sav.  Fund  Soc.  v. 
Stern.  41  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  461,  af- 
firmed 23  A.2d  413,  343  Pa.  534. 

34  C.J.  P  127  note  10. 

93.  N.C. — Merchants'   Nat.    Bank  v. 
Newton  Cotton  Mills,   20   S.B.   765, 
115  N.C.  507. 

04.  N.a— Merchants'  Nat  Bank  v. 
Newton  Cotton  Mills,  supra, 


§167 


JUDGMENTS 


C.J.S. 


Costs  and  attorneys  fees.  A  judgment  by  con- 
fession may  ordinarily  include  an  allowance  for 
plaintiffs  costs,96  except  such  as  are  incurred  un- 
necessarily.98 The  judgment  may  also  include  a 
reasonable  allowance  for  plaintiffs  attorney's  fees, 
if  that  is  authorized  by  the  terms  of  the  warrant,  as 
discussed  supra  §  154,  or  confession,97  and  is  not 
contrary  to  statute.98  Where  defendant  confesses 
judgment  in  a  sum  below  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court,  and  judgment  is  rendered  on  the  confession, 
it  has  been  held  that  he  is  not  entitled  to  recover 
costs." 


Liquidation  by  court  or  clerk.  Where  the  con- 
fession of  judgment  does  not  determine  the  extent 
of  the  recovery,  and  it  is  not  ascertainable  by  mere 
calculation,  it  must  be  liquidated  by  the  court,1  on  a 
writ  of  inquiry,2  and  not  by  the  clerk  or  prothono- 
tary,*  who  may,  it  has  been  held,  enter  judgment 
only  for  the  amount  which  appears  to  be  due  from 
the  face  of  the  instrument.4  If,  however,  the 
amount  of  recovery  is  simply  a  matter  of  calcula- 
tion, this  may  be  done  by  the  clerk;5  and  it  has 
been  held  that  this  is  a  duty  which  he  must  per- 
form without  unnecessary  delay.6 


F.  CONSTRUCTION  AND  OPERATION  OF  JUDGMENT 


§  168.    In  General 

A  Judgment  by  confession  Is  the  act  of  the-  court, 
and  until  it  Is  reversed  or  set  aside,  It  has  all  the  qual- 
ities, Incidents,  and  attributes  of  a  Judgment  on  a  ver- 
dict. 

Although  a  judgment  by  confession  may  be  en- 
tered without  a  direct  adjudication  of  the  court  or 


order  of  a  judge,  as  discussed  supra  §  160,  such 
judgment  whether  entered  on  a  warrant  of  attor- 
ney, or  on  a  cognovit,  is  the  act  of  the  court,  and 
until  it  is 'reversed  or  set  aside,  it  has  all  the  quali- 
ties, incidents,  and  attributes  of  a  judgment  on 
a  verdict7  It  is  conclusive,  as  between  the  parties 


98.    Iowa,— Penley   v.   Ph«nix  Ins. 

Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,   247  N.W. 

6135,  2f5  Iowa  1369. 
N.C.— -Farmers'  Bank  of  Clayton  T. 

McCullera,  1*60   SJBJ.  494,  201  N.C, 

440. 
34  CJ.  p  1*2?  notes  18,  22,  28. 

96.  Pa.— Moore's  Appeal,  1  A.  59$, 
110  Pa.  41313. 

34  C.J.  p  127  note  19. 

97.  Md.— Legum   v.    Farmers    Nat 
Bank   of   Annapolis,    24   A.2d   281, 
180  Md.  35*— Webster  v.  People's 
Loan,  Savings  &  Deposit  Bank  of 
Cambridge,  152  A.  815,  160  Md.  57. 

Pa. — First  Mortgage  Guarantee  Co. 

of  Philadelphia  v.  "Powell,  9«  Pa. 

Super.'  99 — Bury  &  Holman  v.  Pe- 

zalla,    Com.Pl,,    27    Del.Co.    40"5. 
34  C.J.  p  127  note  21. 

Where  space  for  amount  is  left 
blank,  it  is  implied  that  fee  should 
be  reasonable,  but,  where  line  is 
drawn  through  space  for  amount  of 
attorney's  fee,  it  is  implied  that 
there  should  be  no  attorney's  fee.-— 
Beard  v.  Baxter,  258  HLApp.  &40. 

Pee  is  not  gratuity  to  which  attor- 
ney is  entitled  by  plaintiff's  appear- 
ance, but  is  payable  for  services  ren- 
dered, and,  if  plaintiff  pays  less  for 
services  of  attorney  than  amount  al- 
lowed in  entering  judgment,  he  must 
remit  difference*  while,  if  he  pays 
more,  he  must  stand  expense. — Web- 
ster v.  People's  Loan,  Savings  &  De- 
posit Bank  of  Cambridge,  152  A.  815, 
160  Md.  57. 
Allowances  held  excessive 

(1)  Two  hundred  dollars  on  two 
thousand  five  hundred  dollar  debt — 
Schmoldt  v.  Chicago  Stone  Setting 
Co.,  3-3  N.H2d  182,  809  IlLApp.  377. 

C2)  One  hundred  fifty  dollars  on 


nine  hundred  fifty  dollar  debt.— Se- 
curity Discount  Corporation  v.  Jack- 
son, 51  K.E.2d  618,  1320  IlLiApp.  440. 
C3)  Fifteen  per  cent.— Walton  v. 
Abbott  tPa.Com.Pl.,  67  Montg.Co.  1. 

98.  N.J.— Huck-Gerhardt      Co.       v. 
Farreca,    154  A.   870,   9  N.J.Mlsc. 
5.6-3. 

Docket  fee 

Statutory  provision  that  defendant 
need  not  pay  costs  or  fee  to  plain- 
tiff's attorney,  where  judgment  is 
entered  by  confession  by  prothono- 
tary,  was  held  to  relieve  defendant 
from  paying  the  so-called  docket  fee 
otherwise  payable  to  plaintiff's  at- 
torney, but  not  to  bar  fee  stipulated 
for  in  warrant. — First  Mortgage 
Guarantee  Co.  of  Philadelphia  v. 
Powell,  -98  Pa.Super.  99. 

99.  Mo.— Lee  v.  Stern.  22  -Mo.  575. 

1.  Ky.— Bontft  v.   Clay,  1  Litt   27. 
Pa,— Church  v.  Given,  15  Phila.  188. 

2.  Ya.— Dunbar  v.   Lindenberger,  8 
Munf.  169,  17  Va.  1'69. 

Pa. — R.  S.  Noonan,  Inc.  v.  Hoff, 
58  A.2d  53,  850  Pa.  295— Lans- 
downe  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Robin- 
son, 154  A,  17,  305  Pa,  58— 
Schwartz  v.  Sher,  149  A.  731,  299 
Pa.  423 — Orner  v.  Hurwitch,  97 
Pa.Super.  2  66— Meyers  &  Jolly  v. 
Freiling,  81  Pa.Super.  116— Morel 
v.  Morel,  81  Pa.Super.  84— Bell  v. 
Lawler,  Com.Pl.,  45  Lack.Jur.  181 
— lacovazzi  v.  Brauner,  Com.Pl.,  4"4 
Lack.Jur.  273,  $7  York  Leg.Rec. 
165. 

34  C.J.  p  127  note  15. 

4.  Md.— Webster  v.  People's  Loan 
&  Savings  &  Deposit  Bank  of  Cam- 
bridge, 15'2  A.  815,.  160  Md.  57. 

Pa. — Dime  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
tPlttston  v.  O'Boyle,  $  A.2d  106, 

304 


384  Pa.  500 — Commonwealth  v.  J. 
&  A.  Moeschlin,  170  A.  119,  <314  Pa. 
94 — Lansdowne  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Robinson,  154  lA.  17,  -3013  Pa. 
58— Schwartz  v.  6her,  149  A.  731, 
299  IPa.  428— Drey  St  Motor  Co.  v. 
Nevling,  161  A.  880,  106  Pa.Super. 
42— Orner  v.  Hurwitch,  97  Pa.Su- 
per.  263 — Meyers  &  Joly  v.  'Frei- 
ling, 81  OPa-Super.  116— Morel  v. 
Morel,  81  Pa.Super.  -84— William 
J.  Ryan,  toe.,  to  Use  v.  Bodek,  10 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  520— Union  Accept- 
ance Co.  v.  Grant  Motor  Sales  Co., 
5  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  407,  213  Luz.Leg. 
Beg.  89,  2  Som.Leg.J.  260,  39  York 
Leg.Rec.  14il — Heller  v.  Bloom, 
ComJPl.,  51  Da-uph.  Co.  3'60 — laco- 
vazzi v.  Brauner,  Com.Pl.,  4<4  Lack. 
Jur.  273,  57  York  Leg.Rec.  165— 
Little  v.  Gardner-Denver  Co.,  Com. 
•PI.,  4il  Lack.Jur.  9— Morris  v. 
Chevalier,  Com.5Pl.,  20  Lehigh  Co.L. 
J.  1313 — Frederick  v.  Smeltzer, 
Com.Pl.,  19  Lehigh  Co.L.J.  378,  56 
York  Leg.Rec.  30 — Grammes  v. 
Haltzel,  Com.Pl.,  19  Lehigh  Co.L. 
J.  275 — Nash  Sales  &  Service  v. 
Broody,  Com.!Pl.,  88  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
158,  9  Som.Leg.J.  326. 
34  C.J.  p  120  notes  79,  82. 

5.  Pa. — B.  "S.  Noonan,  Inc.,  v.  Holt, 
•38  A.2d  5-3,  350  Pa.  295— Frederick 
Y.  Smeltzer,  19  Lehigh  Co.L.J.  378, 
56  York  Leg.Rec.  30. 

34  C.J.  p  127  note  16. 

Credits  appearing  on  the  instru- 
ment may  be  deducted  from  the 
amount  of  the  original  debt. — Morel 
v.  Morel,  81  Pa.Super.  84. 

6.  Del. — Cook  v.  Cooper,  4  Del.  189. 
34  C.J.  p  127  note  17. 

7.  U.S. — Pennsylvania  Co.  for  Insur- 
ances on  Lives  and  Granting  An- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


169 


and  their  privies,  of  the  points  involved  in,  and 
determined  by,  it;8  but  a  stranger  thereto  is  not 
concluded  by  it.9  Like  other  judgments,  it  supports 
an  execution,  as  considered  in  Executions  §  7  d; 
it  is  capable  of  being  abstracted  and  sent  to  coun- 
ties other  than  that  where  in  it  was  obtained;10 
it  may  be  renewed;11  and  it  is  subject  to  the  gen- 
eral principles  of  construction,  as  discussed  infra 
§§  436-443,  in  determining  its  operation  and  ef- 
fect.12 If  it  is  made  in  a  court  without  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  case,  it  has  been  held  to  have  the  force 
and  effect  of  an  account  stated  and  acknowledged.18 

Effect  on  other  remedies.  A  judgment  by  con- 
fession has  been  held  not  to  preclude  the  creditor 
from  pursuing  other  remedies  for  the  collection  of 
the  same  debt  or  claim,1*  or  of  such  portion  there- 


of as  is  not  satisfied  by  an  execution  on  the  judg- 
ment15 

§  169.    As  Release  or  Waiver  of  Defects 

A  Judgment  by  confession  operates  as  a  release  or 
waiver  of  formal  errors  or  defects  In  the  proceedings, 
but  neither  the  judgment  Itself,  nor  an  express  release 
of  errors,  will  operate  to  release  errors  of  substance. 

A  judgment  by  confession  operates  as  a  release 
or  waiver  of  formal  errors  or  defects  in  the  pro- 
ceedings,16 such  as  of  defects  or  omissions  in  the 
declaration  ;17  and  the  debtor  may  by  clear  and  ap- 
propriate language  contained  in  the  cognovit  or 
warrant  of  attorney  expressly  release  all  procedural 
errors,18  and  in  such  a  case  the  confession  of  the 
judgment  is  of  itself  an  operative  release,  and  no 
formal  plea  of  release  is  necessary.1*  On  the  oth- 


nuities  v.  Watt.  C.C.A.Fla.,  151  F. 

2d   697— Kieda  v.  Krull,  C.C.AJPa., 

Iftl  F.2d  917. 
111. — McKenna    v.    Forman,    283    HL 

App.   60-6. 
Md. — Foland  v.  Hoffman,  47  A.2d  62 

— -Pioneer  Oil  Heat  v.  Brown,  16  A. 

2d  880,  179  Md.  i!55. 
N.Y.— -Pierce    v.    Bristol,    223    N.Y.S. 
.     678,  1'30  Misc.  188. 
Ohio. — Risman    v.   Krupar,    18'6   N.B. 

830,  45  Ohio  App.  29. 
Pa.— O'Hara  v.  Manley,  12  A.2d  820, 

140  Pa.Super.  -39. 
Wis.— Grady  v.  Meyer,  2"36  N.W.  569, 

205    Wis.    147— Wessling    v.   Hieb, 

192  N.W.  458,  180  Wis.  160. 
34  C.J.  p  127  note  26. 

Judgment  confessed  in  favor  of 
attachment  plaintiffs  had  same  ef- 
fect as  if  court  had  entered  judg- 
ment on  evidence  in  the  attachment 
proceeding. — Deeds  v.  Gilmer,  174  S. 
E.  .37,  162  Va.  157. 

A  judgment  entered  by  the  pro* 
thonotary  under  a  power  contained 
in  the  instrument  has  the  same  force 
and  effect  as  a  judgment  confessed 
by  an  attorney  or  one  given  in  open 
court. — St.  Bartholomew's  Church  v. 
Wood,  61  Pa.  96— Miller  v.  Desher,  12 
Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  -SIS,  «4d.  Lanc.LJRev. 
335. 
Subsequent  matters 

(1)  Judgment   for   deficiency   was 
not  invalidated  by  anything  appear- 
ing in  subsequent  report  of  receiver 
as  to  receipt  of  rents  by  plaintiff. — 
Levin  v.   Wenof,  14«6  A.  789,  7  N.J. 
Misc.  603. 

(2)  Issuance  of  execution  on  judg- 
ment and  service  thereof  on  defend- 
ant did  not  render  judgment  either 
void     or     valid. — Kolmar,     Inc.,     v. 
Moore,    55    N.E.2d    524,   82t3    IlLApp. 
32i3. 

8.  Pa.—- First  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
of  Bethlehem  v.  Laubach,  5  A.2d 
039,  33'3  Pa.  3*4— -Usnick  v.  Pitts- 
burgh Terminal  Coal  Corporation, 

49  C.J.S.—20 


157  A.  787,  305  Pa.  855— Greiner 
v.  Brubaker,  16  A.2d  689,  142  Pa, 
Super.  538. 

Tenn. — Marshall    v.    Johnson    Hard- 
ware Co.,  5  TemuApp.  $69. 
34  C.J.  -p  127  note  27. 
Confessed  judgment  as  res  Judicata 

see  infra  I  629. 

Estoppel  to  deny  validity  see  infra 
§  172. 

If  valid  M  to  debtor,  it  is  equally 
so  as  to  creditor,  unless  it  can  be 
impeached  on  some  ground  of  fraud 
or  collusion. — .American  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  T.  National  Bank  of  Suf- 
folk, 196  SJB.  693,  170  Va.  169— 
Shadrack's  Adxn'r  v.  Woolfolk,  82 
Gratt  707,  7-3  Va.  707. 

Judgment  on  bond  and  on  warrant 
accompanying1  mortgage  is  complete 
and  final  adjudication  of  all  mat- 
ters which  might  have  been  pleaded 
in  an  action  on  the  bond. — Kieda  v. 
Krull,  aOAJPa.,  101  P.2d  917. 

Validity  of  underlying  obligation 
held  admitted  by  confession. — 
Church  v.  (Polar  Ice  Cream  Co,  3  P. 
2d  (301,  89  Colo.  890. 

9.  Colo.— Schuster  v.   Rader,   22  P. 
505,  13  Colo.  -329. 

Judgment  on  bond  accompanying 
mortgage,  with  respect  to  personal 
property  covered  by  mortgage,  is 
against  defendant  only,  and  gives 
plaintiff  no  right  to  levy  on,  seize,  or 
attach  credits  of  alienee  of  mort- 
gaged land.— Fisher  for  Use  of  Buck 
v.  McParland,  167  A.  877,  110  Pa. 
Super,  a 84. 

Sureties  or  indorsers  who  are  not 
parties  to  it  are  not  discharged 
thereby. — Washington  iPirst  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Eureka  Lumber  Co.,  £1  SJ3. 
348,  12S  N.C.  24. 

10.  S.C.— Ex  parte  Ware  Furniture 
£0.,  27  S.E.  9,  49  S.C.  20. 

13*    Pa.— Bchreiner      v.      Dorwarth, 
Com.Pl.,  19  Lehigh  Co.L.J.  *47. 

-    305 


S.C. — Ex  parte  Ware  Furniture  Co., 
27  SJE.  9,  49  S.C.  20. 

12.  -Ind. — Davenport     Mills     Co.     v. 
Chambers,   44  N.E.   1109,   146  Ind. 
156. 

34  C.J.  p  127  notes  33,  34. 

It  must  be  interpreted  in  light  of 
power  of  attorney  in  pursuance  of 
which  it  was  made. — Deeds  r.  Oil- 
mer,  I'M  S.E.  37,  162  Va.  157. 

13.  La. — Payne    v.    Furlow,    29    La. 
Ann.  160. 

14.  (Pa. — Clawson    v.    Elchbaum,    2 
Grant     130 — Reid     v.     Pechersky, 
Com.'PL,   87  Pittsb.Leg.J.  575. 

94  C.J.  p  128  note  (37. 

15.  N.Y.— Lynch  v.  Welch,  Seld.  15. 
54  C.J.  p  128  note  38. 

16.  ni. — Sukowicz  v.  Hinko,  40  NJS. 
2d   845,  514  IlLApp.   195— Long  v. 
Coffman,    2-30    IlLApp.    527— Harris 
Trust  &  Savings   Bank  v.   Neigh- 
bors, 222  IlLApp.  201. 

Tenn.— Brier  Hill  Collieries  V.  File, 
9  Tenn. App.  16. 
:  CoJ.  p  128  note  40. 

17.  W.Va.— Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
Hanner   v.    Tracey,   1*76   S.E.    238, 
239,  115  W.Va.  »349. 

I  C.J.  p  128  note  41. 

18-    HL— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Royer, 

2713  IlLApp.  158. 
Pa.— Kait  v.  Rose,  41  A.2d  750,  $51 

•Pa.     560 — Altoona    Trust     Co.     T. 

Fockler,  O^B  A.  740,  -311  OPa.  426— 

Markeim-Chalmers-Ludington   Inc., 

v.  Mead,  14  A.2d  152,  d40  Pa. Super. 

490— 'Pittsburgh      Terminal      Coal 

Corporation  v.  Robert  <Potts,  92  Pa. 

Super.  1— 'Parsons  v.  Kuhn,  45  Pa. 

Dist.  &  Co.  356. 
34  C.J.  p  128  note  42. 

failure  to  have  summons  issued  is 
only    procedural    error. — Consumers' 
Mining  Co.  v.  Chatak,   92  TsuSuper. 
17. 
ISu    UL— Hall.  v.  Jones,  32  HL  $8. 


§  170 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


er  hand,  neither  the  judgment  itself  nor  such  ex- 
press release  operates  to  release  or  waive  errors  of 
substance,20  such  as  a  want  of  jurisdiction,21  or 
lack  of  authority  to  confess  the  judgment.22 

§  170.    Presumptions  Supporting  Judgment 

A  Judgment  on  confession  entered  in  a  court  having 
jurisdiction,  Is  supported  by  the  same  presumptions,  with 
respect  to  matters  essential  to  Its  validity,  as  a  Judg- 
ment in  a  contested  action,  at  least  where  it  is  entered 
in  term  time. 

A  judgment  on  confession,  entered  in  a  court  hav- 
ing jurisdiction,  is  supported  by  the  same  presump- 
tions with  respect  to  the  regularity  of  the  proceed- 
ings, the  sufficiency  of  the  pleadings  and  evidence, 
and  other  matters  essential  to  its  validity,  as' a  judg- 
ment in  a  contested  action,28  at  least  where  the 
judgment  is  entered  in  term  time.24  It  has  been 
held,  however,  that  such  presumptions  do  not  ap- 
ply to  judgments  entered  in  vacation.25  Where  the 
right  to  enter  the  judgment  depended  on  the  con- 
tingency that  defendant  violated  his  contract,  the 
law  will  not  presume  that  he  has  done  so.2ft 

§  171.    Validity 

According  to  some  decisions,  a  Judgment  by  confes- 
sion is  absolutely  void  If  the  proceedings  in  confessing 
or  entering  the  Judgment  do  not  conform  .to  statutory 


requirements,  but,   according  to  other  decisions,  such  a 
Judgment  Is  merely  voidable. 

According  to  some  decisions  a  judgment  by  con- 
fession is  absolutely  void,  if  the  proceedings  in 
confessing  or  entering  the  judgment  do  not  conform 
to  statutory  requirements.27  According  to  other  de- 
cisions, however,  the  judgment  is  not  absolutely 
void,  but  is  voidable  only.2*  Thus  failure  to  file 
a  proper  affidavit  of  default  according  to  some  de- 
cisions renders  the  judgment  void,29  while,  accord- 
ing to  other  authority,  it  is  merely  voidable.30  In 
any  case,  under  a  statute  so  providing,  failure  on 
the  part  of  the  clerk  to  perform  any  of  the  duties 
imposed  on  him  by  statute  does  not  impair  the  va- 
lidity of  the  judgment  or  the  lien  thereof.81  If  the 
confession  of  judgment  is  void,  it  is  not  sufficient 
consideration  to  support  a  mortgage  made  to  secure 
its  payment.32 

Defective  statement.  Compliance  with  a  statute 
requiring  a  statement  of  the  -facts  out  of  which  the 
indebtedness  arose  to  be  filed  with  a  confession  of 
judgment,  as  discussed  supra  §  158,  has  been  held 
to  be  essential  to  confer  jurisdiction  on  the  court 
and  to  insure  validity  of  the  judgment,33  and  fail- 
ure to  comply  therewith  has  been  held  to  render  the 
judgment  void.34  However,  according  to  other  au- 
thority, the  fact  that  the  statement  is  defective  or 


20.  Pa, — Markeim-Chalmers-Luding- 
ton,  -Inc.,  v.  Mead,  14  A.2d  152,  140 
Pa. Super.    490 — Grakelow    v.    Kid- 
der,  95  Pa.Super.  250. 

34  C.J.  p  128  note  44. 

21.  111.— First  Nat.   Bank  v.  Boyer, 
27-3  I11.APP.  158. 

34  C.J.  p  128  note  45. 

22.  111.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Royer, 
27,3  I11.APP.  158. 

Pa.— 'Pittsburgh  Terminal  Coal  Cor- 
poration v.  Robert  (Potts,  92  'Pa, 
Super.  1. 

23.  U.S.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Monarch      Refrigerating-      Co.      v. 
Farmers'   Peanut  Co.,   C.C.A.,   Cir., 
74  F.*2d  790,  792. 

Md.— Pioneer  Oil  Heat  v.  Brown,  16 
A.2d  880,  179  'Md.  155. 

Pa. — Hebrew  -Loan  Society  of  Wy- 
oming Valley  v.  Margolis,  Com.Pl., 
$3  Luz.Legr.Reg.  10&. 

34  C.J.  p  1128  note  47. 

Judgment  held  valid  in  absence  of 
showing  of  invalidity 

111. — Chicago  Title  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Astrahan,  20  N.E.2d  308,  299  111. 
lApp.  623. 

24*  111. — Alton  Banking  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Gray,  179  N.B.  469,  347  111.  99— 
Book  v.  Ewbank,  35  N.OB. 2 d  961, 
311  IlLAfrp.  312 — Bowman  v.  -Pow- 
ell, 127  JlLApp.  114. 

22  C.J.  p  128  mote  8*3  [d]. 

25-  111. — Alton  Banking  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Gray,  179  'NJB.  469,  £47  111.  99 


— Farwell  v.  Huston,  37  NJB.  8-64, 
151  111.  239— Book  v.  Ewbank,  -35 
N.E.2d  961,  «311  IlLApp.  312. 

3<4  C.J.  p  128  note  49. 

26-    OPa.— Patterson  v.  "Pyle,  17  A.. 6. 

27.  Utah.— Utah  Nat.  Bank  v.  Sears, 
44  'P.  852,  U3  Utah  172. 

34  C.J.  p  '128  note  51. 
Judgment    without    jurisdiction     of 
subject  matter  or  parties  as  void 
see  supra  §  161  a. 

Uncertainty  in  designation  of  par- 
ties as  voiding  judgment  see  su- 
pra §  164. 

False  statement  as  to  amount  due  as 
rendering  judgment  void  see  supra 
§  1'67. 

Xf  clerk  enters  Judgment  for  an 
amount  not  authorized  by  the  con- 
fession, the  judgment  is  void. — Illi- 
nois Valley  Bank  v.  Harshman,  201 
IlLApp.  107. 

Judgment    entered,   without   proof 
of  execution  of  warrant  or  power  of 
attorney  held  void. 
111. — Oppenheimer  v.    Giershofer,    54 

HLApp.  38. 

Okl. — St.    Louis-San    Francisco    Ry. 
Co.    v.    Bayne,    40    P.2d   1104,    170 
Okl.  542. 
34  C.J.  p  121  note  2. 

28.  N.Y. — -Shenson   v.   L   Shainin   & 
Co.,    2-76    N.Y.S.    881.    243    AppJDiv. 
638,  affirmed  198  N.E.   407,  26'8  'N. 
Y.  567. 

34  C.J.  P  128  note  52. 

306 


Entry  of  Judgment  before  maturity 
of  obligation  authorizing  entry  there- 
of after  maturity  is  irregularity  ren- 
dering judgment  voidable  only. — Pas- 
co  Rural  Lighting  Co.  v.  Roland,  88 
Pa.Super.  245. 

29.  Pa.— Hogsett  v.  (Lutrario,   13  A. 
2d    902,    140    Pa.Super.    -419— Home 
Protective   Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n 
v.  Kefalas,  48  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  546,  '6 
Fay.L.J.   151,  91  Pittsb.Leg.J.  '326. 

30.  Pa.— Valentour    v.    Gregory,    11 
Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  240,  8  Wash.Co.  111. 

31.  Failure  to  require  a  certificate  of 
defendants  residence 

Pa. — Holland  Furnace  Co.  v.  Davis, 
31  Pa.JDist.  &  Co.  469,  5  Sch.Reg. 
157. 

32.  Mich.— Austin  v.  Grant,  1  Mich. 
490. 

33.  N.C.— Gibbs  v.  G.  H.  Weston  & 
Co.,    18    S.OE.2d    698,    221    N.C.    7— 
Cline  v.  Cline,  183  S.B.  904,  209  -N.C. 
5"31 — Farmers'  Bank  of  Clayton  v. 
McCullers,    160   S.B.   494,    201  N.C. 
440. 

34.  N.C.— Smith    v.    Smith,    23   S.E. 
270,  117  N.C.  i34'8. 

Judgment  entered  on  statement 
signed  by  only  some  of  debtors  held 
void  as  to  all. — French  v.  Edwards, 
C.C.Cal.,  9  F.Cas.No.5,098>  5  Sawy. 
266—34  C.J.  «p  118  note  33. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  172 


insufficient,  while  not  a  mere  irregularity,35  will 
not  render  the  judgment  absolutely  void.36  It  is 
valid  as  between  the  parties,37  and  void,  or  voidable, 
only  as  to  interested  third  persons.38  According  to 
some  authorities,  as  discussed  infra  §  433,  such 
judgment  cannot  be  collaterally  attacked,  but  must 
be  called  in  question  in  a  direct  proceeding  for 
that  purpose  ;39  and  plaintiff  may  sustain  his  judg- 
ment by  proving  that  it  is  fair,  and  not  fraudulent 
or  collusive,  and  warranted  by  the  facts  actually 
existing,  although  such  facts  were  not  included  in 
the  statement.40 

Failure  to  fie  affidavit  of  bona  fides.  A  failure 
to  file  the  required  affidavit  as  to  the  bona  fides  of 
the  confession,  as  discussed  supra  §  163,  or  the  fil- 
ing of  one  which  is  not  in  substantial  compliance 
with  the  requirements  of  the  statute,  renders  the 
judgment  by  confession,  not  absolutely  void,  but 
voidable  only  as  to  other  creditors;41  it  is  valid  as 
between  the  parties  thereto.42 

Fraud.  A  judgment  by  confession  entered  by  the 
creditor  without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the 
debtor  after  the  debt  had  been  paid  fully  has  been 
held  fraudulent  and  void.43  If  the  judgment  is 
confessed  for  the  purpose  of  defrauding  creditors 
or  other  third  persons,  it  is  invalid  as  to  them;44 
but  it  cannot  be  attacked  by  creditors  or  other  in- 
terested persons  merely  because  it  is  fraudulent  as 


35.  Insufficiency  is  not  imperfect 
pleading,  or  due  to  negligence  of 
party  or  his  attorney  by  which  ad- 
verse party  has  not  been  prejudiced, 
within  statute  providing  that  judg- 
ment cannot  be  affected  by  such  im- 
perfections.— Johnston  v.  A.  L.  Br- 
langer  Realty  Corporation,  296  N.T. 
a  '89,  162  Misc.  881. 

30.    N.T. — Shenson  v.    L  Shainin  & 

Co.,    276    N.T.S.    8-81,    243    App.Div. 

•638,  affirmed  198  N.R  407,  2-68  N.T. 

5'6'7. 
34  C.J.  P  128  note  56. 

Statute  held  to  Tie  merely  directory 
and  hence  failure  to  comply  there- 
with does  not  invalidate  judgment — 
Hughes  v.  Helms,  TennJCh.,  52  S.W. 
460. 
Defect  not  jurisdicttonal 

The  failure  of  an  attorney  confess- 
ing judgment  by  warrant  of  attorney 
to  set  down  with  officer  entering  the 
judgment  the  real  debt  is  not  Juris- 
dictional.— Rhoads  v.  Mitchell,  DeL, 
47  A.2d  174. 

37.    Minn. — Whelan  v.  Reynolds,  112 

N.W.    223,    101   Minn.   290. 
34  C.J.  p  128  note  57. 


against  the  debtor,  if  it  is  not  fraudulent  as  to 
them;45  and,  although  it  is  fraudulent  as  against 
creditors,  if  no  fraud  or  deception  is  practiced  on 
the  debtor,  it  is  binding  as  between  the  original 
parties.46 

Forgery.  A  judgment  by  confession  based  on  a 
forgery  has  been  held  to  be  a  nullity.47 

§  172.    Estoppel  to  Deny  Validity 

A  defendant  confessing  Judgment  Is  estopped,  In  the 
absence  of  fraud,  to  question  the  validity  of  the  confes- 
sion on  account  of  irregularities  to  which  he  did  not 
object,  and  if,  after  the  entry  of  Judgment,  he  ratifies 
or  acquiesces  In  it,  he  Is  estopped  to  deny  the  author- 
ity on  which  It  was  confessed  or  otherwise  to  impeach 
its  validity. 

A  defendant  confessing  judgment  is  estopped,  in 
the  absence  of  fraud,  to  question  the  validity  of  the 
confession  on  account  of  irregularities  to  which 
he  did  not  object,48  or  to  dispute  any  facts  set  forth 
in  the  confession49  or  accompanying  statement,50  or 
to  set  tip  any  claims  or  defenses  which  might  have 
been  presented  in  opposition  to  plaintiffs  action,51 
and  if,  after  the  entry  of  the  judgment,  defendant 
ratifies  or  accepts  it,  or  acquiesces  in  it,  he  is  es- 
topped to  deny  the  authority  on  which  it  was  con- 
fessed or  otherwise  to  impeach  its  validity.52  Es- 
toppel cannot,  however,  be  invoked  so  as  to  pre- 
clude attack  on  a  judgment  obtained  in  violation 
of  a  prohibitory  law.53 

47.    111.— Stoner  Y.    MilHkln,    85    111. 

218— Kolmar,  Inc.,  v.  Moore,  55  N. 

B.2d   524,   323    IlLApp.    323. 
43.     va. — Corpus      Juris      cited      i» 

Johnson    v.    Alvis,    165    S.E.    489, 

490,  159  Va.  229. 
84  O.J.  p  129  note  67. 
49.    SXX— Martin   v.    Bowie,    21    S.C, 

Law  225. 
Ya.— ^Corpus  Juris   cited  in  Johnson 

V.  Alvis.  165  S.'E.  489,  490,  159  Va. 


38.    S.C.— Woods   v.    Bryan,   19    S.B. 

218,  41  S.C.  74,  44  Am.S.R.  6S8. 
34  C.J.  p  129  note  59. 

i.    CaL— Lee  v.  tftes,    37   Cal.    328, 

99  Am.D.  271. 
N.Y.— Bradley    v.    Glass,    46  -N.T.S. 

790,  20  App.Div.  200. 

40.  CaL— Cordier  v.  Schloss,  18  Cal. 
576. 

34  C.J.  P  129  note  62. 

41.  Ind.— Bible    v.    Voris,    40    N.B. 
670,  141  Ind.  569. 

•34  C.J.  p  122  note  16. 

42.  Ind.— Irose    v.    Balla,    104    N.E. 
851,  181  Ind.  4-91. 

34  C.J.  p  122  note  17. 

43.  111.— Rea  v.  Forrest,  88  111.  275. 

44.  Wash. — Compton  v.   Schwabach- 
er,  46  P.  538,  15  Wash.  306. 

34  C.J.  P  129  note  -64. 

Validity  of  judgment  by  confession 
as  to  creditors  generally  see 
Fraudulent  Conveyances  §  44  b. 

45.  Pa,— Gould    v.    Randal,    81    A. 
809,  232  Pa.  -612. 

34  C.J.  p  129  note  65. 

46.  Pa.— Dillen  v.  Dillen,  70  A.  $06, 
221  Pa.  435. 

34  C.J.  IP  129  note  66. 


50.  N.C.— Martin  v.  Briscoe,  55  S.B. 
782,  14-3  N.C.  353. 

34  C.J.  p  129  note  69. 

51.  Iowa. — Troxel  v.   Clark,   9  Iowa 
201. 

34  C.J.  p  12  9  note  70. 

52.  Ohio.— Kisman  v.  Krupar.  186  N. 
B.  830,  45  Ohio  App.  29. 

Pa.— Fullerton's  Appeal,  46  Pa.Sk  144 

— ^Farmers  Nat.  Bank  of  Bphrata  v. 

Kyper,  Com.PL,  48  I«anc-I*.Rev.  211. 
Va.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Johnson 

v.  Alvis,  165  fiJBL  4'8$,  490,  159  Va. 

229. 
34  C.J.  P  129  note  71. 

53.  La.— Cilluffa  Y.  Monreale  Realty 
Co.,  24  <So.2d  60& 


307 


§  173 


§  173.    Consent 


JUDGMENTS 
'TIL  JUDGMENT  ON  CONSENT,  OFFEB,  OE  ADMISSION 


C.J.S. 


A  judgment  by  consent  Is  In  substance  a  contract  of 
record  made  by  the  parties  and  approved  by  the  court, 
and  is  to  be  distinguished  from  a  Judgment  by  confes- 
sion or  on  default. 

A  judgment  by  consent  of  the  parties  is  a  judg- 
ment the  provisions  and' terms  of  which  are  settled 
and  agreed  to  by  the  parties  to  the  action  in  which 
it  is  entered,  and  which  is  entered  of  record  by  the 
consent  and  sanction  of  the  court;54  it  may  be 
more  briefly  defined  as  a  contract  of  the  parties  ac- 
knowledged in  open  court  and  ordered  to  be  re-. 
corded,55  an  agreement  of  the  parties  entered  of 
record  with  the  approval  of  a  court  of  competent 
jurisdiction,56  or  a  solemn  contract  or  judgment  of 
the  parties  put  on  file  with  the  sanction  and  permis- 


sion of  the  court.57  A  consent  judgment  is  not  a 
judicial  determination  of  any  litigated  right,5*  and 
it  is  not  the  judgment  of  the  court,  except  in  the 
sense  that  the  court  allows  it  to  go  upon  the  record 
and  have  the  force  and  effect  of  a  judgment  ;5^  it 
is  merely  the  act  of  the  parties  consented  to  by  the 
court60 

Consent  to  entry  of  judgment  implies  that  the 
terms  and  conditions  have  been  agreed  on  and  con- 
sent thereto  given  in  open  court  or  by  stipulation,61 
and  the  court  has  no  power  to  supply  terms,  provi- 
sions, or  essential  details  not  previously  agreed  to 
by  the  parties.62  It  has  been  held,  however,  that 
the  fact  that  a  judgment  is  entered  by  consent  of 
the  parties  does  not  deprive  it  of  its  judicial  char- 
acter or  efficacy.68 


54.  Ky.~ Kames  v.  Black,  215  fi.W. 
191,  185  Ky.  410. 

Neb. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  In  re 
Director  of  Insurance,  -3  N.W.2d 
922,  92'6,  141  Neb.  488. 
R.I. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  An- 
drews v.  Indemnity  Ins.  Co.  of 
'North  America,  181  A.  403,  405,  55 
R.I.  341. 

Tex. — Matthews  v.  Looney,  123  S.W. 
2d  871,  132  Tex.  «313— De  Garza  v. 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.,  Civ.App 
'S3  S,W.2d  453. 

34  C.J.  p  130  note  73—12  C.J.  p  520 
note  90. 

The  essence  of  a  "consent  decree" 
Is  that  the  parties  thereto  have  en- 
tered voluntarily  into  a  contract  set- 
ting the  dispute  at  rest,  on  which 
contract  the  court  has  entered  judg- 
ment conforming  to  terms  of  the 
agreement,  without  putting  parties 
to  necessity  of  proof. — Harter  v. 
King  County,  119  P.2d  919,  11  Wash. 
2d  58-3. 

55.  N.C. — Keen  v.  Parker,   8  S.B.2d 
209,  217  N.C.  378— Cason  v.  Shute, 
189  fi.E.    494,   211  N.C.   195— !First 
Nat.    Bank    v.    Mitchell,    131    S.B. 
656,  191  N.C.  190— ^Joburn  v.  Board 
of  Com'rs  of  Swain  County,  131  S. 
B.  i372,  191  N.C.  63— Southern  Dis- 
tributing Co.  v.  Carraway,  127  S.'B. 
427,  189  N.C.  420— Union  Bank  v. 
Commissioners  of  Town  of  Oxford, 
25  S,B.  966,  119  N.C.  214,  84  QLR.A. 
4'87. 

Tex.— Prince  v.  Frost-Johnson  Lum- 
ber Co.,   Civ.App.,   250  6.W.   785. 
In  many  respects  a  judgment  by 
consent  is  treated  as  a  contract  be- 
tween    the     parties. — Rodriguez     v. 
Rodriguez,    29    S.E.2d    9P1,    224   N.C, 
275. 

56.  0.S.— Watson  V.  U.  S.,  D.C.N.C., 
.   34  F.Supp.  777. 

Neb. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 
Director  of  Insurance,  3  N.W.2d 
922,  926,  141  Neb.  488— Me  Arthur 


v.    Thompson,    299    N.W.   $19,   140 
Neb.   408,   139   A.L.R.  413. 

N.C.— King  v.  King,  95  S.B.2d 
Jones  v.  Griggs,  25  S.E.2d  «8^2,  223 
N.C.  279 — Edmundson  v.  EJdmund- 
son,  22  S.E.2d  57-6,  222  N.C.  131— 
Keen  v.  Parker,  8  S.E.2d  209,  217 
NXX  378— Webster  v.  Webster,  195 
S.<E.  «62,  213  N.C.  1-35— Cason  v. 
Shute,  189  S.E.  494,  211  N.C.  195— 
Weaver  v.  Hampton,  167  S.E.  484, 
204  NXJ.  42 — Weaver  v.  Hampton, 
1*1  <S.E.  4'80,  201  N.C.  79-8— Bunn 
v.  Braswell,  51  S.B.  927,  139  N.C. 
135,  138. 

R.I. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  An- 
drews v.  Indemnity  Ins.  </o.  of 
North  America,  181  A.  403,  :4(K5, 
R.I.  941. 

34  C.J.  |p  ISO  note  75. 

57.  N.C. — Town  of  Cary  T.  Temple- 
ton,  152  S.E.  797,  198  N.C.  604 — 
Bunn  v.  Braswell,  51  S.E.  927,  139 
N.C.  195. 

a  Mass.— New  York  Cent  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  T.  Stuart  &  iSon  Co.,  157 
N.E.  540,  260  Mass.  242. 

59.  Ky.— -Kentucky  Utilities  Co.  v. 
Steenman,  141  S.W.2d  265,  293  Ky. 
<3I7-rHarrel  v.  Yonts,  113  S.W.2d 
426,  271  Ky.  783— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed, in  Myers  v.  Myers,  100  S.W.2d 
693,  694,  266  Ky,  831— Boone  v. 
Ohio  Valley  Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 
«Co.'s  Receiver,  55  S.W.2d  974,  24« 
Ky.  489. 

Neb. — Corpus  Juxi*  quoted  in  In  re 
Director  of  Insurance,  3  N.W,2d 
922,  926,  141  Neb.  488. 

R.I. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  An- 
drews v.  Indemnity  Ins.  Co.  of 
North  America,  1*81  A.  403,  405,  55 
R.I.  341. 

34  C.J.  v  130  note  74. 

60.-  111.— Heymann  v.  O*Connell,  1* 
N.E.2d  100,  29*  .U1.APP.  634— Co n- 
saer  v.  Wisniewski,  13  N.E.2d  93, 
299  IlLApp.  529. 

308 


Mich. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In  re 
Meredith's  Estate,  2-66  N.W.  881, 
354,  275  Mich.  278. 

Neft. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 
Director  of  Insurance,  8  N.W.2d 
922,  92*6,  141  Neb.  488. 

N.Y. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  People 
ex  rel.  Norwich,  Pharmacal  Co.  v. 
Porter,  539  N.Y.S.  28,  80,  31,  22*8 
App.Div.  54. 

N.C.— Ellis  v.  Ellis,  156  S.B.  «$0,  193 
N.C.  216. 

R.I. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  An- 
drews v.  Indemnity  Ins.  Co.  of 
North  America,  in  A.  403,  405,  5.' 
R.'X  941. 

W.Va.— Stannard  Supply  Co.  v.  Del- 
mar  Coal  Co.,  in  S.BL  907,  110  W. 
Va.  560. 

34  C.J.  p  130  note  70. 

01.  N.Y.— Jacobs  y.  Steinbrink,  «73 
N.Y.S.  498,  243  Ajpp.DiT.  197. 

62.  OkL — Insurance   Service   Co.    v. 
iFinegran,  1£5  P.2d  -620. 

Tex.— -Matthews  >v.  Xiooney,  123  a 
W.2d  871,  132  Tex  313— Wyss  v. 
Bookman,  Qom.App.,  2*35  3.W.  567, 

63.  Va.— Culpeper  Nat  Bank  of  Cul- 
peper  v.  Morris,  191  S.E.  764,  168 
Va.  379. 

Judicial  act 

While  a  consent  judgment  is  based 
on  agreement  of  the  parties  rather 
than  a  finding:  of  facts  by  the  court, 
it  is  something  more  than  a  mere 
authentication  or  recording-  of  the 
agreement;  it  is  a  Judicial  act  in- 
volving a  determination  by  the  court 
that  it  is  equitable  and  in  the  pub- 
lic interest— IT.  S.  v.  Radio  Corpora- 
tion of  America,  D.O.*Del.,  46  tP.Sirpp. 
654,  appeal  dismissed  6$  S.Ct  851, 
31-8  UJS.  796,  87  L.Bd.  1161. 
Judgment  of  court 
N.C.— T Keen  v.  Parker,  8  S.(E.2d  209, 
217  N.C.  378— Weaver  v.  Hampton, 
167  S.EL  484,  -20'4  N.C.  42. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  174 


Distinctions.  A  judgment  by  consent  is  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  one  rendered  on  an  adjudication 
actually  made  by  the  court  after  due  consideration 
and  investigation,  as  following  verdict  or  findings 
in  an  adverse  proceeding,6*  and  such  a  judgment 
will  not  become  a  judgment  by  consent  even  though 
the  parties  may  have  superadded  their  consent  to 
the  adjudication  of  the  court65  It  is  similar  to  a 
judgment  after  trial  on  the  merits  in  that  it  is  bind- 
ing on  the  parties,  but  differs  therefrom  in  that 
it  is  not  appealable  and  can  be  vacated  only  in 
certain  circumstances  for  fraud  or  want  of  con- 
sent.66 A  judgment  by  consent  is  to  be  distin- 
guished from  a  judgment  by  default,  its  special 
characteristic  being  the  settlement  between  the  par- 
ties of  the  terms,  amount,  or  conditions  of  the  judg- 
ment to  be  rendered,67  and  is  also  to  be  distin- 
guished from  a  judgment  by  confession  discussed 
supra  §  134.  Termination  of  an  action  by  entry  of 


agreement  for  judgment  for  "neither  party"  con- 
stitutes a  final  disposition  of  the  action,  but  no  judg- 
ment may  be  rendered  thereon  by  the  court68 

§  174.    Right  and  Authority  to  Consent 

a.  In  general 

b.  Who  may  and  must  consent 

a.  In  General 

Within  limitations  Imposed  by  positive  requirements 
of  law,  the  parties  may  agree  to  any  disposition  of  a 
pending  action  and  the  court  may  and  should  render 
Judgment  accordingly. 

Within  limitations  imposed  by  positive  require- 
ments of  law,6^  any  disposition  of  a  pending  action, 
not  illegal,  may  be  fairly  agreed  to  by  the  parties, 
and  when  so  agreed,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
permit  such  disposition  and  to  enter  judgment  ac- 
cordingly, which  judgment  will  be  given  effect  be- 
tween the  parties  and  their  privies.70  The  court 


64.    Pa. — Cesare  v.  Cagrato,  100  Pa. 

Super.  188. 
34  C.J.  p  130  note  77. 

Consent  judgment  sufficiently 
shown  by  plaintiff's  acceptance  of  de- 
fendant's offer  in  open  court — Gar- 
rett  v.  Davis,  112  So/  342,  216  Ala. 
74. 

Consent  judgment  not  shown 

(1)  By  recital  in  order  that  there 
had  been  an  agreement  on  figures. — 
060  Park  Ave.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  D.C. 
N".Y.,  22  F.Supp.  188. 

(2)  Where  suit  to  set  aside  oil  and 
gas   lease   covering  allotted  acreage 
of  full-blood  restricted  Creek  Indian 
was    consolidated   with  suit   by   de- 
fendants   therein    to    Quiet    title    to 
lease,    and    thereafter   parties   made 
written  compromise  agreement,   and 
court,    after    examination    of  issues, 
rendered    judgment    approving    such 
agreement   and  quieting  defendant's 

,  title,  the  judgment  was  not  a  "con- 
sent decree"  but  a  valid  "final  de- 
cree," barring  subsequent  action  by 
deceased  Indian's  administrator  to 
set  aside  the  lease  and  for  an  ac- 
counting because  of  Indian's  incom- 
petency. — Spencer  v.  Gypsy  Oil  Co., 
C.CA.OW.,  142  F.2d  935,  certiorari 
denied  66  S.Ct.  4-39,  323  U.S.  798,  89 
UEd.  636. 

Decree  resting  on  evidence 

Where  trial  court's  recitation  in 
decree  entered,  in  quiet  title  action 
against  county  purported  to  rest  de- 
cree on  evidence,  and  not  on  con- 
sent of  parties,  the  decree  would  not 
be  construed  as  a  "consent  decree," 
especially  where  there  was  no  show- 
ing of  fraud  or  collusion  between 
prosecuting  attorney  representing 
county  and  the  plaintiff  in  procur- 
ing the  decree.— Harter  v.  King 
County,  119  P.2d  919,  11  Washed 
533. 


Failure  of  a  party  to  plead  farther 
after  his  demurrer  is  overruled  does 
not  make  a  subsequent  judgment  one 
by  consent. — State  v.  Glover,  S  P.2d 
1014,  165  Wash.  567. 

65.  Pa.— Cesare  v.   Caputo,    100   Pa. 
Super.  188. 

34  C.J.  p  130  note  77. 
Agreement  to  survey 

Where  parties  to  ejectment  action 
agreed  to  survey,  and  verdict  based 
on  results  of  survey  was  returned, 
judgment  thereon  was  judgment  on 
verdict  in  adverse  proceeding  and 
not  by  consent— Cesare  v.  Caputo, 
supra. 

66.  Ky.— Myers  v.   Myers,   100   S.W. 
2d  693,  266  Ky.  831. 

67.  Ark.— Corpus    Juris    &uoted    in 
Vaughan  v.  Brown,  40  S.W.2d  996, 
997,  184  Ark.  185. 

34  C.J.  p  130  note  78. 
Judgment  held  by  default  and  not  by  j 
consent 

Where  an  order  form  for  judgment 
by  default  is  prepared  by  counsel  for 
plaintiff,  presented  to  attorney  for 
defendant,  the  abbreviation  *'O.  K." 
indorsed  on  the  back  thereof,  fol- 
lowed by  the  signatures  of  the  at- 
torneys for  both  parties  and  entered 
without  any  notation  of  consent  on 
the  face  of  the  record,  and  there  is 
no  appearance  of  defendant  noted, 
the  judgment  is  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault, and  not  a  consent  judgment. — 
Bank  of  Gauley  v.  Osenton,  114  6. 
B.  435,  92  W.Va.  1. 
63.  Mass.— Whalen  v.  Worcester 

Electric  Light  Co.,  29  -N.E.2d  763, 

307    Mass.    169— White   v.    Beverly 

Bldg.    Ass'n,     108    N.EL     921,     221 

Mass.  15. 
Dismissal  on  consent  of  parties  see 

Dismissal  and  Nonsuit  i  9. 
69.    Ohio. — Rosebrough  Y.  Ansley,  »35 

Ohio  St.  107. 


Tex. — Lauderdale  v.  R.  &  -T.  A.  Ennis 
Stationery  Co.,  Civ.App.,  24  S.W. 
8-34. 

34  C.  J.  !p  132  note  95. 

TO.    TT.g.— Corpus     juris     cited     in 
Hot  Springs  Coal  Co.  v.  Miller,  C. 
C.A.Wyo.,  107  !F.2d  677,  6S1. 
Cal. — Krug  v.  John  E.  Toakum  Co,, 

SO  P.2d  492,   27  Cal.App.2d  91. 
Ga. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Estes  v. 

Estes,   14   S.E.2d   6S1,  £83,    192   Ga. 

94. 
111. — Bergman    v.    Rhodes,    165    N.K. 

59S,  -334   111.    137,    65   A.L.R.  344— 

Consaer  v.  Wisniewski,   13   X.E.2d 

93,  29>3  HLApp.  529. 
Iowa. — Cooper    v.    Stekelenburg,    -300 

X.W.   293,   230   Iowa  1066. 
Kan. — Corpus    Juris    oited   in    Bald- 
win v.  Baldwin,   96  P.2d   614,    617, 

150  Kan.  807. 
I£y. — Corpus  Juris  cited,  in  Myers  v. 

Myers,    100    S.W.2d    693,    694,    266 

Ky.  S31. 
2?eb. — Corpus    Juris    cited   in   In    re 

Kiersyead's  Estate,   259  N.W.  740, 

743,  128  Neb.  654. 
N.H.— Perley  v.   Bailey,   199  A.   570. 

89  N.H.  359. 
N.Y.— Gass  v.  Arons,  227  N.T.S.  282, 

1-31  Misc.  502. 
Ttf.C. — Coburn  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 

Swain  County,  131  S.E.  '372,  191  N. 

C.  68. 
Utah. — Corpus  Juris  anoted  in  Tra- 

cey  v.  Blood,   3   P.2d  263,   265,  78 

Utah  385. 

34  CJ.  P  130  note-80. 
Validity   of   consent   judgment   gen- 
erally see  infra  5  178. 

Implied  power  of  oonrt 

Where  court  has  «power  to  render 
final  judgment  on  merits,  power  to 
render  judgment  on  compromise 
agreement  is  necessarily  implied.— 
Union  Cent  I*if  e  Ins.  Co.  v.  Boggs, 
66  S,W.2d  1077,  188  Ark.  604. 


309 


§  174 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


does  not  inquire  into  the  merits  or  equities  of  the 
case ;  the  only  questions  to  be  determined  by  it  are 
whether  the  parties  are  capable  of  binding  them- 
selves by  consent  and  whether  they  have  actually 
done  so.71  The  judgment  agreed  on  must  be  one 
within  the  general  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  ren- 
der,?2 and  such  as  is  warranted  by  law,™  for  if 
the  court  is  without  authority  the  parties  cannot 
confer  it74 

Pleadings,  proof,  etc.  Since  consent  to  a  judg- 
ment has  been  held  to  cure  all  errors  not  going  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,75  where  the  court  has 
acquired  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter  and  of 
the  parties,  a  judgment  by  consent  without  the  serv- 
ice or  filing  of  a  declaration  or  complaint  has  been 
held  valid.76  There  is  authority  for  the  view  that 
a  judgment  by  consent  may  be  entered  and  given 


effect  as  to  any  matters  of  which  the  court  has  gen- 
eral jurisdiction,  without  regard  to  the  pleadings,77 
and  even  though  the  pleadings  do  not  support  it.7* 
Thus  it  has  been  held  that  the  rule  that  a  judg- 
ment on  matters  outside  the  issues  raised  by  the 
pleadings  is  a  nullity  does  not  apply  to  judgments 
entered  by  consent,79  and  that  a  consent  judgment 
going  beyond  the  pleadings  is  erroneous  but  not 
void.80  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that 
consent  will  not  support  a  judgment  on  a  declara- 
tion or  complaint  which  fails  to  state  a  cause  of 
action,81  or  a  judgment  on  matters  entirely  without 
the  scope  of  the  pleadings,82  such  as  a  judgment  on 
a  cause  of  action  other  than  that  stated  in  the  plead- 
ings83 or  a  judgment  for  an  amount  in  excess  of 
the  amount  alleged  to  be  due,84  and  that  a  judg- 
ment rendered  outside  the  issues  made  by  the  plead- 
ings is  void  although  entered  by  consent.*5  In  any 


Set-off 

Stipulation,  on  which  case  was  re- 
ported, that,  if  verdict  for  defendant 
was  sustained,  Judgment  for  defend- 
ant should  be  entered  for  amount 
'claimed  in  set-off,  was  binding  on 
parties  and  became  law  of  the  case. 
—Adams  v.  Grundy  &  Co.,  152  N.E. 
379,  256  Mass.  246. 
After  default 

It  has  been  held  that  a  party  may 
in  good  faith  sign  a  written  consent 
that  a  money  judgment  be  entered 
against  him  even  after  his  default 
has  been  entered  in  the  case.— Tra- 
cey  v.  Blood,  *  P.2d  263,  78  Utah  385. 

71.    Colo.— Garf    v.    Weitzman,    209 

P.  809,  72  Colo.  1«36. 
Neb— In  re  Director  of  Insurance,  3 
«N.W.2d    922,     141    Neb.     4-88— Mc- 
Arthur  v.  Thompson,  299  N.W.  519, 
140  Neb.    408,   139   A.L.R.   413. 
Reasons  for  Judgment 

It  has  been  said  that  the  will  of 
the  parties  stands  as  sufficient  rea- 
son for  the  Judgment  so  that  the 
law  will  not  inquire  into  the  reasons 
therefor.— Board  of  Education  of 
Sampson  County  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of  Sampson  County,  134  S.'E.  852,  19° 
N.C.  274. 


72.  Miss.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in, 
Roberts  v.  International  Harvester 
Co.,  ISO  So.  747,  748,  181  Miss.  440 

Neb.— Corpus   Juris    cited   In   In   re 

Mattingly's   Estate,   270  N.W.   4'87 

492,  131  Neb.  891. 
Utah.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Tra 

cey  v.   Blood,   3   P.2d  283,   265,   7 

Utah  «385. 

34  C.J.  p  131  note  81. 
jurisdiction,  shown 
HI.— -Davis  v.   Oliver,   25  N^El2d  905 

.304  IlLApp.  71. 

73.  Utah. — Corpus   Juris   quoted   in 
Tracey  v.   Blood,   8  P.2d  263,  265 
78  Utah  385. 

34  C.J.  P  131  note  82. 


74.  Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Roberts  v.  International  Harvester 
Co.,  180  So.  747,  748,  181  Miss.  440. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Tra- 
cey v.   Blood,   3  P.2d  2*3,   265,   78 
Utah  3*85. 
4  C.  J.  p  1*31  note  S3. 

75*  Ga.— ^Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Estes  v.  Estes,  14  S.E.2d  681,  tfS-3, 
192  Ga.  94. 

Tex. — Brennan  v.  Greene,  Civ.Ajpp., 
154  S.W.2d  623,  error  refused— 
HuUbard  v.  Trinity  State  Bank, 
Civ.App.,  48  S.W.2d  379,  error  dis- 
missed. 

34  C.J.  p  134  note  5-3. 

Consent  Judgment  as  waiver  of  er- 
rors or  irregularities  see  infra  § 
178. 

Scope  of  Jurisdiction  invoiced  by 
pleadings 

Tex. — Williams  v.  Sinclair-Prairie 
Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.f  135  S.W.2d  211, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct. 

76.    Tex. — Mullins  v.  Thomas,  150  S. 
W.2d  S3,  136  Tex.  215— Corpus  Ju- 
ris cited  in  Pope  v.  Powers,  Civ 
App.,    91   S.W.2d   87-3,   875. 
34  C.J.  p  131  note  84. 
Consent  or  ratification 

A  judgment  is  not  void  because 
rendered  without  the  filing  of  a  com 
plaint,  as  the  parties  may  by  con 
sent  or  subsequent  ratification  vali 
date  such  a  judgment— Stanclll  v 
Gay,  92  N.C.  455. 


77.  Ind.— Eletcher  v.  Holmes,  25  Ind 
458. 

Ky.— Kentucky  futilities  Co.  v.  Steen 
man,  141  S.W.2d  265,  283  Ky.  317 

N.C. — Edmundson  v.  Edmundson,  2 
S.E.2d  576,  222  NX3.  181. 

34  C.J.  p  1«31  note  89. 

78.  Mont— Wallace  v.  Goldberg,  £3 
P.  56,  72  Mont.  234. 

Xex. — Pope  v.  Powers,  120  S.W.2 
432,  132  Tex.  80. 

310 


Different  from  contested  Judgment 

For  an  agreed  judgment  arrived 
t  through  compromise  of  the  par- 
ies to  be  valid,  the  pleadings  need 

not  be  such  as  would  be  required  to 
upport  a  contested  judgment— Pope 

v.  Powers,  120  S.W.2d  432,  132  Tex. 

to. 

79.    Ind.— Burrell   v.   Jean,   146  N.E. 
754,  196  Ind.  187. 

y. — Eddington's  Adm'x  v.  Edding- 
ton,  175  S.W.2d  12,  29S  Ky.  548— 
Boone  v.  Ohio  Valley  Fire  &  Ma- 
rine Ins.  Co.'s  Receiver,  55  S.W.2d 
374,  246  Ky.  489— '.Lincoln  County 
Board  of  Education  v.  Board  of 
Trustees  of  Stanford  Graded  Com- 
mon School  Dist,  7  S.W.2d  499, 
225  Ky.  21. 
N.C. — Edmundson  v.  -Edmundson,  22 
S.E.2d  576,  222  N.Q.  181— Keen  v. 
Parker,  8  S.E.2d  209,  217  N.C.  378. 
Reason  for  rule  is  that  parties  may 
agree  as  to  subject  matter  of  litiga- 
tion, and  thereby  waive  the  exception 
that  the  issue  was  not  embraced  by 
the  pleadings.— Lodge  v.  Williams, 
243  S.W.  1011,  195  Ky.  77*. 

8Q.     Qa. — Holcombe  v.  Jones,  30  S.B. 
2d  903,  197  Ga.  825. 

81.  Ohio. — Rosebrough  v.  Ansley,  35 
Ohio  St.  107. 

Puerto  Rico. — Questel    v.    Conde,    18 

Puerto  Rico  727. 
34  C.J.  p  131  note  85. 

82.  Ohio.— Rosebrough  v.  Ansley,  35 
Ohio  -St  107. 

34  C.J.  p  131  note  &6. 

83.  Ohio. — Rosebrough     v.     Ansloy, 
supra. 

54  C.J.  p  181  note  87. 

84.  Ohio. — Rosebrough     Y.     Ansley, 
supra. 

34  C.J.  p  131  note  88. 

85.  Okl. — Oklahoma   City   v.   Robin- 
son, 65  P.2d  531,  179  Okl.  309. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  175 


event,  before  a  judgment  additional  or  foreign  to 
the  subject  matter  of  the  suit  can  be  upheld  as  a 
judgment  by  consent,  it  must  very  plainly  appear 
that  the  parties  intended  such  an  effect,  and  their 
agreement  should  never  be  enlarged  beyond  the 
clear  import  of  the  terms  they  have  used.86  The 
agreement  of  the  parties  has  also  been  held  to  ob- 
viate the  necessity  for  a  hearing  except  for  the  pur- 
puse  of  determining  the  fact  or  validity  of  the 
agreement  and  ordering  judgment  accordingly.8? 
So  it  has  been  held  not  required  that  there  be 
proof88  or  a  verdict  or  findings.89 

b.  Who  May  and  Most  Consent 

Judgment  by  consent  may  be  rendered  only  on  con- 
sent of  all  parties  interested  and  to  be  bound,  or  their 
duly  authorized  agents. 

The  power  of  the  court  to  render  a  judgment  by 
consent  is  dependent  on  the  existence  of  the  consent 
of  the  parties  at  the  time  the  agreement  receives 
the  sanction  of  the  court  or  is  rendered  and  pro- 
mulgated as  a  judgment90  The  consent  to  the  judg- 
ment must  be  given  by  all  the  parties  thereto,91  and 


the  judgment  is  not  binding  as  to  a  nonconsenting 
party,92  as  in  the  case  of  a  party  for  whom  con- 
sent was  given  by  one  lacking  authority  to  act  for 
him.93  Consent  may  be  given  by  the  parties  per- 
sonally,94 or  by  their  legal  representatives,95  or  by 
other  duly  authorized  agents.96 

§  175.    Sufficiency  of  Consent  or  Agree- 
ment 

Consent  to  Judgment  may  be  made  in  writing,  or  it 
may  be  made  orally  if  in  open  court,  and  It  should  be 
clear,  specific,  and  complete.  Withdrawal  of  consent 
prior  to  judgment  may  sometimes  be  permitted. 

Consent  to  judgment  must  be  made  by  or  on  be- 
half of  the  parties  in  open  court  or  by  documentary 
evidence  of  legal  sufficiency.97  If  the  agreement  or 
consent  is  made  in  open  court,  it  may  be  made 
orally;98  otherwise  it  should  be  in  writing,99  and 
should  be  filed.1  It  has,  however,  been  held  that 
a  judgment  may  be  entered  on  an  oral  agreement 
made  out  of  court  when  necessary  to  prevent  in- 
justice to  one  party.2  The  consent  should  be  so 
clear  and  specific  in  terms  that  no  mistake  can  arise 


88.    N.C. — Holloway   v.    Durham,    97 

S.E.  486,  176  N.C.  550. 
«7.     Ga. — Bates  v.   Bates,   14   S.B.2d 

681,  192  Ga.  94, 
JB8.     U.S.— Swift  &  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  APP. 

D.C.,  48  'S.Ct.  811,  276  U.S.  811,  72 

L.Ed.  587. 
.Qa. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bstes  v. 

Estes,   14   S.E.2d  681,   683,   192   Ga. 

94. 
Mich.— Fortunate  v.  Di  'Flippo,  239  N. 

W.  868,  256  Mich.  545. 
N.J. — City    of   Bayonne  v.   Hill,    135 

A.    545,    100   N'.J.Bq.   479,    affirmed 

City  of  Bayonne  v.  Doherty,  138  A. 

927,  101  N.J/Ecu  7'37. 
Tex. — Duke  v.  Gilbreath,  Civ.App.,  10 

S.W.2d   412,   error  refused. 
£4  C.J.  (P  132  note  92. 

After  issue*  have  been  Joined,  tri- 
jal  court  can  enter  judgment  based 
.on  agreement  of  parties  without 
hearing  evidence. — Allen  v.  !Fewel, 
87  S.W.2d  142,  337  Mo.  955. 
.89.  Ga. — Corpus  Joels  quoted  la. 

Bstes  v.  Bstes,  14  S.B.2d  681,  683, 

194  Ga.  94. 
34  C.J.  p  1*32  note  93. 
00.    N.C.— Williamson  v.  Williamson, 

31  <3.B.2d   367,   224  N.C.  474— Rod- 
riguez v.  Rodriguez,  29  S.B.2d  901, 

224  N.C.  275. 
Withdrawal  of  consent  see  infra   § 

175. 
.Judgment  void  without  consent 

The  power  of  the  court  to  sign  a 
consent  Judgment  depends  on  the  un- 
qualified consent  of  the  parties  there- 
to, and  Judgment  is  void  if  such  con- 
sent »does  not  exist  at  the  time  the 
court  sanctions  or  approves  the 
.agreement  and  promulgates  it  as  a 


Judgment—King  v.  King,  <35   S.R2d 
893,  225  N.C.  £39. 

91.  N.C.— Lynch   v.    Loftin,   «9    S.B. 
143,  153  N.C.  270. 

Philippine. — -Be  Tavera  v.  Holy  Ro- 
man Catholic  Apostolic  Church,  10 
Philippine  871. 

92.  Ky.— Hays  v.  Cyrus,   67  S.W.2d 
503,  252  Ky.  4-35. 

Mont — State  ex  rel.  Delmoe  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist, 
46  P.2d  39,  100  Mont  131. 

93*  Miss. — Stevens  v.  Barbour,  8  So. 
2d  242,  19'3  Miss.  109. 

94.  Tenn.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Coley  v.  Family  Loan  Co.,  80  S. 
W.2d  87,  88,  168  Tenn.  Ml. 

34  C.J.  p  132  note  9. 

96.    N.C.— Union  Bank  v.  Oxford,  25 

S.E.    966,    119  N.C.   214,   34   L.R.A. 

487. 
Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Coley 

v.  -Family  Loan  Co.,  80  S.W.2d  87, 

88,  168  Tenn.  681. 
Ultra  Tires  deed 

Where  trustee's  claim  for  services 
was  based  on  ultra  vires  trust  deed 
of  corporation,  alleged  consent  de- 
cree based  on  deed  was  no  more  val- 
id than  the  deed.— Hanrahan  v.  An- 
dersen, 90  P.2d  494,  108  Mont.  218. 
96.  Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  la 

Coley  v.  Family  Loan  Co.,  SO  S.W. 

3d  87,  88,  168  Tenn.  &3L 
34  C.J.  jp  132  note  12. 
Consent   by   attorneys   see   Attorney 

and  Client  §  86. 

A  village  may  not  legally  consent 
to  a  judgment  of  assessment  against 
an  assessment  district — Wood  v. 

311 


Village  of  Rockwood,  18  N.W.2d  864. 
311  Mich.  381. 

Consent  of  an  officer  of  an.  incor- 
porated association  has  been  held  not 
binding  against  Individual  members 
so  as  to  authorize  entry  of  personal 
Judgments  against  them. — People  v. 
Brisket  Buyers  Ass'n  of  Greater  New 
York,  8  N.Y.S.2d  511,  255  App.Div. 
60*3. 
97.  tJ.S.— -U.  8.  v.  Sobey,  I>.C.Mont, 

56  -F.2d  664. 
N.Y.— Gass  v.  Arons,  227  N.Y.S.  282, 

1-31  Misc.  502. 
Stipulation,  held  sufficient 
N.M. — American   Nat.   Bank  of  Tuc- 

umcari  v.  Tarpley,  250  P.  18,  31  N. 

M.  667. 
96.    N.H.— Perley  v.  Bailey,    199   A. 

570,  89  N.H.  359. 
N.Y.— Gass  v.  Arons,  227  N.Y.S.  282, 

131  Misc.  502. 

OkL — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Insur- 
ance Service  Co.  v.  CFinegan,  165 

P.2d  620,  621. 
Or. — Schoren  v.  Schoren,  222  P.  1096, 

110  Or.  272. 
34  C.J.  p  132  note  96. 

99.  Okl.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Insurance  Service  Co.  v.  <Finegan, 
165  P.2d  620,  621. 

34  C.J.  p  132  note  97. 

1.  Okl. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     In. 
Insurance  Service  Co.  «v.  Finegan, 
165  P.2d  620,  621. 

34  C.J.  p  132  note  98. 

2.  N.Y.— Lee    v.    Rudd,    198    N.Y.S. 
628,  120  Misc.  407. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Insur- 
ance Service  Co.  v.  Finegaa,  165 
P.2d  620,  621. 


§  175 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


respecting  the  concurrence  of  tlie  parties,*  and  it 
should  be  complete4  and  unqualified.5 

It  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  deter- 
mine the  fact  and  the  sufficiency  of  such  consent.6 
A  party's  consent  to  a  judgment  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  he  causes  the  judgment  to  be  entered  up  ;7 
but  consent  cannot  be  shown  by  oral  statements  to 
the  judge  out  of  court8  or  by  a  mere  statement  of 
counsel  that  he  has  no  objection  to  the  entry  of  the 
judgment.9  A  stipulation  for  judgment  is  a  consent 
to  the  entry  of  judgment,10  but  a  stipulation  which 
is  merely  a  consent  that  the  pleadings  may  be 
amended,  and  is  not  an  admission  of  the  correctness 
of  the  allegations,  is  not  a  proper  basis  for  a  judg- 
ment.11 

WitJidrawal  or  expiration  of  consent.  It  has  been 
held  that  the  consent  may  be  withdrawn  at  any 
time  prior  to  entry  of  judgment,12  and  that  it  is 
within  the  discretion  of  the  court,  on  motion  of  one 
of  the  parties,  to  withhold  the  agreed  judgment  and 
grant  a  further  trial.18  However,  a  consent  given 


prior  to  the  adjustment  of  the  issues  in  the  contro- 
versy may  be  assumed  to  continue  by  the  failure  to 
withdraw  or  to  protest14  Generally,  consent  to 
the  entry  of  judgment  expires  after  the  creditor's 
remedy  becomes  barred  by  limitations.16 

§  176.    Entry  of  Judgment 

An  order  for  entry  of  a  consent  judgment  Is  a  Judi- 
cial act-  In  the  sense  that  It  requires  the  court  to  ex- 
amine the  record  to  determine  its  authority,  but  is  min- 
isterial In  the  sense  that  It  Is  predicated  on  the  agree- 
ment of  the  parties.  A  consent  judgment  should  be  en- 
tered In  the  proper  book  or  record  and  may  be  entered 
at  any  time  stipulated  by  the  parties  and  permitted  by 
statute. 

While  an  order  for  entry  of  a  consent  judgment 
is  a  judicial  act*  in  the  sense  that  it  requires  the 
court  to  examine  the  record  to  determine  its  au- 
thority,18 the  court  also  acts  ministerially  in  the 
sense  that  its  power  to  enter  judgment  depends  on 
the  agreement  or  consent  of  the  parties.17  So, 
where  the  parties  have  lawfully  agreed,  the  actual 
entry  of  judgment  is  a  mere  ministerial  act,18  un- 


3.  Mass. — Roberts       v.       Anheuser- 
Busch  Brewing  Ass'n,   9*8  N.E.  95, 
211  Mass.  449. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Insur- 
ance Service  Co.  v.  (Finegan,  165 
P.2d  620,  621. 

34  C.J.  p  132  note  L 

Consent  held  not  shown 

Cal. — Stow  v.  Superior  Court  of  Cal- 
ifornia in  and  for  Alameda  Coun- 
ty, 172  P.  598,  178  Cal.  140. 

111.— 'Friend  v.  Borrenpohl,  161  N.E. 
110,  329  111.  528. 

Iowa. — Independent  School  Disk  of 
Manning,  Carroll  County,  v.  Miller, 
178  N.W.  323,  189  "lowa  123. 

Md.— Baltimore  High  Grade  Brick 
Co.  v.  Amos,  62  -A.  582,  95«Md.  571, 
rehearing  denied  5*3  A.  148,  95  Md. 
571. 

4.  N.Y. — Post    Institute    v.    -Lander 
Co.,    295   N.Y.6.   740,    251  App.flDir. 
23. 

Tex. — Wyss  v.   Bookman,   ConouApp., 

235  S.W.  567. 
Omission  of  details 

In  stockholder's  action  for  appoint- 
ment of  a  receiver  and  other  relief, 
trial  court  was  not  authorized  to  en- 
ter judgment  by  consent  on  stipula- 
tion providing  that  settlement  had 
been  reached  in  general  terms  where- 
by stockholder  should  deliver  all  his 
stock  and  receive  six  thousand  dol- 
lars, but  that  details  of  settlement 
had  not  been  agreed  on  and  would  be 
worked  out  later. — Insurance  Service 
Co.  v.  Finegan,  OkL.  165  P.2d  620. 
Stipulated  facts  held  insufficient  to 

support  Judgment 
SJ>.— Fergen  v.  Lonie,  2fI3  N.W.  720, 

51  S.D.  515. 

5.  N.C. — -"Williamson  v.  Williamson, 
31  SJSL2d  <3'67,.  224  N.C.  4-74. 


XTonperfoxmaaioe  of  condition 

Where  it  was  undisputed  that  no 
compliance  was  ever  made  with  con- 
ditions precedent  to  signing  of  con- 
sent judgment  in  action  for  foreclo 
sure  of  a  tax  lien,  superior  court 
clerk  properly  refused  to  sign  the 
purported  consent  Judgment — Wil- 
liamson T.  Williamson,  supra. 

0.     Cal.— Merrill  v.  Bachelder,  5ft  P. 

61'8,  123  Cal.  674. 
R.I.-T Everett  v.  Cutler  Mills,  160  A. 

924,  52  R.X  330. 
Determination  from  record 

Whether  decree  was  entered  by 
consent  is  determined  from  face  of 
record. — Shinn  v.  Shinn,  142  S.B.  63, 
105  W.Va.  246. 

Particular  stipulations  construed 
Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Mason  v.  Schmoll, 

App.,  «7  S.W.2d  972. 
Vt— <St  Pierre  v.  Beauregard,  152  A. 

914,  103  Vt  2S8. 

7.    N.  J. — Young  T.  Young,  17  N.J.Eq. 
1*1. 

a    Iowa. — Thorn  v.   Hambleton,  128 
N.W.  39-3,  149  Iowa  214. 
C.J.  p  1&2  note  5. 

9.  Conn. — Goodri-ch  v.  Alfred,  43  A. 
1041,  72  Conn.  257. 

Consent  shown 

Wash.-iSeely    v.    Gilbert,    134    P.2d 
710,  16  Wash.2d  611. 

10.  CaL — Jackson  nr.   Brown,   23   P. 
142,      82      QaL      275— Morrow      v. 
Learned,   245   P.   442,    76   Cal.App. 
538. 

11*    N.Y.— Phelan  v.  New  York  Cent. 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.Y.S.  35, 

12.    N.Y. — Jacobs  v.  Steinbrink,  273 
N.Y.S.  49-8,  242  App.Div.  197.  ] 

312 


Withdrawal  after  judgment  see  in- 
fra §  178. 
Refusal  to  sign  Judgment 

Superior  court  clerk  properly  re- 
fused to  sign  purported  consent 
judgment  in  action  for  foreclosure 
of  tax  lien,  where  defendant's  con- 
sent thereto  had  been  withdrawn  at 
time  clerk  was  called  on  to  sign  the 
purported  consent  Judgment.— Wil- 
liamson v.  Williamson,  31  S.'B.2d  U7, 
224  N,C.  474. 
13.  Iowa. — Garretson  v.  Altomari, 

181  N.W.  400,  190  Iowa  1194. 
14-    N.Y. — Jacobs  v.   Steinfcrink,   27& 
N.Y.S.  498,   242  App.Div.   197. 

15.  Cal.— Charles   <F.   Harper   Co.  v. 
De  Witt   Mortgage   &  Realty  Co.,. 
75  P.2d  65.  10  Cal.2d  4'67. 

16.  R.I.— Everett    v.    Cutler    Mills,. 
160  A.  924,  52  R.I.  330. 

It  is  a  Judicial  function  and  an  ex- 
ercise of  judicial  power  to  render  a 
judgment  on  consent — Pope  v.  U.  S., 
65  S.CX  16,  323  U.S.  1,  «9  L.Bd.  «. 
Stipulation  as  evidence 

'Stipulation  of  parties  for  judgment 
was  merely  evidence  to  be  considered' 
by  court  in  making  its  decision 
whether  it  has  authority  to  order- 
entry  of  judgment. — -Everett  v.  Cut- 
ler Mills,  160  A.  924,  52  R.L  330. 

17.  Tex, — .State   v.    Reagan    County- 
Purchasing    Co.,    CI'V.App.,    186    «S.. 
W.2d  128,  error  refused. 

ia    Tenn. — Edwards  v.  Turner,  Qh.. 

A.,  47  S.W.  144. 
In  cause  pending  before  referee     • 

Under  statute  it  has  been  held  that, 
superior  court  clerk  may  enter  con- 
sent Judgment  in  cause  pending  be- 
fore referee. — 'Weaver  v.  Hampton*. 
167  S.E.  4*84,  204  IH.C.  42. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§177 


less  the  case  is  one  in  which  defendant  has  the 
right  to  be  heard  as  to  the  nature  or  terms  of  the 
judgment  to  be  entered.19  In  the  absence  of  knowl- 
edge of  an  assignment  affecting  the  rights  of  third 
persons,  the  court  has  the  right  to  journalize  a  set- 
tlement entry,20  and  sureties  on  an  undertaking  on 
appeal  are  not  entitled  to  notice  of  entry  of  a  judg- 
ment against  them  to  which  they  have  in  legal  con* 
templation  consented.21  On  the  other  hand,  sureties 
•  on  a  replevin  bond  of  plaintiff,  seizing  certain  prop- 
erty, have  been  held  not  bound  by  a  judgment  fof 
debt  entered  in  defendant's  favor  on  stipulation  of 
the  parties  without  notice  to  the  sureties.22 

Place  and  time  of  entry.  A  judgment  by  consent 
must  be  entered  in  the  proper  book  or  record,28  and 
within  the  time,  if  any,  specified  by  statute,24  but 
not  before  commencement  of  the  term  at  which  the 
cause  is  returnable.25  Where  the  entry  of  judg- 
ment by  agreement  depends  on  the  rendition  of  a 
final  judgment  in  another  action,  it  cannot  be  en- 
tered pending  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  in  such  oth- 
er action.26  Within  such  limitations  it  may  be  stat- 
ed generally  that  a  judgment  by  consent  may  be 


entered  at  the  time  specified  in  the  stipulation  or 
agreement,2?  and  at  any  stage  of  the  proceedings, 
as  before  the  expiration  of  defendant's  time  for 
pleading;28  and,  with  defendant's  consent,  judg- 
ment may  be  entered  at  the  term  in  which  he  en- 
ters his  appearance.29  If  the  agreement  so  pro- 
vides, the  judgment  may  be  entered  immediately  on 
the  happening  of  a  contingency.80  While  a  judg- 
ment by  consent  may  in  a  proper  case  be  entered 
nunc  pro  tune,81  it  may  not  be  so  entered  where  no 
authority  existed  to  enter  it  in  the  first  instance.32 

§  177.    Form  and  Sufficiency  of  Judg- 
ment 

Ordinarily  a  judgment  by  consent  should  show  the 
consent  on  its  face,  and  should  conform  to  the  terms 
agreed  on  by  the  parties.;  but  such  judgment  will  not 
be  regarded  as  void  on  its  face  unless  It  shows  lack  of 
jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  render  It. 

In  addition  to  the  general  features  common  to 
all  judgments,38  a  consent  judgment  „  ordinarily 
should  recite  or  show  on  its  face  that  it  is  entered 
by  the  agreement  or  consent  of  the  parties;34  but 
such  a  showing  is  not  indispensable  and  the  agree- 


19.  Mo. — Schaeffer  v.   Slegel,   7  Mo. 
A-pp.  542.  ! 

34  C.J.  plS*  note  17. 

20.  Ohio. — Dickinson   v.   Hot   Mixed 
Bituminous      Industry      of     Ohio, 
App.,  58  N.E.2d  78. 

21.  Mont— Waldrop  v.  Maser,  30  P. 
2d  S3,  9*6  Mont.  242. 

22.  Miss. — Home  v.  Moorehead,  152 
So.   49*5,   169   Miss.   362,  suggestion 
of  error  overruled  193  So.  66*8,  1'69 
Miss.  362. 

23.  CaL— Old    Settlers'    Inv.    Co.    v. 
White,   110  P.  922,  158  CaL  236. 

34  C.J.  p  1«32  note  14. 

24.  Ga. — Wright  v.  Broom,  158  S.B. 
443,  43  Ga.App.  269. 

Bntry  in  vacation 

•Consent  decree  entered  in  vacation 
without  order  in  term  authorizing 
decree  and  without  entry  at  time  and 
place  fixed  by  statute  held  inopera- 
tive as  judgment. — Wright  v.  Broom, 
supra. 
Any  time 

Under  express  statutory  authoriza- 
tion the  cleric  may  enter  a  'judgment 
by    consent    at   any    time. — Keen   v. 
Parker,   8   S.E.2d  209,  217  N.C.  "378. 
Entry  on  Monday  not  necessary 

Consent  judgment  need  not  be  en- 
tered on  Monday,  as  in  case  of  oth- 
er judgments  entered  by  clerk  of 
superior  court. — Hood  ex  rel.  Peo- 
ple's Bank  of  Burnsville  v.  Wilson, 
170  S.E.  425,  208  N.C.  120. 
2Sl  Ga. — Bedenbaugh  v.  Burgin,  28 

S.E.2d  652,  197  Ga.  175. 
26.     CaL— Gillmore        v.       American 

Cent.  Ins.  Co.,  2  P.  382,  65  CaL  63. 


87.    N.Y.— Osborn  v.  Rogers,  20  N.R 

365,  112  N.T.  573. 
Xa  vacation 

(1)  Parties  have  right  to  agree  on 
and   have   court   enter   judgment   in 
vacation.— Hurst  v.  Gulf  States  Cre- 
osoting  Co.,    141  So.   346,   1*3   Miss. 
512. 

(2)  Where  attorneys  of  parties  ap- 
peared in  vacation  before  judge  and 
agreed  to  judgment  judgment  signed 
by  Judge,  approved  by  attorneys,  and 
properly  entered,  held  binding,  in  ab- 
sence of  fraud. — Hurst  v.  Gulf  States 
Creosoting  Co.,  supra.     . 

2&  N.J.— Beebe  v.  George  H.  Beet>e 
Co.,  46  A.  168,  '64  N.J.Law  497— 
Hoguet  v.  Wallace,  23  N.J.!Law 
523. 

29.  I1L— Moore  v.   Gilmer,  187  NJBL 
466,  353  m.  420. 

30.  N.Y.-JOsborn  v.  Rogers,  20  N.B. 
365,  112  N.T.  573. 

SU    Tex.— ^Commercial  Credit  Co.  v. 
Ramsey,  Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d  191, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct. 
Failure  to  enter  on  rendition. 

Where  trial  court  rendered  Judg- 
ment, in  accordance  with  an  agree- 
ment made  by  counsel  representing 
parties  to  litigation,  but  judgment 
was  never  entered,  it  was  duty  of 
trial  court  to  enter  Judgment  in  ac- 
cordance with  agreement  nunc  pro 
tune. — Commercial  Credit  Co.  v. 
Ramsey,  supra. 

32.  N.C.— Williamson  v.  Williamson, 
•31   SJS3.2d  367,  224  N.C.   474. 

33.  Description  of  property 

A  consent  decree  involving  title  to 

313 


realty  was  not  void  for  want  of  de- 
scription or  for  want  of  any  words 
to  furnish  a  key  to  any  description 
of  land  where  pleadings  on  which 
consent  decree  was  based  gave  a 
complete  description  of  the  proper- 
ty.—Bentley  v.  Still,  32  S.E.2d  814, 
198  Ga.  743. 

34.    I1L— Bergman  v.  Rhodes,  165  N. 

R   598,   334  I1L  137,  65  A.L..R.   344 

— Consaer  v.   Wisniewski,    13  N.-E. 

2d  93,  293  IlLApp.  529. 
Term. — East  Lake   Lumber   Box   Co. 

v.  Simpson,  5  TenruApp.  51. 
34  C.J.  p  13'3  note  24. 
Indorsement  by  attorney 

(1)  Indorsement    by    counsel    for 
losing  party  of  approval  of  proposed 
decree  did  not  make  decree  a  con- 
sent decree,  but,  under  circumstanc- 
es,  was   only   recognition   that    pro- 
posed decree  was  legally  formulated, 
and  that  it  contained   in  substance 
decision    as    orally    announced    by 
court. 

Mich.— 4S3rn  V.  loor,  253  N.W.  318, 
266  Mich.  335. 

Tex. — State  v.  Reagan  CJounty  Pur- 
chasing Co.,  Civ. App.,  186  S.W.2d 
128,  error  refused. 

Wash.— Harter  v.  King  County,  119 
P.2d  919,  11  Washed  583. 

W.Va. — Bank  of  Gauley  v.  Osenton, 
114  S.B.  435,  92  W.Va.  1. 

(2)  Where    resolution    of    county 
board  of  education  selecting  school 
site  authorized  judgment  in  pending 
litigation  with  county  commissioners 
on  approval  of  resolution  by  latter, 
such  judgment,  by  operation  of  law, 
became    consent    judgment    without 


§  178 


JUDGMENTS 


-49    C.J.S. 


ment  may  be  shown  by  any  other  evidence  consist- 
ent with  the  record,35  and  a  consent  judgment  has 
been  held  not  void  on  its  face  unless  it  shows  a 
want  of  jurisdiction.36  A  recital  that  evidence  was 
heard  is  unnecessary  since  the  consent  obviates  the 
necessity  of  hearing  any  evidence,37  as  is  discussed 
supra  §  174.  The  judgment  entered  must  conform 
to  the  terms  agreed  on  by  the  parties,38  and  the 
court  has  no  power  to  add  conditions  or  provisions 
on  which  the  parties  have  not  agreed.39  Thus  the 
amount  of  the  judgment  must  be  that  fixed  by  the 
agreement  of  the  parties;40  if  it  is  entered  for 
more,  it  may  be  set  aside  as  to  the  excess.41  If 
there  are  several  defendants  and  all  consent,  judg- 


ment must  be  entered  against  all  of  them.42  The 
mere  fact  that  a  document  is  signed  by  defendant, 
consenting  to  entry  of  judgment  against  him,  is  not 
of  itself  a  judgment.43 


§  178. 


Construction,  Operation,  and  Ef- 


fect 


A  judgment  by  consent  ordinarily  has  the  force  and 
effect  of  a  contract  and  Is  so  construed,  although  it  also 
partakes  of  the  nature  of  a  Judgment  and  will  be  up- 
held and  enforced  as  such.  Consent  to  the  Judgment 
waives  all  nonjurisdictional  defects. 

Since  a  judgment  by  consent  is  regarded  as  a 
contract  between  the  parties,44  it  must  be  construed 
the  same  as  any  other  contract45  Its  operation  and 


signatures  of  counsel. — Board  of  Ed- 
ucation of  Sampson  County  v.  Board 
of  Com'rs  of  Sampson  County,  134 
S.E.  852,  192  N.C.  274. 

03)  Other  indorsements  see  34  C. 
J.  p  133  note  24  [b]. 

35.  111. — Bergman  v.  Rhodes,  165  IN". 
B.  598,  334  111.  137,  65  A.L.R.  344— 
Armstrong  v.  Cooper,  11  111.  540 — 
Sundberg   v.    Matteson,    29    N.E.2d 
853,    -307    IlLApp.    239 — Consaer   v. 
Wisniewski,   1-3  N.E.2d   93,  293   111. 
A-pp.  529. 

Sureties'  consent 

(1)  By  agreement  in  replevin  suit 
absolute    money    judgment    may   be 
rendered  against  defendant  and  sure- 
ties on  bond,  and  sureties'  consent  to 
judgment  need  not  affirmatively  afe- 
pear    from    the    judgment — Pederal 
Credit   Co.    v.    Rogers,   148    So.   '353, 
166  Miss.  559. 

(2)  Judgment  in  replevin  rendered 
"by  consent  of  plaintiff  and  defend- 
ants in  this  case,"  providing  for  re- 
covery by  plaintiff  from  "defendants 
and"  named  persons,  "sureties  upon 
the  replevin  bond,"  held  not  void  on 
its  face,  as  against  contention  that 
sureties'  consent  to  judgment  is  not 
shown. — Starling  v.    Sorrell,    100   So. 
10,  134  Miss.  782. 

36.  Miss. — Starling  v.  Sorrell,  supra. 
Waiver    of   alternative    provision,  in 

replevin  Judgment 
Miss. — Starling  v.   Sorrell,  supra. 

37.  Tex. — Day  v.   Johnson,  72  S.W. 
426,    32   Tex.Civ.App.    107. 

38.  Cal. — Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  City 
of  (Santa  Cruz,  14-5  P.  73-6,  26  Cal. 
App.  26. 

Iowa, — Corpus    Juris    cited    in    Van 

Alstine  v.  Hartnett,  222  N.W.   363, 

(364,  207  Iowa  236. 
Mo. — Early  v.   Smallwood,    256  S.W. 

105*3,  302  Mo.  92. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris   quoted  in  Posey 

v.  Abraham,   25   P.2d  287,  289,   165 
.    OkL  140. 
Or.— Holmboe     v.     Morgan,     13'8     P. 

1084,  <69  Or.  395. 


Tex— Edwards  v.  Gilford,  155  S.W.2d 

786,  137  Tex.  559. 
34  C.J.  p  1S3  note  26. 

39.  Cal. — People's  Ditch  Co.  v.  Fres- 
no Canal  &  Irrigation  Co.,   92   P. 
77,  152  Cal.  87. 

N.Y. — Larscy  v.  T.  Hogan  &  Sons, 
146  KB.  430,  239  N.T.  298,  reargu- 
ment  denied  148  N.E.  713,  240  N. 
T.  580. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Posey 
v.  Abraham,  25  P.2d  2«87,  2'89,  165 
Okl.  140. 

34  C.J.  p  133  note  26. 

40.  Ark. — Planters'  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Crockett   170   S.W.   1012,  115  Ark. 
606 — Home  Fire   Ins.  Co.  v.   Stan- 
cell,   127  -S.W.    966,   94  Ark.   578. 

Ky. — Continental  Realty  Co.  v.  Mow- 
bray  &  Robinson  Co.,  218  S.W.  726, 
187  Ky.  98. 

N.Y,— Westcott  Chuck  Co.  v.  Oneida 
Nat.  Chuck  Co.,  92  N.E.  639,  199 
5NT.T.  247,  1;39  Am.StR.  907,  20  Ann. 
Cas.  853. 

Or. — Riner  v.  Southwestern  Surety 
Ins.  Co.,  16-6  P.  952,  85  Or.  293. 

•34  C.J.  p  133  note  27. 

Interest 

In  suit  on  contract  where  parties 
agreed  to  judgment  for  certain 
amount,  without  mention  of  interest, 
the  court  properly  refused  to  add  in- 
terest to  the  judgment. — Vaughan  v. 
Brown,  40  <S.W.2d  996,  184  Ark.  185. 
Basic  of  computation 

A  stipulation  in  an  action  on  a 
guaranty  was  held  to  furnish  the  ba- 
sis by  mere  computation  of  deter- 
mining the  amount  of  the  judgment 
— Avery  v.  Moore,  124  P.  173,  87  Kan. 
337. 
Judgment  on  rever*al 

Where,  on  the  trial  of  an  action 
for  an  accounting,  a  stipulation  was 
I  entered  fixing  the  amount  of  recov- 
ery to  which  the  plaintiffs  would  be 
entitled  in  the  event  of  a  recovery 
but  did  not  clearly  confer  power  on 
the  court  of  appeal  to  grant 
judgment  it  could  not  enter  such 
judgment  on  a  reversal. — Barney  v. 
Hoyt,  135  N.T.S.  126,  150  App.Div. 

314 


991,  affirmed  103  N.E.  1120,  210  N.T. 
542. 

41.  Ark.— Wood  v.  Stewart,  98  S.W. 
711,  81  Ark.  41. 

42.  Mont. — Helena       Second       Nat. 
Bank  v.   Kleinschmidt,   14   P.    667r 
7  Mont.  146. 

43.  Cal.-— Old    Settlers'    Inv.    Co.    v. 
White,   110  P.  922,   158   Cal.  236. 

44.  U.S.— Butler     v.     Denton,     D.C. 
Okl.,  57  'F.Supp.  -656,  affirmed,  C.C. 
A.,  150  P.2d  68*7. 

Cal. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ex  iparte 
Perrigno,  71  P.2d  -329,  3'30,  22  Cal. 
App.2d  472. 

111. — City  of  Kankakee  v.  -Lang,  54 
N.B.2d  605,  323  IlLApp.  14. 

N.C. — Coburn  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Swain  County,  131  S.E.  372,  191  N. 
C.  68. 

Okl.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in,  Insur- 
ance Service  Co.  v.  Pinegan,  165 
P.2d  620,  621,  622— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  Grayson  v.  Pure  Oil  Co., 
118  P.2d  '644,  64'8,  1'89  Okl.  550— 
Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  Ward  v. 
Coleman,  39  P.2d  113,  116,  170  Okl. 
201. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juriji  cited  in  Reagan 
County  Purchasing  Co.  v.  State, 
Civ.App.,  65  S.W.2d  -353,  «356— Dial 
v.  Martin,  Civ.App.,  37  S.W.2d  1&6, 
reversed  on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  '57  S.W.2d  75,  89  A.L..R.  571— 
Scaling  v.  Williams,  Civ.App.,  28-4 
S.W.  '310. 

Definition  and  nature  of  consent 
judgment  generally  see  supra  S 
173. 

Same  effect  as  contract 

Tex. — Pendery  v.  Panhandle  Refining 
Co.,  Civ.Auip.,  169  S.W.2d  766,  er- 
ror refused. 

Contract  of  highest  character 

Va. — Barnes  v.  American  (Fertilizer 
Co.,  130  S.OBJ.  902,  144  Va.  $92. 

45.  Cal. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ex 
parte  'Perrigno,    71   P.2d  529,    330, 
22  Cal.App.2d  472. 

N.C. — Carpenter  v.  Carpenter,  195  -S. 
B.  5,  213  N.C.  «36— Cox  v.  Albe- 
marle  -Drainage  Dist.,  141  S.'E.  885, 
195  N.C.  264— J.  S.  Schofield's  Sons 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  178 


effect  must  be  gathered  from  the  terms  used  in  the 
agreement,46  and  it  should  not  be  extended  beyond 
the  clear  import  of  such  terms  ;47  nor  can  it  be  sup- 
plemented by  agreements  which  are  not  a  part  of 
it48  unless  attacked  for  fraud  or  mistake.49 


As  a  jndgtnent.  As  a  consent  judgment  has  the 
sanction  of  the  court,  and  is  entered  as  its  determi- 
nation of  the  controversy,  it  generally  has  the  same 
force  and  effect  as  any  other  judgment,50  although 
in  some  respects  it  may  be  given  greater  force  than 


Co.  v.  Bacon,  131  S.E.  659,  191  N.  j 
c.  253 — First  Nat.  Bank  v.  -Mitch- 
ell, 131  S.E.  656,  191  N.C.  190— 
Southern  Distributing  Co.  v.  Car- 
raway,  127  S.B.  427,  189  N.C.  420. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Insur- 
ance Service  -Co.  v.  Finegan,  165 
P.2d  620,  622— Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Grayson  v.  Pure  Oil  Co.,  118  P. 
2d  644,  648,  189  Okl.  550— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Ward  v.  Coleman, 
39  P.2d  113,  116,  170  Okl.  201. 

Tex. — Edwards  v.  Gifford,  155  S.W. 
2d  786,  137  Tex.  559— Turman  v. 
Turman,  64  S.W.2d  137,  123  Tex.  1 
— Tyner  v.  City  of  Port  Arthur, 
280  S.W.  523,  115  Tex.  i310— Beh- 
rens  v.  Behrens,  Civ.App.,  1&6  S. 
W.2d  697 — Mauldin  v.  American 
Liberty  Pipe  Line  Co.,  Civ.App., 
1S'5  S.W.2d  158,  refused  for  want 
of  merit. — Aaron  v.  Aaron,  Civ. 
App.,  173  S.W.2d  -310,  error  refused 
— Pendery  v.  Panhandle  Refining 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  169  S.W.2d  766,  er- 
ror refused — Beam  v.  Southwest- 
ern Bell  tel.  Co.,  Civ.Aipp.,  164  S. 
W.2d  412,  error  refused — Richey 
v.  Shell  Petroleum  Corporation, 
Ci-v.App.,  128  S.W.2d  898,  error 
dismissed,  judgment  correct — At- 
lantic Refining  Co.  v.  Buckley,  Civ. 
App.,  '123  S.W.2d  413.  error  dis- 
missed— Korn  v.  Johnson,  Civ. 
App.,  117  -S.W.2d  "844,  error  refused 
— Empire  Gas  &  Fuel  CJo.  v.  Rail- 
road Commission  of  Texas,  Civ. 
App.,  94  S.W.2d  1240,  error  refused 
—Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Tex- 
as  v.  State,  Civ.App.,  275  S.W.  673, 
certforari  granted  46  S.Ct  483 
271  U.S.  653,  70  L.-Ed.  1134,  cer- 
tiorari  vacated  Missouri-Kansas- 
Texas  R.  Co.  v.  State  of  Texas,  48 
S.Ct  82,  275  U.S.  494,  72  L.Ed.  391 
— Prince  v.  gprost-Johnson  Odumlber 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  250  S.W.  785. 

54  C.J.  p  133  note  32. 

Construction,  as  a  whole 

Xj.-s. — Swift  &  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  APP.D.C. 

48  S.Ct  311,  276  'U.S.  311,  72  L.Ed. 

5'8-7. 

Particular  judgments  construed 
Cal. — Cordes  v.  Harding,  169  P.  256 

35  Cal.App.  41. 
D.C.— Bliss  V.  Bliss,  70  -F.2d  924,  63 

APP.D.C.  197. 
Iowa._Van  Alstine  v.  Hartnett, 

N.W.  363,  207  Iowa  236. 
Ky.— Banco-Kentucky  Co.'s   Receive 

v.    National    Bank   of   Kentucky' 

Receiver,   137  S.W.2d  357,   281  Ky 

784— Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.    v 

King,  288  S.W;.  73>3,  216  Ky.  736. 
j^a. — Jackson   v.    Jackson,   App.,    16 

So.  175. 
Mo.— Fellhauer  v.  Norris,  58  S.W.2 


287,  332  Mo.  322— Zeitinger  v.  Har- 
gadine-McKittrick  Dry  Goods  Co.. 
250  S.W.  913,  29S  Mo.  461. 

S".C.— Miller  v.  Teer,  18  S.E.2d  173 
220  N.C.  605— Webster  v.  Wehster, 
195  S.E.  362,  213  N.C.  135— Homer 
v.  -Southern  Ry.  Co.,  114  S.E.  296, 
1-84  N.C.  270. 

.D. — Warner  v.  Intlehouse,  2-35  N. 
W.  638,  60  N.D.  542. 

Ohio.— Whitmore  v.  Stern,  T58  N.E. 
203,  25  Ohio  App.  344. 

Tenn.— Barretsvllle  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Bolton,  187  S.W.2d  306,  182 
Tenn.  -364. 

Tex.— -Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v. 
Caswell,  Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  597, 
rehearing  denied  7  <S.W.2d  '867,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Caswell  v.  Magnolia 
Petroleum  Co.,  49  S.Ct.  34,  278  U. 
S.  640,  73  L.Ed.  555— State  v.  Rea- 
gan County  Purchasing  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  186  S.W.2d  128,  error  refused 
— Pendery  v.  Panhandle  Refining 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  169  S.W.2d  766,  er- 
ror refused — Korn  v.  Johnson,  Civ. 
Aptp.,  141  -S.W.2d  1015,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Prince 
Y.  Frost-Johnson  Lumber  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  250  S.W.  785. 

Wash.-^Connor  v.  City  of  Seattle,  144 
P.  52,  82  Wash.  296. 

J.  US.— Butler  v.  Denton,  D.COkl., 
57  F.Supp.  656,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  ISO 
«F.2d  687. 

Ga. — corpus  Juris  cited  in  Estes  v 
Estes,  14  S.R2d  681,  6*83,  192  Ga. 
94. 

Mo.— Fellhauer  v.  Norris,  58  S.W.2d 
2*7,  3*32  Mo.  322. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Insur- 
ance Service  Co.  v.  (Finegan,  161 
P.2d  620,  622— Corpus  Juris  quoted 
In  Ward  v.  Coleman,  '39  P.2d  113 
116,  170  Okl.  201. 

84  C.J.  P  13-3  note  88. 

Merger  of  prior  negotiation* 
y._Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  T.  King 
288  S.W.  733,  216  Ky.   7-36. 

47.    U.S.— Butler    v.     <Denton,     D.C. 

Okl.,  57  F.Supp.  656,  affirmed,  C.C 

A.,  150  F.2d  687. 
CaL— Palace   Hotel   Qo.   v.  Crist   4 

P.2d  415,  6  CaLApp.2d  690. 
Miss.— <£toner  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.  o 

Indiana,  111  So.  584,  146  Miss.  600 
N.C.— First   Nat    Bank   v.    Mitchel 

181  S.-B.  656,  191  N.C.  190. 
Okl.— Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  Insur 

ance  Service  Co.  v.  (Finegan,  165  P 

2d  620,  622 — Grayson  v.  Pure  O' 

Co.,  118  P.2d  644,  189  Okl.  550. 
Tex.— Edwards  v.  Gifford,  155  S.W.2 

786,   137  Tex.   559 — Kom  v.   John 

son,  Civ,App.,  117   S.W.2d  S44r  er 

ror  refused. 

315 


Vt — Ex  parte  Thompson,  9  A.2d  107, 

111  Vt.  7. 

Wash. — Gregg  v.  Beezer,  252  P.  692, 
142  Wash.  142. 
4  C.J.  ip  133  note  34. 

Ky.— Cord  v.  Hendrick,  6  Ky.L. 
365. 

>kL — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Insur- 
ance Service  Co.  v.  Finegan,  165  P. 
2d  620,  622. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  dt«d  in  Peter- 
man  v.  Peterman,  Civ. App.,  55  S. 
W.2d  1108,  1110. 

49.  Ky.— Cord  v.  Hendrick,   6   Ky.L. 
365. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Insur- 
ance Service  Co.  v.  Finegan,  165 
P.2d  620,  622. 

50.  U.S. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Woods   Bros.   Const  Co.   v.   Tank- 
ton  County,  C.C.AJS.D.,  54  !F.2d  -304, 
308,  81  A.L.R.  300— Utah  Power  & 
Light  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  CtCl.,  42  F.2d 
304— 'Fidelity  &  Columbia  Trust  Co. 
v.  Glenn,  D.C.Ky.,  39  F.Supp.  822. 
iz.— Wall    v.     Superior    Court    of 
Tavapai   County,    89    P.2d   624,    53 
Ariz.  344. 

Cal. — Guaranty  Liquidating  Corpora- 
tion v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Los  An- 
geles County,  71  P.2d  931,  22  Cal. 
App.2d  684 — Rogers  v.  Springfield 
Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  238  P.  679, 
92  CaLApp.  537. 

Ga.— Burch  v.  Dodge  County,  20  S.E. 
2d  428,  193  Ga.  890. 
y.— Kentucky  Utilities  Co.  v.  Steen- 
man,  141  S.W.2d  265,  28*3  Ky.  -317. 
La, — Corpus  Juris  q.uotea  in  Sonnier 

v.  Sonnier,  App.,  140  So.  49,  50. 
Mont — Thrasher  v.  Mannix  &  Wil- 
son, 26  P.2d  370,  95  Mont  273. 
N.T. — People  ex  pel.  Norwich  Phann- 
acal  Co.  v.  Porter,  239  N.Y.S.  28, 
228  App.Biv.  54— Evans  v.  'Stein, 
59  N.T.S.2d  544,  second  case,  af- 
firmed, 59  N.T.S.2d  625,  second 
case,  269  App.Biv.  1052,  appeal  de- 
nied 60  N.Y:S.2d  288,  270  App.Div. 
810. 

.C. — Edmundson  v.  Edmundson,  22 
S.E.2d  576,  222  N.C.  181 — Cason  v. 
Shute,  189  S.E.  494,  211  N.C.  195— 
Walker  v.  Walker,  117  -S.H.  167, 
185  N.C.  3*0. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  qpoted  in-  Ward 
v.  Coleman,  '39  P.2d  118,  116,  170 
Okl.  201. 

Tex. — Beam    v.     Southwestern     Bell 
Tel.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  164  S.W.2d  412, 
error  refused— Corpus  Juris  quot- 
ed in  Peterman  v.  Peterman,  Civ. 
App.,  55  S.W.2d  1108,  1110. 
34  C.J,  p  133  note  «37. 
Decretal  aspects 

An  agreed  judgment  in  so  far  as 
purely    decretal    aspects    are    con- 


§  178 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


an  ordinary  judgment,81  and  in  other  respects  it 
may  be  accorded  less  force.52  Although  the  judg- 
ment is  in  the  nature  of  a  contract  between  the  par- 
ties, the  court  retains  power  to  see  that  its  provi- 
sions are  duly  carried  out58  In  the  absence  of 
fraud  or  mistake  a  consent  judgment  is  valid  and 
binding,  as  such,  as  between  the  parties  thereto  and 
their  privies.54  The  judgment  is  not  invalidated 
by  a  subsequent  failure  to  perform  a  condition  on 
which  the  consent  was  based,55  or  by  the  fact  that 
it  obligates  the  parties  to  do  that  which  they  could 
not  make  a  valid  contract  to  do;56  and  unless  it  is 
vacated  or  set  aside  in  the  manner  provided  for  by 


law57  it  stands  as  a  final  disposition  of  the  rights 
of  the  parties  thereto.58 

In  the  absence  of  fraud,  after  the  agreement  has 
been  made  and  a  judgment  entered  thereon,  the  con- 
sent of  one  of  the  parties  cannot  be  withdrawn,59 
and  he  is  not  entitled  to  a  jury  trial  to  fix  the 
amount  of  damages.^  A  consent  judgment  may 
be  inquired  into  and  held  void  for  fraud  practiced 
on  one  of  the  parties61  or  against  other  creditors  of 
defendant;62  and  is  not  valid  unless  entered  in  a 
court  which  might  lawfully  have  rendered  the  same 
judgment  in  a  contested  case.6*  Where  several  de- 
fendants are  brought  into  court,  a  judgment  by 


cerned,  has  the  same  effect  as  though 
rendered  by  court  after  trial  .of  is- 
sues, "decretal"  meaning  granting  or 
denying  of  remedy  sought. — State  v. 
Reagan  County  Purchasing  Co.,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  186  S.W.2d  128,  error  re- 
fused. 

51.  Neb.— McArthur    v.     Thompson, 
299  N.W.  <519,   140   Nefb.   408,   139 
A.L.R.  41*. 

Pa,— Commonwealth     v.      Highland, 

Mun.,  28  West.Co.L.J.  45. 
Consent  Judgment  as  not  ajppealable 

see  Appeal  and  Error  §  213. 

52.  Pa.— Platt  v.  Wagner,   81  A.2d 
499,  347  Pa.  27. 

Reciprocity  not  established 

Reciprocity  did  not  exist  between 
two  states  on  ground  that  entry  of 
judgment  of  the  supreme  court  in 
certain  case  constituted  a  decision 
that  reciprocity  had  been  established, 
where  judgment  in  that  case  was 
merely  a  consent  judgment— ^Platt  v. 
Wagner,  31  A.2d  499,  '347  Pa.  27. 

53<    &C.— Porter   v.    J.    H.    Hydrick 
Realty  Co.,  131  S.B.  768,   134  S.C 
34. 
Failure  to  Issue  writ  of  possession 

Where  by  a  consent  decree  the  ti- 
tle to  the  timber  was  severed  from 
the  estate  in  land,  the  case  not  be- 
ing such  as  required  an  execution  of 
writ  of  possession  under  the  stat 
utes,  the  failure  to  cause  a  writ  p: 
possession  to  be  issued  within  on. 
year  did  not  render  the  judgmen 
dormant,  and  hence  not  .effective  to 
convey  title  to  the  timber.— Prince  r 
Frost-Johnson  Lumber  Cjo.»  TexXJiv 
App.,  250  -S.W.  785. 

54.    U.S.— Hot  -Springs   Coal   Co.    v 
Miller,  C.C.A.Wyo.,  Iff7  !F.2d  -677— 
*        Commissioner    of    Internal   Reve 
nue   v.   Blair,   C.C.A.,   83  F.2d  -65S 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Blair  v 
Commissioner    of    Internal    Reve- 
nue, 57  S.Ct  33,  57  -S.Ct.  330,  -300  U 
S.   5,    81  ;L.Ed.   465— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Woods  Bros.  Const  Co 
v.  Yankton  County,  C.C.A.SJD.,   5 
F.2d  304, 18 08— Utah  Power  &  Ligh 
Co.  v.  tT.  S-  Ct.CL,  42  QB\2d  30' 


IT.  S.  v.  Radio  Corporation  of| 
America,  D.C.DeL,  46  F.Supp.  654, 
appeal  dismissed  63  'S.Ct.  851,  318 
U.S.  796,  87  L.Ed.  1161— Steingrub- 
er  v.  Johnson,  D.C.Tenn.,  35  E\ 
Suptp.  662. 

Dl.— Riggs  v.  Barrett,  «2  N.B.2d  382, 
308  IlLApp.  549— Riggs  v.  Barrett, 
32  {NVE.2d  392,  SOS  IlLApp.  671. 

La. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Sonnier 
v.  Sonnier,  App.,  140  So.  49,  50. 

Magg.-— .Byron  v.  Concord  Nat  Bank, 
13  N.B.2d  13,  299  Mass.  43$. 

Mich.— -Green  v.  Township  Board  of 
Leoni  Tp.,  194  N.W.  -972,  224  Mich. 
498. 

N.C.— Law  v.  Cleveland,  195  S.E.  809, 
213  N.C.  *89. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  Ward 
v.  Coleman,  39  P.2d  113,  116,  170 
Okl. '201. 

Tex. — Beam  v.  Southwestern  Bell 
Tel.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  164  S.W.2d  412, 
error  refused— Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Reagan  County  Purchasing  Co. 
v.  State,  Civ.App.,  65  S.W.2d  358, 
85S— <Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Peter- 
man  v.  Peterman,  Civ.App.,  55  S. 
W.2d  1108,  1110. 

Va.— Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Barnes  v, 
American  Fertilizer  Co.,  ISO  SJB. 
902,  911,  144  Va.  £92. 
34  C.J.  p  133  note  3*8. 

55.  U.S.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Woods  Bros.  Const  Co.  v.   Yank 
ton  County,  <?.C.A.S.D.,  54  F.2d  304 
308. 

OkL— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  War< 

v.  Coleman,  39  P.2d  H'3,  11*,  17 

Okl.  201. 
Tex.— nCorpus  Juris  quoted  in  Peter 

man  v.  Peterman,  Civ.App.,  55  <S 

W.2d  1108,  1110. 
34  C.J.  ip  1-34  note  39. 

56.  fa.S.^-Corpus    Juris    quoted    In 
Woods  Bros.  Const  Co.  v.  Tank 
ton    County,    C.CJLS.D.,    54    iF.2 
304,  308. 

Okl.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Wan 
v.  Coleman,  39  P.2d  113,  116,  17 
OkL  201. 

34  C.J.  P  134  note  40. 
Invalidity  of  the  contract  on  whic 

a   consent  judgment  is  based  mas 

316 


ender  the  judgment  erroneous,  but 
oes  not  make  it  void. 
Ky.— Lodge    v.    Williams,    24-3    S.W. 
1011,  195  Ky.  773. 

kl.— Ward  v.  Qoleman.  39  P.2d  113, 
170  OkL  201."" 

57.  U.S.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in  . 
Woods  Bros.  Const   Co.  v.  Yank- 
ton  County,  C.C.A.S.D.,  54  F.2d  304, 
308. 

La. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Sonnier 
v.  Sonnier,  App.,  140  So.  49,  50. 

OkL— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ward 
v.  Coleman,  39  P.2d  113,  116,  170 
Okl.  201. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Peter- 
man v.  Peterman,  Civ.App.,  55  S. 
W.2d  1108,  1110. 

58.  U.S. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Woods  Bros.  Const  Co.  v.  Tankton 
County,    Q.C.A.S.D.,    54    !F.2d    304, 

308— Utah*  Power  &  Light  Co.  v. 

U.  S.,  Cta.,  42  F.2d  304. 
Cal. — Rogers   v.   Springfield    Fire    & 

Marine  Ins.  Co.,  268  P.  679,  92  Cal. 

App.  5*7. 
OkL — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ward 

v.  Coleman,  39  P.2d  11*,   116,   170 

Okl.  201. 
Tex. — Beam    v.    Southwestern    Bell 

TeL  Co.,  Civ.App.,  164  S.W.2d  412, 

error  refused— Corpus  Juris  quoted 

in 'Peterman  v.  Peterman,  Civ.  App., 

55  S.W.2d  1108,  1110. 
34  C.  J.  p  134  note  42. 

59.  Tex.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 

Peterman  v.  Peterraan,  giv.App.,  55 
S.W.2d  1108,  1110. 

34  C.J.  p  134  note  43. 

Withdrawal  of  consent  prior  to  judg- 
ment see  supra  S  175. 

60.  Vt.— Manley  v.  Johnson,   81  A. 
919,  85  Vt  262. 

el.  Okl. — Cobb  v.  Killingsworth,  IS 7 
P.  477,  77  OkL  1'86. 

84  C.J.  p  134  note  47. 

(Fraud  as  ground  for  opening  or  va- 
cating see  infra  §  3*30. 

62.  Okl. — Cotrt>  v.  Killingsworth,  su- 
pra. 

63.  Ind. — De  Lange  v.  Cones,  19  N. 

850,  215  Ind.  355* 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§179 


agreement  as  to  one  only  is  a  dismissal  as  to  the 
others,64  and  separate  judgments  against  defend- 
ants who  are  jointly  and  severally  liable  limit  plain- 
tiffs daim  against  one  defendant  to  the  amount  of 
the  judgment  against  such  defendant85 

A  second  judgment  cannot  be  entered  on  an 
agreement  or  consent  of  the  parties  without  vacat- 
ing a  prior  judgment  which  has  been  entered  there- 
on.66 

As  waiver  of  defects  or  irregularities.  A  judg- 
ment by  consent  or  agreement  operates  as  a  waiver 
of  all  defects  or  irregularities  in  the  process,  plead- 
ings, or  other  proceedings  previous  to  the  rendition 
of  the  judgment,67  except  such  as  involve  the  ju- 
risdiction of  the  court.68  It  is  a  sufficient  waiver 
of  trial  by 


§  179.    Offer 

A  Judgment  entered  on  offer  and  acceptance  may 
be  a  judgment  by  consent,  or  a  Judgment  on  the  plead- 
ings if  the  offer  Is  contained  In  a  pleading. 

Apart  from  proceedings  under  statutes  specifical- 
ly authorizing  the  entry  of  judgment  on  an  offer  of 


judgment  made  by  defendant,  a  judgment  entered 
pursuant  to  a  properly  manifested  offer  and  accept- 
ance is  a  judgment  by  consent,  such  as  has  been 
considered  supra  §§  173-178,  or,  if  the  offer  is  con- 
tained in  a  pleading,  there -may  be  a  judgment  on 
the  pleadings.70  Such  an  offer  must  be  accepted 
on  the  terms  and  conditions  on  which  it  is  made,71 
and  before  the  offer  is  properly  withdrawn  or  the 
time  for  accepting  it  has  expired.72  Entry^of  a 
judgment  of  confession  in  a  pending  action,  without 
consent  of  the  adverse  party,  and  against  the  re- 
fusal of  the  court  to  sanction  it,  is  a  nullity.73 

Under  statutory  provisions.  Offer  of  judgment  is 
a  method  provided  by  statute  in  some  states,  where- 
by a  defendant  may  offer  to  allow  plaintiff  to  take 
judgment  against  him  for  a  specified  amount,  or  to 
a  specified  effect,  with  costs  up  to  that  time,  and 
thus  exonerate  himself  from  liability  for  future 
costs  in  case  plaintiff  persists  in  his  action  and  fails 
to  recover  a  judgment  more  favorable  to  him  than 
that  offered.74  It  is  a  modern  substitute  for  the 
common-law  cognovit,75  and  is  a  species  of  judg- 
ment by  confession  76  Statutes  of  this  class  are  re- 


64.  Mo. — Henry  v.    Gibson,   55   Mo. 
570. 

65.  Conn. — Huntington    v.    Newport 
News   &   M.   V.    Co.,   61   A.   59,    78 
Conn.  35. 

68.    Wis.— Duras  v.  Keller,  186  N.W. 
149,  176  Wis.  88. 

67.     U.S.— Swift  &  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  Ajpp. 

D.C.,  48  S.Ct.  311,  276  U.S.  811.  72 
L.Ed.  587 — Fleming  v.  Warshaw- 
sky  &  Co.,  CC.A.I1L,  123  <F.2d  622 
— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Woods 

Bros.  Const  Co.  v.  Yankton  Coun- 
ty,  C.C.A.SJX,   54  F.2d  304,   308. 
Ariz.— Wall    v.     Superior    Court    of 

Yavapni    County,    89    P.2d    624,    53 

Ariz.  344. 
Ark. — Vaughn   v.    Brown,  40   S.W.23 

996,  184  Ark.  185. 
Cal.— Dietrichson  v.  Western  Ix>an  & 

Building  Co.,  11  P.2d.64,  12-3  Cal. 

App.-358. 
Ga.— Estes   v.    Estes,    14   S.E.2d   681, 

192  Ga.  94. 
Ky. — Corpus  juris  cited  in  Kentucky 

Utilities    Co.    v.    Steenman,    141  S. 

W.2d   26-5,   269,   283  Ky.  317. 
Or.— Schmidt  v.  Oregon  Gold  Mining 

Co.,  40  P.  406,  28  Or.  9,  52  Am.S.B. 

750. 
Tex. — Logan  v.   Mauk,  Civ.App.,   126 

S.W.2d  513,  error  dismissed — ^Dick- 
son  v.  McLaughlan,  Civ.App.,  51  S. 

W.2d  628,  error  refused— Posey  v. 

Plains  Pipe  Line  Co.,  Civ.A-pp.,  39 

S.W.2d     1100,     error     dismissed— 

Corpus   Juris   quoted  in   Duke   v 

Gilbreath,  Qiv.App.,  10  S.W.3d  412 

414,  error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  134  note  52. 


__l  errors  going  to  the  merit*  and 
remedial  on  appeal  are  waived  by 
consent  to  a  decree.— Walling  v.  Mil- 
ler C.C.A.Minn.,  13$  F.2d  629,  certio- 
rari  denied  64  S.Ct  781,  321  U.S.  784, 
88  -L.EO.  1076. 
Waiver  of  practice  requirement 

A  practice  requirement  that  affida- 
vit or  other  pleading  be  filed  by  one 
of  parties  to  action  before  entry  of 
ludgment  by   parties*   agreement   is 
for  other  party's  benefit  and  may  be 
waived,  and  judgment  so  entered  is 
valid  between  parties. — De  Lange  v. 
Cones,  19  N.E.2d  850,  215  Ind.  355. 
porm  of  action 
N.Y.— Curran   v.   Hosey,    1*8    N.Y.S. 

910,  153  AppJDiv.  557. 

68.  U.S.— Corpus    Jtui»    quoted    to 
Woods  Bros.  Const  Co.  v.  Yankton 
County,    C.CJU3.D.,    54    F.2d    304, 
•308.  ,__ 

Ky. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kentucky 

Utilities  Co.   v.   Steenman,   141  S. 

W.2d  265,  269,  283  Ky.  317. 
Tex.— Corpus  Jnils  looted  in  Duke 

v.    Gilbreath,   Civ.App.,    10    S.W.Sd 

412,  414. 
34  C.J.  p  134  note  53. 

69.  U.S.— Harniska  v.   Dolph,   Alas- 
ka,  133  -F.   158,  66  C.C.A.   224. 

Ga— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  -Estes  v 
Estes,  14  S.B.2d  681,  68*3,  192  Ga. 
94. 

Waiver  of  trial  by  Jury  generally  see 
Juries  §§  84-113. 

70.  Kan.— Feight  v.   Thisler  114  P 
249,  84  Kan.  185. 

Judgment  on  admissions  in  pleadings 
see  infra  §  186. 

71.  111.— Cteines  v.  Heaton,  100  in 

317 


Aipp.  26,  affirmed  64  N.E.  10S1,  195 
111.  479. 

Pa.— Laughner    v.    Jennings,    1    Pa. 
Dist.  669. 

72.  Kan.— Feight  V.  Thisler.   114  P. 
249,  84  Kan.  185. 

Pa.— JCox  v.  Henry,  36  Pa.  445. 
34  C.J.  P  1'35  note  59. 
Acceptance  or  rejection  of  offer  gen- 
erally see  infra  8  182. 

73.  Ga.— Barefield  v.   Bryan,  «   Ga. 
463. 

N.Y. — Connecticut     Blower     Co.     v. 

Thatcher.  176  N.Y.S.  422,  106  Misc. 

623. 
34  C.J.  p  135  note  60. 

74.  Ky.— Maxwell     v.     Dudley,     15 
Bush  403. 

34  C.J.  p  135  note  61. 
Admissions,  tender,  or  offer  of  judg- 
ment as  affecting  costs  see  Costs, 
§§  76-9-3. 
Proceedings    to    enforce    mechanic's 

liens 

Statutes  relating  to  offers  of  judg- 
ment and  the  effect  thereof  are  ap- 
plicable to  proceedings  for  the  en- 
forcement of  mechanics'  liens. — Ken- 
nedy v.  McKone,  41  N.T.S.  782,  10 
App.Div.  88 — 40  C.J.  p  500  note  4. 

75.  N.Y.— Beards     v.     Wheeler,     11 
Hun   639,  appeal   dismissed  7S  N. 
Y.  213. 

34  C.J.  p  135  note  -62. 

76.  N.Y.— Kantrowitz    v.    Kulla,    Ifc 
H.Y.Civ.Proc-     74t     20     Abb.N.Ca45U 
321. 

34  C.J.  P  135  note  63. 
Judgments  by    confession   generally 
see  supra  §§  134-173. 


§  180 


JUDGMENTS 


medial  ana  should  be  liberally  construed,  so  as  to 
support  the  judgment,"  but  a  judgment  entered  on 
an  offer  of  judgment  can  be  supported  only  in  cas- 
es falling  within,  and  on  compliance  with,  the  terms 
of  the  statute.78  Such  statutes  do  not  prevent  de- 
fendant from  denying  liability  in  whole  or  in  part 
on  instruments  made  the  basis  of  a  suit  against  him, 
or  prevent  his  tendering  into  court  the  amount  he 
owes  plaintiff,  or  impose  on  him  the  duty  of  bring- 
ing plaintiff  into  court  to  accept  or  refuse  his  ten- 
der.™ Where  defendant  in  his  answer  admitted  an 
amount  due  but  claimed  a  set-off,  with  an  offer  to 
confess  judgment  for  the  balance,  judgment  for  the 
amount  confessed  instead  of  the  full  amount  is  er- 
ror in  the  absence  of  any  proof  of  the  set-off.80 

§  180.    Authority  to  Offer 

The  offer  on  which  a  valid  Judgment  Is  entered  must 
have  been  made  by  the  defendant  or  by  his  authority. 

In  order  to  support  a  judgment,  the  offer  on 
which  it  was  entered  must  have  been  made  by  de- 
fendant or  by  his  authority.81  In  the  absence  of 
statutory  authority  one  joint  debtor  or  partner  has 
no  power  to  make  an  offer  in  behalf  of  his  joint 
debtor  or  copartner.82  Under  joint  debtor  acts  it 
has  been  broadly  held  that  there  is  no  statutory  au- 
thority allowing  one  joint  debtor  or  partner  to  make 
an  offer  in  behalf  of  his  joint  debtor  or  copartner,88 
although  there  is  also  authority  to  the  effect  that 
one  defendant,  a  joint  debtor,  served  with  process, 
may,  by  an  offer  of  judgment  bind  his  codefendant 
not  served,  as  to  joint  property.84 


49    C.J.S. 
§  181,    Form  and  Sufficiency  of  Offer 

An  offer  of  Judgment  must  conform  to  statutory  re- 
qulrements  and  ordinarily  must  be  formally  made  In 
open  court. 

In  order  to  support  a  judgment,  the  offer  must 
conform  to  statutory  requirements.^    Under  some 
statutes  an  offer  of  judgment  is  required  to  be  made 
in  court,8*  and  it  has  been  held  that  the  offer  must 
be  made  by  serving  or  filing  a  formal  written  of- 
fer>87  signed  by  the  party  or  his  attorney.88    The 
offer  must  be  such  that  plaintiff  may  immediately 
enter  judgment  on  it;*»   it  must  be  unconditional*0 
and  leave  no  fact  to  be  determined  in  order  to  au- 
thorize the  judgment.91'  Under  some  statutes  judg- 
ment can  be  entered  pursuant  thereto  only  when 
the  offer  was  made  after  action  brought  and  while 
it  is  pending;92  and  it  has  been  suggested  that  ob- 
taining judgment  on  offer  should  not  be  permitted 
to  be  used  as  a  means  of  avoiding  or  evading  com- 
pliance with  the  statutory  safeguards  thrown  around 
judgments  by  confession.93   Another  view,  however, 
is  that  courts  cannot  enforce  a  preference  between 
different  statutory  ways  of  obtaining  judgments, 
and  that  a  judgment  which  is  free  from  fraud  and 
regular  under  the  statute  pursuant  to  which  it  was 
entered  must  be  supported,  although  it  would  be  ir- 
regular or  unauthorized  if  dependent  on  the  provi- 
sions of  some  other  statute.94 

The  offer  may  be  for  the  full  amount  claimed; 
it  need  not  be  for  a  smaller  amount  offered  in  com- 
promise of  the  claim.95  An  offer  contained  in  an 
answer  has  been  deemed  a  good  and  sufficient  stat- 
utory offer.96  Other  courts,  however,  hold  that  sub- 


77.    Ohio. — Adams  v.  Phifer,  25  Ohio 
•St.  SOI. 

73.    N.Y.— MdParren  v.  St  John,  14 

Hun  387. 

34  C.J.  p  135  note  65. 
Time  for  filing1 

Nonresident  defendant's  offer  of 
Judgment  in  partition  proceedings 
need  not  be  filed  ten  days  prior  to 
grant  of  order  of  reference  as  they 
do  not  come  within  the  (provisions  of 
civil  practice  act  section  so  requir- 
ing.—Cahill  v.  Cahlll,  326  N.Y.S.  199, 
131  Misc.  99. 

79.  Ark. — Magnolia    Grocer    Co.    v. 
Farrar,  115  S.W.2d  1094,  195  Ark. 
1069. 

80.  Ark.— Barnett  v.  Wright,  182  S. 
W.  511,  129  Ark.  170. 

81.  N.Y.— Bush  v.   O'Brien,  68  N.E. 
106,  164  N.Y.  205. 

34  C.J.  P  138  note  86. 

.-82.  N.Y.— Garrison  v.  Garrison,  ff7 
How.Pr.  271. 

S3.  N.T.— Garrison  v.  Garrison,  su- 
pra. 


84.  N.Y. — Emery  v.  Emery.  9  How. 
Pr.  130. 

34  C.J.  p  1-38  note  91. 

85.  CaL— Sacramento       County      v. 
Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  61  CaL  250. 

Me.— Hunt  v.   Elliott,   20  Me.   312. 
34  C.J.  p  135  note  68. 

Consent  in  admission  of  service 
that  Judgment  be  entered  against 
defendant  for  the  relief  demanded  in 
the  complaint  has  been  held  equiva- 
lent to  an  offer  of  Judgment. — Cahill 
v.  Cahill,  226  N.Y.S.  199,  131  Misc. 
99. 

86.  Mass.— Madden    v.     Brown,     97 
Mass.  148. 

34  C.J.  p  136  note  69. 

g7.    N.Y.— Bridenbecker  v.  Mason,  16 
How.Pr.  205. 

88.  N.T.— Bridenbecker    Y.     Mason, 
supra. 

34  C.J.  P  136  note  71. 

89.  N.T. — Griffiths  v.  De  iForest,  16 
Abb.Pr.    292,    25    How.Pr.    3-36. 

34  C.J.  p  136  note  72. 

318 


90.  N.Y.— Pinckney  v.  Childs,  20  N. 
Y.Super.  660. 

91.  N.Y.— Pinckney    v.    Childs,    su- 
pra. 

92.  iCal. — Crane   v.    Hirshfelder,    17 
CaL  582. 

34  C.J.  p  136  note  75. 

93.  Cal. — Crane  v.   Hirshfelder,   su- 
pra. 

34  C.J.  p  136  note  76. 
Judgments    by   confession   generally 
see  supra  §§  134-171 

94.  Mo.— Boyd  v.  J.  M.  Ward  Furni- 
ture,  Stove  &  Carpet  Co.,    38   Mo. 
App.  210. 

•34C.J.  p.136  note  77. 

95.  N.Y.— Ross   v.    Bridge,    15    Abb. 
Pr.  150,  24  How.Pr.  163. 

34  C.J.  p  137  note  78. 

98.    Or. — Hammond  v.  Northern  Pa- 
cific R.  Co.,  31  P.  299,  2T3  Or.   157. 
34  C.J.  p  137  note  79. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


182 


stantially  similar  statutes  contemplate  a  separate 
independent  offer  of  judgment,  and  that  it  cannot 
properly  be  embodied  in  the  answer  or  other  plead- 
ing.97 Judgments  on  admissions  or  confessions 
made  in  the  answer  are  governed  by  different  stat- 
utes and  considerations.98  The  court  can  in  no 
event  direct  a  verdict  for  defendant  where,  in  his 
answer,  he  offered  to  permit  judgment  in  plaintiff's 
favor  in  an  amount  specified."  An  insufficient  of- 
fer, not  made  in  conformity  with  the  statute,  will 
not  put  plaintiff  to  his  election  to  accept  or  reject 
it,1  and,  if  plaintiff  does  accept  and  enter  judgment 
thereon,  such  judgment  is  unauthorized  and  irregu- 
lar, and  should  be  vacated.2  In  a  proper  case  the 
court  may  allow  defendant  to  amend  his  offer.8 

§  182. Acceptance    or    Rejection,    and 

Withdrawal  of  Offer 

An   offer  of  Judgment  must  be  accepted  within  the 
period  and  In  the  manner  prescribed  by  statute. 

Defendant  is  not  bound  by  an  offer  to  allow  judg- 
ment for  the  sum  or  relief  specified  unless  the  offer 
is  accepted  within  the  time  limited  by  statute4  or 
fixed  by  the  court.5  If  not  accepted  within  the  time 
prescribed,  the  offer  is  deemed  withdrawn,6  and  can- 
not be  considered  by  the  court  or  jury?  or  allowed 
in  any  way  to  affect  the  judgment,8  except  as  to 
costs,  as  is  discussed  in  Costs  §§  76-87.  An  offer 
not  accepted  in  time  will  not  support  a  judgment,9 
and  after  expiration  of  the  statutory  period  plaintiff 
is  not  entitled  to  accept  the  offer  and  to  have  judg- 
ment entered  thereon,10  particularly  not  after 
trial.11  A  statutory  offer  of  judgment  is  not  a  ten- 


der which  must  be  kept  good  and  may  be  accepted 
at  any  time,1*  and  differs  from  an  offer  set  up  in 
the  answer,  which  may  operate  as  an  admission  or 
confession  of  judgment.18 

The  offer  as  made  and  authorized  by  statute  must 
be  unconditionally  accepted,  without  reservation,14 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  statute,  as  by  filing- 
or  serving  a  written  notice  of  acceptance,15  or  by  an 
oral  acceptance  in  open  court  in  the  presence  of  de- 
fendant.16 Entry  of  judgment  on  an  offer  without 
a  formal  acceptance,  however,  has  been  held  to  be 
merely  an  irregularity  not  affecting  the  validity  of 
the  judgment,17  and,  where  there  was  no  written 
acceptance  of  the  offer,  entry  of  judgment  has  been 
deemed  the  equivalent  of  a  due  acceptance.18 

An  express  rejection  is  unnecessary;  no  affirma- 
tive action  on  the  part  of  plaintiff  is  required  un- 
less he  elects  to  accept  the  offer.«  While  it  has- 
been  broadly  stated  that  a  statutory  offer  of  judg- 
ment may  be  withdrawn  prior  to  acceptance,20  and 
it  seems  that  the  court  has  power  to  allow  a  de- 
fendant to  withdraw  an  offer  made  under  a  mis- 
take,21 it  has  been  held  that  plaintiff  is  entitled  to 
the  whole  of  the  time  limited  within  which  to  ac- 
cept the  offer,  and  defendant  cannot  deprive  him  of 
this  right  by  withdrawing  the  offer  before  plain- 
tiffs right  to  act  on  it  has  expired.22  Until  the 
offer  has  been  rejected,  or  the  time  for  accepting- 
it  has  expired,  defendant  can  take  no  step  in  the 
action  adverse  to  plaintiff  which  is  inconsistent  with 
giving  effect  to  the  offer,  if  plaintiff  shall  accept 
it.2* 


97.  Wis. — Bourda  v.  Jones,  85  N.W. 
•671,  110  Wis.  52. 

34  C.J.  p  137  note  80. 

98.  Iowa. — City     of    Davenport     v. 
(Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  «38  Iowa 
633. 

Judgment  on  admissions  In  pleading's 
see  infra  §  185. 

99.  Or. — Easton  v.  Quackenbush,  168 
P.  631,-  86  Or.  374. 

1.  Ky. — Maxwell  v.  Dudley,  13  Bush 
403. 

34  C.J..p  138  note  83. 

2.  N.Y.— Pinckney  v.   Childs,   20  N. 
T. Super.  660. 

3.  N.Y.— Stark  v.   Stark,   2  How.Pr. 
<360. 

34  C.J.  P  1.38  note  85. 

4.  Colo.— Hagerman  v.  Mutual  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  103  P.  276,  45  Colo.  459. 

Kan. — Johnson   v.   Wamego  Tip.,   105 

P.  530,  81  Kan.  259. 
34  C.J.  p  138  note  95. 

a     Me. — Gilman  v.   Pearson,   47  Me. 

352. 
34  C.J.  p  138  note  94.  i 


&  N.C. — Doggett  Lumber  Co.  v.  Per- 
ry, 196  S.B.  831,  218  N.C.  5-33. 

34  C.J.  p  138  note  96. 

7.  "Wis. — Tullgren  v.  Karger,  181  N.' 
W.  232,  173  Wis.  288. 

34  C.J.  p  189  note  97. 

a  N.T.— Marble  v.  Lewis,  53  Barb. 
432,  -36  How.Pr.  «337. 

34  C.J.  p  139  note  9*8. 

9.  Kan. — Johnson   v.   Waxnego    Tp., 
105  P.  530,  81  Kan.  259. 

34  C.J.  p  139  note  2. 

10.  Wis.-^Smith  v.  Thewalt,  105  N. 
W.  662,  126  Wis.  176. 

34  C.J.  p  189  note  3. 

11.  Mo.— Maize   v.   Big   Creek   Coal 
Co.,  Ap|pM  20-3  S.W.  6*33. 

34  C.J.  p  139  note  4. 

12.  Iowa. — Benson  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  84  N.W.  1028,  113  Iowa 
179. 

Mo.— -Maize  v.  Big  Creek  Coal  Co., 
App.,  203  S.W.  633. 

13.  Mo.— -Maize   v.   Big   Creek   Coal 
Co.,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  139  note  6. 

14.  N.T. — Freudenheim  v.   Raduzin- 
er,  *1  N.Y.S.   194,   10  Misc.  500. 

319 


Lumbering- 


11 


Wis. — Sellers    v.    Union 

Co.,  36  Wis.  398. 
34  C.J.  p  141  note  24. 
15.    Ind. — Homer   v.    Pilklngton, 

Ind.  440. 
Neb.— Becker  v.  Breen,  94  N.W.  614, 

68  Neb.  379. 
16L    Ind. — Homer   v.    Pilkington,    11 

Ind.  440. 

17.    N.Y.— White  v.  Bogart,   78  N.Y.. 

256. 
34  CJ.  p  141  note  23. 

1SL    N.Y.— Cahill    v.    Cahill,    226    N.. 
Y.S.  199,  131  Misc.  99. 

19.  CaL — Scammon  T,  Dento,   14  P- 
98,  72  CaL  393. 

34  C.J.  p  140  note  8. 

20.  Mo.— Haffner  T.  Tainter,   204  a. 
W.  966,  200  Mo.App.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  140  note  10. 

21.  KY.— McVicar  v.  Keating,  46  N~ 
Y.S.   298,   19  App.Div.  581. 

22.  N.Y. — McVicar   v.   Keating,    su- 
pra. 

34  C.X  p  140  note  9. 

23.  N.Y.— U.    S.    Mortgage   &   Trust 


§  182 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S; 


Once  plaintiff  has  made  his  election  either  to  ac- 
cept or  to  reject  the  offer,  his  election  is  binding,24 
and,  after  expressly  refusing  the  offer,  plaintiff  can- 
not thereafter  withdraw  the  refusal  and  accept  the 
offer,  over  defendant's  objection,  although  the  time 
limit  has  not  expired.25  Where  the  case  goes  to 
trial  before  expiration  of  the  time  for  acceptance, 
and  before  any  action  on  the  offer  by  plaintiff,  it  has 
been  held  under  different  statutes  that  the  offer  be- 
comes ineffectual  for  any  purpose,26  that  the  offer 
cannot  be  accepted,27  and  that  plaintiff  in  effect 
elects  not  to  accept;28  but  it  has  also  been  held  that 
the  offer  may  be  accepted  during  the  progress  of 
the  trial.29  Where  plaintiff  rejects  both  a  pre- 
action  tender  of  a  stated  amount  in  settlement  of 
his  claim,  and  also  an  offer  of  judgment  in  the 
same  amount,  but  on  the  trial  plaintiff  introduces 
no  evidence  to  show  that  more  is  due,  judgment  is 
properly  rendered  for  only  the  amount  tendered  and 
offered^ 

Where,  after  the  making  of  an  offer  of  judg- 
ment, plaintiff  amends  his  complaint  by  omitting 
some  of  the  causes  of  action  and  reducing  the  re- 
covery sought,  the  offer  ceases  to  be  binding  or 
conclusive  on  either  party,  and  becomes  for  all  pur- 
poses nugatory.31  Where,  however,  an  amendment 
to  a  complaint  is  one  of  form  only,  and  the  cause 
of  action  and  the  recovery  sought  remain  the  same, 
an  offer  of  judgment  theretofore  made  in  the  ac- 
tion remains  binding  on  the  parties,  notwithstand- 
ing such  amendment.32 

§  183.    Entry  of  Judgment 

Ordinarily  on  due  acceptance  of  the  offer  and  com- 
pliance with  statutory  requirements  the  plaintiff  Is  enti- 
tled to  have  judgment  entered  without  trial.  The  Judg- 
ment must  conform  to  the  terms,  of  the  tender  or  offer. 


On  proper  acceptance  of  an  offer  of  judgment, 
and  on  compliance  with  all  statutory  requirements, 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  have  judgment  entered,  in 
accordance  with  the  offer,  without  a  trial.33  Gen- 
erally such  entry  may  be  made  without  application 
to  the  court,  by  the  clerk  acting  ministerially,3*  un- 
less the  offer  and  acceptance  are  made  in  a  case  of 
the  class  where  application  to  the  court  is  required 
to  be  made.86  If  plaintiff  neglects  to  enter  judg- 
ment after  accepting  the  offer,  judgment  may  be 
entered  on  application  of  defendant36  Where  for 
any  reason  an  application  to  the  court  is  necessary 
when  an  offer  to  allow  judgment  has  been  made,  the 
party  receiving  the  offer  may  go  to  the  court  and 
ask  and  obtain  on  the  offer  such  final  directions  as 
are  necessary  to  give  effect  to  the  offer  and  perfect 
a  judgment  thereon.37  As  the  clerk  acts  minis- 
terially, he  must  follow  closely  the  directions  of  the 
statute  or  the  judgment  will  be  unauthorized  and 
void.38  Judgment  may  be  entered  before  the  re- 
turn term  of  the  writ89  Proof  of  service  of  the 
summons  need  not  be  filed.40  The  judgment  as  en- 
tered must  conform  to  the  offer  accepted.41 


§  184. 


Construction,  Operation,  and  Ef- 


fect 


An  offer  of  Judgment  and  Its  acceptance  are  to  be 
construed  as  a  contract,  and  the  Judgment  entered  there- 
on Is  to  be  given  effect  In  fixing  the  rights  of  the  par- 
ties as  of  the  date  on  which  the  offer  was  made;  entry 
of  Judgment  disposes  of  the  issues  tendered  by  the  plead- 
ings and  operates  to  terminate  the  action. 

An  offer  of  judgment  and  its  acceptance  consti- 
tute a  contract,42  and  together  with  the  judgment 
entered  thereon  are  to  be  construed  and  given  effect 
according  to  the  state  of  the  .pleadings  at  the  time 
the  offer  was  made.43  The  rights  of  the  parties  are 


Co.  v.  Hodgson,  «8  N.Y.S.  1132,  28 
Misc.  447. 
34  C.J.  p  140  note  12. 

24.  Iowa, — Benson  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  84  N.W.  1028,  113  Iowa 
179. 

25.  Iowa. — Benson  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  140  note  13. 

26.  Minn.— Mansfield    v.    Fleck,    23 
Minn.  61. 

34  C.J.  ip  141  note  14. 

37.    Wis.— Smith  v.  Thewalt,  105  N. 

W.  662,  126  Wis.  176. 
34  C.J.  p  141  note  17. 

28.  N.Y.— Corning  v.  Radley,  54  N. 
Y.S.  565,  25  Misc.  318. 

34  C.J.  ip  141  note  16. 

29.  Mo. — Haffner  v.  Tainter,   204  S. 
W.  966,  200  Mo.App.  L 

34  C.J.  p  141  nate  15. 

30.  U.S.— Phillips  Petroleum  Co.  v. 
Rau  Const.  Co.,  C.O.A.Mo.,  130  F.2d 


499,  certiorari  denied  Bau  Const. 
Co.  v.  Phillips  -Petroleum  Qo.,  -63 
S.Ct.  260,  317  U.S.  6*85,  87  -L.Ed.  549, 
rehearing  denied  63  S.Ct  434,  317 
U.S.  71-3,  87  JCtBdL  567. 
31.  N.T. — Woelfle  v.  Schmenger,  12 
N..Y.Civ.Proc.  1312. 

32:    N.Y. — Woelfle  v.  8chmengerf|  su- 
pra, 

33.  N.Y.— -Van  Allen  v.  Glass,  16  N. 
Y.S.   261,   60   Hun  546,   21  N.Y.Civ. 
Proc.  12*7. 

34  CJ.  p  141  note  29. 

34.  Cal. — Old    Settlers'    Inv.    Co.    v. 
White,   110  P.   922,  158  Cal.  236. 

34  C.J.  p  141  note  30. 

35.  N.Y.— Bathgate  v.  Haskin,  63  N. 
Y.  261— Pflster  v.  Stumm,  27  N.Y. 
S.  1000,  7  Misc.  526. 

Application  and  order  for  Judgment 
generally  see  supra  {  104. 

36.  N.Y.— Abel   v.   Bischott,   90  N.Y. 
S.  990,  99  App.Dlv.  248. 

320 


37.  N.Y.— Bathgate  v,  Haskin,  63  N. 
Y.  261. 

38.  Cal.— Old   Settlers'    Inv.    Co.    v. 
White,   110   P.   922,   158   Cal.   2&6— 
Crane  v.  Hirshfelder,   17  Cat   582. 

39.  Mo. — Boyd  v.  J.  M.  Ward  (Fur- 
niture, Stove  &  Carpet  Co.,  38  Mo. 
App.  210. 

40.  N.Y.— Lindsley     v.     Van     Cort- 
landt,   22  N.Y.S.   222,    67  Hun   146, 
affirmed  37  N.E.  825,  142  N.Y.  682. 

41.  N.Y.— Abel  v.   Bischoff,   90   N.Y. 
S.    990,    99  App.Div.    248. 

Judgment  must  "be  responsive  to  ten- 
der 

Wls. — Emerson  v.  Pier,  SO  N.W.  1100, 
105  Wis.  161. 

42.  N'.Y.-JStillweU    v.    StillweU,    80 
N.Y.S.    961,    81   Hun    392,    24   N.Y. 
Civ.Proc.  124,  1  N.Y.Ann.Cas.  41. 

34  C.J.  p  142  note  40. 

43.  N.Y.— Tompkins  v.  Ives,  86  N.Y. 
75. 

34  CJ.  p  142  note  41. 


49    C-J-S. 


JUDGMENTS 


185 


fixed  as  of  that  date,44  and  no.  further  inquiry  as 
to  the  relation  of  the  parties  is  permissible.45  A 
counterclaim  thereafter  filed  or  served  cannot  be 
considered  or  given  effect,4^  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  cause  of  action  set  up  in  such  counterclaim  is 
not  barred  by  the  judgment,  but  may  be  recovered 
in  a  subsequent  action,4?  although  acceptance  of  the 
offer  was  made  after  the  counterclaim  was  plead- 
ed.48 

The  action  is  terminated  by  entry  of  the  judg- 
ment49 and  the  court  has  no  power  to  permit  plain- 
tiff to  enter  judgment  on  the  offer  and  to  continue 
the  action  for  the  recovery  of  the  balance  of  his 
claim.50  An  acceptance  of  an  offer  .of  judgment 
disposes  of  the  issues  tendered  by  the  pleadings,51 
and  a  judgment  on  a  general  offer  concludes  plain- 
tiff from  bringing  a  new  action  for  any  part  of  the 
claim  embraced  in  the  complaint,  and  which  might 
have  been  litigated  in  the  former  action.52  Under 
joint  debtor  acts  a  judgment  may  br:  entered  on  an 
offer  of  judgment  made  by  one  of  several  joint 
debtors  without  affecting  or  barring  the  remedy 
against  the  other  debtors.58 

§  185.    Admission  in  Pleading 
a.  In  general 


44.  N.Y.— XJ.S.  Mortgage  &  Trust  Co. 
v.    Hodgson,    58    N.T.S.    1132,    28 
Misc.  447,  affirmed  U.  S.  Trust  Co. 
v.  Hodgson,  61  N.Y.S.  868,  30  Misc. 
84. 

34  C.J.  p  142  note  42. 

45.  N.Y.— Abel    v.    Bischoff,    90    N. 
Y.S.    990,    99    App.Div.   24'8. 

48.  N.T.— -U.  S.  Mortgage  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Hodgson,  58  N.Y.«S.  1132,  28 
Misc.  447,  affirmed  U.  S.  Trust  Co. 
v.  Hodgson,  61  N.Y.S.  868,  30  Misc. 
84. 

34  C.J.  p  142  note  44. 

47.  N.Y.— Tompkins  v.  Ives,  -36  N. 
Y.      75,     -3     Abb.Pr.,N.S.,     267,     1 
Transcr.A.   266 — Kautz  v.  Vanden- 
burgh,  28  N.Y.S.  1046,  77  Hun  591 
— Fteldings  v.  Mills,  15  N.Y.Super. 
489. 

48.  N.Y.— -Tompklns  v.  Ives,  36  N.Y. 
75,  3  Abb.Pr.,N.S.,  267,  1  Transcr. 
A.  266 — Kautz  v.  Vandenburgh,  28 
N.Y.S.   1046,   77  Hun  591. 

49.  N.Y.— U.  .S.   Trust  Co.  v.  Hodg- 
son,   61   N.Y.S.   868,   30  Misc.   84— 
Freudenheim   v.   Raduziner,   31  N. 
Y.S.  194,  10  Misc.  500. 

50.  N.Y.— Walsh  v.  Empire  Brick  & 
Supply  Co.,  85  N.Y.S.  528,  90  App. 
Div.  498 — 'Freudenheim  v.  Raduzin- 
er,  31  N.Y.-S.  194.  10  Misc.  500. 

51.  N.Y.^Collins  v.  Harris,  $  N.Y. 
St  162. 

34  C.J.  p  142  note  49. 

40  C.J.S.-21 


52.  N.Y.— Robinson 
Hun  325. 

34  C.J.  p  142  note  50. 

53.  N.Y.— Kantrowitz    v.    Kulla,    13 
N.Y.Civ.Proc.     74,     20    Abb.N.Cas. 
<321. 

34  C.J.  (p  1*42,  note  52. 

54.  U.S. — Wark  v.  Brvin  Press  Cor- 
poration, O.C.A.I1L,  48  F.2d  152. 

Mich.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  De- 
troit Trust  Co.  v.  Smith,  240  N.W. 
12,  13,  256  Mich.  376. 

34  C.J.  p  143  note  54. 

55.  Idaho. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
Linch  v.  Perrine,  4  P.2d  353,  355, 
51  Idaho  152. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  De- 
troit Trust  Co.  v.  Smith,  240  N.W. 
12,  13,  256  Mich.  376. 

Pa.— Cain  v.  Redlich,  164  A.  794,  310 
Pa.  *8. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Gatrell 
v.  Salt  'Lake  County,  149  P.2d  827, 
831,  106  Utah  409. 

34  C.J.  p  143  note  55. 

56.  Mich.— Corpus  Juris   quoted  in 
Detroit  Trust  Co.  v.  Smith,  240  N. 
W.  12,  13,  256  Mich.  376. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Gatrell 
v.  Salt  Lake  County,  149  P.2d  827, 
831,  106  Utah  409. 

34  C.J.  p  143  note  56. 

57.  Mich.— Corpus   Juris   quoted  in 
Detroit   Trust   Co.    v.    Smith,    240 
S.W.  12,  13,  256  Mich.  376. 

84  C.J.  -p  143  note  57.  * 


b.  Admission  of  part  of  demand 

c.  Set-off  or  counterclaim 

a.  In  General 

Judgment  may  be  entered  for  either  the  plaintiff  or 
the  defendant  on  a  clear  and  unequivocal  admission  of 
liability  in  the  pleadings  of  the  opposing  party.  In  a 
proper  case,  under  some  practice,  Judgment  may  be  en- 
tered by  the  clerk  of  court  or  prothonotary. 

Where  defendant  in  his  pleadings  admits  liability 
on  the  cause  of  action  set  up  against  him,  plaintiff 
is  entitled  to  have  judgment  entered  in  accordance 
with  such  admission,54  provided  the  admission  is 
distinct,  unequivocal,  and  unconditional,55  and  it  is 
clear  that  no  issue  of  fact  is  to  be  tried56  and  no 
serious  question  of  law  is  to  be  argued.57  Such 
judgment  may  be  entered  on  motion,58  without  a 
trial  on  the  merits,59  without  evidence  in  support 
of  the  admission,60  and  without  regard  to  which 
party  makes  the  motion;61  and  defendant  cannot 
introduce  evidence  which  contradicts  the  admissions 
in  his  answer.62  It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  ren- 
der judgment  for  plaintiff  in  accordance  with  such 
admission,  regardless  of  an  adverse  verdict  ;63  and 

Marks, 


19 


58.     La.— Trank 
Ann.  184. 


v.    Hardee,    22    La. 


llich. — Corpus   Juris   quoted   in   De- 
troit Trust  Co.  v.  Smith,  240  N.W. 
12,  13,  256  Mtch.  278, 
Motion  denied  under  facts. — Pfei- 

fer  v.  Pfeifer,  5  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  310, 

20  Sch.Les.Rec.  212* 

59.  Mich. — Corpus   Juris    quoted   in 
Detroit  Trust  Co.  v.  Smith,  240  N. 
W.  12,  13,  256  Mich.  376. 

34  C.J.  p  143  note  59. 

60.  Ind.— New  Albany  &  V.   Plank 
Road  Co.  v.  Stallcup,  62  Ind.  345. 

Mich.— Corpus   Juris   quoted  in  De- 
troit Trust  Co.  v.  Smith,  240  N.W. 
12,  13,  256  Mich.  376. 
Where  answer  was  composed  sole- 
ly of  negatives  pregnant,  Judgment 
may  be  awarded  without  evidence  to 
support  it,  since  evidence  is  unneces- 
sary  unless   allegations   of   petition 
are  put  in  issue  -by  answer. — White 
v.    City   of  Williamsburg,    280   S.W. 
486,  213  Ky.  90. 

61.  N.T.— U.    S.   Trust   Co.   of  New 
York  v,  Wenzell,   19  N.Y.S.2d  448, 
17*3   Misc.   998,   affirmed   18  N.Y.S. 
2d  1001,  258  App.Div.  1046,  appeal 
denied   19   N.Y.S.2d   770,   259  App. 
Div.  713,  affirmed  U.  S.  Trust  Co. 
v.  Wenzell,  30  N.E.2d  727,  284  N.Y. 
693. 

62.  Ind.— New   Albany  &   V.    Plank 
Road  Co.  v.  Stallcup.  62  Ind.  345. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  guoted  in  De- 
troit Trust  Co.  v.  Smith,  240  N.W. 
12,  13.  256  Mich.  276. 

63.  Ind.— New  Albany  &  V.   Plan* 
Road  Co.  v.  Stallcup,  62  Ind.  345. 


321 


§  185 


JUDGMENTS 


.    49    (J.J.S- 


it  is  error  to  enter  judgment  for  defendant.64  Such 
an  admission,  however,  admits  only  the  traversable 
allegations  of  the  declaration,  and  the  amount  of  the 
debt  or  damages  confessed,65  and  no  greater  sum 

can  be  recovered  without  further  proof,66 

• 

Admission  by  plaintiff.  Where  plaintiff  in  his 
pleading  admits  liability  to  defendant,  and  offers  to 
pay  it,  judgment  may  be  entered  thereon  in  favor  of 
defendant,67  or  at  least  credit,  to  the  amount  of 
such  admission,  should  be  given  defendant  in  en- 
tering judgment  for  plaintiff.68 

Entry  of  judgment  by  clerk  or  prothonotary.  Un- 
der statutes  authorizing  plaintiff  to  take  judgment 
for  the  amount  admitted  to  be  due  by  the  affidavit 
of  defense,  it  has  been  held  that  in  a  proper  case 
the  judgment  may  be  entered  by  the  prothonotary,69 
and  the  prothonotary's  authority  may  extend  to  en- 
try of  judgment  on  an  admission  of  part  of  the  de- 
mand.70 Under  statutory  provisions  authorizing 
the  clerk  of  court  to  enter  judgment  on  default,  the 
clerk  may  not  enter  judgment  where  the  defendant 
admits  the  allegations  of  the  complaint  but  there' 
is  no  default,71  nor  may  judgment  on  the  basis  of 
admissions  in  the  answer  be  entered  before  expira- 
tion of  the  time  to  amend.72 

b.  Admission  of  Part  of  Demand 

Where  the  defendant's  pleadings  admit  part  of  the 
plaintiff's  claim  to  be  due,  the  plaintiff  may  have  judg- 
ment for  the  amount  so  admitted;  at  common  law  he 
may  not  then  sue  for  the  balance,  but  under  some  stat- 


utes he  may  have  a  Judgment  or  order  for  the  amount 
admitted  and  then  proceed  to  trial  for  the  balance. 

Generally,  if  defendant's  answer  admits  the  jus- 
tice of  a  portion  of  plaintiff's  demand,  the  latter 
is  entitled  to  judgment  for  at  least  the  amount  so 
admitted  to  be  due,  and  a  judgment  for  less,  or  a 
judgment  for  defendant  is  erroneous.73  At  com- 
mon law  and  in  the  absence  of  statute  or  court  rule 
to  the  contrary,  plaintiff  has  no  right  to  enter  judg- 
ment for  the  part  admitted,  and  then  to  proceed  to 
trial  for  the  balance  of  his  claim  ;74  but  by  statute 
in  many  jurisdictions  judgment  may  be  entered  be- 
fore trial  for  the  part  admitted  and  a  trial  had  for 
the  part  disputed.75  Under  this  class  of  statutes 
two  judgments  may  be  rendered  in  the  same  case, 
both  for  plaintiff,  or  one  for  plaintiff  and  one  for 
defendant,  according  to  the  result  of  the  trial  of 
the  controverted  portion  of  plaintiffs  claim.76 
Where  defendant  has  admitted  a  part  of  the  claim 
to  be  due,  and  then  proceeds  under  different  statu- 
tory provisions  to  offer  to  confess  judgment  on 
condition  that  the  judgment  be  in  full  of  the  de- 
mands against  him,  such  offer  does  not  affect  the 
right  of  plaintiff  to  have  judgment  entered  for  the 
part  admitted  in  accordance  with  the  first  men- 
tioned statutory  provisions;77  but  the  offer,  if  re- 
fused by  plaintiff,  does  not  defeat  the  defendant's 
right  to  contest  the  entire  claim.7* 

Under  other  statutes  an  "order,"  as  distinguished 
from  a  "judgment,"  may  be  entered  requiring  de- 
fendant to  satisfy  the  part  of  plaintiff's  claim  which 
he  has  admitted,79  or  an  order  may  be  entered  re- 


esT  "N.Tt.— Schenck  v.  Fischer,  1-37  N. 

Y.S.  857. 

34  C.J.  p  14-3  note  S3. 
65.    N.H.— -Kelley  v.  Dover,  18  N.H. 

56$. 
63.    N.H. — Kelley  v.  Dover,  supra. 

67.  Iowa. — Farwell   v.    Des    Moines 
Brick  Mfg.    Co.,    66   N.W.   176,   97 
Iowa  286,  35  L.R.A.  63. 

68.  Ky.— Allen   v.    Hodge,    106  6.W. 
255,  32  Ky.L.  509. 

N.Y.-JFish  v.  Hahn,  108  N.T.S.  T82, 

124  App.-Div.  173. 
34  C.J.  p  143  note  68. 

69.  Pa.— Cain  v.  Redlich,  164  A.  794, 
310  Pa.  68. 

70.  Pa.— Cain  v.   Redlich,   supra. 

71.  N.Y.— Valentine  &  Co.  v.  Tara- 
bocchia,  14  N.T.S.2d  '331,  171  Misc. 
1056. 

72.  N.Y.— Valentine  &  Co.  v.  Tara- 
bocchia,  supra. 

73.  Ky.— Smith  v.   Burchell,   181   S. 
W.2d  48,   297   Ky.    707— Louisville 
Clothing  Co.  v.  Earned,  80  6/W.2d 
549,  258  Ky.  442— Martin  v.  Provi- 
dent Life  &  Accident  Ins.  Co.,  47 
S.W.2d  524,  242  Ky.  667. 


La.— Villere  &  Co.  v.  Latter,  171  So. 
705,  186  La.  91. 

N.C. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Mead- 
ows Fertilizer  Co.  v.  {Farmers' 
Trading  Co.,  165  S.B.  694,  203  N.C. 
261. 

34  C.J.  (p  143  note  70. 

74.  Ala. — Henderson    v.    Henry,     6 
Ala.  361. 

Pa^-Dodds  v.  Blackstock,  1  Pittsb. 

46. 
34  C.J.  p  144  note  74. 

75.  111.— Central  Trust  Co.   of  Illi- 
nois v.   Hagen,   171  N.E.  631,   339 
111.  384— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaran- 
ty Co.  v.  Martin  Auto  Parts  Co., 
15  N.E.2d  913,  296  IlLApp.  6>39. 

Ky.— Martin  v.  Provident  Life  &  Ac- 
cident Ins.  Co.,  47  S.W.2d  524,  242 
Ky.  667. 

N.C.— Meadows  Fertilizer  Co.  v. 
•Farmers'  Trading  Co.,  165  S.3B.  694, 
203  N.C.  261. 

Wash.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Simp- 
son v.  C.  P.  iCox  Corporation,  8  P. 
2d  424,  425,  426,  167  Wash.  34. 

34  C.J.  p  144  note  77. 

76.  Pa.— <Jity  of  'Philadelphia  v.  Sec- 
ond &  Third  Sts.  Pass.  B.  Co.,  2 
Pa.Dist.   705,   13  Pa.Co.  580. 

Wash.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Simp- 

322 


son  v.  C.  P.  Cox  Corporation,  8  P. 
2d  424,  426,  167  Wash.  34. 

77.  Ky.—  Martin  v.  Provident  Life  & 
Accident  Ins.   Co.,   47   S.W.2d  524, 
242  Ky.  667. 

The  offer  does  not  affect  the  state 
of  the  pleadings,  and  admissions 
there  made  remain  an  appropriate 
basis  for  rendition  of  judgment  for 
plaintiff  as  to  the  part  admitted  un- 
der the  statutes  relating  to  Judg- 
ments on  admissions  in  the  plead- 
ing's.— Martin  v.  Provident  Life  & 
Accident  Ins.  Co.,  supra. 

78,  Ky.—  Martin  v.  Provident  Life  & 
Accident  Ins.  Co., 


79.    S.C.  —  Malloy  v.  Douglass,  101  S. 

<E.  825,  113  S.C.  384. 
34  C.J.  p  145  notes  79,  80. 
Erroneous  motion  for  Judgment 

Where  the  proper  motion  is  one 
for  an  "order"  directing  payment  of 
the  portion  of  the  claim  admitted, 
the  fact  that  plaintiff  falls  .into  a 
technical  error  by  moving  for  "Judg- 
ment" for  such  part  will  not  preclude 
the  court  from  granting  an  "order" 
binding  on  defendant  to  pay  the  por- 
tion admitted  to  be  due.  —  Phenix 


49    C-J-S. 


JUDGMENTS 


186 


quiring  the  defendant  to  pay  the  amount  into 
court,80  without  prejudice  to  a  continuation  of  the 
action  as  to  the  remaining  issues,  which  order  may 
be  enforced  by  the  court  as  it  enforces  a  judgment 
or  provisional  remedy.81  In  its  discretion,  under 
some  statutes,  the  court  may  refuse  to  enter  judg- 
ment for  the  part  admitted  in  advance  of  the  final 
judgment  on  the  whole  case,82  and  an  order  may  be 
entered  which  merely  declares  that  plaintiffs  claim 
shall  be  deemed  established  as  to  the  part  admitted, 
the  action  allowed  to  proceed  as  to  the  remainder  of 
the  claim,  and,  on  termination  of  such  action,  the 
judgment  then  entered  including,  in  addition  to  any 
matters  determined  in  the  action,  the  amount  of 
plaintiffs  claim  that  was  admitted.88 

To  entitle  plaintiff  to  such  a  preliminary  judg- 
ment or  order  under  the  statutes,  the  admission 
must  be  unconditional,84  and  amount  to  a  plain, 
explicit,  and  unequivocal  admission  that  a  definite 
sum  or  portion  of  the  relief  sought  is  due  to  plain- 
tiff,85 although  it  is  not  necessary  to  specify  the 
particular  items  of  plaintiffs  claim  or  account  which 
are  admitted;86  and,  where  defendant  in  his  answer 
unequivocally  admits  that  he  owes  a  portion  of  the 
claim,  it  has  been  held  that  he  may  not  by  offer- 
ing to  pay  such  portion  only  on  condition  that  it 
be  accepted  as  full  payment  of  the  entire  claim  de- 
feat plaintiffs  right  to  have  an  order  directing  de- 
fendant to  pay  the  part  unequivocally  admitted  to  be 
due.87  The  remedy  is  stringent  and  should  be  ap- 
plied with  proper  caution.88  The  judgment  must 
be  strictly  confined  to  the  amount  clearly  and  fairly 
admitted  to  be  due.89  Failure  to  deny  is  a  sufficient 
admission  under  some  statutes.90  In  a  case  where 
the  cause  of  action  is  on  an  entire  demand,  and  the 
whole  claim  is  disputed,  the  statute  does  not  apply, 


and  if,  as  a  result  of  error,  or  for  other  reason,  a 
judgment  is  entered  for  a  smaller  amount  than 
plaintiff  claims,  this,  while  the  judgment  remains  in 
force,  is  a  full  settlement  of  the  whole  claim  of 
plaintiff  on  such  cause  of  action.91 

c.  Set-Off  or  Counterclaim 

The  plaintiff  or  the  defendant  may  be  entitled  to 
judgment  as  to  that  portion  of  a  claim  admitted  by  the 
other  wh$re  the  defendant  has  filed  a  counterclaim  or 
Its.  equivalent. 

Where  defendant  pleads  a  set-off  or  counterclaim, 
but  no  other  answer  or  defense,  it  is  an  admission 
of  his  liability  for  so  much  of  plaintiffs  demand  as 
is  in  excess  of  the  alleged  set-off  or  counterclaim, 
and  for  that  excess  plaintiff  may  be  entitled,  some- 
times by  virtue  of  statutory  provisions,  to  take  judg- 
ment,92 and  the  action  may  be  continued  for  trial 
of  the  counterclaim.98  However,  where  the  coun- 
terclaim pleaded  is  sufficient,  if  sustained,  to  ex- 
tinguish the  whole  of  plaintiffs  claim,  an  admis- 
sion of  part  of  it,  as  of  one  or  more  of  several 
causes  of  action  joined  in  the  complaint,  does  not 
entitle  plaintiff  to  judgment  for  the  part  admitted 
in  advance  of  the  trial  and  final  judgment94  De- 
fendant is  entitled  to  judgment  on  his  counterclaim 
to  the  extent  of  items  admitted  by  plaintiff.95 

§  186.    Submission  on  Agreed  Statement  of 
Facts 

Under  some  statutes,  the  court  may  render  Judg- 
ment In  a  case  submitted  on  agreed  facts,  but  the  Judg- 
ment must  be  In  accordance  with  the  facts  agreed  on. 

Under  statutes  so  providing,  where  the  parties 
agree  as  to  the  facts  and  submit  the  case  to  the 
court  for  determination  on  such  facts,  the  court  may 
enter  judgment  on  the  case  so  submitted.96  So, 


Furniture   Co.    v.    Daggett,    143   S.B. 
220,  145  S.C.  -357. 

80.  N.Y. — Dusenberry  v.  Woodward, 
1  Abb.Pr.  443. 

81.  Wls. — Sellers  v.  Union  Lumber- 
ing Co.,  86  Wis.  398. 

34  C.J.  p  145  note  82. 

82.  N.Y.— Cronin  v.  Tebo,  17  N.T.S. 
•650,  63  Hun  190. 

83.  Cal.-L.ee  v.  De  Forest  71  P.2d 
285,  22  Cal.App.2d  351. 

84.  N.Y.— Foster  v.   Devlin.   $  N.Y. 
S.   605,  S7  N.Y.Super.  120. 

85.  N:Y.— Dolan  v.  Petty,  6  -N.Y.Su- 
•per.  678. 

34  C.J.  p  145  note  85. 

86.  Pa. — Roberts    v.    Sharp,    28    A. 
1023,  161  Pa.  185. 

34  C.J.  p  145  note  86. 

87.  S.C.— Phenix    Furniture    .Qo.    v. 
Daggett,  14>3  S.E.  220,  145  S.C.  357. 


88.  N.Y.— Dolan  Y.  Petty,  6  N.Y.Su- 
per. 673. 

34  C.J.  IP  146  note  87. 

89.  Pa.— United    Oil    Cloth    Co.    v. 
Dash,  32  Pa.Super.  155. 

34  C.J.  p  146  note  88. 

90.  N.Y. — Tracy    v.     Humphrey,     S 
How.Pr.  155,  8  Code  Rep.  190. 

91.  Ohio.— White    v.     Herndon,     15 
Ohio    Cir.Ct.    290—Snell   v.   W.   A. 
Banks  Co.,  16  Ohio  Cir.Ct,N.S.,  32, 
affirmed  94  N.E.  1115,  83  Ohio  St 
464. 

92.  Pa.-^Chartiers  Trust  Co.  v.  Lin- 
coln Gas  Coal  £0.,  89  PittsbJLeg. 
J.  77. 

S.C.— Bomar  v.   Gantt,   16S   S.B.   90,. 

167  S.C.  139. 
•34  C.J.  p  146  note  92. 

93.  0.C.-HFidelity  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Brown,  45  App.D.C.  §79. 

34  C.J.  p  146  notes  94,  $5. 

323 


94.    Gff.Y.— Cronin  v,  Tebo,  17  N.Y.S. 

650,  63  Hun  190. 
34  C.J.  p  146  note  95. 

96.    Iowa. — Hueston        v.        Pointer 
Brewing   Co.,    269    N.W.    754,    222 
Iowa  630. 
Sum  deposited  in  court 

Where,  in  a  suit  by  -plaintiff  broker 
against  trustees  and  defendant  bro- 
ker for  commissions,  the  trustees  de- 
posit a  certain  sum  in  court,  conced- 
ing their  liability  for  that  much  and 
relinquishing  all  rights  thereto,  and 
where  plaintiffs  pleadings  claim  only 
a  portion  of  such  sum,  on  defendant 
broker's  cross  motion  for  partial 
Judgment  on  the  pleadings  order 
should  be  entered  awarding  him  the 
difference  between  the  total  sum  de- 
posited and  the  amount  claimed  by 
plaintiff.— Traub  v.  Weinstein,  19  N. 
Y.S.2d  243,  259  Aa?p.Div.  338. 

96.    Wls. — 'Luebke  v.  City  of  Water- 
town,  284  N.W.  513,  230  Wis.  512. 


§  187 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J-S- 


where  a  case  is  called  for  trial  and  certain  matters 
are  admitted  in  court  so  as  to  settle  controverted 
questions  well  pleaded,  it  is  not  erroneous  for  the 
court  to  render  judgment  on  such  admissions.97 


Where  the  case  is  submitted  on  an  agreed  statement 
of  facts,  the  court  should  enter  judgment  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  facts  agreed  on,98  and  the  judg- 
ment must  be  based  on  such  agreed  facts.9* 


VDl  JUDGMENT  BY  DEFAULT 


GENERAL 


§  187.    What  Constitutes  Judgment  by  De- 
fault 

In  a  strict  sense  a  default  Judgment  is  one  taken 
against  a  defendant  who,  having  been  duly  summoned 
in  an  action,  fails  to  enter  an  appearance  in  time;  but 
the  term  is  now  usually  applied  where  default  occurs 
after  appearance  as  well  as  before,  although  such  Judg- 
ments are  also  designated  "nil  dicit." 

Broadly  speaking,  a  judgment  goes  by  default 
whenever,  between  the  commencement  of  the  suit 
and  its  anticipated  decision  in  court,  either  of  the 
parties  omits  to  pursue,  in  the  regular  method,  the 
ordinary  measures  of  prosecution  or  defense.1 
However,  as  will  be  seen,  this  doctrine  is  most  often 
applied  to  defaults  on  the  part  of  defendant;  and, 
strictly  speaking,  a  "judgment  by  default"  is  one 


taken  against  a  defendant  when,  having  been  duly 
summoned  or  cited  in  an  action,  he  fails  to  enter  an 
appearance  at  the  proper  time.2  In  this  strict  sense 
the  term  is  not  properly  applied  to  a  judgment  ren- 
dered where  a  defendant,  after  appearance  and  plea, 
withdraws  his  plea  and  abandons  his  defense,3  un- 
less he  stipulates  that  a  judgment  by  default  may  be 
entered;4  nor  is  it  properly  applied  where  defendant 
fails  to  plead  within  the  time  limited  after  the  over- 
ruling of  his  demurrer.5  Nevertheless,  the  term 
"judgment  by  default"  is  now  generally  applied  to  a 
default  made  after  an  appearance  as  well  as  before,* 
and  may  be  entered  where  defendant  fails  to  answer 
or  plead  within  the  time  allowed  him  for  that  pur- 
pose, as  discussed  infra  §  199,  or  fails  to  appear  on 


Conclusiveness   and   effect  of  stipu- 
lated facts  generally  see  C.J.S.  ti- 
tle Stipulations  §   18,  also  60  C.J. 
p  83  note  66-p  84  note  77. 
Judgment  or  decision  in  controver- 
sies   submitted    to    court    without 
action  see  Q.J.S.   title  Submission 
of  Controversies  S  15,  also  60  C.J. 
p  687  notes  77-89. 
Judicial  act 

In  giving  judgment  on  a  legal  ob- 
ligation which  the  court  finds  to  be 
established  by  stipulated  facts,  the 
court  (performs  a  judicial  act. — Pope 
.  v.  U.  S.,  CtCL,  65  S.Ct.  16,  -323  U.S. 
1,  89  L.E<L  8. 
Facts  in  complaint  and  affidavits 

Where  the  parties  in  legal  effect 
agree  to  submit  the  case  on  the  facts 
appearing  from  the  complaint  and 
affidavits  submitted  on  the  return  to 
an  order  to  show  cause,  the  court 
may  enter  judgment  as  on  an  agreed 
case  under  the  statute. — Luebke  v. 
City  of  Watertown,  284  N.W.  519, 
230  Wis.  512. 
Defendant  not  party  to  agreement 

In  action  to  remove  a  cloud  on  the 
title  to  land,  a  judgment  by  default 
against  defendants  for  failure  to  an- 
swer was  error,  where  judgment  was 
rendered  on  an  agreed  statement  of 
facts  to  which  defendants  were  not 
parties,  and  the  defendants  did  not 
consent  to  signing  judgment  out  of 
term  and  out  of  the  district. — Mer- 
ritt  v.  Inscoe,  193  S.H.  714,  212  N.C. 
526. 
Exceptions  properly  overruled 

Where   parties   agreed   as   to    the 
facts  and  that  the  decision  of  the  su- 


perior court  should  be  final,  an  ex- 
ception -by  defendant  to  findings  for 
plaintiff  must  be  overruled.— -Belk- 
nap  County  v.  City  of  Laconia,  116  A. 
434,  80  N.H.  251. 
97.  Okl.— Oelco  Light  Frigidaire 

Co.  v.  Bab-b,  32  P.2d  894,  168  Okl. 

207. 
Particular  judgment  upheld 

Where  plaintiff,  suing  on  replevin 
redelivery  bond,  admitted  when  case 
was  called  for  trial  that  tender  of 
property  had  been  made  shortly  aft- 
er rendition  of  judgment  requiring 
surrender  of  property,  and  there  was 
no  contention  that  property,  while 
retained,  depreciated  in  value,  judg- 
ment for  plaintiff  for  amount  of 
costs  remaining  due,  but  not  for  val- 
ue of  property,  held  proper. — Delco 
Light  Frigidaire  Co.  v.  Babb,  supra. 
9&  Idaho. — Andrews  v.  Moore,  94  P. 

579,  14  Idaho  465. 
Pa.— Walters   v.   Dooley,   Com.Pl.,    5 

Sch.Beg.  174. 
60  C.J.  -p  84  note  73. 
99.    Pa. — Frailey  v.  Supreme  Coun- 
cil of  American  I*egion  of  Honor, 

20  A.  634,  132  Pa.  -578. 
60  C.J.  p  687  note  83. 

1.  Mont.— Mihelich  v.  Butte  Electric 
Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont  604. 

•34  CJ.  p  147  note  99. 

Default  Judgment  in  federal  courts 

see  (Federal  Courts  §  144  c. 

"A  'default'  occurs  when  there  is 
no  trial  of  issues." — Kelm  y.  Kelm, 
235  N.W.  787,  788,  204  Wis.  301. 

2.  Idaho.— In  re  Smith,  225  P.  495, 
38  Idaho  746. 

324 


2T.J. — New  Jersey  Cash  Credit  Cor- 
poration v.  Zaccaria,  19  A.2d  44 S, 
126  N.J.Law  334. 

N.Y.— Hedfield  v.  Critchely,  14  N.-E. 
2d  377,  277  N.Y.  336,  reargument 
denied  15  N.B.2d  73,  278  N.Y.  483. 

N.C. — Beard  v.  Sovereign  Lodge,  W. 
O.  W.,  Ilt3  S.B.  661,  184  NJC.  154. 

Pa. — Simpson  Motor  Truck  Co.  v. 
Piccolomini,  Com.Pl.,  87  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  37,  1  'Fay.L.J.  149. 

Philippine.— Garcia  v.  Ruiz,  1  Philip- 
pine 634,  1  Off.Gaz.  59. 

Va.— Brame  v.  Nolen,  124  S.B.  290, 
1-39  Va.  413. 

34  C.J.  p  147  note  2. 

3.  Idaho.— In  re  Smith,  f225  P.  495, 
38  Idaho  746. 

34  C.J.  ip  147  note  3. 

4.  111.— Foster  v.  Filley,  2  HI.  256. 

5.  Conn.— Falken   r.   Housatonic   R. 
Co.,  27  A.  1117,  63  Qonn.  258. 

N.Y.— Smith  v.  Barnum,  %  N.Y.S. 
476. 

6.  Pa.— Simpson    Motor    Truck    Co. 
v.  Piccolomini,  Com.Pl.,  37  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.   87,   1  <Fay.L.J.   149. 

Tex. — Corpus    Juris   cited   in   Conti- 
nental Oil  &  Gas  Production  Co.  v. 
Austin,    Civ.App.,   17    S.W.2d   1114, 
1115. 
34  C.  J.  P  147  note  4. 

Object  of  default  judgment  is  to 
reach  case  where  defendant  offers  no 
defense  or  frivolous  defense. — Al- 
bert M.  Travis  Co.  v.  Atlantic  Coast 
Line  R.  Co.,  139  So.  141,  102  -Fla. 
1117. 


49    C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


§  187 


the  trial,  as  discussed  infra  §  198,  or  otherwise  fails 
to  take  some  step  required  by  some  role  of  prac- 
tice or  some  rule  of  court? 

Where  issues  of  fact  have  been  joined,  a  judg- 
ment thereon,  although  defendant  does  not  appear 
at  the  trial,  is  not  a  judgment  by  default;8  but, 
where  there  has  been  a  proper  default,  the  taking 
of  ex  parte  proof  on  which  to  base  a  judgment  does 
not  make  the  judgment  other  than  one  by  default.9 
A  judgment  is  not  by  default  where  defendant  ap- 
pears, files  a  demurrer,  is  present  at  the  final  hear- 
ing, and  joins  in  submitting  the  cause  to  the  court,10 
or  where,  after  defendant's  request  for  an  adjourn- 
ment  is  denied,  he  remains  in  court  and  takes  part 
in  the  trial  by  interposing  objections  to  questions 
and  cross-examining  witnesses.11 

Judgment  nil  dicit.  Nil  dicit  is  generally  the 
technical  form  of  judgment  to  be  rendered  where 
defendant  has  entered  a  general  appearance,  but 
has  failed  to  plead,12  or  where,  having  pleaded,  his 


plea  has  been  stricken  out13  or  is  withdrawn  or 
abandoned  and  no  further  defense  is  made,14  or 
where  he  elects  to  stand  on  a  plea  to  which  a  de- 
murrer has  been  sustained,15  or  where  a  plea  in 
the  nature  of  a  motion,  such  as  a  plea  of  privilege, 
is  sustained,  and  on  transfer  defendant  thereafter 
files  no  other  pleadings.16  However,  although  some 
distinctions  have  been  noted,17  there  is  no  material 
distinction,  either  at  common  law  or  under  the  stat- 
utes, between  a  judgment  by  nil  dicit  and  a  judg- 
ment by  default  in  effect,  operation,  and  the  princi- 
ples applicable  thereto;  and  the  term  "judgment  by 
default"  is  now  usually  applied  to  cases  which,  tech- 
nically speaking,  are  judgments  by  nil  dicit18  Even 
though  the  rendition  of  a  judgment  by  default  aft- 
er the  appearance  of  defendant  when  a  judgment  by 
nil  dicit  should  have  been  entered,  or  of  a  judgment 
by  nil  dicit  when  it  should  have  been  by  default,  is 
technically  erroneous,  it  is  regarded  as  a  mere  in- 
formality or  irregularity,  and  not  a  reversible  er- 


7-  Mont.— Mlhellch  v.  Butte  Electric 
Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont.  604. 

N.H.— Hutchinson  v.  Manchester  St 
R.  Co.,  60  A.  1011,  73  N.H.  271. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Williams 
v.  Jameson,  Civ.App.,  44  S.W.2d 
498,  499,  error  dismissed  Jameson 
v.  Williams,  Com.A3>p.,  67  S.W.2d 
228 — Corpus  Jnria  cited  in  Conti- 
nental Oil  &  Gas  Production  -Co.  v. 
Austin,  Civ.App.,  17  S.W.26:  1114, 
1115. 

Purpose 

(1)  The  purpose  of  the  entry  of  a 
"default"   is  to  speed  the  cause  by 
preventing  a  dilatory  defendant  from 
impeding   plaintiff  in  the   establish- 
ment of  his  claim,  but  it  is  not  in- 
tended  to   furnish  an  advantage  to 
plaintiff  so  that  a  defense  may  be  de- 
feated or  a  Judgment  reached  with- 
out the  difficulty  that  arises  from  a 
contest     by     defendant. — Coggln     v. 
Barfield,   8  So.2d  9,  150  Fla.  551. 

(2)  The  purpose  of  law  regarding 
judgments  by  default  is  not  to  co- 
erce defendants  into  answering  suits, 
but  only  to  provide  method  by  which 
plaintiffs  may  obtain  relief  to- which 
they  are  actually  entitled  when  de- 
fendants   do   not   answer. — Russo  .v. 
Aucoin,  La.App.,  7  So.2d  744. 

8.  Ind. — Indiana  State  Board  of 
Medical  Registration  and  Examina- 
tion v.  Pickard,  177  N.B.  870,  9-3 
IncLApp.  171. 

Mo. — Brooks  v.  McCray,  Aipp.,  145  S. 
W.2d  985 — Meyerhardt  v.  Predman, 
App.,  131  S.W.2d  916— National 
City  Bank  of  St  Louis  v.  Pattiz, 
App.,  26  S.W.2d  815 — Schopp  v. 
Continental  Underwriters*  Co., 
App.,  284  S.W.  808. 

84  C.J.  p  147  note  10. 


3.    Ind.— Debs    v.    Dalton,    34    N.E. 

236,  7  Ind.App.  84. 
Wash. — Van   Buren   v.    Peterson,   185 

P.  572,  108  Wash.  697. 

10.  Okl. — Chivers  v.  Johnston  Coun- 
ty,   161   P.    822,    62   Okl.   2,   L.R.A. 
1917B  1296. 

11.  X.Y.— <Scheckter   Y.    Reiter,    113 
N.Y.S.  729. 

12.  Fla. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Clouts  v.  Spurway,  139  So.  896,  897, 
104  Fla.  340. 

Tex. — Spivey   v.   Saner-Ragley  Lum- 
ber Co.,   Com.App.,  284   S.W.  210 — 
Corpus    Juris    quoted:    in     Grand 
Lodge    Brotherhood     of    Railroad 
Trainmen  v.  Ware,  Civ.Apsp.,  73  S. 
W.2d  1076,  1077,  error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  148  note  17. 
Waiver  of  objections 

A  "judgment  nihil  dicit"  imports 
waiver  of  all  objections  to  service 
and  return  of  process  and  of  mere 
irregularities  of  form  in  stating 
cause  of  action  and  incidental  facts, 
and  admits  cause  of  action  stated  in 
petition,  and  submission  to  such 
judgment  is  an  abandonment  of  ev- 
ery defense  known  or  which  ordi- 
nary diligence  could  have  disclosed. 
— O'Quinn  v.  Tate,  Tex.Civ.App.,  187 
S.W.2d  241. 

13.  111. — Cooper   v.    Buckingham,    4 
I1L   546 — Ferry  v.  National  Motor 
Underwriters,  244  BiApp.  241. 

Tex. — Spivey  v.  Saner-Ragley  Lum- 
ber Co.,  Com. App.,  284  S.W.  210— 
Corpus  Juris  quoted,  in  Grand 
Lodge  Brotherhood  of  Railroad 
Trainmen  v.  Ware,  Civ.App.,  73  S. 
W.2d  1076,  1077,  error  dismissed. 

14.  Tex. — Spivey     v.     Saner-Ragley 
•Lumber    Co.,    Com.App.,    284    S.W. 
210 — Corpus  Juris  guoted  in  Grand 

325 


Lodge  Brotherhood  of  Railroad 
Trainmen  v.  Ware,  Civ.App..  73  S. 
W.2d  1076,  1077,  error  dismissed— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Williams  v. 
Jameson,  Civ.App.,  44  S.W.2d  498, 
499,  error  dismissed  Jameson  v. 
Williams,  Qom.App.f  67  S.W.2d  228 
— Howe  v.  -Central  State  Bank  of 
Coleman,  Civ.App.,  297  S.W.  692. 
34  C.J.  p  148  note  19. 

IS*  111. — Ferry  v.  National  Motor 
Underwriters,  244  IlLApp.  241— 
Chicago,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Bo- 
zarth,  91  IlLApp.  68. 

18.  Tex. — O'Quinn  v.  Tate,  Civ.App., 
187  S.W.2d  241. 

Failure  to  plead  after  decision  on 
plea  or  demurrer  generally  see  in- 
fra §  199  f. 

17.  Tex. — Spivey     v.     Saner-Ragley 
Lumber    Co.,    Com. App.,    284    S.W. 
210 — Grand  Lodge  Brotherhood  of 
Railroad   Trainmen   v.   Ware,    Civ. 
App.,    73    S.W.2d    1076,    error    dis- 
missed. 

34  C.J.  p  148  note  22  [a]. 
Deemed  confession  of  action 

"Judgment  nihil  dicit"  amounts  to 
confession  of  cause  of  action  and 
carries  with  it  more  strongly  than 
judgment  by  default,  admission  of 
justice  thereof. — Evans  v.  McNeill, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d  268,  error 
dismissed — Howe  y.  Central  State 
Bank  of  Coleman,  Tex. Civ.App.,  297 
S.W.  692. 

18.  Fla. — Corpus    .Juris      cited     in 
,  -Clouts    v.    Spurway,    139    So.    896, 

897,  104  Fla.  S40. 
34  C.J.  p  148  note  22. 

19.  IlL—Mann    v.    Brown,    105   N.E. 
328,  263  111.  394. 

34  C.J.  p  148  note  24. 


§  187 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J-S. 


Where  defendant  puts  in  his  plea  and  issue  is 
joined,  and  he  then  fails  to  appear  at  the  trial,  nil 
dicit  is  not  the  proper  form  of  judgment  to  be  en- 
tered, for  he  is  not  in  default  for  want  of  an  an- 
swer.20 At  common  law  there  is  also  a  form  called 
judgment  by  "non  sum  informatus,"  which  is  ren- 
dered where,  instead  of  pleading,  defendant's  attor- 
ney declares  that  he  "is  not  informed"  of  any  an- 
swer or  defense  to  be  made.21 

Non  prosequitur.  Where  plaintiff  refuses  or  fails, 
without  a  sufficient  excuse  therefor,  to  take  in  due 
time  any  of  those  steps  in  the  proceedings  that  he 
is  required  to  take,  in  some  jurisdictions  a  judg- 
ment of  non  prosequitur  or  non  pros,  may  be  taken 
against  him,22  although,  as  appears  in  Dismissal 
and  Nonsuit  §  65,  such  circumstances  generally  war. 
rant  a  judgment  of  dismissal  for  want  of  prosecu- 
tion. The  judgment  of  non  pros,  is  said  to  be  in 
effect  a  judgment  by  default  for  laches.22 

Not  favored.  Since  the  policy  of  the  law  is  to 
have  every  litigated  case  tried  on  its  merits,  judg- 
ments by  default  are  not  favored,24  and,  as  such  a 
judgment  deprives  defendant  of  substantial  rights, 
it  is  lawful  only  when  duly  authorized.25 


§  188.    Constitutional  and  Statutory  Provi- 
sions 

Statutes  governing  default  Judgments  are  to  be 
strictly  construed. 

In  accordance  with  the  principle  stated  supra  § 
187,  that  judgments  by  default  are  not  favored  in 
law,  statutes  governing  default  judgments  are  to 
be  strictly  construed.26 

§  189.    Actions  in  Which  Authorized 

The  actions  In  which  default  Judgments  are  author- 
Ized  depend  on  the  provisions  of  the  statutes,  and  may 
include  or  be  restricted  to  actions  of  contract  for  the 
recovery  of  money  or  damages,  or  to  actions  on  instru- 
ments in  writing  for  the  payment  of  money. 

A  "judgment  by  default"  is  technically  and  strict- 
ly applicable  only  to  actions  arising  under  the  com- 
mon law,27  but  the  term  is  generally  applied  to  like 
judgments  taken  in  statutory  or  special  proceed- 
ings,28 such  as  on  a  motion.29  Under  some  statutes 
the  right  to  take  judgment  by  default,  or  for  want 
of  an  affidavit  of  defense,  is  restricted  to  actions  of 
contract,  or  arising  ex  contractu,30  for  the  recov- 
ery of  money  or  damages,31  and  does  not  include 


20.  Colo. — Taylor  r.  McLaughlin,  2 
Colo.  375. 

Absence  at  trial  as  ground  oi  de- 
fault see  infra  §  198. 

XL  Ark.— Pagre  v.  Button,  29  Ark. 
304. 

34  C.J.  p  148  note  26. 

22.  Md. — Henderson      v.      Maryland 
Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  44  A.  1020,  90 
Md.  47. 

34  C.J.  p  148  note  28. 

23.  Pa. — Derrickson       v.       Colonial 
Trust   Co.,    17   PaoDist.    80,  35   Pa. 
Co.    522 — Walton    v.    Lefever,    17 
Lanc.L.Rev.  203. 

24.  U.S.— Corpus     Juris      cited     ia, 
State    of    Missouri    v.    Fidelity    & 
Casualty  Co.,  D.Q.Mo.,  107  F.2d  343, 
346. 

Iowa. — Jackson  v.  Jones,  300  N.W. 
668,  231  Iowa  106. 

Mont — 'Lindsey  v.  Drs.  Keenan,  An- 
drews &  Allred,  165  P.2d  804— 
•First  Nat  Corporation  v.  Perrine, 
43  R2d  1073,  99  Mont.  454— Koson- 
en  v.  Waara,  285  P.  668,  87  Mont 
24. 

N.M. — Bourgeious  v.  Santa  Fe  Trail 
Stages,  95  P.2d  204,  44  N.M.  453. 

Okl.— Warr  v.  Norton,  m  P.2d  583, 
190  Okl.  114— State  ex  rel.  Higgs 
v.  Muskogee  Iron  Works.  103  P.2d 
101,  187  Okl.  419— State  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Liddell,  61  P.2d  i!075,  178 
Okl.  114— Lane  v.  O'Brien,  49  P.2d 
171,  173  Okl.  475— Standard  v. 
Fisher,  35  fP.2d  878,  169  Okl.  18— 
Morrell  v.  Morrell,  299  P.  866,  149 
Okl.  187. 

34  C.J.  p  1'47  note  14. 


25.  Fla. — Holder   Turpentine  Co.   v. 
M.  C.  Kiser  Co.,  67  So.  85,  68  Fla. 
312. 

Pa. — Globe    &    Republic    Ins.    Co.   v. 

Davis,    190   A.    175,    125    Pa.Super. 

91. 

"The  default  of  a  party  to  an  ac- 
tion is  always  a  harsh  measure,  and 
no  party  should  ever  be  defaulted, 
unless  the  grounds  upon  which  such 
default  is  authorized  are  clearly  and 
authoritatively  established  and  are 
in  such  clear  and  certain  terms  that 
the  party  to  be  defaulted  can  know, 
without  Question,  that  he  is  subject 
to  default  if  he  does  not  act  in  a 
certain  manner." — State  of  Missouri 
v.  Fidelity  &  Casualty  Co.,  D.C.Mo., 
107  F.2d  -3413,  345— Janoske  v.  Porter, 
C.C.A.I11.,  «64  F.2d  958,  960. 

26.  Tex. — 'Middleton  v.   Moore,   Civ. 
App.,    4    S/W.2d    988,    reversed   on 
other  grounds  Moore  v.  Middleton, 
Com.App.,  12  S-W.Sd  9-95. 
"Notwithstanding  the  value  of  the 

Statute  as  preventing  unnecessary 
delay  in  litigation,  the  Courts  of  this 
State  have  never  been  inclined  to 
unduly  extend  the  language  of  the 
Statute  and  uniformly  have  refused 
judgment  when  a  reasonable  doubt 
existed  as  to/  the  right  of  the  plain- 
tiff to  what  has  been  termed  a  'snap 
judgment/" — Selly  v.  Fleming  Coal 
Co.,  180  A,  826,  827, -7  W.W.Harr., 
Del.,  -34. 

Particular  statutes  construed 
Md.— .Carey  v.  Howard,  16  A.2d  '289, 
178  Md.  512. 

326 


N.C.— McNair   v.    Yarboro,   1118    S.B. 

913,  186  N.C,  111. 
Pa. — Borteck  v.   Goldenburg,    87  (Pa,. 

Super.  '602 — Deemer  &  Co.  v.  Kline 

Tp.  School  Dist,  137  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 

698,  6  Sch.Reg.  378. 

27.  Va. — Davis    v.     Commonwealth, 
16  Qratt  134,  57  Va.  U34. 

28.  Ind. — Gwinner  v.  Gary  Connect- 
ing R.  Co.,  103  N.B.  794,  182  Ind. 
553. 

34  C.J.  p  149  note  33. 

29.  Va. — Davis     v.    Commonwealth, 
16  Gratt.  134,  57  Va.  134. 

34  C.J.  p  1-49  note  84. 

30.  Wash. — Garrett      v.      Nespelem 
Consol.    Mines,    US 9    iP.2d    273,  -18 
Washed  340. 

34  C.J.  p  149  note  36. 

31.  U.S. — In  re   Kimbrough,   D.C.N. 
T.,  8  F.Supp.  848. 

N.C.— Baker  v.  Corey,  141  S.B.  892, 
195  N.C.  299 — Beard  v.  Sovereign 
Lodge,  W.  O.  W.,  113  S.E.  661, 
184  N.C.  1&4- 

Wash. — Garrett  v.  Nespelem  Consol. 
Mines,  139  P.2d  2713,  18  Wash.2d 
340. 

34  C.J  p  149  note  37. 
Actions  within,  role 

(1)  An  action  in  assumpsit  for 
damages  for  breach  of  contract  to 
deliver  lumber  is  an  action  on  a 
contract  for  the  payment  of  money 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute 
authorizing  entry  of  judgment  as  in 
case  of  default  in  certain  actions. — 
Stevens- Jarvis  Lumber  Co.  v.  Quix- 
ley  Lumber  Co.,  229  ULApp.  419. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


190 


actions  for  damages  founded  on  a  tort;82  but  in 
other  jurisdictions  default  judgments  in  actions  for 
damages  founded  on  tort  have  been  allowed.33  Also 
under  some  statutes  the  right  to  take  a  default  judg- 
ment does  not  include  an  action  in  which  the  re- 
lief to  be  afforded  on  default  is  to  be  ascertained 
by  a  jury  or  by  the  judge.3*  Still  other  statutory 
provisions  restrict  the  remedy  to  actions  on  instru- 
ments in  writing  for  the  payment  of  money,35  and 
require  that  such  instrument,  a  copy  of  which  must 
be  attached  to  the  affidavit,  show  a  definite  amount 
due.36  Under  a  statute  permitting  an  action  to  be 
maintained  for  a  debt  or  liability  not  yet  due,  as 
where  defendant  is  about  to  depart  from  the  state 
or  conceal  his  assets,  a  default  judgment  to  become 
effective  on  maturity  of  the  debt  is  authorized.37 
An  objection  that  a  default  judgment  may  not  be 
taken  in  a  suit  in  equity  is  of  no  avail  where  dis- 
tinctions between  actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity 
have  been  abolished.38  In  an  action  for  a  declara- 
tory judgment,  judgment  by  default  will  not  be  al- 
lowed, and  formal  proof  must  be  presented.39 
Where  the  action  is  commenced  by  capias,  there 
cannot  at  common  law  be  a  judgment  for  default  of 
appearance.40 

Action  on  life  insurance  policy.  It  has  been  held 
that  the  amount  claimed  on  a  life  insurance  policy  is 
a  liquidated  amount,  which  may  be  verified  by  affi- 
davit and  on  which  a  judgment  by  default  may  be 
rendered,41  and  that,  where  the  payment  of  the 
premium  is  alleged,  and  there  is  judgment  by  de- 

(2)  As  an  action  for  damages  for 
a  buyer's  refusal  to  accept  goods  is 
one  on  a  contract  for  the  payment 
of  money,  it  is  within  the  statute 
providing  for  default  judgment  in 
suit  on  contract,  express  or  implied, 
for  the  payment  of  money. — Orsinger 
v.  Consolidated  Flour  Mills  Co.,  C.C. 
A.I11.,  284  F.  224,  certiorari  denied 
43  <S,Ct  248,  2-60  U.S.  746,  67  L.Ed. 
49-3. 

03)  Other    actions. — Thompson    v. 
Dillingham,    11*2    S.B.   521,    133    N.C. 
566— <34  C.J.  P  149  note  37  [a]. 
Actions  not  within  rule 
N.Y. — Abramson    v.   Held,   32   N.Y.S. 

2d  274,  2613  App.Div.  871. 
3«4  C.J.  p  149  note  137  [b]. 


fault,  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  such  payment;42 
but  it  has  also  been  held  that  a  life  insurance  pol- 
icy is  not  such  an  instrument  in  writing  for  the  pay- 
ment of  money  as  will  permit  a  judgment  by  default 
for  want  of  an  affidavit  of  defense  to  be  taken 
thereon,  since  the  happening  or  performance  of  the 
contingencies  on  which  the  policy  is  to  become  due, 
such  as  the  death  of  the  insured,  furnishing  proofs 
of  death,  etc.,  do  not  appear  from  the  face  of  the 
policy.43 

Action  on  fire  insurance  policy.  It  has  been  held, 
under  statutes  relating  to  judgment  by  default,  that 
an  action  on  a  fire  insurance  policy  is  for  the  re- 
covery of  money  only,  although  the  damages  de- 
manded are  unliquidated,44  but  that  it  is  not  an  ac- 
tion founded  on  an  instrument  ascertaining  plain- 
tiffs demand.45  Some  courts  have  held  that  a  fire 
insurance  policy  is  an  instrument  for  the  payment 
of  money;46  but  other  courts  have  held  the  con- 
trary where  the  policy  contains  a  provision  for  pro- 
rating liability  in  case  of  concurrent  insurance.47 

§  190.    In  Whose  Favor  Default  May  Be  Tak- 
en 

A  judgment  by  default  can  be  rendered  only  In  favor 
of  a  party  to  the  action. 

In  accordance  with  the  general  rule,  stated  supra 
§  28,  that  no  valid  judgment  can  be  rendered  for  or 
against  one  who  is  not  a  party  to  the  action,  a  judg- 
ment by  default  can  be  rendered  only  in  favor  of  a 
person  who  is  a  party  to  the  action,48  and  not  in 


32.  Pa.— Prentzel   v.    Snyder,   5  Pa, 
DIst.  &  Co.  178,  38  York  Leg.Rec. 
25. 

34  C.J.  p  1149  note  38. 

33.  U.S.— Lanham  v.  Cline,  DJCJda- 
ho,  44  F.Supp.  897. 

Tex. — Metzger  v.   Gambill,   Civ.App.» 
#7  S.W.2d  1077,  error  refused. 

34.  s.C.— Marion   v.    Charleston,   &2 
S.B.  4-18,  72  S.C.  576. 

34  C.J.  p  149  note  40. 


35,    Del.— Selly  v.  Fleming  Coal  Co., 
180  A,  326,  7  W.W.Harr.  34. 

Del.— Selly  v.  Fleming  Coal  Co., 
supra. 

37.  Ky.— Cornett  v.  Brashear,   9    S. 
W.2d  802,  225  Ky.  529. 

38.  Neb.— Weir  v.  -Woodruff,  186  N. 
W.  988,  107  Neb.  585. 

Suit  to  set  aside  fraudulent  transfer 
Statutory  provision  relating  to  en- 
try of  judgment  after  proof,  on  fail- 
ure of  defendant  to  answer,  applies 
In  cases  within  exceptions  to  statute 
providing  that  material  allegations 
of  petition  not  controverted  by  an- 
swer shall  be  taken  as  true,  and 
does  not  affect  right  of  plaintiff  to 
default  judgment  in  action  on  for- 
eign judgments  and  to  set  aside 
fraudulent  transfer  of  stock  in  cor- 
poration.— Danbom  v.  Danbom,  273 
N.W.  502,  132  Neb.  858. 

39.  N.Y.— Griscti  v.  Mortgage  Com- 
mission,  291  N.T.S.   257,   249   App. 
Div.  632— Wilson  v.  Wilson,  43  N. 
T.S.2d  526,  181  Misc.  941. 

40.  Pa,— Barbe    v.    Davis,    1    Miles 
118. 

41.  Md. — Knickerbocker     Life     Ins. 
Co.  v.  Hoeske,  32  Md.  317. 

327 


42.  Tex.— Union  Cent.  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.     Lipscomb,     Civ.  App.,     27     S.W. 
307. 

43.  pa. — Kiley   v.    Mutual    Ben.    As- 
soc.,    2    ChestCo.    i305 — Morton    v. 
New  York  Mut.   Life   Ins.  Co.,  12 
Phila.  246. 

44.  Wis.— Schobacher     v. "   German- 
town   Farmers'    Mut.    Ins.    Co.,    17 
N.W.  969,  59  Wis.  86. 

2-6  C.J.  p  570  note  27. 

45.  Ala.— North      Alabama      Home 
Protection  v.   Caldwell,   5   So.  -338, 
85   Ala,   607— Manhattan   Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Fowler,  76  Ala.  872. 

46.  Pa. — Lycoming  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Dickinson,  4  Wkly.N.C.   271. 

26  C.J.  p  570  note  80. 

47.  Ya. — Commercial    Union    Assur. 
Co.  v.  Eberhart,  14  S.B.  836,  88  Ya. 
952. 

48.  Minn. — Bradley    v.     Sandilands, 
68  N.W.  S2fl,   66  (Minn.  40,   61  Am. 
S.R  -386. 

Plaintiff  not  entitled  to  sue 

A  foreign  administratrix  who  was 
not  entitled  under  Kentucky  statute 
to  maintain  action  for  conversion  in 
Kentucky  federal  district  court  was 
not  entitled  to  a  judgment  by  default 


§  190 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


favor  of  one  who  is  not  such  a  party***  unless  he  is 
made  a  party  by  an  order  of  the  court.60 

Deceased  plaintiff.  A  judgment  rendered  by  de- 
fault in  a  suit  instituted  in  the  name  of  a  dead  per- 
son is  not  void,  but  merely  erroneous,  where  de- 
fendant is  duly  served  but  fails  to  appear  and  de- 


Codefendant  becoming  plaintiff.  One  who  is  orig- 
inally a  defendant,  but  afterward,  by  leave  of  court, 
becomes  a  plaintiff  and  files  a  cross  bill,  is  not  enti- 
tled to  a  default  judgment  against  his  codefendants, 
if  they  had  no  notice  of  his  cross  bill  or  that  he  had 
changed  his  status  in  the  case.62 

§  191.    Against  Whom  Default  May  Be  Tak- 
en 

a.  In  general 

b.  Codefendants 

a.  In  General 

Ordinarily  a  default  Judgment  may  be  taken  only 
against  persons  who  are  properly  named  or  described  as 
parties,  in  the  complaint. 

As  a  general  rule  a  judgment  by  default  may  be 
taken  against  such  persons  only  as  are  properly 
named  or  described  as  parties  in  the  complaint53 
and  who  have  appeared  or  been  properly  served 
with  process,54  and  not  against  persons  who  are 


not  so  named  or  described55  although  they  have 
been  served  with  process,56  nor  against  persons  who 
are  not  otherwise  made  parties  to  the  action.57 

Nome.  A  judgment  by  default  should  be  taken 
against  defendant  in  his  real  name,58  and  a  judg- 
ment taken  against  a  person  sued  and  served  by  a 
fictitious  name  is  irregular5^  unless  the  declaration 
or  complaint  is  amended  by  the  insertion  of  his  true 
name.  60 

Persons  in  military  or  naval  service.  Under  vari- 
ous federal  and  state  statutes  enacted  during  the 
war  to  extend  protection  to  the  civil  rights  of  per- 
sons in  the  military  and  naval  service,  before  en- 
tering a  judgment  by  default  plaintiff  is  required 
in  certain  cases  to  file  an  affidavit  showing  that  de- 
fendant is  not  in  such  service,61  or,  in  the  absence 
of  such  affidavit,  to  secure  an  order  of  court  direct- 
ing such  entry.62  Such  a  judgment  without  such  an 
affidavit,  however,  has  been  held  not  absolutely  void, 
but  voidable  only.63  Under  the  provision  that  a 
judgment  rendered  against  a  person  in  the  military 
service,  who  was  prejudiced  in  his  defense  by  rea- 
son of  such  service,  may  be  opened  to  permit  such 
person  to  put  in  his  defense,  the  judgment  so  ren- 
dered is  not  void  but  voidable,64  and  may  be  chal- 
lenged only  by  the  person  against  whom  it  was  ren- 
dered.65 The  statute  does  not  prevent  the  rendi- 


against  defendant  which  had  failed] 
to  answer  petition. — Ballard  v.  UnK-  j 
ed  Distillers  Co.,  D.C.Ky.,  28  F.Supp. 
6*3. 

49.  La.— Seib  v.  Cooper,  127  S-j.  380, 
170  La.  105. 

Okl. — Rebold  v.  National  Supply  Co., 

271  P.  852,  13'3  O'.il.  140. 
3-4  C.J.  p  149  note  44. 
Intervene* 

A  voluntary  intervenes  in  an  ac- 
tion in  claim  and  delivery  for  pos- 
session of  an  automobile,  cannot 
complain  that  plaintiff,  by  obtaining 
possession  under  o  statute  and  t"ien 
dismissing  'his  complaint,  subjected 
himself  to  judgment  without  p)ead- 
ings  for  the  return  of  the  property 
to  defendant,  since  such  intervener 
is  -not  affected  by  proceedings  be- 
tween the  original  parties,  both  ad- 
verse to  him. — Sanders  v.  Milford 
Auto  Co.,  218  P.  126,  62  Utah  110. 

50.  Miss. — Ettringham  v.  Handy,  60 
Miss.  '334. 

51.  W.Va.— McMillan     v.    Hickman, 
14  S.E,  227,  -35  W.Va,  705, 

34  C.J.  p  U49  note  46. 

52.  Tex. — Cole  v.  Grigsby,  Civ.App.( 
35  S.W.  680. 

53.  CaL — Burns  v.  Downs,  108  P.2d 
9&3,  42  Cal.App.2d  322. 

Ga. — Federal  Land  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia v.  Shingler,  T57  S.E.  911,  4'3 
"Ga.App.  92,  reversed  on  other 


grounds  162  S.B.  '815,  174  Ga.  352-, 

conformed  to  164  S.E.  213,  45  Ga. 

App.  199. 
Okl. — Green  Const.  Co.  v.  Oklahoma 

County,  50  «P.2d  625,  174  Okl.  290. 
Tex. — Postal  Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n 

v.  Powell,  Civ.App.,  47  S.W.2d  343, 

error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  149  note  48. 
Ratification 

Even  though  original  action -in  re- 
plevin was  filed  without  knowledge 
or  consent  of  named  plaintiff,  such 
plaintiff  would  be  bound  by  default 
judgment  therein  if  it  ratified  the 
action,  and  ratification  could  be  in- 
ferred if  plaintiff  remained  silent 
when,  according  to  ordinary  experi- 
ence, It  should  have  spoken  if  it 
did  not  consent. — Hanover  Fire  Ins. 


Co.    v. 
111. 


Isabel,    C.C.A.Okl.,    129    F.Sd 


54.  Kan. — Farmers'    Loan   &   Trust 
Co.  v.   Essex,   71  P.  268,   66  Kan. 
100. 

34  C.J.  p  Jj49  note  49. 

A  party  who  purports  to  represent 
himself,  assumes  the  responsibility 
of  watching  calendars  and  trial 
dates.— Latham  v.  Salisbury,  61  N.E. 
2d  306,  32-6  XlLApp.  253. 
Jurisdiction  of  person  generally  see 

infra  8  192. 

55.  Cal.— Ford  v.  Doyle,  37  Cal.  -346. 
34  C.J.  p  149  note  60. 

328 


5&    Cal.— Lamping  v.  Hyatt,  27  Cal. 

99. 
111. — Lewis    v.    West    Side    Trust    & 

Savings  Bank,   36  N.E.2d  57-3,  877 

111.  584. 

57.  Tex.— Buetell  v.  Courand,  29  S. 
W.  114'6,  9  Tex.Civ.App.  564. 

34  C.J.  p  149  note  '52. 

58.  Cal.— Curtis  v.  Herricfc,  14  Cal. 
117,  7.3  Am.D.  6»32. 

59.  N.Y.— Fischer    v.    Hetherington, 
32  N.Y.S.  795,  11  Misc.  575. 

34  C.J.  p  150  note  54. 

60.  Cal. — San  Francisco  v.  Burr,  36 
•P.   771,   4  CaLUnrep.Cas.   634. 

N.Y.— Upham  v.  Conn,  14  N.Y.Civ. 
iProc.  '27. 

61.  Da. — Eureka  Homestead  Soc.  v. 
Clark,  83  So.  190,  145  La.  917. 

Suspension  of  liabilities  of  persons  in 
military  or  naval  service  generally 
see  Army  and  Navy  §  37  f. 

62.  La. — Eureka  Homestead  Soc.  v. 
Clark,  supra. 

63.  La. — Eureka  Homestead  Soc.   v. 
Clark,  supra. 

64.  Tex. — J.  C.  Penney  Co.  v.  Ober- 
priller,   CivJlpp.,   16-3   S.W.2d  1067, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  170   S. 
W.2d  607,  141  Tex.  128. 

65.  Tex. — J.  C.  Penney  Co.  v.  Ober- 
priller,  supra. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  191 


tion  of  a  judgment  against  a  person  in  the  military 
service  who  was  in  default  before  his  enlistment.66 

Deceased  defendant.  Where  defendant  dies  aft- 
er default  and  before  the  execution  of  a  writ  of 
inquiry  or  other  proceedings  for  final  judgment,  a 
final  judgment  cannot  be  entered  thereon67  unless 
the  action  is  revived  against  his  personal  repre- 
sentative.68 

b.  Codefendants 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Where  some  only  default 

(3)  Want  of  service  on  some  defend- 

ants 

(4)  Successful  defense  by  some  defend- 

ants 

(1)  In  General 

Where  all  defendants  jointly  sued  and  served  default, 
a  default  Judgment  cannot,  be  entered  against  some  with- 
out discontinuing  as  to  the  others. 

Where  all  of  several  defendants  who  are  jointly 
sued  and  served  with  process  are  equally  in  default, 
a  judgment  by  default  cannot  be  entered  against 
some  of  them  only69  without  discontinuing  as  to  the 
others.™ 

(2)  Where  Some  Only  Default 

At  common  law,  If  some  defendants  default,  a  sep- 
arate final  judgment  cannot  be  entered  against  them 
alone;  and  while  under  statutes  such  a  judgment  Is 
proper  in  some  cases  It  is  not  permitted  where  the  de- 
fendants are  jointly  liable. 

As  is  discussed  supra  §  34,  nt  common  law,  and 
in  the  absence  of  statute  otherwise,  where  several 
defendants  are  joined  in  an  action  ex  contractu, 


and  all  are  brought  before  the  court  by  service  or 
appearance,  plaintiff  must  recover  against  all  or 
none.  In  accordance  with  this  rule,  if  some  de- 
fendants default,  a  final  judgment  in  favor  of  plain- 
tiff can  be  entered  only  against  all  defendants,71 
and  a  several  judgment  cannot  be  entered  against 
those  only  who  have  defaulted72  or  against  that  de- 
fendant alone  who  has  answered78  In  such  a  case 
there  may  be  entered  an  interlocutory  judgment  of 
default  against  the  defaulting  defendant,74  but  a 
final  judgment  cannot  be  entered  on  the  default  un- 
til the  issue  as  to  the  other  defendants  is  success- 
fully disposed  of.75 

Under  statutes.  As  discussed  supra  §  33,  in  some 
jurisdictions  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  in  ac- 
tions regularly  commenced  against  several  joint  de- 
fendants the  court  may,  whenever  a  se\*eral  judg- 
ment would  be  proper,  render  judgment  against  one 
or'  more  of  them,  leaving  the  action  to  proceed 
against  the  others.  Under  these  statutes,  where  the 
rights  or  liabilities  of  a  portion  of  the  codefend- 
ants  who  are  in  default  is  several,  or  joint  and  sev- 
eral, plaintiff  may  take  a  separate  judgment  by  de- 
fault against  them  and  proceed  to  a  determination 
of  the  issues  as  against  defendants  who  appear  and 
answer,76  and,  as  appears  infra  subdivision  b  (4) 
of  this  section  this  rule  applies  although  defendant 
who  sets  up  a  separate  defense  establishes  it,  and 
judgment  is  rendered  in  his  favor,  and  although  sep- 
arate interlocutory  judgments  by  default  are  en- 
tered against  the  defaulting  defendants  severally  at 
different  periods  and  on  separate  service  of  proc- 
ess.77 However,  even  under  such  statute,  if  the. 
claim  is  on  a  joint  liability,  no  final  judgment  by  de- 


66.  Tex. — J.  C.  Penney  Co.  v.  Ober- 
priller,  supra, 

67.  N.Y.— In  re  Laughlin's  Estate,  8 
N.Y.S.2d    842,    255    App.Div.    927. 

34  C.J.  p  76  note  67   [a]    (-6),  p  152 
note  98. 

68.  <Fa. — Nuss    v.    -Kemmerer,    Com. 
PI.,  17  Leh.L.J.  879,  52  York  Leg. 
Rec.  15. 

Tenn. — Carter   v.    Carrier,    8   Yerg. 
4.11,  24  Am.D.  585. 

69.  111.— Wisner  v.  Catherwood,   225 
IlLApp.  471. 

34  C.J.  p  150  note  63. 

70.  Wis. — Stewart  v.  -Glenn,  5  Wis. 
14. 

71.  N.Y.— Chippewa  Credit  Corpora- 
tion v.  Strozewski,  19  N.Y.S.2d  457, 
259  App.Div.  187. 

34  C.J.  p  150  note  68. 

72.  N.J.— Coles  v.   McKenna,  78  A. 
344,   80  N.J.Law  48. 

34  C.J.  p  150  note  07. 


73.  111.— Wells   v.    Reynolds,    4    111. 
191. 

34  C.J.  p  150  note  €8. 

74.  N.J.— Corpns     Juris     cited     i» 
Kople  v.  Zalon,  2  A.2d  56,  57f  121 
N.JXaw   270,    appeal   dismissed    5 
A.2d  750,  122  N.J.Law  422. 

Tex.— Slndorf  v.  Cen-Tex  Supply  Co., 

Civ.App.,  172  S.W.2d  775. 
34  C.J.  -p  150  note  69. 

75.  111. — Townsend  v.  Postal  Benefit 
Ass'n  of  Illinois.  2-62  Ill.App.  483. 

Tex. — Sindorf  v.  Cen-Tex  Supply  Co., 

Civ.App.,  172  S.W.2d  775. 
Wash.— Marinovich  v.  Lindh,  220  IP. 

807,  127  Wash.  349. 
34  C.J.  p  150  note  70. 

76.  Ind.— Moll   v.   Goedeke,   25  N.B. 
2d  258,  107  -Ind.iA.pp.  446. 

La.— Campti  Motor  Co.  v.  Jolley,  120 

So.  684,  10  La.App.  286. 
Mich.— Kunsky-Trendle  Broadcasting 

Corporation  v.  Kent  Circuit  Judge. 

275  N.W.  175,  281  Mich.  567. 
N.C.— Brooks  v.  White,  122  S.B.  561, 

187  N.C.  6S6. 

329 


Tex.— Buttrill  v.  Occidental  Life  Ins. 

Co.,   Civ.App.,   45   S.W.2d  636. 
314  C.J.  p  151  note  72. 
Convenience  as  controlling1 

Where  there  are  several  defend- 
ants, the  trial  court  may,  as  conven- 
ience dictates,  render  judgment  by 
default  against  nonappearing  parties 
before  final  hearing,  or  await  the 
trial  and  render  appropriate  judg- 
ment as  to  all  parties  at  that  time. 
—Ex  parte  Mason,  104  So.  52*,  213 
Ala.  279. 

Zn  condemnation  proceedings  the 
highway  commission's  failure  to  en- 
ter default  of  one  or  more  nonap- 
pearing defendants  did  not  render 
judgment  void  as  to  defendant  who 
appeared  and  contested  case,  since 
the  only  effect  of  entering  the  de- 
fault would  be  to  bar  the  defaulted 
parties  from  participating  in  further 
proceedings. — State  v.  Whitcomb,  22 
P.2d  82-3,  94  Mont,  415. 

77.    Md.— Loney   v.    Bailey,    48   Md. 
10. 


§  191 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


fault  can  be  entered  xmtil  the  issues  raised  against 
the  other  defendants  are  finally  disposed  of;78  nor 
can  a  judgment  by  default  be  entered  against  a  de- 
fendant who  is  only  secondarily  liable,  until  a  suc- 
cessful termination  of  the  suit  against  defendant 
primarily  liable.79  A  judgment  by  default  cannot 
be  entered  against  persons  who,  being  necessary 
parties  by  virtue  of  having  the  same  interests  as 
plaintiff,  are  brought  into  the  action  as  defend- 
ants.80 

Discontinuance  as  to  some.  Where  one  or  more 
of  several  joint  defendants  who  are  jointly  liable 
default,  plaintiff  cannot  discontinue  or  dismiss  his 
action  as  to  one  defendant  and  take  judgment  by 
default  against  the  others,81  or  discontinue  the  ac- 
tion as  to  the  ones  who  have  defaulted  and  proceed 
to  judgment  against  the  others,82  unless  the  one  as 
to  whom  the  discontinuance  is  had  has  pleaded  a 
matter  going  to  his  personal  discharge,83  or  unless 
the  cause  of  action  is  joint  and  several.84 

(3)  Want  of  Service  on  Some  Defendants 

Where  some  of  several  joint  defendants  are  not 
served,  a  default  Judgment  cannot,  In  the  absence  of 
statute,  be  rendered  against  any  of  them;  but  some 
statutes  permit  judgment  in  such  case  to  be  entered 
against  the  defendants  who  were  served  provided  the 
liability  is  several. 

Since,  as  discussed  infra  §  192,  a  legal  judgment 
by  default  cannot  be  rendered  against  a  defendant 
who  has  neither  appeared  nor  been  duly  served  with 
notice  of  the  suit,  where  one  or  more  of  several 
joint  defendants  has  not  been  properly  served  with 
process  or  appeared,  a  judgment  by  default,  in  the 
absence  of  statute,  cannot  be  rendered  against  any 
of  them.86  Under  appropriate  statutes,  however, 
if  the  codefendants  are  severally  liable,  judgment 


by  default  may  be  entered  against  defendants  who 
have  been  served  with  process,  and  have  defaulted, 
without  regard  to  the  other  defendants.86  It  has 
been  held  that  a  joint  judgment  against  all,  where 
some  have  been  served  irregularly  or  not  at  all, 
is  not  entirely  void;87  it  is  erroneous  merely,  and 
accordingly  valid  as  to  the  person  served,  at  least 
on  collateral  attack,88  although  it  may  be  reversed 
on  appeal  or  error89  or,  if  it  comes  within  the  rules 
considered  infra  §  334,  set  aside  on  a  proper  appli- 
cation in  the  court  below;  Under  some  joint  debt- 
or acts,  judgment  by  default  may  be  taken  against 
all  joint  defendants,  although  only  some  are  served, 
and  the  judgment  will  be  good  as  against  the  joint 
property  of  all,  and  the  separate  property  of  those 
served.90  A  judgment  in  favor  of  one  defendant 
against  another  cannot  be  entered  on  the  default  of 
the  latter,  unless  he  had  notice  and  opportunity  to 
defend  as  against  his  codefendant.91 

(4)  Successful  Defense  by  Some  Defendants 

A  successful  defense  by  one  defendant  on  a  ground 
not  personal  to  himself  Inures  to  the  benefit  of  his  de- 
faulting codefendant  so  as  to  bar  a  Judgment  against 
him;  but  the  rule  may  be  otherwise  where  the  cause 
of  action  is  joint  and  several. 

Where  one  defendant  suffers  a  default,  while  the 
other  pleads  and  goes  to  trial  and  defends  suc- 
cessfully on  a  ground  not  personal  to  himself,  his 
success  will  inure  to  the  benefit  of  the  defaulting 
defendant,  and  judgment  must  be  rendered  for 
both,92  and  in  such  a  case  it  is  erroneous  to  render 
a  judgment  for  defendants  who  have  successfully 
defended  the  action  and  against  those  who  have  de- 
faulted.93 Under  some  statutes,  where  the  cause 
of  action  is  joint  and  several,  judgment  may  be 
taken  against  defendant  who  defaults,  although  it 


78.  N.Y.— Nathan  v.  Zierler,  228  N. 
T.-S.  170,  22i3  App.Div.  355 — Gross- 
man Steel  Stair  Corp.  v.  Steinberg, 
54  N.Y.S.2d  275. 

34  C.J.  P  151  note  75. 

79.  Cal.— Corpus     Juris      cited     i» 
Plott   v.    York,    91    P.2d    924,    926, 
33  Cal.App.2d  460. 

Colo. — 'Pratt  v.  South  Canon  Supply 
Co.,   107   P.    1-105,   47  Colo.   478. 

80.  Cal.— Watkins  v.  Nutting,  110  P. 
2d  384,  17  Oal.2d  490. 

81.  111. — Tolraan  v.  Spaulding,  4  111. 
13. 

34  C.J.  p  151  note  78. 

88.    Ind. — Britton     v.     Wheeler,     8 

Black*.  31. 
314  C.J.  p  151  note  79. 

83.  111.— Tolman  v.  Spaulding,  4  111. 
13. 

Ind. — Britton   v.   Wheeler,    8   Blackf. 
•31. 

84.  U.S.— Conner   v.    Cocker!!!,    C.C. 


DXJ.,  <6  F.Cas.NoJ3,112,  4  Cranch  C. 

C.  3. 

34  C.J.  p  151  note  81. 
65.    Miss.— kartin    v.    Williams.    42 

Miss.  210,  97  Am.D.  4tf6. 
34  C.J.  p  151  note  8i3. 
88,    Cal. — Edwards    v.    Hellings,    37 

P.  218,  1013  Cal.  204. 
"34  C.J.  p  151  note  85. 

87.  Tex. — Ross  v.  Drouilhet,  80  S.W. 
241,  34  Tex.€iv.App.  327. 

34  C.J.  p  152  note  86. 

88.  Mo.— Boyd  V.  Ellis,  18  S.W.  29, 
107  Mo.  394. 

34  C.J.  p  152  note  87. 

89.  Minn.— Dillon   v.   Porter,   -31   N. 
W.  56,  36  Minn.  Ml. 

•34  C.J.  p  152  note  88. 

90.  N.Y.— Lahey  v.  Kingron,  K3  Abb. 
Pr.  192,  22  How-Pr.  209. 

91.  N.Y.— <New  Netherland  Bank  of 
New   York  v.   Boucheron  Co.,   20<3 
N.Y.&  76*6,  122  Misc.  690. 

330 


92.  Ga. — Rhodes  v.   Southern  Flour 
&  Grain  Co.,  168   S.E.  237,   45  Ga. 
App.  13. 

Ind. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Second 
Niat.  Bank  v.  Scudder,  6  N.E.2d 
955,  959,  212  Ind.  283. 

Mo.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Electro- 
lytic Chlorine  Co.  v.  Wallace  & 
Tiernan  Co.,  41  S.W.2d  1049,  -105)3, 
•328  Mo.  782. 

N.J.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kople  v. 
'Zalon,  2  A.2d  56,  58,  121  K.J.Law 
270,  appeal  dismissed  5  A.2d  750, 
122  -N.J.Law  422. 

34  C.J.  p  152  note  92. 

93.  Ind. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    IB 

Second  Nat.  Bank  v.  Scudder,  6  N. 
E.2d  955,  959,  212  Ind.  283. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Electro- 
lytic Chlorine  Co.  v.  Wallace  & 
Tiernan  Co.,  41  &W.2d  1049,  10513, 
•328  Mo.  782. 

34  C.J.  p  152  note  93.    ' 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  192 


is  given  in  favor  of  the  answering  defendant,^  es- 
pecially .where  the  defense  pleaded  by  the  latter  was 
a  personal  one.95 

§  192.    Jurisdiction  in  General 

a.  In  general 

b.  Obtaining  jurisdiction  of  defendant 

a.  In  General 

Jurisdiction  of  the  defendant  and  of  the  subject  mat- 
ter is  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  default  Judgment. 

As  in  the  case  of  judgments  generally,  it  is  es- 
sential to  the  validity  of  a  judgment  by  default  that 
the  court  rendering  the  judgment  have  jurisdiction 
of  defendant9^  and  of  the  subject  matter;97  and, 
as  is  discussed  infra  subdivision  b  of  this  section, 
in  order  to  have  such  jurisdiction  there  must  have 
been  either  due  service  of  process  on  defendant  or 
a  valid  appearance  by  him  or  on  his  behalf.  If 
the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  defendant  and  of 
the  subject  matter,  and  there  are  no  fatal  defects 
in  the  proceedings,  the  court  has  jurisdiction  to 
enter  judgment  by  default.98  Jurisdiction  of  the 
court  to  enter  a  default  judgment  is  not  affected 


by  the  fact  that  the  judgment  is  excessive,  where 
the  excessiveness  is  due  to  defendant's  default99 

b.  Obtaining  Jurisdiction  of  Defendant 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Process 

(3)  Service 

(4)  Appearance 

(1)  In  General 

In  order  to  support  a  default  Judgment,  the  defend- 
ant must  be  properly  served  with  due  process  or  volun- 
tarily appear. 

In  order  for  the  court  to  obtain  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  defendant  essential  to  support  a  judgment  by 
default,  defendant  must  be  properly  served  with 
due  process  or  notice,  or  must  voluntarily  appear 
in  person  or  by  attorney.1  Mere  knowledge  of  the 
pendency  of  the  suit,2  and  even  the  attendance  on 
court,3  will  not  support  a  default  judgment.  If  the 
court's  jurisdiction  of  defendant  lias  been  obtained 
by  due  process,  a  default  judgment  ordinarily  is  not 
void  for  failure  to  give  defendant  notice  of  subse- 
quent proceedings  in  the  cause,4  but  there  is  also 


94.  La. — Oampti  Motor  Co.  v.  Jolley, 
120    So.    684,   10   La.App.   287. 

34  C.J.  p  152  note  95. 

95.  Tex. — Southland  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Stewart,    Civ.App..    211    S.!W.    460. 

93.    Del. — Teatman  v.  Ward,  Super., 

36  A.2d  (355. 
Ky. — Mergenthaler    Linotype    Co.    v. 

Griffin,     10     S.W.2d    63J3,     226    Ky. 

159. 
2STeb. — Brann  v.  Quinn,  199  N.W.  828, 

1112   Neb.    485,    39   A.L.R.   411. 
N.J.— Weiner    v.    Wittman,    27    A.2d 

86*6,  129  N.J.Law  35. 
N.T. — Minnesota  Laundry  Service  v. 

•Mellon,    291    N.T.S.    378,    249    App. 

Div.    648—6    East    97th   St.   Co.   v. 

Grant,    278    N.T.S.    884,    155    Misc. 

581— Leavitt  v.  Matzkin,  114  N.T. 

S.   687. 
N.C.— Harrell  v.  Welstead,  175   S.B. 

2813,  206  NXJ.  817. 
Tex. — Broun     v.     Hayslip,     Civ.App., 

2813  S.W.  177. 

Necessity  of  Jurisdiction  for  render- 
ing- of  judgment  generally  see  su- 
pra $  19. 

97.  Me. — Tremblay    v.     -3Btna    Life 
Ins.  Co.,  55  A.  509,  97  Me.  547,  94 
Am.S.R.  521. 

34  C.J.  p  152  note  8. 

98.  U.S.— Helms    v.    Holmes,    C.C.A. 
NX).,  129  F.2d  263,  141  A.L.R.  1&67. 

Cal.— ^People  v.  Herod,  295  P.  383, 
111  GaLApp.  246. 

Tex. — Bray  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  Civ. 
App.,    10    S.W.2d    2S5,    error    dis- 
missed. 
A  reference  by  rule  of  court  did 

not  effect  a  loss   of  Jurisdiction  of 

pending  cause  and  deprive  superior 


court  of  right  of  revoking  the  refer- 
ence and  ordering  a  default  judg- 
ment.—Lebel  v.  Cyr,  34  A.2d  201,  140 
Me.  98. 

99.    Ark. — Toung  v.  Toung,  147  S.W. 
2d  7136,  201  Ark.  984. 

JU    CaL— Glidden  v.  Packard,  28  Cal. 

6119. 
N.T. — 6  Bast  97th  St.  Co.  v.  Grant, 

278    N.T.S.    884,    155    Misc.    581. 
N.C.— Harrell   v.  Welstead,   175    SJS. 
283,  206  N.C.  817— Fowler  v.  Fowl- 
er,   130    S.B.    315,    190    N.C.    5i36 — 
Clark  v.  Carolina,  Homes,  128  S.E. 
20,   189   NJC,   703— Moore  v.  Pack- 
er,   94    S.B.    449,    174    N.C.    665— 
Condry  v.  Cheshire,  88  N-C.  375 — 
Doyle   v.    Brown,    72   N.C.    39<3. 
Okl.— Street  v.  Dexter,   77  P,2d  707, 

182  Okl.  360. 

Or.— Mutzig  v.  Hope,  158  3P.2d  110 — 

Okanogan  State  Bank  of  Riverside, 

Wash.,   v.   Thompson,    211   P.    933, 

106  Or.  447. 

Pa. — Modern    Home   Heating   Co.    v. 

Diehl,  92  Pa. Super.  571. 
Tex.— Hitt  v.   Bell,   Civ.App.,   Ill    S. 
W.2d  1164— City  of  Corpus  Christi 
v.  Scruggs,  Civ.Apfo.,  89  S.W.2d  458 
— Brecheen   v.   State,   Civ.App.,    89 
$.W.2d  259— ^Christie   v.   Hudspeth 
County  Conservation  and  Reclama- 
tion Dist  No.  1,  Civ.App.,  64  S.W. 
2d  978^Tarrell  v.  XT.  S.  Realty  Co., 
'Civ.App.,  270  S.W.  1079. 
33  C.J.  p  1080  note  96  [a],  [d]. 
OIL  cross  action 

(1)  A  default  judgment  in  favor 
of  one  defendant  against  his  code- 
fendants  on  his  cross  action  is  abso- 
lutely void,  where  such  codefendonts 

331 


did  not  have  required  -statutory  no- 
tice.— Ruby  v.  Davis,  Tex.  Civ. App., 
277  S.W.  4*30. 

(2)  A  default  judgment  against 
plaintiff  -on  defendant's  cross  action 
is  void  where  plaintiff  has  not  been 
served  with  citation  based  on  the 
cross  action. — Dilbeek  v.  Norwood, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  139  S.W.2d  121'— Na- 
tional Stock  Tards  Nat.  Bank  v.  Val- 
entine, Tex.Civ.App.,  39  S.W.2d  907. 
On  amended,  petition. 

When  plaintiff  by  amended  petition 
changes  cause  of  action  and  defend- 
ant has  not  filed  answer,  it  is  neces- 
sary, in  order  to  support  default 
judgment,  to  cite  defendant  on 
amended  cause  of  action. — Nuckles  v. 
J.  M.  Radford  Grocery  Co.,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  72  S.W.2d  652. 

On  filing  a  second  declaration  aft- 
er discontinuance  of  first  action,  de- 
fendant must  again  be  served  with 
process  to  support  default  judgment. 
—Morse  v.  Bragg,  107  F.2d  $48,  71 
App.D.C.  1,  certiorari  denied  60  S. 
Ct  1073,  S10  U.S.  6i30,  84  L.EcL  1400. 

2.  Ark. — Stewart  v.  California  Grape 
Juice  Corporation,  29  S.W.2d  1077, 
181  Ark.  11HO. 

Cal. — Hunstock  v.  Estate  Develop- 
ment Corporation,  1«38  P.2d  1.  22 
Ca!.2d  205,  148  A.L.R.  968. 

3.  Tex— Jameson  v.  Farmers'  State 
Bank  of  Burkbumett,  Civ.App.,  299 
S.W.  458,  affirmed  Farmers'  State 
Bank  of  Burkburnett  v.   Jameson, 
Com.App.,    11    S.W.2d    29'9,   rehear- 
ing denied  1*6  S.W.2d  526. 

4.  U.S. — Rosborough       v.        Chelan 


§  192 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


authority  to  the  contrary,  at  least  as  respects  notice 
of  particular  proceedings.5 

(2)  Process 

A  dsfault  Judgment  1s  void  if  the  process  does  not 
conform  to  essential  statutory  requirements. 

A  judgment  by  default  is  void  where  the  process 
does  not  substantially  conform  to  essential  statu- 
tory requirements.6  Thus  a  default  judgment  is 
void  where  the  notice,  although  bearing  the  proper 
caption,  is  not  properly  addressed  to  defendant,7 
or  where  the  notice,  writ,  or  summons  is  not  prop- 


erly subscribed.8  So  too  a  default  judgment  \t.  void 
where  it  is  based  on  a  citation  which  does  no':  suf- 
ficiently conform  to  the  statutory  requirements,9 
as  where  it  fails  to  name  all  the  parties,10  or  fails 
properly  to  state  the  nature  of  plaintiffs  demand11 
or  the  date  when  plaintiffs  petition  was  filed,12  or 
where  it  summons  defendant  to  appear  on  an  im- 
possible date13  or  at  a  time  or  term  not  designated 
by  law14  or  at  a  place  other  than  the  one  designated 
by  law,15  or  where  it  is  erroneously  or  insufficiently 
directed  to  the  officer  for  service,16  or  where  it 
directs  the  officer  to  summon  someone  other  than 


County,  Wash.,  COA/Wash.,  53  F. 

2d  198. 
Ark.— Hill  v.  Teague,  108  S.W.2d  889, 

194  Ark.  552. 
Va. — Fuller  v.  Edwards,  22  S.E.2d  26, 

180  Va.  191. 
Hlght  to  notice  of  proceedings  after 

judgment    by   default    see    infra    § 

202. 

5.  R.I. — Sahagian   v.    Salragian,    137 
A.  221,  48  R.I.  267. 

6.  Cal. — Wilson    v.    Superior    Court 
in  and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  54 
»P.2d   559,    11    Cal.App.2d    643. 

Fla. — Frostproof  State  Bank  v.  Mal- 

lett,  1'31  So.  .322,  100  Fla.  1464. 
Iowa. — Swan  v.  McGowan,  231  N.W. 

440,  212  Iowa  631. 
La. — Spillman  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

120  So.  905,  10  La,App.  379. 
Mich.— Rood  v.  McDonald,  7  N.W.2d 

9'5,  303  Mich.  6Q-4. 
Okl.— State  v.  City  of  Tulsa,  5  P.2d 

744,  153  Okl.  262. 
33  C.J.  p  1081  note  1   [b],    EC]. 

The  process  must  contain  all  that 
the   statute  requires.— Duke   v.   Spil- 
ler,    111    S.W.    787,    51    Tex.Civ.App. 
237—34  C.J.  p  152  note  6. 
Process  held  sufficient 
U.S. — Tenner    v.    Murray,    C.C.A.Fla., 

•32  F.2d  625. 

7.  Iowa. — Columbian  Hog  &  Cattle 
•Powder   €o.    v.    Studer,    8    N.W.2d 
592. 

8.  Iowa, — Swan  y.  McGowan,  231  N. 
W.  440,  212  Iowa  631. 

WJVa.— Nicholas  Land  Co.  v.  Crow- 
der,  32  S.B.2d  5613. 

9.  La. — Robinson   v.   Enloe,    121    So. 
320,  10  La.App.  435. 

Tex. — Massie  Drilling  Co.  v.  Nees, 
266  S,W.  504— Fort  Worth  Lloyds 
v.  Johnson,  Civ.App%.,  129  S.W.2d 
1157— City  of  Corpus  Christ!  v. 
Scruggs,  Civ.App.,  89  S.W.2d  458 
— Brecheen  v.  Wink  Independent 
School  Dist,  Civ.App.,  89  S.W.2d 
29-3 — Leach  v.  City  of  Orange,  Civ. 
iApp.,  46  S.W.2d  1047— Beck  v.  Nel- 
son, Civ.App.,  17  S.W.2d  144— Lips- 
comb  v.  McCart,  Civ.App.,  295  S.W, 
245 — Atkinson  v.  Leonard,  Civ. 
App.,  287  S.W.  52*5 — Jenness  v. 
First  Nat  Bank,  Civ.App.,  256  S. 
W.  ff34. 


Statute  i»  mandatory 

The  courts  have  uniformly  held 
that  the  requirements  of  the  stat- 
ute as  to  what  shall  be  stated  in  a 
citation  are  mandatory  and  that, 
in  the  absence  of  such  essential  com- 
pliance, a  judgment  by  default  will 
not  be  sustained. — Nueces  Hardware 
&  Implement  Co.  v.  Jecker,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  56  S.W.2d  47»4— Wyman  v. 
American  Mortg.  Corporation,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  629— Tyner  v. 
Glass,  Tex.Civ.App.,  27  S.W.2d  916— 
Martinez  v.  Watson,  Tex.Civ.App., 
21  S.W.2d  54— Boydstun  v.  Nugent, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  285  S.W.  695— Jarrell 
v.  U.  S.  Realty  Co.,  Tex.Civ.Appt, 
270  S.W.  lO-79^Tenness  v.  First  Nat 
Bank,  Tex.Civ.App.,  256  S.W,  6!34, 
635, 

Citations  held  sufficient 

(1)  Citation     containing     palpable 
error  in  date  of  issuance  as  appear- 
ing above  county  clerk's  signature. 
— -Wagnon  v.  Elam,  Tex. Civ. App.,   65 
S.W.2d  407. 

(2)  Default  judgment  may  be  tak- 
en against  foreign  corporation,  where 
citation  gives  name  of  agent  served, 
without  proof  of  agency. — Holcomfo 
&  Hoke  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Amason,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  2  S.W.2d  360. 

1O.    Tex. — Fort     Worth     Lloyds     v. 
Johnson,  Civ.App.,  129  S.W.2d  1157 
— Lipscomb    v.    MtfCart,    Civ.App., 
295     S.W.     245— Jenness    v.    First 
Nat.  Bank,  Civ.App.,  256  S.W.  -634. 
3i3  C.J.  p  1090  note  '67  [gj. 
"And  -wife" 

A  citation  commanding  an  officer 
to  summon  a  named  defendant  "and 
wife"  was  insufficient  to  support 
judgment  by  default  against  either 
of  defendants,  since  it  was  not  in 
compliance  with  statutes  requiring 
names  of  all  parties  to  be  stated. — 
Brecheen  v.  Wink  Independent  School 
Dis£,  Tex.Civ.App.,  89  S.W.2d  293— 
Brecheen  v.  State,  Tex.Civ.App.,  89 
S.W.2d  259. 

<*Bt  ux» 

Citation  designating  certain  per- 
son <4et  ux,"  as  plaintiffs,  without 
naming  plaintiff's  wife,  held  insuffi- 
cient to  sustain  default  judgment 
against  defendant. — Temple  Lumber 

•       332 


Co.  v.  McDaniel,  Tex.Civ.App.,  24  S. 
W.2d  518. 
Miastatement  of  name 

Default  judgment  based  on  cita- 
tion which  misstates  defendant's 
name  on  face  thereof  is  erroneous. — 
Nueces  Hardware  &  Implement  Co. 
v.  Jecker,  Tex.Civ.App.,  56  S.W.2d 
474. 

11.  Tex. — Woodward  v.  Acme  Lum- 
ber Co.,   Civ.App.,   108   S.W.2d   1054 
-STackson  v.  Birk,  Civ.App.,   84   S. 
W.2d    3132 — Bass    v.    Brown,    Civ. 
App.,     262     S.W.     894— Carlton    v. 
Mayner,  10,3  S.W.  411,  47  Tex.Civ. 
App.  47. 

31*3  C.J.  p  1081  -note  1  [a]. 

12.  Tex. — Wise  v.  Southern  Rock  Is- 
land -Plow   Co.,   Civ.App.,   85    S.W. 
2d  257. 

13.  Mies.— Loving     v.     First     Nat. 
Bank,  158  So.  908,  172  Miss.  15,  97 
A.QUR.    745 — Jenne    v.    Davis,    119 
So.. 911,  152  Miss.  4. 

Tex. — Heard  v.  J.  &  C.  Drilling  Co., 
CtoApp.,  124  S,W.2d  866 — Tyner 
V.  Glass,  Civ.App.,  27  S.W.2d  916 
— Martinez  v.  Watson,  Civ.App., 
21  S.W.2d  54 — Baker  v.  Crenshaw 
&  Brewster,  Civ.App.,  270  S.W. 
917. 

14.  Tex. — Wyman       v.       American 
Mortg.  Corporation,  Civ.App.,  45  S. 
W.2d    629 — Baker   v.    Crenshaw   & 
Brewster,   Civ.App.,   270   S.W.   917. 

"Special  term" 

Where  process  was  void  because  it 
directed  defendant  to  appear  at  un- 
authorized and  nonexistent  "special 
term"  of  county  court  to  be  held  in 
December,  fact  that  case  was  tried 
at  following  regular  term  of  court 
would  not  avail  as  ground  for  not 
setting  aside  judgment  by  default. — 
Mosaic  Templars  of  .America  v. 
Gaines,  Tex.Civ.App.,  2615  SjW.  721. 

15.  Tex. — Boydstun  v.  ITugent,  Civ. 
App.,  285  S.W.  '696. 

16.  Tex. — Green  v.  White,  Cir^pip., 
32  S.W.2d  488. 

Nonexistent  county 

Service  of  citation  direfctefc  to 
sheriff  or  constable  of  nonexistent 
county  held  ineffective,  rendering  de- 
fault judgment  void  for  lack  of  ju- 
risdiction of  defendant. — Boulevard 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  192 


defendant.1?  However,  mere  irregularities  in  the 
form  of  process,  provided  they  do  not  violate  essen- 
tial requirements  of  the  statute,  have  been  held  not 
to  render  a  default  judgment  absolutely  void.18 

(3)  Service 

Proper  service  of  process  on  the  defendant  Is  essen- 
tial to  the  validity  of  a  default  Judgment,  and  there  must 
be  a  substantial  compliance  with  statutory  provisions  as 
to  return  and  proof  of  service. 

To  authorize  a  default  judgment,  process  must  be 
properly  served  on  defendant  in  the  manner  pre- 


scribed by  statute.19  If  defendant  is  not  served,  a 
default  judgment  taken  against  him  is  void;2<>  and 
the  same  is  true  where  service  on  defendant  is  rad- 
ically defective.21  Thus  a  default  judgment  is  void 
where  it  is  based  on  service  of  process  by  one  with- 
out authority,22  or  where  service  is  made  on  a  third 
person  instead  of  on  the  actual  defendant23  or  on 
one  not  a  proper  agent  to  receive  sen-ice  of  proc- 
ess.24 However,  mere  irregularities  in  the  man- 
ner of  service,  provided  they  do  not  violate  the  es- 
sential requirements  of  the  statute,  do  not  render  a 
default  judgment  void.25 


Undertaking  Co.  v.  Breaker,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  42  S.W.2d  451. 
Alias  citation 

Where  citations  issued  by  county 
clerk  of  county  in  which  plaintiffs' 
pleadings  alleged  parties  to  be  serv- 
ed resided  were  returned  with  nota- 
tion that  president  who  was  sued 
with  corporation  cbuld  not  be  found, 
but  that  he  was  living  in  county  seat 
of  another  county,  alias  citations 
issued  tfy  same  county  clerk  to  sher- 
iff or  constable  of  other  county 
formed  sufficient  basis  for  default 
judgment. — Artex  Refining  Co.  v. 
Pollard  &  Lawrence,  Tex.Civ.  App., 
124  S.W.2d  946. 

17.  Tex. — Port     Worth     Lloyds     v. 
Johnson,  Civ.App.,  129  S.W.2d  1157. 

Officer  of  corporation 

Citation  commanding  officer  to 
summon  secretary  and  treasurer  of 
defendant  corporation  to  answer  and 
appear,  instead  of  commanding  him 
to  summon  the  corporation  Itself, 
will  not  sustain  default  judgment 
against  corporation. — Temple  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  McDaniel,  Tex.Civ.App., 
24  S.W.2d  518. 

18.  Minn. — 'Peterson  v.  W.  Davis  & 
Sons,  11  N.W.2d  800,  216  Minn.  SO. 

Ohio, — Norris    v.    Frowine,    19    Ohio 
App.  127— Gillett  v.  Miller,  12  Ohio 
Cir.Ct.   209,   5   Ohio  Cir.Dec.   588. 
33  C.J.  p  1091  note  68  [cL  [dj,  [hj. 
Irregularities  Held  not  fatal 

Default  judgment,  entered  by 
court  having  Jurisdiction,  was  not 
void  •  because  caption  of  complaint 
served  with  summons,  named  wrong 
court. — Sievert  v.  Selvig,  222  N.W. 
281,  175  Minn.  597. 

19.  Ky. — Fugate  v.  Pugate,  81  S.W. 
2d  889,  259  Ky.  18. 

Minn. — Pugsley  v.  Magerfleisch,  201 
N.W.  323,  «161  Minn.  246. 

Mo. — Hankins  v.  Smarr,  IS 7  S.W.2d 
409,  345  Mo.  978. 

N.Y.— Leavitt  v.  Matzkin,  114  N.T.S. 
687. 

Or.— Mutzig   v.   Hope,  158   P.2d   110. 

Tex. — Plynt  v.  City  of  Kingsville, 
82  JSI.W.2d  934.  125  Tex.  510— Whit- 
aker  Chevrolet  Co.  v.  Blacksher, 
Civ.App.,  132  S.W.2d  425— First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  C.  H.  Meyers  &  Co., 
Civ.App.,  2SJ  S.W.  265— Household 


Furniture    Co.    v.    Alvarado,    Civ. 
App.,  246  S.W.  1111. 
Service  held  sufficient 

(1)  In  general. 

Fla, — Arcadia  Citrus  Growers   Ass'n 

v.  Hollingsworth,  185  So.  4U1,  135 

Fla.  322. 
Okl.— Hall  v.  Jensen,  249  P.  310,  119 

Okl.  175. 
Tex. — Stephens  v.  Austin,  Civ.App., 

298   S.W.    9S2— Grayce   Oil   Co.    v. 

Varner,   Civ.App.,   260  S.W.    8 S3. 

(2)  The  court  had  jurisdiction  to 
enter    default    on    cross    complaint, 
served  by  mailing  of  copy  by  defend- 
ants' attorneys  to  plaintiffs  attorney 
having  office  in  same  city  at  place 
where  there  was  mail  delivery  serv-. 
ice.— Marsden  v.  Collins,  72  P.2d  247, 
213  Cal.App.2d  148. 

2<X    N.D.— Gallagher      v.      National 

Nonpartisan  League,  205  N.W.  674, 

53  N.D.  2*8. 
Or. — CPeterson  v.  Hutton,  284  P.  279, 

132  Or.  252. 
Tex. — Camden  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hill, 

Com.App.,  276  S.W.  887 — Whitaker 

Chevrolet   Co.    v.    Blacksher,    Civ. 

App.,    132    S.W.2d    425— Cauble    v. 

Cauble,    Civ.App.,    283    S.W.    914— 

Carson  v.  Taylor,  Civ. App.,  26H  S. 

W.  824. 
Utah, — State     Tax     Commission     v. 

Darsen,    110    'P.2d    558,    100    Utah 

103. 

23,  U.S.— Todd  v.  S.  A.  Healy  Co., 
D.OKy.,  49  F.Supp.  58l4. 

Ala,— Kent  v.  Kent,  139  So.  240,  224 
Ala.  1&3, 

CaL — Wilson  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  54 
P.2d  5$9,  11  Cal.App.2d  64=3. 

Ky.— Fugate  v.  Creech,  111  S.W.2d 
402,  271  Ky.  3.  4 

Md.— Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d 
376,  181  Md.  206. 

Mass.— Commonwealth  v.  Aronson, 
44  N.E.2d  679,  312  Mass.  347. 

Neb.— Wistrom  v.  Forsling,  9  N.W. 
2d  294,  1413  Neb.  294,  rehearing  de- 
nied and  opinion  modified  on  other 
grounds  14  N.W.2d  217,  144  Neb. 
6*8. 

N.T.— Leavitt  v.  Matzkin,  114  N.T.S. 
687. 

Pa. — Rogers  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  99  Pa.Super.  505. 

333 


Service  too  late 

In  special  proceeding  for  sale  of 
land  to  pay  debts  of  decedent's,  es- 
tate, service  of  summons  on  defend- 
ants over  thirty  days  after  its  is- 
suance was  insufficient  to  bind  them 
by  default  judgment,  in  absence  of 
waiver  of  service  within  statutory 
period  of  ten  days  after  issuance' of 
summons  or  voluntary  appearance. — 
Green  v.  Chrismon,  28  S.EL2d  215, 
223  N.C.  724. 
Writ  of  capias 

Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to  en- 
ter judgment  by  default  against  de- 
fendant, against  whom  writ  of  ca- 
pias was  issued,  where  defendant  - 
escaped  from  custody  of  sheriff  im- 
mediately o-n  his  arrest,  since  service 
Tinder  writ  of  capias  is  incomplete 
without  production  of  defendant  in 
court  to  answer  or  his  release  on 
bail.— Oliver  v.  Kallock,  178  A.  843, 
133  Me.  403,  followed  in  178  A.  846. 
183  Me.  408. 

22.  Tex. — Turner   v.    Ephraim,    Civ. 
Apr>..  28  S.W.?d  fiftS. 

Sheriff  of  wrong*  county 

Where  a  process  is  directed  to  a 
sheriff  of  one  county  and  service  is 
made  by  a  sheriff  of  another  county, 
a  default  judgment  against  the  one 
so  served  is  void. — Strauss  v.  Owens, 
65  S.E.  161,  6  Ga.App.  415. 

23.  Cal.— Steuri  v.   Junkin,   82   P.2d 
34,  27  Cal.App.2d  758. 

N.T.— Ooldberg  v.  Fowler,  60  N.T.S. 

475,  29  Misc.  328. 
Tex.— Whitaker     Chevrolet     Co.     v. 

Blacksher,    Civ.App.,     132     S.W.2d 

425. 

24.  Tex. — Camden   Fire   Ins.  Co.   v. 
Hill,     Com.App.f     276     S.W.     887— 
Sharp  &  Dohme  v.  Waybotfrne,  Civ. 
App..  74  S.W.2d  413. 

Pormer  officer  of  corporation. 

HI. — McCoy  v.  HY-G  Corporation,  47 

N.E.2d  384,  318  Ill.App,  229. 
Wrong1  state  official 

Service  of  process  on  secretary  of 
state  when  statute  requires  service 
on  commissioner  of  insurance  does 
not  support  a  default  Judgment. — 
Order  of  Calanthe  v.  Armstrong,  62 
So.  269,  7  Ala.App.  37& 

25.  Ariz. — Noonan    v.    Montgomery. 


192 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Personal  service.  In  the  absence  of  any  statutory 
provision  authorizing  substituted  or  constructive 
service,  process  must  be  personally  served  in  order 
to  support  a  judgment  by  default26 

Constructive  or  substituted  service.  A  valid  per- 
sonal judgment  by  default  cannot  be  predicated  on 
substituted  or  constructive  or  extraterritorial  serv- 
ice on  a  nonresident.27  In  the  absence  of  personal 
service  within  the  state  or  a  voluntary  appearance 
by  defendant,  a  default  judgment  against  a  non- 
resident is  void  unless  property  or  credits  belonging 
to  him  within  the  state  have  been  brought  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  by  provisional  proc- 
ess,28 such  as  attachment  and  levy29  or  garnishment 
proceedings,30  or  unless  the  action  involves  title  to 
real  property  within  the  court's  territorial  jurisdic- 
tion.3i  Where  such  property  of  a  nonresident  de- 
fendant is  or  has  been  so  brought  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court,  a  default  judgment  may  be 
taken  against  him  on  the  basis  of  constructive  or 
extraterritorial  service;82  but  such  a  judgment  is 


void  if  the  method  of  attempted  notice  to  defendant 
is  insufficient  to  constitute  due  process38  or  does 
not  comply  substantially  with  the  statutory  require- 
ments as  to  notice.84  Even  where  there  have  been 
proper  constructive  service  and  attachment  and 
levy,  a  default  judgment  cannot  be  enforced  against 
a  nonresident  personally;  the  judgment  is  effective 
only  against  the  property  attached.35  Mere  irreg- 
ularities in  the  manner  of  service  by  publication, 
not  going  to  the  substance  of  the  statutory  require- 
ments concerning  notice,  will  not  render  the  judg- 
ment void.36 

Return  and  proof.  In  the  absence  of  a  general 
appearance  by  defendant,  the  fact  of  due  and  prop- 
er service  of  the  process  must  appear  on  the  rec- 
ord,37 as  by  the  officer's  return  or  proof  of  serv- 
ice.38 It  has  been  held  that  a  valid  judgment  by 
default  cannot  be  taken  when  there  is  no  return  by 
the  officer  serving  the  writ,3^  or  when  the  return 
or  other  proof  is  radically  faulty  or  defective,40 
as  where  it  does  not  conform  to  essential  statutory 


209  P.  302,  24  Ariz.  811,  25  A.L.R. 
1251. 

N.T. — Valz  v.  Sheepshead  Bay  Bun- 
galow Corporation,  16-3  N.E.  124, 
249  N.T.  122,  certlorari  denied  49 
S.CX  82,  278  U.S.  647,  73  L.Ed. 
560. 

Ohio. — Norris  v.  Frowine,  19  Ohio 
App.  0.27. 

28.  Oal. — Hu-nstock    v.    Estate    De- 
velopment Corporation,  138  P.2d  1, 
22  Cal.2d  >205,  148  A.L.R.  968. 

27.  Miss. — Delta  Insurance  &  Real- 
ty Agency  v.  Fourth  Nat.  Bank, 
102  So.  846,  137  Miss.  855. 

Nev. — (Perry  v.  Edmonds,  84  P.2d 
711,  59  Nev.  60. 

Or. — Laughlin  v.  Hughes,  89  P.2d 
568,  i61  Or.  295. 

S.D. — Stevens  v.  Jas.  A.  Smith  Lum- 
ber Co.,  222  N.W.  665,  54  S.D.  170. 

Tex* — (American  Soda  Fountain  Co.  v. 
Hairs  ton  Drug  Co.,  Civ.App.,  52 
S.W.2d  764. 

Wyo. — Kimbel  v.  Osborn,  15-6  P.2d 
279. 

28*  Iowa. — Bates  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  19  Iowa  260. 

29.  N.T. — Dimmerling    v.    Andrews, 
139  N.EL  774,  286  N.T.  48— Merkle 

-  v.  Sable,  197  N.T.S.  576. 

30.  Kan. — Herd  v.  Chambers,  122  P. 
2d  784,  .155  Kan.  55. 

Status  of  proceeding1 

(1)  Under  some  statutes  where 
garnishment  proceedings  are  invoked 
as  a  basis  for  substituted  service, 
a  default  judgment  may  be  rendered 
against  the  principal  defendant  when 
the  default  occurs,  even  though  the 
substituted  service  and  default  must 
both  fail  if  it  subsequently  develops 
that  the  garni  shee  actually  holds  no 


property     of     defendant— Herd     v. 
Chambers,  supra. 

(2)  Under  other  statutes  it  has 
been  held  that,  where  defendant  is 
served  only  by  publication,  and  no 
property  seized,  it  is  improper  to 
render  Judgment  by  default  against 
him  before  finding  that  garnishee 
possesses  property  belonging  to  de- 
fendant, since  the  court  will  have  no 
Jurisdiction  over  defendant  unless 
garnishee  possesses  such  property. — 
Riley  Pennsylvania  Oil  Co.  v.  Syxn- 
moods,  WO  S.W  1088,  195  Mo.Apj>. 
1U. 

31.  Mo. — Garrtoon  v.  Schmicke,  193 
S.W.2d  «14. 

32.  Cal. — City   of    Saiiaas    v.    Luke 
Kow  Lee,  18  P.2d  8«5,  217  Cal.  2S2. 

Mo.— Garrison  v.  Schmicke,  1913  S.W. 
2d  614. 

N.T.— -Le  Baron  v.  Bartoli,  10  N.B.2d 
519,  274  N.T.  499— Valz  v.  Sheeps- 
head Bay  Bungalow  Corporation, 
1613  N.B.  124,  249  N.T.  122,  certio- 
rari denied  49  S.Ct  82,  278  U.S. 
647,  73  L.Ed.  5«0. 

Old. — IB.  R.  Thomas  Motor  Car  Co. 
v.  Robb,  208  P.  785,  86  Ofcl.  26-6. 

Or. — »Pierce  v.  Pierce,  56  P.»2d  3&6, 
1513  Or.  24<8. 

33.  if.T.— Standish   v.    Standish,    40 
N.T.S.2d  538,  179  Misc.  564. 

34*    Ala. — Guy  v.  Pridgen  &  Holman, 

118    So.   229,   22'  Ala.App.   595. 
Fla.— Catlett    v.    Chestnut,    1«46    So. 

241,  107  Fla.  498,  91  A.L.R.  212. 
Or. — Okanogan  State  Bank  of  River- 
side, Wash.,  v.  Thompson,  211  P. 
983,  106  Or.  447. 
3*3  C.J.  p  109(3  note  80. 

Affidavit  for  service  by  publica- 
tion, must  comply  with  statutory 
requirements. — Frybarger  v.  McMil-  | 

334 


len,  25  P.  7113,  15  Colo.  349—33  C.J. 
p  1093  note  80  [b]. 

35.  Del. — Teatinan  v.  Ward,  Super., 
36  A.2d  355. 

36.  Ariz. — Noonan    v.    Montgomery, 
209  P.  302,  24  Ariz.  311,  25  A.L.R. 
1251. 

37.  U.S.^Williams    v.    James,    D.C. 
La.,  54  F.Sufep.  61. 

Mich.— Dades  v.  Central  Mut  Auto- 
Ins.  Co.,  248  N.W.  616,  263  Mich. 
260. 

Miss. — Continental  Casualty  Co.  v» 
Gilmer,  111  So.  74.1,  146  Miss.  22 — 
Globe  Rutgers  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Sayle,  65  So.  125,  107  Miss.  169. 

Tex. — Head  v.  Texas  State  Bank, 
Civ,App.,  16  S.W.2d  298— Fitzpat- 
rick  v.  Dorris  Bros.,  Civ.App.,  284 
S.W.  303 — Broun  v.  Hayslip,  Civ. 
App.,  283  S.W.  177. 

34  C.J.  p  152  note  8. 

Proof  of  Jurisdictional  facts  see  in- 
fra S  211. 

38.  Tex. — Fitzpatrick       v.       Dorris 
Bros.,  Civ.App.,  284  S.W.  30,3. 

34  C.J.  p  152  note  9. 
Piling  with  clerk 

Since  there  was  no  statute  abso- 
lutely requiring  the  sheriffs  return 
to  be  filed  with  the  clerk,  failure  of 
the  sheriff  so  to  file  it  did  not  pre- 
vent default  Judgment,  in  view  of 
the  presumption  that  the  return  was 
exhibited  to  the  court  before  Judg- 
ment.—Rhyne  v.  Missouri  State  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  Tex.Com.App.,  291  S.W.  8«45. 
39-  Mich.— Stanczuk  v.  Pfent,  204  N. 

W.  706,  231  Mich.  689. 
33  CU.  p  1094  note  813. 

40.    La,— Robinson  v.  Bnloe.  120.  So, 

•320,  10  La»Atfp.  435. 
Mich. — Whirl    v.    Reiner,    *Gt    N.W. 

977.  229  Mich.  114. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  192 


requirements41  or  fails  to  show  a  legal  service  of 
the  writ;42  but  there  is  authority  for  the  view  that 
a  faulty  or  defective  return  or  proof  of  service,43 
or  even  complete  absence  of  return  or  proof  of 
service,44  does  not  of  itself  render  a  default  judg- 
ment void  if  due  service  actually  was  had,  since 
it  is  the  fact  of  service,  and  not  the  return  or  proof 
thereof  that  gives  the  court  jurisdiction.45  It  is 
generally  agreed  however,  that  minor  irregularities 
or  ambiguities  in  the  return  will  not  vitiate  the 
judgment.46 


(4)  Appearance 

A  voluntary  general  appearance  Is  a  waiver  of  want 
or  defect  of  process  or  service  and  will  support  a  Judg- 
ment by  default. 

If  a  defendant  enters  a  voluntary  general  appear- 
ance in  any  action,  it  is  a  waiver  of  a  want  of 
process,  or  of  any  defects  in  the  process  or  its  serv- 
ice or  return,  and  a  default  judgment  in  personam 
thereafter  entered  against  him  is  valid  and  bind- 
ing ;4?  but  it  is  otherwise  where  the  appearance  is 
special  and  is  entered  for  the  purpose  of  taking  ad- 
vantage of  a  failure  of  notice  or  defective  serv- 
ice.4* 


Pa, — Rogers    v.    Metropolitan    Life 


Ins.   Co.,   99   Pa.Super.  505. 
Tex.— Home    Ben.    Ass'n    v.     Sims, 
Civ.App.,  48  S.W.2d  708. 

41.  Mich.— Standard     Oil      Co.     v. 
Brukwinski,     217    N.W.     922,     242 
Mich,  49 — Whirl  v.  Reiner,  200  N. 
W.  977,  229  Mich,  114. 

Tex. — Fitzpatrick    v.    Dorris    Bros., 
Civ.App.,  284  S.W.  303. 

42.  Colo.— Gibbs    v.   Slevin,    212   P. 
826,  72  Colo.  590. 

La. — Robinson  v,  Enloe,  121  So.  320, 

10  LaApp.  4fi5. 
Tex.— Remington-Rand   Business 

Service    v.    Angelo    Printing    Co., 

Civ.App.,  31  S.W.'2d  1098. 
33  C.J.  p  1094  note  84. 

Becitals  in  Judgment  that  defend- 
ants were  legally  served  ,do  not  val- 
idate a  default  Judgment  based  on 
faulty  or  defective  return  or  proof 
of  service.— Household  Furniture  Co. 
v.  Alvarado,  Tex.Civ.App.,  246  S.W. 
1111— Miller  v.  First  State  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  Santa  Anna,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  184  S..W.  6»14. 
Agency  of  person  served 

(1)  To    sustain   default   Judgment 
against  corporation  on  direct  attack 
by  appeal,  officer's  return  must  show 
that    person    served   was    agent    on 
whom  service  was  authorized.— Cain, 
Wolcott  &  Rankin  v.  Firemen's  Fund 
Ins.  Co.,  141  So.  «86,  225  Ala.  44. 

(2)  If   the    officer's   return   states 
that  the  person  to  whom  process  was 
delivered   is  defendant  corporation's 
agent,  such  return  becomes  prima  fa- 
cie evidence  sufficient  to   sustain  a 
default     Judgment.— Green     v.     Nu- 
Grape   Co.,    100   So.   84,   19   Ala,App. 

OS)  It  has  also  been  held  that  a 
default  Judgment  against  a  foreign 
corporation  will  be  set  aside,  where 
petition  fails  to  show  whether  agent 
served  was  local  or  traveling  agent 
or  traveling  salesman. — Holcomb  & 
Hoke  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Amason,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  2  S.W.2d  360. 
*etnrtt  held  Insoffiolent 

(1)  In  general.— Midwest  Piping  & 
Supply  Co.  v.  Page,  Tex.Civ.App.,  128 
S.W.2d  459,  error  refused— Home 


Ben.  Ass'n  v.  Sims,  Tex.Civ.App.,  48 
S.W.2d  708. 

(2)  Return  not  stating  what  offi- 
cer delivered  to  defendants  held  in- 
sufficient to  support  Judgment  by 
default— Price  v.  Black  Bros.,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  19  S.W.2d  847. 

C3)  Sheriff's  return  of  service  of 
citation,  stating  that  it  was  executed 
on  May  16,  by  delivering  to  D  and 
C  on  May  27,  "the  within  named  de- 
fendant" true  copy  of  writ  held  in- 
sufficient to  support  default  Judg- 


ment— Fitzpatrick   v.    Dorris    Bros. 
284  S.W.  303. 

Return  or  profef  held  sufficient 
Ohio.— Hendershot  v.  Ferkel,  56  N.E. 


(  205,  144  Ohio  St.  112. 

43,  Ariz. — Noonan  v.  Montgomeryr 
209  P.  302,  24  Ariz.  311,, 25  A.L.R. 
1251. 

CaL— Alpha  Stores  v.  You  Bet  Min- 
ing Co.,  63  P.2d  1137,  18  CaLApp. 
2d  249,  followed  in  63  P.2d  «1138, 

18  Cal.App.2d   767— Wheat  v.  Mc- 
Neill, 295  P.  102,  111  CaLApp.   72. 

Idaho.— Mason  v.  Pelkes,  59  P.2d 
1087,  57  Idaho  10,  certiorari  denied 
Pelkes  v.  Mason.  57  S.Ct.  319,  299 
U.S.  615,  81  L.Eo!  453. 

Iowa.— Mintle  v.  Sylvester,  197  N.W. 
305,  197  Iowa  424. 

Minn. — Leland  v.  Heiberg,  194  N.W. 
9*3,  156  Minn.  30. 

Neb.— State  Furniture  Co.  v.  Abrams, 

19  N.W.2d  627. 

44.  Ariz.— 'Noonan    v.    Montgomery, 
209  P.  302,  24  Ariz.  311,  25  A.L.R. 
1251.  w 

Minn.— Leland  v.  Heiberg,  194  N.W. 
93,  156  Minn.  30. 

45.  Ariz.— Noonan    v.    Montgomery, 
209  P.  302,  24  Ariz.  311,  25  A.L.R. 
1251. 


Iowa.— Mintle  v.  Sylvester,  197  N.W. 

305,  197  Iowa  424. 
Minn.— Leland  v.  Heiberg,  194  N.W. 

93,  156  Minn.  30. 
. — State  Furniture  Co.  v.  Abrams, 

19  N.W.2d  627. 

46.  Cal.— Wheat  v.   McNeill,   295   P. 
102,  111  CaLApp.  72. 

Wash.— Atwood  v.   McGrath,    242  P. 

648,  137  Wash.  400. 
313  C.J.  p  1095  note  85. 

47.  Tex.— Harvey     v.     Wiley,     Civ. 
App.,  88  S.W.2d  569. 

A*  substitute  for  process 

The  effect  of  an  entry  of  appear- 
ance as  a  substitute  for  service  of 
process  is  identical  therewith;  ac- 
cordingly, where  -no  Judgment  by  de- 
fault could  be  taken  against  defend- 
ant for  failure  to  plead  at  the  term 
of  service,  none  can  be  taken  on  ap- 
pearance entered  at  that  term. — 
Baldwin  v.  McClelland.  38  N.B.  14-3, 
152  111.  42. 

What    constitutes    sufficient    appear- 
ance 

(1)  In  general. — Flowers  v.  Jack- 
son, 51  S.W.  462,  66  Ark.  458-^33  C. 
J.  p  1095  note  89   [b]     CD,   [c]. 

(2)  Execution    of    bond,    not    ap- 


Cal.— Alpha  Stores  v.  You  Bet  Min- 
ing Co.,  63  P.2d  1137,  18  CaLApp.2d 
249,  followed  in  63  P,2d  1138,  18 
Cal.App.2d  767— Wheat  v.  McNeill, 
295  P.  102,  111  CaLApp.  72. 

Idaho.— Mason  v.  Pelkes,  59  P.2d 
108i7,  57  Idaho  10,  certiorari  denied 
(Pelkes  v.  Mason,  57  S.Ct  319,  299 
U.S.  615,  81  L.Ed.  453. 

335 


proved  by  clerk,  to  discharge  attach- 
ment, was  not  appearance  authoriz- 
ing default  Judgment  against  surety. 
— Brenton  v.  Lewiston,  216  N.W.  6, 
204  Iowa  892. 

(3)  Notation  on  declaration  where- 
by defendant's  attorney  waived  proc- 
ess and  entered  appearance  during 
term,  without  attestation  by  clerk 
of  court,  held  not  to  authorize  de- 
fault Judgment — Industrial  Inv.  Co. 
v.  Standard  Life  Ins.  Co.,  149  So.  88*3, 
170  Miss:  1-38. 
•Unauthorized  appearance 

Where  attorney's  appearance  on 
behalf  of  a  party  was  wholly  unau- 
thorized and  was  entered  by  mistake 
or  inadvertence,  a  default  Judgment, 
without  proper  service  of  process,  is 
void.— Street  v.  Bexter,-  77  P.2d  707, 
182  Okl.  860. 

48.  N.T.— 6  Bast  97th  St  Co,  v. 
Orant,  278  N.Y.S.  884.  155  Misc. 
581* 


§  193 
§  193. 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Pleadings  to  Sustain  Judgment 

a.  In  general 

b.  Filing 

c.  Service 

d.  Verification  and  signature 

a.  In  General 

In  order  to  sustain  a  Judgment  by  default,  the  plain- 
tiff's pleading  must  state  a  cause  of  action;  otherwise 
the  judgment  will  be  void  or  at  least  voidable.  Accord- 
Ing  to  some  authorities,  but  not  others,  the  pleading  must 
be  sufficient  to  withstand  a  general  demurrer. 


Since,  as  discussed  infra  §  201,  a  default  admits 
only  what  is  well  pleaded,  it  follows  that,  in  order 
to  sustain  a  judgment  by  default,  plaintiffs  declara- 
tion, complaint,  petition,  or  statement  of  claim,  must 
allege  with  clearness  and  certainty  sufficient  facts  to 
constitute  a  good  cause  of  action  or  show  a  right 
to  recover.49  It  should  sufficiently  name  or  de- 
scribe the  plaintiff,50  and  the  defendant,51  and 
their  places  of  residence,  where  this  is  required  by 


4*.  U.S.— Fisher  v.  Jordan,  D.C.Tex., 
32  F.Supp.  608,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  C.C.A.,  116  F.2d  183,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Jordan  v.  Fisher,  61 
S.Ct  734,  312  U.S.  697,  85  L.Ed. 
1132. 

Ala,— National   Surety   Co.   v.   First 
Nat.    Bank,   142    So.   414,   225   Ala, 
108. 
Ariz.— Sturges    v.    Sturges,    50    F.2d 

886,  46  Ariz.  331. 

Ark.— Home  Indemnity  Co.  of  New 
York  v.  Bobo,  55  S.W.2d  81,  186 
Ark.  53 6— Barnes  v.  Balz,  292  S. 
W.  391,  17-3  Ark.  417— -Wilson  v. 
Overturf,  248  S.W.  898,  157  Ark. 
385. 

CaL— Burns  v.  Downs,  108  P.fld  953, 
42  Oal.App.2d  322 — Hammons  v. 
Crozier,  297  P.  567,  112  CaLApp. 
715_Williams  v.  FOBS,  281  P.  7&6, 
«9  CaLApp.  705. 
Del.— American  University  v.  Todd, 

1  A.2d  595,  9  W.W.Harr.  449. 
Fla.— St.  Lucie  Estates  v.  Palm 
Beach  Plumbing:  Supply  Co.,  1"33 
So.  841,  101  Fla.  205. 
Ill._Roe  v.  Cook  County,  198  N.E. 
472,  358  111.  568— Baxter  v.  Atchi- 
son,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  -85  N.B.2d 
565,  510  IHaApp.  616— Whalen  v. 
Twin  City  Barge  &  Gravel  Co., 
280  IlLApp.  596,  certiorari  denied 
Twin  City  Barge  &  Gravel  Co.  v. 
Whalen,  66  S.Ct  590.  297  U.S.  714, 
80  L.Ed.  1000. 

Ky. — St.  Matthews  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Fairleigh,  92  S.W.2d  326,  259 
Ky.  209— Corbin  Bldg.  Supply  Co. 
v.  Martin,  39  S,W.2d  480,  239  Ky. 
272— 'Prater  v.  Dingus,  18  S.W.2d 
883,  230  Ky.  82 — Blackburn  v.  Bev- 
ins,  3  S.W.2d  762,  223  Ky.  389— All- 
good  v.  Atkinson,  2148  S.W.  5(25,  198 
Ky.  229— Bond  v.  Wheeler,  247  S 
W.  708,  197  Ky.  437. 
La. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Perez  v, 
Meraux,  9  So.2d  662,  676,  201  La. 
498 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Simon 
v.  Duet,  148  So.  250,  2-51,  177  La. 
&37. 
Mich. — Smak  v.  Gwozdik,  29-1  N.W 

270,  293  Mich.  185. 
Minn.— Roe  v.  Widme,  254  N.W.  274 

191  Minn.  251. 

Miss. — Stevens   v.   Barbour,    8   So. 2 
242,  19»3  Miss.  109 — W.  T.  Rawleigh 
Co.  v.  Scott,  120  So.  834,  152  Miss 
704. 


Mo.— McCrosky  T.  Burnham,  App.,  j 
282  S.W.  158. 

Mont — Lindsey  v.  Drs.  Keenan,  An- 
drews &  Allred,  1165  P.2d  804— State 
ex  rel.  Delmoe  v.  District  Court  of 
Fifth  Judicial  Dist,  46  P.2d  39, 
100  Mont.  131. 

Neb.— Dfcnbom  v.  Danbom,  2-78  N.W. 
502,  19>2  Neb.  858. 

N.Y. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Leroy 
Arnold,  Inc.,  v.  Mackey,  222  N.T.S. 
225,  129  Misc.  643. 

N.C.— Baker  v.  Corey,  141  S.B.  892, 
195  N.C.  299— Beard  v.  Sovereign 
Lodge,  W.  O.  W.,  115  S.E.  661,  184 
N.C.  1514. 

OkL — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Nordman 
v.  School  Dist.  No.  4«3  of  Choctaw 
County,  121  P.2-d  290,  291,  190  Okl. 
155 — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v.  Ap- 
ple, 267  P.  239,  130  Okl.  270— West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Beach, 
211  P.  1034,  88  Okl.  73. 
Pa. — Richey  v.  Gibboney,  34  A.2d 
913,  15-4  Pa.Super.  1— Rosser  v.  Cu- 
sani,  97  Pa.Super.  2S5— Duquesne 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Mazza,  30  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.,  389,  18  Wash.Co.  5— Dinten- 
fass  v.  Wirfcman,  14  Pa.Dist  &  Co. 
798. 

Tex.— mna  Ins.  Co.  of  Hartford, 
Conn.,  v.  Long,  72  S.W.2d  588,  123 
Tex.  500 — Rhyne  v.  Missouri  State 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  Com.App.,  291  S.W. 
845— .Waples  Platter  Co.  v.  Miller, 
Civ.App.,  139  S.W.2d  83-3— Tolivar 
v.  Lombardo,  Civ.App.,  88  S.W.2d 
733 — State  v.  McKinney,  Civ.App., 
76  S.W.2d  556— Corpus  jTnrls  cited 
in  Williamson  v.  City  of  Bastland, 
Civ.App.,  65  S.W.2d  774,  775— 
Ritch  v.  Jarvis,  Civ.App.,  64  S.W. 
2d  &3-1,  error  dismissed— Williams 
v.  Jameson,  CiVJL\pp.,  44  S.W.2d 
498,  error  dismissed  Jameson  v, 
Williams,  Com.App.,  67  S.W.2d  228 
— Anderson  v.  Dreyfuss  &  Son,  Civ 
App.,  32  S.W.2d  527— Morgan  v 
Davis,  Civ.App.,  293  S.W.  610— 
Nichols  v.  Murray,  Civ.App.,  284  S 
W.  301-r-Wright  v.  Shipman,  Civ 
App.,  279  S.W.  296— Watson  Co. 
Builders,  v.  Sleeker,  Civ.App.,  26 J 
S.W.  147 — Carney  v.  Williams,  Civ 
App.,  266  S.W.  1115— Head  v.  Citt 
of  Gainesville,  Civ.App.,  254  S.W 
323. 

Wash. — Sandgren  v.  West,  115  P.2< 
724,  9  Wash.2d  494— Roche  v.  Me 
Donald,  239  P.  1015,  136  Wash. 

336 


822,    44    A.L.R.    444.    reversed    on 
other  grounds  4-8  S.Ct  142,  275  U. 
S.  449,  72  L.Ed.  363,  53  A.L.R.  1141, 
4  C.J.  p  153  note  16. 
Pleadings    to    sustain    judgment    in 
general  see  supra  §§   39-41. 
facts  not  alleged,  although  prov- 
ed, cannot  form  the  basis  of  a  judg- 
ment    by     default. — State     ex     rel. 
om'rs    of    Land    Office    of    Okl.    v. 
Prock,   158  P.2d  716,   195   OkL   387— 
Le  Clair  v.  Calls  Him,  233  P.  1087, 
106  OkL  247. 

Jurisdiotional  facts  must  be  stated 
n  order  to  sustain  default  judgment. 
N.Y.— ^Contractors'    Trading    Co.     v. 
Henney     Contracting    Corporation, 
248   N.Y.S.    643,    2S'2   App.Div.    829. 
Pa. — Frankel    v.     Donehoo,     158    A. 
570,  306  Pa.  52,  followed  in  Mar- 
vin v.  Donehoo,  158  A.  573,  306  Pa. 
5*8. 
Tex. — Shambeck    v.     Johnson,     Civ. 

App.,  281  S.W.  349. 
Stating  conclusions 

A  complaint  which  merely  alleges 
a   conclusion   is   insufficient   to   sus- 
tain a.  default  Judgment. 
Ark.— (Arkansas  Bond  Co.  v.  Harton, 

87   S.W.2d  52,   191  Ark.    665. 
Mass.— Moriarty  v.  King,  .57  N.E.2d 

633,  317  Mass.  210. 
Mo.— Walrath  v.  Crary,  App.,  222  S. 

W.  895. 

Ohio. — De  Weese  v.  Security  Sav. 
Ass'n  of  Dayton,  186  N.E.  4,  12« 
Ohio  St.  480. 

Immaterial  discrepancy  between 
wording  of  declaration  filed  and  that 
of  copy  served  on  one  defendant  was 
held  not  to  invalidate  judgment.^- 
Karasek  v.  Peoples'  State  Trust  & 
Savings  Bank  of  Pontiac,  247  N.W. 
765,  262  Mich.  636. 

50.  Ala. — Cole  v.  Gay  &  Bruce,  104 
So.  774,  20  Ala_A.pp.  643. 

51.  Ala.— Crook  v.  Rainer  Hardware 
Co.,  97  So.  635,  210  Ala.  178. 

Cal. — Roseborough  v.  Campbell,  115 
P.2d  8139,  46  Cal.App.2d  257— Burn 
v.  Downs,  -108  P.2d  953,  42  Cal.App. 
2d  322— Wilson  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  54 
P.2d  539,  11  Cal.App.2d  643. 

Tex.— Artex  Refining  Co.  v.  Pollard 
&  Lawrence,  Civ.App.,  124  S.W.2d 
946. 

34  C.J.  P  154  note  14. 


49    C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


§  193 


statute,52  and  designate,  with  substantial  accuracy, 
the  court  in  which  the  action  is  to  be  tried.53  It 
should  also  demand  relief  against  defendant.54  If 
the  judgment  is  based  on  constructive  service  of 
process,  plaintiffs  declaration  must  allege  the  facts 
which  justify  such  service,  if  the  statute  so  re- 
quires.55 

Where  a  cross  petition  alleging  a  sufficient  cause 
of  action  has  been  properly  filed,  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault may  be  taken  by  a  defendant  against  a  co- 
defendant56  or  against  a  third  person,5?  but  there 
must  be  a  sufficient  pleading  to  support  a  default 
judgment  on  such  a  cross  action.5* 

Determination  of  sufficiency.  According  to  some 
decisions,  the  declaration  or  complaint  must  be  suf- 
ficient to  withstand  a  general  demurrer,5^  but  other 
authorities  have  held  that,  although  the  complaint  is 
so  defective  that  it  would  be  open  to  general  de- 
murrer, the  judgment  is  not  void,  or  even  necessa- 


rily voidable,  if  the  complaint  contains  allegations 
of  facts  sufficient  to  support  the  judgment,60  or  suf- 
ficient to  apprise  defendant  of  tie  nature  of  plain- 
tiffs demand,61  and  that  if  it  is  good  in  substance 
it  is  sufficient  to  uphold  the  judgment,  although 
there  may  be  formal  defects.62  Conversely,  if  a 
pleading  is  sufficient  to  withstand  a  general  demur- 
rer, it  is  sufficient  to  support  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault,63 even  though  such  pleading  might  be  sub- 
ject to  special  demurrer.64  Indeed,  it  has  been  held 
that,  after  judgment  by  default,  the  complaint  will 
be  most  liberally  construed  as  stating  a  cause  of 
action  which  warrants  the  granting  of  the  relief 
prayed  for.65  In  determining  the  sufficiency  of  the 
allegations  of  a  cross  action  to  support  a  default 
judgment  against  a  third  party,  evidence  on  the  trial 
of  the  action  against  defendant  cannot  aid  the 
pleadings  in  the  cross  action.66  Reference  is  made 
in  the  notes  to  cases  in  which  the  petition,  declara- 
tion, or  complaint  has  been  held  sufficient67  or  in- 


52.  La. — Perez  v.   Meraux,    9   So.2d 
662,  201  La.  498. 

Tex. — Sha-mbeck  v.  Johnson,  Civ.App., 
281  S.W.  349— -Tyler  v.  Blanton,  78 
S.W.  5164,  34  Tex.Civ.App.  39'3. 

53.  Tex.— Miller  v.  Trice,   Civ.App., 
219'  S.W.  229. 

34  C.J.  p  154  note  16. 

54.  Idaho. — Backman     v.     Douglas, 
270  P.  618,  46  Idaho  671. 

Miss.— W.  T.  Rawleigh  Co.  v.  Scott, 

120  So.  8*34,  T52  Miss.  704. 
34  C.J.  p  154  note  17. 

55.  Miss. — 'Mays    Food   Products   v. 
Gloster   Lumber   Co.,   102   So.    735, 
1<37    Miss.    691,    followed   in   Mays 
Food    Products    v.    Anderson,    108 
So.  165. 

56.  Ohio. — Southward    v.     Jamison, 
64  N.E.  135,  66  Ohio  290. 

34  C.J.  p  155  note  31. 

57.  Tex. — Reserve    Loan    Life    Ins. 
Co.  v.  Benson,   CivJV.pp.f   167   S.W. 
2i66. 

58.  Tex. — Celeste  State  Bank  v.  Se- 
curity   Nat    Bank,    Civ.App.,    254 
S.W.  658. 

59.  Ark.— Barnes  v.  Balz,  292   S.W. 
3-91,  173  Ark.  417. 

Tex. — JBtna  Ins.  Co.  of  Hartford, 
Conn,,  v.  Long,  72  S.W.2d  588,  12<3 
Tex.  500 — Cross  v.  Wilson,  Civ. 
App.,  .3'3  S.W.2d  575— Missouri 
State  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rhyne,  Civ. 
App.,  276  S.W.  757,  reversed  in 
part  on  other  grounds  and  af- 
firmed in  part  Rhyne  v.  Missouri 
State  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Com.App.,  291 
S.W.  845. 

H  C.J.  p  154  note  19. 

Oft  Ariz. — Yuma  County  v.  Hanne- 
man,  28  P.2d  622,  42  Ariz.  561. 

111. — Whalen  v.  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.,  2&0  111. App.  596,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Twin  City  Barge  & 

49C.J.S.— 22 


Gravel  Co.  v.  Whalen,  56  S.Ct  590, 

297  U.S.  714,   80  L.Ed.  1000. 
Pa. — Frankel  v.  Donehoo,  158  A.  570, 

306  Pa.  52,  followed  in  Marvin  v. 

Donehoo,  158  A.  573,  306  Pa.  58. 
34  C.J.  p  154  note  20. 

61.  Ala, — Contorno  v.  Ensley  Lum- 
ber Co.,  100  So.  127,  2-11  Ala.  211. 

Cal. — Moran  v.  Superior  Court  in  and 
for  Sacramento  County,  96  P.2d 
193,  35'Cal.App.2d  629. 

Idaho.— Nielson  v.  Garrett,  43  P.Sd 
380,  55  Idaho  240. 

111.— Whalen  v.  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.,  280  111. App.  596,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.  v.  Whalen,  56  S.Ct. 
590,  297  U.S.  714,  80  L.Ed.  1000. 

Kan. — Skaer  v.  Capsey,  275  P.  464, 
127  Kan.  383. 

34  OJ.  p  154  note  21. 

62.  Okl.— McNeal  v.   Moberly,  1   P. 
2d  707,  150  Okl.  253. 

Pa. — Frankel  v.  Donehoo,  158  A.  570, 
«306  Pa.  52,  followed  in  Marvin  v. 
Donehoo,  158  A.  573,  306  Pa.  58. 

34  C.J.  p  154  note  22. 

63.  Cal. — Kennard    v.    Binney,    217 
P.    808,  -02    CaLApp.    732. 

Tex. — Odom  v.  Pinkston,  Clv.App., 
193  S.W.2d  888,  error  refused,  no 
reversible  error. 

64k    Tex. — Odom  v.  iPinkston,  supra. 

65.  Ala. — Contorno  v.  Ensley  Lum- 
ber Co.,  100  So.  127,  211  Afeu  211. 

Ariz. — Tuma  County  v.  Hanneman, 
28  P.2d  622,  42  Ariz.  561. 

Mont— Lindsey  v.  Drs.  Keenan,  An- 
drews &  Allred,  165  P.2d  804. 

Tex.— Odom  v.  Pinkston,  193  S.W.2d 

.  888,  error  refused,  no  reversible 
error. 

Wash. — Aid  v.  Bowerman,  232  P.  297, 
132  Wash.  319. 

68.    Tex. — Reserve    Loan.    Life    In*. 

337 


Co.  v.  Benson,  Civ-App.,  167  S.W, 
268. 

67.  Ala. — National  Surety  Co.  v. 
First  Nat.  Bank,  142  So.  414,  223 
Ala.  10*8 — Ewart  v.  Cunningham, 
122  So.  359,  219  Ala.  399. 

Ark. — Home  Indemnity  Co.  of  New 
York  v.  Bobo,  55  S.W.2d  81,  18ft 
Ark.  636. 

Oal.— Kennard  v.  Binney,  217  P.  808, 
62  CaLApp.  T32. 

Ga.— Royal  v.  Byrd,  180  S.B.  520. 
6-1  Ga.App.  397 — Brooke  v.  Pouts. 
140  SJ3.  902,  37  Ga.App.  56<3, 

La. — Baxsdale  v.  Highway  Commis- 
sion, App.,  1  So.2d  342 — Quillet  v, 
Wilhelm  Moss  Co.,  5  Leu  App.  74  9* 

Neb. — Scheumann  v.  Prudential  Ins, 
Co.  of  America,  19  N.W.2d  48. 

Tex. — Rhyne  v.  Missouri  State  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  Com. App.,  291  S.W.  945 — 
Odom  v.  Pinkston,  193  S.W.2d  88S. 
error  refused,  no  reversible  error 
— Southern  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Schumach- 
er Co.,  Civ.App.,  154.  S,W.2d  2'8fc 
error  refused — Artex  Refining  Co, 
v.  Pollard  &  Lawrence,  CiY.App« 
124  S.W.2d  946 — Cyrus  W,  Scott 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Haynie,  Oiv.App.,  64 
SjW.2d  1090,  error  dismissed— 
Griffin  v.  Burma,  Civ.App.,  24  S.W^ 
2d  805,  affirmed,  Com.App.,  24  S* 
»W.2d  810 — King-  Lumber  Co.  v* 
Blue  Ridge  Mill  Co.,  Civ.App.,  28ft 
S.W.  621. 

Particular  actions 

(1)  Action  to  foreclose  lien.— Mor-» 
gan  v.  Stag  Lumber  Co,,  $14  P.  15. 
124  Wash.  223. 

(2)  Slander  and  libel  actions. 
Okl.— Johnson  v.  Inglis,  123  P.2d  2T3, 

190    Okl.   31$,    followed   in   123   P, 
2d  275,  190  Oki.  319. 
S.C. — Rutledge    v.    Junior    Order   of 
United   American    Mechanics,    193 
SJBX  434,  185  S.C.  142. 


§  193 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J-S* 


sufficient68  to  support  or  sustain  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault 

Effect  of  insufficient  pleading.  The  failure  of  the 
declaration,  complaint,  or  petition  to  state  a  good 
cause  of  action  has  been  held  to  render  void  a  judg- 
ment by  default  based  thereon,6^  at  least  where  the 
petition  wholly  fails  to  state  a  cause  of  action70  or 
where  the  facts  alleged  affirmatively  show  that  plain- 
tiff has  no  cause  of  action;71  but  it  has  generally 
been  held  that  a  judgment  in  such  a  case  is  merely 


erroneous  and  reversible  on  appeal72  or  subject  to 
vacation  by  the  trial  court  on  motion.73  It  has  also 
been  held  that,  where  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of 
the  person  of  defendant  and  of  the  subject  matter,  a 
judgment  on  default  is  not  void  if  the  petition  con- 
tains allegations  sufficient  to  challenge  the  attention 
of  the  court  and  invoke  its  judicial  action  to  deter- 
mine the  sufficiency  thereof.74  Where  the  declara- 
tion contains  several  counts,  one  of  which  is  good, 
a  default  judgment  will  be  sustained,  although  the 
other  counts  are  not  sufficient,76  unless  the  damages 


Particular  allegation* 

(1)  Petition   alleging   indorsement 
and  delivery  of  note  held  sufficient  to 
sustain  default  judgment  against  in- 
dorser.—Skaer  v.  Capsey,  273  P.  464, 
127  Kan.  383. 

(2)  A   petition    alleging    that   de- 
fendant made  and  executed  a  note 
to  payee  therein  sufficiently  averred 
delivery  by  maker  to  payee  so  as  to 
support  a  Judgment  by  default  for 
holder    of    note.— Morgan    v.    Baum, 
Tex.Civ.App.,   116  S,W,2d  11SO,  error 
dismissed. 

03)  Petition  seeking  damages  be- 
cause of  automobile  collision,  alleg- 
ing that  car  was  negligently  and 
carelessly  drive'n,  was  sufficient  on 
which  to  base  default  judgment. — 
Metzger  v.  Gambill,  Tex.Civ.App.,  37 
S.W.2d  107*7,  error  refused. 

68.  Ala. — Coffee  v.  Keeton,  26  So/2d 
80, 

Ariz.— Sturges  v.  Sturges,  50  P.2d 
886,  46  Ariz.  331. 

Ga. — Summerour  v.  Medlin,  172  S.E. 

836,  48  Ga.iA.pp.  403. 
•  Miss. — Stevens   v.   Harbour,    8   So.2d 
242,  19i3  Miss.  109. 

Mont. — Lindsey  v.  Drs.  Keenan,  An- 
drews &  Allred,  165  P.2d  804. 

Okl.— Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v.  Ap- 
ple, 267  P.  239,  1'30  Okl.  270. 

Pa. — Richey  v.  Gibboney,  34  A. 2d  913, 
154  Pa.Super.  1— Kennedy  v.  tJp- 
per  Darby  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n, 
Coim.Pl.,  29  DeLCo.  247. 

Tex.— Bhyne  v.  Missouri  State  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  Com.App.,  291  S.W.  845— 
Beard  v.  Smith.  Civ.lA.pp.,  136  S.W. 
2d  8"86,  error  dismissed,  judgment 
correct— Hicks  v.  Rapides  Grocery 
Co.,  CivJLpp.,  101  S.W.2d  1042— 
Tolivar  v.  Lombardo,  Civ.App.  88 
S.W.2d  7133 — Watson  Co.,  Builders, 
v.  Sleeker,  Civ.App.f  269  S.W.  147. 

Wash.— Sandgren  v.  West,  115  P.2d 
724,  9  Washed  494. 

34  C.J.  P  153  note  13  Dal. 

Particular  actions 

(1)  Actions  on  notes. 

Ky.— Stegemiller   v.    Crowe,    17« 
W.2d  91317,  297  Ky.  52. 

Tex. — Anderson  v.  Dreyfuss  &  Son, 
CivJApp.,  32  S.W.2d  5-27— Morgan 
v.  Davis,  Civ.'App.,  292  S.W.  610. 

(2)  Action  on  fire  insurance  poli- 
cy.— JBtna    Ins.     Co.     of     Hartford, 


Conn.,  v.   Long,   72   S.W.2d  588,   123 
Tex.  500. 

(J3)  Action      to      enforce      lien. — 
Thompson  v.  Hickman,  262  S.W.  20, 
164  Ark.  469. 
Particular  allegations 

(1)  Complaints   which  fail   to  al- 
lege breaches  of  express  or  implied 
contracts  for  sums  certain  or  com- 
putable do  not  authorize  Judgments 
by  default  final  under  the  statute. — 
Byerly  v.  General  Motors  Acceptance 
Corporation,    145    S.E.    236,    196   N.C. 
256 — Baker  v.   Corey,   141   S.B.    892, 
195  N.C.  299. 

(2)  Petition  on  note,  not  alleging 
notice    of    dishonor   to   indorser,    or 
that   such   notice   was    waived,   dis- 
pensed   with,    excused,    or    not    re- 
quired, will  not  support  default  judg- 
ment against  indorser.— Levy  Plumb- 
ing Co.  v.  Heating  &  Plumbing  Fi- 
nance  Corporation,    Tex.Civ.App.,    66 
S.W.2d  456. 

(3)  Mere  allegation   that   plaintiff 
is  temporary  administrator  of  estate 
held  insufficient  to  show  authority  to 
bring  suit,  precluding  default  judg- 
ment against  defendant  on  petition 
containing     such     allegation. — Feni- 
more  v.  Youngs,  26  S.W.2d  195,  119 
Tex.  159, 

69.    Ark.— Arkansas     Bond     Co.     v. 

Harton,    87    S.W.2d    52,    191    Ark. 

665. 
Tex. — Wright  v.   Shipman,  Civ.App., 

279   S.W.  296. 
34  C.J.  p  154  note  28. 
Excessive  relief 

Where  court  enters  a  judgment 
or  awards  relief  clearly  beyond  the 
prayer  of  the  complaint  or  the  scope 
of  its  allegations,  the  excessive  re- 
lief is,  at  least  in  default  cases, 
void. — State  v.  District  Court  of 
Eighth  Judicial  Dist  in  and  for  Na- 
trona  County,  238  P.  545,  33  Wyo. 
281. 

TO.  Okl. — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v, 
Apple,  267  P.  239,  130  Okl.  270. 

71,  Mont. — State  ex  rel.  Delmoe  v. 
District  Court  of  Fifth  Judicial 
Dist.,  46  P.2d  89,  100  Mont  131. 

Tex.— Bitch  v.  Jarvis,  Civ.App.,  64 
S.'WJ2d  831,  error  dismissed. 

Wash.T-Koche  v.  McDonald,  239  P. 
1015,  136  Wash.  322,  44  A.L.R. 
444,  reversed  on  other  grounds  4*8 

338 


S.Ct,    142,    275    U.S.    449,    72    L.Bd. 
365,  53  A.L.R.  1141. 
72.    Ark. — Home    Indemnity    Co.    of 
New  York  v.  Bobo,  55  S.W.2d  81, 
186  Ark.   636— Wilson  v.   Overturf, 
248  S.W.  898,  157  Ark.  3'85. 
Cal.— Williams  v.  Foss.   231  P.    766, 

69  CaLApp.  705. 

111.— Roe  v.   Cook  County,    1913   N.E. 
472,  358  111.  568— Baxter  v.  Atchi- 
son,  T.  <&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  35  N.B.-2d 
563,  310  Ill.lApp.  616. 
Okl. — Western  Union  Telegraph  Co. 
v.  Beach,  211  P.  1034,  88  Okl.  73. 
Tex.— Missouri    State   Life    Ins.    Co. 
v.  Rhyne,  Civ.App.,  276  S.W.   757, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  in  part 
and  affirmed  in  part  Rhyne  v.  Mis- 
souri State  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Com.App., 
291  S.W.  845. 
34  C.J.  p  154  note  24. 
7&    Ariz. — Sturges  v.  Sturges,  50  P. 

2d  886,  46  Ariz.  331. 
Del. — American   University   v.   Todd, 

1  A.2d  595,  9  W.W.Harr.  449. 
Minn.— Roe  v.  Widme,  254  N.W.  274, 

191  Minn.  251. 
3*4  C.J.  P  154  note  25. 
Determination,  of  proper  remedy 

Default  judgment  on  defective 
statement  of  good  cause  of  action  is 
erroneous  and  must  be  appealed  from 
in  order  to  have  it  set  aside,  but  de- 
fault judgment  on  statement  which 
is  insufficient  to  make  out  cause  of 
action  is  irregular  and  can  be  set 
aside  in  reasonable  time  where  merit 
is  shown  and  there  is  no  laches. — 
Hood  ex  rel.  Citizens  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Stewart,  184  S.B.  36,  209  N.C. 
424. 

74.  Kan. — Skaer   v.   Capsey,   273   P. 
464,  1*27  Kan.  383. 

NX!.— Finger  v.  Smith,  1*8  S.B.  186, 
191  N.C.  818. 

Okl.— Ogilvie  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  64 
P.2d  875,  179  Okl.  I'll— McNeal  v. 
Moberly,  1  P.2d  707,  150  Okl.  253 
— Great  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kes- 
water,  268  P.  258,  131  Okl.  19-6. 

Tex.— Wa«ples  Platter  Co.  v.  Miller, 
Civ.App.,  139  S.W.2d  833— Ritch 
v.  Jarvis,  Civ.App.,  64  S.W.2d  831, 
error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  154  note  26. 

75.  N.C.— J.    T.    Bostick   &   Bro.    v. 
Laurinburg  &  S.  R.  Co.*  102  S.E. 
882,  1-79  N.C.  485. 

34  CJT.  p  155  note  27. 


49   C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


§  193 


are  assessed  on  all  the  counts.76  Thus  a  judgment 
by  default  may  be  sustained  on  the  common  counts 
although  a  special  count  is  objectionable;77  or  such 
judgment  may  be  entered  on  the  special  count,  with- 
out a  discontinuance  on  the  money  counts.78 

b.  Piling 

In  most  Jurisdiction*,  before  a  valid  default  Judg- 
ment oan  be  entered  the  plaintiff's  pleading  must  have 
been  filed  within  the  time  required  by  law. 

In  most  jurisdictions  it  is  essential  to  the  validity 
of  the  judgment  that  the  declaration,  petition,  or 
complaint  be  filed  at  or  within  the  time  required 
by  law79  before  judgment,80  or  within  the  time  lim- 
ited by  order  of  court,81  unless  defendant  waives 
the  requirement  as  to  the  filing82  or  is  estopped  to 
raise  the  objection.83  In  the  absence  of  waiver  or 
estoppel,  such  a  judgment  is  premature  and  errone- 
ous if  it  is  entered  before  the  declaration  or  com- 
plaint has  been  on  file  the  number  of  days  required 
by  statute  or  rule,84  or  before  the  declaration  or 
complaint  has  been  filed  at  all;85  and  it  is  not  vali- 
dated by  a  subsequent  filing.86  In  some  jurisdic- 
tions, however,  the  fact  that  the  declaration  or 
complaint  is  not  filed  within  the  required  time  does 
not  affect  a  judgment  by  default,87  especially  where 
defendant  might  have  moved  for  a  dismissal  because 
of  the  delay  in  filing,  but  failed  to  avail  himself  of 
that  remedy.88 


Filing  instrument.  Under  some  statutes  it  is  also 
essential  that  a  written  instrument  on  which  the 
action  is  brought,  or  a  copy  thereof,  be  filed  with 
the  declaration,  in  order  to  sustain  a  judgment  by 
default,89  unless  such  instrument  constitutes  a  part 
of  the  records  of  the  court,90  but  under  other  stat- 
utes the  filing  of  such  instruments  or  copies  is  not 
required.91 

Where  pleading  lost.  Where  plaintiffs  declara- 
tion, complaint,  or  petition  has  been  lost,  together 
with  the  writ  of  summons,  plaintift'cannot  file  a  new 
petition  and  take  a  judgment  by  default  without 
first  supplying  the  lost  record  by  a  proper  proceed- 
ing taken  on  noticS  to  defendant.92 

c.  Service 

Where  the  statutes  so  provide,  a  copy  of  the  plain- 
tiff's pleading  or  a  notice  of  rule  to  plead  must  be  served 
on  the  defendant  In  order  to  sustain  a  default  Judgment. 

Under  some  statutes  it  is  essential  that  a  copy  of 
the  declaration,  complaint,  or  petition  be  served  on 
defendant  at  or  within  a  specified  time,93  or  that  he 
be  served  with  notice  of  rule  to  plead,9*  unless  such 
service  is  waived.95  However,  where  defendant  is 
allowed  to  come  in  and  plead  after  a  default  is  tak- 
en, he  is  bound  to  plead,  and,  if  he  does  not  do  so, 
judgment  by  default  may  be  taken  against  him, 
although  he  is  not  served  with  a  copy  of  the  decla- 
ration.96 


76.  Mass.— Dryden    v.     Dryden,    '9 
Pick.  546— Hemmenway  v.  Htckes, 
4  Pick.  497. 

77.  111.— Rowell  v.  Chandler,  88  HI. 
288. 

Wis.— - Ford  v.  Balrd,  2  Finn.,  Wls., 
242. 

78.  Miss.— Sorla  v.  Planters'  Bank. 
<4  (Miss.  46. 

34  C.J.  p  155  note  30. 

79.  Fla.— Daniell   v.   Campbell!    101 
So.  35,  8*8  Fla,  63. 

HI.— (Andrews  v.  Lawrence,  9  NJBL2d 

584,  288  IlLApp.  627. 
Before  return  -day 

It  has  been  held  that  merely  filing 
the  statement  of  claim  before  judg- 
ment is  not  sufficient;  the  statement 
must  also  be  filed  before  the  return 
day  of  the  writ — Witman  v.  Schle- 
gel,  21  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  113,  26  Berks 
CO.L.J.  15. 

SO.    Pa. — Smith  v.  Bergdollr   159  A. 

•462,    104    Pa.Super.    49— Moran   v. 

Quirk,    Com.Pl.,    8   Sch.Reg.   223. 
34  C.J.  p  155  note  <35. 

81.  Iowa. — Carver  v.  Seevers,  102  N. 
W.  518,  126  Iowa  669. 

82,  Ga,— McDonald  v.  Tutty,  27  S.E. 
157,  99  Ga.  184. 

34  C.J.  p  155  note  37. 


83.  HI.— Schultz  v.  Meiselbar,  32  N. 
E.  550,  144  HI.  26. 

34  C.J.  P  155  note  38. 

84.  Cal.— Billings  v.   Palmer,   88   P. 
1077,  2  CaLApp.  432. 

34  C.J.  p  155  note  39. 

85.  Ala.— Haygood   v.    Tait,    27   So. 
842,  126  Ala.  264. 

34  iC.J.  p  155  note  40. 

Judgment  held  not  void  but  merely 
irregular  and  subject  to  reversal. — 
Terry  v.  Dickinson,  75  Va.  475* 

86-    Ala,— Rankin  v.  Crowill,   Minor 

125.     ' 
Colo. — Gallup  v.  Wilder,  1  Colo.  264. 

87.  N.C. — Leach  v.   Western   North 
Carolina  R.  Co.,  65  N.C.  486. 

54  C.J.  p  155  note  42. 

88.  N.C.— Roberts  v.  Allman,  11  S.B. 
•424,  106  N.C.  891. 

89.  Pa.— McCoy  v.  Royal  Indemnity 
Co.,  -164  A.  77,  107  Pa.Super.  486. 

34  C.J.  p  156  note  45. 

90.  Pa.— Salter   v.    Griffith,    89    Pa. 
200. 

91.'  TJ.S.— Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  TJ.  S.,  App.D.C.,  23  S. 
Ct  120,  187  U.S.  315,  47  L.Ed.  194. 

34  C.J.  p  156  note  48. 

92.    Mo.— Brown  v.  King,  39  Mo.  380. 

339 


93.  Mich.— Marshall   v.    Calkins,    72 
N.W.  992,  114  Mich.  697. 

34  C.J.  p  156  note  52. 

Amended  pleading* 

Where  an  original  complaint  had 
dropped  out  of  existence  as  such 
when  a  second  default  was  entered 
against  a  defendant,  and  an  amended 
complaint  had  not  yet  been  served 
on  defendant,  the  second  default 
stood  as  a  nullity. — Sheehy  v.  Roman 
Catholic  Archbishop  of  San  Francis- 
co, 122  P.2d  60,  49  CaLApp.2d  537. 
In  Pennsylvania 

<1)  A  certified  copy  of  plaintiff's 
statement  of  his  claim  must  be  serv- 
ed on  defendant. — Newbold  v.  Pen- 
nock,  26  A.  606,  154  Pa.  591—34  C.J. 
p  156  note  52  [d]. 

(2)  However,  where  the  default  is 
based  on  want  of  appearance,  serv- 
ice of  the  statement  of  claim  is  not 
required,  it  being  sufficient  that  the 
statement  is  on  file  before  judgment 
is  entered.— Smith  v.  Bergdoll,  159 
A.  462,  104  Pa.Super.  49. 

94.  Mich.— Campbell  v.  Donovan.  69 
N.W.  514,  111  Mich.  247. 

3*4  C.J.  p  156  note  53. 

95.  Ga. — Brown  v.  Tomberlin,  73  S. 
E.  947,  137  Ga.  596. 


96.    N.Y.— Hitchcock 
Wend,  628. 


T.    Barlow, 


§  193 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J-S- 


d.  Verification  and  Signature 

Under  some  statutes  the  complaint  must  be  prop- 
erly verified  or  signed  In  order  to  sustain  a  default  judg- 
ment. 

Under  some  statutes  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to 
sustain  a  judgment  by  default,  that  the  complaint 
should  be  properly  verified,*?  or  be  accompanied  by 
plaintiffs  affidavit  showing  the  nature  of  his  de- 
mand and  the  amount  due,98  but  it  has  been  held 
that  the  want  of  a  proper  verification  is  a  mere  ir- 
regularity which  will  not  avoid  the  judgment" 
Although  under  some  statutes  it  is  necessary  that 
the  petition  or  complaint  be  signed  by  plaintiff  or 
his  attorney  in  order  to  support  a  default  judg- 
ment,1 it  has  been  held  that  the  fact  that  it  was 
not  so  signed,  if  not  objected  to  on  this  ground, 
does  not  render  a  default  judgment  thereon  either 
void  or  voidable.2 

§  194.    Amendment 

Where  the  complaint  Is  amended  In  a  matter  of  sub- 
stance  after  default,  a  valid  default  Judgment  cannot  be 
entered  on  the  amended  pleading  unless  the  defendant 
2s  duly  notified  of  the  amendment  and  given  oppor- 
tunity to  plead. 


Where  the  declaration  or  complaint  is  amended 
in  a  matter  of  substance  after  defendant  has  de- 
faulted, the  amendment  opens  the  case  in  default, 
as  discussed  infra  §  338,  and  a  valid  default  judg- 
ment cannot  thereafter  be  entered  on  the  amended 
pleading3  unless  the  defaulting  defendant  is  prop- 
erly notified  of  or  served  with  the  amended  plead- 
ing and  given  an  opportunity  to  plead,  and  then 
fails  to  do  so  within  the  proper  time.4     Where, 
however,  the  amendment  is  not  as  to  a  matter  of 
substance,  but  only  as  to  an  immaterial  or  formal 
matter,  notice  or  service  of  the  amendment  is  not 
necessary  before  entering  judgment  by  default;5 
neither  is  such  notice  or  service  required  as  to  an 
amendment  which  is  not  a  voluntary  one,  but  is 
made  by  order  of  court  on  the  motion  of  defend- 
ant,6 or  as  to  parties  who  are  brought  into  the  case 
at  the  instance  of  defendant  and  against  whom 
plaintiff  does  not  seek  to  recover.?   It  has  also  been 
held  that,  in  the  absence  of  statute  or  rule  so  re- 
quiring, a  defendant  who  has  been  summoned  but 
has  not  yet  been  put  in  default  need  not  be  resum- 
moned  or  notified  of  a  subsequent  amendment  to  the 


37.    N.C.— McNair  v.  Yarboro,  118  S. 

E.  91»3,  186  NJC.  111. 
34  C.J.  p  1B6  note  68. 
•Verification  repairing  verified  answer 

Where  verification  of  the  complaint 
•calls  for  a  verified  answer,  verifica- 
tion by  a  corporate  plaintiff's  attor- 
ney who  resided  in  a  county  other 
than  that  of  plaintiff,  was  held  not 
sufficient  to  authorize  judgment  by 
•default  for  failure  to  interpose  a 
verified  answer. — Geo.  H.  Storm  & 
•Co.  v.  G.  Migliore  &  Sons,  234  N.T.S. 
571,  130  Misc.  654. 
•Verification  "by  attorney 

A  statement  of  claim  is  insufficient 
•where  the  affidavit  thereto  is  taken 
1>y  plaintiff's  attorney  without  any 
averment  that  he  has  knowledge  of 
the  facts.— Gather  v.  Hess,  10  Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  89,  76  Pittsb.Leg.J.  102. 
S8.  11L— Giles  v.  Grady  &  Neary  Ink 

Co.,  5  N.E.£d  106,  287  IlLApp.  624. 
34  C.J.  p  1517  note  59. 

An  ns^erified  statement  of  claim 
is  insufficient.— <VJw»  T.  Grady  & 
Neary  Ink  Co.,  supra. 

99.    N.C.— -Miller  v.  Curl,  77  fcE.  952, 

162  N.G.  1. 
34  C.J.  p  157  note  60. 


.    Tex.—  Morris   v.   Soble, 
6»1  SJW.2d  139. 


.  Tex.  —  Shipp  v.  (Anderson,  Civ. 
'App.,  17*  S.W.  398. 

.  Ariz.—  Gna  Valley  Electric,  Gas 
&  Water  Co.  v.  Arizona  Trust  & 
Savings  Bank.  215  P,  lb$.  25  Aria. 
177. 


Cal. — Sheehy  v.  Roman  Catholic 
Archbishop  of  San  Francisco,  122 
P.2d  60,  49  Cal.App.2d  537— Gutle- 
ben  v.  Crossley,  56  (P.2d  954,  13 
CaLApp.2d  2<49. 
111. — l.usk  v.  Bluhm,  68  N.E.2d  135, 

321  CIlLApjk  1349. 
Kan.— Taylor    v.    Focks    Drilling    & 
Manufacturing  Corporation,    62   P. 
2d  90-3,  144  Kan.  626. 
,34  C.J.  p  157  note  65. 
Duty  of  court 

Before  entering  default  judgment 
after  amendment  of  pleadings,  trial 
court  should  examine  the  pleadings 
and  ascertain  whether  amendments 
were  so  substantial  as  to  constitute 
waiver  of  default. — Bley  v.  Dessin,  87 
P/2d  889,  31  Cal.App.2d  338. 

Against  codefendaat 

Failure  to  serve  on  adverse  parties 
amended  answers  whereunder  for 
first  time  affirmative  relief,  based  on 
adverse  claims,  is  sought  against  co- 
defendant  who  has  previously  de- 
faulted, precludes  acquisition  of 
binding  additional  adverse  rights 
therei vider. — Gutleben  v.  Crossley,  56 
!V2d  95*4,  1«3  Cal.App.2d  249. 

4*  Ariz.— Gila  Valley  Electric,  Gas 
&  Water  Co.  v.  Arizona  Trust  & 
Savings  Bank,  215  P.  159,  25  Ariz. 
177. 

Ark. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Shep- 
herd v.  Grayson  Motor  Co.,  13-9'  S. 
W.2d  54,  56,  200  Ark.  199.. 

Cal.— Thompson  v.  Cook,  127  P.2d 
909,  20  Cal.2d  564— Stack  v.  Weld- 
er, 43  P.2d  270,  3  Cal.Sd  71— In  re 
Wiechers*  Estate,  250  'P.  397,  199 
Cal.  623,  certiorari  denied  Wiech- 

340 


ers  v.  Wiechers,  47  S.Ct.  476,  273 
U.S.  762,  71  LJEd.  379— Sheehy  v. 
Roman  Catholic  Archbishop  of  San 
Francisco,  122  P.2d  60,  49  Cal. App. 
2d  537 — Strosnider  v.  Superior 
Court  in  and  for  El  Dorado  Coun- 
ty, 62  P.2d  1394,  17  Cal.App.2d  047 
— Gutleben  v.  ICrossley,  56  «P:2d  954, 
13  Oal.App.2d  249. 

111.— Lusk  v.  Bluhm,  513  N.E.2d  135, 
321  IlLApp.  349— Dahlin  v.  May- 
tag Co.,  238  'IlLApp.  85 — Gilbert  v. 
American  Trust  &  Savings  Bank, 
118  IlLApp.  678. 

Tex. — Stewart  v.  Davenport,  Civ. 
App.,  120  SJW.2d  496,  error  dis- 
missed—Phillips v.  The  Maccabees, 
Civ.App.,  50  S.W.2d  478— Liquid 
Carbonic  Co.  v.  Head,  Civ. App.,  «48 
S.W.2d  464,  error  dismissed — Jen- 
ness  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  Civ.App., 
256  S.W.  634.  . 

3«4  C.J.  (P  157  note  66. 

6.  Cal.— Thompson  v.  Cook,  127  P.2d 
90$,  20  CaLSd  564— Sheehy  v.  Ro- 
man Catholic  Archbishop  of  "San 
Francisco,  122  P.2d  60,  49  Cal.App. 
2d  5*37— Bley  v.  Dessin,  8-7  (P.2d 
889,  31  £al.App.2d  338. 

Okl. — Stephens  v.  Ellison,  63  P.2d 
80,  178  Okl.  390. 

Tex. — McConnell  v.  Foscue,  Civ.App., 
24  S.W.  96*4. 

34  C.J.  R  157  -note  68. 

6.  Kan. — Cross    v.    Stevens,     25    P. 
880,  45  Kan.  443. 

7.  Tex.— Perryman    v.     Smith,    Civ. 
App.,  32  S.W.  349. 


49    C-J-S- 


WDGMEXTS 


196 


•complaint,  if  the  amendment  is  such  as  supports  the 
original  cause  of  action.8 

Bringing  in  new  party.  If,  pending  the  action,  a 
new  party  is  brought  in  as  defendant,  he  cannot  be 
defaulted  unless  the  complaint  is  amended,  or  a  new 
•complaint  filed  against  him,9  and  he  has  been  given 
an  opportunity  to  appear  and  plead.10  The  sum- 
mons 'cannot  be  changed  after  defendant's  default 
"by  bringing  in  a  new  plaintiff  and  giving  him  a 
judgment.11 

Judgment  before  amendment.  Where  judgment 
"by  default  is  entered,  before  an  amendment  is  made, 
"based  on  the  original  complaint,  it  is  unnecessary  to 
•serve  the  amended  complaint  on  defendant  as  to 
such  default;12  but,  where  plaintiff  is  required  to 
amend  his  pleading,  he  cannot  enter  a  default  judg- 
ment before  the  amendment  is  made.1* 

Against  plaintiff.  The  fact  that  a  cause  of  action 
alleged  in  the  original  complaint  is  omitted  in  the 
amended  one  is  no  ground  for  entering  default 
against  plaintiff  as  to  the  omitted  cause  of  action.14 

§  195.    Grounds  for  Judgment 

The  defendant  should  not  be  considered  In  default 
except  on  some  definite  and  sufficient  ground. 


Since,  as  stated  supra  §  187,  judgments  by  de- 
fault are  not  favored,  defendant  should  not  be  con- 
sidered in  default  except  on  some  definite  and  suf- 
ficient ground;15  he  must  have  violated  or  disre- 
garded some  statute,16  order,1?  rule  of  court,18  or 
stipulation  of  the  parties,19  and  even  then  he  should 
not  be  considered  in  default  if  a  good  excuse  for 
such  violation  is  shown.20  It  is  not  usually  ground 
for  a  judgment  by  default  that  defendant  has  failed 
to  obey  an  order  which  the  court  has  no  power  to 
make.21  It  is  also  erroneous  to  enter  a  judgment 
by  default  where  a  judgment  of  nonsuit  appears  on 
the  record  as  still  subsisting.22  Where  defendant 
pleads  in  abatement,  and  no  replication  is  filed,  his 
failure  to  move  for  a  judgment  of  non  pros,  does 
not  authorize  the  entry  of  a  judgment  against  him.2n 

§  196.    Default  of  Appearance 

Judgment  by  default  may  be  taken  against  a  de- 
fendant who  falls  to  enter  an  appearance  within  the 
proper  time  after  being  duly  served  with  process. 

Where  defendant  has  been  duly  served  with  proc- 
ess, and  fails  to  enter  his  appearance  within  the 
proper  time,  plaintiff  may  take  judgment  by  de- 
fault.24 Such  a  judgment,  however,  cannot  be  ren- 


S,  III.— Niehoff  v.  -People,  to  Use  of 
Began,  49  N.B.  21«4,  171  111.  2*3— 
James  "W.  Rice  Co.  v.  Agnew,  147 
Ill.App.  468,  modified  on  other 
grounds  91  N.E.  448,  244  HI.  264 
— Gilbert  v.  American  Trust  & 
Savings  Bank,  118  Ill.App.  678. 

3.  Ky.— Davie  v.  Louisville,  166  S. 
W.  969,  159  Ky.  252. 

K.C. — Vass  v.  Peoples'  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n,  91  N.C.  55. 

10.  Cal. — Weldon  v.   Lawrence,   245 
P.  451,  76  Cal.A'pp.  530. 

34  OJ.  p  158  note  72. 

Mere  entry  of  appearance  by  new 
•defendant  does  not  authorize  de- 
fault judgment  against  him  until  the 
expiration  of  the  time  to  file  answer. 
Aufderheide  v.  Aufderheide,  Mo.App., 
18  S.W.2d  119. 

11.  N.Y. — Korman  v.  Grand  Lodge  I. 
O.  F.  S.  I.,  90  N.Y.S.  120,  44  Misc. 
564. 

12.  Cal.— Cole    v.    Roebling  Constr. 
Co.,  105  IP.  255,  156  Cal.  443. 

34  C.J.  p  158  note  74. 

13.  Mich.— Rosenfeld  v.  Wayne  Cir. 
Judge,  177  N.W.  946,  210  Mich.  689. 

14.  Cal. — Concannon  v.  Smith,  66  P. 
40,  -134  Cal.  14. 

15.  Wyo.— McGinnis  v.  Beatty,  204 
P.  1840,  28  Wyo.  828. 

34  aj.  p  158  note  80. 

16.  Wyo.— McGinnis  v.   Beatty,  su- 
pra. 

34  C.J.  p  158  note  81. 


17.  Wyo.— McGinnis   v.  Beatty,  su- 
pra. 

18.  Wyo.— McGinnis  v.  Beatty,   su- 
pra. 

19.  Wyo. — McGinnis  v.  Beatty,   su- 
pra. 

34  C.J.  p  158  note  84. 

20.  Ga.— Sutherlin  v.  Underwriters' 
Agency,  53  Ga.  442. 

34  C,J.  p  158  note  85. 

21.  Md.— Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ritchie,  31  <Md.  191. 

22.  Mo.— Kelley  v.   Hogan,    1-6    Mo. 
215. 

'34  C.J.  p  158  note  8T. 

23.  Ala. — Gaston  v.  (Parsons,  8  Port 
469. 

2*  TT.S.— Lanham  v.  Cline,  D.CJda- 
ho,  44  F.Supp.  897. 

Ala. — Green  v.  NuGrape  Co.,  100  So. 
84,  19  Ala.App.  663. 

Conn.— Gaul  v.  Baker,  148  A.  W,  10=8 
Conn.  173. 

m.-^Tones  v.  Harris  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank,  282  IlLApp.  131. 

Ind. — Carson  v.  Perkins,  29  N,E.2d 
7.72,  217  Ind.  543. 

La. — Franek  v.  Turner,  114  So.  14'8, 
164  La.  532— City  of  Monroe  v. 
Glasscock,  Morrison,  Conner  Const 
Co.,  App.,  178  So.  684— Union  Mo- 
tor Co.  v.  Williams,  8  La.App.  *391. 

Mass.— MacEachern  y.  S.  S.  White 
Dental  Mfg.  Co.,  23  N.E.2d  1020, 
<30>4  Mass.  419. 

Mich.— Kunsky-Trendle  Broadcasting 

341 


Corporation  v.  Kent  Circuit  Judge, 
27o  N.W.  175,  281  Mich.  367. 

Mo. — Gerber  v.  Kansas  City,  277  S. 
W.  562,  311  Mo.  49. 

Mont. — Taylor  v.  South  wick,  253  P. 
889,  78  Mont.  329. 

N.J. — Edelstein  v.  Hub  Loan  Co.,  33 
A.2d  829,  ISO  N.J.Law  511. 

N.Y.— Redfleld  v.  Critchley,  14  N.E.2d 
377,  277  N.Y.  3'36,  278  N.Y.  483— 
Conrad  v.  Harbaugh,  287  X.Y.S. 
1012,  248  App.Div.  655— Kinzler  v. 
Schoeler,  47  N.Y.S.2d  508,  181  Misc. 
368. 

OkL— New  v.  Elliott,  211  P.  1025,  88 
OkL  126. 

Pa. — Deemer  &  Co.  v.  Kline  Tp. 
School  Dist.,  37  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  698, 
6  Sch.Reg.  378— Rhoades  v.  Decker, 
34  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  409— Williams  & 
Co.  v.  Orlando,  6  FaJMst.  &  Co. 
153,  19  North  Co.  295— Auberle  v. 
Ciliberto,  Com.Pl.,  81  Del.Co.  32— 
Smith  v.  Morris,  Com.Pl.,  41  Lack. 
Jur.  18 — Simpson  Motor  Truck  Co. 
v.  Piccolomini,  Com.Pl.,  87  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  87,  1  I>ay.L.J.  87— Moran  v. 
Quirk,  ComvPl.,  8  ScKReg.  223. 

Philippine.— Wolf  son  v.  Chinchilla,  8 
Philippine  467,  5  Off-Gaz.  560— 
Behn  v.  Arnalot  Hernranos.  7  Phil- 
ippine 742,  5  Off-Gaz.  2?51. 

S.C.— Bissonette  v.  Joseph,  170  S.E. 
467,  178  BX3.  407. 

Tex. — Panhandle  Compress  &  Ware- 
house Co.  v.  Best,  Civ.App.,  58  S.W. 
2d  140. 

Va,— Brame  v.  Nolen,  124  SJR  299, 
139  Va,  *13. 


§  196 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J-S 


dered  if  defendant  has  made  a  formal  entry  of  ap- 
pearance25 or  its  equivalent,26  or  has  taken  any  step 
in  the  proceedings  which  unequivocally  shows  that 
he  submits  himself  generally  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court.27  Where  plaintiffs  failure  to  proceed 
justifies  the  conclusion  that  he  has  abandoned  the 
suit,  a  judgment  by  default  cannot  be  grounded  on 
defendant's  failure  to  appear.28 

A  special  appearance^  entered  for  the  purpose 
of  objecting  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,30  or 
to  make  a  motion  to  dissolve  an  attachment,31  or 
for  a  continuance,32  is  generally  held  not  to  be  such 
an  appearance  as  will  prevent  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault, but  there  is  also  authority  to  the  contrary;33 
and  it  has  been  held  that,  on  a  special  appearance 
for  the  purpose  of  objecting  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court,  it  is  'error  to  enter  a  default  judgment 
without  a  hearing  and  ruling  on  the  objection.34 

Appearance  by  attorney.  If  defendant's  appear- 
ance is  entered  by  an  attorney,  in  order  that  it  may 
be  such  as  will  prevent  a  judgment  by  default  for 
want  of  appearanc*,  it  must  be  made  by  formal  no- 
tice of  his  retainer  and  appearance35  or  by  the  fil- 
ing of  a  pleading.36  If  defendant  has  not  been 
properly  served  with  process,  judgment  by  default 
cannot  be  entered  against  him  on  an  unauthorized 
appearance  by  an  attorney;37  but,  where  defendant 
has  been  properly  served  with  process,  an  unauthor- 


ized appearance  for  him  by  an  attorney  does  not 
prevent  such  a  judgment  from  being  entered  against 
him.33 

§  197.    Withdrawal  of  Appearance 

Where  the  defendant's  appearance  Is  withdrawn, 
Judgment  by  default  may  be  taken  against  him  as  on 
nonappearance. 

As  discussed  in  Appearances  §  30,  the  withdrawal 
of  defendant's  appearance,  after  pleading,  works  a 
withdrawal  of  his  plea  or  answer,  and  a  judgment 
by  default  may  thereafter  be  entered  on  his  default 
as  on  nonappearance.39  If  the  attorney  who  has  en- 
tered an  appearance  for  defendant  withdraws  his 
appearance,  before  further  proceedings  are  had, 
judgment  by  default  for  want  of  an  appearance  may 
then  be  taken.40  And  the  absence  of  an  order  per- 
mitting the  withdrawal  cannot  be  complained  of  by 
defendant,  as  the  subsequent  entry  of  judgment  is 
a  ratification  by  the  court  of  the  withdrawal.41 
However,  the  withdrawal  of  the  attorney's  appear- 
ance after  the  filing  of  a  plea  does  not  withdraw  the 
plea  so  as  to  justify  a  judgment  by  default;42  and, 
where  an  attorney  abandons  his  client's  cause  with- 
out notice,  the  client  should  be  given  a  reasonable 
time  to  secure  other  counsel  before  judgment  is 
taken  against  him  by  default.43  Under  some  stat- 
utes, where  an  attorney  is  permitted  to  withdraw  the 
answer  and  his  appearance  for  defendant  who  fails 


Wash.— State  v.  McCoy,  209  P.  1112, 

122  Wash.  94. 
34  C.J.  p  158  note  91. 

25.  Mich. — Buchanan  v.  Weiden,  237 
N.W.  370,  255  Mich.  82. 

Mont. — Taylor  v.   Southwick,  255  (P. 

889,  78  Mont.  '329— Edenfteld  v.  G. 

V.  Seal  Co.,  241  P.  227,   74  Mont 

509. 
34  C.J.  p  159  note  92. 

26.  U.S. — Sheepshanks  v.  Boyer,  C. 
C.Pa.,    21    F.Cas.No.12,741,    Baldw. 
462. 

34  C.J.  p  159  note  93. 

27.  N.T.— Jennings  v.  Doyle,   33  N. 
T.S.2d  695,   268  App.Dlv.   488,  mo- 
tion denied  in  part  and  dismissed 
in    part    50   N.B.2d    242,    290   N.T. 
855,    affirmed    50    N.E.2d    645,    291 
N.Y.  505. 

34  C.J.  p  159  note  94. 
Representation  at  trial 

Party  brought  into  municipal  court 
as  third  party  defendant,  who  filed 
no  appearance  or  plea  of  any  kind, 
was  in  default,  although  its  attor- 
ney was  present  during  the  trial  and 
took  part  in  the  defense. — Jones  v. 
Harris  Trust  &  Sayings  Bank,  282 
IlLApp.  131. 

Pleading1  designated  special  appear, 
ance 

Where,  in  a  garnishment  proceed- 


ing, a  person  ordered  interpleaded 
as  party  defendant  served  a  verified 
pleading  denominated  a  special  ap- 
pearance, but  which  in  fact  amount- 
ed to  an  answer  or  plea  in  abate- 
ment, default  judgment  as  for  non- 
appearance  could  not  be  rendered* 
— Dakota  Nat.  Bank  y.  Johnson,  204 
N.W.  840,  52  N.D.  845. 
228.  Tex. — Brooks  Supply  Co.  v.  BDar- 
dee,  Civ.App.,  32  S.W.2d  384,  er- 
ror refused. 

29.  N.Y.— Powell  v.  Home  Seekers' 
Realty    Co.,  -228    N.T.S.    131,    131 
Misc.  590. 

30.  Conn.— Gaul  v.  Baker,  145  A.  61. 
108  Conn.  173. 

84  C.J.  p  159  note  96. 

31.  Cal.— Glidden  v.  Packard,  28  Cal. 
649. 

34  C.J.  p  159  note  97. 

312.    Ark. — Flowers  v.  Jackson,  51  S. 

W.  462,  66  Ark.  458. 
Colo.— Hoyt  v.  Macon,  2  Colo.  113. 

33.  Mont — Taylor  v.  Southwick,  253 
P.  889,  78  Mont.  329. 

34.  Wash. — Rauch  v.  Zander,  234  P. 
1089,  134  Wash.  40. 

35.  N.T. — Couch     v."   Mulhane,     €3 
HowJPr.  79. 

34  C.J.  p  169  note  99. 

36.  N.Y.— Couch  v.  Mulhane,  supra. 

342 


37,    Nev. — Stanton-Thompson  Co.  v. 

Crane,  51  P.  116,  24  Nev.  171. 
34  OJ.  p  159  note  & 

33.    Cal. — Hunter  v.   Bryant,    33    P. 

55,  98  CaL  252. 
W  C.J.  p  159  note  4. 

39.  N.T.— Kline  v.  Snyder,  231  N.Y. 
S.  275,  133  Misc.  128. 

3'4  C.J.  p  159  note  7. 
Attempted  withdrawal 

Where  defendants  appeared  before 
trial  justice  and  made  several  mo- 
tions, including  application  for  trial 
by  jury,  a  subsequent  attempted 
withdrawal  on  their  part  was  not 
sufficient  to  render  judgment  there- 
after entered  one  taken  by  default. — 
Jay-Washington  Realty  Corporation 
v.  Koondel,  49  N.Y.S.2d  306,  268  App. 
Div.  116. 

40.  Tex. — Cheshire  v.   Palmer,   Civ. 
App.,  44  S.W.2d  438. 

34  C.J.  p  159  note  8. 

41.  N.M. — Rio  Grande  Irrigation  & 
Colonization  Co.  v.  Gildersleeve,  48 
P.  309,  9  N.M.  12,  affirmed  19  S.Ct 
761,  174  U.S.  603,  4J3  L.Ed.  1103. 

42.  Tex. — Muenster  v.  Tremont  Nat. 
Bank,  49  S.W.  362,  92  Tex.  422. 

$4  C.J.  p  159  note  10. 

43.  Mo.-^Parks  v.  Coyne,   137  S.W. 
<335,  156  Mo.App.  379. 


49    C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


§  199 


to  appear  further,  and  no  attempt  is  made  by  plain- 
tiff to  substitute  counsel,  or  to  notify  defendant  to 
do  so,  judgment  cannot  be  taken  against  defend- 
ant." 

§  198.    Absence  from  Trial   or  Other 

Proceeding 

As  a  general  rule  a  default  judgment  may  be  taken 
on  defendant's  failure  to  appear  for  the  trial  after  is- 
sues have  been  joined,  but  plaintiff  has  been  required 
to  establish  his  cause  of  action  before  such  default  judg- 
ment is  entered. 

As  a  general  rule,  judgment  by  default  may  be 
entered  on  defendant's  failure  to  appear,  after  is- 
sue has  been  joined,  when  the  case  is  called  for 
trial.45  However,  in  some  jurisdictions  defendant's 
mere  failure,  after  issue  has  been  joined,  to  attend 
when  the  case  is  called  for  trial  is  not  by  itself 
sufficient  grounds  for  taking  judgment  by  default,46 
at  least  where  defendant  had  not  been  given  notice 
of  trial47  or  has  some  other  good  excuse  for  his 
absence.48  Before  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  judgment 
in  such  a  case,  he  must  establish  his  cause  of  ac- 
tion,4^  unless  the  facts  admitted  by  the  answer50  or 
other  pleas51  make  out  a  prima  facie  case  in  his  fa- 
vor; and  the  proper  course,  in  some  jurisdictions, 


is  to  call  defendant  and,  on  his  failure  to  appear, 
to  proceed  to  trial,  on  which  plaintiff  must  present 
evidence  in  support  of  his  demands;52  or  plaintiff 
may  be  allowed  to  proceed  to  take  an  inquest  and 
enter  judgment  thereon.53  Conversely,  if  plaintiff 
fails  to  appear  or  proceed,  under  some  statutes  de- 
fendant may  proceed  with  the  case  and  judgment 
may  be  rendered  on  the  merits;54  but  under  others 
defendant  cannot  recover  judgment  on  plaintiff's 
cause  of  action  where  plaintiff  fails  to  appear  at 
trial55  and  defendant  has  pleaded  only  defensive 
matters.56  If  defendant  files  a  set-off  or  counter- 
claim and  plaintiff  fails  to  appear,  defendant  may 
proceed  with  the  trial  of  the  set-off  or  counter- 
claim.57 

Pending  imprisonment.  Where  after  issue  is 
joined  one  party  is  sentenced  to  prison,  the  other 
party  may  proceed  in  the  action  and  take  judgment 
by  default.58 

§  199.    Default  in  Pleading 

a.  In  general 

b.  Answering  amended  pleadings 

c.  Answer  to  part  of  cause 

A  Filing  and  serving  plea  or  answer 


44.  Idaho. — Bogue  Supply  Co.  v.  Da- 
vis, 210  P.  5-77,  86  Idaho  249,  fol- 
lowed in  Lundin  v.  Davis,  210  P. 
579,  36  Idaho  258. 

45.  U.S.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    la 
U.   S.  v.  Hoblitzell,  D.C.Va,,  2  P. 
Supp.  832,  834. 

Ala, — Sovereign  Camp,  W.  O.  W.,  v. 
Gay,  104  So.  895,  20  Ala,App.  650, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  104  So. 
898,  213  Ala.  5. 

Conn. — Barton  v.  Barton,  196  A.  141, 
123  Conn.  487. 

•Ga.— Golightly  v.  Line,  121  SJ3.  878, 
31  Ga.App.  550. 

Iowa.— Vaux  v.  Hensal,  277  N.W.  718, 
224  Iowa  1055. 

Sy.— Strader  v.  Miller,  «3  S.W.2d 
668,  236  Ky.  637. 

Pa.— Simpson  Motor  Truck  Co.  v. 
Piccolomini,  Com.Pl.,  87  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  87,  1  Fay.iI/.J.  149. 

Philippine. — Flores  v.  Flores,  7  Phil- 
ippine 323,  5  OfLGaz.  165. 

•R.I.— Dimond  v.  Marwell,  190  A.  683, 
57  R.I.  477— Sahagian  v.  Superior 
Court,  129  A.  813,  47  ILL  85.  ' 

Tex. — Stevenson  v.  Thomas,  Civ.App., 

56  S.W.2d  109'5,  error  dismissed— 

Continental  Oil  &  Gas  Production 

•  Co.  v.  Austin,  Civ.App.,  17  S.W.2d 

•       1114. 

34  C.J.  p  160  note  14. 

46.  U.S.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
U.   S.  v.  Hoblitzell,  D.C.Va.,  2  F. 
Supp.  832,  834. 

Wyo.— McDaniel    v.    Hoblit,    24$    P. 

295,  34  Wyo.  509. 
34  C.J.  p  160  note  15* 


47.  Miss.— International  Shoe  Co.  v. 
Garfinkle,    112   So.   168,   146   Miss. 
799. 

34  C.J.  p  160  note  16. 

48.  N.Y.— Concord    Oil    Corporation 
v.  York  Heat  Service,  Inc.,  27  N. 
Y.S.2d  7*38,  262  App.Div.  758— Mur- 
ling  v.  State,  1  Hilt.  116,  3  Abb.Pr. 
109 — Sussman    v.    Silverman,    199 
N.T.S.  419. 

49.  Ark.— Hurst  v.  Davies,  291  S.W. 
799,  173  Ark.  36. 

HI.— Du  Breuil  v.  Klein,  25-3  IlLApp. 

91. 
Ky.— Kraft    v.    Ballback,    3    S.W.2d 

1068,  223  Ky.  441. 
Mo.— Eubanks  v.  Missouri  Nat  Life 

Ins.  Co.,    24   S.W.2d   715,   223   Mo. 

App.  1095. 
N.Y.— Frucci  v.  Winters,   286  N.T.S. 

781,  2<47  App.Div.  866. 
SJX— Forman  v.  Hall,  212  N.W.  866, 

51  S.D.  144. 
Tex.— Paggi  v.  Rose  Mfg.  Co.,  Civ. 

App.,  259  S.W.  962. 
34  C.J.  p  HO  note  18. 

50.  Neb.— Sutton  First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Sutton   Mercantile    Co.,    110    N.W. 
306,  77  Neb.  596. 

S.D.— Forman  v.  Hall,  212  N.W.  866, 
51  S.D.  144. 

51.  Ala.— Lokey  v.   Ward,    154    So. 
802,  228  Ala.  559 — Sovereign  Camp, 
W.  O.  W.,  v.  Gay,  104  So.  895,  20 
Ala. App.    650,    reversed    on    other 
grounds  104  So.  898,  213  Ala.  5. 

Tex.— Dickson    v.    Navarro    County 
Levee   Improvement   Dist.   No.    3, 

343 


Civ.App.,  124  S.W.2d  94»3,  followed 
in  Dickson  v.  Ellis  County  Levee 
Improvement  Dist.  No.  10,  124  S. 
W.2d  946,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  1<39  S.W.2d  260,  135  Tex. 
102,  set  aside  Dickson  v.  Navarro 
County  Levee  Imp.  Dist.  No.  S,  139 
S.W.2d  257,  135  Tex.  95. 

52.  Cal.— Warden  v.   Lamb,    277   P. 
867,  98  CaLApp.  738. 

Iowa.— Vaux  v.  Hensal,  277  N.W.  718, 

224  Iowa  1055. 
Pa.— Anderson    v.    Gertler,    Com.Pl.. 

92  Pittsb.Leg.J.  56. 
34  C.J.  p  160  note  20. 

53.  N.Y.— Rycroft  v.  Pierce,   135  N. 
T.S.  447,   150  App.Div.   52-1,  reset- 
tled 135  N.T.S.  1140,  150  App.Div. 
931. 

34  C.J.  P  160  note  21. 

34.  Cal. — Clune  v.  Quitzow.  57  P. 
SS6,  125  Cal.  213. 

34  C.J.  p  160  note  23. 

55.  Tex. — Burger  v.  Toung,  15  S.W., 
107,  78  Tex.  656— Cornelius  v. 
Early,  Civ.App.,  24  S,W.2d  757,  af- 
firmed Early  v.  Cornelius,  39  S.W. 
2d  6,  120  Tex.  335. 

56b  Ga. — Beasley  Motor  Co.  v.  Cow- 
art,  154  S.E.  458,  41  Ga.App.  684. 

57.  Iowa. — Stewart  v.  Gorham,  98  N. 
W.  512,  122  Iowa  669. 

34  OJ.  p  160  note  24. 

58.  Ga.— Peterson   v.   C.  A.   Martin 
Furniture  Co.,  86  S.E.  1099,  144  Ga. 
316. 

N.T. — Bonnell  v.  Rome,  W.  &  O.  R- 
Co.,  12  Hun  218. 


§  199 


JUDGMENTS 


49   C-J-S- 


e.  Affidavit  of  defense  or  merits 

f.  After  decision  on  motion  or  demurrer 

g.  Failure  to  reply  or  rejoin 

h.  Striking  or  withdrawal  of  pleading 
i.  Pending  disposition  of  pleading 

a.  In  General 

(1)  Genera!  rules 

(2)  Rule  or  notice  to  plead 

(3)  Time  for  pleading 

(1)  General  Rules 

A  default  judgment  may  be  entered  against  a  de- 
fendant who,  having  been  duly  served  with  process,  fails 
to  demur,  plead,  or  answer  properly. 

Where  process  has  been  duly  served  on  defend- 
ant, and  plaintiff  has  filed  a  good  declaration  or 
complaint,  judgment  as  by  default  may  be  entered 


against  defendant  if  he  fails  to  demur,  plead,  or 
answer  properly59  within  the  required  time,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  subdivision  a  (3)  of  this  section.  The 
rule  applies  notwithstanding  defendant  has  entered 
an  appearance  in  the  action,60  or  has  demanded  a 
trial  by  jury;81  but  defendant's  failure  to  answer 
will  not  support  a  judgment  by  default  where  the 
undisputed  evidence  shows  that  he  is  not  liable  to 
plaintiff.62 

Sufficiency  of  pleading  to  prevent  default.  To 
prevent  a  judgment  by  default  on  this  ground  it  is 
generally  held  that  defendant's  plea  or  answer  must 
be  in  writing,63  and  be  properly  signed64  and  veri- 
fied, where  verification  is  required  by  statute,65  al- 
though, under  some  statutes,  it  has  been  held  that, 
unless  plaintiff  takes  steps  to  have  an  unverified 
answer  removed  or  stricken,  judgment  by  default  is 


59.  U.S.— Orsinger  v.  Consolidated 
Flour  Mills  Co.,  C.CJLI11.,  284  P. 
224,  certiorari  denied  43  S.Ct.  248, 
260  U.S.  746.  67  L.Ed.  493— Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  v.  Da- 
ley, IXCMass.,  26  F.Supp.  421. 

Ala, — Ex  parte  Central  Alabama  Dry 
Goods  Co.,  189  So.  56,  238  Ala.  20. 

Ariz.— Collins  v.  Streitz,  54  P.2d  264, 
47  Ariz.  146,  appeal  dismissed  56 
SXJt.  835,  298  U.S.  040,  80  L.Ed. 
1-373— Martin  v.  Sears,  44  P.2d  526, 
45  Ariz.  414. 

Ark.— Dunbar  v.  Howell,  52  SJW.2d 
618,  186  Ark.  1— Alger  v.  Beasley, 
20  S.W.2d  317,  180  Ark.  46. 

CaL— Union  Oil  Co.  of  California  v. 
Conejo  OU  Co.,  267  P.  320,  91  CaL 
App.  652 — Butler  v.  Robinson,  244 
P.  162,  76  CaLApp.  223. 

111. — Gardner  v.  Shekleton,  253  m. 
App.  333. 

La. — Fowler  Commission  Co.  v.  E.  J. 
Deas  &  Co.,  127  So.  456,  13  La. 
App.  141. 

Miss.— Strain  v.  Gayden,  20  So.2d 
697,  197  Miss.  353. 

Mo. — O'Connell  v.  Dockery,  App.,  102 
S.W.2d  748. 

Mont.— Mihelich  v.  Butte  Electric 
Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont  604. 

N.T.— Kinzler  v.  Schoeler,  47  N.Y.S. 
2d  508,  181  Misc.  368. 

N.C.— King:  v.  Rudd,  37  S.B.2d  116, 
226  N.C.  Ii6— Duplin  County  v.  Ez- 
zell,  27  S.E.2d  448,  223  N.C.  531— 
Battle  v.  Mercer,  122  S.E.  4,  187 
N.C.  4>37,  rehearing  denied  123  S.E. 
258,  188  N.C.  116. 

Ohio.— McCabe  v.  Tom,  171  N.E.  868, 
35  Ohio  App.  73. 

OkL— New  -v.  Elliott,  211  P.  1025, 
88  Okl.  126. 

R.I.— Dimond  v.  Marwell,  190  A.  683, 
57  R.I.  477. 

Tex. — Postal  Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n 
v.  Powell,  Civ.App.,  47  S.W.2d  343, 
error  refused — Shaw  v.  Whitfield, 
Civ.App.,  35  S.W.2d  1115— Fort 
Worth.  Mut.  Benev.  Ass'n  of  Texas 


v.  Golden,  CivJlpp.,  287  S.W.  291 — 
Dnval  County  Ranch  Co.  v. 
Drought  Civ.App.,  260  S.W.  298 — 
Smith  v.  Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  of 
Lubbock,  Civ.App.,  246  S.W.  407 
— Gerlach  v.  North  Texas  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  244  S.W.  662. 

Wash. — Garrett  v.  Nespelem  Consol. 
Mines,  139  (P.2d  273,  18  Wash.2d 
340— Riddell  v,  David,  23  P.2d  22, 
IT'S  Wash,  370 — Lawrence  v.  Raw- 
son,  217  P.  1019,  126  Wash.  158. 

34  C.J.  p  161  note  27. 

Complaint  in  intervention  properly 
served  on  the  original  parties  must 
be  answered  as  though  it  were  an 
original  complaint;  otherwise  a 
judgment  by  default  may  be  taken. — 
State  Bank  of  New  Salem  v. 
Schultze,  209  P.  599,  63  Mont.  410. 

Consolidation  of  cross  suit 

Plaintiffs  were  held  not  entitled  to 
judgment  by  reason  of  defendant's 
failure  to  file  answer,  where  action 
had  been  treated  by  all  parties  as 
consolidated  with  cross  suit.— Rowe 
v.  Arnett,  45  S.W.2d  12,  241  Ky.  768. 

Answer  of  oodefendaut 

(1)  Ordinarily,  the  answer  of  a  co- 
defendant  will  not  prevent  the  tak- 
ing of  a  default  judgment  against 
defendant   who    does   not   answer. — 
Kunsky-Trendle  Broadcasting  Corpo- 
ration v.  Kent  Circuit  Judge,  275  N. 
W.  175,  281  Mich.  867. 

(2)  However,  where  the  answer  of 
a   codefendant   was   treated   by   de- 
fendants   and    the    court  as   having 
been  filled  on  behalf  of  both  defend- 
ants,  the  entry   of  a  default  judg- 
ment against  the  nonanswering  de- 
fendant    was     properly     refused. — 
Thomas  v.  Williams,  49  P.2d  557,  173 
Okl.  601. 

Constructive  service  N 

Where  service  of  process  on  each 
of  defendants  was  constructive  only, 
refusal  of  district  court  to  quash  | 

344 


that  service  imposed  no  duty  on  part 
of  defendants  personally  to  answer 
in  the  cause  in  order  to  avoid  per- 
sonal judgments  by  default — Kimbel 
v.  Osborn,  Wyo.,  156  P.2d  279. 

60.  CaL — Judson  T.   Superior  Court 
of  Los  Angeles  County,   129   P.2d 
861.  21  Cal.2d  11. 

Ind. — Carson   v.   Perkins,    29   N.E.2d 

772,  217  Ind.  543. 
Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Compagnie  G6n4r- 

ale  Transatlantique  v.  Falkenhain- 

er.  274  S.W.  758,  '309  Mo.  224. 
34  C.J.  p  161  note  29. 
Season  for  role 

The  entry  of  an  appearance  pre- 
vents the  taking  of  a  judgment  for 
want  of  an  appearance,  but  not  ft 
judgment  for  want  of  a  plea. — Russ 
v.  Gilbert,  19  Fla.  54. 

mi  dicit 

Tex. — Spivey  v.   Saner-Ragley  Lum- 
ber Co.,  ConuApp.,  284  S.W.  210. 

61.  .Ala, — Ex  parte  Central  Alabama 
Dry  Goods  Co.,  189  So.  56,  238  Ala, 
20— Petree  v.  Olim,  89  So.  602,  203 
Ala,  333. 

62.  Ark.— Wildrick  v.  Raney,  282  S. 
W.  17,  170  Ark.  1194. 

63.  Tex. — State    v.    Patterson,    Civ. 
App.,  40  S.W.  224. 

34  C.J.  <p  161  note  32. 

64.  Ky. — Simon  v.  Webster,   211   SL 
W.  866,  184  Ky.  262. 

34  C.J.  p  161  note  33. 

65.  Ala, — Schwarz   v.   Oppenheimer, 
8  So.  36,  90  Ala.  462. 

ISr.C.— Griffin    v.    Asheville    Light    & 

Power   Col,   16    S.E.   423,   111  N.C. 

434— Alford  v.  McCormac,   90  N.C. 

151. 
Tenn. — Trabue  v.  Higden,  4  Coldw. 

620. 
34  C.X  p  161  note  34. 


49    C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


199 


improper.66  It  must  also  be  filed  in  the  particular 
action,67  and  must  be  responsive  to,  and  join  issue 
on,  the  pleadings  which  defendant  is  bound  to  an- 
swer.68 

Failure  to  a-nsiver  interrogatories.  Under  some 
•statutes  a  party  may  take  a  judgment  by  default  on 
the  opposing  party's  failure  to  answer  interroga- 
tories fileci.69  However,  the  fact  that  the  answers 
are  deemed  insufficient  or  evasive  does  not  authorize 
the  court  to  enter  a  default  without  further  pro- 
ceedings;70 it  should  fix  a  time  within  which  fur- 
ther answers  may  be  filed,  in  order  that  the  time  of 
default,  if  they  are  not  filed,  may  be  definitely 
loiown.71  After  an  answer  to  the  merits,  plaintiff 
may  not  take  judgment  by  default  because  defend- 
ant neglects  to  answer  interrogatories  which  are 
taken  for  confessed,  but  may  avail  himself  only  of 
the  confession  as  proved  on  the  trial.72 

(2)  Rule  or  Notice  to  Plead 

Where  defendant  Is  not  required  to  plead  until  ruled 
-to  do  so,  he  ordinarily  may  be  put  in  default  when,  and 
only  when,  *he  has  been  duly  served  with  rule  to  plead 
and  has  failed  to  comply. 

Where  defendant  fails  to  enter  an  appearance, 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  judgment  by  default  without 
serving  or  posting  any  rule  to  plead  on  him,73  but, 
where  defendant  has  appeared  and  the  practice  or 
circumstances  of  the  case  are  such  that  he  is  not 
obliged  to  plead  unless  he  is  ruled  to  do  so,  he  can- 
not be  put  in  default  and  judgment  entered  against 


him,  unless  a  rule  to  plead  is  taken  out  and  prop- 
erly served  on  him,  requiring  him  to  plead,74  Or 
unless  he  waives  his  right  to  have  plaintiff  take  out 
such  a  rule,75  as  where  he  agrees  to  go  to  trial  with- 
out requiring  the  issues  to  be  completed.76  If,  aft- 
er the  proper  service  or  notice  of  such  rule,  defend- 
ant fails  to  plead  or  answer  within  the  appointed 
time,  judgment  may  be  taken  against  him  as  for 
want  of  a  plea,77  although  it  has  been  held  that  a 
plea  filed  after  the  day  fixed  by  the  rule  will  not  be 
too  late,  where  it  is  filed  before  a  default  is  asked 
for  and  ordered,78  or  where  no  delay  is  occasioned 
by  his  failure  to  plead  within  the  prescribed  time.79 
The  sufficiency  of  the  plea  or  answer  on  a  rule  to 
plead  must  be  determined  by  the  court,80  and  not 
by  plaintiff.81  Apart  from  the  question  of  the  pro- 
priety or  necessity  of  a  rule  to  plead  to  put  defend- 
ant in  default,  it  has  been  held  in  at  least  one  ju- 
risdiction that  the  -court  cannot  make  and  enforce 
an  order  requiring  defendant  to  plead,  answer,  or 
demur,  since  defendant  has  an  absolute  right  to 
stand  iii  default.82 

When  rule  not  required.  A  rule  requiring  de- 
fendant to  plead,  before  the  entry  of  a  default,  is 
not  required  where  the  time  to  plead  is  limited  by 
statute  or  rule  of  court,83  or  where  a  rule  for  judg- 
ment for  want  of  sufficient  pleading  has  been  ar- 
gued and  leave  granted  to  file  a  supplemental  plead- 
ing;84 nor  may  such  a  rule  be  given  and  judgment 
entered  on  it  for  want  of  a  plea,  after  a  plea  has 
been  entered  and  the  cause  remanded  to  the  rules.85 


66.  Iowa.— Mallory    v.     Sailing:,    48 
Iowa  699— Wolff  v.  Hagensick,  10 
•Iowa  590. 

67.  Tex.— Dowell  v.  Winters,  20  Tex. 
793. 

84  C.J.  p  161  note  36. 

68.  Minn. — Hasse  v.  Victoria  Co-op. 
Creamery  Ass'n,  294  N.W.  475,  208 
Minn.  457. 

34  C.J.  p  161  note  37. 
Motion,  to  dismiss 

Defendant's  motion  to  dismiss  pe- 
tition for  want  of  security  for  costs 
was  not  a  "pleading"  preventing  a 
default  Judgment  for  want  of  an  an- 
swer or  demurrer. — Morrison  v.  Bak- 
er, Ohio  App.,  58  N.GE.2d  708. 
Motion  for  1)111  of  particulars 

Motion  to  require  plaintiff  to  set 
forth  particulars  of  claim  for  serv- 
ices is  not  a  demurrer,  but  is  with- 
in statute  as  to  bill  of  particulars* 
and  judgment  by  default  is  proper 
after  removal  of  motion  from  cal- 
ender for  want  of  appearance. — But- 
ler v.  Robinson,  244  P.  162,  76  Cal. 
App.  223-73*4  C.J.  p  161  note  37. 

69.  Ohio. — Simpson  v.   Jackson,   163 
KB.  -307,  29  Ohio  App.  530. 

34  C.J.  p  161  note  39. 


7<X    Mass. — Fels  v.  Raymond,  28  N. 
E.  691,  139  Mass.  98. 

71.    Mass. — Hooton  v.  Redmond,  130 

N.E.  107,  237  Mass.  508. 
Wash. — Lawson    v.    Black    Diamond 

Coal  Min.  Co.,  86  P.  1120,  44  Wash. 


72.  La.— Behan  v.  Hite,  14  La.  67. 

73.  U.S.— King  v.  Davis,  C.C.Va.,  137 
F.   198,   affirmed  157  F.   676,   85  C. 
C.A.  348. 

34  C.J.  p  162  note  43. 

74.  Mich.— Griffin  v.  McGavin,  75  N. 
W.  1061,  117  Mich.  372,  72  Am.S.R. 
564. 

34  C.J.  p  162  note  45. 

Rule   to  plead  generally  see  the  C. 

J.S.   title  Pleading  §   116,   also   49 

C.J.  p  207  notes  91-1. 
Directing1  tender  of  issues 

Under  a  statute  providing  for 
Judgment  by  default  where  defendr 
ant  neglects  or  refuses  to  join  issue 
under  the  direction  of  the  court,  a 
defiault  judgment  is  unauthorized 
where  the  court  did  not  direct  the 
tender  of  issues. — Continental  Oil  & 
Gas  Production  Co.  v.  Austin,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  17  S.W.2d  1114. 

345 


75.  Ind.— Kruse   v.    State,    103    N.E. 
663,  55  Ind.App.  20$. 

76.  Ind. — Kruse  v.    State,    supra. 

77.  111. — Penman  v.  Village  of  Philo, 
•32  N.E.2d  640,  309  IlLApp.  49. 

Ind.— Carson   v.    Perkins,    29    N.E.2d 

772,  217  Ind.  5'43. 
Me.— Lebel  v.  Cyr,   34  A.2d  201,  140 

Me.  98. 

«34  C.J.  p  162  note  48. 
73.    111.— Castle    v.    Judson,    17    111. 

381. 
3"4  C.J.  p  162  note  49. 

79.  Iowa. — Redfield  v.  Miller,   13  N. 
W.  334,  59  Iowa  393. 

80.  Pa.— Goldstein    v.    Fritzius,    41 
Pa. Super.  219. 

81.  Pa. — Goldstein   v.    Fritzius,    su- 
pra. 

82.  Mo.— State     ex    rel.     Tighe     v. 
Brown,    23    S.W.2d    1092,    224    Mo. 
App.  844. 

83.  Colo. — King    v.    Gardner,    55    P. 
727,  25  Colo.  395. 

111.— Michael   v.   Mace,   27   N.E.    694, 
137  111.  485. 

84.  Pa.— Close  v.  Hancock,  3  Pa.Su- 
per.  207,  £9  Wkly.N.C.  460. 

85*    Ky. — Clark  y.  Davis,  Hard.  410. 


§  199 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S- 


Loss  of  pleading.  Where,  after  the  cause  is  at' 
issue,  the  records  and  files  of  the  court  are  de- 
stroyed and  plaintiff  files  a  new  declaration  under 
his  affidavit  that  he  has  substantial  copies  of  the 
papers  which  had  been  filed,  judgment  by  default 
may  not  be  entered  against  defendant  because  of 
his  failure  to  comply  with  a  rule  of  the  court  to 
plead;86  in  such  a  case  the  court  can  do  no  more 
than  allow  plaintiff  to  supply  the  plea.87 
» 

(3)  Time  for  Pleading 

Judgment  by  default  cannot  properly  be  taken  un- 
til the  time  for  pleading  has  expired  and  defendant  has 
failed  to  plead  within  that  time. 

Defendant  cannot  be  put  in  default  for  failure  to 
plead  or  answer  before  the  expiration  of  the  time 
allowed  to  him  for  filing  his  plea  or  answer,88  and, 
as  discussed  infra  §  207,  a  judgment  by  default  en- 
tered against  him  before  the  expiration  of  that  time 


is  irregular  and  voidable  at  his  instance.  However 
judgment  by  default  may  be  entered,  if  defendant 
fails  to  plead  or  make  up  issues  as  the  law  requires, 
within  the  time  limited  by  statute  or  rule  of  court,89 
or  within  the  time  limited  by  an  order  extending  the 
time  to  plead,90  unless  such  order  is  revoked,  in 
which  case  judgment  may  be  taken  for  a  failure  to 
plead  within  the  time  originally  required.91  De- 
fendant cannot  escape  the  consequences  of  his  de- 
fault by  filing  an  answer  or  plea  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  time  allowed,92  unless  it  is  filed  by  con- 
sent of  plaintiff93  or  leave  of  court,94  or  unless,  in 
some  jurisdictions,  it  is  filed  before  the  entry  of  the 
default.9* 

Excuse  for  delay.  The  filing  of  a  plea  or  answer 
after  the  time  allowed  therefor  may  be  sufficient  to 
prevent  a  judgment  by  default,  where  there  is  a  le- 
gal and  sufficient  excuse  for  the  delay,96  as  where 


86.  HI.— Daniels    v.    Chicago    Fifth 
Nat  Bank,  65  111.  409. 

87.  HI.— Daniels    v.    Chicago    Fifth 
Nat.  Bank,  supra. 

88.  Ala. — National     Surety     Co.     v. 
First  Nat.   Bank,  142   So.    414,   225 
Ala,  108. 

Cal.— Baird  v.  Smith,  14  P.2d  749,  216 

Cal.  408. 
La. — Ponchatoula  Farm  Bureau  Ass'n 

v.   Tangipahoa  Bank  &  Trust  Co., 

160  So.  803,  181  La.  1039— Spillman 

v.  Texas  &  P.  Ky.  Co.,  120  So.  905, 

10  La.App.  379. 
Mo.— Aufderheide      v.      Aufderheide, 

App.,  18  S.W.2d  119. 
Mont. — Griffith    v.    Montana    Wheat 

Growers'    Ass'n,     244     P.     277,     75 

Mont.  466. 
N.Y.— Earth    v.    Owens,    35    N.T.S.2d 

632,  178  Misc.  628— Levin  v.  Levin, 

284  N.T.S.  89-7,  157  Misc.  372. 
Pa.— Deibert  v.  Kulp,   45   Pa.Dist.  & 

Co.  41*. 
tfenn.— Fidelity-Phenix  Fire  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Oliver,  152  S.W.2d  254,  25  Tenn. 

App.     114— Marshall     v.     Johnson 

Hardware  Co.,  5  Tenn. App.  369. 
34  C.J.  p  162  note  59. 
Two  "last"  days 

Where  two  modes  of  service  of 
process  have  been  made  under  which 
two  different  periods  in  which  to  an- 
swer are  provided  for,  one  greater 
than  the  other,  defendant  has  right 
of  choice  and  no  default  can  occur 
until  last  day  of  the  longer  period  to 
answer  has  expired. — Olson  v.  Jor- 
dan, 43  N.T.S.2d  348,  181  Misc.  942. 
Sundays  and  holidays 

In  computing  the  time,  intervening 
Sundays  and  holidays  are  counted. — 
Bailey  v.  Edmundson,  46  N.053.  10-64, 
168  Mass.  297. 

89.  Ala. — Ex  parte  Central  Alabama 
Dry  Goods  Co.,  1<89  So.  56,  288  Ala. 
20. 


Ariz.— Collins  v.  Streitz,  &4  P.2d  264, 
'47  Ariz.  146,  appeal  dismissed  56 
S.Ct  835,  298  U.S.  640,  80  L.Ed. 
137>3— Martin  v.  Sears,  44  P.2d  526, 
145  Ariz.  414. 

Ark.— Dunbar  v.  Howell,  52  S.W.2d 
618,  1&6  Ark.  1 — Alger  v.  Beasley, 
20  S.W.2d  317,  180  Ark.  46. 

Cal.— Union  Oil  Co.  of  Calif ornia .  v. 
Conejo  Oil  Co.,  267  P.  320,  91  Cal. 
App.  652. 

111. — Penman  v.  Village  of  Philo,  32 
N.E.2d  640,  309  Ill.App.  49. 

Mo. — O'Connell  v.  Dockery,  App.,  102 
S.W.2d  7«48. 

Mont.— Mihelich  v.  Butte  Electric 
Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont.  604. 

N.C.— King  v.  Rudd,  37  S.E.2d  116, 
226  N.C.  1'56 — Battle  v.  Mercer, 
122  S.E.  4,  187  N.C.  457,  rehearing 
denied  123  S.E.  258,  188  N.C.  116. 

Tex. — Continental  Oil  &  Gas  Produc- 
tion Co.  v.  Austin,  Civ.Ap,p.,  17  S. 
W.2d  111'4— Fort  Worth  Mut 
Benev.  Ass'n  of  Texas  v.  Golden, 
Civ.App.,  287  S.W.  291— Duval 
County  Ranch  Co.  v.  Drought,  Civ. 
App.,  260  S.W.  298. 

Wash. — Garrett  v.  Nespelem  Consol.' 
Mines,  159  ?.2d  27'3,  18  Wash.2d 
340. 

34  C.J.  p  165  note  61. 

90.  Cal.— Union  Oil   Co.   of  Califor- 
nia v.   Conejo  Oil  Co.,  267  P.   320, 
91  Cal.App.  652. 

34  C.J.  p  163  note  62. 

91.  N.Y.— Brown    v.    St    John,    19 
Wend.  617. 

34  C.J.  p  163  note  63. 

92.  Ariz. — Martin  v.  Sears,   44  P.2d 
526,  45  Ariz.  414. 

Cal.— Jones  v.  Moers,  266  P.  821,  91 

CaljApp.  65. 
Idaho. — Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92  P.2d 

1053,  60  Idaho  464,  124  A.L.R.  149. 
111. — Straus    v.    Biesen,    242    111. App. 

570. 

346 


N.C.— Elramy  v.  Abeyounis,  126  S.E. 
T43,  189  N.C.  278. 

Philippine.— Noel  v.  Lasala,  5  Phil- 
ippine 260. 

34  C.J.  p  16i3  note  -64. 

93.  'Ind. — Rooker  v.   Bruce,    85   N.E. 
351,  171  Ind.  86,  96. 

Iowa. — Jones  v.  Jones,  13   Iowa  276. 
Waiver  of  default  see  infra  §  203. 

94.  -111.— Straus    v.    Biesen,    242    111. 
App.  1370. 

:  C.J.  p  163  note  66. 

95.  Cal.— Jones  v.  Moers.  266  P.  821, 
91  CaLApp.  65. 

Fla. — Johnson  v.  City  of  Sebring,  140 

So.  672,  104  Fla.  584. 
Ga. — Butters  worth  v.  Swint,  186  S.E. 

770,    53     Ga.App.     602— Bridges    v 

Wilmington    Sav.    Bank,    13-6    S.B. 

281,  36  Ga.App.  239. 
Mont. — Edenfield  v.   G.  V.   Seal   Co., 

241  P.  227,  74  Mont.  509. 
N.M. — Animas   Consol.   Mines   Co.   v. 

Frazier,  69  P.2d  927,  41  N.M.  389. 
Tex. — World  Co.  v.  Dow,  287  S.W. 

241,  110  Tex.  1146— Aubrey  v.  Dun- 

nahoo,  CivaApp.,  90  S.W.2d  611. 
Utah. — Sanders  v.  Milford  Auto  Co., 

218  P.  126,  62  Utah  110. 
34  C.J.  p  163  note  67. 

96*    D.C. — Home    v.    Ostmann,    Mun. 

App.,  35  A.2d  1T4. 
N.T. — Lord  v.  Vandenburgh,  Ii3  N.T. 

Super.  703. 
N.C.— Blalock  v.  Whisnant,   199   S.E. 

292,  214  N.C.  834. 
34  C.J.  p  16*4  note  68. 
Attorney's  inadvertence 

Even  though  it  does  not  constitute 
a  legally  sufficient  excuse,  the  court 
should  not  summarily  deny  defend- 
ant a  hearing  where  he  is  caught  un- 
awares through  attorney's  Inadvert- 
ence and  no  harm  can  result  from 
trial  on  merits. — Tonkel  v.  Williams, 
112  So.  368,  146  Miss.  842. 


49    C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


§  199 


the  delay  is  due  to  the  action  of  the  court,9?  or  is 
attributable  to  plaintiffs  own  fault  or  irregular  ac- 
tion in  the  case,98  or  the  grant  of  further  time  in 
which  to  plead,99  or  a  delay  in  the  mails,1  unless 
such  delay  is  due  to  defendant's  own  fault.2 

Whole  of  last  day.  Defendant  has  the  whole  of 
the  last  day  of  the  time  limited  in  which  to  plead, 
and  cannot  be  put  in  default  until  that  day  has 
fully  expired,3  and,  if  the  last  day  falls  on  a  Sunday 
or  holiday,  he  is  entitled  to  the  whole  of  the  next 
succeeding  day.4 

Pleading  and  judgment  on  same  day.  Where  de- 
fendant's pleading  is  filed  on  the  same  day  on  which 
judgment  by  default  is  entered,  the  court  may  con- 
sider fractions  of  the  day  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
termining whether  or  not  the  plea  or  answer  was 
actually  filed  before  the  judgment  was  rendered.5 
In  some  jurisdictions  it  will  be  presumed,  in  the 
absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  that  the  plead- 
ing was  first  in  point  of  time,  and  the  judgment, 
therefore,  erroneous.6  In  other  jurisdictions,  how- 
ever, the  presumption  is  that  the  judgment  was 
first  in  point  of  time  ;7  and,  if  the  default  is  taken 
in  good  faith,  and  without  knowledge  of  the  plead- 
ing, it  will  be  upheld  as  regular,8  although  it  was 
in  fact  taken  after  the  plea  or  answer  was  served,9 


especially  where  the  plea  or  answer  was  held  back 
for  the  purpose  of  delay.10 

b.  Answering  Amended  Pleadings 

Where  plaintiff  substantially  amends  his.  pleading, 
default  judgment  usually  may  be  taken  against  defend- 
ant If  he  falls  to  file  a  new  or  amended  plea  within  the 
required  time,  provided  he  Is  properly  served  with,  or 
notified  of,  the  amended  pleading. 

Where  plaintiff  amends  his  declaration  or  com- 
plaint so  as  to  change  the  cause  of  action,  or  add 
a  new  one  and  thereby  abandons  the  original  is- 
sues, judgment  by  default  may  be  taken  against  de- 
fendant if  he  fails  to  file  a  new  or  amended  answer 
or  plea  within  the  time  allowed  therefor,11  notwith- 
standing the  original  answer  or  pica  is  still  on  file,12 
unless  defendant  is  not  properly  served  with,  or 
notified  of,  the  amended  pleading,1^  or  ordered  to 
plead  thereto,14  for  after  an  amendment,  without 
notice,  defendant  may  be  defaulted  only  as  to  mat- 
ters alleged  in  the  original  complaint  and  not  as  to 
matters  alleged  in  the  amended  complaint.15  This 
rule,  however,  does  not  apply  where  the  amendment 
is  merely  to  formal  or  immaterial  matters,  and  does 
not  change  the  cause  of  action,16  unless  the  original 
plea  or  answer  has  been  withdrawn  ;17  nor  does  it 
apply  where  the  original  plea  or  answer  set  forth  a 
sufficient*  defense  to  the  declaration  or  complaint  as 


97.  N.C.— White   v.   Lokey,    42    S.E. 
44'5,  131  N.C.  72. 

84  C.J.  (P  164  note  69. 

98.  Mont. — Corpus   Juris   quoted  in. 
Keynolds  v.  Gladys  Belle  Oil  Co., 
243  P.   576,   581,  75  Mont  332. 

34  C.J.  p  164  note  70. 

99.  D.C.— Home   v.   Ostoann,   Mun. 
App.,  35  A.2d  174. 

34  C.J.  p  164  note  71. 
Construction,  of  extension. 

An  indefinite  agreement  between 
parties'  attorneys  for  extension  of 
time  to  file  answer  should  not  be 
construed  by  counsel  technically  or 
strictly  in  taking  of  default  judg- 
ment, so  as  to  deprive  defendant  un- 
justly of  his  rights,  but  should  be 
construed  in  spirit  of  professional 
courtesy  and  mutual  helpfulness. — 
Cahaley  v.  Cahaley,  12  N.W.2d  182, 
216  Minn.  175,  157  A.L.R.  1. 

1.  N.T.— Tates  v.   Guthrie,   23  N.B. 
741,  119  N.T.  420. 

34  C.J.  p  164  note  72. 

2.  N.T.— Kuh  v.  Goldman,  104  N.T. 
S.  255,  119  AppJMv.  14'8. 

34  C.J.  p  164  note  73. 

3-    HI.— Mercer   v.    Mercer,    271   111. 

App.  307. 
Pa.— Deibert  v.  Kulp,  4'5  FteuDist  & 

Co.  4-13. 

34  C.J.  p  164  note  T4. 
4,    N.T. — Rothchild  v.  Mannesovitch, 

51  N.T.S.  253,  29  App.Div.  580. 
34  CX  p  164  note  75.    . 


5.  pa. — Bordentown  Banking  Co.  v. 
Restein,  6!3  A.  451,  214  Pa.  30. 

6.  111.— Lyon  v.  Barney,  2  111.  387. 
Pa.— Rank  v.  Hauer,  2  Pa.Co.  385. 

7.  Tex.— Wooldridge    v.     Brown,     1 
Tex.  478. 

8.  N.T.— Brainard    v.     Hanford,     6 
Hill  368. 

9.  N.T. — Brainard    v.   Hanford,    su- 


pra. 

10.  N.T.— Rogers  v.  Beach,  18  Wend. 
533. 

11.  Cal.^Corpu*     Juris      cited     in 
Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246,  250,  203 
Cal.    306— Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
Steinbauer   v.    Bondesen,    14    P.2d 
106,  109,  125  CaLApp.  504— Jones  v. 
Moers,  266  P.  '821,  91  CaLApp.  65. 

Fla.— Avon  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Herrin,  114 
So.' 425,  93  Fla.  1128. 

Mo.— Leis  v.  Massachusetts  Bonding 
&  Insurance  Co.,  App.,  125  S.W.2d 
906. 

Mont. — Griffith  v.  Montana  Wheat 
Growers'  Ass'n,  244  P.  277,  75 
Mont.  466. 

N.C. — Brown  v.  Town  of  Hillsboro, 
117  SJB.  41,  185  N.C.  3-68. 

(34  C.J.  p  164  note  85. 

Amendment'  as  superseding  original 
pleadings  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Plead- 
ings $  321,  also  49  C.J.  p  058  note 
37-p  560  note  6*8. 

12.  Cal.— Corpus     Juris     cited     la, 
Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246,  250,  203 
Cal.    i30  6— Corpus    Juris    cited   in. 

347 


Steinbauer    v.    Bondesen,    14    P.2d 
106,  109,  125  CaLApp.  419. 
34  C.J.  p  165  note  86. 

13.    Mont.— Griffith        v.        Montana 

Wheat  Growers'  Ass'n,  244  P.  277, 

75  Mont.  466. 
Okl. — Joplin   Furniture  Co.   v.   Bank 

of  Picher,  3  P.2d  173,  151  Okl.  158. 
34  C.J.  p  165  note  87. 
Refusal  to  accept 

Plaintiff  is  entitled  to  Judgment 
by  default,  where  defendant  returns 
the  amended  complaint,  refuses  to 
accept  it,  and  fails  to  answer. — Wal- 
ton Foundry  Co.  v.  A.  D.  Granger 
Co.,  19-6  N.T.S.  719,  203  App.Div.  226. 

14-  Okl. — Joplin  Furniture  Co.  v. 
Bank  of  Picher,  3  P.2d  173,  151 
Okl.  158. 

15.  Iowa.— Bennett  v.  Carey,   34  N. 
W.  291,  72  Iowa  476. 

16.  Cal.— Gray  v.  Hall,   266   P.   246, 
203  Cal.  306— Steinbauer  v.  Bonde- 
sen, 14  P.2d  106,  125  CaLApp.  419. 

34  C.J.  p  165  note  89. 
Identical  declaration 

A  second  declaration  identical  with 
the  original  is  not  an  "amended  dec- 
laration," so  that  its  filing  requires 
defendant  to  answer  over  to  avoid 
default. — Musher  v.  Perera,  15'8  A. 
14,  162  Md.  44. 

17.  Mo.— State  v.  Taylor,   206   S.W. 
247,  200  Mo.App.  333. 


199 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J.&. 


amended,18  or  where  no  time  for  filing  the  new 
answer  is  fixed  either  by  statute  or  rule  or  order  of 
court.19 

c.  Answer  to  Part  of  Cause 

If  the  answer  or  plea  sets  up  a  defense  to  only  a 
severable  part  of  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  plaintiff  may 
ordinarily  take  judgment  by  default  or  nil  elicit  for  the 
unanswered  part. 

If  defendant's  plea  or  answer  sets  up  a  denial  or 
defense  to  only  a  part  of  plaintiff's  cause  of  ac- 
tion, severable  from  the  rest,  plaintiff  may  take 
judgment  by  default,  or  more  properly  by  nil  dicit, 
for  the  part  that  is  unanswered,20  and  proceed  to 
trial  for  the  rest,21  or  he  may  concede  the  validity 
of  the  defense,  as  to  that  portion  of  his  demand 
which  is  answered,  and  have  judgment  by  default 
for  the  remainder,  without  trial.22  If  in  such  a 
case  plaintiff  at  first  replies  or  demurs,  he  may 
thereafter  take  judgment  nil  dicit  at  any  time  before 
final  judgment  on  the  payment  of  costs.23  If,  how- 
ever, the  plea  professes  to  answer  the  whole  decla- 
ration, but  in  fact  answers  a  part  only,  it  has  been 
held  that  plaintiff  cannot  waive  the  objection  and 
take  judgment  for  the  part  unanswered;24  and  this 


rule  applies  where  some  of  the  pleas  do  and  others, 
do  not  answer  the  whole  declaration.25 

d.  Piling  and  Serving  Plea  or  Answer 

In  order  to  prevent  a  default  it  is  generally  required 
that  defendant's  plea  or  answer  b2  actually  and  duty 
filed  in  the  clerk's  office. 

In  order  to  prevent  a  default  defendant's  plea  or 
answer  must  ordinarily  be  actually  and  duly  filed 
in  the  clerk's  office26  within  the  required  time,27  not- 
withstanding there  has  been  an  affidavit  of  mer- 
its,28 and  notwithstanding  it  has  been  served  orr 
plaintiffs  counsel,29  although  as  to  this  latter  rule 
there  is  authority  to  the  contrary.3**  In  some  juris- 
dictions, in  addition  to  filing,  the  plea  or  answer 
must  be  called  to  the  attention  of  the  court,31  espe- 
cially where  it  is  filed  after  the  time  for  filing  has 
expired.32  If  a  pica  filed  to  a  declaration  is  applica- 
ble to  the  declaration  as  amended,  it  need  not  be 
filed  again.33 

Service.  Failure  to  serve  a  copy  of  defendant's 
pleading  on  plaintiff  or  his  counsel  ordinarily  does 
not  warrant  a  'judgment  by  default,  if  it  has  been 
properly  filed.34 


18.  Cal.— Gray  v.  Hall,   265  P.   246, 
20-3  Cal.  -306 — Steinbauer  v.  Bonde- 
sen,  14  P.2d  10-6,  125  CaLApp.  419. 

Minn.— Kelly  v.  Anderson, '  194  N.W. 

102,  156  Minn/71. 
34  C.J.  p  165  note  91. 
Demurrer 

(1)  Under     a     statute     providing 
that,  in  the  absence  of  a  new  plea 
or  answer  to  an  amended  pleading1, 
the    original    plea   or    answer    shall 
stand  and  be  considered  as  pleaded 
in  answer  to  the  amended  pleading, 
a  demurrer  to  the  original  declara- 
tion should  be   considered  as  made 
to  the  amended  declaration. — Grand 
Court   Order   of  Calanthe   of  North 
America,     South     America,     Europe, 
Asia,  Africa,  and  Australia,  Jurisdic- 
tion of  Florida,  v.  Johnson,  160  So. 
SS4,  119  Pla.  440. 

(2)  If  such  demurrer  is  responsive 
to  amended  declaration,  court  should 
not  enter  default  without  notice  for 
failure  to  demur  or  plead  to  amend- 
ed declaration. — Johnson   v.   City  of 
Sebring,  140  So.  672,  104  Pla.  584. 

19.  Iowa.— Wright     v.     Ho  well,     24 
Iowa  150. 

N.Y.— Elmore  v.  Valletta,  16  Abb.Pr. 

249. 

Reasonable  opportunity  to  plead 
to  an  amended  declaration  must  be 
given  defendant;  hence,  a  default 
judgment  entered  on  day  on  which 
plaintiff  filed  an  amended  declaration 
should  be  reversed. — Boone  v.  Miller, 
133  So.  *121,  160  Miss.  287. 

20.  Fla,— CorpTU     Juris     olted     in 


Clonts    v.    Spurway,    139    So.    896, 

897,  104  Fla.  340. 
34  C.J.  p  165  note  94. 
Cross  complaint 

Where  plaintiff  flies  a  cross  com- 
plaint against  interveners  and  serves 
such  cross  complaint  on  defendant, 
defendant's  failure  to  answer  such 
cross  complaint  does  not  entitle 
plaintiff  to  default  Judgment  thereon, 
where  defendant  answered  the  orig- 
inal complaint  which  involved  the 
same  issues,  and  where  .court  found 
for  defendant  on  such  issues. — Shuff 
v.  Blazer,  152  P.2d  216,  66  CaLApp. 
2d  348. 

21.  Fa.— McKinney    v.    Mitchell,     4 
Watts  &  S.  25— Bradford  v.  Brad- 
ford, 2  Pa.L.J.  406. 

Judgment  on  admission  in  pleadings 
see  supra  §  185. 

22.  111. — Henry  v.  Meriam  &  Morgan 
GParaffine  Co.,  83  111.  461. 

23.  111.— Safford  v.  Vail,   22  111.  326 
— Warren  v.  Nexsen,  4  111.  38. 

24.  Ark.— Jones    v.    Cecil,    10    Ark. 
592. 

25.  Ala.— -Tubb   v.    Madding,    Minor 
129. 

26.  Idaho. — Pendrey  v.  Brennan,  169 
P.  174,  51  Idaho  -54. 

34  C.J.  p  165  note  4. 
Clerical  error 

Where  district  court  clerk  received 
answer  and  marked  it  filed,  although 
he  failed  to  note  filing  on  fee  book, 
and  did  not  place  pleading  with  re- 
mainder of  court  papers  in  Jacket 
provided  therefor,  defendant  was 

348 


not  in  default. — Gause  v.  Cities  Serv- 
ice Oil  Co..  Civ.App.,  70  S.W.2d  2*4,. 
affirmed  City  of  Fort  Worth  v. 
Gause,  101  S.W.2d  221,  129  Tex.  25. 

27.  111.— -Scammon  v.  McKey,  21  111. 
554. 

28.  III. — Scammon  v.  McKey,  supra. 

29.  Mont. — State   v.   Blaine   County 
Twelfth  Judicial  Dist.  Ct.,  145   P. 
724,  50  Mont.  119. 

30.  N.Y.— Smith  v.  Wells,   6  Johns. 
286. 

64  C.J,  p  166  note  8. 

31.  Tex. — Glllaspie     v.     Hunts  ville,. 
Civ.App.,    151    S.W.    1114 — Bartlett 
v,   S.   M.   Jones  Co.,   Civ.App.,   103 
S.W.  705. 

mi  dioit 

'  Failure  of  defendant  to  call  an- 
swer to  attention  of  court  will  not 
authorize  Judgment  nil  dicit  because 
answer  not  shown  to  have  been 
abandoned  raises  rebutting  presump- 
tion against  that  of  implied  confes- 
sion of  Judgment. — Spivey  v.  Saner- 
Ragley  Lumber  Co.,  Tex.Com.App., 
284  S.W.  210— Grand  Lodge  Brother- 
hood of  Railroad  Trainmen  v.  Ware,. 
Tex.Civ.App.,  73  S.W.2d  1076,  error 
refused. 

32.  Ga. — Camp   v.   Wallace,    61   Ga. 
497. 

34  C.J.  p  166  note  10. 

33.  Miss. — 'Northrop    v.     Flaig,     5fr 
Miss.  754. 

34.  N.M.— Ortega   v.    Vigil,    158    P. 
487,  22  N.M.  18. 

34  C.J.  p  1-66  note  IS. 


49    C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


§  19? 


e.  Affidavit  of  Defense  or  Merits 

Under  various  statutes,  judgment  by  default  or  nil 
dJcit  may  be  taken  unless  defendant  duly  flies  an  affi- 
davit of  merits  or  an  affidavit  of  defense  in  cases  where 
they  are  required. 

Under  some  statutes  or  rules  of  court,  judgment 
by  default  or  nil  dicit  may  be  taken  against  defend- 
ant unless  he  duly  files  an  affidavit  of  merits,  show- 
ing that  he  has  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  ac- 
tion,35 unless,  in  some  jurisdictions,  the  answer  is 
verified.36  Under  other  statutes,  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault may  be  entered  against  defendant  unless  he 
files,  within  the  required  time,  an  affidavit  of  de- 
fense setting  forth  the  facts  on  which  he  means  to 
rely  as  a  defense  where  the  action  is  on  an  instru- 
ment or  contract  for  the  payment  of  money,37  in- 
cluding an  action  on  a  contract  of  guaranty  or  sure- 
tyship,38 a  bond  or  recognizance,3 9  a  note  or 
draft,40  a  judgment,41  or  a  book  account.42  How- 
ever, this  requirement  has  no  application  to  claims 
arising  out  of  torts,43  or  where  defendant  is  sued 
in  a  representative  capacity,44  or  where,  owing  to 
the  lapse  of  time,  a  presumption  of  payment  has 
arisen,45  or  where  there  has  been  an  award  of  ar- 
bitrators finding  that  plaintiff  has  no  cause  of  ac- 
tion.46 


If  the  defense  alleged  in  the  affidavit  is  good  as 
to  a  part  of  the  claim,  but  insufficient  as  to  the 
balance,  the  court  may  direct  judgment  for  the  part 
insufficiently  denied,  and  allow  plaintiff  to  try  the 
case  as  to  the  remainder,47  unless  the  affidavit  pur- 
ports to  apply  to  the  whole  of  plaintiff's  claim.48 
Under  some  statutes,  such  judgment  may  also  be 
rendered  for  want  of  an  affidavit  of  defense  in  an 
action  of  scire  facias  on  a  mortgage49  or. mechan- 
ic's lien.50 

t.  After  Decision  on  Motion  or  Demurrer 

Judgment  by  default  or  nil  dicit  may  be  taken  against 
defendant  where  his  motion  or  demurrer  is  overruled 
and,  although  he  is  given  leave  and  the  requisite  oppor- 
tunity to  do  so,  he  fails  to  plead  over. 

Judgment  as  by  default  or  nil  dicit  may  be  ren- 
dered against  defendant  where  he  fails  or  refuses 
to  plead  over  within  the  required  time  after  a  plea 
or  motion  is  overruled  or  denied.51  Thus  a  default 
judgment  may  be  entered  where  defendant  fails  to 
plead  over  after  a  plea  to  the  jurisdiction52  or  a 
plea  in  abatement53  is  found  against  him,,  or  after 
his  motion  to  quash  the  summons54  or  to  dismiss 


35.  U.S. — Orsinger    v.    Consolidated 
Flour   Mills   Co.,   C.C.A.I11.,   284   F. 
224,  certiorari  denied  43  S.Ct.  248, 
260  U.S.   746,   67  L.Ed.   493. 

III. — James  J.  Brown  Plastering  Co. 
v.  Gottschalk,  261  Ill.App.  147— 
Bannat  v.  Zulley,  243  Ill.App.  497 

.  — Stevens-Jarvis  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Quixley  Lumber  Co.,  229  Ill.App. 
419— McWhinney  v.  Gill,  167  111. 
App.  582 — Perry  v.  Krausz,  166 
IlLApp.  1— Koch  v.  Dickinson,  152 
Ill.App.  413. 

34  C.J.  p  166  note  17. 

Effect  of  striking  affidavit  from  files 
see  infra  subdivision  h  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

Affidavit  held  STLfflcient 

N.J. — Fitzsimmons  v.  Board  of  Edu- 
cation of  Borough  of  Carteret,  in 
Middlesex  County,  13  A.2d  305,  125 
N.J.Law  15. 

36.  N.Y.— Goldberg  v.  Wood,  98  N.Y. 
S.  200,  50  Misc.  618. 

34  C.J.  p  It56  note  18, 

37.  Del. — Selly  v.  Fleming  Coal  Co., 
180  A.  326,  7  W.W.Harr.  34. 

Pa.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Baird,  150 
A.  165,  300  Pa.  92— Coryell  v.  Ku- 
ser,  28  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  446 — Com- 
mercial Credit  Co.  v.  Shepherd, 
Com.Pl.,  37  DeLCo.  335,  51  York 
Leg.Rec.  202— Landis  v.  Lancaster 

•  County  Nat.  Bank,  Com.Pl.t  48 
Lanc.L.Rev.  297. 

34  C.J,  p  166  note  21. 

Not  "default"  Judgment 
Judgment    for    want    of   sufficient 


affidavit  of  defense  is  not  "Judgment 
by  default."— Brader  v.  Alinikoff,  85 
Pa.Super.  285. 
Who  must  file 

(1)  An  affidavit  of  defense  cannot 
be   flled  by  one  not  a  party  to  the 
proceeding  so  as  to  prevent  the  tak- 
ing of  Judgment  against  a  party. — 
Rhoades  v.  Decker,  34  Pa.Dist  &  Co. 
409. 

(2)  There  is  no   rule  requiring  a 
terre   tenant   to   file   an   affidavit   of 
defense. — Clippinger  Estate,   Now  to 
Use   of  Ward   v.   Saltzgiver,   38   Pa. 
Dist,   &   Co.    27,    48   Dauph.Co.    320— 
Sal  berg  v.  Duffee,  21  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
144. 

Clerical  error 

Where  the  affidavit  has  been  duly 
filed,  Judgment  for  want  of  affidavit 
of  defense  is  improperly  entered,  al- 
though the  prothonotary  failed  to 
note  the  fact  of  filing  on  the  appear- 
ance docket. — Moore  v.  Monarch  Ac- 
cident Ins.  Co.,  17  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  553, 
80  Sch.Leg.Rec.  272. 

38.  Pa. — Jones    v.    Patterson,    8    A. 
62,  5  Pa.Cas.  19. 

34  C.J.  p  167  note  22. 

39.  Pa. — Byrne    v.    Hay  den,    16    A. 
750,  124  Pa.  170. 

•34  C.J.  p  167  note  23. 

40.  Pa.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Baird, 
150  A.  165,  300  Pa.  92. 

34  C.J.  p  167  note  24. 

41.  Pa.— Mink  v.  Staffer,  1$  A.  805, 
124  Pa,  280. 

34  C.X  p  167  note  25. 

349 


42.  Pa. — Fenn  v.  Early,  6  A.  58,  113 
Pa.  264. 

34  C.J.  p  26  note  167.  . 

43.  Pa. — Osborn     v.     Athens     First 
Nat.  Bank,  26  A.  289,  154  Pa.  134— 
Auberle    v.    Ciiiberto,    Com.PU    31 
DeLCo.  32. 

34  C.J.  p  167  note  27. 

44.  Pa. — McSorley    v.    Mamauac,    28 
Pa.Dist.  1010 — Lewis  v.  Quigney,  1 
Lehigh  VaLL.R.  188. 

45.  Pa. — Hitchcock   v.   Washbum,    9 
Pa.Dist.  272. 

46.  Pa. — Gregg   v.   Meeker,   4    Binn. 
428. 

47.  Pa.— Law  v.  Waldron,  79  A.  647, 
230   Pa.  458,   Ann.Cas.l912A  467. 

34  C.J.  p  167  note  31. 

48.  Pa.— Reilly   v.  Daly,   28   A.   493. 
159   Pa.   605 — Myers  v.  Cochran,  3 
Pa.Dist.  135; 

49.  Pa.— Marsh  v.   Smith,   2   Pa.L.J. 
R.  217,  3  Pa.L.J.  489. 

50.  Pa. — Bradbury    v.    "Wagenhorst, 
54  Pa.  180. 

34  C.J.  p  167  note  36. 

51.  N.Y.— Bellinger  v.  Gallo,  22.4  N. 
Y.S.  162,  221  App.Div.  482. 

52.  Ga. — Jordan    v.    Carter,    60    Ga. 
443. 

53.  Me. — Bstabrook    v.    Ford    Motor 
Co.,  10  A.2d  715,  136  Me.  367,  fol- 
lowed in  10  A.2d  719,  136  Me.  375 
—Jordan    v.    McKay,    165    4.    902, 
132  Me.  55. 

54.  Neb. — McPherson     v.     Beatrice 


199 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J-S- 


the  action55  is  overruled,  or  after  his  demurrer  to 
plaintiff's  declaration  or  complaint  is  overruled,56 
provided,  in  some  jurisdictions,  there  has  been  a 
rule  or  order  granting  him  leave  to  plead  over.57 
However,  until  the  expiration  of  the  statutory  peri- 
od within  which  to  answer,  defendant  cannot  be 
put  in  default  after  the  overruling  of  his  demur- 
rer58 or  plea59  or  denial  of  his  motion;60  and, 
where  the  statutes  give  defendant  a  number  of 
days  after  notice  of  the  decision  in  which  to  an- 
swer, he  cannot  be  put  in  default  in  the  absence  of 
such  notice,61  unless  he  has  waived  it.62 

Failure  to  answer  an  amended  petition  after  the 
overruling  of  a  demurrer  thereto  authorizes  a  judg- 
ment by  default,  although  the  answer  to  the  original 
petition  is  on  file  ;63  but,  where  the  demurrer  is  filed 
after  a  plea,  default  cannot  be  entered  after  over- 
ruling the  demurrer,  as  the  demurrer  does  not  waive 


the  plea.64  Where  defendant's  plea  of  privilege  is 
sustained  and  the  cause  is  transferred  and  defend- 
ant files  no  further  pleading,  judgment  nil  dicit  is 
authorized.65  Where  defendant's  motion  to  strike 
out  parts  of  the  complaint  is  sustained  and  defend- 
ant pleads  no  further,  plaintiff  may  take  judgment 
by  default  if  sufficient  matter  is  left  in  the  com- 
plaint to  warrant  the  relief  granted.66 

Where  demurrer  by  plaintiff  sustained.  Judg- 
ment by  default  may  also  be  taken  against  defend- 
ant where  plaintiff  demurs  to  the  plea  or  answer, 
and  the  demurrer  is  sustained,  and  defendant  fails 
to  avail  himself  of  leave  given  to  amend  or  to 
file  a  new  plea  or  answer,67  or  fails  to  ask  leave  to 
amend  or  plead  over;68  but  default  judgment  can- 
not properly  be  entered  against  defendant  where 
plaintiffs  demurrer  is  sustained  only  as  to  part  of 
the  answer.69 


First  Nat  Bank,  10  N.W.   707,  12 
Neb.  202. 

55.  Iowa. — State   ex   rel.    Adams   v. 
Murray,    2B7    N.W.    553,   219   Iowa 
108. 

Submission  of  order 

Failure  to  submit  order,  as  re- 
quired in  decision  denying  motion  to 
dismiss  complaint,  rendered  subse- 
quent default  judgments  against  de- 
fendants Irregular. — Voperian  v.  In- 
dustrial Rediscount  Corporation,  231 
N.T.S.  676,  133  Misc.  512. 

56.  Cal.— Seale    v.    Mclaughlin,    28 
Cal.  668. 

111. — Ferry  v.  National  Motor  Under- 
writers, 244  IlLApp.  241— Sheehan 
v.   Reardon,    223    Ill.App.    365. 
Xan.— State  v.   Swift  &  Co.,   275  P. 
17-6,   127   Kan.   817,   65   A.L.R.   696. 
Mo.«- Daugherty    v.    Lanning-Harris 
Coal  &  Grain  Co.,  265  S.W.  866,  2-18 
Mo.App.  187. 

Neb. — Hoesly     v.      Department      of 
Roads    and    Irrigation,    9    N.W.2d 
523,  14-3  Neb.  387. 
34  C.J.  p  167  note  40. 
Erroneous  decision  on  demurrer 

Where  trial  court  had  erroneously 
•overruled  demurrer  to  complaint 
wherein  four  causes  of  action  were 
improperly  united,  and  defendant 
stood  on  its  demurrer  and  did  not 
•answer  complaint  within  time  allow- 
ed or  make  any  appearance  there- 
after, a  default  judgment  could  not 
properly  be  entered  without  afford- 
ing defendant  opportunity  to  answer 
complaint  after  correction  thereof  to 
include  only  causes  of  action  prop- 
erly unitable. — Hartford  Min.  Co.  v. 
Home  Lumber  &  Coal  Co.,  114  P.2d 
1091,  61  Nev.  1. 

The  interposition  of  a  defective 
answer  to*  which  a  demurrer  was 
sustained  is  a  failure  to  plead  over 
•within  the  meaning  of  the  statute 
{providing  that  the  judgment  on  over- 


ruling a  demurrer  shall  be  that  the 
•party  plead  over  and,  if  he  fails  so 
to  do,  Judgment  shall  be  rendered 
against  him  as  on  a  default. — Mc- 
Kinney  v.  State,  101  Ind.  35?. 

57.  Okl. — Thwing    v.    Doye,    44    P. 
381,  2  Okl.  608. 

Utah.— Provo  City  v.  Claudin,  63  P. 

2d  570,  91  Utah  60. 
34  C.J.  p  168  note  41. 

58.  .Cal. — Harris   v.   Minnesota  Inv. 
Co.,  265  P.  -306,  89  CaUApp.  396. 

N.C. — Rayburn  v.  Rayburn,  11  S.B.2d 

4-63,  218  N.C.  51'4. 
Utah. — Provo  City  v.  Claudin,  63  P. 

2d  570,  91  Utah  60. 

59.  R.I.— Dukehart  v.  Fales,  143  A. 
615,  49  R.I.  407. 

60.  N.Y.— Levin  v.  Levin,  284  N.T.S. 
897,  157  Misc.  572. 

61.  Cal. — Chamberlin   v.   Del  Norte 
County,    19   P.    271,    77    Cal.   150— 
Harris  v.  Minnesota  Inv.  Co.,  265 
P.  306,  89  CaLApp,  396. 

Presence  in  courtroom 

Default  judgment  for  failure  to 
amend  pleading  within  period  grant- 
ed by  court  on  sustaining  demurrer 
thereto  would  not  be  reversed  for 
lack  of  notice  where,  counsel  was  in 
courtroom  at  time  leave  to  amend 
was  given,  since  court,  which  had 
power  to  refuse  plea  to  amend,  had 
lesser  power  to  permit  amendment 
without  notice  under  circumstances. 
—Provo  City  v.  Claudin,  63  P.2d  570, 
91  Utah  60. 

62.  Cal. — Harris   v.   Minnesota  Inv. 
Co.,  265  (P.  306,  89  Cal.App.  396. 

$4  C.J.  p  168  note  43. 

63.  Cal.— Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246, 
203  Cal.  306. 

Iowa. — Brenner  v.  Gundershiemer,  14 

Iowa  82. 
Mo.— Leis  v.  Massachusetts  Bonding 

350  .    . 


&  Insurance  Co.,  App.,  125  S.W.2d 
906. 

64.  111.— Marshall  v.  Duke,  4  111.  67. 

65.  Tex. — Spivey    v.     Saner-Ragley 
Lumber    Co.,    Com. App.,    284    S.W. 
210— O'Quinn  v.  Tate,  Civ.App.,  187 
S.W.2d  2141. 

66*  Utah. — Taylor  v.  Guaranty 
Mortg.  Co.,  220  P.  1067,  62  Utah 
520. 

67.    Cal. — Gossman      v.       Gossman, 

App.,  168  P.2d  495. 
Fla.— Silva  v.  Robinson,  156  So.  280, 

115  Fla.  S30. 

111. — Ferry  v.  National  Motor  Under- 
writers, 244  IlLApp.  241. 
Or.— Wiggins  Co.  v.  Fleming,  263  P. 

390,  123  Or.  6*44. 
Tex.— O'Quinn  v.  Tate,  Civ.App.,  187 

S.W.2d  241. 
Utah.— Provo  City  v.  Claudin,  63  P. 

2d    570,    91    Utah    60— First    Sav. 

Bank  of  Ogden  v.  Brown,  54  P.2d 

237,  88  Utah  294. 
34  C.J.  p  168  note  46. 

Where  no  leave  to  plead  over  is 
requested  or  given  after  a  demurrer 
to  defendant's  plea  Is  sustained,  final 
judgment  on  the  demurrer,  rather 
than  default  judgment  for  want  of 
a  plea,  should  be  entered. — Hays  v. 
Weeks,  48  So.  997,  57  Fla.  73-^Porter 
v.  Barslow,  21  So.  574,  39  Fla.  50— 
Pettys  v.  Marsh,  3  So.  577,  24  Fla. 
44— L'Engle  v.  L'Bngle,  19  Fla.  714 
— Wade  v.  Doyle,  17  Fla.  522 — Gar- 
lington  v.  Priest,  13  Fla.  559. 

68:  Ohio. — Gockel  v.  Averment,  7 
Ohio  Dec.,  Reprint,  554,  3  Cinc.L. 
Bui.  894. 

Tex.— Hamilton  v.  Black,   Dall.   586. 

69.  CaL — Herrmann  v.  Riesenberg, 
34  P.2d  1-63,  139  Cal.App.  249. 

Mont. — Taylor  v.  Southwick,  253  P. 
889,  78  Mont  329. 


49    C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


199 


Against  plaintiff.  Judgment  as  by  default  may  be 
taken  against  plaintiff  where  he  fails  or  refuses  to 
plead  over  after  the  overruling  of  his  demurrer  to 
the  answer,  which  contains  a  sufficient  defense,70  or 
a  plea  of  set-off  or  recoupment,71  or  after  a  de- 
murrer to  the  complaint  is  sustained.72 

g.  Failure  to  Reply  or  Rejoin 

Where  defendant's  answer  Is  such  as  to  require 
plaintiff  to  reply,  his  failure  to  do  so  within  the  re- 
quired time,  or  to  demur,  will  ordinarily  warrant  a  Judg- 
ment by  default  against  him. 

Judgment  by  default  may  be  entered  against 
plaintiff  where,  on  it  becoming  his  duty  to  make 
replication  to  defendant's  plea  or  answer,  Jie  fails 
to  do  so  within  the  time  required  by  law,73  or  fails 
to  demur  thereto,74  as  where,  in  some  jurisdictions, 
he  fails  to  reply  to  an  answer  of  set-off  or  counter- 
claim,75 or  fails  to  answer  defendant's  cross  com- 
plaint.76 However,  this  rule  does  not  apply  to  a 
failure  to  reply  to  a  pleading  by  defendant  which 
is  in  effect  nothing  more  than  an  affirmative  trav- 
erse or  denial  of  the  allegations  of  the  petition;77 


nor  does  the  rule  apply  to  a  failure  to  reply  to  a 
cross  complaint  which  is  a  repetition  of  the  answer 
and  presents  no  new  issues.78 

Default  judgment  cannot  be  taken  against  plain- 
tiff for  failure  to  reply  to  a  counterclaim  where  the 
allegations  of  the  complaint  controvert  the  countei- 
claim,79  or  where,  as  under  some  statutes,  a  coun- 
terclaim is  deemed  controverted  in  the  absence  of 
a  reply.80  In  any  event,  defendant  has  been  held 
not  entitled  to  judgment  until  plaintiff  has  had  a 
reasonable  opportunity  to  reply,81  or  until  an  issue 
raised  by  the  complaint  and  as  much  of  the  answer 
as  constitutes  a  defense  thereto  have  been  disposed 
of,82  or,  in  some  jurisdictions,  until  he  has  first 
asked  for  a  rule  against  plaintiff.83  Clearly,  where 
plaintiff  fails  to  reply  to  a  verified  answer  setting 
forth  facts  sufficient  to  defeat  the  right  of  action, 
a  valid  default  judgment  cannot  be  rendered  in 
favor  of  plaintiff.84 

Failure  to  rejoin.  Where  defendant  fails  to  re- 
join to  a  replication  when  it  is  his  duty  to  do  so,  a 
judgment  by  default  may  be  taken  against  him.85 


70.  Ala. — Sternberg   v.    Bonfeld,    99 
So.  659,  19  Ala.App.  594. 

34  C.J.  p  168  note  48. 

71.  Ala.— Sternbergr   v.    Bonfeld.    99 
So.  6'59,  19  Ala.App.  594. 

72.  Ind. — Glendenning  v.  Cowan,  109 
N.E.  844,  59  Ind.App.  529. 

73.  Ala. — Sternberg   v.    Bonfeld,    99 
So.  659,  19  Ala.App.  594. 

Miss. — Norwood  v.   Gulf  &   S.  L  R. 

Co.,  1'55  So.  348,  170  Miss.  543. 
Mont. — Mihelich    v.    Butte    Electric 

Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont.  60"4 — 

Middle    States    Oil   Corporation   v. 

Tanner- Jones   Drilling  Co.,   235   P. 

770,  T3  Mont.  180. 
Okl. — Le  Roi  Co.  v.  Grimes,  14'4  P.2d 

975,  193  Okl.  430. 
Pa. — Quigley  v.  Western  &  Southern 

Life  Ins.  Co.,   86  Pittsb.Leg.J.  400, 

affirmed   7   A.2d   70,   1«36  Pa.Super. 

27 — Nerz    v.    Equitable    Life    As- 

sur.  Soc.,  Com.PL,  4  Sch.Reg.  424. 
34  C.J.  p  16'8  note  51. 

On  a  cross  petition,  although  no 
summons  may  be  required  to  be 
served  on  plaintiff,  he  is  entitled  to 
the  same  time  to  plead  to  "the  cross 
petition  as  though  defendant  filing 
the  cross  petition  was  plaintiff  and 
plaintiff  was  sole  defendant,  and  in 
such  case  a  default  and  judgment 
on  the  cross  petition,  before  the 
time  to  plead  has  expired,  are  errone- 
ous.—Farmers'  Mut  Ins.  Co.  of  Ne- 
braska v.  Gunmer,  192  N.W.  941,  109 
Neb.  832. 
Von  pros 

(1)  If  plaintiff  fails  to  reply  at 
common  law,  rule  will  issue  compel- 
ling him  to  reply  or  suffer  judgment 


non  pros. — State  ex  rel.  Shartel  v. 
Skinker,  25  S.W.2d  472,  524  Mo.  955. 
(2)  It  has  been  held  that,  where 
plaintiff  fails  to  reply  to  a  defense 
set  up  in  the  answer,  final  judgment 
by  default  as  on  the  merits  cannot 
be  taken  against  him,  defendant  be- 
ing entitled  only  to  judgment  non 
pros  or  judgment  of  nonsuit. — Ross 
v.  C.  D.  Mallory  Corporation,  "37  A.2d 
766,  132  N.J.Law  1. 

74.  Mont.— Mihelich  v.   Butte   Elec- 
tric Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,   85  Mont. 
60«4— Middle  States  Oil  Corporation 
v.   Tanner-Jones   Drilling  Co.,   235 
P.  770,  78  Mont  180. 

34  C.J.  p  168  note  52. 

75.  Mo.— Dezino  v.  William  S.  Droz- 
da  Realty  Co.,  App.,  13  S.W.2d  -659. 

Mont.— Middle  States  Oil  Corporation 

v.   Tanner-Jones  Drilling  Co.,    235 

P.  770,  73  Mont.  180. 
34  OJ.  p  168  note  "53. 

"A  plaintiff  occupies  the  same 
relation  to  a  plea  of  set-off  or  re- 
coupment as  a  defendant  does  to  the 
complaint.  The  plaintiff  as  to  these 
pleas  is  the  defendant  and  when  he 
appears  or  is  in  court,  and  fails  to 
plead,  is  subject  to  the  same  judg- 
ments."— Sternberg  v.  Bonfeld,  99  So. 
659,  660,  19  Ala.App.  5'94. 
TO,  Cal. — Antonsen  v.  San  Francisco 

Container  Co.,  66  P.2d  716,  20  Cal. 

App.2d  21'4— Ratliff  v.  Ratliff,  2  P. 

2d  222,  116  CaLApp.  39. 
Wash. — Graham     v.     Yakima     Stock 

Brokers,    72   P.2d   1041,   192  Wash. 

121. 

77.    Ky. — Coombs  Land  Co.  v.  Lani- 
er,    300    S.W.    328,    222   Ky.    1«39— 

351 


Higdon  v.  Wayne  County,   157   S. 

W.  708,  154  Ky.  S37. 

isufflciency  of  complaint 

If  complaint  did  not  state  cause 
of  action,  judgment  for  defendant  for 
failure  to  reply  must  be  affirmed, 
although  reply  was  unnecessary. — 
Mihelich  v.  Butte  Electric  Ry.  Co., 
281  P.  540,  85  Mont  -604. 
8.  Cal. — Crofton  v.  Young,  119  P- 

2d  1003,  48  Cal.App.2d  452— Brooks- 

v.  White,   136  P.   500,   22  CaLApp. 

719. 

79.  N.C. — Simon  v.  Masters,  135  S.E. 
861,      192      N.C.    '  731— Tillinghast 
Styles    Co.    v.    Providence    Cotton 
Mills,  55  S.E.  121,  143  N.C.  268. 

80.  U.S.— Liebling  v.  Barbara  Build- 
ing &  Development  Corporation,  D. 
C.Fla.,  52  P.2d  183. 

Cal.— 'Pickwick  Stages,  Northern  Di- 
vision, v.  Board  of  Trustees  of 
City  of  El  Paso  de  Robles,  208  P. 
961,  189  Cal.  417. 

34  C.J.  >p  168  note  56. 

81.  Mont. — State     r.      Silver     Bow 
County   Second  Judicial  Dist.   Ct., 
113  P.  472,  42  Mont.  496,  Ann.Cas. 
1912B  246. 

34  C.J.  p  168  note  57. 

82.  N.Y.— Crompton    T.    Seaich,    128- 
N.Y.S.    586,    143    App.Div.    284. 

83.  Ind. — Buchanan     v.      Berkshire- 
Life  Ins.  Co.,   96  Ind.   510. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Shartel  v.  Skinker,, 
25  S.W.2d  472,  324  Mo.  955. 

84.  okl. — Bankston    v.     Automobile- 
Sales   Co.,   251   P.   3,3,   122  Okl.   67. 

85.  Mo.— Dempsey    v.    Harrison,    * 
Mo.  267. 

34  C.J.  p  169  note  til. 


§  199 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J-S- 


L  Striking  or  Withdrawal  of  Pleading 

Judgment  by  default  or  nil  diclt  ordinarily  may  be 
entered  where  defendant  withdraws  his  pleading  or  does 
not  offer  or  obtain  leave  to  plead  further  after  his  plead- 
ing is  stricken  for  good  cause. 

Judgment  as  by  default  or  nil  dicit  may  be  en- 
tered where  defendant  withdraws  his  plea  or  an- 
swer,86 or  where  he  is  granted  permission  to  with- 
draw a  plea  on  the  express  or  implied  condition  that 
he  will  replead  forthwith  and  he  fails  to  do  so.87 
So,  too,  judgment  by  default  may  be  taken  against 
defendant  where  he  does  not  offer  or  obtain  leave 
to  plead  further  on  his  plea,  answer,  or  affidavit  be- 
ing properly  stricken  out  for  good  cause,88  or  where, 
having  obtained  such  leave,  he  fails  to  file  an 
amended  pleading.89  However,  this  rule  does  not 
apply  where  issue  has  been  joined  on  the  plea  or 
answer,90  especially  after  a  trial  is  had  and  witness- 
es are  sworn  and  examined;91  or  where  the  plea  or 
answer  is  sufficient  and  no  good  reason  for  striking 
it  out  appears;92  or  where  part  of  the  answer  is 
stricken  out,  but  enough  remains  to  constitute  a 


substantial  defense,93  Where  defendant's  pleading 
is  valid  on  its  face  and  not  wholly  frivolous  or 
without  merit,  it  is  error  to  dispose  of  it  summarily 
by  considering  it  ex  parte  and  striking  it  from  the 
files,  and  then  to  adjudge  defendant  in  default.94 

Waiver.  Defendant's  conduct  may  be  such  that 
he  will  be  deemed  to  have  waived,  abandoned,  or 
withdrawn  his  pleas,95  and  in  such  case  he  will  be 
held  impliedly  to  have  authorized  the  entry  of  a 
judgment  by  default,  notwithstanding  the  pleading 
on  file.9* 

i.  Pending  Disposition  of  Pleading 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Pending  decision  on  demurrer 

(3)  Pending  decision  on  motion 

(1)  In  General 

A  default  Judgment  cannot  be  entered  against  de- 
fendant while  there  remains  undisposed  of  an  answer 
or  other  pleading  raising  an  issue  of  law  or  fact. 


86.  111. — Sheehan    v.    Reardon,    223 
Ill.App.  365. 

Mo. — Fawkes    v.    National    Refining 

Co.,  108   S.W.2d   7,  '341  Mo.   6*30. 
Tex. — Grand   Lodge   Brotherhood   of 
Railroad  Trainmen   v.   Ware,   Civ. 
App.,  73  S.W.2d  1076— Williams  v. 
Jameson.   Civ. App.,  44  S.W.2d  498, 
error  dismissed  .Jameson   v.   Wil- 
liams, Com. App.,   67  S.W.2d  228. 
On    cross     action    by     defendant, 
judgment    nil    dicit    may    be    taken 
against  plaintiff  who  withdraws  his 
answer  to  the  cross  action. — Howe  v. 
Central  State  Bank  of  Coleman,  Tex. 
Clv.App.,  297  S.W.  692. 

Withdrawal  of  counsel  does  not  re- 
sult  in   the   withdrawal   of   defend- 
ant's answer  so  as  to  put  defendant 
in  default. 
111.— Harris    v.    Juenger,    11    N.B.2d 

376,  367  111.  «478.  « 

La.— Washington  v.  Comeau,  Mc- 
Gloin  234. 

87.  Ind.T.— Campbell  v.  Scott,  58  S. 
W.  719,  3  Ind.T.  46-2. 

34  C.J.  p  169  note  63. 

Unauthorized  withdrawal  of  an- 
swer by  attorney  who  no  longer  rep- 
resents defendant  in  the  case  does 
not  warrant  default  judgment 
against  defendant. — Emerson-Brant- 
ingham  Implement  Co.  v.  Olson,  227 
N.W.  567,  5-6  S.D.  132. 

88.  Fla. — Grand    Lodge,    K.    P.    of 
North    America,     South    America, 
Europe,  Asia,  Africa,  and  Austra- 
lia,    Jurisdiction     of     Florida    v. 
Stroud,   144   So.   324,   107  Fla,   152. 

Ga. — Hayes  v.  International  Harves- 
ter Co.  of  America,  185  S.E.  197, 
52  Ga.App.  328 — Jones  v.  North 
American  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Chicago, 
168  S.E.  923,  46  Ga,App.  647— Wa- 


ters v.  American  Machinery  Co., 
163  S.E.  -304,  4'5  Ga.App.  64— Pape 
v.  Woolford  Realty  Co.,  134  S.E. 
174,  -35  Ga.App.  284. 

Minn.— Neefus  v.  Neefus,  296  N.W. 
579,  209  Minn.  <495. 

Or.— Mack  v.  Hendricks,  270  -P.  476, 
126  Or.  400. 

Tex. — Aviation  Credit  Corporation  of 
New  York  v.  University  Aerial 
Service  Corporation,  Civ.  App.,  59 
S.W.2d  870,  error  dismissed— Ken- 
tucky Oil  Corporation  v.  David, 
Civ. App.,  276  S.W.  351,  affirmed, 
Com. App.,  285  S.W.  290 — Luse  v. 
Curry,  Civ. App.,  261  S.W.  195. 

34  C.J.  p  169  -note  64. 

After  striking-  affidavit  of  merits 

(1)  Where  an  affidavit  of  merits  is 
stricken  for  insufficiency,  plaintiff  is 
entitled  to  Judgment  as  by  default, 
it   being  unnecessary,   although   not 
improper,  to  strike  the  plea  as  well. 
— Firestone   Tire,    etc.,   Co.   v.   Gins- 
burg,  120  N.E.  5'44,  285  -111.  132— Res- 
nick   v.   Varouxakis,    48   N.E.2d   555, 
319     111. App.     51 — James     J.    Brown 
Plastering  Co.  v.  Gottschalk,  261  111. 
App.   147— Bannat  v.  Zulley,  243  111. 
App.  497. 

(2)  However,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  striking  of  an  affidavit  of  merits 
does  not  carry  with  it  the  plea,  and 
the  filing  thereafter  of  an  additional 
affidavit   under   leave   of  court   will 
prevent  plaintiff  from  taking  Judg- 
ment by  default. — Hunter  v.  Troup, 
226  IlLApp.  -343. 

<3)  After  striking  out  the  plea  for 
failure  to  file  an  affidavit  of  merits, 
judgment  by  default  may  be  enterod 
without  any  rule  on  defendant  to  file 
an  affidavit  and  without  notice  to 
him  of  the  striking  of  the  plea. — 

352 


Stevens-Jarvis  Lumber  Co.  v.  Quix- 
ley  Lumber  Co.,  229  Ill.App.  419. 
89.    Ala. — Green    v.    Nu    Grape    Co., 

100  So.  84,  19  Ala.App.  663. 
Minn.— Silberman  v.  Niles.  214  N.W. 

261,  171  Minn.  40'5. 
34  C.J.  p  169  note  65. 
SO.  III. — Cooper  v.  Buckingham,  4 

111.  546. 

91.  Cal.— Abbott    v.     Douglass,     28 
Cal.  295. 

92.  Or.— Klein    v.    Turner,     133    P. 
625,  66  Or.  369. 

34  C.J.  p  169  note  68. 

93.  Mo. — Taylor  v.   Pearson,  1  Mo. 
App.  -39. 

94.  Fla. — Suwanee     River     Cypress 
Co.  v.  Arbuthnot,  '167  So.  412,  123 
Fla,  497. 

95.  Ala. — Wooten  v.  Traders'  Secur- 
ities Co.,  113  So.  492,  second  case, 
216  Ala.  149. 

La. — Electrical  Supply  Co.  v.  Moses, 

3  La. App.  286. 
96-    Tex. — London    Assur.    Corp.    v. 

Lee,  18  S.W.  508,  66  Tex.  247. 
34  C.J.  p  169  note  70. 
Nil  dicit 

Defendant,  who  withdrew  from 
case  when  it  was  regularly  called 
for  trial  after  its  motion  to  with- 
draw its  answer  and  appearance  was 
overruled  and  remained  in  courtroom 
during  trial  without  objecting  to 
proceedings  or  to  judgment  rendered 
against  it,  waived  issues  raised  by 
answer  as  though  instrument  had 
been  withdrawn  from  record,  so  that 
judgment  rendered  was  judgment  nil 
dicit. — Grand  Lodge  Brotherhood  of 
Railroad  Trainmen  v.  Ware,  Tex.Civ% 
App.,  73  S.W.2d  1076,  error  dis- 
missed. 


49    C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


§  199 


A  judgment  by  default  or  nil  dicit  cannot  be  en- 
tered against  defendant  while  an  answer  or  other 
pleading  by  him,  raising  an  issue  of  law  or  fact, 
is  properly  on  file  in  the  case  and  not  disposed  of  ;97 
before  a  default  judgment  may  be  properly  entered, 
the  answer  or  other  plea  must  be  disposed  of  by 
motion,  demurrer,  or  in  some  other  manner.98  This 
rule  applies,  even  though  defendant's  pleading  is 
filed  out  of  time,"  or  is  defective  in  form  or  in  sub- 
stance,1 unless  it  is  such  that  it  may  be  treated  as 
a  mere  nullity,2  and  even  though  defendant  does 
not  answer  on  being  called.3  The  foregoing  rule 
is  applicable  where  there  is  on  file  and  undisposed 
of  a  plea  in  abatement;4  or  where  the  parties  have 


agreed  to  consider  a  plea  as  filed  and  an  issue 
joined.5 

Distinction  between  negative  and  affirmative  pleas. 
A  distinction  has  been  drawn  between  negative  and 
affirmative  pleas,  and,  while.the  general  rule  is  held 
applicable  to  a  negative  plea  filed  by  defendant  and 
issue  joined  thereon,6  if  defendant  pleads  affirma- 
tively, so  that  he  bears  the  burden  of  proof  and 
afterward  fails  to  appear  and  defend  his  plea,  judg- 
ment by  default  may  be  rendered,  although  the  plea 
has  not  first  been  disposed  of,7  except  where  defend- 
ant files  a  plea  under  oath  denying  the  execution 
of  the  instrument  on  which  the  suit  is  based.* 


97.    lAriz. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    &. 

Turbeville    v.    McCarrell,    80    P.2d 

496,  498,  43  Ariz.  236. 
Ark. — Caine  v.  Lunon,  190  S.W.2d  521 

—North    Arkansas    Highway    Im- 
provement   Dist.    No.    2    v.    Home 

Telephone   Co.,   3    S.W.2d   307,    176 

Ark.  553. 
Cal.— Potts  v.  Whitson,  125  P.*2d  9'47, 

52  Cal.App.2d  199. 
Fla.— Atlanta  (Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hopps, 

183  So.  1'5,  183  Fla.  300. 
Ga. — Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of  America 

v.  Hattaway,  174   S.B.  736,  49  Ga. 

App.  211. 
Idaho.— In  re  Smith,   225  P.   495,   3*8 

Idaho  746. 
111.— Harris    v.    Juenger,    11    N.B.2d 

929,  367  111.  478. 
Ind.— Indiana  State  Board  of  Medical 

Registration    and    Examination    v. 

Pickard,  177  N.E.  870,   93  Ind.App. 

171. 
Iowa. — Cutino  Co.  v.  Weeks,  213  N. 

W.  413,  203  Iowa  681. 
La. — Ponchatoula       Farm       Bureau 

Ass'n  v.  Tangipahoa  Bank  &  Trust 

Co.,  160  So.  803,  181  La.  1039. 
Miss. — Randall    v.    Gunter,    179    So. 

362,    181   Miss.    332— Corpus   Juris 

cited  in  Dalton  -v.   Rhodes   Motor 

Co.,  1'20  So.  821,  822,  1&3  Miss.  51. 
Mo.— Keltner   v.   Threlkel,    291    S.W. 

462,    316    Mo.    609— Meyerhardt   v. 

Fredman,   App.,   131   S.W.2d  $16. 
Mont. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Aronow 

v.    Bishop,    120    P.2d  42<3f   424,    112 

Mont.  611. 
jqev. — Price  Y.  Brimacombe,  72  P.2d 

1107,  58  Nev.  156,  rehearing  denied 

75  P.2d  734,  58  Nev.  156. 
N.M.— Animas   Consol.   Mines  Co.  v. 

Frazier,  -69  P.2d  *27,  41  N.M.  389. 
Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  McCabe 

v.  Tom,  171  NJE.  868,  869,  35  Ohio 

App.  73. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Rice  v. 

Bontjes,    250   P.   89,   121   Okl.   292. 
Pa. — Moore  v.  Monarch  Accident  Ins. 

Co.,  17  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  553,  30  Sen. 

Leg.Rec.  272. 
R.I. — Woodworth   v.    Baker,    13*5    A. 

606,  48  R.I.  99. 
S.a— Nettles    v.    MacMillau    Petro- 
leum Corp.,  37  S.E.2d  134. 

49  0  .J.S.-23 


Tex. — Buhrman-Pharr  Hardware  Co.  | 
v.  Medford  Bros.,  Civ.App.,   118  S.  | 
W.2d  34*5,  error  refused — Sun  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Huttig  Sr-h  &  Door  Co., 
Civ.App.,    36    S.W.2d    561— Ball    v. 
Nelms,  Civ.App.,  293  S.W.  3.36. 
34  C.J.  p  169  note  71. 

Judgment  not  void,  although  er- 
roneous.— Mclntosh  v.  Munson  Road 
Machinery  Co.,  145  So.  781,  167  Miss. 
546. 

Codefendanf s  answer 

Defenses  in  answer  filed  by  one 
defendant  which  would  preclude  re- 
covery by  plaintiff  inured  to  benefit 
of  codefendant  filing  no  answer,  and 
no  judgment  could  be  filed  against 
either  defendant  until  issues  raised 
had  been  disposed  of. — Beddow's 
Adm'r  v.  Barbourville  Water,  Ice  & 
Light  Co.,  66  S.W.2d  ftl,  252  Ky. 
267. 

98.  Ariz. — Corpus    Juris    guoted   in 
Turbeville   v.    McCarrell,    i30    P.2d 
496,  498,  43  Ariz.  236. 

111. — Harris    v.    Juenger,    11    N.B.2d 

929,  367  111.  4-78. 
Iowa. — Cutino  Co.  v.  Weeks,  213  N. 

W.  413,  203  Iowa  S81. 
Miss.— Randall    v.    Gunter,    179    So. 

362,  181  Miss.  '332. 
Ohio.— MoCabe  v.  Tom.  171  N.B.  868, 

35  Ohio  App.  73. 
Tex.— Sun    Lumber    Co.    v.    Huttig 

Sash  &   Door  Co.,  Civ.App.,  36   S. 

W.2d  561. 
3'4  C.J.  p  170  note  72. 

Where  defendant  stands  on  his  an- 
swer after  a  demurrer  thereto  has 
been  erroneously  sustained,  it  is  er- 
ror to  enter  default  Judgment 
against  him. — Gossman  r.  Gossman, 
CaLApp.,  in  P.'2d  495. 

99.  Ariz.— ^Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Turbeville    v.    McCarrell,    30   P.2d 
<496,  498,  43  Ariz.  236. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dalton 

v.  Rhodes  Motor  Co.,  120  So.  821, 

822,  158  Miss.  51. 
Ohio.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  McCabe 

v.  Tom,  171  NJB.  868,  869.  35  Ohio 

App.  78. 

353 


Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Rice  v. 
Bontjes,    250   P.    89,    121    Okl.    292. 
34  C.J.  p  170  note  73. 

1.  Iowa. — Cutino  Co.  v.  Weeks,  213 
N.W.  413,  203  Iowa  581. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dalton 
v.  Rhodes  Motor  Co.,  120  So.  821, 
822,  153  Miss.  51. 
34  C.J.  p  170  note  74. 

better  written  by  garnishee  de- 
fendant to  clerk  of  court  defying 
indebtedness  commanded  notice  by 
plaintiff  at  least  to  extent  of  moving 
that  it  be  stricken  from  files  before 
entry  of  default  judgment. — Wiener 
v.  Valley  Steel  Co.,  236  N.W.  90$. 
254  (Mich.  681. 

2.  Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dal- 
ton v.  Rhodes  Motor  Co.,   120  So. 
82-1,  822,  153  Miss.  51. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Rice  v. 

Bontjes,  250  P.  89,  121  Okl.  292. 
i34  C.J.  p  170  note  75. 

3.  Mont. — Aronow  v.  Bishop,  120  P. 
2d  423,  112  Mont  611. 

34  C.J.  p  170  note  76. 

4.  111. — Charles  H.  Thompson  Co.  v. 
Burns,  199  Ill.«App.  418. 

34  C.J.  p  170  note  79. 
Flea  ostensibly  overruled 

Plea  in  abatement,  treated  as  still 
pending,  and  argued  and  taken  under 
advisement  after  it  had  been  ostens- 
ibly overruled,  prevented  default  un- 
til ruled  on  by  court. — Burbage  v. 
Jedlicka,  23I4  P.  32,  27  Ariz.  426. 

5*  Miss.— McEwin  v.  State,  11  Miss. 
120. 

e.  Ala.— Lokey  v.  Ward,  154  So.  802, 
228  Ala.  559— Wildsmith  v.  Graves, 
96  So.  230,  209  Ala.  294. 

Ky.— Milner  v.    Miller,   4   Bibb   3*41. 

7.  Ala.— Lokey  v.  Ward,  154  So.  80*2, 
228  Ala.  559. 

34  C.  J.  p  170  note  -82. 

8.  Ala.— McCoy  v.  Harrell,   40  Ala. 
232— Crow  Y.  Decatur  Bank,  5  Ala. 
249. 


199 


'JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J-S- 


Where  defendant  properly  demands  oyer,  default 
cannot  be  entered  by  plaintiff  for  failure  of  defend- 
ant to  file  a  plea  until  the  oyer  has  been  furnished,9 
-but  defendant  must  have  his  prayer  entered  of  rec- 
ord and  invoke  the  judgment  of  the  court  as  to 
whether  or  not  he  shall  plead  further  until  the  oyer 
is  granted;  otherwise  plaintiff  may  disregard  his 
demand  and  take  a  judgment  by  default.10  If,  on 
a  demand  of  oyer,  the  oyer  given  is  different  from 
that  set  out  in  the  complaint,  plaintiff  cannot  sign 
judgment  by  default  without  a  rule  or  notice  after 
service  of  a  true  oyer.11 

(2)  Pending  Decision  on  Demurrer 

Judgment  by  default  should  not  ordinarily  be  ren- 
dered against  a  party  whose  demurrer  to  his  adversary's 
pleading  is  still  pending. 

Judgment  by  default  should  not  be  rendered 
against  defendant  who  has  filed  a  demurrer  to  the 
declaration  or  complaint,  where  such  demurrer  re- 
mains undetermined  and  not  disposed  of  in  any 
way,12  unless  defendant  has  waived  or  withdrawn 
his  demurrer,13  or  plaintiff  has  filed  an  amended  or 
substituted  complaint,14  and  the  demurrer  is  not 


renewed  or  a  new  demurrer  filed.15  This  rule  ap- 
plies, even  though  the  demurrer  was  filed  out  of 
time  without  leave  or  consent,16  or  would  not  be 
sustainable,1?  unless  it  is  merely  frivolous,18  or 
even  though  it  is  taken  to  one  only  of  several  counts 
of  the  declaration.^  On  the  same  principle  judg- 
ment by  default  cannot  be  entered  against  plaintiff 
for  failure  to  plead,  where  his  demurrer  to  defend- 
ant's plea  or  answer  is  not  disposed  of,20  or  where 
a  demurrer  to  his  pleading  is  not  disposed  of.21 

(3)  Pending  Decision  on  Motion 

As  a  general  rule,  Judgment  by  default  cannot  be 
entered  while  a  motion  made  by  defendant  remains  pend- 
ing. 

Although  under  some  statutes  a  motion  is  not 
such  a  pleading  as  to  prevent  the  taking  of  a  de- 
fault judgment  during  its  pendency,22  generally,  and 
under  most  statutes,  it  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment by  default  cannot  be  entered  while  a  motion 
made  by  defendant  remains  pending  and  not  dis- 
posed of,23  unless  the  motion  appears  on  its  face 
to  be  frivolous  and  without  merit,24  or  such  that  it 
may  be  treated  as  a  nullity,25  or  is  of  such  a  nature 


9.  N.T.— Varlck    v.    Bodine,    3    Hill 
444. 

10.  Tenn. — Mabry      v.      Cowan,      6 
Heisk,  29'5 — Anderson  v.  Allison,  2 
Head  122. 

11.  N.Y.— Clinton  v.   Porter,    2   Cai. 
176,  Col.  &  C.Cas.  388. 

12.  Ark,— Caine  v.  Lunon,  190  S.W. 
3d  521. 

HI. — Greenys  v.  Jonalis,  244  111.  App. 
78. 

Or. — McCann  v.  Oregon  Scenic  Trips 
Co.,  209  P.  483,  105  Or.  213,  fol- 
lowed in  Smith  v.  Oregon  Scenic 
Trfps  Co.,  209  P.  486,  105  Or.  222. 

Philippine. — Simon  v.  Castro,  6  (Phil- 
ippine 33'5. 

34  C.J.  p  171  note  90. 

13.  Cal.— Davidson    v.    Graham,    141 
P.  834,  24  CaLApp.  692. 

111.— Steelman  v.  Watson,  10  111.  249. 
Demurrer  filed  through  error 

If  the  court's  Jurisdiction  to  en- 
ter a  default  is  obtained  through  the 
service-  of  process,  such  jurisdiction 
is  not  divested  by  the  fact  that 
through  error  a  demurrer  has  been 
filed  in  the  name  of  defendant  and 
is  afterward  withdrawn  by  leave  of 
court. — Deutsch  Roemisch  Katho- 
lischer  Cent.  Verein  v.  Lart2,  94  111. 
App.  255,  affirmed  6-1  N.E.  487,  192 
I1L  485. 

14.  Iowa. — Ronayne      v.      Hawkeye 
Commercial  Men's  Ass'n,  144  N.W. 
319,  1S2  Iowa  615. 

34  C.J.  p  171  note  92. 

15.  Ga. — General    Accident    Fire    & 
Life  Assur.  Corp.  v.  Way,  92  S.E. 
650,  20  Ga,App.  106. 


16.  Cal.— Cuddahy  v.  Gragg,  189  P, 
721,  45  CaLApp.  578. 

Wyo.— Bertagnolli  v.  Bertagnolli,  148 
P.  374,  23  Wyo.  228. 

17.  Or.— McCann   v.   Oregon    Scenic 
Trips  Co.,  209  P.  483,  105  Or.  213, 
followed  in  Smith  v.  Oregon  Scenic 
Trips  Co.,  209  P.  486,  10'5  Or.  22"2. 

34  C.J,  p  171  note  9'5. 

18.  N.C.— Clayton  v.  Jones,  68  N.C. 
497. 

19.  111.— Bradshaw   v.   McKinney,   5 
I1L  54. 

20.  Ala.— White  v.  Whatley,  30  So. 
738,  128  Ala.  524. 

Mo.— Louthan  v.  Caldwell,  52  Mo. 
121. 

21.  Ala.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Walker,  -30   So.   738,   128   Ala.   368. 

34  C.J.  p  171  note  99. 

22.  Nev. — "Price  v.   Brimacombe,   7*2 
P.2d  1107,   58  Nev.  156,  rehearing 
denied  75  P.2d  734,  58  Nev.  156. 

23.  Ark. — Caine  v.  -Lunon,  190  S.W. 
2d  521. 

Fla. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Johnson 
v.  City  of  Sebring,  140  So.  672,  674, 
104  Fla.  694. 

La. — Tatum  v.  Toledo  Scale  Co.,  App., 
187  So.  835. 

Mont.— Paramount  Publix  Corpora- 
tion v.  Boucher,  19  P.2d  223,  93 
Mont.  ,340— Mihelich  v.  Butte  Elec- 
tric Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont. 
604. 

N.C. — Heffner  v.  Jefferson  Standard 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  199  SJE.  293,  214 
N.C.  359. 

OkL— - Massey-Harris  Co.  v.  Booth,  57 
J?.2d  826,  177  Okl.  84. 

354 


Utah.— Hurd  v.  Ford,  276  P.  908, 
74  Utah  46 — Taylor  v.  Guaranty 
Mortg.  Co.,  220  P.  1067,  62  Utah 
520— Sanders  v.  Milford  Auto  Co., 
218  P.  126,  62  Utah  110. 
34  C.J.  p  171  note  1. 

A  motion  not  wholly  frivolous  and 
without  merit  cannot  be  treated  as 
a  nullity  by  the  court,  and  judgment 
by  default  entered  against  the  mov- 
ing party. — State  v.  Tedder,  166  So. 
590,  123  Flo..  188. 
Motion  challenging"  Jurisdiction 

The  statute  authorizing  a  default 
judgment  if  defendant  fails  to  an- 
swer complaint  or  to  make  a  motion 
challenging  "jurisdiction"  of  court 
in  prescribed  manner  uses  quoted 
word  as  meaning  the  power  to  hear 
and  determine  the  particular  case, 
which  power  is  called  into  activity 
by  commencement  of  action  to  en- 
force a  claim  against  defendant  or 
to  redress  or  prevent  a  wrong. — 
Mitchell  v.  McDonald,  136  P.2d  536, 
114  Mont.  292. 

24.  Ark.— Caine  v.  Lunon,  190  S.W. 
2d  521. 

Fla.— State  v.  Tedder,  166  So.  590, 
123  Fla.  188— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Johnson  v.  City  of  Sebring,  140  So. 
672,  674,  KM  Fla.  584. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Rohr  v. 
Jelfery,  278  P.  725,  726,  128  Kan. 
541. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Rice  v. 
Bontjes,  250  P.  89,  121  Okl.  292. 

34  C.J.  p  171  note  2. 

25.  Fla.— Eli  Witt  Cigar  &  Tobacco 
Co.  v.  Somers,  127  So.  £33,  99  Fla. 
592, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


200 


that  a  determination  of  it  will  not  affect  plaintiffs 
right  to  proceed  with  the  cause.26  However,  the 
rule  does  not  apply  if  the  motion  is  not  filed  within 
the  time  to  plead,27  except  in  jurisdictions  where 
defendant  may  prevent  default  by  pleading  at  any 
time  before  default  is  entered;28  and  it  clearly 
does  not  apply  if  the  motion  is  filed  after  the  mo- 
tion for  default  is  served  and  filed,29  or  if  the  mo- 
tion has  been  abandoned  by  defendant30  or  the  rem- 
edy sought  by  the  motion  waived.31 

In  applying  the  rule  to  particular  cases,  it  has 
been  held  that  a  judgment  by  default  cannot  be  en- 
tered while  there  remains  undisposed  of  a  motion  to 
make  the  complaint  more  definite  and  certain,32  or 
to  require  plaintiff  to  state  his  causes  of  action  sep- 
arately,83 or  for  compulsory  amendment  of  the  dec- 
laration,34 or  for  a  bill  of  particulars,35  or  to  strike 
out  a  pleading36  or  certain  allegations  thereof,37  or 
to  quash  the  summons  or  the  service  or  return 


thereof,38  or  to  dismiss  the  cause  or  complaint,39 
or  for  a  change  of  venue,40  for  security  for  costs,41 
for  a  continuance,42  or  for  the  removal  of  the  cause 
to  a  federal  court48  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been 
held  that  such  a  judgment  is  not  prevented  by  the 
pendency  of  a  motion  to  quash  the  writ,44  to  dis- 
miss the  action,45  to  set  aside  an  amended  com- 
plaint,46 or  for  security  for  costs.47 

Where  the  proceedings  are  stayed  until  the  hear- 
ing and  determination  of  a  motion,  plaintiff  may, 
on  decision  on  the  motion,  proceed  at  once  to  enter 
judgment  by  default,  without  serving  notice  of  the 
order,48  unless  the  order  provides  for  notice.49 

§  200.    Operation  and  Effect  of  Default  and 
Judgment 

A  judgment  by  default  has,  In  general,  the  same 
force  and  effect  as  a  judgment  rendered  after  a.  trial 
on  the  merits. 


26.  La. — Motor  Finance  Co.  v.  Lynn, 
App.,  142  So.  310. 

Mont.— Mihelich  v.  Butte  Electric 
Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  -85  Mont.  604. 

Okl. — Bice  y.  Bonties,  250  P.  89,  121 
Okl.  292. 

34  C.J.  P  171  note  3. 

27.  Fla. — Register  v.  Pringle,  50  So. 
•584,  58  Fla.  355. 

Mass. — Dunbar  v.  Baker,  104  Mass. 
211. 

28.  'Fla. — Johnson    v.    City    of    Se- 
bring,  140- So.  672,   104  Fla,  584. 

Utah. — Sanders  v.  Milford  Auto  Co., 
218  P.  126,  62  Utah  110. 

29.  Colo.— McMillen  v.  Hayman,  221 
P.  893,  74  Colo.  300. 

Wash.— General  Lithographing  & 
Printing  Co.  v.  American  Trust 
Co.,  104  P.  608,  55  Wash.  401. 

30.  N.J. — Koenigsberger  v.  Mial,  101 
A.  184,  90  N.J.Law  695. 

N.T. — Strong  v.  Smith,  266  N.Y.S. 
745,  149  Misc.  80. 

31.  Okl. — Massey-Harris       Co.       v. 
Booth,   57  P.2d  826,  177  Okl.   84. 

32.  Okl.— St.  Louis  R.  Co.  v.  Toung, 
130  P.  911,  35  Okl.  521. 

34  C.J.  p  172  note  7. 

33.  Utah.— Felt  City  Townsite  Co.  v. 
Felt  Inv.  Co.,  167  P.  835,  50  Utah 
•364. 

34.  Fla.-^Johnson    y.    City    of    Se- 
bring,  140  So.  672,  10'4  Fla,  584. 

36.    N.Y.— Payne  v.  Smith,  19  Wend. 

122. 

34  C.J.  p  172  note  8. 
After  bill  famished 

Motion  for  bill  of  particulars  on 
last  day  to  plead  did  not  prevent 
default  Judgment  on  failure  to  sub- 
mit answer  or  request  extension  oa 
time  when  bill  was  received.— Kurd 
v.  Ford,  276  P.  908,  74  Utah  46. 
36.  Mont— Paramount  Publix  Cor- 


poration v.  Boucher,  19  P.2d  223, 
9)3  Mont.  #40. 
34  C.J.  p  172  note  10. 

37.  N.C.— Heffner        v.        Jefferson 
Standard   Life   Ins.    Co.,    199    S.B. 
293,  214  N.C.  359. 

Utah, — Sanders  v.  Milford  Auto  Co., 
218  P.  126,  62  Utah  110. 

38.  U.S. — Phillips  v.   Manufacturers 
Trust    Co.,    C.C.A.Idaho,    101    F.2d 
723. 

Kan.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Rohr 
v.  Jeffery,  278  P.  725,  726,  128 
Kan.  -541. 

34  C.J.  P  172  note  12. 

39.  Fla. — Brauer  v.  Paddock,  139  So. 
146,  103  Fla,  1175— Eli  Witt  Cigar 
&  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Somers,   127  So. 
333,  99  Fla.  '592. 

Error  in  filing 

Judgment  by  default  should  not  be 
entered  against  defendant  who  with- 
in apt  time  filed  motion  to  dismiss 
complaint  and  served  notice  of  its 
filing  on  plaintiff,  notwithstanding 
motion  to  dismiss  complaint  was 
filed  in  office  of  clerk  of  court  in- 
stead of  being  presented  to  court. — 
People,  for  Use  of  Heidinger,  v.  U. 
S.  'Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co.,  7  N.B.2d 
472,  239  IlLAprp.  498. 

40.  Mo. — Cannon   v.   Nikles,    151   S. 
W.2d  472,  235  Mo.App.  1094— Car- 
penter v.  Alton  R.  Co.,  A»pp.,   148 
S.W.2d  68. 

34  C.J.  p  172  note  11. 

41.  Mo.— Anspach  v.    Jansen,    78   S 
W.2d   137,   229   Mo.App.   321. 

•34  C.  J.  p  172  note  1-3. 
After  security  deposited 

Where  nonresident  plaintiff  depos- 
ited security  for  costs  in  response  to 
defendant's  motion,  but  did  not  give 
defendant  notice  as  required  by  stat- 
ute that  costs  had  been  furnished 
entering  default  judgment  againsf 

355 


defendant  for  failure  to  serve  affida- 
vit   of   merits    was    error. — Automo- 
bile   Banking   Corporation    v.    -Birk- 
head,  36  A.2d  608,  22  N.J.Misc.  135. 
Motion  in  nature  of  plea 

Where  defendant  filed  motion  for 
costs  and  for  injunction  against 
plaintiff's  "prosecuting-  suits  without 
>aying  costs  in  original  matter,  the 
motion  was  in  the  nature  of  a  plea  in 
abatement,  and  the  court  properly  re- 
fused to  enter  default  judgment — 
Griffin  v.  Arney,  Mo.App.,  12  S.W.'2d 
95. 

42.  Mass. — Hosmer  v.  Hoitt,  36  N.E. 
835,  161  Mass.  173. 

34  C.J.  p  172  note  14. 

43.  I1L— Mattoon  v.  Hinkley,  53  111. 
208. 

Kan. — Cooper    v.    Condon,    15    Kan. 
572. 

44.  N.M.— Elida  -First  Nat  Bank  v. 
George,   189  P.   240,   26  N.M.   46. 

4£.    Cal.— McDonald  v.  Swett,   18  P. 

•324,  76  Cal.  257. 
Fla.— Dudley     v.  White,  81  -So.  $30, 

44  Fla.  264. 

46.  Utah. — Greenfield  v*  Wallace,   1 
Utah  188. 

47.  Ohio. — Morrison  v.  Baker.  App., 
58  N.E.2d  708. 

34  C  J.  !P  172  note  13. 
Signing  of  order 

A  default  judgment  for  plaintiff 
was  not  erroneous  because  of  motion 
pending  at  time  of  Its  entry  to  re- 
quire plaintiff  to  furnish  bond  for 
costs,  where  defendant  failed  to  have 
judge  sign  order  fixing  amount  of 
bond.— Wilson  v.  Lagasse,  179  So. 
472,  14  La.Aprp.  463. 

48.  N.Y.— Tuska  v.  Jarvis,  113  N.T. 
S.  767,  61  Misc.  224. 

49.  N.Y.— Tuska  v.  Jarvis.  supra, 


200 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.  J.  S. 


The  mere  entry  of  a  default  is  not  the  equivalent 
of  a  judgment,50  nor  is  it  a  final  disposition  ;51  in 
legal  effect  it  has  been  said  to  be  the  equivalent  of 
a  demurrer.52  A  default  does  not  affect  the  status, 
rights,  or  liability  of  a  codefendant53  or  intervening 
claimant,54  or  of  defendant  himself  except  as  to  the 
matters  necessarily  admitted  by  the  default.55 

A  judgment  by  default  has  the  same  force  and  ef- 
fect as  a  judgment  rendered  after  a  trial  on  the 
merits,56  except  in  so  -far  as  it  is  governed  by  stat- 
utory provisions,57  and  it  is  not  to  be  discredited 
because  of  the  manner  in  which  it  is  taken.58  It 
determines  plaintiffs  right  to  recover,  and  defend- 
ant's liability,59  although  the  amount  of  recovery  re- 


mains in  some  cases  to  be  ascertained60  A  final 
judgment  cannot  be  rendered  in  defendant's  favor 
without  first  setting  aside  a  default  judgment  that 
has  been  entered  against  him.61 

As  waiving  or  curing  defects.  A  judgment  by 
default  or  nil  dicit  operates  as  a  waiver  or  release 
of  any  mere  formal  errors  or  irregularities  in  the 
previous  proceedings,62  such  as  in  plaintiffs  plead- 
ing;63 but  it  does  not  cure  a  totally  defective  dec- 
laration or  complaint64  or  the  entire  absence  of  an 
allegation  of  a  material  fact,65  nor  does  it  cure  or 
waive  radical  defects  or  errors  which  go  to  the  au- 
thority of  the  court  to  enter  the  judgment66  or  to 
the  foundation  of  plaintiffs  cause  of  action.67 


50.  Ala.  —  Corpus     Juris      cited     in 
Ex   tferte    Anderson,    4    So.2d   420, 
421,  242  Ala.  31. 

Cal.—  Paduveris  v.  Paris,  1  P.2d  986, 

213  Cal.  169. 

Vt—  "Sheldon  v.  Sheldon,  «7  Vt.  152. 
34  C.J.  p  172  note  22. 
Preliminary  entry  of  default  general- 

ly see  infra  §  206. 

Intermediate  step 

An  entry  of  default  is  a  Judg- 
ment only  in  the  sense  that  it  ad- 
judges the  case  in  default,  and  is 
only  an  intermediate  step  authorizing 
plaintiff  to  enter  verdict  and  judg- 
ment subject  to  statutory  exceptions. 
—  Ryles  v.  Moore.  1«  S.E.2d  672,  191 
Ga.  661. 
Status  as  "party" 

A  defendant  who  has  been  merely 
defaulted  is  still  a  "party"  to  the 
suit—  Webb  v.  Willett  Co.,  3-3  N.E.2d 
636,  309  Ill.App.  504. 

Effect  of  laches 

Where  default  had  been  entered 
several  months  prior  to  defendant's 
application  to  intervene,  or  to  plead 
to  court's  jurisdiction,  or  to  traverse 
allegations  of  complaint,  denial  of 
application  was  held  proper  exercise 
of  court's  discretion.  —  Sauve  v.  Ham- 

ilton,  271  P.   630,  S4  Colo.  498. 

» 
Tacit  Joinder  of  issue 

Effect  of  entry  of  preliminary  de- 
fault is  to  form  tacit  joinder  of  issue 
on  basis  of  general  denial,  and,  it 
merely  serves  to  put  plaintiff  on 
proof  of  relevant  facts  alleged.— 
Whalen  v.  Davis,  9  So.2d  424,  200 
Da.  1066  —  Russo  v.  Aucoin,  La.App., 
7  So.2d  744. 

51.  Conn.  —  Felton  v.  QPelton,  196  A. 
791,  123  Conn.  564. 

Mass.  —  Doodlesacfc  v.  Superfine  Coal 
&  Ice  Corporation,  19S  NJDL  773, 
292  Mass.  424,  101  A.1..R.  1247— 
Hooton  v.  Redmond,  130  NJED.  107, 
•237  Mass. 


52.  N.Y.—  Redfield  v.  Critchley,  14 
N.B.2d  377,  277  N.T.  -3«36,  reargu- 
ment  denied  15  N.E.2d  73,  278  N.Y. 
483. 


53.  U.S. — Kuhn  v.  Chesapeake  &  O. 
Ry.  Co.,  C.C.A.W.Va.,  118  F.2d  400. 

Fla. — Merchants'  &  Mechanics'  B^nk 

v.  Sample.  125  So.  1,  98  Fla.  759. 
111.— Ohamblin  v.  Chamblin,  1  N.E. 

2d  73,  362  111,  588,  104  A.-L..R.  1183, 

certiorari   denied    57    S.Ct.    24,   299 

TT.S.  541,  SI  L:Ed.  398. 
Mo. — Fawkes    v.     National    Refining 

Co.,  108  S.W.2d  7,   341  Mo.  630. 
S.C.— J.  R.  Watkins  Co.   v.  Jaillette, 

25    S.E.2d    478,    202    S.C.    429. 
Tenn. — Brown    v.    Wilson,    13    Tenn. 

App.  255. 
Tex.— Buttrill  v.  Occidental  Life  Ins. 

Co.,   Qiv.App.,   45   S.W.2d  636. 
34  C.J.  p  173  note  35. 

54.  TTtah. — Cunnington   v.    Scott,    11 
P.  578,  4  Utah  446. 

55.  U.S.— Kuhn  v.   Chesapeake  &  O. 
Ry.  Co.,  C.C.A.W.Va.,  118  F.2d  400. 

S.C. — Gadsden  v.  Home  Fertilizer  & 
Chemical  Co.,  7b  S.E.  15,  89  S.C. 
433. 

58.     Del. — Teatman  v.  Ward,  Super., 

36  A.2d  355. 
Kan. — Concordia    Building    &    Loan 

Ass'n  v.  -Dundas,   42  P.2d  563,  141 

Kan.  59*8. 
N.C.— Strickland   v.    Shearon,   1-37    S. 

B.  803,  19-3  OST.C:  599. 
Tex. — Ritch   v.    Jarvis,   Civ.App.,    64 

S.W.2d  831,  error  dismissed. 
Wash.— Puett   v.    Bernhard,    71   P.2d 

406,  191  Wash.  557. 
34  C.J.  p  172  notes  2'3,  24. 
Bond  validation,  proceeding 

Judgment  by  default  permitted  "by 
taxpayers  in  bond  validation  pro- 
ceeding has  same  effect  as  any  other 
judgment  by  default  rendered  by 
court  of  competent  jurisdiction. — 
Love  v.  Tazoo  City,  138  So.  '600,  162 
Mass.  65. 
Effect  as  nonsuit  or  dismissal 

Where  court,  on  failure  of  plain- 
tiff to  appear  at  time  set  for  trial, 
heard  evidence  and  submitted  issues, 
judgment  for  defendant  was  essen- 
tially a  judgment  of  nonsuit  or  dis- 
missal, and  the  irregular  (proceeding 
did  not  affect  its  essential  nature  as 
such. — Craver  v.  Spaugh,  38  S.E.2d 
525,  226  N.C.  450. 

356 


57.  Iowa. — Stanbrpugh   v.    Cook,    49- 
N.W.  1010,  83  Iowa  705. 

34  C.J.  p  172  note  26. 

58.  Ind.— Hitt   v.    Carr,    130   N.E.    1. 
77  Ind. App.  488. 

59.  Or. — Winters      v.   Falls  Lumber 
Co.,  -31  P.2d  177,  146  Or.   592. 

Tex. — Simmons   Co.    v.   -Sprulll,    Civ. 

App.,  131  S.W.2d  1026. 
34  C.J.  p  172  note  29. 

60.  Tex. — Simmons    Co.    v.    Spruill,. 
supra. 

34  C.J.  p  173  note  31. 

61.  Tex. — Bateman  v.  Pool,  19  S.W. 
552,  84  Tex.  405. 

62.  Ala. — Eaton   v.   Harris,   42  Ala. 
491. 

34  C.J.  p  173  note  38. 

63.  Ala. — Crawford    v.    Camfield,    6" 
Ala.    1'53 — Swo-pe    v.    "Sherman,    601 
So.  474,  7  Ala.Aipp.  210. 

Tex.— Busby   v.    Busby,   Civ.App.,    64 

S.W.2d  -392. 
34  C.J.  <p  173  note  39. 
Intention  shown  by  record 

A  party  permitting  judgment  nihil 
dicit  impliedly  confesses  judgment 
and  waives  all  errors  in  pleading- 
or  proof  not  fundamental  or  jurisdic- 
tional  in  character,  except  those 
which  record  shows  were  not  in- 
tended to  be  waived. — O'Quinn  v. 
Tate,  Tex.Civ.App.,  187  S.W.2d  241— 
Grand  Lodge  Brotherhood  of  Rail- 
road Trainmen  v.  Ware,  Tex.Civ.App., 
73  S.W.2d  1076,  error  dismissed. 

64.  Mass. — Hemmenway  v.  Hickes,  4 
Pick.  497. 

34  C.J.  ip  173  note  40. 

65.  Tenn. — Tumley  v.  Clarksville  & 
M.  R.  Co.,  2  Coldw.  327— Harlan  v. 
Dew,  3  Head  505. 

34  C.J.  p  173  note  41. 

66.  Md.— McDonald   y.   King,    93   A. 
979,  125  Md.  589. 

34  C.  J.  p  173  note  42. 

67.  Ky. — International         Harvester 
Co.  of  America  v.  Commonwealth, 
185    S.W.    10'2,   170   Ky.   41.   L.R.A. 
1918D  1004. 

34  C.J.  p  173  note  43. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


201 


As  confession  of  judgment.  A  judgment  by  de- 
fault has  been  held  to  operate  as  a  judgment  by  con- 
fession,68 especially  where  it  is  rendered  on  the 
withdrawal  of  a  plea  or  answer,69  which,  in  its  ef- 
fect, is  not  precisely  coextensive  with  a  judgment 
by  express  confession.70 

§  201.    Default  as  Admission 

a.  In  general 

b.  Allegations  in  pleadings 

c.  Amount  of  claim  or  damages 
d  Other  matters 

a.  In  General 

A  default  operates  as  an 'admission  by  tho  defendant 
of  the  truth  of  the  cause  of  action  as  set  forth  In  the 
plaintiff's  pleading,  but  not  as  an  admission  that  the 
facts  alleged  are  in  law  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause 
of  action. 

A  default  or  nil  dicit  operates  as  an  admission  by 
defendant  of  the  truth  of  the  cause  of  action  as  set 
up  in  the  declaration  or  complaint,71  or  admits  lia- 
bility on  the  part  of  defendant,72  or  amounts  to  an 
admission  of  plaintifFs  right  to  recover.78  However, 


it  has  also  been  held  that  a  default  does  not  admit 
that  the  facts  alleged  are  in  law  sufficient  to  consti- 
tute a  good  cause  of  action  or  to  entitle  plaintiff  to 
the  relief  prayed.74 

Constructive  service;  nonresidents.  Where  the 
service  of  process  on  defendant  is  constructive  only, 
as  by  publication,  his  default  is  not  a  sufficient  ad- 
mission of  the  allegations  of  the  complaint  to  au- 
thorize a  judgment  in  accordance  therewith;75  and, 
as  shown  infra  §§  211,  213,  in  order  for  plaintiff  to 
obtain  judgment  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  show  the 
proper  issuance  and  service  of  process  on  defend- 
ant, as  well  as  the  facts  which  entitle  him  to  re- 
cover. A  default  in  pleading  has  been  held  not  an 
admission  of  the  court's  jurisdiction  over  a  nonresi- 
dent of  the  county.76  *  * 

b.  Allegations  in  Pleadings 

A   defendant's   default  has   been    herd  to  -admit  all 
matters  properly  pleaded  and  material  to  the  Issues. 

It  has  been  broadly  held  that  default  by  defend- 
ant operates  as  an  admission  of  all  matters  alleged 
in  plaintifFs  pleading  ;77 ,  more  particularly,  a  de- 


68.  Puerto  Rico. — Cajigas  v.  Prats,  5 
Puerto  Rico  142. 

34  C.J.  |p  173  note  45. 

Judgment  by  confession  distin- 
guished from  default  judgment 
see  supra  §  134. 

69.  Tex. — O'Quinn  v.  Tate,  Civ.App., 
187  S.W.2d  241. 

34  C.J.  p  173  note  46. 
Judgment  nil  dicit  generally  see  su- 
pra §  187. 

70.  Tex. — Grand  <Lodge  Brotherhood 
of    Railroad    Trainmen    v.    Ware, 
Civ.App.,    7-3    S.W.2d   1076— Spivey 
v.   Saner-Ragley  'Lumber  -Co.,   Civ. 
App.,  284  S.W.  210. 

84  C.J.  p  173  note  47. 

71.  Cal. — Heintzsch  v.  LaFrance,  44 
P  3d  35*8,  3  Cal.2d  180. 

111.— Wisner  v.  Catherwood,  225  111. 
App.  471. 

Mo. — Electrolytic  Chlorine  Co.  v. 
Wallace  &  Tiernan  Co.,  41  S.W.2d 
1049,  -328  Mo.  78-2,  78  A.L.R.  930. 

Mont. — Lindsey  v.  Drs.  Keenan,  An- 
drews &  Allred,  1*65  P.2d  804. 

N.C.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  De  Hoff 
v.  Black,  175  -S.E.  179,  180,  206  N.C. 
687 — Strickland  v.  Shearon,  137  S. 
EJ.  803,  193  .N.C.  599— Mitchell  v. 
Town  of  Ahoskle,  129  S.E.  626,  190 
N.C.  f235— Hill  v.  Hufflnes  Hotel 
Co.,  125  S.E.  266,  188  NX!.  686— 
Parker  v.  House,  66  N.C.  -374. 

Tenn. — Grace  v.  Curley,  3  Tenn.Apip. 
1. 

Tex — Saner-Ragley  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Spttey,  Civ.App.,  255  S.W.  193, 
modified  on  other  grounds '  Spivey 
v.  Saner-Ragley  Lumber  Co.,  Com. 
App.,  284  S.W.  210. 

34  C.J.  p  173  note  49. 


Breach  of  penal  bond 

Under  some  statutes,'  where  judg- 
ment on  a  penal  bond  is  obtained  by 
default,  the  court  must  make  an  or- 
der that  the  truth  of  the  breaches 
shall  be  inquired  into  at  the  same  or 
next  succeeding  'term. — Taylor  v. 
Auditor,  4  Ark.  574. 
Failure  to  attach  itemized  statement 

Defendant  after  default  could  not 
complain  that  petition  for  enforce- 
ment of  mechanic's  lien  had  no  item- 
ized statement  attached. — Dierks  & 
Sons  (Lumber  Co.  v.  Taylor,  Mo. 
App.,  296  S.W.  176. 

72.  Md.— Smith  v.  Dolan,  185  A.  453, 
170  Md.  654. 

Mo. — Fawkes  v.  National  Refining 
Co.,  108  S.W.2d  7,  -341  Mo.  630. 

R.L — Fudim  v.  Kane,  136  A.  306,  48 
R.L  155. 

Tex. — Spivey  v.  Saner-Ragley  Lum- 
ber Co.,  Com.App.,  284  S.W.  210. 

34  C.J.  p  17-3  note  49,  p  174  note  60. 

73.  Ark. — Shelton  v.  Landers,  270  S. 
W.  522,  167  Ark.  63*. 

Ind. — Carson   v.    Perkins,    29    N.E.2d 

772,  217  Ind.  543. 
Mich. — Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  New 

York  v.  Furkas,  255  N.W.  381,  267 

Mich.  14. 
Mo.— 'Fawkes    v.    National    Refining 

Co.,  108  S.W.Sd  7,  341  Mo.  630. 
34  C.J.  a?  173  note  49. 

74.  Conn. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
Felton  v.  Felton,   196  A.  791,  793, 
12*3  Conn.  5'64. 

111. — Templeman  v.  People  for  Use 
of  Usher,  11  N.E.2d  974,  292  111. 
App.  647 — Whalen  v.  Twin  City 
Barge  &  Gravel  Co.,  280  Hl.App. 
596,  certiorari  denied  -Twin  -City 

357 


Barge  &  Gravel  Co.  v.  Whalen,  56 

S.Ct.    590,    297   U.S.    714,    80    L.Bd. 
.    1000. 
Pa.— tCorpus   Juris  '  cited   in  Frankel 

v.  Donehoo,  168  A.  S70,  572,  306  Pa. 
.   52,  followed  in  Marvin  v.  I>onehoo, 

153  A,  573,  306  Pa.  58. 
Tex. — Gamel   v.   City   Nat.   Bank   of 

Colorado,    Tex.,    Com. App.,    258    S. 

W.  1043. 
34  C.J.  p  174  note  53. 

75.  Ind. — Rochester    Security  Trust 
Co.  v.  Myhan,  114  N.E.  410,  186  Ind. 
391,  394. 

34  C.J.  p  175  note  75. 

76.  Ga. — Davis-Washington    Co.     v. 
Vickers,    155    <S.E.    92,    -41    Ga.App. 
818.  '     > 

77.  U.S.— In    re    Kimmel,    D.C.N.Y., 
28  F.Supp.  942. 

Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Corpren 
v.  Tallapoosa  County,  3  So.'2d  53, 
241  Ala.  492. 

Cal.— Davis  v.  Davis,  224  P.  478,  *65 
CaLAjpp.  499. 

Conn. — 'Felton  v.  Felton,  196  A.  791, 
123  Conn.  564. 

111.— People  v.  Rust,  292  111.  -  412— 
Templeman  v.  People  for  Use  of 
Usher,  11  N.'ELSd  974,  292  IlLApp. . 
647 — Whalen  v.  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.,  280  IlLApp.  596,  cer- 
tiorari denied  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co,  v.  Whalen,  '56  S.Ct.  $90* 
297  U.S.  714,  $0  -L.Ed.  1000. 

Ind. — Second  Nat.  Bank  v.  Scudder, 
6  N.E.2d  955,  212  Ind.  283. 

Mich.— «mak  v.  Gwozdik,  -291  £NT.W. 
270,  293  Mich.  185. 

Mo. — Fawkes  v.  National  Refining 
Co.,  10'8  S.W.2d  7,  3*1  Mo.  630— 
Electrolytic  ghlorine  Co.  v.  Wai- 


§  201 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


fault  has  been  held  to  constitute  an  admission  of 
traversable78  allegations'  that  are  well  and  properly 
pleaded  and  are  material  to  the  issues79  or  only  such 
allegations  as  are  necessary  to  obtain  the  particular 
relief  sought.80  . 

The  rules  as  to  admissions  resulting  from  default 
have  been  said  to  obtain  even  though  the  allega- 
tions are  untrue.81 


c.  Amount  of  Claim  or  Damages 

A  default  in  an  action  for  an  unliquidated  claim  ad- 
mits the  plaintiff's  right. to  recover  something,  but  not 
the  amount;  where  the  amount  to  which  the  plaintiff 
Is  entitled  is  fixed  or  liquidated,  or  ascertainable  by  mere 
calculation,  a  default  admits  his  right  to  the  sum  de- 
manded. 

Where  the  action  is  in  tort  or  for  an  unliquidat- 
ed claim  or  amount,  a  default  admits  plaintiffs  right 
to  recover  something,82  at  least  nominal  damages,83 
but  does  not  admit  the  amount  to  which  he  is  enti- 


lace  &  Tiernan  Co.,  41  S.W.2d  1049, 
.•828  Mo,  782,  78  AL.R.  930. 
Neb. — Danborn  v.  Danborn,  273  N.W. 

502,  132  Neb.  858. 
N.D.— Corn     Exchange     Sav.     Bank, 

Sioux  Falls,   S.   D.,    v.    Northwest 

Const.  Co.,  260  N.W.   580,   65  N.D. 

577. 
Ohio. — Carter  Wood  Specialty  Co.  v. 

Drug  &  Store  Fixtures,  App.,  50  N. 

B.2d  188. 
Pa. — Irwin  Building-  &  Loan  Ass'n  v. 

Krizanowski,   Com.PL,   22  WestCo. 

L.J.  99. 
Tenn. — Grace  v.  Curley,  «3  Tenn.App. 

1. 
Tex. — Gamel   v.   City   Nat    Bank   of 

Colorado,    Tex. Com. App.,    258    S.W. 

1043 — Milford  ,  v.    Culpepper,    Civ. 

Aipp.,  40  ,S.W.2d  163,  error  refused 

— Citizens'  Bank  v.  Brandau,   Civ. 

App.,  1  S.W.2d  466,  error  refused. 
34  C.  J.  tp  173  note  43. 

Allegations  not  controverted  by 
answer  are  deemed  true,  although 
plaintiff  proceeded  with  evidence  as 
though  issue  were  joined  where  de- 
fendant was  in  default  and  not  pres- 
ent—Stein v.  Rainey,  286  S.W.  53, 
315  Mo.  535. 

Default  in.  prior  cause  carries  with 
it  the  admission  of  all  facts  alleged 
in  that  action  and  that  admission 
may  be  applied  against  defendant  in 
a  new  suit. — Thorne  v.  McKinley 
Bros.,  56  P.2d  204,  5  *Cal.2d  704: 

Admissions  of  oodefendaat 

(1)  The  default  of  one  defendant 
although  an  admission  by  him  of  al- 
legations of  petition,  does  not  oper- 
ate as  an  admission  of  such  allega- 
tions as  against  contesting  codefend- 
ant— Fawkes    v.    National    Refining 
Co.,  108  «S.W.2d  7,  -341  Mo.  630. 

(2)  Where  one  defendant  is  liable 
for  the  negligence  of  his  codefenoV- 
ant  default  by  the  latter  has  been 
held  an  admission  of  the  negligence 
charged   and   is   imputable    over   to, 
and  binding  on,  the  other. — Holland 
v.  Kodimer,  77  P.2d  84-3,  11  Cal.2d  40. 

78.  Mont — ILindsey  v.  Drs.  Keenan, 
Andrews  &  Allred,  16»5  P.'2d  804. 

N.Y. — McClelland  v.  Climax  Hosiery 
Mills,  169  N.BJ.  60'5,  252  N.Y.  «347, 
remittitur  amended  171  NJL  770, 
2£3  N.Y.  633,  reargument  denied 
171  N.B.  781,  253  N.Y.  558— Tremb-J 


lay  v.  <Lyon,  29  N.Y.S.2d  336,  176 

Misc.  906. 
Okl.— Le  Clair  v.  Calls  Him,  233  P. 

10S7,  106  OkL  247. 
34  C.J.  p  17-3  note  49. 

79.  Ariz. — Corpus  Jurii  cited  in 
Postal  Ben.  Ine.  Co.  v.  Johnson, 
165  P.2d  17-3,  178— Collister  v.  In- 
ter-State Fidelity  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  of  Utah,  38  P.2d  626,  44 
Ariz.  427,  98  A.L.R.  1020. 

Ark. — Shelton  v.  Landers,  270  S.W. 
522,  167  Ark.  638. 

Cal.— Strong  v.  Shatto,  258  P.  71,  201 
Cat  555 — In  re  Wiechers'  Estate, 
250  P.  397,  199  CJal.  523,  certiorari 
denied  Wiechers"  v.  Wiechers,  47  S. 
Ct  47'6,  273  U.S.  762,  71  KBd.  879 
— Milstein  v.  Sartain,  133  P.2d  836, 
56  Cal.App.2d  924. 

Conn.— Went  v.  Schmidt  167  A.  721, 
117  Conn.  257. 

Ga. — Corpus  Jtiri«  quoted  in  Sum- 
merour  v.  Medlin,  172  S.E.  8'36,  838, 
43  Ga.App.  403. 

Ind. — Carson  v.  Perkins,  29  N.E.2d 
S43,  217  Ind.  543— Morris  v.  Pier- 
son  &  Bro.,  168  'N.E.  873,  91  Ind. 
App.  288. 

La. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Simon 
v.  Duet,  148  So.  2SO,  251,  177  La. 
337. 

Mich.— Smak  v.  Gwozdik,  291  N.W. 
270,  '293  Mich.  185. 

Mo.— Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  Dierks 
&  Sons  Lumber  Co.  v.  Taylor, 
Aiflp.,  296  S.W.  176,  180. 

Neb. — Scheumann  v.  Prudential  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  1-9  N.W.2d  -48. 

N.M.— Baly  v.  McGahen,  21  P.2d  84, 
37  N.M.  246. 

Or.— Kerschner  v.  Smith,  256  P.  195, 
121  Or.  469. 

Pa. — New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Seku- 
la,  Com.Pl.,  9  -Sch.Reg.  156. 

S.C. — Gadsden  v.  Home  Fertilizer  & 
Chemical  Co.,  72  S.B.  15,  89  S.C. 
483. 

Tex. — Employer's  Reinsurance  Cor- 
poration v.  Brock,  Civ.App.,  74  S. 
W.2d  435,  error  dismissed— Wil- 
liamson v.  City  of  Bastland,  Civ. 
App.,  65  S.W.2d  774— Aviation 
Credit  Corporation  of  New  York  v. 
University  Aerial  Service  Corpo- 
ration, Civ.App.,  59  S.W.2d  870, 
error  dismissed — Buttrill  v.  Occi- 
dental Life  Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  4f 
S.W.2d  63'6— Missouri  State  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Rhyne,  Civ.App.,  276  S.- 

358 


W.  757,  reversed  on  other  grounds 

in  part  and  affirmed  in  <part,  Rhyne 

v.    Missouri    State    Life    Ins.    Co., 

Com.App.,  291  -S.W.  845. 
•34  C.J.  p  173  note  49,  p  175  note  73. 
All  matters  except  amount  of  dam. 

ages 
Tex. — Security  Ben.  Ass'n  v.  Tucker, 

Civ.App.,    Ill    S.W.2d    333,    error 

dismissed. 

80.  Ky.— Wilson's  Adm'r  v.  Wilson, 
156  S.W.Sd  832,   288  Ky.   522— Pin- 
son  v.   Murphy,   295  S.W.  442,   22G 
Ky.  464. 

81.  U.S.— Firestone  Tire   &   Rubber 
Co.  v.  Marlboro  Cotton  Mills,  D.C. 
S.C.,  278  F.  816,  modified  on  other 
grounds  282  >F.  811,  certiorari  de- 
nied 43  S.Ct  248,  260  U.S.  749,  67 
L.Ed.  494. 

Mo. — Evans  v.  Dockins,  App.,  40  S. 
W.2d  1508— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Dierks  &  Sons  Lumber  Co.  v.  Tay- 
lor, App.,  296  S.W.  176,  180. 

82.  U.S. — Thorpe    v.    National    City 
Bank  of  Tampa,  CC.A'Fla.,  274  F. 
200. 

Conn.— New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hungerford,  52  A  487,  75  Conn, 
76. 
Md.— Betz  v.  P.  Welty  &  £0.,  81  A 

382,  116  Md.  190. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hurd 
v.  Ford,  276  P.  908,  911,  74  Utah 
46. 

Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Skid- 
more  v.  Pacific  Creditors,  138  P.2d 
•664,    667,    18    Washed   157. 
34  C.J.  p  174  note  53  [a],  «p  176  note 
80—17  C.J.  p  1048  notes  55,   56. 
Zn  a  negligence  suit  defendant,  by 
default  is  deemed  to  admit  some  in- 
jury to  plaintiff;   but  the  amount  or 
extent    of    damage   must    be    estab- 
lished by  evidence. — Smith  v.  Dolan, 
185  A.  453,  170  Md.  654. 

83-  Conn.— Went  v.  Schmidt,  167  A 
721,  117  Conn.  257. 

N.C.— ODe  Hoff  v.  Black,  175  S.B.  179, 
206  N.C.  687,  followed  in  Akins  v. 
Black,  175  S.E.  181,  206  N.C.  691 
—Mitchell  v.  Town  of  Ahoskie,  129 
S.E.  626,  190  N.C.  235— Acme  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  McQueen,  127  S.E.  246,  189 
N.C.  311— Hill  v.  Huffines  Hotel 
Co.,  125  S.E.  266,  188  N.C.  5'86. 

x7  C.J.  p  1048  note  56. 


49    G.J.S. 


JUDGMENT'S 


201 


tied,84   and  there  is  no  final  judgment  until  the 
amount  is  ascertained,  as  discussed  infra  §  216. 

Fixed  or  liquidated  amount.  Where  the  cause  of 
action  is  such  that  plaintiff,  if  entitled  to  recover  at 
all,  is  entitled  to  recover  a  fixed  or  liquidated 
amount,85  or  where  the  amount  of  his  damages  is 
ascertainable  by  mere  calculation,^  defendant's  de- 
fault admits  plaintiff's  right  to  recover  the  sum  de- 
manded in  the  declaration  or  complaint,  and  judg- 
ment may  be  entered  therefor,  without  further 
proof,  and  without  an  assessment  of  damages. 

d.  Other  Matters 

The  defendant,  by  defaulting,  admits  the  capacity  In 
which   the    plaintiff  *ues,  the  status  or  relationship  of 


the   defendant  as.  alleged,    and  the   jurisdiction    of  the 
court,  in  additipn  to  other  matters. 

A  default  has  been  held  to-,  admit  the  capacity  in 
which  plaintiff  sues,87  that  defendant  is  the  .person 
named  in  the  writ  and  intended  tp  be  sued,88  that 
he  occupies  the  position  or  status  or  fills  the  rela- 
tion to  others  which  is  alleged  in  the  declaration,85 
and  that  the  court  has  acquired  jurisdiction  of  his 
person  and  of  the  cause  of  action.90  It  also  admits 
the  due  execution  and  validity  of  the  instrument 
sued  on,91  that  plaintiff's  claim  or  demand  is  just92 
and  legal,93  and  that  defendant  has  no  defense  to 
the  action.94 

A  default  constitutes  an  admission  of  the  fair 
inferences  and  conclusions  of  fact  to  be  drawn 
from  plaintiff's  allegations  ;95  but  it  does  not  admit 


84.  U.S.— Thorpe    v.    'National    City 
Bank  of  Tampa,  C.C.A.Fla.,  274  F. 
200. 

Conn. — New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hungerford,  "52  A.  487,  75  Conn. 
76. 
Ind. — Second  Nat   Bank  v.   Scudder, 

6  N.E.2d   955,   212  Ind.  283. 
Mich.— Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  New 
York  v.  'Furkas,  255  N.W.  381,  267 
Mich.  14. 
Mo. — Fawkes    v.    National    Refining 

Co.,   108  S.W.2d  7,  341  Mo.  630. 
Mont — -Lindsey  v.  Drs.  Keenan,  An- 
drews &  Allred,  165  P.2d  804. 
N.Y. — McClelland  v.  Climax  Hosiery 

Mills,  169  N.B.  605,  252  N.Y.  347. 
N.C.— Elarle    v.    Earle,    151    S.B.    884, 
198  N.C.  411 — Mitchell  v.  Town  of 
Ahoskle,    129    S.E.    626,    190    N.C. 
235. 
R.I. — Fudim  v.  Kane,  136  A.  806,  48 

R.I.  155. 

Tex. — Spivey  v.  ganer-Ragley  Lum- 
ber Co.,  Com.  App.,  284  S.W.  210— 
Security  Ben.  Ass'n  v.  Tucker,  Civ. 
App.,  .111  S.W.2d  -333,  error,  dis- 
missed. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hurd 
v.  Ford,  276  P.  308,  911,  74  Utah 
46. 

Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  •Skid- 
more  v.  Pacific  Creditors,  138  P.2d 
664,  667,  18  Wash.2d  157. 
34  C.J.  p-176  note  81—17  C.J.  p  1048 

notes    55,  56. 
Proof  required  "by  statute 

A  default  does  not  admit  the 
amount  of  damages  to  which  -plain- 
tiff is  entitled,  if  the  case  is  one  in 
which  the  statutes  require  proof  as 
to  damage. — Odom  v.  Pinkston,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  193  S,W.2d  888,  error  re- 
fused, no  reversible  error. 

Punitive  damages  alleged  in  dec- 
laration are  not  considered  as  ad- 
mitted upon  default — Florida  East 
Coast  Ry.  Co.  v.  McRoberts,  149  So. 
631,  111  <Fla.  278,  94  A.L.R.  376. 

85.  Conn. — New   York,  N.  H.  &  H. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hungerford,  152  A.  487,  78 
Conn.  76. 


Utah.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hurd 
v.  Ford,  276  P.  90S,  911,  74  Utah 
46. 

Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Skid- 
more  v.  Pacific  Creditors,  138  P. 
2d  664,  667,  18  Washed  157. 

34  C.  J.  jp  176  note  85. 

Amount  of  life  insurance  policy 
Action  to  recover  amount  of  life 

insurance    policy    held    action     for 

liquidated    sum. — Metropolitan    Life 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Scarboro,  156  S.E.  726,  42 

Ga.App.  42-3. 

8a  Utah. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Hurd  v.  -Ford,  276  P.  908,  911,  74 
Utah  46. 

Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Skid- 
more  v.  Pacific  Creditors,  138  P. 
2d  664,  667,  18  Wash.2d  157. 

34  .C.J.  <p  176  note  86. 

87.  Conn. — Fresenius  v.  Levy,  108 
A.  540,  94  Conn.  244. 

•34  C.J.  p  175  note  61. 

83.  Utah.— Utah  Credit  Men's  Assoc. 
v.  Bowman,  113  P.  63,  38  Utah  326, 
Ann.Cas.l913B  334. 

34  C.J.  p  175  note  62. 

89.  Minn. — Ueland  v.  Johnson,  80  N. 
W.   700,   77  Minn.   543,  77  Am.S.R. 
698. 

34  C.J.  p  175  note  63. 
Partners 

The  existence  of  a.  partnership  be- 
tween two  or  more  defendants  sued 
as  such  is  admitted  by  a  default. — 
Colorado  River  Syndicate  Subscrib- 
ers v.  Alexander,  Tex.Civ.App.,  288 
S.W.  586—34  C.J.  p  175  note  63  [c]. 

90.  Md.— Beta  v.  Welty,   81  A.  382, 
116  Md.  190. 

34  C.J.  p  175  note  64. 

91.  Conn.— Fresenius    v.   'Levy,    108 
A,  540,  94  Conn.  244. 

34  C.J.  p  175  note  65. 

Assumption  of  mortgage  debt  and 
agreement  to  pay  the  amount  there- 
of is  admitted  on  entry  of  default 
where  the  allegations  clearly  set 
forth  those  facts.— Citizens"  -Nat 
Trust  &  Savings  Bank  of  Ix>a  An- 

359 


geles  v.  Holton,  290  P.  447,  210  Cal. 
44. 

92.  111.— Roe  v.  Cook  County,  193  N. 
E.  472,   358  111.  S'68— Buck  v.   Citi- 
zens'  Coal  Min.   Co.,   98   N.B.   228, 
254  111.  198. 

La. — Segal  v.  Hells,  App.,  168  So. 
364,  amended  on  other  grounds 
170  So.  276,  modified  on  other 
grounds  Siegel  v.  Hells,  172  So. 
768,  186  La.  506— Victory  Oil  Co.  v. 
Von  Schlemmer,  7  LaJVpp.  289. 

93.  U.S. — Cromwell   v.    Sac  County, 
Iowa,   94  -U.S.  -351,   24  -L.Ed.   195— 
In   re  "Van   Buren,   D.C.N.Y.,    2   (BV 
643. 

Ownership  of  title 

In  action  in  nature  of  ejectment, 
wherein  default  judgment  was  en- 
tered for  plaintiff,  plaintiff  was  not 
required  to  exhibit  chain  of  title 
from  some  grantor  in  possession  or 
the  United  States  government  since 
under  statute  the  default  judgment 
was  an  admission  of  title  in  plain- 
tiff, and  proof  thereof  was  unneces- 
sary.— Coffee  v.  Xeeton,  Ala.,  26  So. 
2d  80. 

94.  Ill— Roe  v.  Cook  Bounty,  193  N. 
R  472,  358  HL  568. 

34  C.J.  p  175  note  68. 

Breach  of  contract  on  the  -part  of 
plaintiff  cannot  be  shown  by  a  de- 
fendant who  has  defaulted,  as  the 
default  forecloses  his  rights  in  this 
respect. — Gary  v.  Central  of  Georgia 
Ry.  Co.,  160  S.E.  716,  44  Ga.App. 
120. 

95.  Cal.— Davis    v.    Davis,     224    P. 
478,  65  CaLApp.  499. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Dlerks 

&  Sons  Lumber  Co.  v.  Taylor,  App., 

29'6  -S.W.  176,  180. 
Tenn.— Gace  v.  Curley,  *  Tenn.App. 

1. 
34  C.J.  P  174  note  52. 

In  foreclosure  or  kindred  proceed- 
ing, default  by  defendant  who  is 
called  on  to  disclose  supposed,  but 
unknown  interest  in  the  subject  of 
action  admits  that  such  interest  to 


201 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


forced  infer ences^  or  matters  or  conclusions  of 
law,8?  nor  does  it  admit  allegations  of  facts  ex- 
trinsic to  plaintiffs  cause  of  action98  or  unneces- 
sary to  its  establishment,"  facts  alleged  by  a  code- 
fendant,1 or  statements  in  portions  of  the  record 
not  constituting  part  of  plaintiffs  pleadings.2 

Amendment.  A  default  admits  the  facts  of  an 
amendable  statement  of  facts  as  far  as  it  can  be 
amended,8  but  not  of  an  amendment  setting  up  new 
facts.* 

Value.  It  has  been  held  that  a  default  operates 
as  an  admission  of  value  as  alleged  by  plaintiff;5 
but  there  is  also  authority  to  the  contrary.  6 

Plaintiff's  failure  to  reply  to  a  plea  covering  only 
part  of  the  issues  does  not  preclude  him  from  try- 
ing issues  not  met.by  the  'plea,? 


|  202.    Right  to  Notice  of,  and  Partici- 
pation in,  Further  Proceedings 

Except  as  otherwise  provided  by  statute  or  rules  of 
practice,  the  defendant,  after  entry  of  default,  ordinarily 
Is  not  entitled  to  notice  of,  or  to  participate  in,  further 
proceedings  in  the  case. 

A  defendant  against  whom  a  default  is  entered 
is  out  of  court,8  and  except  as  otherwise  provided 
by  statute  or  rule  of  practice,9  or  in  the  absence  of 
a  request  for,  or  an  order  requiring,  notice10  is  not 
entitled  to  notice  of  further  proceedings  in  the 
case,11  including  notice  of  an  application  for  entry 
of  the  default  judgment,  as  discussed  infra  §  208, 
or  of  assessment  of  damages  against  him,  as  dis- 
cussed in  Damages  §  170. 

Unless  there  is  a  statutory  provision  or  a  rule  of 
court  permitting  him  to  do  so,  or  unless  the  default 


subordinate  to  plaintiff's. — Scheu- 
mann  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of  Amer- 
ica, Neb.,  19  N.W.2d  48— Lincoln 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Virgin,  55  N.W.  218, 
Neb.  735,  -38  Am.S.R.  747—34  C.J.  P 
174  note  52  [a]. 

96.  Ga. — Summerour  v.  Medlin,  172 
S.'E.   836,   48  Ga.App.  403. 

34  C.J.  p  174  note  59. 

97.  Ala. — Corprew      v.      Tallapoosa 
County,  3  So.2d  53,  241  Ala.  492. 

Ga. — Summerour  v.  Medlin,  172  'S.B. 

836,  48  GsuApp.  403. 
Mich.— Bonnici  v.  Kindsvater,  266  N. 

W.  360,  275  Mich.  304. 
34  C.J.  p   175  note  58. 
Allegation,    of    wanton    and    willful 

recklessness 
Mich.— Cogswell  v.   Kells,    292  N.W. 

483,  293  Mich.  541. 

98.  Mich. — Corpus     Juris     cited  .in 
Uonnici    v.    Kindsvater,    266    N.W. 
•J60,  3-61,  275  Mich.  304. 

34  C.J.  p  174  note  55. 

99.  Me.— Dunlap  v.  Glldden,  34  Me. 
517. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bon- 
nici v.  Kindsvater,  2*66  N.W.  360, 
361,  275  Mich.  304. 

X-    Or. — Dempsey  v.  Ball,  167  P.  508, 

85  Or.  560. 
34  C.J,  p  174  note  57. 

2.  Tex. — Whisenant     v.     Thompson 
Bros.  Hardware  Co.,   Civ.App.,   120 
S.W.2d  316. 

Statements  in  caption  of  judgment 
Tex. — Whisenant  v.  Thompson  Bros. 
Hardware  Co.,  supra. 

3.  Puerto  Rico. — Fuentes  v.  Maldon- 
ado,  7  Puerto  Rico  (Fed.  52. 

4.  Ga. — Gary  v. 'Central  of  Georgia 
.    By.  Co.,   160   S.B.    71-6,  44   Ga.A#p. 

120. 
34  C.J.  p  175  note  70. 

5. .  Tex. — Martin  v.  Lee  County  State 
Bank.  Civ.App.,  26'5  S.W.  1057. 


&    Ind.— Second  Nat  Bank  v.  Scud- 

der,   6  N.E.23   955,  212  Ind.   283, 
34  C.J.  p  176  note  81  [a], 

7.  Mich. — Snyder  v.  Quarton,  10  N. 
W.  204,  47  Mich.  211. 

8.  Cal.— Jones  v.  Moers,  26I6  P.  821, 
91  CalApp.  65. 

Idaho. — Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  "92  P.2d 
1053,  60  Idaho  464,  124  AJL.R.  149. 

111.— People  ex  rel.  Wilmette  State 
Bank  v.  Village  of  Wilmette,  13  N. 
E.2d  990,  294  IlLApp.  362. 

Minn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ander- 
son v.  Graue,  236  N.W.  483,  434, 
183  Minn.  336,  followed  in  Lima  v. 
Graue,  23-6  N.W.  484,  18-3  Minn.  338. 

34  C.J.  p  176  note  90. 

9.  Where  rights  not  affected 

The  statute  providing  that,  where 
defendant  has  not  appeared,  service 
of  notice  of  papers  need  not  -be  made 
on  him  means  that  notice  of  papers 
need  not  be  served  on  a  defaulting 
party  if  his  rights  are  not  thereby 
affected. — Thompson  v.  Cook,  127  P. 
2d     909,     20    Cal.2d    564 — Strong    v. 
Shatto,   258   P.   71,   201  CaL   555. 
1<X     Fla. — Grand    Lodge,    K.    P.    of 
North    America,    South    America, 
Europe,  Asia,  Africa,  and  Austra- 
lia,    Jurisdiction    of    Florida,     v. 
Stroud,  144  So.  324,  107  'Fla.  152. 
1L,    Ariz.— Faltis  v.  Colachis,  274  P. 

776,  -35  Ariz.  78. 
Cal. — Citizens'  Nat  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Holton, 
290  P.  447,  210  Cal.  44. 
Fla. — Grand  Lodge,  K.  P.  of  North 
America,  South  America,  Europe, 
Asia,  Africa,  and  Australia,  Juris- 
diction of  Florida,  v.  Stroud,  144 
So.  324,  107  Fla.  152. 
111. — People  v.  Village  of  Wilmette, 
13  N.E.2d  990,  294.  Ill.App.  362— 
Strauss  v.  Zuker,  7  N.E.2d  504,  289 
IlLApp.  619 — Bird-Sykes  Co,  v.  Mc- 
Namara,  252  IlLApp,  2<62 — Hick- 
man  v.  Ritchey  Coal  Co.,  252  111. 
Apj>.  660-^-Precision  products  Co. 
v.  Cady,  233  liLApp,  72, 

360 


Minn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ander- 
son v.  Graue,  236  N.W.  4S-3,  484, 
183  Minn.  336,  followed  in  Lima  v. 
Graue,  2-36  N.W.  484,  183  Minn. 
338. 

Miss. — Strain  v.  Gayden,  20  So.2d 
697. 

N.Y. — Kirschenbaum  v.  Rubin,  '218 
N.Y.S.  373,  128  Misc.  149. 

Wash. — -Skidmore  v.  Pacific  Credi- 
tors, 138  P.2d  664,  18  Wash.2d  157. 

Wis.— Velte  v.  Zeh,  206  N.W.  197,  188 
Wis.  401. 

34  C.J.  ip  176  note  91. 

Effect  of  amended  pleading  without 
notice  to  defendant  see  supra  § 
194. 

Notice  of: 

Application  for  judgment  see  infra 

§  208. 

•Further  proceedings  in  equity  see 
Equity  §  671. 

Charged  with  notice 

Defendant,  who  has  been  .sum- 
moned, is  charged  with  notice  that 
plaintiff  may  make  amendment — 
Bird-Sykes  Co.  v.  McNamara,  252 
IlLApp.  262, 

Cross  petition 

(1)  A    defaulting    defendant    has 
been  held  not  entitled  to  notice  of 
the  filing  of  a  cross  petition  by  a 
codefendant;    where    both    had    been 
served  with  the  original  summons. — 
Rice  v.  Bontjes,  250  P.  89,   121  Okl. 
292— Littlefleld  v.  Brown,  172  P.  643, 
68  Okl.  144. 

(2)  A  cross  petition  by  defendant 
seeking  additional  affirmative  relief 
against  a  codefendant  on  whom  serv- 
ice   of   summons   had   been   had   at 
plaintiffs   request,   but  who  was  in 
default  and  whose  time  for  answer- 
ing   had    expired    before    filing    of 
cross  (petition,   could  not  be  prose- 
cuted to   judgment  without  further 
notice     to     defaulting     defendant — 
Roberts   v.    Paschall,    138    P.2d    834, 
192  Okl.  -673 — Wood  v.  Speakman,   5 
!p.2d  121,  153  Okl.  180. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  203 


has  been  properly  set  aside,12  defendant  cannot,  aft- 
er the  entry  of  default,  file  pleadings  contesting 
plaintiffs  allegations,13  move  for  a  new  trial,14  or 
take,  or  participate  in,  any  further  proceedings  in 
the  cause  affecting  plaintiff's  right  of  action,1^  ex- 
cept to  make  an  application  to  open  or  set  aside  the 
default16  or  to  dismiss  the  case  for  noncompliance 
with  some  statutory  provision17  or  for  failure  of 
plaintiff's  pleading  to  set  forth  a  cause  of  action,18 
or  to  appear  and  contest  the  taxation  of  costs,19 
interpose  proper  objections  to  judgment,20  or  to 
show  facts  in  mitigation  of  unliquidated  damages,21 
although  in  contesting  the  amount  of  damages 


claimed  he  cannot  deny  or  dispute  any  of  the  mate- 
rial facts  adjudicated  against  him  by  the  default.22 

§  203.    Waiver  of  Default 

The  entry  of  default  Is  a  privilege  which  i«  waived 
by  proceeding  with  the  cause  without  taking  advantage 
of  the  default. 

The  entry  of  a  default  against  defendant  is  mere- 
ly a  privilege  which  may  or  may  not  be  exercised 
by  plaintiff,23  and  which  is  waived  by  his  proceed- 
ing with  the  cause  without  taking  advantage  of 
the  default  in  the  proper  time  and  manner,24  un- 


12.  Minn. — Anderson   v.   Graue,    238 
N.W.   483,  183  Minn.  336,  followed 
in  OUma  v.   Graue,   236  N.W.  484, 
133  Minn.  338. 

Proceedings  after  opening-  default 
see  infra  §§  339,  340. 

13.  Cal. — Jones  v.  Moers,  266  P.  821, 
91  CaLApp.  65. 

Colo.— Myers  v.  Myers,  135  P.2d  235, 
110  Colo.  412. 

Idaho. — Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92  P.2d 
1053,  60  Idaho  464,  124  A.L.R.  149. 

La. — Segal  v.  Hells,  Ap-p.,  168  So.  364, 
amended  on  other  grounds  170  So. 
276,  modified  on  other  grounds  Sie- 
gel  v.  Helis,  172  So.  768,  186  La. 
506. 

Minn. — Anderson  v.  Graue,  236  N.W. 
483,  183  Minn.  336,  followed  in 
Lima  v.  Graue,  236  N.W.  484,  18-3 
Minn.  338. 

Okl.— Roskoten  v.  Odom,  87  P.2d  338, 
184  Okl.  368. 

Or. — J.  W.  Copeland  Yards  v.  Sheri- 
dan, 296  P.  838,  136  Or.  37,  rehear- 
ing denied  297  P.  837,  1-3-6  Or.  37. 

Tex.— Buttrill  v.  Occidental  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  636. 

34  C.J.  p  177  note  -96. 

Time  for  pleading  generally  see  su- 
pra 5  199. 

14.  Cal. — Title  Ins.  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
King  Land  &  Improvement  Co.,  120 
P.  1066,  162  Cal.  44. 

34  C.JT.  p  177  note  97. 

However,  it  has  been  stated  that 
one  who  has  defaulted  may  move  for 
a  new  trial.— Carson  v.  Perkins,  29 
N.B.2d  772,  217  and.  543.  ^ 
Defendant  not  in  default 

Where  district  court  clerk  received 
answer  and  marked  it  filed,  although 
he  failed  to  note  filing  on  fee  book, 
and  did  not  place  pleading  with  re- 
mainder of  court  papers  in  Jacket 
provided  therefor,  defendant  was 
held  not  in  default,  entitling  him  to 
new  trial  where  default  judgment 
was  entered  without  notice. — Gause 
v.  Cities  Service  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  70 
S.W.2d  224,  affirmed  City  of  Fort 
Worth  v.  Gause,  101  S.W.2d  221,  129 
Tex  25. 

15.  Ariz.— Martin  v.   Sears,  44  P.2d 
526,  45  Ariz.  414. 

HI.— -People   ex   rel.   Wilmette  State 


Bank   v.    Village   of  Wilmette,    13 
N.R2d  990,  294  IlLApp.  362— Gard- 
ner v.  Shekleton,  253  IlLApp.  -333. 
La. — Harrisonburg-Catahoula      State 
Bank  v.  Meyers,  App.,  185  So.  96. 
Mont.— State    v.  Whitcomb,    22   P.2d 

823,  94  Mont.  415. 
34  C.J.  p  177  note  98. 
Right  to  appeal  see  Appeal  and  Er- 
ror §  155. 
Injecting-  issue 

In  jactitation  action  wherein  de- 
fault judgment  was  entered  against 
defendants,  merits  or  validity  of  ti- 
tle or  lack  of  such  was  not  in  issue, 
and  Issue  with  respect  thereto  could 
not  be  created  by  enlargement  of 
pleadings  by  introduction  of  evidence 
not  primarily  admissible  under  alle- 
gations of  petition. — Segal  v.  Helis, 
App.,  168  So.  364,  amended  170  So. 
276,  modified  on  other  grounds  Sie- 
gel  v.  Helis,  172  So.  768,  18*  !La.  506. 
Introduction  of  evidence 
Ga.— Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Scarboro,  156  S.E.  726,  42  Ga.App. 
423. 
Idaho.— Silk  v.  Kelly,  214  P.  524,  87 

Idaho  11. 

Argument  of  case  to  Jury 
Ga.— Metropolitan    Life    Ins.    Co.    v. 
Scarboro,  156  S.B.  726,  42  Ga.App. 
423. 

Interlocutory  judgment  by  default 
only  prevents  defendant  from  com- 
ing in  and  making  a  defense  after 
expiration  of  time  given  him  to 
plead.— Stein  v.  Rainey,  286  S.W.  53, 
315  Mo.  535. 

16.  Ariz.— Martin  v.   Sears,  44  P.2d 
526,  45  Ariz.  414. 

CaL— Jones  v.  Moer,  266  P.  821,  91 

CaLApp.  65. 
Minn.— Anderson  v.  Graue,  2-36  N-W. 

483,    183    Minn.    336,    followed    in 

Lima  v.  Graue,  236  N.W.  484,  183 

Minn.  338. 
84  C.J.  p  177  note  39. 

17.  Puerto  Rico. — Chavier   y,    Giral- 
dez,  15  Puerto  Rico  145. 

18.  Ga.— O'Connor  v.  Brucker,  45  S. 
B.    7*1.     117     Ga,     451— Kelly    v. 
Strouse  &  Bros.,  43  S.B.   280,  116 
Ga.  $72— (R.  'E.  Jarman  &  Sons  v. 
Drew,    21   S.R3d   444,    67   Ga.App. 

361 


$50 — Thigpen  v.  Bituminous  Cas- 
ualty Corporation,  20  -S.EJ.2d  213, 
67  Ga.App.  367— Hobbs  v.  Citizen's 
Bank  of  Wrens,  124  SJE.  72,  32  Ga. 
App.  522. 

19.  Mo. — Laclede  Land  &  Improve- 
ment Co.  v.  Creason,  175  S.W.  65. 
264  Mo.  452. 

N.T. — Fenton    v.    Garlick,    6    Johns. 
287. 

20.  Wis. — Graham  v.  Zellers,  238  N. 
W.  387,  205  Wis.  547. 

21.  Fla,— Grand    Lodge,    K.    (P.    of 
North    America,     South    America, 
Europe,  Asia,  Africa,  and  Austra- 
lia,    Jurisdiction     of     Florida,     v. 
Stroud,  144  So.  324,  107  OBla,  152. 

Ga. — Metropolitan   -Life    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Scarboro,  156  S.E.  726,  42  Ga,App. 

423. 
I1L — Tleraey  v.  Szumny,  257  IlLApp. 

•457— Gardner  v.  Shekleton,  253  HL 

App.  (333. 
Ind. — Carson    v.    Perkins,    29    N.E,2d 

772,  217  Ind.  543. 
Mo. — Electrolytic     Chlorine     Co.     v. 

Wallace  &  Tiernan  Co.,  41  S.W.2d 

1049,  328  Mo.  782,  78  A.L.R.  930. 
Mont. — Lindsey  v.  Drs.  Keenan,  An- 
drews &  Allred,  165   P.2d  804. 
Tex. — Brill  v.   Guaranty  State  (Bank 

of  Goose  Creek,  (Com. App.,  280  S. 

W.  537. 
34C.J.  p  177  note  3. 

22.  Ga.— Whittier  Mills  Co.  v.  Jenk- 
ins, 98  S.E.  236,  23  Ga.App.  328. 

Recovery  of  liquidated  sum 

In  action  on  life  policy  against  in- 
surer in  default,  court  «properly  re- 
fused to  allow  insurer  to  introduce 
evidence  to  show  recovery  was  not 
for  liquidated  sum. — Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scarboro,  156  S.E. 
726,  42  Ga,Apfc.  42-3. 

23.  U.S. — TJpton-»Lang    Co.    T.    Met- 
ropolitan Casualty  Ins.  Co.  of  New 
York,  C.CJLPa.,  57  F.2d  133. 

Idaho.— Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92  P.2d 
1053,  £0  Idaho  464,  124  A.L.R.  149. 
34  aj.  <p  177  note  5. 

24.  CaL — Oil      Tool    *  Exchange     v. 
Schuh,  153  P.2d  976,  67  CaJ.AOT.2d 
288. 

34  C  J.  f>  177  note  6. 


203 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


less  he  was.  ignorant  of  .the  default  at  the  time.25 
Plaintiff  will  be  held  to  have  waived  defendant's 
default  where  he  voluntarily  extends  the  time  for 
defendant  to  plead26  or  appear,27  accepts  a  plead- 
ing filed  out  of  time,28  files  a  replication  to  a  plead- 


ing so  filed,29  or  goes  to  trial  without  objection.30 
A  default  on  the  part  of  plaintiff  may  likewise  be 
waived  by  defendant's  failure  to  take  advantage 
of  it,31  as  where,  after  the  default,  he  abandons  his 
defense  and  does  not  appear  at  the  trial.32 


B.  PROCEDURE  IN  TAKQTG  DEFAULT  AND  ENTERING  JUDGMENT 


§  204,    Power  of  Court  in  General 

A  preliminary  default  may  be  entered,  and  a  final 
Judgment  by1  default  .may  be  rendered  only  by  a  court 
of  competent  Jurisdiction,  unless  such  power  Is  vested 
In  the  clerk  of  court  or  In  a  court  commissioner. 

Since  the  giving  of  judgment  on  a  legal  obliga- 


tion, when  defendant  is  in  default,  is  a  judicial 
act,83  judgment  may  be  rendered  by  a  court  pos- 
sessing jurisdiction;34  and  the  fact  that  the  clerk 
has  power  to  enter  such  a  judgment  does  not  affect 
the  court's  power  to  render  the  judgment.35  Ex- 
cept in  so  far  as  power  to  enter  a  judgment  by  de- 


Wha*  constitutes  waiver 

(1)  Some  act  disclosing  an  implied 
OP  express  Intent  to  waive  the  de- 
fault   is    required    to    constitute    a 
waiver        thereof. — Kings-bury        v. 
Brown,   92   P.2d  1053,    60   Idaho  464, ; 
124'A.L.R.  149. 

(2)  A  mere   appearance   generally 
after  entry  of  default  does  not  con- 
stitute   a    waiver    of   the   default— 
Kingsbury  v.    Brown,    supra. 

(3).  Plaintiff's  motion  to  strike  an 
unauthorized  and  void  answer  does 
not  affect  the  collusiveness  of  the 
default  or  Judgment. — Kingsrbury  v. 
Brown,  supra. 

(4)  Particular  acts  see  34  C.J.  p 
177  note  6  [a]. 

General   appearance,   made  before 
default    is    actually    entered,    is    in 
time.— Edenfteld  v.  G.  V.  Seal  Co.,  241 
P.  227,  74  Mont.  509. 
Waiver  not  shown 

(1)  Plaintiff's    right    to    Judgment 
for  want  of  affidavit  of  defense  held 
'not   waived   by   voluntarily    placing 
case  at  issue  in  reliance  on  agree- 
ment of  defendant's  attorney  to  file 
pleading. — Upton-Lang  Co.  v.  Metro- 
politan   Casualty    Ins.    Co:    of   NeW 
York,  C.C.A.Pa.,  57  'F.3d  1-33. 

(2)  Other    facts    not    constituting 
waiver  see  34  C.J.  p  177  note  6  C'b]. 

In  Texas 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  participa- 
tion  in   the  trial   by  a  codefendant 
who  defaulted  did  not  waive  the  fil- 
ing  of  a  formal  denial  of  the  allega- 
tions of  plaintiff's  petition  and  that 
such  codefendant  could  not  complain 
•because  no  proof  of  admftted  facts 
was     made     by     plaintiff. — -Brill    v. 

'•  Guaranty  State  Bank  of  Goose  Creek, 
Cpm.A'pp.,  280  S.W.  537. 

(2)  And    it    has    been    hel>d  /that 
plaintiff  ;was    entitled    to    Judgment 
against  defendants  who  did  .not  ap- 
pear and  answer,  notwithstanding  he 
did  not  insist  on  Judgment,  by  de- 
fault.— Foust  v.   Jones,  Civ.App.,   90 
;S.W.2d  <665.          .          .  ' 

r    (3)  However,  the  rule  in  the  text 
has    been     followed. — Corpus    Juris 


oited  in  Shaw  v.  Whitneld,  Civ.App., 
35   S.W.2d  1115.— Corpus  Juris  oited 
in  Brasher  v.  Carnation  Co.  of  Texas, 
!iv.App.,    92   S.W.2d  573,   574. 
85.    N.T.-^-Giles    v.    Gaines,    3    Cai. 

•Cas.  107,  Col.  &  C.Cas.  463. 
34  C.J.  p  177  npte  7. 

26.  Idaho.— Corpus  Juris  guoted  In 
Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  32  P.2d  1053, 
1055,  60  Idaho  464,  124  AJL.R.  149. 

34  C.J.  p  177  note  8. 

Acquiescence  in  delay 

Iowa.— City  of  Des  Moines  v.  Barnes, 

20  N.W.2d  895. 
Effect  of  extension  on  time  of  trial 

A  waiver  of  default  and  grant  of 
right  to  answer,  with  the  under- 
standing that  answer  will  be  filed 
within  a  few  days  and  that  defend- 
ant will  be  ready  to  try  the  case 
during  the  following  term  implies 
that  no  steps  will  be  taken  by  him 
to  delay  the  trial,  and  so  he  waives 
Jiis  right  to  move  for  a. stay  .previous 
to  the  trial,  even  though  he  alleges 
facts  which  are  -claimed  to  render  the 
arbitration  law  a  bar  to  Judgment  by 
plaintiff  witho.ut  first  -resorting  to 
arbitration. — Clyde  Renco  Mill.  Co. 
v.  Globe  Elevator  ,  Co.^  215  N.Y.S. 
829,  216  App.Div.  780. 

27.  Cal.— Baird    v.    Smith,    14    K2d 
749,  216  Cal.  408. 

Mont.— Mitchell  v.  Banking  Corpora- 
tion of  Montana,  264  P.  127,  81 
Mont  459.  . 

23.  Cal. — Oil  Tool  Exchange  "  v. 
'Schuh,  153'P.2d  976,  67  Cal.App.2d 

288.  •  "    ' 

Idaho.— "Corpus      Juris     quoted     in 

Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92  P.2d'l053, 

1055,  60  'Idaho  464,  124  A.'Ii.R.  149. 
S.D. — Tristate  Fair  Ass'n  v.  Lasell, 

2ltf  N.W.   &92,   51'  SJD.   527. 
34  C.J.  p  177  note  9. 

29.    Idaho.— Corpus  Juris  guoted  in 

*  KingsDury  v.  Brown,  92  P.2d  1053, 

1055,  60  Idaho  4*64,  124  A.1L.R.  149. 

•34  C.J,  P  177  note  10. 

30f  Idaho.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Kingsbury  v.' Brown,  92  P.2d  1053, 
1065,  60  Idaho  4$4,'124  A.L.R  149. 

"       362 


Pa.— Dunn    v.    Calpin,    Com.Pl.,    61 

DauptuCo.  192. 
34  C.J.  p  177  note  IL 

31.  Mont— Mihellch  v.   Butte  Elec- 
tric Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont. 
604. 

34  C.J.  p  177  note  12. 

32.  Ind. — Aston  v.  Wallace,  4-3  Ind. 
468. 

33.  xj.s.— Pope  v.  U.  S.,  Ct.CL,  65  S. 
Ct  16,  323  U.S.  1,  89  L.Ed.  3. 

34.  Cal.— Phillips   v.   Trusheim,    156 
P.2d    25,     25     Cal.2d    913— Merver 
•Lumber  Co.  v.  Silvey,  84  P.2d  1062, 
29  Cal.App.2d  426. 

Jurisdiction  in  respect  of  default 
judgments  generally  see  supra  § 
192. 

Judge  of  another  court 

County  Judge  is  without  jurisdic- 
tion to  grant  default  judgment  in  ac- 
tion pending  in  supreme  court. — 
Kline  v.  Snyder,  231  N.Y.S.  275,  133 
Misc.  128. 

Place  of  action  "by  judge 

(1)  Judge    is    authorized    to    give 
default    judgment    outside    court  .in 
which    suit    was    brought. — Gray    v. 
Bank  of  Moundville,  107  So.  804,  214 
Ala.  260. 

(2)  Under    statutes    and    rules    of 
court,  when  a  party  is  entitled  to  a 
Judgment  by  default  and   fcas   com- 
plied with  the  rules  adopted  by  the 
court  for  the   purpose  of  obtaining 
it,  and  the  court  is  open,  the  judge 
of  the  court  may,  anywhere  in  the 
county,  circuit,  or  state,  sign  an  or- 
der in  writing  to  the  clerk  to  enter 
in  the  minutes  a  Judgment  by  default 
for   the   amount   named   therein,    or 
write,  sign,  and  forward  to  the  clerk, 
a  judgment  by  default  to  be  filed  in 
the  cause. — Carothers  v.  Callahan,  93 
So.  569,  207  Ala.  611. 

35.    Colo.— Grifflng  v.   Smith,'  142  P. 

202,  2-6  Colo.App.  220. 
N.C.— Hill  v.  Huffines  Hotel  Co.,  125- 
.  S.B.  266,  188  'N.C.  586. 


49     C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


205 


fault  is  vested  in  the  clerk  of  the  court,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  §  205,  or  a  court  commissioner,36  a 
judgment  by  default  may  be  rendered  only  by  a 
court.87  So,  too,  in  cases  where  the  clerk  of  court 
is  not  authorized  to  make  it,  a  preliminary  entry  of 
default  should  be  made  only  by  the  court;38  or  the 
judge39  authorized  to  preside  over  the  tribunal  and 
empowered  to  hear  and  determine  the  issues  be- 
tween the  parties.40  In  the  absence  of  an  appear- 
ance, strict  compliance  with  the  proceedings  neces- 
sary to  the  rendition  of  judgment  will  be  exacted.41 

§  205.    Authority  and  Duty  of  Clerk 

The  authority  of  a  clerk  of  court  to  make  a  prelimi- 
nary entry  of  default,  or  to  enter  a  final  judgment  by  de- 
fault without  authority  from  the  court,  is  purely  stat- 
utory. 

In  making  a  preliminary  entry  of  default,  or  en- 
tering a  judgment  of  default,  a  clerk  of  court  ex- 


ercises a  purely '  ministerial,  and  not  a  judicial, 
function.-42  Where  a  preliminary  entry  or  interloc- 
utory judgment  of  default  is  necessary  or  proper, 
as  discussed  infra  §  206,  the  clerk  of  the  court  is 
authorized,  under  some  statutes,  to  make  such  entry 
on  defendant's  failure  to  appear  or  answer.43 
The  statutory  provisions  giving  him  such  authority 
must  be  strictly  construed,44  and,  such  power  or 
authority,  being  purely  statutory,45  "may  be  exer- 
cised by  him  only  in  cases  which  clearly  come  with- 
in the  terms  of  the  statute46  and  only  tp  the  ex- 
tent authorized;47  but, the  entry  when  authorized 
may  be  made  by  him  notwithstanding  the  court  is  in 
session,4^  and  notwithstanding  the  -judge  is  dis- 
qualified to  try  the  case.49 

Entry  of  .judgment.  As  in  the  case  of  judgments 
generally,  as  discussed  supra  §  108,  where  a  default 
judgment  is  rendered  by  the  court,  it  should  be  reg- 


3B.    Wash. — Peterson  v.  Dillon,  67  P. 

397,  27  Wash.  78. 
34<C.J.  p  178  note  15  [a]. 

37.  Pa. — School   Dist.   of  Haverford 
Tp.,  to  Use  of  Tedesco  v.  Herzog, 
171  A.  455,  314  Pa.  161— Gallagher 
v.    Dwyer,    Com.Pl.,     34    iLuz.Leg. 
Reg:.      366 — Kaikaman      v.      Greek 
Catholic  Church,  Com.Pl.,  20  Wash. 
Co.  88. 

34  C.J.  p  178  note  17. 

38.  Cal.— Crofton  v.  Young,  119  P.2d 
1003,  48  Cal.App.2d  452. 

39.  Fla.— Albert    M.    Travis    Co.    v. 
Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co.,  139  So. 
141,  102  Fla.  1117. 

Ga.— Burson    v.    Lunsford,    186    S.E. 

.213,  5.3  Ga.App.  411. 
34  C.J.  5)  179  note  «6. 

40.  <La.— Jones   v.   Cunningham,   102 
So.  309,  157  La.  208. 

drudge  who  had  recused  himself 
because  of  personal  interest  could 
not  grant  preliminary  default. — 
Jones  v.  Cunningham,  102  So.  309, 
157  La,  208. 

41.  U.S. — Exchange    Nat.    Bank    of 
(Shreveport,  La.  v.  Joseph  Reifc  Gas 
Engine  Co.,  C.C.AJLa,,   237  'F.   870. 

42.  Cal.— Baird    v.    Smith,    14    P.2d 
749,  216  Cal.  408. 

IFla. — Coslick  v.  Finney,  140  So.  216, 
104  «Fla.  -394— Daniell  v.  Campbell, 
101  So.-  35,  $8  Fla.  «63. 

Mont— Coxpna  Jw*»  «**•*  *»  Com- 
mercial  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Jor- 
dan, 278  P.  832,  8*34,  85  Mont  -3715, 
65  A.L.B.  968. 

Nev. — Price  v.  Brlxnacombe,  72  Pr2d 
1107,  58  Nev.  156,  rehearing  de- 
nied 75  P.2d  7«34,  58  Nev.  156. 

Wyo.— Winnicke  v.  Lieth,  157  P.2d 
274— Kimfcel  v.  OsbornP  15-6  P.2d 
279 — James  v.  Lederer-Strauss  & 
Co.,  23$  P;  137,  $2  Wyo.  -377. 

84  C.J.  *p  178  notea  41,  48. 


Act  of  clerk  regarded  as  Judgment 
of  court 

Iowa. — Fred  Miller  Brewing  Co.  v. 
Capital  Ins.  Co.,  82  N.W.  1023,  111 
Iowa  590,  82  Am.S.R.  529.  • 

8-4  C.J.  p  178  note  44. 

43.  Ala. — -Ex  parte  Anderson,  4  So.2d 
420,  242  Ala,  31. 

Cal. — Trans-Pacific  Trading  Co.  v. 
Patsy  Frock  &  Romper  Co.,  209 
P.  357,  189  Cal.  509— -Hinds  v.  Su- 
perior Court  of  Los  Angeles  Coun- 
ty, 223  P.  422,  65  CaLApp.  223." 

Fla,— Albert  M.  Travis  Co.  v.  Atlan- 
tic Coast  -Line  R.  Co.,  139  So.  141, 
102  'Fla.  1117. 

Mont: — Commercial  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Jordan,  278  P.  832,  85  Mont. 
375,  65  A.L.-R.  968. 

34  C.J.  p  178  note  23. 

Entry  by  clerk  of  office  judgment  see 
infra  §  218. 

Entry  by  clerk  under  Federal  Rules 
of  Civil  Procedure  see  'Federal 
Courts  §  144  c. 

Duty  of  clerk 

(1)  There  should  be  strict  compli- 
ance with  statutes  expressly  reauir- 
ing  the  -clerk  to  enter  defaults. — Se- 
curity Finance  Co.  v.  Gentry,  109  So. 
220,    91   Fla,    lOl'o,   followed   in    109 
So.  222,  91  iFla.  1024. 

(2)  Under    a    statutory    provision 
contemplating,  in  certain  cases,  both 
entry  of  default  and  entry  of  Judg- 
ment by  the  clerk,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  clerk,  in  a  case  within  such  pro- 
vision, and  on  application  by  plain- 
tiff, to  enter  the  default. — Commer- 
cial Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Jordan,  278 
P.  &32,  85  Mont.  «375,  65  AJLR.  968 — 
34  C.J.  p  178  note  23  [a]. 

(8)  However,  another  statutory 
provision  that  in  other  cases,  if  no 
answer,  -demurrer,  or  motion  has 
been  filed  with  clerk  of  court  within 
time  specified  in  summons,  clerk 
must  enter  default,  and  thereafter 

363 


plaintiff  may  apply  for  relief  de- 
manded in  complaint  is  directory 
rather -than  mandatory.— Mitchell  v. 
Banking  Corporation  of  Montana, 
264 'P.  127,  81  Mont.  459— Edenfield  v. 
G.  V.  Seal  Co.,  241  P.  227,  74  Mont 
509. 

44.  Fla. — -Arcadia     Citrus     Growers 
Ass'n    v.    Hollingsworth,    185    So. 

;  431,  135  Fla.  322 — Cosmopolitan 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Boatwright,  51  So. 
540,  59  Fla.  232. 

45.  Ariz.-»Turbeville    v.    McCarrell, 
30  P.2d  496,  43  Ariz.  236. 

flPla. — Arcadia  Citrus  Growers  Ass'n 
v.  Hollingsworth,  185  So.  4*31,  135 
Fla,  322. 

48.    Ariz.— Turbeville    v.    McCarrell, 

30  P.2d  496,  43  Ariz.  '236. 
Cal. — Crofton    v.     Toung,     119     P.2d 

1003,   48  Cal.App.2d  452.' 
Mont— Edenfield   v.    G.   V.    Seal   Co., 

241  P.  227,  74  Mont  509. 
34  C.J.  p  178  note  25. 

47.  W.Va. — Bradley  v.  Long,  i50  S.E. 
746,  57  W.Va,  539. 

'34  CJ.  p  178  note  26. 

Where  summons  and  complaint  are 
served  personally,  clerk  entering  de- 
fault must  enter  it  for  amount  de- 
manded, unless  plaintiff  ejects  small- 
er sum* — McClelland  v.  Climax  Ho- 
siery Mills,  169  NJBL  605,  '252  N.Y. 
347,  226  AppJDiv.  664,  739,  remlttitur 
amended  171  N.B.  770,  253  N.T.  633, 
reargument.  denied  171  jNTJE.  781,  253 

:NT.Y.  558. 

48.  Ariz. — Agua  Fria  Copper  Co.  v. 
Bashford-Burmister  Co.,  35  P.  983, 
4  Ariz.  203. 

49.  Cal. — People  v.  Be  Carrillo,:  £5 
Cal.  -87. 

Fla. — Dudley  v.  White,  31  So.  $30, 
44  Fla.  264. 


§  205 


JUDGMENTS 


49    ang- 


entered by  the  clerk  in  his  minutes,60  but  the 
derk  may  not  enter  a  final  judgment  by  default 
without  authority  from  the  court,51  except  where 
he  is  authorized  by  statute  to  do  so,52  and  then  only 
in.  cases  authorized  by  the. statute,58  and  in  strict54 
conformity  with  the  provisions  of  the  statute.55 
The  clerk  must  determine  from  the  allegations  of 
the  complaint  alone  whether  the  action  is  one  in 
which  he  is  authorized  to  enter  judgment;56  but 


otherwise  he  may  exercise  no  discretion;57  and  he 
is  not  authorized  to  enter  judgment  where  the  tak- 
ing of  extrinsic  evidence  is  necessary  to  ascertain 
and  determine  the  amount  of  the  recovery.58  He 
may  be  disqualified  from  entering  default  judgment 
in  a  particular  case,59  as  by  reason  of  his  pecuniary 
interest  in  the  subject  matter.60 

Authority  of  the  clerk  of  court  to  compute  and 


50.  N.Y.— Tyler  v.  Jahn,  178  N.T.'S. 
689,  109  Misc.  425. 

Tenn. — Memphis  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dowd,  9  Heisk.  179. 

51.  Ala.— Ex  parte  Anderson,  4  So. 
2d  420,  242  Ala.  51. 

34  C.J.  p  178  note  29. 

52.  -Fla. — Coslick  v.  Finney,  140  So. 
216,   104   Fla.  -394 — Green  v.  Proc- 
ter &  Gamble  Distributing1  Co.,  109 
So.  471,  92  Fla.  396. 

Minn. — Marthaler  Machine  &  Engi- 
neering- Co.  v.  Meyers,  218  N.W. 
127,  173  Minn.  «606— Thomas-Hal- 
vorson  Lumber  Co.  v.  McRell,  206 
N.W.  951,  165  Minn.  460. 

Mont— Commercial  'Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Jordan,  278  P.  832,  85  Mont. 
375,  65  A.L.R.  9-68. 

N.C.— Clegs  v.  Canady,  195  S.B.  770, 
513  N.C.  258— Crye  v.  Stoltz,  138  S. 
E.  167,  193  NjC.  802. 

Wyo. — Lederer-Strauss  &  Co.,  235  P. 
1*87,  -32  Wyo.  377. 

34  C.J.  p  178  note  31,  p  185  notes  67, 
68. 

Statutes  authorizing  entry  -by  clerk 
without  prior  application  to  court 
see  Infra  §  208  a. 

53.  Cal. — Trans-Pacific   Trading-   Co. 
v.  Patsy  Frock  &  Rom'per  Co.,  209 
P.   «357,    189    Cal.    509— McOmie   v. 
Board    of    Directors    of    Veterans* 
Home  of  California,  263  P.  25=3,  88 
QaLApp.  16. 

Idaho. — Gustin  v.  Byam,  240  P.  600, 

41  Idaho  538. 
Minn. — High   v.    Supreme    Lodge   of' 

the  World,  Loyal  Order  of  Moose, 

290  N.W.  425,  207  Minn.  228. 
Pa. — School  Dist.  of  Haverford  Tp,, 

to  <Use  of  Tedesco,  v.  Herzog,  171 

A.  455,  314  Pa.  161. 
34  C.J.  IP  179  note  47. 
Strict  construction  of  statute 

Statutory  authority  of  clerks  of 
circuit  courts  as  to  entering  default 
Judgments  in  certain  cases  must  be 
strictly  construed. — Krpier  v.  Kroier, 
116  So.  753,  95  Fla.  8*65. 

Default   Judgment   for  reasonable 
attorney's  fees  is  beyond  th'e  author- 
ity of  the  clerk  to  enter. 
Idaho.—- Tripp  v.  Dotson,  4  P,2d  349, 

51  Idaho  200. 
Wyo.—Wunnicke  v.  (Leith,  '1S7   P.2d 

274.  . 

54*  Cal.— Baird  v.  Smith.  14  P.2d 
749,  216  Cat  408. 


Wyo.— Wunnicke   v.   Leith,    157   P.2d 

274. 
34  C.J.  p  179  note  48. 

55.  La. — Stetson  v.  Webber,  187  So. 
S3,  192  La.  148. 

N.Y.^In  re  Laughlin's  Estate,  8  N. 

Y.S.2d  842,  255  A-pp.Div.   927. 
34  C.J.  p  179  note  48. 

56.  Mont — Soliri    v.    «Fasso,    185    P. 
•322,  56  Mont  400. 

Necessity   of   complaint   and.  timely 
filing  thereof 

<1)  Default  Judgment  cannot  be 
entered  by  clerk  without  application 
to  court,  unless  there  is  complaint. — 
Leroy  Arnold,  Inc.,  v.  Mackey,  2'22 
N.Y.S.  225,  129  Misc.  ««8. 

(.2)  Complaint  must  be  filed  as 
part  of  Judgment  roll  to  authorize 
clerk  of  court  to  enter  Judgment  on 
default. — Juskowitz  v.  Stern,  283  N. 
T.S.  955,  158  Misc.  28. 

(3)  Where  plaintiff  in  law  action 
does  not  file  declaration  on  or  be- 
fore rule  day  to  which  process  is 
made  returnable  or  on  or  before  next 
succeeding  rule  day,  entry  by  clerk, 
not  in  term  time,  of  final  judgment 
for  plaintiff  on  rule  day  thereafter 
on  filing  his  declaration,  unless  fur- 
ther time  has  been  duly  allowed  by 
the  court,  is  unauthorized. — Daniell 
v.  Campbell,  101  So.  35,  88  Fla.  63. 
Cause  of  action,  within  statute 

Question  whether  clerk  was  au- 
thorized to  enter  a  default  Judgment 
against  one  of  defendants  was  not 
dependent  on  whether  complaint 
stated  a  cause  'of  action,  but  on 
whether  the  complaint  stated  a 
cause  of  action  within  statute  au- 
thorizing the  clerk  to  enter  default 
judgment  in  an  action  arising  on 
contract  for  the  recovery  of  money 
or  damages,  only.— Lynch  v.  Bencini, 
110  P.2d  662,  7  Cal,2d  $21. 
Ascertainment  of  amount  from  com- 
plaint 

(1)  Clerk  has   right  to   enter  de- 
fault judgment  only  where  the  prop- 
er   amount    appears    from  terms    of 
contract  as  alleged  in  complaint  or 
follows    therefrom  by   mere   mathe- 
matical computation. — Lynch  v.  Ben- 
cini, supra. 

(2)  The  word  "amount,"  in  statute 
authorizing  clerk  of  district  court  to 
enter   judgment  after  default,   indi- 
cates that  clerk  is  empowered  to  en- 
ter Judgment  only  in  instances  on  an 

364 


account  or  written  instrument  or 
other  contract,  express  or  implied, 
for  payment  of  money  only  where 
plaintiffs  verified  original  petition  is 
such  that  mere  inspection  thereof  or 
computation  from  data  supplied  by 
pleading  enables  clerk  to  enter  a 
judgment  for  a  fixed  sum  with  costs. 
— Kimbel  v.  Osborn,  Wyo.,  156  P.2d 
279. 

(3)  In  determining  whether  an  ac- 
tion is  one  arising  on  contract  for 
the  recovery  of  money  or  damages 
only  so  as  to  authorize  the  clerk  to 
enter  default  judgment,  allegations 
of  complaint  and  the  terms  of  the 
contract  are  to  be  considered  not- 
withstanding the  prayer  is  for  the 
certain  amount — 'Lynch  v.  Bencini, 
110  P.2d  662,  17  Cal.2d  521. 

57-    Fla. — Coslick  v.  Finney,  140  So. 

216,  104  Fla.  394. 
34  C.J.  p  179  note  46. 

Where  exercise  of  discretion  and 
talcing  of  evidence  are  necessary  to 
determine  amount  of  damages,  clerk 
has  no  power  to  enter  default  judg- 
ment— Lynch  v.  Bencini,  110  P.2d 
662,  17  Cal.2d  521. 
Sufficiency  of  defendant's  pleading 

(1)  The    clerk   is   without   author- 
ity to  decide  that  a  -plea  is  not  good 
and  then  enter  default  judgment  for 
want  of  any  plea. — Albert  M.  Travis 
Co.   v.   Atlantic   Coast   Line  R.   Co., 
139  So.  141,  102  "Fla,  1117. 

(2)  It    has    been    held,    however, 
that    default    judgment    entered    by 
clerk  for  failure  to  reply  to  answer 
in  nature  of  counterclaim  is  not  ir- 
regular, even  if  it  is  erroneous  as  to 
the  nature  and  sufficiency  of  defend- 
ant's   pleading  as   a   counterclaim. — 
Finger  v.    Smith,    133   S.E.    186,    191 
NXX  818.  '     • 

58.  Cal^Lynch  v.  Bencini,  110  P.2d 
662,  7  CaUd  521. 

Fla. — Douglass  v.  Oemler,  124  So.  19, 
98  Fla.  497 — Security  Finance  Co. 
v.  Gentry,  109  So.  220,  91  'Fla.  1015, 
followed  in  10'9  So.  222,  91  'Fla. 
1024. 

N.C. — Johnston  County  v.  'Ellis,  38  S. 
E.2d  81,  2-26  NjC.  268. 

59.  NVC. — Thompson  v.   IMllingham, 
112  S.E.  421,  183.  N.C.  566. 

60.  N.C. — Thompson   y«.  Dillingham, 
supra. 


49    C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


206 


allow  interest  in  entering  default  judgment  is  dis- 
cussed infra  §  214  c. 

A  judgment  entered  by  the  clerk  without  author- 
ity to  do  so  is  void.61  If,  however,  a  mistake  or 
irregularity,  not  going  to  the  jurisdiction,  is  com- 
mitted by  the  clerk  in  entering  the  judgment,  the 
judgment  is  not  void,  but  erroneous.62  Even  where 
the  clerk  is  disqualified  to  enter  default  judgment 
in  a  particular  case,  the  judgment  entered  by  him 
ib  not  void,  but  only  voidable,63  unless  it  is  in  viola- 
tion of  some  statute.64  If  plaintiff  has  done  all 
that  is  required  to  entitle  him  to  a  default  judg- 
ment, he  cannot  be  prejudiced  by  the  clerk's  fail- 
ure to  enter  it**  properly.66  Where  a  default  judg- 
ment rendered  by  the  court  is  noted  on  the  docket 
of  the  trial  judge,  the  clerk's  failure  to  enteHt  does 
not  affect  its  validity,67  and  the  omission  may,  in 
a  proper  case,  be  supplied  nunc  pro  tune.68 

§  206.     Preliminary  Entry  of  Default 

A  preliminary  entry  of  default  Is  proper;  but  there 
Is  a  divergence  in  the  rules  obtaining  under  different 
statutes  in  respect  of  its  necessity  as  a  condition  pre- 
cedent to  final  Judgment  by  default. 

An  entry  of  default  is  a  proper  procedural  step.69 


Under  some  statutes,  a  final  judgment  on  default 
may  not  be  rendered  until  there  has  been  a  pre- 
liminary entry  of  the  default,  or  of  an  interlocu- 
tory judgment  of  default,70  unless  the  requirement 
is  waived.71  Under  other  statutes,  such  an  entry 
is  not  necessary.72  Under  still  other  statutes,  while 
it  is  the  practice  to  call  defendant  and  make  an  en- 
try of  the  default,  an  omission  to  do  so  is  at  most  a 
mere  irregularity  which  does  not  render  the  judg- 
ment void,73  although  it  may  constitute  grounds  for 
reversing  it;74  the  default  may  be  entered  in  the 
trial  court  at  any  time  while  the  proceedings  are 
in  fieri.75  Under  the  practice  in  some  jurisdictions, 
entry  of  default  should  not  be  made  until  after  serv- 
ice of  notice.76 

An  entry  of  the  words  "in  default,"  or  their 
equivalent,  on  the  appearance  docket  is  necessary77 
and  sufficient78  to  comply  with  a  statute  so  pro- 
viding. A  statute  requiring  all  defaults  to  be  en- 
tered in  full  in  a  default  docket  is  not  complied 
with  by  entry  of  a  default  in  a  book  designated  as 
a  rules  judgment  docket.79  An  examination  of 
the  files  is  required  before  entering  a  default80 


61.  Idaho. — Tripp  v.  Dotson,  4  P.2d 
349,  51  Idaho  200 — (Justin  v.  Byam, 
240  P.  600, ,41  Idaho  538. 

Pa. — Kaikaman  v.  Greek  Catholic 
Church,  Com.Pl.,  20  Wash.Co.  88. 

Wyo. — Wunnicke  v.  Leith,  157  P.2d 
274. 

34  C.J.  p  178  note  29  [a],  p  179  note 
53. 

62.  "Fla. — Weaver    y.    Hale,    89    So. 
363,  8*2  Fla.  88. 

34  CJ.  p  179  note  49. 

63.  N.C. — Thompson    v.   iDillinghani, 
112  S.E.  321,  183  N.C.  566. 

34  C.J.  p  178  note  38. 
Disqualification,  may  "be  waived 
N.C. — Thompson   v.    Dillingham,    su- 
pra. 

64.  N.C. — Thompson   y.   Dillinghaav 
supra. 

«6.    CaL— -W.     H.     Marston     Co.     v. 

Kochritz,    251   P.    959,   80   Cal.App. 

352. 
68.    Va. — Southern    Express    Co.    v. 

Jacobs,  S3  S.B.  17,  109  Va.  27. 

67.  Tenn. — Memphis  &  Ohio   R.   B. 
Co.  v.  Dowd,  9  Heisk.  179. 

68.  111. — Paulin  y.  American  Surety 
Co.,  204  I11.APP.  218. 

34  C.J.  .p  178  note  <35. 
Nunc  -pro  tune  entries  generally  see 
supra  §§  117-121. 

69.  Mont.— Mihelich  y.   Butte  Elec- 
tric Ry.  Co.,   281  P.  540,   85  'Mont. 
604. 

34  C.J.  p  179  note  61. 

70.  La. — Jones  y.  Cunningham,   102 


So.    309,    157    La.    208— Milliken   & 
Farwell    v.    Taft    Mercantile    Co., 
7  -La.App.   150 — Jackson  v.  Young, 
6  'LfLApp.  S54. 
34  C.J.  p  179  note  56. 

Mandatory  statute 

(1)  The  making  of  an  entry  of  de- 
fault on  the  docket  is  mandatory 
under  some  statutes. — Burson  y. 
Lunsford,  186  S.E.  213,  53  Ga.App. 
411, 

C2)  However,  it  has  been  held  that 
case  not  marked  in  default  or  con- 
taining no  plea  to  merits  before 
Judgment  is  considered  in  default  en- 
titling plaintiff  to  Judgment — J.  S. 
SchofleloVs  Sons  Co.  v.  Vaughn,  150 
S.E.  5-69,  40  Ga.App.  568. 

(3)  A  statute  relating  to  an  inter- 
locutory Judgment  by  default  is 
mandatory  in  the  sense  that  plain- 
tiff has  a  right  to,  and  the  court 
may,  not  deny  him,  an  interlocutory 
Judgment  at  or  after  the  time  of  the 
default;  but  the  failure  of  .plaintiff 
to  take  an  interlocutory  Judgment 
does  not  render  it  improper  or  ir- 
regular for  him  to  await  the  coming 
on  -of  the  case  for  trial  and  then 
prove  his  damages  and  take  a  final 
Judgment  by  default  where  defend- 
ant remains  in  default — Cornoyer  v. 
Oppermann  Drug  Qo.,  Mo.App.,  56  S. 
W.2d  *12. 


71.    Mo. — pornoyer 

'Drug  Cd.,t  supra. 

34  CJ.  P  It9  note  57. 

365 


Oppermann 


72.  CaL— Crouch    v.    Miller,    146    P. 
880,  169  Cal.  341. 

34  C.J.  j>  179  note  59. 

73.  Tenn. — State   v.    Thompson,    102 
S.W.    349,   118   Tenn.   571,   20   L.R. 
A.,N.S.,  1. 

34  C.J.  -p  179  note  61. 

74.  Wis.— »Fisher  v.  Chase,  2  Chandl. 
3. 

75.  Ind. — Torr  y.  Torr,  20  InO.  118. 
34  C.J.  p  179  note  63. 

Time  of  taking  default  generally  see 
infra  §  207. 

76.  111.— Swiercz  y.  Nalepka,  259  111. 
App.  262. 

Wash. — Hofto  v.  National  Casualty 
Co.,  237  P.  T26,  135  Wash.  313. 

77.  Ga. — Gregg   y.   OFitzpatrlck,    187 
S.'E.   730,  54  Ga.App.  503. 

78.  Ga. — (Fraser   v.   Neese,    187   S.E. 
550,  163  Ga.  843. 

*34  C.J.  p  179  note  66  [a]. 
Erasure  and  reentry 

The  original  default  entry  made 
by  the  Judge  is  not  affected  by  an 
unauthorized  erasure  by  the  clerk, 
and  an  ex  parte  order  of  Judge  to  re- 
enter  default  and  reentry  by  clerk 
pursuant  thereto. — Praser  y.  Neese, 
supra. 

79u  Fla. — Security  Finance  Co.  v. 
Gentry,  109  So.  220,  91  'Fla,  1015, 
followed  In  109  So.  222,  91  Fla. 
1024. 

80.  Mich.— Wiener  y.  Valley  Steel 
Co,  136  N.W.  90S,  25*4  Mich.  481. 


§  207 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J-S- 


§  207.    Time  for  Taking  Default  and  Entering 
Judgment 

a.  In  general 

b.  Expiration  of  time  allowed  for  ap- 

pearance or  pleading 

c.  After  entry  of  default 

d.  Term  of  court 

e.  Day  and  hour 

f .  In  vacation  or  at  chambers 

a.  In  General 

There  is  a  conflict  of  authority  on  the  question  wheth- 
er a  premature  default  Judgment  is  void  or  only  void- 
able, as  well  as  on  the  question  whether  a  delay  of  sev- 
eral years  precludes  the  taking  of  a  default  Judgment. 

A  statutory  provision  for  entry  of  judgment  in 
defaulted  cases  at  any  time  after  default  has  been 
construed  to  be  restricted  to  unanswered  defaulted 
cases  and  not  to  apply  where  the  default  consists 
of  failure  to  appear  for  trial.81  A  judgment  by  de- 
fault, of  course,  may  not  be  entered  against  defend- 
ant until  he  is  in  default,  and,  therefore,  neither 
a  simple  default  nor  a  judgment  by  default  may  reg- 
ularly be  taken  and  entered  against  defendant  until 


the  .expiration  of  the  period  prescribed  by  statute 
or  rule  of  practice  for  taking  the  step  or  proceed- 
ing, on  the  failure,  to  take  which  the  default  is 
based,82  or  until  the  expiration  of  the  time  stipulat- 
ed or  agreed  on  by  the  parties.83 

According  to  some  authorities,  a  premature  judg- 
ment by  default  is  not  void,  but  is  merely  irregular 
and  voidable.84  Under  this  view  a  default  judg- 
ment rendered  or  entered  prematurely  will  be  upheld 
unless  it  is  attacked  at  the  time  and  in  the  manner 
provided  by  law;85  and  it  is  effective  until  re- 
versed86 or  set  aside.87  Defendant  may  waive  the 
irregularity  and  so  ratify  the  judgment,88  and,  if  he 
takes  no  steps  to  vacate  or  reverse  the  judgment, 
or  otherwise  to  correct  the  error,  he  may  be  held 
to  have  waived  it89  According  to  a  number  of 
other  authorities,  a  premature  judgment  by  default 
is  void;90  and  under  this  view  a  default  judgment 
prematurely  entered  is  not  validated  by  its  subse- 
.quent  confirmation91  or  by  the  fact  that  it  is  not 
made  final  until  the  expiration  of  the  usual  time,92 
or  by  the  fact  that  defendant  has  suffered  no  iii- 

jury.93 


81.  R.I. — Gregson  v.  Superior  Court, 
128  A.  221,  46  R.I.  36'2. 

82.  Ark.— Murrell   v.    Rawlings,    279 
S.W.  382,  170  Ark.  212. 

Colo. — Netland  v.  Baughman,   162  P. 

2d  601. 
34  C.J.  P  180  note  71. 

Xa  QUO  warranto  proceeding-,  the 
cause  was  held  not  ripe  for  judg- 
ment in  view  of  the  statutes  relat- 
ing to  judgments  by  default  against 
corporations  in  -personal  actions  be- 
ing inapplicable  to  quo  warranto  pro- 
ceedings to  oust  a  corporation  from 
the  exercise  of  its  franchise.— Atty.- 
Gen.  v.  Delaware  &  Bound  Brook  R. 
Co.,  38  N.J.Law  282. 

83.  !N.Y. — Osborn  v.  Rogers,  20  N.E. 
•865,  112  N.T.  573. 

34  C.J.  rp  180  note  72. 

84.  Ohio. — Hughes  v.  Cramer,  34  N. 
B.2d  772,   138   Ohio  St.   267. 

OkL — Orr  v.   Johnson,   149  P.2fl   993, 

194  Okl.  287. 
Or.— Pedro  v.  Vey,  46  P.2d  582,   150 

Or.  415. 
Pa.— -McTee  &  Co.  v.  Clark,  Com.PL, 

13  Northumb.Leg.J.  297. 
34  C.J.  p  180  note  82,  p  181  note  98 

[b]. 
Signature  of  Judge 

(1)  The    text    rule    obtains    where 
the  premature  judgment  is  recorded 
and   signed  by   the  judge.— Hoey  v. 
Aspell,  40  A.  77.6,  62  N.J.-Law  200. 

(2)  On  the  other  hand,  a  prema- 
ture  judgment   is   void  where  it  is 
entered  by  plaintiffs  attorney  with- 
out   the    signature    of    the   judge. — 
Westfield  Trust  Co.  v.  Court  of  Com- 


mon Pleas  of  Morris  County,  178  A. 
546,  115  N.J.Law  86,  affirmed  183  A. 
165,  11-6  N.J.Law  190. 
Xn  Montana 

(1)  The    rule    stated   in    the   text 
has  been  followed. — "Paramount  Pub- 
lix  Corporation  v.   Boucher,   19  P.2d 
223,  93  Mont  340— BatchoflC  v.  Butte 
Pac.  Qopper  Co.,  198  P.  132,  60  Mont 
179. 

(2)  In    some    cases,    however,    it 
has    been    declared    that    a    default 
judgment   prematurely   entered  is   a 
nullity. — Taylor    v.     Southwick,    253 
P.  889,  78  Mont  329— Palmer  v.  Mc- 
Master,  19  P.  585,  8  Mont  18$. 

85.  Okl. — Orr  v.   Johnson,    149  P.2d 
993,  194  Okl.  287. 

86.  N.J.— Hoey  v.  Aspell,  40  A.  776, 
62  N.J.Law  200. 

34  C.J.  p  180  notes  82,  83. 

87.  N.J.— Hoey    v.    Aspell,    supra. 
34  C. J.  p  180  note  84. 

88.  N.Y.— Rothchild      v.      Manneso- 
vitch,    51    N.Y.S.    253,    29    Afrfc.Div. 
'580 — Havemeyer  v.  Brooklyn  Sugar 
Refining  Co.,  12  N.Y.S.  873,  26  Abb. 
N.Cas.  157,  affirmed  15  N.Y.S.  157, 
59  Hun  619. 

89.  Kan.— Mitchell    v.    Aten,    14    P. 
497,-  «7  Kan.   33,  1  Am.S.R.   231. 

34  C.J.  p  180  note  86. 

90.  Cal.— Pinon  v.  Pollard.  158  P.2d 
254,  69  Cal.App.2d  129. 

Fla. — Brauer    v.     Paddock,     1-89    So. 

146,  10-3  'Fla.  1175. 
La. — Evans  v.  Hamner,  24  So.2d  814 

— Cottonport     Bank     v.     Thomas, 

App.,  12  3o.2d  618. 

366 


Mich.— Smak   v.    Gwozdik,    291   N.W. 

270,  293  Mich.  185. 
Miss. — Copiah  Hardware  Co.  v.  Mete- 
or Motor  Car  Co.,  101  So.  375,  136 
Miss.  274,  suggestion  of  error  over- 
ruled    Copiah     Hardware     Co.     v. 
Meteor  Motor  Oar,  101  So.  579,  136 
Miss.  274— J.  B.  Colt  Co.  v.  Ward, 
99  So.  676,  135  Miss.  202. 
Nev. — Price  v.   Brimacombe,   72  P.2d 
1107,  58  Nev.  156,  rehearing  denied 
75   P.2d   734,   58  Nev.   15'6. 
Tex. — Sneed  v.  Box,  Civ. App.,  166  S. 

W.2d  951. 

34  C.J.  p  180  note  87. 
Preliminary  Judgment  by  default 
•La,— Kelly  v.  Kelleher,   171   So.   569, 

186  La.  51. 

Judgment   entered  before  expiration 
of  time   allowed  to   answer   after 
service  by  publication. 
Colo. — Brown   v.    Tucker,    1    P.    221, 

7  Colo.  30. 
lack  of  vacation 

Court  did  not  err  in  basing  its 
judgment  on  a  subsequent  default 
notwithstanding  prior  default  had 
not  been  vacated  when  the  second  de- 
fault was  entered,  where  the  prior 
default  was  a  nullity  because  prema- 
turely entered. — Price  v.  Brima- 
combe, 72  P.2d  1107,  58  Nev.  156,  re- 
hearing denied  75  P.2d  734,  58  Nev. 
156.  ' 

91.  La. — Hart  v.  Nixon,  2'5  La.Ann. 
136 — Washington  v.  Comeau,  McG. 
234. 

92.  La. — Hart  v.  Nixon,  2*5  LaJLnn. 
136. 

93.  La. — Hart  v.  Nixon,  supra. 


49    C-J-S 


JUDGMENTS 


§  207 


Delay.  It  has  been  held  that,  in  the  absence  of 
statutory  limitation,  the  lapse  of  several  years 
after  the  bringing  of  suit  does 'not  prevent  the  en- 
try of  a  default  judgment,94  and  that,  even  where  a 
statute  provides  that  an  action  must  be  dismissed 
where  no  answer  has  been  filed  and  plaintiff  has 
failed  to  have  judgment  entered  within  a  stated 
number  of  years  after  service  of  summons,  a  default 
judgment  entered  after  the  expiration  of  the  stat- 
utory period  is  not  void,95  as  the  court  has  juris- 
diction to  render  it,96  even  though  it  is  erroneous 
and  subject  to  direct  attack  on  appeal.9?  However; 
it  has  also  been  held  that  plaintiff's  inaction  in  the 
case,  including  his  omission  to  have  a  default  judg- 
ment entered  for  several  years,  constitutes  a  waiv- 
er of  his  right98  or  constitutes  an  abandonment  of 
the  suit,  so  that  a  default  judgment  taken  after  such 
long  delay  is  null  and  void,99  and  defendant  is  not 
charged  with  notice  of  the  taking  of  the  default 
judgment.1 

b.  Expiration  of  Time  Allowed  for  Appearance 
or  Pleading 

A  judgment  by  default  Is  premature  where  it  is  en- 
tered before  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  for  ap- 
pearance, if  it  is  taken  for  want  of  appearance,  or  where 
it  is  entered  before  the -expiration  of  the  time  allowed 
for  filing  a  plea  or  answer,  if  it  Is  taken  for  want  of  a 
plea  or  answer. 


A  judgment  by  default  is  premature  if  it  is"  en- 
tered before  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed- by 
law  for  defendant  to  enter  his  appearance,  if  taken 
for  want  of  appearance,2  or  if  it  is  entered  before' 
the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  for  the  filing  of 
a  plea  or  answer,  if  taken  for  want  of  a  plea  or 
answer.3  Thus  a  judgment  by  default  is  premature 
where  the  required  length  of  time  has  not  elapsed 
between  the  service  of  the  summons  or  writ  'and 
the  return  day;4  or  where  it  is  entered  before  the 
expiration  of  the  time  allowed  in  the  summons  or 
writ,6  although  it  is  in  excess  of  the  time  allowed 
by  law;6  or  where  it  is  entered  before  the  expira- 
tion of  the  time  allowed  to  appear,,  plead,  or  an- 
swer, after  constructive  service  by  publication,7  or 
before  the  expiration  of  the  time  limited  in  an  or- 
der extending  the  time  to  plead,8  unless  such  ex- 
tension was  fraudulently  obtained  or  collusively 
granted.9  Where  both  substituted  and  personal 
service  is  made,  judgment  by  default  may  be  entered 
on  the  expiration  of  the  time  to  answer  limited  by 
personal  service,  although  that  limited  by  substitut- 
ed service  is  not  exhausted.10 

In  case  of  joint  defendants  all  must  have  the  full 
time  allowed  for  answering;  and  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault may  not  be  entered  before  the  expiration  of 
such  time.11 


94.  Md. — Carey  v.  Howard,  16  A.2d 
289,  178  Md.  512. 

95.  Gal. — Merner  Lumber  Co.  v.  Sil- 
vey,    84    P.2d   1062,    29   Cal.App.2d 
426. 

96.  Cal.— Phillips  v.   Trusheiin,   156 
P.2d    25,     25     Cal.2d    913— Merner 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Silvey,  84  P.2d  1062, 
29  Cal.App.2d  426. 

97.  Cal.— Phillips  v.   Trusheim,    156 
P.2d  2(5,  2-5  Oal.2d  913. 

98.  N.J.— Kaplan  v.  Tomka,  37  A.2d 
665,  131  N.J.Law  572. 

Waiver  of  default  by  taking  other 
proceedings  in  cause  see  supra  § 
203. 

99.  La. — Evans  v.  Hamner,  App.,  24 
So.2d    164,    affirmed    24    So.2d    814, 
209  La.  442. 

1.  Tex.— Sloan  v.  Bartlett,  Civ.App., 
139  S.W.2d  216. 

2.  Tex. — Sneed  v.  Box,  Civ.App.,  166 
S.W.2d  951. 

34  C.X  p  ISO  note  93. 
Entry  held  not  premature 
La. — City    of    Monroe    v.    Glasscock, 
.   Morris  ton,  Conner  Const.  Co.,  App., 
178  So.  684. 

3.  Ala.— Crook  v.  Rainer  Hardware 
Co.,   97  So.  635,  210  Ala.   178. 

Nev. — Price  v.  Brimacombe,  72  P.'2d 
1107,  58  Nev.  156,  rehearing  denied 
•  75  P.2d  .734,  58  Nev.  156. 

N.J.— Westfleld  Trust  Co,  v.  Court 
of  Common  Pleas  of  Morris  Coun- 


ty, 178  A.  546,  115  N.J.Law  86,  af- 
firmed 183  A.  165,  116  N.J.Law 
191. 

Okl.— Orr  v.  Johnson,  149  P.2d  993, 
194  Okl.  287. 

Or.— Pedro  v.  Vey,  46  P.2d  582,  150 
Or.  4115. 

34  C.J.  p  181  note  94. 

Entry  held  not  premature 

Ark.— Fidelity  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Evans, 
270  S.W.  624,  168  Ark.  459. 

Ind.— Julien  v.  Lane,  157  N.E.  114, 
second  case,  95  Ind. App.  139. 

Pa.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Baird,  150  A, 
165,  300  Pa.  92. 

Tex.— Cook  v.  Waco  Auto  Loan  Co., 
Civ.App.,  299  S.W.  51<4. 

34  C.J.  p  181  note  94  [bj. 

4.  Tex. — Andrus     v.     Andrus,     Civ. 
App.,  168  S.W.2d  891. 

34  C.J.  p  181  note  95. 

5.  Colo. — Tentzer  v.   Thayer,   14   P. 
53,   10    Colo.   63,   3   Am.S.R.   563. 

34  C.J.  P  181  note  96. 

6.  <N.Y.— BGatfield  v.  Atwood,  15  N.Y. 
Civ.Proc.  330. 

34  C.J.  p  181  note  97. 

7;    Cal.— Pinon  v.  Pollard,  158  P.2d 

2*514,  69  Cal.App.2d  129. 
Colo.— Netland  v.  Baughman,  162  P. 

2d  '601. 

34  C.J.  jp  1.81  note  98. 
In  attachment  suit  see  attachment 

5  497  d. 

367 


8.    'N.Y.— Littauer  v.  Stern,  69  N.E. 

538,  177  N,Y.  233. 
34  C.J.  p  181  note  99. 

After  overruling-  of  motion  to   dis- 
miss 

(1)  Default  judgment  on  amended 
complaint    was    erroneously    entered 
against  defendant  who  appeared  and 
moved  for  dismissal,   which  motion 
was,  argued  and   overruled  an'd   de- 
fendant allowed  ten  days  after  notice 
in  which  to  answer,  where  no  notice 
was  served  on  defendant. — Bolognese 
v.    Anderson,    44    P.2d    706,    87   Utah 
'4*50,   modified  on  other  grounds  and 
rehearing    denied    49    P.2d    1034,    87 
Utah  455. 

(2)  Likewise,   where  a  motion  to 
dismiss  the  complaint  was  overruled 
and  the  court  entered  a  rule  against 
defendant  to  plead  to  the  complaint 
within  thirty  days,  a  default  entered 
before  rule  to  plead  had  expired  was 
improper. — L'usk  v.  Bluhm,  53  N.E,2d 
135,  321  IlLApp.  349. 

9.  N.T. — Havemeyer     v.     Brooklyn 
Sugar  Refining  Co.,  IB  N.7.S.  157, 
59  Hun  619. 

10.  N.T.— United  Verde  Copper  Co. 
.     v.  Tritle,  20  Abb.N.Cas.  57. 

11.  N.  J.— Stehr  v.  OUbermann,  10  A. 
54*7,  49  N.J.Law  633. 

34  C.J.  p  181  note  *. 


207 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C-J-S- 


c.  After  Entry  of  Default 

Where  there  are  no  controlling  statutory  provisions 
and  no  compelling  reason  for  delay,  final  judgment  may 
be  rendered  immediately  after  preliminary  entry  of  de- 
fault or  at  any  time  thereafter. 

Where  a  preliminary  entry  of  default  has  been 
made,  the  final  judgment  is  usually  deferred,  as 
discussed  infra  §  216,  until  the  assessment  of  dam- 
ages, where  these  are  uncertain  or  unliquidated; 
but,  where  there  is  no  such  reason  for  delay  and 
in  the  absence  of  statutory  limitations,  final  judg- 
ment may  be  rendered  as  of  the  day  of  the  default,12 
or  at  any  time  thereafter,1^  and  may  be  taken  as 
of  the  term  when  the  default  was  entered.14  A 
statutory  provision  requiring  the  judgment  to  be 
entered  immediately  after  the  entry  of  default  is 
merely  directory,15  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  party 
obtaining  the  judgment,1^  and  hence  the  adverse 
party  may  not  complain  of  a  delay  in  entering  the 
judgment.17  Under  some  statutes,  a  default  may 
not  be  made  final  until  a  succeeding  day18  or  until 
the  elapse  of  a  certain  number  of  days,  after  the 
entry  of  default.1^ 

d.  Term  of  Court 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise,  a 
default  judgment  ordinarily  may  be  rendered  during  any 
term  of  court  after  the  default. 


In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise, 
a  default  judgment  may  be  rendered  at  any  time 
during  any  term  of  court  after  the  default,20  except 
that,  as  indicated  infra  subdivision  e  of  this  sec- 
tion, when  the  case  is  placed  on  the  trial  docket, 
judgment  should  be  rendered  on  or  after  the  day 
on  which  the  case  is  set  for  trial.  In  some  juris- 
dictions this  matter  is  governed  by  statute  and  the 
terms  of  the  statute,  together  with  the  circumstanc- 
es in  regard  to  service  of  process,  appearance,  and 
pleading,  which  control  in  determining  the  term  of 
court  at  which  such  a  judgment  may  or  should  be 
entered  in  a  particular  case  ;21  and  such  a  statutory 
regulation  may  not  be  rendered  nugatory  or  materi- 
ally modified  by  a  conflicting  rule  of  court.22  Under 
some  statutes  and  conditions,  a  default  judgment 
may  be  entered  at  the  first  or  return  term  of  the 
court,23  as  where  a  given  number  of  days  have 
elapsed  since  service  of  process.24  Under  other 
statutes  and  conditions,  it  may  not  properly  be  en- 
tered as  final  at  the  return  term  or  appearance 
term,25  unless  defendant  consents,26  but  only  at  the 
next  term  thereafter,27  as  where  defendant  was  out 
of  the  state  at  the  time  of  service  of  process.28 

A  default  judgment  may  be  rendered  or  entered 
at  a  special,29  but  not  at  an  illegal,30  term  of  court. 


12.  Mo. — Reed  v.  Nicholson,  59  S.W. 
977,  158  Mo.  624. 

34  C.J.  p  182  note  8. 

13.  Iowa, — Honayne      v.      Hawkeye 
Commercial  Men's  Ass'n,  144  N.W. 
319,  162  'Iowa  615. 

34  C.J.  p  182  note  9. 

14.  Tex.— Miller  v.   Trice,   Civ.App., 
219  S.W.  229. 

34  C.J.  p  182  note  10. 

16.    Cal.— Hitter   v.    Braash,    104    P. 

592,  11  CaLApp.  258. 
34  C.J.  p  182  note  9  [a]. 

16.  Cal. — Hitter  v.  Braash,  supra. 
ILack  of  prejudice 

On  entry  of  default  in  action  on 
contract  for  recovery  of  money  or 
damages  only,  it  becomes  duty  of 
clerk  to  enter  judgment  forthwith; 
but  the  failure  of  the  clerk  to  per- 
form his  ministerial  duty  in  this  re- 
spect may  not  prejudice  plaintiff. — 
Jones  v.  Moers,  266  P.  821,  91  Cal. 
App.  65. 

17.  Cal.— Hitter   v.    Braash,    104    P. 
£92,  11  Cal.Afcp.  258. 

15.  Neb.— Oakdale  Heat  &  Light  Co. 
v.  Seymour,  110  N.W.  541,  78  Neb. 
47. 

19.  La. — Evans  v.  Hamner,  #4  So.2d 
814. 

34  C.J.  p  182  note  13. 

Confirmation,  of  default  held  timely 

La. — Blchinger  v.  Lacroix,  189  So. 
572,  192  La.  908 — Many  Iron  Works 
v.  Kay,  App.,  151  So.  253 — Union 


"Motor  Co.  v.  Williams,   8  La.App. 

391. 
After  preliminary  entry  of  decision. 

Under  a  particular  statute,  judg- 
ment  may  not  be  rendered  in  a  de- 
faulted answered  case  until  the  sev- 
enth day  after  the  preliminary  en- 
try of  a  decision,  which  may  be 
properly  entered  after  default  in 
neglecting  to  appear  at  the  time 
fixed  for  trial. — Sahagian  v.  Superior 
Court,  129  A.  813,  47  R.I.  85 — Greg- 
son  v.  Superior  Court,  128  A.  221,  46 
H.I.  362. 

20.  Okl.— Boles  v.  MacLaren,  4  P.2d 
106,    152    Okl.    265— Western    Coal 
&  Mining  Co.  v.  Green,  166  P.  154, 
6*4  Okl.  53. 

Wyo. — James    v.    Lederer-Strauss    & 

Co.,  233  P.  137,  32  Wyo.  377. 
34  C.J.  p  182  note  15. 

21.  Ga. — Mutual  Ben.  Health  &  Ac- 
cident Ass'n  v.  White,  172  S.B.  92, 
48  Ga.App.  146. 

N«J. — Rogers-Ebert  Co.  v.  Century 
Const  Co.,  18  A.2d  8,  126  N.J.Law 
68. 

Ohio. — Strain  v.  Isaacs,  18  N.B.2d 
816,  59  Ohio  App.  495. 

34  C.J.  p  182  note  18. 

22.  Ohio. — Van  Ingen  v.  Berger,  -92 
.N.E.  433,  82  Ohio  St.  255,  19  Ann. 

.   Cas.  799. 

34  C.J.  p  182  note  19  [a]. 

23.  Tenn.— Ross   v.   Meek,    28   S.W. 
20,  93  Tenn.   666. 

34  C.J.  p  182  note  21. 

368 


24.  Mo.— Montz  v.  Moran,  172  S.W. 
613,  263  Mo.  252. 

34  C.J.  p  182  note  22. 

25.  Del. — Southern  Maryland   Trust 
Co.  v.  Henry,  155  A,  699,   4  W.W. 
Harr.  496. 

Miss. — Copiah  Hardware  Co.  v.  Me- 
teor  Motor  Car  Co.,    101    So.    375, 
1)36  Miss.  274,  suggestion  of  error 
overruled  Copiah  Hardware  Co.  v. 
Meteor    Motor    Car,    101    So.    579, 
136    Miss.    274— J.    B.    Colt    Co.    v. 
Ward,  99  So.  676,  135  Miss.  202. 
34  C.J.  p  182  note  24. 
Cross  action 

Court  was  without  authority  to 
enter  judgment  against  codefendant 
on  cross  action,  filed  during  term  at 
which  main  case  was  tried,  where 
such  codefendant  filed  no  answer 
thereto  and  entered  no  appearance 
thereon. — Kirk  v.  City  of  Gorman, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  188. 

26.  Ala.— O'Neal  v.   Garrett,   3  Ala. 
276. 

27.  Iowa.— Walters  v.  Blake,  69  N. 
W.  879,  100  Iowa  521. 

34  C.J.  p  182  note  26. 

28.  Mass. — Thayer  v.  Tyler,  10  Gray 
164. 

34  C.J.  p  183  note  27. 

29.  Tex.— Ruby  v.  Martin.  CivJLpp., 
44  S.W.2d  824,  error  refused. 

30.  Ga.— Martin    v.    Scott,    44    S.E. 
974,  118  Ga.  149. 

34  C.J.  p  183  note  28. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  207 


Where  the  summons  and  declaration  are  filed  at  a 
.  term  which  is  not  held  by  reason  of  the  absence  of 
the  judge,  a  judgment  by  default  may  nevertheless 
be  entered  at  the  next  succeeding  term.3i  It  has 
been  held  that  the  entry  of  a  default  judgment  dur- 
ing a  term  at  which  the  court  has  ordered  the  trial 
of  criminal  cases  only  is  unauthorized;32  but  it  has 
also  been  held  that  a  statute  providing  for  division 
of  a  term  between  civil  and  criminal  business  is  for 
convenience  in  administration  of  the  business  of 
the  court,  and  does  not  limit  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  to  enter  a  default  judgment  during  the  por- 
tion of  the  term  allotted  by  statute  to  criminal  busi- 
ness.33 It  is  improper  to  enter  a  default  judg- 
ment, under  notice  of  trial  for  a  certain  term,  when 
the  case  is  reached  under  a  note  of  issue  for  a 
prior  term.34 

e.  Day  and  Hour 

The  terms  of  the  statutes  control  In  determining  the 
day  of  the  term  on  which  a  default  judgment  may  reg- 
ularly be  rendered. 

The  terms  of  the  statutes  control  in  determining 
the  day  of  the  term  on  which  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault may  be  regularly  rendered.35  As  a  general  rule 
judgment  may  not  be  entered  against  defendant  un- 
til a  day  after  his  default  ;3«  if  he  is  summoned  to 
appear  and  plead  on  the  first  day  of  the  term,  he 
may  not  be  held  in  default  and  judgment  entered 
against  him  until  the  next  or  a  subsequent  day;37 


but  if  the  summons,  although  served  the  required 
number  of  days  prior  to  the  first  day  of  the  term, 
is  made  returnable  at  a  subsequent  day,  judgment 
may  be  entered  on  the  return  day.38  Where  it  is 
the  custom  to  enter  judgments  as  of  the  last  day 
of  the  term,  a  judgment  by  default  may  be  so  en- 
tered, although  the  record  shows  that  the  default 
occurred  on  a  previous  day.39 

Day  of  trial.  In  some  jurisdictions  where  de- 
fendant is  actually  in  default,  judgment  may  be 
entered  before  the  day  on  which  the  cause  is  set 
for  trial,40  or  before  the  time  at  which  the  cause 
may  regularly  stand  for  trial,41  or  judgment  may 
be  entered  notwithstanding  the  case  has  not  been 
set  for  trial  or  placed  on  the  trial  docket.42  In 
other  jurisdictions  judgment  by  default  may  not  be 
entered  before  the  day  set  for  trial,43  or  before  the 
case  stands44  or  is  set45  for  trial,  but  plaintiff  is 
not  deprived  of  his  right  to  claim  a  default  because 
he  does  not  demand  it  until  the  time  of  trial.46 

Hour  of  day.  Where  a  party  is  cited  to  appear 
at  a  certain  hour  on  a  day  named,  judgment  may  not 
be  taken  against  him  at  an  earlier  hour  on  the  same 
day,47  or  at  a  later  hour,  if  defendant  appears  at 
the  hour  set  and  the  judge  is  not  present;48  and  it 
is  not  mandatory  on  the  court,  on  a  party's  failure 
to  arrive  at  the  exact  hour  set  for  trial,  to  proceed 
and  render  judgment  by  default;49  but,  under  ex- 
press statutory  provision,  judgment  by  default  may 


31.  Tenn. — Brient    v.    Waterfield,    5 
Sneed  537. 

32.  Ky. — Thacker  v.  Thacker,  75  S. 
W.2d  3,  255  Ky.  523. 

33.  Miss. — Strain  v.  Gayden,  20  So. 
2d  697,  197  Miss.  353. 

-?*.    N.Y.— Mills  v.  Nedza,  227  N.Y.S. 
156,  222  App.Div.  615. 

35.    Pa. — Cadwallader    v.    Firestone, 

Com.Pl.,  7  Fay.UJ.  259. 
Tex.— Metzger  v.  Gambill,  Civ.App., 
37  S.W.2d  1077,  error  refused- 
Bradford  Supply  Co.  v.  D.  F.  Con- 
nelly Agency,  Civ.App.,  272  S.W. 
519. 

34  C.J.  p  183  note  31. 
Case  going  to  Judgment  automatical- 
ly on  certain,  day 
Default  judgments  are  within  stat- 
utes   and    court    rules    under   which 
cases   which  are  ripe  for  Judgment 
generally   go   to   Judgment  automat- 
ically on  a.  certain  day,  even  though 
the  clerk  of  court  may  fail  to  record 
the  Judgments. — Mann  v.  Rudnick,  2 
NjE.2d  189,  294  .Mass.  853. 
Monday 

Under  a  statute  so  providing,  the 
clerk  of  court  lacks  Jurisdiction  to 
enter  a  default  Judgment  except  on 
a  Monday. — Clegg  v.  Canady,  19'5  S. 
B.  77*0,  213  N.C.  258. 

48  C.  J.S.-24 


Day  when  waiver  of  citation  filed 

A  contention  that  entry  of  default 
Judgment  on  day  when  waiver  of  ci- 
tation was  Hied  was  void  because  of 
fundamental     error    was     overruled 
without   discussion. — Harvey  v.   Wi- 
ley, Tex.Civ.App.,  88  S.W.2d  569. 
38.    Pa. — Cadwallader    v.    Firestone, 
Com.Pl.,    9    Fay.L.J.    62— McTee   & 
Co.  v.  Clark,  Com.Pl.,  13  Northumb. 
Leg.J.  297. 
34  C.J.  p  183  note  32. 

37.  Ala.— Hollis  v.  Herzberg,  29  So. 
582,  128  Ala.  474. 

34  C.J.  p  183  note  33. 

38.  Ind. — Citizens  Loan  &  Trust  Co. 
v.   Boyles,   1  N.E.2d  292,    102  Ind. 
App.  157. 

3'4  C.J.  p  183  note  34. 

39.  Mass. — Herring     v.     Polley,      8 
Mass.  113. 

34  C.J.  p  183  note  35. 

40.  Ind. — Martin  v.    Berry,   37   S.W. 
835,  1  Ind.T.  399. 

Iowa. — Brenner  v.  Gundershiemer,  14 

Iowa  82. 
Failure  to  comply  with  role  or  order 

(1)  If  defendant  fails  to  plead  un- 
der order  of  the  court,  Judgment  may 
be  entered  by  default  before  the  day 
on  which  the  case  is  .docketed  for 
triaL— Blair  v.  Manson,  9  Ind.  £57. 

369 


(2)  Where  the  cause  is  at  Issue,  a 
party  may  not  be  defaulted  until  the 
day  for  trial  except  for  failure  to 
discharge  some  rule  or  order  entered 
in  the  meantime. — Norris  y.  Dodge, 
23  Ind.  190. 

41.  Ohio. — State   ex   rel.   Hughes   v. 
Cramer,  34  N.B.2d  772.  138  Ohio  St. 
267. 

42.  Ind. — Indianapolis       Power       & 
Light  Co.  v.  Waltz,  12  N.R2d  404, 
104  Ind.App.  526. 

Okl.— Boles  v.  MacLaren,  4  P.2d  106, 

152  Okl.  265. 
34  C.J.  p  183  note  37. 

43.  Kan. — Race  v.  Malony,   21  Kan, 
31. 

34  C.J.  p  183  note  38. 

44.  Ky.— Bishop  v.  Bishop,  281  S.W- 
824,  213  Ky.  703. 

45.  Ariz.— Burbage  v.  Jedlicka,   234 
P.  32,  27  Ariz.  426. 

48.    Colo.— Manville   v.   Parks,   2   P. 
212,  7  Colo.  128. 

47.  CaL — Parker  v.  Shephard,  1  Gal. 
131. 

48.  Pa.— Smith    v.     Fetherston,     10* 
Phila.  (306. 

49.  Okl.— St   Louis   I.    M.   &   S.   R, 
Co.    v.   Hardwick.    115    P.   471.    28. 
OkL  577. 


§207 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


be  rendered  at  the  hour  specified  in  the  citation  for 
appearance  and  answer  where  defendant  does  not 
appear  and  answer  at  or  before  such  time.50 

f .  In  Vacation  or  at  Chambers 

A  default  Judgment  may  be  rendered  or  entered  in 
vacation  in  pursuance  of  statutory  authority,  but  not 
otherwise  except  in  the  case  of  an  entry  evidencing  judi- 
cial action  taken  in  term  time. 

"  Where  the  rendition  of  a  judgment  by  default  is 
to  be  performed  as  a  judicial  act  by  the  court,  or 
involves  an  application  to  the  court,  the  judgment 
ordinarily  must  be  rendered  in  term  time  and  not  in 
vacation;51  and,  where  the  time  for  defendant  to 
plead  expires  in  vacation,  plaintiff  must  await  the 
convening  of  the  court  at  term.52  However,  when 
authorized  to  do  so  by  statute,  a  judge  may  render 
a  default  judgment  in  vacation.53  Also,  a  judgment 
by  default  may  be  entered  after  term  time54  by  the 
judge  where  he  has  acted  judicially  and  ordered  the 
entry  before  adjournment.55  Under  some  statutes, 
a 'judgment  by  default,  under  prescribed  circum- 
stances, may  be  entered  by  the  clerk  in  vacation,56 
but  as  such  a  proceeding  is  in  derogation  of  the 
common  law,  the  statutory  requirements  must  be 
strictly  pursued.57 

At  chambers.    In  some  jurisdictions  a  judgment 
.  by  default  may  be  rendered  by  the  jud^e  at  cham- 
bers,58 during  a  regular  tenn;5^   but  in  other  ju- 
risdictions this  practice  is  not  allowed.60 

§  208.    Application  for  Judgment 

.  a.  In  general 

b.  Time  and  place  of  application 

c.  Notice  of  application 


a.  In  General 


An  application  to  the  court  or  cierk  for  a  preliminary 
entry  of  default,  or  to  the  court  for  a  final  default  judg- 
ment, is  necessary  when  required  by  statute  or  rule  of 
court  or,  in  tha  case  of  final  Judgment,  when  Judicial 
determination  of  a  matter  dependent  on  extrinsic  proof, 
such  as  the  amount  of  unliquidated  damages,  Is  neces- 
sary before  rendition  of  Judgment. 

As  a  general  rule,  where  extrinsic  proof  of  any 
fact  is  required  involving  judicial  determination  to 
enable  the  court  to  assess  the  damages  or  take  an 
account,  or  generally  to  render  the  judgment  by  de- 
fault, or  to  carry  it  into  effect,  an  application  must 
first  be  made  to  the  trial  court,  and  such  facts  ju- 
dicially ascertained  before  the  judgment  by  default 
may  be  entered,61  as  where  the  claim  or  demand 
is  for  unliquidated  damages,62  or,  generally,  where 
the  action  is  in  tort,63  unless  the  damages  are  liqui- 
dated;64 and,  although  the  action  is  in  form  ex 
contractu,  if  facts  are  alleged  which  constitute  a 
tort,  application  must  generally  be  made  to  the  court 
before  judgment  by  default  may  be  entered.65 

If  in  such  a  case  judgment  is  entered  by  the  clerk 
without  a  prior  application  to  the  court,  the  judg- 
ment, 'although  irregular,66  is  sometimes  held  not 
void,  but  voidable  merely,67  although  there  is  au- 
thority to  the  effect  that  it  is  absolutely  void.68  It 
is  irregular  for  the  court  to  render  a  judgment  on 
a  default,  in  the  absence  of  both  parties,  and  with- 
out application  by  plaintiff,  at  a  time  when  it  is  reg- 
ularly reached  for  trial,69  notwithstanding  plaintiff 
would  be  entitled  to  such  a  judgment,  on  applica- 
tion therefor.70 

In  many  jurisdictions  there  are  statutory  provi- 
sions to  the  effect  that  a  judgment  by  default  may 
be  entered  by  the  clerk  without  a  prior  application 
to  the  court  where,  in  an  action  on  a  contract  ex- 


50.  Tex.— Metzger  v.    Gambill,    Civ. 
App.,  37  S.W.2d  1077,  error  refused. 

51.  NX?.— Branch  v.  Walker,  92  N.C. 
87. 

34  C.J.  P  183  note  46. 

52.  111.— Cook  v.  Forest,  18  111.  581. 

53.  Fla.— Malone  v.  Meres,   107  So. 
625,  91  Fla.  490. 

54.  Pa.— Wanner  v.  Thompson,  Com. 
PL,  27  DeLCo.  45'5. 

55.  Tex. — Griffln     v.     Burrus,     Civ. 
App.,  24  S.W.2d  805,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.,  24  S.W.2d  810. 

56.  CaL— In  re  Cook's  Estate,  17  P. 
.  923,  19  P.  4'31,  77  Oal.  220,  11  Am. 

S.R.  267,  1  L.R.A.  567. 
34  C.J.  p  183  note  49. 

57.  Ark. — Files  v.  Robinson,  30  Ark. 
487. 

58.  Idaho.— i Neustel  v.  Spokane  In- 


ternational R.  Co.,   149  P.  462,  27 
•Idaho  367. 
34  C.J.  p  184  note  52. 

59.  Ga.— Fouch6    v.    Cherokee    Nat 
Bank,  90  S.E.  102,  18  Ga.App.  569. 

60.  Colo.— Hotchkiss  v.  Denver  First 
Nat    Bank,    85    P.    1007,   $7   Colo. 
228. 

34  <XJ.  p  184  note  54. 

61.  N.Y. — Hotel  Syracuse  v.  Brain- 
ard,  10  N.Y.S.2d  892,  256  App.Div. 
10:55. 

3*4  C.J.  p  184  note  56. 

Where  clerk  may  not  enter  default 
for  amount  demanded,  plaintiff  must 
apply  to  court  or  judge  for  judg- 
ment.— McClelland  v.  Climax  Hosiery 
Mills,  169  N.E.  605,  252  N.T.  347, 
remittitur  amended,  171  N.E.  770,  253 
N.Y.  553,  reargument  denied  171  N. 
E.  781,  253  N.Y.  5*8. 

62.  Okl.— Guthrie  v.  T.  W.  Harvey 
Lumber  Co.,  50  P.  84,  5  Okl.  77«4. 

34  OJ.  P  184  note  57. 

370 


So. 


62 


63.  Fla. — Saucer  v.  Vincent  89 
802,  82  Fla.  296. 

34  CJ.  P  184  note  58. 

64.  N.T.— Reeder    v.    Lockwood, 
N.Y.S.  713,  30  Misc.  531. 

.34  C.J.  p  184  note  59. 

65.  N.Y.— Field    v.    Morse,    7    How. 
Pr.  12 — Flynn  v.  Hudson  River  R. 
Co.,    6    How.Pr.    308,    10    N.Y.Leg. 

'Obs.  158. 

66.  N.Y.— Bissell  v.  New  York  Cent., 
Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  67  Barb.  385. 

67.  N.Y. — Roeber  v.  Dawson,  3  N.Y. 
S.   122,   22  Abb.N.Cas.   73,   15  N.Y. 
Civ.Proc.  417. 

!34  C.J.  p  184  note  62. 

68.  Cal.— Bond  v.   Pacheco,   30   CaL 
530.    . 

34  C.J.  p  184  note  63. 

69.  Neb.— Pitman  v.  Heumeier,  115 
N.W.  1088,  81  Neb.  338. 

!70.    Ne^.— Pitman  v,  Heumeier,  au- 
pwu 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


208 


press  or  implied,  the  nature  of  the  action  and  of 
plaintiff's  demand  is  such  that  there  is  no  necessity 
for  judicial  action  in  determining  the  relief  to  be 
granted  or  the  amount  of  the  recovery,  a  common 
provision  being  that  the  clerk  may  enter  such  judg- 
ment in  an  action  ex  contractu  for  the  recovery  of 
money  or  of  a  certain  or  liquidated  amount.  Wheth- 
er, under  such  a  statute,  the  clerk  may  or  may  not 
enter  a  default  judgment  without  a  prior  application 
to  the  court  depends,  of  course,  on  whether  the  stat- 
ute is  or  is  not  applicable  to  the  particular  case.71 
Under  some  statutes,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  clerk,  in 
one  class  of  actions,  to  enter  defendant's  default  on 
application  by  plaintiff  and,  in  other  actions,  to  en- 
ter such  default  without  praecipe  or  application 
therefor.72  A  rule  of  court  providing  that,  in  all 
causes  in  which  adverse  counsel  have  appeared  of 
record,  no  default  judgment  shall  be  rendered  ex- 
cept on  motion  does  not  apply  to  a  judgment  which 
is  not  a  default  judgment.73 

Judgment  against  self  or  codefendant.  It  has 
been  held  that  defendant  may  not  make  a  motion 
for  a  default  judgment  against  himself74  and  that 
one  defendant  may  not  pray  it  against  codefend- 
ants.75 

Oral  or  written  motion.  Under  a  statute  so  pro- 
viding, it  is  necessary  for  plaintiff  or  his  counsel 
to  appear  in  open  court  and  ask  for  a  preliminary 
default;76  but  the  motion  may  be  made  either  or- 
ally or  in  writing,77  and  it  is  sufficient  if  a  written 
request  for  entry  of  default  is  filed  with  the  clerk 
of  court  and  read  by  him  in  open  court.75 

b.  Time  and  Place  of  Application      , 

An  application  for  Judgment  by  default,  when  one  Is 
necessary  should  be  made  at  the  proper  time  therefor. 


The  application  should  be  made  In  the  court  where  the 
action  is  pending  at  the  time  of  default. 

Where,  as  indicated  supra  subdivision  a  of  this 
section,  an  application  for  judgment  by  default  is 
required,  the  local  statute  or  practice  govern  as 
to  the  time  when  the  application  should  be  made.79 
A  motion  based  on  the  claim  that  affidavits  to 
the  pleas  do  not  comply  with  a  statute  is  too 
late  where  plaintiff  has  waived  any  and  all  rights 
he  may  have  had  at  any  time  to  judgment 
by  default.80  However,  where  the  complaint  is 
duly  verified,  but  the  answer  is  not,  as  required 
by  statute,  delay  in  moving  for  default  judgment  on 
the  complaint  for  want  of  an  answer  is  not,  as  a 
matter  of  law,  a  waiver  of  plaintiff's  rights.81  Also, 
failure  of  plaintiff  to  move  promptly  for  judgment 
because  of  defendant's  default  in  filing  an  answer  in 
time  does  not  work  a  discontinuance  of  the  action.82 

The  application  should  be  made  in  the  court 
where  the  action  is  pending  at  the  time  of  default  ;83 
if  there  has  been  a  change  of  venue,  before  default, 
it  should  be  made,  not  in  the  court  where  the  ac- 
tion was  commenced,  but  in  the  court  to  which  the 
venue  has  been  changed,84  unless  the  change  of 
venue  was  merely  granted  but  never  perfected,85 
or  was  made  by  stipulation  between  plaintiff  and 
interveners  only,  and  was  not  effective  as  to  de- 
fendant.8* 

c.  Notice  of  Application 

Notice  of  an  application  for  a  default  Judgment  is 
necessary  only  when  required  by  statute  or  rule  of 
court. 

Under  some  statutory  or  practice  rules,  notice  of 
the  application  for,  or  entry  of,  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault must  be  given  to  defendant;87  but,  unless  so 


71.  N.Y.— Hotel   Syracuse  v.  Brain- 
ard,  10  N.Y,S.2d  892,  256  AppJMv. 
10S5— -Sohel    v.    Sobel,    4    N.Y.S.2d 
194,  254  App.Div.  203,  reargument 
denied   6   N.Y.'S.   328,   254  App.Div. 
836 — Bump    v.    Carnavale,    244    N. 
Y.S.  206,  137  Misc.  707. 

34  C.J.  JP  18'5  notes  67,  68. 

Authority  of  clerk  to  enter  prelimi- 
nary default  or  default  Judgment 
generally  see  supra  §  205. 

72.  Idaho. — Savage  v.  Stokes,  28  P. 
2d  900,  54  Idaho  109. 

73.  Kan. — Hamilton     v.     Bernstein, 
299  P.  581,  133  Kan.  229. 

74.  Iowa. — Greenbugh  v.  Shelden,  9 
Iowa  *50'3. 

34  C.J.  p  185  note  70. 

75.  Mass.— Vinal  v.  Burrill,  18  Pick. 
29.. 

76.  Da.— Aycock  v.  Miller,  App.,  18 
'So.2d  835.         *  ,    .  . 

77.  La.— Aycock  v.  Miller,  supra. 


78.  La.— Aycock  v.  Miller,  supra. 

79.  Tex.— Merrill  v.  Dunn,  Civ.App., 
140    S.W.2d    320,    error   dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 

34  O.J.  p  185  note  75. 

80.  Md.— Buehner  v.   Sehlhorst,  132 
A.  70,  149  Md.  474. 

Waiver  of  default  generally  see  su- 
pra §  203. 

81.  N.C.— Homey  v.  Mills,  128  S.B. 
S24,  189  -NT.C.  724. 

2.  N.C.— King   v.   Rudd,    87    S.E.2d 
116,  226  N.C.  1S6. 

3.  Iowa. — Wormley  v.  Carroll  Dist. 
Tp.,  45  Iowa  666. 

84.    Iowa.— Wormley  v.  Carroll  Dist, 

Tp.,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  185  note  77. 
86.    Ind.— Snyder  v.  Bunnell,  64  Ind. 

403. 

34  C.J.  p  185  note  78. 
86.    Colo,— TaJpey  v.  Doane,  *  Colo. 

22. 


87.    111.— Marland     Refining     Co.     v. 

Lewis,  264  IlLApp.  163. 
La.— Strange  v.  Albrecht,  App.,    176 

So.  700. 
Pa.— Welzel  v.  Link-Belt  Co.,  35  A.2d 

596,  194  Pa.Super.  66. 
Wis.— Federal  Land  Bank  of  St.  Paul 

v.   Olson,   1   N.W.2d   752,   239   Wis. 

448. 
34  C.J.  p  18*5  note  82. 

Defendant  who  has  appeared 

111.— Swlercz  v.  Nalepka,  259  ULAfcp. 

262— Risedorf  v.  Fyfe,  250  IlLApp. 

122. 
N.D. — Dakota  Nat.  Bank  v.  Johnson, 

204  N.W.  840,  52  N.D.  845. 
S.D.— Heitman  v.    Gross,    19    N.W.2d 

508— Peterson  v.   McMillan.    14   N. 

W.2d  97. 
34  C.J.  p  186  note  82   [d]   (1). 

Purpose  of  court  role  providing 
that  any  attorney  intending  to  make 
a  motion  for  a  default  order  shall 
first  serve  on  adverse  party,  if  one 


371 


§  208 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


required,  a  defendant  who  is  once  in  court  whether 
by  legal  process  or  by  appearance  is  not  entitled  to 
such  notice,88  especially  where  the  judgment  is  one 
which  will  be  entered  as  a  matter  of  course,  as  in 
an  action  for  the  payment  of  money  only.89  Such 
notice  may  be  waived  by  defendant  ;90  and  the  want 
of  it,  even  when  required,  does  not  render  the  judg- 
ment void,  but  merely  irregular.91  A  judgment  by 
default  without  notice  against  a  plaintiff  at  a  term 
after  the  term  at  which  he  was  dismissed  from  the 
case  is  void.92 

Service  of  a  motion  for  judgment  on  a  clerk  of 
an  attorney  for  defendant  is  sufficient  notice  to  de- 
fendant.93 Certain  procedure  permitted  by  a  lo- 
cal court  rule  has  been  held  to  be  constructive  no- 
tice to  a  defendant  before  the  court  that  a  motion 
for  judgment  by  default  will  be  entertained  on  fail- 
ure of  defendant  to  plead;94  and,  irrespective  of 
such  rule,  plaintiff  may  give  actual  notice  that  on 
a  day  specified  he  will  move  for  judgment  unless 
an  answer  is  filed  on  or  before  that  time.95 

§  209.    Bond    or    Recognizance    on    Taking 
Judgment 

The   execution   of   a   bond,   conditioned   to   save   de- 


fendant harmless  If  he  procures  a  vacation  or  modifica- 
tion of  the  Judgment,  is  necessary,  under  a  few  stat- 
utes, before  rendition  of  a  Judgment  against  a  defend- 
ant who  was  constructively  summoned  and  has  not  ap- 
peared. 

Under  some  statutes,  before  the  rendering  of  a 
judgment  against  an  absent  defendant  who  was  con- 
structively summoned,  and  did  not  appear,  a  bond 
or  recognizance  should  be  executed  conditioned  to 
save  him  harmless  if  he  procures  a  vacation  or  mod- 
ification of  the  judgment;96  and  a  judgment  ren- 
dered without  such  security  is  erroneous,97  but  not 
invalid.98  Such  a  bond  is  not  required,  where  an 
absent  defendant  was  personally  served  with  proc- 
ess,99 or  a  defendant  has  appeared  and  no  judgment 
is  rendered  against  him,1  or  the  interest  of  a  de- 
fendant is  identical  with  that  of  another  defendant 
who  appeared  and  asserted  defenses.2 

§  210.    Evidence 

In  order  to  Justify  the  rendition  of  a  default  Judg- 
ment for  plaintiff,  it  is  sometimes  necessary  to  show 
that  plaintiff  appeared. 

One  of  the  matters  to  be  shown,  in  order  to  jus- 
tify the  court  in  rendering  judgment  by  default  for 
plaintiff,  under  statutes  relating  to  the  proceeding 


has    appeared    or    is    known    In    the    court  and  had  announced  ready  for 


case,  a  copy  of  form  of  order  he 
proposes  to  ask  for,  is  to  prevent 
entering  of  default  orders  through 
inadvertence,  mistake,  surprise*  or 
excusable  neglect  of  a  party  who  has 
appeared  in  the  case  either  person- 
ally or  by  an  attorney,  or  of  an  at- 
torney, who  is  known  to  represent 
litigants  but  who  has  not  appeared, 
and  rule  should  not  be  construed  as 
making  it  a  condition  precedent  to 
the  entry  of  a  default  order  that 
plaintiffs  serve  defendants  with  a 
copy  of  order  when  attorneys  repre- 
senting defendants  have  withdrawn 
and  defendants  have  had  ample  time 
in  which  to  substitute  other  attor- 
neys, but  have  failed  to  do  so,  and 
have  failed  to  inform  plaintiffs  of 
defendants'  address. — Merryman  v. 
Colonial  Realty  Co.,  120  P.2d  230, 
168  Or.  12. 

Requirement  not  applicable 

(1)  A   rule    of   court    that    in   all 
causes    in    which    adverse    counsel 
have  appeared  of  record,  no  default 
judgment  shall  be  rendered  except  on 
the    giving    of  at   least   three   days' 
notice  to  such  adverse  party  of  the 
hearing  of  the  motion  for  the  judg- 
ment does  not  apply  to  a  judgment 
which  is  not  a  default  judgment. — 
Hamilton   v.    Bernstein,    299   P.    581, 
133  Kan.  229. 

(2)  Where    plaintiffs    waived    de- 
fendant's failure  to  answer  by  pro- 
ceeding to   introduce  their  evidence 
as  though  defendant  were  present  in 


trial,  statute  requiring  a  three-day 
notice  prior  to  hearing  of  applica- 
tion for  default  judgment  was  inap- 
plicable.—Yeast  v.  Fleck,  121  P.2d 
426,  58  Ariz.  469. 

88.  La.— Barbetta  v.  Blythe  Co.,  129 
So.  167,  14  La.App.  288. 

N.D. — Corn  ESxchange  Sav.  Bank, 
Sioux  Falls,  S.  D.,  v.  Northwest 
Const.  Co.,  260  N.W.  580,  65  N.D. 
•577. 

Tex. — Employer's  Reinsurance  Corpo- 
ration v.  Brock,   Civ.App.,   74  S.W. 
2d  43*5,  error  dismissed. 
Wis.— Velte  v.  Zen,  206  N.W.  197,  188 

Wis.  401. 

34  C.J.  p  1S6  note  S3. 
later  appearance 

After  granting  of  motion  for  de- 
fault for  defendant's  failure  to  ap- 
pear and  answer  in  time,  defendant 
is  not  entitled,  by  reason  of  later  ap- 
pearance, to  notice  of  application  for 
judgment  under  statute  entitling  him 
to  five  days'  notice  of  subsequent 
proceedings  if  he  gives  notice  of  ap- 
pearance before  time  for  answering 
expires. — Skidmore  v.  Pacific  Credi- 
tors, 138  P.2d  664,  18  Wash.2d  157. 

89.  Minn.— Heinrich  v.  England,   26 
N.W.  122,  3«4  Minn.  395. 

34  C.J.  p  186  note  8*5. 

(Former  code  provision  requiring 
notice  was  inapplicable  in  such  case. 
— Heitman  v.  Gross,  S.D.,  19  N.W.24 
508— Henderson  v.  Egan,  179  N.W. 
31,  43  S.I>.  366 — Searles  v.  Lawrence, 
65  N.W.  84,  8  S.D.  11. 

372 


90.  N.T.— Selinger  v.  G.  C.  Inc.,  142 
N.Y.S.  194,  81  Misc.  34-3. 

91.  Cal.— Gray  v.  Hall,   265   P.   246, 
203  Cal.  306. 

— Federal  Land  Bank  of  St.  Paul 
v.    Olson,   1   N.W.2d   T52,   239   Wis. 
448. 
34  C.J.  p  186  note  87. 

92.  Ark.— Liddell  v.  Landau,  112  S. 
W.  1085,  87  Ark.  438. 

93.  Alaska. — Rubenstein   v.    Imlach, 
9  Alaska  62. 

94.  u.S. — Marking  v.  New  St.  Louis 
&  Calhoun  Packet  Co.,  D.C.Ky.,  48 
F.Supp.  680. 

95-    U.S.— Marking  v.  New  St.  Louis 
&  Calhoun  Packet  Co.,  supra. 

96.  Ark. — Hoof  man  v.  Manor,  176  S. 
W.2d  911,  206  Ark.  615. 

Ky. — Carter  v.    Capshaw,    60    S.W.2d 

959,  249  Ky.  483. 
34  C.J.  p  186  note  90. 

97.  Ky. — Morrison  v.  Beckham,  27  S. 
W.    868,    96   Ky.    72,   16  Ky.L.    294. 

34  C.J.  p  186  note  91. 

98.  Ky. — Ballman  v.  Ballman,  67  S. 
W.2d  39,  252  Ky.  332. 

34  C.J.  P  186  note  92. 

99.  Ky.— Hall  v.  Bradley,   160   S.W. 
2d  641,  290  Ky.  120. 

34  C.J.  p  186  note  93. 

1.  Ky. — Miller    v.    Title    Insurance 
&   Trust  Co.,   129   S.W.2d   163,   278 
Ky.  598. 

2,  Ky.— Akers    v.    Kentucky     Title 
Trust  Co..  132  S.W.2d  83,  179  Ky. 
727. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§212 


for  the  trial  of  right  of  property,  is  that  plaintiff 
appeared.3 

Proof  of  jurisdictional  facts  is  discussed  infra  § 
211,  proof  of  default,  infra  §  212,  and  proof  of  the 
cause  of  action  and  amount  recoverable,  infra  §  213. 


§  211. 


Proof  of  Jurisdictional  Facts 


Acquisition  of  Jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  de- 
fendant by  service  of  process  or  voluntary  appearance 
must  be  shown  before  the  rendition  or  entry  of  judg- 
ment by  default. 

In  order  to  sustain  a  judgment  by  default  plaintiff 
must  show  that  the  court  acquired  jurisdiction  over 
the  person  of  defendant.4  Except  where  there  has 
been  a  voluntary  appearance  by  defendant,5  there 
must  be  proof  of  a  proper  service  of  process  on  de- 
fendant.6 Ordinarily  this  proof  is  furnished  by  the 
officer's  return7  or  by  an  affidavit  of  the  person 
serving  the  writ,  which  must  be  made  in  due  form 
in  order  to  support  the  judgment.8  An  admission 
of  service  of  the  summons  and  complaint  is  not 
sufficient,9  unless  it  states  the  manner  in  which  the 
service  was  made;10  and  a  written  acknowledg- 
ment of  service  of  process,  indorsed  on  the  writ, 
and  purporting  to  be  signed  by  defendant,  will  not 
be  sufficient  to  support  a  judgment  by  default,  »\dth- 


out  proof  of  the  authenticity  of  the  indorsement 
and  signature.11 

In  case  of  service  by  publication  on  an  absent  or 
nonresident  defendant,  plaintiff  must  show  a  full 
compliance  with  all  the  requirements  of  the  statute 
with  regard  to  the  mode  of  issuing  and  serving  the 
process,12  and  also  prove  the  facts  which  give  the 
court  jurisdiction  over  the  property  attached,  or  the 
res  on  which  alone  its  judgment  may  operate,13 
unless  the  necessity  for  such  proof  is  obviated  by 
filing  a  statutory  affidavit.14 

A  judgment  rendered  without  sufficient  proof  of 
service  of  process  has  been  held  erroneous15  and, 
according  to  some  decisions,  void.16 


§  212. 


Proof  of  Default 


In  many  jurisdictions  an  affidavit  or  other  extrinsic 
proof  of  a  failure  to  plead  within  the  time  allowed  by 
law  is  essential  to  a  judgment  by  default. 

In  some  jurisdictions,  under  the  rule  that  the 
court  will  take  judicial  notice  from  its  records  as  to 
whether  an  appearance  has  been  entered  or  a  plea 
filed,17  an  affidavit  or  other  extrinsic  proof  of  the 
default  is  not  necessary  before  entering  a  default 
judgment  for  failure  to  appear  and  plead,18  as 


8.  Tex. — Merrill  v.  Dunn,  Civ.App., 
140  S.W.2d  820,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 

4.  Mich.— Denison      v.      Smith,     33 
Mich.   ISS. 

Puerto  Rico. — Aparicio  v.  Christian- 
son,  25  Puerto  Rico  457. 

5.  N.T.— Christal  v.  Kelly,   88  N.T. 
285. 

€.    111.— -Huosaker  v.  Watts,  257  111. 

App.  351. 
S.D.— Illinois  Trust  &  Savings  Bank 

v.  Town  of  Roscoe,  194  'N.W.  £49, 

46  S.D.  477. 
34  C.J.  p  186  note  97. 
Necessity  and  sufficiency  of  service 

of  process  or  notice  see  supra  § 

192. 

7.    Tex — Employer's        Reinsurance 
.      Corporation  v.  Brock,  Civ.App.,  74 

S.W.2d   43*5,   error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  187  note  98. 
Examination  1>y  court  of  return 

Court,  on  request  for  default  Judg- 
ment, is  under  duty  to  examine  proc- 
ess and  returns  thereon,  and  deter- 
mine whether  process  and  manner  of 
service  was  such  as  to  give  defend- 
ant notice  required  by  law. — Brother- 
hood of  Railroad  Trainmen  v.  Agnew, 
•155  So.  205,  170  Miss.  604. 
Formal  offer  in  evidence 

There  is  no  law  requiring  that,  in 
confirming  a  default,  the  citation  and 
return  of  the  sheriff  thereon  be  for- 
mally offered  in  evidence. — Stout  v. 
Henderson,  102  So.  198,  157  La.  169— 


Electrical    Supply   Co.    v.    Moses,    3 
La. App.  286 — Dupuy  v.  Knickerbock- 
er Leather  &  Novelty  Co.,  11  La.App., 
Orleans,  272. 
Ketura   filed    after    adjournment    of 

term 

Filing  summons  in  clerk's  office 
with  return  showing  service  after 
adjournment  of  term  at  which  de- 
fault judgment  was  rendered  is  not 
proof  of  service  or  part  of  proceed- 
ings of  court  for  rendition  of  Judg- 
ment.— Hunsaker  v.  Watts,  257  111. 
App.  351. 
Necessity  of  other  evidence 

(1)  Where     amended     return     of 
sheriff  showed  legal  service  on  for- 
eign corporation  through  local  agent, 
default     judgment    was     warranted 
without  further  showing  or  proof  of 
agency,    and    burden    of   disproving 
agency  was  on  defendant  seeking  to 
overthrow   service. — Employer's    Re- 
insurance Corporation  v.  Brock,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,    74    S.W.2d  43*5,   error  dis- 
missed. 

(2)  However,     where     return     of 
service    of    process,    together    with 
other   parts    of  'record,    leaves   any 
question  of  doubt  or  is  not  sufficient- 
ly explicit,  court,  before  entering  de- 
fault judgment  has   duty  to   hear, 
and  to  require  to  .be  produced,  evi- 
dence  showing  that   defendant  was 
given     notice     required    by     law. — 
Brotherhood   of   Railroad    Trainmen 
v.  Agnew,  155  So.  205,  170  Miss.  604. 
8.    Mich.— People's  Mut  Ben.  Soc.  v. 

373 


Wayne  Cir.  Judge,  56  N.W.  944,  97 
Mich.  627. 
34  C.J.  p  187  note  99. 

9.  N.T.— Read    v.    French,    28    N.T. 
285. 

10.  N.T. — Andrews  v.  Townshend,  1 
N.T.S.  421,  56  N.T.SuDer.   140. 

34  C.J.  p  187  note  5. 

11.  Mich. — Johnson  v.  Delbridge,  35 
Mich.  436. 

34  C.J.  p  187  note  6 

12.  Ind. — Rochester   Security   Trust 
Co.   v.    Myhan,   114   N.E.   410,    186 
Ind.  391. 

34  GJ.  p  187  note  1. 

13.  Ky. — Jackson     v.  '  McElroy,      2 
Bush  132 — Harris  v.  Adams,  2  Duv. 
141. 

14.  Ky. — Harris  v.  Adams,  supra. 

15.  Iowa. — McCraney   v.    Childs,    11 
Iowa  54. 

Pa.— Camp  v.  Welles,  11  Pa.  206. 

16.  Wis. — McConkey    v.    McCraney, 
37  N.W.  822,  71  Wis.  5T6. 

34  C.J.  p  187  note  8. 

17.  Mich.— Edson  v.  La  Londe,  50  N. 
W.  112,  88  Mich,  162. 

34  C.J.  p  187  note  9. 

18.  Mich. — Edson  v.  La  Londe,  su-  • 
pra. 

3'4  C.J.  p  187  note  10. 
Becord  only  neceisary  proof 

Where  plaintiff  made  motion  for 
preliminary  default,  the  only  proof 
necessary  to  show  that  defendant 
had  made  no  appearance  was  record 


§  212 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


where  the  default  consists  of  the  failure  to  obey  a 
rule  to  plead,15  although,  where  judgment  is  taken 
for  want  of  a  plea,  the  record  must  show  that  there 
was  no  plea  filed,20  and  proof  of  service  of  the  dec- ' 
laration  may  be  necessary  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether  the  time  within  which  defendant  might 
plead  has  expired  at  the  time  of  the  entry  of  the 
default" 

In  other  jurisdictions  in  the  ordinary  case  of  de- 
fendant's omission  to  plead  or  answer  within  the 
time  limited  by  law,  plaintiff  is  required  to  make 
and  file  an  affidavit22  or  submit  other  sufficient 
proof23  that  no  plea  or  answer  has  been  received 
or  filed  within  the  time  allowed;  and  the  sufficien- 
cy of  such  affidavit  or  proof,24  and  of  the  filing  or 
service  thereof,25  depends  on  the  requirements  of 
the  particular  statute. 

In  order  to  justify  the  court  in  rendering  judg- 
ment by  default  for  plaintiff,  under  the  statutes  re- 
lating to  the  trial  of  right  of  property,  it  must  be 
made  to  appear  that  defendant  failed  to  appear  or 
neglected  or  refused  to  join  issue  when  directed26 

§  213.    Proof  of  Cause  of  Action 

a.  Necessity 

b.  Admissibility,  weight,  and  sufficiency 


a.  Necessity 

It  Is  a  general  rule  that,  In  order  to  be  entitled  to  a 
judgment  by  default,  plaintiff  need  not  prove  his  cause 
of  action  or  the  allegations  of  his  petition,  declaration, 
or  complaint,  except  as  to  damages  where  they  are  un- 
liquidated. 

In  a  few  jurisdictions  plaintiff  is  required  to 
prove  his  cause  of  action  in  every  case  of  default27 
However,  in  most  jurisdictions,  since  defendant's 
default  in  failing  to  plead  or  answer  admits  the 
material  and  traversable  allegations  of  the  decla- 
ration or  complaint,  as  discussed  supra  §  201,  if 
such  declaration  or  complaint  alleges  a  good  cause 
of  action  and,  when  so  required  by  statute,  is  duly 
verified,  plaintiff,  as  a  general  rule,  is  not  required, 
in  order  to  be  entitled  to  a  judgment  by  default,  to 
establish  his  cause  of  action  by  further  proof,28 
except  as  to  the  amount  of  damages  where  they  are 
unliquidated,  as  discussed  in  Damages  §  163;  but 
the  nature  of  the  action,  or  the  circumstances  of 
the  particular  case  may,  under  some  statutes,  take 
it  out  of  the  general  rule  and  require  plaintiff  to 
prove  the  facts  essential  to  his  recovery,29  as  where 
defendant  was  only  constructively  served  with  proc- 


of  court  which  was  before  court. — 
Aycock  v.  Miller,  La.App.,  18  So.2d 
335. 

19.  Mich.— Bdson  v.  La  Londe,  5  a  N. 
W.    112,    88    Mich.    162— Elliott    v. 
Farwell,  6  N.W.  234,  44  Mich.  186. 

20.  Miss.— Irving  v.  Montgomery,  4 
Miss.  191. 

21.  Mich. — Rosen  v.  Brennan,  221  N. 
W.  276,  244  Mich.  397. 

22.  S.D.— Burton  v.   Cooley,   118  N. 
W.  1028,  22  S.D.  51B. 

34  C.J.  p  187  note  14. 

23.  Fla. — Gamble     v.     Jacksonville, 
Pensacola  &  Mobile  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
Fla.  226. 

34  C.J.  p  187  note  15. 
Requirement  inapplicable 

An  amdavit  or  other  proof  of  fail- 
ure to  answer  is  not  necessary  where 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  Judgment,  not 
because  of  a  failure  to  answer,  but 
on  an  issue  of  law  found  in  his  fa- 
vor, such  as  the  frivolousness  of  a 
demurrer.— Cahoon  v.  Wisconsin 
Cent  R.  Co.,  10  Wis.  290. 

24.  Wis.— Reed    v.    Catlin,    6    N.W. 
326,  4&  Wis.  686. 

34  C.J.  P  187  note  17. 

S5.    S.D. — Whitcher  v.  Cooley,  123  N. 

W.  ll^S,  2*4  S.D.  190. 
34  C.J.  p  188  note  18. 

26.  Tex.— Merrill  v.  Dunn,  Civ.App., 
140  S.W.2d  820,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 


27.  U.-S.— Bradshaw  v.  General  Mo- 
tors Acceptance  Corporation,   D.C. 
Pa.,  19  F.Supp.   993. 

La. — Dreher  v.  Guaranty  Bond  &  Fi- 
nance Co.,  165  So.  711,  '184  La. 
197 — Saenger  Amusement  Co.  v. 
Masur,  104  So.  701,  158  La.  745. 

Pa.— Leglar  v.  Pittsburgh,  C.,  C.  & 
St.  L.  R.  Co.,  131  A,  863,  284  Pa. 
•521 — Johnston  v.  American  Casual- 
ty Co.,  Com.PL,  23  WestCo.L-J. 
178. 

Philippine. — Camps  v.  Patemo,  9 
Philippine  229. 

34     C.J.    p    188    notes    21,     25     [d]. 

Judgment  must  be  on  proof 

N.J. — Gimbel  Bros.  v.  Corcoran,  192 
A.  715,  15  N.J.Misc.  538. 

28.  Ariz.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Postal    Ben.    Ins.    Co.    v.    Johnson, 
165  P.2d  173,  178. 

G«L. — Waters  v.  American  Machinery 

Co..    163    S.B.    304,    45    Ga.App.    64. 
Mo. — Shannon    v.     Del-Home    Light 

Co.,  App.,  4-3  S.W.2d  872. 
Neb. — Danbom  v.  Danbom,  273  N.W. 

502,  132  Neb.  85$. 
N.C.— De  Hoff  v.  Black,  175  S.B.  179, 

206  N.C.  687,  followed  in  Akins  v. 

Black,   175   S.E.   181,  206  N.C.   691 

— Gillam  v.   Cherry,   134   S.B.   423, 

192  N.C.  19*5. 
Tex. — Southern    S.    S.    Co.    v.    Schu- 

macker  Co.,   Civ.App.,    15'4   S.W.2d 

28>3,  error  refused — Simmons  Co.  v. 
-    Spruill,   Civ.App.,   131   S.W.2d   1026 

—Aviation   Credit    Corporation   of 

374 


New    York    v.    University    Aerial 
Service    Corporation,    Civ.App.,    59 
S.W.2d  870,  error  dismissed — Mar- 
tin v.  Bell-Woods,  Civ.App.,   57  S. 
W.  271— Milford  v.  Culpepper,  Civ. 
App.,  40  S.W.2d  163,  error  refused 
— Citizens'   Bank  v.  Brandan,  Civ. 
App.,  1  S.W.2d  466,  error  refused. 
Va. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bova  v. 
Roanoke    Oil    Co.,    23    S.R2d    347, 
3*51,  180  Va.  332. 
34  C.J.  p  188  note  25. 
Taking-  verdict 

In  a  case  within  a  statute  so  pro- 
viding, plaintiff  is  entitled,  on  de- 
fendant's default,  to  take  a  verdict 
as  though  each  allegation  had  been 
proved. — Hayes  v.  International  Har- 
vester Co.  of  America,  183  S.E.  197, 
52  Ga.App.  328 — Pape  v.  Woolford 
Realty  Co.,  13-4  S.E.  174,  35  Ga.App. 
284 — Cochran  v.  Carter,  132  S.E.  921, 
85  Ga.App.  286—34  C.J.  p  188  note 
25  [c]  (1). 
Court  may  require,  or  not  require, 

proof 

111. — Whalen  v.  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.,  280  IlLApp.  59'6,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.  v.  Whalen,  56  S.Ct  590,. 
297  U.S.  714,  80  L.Ed.  1000. 
On  assessment  of  damages  see  Dam- 
ages §  172  b. 

29.  Idaho.— Portland  Cattle  Loan 
Co.  v.  Gemmell,  242  P.  798,  41  Ida- 
ho 756. 

111. — Downers    Grove   Sanitary   Dist* 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  213 


ess,30  as  by  publication,81  or  where  the  complaint 
was  not  served  with  the  summons.32  A  failure  to 
produce  such  proof,  where  required,  does  not  ren- 
der the  judgment  void,  but  merely  erroneous.33  An 
attempt  to  prove  the  allegations  of  the  complaint 
unnecessarily  does  not  affect  plaintiffs  right  to  the 
judgment,84  or  compel  him  to  make  a  complete 
case;35  nor  does  it  affect  statutory  provisions  re- 
garding the  effect  of  defendant's  default.36 

Quo  warranto  proceeding.  In  some  jurisdictions, 
the  state  is  entitled,  without  making  proof  of  the 
facts  set  out  in  the  petition  or  information,  to  a 
judgment  of  ouster  against  defendant  in  a  quo  war- 
ranto proceeding  where  he  defaults  by  failing  to 
appear  or  answer  ;37  but  in  other  jurisdictions  proof 
must  be  made  to  sustain  a  judgment  in  case  of  de- 
fault.8* 

Joint  defendants.  Where  one  of  two  joint  de- 
fendants answers,  controverting  the  material  alle- 
gations of  the  declaration,  the  fact  that  the  other 
defendant  suffers  default  does  not  dispense  with  the 
necessity  of  proof  as  to  the  answering  defend- 
ant;89 and  proof  against  those  in  default  may  be 


taken  at  the  same  time  and  on  the  trial  of  the  is- 
sues against  those  defending  and  a  judgment  may  . 
be  rendered  on  the  whole  case.40 

Where  there  are  several  adverse  claimants  to  the 
demand  and  one  of  them  appears  and  prosecutes  his 
claim,  and  the  other  fails  to  do  so,  and  defendant 
interposes  no  defense,  the  party  prosecuting  may 
not  take  judgment  by  default,  unless  he  shows  by 
legal  proof  a  right  of  recovery  prima  facie  in  him- 
self.4! 

b.  Admissibility,  Weight,  and  Sufficiency 

In  so  far  as  they  are  not  varied  by  statute,  general 
rules  as  to  the  admissibillty  and  weight,  and  the  suffi- 
ciency, of  evidence  are  applicable  where,  on  an  applica- 
tion for  a  default  judgment,  proof  of  plaintiff's  cause  of 
action  is  required. 

Where  proof  of  the  cause  of  action  or  of  the 
amount  of  plaintiffs  claim  or  demand  is  necessary, 
the  general  rules  of  evidence,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
not  varied  by  statute,  apply  in  a  proceeding  on  an 
application  for  a  default  judgment  with  regard  to 
the  admissibility42  and  the  weight  and  sufficiency48 
of  the  evidence.  Plaintiff's  proof  must  conform  to 


v.  Downers  Grove  Inv.  Co.,  178 
N.E.  42,  (3'45  111.  3'59. 

Mo.— Jones  v.  Cook,  193  S.W.2d  494. 

Okl.— Henshaw  v.  Pringle,  300  P. 
666,  150  Okl.  64, 

Tex.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kobert,  Civ. 
App.,  10  S.W.2d  1010— Love  v. 
Allard,  Civ.App.,  286  S.W.  581. 

34  C.J.  p  188  notes  28,  32. 

Under  speedy  judgment  act 

Md. — Carey  v.  Howard,  16  A.2d  289, 
178  Md.  512. 

Necessity  of  proof  in  action  to  auiet 
title  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Quieting 
Title  §  104,  also  51  C.J.  P  282  notes 
•  38-41. 

Whether  proof  necessary  when  de- 
fendant absent  from  trial  see  su- 
pra §  198. 

30.  Ga. — Jones    v.    Adams,    46    Ga. 
605. 

31.  Tex.— Pellum   v.    Fleming,    Civ. 
App.,    283   S.W.  531,   error  refused 
Fleming  v.  Pellum,   287  S.W.  492, 
116    Tex.    130— Lopez    v.    Mexico- 
Texas  Petroline  &  Asphalt  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  281  S.W.  326. 

34  C.J.  p  188  note  30. 

32.  N.T. — Whitman  &  Barnes  Mfg. 
,    Co.  v.  Hamilton,  57  N.T.S.  760,  27 

Misc.  198. 
34  C.J.  p  188  note  31. 

33.  Kan.— Garner  v.  State,  28  Kan. 
790. 

34  C.J.  p  189  note  33. 
Waiver 

In  suit  by  heir  against  other  heirs 
for  sale  of  land  because  of  indi- 
visibility, any  error  in  rendering 
Judgment  against  nonresident  de- 


fendants without  supporting  evi- 
dence was  waived  where,  after  judg- 
ment, the  nonresident  defendants 
filed  an  answer  in  which  they  ad- 
mitted the  allegations  of  the  peti- 
tion and  asked  that  the  sale  be  con- 
firmed.— Adams  v.  Gardner,  277  S.W. 
284,  211  Ky.  2'46. 

34.  Wis. — Phillips  v.  Portage  Trans- 
it Co.,  118  N.W.  539,  137  Wis.  189. 

34  C.J.  p  189  note  34. 

35.  wis. — Phillips  v.  Portage  Trans- 
it Co.,  supra. 

36.  Tex. — Southern     S.     S.     Co.    v. 
Schumacher   Co.,    Civ.App.,    154    S. 
W.2d  283,  error  refused — Simmons 
Co.  v.  Spruill,  Civ.App.,  131  S.W.2d 
1026. 

37.  R.L— State  v.  Kearn,  22  A.  322, 
17  R.I.  391. 

51  C.J.  p  360  note  63. 

38.  Gal.— Searcy  v.    Grow,    15    Cal. 
117. 

'51  C.J.  p  360  note  64. 

39.  111. — Chamblin    v.    Chamblin,    1 
N.E.2d  73,   362   111.  588,   104  A.L.R. 
1183,  certiorari  denied  57  S.Ct.  24, 
299  U.S.  541,  81  L.Ed.   398. 

34  C.J.  p  1S9  note  37. 
Default  at  direction  of  another  de- 
fendant 

A  defendant's  default  at  direction 
or  for  benefit  of  codefendant  by 
whom  defendant  was  employed  did 
not  relieve  plaintiff  from  proving 
her  case  against  codefendant,  as 
any  defendant  at  any  time  may  with- 
draw his  defense. — Fawkes  v.  Na- 
tional Refining  Co.,  108  S.W.2d  7, 
341  Mo.  630. 

375 


40.  N.Y.— Lyon    v.    Yates,    61    N.T. 
661 — Erie     Basin     Impr.     Co.     v. 
Smith,  120  N.Y.S.  323;  135  App.Div. 
365. 

41.  U.S.— Bright  v.    U.    S.,    8    CtCl. 
i326. 

42.  Va. — Frazier  v.  Frazier,  2  Leigh 
642,  29  Va.  642. 

34  C.J.  p  190  note  54. 
Admissibility    of    evidence    of    dam- 
ages see  Damages  §  172  b. 

43.  Tex. — Engineers'   Petroleum  Co. 
v.  Gourley,  Civ.App.,  243  S.W.  595. 

34  C.J.  p  190  note  55. 

Prima  facie  case  sufficient 

La.— Strange  v.  Albrecht,  183  So.  209. 

190  La.  897. 
Tex. — Olsan    Bros.     v.    Miller,     Civ. 

App.,  108  S.W.2d  856. 
Incompetent  evidence  admitted  with- 
out objection 

Whether  the  judgment  is  by  de- 
fault or  otherwise,  it  is  not  support- 
ed by  evidence  which  is  wholly  in- 
competent and  therefore  without 
probative  force,  even  though  It  was 
admitted  without  objection. — Paggi 
v.  Rose  Mfg.  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  259 
S.W.  962. 

Statement  of  account,  indorsed  by 
defendant  as  true  and  correct,  is  a 
liquidated  demand  and  sufficient 
proof  to  support  default— Colorado 
River  Syndicate  Subscribers  v.  Al- 
exander, Tex.Civ.'App.,  288  S.W.  586. 

Evidence  held  sufficient  to  sustain 
default  judgment. 
Ariz. — Tuma   County   v.    Banneman, 

28  P.2d  622,  <42  Ariz.  561. 


§  213 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


his  allegations,44  and  must  be  sufficient  to  make 
out  his  case  with  legal  certainty.45  In  the  absence 
of  statute  prescribing  the  nature  of  the  evidence, 
the  judgment  may  be  founded  on  any  legal  evidence 
which  is  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  court.46  Under 
some  statutes  an  affidavit  in  respect  of  plaintiff's 
claim  or  demand,  if  regularly  and  properly  made, 
may  be  sufficient  by  itself  to  support  the  judg- 
ment;47 but  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  court 
to  require  other  or  further  proof.48 

Evidence  for  defendant.  As  defendant  by  his 
default  has  admitted  all  the  traversable  facts  which 
were  properly  pleaded  in  the  declaration  or  com- 
plaint, as  discussed  supra  §  201,  he  usually  is  not 
permitted  on  the  hearing  of  an  application  for  a 
default  judgment  to  introduce  any  evidence  con- 
troverting plaintiffs  cause  of  action  and  his  liability 
thereon  ;4&  but,  as  indicated  in  Damages  §  172  b, 
he  may,  in  a  proceeding  for  the  assessment  of  dam- 
ages, offer  evidence  in  mitigation  or  reduction  of 
the  damages  claimed  by  plaintiff. 


§  214, 


Hearing,  Determination,  and  Relief 
a.  In  general 


b.  Conformity  to  pleadings  and  proof 

c.  Amount 

d.  Attorney's  fees 

a.  In  General 

The  court  may  render  judgment  by  default  or  deny 
the  application  therefor,  continue  the  cause,  and  grant 
further  time  to  plead.  Where  it  renders  Judgment  for 
plaintiff  by  default,  the  court  may  award  such  recovery 
or  relief  as  is  permissible  and  appropriate  under  the  law 
and  the  facts. 

A  default  judgment  may  properly  be  rendered 
without  the  aid  of  a  jury50  where  a  writ  of  inquiry 
is  unnecessary;61  and,  under  some  statutes  relat- 
ing to  particular  classes  of  actions,  a  hearing  is  not 
a  prerequisite  to  a  default  judgment;52  but  where 
the  cause  of  action  must  be  proved,  as  considered 
supra  §  213,  and  the  preliminary  default  must  be 
confirmed,  as  discussed  infra  §  216,  a  confirmation 
of,  or  attempt  to  confirm,  a  preliminary  -default  in- 
volves  a  trial  of  the  case  on  the  merits  and  on  the 
issue  joined  by  the  preliminary  default.53  The  suf- 
ficiency of  the  cause  of  action  stated  in  the  decla- 
ration or  complaint  is  open  for  consideration;54 
and,  where  no  cause  of  action  is  stated,  it  is  proper 
for  the  court  to  dismiss  the  complaint.55  The  court. 


F.2d   732, 


Kan. — Royse  v.  Grage, 

138  Kan.  779. 

Evidence  held  insufficient  to  support 
default  Judgment 

(1)  Generally.— Dreher  v.  Guaran- 
ty Bond  &  Finance  Co.,  16*5  So.  711, 
184  La.  197— W.  T.  Rawleigh  Co.  v. 
Copeland,  La.App..  169  So.  251— Pfei- 
fer  v.  Bacharach,  121  So.  196,  10  La. 
App.  -30 — 34  C.J.  p  190  note  55   [a]. 

(2)  As    to    amonnt. — San    Antonio 
Paper  Co.   v.   Morgan,   Tex.Clv.App., 
53  S.W.2d  6*51,  error  dismissed. 

44*    La.— Wilson   &   Gandy  v.   Cum- 

mlngs,  App.,  -1'50  So.  436. 
Tex. — Pellum   v.    Fleming,   Clv.App., 

283  S.W.  5*31,  writ  of  error  refused 

Fleming  v.  Pellum,   287   S.W.  <492, 

116  Tex.  130. 
34  C.J.  p  190  note  56. 
45.    La.— Noullet    v.    Schulz,    2    La. 

App.,  Orleans,  416. 
48b    S.D. — Gordon  v.  Gordon,  105  N. 

W.  244,  20  S.D.  275. 
34  C.J.  p  190  note  58. 

47.  La.— Victory  Oil  Co.  v.  Von 
Schlemmer,  7  La. App.  289. 

N.J.— Becker  v.  Welliver,  34  AJ2d 
893,  131  N.J.Law  64. 

N.D. — Corn  Exchange  Sav.  Bank, 
Sioux  Falls,  S.  D.,  v.  Northwest 
Const  Co.,  260  N.W.  680,  65  N.D. 
'577. 

34  C.J.  p  190  note  60. 

Action  "by  executor 
An   executor   who   brought   action 

on    note   was   not  an  agent  within 

meaning  of  statutory  provision  that, 

if  all  plaintiffs  are  absent  from  the 


state  at  time  of  bringing  of  suit,  or 
if  plaintiff  is  a  corporation,  affidavit 
or  affirmation  may  be  made  by  an 
agent  of  plaintiffs  who  will  make 
further  oath  or  affirmation  that  he 
has  personal  knowledge  of  the  mat- 
ters therein  stated,  and  hence  execu- 
tor was  not  required  to  make  oath  or 
affirmation  that  he  had  personal 
knowledge  of  matters  stated  in  affi- 
davit— Carey  v.  Howard,  16  A.2d 
289,  178  Md.  '512. 
Basis  of  affidavit 

Under  a  particular  statute,  affida- 
vit of  demand  for  judgment  must  be 
based  on  unconditional  promise  to 
pay  an  ascertained  sum  of  money 
only. — Selly  v.  Fleming  Coal  Co.,  180 
A.  326,  7  W.W.Harr.,  Del.,  34. 

Doubt  a*  to  sufficiency  of  affidavit 
is  resolved  in  favor  of  defendant — 
Holland  v.  Universal  Life  Co.,  180 
A.  328,  7  W.W.Harr.,  Del.,  39. 

Affidavit  held  insufficient  to  sup- 
port judgment 
Fla.— St     Lucie     Estates     v.     Palm 

Beach   Plumbing    Supply   Co.,    133 

So.  8(41,  101  Fla.  205. 
Tex. — Gause   v,   Roden,   Civ. App.,    66 

S.W.2d  400. 
34  OJ.  p  190  note  «0  [a]. 

48*  U.S. — Orsinger  v.  Consolidated 
Flour  Mills  Co.,  C.C.ULI1L,  284  F. 
224.  . 

N.T. — Didier  v.  Warner,  1  Code  Rep. 
42,  '2  Edm.Sel.Cas.  41. 

49.    Ala. — Werten  v.  Koosa,  5<3   So. 

98,  169  Ala.  258. 
34  C.J.  p  189  note  42. 

376 


50.  Ala.— King  v.   Holtam,    122   So. 
405,  219  Ala.  410. 

Direction  of  verdict 

Where  there  has  been  a  default  on 
a  trial,  parties  may  have  a  direction 
of  a  verdict  with  the  same  force 
and  effect  as  though  a  Jury  were 
physically  present — Davis  v.  Ross, 
20  N.T.S.2d  375,  259  App.Div.  577, 
reargument  denied  21  N.T.S.2d  391. 
259  App.Div.  10*29. 

51.  Ala.— Lokey    v.    Ward,    154    So. 
802,  228  Ala.  5*59. 

52.  Ohio. — State  ex  reL   Hughes  v. 
Cramer,    8'4   N.E.2d  772,    138    Ohio- 
St  267. 


53.    La. — Russo 
So.2d  744. 


v.   Aucoin,    App.,   T 


54.  111. — Marabia  v.  Mary  Thompson-. 
Hospital    of    Chicago    for   Women 
and  Children,  140  N.E.  836,  809  111. 
147. 

Pleading  stating  cause  of  action  as 
necessary  to  sustain  judgment  see- 
supra  §  193. 

Correctness  of  conclusion  from  facts 
Whether  pleader  stated  correct  or 
incorrect  conclusion  from  facts  al- 
leged was  question  for  court's  de- 
termination when  judgment  was  en- 
tered.— Wright  v.  Shipman,  TexXJiv. 
App.,  27'9  S.W.  29'6. 

Unless  clearly  "bad,  complaint 
should  be  held  sufficient. — Mihelich- 
v. ,  Butte  Electric  Ry.  Co.,  281  F. 
540,  86  Mont  604. 

55.  Mont — Lindsey  v.  Drs.  Keenan» 
Andrews  &  'Alfred,  165  P.2d  80>4. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  214 


•may  disregard  objections  which  are  not  jurisdic- 
tional,  but  amount  to  no  more  than  mere  irregulari- 
ties.56 

According  to  the  facts,  the  court  may  either  ren- 
der a  judgment  by  default,  or  confirm  the  entry 
thereof,  and  assess  plaintiffs  damages,57  or  it  may 
set  aside  a  preliminary  entry  of  the  default,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  §  333,  or  deny  the  application,  and 
.grant  defendant  further  time  to  answer  or  other- 
wise plead.58  Whether  a  default  judgment  shall 
"be  rendered  in  a  proper  case  or  some  other  permis- 
sible action  taken  rests  largely  in  the  court's  dis- 
cretion,59 which  is  to  be  exercised  in  conformity 
with  the  spirit  of  the  law,  and  in  a  manner  to  sub- 
serve the  ends  of  substantial  justice.6**  However, 
where  by  statute  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  default,  the 
court  may  refuse  it  and  continue  the  cause.61  The 
refusal  of  the  court  to  enter  a  default  at  one  time 
does  not  estop  it  from  granting  a  default  at  a  sub- 
sequent time.62 

Relief  generally.  In  rendering  judgment  for 
plaintiff  by  default,  the  court  may  award  any  re- 
covery or  relief  which  is  appropriate63  and  to 
which  plaintiff  is  entitled  under  the  facts  alleged 
and  relief  demanded  in  his  declaration  or  com- 


plaint,64 but  not  relief  which  is  not  authorized  by 
law.65 

Judgment  for  defendant.  If  plaintiff's  pleading 
states  a  good  cause  of  action,  and  defendant  fails 
to  answer,  it  is  error  to  give  judgment  for  defend- 
ant;66 at  least  affirmative  relief  may  aot  be  given 
in  his  favor  as  long  as  the  default  stands.67  Even 
where  plaintiff  fails  to  appear,  where  defendant  has 
pleaded  only  matter  going  to  defeat  plaintiff's  cause 
of  action,  the  remedy  of  defendant  is  to  move  for 
dismissal  for  want  of  prosecution,68  and  not  to 
prove  his  defense  and  take  a  verdict  and  judgment 
in  his  favor.69  A  judgment  in  favor  of  defendant 
has,  however,  been  sustained  where  required  proof 
of  the  cause  of  action  was  not  introduced  and  con- 
sequently a  judgment  against  him  would  have  been 
improper.70 

Where  defendant  served  by  publication.  Where 
a  nonresident  defendant  is  served  by  publication 
only,  the  proper  judgment  against  him  on  his  default 
is,  not  one  in  personam,  but  a  judgment  quasi  in 
rem.71  A  judgment  in  personam  in  such  a  case  is 
void.72  If  plaintiff  fails  to  prove  his  cause  of  ac- 
tion, the  only  proper  judgment  is  one  dismissing 
the  complaint.73  It  is  not  error  not  to  appoint  an 
attorney  to  represent  one  of  two  defendants  who 


56.  W.Va.— Anderson  v.  Doolittle,  18 
S.B.  724,  38  W.Va.  629. 

34  C.J.  p  191  note  72. 

57.  Wis.— -Wausau  First  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Kromer,  105  N.W.  823,  126  Wis. 
436. 

34  C.J.  p  190  note  64. 

Assessment  of  damages  on  default  or 
interlocutory  judgment  see  Dam- 
ages §§  163-172. 

58.  Mass. — Hooton  v.  Redmond,  130 
N.E.  107,  237  Mass;  508. 

3»4  C.J.  p  190  note  66. 
Restriction  of  time 

If  the  court  grants  defendant 
leave  to  plead,  it  may  restrict  the 
time  within  which  he  may  do  so. — 
Lichtenberger  v.  Worm,  60  N.W.  93, 
41  Neb.  856. 

59.  Ala. — Ex  parte  Central  Alabama 
Dry  Goods  Co.,  189  So.  56,  238  Ala. 
20. 

La. — Levee  Const  Co.  v.  Ectuitable 
Casualty  &  Surety  Co.  of  New 

York,   1-38  So.  431,  173  La.  648. 

N.C. — Brown  v.  Town  of  Hillsboro, 
117  SJSB.  41,  185  N.C.  368. 

Wash. — Garrett  v.  Nespelem  Consol. 
Mines,  139  P.2d  273,  18  Wash.2d 
340 — Graham  v.  Yakima  Stock 
Brokers,  72  P.2d  1041,  192  Wash. 
121. 

In  federal  court  see  Federal  Courts 
5  144  c. 

60.  Wash. — Graham       v.       Yakima 
Stock   Brokers,   T2   P.2d  1141,   1*2 
Wash.  in. 


Discretion  held  abused 
Ala. — Ex  parte  Central  Alabama  Dry 
Goods  Co.,  189  So.  56,  238  Ala.  20. 

61.  La.— -State  v.  Posey,  17  La.Ann. 
352,  87  Am.D.  525. 

62.  Iowa. — Schofield  v.  Peterson,  3"3 
Iowa  597. 

63.  Ky. — Mclntosh   v.    Clark,    Thur- 
mund    &    Richardson,    177    S.W.2d 
155,  296  Ky.  358. 

N.Y.— Karp  v.  Karp,  283  N.Y.S.  65'6, 
246  App.Div.  730. 

64.  Cal.— Faucett  v.  Riveroll,  264  P. 
1098,  20*3  Cal.  438— Kennard  v.  Bln- 
ney,    217  P.    808,   62   CaLApp.    732. 

Fla. — St.     Lucie    Estates    v.     Palm 
Beach  (Plumbing    Supply   Co.,    13«3 
So.  8*41,  101  Fla.  205. 
Minn.— Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Page,  251  N.W.  911,  190  Minn.  360. 
Okl.— Hewitt  Oil  &  Gas  Co.  v.  Ram- 
sey,  261  P.  206,  128  Okl.   87. 
*4  C.J.  p  191  note  68. 

Where  relief  prayed  for  is  not 
definite  and  certain,  and  the  case 
is  not  one  in  which  plaintiff  may, 
without  application  to  the  court,  en- 
ter judgment  on  default,  on  such  ap- 
plication for  Judgment  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  court  to  determine  the  precise 
relief  to  which  plaintiff  is  entitled. 
—Smith  v.  Rathbun,  88  N.Y.  660. 

66.  N.Y.— Bank  of  America  Nat. 
Ass'n  v.  Dames,  289  N.Y.S.  5*58. 
195  Misc.  391. 

377 


66.  Neb. — Bouscaren    v.    Brown,    59 
N.W.  m,  40  Neb.  722. 

33  C.J.    p    1143    note    64—34    C.J.   p 
191  note  73. 

67.  Mo. — Leclede  Land  &  Improve- 
ment Co.  v.  Creason,  1T5  S.W.  55, 
264  Mo.  4*52. 

Dismissal  of  counterclaim 

When  defendant  did  not  appear  on 
the  trial  day,  the  court  when  ren- 
dering Judgment  for  plaintiff  on  its 
cause  of  action  should  have  dis- 
missed the  counterclaim  for  failure 
to  prosecute. — Springfield  Gas  & 
Electric  Co.  v.  Fraternity  Bldg.  Co., 
Mo.App.,  264  S.W.  429. 

68.  Ga. — Woodall  v.  Exposition  Cot- 
ton Mills,  120  S.E.  423,  31  Ga.App. 
269. 

69.  Ga. — Woodall  v.  Exposition  Cot- 
ton Mills,  supra. 

7a  Tex. — Elrst  Nat.  Bank  v.  Rob- 
ert, Civ.App.,  10  S.W.2d  1010. 

71.  Vt— French  v.  White,  62  A.  *5, 
78    Vt.    89,    2    L.R.A.,N.S.,    804,    6 
Ann.Cas.  479. 

•3*4  C.J.  p  191  note  78. 

72.  -Iowa.— Smith  v.  Griffin,  18  N.W. 
423,  59  Iowa  409. 

34  C.J.  p  191  note  79. 

73.  N.Y.— Berger    v.    Horsfield,    176 
N.Y.S.   854,   183  APP.D1V.  649. 

Necessity  of  proof  of  cause  of  ac- 
tion where  defendant  served  by 
publication  see  supra  8  213. 


§  214 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


was  served  by  publication  and  who  filed  no  answer 
and  made  no  appearance,  where  he  testifies  as  a  wit- 
ness at  the  trial.74 

b.  Conformity  to  Pleadings  and  Proof 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  As  to  relief 

(1)  In  General 

A  default  Judgment  must  strictly  conform  to,  and 
be  supported  by,  the  allegations  of  the  petition  or  com- 
plaint. 

A  judgment  for  plaintiff  by  default  must  strictly75 
conform  to,  and  be  supported  by,  the  allegations  of 
the  petition  or  complaint,76  a  closer  correspondence 
between  pleading  and  judgment  being  necessary 
than  after  a  contested  trial.77  Defendant's  default 
does  not  enlarge  or  broaden  plaintiff's  claim  and 
rights  under  the  allegations  of  the  petition  ;78  nor 
may  the  allegations  of  the  petition  be  enlarged  by 
any  evidence  offered  or  introduced  on  confirmation 

74.    Tex. — Sharpe   v.   National  Bank   81.    Ark. — Corpus 
of  Commerce,    Civ.App.f    272    S.W. 
321. 

75-  N.C.— Federal  Land  Bank  of 
Columbia  v.  Davis,  1  S,E.2d  350, 
21'5  N.C.  100. 


of  the  default  judgment.79  Where  plaintiff  proceeds 
under  a  statute  requiring  proof,  and  his  own  evi- 
dence shows  that  he  has  no  cause  of  action,  it  is 
proper  to  render  judgment  in  favor  of  defend- 


76.     Cal.—  Flores   v.   Smith,  «117   P.2d 

T12,    47    Oal.App.2d    253—  Gregg   v. 

Stark,    17    P.2d    766,    128    Cal.App. 

434. 
Idaho.—  Angel  v.  Mellen,  235  P.  461, 

48  Idaho  750. 
Tex.  —  Bass   v.    Brown,    Civ.App.,    262 

S.W.  894. 
•Wash.  —  Bates   v.    Glaser,   227   P.   15. 

130  Wash.  328. 

.  —  Armand     Co.     v.     Federal 


77. 

Trade  Commission,  C.C.A.,  84  F.2d 
973,  certiorari  denied  56  S.Ct  309, 
296  U.S.  650,  80  L.Ed.  '463,  certio- 
rari denied  57  S.Ct  189,  299  U.S. 
$97,  81  LJEd.  440,  rehearing  denied 
57  S.Ct  234,  299  U.S.  62«3,  81  L.Ed. 
4*59. 

78.  Iowa.—  Kayburn   v.    Maher,    288 
N.  W.  136,  227  Iowa  2T4. 

judgment  foreign  to  pleadings 

Defendant's  failure  to  appear  and 
defend  an  action  on  a  note  did  not 
entitle  plaintiffs  to  findings  or  judg- 
ment foreign  to  the  pleadings  in  the 
case.  —  Petersen  v.  Dethlefs,  298  N.W. 
155,  139  Neb.  572. 

79.  La.—  Atkins  v.    Smith,   App.,   21 
So.2d  8*5,  reversed  in  part  on  other 
grounds  1*5  So.2d  855,  204  La.  468. 

Testimony     not     admissible     under 

pleading 
La.—  W.  T.  Rawleigh  Co.  v.  Cbpeland, 

App.,  169  So.  251. 


80.    Hfcwaii.— Hirokawa   v. 
Hawaii  228. 


Abe,    29 


Johnson    v.    Swanson, 

803,  805. 
Ind. — Christ  v.  Jovanoff,  151  N.B.  26, 

84   Ind. App.  ;676,   rehearing  denied 

152  N.B.  2,  8<4  Ind.App.  676. 
Iowa.— Manassa  v.   Garland,    206   N. 

W.  33,  200  Iowa  1129. 


Mont.— Steinbrenner  *v.  Love,  129  P. 
2d  101,  113  Mont  466— Stillwater 
County  v.  Kenyon,  297  P.  453,  89 
Mont.  m— State  v.  District  Court 
of  Eighth  Judicial  Dist,  284  P. 
128,  86  Mont  387. 

N.C.— Lane  v.  Becton,  35  S.E.2d  33'4, 
225  N.C.  457. 

34  C.J.  p  191  note  82. 

2.     Iowa.— Oviatt  v.   Oviatt,   156  N. 
W.  687,  174  Iowa  512. 
3'4  C.J.  p  191  note  S3. 

83.  Cal. — Balaam  v.  Perazzo,  295  P. 
330,  221  Cal.  375— Peck  v.  Peck, 
127  P.2d  34,  52  Cal.App.2d  792— 
Barton  v.  Maal,  55  P.2d  529,  12  Cal. 
App.2d  353— In  re  Thurnell's  Es- 
tate, App.,  19  P.2d  14— McOmie  v. 
Board  of  Directors  of  Veterans' 
Home  of  California,  263  P.  253,  88 
Cal.  App.  16. 

Colo.— Barslund  v.  Anderson,  103  P. 
2d  23,  10'6  Colo.  238. 

Idaho.— ^STielson  v.  Garrett,  43  P.2d 
380,  55  Idaho  240— -Angel  v.  Mel- 
len, 285  P.  «461,  48  Idaho  750. 

I1L— Kryl  v.  Zelezny,  8  N.E.2d  223, 
290  IlLApp.  -599. 

Ind. — Christ  v.  Jovanoff,  151  N.E. 
26,  84  Ind.App.  676,  rehearing  de- 
nied 162  NJB.  2,  84  Tnd.App.  676. 

Minn. — Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Page,  251  N.W.  911,  190  Minn. 
360. 

Miss. — Grissom  v.   General  Contract 
Purchase  Corporation,  4  So.2d  3 
191  Miss.  742. 

Mont— Steinbrenner  v.  Love,  129  P. 

378 


(2)  As  to  Relief 

The  relief  granted  plaintiff  in  a  judgment  by  default 
must  conform  to,  and  be  supported  by,  the  allegations 
in  the  complaint,  as  well  as  by  the  proof  in  support  of 
the  allegations  where  such  proof  is  required. 

The  relief  granted  plaintiff  on  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault must  conform  to,  and  be  supported  by,  the  al- 
legations of  the  declaration  or  complaint,81  and  the 
proofs  in  support  thereof,82  where  such  proof  is 
required,  as  discussed  supra  §  213  ;  and  it  may  not 
be  any  different  from,  or  greater  than,  that  which 
plaintiff  has  demanded  in  his  complaint.88  Plain- 
tiffs relief  in  a  judgment  by  default  is  strictly  lim- 
ited in  nature  and  degree  to  that  specifically  de- 
manded in  the  complaint,84  even  though  the  allega- 

2d  101,  113  Mont  466—  Stillwater 
County  v.  Kenyon,  297  P.  453,  89 
Mont.  354  —  State  v.  District  Court 
of  Eighth  Judicial  Dist.,  284  P. 
128,  86  Mont.  387—  State  V.  District 
Court  of  Nineteenth  Judicial  Dist. 
in  and  for  Toole  County,  245  P. 
529,  76  Mont.  143. 
Nev.  —  Keyes  v.  Nevada  Ghas  Co.,  38 


cited     in 
189    S.W.2d 


P.2d 


5'5  Nev.  431. 


N.Y.—  Slote  v.  Cascade  Holding  Cor- 

poration,   11   N.E.2d   894.   276   N.Y. 

239—  Schiekler  v.  Gordon,  219  N.Y. 

S.  909,  219  App.Div.  747. 
N.C.  —  Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Simms  v. 

Sampson,    20    S.E.2d   55-4,    559,    221 

N.C.  379. 
Wash.  —  Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ermey 

v.    Ermey,    139    P.2d   1016—  Aid   v. 

Bowerman,   232   P.  297,   132  Wash. 

S19. 
Wis.  —  Parish  v.  Awschu  Properties, 

10  N.W.2d  166,  243  Wis.  269—  Good 

v.  Schiltz,  218  N.W.  727,  195  Wis. 

481. 
33  C.J.  p  1146  note  89  [a],  [c]f  [d],  p 

1T47  note  93—34  C.J.  p  154  note  18, 

p  191  note  85,  p  192  note  88. 

84.    Cal.  —  Estrin   v.    Superior   Court 
in  and  for  Sacramento  County,  96 
P.2d  340,   14  Cal.2d  670—  American 
Securities  Co.  v.  Van  Lofcen  Sels, 
56   P.2d  1247,  13  Cal.App.2d  265. 
Minn.—  Pilney  v.  Funk,  3  N.W.2d  792, 
212  Minn.  398—  Keys  v.  Schultz,   2 
N.W.2d  549,   21'2  Minn.   109. 
33  C.J.  p  1147  note  93  [f]. 

Piling  of  demurrer  is  not  the  mak- 
ing of  a  "defense"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  statute  providing  that, 
if  no  "defense"  is  made,  plaintiff 
may  not  have  judgment  for  any  re- 
lief not  specifically  demanded.  —  Un- 
ion Light,  Heat  &  Power  Co.  v.  City 
of  Bellevue,  1414  S.W.2d  104'6,  284  Ky. 
40*5. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  214 


fions85  or  the  proofs,86  or  both,87  would  justify 
other,  '  additional,  or  greater  relief,  as  under  a 
prayer  for  general  relief.88 

According  to  some  authorities  a  default  judgment 
for  relief  different  from,"  or  greater  than,  that  de- 
manded is  void;89  but  according  to  others  it  is 
merely  erroneous  or  voidable.90  If  the  complaint 
states  a  cause  of  action  sufficient  to  sustain  the 
relief  actually  given,  the  judgment  will  not  be  held 
invalid  because  the  complaint  also  states  facts  au- 
thorizing other  relief;91  and  it  has  been  held,  on 
the  theory,  that  the  allegations  and  not  the  prayer 
in  a  petition  should  control  such  a  judgment,92  that 
the  judgment  is  not  void  because  the  relief  afforded 
was  not  specifically  prayed  for.93 

Where  the  complaint  is  amended,  and  defendant 
does  not  answer  either  the  original  or  the  amended 
complaint,  he  may  not  object  that  the  relief  granted 
under  the  amended  complaint  is  greater  than  that 
demanded  in  the  original  complaint,94  unless  the 
amendment  is  made  without  notice  to  him.95 

Award  of  damages  to  defendant.  It  is  error  to 
award  damages  to  defendant  where,  although  plain- 
tiff  defaults  by  failing  to  appear  at  the  time  set  for 
trial,  no  issue  as  to  damages  to  defendant  has  been 
raised  in  the  pleadings.96 

c.  Amount 
A  default  judgment  may  be  rendered  for  the  amount 


claimed  in  the  complaint,  but  not  for  a  greater  amount. 
It  should  not  include  interest  unless  interest  is  de- 
manded in  the  complaint. 

A  judgment  by  default  may  be.  rendered  for  the 
amount  claimed  in  the  complaint,97  less  amounts 
received  in  payment  in  the  meantime,98  unless  the 
case  has  been  compromised  for  a  smaller  sum,99 
or  unless  evidence  is  required  and  a  prima  facie 
case  made  for  the  full  amount  claimed  is  destroyed 
in  whole  or  in  part  by  other  evidence.1  Judgment 
should  not  be  rendered  for  an  amount  greater  than 
that  prayed  for  in  the  declaration  or  complaint,2 
or  justified  by  the  facts  alleged,8  although  the  evi- 
dence shows  a  larger  amount4  The  fact  that  a 
part  of  the  claim  is  barred  by  the  statute  of  limi- 
tations does  not  render  a  default  judgment  for  the 
whole  illegal.5 

Interest.  Except  to  the  extent  that  interest  is 
demanded  in  the  complaint,6  interest  should  not  be 
included  in  the  judgment;7  and,  even  where  interest 
is  allowed,  it  should  not  be  allowed  for  more  than 
the  legal  rate.8  Under  some  statutes,  the  clerk  of 
the  court,  in  entering  a  default  judgment,  is  author- 
ized to  compute  and  allow  interest  if  the  complaint 
asks  for  a  certain  sum  with  interest;9  but  this  does 
not  invalidate  a  judgment,  the  interest  on  which  is 
computed  by  the  court.10 

d.  Attorney's  Fees 
A  statutory  or  contractual  provision  therefor  Is  es- 


85.  Cal. — American  Securities  Co.  v. 
Van  Loben  Sels,   56  P.2d  1247,  13 
Cal.App.2d  26*5. 

86.  Minn.— Pilney  v.  Funk,  3  N.W.2d 
792,  212  Minn.  398. 

facts  not  alleged,  although  proved, 
may  not  form  the  basis  of  the  judg- 
ment.— International  Harvester  Co. 
v.  Cameron,  105  P.  189,  25  Okl.  256. 

87.  Minn.— Keys  v.  Schultz,  2  N.W. 
2d  549,  212  Minn.  109. 

88.  Cal.— Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Welch,  260  P.  5'4'5,  202  Cal.  312 
— American  Securities  Co.  v.  Van 
Loben   Sels,    56   P.2d  1247,   13   Cal. 
App.2d  265. 

Idaho.— Angel  v.  Mellen,  285  P.  461, 

'48  Idaho  750. 
33  C.J.  p  1147  note  33  Eg]. 

99.    Cal. — Balaam  v.  Perazzo,  295  P. 

330,  221  Cal.  375. 
Mont — State    v.    District    Court    of 

Eighth  Judicial  Dist.,   284   P.   128, 

86  Mont.  387. 
N.M.— Corpus    Juris   cited   in  Walls 

v.  Erupcion  Min.  Co.,  6  P.2d  1021, 

1025,  36  N.M.  15. 
"33  C.J.  p  1148  note  9S— 34  C.J.  p  192 

note   91,   p   564   note   35    [a]. 

SO.  Ind. — Christ  v.  Jovanoff,  151  N. 
B.  2*6,  $4  Ind.App.  676,  rehearing 
denied  152  N.E.  2,  84  Ind.App.  676. 


N.C. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Simms 
v.  Sampson,  20  S.E.2d  554,  559,  221 
N.C.  379. 

33  C.J.  p  1147  note  94— 3'4  C.J.  P  192 
note  92. 

91.  Cal. — Zucco   v.    Farullo.    174   P. 
929,  37  CaLApp.  562. 

92.  Ky. — Mansfield   v.    Mansfield,    2 
Ky.Op.  182. 

93.  Ky. — Burton  v.  Louisville,  85  S. 
W.  727,  27  Ky.L.  '514, 

94.  N.T.— Carr  v.   Sterling,   22  N.E. 
37,  114  N.T.  $B8. 

Wash. — Bobbins  v.  Wyman,  135  P. 
6-56,  75  Wash.  617. 

95.  Iowa.— Chandler    Mill.    &    Mfg. 
Co.  v.   Sinaiko,   208  N.W.   323,   201 
Iowa  791. 

33  C.J.  p  1147  note  93  [d]— 34  C.J.  p 
192  note  98. 

96.  Cal.— Evans   v.    Baxter,    260    P- 
832,  86  CaLApp.  412. 

97.  111.— Kryl   v.   Zelezny,   8   N.E.2d 
223,  290  Ill.App.  599. 

34  C.J.  p  192  note  tt. 

98.  111.— Beckers   v.   -Kankakee,    213 
I11.APP.  5S8.  ' 

Va. — Rees  v.  Conococheague  Bank,  5 
Band.  326,  26  Va,  326,  16  Am.D. 
755. 

99.  Ark. — Ozark  Ins.  Co.  v.  Leather- 
wood,   96   S.W.  37<4,   79  Ark.  252. 

379 


!•    La. — Russo  v.  Aucoin,  App.,  7  So. 

2d  744. 
&     Cal.— Floras   v.    Smith,    117    P.2d 

712,    47    Cal.App.2d    253. 
111.— Kryl   v.   Zelezny,    8   N.E.2d   223, 

290  Ill.App.  599. 
S.D. — Jones    v.    Johnson,    222    N.W. 

688,  54  S.D.  149. 

33  C.J.  p  1166  note  11—34  C.J.  p  192 
note  4. 

3.  Miss. — Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Nesho- 
ba  County  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 
160  So.  730,  172  Miss.  326. 

•34  C.J.  p  192  note  5. 

4.  La. — Craver  v.   Gillespie,   86   So. 
730,  148  La.  182. 

5.  Pa.— Wilson  v.  Hayes,  18  Pa.  354. 

6.  Cal. — Flores   v.    Smith,    1'17   P.2d 
712,  47  Cal.App.2d  253. 

111.— Kryl  v.  Zelezny,    8  N.E.2d   22«3, 
290  Ill.App.  599. 

34  C.J.  p  193  note  12. 

7.  CaL— Flores   v.    Smith,    117   P.2<J 
712,  47  Cal.App.2d  253. 

34  C.J.  p  193  note  IB. 

8.  Ky. — Dysart    v.    Logan,    2    J.J. 
Marsh.  428. 

9.  -Ala.— RadclifiC  v.  Erwin,  Minor  88. 
N.T.— Bullard  v.  Sherwood,   85  N.Y. 

253. 

10.  Ala.— Radclitt  v.   Erwin,   Minor 
88. 


§  214 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


sential   to  the   allowance  of  attorney's  fees  to  plaintiff 
on  the  rendition  of  a  default  judgment  In  his  favor. 

A  default  judgment  for  plaintiff  may  include  at- 
torney's fees  where  the  petition  brings  the  case 
within  a  statute  imposing  liability  for  such  fees  on 
defendant;11  but,  as  a  general  rule,  plaintiff  will 
not,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  be  entitled  to  an  al- 
lowance for  attorney's  fees,12  except  where  the  suit 
is  on  a  written  instrument  containing  a  stipulation 
for  .the  payment  of  an  attorney's  fee,  in  which  case 
the  judgment  rendered  on  defendant's  default  may 
include  the  amount  of  such  fee  as  well  as  the  prin- 
cipal sum  of  plaintiff's  demand,13  and  even  in  such 
case  the  allowance  of  the  fee  is  subject  to  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  court,14  and  the  fee  may  be  disal- 
lowed in  a  proper  case.15 

Costs  generally  where  judgment  is  by  default  are 
discussed  in  Costs  §  70. 

• 
§  215.    Form  and  Requisites  of  Judgment 

A  default  Judgment  must  comply  with  general  re- 
quirements as  to  the  form  and  contents  of  judgments, 
except  in  so  far  as  the  statutes  and  rules  of  practice 
govern  the  rendition  and  entry  of  such  Judgments. 

The  essentials  to  the  existence,  validity,  and  reg- 
ularity of  judgments  generally,  as  discussed  supra 
§§  13-61,  and  ,the  general  requirements  as  to  the 


form  and  contents  of  judgments,  as  considered  su- 
pra §§  62-86,  apply  to  judgments  by  default,1*  ex- 
cept in  so  far  as  special  statutes  and  rules  of  prac- 
tice govern  the  rendition  and  entry  of  such  judg- 
ments,17 and,  even  in  such  a  case,  although  it  is 
preferable  that  the  entry  be  made  in  the  language 
of  the  statute,18  it  is  not  essential  that  any  set  form 
be  followed,  a  substantial  compliance  with  the  stat- 
utory requirements  being  sufficient.19  The  judg- 
ment rendered  must  pronounce  the  true  sentence 
of  the  law,20  and  must  be  definite  and  certain  as 
to  its  terms,21  and  as  to  the  amount  of  the  recov- 
ery;22 and  must  be  more  than  a  mere  order  that 
judgment  be  entered.23  Where  the  judgment  is 
given  against  a  defendant  absent  from  the  state, 
it  should  direct  plaintiff  to  comply  with  the  statu- 
tory provisions  which  in  such  a  case  are  necessary 
to  entitle  him  to  execution.24  The  judgment  should 
be  properly  docketed  or  filed;25  but,  if  it  is  duly 
rendered,  the  fact  that  it  is  not  entered  on  the  rec- 
ord does  not  affect  its  validity  as  against  defend- 
ant, if  it  is  so  entered  before  any  action  is  taken 
by  him.2* 

Designation  of  parties.  The  judgment  must  des- 
ignate the  parties  for  and  against  whom  it  is  ren- 
dered;27 and  the  names  of  the  parties  appearing 
in  the  judgment  must  correspond  with  those  in  the 


11.  Tex.— Rhyne  v.  Missouri  State 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  Com.App.,  291  S.W. 
8-45. 

12-  Fla.— Florida  Dev.    Co.   v.    Polk 
County  Nat.  Bank,   80   So.  560,   76 
Fla.  629. 

Ga, — Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Bank  v. 

Alford,    94     S.B.     818,    21    Ga.App. 

546. 
Contract  conditional  as  to  fees 

Where  note  providing  for  princi- 
pal, interest,  and  attorney's  fees  is 
conditional  as  to  attorney's  fees  and 
not  unconditional  contract,  judgment, 
although  by  default,  cannot  be  ren- 
dered thereon  by  the  court  without 
jury< — Fowler  v.  Bank  of  Commerce, 
143  S.E.  512,  38  Ga.App.  226. 

13-  Fla. — Streety     v.     John     Deere 
Plow  Co.,  109  So.  632. 

34  C.J.  P  193  note  20. 

14.  Pa. — Philadelphia  Trust  &  Safe 
Deposit  Co.  v.  McDaniel,  2  Pa.Co. 
102. 

15.  Pa.— Philadelphia  Trust  &  Safe 
Deposit  Co.  v.  McDaniel,  supra. 

34  C.J.  P  193  note  22. 

16.  Colo.— Hoehne     v.     Trugillo,     1 
Colo.  161,  91  Am.D.  70«. 

34  C.J.  P  193  note  25. 
Judgment  held  one  toy  default 
Ala.— Coffee  y.  Keeton,  26  So.2d  SO. 


Default  judgments  held  sufficient 
Ark.— Shelton   v.    Landers,   270   S.W. 

522,  167  Ark.  638. 
34  C.J.  p  193  note  25  [a]. 
Default   judgments   held   regular  or 

not  void  on  face  thereof 
CaL— Associated    Oil    Co.   v.    Mullin, 

294   P.   421,   110   CaLApp.   &85. 
Tex. — Arenstein  v.   Jencks,   Civ.App., 

179   S.W.2d   831,   error  dismissed — 

Citizens     Mut.     Life     &    Accident 

Ass'n   of   Texas   v.   Gillespie,   Civ. 

App.,  93  S.W.Sd  200. 

17.  Mont.— Palmer  v.  McMaster,  19- 
P.  585,  8  Mont  186. 

34  C.J.  p  193  note  27. 

18.  Ga.— Jenkins    v.    Whittier   Mills 
Co.,  93  S.E.  530,  20  Ga.App.  828. 

19.  Ga. — American  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Albright,  89  S.B.  487,  14'5  Ga.  515. 

34  C.J.  p  193  note  29. 

iStrict  compliance 

It  has  been  declared  that  there 
must  be  strict  compliance  with  the 
statutory  provisions  relative  to  the 
entry  of  default  judgments. — Smak 
V.  Gwozdik,  291  NVW.  270,  293  Mich. 
185. 

20.  Conn. — New  York  N.  H.  &  H.  R. 
R.   Co.   v.   Hungerford,   52  A.  '487, 
75  Conn.  76. 

21.  N.T.— U.  S.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jor- 
dan, 4'6  Hun  202,  21  Abb.N.Caa.  330. 

380 


22*    Miss. — Claughton    v.    Black,    24 

Miss.  185. 

34  C.J.  p  193  note  32. 
Proportion  of  debt  for  which  one  of 
several  defendants  liable 

Where  a  creditor  sued  two  named 
defendants  and  heirs  of  another  per- 
son jointly,  judgment  by  default 
against  defendants  and  heirs  was 
invalid  as  to  defendant  who  appeal- 
ed, where  it  failed  to  comply  with  a 
statute  by  fixing  proportion  of  debt 
for  which  he  was  liable  and  propor- 
tion could  not  be  ascertained  by  ref- 
erence to  pleadings. — Hagerdorn  v. 
Klotz,  La.App.,  18'5  So.  653. 

23.  111.— Loughlin    v.    Q.    Heileman 
Brewing  Co.,   189   IlLApp.   176. 

34  C.J.  p  19'4  note  33. 

Entry  evidently  intended  as  guide 
to  clerk  in  making  up  his  record  at 
some  subsequent  time  is  not  a  judg- 
ment.— Townsend  v.  Postal  Benefit 
Ass'n  of  Illinois,  262  Ill.App.  483. 

24.  Conn. — Strong    T.    Meacham,    1 
Root  391. 

25.  Wash. — Warner  v.  Miner,  82  P. 
10-33,  41  Wash.  98, 

34  C.J.  p  194  note  35. 

26.  Iowa.— Romayne     v.     Hawkeye 
Commercial  Men's  Ass'n,  135  N.W. 
73'5. 

27.  Fla.— Stringfellow  T.  <AJax-Grieb 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  216 


pleadings  and  process,28  the  ordinary  rules  as  to 
variance  in  this  respect  being  applicable.29 

Separate  judgments  or  findings.  Where  distinct 
suits  are  brought,  separate  judgments  by  default 
must  be  rendered  therein,  although  the  suits  arise 
out  of  the  same  subject  matter  and  the  parties  are 
identical  in  all,30  unless  they  are  consolidated.31 
The  rule  which  requires  the  court  sitting  as  a  jury 
to  find  separately  facts  and  conclusions  of  law,  as 
discussed  in  the  C.J.S.  title  Trial  §  624,  also  64  C.J. 
p  1244  note  72,  does  not  apply  in  rendering  a  judg- 
ment by  default  against  one  of  several  defendants.32 
It  has  been  held  that  there  was  only  one  judgment 
and  one  final  determination  of  the  rights  and  lia- 
bilities of  all  the  parties,  although  that  part  of  the 
final  determination  relating  to  defaulting  defend- 
ants was  reached  on  a  certain  day  and  another  part 
relating  to  the  remaining  defendant  was  reached 
on  a  later  day.33 


§  2'16. 


Final  or  Interlocutory 


Subject  to  statutory  variation,  a  default  Judgment 
against  the  defendant  in  an  action  against  him  ordi- 
narily may  be,  and  is,  Interlocutory  or  final  according- 
ly as  some  act  does  or  does  not  remain  to  be  done. 


A  judgment  by  default  is  either  interlocutory  or 
final;34  and  where  it  is  not  shown  that  it  was  in- 
tended to  be  final  the  tendency  is  to  hold  it  to  be 
interlocutory.36  Under  the  statutes  of  some  juris- 
dictions, as  considered  supra  §  206,  a  final  judg- 
ment cannot  be  entered  immediately  on  a  default; 
there  must  first  be  a  preliminary  entry  of  the  de- 
fault. The  judgment  is  final  where  the  record  is 
such  that  no  such  inquiry  or  act  is  necessary,36  but 
a  judgment  by  default  against  one  of  several  de- 
fendants ordinarily  is  interlocutory37  and  not  final3* 
until  the  conclusion  of  the  case  against  the  other  de- 
fendants,39 although  it  may  be  final  where  defend- 
ants are  sued  jointly  and  severally,  and,  prior  to  the 
judgment,  the  action  was  discontinued  as  to  the 
other  defendants.40 

The  judgment  is  interlocutory  where  a  writ  of  in- 
quiry must  be  issued  thereon,  or  some -other  act  done 
involving  a  future  inquiry  to  determine  the  amount 
of  recovery.41  Generally  a  final  judgment  need  not 
and  cannot  be  entered  where  the  damages  are  un- 
liquidated or  the  amount  of  plaintiffs  claim  is  un- 
certain or  indeterminate  ;42  there  may  or  must  first 


Rubber    Co.,    64    So.    947,    67    Fla. 
$17. 
34  C.J.  p  19'4  note  38. 

28.  Pa,— Noetling  v.  Wallace,  46  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  169,  16  Northumb.Leg. 
J.  128. 

Tex. — Nueces  Hardware  &  Implement 
Co.  v.  Jecker,  Civ.App.,  56  S.W.2d 
474 — Fairbanks  v.  Hayes-Sammons 
Hardware  Co.,  Civ.App.,  55  S.W.2d 
591. 

34  C.J.  p  194  note  39. 

29.  Tex. — Nelson  v.  Detroit  &  Secur- 
ity Trust  Co.,  Com.App.f  56  S.W.2d 
860. 

34  C.J.  p  194  note  39. 
Variance  not  fatal 

Fact  that  petition  and  citation  des- 
ignated plaintiff  as  administrator 
with  will  annexed  did  not  invalidate 
default  judgment  for  plaintiff  as  ex- 
ecutor; and,  where  probate  court's 
order  probating  foreign  will  showed 
that  foreign  corporation,  suing  on 
note,  was  legal  representative,  de- 
fault judgment  is  not  void  because 
in  favor  of  corporation  under  new 
name. — Nelson  v.  Detroit  &  Securi- 
ty Trust  Co.,  Tex.Com.App.,  56  S.W. 
2d  860. 

80.  Miss.— Louisville  N.  R.  B.  Co.  v. 
McCollister,    5    So.    695,    66    Miss. 
10*. 

81.  Miss.— Louisville  N.  R.  B.  Co.  v. 
McCollister,  supra. 

82.  Cal. — Brown    v.    Brown,    8    GaL 
111. 

S3.  Kan.— Korber  v.  Willis,  274  P. 
239,  127  Kan.  587. 


34,     Conn.  —  Falken  v.  Housatonic  B. 

Co.,  27  A.  1117,  63  Conn.  258. 
S.C.  —  Smith  v.  Vanderhorst,   12   S.C. 

L.  328,  10  AmJX  674. 
Final    and    interlocutory    judgments 

generally  see  supra  S  11. 
Terminology 

01)  The  interlocutory  judgment  re- 
ferred to  in  practice  act  provision  re- 
letting  to  assessment  of  damages  on 
entry  of  interlocutory  judgment  by 
default  is  the  equivalent  of  a  judg- 
ment by  default  under  the  ancient 
practice,  and  is  ordinarily  considered 
a  judgment  notwithstanding  it  may 
fall  short  of  an  actual  judgment  in 
the  strictly  technical  sense.  —  Bdel- 
stein  v.  Hub  Loan  Co.,  33  A.2d  829, 
130  N*.J.Law  '511. 

(2)  A  simple  or  naked  default  is 
not  a  substantial  right,  nor  a  final 
determination  of  cause  of  action,  but 
simply  a  finding  by  the  court  that 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  default  on  rec- 
ord.— Weinhart  v.   Meyer,   2<47  N.W. 
811,  215  Iowa  1317. 

(3)  Under  some  statutes  the  pre- 
liminary   entry    made     by    an    an- 
swering defendant  who  defaults  by 
flailing  to  appear  at  the  trial  is,  and 
should  be,  termed  a  decision  rather 
than  a  judgment.  —  Hathaway  v.  Wil- 
son, 161  A.  234,  52  ILL  447  —  Gregson 
v.  Superior  Court,  1'28  A.  221,  46  RJ. 
362. 


"Judgment  by  default  final"  is  dis- 
tinguished from  "judgment  by  de- 
fault and  inauiry,"  in  that  former 
establishes  allegations  of  complaint 

381 


and  concludes  by  way  of  estoppel, 
while  latter  establishes  right  of  ac- 
tion in  plaintiff  of  kind  stated  in 
complaint,  precise  character  and  ex- 
tent of  which  remain  to  be  deter- 
mined by  hearing  in  damages  and 
final  judgment  thereon. — De  Hoff  v. 
Black,  175  S.E.  179,  206  N.C.  687, 
followed  in  Akins  v.  Black,  175  S.B, 
181,  20*6  N.C.  691. 

35.  Pa. — Commonwealth  v.   McClea- 
ry,  92  Pa,  188. 

34  C.J.  p  194  note  45. 

Marking  case  "no  appearance"  im- 
presses it  with  an  interlocutory  judg- 
ment.— Becker  v.  Welliver,  34  A.2d 
893,  131  N.J.Law  64— Edelstein  v 
Hub  Loan  Co.,  33  A.2d  829,  130  N.J. 
Law  511. 

36.  Ind. — Carson  v.  Perkins,  29  N.E. 
2d  772,  217  Ind.  545. 

34  C.J.  p  194  note  48. 

37.  Ala. — Ex  parts   Mason,   10*4   So, 
•523,  213  Ala.  279. 

38.  Mo. — Fleming    v.    McCall,    App., 
35  S.W.2d  60 — Conrath  v.  Houchin, 
34  S.W.2d  190,   226  Mo.App.   261. 

39.  Tex.— Buttrill  v.  Occidental  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  CivJApp.,  45  S.W.2d  636. 

40.  Tex.— Ridley   v.   McCallum,    163 
S.W.2d  833,  139  Tex.  540. 

41.  Ala.— Ex  parte  Haisten,  149  So. 
213,    227  Ala.   ISS—Ewart  v.  Cun- 
ningham, 122  So.  359,  219  Ala.  399. 

Ind.— Carson   v.    Perkins,    29    N.E.2d 

772.  217  Ind.  543. 
34  C.J.  p  194  note  47. 

42.  Colo.— Melville  v.  Weybrew,  120 
P.2d  189,  108  Colo.  620,  certiorari 


§  216 


JUDGMENTS 


49     C.J.S. 


be  an  interlocutory  judgment  by  default,43  and  the 
final  judgment  is  entered  after  the  damages  have 
been  assessed  on  a  writ  of  inquiry  or  otherwise  de- 
termined according  to  law.44  On  the  other  hand, 
where  plaintiffs  claim  is  liquidated  or  certain  in 
amount,  so  that  he  is  entitled  to  recover  that 
amount,  if  anything  at  all,  final  judgment  may  be 
at  once  entered  on  default.45  If  a  part  of  the  decla- 
ration or  complaint  is  unanswered,  plaintiff  may 
have  an  interlocutory  judgment  as  to  such  part,  but 
final  judgment  cannot  be  entered  until  the  issues  are 
tried  and  determined.46 

Confirmation.  In  some  jurisdictions  a  prelimi- 
nary or  interlocutory  judgment .  entered  on  a  de- 
fault must  be  confirmed  by  the  court,  before  it  can 
have  the  effect  of  a  final  judgment;47  but  in  other 
jurisdictions,  when  a  judgment  by  default  is  prop- 
erly entered  by  the  clerk  or  a  commissioner,  in  final 
form,  it  is  regarded  as  the  judgment  of  the  court, 
as  discussed  supra  §  205,  and  confirmation  by  the 
court  is  not  necessary.48 


Directing  judgment.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is 
proper  for  the  court,  on  entering  an  interlocutory 
judgment,  to  direct  what  final  judgment  shall  be 
entered,49  or  to  direct  that  the  final  judgment  shall 
be  settled  by  the  court  or  a  referee,50  or  that  the 
damages  be  assessed  by  a  jury.51 

Lapse  of  time  as  making  final.  Under  some  stat- 
utes, a  default  judgment  becomes  final  after  the  ex- 
piration of  a  prescribed  period  of  time,52  unless  de- 
fendant pleads53  or  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  is 
filed54  in  the  meantime,  or  unless  the  case  is  con- 
tinued at  plaintiffs  instance.55 

|  217.    Recitals  and  Record 

Where  there  is  a  Judgment  by  default,  the  judgment 
should  contain  appropriate  recitals  of  the  facts  on  which 
it  is  based,  and  the  Judgment  roil  or  record  should  con- 
tain whatever  Is  required  by  statute  to  be  included  there- 
in. 

A  judgment  by  default  should  contain  appropri- 
ate recitals  of  the  facts  on  which  the  judgment 
is  based;56  and  in  states  wherein  the  statutes  pro- 


denied  62  S.Ct  795,  315  U.S.  811,  86 
L.'Ed.  1210,  rehearing  denied  62  S. 
Ct  913,  315  U.S.  830,  86  L.Ed.  1224. 

N.C. — Chozen  -Confections  v.  John- 
son, 11  S.E.2d  472,  218  N.C.  500— 
Baker  v.  Corey,  141  -S.E.  892,  195 
N.O.  299— Brooks  v.  White,  122  S. 
E.  561,  187  N.C.  656— Pyles  v. 
Pyles,  122  S.B.  12,  187  NX!.  486. 

Or. — McAuliffe  v.  McAuliffe,  298  P. 
239,  136  Or.  168. 

Tex.— Morgan  v.  Davis,  Civ.App.,  292 
S.W.  610. 

34  C.J.  p  194  note  50. 

43.  'N.C. — Chozen      Confections      v. 
Johnson,    11    S.E.2d   472,    218    N.C. 
500 — Standard  Supply  Co.  v.  Vance 
Plumbing  &  Electric  Co.,  143   S.B. 
248,  195  N.C.  629— Brooks  v.  White, 
122  S.OL  561,  187  N.C.  65'6— Pyles  v. 
Pyles,  122  S.B.  12,  187  N.C.  486. 

Tex.— Ridley  v.  McCallum,  163  S.W. 

2d  833,   139   Tex.  540 — Southern  S. 

S.    Co.    v.    Schumacher    Co.,    Civ. 

Aow>.,  154  S.W.2d  28'3,  error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  194  note  51. 

Interlocutory  Judgment  in  not  nec- 
essary in  some  states.-^Fawkes  v. 
National  Refining  Co.,  108  S.W.2d  7, 
'341  Mo.  630 — Cornoyer  v.  Oppermann 
Drug  Co.,  Mo.App.,  56  S.W.2d  612. 

44.  Colo.— Melville  v.  Weybrew,  120 
P.2d  189,   108   Colo.   520,   certiorari 
denied   62   S..Ct.   795,    315   U.S.   811, 
'816  iLJSJd.  1210,  rehearing  denied  €2 
S.Ct.    913,   815    U.S.    830,    86   L.Bd. 
1224. 

Tex.— Ridley  v.  McCallum,  163  S.W. 
2d  833,  1*39  Tex.  540 — Southern  S. 
S.  Co.  v.  Schumacher  Co.,  Civ.App., 
154  S.W.2d  283,  error  refused. 

i34  C.J.  p  194  note  51. 

45.  N.C. — Standard    Supply    Co.    v. 
Vance  Plumbing  &  Electric  Co-  149 


S.E.    248,    195    N.C.    629— Baker   v. 
Corey,  141  S.B.  892,  195  N.C.  299— 
Gillam  v.  Cherry,  134  S.B.  423,  192 
N.C.  195. 
34  C.J.  p  195  note  53. 

48.  111. — Lucas  v.  Farrington,  21  I1L 
31. 

'34  C.  J.  p  195  note  64. 
Better  course 

Although  judgment  nil  dicit  may 
be  proper,  better  course  is  to  re- 
serve entry  of  final  judgment  on  un- 
contested  issues  until  contested  is- 
sues are  adjudicated. — Clonts  v. 
Spurway,  139  So.  896,  104  Fla.  340. 
47.  La.— Ballard  v.  Lee,  14  La.  211. 
34  C.J.  p  195  note  55. 

After  disposition  of  motion  to  set 
aside  preliminary  default,  way  was 
open    under   court's    rules    for   con- 
firmation of  default — Motor  (Finance 
Co.  v.  'Lynn,  La.App.,  142  So.  -310. 
Confirmation,  hold  sufficient 
La.— W.  T.  Raleigh  Co.  v.  Freeland, 

App.,  16  So.2d  489. 

Confirmation  after  filing-  of  answer 
is      void.— McClelland     v.      District 
Household  of  Ruth,  La.App.,  151  So. 
246—34  C.J.  p  195  note  55  [b]. 
43.    -U.S.— Patons  v.  Lee,  B.C.,  18  'F. 

Cas.No.10,800,  5  Cranch  C.C.  646. 
Wash.— Peterson  v.  Dillon,  67  P.  397, 

27  Wash.  78. 

49.  N.T.— U.  S.  Life  ins.  Co.  v.  Jor- 
dan, 46  Hun  201,  21  AbbJST.Cas.  330. 

50.  N.Y.— Kerr   v.   Dildine,    14   N.T. 
Civ.Proc.  176. 

51.  N.Y.— Shiffner  v.    Beck,    145   N. 
Y.S.  27,  159  App.Div.  821. 

Assessment  of  damages  by  Jury  aft- 
er Interlocutory  Judgment  see 
(Damages  §  168. 

382 


52.  Idaho. — Brainard         v.         Cceur 
d'Alene  Antimony  Min.  Co.,  208  P. 
855,  35  Idaho  742. 

34  C.J.  p  195  note  -62. 

Time    prescribed    for    appeal    where 

no  appeal  taken 
Cal. — People  v.  Bames  City,   288  P. 

442,  10S  CaLApp.  618. 
In  Maryland 

A  default  judgment  becomes  en- 
rolled on  the  expiration  of  the  term 
of  court  at  which  it  is  entered  or, 
where  the  action  is  in  one  of  the 
courts  of  Baltimore,  at  the  end  of 
thirty  days  after  the  entry  of  the 
judgment. — Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A. 
2d  276,  181  Md.  206— Dixon  v.  Balti- 
more American  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York, 
188  A,  215,  171  Md.  695— Wagner  v. 
Scurlock,  170  A.  5*39,  166  Md.  284— 
Murray  v.  Hurst,  163  A.  183,  163  Md. 
481,  85  A.L.R.  442. 

53.  Va. — Gring  v.   Lake   Drummond 
Canal  &  Water  Co.,  67  S.E.  -360,  110 
Va.  754. 

54.  Tex.— RJdley    v.    McCallum,    163 
S.W.2d  833,  139  Tex.  540. 

55.  W.Va. — Pennsboro     First     Nat 
Bank  v.  Barker,  83  S.B.  898,  75  W. 
Va.  244. 

50.    Colo.— Hille    v.    Evans.    187    P> 

'315,  -68  Colo.  98. 
34  C.J.  p  195  note  67. 
Defendant's    liability    for    debt    or 
claim 

It  has  been  held  that  the  judg- 
ment should  recite  facts  which  show 
defendant's  liability  for  the  debt  or 
claim  sought  to  be  recovered. — Gra- 
ham v.  Reynolds,  45  Ala.  578 — Smith 
y.  Mobile  Branch  Bank,  5  Ala.  26. 


49    C-J-S- 


JUDGMENTS 


§  217 


vide  what  the  judgment  roll  or  record  in  case  of 
judgments  by  default  shall  contain  there  should  be 
a  compliance  therewith.57  The  record  of  the  judg- 
ment imports  verity  of  the  facts  recited;58  but  a 
recital  in  the  judgment  of  a  fact  is  not  proof  there- 
of, where  the  contrary  appears  from  the  records  of 
the  court.59 

Jurisdictional  facts.  The  judgment  or  record 
must  disclose  facts  which  show  that  the  court  had 
jurisdiction  in  the  case,60  such  as  that  process  or 
notice  had  been  duly  and  properly  issued  and  served 
on  defendant,61  and  that  all  facts  necessary  to  give 
the  court  jurisdiction  had  been  proved,62  or  that 
defendant  had  acknowledged  or  waived  service  and 
voluntarily  appeared.63  However,  a  failure  to  re- 
cite such  facts  in  the  judgment  does  not  invalidate 
it,  if  they  sufficiently  appear  in  the  record;64  and 
a  mere  showing  that  proof  of  service  of  summons 
is  absent  from  the  judgment  roll  several  years  after 
the  entry  of  judgment  is  insufficient  to  defeat  the 
judgment,65  especially  where  filing  of  due  proof 
of  service  is  recited  in  the  judgment  itself  and  in 
the  records  of  the  court,  and  is  stated  in  an  affida- 


vit of  the  attorney  at  whose  instance  the  judg- 
ment was  entered.66  The  judgment  need  not  recite 
that  defendant  had  been  called.67  Where  the  serv- 
ice of  process  was  constructive  only,  as  by  publi- 
cation, the  judgment  itself  or  the  record  should  af- 
firmatively show  a  full  compliance  with  the  statute 
authorizing  such  service,68  and  if  the  record  shows 
service  of  an  insufficient  notice  it  will  not  be  pre- 
sumed that  another  sufficient  notice  was  served.69 

Default.  The  judgment  should  recite  facts  suf- 
ficient to  show  affirmatively  that  defendant  was  in 
default,  and  for  what  reason,  whether  for  want  of 
an  appearance,  for  want  of  a  plea,  or  otherwise,70 
and  not  merely  that  plaintiff  claimed  the  default  or 
moved  for  the  entry;71  and  if  the  record  shows  a 
judgment  without  a  lawful  default  the  judgment  is 
void  on  the  face  of  the  record.72 

Proof  of  cause  of  action.  Where  plaintiff  is  re- 
quired to  produce  or  file  proof  of  his  cause  of  ac- 
tion before  the  judgment  can  be  entered,  discussed 
supra  §  213,  the  record  or  the  recitals  of  the  judg- 
ment should  show  a  compliance  with  this  require- 
ment;73 and  under  some  statutes,  where  service  is 


Sufficient  recital  of  trial  of  issues 

Where  a  statute  provides  that  par- 
ties to  an  issue  of  fact  shall  be 
deemed  to  have  waived  a  jury  trial 
by  failing  to  appear  at  the  trial, 
judgment  reciting:  that  defendant,  al- 
though filing  answer,  failed  to  ap- 
pear when  case  was  called  for  trial, 
and  that  thereupon  plaintiff  waived 
jury  and  submitted  his  case  to  court 
on  .pleadings  and  proof  adduced,  is 
not  void  on  its  face  as  not  showing 
a  trial  of  the  issues  raised  by  the 
pleadings. — Goffstein  v.  Coleman,  Mo. 
App.,  S2  S.W.2d  1043. 

57.  Idaho.— Hissing  .v.    Bissing,    115 
P.  827,  19  Idaho  777. 

34  C.J.  p  196  note  72  [a],  [b]. 

58.  Mass.— Gardner  v.  Butler,  78  N. 
E.  885,  193  Mass.  96. 

53.     La.— Deblanc  v.  'Lefclanc,  15  La. 

Ann.  224. 
Miss. — Globe   Rutgers   Life   Ins.   Co. 

v.  Sayle,  65  So.  125,  107  Miss.  169. 
GO.  Tex.— Head  v.  Texas  State  Bank, 

Civ.App.,  16  S.W.2d  298— Brown  v. 

Hayslip,    Civ.App.,    283    S.W.    177. 
34  C.J.  p  196  note  86. 
gOL.    Ala. — Spurlin  Mercantile  Co.  v. 

Lauchheimer,  48  So.  812,  159  Ala. 

512. 

34  C.J.  p  196  note  87. 
62.    Cal.— Doyle  v.  Hampton,  116  P. 

39,  159  Cal.  729. 
34  C.J.  P  197  note  88. 

Minute  entry  showing  that  peti- 
tion, citation,  and  sheriffs  return, 
with  record,  were  introduced  is  suf- 
ficient.—Cohn  Flour  &  (Feed  Co.  v. 
Mitchell,  13-6  So.  782,  18  La.Aj?p.  534. 


A  mere  recital  of  service  is  not] 
sufficient;  the  process  and  return  or 
proof  thereof  must  be  set  out. — Head 
v.  Texas  -State  Bank,  Tex.Civ.App., 
16  S.W.2d  298 — Broun  v.  Hayslip, 
Tex.Civ.A-pp.,  283  S.W.  177— Daugh- 
erty  v.  Powell,  Tex.CJiv.App.,  139  S. 
W.  625— Glasscock  v.  Barnard,  125 
S.W.  615,  58  Tex.Civ.App.  569—34  C. 
J.  p  197  note  88  [a]. 

L    Ala. — De  Jarnette  v.  Dreyfus,  51 

So.  932,  166  Ala,  158. 
34  C.J.  p  197  note  89. 

64.  Tex.— Pipkin    v.    Kaufman,     62 
Tex.  -545. 

65.  N.Y.— Bgan  v.  Giragosian,  245  N. 
T.S.  69,  137  Misc.  8'30. 

.    N.T.— Egan   v.    Giragosian,    su- 
pra. 

67.  N.M. — Rio   Grande'  Irrigation   & 
Colonization  Co.  v.  Gildersleeve,  48 
P.  309,  9  N.M.  12,  affirmed  19  S.Ct 

•761,  174  U.S.   603,  43  L.Ed.  1103. 

68.  Iowa.— Schaller   v.    Marker.    114 
N.W.  4'3,  136  Iowa  575. 

34  CJ.  p  197  note  92. 

69.  Iowa.— Schaller   v.    Marker,    114 
N.W.  43,  136  Iowa  575. 

70.  Ark.— Papan  v.  Nahay,  152  S.W. 
107,  106  Ark.  230. 

34  C.J.  p  19'5  note  69. 

Judgment  reciting-  appearance  of 
parties  and  trial  does  not  show  de- 
fault.— St  Francis  Levee  Dist  v. 
Dorroh,  289  S.W;  925,  316  Mo.  -398. 

Irregularity 

•Fact  that  default  Judgment  recited 
that  it  was  entered  for  want  of  ap- 
pearance instead  of  for  failure  to  file 

383 


pleading    is    a    mere    irregularity. — 
Precision  Products  Co.  v.   Cady,  233 
IlLApp.  72. 
Pact  of  default  sufficient 

It  has  been  held  sufficient  to  state 
the  fact  of  default  generally  with- 
out stating  in  what  respect  defend- 
ant is  in  default— Lyons  Planning 
Mills  v.  Guillot,  XA.APP.,  146  So. 
700— 84  C.J.  p  195  note  69  [b]. 

71.  Ala. — Goodwater  Warehouse  Co. 
v.  Street,  34  So.  903,  137  Ala.  621 
— Woosley  v.  Memphis  &  CJ.  R.  Co., 
2«  Ala.  536. 

72.  Mich.— Goodspeed  v.   Smith,  136 
N.W.   975,   161   Mich.   688. 

N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Westfield 
Trust  Co.  v.  Court  of  Common 
Pleas  of  Morris  County,  178  A. 
546,  549,  115  N.J.Law  86,  affirmed 
18-3  A.  165,  116  N.J.Law  191. 

73.  Pa. — Johnston  v.  American  Cas- 
ualty Co.,  Com.Pl.,  23  WestXJo.  178. 

34  C.J.  p  196  note  77. 

Racitals  or  notations  held  sufficient 

Ark.— Shelton  v.  Landers,  270  S.W. 
522,  167  Ark.  638. 

La.— w.  T.  Rawleigh  Co.  v.  (B'reeland, 
App.,  16  So.2d  489 — -Brown  v. 
Brown,  App.,  196  So.  661— Wilson 
v.  Lagasse,  179  So.  472,  14  La.App. 
4-63 — Martin  v.  District  Grand 
(Lodge  No.  21,  G.  U.  O.  O.  F.  of 
Louisiana,  App.,  146  So.  79!3— Conn 
Flour  &  'Feed  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  136 
Bo.  782,  18  La.App.  S'34. 

54  CJ.  p  196  note  77  [a]  (1). 

Presumption  from  recital 
Where    recitals    in    judgment   are 

that  plaintiff  has  made  due  proof  of 


§  217 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


by  publication,  and  no  answer  is  filed,  a  statement 
of  the  evidence  must  be  filed  as  a  part  of  the  rec- 
ord;74 but  in  the  absence  of  statute  the  evidence 
need  not  be  reduced  to  writing  and  preserved  with 
the  record.75 

Assesstnent  of  damages.  If  an  assessment  of 
damages  is  necessary,  the  judgment  should  recite 
the  fact  that  the  assessment  had  been  made,™  but 
it  need  not  state  explicitly  that  the  assessment  was 
made  by  the  court;77  and  the  record  need  not  show 
that  the  interest  was  computed  by  the  clerk.78  The 
judgment  will  be  held  erroneous  where  the  record 
shows  that  the  judge  acted  on  a  certificate  of  the 
clerk  in  lieu  of  a  writ  of  inquiry  and  does  not  show 
a  compliance  with  statutory  conditions  to  a  default 
judgment  without  a  writ  of  inquiry.79 

Findings.  Unnecessary  findings  form  no  part  of 
the  judgment  roll  in  case  of  a  default  judgment,80 
and  their  incompleteness  does  not  vitiate  the  judg- 
ment81 

§  218.     Office  Judgments 

Under  the  statutes  of  a  few  states,  the  clerk  of 
court,  on  defendant's  default,  enters  a  conditional  Judg- 
ment, known  as  an  office  judgment,  which  is  confirmed 
at  a  subsequent  date  and  becomes  final  at  a  still  later 
date. 


Under  some  statutes,  if  defendant  defaults  at  the 
rules,  to  which  a  writ  or  summons  issued  against 
him  is  returnable,82  and  plaintiff  has  duly  filed  his 
declaration,8^  a  conditional  judgment,  known  as  an 
office  judgment,  may  be  entered  against  him  by  the 
clerk  of  the  court,  by  what  is  known  as  a  common 
order,84  which  may  be  confirmed  at  the  next  suc- 
ceeding rules.85  If  the  "common  order"  and  "com- 
mon order  confirmed"  were  regularly  taken,  the 
cause  is  properly  on  the  office  judgment  docket  at 
the  next  term  of  the  court,86  and  if  the  case  is  one 
in  which  an  order  for  an  inquiry  of  damages  is  not 
necessary  or  made,  unless  defendant  appears  in  the 
meantime  and  demurs,  pleads,  or  otherwise  makes 
defense  to  the  action,87  the  office  judgment  becomes 
final,  so  as  to  bar  a  defense,  on  such  day  of  the 
next  succeeding  term  of  court  as  is  fixed  by  stat- 
ute,88 except  where  the  statutory  number  of  days 
has  not  elapsed  after  the  service  of  process,89  in 
which  case  it  becomes  final  at  the  term  next  suc- 
ceeding the  expiration  of  such  time.90  However, 
where  the  case  is  one  in  which  an  inquiry  of  dam- 
ages is  proper,  an  order  therefor  should  be  made 
and  the  office  judgment  does  not  become  final  so  as 
to  bar  a  defense  thereafter,  without  the  interven- 
tion of  the  court  or  a  jury,91  and  defendant  may 


his  claim,  .presumption  exists  that 
legal  and  sufficient  evidence  was  be- 
fore court — Aycock  v.  Miller,  La. 
A'tfp.,  18  So.2d  3*35 — Goldman  v. 
Thomson,  $  La.App.  469. 

74.  Tex.— McLane   v.    Kirby,    116  $. 
W.    118,    54   Tex.Civ.App.   113. 

34  C.J.  p  19'6  note  79. 

75.  Ariz;.— Postal    Ben.    Ins.    Co.    v. 
Johnson,  165  P/2d  173. 

S.C. — Duncan  v.  Duncan,  76  S.B.  1099, 
93  8.C.  487. 

Defendant  personally   served 

Ariz. — Postal  Ben.  Ins.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 165  P.2d  17-3. 

Tex.— (Dalton  v.  Davis,  Civ.App.,  294 
S.W.  1115,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com.App.,  1  S.W.24  571. 

Defendant  voluntarily  appearing-  and 
filing1  answer 

Ariz.— Kinealy  v.  O'Reilly,  236  P. 
716,  28  Ariz.  246. 

761    Ky.— Daniel  v.  Judy,  14  B.Mon. 

393. 
77.     Mass. — Jarvis    v.    Blanchard,    -6 

Mass.  4. 
Mich. — Howard     v.     Tomlinson,     27 

Mich..  168. 
Recital  of  waiver  of  Jury 

The  recital  in  default  judgment,  in 
action  based  on  fraud,  that  a  jury 
and  a  decision  were  waived  and  that 
a  verdict  was  directed  established 
prima  facie  what  occurred  on  the 
inquest  as  to  whether  there  should 
be  a  jury  trial  or  a  decision.— Davis 


v.  Ross,  20  N.T.S.2d  37'5,  259  App. 
Div.  577,  reargument  denied  21  N.Y. 
S.2d  391,  259  App.Div.  1029. 

78.  Ala.— Hadcliff   v.    Brwin,    Minor 
88. 

79.  Ala, — iFrazier    v.    Dlsmuke,    118 
So.  227,  22  Ala.Atfp.  594. 

80u    Cal.— In  re  Cook's  Estate,  19  P. 

431,  77  Cal.  220,  11  Am.S.R.  267,  1 

L.R.A.  567. 
N.T.— Tyler  v.  Jahn,  178  N.Y.S.  689, 

109  Misc.  425. 
Lack  of  necessity  for  findings  where 

judgment  rendered  by  default  see 

the   C.J.S.   title   Trial    §    612,  also 

34  C.J.  p  196  note  73  and  64  C.J.  p 

1229  note  39. 

81.  N.D. — O'Sullivan  v.  Vadnais,  234 
HT.W.  522,  60  NJD.  <359. 

82.  Va. — Crews  v.  Garland,  2  Munf. 
491,  16  Va.  491. 

34  C.J.  -p  197  note  95. 

83.  Va.-— Waugh  v.  Qarter,   2  Munf, 
'33=3,  16  Va.  333. 

34  C.J.  p  197  note  96. 

84.  Va.— Dillard  .  v.     Thornton,     25 
Gratt  392,  70  Va.  '392. 

34  C.J.  p  197  note  97, 

"Common,  order"  IB  defined  as  the 
usual  order;  or  the  "conditional 
judgment,"  so  called  because  it 
threatens  defendant  with  a  judgment 
unless  he  appear  and  plead  accord- 
ing to  its  terms. — Mahoney  v.  New 
South  Building  &  Ix>an  Ass'n,  C.C. 
Va.,  70  F.  $1«— 12  C.J,  p  205  note  96. 

384 


Thornton,     29 


85.  Va.—  Dillard     v. 
Gratt  392,  70  Va. 

86.  Va.—  Wall   v.   AtweW,    21    Gratt. 
401,  62  Va.  401—  Powell  v.  Watson, 
3  Leigh.  4,  -30  Va.  4. 

34  C.J.  p  197  note  99. 

87.  W.Va.  —  Snider  v.  Cochran,  92  S. 
R  547,  80  W.Va,  252. 

34  C.J.  p  197  note  1. 

88.  Va.  —  Carney   v.    Poindexter,    196 
S.E.  639,  170  Va.  2>33. 

34  C.J.  p  182  note  26  [c],  .p  183  note 
35  [a],  p  195  note  62  [a]  (2),  p 
197  note  4  [a]-[d]. 

Proceedings  after  Judgment  becomes 


All  proceedings  in  action  at  law 
after  office  judgment  becomes  final 
are  nullity  or  should  be  set  aside,  so 
as  to  give  plaintiff  benefit  of  judg- 
ment, if  proceedings  are  regular  and 
plaintiff's  rights  have  not  been 
waived. — Carney  v.  Poindexter,  su- 
pra— Gring  v.  Lake  Drummond  Canal 
&  Water  Co.,  67  SJBL  360.  110  Va. 
754. 

89.  Va. — Dillard     v.     Thornton,     29 
Gratt  392,  70  Va.  392— Turnbull  v. 
Thompson,    27    Gratt.    306,    68   Va. 
(306. 

34  C.J.  p  198  note  & 

90.  Va. — Dillard     v.     Thornton,     29 
Gratt  •392,  70  Va.  392. 

91.  'U.S.— fiiccarello   v.   Jos.    Schlitz 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


219 


plead  to  issue  at  any  time  before  the  order  for  in- 
quiry of  damages  is  executed.92 

Wa:ver.  Plaintiff  may  waive  the  benefit  of  such 
statute  so  as  to  prevent  the  office  judgment  from 
becoming  final  by  operation  of  the  statute,93  and  it 
cannot  thereafter  become  final  until  it  is  entered  up 
as  the  judgment  of  the  court.94 

Affidavits  or  proof.  Under  some  statutes  final 
judgment  cannot  be  entered  up  for  plaintiff,  in  an 
action  for  the  recovery  of  money  arising  out  of 
contract  until  he,  his  agent,  or  his  attorney  has 
filed  an  affidavit  stating  the  amount  he  believes  to 


be  due  him,  or  proved  his  case  in  open  court,95 
Such  affidavit  may  be  filed  at  any  time  before  judg- 
ment is  entered,96  except  that  if  plaintiff  desires  to 
prevent  defendant  from  filing  a  plea  without  affi- 
davit he  must  file  his  affidavit  before  the  plea  is 
filed.97  If  plaintiff  has  filed  such  an  affidavit,  no 
plea  can  be  filed  by  defendant  unless  he  files  there- 
with, as  required  by  statute,  an  affidavit  denying 
that  any  sum  is  due  from  him  to  plaintiff,  or  stat- 
ing that  the  amount  due  is  less  than  that  stated  by 
plaintiff,98  or  unless  plaintiff  waives  the  benefit  of 
such  requirement.99 


IX.  JUDGMENT  ON  MOTION  OE  SUMMARY  PROCEEDINGS 


§  219.    In  General 

Judgment  on  motion  or  In  a  summary  proceeding 
is  permissible  in  some  instances  at  common  law  and 
In  oases  covered  by  statutes  providing  therefor. 

The  common  law  admits  of  a  judgment  on  mo- 
tion or  a  summary  proceeding  for  judgment  in  a 
few  instances,1  such  as  in  case  of  contempt  of  court, 
as  is  discussed  in  Contempt  §  62,  or  in  a  case  to 
compel  an  attorney  to  pay  money  over  to  his  cli- 
ent, as  is  discussed  in  Attorney  and  Client  §  159; 
and,  where  funds  in  the  custody  of  a  court  are  lent 
out  by  order  of  the  court,  the  borrowers  obedience 
to  an  order  requiring  the  return  of  the  money  may 


be  enforced  by  a  judgment  entered  against  him  on 
a 'mere  motion.2  In  most  instances,  however,  such 
a  remedy  is  regarded  as  being  in  derogation  of  the 
common  law,  and  exists  only  under  the  authority 
of  statutory  enactments,3  which  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions provide  in  certain  cases  for  a  special  summary 
proceeding  for  judgment  on  notice  and  motion,4 
and  in  other  jurisdictions  provide  that,  after  issue 
is  joined  by  the  pleadings  in  certain  kinds  of  ac- 
tions, summary  judgment  for  either  party  may  be 
had  on  motion  where  the  moving  party  substanti- 
ates his  claim  or  defense  by  affidavit  and  the  other 
party  fails  to  show  the  existence  of  triable  issues 
of  fact  warranting  a  trial.5 


Brewing:   Co.,    D.C.W.Va,,    1   F.R.D. 

491. 

34  C.J.  p  198  note  7. 
92.    U.S. — Ciccarello    v.    Jos.    Schlitz 

Brewing  Co.,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  195  note  62  [a]   (1),  p  198 

note  8. 
9&     Va,— Pollard  v.  American  Stone 

Co.,   «8    S.E.   2fr6,   111  Va,   147. 
34  O.J.  P  198  note  9. 

94.  W.Va,— James   v.    Gott,    47    S.E. 
649,  S5  W.Va.  223. 

95.  W.Va.— Bell  v.  Tormey,   67  S.E. 
1086,  67  W.Va,  1. 

34  C.J.  p  198  note  13. 
Specific  Items 

An  affidavit  Is  not  defective  as  a 
whole  'because  in  addition  to  stating 
a  sum  certain  It  contains  specific 
divisible  items  not  recoverable  as  a 
matter  of  law. — Pineville  -First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Sanders,  »8  S.B.  187,  77  W. 
Va,  716. 
Record 

It  is  not  necessary  to  make  the 
facts  proved,  or  the  -evidence,  a  part 
of  the  record,  in  case  of  a  Judgment 
by  default;  and  if  any  part  of  the 
evidence  is  referred  to  in  the  Judg- 
ment, this  of  itself  is  insufficient  to 
preclude  the  fact  that  other  evidence 
might  have  been  heard  by  the  court, 

49  0.  J.S.— 25 


unless  it  affirmatively  appears  from 
the  record  that  this  was  all  the  evi- 
dence heard  by  the  court. — Anderson 
v.  Doolittle,  18  S.E.  724,  88  W.Va, 
629. 

96.  W.Va.— Marstiller  v.  Ward,  43  S. 
E.   178,   52  W.Va,   74— Quesenberry 
v.  People's  Building;  -Loan  &  Sav- 
ings  Ass'n,   -30    S.EL    7*3,    44   W.Va, 
512. 

97.  W.Va, — Phoenix    Assur.    Co.    v. 
Fristoe,  44  S.B.  253,  5$  W.Va.  361. 

34  C.J.  p  198  note  15. 

98.  Va,— Price    v/    Marks,    48    &B. 
499,  103  Va,  18. 

34  C.J.  p  198  note  16. 

99.  W.Va.— Williamson,  v.   Nigh,   53 
S.-E.  124,  58  W.Va,  629. 

<34  C.J.  p  198  note  17. 

1.  Tenn. — Ex    parte    Craighea4,    12 
Heisk.  640. 

2.  Tenn. — Vaughn  v.   Tealey,  CStuA., 
39  S.W.  S6S. 

34  C.J.  p  198  note  2*3. 

3.  Ark. — Cook  v.  Cramer  Cotton  Co., 
244  S.W.  7^0,  1*5  'Ark.  549. 

34  C.J.  p  198  note  24. 

4.  Va, — Shearin  v.  Virginia  Electric 

385 


&    Power   Co.,    29    S.B.2d    841,    1*2 

Va,  57-3. 
33  C.J.  p  1065  note  70 — 34  C.J.  p  193 

note  26. 
Procedure  generally  see  infra  9  2*22. 

5.     Cal.— Cowan   Oil    &   Refining  Co. 

v.    Miley    Petroleum    Corporation, 

295  P.  504,  112  Cal.App.Supp.  778. 
N.T.— Aronstam  v.  Scientific  Utilities 

Co.,    196    N.Y.S.    306,    affirmed    199 

K.Y.S.    908,   206  App.Div.   657. 
R.L — Berick   v.    Curran,    179   A.    708, 

55  R.I.  193. 
Wis.— Witzko    v.    Koenig,    272    N.W. 

864,  224  Wis.  674. 
History 

"In  a  general  way,  our  summary 
judgment  statute  traces  its  origin 
to  the  English  Summary  Procedure 
on  Bills  of  Exchange  Act,  18  &  19 
Viet  c.  67,  passed  in  IS  55.  .  .  . 
In  the  United  States  provisions  sim- 
ilar to  the  English  rules  have  been 
adopted  in  a  number  of  states,  either 
by  statute  or  by  rule  of  court. 
Whenever  variations  are  found,  they 
are  traceable  to  local  conditions  or 
Judicial  structure.  An  examination 
of  the  so-called  summary  Judgment 
laws  both  In  England  and  In  this 
country  shows  that  the  purpose  of 
such  laws  was  to  regulate  -procedure, 
and  not  to  create  &  new  right  in  fa- 


219 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Statutes  providing  for  judgment  on  motion  in 
certain  cases  have  generally  been  held  valid,6  and 
it  has  been  held  that,  although  they  should  not  be 
extended  by  construction,?  they  should  be  liberally 
construed  to  effectuate  their  purpose.8  The  power 
given  to  grant  a  summary  judgment  must  be  exer- 
cised with  care,  and  not  be  extended  beyond  its  just 


limits,9  and  before  a  party  is  entitled  to  the  benefit 
of  such  a  statutory  remedy  he  should  bring  himself 
squarely  within  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the  stat- 
ute,10 and  everything  pertaining  to  the  entry  of 
such  a  judgment  must  be  done  strictly  according  to 
the  provision  which  authorizes  it.11  The  remedy 
is  to  be  administered  in  the  furtherance  of  justice.12 


vor  of  a  party  plaintiff.  They  were 
adopted  to  grant  relief  against  proce 
dural  tactics  interposed  for  delay 
and  not  to  substitute  a  new  method 
of  trial  where  an  issue  of  fact  ex- 
ists."-~JFisher  v.  Sun  Underwriters 
Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  179  A.  702 
704,  705,  55  R.I.  175,  103  A.L.R.  1097 

"At  common  law,  although  false 
and  sham  pleas  could  be  stricken 
out,  the  general  issue  could  not  be 
inquired  Into  and  eliminated.  A  de- 
fendant had  the  right  to  plead  the 
general  issue  and  thereby  put  the 
plaintiff  to  his  proof,  irrespective  of 
whether  or  not  he  actually  had  a  de- 
fense to  the  claim  made  against 
him."— 'Fisher  v.  Sun  Underwriters 
Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  supra. 
Actions  commenced  prior  to  enact, 
ment 

Such  a  statutory  provision,  being 
remedial,  applies  to  actions  com- 
menced prior  to  the  date  of  its  en- 
actment.— General  Inv.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
barough  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  193  N.Y. 

5.  903,  200  App.-Div.  794,  affirmed  139 
N.E.    216,    235    N.Y.    13*3— Peninsular 
Transp.   Co.   v.   Greater  Britain  Ins. 
Co.,  Ltd.,  193  N.Y.S.  885,  reversed  on 
other    grounds    198    N.Y.S.    886,    200 
AppJMv.  695. 

6.  Cal. — Cowan  Oil  &  Refining  Co. 
v.    Miley    Petroleum    Corporation, 
29'5  P.  504,  112  Cal.App.Supp.  773. 

N.J.-HNolte   v.   Nannino,   154   A.   8-31, 

107  N.J.Law  4-62. 

N.Y.— Diamond  v.  Davis,  38  N.Y.S.2d 
103,  affirmed  39  N.Y.S.2d  412,  first 
case,  265  App.Div.  919,  appeal  de- 
nied 41  N.Y,S.2d  191,  first  case, 
265  App.Div.  1052,  and  affirmed  54 
N.OB3.2d  683,  first  case,  292  N.Y. 
552. 

Alleged  defects  in  summary  judg- 
ment law  preventing  subpoenaing  of 
adverse  parties  by  defendant  and  not 
requiring  plaintiff's  and  defendant's 
affidavits  to  be  of  same  particularity 
could  not  be  urged  by  party  not  In- 
jured thereby. — People's  Wayne 
County  Bank  v.  Wolverine  Box  Co., 
230  N.W.  170,  250  Mich.  273,  69  A. 
L.R.  1024. 
Claims  under  veterans'  legislation 

However,  It  has  been  held  that  a 
state  statute  providing  for  summary 
judgment  based  on  complaint  and 
affidavits  in  support  of  motion  for 
judgment  without  examination  of 
facts  is  repugnant  to  Tucker  Act, 
which  manifests  congressional  intent 
that  claims  under  World  War  veter- 
ans' legislation  should  not  be  treat*  I 


ed  in  a  summary  manner. — U.  S.  v. 
Lindholm,  C.C.A.Cal.,  79  F.2d  784. 
103  A.L.R.  213,  followed  in  U.  S.  v. 
Stevenson,  79  F.2d  788. 
Consistency  with  other  provisions 

Rules  of  Civil  Practice,  rule  1113, 
providing  that  an  answer  in  certain 
actions  may  be  struck  out,  and  judg- 
ment entered  thereon,  on  motion,  and 
the  affidavit  of  plaintiff,  or  any  other 
person  having  knowledge  of  the 
facts,  justifying  the  cause  of  action, 
and  stating  the  amount  claimed,  and 
his  belief  that  there  is  no  defense 
to  the  action,  unless  defendant  shall 
show  facts  sufficient  to  entitle  him 
to  defend,  is  not  inconsistent  with 
Civ.Prac.  Act  §  422,  providing  that 
an  issue  of  fact  arises  on  an  alle- 
gation, contained  in  an  answer,  that 
defendant  has  no  sufficient  knowl- 
edge or  information  to  form  a  belief 
with  respect  to  a  material  allegation 
of  the  complaint,  §  423,  providing 
that  an  "issue  of  fact  must  be  tried 
as  prescribed  in  this  article"  (§§  421- 
471),  and  §  425,  providing  that,  in  an 
action  in  which  a  complaint  demands 
a  judgment  for  a  sum  of  money  only, 
an  issue  of  fact  must  be  tried  by  a 
jury,  unless  a  jury  trial  is  waived. — 
Hanna  v.  Mitchell,  196  N.Y.S.  4'3,  202 
App^Div.  504,  affirmed  139  N.E.  724, 
235  N.Y.  534. 

7.    Ala.-L.ewis  v.  Head,  189  So.  886, 

2*38  Ala.  151 — Union  Indemnity  Co. 

v.    Freeman,    133    So.   48,   222  Ala, 

479. 

Strict  construction  required 
Ala.— Harris  v.  Barber,  186  So.  "160, 

237  Ala.  1'38. 
Qa.— Breen  v.  Phillips,  149  S.E.  565, 

169  Ga.  1>3. 

&    N.Y. — Reddy    v.    Zurich    General 
Accident   &   Liability   Ins.  Co.,   11 
N.Y.S.2d    88,    171    Misc.    69. 
Va. — Pereira     v.      Davis      Financial 

Agency,  135  S.B.  82-3,  146  Va.  215. 
Dismissal  of  complaint 

Rule  of  civil  practice  authorizing 
dismissal  of  complaint  on  motion 
'here  answer  sets  forth  a  defense 
which  is  sufficient  as  a  matter  of  law 
and  is  founded  on  facts  established 
prima  facie  by  documentary  evi- 
dence or  official  record,  should  be  lib- 
erally construed  to  promote  the  ben- 
eficial results  intended. — Levine  v. 
Behn,  8  N.Y.S.2d  58,  169  Misc.  «601, 
affirmed  12  N.Y.S.2d  190,  257  App. 
Div.  156,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
25  N.B.2d  871,  282  N.Y.  1'20— Dia- 
mond v.  Davis,  -38  N.Y.S.2d  103.  af- 

386 


firmed  39  N.Y:S.2d  412,  first  case, 
265  App.Div.  919,  appeal  denied  41 
N.Y.S.2d  191,  first  case,  265  App. 
Div.  1052,  and  affirmed  54  N.E.2d 
68-3,  first  case,  292  N.Y.  552. 

9.  Cal.— Gibson  v.  De  La  Salle  In- 
stitute, 152  P.'2d  774,  66  Cal.App.2d 
609. 

Colo. — Hat  field   v.    Barnes,    168    P.2d 

552. 

N.Y. — General  Inv.  Co.  v.  Interbor- 
ough  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  139  N.E. 
216,  2-35  N.T.  133— Norwich  Pharm- 
acal  Co.  v.  Barrett,  200  N.Y.S.  298, 
205  App.Div.  749 — Stone  v.  ^Btna 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  -31  N.Y.S.2d  615,  178 
Misc.  2*3 — Rodger  v.  Bliss,  223  N. 
Y.S.  401,  130  Misc.  168— "First 
Trust  Co.  of  Albany  v.  Dumary,  23 
N.Y.S.2d  532— Nester  v.  Nester,  19 
N.Y.S.2d  426,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  22  N.Y.S.2d  119,  259  App. 
Div.  10-65. 
34  C.J.  p  199  note  27. 

"The  procedure  is  drastic  and 
should  be  used  with  caution  in  or- 
der -that  it  may  not  become  a  sub- 
stitute for  existing  methods  In  the 
determination  of  issues  of  fact." — 
Eagle  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v.  Prentice, 
122  P.2d  264,  265,  19  Cal.2d  553. 

10.  Ala.— Union    Indemnity    Co.    v. 
Freeman,  13-3  So.  48,  222  Ala.  479. 

111. — Great  Atlantic  &  Pacific  Tea 
Co.  v.  Town  of  Bremen,  €4  N.B.2d 
220,  327  Ill.A'pp.  '393. 

Md.— Katski  v.  Triplett,  30  A.2d  764, 
181  Md.  545— Power  v.  Allied  As- 
phalt Products  Corporation,  159  A. 
2-51,  162  Md.  175. 

N.Y.— Conyne  v.  McGibbon,  37  N.Y. 
S.2d  590,  179  Misc.  54,  transferred, 
see  39  N.Y.S.2d  609,  265  App.Div. 
976,  and  affirmed  41  N.Y.S:2d  189, 
266  App.Div.  711— Macomber  v. 
Wilkinson,  6  N.Y.S.2d  608. 

Pa.— iLassiter  v.  Style  Shop,  Com. 
PL,  28  Del.Co.  418. 

R.I.— Fisher  v.  Sun  Underwriters 
Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  179  A.  702, 
55  R.I.  175,  103  A.L.R.  1097. 

34  C.J.  p  199  note  28. 

11.  N.Y.— Universal    Credit    Co.    v. 
Uggla,  290  N.Y.S.  365,  248  App.Div. 
8*48,  motion  denied  290  N.Y.S.  997, 
248  Ap-pjDiv.  529,  amended  on  other 

i    grounds   298  N.Y.S.    158,   251  App. 

Div.  78-6. 
[34  C.J.  p  199  note  29. 

12.  N.Y.— Curry    v.    Mackenzie,    146 

375,  239  N.Y.  267. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  219 


Nature  and  purpose  of  statutes. .  Statutes  in  some 
jurisdictions  permitting  the  filing  of  a  notice  of  mo- 
tion for  judgment  in  lieu  of  filing  a  declaration  in 
an  action  at  law  are  intended  to  give  plaintiff  a 
simpler,  cheaper,  and  more  expeditious  mode  of 
procedure  than  is  provided  by  a  regular  common- 
law  action.13  Other  statutes  providing  for  sum- 
mary judgment  in  actions  instituted  in  the  normal 
manner  where  no  triable  issue  of  fact  is  disclosed 
after  consideration  of  affidavits  of  the  parties  are 
intended  to  further  the  prompt  administration  of 
justice,14  and  expedite  litigation16  by  avoiding  need- 
less trials;16  and  they  enable  a  party  speedily  to 
obtain  a  judgment  by  preventing  the  interposition 
of  unmeritorious  defenses  "for  purposes  of  delay.17 
The  object  of  the  proceedings  provided  by  such 


statutes  is  to  determine  whether  a  defense  genu- 
inely exists18  and  whether  there  is  an  issue  of  fact 
warranting  submission  of  the  case  to  the  jury.19 
On  the  other  hand,  such  statutes  were  not  intended 
to  furnish 'an  easy  medium  to  plaintiff  by  which  he 
might  avoid  the  inconvenience  and  uncertainty  of 
a  trial ;  they  do  not  provide  a  new  method  for  the 
consideration  and  determination  by  the  court  of 
questions  of  law  in  advance  of  a  trial  on  the  facts 
contrary  to  established  practice20  or  provide  a  sub- 
stitute for  existing  methods  in  the  determination  of 
issues  of  fact.21  Moreover,  the  statutory  procedure 
for  judgment  on  motion  was  not  intended  as  a 
test  for  the  sufficiency  of  pleadings22  or  to  supplant 
a  demurrer  or  motion  to  make  pleadings  more  defi- 
nite and  certain.23 


13.  Va.— Shearin   v.   Virginia   Elec- 
tric &  Power  Co.,    29    S.E.2d   841, 

'  182     Va.     5  T3 — Pereira    v.     Davis 
Financial  Agency,  135  S.E.  823,  146 
Va.  215. 
34  C.J.  p  199  note  30. 

14.  N.Y. — First  Trust  Co.  of  Albany 
v.   Dumary,   2&  N.Y.-S.2d  532. 

H.I. — (Fisher  v.  Sun  Underwriters 
Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  179  A.  702, 
705,  55  R.I.  175,  10'3  A.L.R.  1097. 

Other  statements  of  purpose 

(1)  The    purpose    is    to    simplify 
court    practice    and    eliminate    tech- 
nicalities and  formalism  serving  no 
useful  purpose. — Simson  v.  Bugman, 
45  N.Y.S.2d  140. 

(2)  The    object    of    statute    is    to 
regulate   procedure   and   to   aid   the 
court  in  promoting  Justice  by  elim- 
inating so  far  as  possible  fictitious 
defenses. — Minuto     v.     Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  179  A.  713,  55  R.I.  201. 

(3)  The   object  is  to  provide   for 
speedy  collection  of  debts  by  requir- 
ing from  -plaintiff  and  defendant  a 
definite  sworn  statement  of  the  claim 
and  the  defense,  if  any,  so  that  par- 
ties may  know  exactly  wherein  they 
differ  and  shape  their  action  accord- 
ingly.—Katski    v.    Triplett,    <30    A.2d 
764,  181  Md.  545. 

15.  U.S. — Prudential     Ins,     Co.     of 
America  v.  Goldstein,  D.C.N.Y.,  43 
P.  Sup  p.  767. 

N.Y.— -Glove  City  Amusement  Co.  v. 

Smalley  Chain  Theatres,   4  .N.Y.S. 

2d  «397,  167  Misc.   603— Halpern  v. 

Lavine,  60  N.Y.S.2d  121. 
Wis.— Binsfeld    v.    Home    Mut    Ins. 

Co.,  19  N.W.2d  240,  247  Wis.  273. 

le.  111.— Puckett  v.  American  -Life 
of  Illinois,  1:3  N.EL2d  828,  294  I1L 
App.  605. 

N.Y. — Chance  v.  Guaranty  Trust  Co. 
of  New  York,  20  N.Y.S.2d  635,  173 
Misc.  754,  affirmed  13  N.Y.S.2d  785, 
257  Ajpp.Div.  1006,  affirmed  26  N.B. 
2d  802,  282  N.Y.  656— -Dr.  A.  Pos- 
ner  Shoes  v.  Vogel,  198  N.Y.S. 

m. 


Wis.— Potts  v.  Farmers'  Mut  Auto- 
mobile Ins.  Co.,  289  N.W.  606,  2'33 
Wis.  313. 

17.  Cal. — Bank     of     America     Nat. 
Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Oil  Well 
Supply  Co.  of  California,  55  P.2d 
885,  12  Cal.App.2d  265. 

Mass.— Norwood  Morris  Plan  Co.  T. 
(McCarthy,  4  N.'E.2d  450,  295  Mass. 
597,  107  A.L.R.  1215. 

N.Y.— McAnsh  v.  Blauner,  226  N.Y.S. 
379,  222  App.I>iv.  381,  affirmed,  162 
N.B.  515,  248  N.Y.  537— Hurwitz  v. 
Corn  Exchange  Bank  Trust  Co., 
25'3  N.Y.S.  851,  142  Misc.  -398— 
Western  Felt  Works  v.  Modern 
Carpet  Cleaning  &  Storage  Corpo- 
ration, 252  N.Y.S.  69-6,  141  Misc. 
495. 

Wis.— Costello  v.  Polenska,  7  N.W.2d 
59*3,  242  Wis.  204,  modified  on  oth- 
er grounds  8  N.W.2d  <307,  242  Wis. 
204— Atlas  Inv.  Co.  v.  Christ  2  N. 
W.2d  714,  240  Wis.  114— Prime 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  F.  Gallun  &  Sons 
Corporation,  281  N.W.  697,  229  Wis. 
348. 

•34  C.J.  -p  199  note  4L 

Separation  of  matter  in  denial 

Object  of  motion  for  summary 
Judgment  is  to  separate  what  is 
formal  or  pretended  in  denial  from 
what  is  genuine  and  substantial. — 
Richard  v.  Qredit  Suisse,  152  N.E. 
110,  242  N.Y.'  346,  45  AJL.R.  1041. 

18.  I1L— Security  Discount  Corpora- 
tions. Jackson,  51  N.E.2d  618,  320 
IlLApp.      440— Harris     v.      Oxford 
Metal  Spinning  Co.,  43  N.B.2d  186, 
315    Ill.A'pp.   490— Shirley   v.    Ellis 
Drier  Co.,   89  N.E.2d   329,  379   111. 
105 — Diversey   Liquidating   Corpo- 
ration  v.   Neunkirchen,    19  N.B.2d 
(3-63,  -370  I1L  523. 

19.  I1L — Macks  v.  Macks,  -67  N.-E.2d 
505,  329  HLApp.  144— Barkhausen 
V.  Naugher,  64  N.E.2d  561,  327  I1L 
A#p.    555— IPblasi    v.    Western    & 
Southern  Life  Ins.  Co.,  64  N.E.2d 

387 


233,  327  IlLApp.  412 — Great  Atlan- 
tic &  Pacific  Tea  Co.  v.  Town  of 
Bremen,  64  N,E.2d  220,  $27  HI. 
App.  39*3— (Fellheimer  v.  Wess,  45 
N.E.2d  89,  316  HLApp.  449— Soelke 
v.  Chicago  Business  Men's  Racing 
Ass'xv  41  N.E.2d  232,  '314  IlLApp. 
3136 — GUwa  v.  Washington  Polish 
Loan  &  Building  Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d 
73'6,  310  IlLApp.  465— Mee  v. 
Marks,  26  N.B.2d  516,  304  IlLApp. 
'370. 

Mich. — People's  Wayne  County  Bank 
v.  Wolverine  Box  Co.,  230  N.W.  170, 
2-50  Mich.  275,  69  A.L.R.  1024. 

N.Y.— Ecker  v.  Muzysh,  19  N.Y.S.2d 
250,  259  App.Div.  206 — First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Dolgeville,  N.  Y.,  v.  Mang, 
41  N.Y.S.2d  92— (Macomber  v.  Wil- 
kinson, «  N.Y.S.2d  608. 

20.  R.L — Minuto  v.  Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  179  A.  716,  55  R.L 
201— 'Fisher  v.  Sun  Underwriters 
Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  179  A.  702, 
55  R.L  175,  103  A.L.R.  1097. 

Trial  by  affidavit 

It    is    not    purpose    of    summary 
Judgment  statute  to  substitute  a  tri- 
al by  affidavit  for  a  trial  according 
to  law. 
R.I. — Goucher  v.  Herr,   14  A.2d  651, 

65  R.I.  246. 
Wis.— McLaughlin  v.  Malnar,  297  N. 

W.  370,  237  Wis.  492. 

2L  CaL— Walsh  v.  Walsh,  116  P.2d 
62,  18  CaL2d  439 — Gibson  v.  De  tLa 
Salle  Institute,  152  P.2d  774,  66 
CaLA'pp.Sd  609. 

UL — Soelke  v.  Chicago  Business 
Men's  Racing  Ass'n,  41  N.'E.2d  232, 
314  IlLApp.  3136. 

R.L— Berick  v.  fiurran,  173  A.  708, 
55  R.X  193. 

22.  CaL— Eagle  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v. 
Prentice.    122   P.2d   264.    19   Cal.2d 
553. 

23.  Wis.— McLoughlin     v.     Malnar, 
297  N.W.  370,  237  Wis,  492. 


§220 
§  220. 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Cases  in  Which  Allowed 

a.  In  general 

b.  Particular  actions 

c.  As  determined  by  issues 


a.  In  General 

As  a  general  rule,  summary  Judgment  on  motion  wM 
be  granted  only  In  cases  or  under  circumstances  clearly 
covered  by  the  statute  or  court  rule,  and,  where  It  Is 
so  provided,  the  remedy  Is  available  to  both  the  plain- 


tiff  and  the  defendant,  on  original  causes  of  action  OP 
counterclaims,  and  judgment  may  be  obtained  for  part 
cf  a  claim. 

Except  in  so  far  as  such  remedy  is  permitted  by 
the  common  law,  a  summary  judgment  on  motion 
will  be  granted  only  in  cases,  or  under  circum- 
stances, covered  by  the  terms  of  the  statute  or  court- 
rule.24  The  statutes  generally  limit  summary  pro- 
cedure to  simple  cases,25  where  the  moving  party's 
right  to  judgment  is  clear  and  free  from  doubt.2& 


24.    Ala,— Lewis    v.    Head,    189    So. 
886,    238    Ala,    151— Union   Indem- 
nity Co.  v.  Freeman,  133  So.  48,  222 
Ala,  479. 
Del.— Edsall  v.   Rockland  Paper  Co., 

194  A.  115,  8  W.W.Harr.  495. 
Idaho. — Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Albrethsen,  294  P.  842,  50  Idaho 
196. 
HI. — Ward    v.    Sampson,    6$    N.E.2d 

751,  391  111.  585. 

N.Y.— Newurk  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brill, 
29-6  N.Y.S.  707,  251  App.Div.  399— 
Bethlehem  Knitting  Mills  v..  fl. 
Karpen  &  Bros.,  292  N.Y.S.  754, 
249  App.Div.  855— *Fiscella  v.  Frid- 
man,  7  N.Y.S.2d  544,  169  Misc.  327 
— Ben  Bimberg  &  Co.  v.  Unity  Coat 
&  Apron  Co.,  270  N.Y.S.  579,  151 
Misc.  442 — Rodger  v.  Bliss,  223  N. 
'Y.S.  401,  1'30  Misc.  168 — Lawrence 
Textile  Corporation  v.  American 
Ry.  Express  Co.,  211  N.T.S.  699, 
125  Misc.  858 — George  F.  Hinrichs, 
Inc.,  v.  City  of  New  York,  201  N. 
Y.S.  377,  121  Misc.  592,  affirmed 
207  N.Y.S.  852,  212  App.Div.  816 
and  affirmed  209  N.Y.S.  836,  213 
App.Div.  863— Tenny  v.  Tenny,  36 
'  N.Y.S.2d  704— Borenstein  v.  Buffalo 

Hat  Co.,  -33  N.Y.S.2d  60. 
Pa. — Bellevue    Park    Ass'n    v.    Lipp- 
man,   Com.Pl.,   54   Dauph.Co.   163— 
(McVeigh  v.  Scranton-Spring  Brook 
Water    Service     Co.,    Com.Pl.,     44 
Lack.Jur.  20-5. 
S.C.— Anderson    v.    Gage,    23    S.C.L. 

319. 

Tex.— -Grubstake  Inv.  Ass'n  v.  Wor- 
ley,  Civ.App.,  116  S.W.2d  47'2,  er- 
ror dismissed. 

Wis. — Prey  v.   Allard,   300  N.W.   13, 
289  Wis.  151 — McLoughlin  v.  Mal- 
nar,  297  N.W.  370,  237  Wis.  492. 
34  C.  J.  p  199  notes  34-86. 

In  action  to  vacate  an  order  on 
ground  that  it  is  unlawful  or  unrea- 
sonable, as  on  appeal  from  revoca- 
tion of  architect's  license,  no  motion 
for  summary  Judgment  is  necessary 
and  there  is  no  occasion  to  supple- 
ment the  record  by  affidavits  filed  by 
both  parties  io  support  motions  for 
summary  Judgment. — Kuehnel  v 
Wisconsin  Registration  Board  of 
Architects  and  Professional  Engi- 
neers, 9  N.W.2d  630,  243  Wis.  188. 

Corts 

Th,e  provision  of  municipal  court 
code  that,  within  limits  of  Jurisdic- 
tion defined  in  the  code,  the  court 


shall  have  power  to  render  any  Judg-  | 
ment  that  is  consistent  with  a  case  | 
made  by  the  pleadings  and  embraced 
within  the  issues,  does  not  author- 
ize the  granting  of  summary  Judg- 
ment against  a  party  who  has  failed 
to  pay  costs  assessed  against  him 
in  a  prior  action.— Ebel  v.  Ast,  21  N. 
Y.S.2d  7-68,  afcpeal  granted  23  N.Y. 
S.2d  47-6,  260  App.Div.  870. 
Validity  of  cause  of  action 

The  validity  or  invalidity  of  the 
cause  of  action  on  which  the  motion 
for  summary  Judgment  was  made 
depends  on  the  facts  existing  at  the 
time  the  action  was  commenced,  or, 
at  least,  at  the  time  the  motion  was 
made.— Poritzky  v.  Wachtel,  27  N.Y. 
S.2d  316,  176  Misc.  633. 

25.  111. — Ward  v.  Sampson,   63  N.B. 
2d  7-51,  391  111.  585— Soelke  v.  Chi- 
cago Business  Men's  Racing  Ass'n, 
41    N.B.2d    2!32,    314    IlLApp.    336— 
Gliwa  v.  Washington  Polish  Loan 
&    Building   Ass'n,    34    N.E.2d   736, 
•310  IlLApp.  465. 

Pa. — Malter    v.    Whitehall,    Com.Pl., 

2  DeLCo.  442. 
Actions  in  special  assnmpsit 
.  Generally,  remedy  by  summary 
Judgment  is  applicable  to  commer- 
cial cases  and  to  simple  actions  in 
assuntpsit,  but  actions  in  special  as- 
sumpsit  involving  complicated  facts 
difficult  to  establish  by  means  of 
affidavits  are  outside  scope  of  stat- 
ute.—Fisher  v.  Sun  Underwriters 
Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  179  A.  702,  55 
ILL  175,  103  A.L.R.  1097. 

26.  Ariz.— Cress   v.  Switzer,   150   P. 
2d  86,  61  Ariz.  405. 

111.— Scharf  v.  Waters,  66  N.E.2d  499, 
•328  IlLApp.  525 — Bertlee  Co.  v.  Il- 
linois Publishing  &  Printing  Co., 
52  N.E.2d  47,  320  IlLApp.  .  490— 
Security  Discount  Corporation  v, 
Jackson,  51  N.E.2d  618,  320  111, 
App.  440 — Fellheimer  v.  Wess,  45 
N.E.2d  89,  316  IlLApp.  449— Gliwa 
v.  Washington  Polish  Loan  & 
Building  Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d  7=36,  310 
IlLApp.  465. 

N.Y.— Sorensen  vw  East  River  Sav 
Inst.,  196  N.Y.S.  361,  119  Misc.  297 

Pa. — Ockman  v.  Jones  Mach.  Too! 
Works,  4-5  A.2d  47— Ockman  v 
Jones  Mach.  Tool  Works,  $7  A.2d 

"  5<38,  349  Pa.  $27— Bacher  v.  C.ity 
Nat  Bank  of  Philadelphia,  31  A 
2d  T25,  347  Pa.  80— Koehring  Co 
v.  Ventresca,  6  A.2d  297,  $34  Pa. 

388 


566— Miller  v.  Adonlzio,  6  A.2d  77, 
334    Pa.    286— Aultman   v.    City   of 
Pittsburgh,  192  A.  112,  326  Pa.  213 
— Drummond    v.    Parrlsh,    182    A. 
•3S3,    320    Pa.   307— Moran   v.    Balr. 
156  A.  81,  304  Pa.  471— -Vierling  v. 
Baxter,    141   A.    728,    293    Pa.    52— 
Smith  v.  Miller,  137  A.  254,  289  Pa. 
184— Holladay    v.    Fidler,    4'3    A.2d 
919,   158   Pa.Super.   100 — Jordan   v. 
Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of  America,  1& 
A.2d  485,  144  Pa.Super.  3 — Blieden 
v.  Toll,  12  A.2d  487,  139  Pa.Super. 
436 — Societe  Anonyme  Des  Estab- 
lissements  J.  Peraro  v.  Loewe,  157 
A.  509,  103  Pa.Super.  526 — Gregory 
v.  Russo,  87  Pa.'Su»per.  5*37 — Mehr- 
kam  v.  Schlegel  &  Williamson,  Inc., 
5  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  -668,  10  Lehigh  Co. 
L.R.    368,    39    York   Leg.Rec.    28— 
Farmers-Kissinger    Market    House 
Co.  v.   Garman,  Com.PL,   36  Berks 
Q0t    149 — Hess   v.   McMahon,   Com. 
PL,  32  DeLCo.  5-28— Allen  v.  Berg- 
doll,    Com.PL,    32    DeLCo.    -343,    12 
Som.Leg.J.    38— Kennedy  v.   Upper 
Darby  '  Building   &       Loan    Ass'n, 
Com.PL,   29  DeLCo.  247— (Lindholm 
v.    Wiley   Const    Co.,    Oom.Pl.,    49 
Lanc.L.Rev.  126— Macheska  v.  Pas- 
ternak,  Com.PL,  46  Lack.Jur.  30— 
Kies  v.  Town  Hall  Co.,  Com.PL,  44 
'Lack.Jur.    241 — Regan    v.    City    of 
Scranton,     Com.PL,     44     Lack.Jur. 
210,    35    Mun.L.R.    59— New    York 
Credit   Men's   Ass'n  v.   Boyan,    37 
Luz.Leg.Reg.    214— Warlong    Glove 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Sam  til  Co.,  Oom.PL,  35 
•Luz.Leg.Reg.  240— 'First  Nat.  Bank 
in    Greensburg,   v.    Serro,    Com.PL, 
26    WestCo.    69— Gisburne    v.    Pe- 
troleum Transport  Co.,  Com.PL,  65 
York  Leg.Rec.  165. 
Wis.— Marco  v.  Whiting,    12   N.W.2d 
92-6,  244  Wis.  621— Prime  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  A.  F.  Gallun  &  Sons  Corporation, 
281  N.W.  697,  229  Wis.  348. 

Doubt  should  be  resolved  against 
right  to  summary  Judgment 
Cal. — Gibson  v.  De  La  Salle  Institute, 

152  P.2d  774,   66  Cal.App.2d  609. 
Colo. — Hatfleld   v.    Barnes,    168   P.2d 

552. 

Pa.-^Ottman  v.  Nixon-Nirdlinger,  151 
A.  879,  301  Pa.  234— Armstrong  v. 
Connelly,  149  A.  87,  299  Pa,  Si- 
Davis  v.  Investment  .Land  Co.,  146 
A.  119,  296  Pa.  449. 

R.'L— Goucher  r.  Heir,  14  A.2d  651, 
65  ILL  246. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  220 


Whether  a  case  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  permit 
application  of  the  statutory  procedure  rests  largely 
in  the  trial  judge's  discretion.27  The  statutory  rem- 
edy of  summary  judgment  where  no  triable  issue  is 
shown  to  exist  is  available  to  defendant  as  well  as 
to  plaintiff,28  but  defendant's  remedy  is  generally 
limited  to  the  kinds  of  actions  in  which  plaintiff 
could  have  secured  such  judgment,29  except  to  the 
extent  that  the  statute  permits  defendant  to  move 
for  summary  judgment  in  other  actions.30 

Counterclaims.  As  a  general  rule,  summary  judg- 
ment procedure  is  applicable  to  defendant's  coun- 
terclaims as  well  as  to  original  actions,  so  that  ei- 
ther party  may  move  with  respect  to  the  same  as 
though  the  counterclaim  were  an  independent  ac- 


tion.81 Where  the  statute  authorizes  summary 
judgment  only  in  certain  kinds  of  actions,  as  is 
discussed  infra  subdivision  b  of  this  section,  the 
counterclaim  must  be  based  on  a  cause  of  the  kind 
specified,82  but,  if  it  is  of  such  a  kind,  summary 
judgment  may  be  obtained  even  though  the  main 
action  is  not  of  the  kind  in  which  summary  judg- 
ment could  be  granted.33 

Partial  judgment.  Under  some  statutes  or  court 
rules,  if  it  appears  that  defendant's  defense  applies 
only  to  a  part  of  plaintiffs  claim,  or  admits  a  part 
of  it,  plaintiff  may  have  judgment  on  motion  for 
so  much  of  his  claim  as  such  defense  does  not  apply 
to34  or  as  is  admitted  without  qualification;35  and 
such  recovery  may  be  had  where  the  amount  is  ad- 


27.  111. — Gliwa    v.    Washington    Po- 
lish Loan  &  Building  Ass'n,  34  N. 
B.2d  736,  310  IlLApp.  465. 

N.Y.— New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Gil- 
lespie,  16  N.Y.S.2d  618,  172  Misc. 
112. 

28.  U.S. — MacNamara   &    Wadbrook 
Trading  Co.  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  D.C. 
N.Y.,  288  F.  985. 

N.Y.— Chester   v.    Chester,    13   N.Y.S. 

2d    502,    171    Misc.    608— Rainville 

v.   Keil,    26-6   N.Y.S.   $67,   148   Misc. 

795. 

Wis. — Binsfeld    v.    Home    Mut    Ins. 

Co.,  19  N.W.2d  240,  247  Wis.  273. 
Defendant's  right  to  judgment  as  de- 
termined by  issues  see  infra  sub- 
division c  (2)  of  this  section. 
Judgment   agfainrt  interpleaded  par. 

ties 

Defendant  may  contest  plaintiffs 
motion  for  summary  judgment 
against  it  and  at  the  same  time  move 
for  summary  judgment  against  in- 
terpleaded  parties  in  the  event  that 
summary  judgment  is  awarded 
against  it.— William  J.  Conners  Oar 
Co.  v.  Manufacturers'  &  Traders' 
Nat  Bank  of  Buffalo,  209  N.Y.'S.  406, 
124  Misc.  584,  affirmed  210  N.Y.S. 
939,  114  App.Div.  811. 

29.  N.Y. — Dumont    v.    Raymond,    49 
NiY.S.2d    865,    affirmed    56    N.Y.S. 
592,.  269  App.Div.  592. 

30.  N.Y.— Levine  v.  Behn,  25  N.'B.2d 
871,  282  N.Y.  120— Simson  v.  Bug- 
man,  45  N.Y.S.2d  140. 

Defense  founded  on  documentary  ev- 
idence 

Where  case  does  not  fall  within 
any  of  the  eight  classes  specifically 
enumerated  in  first  paragraph  of  rule 
of  civil  practice  governing  summary 
judgment,  defendants'  authority  to 
move-  for  summary  judgment  may  be 
found  in  the  paragraph  governing 
summary  judgment  where  defense 
founded  on  facts  established  prima 
facie  by  documentary  evidence  or 
official  record. — Levine  v.  Behn,  25 
N.B.2d  871,  382  N.Y.  120— (Lederer  v. 
Wise  Shoe  Co.,  12  K.B.2d  544,  276  N. 


Y.  459,  852,  disapproving  Felberose 
Holding  Corporation  v.  New  York 
Rapid  Transit  Corporation,  279  N. 
Y.S.  645,  244  App.Div:.  427— Waiters 
v.  Watters,  19  N.Y.S.2d  995,  259  App. 
Div.  611— White  v.  Merchants  Des- 
patch Transp.  Co.,  10  N.Y.S.2d  962, 
25  App.Div.  1044 — Pross  v.  -Founda- 
tion Properties,  285  N.Y.S.  79'6,  158 
Misc.  304. 

31.  N.Y.— Stein  v.  W.  T.  Grant  Co., 
56   N.Y.'S.2d  582.    269   App.Div.   909 
— Dell'0ss6  v.  Everett,   197  N.Y.S. 
423,  119  Misc.  502,  modified  on  oth- 
er grounds  200  N.Y.S.  840,  206  App. 
Div.   718,  appeal  dismissed  144  N. 
B.    887,    238   N.Y.    551— Zaveloff  v. 
Zaveloff,  37  N.Y.S.M  46. 

Effect  of  counterclaim  on  plaintiff's 
motion  for  summary  judgment  on 
his  cause  of  action  see  infra  sub- 
division c  (1)  of  this  section. 
Conditions    under    which    Judgment 

granted 

Court  rule  fixing  conditions  under 
which  summary  judgment  may  be 
granted  applies  to  counterclaims  as 
well  as  to  defenses. — Salt  Springs 
Nat  Bank  of  Syracuse  v.  Hitchcock, 
259  N.Y.S.  24,  144  Misc.  547,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  263  N.Y.S.  55,  238 
App.Div.  150. 

32.  N.Y. — Macomber  v.  Wilkinson,  6 
N.Y.S.2d  608. 

33.  N.Y. — Macomber    v.    Wilkinson, 
supra. 

In  summary  proceeding1  by  land- 
lord wherein  tenant  filed  counter- 
claim for  injuries  caused  by  deleteri- 
ous gas  escaping  from  an  electrical 
refrigerator  on  the  premises,  fact 
that  a  summary  judgment  awarding 
the  premises  to  landlord  could  not 
be  granted  did  not  preclude  testing 
the  sufficiency  of  the  counterclaim 
under  rule  of  civil  practice  provid- 
ing for  summary  judgment  in  speci- 
fied cases.— Macom'ber  v.  Wilkinson, 
supra. 

34.  U.S.— Tractor  &  Equipment  Cor- 
poration v.  Chain  Belt  Co.,  D.G.N. 
Y.,  50  F.Supp.  1001. 

389 


N.Y.— Mayfair    Detectives    v.    Karp 
Metal    Products    Co.,    35    N.Y.«S.2d 
544,  264  App.Div.  410— Amalgamat- 
ed Bank  of  New  York  v.  Lancto,  28 
N.Y.S.2d  944,    176   Misc.   754— Cou- 
denhove-Kalergl  v.  Dieterle,  36  N. 
Y.S.2d  313. 
34  C.J.  p  200  note  52. 
Actions  to  which  applicable 

Provisions  of  rule  limiting  sum- 
mary Judgment  to  certain  actions  ap- 
ply to  partial  judgment — Berson 
Sydeman  Co.  v.  Waumbeck  Mfg.  Co., 
208  N.Y.S.  716,  21'2  App.Div.  422— 
Hilbring  v.  Mooney,  223  N.Y.S.  303, 
1'30  Misc.  273— 34  C.J.  p  200  note  50 
Ca]. 

Severing1  cause  of  action 

The  severing  of  first  cause  of  ac- 
tion and  granting  summary  judg- 
ment on  second  cause  of  action  was 
improper,  where  amount  of  damages 
under  second  cause  of  action  might 
affect  defendant's  liability  under  first 
cause  of  action,  and  the  whole  claim 
should  be  considered  at  one  time. — 
Cavagnaro  v.  Bowman,  34  N.Y.S.2d 
637,  2'64  App.Div.  118,  appeal  denied 
36  N.Y.S.2d  187,  264  AppaDiv.  853. 

35.  N.Y.— Fleder  T.  Itkin,  60  N.B.2d 
753,  294  N.Y.  77— Mayfair  Detec- 
tives v.  Karp  Metal  Products  Co., 
35  N.Y.S.-2d  544,  364  App.Div.  410— 
Sheehan  v.  Andrew  Cone  General 
Advertising  Agency,  29  N.Y.S.2d 
•317,  176  Misc.  882— Friedman  v. 
Equitable  Life  Assur.  «Soc.  of  U.  S., 
274  N.Y.S.  851,  133  Misc.  349— 
Barber  v.  Warland,  247  N.Y.S.  455, 
139  Misc.  398— Finkel  v.  Affom 
Holding  Corporation,  46  N.Y.S,2d 
378— Kaminsky  v.  Rich,  10  N.Y.S. 
2d  503. 

Pa. — 'Mesharrer  v.  Lewis,  Com.Pl.,  88 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  530. 

'34  C.J.  p  200  note  51. 

Judgment  on  admission  in  pleadings 
generally  see  supra  $  185. 

Defense  enabling1  delay  in  recovery 

A  plaintiff  may  recover  judgment 
forthwith  where  defendant  admits 
that  he  has  no  defense  on  merits  to 


§  220 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


mitted  to  be  due  on  the  same  transaction  which 
forms  the  basis  of  plaintiff's  claim,  notwithstanding 
the  admission  of  liability  is  predicated  on  a  cause 
of  action  different  from  that  alleged  in  the  com- 
plaint, or  on  different  terms  concerning  the  same 
type  of  action.36  However,  a  motion  for  partial 
judgment  must  be  denied  where  the  amount  due  is 
disputed37  or  where  the  amount  tendered  by  de- 
fendant was  not  accepted.38  If  defendant's  motion 
for  summary  judgment  applies  only  to  one  or  more 
of  several  causes  of  action  or  to  one  or  more  of 
several  parties  plaintiff,  and  his  contentions  are 
sufficient  to  dispose  of  the  claims  of  the  complaint 
in  such  part,  defendant  may  have  final  judgment 
forthwith  dismissing  the  complaint  to  the  extent 
warranted,  and  the  action  may  be  severed;39  but 
defendant  is  not  entitled  to  partial  summary  judg- 
ment for  certain  alleged  items  of  damage  set  forth 
in  the  complaint  where  only  a  single  cause  of  ac- 
tion is  alleged  and  other  items  of  damage  remain 
for  determination.40 


b.  Particular  Actions 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Liquidated  or  unliquidated  claims 

(1)  In  General 

The  remedy  of  summary  Judgment  Is  available  only 
In  the  kinds  of  actions  provided  for  by  the  statute  or 
court  rule,  and,  within  limitations,  such  provisions 
usually  extend  to  actions  at  law  or  equity,  and  to  causes, 
based  on  contract. 

Generally  the  remedy  of  summary  judgment  is 
available  only  in  such  actions  as  are  within  the 
terms  of  the  statute  or  court  rule.41  If  the  statute 
so  provides,  summary  judgment  may  be  granted  in 
actions  at  law42  or  in  equity,43  but  the  action  must 
be  otherwise  one  permitted  by  the  statute,  as  where 
the  remedy  is  further  restricted  to  liquidated  de- 
mands, as  is  discussed  infra  subdivision  b  (2)  of 
this  section,  and  under  some  statutes  the  remedy  is 
not  available  in  equitable  actions  other  than  those 
particularly  specified.44  The  statutes  usually  apply 


part  of  plaintiff's  claim,  although  he 
may  have  a  defense  which  might  en- 
able him  to  defeat  recovery  on  the 
cause  of  action  stated  and  to  delay 
recovery  even  for  the  part  of  the 
claim  which  defendant  is  admittedly 
bound  to  pay  immediately. — OHeder 
V.  Itkin,  60  N.E.2d  753,  294  N.T.  77. 

36.  N.T. — Sheehan  v.   Andrew  Cone 
General  Advertising  Agency,  29  N. 
T.S.2d  317,  176  Misc.  882. 

37.  N.T.— Hilbring    v.    Mooney,    223 
N.T.S.   303,   130  Misc.   273. 

Accord  and  satisfaction 

One  suing  for  purchase  price  of 
goods  sold  and  delivered  was  not  en- 
titled to  a  partial  summary  judg- 
ment on  ground  that  buyer  had  ad- 
mitted liability  for  a  specific  amount 
for  whicn  it  had  sent  its  check  be- 
fore commencement  of  action,  where 
allegations  of  defense  of  buyer,  if 
proven  upon  trial,  would  establish 
accord  and  satisfaction. — Capitol 
Coal  Corporation  v.  Juneglory  Realty 
Corporation,  281  N.T.S.  947,  156  Misc. 
631. 

38.  N.T. — Hilbring   v.    Mooney,    223 
N.T.S.  'SOS,  180  Misc.  2T3. 

3d.  N.T. — Boyan  v.  General  Time 
Instruments  Corporation,  47  N.T.S. 
2d  29,  267  App.Div.  908— Goldman 
v.  Nu-Boro  Park  Cleaners,  41  N.T. 
S.2d  59'2,  266  App.Div.  780,  appeal 
denied  43  N.T.6.'2d  635,  two  cases, 
266  App.Div.  85-6 — Winkler  v.  Com- 
pania  Sud  Americana  De  Vapores, 
41  N.TjS.2d  67,  180  Misc.  181— 
Druckerman  v.  Harbord,  29  N.T. 
S.24  370. 

40.  N.T.— 'Luotto  v.  (Field,  63  N.E. 
2d  53,  294  N.T.  460— Dumont  v. 
Raymond,  49  N.T.S.2d  865,  affirmed 
56  N.T.S.2d  592,  269  App.Div.  592. 


41.     Ark.— Craig  v.  Collier,  244  S.W. 

717,  15'5  Ark.  538. 

111. — Gliwa  v.  Washington  Polish 
Loan  &  Building  Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d 
736,  310  IlLApp.  465.  . 
Mich. — Detroit  Trust  Co.  v.  City  of 
Detroit,  227  N.W.  71-5,  248  Mich. 
612. 

N.T.— Tracy  v.  Danzinger,  291  N.T.S. 
113,  249  Apfr.Div.  4'6— 108  Park 
Ave.  Co.  v.  Exchange  Buffet  Cor- 
poration, 197  N.T.S.  42'2,  203  App. 
Dlv.  739 — Resource  Holding  Corpo- 
ration v.  Nitke,  239  N.T.S.  26,  13-6 
Misc.  139. 

W.Va. — Mountain  State  Water  Co.  v. 
Town  of  Kingwood,    1  S.E.2d  395, 
121  W.Va.  66. 
Wis.— Winter    v.    Trepte,    290    N.W. 

599,  234  Wis.  193. 
'34  C.J.  p  200  note  54. 
Particular    actions    in    which    sum- 
mary judgment  allowed: 
Against: 

Collectors  of  taxes  and  revenues 
see  the  C.J.'S.  title  Taxation  §5 
670,  682,  also  61  C.J.  p  1026 
notes  1(3-18,  p  1036  notes  25- 
43. 
(Defaulting: 

Attorney  charged  with  collec- 
tion of  money  for  his  client 
see  Attorney  and  Client  § 
159. 

Officers  and  their  sureties  see 
the  C.J.S.  title  Officers  §§ 
12-3,  167,  also  46  Q.J.  p  1042 
notes  75-35,  p  1075  note  20-p 
1076  note  33. 

Sheriffs  and  constables  see  the 
C.J.S.  title  Sheriffs  and  Con- 
stables §§  168-172,  192,  also  57 
C.J.  p  980  note  3-p  997  note 
56,  p  1046  note  8-p  10*57  note 
35. 
Stipulators  see  Admiralty  §  2,85. 

390 


Particular    actions    in    which    sum- 
mary Judgment   allowed — Cont'd 
Against— Cont'd 

Sureties  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Prin- 
cipal and  Surety  §  277,  also  50 
C.J.  p  224  notes  30-32. 
For  costs  see  Costs  §  181. 
In    favor    of    surety    against    his 
principal  whose  debts  surety  has 
had   to  pay  see  the  C.J.S.   title 
Principal  and  Surety  §  337,  also 
'50  C.J.  p  263  note  82-p  2*64  note 
8. 
On   appeal    bond    see   Appeal   and 

Error  §§  2087-2094. 
To    recover    on   bill    or   note    see 

Bills  and  Notes  §  527. 
Collection  of  excise  tax 

While  ordinarily  as  between  pri- 
vate litigants  a  notice  of  motion 
can  be  employed  only  to  recover 
money  due  on  contract,  under  stat- 
ute relating  to  collection  of  claims 
due  the  state,  state  could  proceed 
by  notice  of  motion  for  collection  of 
gasoline  excise  tax  and  penalties. — 
State  v.  Penn  Oak  6il  &  Gas,  W.Va., 
36  S.E.2d  595. 

42.  Mich. — Robertson  v.   New  Tork 
Life   Ins.   Co.,    19   N.E.2d   498,    312 
Mich.  92,  certiorari  denied  66  S.Ct. 

470,    326    U.S.    786,    90    L.Ed.    . 

rehearing  denied  66  S.Ct.   896. 

Va.— Plckeral  v.  Federal  Land  Bank 
of  Baltimore,  15  SJB.2d  82,  177  Va. 
743. 

43.  111.— Fisher  v.  Hargrave,  48  N.E. 
2d  966,  318  IlLApp.  €10. 

44.  N.T. — Tracy   v.    Danzinger,    291 
N.T.S.    113,    249    App.Div.    46—103 
Park  Ave.  Co.  v.  Exchange  Buffet 
Corporation,    197.  N.T.S.    422,    203 
App.Div.    739— People   v.    AUender 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


220 


to  actions  on  contracts  express  or  implied  in  fact 
or  in  law,45  and  are  sometimes  restricted  in  ap- 
plication to  actions  of  such  a  nature.46  In  some 
states,47  but  not  in  others,48  summary  procedure 
may  be  used  in  tort  actions. 
The  remedy  of  summary  judgment  has  been  held 


available  in  various  particular  actions  such  as  for 
an  accounting49  arising  on  a  written  contract,50  for 
ejectment,51  to  recover  possession  of  a  specific  chat- 
tel,52 for  forcible  entry  and  detainer,53  for  specific 
performance  of  a  contract  for  the  sale  and  pur- 
chase of  specific  property,54  to  enforce  or  foreclose 
a  lien  or  mortgage,55  and  In  an  action  on  a  statute 


Co.,  43  N.Y.S.Sd  685,  181  Misc.  307 

— Fiscella  v.   Fridman,   7  N.Y.S.2d 

544,  169  Misc.  327. 
34  C.J.  p  200  note  54  [b]   (1). 

Reformation  of  instrument  is 
function  of  court  of  equity  and  not 
of  court  of  law  on  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment. — Comas  Holding 
Corporation  v.  Handel,  265  N.T.S. 
873,  14.8  Misc.  439. 

46.  TIL — Eagle  Indemnity  Co.  v. 
Haaker,  33  N.E.2d  154,  309  Ill.App. 
-•406. 

N.Y.— Pribyl  v.  Van  Loan  &  Co.,  26 
N.T.S.2d  1,  261  App.Div.  503,  re- 
argument  denied  27  N.Y.S.2d  992, 
2ff2  App.Div.  711,  affirmed  40  N.E. 
2d  36,  287  N.Y.  749— Title  Guaran- 
tee &  Trust  Co.  v.  Smith,  213  N.Y. 
S.  730,  21'5  App.Div.  448— Hughes 
v.  Frank  M.  Murphy,  Inc.,  6  N.Y. 
S.2d  $33,  169  Misc.  239. 

W.Va. — Mountain  State  Water  Co. 
v.  Town  of  Kingwood,  1  S.B.2d  395, 
121  W.Va.  66 — Lambert  v.  Morton, 
160  S.E.  223,  111  W.Va.  25. 

Wis. — Jefferson  Gardens  v.  Terzan, 
257  N.W.  154,  21'6  Wis.  230. 

Actions  held  within  statute  or  rule 

(1)  Action  to  recover  tax  paid  un- 
der protest— National  Bond  &  Share 
Corporation  v.  Hoey,  D.C.N.Y.,  14  F. 
Supp.  787. 

(2)  Action  to  recover  amount  due 
because  of  bank  stockholders  double 
liability.— Schafer  v.  Bellin  Memorial 
Hospital  of  Wisconsin  Conference  of 
Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  264  N. 
W.  177,  219  Wis.  495. 

(3)  A  suit  for  accounting  on  the- 
ory that  by  agreement  defendants  or 
their    predecessors    in    interest    as- 
sumed  liabilities   of   dissolved   bro- 
kerage firm  with  which  plaintiff  had 
dealt.— Fisher  v.  Hargrave,  48  N.B.2d 
966,  318  Ill.App.  510. 

Waiver  of  tort 

Rule  authorizing  summary  Judg- 
ment is  applicable  to  proceeding  aris- 
ing out  of  wrongful  taking,  where 
plaintiff  waived  tort  and  proceeded 
on  implied  contract. — Bishop  v. 
Spector,  269  N.Y.S.  •  76,  1'50  Misc.  860. 

Third-party  beneficiary 

Plaintiff  seeking  to  enforce  a  con- 
tract as  third-party  beneficiary  is 
asserting  a  contract  right  within 
statute  authorizing  summary  judg- 
ments.— Rifkln  v.  Safenovitz,  40  A. 
2d  188,  131  Conn.  411. 
All  cases  not  within  statute 

Under  some  statutes  proceedings 


for  summary  judgment  are  not  ap- 
plicable in  all  cases  founded  on  con- 
tract.— Goucher  v.  Herr,  14  A.2d  651, 
65  R.I.  246. 

46.  W.Va.— City  of  Beckley  v.  Craig- 
head,  24  S.B.2d  908,  125  W.Va.  484. 
A  municipal  special  assessment  for 

the  cost  of  street  paving  did  not 
create  a  "contractual  obligation"  as 
against  the  owners  of  abutting  lots. 
-rCity  of  Moundsville  v.  Brown,  25 
S.E.2d  900,  125  W.Va.  779. 
Damages 

Notice  of  motion  for  judgment  on 
Justice's  official  bond  is  not  proper 
procedure  to  enforce  claim  sounding 
in  damages.— White  v.  Conley,  152  S. 
E.  527,  108  W.Va.  658. 

47.  Mich.— Robertson  v.   New  York 
Life  Ins.  Co.,   19  N.W.2d  49,8,   312 
Mich.  92,  certiorari  denied  66  S.Ct, 
470,  326  U.S.  786,  90  L.Ed. ,  re- 
hearing denied  66  S.Ct  896. 

48.  N.Y.— Allegro    for    Children    T. 
Weisbrod,   18  N.Y.S.2d   369. 

Summary  judgment  held  unavailable 
(1)  In  action  for  conversion. — 
Formel  v.  National  City  Bank  of 
New  York,  273  N.Y.S.  817,  152  Misc. 
275 — Rothman  v.  Charles  D.  Strang, 
Inc.,  273  N.Y.S.  816,  152  Misc.  606 
— Allegro  for  Children  v.  Weisbrod, 
18  N.Y.S.2d  369. 

,  (2)  In  action  for  negligence  re- 
sulting in  damage  to  personal  prop- 
erty.— Ottone  v.  American  London 
Shrinkers  Corp.,  55  N.Y.S.2d  243. 

49.  111.— Fisher  v.  Hargrave,  48  NJ3. 
2d  96-6,  318  Hl.App.  510. 

50.  N.Y.— City  Bank  Fanners'  Trust 
Co.    v.    Charity    Organization    Soc. 
of  City  of  New  York,  265  N.Y.S. 
267,  238  App.Div.  720,  affirmed  191 
NJD.  504,  204  N.Y.  441. 

Accounting  not  under  contract 

Summary  judgment  cannot  be 
granted  plaintiffs  in  action  for  ac- 
counting, where  they  do  not  rely  on 
written  contract — Ben  Bimberg-  & 
Co.  v.  Unity  Coat  &  Apron  Co.,  270 
N.Y.S.  579,  151  Misc.  442. 

51.  N.J.— Milberg  v.  Keuthe,  121  A. 
713,  98  N.J.Law  779. 

Alternative  procedural  remedy 

The  code  section,  extending  right 
to  proceed  by  motion  for  judgment 
in  ail  cases  where  action  at  law  of 
any  kind  would  lie,  includes  alterna- 
tive procedural  remedy  to  common- 
law  action  of  ejectment,  that  is,  pe- 
tition to  establish  boundary  lines, 
which  partakes  of  legal  nature  of 

391 


such  action  and  Is  governed  much 
by  like  legal  principles  and  rules. — 
Pickeral  v.  Federal  Land  Bank  of 
Baltimore,  15  S.E.2d  82,  177  Va,  743. 
52.  N.Y.— Le  Fevre  v.  Reliable  Paint 

Supply    Co.,    275    N.Y.S.    903,    152 

Misc.  594. 

Action  in  conversion  for  damages 
for  unlawful  repossession  of  auto- 
mobile is  not  one  to  recover  posses- 
sion of  specific  chattel  so  as  to  war- 
rant granting  of  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment— Gilbert  v.  Gotham 
Credit  Corporation,  273  N.Y.S.  81'5, 
152  Misc.  59,8. 

Prior  to  change  in  statute,  sum- 
mary judgment  could  not  be  obtained 
in  a  replevin  action. — New  York  Yel- 
low Cab  Co.  Sales  Agency  v.  Wein- 
berg,  222  N.Y.S.  862,  220  App.Div. 
761. 

5a  HI. — Killian  v.  Welfare  Engi- 
neering Co.,  66  NJB.2d  305,  328  HI. 
App.  375— Wainscott  v.  Penikoff,  4 
N.E.2d  511,  287  IlLApp.  78. 

54.  N.Y.— Bennett  v.  Ritchie,  55  N. 
Y.S.2d   820,    269   App.Div.    851. 

A  contrary  role  prevailed  prior  to 
amendment  of  rule  of  civij  practice 
specifically  permitting  summary 
judgment  in  such  actions. — Morris 
v.  Dorfmann,  233  N.Y.S.  460,  226  App. 
Div.  695. 

Action  not  within  rule 

(1)  An  action  for  specific  perform- 
ance of  a  contract,  under  which  de- 
fendant   allegedly    agreed    that    on 
plaintiff's    return    from    the    armed 
forces    defendant    would    return    to 
plaintiff  the  taxi  business  which  had 
been  transferred  to  defendant,  was 
not  an  action  for  specific  perform- 
ance of  a  contract  for  the  sale  and 
purchase  of  specific  property  or  to 
recover  possession  of  a  specific  chat- 
tel which  could  be  disposed  of  on 
motion    for    summary    judgment — 
Bennett  v.  Ritchie,  65  N.Y.S.2d  820, 

9  App.Dlv.  851. 

(2)  The   statutes   do  not   compre- 
hend actions  to  compel  specific  per- 
formance of  an  alleged  agreement  of 
an  insurer  to  reinstate  a  policy  ter- 
minated by  failure  of  plaintiff  to  pay 
premiums. — Lias  v.  Continental  Cas- 
ualty Co.,   284  N.Y.S.   304,   245  App. 
Div.  670. 

55.  N.Y.— City  of  New  Rochelle  v. 
Echo  Bay  Waterfront  Corp.,  *49  N. 
Y.S.2d  673,   268.  App.Div.  182,  cer- 
tiorari   denied   Echo    Bay   Water- 
front Corp.  v.   City  of  New  Ro- 
chelle, 66  S.Ct.  24,  826  U.S.  720,  00 


§  220 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


where  the  sum  sought  to  be  recovered  is  a  sum  of 
money  other  than  a  penalty.56 

On  the  other  hand,  summary  judgment  procedure 
has  been  held  inapplicable  to  special  proceedings,57 
such  as  mandamus,58  an  action  against  a  state  in 
the  court  of  claims,59  or  summary  proceedings  by 
a  landlord  to  recover  possession  of  premises,60  or 
in  actions  or  proceedings  for  a  declaratory  judg- 
ment,61 to  partition  realty,62  to  quiet  title,63  to  es- 
tablish a  claim  against  a  decedent's  estate,64  to  have 
a  trustee's  compensation  determined,65  to  recover 
attorney's  fees,66  or  to  levy  on  the  earnings  or  in- 
come, of  a  judgment  debtor.67  Summary  judgment 
under ~a  state  statute  is  not  authorized  in  suits  in 


the  federal  courts  on  claims  under  veterans'  legis- 
lation.68 

(2)  Liquidated  or  Unliquidated  Claims 

The  statutes  or  court  rules  authorizing  summary 
Judgment  usually  apply  to  actions  to  recover  a  debt  or 
liquidated  demand  arising  on  a  contract  or  judgment 
and  are  sometimes  restricted  to  such  actions,  but  some 
provisions  also  authorize  the  remedy  In  suits  to  recover 
on  an  unliquidated  claim. 

The  statutes  or  court  rules  authorizing  the  entry 
of  judgment  on  motion  where  no  triable  issue  is 
raised  in  response  to  the  affidavits  of  the  moving 
party  usually  apply  to  actions  to  recover  a  debt 
or  liquidated  demand  arising  on  a  contract  express 
or  implied  in  fact  or  in  law,69  or  arising  on  a  judg- 


L.Ed.  .    Affirmed  60  N.B.2d  838, 

294    N.Y.     67S— Reddy    v.    Zurich 

General  Accident  &  Liability  Ins. 

Co.,   11   N.Y.S.2d  88,    171   Misc.    69. 

Summary  Judgment  is  not  avail- 
able in  such  an  action  under  statutes 
in  some  jurisdictions. — Slama  v. 
Dehmel,  257  N.W.  163,  216  Wis.  224. 

Prior  to  change  in  rule,  summary 
judgment  could  not  be  obtained  in 
such  an  action. — Toner  v.  Ehrgott, 
285  N.Y.S.  17,  226  App.Div.  244— 
Reed  v.  Neu-Pro  Const.  Corporation, 
234  N.T.S.  400,  22*6  App.Div.  70— Se- 
curities Acceptance  Corporation  v. 
E.  M.  Kane  Co.,  196  N.Y.S.  -519,  119 
Misc.  354,  affirmed  201  N.T.S.  945, 
207  App.Div.  840 — Savad  v.  Schwartz, 
241  N.Y.S.  729^34  C.J.  p  200  note  54 
£b]  (2).^ 

Suits  'under  mechanic's  lien  act 
are  within  court  rule  authorizing 
summary  judgment. — Nolte  v.  Nan- 
nino,  154  A.  831,  107  N.J.Law  462. 

56.  N.Y.— Ehlers  v.  Blood,  22  N.Y.S. 
2d  999. 

Failure  to  honor  execution 

Action  against  judgment  debtor's 
employer  for  failure  to  honor  execu- 
tion against  employee's  earnings  is 
one  founded  on  statute  within  text 
rule. — Rosenberg  v.  Parlay  Hats,  258 
N.Y.S.  949,  144  Misc.  519. 
Action  not  within  rule 

Rule   did   not  apply   to   an  action 
brought  under  the  general   corpora- 
tion law  to  compel  individual  to  ac- 
count to  corporation  for  management 
and  disposition  of  assets  of  corpora- 
tion.— Fiscella  v.  Fridman,   7  N.Y.S. 
2d  544,  169  Misc.  827. 
Action  held  one  to  recover  penalty 
N.Y.— Wachtel  v.  Schelberg,  59  N.Y. 

S.2d  846,  186  Misc.  406. 

57.  CaL — Loveland  v.  City  of  Oak- 
land,   159    P.2d    70,    69    Cal.App.2d 
399. 

58.  Cal.— Loveland  v.   City  of  Oak- 
land, supra. 

60.    N.Y.— Muccino  v.   State,   300  N. 

Y.S.  247,  164  Misc.  918. 
60.    N.Y.— In  re  Wendel's  Estate,  266 


N.Y.S.  694,  148  Misc.  912—905 
West  End  Ave.  Corp.  v.  Peers,  195 
N.Y.S.  86,  118  Misc.  754— Gardella 
v.  Hagoplan,  28  N.Y.S.2d  250,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  31  N.Y.S. 
2d  450,  263  App.Div.  816— Macomb- 
er  v.  Wilkinson,  6  N.Y.S.2d  608 — 
Alexander  v.  O'Brien,  6  N.Y.S.2d 
61'4. 

61.  N.Y.— Tiernan  Realty  Co.  v.  Ti- 
tle Guarantee  &  Trust  Co.,  28  N. 
Y.S.2d  920,  176  Misc.  1071— Spauld- 
ing  v.  Hotchkiss,  62  N.Y.S.2d  151. 

62.  N.Y.— Lowe   v.   Plalnfield   Trust 
Co.  of  Plainfield,  N.  J.,  215  N.Y.S. 
50,    216    App.Div.    72— Zaveloff    v. 
Zaveloff,  37  N.Y.S.2d  4-6. 

63.  111. — Ward  v.  Sampson,  63  N.E. 
2d  751,  391  111.  585. 

Wis.— Loehr  v.  Stenz,  263  N.W.  373, 
219  Wis.  361. 

64.  Mich. — Caswell   v.    Stearns,    241 
N.W.  165,  257  Mich.  461. 

65.  Mich.— In  re  Stott's  Estate,  239 
N.W.  i336,  256  Mich.  281. 

66.  Mich. — BIsbee   v.  Wetmore,    241 
N.W.  162,  257  Mich.  178. 

67.  N.Y. — Royco  Realty  Corporation 
v.  Farber,  22*5  N.Y.S.  688,  131  Misc. 
46. 

68.  U.S.— U.   S.   v.   Lindholm,  C.C.A. 
Cal.,   79   F.2d   784,    103.  A.L..R.   213, 
followed  in  U.  S.  v.  Stevenson,  79 
F.2d  788. 

69.  Cal. — Haupt  v.  Charlie's  Kosher 
Market,- 112  P.2d  627,  17  Cal^d  843. 

N.Y. — United  Products  Corporation 
of  America  v.  Standard  Textile 
Products  Co.,  231  N.Y.S.  115,  224 
App.Div.  371 — Hurwitz  v.  Corn  Ex- 
change Bank  Trust  Co.,  253  N.Y.S. 
851,  142  Misc.  39,8— Haiss  v. 
Schmukler,  201  N.Y.S.  332,  121 
Misc.  574— Garlick  v.  Garlick,  63 
N.Y.S.2d  m— David  S.  .Stern  Cor- 
poration v.  Richard  Nathan  Cor- 
poration, 42  N.Y.S.2d  249— Zaveloff 
v.  Zaveloff,  87  N.Y.S.2d  46. 

34  C.J.  p  199  note  48. 

Particular  claims  within  statute  or 

court  rule 
Cl)  Action  for  rent  due. — American 

392 


Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  Chicago 
v.  National  Mineral  Co.,  63  N.E.2d 
142,  326  IlLApp.  597. 

(2)  Action  to  recover  initial  pay- 
ment   on    realty. — Perloff    v.    Island 
Development  Co.,   133  A.   178,   4  N.J. 
Misc.  473. 

(3)  Action  to  recover  deposit  and 
fees    for  s-earching  title. — Grossman 
v.  Brick,  139  A.  490,  5  N.J.Misc.  1016. 

(4)  Action   for  services   on   quan- 
tum meruit. — Jacobs  v.  Korpus,  218 
N.Y.S.  314,  128  Misc.  445. 

(5)  Action  on  provision  in  obliga- 
tion  for  payment  of  reasonable  at- 
torney's fees. 

N.Y. — Waxman  v.  Williamson,  175 
N.E.  534,  256  N.Y.  117,  amendment 
of  remittitur  denied  177  N.E.  151, 
'256  N.Y.  687. 

R.I. — Morris  Pfetn  Co.  of  Rhode  Is- 
land v.  Whitman,  150  A.  610,  51 
R.I.  24, 

(6)  Other  actions. 

Conn. — Rifkin    v.    Safenovitz,    40    A. 
'  2d  188,  131  Conn.  411. 
N.Y.— Weisberg   v.   Art   Work   Shop, 
235  N.Y.S.  8,  22.6  App.Div.  532,  af- 
firmed 170  N.E.  147,  252  N.Y.   572. 
Wis.— Unmack  v.   McGovern,   296   N. 

W.  66,  236  Wis.  639. 
Actions   held  not  within  statute  or 
court  rule 

(1)  An  action  by  a  tenant  of  stalls 
in   a   public  market   to   recover   in- 
creased rent  paid  under  protest,  un- 
der threat  to  revoke  license. — George 
F.    Hinrichs,    Inc.,   v.    City   of   New 
York,   201  N.Y.S.   377,  121  Misc.  592, 
affirmed    207    N.Y.'S.    8152,    212    App. 
Div.  816  and  affirmed  203  N.Y.S.  836, 
213   App.Div.   863,  affirmed   152   N.E. 
413,  242  N.Y.  527. 

(2)  Action    for    damages    against 
landlord  for  breach  pf  covenant  of 
quiet    enjoyment. — Paul    v.    Mantell, 
•247  N.Y.S.  452,  139  Misc.  395. 

(3)  Other  actions* — Joseph  Mogul, 
Inc.,  v.  C.  Lewis  Lavine,  Inc.,  159  N. 
E.  70S,  247  N.Y.  20,  57  A.KR.  934— 
Nagle  v.  Rubin,  247  N.Y.S.   786,  231 
App.Div.  462 — Schwed  v.  E.  N.  Ken- 
nedy, Inc.,   221  N.Y.S.  179,  220  App. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  220 


ment  for  a  stated  sum.70  The  words  "debt"  or 
"liquidated  demand"  as  used  in  the  statutes  are  not 
to  be  given  a  constricted  interpretation,  although 
they  should  not  be  stretched  to  include  a  cause  of 
action  outside  the  main  purpose  of  the  enactment.71 
The  suit  ordinarily  must  be  one  founded  on  express 
or  implied  contract  to  pay  a  sum  which  is  certain 
or  readily  reducible  to  certainty,72  and,  while  it  has 
been  held  that  proceedings  for  summary  judgment 
are  applicable  in  any  action  in  which  recovery  is 
sought  under  the  indebitatus  counts,78  they  are  not 
applicable  in  every  action  in  assumpsit7*  Some 
statutes  do  not  extend  the  summary  judgment  pro- 
cedure to  an  action  for  unliquidated  damages!75 
even  though  no  defense  is  disclosed  by  the  an- 
swer ;76  but  other  statutes  or  court  rules  make  the 
remedy  available  in  an  action  to  recover  an  unliqui- 
dated debt  or  demand  for  a  sum  of  money  arising 
on  express  or  implied  contract77 


c.  As  Determined  By  Issues 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  On  motion  by  defendant 

(3)  Particular  causes  and  issues 

(1)  In  General 

Under  statutes  and  court  rules  authorizing  summary 
Judgment  where  affidavits  are  tendered  in  support  of 
the  claim  and  the  opposing  party  fails  to  present  facts 
establishing  a  triable  issue,  the  court  will  grant  the 
motion  if  no  such  issue  i*  disclosed,  even  though  the 
answer  presents  a  counterclaim;  but  it  will  deny  the 
motion  If  a  triable  issue  of  fact  is  raised  as  to  a  valid 
defense  even  though  such  defense  Is  not  properly 
pleaded. 

Under  various  statutes  and  court  rules  authoriz- 
ing summary  judgment  where  the  moving  party 
files  an  affidavit  in  support  of  his  claim  or  defense 
and  the  opposing  party  fails  to  present  any  facts 
giving  rise  to  any  triable  issue  or  defense,  the  right 
to  judgment  depends  on  the  nonexistence  of  a  gen- 
uine issue  warranting  a  trial,78  and  not  merely  on 


Div.  189— Buffalo  Gaiety  Theatre  Co. 
v.  Indemnity  Ins.  Co.  of  North  Amer- 
ica, 219  N.T.S.  212,  218  App.Div.  6*9 
— Apfel  v.  Auditore,  216  N.T.S.  795, 
217  App.Div.  724,  appeal  dismissed 
155  N.B.  875,  244  N.T.  BO 7— Nor- 
wich Pharmacal  Co.  v.  Barrett,  200 
N.T.S.  298,  205  App.Div.  749— Law- 
rence Textile  Corporation  v.  Amer- 
ican Ry.  Express  Co.,  211  N.T.S.  699, 
125  Misc.  858— State  Realty  Co.  v. 
Post,  206  N.T.S.  718,  128  Misc.  92« 
— Haiss  v.  Schmukler,  201  N.T.S. 
882,  121  Misc.  574. 

Demand  for  ram  of  money 

(1)  Motions  for  judgment  will  be 
entertained    only    for    the    recovery 
of  money  based  on  contract — Moun- 
tain   State   Water   Co.   v.    Town   of 
Kingwood.   1   S.E.2d   $96,   121  W.Va. 
66. 

(2)  A  mandate  proceeding  to  com- 
pel payment  of  pension  to  fireman's 
widow,    when    pension   trustees   had 
refused  to  recognize  widow's  right, 
was   not  a  "demand  for  a  sum  of 
money  only"  within  statute  govern- 
ing   summary    judgment. — Loveland 
v.  City  of  Oakland,  169  P.2d  70,  69 
CaLApp.2d  899. 

70.  N.T.— Tenny  v.  Tenny,  36  N.T. 
S.2d  704. 

An  action  for  arrears  of  Alimony 
under  a  foreign  decree  is  not  cov- 
ered by  statute  authorizing  summary 
judgment  in  "actions  to  recover  a 
debt  or  liquidated  demand  arising  on 
a  judgment  for  a  stated  sum."— 
Southard  v.  Southard,  232  N.T.S.  891, 
138  Misc.  2-59— Tenny  v.  Tenny,  36 
N.T.S:2d  704. 

71.  Mass. — Norwood     Morris     Plan 
Co.-v.  McCarthy,  4  N.-E.2d  450,  295 
Mass.  597,  107  A.L.R.  1215. 


Debt 

(1)  Notes  containing  unconditional 
promise  to  pay  sum  certain  in  money 
with  unconditional  promise  to  pay 
plaintiff  reasonable  attorney's  fee 
was  a  "debt" — Norwood  Morris  Plan 
Co.  v.  McCarthy,  supra. 

C2)  Action  held  not  one  on  debt. — 
Schaffer  Stores  Co.  v.  Sweet,  228  N. 
T.S.  599,  132  Misc.  38. 
72.    N.T.— Paul  v.  Mantell,  247  N.T. 

S.  452,  139  Misc.  39*5. 


latical  calculations 
Amount  claimed  to  be  due  is  a 
"liquidated  demand"  within  statute 
authorizing  summary  judgments  if  It 
is  susceptible  of  being  made  certain 
in  amount  by  mathematical  calcula- 
tions, from  factors  which  are  or 
ought  to  be  in  possession  or  knowl- 
edge of  party  to  be  charged. — Rifkin 
v.  Safenovitz,  40  A.2d  188,  131  Conn. 
411. 

73.  N.T.— Waxman    v.    Williamson, 
175  NJS.  534,  2B6  N.T.  117,  amend- 
ment of  remittitur  denied  177-  N.E. 
151,  256  N.T.  5*7. 

ILL— Fisher  v.  Sun  Underwriters 
Ins.  Co.  of  New  Tork,  179  A.  702, 
5*5  ILL  175,  103  A.L.R.  1097— Henry 
W.  Cooke  Co.  v.  Sheldon,  164  A, 
327,  53  ILL  101. 

34  C.J.  p  201  note  5*5. 

74,  ILL— Beriok  v.   Curran,    179    A. 
'    708,    55    R.I.    193— Fisher   T.    Sun 

Underwriters     Ins.     Co.     of    New 

Tork,  179  A.  702,  5-5  ILL  175,  103 

A.L.R.  1097, 
Basis  of  recovery 

Generally  the  basis  for  "assump- 
sit"  is  not  recovery  under  a  contract, 
but  recovery  of  damages  for  a  con- 
tract's breach,  while  a  "notice  of  mo- 
tion for  judgment"  is  for  recovery  of 
money  due  under  and  by  virtue  of  a 

393. 


contract — City     of     Moundsville    v. 

Brown,  25  S.K2d  900,  125  W.Va.  779. 

75.  Mass. — Norwood  Morris  Plan  Co. 
v.  McCarthy,  4  N.B.2d  450,  295 
Mass.  597,  107  A.L.R.  1215. 

Mich. — Hecfcer  Products  Corporation 
v.  Transamerican  Freight  Lines, 
296  N.W.  297,  296  Mich.  381. 

R.I.— Goucher  v.  Herr,  14  A.2d  651, 
65  R.X  246 — Fisher  v.  Sun  Under- 
writers Ins.  Co.  of  N£W  Tork,  179 
A.  702.  65  R.L  175.  108  A.L.R.  1W7. 

34  C.J.  p  201  note  56. 

78.  Idaho.--Welch  v.  Bigger,  18*  P. 
381,  24  Idaho  169. 

77.  Cal. — Bank  of  America  Nat 
Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Oil  Well 
Supply  Co.  of  California,  55  P.2d 
885,  12  Cal.App.2d  265. 

In  New  Tori 

(1)  The  text  rule  now  prevails. — 
Aiken  Mills  v.  Boss  Mfg.  Co.,  265  N. 
T.S.  555,  238  App.Div.  60S. 

(2)  Prior    to    the    amendment    of 
the    court   rules    in    1932,    summary 
judgment  could  hot  be   obtained  in 
an    action    to    recover    unliquidated 
damages. — Interstate   Pulp  &  Paper 
Co.  v.  New  Tork  Tribune,  202  N.T.S. 
232,      207      App.Div.      453— Norwich 
Pharmacal  Co.  v.  Barrett  200  N.T.S. 
298,   205  App.Div.   749 — Golden  State 
Fruit  Distributors   v.   Shambro,   232 
N.T.S.  338.  183  Misc.  561. 

Ta,  Cal.— Walsh  v.  Walsh,  116  P.2d 
62,  18  CaL2d  439. 

N.T.— Piedmont  Hotel  Co.  v.  A.  E. 
Nettleton  Co.,  188  N.B.  14$,  068 
N.T.  25— Curry  v.  Mackenzie,  1'4'6 
N;B.  375,  239  N.T.  267— Miorin  V. 
Miorin,  13  N.T.S.2d  705,  257  App. 
Div.  556,  reargument  denied  14  N. 
T.S.2d  H>03,  257  AppJDiv.  1034— 
Moir  v.  Johnson,  207  N.T.S.  850, 
211  App.Dlv.  427— -Rit*  Carlton 


220 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


whether  the  pleadings  join  issue.79  In  passing  on 
such  a  motion,  the  court  is  not  authorized  to  try 
an  issue  of  fact  between  the  parties,80  but  is  to 
determine  whether  or  not  there  is  an  issue  to  be 


tried;8!  and  whether  under  the  facts  defendant  is 
entitled  to  defend.*2  If  it  is  apparent  from  the  op- 
posing affidavits  or  other  pleadings  and  proof  that 
there  is  a  substantial  issue  between  the  parties,  a 


Restaurant  &  Hotel  Co.  v.  Ditmars, 
197  N.T.S.  40*5,  203  App.Div.  748— 
American  Surety  Co.  of  New  York 
v.  Empire  Trust  Co.,  217  N.T.S. 
673,  128  Misc.  116— Peabody  v.  In- 
terborough  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  209 
N.T.S.  376,  124  Misc.  801,  affirmed 
-  209  N.T.S.  893,  213  App.Div.  857, 
affirmed  148  N.E.  768,  240  N.T. 
708— First  Trust  Co.  of  Albany  v. 
Dumary,  23  N.T.S.2d  552. 

79.  111. — Roberts  v.  Sauerman  Bros., 
•20  N.E.2d  849,  300  IlLApp.  213. 

Joinder  presupposed 

Ordinarily  a  motion  for  summary 
judgment  presupposes  that  the 
pleadings  properly  join  issue.— Rob- 
erts v.  Sauerman  Bros.,  supra. 

Tlu  mere  service  of  an,  amended 
answer  after  plaintiff  moves  for 
summary  Judgment  will  not  of  it- 
self defeat  the  motion,  but  the  case 
may  be  considered  on  the  amended 
pleadings  and  the  affidavits  in  sup- 
port thereof. — Standard  Factors 
Corp.  v.  Kreisler,  53  N.T.S.2d  871. 
Affirmed  56  N.T.S.2d  414,  269  App. 
Div.  830. 

80.  •  U.S.— Schrara  v.  Clair,  D.C.N.T, 
28  F.Supp.  422. 

Gal.— Arnold  v.  Hibernia  Savings  & 
Loan  Soc.,  146  P.2d  684,  23  Cal.2d 
741— Eagle  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v. 
Pretxtice,  122  P.2d  2«4,  19  CaUd 
553— Walsh  v.  Walsh,  116  P.2d  62, 
18  Cal.2d  439 — Slocum  v.  Nelson 
App.,  163  P.2d  888. 

111. — Molner  v.  Schaefle,  58  K.B.2d 
744,  324  IlLApp.  589. 

N.T. — Irving  Trust  Co.  v.  Anahma 
Realty  Corporation,  85  N.B.2d  21, 
•2*5  N.T.  416— Brooklyn  Fire  Brick 
Works  v.  Brooklyn  Contractors 
Machinery  Exchange,  47  N.T.S.2d 
229,  181  Misc.  662— Tokohama  Spe- 
cie Bank,  Limited,  New  Tork 
Agency,  v.  Milljert  Importing  Co., 
44  N.T.S.2d  71,  182  Misc.  281— Hav- 
ens v.  Rochester  Ropes,  Inc.,  89  N. 
T.S.2d  4'44,  179  Misc.  889,  affirmed 
41  N.T.S.2d  180,  266  App.Div.  672 
appeal  denied  41  N.T.S.JJd  907,  266 
'tApp.Div.  692 — Neptune  Meter  Co 
v  Long  Island  Water  Meter  Re- 
pair Co.,  39  N.T.S.2d  325,  179  Misc. 
445 — Community  Volunteer  Fire 
Co.  of  NImmonsburg  v.  City  Nat 
Bank  of  Binghamton,  14  N.T.S.2d 
306,  171  Misc.  1027— Falk  v.  Em 
pire  State  Degree  of  Honor  o: 
Stockton,  246  N.T.S.  -649,  138  Misc. 
697— New  Tork  Post  Corp.  v.  Kel 
ley,  61  N.T.S.2d  264,  affirmed 
Hearst  Consolidated  Publications 
v.  Kelley,  61  N.T.S.2d  762,  27 
App.Div.  916,  appeal  granted  6 
N.T.S.'2d  W.4,  270  App.Div,  928 


New  Tork  Sun  v.  Kelley,  62  N.T. 
S.2d  614,  270  App.Div.  924,  New 
Tork  World  Telegram  Corp.  v. 
Kelley,  62  N.T.S.2d  614,  270  App. 
Div.  924,  and  New  Tork  Post  Corp. 
v.  Kelley.  62  N.T.S.2d  615,  270 
App.Div.  923 — Robinov  v.  Homier 
Progressive  Soc.,  52  N.T.S.2d  39, 
affirmed  -56  N.T.$.2d  413,  269  App. 
Div.  832— Gardella  v.  Hagopian,  28 
N.T.S.2d  250,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  31  N.T.S.2d  450,  263  App. 
Div.  816— Spiegel  vt  U.  S.  Lines 
Co.,  27  N.T.S.2d  631— Biloz  v.  Tioga 
County  Patrons'  Fire  Relief  Ass'n, 
21  N.T.S.2d  643,  affirmed  23  N.T.S. 
2d  460,  260  App.Div.  976— Dr.  A. 
Posner,  Shoes,  v.  Vogel,  198  N.T.S. 
233. 
R.I.— Berick  v.  Curran,  179  A.  708,  55 

R.I.  193. 
Wis.— Parish  v.  Awschu  Properties, 

19  N.W.2d  276,  247  Wis.  166. 
34  CJT.  p  201  note  60. 
OL    U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Stephanidis,  D.C. 

N.T.,  41  F.2d  958. 

Cal.— Arnold  v.  Hibernia  Savings  & 
Loan  Soc.,  146  P.2d  684,  25  Cal.2d 
741— Eagle   Oil  &  Refining  Co.   v. 
Prentice,    12T2   P.2d   264,   19   CaL2d 
553— Walsh  v.  Walsh,  116  P.2d  62, 
18    Cal.2d   439— Slocum  v.  Nelson, 
App.,    163    P.2d    888— Loveland    v. 
City  of.  Oakland,   159   P.2d  70,    69 
Cal.App.2d  399— Security-First  Nat 
Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Cryer,  104 
P.2d   66,   39   Cal.App.2d  757— Kelly 
v.  Liddicoat,  96  P.2d   186,   $5   CaL 
App.2d  559— Shea  v.  Leonis,  84  P. 
2d   277,    29    Cal.App.2d   1S4. 
111.— Scharf  v.  Waters,  66  N.E.2d  499, 
328  IlLApp.  525— Bertlee  Co.  v,  Il- 
linois  Publishing   &  Printing  Co., 
52  N.B.2d  47,  320  IlLApp.  490. 
Mass. — Norwood  Morris  Plan  Co.  v, 
McCarthy,  4  N.E.2d  450,  295  Mass. 
597,  107  A.L.R.  1215. 
Mich.— Bed  v.  Fallon,  12  N.W.2d  396 
307     Mich.     466 — People's    Wayne 
County  Bank  of  Dearborn  v.  Har- 
vey, 255  N.W.  436,  268  Mich.  47— 
Baxter  v.  Szucs,  227  N.W.  -666,  248 
Mich.  672. 
N.T.— Miorin  v.  Miorin,   13  N.T.S.2d 
705,  257  App.Div.  556,  reargument 
denied  14  N.T.S.2d  100*3,  267  App 
Div.    1084— Camp-Of-The-Pines    v 
New  Tork  Times  Co.,  53  N.T.S.2d 
475,  18'4  Misc.  389— First  Trust  Co 
of  Albany  v.  Arnold,   39  N.T.S>2 
1T5,    179     Misc.     349— Edward    F 
Dibble  Seedgrower  v.  Jones,  223  N 
T.S.    785,    130    Misc.    359— Rodger 
v.  Bliss,  223  N.T.S.  40-1,  130  Misc. 
168 — Tchlenoff  v.   Jacobs,   4'4   N.T 
S.2d  38,  affirmed  46  N.T.S.2d  875 
267  App.Div.  908,  appeal  denied  4 
N.T.S.2.d    451.     267    AppJMv.  .  98 
affirmed  60  N.E.2d  32,  293  N.T.  904 

394 


— First  Nat.  Bank  of  Dolgeville, 
N.  T..  v.  Mang,  41  N.T.S.2d  92— 
Biloz  v.  Tioga  County  Patrons' 
Fire  Relief  Ass'n,  21  N.T.S.2d  643, 
affirmed  23  N.T.S.2d  460,  260  App. 
Div.  976 — Krauss  v.  Central  Ins. 
Co.  of  Baltimore,  40  N.T.S.2d  736— 
Erie  County  Sav.  Bank  v.  Garson, 
33  N.T.S.2d  142— Nester  v.  Nester, 
19  N.T.S.2d  426,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  22  N.T.S.2d  119,  2-59  App. 
Div.  1065 — Ludmerer  v.  New  Tork 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  19  N.T.S.2d  272. 

R.I.— Minuto  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  179  A.  713,  €5  R.I.  201— 
Berick  v.  Curran,  179  A.  708,  5'5  R. 
I.  193— Fisher  v.  Sun  Underwrit- 
ers Ins.  Co.  of  New  Tork,  179  A. 
702,  55  R.L  175,  103  A.L.R.  1097, 

Wis. — Potts  v.  Farmers'  Mut  Auto- 
mobile Ins.  Co.,  289  N.W.  606,  233 
Wis.  313— Prime  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  F. 
Gallun  &  Sons  Corporation,  281 
N.W.  697,  229  Wis.  3<48. 

34  C.J.  p  201  note  61. 

Court  determines  Whether  there  is 
real  defense 

N.T. — Connor  v.  Commercial  Travel- 
ers Mut.  Accident  Ass'n  of  Ameri- 
ca, 287  N.T.S.  416,  247  App.Div. 
352 — Cleg-horn  v.  Ocean  Accident  & 
Guarantee  Corporation,  Limited,  of 
London,  21*5  N.T.S.  127,  216  App. 
Div.  342,  modified  on  other  grounds 
155  N.B.  87,  244  N.T.  166— Securi- 
ty Finance  Co.  v.  Stuart,  224  N. 
T.S.  257,  130  Misc.  538. 

82.    N.T.— Hamilton  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Greger,    218   N.T.S.   534,    218   App. 

Div.  556,  reversed  on  other  grounds 

158  N.E.-  60,  246  N.T.  162,  S5  A.L.R. 

921— Rogan   v.    Consolidated    Cop-, 

permines  Co.,   193  N.T.S.   163,   117, 

Misc.  718. 

The  test  of  a  motion  for  summary 
judgment  is  whether  the  pleadings, 
affidavits,  and  exhibits  in  support  of 
the  motion  are  sufficient  to  overcome 
the  opposing  papers  and  to  justify 
a  finding  as  a  matter  of  law  that 
there  is  no  defense  to  the  action. — 
Nester  v.  Nester,  19  N.T.S.2d  436, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  22  N.T.S. 
2d  119,  259  App.Div.  1065. 
Protection  of  defendant 

In  proceedings  for  summary  judg- 
ment, defendant's  right  to  present 
his  defense  at  a  trial  should  be  care- 
fully protected. — Berick  v.  Curran, 
179  A.  708,  55  R.I.  193. 
Disclosure  of  defense 

On  plaintiff's  motion  for  summary 
judgment,  defendant  is  not  required 
to  disclose  his  entire  defense,  but 
only  so  much  as  to  show  .that  there 
is  an  issue  to  be  decided  by  the  jury. 
—La  Pointe  v.  Wilson.  61  N.T.S.2d 
64. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  220 


judgment  can  be  entered  only  after  the  trial  of  the 
issue  in  regular  course.83  In  such  a  case  defend- 
ant should  be  given  leave  to  defend84  and  a  mo- 
ss. U.S.— Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of 

America    v.    Zorger,    C.C.A.I11.,    86 

F.2d    4«46,    108    A.L.R.    498— Mary- 
land Casualty  Co.   v.  Sparks.  C.C. 

A.Mich.,    76    P.2d   929 — Chase   Nat 

Bank  of  City  of  New  Tork  v.  Burg, 

D.C.Minn.,   82  P.Supp.  230— Schen- 

ley  Distributors  v.  Wisconsin.  Wine 

&  Spirit  Import  Corporation,  D.C. 

Wis.,  28  F.Supp.  635. 
Ariz. — Cress  v.  Switzer,  1'50  P.2d  86, 

61  Ariz.  405— Hughes  v.  Union  Oil 

Co.    of   Arizona,    132   P.2d   640,    60 

Ariz.  130. 
Cal.— Walsh  v.  Walsh,  116  P.2d  62,  18 

Cal.2d  439 — Gibson  v.  De  La  Salle 

Institute,  152  P.2d  774,  66  CaLApP. 

2d  609— Grady  v.  Easley,  114  P.2d 

635,  45  Cal.App.2d  632. 
111.— Bertlee  Co.  v.  Illinois  Publish- 
ing &  Printing  Co.,  52  N.B.2d  47, 

320  IlLApp.  490. 
N.T. — Gravenhorst    v.     Zimmerman, 

139  N.B.  766,  236  N.T.  22,  27  A.L. 

R.   1465— Greca  v.  De  Luxe  Dain- 
ties, 61  N.T.S.2d  413,  270  App.Div. 

907,  appeal  denied  62  N.T.S.2d  847, 

270    App.Div.     9"44 — Sound    Realty 

Co.  v.  Nicholson,  27  N.T.S.2d  929, 

262  App.Div.  81,  reargument  denied 

29    N.T.S.2d    712,    two    cases,    262 

App.Div.  848— Mills  v.  City  of  New 

Tork,    27    N.T.S.2d    929,    262    App. 

Div.   81,  reargument  denied  29  N. 

Y.S.2d  712,  262  App.Div.  848— Far- 

ber  v.   De   Bruin,   2  N.T.S.2d  244, 

253    App.Div.    909— Childs    Co.    v. 

Stone,    240    N.T.S.    682,    228    App 

Div.    546— Weinberg   v.    Goldstein, 

235    N.T.S.    529,    226    App.Div.   479 

—Leidy  v.  Procter,  235  N.T.S.  101, 

226  App.Div.  322— H.  C.  King  Mo- 
tor Sales  Corporation  v.  Allen,  204 

N.T.S.     SSS,     209     App.Div.     281— 

Moers    v.     American    Exch.    Nat. 

Bank,  203  N.T.S.  727,  208  App.Div. 

473 — Brooklyn    Clothing    Corpora- 
tion  v.    Fidelity-Phenix   Fire   Ins. 

Co.,    200   N.T.S.   208,   205   App.Div. 

743 — mtz    Carlton    Restaurant    & 

Hotel   Co.   v.   Ditmars,   197  N.T.S. 

405,    203   AppJMv.   748— New  Tork 

Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Gillespie,  16  N.T.S. 

2d    618,    172    Misc.    112— National 

City   Bank   of  New  Tork  v.   Bon 

Ray  Dance  Frocks,  275  N.T.S.  510, 

153    Misc.    549— Wm.   H.   Frear   & 

Co.  v.  Bailey,  214  N.T.S.  675,  127 

Misc.   79— Macomber  v,  Wilkinson, 

6  N.T.S.2d  608. 


tion  for  a  summary  judgment  should  not  be  grant- 
ed,85 especially  where  it  would  not  dispose  of  an 


. — Parish  v.  Awschu  Properties 
19   N.W.2d   276,  247  Wis.   166— At- 
las  Inv.   Co.   v.   Christ,   2   N.W.2d 
714,  240  Wis.  114. 
34  C.J.  P  201  note  63. 


Adjudication  a»  to  tame  of  fact 

Where  appellate  court  had  held  is- 
sue .of  fact  raised  by  reply,  issue  re- 
mained an  issue  of  fact  after  filing, 
of    rejoinder    traversing    reply   an<" 


precluded   entry  of  summary  Judg- 
ment— Harvester   Building   &   Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Hana  &  Simon  Blbaum,   3 
.2d  4'50,  1-21  N.J.Law  515. 
L    N.J.— - Louis  S.  Kaplan,  Architect 
v.  Catlett  1  A.2d  884,  121  N.J.Law 
201. 

'4  C.J.  p  201  note  64. 
fatter  of  right 

Where  defendant  flies  an  answer 
presenting  a  good  defense,  and  rea- 
sonably supports  the  essential  fac- 
ual  assertions  of  his  answer  by  affi- 
davit or  other  proofs,  he  is  entitled 
as  a  matter  of  right,  and  not  of  dis- 
cretion or  on  terms,  to  have  his  an- 
swer sustained  as  against  a  motion 
for    summary    judgment. — Louis    S. 
Kaplan,  Architect  v.  Catlett,  supra. 
85.    U.S.— Schenley    Distributors    v. 
Wisconsin  Wine  &   Spirit   Import 
Corporation,   D.CWis.,    28    P.Supp. 
63*5— Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  New 
York    v.    Patterson,    D.C.N.T.,    17 
F.Supp.   416— Aufderheide  v.  Mine 
Safety    Appliance    Co.,    D.C.Pa.,    9 
F.Supp.  918— U.  S.  v.  Turner  Milk 
Co.,  D.C.I11.,  1  F.R.D.   643. 
Ariz.— Cress  v.  Switzer,  1*50  P.2d  86, 

61  Ariz.  405. 

Cal.— Walsh  v.  Walsh.  116  P.2d  62, 
18  Cal.2d  459— Ross  v.  McDougal, 
87  P.2d  709,  81  Cal.iApp.2d  li4. 
I1L— Shirley  v.  Ellis  Drier  Co.,  39 
N.E.2d  329,  379  111.  105— Diversey 
Liquidating  Corporation  v.  Neun- 
kirchen,  19  N.E.2d  363,  370  111. 
523,  120  A.L.R.  1395— C.  L  T.  Cor- 
poration v.  Smith,  48  N.E.2d  735, 
318  IlLApp.  642 — Shaw  v.  National 
Life  Co.,  42  N.E.2d  885,  315  I1L 
App.  210. 

Mich.— Bullard  Gage  Co.  v.  Saflady, 
11  N.W.2d  895,  807  Mich.  296— 
Terre  Haute  Brewing  Co.  v.  Gold- 
berg, 289  N.W.  192,  291  Mich.  401 
—McDonald  v.  Staples,  261  N.W 
86,  271  Mich.  690. 

N.T.— Werfel  v.  Zivnostenska  Banka, 
38  NJB.2d  382,  287  N.T.  91— Mc- 
Carthy v.  Pieret,  24  N.E.2d  102 
2,81  N.T.  407,  reargument  denied 
27  N.E.2d  207,  282  N.T.  S'OO— Owen 
T.  Blumenthal,  19  N.B.2d  977,  280 
N.T.  96— Muth  v.  Telenga,  191  N.B. 
623,  264  N.T.  477— Vandeweghe  v 
City  of  New  Tork,  189  N.E.  751, 
263  N.T.  672— Brawer  v.  Mendelson 
Bros.  Factors,  186  N.E.  200,  202 
N.T.  58,  amended  188  N.E.  65 
262  N.T.  ff62— People's  Nat  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  of  White  Plains  v 
Westchester  County,  185  N.E.  405 
161  N.T.  342,  followed  in  Gramatan 
Nat  Bank  A  Trust  Co.  of  Bronx- 
villa  v.  Westchester  County,  185  N 
E.  773,  261  N.T.  640— Dam  v.  Dam, 
61  N.T.S.2d  902.  268  App.Div.  601— 
Gutterson  v.  Gutterson,  38  N.T.S 
2d  9,  265  App.Div.  902— Goodman 


v.  W.  W.   Const   Co.,   82  N.T.S.2d 
198,    263    App.Div.    879— Oleck    v. 
Blustein  Wine  &  Liquor  Store,  2S 
N.T.S.2d    325,    262    App.Div.    870— 
Jos.  Riedel  Glass  Works  v.  Indem- 
nity Ins.  Co.  of  North  America,  25 
N.T.S.2d  46,  261  App.Div.  886,  mo- 
tion   denied    27   N.T.S.2d    185,    261 
App.Div.    956,    motion    denied    27 
N.T.S.2d    189,     261    App.Div.     956, 
appeal    denied    27    N.T.S.2d    1013, 
261    App.Div.     956 — Weinstein    v. 
Berg,    18    N.T.S.2d    496,    259    App. 
Div.    741— Zabelle  v.    Gladstone,   8 
N.T.S.2d    238,    25*5    App.Div.    953— 
Lawrence,  Blake  &  Jewell  v.  Rock- 
hurst   Realty   Corporation,    8   N.T. 
S.2d  202,  255  App.Div.  491— Elsman 
v.  Elsman,  28-4  N.T.S.  406,  245  APP. 
Div.  699— Chase  Nat  Bank  of  City 
of  New  Tork  v.  Wessell,  281  N.T.S. 
146,    245    App.Div.    8-15 — Brooklyn 
Nat.   Bank   of   New   Tork  v.   City 
of  Long  Beach,  274  N.T.S.  799,  242 
App.Div.  790 — Gellens  v.  Continen- 
tal Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  New  Tork, 
272  N.T.S.    900,    2*41   App.Div.   S91, 
followed  in  Wiand  v.  Continental 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  New  Tork, 
272  N.T.S.    903,   241   App.Div.    593, 
and  Twomey  v.  Continental  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  of  New  Tork,  272  N. 
T.S.    904,    241    App.Div.    594— Gold 
v.  Smith,  272  N.T.S.  139,  242  App. 
Div.      643,      amended      on      other 
grounds   275   N.T.S.  542,   242   App. 
Div.  777— Nusbaum  v.  Rialto  Sec. 
Corporation,    264    N.T.S.    518,    238 
App.Div.    257— Salt    Springs    Nat 
Bank    of    Syracuse    v.    Hitchcock, 
263   N.T.S.   5-5,   235   App.Div.   150— 
Friedman  v.  Universal  Mercerizing 
Co.,    262   N.T.S.    674,    238   App.Div. 
805 — Krausman   v.    John   Hancock 
Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.,  260  N.T.S.  819, 
236  App.Div.  582,  reargument  de- 
nied -260   N.T.S.   981,   237  App.Div. 
810— Standard  Oil  Co.  of  New  Tork 
v.  Boyle,  246  N.T.S.  142,  231  App. 
Div.   101— Exhibitors'  Supply  Cor- 
poration v.  North  Veroon  Lumber 
Mills,  241  N.T.S.  192,  229  App.Div. 
702— Leidy  v.   Procter,   235   N.T.S. 
101,  226  App.DIv.   322— Hemingray 
Glass  Co.  v.  Wilkenfeld  Bros.,  23*4 
N.T.S.  829,  226  App.Div.  7T1— Raw- 
lin  v.  New  Jersey  Fidelity  &  Plate 
Glass  Ins.  Co.,  223   N.T.S.  85,  221 
App.Div.     399— Domestic     Electric 
Co.  v.  MelisM,  21=2  N.T.S.  799,  215 
App.Div.    669 — Ritz    Carlton    Res- 
taurant &  Hotel   Co.   v.   Ditmars, 
197   N.T.S.    405,    204   App.Div.   748 
—New  Tork  Consol.  R.  Co.  v.  City 
of  New  Tork,  197  N.T.S.  887,  2W 
App.Div.        171— Nemours-Stevens, 
Limited,  T.  Nemours  Trading  Cor- 
poration, 197  N.T.S.   341,  204  App. 
Div.   38— Sachs  Quality  Furniture 
v.  Nadborae,  51  N.T.S.2d  505,  183 
Misc.  778,  affirmed  54  N.Y.S.2d  585, 


395 


220 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


essential  part  of  the  case.8* 

The  rule  that  a  motion  for  summary  judgment 
should  not  be  granted  where  a  triable  issue  is  pre- 
sented has  been  -held  to  apply  where  there  is  any 


doubt  as  to  the  defense,87  or  where  defendant  al- 
leges facts  which,  if  proved,  will  constitute  a  good 
defense  to  the  action,88  or  where  an  authorized 
form  of  general  denial  has  been  interposed  by  a 


183  Misc.  781— Jones  v.  Moffatt,  50 
N.Y.S.2d  233,  183  Misc.  129,  affirm- 
ed 51  N.Y.S.2d  767,  268  App.Div. 
967 — Havens  v.  Rochester  Ropes, 
Inc.,  89  N.Y.S:2d  44*4,  179  Misc.  889. 
affirmed  41  N.T.S.2d  180,  266  App. 
Div.  672,  appeal  denied  41  N.Y.S. 
2d  907,  266  App.Div.  692— White  v. 
Nemecek,  9  2ST.Y.S.2d  882,  170  Misc. 
$$9 — Sternlieb  v.  Normandie  Nat. 
Securities  Corporation,  273  N.Y.S. 
229,  152  Misc.  303— Gantz  v.  Inves- 
tors' Syndicate,  -265  N.Y.S.  749,  148 
Misc.  27*4— Pyrke  v.  Standard  Ac- 
cident Ins.  Co.,  2*52  N.Y.S.  635, 
141  Misc.  186,  reversed  in  part  on 
other  grounds  and  affirmed  in  part 
254  N.Y.S.  520,  23«4  App.Div.  133 
—Bauer  v.  Phelps,  235  N.Y.S.  47, 
134  Misc.  44'7 — Hilbring  v.  Moon- 
ey,  223  N.Y.S.  303,  130  Misc.  273 
— Wm.  H.  Frear  &  Co.  v.  Bailey, 
214  N.Y.S.  675,  127  Misc.  79— Kel- 
log  v.  Berkshire  Bldg.  Corporation, 
fill  N.Y.S.  623,  125  Misc.  818— Is- 
erman  v.  J.  E.  Long  Coal  Co.,  204 
N.Y.S.  98,  122  Misc.  822,  affirmed 
20'5  N.Y.S.  929,  209  App.Div.  8.82 
— Chappell  v.  Chappell,  60  N.Y.S. 
2d  447— Franz  v.  48  West  Forty- 
Eighth  Realization  Corp.,  60  N.Y.S. 
2d  160 — Zipser  v.  Hardy,  57  N.Y.S. 
2d  482 — Ottone  v.  American  London 
Shrinkers  Corp.,  55  N.Y.S.2d  243 
— National  Sur.  Corp.  v.  Laurentz, 

53  N.Y.S.2d    889— Coudenhove-Kal- 
ergi  v.  Dieterle,  36  N.Y.S.2d  313— 
Reisfeld  v.   Casino  &  Co,,  198  N. 
Y.S.  778— Christo  v.  Bayufcas,  196 
N.Y.S.  600. 

Pa.— Ockman  v.  Jones  Mach.  Tool 
Works,  45  A.2d  47,  3-53  Pa.  308— 
Roberts  v.  Washington  Trust  Co., 
170  A.  291,  813  Pa.  584,  certiorari 
denied  54  SX5L  778,  292  U.S.  608. 
78  L.Ed.  1469,  rehearing  denied  54 
S.Ct  857,  292  U.S.  613,  7«  L.Ed. 
1472— Berman  v.  Hartford  Accfr- 
dent  &  Indemnity  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  34 
Del.Co.  85 — Commonwealth  v.  Iv- 
annucci,  Coxn.PL,  33  Del.Co.  674 
— In  re  Chester  County  Trust  Co., 
Com.PL,  29  DeLCo.  178— Bellevue 
Park  Ass'n  v.  Lippman,  Com.PL, 

54  DauphJCo.   163 — Department   of 
Public  Assistance  v.   Jones,   Com, 
PL,    44    Lack.Jur.    148— Pieklo    v. 
Pieklo,    Com.Pl.,    38    Luz.Leg.Reg. 
3  g-g— -North  River  Ins.   Co.  v.  Yo- 
cum,  Com.Pl.,  16*  Northumb.L.J.  1 
— Porter     v.     Nldo,     Com.Pl.,     86 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  2"5. 

Wis.— -City  of  Milwaukee  v.  Heyer,  4 
N.W.2d  126,  241  Wis.  56— Mc- 
Jjoughlin  v.  Malnar,  297  N.W.  370, 
237  Wis.  492— Prime  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
A,  F.  Gallun  &  Sons  Corporation, 
281  N.W.  697,  229  Wis.  348— Sul- 


livan v.    State,    251   N.W.   251,   213 

Wis.  186,  91  A.L.R.  877. 
34  C.J.  p  201  note  6$. 
Other  statements  of  role 

(1)  Summary  judgment  should  not 
be    entered    where    the    trial    judge 
would    have    to    decide    controverted 
questions  of  fact— Security  Discount 
Corporation    v.    Jackson,    51    N.E.2d 
618,  320  Ill.App.  4'40. 

(2)  Summary   judgment   may    not 
be  granted  where  the  conclusion  de- 
pends   on   varying  inferences   to   be 
drawn    from    the    flacts.— Krauss    v. 
Central  Ins.  Co.  of  Baltimore,  40  N. 
Y.S.2d  736. 

(3)  To  warrant  a  summary  judg- 
ment,   there    must    be   a   failure    on 
the  part  of  defendant  to  satisfy  the 
court  that  there  is  any  basis  for  his 
denial  or  any  truth  in  his  defense, 
and  unless  the  defendant  fails  so  to 
do,  the  case  should  proceed  to  trial. 
— Grady  v.  Easley,  114  P.2d  635,  45 
CaLApp.2d  632. 

(4)  Judgment     may    be    rendered 
against  defendant  only  as  result  of 
conclusion  of  law  from  facts  found 
or  not  disputed.— Persky  v.  Bank  of 
America  Nat.  Ass'n,  185  N.E.  77,  261 
N.Y.  212. 

Several  defenses 

Where  defendant  shows  that  under 
any  one  of  several  defenses  genuine 
and  substantial  issue  is  created,  he 
is  entitled  to  trial,  and  summary 
judgment  is  improper. — American 
Surety  Co.  of  New  York  v.  Empire 
Trust  Co.,  217  N.Y.S.  673,  128  Misc. 
116. 
Denial  of  damages 

Denial  in  answer  of  plaintiff's  alle- 
gation of  damages  raised  no  issue 
requiring  trial. — Gise  v.  Brooklyn 
Soc.  for  Prevention  of  Cruelty  to 
Children,  260  N.Y.S.  787,  236  App. 
Div.  ,852,  appeal  dismissed  186  N.E. 
412,  262  N.Y.  114,  reargument  denied 
188  N.E.  111,  262  N.Y.  '664. 

86.  Ind. — New  Hampshire  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Wall,   75  N.E.   668,  36  Ind. 
App.  238. 

Absent  party 

In  action  by  one  of  depositors  hav- 
ing joint  savings  account  to  recover 
amount  thereof  as  sole  owner  with- 
out bank  book  in  absence  of  other 
depositor,  plaintiff  was  not  entitled 
to  summary  judgment,  since  deposi- 
tor could  serve  other  depositor  by 
publication  and  obtain  judgment  cut- 
ting off  her  rights,  if  his  contentions 
were  true. — Caruso  v.  Dry  Dock  Sav. 
Inst,  11  N.Y.S.2d  41ft.  170  Misc.  867. 

87.  Del. — Lam-son  v.  Habbart,  43  A. 
2d  249. 

396 


111.— Bertlee  Co.  v.  Illinois  Publish- 
ing &  Printing  Co.,   52   N.E.2d  47, 
320  IlLApp.  490. 
34  C.J.  p  201  note  67. 

If  a  defense  is  arguable,  apparent, 
or  made  in  good  faith,  it  should  be 
submitted  to  a  jury,  and  plaintiff's 
motion  for  summary  judgment 
should  not  be  granted. 
111. — C.  L  T.  Corporation  v.  Smith, 
48  N.E.2d  735,  318  IlLApp.  642— 
Fellheimer  v.  Wess,  46  NJE.2d  89, 
316  IlL'App.  449— Shaw  v.  National 
Life  Co.,  42  N.E.2d  885,  315  111. 
App.  210 — Soelke  v.  Chicago  Busi- 
ness Men's  Racing  Ass'n,  41  N.E. 
2d  232,  314  IlLApp.  336 — Gliwa  v. 
Washington  Polish  Loan  &  Build- 
ing Ass'n,  84  N.E.2d  736,  810  HL 
App.  465. 

N.Y. — Neivel    Realty    Corporation    v. 
Prudence    Bonds   Corporation,    271 
N.Y.8.  209,  151  Misc.  737— Federal 
Deposit  Ins.  Corporation  v.-  Appel- 
baum,  39  N.Y.S.2d  300. 
Defense  held  not  sham 
XJ.s. — Goess  v.  A.  D.  H.  Holding  Cor- 
poration,  C.C.A.N.Y.,    85   F.2d   72. 
Finding-  as  matter  of  law 

To  warrant  summary  judgment, 
pleadings,  affidavits,  and  exhibits 
supporting  motion  therefor  must 
overcome  opposing  papers  and  justi- 
fy finding  as  matter  of  -law  that 
there  is  no  defense.— People's  Wayne 
County  Bank  v.  Power  City  Trust 
Co.,  263  N.Y.S.  477,  147  Misc.  168. 

8a  111.— «Fellheimer  v.  Wess,  45  N. 
B.2d  89,  316  IlLApp.  449— Barrett 
v.  Shanks,  20  N.E.2d  799,  300  111. 
App.  119,  followed  in  Barrett  v. 
Heichman,  20  N.E.'2d  802,  «00  111. 
App.  605 — Barrett  v.  Volkman,  20 
N.B.2d  802,  300  IlLApp.  605— Bar- 
rett v.  Gardner,  20  N.E.  803,  300 
IlLApp.  605 — Barrett  v.  Wallace, 
20  N.R2d  804,  300  IlLApp.  606— 
Puckett  v.  American  Life  of  Illi- 
nois, 13  N.E.2d  828,  294  IlLApp. 
60'5. 

K.Y. — General  Inv.  Co.  v.  Interbor- 
ough  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  139  N.E. 
•216,  235  N.Y.  1-33— Progressive 
Finance  &  Realty  Co.  v.  Miller  & 
•Sherry  Enterprises,  28*3  N.Y.S.  478, 
246  App.Div.  6139 — Rawlin  v.  New 
Jersey  Fidelity  &  Plate  Glass  Ins. 
Co.,  223  N.Y.S.  85,  221  APP-Div. 
399- — Abrams  v.  Abrams,  270  N.Y. 
S.  841,  150  Misc.  660— Wm.  H. 
Frear  &  Co.  v.  Bailey,  214  N.Y.S. 
675,  127  Misc.  79— Iserman  v.  J. 
E.  Long  Coal  Co.,  204  N.Y.«S.  98, 
122  Misc.  822,  alarmed  205  N.Y.S. 
$29,  209  App.Div.  882— «Sellingsloh 
V.  Sellingsloh,  59  N.Y.S.2d  38. 

84  C.J.  p  202  note  68. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  220 


defendant  having  no  interest  other  than  that  of 
self-protection,8'9  or  where  the  allegations  and  proof 
adduced  by  plaintiff  are  insufficient  as  a  matter  of 
law  to  warrant  recovery.^  Likewise  plaintiffs  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment  will  be  denied  where 
the  interests  of  justice  require  that  the  controversy 
be  disposed  of  on  a  trial  rather  than  on  the  mo- 
tion,91 as  where  there  is  a  real  question  as  to  a 
matter  of  law  which. could  not  be  determined  with- 
out a  full  and  authoritative  determination  of  the 
facts  by  a  trial.92  If  the  facts  on -which  the  ap- 
plication for  summary  judgment  is  based  are  ex- 
clusively within  the  knowledge  of  the  moving  party, 


or  clearly  not  within  the  knowledge  of  the  op- 
ponent, the  relief  requested  will  be  denied;93  but 
it  must  appear  that  the  lack  of  knowledge  is  genu- 
ine, and  if  the  facts  are  matters  of  public  record 
or  are  otherwise  fully  available  to  the  opposing 
party,  his  plea  of  lack  of  knowledge  will  be  with- 
out force.94 

On  the  other  hand,  a  motion  for  a  summary  judg- 
ment may  be  allowed  where  plaintiff  has  sufficiently 
shown  or  verified  his  claim  or  demand  and  it  satis- 
factorily appears  that  there  is  no  real  issue  of  fact 
to  be  determined  between  the  parties,96  or  that  there  • 


89.  N.Y. — Sorenson  v.  Bast  River 
Sav.  last,  196  N.T.S.  361,  119  Misc. 
297. 

34  C.J.  p  202  note  69. 

90.  N.Y. — Town   of  Putnam   Valley 
v.   Slutzky,   28  N.E.-2d   860,   283  N. 
Y.  334,  rearmament  denied  29  N.E. 
2d  665,  284  N.Y.  590— St.  Joseph's 
Maternity  Hospital  v.  Hawthorne, 
•34   N.T.S.2d   427,    264  App.Div.   749 
—•Swift  &  Co.  v.  Cohen,  10  N.Y.S. 
2d   484,    256   App.Div.    996,   reargu- 
ment   denied   12   N.Y.S.2d   353,   256 
App.Div.  1082 — Charitis  v.  Savran- 
sky,    225   N.Y.S.   803,   222  App.Div. 
697 — Bercholz   v.    Guaranty    Trust 
Co.  of  New  York,  44  N.Y.S.2d  148, 
180    Misc.    1043— Wecht    v.    Korn- 
blum,  264  N.Y.S.  333,  147  Misc.  653 
— Romine  v.  Barnaby  Agency,  227 
N.Y.S.    235,    1»31    Misc.    696— Clark 
v.    Herkimer    County,    8    N.Y.S. 2d 
676. 

91.  N.Y.— Scalia  v.  Goldfarb,  5*  N. 
Y.S.2d  950. 

92.  ILL— Minuto     v.      Metropolitan 
•Life  Ins.  Co.,   179  A.   713T,   55  R.I. 
201. 

34  C.J.  p  202  note  70. 
Complicated  case 

An  answered  case  that  presents 
actually  disputed  and  complicated 
facts  subject  to  different  interpreta- 
tion, or  abstruse  Questions  of  law, 
should  proceed  to  an  orderly  and  au- 
thoritative determination  of  the 
facts  by  trial  and  should  not  be 
summarily  determined  on  motion  for 
summary  judgment,  even  though 
what  appears  to  be  question  of  fact 
may  ultimately  resolve  itself  into  a 
question  of  law. — Minuto  v.  Metro- 
politan Life  Ins.  Co.,  supra. 

93.  N.Y. — Suslensky  v.  Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  43  N.Y.S.24  144,  180 
Misc.     6*24,    affirmed     46    N.Y.S.2d 
888,   267  App.Div.   812,  appeal  de- 
nied 60  N.Y.S.Sd  294,  270  App.Div. 
819. 

Indorsees  denial  of  knowledge  or 
information  sufficient  to  form  a  be- 
lief as  to  holder's  allegations  of  due 
presentment,  .protest,  and  notice,  cou- 
pled with  denial  of  receipt  of  notice, 
was  sufficient  to  warrant  denial  of 


motion  for  summary  Judgment  and 
to  require  holder  to  prove  its  cause 
of  action,  where  indorser  was  not 
shown  and  could  not  be  expected  to 
have  any  actual  knowledge  of  pro- 
test.—Asbury  Park  &  Ocean  Grove 
Bank  r.  Simensky,  290  N.Y.S.  992, 
160  Misc.  92L 

94b  N.Y. — Suslensky  v.  Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  4*3  N.Y.S.2d  144,  180 
Misc.  624,  affirmed  46  N.Y.S.2d 
888,  267  App.Div.  812,  appeal  de- 
nied 60  N.Y.S.2d  294,  270  App.Div. 
819. 

95.  Ariz. — Suburban  Pump  &  Wa- 
ter Qo.  v.  Linville,  135  P.2d  210,  60 
Ariz.  274. 

D.C. — Sedgwick  v.  National  Savings 
&  Trust  Co.,  130  F.2d  440,  76  U.S. 
App.D.C.  177. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Barclay  v.  West 
Chicago  Park  Com'rs,  32  N.-B.2d 
'323,  308  Ill.A'pp.  622. 

N.Y. — Sannasardo  v.  Hartford  Acci- 
dent &  Indemnity  Co.,  8  N.Y.S.2d 
974,  256  Afcp.Div.  825— Evans  v. 
Rome  Trust  Co.,  282  N.Y^S.  785,  246 
App.Div.  569— City  Bank  Farmers' 
Trust  Co.  v.  Charity  Organization 
Soc.  of  City  of  New  York,  265  N. 
Y.S.  267,  238  App.Div.  720,  affirmed 
191  N.B.  504,  264  N.Y.  441— Nath- 

•  an  H.  Gordon  Corporation  v.  Cos- 
man,  249  N.Y.S.  544,  2(32  App.Div. 
280 — Lion  Brewery  of  New  York 
City  v.  Loughran,  229  N.Y.S.  216, 
223  App.Div.  623— O'Neil  v.  Mc- 
Kinley  Music  Co..  212  N.Y.S.  7,  214 
App.Div.  181— Appleton  v.  National 
Park  Bank  of  New  York,  208  N.Y. 
S.  228,  211  App.Div.  708,  affirmed 
150  N.E.  555,  241  N.Y.  561— Hong- 
kong &  Shanghai  Banking  Corpora- 
tion v.  Lazard-Godchaux  Co.  of 
America,  201  N.Y.S.  771,  207  App. 
(Div.  174,  affirmed  147  N.B.  216, 
2-39  N.Y.  610— Lee  v.  Graubard, 
199  N.Y.S.  '563,  205  App.Div.  344— 
Second  Nat  Bank  v.  Breitung,  197 
N.YJS.  375,  203  App.Div.  636— Os- 
borne  v.  Banco  Aleman-Antiooue- 
no,  29  N.Y.S.2d  236,  17-6  Misc.  664 
• — Glove  City  Amusement  Co.  v. 
Smalley  Chain  Theatres,  4  N.Y.S. 
2d  397,  167  Misc.  608-^Sedwitz  Y. 
Arnold,  199  N.Y.S.  g«,  164  Misc. 

397 


892— Haight  v.  Brown,  288  N.Y.S. 
65,  159  Misc.  652— Kaufman  v.  In- 
vestors' Syndicate,  266  N.Y.S.  38'6, 
148  Misc.  624,  affirmed  271  N.Y.S. 
1058,  242  App.Div.  609— Garfunkel 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  266  N.Y.S. 
35,  147  Misc.  810— Lewis  Histori- 
cal Pub.  Co.  v.  Bowe,  255  N.Y.S. 
•59,  142  Misc.  862— Western  Felt 
Works  v.  Modern  Carpet  Cleaning 
&  Storage  Corporation,  252  N.Y. 
S.  696.  141  Misc.  495— CJogswell  v. 
Cogswell,  224  N.Y.S.  59,  130  Misc. 
541 — Guardino  v.  Guardino,  62  N. 
Y.S.2d  531 — MacKenzie  v.  Muncie, 
54  N.Y.S.'2d  52 — Green  v.  Foreman, 
53  N.Y.S.2d  863— Marte  v.  Marte, 
45  N.Y.S.2d  174— Glazman  v.  City 
of  New  York,  29  N.Y.S.2d  804. 

Pa.— John  J.  Strassel  &  Son  v.  Ross- 
man- Weaver  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  48 
Dauph.Co.  172 — Holt  Lumber  Co. 
v.  Lauzar,  Com  PL,  42  <Lack.Jur. 
147— Nathan  B.  Salsbery  v.  Fan- 
ning Motor  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  40.  Lack. 
Jur.  199 — Tierney  v.  Llfland,  Com. 
PL,  30  North.Co.  149. 

R.L— Mackenzie  v.  Desautels,  3  A.2d 

'  660,  62  R.I.  1135— Bond  &  Goodwin 

V.  Weiner,  172  A,  395,  54  R.I.  244— 

Henry   W.   Cooke   Co.   v.   Sheldon, 

164  A.    327,  53  R.I.  101. 

Wis. — H.  Hohensee  Const  Co.  v.  City 
of  Oshkosh,  291  N.W.  309,  234  Wis. 
274-nSchlesinger  v.  Schroeder,  245 
N.W.  666,  210  Wis.  403. 

34  C.J.  p  202  note  72. 

The  test  of  whether  triable  Issues 
of  fact  appear  from  the  pleadings, 
within  rule  that  summary  judgment 
is  not  permitted  where  triable  Issues 
of  fact  appear  from  the  pleadings,  is 
in  the  facts  alleged,  in  defendant's 
affidavit  of  merits  and  plaintiff's 
sworn  reply. — Smith  "v.  Karasek,  40 
N.B.2d  594,  S13  IlLApp.  6S4. 

Statement  of  conclusion  of  law  or 
fact  is  insufficient  to  raise  issue  of 
fact  on  application  for  summary 
judgment. — Galusha  Stove  Co.  v. 
PJtvnlck  Const  CO.,  230  N.Y.S.  720, 
H32  Misc.  875. 
Cause  OIL  jury  calendar 

Judgment  may  be  entered  when  no 
issue  of  fact  is  raised,  although  the 
cause  i«  on  a  Jury  calendar, — Resnick 


220 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


clearly  is  no  substantial  defense  to  the  action,96  or 
that  the  defense  alleged  is  clearly  a  sham  or  friv- 
olous,97 even  though  it  is  necessary  to  decide  an 
important  question  of  law.98  So  it  has  been  held 
that,  where  the  question  raised  is  wholly  one  of 
law,  the  determination  of  such  question  on  a  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment  is  proper.99 
Effect  of  counterclaim.  It  has  been  held  that  the 


remedy  of  summary  judgment  may  be  available  to 
plaintiff  on  his  cause  of  action  even  where  the  an- 
swer sets  up  a  counterclaim,1  and  that,  if  the  coun- 
terclaim is  plausible,  judgment  may  be  granted  for 
plaintiff  with  a  stay  of  execution  until  trial  of  the 
counterclaim;2  but  it  has  been  held  improper  to 
grant  summary  judgment  where  valid  counterclaims 
are  pleaded  for  sums  exceeding  the  damages  de- 


T.    Varouxakis,    48    N.E.2d    555,    8-19 
m.App.  51. 

Tacts,  if  iMsnffiolent  to  sustain 
verdict  under  practice  act,  are  not 
sufficient  to  .entitle  party  to  defend 
in  motion  for  summary  judgment — 
Edward  «F.  Dibble  Seedgrower  v. 
Jones,  223  N.Y.S.  785,  180  Misc.  859. 
Bright  to  plead  anew 

If  affidavit  of  party  whose  plead- 
ing is  attacked  by  motion  for  sum- 
mary Judgment  does  not  show  facts 
sufficient  to  constitute  defense,  no 
leave  to  plead  anew  should  be  grant- 
ed.— Perlman  v.  Perlman,  257  N.T.S. 
48,  235  App.Div.  313. 

96.  Ariz. — Suburban  Pump  &  Wa- 
ter Co.  v.  Linville,  135  P.2d  210.  60 
Ariz.  274. 

Mich. — Jackson  Reinforced  Concrete 
Pipe  Co.  v.  Central  Contracting  & 
Engineering  Co.,  234  N.W.  Ill,  25:3 
Mich.  157. 

N.Y.— 'Ford  v.  Hahn,  '55  N.T.S.2d  854, 
269  App.Div.  4!36 — Gellens  v.  11 
West  42nd  -Street,  19  N.T.S.2d  525, 
259  App.Div.  435,  appeal  denied  20 
N.Y.<S.2d  985,  259  App.Div.  1002— 
Guaranty  Trust  Co.  of  New  York 
v.  Compton  Mines  Corporation,  5 
N.Y.S.2d  46,  254  App.Div.  876— 
Consolidated  Film  Industries  v. 
Talking  Picture  Epics,  260  N.Y.S. 
1,  236  App.Div.  422 — 'Lion  Brewery 
of  New  York  City  v.  Loughran,  229 
N.Y.S.  216,  223  App.Div.  623— 
Isaacs  v.  Schmuck,  218  N.Y.S.  568, 
218  App.Div.  516,  reversed  156  N.E. 
621,  245  N.Y.  77,  51  A.L.R.  1454— 
Pinney  v.  Geraghty,  205  N.Y.S.  645, 
209  App.Div.  630— Wilbur-Dolson 
Silk  Co.  v.  William  Wallach  Co., 
201  N.Y.S.  465,  206  App.Div.  470— 
lago  Realty  Corp.  v.  Marmin  Ga- 
rage Corp.,  59  N.Y.S.2d  740,  186 
Misc.  478— Utilities  Engineering 
Institute  v.  Kofod,  68  N.Y.S.2d  743, 
185  Misc.  1035 — Hyman  v.  Fischer, 
52  N.Y.S.2d  553,  184  Misc.  90— Ellis 
v.  City  of  New  York,  46  N.Y.S.2d 
363,  180  Misc.  968,  affirmed  47  N.Y. 
S.2d  96,  267  App.Div.  810 — Sackman 
v.  losue,  36  N.Y.S.2d  625,  178  Misc. 
759 — Osborne  v.  Banco  Aleman- 
AntloQueno,  29  N.Y.S.2d  236,  176 
Misc.  664-HLann  v.  United  Steel 
Works  Corporation,  1  N.Y.S.2d  951, 
166  Misc.  465— Haight  v.  Brown, 
288  N.Y.S.  65,  159  Misc.  652— First 
Trust  &  Deposit  Co.  v.  Potter,  278 
N.Y.S.  847,  155  Misc.  106— Paul  v. 
Mantell,  247  N.T.S.  452,  139  Misc. 


395 — Security  'Finance  Co.  v.  (Stu- 
art, 224  N.Y.S.  2o7,  130  Misc.  538— 
Cogswell  v.  Cogswell,  224  N.Y.S. 
59,  130  Misc.  541— Edward  F.  Dib- 
ble Seedgrower  v.  Jones,  223  N.Y.S. 
78-5,  130  Misc.  359— Conoley  v.  Dis- 
tileria  Serralles,  Inc.,  48  N.Y.S.2d 
11 — Bankers  Trust  Co.  v.  Fuller,  37 
N.Y.S.2d  5>36— Henderson  v.  Hild- 
reth  Varnish  Co.,  276  N.Y.'S.  414. 
Pa.— Commonwealth  to  Use  of  Un- 
employment Compensation  Fund, 
v.  Lentz,  44  A.2d  291,  353  Pa.  98. 
Wis. — Donovan  v.  Theo.  Otjen  Co., 
298  N.W.  168,  238  Wis.  47— First 
Wisconsin  Nat  Bank  of  Milwaukee 
v.  Pierce,  278  N.W.  451,  227  Wis. 
58-1. 

34  C.J.  p  202  note  73. 
Additional  facts 

Where  defendant  filed  answer  al- 
leging state  of  facts  substantially  as 
those  alleged  in  complaint,  but  show- 
ing additional  facts  claimed  to  con- 
stitute defense,  summary  judgment 
could  be  entered  if  affirmative  mat- 
ters alleged  as  defense  did  not  as 
matter  of  law  constitute  a  defense, 
although  if  additional  facts  alleged 
did  constitute  defense  summary 
Judgment  could  not  be  entered. — Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Ames  v.  Marx,  18  N.E.2d 
915,  370  I1L  264. 
Alimony 

Motion  for  summary  judgment  for 
arrears  of  alimony  under  foreign  de- 
cree will  not  be  denied  because  of 
court's  power  to  modify  decree  as  to 
alimony. — Curran  v.  Curran,  240  N.Y. 
S.  364,  136  Misc.  598. 

Sff.  U.S. — Irving  Trust  Co.  v.  Amer- 
ican Silk  Mills,  Inc.,  Q.C.A.N.Y.,  72 
!F.2d  288,  certiorari  denied  Ameri- 
can Silk  Mills,  Inc.,  v.  Irving  Trust 
Co.,  55  «S.Ct.  239,  293  U.S.  $24,  79 
L.Ed.  711. 

Cai. — Bank  of  America  Nat  Trust  & 
Siavings  Ass'n  v.  Oil  Well  Supply 
Co.  of  California,  55  P.2d  885,  12 
CaLApp.2d  265. 

N.Y. — Alexander  Hamilton  Institute 
v.  Huston,  4  N.Y.S.2d  776,  254  App. 
iDiv.  729 — Heer  v.  Forward,  3  N.Y. 
S.2d  3,  2!54  App.Div.  628— Nathan 
H.  Gordon  Corporation  v.  Cosman, 
249  N.Y.S.  544,  232  Afcp.Div.  280— 
Cleghorn  v.  Ocean  Accident  & 
Guarantee  Corporation,  Limited,  of 
London,  215  N.Y.S.  127,  21*  App. 
Div.  342,  modified  on  other  grounds 
155  N.B.  87,  244  N.Y.  166— Slrsl 
Trust  Co.  of  Albany  v.  Arnold,  3ti 

398 


N.Y.S.2d  175,  179  Misc.   349— Man- 
hattan Paper  Oo.  v.  Bayer,  263  N. 

Y.S.  720,  147  Misc.  227 — Rodger  v. 

Bliss,    223    N.Y.S.    401,    130    Misc. 

168— Donlin  v.   Carlow,   200  N.Y.S. 

'339,  120  Misc.  698— First  Trust  Co. 

of  Albany  v.  Dumary,  23  N.Y.S.2d 

532. 

34  C.J.  p  202  note  74. 
93.    N.Y. — Kennilwood  Owners'  Ass'n 

v.  Wall,   264  N.YjS.  135,  148  Misc. 

67. 

34  Q.J.  p  202  note  75. 
99.    U.S.— Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v. 

Sparks,  CC.AMich.,  76  F.2d  929. 
D.C. — Maghan  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 

District  of  Columbia,  141  (F.2d  274, 

78  U.S.APP.D.C.  370. 
111. — Reconstruction   -Finance    Corpo- 
ration   v.    Lucius,    49    N.E.2d    852, 

320  IlLApp.  57. 
N.Y.— Fisher   v.    Lohse,    42    N.Y.S.23 

121,  181  Misc.  149. 
Conflicting-  motions 

Where  plaintiff  made  a  motion  for 
summary  judgment  on  ground  that 
there  was  no  defense  to  the  action, 
and  defendant  in  opposition  did  not 
Indicate  existence  of  triable  issues  of 
fact  and  made  a  motion  that  sum- 
mary judgment  should  be  granted 
dismissing  complaint,  sole  issue  to 
be  determined  by  the  court  was  one 
of  law. — Schifter  v.  Commercial 
Travelers  Mut.  Accident  Ass'n  of 
America,  50  N.Y.S.2d  376,  183  Misc. 
74,  affirmed  54  N.Y.S.2d  408,  2-69  App. 
Div.  706. 

1.  N.Y.— Smith   v.    Cranleigh,    Inc., 
231  N.Y.S.  201,  224  Apfc.Div.  376 — 
Hinman  v.  Hinman,  263  N.Y.S.  800, 
146   Misc.    7 S'6— Little  Falls   Dairy 
Co.  v.  Berghorn,  224  N.Y.S.  34,  130 
Misc.   454— Evalenko  v.   Catts,   210- 
N.Y.S.    35,    125   Misc.   726,   affirmed 
213    N.Y.S.    796,    215  App.Div.    805r 
and   216    N.Y.S.   827,   217   App.Div. 
728,  affirmed  154  N.E.   627,   243  N. 
Y.   613,  reargument  denied  155  N. 
B.  873,  244  N.Y.  -504. 

34  C.J.  p  201  note  58. 

However,  it  has  been  held  that  ft 
counterclaim  predicating  good  and 
substantial  cause  Justifying  trial 
constitutes  insuperable  objection  to- 
summary  judgment  for  plaintiff. — 
Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Slifka,  264  N.Y.S. 
204,  148  Misc.  60— Wilkinson  v.  Hal- 
liwell  Electric  Qo.,  204  N.Y.S.  854, 
12*3  Misc.  250. 

2.  N.Y. — Dell'Osso   r.   Everett,   197 
N.Y.S.  423.  119  Misc.  502. 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


220 


manded  by  plaintiff.8  Plaintiff  may  be  entitled  to 
summary  judgment  with  respect  to  the  counterclaim 
itself  if  no  triable  issue  is  raised  in  response  to  his 
defense  tbtfreto,4  but  his  motion  will  be  denied 
if  issues  are  raised  requiring  determination  at  a 
trial.* 

Sufficiency  of  pleadings.  On  a  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment  on  a  claim  or  defense  on  the  ground 
that  no  triable  issue  of  fact  is  raised,  the  decisive 
issue  is  not  the  sufficiency  of  the  opposing  party's 
pleadings,6  for,  if  defective  pleadings  disclose  a 
triable  issue,  they  may  be  amended  at  or  before  the 
trial,  and  the  motion  for  summary  judgment  should 
be  denied  ;7  but  an  amended  pleading  merely  restat- 
ing in  different  form  sham  allegations  set  forth  in 
an  earlier  pleading  will  not  defeat  the  motion.8 


(2)  On  Motion  by  Defendant 

Where  the  defendant's  affidavits  show  that  his  de- 
nials or  defenses  are  sufficient  to  defeat  the  plaintiff, 
or  that  his  cause  of  action  on  a  counterclaim  warrants 
recovery,  summary  judgment  for*  the  defendant  may  be 
entered  with  respect  to  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  or 
the  defendant's  counterclaim,  if  the  plaintiff  by  affidavit 
fails  to  establish  triable  issues  of  fact. 

As  is  discussed  supra  subdivision  a  of  this  sec- 
tion, the  statutes  and  court  rules  .permit  defendant 
to  move  for  summary  judgment  with  respect  to 
plaintiffs  cause  of  action  or  with  respect  to  his  own 
counterclaims.  Accordingly,  where  defendant's  af- 
fidavits establish  his  contentions  and  show  that  his 
denials  or  defenses  are  sufficient  to  defeat  plaintiff, 
and  plaintiff  by  affidavit  fails  to  establish  triable  is- 
sues of  fact,  the  complaint  may  be  dismissed  and 
judgment  entered  for  defendant.8  However,  the 


3.  N.Y. — Nussbaum  v.   Sobel,   54  N. 
Y.>S.2d  228,  269  App.Div.  105,  rear- 
gument  denied  55  N.Y.S.2d  117,  269 
App.'Div.  767— Plaut  v.  Plaut,  7  N. 
Y.S.2d  583,  255  App.Div.  375— Dietz 
v.  Glynne,  223  N.YjS.  221,  221  App. 
Div.   329 — Gregor  v.  Bird  Aircraft 
Corporation,    260    N.Y.S.    164,    145 
Misc.  755. 

Effect  of  proviso 

Defendant's  counterclaim  for 
amount  greater  than  that  sued  for 
by  plaintiff  prevented  entry  of  sum- 
mary judgment  for  plaintiff,  notwith- 
standing proviso  that  amount  col- 
lected thereunder  should  be  held  sub- 
ject to  Judgment  obtained  by  defend- 
ant on  counterclaim. — £Dtna  Life  Ins. 
Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  v.  National 
Dry  Dock  &  Repair  Co.,  245  N.Y.S. 
3'65,  230  App.Div.  486. 

4.  Cal. — Cowan  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v. 
Miley  Petroleum   Corporation;   295 

•P.   50,4,   112  Cal.App.Supp.  773. 

N.Y.— Zaveloff  v.  Zaveloff,  37  N.Y.S. 
2d  46 — Macomber  v.  Wilkinson,  6 
N.Y.S.2d  608. 

Right  generally  see  supra  subdivi- 
sion a  of  this  section. 

Defendant's  right  to  summary  Judg- 
ment as  determined  by  issues  see 
infra  subdivision  c  (2)  of  this 
(Section. 

fi.  N.Y.— Wise  v.  Powell,  215  N.Y.S. 
693,  2-16  App.Div.  618— Miller  v. 
Bastqn,  213  N.Y.S.  418,  126  Misc. 
330 — Macomber  v.  Wilkinson,  6  N. 
Y.S.2d  608. 

Pa.— Barnett  v.  Dickerman,  Com.PL, 
'25  Brie  Co.  321. 

6.  N.Y. — Werfel  v.  Zivnostenska 
Banka,  38  N.E.2d  382,  287  N.Y.  91 
— Miorin  v.  Miorin,  13  N.Y.«S.2d 
^705,  257  App.Div.  556,  reargument 
denied  14  N.Y.S.2d  .1003,  257  Ap>p. 
Div.  1084 — Woodmere  Academy  v. 
Moskowitz,  208  N.YJS.  578,  212 
A&p.Div.  457— Marks  v.  Folio,  29 
N.Y.S.2d  1019,  177  Misc.  108— Lyon 
V.  Holton,  14  N.Y.S^d  4*36,  172 
Misc.  31,  affirmed  20  N,Y.S.2d  101$, 


259  App.Div.  877,  appeal  denied  21 
N.Y.S.2d    612,    259    App.'Div.    10713, 
modified  on  other  grounds  3*6  N.E. 
2d  201,  286  N.Y.  270— Nix  v.  Low, 
1   tf.Y.S.2d   21,   165   Misc.   484. 
Technical    defects    in    answer   are 
not  available  on  application  for  sum- 
;mary   judgment.— -Curry   v.    Macken- 
zie, 146  N.B.  375,  239  N.Y.  267— Don- 
nelly v.  Bauder,  216  N.Y.S.  437,  217 
App.Div.    59—JLe   Fevre   v.    Reliable 
Paint  Supply  Co.,  273  N.Y.S.  903,  152 
Misc.   594— Hilbring  v.   Mooney,   223 
N.Y.'S.    30-3,    130    Misc.    2713— 4Ford   v. 
Reilley,  216  N.Y.S.  273,  127  Misc.  373. 
Superfluous  matter 

Fact  that  statement  of  claim  does 
not  state  facts  in  concise  and  sum- 
mary form,  and  contains  superfluous 
matter,  does  not  warrant  entering 
summary  Judgment  for  defendant — 
Davis  v.  Investment  -Land  Co.,  146  A. 
119,  296  Pa.  449. 
Denial  of  motion  to  dismiss 

Affirmance  of  an  order  denying  mo- 
tion to  dismiss  cause  of  action  for 
insufficiency  did  not  entitle  plaintiff 
to  summary  judgment,  since  such 
order  merely  determined  that  the 
cause  of  action  was  sufficient  from 
standpoint  of  pleading  to  state  a 
good  prima  facie  case. — Brandt  v. 
Davidson,  48  N.Y.«S.2d  917. 

Which  of  two  causes  of  action. 
plaintiff  intended  to  state  is  imma- 
terial on  motion  for  summary  Judg- 
ment, if  allegations  of  complaint 
show  any  cause  of  action. — Sullivan 
v.  State,  251  N.W.  251,  213  Wis.  185, 
91  A.L.R.  877. 

7.  N.Y.— Curry  v.  Mackenzie,  14-6  N. 
E.  375,-  239  N.Y.  267— Bast  River 
Sav.  Bank  v.  Lash  Realty  Co.,  5*3 
N.Y.S.2d  229,  269  App.Div.  658— 
Perlman  v.  Perlman,  257  N.Y.S. 
48/335  App.Div.  'SI'S— Marks  v. 
Folio,  29  N.Y.S.2d  1019,  177  Misc. 
108 — Tompkins  Haulage"  Corpora- 
tion v.  Roberts,  249  N.Y.S.  22,  140 
Misc.  SO— Krauss  v.  Central  Ins. 

399 


Co.  of  Baltimore,  40  N.Y.S.2d  736 
—  Biloz  v.  Tioga  County  Patrons' 
Fire  Relief  Ass'n,  21  N.Y.'S.2d  643, 
,  affirmed  23  N.Y.S.2d  460,  260  APP- 
Div.  976. 

If  the  facts  develop  a  defense, 
summary  judgment  is  not  justified 
even  though  the  pleadings  require 
amendment  to  allow  the  defense.  — 
Erie  Commercial  Corporation  v. 
Then,  18  N.Y.S.2d  5*9,  259  App.Div. 
786—  Nix  v.  <Low,  1  N.Y.6.2d  21,  165 
Misc.  484  —  Royal  Diamond  Co.  v.  Os- 
trin,  232  N.Y.S.  223,  133  Misc.  555— 
Agress  Const.  Co.  of  Brooklyn  v. 
;Jurgens,  217  N.Y.S.  204,  128  Misc.  12. 


for  amendment 
If  either  party  on  hearing  of  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment  finds 
"that  his  pleading  is  inadequate,  ei- 
ther by  way  of  allegation  or  denial, 
court  may  and  should  permit  party 
to  amend,  but  in  absence  of  request 
for  amendment,  there  is  no  occasion 
:to  inquire  about  possible  issues  not 
raised  by  pleadings.  —  Gardenswartz 
'v.  Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S., 
63  P.2d  322,  2'3  CaLApp.Sd  Supp.  745. 

8.  N.Y1  —  Nathan   H.    Gordon  Corpo- 
ration v.  Cosman,   249  N.Y.S.  544, 
232  App.Div.  280. 

9.  U.S.  —  Banco  de  Espana  v.  (Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  D.C. 
N.Y.,   28  -F.Supp.   958,  affirmed,  a 
C.A.,  114  F.2d  4«38—  Larson  v.  Todd 
Shipyards  (Corporation,  D.C.N.Y.,  16 
F.Supp.  9-67.     • 

Colo.  —  Klancher  v.  Anderson,  158  P. 
2d  923,  113  Colo.  478. 

N.Y.  —  Independent  Electric  Lighting 
Corp.  v.  Armin  Development  Corp., 
61  N.Y.S.-2d  69,  270  App.Div.  878— 
Melioris  v.  Morgenstein,  58  N.Y.«S. 
2d  885,  269  AppJDiv.  1028—  Myers 
v.  139  East  79th  Street,  Inc.,  53  N. 
Y.S.2d  650,  269  Ajxp.t>iv.  68—  Noll 
V.  Ruprecht,  9  N.Y.S.2d  651,  256 
App-Div.  926,  affirmed  25  N.'E.2d 
886,  2*2  N.Y.  «98—  Feeney  v. 
Woods,  300  N.Y.S.  1044,  2  S3  App. 


§  220- 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


complaint  will  not  be  dismissed  if  proof  at  the  trial 
is  necessary  to  the  determination  of  the  legal  ques- 
tion raised,  or  if  substantial  justice  requires  a  trial 
and  a  full  disclosure  of  the  facts,*0  or  if  defend- 
ant^ denials  or  defenses  are  insufficient  to  defeat 
plaintiffs  claim,**  or  where  although  the  cause  must 
go  against  plaintiff,  the  question  of  the  right  of  de- 


fendants as  among  themselves  remains  to  be  set- 
tled." While  a  plaintiff  should  not  be  permitted  to 
defeat  defendant's  motion  for  judgment  by  the  mere 
device  of  serving  an  amended  complaint,1*  such  mo- 
tion will  not  be  granted  it  a  cause  of  action  added 
by  amendment  possesses,  merit.1*  Defendant  may 
be  entitled  to  summary  judgment  on  his  counter- 


Div.  751 — Bauersfeld  v.  Valentine, 
43  N.Y.S.2d  S6,  180  Misc.  705— 
Stone  v.  .^tna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  31 
N.Y.S.2d  615,  178  Misc.  23— Chester 
v.  Chester,  1*3  N.Y.S.2d  502,  171 
Misc,  608— Helmick  v.  Probst,  9  N. 
YjS.2d  97-5,  170  Misc.  284— Goebbel 
v.  Gross,  275  N.Y.S.  308,  153  Misc. 
637 — Justry  v.  Northern  Ins.  Co.  of 
New  York,  273  N.Y.S.  64,  151  Misc. 
757— iShlivek  v.  Castle  &  Overton, 
39  N.Y.S.2d  685. 

Pa.— Shockley  v.  Travelers  Ins.  Co., 
Com.PL,  38  DeLCo.  526— Stahl  v. 
Wildwood  Development  Co.,  Com. 
PL,  89  Pittsb.L.J.  284,  50  York 
Leg.Rec.  60. 

Wls.— Binsfeld    v.    Home    Mut    Ins. 
Co.,  19  N.W.2d  240,  247  Wis.  273— 
Marco  v.  Whiting,  12  N.W.2d  92-6, 
244  Wis.  621. 
Direction,  of  verdict 

When  it  appears  from  thorough 
consideration  of  uncontroverted  facts 
that  they  would  impel  direction  of 
verdict  by  court,  no  issue  exists  and 
summary  Judgment  is  properly  en- 
tered.—Marco  v.  Whiting,  supra. 
Inadmissible  parol  testimony 

In  action  for  breach  of  an  alleged 
contract  to  convey  property,  where 
proof  of  existence  of  such  contract 
would  have  depended  on  inadmissible 
parol  testimony,  summary  judgment 
for  defendants  was  proper.— Ajax 
Holding  Co.  v.-Heinsbergen,  149  P.2d 
189,  64  CaLApp.2d  665. 
Retention  as  nominal  party 

Where,  in  stockholders'  action  to 
obtain  relief  against  both  the  direc- 
tors and  the  corporation  itself,  stock- 
holders were  not  entitled  to  relief 
against  the  corporation  or  certain 
defendants  who  moved  for  summary 
judgment  dismissing  complaint,  but 
the  action  continued  as  to  the  non- 
moving  defendants,  stockholders 
were  entitled  to  have  the  corporation 
retained  as  a  nominal  party  defend- 
ant, in  so  far  as  relief  was  sought 
against  nonmoving .  individual  de- 
fendants in  favor  of  the  corporation. 
— Lyon  v.  Holton,  36  N.E.2d  201,  286 
N.Y.  270. 

10.  Cal. — Hardy  v.  Hardy,  143  P.2d 
701,  28  CaL2d  244— -Loveland  v. 
City  of  Oakland,  159  P.2d  70,  69 
Cal.App.2d  399 — Gibson  v.  De  La 
Salle  Institute,  152  P.2d  774,  6-6 
CaLApp.2d  609. 

N.Y.— Stulsaft  v.  Mercer  Tube  & 
Mfg.  Co.,  43  N.-E.2d  31,  288  N.Y. 
255 — *Werfel  v.  Zivnostenska  Ban- 
ka,  38  N.B.2d  $82,  287  N.Y.  91- 


Woods  v.  Bard,  82  N.B.2d  772,  285 
N.Y.  11— Hogan  v.  Williams,  59  N. 
Y.S.2d     331, '  270    AjrpJDiv.     789— 
Schottke    v.    Jeacock,   '55   N.Y.S.2d 
186,     269    Aipp.Div.     242,    affirmed, 
Schottke  v.  Jeacock,  66  N.B.2d  586, 
295  N.Y.   812— Solotoff  v.  Solotoff, 
63  N.YjS.2d  510,   269  App.DIv.  677, 
reargument  denied  55  N.Y.S.-2d  567, 
269  Aj>p.Div.  777— Giorno  v.  Banco 
Di  Napoli  Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.,   52 
N.Y.S.2d    659,    2I68   App.Div.   1036— 
Drapkin  v.  Ryan  Contracting  Cor- 
poration, 42  tt.Y.S.2d  307,  2*6  App. 
Div.    857,    appeal   and   reargument 
denied   44   N.Y.S.2d    343,   266   App. 
Div.  922— Citizen's  Bank  of  White 
Plains  v.  Oglesby,  39  N.Y.S.2d  500, 
265    Ap-p.Div.    1062,    appeal    denied 
41  N.Y.S.2d  219,  266  Afep.Div.  682— 
Schelberger  v.  Schelberg,  35  N.Y.S. 
2d  516,  264  App.Div.  870— Berkeley 
V.    Efostein,    22    N.Y.S:2d    921,    260 
App.Div.  877— Miorin  v.  Miorin,  13 
N.Y.S.2d  705,  257  App.Div.  55'6,  re- 
argument  denied  14  N.YjS.2d  1003, 
257  App.Div.   1084—431  Fifth  Ave. 
•Corp.  v.  City  of  New  York,  55  N. 
Y.S.2d   203,   184   Misc.   1001,  modi- 
fied on  other  grounds  59  N.Y.S.2d 
25,  270  App.Div.  241,  appeal  grant- 
ed   60    N.Y.S.2d    272,    270   App.Div. 
804 — Jones  v.  Moffatt,  50  N.Y.S.2d 
233,  183  Misc.  129,  affirmed  51  N. 
Y.S.2d     767,     2-68     App.Div.     967— 
Daniel  J.  Rice,  Inc.,  v.  City  of  New 
York,    42    N.Y.S.2d    532,    180   Misc. 
860— Havens   v,    Rochester   Ropes, 
Inc.,    39    N.Y.'S.2d    444,    179    Misc. 
889,  affirmed  41  N.Y.S.2d  180,   26 
Afop.DIv.   672,  appeal  denied  4«1  N 
Y.S^d     907,     266     App.Div.     692— 
•Freuna    v.    Zephyr    Laundry    Ma 
chinery   Co.,    39   N.Y.S.2d   250,    180 
Misc.  249,  affirmed  41  N.Y.S.2d  909 
266    App.Div.    734,    appeal    discon- 
tinued   43   N.YjS.2d    857,    2'66   App 
Div.  853 — Walfrice  v.  Buffalo  Pot- 
tery Co.,  27  N.Y.S.2d  487,  176  Misc. 
472,  affirmed  32  N.Y.S.2d  121,   2-63 
AppjDiv.    787,    reargument    denied 
33  N.Y.S.2d  541,   263  App.Div.   93'5 
—Cohen  v.  Ideberman,   289  N.Y.S. 
797,  160  Misc.  810— Regan  v.  Bank 
of   Athens   Trust   Co.,    286    N.Y.S. 
726,    159    Misc.    361— Franz  v.    48 
West      Forty-Eighth      Realization 
Corp.,   60   N.Y.S.2d   160— Loomis  v. 
Loomis,   5-1  N.Y.*S.2d  417,  affirmed 
«51  N.Y.S.2d  94,  268  Al>p.Div.  883— 
Mortenson  v.  New  York  Telephone 
Co.,    32   N.Y.S.2d   488,  modified   38 
N.Y.S.2d  949,  179  Misc.  289— Schos- 
tal  v.  Compagnie  Generate  Trans- 
atlantiQue,   27   N.YjS.2d   688— Per- 


sonal Finance  Corporation  of  Wa- 
terbury  v.  Robinson,  27  N.Y.S.2d 
'6—  O'Brien  v.  O'Brien,  16  N.Y.S  2d 
799. 

Pa.—  Miller  v.  Adonizio,  6  A.2d  77 
334  Pa.  286—  Ottman  v.  Nixon-' 
Nirdlinger,  151  A.  879,  301  Pa.  234 
—  Leedy  v.  Cimino,  Com.Pl.,  49 
Dauph.Co.  54—  Kies  v.  Town  Hall 
Co.,  Com.PL,  44  Lack.Jur.  241— 
Regan  v.  City  of  Scranton,  Coin. 


<_™          -  '  -.. 

59—  McVeigh  v.  Scranton-Spring 
Brook  Water  Service  Co.,  Com.Pl 
44  Lack.Jur.  205—  Kern  v.  Union 
Mut  Life  Ins.  Qo.,  Com.Pl.,  44 
LacfcJur.  14«3—  Geo.  T.  Sellers* 
Sons  v.  Bshleman,  Com.Pl  48 
Lanc.Rev.  79. 

Wis.—  Parish  v.  Awschu  Properties, 
19  N.W.Sd  27-6,  247  Wis.  166— 
Holzschuh  v,  Webster,  17  N.W.2d 
553,  246  Wis.  423-HFirst  Wisconsin 
Nat  Bank  of  Milwaukee  v.  Bryn- 
wood  .Land  Co.,  15  N.W.2d  840,  245 
Wis.  610—  ^Employers  Mut  Liabil- 
ity Ins;  Co.  v.  Starkweather,  12  N 
W.2d  904,  244  Wis.  531. 

Question  fop  determination 

In  determining  whether  summary 
judgment  should  be  entered  for  de- 
fendant, question  is  whether  state- 
ment of  claim  shows  that  law  will 
not  permit  recovery  by  plaintiff.— 
Davis  v.  Investment  Land  Co.,  146 
A.  119,  296  Pa.  449. 

Technical  defects  in  pleading  iu»e 
not  available  to  defendant  on  a  mo- 
tion to  dismiss  a  complaint  under 
the  rule  relating  to  summary  judg- 
ment—Benjamin v.  Arundel  Corp., 
59  N.Y.S.2d  437,  270  App.Div.  766 
Moot  action 

•Fact  that  an  action  has  become 
moot  is  not  a  defense,  and  dismissal 
on  that  ground  does  not  entitle  de- 
fendant to  summary  Judgment  _ 
Duel  v.  State  Farm  Mut  Automobile 
Co.,  9  N.W.2d  593,  243  Wis.  172. 

11.  U.'S.—  Warner  v.  Marsh  &  Mc- 
Lennan, D.C.N.Y.,  26  F.Supp.  814. 

N.Y.—  Gans  v.  Hearst,  50  N.Y.S.2d 
47-5—  McDonald  v.  Cluff  &  Picker- 
luff,  35  N.Y.S.2d  380. 


vT  Ins.   Co.   of 

New  York  v.  Patterson,  D.C.N.Y 
17  F.Supp.  416. 

13.    N.Y.—  Chester  v.  Chester,  1'3  K 
Y.S.2d  502,  171  Misc.  608. 


400 


14.    N.Y.— (Jhester  v.  Chester,  supra. 


49    C.  J,  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


220 


claim  if  no  triable  issue  is  raised  in  response  to  his 
affidavits,16  but  his  motion  will  be  denied  if  such 
an  issue  appears.16 

Facts  established  by  documentary  evidence  or  of- 
ficial record.  Under  some  statutes  or  court  rules, 
where  an  answer  states  a  defense  sufficient  as  a 
matter  of  law  and  if  founded  on  facts  established 
prima  facie  by  documentary  evidence  or  official  rec- 
ord, defendant  may  obtain  judgment  dismissing  the 
complaint  unless  plaintiff  shows  facts  sufficient  to 
raise  an  issue  respecting  the  verity  and  conclusive- 
ness  of  such  evidence  or  record;17  "defense"  is 
used  in  such  provisions  in  its  broadest  sense  and 
includes  everything  which  would  defeat  plaintiffs 
claim,  including  a  general  denial.18  However,  the 
complaint  will  not  be  dismissed  if  the  defense  is  in- 
sufficient in  law,19  or  if  facts  are  shown  sufficient 


to  raise  an  issue  with  respect  to  the  verity  and  con- 
clusiveness  of  the  documentary  evidence.20 

(3)  Particular  Causes  and  Issues 

Summary  judgment  has  been  granted  or  has  been 
denied  in  numerous  particular  actions,  and  with  re* 
spect  to  numerous  particular  Issues,  depending  .on 
whether  triable  issues  of  fact  were  raised  in  opposition 
to  the  affidavits  of  the  moving  party. 

The  rule  that  summary  judgment  will  be  granted 
only  where  the  moving  party  substantiates  his  claim 
or  defense  by  affidavit  and  no  triable  issue  of  fact 
is  raised  in  response  thereto,  discussed  supra  sub- 
divisions c  (1)  and  c  (2)  of  this  section,  has  been 
applied  in  numerous  cases  which  have  adjudicated 
the  existence  or  nonexistence  of  triable  issues  in 
causes  of  action  on  express  or  implied  contracts 
generally,21  to  recover  the  price  of  goods  or  mer- 


15.  N.T.— -Stein  v.  W.  T.  Grant  Co., 
5*6   N.Y.S.2d  582,   269  App.Div.   909 
— Bissell  v.  Finley  Realty  Cp.»  298 
N.Y.S.    47,    249   App.Div.    855— Lip- 
scomb    v.    Lipscomb,    40    N.Y.S.2d 
720,     17D    Misc.    1025— Conoley    v. 
Distileria   Serralles,   Inc.,    48   N.T. 
S.2d    1<1— Ringler    v.    Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.   Co.,  29  N.Y.S.2d  281. 

16.  N.Y. — Commercial  Credit  Corpo- 
ration   v.    Podhorzer,    224    N.Y.S. 
505,     221     App.Div.     644— National 
Electrotype  Co.   v.  Pennie,   282  N. 
Y.S.  787,  157  Misc.  2$,  affirmed  278 
N.Y.S.    529,   243  App.Div.   764. 

17.  N.Y.— -Walters  v.  Watters,  19  N. 
Y.S.2d  995,  259  App.Div.  611— Hub 
Oil  Co.  v.  Jodomar,  Inc.,  27  N.Y.S. 
2d   370,    176   Misc.    320— Chance  v. 
Guaranty  Trust  Co.  of  New  York, 
20  N.Y:S.2d  635,  173  Misc.  754,  af- 
firmed   13    N.Y.S.2d    785,    257    App. 
Div.    1006,  affirmed  26  N.-E.2d  802, 
282    N.Y.    656— Diamond   v.    Davis, 
38  N.Y.S.2d  93,  affirmed  39  N.Y.S.2d 
412,  second  case,  265  App.Div.  919* 
affirmed  54  N.E.2d  68<3,  second  case, 
292  N.Y.  6-54. 

Remedy  as  available  in  actions  other 
than  those  in  which  plaintiff  may 
move  for  judgment  see  supra  sub- 
division a  of  this  section. 

Statute  of  frauds 

Where  agreement  on  which  action 
was  brought  was  unenforceable  un- 
der statute  of  frauds,  plaintiff  could 
not  defeat  defendant's  motion  for 
summary  judgment  because  plaintiff 
might  have  had  a  cause  of  action 
different  from  one  set  forth  in  com- 
plaint.—Elsf  elder  v.  Cournand,  59  N. 
Y.:S.2d  34,  270  App.Div.  1'62,  followed 
in  59  N.Y.S.2d  377,  269  AppJDiv.  1034. 

Books  of  corporate  defendant  are 
"documentary  evidence"  within 
meaning  of  text  rule. — White  v.  Mer- 
chants Despatch  Transp.  Co.,  10  N. 
Y.S.2d  962,  256  App.Div.  1044. 

49  C.J.S.-26 


Admissions  as  documentary  proof 

In  action  for  carrier's  failure  to 
deliver  merchandise,  plaintiff's  ad- 
missions or  concessions  that  there 
was  no  conversion  were  to  be  given 
weight  of  documentary  proof  on 
which  defendants  might  move  for  a 
summary  judgment. — Winkler  v, 
Compania  Sud  Americana  De  Va- 
por es,  41  N.Y.S.2d  67,  180  Misc.  181. 

18.  N.Y.— 4Levine  v.  Behn,  25  N.E.2d 
871,  282  N.Y.  120— Dumont  v.  Ray- 
mond, 49  N.Y.S.2d  865,  affirmed  56 
N.Y.S.2d    592,    269    App.Div.    592— 
•Sirason  v.  Huffman,  45  N.Y.S.2d  140. 

19.  N.Y.— Maxwell  v.  Maxwell,  7  N. 
Y.S.2d  991,  169  Misc.  431,  affirmed 
9  N.Y.S.2d  572,  256  Apfc.Div.  809. 

Uncertainty  of  damages 

The  complaint  will  not  be  dis- 
missed if  a  cause  of  action  exists 
and  only  the  amount  of  damage  aris- 
ing from  a  breach  of  contract  is  un- 
certain.—Bogardus  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity 
&  Guaranty  Co.,  58  N.Y.S.2d  217,  269 
App.Div.  615,  appeal  denied  60  N.Y. 
S.2d  270,  270  App.Div.  801. 

20.  N.Y.— Levine  v.  Behn,  25  N.E.2d 
871,  282  N.Y.  120— -Duraont  v.  Kay- 
mond,  56  N.Y.S.2d  592,  269  App.Div. 
'592 — Goldstein     v.     Massachusetts 
Accident   Co.,    284   N.Y.S.    704,    246 
App.'Div.   823 — Lyon  v.  Holton,   14 
N.Y.S.2d    436,     172    Misc.    31,    af- 
firmed 20   N.Y.S.2d  1015,   259   App. 
Div.  877,  modified  on  other  grounds 
36  N.B.2d  201,  286  N.Y.  270— New 
York  Post  Corp.   v.  Kelley,   61  N. 
Y.S.2d    264,   affirmed   Hearst    Con- 
solidated Publications  v.  Kelley,  61 
N.Y.S.2d  762,  270  App.Div.  916,  ap- 
peal granted   62  N.Y.'S.2d   614,   270 
App.Div.    923,    New    York    Sun    v. 
Kelley,   62  N.Y.S.2d   614,   270   App. 
Div.  924  and  New  York  World  Tel- 
egram Corp.  v.  KeHey,  ff2  N.Y.S.2d 
614,    270    App.Div.    924,    and    New 
York  Post  Corp.   v.   Kelley,   62  N. 
YjS.2d     615,     270     App.Div.     923— 

401 


Steinbugler  v.  Steinbugler,  .9  N.Y. 
S.2d  939. 

21.  U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Stephanidis,  D.C. 
N.Y.,  41  P.2d  958. 

CaL— Walsh  v.  Walsh,  108  P.2d  760, 
42  Cal.App.2d  282. 

Mich.— Barsky  v.  Katz,  216  N.W.  382, 
241  Mich.  63. 

N.J. — Perloff  v.  Island  Development 
Co.,  133  A.  178,  4  N.J.Misc.  473. 

N.Y. — National  Brokerage  Corp.  v. 
Travelers  Ins.  Co.,  65  N.B.2d  183, 
295  N.Y.  97— Rotberg  v.  M.  S.  &  J. 
A.  Workman,  200  N.B.  314,  270 
N.Y.  553 — Keystone  Hardware 
•Corporation  v.  Tague,  158  N.B.  27, 
246  N.Y.  79,  53  A.L.R.  610— Me- 
Cabe  v.  Interstate  Iron  &  Steel 
Co.,  27  N.Y.S.2d  862,  262  Aj>p.Div. 
777 — Birch  v.  Cameron  Mach.  Co., 
1  N.Y.S.2d  550,  253  App.Div.  8-30, 
modified  on  other  grounds  2  N.Y. 
S.2d  66,  253  App.Div.  900— Wald  v. 
Manufacturers  Trust  Co.,  290  N.Y. 
<S.  632,  2*48  App.Div.  911,  affirmed  6 
N.Y.S.2d  142,  254  App.Div.  T-69,  re- 
argument  denied  6  N.Y.S.'2d  350, 
254  App.Div.  885 — Sanborn  v.  Am- 
ron,  234  N.Y.S.  129,  225  App.Div. 
616 — Lion  Brewery  of  New  York 
City  v.  Loughran,  229  N.Y.S.  216, 
223  AppJDiv.  623— Rawlin  v.  New 
Jersey  Fidelity  &  Plate  Glass  Ins. 
Co.,  2tt  N.Y.S.  85,  221  App.Div. 
399 — Schulman  v.  Cornman,  223  N. 
Y.'S.  19,  221  App.Div.  170— Aviation 
Training  Corp.  v.  Gargiulo,  03  N. 
Y.S.2d  141.  184  Misc.  198— Kahn  v. 
Bosenstiel,  212  N.Y.S.  441,  125 
Misc.  569— Bein  v.  Slater,  51  N.Y. 
•S.2d  89-6,  affirmed  55  N.T.S.2d  118, 
269  App.Div.  764,  appeal  denied  56 
N.Y.S.2d  203,  269  AppJDiv.  818— 
Borrelli  v.  J.  H.  Taylor  Const  Co., 
37  N.Y.S.2d  150— Federal  Schools 
v.  Goldstein,  29  N.Y,S.2d  256. 

Pa. — Simpson  v.  Stabler,  Com.PL,  53 
Dauph.Co.  350 — Kosko  v.  Wenner, 
35  Luz.Leg.Reg.  151. 

Wis.— Prime  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  £B\  Gallun 


I  220  JUDGMENTS  49    0.  J.  S. 

chandise  sold22  or  for  services  rendered,28  causes  i  of  action  on  bills,  notes,  and  bonds,24  on  insur- 


&  Sons  Corporation,  281  N.W.  697, 
229  Wis.  348. 

Employment  contract* 

N.Y. — Montefalcone  v.  Banco  Di  Na- 
poll  Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.,  52  N.Y.S.2d 
655,  2'68  App.Div.  63*6,  reargument 
denied  53  N.Y.S.2d  955,  269  App. 
Div.  685 — Catherwood  v.  Ithaca 
College,  33  N.Y.S.2d  537,  263  App. 
Div.  1027— Sundland  v.  Korfund 
Co..  20  N.Y.S.2d  819,  260  App.Div. 
80. 

Summary  Judgment  granted 

111. — Gateway  Securities  Co.  v, 
Sckultz,  52  N.E.2d  825,  321  IlLApp. 
312. 

N.Y. — Jamaica  Water  Supply  Co.  v. 
City  of  New  York,  18  N.E.2d  523, 
279  N.Y.  342 — Lueders  v.  Lueders, 
'55  ,N.Y.S.2d  7-17,  269  Afcp.Div.  869 
— "Sargant  v.  Monroe,  49  N.Y.S.2d 
546,  268  App.Div.  123— Long  Island 
Daily  Press  Pub.  Co.  v.  Uneeda 
Credit  Clothing  Stores,  38  N.Y.S.2d 
712,  2-65  App.Div.  958— Staniloff  v. 
•Ferguson,  283  N.YjS.  244,  246  App. 
Div.  630 — United  Products  Corpo- 
ration of  America  v.  Standard  Tex- 
tile Products  Co.,  2)31  N.Y.S.  115, 
224  App.Div.  371— O'Neil  v.  Mc- 
Kinley  Music  Co.,  212  N.Y.S.  7,  214 
AppJDiv.  181 — Kennedy  v.  Herter, 
'38  N.Y.S.2d  863. 

22.  N.Y.— Ellison    v.    Republic    Mfg. 
Corporation,     29'6     N.Y.S.     38,     251 
App.Div.   746 — Bank  of  Taiwan   v. 
Schild,  358  N.Y.S.  331,  236  App.Div. 
128— Klein   v.   Halbreich,    227   N.Y. 
•S.     83'4,     22'3    Ajyp.Div.    732— J.    R. 
Melcher,   Inc.,  v.  Graziano,   209  N. 
Y.S.   42$,  212  At>p.Div.   589. 

Summary  Judgment  granted 

N.Y. — Edward  P.  Dibble  Seedgrower 

v.  Jones,  226  N.Y.«S.  785,  130  Misc. 

359. 

23.  N.Y. — Geweye   v.   Half  en,    10   N. 
Y.S.2d  743,  256  App.Div.  1035— Mc- 
Culloch  v.   Morton  'Lodge,  No.   63, 
F.  &  A.  M.,  267  N.Y.S.  5,  240  App. 
Div.  848— Strom  v.  Prince,  279  N. 
Y.S.   589,   154   Misc.   888— Bergman 
v.   Royal   Typewriter  Co.,   29   N.Y. 
S.2d  827,  modified  on  other  grounds 
32  N.Y.S.2d  132,  26-3  App.Div.  812. 

Wis.— Sullivan  v.  -State,  251  N.W. 
251,  213  Wis.  185,  91  A.L.R.  877.. 

Actions  for  commissions 

N.Y. — North  Sea  Developments  v. 
Burnett,  173  N.B.  228,  254  N.Y.  Q74 
— Kenny  v.  New  York  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  46  N.Y.S.2d  4,  267  App.Div. 
SS7.  appeal  denied  47  N.Y.6.2d  "315, 
267  ApfrDiv.  879— Axelrath  v. 
Spencer  Kellogg  &  Sons,  38  N.Y.S. 
2d  39,  265  App.Div.  874,  affirmed  50 
N.E.2d  103,  290  N.Y.  767,  certiorari 
denied  64  S.Ct  71,  two  cases,  320 
U.S.  761,  8-8  L.Ed.  4'54— Tuohey  v. 
Carviu  Bottle  Cap  Corporation,  12 
N.Y.S.2d  51'6,  257  App.Div.  856— 
Romlne  v.  Barnaby  Agency,  227  N. 
Y.'S.  235,  131  Misc.  696— Windsor 


Investing  Corporation  v.  T.  J.  Mc- 
iLaughlin's  Sons,  225  N.Y.S.  7,  130 
Misc.  730,  affirmed  229  N.Y.S.  926 
224  App.Div.  715 — Murray  v.  Plym- 
outh Oil  Co.,  46  N.Y.S.2d  113— 
Handel  v.  Dumbra,  23  N.Y.«S.2d  347. 
Attorneys'  fees 
111. — Soelke  v.  Chicago  Business 
Men's  Racing  Ass'n,  41  N.B.2d  232, 
314  IlLApp.  336— Woods  v.  Village 
of  La  Grange  Park,  19  N.-B.2d  396, 
298  IlLApp.  595. 
N.Y.— Breitbart.v.  Weill,  7  N.Y.S.2d 
266,  255  App.Div.  801 — Zipser  v. 
Hardy,  57  N.Y.S.2d  482 — Goldwater 
v.  Hal-Ro  Textile  Corp.,  63  N.Y.S. 
2d  73. 

Summary  judgment  granted 
N.Y. — McDonald  v.  Amsterdam  Bldg. 
Co.,  251  N.Y.S.  494,  232  App.Div. 
1382,  affirmed  1S2  N.E.  169,  2-59  N. 
Y.  533— Geraci  v.  Fabbozi,  291  N. 
Y.'S.  86,  161  Misc.  450— Goldsmith 
v.  T.  &  G.  Assets  Realization  Cor- 
poration, 37  N.Y.S.2d  37,  affirmed 
39  N.Y.S.2d  413,  265  App.Div.  917, 
affirmed  50  N.B.2d  107,  290  N.Y. 
784. 
Value  of  services 

The  value  of  professional  services 
rendered  and  the  amount  thereof  re- 
maining unpaid  should  be  determined 
by  assessment  before  a  jury,  and  the 
granting  of  a  summary  judgment 
for  a  certain  amount  was  improper, 
where  allegation  in  complaint  that 
services  were  reasonably  worth  the 
'sum  of  one  hundred  dollars  was  de- 
nied in  defendant's  answer  and  de- 
nial found  support  in  the  affidavits. — 
Averbach  v.  Stone,  12  N.Y.S.2d  114, 
257  App.Div.  922. 

24.  UVS. — (Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
New  York  v.  Palm,  79  F.2d  53'9. 

CaL — Slocum  v.  Nelson,  App.,  163  P. 
2d  888. 

Colo.— Hatfield  v.  Barnes,  1*68  P.2d 
552. 

Mich. — Hart  &  Crouse  Co.  v.  Palavin, 
241.  N.W.  806,  257  Mich.  637— Tom- 
linson  v.  Imperial  Hotel  Corpora- 
tion, 222  N.W.  104,  245  Mich.  52. 

N.J.— Maurer  v.  Hahn,  140  A.  273, 
104  N.J.Law  254,  affirmed  145  A. 
«31'6,  105  N.J.Law  494. 

N.Y.— Niles  v.  Seeler,  148  N.B.  743, 
240  N.Y.  «50— Segal  v.  National 
City  Bank  of  N.  Y.,  58  N.Y.S.2d 
261,  269  App.Div.  986— Empire 
Trust  Co.  v.  Bartley  &  Co.,  16 
N.Y.S,2d  248,  258  App.Div.  249 
— C.  I.  T.  Corporation  v.  Revoir 
Motors,  13  N.Y.S.2d  221,  257  App. 
Div.  385 — 'Sweeney  v.  National  City 
Bank  of  Troy,  10  N.Y.S.2d  796,  256 
App.Div.  102'2— Sherry  v.  Marsh,  9 
N.Y.S.2d  4-94,  256  App.Div.  219— 
Lawrence,  Blake  &  Jewell  v.  Rock- 
hurst  Realty  Qorporation,  8  N.Y. 
S.2d  202,  255  App.Div.  491— C.  I.  T. 
Corporation  v.  McKinney,  3  N.Y.©. 
2d  92,  254  App.Div.  629— National 

402 


City  Bank  of  New  York  v.  Piluso, 
290  N.Y.S.  968,  249  App.Div.  626— 
Totoris  v.  Welikes,  286  N.Y.S.  924, 
247  App.Div.  923 — Danneman  v. 
White,  283  N.Y.S.  868,  246  Apfc.Div. 
727 — Salt  Springs  Nat.  Bank  of 
Syracuse  v.  Hitchcock,  2*63  N.Y.'S. 
55,  238  App.Div.  150— First  Trust 
&  Deposit  Co.  v.  Le  Messurier,  257 
N.Y.S.  394,  235  App.Div.  347,  mo- 
tion granted  and  question  certified 
258  N.Y.S.  1075,  236  App.Div.  775— 
Ulster  Finance  Corporation  v. 
Schroeder,  243  N.Y.S.  682,  230  App. 
Div.  14'6 — Weinberg  v.  Goldstein, 
235  N.Y.S.  529,  226  App.Div.  479— 
Bernstein  v.  Kritzer,  231  N.Y.S.  97, 
224  App.Div.  387 — Karpas  v.  Band- 
ler,  218  N.Y.S.  500,  218  App.DJv. 
418 — Hauswald  v.  Katz,  214  N.Y. 
S.  705,  216  App.Div.  92— Herson 
Sydeman  Co.  v.  Waumbeck  Mfg. 
Co.,  208  N.Y.S.  716,  212  App.Div. 
'422 — Hongkong  &  Shanghai  Bank- 
ing Corporation  v.  Lazard-God- 
chaux  Co.  of  America,  201  N.Y.S. 
771,  207  App.Div.  174,  affirmed  147 
N.B.  216,  239  N.Y.  610— Ritz  Carl- 
ton  Restaurant  &  Hotel  Co.  v.  Dit- 
mars,  197  N.Y.S.  405,  203  App.Div. 
748— Allick  v.  Columbian  Protec- 
tive Ass'n,  53  N.Y.S.2d-  507,  184 
Misc.  -525,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  55  N.Y.S.2d  438,  269  App. 
Div.  281,  affirmed  64  N.B.  350, 
295  N.Y.  '603— Duval  v.  Skouras, 
44  N.Y.S.2d  107,  181  Misc.  651,  af- 
firmed 46  N.Y.S.2d  888,  2'67  App. 
Div.  811,  and  affirmed,  61  N.Y.S.Sd 
379,  270  App.Div.  841— Yokohama 
•Specie  Bank,  Limited,  New  York 
Agency,  v.  Mllbert  Importing  Co., 
44  N.Y.S.2d  71,  182  Misc.  281— 
Neptune  Meter  Co.  v.  Long  Island 
Water  Meter  Repair  Co.,  39  N:Y. 
S.2d  325,  179  Misc.  445— Oester- 
reichisches  Qredit-Institut  v. 
Gross,  9  N.Y.'S.2d  84,  169  Misc. 
951— Zurich  General  Accident  & 
Liability  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lackawanna 
Steel  Co.,  299  N.Y.S.  862,  164  Misc. 
498 — Anglo-Continentale  Treuhand, 
A.  G.,  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  299  N. 
Y.S.  859,  165  Misc.  562,  affirmed 
298  N.Y.S.  181r  251  App.Div.  803— 
Asbury  .Park  &  Ocean  Grove  Bank 
v.  Simensky,  290  N.Y.S.  9*92,  160 
Misc.  921— Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Slifka, 
264  N.Y.S.  20-4,  148  Misc.  60— Hur- 
witz  v.  Corn  Exchange  Bank  Trust 
Co.,  253  N.Y.S.  851,  142  Misc.  398— 
American  Surety  Co.  of  New  York 
V.  Empire  Trust  Co.,  217  N.Y.S. 
«673,  128  Misc.  11'6— Gramercy . 
'Finance  Corporation  v.  Greenberg, 
217  N.Y.S.  224,  127  Misc.  897— 
•Ford  v,  Reilley,  216  N.Y.S.  27«3, 
127  Misc.  373— Cohen  v.  Public 
Nat.  Bank  of  New  .York,  204  N.Y. 
S.  332,  123  Misc.  MS— i Asbestos 
Trading  &  -Finance  Co.  v.  Hazen, 
20'3  N.Y.S.  565,  .122  Misc.  269— 
Buler  v.  Sutherland,  55  N.Y.iS.2d 


49    O.J:S. 


JUDGMENTS 


220 


ance  policies,25  causes  of  action  pertaining  to,  in-  I  volving  or  based  on  contracts  of  guaranty  or  sure- 


758— -First  Nat.  Bank  of  Dolge- 
ville,  N.  T.,  v.  Man*,  41  N.Y.S.2d 
92— Haskell  v.  Lason,  31  N.Y.S.2d 
729 — Goldstein  v.  Korff,  203  N.Y.S. 
119 — Chris  to  v.  Bayukas,  196  N. 
Y.S.  500. 

. — Atlas  Inv.  Co.  v.  Christ,  2  N. 
*W.2d  714.  240  Wis.  114. 

Summary  judgment  grouted 
(1)  To  plaintiff. 

U.S. — Maryland      Casualty      Co.      v. 
Sparks,  C.C!.A.Mich.,  76  F.2d  929. 

I1L — Smith    v.    Karasek,    40    N.E.2d 
59-4,  31«3  IlLApp.  654. 

Mich, — Mcl>onald  v.   Staples,   261  N. 
W.  86,  271  Mich.  5*90. 

N.Y. — Waxman  v.  Williamson,  175  N. 
E.  534,  256  N.Y.  117,  amendment  of 
remittitur  denied  177  N.E.  151,  256 
N.Y.  587— -Nester  v.  Nester,  22  N.Y. 
S.2d  119,  259  App.Div.  1065 — Ken- 
nah  v.  Hurley,  14  N.Y.S.2d  799.  258 
App.Div.  771 — Modernization  Con- 
tracts Corporation  v.  Sadonls,  9  N. 
Y.S.2d  247,  256  App.Div.  877— In- 
ternational &  Industrial  Securities 
Corporation  v.  Jamaica  Jewish 
Center,  263  N.Y.S.  840,  237  App.Div. 
738— National  City  Bank  of  New 
Rochelle  v.  Holzworth,  248  N.Y.S. 
584,  231  App.Div.  688— Smith  v. 
Cranleigh.  Inc.,  231  N.Y.S.  201,  224 
App.Div.  376 — New  York  Trust  Co. 
v.  American  Realty  Co.,  210  N.Y.S. 
64,  213  App.Div.  272— Caledonian 
Ins.  Co.  of  Edinburgh,  Scotland  v. 
National  City  Bank  of  New  York, 
203  N.Y.S.  32,  208  App.Div.  $3— 
Second  Nat.  Bank  v.  Breitung,  197 
N.Y.S.  375,  203  App.Div.  636— First 
Trust  Co.  of  Albany  v.  Arnold,  39 
N.Y.S.2d  175,  179  Misc.  349— Lann 
v.  United  Steel  Works  Corporation, 
1  N.Y.S.2d  951, 166  Misc.  465— First 
Trust  &  Deposit  Co.  v.  Potter,  278 
N.Y.S.  847,  155  Misc.  106— Union 
Trust  Co.  of  Rochester  v.  Lauman, 
248  N.Y.S.  233,  139  Misc.  308— 
Ralph  Klonick  Corporation  v. 
Haas,  240  N.Y.-S.  643,  1<36  Misc.  286 
— Palmer  'Lumber  Co.  v.  Whitney, 
240  N.Y.S.  640,  13-6  Misc.  284— 
Security  'Finance  Co.  v.  Stuart,  224 
N.Y.S.  257,  130  Misc.  538— Rodger 
v.  Bliss,  2'23  N.Y.S.  401,  130  Misc. 
1)68 — Sarachan  &  Rosenthal  v.  J. 
R.  Bull  &  Co.,  217  N.Y.S.  5'88,  127 
Misc.  760— Mark  Spiegel  Realty 
'Corporation  v.  Gotham  Nat  Bank 
of  New  York,  201  N.Y.S.  599,  12<1 
Misc.  547,  affirmed  204  N.Y.S.  927, 
208  App.Div.  843 — Brown  v.  C. 
Rosenstein  Co.,  200  N.Y.S.  491,  120 
Misc.  787,  affirmed  20*3  N.Y.S.  922, 
'  208  App.Div.  799— Blanchard  Press 
v.  Aerosphere,  Inc.,  51  N.Y.S.2d 
715,  affirmed  56  N.Y.S.2d  415,  269 
App.Div.  826 — Ullman  v.  Edgebert 
43  N.Y.S.2d  666— Lalor  v.  Bour,  3fl 
N.Y.S.2d  850— Douglass  v.  John 
Aquino  Sons,  16  N.YjS.2d  196— 
Integrity  Trust  Co.  T.  Posch,  13 
N.Y.S.2d  973. 


(2)  To  defendant— Swift  &  Co.  v. 
Bankers    Trust   Co.,    3   N.Y.S.2d    923, 
254  Apfc.Div.  6*66,  affirmed  19  N.E.2d 
992,  280  N.Y.  135. 
Judgment  for  defendant  denied 
Wis. — Schultz   v.    Rayome,    19    N.W. 

2d  280,  247  Wis.  178. 
Defense  sufficient  in  law 

To  justify  denial  of  plaintiffs'  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment  in  action 
on  note,  it  is  not  enough  that  there 
be  a  factual  dispute,  but  it  must 
appear  that  the  maker  has  a  defense 
which  is  sufficient  in  point  of  law. — 
President  and  Directors  of  Manhat- 
tan Co.  v.  Cocheo,  10  N.Y.S.2d  770, 
25«6  App.Div.  '560. 

Acquisition     from     holder     in     due 
course 

Whether  plaintiff  acquired  note 
from  holder  in  due  course  was  ques- 
tion of  fact  and  hence  motion  for  a 
summary  judgment  was  properly  de- 
nied.—Zabelle  v.  Gladstone,  8  N.Y.S. 
2d  238,  255  App.Div.  953— Korn  v. 
Garfinkel,  9  N.Y.S.2d  20. 

25.  U.S. — Hoff  v.  St  Paul-Mercury 
Indemnity  Co.  of  St  Paul,  C.C.A., 
74  F.2d  689 — Consolidated  Indemni- 
ty &  Insurance  Co.  v'.  Alliance  Cas- 
ualty Co.,  CJC.A.N.Y.,  68  F.2d  21— 
General  Accident  Fire  &  Life  As- 
sur.  Corporation,  Limited,  of  Perth, 
•Scotland,  v.  Morgan,  D.C.N.Y..  30 
'F.Supp.  753 — Maslin  v.  Columbian 
Nat.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  D.C.N.Y.,  3  'F. 
Supfp.  368. 

111.— Ublasi  v.  Western  &  Southern 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  64  N.E.2d  233,  327 
IlLApfc.  412. 

N.Y.— Butler  v.  New  York  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  38  N.Y.S.2d  451,  265  App.Div. 
289,  appeal  denied  39  N.Y.S.2d  98>8, 
2&5  App.Div.  991— Udisky  v.  Met- 
ropolitan Life  Ins.  Co.,  35  N.Y.S. 
2d  1021,  264  App.Div.  890 — Wino- 
kur  v.  Commercial  Casualty  Ins. 
Co.,  30  N.Y.«S.2d  22-5,  262  App.Div. 
972 — Eifert  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  Co.,  16  N.Y.S.2d  783,  258 
AppJDiv.  921— Imperial  Auction 
Galleries  v.  Massachusetts  Fire  &, 
Marine  Ins.  Co.,  Boston,  Mass.,  9 
N.Y.S.2d  424,  256  App.Div.  242— 
Duke  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co., 
8  N.Y.S.2d  723,  255  App.Div.  923— 
Kaufman  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  287  N.Y.-S.  1014,  248  App.Div. 
'613,  motion  denied  4  N.E.2d  421, 
272  N.Y.  508— Klein  v.  Metropoli- 
tan Life  Ins.  Co.,  282  N.Y.S.  794, 
246  App.Div.  564— Lo  Gal-bo  v.  Co- 
lumbia Casualty  Co.,  255  N.Y.S. 
50'2,  234  App.Div.  510— Tully  v. 
New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.,  240  N.Y. 
S.  118,  228  App.Div.  449— Brooklyn 
Clothing  Corporation  v.  Fidelity- 
Phenix  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  200  N.Y.S. 
208,  205  App.Div.  743 — 'Fertig  v. 
General  Accident  Fire  &  Life  As- 
sur.  Corporation,  Limited,  of  Perth, 
Scotland,  1<3  N.Y.S.2d  872,  171  Misc. 

403 


921 — -Hoffman    v.    Fireman's    Fund 
Indemnity  Co.,  290  N.Y.-S.  876,  160 
Misc.  823,  affirmed  in  part  290  N. 
Y.S.     8T8,    248    App.Div.    866 — Pol- 
lack v.  Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc. 
of  U.  S.,  277  N.Y.S.  328,  15*4  Misc. 
443 — Garrow   v.   Lincoln  -Fire   Ins. 
Co.   of  New  York,   273  N.Y.S.   492, 
152     Misc.     423— Falk    v.     Empire 
State  Degree  of  Honor  of  Stockton, 
246    N.Y.S.     649.    138    Misc.    697— 
Carr   v.    Prudential    Life    Ins.    Co. 
of  America,   27  N.Y.S.Sd  349— Pal- 
ermo v.  Northwestern  Nat  Ins.  Co. 
of  Milwaukee,  201  N.Y.S.  10*6. 
"Summary     Judgment     is     rarely 
granted  in  actions  on  policies  of  in- 
surance.   Almost  always  in  such  cas- 
es   the    facts    are    not    within    the 
knowledge  of  the  defendant  who  is 
therefore  entitled  to  have  the  plain- 
tiff's claim  submitted  to  the  test  of 
cross-examination.    The  better  prac- 
tice,  even  in  such  cases,   is  for  the 
defendant  to  submit  in  proper  form 
what  knowledge  he  has  on  the  sub- 
ject   or    to    set    forth    his    lack    of 
knowledge.     But   the    nature   of   the 
case  may  be  such  that  the  very  facts 
set  forth  in  the  moving  affidavit  it- 
self demonstrate  that  a  trial  rather 
than  a  summary  judgment  is  appro- 
priate."— Suslensky    v.    Metropolitan 
Life    Ins.    Co.,    43    N.Y.S.2d    144,    146, 
180   Misc.    624,   affirmed    46   N.Y.S.Sd 
888,   2'67  App.Div.   812,  appeal  denied 
60  N.Y.S.2d  294,   270  App.Div.   819. 
Summary  Judgment  granted 

(1)  To  plaintiff. 

U.'S. — Empire  Carting  Co.  v.  Employ- 
ers' Reinsurance  Corporation,  C.C. 
A.N.Y.,    64   F.2d    36— Goldberger  v. 
McPeak,   D.C.Pa.,  «60   F.Susxp.   498. 
111. — Kovae  v.  Modern  Mut  Ins.  Co., 

30  N.E.2d  109,  307  IlLApp.  247. 
N.Y. — Cleghorn  v.  Ocean  Accident  & 
Guarantee  Corporation,  Limited,  of 
'London,  215  N.Y.S.  127,  216  App. 
Div.  342,  modified  on  other  grounds 
155  N.B.  87,  24'4-  N.Y.  186— Bal- 
sam v.  National  Retailers  Mut. 
Ins.  Co.,  48  N.Y.S.2d  828,  182  Misc. 
16— Youknot  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  Co.,  283  N.Y.S.  902,  15£ 
Misc.  33,  affirmed  281  N.Y.S.  968, 
245  App.DIv.  705— Killeen  v.  Gener- 
al Ace.,  Fire  &  Life  Assur.  Corpo- 
ration, 227  N.Y.S.  220,  131  Misc. 
'691,  affirmed  229  N.Y.S.  875,  224 
App-Div.  719 — Independence  In- 
demnity Co.  v.  Albert  A,  .Volk  Co., 
226  N.Y.S.  457,  131  Misc.  61— Kras- 
ilovsky  Bros.  Trucking  Corp.  v. 
Maryland  Gas.  Co.,  54  N.Y.S.2d  60. 
<2)  To  defendant 

N.Y.— Feldstein  v.  New  York  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  23  N.Y.S.2d  108,  2'60  App. 
Div.  476,  affirmed  35  N.E.2d  924, 
286  N.Y.  572— Kalna  v.  Newark 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  22  N.Y.«S.2d  407.  260 
App.Div.  829,  appeal  dismissed  40 
N.E.2d  42,  287  N.Y.  756— Rifkin 
v.  Manhattan  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  New 


§220  JUDGMENTS  49    CLJ.S. 

tyship,2*  on  judgments,27  and  causes  of  action  in-  J  volving  foreclosure  of  liens  or  mortgages,28  specific 


York,  288  N.Y.'S.  6S5,  248  App.Div. 
732— Webster  v.  Mutual  Life  Ins. 
Co.  of  New  York,  20  N.Y.S.2d  608, 
174  Misc.  262,  appeal  denied  22  N. 
Y.S.2d  824,  260  App.Div.  811— Bar- 
enblatt     v.     Massachusetts     Acci- 
dent Co.,  280  N.Y.S.  414,  155  Misc. 
594,    affirmed   288    N.Y.S.    889,    247 
App.Div.  882— Mizrahi  v.  National 
Ben  Franklin  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  37  N. 
Y.S.2d  '698 — Cullinane  v.  Travelers 
Ins.   Co.,    26   N.Y.-S.  2d   933 — Arroyo 
v.    John   Hancock   Mut   Xiife   Ins. 
Co.,     2«4    N.Y.S.2d     188— Moore     v. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  .Qo.,   16  N. 
Y.S.23  195. 
Wis.— (Fehr  v.  General  Accident  -Fire 
&  Life  Assur.  Corp.,  16  N.W.2d  787, 
24'6    Wis.    228— Binsfeld   v.    Home 
Mut.  Ins.  Co.,   15  N.W.2d  '828,  245 
Wis.   552 — Potts  v.   Farmers'  Mut. 
Automobile  Ins.  Co.,  289  N.W.  606, 
233    Wis.    313— Witzko   v.    Koenig, 
272   N.W.    8-64,    224   Wis.    674. 
(3)  Where  plaintiff   fails  to   com- 
ply with  the  necessary  requirements 
before  he  can  enforce  his  cause  of 
action,  such  as  making  proper  proof 
of  loss  prior  to  an  action  against  an 
insurer,  no  issue  for  trial  exists,  and 
a    summary    judgment    is    proper. — 
Binsfeld  v.  Home  Mut.   Ins.  Co.,   19 
N.W.2d  240,  247  Wis.  273. 
Defendant's  motion  for  Judgment  de- 
nied 

Mich. — R.  E.  Townsend  Corporation 
v.  Gleaner  Life  Ins.  Soc.,  298  N. 
W.  386,  298  Mich.  10. 
N.Y. — Duke  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  298  N.Y.S.  608,  163  Misc.  629, 
affirmed  *  N.Y.S.2d  723,  255  A"pp. 
(Div.  923 — Halpern  v.  JLavine,  60 
N.Y.S.-2d  121— -O'Neal  v.  Travelers 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  48  N.Y.S.2d  99— 
Esquilin  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of 
America,  38  N.Y.S.2d  6— Biloz  v. 
Tioga  County  Patrons'  Fire  Relief 
Ass'n,  21  N.Y.S.2d  643,  affirmed  23 
N.Y.S.2d  460,  260  App.Div.  976. 
26.  US.— Real  Estate-Land  Title  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Commonwealth  Bond 
Corporation,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  63  'F.2d 
237— u.  S.  v.  Stephanidis,  D.C.N.Y., 
41  !F.2d  958 — Massee  &  Felton 
Lumber  Qo.  v.  Benenson,  D.C.N.Y., 
23  F.2d  107 — Chase  Nat.  Bank  of 
City  of  New  York  v.  Burg,  D.C. 
Minn.,  32  F.Supp.  230. 
N.Y.— Read  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co., 
•31  N.B.2d  891,  284  N.Y.  435— An- 
derson v.  Title  Guarantee  &  Trust 
Co.,  -10  N.B.2d  644,  274  N.Y.  546— 
Morris  v.  Albany  Hotel  Corpora- 
tion, 27*6  N.Y.S.  -685,  243  App.Div. 
645,  affirmed  198  N.B.  #35,  26"8  N. 
Y.  641— «Seglin  Const.  Co.  v.  Co- 
lumbia Casualty  Co.,  *264  N.Y.'S. 
144,  239  App.Div.  803 — -Koran  v. 
Van  IDyk,  260  N.Y.S.  12,  2'3I6  App. 
•Div.  463 — Souhami  v.  Prudence- 
Bonds  Corporation,  270  N.Y.S,  359, 
150  Misc.  U02 — Biel  v.  Crosse  & 
Blackwell,  264  N.Y.S.  318,  147 


Misc.  718  —  People's  Wayne  Coun- 
ty Bank  v.  Power  City  Trust  Co., 
2'63  N.Y.S.  477,  147  Misc.  168— 
Pyrke  v.  -Standard  Accident  Ins. 
Co.,  252  N.Y.S.  635,  141  Misc.  186, 
reversed  in  part  on  other  grounds 
and  affirmed  in  part  254  N.Y.S.  '520, 
234  A&p.Div.  la's—  Standard  Fac- 
tors Corp.  v.  Kreisler,  '53  N.Y.S.2C 
871,  affirmed  5*6  N.Y.'S.2d  '414,  269 
App.Div.  830,  motion  denied  '62 
NVE.  247,  294  N.Y.  1. 
Wis.  —  Frank  v.  Schroeder,  300  N.W. 
2-54,  239  Wis.  159. 


Smmnary  judgment 

N.J.  —  Electric  Service  Supplies  Co. 
v.  Consolidated  Indemnity  &  In- 
surance Co.,  16'8  A.  412,  111  N.J. 
(Law  288. 

<Srimmfury  Judgment;  denied 

(1)  To     plaintiff.—  Morris    v.     Al- 
bany Hotel  Corporation,  198  N.B.  53'5, 
268     N.Y.     '641—  Kramer     v.     Relgov 
Realty  Co.,    198   N.B.   420,    268   N.Y. 
592  —  Brawer     v.     Mendelson     Bros. 
Factors,  186   N.B.   200,   262  N.Y.  53, 
amended  on  other  grounds  188  N.E. 
65,  2-62  N.Y.  5*62—  Moran  v.  Van  Dyk, 
279    N.Y.S.    '638,    244    App.Div.    810. 

(2)  To  defendant. 

Mich.  —  American  Employers'  Ins.  Co. 
v.  H.  G.  Christman  &  Bros.  Co., 
278  N.W.  750,  284  Mich.  36. 

N.Y.—  Read  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co., 
131  N.E.2d  891,  284  N.Y.  435. 

27.  N.Y.—  Sargant  v.  Monroe,  49  N. 
Y.S.2d    -546,        268    App.Div.    123— 
Barber  v.  Warland,  247  N.Y.S.  455, 
139  Misc.   398—  Bissell  v.  Bngle, 
N.Y.S.2d  747. 

Wis.  —  Ehrllch  v.  Frank  Holton  & 
Co.,  280  N.W.  297,  228  Wis.  676,  re- 
hearing denied  and  mandate  va- 
cated 281  N.W.  696,  228  Wis.  676. 

Summary  judgment  granted 

N.Y.—  Preston  v.  Preston,  33  N.Y.iS. 
2d  24,  178  Misc.  81  —  Curran  v.  Cur- 
ran,  240  N.Y.S.  364,  13*6  Misc.  598. 

Wis.—  Bhrlich  v.  Frank  Holton  &  Co, 
281   N.W.   -696.    228   Wis.    676. 

28.  <N.Y.  —  Spruce     Hill     Homes     v. 
Brieant,    43    N.E.2d    5-6,    288    N.Y. 
309,  motion  denied  47  N.E.2d  445, 
289     N.Y.     849—  Bast    River    Sav. 
Bank  v.  671  Prospect  Ave.  Holding 
Corporation,  20  N.E.2d  780,  280  N. 
Y.   '342,    reargument   denied   21   N. 
B.2d  699,  2'80  N.Y.  814,  motion  de- 
nied 22  N.B.2d  871,  281  N.Y.  676— 
City  of  New  Rochelle  v.  Echo  Bay 
Waterfront  Corporation,   49  N.Y.S. 
2d  673,  268  App.Div.  182,  certiorari 
denied  (6'6  S.Ct  24,  326  U.S.  720,  90 
L.Bd.  -  .     Affirmed  60  N.E.2d  8^8, 
294  N.Y.  ^78—  Town  of  Harrison  v. 
Valentine,  34  N.Y.S.2d  54,  264  Ajpp. 
Div.  729  —  Box  v.  Linnemann,  1*2  N. 
Y.S.2d     '527,     237     App.Diy.     '849— 
•Clinton   Trust  Co.   v.  Church  Ex- 
tension Committee  of  Presbytery 
of  New:  York,   5  N.Y.S.2d  290,  255 
App.Div.  -167  —  Farber  v.  De  Bruin, 

404 


2  N.Y.S.2d  244,  253  App.Div.  909— 
Bowery  iSav.  Bank  v.  Sonona  Hold- 
ing Corporation,  296  N.Y.S.  7=9,  251 
App..Div.  7416— 'Flushing  Nat.  Bank 
in  New  York  v.  Thorpe,  295  N.Y. 
S.  172,  251  App.Div.  721— (Floral 
Park  Lawns  v.  O'Connell,  *294  N.Y. 
S.  991,  -250  App.Div.  464— Phc&nix 
Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tuddington 
Holding  Corporation,  291  N.Y.S. 
1012,  '249  AppZ>iv.  76^6— Pruden- 
tial Ins.  Co.  of  America  v.  K  L. 
F.  Realty  Co.,  287  N.Y.S.  124,  247 
App.Div.  89'8 — Exchange  Bank  v. 
Ludlum,  285  N.Y.'S.  862,  246  App. 
Div.  892— Safety  Building-Loan  & 
Savings  Ass'n  of  City  of  Albany  v. 
Felts,  279  N.Y.S.  846,  '244  App.Div. 
867 — Brescia  Const  Co.  v.  Walart 
Const  Co.,  2'64  N.Y.S.  8'62,  -238  App. 
Div.  360 — Reed  v.  Neu-Pro  Const. 
Corporation,  2*34  N.Y.'S.  400,  226 
App.Div.  70— 6udarsky  v.  Woodmar 
Realty  Co.,  223  N.Y.S.  576,  224  App. 
Div.  38— Levy  v.  Cohen,  267  N.Y.S. 
4>6,  148  Misc.  908— Kaufman  v. 
Hitesman,  61  N.Y.S.2d  734. 
Wis. — Seymour  Holding  Corp.  v. 
Wendt,  21  N.W.2d  267.  248  Wis. 
1<30. 

Summary  judgment  granted 

I1L — Qhepard  v.  Wheaton,  60  N.-E.2d 
47,  325  IlLApp.  '269. 

N.Y.— Astor  v.  Hotel  St.  Regis,  195 
KB.  227,  266  N.Y.  617— Mills  ILand 
Corporation  v.  Rapoport,  "51  N.Y. 
S.2d  17,  26:8  Apfc.DJv.  911— ^Frank- 
liri  Soc.  for  Home-Building  &  Sav- 
ings v.  Flavin,  40  N.Y.-S.'2d  582,  2'65 
App.Div.  720,  affirmed  *50  N.B.2d 
653,  291  N.Y,  S30,  certiorari  denied 
•Flavin  v.  Franklin  «Soc.  for  Home 
Building  &  Savings,  '64  S.Ct  158, 
320  U.S.  786,  88  L.Ed.  472^-Smyth 
v.  McDonogh,  22  N.Y.S.2d  -631,  2>60 
AppJDiv.  889,  reargument  denied  23 
N.Y.-S.2d  83'3.  260  App.Div.  897,  ap- 
peal denied  30  N.B.2d  731,  248  N. 
Y.  8'22 — New  York  State  Teachers' 
Retirement  System  v.  Coyne,  1'3  N. 
Y.S.2d  660,  257  App.Div.  1010,  cer- 
tified questions  answered  and  af- 
firmed 28  N.B.2d  28,  28'3  N.Y.  615, 
motion  granted  29  N.B.2d  669,  284 
N.Y.  594— New  York  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.  West  Eighteenth  &  Nineteenth 
Streets  Realty  Corporation,  2  N. 
Y.S.2d  806,  25'3  App.Div.  5'2 3— Mal- 
colm Realty  Co.  v.  21  Bast  21st 
•St.  Corporation,  280  N.Y.S.  146, 
245  App.Div.  731— Pellino  v.  3232 
Hull  Ave.  Realty  Corporation,  2!64 
N.Y.S.  214,  2-37  A«pp.Div.  759— Hy- 
man  v.  Fischer,  "52  N.Y.S.2d  553, 
184  Misc.  90 — Home  Owners'  Loan 
Corporation  v.  Wood,  9  N.Y.S.2d 
83-4,  170  Misc.  74— Clark  v.  Selig- 
man,  2-96  N.Y.'S.  98,  1'63  Misc.  5>33— 
Kennilwood  Owners'  Ass'n  v.  Wall, 
264  N.Y.S.  135,  148  Misc.  «67— Vil- 
lage of  'Fleischmanns  v.  Silberman, 
15  N.Y.S.2d  904. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


220 


performance,29  to  recover  chattels,30  or  to  recover  a 
deposit  of  money,31  and  causes  or  proceedings  in- 
volving the  rights  and  liabilities  of  corporations, 
corporate  officers,  or  stockholders,32  and  landlord 
and  tenant.33 

So  also  summary  judgment  has  been  granted  or 


has  been  denied  depending  on  whether  issues  of 
fact  were  raised  with  respect' to  such  matters  as 
the  existence,  validity,  and  conditions  of  a  con- 
tract,34 the  right  of  set-off  or  recoupment  against 
plaintiffs  claim,35  negligence,36  statute  of  frauds,37 
limitations,38  and  whether  issues  of  fact  were  raised 


Defendant's  motion  denied 

N.Y.— Katz  v.  Welnschelblatt,  205  N. 
Y.S.  76,  209  App.Div.  606. 

29.  Cal. — Gibson  v.  De  iLa  Salle  In- 
stitute, 152  P.2d  774,  «6  Cal.App. 
2d  609. 

N.Y.— Bartels  v.  Bennett,  8  N.Y.S.2d 
335,  255  App.Div.  1001— Mondrus  v. 
•Salt  Haven  Corp.,  62  N.Y.S.2d  477, 
modified  on  other  grounds  63  N.Y. 
S.2d  205 — MacLaeon  v.  Lipchitz,  56 
N.Y.S.2d  $09,  affirmed  #8  N.Y.S.2d 
337,  269  App.Div.  953. 

Defendant's   motion  denied 

N.Y.— 'Singer  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  287 
N.Y.S.  634,  248  App.Div.  $09- New 
York  Produce  Exch.  Safe  Deposit 
&  Storage  Co.  v.  New  York  Produce 
Exch.,  20-3  N.Y.S.  648,  208  AppJDiv. 
421,  affirmed  144  N.B.  901,  '2i38  N. 
Y.  582— MacLaeon  v.  Lipchitz,  '56 
N.Y.S.2d  609,  affirmed  58  N.Y.S.2d 
337,  269  App.Div.  953. 

30-  N.Y.— Sullivan  County  Oil  Co: 
v.  'Sommers,  45  N.Y.S.2d  547,  267 
App.Div.  799 — Hampton  Bottlers  v. 
Distributors  Consol.  Corporation, 
38  N.Y.S.2d  236. 

Pa. — Koehring  Co.  v.  Ventresca,  6  A. 
2d  297,  3'34  Pa.  566— Household 
Outfitting  Co.  v.  Goldman,  Com.Pl., 
43  OL.ack.Jur.  10'6— Pieklo  v.  Pieklo, 
Com.Pl.,  $8  •'Luz.Leg.Reg.  «3'69 — Au- 
tomobile Banking  Corporation  v. 
Drahus,  33  (Luz.Leg.Reg.  481,  ap- 
peal quashed  13  A.2d  874,  140  Pa. 
Super.  469. 

81.  N.Y.— Ditkoff  v.  Prudential  'Sav. 
Bank,  280  N.Y.S.  437,  245  App.Div. 
748 — Larkin  v.  Greenwich  Sav. 
Bank,  271  N.Y.S.  288,  241  App.Div. 
874 — Allison  v.  Brooklyn  Trust  Co., 
2-60  N.Y.S.  31,  145  Misc.  658— Chil- 
vers  v.  Baldwin's  Bank  of  Penn 
Tan,  23*3  N.Y.S.  !520,  193  Misc.  787 
— Sperling  v.  Sperling,  56  N.Y.S.2d 
88 — Lourie  v.  Chase  Nat.  Bank,  42 
N.Y.S.2d  205 — Hampton  Bottlers  v. 
Distributors  Consol.  Corporation, 
•38  N.Y.S.2d  236— Stoever  v.  'Small, 
35  N.Y.S.2d  375— Kirshenblatt  v. 
Public  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
New  York,  9  N.Y.S.2d  262. 
Summary  judgment  granted  , 

Cl)  To  plaintiff. — Van  Der  Veen  v. 
Amsterdamsche  Bank,  '35  N.Y.S.M 
945,  178  Misc.  668— Community  Vol- 
unteer Fire  Co.  of  NimmonsbuKg  v. 
City  Nat  Bank  of  Btnghamton,  14  N. 
Y.S.2d  306,  171  Misc.  1027. 

(2)  To  defendant — Bromberg  v. 
Bank  of  America  Nat  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Ass'n,  135  P.2d  689,  -58  Cal.App. 
2d  1. 


32.  N.Y.—  Binder  v.  Doelid,  2*8'5  N.Y 
•S.  56,  246  App.Div.  800-nSchnitzler 
v.  Tartell,  224  .N.Y.S.  339,  130  Misc 
565—  (Federal    Deposit   Ins.    Corpo- 
ration v.  Appelbaum,  39  N.Y.S.2d 
•300—  Kirby  v.  Schenck,  25  N.Y.S.2d 
431. 

33.  N.Y.—  Piedmont  Hotel  Co.  v.  A. 
B.  Nettleton  Co.,  188  N.B.  145,  263 
N.Y.  25  —  Land  Associates  Corpora- 
tion v.  Grand  Union  Stores,  299  N. 
Y.S.   882,  253  App.Div.   90S—  Berry 
v.   Stuyvesant  283  N.Y.S.  191,  245 
App.Div.  51'6  —  Maxrice  Realty  Cor- 
poration  v.   B/G    Sandwich   Shops, 
267  N.Y;S.  86>3,  239  App.Div.  472— 
60    "West    53rd   St    Corporation    v. 
Haskell,   246  N.Y.S.   360,   231   Ajpp. 
Div.    62  —  Canrock   Realty  Corpora- 
tion v.  Vim  Electric  Co.,  '37  N.Y.S. 
2d  139,  179  Misc.  39-1—  Comas  Hold- 
ing Corporation  v.  Handel,  265  N. 
Y.S.   '873,    148   Misc.    439—  Stein   v. 
'Feinberg,  245  N.Y.S.  551,  138  Misc. 
295  —  Printerion     Realty    Corp.     v. 
Mancini,    61    N.Y.S.2d    200—  Direct 
Realty  Co.  v.  Birnbaum,  46  N.Y.S. 
2d  '435-^Tefferson  Estates  v.  Wil- 
son,    139     N.Y.S.2d     '502—  Sheridan 
Ave.  Corporation  v.  Sift,  29  N.Y.®. 
2d  -333. 

Summary  judgment  granted 

(1)  To  plaintiff. 

T3VS.  —  Irving  Trust  Co.  v.  American 
Silk  Mills,  Inc.,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  72  (P. 
2d  288,  certiorari  denied  American 
Silk  Mills.  Inc.,  v.  Irving  Trust 
Co.,  55  S.Ct.  239,  S93  U.S.  '624,  79 
L.Bd.  711. 

N.Y.—  Rabitzek  Investing  Co.  v.  Co- 
lonial Beacon  Oil  Co.,  40  N.Y.S.2d 
819,  2*65  App.Div.  749,  appeal  de- 
nied 42  N.Y.S.2d  922,  266  App.Div. 
775—  Silleck  v.  McDonald,  2*60  N. 
Y.S.  802,  237  App.Div.  121—  lago 
Realty  Corp.  v.  Marmin  Garage 
Corp.,  59'N.YjS.2d  740,  186  Misc. 
478. 

(2)  To   defendant  —  Abrams  v.  Al- 
len,   42    N.Y.S.2d    641,    26«    App.Div. 
S3  5,    reargument   and   appeal    denied 
44  N.Y.S.2d  337,   266  Ajpp.Div.  948. 
Motion  by  defendant  denied 

U.ig.  —  Weisser  v.  Mursam  Shoe  Cor- 

poration, C.C.A.,  127  <F.2d  344,  145 

A.L.R.  467. 
N.Y.—  Schulte    Real    Estate  .  Co.    v. 

Pedexnode,  Inc.,   195  N.E.  195,   266 

N.Y.  5-50. 


34.  jvf.Y.  —  Liebman  v.  Rosen  thai,  59 
N.Y.S.2d  148,  2?69  A«pp.Div.  10!62  — 
Sherry  v.  Marsh,  9  N.Y.S.2d  494, 
256  App.Div.  219—  Hano  Paper  Cor- 
poration v.  F..W.  Woolworth  Co., 
293  N.Y.S.  804,  250  App.Div.  49— 

405 


Lowe  v.  Plainneld  Trust  Co.  of 
Plainsfield,  N.  J.,  215  N.Y.S.  50,  216 
App.Div.  72 — Perera  v.  Longone, 
213  N.Y.S.  418,  215  App.Div.  79-6— 
Gantz  v.  Investors'  (Syndicate,  265 
N.Y.S.  749,  148  Misc.  274. 

35.  N.Y.— Gaimari  v.  Horch,  -2  93  N. 
Y.S.   479,   249   App.Div.   537— Union 
Trust  Co.   of   Rochester  v.   Vetro- 
mile,    268   N.Y.S.    26,   '239    App.Div. 
562— A.    B.    Aldus    Realty    Co.    v. 
Breslof,   231  N.Y.S.   640,   133  Misc. 
149. 

36.  Ariz.— Manor  v.  Barry,  154  P.2d 
<374. 

N.Y.— Troy  v.  New  York  Trust  Co., 
16  N.Y.S.2d  589,  258  App.Div.  959, 
reargument  denied  In  re  Wolff's 
Will,  18  N.Y.S.2d  742,  258  App.Div. 
1055 — Nusbaum  v.  Rial  to  Sec.  Cor- 
poration, 264  N.Y.S.  513,  238  App. 
Div.  257 — Pyramid  Musical  Corpo- 
ration v.  -Floral  Park  Bank,  42  N. 
Y.S.2d  24,  179  Misc.  73'3 — Siegal  v. 
Public  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
New  York,  7  N.Y.S.2d  771. 

37.  N.Y.— Gold  v.  'Smith,  272  N.Y.S. 
139,  242  App.Div.  643,  amended  on 
other  grounds  275  N.Y.S.  342,  242 
App.Div.    777 — Pohlers    v.    Exeter 
Mfg.     Co.,     52     N.Y.S.2d     31*6— De 
Jahn  v.  Crichton,  16  N.Y.'S.2d  888. 

On  defendant's  motion 

Whether  oral  contract  in  suit  is 
void  and  unenforceable  under  stat- 
ute of  frauds  should  be  determined 
on  trial  of  issues,  rather  than  on 
defendant's  motion  for  summary 
Judgment — Jacobson  v.  Jacobson,  49 
N.Y.S.2d  166,  2S8  App.Div.  770. 

38.  U.S.— Aachen     &     Munich    Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Guaranty  Trust  Co.  of 
New  York,  D.C.N.Y.,   24  -F.2d  463. 

N.Y.— <Di  Nufrio  v.  Ajello,  207  N.Y.S. 
229,  211  App.Div.  487— Fogarty  v. 
Ross,  41  N.Y.S.2d  109,  180  Misc. 
606— Monhof  v.  Happy,  258  N.Y.S. 
498,  144  Misc.  208— Arnold  v.  Buss- 
mann,  29  N.Y.S.2d  155,  affirmed  34 
N.Y.S.2d  829,  264  App.Div.  713. 
Motion  for  defendant  granted  on 

defense  of  limitations. 

U.iS. — Downey  v.  Palmer,  D.C.N.Y., 
32  F.'Supp.  344,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  C.C.A.,  114  «F.2d  116. 

IlL — Richey  v.  Northwestern  Univer- 
sity, '55  N.E.2d  406,  "323  Ill.App. 
293. 

N.Y.— Haxnill  v.  Title  Guarantee  & 
Trust  Co.,  23  N.Y.S.2d  244,  260 
App.Div.  873,  appeal  denied  24  N. 
YJS.2d  127,  260  App.X)iv.  932,  ap- 
peal denied  31  N.E.  2 a  5*17,  255  N. 
Y.  85*6— CJhance  v.  Guaranty  Trust 


220 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


with  respect  to  false  representations  or  fraud,39 
waiver,40  duress,41  and  usury.42 

Issue  as.  to  foreign  law.  A  question  raised  as  to 
foreign  law  ordinarily  presents  a  triable  issue  so  as 
to  preclude  the  granting  of  summary  judgment,43 
but  that  is  not  the  case  where  no  interpretive  deci- 
sions of  foreign  courts  are  referred  to  by  either 
side,  and  statutes  alone  are  presented  for  construc- 
tion.44 

Damages.  Where  the  statute  ior  court  rule  per- 
mits recovery  of  summary  judgment  on  an  unliqui- 
dated claim  where  no  triable-  issue  exists,  and  pro- 
vides for  an  assessment  of  damages  to  determine 
the  amount  of  the  judgment,  an  issue  of  fact  with 
respect  to  damages  will  not  bar  judgment.45 

Claims  against  decedents'  estates.  In  actions 
prosecuting  claims  against  a  decedent's  estate  based 


on  a  transaction  with  the  decedent,  plaintiffs  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment  ordinarily  will  be  de- 
nied notwithstanding  insufficiency  of  opposing  affi- 
davits since  the  facts  on  which  the  claim  is  based 
usually  are  within  plaintiffs  exclusive  knowledge 
and  the  claim  should  be  properly  proved  on  a  trial.46 

§  221.    Against   Whom  Judgment   May   Be 
Rendered 

In  a  proper  case  summary  Judgment  may  be  rendered 
against  all  persons  permitted  by  statute  to  be  Joined 
in  the  action  and  who  are  parties  thereto. 

In  a  proceeding  for  summary  judgment  by  mo- 
tion, plaintiff  may  proceed  against  all  persons  per- 
mitted by  statute  to  be  joined  in  the  action.47 
However,  a  summary  judgment  may  be  entered  only 
against  a  party  to  the  action,48  and  not  against  a 
third  person  who  is  not  such  a  party.49  Where  the 


Co.  of  New  York,  13  N.Y.S.2d  785, 
257  AppJMv.  1006,  affirmed  £6  N. 
E.2d  802,  282  N.Y.  '65«— Lyon  v. 
Holton,  14  N.Y,S.2d  436,  172  Misc. 
31,  affirmed  20  N.Y.S.2d  1015,  259 
App.DIv.  877,  modified  on  other 
grounds  -86  N.E.2d  201,  286  N.Y. 
270. 

Motion  for  defendant  denied 

U.S.— Hadlock  v.  Eric,  D.C.N.Y.,  "23 
F.Supp.  692. 

N.Y.— Schmoll  Pils  Associated  v.  Ex- 
port S.  S.  Corporation,  21  N.Y.-S.2d 
194. 

39.  N.T. — Bank  of  Lucedale  v.  Unit- 
ed Naval  Stores  Co.,  211  N.Y.S.  32, 
214  App.Div.  .  81— Tidewater  Oil 
Sales  Corporation  v.  Pierce,  210 
N.Y.S.  769,  213  App.Div.  796— Ca- 
pone  v;  Simantob  Realty  Corpora- 
tion, 260  N.Y.S.  486,  1'46  Misc.  2— 
Asbestos  Trading  &  Finance  Co.  v. 
Hazen,  203  N.Y.S.  5*65,  m  Misc. 
269 — Utilities  Engineering  Insti- 
tute v.  Hagerty,  56  N.Y.S.2d  377— 
First  Nat  Bank  of  Dolgeville,  N. 
Y.,  v.  Mang,  41  N.Y.S.2d  92— Util- 
ities Engineering  Institute  v.  Yan- 
ick,  29  N.Y.S.2d  258. 

Summary  judgment  granted  to  de- 
fendant 

K.Y.— Marshall  v.  U.  'S.  Review  Cor- 
poration, 15  N.Y.S.2d  21,  258  App. 
Div.  722,  appeal  dismissed  25  NJC. 
2d  147,  2'82  N.Y.  5S4. 

Summary  Judgment  for  defendant 
denied 

N.Y.— Goldsmith  v.  National  Con- 
tainer Corporation,  40  N.E.2d  242, 
287  N.Y.  4(38. 

4a  N.Y.— 'Federal  Terra  Cotta  Co. 
v.  Margolies,  2ttl  N.Y.S.  8756,  215 
App.Div.  651— Hurwite  v.  Slater, 
•53  N.Y.S.2d  905. 

Pa. — Klupot  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co. 
of  America,  Com.Pl.,  36  QUizXeg. 
Reg.  165. 

41.  N.Y. — Ritz  Carlton  Restaurant 
&  Hotel  Co.  T.  Ditmars,  197  N.Y.S. 


405,  20*3  Aj?p.Div.  748— Merchants' 
"Ladies  Garment  Ass'n  v.  Coat 
House  of  William  M.  Schwartz, 
Inc.,  273  N.Y.-S.  '317,  1-52  Misc.  130. 

42.  Mich.— Straus  v.  Elless  Co.,  222 
N.W.  752,   245  Mich.   558. 

N.Y.— Baker  v.  Smythe,  59  N.Y.S.2d 
709,  270  App.Div.  811,  reargument 
denied  61  N.Y.*S.2d  388,  two  cases, 
270  App.Div.  342— S.  C.  Beckwith 
Special  Agency  v.  Orange  County 
Herald  Pub.  Co.,  212  N.Y.S.  108, 
214  App.Div.  212— Royal  Diamond 
•Co.  v.  Ostrin,  232  N.Y.S.  223,  133 
Misc.  S'5'5— Hinman  v.  Brundage,  13 
N.Y.S.2d  '36-3. 

43.  N.Y. — Bercholz      v.'      Guaranty 
Trust  Co.  of  New  York,  40  N.Y.S. 
2d   41,   179   Miac.   778— Paterno  v. 
Eagar,  51  N.Y.S.2d  938— Old  World 
Art  v.  Quistgaard,  41  N.Y.'S.2d  586, 
affirmed  '44  N.Y.S.2d  341,  266  App. 
IDlv.  "951,  appeal  denied  44  N.Y.S. 
2d    687,    2'6>6    App.Div.    964— Dum- 
badze  v.  Agency  of  Canadian  Car 
&   Foundry   Co.,    38    N.Y.S.2d    991, 
affirmed  Gurge  v.  Agency  of  Cana- 
dian Car  &  .Foundry  'Co.,  45  N.Y.S. 
2d  955,  2*67  App.Div.  782,  appeal  de- 
nied In  re  Dumbadze's  Estate,  47 
N.Y.'S.2d   315,    2-67    App.Div.    8T8. 

44.  N.Y. — Dumbadze   v.   Agency   of 
Canadian  Car  &  Foundry  Co.,  Q8 
N.Y.S.2d    991,    affirmed    Gurge    v. 
Agency  of  Canadian  Car  &  Foun- 
dry Co.,  45  N.Y.S.2d.  955,  267  A#p. 
Div.  782,  appeal  denied  In  re  Dum- 
•badze's  Estate,  47  N.Y.S.Sd  315,  267 
App.Div.  878. 

46.  N.Y.-JC.  J.  G.  Corporation  v. 
Knickerbocker  Ins.  Co.  of  New 
York,  273  N.Y.S.  42,  242  App.Div. 
•  685 — (Fuller  v.  American  Surety 
Co.,  275  N.Y.S.  113,  IS*  Misc.  432. 

46.  N.Y. — Browne  v.  Browne,  40  N. 
Y.«S.2d  253,  2-66  App.Div.  664— Rob- 
insohn  v.  Herman,  234  N.Y.S.  693, 
184  Misc.  24*6 — Sorensen  v.  East 
River  Sav.  Inst,  196  N.Y.S.  361, 

406 


119  Misc.  297— Quigley  v.  Fitts,  S7 

N.Y.S.2d  1<6. 

In  action  on  unpaid  checks  against 
maker's  administrator,  wherein  ad- 
ministrator denied  knowledge  of 
transaction  in  which  checks  were 
given,  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to 
summary  Judgment,  since  formal 
proof  would  be  required  even  though 
plaintiff  was  likely  to  succeed  at  tri- 
al.—'Friedman  v.  Friedman,  29$  N.Y. 
S.  7-14,  251  App.Div.  865. 

47.  W.Va.— State    ex   rel.    Connells- 
ville  By-Product  Coal  Co.  v.  Con- 
tinental Coal  Co.,  186  S.E.  119,  117 
W.Va.  447,   106  A.L.R.   83. 

Persons   liable   on  instrument. 

Statute  providing  "that  holder  of 
instrument  in  any  proceeding  by  no- 
tice for  judgment  on  motion  there- 
on may  join  all  or  any  intermediate 
number  of  persons  liable  although 
promise  of  makers  or  obligations  of 
persons  otherwise  liable  may  be  joint 
or  several  or  joint  and  several,  be- 
ing remedial,  should  not  be  given  a 
technical  or  unlimited  construction. 
— State  ex  rel.  Connellsville  By- 
Product  Coal  Co.  v.  Continental  Coal 
Co.,  supra.. 
Sureties  on  different  bonds 

Where  two  supersedeas  bonds  were 
filed  In  the  same  suit  and  conditioned 
the  same,  although  made  at  differ- 
ent times,  in  different  penalties  and 
signed  by  different  sureties,  the 
sureties  could  not  be  joined  as  par- 
ties defendant  in  a  notice  of  motion 
for  judgment  for  recovery  on  the 
bonds.— -State  ex  rel.  Shenandoah 
Valley  Nat  Bank  v.  Hiett,  17  S.B.2d 
878,  123  W.Va.  739,  137  A.L.R.  1041. 

48.  N.Y.— (Field  v.  Maghee,  *  Paige 
539. 

49.  N.Y.— flWeld  v.  Maghee,  supra. 
Tenn. — Ex  parte  Qraighead,  12  Heisk. 

640. 
34  C.J.  p  202  note  77. 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  222 


action  is  against  two  or  more  defendants,  it  has 
been  held  that  a  summary  judgment  may  not  be 
entered  against  one  of  them  alone,50  unless  it  ap- 
pears that  he  has  no  defense  to  the  action  and  that 
the  others  have  good  defenses  and  should  be  per- 
mitted to  defend.51  •  A  motion  and  judgment  against 
heirs  only,  where  they  are  liable  only  jointly  with 
the  personal  representative,  has  been  held  to  be  er- 
roneous but  not  void,  where  the  court  had  juris- 
diction of  the  subject  matter.52  Where  the  mo- 
tion is  under  a  special  statute  which  is  applicable 
only  to  certain  persons,  judgment  may  be  had 
against  those  only  against  whom  the  remedy  is  giv- 
en.^ 

§  222.    Procedure  in  General 

The  procedure  prescribed  by  statute  or  court  rule 
for  obtaining  summary  judgment  on  motion  or  in  spe- 
cial proceedings  generally  must  be  followed,  and  a  fail- 


ure to  comply  therewith  will  preclude  the  granting  of 
the  motion. 

A  party  moving  for  summary  judgment  must  gen- 
erally  comply  with  the  statute  or  court  rule  relat- 
ing thereto,  and  a  failure  to  "follow  the  procedure 
prescribed  will  preclude  the  granting  of  a  motion 
for  summary  judgment  or  the  substantiation  of  a 
claim  of  defense.54  Under  statutes  providing  for 
summary  judgment  on  motion  in  actions  instituted 
in  the  ordinary  way  where  no  triable  issue  of  fact 
is  disclosed  in  answer  to  affidavits  of  the  moving 
party,  such  a  motion  is  the  procedural  equivalent  of 
a  trial,55  and  all  necessary  parties  must  be  before 
the  court,  or  their  status  must  be  submitted  by  prop- 
er proof.56  The  motion  searches  the  record,57  and, 
where  made  by  plaintiff,  it  admits  every  material 
averment  in  the  answer  or  affidavit  of  defense58 
and  reopens  the  question  of  the  sufficiency  of  the 
complaint;59  but  defendant's  motion  for  judgment 


50.  N.Y. — Alwais  v.  Employers*  Lia- 
bility Assur.  Corporation,  (Limited, 
of   London,    Eng.,    208   N.Y.S.    137, 
211  App.Div.  734. 

34  C.J.  p  202  note  79. 

51.  N.Y.— Meeker  v.  Saskill,  298  N. 
T.'S.  754,  164  Misc.  718. 

34  C.J.  p  202  note  78. 

52.  Ky. — Bustard  v.  Gates,  4  Dana 
429. 

53.  Cal. — Hansen  v.  Martin,  63  Cal. 
282. 

34  C.J.  p  202  note  -82. 

54.  Md.— Katski  v.  Triplett,  30  A.2d 
764,  181  Md.  545— Mueller  v.  Mich- 
aels, 60  A.  485,  101  Md.  188. 

Mich. — Terre  Haute   Brewing  Co.  v. 
,  Goldberg,  289  N.W.  m  291  Mich. 

401— Gloeser   v.    Moore,    278,   N.W. 

781,  284  Mich.  106. 
N.Y.— Silvestro  v.  City  of  New  York, 

49  N.Y.S.2d  217,  affirmed  55  N.Y.S. 
.  2d   583,    269   AppJDiv.   783. 
Verification  and  statement  of  amount 

To  entitle  plaintiff  to  a  summary 
Judgment,  under  Rules  of  Civil  Prac- 
tice, rule  113,  the  cause  of  action 
must  be  verified  by  plaintiff,  or  by 
a  iperson  having  knowledge  of  the 
facts,  .and  the  amount  claimed  must 
be  stated. — State  Bank  v.  Mackstein, 
205  N.Y.S.  290,  123  Misc.  41'6. 
TTnprecedented  motion 

.•Fact  that  defendant's  motion  to  re- 
quire plaintiff  to  accept  as  a  suffi- 
cient response  to  plaintiff's  motion  to 
strike  out  the  answer  and  for  sum- 
mary judgment  an  annexed  affidavit 
and  on  the  strength  of  such  affida- 
vit to  have  motion  for  judgment  de- 
nied was  unprecedented  was  no  rea- 
son of  itself  for  denying  the  motion. 
— Stone,  v.  ^Etna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  31  N. 
Y.S.2d  61'5,  ITS  Misc.  23. 

65.    N.Y. — Irvin  Agency  v.  Hess,   26 
N.Y.S.2d    819,    17-6    Misc.    6%  .af- 


firmed   26    N.Y.S<2d    858,    2fcL    App. 

Div.  935. 
Admission  of  defense 

The  rule  that  a  defense  in  defend- 
ant's answer  stands  admitted  where 
plaintiff  does  not  file  a  reply  applies 
as  well  on  a  motion  for  summary 
judgment  as  on  a  trial. — Gliwa  v. 
Washington  Polish  Loan  &  Building 
Ass'n,  34  N.B.2d  7'36,  310  IlLApp. 
465. 

58.    N.Y.— Grossman       'Steel       Stair 
Corp.  v.  -Steinberg,  54  N.Y.S.2d  275. 
Partners 

In  action  against  two  partners, 
.where  only  one  of  them  files  answer 
and  papers  submitted  on  plaintiff's 
motion  for  summary  judgment  do 
not  show  whether  codefendant  was 
served  with  process  and  appeared  or 
answered  motion  will  be  held  in 
abeyance  and  plaintiff  will  be  permit- 
ted to  submit  proof  by  affidavit  as  to 
whether  such  codefendant  was 
served  with  process,  appeared  and 
answered,  and  also  whether  he  is 
entitled  to  benefits  of  Soldiers'  and 
Sailors'  Civil  Relief  Act. — Grossman 
Steel  Stair  Corp.  v.  Steinberg,  supra. 
Defendant  held  within  Jurisdiction 

of  court 

I1L— National  Builders  Bank  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Simons,  31  N.E.2d  269,  307 
IlLApp.  552. 

57.  Wis. — Unmack  v.  McGovern, 
296  N.W.  66,  236  Wis.  639— Fuller 
v.  General  Accident  Fire  &  Life 
Assur.  Corporation,  Limited,  of 
Perth,  "Scotland,  272  N.W.  839,  224 
Wis.  '603. 
First  defective  pleading 

Record  on  motion  for  summary 
judgment  will  be  searched  to  ascer-, 
tain  first  fault  in  pleading  and  con- 
demnation visited  on  first  pleading 
found  defective. 

Trust  Co.  v.  Anthony  Ric- 

407. 


ci  Realty  Co.,   241  N.Y.S.  481,  137 

Misc.  128. 
Wis.— Sullivan    v.    State,    251    N.W. 

251,  213  Wis.  185,  91  A.L.R.  877. 

Demurrer  to  motion  for  judgment 
admitted  truth  of  matters  alleged  in 
motion. — Arkansas  State  Highway 
Commission  v.  Partain,  103  -S.W.2d 
53,  193  Ark.  803. 

58.  U.S.— Mara  v.  XT.  S.,  D.C.N.Y.,  64 
F.2d  397. 

Cal.— Grady  v.  Basley,  114  P.2d  '635, 
45  Cal.App.2d  632. 

59.  111. — Gliwa   v.    Washington    Po- 
lish Loan  &  Building  Ass'n,  34  N. 
B.2d   736,   310    IlLApp.    465. 

Affidavits 

Search  of  record  on  plaintiff's  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment  should 
include  affidavits  supporting  com- 
plaint, which  should  be  dismissed, 
where  such  affidavits  disclose  no 
cause  of  action,  although  demurrer 
would  otherwise  have  to  be  over- 
ruled.—-Sullivan  v.  State,  251  N.W. 
251,  213  Wis.  185,  91  A.L.R.  877. 
Typographical  error 

On  motion  for  summary  judgment, 
a  typographical  error  in  complaint 
may  be  corrected,  and  complaint  will 
be  deemed  corrected  for  purpose  of 
motion. — Schroeder  v.  Columbia  Cas- 
ualty Co.,  21'3  N.Y.-S.  649,  126  Misc. 
205. 
Unlike  judgment  on  pleadings 

While  a  motion  for  suinmary  judg- 
ment, when  properly  supported  by 
required  affidavits,  searches  the  rec- 
ord and  permits  the  court  to  exam- 
ins  the  complaint  to  determine 
whether  it  states  a  cause  of  action, 
such  motion  is  not  the  same  as  a 
motion  for  judgment  on  the  plead- 
ings.— Fuller  v.  General  Accident 
.Fire  &  Life  Assur.  Corporation,  "Lim- 
ited, of  Perth,  Scotland,  272  N.W. 
;  839,  224  Wis.  603. 


222 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


dismissing  the  complaint  on  the  ground  that  there 
was  an  existing  final  judgment  determining  the 
same  cause  of  action  does  not  challenge  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  facts  alleged  in  the  complaint  to  con- 
stitute a  cause  of  action  or  the  truth  of  such  alle- 
gations.60 

The  filing  of  a  motion  for  summary  judgment 
does  not  constitute  the  filing  of  a  motion  for  de- 
fault which  would  preclude  defendant  from  filing 
answer  thereafter,61  but  a  cross  motion  to  amend 
the  answer  will  not  lie  on  a  motion  for  summary 
judgment.62  The  refusal  to  permit  interrogatories 
to  obtain  certain  evidence  in  defense  of  a  motion 
for  summary  judgment  is  not  error  where  such 
evidence  would  not  constitute  a  defense  to  the  ac- 
tion.63 Plaintiffs  motion  for  partial  summary 
judgment  is  not  an  acceptance  of  defendant's  ten- 
der of  part  of  the  amount  claimed  but  is  subject 
to  the  implied  reservation  of  the  right  to  proceed 
with  the  prosecution  of  the  cause  of  action  for  the 
remainder  of  his  claim.64 

Proceedings  by  notice  of  motion.     Under  some 


statutes,  in  lieu  of  an  ordinary  action  at  law,  one 
may  proceed  in  certain  cases  by  way  of  notice  ot 
motion  for  judgment,65  and  under  such  procedure 
the  notice  constitutes  the  writ  and  declaration  in 
the  case  informing  defendant  of  the  demand  on 
which  summary  judgment  will  be  sought  on  a  fu- 
ture day,  as  is  discussed  infra  §  223  b. 

The  proceedings  for  a  summary  judgment  by 
motion  on  notice  are  of  an  informal  nature,66  not 
in  all  respects  governed  by  the  common-law  rules 
of  practice  and  procedure,67  and  are  to  be  construed 
with  liberality.68  Formal  pleadings  usually  are  not 
required;69  but  there  must  be  both  allegation  and 
proof  to  entitle  plaintiff  to  judgment,70  and  the 
allegation  must  precede  the  proof,71  and  what  is 
lacking  in  the  allegations  cannot  be  supplied  by 
evidence.72  An  answer  or  other  pleading  to  the 
motion  is  not  required,73  except  in  cases  where 
pleadings  are  required  by  statute.74  Defendant 
may  either  demur  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  notice,75 
in  which  case  the  demurrer  admits  the  truth  of  all 
the  facts  properly  pleaded  in  the  notice,76  or  he 


60.  N.Y.—  Pagano  v.  Arnstein,  55  N. 
E.2d  181,  292  N.Y.  826. 

61.  Iowa.  —  City    of    Des    Moines    v. 
Barnes,  20  N.W.2d  895. 

62.  N.Y.—  \E3rie    Commercial    Corpo- 
ration   v.    Then,    18    N.Y.'S.2d    569, 
259  APp.Div.  786. 

63.  Mich.—  Dart  Nat.   Bank  v.   Bur- 
ton,  241  N.W.  '85'S,   258  Mich.   283. 

64.  N.T.—  -Fleder  v.  Itkin,  «60  N.E.2d 
753,  294  N.T.  77. 

65.  Va.—  Schreck    v.    Virginia    Hot 
Springs  Co.,   125  «S.B.   316,  140  Va. 
429. 

W.Va.—  Oeorge  A.  Kelley  Qo.  v.  Phil- 
lips, 184  S.E.  469,  102  W.Va.  85. 

66.  Va.  —  Schreck    v.    Virginia    Hot 
Springs  Co.,  125  S.E.   316,  140  Va. 
429—  Bardach  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v. 
Tenenbaum,  118  S.E.   502,   136  Va. 

ro. 

W.Va.  —  Elkhorn  (Sand  &  Supply  Co. 
v.  Algonquin  Coal  Co.,  '136  "S.E.  783, 
10i3  W.Va.  110—  George  A.  Kelley 
Co.  v.  Phillips,  134  S.E.  469,  102 
W.Va.  85. 

34  C.J.  p  202  note  '83. 

67.  W.Va.  —  «Lawhead  v.  Nelson,  168 
S.E.   659,   113  W.Va.   453—  Elkhorn 
Sand  &  Supply  Co.   v.   Algonquin 
Coal  Co.,   1*36   S.E.   783,  103  W.Va. 
1-10. 

68.  Va.—  Warren  v.  Shackelford,  169 
S.E.  737,  160  Va.  671. 

34  C.J.  p  202  note  84. 

69.  W.Va.—  Citizens'    Nat.    Bank   v. 
Dixon,  117  S.E.  685,  94  W.Va.  21. 

<34  C.J.  p  202  note  85. 


A  motion  for  summary  judgment 


serves  office  of  icomplaint. — Harris  v. 
Barber,  186  So.  160,  237  Ala.  138. 

70.  Va.— -Kennedy  v.  Mullins,  154  S. 
E.    568,    155    Va.    166— Mankin    v. 
Aldridge,  105  S.E.  459,  127  Va,  761. 

Common  counts 

The  bare  allegation  of  the  com- 
mon counts  in  assum-psit  in  a  no- 
tice of  motion  for  judgment  was  not 
sufficient  to  warrant  recovery  on  the 
basis  of  fraud,  since  fraud  must  be 
clearly  alleged  and  proved.— Inter- 
Ocean  Casualty  Co.  v.  Leccony 
Smokeless  'Fuel  Co.,  17  S.E.2d  51,  123 
W.Va.  541,  137  A.L.R.  488. 
Note  not  due 

Where,  on  trial  of  motion  for  Judg- 
ment, one  of  two  notes  sued  on  was 
not  due  when  notice  was  filed  in 
clerk's  office  and  suit  thereby  begun, 
reception  in  evidence,  over  objection, 
of  such  immature  demand  consti- 
tutes error. — Charlton  v.  Pancake, 
127  -S.E.  70,  9'8  W.Va.  8«S. 
Writ  of  inquiry 

In  notice  of  motion  for  judgment 
on  bond  with  collateral  conditions, 
writ  of  inquiry  is  necessary  in  case 
of  default  by  defendant — State  v. 
Picklesimer,  138  S.E.  '313,  103  W. 
Va.  '561. 

71.  Va.— Mankin  v.  Aldridge,  105  S. 
E.  459,  127  Va.  761. 

72.  Va. — Mankin  v.  Aldridge,  supra. 
W.Va. — Anderson   v.   Prince,   55   S.E. 

656,  60  W.Va.  557. 

73.  Kan. — Berry   v.    Dewey,    170    P. 
1000,  102  Kan.  392. 

74.  Va. — Saunders    v.    Mecklenburg 
Bank,  71  S.E.  714,  112  Va.  44'3.  Ann. 


Cas.l913B  982— Liskey  v.  Paul,  42 

S.E.  875,  100  Va.  764. 
84  C.J.  20*3  note  90. 
Counter-affidavit 

(1)  Where  plaintiff  has  served  and 
filed    a    proper    affidavit,    defendant 
must  first  file  a  counter-affidavit  and 
plead  before  he  is  entitled  to  cross- 
examine    witnesses    and    offer    evi- 
dence.— Bluefield      Supply      Co.      v. 
Waugh,  145  «S.B.  584,  106  W.Va.  '67. 

(2)  Statute    providing    for    notice 
of    motion    for    judgment     changed 
common-law    rule     permitting     evi- 
dence on  writ  of  inquiry  to  reduce 
plaintiff's     claim. — Bluefleld     Supply 
Co.  v.  (Waugh,  supra. 

75.  Va. — Crosswhite  v.  "Shelby  Oper- 
ating  Corporation,    30    S.E.2d    673, 
182  Va.  713,  153  A.IL.R.  $73. 

'34  C.J.  p  203  note  91. 

Demurrer  rather  than  a  motion  to 
strike  is  proper  to  attack  sufficiency 
of  motion. — Harris  v.  Barber,  1^6  So, 
160,  237  Ala.  138. 

Motion  to  qnash  notice  of  motion 
is  equivalent  of  demurrer  with  re- 
spect to  attacking  defects  in  notice. 
— Kitson  v.  Messenger,  27  S.E.2d  265, 
126  W.Va.  -60. 

Matters  considered 

On  demurrer  to  notice  of  motion 
for  judgment,  bill  of  particulars  and 
exhibits  filed  therewith  and  subse- 
quent stipulation  and  exhibits  are 
not  to  be  considered. — City  of  Beck- 
ley  v.  Craighead,  24  $.E.2d  908,  125 
W.Va,  484. 

76.  U.S. — Artinano  v.  W.  R.   Grace 
&  Co.,  D.C.Va.,  286  P.  702. 


408 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


223 


may  tender  an  issue  by  plea;77  or,  in  the  absence 
of  a  statute  providing  otherwise,  he  may  file  an  in- 
formal statement  in  writing  of  his  grounds  of  de- 
fense.78 Where  the  grounds  of  defense  are  set 
up  in  writing  without  a  formal  pleading,  the  par- 
ties are  generally  deemed  to  be  at  issue  on  the 
grounds  so  stated  without  the  necessity  for  a  rep- 
lication or  other  pleading.79 

Under  the  doctrine  that  defendant  may  plead  as 
many  several  matters  of  law  or  fact  as  he  thinks 
necessary  and  is  not  required  to  file  all  his  pleas  in 
bar  at  the  same  time,  the  filing  of  a  special  plea  is 
not  a  waiver  of  other  grounds  of  defense.80  Where 
defendant  has  appeared,  he  cannot  demur  to  the  no- 
tice on  the  ground  that  it  does  not  appear  therefrom 
at  what  time  the  court  is  to  be  held,  but  his  objec- 
tion, if  available,  must  be  taken  by  plea  in  abate- 
ment.81 There  is,  strictly  speaking,  no  such  plead- 
ing as  a  general  issue  to  a  notice,82  but  the  court 
may  accept  it  as  a  general  denial  of  plaintiffs  claim 
set  up  in  the  notice,  and,  like  other  general  issues, 
it  may  be  pleaded  orally.83 

Supreme  court  commissioners.  Under  some  stat- 
utes supreme  court  commissioners  designated  to 


hear  and  determine  motions  preliminary  to  trial 
have  no  power  to  make  an  order  for  summary  judg- 
ment.84 

§  223.    Notice 

a.  In  general 

b.  Nature  and  sufficiency  of  notice  as  a 

pleading 

a.  In  General 

A  party  against  whom  summary  Judgment  is  sought 
must  be  served  with  timely,  proper,  and  sufficient  no- 
tice of  the  motion,  and  there  must  be  a  compliance  with 
statutory  requirements  as  to  the  service,  return,  and 
docketing  of  the  notice. 

As  a  general  rule,  it  is  essential  to  the  validity  of 
a  judgment  on  motion  that  defendant  be  served  with 
proper  and  sufficient  notice  of  the  motion,  as  re- 
quired by  the  statute  or  court  rule,85  within  the 
time  specified  therein,86  and,  even  where  the  statute 
authorizing  such  a  proceeding  is  silent  as  to  notice, 
defendant  is  entitled  to  a  reasonable  notice;87  but 
the  requirement  of  notice  may  be  waived  by  the 
party  against  whom  judgment  or  order  is  sought88 
The  giving  of  notice  will  not  be  inferred  from  a 


77.  Ala,— Griffin    v.    State    Bank,    6 
Ala.  908. 

Va. — Wh'itley   v.    Booker   Brick  Co., 
74  S.B.  160,  113  Va,  434. 

78.  W.Va.— Collins    v.    White    Oak 
Fuel  Co.,  71  S,E.  277,  «9  W.Va.  292. 

34  C.J.  p  203  note  94. 
Affidavit  of  defense 

Trial  court  erred  in  rendering:  a 
judgment  for  plaintiff  in  a  proceed- 
ing- on  a  notice  of  motion  for  judg- 
ment on  a  note  after  hearing  on  the 
merits  but  without  passing  on  affi- 
davit of  defense,  filed  by  defendants. 
—Bacon  v.  Dettor,  3*3  <S.E.2d  648,  183 
Va,  835. 

79.  Va. — Duncan   v.   Carson,  10»3    S. 
E.  665,  127  Va.  306,  rehearing  de- 
nied -105   8.E.   62,  127  Va.  306. 

80.  Va. — Duncan  v.  Carson,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  20*3  note  97. 

81.  Ala,— Griffin    v.   State    Bank,    6 

Ala.  90s. 

82.  Va. — -Duncan   v.  Carson,   103   S. 
B.  -66-5,  127  Va,  30'6,  rehearing  de- 
nied 105   S.B.   62,   127  Va.  306. 

83.  Va. — Duncan  v.  Carson,  supra. 

84.  N.J.— Milberg  v.  Keuthe,  121  A. 
713,  98  N.J.Law  779— Okin  v.  Rail- 
way  Bxp.    Agency,   Sup.,    44   A.2d 
896 — Rollenhagen  r.  Stevenson,  43 
A.2d    173,    23    N.J.Misc.   219— State 
v.  Owen,  41  A.2d  809,  23  N.J.Mise. 
123 — Township     of     Neptune     v. 
Sweet,  160  A.  209,  10  N.J.Misc.  615 
— Bgan  v.  Hemingway,  159  A.  703, 
10  NU.Misc.  466. 

86.    N.T. — Aronstam      v.      Scientific 


Utilities  Co.,  198  N.T.S.  306,  af- 
firmed 1-99  N.TJ3.  908,  20'6  App.Div. 
657. 

34  C.J.  p  203  note  8. 
UTo'tico  hflM.  sufficient 

Notice  of  motion,  requesting  judg- 
ment on  pleadings,  and  for  such  oth- 
er relief  as  court  may  deem  just, 
brought  plaintiff  within  statute  pro- 
viding for  partial  summary  judgment 
on  motion.— Little  'Falls  Dairy  Co., 
v.  Berghorn,  224  N.T.S.  34,  130  Misc. 
454. 
Who  issues  notice 

Notice  in  motion  proceedings  for 
judgment  emanates  from  plaintiff 
and  does  not  come  within  control  of 
court  until  return  to  clerk  of  court 
— Pereira  v.  Davis  Financial  Agency, 
1<35  -S.B.  823,  14'6  Va.  215. 

88.    N.T.— Wise  v.  Powell,   215  N.T. 

•S.  "69-3,   216  App.Div.   618. 
After  time  for  reply 

Notice  of  motion  to  strike  answer 
and  for  summary  judgment  was  not 
ineffective  because  given  after  ex- 
piration of  time  for  reply. — Charles 
S.  Schultz  &  Son  v.  Klipper,  145  A, 
634,  7  N.J.Misc.  391,  followed  in 
Newell  v.  Klipper,  145  A,  635,  7  N. 
J.Misc.  398. 
Defect  held  nonprejudlcial 

Motion  for  summary  judgment 
would  not  be  denied  for  failure  to 
give  notice  within  prescribed  time 
where  motion  was  argued  on  merits 
and  defendants  were  not  prejudiced, 
having  submitted  complete  set  of 
affidavits  in  objection  to  motion.— 

409 


Le  'Fevre  v.   Reliable  Paint   Supply 
Co.,  273  N.T.S.  903,  152  Misc.  594. 
Particular  requfrcmieatg 

Any  person  entitled  to  recover 
money  by  action  on  contract  may  ob- 
tain judgment  by  motion  in  a  court 
having  jurisdiction,  after  having 
given  his  debtor  notice  in  writing 
of  such  motion  for  at  least  twenty 
days  of  the  time  and  court  in  which 
the  motion  will  be  made,  which  no- 
tice shall  be  returned  to  the  clerk's 
office  of  such  court  at  least  fifteen 
days  before  the  time  such  motion  is 
heard. — Citizens'  Nat  Bank  v.  Dixon, 
117  S.-E.  685,  94  W.Va.  21. 

87.  Ala. — Brown  v.  "Wheeler,  3  Ala. 
287. 

Tenn. — -Williamson  v.  Burge,  7  Heisk. 
117. 

88.  Ark. — Brickell  v.  Guaranty  Loan 
&   Trust  Co.,   93    S.W.2d   656,    192 
Ark.  6*52. 

JTo  prejudice 

The  entering  of  plaintiff's  motion 
for  summary  judgment  was  not  er- 
ror, notwithstanding  notice  of  plain- 
tiffs motion  did  not  cover  a  motion 
for  summary  judgment,  where  de- 
fendants were  in  court  in  response 
to  the  notice  and  had  been  permit- 
ted to  and  did  file  an  original  and 
amended  affidavit  of  defense,  and 
there  was  no  prejudice  to  defend- 
ants, and  the  trial  court  had  before 
it  the  several  sworn  pleadings  of  the 
parties  and  .the  parties  themselves.— 
Smith  v.  Karasek,  40  2SMB.2d  -594,  -31<3 
IlLApp.  '654. 


§223 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


statement  on  the  record  that  the  parties  came  by 
their  attorneys.89 

As  to  place  and  time  of  motion.  The  notice  must 
allege  the  place  where,90  and  the  time  when,91  the 
motion  will  be  made.  It  has  been  held  to  be  suffi- 
cient if  it  states  that  a  judgment  will  be  moved  for 
at  a  specified  term  of  the  court;92  and  it  need  not 
designate  the  day  on  which  the  motion  will  be 
made93  unless  the  statute  requires  that  it  must  sum- 
mon the  party  on  whom  it  is  served  to  a  fixed  and 
certain  day.94  The  notice  need  not  be  dated,95  un- 
less the  date  is  made  material  by  a  reference  to  it 
as  indicating  the  time  when  the  motion  will  be 
made,  or  unless  it  is  material  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  the  time  when  the  court  is  to  be  held,  such 
time  not  otherwise  appearing.96 

Service,  return,  and  docketing.  There  must  be  a 
compliance  with  statutory  requirements  as  to  the 
service,97  return,9*  and  docketing99  of  the  notice. 
It  must  be  served  on  defendant  the  prescribed  peri- 


od before  the  day  on  which  the  motion  is  to  be 
made,1  although  an  error  in  this  respect  may  be 
waived  by  defendant's  appearing  and  consenting  to 
the  trial  without  objection.2  If  the  notice  is  served 
prematurely,  it  is  subject  to  a  plea  in  abatement.3 

b.  Nature  and  Sufficiency  of  Notice  as  a  Plead- 
ing 

In  special  proceedings  for  judgment  instituted  by 
notice  of  motion,  the  notice  serves  the  purpose  of  a 
writ  and  declaration  and  must  state  with  reasonable 
certainty  sufficient  facts  to  show  a  good  caus.e  of  action 
against  the  defendant,  and  if  the  notice  is  uncertain 
the  plaintiff  may  be  required  to  file  a  bill  of  particulars. 

The  statutes  of  some  states,  as  discussed  supra  § 
222,  authorize  special  proceedings  for  judgment  in- 
stituted by  notice  of  the  proposed  motion.  In  such 
proceedings,  notice  of  the  motion  serves  the  pur- 
pose both  of  a  writ  and  a  declaration.4  It  there- 
fore must  allege  facts  which  are  necessary  to  show 
jurisdiction  ;5  and,  although  it  need  not  set  out,  in 


89.  Ala. — Brown  v.  Wheeler,  "3  Ala, 
287. 

90.  Tenn. — Curry     v.      Munford,      5 
Heisk.  61. 

91*    Tenn. — Curry  v.  Munford,  supra, 
Special  term 

Notice  of  motion  for  judgment 
may  be  made  returnable  to,  and 
heard  at,  special  term,  if  properly 
matured. — Monongahela  Bank  of 
Fairmont  v.  Watson,  150  S.E.  731,  108 
W.Va.  250. 

92.  Tenn. — State  v.  Allison,  8  Heisk. 
1. 

34  C.J.  p  204  note  26. 

93.  Tenn. — State  v.  Allison,  supra. 

94.  Va.— Tench  v.  Gray,  4'6  S.E.  287 
102  Va.  215. 

96.    Ala.— Griffin    v.    State    Bank,    6 
Ala.  903. 

96.  Ala. — Griffin  v.  State  Bank,  su- 
pra. 

97.  Ark.— -Milor  v.  Farrelly,  25  Ark. 
363. 

Va.— Kain  v.  Ashworth,  «89  S.B.  857, 

119  Va.  605. 
Amended  notice 

Service  of  an  amended  notice  of 
motion  for  judgment,  not  Involving 
new  parties,  is  not  required,  when 
the  amendment  is  made  in  term, 
and  "by  leave  of  court — Morrison  v. 
Judy,  13  S.EL2d  751,  123  W.Va.  200. 
Service  "by  marshal 

On  notice  of  motion  for  judgment, 
under  practice  in  some  jurisdictions, 
it  is  not  necessary  that  writ  or  oth- 
er process  be  served  by  marshal  to 
"bring  defendants  into  court — Chis- 
holm  v.  Gilxfaer,  C.C.A.Va.,  81  'P.2d 
120,  affirmed  57  S.Ct  «65,  2-99  -XT-fl.  99, 
81  L.Bd.  63,  rehearing  denied  57  S. 
Ct  229,  29*9  U.S.  6213,  81  L.Ed,  458. 


98*    Va.— Brame   v.    Nolen,    124   S.E. 

299,  139  Va.  41*3. 
34  C.J.  p  204  note  -34. 

Clerk's  certificate,  indorsed  on  no- 
tice of  motion  for  judgment  as  to 
when  notice  was  returned  and  filed, 
is  an  official  record  which  imports 
verity. — Brame  v.  Nolen,  supra. 

In  computing'  time  in  which  no- 
tice of  motion  for  judgment  must  be 
returned  to  clerk's  office,  the  day  of 
service  but  not  the  date  of  return 
is  to  be  counted. — Brame  v.  Nolen, 
supra. 
Notice  returnable  after  adjournment 

Under  statute,  fact  that  notice  of 
motion  for  judgment  was  made  re- 
turnable after  final  adjournment  of 
term  did  not  justify  dismissal  and 
refusal  to  reinstate  cause  of  action. 
— Warren  v.  Shackelford,  169  S.E. 
737,  160  Va,  671. 

99.     Va. — Brame    v.    Nolen,    124    S.E. 

299,  139  Va.  413. 
W.Va.— Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dixon, 

117  S.E.  685,  94  W.Va.  21. 
34  C.J.  p  204  note  35. 
Time  of  filing 

The  notice  of  motion  for  judgment, 
with  the  return  of  service  thereon, 
necessary  in  a  procedure  to  recover 
money  due  on  contract  by  motion, 
may  be  filed  in  the  clerk's  office  at 
any  time  before  the  commencement 
of  the  term  at  which  the  motion  is 
to  be  heard,  sufficient  to  enable  the 
clerk  to  docket  for  trial. — Citizens' 
Nat  Bank  v.  Dixon,  supra. 

L,    Va.— Tench  v.  Gray,  '4'6  S.B.  287, 

102  Va.  215. 
34  C.J.  p  204  note  36. 

2.    Ky.— Millett  v.  Millett,  3  Ky.Op. 
431. 

410 


3.  U.S.— Schofield  v.  Palmer,  C.C.Va., 
134  F.  753. 

34  C.J.  p  204  note  38. 

4.  W.Va. — Myers  v.  Myers,   35  S.E. 
2d  847 — Kitson  v.  Messenger,  27  S. 
B.2d   265,   126   W.Va.    60— Citizens' 
Nat  Bank  v.  Dixon,  117  S.E.  6*85, 
•94  W.Va.  21. 

34  C.J.  P  203  note  6. 
Notice  performs  functions  of  a  sum- 
mons 
Ark. — Brickell   v.   Guaranty  Loan  & 

Trust  Co.,  93  S.W.2d  656,  192  Ark. 

652. 
Liberal  construction 

Notices  of  motions  for  judgment 
must  be  viewed  as  pleadings  with 
great  liberality,  and  the  same  strict- 
ness as  in  formal  pleadings  is  not 
required. 
Va. — Bardach  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v. 

Charleston  Port  Terminals,  129  S. 

B.    687,    143    Va.    6-56— Shreck    v. 

Virginia  Hot  Springs  Co.,  125  S.E. 

316,  140  Va.  429. 
W.Va. — Mountain    State    Water    Co. 

v.    Town   of    Kingwood,    1    S.B.2d 

395,  121  W.Va.  66. 

5.  U.S. — West    Fork    Glass    Co.    v. 
Innes-Weld  Glass   Co.,   W.Va.,   175 
P.  20'5,  101  C.C.'A.  525. 

Va. — City   of  Richmond  v.  Best   23 

S.B.2d  224,  180  Va.  429. 
Cause  THwed  on  contract 

Recovery  on  notice  of  motion  for 
judgment  is  confined  to  recovery 
based  on  contract,  and  it  is  neces- 
sary that  essential  elements  show- 
ing money  due  on  contract  as  dis- 
tinguished from  damages  for  breach 
be  alleged  notwithstanding  no  for- 
mality of  pleading  is  exacted. — City 
of  Beckley  v.  Craighead,  24  S.E.2d 
908,  125  W.Va.  484. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


223 


haec  verba,  the  contract  or  instrument  relied  on,6 
it  must  state  with  reasonable  certainty7  sufficient 
facts  to  show  a  good  cause  of  action  against  de- 
fendant,8 and  fairly  apprise  him  of  the  nature  of 
the  demand  made  on  him,9  and  to  enable  the  court 
to  say  that,  if  the  facts  stated  are  proved,  plaintiff 
is  entitled  to  recover;10  and  it  must  indicate  with 
reasonable  certainty  that  the  obligation  which  it  is 
proposed  to  reduce  to  judgment  is  that  of  defend- 
ant.11 It  is  not  necessary  to  have  separate  counts 
in  the  notice,12  and  the  case  may  be  stated  in  a 
composite  form;18  and,  while  the  notice  is  insuffi- 
cient if  it  states  too  little,14  any  excess  therein  may 
as  a  general  rule  be  treated  as  surplusage.1^ 
Bitt  of  particulars.  Under  some  statutes,  if  the 


notice  is  uncertain  as  to  the  facts  constituting  the 
cause  of  action,  the  court,  on  demand  of  defend- 
ant, should  require  plaintiff  to  file  a  bill  of  partic- 
ulars.16 If  the  bill  of  particulars  is  insufficient,  de- 
fendant may  move  to  reject  any  evidence  offered  by 
plaintiff  touching  any  matters  not  described  in  the 
notice  or  other  pleading  so  plainly  as  to  give  notice 
of  its  character.17  Bills  of  particulars  filed  by 
plaintiff  following  his  original  notices  are  no  part 
of  the  original  or  amended  notices  and  are  not  to 
be  considered  in  determining  their  sufficiency.18 

Amendment.  The  court  may  permit  the  notice  to 
be  amended  during  the  proceedings,  where  defend- 
ant is  not  thereby  taken  by  surprise.1* 


6.  va, — Foltz  v.  Conrad  Realty  Co., 
109  SJB.  463,  131  Va,  496. 

Filing-  of  policy  sued  on 

Where  plaintiff  in  action  on  fire 
policy  proceeded  by  notice  of  mo- 
tion, it  was  proper  to  file  with  notice 
the  original  policy  sued  on. — Skid- 
more  v.  Star  Ins.  Co.  of  America,  27 
S.E.2d  845,  126  W.Va,  307. 

7.  W.Va. — Tuggle  v.  Belcher,  139  S. 
E.     653,    104    W.Va.    178— Hall    T. 
Harrisville    Southern   R.    Co.,    137 
S.B.  226,  103  W.Va.  287— Pelley  v. 
Hibner,  118  S.E.  923,  93  W.Va.  169 
—Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dixon,  117 
S.B.  685,  94  W.Va.  21. 

34  CjJ.  p  203  note  9. 

8.  W.Va.— Mountain     State     Water 
Co.  v.  Town  of  Kingwood,  1  S.EL2d 
39"5,   121   W.Va.    66— -Citizens'   Nat. 
Bank  v.  Dixon,  117  S.B.  685,  94  W. 
Va,  21. 

34  C.J.  p  203  note  10. 
ZTottoes  held  sufficient 

(1)  Notjce  is  sufficient  if  it  is  such 
that    defendant     cannot    reasonably 
mistake   the   cause  of  action  stated 
therein.— Walton  v.  Light,  26  S.E.2d 
29,  181  Va.  609. 

(2)  Notice  is  sufficient  if  it  clearly 
informs    defendant    of    nature    and 
object  of  plaintiff's  claim.— Lawhead 
v.   Nelson,    168   S.E.    659,   113  W.Va. 
4'53— Blkhorn  Sand  &  Supply  Co.  v. 
Algonquin    Coal    Co.,    136    S.E.    783, 
103    W.Va.    110 — George    A.    Kelley 
Co.  v.  Phillips,  134  S.E.  469,  102  W. 
Va,  85. 

(3)  Notice     indicating    -obligation, 
demand,    or  account  on  which  it  Is 
based  with  reasonable  certainty,  and 
that  it  is  owing  plaintiff  by  defend- 
ant, is  sufficient.— Tuggle  v.  Belcher, 
139  S.E.  653,  104  W.Va.  178.      ' 

(4)  Where    notice    of    motion    for 
Judgment  is  accompanied  by  state- 
ment of  account  made  part  thereof 
items  designated  "To  Mdse."  are  suf- 
ficient, without  naming  each  particu- 
lar article  making  up  items  listed.— 
George  A.  Kelley  Co.  v.  Phillips,  134 
S.E.  469,  102  W.Va.  85. 


(5)*  Notice  setting  out  note  in  full, 
accompanied  by  account  and  affidavit 
showing  exact  amount  due  at  time 
thereof,  satisfies  statute,  although 
exact  amount  for  which  judgment 
will  be  asked  is  not  specified.— Fink 

Scott.  14-3  S.E.  305,  10-5  W.Va.  523. 

(6)  If  nonpayment  of  note  is  aver- 
red in  affidavit,  failure  to  allege  non- 
payment   in    notice    of    motion    for 

udgment  is  not  material. — People's 
State  Bank  of  Crown  Point,  Ind.. 
v.  Jeffries,  129  S.E.  462,  99  W.Va. 
399. 

(7)  Allegations     in     notice     that 
plaintiff  was  the  duly  appointed  re- 
ceiver of  a  named  bank  which  had 
acquired  note  sued  on  in  due  course 
and  that  the  note  was  an  asset  of 
the  said  bank  were  sufficient  allega- 
tions as  to  ownership  of  the  note. — 
Odland   v.  Hamrick,  W.Va.,  .32   S.E. 
2d  629. 

(8)  Other  cases. 

Va, — Walton  v.  Light,  26  S.E.2d  29, 
181  Va.  609— Aistrop  v.  Blue  Dia- 
mond Coal  Co.,  24  S.E.2d  546,  181 
Va,  287 — Kaylor  v.  Quality  Bread 
&  Cake  Co.,  15'4  S.E.  572,  155  Va, 
156— Kennedy  v.  Mullins,  154  S.E. 
568,  155  Va,  166— Bardach  Iron  & 
Steel  Co.  v.  Charleston  Port  Ter- 
minals, 129  8.B.  -687,  143  Va,  656— 
Shreck  v.  Virginia  Hot  Springs  C<>~, 
125  S.E.  316,  140  Va,  429— Wessel 
v.  Bargamin,  120  SJE.  287,  137  Va, 
701. 

TTV.Va,— Lawhead  v.  Garlow,  171  S.E. 
250,  114  W.Va,  175— Hall  v.  Harrls- 
ville  Southern  R.  Co.,  137  S.E.  226, 
103  W.Va,  287 — Elkhorn  Sand  & 
Supply  Co.  v.  Algonquin  Coal  Co., 
136  S.E.  783,  103  W.Va.  110— 
Charleston  v.  Pancake,  T27  S.E 
70,  a8  W.Va,  363. 

34  CJ.  p  203  note  10  [a]. 

Notices  held  insufficient 

Va. — Alpaugh  v.  Wolverton,  36  S.E 
2d  906,  184  Va.  943 — Costello  v 
Larsen,  29  S.E.2d  856,  182  Va.  557 

W.Va, — City  of  Beckley  v.  Craighead, 
24  S.E.2d  908,  125  W.Va,  '484— 
Mountain  State  Water  Co. 

411 


Town  of  Kingwood,  1  S.E.2d  395, 
121  W.Va,  6-6— Bringardner  v.  Rol- 
lins, 135  S.E.  665,  102  W.Va.  584. 

i4  C.J.  p  203  note  10  [b]. 

>.  Va,— Kennedy  v.  Mullins,  154  S. 
E.  568,  1V5  Va,  166— Wessel  v. 
Bargamin,  120  S.E.  287,  137  Va, 
701— Bardach  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v. 
Tenenbaum,  118  SJB.  502,  136  Va. 
163. 

W.Va.— Pelley  v.  Hibner,  118  S.E. 
923,  93  W.Va,  169 — Citizens'  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Dixon,  117  S.E.  685,  94  W. 
Va.  21. 

34  C.J.  p  203  note  11. 

10.  Va.— Mankin  v.  Aldridge,  105  S. 
E.  459,  127  Va,  761. 

11.  W.Va, — Citizens'    Nat.    Bank    v. 
Dixon,  117  S.E.  685.  94  W.Va,  21— 
Anderson   v.   Prince,    55    S.E.   «56, 
60  W.Va,  5'57. 

Parties  to  note 

In  notice  of  motion  for  judgment 
on  note,  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege 
affirmatively  parties  thereto,  when 
these  facts  appear  with  reasonable 
certainty  from  entire  notice. — Peo- 
ple's State  Bank  of  Crown  Point, 
Ind.,  v.  Jeffries,  129  S.E.  462,  99  W. 
Va,  399. 

12.  Va,— Hines    v.    Beard,    107    S.E. 
717,  130  Va,  286. 

13.  Va;— Hines   v.  Beard,  supra, 

14.  Va.— Hines  v.  Beard,  supra, 

15.  W.Va, — Anderson  v.   Prince,    55 
S.E.  ff56,  60  W.Va,  557. 

34  C.J.  p  204  note  17. 

16.  Va, — Piccolo  v.  Woodford,  35  S. 
B.2d  393,  184  Va,  432— Schreck  v. 
Virginia  Hot  Springs   Co.,  125   S. 
E.  316,  140  V  a.  429 — Wessel  v.  Bar- 
gamin, 120   S.E.   287,    137  Va.   701. 

34  C.J.  p  204  note  20. 

17.  Va,— Lehigh    Portland     Cement 
Co.   v.   Virginia  SS.   Co.,  Ill   S.E. 
104,  132  Va,  257. 

18.  va.— Rinehart  v.  Pirkey,  101  S. 
E.  353,  126  Va,  346. 

19.  Va.— Ropp  v.   Stevens,  154  SJE 
553,  1S5  Va,  304. 

( W.Va.— Elkhorn  Sand  &  Supply  Co. 


§  224 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  224.    Motion 

A  motion  for  summary  Judgment  must  be  made  by 
proper  application  to  the  court  and  should  be  proceeded 
with  within  the  proper  time. 

Under  the  practice  prevailing  in  some  states,  a 
motion  for  summary  judgment  generally  must  be 
made  by  application  to  the  court  for  such  relief,20 
but  formal  requirements  have  been  dispensed  with 
in  some  cases,21  and  motions  not  expressly  seeking 
summary  judgment  or  referring  to  the  court  rule 
providing  .therefor  have  sometimes  been  treated  as 
motions  for  summary  judgment  where  it  otherwise 
appeared  that  such  was  the  intent  of  the  moving 
party.22  Under  some  statutes  or  court  rules,  on  a 
motion  for  summary  judgment  by  one  party,  the 
court  may  award  judgment  to  the  other  party  if  he 
is  entitled  thereto  notwithstanding  such  other  party 
has  not  made  a  cross  motion  therefor.2^  A  mo- 


tion to  strike  the  motion  for  summary  judgment  has 
been  held  proper  procedure  to  test  its  sufficiency.24 

As  a  general  rule,  a  motion  for  judgment  must  be 
made  and  proceeded  with  within  the  proper  time,25 
and  under  some  statutes  or  court  rules  such  a  mo- 
tion may  be  entertained  only  after  answer  is  filed2* 
and  issue  is  joined,27  although  it  may  be  pursued 
at  any  subsequent  stage  of  the  litigation.2^  In  pro- 
ceedings instituted  by  notice  of  motion  for  judg- 
ment, if  the  motion  is  not  proceeded  with  at  the 
term  to  which  the  notice  is  returnable,29  or  on  the 
day  specified  in  the  notice,30  it  operates  as  a  dis- 
continuance, and  the  case  cannot  be  taken  up  subse- 
quently, and  judgment  entered,  on  the  same  motion, 
unless  defendant  waives  the  objection  by  appearing 
personally  and  failing  to  object  at  the  proper  time,81 
or  by  himself  calling  up  the  motion.32  However, 
discontinuance  of  the  proceeding  by  reason  of  fail- 


v.    Algonquin   Coal    Co.,    136    S.E. 
783, 103  W.Va.  110. 
34  C.J.  p  204  note  23. 

20.    N.Y. — Sheepshead    Bay    Bunga- 
low Corporation  v.  Mandel  &  Co. 
279  N.Y.S.  556,  244  App.Div.  811— 
Glove    City    lAmusement    Co.    v. 
Smalley  Chain  Theatres,  4  N.Y.S. 
2d  3'97,  167  Misc.  603. 
A  motion  to  dismiss  ease  as  moot 
could  not  be  treated  as  a  motion  for 
summary  Judgment  as  the  latter  in- 
volves a  determination  of  existence 
of  a  cause  of  action  and  virtue  of 
claimed    defenses,    and    practice    of 
dismissing    actions    when    questions 
have  become  moot  does  not  arise  out 
of  statute  relating  to  summary  judg- 
ment.— Duel  v.  State  Farm  Mut  Au- 
tomobile   Ins.    Co.,     9    N.W.2d    593, 
243  Wis.  172. 

Use  of  affidavits  is  not  permitted 
under  rules  providing  for  judgment 
on  the  pleadings,  for  striking  out  of 
a  pleading  as  sham,  or  for  dismissal 
of  counterclaim  or  striking  out  of 
defense  consisting  of  new  matter  in 
certain  cases  an.d  a  motion  based 
thereon  and  on  other  rules  concern- 
ing summary  judgments  permitting 
affidavits  will  be  treated  as  motion 
under  such  other  rules. — Henderson 
v.  Hildreth  Varnish  Co.,  276  N.Y.S. 
414. 

21.  N.T. — Simson  v.  Bugman,  45  N. 
Y.S.2d  140. 

Oral  application  was  sufficient  as 
"motion  for  judgment,"  filing  of  for- 
mal motion  being  unnecessary. — 
Baldwin  v,  Anderson,  13  P.2d  650, 
'52  Idaho  243. 

22.  U.S. — Larson  v.  Todd  Shipyards 
Corporation,    D.C.N.Y.,   16   F.Supp. 
967. 

Motion  for  Judgment  on  pleadings 

(1)  Motion  ostensibly  for  judg- 
ment on  pleadings  would  be  treated 


as  motion  for  summary  judgment 
where  letter  was  annexed  to  motion 
papers  and  additional  agreed  facts 
were  stated  in  argument — Mara  v. 
U.  S.,  D.C.N.Y.,  '54  F.2d  897. 

02)  Fact  that  affidavits  were  used 
on  motion  for  judgment  was  held  to 
show  that  it  was  for  summary  judg- 
ment, and  not  for  judgment  on  plead- 
ings.—Donelly  v.  Bauder,  216  N.Y.S. 
437,  217  App.Div.  59. 
Motion  for  dismissal 

Where  plaintiff  moved  for  sum- 
mary judgment,  defendant's  moving 
affidavit  asking  for  dismissal  of  com- 
plaint was  properly  treated  as  cross 
motion  for  summary  judgment — 
Goldarbelter  v.  Cunard  White  Star 
Limited,  27  N.Y.S.2d  920. 

23.  N.Y.— • Board    of    Education    of 
Union    Free    School    Dist.    No.    8, 
Town  of  Huntington,  Suffolk  Coun- 
ty, to  Use  and  Benefit  of  Stickley 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  American  Bonding  Co. 
of  Baltimore,  30  N.Y.S.2d  428,  177 
Misc.  341,  affirmed  29  N.Y.S.2d  492, 
177  Misc.  343. 

24.  111.— -Wainscott    v.    Penikoff,    4 
N.E.2d   511,  -287  IlLApp.   78. 

Forcible  detainer  action 

Affidavit  for  summary  judgment  in 
forcible  detainer  action  to  which  was 
attached  plaintiffs  lease  to  prem- 
ises would  not  be  struck  for  failure 
to  state  that  attached  lease  was 
sworn  or  certified  copy  of  lease  on 
which  plaintiff  relied;  motion  to 
strike  admitted  that  plaintiff  was 
.essee  of  premises  for  term  covering 
time  when  plaintiff  demanded  posses- 
sion of  premises. — Wainscott  v;  Peni- 
koff, supra. 

85.  N.Y. — Sheepshead  Bay  Bungalow 
Corporation  v.  Mandel  &  Co.,  279 
N.Y.S,  556,  244  iApp.Div.  811. 

14  C.J.  p  204  notes  40,  41. 

412 


Intervention 

A  motion  for  summary  Judgment 
by  one  prior  to  granting  of  his  peti- 
tion of  intervention  in  the  case  is 
premature,  but  the  court  will  con- 
sider the  motion  where  it  intends  to 
permit  the  intervention.— Stern  v. 
Newton,  39  N.Y.S.2d  "593,  180  Misc. 
241. 

28,  Cal.— Loveland  v.  City  of  Oak- 
land, 159  P.2d  70,  69  CaLApp.2d 
.399. 

. — Bobrose  Developments  v.  Ja- 
cobson,  2-96  N.Y.S.  $20,  251  App. 
Div.  8-25. 

27.  N.Y. — Sheepshead    Bay    Bunga- 
low Corporation  v.  Mandel  &  Co., 
279   N.Y.S.    556,    244  App.Div.    811. 

Papers  not  yet  in  case 

Defendant's  motion  for  summary 
judgment  on  papers  including  plea 
not  yet  in  case  was  premature. — Ap- 
person  Realty  Corporation  v.  Wolos- 
ky,  279  N.Y.S.  688,  156  IMisc.  29. 

28.  N.Y.— Ecker  v.  Muzysh,  19  N.Y. 

S.2d    2-50,    2*59    App.Div.    20'6. 

Fact  that  plaintiff  proceeded  to- 
trial  did  not  preclude  him  from 
thereafter  moving  for  summary 
judgment — Ecker  v.  Muzysh,  supra. 

29.  Ark. — Webb   v.    Brown,    3    Ark. 
488. 

34  C.J.  p  204  note  '42. 

30.  Ala. — Barclay    v.     Barclay,     42 
Ala.  345. 

34  C.J.  p  204  note  43. 

31*    Ala. — Evans   v.  'State  Bank,   13 

Ala,  787. 
Miss.— Phillips   v.   Chaney,    8    Miss. 

250. 

32.  Ala.— Gary  v.  State  Bank,  11 
Ala.  771, 


C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  225 


ure  to  obtain  an  order  of  continuance  may  be  pre- 
vented by  the  provisions  of  statute.83 

§  225.    Affidavits  and  Other  Evidence 

a.  In  general 

b.  In  support  of  motion 

c.  In  opposition  to  motion 

d.  Applications  of  rules 

a.  In  General 

The  function  of  affidavits  on  a  motion  for  summary 
judgment  Is  to  show  whether  the  issues  are  genuine  and 
require  a  trial.  They  should  contain  evidentiary  facts, 
not  conclusions  or  mere  general  averments;  and  they 
must  be  made  by  affiants  having  personal  knowledge  of 
the  facts  and  competent  to  testify  thereto. 


The  affidavits  on  a  motion  for  summary  judg- 
ment do  not  constitute  a  second  set  of  pleadings  in 
the  action,34  the  purpose  of  the  affidavits  being  only 
to  show  whether  or  not  the  issues  apparently  made 
by  the  formal  pleadings  are  genuine  and  require  a 
trial,  and  whether  or  not  each  party  has  competent 
evidence  to  offer  which  tends  to  support  his  side  of 
the  issue.35  Summary  judgment  statutes  are  not 
intended  to  authorize  the  trial  of  contested  issues  on 
affidavits,36  and  hence  summary  judgment  cannot 
be  granted,  on  motion  of  either  plaintiff  or  defend- 
ant, where  the  affidavits  or  other  proofs  submitted 
set  forth  facts  showing  that  there  is  a  triable  issue 
of  fact.37  Where  court  rules  relating  to  the  affi- 
davits in  support  of,  or  in  opposition  to,  a  motion 


33.  W.Va.— Odland   v.   Hamrick,   32 
S.B.2d  629. 

34.  Cal.— Loveland  v.  City  of  Oak- 
land,   159    P.2d    70,    69    Cal.App.2d 
399— Gardenswartz     v.     Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.f  68  P.2d 
322,   23   Cal.App.2d  Supp.  745. 

35.  Cal.— Loveland  v.  City  of  Oak- 
land,   1'59    P:2d   70,    69    Cal.App.2d 
399— Gardenswartz     v.     Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  68  P.2d 
322,  23  Cal.App.2d  Supp.  745: 

111— Otis  Elevator  Co.  v.  American 
Surety  Co.  of  New  York,  4'1  N.E.2d 
987,  314  Ill.App.  479. 
"Th.e   function  of  affidavits   upon 
a  motion  for  summary  judgment  is 
to  show  quickly  and  summarily  what 
the  parties  can  prove  at  a  long  tri- 
al."— Rosenblum  v.  Dingfelder,   C.C. 
A.N.Y.,  111  F.2d  '406,  408. 

36.  Colo.— Hatfleld  v.  Barnes,  168  P. 
2d  552. 

B.C.— Morse  v.  U.  S.,  to  Use  of  Hine, 

29  App.D.C.  433. 

Mass. — Norwood  Morris  Plan  Co.  v. 
McCarthy,  4  N.E.2d  450,  295  Mass. 
597,  107  A.L.R.  1215. 
N.Y. — Berson  Sydeman  Co.  v.  Waum- 
beck  Mfg.  Co,,  '208  N.Y.S.  716,  212 
App.Div.  422. 

•Wis. — Parish  v.  Awschu  Properties 
19   N.W.2d  276,  247  Wis.  166— At- 
las  Inv.   Co.    v.   Christ,    2   N.W.2d 
714,  240  Wis,  114— Prime  Mfg.  Co 
v.  A.  F.   Gallun  &  Sons  Corpora- 
tion,  281   N.W.   697,  229  Wis.   348 
"Conflicts  of  testimony  which  are 
not  patently  a  sham  cannot  be  dis 
posed    of    summarily."— Hoff   v.    St 
Paul-Mercury   Indemnity   Co.   of  St 
Paul,    C.C.A.N.Y.,    74    F.2d    689,    690 


The  credibility  of  affiants  will  no 
be  determined  on  a  motion  for  sum 
mary  judgment. 
Mass.— Norwood  Morris  Plan  Co. 

McCarthy,  4  N.E.2d  450,  ^S  Mass 

597,  107  IA.L.R.  1215. 
N.Y.— Roxy    Athletic    Club   v.    Sim 

mons,    44  N.Y.S.2d  47— First  Nat 

Bank  of  Dolgeville,  N.  X,  v.  Mang 

41  N.Y.S.2d  92. 


Analogy  to  questions  for  jury 
CD  A  summary  judgment  may  not 
e   entered   where,   if   evidence  con- 
ained  in  affidavits  was  orally  sub- 
mitted to  the  court,  there  would  be 
omething  left  to   go   to  the  jury; 
ut  summary  judgment  should  be  en- 
ered  if  what  is  contained  in  the  af- 
davits   would   have   constituted  all 
vidence  before  the   court,   and,   on 
uch  evidence,  there  would  be  noth- 
ng  left  to  go  to  the  jury.— Shirley  v. 
Ellis  Drier  Co.,   39   N.E.2d  329,   379 
11.  105. 

(2)  "If  the  pleadings  taking  them 
«,d  they  stand  make  a  case  for  trial 
by  a  jury,  a  summary  judgment  will 
be  denied  unless  it  appears  from  the 
affidavits  that  different  conclusions 
of  essential  ultimate  fact  can  not 
reasonably  be  drawn." — Hanson  v. 
Halvorson,  19  N.W.2d  582,  883,  247 
Wis.  434. 

37.  Cal.— Hardy  v.  Hardy,  143  P.2d 
701,'  23  Cal.2d  2-44— Eagle  Oil  & 
Refining  Co.  v.  Prentice,  122  P.2d 
264,  19  CaUd  553— Gibson  v.  De  La 
Salle  Institute,  152  P.2d  774,  66 
Cal.App.2d  609— Grady  v.  Easley, 
114  P.2d  635,  45  Cal.App.2d  632. 

111. — Roberts  v.  Sauerman  Bros.,  20 
N.E.2d  849,  300  IlLApp.  213. 

Mich.— Maser  v.  Gibbons,  274  N.W. 
352,  280  Mich.  621— Lippman  v 
Hunt,  227  N.W.  668,  249  Mich.  86 

N.Y.— Ross  Industries  Corporation  v 
Bentley,  51  N.Y.S.2d  183,  268 
App.Div.  897— Grunder  v.  Schwab 
46  N.Y.S.2d  715,  267  App.Div.  887 
appeal  denied  48  N.Y.S.2d  330,  267 
App.Div.  946— Kelly  v.  Rathburn 
38  N.Y.S.2d  391,  265  App.Div.  .88 
— Malone  v.  Kahnert,  37  N.Y.S.2 
•50»5,  265  App-Div.  832— Merlau  v 
Dermetlcs  Co.,  35  N.Y.S.2d  76 
264  App.Div.  829— Strauss  v.  G.  H. 
Mumra  Champagne  &  Associates 
30  N.Y.S.2d  117,  262  App.Div.  97 
—Gross  v.  Continental  Caoutchouc 
Export  Aktien-Gesellschaft,  Con 
tinental  Rubber  Export  Corpora 
tion,  28  N.Y.S.2d  434,  262  App.Div 
866 — Biloz  v.  Tioga  County  Pa 


trons*  Fire  Relief  Ass'n,  23  N.Y.S. 
2d  460,  260  AppJDiv.  976— Lloyd  v. 
Sloan,  «19  N.Y.S.2d  842,  259  App. 
Div.  615— Airflow  Taxi  Corporation 
v.  C.  I.  T.  Corporation,  1'5  N.Y.S.2d 
9CT5,  258  App.Div.  857,  reargument 
denied  17  N.Y.S.2d  1002,  258  App. 
Div.  1030— Newman  v.  Newman,  11 
N.Y.S.2d  153,  -256  App.Div.  605,  re- 
argument  denied  12  N.Y.S.2d  352, 
2*56  App.Div.  1067 — Adams  v.  Jud- 
son,  277  N.Y.S.  304,  243  App.Div. 
404— Silberman  v.  Feinstein,  214 
N.Y.S.  920,  216  App.Div.  727— Katz 
v.  Film  Metal  Box  Corporation,  47 
N.Y.S.2d  4-54,  181  Misc.  812— La- 
mere  v.  Franklin,  267  N.Y.S.  310, 
149  Misc.  371— Sark  Co.  v.  Display 
Finishing  Co.,  61  N.Y.S.2d  786 — 
La  Pointe  v.  Wilson,  61  N.Y.S.2d 
64— Gorman  v.  Baltimore  Drive  It 
Yourself  Co.,  46  N.Y.S.2d  530— 
La  Salle  Extension  University  v. 
Glickman,  29  N.Y.S.2d  32. 
Pa. — Drummond  v.  Parrish,  182  A. 
3,83,  320  '  Pa.  307 — Britex  Waste 
Co.  v.  Nathan  Schwab  &  Sons,  12 
A.2d  473,  139  Pa.Super.  474— Brown 
v.  Brown,  Com.Pl.,  41  Lack.Jur. 
155. 
R.I. — Berick  v.  Curran,  179  A.  708, 

5*5  R.I.  193. 

Wis.— Dubin  v.  Mohr,  19  N.W.2d  880, 
247   Wis.    520 — Potts    v.    Farmers' 
Mut  Automobile  Ins.  Co.,  289  N.W. 
606,  233  Wis.  313. 
Possibility  of  amending  pleadings 

Facts  in  affidavits  and  record  con- 
trol and  if  pleadings  can  be  amend- 
ed to  include  such  facts  or  defenses 
they  must  be  considered. — Benjamin 
v.  Arundel  Corp.,  59  N.Y.S.2d  437. 

On  issues  of  good  faith,  intent,  and 
purpose,  the  bald  declaration  of  a 
party  by  affidavit  is  insufficient  in 
the  face  of  a  pleaded  denial  to  re- 
solve the  issue.— Hatfleld  v.  Barnes, 
'Colo.,  168  P.2d  '552. 
Special  meaning'  of  word* 

Whether  the  term  "existing  viola- 
tions" had  by  custom  or  usage  ac- 
quired a  special  meaning  presented 
a  question  of  fact  which  could  not 


413 


§  225 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.  J.  S. 


for  summary  judgment  are  mandatory,  failure  of 
either  party  to  comply  therewith  will  preclude  the 
granting  of  the  motion  or  the  substantiation  of  a 
claim  of  defense.38 

The  statements  made,  whether  adduced  in  sup- 
port of,. or  in  opposition  to,  the  motion  for  summary 


judgment,  must  be  statements  of  fact,39  and  not 
mere  conclusions,  opinions,  or  beliefs.40  The  affi- 
davits must  be  made  by  affiants  who  have  personal 
knowledge  of  the  facts  stated,41  and  must  state  only 
facts  to  which  affiant  could  testify,  if  called  as  a 
witness  on  the  trial.42  The  affidavits  should  set 


be  disposed  of  on  affidavits  on  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment. — Horby 
Realty  Corp.  v.  Yarmouth  Land 
Corp.,  62  N.T.S.2d  173. 

38.  Mich.— Gloeser  v.  Moore,  278  N. 
W.  781,  -284  Mich.  106. 

39.  Cal.— Bank     of     (America     Nat 
Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Oil  Well 
Supply  Co.  of  California,   55   P.2d 
885,  12  Cal.App.2d  265. 

III.— Gliwa  v.  Washington  Polish 
Loan  &  Building  Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d 
736,  310  IlLApp.  46*5. 
N.Y. — Maurice  O'Meara  Co.  v.  Na- 
tional Park  Bank  of  New  York, 
146  N.E.  636,  239  N.Y.  386,  39  A. 
L.R.  747,  reargument  denied  148 
N.B.  72-5,  240  N.Y.  607— Smith  v. 
McCullaagh,  255  N.Y.S.  497,  234 
App.Div.  490 — Stone  v.  ^Etna  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  31  N.Y.S.2d  615,  178  Misc. 
23. 
R.I.— Berick  v.  Curran,  179  A.  708,  55 

R.I.  193. 
Trivolons  proof;   innuendo 

Frivolous,  sham,  and  transparent- 
ly insufficient  proof,  or  mere  denials 
or  statements  of  innuendo  or  sus- 
picion, will  not  suffice. — Diamond  v. 
Davis,  38  N.Y.S.2d  103,  affirmed  89 
K.Y.S.2d  412,  first  case,  265  lApp.Div. 
919,  appeal  denied  41  N.Y.S.2d  191, 
first  case,  265  App.Div.  1052,  and  af- 
firmed '54  N.R2d  683,  first  case,  292 
N.Y.  552. 

40.  Cal. — Gardenswartz  v.  Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  68  P.2d 
322,  23  Cal.App.2d  Supp.  745— Cow- 
an Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v.  Miley  Pe- 
troleum   Corporation,    -295    P.    504. 
112  Cal.App.Supp.  773. 

111.— Willadsen  v.  City  of  Bast  Pe- 
oria,  47  N.B.2d  136,  317  IlLApp. 
541 — Soelke  v.  Chicago  Business 
Men's  Racing  Ass'n,  41  N.E.2d  232, 
314  IlLApp.  336— Roberts  v.  Sauer- 
raan  Bros.,  20  N.E.2d  849,  300  111. 
App.  213. 

Mich.— Terre  Haute  Brewing  Co.  v. 
Goldberg,  289  N.W.  192,  291  Mich. 
401— Gloeser  v.  Moore,  278  N.W. 
781,  284  Mich.  106 — Gloeser  v. 
Moore,  -278  N.W.  72,  283  Mich.  42-5 
— People's  Wayne  County  Bank  v. 
Wolverine  Box  Co.,  230  N.W.  170, 
250  Mich.  273,  69  A.L.R.  1024 — 
Warren  Webster  &  Co.  v.  Pelavin, 
216  N.W.  430,  241  Mich.  19. 

N.Y.— Irving  Trust  Co.  v.  Orvis,  248 
N.Y.S.  771,  139  Misc.  '670— Ralph 
Klonick  Corporation  v.  Haas,  240 
N.Y.S.  643,  136  Misc.  286. 

^Failure  of  oonjdderattoii 

A  mere  statement  in  affidavit  that 


there  was  a  "failure  of  considera- 
tion" is  not  sufficient  to  create  a 
triable  issue  of  fact— Bentley,  Set- 
tle &  Co.  v.  Brinkman,  42  N.Y.S.2d 
194. 
Hospital  as  charitable  institution 

Statement  in  affidavit  of  attorney 
that  hospital  was  not  a  charitable  in- 
stitution was  a  conclusion  of  law, 
and  was  insufficient  under  statute  re- 
quiring statement  of  evidentiary 
facts. — Schau  v.  Morgan,  6  N.W.2d 
212,  241  Wis.  334. 

Indebtedness 

In  action  on  common  counts  for 
amount  owing  plaintiff  by  defendant, 
statement  in  affidavit  supporting 
plaintiff's  motion  for  summary  judg- 
ment that  indebtedness  was  on  ac- 
count of  purchase  of  merchandise 
and  products  mentioned  in  affidavit 
and  agreements  attached  as  exhibits 
was  statement  of  fact  not  conclu- 
sion.— Terre  Haute  Brewing  Co.  v. 
Goldberg,  289  N.W.  192,  291  Mich. 
401. 

41.  U.S.— IT.  S.  v.  Stephanidis,  D.C. 
N.Y.,  41  F.2d  958. 

Cal. — Gardenswartz  v.  Equitable  Life 
Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  68  P.2d  322,  23 
Cal.App.2d  Supp.  745. 

N.Y.— Curry  v.  Mackenzie,  146  N.B. 
375,  239  N.Y.  267— Gnozzo  v.  Ma- 
rine Trust  Co.  of  Buffalo,  17  N.Y.S. 
2d  168,  258  App.Div.  298,  reargu- 
ment denied  Gnozzo  v.  Marine 
Trust  Co.,  18  N.Y.S.2d  752,  259 
App.Div.  788,  affirmed  Gnozzo  v. 
Marine  Trust  Co.  of  Buffalo,  29 
N.B.2d  933,  284  N.Y.  617— City  Sav. 
Bank  of  Brooklyn  v.  Torro,  300  N. 
Y.S.  1009,  253  App.Div.  748— Lon- 
sky  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  221  N.Y.S. 
177,  220  App.Div.  194— Krause  v. 
Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.,  14  N.Y.S.2d 
206,  172  Mich.  2— Hurwitz  v.  Corn 
Exchange  Bank  Trust  Co.,  253  N.Y. 
S.  851,  142  Misc.  398— Abercromble 
&  Fitch  Co.  v.  Colford,  204  N.Y. 
S.  209,  123  Misc.  138— Hodson  v. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  34  N.Y. 
S.2d  922. 

R.I.— Minuto  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  179  A.  713,  55  R.I.  201. 

Information  derived  from  others 

Affidavits  by  attorney  and  a  book- 
keeper, based  solely  on  information 
and  belief  derived  from  discussions 
with  agent  and  employee  of  plaintiff, 
were  not  made  by  persons  having 
knowledge  of  the  facts. — Miller  v. 
Wightman,  43  N.Y.S.2d  6,81. 

414 


Affiants  held  to  have  personal  knowl- 
edge 

111.— National  Builders  Bank  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Simons,  31  N.E.2d  274,  307 
IlLApp.  -562. 

N.Y. — Royal  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Gins- 
berg, -284  N.Y.S.  5-51,  157  Misc.  507. 

Admission  of  elements  of  cause  of 

action 

Motion  for  summary  judgment 
would  be  granted  where  defendant 
admitted  all  elements  of  plaintiff's 
cause  of  action,  notwithstanding 
moving  affidavit  was  made  by  at- 
torney and  not  by  plaintiff  or  some 
person  having  knowledge  of  facts. — 
Johnson  v.  Briggs,  Inc.,  12  N.Y.S.2d 
60. 

42.  Cal. — Gardenswartz  v.  Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  68  P.2d 
322,  23  CaLApp.2d  Supp.  T45. 
111. — Soelke  v.  Chicago  Business 
Men's  Racing  Ass'n,  41  N.E.2d  232, 
314  IlLApp.  336 — Gliwa  v.  Wash- 
ington Polish  Loan  &  Building 
Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d  736,  310  IlLApp. 
465. 

Mich.— Gloeser  v.  Moore,  278  N.W. 
781,  284  Mich.  106— Gloeser  v. 
Moore,  278  N.W.  72,  283  Mich.  42-5 
— Birgbauer  v.  -SJtna  Casualty  & 
Surety  Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  232 
N.W.  403,  251  Mich.  614 — La  Prise 
v.  Smith,  208  N.W.  449,  234  Mich. 
371. 

R.I. — Henry  W.  Cooke  Co.  v.  Sheldon, 

164  A,  327,  63  R.I.  101— Rosenthal 

v.    HJalsband,   152    A.    320,    51    R.L 

119. 

Wis.— JTuergens  v.   Ritter,    279   N.W. 

51,  227  Wis.  480. 
Affidavit  of  felon 

In  a  jurisdiction  in  which  a  felon 
is  a  competent  witness  on  a  trial, 
a  motion  for  summary  judgment 
may  be  predicated  on  the  affidavit  of 
a  felon,  and  the  test  to  be  applied  to 
such  affidavit  is  the  test  to  be  ap- 
plied to  the  affidavit  of  any  witness. 
— William  J.  Cdnners  Car  Co.  v. 
Manufacturers'  &  Traders'  Nat  Bank 
of  Buffalo,  209  N.Y.S.  406,  124  Misc. 
584,  affirmed  210  N.Y.S.  939,  214  App. 
Div.  811. 

Conjectural  allegations 
111.— Fisher   v.   Hargrave,    48   N.E.2d 

966,  318  IlLApp.  510. 
Hearsay 

Cal.— Shea  v.  Leonis,  84  P.2d  277,  29 
'Oal.App.2d  184 — Gardenswartz  v. 
Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S., 
68  P.2d  322,  23  Cal. App. 2 d  Supp. 
74«5. 

R.L— Rosenthal  v.  Halsband,  152  A. 
320.  81  R.I.  119. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


225 


forth  evidentiary43  and  not  ultimate44  facts,  and 
should  set  forth  the  facts  with  particularity,45  mere 
general  averments  being  insufficient46  However, 
the  affidavit  need  not  be  composed  wholly  of  strict- 
ly evidentiary  facts,47  and  an  affiant  is  not  required 
to  aver  as  a  fact  that  which  is  not  a  fact,  but  an 
opinion.48 

Burden  of  proof.  Provisions  authorizing  sum- 
mary judgment  do  not  shift  the  burden  of  proof.49 
Where  the  motion  for  summary  judgment  is  made 
by  plaintiff,  he  is  required  to  sustain  the  burden  of 
submitting  convincing  proof,  by  affidavit  or  other- 
wise, that  the  answer  is  sham,  and  that  there  is  no 


real  defense  or  real  issue  to  be  determined.50  On 
a  motion  by  defendant  for  summary  judgment  the 
burden  is  on  defendant  to  establish  his  defense  by 
proof  of  the  facts  pleaded.51 

Documentary  evidence;  attachment  of  papers* 
Under  some  court  rules,  where  a  sufficient  defense 
is  founded  on  facts  established  prima  facie  by  doc- 
umentary or  official  record,  defendant  may  have 
summary  judgment  in  his  favor  unless  plaintiff 
shows  facts  sufficient  to  raise  an  issue  with  respect 
to  the  verity  and  conclusiveness  of  such  documen- 
tary evidence  or  official  record;62  and  the  defense 


Violation  of  parol  evidence  role 

(1)  Defendant's     affidavit     raising 
defense  obnoxious  to  parol  evidence 
rule  was  insufficient. — Power  v.  Al- 
lied   Asphalt    Products    Corporation, 
1-59  A.  251,  162  Md.  175. 

(2)  An   affidavit   stating  the   con- 
tents of  certain  writings  by  giving 
their  purport  but  not  their  words  is 
not  sufficient,  since  <as  a  witness  the 
affiant    could    not    competently    give 
such   testimony,   over   proper   objec- 
tion, there  being  no  showing  of  loss 
of  the  writings  or  other  circumstanc- 
es which  would  excuse  production  of 
the  originals. — Gardenswartz  v.  Equi- 
table Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  the  U.  S., 
68  P.2d  822,  23  Cal.App.2d  Supp.  745. 

(3)  Introduction  contained  in  affi- 
davits in  support  of  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment,  which  stated  facts 
leading  up  to  preparation  of  original 
order,  did  not  render  affidavits  inad- 
missible as  an  attempt  to  vary  terms 
of  written  contract  between  parties, 
but  introduction  could  be  treated  as 
mere  surplusage. — Lowenstern  Bros, 
v.  Marks  Credit  Clothing,  48  N.B.2d 
729,  319  IlLApp.  71. 

43.  Cal.— Kelly   v.    Liddicoat,    96   P. 
2d  186,  3'5  Cal.App.2d  559 — Garden- 
swartz.   v.    Equitable    Life    Assur. 
Soc.  of  U.  S.,  68  P.2d  322,  23  Cal. 
App.2d  Supp.  745. 

Mass. — Norwood  Morris  Plan  Co.  v. 

McCarthy,  4  N.E.2d  450,  295  Mass. 

597,  107  A.L.R.  1215. 
N.Y.— Hopfan  v.  Knauth,   282  N.T.S. 

219,     156    Misc.    545— Diamond    v. 

Davis,    38    N.T.S.2d    103,    affirmed 

39    N.Y.S.2d    412,    first    case,    265 

App.Div.  919,  appeal  denied  41  N.Y. 

S.2d    191,   first  case,    265   App,Div. 

10*52,    and  affirmed  54   N.E.2d   683, 

first  case,  292  N.Y.  552. 
Wis. — Schau    v.    Morgan,    6    N.W.2d 

2fl2,  241  Wis.  334. 

Kaked  assertions,  unsupported  by 
evidentiary  facts,  and  unaccompa- 
nied by  available  documentary  proof, 
are  insufficient. — Hopfan  v.  Knauth, 
282  N.Y.S.  219,  156  Misc.  545. 

44.  Cal.— Kelly  v.  Liddicoat   96   P. 
2d  186,  35  Cal.App.2d  559 — Garden- 
swartz   v.    Equitable    Life    Assur. 


Soc.  of  U.  S.,  68  P.2d  322,  23  Cal. 
App.2d  Supp.  745. 

45.  Cal.— Shea    v.    Leonis,    84    P.2d 
277,     29    Cal.App.2d    184 — Garden- 
swartz   v.    Equitable    Life    Assur. 
Soc.  of  U.  S.,  68  P.2d  322,  23  Cal. 
App.2d    Supp.    74'5 — Cowan    Oil    & 
Refining    Co.    v.    Miley    Petroleum 
Corporation,   -295    P.    504,    112    Cal. 
App.Supp.  773. 

46.  Mass. — Norwood     Morris     Plan 
Co.  v.  McCarthy,  4  N.E.2d  450,  92-5 
Mass.  597,  107  A.L.R.  1215. 

N.Y. — Dodwell  &  Co.  v.  Silverman, 
254  N.Y.S.  746,  234  App.Div.  362 
— Blanchard  Press  v.  Aerosphere, 

*  Inc.,  '51  N.Y.S.2d  71'5,  affirmed  56 
N.Y.S.2d  415,  269  App.Div.  826. 

47.  Cal. — Eagle  Oil  &  Refining  Co. 
v.  Prentice,  122  P.2d  264,   19   Cal. 
2d  553 — Gibson  v.  De  La  Salle  In- 
stitute,   152   P. 2 d   774,    66   Cal.App. 
2d  609. 

Conclusions 

Where  affiant  was  competent  to 
testify  to  all  the  contents  of  his 
affidavit,  conclusions  contained  in 
affidavit  would  not  vitiate  the  par- 
ticularities or  nullify  their  force. — 
McComsey  v.  Leaf,  97  P.2d  242,  36 
Cal.App.2d  132. 

48.  Mich.— Baxter  v.  Szucs,   227  N. 
W.  666,  248  Mich.  672. 

Value  of  services 

Attorney  was  held  not  entitled  to 
summary  Judgment  for  services, 
where  defendant  filed  affidavit  de- 
nying that  services  were  worth  more 
than  amount  paid. — Baxter  v.  Szucs, 
227  N.W.  666,  248  Mich.  672. 

49.  N.Y.— Lonsky  v.  Bank  of  U.  S., 
221    N.Y.S.    177,    220    App.Div.    194 
— Hurwitz  v.  Corn  Exchange  Bank 
Trust  Co.,  2I53  N.Y.S.  851,  142  Misc. 
398. 

50.  N.Y.— Stuyvesant    Credit   Union 
v.    Manufacturers'    Trust   Co.,    267 
N.Y.S.  302,  239  App.Div.  187— Tide- 
water   Oil    Sales    Corporation    v. 
Pierce,    210    N.Y.S.    759,    213    App. 
Div.  796— Win.  H.  Frear  &  Co.  v. 
Bailey,   214  N.Y.S.    675,   127   Misc. 
79— Nester  v.  Nester,   19  N.Y.S.2d 

'    426,  reversed  on  other  grounds  22 

415 


N.Y.S.2d  119,   259  App.Div.   1065. 

"The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the 
plaintiff  to  prove  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion, and  to  show  that  the  defense 
is  interposed  solely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  delay." — State  Bank  v.  Mack* 
stein.  205  N.Y.S.  290,  291,  123  Misc. 
•416. 

51.  N.Y. — Dumbadze    v.    Agency   of 
Canadian  Car  &  Foundry  Co.,    $&• 
N.Y.S.2d    991,    affirmed    Gurge    v. 
Agency  of  Canadian  Car  &  Foun- 
dry 'Co.,  45  N.Y.S.2d  955,  267  App. 
Div.  782,  appeal  denied  In  re  Dum- 
badze's    Estate,    47    N.Y.S.24    315^ 
267  iApp.Div.  878. 

52.  N.Y. — Gnozzo    v.    Marine    Trust 
Co.  of  Buffalo,  17  N.Y,S.2d  168,  25* 
App.Div.    298,    re-argument    denied 
Gnozzo   v.    Marine    Trust    Co.,    18 
N.Y.S.2d     752,     2«59    App.Div.     788* 
affirmed   Gnozzo   v.    Marine   Trust 
Co.  of  Buffalo,  29  N.E.2d  933,  284 
N.Y.  617— White  v.  Merchants  Des- 
patch Transp.  Co.,  10  N.Y.S.2d  962, 
256  App.Div.  1044 — Wels  v.  Rubin, 
S    N.Y.S.2d   350,    254    App.Div.    484, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  20  N.E. 
2d    737,    280    N.Y.    233— Algiere   v. 
Cosmopolitan   Shipping  Co.,  56  N. 
Y.S.2d  361,  185  Misc.  271— Hyde  v. 
Clark,   39   N.Y.S.2d   229,    179   Misc. 
414— Beisheim  'v.   People,    39   N.Y. 
S.2d  333 — Diamond  v.  Davis,  38  N. 
Y.S.2d    103,    affirmed    39    N.Y.S. 2 (I 
412,    first   case,    266   App.Div.    919, 
appeal  denied  41  N.Y.S.2d  191,  first 
case,  265  App.Div.  1052,  and  affirm- 
ed 54  NJB.2d  683,  first  case,  292  N. 
Y.  .552— DittLmond  v.   Davis,    38  N. 
Y.S.2d  93,  affirmed  39  N.Y.S.2d  412,. 
second  case,  265  iApp.Div.  919,  ap- 
peal  denied   41   N.Y.S.2d   191,  sea- 
ond   case,    265   App.Div.   1052,   and: 
affirmed  54  N.E.2d  683,  second  case, 
292  N.Y.  554. 

When  documentary  evidence  required 
Under  some  rules,  where  case  is 
one  of  those  enumerated  in  specified 
subdivisions,  affidavits  may  be  used 
on  motion  for  summary  judgment 
but  otherwise  the  defense  must  be- 
established  by  documentary  evi- 
dence.— Dumont  v.  Raymond,  49 


§  225 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


relied  on  need  not  be  an  affirmative  defense.53  Un- 
der some  rules  of  this  nature  there  is  nothing  which 
specifies  or  limits  the  form  or  character  of  the  doc- 
umentary evidence  or  official  record  on  which  the 
motion  for  summary  judgment  by  a  defendant  is  to 
be  based;54  the  documentary  proof  required  under 
these  provisions  is  not  limited  to  that  which  prima 
facie,  completely,  and  conclusively  establishes  the 
defense,  without  resort  to  extrinsic  or  fragmentary 
connecting  links  of  proof  supplied  by  affidavit  or 
scattered  entries  or  memoranda.55  Defendant  need 
not  present  all  the  official  record,  and  if  he  submits 
merely  part  of  the  record  it  is  within  the  province 
of  plaintiff  to  submit  the  remainder  if  in  his  judg- 
ment he  can  thereby  show  facts  sufficient  to  raise 
an  issue  as  to  the  official  record.56  Under  provi- 
sions of  this  nature  the  defense  must  be  established 


prima  facie  by  documentary  evidence  or  official  rec- 
ord,57 and  summary  judgment  will  be  denied  where 
plaintiffs  showing  of  the  facts  is  sufficient  to  raise 
an  issue  with  respect  to  the  verity  and  conclusive- 
ness  of  the  documentary  evidence  or  official  records 
adduced  by  defendant.58 

Some  court  rules  require  the  attachment  of  copies 
of  all  papers  on  which  a  party  relies  on  a  motion 
for  summary  judgment,59  but  the  failure  to  attach 
all  such  papers  has  been  held  not  to  be  fatal  to  a 
granting  of  the  motion  where  copies  of  the  exhib- 
its were  either  attached  to  the  complaint,  or  were 
contained  in  the  files  in  the  clerk's  office,  or  were 
available  to  defendant  at  any  time.60 

Production  of  witnesses  for  oral  examination. 
Under  some  statutes  and  rules  the  court  may,  in  its 


S.2d  ,865,    affirmed    5$   N.T.S.2d   592, 
269  App.Div.  592. 

53.  N.Y.— Diamond  v.  Davis.   38   N. 
T.S.2d  93,  affirmed  39  N.Y.S.2d  412, 
second  case,  265  App.Div.  919,  ap- 
peal denied  41  N.Y.S.2d   191,  sec- 
ond  case,    26'5   App.Div.    1052,  and 
affirmed  54  N.E.2d  683,  second  case, 
292  N.T.  554. 

54.  N.T.— Levine  v.  Behn,  8  N.T.S.2d 
58,  169  Misc.   601,   affirmed  12  N. 
T.S.2d   190,   257  AppJMv.   156,   re- 
versed on  other  grounds  25  N.E.2d 
871,  282  N.Y.  120 — Diamond  v.  Da- 
vis,'  38   N.Y.S.2d   103,    affirmed    39 
N.Y.S.2d  '412,   first   case,   265   App. 
Div.   919,  appeal  denied  41  N.Y.S. 
2d    191,    first    case,    2ff5    App.Div. 
1052,  and  affirmed  54  N.E.2d  683, 
first  case,  292  N.Y.  552. 

What  constitutes  docionentary  evi- 
dence or  official  records 
(1)  In  stockholders'  derivative  ac- 
tion against  corporate  officers  and 
directors  invoices  and  petty  cash 
slips,  and  excerpts  from,  and  photo- 
static  copies  of,  corporate  books  and 
records  constituted  "documentary 
evidence"  which  could  be  considered 
on  defendants'  motion  for  summary 
judgment — Dumont  v.  Raymond,  49 
N.Y.S.2d  86*5,  affirmed  56  N.Y.S.2d 
592,  269  AppJDiv.  592. 

<2)  In  such  an  action,  however, 
affidavits  vouching  for  purity  of  de- 
fendants' motives  and  seeking  to 
justify  acts  criticized  by  plaintiffs, 
do  not  constitute  "documentary  evi- 
dence" within  the  rule. — Dumont  v. 
Raymond,  supra. 

(3)  In  action  for  injuries  sustain- 
ed as  result  of  defendant's  alleged 
negligent  construction  of  machine, 
affidavits  of  defendant's  vice  presi- 
dent and  of  defendant's  buyer  and 
copy  of  purchasing  agreement  indi- 
cating that  machine  was  purchased 
from  a  third  person  and  not  manu- 


factured by  defendant  were  not 
"documentary  evidence"  or  "official 
records"  as  contemplated  by  rule. — 
Dewar  v.  Sears  Roebuck  &  Co.,  49  N. 
Y.S.2d  404. 
Competency  or  admissibUity 

Where  affidavits  and  certificates 
were  supplied  to  plaintiff  by  defend- 
ant at  plaintiff's  request,  plaintiff 
could  not  object  to  them  on  ground 
of  competency  or  admissibility. — 
Diamond  v.  Davis,  38  N.Y.S.2d  93, 
affirmed  39  N.Y.S.  2d  412,  second  case, 
26'5  App.Div.  9*19,  appeal  denied  41 
N.Y.S. 2d  191,  second  case,  265  App. 
Div.  1052,  and  affirmed  54  N.B.2d 
683,  second  case,  292  N.Y.  554. 

55.  N.Y. — Chance  v.  Guaranty  Trust 
Co.  of  New  York,  20  N.Y.S.2d  635, 
173  Misc.  754,  affirmed  13  N.Y.S.2d 
785,  257  App.Div.  1006,  affirmed  26 
N.B.2d  802,  282  N.Y,  056. 

56.  N.Y.— -Wels  v.  Rubin,  5  N.Y.S.2d 
3'50,  254  App.Div.  484,  reversed  on 
other  grounds   20   N.E.2d  737,   280 
N.Y.  233. 

57.  N.Y.— Diamond  v.  Davis,  38  N.Y. 
S.2d  93,   affirmed   39  N.Y.S.2d  412, 
second  case,  265  App.Div.  919,  ap- 
peal denied  41  N.Y.S.2d  191,   sec- 
ond  case,   265   App.Div.   1052,  and 
affirmed  54  N.E.2d  683,  second  case, 
292  N.Y.  55'4. 

58.  N.Y. — Davignon      v.      Raquette 
River  Paper  Co.,   56  N.Y.S.2d  249, 
269  App.Div.  889,  appeal  denied  57 
N.Y.S.2d  6'53,  269  App.Div.  913,  ap- 
peal dismissed  64  N.E.2d  279,  295 
N.Y.   569— Grunder  v.   Schwab,   43 
N.Y.S.2d  931,  181  Misc.  488,  modi- 
fied on  other  grounds  46  N.Y.S.2d 
715,   267  App.Div.   887,  appeal  de- 
nied '48  N.Y.S.2d  330,  267  App.Div. 
946— Hyde    v.    Clark,    39    N.Y.S.2d 
229,  179  Misc.  414— Conyne  v.  Mc- 
Gibbon,  37  N.Y.S.2d  -590,  179  Misc. 
54,    transferred,    see    39    N.Y.S,2d 
609,   265  App.Div.   976,  affirmed  41 

416 


N.Y.S.2d  189,  266  App.Div.  711— 
Dewar  v.  Sears  Roebuck  &  Co.,  49 
N.Y.S.2d  404 — Dumbadze  'v.  Agen- 
cy of  Canadian  Car  &  Foundry  Co., 
38  N.Y.S.2d  991,  affirmed  Gurge  v. 
Agency  of  Canadian  Oar  &  Foun- 
dry Co.,  45  N.Y.S.2d  955,  267  App. 
Div.  782,  appeal  denied  In  re  Dum- 
badze's  Estate,  47  N.Y.S.2d  315,  267 
App.Div.  878. 

59.  111. — Otis  Elevator  Co.  y.  Amer- 
ican Surety  Co.  of  New  York,  41  N. 
E.2d  987,  314  Ill.App.  479. 

Original  or  copy 

In  the  absence  of  circumstances 
showing  loss  of  a  writing  or  other 
circumstances  which  would  excuse 
production  of  the  original,  an  affida- 
vit, to  be  sufficient  as  to  a  writing, 
must  have  attached  to  it  the  original 
of  such  writing  or,  possibly,  a  veri- 
fied or  certified  copy. — Gardenswartz 
v.  Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U. 
S.,  68  P.2d  322,  23  CaLApp.2d  Supp. 
745. 

Settlement  agreement 

If  settlement  agreement  alleged 
as  defense  to  action  on  note,  was  in 
writing,  such  writing  should  have 
been  produced  in  evidence  to  defeat 
motion  for  summary  judgment — Dl 
Roma  v.  Chambers  Drug  Store,  28  N. 
Y.S.2d  170,  262  App.Div.  856. 

60.  HI. — Otis  Elevator  Co.  v.  Amer- 
ican Surety  Co.  of  New  York,  41 
N.E.2d    987,    314    IlLApp.    '479. 

Vouchers 

In  action  under  Speedy  Judgment 
!Act,  it  is  necessary  that  plaintiff 
file  any  vouchers  of  his  claim  at  time 
he  institutes  his  suit  and  vouchers 
must  show  on  their  face  a  prima 
facie  case  of  defendant's  indebted- 
ness to  plaintiff  for  certain  amount 
or  an  amount  which  they  furnish 
the  means  of  making  certain. — Kat- 
ski  v.  Triplett  30  A.2d  764,  181  Md. 
54'5. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  225 


discretion,  require  production  of  witnesses  for  oral 
examination  in  open  court.61 

b.  In  Support  of  Motion 

In  order  to  Justify  the  granting  of  a  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment  In  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  the  affidavits 
or  other  proof  adduced  in  support  of  the  motion  must 
verify  the  cause  of  action  and  negative  the  exis*ence  of 
a  defense,  or,  where  the  motion  is  made  by  the  defend- 
ant, must  establish  the  sufficiency  of  his  defense.  They 
must,  in  addition,  contain  any  formal  statements  re- 
quired by  statute,  such  as  a  statement  of  an  affiant's 
belief  that  there  is  no  defense  to  the  action,  or,  where 
the  motion  Is  by  the  defendant,  that  there  is  no  merit 
to  the  action. 

The  affidavits  of  the  moving  party  must  contain 


facts  sufficient  to  entitle  him  to  judgment  in  his  fa- 
vor,^ anci  are  to  fce  strictly  construed6*  They 
must  comply  with  the  statutory  requirements  and 
the  rules  of  court64  as  to  the  matters  required  to  be 
stated65  and  as  to  service  on  the  adverse  party.66 

Ordinarily,  in  order  that  plaintiff  may  be  entitled 
to  summary  judgment  on  motion,  he  must  file,  in 
support  thereof,  an  affidavit  or  other  proof  which 
fully  and  clearly  verifies  or  states  the  facts  which 
constitute  his  cause  of  action  against  defendant, 
and  negatives  the  existence  of  a  defense;67  and, 
if  plaintiffs  affidavits  are  insufficient  to  support  his 
cause  of  action,  the  motion  should  be  denied.6^  It 


61.  Mich. — Schempf     v.     New     Era 
Life  Ass'n,  234  N.W.  177,  253  Mich. 
152. 

Befusal  to  take  testimony 

Under  particular  circumstances  it 
was  held  that  the  court  abused  its 
discretion  in  refusing  to  take  the 
testimony  of  witnesses  offered  for 
the  purpose  of  supplying  the  insuffi- 
ciencies of  affidavits. — Schempf  v. 
New  Era  Life  Ass'n,  supra. 

62.  Cal. — Hardy  v.  Hardy,  143  P.2d 
701,    23   Cal.2d   244— Gibson   v.   Be 
La   Salle    Institute,    152   P.2d   774, 
66  Cal.App.2d  609. 

Proof  rather  than,  mere  presump- 
tion, is  necessary  to  warrant  the 
granting  of  summary  Judgment. — 
Romine  v.  Barnaby  Agency,  227  N.Y. 
S.  235,  131  Misc.  696. 
Method  of  testing  sufficiency 

Under  some  statutes  a  motion  to 
strike  an  affidavit  for  summary  judg-  ! 
ment  from  the  flies  is  a  proper  meth- 
od of  testing  the  sufficiency  of  the 
affidavit.— People,  for  Use  of  Dyer, 
v.  Sawyer,  2  N.E.2d  345,  284  Ill.App. 
463. 

63.  Cal.— Eagle   Oil  &  Refining  Co. 
v.   Prentice,  '122  P.2d  264,   19   Cat. 
2d  553 — Gibson  v.  De  La  Salle  In- 
stitute, 152  P.2d  774,  66  Cal.App,2d 
009 — Grady    v.    Easley,    11'4    P.2d 
635,  45  Cal.App.2d  632. 

D.C.— Wyatt  v.  Madden,  32  F.2d  m, 
59  App.D.C.  38— Gleason  v.  Hoeke, 
5  App.D.C.  1. 

111.— Molner  v.  Schaefle,  58  N,E.2d 
744,  324  Ill.App.  589— Security  Dis- 
count Corporation  v.  Jackson,  51 
N.E.2d  618,  320  IlLApp.  440— C.  L 
T.  Corporation  v.  Smith,  48  N.E.2d 
735,  318  IlLApp.  642— Fellheimer 
v.  Wess,  45  N.E.2d  89,  316  Ill.App. 
449— Shaw  v.  National  Life  Co.,  42 
N.E.2d  885,  315  Ill.App.  210— Soel- 
ke  v.  Chicago  Business  Men's  Rac- 
ing Ass'n,  41  N.B.2d  232,  31'4  111. 
App.  336— Gliwa  v.  Washington 
Polish  Loan  &  Building  Ass'n,  34 
N.E.2d  736,  310  IlLApp.  465. 

64.  Md.— Mueller  v.  Michaels,  60  A. 
485,  101  Md.  188. 

N.Y.— William  J,  Cdnners  Car  Co. 
v.  Manufacturers'  &  Traders'  Nat 

40  C.  J.S.-27 


Bank   of  Buffalo,    209    N.T.S.    406 

124   Misc.   5.84,  affirmed  210  N.Y.S 

939,  214  App.Div.  811. 
65.    N.T.— Macomber  v.  Wilkinson,  6 

N.Y.S.2d  608. 
34  C.J.  p  205  note  53. 
Knowledge  of  affiant 

Plaintiff's  affidavit  that  he  could 
swear  to  the  facts  of  his  own  knowl- 
edge, but  without  doing  so,  is  in- 
sufficient to  support  his  motion  for 
summary  judgment. — Minuto  v.  Met- 
ropolitan Life  Ins.  Co.,  179  A.  713,  55 
R.I.  201. 

Statement  as  constituting-  "account" 
Where  plaintiffs  intending  to  bring 
suit  under  the  Speedy  Judgment  Act 
filed  with  their  declaration  a  state- 
ment under  affidavit  claiming  that 
defendants  were  indebted  to  them  in 
a  specified  sum,  but  statement  did 
not  mention  any  items  of  merchan- 
dise alleged  to  have  been  sold  to 
the  defendants,  or  a  copy  of  agree- 
ments subsequently  relied  on  where- 
in defendants  promised  to  be  liable 
for  merchandise  purchased,  the  state- 
ment did  not  constitute  an  "account" 
within  meaning  of  the  statute.— Kat- 
ski  v.  Trlplett,  30  A.2d  764,  181  Md. 
545. 

Capacity  to  institute  action 

In  action  under  Speedy  Judgment 
Act,  affidavit  of  merit  need  not  con- 
tain positive  allegation  of  plaintiffs 
capacity  to  institute  action. — Power 
v.  Allied  Asphalt  Products  Corpora- 
tion, 159  A.  251,  162  Md.  175. 

66.  N.Y.— Neff  v.  Palmer,   227  N.Y. 
S.  612,  131  Misc.  671. 

C.J.  p  205  note  5'5. 

67.  111. — People,  for  Use  of  Dyer,  v. 
Sawyer,  2  N.E.2d  343,  284  IlLApp. 
463. 

Mich. — Gloeser  v.  Moore,  278  N.W. 
781,  284  Mich,  106. 

N.Y.— Barrett  v.  Jacobs,  175  N.E.  2*75, 
255  N.Y.  520 — Curry  v.  Mackenzie, 
146  N.E.  3T5,  239  N.Y.  267— Max- 
rice  Realty  'Corporation  v.  B/G 
Sandwich  Shops,  267  N.Y.S.  863, 
239  App.Div.  472 — Hallgarten  v. 
Wolkenstein,  198  N.Y.S.  485,  204 
App.Div.  487 — Union  Trust  Co.  of 
Rochester  v.  "Mayer.  270  N.Y.S. 

417 


355,  150  Misc.  375,  affirmed  in  part 

and    reversed    in    part     on    other 

grounds    273   N.Y.S.    438,    242   App. 

E>iv.   671,  affirmed  285  N.Y.S.  1046. 

246  App.Div.   68'5— First  Trust  Co. 

of  Albany  v.  Dumary,   23  N.Y.S.2d 

532. 
Pa.— Pennsylvania  Co.  for  Insurance 

on  Lives   and   Granting  Annuities 

v.  Stern,  14  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  188. 
R.I. — Berick  v.   Curran,    179    A.    708, 

55  R.I.  193, 
34  C.J.  p  205  note  39. 
Execution  of  contract 

Plaintiff  seeking  summary  judg- 
ment for  amounts  due  under  assign- 
ed land  contract  must  first  prove 
that  such  contract  was  entered  into 
by  defendants.— MacClure  v.  Noble, 
244  N.W.  174,  -259  Mich.  601. 
Effect  of  tender 

Plaintiff's  application  for  partial 
judgment  must  be  supported  by 
proof  that  part  of  plaintiff's  claim 
is  admitted,  and  defendant's  tender 
and  payment  into  court  of  part  of 
amount  claimed  does  not  itself  fur- 
nish such  proof. — Pleder  v.  Itkin,  60 
N.B.2d  753,  294  N.Y.  77. 
Computation  of  amount  claimed 

Where  declaration  is  based  on 
common  counts,  plaintiff's  affidavit, 
alleging  defendant's  indebtedness  to 
jlaintiff  in  certain  amount,  need  not 
state  manner  in  which  such  amount 
was  computed. — Terre  Haute  Brew- 
ng  Co.  v.  Goldberg,  289  N.W.  192, 
291  Mich,- 401. 

88.    Del. — Lamson  v.  Habbart,  43  A. 

2d  249. 

34  C.J.  p  205  note  '57. 
Bad  count 

Under    statutes    whereby    the    de- 
scription of  plaintiff's  cause  of  <ac- 
ion  in  his  affidavit  becomes  a  part 
f  each  count  in  his  declaration;  the 
'act  that  one  of  the  counts  is  bad  in 
aw  does   not  vitiate  the  statement 
f  the  cause  of  action  contained  in 
the   affidavit  which   is   documented, 
lear,   distinct,   and  precise;    and   a 
defendant  who  has  failed  to  demur 
r  object  to  a  count  cannot  reach 
he  defect  through  an  objection  to 
he   affidavit— Power  v.   Allied   As- 


225 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


has  been  held,  however,  that  summary  judgment 
will  not  be  denied  because  of  the  insufficiency  of 
plaintiffs  affidavit  where  the  complaint  is  sufficient 
and  its  essential  facts  are  admitted.^  Plaintiffs 
affidavits  must  do  more  than  merely  set  forth  those 
allegations  which  would  be  required  by  a  pleading  to 
constitute  a  cause  of  action;70  they  should  set 
forth  the  evidentiary  facts,  from  the  existence  of 
which  the  conclusion  of  law  must  follow  that  plain.- 
tifPs  claim  is  valid  and  enforceable.71  Although 
plaintiff  cannot  convert  his  affidavit  into  a  plead- 
ing,72 and,  by  anticipating  therein  a  defense,  re- 
quire defendant  to  negative  or  defend  against  such 
new  matter,73  it  has  been  held  that  if  his  complaint 
is  merely  defective  it  may  be  deemed  amended  for 
the  purpose  of  the  motion  where  the  affidavits  filed 
in  support  of  the  motion  contain  facts  which  cure 
the  defects.74 

On  a  motion  by  defendant  for  summary  judgment 
dismissing  the  complaint,  his  affidavits  must  set 
forth  evidentiary  facts  showing  the  sufficiency  of 
his  defense.75  He  must  make  out  a  clear  case  on 


undisputed  material  facts  presented  on  the  record.76 
However,  where  the  affidavits  or  other  proofs  do  es- 
tablish that  the  action  has  no  merit  and  that  there 
is  no  triable  issue,  a  motion  by  defendant  for  sum- 
mary judgment  in  his  favor  is  properly  granted.77 

Belief  as  to  merit  of  action  or  defense.  It  is  fre- 
quently required  by  the  statutes  or  rules  of  court 
that,  on  a  motion  by  plaintiff  for  summary  judg- 
ment, the  affidavits  submitted  in  support  of  the  mo- 
tion state  the  belief  of  one  having  knowledge  of 
the  facts  that  there  is  no  defense  to  the  action.78 
The  fact,  however,  that  none  of  the  affidavits  pre- 
sented by  plaintiff  contains  the  averment  that  there 
is  no  defense  to  the  action  is  not  fatal  to  the  legal 
efficacy  of  the  affidavits,  where  affiants  have  used 
language  which  is  equivalent  in  sense  and  meaning 
to  the  words  employed  by  the  statute.79 

Affidavits  of  a  defendant  submitted  in  support'  of 
a  motion  for  summary  judgment  dismissing  the 
complaint  are  required  by  some  provisions  to  state 
his  belief  that  the  action  has  no  merit.80 


phalt   Products   Corporation,    159    A. 
251,  162   Md.  175. 

69.  ill.— People     ex     rel.     Ames     v. 
Marx,    18   N.B.2d  915,   370  111.  264. 

70.  N.T.— Sher  v.   Rodkin,   198  N.T. 
S.  597. 

Verification  of  cause  of  action 

The  statutory  requirement  of  an 
affidavit  "verifying  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion" means  an  affidavit  which  will 
enable  the  judge  to  determine  wheth- 
er plaintiff  has  in  fact  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion which  cannot  be  controverted  on 
a  trial. — Sher  v.  Bodkin,  supra. 

71.  111.— Wainscott  v.  Penikoff,  4  N. 
E.2d  €11,  287  IlLApp.  78. 

N.T.— Schaffer   Stores    Co.   v.   Sweet, 

228  N.T.S.  599,  132  Misc.  38. 
^Foundation  of  proceeding- 
Plaintiff's   affidavit   in  aid  of  mo- 
tion  for   summary  judgment   is   the 
foundation  and  not  a  mere  incident 
of  such  proceedings,  and  facts  with- 
in personal  knowledge  of  affiant  must 
be  set  out  sufficiently  to  apprise  the 
court   with    reasonable    certainty    of 
the  truth  of  plaintiff's  claim. — Minu- 
to  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  179 
A.  713,  55  R.I.  201. 
Originals   or   copies    of  instruments 
Involved 

(1)  Papers  on  which  plaintiff's  mo- 
tion   for    summary    judgment    was 
granted   were   held   defective   where 
they  did  not  contain  a  copy  of  al- 
leged contract  and  note  sued  on. — La. 
Salle  Extension  University  v.  -Man- 
del,  27  N.T.S.2d  625. 

(2)  Insured's   affidavit   in   support 
of  motion  for  summary  judgment  in 
action   on   disability   policies,    which 
affidavit  stated  provisions  of  policies 


by  their  legal  effect  only  without 
any  showing  to  excuse  production  of 
originals,  was  insufficient  if  any 
showing  of  provisions  of  policies 
was  required;  but  in  the  particular 
case  insured's  affidavit  was  held  not 
insufficient  where  affidavits  set  forth 
provisions  of  policies  by  their  legal 
effect  and  insurer's  answer  set  forth 
exact  language  of  policies  and  de- 
nied execution  thereof  in  any  other 
terms,  and  there  was  no  issue  in 
pleading  as  to  issuance  of  policies 
or  their  terms. — Gardenswartz  v. 
Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S., 
68  P.2d  322,  23  Cal.App.2d  Supp.  745. 

72.  B.C.— Booth   v.    Arnold,   27   App. 
D.C.   287. 

73.  D.C. — Booth  v.  Arnold,  supra. 

74.  U.S. — Seaboard    Terminals    Cor- 
poration   v.    Standard    Oil    Co.    of 
New   Jersey,    C.C.A.N.T.,    104    F.2d 
659. 

N.T.— McAnsh  v.  Blauner,  226  N.T.S. 
379,  222  App.Div.  3,81,  affirmed  162 
N.E.  515,  248  N.T.  537— Florida 
Land  Holding  Corporation  v. 
Burke,  238  N.T.S.  1,  135  Misc.  341, 
affirmed  243  N.T.S.  799,  229  Ap'p. 
Div.  855. 

76.  N.T.— Krause   v.   Lehigh   Valley 
Coal    Co.,     14    N.T.S.2d     206,     172 
Misc.  2. 

Wis. — Fuller  v.  General  Accident 
Fire  &  Life  Assur.  Corporation, 
Limited,  of  Perth,  Scotland,  272 
N.W.  839,  224  Wis.  603. 

78.  'N.T. — Gorman  v.  Baltimore 
Drive  It  Tourself  Co.,  46  N.T.S.2d 
530. 

77.  N.T.— Luotto  v.  Field,  50  N.T.S. 
2d  849,   268  App.Div.  227,  reversed 
on    other    grounds    63    N.E.2d   '58, 

418 


294  N.T.  460— Pribyl  v.  Van  Loan 
&  Co.,  26  N.T.S.2d  1,  261  App.Div. 
503,  reargument  denied  27  N.T.S. 
2d  992,  262  App.Div.  711,  affirmed 
40  N.E.2d  36,  287  N.T.  749 — Colwell 
v.  Adelphi  College,  25  N.T.S.2d  429, 
261  App.Div.  933,  affirmed  42  N.E. 
2d  599,  288  N.T.  585— Camp-Of- 
The-Pines  v.  New  Tork  Times  Co,, 
53  N.T.S.2d  '475,  184  Misc.  a89— 
Eichler  v.  Furness,  Withy  &  Co..  6 
N.T.S.2d  893,  169  Misc.  22. 
Wis. — Blnsfeld  v.  Home  Mut.  Ins. 
Co.,  IS  N.W.2d  828,  245  Wis.  552— 
Potts  v.  Farmers'  Mut.  Automobile 
Ins.  Co.,  289  N.W.  606,  233  Wis. 
313. 

78.  N.J.— Katz  v.  Inglis,  160  A.  314, 
109  N.J.Law  54. 

N.T. — Freund  v.  James  McCullagh, 
Inc.,  50  N.T.S.2d  740,  268  App.Div. 
875— Universal  Credit  Co.  v.  Ug- 
gla,  290  N.T.S.  365,  248  App.Div. 
848,  motion  denied  290  N.T.S.  997, 
248  App.Div.  529,  amended  on  oth- 
er grounds  298  N.T.S.  15,8,  251  App. 
Div.  786— Krause  v.  Lehigh  Valley 
Coal  Co.,  14  N.T.S.2d  206,  172  Misc. 
2 — Baronberg  v.  Humphreys,  1'N. 
T.S.2d  415,  166  Misc.  100— Bevelyn 
Realty  Corporation  v.  Brooklyn 
Const.  Co.,  249  N.T.S.  41,  140  Misc. 
74 — Tompkins  Haulage  Corporation 
v.  Roberts,  2'49  N.T.S.  22,  140  Misc. 
80— La  Pointe  v.  Wilson,  61  N.T.S. 
2d  64. 

R.I.— Berick  v.  Curran,  179  A.  708,  55 
R.I.  193. 

79.  N.J.— Fidelity   Union  Trust   Co. 
v.  Decker  Bldg.   Material  Co.,   148 
A.  717,  106  N.J.Law  132. 

80.  N.T.— Krause  v.  Lehigh  Valley 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


225 


By  whom  made.  Plaintiff's  affidavit  may  be  made 
either  by  plaintiff  himself81  or.  by  his  agent;82  and 
if  it  is  made  by  an  agent  it  is  not  necessary  that  it 
should  show  why  plaintiff  did  not  execute  it88  nor 
need  it  expressly  appear  whether  the  agent's  knowl- 
edge is  personal  or  is  merely  based  on  information 
and  belief.8* 

Amendment  of  affidavit.  Whether  or  not  plaintiff 
should  be  permitted  to  amend  his  affidavit  of  merit 
is  a  matter  within  the  sound  discretion  of  the 
court.85 

Special  proceedings  for  judgment  by  notice  of 
motion.  Under  statutes  providing  for  special  pro- 
ceedings for  judgment  by  notice  of  motion,  dis- 
cussed generally  supra  §  222,  an  affidavit  may  be 
used  to  supplement  the  notice  of  motion.86  Such 
affidavit  should  refer  to  the  notice  and  the  demand 
or  demands  therein  stated,87  and  must  comply  with 
statutory  requirements  as  to  the  time  of  making88 
and  as  to  its  service  on  defendant.89  The  use  of 


exhibits  in  a  notice  of  motion  for  judgment  pro- 
ceeding has  been  held  improper.90 

c.  In  Opposition  to  Motion 

After  the  plaintiff  makes  out  a  prlma  facie  case  for 
summary  Judgment  by  his  proofs,  the  defendant  by 
affidavits  or  other  proof  must  show  a  bona  fide  defense, 
although  In  this  he  is  aided  by  a  liberal  construction 
of  his  affidavits,  and  the  acceptance  as  true  of  the  state- 
ments therein. 

Defendant  is  entitled  to  an  opportunity  to  inter- 
pose an  affidavit  in  response  to  plaintiff's  proof, 
and  to  have  the  affidavit  weighed  as  against  such 
proof.91  Indeed,  where  plaintiff  has  shown  suf- 
ficient facts  to  make  out  his  case,  if  defendant  con- 
tests the  granting  of  the  motion  and  wishes  to  be 
entitled  to  defend,  he  must  establish  by  affidavit  or 
other  proof  such  facts  as  show  that  he  has  a  bona 
fide  defense  to  the  action,92  and  the  mere  filing  of 
an  answer  containing  denials  or  raising  an  issue  of 
fact  is  not  sufficient.93  Where  defendant  does  not 
deny  the  allegations  of  the  affidavit  presented  by 


Coal    Co.,     14    N.T.S.2d     206,     172 

Misc.  2. 
Wis. — Fuller     v.     General     Accident 

Fire    &    Life    Assur.    Corporation, 

Limited,    of    Perth,    Scotland,    272 

N.W.  839,  224  Wis.  603. 
Basis  of  belief 

A  provision  in  summary  Judgrment 
statute  requiring  party  moving  f°r 
summary  judgment  to  make  a  veri- 
fied statement  that  he  believes  that 
the  action  has  no  merit  does  not  re- 
quire the  moving  party  to  state  the 
basis  for  his  belief,  or  that  he  had 
been  so  advised  by  an  attorney,  and 
does  not  require  an  affidavit  by  an 
attorney  to  that  effect. — Tregloan  v. 
Hayden,  282  N.W.  698,  229  Wis.  500. 

81.  D.C. — Newman    v.    Goddard,    12 
APP.D.C.  404. 

34  C.J.  p  205  note  63* 

82.  D.C. — Newman  v.   Goddard,    su- 
pra, 

34  C.J.  p  205  note  64. 
Failure  to  allege  agency 

Affidavit  of  merit  was  not  defective 
for  affiant's  failure  to  allege  his 
agency  for  plaintiff. — Power  v.  Al- 
lied Asphalt  Products  Corporation, 
1'59  A.  251,  162  Md.  175. 

Where  plaintiff  was  corporation, 
the  affidavit  on  which  its  motion  for 
summary  judgment  was  based  was 
not  improperly  -received  because 
made  by  plaintiff's  attorneys  instead 
of  by  plaintiff. — Monroe  County  Fi- 
nance Co.  v.  Thomas,  11  N.W.2d  190, 
243  Wis.  568. 

83.  B.C. — Newman   v.    Goddard,    12 
App.D.C.  404. 

84.  D.C. — Newman  v.   Goddard,   su- 
pra. 

85.  D.C. — McReynolds   v.    Mortgage 


&  Acceptance  Corporation,  18  F.2d 
313,  56  App-D.C.  342. 

86.  W.Va. — Mountain    State    Water 
Co.  v.  Town  of  Kingwood,  1  S.B.2d 
395,   121  W.Va.   66— People's   State 
Bank  of  Crown  Point,  Ind.,  v.  Jef- 
fries, 129  S.E.  462,  99  W.Va,  399. 

Cause  of  action 

Under  some  statutes,  the  affidavit 
filed  with  a  notice  of  motion  for 
judgment  need  not  set  out  a  cause  of 
action  stated  in  the  notice,  but  is 
sufficient  if  It  states  that  there  is, 
as  affiant  verily  believes,  due  and 
unpaid,  from  defendant  to  plaintiff, 
on  demand  or  demands  stated  in  the 
notice,  including  principal  and  inter- 
est, after  deducting  all  payments, 
credits,  and  set-offs  made  by  defend- 
ant, or  of  which,  he  is  entitled,  a 
sum  certain,  named. — Citizens'  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Dixon,  117  S.B.  685,  94  W. 
Va.  21. 

87.  W.Va,— Rogers  v.  Wolf,  1$9  S.E. 
702,  104  W.Va,  206. 

34  C.J.  p  205  note  51. 

88.  W.Va,  —  Landsman-Hirscheimer 
Co.  v.  Radwan,  111  S.E.  507,  90  W. 
Va,  590. 

89.  W.Va,  —  Landsman-Hirscheimer 
.Co.  v.  Radwan,  supra, 

34  C.J.  p  205  note  55  [a]. 

90-  W.Va,— City  of  Beckley  v. 
Craighead,  24  S.E.2d  908,  125  W. 
Va.  484,  overruling  Mountain  State 
Water  Co.  v.  Town  of  Kingwood, 
1  S.B.2d  39*5,  121  W.Va.  66. 

91.  U.S. — Massee  &  Felton  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Benenson,  D.C.N.Y.,  23  F.2d 
107. 

N.Y. — Federal  Deposit  Ins.  Corpora- 
tion v.  Fisher,  16  N.T.S.2d  221,  258 
App.Div.  900. 

419 


Claim  of  surprise 

Plaintiff  has  been  held  not  enti- 
tled to  claim  surprise  because  of  a 
statement  made  in  the  answering  af- 
fidavit where  a  similar  statement 
was  contained  in  the  opposing  affida- 
vit submitted  on  a,  prior  motion  for 
summary  judgment. — Doniger  v.  Las- 
off,  211  N.Y.S.  486,  12!5  Misc.  838. 
92.  Cal.— Kelly  v.  Liddicoat,  96  P.2d 

'186,    35    CaLApp.2d    559— Shea    v. 

Leonis,    84    P.2d    277,    29    Cal.App. 

2d  184. 
111.— Killian  v.  Welfare  Engineering 

Co.,  66  N.B.2d  305,  328  IlLApp.  375 

— Great  Atlantic  &  Pacific  Tea  Co. 

v.  Town  of  Bremen,  64  N.B.2d  220, 

327  IlLApp.  393. 
Mich. — Gloeser   v.    Moore,    278   N.W. 

781,     284     Mich.     106 — Gloeser     v. 

Moore,  278  N.W.  72,  283  Mich.  425. 
NJ. — Pusatere  v.  New  Amsterdam 

Casualty  Co.,  184  A.  513,  116  N.J. 

Law  359. 
N.T. — Security  Finance  Co.  v.  Stuart, 

224    N.Y.S.    257,     130    Misc.    638— 

Henderson     v.     Hildreth     Varnish 

Co.,  276  N.T.S.  414. 
34  C.J.  p  206  note  75. 

Statements  by  defendants'  attorney 
on  information  and  belief,  without 
stating  basis  of  belief,  are  insuffi- 
cient to  defeat  motion  for  summary 
judgment. — Seventh  Nat.  Bank  of 
New  York  v.  Cromwell,  226  N.Y.S. 
721,  131  Misc.  276. 

98.    Ark.— Holland  v.  Wait,  86  S.W. 

2d  415,  191  Ark.  405. 
Ill, — Killian  v.  Welfare  Engineering 

Co.,    66    N.E.2d    30-5,    328    IlLApp. 

375. 
N.Y.— Saunders  v.  Delario,  238  N.Y.S. 

337,     135     Misc.     455— Rodger     v. 

Bliss,  223  N.Y.S.  401,  180  Misc.  168 

— William  JT.   Conners  Car   Co.   v. 


§  225 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


plaintiff  in  support  of  his  motion,  the  allegations  of 
that  affidavit  are  taken  as  true.94 

Defendant,  however,  is  under  no  duty  to  chal- 
lenge the  claim  of  plaintiff  or  to  submit  affidavits 
or  proof  showing  a  meritorious  defense,  unless  the 
affidavits  or  other  proof  in  support  of  the  motion 
show  in  the  first  instance  a  good  cause  of  action  in 
plaintiff  and  that  the  defense  is  without  merit.95 
If  plaintiffs  complaint96  or  affidavits  or  proof97  are 
insufficient  to  justify  summary  judgment  the  mo- 
tion must  be  denied  although  defendant  fails  to  file 
on  opposing  affidavit  or  to  show  any  facts  sufficient 
to  entitle  him  to  defend  Defendant  is  under  no 
burden  to  show  that  affirmative  allegations  in  the 
defense  are  not  sham  when  the  attack  on  such  alle- 
gations is  made  solely  on  the  ground  that  they  are 
insufficient  in  law.98 


Where  the  motion  for  summary  judgment  is  made 
by  defendant,  the  allegations  of  the  complaint  do 
not  constitute  proof  on  behalf  of  plaintiff  of  the 
facts  therein  alleged  so  as  to  defeat  the  motion.9* 

The  general  requirements  of  an  affidavit  filed  in 
opposition  to  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  are 
no  different  from  those  necessary  in  support  of  a 
summary  judgment.1  The  averment  of  facts  which 
create  only  an  issue  of  law,  rather  than  an  issue  of 
fact,  will  not  defeat  the  motion.2  To  avert  sum- 
mary judgment  in  favor  of  plaintiff,  the  affidavits 
or  other  proof  adduced  by  defendant  must  disclose 
a  good  defense  or  set  out  facts  and  circumstances 
sufficient  to  raise  a  triable  issue  of  fact  and  to  en- 
title defendant  to  defend.3  Affidavits  of  defendant 
opposing  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  which 


Manufacturers'  &  Traders'  Nat. 
Bank  of  Buffalo,  209  N.Y.S.  406, 
124  Misc.  584,  affirmed  210  N.T.S. 
939,  214  App.Div.  811— Devlin  v. 
New  York  Mut  Casualty  Taxicab 
Ins.  Co.,  206  N.Y.S.  365,  123  Misc. 
784,  modified  on  other  grounds  210 
N.Y.S.  57,  213  App.Div.  152— Bent- 
ley.  Settle  &  Co.  v.  Brinkman,  42 
N.Y.S.2d  194 — Allen  Commercial 
Corporation  v.  Loucks,  41  N.Y.S.2d 
106. 
34  C.J.  p  206  note  77. 

The  pleadings  are  not  controlling, 
and  if  it  appears  from  facts  stated 
in  affidavits  or  documents  that  the 
answer  pleaded  is  sham,  false,  or 
frivolous,  the  answer  will  be  disre- 
garded.— Fellheimer  v.  Wess,  45  N.B. 
2d  89,  316  IlLApp.  449— Gliwa  v. 
Washington  Polish  Loan  &  Building 
Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d  736,  310  IlLApp.  465. 

94.  in.— Killian-  v.    Welfare    Engi- 
neering Co.,  66  N.E.2d  305,  328  111. 
App.  375. 

N.Y:— Title  Guarantee  &  Trust  Co.  v. 

Smith,  213  N.Y.S.  730,  21'5  App.Div. 

448. 
Wis. — Jefferson   Gardens   v.    Terzan, 

2*7  N.W.  154,  216  Wis.  230. 
Presumption  of  inability  to   sustain 
defense 

Absence  of  affidavit  supporting 
answer  raises  presumption  that  de- 
fense cannot  be  sustained. — U.  S.  v. 
Fiedler,  D.C.N.Y.,  37  F.2d  578. 

95.  N.Y. — Cohen      v.      Metropolitan 
Casualty  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  252 
N.Y.S.    8'41,   233   App.Div.  340— Ja- 
cobs v.  Korpus,  218  N.Y.S.  314,  128 
Misc.    445— State    Bank    v.    Mack- 
stein,  205  N.Y.S.  290,  123  Misc.  416. 

Admission  of  triable  issue 

Defendant's  failure  to  submit  affi- 
davit showing  facts  entitling  him 
to  trial  did  not  require  court  to 
grant  plaintiff's  motion  for  summary 
Judgment  where  the  moving  affidavit 
admitted  that  the  answer  raised  a 


triable  issue.— Bergman  v.  Santa- 
maria,  279  N.Y.S.  876,  244  App.Div. 
819. 

96.  N.Y.— Gubin     v.    City    of    New 
York,  276  N.Y.S.  515,  154  Misc.  547. 

97.  Cal.— Gardenswartz,    v.    Equita- 
ble Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  68  P. 
2d  322,  23  Cal.App.2d  Supp.  745. 

111.— Fellheimer  v.  Wess,  45  N.E.2d 
89,  316  IlLApp.  449— Gliwa  v. 
Washington  Polish  Loan  &  Build- 
ing Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d  736,  310  111. 
App.  465. 

N.Y.— Hurwitz  v.  Corn  Exchange 
Bank  Trust  Co.,  253  N.Y.S.  851, 
142  Misc.  398 — Homine  v.  Barnaby 
Agency,  227  N.Y.S.  235.  131  Misc. 
696. 

34  C.J.  p  205  notes  58,  59. 
Disclosure    of    issues    in    plaintiff's 

showing 

Insufficiencies  in  affidavit  of  mer- 
its, filed  by  defendants  in  proceed- 
ing for  summary  judgment,  are  un- 
important, where  plaintiff's  own 
showing  discloses  fact  issues. — Gas- 
well  v.  Stearns,  241  N.W.  165,  257 
Mich.  461. 
Duty  to  deny  statement  of  ultimate 

fact 

Defendant  need  not  submit  an  op- 
posing affidavit  to  an  allegation 
which  is  at  best  a  statement  of  an 
ultimate  fact,  rather  than  a  state- 
ment of  evidentiary  facts  which 
proves  plaintiff's  cause  of  action. — 
Kellog  v.  Berkshire  Bldg.  Corpora- 
tion, 211  N.Y.S.  623,  125  Misc.  818. 
Effect  of  admissions  and  documen- 
tary evidence 

Summary  judgment  has  been  held 
proper,  notwithstanding  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  plaintiff's  affidavits  stand- 
ing alone,  where  such  affidavits  to- 
gether with  defendant's  admissions 
in  his  pleadings  and  with  other  doc- 
umentary evidence  presented  a  case 
to  which  no  valid  defense  was  offer- 
ed.—Pratt  v.  Miedema,  18  N.W.2d 

420 


279,   311   Mich.    64,   certiorari  denied 
66  S.Ct.  49. 

98.  N.Y.— Hessian      Hills      Country 
Club  v.    Home   Ins.    Co.,    186   N.E. 
439,    262    N.Y.    189 — Hessian    Hills 
Country  Club  v.  Hartford  Fire  Ins. 
Co.,    186    N.E.    439,    262    N.Y.    189. 

99.  N.Y. — Pribyl  v.  Van  Loan  &  Co-., 
26    N.Y.S.2d    1,    261    App.Div.    503, 
reargument  denied  27  N.Y.S.2d  992, 
262  App.Div.  711,  affirmed  40  N.E. 
2d  36,  287  N.Y.  749 — Gnozzo  v.  Ma- 
rine Trust  Co.  of  Buffalo,  17  N.Y.S. 
2d  168,   258   APP-Div.   298,   reargu- 
ment   denied    Gnozzo    v.    Marine 
Trust    Co.,     18    N.Y.S.2d    752,    259 
App.Div.    788,    affirmed    Gnozzo    v. 
Marine  Trust  Co.  of  Buffalo,  29  N. 
E.2d   933,    284  N.Y.   617 — Camp-Of- 
The-Pines  v.  New  York  Times  Co., 
53    N.Y.S.2d    475,    184    Misc.    389 — 
Midland  Union   Groupe  v.   McMul- 
len,  5  N.Y.S.2d  975,  167  Misc.   SOC. 

1.  111.— Fisher  v.  Hargrave,  48  N.E. 
2d  966,  318  IlLApp.  510. 

2.  Cal. — Grady  v.   Easley,    1-14    P.2d 
635,    45    Cal.App,2'd    632— Bank    of 
America    Nat    Trust    &    Savings 
Ass'n   v.    Casady,   59    P.2d   444,    15 
Cal.App.2d  163. 

Pa. — Allen  v.  York  Buffalo  Motor  Ex- 
press,   Com.PL,    56    York   Leg.Rec. 
145. 
Construction  of  contract 

Court   may   enter   summary   judg- 
ment,  where   only  issue  Involved  is 
true    construction    of    written    con- 
tract, and  opposing  affidavits  suggest 
no  facts  which  might  be  proved  to 
aid  in  interpretation. 
U.S. — Sterling  Homes  Co.   v.    Stam- 
ford Water  Co.,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  79  F.2d 
607. 

IH._Spry  v,  Chicago  Ry.  Equipment 
Co.,  19  N.E.2d  122,  298  IlLApp.  471. 
R.I.— Sutter    v.    Harrington,    154    A. 
657,  51  R.I.  32-5. 

3.  U.S.— U.  S.  Gypsum  Co,  T.  Insur- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§225 


merely  repeat  the  various  denials  contained  in  the 
answer,4  or  which  merely  deny  in  general  terms 
plaintiff's  right  of  action,5  are  insufficient.  His  af- 
fidavits must  set  forth  evidentiary  facts  sufficient 
to  show  that  he  has  a  defense  to  plaintiff's  claim 
or  to  some  part  thereof.6  The  facts  must  be  set 
forth  with  such  particularity  that  the  court  can  de- 
termine whether  there  is  a  good  and  substantial  de- 


fense,7 general  denials  or  expressions  of  defend- 
ant's belief,  or  conclusions  and  inferences  of  law, 
and  the  like,  being  insufficient.8 

The  affidavits  of  the  party  opposing  the  motion 
are  to  be  liberally  construed9  and  must  be  accepted 
as  true  for  the  purposes  of  the  motion.1^  Plain- 
tiffs motion  for  summary  judgment  will  not  be 


ance   Co.   of  North  America,   D.C.  | 
N.T..  19  P.Supp.  767.  | 

111. — Killian  v.  Welfare  Engineering 
Co.,  66  N.B.2d  305,  328  Ill.App.  375  | 
— Clark  v.  Lithuanian  Roman 
Catholic  Alliance  of  America,  64 
N.B.2d  209,  327  Ill.App.  336 — Em- 
ployers' Liability  Assur.  Corpora- 
tion v.  A.  A.  Electric  Co.,  27  N.E.2d 
321,  305  Ill.App.  209— Spry  v.  Chi- 
cago Ry.  Equipment  Co.,  19  N.E.2d 
122.  298  Ill.App.  471. 

Mich.— Schneider  v.  Levy,  239  N.W. 
326,  256  Mich.  184. 

N.J. — National  Sur.  Corp.  v.  Clement, 
42  A.2d  387— Birkenfeld  v.  Gins- 
burg.  146  A.  170,  106  N.J.Law  377. 

N.Y.— Di  Roma  v.  Chambers  Drug 
Store,  28  N.Y.S.2d  170,  262  App. 
Div.  856— Butler  v.  Mercantile  Ar- 
cade Realty  Corporation,  276  N.Y. 
S.  190,  2*43  App.Div,  60 — Strasbur- 
ger  v.  Rosenheim,  255  N.Y.S.  316, 
234  App.Div.  544 — Dodwell  &  Co. 
v.  Silverman,  25'4  N.Y.S.  746,  234 
App.Div.  362 — Lapkin  v.  Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  42  N.Y. 
S.2d  642,  181  Misc.  856,  modified 
on  other  grounds  48  N.Y.S.2d  463, 
267  App.Div.  950— First  Nat.  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  of  Elmira  v.  Conzo,  7 
N.Y.S.2d  334,  169  Misc.  268— Han- 
feld  v.  A.  Broido,  Inc.,  3  N.Y.S.2d 
463,  167  Misc.  85— Union  Trust  Co. 
of  Rochester  v.  Mayer,  270  N.Y.S. 
355.  150  Misc.  375,  affirmed  in  part 
and  reversed  in  part  on  other 
grounds  273  N.Y.S.  438,  242  App. 
Div.  671,  affirmed  285  N.Y.S.  1046, 
246  App.Div.  685 — Sobel-Mirken 
Holding  Corporation  v.  Rubman, 
259  N.Y.S.  476,  144  Misc.  731— 
Goodman  &  Suss  v.  Rosenthal,  244 
N.Y.S.  242,  137  Misc.  704— Hanrog 
Distributing,  Corp.  v.  Hanioti,  54 
N.Y.S.2d  500 — Blanchard  Press  v. 
Aerosphere,  Inc.,  51  N.Y.S.2d  715, 
affirmed  56  N.Y.S.2d  415,  269  App. 
Div.  826— First  Nat.  Bank  of  Dol- 
geville,  N.  Y.,  v.  Mang,  41  N.Y. 
S.2d  92 — Air  Conditioning-  Train- 
ing Corporation  v.  Strassberg,  18 
N.Y.S.2d  310— Samuel  Goldberg  & 
Son  v.  Siegel,  8  N.Y.S.2d  897— 
Hoof  v.  John  Hunter  Corp.,  193 
N.Y.S.  91. 

R.I. — Minuto  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  179  A.  713,  55  R.I.  201— 
Merchants'  &  Manufacturers'  Fi- 
nance Co.  v.  Jeschke, -165  A.  441. 

34  C.J.  p  206  note  80. 

4.  U.S. — Prick  Co.  v.  Rubel  Corpo- 
ration, C.C.A.N.Y.,  62  F.2d  768. 


N.Y.— Maurice  O'Meara  Co.  v.  Na- ! 
tional  Park  Bank  of  New  York,  146 
N.E.  636,  239  N.Y.  386,  39  A.L.R. 
747,  reargument  denied  148  N.E. 
725,  240  N.Y.  607 — Dodwell  &  Co. 
v.  Silverman,  25-4  N.Y.S.  746,  234 
App.Div.  362— Cleghorn  v.  Ocean 
Accident  &  Guarantee  Corporation, 
Limited,  of  London,  215  N.Y.S.  127, 
216  App.Div.  342,  modified  on  oth- 
er grounds  155  N.E.  87,  244  N.Y. 
166— Phillips  v.  Investors'  Syndi- 
cate, 259  N.Y.S.  462,  1'45  Misc.  361 
—La  Pointe  v.  Wilson,  61  N.Y.S.2d 
64 — Krauss  v.  Central  Ins.  Co.  of 
Baltimore,  40  N.Y.S.2d  736. 
Denial  of  infancy 

In  an  action  by  an  infant  to  disaf- 
firm a  contract,  defendant's  denial  of 
knowledge  or  information  sufficient 
to  form  a  belief  as  to  plaintiffs  in- 
fancy is  insufficient  to  defeat  plain- 
tiff's motion  for  summary  judgment, 
in  the  absence  of  a  showing  con- 
trary to  the  proof  advanced  by  plain- 
tiff by  affidavit  and  his  birth  certifi- 
cate.— Bower  v.  M.  Samuels  &  Co., 
234  N.Y.S.  379,  226  App.Div.  769,  af- 
firmed 170  N.E.  138,  252  N.Y.  549. 
Mere  refusal  to  concede  statements 

A  statement  in  an  affidavit  that  de- 
fendant does  not  concede  certain 
statements  made  in  plaintiff's  affi- 
davit is  unavailing  as  counter  proof 
on  a  motion  for  a  summary  Judg- 
ment.—Honkkong  &  Shanghai  Bank- 
ing Corporation  v.  Lazard-Godchauac 
Co.  of  America,  201  N.Y.S.  771,  207 
App.Div.  174,  appeal  denied  143  N.E. 
761,  237  N.Y.  604,  and  affirmed  147 
N.E.  216,  239  N.Y.  610. 

5.  111.— Wainscott  v.  Penikoff,  4  N. 
E.2d  511.  287  IlLApp.  78. 

R.I.— Sutter  v.  Harrington,  154  A, 
657,  51  R.I.  325— Rosenthal  v. 
Halsband,  1*52  A.  320,  51  R.I.  119. 

6.  Cal. — Security-First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Los    Angeles    v.    Cryer,    104    P.2d 
66,  39  Cal.App.2d  757— Shea  v.  Le~ 
onis,    84    P.2d    277?    29    Cal.App:2d 
18-4. 

111.— Killian  v.  Welfare  Engineering 
Co.,  66  N.E.2d  305,  328  Ill.App.  375. 

N.Y. — Anderson  v.  City  of  New  York, 
17  N.Y.S.2d  326,  258  App.Div.  588. 

R.I.— -Merchants'  &  Manufacturers' 
Finance  Co.  v.  Jeschke,  165  A.  441. 

7.  Mich.— Andrews  v.  Pfent,  273  N. 
W.  585,  280  Mich.  324. 

8.  111. — Killian  v.  Welfare  Engineer- 
ing Co.,  66  N.B.2d  305,  328  IlLApp. 
375. 

421 


R.I.— Minuto    v.    Metropolitan    Life 

Ins.  Co.,  179  A.  713,  55  R.I.  201. 
Discretion  of  court 

Trial  court  was  vested  with  sound 
judicial  discretion  to  deny  motion 
for  summary  judgment  against  de- 
fendant on  ground  that  defendant's 
answers  to  interrogatories  were  mod- 
ified expressions  and  not  positive 
declarations. — Aycock  v.  Bottoms, 
144  S.W.2d  43,  201  Ark.  104. 

9.  Cal.— Eagle  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v. 
Prentice,    122    P.2d    264,    19    Cal.2d 
553 — Gibson    v.    De    La    Salle    In- 
stitute, 152  P.2d  774,  66  Cal.App.2d 
609— Grady  v.  Easley,  114  P.2d  635, 
45    Cal. App. 2d    S3  2 — McComsey    v. 
Leaf,    97    P.2d   242,    36    Cal.App.2d 
132. 

D.C.— Wyatt  v.  Madden,  32  F.2d  838. 
59  App.D.C.  38 — Gleason  v.  Hoeke, 

5  App.D.C.  1. 

111.— .Fellheimer  v.  Wess,  45  N.E.2d 
89,  316  IlLApp.  449— Soelke  v.  Chi- 
cago Business  Men's  Racing  Ass'n. 
41  N.E.2d  232,  314  Ill.App.  336— 
Gliwa  v.  Washington  Polish  Loan 

6  Building   Ass'n,    34    N.E.2d    736, 
310  IlLApp.  465. 

N.Y.— Diamond  v.  Davis,  38  N.Y.S. 
2d  103,  affirmed  59  N.Y.S.2d  412, 
first  case,  265  App.Div.  919;  appeal 
denied  41  N.Y.S.2d  191,  first  case, 
265  App.Div.  1052,  and  affirmed  '54 
N.E.2d  683,  first  case,  292  N.Y. 
552. 

Presumption  of  exercise  of  ordinary 
oare 

In  action  for  death  of  motorist  at 
crossing,  in  determining  whether  de- 
fendant was  entitled  to  summary 
Judgment,  presumption  that  motor- 
ist exercised  ordinary  care  was  to 
be  considered. — Holzschuh  v.  Web- 
ster, 17  N.W.2d  553,  246  Wis.  423. 

10.  CaL — Eagle   Oil  &  Refining  Co. 
v.  Prentice,   122  P.2d  264,   19  Cal. 
2d    553 — Slocum    v.    Nelson,    App., 
163    P.2d    888— Gibson    v.    De    La 
Satte    Institute,    152    P.2d    774,    66 
Cal.App.2d    609— Grady    v.    Easley, 
114   P.2d   635,   45  Cal.App.2d   632— 
Anchors  v.  Anchors,  App., '  107   P. 
2d   973— Kelly  v.   Liddicoat,   96   P. 
2d  186,  35  CaL  App.  2d  559 — Shea  v. 
Leonis,  84  P.2d  277,  29  Cal.App.2d  . 
184— Bank  of  America  Nat.  Trust 
&  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Casady,  59  P. 
2d    444,    15    Cal.App.2d    16S— Krle- 
ger  v.  Dennie,  10  P.2d  820,  123  CaL 
App.Supp.  777 — Cowan  Oil  &  Refin- 
ing Co.  v.  Miley  Petroleum  Corpo- 


225 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


granted  where  the  affidavits  submitted  in  opposition 
state  facts  which,  if  true,  would  constitute  a  de- 
fense,11 or,  as  the  rule  is  sometimes  expressed,  in 
order  to  warrant  summary  judgment  against  de- 
fendant, there  must  be  a  failure  on  the  part  of  de- 
fendant to  satisfy  the  court  by  affidavit  or  other 
proof  that  there  is  any  basis  for  his  denial  or  any 
truth  in  his  defense.12  The  fact  that  the  statements 
made  in  the  opposing  affidavit  are  made  on  infor- 
mation and  belief  does  not  of  itself  render  the  affi- 
davit insufficient  to  defeat  the  motion.1^  In  the 
exercise  of  its  sound  discretion,  the  court  may  grant 
defendant  the  right  to  amend  an  affidavit  of  de- 
fense which,  although  suggesting  a  triable  issue, 
may  be  incomplete  or  technically  deficient.14 

Difficulty  of  making  proper  -showing.  Failure  of 
defendant  to  dispute  the  facts  presented  in  plain- 
tiffs affidavit  is  not  excused  on  the  ground  that  the 
necessary  proof  would  be  difficult  to  obtain.15  Un- 
der some  circumstances,  however,  the  court  in  the 
exercise  of  its  discretion  may  deny  a  motion  for 
summary  judgment  even  though  defendant  is  unable 
to  make  a  showing  such  as  the  statute  requires,  as 


ration,    295    P.    504,    112    CaLApp. 
Supp.  773. 
D.C.— Wyatt  v.  Madden,  32  F.2d  838, 

59  App.D.C.  38. 

111.— Fellheimer  v.  Wess,   45   N.E.2d 
89,     316     IlLApp.      449— Gliwa     v. 
.    Washington  Polish  Loan  &  Build- 
ing Ass'n,   3«4   N.E.2d  736,   310   HL 
App.  465. 
Mich. — Dempsey  v.  Langton,   253  N. 

W.  210,  266  Mich.  47. 
N.Y. — Chance  v.  Guaranty  Trust  Co. 
of  New  York,  21  N.Y.S.2d  356,  260 
App.Div.  216 — German  v.  Snedeker, 
13  N.T.S.2d  237,  257  App.Div.  596, 
reargument  denied  14  N.Y>S.2d 
1012,  2'58  App.Div.  708,  affirmed  24 
N.E.2d  492,  281  N.Y.  832— Tully  v. 
New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.,  240  N.Y.S. 
118,  228  App.Div.  449— Marcus  v. 
Knitzer,  4  N.Y.S.2d  308,  168  Misc. 
9— Voros  v.  Baroa,  285  N.Y.S.  926, 
158  Misc.  500 — Greenberg  v.  Rud- 
nick,  2-58  N.Y.S.  679,  143  Misc.  793 
— Magner  v.  Mills,  242  N.Y.S.  705, 
137  Misc.  535— Harris  v.  Equitable 
Surety  Co.,  226  N.Y.S.  263,  131 
Misc.  85— De  Mott  v.  Palmer,  59 
N.Y.S.2d  163— Biloz  v.  Tioga  Coun- 
ty Patrons'  Fire  Relief  Ass'n,  21 
N.Y.S.2d  6'43,  affirmed  23  N.Y.S.2d 
460,  260  App.Div.  976. 
R.I.— Berick  v.  Curran,  179  A,  708, 

55  R.I.  193. 
Conclnsiveness  .  of   testimony   "before 

trial 

Testimony  of  a  witness  before  tri- 
al is  not  conclusive  and  does  not  on 
motion  for  summary  judgment  pre- 
clude consideration  of  his  supple- 
mental statement  contained  in  affida- 
vit.— Strauss  v.  G.  H.  Mumm  Cham- 


pagne &  Associates,  30  N.Y.S.2d  117, 
262  App.Div.   971. 

Incredibility 

Claims  of  defendant's  witnesses 
relative  to  issue  of  fact  raised  by 
answer  should  not  be  disposed  of 
on  affidavits,  on  plaintiff's  motion  for 
summary  judgment,  on  ground  that 
testimony  is  incredible  as  matter  of 
law. — Danneman  v.  White,  283  N.Y.S. 
868,  246  App.Div.  727. 

Only  the  facts  well  pleaded  must 
be  taken  as  admitted,  and  not  a 
party's  conclusions  therefrom. — 
Shepard  v.  Wheaton,  60  N.E.2d  47, 
325  IlLApp.  269. 

11.  N.Y.— Cook  v.  Bauman,  217  N.Y. 
S.  187,  128  Misc.  23. 

Consideration,  of  entire  affidavit 

Fact  that  a  certain  part  of  defend- 
ant's affidavit  opposing  plaintiff's 
motion  for  summary  judgment  does 
not  in  itself  constitute  a  defense  is 
not  a  valid  ground  for  disregarding 
entire  affidavit. — Scharf  v.  Waters, 
IlLApp.,  66  N.E.2d  499. 

12.  Cal.— McComsey  v.  Leaf,   $7  P. 
2d  242,  36  Cal. App. 2 d  132. 

N.Y.— Curry  v.  Mackenzie,  146  N.E. 
375,  239  N.Y.  267— Salt  Springs 
Nat  Bank  of  Syracuse  v.  Hitch- 
cock, 259  N.Y.S.  24,  14'4  Misc.  547, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  263 
N.Y.S.  55,  238  App.Div.  150— Robin-' 
sohn  v.  Herman,  234  N.Y.S.  693,  134 
Misc.  246. 
Weight  and  credibility  of  defense 

Where  affidavit  in  opposition  to 
plaintiff's  motion  for  summary  judg- 
ment indicates  that  there  may  be  a 

422 


where  the  facts  of  the  defense  are  not  within  de- 
fendant's knowledge  and  other  persons  who  know  or 
claim  to  know  them  refuse  to  make  affidavits  to  be 
used  in  opposition  to  the  motion;16  but  before  de- 
fendant may  have  the  benefit  of  this  rule  he  should 
at  least  present  an  affidavit  by  some  one  who  states 
of  his  own  knowledge  that  such  other  persons  do 
know  or  claim  to  know  the  facts  and  have  refused 
to  make  affidavits,17  and  such  affidavit  ought  to 
name  the  other  persons  and  set  forth  what  each 
one  knows  or  claims  to  know,  in  a  manner  similar 
to  an  affidavit  for  continuance  on  the  ground  of  ab- 
sence of  witnesses.18 

Preponderance  of  proof  unnecessary.  Where  the 
motion  for  summary  judgment  is  made  by  plaintiff, 
the  affidavits  of  defendant  are  not  required  to  es- 
tablish his  defense  by  a  preponderance  of  proof.19 
Similarly,  on  a  motion  by  defendant  for  summary 
judgment,  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  establish  his 
defense  to  the  motion  by  a  preponderance  of  the 
proof.20 

Executors  and  administrators.  Since  the  repre- 
sentative of  a  deceased  person  may  be  in  ignorance 

defense  to  the  action,  the  weight  and 
credibility  of  such  defense  is  for 
the  jury,  and  court  cannot  discount 
it  entirely.— La  Pointe  v.  Wilson,  61 
N.Y.S,2d  64. 

13.  N.Y. — Dolge  v.  Commercial  Cas- 
ualty Ins.   Co.,   207  N.Y.S.    42,   211 
App.Div.  112,  affirmed  148  N.E.  746, 
240  N.Y.  656. 

M  C.J.  p  206  note  75  [a]. 
Effect  of  failure  to  deny 

An  allegation  made  in  an  answer- 
ing affidavit  on  information  was  held 
the  equivalent  of  a  statement  of  fact 
where  it  was  not  denied. — Doniger 
v.  Lasoff,  211  N.Y.S.  486,  125  Misc. 
838. 

14.  Pa. — Yezek       v.       Pennsylvania 
Turnpike  Commission,   Com.PL,   22 
West.Co.L.J.  262. 

R.I.— -Berick  v.  Curran,  179  A.  708,  55 
R.I.  193. 

15.  N.Y.— William    J.    Conners    Car 
Co.   v.   Manufacturers'   &   Traders' 
Nat.   Bank  of   Buffalo,    209    N.Y.S. 
406,    124    Misc.    58'4,    affirmed    210 
N.Y.S.    939,    214    App.Div.    811. 

16.  Cal. — Gardenswartz  v.  Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,   68  P.2d 
322,  23  Cal.App.2d  Supp.  745. 

17.  Cal. — Gardenswartz  v.  Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  supra. 

la    Cal. — Gardenswartz  v.  Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  supra. 

19.  N.Y. — Connor      v.      Commercial 
Travelers  Mut.   Accident  Ass'n  of 
America,   287  N.Y.S.  416,  247  App. 
Div.  352. 

20.  N.Y.— First  Trust  &  Deposit  Co. 
v.  Dent,  34  N.Y.S.2d  282,  263  App. 

"Div.  1058. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  225 


of  the  facts,  a  denial  by  such  representative  of 
knowledge  or  information  sufficient  to  form  a  be- 
lief is  sometimes  sufficient  to  defeat  plaintiffs  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment  where  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  the  representative  has  such  factual  knowl- 
edge of  the  circumstances  as  to  make  his  denial 
worthless.21  A  mere  statement  in  the  representa- 
tive's affidavit  of  want  of  knowledge  of  the  facts 
does  not,  however,  prevent  summary  judgment,22 
such  a  want  of  knowledge  being  sufficient  to  pre- 
vent summary  judgment  only  when  it  appears  that 
a  thorough  investigation  has  been  made  and  that 
ignorance  persists  after  genuine  efforts  to  ascertain 
the  facts.23 

Objections  to  affidavits;  motion  to  strike.  The 
better  practice  is  for  defendant  to  include  in  his 
affidavit  all  his  objections  to  plaintiffs  affidavit24 
It  has  also  been  held,  however,  that  the  failure  of 
defendant  to  object  to  plaintiffs  affidavit  is  not  a 
waiver  of  errors  therein,  since  unless  plaintiff  does 
those  things  which  the  statutes  prescribe  as  essen- 
tial to  jurisdiction  he  can  claim  none  of  its  bene- 
fits.^ 

Under  the  practice  in  some  jurisdictions,  a  plain- 
tiff who  contends  that  the  affidavit  or  affidavits  sub- 
mitted by  defendant  do  not  present  a  defense,  or 
are  otherwise  objectionable,  should  move  to  strike 
all  of  the  affidavit  or  the  objectionable  parts  ;26  and 
a  defendant  who  desires  to  test  the  sufficiency  of 
plaintiffs  motion  and  affidavit  for  summary  judg- 
ment should  file  a  written  motion  to  strike,  specify- 
ing his  objections.27  On  a  motion  to  strike  an  affi- 
davit or  portions  thereof,  the  material  facts  well 
pleaded  or  stated  in  the  affidavit  are  deemed  admit- 
ted.** . 


Service  of  affidavits.  The  court  may  permit  an- 
swering affidavits  in  a  proper  case,  although  they 
are  not  served  within  the  time  limited  by  the  mov- 
ing party.29  Under  the  practice  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions, a  party  moving  for  summary  judgment  who 
gives  sufficient  notice  of  his  motion  may  require 
that  the  adverse  party  serve  his  affidavits  in  opposi- 
tion a  specified  time  before  the  hearing;  and  where 
without  good  cause  the  opposing  party  has  failed 
to  comply  with  such  a  demand  the  court  may  re- 
fuse to  receive  his  affidavits.30 

Counterclaims  or  set-offs.  Summary  judgment  in 
favor  of  defendant  on  a  counterclaim  asserted  by 
him  is  proper  where  there  is  no  substantial  evi- 
dence in  the  affidavits  to  sustain  any  of  the  de- 
fenses alleged  in  plaintiffs  reply;31  but  the  sub- 
mission of  affidavits  by  plaintiff  which  raise  a  tria- 
ble issue  as  to  the  counterclaim  precludes  summary 
judgment  thereon.32 

It  has  been  held  that,  under  a  plea  of  non  as- 
sudpsit  to  a  motion  on  an  open  account,  defendant 
may  prove  set-offs.33 

d.  Applications  of  Eules 

The  principles  governing  the  necessity  and  suffi- 
ciency of  affidavits  or  other  proofs  in  support  of,  or  in 
opposition  to,  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  have  been 
applied  In  a  great  variety  of  cases,  and  summary  judg- 
ments have  been  granted  or  denied,  on  motion  of  either 
the  plaintiff  or  the  defendant,  according  to  the  circum- 
stances of  particular  cases. 

In  accordance  with  the  principles  discussed  in  the 
foregoing  subdivisions  of  this  section,  the  affida- 
vits or  other  proofs  submitted  by  plaintiff  on  a  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment  in  his  favor,  coupled 
with  the  failure  of  defendant  sufficiently  to  contro- 


21.  N.T.— Emley  v.  Gray,  32  N.Y.S. 
2d   "537,    263    App.Div.    894— Wood- 
mere   Academy   v.   Moskowitz,    208 
N.Y.S.   578,   2«12  App.Div.  457. 

22.  Mass.— Norwood     Morris     Plan 
Co.  v.  McCarthy,  4  N.B.2d  450,  295 
Mass.   £97,    107   A.L.R.    1215. 

23.  Mass. — Norwood     Morris     Plan 
Co.  v.  McCarthy,  supra.  . 

24.  Mich. — Hecker   Products    Corpo- 
ration   v.    Transamerican    Freight 
Lines,  296  N.W.  297,  296  Mich.  381. 

25.  Md.— Power    v.    Allied    Asphalt 
Products   Corporation,   159   A.   251, 
162  Md.  175. 

Failure  of  defendants'  attorney  to 
contest  motion  for  summary  judg- 
ment is  not  waiver  of  plaintiff's  com- 
pliance with  statute  and  court  rule. 
— MacClure  v.  Noble,  24'4  N.W.  174, 
259  Mich.  601. 
Defective  affidavit 

Defendant  in  action  under  Speedy 
Judgment  Act  can  be  put  in  no  worse 


position  by  filing  defective  affidavit 
of  defense  than  if  he  filed  none. — 
Power  v.  Allied  Asphalt  Products 
Corporation,  159  A.  251,  162  Md.  175. 

26.  111.-— Scharf  v.  Waters,  App.,  66 
N.E.2d  499. 

27.  111. — Scharf  v.  Waters,  supra. 

28.  111. — Ublasi  v.  Western  &  South- 
ern Life  Ins.  Co.,  64  N.E.2d  233,  327 
111. App.    412 — Lowenstern   Bros.   v. 
Marks  Credit   Clothing,   4$  N.E.2d 
729,      319      IlLApp.      71— National 
Builders   Bank   of  Chicago   v.    Si- 
mons,   31   N.E.2d   274,    307   IlLApp. 
562. 

29.  N.Y.— McMasters  v.   Allcut,   136 
N.Y.S.   144,  151  App.Div.   559. 

Refusal  to  consider  filed  affidavits 

Where  affidavits  opposing  a  motion 
for  summary  judgment  were  filed, 
the  court's  refusal  to  consider  them, 
on  the  ground  that  copies  had  not 

423 


been  served  on  plaintiff's  attorney 
as  directed,  and  that  plaintiff  had  not 
had  an  opportunity  to  reply  there- 
to, was  held  error. — Cook  v.  Bau- 
man,  217  N.Y.S.  187,  128  Misc.  23. 

30.  N.Y. — Gnozzo    v.    Marine    Trust 
Co.  of  Buffalo,  17  N.Y.S.2d  168,  258 
App.Div.    298,    reargument    denied 
Gnozzo    v.    Marine    Trust    Co.,    18 
N.Y.S.2d  752,  259  App.Div.  788,  af- 
firmed Gnozzo  y.  Marine  Trust  Co. 
of  Buffalo,    29   N.E.2d    933,    284   N. 
Y.  617. 

31.  N.Y. — Brooks  v.  Slawson,  10  N. 
Y.S.2d  S7§,   256  AppJMv.   1052,  af- 
firmed 24  N.R2d  21,   281  N.Y.   762. 

32.  N.Y. — Gottesman     v.     Goldberg, 
266   N.Y.S.    676,    149    Misc.    50. 

Wis.— Prime  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  P.  Gal- 
lun  &  Sons  Corporation,  281  N.W. 
697,  229  Wis.  348. 

33.  Va. — Whitley    v.    Booker    Brick 
Co.,  74  S.E.  160,  113  Vat  434. 


§  225 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


vert  such  proof,  have  been  held  to  justify  summary 
judgment,  as  to  either  all  or  a  part  of  the  claim  as- 
serted, in  a  great  variety  of  actions,34  including  ac- 
tions for  or  involving  accounts  stated,35  alimony,36 
assessments  against  stockholders37  or  policyhold- 


ers,38  bonds,39  building  or  construction  contracts,40 
checks,41  drafts,42  extension  agreements,43  fees  and 
charges,44  forcible  detainer,45  foreclosure  of  mort- 
gages, deeds  of  trust,  or  liens,46  guaranties,47  in- 
surance,48 loans,49  notes,50  rents,51  including  ac- 


34.  111.— Great  Atlantic  &  Pacific 
Tea  Co.  v.  Town  of  Bremen,  64  N. 
E.2d  220,  327  Ill.App.  393— Gliwa  v. 
Washington  Polish  Loan  &  Build- 
ing Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d  736,  310  111. 
App.  46-5. 

N.T.— Isaacs  v.  Schmuck,  156  N.E. 
621,  245  N.T.  77,  51  A.L.R,  1454— 
Buffalo  Sav.  Bank  v.  O'Gorman,  25 
N.T.S.2d  8,  260  App.Div.  993— Ton- 
kers  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Roth,  285  N.T.S.  264,  2'47  App.Div. 
730— Schlesinger  v.  Kofsky-Moos, 
Inc.,  276  N.T.S.  980,  154  Misc.  242. 

Wis.— Barneveld  State  Bank  of 
Barneveld  v.  Rongve,  280  N.W.  295, 
228  Wis.  293. 

.35.  N.T.— Tobey  v.  Nelson,  270  N.T. 
S.  201,  150  Misc.  346 — Manhattan 
Paper  Co.  v.  Bayer,  263  N.T.S.  720, 
147  Misc.  227. 

36.  N.T.— Sutin  v.   Sutin,    38  N.T.S. 
2d  162,  180  Misc.  197. 

37.  N.T.— Broderick     v.     Alexander, 
275  N.T.S.   278,   153  Misc.   825. 

38.  Wis.— Duel    v.     Ramar    Baking 
.  Co.,   18   N.W.2d  345,   246  Wis.   604. 

39.  111. — People     ex     rel.     Ames    v. 
Marx,  18  N.E.2d  915,  370  111.  264. 

N.J. — Electric  Service  Supplies  Co. 
v.  Consolidated  Indemnity  &  In- 
surance Co.,  168  A.  412,  111  N.J. 
Law  288. 

N.T. — Perry  v.  Norddeutscher  Lloyd, 
268  N.T.S.  525,  150  Misc.  73— 
Union  Trust  Co.  of  Rochester  v. 
Toal,  28  N.T.S.2d  956. 

43.  111.— Willadsen  v.  City  of  East 
Peoria,  47  N.E.2d  136,  317  Ill.App. 
•541. 

Md.— Power  v.  Allied  Asphalt  Prod- 
ucts Corporation,  159  A.  251,  162 
Md.  175. 

N.J. — Nolte  v.  Nannino,  15'4  A.  831, 
107  N.J.Law  462. 

N.T. — J.  R.  Const.  Corporation  v, 
Berkeley  Apartments,  26  N.T.S.  2d 
958,  261  App.Div.  1085,  appeal  de- 
nied 28  N.T.S.2d  715,  262  App.Div, 
757,  appeal  denied  35  N.E.2d  941 
286  N.T.  604,  reargument  denied  30 
N.T.S.2d  49'4,  268  App.Div.  965. 

41.  N.T. — Frankfurter  v.  Silverman 
208  N.T.S.  405,  124  Misc.  751— Wil- 
liam J.  Conners  Car  Co.  v.  Manu- 
facturers'   &    Traders'    Nat.    Bank 
of    Buffalo,    209    N.T.S.    406,    124 
Misc.  584,  affirmed  210  N.T.S.  939 
214  App.Div.  811. 

42.  N.T.— Buffalo    Porcelain    Enam 
eling    Corporation    y.    Paramoun1 
Service  Corporation,  202  N.T.S.  301 

43.  N.T.— East   River   Sav.   Bank  v 
Realty  Ventures,   60  N.T.S.2d  581 

44.  N.T.— Title   Guarantee   &  Trus 


Co.   v.    Smith,    213   N.T.S.   730.    215 
App.Div.  4'48. 

45.  111.— Wainscott  v.  Penikoff,  4  N. 
E.2d  Ml.  287  Ill.App.  78. 

46.  Cal.— Ware   v.   Heller,    148   P.2d 
410,   -63    Cal.App.2d    817— Security- 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v. 
Cryer,   104   P.2d   66,   39   Cal.App.2d 
757. 

N.T. — City  of  New  Rochelle  v.  Echo 
Bay  Waterfront  Corporation,  49  N. 
T.S.2d  673,  268  App.Div.  182,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Echo  Bay  Water- 
front Corp.  v.  City  of  New  Ro- 
chelle, 66  S.Ct.  24.  Affirmed  60  N. 
E.2d  838,  294  N.T.  678— Federation 
Ba<&  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Andrew  Jack- 
son Apartments,  7  N.T.S.2d  983, 
255  App.Div.  878,  reargument  de- 
nied 8  N.T.S.2d  1005,  255  App.Div. 
986— Proudman  v.  Shaw  Service 
Stations,  7  N.T.S.2d  526,  255  App. 
Div.  857 — Federation  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Andrew  Jackson  Apartments, 
5  N.T.S.2d  928,  168  Misc.  328,  af- 
firmed 7  N.T.S.2d  983,  25'5  App.Div. 
878,  reargument  denied  8  N.T.S.2d 
1005,  255  App.Div.  986— Meurer  v. 
Keimel,  267  N.T.S.  799,  150  Misu, 
113. 

47.  N.T.— Doehler   Die    Casting    Co. 
v.    Holmes,    52   N.T.S.2d   321— Kir- 
sten  v.  Chrystmos,  14  N.T.S.2d  4'42. 

48.  111.— Clark  v.  Lithuanian  Roman 
Catholic    Alliance    of   America,    64 
N.E.2d    209,    327    Ill.App.    336— Bil- 
ton  v.  Pure  Protection  Ins.  Ass'n, 
49    N.E.2d    834,  ,319    IlLApp.    644— 
Employers'  Liability  Assur.  Corpo- 
ration v.  A.  A.  Electric  Co.,  27  N.E. 
2d  321,  305  IlLApp.  209. 

N.T.— Killian  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  232  N.T.S.  280,  225  App. 
Div.  781,  affirmed  166  N.E.  798,  251 
N.T.  44,  64  A.L.R.  956— Killeen  v. 
General  Ace.,  Fire  &  Life  Assur, 
Corporation,  227  N.T.S.  220,  131 
Misc.  691,  affirmed  229  N.T.S.  875 
224  App.Div.  719 — Krauss  v.  Cen- 
tral Ins.  Co.  of  Baltimore,  40  N.T. 
S.2d  736. 

49.  N.T.— Perlman   v.   Perlman,    257 
N.T.S.  48,  235  App.Div.  313— Rodg- 
er   V.    Bliss,    223    N.T.S.    401,    130 
Misc.   168. 

50-  Cal.— Kelly  v.  Liddicoat,  96  P 
2d  186,  3'5  Cal.App.2d  559— Himes 
v.  Club  Rustico  De  La  Playa,  S.  A. 
44  P.2d  395,  6  Cal.App.2d  356. 

HI. — National  Builders  Bank  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Simons,  31  N.B.2d  274,  30 
IlLApp.  562. 

Mass.— Norwood  Morris  Plan  Co.  v 
McCarthy,  4  N.E.2d  450,  295  Mass 
597,  107  A.L.R.  1215. 

— Dart  Nat.  Bank  v.  Burton,  241 

424 


N.W.  858,  258  Mich.  283— Warren 
Webster  &  Co.  v.  Pelavin,  216  N.W. 
430,  241  Mich.  19— Slebodnick  v. 
La  Buda,  213  N.W.  698,  238  Mich. 
550. 

NT.J.— Irvington  Trust  Co.  v.  Maurer, 
151  A.  72,  8  N.J.Misc.  565,  affirmed 
156  A.   428,   108  NJT.Law  40*4. 
tf.T. — General   Inv.   Co.   v.    Interbor- 
ough  Rapid  Transit  Co.,   139   N.E. 
216,  235  N.T.  133— Italiano  v.  Ros- 
enbaum,    28-4   N.T.S.   177,   246   App. 
Div.  687,  affirmed  3  N.E.2d  196,  271 
N.T.    583— Walmor    Inc.,    v.    Globe 
Industrial  Corporation,   276  N.T.S. 
1000,  243  App.Div.  619 — Hayes  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Chynoweth,  257  N.T.S.  561, 
235  App.Div.  890 — McAnsh  v.  Blau- 
ner,    226    N.T.S.    379,    222   App.Div. 
381,  affirmed  162  N.E.  515,  248  N.T; 
'537 — Commonwealth    Fuel    Co.    v. 
Powpit    Co.,    209    N.T.S.    603,    212 
App.Div.    553— Hanna'v.    Mitchell. 
196    N.T.S.    43,    202    App.Div.    504. 
affirmed    139    N.E.    724,    235    N.T. 
534— First  Nat  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
of  Elmlra  v.  Conzo,  7  N.T.S.2d  334, 
169  Misc.  268— Irving  Trust  Co.  v. 
Orsris,  248  N.T.S.  771,  139  Misc.  670 
— Garcin  v.  Granville  Iron  Corpora- 
tion, 244  N.T.S.  145,  137  Misc.  648 
— Palmer  Lumber  Co.  v.  Whitney, 
240    N.T.S.    6'40,    136    Misc.    284— 
Ullman    v.    Edgebert,    43    N.T.S.2d 
666— Bentley,     Settle     &     Co.     v. 
Brinkman,    42    N.T.S.2d    194. 
R.I. — Bond  &  Goodwin  v.  Weiner,  167 
A.    189,   53   R.I.    407— Rosenthal   v. 
Halsband,  152  A.  320,  51  R.I.  119. 
Genninenes*   of   testator's    signature 
In  action  against  executor  on  note 
wherein    plaintiff    filed    motion    for 
summary  judgment,  counter-affidavit 
of   defendant    denying   signature    of 
testator    on     note     and     demanding 
proof    of    genuineness    of    signature 
was  held  ineffectual  as  showing  of 
facts  entitling  executor  to  defend. — 
Norwood    Morris    Plan    Co.    v.    Mc- 
Carthy,    4    N.E.2d    450,     295     Mass. 
597,  107  A.L.R.  1215. 
Agreement    respecting1    payment    of 

different  note 

In  action  on  demand  note,  written 
agreement  respecting  payment  of 
earlier  note  not  held  by  plaintiff  was 
held  inapplicable  to  note  in  suit  and 
could  not  prevent  summary  Judgment 
for  plaintiff,  where  execution  and  de- 
livery of  note  in  suit  were  admitted. 
— White  v.  Douglas,  270  N.T.S.  661, 
240  App.Div.  530. 

51.  111.— Board  of  Education  of  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Crilly,  37  N.E.2d 
873,  312  IlLApp.  177. 

N.T.— Louis  K.  Liggett  Co.  v.  Broad- 
way-John Street  Corporation,  221 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  225 


tions  for  replevin,62  repurchase  agreements,68  sales 
of  personal  property,64  services  rendered,65  specific 
performance,66  sureties,67  wages  or  salaries,68  and 
wrongful  discharge.69 

In  other  cases  the  affidavits  or  proofs  submitted 
by  plaintiff,  when  considered  with  the  opposing  af- 


fidavits or  proofs  submitted  by  defendant,  have 
been  held  insufficient  to  justify  summary  judgment, 
at  least  for  the  full  amount  claimed,60  as,  for  ex- 
ample, in  actions  for  or  involving  accounts,61  as- 
sessment of  stockholders,62  bonds,63  building  or 
construction  contracts,64  checks,65  commissions,66 


N.Y.S.  189,  220  App.Dlv.  195—  Han- 
feld  v.  A.  Broido,  Inc.,  3  N.Y.S.2d 
463,  167  Misc.  85—  City  &  State 
Supervision  Co.  v.  Hogran,  246  N.Y. 
S.  557,  1*40  Misc.  404. 


In  action  for  rent  wherein  main 
defense  was  abandonment  of  lease, 
an  affidavit  resisting  the  motion 
which  failed  to  show  that  lessors 
knew  of  lessee's  intention  to  aban- 
don or  the  abandonment  by  the  les-' 
see  was  insufficient  to  resist  the  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment.  —  Shea 
v.  Leonis,  8'4  P.2d  277,  29  Cal.App.2d 
184. 

52.  N.Y.—  Roxy  Athletic  Club  v. 
Simmons,  44  N.Y.S.2d  47. 

63.  N.Y.  —  Strasburger  v.  Hosenheim, 
255    N.Y.S.    316,    234    App.Div.    544. 

64.  111.  —  Lowenstern  Bros.  v.  Marks 
Credit  Clothing,  48  N.E.2d  729,  319 
IlLApp.    71—  Mee  v.   Marks,   26  N. 
B.2d  5-16,  304  IlLApp.  370. 

Mich.  —  Terre  Haute  Brewing  Co.  v. 

Goldberg,  289  N.W.  192,  291  Mich. 

401. 
N.Y.  —  Edward  F.  Dibble  Seedgrower 

v.  Jones,  223  N.Y.S.  785,  130  Misc. 

359  —  Methuen  Heel  Co.  v.  Tupper, 

41    N.Y.S.2d    357—  Stern    v.    S.    S. 

Steiner,  Inc.,   12  N.Y.S.2d  4'4. 
Pa.  —  Gray  Co.  v.  D.  G.  Nicholas  Co., 

Com.Pl.,    41   Lack.Jur.    157. 

65.  N.Y.—  Geraci  v.  Ffcbbozi,  291  N. 
Y.S.  86,  161  Misc.  450. 

Wis.  —  Juergens   v.   Hitter,    279  N.W. 

51,  227  Wis.  480. 
Hospital  services 
N.Y.  —  Buffalo    General    Hospital    v. 

Suppa,    13    N.Y.S.2d   680,   257  App. 

Div.  1030. 

66.  N.Y.—  Friedman  v.  Platzik,  57  N. 
Y.S.2d  215. 

67.  N.J.  —  Electric    Service    Supplies 
Co.    v.    Consolidated    Indemnity  & 
Insurance  Co.,   168  A.  412,   111  N. 
J.Law  288. 

68.  111.  —  Case  v.  Green  Oil  Soap  Co., 
13   N.E.2d  866,   294  Ill.App.   610. 

N.Y.  —  Bergman  v.  Royal  Typewriter 
Co.,  29  N.Y.S.2d  827,  modified  on 
other  grounds  32  N.Y.S.2d  132,  263 
App.Div.  812  —  Henderson  v.  Hil- 
dreth  Varnish  Co.,  276  N.Y.S.  414. 

59.  N.Y.—  Wilkinson      v.      Halliwell 
Electric    Co.,    204    N.Y.S.    854,    123 
Misc.  250. 

60.  Cal.  —  McComsey  v.  Leaf,   97  P. 
2d    242,    36    Cal.App.2d   132.  I 


111.— Scharf  v.  Waters,  App.,  66  N.E, 
2d  499. 

Mich.— Caswell  v.  Stearns,  241  N.W. 
165,  257  Mich.  461. 

N.Y. — Diamond  D.  Bus  Lines  v.  Hud- 
son Transit  Corporation,  1'4  N.Y.S. 
2d  811,  258  App.Div.  770— County 
Trust  Co.  v.  Moore,  300  N.Y.S.  128, 
252  App.Div.  351 — Braus  v.  Blon- 
del's  Shops,  286  N.Y.S.  777,  247 
App.Div.  209 — Klein  v.  Horowitz, 
270  N.Y.S.  834,  240  App.Div.  495— 
Consolidated  Indemnity  &  Insur- 
ance Co.  v.  Epstein,  255  N.Y.S.  408, 
23-5  App.Div.  661— Standard  Oil 
Co.  of  New  York  v.  Boyle,  246  N. 
Y.S.  142,  231  App.Div.  101— Miner 
v.  Reinhardt,  233  N.Y.S.  592,  225 
App.Div.  530 — Erzinger  v.  Lieber- 
man,  219  N.Y.S.  28,  218  App.Div. 
847— Idoni  v.  Down,  8  N.Y.S.2d 
719,  170  Misc.  303— Broderick  v. 
Cox,  297  N.Y.S.  875,  163  Misc.  283 
— Schaffer  Stores  Co.  v.  Sweet,  228 
N.Y.S.  599,  132  Misc.  38— McKin- 
ney  v.  Donahue,  59  N.Y.S.2d  726— 
Bloom  v.  Hershowitz,  202  N.Y.S. 
298. 

Pa. — Armstrong  v.  Connelly,  149  A. 
87,  299  Pa.  51 — Forest  City  Foun- 
dry v.  Lamb,  Com.Pl.,  2'4  Erie  Co. 
118. 

Recovery  of  property  from  police 
department  property  clerk 

N.Y.— Costello  v.  Simmons,  55  N.Y.S. 
2d  735,  269  App.Div.  823.  affirmed 
66  N.E.2d  581,  295  N.Y.  801— Klei- 
ger  v.  Simmons,  47  N.Y.S.2d  269, 
18-1  Misc.  17-5,  appeal  granted  55  N. 
Y.S.2d  665,  269  App.Div.  784. 

61.  'Cal.— Eagle   Oil   &   Refining   Co. 
v.  Prentice,  122  P.2d  264,  19.Cal.2d 
553. 

Mich. — Grand  Dress  v.  Detroit  Dress 
Co.,  227  N.W.  723,  248  Mich.  447. 

N.Y.— Curry  v.  Mackenzie,  146  N. 
E.  375,  239  N.Y.  267— Roberts  v. 
McDonald,  280  N.Y.S.  817,  245  App. 
Div.  80— Marvin  v.  Goldhurst,  234 
N.Y;S.  SO,  226  App.Div.  758. 

62.  U.S.— Goess  v.  A.  D.  H.  Holding 
Corporation,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  85  F.2d  72. 

63.  N.Y.— Read  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R. 
Co.,    31    N.E.2d    801,    284    N.Y.    435 
— Gellens   v.    Continental    Bank   & 
Trust  Co.  of  New  York,  272  N.Y.S. 
900,  241  App.Div.  591,  followed  in 
Wiand     v.     Continental     Bank    & 
Trust  Co.  of  New  York,  272  N.Y.S. 
903,  241  App.Div.  593,  and  Twomey 
v.   Continental   Bank  &  Trust   Co. 
Of  New  York,   272  N.Y.S.   904,  241  j 

425 


App.Div.    594— Marks   v.    Folio,   29 
N.Y.S.2d  1019,   177  Misc.   108— Mil- 
anese v.  Azzarone,  294  N.Y.S.  479, 
162  Misc.  329. 
Usury 

Where  right  of  individual  obligors 
on  bond  to  raise  defense  of  usury  de- 
pended on  whether  or  not  they  were 
principals  or  merely  sureties  or  guar- 
antors of  corporation's  debts,  and 
contradictory  affidavits  had  been 
submitted  on  that  issue,  rendition  of 
summary  judgment  against  individ- 
ual defendants  was  improper. — Pink 
v.  L.  Kaplan,  Inc.,  300  N.Y.S.  45,  252 
App,Diy.  490. 

64.  Mich.— Douglas    v.    Milbrand,    4 
N.W.2d   528,   302   Mich.   227. 

N.Y. — Charles  C.  Kellogg  &  Sons  Co. 
v.  De  Lia,  28  N.Y.S.2d  4,  262  App. 
Div.  803. 

65.  N.Y.— Stuyvesant    Credit    Union 
v.    Manufacturers'    Trust    Co..    267 
N.Y.S.  302,   239  App.Div.   187— Moe 
v.  Bank  of  U.  S.,   207  N.Y.S.   347, 
211  App.Div.  5'19 — Cardo  Drug  Co. 
v.   Chatham   &  Phenix  Nat.   Bank, 
204   N.Y.S.    13,   209    App.Div.   167— 
Hurwitz   v.    Corn   Exchange   Bank 
Trust  Co.,  253  N.Y.S.  851,  1'42  Misc. 
398. 

Check  for  gambling  debt 

In  action  on  check  against  maker 
and  payee,  plaintiff  was  not  entitled 
to  summary  judgment  under  affida- 
vits which  showed  that  check  was 
indorsed  to  plaintiff  in  payment  of 
unenforceable  gambling'  debt  and 
which  raised  triable  issue  of  fact. — 
Singer  v.  Union  Table  &  Spring  Co., 
271  N.Y.S.  349,  151  Misc.  909. 

66.  N.Y.— Barrett  v.  Jacobs,  175  N. 
E.  275,  255  N.Y.  520— Windsor  In- 
vesting  Corporation   v.   T.   J.   Mc- 
Laughlin's  Sons,  225  N.Y.S.  7,  130 
Misc.  730,  affirmed  229  N.Y.S.  926, 
224    App.Div.    715 — La    Polnte    v. 

*Wilson,  61  N.Y.S.2d  64. 
Authority  to  promise  payment 

Where  plaintiff  made  affidavit  that 
corporate  officers  had  authority  to 
sign  written  promise  to  pay  real 
estate  commissions  to  plaintiff,  and 
authority  was  denied  by  defendants, 
fact  issue  was  raised  for  trial. — 
Archbold  v.  Industrial  Land  Co.,  240 
N.W.  858,  264  Mich.  289. 
Employment  "by  competitor 

Where  defendant's  affidavit  in  op- 
position to  plaintiffs*  motion  for 
summary  judgment  in  action  for 
commissions  alleged  that  plaintiffs 
had  an  associate  who  was  repre- 


225 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


drafts,67  escrow  agreements,68  foreclosure  of  mort- 
gages or  liens,69  foreign  judgments,70  guaranties,71 
insurance,72  labor  and  materials,73  money  had  and 


received,74  necessaries,75  notes,76  partnerships,77 
property  settlement  agreements  between  spouses,78 
rents  or  leases,79  replevin,80  sales  of  personal81  or 


senting  a  competitor  of  defendant 
and  it  was  admitted  in  plaintiffs'  af- 
fidavit and  in  letters  that  such  in- 
dividual did  do  certain  work  for 
plaintiffs,  and  also  work  on  his  own 
account  connected  with  competitors 
of  defendant,  trial  court  erred  in 
granting  summary  judgment. — Shir- 
ley v.  Ellis  Drier  Co.,  39  N.E.2d  329 
379  111.  105. 

67.  N.Y.— Siegal  v.  Public  Nat  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  of  New  York,  7  N.Y. 
S.2d  771. 

68.  'Conn. — Rifkin   v.   Safenovitz,   4( 
A.2d  188,  131  Conn.  411. 

69.  N.Y.— Weber  v.  Richter,  58  N.T. 
S.2d  147,  269  App.Div.  961,  motion 
denied   59    N.T.S.2d    276,    269   App. 
Div.  1037— Title  Guarantee  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Queens  Freeholds,  45  N.Y.S. 
2d    5T5,     267    App.Div.    787— Dime 
Sav.  Bank  of  Brooklyn  v.  Feeney, 
284   N.Y.S.    94,   246   App.Div.   769— 
Citizens  Nat.  Bank  of  Freeport  v. 
Mintz,    280    N.Y.S.    902,    245    App. 
Div.    759^Brescia    Const.     Co.    v. 
Walart  Const.  Co.,  26'4  N.Y.S.  862, 
238  App.Div.   360 — Harry  Kresner, 
Inc.,  v.  Fuchs,  262  N.Y.S.  669,  238 
App.Div.  844. 

TTnconscionaTble  conduct 

In  foreclosure  action,  where  facts 
set  forth  in  affidavit  opposing  plain- 
tiff's motion  for  summary  judgment 
show  oppressive  or  unconscionable 
conduct  on  part  of  mortgagee  in  de- 
claring entire  principal  due  because 
of  mortgagor's  short  delay  in  paying 
interest  installment,  plaintiff's  mo- 
tion for  summary  Judgment  was  de- 
nied.— Domus  Realty  Corporation  v. 
3440  Realty  Co.,  40  N.Y.S.2d  69,  179 
Misc.  74'9,  affirmed  41  N.Y.S.21  940, 
266  App.±>iv.  725. 

70.  N.Y.— Croker  v.  Croker,  168  N.E. 
450,  252  N.Y.  24,  remittitur  amend- 
ed   169    N.E.    408,    252    N.Y.    345— 
Scanlon  v.  Kuehn,   232  N.Y.S.  592, 
225  App.Div.  256. 

71.  U.S.— Real  Estate-Land  Title  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Commonwealth  Bond 
Corporation,     C.C.A.N.Y.,     63     F.2d 
237. 

72.  Cal. — Gar  dens  war  tz  v.  Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  68  P.2d 
322,    23    Cal.App.2d    Supp.    745. 

111.— Shaw  v.  National  Life  Co., -42 
N.E.2d  885,  3'15  IlLApp.  210. 

N.Y. — Panettieri  v.  John  Hancock 
Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Boston, 
Mass.,  42  N.Y.S.2d  317,  266  App. 
Div.  872,  appeal  denied  44  N.Y.S. 
2d  471,  266  App.Div.  924 — Svensen 
v.  Zurich  General  Accident  &  Lia- 
bility Ins.  Co.,  Limited,  of  Zurich, 
Switzerland,  16  N.Y.S.2d  751,  258 


App.Div.     964 — Kaplan    v.     Girard 
Fire  &  Marine  Ins.   Co.,   266  N.Y 
S.    226,    238    App.Div.   "577— Kraus 
man   v.    John   Hancock   Mut   Life 
Ins.  Co.,   260  N.Y.S.   319,    236  App 
Div.    582,    reargument    denied    260 
N.Y.S.     981,     237     App.Div.     810 — 
Suslensky  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins 
Co.,  43  N.Y.S.2d  144,  180  Misc.  624 
affirmed  46  N.Y.S.2d  888,  267  App. 
Div.  812,  appeal  denied  60  N.Y.S.2d 
294,    270    App.Div.    819— Wecht    v 
Kornblum,  264  N.Y.S.  333,  147  Misc. 
653. 

R.I. — Minuto  v.  Metropolitan  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  179  A.  713,  55  R.I.  201. 

Identity  of  vehicle;  failure  to  co- 
operate 

N.Y. — Cohen  v.  Metropolitan  Casual- 
ty Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  252  N.Y.S. 
841,  233  App.Div.  3(40. 

Intoxication  of  insured 

N.Y. — Connor  v.  Commercial  Travel- 
ers Mut.  Accident  Ass'n  of  Ameri- 
ca, 287  N.Y.S.  416,  247  App.Div.  352. 

73.  N.Y. — Curry   v.    Mackenzie,    146 
N.E.  375,  239  N.Y.  267. 

74.  Mich.— Dempsey  v.  Langton,  253 
N.W.  2flOf  266  Mich.  47. 

75.  N.Y.— Moll  v.   Greer,   269  N.Y.S. 
660,  150  Misc.  10. 

76.  Cal. — Slocum    v.    Nelson,    App, 
163  P.2d  888. 

Del. — Lamson  v.  Habbart,  43  A.2d 
249. 

111. — Security  Discount  Corporation 
v.  Jackson,  51  N.E.2d  618,  320  111. 
App.  440 — C.  I.  T.  Corporation  v. 
Smith,  48  N.E.2d  735,  318  IlLApp. 
642. 

Mich. — Scripsema  v.  De  Korne,  268 
N.W.  762,  276  Mich.  634— Lammie 
v.  Klug,  249  N.W.  866,  264  Mich. 
323 — Cass  v.  Washington  Finance 
Co.,  248  N.W.  863,  263  Mich.  440. 

N.J. — Berger  v.  Respond,  158  A.  472, 
108  N.J.Law  268. 

N.Y. — C.  I.  T.  Corporation  v.  Revoir 
Motors,  13  N.Y.S.2d  221,  257  App. 
Div.  38'5 — Greenblatt  v.  Miller,  5  N. 
Y.S.2d  388,  255  App.Div.  18— Union 
Trust  Co.  of  Rochester  v.  Mayer, 
273  N.Y.S.  438,  242  App.Div,  671, 
affirmed  285  N.Y.S.  1046,  246  App. 
Div.  685 — Brulatour,  Inc.,  v.  Gars- 
son,  242  N.Y.S.  583,  229  App.Div. 
466 — Scanlon  v.  Kuehn,  232  N.Y.S. 
592,  225  App.Div.  256— Moir  v. 
Johnson,  207  N.Y.S.  380,  211  App. 
Div.  427 — Sherwin  v.  Jonas,  269 
N.Y.S.  121,  1*50  Misc.  342— Berman- 
Steinberg  <v.  Standard  Cotton 
Stores,  262  N.Y.S.  495,  146  Misc.' 
586 — Franco  v.  Swartz,  225  N.Y.S. 
739,  1»1  Misc.  74— C.  I.  T.  Corpora- 
tion v.  Spence,  224  N.Y.S.  297, 
130  Misc.  6'59-rSecurity  Finance 

426 


Co.  v.   Stuart,    224  N.Y.S.   257,   130 

Misc.  538 — Weartex  Rubber  Co.  v. 

Goldman,  204  N.Y.S.  205,  123  Misc. 

228— Sher    v.    Rodkin,    198    N.Y.S. 

597. 
R.I. — Beauvais  v.  Kishfy,  175  A.  826, 

54  R.I.  494. 
Wis.— Atlas  Inv.  Co.  v.  Christ,  2  N. 

W.2d  714,  240  Wis.  114. 
Material  misrepresentations 

Affidavit  of  defense  alleging  that 
defendant  was  induced  to  execute 
notes  by  material  misrepresentations 
was  held  sufficient  to  withstand  mo- 
tion for  summary  Judgment. — Wyatt 
v.  Madden,  32  F.2d  838,  59  App.D.C. 
38. 

Lack  of  consideration 

In  payee's  action  on  note,  which 
had  allegedly  been  given  in  payment 
of  account  originally  owed  by  de- 
fendant to  payee's  husband  and  as- 
signed to  payee,  defendant's  affidavit 
disputing  items  of  account  and 
pleading  lack  of  consideration  for 
note  was  held  proper  defense  as  be- 
tween original  parties  and  sufficient 
to  defeat  payee's  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment — Feinberg  v.  Mullin. 
291  N.Y.S.  302,  249  App.Div.  670. 

77.  N.Y. — Scanlon  v.  Kuehn,  232  N. 
Y.S.   592,   225  App.Div.  256— Schul- 
man  v.  Cornman,  223  N.Y.S.  19,  221 
App.Div.  170. 

78.  N.Y.— Jaeckel  v.   Jaeckel,   40  N. 
Y.S.2d  491,  179  Misc.  994. 

79.  Cal. — Krieger  v.  Dennie,  10  P.2d 
820,    123    CaLApp.,    Supp.,    777. 

N.Y.— Foster  v.  Barbeau,  5  N.Y.S.2d 
168,  254  App.Div.  823 — Walgreen 
Co.  v.  Diamond,  292  N.Y.S.  513, 
249  App.Div.  387— Port  Chester 
Central  Corporation  v.  Leibert,  39 
N.Y.S.2d  41,  179  Misc.  839. 

80.  N.Y. — Hofferman  v.  Simmons,  49 
N.E.2d  523,  290  N.Y.  4'49— Rader  v. 
Simmons,   49  N.E.2d  523,   290  N.Y. 
449,  appeal  denied  37  N.Y.S.2d  621, 
265    App.Div.    1003,    motion   denied 
49  N.E.2d   624,  290  N.Y.   668— Riv- 
era v.  Simmons,  49  N.E.2d  523,  290 
N.Y.  449— Smith  v.  Simmons,  49  N, 
E.2d  523,  290  N.Y.  449— Le  Fevre  v. 
Reliable  Paint  Supply  Co.,  273  N.Y. 
S.  903,  152  Misc.  594. 

81.  111. — Kanik    v.     Johnson     Bros. 
Heating    Co.,    5"4    N.E.2d    751,    323 
IlLApp.  282. 

Mich.— Bed  v.  Fallen,  12  N.W.2d  396, 
307  Mich.  466. 

N.Y. — Enterprise  Frame  &  Novelty 
Corporation  v.  Schieman,  49  N.Y. 
S.2d  860,  183  Misc.  3— Mill  Fac- 
tors Corporation  v.  Bridal  Veil  & 
Accessories  Co.,  51  N.Y.S.26!  356. 

Wis. — Prime  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  F.  Gal- 
lun  &  Sons  Corporation,  281  N.W. 
697,  229  Wis.  348. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  225 


real82  property,  services  rendered,88  specific  per- 
formance,84 subscriptions  for  stocks85  or  bonds,86 
trade  acceptances,87  and  wrongful  discharge.88 

On  defendant's  motion.  On  the  basis  of  the  affi- 
davits or  other  proof  submitted,  following  the  prin- 
ciples discussed  in  the  foregoing  subdivisions  of  this 
section,  defendant  has  been  held  entitled  to  sum- 


mary judgment  dismissing  the  complaint,  either  en- 
tirely or  in  part,  in  various  actions,89  including  ac- 
tions for  or  involving  accounts  stated,90  bank  de- 
posits,91 bonds,92  breach  of  marriage  promise,93 
commissions,94  conspiracy  and  slander,96  eject- 
ment,96 employment  agreements,97  fraudulent  trans- 
fers,98 insurance,99  liens  on  realty,1  malicious  pros- 
ecution and  false  arrest,2  property  settlements  be- 


82.  Mich. — Maser  v.  Gibbons,  274 
N.W.  352,  280  Mich.  621— MacClure 
v.  Noble,  244  N.W.  174,  259  Mich. 
601 — Sloman  v.  Allen,  233  N.W. 
4&1,  252  Mich.  578. 
Assignment  of  land  contract 

In  vendor's  action  on  land  contract 
wherein  defendant  filed  answer  as- 
serting that  another  had  been  sub- 
stituted as  vendee,  defendant's  affi- 
davit of  merits,  stating:  that  con- 
tract was  assigned  with  plaintiffs 
consent  and  that  by  agreement  de- 
fendant was  released,  was  held  suf- 
ficient.— Lauppe  v.  Silverstein,  260  N. 
W.  105,  271  Mich.  19. 

S3.    Colo. — Inter-Mountain     Iron     & 

Metal  Co.  v.  Cortinez,  162  P.2d  237. 

111. — Fein  v.   Taylor  Washing  Mach. 

Co.,    28    N.E.2d    3'44,    306    IlLApp. 

273. 

Mich. — Laughery  v.  Wayne   County, 

11  N.W.2d  902,  307  Mich.  $16. 
N.Y.— Knapp   v.  -Friedman.   238   N.Y. 
S.   22,   227  App.Div.   261— Gruss  v. 
City    of    New    York,    40    N.Y.-S.2d 
81«6,  179  Misc.  105'3— Brandt  v.  Da- 
vidson,  48  N.Y.S.2d  917— Miller  v. 
Wightman,    43    N.Y.S.2d    681. 
R.I.— Berick   v.   Curran,    179   A.    708, 

55  R.I.  19'3. 
Wis.— Sullivan    v.    State,    251    N.W. 

2-51,  213  Wis.  185,  31  A.L.R.  '877. 
Liability  of  stockholders  for  services 

performed  for  corporation. 
Plaintiff,  suing  under  statute  mak- 
ing stockholders  personally  liable  to 
laborers,  servants,  and  employees 
for  services  performed  for  corpora- 
tion, was  held  not  entitled  to  sum- 
mary judgment  wfrere  answering 
affidavits  presented  triable  issues 
whether  plaintiff  was  laborer,  serv- 
ant, or  employee,  and  whether  action 
was  commenced  within  period  of  lim- 
itation.— Warsen  v.  Granger,  2*84  N. 
Y.S.  308,  246  App.Div.  778. 

84.  N.Y. — Herrick     Park     Develop- 
ment Corporation  v.  Sholom  Real- 
ty  Co.,    298    N.Y.S.    656,    164   Misc. 
-603. 

85.  N.Y.— Armleder  Motor  Truck  Co. 
of  New  York  v.  Barnes,  202  N.Y.«S. 
472,  207  App.Div.  764. 

86.  N.Y. — Woodmere     Academy     v. 
Moskowitz,     208    N.Y.S.    -678,    212 

App.Div.  457. 

% 

87.  N.Y. — Berson    Sydeman    Co.    v. 
Waumbeck    Mfg.    Co.,    203    N.Y.S. 
716,  212  App.Div.  422. 


88.  N.Y. — Stevens   v.    Elizabeth   Ar- 
den,  Inc.,  2  N.Y.S.2d  187,  253  App. 
Div.  358. 

89.  111.— Fisher  v.   Hargrave,   48   N. 
B.2d   9«6,  '318   IlLAp-p.  '510. 

NT.Y.-^Graves  v.  Northern  N.  Y.  Pub. 
Co.,  22  N.Y.S.2d  -537,  260  App.Div. 
900,  motion  granted  32  N.-E.2d  832, 
285  N.Y.  547— Gnozzo  v.  Marine 
Trust  Co.  of  Buffalo,  -17  N.Y.S.2d 
168,  258  App.Div.  298,  reargument 
denied  Gnozzo  v.  Marine  Trust 
Co.,  18  N.Y.S.2d  752,  259  App.Div. 
788,  affirmed  Gnozzo  v.  Marine 
Trust  Co.  of  Buffalo,  29  N.B.2d 
93*3,  284  N.Y.  '617— Marmor  v. 
Bernstein,  11  N.Y.S.2d  818,  2-56 
App.Div.  1106,  affirmed  23  N.E.2d 
557,  281  N.Y.  7-54— Hyde  v.  Clark, 
3'9  N.Y.S.2d  '229,  179  Misc.  414— 
Beisheim  v.  People,  39  N.Y.S.2d 
333. 
Hospital  as  charitable  institution. 

In  action  for  injuries  to  patient 
at  hospital,  the  mere  assertion  of 
patient's  counsel  in  affidavit  that  de- 
fendant hospital  was  not  a  charita- 
ble institution  did  not  create  an  is- 
sue as  opposed  to  affidavit  of  hospi- 
tal's superintendent  which  contained 
copies  of  material  documents,  the 
articles  of  incorporation,  constitu- 
tion, and  by-laws,  which  showed  the 
actual  charitable,  benevolent,  and  ed- 
ucational practices  of  defendant; 
and  hence  defendant's  motion  for 
summary  judgment  should  have  'been 
granted. — Schau  v.  Morgan,  6  N.W. 
2d  212,  241  Wis.  334. 

90.  N.Y.— Ziegfeld  Theatre  Corp.  v. 
Sixth   Ave.    Amusement   Corp.,   -57 
N.Y.S.2d  -195. 

91.  U.'S.— U.   -S.   v.   Guaranty  Trust 
Co.  of  New  York,  Q.C.A.N.Y.,   100 
F.2d  369. 

92.  N.Y.— Anglo  -  Continental  Trust 
Maatschappij  (Anglo  -  Continental 
Trust    Co.)    v.    Allgemeine    Blek- 
tricitaets  -   Gesellschaft    (General 
Electric   Co.,    Germany),    1*3    N.Y. 
S.2d  397,  171  Misc.  714. 

93-  N.Y. — Sweinhart  v.  Bamberger, 
2  N.Y.SJSd  1'30,  16-6  Misc.  25'6. 

94.  N.Y. — Dumbadze  v.  Agency  of 
Canadian  Car  &  'Foundry  Co.,  38 
N.Y.S.2d  991,  affirmed  Gurge  v. 
Agency  of  Canadian  Car  &  (Foun- 
dry Co.,  45  N.Y.S.2d  955,  2"67  App. 
Div.  782,  appeal  denied  In  re  Dum- 
badze's  Estate,  47  N.Y.S.2d  *15, 
267  App.Div.  878. 


95.  Mich. — Robertson   v.   New   York 
•Life  Ins.  Co.,   19   N.W.2d   498,   312 
Mich.  92,  certiorari  denied  6*6  S.Ct 
470,  rehearing  denied  66  S.Ct.  896. 

96.  Wis. — Tregloan  v.    Hay  den,    282 
N.W.  698,  229  Wis.  -500. 

97.  U.S. — Larson  v.  Todd  Shipyards 
Corporation,    D.C.N.Y.,    16    OP.Supp. 
967. 

111. — Owen  v.  Mathias  Klein  &.'Sons, 
•  54  N.E.2d  88,  322  Ill.Ap»p.  "689. 

N.Y. — Kirschbaum  v.  Dauman,  26  N. 
Y.S.2d  646,  261  A-pp.Div.  998,  re- 
argument  denied  28  N.Y.S.2d  15'6, 
262  App.Div.  747. 

98.  N.Y.— 'Lederer  v.  Wise  Shoe  Co., 
12  N.E.2d  544,  STfc  N.Y.  459,  motion 
denied   296   N.Y.S.      824,    250   App. 
Div.  352. 

99.  N.Y.— Starker  v.  Prudential  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  282  N.Y.S.  845,  246 
AppJDiv.     567 — Ludmerer    v.    New 
York   «Life    Ins.    Co.,    19    N.Y.S.2d 
272. 

•Wis. — Fehr  v.  General  Accident  Fire 

&    Life    Assur.    Corp.,    16    N.W.2d 

787,  246  Wis.  228. 
Lapse  for  nonpayment  of  premiums 

Where  insurer's  affidavit  showed 
that  on  date  of  insured's  death  life 
policy  sued  on  had  lapsed  for  non- 
payment of  premiums,  and  insurer's 
claim  was  not  controverted,  insurer's 
motion  for  summary  judgment 
should  have  been  granted. — Mecca  v. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  "Co.,  42  N.YjS. 
2d  452,  26'6  App.Div.  910. 
Vessel  unattended 

Affidavits  disclosing  that  marine 
policy  contained  warranty  by  insured 
that  barge  when  moored  should  be 
in  charge  of  competent  watchman, 
and  that  loss  occurred  while  moored 
barge  was  unattended,  entitled  in- 
surer to  summary  judgment  dis- 
missing complaint  for  lack  of  merits. 
— IT.  S.  Gypsum  Co.  v.  Insurance  Co. 
of  North  America,  D.C.N.Y.,  19  F. 
Supp.  767. 

1.  N.Y.— Tymon  v.  Tyrose  Homes,  1 
N.Y.-S.2d  974,  2#3  Aj?p.Div.  900,  re- 
settled   3    N.Y;S.2d    74,    254    App. 
Div.  5*82,  appeal  dismissed  IS  N.E. 
2d  869,  279  N.Y.  787. 

2.  N.Y. — Goldman  v.  Nu-Boro  Park 
Cleaners,  41  N.Y.S.2d  532,  2"66  App. 
Div.  780,  appeal  denied  43  N.Y.S.2d 
'635,  two  cases,  26$  App.Div.  8-56. 


427 


225 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tween  spouses,3  releases,4  rents  or  leases,5  res  judi- 
cata,6  specific  performance,7  stockbrokers,8  and 
stocks  or  stockholders.9 

In  other  cases,  summary  judgment  in  favor  of 
defendant  dismissing  the  complaint,  at  least  as  to  all 
causes  of  action  involved,  has  been  held  not  justi- 
fied on  the  basis  of  the  affidavits  or  other  proof  sub- 


mitted,10 as,  for  example,  in  actions  for  or  involv- 
ing alimony,11  bonds,12  condemnation  of  land,13  det- 
inue,14 employment  contracts  or  services  rendered,15 
foreclosure  of  mortgages,15  guaranties,17  insur- 
ance,18 liability  of  corporate  directors  for  alleged 
dereliction  of  duty,19  libel,20  notes,21  personal  inju- 
ries,22 releases,23  rents  or  leases,24  replevin,25  roy- 


3.  CaL— Hardy   v.   Hardy,    143   P.2d 
701,  23  Cal.2d  244. 

4.  N.Y.— Murphy  v.   Bissell,   5  N.Y. 
S.2d    22-5,    254    App.Div.    891,    fol- 
lowed in  5  N.Y.S.2d  226,   254  App. 

•      Div.  891. 
Insufficient  proof  of  infirmity  in  re- 
lease 

Where  documentary  evidence  sup- 
ported defense  of  release 'and  plain- 
tiff, to  meet  that  defense,  interposed 
only  an  affidavit  of  an  attorney  hav- 
ing no  personal  knowledge  and  re- 
citing hearsay,  although  it  affirma- 
tively appeared  that  several  individ- 
uals, including  plaintiff,  were  in  po- 
sition to  make  affidavits  if  true  sit- 
uation revealed  any  infirmity  in  re- 
lease, defendants'  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment  should  have  been 
granted. — Favole  v.  G-allo,  30  N.Y.S. 
2d  878,  263  App.Div.  729,  reargument 
denied  32  N.Y.S.2d  139,  203  App.Div. 
826.  affirmed  45  N.E.2d  456,  289  N.Y. 
696. 

5.  N.Y. — Ziegfeld   Theatre    Corp.    v. 
Sixth   Ave.    Amusement  Corp.,   -57 
N.Y.S.2d  195. 

6.  N.Y.— Ritter  v.  Broff,  43  N.Y.S.2d 
867. 

7.  N.Y. — Brookwood  Parks  v.  Jack- 
son,  26  N.Y.S.2d  127,   261  App.Div. 
410. 

Wis.— 'Strelow  v.  Bohr,  290  N.W.  '603. 
234  Wis.  170. 

S.  N.Y. — Mackenzie  v.  Rothschild, 
47  N.Y.'S.2d  928,  267  App.DJv.  989, 
reargument  denied  50  N.Y.S.2d  174, 
268  App.Div.  780,  affirmed  62  N. 
E.2d  237,  294  N.Y.  800. 

9.  U.S. — Toebelman  v.  Missouri- 
Kansas  Pipe  Line  Co.,  C.C.A.Del., 
130  'F.2d  1016. 

N.Y. — O'Brien  v.  American  Beverage 
Corporation,  45  N.Y.S.2d  760,  267 
App.Div.  :813 — Vendrink  Corpora- 
tion of  New  York  v.  MacBride,  23 
N.Y.S.2d  705,  261  App.Div.  19— 
Diamond  v.  Davis,  '38  N.Y.S.2d  103, 
affirmed  39  N.Y.S.2d  412,  first  case, 
265  App.Div.  919,  appeal  denied 
41  N.Y.S.2d  191,  first  case,  265 
App.Div.  1052,  and  affirmed  54  N. 

.  E.2d  683,  first  case,  292  N.Y.  552— 
Diamond  v.  Davis,  38  N.Y,S.2d  93, 
affirmed  "39  N.Y.S. 2d  412,  second 
case,  265  App.Div.  919,  appeal  de- 
nied 41  N.Y.S.2d  191,  second  case, 
295  App.Div.  1052,  and  affirmed  54 
JT.E.24  '683,  second  case,  292  N.Y. 


5  5  4 — Druckerman 
N.Y.S.2d  370. 


v.    Harbord,    29 


10.  N.Y.— Idoni  v.  Down,  8  N.Y.S.2d 
719,  170  Misc.  303-^Dale  Radio  Co. 
v.    Fairbrother,   «32    N.Y.S.2d    344— 
Michigan  Millers   Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Regan,  21  N.Y.S.2d  3*6. 

Wis.— Holzschuh   v.    Webster,    17   N. 
W.2d  553,  246  Wis.  423. 

11.  N.Y.— Bogert  v.  Watts,  38  N.Y. 
S.2d  426.  265  App.Div.  $31,  revers- 
ing "8-8  N.Y.S.2d  658,  appeal  denied 
39  N.Y.S.2d  988,  265  App.Div.  992. 

12.  N.Y. — Aronow    Bros.    v.    U.    S 
Casualty   Co.,    35   N.Y.S.2d  75,   af- 
firmed   39    N.Y.iS.2d    99<3,    265    App, 
Div.   992,   appeal   denied   41  N.Y.S, 
2d  192,  265  App.Div.   1052. 

13.  Wis.— City     of     Milwaukee     v, 
Heyer,  4  N.W.2d  -126,  241  Wis.  56. 

14.  111.— Macks  v.  Macks,  App.,  67  N. 
E.2d  505. 

15.  -N.Y.— Rechtschaffer     v.     Recht- 
schaffer,  59  N.Y.S.2d  735,  270  App. 
Div.  812,  appeal  denied  61  N.Y.S.2d 
386,  270  App.Div.  343 — King  v.  Laf- 
ayette  Nat.   Bank  of  Brooklyn  in 
New    York,    31    N.Y.S.2d   '602,    2'63 
App.Div.    830,    reargument    denied 
33   N.Y.S.2d  256,    26'3    App.Div.   8 
— King  v.  Lafayette  Nat.  Bank  of 
Brooklyn  in  New  York,  '31  N.Y.S.2d 
601,  263  App.Div.  '830— Schwartz  v. 
Frieder,    291   N.Y.S.    836,    249   App. 
Div.    199 — Qruss    v.    City   of    New 
York,    40    N.Y.S.2d    816, ' -17D    Misc. 
1053 — Semprevlvo  v.  Winn,  62  N.Y. 
S.2d  "350— New  York  Post  Corp.  v. 
Kelley,    61   N.Y.S.2d    264,    affirmed 
Hearst  Consolidated  Publication  v. 
Kelley,    61   N.Y.S.2d   762,    270   App. 
Div.  916,  appeal  granted  '62  N.Y.S 
2d    614,     270     App.Div.     923,    New 
York    Sun    v.    Kelley,  '62   N.Y.S.2d 
614,    270    App.Div.    924,   New   York 
World  Telegram    Corp.   v.   Kelley, 
62   N.Y.S.2d  614,   270  App.Div.   924, 
and  New  York  Post  Corp.  v.  Kel- 
ley, '62   N.Y.S,2d  615,   270  App.Div. 
923 — Pohlers    v.    Exeter   Mfg.    Co., 
52  N.Y.S.2d  316— Russell  v.  Lopez, 
16  N.Y.S,2d  595,  affirmed  20  N.Y.S. 
2d  1016,   259  App.Div.  •SSS. 

16.  N.Y,— Riordan    v.    Crabtree,    56 
N.Y.S.23  425,  2-69  App.Div.  907,  ap- 
peal dismissed   68   N.E,2d  455,  296 
N.Y.  515. 

428 


17.  N.Y.— Gervis  v.  Knapp,  43  N.Y.S. 
2d  849,  182  Misc.  311. 

18.  N.Y. — Gold  v.  Travelers  Ins.  Co., 
31   N.Y.S.2d   580,   263   App.Div.    817 
— Daly   v.    National    Civil    Service 
Endowment  Ass'n,  43  N.Y.S.2d  339, 
181    Misc.    16-3— Roth   v.   Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  50  N.Y. 
S.2d  119,  affirmed  5-5  N.Y.S.2d  117, 
269    App.Div.    746,    appeal    denied 
56   N.Y.S.2d  202,   2'69   App.iDiv.   818 
— Biloz  v.   Tioga  County   Patrons' 
Fire  Relief  Ass'n,  21  N.Y.S.2d  643, 
affirmed  23   N.Y.S.2d  460,  260  App. 
Div.  976. 

Notice  of  accident 

In  action  for  injuries  sustained  'in 
an  automobile  accident,  where  de- 
fendant's liability  insurer  moved  for 
summary  judgment  dismissing  com- 
plaint on  ground  that  insurance  cov- 
erage was  lost  because  of  insured's 
failure  to  give  insurer  notice  of  the 
accident  as  soon  as  practicable,  mo- 
tion was  properly  denied  in  view  of 
affidavits  raising  an  issue  of  fact 
whether  insurer  was  notified  as  soon 
as  practicable. — "Vande  Leest  v.  Bas- 
ten,  6  N.W.2d  $67,  241  Wis.  !509. 

19.  U.S. — Toebelman     v.   'Missouri- 
Kansas  Pipe  Line  Co.,  C.C.A.Del., 
130  F.2d  1016. 

N.Y.— Levine  v.  Behn,  25  N.E.2d  871, 
282  N.Y.  120. 

20.  N.Y.— Wels  v.  Rubin,  20  N.E.2d 
737,  280  N.Y.  233. 

21.  N.Y.— (First    Trust     &     Deposit 
Co.   v.   Dent,    34   N.Y.-S.2d   282,   263 
App.Div.  1058 — Farley  v.  Overbury, 
3  N.Y.S.2d  990,  254  App.Div.  739— 
Strong  v.   Dahm,   -39   N.Y.S.2d   266 
—O'Brien  v.   O'Brien,    16   N.Y.S.2d 
799. 

22.  Wis. — Hanson   v.   Halvorson,    19 
N.W.2d    882,    247   Wis.    434— Ettel- 
dorf  v.  Yellow  Cab  &  Transfer  Co., 
18  N.W.2d  <330,  246  Wis.   602. 

23.  N.Y.— Adams  v.   Judson,  277  N. 
Y.S.   304r  243   App.Div.  404. 

24.  TT.S.— Weisser.  v.   Mursam   Shoe 
Corporation,    C.C.A.N.Y.,    127    F.2d 
344,  145  A.L.R.  467. 

N.Y. — Port  Chester  'Central  Corpora- 
tion v.  iLeibert,  39  N.Y.S.2d  41,  179 
Misc.  '839. 

25.  N.Y. — Kennedy  v.  Schroeder,  40 
N.Y.S.2d    611,    265    App.Div.    725. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  226 


alties,26  sales  of  personalty,27  and  stock  subscrip- 
tions.28 


§  226. 


Hearing  and   Determination;    Relief 
Awarded 

A  motion  for  summary  judgment  is  to  be  determined 
on  the  facts  shown  by  the  record,  and  relief  awarded  in 
accordance  with  the  rules  of  law  and  equity. 

In  passing  on  a  motion  for  summary  judgment 
the  court  should  consider  all  the  facts  shown  by 
the  record,29  and,  if  the  circumstances  require,  may 
hold  its  decision  on  the  motion  in  abeyance  pending 
submission  to  it  of  facts  necessary  for  a  determi- 


nation.30  The  pleadings  should  be  considered  in 
order  that  the  court  may  know  what  the  issues 
are,3i  although  it  has  been  held  that,  on  a  motion 
for  summary  judgment  by  plaintiff,  the  court  will 
not  decide  whether  particular  defenses  have  been 
properly  denominated  or  pleaded.32  The  questions 
to  be  decided  are  whether  the  facts  set  forth  suffi- 
ciently show  all  that  the  case  will  involve  on  a 
trial,  and  whether  the  evidence,  including  the  plead- 
ings and  exhibits,  clearly  demonstrates  that  the 
movants  are  entitled  to  judgment  in  their  favor.33 

Relief  is  to  be  awarded  in  accordance  with  the 
rules  of  law  and  equity,34  and,  where  the  circum- 


28.  U.S. — Sartor  v.  Arkansas  Natur- 
al   Gas    Corporation,    La.,    64    S.Ct. 
724,  321  U.S.  -620,  88  L.Ed.  967,  re- 
hearing denied  64  S.Ct.  941,  322  U. 
S.  767,  88  L.Ed.  1593. 

27.  N  Y. — Price  v.  Spielman  Motor 
Sales  Co.,  26  N.Y.S.2d  886,  261 
App.Div.  62"6 — S.  Reubens  &  Bros, 
v.  Samdperil,  47  N.Y.S.2d  407,  181 
Misc.  7113 — Jenks  v.  La  due,  59  N. 
Y.-S.2d  353. 

aa  Pa.— Bell  v.  Brady,  31  A.2d  547, 
346  Pa.  666. 

29.  Ariz. — Suburban  Pump  &  Water 
Co.    v.    Linville,    135    P.2d    210,    60 
Ariz.  274. 

111. — Gliwa     v.     Washington     Polish 

Loan  &  Building  Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d 

•136,  310  IlLApp.  4-65. 
Matters  subsequent  to  formation  of 
original  issues 

The  court  has  jurisdiction  to  ren- 
der summary  judgment  on  issues 
raised  by  stipulations  and  facts  oc- 
curring after  the  formation  of  issues 
by  the  original  pleadings,  since  such 
stipulations  and  facts  could  be  set 
up  by  supplemental  pleadings. — 
Costello  v.  Polenska,  7  N.W.2d  593 
242  Wis.  204,  modified  on  other 
grounds  8  N.W.2d  307,  242  Wis.  204 
Correction  of  name 

A  difference  in  pleadings  and  no- 
tice of  motion  for  summary  judg 
ment  as  to  defendant's  name  will  be 
disregarded  on  filing  of  affidavit  as  tc 
his  correct  name. — Grossman  Stee 
Stair  Corp.  v.  Steinberg,  54  N.Y.S.2 
275. 

30.    N.Y. — -Forma   Corp.    v.   A.   &  L 
Constructors     Corp.,     5-9     N.Y.S.2c 

5  7  8— Grossman  Steel  Stair  Corp.  v 
Steinberg,     54    N.Y.>S.2d    275— Mi] 
Factors  'Corporation  v.  Bridal  Vei 

6  Accessories  Co.,  51  N.Y.S.2d  256 
AeoLueat  for  additional  information 

It  was  held  not  improper  for  th 
court,  after  argument  on  motion  fo 
summary  judgment,  to  ask  for  add 
tional  information  which  was  sup 
plied,  and  which  completed  th 
showing  that  entitled  plaintiff  t 
summary  judgment,  where  defend 
ants  were  accorded  full  opportunit 


o  supply  any  facts  which  they  j 
eemed  material  and  motion  papers 
ontained  all  that  was  necessary  to 
dvise  defendants  of  claim  of  plain- 
._- Winter  v.  Trepte,  290  N.W.  599, 
34  Wis.  193. 
1.  111. — Roberts  v.  Sauerman  Bros., 

20   N.B.2d   849,    300   IlLApp.    213. 
All  pleadings  considered 
NT.Y. — 'Fertig     v.     General     Accident 
Fire    &    Life    Assur.    Corporation, 
Limited,  of  Perth,  Scotland,  13  N. 
Y.S.2d  872,  171  Misc.  921. 
A  liberal  construction  must  be  giv- 
n    to    the    pleadings    of    the    party 
against  whom  the  motion  is  made. — 
Eagle   Oil   &   Refining   Co.   v.    Pren- 
ice,  122  P.2d  264,  19  Cal.2d  55'3. 
Inclusion  of  separate  defense  in  an- 
swer 

Plaintiff's  motion  that  amended 
answer  be  stricken  and  summary 
udgment  entered  for  him  constitut- 
ed an  attack  on  answer  as  it  then 
stood,  and  propriety  of  granting  of 
motion  must  be  tested  on  under- 
standing that  answer  included  sep- 
arate defense  to  which  general  de- 
murrer was  pending. — Ware  v.  Hel- 
ler, 148  P.2d  410,  63  Cal.App.2d  817. 
Cross  complaint  treated  as  counter- 

claim 

It  has  been  held  that  a  cross  com- 
plaint could  be  treated  as  counter- 
claim, notwithstanding  statute  relat- 
ing to  summary  judgments  does  not 
specifically  mention  cross  complaints. 
— Loehr  v.  Stenz,  263  N.W.  373,  219 
Wis.  361. 

32.  N.Y. — Standard  Factors  Corp.  v. 
Kreisler,  53  N.Y.S.2d  871,  affirmed 
56  K.Y.S.2d  414,  269  App.Div.  830. 


33,  U.S.— Sun  Oil  Co.  v.  Blevins,  D 
C.La.,  29  F.-SUPP.  901,  affirmed,  C 
C.A.,  Blevins  v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  110 
F.2d  566. 

"The  test  of  a  motion  for  summary 
judgment  is  whether  the  pleadings 
affidavits,  and  exhibits  in  support  of 
the  motion  are  sufficient  to  overcome 
the  opposing  papers,  and  to  justify  a 
finding  as  a  matter  of  law  that  therr 
is  no  defense  to  the  action/'— Stuy 
vesant  Credit  Union  v.  Manufactur 

429 


ers'  Trust  Co.,  267  N.Y.S.  302.  305, 
2«39  App.Div.  187— Tidewater  Oil 
Sales  Corporation  v.  Pierce,  210  N. 
Y.S.  759,  760,  213  App.Dir.  796— Wm. 
H.  'Frear  &  <Co.  v.  Bailey,  214  N.Y.S. 
'675,  677, 127  Misc.  79. 
Showing1  a*  to  good  faith  and  merits 

Under  some  statutes,  the  test  in 
determining  right  to  relief  in  sum- 
mary judgment  proceedings  is  good 
faith  and  merits  as  disclosed  by 
showing  made. — Jackson  Reinforced 
Concrete  Pipe  Co.  v.  Central  Con- 
tracting &  Engineering  Co.,  234  N. 
V.  Ill,  253  Mich.  157. 

34.    N.Y. — Federal   Reserve   Bank  of 

Philadelphia  v.  Weekes,   11  N.Y.S. 

2d  952,  171  Misc.  404— First  Trust 

&  Deposit  Co.  v.  Potter,   278  N.Y. 

S.    847,    155    Misc.     106— Balio    v. 

Utica   General   Truck  Co.,    38   N.Y. 

S.2d  85. 
Restating  burdens 

The  rules  cannot  be  changed  mere- 
y  because  grave  burdens  will  there- 
>y  'be  placed  on  individuals  or  in- 
stitutions.—First  Trust  &  Deposit 
Co.  v.  Potter,  278  N.Y.S.  847,  155 
Misc.  106. 

Failure  to  as*  proper  relief 

As  the  duty  of  judges  is  to  admin- 
ister justice  according  to  law,  if 
counsel  should  inadvertently  omit  to 
ask  what  his  client  is  entitled  to  de- 
mand in  a  summary  proceeding,  the 
court  is  nevertheless  bound  to  award 
it  to  him,  notwithstanding  the  omis- 
sion.—Roth  v.  Steffe,  9  Lanc.Bar., 
Pa,,  77. 
Possibility  of  double  liability 

Summary  judgment  will  not  be  de- 
nied on  the  ground  that  defendant 
may  be  subjected  to  a  double  liabil- 
ity where  defendant  can  fully  protect 
himself  by  an  application  for  a  stay 
of  execution. — Jackson  Reinforced 
•Concrete  Pipe  Co.  v.  Central  Con- 
tracting &  Engineering  Co.,  434  N.W. 
Ill,  253  Mich,  157. 
Striking  out  of  answer 

An  answer  containing  defenses  or 
denials  may  be  stricken  out  as  .sham 
or  frivolous  when  the  motion  papers 
on  a  motion  for  summary  judgment 


226 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


stances  require,  the  court  will  look  through  the 
form  of  a  transaction  to  determine  its  true  nature,35 
although  it  cannot  inquire  into  the  circumstances  of 
the  case  except  as  they  are  revealed  in  the  papers 
submitted36  The  number  of  affidavits  submitted 
on  behalf  of  the  respective  parties  is  not  controlling 
any  more  than  the  weight  of  the  testimony  on  the 
trial  of  an  action  is  governed  by  the  number  of  wit- 
nesses.37 The  amount  awarded  by  way  of  summary 
judgment  should  be  consistent  with  that  demanded 
and  shown  to  be  due,38  and  the  various  provisions 
of  the  judgment  must  be  consistent  with  each  oth- 
er.39 Where  a  motion  by  defendant  for  judgment 
on  the  pleadings  has  been  granted,  his  motion  for 


summary  judgment  is  properly  denied  as  academ- 
ic^ 

Determination  of  the  issues  should  not  be  made 
piecemeal,41  and  the  granting  of  a  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment  with  respect  to  some  of  the  issues 
has  been  held  improper  where  there  was  no  dis- 
position of  other  issues.42  However,  where  the 
proofs  adduced  on  the  motion  show  no  issue  as  to 
the  existence  of  some  liability  on  the  part  of  de- 
fendant, although  they  do  present  an  issue  as  to  the 
amount  of  liability,  summary  judgment  may  be 
granted  on  the  issue  of  liability,  with  directions  for 
the  assessment  of  the  amount  of  liability  by  trial  or 
hearing;43  but  where  a  complaint  demanding  a  liq- 
uidated amount  is  supported  by  the  moving  affida- 


make  it  appear  that  the  answer  falls 
within     either     category. — Common- 
wealth (Fuel  Co.  v.  Powpit  Co.,   209 
N.Y.S.   60S,   212  App.Div.   553. 
Amendment  of  statement  of  claim 

Where  statement  of  claim  was  not 
in  form  required  by  statute,  the 
court  instead  of  entering  summary 
Judgment  against  plaintiff,  should 
have  permitted  him  to  amenta  so  as 
to  make  his  cause  of  action  clear. — 
Seaman  v.  Tamao.ua  Nat.  Bank,  124 
A.  '32'3,  280  Pa.  124. 
Default 

Defendant  was  properly  defaulted 
when  absent  from  hearing  on  plain- 
tiff's motion  for  judgment,  and 
hence  was  not  entitled  to  file  demand 
for  trial  within  seven  days  from  or- 
der for  judgment,  and  thus  secure 
advance  of  case  for  speedy  trial. — 
Norwood  Morris  Plan  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Carthy, 4  N.B.2d  450,  295  Mass.  597, 
107  A.<L.R.  1215. 

35.  N.Y. — Lamula    v.    Morris    Plan 
Industrial  Bank  of  New  York,   19 
N.Y.S.2d  357,  173  Misc.  "847. 

36.  N.Y.— First  Trust  &  Deposit  Co. 
v.  Potter,  278  N.Y.S.  847,  155  Misc. 
106. 

Insertions  in  written  contract 

In  action  for  breach  of  an  alleged 
contract  to  convey  property,  on  de- 
fendants' motion  for  summary  judg- 
ment for  nonexistence  of  a  contract 
in  writing,,  trial  judge  was  not  bound 
to  insert  in  the  agreement  what  was 
omitted  but  merely  to  ascertain  and 
declare  legal  effect  of  contents  of 
writings  purporting  to  evidence  con- 
tract—AJax  Holding  Co.  v.  Heins- 
•bergen,  149  P.2d  189,  64  Cal.App.2d 
'665. 
Matter*  not  before  the  court 

(1)  A  notice  of  intention  to  apply 
for  leave  to  amend  a  pleading  is  not 
properly  before  the  court  on  an  ap- 
plication   for    summary   judgment — 
Dale  Kadio  Co.  v.  Fairbrother,  32  N. 
T.8.2d  344. 

(2)  An  order  which  strikes  out  ar 
.  answer,   and  from  which  no  ajppeal 


has  been  taken,  cannot  be  revised  on 
a  motion  for  summary  judgment — 
2018  Seventh  Ave.,  Inc.,  v.  Nach- 
Haus  (Leasing  Corporation,  46  N.E.2d 
900,  289  N.Y.  490,  motion  denied  47 
N.E.2d  443,  289  N.Y.  848,  motion  de- 
nied SO  N.E.2d  308,  290  N.Y.  925. 

37.    N.Y.— La  Pointe  v.   Wilson,    61 
N.Y.S.2d  64. 

3&     HI.— Drake    v.    Wood,    4    N.B.2d 

50,  286  IlLApp.  623. 
Mich. — Baxter    v.    Szucs,    227    N.W. 

<66*6,  248  Mich.  672. 
Va. — Morrow      v.      Vaughan-Bassett 

•Furniture    Co.,    4    S.E.2d   '399,    173 

Va,  417. 
Srroneon*  item 

Where  computation  in  notice  of 
motion  for  judgment  on  note  showed 
on  its  face  that  plaintiff's  claim  in- 
cluded a  certain  item  which  was  no 
part  of  note,  court  was  without  au- 
thority to  enter  office  judgment  for 
plaintiffs  without  deduction  of  such 
item  irrespective  of  defendant's  ap- 
pearance.— Bacon  v.  Dettor,  33  "S.E. 
2d  648,  183  Va.  835. 
Allowance  previously  credited 

Defendant  was  not  entitled  to  an 
allowance  provided  in  contract,  on 
plaintiff's  recovering  summary  judg- 
ment for  breach  of  contract,  where 
it  appeared  that  allowance  had  al- 
ready been  credited  to  defendant— 
Lowenstern  Bros.  v.  Marks  Credit 
Clothing,  48  N.E.2d  729,  313  IlLApp. 
71. 

39.    N.Y. — Closson  v.  Seaboard  Sand 
&    Gravel  Corporation,    265   N.Y.S. 
160,   238   App.Div.   5*84,  motion  de- 
nied 189  N.B.   701,  26«3  N.Y.  -5-68. 
Assessment  of  damages  on  denial  of 

motion 

An  order  which  denies  plaintiff's 
motion  for  summary  Judgment,  .and 
at  the  same  time  sets  the  case  down 
for  trial  for  the  purpose  of  assess- 
ing damages,  is  inconsistent. — R.  K 
L.  Dresses  v.  Nationwide  Packing  & 
Shipping  Service,  11  N.Y.S.2d  729.  171 
Misc.  L, 

430 


Direction  for  trial  after  striking  of 
answer 

It  is  error  for  the  court  to  direct 
that  the  answer  be  stricken  out  on 
a  motion  for  summary  judgment, 
leaving  no  issues  whatever  to  be 
tried,  and  then  to  send  the  matter  to 
another  part  of  the  court  for  trial. — 
Closson  v.  Seaboard  Sand  &  Gravel 
Corporation,  265  N.Y.S.  160,  2'38  App. 
Div.  584,  motion  denied  189  N.E.  701, 
263  N.Y.  568. 

40.  N.Y.— Dry    Dock    Sav.    Inst    v. 
Grant,  60  N.Y.S.2d  2'38. 

41.  111. — Gliwa    v.    Washington    Po- 
lish Loan  &  Building  Ass'n,  34  N. 
B.2d  736,   310  111. App.  4'65. 

42.  N.Y.— Warner  v.  P.  F.  Collier  & 
•Son   Distributing  Corporation,    218 
N.Y.S.  262,  218  App-Div.  354. 

Undetermined  plea  in  abatement 

A  decision  granting  a  plaintiff's 
motion  for  summary  judgment  made 
while  a  plea  in  abatement,  for  non- 
joinder of  necessary  parties,  re- 
mained open  for  judicial  determina- 
tion, was  premature  and  judgment 
was  a  nullity. — Goucher  v.  Herr,  14 
A.2d  '651,  65  R.I.  246. 

43.  N.Y.— Reid  v.  Reid,  10   N.Y.S.2d 
916,    170    Misc.    719— Kollsman    v. 
Detzel,  55  N.Y.S.2d  491— President 
and  Directors  of  Manhattan  Co.  v. 
Spier,  43  N.Y.S.2d  954. 

Questions    determinable    at    assess- 
ment 

In  action  against  liability  insurer 
for  failure  to  defend .  action  against 
insured,  amount  of  expenses  in- 
curred by  insured  in  defending  ac- 
tion, and  whether  settlement  made 
was  reasonably  necessary,  were 
questions  which  could  properly  be 
determined  at  an  assessment  ordered 
in  connection  with  granting  of  in- 
sured's  motion  for  summary  judg- 
ment against  insurer. — Krasilovsky 
Bros.  Trucking  Corp.  v.  Maryland 
Cas.  Co.,  54  N.Y;S.2d  60. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  226 


vit,  and  no  issue  with  respect  thereto  has  been 
raised  by  the  answering  affidavit,  it  is  error  to  di- 
rect ah  assessment  of  damages.44  The  court  may 
grant  partial  summary  judgment  for  the  amount  es- 
tablished to  be  due,  and  may  direct  that  the  action 
be  severed,  and  the  case  proceed  in  its  usual  course 
as  to  the  balance  of  the  claim.45  It  has  been  held 
that  where  defendant  admits  plaintiffs  claim,  but 
asserts  a  counterclaim,  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  sum- 
mary judgment  only  for  the  difference  between  his 
claim  and  the  amount  of  defendant's  counter- 
claim;46 but  it  has  also  been  held  proper  in  such 
a  case  to  award  plaintiff  judgment  for  the  amount 
of  his  claim  and  allow  the  counterclaim  to  stand, 
to  be  disposed  of  in  the  usual  course  of  practice.47 

In  some  jurisdictions,  on  a  motion  by  either  party 
for  summary  judgment,  the  other  party  may  have 
a  judgment  to  which  he  shows  himself  to  be  enti- 
tled.48 Thus  summary  judgment  may  be  granted 
to  plaintiff,  notwithstanding  the  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment  was  made  by  defendant  and  plaintiff 
did  not  move  therefor,  where  it  appears  that  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  judgment.49  Similarly  summary 
judgment  may  be  granted  in  favor  of  defendant  dis- 
missing the  complaint,  notwithstanding  'the  motion 
for  summary  judgment  was  made  by  plaintiff.50 
Under  the  practice  in  other  jurisdictions,  however, 
the  court  is  not  authorized  to  dismiss  the  suit  on 
striking  plaintiff's  affidavit  for  summary  judgment 


from  the  files,  in  the  absence  of  a  motion  by  de- 
fendant for  dismissal.51 

Terms  or  conditions.  It  is  within  the  discretion 
of  the  court,  where  justified  by  the  circumstances, 
to  deny  or  grant  a  motion  for  summary  judgment 
on  such  terms  as  the  justice  of  the  case  may  re- 
quire;52 but,  in  the  absence  of  circumstances  war- 
ranting the  imposition  of  terms  or  conditions,  a  mo- 
tion for  summary  judgment  must  be  granted  or  de- 
nied without  condition.53 

Decision  as  without  prejudice  or  on  the  merits. 
In  a  proper  case  the  court  may  deny  the  motion  for 
summary  judgment  without  prejudice  to  a  new  mo- 
tion54 or  without  prejudice  to  the  right  of  the 
moving  party  to  seek  other  appropriate  relief.56 
It  has  been  held  that  dismissal  of  a  cause  of  action 
on  defendant's  motion  for  summary  judgment  may 
be  made  without  prejudice  to  plaintiff's  right  to 
move  for  permission  to  serve  an  amended  com- 
plaint;56 but  it  has  also  been  held  that  dismissal 
of  the  complaint  without  prejudice,  on  defendant's 
motion  for  summary  judgment,  is  improper.57 
Where  an  action  has  been  submitted  to  the  court 
on  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  only,  and  has 
not  been  assigned  for  hearing  on  the  merits,  it  is 
error  for  the  court  to  dispose  of  the  case  on  the 
merits  after  it  appears  that  a  decision  necessarily 
involves  the  determination  of  a  controverted  issue 
of  fact." 


44,  N.Y.— -Mayer    v.    Sulzberger,    41 
N.Y.S.2d  822. 

45.  N.Y.— Direct  Realty  Co.  v.  Birn- 
baum,    46    N.Y.S.2d   435— Tenny  v. 
Tenny,  «3'6  N.Y.S.2d  704. 

Claim  of  excessive  amount  held  not 

fatal 

The  fact  that  plaintiff  claims  an 
-excessive  amount  does  not  necessi- 
tate denial  of  his  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment,  since  he  is  entitled 
to  partial  summary  judgment  for  the 
amount  established  to  be  due. — Up- 
town Transp.  Corporation  v.  !Fisk 
Discount  Corporation,  271  N.Y.S.  723, 
151  Misc.  469. 

48.    N.Y.— Dairymen's     League     Co- 

Op.  Ass'n  v.  Egli,  239  N.Y.S.  152, 

228  App.Div.  164. 
"Effect  of  counterclaim  generally  see 

supra  §  220  c  (1). 
47.    N.Y.— Little  Palls  Dairy  Co.  v. 

Berghorn,  224  N.Y.S.  '34,  130  Misc. 

454. 

Restraint      against      disposition,     of 
Judgment  or  recovery 

It  was  held  proper  to  sever  the 
action  on  the  counterclaim  and  to 
permit  plaintiff  to  proceed  to  collect 
the  amount  of  his  judgment,  except 
that  plaintiff  was  restrained,  pend- 
ing disposition  of  the  counterclaim, 


from  assigning  or  otherwise  dispos- 
ing of  the  judgment,  or  of  the  mon- 
eys payable  thereunder  to  an  amount 
equal  to  defendant's  counterclaim. — 
Little  Falls  Dairy  Co.  v.  Berghorn, 
supra. 

48.  N.Y.-JCuchal  v.  Walsh,  59  N.Y. 
S.2d  435,  185  Misc.  1008,  modified 
on  other  grounds  60  N.Y.S.2d  7T6. 

43.  N.Y.— Bradley  v.  Koe,  13  N.Y. 
S.2d  693,  257  App.Div.  1005,  certi- 
fied questions  answered  27  N.E.2d 
35,  282  N.Y.  525,  129  A.L.R.  633, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  27  N.B. 
2d  '35,  282  N.Y.  525,  -129  A.L.R.  633. 

50.    N.Y.— Porcella  v.  Kramrisch,  59 

N.Y.S.2d  349. 

Where  lack  of  Jurisdiction  appears, 
the  court  on  a  motion  for  summary 
judgment  should  dispose  of  the  case 
finally  on  the  jurisdictional  point 
without  requiring  an  additional  mo- 
tion for  a  dismissal. — Mara  v.  U.  S., 
•D.C.N.Y.,  54  'F^d  397. 

51:  111. — People,  for  Use  of  Dyer,  v. 
Sawyer,  2  N.B.2d  343,  284  IlLApp. 
46*3. 

52.  N.Y.— Souhami  v.  Prudence- 
Bonds  Corporation,  270  N.Y.S.  359, 
150  Misc.  '602— Free  v.  "Fisher,  41 

431 


N.Y.S.2d  111— Lalor  v.  Bour,  36  N. 
Y.S.2d  850. 
34  C.J.  p  20'6  note  92. 

53.  N.Y.— National     City     Bank    of 
Cleveland  v.  Cold  Mix,  1  N.Y.S.  2d 
459. 

Famishing  of  bond 

An  order  granting  a  motion  for 
summary  judgment  unless  defendant 
gives  bond  to  pay  any  judgment  ul- 
timately recovered  has  been  held  un- 
authorized.— Gibson  v.  Standard  Au- 
tomobile Mut.  Casualty  Qo.  of  New 
York,  203  N.Y.S.  5'3,  208  App.Div.  91. 

54.  N.Y.— A.    Sidney    Davison    Coal 
Co.,  Inc.  v.  Interstate  Coal  &  Dock 
Co.,  193  N.Y.S.  883. 

34  C.J.  p  207  note  98. 

55.  N.Y. — Ottone  v.  American  Lon- 
don   Shrinkers    Corp.,    55    N.Y.S.2d 
243. 

56.  N.Y. — Boscarino    v.    Spear    Box 
Co.,   52  N.Y.S.2d  252,  268  App.Div. 
1041. 

57.  Wis.-— Potts    v.    Farmers'    Mut 
Automobile  Ins.  Co.,  289  N.W.  606, 
233  Wis.  313. 

58.  Mich.— Eston  v.   Robert  Brown, 
Limited,   282  N.W.   895,   887  Mich. 

44. 


§  226 


JUDGMENTS 


49    (XJ.S. 


Reconsideration  or  renewal  of  motion.  The  court 
may,  before  final  judgment,  reconsider  its  ruling 
on  a  motion  for  judgment.59  It  may  grant  reargu- 
ment  of  the  motion60  and,  in  the  interests  of  jus- 
tice, may  on  reargument  consider  a  new  affidavit 
presented  by  a  party  as  though  it  had  been  timely 
presented.61  On  denial  of  a  motion  for  summary 
judgment  for  insufficiency  of  the  affidavit  submit- 
ted, leave  may  be  granted  to  renew  the  motion  on 
affidavits  which  comply  with  the  statutes.62  It  has 
been  held  that  where  plaintiffs  motion  for  summary 
judgment  was  denied  and  the  case  tried,  he  waived 
his  right  to  move  again  for  summary  judgment.63 

Costs.  Notwithstanding  denial  of  a  motion  for 
summary  judgment  on  the  ground  that  plaintiff's 
affidavit  is  insufficient  to  support  his  cause  of  ac- 
tion, if  defendant  has  failed  to  show  sufficient  facts 
to  entitle  him  to  defend,  the  motion  should  be  de- 
nied without  costs.64 

Disposition  of  exhibits.  Where  exhibits  are  pro- 
duced in  court  in  support  of  a  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment,  the  court  on  granting  the  motion 
may  make  suitable  provision  for  their  disposition.65 

Construction  and  operation.  It  has  been  held  that 
the  validity  of  a  summary  judgment  is  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  sufficiency  of  the  affidavits  considered 
on  the  hearing  of  the  motion.66  Where  the  facts 
are  undisputed,  the  decision  on  a  motion  for  sum- 
mary judgment  is  on  the  law.67  An  order  which 


terminates  plaintiffs  motion  for  summary  judgment 
and  defendant's  cross  motion  to  dismiss  the  com- 
plaint, by  grant  of  defendant's  motion,  by  neces- 
sary inference  denies  the  motion  for  summary  judg- 
ment68 A  dismissal  as  to  one  of  the  parties  to  a 
motion  for  judgment  is  not  a  discontinuance  of  the 
entire  motion,69  although  the  party  dismissed  was 
notified  and  has  appeared  and  pleaded.70 

§  227.    Form,  Requisites,  and  Entry  of  Judg- 
ment 

A  summary  Judgment  should  show  compliance  with 
statutory  requirements  as  to  its  form  and  entry,  and 
should  set  forth  those  facts  necessary  to  give  the  court 
jurisdiction  and  to  support  the  judgment. 

A  summary  judgment  on  motion  must  show  on  its 
face  the  existence  or  proof  of  all  facts  whidi  were 
necessary  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction  and  support 
the  judgment71  It  must  show  that  there  was  com- 
pliance with  all  the  statutory  requirements,72  such 
as  that  notice  was  given  for  the  time  and  in  the 
manner  required73  and  that  the  motion  was  made 
at  the  proper  time  and  place.74  The  court  should 
not  make  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law 
on  granting  a  motion  for  summary  judgment.75 

On  the  granting  of  a  motion  for  summary  judg- 
ment for  plaintiff,  it  is  better  practice  to  enter  an 
order  striking  out  the  answer  and  directing  judg- 
ment,76 with  the  result  that  there  is  an  entry  of 


59.  111.— Roach  v.   Village   of  Win- 
netka,  10  N.E.2d  356,  (366  111.  578. 

60.  N.Y.— Newman  v.  Special,  13  N. 
Y.S.2d  fr34,   257  App.Div.   1030. 

Piling-  of  bond  as  condition  for  new 
hearing1 

The  court  may  grant  a  new  hear- 
ing to  Defendant  on  facts  not  pre- 
sented in  opposition  to  a  motion  for 
summary  judgment  on  his  filing  a 
bond  to  protect  plaintiff  against  any 
judgment  that  may  be  procured. — 
Greenberg  v.  Rudnick,  258  N.T.S.  679, 
143  Misc.  793. 
motion  held  one  for  rehearing- 

A  motion  for  reargument  on  which 
new  facts  were  adduced  was  held  in 
effect  a  motion  for  a  rehearing  on 
additional  papers. — Gold  v.  Travelers 
Ins.  Co.,  31  N.T.6.2d  -580,  2*3  App.Div. 
817. 

61.  N.Y. — Musler  v.  Brooks,  Inc.,  1 
IST,Y.S.2d    527,    1S5    Misc.    797,    af- 
firmed   1    N.Y.S.2d    528,    253    App. 
Div.  793. 

62.  Wis. — 'Puller  v.  General  Accident 
Fire    &   -Life    Assur.    Corporation, 
Limited,  of  Perth,  Scotland,  272  N. 
W.  8139,  224  Wis,  -603. 

G3.    N.Y. — Corr  v.   Boggiano,    278  N. 
Y.S.  455,  244  App.Div.  724.     .          ; 


64.  N.Y.— A.    Sidney    Davison    Coal 
Co.,  Inc.  v.  Interstate  Coal  &  Dock 
Co.,  193  N.Y.S.  '883. 

65.  Safeguarding1  of  notes 

In  an  action  on  notes,  where  notes 
are  produced  in  court  in  support  of 
motion  for  summary  Judgment,  the 
court  on  granting  the  judgment 
should  require  the  notes  to  'be 
marked  as  exhibits,  or  should  seal 
the  notes,  or  require  them  to  be 
placed  in  a  safe  depositary' to  be  re- 
tained under  the  -order  of  the  court 
and  redelivered  under  like  order  to  a 
person  designated  therein  after  final 
termination  of  a  litigation. — General 
Inv.  Co.  v.  Interborough  Rapid 
Transit  Co.,  139  N.E.  216,  235  N.Y. 
133. 

66.  Cal. — McComsey  v.  'Leaf,   97   P. 
2d  242,  '38  Cal.App.2d  132. 

67.  Mich.— Michigan  Lafayette 
Bldg.  Co.  v.  Continental  Bank,  246 
N/W.  5«3,  2-61  Mich.  256. 

ea  N.Y.— New  York  Cent  .R.  Co.  v. 
Beacon  Milling  Co.,  !53  N.Y.S.2d 
405,  184  Misc.  187. 

69.  Ala. — Beard    v.    Mobile    Branch 
Bank,  '8  Ala.  344. 

70.  Ala. — Beard    v.    Mobile    Branch 
Bank,  supra. 

432 


71.  N.Y. — Brown  v.  Randazzo,  15  N. 
Y.S.2d  425,   258  App.Div.   748. 

Tenn.— Phillips  v.  Landess,  2'80  S.TT. 

694,  152  Tenn.  682. 
34  C.J.  p  20'6  note  83. 
Production  of  note 

In  rendering  summary  Judgment 
in  an  action  on  a  note,  where  the 
note  Is  produced  in  court,  the  court 
should  recite  in  its  order  that  the 
note  was  produced. — General  Inv. 
Co.  v.  Interborough  Rapid  Transit 
Co.,  139  N.B.  216,  235  N.Y.  133. 

72.  Ala.— Arthur  v.  State,  22  Ala.  61. 
Pa, — Freihofer   v.    Diggins,    Com.PL. 

27  Del.  275. 

73.  Tenn. — Lane   v.   Keith,    2   Baxt. 
189. 

'34  C.J.  p  20'6  note  85. 
Notice  held  sufficient 
111.— Mecartney    v.    Hale,    48    N.B.2d 
570,  i318  I11.APP.  502. 


74.    Tenn. — Curry     v. 
Heisk.  61. 


Munford,      5 


75.  N.Y. — Brescia  Const.tCo.  v.  Wai- 
art  Const.  Co.,  264  N.Y.S.  862,  238 
App.Div.  360. 

76.  N.Y. — Donne'lly    v.    Bauder,    216 
N.Y.S.  437,  217  App.Div.  59. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  228 


both  an  order  and  a  judgment;77   but  such  an  or- 
der  is  not  strictly  necessary.78 

Entry^  Summary  judgment  must  be  entered  by 
a  person  authorized  so  to  do.79  The  entry  of  a  de- 
cree by  the  clerk  on  the  minutes  of  the  court  in  a 


summary  proceeding  is  the  judgment;80  and  where, 
after  such  entry,  defendant  dies,  the  fact  that  it  is 
signed  during  the  term  thereafter  does  not  make  it 
irregular.81  If  judgment  is  entered  on  the  motion 
before  the  time  as  to  which  defendant  was  notified 
it  is  erroneous,  but  not  void.82 


X.  AMENDING,  CORRECTING,  REVIEWING,  OPENING,  AND  VACATING  JUDGMENT 
A.  JURISDICTION  AND  POWER  GENERALLY 


§  228.    In  General 


Courts  have  inherent  power  to  control,  amend,  open, 
and  vacate  their  judgments  under  proper  circumstances, 
although  in  some  Jurisdictions  statutes  regulate  the 
courts'  control  of  their  judgments. 


In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  courts, 
under  proper  circumstances,  may  control,  amend, 
open,  and  vacate  their  own  judgments.88  This  pow- 
er is  inherent  and  independent  of  statutes.84  In 


77.  N.Y. — Weinberg     v.      Goldstein, 
235   N.Y.S.  529,  226  App.Div.  479. 

78.  N.Y. — Donnelly    v.    Bauder,    218 
N.Y.S.  437,  217  App.Div.  59. 

79.  Court  or  judge  at  chambers  may 
enter   summary   judgment  after  su- 
preme court  commissioner  has  struck 
out  answer. — National  Surety  Co.  v. 
Mulligan,    146    A.    372,    10-5    N.J.Law 
336. 

80.  S.C.— -Dibble    v.   Taylor,    29    S.C. 
L.  308,  42  Am.D.  368. 

•34  C.J.  p  206  note  87. 

81.  S.C.— Dibble  v.  Taylor,  supra. 

82.  Ky. — Bustard  v.  Gates,  4  Dana. 
429. 

83.  U.S.— Pet  way    v.     Dobson,     D.C. 
Tenn.,      46      P.Supp.     114— Illinois 
Printing    Co.    v.    Electric    Shovel 
Coal    Corporation,    D.Q.IU.,    20    F. 
Sup-p.  181. 

Ala. — Du  Pree  v.  Hart,  *8  'So.2d  183, 

242  Ala.  690. 
Ark.— State   v.   West,    254   S.W.    828, 

160  Ark.  413. 
Cal.— In  re  Estrem's  Estate,   107  P. 

2d  36,   16  Cal.2d  563— Kohlstedt  v. 

Hauseur,  74  P.2d  314,  24  Cal.App.2d 

£0. 
Conn.— Persky  v.  Pugiisi,  127  A.  351, 

101  Conn.  658. 
Ga. — Coker  v.  Eison,  151  S.-E.  '682,  40 

Ga.App.   835. 
111.— Western    Smelting    &    Refining 

Co.  v.  Benj.  Harris  &  Co.,  24  N.E. 

2d  255,  302  Ill.App.  535. 
Kan.— State    v.    Riverside    Drainage 

Dist.   of  Sedgwick  County,   255  P. 

>37,  123  Kan.  393. 
Ky.— Dotson  v.  Burchett,  190  S.W.2d 

697,  301  Ky.  28. 
La. — Termini  v.  McCormick,  23  So.2d 

52,   20S   La.   221— 'Frank  v.   Currie, 

Ap.p.,  172  So.  843. 
Mass.— Russell    v.    Foley,    179    N.E, 

619,  278  Mass.  145. 
Mich.— Home  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cohen, 

270    N.W.    256,    278   Mich.   1'69. 
Miss. — Moore  v.  Montgomery  Ward  & 

Co.,    156   So.    875,   171  Miss.   420. 
N.J.— Pink    v.    Deerlng,    4    A.2d  -790, 

122  N.J.Law  277,  motion  denied  17 

49C.J.S.-28 


A.2d  603,  12-5  N.J.Law  569— Assets 
Development  Co.  v.  Wall,  119  A,  10, 
97  N.J.Law  468— Davis  v.  City  of 
Newark,  17  A.2d  305,  19  N.J.Misc. 
85. 

N.Y. — Youngs  v.  Goodman,  148  N.E. 
639,  240  N.Y.  470,  reargument  de- 
nied 150  N.E.  533,  241  N.Y.  509— 
White  v.  White,  231  N.Y.S.  146, 
224  App.Div.  355— La  «Salle  Exten- 
sion University  v.  Parella,  294  N. 
.Y.S.  146,  1-62  Misc.  220— Siegel  v. 
State,  246  N.Y.S.  652,  188  Misc.  474 
— Tousey  v.  Barber,  231  N.Y.S.  133, 
132  Misc.  861. 

N.C.— Fowler  v.  "Fowler,  130  S.E.  315, 
190  N.C.  536. 

Pa.— 'In  re  Sale  of  Real  Estate  on 
Compromise  of  Taxes,  Com,P}.,  46 
•Lack.Jur.  31. 

S.C. — Foster  v.  Pruitt,  167  S.E.  410, 
168  S.C.  262. 

Tex. — Spence  v.  National  Life  &  Ac- 
cident Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  50  »S.W. 
2d  212— Texas  Co.  v.  Beall,  Civ. 
App.,  3  S.W.2d  524,  error  refused. 

Authority  of  court  over  its  records 
generally  see  Courts  §§  229-236. 

Power  of: 
Amendment     and     correction     of 

judgments  see  infra  §  236. 
Opening   and    vacating   judgments 
see  infra  §  265. 

Memorandum  of  court,  designated 
'memorandum  on  final  hearing,'* 
which  contained  court's  conclusions 
of  law  entitling  plaintiff  to  recover, 
and  concluded,  "Judgment  according- 
ly," was  at  most  a  memorandum  hav- 
ing weight  of  general  verdict  of  ju- 
ry, and  neither  special  finding  of 
facts  nor  final  judgment,  which  pre- 
cluded court  from  reopening  case  at 
succeeding  term.— G.  Amsinck  &  Co. 
v.  Springfield  Grocer  Co.,  C.C.A.Mo., 
7  «F.2d  855. 

Unsigned  judgment  may  be  modi- 
fled. — Koontz  v.  Butler,  38  S.W.2d 
204,  238  Ky.  406. 

Until  order  book  to  signed  by  judge 
judgment  is  under  court's  control 
and  may  be  amended, 'modified,  or  set 

-    .  433 


aside. — Hazelip  v.   Doyel,    85   S.W.2d 
685,  260  Ky.  313. 
Void  judgment 

When  the  court's  attention  is  di- 
rected to  a  void  judgment,  it  should 
purge  its  records  of  the  nullity  by 
canceling  the  entry.— Stretch  v. 
Murphy,  112  P.2d  1018,  166  Or.  439. 

Xn     declaratory    Judgment     action 
after  there  had  been  a  trial  of  the 
issues,  the  trial  judge  had  no  power 
to  vacate  the  judgment. — Jay-Wash- 
ington Realty   Corporation  v.  Koon- 
del,  49  N.Y.S.2d  308,  268  App.Div.  116. 
t.    U.S.— Illinois     Printing     Co.     v. 
Electric    Shovel   Coal   Corporation, 
•D.C.I11.,  20  F.Supp.  181— Peters  v. 
Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York, 
D.C.Pa.,    17    F.Supp.    246,    reversed 
on  other  grounds,  -C.C.A.,   92  F.2d 
301. 

Ala.— Louisville     &     N.     R.     Co.     v. 
Bridgeforth,    101   So.   807,    20   Ala. 
App.  326. 
Del.— Miles  v.  Lay  ton,  193  A.  -567,  8 

W.W.Harr.   -411,    112   AJL.R.   7S6. 
Ind. — Cory  v.  Howard,   164  N.E.  639, 

88  Ind.App.  503. 

N.Y.— Application  of  Bond,  36  N.Y.S. 
2d  147,  264  App.Div.  484,  motion 
denied  In  re  Bond  49  N.E.2d  1006, 
290  N.Y.  739,  and  affirmed  50  N. 
R2d  299,  290  N.Y.  901— Albright 
v.  New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.,  26  N. 
Y.S.2d  210,  261  App.Div.  419— Wil- 
liams v.  Williams,  25  N.Y.S.2d  940, 
261  App.Div.  470,  affirmed  40  N.E. 
2d  1017,  287  N.Y.  799— Monahan  v, 
Kenny,  288  N.Y.S.  323,  24'8  App. 
Div.  159 — Jacobowltz  v.  Herson, 
276  N.Y.S.  816,  243  App.Div.  274, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Jacobo- 
witz  v.  Metselaar,  197  N.B.  -169,  26S 
N.Y.  130,  99  A.L.R.  1198,  reargu- 
ment denied  Jacobowitz  v.  Herson, 
198  N.B.  528.  268  N.Y.  630— Klein 
v.  Fairberg,  276  N.Y.S.  347,  242 
App.Div.  609 — In  re  Wing,  295  N. 
Y.S.  "386,  162  Misc.  551— Greenberg 
v.  Rudnlck,  258  N.Y.S.  «'&79,  143 
Misc.  793— American  Cities  Co,  v. 
Stevenson,  60  N.Y.S.2d  fiSo — Los 
Angeles  Inv.  Securities  Corpora- 


§  228 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


some  states  it  has  been  held  that  jurisdiction,  at 
least  with  respect  to  certain  courts,  ceases  with 
the  rendition  of  the  final  judgment,  and  that  there- 
after the  court  has  no  power  to  amend  or  vacate 
the  judgment  except  pursuant  to  statutory  author- 
ity.8* 

Where  the  court  is  not  justified  in  modifying  or 
vacating  a  judgment,  it  may  not  accomplish  the 
same  result  by  indirection  by  refusing  to  enforce 
the  judgment.86 


Statutory  provisions  generally.  In  various  juris- 
dictions statutes  have  been  enacted  which  regulate 
the  amendment,  correction,  opening,  and  vacation 
of  judgments.87  Some  such  statutes  do  not  affect 
the  inherent  power  and  control  of  the  court  over 
its  judgments,88  while  other  statutes  do.8d  In  cases 
not  within  the  statute,  the  common-law  rules  pre- 
vail.90 Such  statutes  are  remedial  and  should  be 


tion  v.  Joslyn,  12  N.Y.S.2d  370,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  14  N.Y.S. 
2d  798,  258  App.Div.  T62,  motion 
denied  15  N.T.S.2d  175,  25'8  App. 
Div.  821,  motion  granted  16  N.Y. 
S.2d  875,  258  App.'Div.  1018,  motion 
granted  25  N.E.2d  146,  285  N.T. 
-592,  appeal  dismissed  26  N.E.2d 
9-68,  282  N.Y.  438. 

Pa. — Davis  v.  Commonwealth  Trust 
Co.,  7  A.2d  3,  335  Pa.  387— In  re 
Stetson's  Estate,  155  A.  856,  305 
Pa.  62. 

S.D. — Janssen  v.  Tusha,  5  N.W.2d 
684,  68  -S.D.  6*39— Boshart  v.  Na- 
tional Ben.  Ass'n  of  Mitchell,  2T3 
N.W.  7,  65  S.D.  -260. 

Tex.— Nevitt  v.  Wilson,  285  S.W. 
1079,  1118  Tex.  29,  48  A.L.B.  355— 
Garrett  v.  Katz,  Civ.App.,  27  S.W. 
2d  373. 

Wis. — Libby  v.  -Central  Wisconsin 
Trust  Co.,  197  N.W.  206,  -182  Wis. 

59$. 

Court  of  claims  has  same  inher- 
ent discretionary  powers  to  set  aside 
own  judgments  for  error  of  law  as 
supreme  court. — Siegel  v.  State,  246 
N.Y.S.  652,  138  Misc.  474. 

Power  to  vacate  judgment  on 
ground  It  is  prejudicially  irregular, 
therefore  voidable,  is  not  dependent 
on  statute. — ^Fowler  v.  Fowler,  130  S. 
B.  315,  190  N.C.  536. 
Zn  California 

(1)  Independently        of        statute 
courts  have  power  to  correct,  amend, 
and  annul  judgments. — Bastajian  v. 
Brown,   120   P.2d   9,   19    Cal.2d   209— 
Treat  v.   Superior  Court  in  and  for 
City  and  -County  of  San  "Francisco,  62 
P.2d.  147,    7    Cal.2d    636— Qarson    v. 
Emmons  ODraying-  &  Safe  Moving  Co., 
64   P.2d  176,   18  Cal.App.2d  326,   fol- 
lowed in   64  P.2d  17'8,   18  Gal.App.2d 
7-68 — Button  Dredge  Co.  v.  Goss,  247 
P.  594,  77  CaLApp.  727. 

(2)  However,    it   has    been    stated 
that    in    the    absence    of    statutory 
authority    courts    have    no    jurisdic- 
tion to  alter  their  final  judgments. — 
Gillespie  v.  Andrews,  248  P.  715,  78 
CaLApp.  '59-5. 

03)  Once  a  decree  has  become  final 
it  may  not  be  amended,  modified,  or 
supplemented  except  where  other- 
wise authorized  'by  statute  or  where 
there  has  been  a  clerical  error  or 
misprision  due  to  inadvertence. — , 


Hales  v.  Snowden,  105  P.2d  1015,  40 
Gal.App.2d  '801. 

85.  La. — Succession  of  Harrison,  123 
So.    120,   168  La,  '675— Albritton  v. 
Nauls,  App.,   15  So.2d  126— Lacaze 
v.  Hardee,  App.,  7  So.2d  719 — Jeff- 
erson   v.    'Laure    N.    Truck    Line, 
App.,   181  So.  821,  affirmed  Jeffer- 
son v.  'Lauri  N.  Truck  Lines,  187 
So.  44,  192  La.  29— American  Mul- 
tigraph  Sales  Co.  v.  Globe  Indem- 
nity Co.,   123   «So.    358,   11  La.App. 
353. 

Mass.— Amory   v.    Kelley,    3'4   N.B.2d 

507,  309  Mass.  162. 
34  C.J.  p  210  note  8. 
Money   judgment   is  not   subject   to 

change 
La.— Wright  r.  Wright,  179  So.  866, 

189  La,  539. 

86.  N.Y.— In   re  Kananack's  Estate, 
278  N.T.S.  898,  155  Misc.  35. 

87.  Ariz.— Swisshelm      Gold     Silver 
Co.    v.    Farwell,    124    P.2d   544,   '59 
Ariz.  162. 

•Cal. — Olivera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d  5-64, 
19  Cal.2d  570,  140  A.L.R.  1<328— 
In  re  Smead's  Estate,  82  P.2d  182, 
12  Cal.2d  20 — Stan  ton  v.  Superior 
Court  within  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  261  P.  1001,  202  Cal.  478— 
In  re  Wiechers'  Estate,  250  P.  397, 
199  Cal.  !523,  certiorari  denied 
Wiechers  v.  Wiechers,  47  S.Ct.  476, 
273  U.S.  762,  71  L.Ed.  879— Wat- 
terson  v.  Owens  River  Canal  Co., 
210  P.  625,  190  CaL  88— Wetzel  v. 
Wetzel,  App.,  1'62  P.2d  299— Jones 
v.  Clover,  74  P.2d  517,  24  CaLApp. 
2d  210. 

I1L — Trupp  v.  'First  Bnglewood  State 
Bank  of  Chicago,  50  N.B.2d  198, 
307  111. App.  258. 

Iowa. — Workman  v.  District  Court, 
Delaware  -County,  269  N.W.  27,  222 
Iowa  '364. 

Minn.— Cacka  v.  Gaulke,  3  N.W.2d 
791,  212  Minn.  404. 

N.Y.— Keim  v.  Orel,  31  N.Y.S.2d  321, 
26'3  App.Div.  "779,  reargument  de- 
nied '32  N.Y.'S.2d  1010,  26-3  App. 
Div.  908,  motion  dismissed  Lefko- 
witz  v.  Keim,  41  N.B.2d  165,  287 
N.Y.  837 — Germann  v.  Jones,  221 
N.Y.S.  32,  220  App.Div.  5— Goishen 
v.  Samor  Realty  Co.,  4  N.Y.S.2d 
107,  167  Misc.  477 — In  re  Kenne- 
dy's Estate,  266  N.Y.S.  883,  149 
Misc.  188. 

434 


NJX— Bellingham  State  Bank  of 
Bellingham  v.  McCormick,  215  N. 
W.  152,  55  N.D.  700. 

Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Kins- 
man Nat.  Bank  v.  Jerko,  25  Ohio 
N.P..N.S.,  4'45,  457. 

Pa. — Davis  v.  Commonwealth  Trust 
Co.,  Com.Pl.,  46  Dauph.Co.  419. 

34  C.J.  -p  221  note  '54. 

Correction  and  vacation  of  decrees  in 
equity  see  Equity  §§  622-667,  674- 
'677,  682. 

Repeal  of  statute 

Statute  providing  that  judgment 
shall  not  be  set  aside  for  irregular- 
ity on  motion  unless  made  within 
three  years  after  term  At  which  such 
judgment  was  rendered  is  not  incon- 
sistent, and  therefore  is  not  repealed 
by  implication  by  civil  code  for  prac- 
tice and  procedure  in  all  courts  en- 
acted in  194'3,  or  by  harmonizing 
rules  of  supreme  court. — Poindexter 
v.  Marshall,  Mo.App.,  193  S.W.2d  622. 

88.  Ga. — East  Side  Lumber  &  Coal 
Co.  v.  Barfleld,  18  S.E.2d  492,  193 
Ga.  273. 

Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Kins- 
man  Nat   Bank  v.  Jerko,   25   Ohio 
N.P..N.S.,  445,  457.     . 
Tex. — Nevitt     v.    Wilson,     28-5     "S.W. 

1079,  116  Tex.  29,  48  A.L.R.  355. 
34  C.J.  p  223  note  56,  p  332  note  57 
[a]. 

Rules  of  Civil  Procedure,  rule  21, 
does  not  deprive  court  of  inherent 
power  to  set  aside  judgment  during 
,the  term. — Arenstein  v.  Jencks,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  179  S.W.2d  831,  error  dis- 
missed. 

Court  rule  relating  to  time  for  per- 
fecting appeal  to  supreme  court  did 
not  limit  power  of  trial  court  to  va- 
cate judgment  for  defendant,  which 
was  entered  without  payment  of 
judgment  fee  required  by  statute  and 
another  court  rule. — Detroit  Edison 
Co.  v.  Hartrick,  278  N.W.  664,  283 
Mich.  -502. 

'.  Colo. — 'Empire  Constr.  Co.  v. 
Crawford,  141  P.  474,  57  Colo.  281. 

Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Kins- 
man Nat.  Bank  v.  Jerko,  25  Ohio 
N.P.,N.S.,  445,  '457. 

34  C.J.  p  224  note  57. 

90-    N.M.— De  Baca  v.  Sais,  99  P.2d 

106,  44  N.M.  105. 
Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Kins- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  228 


liberally  construed,91  although  they  cannot  be  ex- 
tended beyond  their  legitimate  purport.92  Thus  if 
they  speak  only  of  "defaults"  they  cannot  be  ap- 
plied to  final  judgments  otherwise  rende/ed.93  Stat- 
utes of  this  character  should  not  be  construed  retro- 
spectively.94 

Under  some  of  these  statutes  a  court  retains  con- 
trol of  its  judgments  for  a  fixed  period  of  time,95 
and  a  judgment  may  be  amended,  corrected,  opened, 
or  vacated  only  within  the  time  so  limited,96  such 
as  thirty  days,97  sixty  days,98  or  six  months99  aft- 


er the  making  or  entry  of  the  judgment  or  notice 
of  the  judgment,  during  the  term,  as  considered  in- 
fra §  229,  or  within  a  reasonable  time,  but  not  ex- 
ceeding six  months  after  judgment  is  taken.1  The 
court  may  amend  a  judgment  after  the  expiration 
of  the  statutory  period  as  to  matters  of  form2  or 
where  the  judgment  is  interlocutory.^  Where  the 
judgment  is  void  the  court  may  vacate  it  after  the 
expiration  of  the  time  fixed  by  statute.4 

After  expiration  of  time  for  appeal.  Unless  oth- 
erwise provided  by  statute,5  a  court  ordinarily  does 
not  lose  the  power  to  vacate  a  judgment  merely  on 


man  Nat.  Bank  v.  Jerko,  2-5  Ohio 
N.P..N.S.,  445,  457. 
34  C.J;  p  224  note  58. 

91.  Cal.— Bonftlio  v.  Ganger,  140  P. 
2d   861,    60   Cal.App.2d  405. 

Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Kins- 
man Nat.  Bank  v,  Jerko,  25  Ohio 
N.P.,N.S.,  445,  457. 

34  C.J.  p  224  note  '59. 

92.  Ohio. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in. 
Kinsman   Nat.   Bank  v.   Jerko,    25 
Ohio  N.P..N.S.,  4'45,  457. 

34  C.J.  p  224  note  '61. 

93.  Ga. — O'Connell   v.   'Friedman,   45 
S,B.  668,  118  Ga.  831. 

34  C.J.  p  224  note  61. 

94.  Miss. — Pendleton   Y.    Prestridge, 
20  Miss.  <302. 

34  C.J.  p  224  note  62. 

'95.  Ala. — Reese  &  Reese  v.  Burton 
&  Watson  Undertaking  Co.,  184  So. 
820,  28  Ala.App.  384. 

Control  of  Judgments  where  terms 
abolished  see  infra  §  231. 

96.  Ala.— Oabbert    v.    Gabbert,    117 
So.    214,    217    Ala.    599— Reese    & 
Reese  v.  Burton  &  Watson  Under- 
taking   Co.,    184    So.    820,    28    Ala. 
A'pp.  3$  4. 

CaL— Olivera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d  564, 
19  Cal.2d  570,  140  A.L.R.  1328— 
Cikuth  v.  Loero,  57  P.2d  1009,  14 
Cal.App.2d  32 — Delmuto  v.  Superior 
Court  in  and  for  San  Joaquin  Coun- 
ty, 6  P.2d  1007,  119  CaLApp.  590. 

Iowa.— Albright  v.  Moeckley,  237  N. 
W.  -'309. 

Minn. — Elsen  v.  State  (Farmers  Mut. 
Ins.  Co.,  17  N.W.2d  6-52,  219  Minn. 
315 — Smude  v.  Amidon,  7  N.W.2d 
776,  214  Minn.  266. 

N.D. — Kilby  v.  Movius  Land  &  Loan 
Co.,  219  N.W.  948,  57  N.D.  14— 
Bellingham  State  Bank  of  Belling- 
ham  v.  McCormick,  215  N.W.  152, 
5-5  N.D.  700. 

Wis. — Amalgamated  Meat  Cutters  & 
Butcher  Workmen  of  N.  A.,  A.  P. 
of  'K,  Local  Union  No.  73  v.  Smith, 
10  N.W.2d  114,  24«3  Wis.  '390— 
Kickapoo  Development  Corporation 
v.  Kickapoo  Orchard  Co.,  285  N.W. 
354,  231  Wis.  458. 

34  C.J.  p  221  note  54. 

97.  Ala.— Pate    v.    State,    14    So.2d 


251,  244  Ala.  396— Brand  v.  State,  6 
So.2d  446,  242  Ala.  15,  certiorari 
denied  6  So.2d  450,  242  Ala.  349— 
Ex  parte  Howard,  142  So.  403,  225 
Ala.  108— Ex  parte  Fidelity  &  De- 
posit Co.  of  Maryland,  134  So.  861, 
223  Ala.  98— Ex  parte  Green,  129 
'So.  72,  221  Ala.  298— Mt.  Vernon- 
Woodberry  Mills  v.  Union  Springs 
Guano  Co.,  155  So.  710,  26  Ala.App. 
13'6.  certiorari  denied  155  So.  716, 
229  Ala.  91. 

111.— Barnard  v.  Michael,  6?  N.E.2d 
858,  S92  111.  130— Illinois  Nat. 
Bank  of  Springfield  v.  Gwinn,  61 
N.E.2d  249,  590  111.  345— In  re 
Reexnts'  Estate,  50  N.E.2d  €14,  3S3 
111.  447— People  ex  rel.  Meier  v. 
Lewe,  44  N.E.2d  -551,  380  111.  '531— 
Department  of  Public  Works  and 
Buildings  v.  Legg,  29  N.E.2d  515, 
374  111.  306— Scribner  v.  Village  of 
Downers  Grove,  25  N.E.2d  54,  372 
III  614— Simon  v.  Horan,  5'6  N.E. 
2d  147,  32i3  Ill.App.  627— Thome  v. 
Thome,  45  N.E.2d  85,  316  IlLApp. 
451 — Schmahl  v.  Aurora  Nat 
Bank,  35  N.E.2d  689,  311  IlLApp. 
228 — Trupp  v.  'First  Englewood 
State  Bank  of  Chicago,  30  N.E.2d 
198,  307  IlLApp.  258— Becker  v. 
Loebs  Ins.  Agency  Co.,  2*6  N.E.2d 
653,  304  IlLApp.  575 — Rasmussen 
v.  National  Tea  Co.,  26  N.E.2d  523, 
•304  IlLApp.  «353— Parish  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Uptown  Sales  &  Serv- 
ice Co.,  20  N.E.2d  634,  300  IlLApp. 
7$ — McKenna  v.  Forman,  2*83  111. 
App.  606. 

Md.— Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d  276, 
1S1  Md.  20'6. 

tf.J. — Zicarelli  v.  General  (Finance 
Co.,  186  A.  726,  14  N.J.Misc.  711. 

N.M.— De  Baca  v.  «Sais,  99  P.2d  106, 
44  N.M.  105— Arias  v.  Springer,  78 
P.2d  153,  42  N.M.  350— Pugh  v. 
Phelps,  19  P.2d  315,  37  N.M.  126. 

Tenn.— Broadway  Motor  Co.  v.  Public 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  12  Tenn.App.  278— 
Durham  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Bischel, 
4  Tenn.App.  233. 

Tex. — Joy  v.  Toung,  Civ.App.,  1W  S. 
W.2d  159. 

34  C.J.  p  210  note  8  [a],  p  221  note  54 
[d].  I 

435 


Common  rule  allowing1  correction 
or  vacation  during-  term  was  changed 
by  statute  limiting  time  to  thirty 
days. — Reese  &  Reese  v.  Burton  & 
Watson  Undertaking  Qo.f  184  So.  820, 
28  Ala.Aj>p.  384. 

98*  Ky. — Hutchinson  v.  Hutchinson, 
168  S.W.2d  738,  293  Ky.  270— 
Straton  &  Terstegge  'Co.  v.  Begley, 
61  S.W.2d  287,  249  Ky.  «32. 

99.  Ariz.— Hartford  Accident  &  In- 
demnity Co.  v.  Worrells,  69  P.2d  240, 
50  Ariz.  90— In  re  Ralph's  Estate, 
67  P.2d  230,  49  Ariz.  391— Inter- 
mountain  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v. 
Allison  Steel  Mfg.  Co..  22  P.2d  -413, 
42  Ariz.  51. 

Cal.— Goatman  v.  Fuller,  216  P.  35, 
191  Cal.  245. 

Mont. — Edgar  State  Bank  v.  Long, 
278  P.  108,  85  Mont.  225. 

Nev.— iLauer  v.  Eighth  Judicial  -Dis- 
trict Court  in  and  for  Clark  Coun- 
ty, 140  P.2d  95«3f  62  Nev.  78. 

1.  Cal. — People    v.    Greene/    16    P. 
197,    74   Cal.    400,  6  Am.S.R.   448— 
Wetzel   v.  Wetzel,   App.,   162  P.2d 
2-99. 

2.  111.— Thorne   v.    Thorne,    45    N.E. 
2d  185,  316  IlLApp.  451. 

3.  Ala.— Blankenship    v.    Hail,     106 
So.  '594,  214  Ala.  35. 

4.  111.-— Barnard  v.  Michael,  63  N.E. 
2d    858,    392    111.    130— Pedersen  v. 
Logan    Square    State    &    Savings 
Bank,    32   N.E.2d  S44,   -309    IlLApp. 
>54,   reversed  on  other  grounds   36 
N.E.2d  732,  377  111.  408. 

84  C.J.  p  210  note  8  [a]. 
Fraud  on  court  and  counsel 
N.J. — Zicarelli    v.    General    Finance 
Co.,   186  A.   72«,   14  N.J.Misc.  711. 

5.  Minn. — Smude  v.  Amidon,  7  N.W. 
2d  77«,  214  Minn.  266. 

Interlocutory  Judgment 

After  expiration  of  time  to  appeal 
from  or  to  modify  interlocutory 
judgment,  trial  court  had  no  juris- 
diction to  determine  whether  inter- 
locutory Judgment  was  supported  by 
the  finding. — Kickapoo  Development 
Corporation  v.  Kickapoo  Orchard  Co., 
285  N.W.  854,  231  Wis.  458. 


§  229 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  lapse  of  the  statutory  period  during  which  an 
appeal  may  be  taken.6 

§  229.    During  Term 

At  common  law  a  court  has  full  control  over  Its  or- 
ders  or  Judgments  during  the  term  at  which  they  are 
made,  and  may,  on  sufficient  cause  shown  amend,  cor- 
rect,  open,  or  vacate  such  judgments. 


In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  a 
court  has  full  control  over  its  orders  or  judgments 
during  the  term  at  which  they  are  made,  and  may, 
on  sufficient  cause  shown,  in  the  exercise  of  its 
sound  discretion,  amend,  correct,  revise,  supple- 
ment, open,  or  vacate  such  judgments,  at  least 
where  the  court  is  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction.? 


8.  U.S. — Denholm  &  McKay  Co.  v. 
Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue, 
C.C.A.,  132  «F.2d  243. 

7.     U.S.— Zimmern  v.  U.   S.,   Ala,,   56 
S.Ct.    706,    298    U.S.    1*67,    80    L.Ed. 
1118— U.   S.  v.   Benz,   51   S.Ct.   113. 
282  U.S.  304,  75  L.Ed.  354— Sun  OU 
Co.   v.   Burford,   C.C.A.Tex.,   130  F. 
2d   10,   reversed   on   other  grounds 
63  S.Ct.  109S,  319  U.-S.  '315,  87  L.Ed. 
1424,     rehearing    denied     63     S.Ct. 
1442,    320   U.S.    214,  $7   L.Ed.    1851, 
and  63  S.Ct  1442,  320  U.S.  214.  87 
L.Ed.   1851— Suggs  v.  Mutual  Ben. 
Health    &    Accident    Ass'n,    C.-C.A. 
OkL.  115  F.2d  'SO — Arcoil  Mfg.  Co. 
v.   American  Equitable  Assur.   Co. 
of  New   York,    C.C.A.N.J.,    87   F.2d 
206 — American     Guaranty     Co.     v. 
Caldwell,  C.C.A.CaL,  72  F.2d  209— 
Associated    Mfrs.    Corporation    of 
America  v.  De  Jong,  C.C.A.Iowa,  64 
*F.2d  i$4 — Obear-Nester  Glass  Co.  v. 
Hartford-Empire  Co.,  C.C.A.Mo..  61 
F.2d  31 — Massachusetts  Fire  &  Ma- 
rine Ins.   Co.  v.   Schmick.   CC.A.S. 
D..  58  F.2d  130— Gentry  v.  State  of 
Missouri,    ex    rel.    and   to    Use    of 
Butler,    C.C.A.MO.,    32    (F.2d    159— 
McCandless  v.  Haskins,  C.C.A.S.D., 
28  «F.2d   693 — Cudahy   Packing   Co. 
v.   City   of   Omaha,   C.C.A.Neb.,    24 
F.2d  '3,    certiorari   denied   49    S.Ct. 
D    '78  U.«S    601,  73  L.Ed.  530— Chi- 
ckgo,  lil  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lever- 
entz,  C.C.A.Minn.,  19  F.2d  915,  cer- 
tiorari denied  48  S.Ct.  '38,  275  U.S. 
343,    72    <L.Ed.    416— Maison   Dorin 
SociSte1  Anonyme  v.  Arnold,  C.C.A. 
AJY    16  'F.2d  977,  certiorari  denied 
47  S.Ct.  571,  273  U.S.  766,  71  L.Ed. 
SSI — Pennsylvania  R.   R.  v.  Mont- 
gomery,   C.C.A.N.Y.,    6    F.2d   '386— 
In  re  Vardaman  Shoe  Co.,  D.C.Mo. 
52    'F.Supp.    562— Leslie    v.    Floyd 
Gas  Co.,  D.O.Ky.,  11  F.Supp.  401— 
Greyerbiehl     v.     Hughes     Electric 
•Co.,  C.C.A.N.D.,  294  F.  802,  certio^ 
rari  denied  Hughes  Electric  Co.  v 
Greyerbiehl,  44  S.Qt  402,  264  U.S 
589,  '68  L.Ed.  864. 

Ala.— Schaeffer  v.  Walker,  3  So.2d 
405,  241  Ala.  530— Sovereign  Camp 
W.  O.  W.,  v.  Gay,  104  So.  895,  20 
Ala.App.  650,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  104  So.  898,  213  Ala,  5— 
State  v.  Heflin,  96  So.  459,  19  Ala, 
App.  222. 
Alaska.— Mitchell  v.  Beaver  Dredging 

Co.,  8  Alaska  566. 

^riz. — in  re  Ralph's  Estate,  67  P 
3d  230,  49  Ariz.  391— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  Intermountain  Building  & 
JLoan  Assfn  v.  Allison  Steel  Mfg 


Co.,  22  P.2d  413,  415,  42  Ariz.  51. 
\rk.— Stinson  v.  Stinson.  159  S.W.2d 
446.  203  Ark.  888— Security  Bank 
of  Branson,  Mo.,  v.  Speer,  157  S.W. 
2d  775,  203  Ark.  562 — Browning  v. 
Berg,  118  S.W.2d  1017,  196  Ark.  595 
— McDonald  v.  Olla  State  Bank,  93 
S.W.2d  325,  192  Ark.  603— Union 
Sawmill  Co.  v.  Langley,  66  S.W.2d 
300,  188  Ark.  316 — American  Build- 
ing &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Memphis  Fur- 
niture Mfg.  Co.,  49  S.W.2d  377, 
185  Ark.  762— Union  &  Planters' 
Pank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Pope,  5  S. 
W.2d  330,  176  Ark.  1023 — T.  J. 
Moss  Tie  Co.  v.  Miller,  276  S.W. 
586,  169  Ark.  657 — Dawson  v. 
Mays,  252  S.W.  33,  159  Ark.  331, 
30  A.UR.  1463. 
Cal.— Olivera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d  56'4, 

19    Cal.2d    570,    140   A.L.R.    1328. 
Conn. — Ideal  Financing  Ass'n  v.  La- 
Bonte,  180  A.  300,  120  Conn.  190 — 
Ferguson  v.  Sabo,  162  A,  844,  115 
Conn.    619,   certiorari   denied   53   S. 
Ct  595,  289  U.S.  734,  77  L.Ed.  1482 
— McCulioch    v.    Pittsburgh    Plate 
Glass    Co.,   140    A.    114,    107    Conn. 
164. 
Del. — Tweed  v.  Lockton,  167  A.  703,  5 

W.W.Harr.  474. 
D.C.— Meloy   v.    F'nbers   Realty  Co., 

66  F.2d  208,  62  App.D.C.  228. 
Fla. — State  v.  City  of  Sarasota,  17 
So.2d  109,  154  Fla.  250 — Revell  v 
Dishong,  175  So.  905,  129  Fla.  9— 
State  v.  Wright,  145  So.  598,  107 
Fla.  178 — Hozen  v.  Smith,  135  So. 
813,  101  Fin.  767 — Whi  taker  v, 
Wright,  129  So.  889.  100  Fla.  282— 
Robinson  v.  Farmers'  &  Merchants' 
Bank  of  Tullahoma,  Tenn.,  117  So, 
393,  95  Fla.  940 — Alabama  Hotel 
Co.  v.  J.  L.'  Mott  Iron  Works,  98 
So.  825,  86  Fla.  608. 
a. — East  Side  Lumber  &  Coal  Co 
v.  Barfleld,  IS  S.E.2d  492,  193  Ga 
273 — Deen  v.  Baxley  State  Bank, 
'15  S.E.2d  194,  192  Ga.  300 — Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Kerr  v.  Kerr,  189  S 
E.  20,  183  Ga.  573— Gaines  v 
Gaines,  150  S.E.  645,  169  Ga.  432- 
Loughridge  v.  City  of  Dalton,  14 
S.E.  393,  166  Ga.  323— Berrien 
County  Bank  v.  Alexander,  115  S.E 
648,  154  Ga.  775,  answers  to  certi 
fled  questions  conformed  to  11 
S.E.  231,  29  Ga.App.  658— Milton 
v.  Mitchell  County  Electric  Mem 
bership  Ass'n,  12  S.E.2d  367,  6 
Ga.App.  63— Methodist  Episcopa 
Church  South  v.  Decell,  5  S.E.2 
66,  60  Ga.App.  843 — Frazier 
Beasley,  1  S.E.2d  458,  59  Ga.App 
500 — International  Agr.  Corpora 

436 


tion  v.  Law,  151  S.E.  557,  40  Ga. 
App.  756 — J.  S.  Schofield's  Sons 
Co.  v.  Vaughn,  150  S.E.  569,  40  Ga. 
App.  568 — Grogan  v.  Deraney,  143 
S.E.  912,  38  Ga.App.  287— Dabney 
v.  Benteen,  132  S.E.  916,  35  Ga. 
App.  203 — Terrell  v.  Clarke,  122  S. 
E.  718,  32  Ga.App.  39— Hardwick 
v.  Hatfield,  119  S.E.  430,  30  Ga,App. 
760. 
Hawaii. — A-One  Building  Co.  v.  Tee. 

32  Hawaii  15. 

ll.-_Corwin  v.  Rheims,  61  N.E.2d  40, 
390  111.  205— People  v.  Lyle,  160 
N.E.  742,  329  111.  418— Brelsford  v. 
Community  High  School  Dist.  No. 
36  of  Pulaski  County,  159  N.E.  237, 
328  111.  27 — Unbehahn  v.  Fader,  149 
N.E.  773,  319  111.  250— Simon  v. 
Horan,  56  N.E.2d  147,  323  IlLApp. 
-527 — Schmahl  v.  Aurora  Nat.  Bank, 
35  N.E.2d  689,  311  IlLApp.  228— 
People  ex  rel.  Nelson  v.  Farmers  & 
Merchants  State  Bank  of  Mendota, 
281  IlLApp.  354 — Wilson  v.  Hilli- 
goss,  278  IlLApp.  564. 
Ind. — Tri-City  Electric  Service  Co.  v. 
Jarvis,  185  N.E.  136,  206  Ind.  5— 
State  v.  Superior  Court  of  Marion* 
County,  174  N.E.  732,  202  Ind.  456 
—Hoffman  v.  Hoffman,  57  N.E.2d 
591,  115  Ind.App.  277,  rehearing  de- 
nied 58  N.E.2d  201,  115  Ind.App. 
277 — Papuschak  v.  Burich,  185  N. 
E.  876,  97  Ind.App.  100— Butcher 
v.  Olmstead,  182  N.E.  265,  99  Ind. 
App.  92. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Concan- 
non  v.  Blackman,  6  N.W.2d  116, 
119,  232  Iowa  722 — Hallam  v. 
Finch,  195  N.W.  352,  197  Iowa  224. 
Kan.— Rasing  v.  Healzer,  142  P.2d 
832,  157  Kan.  516 — Hoffman  v. 
Hoffman,  135  P.2d  887,  156  Kan. 
647 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Herd  v. 
Chambers,  122  P.2d  784,  787,  155 
Kan.  55 — Mayall  v.  American  Well 
Works  Co.,  89  P.2d  846,  149  Kan. 
781 — Epperson  v.  Kansas  State  De- 
partment of  Inspections  and  Regis- 
tration, 78  P.2d  850,  147  Kan,  762 
—Standard  Life  Ass'n  v.  Merrill, 
75  P.2d  825,  147  Kan.  121— Gaston 
v.  Collins,  72  P.2d  84,  146  Kan. 
449 — Board  of  Com'rs  of  Montgom- 
ery County  v.  Allen,  25  P.2d  374, 
138  Kan.  265— Corpus  Juris  quoted 
in,  Isenhart  v.  Powers,  9  P.2d  988, 
989,  13'5  Kan.  Ill— J.  B.  Colt  Co.  v. 
Clark,  266  P.  41,  125  Kan.  722— 
Wichita  Motors  Co.  v.  United 
Warehouse  Co.,  255  P.  30,  123  Kan. 
235 — Golden  v.  Southwestern  Util- 
ities Corporation  of  Delaware,  250 
P.  286,  121  Kan.  793— Schubach  v. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


229 


Hammer,  232  P.  1041,  117  Kan. 
fflo. 

Ky.— Furst  v.  Meek,  180  S.W.2d  410, 
297  Ky.  509 — Welch  v.  Mann's  Ex'r, 
88  S.W.2d  1,  261  Ky.  470 — Equita- 
ble Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.  v. 
Goble,  72  S.W.2d  35,  254  Ky.  614 
—Clements  v.  Kell,  39  S.W.2d  663, 
239  Ky.  396— Fields  v.  Combs,  18  S. 
\V.2d  965,  230  Ky.  97 — Morris  v. 
Morris,  10  S.W.2d  277,  225  Ky. 
823. 

ana. — Eddy  v.  Summers,  39  A.2d  812, 
183  Md.  683 — Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29 
A.2d  276,  181  Md.  206. 

Miss.— Mutual  Health  &  Benefit 
Ass'n  v.  Cranford,  156  So.  876,  173 
Miss.  152. 

3£o. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In  re 
Zartman's  Adoption,  65  S.W.2d  951, 
955,  334  Mo.  237— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  State  v.  Lonon,  56  S.W.2d 
378,  380,  331  Mo.  591— Bruegge  v. 
State  Bank  of  Wellston,  74  S.W.2d 
835 — State  ex  rel.  Holtkamp  v. 
Hartmann,  51  S.W.2d  22,  330  Mo. 
386— Meffert  v.  Lawson,  287  S.W. 
610,  315  Mo.  1091 — Boegemann  v. 
Bracey,  285  S.W.  992,  315  Mo.  437 
— Spickard  v.  McNabb,  App.,  180 
S.W.2d  611— McCormick  v.  St. 
John,  149  S.W.2d  894,  236  Mo.App. 
72 — Savings  Trust  Co.  of  St  Louis 
V.  Skain,  131  S.W.2d  566,  345  Mo. 
46 — Wilson  v.  Teale,  App.,  88  S.W. 
2d  422 — In  re  Henry  County  Mut. 
Burial  Ass'n,  77  S.W.2d  124,  229 
Mo.App.  300 — Niedringhaus  v.  Wm. 
F.  Niedringhaus  Inv.  Co.,  App.,  54 
S.W.2d  79,  certiorari  quashed  State 
ex  rel.  Williams  v.  Daues,  66  S.W. 
2d  137,  334  Mo.  91— Herbert  V. 
Hawley,  App.,  32  S.W.2d  1095— 
Dietrich  v.  Dietrich,  28  S.W.2d  418 
— National  City  Bank  of  St.  Louis 
v.  Pattiz,  App.,  26  S.W.2d  815— 
State  ex  reL  Ramsey  v.  Green, 
App.,  17  S.W.2d  629 — Ekonomou  v. 
Greek  Orthodox  Church  St.  Nicho- 
las, App.,  280  S.W.  57— State  ex 
rel.  Pargeon  v.  McPike,  App.,  243 
S.W.  278. 

Neb. — Barney  v.  Platte  Valley  Pub- 
lic Power  &  Irr.  Dist.,  23  N.W.2d 
335 — First  Nat.  Bank  of  Fairbury 
v.  First  Trust  Co.  of  Lincoln,  15 
N.W.2d  386,  145  Neb.  147— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Sedlak  v.  Duda,  13 
X.W.2d  892,  899,  1'44  Neb.  567,  154 
A.L.R.  490 — Gate  City  Co.  v.  Doug- 
las County,  282-  N.W.  532,  135  Neb. 
531— Britt  v.  Byrkit,  268  N.W.  83, 
131  Neb.  350 — Lyman  v.  Dunn,  252 
N.W.  197,  125  Neb.  770— Lacey  v. 
Citizens'  Lumber  &  Supply  Co., 
2-48  N.W.  378,  124  Neb.  813— Citi- 
zens' State  Bank  of  Cedar  Rapids 
v.  Young,  244  N.W.  294,  123  Neb. 
786— Shafer  v.  Wilsonville  Eleva- 
tor Co.,  237  N.W.  155,  121  Neb.  280 
— Netusil  v.  Novak,  235  N.W.  335, 
120  Neb.  751. 

N. JT. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Dorman 
v.  Usbe  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  180 
A.  413,  415,  115  N.J.Law  337— Sha- 
heen  v.  New  Jersey  Fidelity  & 


Plate  Glass  Ins.  Co.,  160  A.  553, 
109  N.J.Law  201. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gilbert 
v.  New  Mexico.  Const. 'Co.,  295  P. 
291,  292,  35  N.M.  262. 

Ohio.— In  re  Kleinhen's  Estate,  63 
N.E.2d  315,  .76  Ohio  App.  122— 
Thompson  v.  Stonom,  App.,  57  N. 
E.2d  788— Rauth  v.  Rauth,  57  N.E. 
2d  266,  73  Ohio  App.  564— Davis  v. 
Teachnor,  App.,  53  X.E.2d  208 — 
Ames  Co.  v.  Busick,  App.,  47  N.E. 
2d  647— Central  Nat.  Bank  of 
Cleveland  v.  Ely,  App.,  44  N.E.2d 
822 — Mosher  v.  Mutual  Home  & 
Savings  Ass'n,  App.,  41  N.E.2d  871 
— Schnitzler  v.  Lake  Shore  Coach 
Co.,  41  N.E.2d  436,  69  Ohio  App.2d 
265 — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v. 
John  F.  Rees  Co.,  App.,  40  N.E.2d 
200— Coble  v.  Coble,  App.,  38  N.E. 
2d  928 — State  ex  rel.  Hussey  v. 
Hemmert,  App.,  37  N.E.2d  668 — 
Leatherman  v.  Maytham,  83  N.E.2d 
1022,  66  Ohio  App.  344— National 
Guaranty  &  Finance  Co.  v.  Lindi- 
raore,  App.,  31  N.E.2d  155 — Pfeiffer 
v.  Sheffield,  37  N.E.2d  494,  64  Ohio 
App.  1— Sullivan  v.  Cloud,  24  N.E. 
2d  625,  62  Ohio  App.  462— Barger- 
Mitchell  Motor  Co.  v.  Levy,  170  N. 
E.  443,  34  Ohio  App.  84— Smith  v. 
Smith,  157  N.E.  768,  25  Ohio  App. 
239. 

Okl.— Harder  v.  Woodside,  165  P.2d 
841 — Phillips  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Da- 
vis, 147  P.2d  135,  19'4  Okl.  84— 
Long  v.  Hill,  145  P.2d  434,  193 
Okl.  463— Riddle  v.  Cornell,  135  P. 
2d  41,  192  Okl.  232— Roland  Union 
Graded  School  Dist  No.  1  of  Se- 
quoyah  County  v.  Thompson,  124 
P.2d  400,  190  Okl.  416— Haskell  v. 
Cutler,  108  P.2d  146,  188  Okl.  239— 
Pitts  v.  Walker,  105  P.2d  760,  188 
Okl.  17 — Western  Union  Telegraph 
Co.  v.  Martin,  95  P.2d  849,  186  Okl. 
24 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Monta- 
gue v.  State  ex  rel.  Commission- 
ers of  Land  Office  of  Oklahoma,  89 
P.2d  283,  285,  184  Okl.  574— Hart  v. 
Howell,  85  P.2d  401,  184  Okl.  146 
— Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Washington,  56  P.2d  1190,  176 
Okl.  521 — Firemen's  Fund  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Griffin,  54  P.2d  1032,  176  Okl. 
94— Lane  v.  O'Brien,  49  P.2d  171, 
173  Okl.  475 — Nichols  v.  Bonaparte, 
42  P.2d  866,  171  Okl.  234— Johnson 
v.  Bearden  Plumbing  &  Heating 
Co..  38  P.2d  500,  170  Okl.  63— Mc- 
Nac  v.  Kinch,  238  P.  424,  113  Okl. 
59— McNac  v.  Chapman,  223  P.  350, 
101  Okl.  121 — Ross  v.  Irving,  220 
P.  642,  96  Okl.  124— Wall  v.  Snider, 
219  P.  671,  93  Okl.  99— Missouri 
Quarries  Co.  v.  Brady,  219  P.  868, 
95  Okl.  279. 

Or. — Seufert  v.  Stadelman,  167  P.2d 
936— In  re  Mannix'  Estate,  29  P. 
2d  364,  146  Or.  187— Jackson  v. 
United  Rys.  Co.,  28  P.2d  836,  145 
Or.  546 — Rosumny  v.  Marks.  246 
P.  723,  118  Or.  248— In  re  Gerhar- 
<dus'  Estate,  239  P.  829,  116  Or.  113 
— Finch  v.  Pacific  Reduction  & 

437 


Chemical  Mfg.  Co.,  234  P.  296,  113 
Or.  670 — Hudelson  v.  Sanders- 
Swafford  Co.,  227  P.  310,  111  Or. 
600. 

Pa,— Bergen  v.  Lit  Bros.,  47  A.2d  671 
— Bekelja  v.  James  E.  Strates 
Shows,  3.7  A.2d  502,  349  Pa.  442— 
H.  H.  Robertson  Co.  v.  Pfotzer,  28 
A.2d  721,  150  Pa,Super.  457 — Com- 
monwealth ex  rel.  Howard  v.  How- 
ard, 10  A.2d  779,  138  Pa.Super. 
505 — Hoffer  v.  Carlisle  Community 
Hotel  Co.,  198  A.  478,  130  Pa.Super. 
457 — Keefer  v,  Lancaster  Intelli- 
gencer and  News-Journal,  6  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  476,  39  Lanc.L.Rev.  225. 
38  York  Leg.Rec.  167— Collins  v. 
Media-69th  St.  Trust  Co.,  Com.Pl.. 
30  DeLCo.  332— Allied  Store  Util- 
ities Co.  v.  Azat.  Com.Pl.  34  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  41. 

S.D. — Brown  v.  Brown,  206  N.W. 
68S,  49  S.D.  167. 

Tenn. — Citizens'  •  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Bayles,  281  S.W.  932,  153  Tenn. 
40 — Broadway  Motor  Co.  v.  Pub- 
lic Fire  Ins.  Co.,  12  Tenn.App.  278. 

Tex.— Callahan  v.  Staples,  161  S.W. 
2d  489,  139  Tex.  8 — Turman  v.  Tur- 
man,  64  S.W.2d  137,  123  Tex.  1— 
Wear  v.  McCallum,  33  S.W.2d  723, 
119  Tex  473— Dittman  v.  Model. 
Baking  Co.,  Com.App.,  271  S.W.  75 
— Collins  v.  Davenport,  Civ.App., 
192  S.TT.2d  291 — Henderson  v. 
Soash,  Civ.App.,  157  S.W.2d  161— 
Glasscock  v.  Bryant,  Civ.App.,  185 
S.W.2d  595,  refused  for  want  of 
merit — Arenstein  v.  Jencks,  Civ. 
App.,  179  S.W.2d  831,  error  dis- 
missed— Witty  v.  Rose.  Civ.App., 
148  S.W.2d  962,  error  dismissed— 
St.  John  v.  Archer,  Civ.App.,  147  S. 
W.2d  519,  error  dismissed— Rhodi- 
us  v.  Miller,  Civ.App..  139  S.W.2d 
316,  error  dismissed,  judgment  cor- 
rect— Johnson  v.  Henderson,  Civ. 
App.,  132  S.W.2d  458— Zachary  v. 
Home  Owners  Loan  Corporation, 
Civ.App.,  117  S.W.2d  153,  error  dis- 
missed— F.  C.  Crane  Co.  v.  Gosdin, 
Civ.App.,  94  S.W.2d  221,  followed 
in  F.  C.  Crane  Co.  v.  Bozarth,  94 
S.W.2d  223  and  F.  C.  Crane  Co.  v. 
Williams,  94  S.W.2d  224— Gaffney 
v.  Kent,  Civ.App.,  74  S.W.2d  176— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Turman  v. 
Turman,  Civ.App.,  71  S.W.2d  898, 
901,  error  dismissed— Guaranty 
Bond  State  Bank  of  Timpson  v. 
Redding,  Civ.App.,  24  S.W.2d  457 
— Perkins  v.  Lightfoot,  Civ^App., 
10  S.W.2d  1030,  error  dismissed— 
Texas  Employers'  Ins.  Ass'n  v. 
Knouff,  Civ.App.,  297  S.W.  799,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds.  Com.App., 
7  S.W.2d  68 — Adamson  v.  Collins, 
Civ.App.,  286  S.W.  598 — Ex  parte 
Reis,  33'S.W.2d  435,  117  Tex.Cr. 
123— Reeves  v.  State,  4  S.W.2d  49, 
109  Tex.Cr.  289,  followed  in  4  S.W. 
2d  1115,  1116,  109  Tex.Cr.  462. 

Va. — Massanutten  Bank  of  Strasburg 
v.  Glaize,  14  S.E.2d  2-85,  177  Va. 
519 — -®tna  Casualty  &  Surety  Co, 
of  Hartford,  Conn.,  v.  Board  of 


§  229 


JUDGMENTS 


49     C.J.S. 


This  power  is.  inherent  and  exists  independently 
of  any  statute.8  Unless  previously  adjourned  sine 
die,  every  term  continues  until  the  beginning  of 
the  next  for  the  purpose  of  this  rule.9  The  power 
of  the  court  extends,  at  least  in  cases  tried  without 
the  intervention  of  a  jury,  to  the  hearing  of  addi- 
tional testimony  with  respect  to  any  part  of  the 
proceedings  as  to  which  the  judge  may  entertain 
doubt.10  The  perfection  of  an  appeal  during  the 
term  does  not  deprive  the  court  of  this  power.11 

Statutory  provisions.  In  some  jurisdictions  the 
statutes  expressly  provide  that  the  judgment  may 
be  amended  or  vacated  during  the  term  at  which 
it  was  entered.12 


§  230.    After  Expiration  of  Term 

a.  In  general 

b.  Void  judgments 

c.  Reservation  of  power  in  judgment 

d.  Consent  and  waiver 

a.  IE  General 

In  the  absence  of  statutory  authority,  a  court  ordi- 
narily has  no  power  to  correct,  amend,  open,  or  va- 
cate a  Judgment  after  the  expiration  of  the  term. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise, 
jurisdiction  over  the  cause  ceases  with  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term  at  which  final  judgment  is  ren- 
dered13 and  thereafter  the  court  has  no  power  to 
correct  or  amend  the  judgment,14  and  a  fortiori  the 


Sup'rs  of  Warren  County,  188  S.E. 

617,  180  Va.  11. 
W.Va.— Baker  v.   Gaskins,   36   S.B.2d 

893 — Chaney  v.  State  Compensation 

Com'r,  S3  S.E.2d  284. 
Wis. — Feiges    v.    Racine   Dry    Goods 

Co.,  285  N.W..805,  231  Wis.  284. 
Wyo.— Book  v.   Book,   T41  .P.2d   546, 

59  Wyo.  423 — Corpus  Juris  quoted 

in  In  re   Shaul,    39    P.2d   478,   480, 

46  Wyo.  549— Sioux  City  Seed  Co. 
v.     Montgomery,     291     P.     918,     42 
Wyo.    170— State  v.    Scott,   247   P. 
699,  35  Wyo.  108. 

34  C.J.  p  207  note  5. 
Amendment    and    correction    see    in- 
fra §§   236-264. 

Jurisdiction  of  courts  of  limited  ju- 
risdiction  see   infra   §    235. 
Opening-  and   vacating   see   infra   §§ 

265-310. 

Setting    aside    dismissal    and    rein- 
statement of  cause  see  Dismissal 
and  Nonsuit  §§  41,  79. 
Resorting  to  motion  for  judgment 
non  obstante  veredicto  in  trial  with- 
out jury  does  not  deprive  court  of 
control  of  judgment  during  term. — 
Fitzpatrick    v.    Bates,    92    Pa.  Super. 
114. 

8.    Ariz. — Intel-mountain  Building  & 

Loan  Ass'n   v.   Allison  Steel  Mfg. 

Co.,   22  P.2d  413,  415,   42  Ariz.  51. 
Fla.— Whitaker    v.    Wright,    129    So. 

889,  100  Fla.  282. 
111. — Department    of    Public    Works 

and  Buildings  v.  Legg,  29  N.E.2d 

•515,  374  HI.  306. 
Iowa. — Concannon  v.  Blackman,  6  N. 

W.2d  116,  119,  232  Iowa  722. 
Ohio. — Moherman  v.  Nickels,  4'5  N.E. 

2d  405,  140  Ohio  St.  450,  143  A.L.R. 

1174 — Ames    Co.    v.    Busick,    App., 

47  N.E.2d  647. 

Okl.— Montague  v.  State,  89  P.2d  283, 
184  Okl.  574. 

3-4  C.J.  p  207  note  5. 

Hot  dependent  on  statute  regulating 
new  trials 

Ky. — City  of  Hazard  v.  Duff,  175  S.W. 
2d  357,  295  Ky.  701— -First  State 
Bank  v.  Asher,  117  S.W.2d  581, 
273  Ky.  574— South  Mountain  Coal 


Co.  v.  Rowland,  265  S.W.  320,  204 

Ky.  820. 
Mo.— Ritchie  v.  Ritchie,  App.,  173  S. 

W.2d  101. 
Okl. — Firemen's    Fund    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Griffin,   54   P.2d  1032,   176   Okl.   94. 
Tex. — Townes  v.  Lattimore,  272  S.W. 

435,  114  Tex.  511. 

Statute  relating  to  entry  of  judg- 
ment did  not  affect  power  of  district 
court  to  modify  at  term  in  which  it 
was  rendered  a  judgment  which  was 
entered  after  direction  of  verdict. — 
Zachary  v.  Home  Owners  Loan  Cor- 
poration, Tex.Civ.App.,  117  S.W.2d 
153,  error  dismissed. 
9.  Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In 

re  Shaul,  30  P.2d  478,  480,  46  Wyo. 

549. 

34  C.J.  p  209  note  6. 
Terms   and   sessions   see   Courts    §§ 

147-169. 
lOt    Tex. — P.  C.  Crane  Co.  v.  Gosdin, 

CIv.App.,    94    S.W.2d   221,   followed 

in  F.  C.  Crane  Co.  v.  Bozarth,  94 

S.W.2d  223  and  F.  C.  Crane  Co.  v. 

Williams,  94  S.W.2d  224. 

11.  Pa.— Kingsley  Clothing  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Jacobs.  26  A.2d  315,  344  Pa,  551. 

Tex. — Glasscock  v.  Bryant,  Civ.App., 
185  S.W.2d  595,  refused  for  want 
of  merit. 

12.  Iowa. — Concannon  v.  Blackman, 
6  N.W.2d  116,  232  Iowa  722— John- 
ston v.   Calvin,   5   N.W.2d   840,   232 
Iowa  531. 

34  C.J.  p  221  note  54  [e]  (1). 

13.  U.S. — New     England     Furniture 
&    Carpet    Co.    v.    Willcuts,    D.C. 
Minn.,  55  F.2d  983. 

Ala.— Pate  v.  State,  14  So.2d  251,  244 
Ala,  396. 

Ark. — Coulter  v.  Martin,  139  S.W."2d 
688,  200  Ark.  1189,  201  Ark.  21. 

Conn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Appli- 
cation of  Title  &  Guaranty  Co.  of 
Bridgeport  to  Change  Name  to 
Bankers'  Security  Trust  Co.,  145  A. 
151,  109  Conn.  45. 

DeL— Miles  v.  Dayton,  193 -A.  567, 
8  W.W.Harr.  411,  112  A.L.R.  ?86. 

Fla.— State  v.  Wright,   1'45    So.   598, 

438 


107  Fla.  178— Kroier  v.  Kroier,  116 
So.  753,  95  Fla.  865. 

Hawaii. — Goo  v.  Hee  Fat,  34  Hawaii 
123. 

111. — Wallace  Grain  &  Supply  Co.  v. 
Gary,  24  N.E.2d  907,  303  Ill.App. 
221,  reversed  on  other  grounds  28 
N.E.2d  107,  374  111.  57. 

Ind.— In  re  Perry,  148  N.E.  163,  83 
Ind.App.  456. 

Kan. — Thornton  v.  Van  Horn,  37  P.2d 
1015,  140  Kan.  568. 

Ky.— Reed   v.    Hatcher,   1    Bibb.    346, 

Md. — Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d  276, 
181  Md.  206. 

Mo. — ^Etna  Ins.  Co.  v.  O'Malley,  118 
S.W.2d  3,  342  Mo.  800 — Burton  v. 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  204  S.W.  501, 
275  Mo.  185. 

Ohio. — Davis  v.  Teachnor,  App.,  63  N. 
E.2d  208 — Ryan  v.  Buckeye  State 
Building  &  Loan  Co.,  163  N.E.  719, 
29  Ohio  App.  476. 

Okl. — U.  S.  Smelting  Co.  v.  McGuireK 
253  P.  79,  123  Okl.  272. 

Pa. — Cesare  v.  Caputo,  100  Pa.Supen 
188. 

S.C. — Burns  v.  Babb,  3  S.E.2d  247, 
190  S.C.  508 — Eagerton  v.  Atlantic 
Coast  Line  R.  Co.,  178  S.E.  844,. 
175  S.C.  209. 

Tenn. — Citizens'  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Bayles,  281  S.W.  932,  153  Tenn.  40 
—Shaw  v.  Shaw,  277  S.W.  898,  15* 
Tenn.  360,  rehearing  denied  280  S. 
W.  23,  152  Tenn.  552. 

Tex. — Reeves  v.  State,  4  S.W.2d  49, 
109  Tex.Cr.  28'9,  followed  in  4  S.W. 
2d  1115,  1116,  109  TexCr.  462. 

Wyo. — Midwest  Refining  Co.  v. 
George,  7  P.2d  213,  44  Wyo.  25. 

34  C.J.  p  210  note  11,  p  212  note  12 — 
15  C.J.  p  825  note  85. 

Amendment  and  correction  see  infra 
§§  236-264. 

Terms  and  sessions  see  Courts  §§" 
147-169. 

14.  U.S. — Stewart  Die  Casting  Cor- 
poration v.  National  Labor  Rela- 
tions Board,  C.C.A.,  129  F.2d  481— 
Beyer  v.  McGeorge,  C.C.A.N.J.,  90 
F.2d  998— U.  S.  v.  Wilson,  C.C.A. 
Wash.,  85  F.2d  444 — Hiawassee 
Lumber  Co.  v.  U,  S.,  C.C.A.N.C.,. 


49    0.  J.  S.  JUDGMENTS  §  230 

court  has  no  power  after  expiration  of  the  term  to  |  open  or  vacate  the  judgment,^  except  in  either 


64  F.2d  417 — Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Muskogee  County  v.  Merely,  C.C.A. 
Oki:,  6  F.2d  553— Canning  v.  Hack- 
ett,  D.C.Mass.,  3  F.Supp.  460. 

AJa.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Sisson  v. 
Leonard,  11  So.Sd  144,  146,  243  Ala, 
546 — Ex  parte  Bergeron,  193  So. 
113,  238  Ala.  665— Ex  parte  How- 
ard, 142  So.  403,  22-5  Ala.  106— 
Gabbert  v.  Gabbert,  117  So.  214, 
217  Ala.  599. 

Ariz.— In  re  Ralph's  Estate,  67  P.2d 
230,  49  Ariz.  391. 

Ark. — Bright  v.  Johnson,  152  S.W.2d 
5-40,  202  Ark.  751— Bank  of  Rus- 
sellville  v.  Walthall,  96  S.W.2d 
952,  192  Ark.  1111— Evans  v.  U.  S. 
Anthracite  Coal  Co.,  21  S.W.2d  952, 
180  Ark.  578 — Browning  v.  Wai- 
drip,  273  S.W.  1032,  169  Ark.  261. 

Colo.— Osborne  v.  MacDonald,  8  P.2d 
707,  90  Colo.  292. 

Conn. — Foley  v.  George  A.  Douglas  & 
Bro.,  185  A.  70,  121  Conn.  377— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ferguson  v. 
Sabo,  162  A,  844,  845,  115  Conn. 
619,  certiorari  denied  53  S.Ct.  595, 
289  U.S.  734,  77  L.Ed.  1482. 

Del.— Smulski  v.  H.  Feinberg  Fur- 
niture Co.,  193  A,  585,  8  W.W.Harr. 
451.  <mt 

Fla.— State  ex  rel.  Coleman  v.  Wil- 
liams, 3  So:2d  152,  147  Fla.  514— 
Alabama  Hotel  Co.  v.  J.  L.  Mott 
Iron  Works,  98  So.  825,  86  Fla.  608. 

Ga. — Crowell  v.  Crowell,  11  S.E.2d 
190,  191  Ga.  36 — Frazier  v.  Beasley, 
1  S.E.2d  458,  59  Ga.App.  500— 
Rogers  v.  Rigell,'  188  S.E.  704,  183 
Ga.  455— Farmers  Mut.  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  of  Georgia  v.  Pollock,  184  S.E. 
383,  52  Ga.App.  603— Jill  Bros.  v. 
Holmes,  150  S.E.  921,  40  Ga.App. 
625. 

Hawaii. — Goo  v.  Hee  Fat,  3'4  Ha- 
waii 123. 

111.— People  ex  rel.  McDonough  v. 
Klein,  186  N.E.  533,  353  111.  80 
—People  v.  Lyle,  160  N.E.  742, 
329  111.  418— Village  of  Downer's 
Grove  v.  Glos,  147  N.E.  390,  316 
111.  583— Marabia  v.  Mary  Thomp- 
son Hospital  of  Chicago  for  Wo- 
men and  Children,  140  N.E.  836 
309  111.  147— Chicago  Title  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Gottschalk,  45  N.E.2d  194 
316  HLApp.  455— Schmahl  v.  Au- 
rora Nat.  Bank,  35  N.E.2d  689,  311 
HLApp.  228 — Chicago  Faucet  Co.  v 
839  Lake  St.  Bldg.  Corporation,  1 
N.E.2d  865,  285  Ill.App.  151— Quig- 
ley  v.  Quigley,  268  Ill.App.  130— 
Walentarski  v.  Racine,  264  IlLApp 
369 — Nelson  v.  Arcola  State  Bank, 
261  HLApp.  421. 

Ind.— Wagner  v.  McFadden,  31  N.E 
2d  628,  218  Ind.  400— Scheiring  v 
Baker,  177  N.E.  866,  202  Ind.  67? 
— Rooker  v.  Fidelity  Trust  Co. 
177  N.E.  45'4,  202  Ind.  641. 

Iowa. — COrpns  Juris  cited  in  Concan 
non  v.  Blackman,  6  N.W.2d  116 
119,  232  Iowa  722. 


Kan.— Elliott  v.  Elliott,  114  P.2d  823, 
154  Kan,  145— State  v.  Frame,  95 
P.2d  278,  150  Kan.  646— Shope  v. 
Shope,  89  P.2d  859,  149  Kan.  754 
— Bigler  v.  Goltl.  64  P.2d  '39,  145 
Kan.  191— Riley  v.  Riederer,  61  P. 
2d  106,  1414  Kan.  422— Drury  v. 
Drury,  41  P.2d  1032,  141  Kan.  511 
— J.  B.  Colt  Co.  v.  Clark,  266  P.  41, 
125  Kan.  722— Heston  v.  Finley, 
236  P.  841,  118  Kan.  717. 
Ky.— Schlenker  v.  Clarkr  11  S.W.2d 
725,  226  Ky.  665— People's  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Sleet,  4  S.W.2d  689. 
223  Ky.  749— Nelson  v.  Cartmel,  6 
Dana  7. 

Mo.— City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Franklin 
Bank,  173  S.W.2d  837,  351  Mo.  688 
—Smith  v.  Smith,  164  S.W.2d  921, 
350  Mo.  104— Seigle  v.  First  Nat. 
Co.,  90  S.W.2d  776,  338  Mo.  417, 
105  A.L.R.  181— Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  JBtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hyde,  34  S.W. 
2d  85,  87,  327  Mo.  115— Johnson  v. 
Underwood,  24  S.W.2d  133,  324  Mo. 
578—state  ex  rel.  Maple  v.  Mulloy, 
15  S.W.2d  809,  322  Mo.  281— Clancy 
v.  Herman  C.  G.  Luyties  Realty 
Co.,  10  S.W.2d  914,  321  Mo.  282 
— Madden  v.  Fitzsimmons,  150  S. 
W.2d  761,  235  Mo.App.  1074. 
N.J.— Somers  v.  Holmes,  177  A,  434, 

114  N.J.Law  497. 
N.Y. — Walzer  v.  Manufacturers  Trust 
Co.,  290  N.T.S.  879,  160  Misc.  803, 
affirmed  290  N.Y.S.  880,  248  App. 
Div.  865,  affirmed  12  N.E.2d  452, 
276  N.T.  507. 
Ohio.— Davis  v.  Teachnor,  App,,  53 
N.E.2d  208— Corpus  Juris  auoted  in 
Kinsman  Nat.  Bank  v.  Jerko,  25 
Ohio  N.P..N.S.,  445,  456. 
Okl.— Harder  v.  Woodside,  165  P.2d 
841 — Great  American  Ins.  Co.  v, 
Keswater,  268  P.  258,  131  Okl.  196 
— McNac  v.  Kinch,  238  P.  424,  113 
Okl.  59 — Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Pot- 
ter, 233  P.  700,  108  Okl.  49— Mc^Tac 
v.  Chapman,  223  P.  350,  101  Okl. 
121. 

Or. — Hicks  v.  Hill  Aeronautical 
School,  286  P.  553,  132  Or.  545 — 
Smith  v.  Rose,  265  P.  800,  125  Or. 
56— Western  Land  &  Irrigation  Co. 
v.  Humfeld,  247  P.  143,  118  Or 
416 — Finch  v.  Pacific  Reduction  & 
Chemical  Mfg.  Co.,  234  P.  296,  113 
Or.  670. 
Pa.— Commonwealth  v.  Wright,  Oyer 

&  T.,  33  DeLCo.  254. 
Tenn.— Sullivan  v.  Eason,  8  Tenn. 
App.  429— Everett  v.  Everett,  1 
Tenn.App.  85. 
Tex. — Arrington  v.  McDahiel,  25  S 
W.2d  295,  119  Tex.  148— Federal 
Surety  Co.  v.  Cook,  24  S.W.2d  39'4 
119  Tex.  89 — O'Neil  v.  Norton,  Com 
App.,  33  S.W.2d  733— Collins  v 
Davenport  Civ.App.,  192  S.W.2d 
291 — Railroad  Commission  v.  Dyer 
Civ.App.,  144  S.W.2d  375— Render- 
son  v.  Stone,  'Civ.App.,  95  S.W.2 
772,  error  dismissed. 

439 


Utah.— Frost  v."  District  Court  of 
First-  Judicial  District  in  and  for 
Box  Elder  County,  83  P-2d  737,  96 
Utah  106,  rehearing  denied  85  P. 
2d  601,  96  Utah  115. 

.— Baker  v.  Gaskins,  36  S.E.2d 
893— Chaney  v.  State  Compensa- 
tion Com'r,  33  S.E.2d  284— Stan- 
nard  Supply  Co.  v.  Delmar  Coal 
Co.,  158  S.E.  907,  110  W.Va.  560. 
Wyo.— Bales  v.  Brome,  105  P.2d  568, 
56  Wyo.  Ill— Midwest  Refining  Co. 
v.  George,  7  P.2d  213,  44  Wyo.  25 — 
Boulter  v.  Cook,  234  P.  1101,  32 
Wyo.  461,  rehearing  denied  236  P. 
245,  32  Wyo.  461. 
34  C.J.  p  210  notes  10,  11. 

In  determining  whether  federal 
court  lost  jurisdiction  to  modify 
udgment  by  expiration  of  term,  case 
should  be  deemed  as  belonging  to  di- 
vision in  which  county  was  situated 
from  which  removal  was  made, — Up- 
ton-Lang Co.  v.  Metropolitan  Casual- 
ty Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  C.C.A.Pa., 
57  F.2d  133. 

Judgment  on  petition  fox  new  trial 
is  "final  Judgment"  and  cannot  be 
modified  by  the  court  rendering  it  at 
a  subsequent  term  on  a  motion  for  a 
new  trial.— Wilhoit  v.  Nicely,  134  S. 
W.2d  615,  280  Ky.  793. 

15.  U.S.— Aderhold  v.  Murphy,  C.C. 
A.Kan.,  103  F.2d  492 — Sun  Indem- 
nity Co.  of  New  York  v.  U.  S.,  C.C. 
A.N.J.,  91  F.2d  120— Beyer  v.  Mc- 

•  George,  C.C.A.N.J.,  90  F.2d  998— 
Mallinger  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.Pa.,  82 
Ft2d  705— Upton-Lang  Co.  v.  Met- 
ropolitan Casualty  Ins.  Co.  of  New 
York,  C.C.A.Pa.,  57  F.2d  133— 
Woods  Bros.  Const.  Co.  v.  Yank- 
ton  County,  S.  D.,  C.C.A.S.D.,  54  F. 
2d  304,  81  A.L.R.  300— Ayer  v. 
Kemper,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  48  F.2d  11, 
certiorari  denied  Union  Trust  Co. 
of  Rochester  v.  Ayer,  52  S.Ct.  20, 
284  U.S.  639,  76  L.Ed.  543— Henry 
v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.Pa.,  46  F.2d  640— 
Kulesza  v.  Blair,  C.C.A.I11.,  41  F.2d 
439,  certiorari  denied  51  S.Ct.  86, 
282  U.S.  883,  75  L.Ed.  779 — Bach»3 
v.  Moe,  D.C.Ohio,  33  F.2d  976— 
Roman  v.  Alvarez,  C.C.A.Puerto 
Rico,  30  F.2d  813— U.  S,  v.  Ali,  D. 
CMich.,  20  F.2d  998 — G.  Amsinck 
&  Co.  v.  Springfield  Grocer  Co., 
C.C.A.MO.,  7  F.2d  855 — Ex  parte 
Robinson,  D.C.Tex.,  44  F.Supp.  795 
— Heffern  v.  The  De  Witt  Clinton, 

•  D.C.N.Y.,  44  F.Supp.  550— U.  S;  v.. 
Clatterbuck,  D.C.Md.,  26  F.Supp. 
297— Borough  of  Hasbrouck 
Heights,  N.  J.,  v.  Agrios,  D.C.N.J., 
10  F.Supp.  371 — U.  S.  v.  Manger,  D. 
C.N.J.,  7  F.Supp.  720 — Canning  v. 
Hackett,  D.C.Mass.,  3  F.Supp.  460. 

Ala.— Pate  v.  State,  14  So.2d  251,  2-44 
Ala.  396— Ex  parte  Bergeron,  193 
So.  113,  238  Ala.  665— Ex  parte 
Howard,  142  So.  403,  225  Ala.  106 
—Ex  parte  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Ch. 


§  230  JrDGUENTS  49    C.  J.  8. 

case   pursuant   to    proceedings   begun   within   the     proper  time  and  continued  to  the  subsequent  term; 


of  Maryland,  134  So.  861,  223  Ala. 
98 — Monroe  County  Growers'  Exch. 
v.  Harper,  103  So.  600,  20  Ala.App. 
532. 

Ariz.— In  re  Ralph's  Estate,  67  P.2d 
230,  49  Ariz.  391— Mosher  v.  Dye, 
39  P.2d  639,  44  Ariz.  555. 

Ark.— Feild  v.  Waters,  1  S.W.2d  S07, 
175  Ark.  1169— McConnell  v.  Hour- 
land,  299  S.W.  44,  175  Ark.  253— 
Browning  v.  Waldrep,  273  S.W. 
1032,  169  Ark.  261. 

Cal. — Casner  v.  San  Diego  Trust  & 
Savings  Bank,  94  P.2d  65,  34  Cal. 
App.2d  52'4. 

Colo. — Osborne  v.  MacDonald,  8  P.2d 
707,  90  Colo.  292— Monte  Vista  Po- 
tato Growers'  Co-op.  Ass'n  v.  Bond, 
252  P.  813,  80  Colo.  516. 

Conn. — Foley  v.  George  A.  Douglas 
&  Bro.,  185  A.  70,  121  Conn.  377 — 
Application  of  Title  &  Guaranty 
Co.  of  Bridgeport  to  Change  Xame 
to  Bankers'  Security  Trust  Co., 
145  A.  151,  109  Conn.  45. 

Del. — Smulski  v.  H.  Peinberg  Furni- 
ture Co.,  193  A,  585,  8  W.W.Harr. 
451 — Hazzard  v.  Alexander,  178  A. 
873,  6  W.W.Harr.  512— Tweed  v. 
Lockton,  167  A.  703,  5  W.W.Harr. 
474. 

D.C. — Yerkouteren  v.  Edwards,  128 
P.2d  33,  76  U.S.App.D.C.  18— Fidel- 
ity &  Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland  v. 
Hurley,  72  F.2d  927,  63  App.D.C. 
377— Taliaferro  v.  Carter,  72  F.2d 
172,  63  App.D.C.  304. 

Fla. — Cassels  v.  Ideal  Farms  Drain- 
age Dlst,  23  So.2d  247— State  ex 
rel.  Coleman  v.  Williams,  3  So.2d 
152,  147  Fla,  514— Zemurray  v.  Kil- 
gore,  177  So.  714,  130  Fla.  317— 
Kroier  v.  Kroier,  116  So.  753,  95 
Fla.  865, 

Ga.— Peoples  Loan  Co.  v.  Allen,  34 
•S.E.2d  811,  199  Ga.  537— Smith  v. 
Cone,  15-6  S.E.  612,  171  Ga,  697— 
Loughridge  v.  City  of  Dal  ton,  143 
S.B.  39»3,  166  Ga.  323— Gulf  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Gaines,  179  S.E.  199,  50 
Ga.App.  50-4 — Jill  Bros.  v.  Holmes, 
150  S.E.  921,  40  Ga.App.  625. 

111.— Wilson  v.  Fisher,  17  N.E.2d  216, 
369  111.  538— Checker  Taxi  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  174  N.E. 
84'9,  343  111.  139— McCorcl  v.  Briggs 
&  Turivas,  170  N.E.  320,  33'8  111. 
15-S— Shoup  v.  Cummins,  1'66  N.E. 
118,  3<34  111.  533,  65  A.L.R.  887— 
Loew  y.  Krauspe,  150  N.E.  683,  320 
111.  244 — People  v.  Omega  Chapter 
of  Psi  Upsilon  Fraternity,  150  N.E. 
677,  320  111.  326— Noonan  v. 
Thompson,  83  N.E.  426,  231  111.  588 
—Continental  111.  Nat.  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  Chicago  v.  Universi- 
ty of  Notre  Dame  Du  Lac,  63  N. 
E.2d  127,  32«  111.  App.  567— Chicago 
Faucet  Qo.  v.  839  Lake  St.  Bldg. 
•Corporation,  1  N.E.2d  865,  285  111. 
App.  151 — People  ex  rel.  Nelson  v. 
Farmers  &  Merchants  'State  Bank 
of  Mendota.  281  IlLApp.  854— 


Travelers  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wagner,  279 
111.  App.  13—  Hamilton  Glass  Co.  v. 
Borin  Mf0'.  Co.,  248  IlLApp!  301. 

Ind.—  Irwln  v.  State,  41  X.E.2d  $09, 
220  Ind.  228. 

Kan.  —  Hoffman  v.  Hoffman,  135  P.2d 
SS7,  156  Kan.  647—  Keys  v.  Small- 
wood,  102  P.2d  1001,  152  Kan.  115 

—  Gaston    v.    Collins,    72    P.2d    "84, 
146   Kan.    449—  Bigler  v.    Goltl,    64 
P.2d    39.    145    Kan.    191—  Thornton 
v.    Van    Horn,    37    P.2d    1015,    140 
Kan.  5'6-S. 

Ky.  —  First  State  Bank  v.  Asher,  117 
S.W.2d  581,  273  Ky.  574—  Faulk- 
ner v.  Faulkner,  110  S.W.'d  465, 
270  Ky.  693—  Warfleld  Natural  Gas 
Co.  v.  Endicott,  99  S.W.2d  822, 
266  Ky.  735—  Fidelity  &  Columbia 
Trust  Co.  v.  Huffman,  82  S.W.2d 
482,  2-59  Ky.  477—  Bobbins  v.  Hop- 
kins, 65  S.W.2d  54,  251  Ky.  413— 
Stratton  &  Terstegge  Co.  v.  Begley, 
61  S.W.2d  287,  249  Ky.  632—  Sandy 
Hook  Bank's  Trustee  v.  Elliott 
County  Fiscal  Court,  -58  S.W.2d 
'$37,  248  Ky.  498—  Center's  Guard- 
ian v.  Center,  51  S.W.2d  460,  244 
Ky.  502—  Crawford  v.  Riddle,  45 
S.W.2d  463,  241  Ky.  839—  Brown's 
Adm'r  v.  Gabhart,  23  S.W.2d  551, 
232  Ky.  336—  Malnowski  v.  Stacy, 
20  S.W.2d  1008,  231  Ky.  23—  Com- 
monwealth v.  Partin,  3  S.W.2d  779, 
223  Ky.  405—  Barnes  v.  Montjoy's 
Adm'r,  290  S.W.  i349,  217  Ky.  465 
—Watts  v.  Noble,  262  S.W.  1114, 
203  Ky.  699—  Cooper  v.  Williamson, 
248  S.W.  245,  198  Ky.  62. 

Md.  —  Armour  -Fertilizer  Works,  Divi- 
sion of  Armour  &  Co.  of  Del.  v. 
Brown,  44  A.2d  753. 

Mich.  —  Moebius  v.  McCracken,  246 
N.W.  163,  261  Mich.  409. 

Miss.—  Strain  v.  Gayden,  20  So.2d  697, 
197  Miss.  353—  Evans  v.  King-Peo- 
ples Auto  Co.,  99  So.  758,  135  Miss. 
194. 

Mo,  —  City   of  St.   Louis  v.   Franklin 

'  Bank,  173  S.W.2d  837,  351  Mo.  688 

—  State  ex  rel.  Holtkamp  v.  Hart- 
mann,  -51  S.W.2d  22,  3<30  Mo.  386— 
Harrison  v.  Slaton,  49  S.W.2d  31  — 
People's  Bank  of  Glasgow  v.  Yager, 
4-6   S.W.2d   585,   329   Mo.   767—  Sut- 
ton  v.   Anderson,   31   S.W.2d   1026, 
326    Mo.    304  —  Johnson    v.    Under- 
wood, 24   S.W.2d  133,   324  Mo.  678 

—  Johnson  v.  Baumhoff,  18  S.W.2d 
13,    322    Mo.    1017—  State    ex    rel. 
Maple   v.    Mulloy,    15    S.W.2d    809, 
322    Mo.    281—  Bess    v.    Bothwell, 
App.,  163  S.W.Sd  125—  State  ex  reL 
Caplow  v.  Kirkwood,  App.,  117  S. 
W.2d  652—  Haight  v.  Stuart,  App., 
31  -S.W.2d  241. 


.—  Hamaker  v.  Patrick,  244  N.W. 

420,  123  Neb.  809. 
N.J.  —  Somers  v.  Holmes,  177  A.  434, 

114  N.J.Law  497. 
N.Y.—  Kalwite  v.  National  Liberty 

Ins.    Co.    of   America,    233   N.T.S. 

440 


183,  225  App.Div.  898,  appeal  d.s- 
missed  170  N.E.  136,  252  N.Y.  542. 

N.C.— Clark  v.  Cagle,  '37  S.E.2d  672. 
226  N.C.  230— Crow  v.  McCullen,  17 
S.E.2d  107,  220  N.C.  306— State  v. 
Hollingsworth,  175  S.E.  99,  206  N. 
C.  739 — Hinnant  v.  American  Fire 
&  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  168  S.E.  199 
(first  case),  204  N.C.  307— Bisanar 
r.  Suttlexnyre,  138  S.E.  1,  193  N.C. 
711—1 Dunn  v.  Taylor,  121  S.E.  65S, 
187  N.C.  385. 

Ohio. — Mosher  v.  Mutual  Home  & 
Savings  Ass'n,  App.,  41  N.E.2d  871 
— Rabinovitz  v.  Novak,  App.,  31  N. 
E.2d  151— Pfeiffer  v.  Sheffield,  27 
N.E.2d  494,  64  Ohio  App.  1— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Kinsman  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Jerko,  25  Ohio  N.P..N.S., 
445,  456. 

Okl.— Savery  v.  Mosely,  76  P.2d  902, 
182  Okl.  133 — 'Fowler  v.  Humphrey 
Inv.  Co.,  286  P.  867,  142  Okl.  221— 
Okmulgee  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ok- 
lahoma Salvage  &  Supply  Co.,  271 
P.  167,  1«33  Okl.  64— McNac  v. 
Kinch,  238  P.  424,  113  Okl.  69— 
McNac  v.  Chapman,  223  P.  350,  101 
Okl.  121. 

Or. — Hicks  v.  Hill  Aeronautical 
School.  2'S'6  P.  -553,  132  Or.  545— 
Western  Land  &  Irrigation  Co.  v. 
Humfeld,  247  P.  143,  118  Or.  416. 

Pa.— York  v.  George,  39  A.2d  625,  850 
Pa.  439— 'Frantz  v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia, -3  A.2d  917,  333  Pa.  220— 
Dellacasse  v.  -Floyd,  2  A.2d  860, 
332  Pa.  218 — Dormont  Motors  v. 
Hoerr,  1  A.2d  493,  132  Pa.Super. 
567— Kappel  v.  Meth,  189  A.  795, 
125  Pa. Super.  443^Citizens'  Bank 
v.  Gwinner,  170  A.  471,  112  Pa.Su- 
per.  12 — Schlosberg  v.  City  of  New 
Castle,  100  Pa.Super.  139— Abram- 
son  v.  Getz,  89  Pa. Super.  403 — 
Brader  v.  Alinikoff,  85  Pa.  Super. 
285— Petition  of  'Lissi,  16  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  787,  23  Berks  Co.  255— Knip- 
per  v.  B.  &  L.  E.  Traction  Co.,  9 
PaJDist.  &  Co.  235,  8  Erie  Co.  112, 
74  Pittsb;Leg.J.  564— McKenzie  Co. 
v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of  Mary- 
land, Com.Pl.,  54  Dauph.Co.  294 — 
Levitt  v.  Wayne  Title  &  Trust  Co., 
Com.Pl.,  29  Del.Co.  558— Wanner  v. 
Thompson,  Com.Pl.,  27  iDeLCo.  455 
—Allied  Store  Utilities  Co.  v.  Azat 
Com.Pl.,  34  Luz.Leg.Reg.  41— Pitts- 
ton  Building  &  {Loan  Ass'n  v.  Cog- 
gins,  'Com.Pl.,  31  Luz.Leg.Reg.  345. 

Tenn.— Battle  v.  National  Life  &  Ac- 
cident Ins.  Qo.,  157  S.W.2d  817,  17& 
Tenn.  283. 

Tex. — Lanier  v.  Parnell,  Civ.App.,  190 
S.W.2d  421— Aldridge  v.  General 
Mills,  Civ.App.,  188  S.W.2d  407— 
Smith  v.  Pegram,  Civ.App.,  80  S.W. 
2d  354,  error  refused — Pfeifer  v. 
Johnson,  Civ. App.,  70  S.W.2d  203 — 
Bell  v.  Rogers,  Civ.App.,  58  S.W.2d 
.$78 — Pass  v.  Ray,  Civ.App.,  44  S. 
W<2d  470— Keller  v.  Keller,  Civ. 
App.,  3  S.W.2d  590,  error  dismissed 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  230 


in  such  cases  the  proceedings  remain  in  fieri,  and  reenter  it  as  of  a  later  date  for  the  purpose  of  ex- 
the  court  may  open,  amend  or  vacate  the  judgment  '  tending,  or  reviving,  the  time  for  appeal  there- 
at the  subsequent  term.16  The  court  may  not,  after  from.17  The  only  remedy  after  the  term  for  ir- 
the  expiration  of  the  term,  set  aside  a  judgment  and  regular  and  erroneous,  as  distinguished  from  void, 


—  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co,  v.  Owens, 
Civ.App.,  299  S.W.  516—  Kahl  v. 
Porter,  Civ.App.,  296  -S.W.  324— 
Phoenix  Oil  Co.  v.  Illinois  Torpedo 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  261  S.W.  487—  Lepp 
v.  Ward  County  Water  Improve- 
ment Dist.,  No.  2,  Civ.App.,  257  S. 
W.  916  —  Wier  v.  Tates,  Civ.App., 
25*6  S.W.  636—  Silver  v.  State,  9  S. 
W.2d  358,  110  Tex.Cr.  512,  60  A.L. 
R.  290. 

W.Va.  —  Baker  v.  Gaskins,  36  S.E.2d 
893—  Chaney  v.  State  Compensation 
Com'r,  3'3  S.E.2d  284—  County  Court 
of  Mason  County  v.  Roush,  142  S. 
•E.  520,  105  W.Va.  355. 

^•jS.  —  Osmundson  v.  Lang,  290  N.W. 
125,  233  Wis.  591—  State  ex  rel. 
Wingenter  v.  Circuit  Court  for 
Walworth  County,  248  .N.W.  413, 
211  Wis.  561. 

Wyo.—  Boulter  v.  Cook,  234  P.  1101, 
32  Wyo.  461,  rehearing  denied  236 
P.  245,  32  Wyo.  461. 

34  C.J.  p  210  note  10,  p  212  note  12. 

Opening  and  vacating  see  infra  §§ 
265^310. 

Setting  aside  dismissal  and  rein- 
statement of  cause  after  close  of 
term  see  Dismissal  and  Nonsuit  §§ 
41,  79. 


for  rule 

<t)  Basis  of  rule  that  court  is 
without  power  to  modify  or  vacate 
Judgment  in  other  than  clerical  mat- 
ters after  expiration  of  term  in 
which  It  was  rendered  is  that  in  In- 
terest of  public  as  well  as  parties 
time  must  be  fixed  after  expiration 
of  which  controversy  is  regarded  as 
settled.  —  Foley  v.  George  A.  Douglas 
&  Bro.,  185  A.  70,  121  Conn.  377. 

(2)  Other  cases  see  34  C.J.  p  212 
note  12  [a]. 

Judgment  should,  not  be  lightly  set 
aside  after  expiration  of  terra  at 
which  rendered.  —  Dunlap  v.  Villareal, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  91  S.W.2d  1124. 

Rule  ordinarily  refers  to  Judg- 
ments recovered  after  trial  or  by  de- 
fault, where  defendant  has,  or  is 
treated  as  having,  knowledge  of 
judgment  —  Denton  Nat.  Bank  of 
Maryland  v.  Lynch,  142  A.  103,  155 
Md.  333. 

Time  limit  is  not  when  right  of  ex- 
caption  expires,  but  rather  is  the  end 
of  the  term.  —  Deen  v,  Baxley  State 
Bank,  15  «S.B.2d  19-4,  192  Ga,  300. 

Where  court  did  not  enter  Judg- 
ment and  prothonotary's  entries  were 
insufficient,  rule  that  judgment  can- 
not be  disturbed  after  term  of  entry, 
except  on  appeal,  does  not  control.  — 
Trestrail  v.  Johnson,  146  A.  150,  297 
Pa.  49. 


Judgment  vacating  previous  judg- 
ment 

Ga. — East  Side  'Lumber  &  Coal  Co.  v. 
Barfleld,  18  S.B.2d  492,  193  Ga.  273. 

Judgment  rendered  in  vacation 
Ky. — Hurd  v.  Laurel  County  Board 
of  Education,  103  S.W.2d  277,  267 
Ky.  7*30 — Clark  County  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Rowan  County  Board  of  Educa- 
tion, 89  S.W.2d  $38,  262  Ky.  153, 
overruling  Center's  Guardian  v. 
Center,  '51  S.W.2d  460.  244  Ky.  502 
— Estes  v.  Woodford,  55  S.W.2d 
396,  24'6  Ky.  485. 
Miss.— Ex  parte  Stanfield,  53  So.  538, 
98  Miss.  214. 

Portion  of  judgment  vacated  dur- 
ing term  may  not  be  reinstated  after 
expiration  of  term. — 'Furst  v.  Meek, 
180  -S.W.2d  410,  297  Ky.  509. 

16,  U.S.— Windholz  v.  Everett,  C.C. 
A.N.C.,  74  F.2d  834,  followed  in 
Blackley  v.  Powell,  74  F,2d  1009— 
Montgomery  v.  Realty  Acceptance 
Corporation,  C.C.A.DeL,  <51  P.2d  642, 
affirmed  Realty  Acceptance  Corpo- 
ration v.  Montgomery,  52  S.Ct.  215, 
284  U.S.  547',  76  'L.Ed.  476— Ex 
parte  Robinson.  iD.C.Tex.,  44  F. 
Supp.  79-5 — Canning  v.  Hackett,  D. 
C.Mass.,  3  'F.'Su-pp.  -460. 

Ala.— Pate  v.  State,  14  So.2d  251,  244 
Ala.  396. 

Conn. — Ferguson  v.  Sabo,  162  A.  '844, 
115  Conn.  619,  certiorarl  denied  53 
S.Ct.  595,  289  U.S.  '734,  77  L.Ed. 
14132— -Application  of  Title  &  Guar- 
anty Co.  of  Bridgeport  to  Change 
Name  to  Bankers1  Security  Trust 
Co.,  145  A.  151,  109  Conn.  45. 

Del. — Hazard  .  v.  Alexander,  178  A. 
87*3,  6  W.W.Harr.  512. 

Fla,— E.  B.  Elliott  €o.  v.  Turrentine, 
151  So.  414,  113  Fla.  210— State  v. 
Wright,  145  So.  598,  107  Fla.  178. 

Ga.— 'Frazier  v.  Beasley,  1  -S.E.2d  458, 
'5'9  Ga.App.  500 — Hardwick  v.  Sha- 
han,  118  S.E.  575,  30  Ga.App.  526. 

Ky.— Riggs  v.  Ketner,  187  S.W.2d 
287,  299  Ky.  "754 — Welch  v.  Mann's 
Ex'r,  88  S.W.2d  1,  2-61  Ky.  470— 
Lilly  v.  Marcum,  283  S.W.  1059,  214 
Ky.  514. 

Mo.— -S3tna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hyde,  34  S. 
W.2d  85,  327  Mo.  115— Herrmann  v, 
Kaiser,  App.,  85  S.W.2d  928. 

Ohio. — Pfeiffer  v.  Sheffield,  27  N.E.2d 
49-4,  64  Ohio  App.  1— Corpus  Juris 
auoted  in  Kinsman  Hat.  Bank  v. 
Jerko,  25  Onio  NT.P.,N.S.,  445,  45*6. 

Okl. — Phillips  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Da- 
vis, 147  P.2d  185,  194  Okl.  84 
Riddle  v.  Cornell,  135  P.2d  41, 
192  Okl.  232 — Canada  v.  Canada, 
121  P.2d  989,  190  Okl.  203— Nichols 

,     V.  Bonaparte,  42  P.2d  866,  171  Okl. 

441 


234— Martin  v.  Jones,   33*  P.   458, 

111  Okl.  101. 
Or.— Hicks      v.      Hill      Aeronautical 

•School,   286   P.   553,    132    Or.   54-5 — 

Finch     v.     Pacific     Reduction     & 

Chemical  Mfg.  Co..  234  P.  296,  113 

Or.  670. 
Pa. — Stein   v.    Kessler,   '92    Pa.Super. 

359 — Commonwealth      v.      Wright, 

Oyer  &  T.,   33   DeLCo.   254. 
Tex. — Duclos  v.  Applin,  Civ.App.,  '66 

S.W.2d  1105. 
W.Va. — Womeldorff  &  Thomas  Co.  v. 

Moore,  152  S.E.  783,  108  W.Va.  721 

— Bank  of  Gauley  v.  Osenton,  114 

S..E.  435,  '92  -W.Va.  1. 
Wyo.— Ramsay  v.   Gottsche,   69   P.2d 

535,  51  Wyo.  516. 
34  C.J.  «p  214  note  13. 

Sufficiency  of  proceedings 

(1)  In  absence  of  motion  for  new 
trial,  district  court's  attempted  modi- 
fication of  judgment,  more  than  thir- 
ty days  after  rendition  but  in  same 
term,   could  not  form   predicate   for 
modification   of  judgment  at   subse- 
auent     term.— Hardy    v.     McCulloch. 
Tex.Civ.App.,    286    S.W.    629. 

(2)  Motions  to  modify  or  to  vacate 
a  judgment,  when  not  acted  on  dur- 
ing the  term,  have  been  held  not  t* 
confer,  jurisdiction  to  modify  or  va- 
cate at  a  subsequent  term. — Hoffman 
v.   Hoffman,   135  P.2d  887,   r5»6  Kan. 
647. 

(3)  Other  cases. — Ayer  v.  Kemper, 
•C.C.A.N.Y.,  48  F.2d  11,  certiorari  de- 
nied Union   Trust   Co.   of  Rochester 
V.  Ayer,  52  S.Ot.  20,  284  U.S.  '639,  76 
LuEd.  543—34  C.J.  p  214  note  1«  [b]- 
[h]. 

Motion  for  new  trial 

(1)  Where  a  motion  for  a  new  tri- 
al is  made  and  continued  over  the 
'term,  it  suspends  the  finality  of  the 
judgment    so    that    the    court    may 
modify  or  set  it  aside  at  a  subse- 
quent terra. — Luther  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Sheldahl   Sav.   Bank,   139    P.    433,   22 
Wyo.  302. 

(2)  Pendency    of  motion   for   new 
trial  does  not  authorize  court  to  re- 
open cause  at  subsequent  term  for 
taking  further  evidence  and  entering 
another  decree. — Irwin  v.  Burgan,  28 
S.W.2d  1017,  32-5  Mo.  309. 

Order  within  term  suspending-  all 
proceeding*  to  keep  way  open  for 
further  action  was  within  court's 
discretion. — Stein  v.  Kessler,  92  Pa. 
Super.  3-59, 

17.  U.S.— Board  of  Com'rs  of  Musk- 
ogee  C.ounty  v."  Morely,  C.C.A.OkL, 
6  F.2d'o53. 


230 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


judgments  is  usually  by  new  trial,  review,  writ  of 
error,  or  appeal,  as  may  be  appropriate  and  allow- 
able by  law,  or  by  some  other  mode  specially  pro- 
vided by  statute.18 

Exceptions  to  rule.    There  are  various  exceptions 
to  the  rule  that  jurisdiction  of  a  court  over  its  judg- 


ments terminates  with  the  close  of  the  term.19 
Clerical  or  formal  corrections  or  amendments  of  the 
judgment  record,  necessary  to  make  it  speak  the 
truth,  and  not  involving  any  change  in  the  judicial 
action  already  taken,  may  be  made  at  any  time, 
before  or  after  expiration  of  the  term.20  Judg- 


18L  U.S. — Arcoil  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Amer- 
ican Equitable  Assur.  Co.  of  New 
York,  C.C.A.N.J.,  87  F.2d  206— 
U.  S.  v.  Manger,  D.C.N.Y.,  7  F. 
Supp.  720. 

Ark. — Hagen  v.  Hagen,  183  S.W.2d 
785.  207  Ark.  1007— Robertson  v. 
Cunningham,  178  S.W.2d  1014,  207 
Ark.  76— Merriott  v.  Kilgore,  139 
S.W.2d  S87,  200  Ark.  394— Bank  of 
Russellville  v.  Walthall,  96  S.W.2d 
952,  192  Ark.  1111 — IFawcett  v. 
Rhyne,  63  S.W.2d  '349,  187  Ark.  940 
—Merchants'  &  Planters'  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Ussery,  38  S.W.2d 
10S7,  183  Ark.  838. 

Fla, — Alabama  Hotel  Co.  v.  J.  L. 
Mott  Iron  Works,  98  So.  825,  *6 
Fla.  608. 

Ga. — Donalson  v.  Bank  of  Jakin,  127 
S.E.  229,  33  Ga.App.  428. 

Ill._Wilson  v.  Fisher,  17  N.E.2d  216, 
•369  111.  538— Katauski  v.  Eldridge 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  255  Ill.A-pp.  41— 
Hickman  v.  Ritchey  Coal  Co.,  252 
IlLApp.  560— Toth  v.  Samuel  Phil- 
lipson  &  Co.,  250  IlLApp.  247. 

Iowa. — Concannon  v.  Blackman,  >6  N. 
W.2d  116,  232  Iowa  "722. 

Kan.— Sparks  v.  Maguire,  169  P.2d 
82  s— Hoffman  v.  Hoffman,  13'5  P. 
2d  887,  156  Kan.  647 — Keys  v. 
Smallwood,  102  P.2d  1001,  152  Kan. 
115— Riley  v.  Riederer,  61  P.2d  106, 
144  Kan.  422. 

Ky. — House  v.  Rawlings,  177  S.W.2d 
562,  296  Ky.  -578— Swartz  v.  Caudill, 
1'30  S.W.2d  80,  279  Ky.  206— 'First 
State  Bank  v.  Asher,  117  S.W.2d 
»5'81,  273  Ky.  574— Faulkner  v. 
•Faulkner,  110  S.W.2d  465,  270  Ky. 
693— Sauerman  Bros.  v.  Roberts, 
100  S.W.2d  225,  286  Ky.  815— 
Schlenker  v.  Clark,  11  S.W.2d  725, 
226  Ky.  '665 — Newman  v.  Ohio  Val- 
ley Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  299  S. 
W.  559,  221  Ky.  616— Duff  v.  Duff, 
265  S.W.  305,  205  Ky.  10. 

Md. — Armour  Fertilizer  Works  Divi- 
sion of  Armour  &  Co.  of  Del.  v. 
Brown,  44  A.2d  753. 

Mo. — Johnson  v.  Underwood,  24  S. 
W.2d  133,  '324  Mo.  678— Robinson 
v.  Martin  Wunderlich  Const.  Co., 
App.,  72  S.W.2d  127 — Goodman  v. 
Meyer,  App.,  «8  S.W.2d  268. 

Neb.— Stanton  v.  Stanton,  18  N.W. 
2d  '654 — State  ex  rel.  Spillman  v. 
Commercial  State  Bank  of  Omaha, 
10  N.W.2cl  2818,  143  Neb.  4-90-— 
(Feldt  v.  Wanek,  £78  N.W.  S-57,  134 
Neb.  334— Elvidge  v.  Brant,  267  N. 
W.  169,  131  Ne-b.  1— Cronkleton  v. 
Lane,  263  N.W.  388,  130  Neb.  17— 
Hoeppner  v.  Bruckman,  2*61  N.W. 
572,  129  Neb.  390— Howard  Stove  & 


Furnace  Co.  v.  Rudolf,  260  N.W. 
189,  128  Neb.  665 — Lyman  v.  Dunn, 
2-52  N.W.  197,  125  Neb.  770— State 
ex  reL  Sorensen  v.  Security  State 
Bank  of  Plain  view,  251  N.TT.  97, 
125  Neb.  516. 

N.C.— Phillips  v.  Ray,  129  S.E.  177, 
190  N.C.  152. 

Ohio. — State  ex  rel.  Bell  v.  .Edmond- 
son,  App.,  43  N.B.2d  108— Maryland 
Casualty  Co.  v.  John  F.  Rees  Co., 
App.,  40  N.K2d  200— State  ex  rel. 
Hussey  v.  Hemmert,  App.,  «37  N.E. 
2d  668— Dusha  v,  Binz,  155  N.B. 
256,  23  Ohio  App.  285— Corpus  Ju- 
ris quoted  in  Kinsman  Nat  Bank 
v.  Jerko,  25  Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  445, 
456. 

Okl.— Harder  v.  Woodside,  165  P.2d 
841— Savery  v.  Mosely,  76  P.2d  902, 
182  Okl.  133— Purcell  Wholesale 
Grocery  Co.  v.  Cantrell,  2-55  P.  704, 
124  Okl.  2T3— Taliaferro  v.  Batis, 
252  P.  845,  123  Okl.  59— American 
Inv.  Co.  v.  Wadlington,  244  P.  43-5, 
114  Okl.  124— First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Smith,  241  P.  761,  115  Okl.  119— 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Potter,  233  P. 
700,  10'S  Okl.  49. 

Or. — Rosumny  v.  Marks,  246  P.  723, 
118  Or.  248. 

Tex. — Smith  v.  Ferrell,  «Com.App.,  -44 
S.W.2d  962— Universal  Credit  Co.  v. 
Cunningham,  Civ. App.,  109  S.W.2d 
507,  error  dismissed. 

Utah.— Salt  Lake  City  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  22  P.2d  104J6,  82  Utah 
179. 

W.Va.— Aide  v.  Amburgey,  148  S.E. 
326,  107  W.Va.  370— County  Court 
of  Mason  County  v.  Roush,  142  S. 
B.  520,  105  W.Va.  355. 

Wls. — Amalgamated  Meat  Cutters  & 
Butcher  Workmen  of  N.  A.,  A.  F.  of 
•L.  Xiocal  Union  No.  73  v.  Smith,  10 
N.W.2d  114,  243  Wis.  390— Kel- 
logg-Cltizens  Nat.  Bank  of  Green 
Bay  v.  "Francois,  3  N.W.2d  68"6,  240 
Wis.  432— State  ex  rel.  Gaudynski 
v.  Pruss,  290  N.W.  2-89,  233  Wis. 
600 — In  re  Meek's  Estate,  227  N. 
W.  270,  199  Wis.  602. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ramsey 
v.  Gottsche,  69  P.2d  535,  #39,  51 
Wyo.  516. 

84  C.J.  p  215  note  15. 

19.  Del.— Webb  Packing  Co.  v.  Har- 
mon, 193  A.  596,  8  W.W.Harr.  476. 

Ohio. — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v. 
John  'F.  Rees  Co.,  App.,  40  N.B.2d 
200. 

Fa, — Kappel  v.  Meth,  189  A.  795,  125 
Pa.  Super.  4-43. 

Tex. — Halbrook  v.  Quinn,  Civ.App., 
286  S.W.  954,  certified  Questions 

442 


dismissed  Quinn  v.  Halbrook,   285 

S.W.   1079,   115  Tex.   1079. 

"These  exceptions  may  be  sum- 
marized as  follows:  (1)  where  the 
subject  is  governed  by  statute,  (2) 
the  correction  of  a  clerical  error,  (3) 
where  the  judgment  has  been  en- 
tered by  misprision  of  a  clerk,  (4) 
errors  of  law  disclosed  by  the  rec- 
ord or  where  it  appears  that  there 
are  errors  in  matters  of  fact  which 
have  not  been  put  in  issue  and 
passed  upon,  and  were  material  to 
the  validity  and  regularity  of  the 
proceedings,  and  (5)  where  from  the 
record  it  is  apparent  that  the  judg- 
ment is  void  in  law." — Goo  v.  Hee 
Fat,  34  Hawaii  123,  127. 

Tendency  in  modern  judicial  pro- 
cednre  is  to  minimize  or  abandon 
the  significance  of  the  mere  expira- 
tion of  the  term  of  court  as  no  long- 
er having  the  importance  attached  to 
it  under  other  conditions  .prevailing- 
at  common  law. — U.  S.  v.  Clatter- 
buck,  D.C.Md.,  26  F.Supp.  297. 

Where  record  shows  that  defend- 
ants have  been  deprived  of  rights 
given  by  law,  judgments  have  been 
vacated. — Webb  Packing  Co.  v.  Har- 
mon, 193  A,  596,  8  W.W.Harr.,  Del., 
476. 

20.  U.S.— Gilmore  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A. 
Ark.,  131  F.2d  873— In  re  Pottasch 
Bros.  Co.,  D.C.N.Y.,  11  F.Supp.  275, 
affirmed,  C.C.A.,  79  F.2d  $1«3— Ex 
parte  Robinson,  D.C.Tex.,  44  F. 
Supp.  795. 

Ala.— Ex  parte  French,  147  So  631, 
22-6  Ala.  297. 

Ark.— Richardson  v.  Sallee,  183  S.W. 
2d  508,  207  Ark.  915— Bright  v. 
Johnson,  152  S.W.2d  540,  202  Ark. 
751— Kory  v.  'Less,  87  S.W.2d  92, 
183  Ark.  553— Evans  v.  U.  43.  Anth- 
racite Coal  Co.,  21  S.W.2d  952,  180 
Ark.  578. 

Conn.— Gruber  v.  Friedman,  132  A. 
395,  104  Conn.  107. 

D.C. — Verkouteren  v.  Edwards,  128 
F.2d  33,  76  U.S.App.D.C.  18— Fidel- 
ity &  Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland  v. 
Hurley,  72  F.2d  927,  63  App.D.C. 
•377. 

I1L— Quigley  v.  Quigley,  268  IlLApp. 
130. 

Iowa. — Murnan  v.  Schuldt,  265  N.W. 
36-9,  221  Iowa  242. 

Kan.— Bush  v.  Bush,  150  P.2d  168, 
1-58  Kan.  760— Elliott  v.  Elliott  114 
P.2d  823,  154  Kan.  145— North 

.  American  Life  Ins.  Co.  of.  Chicago, 
111.,  v.  Dyatt,  250  P.  "341,  121  Kan. 
«73. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  230 


ments  entered  as  the  result  of  clerical  mistake  or 
inadvertence,21  or  which  are  void  on  their  face,22 
may  be  vacated  after  expiration  of  the  term. 

Where  a  judgment  is  irregular  by  reason  of  er- 
ror or  mistake  of  fact,  such  as  was  ground  for  a 
writ  of  error  coram  nobis,  the  practice  in  some  ju- 
risdictions permits  it  to  be  opened  or  vacated  on 
motion  after  the  term;23  but  this  exception  does 
not  reach  to  facts  submitted  to  a  jury,  or  found 
by  a  referee  or  by  the  court  sitting  to  try  the  is- 
sues.24 In  some  cases  equitable  relief  against  the 
judgment  has  been  granted  in  a  summary  way  on 
motion  after  the  term  to  avoid  the  expense  and  de- 
lay of  a  formal  suit  in  equity,25 

Statutes  in  some  states  confer  on  the  court  which 


rendered  the  judgment  a  prescribed  and  limited 
control  over  it  after  expiration  of  the  term  at  which 
it  was  rendered.26  Statutory  judgments  entered 
by  the  clerk,  and  which  may  be  entered  in  vaca- 
tion, are  not  within  the  general  rule  ;27  and  it  has 
been  held  that  in  statutory  proceedings  the  judg- 
ment may  be  opened  at  a  subsequent  term  where 
there  is  due  diligence.28 

Interlocutory  judgments.  The  rule  against 
amending  or  vacating  a.  judgment  after  expiration 
of  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered  has  no  ap- 
plication to  interlocutory  judgments,  and  such  judg- 
ments may  be  opened,  amended,  or  vacated  at  any 
time  while  the  proceedings  remain  in  fieri,  and  be- 
fore the  final  judgment,29  and  a  statute  making  such 


Me.-0avis  v.  Cass,  142  A.  377,  127, 

Me.  167. 

Mo,— Campbell  v.  Spotts,  55  S.W.2d 
986  331  Mo.  974 — Vaughn  v.  Kan- 
sas City  Gas  Co.,  159  S.W.2d  690, 
236  Mo.App.  $69 — -Ex  parte  Mes- 
sina, 128  S.W.2d  1082,  23-3  Mo.App. 
1234. 

Mont.— Morse  v.  Morse,  154  P.2d  982 
— State  ex  reL  Kruletz  v.  District 
Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist.  in 
and  for  Beaverhead  County,  98  P. 
2d  883,  110  Mont.  36. 

Xeb.— Petersen  v.  Dethlefs,  298  N.W. 
155,  139  Neb.  572. 

N.H. — Hubley    v.    Goodwin,    *4    A.2d 

*   665,  90  N.H.  54. 

N.M.— De  Baca  v.  Sais,  99  P.2d  106, 
44  N.M.  105. 

«pex. — Jones  v.  Bass,  Com.App.,  49 
S.W.2d  723 — Collins  v.  Davenport, 
Civ.App.,  192  S.W.2d  291 — De  ILeon 
v.  Texas  Employers  Ins.  Ass'n,  Civ. 
App..  159  S.W.2d  574,  error  refused 
— Kveton  v.  'Farmers  Royalty 
Holding  Co.,  Civ.App.,  149  S.W.2d 
998 — Duncan  v.  Marlin  Motor  Co., 
Civ.App.f  41  S.W.2d  740,  error  re- 
fused—Bray v,  -Clark,  Civ.App.,  9 
S.W.2d  203,  error  dismissed. 

yt. — St.  Pierre  v.  Beauregard,  152  A. 
914,  103  Vt.  258. 

Wash.— Pappas  v.  Taylor,  244  P.  393, 
138  Wash.  31. 

W.Va.— Chaney  v.  State  Compensa- 
tion Com'r,  33  S.E.2d  2S4. 

Wis.— JEtna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  McCor- 
mick,  20  Wis.  265. 

Wyo.— Bales  v.  Brome,  105  P.2d  568, 
56  Wyo.  111. 

Correction  of  clerical  and  formal  er- 
'rors    generally    see    infra    §§    237 
239-249. 

Power  of  court  exists  "by  virtue  of 
continuing'  power  over  its  records 
and  right  of  parties  to  have  a  cor- 
rect record  without  instituting  an 
independent  suit  to  obtain  it—Weav- 
er v.  Humphrey,  Tex.Civ.App.,  114 
S.W.2d  609,  error  dismissed. 
Jnterlooutory  order 
Wyo.— Bales  v.  Brome,  105  P.2d  568 

56  Wyo.  111. 


21.     111. — Chapman  v.   North  Ameri- 
can Life  Ins.  Co.,  126  N.E.  732,  292 

111.  179. 
Wis.— JEtna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  McCor- 

mick,  20  Wis.  265. 
Grounds    for   opening   and   vacating 

generally  see  infra  §§   2:66-281. 

L    Del.— Hendrix  v.  Kelley,  143  A. 

480,  4  W.W.Harr.  120. 
Miss. — Home  v.   Moorehead,   153   So. 

668,  169  Miss.  "362. 
Mo. — Case   v.    Smith,    257    S.W.    148, 

215  Mo.Apfc.  621. 
Okl.— Skipper    v.    Baer,    277    P.   930, 

136  Okl.  2-86. 
«34  C.J.  p  215  note  18. 

Judgment  is  "void  on  its  face," 
when,  it  reqtOres  only  inspection  of 
the  judgment  roll  to  show  its  in- 
validity.— Anderson  v.  Lynch,  221  P. 
415,  94  Okl.  137. 

23.  U.-S.— Gilmore    v.    U.    S.,    C.C.A. 
Ark.,     131     'F.2d     873 — Hiawassee 
Lumber  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.N.C.,  64 
F.2d  417. 

111.— Gunn  v.  Britt,  39  N.E.2d  76,  313 

IlLApp.  13. 
34  C.J.  p  215  note  20. 
Writ  of  error  coram  nobis  see  infra 

§§  -311-313. 

24.  U.S. — Bronson    v.    Schulten,    N. 
Y.,    104  U.S.   410,   26   L.Ed.   997, 

34  C.J.  p  216  note  21. 

25.  U.S. — Bronson   v.    Schulten,    su- 
pra. 

34  C.J.  p  216  note  22. 
Equitable    relief   against    judgments 
see  infra  §§  341-400. 

26.  Iowa.— Albright      v.      Moeckley, 
237  N.W.  309. 

Minn. — Elsen  v.  State  Farmers  Mut 

Ins.  Co.,  17  N.W.2d  '652,  219  Minn. 

315. 
Okl. — Carter    v.    Grimmett,    213    P 

732,  89  Okl.  37. 
Wis. — Osmundson  v.  Lang,  290  N.W 

125,  2*38  Wis.  591. 
Wyo. — Midwest      Refining     -Co.      v 

George,   7  P.2d  213,  44  Wyo.   25— 

Boulter    v.    Cook,    236    P.    245,    32 

Wyo.  461. 
34  C.J.  p  216  note  23,  p  221  note  54 

443 


27.    Cal. — People    v.    Greene,    16    P. 
197,   74  CaL  '400,  5  Am.S.R.  448. 

34  C.J.  p  216  note  24. 
I    Pa. — M.  A.  Long  Co.  v.  Keystone 
Portland  Cement  Co.,    153   A.    429, 
302  Pa.   308— Kantor  v.  Herd,   120 
A.  450,  276  Pa.  519. 

29.    Ala.— Scott  v.   Leigeber,   18    So. 
2d  275,  245  Ala.  58"3— Ooipus  Juris 
cited  in  Ex  parte   Green,    129   So. 
72,  73,  221  Ala.  298. 
Conn. — Stolman  v.  Boston  Furniture 

Co.,  180  A.  507,  120  Conn.  235. 
(Fla.— State  v.  City  of  Sarasota,  17 
So.2d  109,  154  -Fla,  2-50— Whitaker 
V.  Wright,  129  'So.  S'89,  100  Fla.  282 
—Alabama  Hotel  Co.  v;  J.  L.  Mott 
Iron  Works,  98  So.  825,  SB  Fla,  608. 
111. — Parsons  v.  Parsons  'Lumber  Co., 

27  N.E.2d  477,  305  Ill.App.  486. 
Ind. — State  ex  reL  Unemployment 
Compensation  Board  of  Unemploy- 
ment Compensation  Division  v. 
Burton,  44  N.E.2d  506,  112  Ind. 
App.  268. 

Iowa.^Riley  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of 
Policemen's  Pension  Fund,  222  N. 
W.  403,  207  Iowa  177. 
y.— Corbin    v.    Corbin,    176    S.W.2d 
«691,     29'6     Ky.     276— Wilcoxen     v. 
'Farmers'  Nat  Bank  of  Scottsville, 
10  S.W.2d  298,  225  Ky.  764. 
Mo. — Corpus   Juris   cited   in   Barlow 

V.  Scott,  85  S.W.2d  504,  519. 
N.T.— Bannon    v.    Bannon,    1    N.E.2d 
975,  270  N.T.  484,  105  A.-L.R.  1401. 
Pa.— Markofski  v.  Tanks,  146  A.  569. 

297  Pa.  74. 
Tex. — Manley  v.  Razien,  Civ.App.,  172 
•S.W.2d    798 — Standard    Oil    Co.    v. 
•State,  Civ.App.,  132  S.W.2d  612,  er- 
ror dismissed,  judgment  correct — 
Blain    v.    Broussard,    Civ.Aj?p.,    99 
S.W.2d     -993 — Ellis      v.      Jefferson 
Standard   Life    Ins.    Co.,    Civ.App., 
78  S.W.2d  645 — Brannon  v.  Wilson, 
Civ.App.,  260  S.W.  201. 
Utah.— Richards  v.  District  Court  of 
Weber  Qounty,  267  P.  779,  71  Utah 
473. 
Va.— Freezer  v.  Miller.  176  S.E.  159, 

163  Va.  180. 
Wyo.— Corpns  Juris  cited  in  Bales  v. 


§  230 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.  J.  S. 


a  judgment  appealable  does  not  change  the  rule.30 
Removal  of  cause.  When  a  cause  is  remanded  to 
the  state  court  after  removal  to  a  federal  court,  the 
state  court  again  has  the  same  jurisdiction  it  had 
at  the  time  of  removal,  and  may  open,  amend,  or 
vacate  a  judgment  notwithstanding  the  lapse  of  a 
term  if  it  could  have  done  so  at  the  time  of  re- 
moval.31 

Effect  of  improper  amendment  or  vacation  after 
term.  According  to  some  decisions  any  change  or 
modification  or  attempted  vacation  of  the  judgment 
itself  at  a  subsequent  term  is  beyond  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  court  and  is  void  for  that  reason.32  Ac- 
cording to  other  decisions,  however,  where  an  im- 
proper amendment  in  a  matter  of  substance  has 
been  made,  the  order  making  such  amendment,  while 
erroneous,  is  not  void,  and  may  not  be  assailed  col- 
laterally; the  party  aggrieved  must  seek  his  reme- 
dy by  appeal  from  the  order.33 

b.  Void  Judgments 

A  judgment  which   is  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction 


may  be  vacated  at  a  subsequent  term. 

Where  a  judgment  is  entirely  void  for  want  of 
jurisdiction,  the  power  to  vacate  it  or  set  it  aside  is 
not  limited  to  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered,  but 
may  be  exercised  at  a  succeeding  term,34  subject 
to  any  existing  statutory  provisions.35  A  judgment 
of  a  court  of  last  resort  may  not  be  set  aside  after 
the  term  on  the  ground  that  the  court  had  no  ju- 
risdiction.36 

c.  Reservation  of  Power  in  Judgment 

A  reservation  in  the  Judgment  of  power  to  amend 
or  vacate  it  at  a  subsequent  term  does  not  enlarge  or 
extend  the  authority  of  the  court. 

An  attempted  reservation  in  the  judgment  itself 
of  power  to  amend  or  vacate  it  at  a  subsequent 
term  does  not  enlarge  or  extend  the  authority  which 
the  court  otherwise  has  in  that  behalf.37  A  new  or 
amended  judgment  rendered  at  a  subsequent  term 
pursuant  to  such  reservation  is  without  jurisdic- 
tion and  void,  and  the  prior  judgment  continues  in 
force.38 


Brome,  105  P.2d  5*8,  574,  =56  Wyo. 

111. 
34  C.J.  p  216  note  30 — 47  C.J.  p  4'35 

note  10,  p  43'6  note  24. 
Final  or  interlocutory  Judgment  see 

supra  §  11. 
Interlocutory   decrees    In   equity   see 

Equity  §  «624. 
Ruling  on  pleading- 

Trial  court,  when  it  becomes  satis- 
fied that  erroneous  ruling  has  been 
made  concerning  a  pleading,  should 
set  aside  such  ruling. — Shaw  v.  Dor- 
ris,  124  N.E.  796,  290  111.  196— Mater 
v.  Silver  Cross  Hospital,  2  N.B.2d 
138,  285  IlLApp.  437. 
In  Georgia 

The  court  cannot  revoke  interlocu- 
tory rulings  made  at  preceding  term, 
notwithstanding  cause  is  still  pend- 
ing and  no  final  judgment  on  merits 
has  been  rendered. — Gulf  iLife  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Gaines,  179  S.E.  199,  50  Ga. 
App.  504. 

30.  Mo.— Aull  v.  Day,   34   S.W.   578, 
133  Mo.  3-37. 

31.  111. — Jansen  v.  Grimshaw,  17  N. 
E.  'S'50,  125  111.  46S. 

32.  U.-S. — In   re   Metropolitan    Trust 
Co.  of  City  of  New  York,  N.  Y.,  31 
S.Ct    18,    218    U.S.    312,    54    L.Ed. 
1051. 

34  C.J.  p  216  note  27. 
Validity  of  second  judgment 

Second  judgment,  entered  after  ex- 
piration of  term,  expunging  judg- 
ment timely  entered  from  record, 
was  void. — Hubbard  v.  Trinity  State 
Bank,  Tex.Civ.App.,  48  S.W.2d  379, 
error  dismissed. 

33.  N.Y.— Stannard  v.  Hubbeli;  25  N. 
E.  1084,  123  N.Y.  520. 


Trial  court's  opening  judgment, 
after  end  of  term  during  which  it 
was  rendered,  is  erroneous  but  not 
void. — Simpson  v.  Young  Men's 
Christian  Ass'n  of  Bridgeport,  172  A. 
•855,  118  Conn.  414. 

34.  U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Sotis,  C.C.A.I11., 
131  F.2d  783— Corpus  Juris  guoted 
in  Woods  Bros.  Const  Co.  v.  Yank- 
ton  County,  S.  D.,  C.C.A.S.D.,  '54 
F.2d  304,  310 — Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  U.  S.  v.  Turner,  C.C.A.N.D.,  47 

JF.2d  86,  88. 

Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ex  parte 
B.  H.  Byrd  Contracting  Co.,  156  So. 
579,  581,  26  Ala.App.  171. 

Del. — Hazzard  v.  Alexander,  178  A. 
873,  6  W.W.Harr.  512. 

•Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Coleman  v.  Wil- 
liams, 3  So.2d  152,  147  Fla.  514. 

Ga. — Hamilton  v.  Hardwick,  170  S.E. 
826,  47  Ga.App.  513. 

111. — In  re  Johnson's  Estate,  277  111. 
App.  '319 — Heckman  v.  Ritchey 
Coal  Co.,  252  IlLApP.  560. 

Kan. — Sparks  v.  Maguire,  169  P.2d 
826. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In  re 
Main's  Estate,  App.,  152  S.W.2d 
696,  701 — Corpus  Juris,  cited  in 
•Dickey  v.  Dickey,  App.,  132  S.W.2d 
1026,  1032. 

N.J.— Pink  v.  Deering,  -4  A.2d  790, 
122  N.J.Law  277,  motion  denied 
17  A.2d  603,  12-5  N.J.Law  569. 

N.Y. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  People 
v.  Ashworth,  56  N.Y.S.2d  791,  793, 
185  Misc.  391. 

Ohio. — Synder  v.  Clough,  50  N.E.2d 
384,  71  Ohio  App.  440— McAllister 
v.  Schlemmer  &  Graber  Co.,  177 
N.E.  '841,  39  Ohio  App.  434— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Kinsman  Nat. 

444 


Bank  v.   Jerko,   25   Ohio   N.P.,N.S., 

445,  457. 
Or. — Finch    v.    Pacific    Reduction    & 

Chemical  Mfg.  Co.,  234  P.  296,  113 

Or.   670. 
Pa. — Stickel    v.    Barren,    Com.Pl.,    7 

Ffcy.L.J.  «35. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  clte4  ia  Harri- 
son v.  Whiteley,  Com.App.,  6  S.W. 

2d   89,    90— Nymon  v.  Eggert,   Civ. 

App.,  154  S.W.2d  157. 
34  C.J.  p  217  note  32. 

Especially  where  defect  appears  on 
record,  authority  of  court  to  set  aside 
void  judgment  continues  beyond  ex- 
piration of  term. — Harrison  v.  White- 
ley,  Tex.Com.App.,  6  S.W.2d  89. 

Tiling  answer  did  not  deprive 
court  of  jurisdiction  to  (pass  on  mo- 
tion to  set  aside  void  judgment  ren- 
dered before  service  of  summons. — 
Kastner  v.  Tobias,  282  P.  585,  129 
Kan.  321. 

35.  Ohio. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Kinsman   Nat    Bank  v.   Jerko,    25 
Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  '445,  457. 

34  C.J.  p  219  note  33. 

36.  Ohio.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Kinsman   Nat.   Bank  v.    Jerko,    25 
Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  445,  4'57. 

Wis. — State     v.     Waupaca     County 

Bank,  20  Wis.  640. 
34  C.J.  p  219  note  34. 

37.  U.S. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    In 
Woods   Bros.   Const.   Co.  v.   Yank- 
ton    County,    C.C.A.S.D.,    54    F.2d 
304,  310,  81  A.LJR.  300 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  citei*  *n  Consoli- 
dated School  Disk  No.  Ib  »  Green, 
71  P.2d  712,  714,  1'SO  Okl.  557. 

34  C.J.  p  219  note  35. 

3a  Mo.— Hill  v.  St  Louis,  30  Mo. 
584. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  232 


d.  Consent  and  Waiver 

The  authorities  are  In  disagreement  on  the  question 
whether  or  not  a  judgment  rendered  at  one  term  of 
court  can  be  set  aside  at  a  subsequent  term  by  consent 
of  both  parties. 

On  the  ground  that  consent  cannot  confer  ju- 
risdiction, it  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  rendered 
ac  one  term  of  court  cannot  be  set  aside  at  a  sub- 
sequent term  even  by  consent  of  both  parties,39 
except  where  the  judgment  was  entered  by  reason 
of  a  clerical  mistake  or  inadvertence.40  Other 
courts  have  held  that,  although  a  court  may  not 
amend  or  vacate  its  own  final  judgments,  after  ex- 
piration of  the  term  at  which  they  were  rendered 
without  the  consent  of  both  parties,  it  may  do  so 
with  such  consent,  and  the  second  judgment  in  such 
cases  is  not  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction.41  Parties 
who  consent  to  the  amendment  of  a  judgment  have 
been  held  to  be  estopped  from  afterward  objecting 
to  it.42  Appearance  on  application  to  amend  judg- 
ment after  term,  however,  has  been  held  to  con- 
fer no  jurisdiction  to  make  it.43 

§  231.     Where  Terms  Abolished 

Where   terms   of   court   have   been    abolished,    relief 


against  a  final  judgment  may  be  had  In  the  manner  and 
within  the  time   provided  by  statute. 

Where  terms  of  court  are  abolished,  and  the  court 
is  deemed  to  be  continuously  in  session,  as  con- 
sidered in  Courts  §  148,  the  general  rule  of  control 
during  the  term,  as  discussed  supra  §  229,  has  no 
application,44  and  relief  against  a  final  judgment 
may  be  had  only  in  the  manner  and  within  the  time 
provided  by  statute,45  except  that  judgments  inad- 
vertently or  improvidently  made,  or  prematurely 
entered,  may  be  vacated  under  the  inherent  power 
of  the  court,46  and 'judgments  void  on  their  face 
may  be  vacated  at  any  time.47 

§  232.    At  Chambers  or  in  Vacation 

In  the  absence  of  statutory  authority,  a  Judgment 
ordinarily  may  not  be  amended,  opened,  or  vacated  at 
chambers  or  in  vacation. 

Except  as  to  purely  clerical  amendments  of  the 
record,48  the  exercise  of  the  power  to  amend,  open, 
or  vacate  a  judgment  is  a  judicial  act  which,  unless 
otherwise  authorized  by  statute,  must  be  performed 
in  open  court,  in  term  time,  and  which  cannot  be 
done  at  chambers  or  in  vacation.49 


39.  Tenn. — Everett     v.     Everett,     1 
Tenn.App.  85. 

34  C.J.  p  219  note  37. 

40.  Tenn. — Anderson    v.    Thompson, 
7  Lea    259. 

41.  111.— Steinhagen  v.  Trull,  151  N. 
B.    250,    320    111.    382— Reisman    v. 
Central   Mfg.   Dist.   Bank.   45   N.E. 
2d   90,    316    IU.APP.    371— Hickman 
v.    Ritchey    Coal    Co.,    252    IlLApp. 
S60. 

Tex. — Slattery    v.    Uvalde   Rock   As- 
phalt Co.,  Civ.App.,  140  S.W.2d  987, 
error  refused. 
34  C.J.  -p  220  note  39. 
Consent  not  shown 
N.C.— Clark  v.   Cagle,   37  S.E.2d   672, 
226  N.C.  230. 

Persons  not  parties  to  stipulation 
are  not  bound. — Western  Land  &  Ir- 
rigation Co.  v.  Humfeld,  2*47  P.  143, 
118  Or.  416. 
In  Arkansas 

(1)  A     valid     agreement    between 
the  parties  that  a  foreclosure  decree 
be   vacated   is   enforceable,   although 
the   term   at   which   the  decree  was 
rendered    has     expired. — 'Franzen    v. 
Juhl,  «32   S.W.2d  627,  182  Ark.   663. 

(2)  It  has  also  been  held,  however, 
that  consent  of  parties  will  not  au- 
thorize   vacation   of   judgment   after 
the   expiration   of   the   term. — Brady 
v.  Hamlett,  33  Ark.  105— Little  Rock 
v.  Bullock,  6  Ark.  282. 

42.  Wis. — Steckmesser    v.    Graham, 
10  Wis.  37. 

43.  Mo.— Ross  v.  Ross,  83  Mo.  100. 
34  C.J.  p  220  note  41, 


44.  U.S.— U.    S.   v.   Maier,   18  C.C.P. 
A., Customs,  409. 

N.D. — Bank  of  Inkster  v.  Christen- 

son,   194  N.W.   702,  49  N.D.  1047. 
34  C.J.  p  220  note  43. 

45.  U.S.— IT.  S.  v.  Maier,  18  C.C.P.A., 
Customs,  409. 

Ala.— Pate  v.  State,  14  So.2d  2-51,  244 

Ala.  396. 

Ariz. — In  re  Ralph's  Estate,  67  P.2d 
230,  49  Ariz.  391 — Intel-mountain 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Allison 
Steel  Mfg.  Co.,  22  P.2S  '413,  42 
Ariz.  51. 
111. — McKenna  v.  Fonnan,  283  111. 

App.  606. 

Xy. — Hutchinson  v.  Hutchinson,  168 
S.W.2d  738,  293  Ky.  270— Straton  & 
Terstegge  Co.  v.  Begley,  61  S.W.2d 
287,  24-9  Ky.  «632. 

Mont. — In  re  Jennings'  Estate,  254 
P.  1069,  79  Mont  80— In  re  Jen- 
nings' Estate.  254  P.  1067,  79  Mont. 
73 — stabler  v.  Adamson,  237  P. 
•4<S3,  73  Mont.  490. 
S.D.— Janssen  v.  Tusha,  5  N.W.2d 

684,  68  S.D.  6*39. 
Tex. — Joy  v.  Young,  Civ.App.,  194  S. 

W.2d  159. 

34  C.J.  p  220  note  44,  p  221  note  54. 
Independent  suits 

Rule  fixing  time  applies  only  to 
motions  in  original  cause  and  not  to 
independent  suits  to  set  aside  judg- 
ment.— Lauer  v.  Eighth  Judicial  Dis- 
trict Court  in  and  for  Clark  County, 
140  P.2d  953,  62  Nev.  78. 

46.  N.D.— Martinson  v.  Marzolf,  103 
N.W.  937,  14  N.D.  301. 

34  C.J.  p  220  note  45. 

445 


47.  CaL— JLuckenbach     v.     Krempel. 
204  P.  591,  188  Cal.  175. 

Nev. — 'Lauer  v.  Eighth  Judicial  Dis- 
trict Court  in  and  for  Clark  Coun- 
ty, 140  P.2d  953,  62  Nev.  78. 

3-4  C.J.  p  220  note  46, 

48.  Tex.— Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co. 
r.  Roberts,  81  S.W.  25,  98  Tex.  42 
— Baum    v.    Corsicana   Nat.    Bank, 
75   S.W.   863,    32   Tex.Qiv.App.   581, 
error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  220  note  48. 

Amendment  and  correction  of.  cleri- 
cal errors  generally  see  infra  §§ 
237,  239-249. 

49.  Ga. — O'Neal    v.    Neal    Veneering 
Co.,    143    S.B.    381,    166    Ga.    376— 
Davis  v.  Bennett,  125  S.B.  714,  15D 
Ga.  332— Davis  v,  Bennett,  128  S.E. 
11,    158   Ga.    368— Revels  v.   Kilgo, 

121  S.R   209,   1-57   Ga.   39— Atlantic 
Coast   Line  R.   Co.   v.  Devero,   173 
S.E.  885,  48  Ga.App.  800. 

Okl.— Appeal  of  Barnett,  252  P.  41$, 

122  Okl.    169 — Appeal    of   Barnett, 
252  P.  410,  122  Okl.  160. 

34  C.J.  p  220  note  50,  p  221  note  51. 
Consent  of  parties 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  a  motion 
to  vacate  may  be  made  and  heard  in 
vacation    by    consent    of    parties. — 
Skinner  v.  Terry,  12  S.E.  118,  107  N. 
C.  103. 

(2)  Under  some   statutes  a  judge 
at   chambers,   except  by   consent  of 
parties  to  be  affected,  has  no  juris- 
diction to   modify  or  correct  decree 
of  district  court — Nicholson  v.  Get- 
chell,  202  N.W.  618,  113  Neb.  248. 


§  233 

§  233.    Authority  of  Clerk 

Unless  authorized  by  statute,  the  clerk  of  court  Is, 
-without  power  to  amend,  correct,  or  vacate  a  Judgment. 

Except  to  the  extent  that  permission  may  be  giv- 
en by  statute,50  the  clerk  of  the  court  has  no  au- 
thority on  his  own  responsibility  and  without  an 
order  or  direction  of  the  court  to  amend,  change,  or 
correct  a  judgment  record.51  A  court  may  not  dele- 
gate its  judicial  functions  to  its  clerk  so  that  he  may 
set  aside  a  judgment  on  the  performance  of  a  condi- 
tion.52 

§  234.    Judgments  Subject  to  Amendment  or 
Vacation 

Various  classes  and  kinds  of  Judgments  may  be 
amended  or  vacated,  but  a  void  Judgment,  or  a  Judg- 
ment which  has  been  vacated,  may  not  be  amended. 

In  proper  cases  and  for  sufficient  cause  shown, 
-various  classes  and  kinds  of  judgments  may  be 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


amended  or  vacated,53  including,  as  considered  in- 
fra §§  321,  328-330,  333,  judgments  by  confession, 
consent,  or  default. 

Where  the  court  does  not  render  a  formal  or 
proper  judgment,  there  is  no  judgment  to  vacate.54 
An  unauthorized  and  void  judgment  may  not  be 
amended  ;55  nor  may  a  vacated  judgment  be  amend- 
ed^ 

A  judgment  on  demurrer,  where  proper  grounds 
exist,  may  be  vacated  with  leave  to  amend  or  plead 
over.57 

Executed  or  satisfied  jiidgments.  In  some  juris- 
dictions a  judgment  may  be  opened,  amended,  or 
vacated  for  good  cause,  even  after  the  amount  of 
it  has  been  collected  by  payment  or  by  levy  and 
sale  on  execution.58  In  other  jurisdictions  a  judg- 
ment which  has  been  paid  or  otherwise  satisfied 


(3)  It  has  also  been  held  that  ju- 
risdiction to  vacate  judgment  at 
chambers  cannot  -be  conferred  by 
agreement. — Moody  v.  «Freeman,  104 
P.  30,  24  Okl.  701. 
•Proceeding1  "begun,  in.  vacation 

A  judgment  passed  in  term  time  in 
a  proceeding  begun  in  vacation, 
-which  judgment  sets  aside  a  judg- 
ment ^previously  entered,  was  not 
void  for  lack  of  jurisdiction.— Revels 
v.  Kilgo,  in  S.B.  209,  157  Ga.  »39— 
Kalil  v.  Spivey,  27  S.B.2d  475,  70  Ga. 
.App.  84. 
.50.  N.C.— Caldwell  v.  Caldwell,  128 

S.E.  329,  189  N.C.  SOS. 

Motion  to  vacate  may  be  made  be- 
fore judge  or  clerk  for  irregularity 
of  judgment  entered  by  clerk  of  su- 
perior court — Caldwell  v.  Caldwell, 
supra. 
Decision  of  clerk  is  reviewable  by 

judge 
!N.C.— Caldwell  v.  Caldwell,  supra, 

.51.    U.S.— Barnes  v.  iLee,  D.C.,  2  -F. 

Cas.No.1,017,  1  Cranch  C.C.  430. 
34  C.J.  p  221  note  52. 
JSxercise    of    judicial    functions    by 

clerk     generally     see     Clerks     of 

Courts  §§  3*4-37. 

52.  N.C. — Hopkins  v.  Bowers,   16   S. 
E.  1,  111  N.C.  175. 

34  C.J.  p  221  note  53. 

53.  Ala. — Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bridgeforth,   101  So.    807,    20   Ala. 
App.  326. 

Ariz. — Hartford  Accident  &  Indem- 
nity Co.  v.  -Sorrells,  69  P.2d  240, 
50  Ariz.  90. 

N.Y. — McCormick  v.  Walker,  142  N. 
T.S.  T59,  158  App.Div.  54. 

54  C.J.  p  224  note  6*. 

Amendment,  modification,  and  vaca- 
tion of  orders  see  the  C.J.3.  title 
Motions  and  Orders  §  62,  also  42  C. 
J.  p  541  note  17  et  sea. 


Amendment,    opening,    and    vacation 

of    interlocutory    judgments    after 

term  see  supra  §  230  a. 
Correction  and  vacation  of  decrees  in 

equity  see  Bauity  §§  622-667. 
Effect   of   filing   transcript  in  other 

court  on  power  to  amend  or  vacate 

see  supra  §  129. 
Setting    aside    dismissal    or    nonsuit 

and    reinstatement    of    cause    see 

Dismissal    and    Nonsuit    §§    40-44, 

7S-85. 

Statute  authorizing*  court  to  modi- 
fy   or    set    aside   its   Judgment    for 
good  cause  shown  applies  to  all  judg- 
ments   and    not    simply    to    default 
judgments  or  judgments  that  are  er- 
roneous.—Holmes   v.    Center,    295   N. 
W.  649,  209  Minn.  144. 
judgment  on  directed  verdict 
Tex. — Zachary  v.  Home  Owners  Loan 

Corporation,   Civ.App.,    117    S.W.2d 

153,  error  dismissed. 
Judgment  entered  on  failure  to  pre- 
sent exceptions 
Mass.— Russell    v.    -Poley,    179    N.E. 

1619,  278  Mass.  145. 
Judgment  for  partition 
Kan.— Daleschal  v.  Geiser,  13  P.  595, 

36  Kan.  374. 
47  C.J.  p  436  notes  15,  17,  23. 

Judgments  based  on  jury  verdict 
do  not  come  within  court's  discre- 
tionary power  to  revise  or  vacate 
during  term  of  entry. — J.  S.  Scho- 
fteld's  Sons  Co.  v.  Vaughn,  150  S.E. 
569,  40  Ga.App.  568— Grogan  v.  Der- 
aney,  1'43  S.E.  912,  38  Ga.App.  287. 

54.     I1L — Robinson    v.    (Stewart,    252 

IlLAjpp.  203. 
Stipulation 

The  filing,  prior  to  trial,  of  stip- 
ulation which  stated  "settled  no 
costs,"  and  which  had  the  effect  of 
terminating  the  action,  was  not  a 
"Judgment"  within  statute  authoriz- 

446 


ing  person,  against  whom  judgment 
has  been  rendered  in  action  wherein 
no  trial  has  been  had,  to  petition  su- 
preme court  for  a  trial,  since  no  act 
or  determination  of  trial  court  was 
involved  in  bringing  about  such  ter- 
mination.— Girard  v.  Sawyer,  9  A.2d 
854,  64  R.I.  48. 

55.  N.T. — Ainsworth    v.    Ainsworth, 
267  N.Y.S.  587,   239  App.Div.  2'58— 
American   Cities  Co.  v.   Stevenson, 
60  N.T.S.2d  685. 

Tex. — Ashton  v.  -Farrell  &  Co.,   Civ. 

App.,    121    S.W.2d    611,    error    cUs- 

missed. 

34  C.J.  p  225  note  67. 
Judgment  declared  void  by  appellate 

court 
Ala.— Ex  pane  S.  &  R.  McLeod,  104 

So.  688,  20  Ala.App.  641. 

Void  judgment  cannot  be  made  val- 
id 'by  amendment — Wunnicke  v. 
Xieith,  Wyo.,  157  P.2d  274. 

56.  N.C. — Carolina-Tennessee  Power 
Co.  v.  Hiawassee  River  Power  Co., 
88  S.E.  349,  171  N.C.  248. 

57.  N.D. — Taylor      State      Bank     v. 
Baumgartner,  147  N.W.  385,  27  N. 
D.  $06. 

34  C.J.  p  224  note  63   [b]— 49  C.J.  p 
465  note  81. 

5a    Cal.— Patterson    v.    Keeney,    132 

P.    1043,     165    Cal.    465,    Ann.Cas. 

1914D  232. 
Ky. — Williams  v.  Isaacs,  256  S.W.  ±9, 

201  Ky.  158. 
34  C.J.  p  225  note  6'8. 

Irrespective  of  tender  of  amount 
of  judgment  "by  defendant  in  open 
court,  court  of  common  -pleas,  dur- 
ing term  on  its  own  motion  and  in 
interests  of  justice,  has  inherent 
power  to  strike  off  judgment  entered 
against  defendant. — Bergen  v.  Lit 
Bros.,  '45  A.2d  373,  158  PaJSuper.  469, 
affirmed,  Sup.,  47  A.2d  671. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  236 


and  discharged  may  not  be  amended,59  modified,60 
or  vacated.61 

§  235.    Jurisdiction  of  Particular  Courts  and 
Judges 

A  judgment  ordinarily  may  be  amended,  opened,  or 
vacated  only  by  the  court  by  which  it  wasi  rendered. 

A  judgment  may  not  be  amended  or  vacated  by 
a  court  unless  the  court  has  jurisdiction.62  As  a 
general  rule  a  judgment  may  be  amended,  opened, 
vacated,  or  set  aside  only  by  the  court  by  which  it 
was  rendered.63  A  judge  of  that  court,  other  than 
the  one  who  presided  at  the  trial  and  rendered  the 
judgment,  may  order  its  amendment  or  vacation,64 


although,  as  a  matter  of  practice,  what  amounts  to 
an  appeal  from  one  judge  to  another  coordinate 
judge  will  not  be  permitted  in  the  absence  of  spe- 
cial circumstances.65 

The  jurisdiction  of  the  proper  court  to  amend 
the  judgment  is  not  affected  by  defendant's  absence 
from  the  state,  jurisdiction  of  his  person  having  at- 
tached in  the  action,66  or  by  the  fact  that  similar 
relief  has  already  been  granted  to  a  joint  party.67 


Courts  of  special  or  limited  jurisdiction.  Unless 
authority  is  conferred  by  statute,  courts  of  special 
or  limited  jurisdiction  have  no  power  to  review,  re- 
try, annul,  or  set  aside  their  judgment*.68 


.  B.  AMENDMENT  AND  CORRECTION 


§  236.    In  General 


The  general  rule  is  that  a  court  may  amend  Its  Judg- 
ment as  truth  requires  and  the  rules  of  law  permit,  so 
as  to  make  it  express  what  was  actually  decided  or  in- 
tended. 


As  a  general  rule,  all  courts  whose  judgments  are 
preserved  in  any  species  of  record  or  memorial  have 
the  power  and  authority  to  make  such  amendments 
and  corrections  therein  as  truth  and  justice  require 
and  the  rules  of  law  permit,69  to  the  end  that  the 


59.  Miss.— Spring-     v.     Tidwell,     31 
Miss.  63. 

Tvjeb. — Durlana   Trust  Co.  v.   Uttley, 

172  N.W.  2-51,  103  Neb.  461. 
34  C.J.  p  225  note.  69. 

60.  La. — Sweeney    v.     Black    River 
Lumber  Co.,  4  La.App.  244. 

61.  N.C.— Pardue  v.  Absher,  94  S.B. 
414,  174  N.C.  $76. 

34  C.J.  p  225  note  70. 

62.  Iowa,— Albright     v.      Moeckley, 
237  N.W.  309. 

Power  of  probate  court  see  CJourts  § 

309  c. 

Superior  court  has  general  juris., 
diction  over  subject  matter  of  setting 
aside  judgments  rendered  therein. — 
State  v.  Superior  Court  for  Thurston 
County,  271  P.  87,  149  Wash.  443. 

63.  Ga. — Jackson  v.  Jackson,  -35   S. 
E.2d    258,    199    Ga.    716— Barber   v. 
Barber,  121  S.B.  317,  157  Ga.  188— 
City  of  Albany  v.  Parks,  5  S.E.2d 
680,  61  Ga.App.  55. 

Iowa.— Hansen   v.   McCoy  &  McCoy, 

266  N.W.  1,  221  Iowa  523. 
Ky. — Kaze  v.  Wheat's  Guardian,  4  S. 

W.2d  723,  223  Ky.  719. 
Mich. — Jackson  City   Bank  &   Trust 
.     Co.  v.  Fredrick,  260  N.W.  «0«8,  271 

Mich.  538. 
N.Y.— Harvey  v.  Harvey,  48  N.Y.S.2d 

238,     183    Misc.    475— Feinberg    v. 

•Feinberg,     41     N.T.S.2d     869,     180 

Misc.  305. 
N.C. — Gaster    v.    Thomas,    124    S.B. 

609,  188  N.C.  3"46. 
Ohio.— Buckeye     State     Building     & 

Loan  Co.  v.  Ryan,  157  N.B.  811,  24 

Ohio  App.  481. 
Pa — Frew    v.    Heinbach,   Com.PL,   $ 

Sch.Reg.  91. 


Tex.— Texas-Carolina      Oil      Co.      v. 

Fires,  4'8  S.W.2d  600,  121  Tex.  396. 
34  C.J.  p  225  note  75. 
Collateral  attack  see   infra   §§    401- 

435. 
Effect   of   filing   transcript   in   other 

court  on  power  to  amend  or  vacate 

see  supra  §  129. 
Jurisdiction  to  grant  equitable  relief 

see  infra  §  342. 
Vacating,    modifying,     or    annulling 

decisions     of     other     courts     see 

Courts  §§  501,  552. 

Appellate   court   is    without   juris- 
diction to  vacate  judgment  of  trial 
court. 
CaL— Bank  of  Italy  v.  B.  N.  Cadenas- 

so,  274  P.  534,  20>6  Cal.  436. 
Wis,— Milwaukee  County  v.  H.  Neid- 

ner  &  Co.,  265  N.W.  226,  220  Wis. 

185,   motion   denied   266  N.W.   238, 

220  Wis.  185. 
34  C.J.  p  225  note  75  [b]. 

64.  Conn. — Gruber  v.  Friedman,  132 
A.  395,  104  Conn.  107. 

Mass. — Commonwealth  v.  Gedzium, 
159  N.B.  51,  261  Mass.  299. 

Neb.— State  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Indian- 
apolis, Ind.,  v.  Heffner,  269  N.W. 
629,  131  Neb.  700. 

S.<X— Bx  parte  Hart,  2  S.E.2d  52,  190 
S.C.  47-3,  certiorari  denied  Bowen 
v.  Hart,  60  S.Ct.  82,  308  U.S.  569, 
84  L.Ed.  477. 

34  C.J.  p  227  note  76. 

Powers  of: 
Substitute    or    special    judge    see 

Judges  $  105. 
Successor  judge  see  Judges  $56. 

65.  N.Y.^Levy    v.    Kurak,    52    N.T. 
S.2d  304,  184  Misc.  29. 

-.C.— -Price  v.  Life  &  Casualty  Ins. 

447 


Co.  of  Tennessee,  160  S.B.  367,  201 
tf.C.  376. 
£4  C.J.  p  227  note  77. 

68.  La. — Smith    T.    Railroad    Lands 
Co.,  45  So.  441,  120  La.  564. 

Me.— Hall  v.  Williams,  10  Me.  278. 

Jurisdiction  once  acquired  over 
the  parties  to  a  suit  oon.tin.ueB  as 
long  as  action  by  the  court  for  the 
purpose  of  making  a  true  record  may 
be  necessary. — Hubley  v.  Goodwin,  •*• 
A.2d  665,  90  N.H.  54. 

67.  Miss.— Healy  v.  Just,  53  Miss, 
547. 

63.    Ind.— Pass    v.    State,    147    N.E, 

287,  83  tnd.App.  598. 
Amendment  and  vacation  by  justice- 
of  peace  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Justic- 
es of  the  Peace  §§  U2,  113,  also  3& 
C.J.  p  677  note  47  et  seq. 
Courts    of    limited    jurisdiction    see 
Courts  §§  244-248. 
Circuit  court   commissioneri   after1 
judgment  in  summary  proceedings  by 
vendors    to    repossess    premises    had 
been     entered    on    his    docket    and 
signed  by  him,  was  without  authori- 
ty to  make  any  alterations  in  docket 
entry  either  by  addition,  deletion,  or 
change  of  name  or  figures. — Spring- 
ett  v.  Circuit  Court  Com'r  for  Jack- 
son County,  283  N.W.  857,  287  Mich. 
271. 

69.  U.S.— Illinois     Printing    Co.     v. 
Electric   Shovel   Coal    Corporation,. 
D.C.I11.,  20  F.Supp!  181. 

Ark. — Kory  v.  Less,  37  »S.W.2d  92, 
183  Ark.  553— United  Drug  Co.  v. 
Bedell,  2'62  S.W.  316,  164  Ark.  527. 

Cal. — Olivera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d  5-64, 
19  CaL2d  570,  140  A.L.R.  1328 — 
Leftridge  v.  City  of  Sacramento,. 


§  236 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


judgment  may  express  what  was  actually  decided  or 
intended.70  This  power  is  inherent  and  independent 
of  statutes  ;71  but  the  power  to  amend  and  correct 


judgments  is  very  largely  regulated  by  statute  in  the 
different  jurisdictions.72 


119  P.2d  390,  48  Cal.App.2d  589— 
Carter  v.  Shinsako,  108  P.2d  27, 
42  CaI.App.2d  9 — Phipps  v.  Superi- 
or Court  in  and  for  Alameda  Coun- 
ty, 89  P.2d  698,  32  Cal.App.2d  371. 
Colo. — Wilson  v.  Carroll,  250  P.  555. 

SO  Colo.  234. 

Ind. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  filler  v. 
Muir,   56  N.E.2d  496,  50'4,   115  Ind. 
App.  335. 
Mont — In  re  Jennings'  Estate,  254  P. 

1067,  79  Mont.  73. 
N.H.— Hubley    v.    Goodwin,    4    A.2d 

665,  90  N.H.  54. 
N.Y.— American  .Cities  Co.  v.  Steven- 

son,  60  N.Y.S.2d  685. 
Tex. — Jones  v.  Bass,  Com. App.,  49 
S.W.2d  723— Weaver  v.  Humphrey, 
Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d  609,  error  dis- 
missed— Corbett  v.  Rankin  Inde- 
pendent School  Dist,  Civ.App.,  100 
S.W.2d  113. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bales  v. 
Brome,  105  P.2d  568,  572,  56  Wyo. 
111. 
34  C.J.  p  228  note  80,  p  229  note  82— 

47  C.J.  p  435  note  2. 
After   decision  and   mandate   on  ap- 
peal see  Appeal  and  Error  §  1967. 
Amendment   and   correction   of  Judi- 
cial  records    generally   see    Courts 
§§  231-236. 

Jurisdiction  and  power  of  court  to 
deal  with  judgments  generally  see 
supra  §§  228-235. 

Jurisdiction    of    probate     courts    to 
amend    or    correct    judgments    or 
orders  see  Courts  §   309  c. 
"If  in  fact  the  judgment  fails  to 
set  forth  the  court's  determination  of 
the    prior    suit    in    accordance    with 
the    record,    it    is    the    privilege    of 
the  plaintiff  to  move  for  amendment 
of  the  judgment  to  procure  such  re- 
lief as  the  law  affords." — O'Brien  v. 
New    York   Edison  Co.,   D.C.N.Y.,    26 
•F.Supp.  290,  292. 

Amendment  or  modification  held  not 
shown 

(1)  It  is  not  a  modification  of  a 
judgment  of  partition,  which  directs 
the    commissioners    to    proceed   gen- 
erally according  to  law,   to  give,  in 
a   subsequent   order  appointing  new 
commissioners,    specific    instructions 
following  the  statute,  as  every  judg- 
ment of  partition  contains  the  stat- 
utory   directions    by    implication,    if 
they  are  not  expressed. — Houston  v. 
Blythe,  10  <S.W.  '520,  71  Tex.  719. 

(2)  Other  circumstances. 

jf.J. — Terminal  Cab  Co.  v.  Mikolasy, 

25  A.2d  253,  128  N.J.Law  275. 
N.Y.— Siegel  v.  State,  246  N.Y.S.  652, 

138  Misc.  474. 

Motion  for  modification  not  required 
Wnere  both  plaintiff  and  defendant 
sought  ejectment  against  the  other 
and  court  entered  judgment  denying 
plaintiff  relief  but  failed  to  pass  on 


issues  raised  by  defendant's  plead- 
ing, plaintiff  properly  moved  court 
to  enter  a  final  judgment  and  was 
not  required  to  move  for  modifica- 
tion of  judgment  entered  and  thus 
invite  error  as  moving  court  to  find 
against  him  on  issues  tendered  by 
his  opponent.— State  ex  rel.  Clark  v. 
Rice,  47  N.E.2d  849,  113  Ind.App.  238. 

Revision  by  lay  judges 

The  court  may  change  its  decision 
on  the  day  on  which  it  is  rendered, 
so  that,  treating  the  prior  decree  of 
president  judge  of  court  of  common 
pleas  of  county  as  that  of  the  court, 
it  was  still  subject  to  revision  as  to 
facts  by  a  majority  of  lay  judges 
on  the  same  day. — Petition  of  Mur- 
ray, 105  A.  61,  262  Pa.  188. 

70.  Cal. — Phipps  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Alameda  County,  S9  P.2d 
698,  32  Cal.App.2d  371— In  re  East- 
on's  Estate,  28  P.2d  376,  136  Cal. 
App.  213. 

111. — Rogers  v.  Trudzinski,  67  N.E. 
2d  427,  329  Ill.App.  170. 

Kan.— Bush  v.  Bush,  150  P.2d  168, 
158  Kan.  760. 

Mont. — Morse  v.  Morse,  154  P.2d  9'82 
— State  ex  rel.  Vaughn  v.  District 
Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist.  in 
and  for  Madison  County,  111  P.2d 
810,  111  Mont.  552— State  ex  rel. 
Kruletz  v.  District  Court  of  Fifth 
Judicial  Dist.  in  ana  for  Beaver- 
head  County,  98  P.2d  883,  110  Mont. 
3£— Kline  v.  Murray,  257  P.  465, 
79  Mont  530 — State  v.  Silver  Bow 
County  Second  Judicial  Dist.  Ct, 
176  P.  «08,  55  Mont.  324. 

N.J.— Terminal  Cab  Co.  v.  Mikolasy, 
25  A.2d  253,  128  N.J.Law  275. 

N.Y. — American  Cities  Co.  v.  Steven- 
son, 60  N.Y.S.2d  6S5. 

Pa. — Davis  v.  Commonwealth  Trust 
Co.,  7  A.2d  3,  335  Pa,  387. 

Tex. — Weaver  v.  Humphrey,  Civ. 
App.,  114  S.W.2d  609,  error  dis- 
missed. 

As  long  as  trial  court  has  juris- 
diction of  the  cause,  it  has  the  inher- 
ent power  to  modify  its  judgment  to 
make  it  conform  to  the  judgment 
actually  entered. — Penchos  v.  Ran- 
ta,  155  P.2d  277,  22  Washed  198. 

At  any  time 

(1)  A  court  may  at  any  time  cor- 
rect  a  judgment  so  as   to  make   it 
conform    to     the    decision    actually 
made.— Ben  way  v.  Benway,  159  P.2d 
682,  69  Cal.App.2d  574. 

(2)  This   is    true   at   least  as   be- 
tween    the     parties. — Klinefelter    v. 
Anderson,  230  N.W.  288,  59  N.D.  417. 

"XTo  lapse  of  time,  however  long, 
will  preclude  the  correction  of  the 
judgment  roll  so  as  to  make  it  speak 

448 


precisely  what  the  court  Intended." 
— Cazzell  v.  Cazzell,  3  P.2d  479.  480, 
133  Kan.  766. 

71.  U.S.— Illinois     Printing     Co.     v. 
Electric    Shovel   Coal    Corporation, 
D.C.I11.,  20  F.Supp.  181. 

Cal.— In  re  Goldberg's  Estate,  76  P. 
2d  508,  10  Cal.2d  709 — Olivera  v. 
Grace,  122  P.2d  564,  19  Cal.2d  570, 
140  A.L.R.  1328— Bastajian  v. 
Brown,  120  P.2d  9,  19  Cal.2d  209. 

Mont. — Edgar  State  Bank  v.  Long, 
278  P.  10'S,  85  Mont.  225— In  re 
Jennings'  Estate,  254  P.  1067,  79 
Mont  73. 

Nev. — Lindsay  v.  Lindsay,  280  P. 
95,  52  Nev.  26,  67  A.L.R.  824. 

N.D. — Klinefelter  v.  Anderson,  230 
N.W.  288,  59  N.D.  417. 

Okl. — Montague  v.  State  ex  rel.  Com- 
missioners of  Land  Office  of  Okla- 
homa, 89  P.2d  283,  184  Okl.  574. 

Pa. — Davis  v.  Commonwealth  Trust 
Co.,  7  A.2d  3,  335  Pa.  387. 

Tex. — Collins  v.  Davenport,  Civ.App.. 
192  S.W.2d  291— Weaver  v.  Humph- 
rey, Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d  «609,  er- 
ror dismissed. 

Utah. — Garrison  y.  Davis,  54  P.2d 
439,  88  Utah  «358. 

Wyo.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bales  v. 
Brome,  105  P.2d  568.  572,  56  Wyo. 
111. 

34  C.J.  p  228  note  81. 

In  Iowa- 

(1)  The    power    of    the    court    to 
modify   a  judgment,   when   once   en- 
tered, is  purely  statutory. — Hammon 
v.    Gilson,    291    N.W.    448,    227    Iowa 
1366 — Workman    v.     District     Court, 
Delaware   County,    269   N.W.   27,   222 
Iowa  364. 

(2)  "When  a  clear  mistake  of  fact, 
due    to    misunderstanding    honestly 
made,  is  presented  to  the  court  at  the 
same    term   at   which    the    entry   is 
made,  both  statutory  authority  (sec- 
tion 10801,  Code  of  1935)  and  inher- 
ent   power    is    [are]    vested    in    the 
court  to  change,  modify  or  even  ex- 
punge the  record." — Watters  v.  Knut- 
sen,  272  N.W.  420,  422,  223  Iowa  225. 

(2)  "The  power  and  authority  of 
the  court  to  correct  an  evident  mis- 
take is  [are]  not  restricted  either 
by  section  11550  or  sections  12787, 
12790,  and  12791,  but  ... 
suchi  power  is  inherent  in  the  court, 
and  [correction]  may  be  made  under 
such  inherent  power  as  well  as  un- 
der section  10803." — Murnan  v. 
Schuldt,  265  N.W.  369,  373,  221  Iowa 
242. 

72.  CaL — Brown    v,    Jones,    52    P.2d 
962,  11  CaLA*>p.2d  30. 

Kan,— 4Leach    v.    Roberson,    52    P.2d 

629,  142  Kan.  687. 
Mass.— Araory  v.   Kelley,    34   N.K2d 

507,  309  Mass.  163. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


237 


It  has  been  held  that  in  the  case  of  fraud,  mis- 
representation, or  mistake  relief  must  be  granted  by 
a  court  by  the  correction  of  its  decrees,  in  the  in- 
terests of  justice;73  and,  under  some  authorities, 
a  judgment  procured  through  fraud,  collusion,  de- 
ceit, or  mistake  may  be  modified  at  any  time,  on  a 
proper  showing  by  the  party  injured.74  However, 
the  right  of  a  court  to  modify  its  judgment  is  not 
limited  to  a  showing  that  it  was  procured  by  fraud, 
collusion,  or  misrepresentation,75  but  it  is  sufficient 
if  there  is  a  showing  that  the  rights  of  interested 
parties  are  prejudicially  affected  by  the  judgment, 
and  if  there  was  a  withholding  of  matters  which 
should  have  been  before  the  court,  but  for  which 
withholding  the  judgment  would  not  have  been  ren- 
dered.76 


Where  amendments  affecting  the  enforcement  of 
a  judgment  or  its  application  to  the  subject  matter 
adjudicated  may  be  made  without  relitigating  for- 
mer issues,  no  attack  on  the  judgment  is  made.77 

§  237.    Clerical  and  Formal  Changes 

The  general  rule  is  that  clerical  and  formal  errors 
in  a  Judgment  may  be  corrected,  either  during  or  after 
the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered. 

The  general  rule  is  that  the  court,  at  any  time 
either  before  or  after  the  expiration  of  the  term  at 
which  a  judgment  was  rendered,  may  and  should 
correct  or  amend  clerical  or  formal  errors  and  mis- 
prisions  of  its  officers  so  as  to  make  the  record  en- 
try speak  the  truth  and  show  the  judgment  which 
was  actually  rendered  by  the  court  ;7*  and  the 


Wash.— SchmelliBg   v.    Hoffman,    213 

P.  478,  124  Wash.  1. 
34  C.J.  p  229  note  82. 

'Irregular;"    "irregularity" 

(1)  Under    some    statutes    courts 
may  modify  their  judgments  or  or- 
ders for  irregularity  in  proceedings. 
— Vann    v.    Board    of    Education    of 
Town   of   Lenapah,    229   P.    433,    102 
Okl.  286. 

(2)  Under  such  statute,  errors  in 
permitting    amendment    of    petition 
after  judgment,  in  fixing  amount  of 
attorney's    fees,    and    in    rendering 
judgment  on  verdict,  were  held  not 
grounds  for  modifying  judgment  on 
motion  filed  after  expiration  of  term 
at  which  judgment  was  rendered. — 
•Duncan   v.  Wilkins,   229  P.   801,   103 
Okl.  221. 

(3)  An  "irregular  judgment"  with- 
in meaning  of  statute  providing  that, 
for  irregularity  in  obtaining  a  judg- 
ment, a  district  court  has  power  to 
modify   the   judgment,  after   expira- 
tion of  the  term  at  which  the  judg- 
ment   was    rendered   is   a  judgment 
which   is   rendered   contrary   to   the 
course  of  law  and  the  practice  of  the 
courts. — Petersen  v.  Dethlefs,  298  N. 
W.  155,  139  Neb.  572. 

(4)  "Irregularity,"   within    statute 
permitting  modification  of  judgment 
by    proceeding    begun    within    three 
years  for  mistake,  neglect,  or  omis- 
sion of  clerk,  or  irregularity  in  ob- 
taining judgment  or  order,  does  not 
apply  merely  to  acts  of  clerk  or  oth- 
er ministerial   officers,  but  includes 
case  where  court  has  acted  on  er- 
roneous   understanding    of    facts. — 
Phoenix  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Aby,  <61 
P.2d  915,  144  Kan.  544,  rehearing  de- 
nied 64  P.2d  21,  145  Kan.  18. 

Unavoidable  casualty 

Illness  of  litigant  represented  by 
counsel  was  not  "unavoidable  casual 
ty  or  misfortune"  within  statute  au- 
thorizing modification  of  judgment 
against  litigant  after  expiration  of 
term  at  which,  it  was  rendered  for 

49  CJ.S.-29 


unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune 
preventing  litigant  from  appearing 
:>r  defending,  where  nothing  could 
have  been  done  to  protect  litigant's 
rights  while  she  was  ill  which  could 
not  have  been  done  theretofore,  and 
no  continuance  of  hearings  before 
commissioner  because  of  her  Inabil- 
ity to  be  present  was  requested. — 
Washle  v.  Security  Bank,  97  S.W.2d 
82-3,  265  Ky.  '808. 
Negligence 

Some  statutes  are  not  intended  to 
relieve  a  party  from  the  consequenc- 
es of  his  own  negligence. — Hickman 
v.  Ritchey  Coal  Co.,  252  Ill-App.  560. 

73.    U.S.— Illinois     Printing    Co.    v. 

Electric   Shovel   Coal   Corporation, 

D.C.I11.,  20  F.Supp.  181. 
Iowa.— Watt  ers   v.   Knutsen,   272   N. 

W.  420,  223  Iowa  225. 

7*.    Fla, — Zemurray   v.   Kilgore,    177 
So.    714,    130    Fla,    317— State    v. 
Wrigh't,  145  So.  '598,  107  Fla.  178— 
Eli  Witt  Cigar  &  Tobacco  Co.  v. 
Somers,  127  So.  333,  99  Fla,  592— 
Alabama  Hotel  Co.  v.  J.  L.  Mott 
Iron  Works,  98  So.  825,  186  'Fla.  608. 
Correctness  of  final  judgment  can- 
not be  questioned  on  application  for 
modification,    in    absence    of    error, 
fraud,   or  misrepresentation. — Bailey 
v.    Gifford  Sand  &   Gravel   Co.,    La. 
App.,  145  So.  712. 
Errors  corrective  by  writ  of  error 

coram  nobis 

.  (1)  Under  statutes  providing  that 
all  errors  of  fact  committed  in  pro- 
ceedings of  any  court  of  record, 
which  by  common  law  could  have 
been  corrected  by  writ  of  error  cor- 
am nobis,  may  be  corrected  by  court 
in  which  error  was  committed  on 
motion  in  writing  made  at  any  time 
within  five  years  after  the  rendition 
of  final  judgment,  "errors  of  fact" 
include  duress,  fraud,  and  excusable 
mistake,  and  fraud  of  opposing  par- 
ty or  his  counsel  which  prevents  one 
from  making  his  defense  is  such  sa. 

449 


error  of  fact. — Gunn  v.  Britt,  3D  N. 
E.2d  76,  313  IlLApp.  13. 

(2)  Errors  of  fact  which  may  be 
assigned  under  motion  authorized  by 
such   statute  must   be   as   to   facts, 
unknown  to  court,  which  would  have 
precluded  entry  of  judgment  order. — 
Tylke   v.  Norwegian  American  Hos- 
pital, 54  N.E,2d  75,  322  IlLApp.  283. 

(3)  Writ    of    error    coram    nobis 
generally  see  infra  §§  311-313. 

76.  Ohio. — Pengelly       v,       Thomas, 
App.,    65    N.E.2d    897,    appeal   dis- 
missed 67  N.E.2d  71'4,  146  Ohio  St. 
69*3. 

70.  Ohio. — Pengelly  v.  Thomas,  su- 
pra, 

77.  Ky. — Ballew  v.  Denny,  177  S.W. 
2d  152,  296  Ky.  368,  150  A.L.R.  770. 

78.  U.S. — Simonds  v.  Norwich  Union 
Indemnity  Co.,  C.C.A.Minn.,   73  F. 
2d  412,   certiorari  denied  Norwich 
Union  Indemnity  Co.   v.   Simonds, 
55  S.Ct  507,  29'4  U.S.  711,  79  L.Ed. 
124-6 — Woods    Bros.   Const.    Co.    v. 
Tankton  County,  C.C.A.S.D.,  54  F. 
2d    304,    81    AJUR.    300— Fultz    v. 
Laird,    CXC.A.Mich.t    24    F.2d    172— 
Ex  parte  Robinson,  D.C.Tex.,  44  »F. 
Supp.    795 — New    River    Collieries 
Co.  v.  U.  S.,  D.C.N.J.,  300  F.  333— 
Ewert  v.  Thompson,  C.C.A.OkL,  281 
tF.  449. 

Ala, — Parker  v.  Duke,  157  So.  436, 
229  Ala.  3-61— Ex  parte  R.  H.  Byrd 
Contracting  Co.,  156  So.  «79,  26  Ala. 
App.  171,  certiorari  denied  156  So. 
582,  229  Ala.  248. 

Ark. — Kory  v.  Less,  «37  S.W.2d  92, 
183  Ark.  553 — Reynolds  v.  Winship, 
299  S.W.  16,  175  Ark.  352— United 
Drug  Co.  v.  Bedell,  263  -S.W.  316, 
164  Ark.  527. 

CaL— Ollvera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d  564, 
Ifl  CaL2d  570,  140  A.L.R.  1328— 
In  re  Goldberg's  Estate,  76  P.2d 
508,  10  CaL2d  709— Security-First 
Nat.  Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Rud- 
dle Properties,  295  P.  343,  211  CaL 
346— Barkelew  v.  Barkelew,  Afcp., 
1&6  P.2d  <57— Benway  Y.  Benway, 


§  237 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


correction  of  such  error  may  be  authorized  by  stat- 
ute.79 The  term  "clerical  error"  as  here  used  must 
not  be  taken  in  too  narrow  a  sense;  it  includes  not 


only  errors  made  by  the  clerk  in  entering  the  judg- 
ment, but  also  those  mistakes  apparent  on  the  rec- 
ord, whether  made  by  the  court  or  by  counsel  during 


159  P.2d  682,  *69  Cal.App.2d  574— 
Hercules  Glue  Co.  v.  Littooy,  113 
P.2d  490,  45  CaLApp.2d  42— Phipps 
v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for  Alam- 
eda  County.  89  P.2d  698,  32  Cal. 
App.2d  $71 — Kohlstedt  v.  Hauseur, 
74  P.2d  314,  24  Cal.App.2d  60— 
Bradbury  Estate  Co.  v.  Carroll, 
276  P.  394,  98  CaLApp.  145— Mc- 
Kannay  v.  McKannay,  230  P.  21-8, 
'68  CaLApp.  709. 

Conn. — Varanelli  v.  Luddy,  32  A.2d 
61,  130  Conn.  74 — Sachs  v.  Feinn, 
183  A.  384,  121  Conn.  77— Connecti- 
cut Mortgage  &  Title  Guaranty 
Co.  v.  Di  'Francesco,  151  A.  491,  112 
Conn.  673— Application  of  Title  & 
Guaranty  Co.  of  Bridgeport  to 
Change  Name  to  Bankers'  Security 
Trust  Co.,  14'5  A.  151,  109  Conn. 
45. 

Fla. — Kroier  v.  Kroier,  116  So.  753, 
95  Fla.  865 — R.  R.  Ricou  &  Sons 
Co.  r.  Merwin,  113  So.  745,  *94  Fla. 
86. 

Ga. — Robinson  v.  Vickers,  127  S.E. 
849,  160  Ga.  ®62. 

Hawaii. — City  and  County  of  Hon- 
olulu v.  Caetano,  30  Hawaii  1. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Sweitzer  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  2  N.E.2d  330,  363  111. 
409,  104  A.L.R.  1335— People  v. 
iLyle,  160  N.E.  742,  329  111.  418— 
Mclntosh  v.  Glos,  136  N.E.  781,  304 
111.  620 — Rogers  v.  Trudzinski, 
App.,  67  N.E.2d  427-<Jhicago 
Wood  Piling  Co.  v.  Anderson, 
N.E.2d  702,  313  IlLApp.  242— Hick- 
man  v.  Ritchey  Coal  Co.,  252  111. 
App.  560— Nokol  Co.  of  Illinois  v. 
Cunningham,  231  111. App.  154. 

Iowa. — Equitable  Life  Ins.  Co.  of 
Iowa  v.  Carpenter,  212  N,W.  145, 
202  Iowa  1334. 

Kan.— Elliott  v.  Elliott,  114  P.2d  823, 
154  Kan.  145 — State  v.  Frame,  95 
P.2d  278,  150  Kan.  646— Perkins  v. 
Ashmore,  61  P.2d  888,  144  Kan.  540. 

Ky.— Wides  v.  Wides,  188  S.W.2d 
471,  300  Ky.  344— Weil  v.  B.  E. 
Buffaloe  &  Co.,  65  S.W.2d  704,  251 
Ky.  673 — Stratton  &  Terstegge  Co. 
v.  Begley,  61  S.W.2d  287,  249  Ky. 
«32— Keyser  v.  Hopkins,  -34  S.W.2d 
968,  237  Ky.  10'5— Lindholm  v.  Kice, 
2'81  S.W.  795,  213  Ky.  -544— Jones 
v.  Dalton,  273  S.W.  -449,  209  Ky. 
•593. 

Mass.— In  re  Keenan,  47  N.E.2d  12, 
313  Mass.  186 — Amory  v.  Kelley, 
34  N.E.2d  507,  309  Mass.  162. 
Minn. — Plankerton  v.  Continental 
Casualty  Co.,  230  N.W.  464,  180 
Minn.  168. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Holtkamp  v.  Hart- 
mann,  51  &W.2d  22,  -330  Mo.  386— 
Clancy  v.  Herman  C.  G.  Luyties 
Realty  Co.,  10  S.W.2d  914,  321  Mo. 
282— Haycraft  v.  Haycraft,  App., 
141  S.W.2d  170— Corpus  Juris  cited 


in  Thomas  v.  Brotherhood  of  Rail- 
way &  Steamship  Clerks,  App.,  72 
S.W.2d  502,  503 — Everett  v.  Glenn, 
35  S.W.2d  652,  225  Mo.App.  921— 
Greggers  v.  Gleason,  29  S.W.2d 
183,  224  Mo.App.  1108. 

Mont. — State  ex  reL  Kruletz  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  'Fifth  Judicial  Dist. 
in  and  for  Beaverhead  County, 
P.2d  883,  110  Mont.  36— Edgar 
State  Bank  v.  Long,  278  P.  108,  85 
Mont.  225 — Oregon  Mortg.  Co.  v. 
Kunneke,  245  P.  539,  76  Mont  117. 

Nev. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Silva  v. 
Second  Judicial  Dist.  Court  in  and 
for  Washoe  County,  66  P.2d  422, 
424,  57  Nev.  468— Lindsay  v.  Lind- 
say, 280  P.  95,  52  Nev.  26,  <67  A.L. 
R.  824. 

N.J. — Terminal  Cab  Co.  v.  Mikolasy, 
25  A.2d  253,  128  N.J.Law  275. 

N.Y.— Hiser  v.  Davis,  137  N.B.  596, 
234  N.Y.  -300— West  158th  Street 
Garage  Corporation  v.  State,  10  N. 
T.S.2d  990,  256  App.Div.  401,  rear- 
gument  denied  12  N.T.S.2d  759,  257 
App.Div.  875— In  re  Gould,  8  N.Y. 
S.2d  714,  255  App.Div.  433— In  re 
Brady's  Estate,  264  N.Y.S.  4-49, 
147  Misc.  613— Siegel  v.  State,  2 
N.Y.S.  652,  138  Misc.  474— Board 
of  Hudson  River  Regulating  Dist. 
v.  De  Long,  236  N.Y.S.  245,  134 
Mis<j.  775— Santasino  v.  Karnuth, 
41  N.Y.S.2d  459. 

N.C. — 'Federal  Land  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia v.  Davis,  1  S.E.2d  350,  215  N. 
C.  100. 

N.D. — Klinefelter  v.  Anderson,  230  N. 
W.  288,  59  N.D.  417. 

Ohio.— Webb  v.  Western  Reserve 
Bond  &  Share  Co.,  153  N.E.  289, 
115  Ohio  St.  247,  48  A.L.R.  1176. 

Oil. — McAdams  v.  C.  'D.  Shamburger 
Lumber  Co.,  240  P.  124,  112  Okl. 
17«3 — Mason  v.  Slonecker,  219  P. 
357,  92  Okl.  227. 

Or.— 'Farmers1  Loan  &  Mortgage  Co. 

v.  Hansen,  260  P.  999,  123  Or.  72. 
Pa. — 'Fitzpatrick  v.  Bates,   92  Pa.Su- 

per.    114— -Casey   Heat   Service   Co. 

v.  Klein,  Com.Pl.,  46  'Lack.Jur.  257. 
S.C.— Varser  v.  Smith.  197  S.E.  394, 

187  S.C.  328. 
S.D. — Janssen    v.    Tusha,    5    N.W.2d 

684.  68  S.D.  -639. 
Tenn. — College  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v. 

•Smith,   21  S.W.2d  1038,   160  Tenn. 

93. 
Tex. — Panhandle  Const.  Co.  v.  Llnd- 

sey,  72  S.W.2d  1068,  123  Tex.  613— 

O'Neil  v.  Norton,  Com.  App.,   3-3  S. 

W.2d    733 — Collins    v.    Davenport, 

Civ.App.,   192   S.W.2d  291— Weaver 

v.  Humphrey,  Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d 

'609,     error     dismissed — Acosta    v. 

Realty  Trust  Co.,  Civ.App.,  Ill  S. 

W.2d  777— Flannery  v.  Eblen,  Civ. 

App.,    106    S.W.2d   837,   error   dis-  j 

450 


missed — Florence  v.  Swails,  Civ. 
App.,  85  S.W.2d  257— Goodyear 
Tire  &  Rubber  Co.  v.  Pearcy,  Civ. 
App.,  80  S.W.2d  1096— Veal  v.  Jag- 
gers,  Civ.App.,  13  S.W.2d  745,  er- 
ror dismissed. 
Utah. — Garrison  v.  Davis,  54  P.2d 

439,  88  Utah  358. 
W.Va. — Haller   v,    Digman,    167    S.E. 

593,  113  W.Va.  240. 
Wyo.— Riverton      Valley      Drainage 
Dist   v.   Board  of  Com'rs   of  'Fre- 
mont County,  74  P.2d  871,  52  Wyo. 
3-36,  114  A.L.R.  1093— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  In  re  Pringle's  Estate,  67 
P.2d  204,  209,  51  Wyo.  352. 
34  C.J.  p  229  note  83. 

"It  is  the  generally  accepted  rule 
that  courts  have  the  inherent  power 
to  correct  or  amend  their  judgments 
so  that  they  shall  truly  express  that 
which  was  actually  decided,  where  it 
appears  from  the  face  of  the  record 
that  a  clerical  mistake  has  been 
made  in  setting  forth  correctly  that 
which  was  in  fact  determined  by  the 
court" — In  re  Jennings1  Estate,  254 
P.  1067,  1068,  79  Mont.  73. 

Correction  without  vacation 

•Such  an  error  may  and  should  be 
corrected  by  amendment  without  va- 
cating the  Judgment. — Chadwick  v. 
Superior  Court  of  California  in  and 
for  Los  Angeles  County,  270  P.  192, 
20-5  Cal.  163. 

Correction  within  reasonable  time 
Mont — State  Bank  of  New  Salem  v. 
Schultze,  209  P.  599,  63  Mont.  410. 

Judgment  in  ejectment 

Idaho. — Wilcox  v.  Wells,   51  P.  985, 

5  Idaho  786. 

19  C.J.  p  1212  note  60. 

79.    La. — Glen  Falls  Indemnity  Co.  v. 

Manning,  App.,  IBS  So.  787. 
Neb.— Crete  Mills  v.  Stevens,  235  N. 

W.  453,  120  Neb.  794. 
Okl.— Hurley  v.  Childers,  243  P.  218, 

116  Okl.  84. 

Tex.— Arrington  v.  McDaniel,  25  S. 
W.2d  295,  119  Tex.  148— Miller  v. 
Texas  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Civ. App.,  12-3 
S.W.2d  756,  error  refused — Hays  v. 
Hughes,  Civ. App.,  106  S.W.2d  724, 
error  refused^Bell  v.  Rogers*  Civ. 
App.,  58  S.W.2d  878— State  Bank 

6  Trust   Co.    of  San    Antonio   v. 
Love,  Civ.App.,   57  S.W.2d  924,  af- 
firmed Love  v.  State  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  San  Antonio,  90  S.W.2d  819, 
126  Tex.  591 — Pring  v.  Pratt,  Civ. 
App.,  1  S.W.2d  441,  error  dismissed 
—Bray  v.  City  of  Corsicana,  Civ. 
App.,  280  S.W.  609. 

W.Va.— Yost  v.  O'Brien,  ISO  S.E.  «442, 

100  W.Va.  408. 
Wis.— In  re  Cudahy's  Estate,  219  N. 

W.  203,  196  Wis.  260. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


238 


the  progress  of  the  case,  which  cannot  reasonably 
be  attributed  to  the  exercise  of  judicial  considera- 
tion or  discretion.80  Errors  into  which  the  court  it- 
self falls,  however,  have  been  said  to  be  judicial 
errors,81  and  it  has  been  said  that  an  error  in  ar- 
riving at  a  conclusion  cannot  possibly  be  a  clerical 
error,  but  must  be  a  judicial  one.82  A  mere  arith- 
metical error,  as  in  computation,  may  be  correct- 
ed as  a  clerical  error.83 

The  amendment  of  clerical  errors  after  the  term 
has  been  limited  to  situations  in  which  the  error  has 
not  misled,  and  does  not  prejudice,  -the  party  op- 
posing the  amendment84 


§  238.    Judicial  and  Substantial  Changes 

Subject  to  some  exceptions,  the  general  rule  is  that, 
after  the  term  at  which  it  renders  a  judgment,  a  court 
cannot  amend  It  In  a  matter  of  substance  or  In  a  manner 
Involving  the  exercise  of  judicial  discretion  on  the  -merits. 

After  expiration  of  the  term  at  which  it  was  ren- 
dered, or  of  the  statutory  period  of  limitation,  in 
cases  governed  by  statute,  a  judgment  is  no  longer 
open  to  any  amendment,  revision,  modification,  or 
correction  whiih  involves  the  exercise  of  the  judg- 
ment or  discretion  of  the  court  on  the  merits  or  on 
matters  of  substance.85  The  only  amendment  then 
permissible  is  one  which  is  intended  to  make  the 


80.  Gal. — Ben  way  y.  Benway,  169 
P.2d  682.  69  Cal.App.2d  574— Car- 
ter v.  Shinsako,  108  P.2d  27,  42 
Cal.App.2d  9 — McKannay  v.  Mc- 
Kannay,  230  P.  218,  68  Cal.App. 
709. 
Tex.— Hays  v.  Hughes,  Civ.  App.,  106 

S.W.2d    724,    error   refused. 
Wyo. — Corpus  Toils  quoted  in  In  re 
Pringle's  Estate,  67  P.2d  204,  209, 
51  Wyo.  352. 
34  C.J.  P  231  note  84. 

"Ordinarily,  although  originally 
and  in  its  literal  significance,  a 
'clerical  error*  is  one  that  has  been 
made  by  a  clerk  or  some  subordinate 
agent,  latterly  the  meaning  has  been 
broadened  and  extended  so  that  it 
now  may  include  an  error  that  may 
have  been  made  by  the  judge  or  by 
the  court." — In  re  Goldberg's  Estate, 
76  P.2d  '508.  511,  10  CaL2d  70S. 
Nature  of  clerical  error 

(1)  "Such  a  mistake  ordinarily  is 
apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  record 
and   capable   of  being  corrected  by 
reference  to  the  record  only.    It  is 
usually    a    mistake    in    the    clerical 
work  of  transcribing  the  particular 
record.    It   is  usually  one  of  form. 
It  may  be  made  by  a  clerk,  by  coun- 
sel, or  by  the  court.    A  clerical  er- 
ror in  reference  to  an  order  for  Judg- 
ment or  judgment,  as  regards  cor- 
rection,  includes   one   made  by  the 
court  which  cannot  reasonably  be  at- 
tributed to  the  exercise  of  judicial 
consideration  or  discretion." — Wilson 
v.  City  of  'Fergus  Falls,  232  N.W.  322, 
323,  181  Minn.  329. 

(2)  "Clerical  error"  defined  gener- 
ally see  Clerical  14  C.J.S.  p  1202  note 
33-p  1203  note  52. 

(3)  "Clerical    misprislon"  '  defined 
generally  see  Clerical  14  C.J.-S.  p  1203 
notes  53-60. 

Expression  of  Judicial  desire  or  in- 
tention 

Where  judgment  assigned  by  trial 
judge  does  not  express  the  actual 
judicial  desire  or  intention  of  the 
trial  court,  but  is  contrary  thereto, 
the  signing  of  such  purported  Judg- 
ment is  a  clerical  error  rather  than 
a  judicial  one. — Bastajian  y.  Brown, 
120  P.2d  9,  19  CaL2d  209.  j 


Types  of  errors  oorrectible 

Mistakes  in  the  names  of  the  par- 
ties, dates,  descriptions  of  lands, 
amounts,  and  others  of  similar  char- 
acter may  be  corrected  on  the  court's 
own  motion  at  any  time,  when  it  is 
clear  from  the  whole  record  what  the 
entry  should  be. 
Kan.— Cubitt  v.  Cubitt,  86  P.  475, 

74  Kan.  353. 
OkL— Mason  v.  Slonecker,  219  P.  357, 

92  Okl.  227. 
Use  of  "and"  for  "or" 
Mo.— 'Fulton  Loan  Service  No.   *  v. 

Colvin,  App.,  81  S.W.2d.373. 

Personal  Judgment,  entered  in  suit 
to  enforce  paving  lien,  not  praying 
for  such  judgment,  was  not  clerical 
misprislon,  correctible  by  motion  in 
lower  court — Dotson  v.  People's 
Bank,  27  S.W.2d  673,  234  Ky.  138— 
Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Olive  Hill,  21  S.W.2d  127,  231  Ky. 
65. 

81.  Conn. — Connecticut  Mortgage  & 
Title  Guaranty  Co.  v.  Di  'Frances- 
co,  151  A.  491,   112  Conn.   673. 

34  C.J.  p  232  note  85. 
Judicial  and  substantial  changes  see 
infra  §  238. 

82.  Cal. — Howland  v.  Superior  Court 
of   Los   Angeles   County,    16   P.2d 
318,  1,27  CaLApp.  695. 

83.  Cal.— Chadwick      v.       Superior 
Court  of  California  in  and  for  Los 
Angeles   County,    270   P.   192,   205 
CaL  163. 

ICy. — Weil  v.  B.  B.  Buff  aloe  &  Co.,  65 
S.W.2d  704,  251  Ky.  673— Jones  v. 
Dalton,  273  S.W.  449,  209  Ky.  593. 

Mass.— Amory  v.  Kelley,  34  N.E.2d 
507,  309  Mass.  1<62. 

Minn. — Barnard-Curtiss  C|o.  v.  Min- 
neapolis Dredging  Co.,  274  N.W. 
22-9,  200  Minn.  327. 

Wash. — In  re  Darning's  Guardianship, 
73  P.2d  7fr4,  192  Wash.  190. 

Wis.— Olson  v.  Elliott,  15  N.W.2d  37, 
245  Wis.  279. 

34  C.J.  p  231  note  84  [h]. 

Amount  of  recovery  and  allowance  of 
interest  see  infra  §  2*47. 

Costs  and  allowances  see  infra  § 
2*8.  i 

451 


Computation    of    commissions    and 

fees 
Wyo. — In  re  Pringle's  Estate,  67  P. 

2d  204,  51  Wyo.  352. 

84.  Ga.— Rogers  v.  Rigell,   188  S.B. 
704,  183  Ga.  455. 

Reliance  on  date  of  judgment 

Defendants  in  action  were  not  en- 
titled nine  months  after  rendition  of 
judgment  of  nonsuit  to  have  judg- 
ment revised  so  as  to  show  true 
date  on  which  it  was  rendered,  where 
such  revision  would  have  required 
dismissal  of  plaintiff's  second  action 
which  had  been  commenced  within 
six  months  from  date  appearing  on 
original  Judgment,  on  which  plaintiff 
had  relied.— Rogers  v.  Rigell,  supra. 

85.  U.S. — Ex    parte    Robinson,    B.C. 
Tex.,  44  F.Supp.  795. 

Fla.— Kroier  v.  Kroier,  116  So.  753, 
95  Fla.  865. 

Ga. — Rogers  v.  Rigell,  188  S.E.  704, 
183  Ga.  455. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Sweitzer  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  2  N.E.2d  330,  363  111. 
409.  104  A.L.R.  1335— Mclntosh  v. 
Glos,  13-6  N.E.  781,  304  111.  620— 
'Dillenburg  v.  Hellgren,  25  N.E.2d 
890,  304  Ill.A«pp.  51,  transferred, 
see,  21  N.E.2d  393,  371  111.  452— 
Parish  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Up- 
town Sales  &  Service  Co.,  20  N.E. 
2d  634,  300  Ill.App.  73. 

Ind. — Rooker  v.  Fidelity  Trust  Co., 
177  N.E.  454,  202  Ind.  641— Farm- 
ers' &  Merchants  Nat  Bank  of 
Rensselaer  v.  Elliott,  141  N.E.  652, 
80  IndApp.  596. 

Minn.— Wilson  v.  City  of  'Fergus 
Falls,  232  N.W.  322,  181  Minn.  329. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Holtkamp  v.  Hart- 
mann,  51  S.W.2d  22,  880  Mo.  386. 

Mont. — Oregon  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Kun- 
neke,  245  P.  539,  76  Mont.  117. 

N.Y.— In  re  Gould,  8  N.T.S.2d  714, 
255  App.Div.  433. 

Tenn.— College  Coal  &  Mining  C.o.  v. 
Smith,  21  S.W.2d  1038,  1-60  Tenn.  93. 

Tex. — O'Neil  v.  Norton,  Com. App.,  33  • 
S.W.2d   733— Bell   v.    Rogers,    Civ. 
App.,  $8  S.W.2d  578. 

Utah.— Frost  v.  District  Court  of 
IFirst  Judicial  District  In  and  for 
Box  Elder  County,  83  P.2d  737,  9ft 


§  238 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


judgment  speak  the  truth  by  showing  what  the  ju- 
dicial action  really  was,  and  not  one  which  corrects 
judicial  errors  or  remedies  the  effects  of  judicial 
nonaction;  the  court  has  no  power  at  such  time  to 
revise  and  amend  a  judgment  by  correcting  judicial 
errors,  and  making  it  express  something  which  the 


court  did  not  pronounce,  and  did  not  intend  to  pro- 
nounce, in  the  first  instance.86  Judicial  errors  in 
judgments  are  to  be  corrected  by  appeal  or -writ  of 
error,  or  by  certiorari,  or  by  awarding  a  new  trial, 
or  by  any  means  specially  provided  by  statute,  and 
not  by  amendment,87  unless  the  statute  permits  such 


Utah  106,  rehearing:  denied  85   P. 
2d  601,  -96  Utah  115. 
34C.J.  p  232  note  90. 
Expiration  of  term  generally  see  su- 
pra §  230. 
Statutory    provisions    generally    see 

supra  §  223. 
»ule  limited  to  operative  portion 

The  rule  limiting1  the  <power  of  the 
court  over  its  own  judgments  and  de- 
crees to  the  term  is  applicable  only 
to  the  operative  portion  of  the  decree 
or  judgment  sought  to  be  affected. — 
Santasino  v.  Karnuth,  41  N.Y.S.2d 
459. 

Failure  of  clerk  to  extend  judgment 
on  minutes 

(1)  If    a    judge    makes    a    docket 
memorandum  of  his  judgment,  and 
the  clerk  fails  during  term  to  extend 
it  in   form  on  the  minutes,  it  is  a 
"mistake  of  the  clerk"  which  is  not 
merely  "clerical"  but  it  may  'be  cor- 
rected  at  a   subsequent   term   by  a 
judgment  nunc  pro  tune  under  stat- 
ute,— Sisson  v.  Leonard,  11  So.2d  144, 
243  Ala.  546. 

(2)  Allowing      amendment      nunc 
pro  tune  generally  see  infra  §  258. 
86.    Cal.— In  re  Goldberg's  Estate,  78 

P.2d  508,  10  Cal.2d  709— Hercules 
Glue  Co.  v.  Littooy,  113  P.2d  490, 
45  Gal.App.2d  42— Los  Angeles 
County  v.  Rindge  County,  230  P. 
468,  69  Cal.App.  72,  error  dismissed 
Marblehead  Land  Co.  v.  Los  An- 
geles County,  47  S.Ct  247,  273  U. 
S.  646,  71  CL.Ed.  820. 

Conn. — Varanelli  v.  Luddy,  32  A.2rf 
61,  130  Conn.  74 — Connecticut 
Mortgage  &  Title  Guaranty  Co.  v. 
Di  'Francesco,  151  A.  491,  112  Conn. 
673. 

Ga.— Rogers  v.  Rigell,  188  S.E.  704, 
183  Ga.  455. 

Hawaii.— City  and  County  of  Hon- 
olulu v.  Caetano,  30  Hawaii  L 

111. — Chicago  Wood  Piling  Co.  v.  An- 
derson, 39  N.E.2d  702,  313  IlLApp. 
242. 

Ind. — State  ex  rel.  Clark  v.  Rice,  47 
N.E.2d  849,  113  Ind.Apj?.  238. 

Kan. — State  v.  Frame,  95  P.2d  278, 
150  Kan.  «46. 

Mo. — Clancy  v.  Herman  C.  G.  Luyties 
Realty  Co.,  10  S.W.2d  914,  321  Mo. 
282— Haycraft  v.  Haycraft,  App., 
141  8.W.2d  170. 

N.C. — -Federal  Land  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia v.  Davis,  1  S.E.2.d  360,  215  N. 
C.  100. 

Tenn. — College  Coal  &  Mining  Co. 
v.  Smith,  21  S.W.2d  1038,  160  Tenn. 
93. 

Tex. — 'Panhandle  Const.  Co.  v.  !Lind- 
sey,  72  S.W.2d  10*8,  123  Tex.  613 


— Arrington  v.  McDaniel,  25  S.W. 
2d  295,  119  Tex.  148— Jones  v. 
Bass,  Com. App.,  49  S.W.2d  723 — 
Collins  v.  Davenport  Civ.A'pp.,  192 
S.W.2d  291— Kveton  v.  Farmers 
Royalty  Holding  Co.,  Civ. App.,  149 
S.W.2d  998— Miller  v.  Texas  Life 
Ins.  -Co.,  Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d  756, 
error  refused — Acosta  v.  Realty 
Trust  Co.,  Civ.App.,  Ill  S.W.2d 
777 — Flannery  v.  Eblen,  Civ.App., 
106  -S.W.2d  837,  error  dismissed— 
Hays  v.  Hughes,  Civ.App.,  106  S. 
W.2d  724,  error  refused — Florence 
v.  Swails,  Civ.App.,  85  S.W.2d  257 
— Bell  v.  Rogers,  Civ.App.,  58  S. 
W.2d  878— -State  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
of  San  Antonio  v.  Love,  Civ.App., 
57  S.W.2d  924,  affirmed  Love  v. 
State  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  San 
Antonio.  90  S.W.2d  819,  126  Tex. 
591 — Montgomery  v.  Huff,  Civ. 
App.,  11  S.W.2d  237,  error  refused 
— Pring  v.  Pratt  Civ.A'pp.,  1  S.W. 
2d  441,  error  dismissed. 
W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  First 
Nat.  Bank  of  Williamson  v.  Webb, 
158  S.E.  378,  379,  110  W.Va.  387. 
34  C.J.  p  234  note  91. 

"Under  the  guise  of  an  amend- 
ment there  is  no  authority  to  cor- 
rect a  judicial  mistake.  . 
The  authority  of  the  court  is  to 
amend  its  record  so  as  to  make  it 
speak  the  truth,  but  not  to  make  it 
speak  what  it  did  not  speak  but 
ought  to  have  spoken." — Kory  v. 
Less,  37  S.W.2d  92,  93,  183  Ark.  553. 

87.  U.S. — Parker  Bros.  v.  QFagan,  C. 
C.A.Fla.,  68  F.2d  616,  certiorari 
denied  54  S.Ct  719,  292  U.S.  638, 
78  L.Ed.  1490. 

Cal.— -Reichert  v.  Rabun,  265  P.  260, 
89  CaLApp.  375— McConville  v.  Su- 
perior Court  within  and  for  Los 
Angeles  County,  2-4-8  P.  553,  78  Cal. 
App.  203 — Los  Angeles  County  v. 
Rindge  County,  230  P.  468,  69  Cal. 
App.  72,  error  dismissed  Marble- 
head  Land  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles 
County,  47  S.Ct.  247,  273  U.S.  646, 
71  L.Ed*  820 — McKannay  v.  Mc- 
Kannay,  230  P.  218,  68  CaLApp.  709. 

Colo. — Schattinger  v.  Schattinger, 
250  P.  851,  80  Colo.  2'61. 

Fla.— Malone  v.  Meres,  109  So.  677, 
91  Fla.  709. 

Hawaii. — City  and  County  of  Hon- 
olulu v.  Caetano,  30  Hawaii  1. 

Idaho. — Baldwin  v.  Anderson,  299  P. 
341,  50  Idaho  606,  certiorari  dis- 
missed American  Surety  Co.  v. 
Baldwin,  53  S.Ct.  98,  287  U.S.  156, 
77  (L.Ed.  231,  86  A.L.R.  298. 

Ky. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Broderick 
v.  Bourbon-Agricultural  Bank  & 

452 


Trust  Co.,  '58  S.W.2d  397,  398,  248 
Ky.  191 — Dotson  v.  People's  Bank, 
27  S.W.2d  673,  234  Ky.  138. 

La. — Jefferson  v.  Laure  N.  Truck 
Line,  App.,  181  So.  821,  affirmed 
Jefferson  v.  Lauri  2*.  Truck  Lines, 
187  So.  44,  192  La.  29. 

Mont. — Hawker  v.  Hawker,  llg  P.2d 
759,  112  Mont.  546-— Corpus  Juris 
olted  in  Midland  Development  Co. 
v.  Cove  Irr.  Dist,  58  P.2d  1001. 
1003,  102  Mont  479 — Oregon  Mort- 
gage Co.  v.  Kunneke,  245  P.  539,  76 
Mont  117. 

N.Y.— Application  of  Bond,  36  N.Y. 
S.2d  147,  2«64  App.Div.  484,  motion 
denied  In  re  Bond,  49  N.E.2d  1006, 
290  N.Y.  739,  affirmed  50  N.E.2d 
299,  2-96  N.Y.  901— J.  H.  &  'S.  Thea- 
tres v.  'Fay,  257  N.Y.S.  64,  235  App. 
Div.  820,  followed  in  257  N.Y.S.  65, 
235  App.DIv.  820— Kittinger  v. 
Churchill  Evangelistic  Ass'n,  276 

.  N.Y.S.  465,  1-53  Misc.  880,  affirmed 
281  N.Y.»S.  680,  244  App.Div.  876, 
reargument  denied  2U1  N.Y.S.  409, 
245  App.Div.  805,  affirmed  2'81  N. 
Y.S.  681,  244  App.Div.  877— In  re 
Brady's  Estate,  264  N.Y.S.  449,  147 
Misc.  613. 

N.C.— Nail  v.  McConnell,  190  S.E.  210, 
211  N.C.  258— State  v.  Hollings- 
worth,  175  S.E.  99,  206  N.C.  739— 
Thomas  v.  Watkins,  137  S.E.  818, 
193  N.C.  630. 

Tex. — Love  v.  State  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  San  Antonio,  90  S.W.2d  «19, 
126  Tex.  '591 — Jones  v.  Bass,  Com. 
App.,  49  S.W.2d  723 — Acosta  v. 
Realty  Trust  Co.,  Civ.App.,  Ill  «S. 
W.2d  777— Pring  v.  Pratt,  Civ. 
App.,  1  S.W.2d  441,  error  dismissed. 

Wash. — Spalsbury  v.  Wycoff,  213  P. 
47-6,  123  Wash.  691. 

34  C.J.  p  232  note  90  EC],  p  234  note 
92. 

The  reason  for  the  rule  is  that  if, 
on  the  application  of  one  party,  the- 
court  could  change  its  judgment  to 
the  prejudice  of  the  other,  it  could 
thereafter,  on  application  of  the  lat- 
ter, again  change  the  judgment  and: 
continue  this  practice  indefinitely. — 
Kline  v.  Murray,  257  P.  465,  79  Mont 
530. 

Judgment  rendered  as  Intended  be- 
comes final  and  may  be  reviewed  or 
corrected  only  on  appeal  or  motion 
for  new  trial. — St  Onge  v.  Blakely,. 
245  P.  532,  76  Mont  1. 
Correction  by  trial  court 

Judicial  e-ror  cannot  be  corrected 
by  trial  co;.rt  except  through  new 
trial  or  on  t  raely  motion,  where  er- 
roneous conclusions  of  law  not  con- 
sistent with  findings  have  been 


49    C.J.S. 

amendment.88 


JUDGMENTS 


§  238 


At  common  law,  and  in  the  absence  of  statute 
changing  the  rule,  all  proceedings  of  the  court  re- 
.main  in  the  breast  of  the  judge  until  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term  at  which  they  were  had,  and,  ac- 
cordingly, it  has  been  held  or  stated  that  a  judg- 


ment may  be  amended  and  changed  in  matter  of 
substance  by  the  judicial  action  of  the  court,  taken 
during  the  term  at  which  such  judgment  was  ren- 
dered;89 but  some  authorities,  without  express  ref- 
erence to  the  term  or  time,  deny  the  power  of  the 
court  to  correct  a  judicial  error  or  omission,  or  to 
make  a  change  in  substance,90  even  where  such 


drawn,  or  where  judgment  is  incon-  i 
sistent  with  special  verdict — How- 
land  v.  Superior  Court  of  Los  An- 
geles County,  16  P.2d  318,  127  Cal. 
App.  695. 

Conformity  to  evidence,  findings,  or 
order 

(1)  Where  a  decree   fails  to   con- 
form to  evidence,  findings,  or  order, 
error  may  be  corrected  only  on  some 
seasonable     and    legally    recognized 
•proceeding  for  review. — Hill  v.  Tay- 
lor, Mass.,  65  N.B.2d  97. 

(2)  If  judgment  conforms  to  find- 
ing,  only  remedy  is  by  motion  for 
new    trial    asking    that   finding    and 
judgment   be   set   aside. — S.   J.   Pea- 
body  Lumber  Co.  v.  Northam,  184  N. 
B.    794,    96    Ind.App.    197 — Tri    Lake 
Const.  Co.  v.  Northam,  184  N.K  792, 
96  Ind.App.  183. 

Giving    judgment    over   against    an- 
other defendant 

N.T. — Terry    &    Gibson   v.    Bank   of 
New  York  &  Trust  Co.,  273  N.T.S. 
32,  242  App.Div.  699. 
Inclusion  of  matters  outside  issues 
Where  judgment  allegedly  includes 
matters  outside  of  issues,  only  rem- 
edy  is   by   motion   to   modify  judg- 
ment,   designating    changes    desired, 
ruling    on    motion    being   assignable 
as   error. — Rooker  v.  'Fidelity  Trust 
Co.,   177   N.B.   454,    202    Infl.    641. 

On  opposition  to  administrator's 
final  account,  judge  could  not  reverse 
or  amend  judgment  to  prejudice  of 
administrator  without  giving  him 
opportunity  to  be  heard  again  by 
new  trial.— Succession  of  Coreil,  148 
So.  711,  177  La.  568. 

laps©  of  time  for  appeal  or  motion 

for  new  trial 
A  court  has  no  jurisdiction  to 
modify  its  judgment  after  time  for 
appeal  or  motion  for  new  trial  has 
lapsed,  except  to  correct  clerical 
mistakes. — Johnson  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Tuba  County,  87  P.2d  384, 
31  Cal.A-pp.2d  111. 

88.  Cal.— Bastajian  v.  Brown,  120  P. 
2d   9,    19    Cal.2d   209— McMahan  v. 
Baringer,  122  P.2d  63,  49  Cal.App. 
2d  431. 

89.  U.S. — Suggs     v.     Mutual     Ben. 
Health    &    Accident    Ass'n,    C.C.A. 
Okl.,  115  P.2d  80. 

Conn. — Varanelli   v.   Luddy,   82   A.2d 

6.1,  130  Conn.  74. 
Ind. — Rooker  v.   Fidelity  Trust  Co., 

177  N.B.  454,  202  Ind.  641. 
Mo. — Clancy  v.  Herman  C.  G.  Luyties 


Realty  Co.,  10  S.W.2d  914,  321  Mo.  i 

282. 

34  C.J.  p  232  note  87. 
Jurisdiction  and  power  during  term 

generally  see  supra  §  229. 
Statutory    provisions    as    to    court's 

dealing  with   judgments   generally 

see  supra  §  228. 

90.  Cal. — In  re  Burnett's  Estate,  79 
P.2d  89,  11  Cal.2d  2-59— (Liuzza  v. 
Brinkerhoff,  83  P.2d  97-6,  29  Cal. 
App.2d  1 — McConville  v.  Superior 
Court  within  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  248  P.  553,  78  CaLApp.  203 
— McKannay  v.  McKannay,  230  P. 
218,  68  CaLApp.  709. 
111.— Dillenburg  v.  Hellgren,  25  N.B. 
2d  890,  304  IlLApp.  61,  transferred, 
see,  21  N.B.2d  393,  371  111.  452. 
Ind. — First  State  Bank  of  «Frankfort 
v.  Spradling,  11  N.B.2d  76,  104 
Ind.App.  342. 

Mont. — Hawker  v.  Hawker,  118  P.2d 
759,  112  Mont  546 — State  ex  rel. 
Vaughn  v.  District  Court  of  ^ifth 
Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for.  Madison 
County,  111  P.2d  810,  111  Mont. 
552. 

N.T.— Hiser  v.  Davis,  137  N.B.  596, 
234  N.T.  300— Application  of  Bond, 
36  N.T.S.2d  147,  264  App.Div.  484, 
motion  denied  In  re  Bond,  49  N.B. 
2d  1006,  290  N.Y.  739,  affirmed  50 
N.E.2d  299,  290  N.T.  901— Fred 
Medart  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rafterty,  276 
N.T.S.  678,  243  App.Div.  632— 
Feinberg  v.  'Feinberg,  41  N.T.S.2d 
869,  180  Misc.  305— Kittinger  v. 
Churchill  Evangelistic  Ass'n,  276 
N.T.S.  465,  153  Misc.  380,  affirmed 
281  N.T.S.  '680,.  244  App.Div.  876, 
reargument  denied  281  N.T.S.  409, 
245  App.Div.  805,  affirmed  281  N. 
T.-S.  6'Sl,  244  App.Div.  877— Siegel 
v.  State,  246  N.T.S.  652,  138  Misc. 
474— Gellens  v.  Saso,  44  N.T.S.2d 
84— Seward  v.  Jackson,  8  Cow. 
406. 
S.C.— Varser  v.  Smith,  197  S.E.  394, 

187  S.C.  32$. 
Vt — In   re   Prouty's   Estate,    163   A. 

•566,  ia5  Vt  66. 
"Judicial  error"  defined 

A  judicial  error  is  one  which  is 
not  merely  clerical,  but  affects  the 
substance  and  justice  of  the  judg- 
ment—Connecticut Mortgage  &  Title 
Guaranty  Co.  v.  Di  Francesco,  151 
A.  491,  492,  112  Conn.  673. 
judgment  following  findings  or  eon. 

elusions 

(i)  Where  Judgment  accords  with 
findings,  any  omission,  if  error,  can- 
not be  remedied  by  an  amendment 

453 


made  after  judgment  is  entered. — 
Van  Tiger  v.  Superior  Court  in  and 
for  Los  Angeles  County,  60  P.2d  851, 
7  Cal.2d  377. 

(2)  Motion    to    modify    judgment 
will  not  lie  where  judgment  followed 
court's  finding.  . 

Colo. — Schattinger  v.  -Schattinger, 
250  P.  851,  80  Colo.  261. 

Ind. — S.  J.  Peabody  'Lumber  Co.  v. 
Northam,  184  N.E.  794,  96  Ind.App. 
197— Tri  Lake  Const.  Co.  v.  North- 
am,  184  N.E.  792,  96  Ind.App.  183 
— Heppe  v.  Heppe,  152  N.B.  293,  85 
Ind. App.  39,  transferred,  see,  149 
N.B.  890,  199  Ind.  566— Southern 
Colonization  Co.  v.  Sanford,  149 
N.E.  '655,  83  Ind. App.  626— Hall  v. 
Bledsoe,  149  N.B.  448,  83  Ind.App. 
622. 

(3)  The   same  is   true   where   the 
judgment  is  in  accordance  with  the 
court's    conclusions    of    law. — Pitts- 
burgh, C.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mun- 
cie  &  Portland  Traction  Co.,  91  N.B. 
600,    174    Ind.    167— Old    First    Nat 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  Fort  Wayne  v. 
Snouffer,    192   N.B.    369,    99   Ind.App. 
325. 

(4)  Trial  court  properly  refused  to 
modify     judgment     which     followed 
finding  of  facts  and  conclusions   of 
law  laid  down  by  court  sitting  with- 
out   jury. — Griffith    State    Bank    v. 
Clark,    199    N.B.    447,    101    Ind.App. 
458. 

(5)  Where    error    in    computation 
appeared    in    judgment    findings    of 
fact  and  conclusions  of  law,  amend- 
ed   judgment    correcting    error    was 
not  supported  by  findings  or  conclu- 
sions.— Proctor  v.  Smith,  4  P.2d  773, 
214  Cal.  227. 

An  error  of  law  in  judgment  as 
originally  entered  cannot  be  correct- 
ed by  amending  Judgment  where  en-* 
try  made  was  the  one  intended  to 
be  made  and  was  free  from  mistake 
other  than  error  of  law. — Amory  v. 
Kelley,  S'4  N.B.2d  507,  309  Mass.  162. 

Resettlement 

(1)  Resettlement  is  a  procedure  of 
correction  or  clarification  and  not  a 
procedure  to  change  or  amplify  the 
direction  of  the  court,  and  is  un- 
available in  a  situation  where  object 
sought  is  an  alteration  of  the  deci- 
sion actually  made. — In  re  Chisholm's 
Estate,  30  N.T.S.2d  «70,  177  Misc. 
123,  affirmed  35  N.T.S.2d  212,  264 
App.Div.  793,  appeal  denied  37  N.T.S. 
2d  442,  264  App.Div.  956,  affirmed  50 
N.E.2d  239,  290  N.T.  842— In  re  Bart- 


238 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


change  is  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  some  supposed 
equity  subsequently  called  to  the  court's  attention 
or  subsequently  arising,91  or  newly  ascertained  pro- 
visions of  law.92  A  new  adjudication  on  an  issue 
not  previously  disposed  of  cannot  be  made  in  the 
guise  of  an  amendment  of  a  judgment.93 

A  court  cannot  correct  a  judicial  error  under  the 
guise  of  correcting  or  rectifying  a  clerical  one;94, 
but  it  has  full  power  to  determine  whether  an  al- 
leged error  is  clerical  or  judicial  in  character.95  It 
has  been  said  to  be  difficult,  often,  to  draw  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  two  types  of  error,96  but  that 
the  distinction  is  not  dependent  on  the  source  of  the 
error.97  The  court  has  been  held  not  precluded 
from  determining  whether  an  error  is  judicial  or 
clerical  by  the  fact  that  the  judgment  follows  the 
findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law;9*  but  it 


has  also  been  held  that,  where  the  judgment  accords 
with  the  findings,  any  omission,  if  error,  is  a  judi- 
cial, rather  than  a  clerical,  error.99 

Exceptions  to  rule.  The  rule  against  rectification 
of  judicial  error  after  the  term  has  been  said  to 
obtain  except  in  exceptional  circumstances.1  Thus, 
according  to  some  decisions,  when  it  clearly  appears 
what  judgment  should  have  been  rendered  as  of 
course  on  the  facts  in  the  record,  the  court  will  as- 
sume to  treat  the  failure  to  render  such  judgment 
as  a  mere  clerical  misprision,  and  will  amend  the 
judgment  so  as  to  make  it  conform  to  that  which 
should  have  been  rendered  on  the  facts.2  Likewise, 
directions  for  carrying  a  judgment  into  effect,  which 
do  not  change  or  modify  the  judgment  with  respect 
to  matters  put  in  issue  and  determined  by  the  judg- 
ment, may  be  inserted  or  modified  by  amendment.3 


lett's  Will,  299  N.Y.S.  3*6,  184  Misc. 
524. 

(2)  When  properly  performed,  the 
act  of  resettlement  of  a  decree  is 
merely  the  exercise  of  the  court's  in- 
herent authority  to  alter  its  formal 
pronouncements  in  cases  in  which 
the  initial  instrument  of  adjudication 
is  shown  to  have  been  the  result  of 
mistake  or  inadvertence. — In  re  Bart- 
lett's  Will,  supra. 

(8)  Where  decree  as  originally  en- 
tered correctly  reflected  the  decision 
of  the  court,  there  was  no  authority 
for  its  resettlement — In  re  Put- 
nam's Will,  17  N.T.S.2d  238,  173  Misc. 
151. 

(4)  In  order  to  obtain  an  altera- 
tion of  a  decision  actually  made, 
there  must  be  an  actual  vacatur  of 
the  order  or  decree  in  Question,  and 
not  merely  a  resettlement  of  such 
order  or  decree. — In  re  Chisholm's 
Estate,  supra, 

91*  N.T. — Application  of  Bond,  36  N. 
T.S.2d  147,  264  App.Div.  484,  mo- 
tion denied  In  re  Bond,  49  N.E.2d 
1006,  290  N.7.  739,  affirmed  50  N. 
B.2d  299,  290  N.T.  901— West  158th 
Street  Garage  Corporation  v.  State, 
10  N.Y.S.2d  990,  25'6  App.Div.  401, 
reargument  denied  12  NVJr.S.2d  759, 
2*57  App.Div.  8T5 — (Feinberg  v. 
Feinberg,  41  N.T.S.2d  869,  180 
Misc.  305. 

34  C.J.  p  282  note  90  CcL 

92.  N.Y.— West  158th  Street  Garage 
•Corporation  v.    State,    10   N.T.S.2d 
'9*90,  256  App.Div.  401,  reargument 
denied  12  N.Y&2&  759,   257  App. 
3>iv.  875. 

93.  Cal. — Lef  tridge  v.  City  of  Sacra- 
mento, 119  P.2d  390,  48  Cal.App.2d 
589. 

Mont. — State  ex  rel.  Vaughn  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Dlst  j 
in  and  for  Madison  County,  111  P.  j 
2d  810,  111  Mont  552.  j 


Adjudication  as  to  land  not  in  issue 
Wash. — Engstrom  v.  Edendale  Land 

Co.,  157  P.  683,  91  Wash.  241. 
19  C.J.  p  1212  note  61  [a]. 

Resettlement  of  a  decree  is  wholly 
unavailable  for  purpose  of  including 
a  ruling  on  a  matter  not  initially 
adjudicated.— In  re  Bartlett's  Will, 
299  N.T.S.  316,  164  Misc.  524. 

94.  Cal. — Carpenter  v.    Pacific   Mut 
Life  Ins.  Co.   of  California,   96  P. 
2d  796,  14  Cal.2d  704. 

Idaho. — -"Fall  River  Irr.  Co.  v.  Swend- 
sen,  241  P.  1021,  41  Idaho  68*6. 

95.  Cal. — In  re  Goldberg's  Estate,  76 
P.2d  508,  10  Cal.2d  709—Harman  v. 
Cabaniss,  276  P.  569,  207  Cal.  60. 

Final  determination  by  trial  court 

A  trial  Judge  who  has  made  a  de- 
cision in  which  error  appears  in 
record  has  full  power  in  the  first  in- 
stance to  determine  whether  error 
is  clerical  or  judicial,  and  his  con- 
clusion, in  the  absence  of  a  clear 
showing  to  the  contrary,  is  final. — 
Carpenter  v.  Pacific  Mut.  Life  Ins. 
Co.  of  California,  96  P.2d  796,  14  CaL 
2d  704. 

9*  Ky.— Wides  v.  Wides,  188  S.W. 
2d  471,  300  Ky.  344. 

97.  Ky. — Wides  v.  Wides,  supra. 

98.  Cal. — Harman    v.   Cabaniss,    276 
P.   569,    207  Cal.   60— Kohlstedt  v. 
Hauseur,   74  P.2d  314,  24  CaLApp. 
2d  60. 

The  signing  of  the  findings  does 
not  necessarily  establish  that  an  er- 
ror in  a  judgment  is  a  judicial  error. 
— Bastajian  v.  Brown,  120  P.2d  9,  19 
Cal.2d  209. 

99.  Cal. — Van     Tiger     y.     Superior 
Court    in    and    for    Los    Angeles 
County,  60  P.2d  851,  7  Cal.2d  377. 

1*  Conn.— Application  of  Title  & 
Guaranty  Co.  of  Bridgeport  to 
Change  Name  to  "Bankers'  Secur- 
ity Trust  Co.,  145  A.  151,  109  Conn. 
45. 

454 


2.  HI. — Dillenburg   v.    Hellgren,    25 
N.EL2d  890,  304  IlLApp.  51,  trans- 
ferred, see  21  N.E.2d  393,   371  111. 
452. 

N.Y.— West  158th  Street  Garage  Cor- 
poration v.  State,  10  N.Y.S.2d  990, 
25fl  App.Div.  401,  reargument  de- 
nied 12  N.Y.S.2d  759.  257  App.Div. 
575 — Board  of  Hudson  River  Reg- 
ulating Dist.  v.  De  Long,  536  N.Y. 
S.  245,  134  Misc.  775. 

34  C.J.  p  235  note  94. 

3.  CaL — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Gibson  v.  River  Farms  Co.  of  Cali- 
fornia,  121  P.2d  504,   508,   49   Cal. 
App.2d  278. 

HI.— Dillenburg  v.  Hellgren,  10  N.E. 
2d  44,  291  IlLApp.  448,  cause  re- 
manded 21  N.B.2d  393,  371  111.  452, 
transferred,  see,  25  N.E.2d  890,  304 
IlLApp.  51. 

Kan.— Cazzell  v.  Cazzell,  3  P.2d  479, 
133  Kan.  7£6. 

Tex. — Chambers  v.  Hodges,  3  Tex. 
617— Collins  v.  Davenport,  Civ. 
App.,  192  S.W.2d  291 — Flannery  v. 
Bblen,  Civ.App.,  106  S.W.2d  837,  er- 
ror dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  235  note  95. 

Extension,  of  time. 

(1)  The  court  has  power  to  make 
an  order  extending  the  time  within 
which,  by  the  terms  of  a  judgment 
for  specific  performance,  a  defendant 
is  required  to  pay  purchase  money 
and  accept  title  to  land. 

Cal. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gibson 
v.  River  Farms  Co.  of  California, 
121  P.2d  '504,  508,  49  Cal.App.2d 
278. 

N.Y.— Adams  v.  Ash,  46  Hun  105. 

(2)  Where    a    time    is    prescribed 
within   which  money  must   be   paid 
to  entitle  a  party  to  the  benefit  of  a 
judgment,  the  court  may,  even  after 
such  time  has  expired,  extend  it  by 
a   modification   of   the   judgment   in 
furtherance  of  justice. 

CaL — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in,  Gibson 
V.  River  Farms  Co.  of  California, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  242 


§  239.    Particular  Amendments  and  Correc- 
tions 

The  application  of  the  general  rules  governing 
the  amendment  or  correction  of  judgments,  consid- 
ered supra  §§  236-238,  to  particular  types  of  amend- 
ment or  correction  is  treated  infra  §§  240-249. 

Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 
§  240.    Supplying  Omissions  Generally 

Matter  which  Is  properly  part  of  a  Judgment,  and  was 
so  Intended,  but  was  negligently  or  inadvertently  omit- 
ted, may  be  supplied  by  amendment,  even  after  the 
term. 

If  anything  has  been  omitted  from  the  judgment 
which  is  necessarily  or  properly  a  part  of  it,  and 
which  was  intended  and  understood  to  be  a  part  of 
it,  but  failed  to  be  incorporated  in  it  through  the 
negligence  or  inadvertence  of  the  court  or  counsel, 


or  the  clerk,  the  omission  may  be  supplied  by  an 
amendment,  even  after  the  term.4  If  the  proposed 
addition  is  a  mere  afterthought,  and  formed  no  part 
of  the  judgment  as  originally  intended  and  pro- 
nounced, it  may  not  be  brought  in  by  way  of  amend- 
ment.5 

§  241.    Striking  Out  Improper  or  Errone- 
ous Entries 

Matter   Improperly  Included  In   a  Judgment  may  be 
stricken  out  by  amendment. 

The  power  of  amendment  may  be  employed  to 
strike  out  surplusage  or  other  matter  improperly 
included  in  a  judgment.6 


§  242. 


Recitals  in  General 


Incorrect  recitals  in  a  Judgment  may  be  corrected, 
omitted  recitals  supplied,  and  improper  recitals  stricken 
out,  by  amendment. 


121    P.2d    504,    508,    49    Cal.App.2d 
278. 

N.D.— Tyler  v.   Shea,  '61  N.W.  -468,  4 
N.D.    377,    50    Am.S.R.    660. 

4.    Ala. — Nabson     v.     McGowen,    54 

Ala,  167. 
Cal.— Olivera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d  564, 

19  Cal.2d  570,   140  A.L.R.  1328. 
Fla.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  walling 

v.   Carlton,    147    So.    236,    239,    109 

(Fla.  97. 
Kan. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Cazzell 

v.  Cazzell,  3  P.2d  479,  480,  133  Kan. 

76-6— Cubitt  v.  Cubitt,  86  P.  475,  74 

Kan.  353. 
Miss.— Huckaby  v.  Huckaby,  122  So. 

4*87,  154  Miss;  378. 
Neb.— -Crete  Mills  v.  Stevens,  235  N. 

W.  453,  120  Neb.  794. 
OkL— Mason    v.     Slonecker,    219    P. 

357,  92  OkL  227. 
S.IX— Gerhart    v.    Quirk,     209    N.W. 

•544,  50  S.D.  269. 
Tex.— »Luck  v.  Riggs  Optical  Co.,  Civ. 

App.,  149  S.W.2d  204— Corpus  'Juris 

quoted  in  Veal  v.  Jaggers,  Civ.App., 

13   «S.W.2d    745,    error   dismissed— 

O'Qulnn  v.  Harrison,  Civ.App.,  271 

S.W.  137. 
Wis. — Corpus    Juris    cited   in,    Olson 

v.    Elliott,    15    N.W.2d    37,    40,    245 

Wis.  279. 

34  C.J.  p  235  note  1. 
Amendments    as    to    carrying    judg- 
ment into  effect  see  supra  §  238. 
Particular    omissions    see    Infra    §§ 

242-249. 

Matter    supplied  "by   amendment 

(1)  Inadvertent  omission  of  claim 
from  computation. — Olson  v.  Elliott, 
15  N.W.2d   37,    245  Wis.   279. 

(2)  Failure  to  state,  in  'judgment 
for  plaintiff  in  full  amount  claimed, 
that  defendants'  counterclaims  were 
dismissed. — S.  J.  B.  Building  Corpo- 
ration y.  Matt  O.  M.  Construction  Co., 
192    N.E.    413,    265    N.Y.    282. 


235 


(3)  Other  matter  see  34  C.J. 
note  1  [a]. 

Resettlement  is  permissible  for  in- 
clusion in  Judicial  pronouncement  of 
some  provision  which  was  initially 
omitted  through  inadvertence.  —  In  re 
Chlsholm's  Estate,  30  N.Y.S.2d  870, 
177  Misc.  423,  affirmed  35  N.T.S.2d 
212,  264  App.Div.  793,  appeal  denied 
37  N.Y.S.2d  442,  264  AppJWv.  956, 
affirmed  50  N.E.2d  239,  290  N.Y. 
842. 
B.  Vt.—  In  re  Prouty's  Estate,  163  A}, 

566,  105  Vt  66. 
W.Va.  —  Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  First 

Nat.  Bank  of  Williamson  v.  Webb, 

158  S.E.  378,  379,  110  W.Va.  387. 
34  C.J.  p  236  note  2. 
Nunc  pro  tune  amendments  see  infra 

§  258. 
Bounds  of  encumbrance 

In  Judgment  record  establishing 
prescriptive  right  to  pile  materials 
on  easement  of  way,  omission  of 
finding  giving  definite  bounds  of  en- 
cumbrance cannot  be  cured  by 
amendment  of  record.  —  Noyes  v. 
Levine,  159  A.  117,  131  Me.  88. 
&  111.  —  Nokol  Co.  of  Illinois  v.  Cun- 

ningham, 231  IlLApp.  154. 
S.D.  —  Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Cannon 

v.  Merchen,  223  N.W.  824,  825,  54 

S.D.  592. 
34  C.J.  p  23-'6  note  3,  «p  243  note  59 

[I,]—  19  c.J.  p  1212  note  6'4   [b]. 
Striking   out   improper   recitals    see 

infra  §  242. 
Matters    properly    stricken    out    by 

(1)  A  finding  or  other  part  of  a 
judgment    foreign    to    any   pleading 
and    not    necessary    to    the    relief 
grantable  to  any  litigant—  Petersen 
v.  Dethlefs,  298  N.W.  155,  139  Neb. 
572. 

(2)  Improper  directions  to  probate 
court.  —  Anderson  v.  Anderson,  2'66  N. 
W.  841,  197  Minn.  252, 

455 


(3)  Improper  personal  judgment. — 
Perkins  v.  Ashxnore,  61  P.2d  888,  144 
Kan.  540. 

(4)  Statement  of  theory  on  which 
damages    were    awarded. — Brown    v. 
•Shyne,  206  N.Y.S.  310,  123  Misc.  $51. 

(5)  Void     portion     of     judgment 
which  court  was  unauthorized  to  de- 
cide.—Maloney  v.  Zipf,  237  P.  632,  41 
Idaho  30. 

C6)  Other  matters. — 'Goldstein  v. 
Schick,  261  N.T.S.  839,  237  App.Div. 
905,  motion  denied  185  N.E.  804,  261 
N.Y.  713,  affirmed  188  N,E.  126,  262 
N.Y.  696—34  C.J.  p  231  note  84  [c] 
(3),  p  23-6  note  3  [a]. 

Matters  not  properly  stricken  out  by 

—  ,,-  __  JB««J AH 4* 

(1)  Words  "with  prejudice"  In  di-- 
vorce  decree  are  improperly  stricken 
out,  ten  months  after  entry,  where 
change   in  judgment  was   not  made 
because  of  any  changed  findings,  but 
because  court  had  reached  a  differ- 
ent  conclusion  on  a  point  of  law. — 
Hawker  v.  Hawker,  118  P.2d  759,  112 
Mont.  546. 

(2)  Trial  court's   order,  emending 
judgment  for  defendant  in  action .  on 
fire  insurance  policy  by  striking  out 
words,  "solely  upon  the  ground  that 
an  appraisement  of  the  loss  was  not 
had  prior  to  the   commencement  of 
the  above  entitled  action,"  was  im- 
proper.— Jacobs    v.    Norwich    Union 
Fire  Ins.  Soc.,  40  P.2d  899,  4  CaLApp. 
2d  1. 

(3)  Other  matters. 

CaL— Ouzza  r.  Brinkerhoff,  "83  P.2d 

976,  29  Cal.App.2d  1.     ' 
Ind.— -First  State  Bank  of  (Frankfort 

v.  Spradling,  11  N.E.2d  T6,  104  Ind. 

App.  342. 
Kan. — Leach   v.    Roherson,    $3 

629,  142  Kan.  «87. 
19  C.J.  p  1212  note  60  [c],  £fl. 


242 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Incorrect  and  erroneous  recitals  in  a  judgment 
may  be  corrected,7  omitted  recitals  supplied,8  and 
improper  recitals  stricken  out,9  by  amendment ;  but 
a  judgment  will  not  be  amended  in  order  to  show 
facts.** 

§  243.    Conforming  Judgment  to  Ver- 
dict or  Findings 

A  judgment  may  be  amended  so  as  to  make  it  con- 
form to  the  verdict  or  findings. 

A  judgment  may  properly  be  amended  so  as  to 


make  it  conform  to  the  verdict,  findings,  or  decision 
where  by  mistake  or  inadvertence  it  has  been  en- 
tered in  terms  differing  therefrom,11  but  the  court 
is  limited  to  the  substitution  of  the  judgment  that 
should  have  been  given  on  the  findings,  and  cannot 
substitute  new  findings  and  judgment.12  Correc- 
tion of  a  judgment  will  not  be  granted  where  the 
findings  are  not  inconsistent  therewith.18 

It  has  been  held  that  a  motion  for  an  order  cor- 
recting a  judgment  so  as  to  conform  to  the  verdict, 
being  in  effect  a  request  to  construe  the  verdict, 
must  be  made  before  the  jury  are  discharged.14 


7.  Cal.— McKannay     v.     McKannay, 
230  P.  218,  68  €al.App.  709. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Flan- 
nery  v.  Eblen,  Civ.App.,  106  S.W.2d 
837,  error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  236  note  5. 

Recital  as  to  issuance  and  service 
of  process  see  infra  §  245. 

8.  Cal. — McKannay     v.     McKannay, 
230  P.  218,  68  CaLApj).  709. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Flan- 

nery  v.  Eblen,  Civ.App.,  106  S.W.2d 

837,  error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  237  note  6. 
Supplying:    omissions    generally    see 

supra  §  2-40. 

Resettlement  is  permissible  for  in- 
clusion in  judicial  pronouncement  of 
some  recital  which  was  initially 
omitted  through  inadvertence. — In  re 
Chisholm's  Estate,  30  N.T.S.2d  '870, 
177  Misc.  423,  affirmed  35  N.Y.S.2d 
212,  264  App.Div.  793,  appeal  denied 
37  N.Y.S.2d  442,  2«64  App.Div.  956,  af- 
firmed 50  N.E.2d  239,  290  N.Y.  842— 
In  re  Bartlett's  Will,  299  N.Y.S.  316, 
164  Misc.  524. 

9.  Tex. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
•Flannery   v.    Eblen,    Civ.App.,    106 
S.W.2d   837,   error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  237  note  7. 

Striking   out   improper   or   erroneous 

entries  see  supra  §  241. 
Erroneous   recital   of  •  dismissal   "on 
jfofr  merits" 

An  erroneous  recital  in  the  judg- 
ment that  it  was  dismissed  "on  the 
merits"  may  be  stricken  out  on  mo- 
tion.—Mink  v.  Keim,  41  N.Y.S.2d  769, 
266  App.Div.  184,  affirmed  52  N.R2d 
444,  291  N.Y.  300—33  C.J.  p  1215  note 
88—34  C.J.  p  236  note  5  [b]. 

la    Ind. — Carr    v.    Besse,    143    N.E. 

639,  52  Ind.App.  124. 
Facts  as  to  mortgage 

It  Is  not  function  of  judgment  to 
show  facts,  and  hence  motion  to 
modify  judgment  adjudging  deed 
sought  to  be  set  aside  a  mortgage, 
to  show  what  amount  of  money 
mortgage  secured,  and  what  debt 
was  secured,  was  properly  overruled. 
— Carr  v.  Besse,  supra. 

II.  .U.S. — Kenyon  v.  Chain  O'Mines, 

C.C.A.Colo.,  107  F.2d  160. 
Cal. — Benway   v.    Benway,    159   P.2d 


682,  69  Cal.App.2d  574— Button 
Dredge  Co.  v.  Goss,  247  P.  594, 
77  CaLApp.  727. 

Ga.— Brown  v.  Cole,  28  S.E.2d  76, 
196  Ga.  8'43— Jones  v.  Whitehead, 
146  S.E.  768,  167  Ga,  848. 

Hawaii. — City  and  County  of  Hon- 
olulu v.  Caetano,  30  Hawaii  1. 

Minn. — Berthiaume  v.  Erickson,  16 
N.W.2d  288,  218  Minn.  403— Plank- 
erton  v.  Continental  Casualty  Co., 
230  N.W.  464,  180  Minn.  168. 

Mont. — Morse  v.  Morse,  154  P.2d 
982— Hawker  v.  Hawker,  118  P.2d 
759,  112  Mont  546. 

N.Y.— Smith  v.  Moles,  223  N.Y.S. 
637,  130  Misc.  399. 

Ohio. — State  ex  rel.  Fulton  v.  Ach,  24 
N.E.2d  462,  62  Ohio  App.  439. 

Wash. — In  re  Christiansen's  Estate, 
132  P.2d  368,  16  Wash.2d  48 — 
City  of  Tacoma  v.  Nyman,  281 
P.  48'4,  154  Wash.  154— Pappas  v. 
Taylor,  244  P.  393,  138  Wash.  31. 

Wyo. — Marcante  v.  Hein,  67  P.2d  196, 
51  Wyo.  329. 

34  C.J.  p  237  note  8. 

Conformity  to  verdict  or  findings  see 
supra  §§  55-61. 

Amendment  at  following  terra 

Ky. — Koontz    v.    Butler,    38    S.W.2d 

204,  238  Ky.  406. 
Tex. — Batson    v.    Bentley,    Civ.App., 

297  S.W.  769. 

lament  at   subsequent   term 


(1)  Generally. 

Ga. — Jones  v.  Whitehead,  146  S.E. 
768,  167  Ga.  848— Merchants'  Gro- 
cery Co.  v.  Albany  Hardware  & 
Mill  Supply  Co.,  160  S.E.  658,  44 
GsuApp.  112. 

Tex. — Rush  v.  Klapproth,  Civ.App., 
81  S.W.2d  257. 

(2)  However,  a  judgment  for  dou- 
ble rent  in  dispossessory  proceeding 
despite   verdict   against   double  rent 
was  not  an  error  appearing  on  face 
of  record  or  an  error  to  which  ex- 
ception could  be. taken  in  a  motion 
for  new  trial,  and  hence  trial  court 
could  not  modify  judgment  at  a  sub- 
sequent term  in  absence  of  a  motion 
made   at    term    at   which   judgment 
was  rendered. — Frazier  v.  Beasley,  1 
S.E.2d  458,  59  Ga.App.  500,  transfer- 
red, see,  199  S.E.  194,  186  Ga.  861. 

456      . 


Amendment  after  issuance  of  exeou- 
tion 

Judgment  may  be  amended  to  con- 
form to  verdict  even  after  issuance 
of  execution. — Frank  E.  Wood  Co.  v. 
Colson,  158  S.E.  533,  43  Ga.App.  265. 
Amount 

Where  by  clerical  misprision  judg- 
ment was  entered  for  greater  sum 
than  that  named  in  verdict,  it  could 
be  corrected  by  motion  below. — 
Jones  v.  Dalton,  273  S.W.  449,  209 
Ky.  593. 

The  intention  of  the  jury  should 
govern  and  control  recitals  in  a 
judgment;  thus,  where  the  state- 
ments therein  do  not  conform  to 
what  the  panel  intended,  it  may  be 
amended. 
Ark. — Reader  R.  R.  v.  Sanders,  90  S. 

W.2d  762,  192  Ark.  28. 
Ky. — Wolff  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins.  Co., 

32  .S.W.2d    548,    236   Ky.    1. 
Okl.— Marker  v.  Gillam,   196   P.  126, 

80  Okl.  259. 
Snowing  of  error  by  court's  notes. 

Where  the  notes  required  to  be 
kept  by  court  of  its  proceedings 
show  that  a  duly  recorded  judgment 
does  not  reflect  the  true  procedure 
and  finding  of  the  court,  the  judg- 
ment may  be  corrected  on  motion  of 
an  aggrieved  party. — Ex  parte  Mes- 
sina, 128  S.W.2d  1082,  233  Mo.App. 
1234. 

Judgment  reciting  "dismissed  on 
the  merits"  will  be  corrected  to  «, 
judgment  "by  dismissal"  in  order  to 
conserve  possible  equity  right  of 
plaintiff  where  the  court  intimated 
that  plaintiff,  although  not  entitled 
to  recover  at  law,  might  have  pos- 
sible equitable  rights.— Hertenberger 
v.  Smith,  280  N.Y.S.  926,  24'5  App. 
Div.  785. 
12.  Oal. — Jones  v.  Clover,  74  P.2d 

'517.  24  Cal.App.2d  210. 
13-    Ind.— Wise   v.   Layman,  •  WO   N. 

E.     368,     197     Ind.     393— Brier    v. 

Childers,    148    N.E.    474,    196    Ind. 

520. 
Utah. — Frost    v.    District    Court    of 

First  Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for  Box 

Elder  County,  85  P.2d  60X  96  Utah 

115. 
14.    Cal.— Murray  v.   Babb,    86   P,2d 

146,  30  CaLApp.2d  301. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  2M 


§  244.    Parties 

Errors  of  omission.  Inclusion,  or  description  of  par- 
ties In  a  Judgment  may  generally  be  corrected  by  amend- 
ment, provided  new  parties,  not  previously  before  the 
court,  are  not  brought  in,  and  the  judgment  Is  not 
changed  in  substance. 

Where  a  judgment  entry  fails  to  correspond  with 
the  record  in  consequence  of  a  clerical  error,  or  in- 
advertence, which  makes  it  include  more  or  fewer 
parties  than  it  should,  it  may  be  amended  by  strik- 
ing out  the  names  of  those  erroneously  added,15  or 
inserting  the  names  of  those  improperly  omitted.16 
A  judgment  may  be  corrected,  with  respect  to  the 
parties,  so  as  to  conform  to  the  verdict17  It  may 


even  be  permissible,  where  necessary-  to  carry  out 
the  purpose  of  the  judgment,  to  substitute  one  party 
for  another  as  plaintiff  or  defendant,18  or  to  cor- 
rect the  entry  of  judgment,  through  inadvertence, 
for  the  wrong  party.19  The  power  of  amendment, 
however,  cannot  be  employed  to  bring  within  the 
judgment  new  parties,  v/ho  were  not  previously  be- 
fore the  court,20  or  for  the  purpose,  or  with  the  ef- 
fect, of  changing  the  substance  and  effect  of  the 
judgment  as  to  the  parties  who  were  before  the 
court.21 

A   misnomer  or  misdescnption  ot  a  party  or 
wrong  spelling  of  his  name  in  the  judgment  may 


Reason  fox  role 

Any  objections  to  form  of  verdict 
must  be  made  before  Jury  are  dis- 
charged, and  change,  if  any,  in  ver- 
dict must  be  made,  not  by  the  court, 
but  by  the  jury  acting  under  proper 
instructions. — Murray  v.  Babb,  86  P. 
2d  146,  80  Cal.App.2d  801. 

15.  Fla. — Robinson    v.    Farmers'    & 
Merchants'    Bank    of    Tullahoma, 
Tenn.,   117   So.   398,  95  Fla.  940. 

Ga,— Miller  v.  Jackson,  175  S.E.  409, 
49  Ga.App.  809— Merchants'  Gro- 
cery Co.  v.  Albany  Hardware  & 
Mill  Supply  Co.,  160  S.E.  658,  44 
Ga.App.  112. 
La.— Fradelia  v.  Pumilia,  174  So.  850, 

187  La.  263. 

Pa. — Merchants  Banking  Trust  Co.  v. 
Klimosky,    9    Pa.Dist.    &   Co.    143, 
23  Sch.Leg.Rec.  78. 
Tex. — Rush   v.   Klapproth,    Civ.App., 
81  S.W.2d  257— Batson  v.  Bentley, 
Crv.App.,  297  S.W.  769. 
34  C.J.  p  238  note  14. 
Parties  to  judgment: 
Generally  see  supra  $9  27-38. 
Designation  of  see  supra  8  75. 
Nominal  party 

A  wife,  who  Is  made  a  nominal 
party  in  a  suit  against  her  husband, 
has  a  right  to  have  the  judgment  is- 
sued in  the  action  amended  by  de- 
leting her  name. — Rawlings  v.  Lew- 
ert,  9  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  701,  28  Lack. 
Jur.  15,  75  Pittsb.Leg.J.  111. 

16.  S.C. — Boykin  v.  Capehart,  31  S. 
E.2d  506,  203  S.C.  276. 

Tex. — Brite  v.  Atascosa  County,  Civ. 

App.,  247  S.W.  878. 
34  C-J.  p  238  note  1*5. 

Agent's  name  may  be  inserted  in 
judgment  by  amendment  where  the 
verdict  was  against  both  him  and 
his  principal. — Power  v.  Crown  Stage 
Co.,  256  P.  457,  82  CaLApp.  660. 
Judgment  against  defendant  "et  aL" 

(1)  Trial  court  was  ( authorized  to 
amend  original  judgment  against  one 
of  three  defendants  "et  als."  by  ren- 
dering second  judgment  naming  all 
defendants  in  action,  so  that  execu- 
tion issued  thereon  would  be  valid. — 
Glen  Falls  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Manning, 
La.App.,  168  So.  787. 


(2)  However,  judgment  against  a 
named  defendant  "et  al.,"  based  on  a 
decision  directing  judgment  against 
"defendant,"  without  specifying 
which  defendant  was  intended,  can- 
not be  amended  so  as  to  name  spe- 
cifically each  of  defendants. — Marc 
v.  Pinkard.  230  N.T.S.  765,  133  Miss. 
83. 

Defendant  not  cast  in.  original  judg- 
ment 

Under  the  general  law,  a  defini- 
tive judgment  cannot  be  amended  by 
rule  to  condemn  a  party  defendant 
who  by  inadvertence  was  not  cast  in 
the  original  judgment. — Jefferson  v. 
Laure  N.  Truck  Line,  La.  App.,  181 
So.  821,  affirmed  Jefferson  v.  Lauri 
N.  Truck  Lines,  187  So.  44,  192  La. 
29— State  ex  reL  Sehrt  v.  Registrar 
of  Conveyances,  129  So.  197,  1'4  La. 
App.  30. 

17.  Cal. — Phipps  v.   Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Alameda  County,  89  P. 
2d  698,  32  Cal.App.2d  371. 

Ohio. — State  ex  rel.  Fulton  v.  Ach, 
24  N.E.2d  462,  62  Ohio  App.  439. 

Conforming  judgment  to  verdict  or 
findings  generally  see  supra  §  243. 

18.  Mich.— Kees  v..  Maxim.  58  N.W. 
473,  99  Mich.  493. 

34  C.J.  p  238  note  16. 
Partnership  or  members  thereof 

(1)  Where  a  partnership  was  sub- 
stituted for  corporate  plaintiff,  judg- 
ment was  required  to  be  amended  to 
run  in  favor  of  the  partnership  and 
individual  members  thereof. — Wil- 
liams Lumber  Co.  v.  Stewart  Gast 
&  Bro.,  La.App.f  21  So.2d  773. 

C2)  Judgment  in  favor  of  partner- 
ship was  properly  amended  by  sub- 
stituting individual  names  of  plain- 
tiffs as  recovering  judgment,  where 
original  amended  petition  showed 
dissolution  of  partnership  and  that 
plaintiffs  seeking  to  recover  were 
surviving  partner  and  widow  of  de- 
ceased partner,  individually  and  as 
independent  executrix  of  his  estate. 
— Bridges  v.  Wilder,  Tex.Oiv.App.,  72 
S.W.2d  644. 
Administrator  gubstttiited  for  payee 

of  note 
Pa.— Aiken,  to  Use  of  Mayberry,  v. 

457 


Mayberry,  193   A.   374,   128   Pa.Su- 
per.  15. 

19.  Pa.— Fitzpatrick  v.  Bates,  92  Pa. 
Super.  114. 

Correction  "before  or  after  term 
Pa. — Fitzpatrick  v.  Bates,  supra. 

20.  OkL— Hurley  v.  Childers,  243  P. 
218,  116  Okl.  8'4. 

Tex. — Florence   v.    S  wails,    Civ.  App., 
85  S.W.2d  257 — Turman  v.  Turman, 
Civ.App.,  71  S.W.2d  898,  error  dis-  ' 
missed. 

34  C.J.  p  238  note  17. 

21.  B.C.— U.  S.  ex  rel.  Rauch  v.  Da- 
vis,   8    P.2d    907,    56    App.D.C.    46, 
certiorari  denied  46  S.Ct  352,  270 
U.S.  £53,  70  L.Ed.  782. 

N.Y.— Piratensky  v.  Wallach,  295  N. 

Y.S.  581,   162   Misc.   749. 
34  C.J.  p  238  note  18. 
Judicial     and     substantial     changes 

generally  see  supra  §  238. 

Joint  or  several  right 

(1)  The  erroneous  entry  of  a  joint 
judgment  does  not  preclude  plaintiff 
from  applying  for  and  having  a  sev- 
eral judgment  against  defendants. — 
Leese  v.  Clark,  28  Cal.  26. 

(2)  Where  auditor's   findings   and 
judgment  thereon  were  for  plaintiffs 
severally,  and  execution  was  in  favor 
of   plaintiffs   jointly   and   severally, 
amendment  of  judgment  in  favor  of 
plaintiffs  jointly  and  severally  was 
unauthorized. — Kicklighter   v.    Burk- 
halter,  170  S.B.  75,  177  Ga.  187. 

(3)  Where  clerk  inadvertently  en- 
tered   a    several    judgment    against 
each  defendant  when  in  fact  verdict 
correctly  construed  was  a  joint  and 
several   judgment   and   should   have 
been   entered   against   both   defend- 
ants, nunc  pro  tune  order  correcting 
entry  of  judgment  was  not  an  order 
vacating  a  previous  judgment,   but 
was  merely  an  order  for  correction 
of  clerical   mistake  in  original  'en- 
try,  so  that  court  had  jurisdiction 
to   make  order,   although   judgment, 
had  become  final. — Phipps  v.  Superior 
Court  in  and  for  Alameda  County,  89 
P.2d  698,  32  CaLApp.2d  871.    > 


§  244 


JUDGMENTS 


aj.s. 


be  cured  by  amendment,22  as  may  an  error  in  the 
description  of  the  attorney.2^ 

Personal  or  representative  capacity.  A  judgment 
entered  against  a  party  in  a  representative  capac- 
ity, when  it  should  have  been  against  him  individ- 
ually, or  vice  versa,  or  a  personal  judgment  against 
an  executor  or  administrator  which  should  have 
been  against  the  goods  of  the  estate,  may  be  cured 
by  amendment  when  the  mistake  was  clerical,  but 
not  where  the  error  was  judicial.24 

Remission  against  one  or  more  defendants.  By 
consent,  the  court,  after  judgment  in  an  action  of 
trespass  to  try  title,  may  reform  the  judgment  and 
permit  plaintiff  to  dismiss  or  remit  the  judgment 
against  one  or  more  of  several  defendants.26 


§  245. 


Process  and  Appearance 


A  recital  in  a  judgment  as  to  the  Issuance  or  service 
of  process,  or  as  to  appearance,  may  be  'amended  to 
make  ft  conform  to  the  facts  or  to  make  It  more  explicit. 

An  erroneous  recital  in  a  judgment  with  respect 
to  the  issuance  or  service  of  process  may  be  amend- 


ed to  make  it  conform  to  the  actual  facts,  or  to 
make  it  more  explicit;26  and  recitals  as  to  appear- 
ance likewise  may  be  amended.27  A  fault,  howev- 
er, which  is  not  in  the  statements  or  recitals  of  the 
record,  but  in  the  writ  or  process  itself,  cannot  be 
amended,  being  a  jurisdictional  defect.28 

§  246.    Relief  Awarded  in  General 

A  judgment  may  be  amended  with  respect  to  the  re- 
lief granted  so  as  to  carry  out  the  court's  intention,  as 
by  correcting  clerical  or  formal  mistakes;  but  correcting 
judicial  errors  after  the  term,  or  granting  relief  other 
than  that  originally  intended,  may  not  be  accomplished 
by  amendment. 

With  respect  to  the  extent  and  character  of  the 
relief  granted,  if  the  judgment  entered  does  not 
correspond  with  that  actually  intended  and  pro- 
nounced by  the  court,  it  may  be  amended  to  carry 
out  the  court's  intention,29  by  correcting  any  cleri- 
cal mistake,30  by  supplying  matters  inadvertently 
omitted,31  by  striking  out  clauses  erroneously  in- 
serted,32 or  by  making  merely  formal  or  insub- 
stantial changes,38  such  as  are  necessary  to  make 
the  judgment  conform  to  the  pleadings,34  verdict,35 


22.  N.M.— Zintgraff    v.    Slsney,    249 
P.  108,  31  N.M.  564. 

N.Y. — Emmons  v.  Hirschberger,  55 
N.T.S.2d  257,  269  App.Biv.  789,  ap- 
peal denied  63  N.E.2d  712,  294  N. 
7.  978,  affirmed  65  N.E.2d  328,  295 
N.Y.  680. 

S.C. — Tunstall  v.  Lerner  Shops,  159 
S.E.  386,  160  S.C.  557. 

34  C.J.  p  239  note  20. 

23.  U.S. — Odell    v.    Reynolds,    Ohio, 
70  F.  6-56,  17  C.C.A.  317. 

24.  Ark.— -Crane  v.   Crane,    11    S.W. 
1,  51  Ark.  287. 

34  C.J.  p  238  note  22. 

25.  Tex. — Jones  v.  Andrews,  9  S.W. 
170,  72  Tex.  5. 

26.  Tex. — Gerlach  Mercantile  Co.  v. 
Hughes-Bozarth-Anderson  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  189  S.W.  784. 

34  C.J.  p  239  note  2*4. 

Amendment  as  to  recitals  in  general 
see  supra  §  242. 

Validity  and  regularity  of  judgment 
as  dependent  on  process  or  ap- 
pearance see  supra  §§  23-26. 

27.  Mass. — Tilden     v.     Johnson,     6 
Cush.  3-54. 

34  C.J.  p  239  note  25. 

28.  Tex.— Florence    v.    SwaUs,    Civ. 
App.,  85  S,W.2d  257. 

3'4  OJ.  p  240  note  26. 

Amendment  of  process  or  return 
see  the  C.J.S.  title  Process  §§  114- 
118,  also  50  C.J.  p  599  note  12-p 
612  note  2. 

Effect  on  judgment  generally  of  de- 
fective process  or  service  see  supra 
8  24. 

29.  Arjp. — Morgan     v.     Scott-Mayer 


Commission  Co.,  48  S.W.2d  838,  185 

Ark.  637. 
Cal. — Dutton  Dredge  Co.  v.  Goss,  247 

P.  594,  77  CaLApp.  727. 
Mont— St.    Onge  v.   Blakley,   245   P. 

532,  76  Mont.  1. 
34  C.J.  p  240  note  27. 

Judgment's    failure  to    speak   tne 
trutli  is   ground   for  modification. — 
City  of  Tacoma  v.  Nyman,  281  P.  484, 
154  Wash.  1'54. 
Release  of  lien  on  realty 

Where  court  never  intended  recov^ 
ery  .to  be  preferred  claim  against 
company  in  process  of  liquidation, 
judgment  could  be  amended  so  that 
it  would  not  be  a  lien  on  realty. — 
Davis  v.  Commonwealth  Trust  Co.,  7 
A.2d  3,  335  Pa.  387. 
Source  of  payment 

Judgment  ordered  paid  out  of 
funds  in  hands  of  highway  commis- 
sion may  be  amended  to  require  pay- 
ment out  of  funds  in  hands  of  its 
transferee. — Pigeon-Thomas  Iron  Co. 
v.  Drew  Bros.,  Ill  So.  182,  162  La. 
836. 

30.  111. — Berghoff  v.  Cummings,  22*5 
IlLApp.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  2"40  note  27. 
Clerical  and  formal  changes  gener- 
ally see  supra  5  287. 

31.  N.Y.— New     York     Ice    Co.     V. 
Northwestern  Ins.  Co.,  23  N.T.  357. 

34  C.J.  p  240  note  27. 
Supplying    omissions    generally    see 
supra  §  240. 

32.  Pa. — Altoona  Trust  Co.  v.  Fock- 
ler,   16-5  A.   740,  311  Pa.  426. 

34  C.J.  p  '2*40  note  27. 

33.  Ind.— Scheiring  v.  Baker,  177  N. 

458 


B.    866,    202    Ind.    678— Hinton    v. 

Bryant,  190  N.E.   554,   99  Ind.App. 

38 — Haas  v.  Wishmier's  Estate,  190 

N.E.  548,  99  Ind.App.  31. 
Judicial  and  substantial  changes  gen- 
erally see  supra  §  238. 
Itemising  property 

Where  court,  in  decree  interpreting 
original  judgment,  merely  sets  out 
particular  tteais  of  property  referred 
to  generally  in  original  judgment, 
there  was  no  material  alteration  or 
amendment  substantially  changing 
such  original  Judgment^Baptiste  v. 
Southall,  102  So.  420,  157  La.  333. 
Dismissing  without  prejudice 

Where  judgment  of  dismissal  was 
predicated  on  pendency  of  suit  before 
railroad  commission,  amendment, 
making  dismissal  without  prejudice 
to  bringing  of  another  suit,  was  not 
erroneous,  as  it  added  nothing  to 
original  judgment — Marine  Produc- 
tion Co.  v.  Shell  Oil  Co.,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  146  S.W.2d  1024. 

34.  Ga, — Robinson  v.  Vickers,  127  S. 
E.  849,  160  Ga.  362. 

N.C. — Federal  Land  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia v.  Davis,  1  S.E.2d  360,  215  N.C. 
100. 

34  C.J.  p  240  note  28. 

Conformity  to  pleadings  see  supra 
§§  47-54. 

35.  Ga. — Jones  v.  Whitehead,  146  S. 
E.    768,    167   Ga.    8-48— Robinson  v. 
Vickers,  127  S.E.  849,  160  Ga.  362. 

Ind. — Scheiring  v.  Baker,,  177  N.E. 
866,  202  Ind.  678 — Tom  v.  Tom, 
26  N.E.2d  410,  107  Ind.App.  599— 
Moore  v.  Moore,  129  N.B.  480,  74 
Ind.App.  626. 

34  C.J.  p  240  note  29. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


findings,86  conclusions  of  law,87  and  agreements  of 
the  parties.88 

Although  there  is  some  authority  to  the  con- 
trary,89 it  has  generally  been  held  that  there  is  no 
power  to  amend  by  correcting  a  judicial  mistake  or 
error  of  law,  at  least  after  the  term  at  which  the 
judgment  is  rendered.40  Also  a  court  may  not 
grant  relief  in  addition  to,41  or  in  lieu  of,42  that 
originally  contemplated  and  intended  to  be  given, 
or  change  the  rights  of  the  parties  as  fixed  by  the 
original  decision,48  or  adjudicate  a  matter  which 
might  have  been,  but  was  not,  considered  and  de- 
termined on  the  trial.44 

Medium  of  payment.  An  amendment  in  the  pro- 
vision of  a  judgment  designating  the  medium  of 
payment  may  be  allowed  in  a  proper  case.45 

Conforming  judgment  to  verdict  and 

findings  generally  see  supra  §  243. 
Verdict  toy  implication. 

Jury's  failure  to  mention  employee 
in  verdict  against  employer  was  in 
law  equivalent  of  a  verdict  for  em- 
ployee, and  trial  court  should  have 
granted  motion  to  amend  judgment 
to  provide  that  complaint  be  dis- 
missed as  against  employee.— Thibo- 
deau  v.  Gerosa  Haulage  &  Warehouse 
Corporation,  300  N.Y.S.  686,  252  App. 
Div.  615,  affirmed  16  N.E.2d  9'8,  278 
N.T.  551. 


§  247 

§  247.    Amount  of  Recovery  and  AUo\v- 

ance  of  Interest 

A  Judgment  may  be  amended  in  order  to  correct 
clerical  mistakes  as  to  the  amount  OP  Interest  recoverable 
so  as  to  make  It  conform  to  the  record  and  the  court's 
intention;  but  judicial  errors  with  respect  to  such  mat- 
ters  may  not  be  corrected  by  amendment,  at  least  after 
the  term. 

An  amendment  of  a  judgment  is  proper  where 
the  clerk  in  entering  the  judgment  has  omitted  to 
insert  the  sum  recovered.46  If,  in  consequence  of  a 
clerical  error47  or  miscalculation  on  the  part  of  the 
clerk  or  the  court,48  the  amount  of  the  recovery  in 
a  judgment  is  stated  at  a  wrong  sum,  the  judgment 
may  be  amended  to  conform  to  the  truth.  Where, 
however,  the  amount  of  a  judgment  is  wrong  be- 
cause of  a  judicial  error  in  fixing  the  amount,  it 
cannot  be  amended  after  the  term,4*  although,  dur- 


36.  Ind. — Scheiring  v.  Baker,  177  N. 
B.  866,  202  Ind.  678— Tom  v.  Tom, 
26   N.B.2d   410,   107  Ind.App.   599— 
Moore  v.  Moore,  129  N.B.  480,  74 
Ind.  App.  626. 

34  OJ.  p  240.  note  29. 

37.  Mont— Monteath    v.    Monteath, 
4'4  P.2d  517,  99  Mont  444. 

38.  Pa,— Altoona  Trust  Co.  v.  Fock- 
ler,  165  A.  740,  311  Pa,  426. 

39.  N.Y.— Caruso     v.     Metropolitan 
5  to  50  Cent  Store,  212  N.Y.S.  109, 
214   App.Div.  328. 

Wash. — Bulkley  v.  Dunkin,  230  P. 
429,  131  Wash.  422,  affirmed  on  re- 
hearing 236  P.  301. 

40.  Tex.— Acosta    v.    Realty    Trust 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  Ill  S.W.2d  777. 

34  C.J.  p  240  note  31. 

Amendment  removing1  material* 
man's  lien  on  a  building:  was  held 
improper  as  being  a  correction  of 
Judicial  error. — Johnson  v.  Foreman, 
56  N.B.  2-54,  24  Ind.App.  93. 

41.  N.T.— Winter  v.  New  York  L 
Ins.  Co.,  23  N.Y.S.2d  759,  260  App. 
Div.   676,  appeal  denied  25  N.Y.S. 
2d  781,  261  App.Div.  816. 

34  C.J.  p  240  note  32. 
Adjudicating  new  issue 

Judgment  deciding  issue  of  title  to 
land  against  municipality  could  n<>t 
be  amended  so  as  to  adjudicate  va- 
lidity of  taxes  imposed  by  the  city 


after  the  entry  of  the  judgment— 
EGarway  Improvement  Co.  v.  Part- 
ridge, 222  N.Y.S.  176,  220  App.Div. 
595. 

42.  Ind.— Scheiring  v.  Baker,  177  N. 
B.  866,  202  Ind.  678— Haas  v.  Wish- 
mier's  Estate,  190  N.B.  548,  99  Ind. 
App.  31. 

K.Y.— Winter  v.  New  York  Life  Ins. 

Co.,   23  N.Y.S.2d  759,  260  App.Div. 

676,  appeal  denied  25  N.Y.S.2d  781, 

261  App.Div.  816! 
34  C.J.  p  240  note  32. 

"Amendments  to  judgments  can 
only  be  made  for  the  purpose  of 
making  the  record  conform  to  the 
truth,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of 
revising  and  changing  the  judg- 
ment"—Barkelew  v.  Barkelew,  Cal. 
App.,  166  P.2d  57,  59— Felton  Chemi- 
cal Co.  v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for 
Los  Angeles  County,  92  P.2d  684,  687, 

33  Cal.App.2d  622. 

43.  CaL — Jacobs   v.   Norwich   Union 
Fire  Ins.  Soc.,  40  P.2d  899,  4  Cal. 
App.2d  1. 

34  C.J.  p  240  note  34. 
Reason  for  rule 

Public  policy  requires  end  to  liti- 
gation and  that  Judgment  securing 
valuable  rights  should  not  lightly  be 
disturbed. — Palm  Beach  Estates  v. 
Croker,  152  So.  416.  Ill  Fla.  671. 
Award  of  possession 

Where  defendants  were  awarded 
certain  items  of  decedent's  person- 
alty, and  plaintiff  other  items,  refus- 
al to  amend  judgment,  by  expunging 
portion  purporting  to  award  defend- 
ants any  property  described  in  com- 
plaint, was  upheld. — Hinton  v.  Bry- 
ant, 190  N.E.  55*4,  99  Ind.App.  38. 
Award  to  one  not  party 

Where  vendor  was  not  party  to 
suit  in  which  court  awarded  propor- 
tionate share  of  rents  to  him  and 
during  pendency  of  which  purchaser 
bought  vendor's  interest,  mistake  ir 
award  to  vendor  instead  of 

459 


purchaser  was  held  not  to  authorize 
correction  of  judgment.  —  Bell  v.  Rog- 
ers, Tex.Civ.App.,  58  S.W.2d  878. 

44.  Wash.—-  Engstroxn    v.     Bdendale 
Land  Co.,  157  P.  683,  91  Wash.  241. 

34  C.J.  p  240  note  35. 

45.  N.Y.—  Miller   v.    Tyler,    58   N.Y. 
477. 

34  C.J.  p  240  note  30. 
Specifying   medium    of   payment   i» 
judgment  see  supra  §  79. 

46.  Ga.—  Bank  of  Tupelo  v.  Collier, 
15    S.B.2d   499,    192    Ga.    409. 

34  C.J.  p  2'40  note  36. 

47.  Iowa.  —  Muraan   v.   Schuldt,    265 
N.W.  369,  221  Iowa  242. 

Ky.~  Weil   v.   B.   E.   Buftaloe  &  Co., 
65  S.W.Sd  704,  251  Ky.  673. 

Tex.  —  Wedgeworth  v.  Pope,  Civ.App., 
12  S.W.2d  1045,  error  refused. 

Wyo.—  Riverton      Valley      Drainage 
Dist    v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Fre- 
mont County,  74  P.2d  871,  52  Wyo. 
336,  114  A.L..R.  1093. 
C.J.  p  241  note  37. 

48.  Tex.—  Birdsong    v.    Allen,    Civ. 
App.,  166  S.W.  1177. 

34  C.J.  p  241  note  37. 

Pact  that  evidence  fails  to  sup- 
port fnH  amount  of  judgment  is  a 
basis  for  new  trial  and  does  not  war- 
rant modification  of  judgment.  —  Boos 
v.  State,  39  N.B.  197,  11  Ind.App. 
257. 


49.    Ind.—  Pursley  v.  Wickle,  30 

HI'S,  '4  Ind.App.  382. 
Kan.—  Barker   v.    Mecartney,    B2    P. 


439,  10  Kan.App.  130. 

N.Y.— Minnesota  Laundry  Service  v. 
Mellon,  32  N.Y.S.2d  455,  263  App. 
Div.  889,  reargument  denied  33  N.Y. 
S.2d  826,  263  App.Div.  968,  reargu- 
ment denied  33  N.Y.S.2*  826,  263 
App.Div.  968,  affirmed  46  N.B.2d 
354,  289  N.Y.  749. 

Tex. — Arlington  v.  McDaniel,  25  S. 
W.2d  295,  119  Tex.  148. 

34  C.J.  P  241  note  «4S. 


§  247 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ing  the  term  such  errors  have  been  held  correcti- 
ble.50 

In  accordance  with  the  foregoing  rules,  an  amend- 
ment may  be  made,  particularly  where  plaintiff  re- 
mits the  excess,51  in  a  case  in  which  the  amount 
of  the  judgment  is  in  excess  of  that  claimed  by 
plaintiff  in  his  pleadings,52  or  is  in  excess  of  the 
sum  found  by  the  verdict,53  or  findings,54  or  or- 
dered by  the  court,55  or  is  larger  than  the  total 
which  limits  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,55  or  is 
excessive  in  consequence  of  the  failure  to  allow 
proper  credits.57 

A  rule  similar  to  that  followed  in  the  case  of 


excessive  judgments,  applies  where  through  inad- 
vertence or  mistake  the  judgment  is  entered  for 
too  small  an  amount,58  as  where  it  is  for  less  than 
appears  on  the  face  of  the  obligation  in  suit,5*  or 
less  than  the  amount  admitted  to  be  due  by  de- 
fendant's pleadings.60 

In  some  jurisdictions  the  statutes  contain  express 
provisions  governing  the  correction  of  the  amount 
awarded  in  a  judgment.61 

Allowance  of  interest.  A  clerical  error  in  the 
calculation  of  interest62  or  in  fixing  the  date  from 
or  to  which  interest  shall  run,63  or  the  inadvertent 


Amendments    after    term    generally 

see  supra  §  230. 

Amount  of  recovery  for  slander 
held  not  amendable. — Crowder  v. 
fitters,  1  S.E.2d  353,  215  N.C.  123. 

After  a  proceeding1  in  partition,  a 
valuation  of  the  estate  by  a  jury, 
confirmation  of  the  inquisition,  and 
awarding:  the  estate  to  one  of  the 
heirs,  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the 
'orphans'  court  to  make  any  subse- 
quent decree  or  order  by  which  the 
amount  of  the  liability  of  the  heir 
to  whom  the  estate  was  awarded  is 
either  increased  or  diminished. — Gal- 
braith  v.  Galbraith,  6  Watts,  Pa., 
112. 

50.  Iowa. — Flickinger      v.      Omaha 
Bridge   Terminal   R.  Co.,   67  N.W. 
372,  98  Iowa  358. 

Amendments   during  term  generally 
see  supra  §  229. 

51.  N.J.— Bozza  v.  Leonardis,  131  A. 
87,  3  N.J.Misc.  1186. 

34  C.J.  p  242  note  48! 

52.  N.J.— Bozza  v.  Leonardis,  131  A. 
87,  3  N.J.MISC.  1186. 

S.D. — Sinclair  Refining  Co.  v.  Larson, 

214  N.W.  842,  51  S.3X  443. 
34  C.J.  p  241  note  38. 

53.  CaL— Alpers  v.  Schaxnmel,  17  'P. 
708,  75  Cal.  590. 

34  GJ.  p  241  note  39. 

64.    Mont— Quigley  v.  Birdseye,   28 

P.  741,  11  Mont  439. 
34  CJ.  p  241  note  39. 

55.    Colo.— Kindel   v.   Beck  &  Paul! 

Lithographing   Co.,    85    P.    538,   19 

Colo.  310. 

34  C.J.  p  241  note  39. 
Liability  of  oodefendants 

(1)  Judgment  ordering  full  recov- 
ery against  each  of  a  number  of  de- 
fendants requires  reformation  to  pro- 
vide that  any  sum  paid  by  any  de- 
fendant shall  to  that  extent  satisfy 
Judgment  against  other  defendants. 
—First   Nat    Bank  v.    Slaton   Inde- 
pendent   School    Dist,    Tex.Clv.App., 
58  S.W.2d  870,  error  dismissed. 

(2)  Where  Judgment  was   entered 
against  both  owner  and  operator  of 
motor  vehicle  for  five  thousand  dol- 


lars and  twelve  thousand  five  hun- 
dred dollars,  respectively,  and  costs, 
it  should  be  modified  so  as  to  pre- 
vent collection  of  more  than  twelve 
thousand  five  hundred  dollars  and 
costs,  and  to  show  that  owner's  stat- 
utory liability  depended  on  nonpay- 
ment by  operator.— O'Neill  v.  Wil- 
liams, 15  P.2d  879,  127  CaLApp.  385. 

66.    N.Y.— Stinerville  &  B.  Stone  Co. 

v.  White.   54   N.T.S.  577,   25  Misc. 

31*4,  reversed  on  other  grounds  65 

N.T.S.  609,  32  Misc.  135. 
34  C.J.  p  241  note  40. 

57.    U.S. — Sabine    Hardwood   Ce.    v. 

West  Lumber  Co.,  D.C.Tex.,  238  F. 

611. 
34  C.J.  p  -241  note  *1. 

Where  court's  instructions  con- 
fused Jury  and  resulting  verdict  was 
too  large  because  of  Jury's  failure 
to  understand  charges  and  credits, 
Judgment  rendered  on  verdict  was 
properly  modified,  especially  where 
the  change  received  plaintiffs  ap- 
proval.— Mosher  v.  Sanford-Bvans 
Co.,  216  P.  811.  68  Mont  64. 
BTeoessity  of  pleading*  credit  item 

Fact  that  Judgment  includes  allow- 
ances for  work  done  by  plaintiff  for 
defendant  on  Sunday  is  not  ground 
for  modifying  it,  issue  of  right  to 
pay  for  Sunday  work  not  having 
been  raised  by  the  pleadings. — Mos- 
ing  v.  Bankers'  Oil  Co.,  212  P.  115, 
112  Kan.  575. 
Allowance  for  prior  recovery 

Where  bonds,  secured  by  trust 
deed,  had  already  been  basis  of  per- 
sonam  Judgment  obtained  by  bond- 
holder, subsequent  deficiency  Judg- 
ment, obtained  by  trustee  in  foreclo- 
sure suit,  for  entire  debt,  less  pro- 
ceeds of  foreclosure  sale,  was  exces- 
sive to  extent  of  first  recovery  and 
could  have  been  corrected. — Doerr  v. 
Schmitt,  81  N.B.-2d  971,  375  111.  470. 
Effect  of  code  provision 

Amendment  of  Judgment,  holding 
defendants  liable  for  rent  fer  bal- 
ance of  term,  after  abandonment  of 
premises  by  them,  is  not  necessary 
to  give  them  credit,  to  which  they 
are  entitled  for  rent  collected  by 

460 


plaintiff  for  such  period  from  new 
tenants,  as  under  the  code  such  cred- 
it may  be  urged  as  a  set-off  against 
the  Judgment  itself,  in  reduction  and 
partial  compensation  thereof. — Meri- 
wether  v.  Dorrity,  104  So.  187,  158 
La.  405. 

58.  Iowa. — Murnan  v.   Schuldt,   265 
N.W.  369,  221  Iowa  242. 

Ky. — Weil   v.   B.  B.   Bufflaloe  &  Co., 

65  S.W.2d  704,  251  Ky.  673. 
34  C.J.  p  3*1  note  42. 

59.  La. — Brumfleld  v.  Mortee,  15  La. 
116. 

34  C.J.  p  241  note  *3. 

6<X    Minn. — Brown     v.     Lawler,     31 

•Minn.  327. 
34  OJ.  p  241  note  44. 

£L    Iowa. — McConkey    v.    Lamb,    33 

N.W.  146,  71  Iowa  636. 

Court  has  both  inherent  and  stat- 
utory power  to  correct  evident  mis- 
takes in  awarding  amounts  in  Judg- 
ments, and  such  power  is  not  re- 
stricted by  provisions  of  statutes 
providing  for  vacation  or  modifica- 
tion of  Judgments  to  correct  errors 
in  amount  or  mistakes,  neglect,  or 
omissions  of  clerk  and  limiting  time 
within  which  motion  therefor  may 
be  made  to  one  year. — Murnan  v. 
Schuldt,  265  N.W.  369,  221  Iowa  242. 

62.  Ga. — Haygood  v.  B.  B.  Clark  Co., 
118  S.E.  461,  30  Ga.App.  392. 

84  C.J.  p  242  nete  50. 

Interest  in  Judgments  generally  see 

supra  §  77. 

Where  plaintiff's  attorney  incor- 
rectly computed  interest  to  which 
plaintiff  was  entitled,  plaintiff  was 
entitled  to  order  amending  and  cor- 
recting Judgment  by  inserting  there- 
in proper  amount  of  Interest — Spatz 
v.  Pulensky.  <48  N.Y.S.2d  314,  267 
App.Div.  1031. 

63.  Idaho. — Donahoe  v.  Herrick,  260 
P.  150,  <44  Idaho  560. 

Ky.— Keyser  v.  Hopkins,  34  S.W.2d 
968,  237  Ky.  105. 

La. — Gurney  Refrigerator  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 131  So.  853,  15  La.App.  319. 

N.T.— Board  of  Hudson  River  Regu- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  248 


omission  of  a  provision  for  interest,64  may  be  cor- 
rected by  an  amendment;  and  the  court  may  cor- 
rect its  judgment  so  as  to  show  the  rate  of  inter- 
est65 and  the  date  from  which  interest  is  to  run.66 
However,  judicial  error  in  passing  on  the  right  to 
interest,67  or  in  fixing  the  amount  of  interest  to 
be  recovered,68  or  in  failing  to  make  any  provi- 
sion for  interest  in  the  judgment,69  cannot  be  cor- 
rected by  amendment,  at  least  after  the  term. 

In  determining  whether  an  amendment  of  the 
award  of  interest  is  proper,  courts  will  consider 
whether  the  correction  will  conform  the  judgment 
to  the  verdict,70  and  to  the  findings.71 


§  248.    Costs  and  Allowances 

A  clerical  error  or  omission  as  to  the  costs  In  a  judg- 
ment may  be  corrected  by  amendment;  but  errors  of 
substance  In  the  allowance  of  costs  or  attorneys'  fees, 
may  not  be  amended  after  the  term. 

A  clerical  error72  or  omission73  with  respect  to 
the  costs  to  be  included  in  the  judgment  may  be 
corrected  by  amendment  It  is  not  permissible, 
however,  by  an  amendment  after  the  term,  to  add  to 
the  judgment  costs  which  were  not  originally  al- 
lowed or  within  the  purview  of  the  original  judg- 
ment,74 or  to  reconsider  or  review  the  allowance 


latin*  Dist.  v.  De  Long,  236  N.T.S. 

245,  134  Misc.  775. 
34  C.J.  p  242  note  50. 
64.  U.S. — Hartmann-Schneider  Co.  v. 

Farish  Co.,    C.C.A.Pa.,   7  F.2d  561. 
Cal. — Pacific   Coast   Adjustment  Bu- 
reau v.  Indemnity  Ins.  Co.  of  North 

America,   2  F.2d  218,  115  Cal.App. 

583. 
Mich. — Porter  v.   Michigan  Elevator 

Exchange,  271  N.W.  757,  279  Mich. 

276. 
N.Y.— Tedesco  v.  Genova,  235  N.Y.S. 

739,  134  Misc.  222. 
Interest  as  matter  of  course 

Where  judgment  as  entered  bears 
Interest  as  a  matter  of  course,  ad- 
dition of  a  provision  expressly  pro- 
viding for  interest  was  held  a  change 
in  form,  and  not  in  substance. — New 
River  Collieries  Co.  v.  U.  S..  D.C. 
N.J.,  300  F.  333. 

Amendment  after  term 

(1)  Where  judgment  has  been  ren- 
dered   for    principal,    interest    and 
costs,       without      specifying      any 
amounts,  but  they  are  determinable 
by    inspection    of   record,    including 
pleadings  and  verdict,  without  resort 
to  extraneous  proof,  judgment  may 
be  amended  at  a  subsequent  term  by 
inserting  the  several  amounts   thus 
shown  to  be  due. — Bank  of  Tupelo  v. 
Collier,   15   S.E.2d  499,  192   Ga.   409. 

(2)  Where  jury's  answers  showed 
that  verdict  did  not  include  interest, 
court   at   subsequent   term  may  in- 
crease judgment  by  including  inter- 
est— Beeler  v.  Continental  Casualty 
jCo.,  265  P.  57,  125  Kan.  441. 

(3)  Judgment  .may  be   corrected 
before  execution  to  provide  for  in- 
terest on  contract    demand,  regard- 
less   of   expiration   of  trial   term. — 
McLaughlin  v.  Brinckerholt  226  N.T. 
S.  623,  222  App.Div.  '458,  followed  in 
Joannes   Bros.  Co.  v.  Lambprn,   234 
N.Y.S.  817,  226  App.Div.  777. 

*6.    Tex. — Luck  v.  Riggs  Optical  Co., 
Civ.App.,  1'49  S.W.2d  204. 

66.  Tex.— Luck    v.     Riggs     Optical 
Co.,  supra. 

67.  N.Y. — Rambusch   v.    Burke,    223 
N.Y.S.    464,    221   App.Div.    777— In 


re  Brady's  Estate,  264  N.Y.S.  449, 
147  Misc.  613. 

68.  N.C.— Garrett  v.   Love,    90   N.C. 
368. 

34  C.J.  p  242  note  51. 

Allowance  for  insufficient  period. 

If  court  erred  in  failing  to  pro- 
vide for  interest  on  amount  recov- 
erable from  collector  of  internal  rev- 
enue from  date  of  judgment  to  date 
of  payment,  error  was  judicial  and 
not  subject  to  correction  after  ex- 
piration of  term  at  which  judgment 
was  rendered.— Reed  v.  Howbert  C. 
C. A. Colo.,  77  F.2d  227. 

69.  Conn. — Goldreyer  v.  Cronan,  65 
A.  594,  76  Conn.  113. 

34  C.J.  p  2'42  note  51. 
Bight  to  interest  debatable 

Denial  of  interest  from  date  of  or- 
der for  possession  in  condemnation 
proceeding  was  held  judicial  error, 
if  any,  and  not  subject  to  correction 
as  clerical  error,  where  matter  of 
defendants'  right  to  such  interest 
was  debatable. — Howland  v.  Superior 
Court  of  Los  Angeles  County,  16  P. 
2d  318,  127  CaLApp.  695. 

70.  Objection  to  verdict  necessary 

(1)  Where  no  objection  was  made 
to  verdict  which  did  not  allow  inter- 
est on  notes  sued  on,  court  was  pow- 
erless to  fix  amount  of  interest  to  be 
recovered  or  to  amend  judgment  ac- 
cordingly.— Meffert    v.    Lawson,    287 
S.W.  610,  315  Mo.  1091. 

(2)  Conformity  of  Interest  award 
to  verdict  and  findings  see  supra  S 
58. 

71.  Interest  not  recoverable  eo  no- 
mine but  as  damages  is  a  question 
for  jury,  and,  in  absence  of  finding 
awarding  such  interest,  judgment  in- 
cluding such  interest  should  be  re- 
formed so  as  to  exclude  it — Atkin- 
son v.   Jackson  Bros.,   Tex.Civ.App., 
259    S.W.    280,    modified    on    other 
grounds,  Com.App.,  270  S.W.  848. 

72.  Conn. — Albright   v,    MacDonald, 
183  A.  389,  121  Conn.  88. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gallo- 
way v.  Wesley,  73  P.2d  1073,  1079, 
146  Kan.  937. 

461 


Tex.— Weaver  v.   Humphrey,    114   S. 

W.2d  609,  error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  242  note  52. 
Costs,     allowances,     and     attorney's 

fees    in    judgments    generally   see 

supra  §  "78. 
Taxation  against  wrong  party 

Clerical  error  of  clerk  In  entering 
judgment  taxing  costs  against  plain- 
tiff in  error  instead  of  defendant  in 
error  could  be  corrected.— O'Neil  v. 
Norton,  Tex.Com.App.,  33  S.W.2d 
733. 
Stipulation  binding  on  parties 

Where  attorneys  for  plaintiff  and 
defendant  drew  and  signed  stipula- 
tion that  judgment  should  be  enter- 
ed for  plaintiff  for  one  hundred  dol- 
lars "without  costs"  and  judgment 
was  entered  by  clerk  for  one  hundred 
two  dollars,  including  two  dollars 
clerk  fees,  trial  court  on  defendant's 
motion  properly  reduced  the  judg- 
ment to  one  hundred  dollars. — Berth- 
iaume  v.  Erickson,  16  N.W.2d  288, 
218  Minn.  403. 

73.  Ga. — Bank  of  Tupelo  v.  Collier, 
15  S.B.2d  499,  192  Ga,  409. 

Kan. — Corpus  Jnria  quoted  in  Gallo- 
way v.  Wesley,  73  P.2d  1073,  1079, 
146  Kan.  937. 
N.Y. — Empire   Produce   Co.  v.  Ring, 

232    N.Y.S.    82,    225    App.Div.    6. 
34   C.J.   p   242   note   52,   p    243   note 

55   [c]. 
After  satisfaction  of  judgment 

Judgment  may  be  amended  to  al- 
low costs  to  defendant  notwithstand- 
ing the  judgment  has  been  satisfied. 
—Coffee  v.  Johnson,  24  N.Y.S.2d  588, 
Cost*  to  which  party  in  entitled  as 
of  course  may  be  added  by  amend- 
ment.— Coffee  v.  Johnson,  supra — 
34  C.J.  p  242  note  52  [b]. 

74.  Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in 
Galloway  v.  Wesley,  73  P.2d  1073, 
1079,  146  Kan.  937. 

34  OJ.  p  242  note  53. 

Remedy  for  omitting  costs  from 
judgment  is  by  appeal  or  motion  to 
vacate,  if  omission  is  substantial. — 
Empire  Produce  Co.  v  King,  232  N. 
Y.S.  82,  226  App.Div.  6. 


248 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


of  costs,76  or  to  shift  them  from  one  party  to  the 
other.™ 

Allowances  for  attorneys'  fees.  Error  with  re- 
spect to  the  allowance  of  attorneys'  fees  may  be 
presented  by  motion  to  modify  the  judgment.77 
Such  allowances  are  also  subject  to  the  rule  that 
the  correction  of  other  than  clerical  or  formal  er- 
rors, by  amendment,  is  limited  to  the  term  at  which 
the  judgment  is  rendered.78 


§  249.    Other  Errors  or  Defects 

The  general  rules  governing  the  amendment  of  judg- 
ments have  been  applied  to  various  particular  types  of 
amendments  or  corrections,  such  as  those  relating  to  the 
cure  of  ambiguity,  date  of  judgment,  signature,  and  de- 
scription of  property. 

In  addition  to  the  amendments  and  corrections 
discussed  supra  §§  240-248,  under  the  general  rules 
governing  the  amendment  and  correction  of  judg- 
ments particular  amendments  have  been  permitted 
or  have  been  held  proper,™  or  have  been  not  per- 
mitted or  have  been  held  improper.80 


of  substance 


A  provision  withholding:  or  award- 
ing1 costs  is  a  substantive  part  of  a 
Judgment  in  an  action  In  equity  and 
cannot  be  amended. — Schenectady 
Trust  Co.  v.  Emmons,  48  N.E.2d  497, 
290  N.Y.  225—34  C.J.  p  242  note  53 
Cb]  (1). 

75.  Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Galloway  v.  Wesley,  73  P.2d  1073, 
1079,  146  Kan.  937. 

Tex. — Wiggins  v.  Hensley,  Civ.App., 

114  S.W.2d  914,  error  dismissed. 
3*4  C.J.  p  243  note  54. 
Bemedy 

Effect  of  judgment  for  costs  in- 
curred by  successful  appellant  was 
not  avoidable  by  motion  to  modify 
judgment,  but  only  by  motion  for 
new  trial  and  appeal  from  order  de- 
nying- it — Reno  Electrical  Works  v.. 
Ward,  290  P.  1024,  63  Nev.  1,  re- 
hearing denied  296  P.  1112,  53  Nev.  1. 

76.  Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    la 
Galloway  v.  Wesley,  73  P.2d  1073, 
10-79,  1'46  Kan.  937. 

34  C.J.  p  243  note  54. 

77.  Ind. — Tom    v.    Tom,    26    N.R2d 
410,  107  IndApp.  599. 

Separability  of  fee  from  award 

Fact  that  judgment  has  been  ren- 
dered for  an  amount  including  attor- 
ney's fees,  which  were  not  recover- 
able, is  cause  for  striking  that  part 
of  judgment  covering  attorney's  fees, 
and  this  portion  can  be  stricken  only 
where  the  amount  thereof  is  separa- 
ble from  the  balance  of  the  judge- 
ment.— Love  v.  National  Liberty  Ins. 
Co.,  121  S.E.  648,  157  Ga.  259. 
7S.  Kan. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In 
Galloway  v.  Wesley,  73  P.2d  1073, 
.  1079,  146  Kan.  937. 
3"4  C.J.  p  243  note  5-5. 

'Scrivener's  error  in  deoree  in  fore- 
closure suit  was  properly  amended 
nearly  two  years  after -entry  to  show 
correct  amount  of  '  attorney's  fee. — 
Wilson  v.  Carroll,  250  P.  555,  80  Colo. 
234. 

79.  Defects  held  amendable  or  oor- 
xeotlbto 

<1)  Failure  to  enter  judgment  as 
directed  by  court. — Bwert  v.  Thomp- 
son, C.C.A.Okl.,  281  F.  449. 

(2)  Failure  of  judgment  against 
guardian  to  direct  that  levy  should. 


be  made  on  goods  of  ward  in  guard- 
ian's hands.— Haller  v.  Digman,  167 
S.B.  593,  113  W.Va.  240. 

(3)  Clerk's    mistake    in    recording 
decree  providing  for  sale  of  oil  and 
gas  leases  instead  of  land.— Reynolds 
v.    Winship,    299    S.W.    16,    175   Ark. 
352. 

(4)  Dismissal  on  merits  in  absence 
of  plaintiff's  counsel,  resulting  from 
a    misunderstanding  between   plain- 
tiff and  his  counsel  as  to  disposal  of 
case.— Massachusetts  Fire  &  Marine 
Ins.    Co.    v.    Schmick,    C.C.A.S.D.,    58 
F.2d  130. 

(5)  Failure  to  provide  for  return 
of  property  or  its  value  in  a  judg- 
ment of  nonsuit  in  claim  and  deliv- 
ery action. — Skaggs  v.  'Taylor,  247  P. 
218,  77  Cal.App.  519. 

(6)  Failure  to  include  an  order  for 
sale  of  attached  debt — Hudelson  v. 
Sanders-Swafford  Co.,  227  P.  310,  111 
Or.  600. 

(7)  Other  amendments. 

Cal.— Carter  v.  Shinsako,  108  P.2d  27, 

42  Cal.App.2d  9. 
Iowa. — Walters  v.  Knutsen,  272  N.W. 

420,  223  Iowa  225. 
Ky. — Williams    v.    Isaacs,    256    S.W. 

19,  201  Ky.  165. 
N.T. — Vogel  v.  Harriman  Nat.  Bank 

&  Trust  Co.  of  City  of  New  York, 

5   N.T.S.2d   306,   254   App.Div.   479. 
Tex. — Kittrell  v.  Conanico,  Civ.App., 

56  S.W.2d  272. 
34   C.J.    p    231    note    84    [c],    p    235 

note  99  [a]. 


SO. 


adments   held   improper   or 


not  permitted 

(1)  Order  striking  words  "on  the 
merits"    from    judgment    dismissing 
action  on  merits. — McElroy  v.  Board 
of  Education  of  City  of  Minneapolis, 
238  N.W.  681,  184  Minn.  357. 

(2)  Order    directing    receiver,    in- 
stead of  sheriff,  to  sell  property  and 
pay   costs   and   expenses  from  pro- 
ceeds, instead  of  rent  money. — State 
ex  reL  Maple  v.  Mulloy,  15  S.W.2d 
809,  322  Mo.  281. 

(3)  Refusal   of  judgment  against 
attachment  claimant  and  bondsmen 
for    value    of    property. — Pring    v. 
Pratt,    Tex.Civ.App.,    1    S.W^d    441, 
error  dismissed. 

(4)  To  correct  error  in  conclusions 

462 


of  law  and  judgment,  in  failing  to 
state  that  property  was  not  benefited 
by  improvement,  so  as  to  constitute 
res  judicata. — Wilson  v.  City  of  Fer- 
gus Falls,  232  N.W.  322,  181  Minn. 
329. 

(5)  To   correct  error  in  judgment 
vesting    title,    where    ownership    of 
land  was  adjudicated  in  trespass  to 
try  title  in  partition  suit.— Montgom- 
ery  v.    Huff,    Tex.Civ.App.,    11    S.W. 
2d  237,  error  refused. 

(6)  Other  amendments. 

CaL— Liuzza  v.  Brinkerhoff,  83  P.2d 
976,  29  Cal.App.2d  1— McConville 
v.  Superior  Court  within  and  for 
Los  Angeles  County,  248  P.  553, 
78  Cal.App.  203 — McKannay  v.  Mc- 
Kannay,  230  P.  218,  68  CaLApp. 
709. 

Colo.— Berkley  v.  Consolidated  Low- 
er Boulder  Reservoir  &  Ditch  Co., 
216  P.  5'48,  73  Colo.  483. 

Ga. — City  of  Cornelia  v.  Wells,  183 
S.B.  66,  181  Ga,  55'4. 

111.— Noel  State  Bank  v.  Blakely  Real 
Estate  Imp.  Corporation,  53  N.B.2d 
621,  321  IlLApp.  594. 

Kan. — Leach  v.  Roberson,  52  P.2d 
629,  142  Kan.  687. 

Ky.— Broderick  v.  Bourbon-Agricul- 
tural Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  58  S.W.2d' 
397,  248  Ky.  191. 

N.T. — Brocia  v.  F.  Romeo  &  Co.,  150 
N.B.  530,  241  N.T.  505— Hiser  v. 
Davis,  137  N.EL  596,  234  N.T.  300— 
Kittinger  v.  Churchill  Evangelistic 
Ass'n,  276  N.T.S.  465,  153  Misc. 
880,  affirmed  281  N.T.S.  680,  244 
App.Div.  876,  reargument  denied 
281  N.T.S.  409,  245  App.Div.  805, 
affirmed  281  N.T.S.  681,  244  App. 
Div.  877. 

Or.— Hicks  v.  Hill  Aeronautical 
School,  286  P.  553,  132  Or.  545. 

Tex.— Arrington  v.  McDaniel,  25  S. 
W.2d  295,  119  Tex.  148— Miller  v. 
Texas  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  123 
S.W.2d  756,  error  refused. 

Utah.— Frost  v.  District  Court  of 
First  Judicial  District  in  and  for 
Box  Elder  County,  83  P.2d  737,  96 
Utah  106,  rehearing  denied  85  P.2d 
601,  96  Utah  115. 

34  OJ.  p  235  note  99  [b]. 

Dismissal  without  prejudice 

(1)  Under     some     statutes     trial 

court  was  without  power  to  amend 

judgment  of  dismissal  by  inserting 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  249 


Curing  ambiguity.  Independently  of  statute,81  a 
judgment  may  be  amended  so  as  to  cure  it  of  am- 
biguity or  remove  the  possibility  of  confusion.82 

Date  of  judgment.  An  error  in  the  date  of  ren- 
dition of  a  judgment  is  amendable,83  even  at  a 
subsequent  term,84  so  as  to  make  it  express  the 
true  date.  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  the 
date  on  which  the  judgment  is  entered  is  not  a 
part  of  the  judgment,  and  that  it  is  a  fact  which 
the  court  cannot  correct.85 

Signature.  The  required  signature  of  the  judge 
or  clerk  may  be  supplied  by  amendment;86  and 


the  defect  of  an  intervening  space  between  the  end 
of  the  judgment  and  the  judge's  signature  may  be 
corrected  at  any  time.87 

Description  of  property.  Where  a  description  of 
the  land  or  other  property  involved  is  omitted  from 
a  judgment,  or  where  such  description  is  erroneous 
or  uncertain,  it  may  be  inserted  or  corrected  by 
amendment.88 

Conforming  judgtnent  to  pleadings.  A  judgment 
may  be  reformed  or  amended  so  as  to  conform  to 
the  pleadings.89 


words  "without  prejudice,"  without 
showing  that  its  original  intention 
was  to  dismiss  without  prejudice. — 
Testa  v.  Armour  &  Co.,  8  N.Y.S.2d 
302,  255  App.Div.  998— Cabang  v. 
U.  S.  Shipping  Board  Merchant  Fleet 
Corporation.  237  N.Y.S.  105,  227  App. 
Div.  751. 

(2)  Refusal  to  amend  judgment  of 
dismissal  by  making  dismissal  with- 
.  out  prejudice,  as  for  failure  of  proof, 
was  justified,  under  some  statutes. — 
Ziegler  v.  International  Ry.  Co.,  248 
7ST.T.S.  375,  232  App.Div.  43— Commer- 
cial Motors  Mortg.  Corporation  v. 
Mack  International  Motor  Truck  Cor- 
poration, 209  N.T.S.  661,  213  App.Div. 
25. 

81.  Nev. — Lindsay  v.   Lindsay,    280 
P.   95,   52  Kev.   26,   67  A.L.R.   824. 

82.  Cal. — Dahlberg  v.  Dahlberg,  268 
P.  695,  92  CaLApp.  639. 

La. — Qien  Falls  Indemnity  Co.  v. 
Manning,  App.,  168  So.  787. 

Tex. — Weaver  v.  Humphrey,  114  S.W. 
2d  609,  Civ.App.,  error  dismissed — 
Corpus  Juris  quoted  in,  Flannery 
v.  Eblen,  Civ.App.,  106  S.W.2d  837, 
error  dismissed — Shipman  v. 
Wright,  Civ.App.,  3  S.W.2d  519, 
error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  236  .note  4. 

Specifying  parties 

<1)  Where  it  appeared  that,  al- 
though judgment  was  entered  in  fa- 
vor of  one  defendant,  judgment  was 
erroneously  entered  against  "defend- 
ants" without  specifying  them,  judg- 
ment file  could  be  corrected. — Sachs 
v.  Feinn,  183  A.  384,  121  Conn.  77. 

(2)  Parties  generally  see  supra 
$  244. 

Double  recovery 

Judgment  for  plaintiffs  which  was 
ambiguous  and  could  be  construed  as 
permitting  double  recovery  was  re- 
quired to  be  amended  to  remove  am- 
biguity.— Coluccip  v.  State,  64  P.2d 
786,  189  Wash.  236. 

Ownership  of  property 

In  suit  for  damages  resulting  from 
conversion  of  furniture,  where  de- 


fendants were  shown  to  be  the  own-  j 
era  of  items  of  furniture  described 
in  their  answer  and  in  the  judgment, 
defendants  were  entitled  to  have  the 
judgment  amended  so  as  to  leave  no 
doubt  of  defendants'  ownership  of 
such  items. — Turner  v.  Charlton,  La. 
App.,  197  So.  187. 

83.  Or.— Fuller    v.    Blanc,    77    P.2d 
4'40,  160  Or.  50. 

Date  of  rendition,  shown  in  judgment 
Where  judgment  was  actually  ren- 
dered, as  recited  in  the  judgment  it- 
self, on  a  certain  date,  motion  for 
leave  to  amend  to  show  that  it  was 
actually  rendered  on  a  later  date,  so 
as  to  render  effective  appeal  bond 
filed  within  thirty  days  of  entry  of 
judgment  but  more  than  thirty  days 
from  date  of  rendition,  was  overrul- 
ed.— Sloan  v.  Richey,  Tex.Civ.App., 
T43  S.W.2d  119,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 

84.  Iowa. — Greazel  v.  Price,   112  N. 
W.  827,  135  Iowa  364. 

34  C.J.  p  237  note  9. 

85.  Ohio. — Friedman  v.   Brown,    172 
K.E.  565,  35  Ohio  App.  450. 

Delay  in  spreading  entry  on  journal 
Under  a  statute  authorizing  the 
court  to  modify  its  judgment  after 
the  term  for  mistake,  neglect,  or 
omission  of  the  clerk,  the  record 
will  not  be  corrected  to  show  the  en- 
try of  judgment  to  have  been  made 
on  the  date  the  journal  clerk  spread 
the  entry  on  the  journal,  rather  than 
the  earlier  date  on  which  it  was 
filed  with  the  clerk,  as  there  was  no 
mistake,  neglect,  or  omission  by 
the  clerk  in  not  spreading  the  entry 
on  the  journal  on  the  date  of  filing. 
— Morewood  Realty  Holding  Co.  v. 
Amazon  Rubber  Co.,  18  Ohio  App. 
201,  affirmed  Amazon  Rubber  Co.  v. 
Morewood  Realty  Holding  Co.,  142  N. 
E.  363,  109  Ohio  St.  291. 

86.  -Gfiu— Pollard    v.    King,    62    Ga. 
103. 

N.Y.— Seaman  v.  Drake,  1  Cal.  9. 
Signing  by  judge  or  clerk  generally 
see  supra  §  85. 

463 


87.  Ky. — Leming   v.    Farmers'   Nat 
Bank,  25  S.W.2d  1020,  233  Ky.  438. 

88.  Ala.— Parker   v.    Duke,    157    So. 
436,  229  Ala.  361. 

Cal. — Bradbury  Estate  Co.  v.  Carroll, 

276   P.   394,    98    CaLApp.    145— -Ho- 

gan  v.  Horsfall,  266  P.  1002,  91  Cal. 

App.  37,  followed  in  266  P.  1005,  91 

CaLApp.  797. 
Mont. — State  Bank  of  New  Salem  v. 

Schultze,  209  P.  599,  63  Mont.  410. 
Or.— Winslow  v.  Burge,  237  P.  979, 

115  Or.  375. 
S.D. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Gerhart 

v.  Quirk,  209  N.W.  54'4.  545,  50  S.D. 

269. 
3«4  C.J.  p  237  note  10. 

Conformity  to  description  in  plead- 
ing- 
Court  has  authority  at  any  time  to 
correct  misdescriptlon  of  lands  con- 
tained in  judgment  where  pleadings 
and  proof  correctly  describe  land  in 
question;  but  erroneous  description 
of  land  which  was  in  accordance 
with  description  referred  to  in  com- 
plaint cannot  be  corrected  as  clerical 
error,  since  the  judgment  correctly 
expresses  the  decision  of  the  court 
— Oregon  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Kunneke,  245 
P.  539,  76  Mont  117—34  C.J.  p  237 
note  10  [b]. 

39.    Cal.— McFarland  v.  Cordiero,  278 

P.  889,  99  CaLApp.  352. 
Tex. — Davis    v.    Standard    Rice    Co., 

Civ.App.,  293  S.W.  593. 
Changes     with     respect     .to     relief 

awarded  see  supra  S  246. 
Conformity    to    pleadings    generally 

see  supra  §5  47-54. 

,  Judgment  in  ejectment  was  sub- 
ject to  amendment  to  conform  to  the 
declaration. — Renwick  v.  Noggle,  225 
N.W.  535,  247  Mich.  150. 

After  Judgment  in  foreclosure  suit 
and  sale  of  land  thereunder  and  con- 
firmation of  sale,  judgment  there- 
after should  be  modified  an  motion 
to  conform  to  pleadings  and.  proof,  if 
at  all,  in  such  respect  as  not  to  prej- 
udice uncontroverted  rights  of  par- 
ties.—First  State  Bank. of  Larned  v. 
Arnold,  234  P.  1003,  118  Kan,  389. 


250 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  250.    Procedure  and  Relief 

A  judgment  once  entered  must  be  corrected,  If  Irreg- 
ular or  erroneous,  by  some  proper  proceeding  for  that 
purpose. 

A  judgment  once  entered  must  be  corrected,  if  ir- 
regular or  erroneous,  by  some  proper  proceeding 
for  that  purpose;  it  cannot  be  merely  disregarded 
and  the  proper  judgment  entered  anew.90  A  judg- 
ment once  regularly  signed  or  entered  may  be  mod- 
ified or  altered  by  the  court  which  entered  it  only 
in  the  manner,  if  any,  prescribed  by  statute.91 

Substantial  or  judicial  errors,  as  discussed  supra 


§  238,  are  generally  to  be  corrected  by  a  motion  for 
a  new  trial  or  by  appeal  or  writ  of  error,  or  they 
may  be  amended  under  appropriate  statutory  proce- 
dure,92 or,  after  the  term,  by  independent  action  ;9S 
and  it  has  been  held  that  the  correction  cannot  be 
made  on  the  court's  own  motion.94 

Merely  formal  or  clerical  errors  in  the  judgment 
as  entered  are  to  be  corrected  by  amendment  in  the 
trial  court,  and  not  by  writ  of  error  or  appeal  from 
the  judgment;95  and  they  may  be  corrected  on 
motion  or  at  the  instance  of  the  parties.96  During 
the  term  at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  the 


90.  Wis.  —  Hottelet  v.  Von  Cotzhau- 
sen,  154  N.W.  701,  162  Wis.  12. 

34  C.J.  p  24S  note  57. 

Action  to  review  judgment  see  infra 
§§  314-319. 

Writ  of  error  coram  nobis  see  infra 
§§  311-313. 


(1)  A  judgment  stands  in  amount 
as  it  is  entered,  and  the  only  way 
in  which  it  may  be  modified  is  by  a 
direct  proceeding  for  that  purpose. 
—  Blakeslee's   Storage  Warehouse  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  17  N.E.2d  1,  369  111. 
480,  120  A.L.R.  715. 

(2)  Amendment  as   to  amount  of 
recovery  generally  see  supra  §  247. 
Final  judgment 

To  modify  an  original  Judgment 
that  has  become  final,  proceedings 
must  be  had  directed  to  that  end  un- 
der statute  or  in  some  direct  pro- 
ceeding to  correct  the  Judgment.  — 
Jackson  v.  Redding,  139  So.  317,  162 
Miss.  323. 

91.  Gal.  —  Eisenberg      v.       Superior 
Court  in  and  for  City  and  County 
of  San  Francisco,  226  P.  617,  193 
Cal.  575. 

Idaho.  —  Occidental    Life    Ins.   Co.   v. 

Niendorf,   44   P.2d   1099,   55   Idaho 

•521. 
Ky.—  Gardner  v.  Breedlove,  76  S.W.2d 

240,  256  Ky.  413. 
La.  —  Castelluccio  v.  Cloverland  Dairy 

Products  Co.,  115  So.  796,  165  La. 

606,  conformed  to  8  La.  App.  723. 
Ohio.—  Barman  v.  Feid,  27  Ohio  N.P., 

N.S.,  409. 
Wash.  —  Betz  v.  Tower  Sav.  Bank,  55 

P.2d  338,  185  Wash.  314. 

92.  Cal.—  Bastajian  v.  Brown,  120  P. 
2d   9,   19   Cal.2d   209—  McMahan  v. 
Baringer,  122  P.2d  63,  49  Cal.App. 
2d  431. 

Time  for  correction  or  motion 

(1)  Judicial  errors  cannot  be  cor- 
rected at  any  time,  but  must  be  cor- 
rected    seasonably,     in     accordance 
with    statutory   or    code    provisions 
for  the  correction  of  erroneous  judg- 
ments.— Wides  v.  Wides,  188  S.W.2d 
4-71,  300  Ky.  344. 

(2)  A  motion  calling,  not  for  cor- 
rection of  a  mere  clerical  error,  but 
for  modification  of  an  essential  judi-  j 


catory  part  of  a  judgment  must  be 
made  during  the  term  at  which  the 
Judgment  was  rendered. — Farmers'  & 
Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  of  Rensselaer 
v.  Elliott,  141  N.E.  652,  80  Ind.App. 
596. 

93.  Tex. — Love  v.  State  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  San  Antonio,  90  S.W. 
2d  819,  126  Tex.  591— Coleman  v. 
Zapp,  151  S.W.  10'40,  105  Tex.  491 
— Miller  v.  Texas  Life  Ins.  Co., 
Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d  756,  error  re- 
fused. 

94*  Minn. — Wilson  v.  City  of  Fergus 
Falls,  232  N.W.  322,  181  Minn.  329. 

N.Y.— In  re  Starbuck,  225  N.T.S. 
113,  221  App.Div.  702,  affirmed  In 
re  Starbuck's  Ex'x,  162  N.E.  522, 
248  N.Y.  5*55. 

95.  N.Y.— Goldstein    v.    Schick,    261 
N.Y.S.   839,   237  App.Div.   905,  mo- 
tion, denied   185  N.E.   804,   261  N. 
T.  713,  affirmed  188  N.E.  126,  262 
N.T.  696. 

34  C.J.  p  243  note  59. 

96.  Ariz.— Fay  v.  Harris,    164   P.2d 
860. 

CaL — Benway  v.  Benway,  159  P.2d 
682,  69  Cal.App.2d  574. 

Ky. — Weil  v.  B.  E.  Buffialoe  &  Co., 
65  S.W.2d  704,  251  Ky.  673— Strat- 
ton  &  Terstegge  Co.  v.  Begley,  61 
S.W.2d  287,  249  Ky.  632— Keyser  v. 
Hopkins,  34  S.W.2d  968,  237  Ky. 
105— Williams  v.  Isaacs,  256  S.W. 
19,  201  Ky.  165. 

N.T.— Goldstein  v.  Shicfc,  261  N.Y.S. 
839,  237  App.Div.  905,  motion  de- 
nted 185  N.E.  804,  261  N.Y.  713,  af* 
firmed  188  N.E.  126,  262  N.Y.  696— 
Brown  v.  Shyne,  206  N.Y.S,  310, 
123  Misc.  851. 

N.C. — Federal  Land  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia v.  Davis,  1  S.E.2d  350,  215  N.C. 
100. 

Okl.— Hurley  v.  Childers,  243  P.  218, 
116  Okl.  84— McAdams  v.  C.  D. 
Shamburger  Lumber  Co.,  240  P. 
124,  112  Okl.  173. 

Tex. — t<ove  v.  State  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  San  Antonio,  90  S.W.2d  819, 
126  Tex.  591 — Coleman  v.  Zapp,  151 
S.W.  10-40,  105  Tex.  491— Weaver 
v.  Humphrey,  Civ.  App.,  114  S.W. 
2d  609,  error  dismissed— Acosta  v.  j 

464 


Realty  Trust  Co.,  Civ.App.,  Ill  S. 

W.2d  777. 
34  C.J.  p  244  note  64. 

Defects  amounting-  only  to  irreg- 
ularities should  be  corrected  by  a 
motion  for  that  purpose. — Brantley 
v.  Greer,  71  Ga.  11 — City  of  Albany 
v.  Parks,  5  S.E.2d  680,  61  Ga.App. 
55. 

"Errors"  may  be  corrected  on  the 
application  of  a  party  in  interest- 
In  re  Cornine's  Guardianship,  N.J. 
Orph.,  199  A.  733. 

Improper    recital    of    dismissal    on 

merits 

A  judgment  improperly  reciting 
that  the  dismissal  is  on  the  merits 
may  be  corrected  by  motion. — Mink 
v.  Keim,  41  N.Y.S.2d  769,  266  App. 
Div.  184,  affirmed  52  N.E.2d  444,  291 
N.Y.  300. 

Motion  as  not  suggestion  of  error 

In  order  to  include  material  ele- 
ments left  out  through  error  or  over- 
sight, judgment  may  be  corrected  on 
motion;  and  such  motion  is  not  a 
suggestion  of  error. — Huckaby  v. 
Jenkins,  122  So.  '487,  154  Miss.  378. 

Securing1  costs 

Where  defendant  in  law  action  was 
entitled  to  recover  statutory  costs 
as  matter  of  course,  and  judgment 
was  entered  for  plaintiff  and  was 
satisfied,  proper  procedure  to  secure 
costs  for  defendant  was  by  motion  to 
amend  judgment  and  not  by  the  en- 
try of  second  judgment  for  costs. — 
Coffee  v.  Johnson,  24  N.Y.S.2d  588. 

ZH  Tnffi'M'Lft 

(1)  The  office  of  a  motion  to'  mod- 
ify judgment  is  to  make  the  judg- 
ment conform  to  the  verdict  or  find- 
ing.— Wise  v.  Layman,  150  N.E.  368, 
197  Ind.  393— Blagetz  v.  Blagetz,  37 
N.E.2d   318,   109   Ind.App.    662— First 
State  Bank  of  Frankfort  v.   Sprad-' 
ling,  11  N.E.2d  76,  10*4  Ind.App.  342 
— Hinton    v.    Bryant,    190    N.E.    554, 
99  Ind. App.  38 — Moore  v.  Moore,  135 
N.B.  3*2,  81  Ind. App.  169. 

(2)  Such  a  motion  cannot  be  usei 
for  any  other  purpose  than  to  raise  • 
questions  affecting  the  form  of  the 
judgment. — First     State     Bank     of 
Frankfort  v.  Spradling,  supra. 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  250 


correction  may  be  made  by  an  order  of  the  court  on 
a  mere  suggestion  of  the  error.97  Under  a  num- 
ber of  authorities,  the  court  may  act  of  its  own  mo- 
tion, without  application  by  a  party,98  although 
some  authorities  restrict  this  power  to  the  term" 
and  hold  that  after  the  term  the  amendment  can 


be  made  only  on  the  presentation  of  a  formal  pe- 
tition or  motion,1  entitled  and  filed  in  the  action  or 
proceeding  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered.2 

A  motion  in  the  cause,  as  distinguished  from  an 
independent  action,  is  generally  the  proper  remedy 
to  obtain  an  amendment  of  a  judgment,8  and  such 


*  (3)  Such  a  motion  may  be  used  to 
correct  some  matter  of  form  in  judg- 
ment, but  not  to  secure  the  substi- 
tution   of    a   different   one. — Blagetz 
v.  Blagetz,  supra— Hinton  v.  Bryant, 
supra. 

(4)  Such  a  motion  cannot  be  made 
to   perform    the    office   of   a  motion 
for  a  new  trial. — Blagetz  v.  Blagetz, 
supra — Hinton     v.    Bryant,    supra — 
Hatfield  v.  Ralston,  155  N.B.  221,  85 
Ind.App.   621. 

(5)  Remedy  against  an  erroneous 
or   improper  judgment  is   a  motion 
to  modify  the  judgment,  not  a  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial. — Smith  v.  Hill, 
165  N.E.  911,  200  Ind.  616— Edwards 
v.   Wiedejitoaupt,   32   N.E.2d   106,   109 
Ind.App.  450. 

(6)  Remedy  against  judgment  not 
within    issues,    and    which    did    not 
follow  findings,  was  held  to  be  a  mo- 
tion   to    modify    the    judgment    and 
not  a  motion  for  a  new  trial. — Fisher 
v.  Rosander,  151  N.E.  12,  84  Ind.  App. 
694—34  C.J.   p   243  note  59    [ej. 

97.  Mo.— Marsala    v.    Marsala,    282 
S.W.  1048,  288  Mo.  501. 

84  C-J.  p  243  note  60. 

98.  Ariz.— Fay   v.   Harris,    1$4   P.2el 
860— Swisshelm  Gold  Silver  Co.  v. 
Farwell,  124  P.2d  5*4,*  59  Ariz.  162. 

Gal.— In  re  Soboslay's  Estate,  47  P. 
2d  714,  4  Cal.2d  17.7— Benway  v. 
Benway,  159  P.2d  682,  69  CaLApp. 
2d  574— Kohlstedt  v.  Hauseur,  74 
P.2d  314,  24  Cal.App,2d  60— Hogan 
v.  Horsfall,  266  P.  1002,  91  Cal. 
App.  37,  followed  in  266  P.  1005, 

91  CaLApp.  797— McConville  v.  Su- 
perior  Court   within  and   for  Los 
Angeles  County,  248  P.  553,  78  Cal. 
App.  203. 

Kan.— Cubitt  v,  Cubitt,  86  P.  475,  74 

Kan.  353. 
Minn. — Wilson    v.    City    of    Fergus 

Falls,     232    N.W.    322,    181    Minn. 

329 — Plankerton      v.      Continental 

Casualty    Co.,    230    N.W.   '4S4,    180 

Minn.  168. 

Mont.— Morse  v.  Morse,  154  P.2d  982. 
Okl. — Mason  v.  Slonecker,  219  P.  357, 

92  Okl.  227. 

Tex, — Liove  v.  State  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  San  Antonio,  90  S.W.2d  819, 
126  Tex.  591— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 

•  Townes  v.  Lattiraore,  272  S.W.  435, 
437,     114     Tex.     511— Coleman    v. 
Zapp,   151  S.W.  1040,  105  Tex.  491 
— Weaver  v.  Humphrey,    Civ. App., 
114   S.W.2d   609,  error  dismissed— 

49C.J.S.— 30 


Acosta  v.   Realty  Trust  Co.,   Civ. 

App.,   Ill   S.W.2d  777. 
34  C.J.  p  244  note  61. 
Notice  see  infra  §  254. 
Correction  within  period  for  signing1 

District  judge  was  entitled  to 
correct  clerical  errors  in  judgment 
ex  proprio  motu  within  period  pro- 
vided by  statute  for  signing  .judg- 
ment. —  State  ex  rel.  Porterie  v. 
Walmsley,  162  So.  826,  183  La.  139, 
appeal  dismissed  Board  of  Liquida- 
tion v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Port  of 
New  Orleans,  56  S.Ct  141,  296  U.S. 
5!40,  80  L.Ed.  3S4,  rehearing  denied 
Board  of  Liquidation,  City  Debt  of 
New  Orleans  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Port  of  New  Orleans,  56  S.Ct  246, 
296  U.S.  663,  80  L.Ed.  473. 
Duty  of  court 

If  a  court  is  made  aware  that 
through  mistake  or  omission  its  rec- 
ords do  not  recite  its  judgment  as 
actually  rendered,  it  is  not  only  the 
right  but  the  duty  of  the  court, 
of  its  own  motion,  to  order  the  prop- 
er entry.  —  Coleman  v.  Zapp,  151  S.W. 
1040,  105  Tex.  491—  Magnolia  Petro- 
leum Co.  v.  Wheeler,  Tex.  Civ.  App., 
132  S.W.2d  456,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 

'•Errors"  may  -be  corrected  by  court 
on  its  own  motion.  —  In  re  Cornine's 
Guardianship,  N.J.Orph.,  199  A.  733. 
99.  Ark.  —  Stinson  v.  S  tin  son,  159  S. 

W.2d  446,  203  Ark.  888—  American 

Building    &    Loan    Association    v. 

Memphis  Furniture  Manufacturing 

Co.,  49  S.W.2d  377,  185  Ark.  762. 
Mo.—  Marsala  v.   Marsala,    232    S.W. 

1048,  288  Mo.  501. 
34  C.J.  p  244  note  61. 

1.  Mo.  —  Marsala  v.  Marsala,  supra. 
3'4  C.J.  p  244  note  62. 

2.  Md.—  Clark  v.  Digges,  5  GUI  109. 
34  C.J.  P  244  note  63. 

3.  Ky.  —  Gardner  v.  Breedlove,  76  S. 
W.2d  240,  256  Ky.  413—  Campbell  v. 
First  Nat.  Bank,  50  S.W.2d  17,  244 
Ky.  110. 

N.C.—  Federal  Land  Bank  of  Colum- 

bia v.  Davis,  1  S.E.2d  350,  215  N. 

C.  100  —  Murray  v.  Southerland,  34 

S.E.  270,  125  N.C.  175. 
34  C.J.  p  244  note  64. 
Action   to   review  judgment   see  in- 

fra §§  314-319. 

If  a  judgment  is  irregular,  remedy 
is  by  motion  in  the  case  made  with- 
in a  reasonable  time.  —  Nail  v.  Mc- 
ConneH,  190  S.E.  210,  211  N.C.  258. 


Remedy  after  statutory 
Where  invalidity  of  a  judgment  is 

465 


apparent  from  the  record  so  that  the 
court  rendering  it,  in  the  absence 
of  an  application  within  six  months 
after  its  rendition  for  relief  from 
mistake,  is  powerless  to  modify  the 
judgment,  the  sole  remedy  of  the 
aggrieved  party  is  by  a  new  action. 
— People  ex  rel.  Pollock  v.  Bogart, 
138  P.2d  360,  58  Cal.App.2d  831. 
Iffiotion  to  bring  forward  suit 

Usual  form  of  procedure  where  a 
correction  of  record  of  judgment  is 
sought  is  a  motion  to  bring  forward 
the  suit  and  to  correct  the  judg- 
ment entry  therein;  suit  by  plaintiff 
to  amend  record  of  judgment  against 
nonresident  motorist  and  another  for 
damages  growing  out  of  accident  or 
collision  could  be  treated  as  a  mo- 
tion to  bring  forward  the  law  action 
for  the  correction  of  the  judgment 
entry  therein. — Hubley  v.  Goodwin,  4 
A.2d  665,  90  N.H.  54. 
Salt  constituting1  collateral  attack 

(1)  Under  some  statutes  an  error 
of  form  of  a  judgment  in  replevin 
is  not  rectifiable  in  suit  constituting 
collateral  attack  on  such  judgment 
—Fore  v.  Chenault,  271  S.W.  704,  108 
Ark.  747. 

(2)  Collateral  attack  generally  see 
infra  §§  401-435. 

Separate  suit  a»  not  abridging  rights 
Fact  that  party  seeking  to  have 
alleged  error  in  judgment  corrected 
brought  separate  suit  instead  of  pro- 
ceeding by  motion  in  original  suit  as 
apparently  contemplated  by  statute, 
was  held  not  to  abridge  his  rights. 
—Bell  v.  Rogers,  Tex.Civ.App.,  58  S. 
W.2d  878. 

Trial  of  i»sne  on  claim  of  property 

Where  original  judgment  on  the 
merits  had  become  final  by  reason  of 
the  fact  that  no  appeal  had  been  tak- 
en therefrom,  such  judgment  was  not 
amendable  on  the  trial  of  claimant's 
issue  pursuant,  to  statutory  affidavit 
claiming  property  before  sale  under 
levy. — Spencer  v.  Harmon,  126  So. 
824,  156  Miss.  729. 
Xn  Illinois 

(1)  The  practice  and  procedure  un- 
der PractAct  5  89,  stating  the  man- 
ner in  which  all  errors  in  fact  com- 
mitted in  the  proceeding  of  any 
court  of  record  may  be  corrected,  are 
similar  in  most  respects  to  the  prac- 
tice under  the  writ  of  error  coram 
nobis;  the  rmotion  under  §  89  is 
treated  substantially  as  the  petition 
or  motion  for  the  common-law  writ, 
and  is  the  beginning  of  a  new  suit, 
and  the  sufficiency  of  the  motion 


§  250 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


notion  is  to  be  disposed  of  in  a  summary  manner 
without  formal  pleadings,4  although  formal  plead- 
ings and  process,  if  resorted  to,  may  and  should  be 
regarded  as  constituting  merely  a  written  motion 
and  notice.5  However,  in  some  jurisdictions,  the 
amendment  may  be  obtained  by  action,  the  same  as 
on  motion  in  the  original  cause,6  although,  of 
course,  an  action  cannot  take  the  place  of  an  appeal 
as  a  means  for  the  correction  of  erroneous  judg- 
ments.7 

Where  a  judgment  is  incomplete,  in  not  going  as 
far  as  the  pleadings  demand,  the  remedy  has  been 
held  to  be  by  motion  to  modify.8 

Error  in  entering  judgment  after  trial  for  more 
than  the  amount  demanded  has  been  held  correcti- 
ble  on  motion  or  by  appeal.9 

§  251.    Jurisdiction 

Jurisdiction  over  the  amendment  of  judgments  is 
discussed  generally  supra  §§  228-235,  and  the  ju- 
risdiction of  particular  courts  and  judges  supra  § 
235. 

Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 


§252. 


Time  for  Application 


An  application  to  amend  a  Judgment  must  be  made 
within  the  time  prescribed  by  statute  unless  it  invokes 
the  inherent  power  of  the  court  to  amend  its  Judgments. 
Laches  may  defeat  the  application. 

Any  statutory  limitation  of  the  time  within  which 
an  application  to  amend  or  correct  a  judgment  may 
be  made  must  be  observed  in  all  applications  mad.e 
under,  and  within  the  operation  of,  the  statute.*0 
It  has  been  held  that,  where  a  judgment  becomes 
final  at  the  end  of  a  specified  period,  an  application 
to  amend  or  correct  errors  must  be  filed  before  the 
lapse  of  that  time.11 

Where  an  application  for  the  amendment  of  a 
judgment  is  not  made  under  statute,  or  on  statutory 
grounds,  but  invokes  the  inherent  power  of  the 
court  to  amend  its  judgments,  the  statutory  limita- 
tion is  generally  deemed  not  applicable,12  and  the 
power  of  the  court  to  correct  or  amend  in  proper 
cases  is  not  lost  by  mere  lapse  of  time,  the  ex- 
piration of  the  term,  or  the  time  for  appeal.13 
However,  judicial  errors,  unlike  clerical  mistakes, 
may  not  be  corrected  at  any  time  and  the  appli- 


may  be  raised  by  demurrer,  or  an 
Issue  of  fact  may  be  raised  by  plea 
denying  the  truth  of  the  error  in 
fact  alleged. — Smyth  v.  Fargo,  138 
N.R  610,  307  111.  300. 

(2)  Writ  of  error  coram  nobls  see 
infra  5§  311-313. 

4.  Ind. — Morrow  v.  Greeting,  55  N. 
R  787,  23  Ind.App.  494. 

34  C.J.  p  244  note  65. 

Alleging   valid    cause    of   action    or 

defense 

Where  motion  to  modify  Judgment 
is  filed  during  term  at  which  it  is 
rendered,  movant  need  not  allege  or 
prove  a  valid  cause  of  action  or  de- 
fense.—Long  v.  Hill,  Okl.,  1-45  P.2d 
434 — Montague  v.  State  ex  rel.  Com- 
missioners of  Land  Office  of  Okla- 
homa, 89  P.2d  283,  184  Okl.  5'74. 

5.  Ind. — Jenkins    v.    Long,    23    Ind. 
460. 

34  C.J.  p  244  note  65. 

•6.    OkL— Grayson   v.    Stith,    72    P.2d 

820,  181  Okl.  131,  114  A.L.R.  276. 
34  C.J.  p  244  note  67. 

7.  N.T. — Libby    v.     Rosekrans,     5*5 
Barb.  202. 

Equitable   relief   against   judgments 
see  infra  §§  341-400. 

8.  Ind. — Walters  v.   Cantner,   60  N. 
B.2d  138. 

9.  Minn.— Becker  v..  Brecht,   231  N. 
W.  2.20,  180  Minn.  482. 

10.  CaL— Goatman  v.  Fuller,  216  P. 
35,  191  CaL  2*45— People  ex  rel.  Pol- 


lock  v.   Bogart, 

CaLApp.2d  831. 
Ky.— Wides    v.    Wides,    188    S.W.2d 

471,  300  Ky.  344. 
La,— Nichols  v.  Bell  &  Bachal,  2  La. 

App.  16, 
Pa.— Balch  v.  Shick,  24  A.2d  548,  147 

Pa.Super.    273 — Commonwealth    v. 

Wright,  O.  &  T.,  33  Del.Co.  254. 
34  C.J.  p  244  note  76,  p   245  note  77. 


138  P.2d  360,  58  I  include  statutory  damages,  however, 
need  not  be  filed  within  time  for  fil- 
ing suggestions  of  error. — Huckaby 
v.  Jenkins,  supra. 

11.  Tenn. — Harris     v.     Penn.     Nat. 
Hardware  Mutual,  7  Tenn.App.  330. 

12.  Colo.— Pleyte   v.    Pleyte,    24    P. 
679,  15  Colo.  44. 

34  C.J.  p  245  note  79. 


Particular  requirements  as  to  time 

(1)  Within  time  for  taking  appeal. 
—In    re    Simon's    Estate,    246    N.W. 
31,  187  Minn.  399. 

(2)  Within  thirty  days.— Pugh  v. 
Phelps,   19   P.2d  315,   37  N.M.   126. 

(3)  Within  one  year. 

N.Y.— Petition  of  Holman,  51  N.T.S. 

2d  246,  268  App.Div.  330. 
Wash. — Nevers   v.    Cochrane,   229   P. 

738,  131  Wash.  225. 
3-4  C.J.  p  244  note  76   [a],  [b]. 

(4)  Within     two    years.— Applica- 
tion of  Beaver  Bam  Ditch  Co.,  93  P. 
2d  934,  54  Wyo.  459. 

(5)  Within     three     years. — Wash- 
burn  v.  Culbertson,  75  P.2d  190,  181 
Okl.  476— Ritchie  v.  Keeney,  73  P.2d 
397,  181  Okl.  207. 

(6)  Within    four    years. — Huggins 
v.  Johnston,  Civ.App.,   3  S.W.2d  937, 
affirmed  35  S.*W.2d  688,  120  Tex  21. 

Time  for  suggestion  of  error 

(1)  Motion  to  correct  judgment,  in- 
volving  change   in   court's   decision, 
must  be  filed  within  time  for  filing 
suggestion     of     error. — Huckaby    v. 
Jenkins,  122  So.  487,  154  Miss.  378. 

(2)  Motion  to  correct  judgment  to  < 

466 


Statute  held  applicable 

(1)  Where  it  did  not  appear  satis- 
factorily  that  a  clerical   error  was 
made    and    all-important    witnesses, 
including   the   judge,    were    dead,    it 
was  held  that  failure  to  take  steps 
within  the  statutory  period  to  amend 
a  judgment  was  a  bar,  and  the  court 
had  no  inherent  power  to  amend. — 
Application    of    Beaver    Dam    Bitch 
Co.,  93  P.2d  934,  5'4  Wyo.  459. 

(2)  Where    the    error   was    in    no 
way    disclosed    in    the    record,    and 
there  was  no  clerical   error  and  no 
difference  between  the  judgment  and 
the  record,  it  was  held  that  the  stat- 
utory   limitation    applied    and    the 
court  did  not  have  inherent  power  to 
correct    or    amend    the    judgment — 
Goatman  v.  Fuller,  216  P.  35,  191  Cal. 
245. 

13.    Ga.— Brown   v.    Cole,    28    S.B.2d 

76,  196  Ga.  843. 
Kan. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Cazzell 

v.    Cazzell,    3  «P.2d    479,    480,    133 

Kan.  766. 
Mich. — Partch  v.  Baird,  199  N.W.  692, 

227  Mich.  660. 
34  C.J.  p  2*45  note  79. 
Jurisdiction   and   power   after   term 

generally  see  supra  $  230. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


254 


cation  must  be  made  seasonably,  in  accordance  with 
statutory  or  code  provisions.14 

Laches  or  undue  delay  in  making  application  for 
the  amendment  of  a  judgment  is  ground  for  denial 
of  the  application,15  particularly  where  rights  have 
vested  under  the  judgment  as  entered  which  would 
be  disturbed  by  its  alteration.16  Mere  delay  ex- 
plained and  excused  is  not  fatal  to  the  applica- 
tion;17 but  a  prima  facie  case  of  laches  and  delay 
must  be  excused  to  warrant  relief.18 

Although  an  application  to  amend  or  correct  a 
judgment  has  been  held  timely  if  filed  while  the 
execution  is  in  the  hands  of  the  sheriff,19  generally 
an  application  to  amend  a  judgment  is  too  late  after 
the  amount  of  it  has  been  paid,  especially  if  the 
amendment  would  make  a  party  liable  to  pay  it  a 
second  time.20 


§  253. 


Parties 


An  application  for  the  amendment  of  a  judgment 
must  be  made  by  one  entitled  to  such  relief;  and  all 
parties  whose  rights  or  Interests  may  be  affected  by  the 
amendment  should  be  made  parties  to  the  application. 

An  application  for  the  amendment  of  a  judgment 
must  be  made  by  one  entitled  to  such  relief.31    It 


has  variously  been  held  that  the  application  may 
be  made  by  either  litigant,22  by  the  party  for  or 
against  whom  judgment  has  been  given,23  by  any- 
one injuriously  affected,24  by  a  defendant,  to  de- 
termine rights  as  between  him  and  a  codefendant,25 
and  by  persons  not  parties  whose  vested  rights 
would  be  affected  ;26  but  it  has  also  been  held  that 
only  the  parties  to  a  judgment  may  apply,27  except 
that,  where  the  rights  of  one  not  a  party  are  direct- 
ly and  necessarily  affected,  he  may  intervene  after 
judgment  and  have  his  rights  protected.28  A  per- 
son who  suffers  no  loss  by  a  judgment  has  been 
held  to  have  no  right  to  a  modification  thereof.29 

All  the  parties  to  the  judgment  whose  rights  or 
interests  may  be  affected  by  the  proposed  amend- 
ment should  be  made  parties  to  the  application 
therefor;80  but  persons  whose  rights  are  not  af- 
fected need  not  be  joined.31 

§  254.    Notice 

It  is  a  general  rule  that  a  Judgment  cannot  be  ma- 
terially amended,  especially  after  the  term,  unless  due 
and  proper  notice  of  the  application  for  amendment  has 
been  given  to  the  opposite  party;  but  notice  Is  not  re- 
quired for  clerical  amendments  based  on  matters  appear- 
ing in  the  record. 


14.  Ky.— Wides  v.  Wides,   188  S.W. 
2d  471,  300  Ky.  344. 

Judicial   errors   generally   see   supra 
S  238. 

15.  U.S.— Albion-Idaho  Land  Co.  v. 
Actons,  D.dldaho,  58  F.Supp.  579. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Floyd 

County   v.   Ramsey,   239  N.W.  237, 

238,  213  Iowa  556. 
Wyo. — Application    of    Beaver    Dam 

Bitch   Co.,    93    P.2d    934,    54   Wyo. 

459. 

34  C.J.  p  245  note  81. 
Laches  generally  see  Equity  89  112- 

132. 

laches  not  shown 

Where  a  Judgment  was  defective 
for  failure  of  the  trial  court  to  cer- 
tify the  evidence  and  direct  that 
Judgment  be  entered  for  plaintiffs, 
plaintiffs,  in  waiting  four  and  a 
half  years  before  attempting  to  per- 
fect the  Judgment,  were  not  guilty 
of  laches  so  as  to  preclude  relief, 
since  the  oversight  was  the  fault 
of  the  trial  court.— Balch  v.  Shick, 
24  A.2d  548,  147  Pa.Super.  273. 

16.  TJ.S. — Albion-Idaho  Land  Co.  v. 
Adams,  D.C.Idaho.  58  F.Supp.  579. 

Wyo. — Application    of    Beaver    Dam 
Ditch  Co.,  93  P.2d  93*4,  54  Wyo.  459. 
34  OJ.  p  245  note  82. 

17.  Pa.— Balch    v.    Shick,    24    A.2d 
548,  147  Pa.Super.  273. 

34  C.J.  p  245  note  83. 

18.  Wis. — In  re   Brandstedter's  Es- 
tate, 224  N.W.  735,  198  Wis.  457. 


Wyo. — Application    of    Beaver    Dam 
Ditch  Co.,  93  P.2d  934.  54  Wyo.  459. 

19.  N.C. — Brown  v.  Norfolk   South- 
ern R.  Co.,   181  &E.  279,  208  N.C. 
423. 

20.  Pa,— Appeal  of  Hassler,  5  Watts 
176. 

3*4  C.J.  p  245  note  85. 
Executed  or  satisfied  Judgments  see 
supra  £  234. 

21.  Ind.— Pritchard  v.  Mines.  106  N. 
E.  411,  56  Ind.App.  671. 

34  C.J.  p  245  note  86. 
Judgment  in  rent 

Where  a  Judgment  operates  only 
in  rem  against  property,  a  party  who 
is  the  holder  of  a  claim  adverse  to 
that  of  the  Judgment  creditor  is  en- 
titled to  a  correction  of  the  Judg- 
ment so  as  to  reduce  the  tetter's 
claim. — Globe  Automatic  Sprinkler 
Co.  v.  Bell,  165  So.  150,  183  La.  937. 

22.  Tex. — Batson    v.    Bentley,    Civ. 
App.,  297  S.W.  769. 

23.  N.T.— Montgomery    v.    Ellis,     6 
How.Pr.  326. 

34  C.J.  p  245  note  86  JbL 
Who  may  invoke  statute 

Statute  providing  that  Judgment 
becomes  vested  property  of  person 
in  whose  favor  it  is  rendered,  which 
cannot  be  altered  except  in  mode 
provided  by  law,  can  be  invoked  only 
by  person  in  whose  .favor  Judgment 
is  rendered.— Glen  Falls  Indemnity 
Co.  v..  Manning,  LauApp.,  168  So.  787. 

467 


24.  Wash. — In  re  Christiansen's  Es- 
tate, 132  P.2d  368,  16  Wash.2d  48. 

25.  N.T. — Cohen  v.  Dugan  Bros.,  235 
N.Y.S.  116,  134  Misc.  500. 

26.  Colo. — In    re    German    Ditch    & 
Reservoir  Co.,   139   P.   2,   56  Colo. 
252. 

Village  tnurtees  ousted  by  unau- 
thorized part  of  Judgment  in  an 
action  in  which  they  were  not  made 
parties  are  entitled  to  apply  for 
relief  by  motion  to  strike  out  un- 
authorized part.— Abell  v.  Hunter, 
207  N.T.S.  203,  211  App.Div.  467,  af- 
firmed 148  N.E.  765,  240  N.T.  702. 

27.  Tex. — Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  State, 
Civ.App.,  132  S.W.2d  612,  error  dis- 
missed,   Judgment    correct 

28.  Tex.— Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  State, 
supra. 

29.  Mo. — Heldbreder  r.  Superior  Ice 
&  Cold  Storage  Co*   83   S.W.   469, 
184  Mo.  456. 

3D.    Ind.— Bradford    v.    McBride,    96 

N.E.    508,    50    Ind.App.    624. 
34  C.J.  p  246  note  87. 
•mnrM-ng  parti**  before  court 

Where  all  parties  whose  rights  or 
interests  may  be  affected  by  the  pro- 
posed amendment  are  not  made  par- 
ties to  the  application,  an  amend- 
ment of  the  Judgment  is  binding  only 
on  those  parties  properly  before  the 
court. — Pritchard  v.  Mines,  106  NJE. 
411,  56  Ind.App.  671. 

31.    Mo. — Turner  v.  Christy,  50  Mo. 

145. 
34  C.J.  p  246  note  88. 


§  254 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


As  a  general  rule  a  judgment  cannot  be  amended 
in  a  material  particular  unless  due  and  proper  no- 
tice of  the  application  for  amendment  has  been  giv- 
en to  the  adverse,  interested,  or  affected  parties,  so 
that  they  may  have  an  opportunity  to  appear  and 
show  cause  against  the  proposed  correction;32  but 
it  has  been  held  that,  in  order  to  make  a  judgment 
as  entered  conform  to  the  judicial  decision  actually 
made,  the  court  may  correct  the  judgment  with  or 
without  notice,33  although  in  this  situation  notice 


has  also  been  required-84  It  has  been  held  that  an 
amendment  may  be  made  without  notice  during  the 
same  term  at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,35 
but  that  notice36  or  voluntary  appearance37  is  nec- 
essary to  an  amendment  at  a  subsequent  term.  It 
has  also  been  held  that  formal  or  clerical  amend- 
ments, based  entirely  on  matters  appearing  in  the 
record,38  or  resting  in  the  recollection  of  the 
judge,39  may  be  made  without  notice,  but  that 
amendments  based  on  evidence  aliunde  may  be 


32.  Ariz.— Fay  v.  Harris,  164  P.2d 
860. 

111.— Thome  v.  Thome,  45  N.R2d 
85,  316  IlLApp.  451— Schmahl  v. 
Aurora  Nat  Bank,  35  N.E.2d  6"" 
311  IlLApp.  228. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Charf- 
ton  &  Lucas  County  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Taylor,  232  N.W.  487,  490,  210 
Iowa  1153. 

Mich. — McHenry  v.  Merriam,  204  N. 
W.  99,  231  Mich.  479— Partch  v. 
Baird,  199  N.W.  692,  22?  Mich.  660. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Countiss 
v.  Lee,  131  So.  643.  644,  159  Miss. 
11. 

N.J. — Surety  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
of  Newark  v.  Risack,  179  A.  6SO, 
118  N.J.EQ.  425. 

N.T. — Metropolitan  Commercial  Cor- 
poration v.  Scheffier,  256  N.Y.S.  473, 
143  Misc.  359. 

Okl.— Lewis  v.  Ward,  223  P.  839,  101 
Okl.  146— Co-Wok-Ochee  v.  Chap- 
man, 183  P.  610,  76  OkL  1. 

Tex. — Kveton  v.  Farmers  Royalty 
Holding  Co.,  Civ.App.f  149  S.W.2d 
998— Miller  v.  Texas  Life  Ins.  Co., 
Civ.App..  123  S.W.2d  756,  error  re- 
fused— Turman  v.  Turxnan,  Civ. 
App.,  71  S.W.2d  898,  error  dismiss- 
ed—Presidio Cotton  Gin  &  Oil  Co. 
v.  Dupuy,  Civ. App.,  2  S.W.2d  341 
— Bray  v.  City  of  Corsicana,  Civ. 
App.,  280  S.W.  609. 

34  C.J.  p  246  note  91. 

Parties  to  application  see  supra  § 
253. 

After  final  decree,  entry  of  sup- 
plemental  order  without  notice  to, 
and  in  absence  of,  parties  in  inter- 
est, and  proceedings  thereunder, 
were  void.— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Webb, 
158  S.E.  378,  110  W.Va.  387. 

Entry  of  remtttitnr 

Court  did  not  err  in  permitting: 
plaintiff  to  enter  remittitur  of  part 
of  Judgment  for  him  without  notice 
to  defendant— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Morrow,  Tex.Civ.App.,  66  S. 
W.2d  481,  error  dismissed. 

Person  without  advene  interest 

The  statute  requiring  reasonable 
notice  to  be  given  to  adverse  party 
of  proceedings  to  correct  irregularity 
in  obtaining  judgment  is  for  pur- 
pose of  protecting  one's  adverse  in- 
terest and  notice  is  not  required  to 
be  given  to  one  whose  interest  can- 
not possibly  be  adverse  to  the  re-, 


suit  to  be  accomplished. — Franklin 
v.  Hunt  Dry  Goods  Co.,  123  P.2d  258, 
190  Okl.  296. 

Sureties  on  redelivery  bond  are  not 
entitled  to  notice  of  application  for 
modification  of  judgment  in  replev- 
in suit,  not  being  parties  thereto. — 
White  Automobile  Co.  v,  Hamilton, 
226  P.  687,  3  Wyo.  390. 

3&    Cal. — Benway  v.  Benway,  159  P. 

2d  682,   69  Cal. App. 2 d  574. 
Iowa. — Hobson    v.    Dempsey    Const. 

Co.,  7  N.W.2d  896,  232  Iowa  1226. 

Obvious  mistake 

Generally  notice  is  not  necessary 
to  make  a  nunc  pro  tune  entry  to 
correct  an  obvious  mistake  in  judg- 
ment in  order  to  make  record  speak 
truth.— Miller  v.  Bates,  292  N.W.  818, 
228  Iowa  775. 

34.  Tex. — Coleman  v.   Zapp,   151   S. 
W.    1040,    105    Tex.    491— Magnolia 
Petroleum    Co.    v.    Wheeler,    Civ. 
App.,    132    S.W.2d    456,    error   dis- 
missed, judgment  correct 

35.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  17.  S. 
ex  rel.  Campbell  v.  Bishop,  C.C.A. 
Fla.,  47  F.2d  95,  97. 

Ark.— Stinson  v.  Stinson,  159  S.W.2d 

446,  203  Ark.  888. 
Wyo. — White     Automobile     Co.     v. 

Hamilton,  226  P.  687,  31  Wyo.  390. 
34  C.J.  p  246  note  92. 

36.  Ga.— Crowell  v.  Crowell,  11  S.B. 
2d  190,  191  Ga.  36. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Sweitzer  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  2  N.E.2d  330,  363  HI. 
409,  104  A.L.R.  1335— Chicago 
Wood  Piling  Co.  v.  Anderson,  39 
N.E.2d  702,  313  m.App.  242— Hick- 
man  v.  Ritchey  Coal  Co.,  252  111. 
App.  560. 

Ind. — Penn  v.  Ducomb,  12  NJE.2d  116, 
213  Ind.  133. 

Mich.— Emery  v.  Whitehill,  6  Mich. 
474. 

Miss. — Countiss  v.  Lee,  131  So.  6*43, 
159  Miss.  11. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Holtkamp  v. 
Hartxnann,  91  S.W.2d  22,  330  Mo. 
386 — Clancy  v.  Herman  C.  G.  Luy- 
tles  Realty  Co.,  10  S.W.2d  914,  321 
Mo.  282. 

N.C.— Pendergraph  v.  Davis,  1$9  S.E. 
815.  205  N.C.  29. 

34  C.J.  p  247  note  93.  i 

468 


37.  Ind. — Penn  v.  Ducomb,   12  N.E. 
2d  116,  213  Ind.  133. 

38.  U.S.— U.  S.  ex  rel.  Campbell  v. 
Bishop,  CC.A.Fla.,  47  F.2d  95. 

Ala. — Sisson    y.    Leonard,    11    So.2d 

144,  243  Ala.  546. 

OaL — Carpenter  v.  Pacific  Mut  Life 
Ins.  Co.  of  California,  96  P.2d  796, 
14  Cal.2d  704 — Benway  v.  Benway, 
159  P.2d  682.  69  CaLApp.2d  574— 
Hogan  v.  Horsfall,  266  P.  1002. 
91  CaLApp.  37,  followed  in  266  P. 
1005,  91  CaLApp.  797. 
Mo. — Conrath  v.  Houchin,  34  S.W.2d 

190,  226  Mo.App.  2«1. 
34  C.J.  p  2*7  note  94. 

"Having  had  jurisdiction  of  the 
parties  and  subject  matter  when  the 
decision  was  made,  the  power  of  the 
court  to  control  the  record  and  its 
ministerial  officers  does  not  depend 
upon  the  continued  presence  of  the 
parties." — Hobson  v.  Dempsey  Const. 
Co.,  7  N.W.2d  896,  900,  232  Iowa  1226. 
Ex  parte  amendment  held  proper 

(1)  In    an    action    in    which    the 
court  in  rendering  judgment  errone- 
ously described  defendant,  there  was 
no   error  in   directing   the   clerk  to 
strike  out  the  name  improperly  used 
and  insert  defendant's  name,  without 
citing  defendant  to  show  cause  why 
the  correction  should  not  be  made,  as 
the  error  was  of  little  or  no  impor- . 
tance. — Town   of  Mandeville   v.   Pa- 
duette,  95  So.  391,  153  La,  33. 

(2)  An  order  amending  judgment 
on  plaintifFs-  ex  parte  application  so 
as  to  render  liable  a  defendant  who 
had  appeared  and  filed  answer  and 
had  been  held  not  liable  to  plaintiff, 
although  he  had  not  taken  part  in 
trial,  was  valid.— Kohlstedt  v.  Hau- 
seur,  74  P.2d  314,  2-4  CaLApp.2d  60. 
Under  statute 

(1)  Under  some  statutes  the  prop- 
er method  of  correcting  clerical  mis- 
prislon  is  by  motion  on  reasonable 
notice   to  adverse   party  or  his  at- 
torney.— Stratton  &  Terstegge  Co.  v. 
Begley,    61  S.W.2d  287,  249  Ky.  632. 

(2)  Also    under    some    statutes    a 
mistake  or  omission  of  the  clerk  in 
entering   judgment    on    the    journal 
may  be  corrected  by  motion  on  rea- 
sonable notice  during  or  after  term 
at  which  judgment  was  rendered. — 
Hurley  v.  Childers.  243  P.  218,   116 
OkU  84. 

39.    CaL— Carpenter  v.  Pacific  Mut 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§255 


made  only  after  notice*  and  that,  in  the  absence  of 
notice,  the  proceedings  for  amendment  or  correc- 
tion are  void.40 

Other  authorities  have  held  that  during  the  same 
term  and  before  the  judgment  has  been  entered  of 
record,  the  court  may  change  its  rulings  of  its  own 
motion  and  without  notice,  and  direct  a  different 
judgment,41  but  that  after  the  judgment  has  been 
entered  the  court  may  not  change  the  record  with- 
out notice  even  at  the  same  term.42 

The  notice,  if  required,  must  be  sufficient  in  form 
and  substance  to  inform  the  party  of  the  time  and 
purpose  of  the  proceeding.43  Written  notice  is  not 
always  required;44  and  actual  notice  may  supply 
the  place  of  formal  notice.45  Appearance  at  the 
hearing  waives  the  absence  of,  or  defects  in,  the 
notice  of  the  application.46  Service  of  notice  must 
be  on  the  party  or  his  attorney  of  record.47 


« 

Where  the  time  of  notice  is  prescribed  by  statute 
or  rule  of  court,  failure  to  give  the  required  notice 
may  be  fatal  to  the  order  amending  the  judgment48 

§  255.    Contents  and  Sufficiency  of  Ap- 
plication 

An  application  for  amendment  of  a  Judgment  should 
specify  the  errors  or  omissions  complained  of  and  the 
correction  desired,  and  should  state  a  sufficient  ground 
for  the  modification  asked. 

A  petition  or  motion  for  the  amendment  or  cor- 
rection of  a  judgment  should  set  forth  dearly  and 
specifically  the  nature  of  the  errors  or  omissions 
complained  of,  and  the  terms  of  the  correction  de- 
sired;49 an  application  which  states  no  ground  or 
reason  for  the  modification  asked,  or  an  insufficient 
one,  is  properly  overruled.50 


Life  Ins.  Co.  of  California,  96  P.2d 

796,  14  Cal.2d  704. 
34  C.J.  p  247  note  95. 
Recollection  of  judge  as  basis  for 

amendment  see  infra  §  256. 

40.  U.S. — Odell    v.    Reynolds,    Ohio, 
70  P.  656,  17  C.C.A.  317. 

34  C-J.  p  2-47  note  96. 
Evidence  as  basis  of  amendment  see 
infra  §  256. 

41.  Tex. — Daniel  v.  Sharpe.  Civ.App., 
69  S.W.2d  508. 

34  C.JT.  p  247  note  97. 

42.  Iowa. — Willson   v.   Polk  County 
Dist   Ct.,   147  N.W.   766,  166  Iowa 
352— Kwentsky   v.    Sirovy,    121   N. 
W.  27,  142  Iowa  385. 

43.  Cal.— Citizens'     Nat.     Trust     & 
Savings   Bank   of   Los   Angeles  v. 
Holton,    290    P.    447,    210    CaL    44. 

Tex.— Luck  v.  Riggs  Optical  Co.,  Civ. 

App.,  149  S.W.2d  204. 
34  C.J.  p  247  note  99. 
Personal  service  not  required 

On  motion  to  correct  a  judgment 
-entry,  personal  service  on  the  op- 
posing party  such  as  would  give  Ju- 
risdiction in  a  new  proceeding  is  not 
required,  but  notice  of  the  motion  to 
the  opposing  party  is  sufficient — 
Hubley  v.  Goodwin,  4  A.2d  665,  90 
N.H.  54. 

44.  Va.— Dillard     v.     Thornton,  .29 
Gratt  392,  70  Va.  392. 

45.  OkL^Jones    v.    Gallagher,    166 
P.  204,  64  Okl.  41. 

Tex.— Varn    v.    Yarn,    125    S.W.    639, 
58  Tex.Civ.App.  595. 

46.  Ind. — Penn  v.  Ducomb,   12  N.E. 
2d  116,  213  Ind.  133. 

Tex.— -Luck    v.    Riggs    Optical    Co., 

Clv.App.,  149  S.W.2d  204. 
34  C.J.  p  247  note  3. 

47.  Ely. — Stratton   &   Terstegge   Co. 
v.  Begley,   61  S.W.2d  2871,  249  Ky. 
632. 


N.T. — Metropolitan  Commercial  Cor- 
poration   v.    Scheffier,    256    N.Y.S. 
473,   143   Misc.  359. 
Okl.— Hurley  v.  Childers,  243  P.  218, 

116  Okl.   84. 
34   C.J.  p   247  note  4. 
Service  on  attorney  after  final  judge- 
ment 

The  notice  of  application  to  correct 
a  final  Judgment  may  be  given  to  the 
attorney  who  appeared  for  adverse 
party  in  the  original  action  or  pro- 
ceeding, notwithstanding  the  final 
termination  thereof,  since  the  au- 
thority of  an  attorney  does  not  nec- 
essarily terminate  on  the  entry  of 
judgment  but  he  is  regarded  as  still 
representing  the  party  for  the  pur- 
pose of  receiving  notices  of  motion 
or  other  appropriate  process. — Lang- 
rick  v.  Rowe,  32  N.T.S.2d  328,  af- 
firmed 41  N.T.S.2d  82,  265  App.Div. 
793,  affirmed  52  N.E.td  96-4,  291  N. 
T.  756. 
Service  on  transferee  of  interest 

Notice  was  properly  given  to  one 
to  whom  original  adverse  party  had 
transferred  interest. — Burris  v.  Rein- 
hardt,  242  P.  143,  120  TCan.  32. 

48-    U.S. — Bernard    v.    Abel,    Wash,, 

156  F.  649,  84  C.C.A.  361. 
Statute   requiring  reasonable   notice 

Notice  of  hearing  of  motion  to 
amend  judgment  given  by  registered 
mail  and  received  a  reasonable  time 
before  hearing,  which  was  attended 
by  defendant  who  made  due  objection 
and  formal  protest,  constituted  "rea- 
sonable notice"  within  statute  au- 
thorizing correction  of  judgments. — 
Luck  v.  Riggs  Optical  Co.,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  14*9  S.W.2d  20*4. 

49.  Ind.— Mazac  v.  Michigan  City, 
189  'N.B.  400,  98  Ind.App.  366. 

Tex. — Wier  v.  Yates,  Civ. App.,  256 
S.W.  636. 

34  C.J.  p  247  note  7. 

469 


Conforming-  to  verdict 

Motion  to  reform  judgment  to  con- 
form to  verdict  is  in  essence  motion 
to  amend  judgment, — Jones  v.  White 
head,  146  S.E.  768,  167  Go.  848. 

Motion  to  correct  journal  entry  of 
judgment  by  clerk  was  not  insuffi- 
cient in  failing  to  allege  that  error 
was  due  to  clerk's  mistake  or  omis- 
sion.—Hurley  v.  Childers,  243  P.  218, 
116  Okl.  84. 

Where  rule  seeks  modification  of 
postea*,  reasons  for  such  modification 
must  be  set  forth  in  statement  of 
case. — Fantauzzo  v.  Phoenix  Assur. 
Co.  of  London,  155  A.  749,  9  N.J.Misc. 
713. 
Verification 

Failure  of  plaintiff  to  swear  to 
motion  to  correct  record  of  judgment 
erroneously  entered  was  immaterial. 
— Greggers  v.  Gleason,  29  S.W.2d 
183,  224  Mo.App.  1108. 
Agreement  of  parties  as  to  referee's 

findings 

Correction  of  judgment  entered  on 
report  of  referee,  settling  contro- 
versy on  count  on  note,  to  show  that 
parties  had  agreed  that  referee's 
findings  should  not  pertain  to  count 
on  note,  could  be  made  at  term  at 
which  judgment  was  rendered,  on 
motion  to  correct  entry  and  judg- 
ment, as  against  contention  that 
matter  could  only  be  presented  by 
motion  for  new  trial,  or  under  stat- 
utes relating  to  vacation  or  modifi- 
cation of  judgments,  since  such  stat- 
utes had  reference  to  proceedings  in- 
stituted after  term  at  which  judg- 
ment was  entered. — Waiters  v.  Knut- 
sen,  272  N.W.  420,  223  Iowa  225. 
5<X  Ind. — Briles  v.  Prudential  Ins. 
Co.,  25  N.B.2d  2-40,  216  Ind.  627— 
Brier  v.  Childers,  148  N.EL  474, 
196  Ind.  520— Elliott  v.  Gardner,  46 
N.E.2d  702,  113  Ind.App.  47. 
Mo. — State  ex  reL  Woolman  v.  Gui- 


§  256 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  256.    Evidence;    Source   of   Amend- 
ment or  Correction 

While  some  authorities  hold  that  a  Judgment  may  be 
amended  on  any  satisfactory  extrinsic  evidence,  other 
authorities  hold  that  an  amendment  after  the  term  must 
be  based  on  evidence  in  the  record,  or  matter  in  the 
nature  of  record.  During  the  term,  an  amendment  may 
be  based  on  any  satisfactory  evidence,  or  on  the  court's 
recollection. 


notte,    282    S.W.    68,    221    Mo.App 

466. 

34  C.J.  p  2-47  note  8. 
Allegations  held  sufficient 

Motion  to  amend  judgment  refer- 
ring to  pleadings  in  original  suit, 
and  containing  copies  of  verdict  and 
of  judgment  sought  to  be  amended, 
set  forth  sufficient  facts  to  authorize 
relief.— Brown  v.  Cole,  28  S.B.2d  76, 
190  Ga.  843. 

Expression  of  opinion  or  "belief  is 
insufficient. — Wier  v.  Yates,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  256  S.W.  636—34  C.J.  p  247 
note  8  [a]. 

51.  Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pal- 
atine Ins.  Co.  v.  Hill,  121  So.  412, 
415,  219  Ala,  123— Jackson  v.  Board 
of  Revenue  of  Choctaw  County,  1 
So.  799.  215  Ala.  41S. 

Ga. — Brown  v.  Cole,  28  S.E.2d  76, 
198  Ga.  843 — Jones  v.  Whitehead, 
146  S.B.  768,  167  Ga.  848— Miller 
v.  Jackson,  175  S.B.  409,  49  Ga^App. 
309 — Frank  B.  Wood  Co.  v.  Col- 
son,  158  S.B.  533,  43  Ga.App.  265. 

111. — McCord  v.  Briggs  &  Turivas, 
170  N.E.  320,  338  111.  158. 

Ky. — Bowling  v.  Evans,  98  S.W.2d 
916,  266  Ky.  2-42 — Decker  v.  Tyree, 
264  S.W.  726,  204  Ky.  302— Combs 
v.  Deaton,  251  S.W.  638,  199  Ky. 
477. 

Mo.— Schulte  v.  Schulte,  140  S.'w.2d 
51 — Clancy  v.  Herman  C.  G.  Luy- 
ties  Realty  Co..  10  S.W.2d  914,  321 
Mo.  282 — Vaughn  v.  Kansas  City 
Gas  Co..  159  S.W.2d  690,  236  Mo. 
App.  669 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
State  v.  Guinotte,  282  S.W.  68.  70, 
221  Mo.  App.  466 — Fulton  Loan 
Service  Xo.  2  v.  Colvin,  App.,  81 
S.W.2d  373. 

Tenn.— Clardy  v.  Clardy,  186  S.W. 
2d  526.  23  Tenn.App.  608. 

Wyo. — Application  of  Beaver  Dam 
Ditch  Co.,  93  P.Sd  934,  54  Wyo.  459. 

34  C.J.  p  248  note  13,  p  249  note  16. 

Evidence  as  basis  for  amending  de- 
crees see  Equity  J  632  b. 

Amendment  nunc  pzo  tuno 

(1)  A   Judgment   may  be  amended 
nunc    pro    tune    only    on    record    or 
quasi-record  evidence. — Palatine  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Hill,  121  So.  412,  219  Ala.  123 
— Jackson    v.   Board   of   Revenue   of 
Choctaw  County,  110  So.  799,  215  Ala. 
418. 

(2)  Where   formal   judgment   con- 
tained   entry    taxing    costs   against 
contestant,    and   there   was   no   evi- 
dence of  any  other  Judgment  respect- 
ing  costs,   nunc  pro   tune  order  at 


subsequent  term  amending  judgment 
by  taking  costs  against  estate  was 
erroneous. — Calnane  v.  Calnane,  17 
S.W.2d  566,  223  Mo.App.  381. 

(3)  Evidence  was  held  insufficient 
to  justify  amendment  nunc  pro  tune. 
— Wiggins  v.  Union  Trust  Co.  of 
East  St.  Louis.  266  IlLApp.  560. 
Power  or  authority  to  allow  amend- 
ment nunc  pro  tune  see  infra  § 

258. 
Nunc  pro  tune  entry  of  judgment  see 

supra  §  120. 
Nunc  pro  tune  entry  to  correct  or 

amend  court  records  generally  see 

Courts  S  227  d. 

Deficiency  in  judgment  cannot  be 
supplied  by  parol. — Jackson  v.  Board 
of  Revenue  of  Choctaw  County,  110 
So.  79*9,  215  Ala.  418. 
Presumptions  and  burden  of  proof 

(1)  In    proceedings    to    correct    a 
Judgment    nunc    pro    tune,    a    pre- 
sumption  exists   that  judgment   en- 
tered of  record  is  Judgment  actual- 
ly   rendered. — In    re    Tompkin's   Es- 
tate,   Mo.App.,    50    S.W.2d    659. 

(2)  Rule  that,  where  Judgment  is 
shown    to    be   rendered    for   one    of 
the  parties,  and  statute  directs  what 
that   judgment   shall   be.   it   will   be 
presumed  that  the  judgment  render- 
ed was  only  such  as  could  have  been 
rendered,   applies  in   proceedings   to 
correct    and    amend    judgment    nunc 
pro    tune. — Saunders    v.    Scott,    111 
S.W.   874.   132,Mo.App.  209— State  v. 
Juden,    Mo.App.,    50    S.W.2d   702. 

(3)  Burden  is  on  party  seeking  to 
correct  judgment  record  to  overcome 
presumption      of     truthfulness      of 
court's  recitals  of  fact  in  record. — 
Sullivan   v.   Coakley,   217  N.W.    820, 
205  Iowa  225. 

(4)  Under   statute   providing  that 
a  judgment  shall  not  be  vacated  at 
plaintiff's    request    until    it    is    ad- 
judged that  there  is  a  valid  cause  of 
action,   where   defendants    demurred 
on  grounds  of  misjoinder  of  causes 
of  action,  and  that  petition  did  not 
state  a  cause  of  action,  and  court 
informed   defendants   that   demurrer 
would  be  sustained  on  ground  of  mis- 
joinder    of    parties,    and    thereafter 
sustained    demurrer    generally,    and 
ordered  action  dismissed,  plaintiff,  at 
subsequent  term,  seeking  to  correct 
order  sustaining  demurrer  to  corre- 
spond to  the  facts,  was  not  required 
to  show   that  petition  stated  cause 
of  action,  since  trial  court,  in  refus- 
ing to  sustain  demurrers  on  ground 

470 


There  is  considerable  authority  for  the  rule  that 
an  amendment  or  correction  of  a  judgment  cannot 
be  made,  especially  after  the  term,  on  extrinsic  evi- 
dence but  must  be  based  on  evidence  contained  in 
the  record,  or  quasi  of  record,51  including  the  ver- 
dict and  the  pleadings,62  at  least  where  the  error 
or  mistake  complained  of  is  such  that,  if  it  exists, 

that  it  failed  to  state  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion,   impliedly   held    that   it    stated 
such  cause. — Bales  v.  Brome,  105  P. 
2d  568,  56  Wyo.  111. 
Recital  held  insufficient 

Where  amended  Judgment  recited 
that,  through  inadvertence,  there 
was  inserted  in  the  record  of  the 
Judgment  a  direction  and  order  that 
a  receiver  be  appointed,  such  recital 
cannot  Justify  review  by  the  court  of 
its  own  Judicial  act  without  showing 
to  justify  it — Schroeder  v.  Superior 
Court  of  California  in  and  for  Ala- 
meda  County,  239  P.  65,  73  CaLApp. 
687. 

Sule  not  dependent  on  statute 

Necessity  of  record  evidence  as 
condition  to  amendment  of  judgment 
is  not  dependent  on  statute. — Pala- 
tine Ins.  Co.  v.  Hill,  121  So.  412,  219 
Ala.  123. 

TTnoertainty  in  judgment  may  not 
be    supplied    by    parol    proof,    since 
the  rule  is  that  judgments  may  not 
be  amended  in  any  such  manner,  but 
the   entire  record  may  be   Inspected 
to  cure  the  uncertainty. — Decker  v 
Tyree,    264    S.W.    726,    204    Ky.    302. 
62.    Ga.— Brown   v.    Cole,    28    S.B.2d 
76,    196   Ga,    843— Jones  v.   White- 
head,   146   S.B.   768,    167  Ga.   848— 
Miller  v.  Jackson,  175  S.B.  409,  49- 
Ga.App.  309. 
Mo.— Pulton   Loan  Service  No.   2  v. 

Colvin,     App.,     81     S.W.2d    373. 
Evidence  hold  sufficient 

(1)  Contract  and  pleadings  held  to 
authorize    court    to    enter    judgment 
nunc  pro  tune,  adding  name  of  de- 
fendant omitted  from  original  judg- 
ment.— Batson    v.    Bentley,    Tex.  Civ. 
App.,  4  S.W.2d  577. 

(2)  Evidence       authorized       trial 
judge's  finding  that  recital  in  judg- 
ment denying  recovery  on  pleas  of 
intervention  was  clerical  error,  which 
court   could   correct   at   term   subse- 
quent   to    rendition    of   Judgment. — 
Duncan   v.   Marlin   Motor   Co.,    Tex. 
Civ.App.,    41    S.W.2d    740,    error   re- 
fused. 

Findings  ftnfl.  pleadings 
(1)  In  deciding  a  motion  to  modify 

the  judgment,  the  court  cannot  look 
beyond  the  findings  and  pleadings. 
— - Briles  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.,  2& 
N.B.2d  240,  216  Ind.  627— Brier  v. 
Childers,  148  N.E.  474,  196  Ind.  520 — 
Elliott  v.  Gardner,  46  N.B.2d  702,. 
113  Ind-App.  47 — Eteaton  v.  Grant 
Lodge  No.  335  X.  O.  O.  F.,  103  N. 
E.  488,  55  Ind.App.  100. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  256 


it  should  be  apparent  from  the  papers  and  records 
in  the  case.53  For  the  purpose  of  this  rule,  the 
matters  relied  on  need  not  be  part  of  the  record 
proper,  or  strict  judgment  roll;  it  is  generally 
deemed  sufficient  if  the  amendment  is  not  based  on 
parol  evidence  alone,  but  is  supported  by  the  rec- 
ord, or  some  note  or  minute  made  by  the  judge  or 
clerk,  or  notes  taken  by  the  stenographer,  or  some 
memorial  paper  or  document  in  the  nature  of  a  rec- 


ord made  in  connection  with  the  case  or  on  the 
trial  or  hearing.54 

Some  •  authorities,  however,  adhere  to  the  rule, 
characterized  as  the  more  liberal  rule,55  that  an 
amendment  may  be  based  on  any  satisfactory  or 
competent  extrinsic  evidence,56  parol  as  well  as 
written.57  This  rule  is  subject  to  the  limitation  that, 
where  there  is  no  record  or  quasi-record  evidence, 
the  court  should  act  with  great  caution,58  and  only 
on  evidence  which  is  clear  and  convincing.5  9 


(2)  While,  on  motion  to  modify  | 
judgment,  the  court  cannot  look  be- 
yond the  pleadings  to  determine  the- 
ory of  the  case,  this  rule  refers  to 
the  pleadings  as  construed  by  the 
parties. — Montgomery  v.  Montgom- 
ery, 1'40  N.E.  917,  81  Ind.App.  1. 

53.  Cal.— Citizens'     Nat.     Trust     & 
Savings   Bonk  of  Los  Angeles  v. 
Holton,   290  P.  447,  210  Cal.  44. 

Hl._McCord    v.    Briggs    &    Turivas, 

170  N.E.  320,  338  111.  158. 
Ky.— Bowling   v.    Evans,    98    S.W.2d 

916,  266  Ky.  2*42 — Combs  v.  Deaton, 

251   S.W.   638,   199  Ky.   477. 
Tenn.— Clardy  v.  Clardy,  136  S.W.2d 

526,  23  Tenn.App.  608. 
34  C.J.  P  248  note  13. 

54.  m. — People  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
2    N.E.2d    330.    363    111.    409,    104 
A.L.JL   1335— People  v.  Weinstein, 
131  N.B.   631,   298  111.  264— People 
v.  Leinecke,  125  N.B.  513,  290  111. 
560. 

Mo._ Vaughn  v.  Kansas  City  Gas  Co., 
159    S.W.2d    690,    236   Mo.App.   669 
—Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  ex 
rel.  Woolman  v.   Guinotte,   282   S. 
W.  68,  70,  221  MO.APP.  466. 
34  OJ.  P  248  notes  13,  15. 
Judgment  roll  or  record  see  supra  §§ 
122-125. 

Affidavit  of  plaintiff's  attorney  that 
defendant's  name  had  been  omitted 
from  judgment  by  mistake,  record 
disclosing  such  omission  was  held 
sufficient  for  amendment — Citizens' 
TSTat.  Trust  &  Savings  Bank  of  Los 
Angeles  v.  Holton,  290  P.  447.  210 
Cal.  44. 

Appearance  or  Judgment  docket  en- 
tries 

(1)  Appearance  and  docket  entries 
of  amount   of   judgment   were  held 
admissible  in  proceeding  to  correct 
judgment.— Brooks  v.   Owen,   202  N. 
-W.  505,   200   Iowa  1151,  modified  on 
other  grounds  and  rehearing  denied 
•206  N.W.  149. 

(2)  Where  action  and  cross  action 
were  identified  on  court's  docket  by 
•same  number  and  style,  court's  dock- 
et entry  stating  that  such  numbered 
and  styled  case  was  "dismissed  for 
-want  of  prosecution"  sufficiently  evi- 
denced the  fact  that  the  court  ren- 
dered judgment  dismissing  the  whole 
case  so  that,  if  judgment  as  entered 
was  not  sufficient  to  effect  a  dismis- 


sal of  the  cross  action,  it  was  a  suf- 
ficient notation  to  support  a  mine  pro 

unc  order  to  correct  the  judgment 
so  as  to  make  it  include  the  cross 
action  in  dismissal. — Johnson  v. 
Campbell,  Tex.Civ.App.,  154  S.W.2d 
878. 

Evidence  outside  of  the  Judgment 
sought  to  be  amended  may  be  ad- 
mitted.—Willard  v.  Loucks,  175  N.B. 

!56,  97  Ind.App.  131. 
Memoranda  of  judge 

Judgment  may  be  amended  after 
term,  where  memoranda  of  judge 
form  basis  therefor. — McCord  v. 
Briggs  &  Turivas,  249  IlLApp.  516, 
affirmed  170  N.E.  320,  338  111.  158— 
34  C.J.  p  248  note  15  [f]. 

$5.  Vt— In  re  Prouty's  Estate,  163 
A.  566,  105  Vt.  66. 

Wis. — Milwaukee  Electric  Crane  & 
Mfg.  Corporation  v.  Feil  Mfg.  Co., 
230  N.W.  607,  201  Wis.  494 — Pack- 
ard v.  Kinzie  Avenue  Co.,  81  N.W. 
488,  105  Wis.  323. 

56.  Ark.— Kory  v.  Less,  37  S.W.2d 
92,  183  Ark.  553 — Bowman  v. 
State,  129  S.W.  80,  93  Ark.  168— 
Liddell  v.  Bodenheimer,  95  S.W. 
475,  78  Ark.  364,  115  Am.S.R.  42— 
Goddard  v.  State,  95  S.W.  476,  78 
Ark.  226— Ward  v.  Magness,  86  S. 
W.  822.  75  Ark.  12. 

Kan.— Bush  v.  Bush,  150  P.2d  168, 
158  Kan.  760 — United  Zinc  & 
Chemical  Co.  v.  Morrison,  93  P. 
111'4,  76  "ESfrn.  799 — Christisen  v. 
Bartlett,  84  P.  530,  73  Kan.  401, 
rehearing  denied  85  P.  594,  73  Kan. 
401— Martindale  v.  Battey,  84  P 
527,  73  Kan.  92. 
jj.H. — Hubley  v.  Goodwin,  4  A.2d 

665,  90  N.H.  54. 

Vt. — In  re  Prouty's  Estate,  163  A. 
566,  105  Vt  66. 

. — Packard  v.  Kinzie  Avenue  Co 
81  N.W.  488,  105  Wis.  323. 
34  C.J.  p  247  note  12. 
Nature  and  amount  of  evidence  re- 

Quired 

Court  in  which  judgment  is  en- 
tered may  correct  it  on  evidence  sat- 
isfactory to  itself,  whether  oral  or 
documentary,  record  or  otherwise 
and  the  kind  and  amount  of  evi 
dence  requisite  to  show  that  amend 
ments  should  be  made  are  for  court 
— McAdams  v.  C.  D.  Shamburger 

'          471 


Lumber    Co.,    240    P.    124,    112    Okl. 

.73. 
Motion  within  two  months  after  en- 

try 

Where  motion  to  amend  Judgment 
was  made  within  two  months  after 
entry,  court  could  order  correction 

>ased  on  facts  outside  record. — 
Milwaukee  Electric  Crane  &  Mfg. 
Corporation  v.  Feil  Mfg.  Co.,  230  N. 
W.  607,  201  Wis.  494. 

57.  Ark.— Kory  v.   Less,    37    S.W.2d 
92,  183  Ark.  553. 

Kan.— Bush  v.  Bush,  150  P.2d  168, 
158  "Kan.  760— United  Zinc  & 
Chemical  Co.  v.  Morrison,  92  P. 
1114,  76  Kan.  799— Christisen  v. 
Bartlett,  84  P.  530,  703  Kan.  401, 
rehearing  denied  85  P.  594,  73 
Kan.  401— Martindale  v.  Battey,  84 
P.  527,  73  Kan.  92. 

Okl. — McAdams  v.  C.  D.  Shamburger 
Lumber  Co.,  240  P.  124,  112  Okl. 
173. 

58.  Okl.— McAdams  v.  C.  D.   Sham- 
burger  Lumber  Co.,  supra. 

Vt.— In   re   Prouty's   Estate,    163   A. 

566t  105  Vt  66. 
34  C.J.  p  247  note  12  [b]. 

59.  Ark.— Tracy  v.   Tracy,   43    S.W. 
2d  539,  184  Ark.  832— Kory  v.  Less, 
37  S.W.2d  92,   183  Ark.   553. 

Okl. — Co-Wok-Ochee  v.  Chapman,  183 
P.  610,  76  Okl.  1— Jones  v.  Galla- 
gher, 166  P.  20-4,  64  Okl.  41,  10 
A.L.R.  518. 
Vt— In  re  Prouty's  Estate,  163  A. 
566,  105  Vt  66. 

Absence  of  witness  at  opening  of 
probate  court  when  certain  person 
was  adjudged  incompetent  and 
guardian  was  appointed,  and  absence 
of  sheriff  and  clerk  from  hearing 
were  insufficient  to  overturn  recitals 
of  judgment. — Randolph  v.  Porter,  67 
S.W.2d  574,  188  Ark.  729. 
Overcoming  recitals 

In  order  to  justify  nunc  pro  tune 
judgment  after  term,  evidence,  sup- 
plemented by  judge's  personal  recol- 
lection, must  be  so  clear  as  to  over- 
come recitals  of  written  judgment 
sought  to  be  corrected. — Morgan  v. 
Scott-Mayer  Commission  Co.,  48  S.W. 
2d  838,  185  Ark.  637. 

Parol  evidence  was  sufficient  where 
the  judge  who  rendered  the  original 
judgments  was  the  same  judge  who 
made  the  correction  therein  as  to 


§  256 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Parol  and  extrinsic  evidence  may  be  competent 
for  various  purposes  in  connection  with  record  evi- 
dence,60 as  to  show  whether  the  record  shows  what 
was  really  done,61  or  to  support  or  rebut  evidence 
not  technically  a  matter  of  record.62 

Although  there  is  authority  to  the  contrary,6^  it 
has  been  held  that  an  amendment  at  a  subsequent 
term  cannot  be  based  on  the  judge's  knowledge  or 
recollection  of  the  facts,64  and  that  such  an  amend- 
ment cannot  rest  on  the  recollection  of  other  per- 
sons.65 

After  the  lapse  of  a  long  period,  such  as  fifty 
years,  clear,  cogent,  and  convincing  proof  should  be 
required  for  amendment,66  nothing  being  left  to 
speculation  or  conjecture.67 

During  the  term,  and  before  the  court  has  lost 
jurisdiction  of -the  cause,  it  has  been  held  that  an 
amendment  of  the  judgment  may  be  made  on  any 


evidence  satisfactory  to  the  court,  whether  oral  or 
documentary,  and  whether  of  record  or  otherwise,68 
or  the  court  may  act  solely  on  its  own  knowledge 
and  recollection.6^ 

§  257.    Hearing  and   Determination  in 

General 

On  an  application  to  amend  a  Judgment,  the  adverse 
party  Is  entitled  to  a  hearing.  Only  matters  Involved  In 
determining  the  necessity  or  propriety  of  the  amend- 
ment will  be  examined. 

On  an  application  to  amend  a  judgment,  the  ad- 
verse party  is  entitled  to  be  heard  in  opposition.70 
The  questions  presented,  whether  of  law  or  fact, 
are  for  the  determination  of  the  court  to  which  the 
motion  is  addressed.71  No  questions  will  be  ex- 
amined other  than  those  necessary  to  determine  the 
necessity  or  propriety  of  the  amendment.72  Mat- 
ters already  determined  will  not  be  reviewed  and 


the  date  on  which  judgments  were 
rendered,  and  the  time  between  the 
rendition  of  the  judgments  and  the 
correction  thereof  was  not  long. — St. 
Louis-San  Francisco  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hov- 
ley,  120  S.W.2d  14,  196  Ark.  775. 

To  correct  clerical  mistake  in 
judgment,  evidence  must  be  clear  and 
convincing  that  mistake  is  clerical, 
and  not  judicial.— Fall  River  Irr.  Co. 
v.  Swendsen,  241  P.  1021,  41  Idaho 
686. 
60t  Miss. — Wilson  Y.  Handsboro,  54 

So.    $45,    99    Miss.    252,    Ann.Cas. 

1913B  345. 
34  C.J.  p  249  note  17. 

61.  Colo.— West     Pueblo     Ditch     & 
Reservoir   Co.   v.    Bessemer   Ditch 
Co.,  210  P.  601,  72  Colo.  224. 

62.  Teac. — Getzendaner  v.  Trinity  & 
B.  V.  R.  Co.,  102  S.W.  161,  43  Tex. 
Civ.App.  66. 

24  C.J.  p  249  note  18. 

63.  Ark. — Randolph  v.  Porter,  67  S. 
W.2d  574,  188  Ark.  729— Morgan  v. 
Scott-Mayer  Commission  Co.,  48  S. 
W.2d    838,     185    Ark.     637— Bertig 
Bros.    v.    Grooms    Bros.,    262    S.W. 
672,  164  Ark.  628. 

Cal. — Bastajian  v.  Brown,  120  P.2d  9, 

19  Cal.2d  209. 

Kan.— Elliott  v.  Elliott,  114  P.2d  823, 
154   Kan.  145— Christisen  v.   Bart- 
lett,  84  P.  530,  73  Kan.  401,  rehear- 
ing denied  85  P.  594,  73  Kan.  401. 
Vt.— In   re   Prouty's  Estate,   163  A. 

566,     105     Vt.    66. 
Wis. — Wyman  v.  Buckstaff,   24  Wis. 

477. 

34  C.J.  p  249  note  20. 
Amendment  of  court  records  general- 
ly    on     court's     recollection     see 
Courts  §  235. 
Porce  of  evidence 

Judge's  recollection  of  circum- 
stances of  rendering  judgment  and 
of  court's  intention  has  force  of  evi- 


dence on  question  of  propriety  of 
nunc  pro  tune  order. — Cazzell  v.  Caz- 
zell,  3  P.2d  479,  133  Kan.  766. 

Bole  should  be  confined  to  cases 
in  which  the  application  is  made 
within  so  short  a  time  after  the 
judgment  is  entered  that  the  terms 
of  the  judgment  pronounced  will  be 
fresh  in  the  minds  of  both  counsel 
and  court. — Milwaukee  Electric 
Crane  &  Mfg.  Corporation  v.  Fell 
Mfg.  Co.,  230  N.W.  607,  201  Wis.  494 
— Packard  v.  Kinzie  Avenue  Co.,  81 
N.W.  488,  105  Wis.  323. 

Vagueness  or  inaccuracy  in  terms 
of  entry  of  judgment  on  docket  could 
be  corrected  or  omissions  therefrom 
supplied  through  testimony  and  tri- 
al judge's  own  recollection  of  trans- 
action.— Kluck  v.  Spitzer,  Tex-Civ. 
App.,  54  S.W.2d  1063. 

64.  HI. — People  ex  reL   Sweitzer  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  2  K.E.2d  330,  363 
111.  409,  104  AJL.R.  1335— People  v. 
Welnstein,    131    N.E.    631,    298    111. 
264— People  v.  Leineeke,  125  N.E. 
513,  290  I1L  560. 

Ky.— Combs  v.  Deaton,  251  S.W.  638, 

199  Ky.  477. 
34  C.J.  p  249  note  19. 

65.  111. — >People  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
2   N.E.2d   330,   363   111.   409,   104  A. 
L.R.     1335 — People    v.     Weinstein, 
131  NJE..  631,   298  HI.   2$4— People 
v.  Leinecke,   125  N.E.  513,  290  111. 
560. 

Counsel 

Tenn. — Clardy  v.  Clardy,  136  S.W.2d 
526,  23  Tenn.App.  608. 

6&  Wyo. — Application  of  Beaver 
Dam  Ditch*  Co.,  93  P.2d  934,  54 
Wyo.  459. 

67.  Wyo. — Application     of     Beaver 
Dam  Ditch  Co.,  supra. 

68.  Mo. — In  re  Henry  County  Mut. 

472 


Burial    Ass'n,    77    S.W.2d   124,    229 

Mo. App.  300. 
34  C.J.  p  249  note  21. 
69.    Mo. — Kirkxnan  v.  Stevenson,  238 

S.W.  543,  210  Mo.App.  380. 
34  C-J.  p  249  note  22. 
7Q,    I1L — Village  of  Downer's   Grove 

v.  Glos,   147  N,E.  390,  £16  111.  563. 
Mo. — Clancy  v.  Herman  C.  G.  Luyties 

Realty  Co..  10  S.W.2d  914,  321  Mo. 

282. 
N.Y. — Cohen  v.  Dugan  Bros.,  235  N. 

7.S.  118,  134  Misc.  155. 
Tex. — Presidio  Cotton  Gin  &  Oil  Co. 

v.  Dupuy,  Civ.App.,   2   S.W.2d  341. 
34  C.J.  p  249  note  23. 
Notice  of  application  see  supra  §  254. 


Bight  to  cxoss-4 


tie  clerk 


Before  entry  of  nunc  pro  tune  or- 
der in  subsequent  term  correcting 
judgment  plaintiff  has  right  to  be 
present  and  cross-examine  clerk.— 
Clancy  v.  Herman  C.  G.  Luyties 
Realty  Co.,  10  S.W.2*  914,  321  Mo. 
282. 

Correction  of  parties'  auutne* 

Proofs  or  admissions  and  findings 
should  precede  order  correcting 
names  of  parties,  where  corrections 
may  involve  questions  of  jurisdiction 
over  parties. — E.  B.  Elliott  Co.  v. 
Turrentine,  151  So.  414,  113  Fla,  210. 

71.  N.H,— Hubley  v.  Goodwin,   4  A. 
2d  665,  90  N.H.  54— Prink  v.  Frink, 
43  N.H.  508,  80  Am.D.  189,  82  Am. 
D.  172. 

OkL — McAdams  v.  C.  D.  Shamburger 
Lumber  Co.,  240  P.  124,  112  OkL. 
173. 

34  C.J.  p  249  note  24. 

Discretion  of  court  see  infra  $  259. 

72.  Ga. — Pryor  v.   Leonard,   57    Ga. 
136. 

Nature  of  questions  raised 

(1)  Motion  to  modify  judgment 
merely  raises  the  question  whether 
judgment  follows  the  conclusions  of 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


re-examined;   the  motion  is  not  a  new  trial  or  re- 
hearing of  the  original  case.™ 

The  opening  of  the  judgment  for  the  purpose  of 
amending  it  should  not  be  made  the  occasion  for 
granting  relief  other  than  that  asked  in  the  mo- 
tion,74 although  it  is  proper  to  impose  reasonable 
and  just  conditions  on  granting  the  amendment,  as 
discussed  infra  §  260.  A  judgment  may  be  amend- 
ed as  to  one  only  of  several  joint  parties  where  the 
rights  of  the  others  will  not  be  affected.75 

Where  an  alteration  of  the  record  would  be  futile, 
an  application  therefor  will  not  be  granted.76  An 
equitable  estoppel  is  ground  for  denial  of  the  appli- 
cation.77 Where  the  motion  is  too  broad,  it  may 
be  denied  in  toto.78 

An  inquiry  into  facts  dehors  the  record  may  be 
had  by  reference  or  otherwise.79 


§  258- 

§  258*    Allowing  Amendment  Nunc  pro 

Tune 

Subject  to  the  rules  governing  amendments  and 
corrections  of  Judgments  generally,  a  court  may  amend 
or  correct  Its  own  Judgments  nunc  pro  tune,  for  clerical 
errors  or  omissions,  so  as  to  make  them  speak  the  truth, 
but  not  to  correct  Judicial  errors  or  omissions,  or  to 
change  a  Judgment. 

Subject  to  the  rules  governing  amendments  and 
corrections  of  judgments  generally,  discussed  supra 
§  228  et  seq,  the  power  to  amend  or  correct  a  judg- 
ment nunc  pro  tune  so  as  to  make  it  speak  the  truth 
is  inherent  in  courts  of  record.80  Thus,  if  a  judg- 
ment has  been  irregularly  entered,  or  fails  to  con- 
tain all  that  is  essential  to  it,  or  to  express  the  true 
decision  of  the  court,  in  consequence  of  clerical  er- 
rors or  omissions,  it  may  be  completed  by  an  order 
nunc  pro  tune,  or  may  be  set  aside  and  the  true  and 
correct  judgment  entered  nunc  pro  tune.81 


law.— Kostanzer    v.     State     ex    rel.  \ 
Ramsey,   187  N.E.  587.  205  Ind.   536. ! 

(2)  A   motion   to    modify  a   Judg- 
ment does  not  present  any  question 
as  to  what  finding  ought  to  be,  but 
only  whether  Judgment  conforms  to 
findings     actually     made. — Briles    v. 
Prudential    Ins.    Co.,    25    N.B.2d    2-40, 
n6  Ind.   627— Brier  v.  Childers,   148 
N.E.    474,     196    Ind.    520— Elliott    v. 
Gardner,  46  N.E.2d  702,  113  Ind.  App. 
47. 

(3)  A  judge  who  has  made  a  deci- 
sion  should   not   direct   amendment, 
unless   he   is    satisfied  that   original 
entry  does  not  clearly  express  order 
which  was  made. — Kohlstedt  v.  Hau- 
setir,    74   P.2d   314,   24  Ca-l.App.2d  60. 
Existence  of  cause  of  action  or  de- 
fense 

Modification  of  Judgment  was  held 
substantially  to  comply  with  statute 
requiring  existence  of  cause  of  ac- 
tion or  defense  to  be  adjudged.— 
Burris  v.  Reinhardt,  242  P.  143,  120 
Kan.  32. 

73.  Wyo. — Application     of     Beaver 
Dam    Ditch    Co.,    93    P.2d    934,    54 
Wyo.  459. 

3-4  C.J.  p  249  note  26. 

74.  N.T.— Siegrist  v.  Holloway,  7  N. 
T.Civ.Proc.  58. 

75.  Ark.— Kory   v.   Less,    37   S.W.2d 
92,  183  Ark.  553. 

Mo.— Neenan  v.  St.  Joseph,  28   S.W. 

963,  126  Mo.  89. 
Entirety  of  judgments  see  supra  8 

33. 
Rights  of  third  persons  see  infra  5 

264. 

76.  Me.— Hurley  v.  Robinson,  27  A. 
270,  85  Me.  400. 

77.  Kan.— Cornell       University 
Parkinson,  53  P.  138,  59  Kan.  365. 

78.  Ind.— Overbay  v.  Fisher,  115  N. 
E.  366,  64  Ind.App.  44. 

34  C.J.  p  250  note  32. 


Motion  good  in  part  and  bad  in  part 
Although  a  judgment  for  costs  in- 
cludes costs  not  properly  recovera- 
ble, it  is  not  error  to  overrule  a  mo- 
tion to  modify  such  judgment,  the 
motion  including  both  costs  prop- 
erly, and  those  improperly,  awarded. 
— Spence  v.  Owen  County,  18  N.E. 
513,  117  Ind.  573. 

79.  N.T.— Pitt   v.   Davison,   12   Abb. 
Pr.   385,  affirmed  37  N.T.  235. 

Extrinsic  evidence  as  source  of 
amendment  see  supra  §  256. 

80.  Cal.— Mather  v.  Mather,  134  P.2d 
795,  reheard  140  P.2d  808,  22  CaL 
2d   713 — E.   Clemens   Horst  Co.   v. 
•Federal  Mut.  Liability  Ins.  Co.,  71 
P.2d  599,  22  Cal.App.2d  548. 

Iowa. — Hobson  v.  Dempsey  Const 
Co.,  7  N.W.2d  896,  232  Iowa  1226. 

Mo. — Schulte  v.  Schulte,  140  S.W.2d 
61— In  re  Toxnpkins'  Estate,  App., 
50  S.W.2d  659. 

OkL — Hawks  v.  McConnack,  71  P.2d 
724,  180  OkL  569. 

Tex. — Collins  v.  Davenport,  Civ.App., 
192  S.W.2d  291— White  v.  Haynes, 
Civ.App.,  60  S.W.2d  275,  error  dis- 
missed. 

34  C.J.  p  7*6  note  69. 

Amending  and  correcting  record  gen- 
erally see  Courts  §§  231-23'6. 

Entering  judgment  nunc  pro  tune 
see  supra  §§  117-121. 

33^  TJ.S. — Irving  Trust  Co.  v.  Amer- 
ican Silk  Mills,  Inc.,  C.C.A^T.Y.,  72 
F.2d  288,  certiorari  denied  Amer- 
ican Silk  Mills,  Inc.,  v.  Irving 
Trust  Co.,  55  S.Ct  239,  293  U.S. 
•624,  79  'L.Ed.  711— Fultz  v.  Laird, 
C.C.A.Micbu,  24  F.2d  172. 

Ala. — Sisson  v.  Leonard,  11  So.2d  144 
243  Ala.  -546— Gaston  v.  Recon- 
struction Finance  Corporation,  185 
So.  893,  237  Ala.  Ill— Parker  v 
Duke,  157  So.  436,  22»  Ala,  361— 
Ex  parte  R.  H.  Byrd  Contracting 
Co.,  156  So.  579,  26  Ala~A.pp.  171 

473 


certiorari  denied  156   So.   B82,   229 
Ala.  248. 

Ark. — Corpus  Jfcris  quoted  In  Wright 
v.  Curry,  187  S.W.2d  SSO,  881,  208 
Ark.  816— Bright  v.  Johnson,  152 
S.W.2d  540,  202  Ark.  751. 
CaL — Mather  v.  Mather,  134  P.2d 
795,  reheard  140  P.2d  808,  22  Cal.2d 
713_Hughes  v.  Hughes,  App.,  168 
P.2d  429— Benway  v.  Benway,  159 
P.2d  682,  69  Cal.App,2d  574 — Stew- 
art v.  Abernathy,  144  P.2d  8-44,  62 
Cal.App.2d  429— Felton  Chemical 
Co.  v.  -Superior  Court  in  and  for 
Los  Angeles  County,  92  P.2d  684, 
33  Cal. App.  2d  622 — Phipps  v.  Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  Alameda 
County,  89  P.2d  698,  32  CaLApp.2d 
371 — B.  Clemens  Horst  Co.  v.  Fed- 
eral Mut.  "Liability  Ins.  Co.,  71  P.2d 
599,  22  Cal.App.2fl  548 — Albori  v. 
Sykes,  65  P.2d  84,  18  Oal.App.2d 
619 — Haug  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  37  P. 
2d  1048,  2  CaLApp.2d  547— Schroe- 
der  v.  Superior  Court  of  Califor- 
nia in  and  for  Alameda  County, 
239  P.  6-5,  73  CaLApp.  687. 
Fla. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Taylor 
V.  Chapman,  173  So.  143,  144,  127 
Fla.  401 — R.  R.  Ricou  &  Sons  Co. 
v.  Merwin,  113  So.  745,  34  Fla,  86. 
Ga.— Rogers  v.  Rigell,  188  S.E.  704, 

183  Ga.  455. 

IXL — Village  of  Downer's  Grove  v. 
Glos,  147  N.E.  390,  316  I1L  563— 
Chicago  Wood  Piling  Co.  v.-  An- 
derson, 39  N.E.2d  702,  313  ULApp. 
242. 

Ind. — Citizens'  Trust  Co.  v.  Wheeling 

Can  Co.,  157  KB.  441,  199  Ind.  311. 

Iowa.— Hobsan    v.    Dempsey    Const 

Co.,  7  N.W.2d  396.  232  Iowa  1226— 

Muman  v.   Schuldt,  265  N.W.  369, 

221  Iowa  242. 

Kan. — State  v.   'Frame,    95   P.2d  2J8, 

150  Kan.  >64'6. 

Mich.— Ttonohue  v.  Merriam,  213  N. 
W.  150,  238  Mich.  253. 


258 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


The  power  to  order  the  entry  of  judgments  mine 
pro  tune,  however,  cannot  be  used  for  the  purpose 
of  correcting  judicial  errors  or  omissions  of  the 
court.82  This  procedure  cannot  be  employed  to 
give  life  to,  or  validate,  a  void  judgment,83  or  to 


change  or  revise  a  judgment,84  or  to  set  aside  a 
judgment  actually  rendered,85  or  to  change  the 
judgment  actually  rendered  to  one  which  the  court 
neither  rendered  nor  intended  to  render,86  or  to 
render  a  judgment  different  from  the  one  actually 


Minn. — Plankerton  v.  Continental 
Casualty  Co.,  230  X.W.  464,  ISO 
Minn.  16S. 

Mo.— Wiggins  v.  Perry,  119  S.W.2d 
S39,  343  Mo.  40,  126  A.L.R.  949— 
Curry  v.  Crull.  116  S.W.2d  125. 
342  Mo.  553— State  ex  rel.  Holt- 
kamp  v.  Hartmann,  51  S.W.2d  22, 
330  Mo.  3  S6— Clancy  v.  Herman  C. 
G.  Luyties  Realty  Co.,  10  S.W.2d 
914,  321  Mo.  282— Vaughn  v.  Kan- 
sas City  Gas  Co.,  159  S.W.2d  690, 
236  Mo.App.  669 — State  ex  rel. 
Arthur  v.  Hammett,  151  S.W.2d 
695.  235  MO.APP.  927— Haycraft  v. 
Haycraft,  App.,  141  S.W.2d  170— 
Thompson  v.  Baer,  App.,  139  S.W. 
2d  1080— Ex  parte  Messina,  128  S. 
W.2d  1082,  233  Mo.App.  1234— Ful- 
ton X«oan  Service  No.  2  v.  Colvin, 
App.,  SI  S.W.2d  373— State  ex  rel. 
and  to  Use  of  Grant  v.  Juden,  App., 
50  S.W.2d  702— In  re  Tompkins' 
Estate,  App.,  50  S.W.2d  659 — Ever- 
ett v.  Glenn,  35  S.W.2d  652,  225 
Mo.App.  921 — Cordes  v.  Femmer, 
App.,  2S9  S.W/  13— Pulitzer  Pub. ! 
Co.  v.  Allen,  113  S.W.  1159.  134 
Mo.App.  229. 

Mont.— State  Bank  of  New  Salem  v. 
Schultze,  209  P.  599,  63  Mont.  410. 

Ohio. — Webb  v.  Western  Reserve 
Bond  &  Share  Co.,  153  N.SL  289; 
115  Ohio  St.  247,  48  A.-L..R.  1176— 
State  ex  rel.  Stephens  v.  Wiseman, 
App.,  42  N.E.2d  240— State  ex  rel. 
Fulton  v.  Ach,  24  N.E.2d  '462,  62 
Ohio  App.  439. 

Okl. — Hawks  v.  McCormack,  71  P.2d 
724,  180  Okl.  569. 

Tex. — Collins  v.  Davenport,  Civ.App., 
192  S.W.2d  291 — Johnson  v.  Camp- 
bell, Civ.App.,  154  S.W.2d  878— 
Kveton  v.  Farmers  Royalty  Hold- 
ing Co.,  Civ.App.,  149  S.W.2d  398— 
Hays  v.  Hughes,  Civ.App.,  106  S. 
W.2d  724,  error  refused — Rogers  v. 
Allen,  Civ.App.,  80  -S.W.2d  1085— 
Veal  v.  Jaggers,  Civ.App.,  13  S.W. 
2d  745,  error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  76  note  70. 

What  constitutes  clerical  error  gen- 
erally see  supra  §  237. 

The  test  of  whether  a  judgment 
may  be  amended  nunc  pro  tune  is 
-whether  the  change  will  make  the 
record  speak  the  truth  as  to  what 
was  actually  determined  or  done  or 
intended  to  be  determined  or  done  by 
the  court,  or  whether  it  will  alter 
such  action  or  intended  action. — 
State  ex  rel.  Kruletz  v.  District  Court 
of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for 
Beaverhead  County,  9$  P.2d  883,  110 
Mont.  86. 

Purpose  • 

(1)  The    purpose    of  &   nunc   pro 


tune  order  correcting  a  clerical  er- 
ror in  a  judgment  appearing  on  the 
face  of  the  record  is  to  make  the 
judgment  as  entered  conform  to  the 
judicial  decision  actually  made. — 
Barkelew  v.  Barkelew,  Cal.App.,  166 
P.2d  57. 

(2)  The    purpose    of    a    nunc    pro 
tune  judgment  is  to  record  a  judg- 
ment theretofore  pronounced  by  the 
court  but  which  has  been  imperfect- 
ly or  erroneously  entered. — Goodman 
v.  Mayer,  128  S.W.2d  1156,  133  Tex. 
319. 

(3)  The    purpose    of    a    nunc    pro 
tune  order  is  to  have  judgment  re- 
flect its  true  finding,  and,  whenever 
original  judgment  entry  does  not  do 
so,  trial  court  has  very  broad  power 
to  correct  the  entry  by  nunc  pro  tune 
order. — Tresemer  v.  Gugle,  42  N.E.2d 
712,  70  Ohio  App.  409. 

(4)  The  sole  purpose  for  which  a 
judgment  may  be  amended  nunc  pro 
tune   is    to   correct   an   error  which 
has  crept  into  the  judgment  by  rea- 
son   of    misprision    on    part    of    the 
clerk,  judge,  or  counsel,  when  the  er- 
ror is  apparent  on  face  of  the  rec- 
ords, so  that  the  judgment  will  truly 
express  what  was  actually  decided  or 
intended  to  be  decided  and  will  grant 
the   relief  originally  intended  to  be 
granted  together  with  the  relief  fol- 
lowing therefrom  by  reason  of  law. — 
State    ex    rel.    Kruletz    v.    District 
Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist.  in  and 
for  Beaverhead  County,  98  P.2d  883, 
110  Mont.  36. 

Judgment  in  excess  of  statutory 
limit  was  not  a  clerical  error  which 
could  be  corrected  by  a  nunc  pro 
tune  order. — Garrison  v.  Williams,  17 
P.2d  1072,  128  CaLApp.  598. 

Lapse  of  long1  period 

A  judgment  may  be  amended  at  a 
subsequent  term,  nunc  pro  tune, 
eTen  a  long  time  after  rendition,  and 
thus  perfect  verdict,  where  rights  of 
intermediate  parties  will  not  be  prej- 
udiced*— Tanner  v.  Wilson,  192  S.E. 
425,  184  Ga.  628. 

82.  Ark.— Wright  v.  Curry.  187  S.W. 
2d  880,  208  Ark.  816. 

Gal. — Reider  v.  Aqueduct  Const  Co.. 
89  P.2d  169,  32  Cal.App.2d  90— 
E.  Clemens  Horst  Co.  v.  Federal 
Mut.  Liability  Ins.  Co.,  71  P.2d  599, 
22  Cal.App.2d  548— Albori  v.  Sykes, 
65  P.2d  8-4,  18  Cal.App.2d  619 — 
Garrison  v.  Williams,  17  P.2d  1072, 
128  GaLApp.  598 — Schroeder  v.  Su- 
perior Court  of  California  in  and 
for  Alameda  County,  239  P,  65,  73 
CaLApp.  687. 

474 


Ky. — Bowling  v.  Evans,  98  S.W.2d 
916,  266  Ky.  242. 

Mo.— Wiggins  v.  Perry,  119  S.W.2d 
839,  343  Mo.  40,  126  A.L.R.  949— 
State  ex  rel.  Holtkamp  v.  Hart- 
mann, 51  S.W.2d  22,  330  Mo.  386 
— Haycraft  v.  Haycraft,  App.,  141 
S.W.2d  170 — Thompson  v.  Baer, 
App.,  139  S,W.2d  1080 — Cordes  v. 
Femmer,  App.,  2S9  S.W.  13. 

Tex. — Hays  v.  Hughes,  Civ.App.,  106 
S.W,2d  724,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  77  note  72. 

Judicial  errors  generally  see  supra 
§  238. 

83.  Ga.— Wright  v.  Broom,  158  S.E. 
443,  43  Ga.App.  269. 

Mo. — State  v.  Pemberton,  151  S.W.2d 
111,  235  Mo.App.  1128. 

84.  Ark. — Evans  v.  U.  S.  Anthracite 
Coal  Co.,  21  S.W.2d  952,   ISO  Ark. 
578. 

Cal.— Albori  v.  Sykes,  65  P.2d  84,  18 
Cal.App.2d  619-*-Schroeder  v.  Su- 
perior Court  of  California  in  and 
for  Alameda  County,  239  P.  65, 
73  CaLApp.  687. 

Ga.— Rogers  v.  Rigell,  188  S.E.  704, 
183  Ga,  '455. 

Change    of    date    to    save    appeal 
from  being  premature  is  a  nullity. — 
Hampshire  Arms  Hotel  Co.  v.  Wells, 
298  N.W.  452,  210  Minn.  286. 
Description  of  lands 

The  purpose  of  such  amendment  is 
not  to  change  the  description  of 
lands  in  the  decree  otherwise  than  to 
conform  to  pleadings  and  proof. — 
State  ex  reL  Kruletz  v.  District 
Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist.  in  and 
for  Beaverhead  County,  98  P.2d  883, 
110  Mont.  36. 
Matters  not  in  court's  decision 

The  amendment  of  a  judgment  by 
order  nunc  pro  tuno  may  not  make 
the  judgment  express  anything  not 
embraced  in  the  court's  decision,  al- 
though proposed  amendment  con- 
tains matters  which  ought  to  have 
been  so  pronounced. — Felton  Chemi- 
cal Co.  v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for 
Los  Angeles  County,  92  P.2d  684,  33 
CaLApp.2d  622. 

85.  Mont — State  ex  rel.  Kruletz  v. 
District    Court    of    Fifth    Judicial 
Dist.  in  and  for  Beaverhead  Coun- 
ty, 98  P.2d  883,  110  Mont.  36. 

86.  Ark. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Wright  v.   Curry,   187   S.W.2d  880, 
881,  208  Ark.  816. 

Cal.— Albori  v.  Sykes,  65  P.2d  84,  18 
Gal. App.  2d  619 — Schroeder  v.  Su- 
perior Court  of  California  in  and 
for  Alameda  County,  239  P,  65,  73 
CaLApp.  687. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


260 


rendered,  even  though  the  judgment  actually  ren- 
dered was  not  the  judgment  the  judge  intended  to 
render.87  It  cannot  be  used  to  enlarge  the  judg- 
ment as  originally  rendered88  or  to  change  the 
rights  fixed  by  it  as  it  was  originally  intended  or 
made,89  nor  can  it  be  employed  where  the  fault  in 
the  original  judgment  is  that  it  is  wrong  as  a  mat- 
ter of  law90  or  to  allow  the  court  to  review  and 
reverse  its  action  with  respect  to  what  it  formerly 
refused  to  do  or  assent  to.91 

Where  the  clerk  has  made  no  entry  of  the  judg- 
ment, a  motion  to  amend  by  entering  judgment  nunc 
pro  tune  cannot  be  granted  because  there  is  no 
judgment  to  amend.92 


§  259. 


Discretion  of  Court 


Whether  or  not  a  court  will  amend,  modify,  or  cor- 
rect a  judgment  generally  rests  within  Its  sound  discre- 
tion. 

Although  in  some  circumstances  the  allowance  of 
an  amendment  or  correction  of  a  judgment  is  a 
matter  of  duty,93  an  application  to  amend,  modify, 
or  correct  a  judgment  is  generally  addressed  to  the 


sound  discretion  of  the  court,9*  and,  as  stated  in 
Appeal  &  Error  §  1630,  the  exercise  of  such  discre- 
tion will  not  be  interfered  with  by  an  appellate 
court  unless  an  abuse  of  discretion  is  manifest,  nor, 
as  discussed  in  the  CT.S.  title  Mandamus  §  97,  also 
38  CJ.  p  636  notes  71-78,  will  it  usually  be  con- 
trolled by  mandamus.  This  discretion,  however, 
must  not  be  exercised  in  an  arbitrary  manner,95 
and  the  court  will  not  favorably  exercise  its  discre- 
tion and  allow  an  amendment  where  injustice  will 
thereby  be  done  to  anyone.96  Relief  is  granted  on 
equitable  principles  and  only  on  a  showing  of  merits 
in  the  application.9? 

After  the  term,  the  power  of  amendment  should 
be  exercised  discretely  and  with  caution.98 

§  260.    Imposition  of  Terms 

In  granting  an  application  to  amend  a  Judgment,  the 
court  may  impose  reasonable  and  Just  terms. 

In  the  exercise  of  its  discretion  to  grant  or  re- 
fuse an  application  to  amend  a  judgment,  the  court, 
in  granting  such  application,  may  impose  such  terms 
as  are  reasonable  and  just99 


Ohio. — Herman  v.  Oliio  Finance  Co., 

32  N.E.2d  28,  66  Ohio  App.  164. 
34  C.J.  p  77  note  75. 

87.  Mo. — Wiggins  v.  Perry,  119  S.W. 
2d  839,  343  Mo.  40,  126  A.L.R.  949 
— State  ex  rel.  Holtkamp  v.  Hart- 

'  mann,  51  S.W.2d  22,  330  Mo.  386— 
Clancy  v.  Herman  C.  G.  Luyties 
Realty  Co.,  10  S.W.2d  914,  821  Mo. 
282— Burnside  v.  Wand,  71  S.W. 
337,  170  Mo.  531,  62  L.R-A.  427— 
Hay  craft  v.  Haycraft,  App.,  141 
S.W.2d  170— Thompson  v.  Baer, 
App.,  139  S.W.2d  1080— Cordes  v. 
Pemmer,  App.,  289  S.W.  13. 

88.  Cal.— Felton  Chemical  Co.  v.  Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  Los  An- 
geles County,  92  P.2d  684,  33  CaL 
App.2d  622. 

Varying  rights  of  parties 

A  nunc  pro  tune  order  enlarging  a 
Judgment  so  as  to  vary  the  rights 
of  the  parties  as  fixed  by  the  orig- 
inal decision  is  void,  although  the 
court  informed  counsel  of  its  inten- 
tion to  enter  such  order  and  read  its 
contents  to  counsel  who  did  not  ob- 
ject thereto,  and  although  the  court 
committed  a  judicial  error  through 
inadvertence  and  oversight — Felton 
Chemical  Co.  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  supra. 

89.  Mont.— State  ex  rel.  Kruletz  v. 
District    Court    of   Fifth   Judicial 
Dist.  in  and  for  Beaverhead  Coun- 
ty. 98  P.2d  S83,  110  Mont  36. 

90.  Ark. — Corpus    Juris    guoted    i& 

Wright  v.  Curry,  187  S.W.2d  880, 
881.  208  Ark.  816. 
3'4  C.J.  p  77  note  76. 


91.  Ark.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Wright  v.  Curry,  187  S.W.2d  880, 
881,  208  Ark.  816. 

34  OiJ.  p  77  note  77. 

92.  S.C. — Brown  v.  Coward,  21  S.C. 
L.  4. 

34  CJ.  p  244  note  69. 

93.  Minn. — National   Council,   K.   & 
L,  S.  v.  Silver,  164  N.W.  1015,  138 
Minn.  330,  10  A.L.R.  523. 

Wash. — O'Bryan  v.  American  Inv.  & 
Imp.  Co.,  97  P.  241,  50  Wash.  371. 
ft'»**ftTifliTiftti1?  as  ualrfcer.  of  right 

(1)  In  a  case  where  the  mistake 
is    conceded,    where   it   is   material, 
where  the  judgment  is  unexecuted, 
and  the  parties  are  still  in  statu  quo, 
and  the  rights  of  no   third  parties 
have  intervened,  the  parties  are  en- 
titled as  a  matter  of  right  to  the 
judgment  the  court  has  ordered,  and 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  correct 
the  mistake.— National  Council  K,  & 
L.   S.  v.  Silver,  164  N.W.  1015,   138 
Minn.  330,  10  A.L.R.  523. 

(2)  Where  an  entry  of  a  judgment 
concededly  does  not  speak  the  truth, 
no   discretion  is  involved  and  it  is 
the  imperative  duty  of  the  court  to 
correct  such  an  entry  when  no  Inno- 
cent third  person  will  suffer  thereby. 
— O'Bryan  v.  American  Inv.  &  Imp. 
Co.,  97  P.  241,  50  Wash.  371. 

94.  Ind. — Bearing  v.  Speedway  Real- 
ty Co.,  40  N.B.2d  414,  111  Ind.App. 
585. 

Kan. — Hoffman  v.  Hoffman,  135  P.2d 
887,  156  Kan.  6-47— Schubach  v. 
Hammer,  232  P.  1041,  117  Kan.  615. 

Nev. — Gottwals  v.  Bencher,  98  P.2d 
481,  60  Nev.  35,  126  AJt*R.  1262.; 

475 


Ohio.  —  Central  Nat  Bank  of  Cleve- 
land v.  Ely,  App.,  44  NJEL2d  822. 

Okl.—  Long  v.  Hill,  145  P.2d  434,  193 
Okl.  463—  Pitts  v.  Walker,  105  P.2d 
760,  188  Okl.  17—  Parker  v.  Board 
of  County  Com'rs  of  Okmulgee 
County,  102  P.2d  880,  187  Okl.  308, 
followed  in  Parker  v.  Board  of 
Com'rs  of  Okmulgee  County,  102 
P.2d  883.  187  Okl.  311—  Montague 
v.  State  ex  rel.  Commissioners  of 
Land  Office  of  Oklahoma,  89  P.2d 
283,  184  Okt  574—  Wilson  v.  Por- 
ter, 221  P.  713,  94  Okl.  259. 

34  C.J.  p  250  note  34. 

Discretion  of  court  during  term  see 
supra  §  229. 

95.  Ga.  —  Grogan  v.  Deraney,  143  S. 
B.  912,  38  Ga.App.  287. 

W.Va.—  Baker  v.  Gaskins,  36  S.B.2d 
893. 

9ft,  Ohio.—  Central  Nat  Bank  of 
Cleveland  v.  Ely,  App.,  44  N.B.2d 
822. 

34  C.J.  p  250  note  38. 

Rights  of  third  persons  see  infra  § 
264. 

97.    Wis.—  Reichenbach  v.  Fisher.  32 
133. 


98.  U.S.—  Odell    v.    Reynolds,    Ohio, 
70  P.  656,  17  C.C.A.  317. 

99.  Mich.—  Salter  v.  Sutherland,  85 
N.W.  112,  125  Mich.  662. 

34  C.J.  p  250  note  42. 
Payment  of  specified,  sum 

The  court  may  amend  a  Judgment 
subject  to  the  payment  of  a  speci- 
fied sum  by  the  party  who  caused 
the  irregularities  necessitating  such 
amendment.—  Whitney  v,  Lyric-Ro- 


§  261 

§  261.    Order 

An  order  granting  or  refusing  an  amendment  to  a 
judgment  is  a  final  order.  Where  it  allows  such  amend- 
ment, it  should  recite  all  necessary  jurisdictionai  facts 
and  should  not  be  too  broad. 

The  order  granting  or  overruling  a  motion  to 
amend  a  judgment  is  a  final  order  which  cannot  be 
set  aside  at  a  subsequent  term,1  and  which  precludes 
a  renewal  of  the  motion2  or  a  retrial  of  the  ques- 
tion in  a  subsequent  action.^ 

An  order  allowing  an  amendment  of  a  judgment 
should  recite  all  necessary  jurisdictionai  facts.4 
It  should  not  be  too  broad;5  only  as  much  of  the 
judgment  as  needs  correction  should  be  corrected.6 

§  262.    Mode  of  Making  Amendments 

Although  good  practice  requires  that  the  amendment 
of  a  judgment  be  actually  made  as  directed,  other  meth- 
ods are  permitted  or  tolerated,  such  as  the  entry  of  the 
order  for  amendment,  or  erasure  and  interlineation. 

Although  good  practice  requires  not  only  that  the 
amendment  of  a  judgment  should  be  ordered,  but 
that  the  clerk  should  actually  make  it  as  directed,7 
such  amendment  may  practically  be  accomplished  by 
entering  the  order  therefor,  or  the  making  and  en- 
try of  an  order  which  effects  the  same  result,8  in 
which  case  the  amendment  may  actually  be  made 
at  any  time  thereafter,9  or  by  the  entry  of  a  re- 
lease or  remittitur,  where  that  will  make  the  nec- 
essary correction.10  The  courts  tolerate,  but  do 
not  favor,  the  making  of  such  corrections  by  erasure 
and  interlineation  on  the  original  record,11  the  bet- 
ter method  being  to  annul  .or  vacate  the  defective 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


entry  and  replace  it  by  a  new  entry,12  which,  as 
stated  supra  §  258,  in  proper  cases  may  be  ordered 
to  be  made  nunc  pro  tune.  There  must  be  a  com- 
pliance with  a  statute  requiring  amendment  in  open 
court1*  The  judgment  of  a  court  cannot  be 
changed  or  modified  by  the  agreement  of  parties 
or  the  testimony  of  witnesses.14 

Where  a  judgment  already  made  in  a  cause  is 
tacitly  revoked  during  the  same  term,  and  a  second 
judgment  is  made  on  the  same  subject  matter,  it  is 
more  orderly  and  convenient,  in  making  the  second 
judgment,  to  refer  to  the  first  one  and  state  in 
what  particular  it  is  intended  to  modify,  supplement, 
or  supersede  it;  but  this  is  not  essential  where  a 
comparison  of  the  two  judgments  discloses  the 
changes  or  modifications  made.15  An  order  au- 
thorizing execution  on  a  judgment  does  not  con- 
stitute an  amendment  of  the  judgment.1^  The  filing 
of  amended  findings  and  the  entry  of  a  modified 
judgment,  without  first  vacating  the  judgment  pre- 
viously entered,  has  been  held  proper.17 


263. 


Operation  and  Effect  in  Gen- 


eral 


Generally  an  amendment  or  correction  of  a  Judg- 
ment makes  the  Judgment  of  the  same  effect  as  though 
the  defects  necessitating  the  amendment  had  never  ex- 
Isted;  It  does  not  confer  any  new  or  additional  rights. 

Since  the  amendment  of  a  judgment  is  merely 
perfected  evidence  of  what,  in  contemplation  of  law, 
existed  from  the  time  judgment  was  pronounced,18 
as  between  the  parties  the  amendment  or  correction 
of  a  judgment  relates  back  to  the  original  judgment 


Chester  Corporation,  287  N.Y.S.  126, 
247  App.Div.  925. 

1.  Ky. — Bonar  v.    Gosney,    30    S.W. 
602,  1-7  Ky.L.  92. 

2.  Ky. — Bonar  v.  Gosney,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  250  note  45. 

3.  Kan. — Emery    v.    Farmers'    State 
Bank,  155  P.  34,  97  Kan.  231. 

4.  Tenn. — Carney    v.    McDonald,    10 
Heisk.  232. 

5.  N.Y. — Frankland    v.     Schoenfeld, 
106  N.T.S.  1101,  58  Misc.  547. 

34  C.J.  p  -250  note  '48. 
e.    Ky. — Snowden  v.  Darnaby,  15  Ky. 
L.  332. 

7.  Mo.— State   v.    Broaddus.   Ill   R 
W.  508,  212  Mo.  685. 

34  C.J.  p  251  note  55. 

8.  Tex. — Swanson  v.  Holt  Civ.App., 
56   S.W.2d   266,   reversed   on  other 
grounds  87  S.W.2d  1090,   126  Tex. 
383,   remanding  cause   for  further 
consideration,   Civ.App.,   97  S.W.2d 
285. 

34  C.J.  p  251  note  52. 

9.  N.C.— Marshall  v.  Fisher,  46  N.C. 
111- 


la    U.S.— Ambler  v.    McMechen,   D. 

C..   1   F.Cas.No.273,   1  Cranch  C.C. 

320. 
34  C.J.  p  251  note  54. 

Waiver  of  new  entry  after  remittiU 

tux 

Parties  after  reduction  of  judg- 
ment by  writing  of  remittitur  on 
combination  docket  could  waive  new 
entry  on  district  court  record;  par- 
ties on  filing  of  motion  after  re- 
mittitur actuating  continued  exist- 
ence of  Judgment  in  effect  waived 
cancellation  of  existing  Judgment 
and  new  entry. — Fox  v.  McCurnin, 
228  N.W.  582,  210  Iowa  429. 

11.  Tex — Goodyear  Tire  &  Rubber 
Co.  v.  Pearcy,  Civ.App.,  80  S.W.2d 
1096. 

34  C.J.  p  251  note  56. 
Party's  initials 

Although  the  better  practice  in 
correcting  a  clerical  mistake  in  en- 
tering a  Judgment,  such  as  where  a 
party's  initials  are  erroneously  giv- 
en, is  to  renter  the  corrected  Judg- 
ment nunc  pro  tune,  a  correction  by 
erasure  or  by  interlineation  does  not  j 

476 


destroy  the  Judgment— Rogers  v.  Al- 
len, Teac.Civ.App.,  80  S.W.2d  1085— 
Goodyear  Tire  &  Rubber  Co.  v.  Pear- 
cy, Tex.Civ.App.,  80  S.W.2d  1096. 

12.  Tex.— Swanson  v.  Holt,  Civ.App., 
56    S.W.2d   266,    reversed    on    oth- 
er   grounds    87    S.W.2d    1090.    126 
Tex.  383,  remanding  cause  for  fur- 
ther    consideration,     Civ.App.,     97 
S.W.2d  285. 

34  C.J.  p  251  note  57. 

13.  Tex.— Presidio  Cotton  Gin  &  Oil 
Co..  v.   Dupuy,   Civ.App.f   2   S.W.2d 
341. 

14.  111. — People  v.  Traeger,  171  N.B. 
548,  339  111.  356. 

15.  Mo.— Eddie    v.    Eddie,    39    S.W. 
451,  138  Mo.  599. 

34  C.J.  p  251  ncte  59. 

16.  Colo.— Scott   v.   Woodhams,    246 
P.   1027,   79   Colo.  528,   followed  in 
246  P.  102*.  79  Colo.  532. 

17.  Cal. — Robinson  v.  Fidelity  &  De- 
posit Co.  of  Maryland,  42  P.2d  653, 
5  CaLApp.2d  241. 

18.  Okl. — Gaines  v.  Gaines,  151  P.2d 
S93,  194  OkL  "343. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§264 


and  becomes  a  part  of  it,  and  makes  the  judgment 
of  the  same  effect  as  though  the  defects  or  mistakes 
because  of  which  it  was  amended  or  corrected  had 
never  existed.19  However,  it  usually  does  not  make 
a  new  judgment  or  confer  any  new  or  additional 
rights,20  although  a  change  materially  affecting  a 
judgment  and  the  rights  of  the  parties  against 
whom  it  is  rendered  and  involving  the  exercise  of 
judicial  discretion  does  amount  to  a  new  judg- 
ment.21 

Generally  an  amendment  leaves  the  original  judg- 
ment effective  and  unimpaired;22  and  where  the 
court  strikes  out  part  of  a  judgment  the  remaining 
portion  stands23  so  that  the  court  need  not  enter 
a  new  judgment  with  the  stricken  part  omitted.24 

An  order  amending  a  clerical  error  in  a  judg- 
ment does  not  supersede  the  judgment  or  incorpo- 
rate it  into  the  order,25  and  the  act  of  the  clerk 
in  correcting  the  judgment  pursuant  to  such  order 
is  ministerial  and  does  not  affect-the  materiality  or 
finality  of  the  judgment  or  order.26 

Where  a  party  applies  for  and  obtains  an  amend- 
ment of  the  judgment,  he  thereby  waives  all  errone- 
ous rulings  of  the  court  preceding  the  judgment27 


An  amendment  or  correction  of  a  judgment  is  bind- 
ing on  those  parties  who  were  afforded  an  oppor- 
tunity to  be  heard  ;28  but  an  amendment  or  modifi- 
cation changing  the  rights  of  the  parties  as  fixed  by 
a  former  judgment  is  not  binding  on  a  party  in  in- 
terest who  was  not  afforded  such  opportunity.29 

§  264.    Rights  of  Third  Persons 

An  amendment  of  a  judgment,  unless  made  at  the 
same  term  at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  will  not 
be  allowed  to  prejudice  the  rights  of  third  persons  who 
have  acquired  Interests  for  value  and  without  notice. 

While  a  few  cases  hold  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
court  to  amend  and  correct  its  records  so  as  to  make 
them  speak  the  truth  regardless  of  the  effect  of  so 
doing  on  the  interests  of  either  parties  or  third  per- 
sons,30 the  general  rule  is  that  an  amendment  of  a 
judgment  will  not  be  allowed  to  prejudice  the  rights 
of  third  persons  who  have  acquired  interests  for 
value,31  except  where  they  have  taken  with  notice32 
or  where  the  amendment  is  made  at  the  same  term 
at  which  the  judgment  is  rendered33  The  order 
allowing  an  amendment  should  contain  a  saving  of 
the  intervening  rights  of  third  persons34  but  the 
law  makes  such  reservation  whether  or  not  it  is 
expressly  reserved.35 


19.  Ark.— T.  J.  Moss  Tie  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler,  276   S.W.   586,   169  Ark.   657. 

Okl. — Gaines  v.  Gaines,  151  P.2d  393, 
194  Okl.  343— Mason  v.  Slonecker, 
219  P.  357.  92  Okl.  227. 
34  C.J.  p  251  note  60. 
Waiver  of  irregularity 

Recitation  in  amendment  to  final 
judgment  that  all  parties  consented 
to  amendment  was  waiver  of  al- 
leged irregrularity  of  circuit  judge 
in  having  arrived  at  his  conclusions 
and  placed  them  in  form  of  order 
and  judgment  in  chambers  in  city 
which  was  not  county  seat  and  after- 
wards filing  them  in  office  of  clerk 
of  court  in  county  seat  to  be  record- 
ed in  court's  minutes  as  judgment 
of  court. — State  ex  rel.  Landis  v. 
City  of  Auburndale,  163  So.  698,  121 
Fla.  336. 

20.  Cal.— McConville      v.      Superior 
Court  within  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  248  P.  553,  78  Cal.App.  203. 

Okl. — Mason  v.  Slonecker,  2 19.  P.  357, 

92  Okl.  227. 
34  C.J.  p  251  note  61. 

21.  Cal. — McConville      v.      Superior 
Court  within  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  248  P.  553,  78  Cal.App.  203. 

22.  CaL— McConville      v.      Superior 
Court  within  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  supra. 

23.  Ind.— Elliott  v.    Gardner,   46  N. 
B.2d  702,  113  Ind.App.  '47. 

Where  the  name  of  a  defendant  is 
stricken  from  a  judgment,  the  judg- 


ment is  valid  as  against  the  re- 
maining defendants. — Henderson  v. 
Ellarbee,  131  S.E.  524,  35  Ga.App.  5. 

24.  Ind.— Elliott  v.  Gardner,  46  N.E. 
2d  702,  113  Ind.App.  47. 

26.  Cal.— McConville  v.  Superior 
Court  within  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  248  P.  553,  78  CaLApp.  203. 

26.  Cal.— McConville      v.      Superior 
Court  within  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  supra. 

27.  U.S. — Sabine  -Hardwood    Co.    v. 
West  Lumber  Co.,  D.C.Tesi,  238  F. 
611,  affirmed  248  F.   123,   160  C.C. 
A.  263. 

Ind.— Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Beck,  52  N.E.  399,  superseded, 
53  N.E.  439,  152  Ind.  421. 

28.  Iowa.— Samek  v.  Taylor,  213  N. 
W.  801,  203  Iowa  1064. 

Pa. — Altoona  Trust  Co.  v.  Fockler, 
165  A.  740,  311  Pa.  426. 

29.  N.T. — Emmet  v.  Runyon,  123  N. 
T.S.   1026,  139  App-Div.   310. 

3<X    N.C.— Walton  v.  Pearson,  85  N. 

C.  34. 

34  C.J.  p  252  note  69. 
Estoppel 

Parties  to  the  record  by  their 
dealings  with  third  persons  may  sub- 
ject themselves  .to  estoppels  or  other 
equities  which  will  prevent  them 
from  taking  any  advantage  from  the 
amendment.— Foster  v.  Woodfin,  65 
BT.C.  20. 

477 


31.  U.S. — Sabine    Hardwood    Co.    v. 
West    Lumber    Co.,    D.C.Tex.,    23 S 
F.  611,  affirmed  248  F.  123,  160  C.C. 
A.  263. 

34  C.J.  p  252  note  64—47  C.J.  p  435- 
note  6. 

laand  descriptions 

Clerical  error  in  judgments  con- 
cerning land  descriptions  may  be 
corrected  nunc  pro  tune,  if  the  rights 
of  strangers  are  not  affected. — State 
Bank  of  New  Salem  v.  Schultze,  209- 
P.  599,  63  Mont  410. 

Third  persons  held  not  prejudiced 
by  correction. — Plankerton  v.  Con- 
tinental Casualty  Co.,  230  N.W.  464. 
180  Minn.  168. 

32.  U.S.— Sabine    Hardwood    Co.    v. 
West  Lumber  Co.,  D.C.Tex.,  238  F. 
611,  affirmed  248  F.  123,  160  C.C.A. 
263. 

Ind. — Colman  v.  Watson,  54  Ind.  65. 

33.  U.S. — Henderson    v.    Carbondale- 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  111.,  11  S.Ct  SSI, 
140  U.S.  25,  35  L.Ed.  332. 

34  C.J.  p  252  note  66. 

34.  Or. — Senkler  v.  Berry,  96  P- 
1070,  52  Or.  212. 

34  C.J.  P  252  note  67. 

35.  U.S. — Sabine    Hardwood    Co.    v. 
West    Lumber    Co.,    IXC-Ter.,    238 
F.  611,  affirmed  248  F.  123,  160  CL 
C.A.  363. 

34  C.J.  p  252  notes  64-67. 


§  265 


JUDGMENTS 

C.  OPEXIXG  AND  VACATING 
1.    IN  GENERAL 


49    C.J.S. 


§  265.    In  General 

Courts  of  record  OP  of  general  Jurisdiction  have  in- 
herent  power  to  vacate  or  set  aside  their  own  Judgments. 

In  accordance  with  the  rules  governing  the  pow- 
er and  control  of  a  court  over  its  judgments  gener- 
ally, considered  supra  §§  228-235,  the  authority  to 
vacate  or  set  aside  its  own  judgments  is  inherently 
incident  to  all  courts  of  record  or  of  general  juris- 
diction^ and  may  be  exercised  without  the  grant 
of  any  special  statutory  authority,*?  although  courts 
of  special  or  limited  jurisdiction  have  no  such  pow- 
ers in  the  absence  of  statutes  expressly  granting 
them.88  However,  in  jurisdictions  having  statutes 
regulating  the  power,  the  statutes  are  controlling.39 
The  rules  governing  the  vacation  of  decrees  in  eq- 
uity and  of  judgments  at  law  are  the  same.40 

Opening  and  vacating  distinguished.  Opening  a 
judgment  is  not  setting  it  aside,  striking  it,  annul- 
ling, or  reversing  it,  but  is  a  mode  of  allowing  de- 
fendant a  hearing  on  the  merits,  the  judgment 
meanwhile  remaining  in  force  and  standing  as  se- 
curity; if  the  defense  is  successful  the  judgment  is 
vacated,  otherwise  when  it  is  closed  by  the  action 
of  the  court  it  operates  as  though  it  had  never  been 
disturbed.41  Another  distinction  is  that  a  petition 


to  vacate  or  set  aside  or  strike  a  judgment  is  based 
on  fatal  defects  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record, 
while  petitions  to  open  concern  other  matters  associ- 
ated with  the  judgment,  or  those  on  which  the 
judgment  is  based,  in  other  words,  the  merits  of 
the  controversy.42  An  application  to  open  a  judg- 
ment admits  its  validity.43 

Judgments  against  personal  representative.  The 
rule  stated  above  has  been  held  to  apply  to  judg- 
ments against  a  personal  representative,  and  such 
judgments  may  be  opened  or  vacated  when  proper 
grounds  for  such  relief  exist.44 

Judgments  in  ejectment.  Within  and  under  the 
general  rules,  a  judgment  in  ejectment  may  be 
set  aside  for  a  sufficient  cause,45  whether  the  judg- 
ment is  against  the  casual  ejector46  or  against  the 
tenant.4? 

Motion  for  new  trial  distinguished.  The  motion 
to  vacate  is  to  be  distinguished  from  a  motion  for 
a  new  trial  which  is  granted  on  different  principles 
and  grounds;48  and  statutes  regulating  or  limiting 
motions  for  a  new  trial  have  no  application  to  mo- 
tions to  open  or  vacate  the  judgment.49 

"Impeach"    The  word  "impeach,"  as  applied  to 


36.  Ala.— Alabama  By-Products  Cor- 
poration   v.    Rutherford,    195    So. 
210,  239  Ala,  413. 

Pla. — Skipper  v.  Schumacher,  160  So. 
357,  118  Flsu  867,  followed  In  Col- 
lier v.  Kins,  160  So.  926.  118  Fla. 
866,  and  certiorari  denied  56  S.Ct 
88,  296  U.S.  578,  80  L.Ed.  408. 
Tex. — Pavelka  v.  Overton,  Civ.App.f 

47  S.W.2d  369,  error  refused. 
34  C.J.  P  252  note  72. 
Opening  or  vacating: 

Divorce  decrees  see  Divorce  §§  166, 

168-172. 
Judgments  against  married  women 

see  Husband  and  Wife  §  454. 
Power  of: 

Appellate  court  to  vacate  its  judg- 
ments see  Appeal  and  Error  § 
1957  a. 

Probate  court  to  open  or  vacate  its 
judgments  or  orders  see  Courts 
$  309  c. 

Trial  court  to  open  or  vacate  judg- 
ment after  perfection  of  appeal 
see  Appeal  and  Error  §  616. 
Review  of  referee's  decision. 

A  court  cannot,  on  a  motion  to  va- 
cate a  judgment,  review  the  decision 
of  the  referee  on  which  the  judgment 
was  entered,  as  such  remedy  is  only 
by  appeal. — Jones  v.  Jones,  24  N.Y.S. 
1031,  71  Hun  519. 

37.  Ark.— -Wells    v.    W.    B.    Baker 


Lumber    Co.,    155    S.W.    122.    107 
Ark.  415. 
34  C.J.  p  253  note  76. 

38.  Ind.— Pass    v.    State,    147    NJB. 
287,  83  Ind.App.  598. 

N.Y.— Holmes    v.    Evans,    13    N.T.S. 

610,   59  N.T.S.  121,   affirmed  29  N. 

E.  233,  129  N.T.  140. 
Wis.— In    re    Cudahy's    Estate,    219 

N.W.  203,  196  Wis.  260. 
34  C.J.  p  253  note  76  [a]. 

39.  Iowa. — Hammon    v.    Gilson,   291 
N.W.    448,    227    Iowa   1366— Work- 
man  v.    District   Court,   Delaware 
County,  569  N.W.  27,  222  Iowa  364. 

34  C.J.  p  254  note  77. 

40.  Mont— Meyer  v.  Lemley,  282  P. 
268,  86  Mont.  83. 

Vacation  of  decrees  in  equity  see 
Equity  §§  622-667, 

41.  Neb. — Farmers'    Loan   &   Trust 
Co.   v.   Killinger,   65  N.W.    790,   46 
Neb.  677,  41  L.R.A.  222. 

Pa. — rcaftn  v.  Kahn,  Com.Pl.,  47 
Dack.Jur.  101 — Schantz  v.  Clem- 
mer,  Com.Pl.,  21  X,eh.L.J.  394. 

34  C.J.  p  255  note  81. 

42.  Pa.— Nixon  v.  Nixon,  198  A.  154, 
329  Pa.  256. 

Judgment  must  be  null  and  void 
Generally  a  judgment   cannot   be 

478 


stricken  off  unless  it  is  entirely  null 
and  void;  and  if  it  is  merely  irreg- 
ular it  will  be  opened  and  defendant 
let  in  to  a  defense. — Dikeman  v.  But- 
terfield,  19  A.  938,  135  Pa.  236—34  C. 
J.  p  376  note  14. 

43.  Pa. — Noonan  v.  Hoff,  Com.PL,  57 
York  Leg.Rec.  113,  affirmed  R.   S. 
Noonan,   Inc.,  v.  Hoff,   38  A.2d   53, 
350  Pa.  295. 

34  C.J.  p  255  note  82. 

44.  Ba. — Fischer  v.  Woodruff,  98  A. 
878,  254  Pa.  140—24  C.J.  p  887  note 
79,  p  888  note  80. 

46.    Ga. — Bryan   v.    Averett,    21    Ga. 

401,   68  Am.D.  '464. 
19  C.J.  p  1212  note  65. 

46.  Ala. — Howard  v.  Kennedy,  4  Ala. 
592,  39  Am.D.  307. 

19  C.J.  p  1212  note  67. 

47.  I1L— Williams  v.  Brunton,  8  HL 
600. 

19  C.J.  p  1212  note  68. 

48.  I1L— Grubb.    v.    Milan,    157    HI. 
App.      228,      reversed      on     other 
grounds  94  N.E.  927,  249  111.  456. 

34  CJJ.  p  254  note  79. 

49.  Ky. — Union    Gas    &    Oil    Co.    v. 
Kelly,  238  S.W.  384,  194  Ky.  158. 

34  C.J.  p  255  note  80. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


266 


a  judgment,  means  to  show  that  it  was  erroneous,50 
not  to  deny  its  existence.51 

§  266.    Right  to  and  Grounds  for  Relief 

The  grounds  on  which  courts  may  open  op  vacate 
their  Judgments,  particularly  after  the  term,  are  gen- 
erally matters  which  render  the  Judgment  void  or  which 
are  specified  in  statutes  authorizing  such  action. 

In  accordance  with  the  rules  governing  the  pow- 
er and  control  of  courts  over  their  judgments  gen- 
erally, considered  supra  §§  228-235,  it  has  been  held, 
without  reference  to  the  term  or  time  at  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered,  that  the  inherent  power  of 
a  court  to  open  or  vacate  its  judgment  may  be  ex- 
ercised when  the  judgment  is  void,52  or  when 
there  has  been  a  procedural  or  jurisdictional  de- 
fect or  where  a  question  of  fraud  or  other  col- 
lateral issue  is  raised,58  and  that  courts  have 
no  power  to  set  aside  judgments  on  other  grounds 
unless  specific  power  is  granted  to  them.54  How- 


ever, under  some  statutes  the  courts  may  open 
or  vacate  their  judgments  on  various  other 
grounds;55  but  the  statute  will  not  prevent  the 
courts  from  acting  on  other  grounds  or  causes 
which  would  be  good  and  sufficient  at  common  law, 
and  an  application  based  on  such  a  ground  is  not 
governed  by  the  statute.56  In  general  a  judgment 
or  decree  once  solemnly  entered  should  not  be  easily 
or  lightly  opened  or  vacated  except  for  cogent  rea- 
sons.57 A  judgment  can  be  set  aside  for  various 
reasons  even  though  it  is  not  reversible.58 

Time.  During  the  term  the  power  of  the  court 
is  absolute,  and  the  court  may  even  change  its  de- 
cision on  the  merits;  accordingly  any  consideration 
sufficient  to  move  the  equitable  discretion  of  the 
court  is  ground  for  opening  or  vacating  the  judg- 
ment during  the  term.59  While  the  statutory 
grounds  have  been  held  merely  cumulative,60  it  has 
been  held  that  after  the  term  the  judgment  can  be 
opened  only  on  statutory  grounds,61  except  where 


50.  La, — Pratt  v.  McCoy,  52  So.  151, 
125  La,  1040. 

51.  N.J.— rDen   v.    Downam,    13   N.J. 
Law  135. 

52.  Fla. — Skipper     v.      Schumacher, 
160  So.  357,  118  Fla.  867,  followed 
in  Collier  v.  King,  160  So.  926,  118 
Fla.   866,   and   certiorari  denied   56 
S.Ct  88,  296  U.S.  578,  80  L.Ed.  408. 

53.  N.Y.— Quirk  v.  Quirk,  24  N.Y.S. 
2d  937,  175  Misc.  703. 

Grounds  for  equitable  relief  against 
judgment  see  infra  §§  350-376. 

Right  to,  and  grounds  for,  opening 
or  vacating  default  judgments  see 
infra  §  334. 

54.  N.T. — Quirk  v.  Quirk,  supra. 
N.C.— Poison   v.   Strickland,   136   S.B. 

873,  193  N.C.  299. 

Pa,— Frantz  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 
3  A.2d  917,  333  Pa,  220— Schwartz 
v.  Stewart,  55  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  633, 

5  Lawrence  L.J.   1— Dickel  v.  Ty- 
son,   Com.Pl.,     50    Larcc.Rev.    163. 

55.  Cal. — McMahan  v.  Baringer,  122 
P.2d   63,    49   Cal.App.2d  431— Fisch 

6  Co.  v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for 
Los  Angeles  County,  43  P.2d  855, 
6  Cal.App.2d  21. 

N.D.— Bellingham  State  Bank  of  Bel- 
lingham   v.   McCormick,    215   N.W. 
152,  55  N.D.  700. 
34  C.J.  p  268  note  45. 
fi^refr  grounds  as  for  writ  of  error 

coram  nobis 

Reasons  for  correcting  judgment 
under  statute  are  same  as  those  re- 
quired by  writ  of  error  coram  no- 
bis.— Coultry  v.  Yellow  Cab  Co.,  252 
IlLApp.  443. 

56.  N.Y.— Ladd  v.  Stevenson,  19  N. 
E.    842,    112    N.Y.    325,    8    Am.S.R. 
T48. 

34  C.J.  p  268  note  47. 


57.    Ark.— Dent  v.   Adkisson,   157   S. 

W.2d  16,  203  Ark.  1'76. 
Cal.— Spahn  v.   Spahn,   App.,    162   P. 

2d  53. 

N.M.— Board  of  Com'rs  of  Quay 
County  v.  Wasson,  24  P.2d  1098, 
37  N.M.  503,  followed  in  Board  of 
Com'rs  of  Quay  County  v.  Gardner, 
24  P.2d  1104,  37  N.M.  514— Baly  v. 
McGahen,  21  P.2d  84,  37  N.M.  246. 
N.Y.— In  re  Madden's  Estate,  279  N. 
Y.S.  218,  155  Misc.  308— In  re  Mi- 
nard's  Will,  35  N.Y.S.2d  457. 
Pa,— Ferguson  v.  O'Hara,  132  A.  $01, 
286  Pa,  37— McKenzie  Co.  v.  Fidel- 
ity &  Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland, 
Com.PL,  54  Dauph.Co.  294— Wan- 
ner v.  Thompson,  Com.Pl.,  27  DeL 
Co.  455— Charles  B.  Scott  Co.  v; 
Oliver,  Com.PL,  1  Monroe  L.R.  143. 
S.C.— - Anderson  v.  Toledo  Scale  Co., 
6  S.E.2d  '465,  192  S.C.  300-^Feffer- 
son  Standard  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hy- 
drick,  141  S.E.  278,  143  S.C.  127. 
Wash. — In  re  Upton's  Estate,  92  P. 
2d  210,  199  Wash.  447,  123  A.L.R. 
1220. 

Wyo. — Application  of  Beaver  Dam 
Ditch  Co.,  93  P.2d  934,  54  Wyo.  459. 
58.  N.Y. — Lasser  v.  Stuyvesant  Ins. 
Co.,  16  N.Y.S.2d  401,  258  App.Div. 
340,  affirmed  17  N.Y.S.2d  221,  258 
App.Div.  340. 
Conviction  of  crime 

Where  insured's  conviction  for  de- 
stroying apartment  by  fire  with  in- 
tent to  defraud  insurer  was  upheld 
by  supreme  court,  sound  public  pol- 
icy required  that  insurer's  motion 
for  arrest  and  vacation  of  judgment 
for  insured  in  action  on  flre  policy, 
begun  before  trial  on  criminal 
charge,  be  granted  on  that  ground. 
—North  River  Ins.  Co.  of  City  of 
Mfew  York  v.  Militello,  67  P.2d  625, 
100  Colo.  343. 

479 


59.  U.S.— Corpus  Juris  cited  i& 
Suggs  v.  Mutual  Ben.  Health  &  Ac- 
cident Ass'n,  C.C.A.OkL,  115  F.2d 
SO,  82. 

Ala. — Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bridgeforth,  101  So.  807,  20  Ala* 
App.  326. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Occi- 
dental Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Niendorf, 
44  P.2d  1099,  1102,  55  Idaho  521. 

Ky. — Kentucky  Home  Mut  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Hardin,  126  S.W.2d  427,  277" 
Ky.  565. 

Neb. — First  Nat.  Bank  of  Fairbury  v. 
First  Trust  Co.  of  Lincoln,  15  N. 
W.2d  386.  145  Neb.  147. 

Ohio. — Harbine  v.  Davis,  App.,  57 
N.B.2d  421— Ames  Co.  v.  Buslck, 
App.,  47  N.E.2d  647— Canal  Win- 
chester Bank  v.  Exline,  22  N.B.26? 
528,  61  Ohio  App.  253.' 

34  C.J.  p  268  note  48. 

Additional  evidence 

A  district  court  has  discretionary- 
power,  in  furtherance  of  justice,  to- 
vacate  a  decree  at  the  same  term, 
in  order  to  allow  additional  evidence 
to  be  introduced. — Bartels  v.  Meyer, 
285  N.W.  698,  136  Neb.  274. 

6O.  Ohio. — Snyder  v.  Clough,  50  N. 
R2d  384,  71  Ohio  App.  440— Mosh- 
er  v.  Mutual  Home  &  Savings- 
Ass'n,  App.,  41  N.E.2d  871. 

£L  Ark. — Old  American  Ins.  Co.  v- 
Perry,  266  S.W.  943,  167  Ark.  198. 

Cal.-— Hotel  Park  Central  v.  Security- 
First  Nat  Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  S9- 
P.2d  606,  15  Cal.App.2d  29&— Ci- 
kuth  v.  Loero,  57  P.2d  1009,  14  Cat 
App.2d  32. 

Iowa. — Montagne  v.  Cherokee  Coun- 
ty, 2.05  N.W.  228,  200  Iowa  534. 

Okl. — Burton  v.  Graves,  273  P.  89&f 
135  Okl.  *5— McAleer  v.  Waddell- 


§  267 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  grounds  are  sufficient  to  invoke  the  inherent 
power  of  the  court,  generally  limited  to  matters 
which  render  the  judgment  void,  or  which  affect 
the  correctness  or  authoritative  character  of  the 
record.62 

§  267.    Invalidity  of  Judgment  in  Gen- 
eral 

Invalidity  of  the  judgment  of  such  nature  as  to  ren- 


der It  void  Is  a  valid  ground  for  vacating  it,  at  least  If 
the  invalidity  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record. 

Under  or  apart  from  statutory  provisions,  inva- 
lidity of  the  judgment  as  for  want  of  jurisdiction 
either  of  the  person  or  of  the  subject  matter,  or  of 
the  question  determined  and  to  give  the  particular 
relief  granted,  rendering  the  judgment  void,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  merely  voidable  or  erroneous,  is 
ground  for  vacating  it,63  even  after  the  expiration 


O'Brien  Motor  Co..  231  P.  4  SO.  105 
Okl.  35. 
34  C.J.  p  26S  note  49. 

62.  Cal.— Cikuth   v.    Loero,    57   P.2d 
1009,      14      Cal.App.2d     32— F.     B. 
Young-  Co.   v.  Fernstrom,   79    P.2d 
1117,    31   Cal.App.2d    Supp.    763. 

Fla.— Malone  v.   Meres,   107   So.   625, 

91  Fla.  490. 
Idaho. — Baldwin  v.  Anderson,  8  P.2d 

461,  51  Idaho  614. 

Ky. — Mclntosh   v.   Clark,    Thurmund 
*  &  Richardson,  177  S.W.2d  155,  296 

Ky.  358. 
Mo. — Irwin    v.    Burgan,    28    S.W.2d 

1017,  325  Mo.  309. 
N.J. — Gimbel  Bros.  v.  Corcoran,  192- 

A.  715.  15  N.J.Misc.  538. 
Ohio.— Snyder   v.   Clough,    50    N.E.2d 

384,   71  Ohio  App.  440— Mosher  v. 

Mutual    Home    &    Savings    Ass'n, 

App.,  41  X.E.2d  S71. 
Pa. — Corby   v.   Swing,   22   Pa.Dist.   & 

Co.  717 — James  B.  Sheehan  Build- 
ing &  Loan  Ass'n  v.   Scanlon,   16 

Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  646,  affirmed  164  A. 

722,  310  Pa.  6. 
Judgment  held  not  void  on  face 

Where  appearance  bond  did  not 
purport  to  have  been  executed  by 
surety  as  a  feme  covert,  and  to  es- 
tablish the  fact  of  coverture  and  its 
consequent  disabilities  would  require 
evidence  aliunde  the  record,  and 
term  of  court  at  which  judgment 
was  rendered  against  surety  had 
expired,  federal  district  court  was 
without  Jurisdiction  in  a  summary 
proceeding  to  declare  judgment, 
which  was  not  void  on  its  face,  void 
ab  initio  on  ground  that  judgment 
of  Florida  court  declaring  the  sure- 
ty to  be  a  feme  sole  was  without  ef- 
fect.— U.  S.  v.  Peacock,  D.C.Fla.,  34 
P.Supp.  557. 

63.  U.S. — Simonds  v.  Norwich  Union 
Indemnity  Co.,  C.C.A.Minn.,  73  F.2d 
412,  certiorari  denied  Norwich  Un- 
ion Indemnity  Co.  v.  Simonds,   55 
S.Ct.    507,    294    U.S.    711,    29    L.Ed. 
1246— U.   S.  v.  Turner,   C.C.A.N.D., 
47  F.2d.  86. 

Ala. — Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co,  v.  Street, 
176  So.  350,  234  Ala.  537. 

Alaska. — Smith  v.  Coucher,  9  Alas- 
ka 730 — In  re  Young's  Estate,  9 
Alaska  158 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
U.  S.  v.  Hoccle,  8  Alaska  201,  209. 

Ark. — Taylor  v.  O'Kane,  49  S.W.2d 
400,  185  Ark.  782. 

CaL — Casner  v.  San  Diego  Trust  & 


Savings  Bank,  94  P.2d  65,  34  Cal. 
App.2d  524— Richert  v.  Benson 
Lumber  Co.,  34  P.2d  840,  139  Cal. 
App.  671— Harvey  v.  Griffiths,  23 
P.2d  532,  133  CaLApp.  17— Jellen  v. 
O'Brien,  264  P.  1115,  89  CaLApp. 
505 — Petition  of  Furness,  218  P. 
61,  62  CaLApp.  753. 

Colo.— Sidwell  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 
233  P.  153,  76  Colo.  547. 

Fla. — Watkins  v.  Johnson,  191  So.  2, 
139  Fla.  712 — Skipper  v.  Schumach- 
er, 160  So.  357,  118  Fla.  867,  fol- 
lowed in  Collier  v.  King,  160  So. 
926.  118  Fla,  866,  and  certiorari  de- 
nied 56  S.Ct.  88,  296  U.S.  578,  80 
L.Ed.  408 — Frostproof  State  Bank 
v.  Mallett,  131  So.  322,  100  Fla. 
1464— Kroier  v.  Kroier,  116  So.  753, 
95  Fla.  865. 

Ga. — Ward  v.  Master  Loan  Service, 
33  S.E.2d  313,  199  Ga.  108— Ander- 
son v.  Turner,  133  S.E.  306,  35  Ga. 
App.  428 — Smoyer  v.  Jarman,  114 
S.E.  924,  29  Ga.App.  305. 

Idaho.— McHan  v.  McHan,  84  P.2d 
984,  59  Idaho  496— Jensen  v. 
Gooch,  211  P.  551,  36  Idaho  457. 

HI.— Barnardt  v.  Michael,  63  N.E.2d 
858,  392  111.  130— City  of  Des 
Plaines  v.  Boeckenhauer,  50  N.E.2d 

.  '483,  383  III.  475— Thayer  v.  Village 
of  Downers  Grove,  16  N.E.2d  717, 
369  111.  334— Industrial  Nat.  Bank 
of  Chicago  v.  Altenberg,  64  N.E.2d 
219,  327  IlLApp.  337— Personal 
Loan  &  Savings  Bank  v.  Schuett, 
20  N.E.2d  329,  299  Ill.App.  421— 
Webster  Grocer  Co.  v.  Gammel,  1 
NJ3.2d  890,  285  IlLApp.  277— Cum- 
mer v.  Cummer,  283  111. App.  220 
— Calbreath  v.  Beckwith,  260  I1L 
App.  7 — Sherman  &  Ellis  v.  Jour- 
nal of  Commerce  and  Commercial 
Bulletin,  259  IlLApp.  453 — Conway 
v.  Gill,  257  111.  606— Hickman  v. 
Ritchey  Coal  Co.,  252  IlLApp.  560. 

Kan. — Sparks    v.    Maguire,    169    P.2d 

•  826 — Penn  Mut.  iLife  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Tittel,  111  P.2d  1116,  153  Kan. 
530,  rehearing  denied  114  P.2d  312, 
153  Kan.  747— Wible  v.  Wible,  110 
P.2d  761,  153  Kan.  428— Taylor  v. 
Focks  Drilling  &  Manufacturing 
Corporation,  62  P.2d  903,  144  Kan. 
626 — Poorman  v.  Carlton,  253  P. 
424,  122  Kan.  762. 

Ky. — Morris  V.  Morris,  1'85  S.W.2d 
244,  299  Ky.  235— Dees'  Adm'r  v. 
Dees'  Ex'rs.  13  S.W.2d  1025,  227 
Ky.  670 — Harding  v.  Board  of 
Drainage  Com'rs  of  McCracken 

480 


County,  13  S.W.2d  1011,  227  Ky. 
661. 

Md. — Spencer  v.  Franks,  195  A.  306, 
173  Md.  73,  114  A.L.R.  263. 

Minn. — In  re  Belt  Line,  Phalen,  and 
Hazel  Park  Sewer  Assessment,  222 
N.W.  520,  176  Minn.  59. 

Mo.— Haight  v.  Stuart,  App.,  31  S.W. 
2d  241. 

Mont. — Oregon  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Kun- 
neke,  245  P.  539,  76  Mont  117. 

Neb. — Rasmussen  v.  Rasmussen,  269 
N.W.  SIS,  131  Neb.  724 — Shafer  v. 
Wilsonville  Elevator  Co.,  237  N.W. 
155,  121  Neb.  280— Foster  v.  Fos- 
ter, 196  N.W.  702,  111  Neb.  414. 

N.J. — New  Jersey  Cash  Credit  Cor- 
poration v.  Zaccaria,  19  A.2d  448, 
126  N.J.Law  334 — Gloucester  City 
Trust  Co.  v.  Goodfellow,  3  A.2d 
561,  121  N.J.Law  546 — Gimbel  Bros, 
v.  Corcoran,  192  A.  715,  15  N.J. 
Misc.  538. 

N.Y. — Conkling  Rug  Co.  v.  Hinman, 
29  N.T.S.2d  244,  176  Misc.  842. 

N.C.— Casey  v.  Barker,  14  S.E.2d  429, 
219  N.C.  465— Ellis  y.  Ellis,  136  S. 
E.  350,  193  N.C.  216 — Fowler  v. 
Fowler,  130  S.E.  315,  190  N.C.  536 
—Ellis  v.  Ellis,  130  S.E.  7,  190 
N.C.  418. 

Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Kins- 
man Nat.  Bank  v.  Jerko,  25  Ohio 
KP..N.S.,  445,  457. 

Okl. — Petty  v.  Roberts,  98  P.2d  602, 
186  Okl.  269— Hinkle  v.  Jones,  66 
P.2d  1073,  180  OkL  17— Blake  v. 
Metz,  276  P.  762,  136  OkL  146, 
followed  in  Blake  v.  Metz,  276  P. 
765,  136  Okl.  150— Nero  v.  Brooks, 
244  P.  588,  116  Okl.  279. 

Or.— Lothstein  v.  Fitzpatrick,  138  P. 
2d  919,  171  Or.  64'8— -Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  Dixie  Meadows  Independ- 
ence Mines  Co.  v.  Kight,  45  P.2d 
909,  911,  150  Or,  395— McLean  v. 
Porter,  35  P.2d  664,  148  Or.  262— 
Finch  v.  Pacific  Reduction  & 
Chemical  Mfg.  Co.,  234  P.  2'96, 
113  Or.  670. 

Pa.— In  re  Galli's  Estate,  17  A.2d 
899,  340  Pa.  561 — Commonwealth 
ex  rel.  Howard  v.  Howard,  10  A.2d 
779,  138  Pa.Super.  505— Baker  v. 
Carter,  157  A,  211,  103  Pa.Super. 
344 — Department  of  Public  Assist- 
ance v.  Scalzo,  45  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  89, 
44  Lack.Jur.  19— Webber  v.  Dolan, 
17  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  93— Sterling  Fi- 
nance Ass'n  v.  Frankel,  11  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  456 — Toder  v.  Universal 
Credit  Co..  Com,PL,  8  SckReg.  76. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  267 


of  the  term,  as  discussed  supra  §  230,  and  without 
limitation  of  time  other  than  such  as  may  be  ex- 
pressly prescribed  by  statute,  discussed  infra  §  288, 


at  least  if  such  invalidity  is  apparent  on  the  face 
of  the  record.6*    In  fact  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court 


S.D.— Janssen    v.    Tusha,    5    N.W.2dj 
684,  63  S.D.  639 — In  re  Shafer*s  Es-  I 
tate     209    N.W.    355,    50    S.D.    232, 
opinion  adhered  to  In  re  Schafer's 
Estate,  216  N.W.  9*48,  52   S.D.  182 
—Wayne  v.  Caldwell,  47  N.W.  547, 
1  S.D.  483. 

Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W. 
2d  94,  134  Tex.  633 — Wichita  Palls, 
R.  &  Fort  Worth  Ry.  Co.  v.  Combs, 
2S3  S.W.  135,  115  Tex  405— Corpus 
juris  guoted  In  Ferguson  v.  Fergu- 
son, Civ.App.,  98  S.W.2d  847,  850— 
Mendlovitz  v.  Samuels  Shoe  Co., 
Civ.App.,  5  S.W.2d  559— Barton  v. 
Montex  Corporation,  Civ.App.,  295 
S.W.  950. 
Utah. — Cooke  v.  Cooke,  248  P.  83,  67 

Utah  371. 

Wash. — John  Hancock  Mut  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Gooley,  83  P.2d  221,  196 
Wash.  357,  118  A.L.R.  1484. 
Wis.— State  ex  rel.  Wall  v.  Sovinski, 
291  N.W.  344,  234  Wis.  336— State 
ex  rel.  Dang  v.  Civil  Court  of  Mil- 
waukee County,  280  N.W.  3"47,  228 
Wis.  411. 

Wyo. — Bank    of   Commerce    v.   "Wil- 
liams, 69  P.2d  525,  52  Wyo.  1,  110 
A.I».R.  1463. 
34  C.J.  P  269  note  57. 
Existence  of  valid  or  meritorious  de- 
fense to  action  as  condition  of  re- 
lief see  infra  §  290. 
The    reason    for   enacting    statute 
authorizing  courts  to  set  aside  void 
judgments  or  orders  was  the  proba- 
bility that  the  legislature  feared  that 
courts  not  of  record  might  be  held 
not  to  possess  such  power  after  re- 
peal of  statutes  authorizing  justice 
courts  to  set  aside  void  judgments 
and  to  relieve  against  judgments  on 
ground  of  inadvertence,  surprise  or 
excusable  neglect— F.  B.  Young  Co. 
v.  Fernstrom,   79   P.2d  1117,  31  CaL 
.  App.2d  Supp.  763. 

Judgment  beyond  issues 

(1)  A  judgment  outside  the  issues 
in   the   case   and   on   a  matter  not 
submitted   to   the  court  for  its  de- 
termination is  a  nullity,  and  may  be 
vacated  at  any  time  on  motion  of  the 
judgment  debtor  or  other  persen  af- 
fected thereby. 

Kan.—- Hawkins   v.    Smith,    111 

1108,  153  Kan.  542. 
Okl.— Electrical    Research    Products 

v.  Haniotis  Bros.,  39  P.2d  42,  171 

OkL  150. 
34  C.J.  p  269  note  57  [d]. 

(2)  In  action  to  declare  a  result 
ing  trust  of  real  property  in  favor  of 
plaintiffs  where  judgment  for  plain- 
tiffs undertook  to  adjudicate  rights 
to  described  personal  property,  plain- 
tiffs'  statement   that   no  personalty 
was  demanded  was  a  concession  of 
errer  subject   to   attack  by  defend- 
ant's motion  after  judgment  term  to 

49OJ.S.-31 


et  the  judgment  aside  on  ground  of 
rregularity.— -Weatherford  v.  Spir- 
tual  Christian  Union  Church,  Mo., 
63  S.W.2d  916. 

Judgment  for  less  than  juxisdietional 

amount 

Under  statute  providing  for  dis- 
missal of  cause  where  amount  sued 
for  is  less  than  jurisdiction  of  court, 
and  for  taxation  of  entire  cost 
against  plaintiff  where  suit  is 
brought  for  amount  of  which  court 
has  Jurisdiction  and  a  smaller  sum 
s  recovered,  the  overruling  of  de- 
fendants' motion  to  set  aside  judg- 
ment for  plaintiff  for  one  cent  and 
costs  on  ground  that  Judgment  was 
for  an  amount  less  than  jurisdiction 
of  court  was  not  error. — -Watson  v. 
Spinks,  199  So.  1,  240  Ala.  291. 

Question  of  venue 

(1)  Whether    trial    should    be    in 
county  court  from  which  summons 
issued  or  in  county  in  which  served 
was    Question,    not    of    Jurisdiction, 
rat  of  venue,  which  should  be  raised 
ay  motion  for  removal  to  latter  coun- 
ty, not  by  motion  to  set  aside  Judg- 
ment—Virginia-Carolina      Chemical 
Co.  v.  Turner,  130  SJB.  154,  190  HT.C 
471. 

(2)  Where    an    action    to    recover 
damages  to  land  caused  by  drainage 
water    from    defendants'    adjoining 
land   was  brought  in  county  where 
plaintiff's  land  was  situated,  against 
defendants  residing  in  other  counties 
and  in  which  counties  each  was  serv- 
ed with  summons,  a  motion  filed  aft- 
er term  to  vacate  Judgment  was  im- 
properly  overruled,    even    though   • 
defense  to  the  action  was  not  ten- 
dered,   since    action,    being    "transi- 
tory,"   was    maintainable     only    in 
county  in  which  one  of  the  defend- 
ants resided  or  service  could  be  had 
and  judgment  was  "void"  ab  initio. — 
Snyder  v.  Clough,  50  NJEL2d  884,  71 
Ohio  App.  440. 

judgment  based  on  void  Judgment 

On  motien  to  set  aside  judgment 
based  on  filing  transcript  of  another 
judgment,  it  is  proper  to  grant  re- 
lief asked  on  showing  that  the  other 
judgment  was  void. — Lowry  v. 
BQmmler,  239  N.T.S.  847,  186  Misc. 
215. 
judgment  "based  on  void  verdict 

In  joint  action   for  injuries  sus 
tained  in  automobile  collision  agains 
owner   of   automobile   and   her   son 
who  was  driving  automobile  at  time 
of   collision,    a   verdict   exeneratinj 
son  but  finding  owner  liable  was  void 
and    the    judgment    based    thereon 
could  be  attacked  on  a  motion  to  se 
aside.— Kalil    r.    Spivey,    27    S.E.2< 
•475,  70  Ga-App.  84. 

481 


Pacts  Held  not  to  show  want  of  ju- 
risdiction 

Where  surviving  partners  suing 
he  alien  property  custodian  and  the 
United  States  treasurer  to  recover 
a,  debt  claimed  to  be  owing  to  firm 
by  an  enemy  corporation  set  forth  in 
heir  complaint  their  claim,  their 
nonenerny  status,  transactions  out 
of  which  claim  arose,  and  that  they 
had  given  statutory  notice  of  claim, 
denials  of  answer  concerning  part- 
ners' status  and  transactions,  and 
affirmative  defenses  alleging  that 
there  were  prior  claims,  that  part- 
ners did  not  have  title  to  cause  of 
action,  that  partnership  had  been 
dissolved  through  outbreak  of  war, 
that  claim  had  passed  to  another 
partner  and  on  his  death  to  his 
3-erman  executors  who  had  entered 
nto  an  arbitration  agreement,  and 
that  arbitrators  had  found  no  lia- 
bility en  part  of  enemy  corporation, 
presented  issues  which  the  district 
court  was  competent  to  try,  and 
hence  unappealed  from  judgment  on 
such  issues  could  not  be  set  aside 
for  want  of  jurisdiction  on  ground 
that  beneficial  owner  of  claim  was 
an  enemy  as  defined  by  the  act. — 
Jackson  v.  Irving  Trust  Co.,  61  S. 
Ct.  326,  311  U.S.  494,  85  L.Ed.  297. 
Pacts  held  not  to  warrant  relief 

(1)  Conduct  of  condemnation  pro- 
ceeding by  special  assistant  to  at- 
torney general  is  not  ground  for  va- 
cation  of  final   condemnation   order 
and  judgment — U.  S.  v.  Certain  Land 
at   Great   Neck   in  Xassau   County, 
N.Y.,  D.C.N.Y.,  57  F.Supp.  157. 

(2)  A  definitive  Judgment,  in  pet- 
itory   action   by    plaintiffs   who   had 
possession   of   land   under   recorded 
tax  deed,  could  not  be  set  aside  for 
alleged  invalidity  of  tor  sale  because 
taxes    for   collection   of  which   sale 
was  made  had  been  made  on  part  of 
property    by    third    person. — Adkins* 
Heirs  v.  Crawford,  Jenkins  &  Booth, 
La.,  24  8o.2d  246. 

(3)  Where  the  court  has  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  parties  and  the  subject 
matter,  a  judgment  cannot  be  vacat- 
ed  on   the   ground   that   there   was 
no   case   or  controversy   before   the 
court,    since    that    question    should 
properly    be    raised    by    appeal    or 
bill  of  review.— Swift  &  Co.   v.   XT. 
S.,   AppJXC.,   48   S.Ct   811,    276   U.& 
811,  72  L.Ed.  587. 

C4)  Other  facts. 
Ariz.— In  re  Hannerkam's  Estate,  77 

P.2d  814.  51  Ariz.  447. 
Ga,— Manrr   v.    Stephens.    0    S^J.2d 

58,  !»•  Ga.  80S. 
64.    Ala.— Gibson  *.  Edwards,  16  So. 

2d    8«5,    245    Ala.    834— Griffin    v, 

Proctor.    14    So,2d    116,    *44    Ala. 

587. 


§  267 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


to  annul  an  invalid  judgment.65  However,  it  has  al- 
so been  held  that  a  void  judgment  need  not  be  set 
aside  since  it  is  an  absolute  nullity  and  ineffective 
without  being  set  aside.6*  Any  applicable  statutes 
are,  of  course,  controlling.67 

Process,  sen-ice,  or  notice  lacking  or  defective. 
Since  the  validity  and  regularity  of  a  judgment  de- 


pend on  the  existence  and  sufficiency  of  the  process 
or  notice  on  which  it  is  based,  as  discussed  supra  §£ 
23-25,  it  is  good  ground  for  vacating  or  opening 
a  judgment  that  defendant  had  no  notice  of  the  ac- 
tion, either  because  of  a  failure  to  serve  him  with 
process  or  because  the  process  or  service  was  fa- 
tally irregular  or  defective.68  Thus  a  false  return 


Cal.— Olivera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d  564, 
19  Cal.2d  570,  140  A.L.R.  1328— 
City  of  Salinas  v.  Luke  Kow  Lee, 
18  P.2d  335,  217  Cal.  252— Michel 
v.  Williams,  56  P.2d  546,  13  Cal. 
App.2d  19S— Shelley  v.  Casa  Be 
Oro,  Limited,  24  P.2d  900,  133  Cal. 
App.  720— People  v.  Barnes  City, 
288  P.  442.  105  Cal.App.  618. 

Idaho. — Occidental  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Niendorf,  44  P.2d  1099,  55  Idaho 
521 — Baldwin  v.  Anderson,  8  P.2d 
461,  51  Idaho  614. 

Mo.— Harrison  v.  Slaton,  49  S.W.2d 
31 — McFadden  v.  Mullins,  136  S. 
W.2d  74,  234  Mo.App.  1056. 

N.C.— Dunn  v.  Wilson,  187  S.B.  S02, 
210  X.C.  493. 

Okl.— Morgan  v.  City  of  Ardmore  ex 
rel.  Love  &  Thurmond,  78  P*2d 
785,  1S2  Okl.  542 — Weimer  v.  Au- 
gustana  Pension  and  Aid  Fund,  67 
P.2d  436,  179  Okl.  572— American 
Exchange  Corporation  v.  Lowry, 
63  P.2d  71,  178  Okl.  433— Green  v. 
James,  296  P.  743,  147  Okl.  273— 
Bleflsoe  v.  Green,  2SO  P.  301,  138 
OkL  15— Skipper  v.  Baer,  277  P. 
930,  136  Okl.  286. 

Pa.— Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Howard 
v.  Howard,  10  A.2d  779,  138  Pa, 
Super.  505 — Gedrich  v.  Yaroscz, 
156  A.  575,  102  Pa.Super.  127. 

Determination  from  record 

(1)  Whether  the  judgment  is  void 
on  its  face  must  be  determined  from 
an  inspection   of  the  judgment  roll 
alone,   and  unless  the  record  affirm- 
atively   shows    that    the    court    was 
without    jurisdiction,    the    judgment 
is  not  subject  to  such  summary  ac- 
tion.— Spahn  v.  Spahn,  CaLApp.,  162 
P.2d  53. 

(2)  A  judgment  is  void  on  its  face 
when  the  judgment  roll  affirmatively 
shows   that   trial   court  lacks  either 
Jurisdiction   over   the   person,   juris- 
diction over  the  subject  matter,   or 
judicial    power    to    render    the    par- 
ticular Judgment. — Town  of  Watonga 
v.  Crane  Co.,   114  P.2d  941,   189  Okl. 
184 — Caraway    v.    Overholser,    77    P. 
2d  688,  182  Okl.  357. 

Judgment  held  not  void  on  face 

(1)  In  general. 

CaL— In  re  Robinson's  Estate,  121  P. 

2d    734,   19   Cal.2d   534-— In  re   Es- 

tremfs  Estate,  107  P.2d  36,  16  Cal. 

2d  563. 
Okl. — Caraway  v.  Overholser,  77  P.2d 

€88,  182  Okl.  357. 

(2)  Absence    from    judgment    roll 
of   original    summons    against    sub- 
contractors as   to  whom  cause  was 


continued  was  held  not  to  make 
judgment  declaring  materialman's 
lien  void,  and  subject  to  attack  after 
term. — Harris  v.  Spurrier  Lumber 
Co.,  265  P.  637,  130  Okl.  99. 

(3)  Judgment  failing  to  show  de- 
fendant's presence  at  trial,  but  show- 
ing  that   she  was   represented,  was 
held  not  void  on  face,  so  as  to  jus- 
tify setting  it  aside  on  motion  after 
term     at    which     rendered. — Steiner 
v.  Smith,  242  P.  207,  115  Okl.  205. 

(4)  A  judgment  would  not  be  va- 
cated  where   it  would  be   presumed 
that  facts  required  to  be  proved  to 
confer  jurisdiction  were  duly  proved, 
even    though    record    was   silent   on 
the    matter. — Town    of   Watonga   v. 
Crane    Co.,    114    P.2d    941,    l'S9    Okl. 
184. 

65.  N.J. — Gimbel  Bros.  v.  Corcoran, 
192  A.  715,  15  X.J.Misc.  538. 

Tex. — Bridgman  v.  Moore,  183  S.W. 
2d  705,  143  Tex.  250. 

63.  Miss. — Walton  v.  Gregory  Fu- 
neral Home,  154  So.  717,  170  Miss. 
129. 

67.  Ohio.— Corpus  •  Juxi*    quoted   In 
Kinsman   Nat    Bank  v.   Jerko,    25 
Ohio  N.P..N.S.,   445,   457. 

34  C.J.  p  270  note  'SO. 

68.  U.S.— Pen-Ken  Gas  &  Oil  Corpo- 
ration v.  Warfleld  Natural  Gas  Co., 
C.C.A.Ky.,   137  F.2d  871,  certiorari 
denied  64  S.Ct.  431,  320  U.S.  800,  -88 
L.Ed.    483,   rehearing  denied  64 
Ct.  634,  321  U:S.  803,  88  L.Ed.  1089. 

Alaska. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  U.  S. 
v.  Hoxie,  S  Alaska,  201,  208. 

Fla.— Rhea  v.  Hackney,  157  So.  190, 
117  'Fla.  62. 

Ga. — Cone  v.  Eubanks,  145  S.E.  '652, 
167  Ga.  384— Wilby  v.  McRae,  191 
S.E.  662,  56  Ga.App.  140. 

111.— Howard  v.  Howard,  26  N.E.2d 
421,  304  IlLApp.  637— Sweet  v. 
Sweet,  277  IlLApp.  545. 

Ky.— Center's  Guardian  v.  Center,  51 
S.W.2d  460,  244  Ky.  502— Farmers' 
Bank  of  -Salvisa  v.  Riley,  272  S.W. 
9,  209  Ky.  54. 

Mich. — Huebner  v.  WinskowskI,  224 
N.W.  340,  24'6  Mich.  77. 

N.Y.— Pacek  v.  Ferrar,  14  N.T.S.2d 
814,  258  App.Div.  772— Universal 
Credit  Co.  v.  Blinderman,  288  N. 
T.S.  77,  159  Misc.  802— Doctor's 
Hospital  v.  Kahal.  277  N.Y.S.  73-6, 
155  Misc.  126,  affirmed  277  N.Y.S, 
738,  155  Misc.  127— Potenza  v.  Can- 
to, 18  N.Y.S.2d  849. 

Okl. — American  Exchange  -Corpora- 
tion v.  Lowry,  63  P.2d  71,  17i8  Okl. 

482 


433— Locke  v.  Gilbert,  271  P.  247. 
133  Okl.  93 — Hatfield  v.  Lewis,  236 
P.  611,  110  Okl.  9S— Good  v.  First 
Nat  Bank,  211  P.  1051,  88  Okl.  110. 
Pa. — In  re  Stolzenbach's  Estate,  29 
A.2d  6,  346  Pa.  74— Schlegel  v. 
Brobst,  Com.Pl.,  18  Leh.L.J.  365 
— Rought  v.  Billings,  Com.Pl.,  3S 
Luz.Leg.Keg.  405. 

Tex. — Empire  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Al- 
bright,   87    S.W.2d    1092,    126    Tex. 
485 — Mandlovitz    v.    Samuels    Shoe 
Co.,  Civ. App.,  5  S.W.2d  559. 
Va.— Mann  v.  Osborne,   149   S.E.  537, 
153    Va.    190— Lockard   v.   Whiten- 
ack,  144  S.E.  606,  151  Va.  143. 
Wash. — City    of   Tacoma   v.    Nyman, 

2S1  P.  484,  154  Wash.  1*54. 
34  C.J.  p  270  note  63. 
Judgment  against  several  defendants 
Judgment,  valid  as  to  one  defend- 
ant, will  not  be  set  aside  as  to  such 
defendant  for  the  reason  that  no 
service,  or  insufficient  service,  has 
been  had  on  codefendant. — Burns  v. 
Pittsburg  Mortg.  Inv.  Co.,  231  P. 
887,  105  Okl.  150—34  C.J.  p  270  note 
63  [a]. 

Notice  to  unauthorized  attorney 

Judgment  rendered  pursuant  to  no- 
tice to  attorney  acting  without  au- 
thority may  be  vacated  even  after 
term. — Jacobson  v.  Ashkinaze,  168 
N.R  «647,  337  111.  141. 

Decree  on  cross  complaint 
Ark.— Taylor    v.    Harris,    54    S.W.2d 
701,  186  Ark.  580. 

Service  by  publication 

(1)  Where  service  of  summons  by 
publication  on  defendants  was  based 
on  an  affidavit  which  was  defective 
because  of  failure  to  allege  that  de- 
fendants   could    not   after    due    dili- 
gence be  found  in  the  state,  the  de- 
nying   of    motion    of    defendants    to 
vacate  the  judgment  because  of  de- 
fective service  was  error. — Groce  v. 
Groce,   199  S.E.   388,   214  N.C.  398. 

(2)  However  where  court  appoint- 
ed guardian  ad  litera  for  certain  de- 
fendants who  were  cited  by  publica- 
tion in  suit  on  notes  and   to   fore- 
close vendor's  and  trust  deed  liens, 
and  judgment  made  specific  provision 
protecting  interests  of  defendants  so 
summoned,    judgment   would  not   be 
set  aside  on  ground  that  by  exercise 
of   reasonable    diligence    defendants' 
residences    could    have    been    ascer- 
tained;    moreover    without    showing 
that     defendants'     residence     could 
have  been  ascertained  by  reasonable 
diligence  or  that  he  had  meritorious 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


267 


of  service  of  process  has  been  held  ground  for  va- 
cating the  judgment.69  However,  in  some  cases  it 
has  been  held  that  the  failure  or  defect  must  be  ap- 
parent on  the  face  of  the  record,70  so  that  a  judg- 
ment will  not  be  vacated  on  the  claim  of  a  false 
return  of  service,  since  the  return  is  conclusive,71 
unless  there  is  an  irreconcilable  conflict  in  the  judg- 
ment roll.72 

In  any  event,  a  judgment  will  not  be  set  aside  for 
mere  clerical  errors,  omissions,  or  irregularities  in 
the  process  not  affecting  the  jurisdiction,7^  espe- 
cially where  defendant  had  actual  notice  of  the  com- 
mencement of  the  action74  and  refrained  from  ap- 
pearing and  defending  in  the  expectation  that  he 
could  overturn  the  judgment  in  consequence  of  such 
error  or  defect,75  or  where  his  objections  to  the 
process  or  service  are  waived  by  his  appearance.76 
Moreover,  when  a  party  has  once  been  properly 
served  with  proper  process,  he  is  in  court  for  every 
purpose  connected  with  the  action,  and  cannot  have 
the  judgment  vacated  for  the  failure  to  notify  him 
of  some  intermediate  step  in  the  case.77 

Unauthorized  appearance.  Where  a  judgment  is 
entered  without  service  of  process  on  the  judgment 
defendant,  based  solely  on  an  unauthorized  appear- 
ance of  an  attorney,  some  cases  have  held  that  the 


remedy  of  the  judgment  defendant  is  against  the 
attorney,  and  that  the  judgment  cannot  be  opened 
or  vacated  on  the  ground  that  such  appearance  was 
unauthorized  unless  the  attorney  is  insolvent  and 
not  able  to  respond  in  damages  for  his  wrong,78 
or  unless  plaintiff  or  his  attorney  was  guilty  of 
fraud  or  collusion,  or  was  otherwise  a  party  to  the 
wrong,™  or  where  there  is  some  other  good  reason 
for  not  confining  the  party  to  his  remedy  against 
the  attorney,  in  which  cases  the  judgment  may  be 
opened  or  vacated80  However,  the  generally  pre- 
vailing rule  is  that  a  judgment  entered  without  the 
service  of  process  on  the  unauthorized  appearance 
of  an  attorney  may  be  set  aside  without  regard  to 
whether  or  not  the  attorney  is  financially  responsi- 
ble for  his  wrong,8*  provided  defendant  did  not  ac- 
cept or  ratify  the  unauthorized  act  of  the  attorney, 
as  by  acquiescing  in  it  or  failing  to  object,  with  full 
knowledge.82 

Where  process  has  been  served,  and  plaintiff  is 
innocent  of  any  fraud  or  collusion,  and  the  attorney 
is  solvent,  the  party  for  whom  the  attorney  appeared 
is  confined  to  his  remedy  against  the  latter,  plaintiff 
in  such  case  being  regarded  as  blameless  and  de- 
fendant negligent  in  not  appearing  and  making  de- 
fense by  his  own  attorney,  if  he  had  any  defense*83 


defense  to  the  action,  Judgment 
would  not  be  set  aside  on  ground 
that  defendant  was  improperly  cited. 
— Patridge  v.  Peschke,  Tex.Civ.App., 
Ill  S.W.2d  1147. 

Summons  held  sufficient; 
Okl. — Thomas    v.    Tucker,    86    P.2d 
1011,  184  Okl.  304. 

3^088  of  papers 

Bight  to  attack  judgment  on 
ground  of  nonservice  would  not  be 
denied  because  papers  in  suit  except 
judgment  had  been  lost. — Downing 
v.  White,  188  S.E.  815,  211  N.C.  40. 

Defendant  held  to  have  "been,  served 
KY.— Peppe  v.  Black,  7  N.Y.S.2d  748. 
N",C. — Jackson    v.    Turnage,    22    S.B. 
3d  434,  222  N.O.  752. 

69.    N.D.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 

Baird    v.    Ellison,    293    N.W.    794, 

800,  70  N.D.  261. 
34  C.J.  p  271  note  84. 
•j|*mT>frfr/»>nyi  •T'l?  of  return 
Ky. — Gardner    v.     Lincoln    Bank    & 

Trust  Co.,   64   S.W.2d  497,  251  Ky. 

109. 

70t    Ky. — Horton    v.    Horton,    92    «S. 

W.2d  373,  263  Ky.  413. 
Okl.— Good    v.  'First  Nat   Bank,   211 

P.  1051,  88  OkL  110. 

Judgment  rendered  on  proper  serv- 
ice by  publication  is  not  void  on  its 
face  within  law  providing  for  vaca- 


tion   of    void    judgment. — Moore    v. 
Hawkins,  271  P.  244,  133  Okl.  227. 
Special    provision    where    invalidity 

not  apparent 
Okl.— Morrissey  v.  Hurst,  229  P.  431, 

107  Okl.  1— Woodley  v.  McKee,  223 

P.  346,  101  Okl.  120. 

71.  Pa.— Liberal  Credit  Clothing  Co. 
v.  Tropp,  4  A.2d  565,  135  Pa.Super. 
53. 

72.  OkL— Babb     v.     National     Life 
Ass'n,  -86  P.2d  771,  184  OkL  273. 

73.  Fla. — Walker  v.  Carver,  112  So. 
45,  93  Fla.  337. 

34  C.J.  9  271  note  66. 

Amendable  defect 

Ga. — Hayes    v.    American    Bankers' 

Ins.   Co.,  167  S.B.   731,   4-6  Ga.App. 

552. 

74.  Fla.— Seiton  v.  Miami  Roofing  & 
Sheet  Metal,  10  So.2d  428,  151  Fla. 
631. 

34  C.J.  p  272  note  «7. 
Cross  complaint 

Ark. — Taylor  v.  Harris,  54  S.W.2d 
701,  186  Ark.  580. 

75.  Cal.— McGinn  v.  Rees,  165  P.  52, 
33  CaLApp.  291. 

34  C.J.  p  272  note  68. 

76*  E^in. — Home  Owners'  Loan  Cor- 
poration v.  Clogston,  118  P.2d  568, 
154  Kan.  257. 

34  C.J.  P  272  note  69. 

483 


77.    N.Y. — Eyring  v.   Hercules  Land 
Co.,  41  N.Y.S.  191,  9  AppJDiv.  306. 
34  C.J.  p  272  note  70. 

ATnonifTritt'n*   Q±  petition 


U.S.— U.  S.  v.  165.1978  Acres  of  ILand, 
More  or  Less,  in  East  Hampton 
TpM  Suffolk  County,  D.  a,  N.Y.,  61 
'F.Supp.  362. 

Intervention  hy  third  parties 

Ark. — Progressive  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Riley,  88  S.W.2d  66,  191  Ark.  850. 

7S.  N.Y.— Vilas  v.  Pittsburgh  &  M. 
R.  Co.,  25  N.E.  941,  123  N.Y.  440, 
20  Am.S.R.  771,  9  L.R.A.  844. 

34  C.J.  p  272  note  72. 

Validity  of  judgment  based  on  un- 
authorized appearance  see  supra  5 
26. 

79.  N.Y. — Yates  v.   Horansoa,   30   N. 

Y.Super.  12. 
34  C.J.  p  273  note  73. 
«X     N.Y.— Hamilton    v.    Wright,    37 

N.Y.  502,  504,  5  Transcr.A.  L 
34  C.J.  P  273  note  75. 

81.  Fla. — St.  Lucie  Estates  v.  Palm 
Beach.   Plumbing    Supply    Co.,    133 
So.  841,  101  Fla.  205. 

Okl.— Myers  v.  Chamness,  228  P.  9*$, 

102  Okl.  131. 
34  C.J.  p  274  note  76. 

82.  Ga. — Jackson  v.  Jackson,  35  SJBL 
2d  258,  199  Ga,  716. 

84  C,J.  p  274  note  77. 

83.  N.C. — Hatcher  v.  Faison,  55  S.E. 
284,  142  N.C.  364. 

34  C.J.  p  274  note  78. 


268 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  268.    Irregularity  of  Judgment  in  Gen- 
eral 

A  material  and  substantial  Irregularity  which  has 
not  been  cured  or  waived  Is  a  ground  for  opening  or  va- 
cating judgment  If  the  complaining  party  Is  adversely 
affected  thereby. 

A  judgment  ordinarily  will  not  be  vacated  for 
merely  technical,  formal,  and  unimportant  irregu- 
larities which  may  be  disregarded  on  the  principle 


of  harmless  error,84  or  which  are  eurable  by  amend- 
ment,85 or  which  may  be  deemed  cured  or  waived 
as  by  failure  to  object  in  due  season;86  and  the  only 
remedy  for  such  irregularity  is  by  proceedings  for 
review  by  an  appellate  court87  However,  irregu- 
larity in  the  proceedings  leading  to  the  entry  of  a 
judgment,  as  distinguished  from  mere  error  which 
is  considered  infra  §  274,  has  been  held  a  ground 
for  vacating  the  judgment,88  provided  it  is  preju- 


84.     U.S. — Soroush      v.      Hasbrouck 

Heights,  N.  X,  T.  Agrios,  D.C.N.J., 

10  F.Supp.  371. 
Ga. — Manry  v.  "Stephens,  9  S.B.2d  58, 

190  Ga,  305. 
Ky.— Barker  v.  Hoe,  109  S.W.2d  395, 

270  Ky.  158. 
N.J.— Cook  v.   American   Smelting  & 

Refining    Co.,    122   A.    743,    99   N.J. 

Law  81. 
N.M  —American    Nat    Bank    of   Tu- 

cumcari  v.  Tarpley,  250  P.  1$,  31  N. 

M.  667. 
N.Y.— Harwitz   v.   Cohen,   245  N.Y.S. 

350,    138    Misc.    300 — Brockman   v. 

Pape,  116  N.T.S.  752. 
N.C.— Mitchell   v.    Mitchell,   190   S,B. 

487,  211  N.C.  508. 
Pa. — Holland  'Furnace  Co.  v.  Davis, 

31  Pa.Dist  &  Co.   469,   5   Sch.Reg. 

157. 
Tex — Bearden  v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ.App., 

41  S.W.2d  447,  affirmed,  ConuApp., 

60  S.W.2d  1031. 
Wis. — Luebke  v.  City  of  Watertown, 

284  N.W.  519,  230  Wis.  512. 
34  C.J.  p  276  note  84. 

Particular  irregularities  held  insuffi- 
cient 

(1)  -Failure  to  give  notice  of  entry 
of  Judgment,  at  least  where  the  oth- 
er party  was  not  harmed  thereby. 
Ky.— McAllister  v.   Dravenstott,    115 

S.W.2d  1041,   273  Ky.  239. 

Okl.— Mayer  v.  Keener,  163  P.2d  991, 
195  Okl.  658. 

Wash. — Larson  v.  Department  of  La- 
bor and  Industries,  25  P.2d  1040, 
17-4  Wash.  618. 

(2)  Fact   that   court   in  rendering 
final    judgment    inadvertently    over- 
looked previous  minute  entry  setting 
case  for  hearing  at  subsequent  date 
was  held  not  to  justify  mine  pro  tune 
order  at  subsequent  term  annulling 
final  judgment. — State  ex  reL  Holt- 
kamp    v.    Hartmann,    51   S.W.2d   22, 
330  Mo.  38*6. 

(3)  Failure  of  commissioners,  ap- 
praising land  condemned,  to  include 
description  thereof,  date  of  view*  and 
other    details,    was    not   irregularity 
authorizing   vacation   of  final   judg- 
ment   awarding    owner    amount    of 
damages   assessed    by,  them. — Board 
of  Com'rs  of  Quay  County  v.  Was- 
son,  24  P.2d  1098,  37  N.M.  '503.  fol- 
lowed ta  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Quay 
County  v.  Gardner,  24  P.2d  1104,  37 
N.M.  514. 

(4)  On    bill    to    review    judgment 


rendered  on  notice  by  publication, 
where  the  issues  were  made  and  tried 
on  the  bill  and  answers  filed  there- 
to, .  the  judgment  will  not  be  set 
aside  merely  because  there  was  tech- 
nical failure  to  set  aside  the  orig- 
inal judgment  and  make  up  the  same 
issues  on  the  old  petition  and  an- 
swers.—Witcher  v.  Hanley,  253  -S.W. 
1002,  299  Mo.  696. 

(5)  A  valid  judgment  is  not  ren- 
dered void  merely  by  an  unauthor- 
ized,  immaterial,  and  nonprejudicial 
interlineation,  and  addition  to  judg- 
ment by  attorney  for  plaintiff  after 
judge  had  signed  judgment  and  im- 
mediately over  judge's  signature  did 
not  change  nature,  force  or  effect  of 
judgment,  and  hence  such  interpola- 
tion did  not  invalidate  otherwise  val- 
id judgment  as  constituting  a  fraud 
upon  defendants'  rights. — Parrish  v. 
Ferriell,    186    S.W.2d    625,    299    Ky. 
676. 

(6)  Judgment  creditor's  laches  in 
not  having  judgment  entered  of  rec- 
ord unttl  more  than  six  years  after 
rendition   thereof,   where   there   was 
no  showing  that  judgment  debtor  had 
been  harmed  in  any  way  by  belated 
filing,    since   belated  entry  of  judg- 
ment did  not  extend  lien  thereof. — 
Harvey  v.  Gibson,   2  S.E.2d  385,  190 
S.C.  98. 

(7)  Other  irregularities. 

'U.S.— Coggeshall  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.S.C., 

95  'F.2d  986. 
Ala.— Du  Pree  v.  Hart  8  So.2d  183, 

242  Ala.  690. 
N.Y.— Peters  v.  Berkeley,  219  N.T.S. 

709,  219  App.Div.  261. 
Pa.— Liberal   Credit  Clothing  Co.   v. 

Tropp,    4    A.2d   565,    135   Pa. Super. 

53. 

34  C.  J.  <p  276  note  84  [a]. 
85.    Ga. — Nottingham    v.    Nicholson, 

157  S.B.  11'8,  42  Ga,App.  -628. 

C.J.  p  277  note  85. 

An  inquest  to  make  partition  will 
not  *be  set.  aside  for  an  irregularity 
which  may  be  corrected  by  amend- 
ment.— In  re  Schweitzer,  3  DeLCo., 
Pa.,  285,  4  Lanc.L.Rev.  369,  1  North. 
Co.  65. 
Statute  9*  to  automatic  amendment 

Where  record  was  insufficient  to 
sustain  decree  in  failing  to  require 
county  in  whom  title  to  realty  was 
adjudged  to  pay  county's  bid  on  tax 
sales  to  sheriff  and  in  failing  to 
show  payment  thereof,  and  deficien-l 

484 


cy  could  have  been  supplied  by 
amendment,  plaintiff  was  not  enti- 
tled to  have  decree  set  aside,  in  view 
of  statute  providing  that  an  amenda- 
ble decree  under  such  circumstances 
is,  in  legal  effect,  amended. — Burch  v. 
Dodge  County,  20  S.E.2d  428,  193  Ga. 
890. 

88.  Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Holtkamp  v. 
Hartmann,  51  S.W.2d  22,  330  Mo. 
386. 

N.Y.— C«hn  v.  Warschauer  Sick  Sup- 
port Soc.  Bnei  Israel,  19  N.Y.S. 
2d  742,  appeal  denied  20  N.V.S.2d 
669,  259  App.Div.  914. 
Wyo. — Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Wil- 
liams, 69  P.2d  525,  52  Wyo.  1,  110 

A.L.R:  1453. 

34  C.J.  p  278  note  86. 
Motion  to  open  judgment 

One  moving  t.o  open  judgment  will 
be  held  to  have,  waived  mere  irreg- 
ularity in  entry  thereof. — Pasco  Rur- 
al 'Lighting  Co.  v.  Roland,  88  Pa.  Su- 
per. 245. 
Filing  of  amended  answer 

Defendants  in  partition  action  who 
took  no  further  steps  until  nearly 
two  years  after  filing  of  answer  when 
they  filed  an  amended  answer  after 
cause  had  been  submitted  without 
objection  was  held  not  entitled  to 
assert  that  judgment  entered  on 
same  day  that  amended  answer  was 
filed  was  irregular  or  premature, 
where  filing  of  amended  answer  was 
permitted  on  condition  that  it  should 
not  delay  trial. — Horton  v.  Horton,  92 
S.W.2d  373,  263  Ky.  '413. 

87.  U.S. — Parker  Bros.  v.  Fagan,  C. 
C.A.Fla.,  68  $*.2d  61*6,  certiorari  de- 
nied 54  «.Ct  719,  292  U.S.  '638,  78 
L.Ed.  1490. 

111. — Hamilton  Glass  Co.  v.  Borin 
Mfg.  Co.,  248  IlLApp.  501. 

88.  Ariz. — American   Surety  Ce.  •  of 
New  York  v.  Mosher,  'S4  P.2d  1025, 
48  Ariz.  552. 

Conn. — Corpus  Jtiris  quoted  in.  Stol- 
man  v.  Boston  'Furniture  Co.,  180 
A.  507,  509,  120  Conn.  235. 

Ind. — Isaacs  v.  'Fletcher  American 
Nat.  Bank,  185  N.E.  154,  98  Ind. 
App.  111. 

Mont. — Stenner  v.  Colorado-Montana. 
Mines  Ass'n,  149  P.2d  -546. 

N.C.— Nail  v.  McConnell,  190  SJSL 
210,  211  N.C.  2-58— Fowler  v.  bowl- 
er, 130.  S.B.  315,  190  N.C.  536. 

Oil. — Vann  v.  Board  of  Education  of 
Town  of  (Lenapah,  229  P.  433,  103 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


268 


dicial  or  dangerous  to  the  substantial  rights  and  in- 
terest of  the  party  affected,89  at  least  during  the 
term.90 
Irregularity  apparent  on  -face  of  record.    In  some 


states  it  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  cannot  be 
vacated  for  irregularity  unless  the  irregularity  ap- 
pears on  the  face  of  the  record,91  at  least  where 


Okl.    286— Boaz   v.    Martin,    225    P 
516,  101  Okl.  243. 

•S.D. — Janssen  v.  Tusha,  5  N.W.2d 
684,  68  S.D.  639. 

Tex. — British  General  Ins.  Co.  v 
Ripy,  106  S.W.2d  1047,  130  Tex. 
101. 

Wis.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Feder- 
al Land  Bank  of  St.  Paul  v.  Olson 
1  N.W.2d  T52,  754,  239  Wis.  448. 

Wyo. — Ramsay  v.  Gottsche,  69  P.2d 
535,  51  Wyo.  516 — Bank  of  Com- 
merce v.  Williams,  69  P.2d  525 
52  Wyo.  1,  110  A.L.R.  1463. 

34  C.J.  p  274  note  81. 

89.    Conn. — Corpus    Juris    Quoted   in 

Stolman   v.   Boston  'Furniture  Co., 

180  A.  507,  509,  120  Conn.  235. 
Ga. — Byers    v.    Byers,    154    S.E.    456, 

41  Ga.App.  -671. 
111. — City  of  Des  Plaines  v.  Boecken- 

hauer,  50  N.E.2d  483,  383  111.  475. 
Kan.— Swalwell  v.  Wyatt,  257  P.  742, 

124  Kan.  152. 
La. — Coltraro    v.    Chotin,    1    La.App. 

628. 
Md.— Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d  276, 

181  Md.  206. 

N.J.— Kohn  v.  Lazarus,  15'5  A.  260, 
9  N.J.Misc.  644. 

N.C.— Fowler  v.  Fowler,  130  S.B.  315, 
190  N.Q.  536— Snow  Hill  Live  Stock 
Co.  v.  Atkinson,  126  S.E3.  610,  189 
N.C.  248. 

Okl.— Le  Hoi  Co.  v.  Grimes,  144  P.2d 
973,  93  Okl.  430— Stull  v.  Hoehn, 
126  P.2d  1007,  191  Okl.  190. 

Pa.— Moyer  v.  Meray,  25  A.2d  612, 
14'S  Pa.Super.  284 — Kerstetter  v. 
Kers tetter,  Com.Pl.,  49  GDauph.Co. 
102— Hair  v.  Kulp  Roofing:  &  Paint- 
ing1 Co.,  Com.Pl.,  34  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
14. 

Wis. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Federal 
Land  Bank  of  St.  Paul  v.  Olson, 
1  N.W.2d  752,  754,  239  Wis.  448. 

34  C.J.  p  275  note  83. 

Irregularity  within,  rule 

(1)  The  irregularity  must  be  a 
want  of  adherence  to  .some  pre- 
scribed rule  or  mode  of  proceeding, 
either  in  omitting  to  do  something 
that  is  necessary  for  the  orderly 
conduct  of  a  suit,  or  doing-  it  at  an 
unreasonable  time,  or  in  »an  improp- 
er manner. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Caplow  v.  Kirk- 
wood,  App.,  117  S.W.2d  652— 
Platies  v.  Theodorow  Bakery  Co., 
App.,  79  S.W.2d  504— Robinson  v. 
Martin  Wunderlich  Const.  Co., 
App.,  72.  S.W.2d  127— Mefford  v. 
Mefford,  App.,  26  S.W.2d  804. 
N.M. — Sheppard  v.  Sandfer,  102  P.2d 

6-68,  44  N.M.  357. 
Wash.— In  re  Ellern,  160  P.2d  639,  23 

Wash.2d  219. 
34  OT.  p  275  note  83  M. 


(2)  Judgment  is  "irregular"  when 
ever  it  is  not  entered  in  accordant 
with  practice  and  course  of  proceed 
ing  where  it  was  rendered. 
Conn.— Stolman  v.  Boston  Furniture 

Co.,    180   A.   507,   120   Conn.   23S. 
N.C. — Everett  v.  Johnson,   14   S.B.2d 

520,  219  N.C.  540— Fowler  v.  Fowl 

er  130  S.E.   315.   190   N.C.   536. 

Particular   irregularities    held   suffi- 
cient 

(1)  Entry    of    Judgment    without 
notice    to    parties    concerned. 
Ky.— Middleton    v.    Lewis,    95    S.W 

2d  1114,  265  Ky.  '9. 

Minn. — Kemerer  v.  -State  -Farm  Mut. 
Auto.  Ins.  Co.  of  Bloomington,  111., 
288  N.W.  719,  206  Minn.  325. 

N.M. — Moore  v.  Brannin,  274  P.  50, 
33  N.M.  624. 

Ohio.— Baldwin  v.  Lint,  5  N.B.2d  413, 
53  Ohio  App.  349,  appeal  dismissed 
4  N.B.2d  399,  132  Ohio  St.  140. 

Okl.— Sizemore  v.  Dill,  220  P.  352,  93 
Okl.  176. 

Or.— 'Lawson  v.  Hughes,  270  P.  922, 
127  Or.  16. 

Wash. — Larson  v.  Department  of  (La- 
bor and  Industries,  25  P.2d  1040, 
174  Wash.  618. 

(2)  Entry  of  Judgment  without  no- 
tice, after  transfer,  where  attorneys 
before  transfer  agreed  notice  would 
be  given. — Home  State  Bank  of  Ar- 
cadia V.  Haynes,  290  P.  338,  144  Okl. 
190. 

(3)  Failure  to  give  prior  notice  of 
entry  of  Judgment  in  case  taken  un- 
der advisement  as  required  by  stat- 
ute.— McKinley    County    Abstract    & 
Investment  Co.  v.  -Shaw,  239  P.  865, 
•80  N.M.  517. 

(4)  Where   court   took  case  under 
advisement  and,  before  rendition  of 
Judgment,  plaintiff's  attorney  mailed 
notice,  addressed  to  residence  of  de- 
fendant's attorney,   that  a  form   of 

Judgment  would  be  presented  to 
court,  but  defendant's  attorney  did 
not  receive  notice,  trial  court  prop- 
erly vacated  Judgment  for  plaintiff, 
since  under  the  statute  actual  notice 
from  court  was  required. — R.  V. 
Smith  Supply  Co.  v.  Black,  88  P.2d 
269,  43  N.M.  177. 

(5)  Entry    of    judgment    without 
disposition    having    been    made     of 
counterclaim. — Springfield      Gas      & 
Electric  Co.  v.  Fraternity  Bldg.  Co., 
Mo.App.,  264  S.W.  429. 

06)  Judgment  not  in  conformity 
with  verdict- Mielcarek  v.  Riske,  N. 
D.,  21  N.W.2d  218. 

(7)  Clerical  mlsprision. 
111.— Simon  v.  Balasic,  39  N.E.2d  '685, 
313  I1LAPP.  266. 

485 


Ky.— Stratton    &    Terstegge    Co.    v. 
Begley,  61  S.W.2d  287,  249  Ky.  632. 

(8)  Other  irregularities. 
Ohio. — Morrison    v.    Baker,    App.,    58 

N.B.2d    708 — Ramsey    v.    Holland, 

172  N.B.  411,  -35  Ohio  App.   199. 
Wash. — State   v.    Superior    Court    of 

Okanogan  County,   290  P.  430,  158 

Wash.  46. 
34  C.J.  p  275  note  S3  [c]. 

Particular  matters  held  not  irregu- 
larities 

(1)  The    statute    authorizing    the 
court  to  vacate  a  Judgment  because 
of  "irregularity"  in  obtaining  it  does 
not  authorize  the  vacation  of  a  Judg- 
ment because  of  perjured  testimony 
of  prevailing  party. — Cherry  v.  Gam- 
ble, 224  P.  960,  101  Okl.  234. 

(2)  The  statute  providing  that  no 
judge  of  the  county  court  shall  be 
retained  as   attorney  in  any  action 
which  may  depend   on   or  relate  to 
any  Judgment  passed  by  him  did  not 
require  vacating  Judgment  rendered 
in  proceedings  wherein  claimant  was 
represented    by    attorney    who    was 
public  administrator  of  county  under 
an   appointment  by   the  Judge   who 
presided  over  the  proceedings. — In  re 
Evans'   Estate,    22    N.W.Sd   497,    248 
Wis.  456 

90,  Conn.— Application    of    Title    & 
Guaranty    Co.     of    Bridgeport     to 
Change  Name  to  Bankers'  Security 
Trust  Co.,  145  A.  1'51,  109  Conn.  45. 

Okl. — Curtis  v.  Bank  of  Dover,  241 
P.  173,  113  Okl.  224. 

91.  Ga.— Jackson  v.  Jackson,    35   S. 
B.2d    258,    199    Ga.    716— Fields    v. 
Arnall,  34  S.E.2d  692,  199  Ga,  491. 

Mo. — Badger  Lumber  Co.  v.  Good- 
rich, 184  S.W.2d  435,  35-3  Mo.  769 
— Weatherford  v.  Spiritual  Chris- 
tian Union  Church,  163  S.W.2d  916 
—Harrison  v.  Slaton,  49  S.W.2d  31 
— State  ex  rel.  Caplow  v.  Kirk- 
wood,  Ajpp.,  117  S.W.2d  1652— Mef- 
ford v.  Mefford,  App.,  26  S.W.2d 
804. 

>a. — McConnell  v.  Bowden,  41  A.2d 
849,  352  Pa.  48— Nixon  v.  Nixon, 
198  A,  154,  329  Pa,  256— Harr  v. 
Bernheimer,  185  A.  857,  322  Pa.  412 
—Giles  v.  Ryan,  176  A.  1,  517  Pa. 
6-5— Liberal  Credit  Clothing  Co.  v. 
Tropp,  4  A.2d  565,  135  Pa. Super. 
53 — Eastman  Kodak  Co.  v.  Oseni- 
der,  193  A,  284,  127  Pa.Super.  332 
— Lyman  (Felheim  Co.  v.  Walker, 
193  A.  69,  128  Pa. Super.  1— C.  ' 
Trevor  Bunhara,  Inc.  v.  Maloney, 
7  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  419— Picone  v. 
Barbano,  Com.Pl.,  32  Del.Co.  88— 
•Siddall  v.  Burke,  Com.Pl.,  30  Bel. 
Co.  47— Kahn  v.  Kahn,  Com.Pl.,  47 


§  268 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  application  is  made  after  the  end  of  the  term  at 
which  judgment  was  rendered.92 

The  taxation  of  costs  ivithout  notice  has  been  held 
not  of  itself  a  sufficient  ground  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment,93 especially  where  the  judgment  is  just  and 
equitable94  or  where  no  error  is  claimed.95 

§  269. Fraud  or  Collusion 

Fraud  or  collusion  In  obtaining  Judgment  Is  a  suffi- 
cient ground  for  opening  or  vacating  It,  even  after  the 


term  at  which  It  was  rendered,  provided  the  fraud  was 
extrinsic  and  collateral  to  the  matter  tried  and  not  a 
matter  actually  or  potentially  In  issue  in  the  action. 

The  fact  that  a  judgment  was  obtained  through 
fraud  or  collusion  is  universally  held  to  constitute 
a  sufficient  reason  for  opening  or  vacating  such 
judgment  either  during  or  after  the  term  at  which 
it  was  rendered.96  In  some  jurisdictions  statutes 
confer  power  on  the  courts  to  vacate  judgments 
on  the  ground  of  fraud  and  to  regulate  its  exer- 
cise,97 although  generally  courts  of  record  possess 


La.ck.Jur.  101 — Aponikas  v.  Skryp- 
kun,  Com.Pl.,  $  Sch.Heg.  1. 
34  C.J.  |p  3-57  note  97. 

92.  Mo. — In    re    Tompkins*    Estate, 
App.f  SO  S.W.2d  '659. 

34  C.J.  p  35S  note  98. 

93.  vt.— Nicholas  v.  Nicholas,  67  A. 
531,  80  Vt.  242. 

15  C.J.  p  177  note  45—34  C.J.  p  276 
note  84  [a]  (31),  (32),  p  290  note 
53  [a]. 

Irregularity  in  taxation  of  costs  as 
error  of  law  see  infra  §  274, 

94.  Wis.— Rollins  v.  Kahn,  29  N.W. 
640,  66  Wis.  65'8. 

95.  Vt.— Nicholas  v.  Nicholas,  «67  A. 
531,  80  Vt.  242. 

9a  U.S.— Griffin  v.  Griffin,  App.D.C., 
66  S.Ct.  556,  rehearing  denied  66 
•S.Ct  975— In  re  Cox,  D.C.Ky.,  33 
•F.Supp.  796— Illinois  Printing  Co. 
v.  Electric  Shovel  Coal  Corpora- 
tion, D.C.I11.,  20  F.Supp.  181. 

Ala. — Bean  v.  Harrison,  104  So.  244, 
213  Ala.  33-^Louisville  &  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bridgeforth,  101  So.  807,  20 
Ala.App.  326. 

Ariz.— Gordon  v,  Gordon,  278  P.  375, 
35  Ariz.  -357,  motion  denied  281 
P.  215,  3-5  Ariz.  532— Kendall  v. 
Silver  King  of  Arizona  Mining  Co., 
226  P.  540,  26  Ariz.  456. 

Ark. — Chronister  v.  Robertson,  185  S. 
W.2d  104. 

Cal.— In  re  Estrem's  Estate,  107  P.2d 
36,  16  Cal.2d  5-63— Hirsch  v. 
Hirsch,  App.,  168  P.2d  770 — Cowan 
v.  Cowan,  App.,  166  P.2d  21— Rhea 
V.  Millsap,  156  P.2d  941,  68  CaLApp. 
2d  449— King  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  San  Diego  County,  56  P.2d 
268,  12  QU.App.2d  501 — Kronman 
v.  Kronman,  18  P.2d  712,  129  Cal. 
App.  10— Vale  v.  Maryland  Casual- 
ty Co.,  281  P.  1058,  101  CaLApp. 
599. 

Fla.— Zemurray  v.  Kilgore,  177  So. 
714,  130  Fla.  317 — State  v.  Wright, 
145  So.  598,  107  Fla.  178— Alabama 
Hotel  Co.  v.  J.  L.  Mott  Iron  Works, 
98  So.  825,  86  Fla.  608. 

Ga. — Young  v.  Young,  2  S.E.2d  622, 
188  Ga.  29 — Lester  v.  Graham,  123 
S.E.  37,  32  Ga.App.  379. 

HI. — Barnard  v.  Michael,  63  N.E.2d 
858,  392  111.  130— Nash  v.  Park 
Castles  Apartment  Bldg.  Corpora- 
tion, 50  N.E..2d  725,  384  111.  68— 
Thorne  v.  Thorne,  45  N.E.2d  85, 


316  IlLApp.  451— In  re  Togneri's 
Estate,  15  N.E.2d  908,  296  IlLApp. 
33. 

Md.— Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d  276, 
181  Md.  206. 

Miss.— Rockett  v.  Finley,  18'4  So. 
78,  183  Miss.  308. 

Neb.— Lincoln  County  v.  Provident 
Loan  &  Inv.  Co.  of  Lincoln,  22  N. 
W.2d  609 — State  Life  Ins.  Co.  of 
Indianapolis,  Ind.  v.  Heffner,  269 
N.W.  629,  131  Neb.  700. 

Nev. — Lauer  v.  Eighth  Judicial  Dist 
Court  in  and  for  Clark  County,  140 
P.2d  953,  62  Nev.  78. 

N.J.— Simon  v.  Calabrese,  46  A.2d  58, 
137  N.J.EQ.  581— Kaffltz  v.  Claw- 
son,  36  A.2d  215,  134  N.J.Ea.  4*94. 

NT.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kerr  v. 
Southwest  Fluorite  Co.,  294  P.  324, 
326,  35  N.M.  232. 

N.Y.— Lyons  v.  Goldstein,  47  N.E.Sd 
425,  290  N.Y.  19,  146  A.L.R.  1422 
—In  re  Holden,  2  N.E.2d  631,  271 
N.Y.  212— Scopano  v.  TJ.  S.  Gypsum 
Co.,  3  NT.Y.S.2d  300,  166  Misc.  805. 

N.D.— Jacobson  v.  Brey,  6  N.W.2d 
269,  72  N.D.  269— Smith  v.  Smith, 
299  N.W.  693,  71  N.D.  110— Lamb 
v.  King,  296  N.W.  185,  70  N.D.  469. 

Okl.— Pruner  v.  McKee,  258  P.  749, 
126  Okl.  121. 

Pa.— First  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
of  Bethlehem  v.  Laubach,  5  A.2d 
139,  333  Pa.  34-4— Salus  v.  Fogel, 
153  A.  547,  302  Pa,  268— Sallada 
v.  Mock,  121  A.  64,  277  Pa.  2"85— 
Dormont  Motors  v.  Hoerr,  1  A.2d 
493,  132  Pa.Super.  567— Willetts  v. 
Willetts,  96  Pa.Super.  198— Stoll 
v.  Kunkel,  5  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  161, 
38  York  Leg.Rec.  1 — Zardus  v.  Zar- 
dus,  Com.Pl.,  28  DeLCo.  332 — 
Davis  v.  Tate,  Com.PL,  26  Erie  Co. 
141— Kahn  v.  Kahn,  Com.PL,  47 
Lack.Jur.  101. 

Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  633— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Ferguson  v.  Ferguson, 
Civ.App.,  98  S.W.2d  847,  850— 
Brammer  &  Wilder  v.  Limestone 
County,  Civ. App.,  24  S.W.2d  99,  er- 
ror dismissed — Saunders  v.  Saun- 
ders,  Civ.App.,  293  S.W.  899. 

W.Va. — Baker  v.  Gaskins,  36  S.E.2d 
893. 

34  C.J.  p  278  note  89. 

Collateral  attack  on  ground  of  fraud 
see  infra  §  434. 

486 


Equitable  relief  on  ground  of  fraud 

see  infra  §  372. 
Fraud  as  within  statute  authorizing 

opening   or  vacating  of  Judgment 

for  surprise,  mistake,  or  excusable 

neglect  see  infra  §  280. 
Pacts  held  not  to  constitute  fraud 

Where  case  on  oral  agreement  is 
continued  to  permit  defendant's  coun- 
sel to  take  depositions,  action  of 
plaintiffs  counsel  in  taking  Judgment 
at  subsequent  term,  in  absence  of  de- 
fendant's counsel,  is  not  fraud,  or 
ground  for  setting  Judgment  aside. 
— National  Union  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Ethridge,  124  S.E.  5*46,  32  Ga.App. 
725. 
Fraud  of  party  attacking  Judgment 

A  declaratory  Judgment  establish- 
ing that  plaintiff  had  never  been 
validly  married  to  defendant  would 
not  be  vacated  on  plaintiff's  motion 
on  ground  that  plaintiff  had  facilitat- 
ed granting  of  judgment,  in  that 
she  had  accepted  a  settlement  and 
thereafter  acquiesced  in  the  result 
without  trial  justice's  knowledge. — 
Greenman  v.  Greenman,  53  N.Y.S.2d 
551,  affirmed  59  N.Y.S.2d  153,  269 
App.Div.  998.  t 

Party    attacking    Judgment    not    de- 
ceived 

Fraudulent  misrepresentations  are 
not  ground  for  vacating  decree,  if 
complainant  knew  of  misrepresenta- 
tions or  was  not  deceived. — Grant 
Inventions  Co.  v.  Grant  Oil  Burner 
Corporation,  157  A.  108,  109  NJ".Eq. 
281. 

Fraud  of  executor  or  administrator 
A  Judgment  procured  through  the 
fraud  or  collusion  of  an  executor  or 
administrator  will  not  be  allowed  to 
stand  against  the  objection  of  a 
party  in  interest. — Patterson  v.  Car- 
ter, 4T  So.  133,  1'47  Ala.  522—24  C.J. 
p  888  note  81. 
97.  Ky. — Buttermore  v.  Hensley,  103 

S.W.2d  68,  267  Ky.  669. 
Wash. — Pacific     Telephone     &    Tele- 
graph  Co.    v.    Henneford,    92    P.2d 
214,  199  Wash.  462,  certiorari  de- 
nied   Henneford    v.    Pacific    Tele- 
phone   &   Telegraph   Co.,    59    S.Ct. 
483,  306  U.S.  637,  83  L.Ed.  1038. 
34  C.J.  p  280  note  93. 
Txand  practiced  in  obtaining  Judg- 
ment" 
Where  defendant  was  allegedly  in- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


269 


an  inherent  common-law  power  in  this  behalf,  which 
is  not  •  dependent  on  legislation.98  However,  in- 
ferior courts  not  of  record  do  not  possess  this  pow- 
er," unless  it  is  conferred  by  statute.1 

Nature  of  fraud  required.  While  a  few  cases 
have  held  or  assumed  for  the  purpose  of  the  deci- 
sion that  a  judgment  should  be  vacated  for  fraud 
or  deceit  practiced  by  one  party  on  the  other  in  re- 


gard to  the  cause  of  action,2  the  authority  to  set 
aside  judgments  for  fraud  after  the  term  usually  is 
limited  to  cases  where  the  fraud  complained  of  was 
practiced  in  the  very  act  of  obtaining  the  judgment, 
and  all  cases  of  fraud  which  might  have  been  used 
as  a  defense  to  defeat  the  action  are  excluded;  the 
fraud  must  be  extrinsic  and  collateral  to  the  matter 
tried,  and  not  a  matter  which  was  actually  or  po- 
tentially in  issue  in  the  action,3  unless  the  interpo- 


duced  to  sign  note  by  misrepresenta- 
tion and  misrepresentation  was  al- 
legedly repeated  shortly  before  suit, 
such  fraud,  if  inducing  defendant  to 
believe  that  he  had  no  defense,  was 
"fraud  practiced  in  obtaining  Judg- 
ment" within  statute  permitting  va- 
cation of  judgment  and  granting  new 
trial  after  term. — Rock  Island  Plow 
Co.  v.  Brunkan,  248  N.W.  32,  215 
Iowa  1264. 
Fraud  of  "successful  party" 

A  creditor  who,  in  order  to  es- 
tablish his  claim,  intervened  in  ac- 
tion for  dissolution  of  partnership, 
could  thereby  become  a  "successful 
party"  as  to  judgment  approving  re- 
ceiver's sale  of  personal  property, 
within  statute  authorizing  district 
court  to  vacate  its  judgment,  after 
the  term,  for  fraud  practiced  by  the 
"successful  party." — Mayer  v.  Har- 
rison, 166  P.2d  674,  161  Kan.  'SO. 

98.  Cal.— Rhea  V;  Millsap,  156  P.2d 
941,  68  Cal.App.2d  449. 

Mont— Gillen  v.  Gillen,  159  P.2d  511. 
N.Y. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  People 

v.  Ashworth,  56  N.Y.S.2d  791,  793, 

185  Misc.  391. 
N.D.— Lamb  v.  King,  296  N.W.  185, 

70  N.D.  -469. 
Wis.— In  re  Cudahy's  Estate,  219  N. 

W.  203,  196  Wis.  260. 
Wyo.— Midwest      Refining      Co.      v. 

George,  7  P.2d  213,  '4-4  Wyo.  25. 
34  C.J.  p  279  note  92. 
Motion  made  tinder  statute 

Fact  that  notice  of  motion  to  va- 
cate decree  stated  that  it  was  made 
under  statute  and  for  fraud  did  not 
deprive  court  of  inherent  jurisdic- 
tion to  vacate  decree  obtained  by 
fraud. — Kronman  v.  Kronman,  18  P. 
2d  712,  129  CaLApp.  10. 

99.  N.Y. — Corpus    Juris    Quoted    in 
People    v.    Ashworth,    5*   N.Y.S.2d 
791,  793,  185  Misc.  391. 

3-4  C.J.  p  280  note  94. 

1.  N.Y. — Corpus     Juris    auoted    in 
People    v.    Ashworth,    56   N.Y.S.2d 
791,  793,  185  Misc.  391. 

34  C.J.  p  280  note  95. 

2.  111. — Chicago    v.     Newberry    Li- 
brary,  79  N.B.   666,   224  111.   330. 

34  C.J.  p  283  note  8. 
Fraud  held  immaterial 

Refusal  to  strike  out  judgment 
for  manager  of  department  who  sued 
owner  of  milliner/  establishment 
for  percentage  of  net  profits  of  de- 


partment, because  manager  falsely 
represented  that  she  was  unmarried 
and  was  working  in  similar  business 
at  inception  of  contract,  which  could 
be  severed  after  six  months,  was 
held  not  error,  where  manager  vol- 
untarily left  after  three  years'  serv- 
ice.—Morris  v.  Phillips,  168  A.  400, 
.165  Md.  392. 
3.  U.S.— Piske  v.  Buder,  C.C.A.Mo., 

125   F.2d   841— In   re   Burton   Coal 

Co.,    D.C.I11,,    57    F.Supp.    361. 
Ariz. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Schus- 
ter v.  Schuster,  73  P.2d  1345,  134<8, 

51  Ariz.  1. 
Ark. — Manning  v.  Manning,  175  S.W. 

2d   982,    206   Ark.    425— Karnes   v. 

Gentry,   172   S.W.2d  42-4,   205   Ark. 

1112— Kersh  Lake   Drainage   Dist. 

v.  Johnson,  157  S.W.2d  39,  203  Ark. 

315,    certiorari   denied   Johnson  v. 

Kersh  Lake  Drainage  Dist.,  62  S. 

Ct    10-44,    316    U.S.    673,    86    L.Ed. 

1748 — Baker  v.  State,  for  Use  and 

Benefit    of    Independence    County, 

1'47  S.W.2d  17,  201  Ark.  652— Hol- 
land v.  Wait,   86   S.W.2d  415,   191 

Ark.  405— Peild  v.  Waters,  1  S.W. 

2d  807,  175  Ark.  1169. 
Cal.— Metzger  v.  Vestal,  42  P.2d  67, 

2    Cal.2d    517— Hirsch    v.    Hirsch, 

App.,  168  P.2d  770. 
Ga.— Corpus    Juris    cited    in    Aber- 

crombie  v.  Hair,  196  S.E.  447,  450, 

185  Ga.  728. 
Ind.— State  v.  Martin,   154  N.E.  284, 

198  Ind.  516. 
Iowa.— Girdey  v.    Girdey,    238   N.W. 

•432,  213  Iowa  1. 
Kan.— Suter  v.  Schultz,  7  P.2d  55,  134 

Kan.  538 — Putnam  v.  Putnam,  268 

P.  797,  126  Kan.  479. 
Ky.— Clifton  v.   McMakin,  157    S.W. 

2d  -81,  288  Ky.  813. 
Minn. — Swan  v.  Rivoli  Theater  Co., 

219   N.W.    85,    1T4    Minn.    137. 
Miss. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Car- 

raway  v.   State,   148   So.   3*40,   344, 

167  Miss.  390. 
Mo.— State  ex  inf.  McKittrick  ex  rel. 

Oehler  v.  Church,  App.,  158  S.W.2d 

215. 
Nev.— Calvert   v.    Calvert,    122    P.2d 

426,  61  Nev.  168. 
N.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kerr  v. 

Southwest  Fluorite  Co.,  294  P.  324, 

326,  35  N.M.  232. 
N.Y.— In   re   Holden,    2    N.BL2d   <631, 

271   N.Y.    212— Klein   v.    Fairberg, 

276   N.Y.S.    347,   243   App.Div.    609. 
N.D. — Jacobson    v.    Brey,    '6    N.W.2d 

J69,  72  N.D.  269. 

487 


Ohio.— May  v.  May,  50  N.E.2d  790, 
72  Ohio  App.  82 — Haynes  v.  United 
Ins.  Co.,  194  N.E.  3»S1,  48  Ohio  App. 
475. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Metzger 
v.  Turner,  158  P.2d  701,  704,  195 
Okl.  406— Davison  v.  Mutual  Sav- 
ings &  Loan  Ass'n,  73  P.2d  455,  181 
Okl.  29S— Render  v.  Capitol  Hill 
Undertaking  Co.,  56  P.2d  829,  176 
Okl.  520— Wright  v.  Saltmarsh,  50 
P.2d  694,  174  Okl.  226— Lee  v.  Ter- 
rell, 40  P.2d  10,  170  Okl.  310— 
Brown  v.  Exchange  Trust  Co.,  36 
P.2d  495,  169  Okl.  175— Riley  v. 
Jones,  4  P.2d  1070,  153  Okl.  64— 
Bird  v.  Palmer,  3  P.2d  890,  152 
Okl.  3,  followed  In  Bird  v.  Palm- 
er, 3  P.2d  894,  152  Okl.  7— Vacuum 
Oil  Co.  v.  Brett,  300  P.  «32,  150 
Okl.  15-3 — Cherry  v.  Gamble,  224 
P.  960,  101  Okl.  234. 
Pa.— Greiner  v.  Brubaker,  30  A.2d 
621,  T51  Pa.Super.  515,  certiorari 
denied  Royer  v.  Greiner,  '64  S.Ct. 
42,  320  U.S.  742,  88  L.Ed.  440,  re- 
hearing denied  64  S.Ct  194,  320  U. 
S.  813,  88  L.Ed.  491,  rehearing  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct  434,  320  U.S.  816,  88 
L.Ed.  493 — Estok  v.  Estok,  157  A. 
356,  102  Pa.Super.  604— Kahn  v. 
Kahn,  Com.PL,  47  Lack.Jur.  101. 
Tex. — O'Meara  v.  O'Meara,  Civ.App., 
181  S.W.2d  891,  error  refused- 
Price  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  109  S. 
W.2d  1144,  error  dismissed—Cor- 
pus Juris  cited  in  Traders  &  Gen- 
eral Ins.  Co.  v.  Rhodabarger,  Civ. 
App.,  109  S.W.2d  1119,  1123— Cor- 
pus  Juris  quoted  in  'Ferguson  v. 
Ferguson,  Civ.App.,  98  S.W.2d  847, 
1850 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Yount- 
Lee  Oil  Co.  v.  Federal  Crude  Oil 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  92  S.W.2d  49-3,  495— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 
Wright  Civ.App.,  '56  S.W.2d  950, 
952— Saunders  v.  Saunders,  Civ. 
App.,  293  S.W.  899— Wame  v. 
Jackson,  Civ.App.,  273  S.W.  315. 
34  C.J.  p  230  note  46,  p  287  note  25. 
What  constitutes  "extrinsic  or  col- 
lateral fraud" 

(1)  "Fraud,  which  is  extrinsic  or 
collateral  to  the  matter  tried  by  the 
court,"  withta  the  rule,  is  fraud,  the 
effect  of  which  is  to  prevent  the  un- 
successful party  from  having  a  trial 
or  from  presenting  his  case  fully,  as 
keeping  him  away  from  court,  or 
purposely  keeping  him  in  ignorance 
of  the  action,  or  where  an  attorney 
fraudulently  pretends  to  represent  a 


269 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


sition  of  such  defense  was  prevented  by  fraud,  ac- 
cident, or  the  act  of  the  opposite  party  without  fault 
or  blame  on  his  own  part.4  The  principle. that  a 
final  judgment  concludes  all  matters  litigated,  or 
which  might  have  been  litigated  in  the  case,  affords 
the  fundamental  reason  for  this  rule5  which  applies 
equally  whether  the  judgment  is  attacked  by  mo- 
tion in  the  cause  or  by  separate  suit.6  The  instances 
in  which  the  judgment  may  be  vacated  are  those  in 


which  the  party  is  prevented  from  having  a  fai* 
trial  of  the  real  issue  by  reason  of  the  fraudulent 
contrivance  of  his  adversary.7 

Fraud  practiced  on  the  court  is  always  ground 
for  vacating  the  judgment,  as  where  the  court  is 
deceived  or  misled  as  to  material  circumstances,  or 
its  process  is  abused,  resulting  in  the  rendition  of  a 
judgment  which  would  not  have  been  given  if  the 
whole  conduct  of  the  case  had  been  fair.8  So  a 


party  and  connives  at  his  defeat  or, 
being  regularly  employed,  sells  out 
his  client's  interest,  or  where  a  par- 
ty, residing  without  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court,  is  induced  "by  false  pre- 
tenses or  representations  to  come 
within  the  jurisdiction  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  getting  personal  service 
of  process  on  him,  or  where,  through 
the  instrumentality  of  the  successful 
party,  the  witnesses  of  his  adversary 
are  forcibly  or  illegally  detained 
from  court  or  bribed  to  disobey  the 
subpoena  served  on  them,  or  where 
a  judgment  is  obtained  in  violation 
of  an  agreement  between  the  parties. 
U.S. — U.  iS.  v.  Kusche,  D.C.Cal.,  56 

F.Supp.  201. 
Mont— Clark  v.  Clark,  210  P.  93,  64 

Mont.  3-86. 
Okl.— Beatty  v.   Beatty,   242   P.   7«66, 

114  Okl.  5. 
Tex.— Price   v.    Smith,   Civ.App.,   109 

S.W.2d  1144. 
34  C.J.  p  280  note  96  [b]. 

<2)  "-Extrinsic    fraud"    is    act    or 
conduct  preventing   fair  submission 
of  controversy. 
Kan.— Putnam    v.    Putnam,    268    P. 

797,  126  Kan.  479. 
Pa.— Willetts  v.  Willetts,  96  Pa.Su- 

per.  198. 

Hearsay  evidence 

Proof  that  only  evidence  given  by 
plaintiff,  in  quiet  title  action  against 
county,  was.  hearsay  evidence,  would 
not  establish  that  decree  in  favor  of 
plaintiff  was  fraudulently  entered, 
so  as  to  provide  ground  for  vacat- 
ing the  decree. — Harter  v.  King 
County,  119  P.2d  919,  11  Wash.2d 
583. 

False  allegations  in  pleadings  are 
not  such  fraud  as  will  justify  or  re- 
quire vacation  of  the  judgment — 
Steele  v.  The  Maccabees,  53  P.2d 
232,  175  Okl.  471—34  C.J.  p  280  pote 
96  [c]. 
Defendant's  fraud  as  to  garnishee 

Where  insurer  under  automobile 
liability  policy  was  summoned  as 
garnishee  in  attachment  execution 
on  a  judgment  obtained  in  action  by 
injured  party  against  insured,  in 
which  insurer  was  not  a  party,  "peti- 
tion to  open  judgment  on  ground  of 
collusion  and  fraud  imposed  on  gar- 
nishee by  insured  and  injured  party 
was  properly  denied,  since  such  de- 
fenses could  be  interposed  in  the  at- 
tachment proceeding;  and  the  pro- 


cedure formerly  adhered  to  of  per- 
mitting a  party  to  open  judgment  to 
interpose  a  defense  of  fraud  or  col- 
lusion to  defraud  garnishee  should 
not  be  resorted  to  unless  there  is 
some  compelling  reason  therefor  and 
the  third  party  should  be  compelled 
to  litigate  his  right  in  a  collateral 
issue. — Renschler  v.  Pizano,  198  A. 
33,  329  Pa.  249. 

4.  U.S.— Hartford-Empire      Co.      v. 
Hazel-Atlas    Glass    Co.,    C.C.A.Pa., 
137    P.2d    764,    reversed    on   other 
grounds  Hazel-Atlas   Glass   Co.  v. 
Hartford-Empire  Co.,  64  S.Ct   997, 
322    U.S.    238,    88   'L.Ed.    1250,    re- 
hearing denied   64    S.Ct   1281,    322 
U.S.    772,    88    'L.Ed.    1596.     Motion 
denied,     C.C.A.,      Hartford-Empire 
Co.  v.   Shawkee  Mfg.  Co.,  147  F.2d 
•532 — Hartford    -    -Empire    Co.     v. 
Shawkee    Mfg.   Co.,    C.C.A.Pa.,    137 
F.2d      764,      reversed      on      other 
grounds  Shawkee  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hart- 
ford-Empire Co.,  64  S.Ot.  1014,  322 
U.S.   271,   88   L.Ed.   1269,  rehearing 
denied  64  S.Ct  1281,  3221  U.S.  772, 
88    L.Ed.    1596.     Motion   denied   C. 
C.A.,      Hartford-Empire      Co.      v. 
Shawkee  Mfg.  Co.,   147  F.2d  532— 
Abbott  v.  Mtna.  Casualty  &  Surety 
Co.,    D.O.Md.,    42  'F.Supp.   793,   af- 
firmed   C.O.A.,    -aEtna    Casualty    & 
Surety  Co.  v.  Abbott,  130  'F.2d  40. 

Ariz. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  -Schuster 
v.  Schuster,  73  P.2d  '1345,  134-8,  51 
Ariz.  1. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Metzger 
v.  Turner,  158  P.2d  701,  704,  195 
Okl.  406— Bird  v.  Palmer,  3  P.2d 
890,  152  Okl.  3,  followed  in  Bird  v. 
Palmer,  3  P.2d  894,  152  Okl.  7. 

Pa. — Fleming  v.  Fleming,  83  Pa.  Su- 
per. 554. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Traders 
&  General  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rhodabarger, 
Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d  1119,  1123— 
Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ferguson 
v.  Ferguson,  Civ.App.,  98  S.W.2d 
847,  850. 

34  C.J.  p  281  note  97. 

-Failure  to  interpose  defenses  gen- 
erally as  ground  for  opening  or 
vacating  judgment  see  infra  §  272. 

5.  U.S. — U.  S.  v.  Throckmorton,  Cal., 
98  U.S.  '61,  25  L.Ed  93. 

34  C.J.  p  282  note  99. 
8.    Mont— Clark  v.  Clark,  210  P.  93, 
64  Mont.  386. 

7.  Kan. — Putnam  v.  Putnam,  268  P. 
797,  126  Kan,  4?9. 

488 


Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Stout 
v.  Derr,  42  P.2d  136,  13'8,  139,  171 
Okl.  1-32. 

34  C.J.  p  282  note  2. 

8.  U.S. — American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lucas, 
D.C.Mo.,  38  F.Supp.  926,  appeals 
dismissed  62  S.Ct  107,  314  U.S. 
575,  86  L.Ed.  466  and  affirmed  C.O. 
A,,  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scheufler, 
129  F.2d  143,  certiorari  denied  «3 
S.Ct  257,  317  U.S.  6-87,  87  iL.Ed. 
5-51,  rehearing  denied  *63  S.Ct  433, 
317  U.S.  712,  87  L.Ed.  567. 

Ark.— Holland  v.  Wait  86  S.W.2d 
415,  191  Ark.  405. 

Cal.— Kasparian  v.  Kasparian,  W  P. 
2d  802,  132  CaLApp.  773. 

N.T. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In  re 
Holden,  2  KE.2d  631,  633,  271  N. 
T.  212— In  re  Gellis'  Estate,  252  N. 
T.S.  725,  141  Misc.  432. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Stout 
v.  Derr.  42  P.2d  136,  138,  139,  171 
Okl.  132. 

Pa.— Willetts  v.  Willetts,  96  Pa-Su- 
per. 198. 

34  C.J.  p  282  note  3. 
Concealment  of  material  facts 

(1)  The      concealment     of     facts 
which,   if  revealed  to  a  trial  court, 
may  result  in  a  postponement  of  an 
adjudication  until  absent  party  can 
be      heard,      constitutes      "extrinsic 
fraud"   which   will   warrant   setting 
aside    of   the   judgment — Landon   v. 
Landon,   Cal.App.,   169   P.2d   980. 

(2)  An  order  of  partition  procured 
by  a  party  who  concealed  such  ma- 
terial facts  as  would  have  defeated 
the    action    is    properly   vacated    on 
the   application   of   the   real   parties 
in  interest — Daleschal  v.  Geiser,   13 
P.  -595,  36  Kan.  374. 

(3)  Judgment      obtained      against 
corporation    by    default    in    action 
wherein    four   of  five   directors   had 
adverse  interest  constituted  "extrin- 
sic fraud  or  collusion/'  warranting 
vacation  of  judgment  at  instance  of 
stockholder,  where  directors'  interest 
had    not    been    disclosed. — Kerr    v. 
Southwest  Fluorite  Co..   294  .P.   324,  . 

35  N.M.  232. 

Fraud  in  service  of  process 

(1)  A  judgment  obtained  against 
one  induced  by  fraud  to  come  within 
the  jurisdiction  where  he  is  served 
with  process  may  be  set  aside  as 
fraudulent.— Wyman  v.  Newhouse,  C. 
C.A.ST.Y.,  93  F.2d  313,  115  A.L.R.  *60, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


270 


judgment  may  be  vacated  for  misrepresentations  or 
tricks  practiced  on  defendant  to  keep  him  away 
from  the  trial,  or  to  prevent  him  from  claiming  his 
rights  in  the  premises,  or  from  setting  up  an  avail- 
able defense,9  or  for  fraudulent  collusion  between 
some  of  the  parties  to  the  action,  or  between  the 
counsel  in  the  case,  working  injury  to  the  just 
rights  of  the  others.1**  However,  mere  failure  to 
disclose  to  the  adversary,  or  to  the  court,  matters 
which  would  defeat  one's  own  claim  or  defense  is 
not  such  extrinsic  fraud  as  will  justify  or  require 
vacation  of  the  judgment.11 


While  there  is  some  authority  to  the  contrary,12 
actual  fraud  as  distinguished  from  constructive 
fraud  has  been  held  essential,13  except  in  the  case 
of  judgments  against  municipalities.14 

§  270.    Perjury 

In  general  perjury  at  the  trial  Is  not  regarded  as  a 
ground  for  vacating  the  Judgment. 

Perjury  at  the  trial  generally  is  held  to  be  no 
ground  for  vacating  the  judgment16  as  being  one 


certiorari    denied    58   S.Ct    8-31,    30*3 
U.S.  664,  82  I^Bd,  1122. , 

(2)  A  willful  misstatement  of  de- 
fendant's address  In  an  affidavit  for 
publication  of  summons  is  "extrinsic 
fraud"  which  justifies  setting  asidi 
judgment  resulting  from  proceed- 
ings of  which  defendant  did  not 
have  notice. — Rivieccio  v.  Bothan 
Cal.,  1*5  P.2d  677. 

9.  Okl. — Covington  v.  Anthony,   128 
P.2d    1012,    191    Okl.    266— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Stout  v.  Derr,  42 
P.2d  136,  138,  139,  171  OkL  132. 

Pa,— Kahn  v.  Kahn,  Com.PL,  47  Lack. 

Jur.     101 — Schantz     v.     Clemmer, 

Com.Pl.,  21  X,eh.!,.J.  394. 
34  C.J.  p  282  note  4. 

10.  Ga. — Hargroves'  Bx'rs  v.  Nix,  14 
Ga.  316. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  to  Stout 

v.  Derr,  42  P.2d  136,  138,  139,  171 

Okl.  132— In  re  Gypsy  Oil  Co.,  285 

P.  67,  141  Okl.  291. 

Tex. — Ferguson    v.     Ferguson,    Civ. 

App.,  98  S.W.2d  847. 
34  C.J.  p  2*83  note  5. 
Bribery 

Where  suits  by  fire  insurance  com- 
panies to  enjoin  superintendent  of 
insurance  from  Interfering  with  col- 
lection of  proposed  increased  rates 
were  settled  by  bribery  of  the  super- 
intendent the  bribery  constituted 
extrinsic  fraud  which  would  permit 
reopening  of  decrees  of  dismissal 
after  term  for  purpose  of  ordering 
redistribution  of  amount  of  rate  in- 
crease which  had  been  impounded 
and  collected  pending  the  litigation. 
— American  Ins.  Co.  v.  (Lucas,  D.C. 
Mo.,  38  F,Supp.  926,  appeals  dis- 
missed 62  S.Ct  107,  314  U.S.  575,  *6 
L.Ed.  466,  and  affirmed,  C.C.A., 
American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scheufler,  129 
'F.2d  143,  certiorari  denied  63  S.Ct. 
257,  317  US.  687,  87  L.B3d.  551,  re- 
hearing denied  <63  &Ct  433,  -317  U.S. 
.  712,  87  L.Bd.  567. 
No  injury  resulting 

Collusion  between  third  persons 
and  municipal  employees  or  official 
not  shown  to  have  resulted  in  injury 
to  the  municipality  is  not  cause  for 
setting  aside  a  judgment  regularly 
obtained,— City  of  New  York  v.  Bra- 
dy, 22  N.E.  237,  115  N.Y.  «9$. 


11.    Ga. — Young  v.  Young,   2  S.E.25 

'62*2,    188    Ga,    29— Coker  v.   (Bison 

151    S.E.    682,   40  Oa,App.   835. 
Mo. — Corpus   Juris   quoted  Ja  'First 

Nat.   Bank  &  Trust  Co.   of  King 

City   v.    Bowman,    15    S.W.Sd   842 

852,  322  Mo.  654. 
Okl.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Stout 

v.  Derr,  42  P.2d  136,  13$,  139,  171 

Okl.  132. 
Tex.— Corpus  Juris  oited  in  Price  v 

Smith,   Civ.App.,   109   S.W.2d   1144 

1149. 

•34  C.J.  p  283  note  6. 
Nondisclosure  of  agreement  with  oo- 
defendant 

In  action  against  several  defend- 
ants Jointly  to  recover  for  an  injury, 
plaintiff  was  under  no  duty  to  inform 
one  defendant  of  agreement  with  co- 
defendants  under  which  plaintiff  re- 
ceived sum  of  money  in  satisfaction 
of  her  claim  against  them,  and  plain- 
tiffs nondisclosure  thereof  was  not 
"fraudulent"  so  as  to  require  vaca- 
tion of  judgment  against  such  de- 
fendant for  fraud. — Gillespie  v. 
Brewer,  Miss.,  10  So.2d  197. 

12.  inadvertent       withholding       of 
facts 

The  right  of  a  court  to  vacate  or 
modify  judgment  is  not  limited  to 
showing  that  it  was  procured  by 
actual  fraud,  collusion,  and  misrep- 
resentation, but  it  is  sufficient  if 
there  is  a  showing  that  the  rights  of 
interested  parties  are  prejudicially 
affected  by  the  judgment  and  if  there 
was  inadvertently  a  withholding 
from  the  court  of  matters  which 
should  have  been  properly  before  it, 
but  for  which  withholding  the  judg- 
ment would  not  have  been  rendered. 
— Pengelly  v.  Thomas,  App.,  65  N.-B. 
2d  897,  appeal  dismissed  67  N.B.2d 
714,  146  Ohio  St.  693. 

13.  Mo. — Corpus     Juris    quoted    In 
First  Nat.   Bank  &  Trust  Co.   of 
King  City  v.  Bowman,   15  S.W.2d 
•842,  852,  322  Mo.  654. 

Okl.— Abernathy  v.  Huston,   26  P.2d 

939,  166  Okl.  184. 
4  -C.J.  p  2S3  note  7. 

14.  Constructive  or  legal  fraud  as 
sufficient 

Where  illegal  claim  against  munic- 
pal  or  quasi-municipal  corporation! 

489 


is  reduced  to  Judgment  under  agree- 
ment between  claimant  and  officers 
representing  municipality  without 
judicial  determination  of  merits  of 
claim  and  where  circumstances  sur- 
rounding entry  of  judgment  Justify 
finding  of  collusion,  court  may  va- 
cate judgment  on  grounds  of  legal 
fraud;  and  where,  after  taxpayer 
had  established,  in  test  cases,  right 
to  recover  protested  tax  because  not 
properly  notified  of  increase  in  prop- 
erty valuation,  attorneys  of  claim- 
ants in  consolidated  case  and  county 
official  prepared  journal  entry  recit- 
ing rendition  of  Judgment  in  consoli- 
date4  case  as  of  date  of  trial  of  test 
cases  and  obtained  judge's  signature 
without  consulting  city  and  school 
district,  not  parties  to  case  but  in- 
terested in  funds  involved  and  whose 
attorneys  had  indicated  disposition 
to  participate  in  trial,  facts  estab- 
lished that  Judgment  in  consolidated 
case  should  be  vacated  because  based 
on  legal  fraud.— Abernathy  v.  Hus- 
ton, supra. 

15.  U.S.— Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Rellstab,  N.J.,  48  S.Ct.  203,  276 
U.-S,  1,  72  L.E6V  439. 

Ark.— Turley  v.  Owen,  '69  S.W.2d  882, 
188  Ark.  1067. 

Cal.— Stiebel  v.  Roberts,  109  P.2d  22, 
42  Cal.App.2d  434. 

Conn. — Boushay  v.  Boushay,  27  A.2d 
800,  129  Conn.  347. 

111. — Thorne  v.  Thorne,  45  N.E.'2d  85, 
316  IlLApp.  451. 

Iowa. — Genco  v.  Northwestern  Mfg. 
Co.,  214  N.W.  €45,  203  Iowa  1390. 

Mass.— Stephens  v.  Lampron,  30  N, 
B.2d  838,  308  Mass.  50,  131  A.L.R. 
1516 — Chagnon  v.  Chagnon,  15  N. 
E.2d  231,  300  Mass.  309. 

Mo.— Wright  v.  Wright,  16-5  S.W.2d 
870,  350  Mo.  325. 

Mont — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  m>«m 
v.  Khan,  105  P.2d  665,  *66,  110 
Mont.  591. 

Okl.— Davison  v.  Mutual  Savings  & 
X<aan  Ass'n,  73  P.2d  455,  H81  Okl. 
295— Render  v.  Capitol  Hill  Under- 
taking Co.,  56  P.2d  829,  17-6  Okl. 
520— Small  v.  White,  46  P.2d  517, 
173  Okl.  83— State  ex  reL  Oklaho- 
ma Tax  Commission  v.  Sinclair 
Prairie  Oil  Co.,  41  P.2d  876,  171 
OkL  498— National  Aid  Life  Asa'n 


§  271 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


obtained  by  fraud,16  within  the  rule  stated  supra  § 
269,  unless  specially  made  so  by  statute,17  or  un- 
less the  perjury  is  connected  with  extrinsic  or  col- 
lateral fraud  and  the  complaining  party  is  without 
fault.18  This  rule  rests  on  grounds  of  public  policy 
which  requires  that  there  shall  be  an  end  to  liti- 
gation.1^ Some  courts  hold,  however,  that  a  judg- 
ment may  be  vacated  for  perjury  under  certain  con- 
ditions,20 as  where  a  party  obtains  a  judgment  by 
his  own  willful  perjury,  or  by  the  use  of  false  tes- 
timony, which  he  knows  at  the  time  to  be  false.21 
In  any  event  perjury  is  not  ground  for  vacating  the 
judgment  where  the  judgment  does  not  rest  on  the 
perjured  testimony,  as  where  it  relates  to  an  imma- 
terial matter,22  or  where  it  does  not  appear  that  the 


perjury  was  in  any  way  instrumental  in  the  court's 
assuming  jurisdiction  of  the  case.23 


§  271. 


Violation  of  Agreement 


A  judgment  secured  in  violation  of  an  agreement  not 
to  enter  judgment  may  be  vacated  on  that  ground. 

Where  there  was  an  agreement  between  the  par- 
ties that  the  case  should  be  continued,  or  that  de- 
fendant's time  to  answer  should  be  extended,  or  that 
the  action  should  be  dismissed  as  the  result  of  a 
compromise  or  settlement,  or  a  promise  of  plaintiff 
that  he  would  not  press  the  case  to  judgment,  in  vi- 
olation of  which  plaintiff,  without  notice  to  defend- 
ant, secures  a  judgment  against  the  latter  in  his 
absence,  it  is  good  ground  for  vacating  the  judg- 


v.  Morgan,  33  P.2d  290,  1'68  Okl.  224 
—National  Aid  Life  Ass'n  v.  Mor- 
gan, 32  P.2d  2-88,  168  Okl.  226— 
Oklahoma  Union  Ins.  -Co.  v.  Mor- 
gan ,32  P.2d  287,  168  Okl,  225— 
Oklahoma  Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
gan, 32  P.2d  287,  168  OkL  225— 
Riley  v.  Jones,  4  P.2d  1070,  153 
Okl.  -64— Bird  v.  Palmer,  3  P.2d 
890,  152  Okl.  2,  followed  in  -3  P.2d 
894,  152  Okl.  7— Vacuum  Oil  Co.  v. 
Brett,  300  P.  '632,  150  Okl.  1'53— 
Bell  v.  Knoble,  225  P.  897,  99  Okl. 
110— Cherry  v.  Gamble,  224  P.  960, 
101  Okl.  234. 
Pa. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Crouse  v. 
Volas,  178  A.  414,  416,  117  Pa.-Su- 
per.  532 — Kahn  v.  Kahn,  Com.Pl., 
47  JLack.Jur.  101. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Crouch 
v.  McGaw,  13«S  S.W.2d  94,  96,  134 
Tex.  -633— Yount-Lee  Oil  Co.  v.  Fed- 
eral Crude  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  92  S. 
W.2d  493,  certiorari  denied  Federal 
Crude  Oil  Co.  v.  YountJLee  Oil  Co., 
«7  S.Ct  16,  299  U.S.  554,  81  L.Ed. 
408. 
Wis. — Gray  v.  Gray,  287  N.W.  708, 

2-32  Wis.  400. 
34  C.J.  p  284  note  10. 
Equitable  relief  on  ground  of  perjury 

see  infra  §  374. 
Opportunity  to  refute 

The  alleged  perjury  of  witness  on 
trial  of  contested  issue,  to  which  op- 
posing party  had  the  opportunity  to 
refute,  will  not  furnish  basis  for 
setting  aside  Judgment  on  bill  of  re- 
view.— Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  633. 

A  forged  instrument  introduced  In 
evidence  is  the  equivalent  of  per- 
jured testimony,  for  which  a  judg- 
ment cannot  be  set  aside. — Bradford 
v.  Trapp,  193  P.  584,  49  CaLApp.  493 
—34  C.J.  p  280  note  96  [o]. 

ia    111. — Conway  v.  Gill,  257  Ill.Aj?p. 

606, 
Iowa.— Girdey   v.    Girdey,    288    N.W. 

4*32,  213  Iowa  1. 
tf.Y.— Cowens  v.  Ticonderoga  Pulp  & 

Paper  Co.,  217  N.Y.S.  647,  127  Misc. 

898,  affirmed  in  part  219  N.Y.S.  774, 

219  App.Div.  749,  and  reversed  in 


part  on  other  grounds  Cowans  v 
Ticonderoga  Pulp  &  Paper  Co.,  219 
N.Y.S.  284,  219  AppjDiv.  120,  appeal 
dismissed  in  part  157  N.E.  862,  245 
N.Y.  573,  affirmed  159  N.E.  669,  246 
N.Y.  603. 

Okl.— Small   v.   White,    46   P.2d    517 
173  Okl.  83. 

Pa.— Sallada  v.  Mock,  121  A.  54,  277 
Pa.  28'5. 
Perjury    is    "intrinsic    fraud"    for 

which  a  judgment  will  not  ordinarily 

be  vacated. 

CaL— Adams  v.  Martin,  44  P.2d  572, 
3  Cal.2d  24*6. 

Kan.— Suter  v.  Schultz,  7  P.2d  5-5,  134 
Kan.  538. 

Pa. — Greiner  v.  Brubaker,  30  A.2d 
621,  151  Pa, Super.  515,  certiorari 
denied  Royer  v.  Greiner,  64  S.Ct. 
42,  320  U.S.  742,  S'8  (L.Ed.  640,  re- 
hearing denied  64  -S.Ct.  194,  320  U. 
S.  31-3,  88  L.Ed.  491,  rehearing  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct.  434,  320  U.S.  816,  88 
L.Ed.  493— Willetts  v.  Willetts, 
Pa.  Super.  198. 

17.    Ark.— JFawcett  v.   Rhyne,   $3    S. 

W.2dr  349,  187  Ark.  340. 
•Ga. — Grogan  v.  Deraney,  143  S.E.  912, 

38  Ga.App.  287. 
34  C.J.  p  284  note  12. 
Statute  authorizing  new  trial 

Perjured  testimony  in  obtaining 
judgment  constitutes  "fraud"  with- 
in statute  authorizing  new  trial. — 
Reynolds  v.  Evans,  50  S.W.2d  €49, 
244  Ky.  267. 

&    Wash, — E.  R.  Thomas  &  Co.  v. 
Penland,  268  P.  867,  148  Wash.  279. 

la,     111.— Cohen  v.  Sparberg,  44  N.E. 

2d  335,  '316  Ill-App-.  140. 
34C.J.'p  285  note  13. 

20.    Against  arood  conscience 

Only  when  a  judgment  is  clearly 
shown  to  have  been  obtained  by 
fraud  or  false  testimony  and  when  it 
would  be  against  good  conscience 
to  enforce  judgment  and  proper 
showing  of  due  diligence  is  made 
will  a  judgment  be  vacated  after 
term  in  which  it  was  rendered. — Lin- 
coln County  v.  Provident  Loan  & 

490 


Inv.  Co.  of  Lincoln,  Neb.,  22  N.W.2d 
609— Kielian    v.    Kent   &   Burke   Co., 
2#8  N.W.  79,  131  Neb.  308. 
Complaining  party  without  fault 

An  action  will  lie  to  set  aside  a 
judgment  procured  by  the  false  and 
perjured  testimony  of  the  party  in 
whose  favor  the  judgment  was  ren- 
dered, where  the  party  against  whom 
such  judgment  was  rendered  was  not 
personally  served,  was  not  wanting 
in  diligence  in  presenting  his  defens- 
es in  the  original  action,  was  pre- 
vented from  so  doing  by  the  wrong- 
ful conduct  of  the  adverse  party,  and 
moved  with  due  diligence  to  set  aside 
the  judgment  after  its  rendition. — 
Lunt  v.  Lunt  Tex.Civ.App.,  121  S. 
W.2d  445,  error  dismissed. 
After  conviction  of  witness 

Ground  for  vacation  of  judgment 
that  judgment  was  secured  by  per- 
jured testimony  is  not  available  un- 
til after  conviction  of  witness 
against  whom  charge  of  perjury  is 
made. — Haynes  v.  United  Ins.  Co., 
194  N.B.  •SSI,  48  Ohio  Aj>p.  475. 

21.  Ky.— Webb  v.  Niceley,  151  S.W. 
2d  768,  286  Ky.  632. 

La. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Christie 
v.  Patorno,  8  !La.App.  603. 

Ohio. — Cincinnati  Traction  Co.  v. 
Schlasinger,  26  Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  9. 

34  C.J.  p  285  note  14. 

Mare  suspicion  of  truth  of  defend- 
ant's testimony  founded  on  improb- 
ability or  conflicting  statements  will 
not  be  sufficient  to  support  finding 
of  perjury. — Christie  v.  Patorno,  8 
La.App.  60-3. 

22.  Pa.— Sallada  v.  Mock,  121  A.  54, 
277  Pa,  285. 

Tex. — Yount-Lee  Oil  Co.  v.  -Federal 
Crude  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  92  S.W.2d 
493,  certiorari  denied  Federal 
Crude  Oil  Co.  v.  Yount-Lee  Oil  Co., 
57  S.Ct.  16,  299  'U.S.  554,  81  L.Ed. 
408. 

34  C. J.  p  285  note  15. 

23.  Ariz. — In    re    Hanrierkam's    Es- 
tate,  77  P.2d  814,   51  Ariz.  447, 


49     C.J.S, 


JUDGMENTS 


§  272 


ment.24  However,  the  agreement  or  promise  must 
have  been  explicit,  and  of  such  a  character  that  de- 
fendant could  rely  on  it  and  remain  inactive  without 
being  thereby  chargeable  with  negligence  or  lack 
of  due  diligence  in  guarding  his  own  interests.25 
Where  a  statute  or  rule  of  court  requires  agree- 
ments to  extend  the  time  for  pleading,  or  for  the 
trial,  to  be  reduced  to  writing  and  filed,  or  com- 
municated to  the  court,  a  mere  oral  agreement  of 
the  parties,  not  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  court, 
will  not  be  sufficient  to  authorize  the  vacation  of  a 
judgment  taken  in  violation  of  its  terms.2^  It  has 
nevertheless  been  held  that,  although  oral  stipula- 
tions are  not  regarded  with  favor,27  relief  -may  be 


granted  on  the  basis  of  an  oral  agreement  satisfac- 
torily established.28 


§  272. 


Defenses  to  Action 


In  general,  a  judgment  will  not  be  opened  or  va- 
cated on  grounds  which  could  have  been  pleaded  In  the 
original  action. 

Except  where  the  motion  to  vacate  is  filed  within 
the  term  at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,2^ 
a  proceeding  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  cannot 
be  sustained  on  any  grounds  which  might  have  been 
pleaded  in  defense  to  the  action,  and  could  have 
been  so  pleaded  with  proper  care  and  diligence.30 
Within  this  rule  are  included  various  defenses,81 


24.  Ky. — American  Ry.  Express  Co. 
v.  Hulentoops  &  Co.,  261  S.W.  889, 
203  Ky.  107. 

Pa,— First  Nat.   Bank  of  Irwin,   for 

Use    of,    v.    Shields,    Com.Pl.,    22 

West.Co.  50. 
34  C.J.  p  285  note  16. 
Violation   of  agreement  as   surprise 

see  infra  §  280. 
Party   having1  notice;    appearing-   at 
trial 

An  alleged  agreement  by  defend- 
ant with  one  of  the  attorneys  for 
plaintiff  before  judgment,  that  suit 
would  be  dismissed,  is  not  ground 
for  setting  aside  the  judgment  "or  ar- 
resting execution,  where  it  appears 
that  defendant  appeared  at  the  trial 
and  defended  against  the  action. — 
Felker  v.  Johnson,  7  S.E.2d  -668,  US 9 
Ga.  797. 

25.  111.— -Hartford    Life    &    Annuity 
Ins.  Co.   v.   Rossiter,   63  N.B.   680, 
19-6  111.  277. 

34  C.J.  p  286  note  17. 
Unenforceable  agreement 

Fact  that  testator's  widow  orally 
agreed  with  certain  of  husband's 
heirs  that,  if  they  would  offer  no 
defense  to  her  suit  for  construction 
of  the  will,  she  would  execute  a  will 
whereby  at  her  death  the  heirs  would 
be  devised  all  of  the  real  property 
of  the  husband  of  which  she  should 
die  possessed,  was  not  valid  ground 
for  setting  aside  the  decree  in  the 
will  construction  suit,  since  such 
oral  promise  was  not  fraud  in  the 
legal  sense  and  was  unenforceable 
under  statute  of  frauds. — Sample  v. 
Ward,  Fla.,  23  So.2d  81. 

26.  Pa. — Bauman     Iron     Works     v. 
Buono,    22    Pa,Dist.   &  Co.    362. 

34  C.J.  p  286  note  18. 

27.  Iowa. — Dixon    v.     Brophey,     29 
Iowa  460. 

28.  Cal. — Johnson  v.  Sweeney,  -30  P. 
540,  95  Cal.  304. 

34  C.J.  p  286  note  20. 

29.  Ohio. — Ames  Co.  v.  Busick,  App., 
47  N.B.2d  647. 

Additional  defense  necessary 
A   final  judgment  for  plaintiff,   if 


correct  will  not  be  vacated  for  the 
purpose  of  granting  leave  to  amend 
the  answer,  unless  the  proposed 
amended  answer  discloses  additional 
facts  or  defenses  material  to  the 
action  and  not  pleaded  in  the  orig- 
inal answer. — State  v.  Coleman,  127 
P.  568,  71  Wash.  15. 

30.  Ga.— Alexander  v.  Slear,  169  S. 
B.  304,  177  Ga.  101— Wilder  v. 
Hardwick,  122  S.E.  624,  32  Ga.App. 
105— Hardwick  v.  Hatfleld,  119  S. 
E.  430,  30  Ga.App.  760. 

111. — Gliwa  v.  Washington  Polish 
Loan  &  Building  Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d 
736,  310  IlLApp.  465— Mitchell  v. 
Eareckson,  250  IlLApp.  508. 

Ky.— Childers  v.  Potter,  1-65  S.W.2d 
3,  291  Ky.  478. 

Mass. — Lynch  v.  City  of  Boston,  48 
N.B.2d  26,  313  Mass.  478— Besero- 
sky  v.  Mason,  168  N.B.  726,  269 
Mass.  325. 

Mich.— Kirn  v.  loor,  2-53  N.W.  318, 
266  Mich.  335. 

Minn. — In  re  Jordan's  Bstate,  271  N. 
W.  104,  109  Minn.  53. 

Mo.—Bodine  v.  Farr,  182  fi.W.2d  173, 
353  Mo.  206— State  ex  rel.  Gary 
Realty  Co.  v.  Hall,  17  S.W.2d  935 
322  Mo.  1118. 

N.Y.— Winter  v.  New  York  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  23  N.Y.S.2d  759,  260  App.Div. 
676,  appeal  denied  25  N.Y.S.2d  7-81, 
261  App.Div.  816,  appeal  denied  33 
N.B.2d  568,  285  N.Y.  8«63— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Dl  Donato  v.  Ros- 
enberg-, 245  N.Y.S.  675,  679,  230 
App.Dir.  538. 

Okl. — Staples  v.  Jenkins,  62  P.2d  504, 
178  Okl.  186— Corpus  Juris  cited 
*n  Dial  v.  Kirkpatrick,  31  P.2d  591, 
592,  168  Okl.  21,  95  A.L.R.  126*3. 

Pa.— Berkowitz  v.  Kass,  40  A.2d  691, 
351  Pa.  263— Keystone  Bank  of 
Spangler,  Pa.,  v.  Booth,  6  A.2d  417, 
334  Pa.  545— McCloskey  v.  Sykes, 
14  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  437— New  York 
Joint  Stock  Land  Bank  v.  Kegerise, 
Com.Pl.,  29  Berks.Co.  296 — Plcone 
v.  Barbano,  Com.Pl.,  32  Del. Co.  88 
— Gapes  v.  Lawrenitis,  (Qom.Pl.,  4. 
Sch.Reg.  403: 

Utah. — Logan  Cityv.  Utah  Power  & 

491 


Light   Co.,   16   P.2d   1097,   86   Utah 

340,    opinion    adhered    to    44    P.2<T 

•698,  86  Utah  354. 
34  C.J.  p  286  note  21. 

Good  defense  is  insufficient  ground 
for  setting  aside  judgment,  .unless 
judgment  debtor  brings  himself 
within  particular  class  to  whom  re- 
lief may  be  given. — Collins'  Bx'rs  v. 
Bonner,  294  S.W.  1027,  220  Ky.  212. 
Disqualification  of  attorney 

Attack  on  judgment  for  disqualifi- 
cation of  other  party's  attorney  was 
held  too  late,  where  no  objection  was 
made  before  judgment,  although 
facts  were  known. — Dewey  v.  Fraw- 
ley,  2-36  N,Y.S.  484,  227  App.Div.  757. 
Matter  available  on  motion  for  new 
trial 

Where,  on  an  equitable  petition 
and  an  answer  by  defendant  in  the 
nature  of  a  cross  bill,  the  jury  re- 
turned a  verdict  in  favor  of  defend- 
ant on  the  special  issues  of  fact 
submitted  by  the  judge,  and  plain-' 
tiff*s  motion  for  new  trial  on  gen- 
eral and  special  grounds  was  denied, 
and  his  writ  of  error  from  such 
judgment  was  dismissed  by  the  su- 
preme court,  plaintiff  could  not  in  a 
subsequent  petition  or  motion  to  set 
aside  the  verdict  and  judgment  at- 
tack them  on  any  grounds  which  ei- 
ther were  included  in  previous  mo- 
tion for  new  trial  or  could  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  reasonable  diligence  have 
been  so  included,  if  the  grounds  pre- 
sented such  questions  as  could  be 
raised  by  motion  for  new  trial. — 
Manry  v.  Stephens,  9  S.B.2d  58,  190 
Ga.  305. 

Individual  or  partnership  liability 

Where  defendant  defended  as  in 
action  for  Individual  liability,  he 
might  not  have  judgment  vacated  on 
ground  based  on  partnership  liabil- 
ity.— Pace  v.  Continental  Supply  Co., 
251  P,  743,  120  Oil.  302. 

31.     Statute  of  limitations 

Refusing  to  open  judgment  on 
pleadings  to  afford  defendant  oppor- 
tunity to  plead  statute  of  limita- 
tions was  held  not  abuse  of  discre- 


§  272 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


such  as  payment;82  set-off  and  counterclaim ;3S 
want  or  failure  of  consideration;34  fraud  as  dis- 
cussed supra  §  269;  forgery;85  and  illegality  of 
the  contract  or  transaction  out  of  which  the  al- 
leged cause  of  action  arose,3*  except  in  so  far  as 
statutes  have  changed  the  rule,37  or  public  policy 
requires  the  opening  of  the  judgment  to  permit  the 
introduction  of  such  defense.38  Moreover,  if  the 
parties  were  equally  guilty  in  participating  in  an 
immoral  or  unlawful  contract,  the  courts  will  give 
no  relief  after  the  recovery  of  a  judgment  thereon, 
but  will  leave  them  where  they  stand.39 

•  Notwithstanding  the  general  rule,  where  the 
pleading  and  triail  of  a  defense  is  prevented  by 
fraud,  accident,  or  other  cause  for  which  the  mov- 
ing party  is  not  to  blame,  the  judgment  may  be 
opened  or  vacated  to  let  in  the  defense;40  and,  as 
appears  infra  §  334,  default  judgments  ordinarily 
will  be  opened  to  let  in  substantial  defenses  where 
the  default  is  sufficiently  excused.  Also,  while  some 


authorities  have  held  that  a  judgment  will  not  be 
opened  to  let  in  a  defense  which  has  arisen  since 
the  entry  of  the  judgment,41  others  have  held  that 
matter  arising  after  judgment,  or  before  judgment 
but  too  late  to  be  presented  as  a  defense,  which 
would  have  been  an  effectual  bar  to  the  action  if 
it  had  occurred  in  time  to  be  presented  as  a  de- 
fense, is  ground  for  vacating  the  judgment.42  In 
any  event,  the  court  will  usually  decline  to  open  a 
judgment  to  let  in  a  merely  technical  defense  as 
distinguished  from  a  meritorious  defense.43 

Subsequent  changes  in  law.  A  judgment  will  not 
be  opened  or  vacated  on  the  ground  that  a  statute 
becoming  effective  after  the  judgment  would  have 
warranted  a  different  decision,  where  such  statute 
does  not  purport  to  be  curative.44  Similarly,  a  ju- 
dicial decree  will  not  be  set  aside  by  reason  of  a 
change  in  the  law,  resulting  from  a  subsequent  de- 
cision by  a  higher  court  reaching  a  contrary  con- 
clusion.45 The  reason  for  the  rule  is  that  there 


tion.— Bedell  v.   Oliver  H.   Bair  Co., 
158  A.    651,   104  Pa,Super.  146. 

32.  N.C.— Council  v.  Willis,  66  N.C. 
359. 

34  C.J.  j>  2>S7  note  22. 

33.  Pa.— Bennett   v.   Bechtel,   7  Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  283. 

•84  C.J.  p  287  note  23. 
During*  term 

The  rule  that  a  counterclaim  can- 
not be  made  available  as  a  basis  to 
vacate  judgment  is  inapplicable  to  a 
motion  to  vacate  judgment  filed 
within  term  at  which  judgment  was 
rendered. — Ames  Co.  v.  Busick,  Ohio 
App.,  47  N.E.2d  647. 

34.  111.— Blake  v.  State  Bank,  $2  N. 
B.  957,  178  HI.  182. 

34  C.J.  p  287  note  24. 

35.  Philippine. — Cruz    v.    Lopez,    19 
Philippine  555. 

38.    Okl. — Corpus     Juris      cited     in 
Dial   v.  Kirkpatrick,    31   P.2d   591, 
692,  168  Okl  21,  95  A.L..R  1268. 
34  C.J.  p  287  note  27. 
Champerty 

Where  defendants  In  quiet  title 
action  proceeded  to  trial  on  theory 
of  validity  of  resale  tax  deed  to 
county  and  commissioners'  deed  un- 
der which  they  claimed  and  appealed 
on  same  theory  without  attempting 
to  inject  defense  of  champerty,  they 
could  not  assert  such  defense  as 
grounds  for  vacating  adverse  judg- 
ment in  quiet  title  action. — Dierks  v. 
Walsh,  Okl.,  165  P.2d  354. 
Usury 

Judgments  will  not  be  opened  to 
let  in  a  defense  of  usury  which 
could  and  should  have  been  raised  at 
the  trial. 

S.D. — James  Valley  Bank  v.  Nichol- 
as, 210  N.W.  1«1,  50  S.D.  &6$.  j 


Wash.— Arnot  v.  Fischer,  295  P.  1117, 

161  Wash.  67. 
34  C.J.  p  287  note  27  [a], 
37.     111.— West  v.  Carter,  21  JT.H.  782, 

129  111.  249. 
34  C.J.  <p  287  note  28. 
3a    Okl.— Dial  v.  Kirkpatrick,  31  P. 

2d  591,  168  Okl.  21,  95  A.L.R.  1263. 
Pa. — Nescopeck  Nat  Bank  v.  Smith, 

165    A.    526,    108    Pa.Super.    553— 

•Gordon  v.  Miller,  21  PaoDist  &  Co, 

272,    39    Dauph.Co.    126— Smith    v. 

Press,  Com.Pl.,  54  Montg.Co.  169. 
34  O.J.  p  287  note  27  [b]. 
Wo  trial  on  merits 

The  rule  that  the  lack  of  consid- 
eration is  an  affirmative  defense  that 
can-not  be  raised  after  judgment  does 
not  apply  in  a  direct  proceeding  to 
vacate  a  judgment  procured  on  an 
affidavit  of  demand  without  trial  on 
the  merits  and  for  defects  apparent 
on  the  face  of  the  record. — American 
University  y.  Todd,  1  A.2d  595,  9  W. 
W.Harr.  Del,  449* 
Usury 
Pa.—- Personal  finance  Co.  v.  Ketter- 

ing,  20  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  '654. 

39.  Pa.— Woelfel  v.  Hammer,  28  A. 
146,  159  Pa.  446. 

34  C.J.  p  287  note  2 9. 

40.  Ohio. — Buckeye    State    Building 
&  "Loan  Co.  v.  Ryan,  157  N.E.  fill, 
24  Ohio  App.  481. 

Pa. — Zuch  v.    Gorman,   7  Pa,Dist  & 

Co.  '564,  39  ljanc.X4.Rev.  557. 
•34  C.J.  p  287  note  30. 
Pleading  defense  of  fraud  prevented 

by  fraud  or  accident  see  supra  5 

299. 
Defense  held  not  prevented 

Defendants  in  quiet  title  action 
were  not  prevented  from  asserting 
defense  of  champerty  by  inadvertent 
institution  of  action  in  name  of 

492 


former  record  owner  of  the  land 
without  disclosing  the  fact  of  his 
prior  death,  where  his  grantee  by 
unrecorded  deed  was  substituted  as 
plaintiff  before  trial  and  introduced 
in  evidence  his  deed,  showing  date 
when  he  acquired  title. — Dierks  v. 
Walsh,  Okl.,  165  P.2d  354. 

41.    Pa.— Ward  &  Wiener  v.  Caster- 
line,  Com.Pl.,  33  Luz.Leg.Reg.  54. 
34  C.J.  p  286  note  21  [c]. 

4S.    Cal.— Gordon  v.  Hillman,  191  P. 

62,  47  CaLApp.  571. 
34  C.J.  p  288  note  82. 

4&  Ka.n. — Mulvaney  v.  Lovejoy,  15 
P.  181,  37  Kan.  305. 

44.  Pa.— In  re  Kulp's  Estate,  Orph., 
•5*6  Montg.Co.  347. 

Wash. — Pacific  Telephone  &  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Henneford,  92  P.2d 
'214,  199  Wash.  462,  certiorari  de- 
nied Henneford  v.  Pacific  Tele- 
phone &  Telegraph  Co.,  59  S.Ot 
483,  306  U.S.  637,  33  L.Ed.  1038. 

45.  Cal. — Sontag    Chain    Stores    Co. 
r.  -Superior  Court  in  and  for  Los 
Angeles   County,   113   P.2d   689,    18 
Cal.2d  92— Union  Oil  Co.  of  Califor- 
nia v.  Reconstruction  Oil  Co.,  135 
P.2d   621,  58  CaLApp.2d  30. 

N.T. — Williams  v.  Madison  Personal 
Loan,  4'2  N.Y.S.2d  144,  180  Misc. 
497. 

Change  in  law  as  to  estate  by  curtesy 
•Finality  of  Judgment  that  title  by 
curtesy  consummate  existed  in  fa- 
vor of  husband  to  all  laads  of  which 
Chickasaw  wife  became  seized  dur- 
ing coverture  was  held  not  subject 
to  subsequent  attack  by  motion  to 
vacate  as  void  after  rule  of  law  had 
been  established  by  subsequent  de- 
cision of  a  higher  court  that  estate 
by  curtesy  did  not  attach.— Latimer 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  274 


must  be  an  end  to  litigation,  and  it  is  the  policy  of 
the  law  to  prohibit,  as  far  as  possible,  the  further 
contest  of  an  issue  once  judicially  decided  and  to 
accord  finality  to  judgments.46  However,  a  motion 
to  open  a  judgment  has  been  allowed  -where  the 
higher  court  subsequently  made  a  contrary  decision 
on  the  identical  facts.47 


§273. 


Newly  Discovered  Evidence 


Newly  discovered  evidence  Is  ground  for  vacating  a 
judgment,  provided  it  could  not  have  been  discovered  at 
the  time  of  the  trial,  and  it  Is  material  and  such  as  to 
affect  the  decision. 

Newly  discovered  evidence,  as  distinguished  from 
matter  newly  arising  which  would  have  constituted 
a  defense  if  it  had  occurred  in  time  to  be  presented 
as  a  defense  in  the  action,  as  considered  supra  § 
272,  is  ground  for  vacating  a  judgment,48  pro- 


vided the  party  was  ignorant  of  such  evidence  and 
could  not  have  discovered  it  in  time  to  adduce  it  at 
the  trial,  by  the  exercise  of  due  diligence,49  and  pro- 
vided the  evidence  is  material  and  such  as  to  affect 
the  decisidn  of  the  issue,60  and  not  merely  cumu- 
lative or  additional  to  that  which  was  introduced 
at  the  trial.51  It  has  been  held  that  the  power  to 
open  or  vacate  a  judgment  for  newly  discovered  evi- 
dence applies  only  during  the  term  in  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered,  and  not  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term.62 


§  274. 


Errors  of  Law 


While  a  judgment  may  be  opened  or  vacated  during 
the  term  for  errors  of  law,  such  relief  ordinarily  will  not 
be  granted  after  the  expiration  of  the  term. 

During  the  term,  a  judgment  may  be  opened  or 
vacated  for  errors  of  law,63  even  though  the  error 


v.  Vanderslice,  62  P.2d  1197,  178  Okl. 
501. 

46.  Cal. — Sontag  Chain  Stores  Co.  v. 
Superior  Court  in  and  for  Los  An- 
geles County,  113  P.2d  689,  18  Cal. 
2d  92— Union  Oil  Co.  of  California 
v.  Reconstruction  Oil  go.,  185  P.2d 
621,  58  Cal.App.2d  30. " 

47.  La. — Townley  v.  Pomes,  194  So. 
763,  194  La.  730. 

48.  Ark. — Papa  v.  Jackson,  67  S.W. 
2d  187,  188  Ark.  1167. 

Minn. — Holmes   y.   Center,   295  N.W. 

649,  209  Minn.  144. 
N.J.— Strong  v.  Strong,  47  A.2d  4'27. 
Wis. — Welhouse   v.    Industrial   Com- 
mission   of    Wisconsin,    252    N.W. 
717,  214  Wis.  1-63. 
34  C,J.  p  288  note  36. 
Grounds  for  opening,  not  vacating 
Where    new    evidence    relating    to 
the  cause  of  action  must  be  Intro- 
duced  in  order  to  sustain  an  attack 
on  a  judgment,  the  judgment  should 
not    be    vacated    or    set    aside,    but 
should  be  opened  for  the  purpose  of 
admitting  the  new  evidence. — Nixon 
v.  Nixon,  198  A.  154,  329  Pa.  2*56. 
Failure  to  comply  with  statute 

In  suit  on  fire  policy,  defendant's 
motion  to  vacate  judgment  for  plain- 
tiff, which  alleged  that  fact  had  been 
discovered  since  trial  that  plaintiff 
was  not  owner  of  building  was  prop- 
erly overruled,  where  motion  was 
not  verified,  no  testimony  was  offered 
to  support  it,  and  no  attempt  was 
made  to  comply  with  statute  relat- 
ing to  granting  of  new  trial  on 
ground  of  newly  discovered  evidence. 
— Farmers  Union  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Jordan,  140  S.W.2d  430,  200  Ark.  711. 

49.  Ark. — Papa  v.  Jackson,  67  S.W. 
2d  187,  188  Ark.  1167. 

111.— Hodge  v.  Globe  Mut.  Life  Ins. 

Co.,  274  IlLApp.  31. 
Minn, — Holmes  v.  Conter,  295  N.W. 

649,  209  Minn.  144. 
N.J.— Strong  v.  Strong,  47  A.2d  427. 


N.Y.— Albright  v.  New  York  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  26  N.T.S.2d  210,  261  App.Div. 
419 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Di  Don- 
ato  v.  Rosenberg,  245  N.Y.S.  675, 
679,  230  App.Div.  53'8—In  re  Lynn's 
Estate,  23  N.Y.S.2d  995,  175  Misc. 
441,  modified  on  other  grounds  and 
affirmed  26  N.Y.S.2d  96,  261  App. 
Div.  'SIS,  affirmed  In  re  (Lynn's 
Will,  39  N.B.2d  28-6,  287  N.Y.  627. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Walker 
v.  State,  Civ.App.,  103  S.W.2d  404, 
•405. 

•34  C.J.  p  288  note  38. 

Inability  to  locate  property  in  issue 
Where  party  seeks  to  set  aside 
judgment  for  newly  discovered  evi- 
dence which  could  not  have  been  pro- 
duced before  because  the  location 
of  property  in  issue  was  not  known, 
owing  to  the  loss  of  the  deeds,  the 
party  must  show  that  the  deeds  were 
not  recorded,  or,  if  recorded,  were 
improperly  indexed,  since  otherwise 
slight  effort  would  have  disclosed  a 
true  description  of  the  property. — 
Trustees  of  Cumberland  Presbyterian 
Church  of  Central  Qity  v.  Central 
City,  11  S.W.2d  694,  226  Ky.  699. 

Evidence  held  previously  ascertain- 

able 
N.J. — Pamrapau  Corporation  v.  City 

of  Bayonne,    19   A.2d   877,    129   N. 

J.EQ.  586. 
N.Y. — Joannes   Bros.   Co.   v.   federal 

Sugar  Refining  Co.,  218  N.Y.S.  504, 

21)8  App.Div.  396. 

50.     Conn. — Comcowich    v.     Zapary- 

niuk,  37  A.'2d  612,  131  Conn.  40. 
Minn. — Holmes  v.  Conter,   295  N.W. 

649,  209  Minn.  144. 

N.J.— Strong  v.  Strong,  '47  A.2d  427. 
N.Y.— In  re  Madden's  .Estate,  279  N. 

Y.S.  218,  155  Misc.  308. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris   cited  In  Kelley 

v.  Wright,  Civ.App.,  184  S.W.2d  64$, 

654.  . 
34  C.J.  P  288  note  39. 

493 


Evidence    held   to    warrant    opening 

Judgment 

Judgment  holding  defendant  liable 
on  agreement  in  bill  of  sale  will  be 
set  aside  on  production  of  copy  of 
bill  of  sale  showing  no  liability. — 
Bddingston  v.  Acorn,  Tex.Civ.App., 
287  S.W.  96. 
Evidence  held  not  to  warrant  opening 

Judgment 

(1)  Petition,    alleging    newly   dis- 
covered evidence  that  judgment  had 
been   secured   by  perjury,   was  held 
insufficient  to  reopen  case. — King  v. 
King,    Tex.Civ.App.,    279    S.W.    899. 

(2)  Defendant    could    not    attack 
Judgment  on  ground  of  ne.wly  discov- 
ered evidence  that  it  awarded  dam- 
ages   based    on    retail    rather    than 
wholesale  values. — White  Transp.  Co. 
v.  Michelin  Tire  Co.,  161  A.  163,  1-63 
Md.  142. 

(3)  Other  evidence. 

Ind. — Lowther  v.  Union  Trust  Co.  of 
Indianapolis,  50  N.B.2d  872,  221 
Ind.  63'5. 

N.Y.— In  re  Lynn's  Estate,  23  N.Y. 
S.2d  995,  175  Misc.  441,  modified  on 
other  grounds  and  affirmed  26  N. 
Y.S.2d  96,  261  App.Div.  513,  af- 
firmed In  re  Lynn's  Will,  39  N.E. 
2d  266,  287  N.Y.  627. 

51.  111.— Hodge  v.   Globe  Mut.  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  27*  IlLApp.  31. 

34  C.J.  p  2-89  note  40. 

52.  N.C.— Crow   v.    McCullen,    17   S. 
EL2d  107,  220  N.C.  306. 

53.  U.S. — Suggs     v.     Mutual     Ben. 
Health   &   Accident   Ass'n,    C.C.A. 
Okl.,  115  (P.2d  80. 

Ky.— Kentucky  Home  Mut  Life  Ins. 

Co.  v.  Hardin,  126  <S.W.2d  427,  277 

Ky.  «65. 
Mich. — -Strausser  v.  Sovereign  Camp, 

W.  O.  W.,  278  N.W.  101,  283  Mich. 

370. 
N.C.— Price  v.  Life  &  Casualty  Ins. 

Co.  of  Tennessee,  157  SJL  132,  200 

N.C.  427. 


§  274 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


was  invited  by  the  party  against  whom  the  judg- 
ment was  entered.54  However,  after  the  term  at 
which  a  judgment  was  rendered,  it  cannot  be  va- 


cated or  set  aside  on  the  sole  ground  that  it  is  er- 
roneous in  matter  of  law,55  except  in  so  far  as  such 


Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pitts  v. 

Walker,  105  P.2d  760,  7-61,  188  Okl. 

17. 

84  C.J.  p  289  note  41. 
Duty 

It  is  duty  of  judge  of  court  to  set 
aside  a  judgment  which  he  concludes 
was  erroneously  entered  by  him. — 
Dorman  v.  Usbe  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n.  180  A.  41-3,  115  N.J.Law  337. 
Refusal  held  error 

Where  court  improperly  rendered 
judgment,  discharging  garnishee 
without  requiring  it  to  answer,  it 
was  error  to  refuse  motion  made 
during  term  to  vacate  judgment — 
American  Agricultural  Chemical  Co. 
v.  Bank  of  Madison,  123  S.E.  921,  32 
Ga.App.  473. 
To  make  additional  findings 

In  death  action,  trial  court  had 
authority  to  reopen  judgment  against 
'defendant  for  purpose  of  making  ad- 
ditional findings  which  it  had  omit- 
ted to  make  where  court  acted  with- 
in term  at  which  judgment  was  ren- 
dered and  all  parties  were  before 
court  and  no  advantage  was  taken  of 
either.— Western  Union  Telegraph 
Co.  v.  Martin,  95  P.2d  «849,  186  Okl. 
24. 

54.  Okl.—Pitts  v.  Walker,  105  P.2d 
7-60,  188  Okl.  17. 

55.  Ariz.— Hawkins  v.  Leake,  22  P. 
2d  833,  42  Ariz.  121. 

Ark. — Magnolia  Grocer  Co.  v.  Far- 
rar,  11'5  S.W.2d  1094,  195  Ark.  1069 
— Feild  v.  Waters,  1  S.W.2d  -807. 
175  Ark.  1169. 

Cal.— Phillips  v.  Trusheim,  156  P.2d 
25,  25  Cal.2d  913— Bastajian  v. 
Brown,  120  P.2d  9,  19  Cal.2d  209— 
Stevens  v.  Superior  Court  in  and 
for  San  Joaquin  County,  59  P.2d 
988,  7  Cal.2d  110— In  re  Lingg's 
Estate,  App.,  162  P.2d  707— Reich- 
ert  v.  Rabun,  265  P.  260,  89  Cal. 
App.  375. 

Conn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Kal- 
inick  v.  Collins  Co.,  163  A.  460, 
462,  116  Conn.  1. 

Ga.— Lester  v.  Rogers,  121  S.E.  582, 
31  GfuApp.  590. 

111. — Jerome  v.  5019-21  Quincy  Street 
Bldg.  Corporation,  5$  N.E.2d  444,. 
•3*5  111.  524— McNulty  v.  White,  248 
IlLApp.  572. 

Kan. — McLeod  v.  Hartman,  253  P. 
1094,  123  Kan.  110. 

Ky.— McKim  v.  -Smith,  172  S.W.2d' 
•634,  294  Ky.  835— Crawford  v.  Rid- 
dle, 45  S.W.2d  463,  241  Ky.  839. 

La. — Wunderlich  v.  Palmisano,  App., 
177  So.  843. 

Mass. — Peterson  v.  Hopson,  29  N.E. 
2d  140,  306  Mass.  '597,  132  A.L.R.  1 

^  — Powdrell  v.  Du  Bois,  174  N.B. 
220,  274  Mass.  J.06. 

Minn. — In  re  Holum's  Estate,  229  N. 
W.  133,  179  Minn.  315. 


Miss. — Mclntosh     v.     Munson     Road 
Machinery    Co.,    145    So.    731,    16 
Miss.  546. 

Mo. — Weatherford  r.  Spiritual  Chris- 
tian Union  Church,  163  S.W.2d  916 
— Harrison  v.  Slaton,  49  S.W.2d  31 
— McPadden  v.  Mullins,  136  S.W. 
2d  74,  234  Mo.App.  1056. 

Neb. — Penn  Mut.  (Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Sweeney,  273  N.W.  46,  13'?  Neb. 
624. 

Nev. — Scheeline  Banking  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Stockgrowers'  &  Ranchers'  Bank 
of  Reno,  16  P.2d  368,  54  Nev.  34*6. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In  re 
Field's  Estate,  60  P.2d  945,  951,  40 
N.M.  4'2-3— Mozley  v.  Potteiger,  l'8 
P.2d  1021,  87  N.M.  91. 

N.T.— Dana  v.  Howe,  IS  N.T.  306— 
West  158th  -Street  Garage  Corpora- 
tion v.  State,  10  N.T.S.2d  990,  256 
App.Div.  401,  reargument  denied  12 
N.Y.S.2d  759,  257  App.Div.  875— 
Klein  v.  Pairberg,  276  N.Y.S.  347, 
243  App.Div.  609— In  re  Beach  9th 
St  (Jarvis  Lane)  in  City  of  New 
York,  54  N.Y.S.2d  1«87,  183  Misc. 
446— Feinberg  v.  Peinberg,  41  N.Y. 
S.2d  868,  180  Misc.  305— In  re  Min- 
ard's  Will,  35  N.Y.S.2d  457. 

N.C. — Herbert  B.  Newton  &  Co.  v. 
Wilson  Furniture  Mfg.  Co.,"  174 
S.E.  449,  206  N.C.  533. 

N.D.— Kranz  v.  Tavis,  192  N.W.  176, 
49  N.D.  55-3. 

Ohio. — State  ex  reL  Ehmann  v. 
Schneider,  App.,  67  N.E.2d  117. 

Okl.— Tolliver  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  64 
P.2d  1215,  179  Okl.  191— Hill  v.  Cap- 
itol State  Bank,  >63  P.2d  957,  178 
Okl.  610. 

Pa.— Levitt  v.  Wayne  Title  &  Trust 
Co.,  Com.Pl.,  29  Del. Co.  558 — In  re 
Kulp's  Estate,  Orph.,  56  Montg.Co. 
347. 

S.D.— Payton  v.  Rogers,  285  N.W.  873, 
66  S.D.  486— Boshart  v.  National 
Ben.  Ass'n  of  Mitchell,  '273  N.W.  7, 
65  S.D.  260. 

Wash. — Pacific  Telephone  &  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Henneford,  92  P.2d 
214,  199  Wash.  462,  certiorari  de- 
nied Henneford  v.  Pacific  Tele- 
phone &  Telegraph  Co.,  59  S.Ct  483, 
306  'U.S.  637,  83  L.Bd.  1038— Good- 
win v.  American  Surety  Co.  of  New 
York,  68  P.2d  619,  190  Wash.  457. 

Wyo. — Bank  of  Commerce  .v.  Wil- 
liams, 69  P.2d  525,  52  Wyo.  1,  110 
A.L.R.  14*3. 

34  C.J.  p  289  note  42. 

An  "error  of  law"  is  committed 
when  court  either  on  motion  of  one 
of  the  parties  or  on  its  own  motion, 
makes  some  erroneous  order  or  rul- 
ing on  some  question  of  law  which 
s  properly  before  it  and  within  its 
jurisdiction  to  make. — In  re  •  Ellern, 
160  P.2d  639,  '23  Wash. 2 d  219. 

494 


Even  gross  error  in  decree  does 
not  render  it  void  and  subject  to  mo- 
tion to  vacate.— Swift  &  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
APP.D.C.,  48  S.Ct  311,  276  U.S.  311, 
72  L.Ed.  587. 
Error  held  not  "Judicial" 

Where  trial  judge  intended  to  pro- 
nounce judgment  for  defendants  but 
signed  a  judgment  for  plaintiff, 
whose  counsel  had  prepared  findings 
of  fact,  conclusions  of  law,  and  judg- 
ment, the  error  in  signing  judgment 
was  a  "clerical  error"  and  not  a  "ju- 
dicial error." — Bastajian  v.  Brown, 

120  P.2d  9,  19  Cal.2d  209. 

Appeal  held  proper  remedy 

Miss.— Bates    v.    Strickland,    103   «So. 

432,  139  Miss.  636. 
Mo. — Platies    v.    Theodorow    Bakery 

Co.,  App.,  79  S.W.2d  504. 
N.T.— Whitney   v.    Chesbro.    280    N. 

Y.S.      133,      244      App.Div.       594— 

Schwert   v.    Crawford,    271    N.T.S. 

«54,     '241      App.Div.      909— In      re 

White's    Estate,    10    N.Y.S.2d    983, 

170  Misc.  657. 
N.C. — Crissman  v.  Palmer,  3-5  S.-E.2d 

422,  225  N.C.  472— Dail  v.  Hawkins, 

189   S.E.   774,  211  N.C.   283. 
S.D.— Janssen    v.    Tusha,    5    N.W.2d 

684,  68  S.D.  639. 

Estoppel 

One  making  Judicial  declaration  on 
which  judgment  is  rendered  cannot 
ordinarily  attack  judgment  for  er- 
ror of  law. — Succession  of  Williams, 

121  So.  171,  168  La.  1. 

Particular  matters  within  rule 

(1)  A   motion    to    vacate   a   judg- 
ment cannot  be  based  on  the  recep- 
tion of  incompetent  evidence  or  the 
alleged  insufficiency  of  the  evidence 
to  support  the  judgment. 

Kan. — Sparks  v.  Maguire,  169  P.2d 
826 — American  Oil  &  Refining  Co. 
v.  Liberty-Texas  Oil  Co.,  211  P. 
137,  112  Kan.  309. 

Mo.— Weatherford  v.  Spiritual  Chris- 
tian Union  Church,  163  S.W.2d  91-6 
— Robinson  v.  Martin  Wunderlich 
Const.  Co.,  App.,  72  S.W.2d  127. 

N.C. — Crissman  v.  Palmer,  35  S.E.2d 
422,  225  N.C.  472. 

34  C.J.  p  289  note  42  [a]. 

(2)  Where    court   had   jurisdiction 
of  parties   and   to   administer   legal 
and  equitable  relief,  mistake,  if  any, 
in    holding    complaint    sufficient    to 
warrant  both  was  judicial  error,  not 
irregularity.— Porter     v.     Alamocitos    ' 
Land  &  Live  Stock  Co.,  256  P.  179, 
32  N.M.  344. 

(3)  Errors    in    permitting    amend- 
ment of  petition  after  judgment,  and 
in  fixing  amount  of  attorney's  fees, 
and  in  rendering  judgment  on  ver- 
dict were  held  not  grounds  for  va- 
cating judgment  on  motion  filed  after 
expiration   of   term   at   which   judg- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  275 


procedure  may  be  authorized  by  statute,56  or  unless 
the  error  is  one  going  to  the  jurisdiction;57  and, 
while  there  is  some  authority  to  the  contrary,58 
it  has  been  held  to  be  immaterial  that  the  time  for 
a  review  of  the  judgment  has  expired.55 

Amount  of  judgment.  A  judgment  may  be  vacat- 
ed when  rendered  for  an  amount  in  excess  of  that 
claimed  in  the  writ  or  declaration,60  -or  where  it 
includes  an  unauthorized  allowance  of  damages  in 
addition  to  the  amount  fixed  by  the  jury,61  unless 
the  fault  can  be  cured  by  reducing  or  remitting  the 
excess,62  or  unless  the  excess  is  very  trifling.63 
However,  this  cannot  generally  be  done  on  account 
of  an  erroneous  computation  of  the  amount  of  dam- 
ages or  interest,64  or  on  an  allegation  that  the 
amount  of  the  judgment  is  greater  than  the  facts 
of  the  case  will  warrant.65  It  has  been  held  that 
a  judgment  may  be  set  aside  on  the  ground  of  clear 
inadequacy  of  the  amount  awarded,66  at  least  during 
the  term.67 


Taxation  of  costs.  A  judgment  should  not  be  set 
aside  for  irregularity  in  the  taxing  of  costs,  or  er- 
ror in  the  amount  as  taxed,  the  remedy  being  by 
motion  to  correct  the  judgment  by  reducing  or  oth- 
erwise changing  the  taxed  costs.68  The  taxation  of 
costs  without  notice  as  ground  for  setting  aside  a 
judgment  is  considered  supra  §  268. 


§  275. 


Errors  of  Fact 


Errors  of  fact  going  to  the  validity  or  regularity 
of  a  judgment  constitute  grounds  for  opening  or  vacat- 
ing the  judgment. 

Error  or  mistake  of  fact  going  to  the  validity  or 
regularity  of  the  judgment,  such  as  furnished 
ground  for  the  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  at  com- 
mon law,  discussed  infra  §§311,  312,  has  been  held 
a  ground,  sometimes  by  virtue  of  statutory  provi- 
sions, for  opening  or  vacating  the  judgment.^  Er- 


tnent     was      rendered. — Duncan      v. 
Wilkins,   220  P.  801,   103  Okl.  221. 

<4)  Other  matters. 
Ga. — Hood  v.  Bibb  Brokerage  Corpo- 
ration,   173    S.B.    236,    48    Oa.App. 
606. 
111. — Linehan   v.   Travelers   Ins.   Co., 

18  N.B.2d  178,  370  111.  157. 
56.  Cal.— Phillips  v.  Trusheim,  156 
P.2d  25,  25  Oal.2d  913— Bastajian 
v.  Brown,  120  P.2d  9,  19  Cal.2d  209 
— In  re  Lingg*s  Estate,  App.,  162  P. 
2d  707. 

34  C.J.  p  290  note  44. 
Error  of  law  as  'Irregularity" 

An  "irregularity,"  within  statute 
authorizing  setting  aside  of  a  judg- 
ment for  irregularity,  does  not  em- 
brace judicial  error  in  rendition  of 
Judgment,  and,  where  proceedings 
have  been  regular,  court's  power  to 
correct  judgment  ceases  with  end  of 
Judgment  term,  regardless  of  how 
erroneous  proceedings  may  have 
been. — State  ex  rel.  Caplow  v.  Kirk- 
wood,  Mo.App.,  117  S.W.2d  652—34  C. 
jr.  p  290  note  44  [a]. 
Vkunipported  Judgment  or  conclu- 
sions of  law 

(1)  Under  statute  so  providing,  a 
Judgment  may  be  vacated  "and  an- 
other and  different  judgment  entered 
for  either  of  the  following  causes 
materially  affecting  the  substantial 
rights  of  such  party  and  entitling 
him  to  a  different  judgment:  1.  In- 
correct or  erroneous  conclusions  of 
law  not  consistent  with  or  not  sup- 
ported by  the  findings  of  fact;  and 
in  such  case  when  the  judgment  is 
set  aside,  the  conclusions  of  law 
shall  be  amended  and  corrected.  2. 
A  judgment  not  consistent  with  or 
not  supported  by  the  special  ver- 
dict"—Irer  v.  Gawn,  277  P.  1053, 
•  ,09  Cal. App.  17— Gale  v.  Dixon,  267 


P.    342,    91    CaLApp.    529—34    QJ.    P 
290  note  44  [c]. 

(2)  In  particular   cases   the   facts 
were  held  not  to  furnish  grounds  for 
setting    aside    the    judgment    under 
such  a  statute.  —  Stanton  v.  Superior 
Court  within  and   for  -Los   Angeles 
County,    261   P.    1001,    202   Cal.   478. 

(3)  Order  vacating  judgment  find- 
ings of  fact,  and  conclusions  of  law 
on  ground  that  they  were  signed  and 
fled    by    inadvertence,    and   granting 
certain  defendants   leave   to   substi- 
tute  modified  judgment,  findings   of 
fact,    and    conclusions    of   law,    was 
held  invalid  as  not  within  the  stat- 
ute. —  Warden  v.  Barnes,  295  P.  569, 
111  CaLApp.  387. 


57.  N.Y.—  <Schaettler  v.  Gardiner,  47 
N.Y,  404. 

58.  N.Y.—  Siegel  v.  State,  246  N.T.S. 
•6'52,  1-38  Misc.  474. 

59.  Minn.—  State    ex    rel.    Wendland 
v.  Probate  Court  of  St.  Louis  Coun- 
ty, 22  N.W.2d  448. 

Wash.—  In  re  Jones,  199  P.  734,  116 
Wash.  424. 

€0.    Pa.  —  Great  American  Tea  Co.  v. 

McCabe^  94  Pa.Super.  573." 
34  C.J.  p  290  note  46. 

61.  N.Y.  —  Chicago  Corn  -Bxch.  Bank 
v.  Blye,  23  N.E.  »805,  119  N.Y.  414. 

62.  Ga.  —  Love    v.    National   -Liberty 
Ins.  Co.,  121  S.E.  648,  157  Ga.  259. 

N.J.  —  A.  Poth  Brewing  Co.  v.  Bernd, 
Sup.,  36  A.  664. 

63.  Cal.—  Ziel  v.  Dukes,  12  Cal.  479. 
Wis.—  Lathrop    v.    Snyder,    17    Wis. 

110. 
34  C.J.  p  290  note  49. 

64.  Mo.  —  Robinson  v.   Martin  Wun- 
derlich  Const   Co.,   App.,    72   S.W. 
2d  127. 

495 


Wash. — E.  R.  Thomas  &  Co.  v.  Pen- 
land,  268  P.  867,  148  Wash.  279.  ' 

34  C.J.  p  290  note  50. 

After  term 
Rendition    of    judgment    changing 

interest  date  at  term  subsequent  to 

rendition  of  judgment  reopened  was 

held  error. — Potter  v.  Prudential  Ins. 

Co.,  142  A,  891,  108  Conn.  271. 

65.  Ga. — Lester  v.  Rogers,  121  S.B. 
582,  31  Ga.App.  590. 

Okl. — Welden  v.  Home  Owners  & 
Loan  Corporation,  141  P.2d  1010, 
193  Okl.  167. 

34  C.J.  p  290  note  51. 

66.  Cal. — Collier  v.  Landram,  155  P. 
2d    652,   .67  Cal.App.2d   752. 

Conn. — Santoro  v.  Kleinberger,  163  A. 
107,  115  Conn.  631. 

67.  Ohio.— Licht  v.   Woertz,   167  N. 
B.    614,   32   Ohio  App.    111. 

Pa.— Bekelja  v.  James  B.  Strates 
Shows,  37  A.2d  502,  349  Pa.  442. 

68.  Or. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Linn  County  v.   Rozelle,    162  P.2d 
150,  165. 

15  C.J.  p  186  note  10—34  C.J.  jp  290 
note  53. 

69.  Ill.^-Loew  v.  Krauspe,  150  N.B. 
683,  320  111.  244— Harris  v.  Chica- 
go  House-Wrecking  Co.,    145   N.B. 
666,   314  111.  500 — O'Connell  v.'  Ja- 
cobs,   '30    N.B.2d    136,    307    IlLApp. 
245— Reid  v.  Dolan,  19  N.B.2d  764, 
299    Ill.App.    612 — Chicago    Securi- 
ties Corporation  v.  Olsen,   14  N.B.. 
2d  893,  295  Ill.App.  615— Seither  & 
Cherry  Co.  v.  Board  of  Education 
of   District   No.    15,    Town   of   La 
Harpe,  283  Ill.App.  392. 

Miss. — Lott  v.  Illinois  Cent  R.  Co., 
.  10  So.2d  96,  193  Miss.  443. 

Tex. — John  EL  Quarles  Co.  v.  Lee, 
Com. App.,  58  S.W.2d  77,  costs  re- 
taxed  67  S.W.2d  607— Corpus  Juris 


§  276 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


rors  of  fact  within  this  rule  are  errors  in  material 
matters,  prejudicial  to  the  judgment  debtor,  and 
which,  if  known,  would  have  prevented  rendition  of 
the  judgment.70  Erroneous  or  mistaken  findings 
as  to  facts  in  issue  afford  no  ground  for  vacating 
the  judgment.71 


§  276.    Defects   and   Objections  as  to 

Parties 

A  Judgment  may  be  opened  or  vacated  for  serious 
defects  or  objections  as  to  parties,  and  generally  for 
the  disability  or  death  of  a  party. 

A  judgment  may  be  vacated  for  nonjoinder  of 
a  necessary  party,72  or  where  it  was  rendered  on  a 


cited  in  Walker  v.  State,  Civ.App., 

103  S.W.2d  404,  405. 
W.Va.— Yost  v.  O'Brien,  130  S.E.  442, 

100  W.Va.  408. 

34  C.J.  p  290  note  55,  p  291  note  57. 
Mistake  of  fact  generally  see  infra  S 

280. 
Opening  or  vacating  Judgment  after 

expiration    of   term   generally   see 

supra  §  230. 

Errors  not  appearing-  on  face  of  rec- 
ord 

(1)  Statutory  motion  in  nature  of 
writ    of   error    coram   nobis    is   not 
available  to  review  questions  of  fact 
arising  on   pleadings,   being  limited 
to  matters  not  appearing  of  record. — 
Jacobson  v.  Ashkinaze,  168  N.E.  647, 
337  111.  141. 

(2)  Under      statute      substituting 
motion  for  writ 'of  error  coram  nobis 
and  providing  that  motion  may  be 
made   in   writing  within   five  years 
after  rendition  of  final  judgment  on 
reasonable  notice,   certain  errors  of 
fact  not  appearing  on  face  of  record 
can  be  corrected  on  proper'  showing. 
—Grice  v.  Grice,  '26  N.E.2d  747,  304 
IlLApp.  584. 

Effect  of  negligence 

(1)  Under  statute  substituting  mo- 
tion for  writ  of  error  coram  nobis 
and  providing  that  motion  may  be 
made    in   writing   within   five   years 
after  rendition  of  final  Judgment  on 
reasonable  notice,  motion  will  not  lie 
where  party  seeking  relief  is  guilty 
of  negligence. — Grice  v.  Grice,  26  N. 
B.2d  747,  304  IlLApp.  5'84. 

(2)  Failure  of  attorneys  for  plain- 
tiff to  attend  call  of  calendar  of  cer- 
tain Judge  which  resulted  in  dismiss- 
al of  cause  for  want  of  prosecution 
is  not  such  negligence  as  bars  vaca- 
tion of  Judgment  for  error  of  fact  on 
motion  under  the  statute,  where  it 
appears  that   cause  was   improperly 
on  calendar  of  such  Judge  and  was 
on    calendar    of    another    Judge,    to 
whom  cause  had  been  originally  as- 
signed,  for  call  on  same  day,   and 
that  attorneys  were  present  before 
such  latter  Judge,  and  that  attorneys 
for  both  parties  were  absent  at  call 
of    first    judge's    calendar. — Reid    v. 
Chicago  Rye.  Co.,  231  Ill.App.  58. 

70.  Conn. — Stolman  v.  Boston  Furni- 
ture Co..  180  A.  507,  120  Conn.  235. 

I1L — Jacobson  v.  Ashkinaze,  168  N.E. 
647,  337  111.  141— Loew  v.  Krauspe, 
150  N.E.  683,  320  111.  244— Lusk  v. 
Bluhm,  53'  N.E.2d  1-35.  321  IlLApp. 
349— Reid  v.  Dolan,  19  N.E.2d  764, 
299  IlLApp.  612— Mitchell  v.  Ear- 


eckson,  250  IlLApp.  508— McNulty 
v.  White,  248  IlLApp.  572. 

Miss.— Lott  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co., 
10  So.2d  96,  193  Miss.  443. 

34  C.J.  p  291  note  58. 

Effect  of  statute  on  court's  power 

The  statute  authorizing  a  court  in 
its  discretion  and  on  Just  terms,  at 
any  time  within  one  year  after  no- 
tice, to  relieve  a  party  .from  a  judg- 
ment, order,  or  other  proceeding  tak- 
en against  him  through  his  mis- 
take, inadvertence,  surprise,  or  ex- 
cusable neglect  is  not  a  limitation 
on  court's  power  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment based  on  stipulated  facts 
where  it  appears  that  there  was  a 
mutual  mistake  concerning  certain 
material  facts. — Payton  v.  Rogers, 
285  K.W.  -873,  '66  S.D.  486. 

Errors  held  -within  rule 

(1)  Error  in  fact,  to  justify  vaca- 
tion of  judgment,  is  not  necessarily 
one  which  would  have  precluded  ren- 
dition of  Judgment  for  lack  of  juris- 
diction.— Baird    &   Warner,    Inc.,    v. 
Roble,  250  IlLApp.  255. 

(2)  Where  trial  judge  intended  to 
pronounce  judgment  for  defendants 
but  signed  a  judgment  for  plaintiff, 
whose  counsel  had  prepared  findings 
of  fact,  conclusions  of  law,  and  judg- 
ment, the  error  in  signing  judgment 
was  a  "clerical  error"  and  not  a  "Ju- 
dicial error,"  and  hence  trial  court, 
on  defendants'  motion,  had  -power  to 
vacate    findings    and    judgment    on 
ground  that  they  were  signed  as  re- 
sult     of      mistake. — Bastajian      v. 
Brown,   120  P.2d  9,  .19  Cal.2d  209. 

(3)  Mistakes    of    fact,    Justifying 
vacation  of  judgment,  are  not  con- 
fined to  omissions  or  misprisions  of 
clerk  of  court — Toth  v.  Samuel  Phil- 
lipson  &  Co.,  260  IlLApp.  247. 

(4)  Other   errors.— Chicago   Secur- 
ities corporation  v.  Olsen,  14  N.E.2d 
893,  295  IlLApp.  613 — Hooper  v.  Wa- 
bash  Automotive  Corporation,  10  N.EL 
2d  89*2,   291   IlLApp.  '618— Swiercz  v. 
Nalepka,    259    IlLApp.    262— Reid    v. 
Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  231  IlLApp.  68. 

Errors  held  not  within  role 

(1)  (Facts  that  cause  was  stricken 
off  calendar  through  mistake,  and 
inadvertence  in  office  of  plaintiff's 
attorney,  and  that,  latter  being  ig- 
norant of  fact  that  case  was  within 
order  striking  certain  cases  from 
docket,  it  was  again  stricken  from 
calendar,  were  held  not  errors  of 
fact  authorizing  recall  of  judgment 
of  dismissal. — Harris  v.  Chicago 

496 


House-Wrecking   Co.,    145    N.E.    666, 
•314  111.  500. 

(2)  A  trial  court's  entry  of  Judg- 
ment,  without  observing  court  rules 
of  record,  such  as  rule  requiring  that 
testimony  be  taken   down   by   court 
reporter,   does  not  constitute  "error 
of  fact"  entitling  defendant  to  vaca- 
tion   of    Judgment    on    motion,    as 
courts  take  judicial  notice  of  their 
own  records,  which  are  always  con- 
structively    before*    them. — Viedens- 
chek  v.  Johnny  Perkins  Playdium,  49 
KE.2d    339,    319   IlLApp.    523. 

(3)  "Errors   of  fact"   not   arising- 
on  the  trial  of  an  action,  which  au- 
thorize the  vacating  of  a  Judgment, 
do  not  include  a  failure  to  present  a 
defense  based  on  facts  known  to  the 
party  at  the  time  of  the  original  ac- 
tion.—Boslov  v.  Boslov,   31  N.Y.S.2d 
970,    177    Misc.    «17,   affirmed    36    N. 
T.S.2d  744,  264  App.Div.  943. 

(4)  Other       errors. — McNnlty      v. 
White,  248  IlLApp.  572. 

71.  Mass. — Chagnon  v.  Chagnon,  15 
H.*E.2d  231,  300  Mass.  '309— Parse- 
kian  v.  Oynoian,  13  K.R2d  409,  299 
Mass.  543,  115  A.L.R.  470. 

N.M. — Porter  v.  Alaznocitos  Land  & 
ILive  Stock  Co.,  256  P.  179,  82  N.M. 
344. 

94  CJ.  p  291  note  59. 
Effect  of  statute 

Statute  authorizing  setting  aside 
of  judgment  where  conclusions  are 
inconsistent  with  findings  has  been 
held  not  to  authorize  attack  on  find- 
ings of  fact — Stanton  v.  Superior 
Court  within  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  261  P.  1001,  202  Cal.  478. 

72.  Ky. — Hazard  Lumber  &  Supply 
Co.    v.   Horn,    15  S.W.'2d  492,    22-8 
Ky.  554. 

34  C.J.  p  291  note  61. 
Demurrer  held  proper  remedy 

Judgment   cannot   be   attacked  by 
motion  to  set  aside  as  beyond  juris- 
diction of  court,  where  defect  is  of 
parties,   demurrer  being  the  proper 
remedy. — -Royal     Indemnity    Co.     v. 
Peebles  Ceramic   Products   Co.,    169' 
N.E.  39,  3-3  Ohio  App.  247. 
Vacation  not  warranted 

Where  action  against  county  to 
quiet  title  was  duly  commenced  by 
proper  service  on  county  auditor  and 
defended  by  assistant  prosecuting 
attorney,  lack  of  knowledge  by 
board  of  county  commissioners  of 
such  action  and  board's  failure  to 
participate  therein  afforded  no 
grounds  for  vacation  of  decree  en- 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


277 


joint  contract  against  only  some  of  the  defend- 
ants,73 or  where  it  affects  persons  who  were  never 
made  parties  to  the  suit,74  .or  where  it  appears  that 
the  real  party  in  interest  has  not  been  joined,76  al- 
though on  the  last  point  there  is  some  authority  to 
the  contrary.76  However,  it  has  been  held  that  a 
judgment  good  as  to  at  least  some  of  the  defend- 
ants will  not  be  stricken,  although  it  may  be 
opened;77  and,  except  during  the  term  in  which 
the  judgment  was  rendered,78  a  judgment  will  not 
be  set  aside  because  of  the  misnomer  of  a  party,  at 
least  where  it  did  not  mislead,  and  is  not  calculated 
to  work  substantial  injury;79  nor  will  a  judgment 
be  set  aside  because  of  a  technical  objection,  not 
appearing  on  the  face  of  the  record,  to  plaintiff's 
capacity  to  sue.80 

Legal  disability.  Except  in  so  far  as  there  may 
be  a  waiver  of  the  right  to  raise  the  objection,81 
legal  disability,  such  as  coverture,  infancy,  or  insan- 
ity, of  a  party  against  whom  a  judgment  is  improvi- 
dently  rendered  without  regard  to  such  disability  is 


ground  for  opening  or  vacating  such  judgment,81 
in  some  instances  under  statutes  to  that  effect88 
Such  a  case  is  one  of  mistake  of  fact,84  as  distin- 
guished from  irregularity.85 

Death  of  party.  It  is  competent  and  proper  for 
the  court  to  set  aside  a  judgment  which  was  ren- 
dered for  or  against  a  party  after  his  death,86  par- 
ticularly where  statutes  so  provide.87  However,  a 
party's  death  after  judgment  has  been  rendered  does 
not  warrant  vacation  of  the  judgment,  even  though 
the  cause  of  action  would  not  have  survived.88 

Bankruptcy  of  party.  The  bankruptcy  of  defend- 
ant has  been  held  to  be  no  ground  for  opening  a 
judgment  against  him.89 

§  277.    Defects    and    Objections   as   to 

Pleadings 

While  ordinarily  a  Judgment  will  not  be  set  aside 
for  mere  defects  In  the  pleadings,  It  may  be  set  aside 
where  there  Is  a  fatal  error. 

A  judgment  will  not  be  set  aside  because  of  de- 


tered  therein. — Harter  v.  King  Coun- 
ty, 119  P.2d  919,  11  Wash.2d  583. 
73.    Tex. — Uher    v.     Cameron    State 

Bank,    125    S.W.    321,    59    TeatCiv. 

App.  134. 
34  C.J.  p  292  note  62. 

74*    Mich. — Rosenfield  v.  Wayne  Cir- 
cuit Judge,  177  N.W.  946,  210  Mich. 
689. 
34  C.J.  p  292  note  #3. 

Judgment  aniettng-  title  to  land  is 
void,  except  as  to  land  of  plaintiff 
and  subject  to  be  set  aside  on  de- 
fendants' motion,  in  so  far  as  they 
were  affected  thereby,  where  action 
was  brought  by  plaintiff  for  himself 
and  other  landowners  not  parties  to 
case,  whose  lands  were  not  de- 
scribed.— Taylor  v.  Pocks  Drilling  & 
Manufacturing  Corporation,  62  P.2d 
903,  144  Kan.  626. 

75.  N.M.—Miller  v.  Klasner,  140  P. 
1107,  19  N.M.  21. 

Tex. — Bbel  v.  Bursinger,   8  S.W.  77, 

70  Tex  120. 
Substitution  of  parties 

Court,  in  vacating  judgment  for 
defendant  and  allowing  substituted 
party  for  plaintiff  to  put  in  com- 
plaint, did  not  abuse  discretion. — 
Demarrias  v.  Burke,  210  N.W.  ,198,  '50 
S.D.  353. 

76.  N.Y.— Grinnell  v.  Schmidt,  4  N. 
T.Super.    706,   3   Code  Rep.   19. 

Pa,— McKenzie  Co.  v.  'Fidelity  &  De- 
posit Co.  of  Maryland,  C|om.PL,  54 
Dauph.Co.  294. 

77.  Pa. — Merchants    Banking   Trust 
Co.   v.  Klimosky,   9  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
143,  23  Sch.L.R.  78. 

78.  Kan. — Standard    Life    Ass'n    v. 
Merrill,  75  P.2d  825,  147  Kan.  121. 

49  C.J.S.-^32 


79.  N.Y.— Meurer  v.  Berlin,  80  N.T. 
•S.  240,  SO  App.Div.  294. 

34  C.J.  p  292  note  65. 

80.  Tex. — Sayles    v.    Abilene    First 
State  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  Civ. App., 
199  S.W.  823. 

34  C.J.  p  292  note  66. 

81.  Previous  claim  of  legal  ability 
Where  a  married  woman  claiming 

disability  and  seeking  to  otpen  a 
judgment  on  that  ground  previously 
swore  that  she  was  unmarried  she 
is  precluded  from  asserting  the  con- 
trary.— Cole  v.  Hunter,  20  Pa.Dist.  & 
Co.  477,  35  Lack.Jur.  23f 

82.  111.— Mitchell  v.  Eareckson,   250 
IlLApp.  508. 

Mass. — Herlihy   v.    Kane,    38    KT.B.2d 

£20,  310  Mass.  457. 
34  C.J.  p  292  note  67,  p  316  note  44 

[b]. 
Availability  of  writ  of  error  coram 

nobis  see  infra  §  312. 
Abnormal  mental  condition 

The  trial  court  has  discretion  to 
vacate  a  judgment  which  has  been 
brought  about  as  the  result  of  an 
abnormal  mental  condition-  of  a  par- 
ty against  whom  it  was  rendered, 
and  who  was  not  represented  by  a 
guardian  or  a  guardian  ad  litem. — 
Herlihy  v.  Kane,  38  K.E.2d  620,  810 
Mass.  457. 

83.  Ark. — Hare  v.   Ft   Smith  &  W. 
Co.,  148  S.W.  10-38,  104  Ark.  187. 

34  C.J.  P  292  note  71. 

84.  111.— St.  Louis  Cons.  Goal  Co.  v. 
Oeltjen,  59  N.B.  600>  189  m.  85. 

Mo.— Powell  v.  Gott,  13  Mo.  458,   53 

Am.D.  153. 

Knowledge  prior  to   entry  of  Judg- 
ment 

Where  the  disability  is  known  to, 

497 


the  court  before  the  entry  of  judg- 
ment, the  judgment  will  not  be  va- 
cated since  the  error  then  is  one  of 
law,  to  be  remedied  by  appeal. — 
Mitchell  v.  QEareckson,  250  IlLApp. 
€08. 

85.  Mo.— Powell  v.  Gott.  13  Mo.  458, 
53  Am.D.  153. 

34  C.J.  p  292  note  *69. 

86.  Ala, — Griffln  v.   Proctor,    14   So. 
2d  116,  244  Ala.  537. 

HI. — State  Bank  of  Prairie  du  Hoch-. 

er  v.  Brown,  263  IlLApp.  -312. 
34  C.J.  p  269  note  57  [e],  p  293  note 

72,  p  317  note  50. 
Death  of  executor 

Judgment  against  estate  of  dece- 
dent was  properly  set  aside,  where 
executor  was  dead  at  time  of  trial 
and  his  death  was  unknown  to  coun- 
sel for  plaintiff  and  for  estate,  and 
administrator  cum  testamento  an- 
nexo  was  not  made  party  to  action 
and  did  not  appear  therein,  notwith- 
standing cause  was  properly  and 
fairly  tried  and  fully  presented  to 
jury  and  that  administrator  cum 
testamento  annexo  on  order  of  court, 
paid  two  hundred  and  fifty  dollars 
to  attorneys  who  tried  case  and  who 
prepared  and  served  statement  of 
case  on  appeal. — Taylor  v.  Caudle, 
180  -S.E.  £99,  208  N.C.  298. 

87.  Okl.— Jefferson  v.  Hicks,  126  P. 
739,  33  Okl.  407. 

34  C.J.  p  293  note  73. 

88.  Colo.— Ahearn    v.    Goble,    7  P.2d 
409,  90  Colo.  173. 

89.  Pa. — Felin  v.  Conway,  32  £*.  Su- 
per. 171. 

34  C.J.  p  293  note  75. 


§  277 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S 


fects  or  insufficiency  in  the  pleadings,90  especially 
where  the  alleged  fault  is  amendable,91  or  has  been 
waived,  as  by  joining  issue  and  going  to  trial,92  or 
has  been  cured  by  the  verdict,93  or  otherwise  will 
not  result  in  a  miscarriage  of  justice.94  However, 
a  judgment  without  a  declaration  to  support  it  may 
be  set  aside  as  irregular  ;95  and  it  has  been  held  that 
a  judgment  will  be  set  aside  where  there  is  a  fatal 
error  as  to  the  pleadings.96  A  judgment  for  de- 
fendant on  the  pleadings  for  want  of  a  reply  may 


be  vacated  and  plaintiff  granted  leave  to  reply.97 

Failure  to  state  cause  of  action.  It  has  been  held 
that  since,  where  the  declaration  or  complaint  states 
no  cause  of  action,  or  contains  no  averments  show- 
ing liability  on  the  part  of  defendant,  the  judgment 
based  thereon  is  erroneous  and  reversible,  but  not 
void,  as  is  discussed  supra  §  40,  it  is  not  subject  to 
vacation  on  the  ground  of  such  insufficiency  of  the 
declaration  or  complaint,98  in  accordance  with  the 


90.  Ariz.— Hawkins  v.  Leake,  22  P. 
2d  833,  42  Ariz.  121. 

Mo. — Harrison  v.    Slaton,   49    S.W.2d 

31. 
Pa. — Lauderbaugh     v.     Lumley,     38 

Lu2.Lieff.Reg.  441. 

Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in  Em- 
pire Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Noble,  Com. 
App.,  36  S.W.2d  451,  454. 
34  C.J.  p  293  note  76. 
Petition  held  not  insufficient 

In  suit  to  declare  a  resulting-  trust, 
petition  alleging  that  plaintiffs'  an- 
cestor purchased  the  real  estate  in- 
volved and  paid  the  consideration 
therefor  and  that  defendant  con- 
tributed no  part  of  such  considera- 
tion, containing  no  allegation  that 
the  ancestor  had  acted  contrary  to 
the  law,  was  not  insufficient  as 
against  motion  filed  after  judgment 
term  to  set  judgment  for  plaintiffs 
aside  on  ground  of  irregularity  be- 
cause of  alleged  fraudulent  appro- 
priation by  ancestor.— Weatherford 
v.  Spiritual  Christian  Union  Church, 
Mo.,  163  S.W.2d  916. 

91.  Ga. — Auld  v.  Schmelz,  34  S.B.2d 
860,   199  Ga.   633— Burch  v.   Dodge 
County,  20  S.B.2d  428,  193  Ga.  890 
—•Georgia  Securities  Co.  v.  Ward, 
17  S.B.2d  605,  '66  Ga.App.  182. 

Okl.— Simmons    v.    Howard,    276    P. 

718,     136     Okl.     118— Ashinger    v. 

White,    23'2   P.    850,    106  Okl.   19— 

Latimer  v.  Haste,  223  P.   879,  101 

Okl.  109. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Empire 

Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Noble,  Com.App., 

36  S.W.2d  451,  454. 
34  C.J.  p  293  note  77. 

Pendency  of  demurrers  undisposed 
of  did  not  constitute  defect  on  rec- 
ord authorizing  setting  aside  judg- 
ment where  petition  was  amendable. 
— Oliver  v.  Fireman's  Ins.  Co.,  155 
S.B.  227,  42  Ga.App.  99. 
Particular  defects 

(1)  Omission  of  prayer  for  proc- 
ess  from  petition   held    "amendable 
defect"     within     statute     providing 
that  judgment  may  not  be  set  aside 
for  any  defects  in  pleadings  or  rec- 
ord   that    is    aided    by    verdict    or 
amendable    as    matter    of    form. — 
Guthrie  v.  Spence,   191  S.E.   188,   55 
Ga.App.  669. 

(2)  Where   plaintiff  filed  amended 
petition    alleging    that,    by    mistake 
and   oversight,    case  was   styled   by 


name  of  another  instead  of  plaintiff, 
court  entered  order  directing  that 
plaintiff's  name  be  substituted,  and 
subsequent  proceedings  were  con- 
ducted in  the  name  and  for  plaintiff's 
benefit  under  original  title,  plaintiff 
was  party  in  interest  and  proceed- 
ings would  not  be  set  aside  because 
of  mistake  in  title.— Spence  v.  Yell, 
71  P.2d  701,  180  Okl.  475. 

92.  Ark. — 'Manhattan   Const.    Co.    v. 
Atkisson,   88  S.W.2d  819,   191  Ark. 
920. 

Mo.— MoFadden  v.  Mullins,  136  S.W. 

2d  74,  234  Mo.App.  1056. 
Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in   Em- 
pire Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Noble,  Com. 
App.,  36  S.W.2d  451,  454. 
34  C.J.  p  293  note  78. 

Tinder  statute  so  providing,  where 
complaint  states  substantial  cause 
of  action,  judgment  for  plaintiff  can- 
not be  set  aside  for  insufficiency  of 
averment  in  complaint,  in  absence  of 
previous  objection  thereto. — Chand- 
ler v.  Price,  15  So.2d  462,  244  Ala. 
667—34  Q.J.  p  293  note  7-8  [a], 

93.  Ga. — Auld  v.  Schmelz,  34  S.B.2d 
8-60,   199  Ga.   633— -Stowers  v.  Har- 
ris, 22  S.B.2d  405,  194  Ga.  636. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Em- 
pire Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Noble,  Com. 
App.,  36  S.W.2d  451,  454. 

34  C.J.  p  293  note  79. 

Particular  defects 

(1)  Where    petition    by   holder    of 
note  against  maker  alleged  that  note 
was   delivered   by  payee  to  another 
and  through  a  number  of  successive 
assignees  was  delivered  to  plaintiff, 
but  it  did  not  appear  that  the  note 
was  ever  transferred  by  indorsement 
by  payee  or  any  of  the  assignees  or 
that  any  of  the  assignees  or  holder 
had  paid  anything  of  value  for  the 
note,    such    defects    in    the    petition 
were  subject  to  amendment  and  were 
cured  by  verdict  and  judgment  ren- 
dered thereon  could  not  be  set  aside 
on    ground    that    petition    failed    to 
state    a    cause    of    action. — Georgia 
Securities  Co.  v.  Ward,  17  S.E.2d  -605, 
66  Ga.App.  182. 

(2)  In  suit  to  recover  alleged  bal- 
ance   due    of    money    advanced    by 
plaintiff  against  his  salesman's  com- 
mission,   where    judgment   was   ren- 
dered   against    salesman    when    he 
failed  to  prosecute  case  after  filing 
demurrer  and  answer,  salesman  was 

498 


held  not  entitled  to  set  aside  judg- 
ment because  of  failure  of  petition 
to  allege  agreement  that  salesman 
was  to  return  any  excess  of  sums 
advanced  over  commissions  earned, 
since  such  defect  was  cured  by  ver- 
dict and  judgment — Smith  v.  'Frank- 
lin Printing  Co.,  187  S.B.  904,  54  Ga. 
App.  385. 
94.  Cal. — Myers  v.  Metropolitan 

Trust   Co.    of   California,    70   P.2d 

992,  22  CaLApp.2d  284. 
Particular  defects  or  objections 

(1)  Where     defendants     did     not 
show    that    substantial    justice    re- 
quired a  new  trial  or  that  any  real 
injustice  was  done  -by  refusal  of  tri- 
al   court    to   receive   a  special   plea 
three  years  after  entry  of  action  by 
plaintiff,  motion  to  vacate  judgment 
was    properly   denied. — 'Lehigh   Nav. 
Coal  Co.  v.  Keene  Coal  Co.,  197  A. 
410,  89  N.H.  274. 

(2)  In  claim  and  delivery,  the  fact 
that  the  complaint  merely  consisted 
of  a  statement  of  the  facts  consti- 
tuting the  cause  of  action  in  ordi- 
nary and  concise  language,  together 
with  a  demand   for  relief,   and  did 
not  formally  set  up  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion in  claim  and  delivery,   did  not 
mislead  defendant  to  his  prejudice, 
within   constitutional  provision  pro- 
viding that  no  judgment  shall  be  set 
aside  for  errors  in  pleadings  unless 
resulting  in  a  miscarriage  of  justice. 
— Faure  v.  Drollinger,  313  P.  724,  60 
CaLApp.  594. 

96.  U.S.— Ringgold   v.   Elliot,    20   F. 
qas.No.11,844,  2  Cranch  C.C.  462. 

98.    W.Va. — Collins    v.    Dravo    Con- 
tracting Co.,  171  S.B.  757,   114  W. 
Va.  229. 
Certification  "by  clerk 

Judgment  for  amount  of  liquidated 
damages  was  properly  set  aside 
where  it  did  not  appear  that  copy  of 
affidavit  claim  served  on  defendant 
was  certified  by  clerk  of  court  as  re- 
quired by  statute. — Virginia-Lincoln 
Furniture  Corporation  v.  Southern 
Factories  &  Stores  Corporation,  174 
S.B.  848,  162  Va.  767. 

97.  Minn.— Mclaughlin    v.    City    of 
Breckenridge,    142    N.W.    134,    122 
Minn.  154. 

98.  Ariz.— Hawkins  v.  Leake,   22  P. 
2d  833,  4'2  Ariz.  121. 

34  C.J.  p  293  note  81. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


279 


rule,  considered  supra  §  274,  that  mere  error  in  law 
is  not  ground  for  vacating  a  judgment  after  the 
term.  Other  courts,  however,  have  held  that  fail- 
ure of  the  declaration  or  complaint  to  state  a  cause 
of  action  is  ground  for  vacating  the  judgment" 

§  278.    Unauthorized,  Inadvertent,  Im- 
provident, or  Premature  Entry 

A  Judgment  may  be  set  aside  where  its  entry  was 
unauthorized,  inadvertent,  improvident,  or  premature. 

A  judgment  may  be  set  aside  where  it  was  en- 
tered by  the  clerk  without  any  authority  therefor, 
whether  his  entry  thereof  was  the  result  of  mistake, 
inadvertence,  or  wrongful  intent,  and  whether  there 
was  a  total  lack  of  authority  to  enter  any  judgment, 
or  only  a  lack  of  authority  to  enter  the  particular 
judgment;1  and  the  same  is  true  where  the  entry 
was  ordered  by  the  court  inadvertently,  improvi- 
dently,  or  under  a  mistake.2  A  judgment  may  be 
stricken  off  where  it  is  entered  without  the  author- 
ity of  the  party  in  whose  favor  the  judgment  is  en- 
tered and  he  disavows  such  entry.3 

Premature  entry.  While  there  is  some  authority 
to  the  contrary,4  it  has  been  held  that  a  judgment 
may  be  set  aside  where  it  was  prematurely  en- 


tered,6 either  because  made  before  the  return  day, 
or  the  day  fixed  by  law  for  entering  judgments,6 
or  before  the  time  for  answering  or  otherwise  plead- 
ing had  expired,7  or  while  there  was  an  answer  or 
demurrer  on  file  and  not  disposed  of,8  or  before 
pleadings  had  been  completed,9  or  because,  for  any 
other  reason,  it  was  made  before  the  case  was  ripe 
for  trial  or  regularity  came  on  for  hearing.10 

§  279.    Disobedience  of  Order  of  Court 

or  Other  Misconduct  of  Party  or 
Counsel 

Where  a  Judgment  is  entered  In  violation  of  a  court 
order  or  direction  it  may  be  set  aside,  as  may  also  a 
judgment  obtained  through  the  misconduct  of  a  party's 
attorney. 

A  judgment  may  be  set  aside  where  it  is  entered 
in  violation  of  a  court  order  or  direction,11  as  where 
it  is  entered  in  disobedience  to  an  injunction  or  stay 
forbidding  the  further  prosecution  of  the  action,  or 
in  disregard  of  a  pending  order  for  a  new  trial.12 

Misconduct  of  counsel.  A  judgment  may  be  set 
aside  where  it  was  obtained  through  the  fraudulent 
or  dishonest  conduct  of  a  party's  attorney,  as  where 


99.  Ala. — Chandler  v.  Price,  15  So. 
2d  462,  244  Ala,  6*67. 

Ga. — Auld  v.  Schmelz,  -34  S.E.2d  860, 
199  Ga,  633— Stowers  v.  Harris,  22 
S.R2d  405,  194  Ga.  636— Burch  v. 
Dodge  County,  20  S.E.2d  428,  193 
Ga.  890— Smith  v.  'Franklin  Print- 
ing: Co.,  187  S.E.  904,  54  Ga.App. 
385— Tolbert  v.  Tolbert,  154  S.E. 
655,  41  Ga.App.  737. 

34  C.J.  p  293  note  €3. 

1.  Ala. — Du   Pree   v.   Hart,   $   So.2d 
183,  242  Ala,  690— Ex  parte  Ander- 
son, 4  So.2d  420,  242  Ala,  '31. 

Ga. — Athens    Apartment    Corporation 

v.  Hill,  119  SB.  631,  156  Ga,  437. 
N".C. — Powler  v.  Fowler,  130  S.E.  315, 

190  N.C.  536. 
Okl. — Abernathy  v.  Huston,   26  P.2d 

939,  16*6  O'.ti.  184. 
S.D.-^anssen    v.    Tusha,    5    N.W.2d 

684,  68  S.D.  639. 
Tex. — O'Nell  v.  Norton,  Qom.App.,  33 

S.W.2d  733. 
34  C.J.  p  294  note  86. 

2.  Cal.— Carter  v.   Shinsako,   108   P. 
2d  27,  42  Cal.App.2d  9. 

Pa. — Moore     v.     Monarch     Accident 

Ins.  Co.,  17  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  553,  30 

Sch.L.R.  272. 
34  C.J.  p  294  note  87. 

Entry  of  judgment  not  intended, 
and  without  proof  required,  justified 
setting1  aside  judgment — Morsbach 
v.  Thurston  County,  268  P.  135,  148 
Wash.  87. 
£aclc  of  hearing1 

In  suit  to  enjoin  a  nuisance  wttere 
cause    was    by    consent   passed    for 


a  hearing  in  vacation  and  no  hearing 
was  held,  refusal  to  grant  defend- 
ant's' motion  to  vacate  inadvertent 
and  invalid  decree  was  error. — Hes- 
ter v.  Bishop,  10  So.2d  350,  193  Miss. 
449. 
Misapprehension  of  agreement 

Judgment  entered  out  of  county, 
confirming  sale  under  deed  of  trust, 
where  entered  under  misapprehen- 
sion of  agreement  of  parties,  was 
properly  vacated  on  motion. — Brown 
v.  Mitchell,  176  S.E.  258,  207  N.C. 
132. 

3.  Pa. — Commonwealth  v.   Kerr,    2*5 
Pa.Co.  645. 

4.  Ark. — Magnolia     Grocer     Co.     v. 
Farrar,  115  S.W.2d  1094,  195  Ark. 
1069. 

5.  N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  West 
Jersey  Trust  Co.  v.  Bigham,  187  A. 
•561,  56-3,  14  N.J.Misc.  752. 

ILL— Baus  v.  Coffey,  165  A.  593,  53 

R.I.  227. 

34  C.J.  p  294  note  88. 
Eatry  before  decision 

A  judgment  entered  before  a  deci- 
sion is  made  is  premature  and  will 
be  set  aside  on  motion. — Hager  v. 
Arland,  143  N.Y.S.  388,  <S1  Misc.  421. 

6.  Mass. — Everett-Morgan      Co.      v. 
Boyajian  Pharmacy,  139  N.B.  170, 
244  Mass.  4-60. 

34  C.J.  p  294  note  -88. 

7.  Mo. — Poindexter       v.      Marshall, 
App.,  193  S.W.2d  622. 

N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Westfield 
Trust    Co.    v.    Court    of   Common  j 

499 


Pleas  of  Morris  County,  ITS  A.  546, 
«49,  115  N.J.  86. 
34  C.J.  p  294  note  89. 

8.  Idaho.— Vincent  v.  Black,  166  P. 
923,  -30  Idaho  636. 

34  C.J.  p  295  note  90. 

9.  Ky.— Robbing   v.    Hopkins,    65    S. 
W.2d  54,  251  Ky.  413. 

10.  I1L— Simon  v.   Balasic,   4-5  N.E. 
2d  98,  316  Ill.App.  442. 

Or.— Herrick  v.  Wallace,  236  P.  471, 

114  Or.  520. 
Wyo. — Ramsay  v.  Gottscfce,  -69  p.2d 

535,  51  Wyo.  516. 
34  C.J.  p  295  note  91. 
Time  of  service 

In  suit  against  four  grantees  to 
cancel  deed,  where  only  one  grantee 
was  served  in  time  to  make  follow- 
ing term  return  term  as  to  such 
grantee,  verdict  against  all  and  judg- 
ment against  two  grantees  taken  at 
next  term  were  properly  set  aside. — 
Hooper  v.  Weathers,  16-5  S.E.  52,  175 
Ga,  133.  i 

Continuance  to  ffubseanent  term 

Entry  of  judgment  before  term  to 
which  cause  was  continued  was  pre- 
mature.— Nordquist  v.  Armourdale 
State  Bank,  19  S.W.2d  553,  2'25  Mo. 
App.  186. 

11.  N.T.— Kerr  v.  JDildine,   15   N.T. 
St   616,  14  N.Y.Civ.Proc.  176. 

34  O.J.  p  295  note  93  [a]. 

12.  N.Y.— Lobdell   v.    Livingston,    8 
N.Y.Super.  661. 

34  C.J.  p  295  note  93. 


279 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


he  deceives  and  misleads  his  client,18  enters  into  a 
collusive  arrangement  with  the  opposing  party  or 
counsel,14  or  corruptly  sells  out  his  client's  inter- 
ests.15 A  judgment  may  also  be  set  aside  for  such 
constructive  fraud  as  is  implied  in  the  attorney's 
attempt  to  act  for  both  parties,16  or,  out  of  hos- 
tility to  his  client,  his  secret  withdrawal  from  the 
case  and  leaving  it  undefended.17  It  has  even  been 
held  that  the  unauthorized  withdrawal  of  an  attor- 
ney without  any, circumstances  of  fraud  or  dishon- 
esty is  a  sufficient  ground  for  vacating  the  result- 
ing judgment  provided  the  client  did  not  know  of 
or  consent  to  such  withdrawal.18  ' 

However,  where  a  party  is  actually  represented 
by  counsel  in  court,  fully  prepared  to  try  the  cause, 
and  such  counsel  refuses  to  proceed  for  the  sole 
reason  that  he  thinks  the  justice  presiding  may  de- 
cide against  him,  the  judgment  thus  rendered  can- 
not be  vacated  as  though  taken  by  default.19 

§  280.    Mistake,  Inadvertence,  Surprise, 

Excusable    Neglect,    Casualty,    or 
Misfortune 
a.  In  general 


b.  Mistake 

c.  Surprise 

d.  Excusable  neglect 

e.  Act  or  fault  of  counsel 

f.  Casualty  or  misfortune 

a.  In  General 

In  general  the  trial  court  may  grant  relief  against 
judgments  suffered  by  reason  of  mistake.  Inadvertence, 
surprise,  excusable  neglect,  casualty,  or  misfortune. 

It  is  the  general  rule,  in  many  jurisdictions  by 
virtue  of  statutes  so  providing,  that  the  trial  court 
may,  in  its  discretion,  grant  relief  against  judgments 
suffered  by  reason  of  mistake,  inadvertence,  sur- 
prise, excusable  neglect,  casualty,  or  misfortune.20 
The  most  usual  application  of  provisions  of  this  na- 
ture is  found  in  the  case  of  judgments  entered  by 
default,  as  appears  infra  §  334;  and  some  such  stat- 
utes apply  only  where  the  party,  by  reason  of  some 
mistake,  inadvertence,  etc.,  failed  to  be  present  or 
represented  at  the  trial.21  Such  statutes  are  enti- 
tled to  a  liberal  interpretation  so  as  to  advance  the 


13.  N.J. — Barton    v.    Harker,    55   A. 
105,  69  N.J.Law  -603. 

34  C.J.  p  312  note  10. 
Attorney   lacking1    authority 

Where  plaintiff's  former  attorney 
was  without  authority  to  settle  and 
discontinue  action,  court  should 
have  granted  motion  to  vacate  Judg- 
ment entered  pursuant  to  settlement 
and  should  '  have  restored  case  to 
calendar. — Kropiewnicki  v.  National 
Transp.  C.o.,  29  N.Y.S.2d  257,  262 
App.Div.  112. 

14.  Tenn.— Smith    v.    Miller,    Ch.A., 
42  S.W.  1-82. 

Wyo. — Chadron  Bank  v.  Anderson,  48 
P.  197,  6  Wyo.  518. 

16.  Neb. — Anthony    v.    Karbach,    90 
N.W.  243,  64  Neb.  509,  97  Am.S.R. 
662. 

•34  C.J.  p  313  note  12. 

la    N.C.— Patrick  v.  Bryan,  1«62  S.B. 

207,  202  N.C.  62. 
34  C.J.  p  313  note  13. 

17.  N.T>.— Nichells    v.    Nichells,    64 
N.W.    73,    5    N.D.    125,    57    Am.S.R. 
540,  33  L.R.A.  '515. 

54  C.J.  p  313  note  14. 

18.  <S.C. — Ex  parte  Roundtree,  29  S. 
E.  66,  51  B.C.  405. 

34  O.J.  P  313  note  15. 

19.  N.Y.— ' Sutter  v.  New  York,  94  N. 
Y.S.   515,   106  App.Div.   129. 

34  C.J.  p  313  note  16. 

20.  Alaska. — Bubenstein   v.    Imlach, 
9  Alaska  62. 

Ariz. — Postal  Ben.  Ins.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 165  P.2d  173. 
CaL — Pease   v.    City   of    San  Diego, 


App.,  169  P.2d  973 — In  re  Rabino- 
witz'  Estate,  155  P.2d  915,  67  CaL 
App.2d  840 — Hewlns  v.  Walbeck, 
141  P.2d  241,  60  Cal.App.2d  «03— 
Clark  v.  Clark,  132  P.2d  S27,  5-6 
Cal.App.2d  324 — In  re  Moreland's 
Estate,  1'2 1  P.2d  867,  49  Cal.App.2d 
434 — Burbank  v.  Continental  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  3'S  P.2d  451,  2  CaL  App.  2  d 
664 — Startzman  v.  Ix>s  Banos  Cot- 
ton Gins,  256  P.  220,  82  Cal.App. 
624,  followed  in  Erreca  v.  Los 
Banos  Cotton  Gins,  274  P.  1041,  96 
CaLApp.  783. 

Conn. — Kurzaji  v.  Warner  &  Bow- 
man, 137  A.  19,  10*6  Conn.  90. 

Iowa. — Dimick  v.  Munsinger,  211  N. 
W.  404,  202  Iowa  784. 

Minn. — Stebbins  v.  Friend,  Crosby  & 
Co.,  22-8  N.W.  150,  ITS  Minn.  549. 

N.J. — Simon  v.  Qalabrese,  46  A.2d  58, 
137  N.J.Eq.  581— Kaffltz  v.  Claw- 
son,  36  A.2d  215,  134  N.J.Eq.  494. 

Or.— Hartley  v.  Rice,  261  P.  689,  123 
Or.  237. 

S.C. — Savage  v.  Cannon,  30  S.E.2d  70, 
204  S.C.  47-3. 

S.D. — Payton  v.  Rogers,  285  N.W. 
873,  66  S.GD.  486. 

Tex.— Saunders  v.  Saunders,  Civ. 
App.,  293  S.W.  899. 

W.Va.— Baker  v.  Gaskins,  36  S.E.2d 
893. 

Wyo. — Midwest  Refining  Co.  v. 
George,  7  P.2d  213,  44  Wyo.  25. 

34  C.J.  p  296  note  4. 

Surprise,  accident,  mistake,  and  in- 
advertence as  grounds  for  new  tri- 
al see  the  CI.J.S.  title  New  Trial  i§ 
78-100,  also  46  C.J.  j>  214  note  74-p 
243  note  37. 

500 


Relief  from  act  of  court  only 

The  statute  authorizing  persons 
against  whom  Judgment  has  been 
rendered  in  action  wherein  no  trial 
has  been  had,  to  petition  supreme 
court  for  a  trial,  was  not  intended  to 
furnish  relief  against  voluntary  acts 
of  such  person,  but  only  against  act 
of  court  in  rendering  Judgment  un- 
der the  conditions  definitely  set  out 
in  the  statute.  —  Girard  y.  Sawyer,  9 
A.2d  854,  64  R.I.  48. 


term  only 
It  has  been  held  under  some  stat- 
utes that  the  power  to  '  set  aside  a 
Judgment  for  mistake,  inadvertence, 
or  neglect  is  confined  to  the  term  in 
which  the  Judgment  is  rendered  and 
does  not  apply  after  the  term.  —  State 
ex  rel.  Spillman  v.  Commercial  State 
Bank  of  Omaha,  10  N.W.2d  26S,  143 
Neb.  490—  State  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  In- 
dianapolis, Ind.  v.  HefCner,  26$  N.W. 
629i,  131  Neb.  700. 

Legal  reasons 

To  authorize  vacation  of  Judg- 
ment, facts  shown  by  applicant  must 
constitute  mistake,  inadvertence, 
surprise,  or  excusable  neglect  as 
matter  of  law,  and  erroneous  reli- 
ance on  reasons  which  would  merely 
constitute  everyday  excuse  for  suf- 
fering Judgment  to  be  rendered  will 
not  suffice.  —  Salazar  v.  Steelman,  71 
P.2d  79,  22  Cal.App.'2d  402. 

21.    S.C.—  Kaminitsky   v.   Northeast- 

ern R.  Co.,  35  S.C.  53.    .    ' 
34  C.J.  p  296  note  6. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


280 


remedy.22  However,  relief  should  not  be  granted 
where  to  do  so  would  be*  to  grant  a  new  trial  at  the 
capricious  demand  of  a  party  who  was  either  gross- 
ly negligent  or  had  simply  changed  his  mind  after 
•die  judgment;23  and  relief  should  be  granted  only 
when  it  is  sought  in  good  faith  and  when  no  injus- 
tice will  result  therefrom.24  It  has  been  held  that 
tinder  such  statutes  a  judgment  may  be  set  aside  for 
fraud25  and  that  in  such  case  it  is  immaterial  wheth- 
er the  fraud  was  extrinsic  or  intrinsic.26 

Judgment  on  verdict,  findings,  or  conclusions.  It 
lias  been  held  that  a  statute  authorizing  the  setting 
aside  of  a  judgment  for  "mistake,  inadvertence,  sur- 
prise, or  excusable  neglect,"  does  not  apply  to  such 
judgments  as  necessarily  follow  a  verdict,  the  set- 
ting aside  of  which,  without  at  the  same  time  dis- 
turbing the  verdict,  would  be  of  no  advantage  to 


the  party,  as  the  verdict  would  stand  even  if  the 
judgment  were  vacated,  and  such  verdict  could  not 
be  set  aside  after  the  term;27  and  the  same  rule  has 
been  held  to  apply  to  judgments  which  follow  find- 
ings of  fact  or  conclusions  of  law.28 

b.  Mistake 

In  general  a  Judgment  taken  against  a  person  by 
mistake  may  be  opened  or  vacated  provided  the  mistake 
Is  one  of  fact. 

Under  numerous  statutes  a  judgment  taken 
against  a  person  by  mistake  may  be  opened  or  va- 
cated;29 but.  this  applies  only  to  mistakes  of  fact, 
not  to  mistakes  of  law,80  unless  otherwise  provid- 
ed by  the  statute.81  If  the  statute  gives  the  right 
to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  taken  against  a  party 
through  "his"  mistake,  no  mistake  made  by  any  oth- 
er person  will  justify  this  action;82  but  in  the  ab- 


22.  Ariz.— Brown  v.  Beck,  169  P.2d 
855. 

<Cal. — Elms  v.  Elms,  App.,  164  P.2d 
93,6-- Marston  v.  Rood,  144  P.2d 
863,  62  Cal.App.2d  435— He  wins  v. 
Walbeck,  141  P.2d  241,  60  Cal.App. 
2d  603— Miller  v.  (Lee,  125  P.2d  627, 
52  Cal.App.2d  10 — Kent  v.  County 
•Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  Philadelphia,  80 
P.2d  1019,  27  Cal.App.2d  340— 
Starkweather  v.  Minarets  Mining 
Co.,  43  P.2d  321,  5  Cal.App.2d  501. 

S.C. — Jenkins  v.  Jones,  38  S.E.2d  255. 

34  C.J.  p  296  note  7. 

23.  Cal.— Elms    v.    Elms,    App.,    164 
P.2d  936. 

'Inadvertence"  as  excusable 

As  used  in  such  statutes,  "inadver- 
tence" does  not  mean  mere  inadver- 
tence in  the  abstract;  and  if  it  is 
wholly  inexcusable  it  does  not  jus- 
tify relief. — Elms  v.  Elms,  supra. 

24.  Cal.— Hewins    v.    Walbeck,    141 
P.2d  241,  60  Cal.App.  603. 

26.    Or.— Nichols  v.  Nichols,   143  P. 

2d  663,  174  Or.  390. 

.  'Fraud  as  ground  for  opening-  or  va- 
cating- judgment  generally  see  su- 
pra §  269. 
Concealment  of  facts 

The  concealment  from  court  by 
vendor  of  agricultural  land  of  fact 
of  its  actual  forfeiture  of  vendee's 
rights  under  conditional  sales  agree- 
ment constituted  a  "fraud"  justify- 
ing an  order  setting  aside  a  sum- 
mary judgment  granting  vendor  the 
proceeds  derived  from  sales  of  crops 
growing  upon  the  land,  which  pro- 
ceeds had  been  assigned  by  vendee 
as  security  for  payment  of  portion 
of  purchase  price. — Security-First 
Nat  Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Hauer, 
117  P.2d  952,  47  Cal.App.2d  302. 

26.  Cal.— Security-First    Nat.    Bank 
of  Los  Angeles  v.  Hauer,  supra. 

27.  N.C. — Brown  v.  Rhinehart,  16  S. 
E.  '840,  112  N.C.  772. 

34  C.J.  p  296  note  8.  . 


28.  Or.— Haas  v.  Scott  239  P.  202, 
11*  Or.  580. 

29.  Cal.— Salazar  v.  Steelman,  71  P. 
2d  79,   22  CaLApp.2d  402— Tale  v. 
Maryland    Casualty    Co.,     -281    P. 
1058,  101  CaLApp.  599. 

Md. — Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d  276, 

181  Md.  206. 
Minn. — Fagerstrom  v.  Cotton,  246  N. 

W.  884,  188  Minn.  245. 
Neb.^Crete  Mills  v.  Stevens,  235  N. 

W.  453,  120  Neb.  794. 
N.H. — Lancaster  Nat  Bank  v.  White- 
field   Sav.    Bank  &   Trust   Co.,   30 

A.2d  47-3,  92  N.H.  337. 
R.I.— Dlmond  v.  Marwell,  190  A.  683, 

57  ILL  477— Baus  v.  Coffey,  165  A. 

593,  53  ILL  227. 
S.C.— Ex   parte   Clark,    118    S.H.    27, 

125  S.C.  34. 
W.Va.— Baker  v.  Oaskins,   36  S.E.2d 

(893. 

Wis. — Welhouse   v.    Industrial  Com- 
mission   of   Wisconsin,    252    N.W. 

717,  214  Wis.  163. 
34  C.J.  p  294  note  9. 
Consent  to  waive  finding's 

Motion  to  vacate  judgment  and  re- 
quire filing  of  findings  of  fact  was 
held  properly  granted,  where  con- 
sent to  waive  findings  was  inadver- 
tently given, — Baucus  v.  Riveroll, 
272  P.  760,  95  Cal.App.  224. 
Mistake  must  be  shown  by  facts 

Original  judgment  cannot  be  va- 
cated for  mistake,  where  not  shown 
by  facts,  and  subsequent  consent 
judgment  is  not  predicated  upon 
such  mistake. — Sheehan  v.  Connor, 
136  A.  355,  82  N.H.  529. 

80.    CaL — SaJazar  v.  Steelman,  71  P. 

2d   79,   22   Cal.App.24  402. 
Ind.— Carty  v.  Tore,  57  N.E.2d  434. 
Mont— Rieckhoff  v.  Woodhull,  75  P. 

2d  66,  10-6  Mont  22. 
N.C.— Crissman  v.  Palmer,  35  S.E.2d 

422,  225  N.C.  472. 
B.C. — Savage  v.  Cannon,  30  fi.-E.2d* 

70.  204  S.C.  473— Oerptw  Juris  olt- 

501 


ed  in  Lucas  v.  North  .Carolina  Mut 

Life  Ins.  Cor,  191  S.E.*  711,  712,  184 

S.C.  119. 

34  a  J.  p  297  note  10. 
Errors  of  fact  or  law  generally  see 

supra  5S  274,  275. 
Belief  denied 

(1)  A  defendant  who  did  not  ap- 
pear,   demur,    answer,    or   otherwise 
plead  to  petition  in  belief  that  his 
property   could   not   be   reached   by 
execution,  was  held  not  entitled  to 
have  the  judgment  vacated. — Bell  v. 
Knoble,  225  P.  897,  99  OkL  110. 

(2)  Refusal    to    vacate    judgment 
for  party's  failure  properly  to  inter- 
pret   plain    and    unambiguous    lan- 
guage of  trial  court  was  proper. — 
Howe    v.    (Farmers'    &    Merchants' 
Bank,  263  P.  673,  129  OkL  140. 

(3)  'Failure    to    object   to   bill    of 
costs  was  held  not  "mistake"  within 
statute,     authorizing    court    to    set 
aside  judgment  for   mistake,   hence 
court  exceeded  jurisdiction  in  vacat- 
ing judgment  to  revise  costs,  sole  ef- 
fect -being  to  extend  time  for  appeal 
— Bottum  &  Torrance  Co.  v.  Consoli- 
dated Yarns,  163  A.  544,  53  R.L  50. 

31.  CaL— Miller    v.    Lee,    125    P.2d 
627,  '52  Cal.App.2d  10. 

34  C.J.  p  298  note  11. 

32.  N.Y.— Barron  v.  Feist  101  N.T. 
S.  72,  51  Misc.  f*». 

34  C.J.  p  298  note  12. 
Mistake  of  court 

(1)  Error  in  the  decision  of  the 
issue  directly  before  the  court  is  not 
in  the  legal  sense,  a  "mistake"  for 
which    the    judgment    may    be    im- 
peached.—Bradford  v.  Trapp,   153  P. 
584,  -49  Cal.App.  493. 

(2)  Statutes    authorizing   the    va- 
cating of  an  order  made  as  result  of 
mistake,    omission,    inadvertence,    or 
defect  or  through  mistake,  inadver- 
tence, surprise,  or  excusable  neglect 
refers  to  the  parties  or  their  attor- 
neys and  not  to  mistake,  omission, 


§  280 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


sence  of  such  a  restriction  the  mistake  may  be  one 
made  by  plaintiff,  whereby  he  fails  to  secure  all  he 
is  entitled  to,33  a  mutual  mistake  or  misunderstand- 
ing of  the  parties,34  or  a  mistake  of  the  court  aris- 
ing from  misinformation  or  misunderstanding  as  to 
matters  of  fact,35  or  even  the  mistake  of  an  entire 
stranger,  which  affects  the  action  of  the  parties,  or 
the  progress  of  the  cause,  and  the  entry  of  judg- 
ment,36 The  mistake  must  have  been  one  which 
was  excusable  under  the  circumstances;  an  inex- 
cusable mistake  is  no  ground  for  opening  the  judg- 
ment.37 A  motion  for  relief  on  the  ground  that  de- 
fendant was  prevented  by  a  mistake  from  being 
present  at  the  trial  and  making  his  defense  will  not 
be  granted  where  the  defense  set  up  in  the  moving 
papers  is  entirely  new,  and  not  disclosed  by  the 
original  pleadings.38 

As  to  cause  of  action.  A  judgment  will  not  gen- 
erally he  set  aside  on  account  of  a  mistake  as  to  the 
identity  of  the  suit  or  the  cause  of  action,  as  where 
the  party  erroneously  supposes  the  action  is  brought 
on  one  claim  or  obligation,  although  it  is  really  on 
another,3^  unless  there  are  strong  circumstances  to 
show  that  the  mistake  was  natural  and  excusable 
and  productive  of  decided  injustice.40  However,  a 
mistake  as  to  the  capacity  in  which  the  party  is 
sued,  as  where  he  supposes  the  action  to  be  against 
him  in  an  official  capacity,  when  he  is  really  sued 
as  an  individual  or  vice  versa,  may  be  ground  for 


vacating  the  judgment,41  except  where  it  is  inex- 
cusable;42 and  this  is  true  of  a  mistake  as  to  plain- 
tiff's capacity  or  title  to  sue.43  Where  by  mistake 
a  party  splits  his  cause  of  action,  the  judgment  ren- 
dered in  the  action  first  brought  may  be  vacated  as 
it  bars  another  action  for  the  balance  of  the  party's 
claim.44 

As  to  time  for  pleading  or  trial.  A  party  who 
makes  an  honest  and  excusable  mistake  as  to  the 
time  when  he  is  required  to  plead  or  answer,  or  as 
to  the  time  of  the  trial,  whereby  he  is  prevented 
from  making  his  defense  in  due  season,  may  have 
judgment  opened  or  set  aside;45  but  not  where  the 
mistake  was  the  result  of  his  own  heedlessness  or 
lack  of  due  attention  and  care.46  A  party  ordinarily 
is  bound  to  take  notice  of  the  time  and  place  where 
the  court  sits  and  of  the  condition  of  the  calen- 
dar.47 However,  a  judgment  rendered  in  the  ab- 
sence of  defendant  and  of  his  counsel  should  be  set 
aside  where  such  absence  was  caused  by  their  re- 
liance on  a  statement  made  officially  by  the  judge 
of  the  court  that  the  case  could  not  be  reached,  or 
would  not  be  tried,  before  a  certain  date,  or  that 
nothing  further  would  be  done 'without  notifying 
counsel,48  or  where  they  were  similarly  misinformed 
and  misled  by  the  clerk  of  the  court,49  or  by  the 
calendar  or  official  list  of  cases  set  for  trial,50  or 
by  counsel  for  the  adversary  party  ;51  but  some  cas- 
es hold  that  even  such  official  assurances  will  not 


irregularity,  defect,  inadvertence, 
surprise,  or  excusable  neglect  of 
court,  the  correction  of  which  lies  in 
the  discretion  of  the  court. — Ham- 
mond v.  Barone,  33  N.Y.S.2d  119. 

33.  U.S. — Newton  v.  Weaver,  C.C.D. 
C.,  18  F.Cas.No.10,193,  2  Cranch  Q 
C.  685. 

34.  S.D.— Payton   v.   Rogers,   2-85  N. 
W.  873,  66  S.D.  486. 

34  C.J.  p  293  note  14. 

35.  Ky.— Rudy  v.   Raraey,   170  S.W. 
179,  160  Ky.  842. 

34  C.J.  p  398  note  15. 

36.  Idaho. — Thum    v.    Fyke,    55    P. 
364,  6  Idaho  359. 

34  C.J.  p  298  note  1*6. 

37.  S.C. — Martin   v.   Fowler,   2$  S.B 
312,  51  S.C.  164. 

34  C.J.  p  298  note  17. 

38.  U.S. — Kehler    v.    New     Orleans 
•     Ins.  Co.,   C.C.MO.,   23  'F.    709. 

39.  Kan.— Vail  v.  School  Dist.  No.  1, 
122  P.  885,  86  Kan.  808. 

34  C. J.  p  298  note  19. 

40*    Minn.— Martin  v.  Ourley,    73  N. 

W.  405,  70  Minn.  489. 
34  C.J.  p  299  note  20. 

41  Iowa. — Capital  Sav.  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Swan,  69  N.W.  1065, 
100  Iowa  718. 


42.    N.C.— Williamson  v.  Cocke,  32  S. 

B.  963,  124  N.C.  585. 
13.     N.J.— Western     Nat.     Bank     v. 

Paul.  Sup.,  49  A.  830. 

44.  N.Y.— Rockefeller   v.    St    Regis 
Paper  Co.,  80  N.Y.S.  975,  39  Misc. 
746,    appeal    dismissed    83    N.Y.S. 
138,  85  App.Div.  267. 

45.  Iowa. — Newlove  v.  Stern,  196  N. 
W.  51,  196  Iowa  1111, 

34  C.J.  p  299  note  25. 

Mistake  as  to  time  for  appeal 

Judgment  could  not  be  vacated 
after  time  for  appealing  had  expired 
on  ground  of  mistake  as  to  time  to 
appeal. — Johnson  v.  Union  Sav.  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  266  N.W.  169,  196  Minn. 
5S8. 

49.    OkL— Ross  v.  Irving,  220  P.  642, 

96  Okl.  124. 
Pa. — Spadaro  v.  Chase  Const.  Co.,  17 

Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  65,  23  North  Co.  143. 
34  C.J.  p  299  note  26. 

47.  Iowa.— Dollister    v.    Pilkington, 
171  N.W.   127,   185   Iowa  815. 

34C.J.P299  note  27. 

48.  Del.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Yerkes  v.  Dangle,  Super.,  33  A.2d 
406,  408. 

Ga. — International  Agr.  Corporation 
v.  Law,  151  S.B.  557,  40  Ga.App. 
756. 


Okl. — Sharum    v.    Dean,    239    P,    666,. 

113  Okl.  95. 
34  C.J.  p  299  note  2*8. 
49.     Del. — Corpus      Juris      cited     IB. 

Yerkes  v.  Dangle,  Super.,   33  A.2d 

406,  408. 
Okl. — Sharum   v.    Dean,    239   P.    666,. 

113  Okl.  95. 
34  C.J.  p  300  note  29. 
Clerk's  failure  to  notify 

(1)  In  absence  of  statute  or  rule 
of  court,  it  is  not  duty  of  court  clerk 
to   notify   party  or  his  attorney  of 
setting  of  cause  for  trial,  and  failure 
to    do   so    Is   not    ground   to   vacate 
judgment    rendered    in    absence    or 
such     party    or    his    attorney. — Me- 
Candless   v.   Childs,    239   P.   254,    113: 
Okl.   97. 

(2)  It  is  not  sufficient  grounds  on 
which  to  vacate  judgment  that  nei- 
ther plaintiffs  nor  their  attorneys  of 
record  were  notified  by  the  clerk  of 
the  court  at  the  time  that  the  case 
was   set   for   trial. — Ross  v.   Irving, 
220  P.  642,  9-6  Okl.  124. 

60.    N.Y. — Carpenter     v.      Tuffs,      2; 

How.Pr.  166. 
34  C.J.  p  300  note  -31. 

51.    Ga. — Rodgers   T.    (Purse,    D    S.1L 

669,  83  Ga.  115. 
N.Y. — Rabinowitz    v.    Haimowitz,    9L 

N.Y.S.  11. 


502 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  280 


relieve  litigants  or  their  counsel  from  the  duty  of 
exercising  the  utmost  vigilance  in  watching  the 
progress  of  their  cases.52 

As  to  process.  A  person  served  with  a  summons 
must  make  sure  that  he  understands  what  it  is,  by 
reading  it  or  having  it  read  to  him,  since  he  cannot 
have  a  judgment  set  aside  on  the  ground  that  he 
mistook  it  for  a  subpoena  or  for  a  notice  in  another 
suit,58  or  a  suit  against  him  in  a  representative  in- 
stead of  an  individual  capacity  or  vice  versa,54  un- 
less he  failed  to  receive  a  copy  of  the  writ  and  was 
misled  by  the  officer  as  to  its  purport,55  or  where 
the  copy  was  so  illegible  that  the  command  of  the 
writ  could  not  be  ascertained  and  obeyed,56  or 
where  there  was  some  other  sufficient  excuse.57 

As  to  retainer  of  counsel.  A  defendant  ordina- 
rily cannot  procure  the  setting  aside  of  a  judgment 
against  him  on  the  ground  of  his  mistaken  belief 
that  he  had  retained  an  attorney  to  protect  his  in- 
terests for  he  must  see  to  it  that  the  attorney  un- 
derstands and  accepts  the  retainer,  and  his. failure 
to  pay  personal  attention  to  the  case  is  inexcusable 
negligence.58  However,  there  are  cases  of  this  kind 
where  the  court,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion, 
has  granted  relief.59  Where  the  mistake  was  as  to 
the  employment  of  counsel  by  a  person  whom  de- 
fendant justifiably  relied  on  to  attend  to  that  mat- 
ter as  a  codefendant,  or  a  business  agent,  it  may 
furnish  cause  for  vacating  the  judgment60 

As  to  validity  and  regularity  of  proceedings.  A 
mistake  as  to  the  validity  or  regularity  of  the  pro- 
ceedings is  one  of  law,  not  of  fact,  and  therefore  a 
defendant  cannot  have  a  judgment  set  aside  because 
he  erroneously  believed  that  the  service  of  process 


on  him  was  illegal61  or  that  the  proceedings  were 
otherwise  irregular  or  invalid.62 

Ignorance  as  excuse.  The  illiteracy  of  a  defend- 
ant, or  ignorance  of  the  English  language,  of  the 
course  of  judicial  procedure,  or  of  his  rights  and 
duties,  will  furnish  no  excuse  for  failing  to  defend 
the  action,  or  justify  the  vacation  of  the  judgment, 
where  he  at  least  knew  that  he  had  been  sued,  and 
neglected  to  ask  information  or  advice  from  oth- 
ers,63 although  it  may  be  otherwise  where  such  ig- 
norance prevented  him  from  discovering  that  legal 
proceedings  had  been  taken  against  him  until  after 
the  rendition  of  the  judgment,64  or  where  plaintiff 
has  taken  a  fraudulent  or  deceitful  advantage  of  his 
ignorance,65  or  where  defendant  was  not  negligent 
and  asked  information  or  advice  from  others  but 
was  given  no  notice  of  the  case  being  set  for  trial.66 

c.  Surprise 

Judgments  usually  may  be  opened  or  vacated  on 
the  ground  that  they  were  obtained  through  surprise  of 
the  party  Injuriously  affected. 

Under  the  statutes  in  many  jurisdictions  judg- 
ments may  be  opened  or  vacated  on  the  ground  that 
they  were  obtained  through  some  surprise  of  the 
party  injuriously  affected,67  provided  such  surprise 
could  not  have  been  avoided  by  the  exercise  of  due 
diligence.68 

What  constitutes  "surprise"  within  rule.  The  sur- 
prise contemplated  by  the  statute  is  some  condition 
or  situation  in  which  a  party  to  a  cause  is  unex- 
pectedly placed  to  his  injury,  without  any  fault  or 
negligence  of  his  own,  which  ordinary  prudence 
could  not  have  guarded  against.69  However,  this 


52.  Minn. — Stewart  v.  Cannon,  68  N. 
W.  604,  66  Minn.  64. 

34  C.J.  .p  300  note  33. 

53.  Ky.— Dean  v.  Noel,  70  S.W.  406, 
24  Ky.L.  969. 

34  C.J.  p  300  note  '34. 

34.    N.C.— Williamson  v.  Cocke,  32  S. 

B.  963,  124  N.O.  585. 
34  C.J.  p  300  note  35. 

.'56.    Ind.— Kite  v.  Fisher,  7-6  Ind.  231. 

,56.  N.D.— Wheeler  v.  Castor,  92  N. 
W.  381,  11  N.D.  347,  61  L.R.A,  746. 

.57.    Mont.— Delaney  v.  Cook,   19*5  *F. 

8-33,  59  Mont  92. 
34  C.J.  p  300  note  38. 

J38.  Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Dempsey  v.  Gibbon,  Civ.App.,  100 
S.W.2d  430,  432. 

:34  C.J.  p  300  note  39,  p  306  note  72. 

..59.    Wash. — Kain    v.    Sylvester,    113 

P.  57-3,  62  Wash.  151. 
34  C.J.  p  300  note  40. 

«60.    Iowa. — Barto  v.  Sioux  City  -Elec- 


tric  Co.,    93    N.W.    268,    119    Iowa 
179. 
34  C.J.  p  300  note  41. 

61.  Ky. — Sergeant  of  the  Court  of 
Appeals   v.    George,    5    Litt.    198. 

S.D. — Piano  Mfgr.  Co.  v.  Murphy,  92 
•  fr.W.    1072,    16    S.D.    380,    102    Am. 
S.R.  692. 

62.  Conn. — Jartman    v.    Pacific    Fire 
Ins.  Co.,  37  A.  970,  69  Conn.  355. 

34  C.J.  P  301  note  43. 

63.  Fla. — Gainesville  v.  Johnson,  51 
So.  -852,  59  'Fla.  459. 

34  C.J.  p  301  note  44. 

64.  Mont. — State  v.  Second  Judicial 
Dist.  Ct.,  100  P.  207,  38  Mont.  415. 

34  C.J.  p  301  note  45. 

65.  Wash. — Paltro  v.   Gavenas,    166 
P.  1156,  97  Wash.  327. 

34  C.J.  P  301  note  46. 

66.  Okl.— McNac    v.    Kinch,    238    P. 
424,  113  Okl.  -59— McNac  v.  Chap- 
man, 223  P.  350,  101  Okl.  121. 

503 


67.  M<3. — Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d 
276,  181  Md.  206. 

34  C.J.  p  301  note  47. 
Change  in  law  "by  subsequent  deci- 
sion 

Where  supreme  court  decision, 
rendered  after  trial  court  granted 
defendants'  motion  for  judgment  on 
pleadings  in  action  for  malicious 
prosecution,  established  that  amend- 
ed complaint  stated  cause  of  action 
because  It  sufficiently  alleged  that 
particular  criminal  proceeding 
against  plaintiff  for  embezzlement 
was  terminated  by  final  judgment  of 
dismissal  after  trial,  trial  court  did 
not  abuse  its  discretion  in  granting 
plaintiff's  motion  to  vacate  judgment 
on  ground  of  "surprise." — Miller  v. 
Lee,  125  P.2d  627,  52  Cal.App.2d  10. 

68.  W.Va. — Baker  v.  Gaskins,  36  &. 
E.2d  893. 

34  C.J.  p  -302  note  4-8. 

6d.    Cal.— Miller  v.  Lee,  125  P.2d  627, 

52  Cal.App.2d  10. 
34  C.J.  p  302  note  49. 


§  280 


JUDGMENTS 


49 


does  not  include  surprise  occasioned  by  a  ruling  or 
decision  of  the  court,70  the  unexpected  introduction 
or  rejection  of  evidence  at  the  trial,71  or  the  calling 
of  the  case  for  trial  before  defendant  thought  it 
could  possibly  be  reached.72 

The  unanticipated  transfer  of  the  case  to  another 
court  may  constitute  legal  surprise,78  and  so  may 
the  taking  of  judgment  contrary  to  an  agreement 
to  postpone  the  time  for  answering  or  for  the 
trial,74  or  a  mistake  as  to  the  employment  of  coun- 
sel,.75 or  a  misunderstanding  among  several  counsel 
for  the  defense  as  to  who  was  charged  with  the 
duty  of  filing  the  answer.76  There  is  no  legal  "sur- 
prise" where  the  judgment  was  given  by  consent  of 
the  party's  attorney,  and  the  contention  is  merely 
that  he  exceeded  his  authority.77 

d.  Excusable  Neglect 

A  party  may  be  relieved  agafnat  a  Judgment  taken 
against  him  through  his  excusable  neglect. 


Implication  of  active  misconduct 

"Surprise,  in  the  legal  sense  of  the 
term,  that  would  defeat  a  Judgment, 
always  involves  the  idea  that  there 
has  been  active  misconduct  on  part 
of  the  plaintiff  amounting  to  much 
the  same  thing  as  fraud." — Turley 
v.  Taylor,  6  Baxt.,  Tenn.,  376,  390. 

Tacts   held   not   to    constitute   "sur- 
prise" 

(1)  Where    mineral   deed,    'bearing 
notary's  certificate  that  his  commis- 
sion expired  on  date  before  that  of 
deed,  was  in  grantee's  possession  ap- 
proximately   twenty    years,    parties 
suing  to  remove  cloud  thereof  from 
their  title  to  land  containing  miner- 
als   conveyed    specifically    denied    in 
reply,   filed   some   time   before  trial, 
that  deed  was  validly  registered,  and 
record    of   notaries'    commissions    in 
governor's  office  was  available  at  all 
times  to  grantee,  he  could  not  claim 
surprise    or    inadvertence    entitling 
him    to    vacation    of    Judgment    for 
plaintiffs      because       such       record 
showed  that  notary's  commission  ex- 
pired after  execution  of  deed. — Criss- 
man  v.  Palmer,  35  S.E.2d  422,  225  N. 
•0.  472. 

(2)  Judgment  in  partition  proceed- 
ings would  not  be  set  aside  because 
plaintiff    did    not    receive    as    much 
land  as  he  expected,  where  Judge  had 
indicated   by  his   opinion  previously 
filed   Just  how  property  was  to  be 
partitioned  and  had  authorized  a  sur- 
veyor   to    prepare    a    map    showing 
courses  and  distances  in  accordance 
with  directions  contained  in  opinion, 
and  immediately  preceding   drawing 
of  decree,   all  of  parties  with  their 
respective   attorneys    had   met    with 
Judge  and  agreed .  to  waive  findings, 
it    not    appearing    that    decree    as 
signed  -by  Judge  departed  in  any  de- 
gree from  conclusions  announced. — 


Chavez  v.  Scully,  232  P.  165,  «9  Cal. 
App.   633. 

70.  N.C. — Crissman  v.  Palmer,  35  S. 
B.2d  422,  225  N.C.  472. 

•34  C.J.  P  302  note  '50. 

71.  Ark. — Robinson   v.  Davis,   51  S. 
W.  66,  66  Ark.  429. 

34  C.J.  p  302  note  51. 

72.  Okl.— -Tracy  v.  Fancher,   159   P. 
496,  60  Okl.  109. 

34  C.J.  p  302  note  52. 

73.  W.Va,— Bennett  v.    Jackson,    11 
S.B.  734,  34  W.Va,  62. 

Wis. — Dunlop   v.   Schubert,  72  NVW. 
350,  97  Wis.  135. 

74.  Or. — Durham      v.      Commercial 
Nat  Bank,  77  P.  902,  4*5  Or.  385. 

•34  C.J.  p  302  note  54. 

75.  S.C. — Ex  parte  Rountree,  29   S. 
B.  6-6,  51  S.C.  405. 

34  C.J.  p  302  note  55. 

70.    N.X.— Bradley      v.      McPherson, 
Ch.,  <56  A.  303. 

7%    N.C. — Halrston  v.    Qarwood,    81 
-S.E.  653,  123  N.<X  345. 

78.    N.C.— Hooks    V.    Neighbors,    190 

S.E.  236,  211  N.C.  382. 
•34  C.J.  p  302  note  58. 
Act  of  prudent  person  a*  test 

"•Excusable  neglect"  must  be  such 
neglect  as  might  have  been  the  act 
ef  a  reasonably  prudent  person  un- 
der the  same  circumstances. — Elms 
v.  Elms,  Cal.App.,  164  P.2d  936. 
Inexcusable  nefifUgrence 

(1)  Inexcusable     negligence     may 
defeat  an  application  to  open  or  va- 
cate   a    Judgment. — National    Fertil- 
izer Co.   v.   Hinson,   15   So.  344,   103 
Ala.  532. 

(2)  Statute   providing  for   correc- 
tion of  errors  of  fact  by  motion  in 
nature  of  application  for  writ  of  er- 
ror coram  nobis  was  not  intended  to 
relieve  &  party  f^-n  consequences  of 

504 


Under  the  statutes  in  many  states  a  party  may  be 
relieved  against  a  judgment  taken  against  him 
through  his  "excusable  neglect,"  which  means  a 
lack  of  attention  to  the  progress  of  his  cause,  or 
failure  to  attend  the  trial,  which  is  excused  or  justi- 
fied by  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case.78 
However,  the  term  "excusable  neglect"  has  no  fixed 
legal  meaning,79  the  question  being  one  of  fact  de- 
pendent on  the  circumstances  of  each  case;80  but 
whether  the  facts  found  or  admitted  constitute  ex- 
cusable neglect  is  a  conclusion  of  law,*1  unless  dif- 
ferent inferences  as  to  the  ultimate  fact  might  rea- 
sonably be  drawn  by  different  minds,  in  which  case 
it  is  a  question  of  fact82 

Negligence  may  be  excusable  where  it  is  caused 
by  failure  to  receive  notice  of  the  action  or  the 
trial,83  by  an  accident  or  chain  of  accidents  which 
could  not  have  been  avoided  or  controlled,84  by  a 
genuine  and  excusable  mistake  or  miscalculation,85 

his  own  negligence. — Trust  Co.  of 
Chicago  v.  Public  Service  Co.  of 
Northern  Illinois,  57  N.E.2d  900,  924 
IlLApp.  228 — Blaha  v.  Turk,  12  N.E. 
2d  338,  393  IlLApp.  626. 

(3)  In  action  for  personal  injuries 
sustained  in  automobile  collision 
wherein  defendant  was  informed  by 
his  insurer  that  it  would  look  after 
case  for  him  and  it  appeared  that 
the  insurer  instructed  a  firm  of  at- 
torneys to  appear,  but  they  later 
withdrew  their  appearance  without 
notice  to  defendant  and  damages 
were  assessed  and  judgment  taken 
against  him  without  notice,  it  was 
held  that  defendant  was  not  so  neg- 
ligent as  to  preclude  him  from  ob- 
taining relief  by  motion  In  the  na- 
ture of  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis, 
there  being  nothing  to  show  that  the 
case  was  on  the  regular  trial  call 
when  heard. — Heinsius  v.  Poehl- 
mann,  282  IlLApp.  472. 
79*  N.C. — Beaufort  Lumber  Co.  v. 

Cottingham,  92  S.B.  3,  173  N.C,  ***. 
34  C.J.  p  303  note  59. 

80.  Ind. — Masten  v.   Indiana  Car  & 
•Foundry  Co.,  57  N.E.  14$,  25  Ind. 
App.  175. 

34  CJ.  p  303  note  60. 

81.  N.C. — Gaylord  v.  Berry,  86  S.B. 
623,  16?  N.C.  733— Morris  v.  Liver- 
pool, CU  &  G.  Ins.  Co.,  42  S.B.  577, 
131  N.C.  212. 

82.  Ind. — Masten  v.   Indiana  Car  & 
Foundry  Co.,  57  N.E.  148,  25  Ind. 
App.  175. 

83.  Ind.— Knowlton  T.  Smith,  7jL  N. 
EL  895,  1>63  Ind.  294. 

34  C.J.  p  304  note  63. 

84.  Or. — Capalija  v.  Kulish,    201  P. 
545,  101  Or.  666. 

34  C.J.  p  304  note  64. 

85.  Minn.— Barta  .v.  Nestaval,  157 
N.W.  1076,  133  Minn.  116. 

34  CJ.  P  304  note  66. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§280 


by  reliance  on  assurances  given  by  those  on  whom 
the  party  had  a  right  to  depend,  as  the  adverse  party 
or  counsel  retained  in  the  case,  or  a  competent  busi- 
ness adviser,  that  it  would  not  be  necessary  for  him 
to  take  an  active  part  in  the  case  or  that  the  suit 
would  not  be  prosecuted,86  by  relying  on  another 
person  to  attend  to  the  case  for  him,  when  such 
other  person  promised  to  do  so  or  was  chargeable 
with  that  duty,87  by  a  well-founded  belief  that  the 
case  would  not  be  reached  for  trial  as  quickly  as  it 
was  in  fact  reached,88  or  by  other  circumstances 
not  involving  fault  of  the  moving  party.89 

Diligence  required  of  suitors.  A  party  seeking 
relief  against  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  excusa- 
ble negligence  must  clear  himself  of  the  imputation 
of  want  of  due  diligence,  and  he  cannot  have  relief 
if  the  taking  of  the  judgment  appears  to  have  been 
due  to  his  own  carelessness,  slothfulness,  or  indif- 
ference to  his  own  rights.90  Thus,  in  order  to  put 
himself  in  a  position  where  he  can  claim  relief 
against  an  adverse  judgment,  suffered  by  reason  of 


excusable  neglect,  he  must,  unless  he  means  to  try 
his  own  case,  retain  an  attorney  practicing  in  the 
particular  court,91  and,  as  appears  supra  subdivi- 
sion b  of  this  section,  see  that  his  attorney  under- 
stands and  accepts  the  retainer.  In  case  his  coun- 
sel dies,  or  withdraws  or  is  discharged  from  the 
case,92  or  is  otherwise  unable  to  handle  the  case 
properly,98  he  must  promptly  engage  another,  unless 
he  is  excused  therefrom  by  ignorance  of  the  facts 
requiring  it,  in  which  case  he  must  act  promptly  on 
discovery  of  the  facts.94 

It  is  the  duty  of  a  party  to  inform  his  counsel 
fully  of  the  facts  constituting  his  cause  of  action 
or  defense,95  and  to  be  personally  active  in  procur- 
ing witnesses,  collecting  evidence,  and  otherwise 
preparing  for  trial,  the  mere  employment  of  counsel 
not  being  sufficient  to  excuse  the  party  from  giving 
the  case  his  personal  attention".96  A  party  must 
keep  himself  informed  of  the  progress  of  the  case, 
not  relying  on  such  news  as  he  can  obtain  from  per- 
sons not  bound  to  keep  him  advised,97  and,  particu- 


86.  Tex. — Jordan     v.     Brown,     Civ. 
App.,  94  S.W.  398. 

34  C.J.  p  304  note  66. 

87.  Iowa. — Acheson  v.  Inglis,  135  N. 
W.  632,  155  Iowa  239. 

34  C.J.  p  304  note  67. 

88.  111.— Rapp    v.   Goerlitz,    40   N.E. 
2d  7*67,  314  Ill.App.  191. 

34  C.J.-  p  305  note  68. 

89.  Cal.— Rehfuss    v.    Kehfuss,    145 
P.  1020,  169  Cal.  86. 

34  C.J.  p  305  note  69. 

90.  Ark.— Hill   v.   Teague,   108   S.W. 
2d    889,    194    Ark.    552— Merchants' 
&  Planters'   Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Ussery,    38   S.W.2d  1087,   183  Ark. 
838. 

Cal. — Elms   v.   Elms,   App.,   164   P.2d 

936. 
Ga. — Gray  v.  Georgia  -Loan  &  Trust 

Co.,    143    S.E.    'SOI,    166    Ga.    445— 

Hoke  v.  Walraven,  194  S.E.  610,  57 

Ga.App.  106. 
Ely. — Workingmen's    Perpetual   Bldg. 

&  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Stephens,   1'84  S. 

W.2d  575,  299  Ky.  177— Vanover  v. 

Ashley,    183    S.W.2d    944,    298    Ky. 
'      722—Gorin    v.    Gorin,    167    S.W.2d 

52,  292  Ky.  562.  . 
Mich.— Corpus    Juris   cited   in   First 

Nat.   Bank  of  Boyne  City  v.  Pine 

Shores  Realty  Co.,  241  N.W.   190, 

191,  257  Mich.  289. 
Minn. — Johnson  v.  Union  Sav.  Bank 

&    Trust    Co.,    26-6    N.W.    169,    196 

Minn.  588. 
Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Allen  v. 

Fewel,  87  S.W.2d  142,  146,  '337  Mo. 

955. 
N.Y.— Winter  v.  New  York  Life  Ins. 

Co.,   23  N.T.S.2d  759,   260  App.Div. 

676,  appeal  denied  25  N.Y.S.2d  781, 

261    App.Div.    816.    Appeal   denied. 
N.C. — Hyde  County  Land  &  Lumber 


Co.  v.  Thoraasville  Chair  Co.,  130 
S.E.  12,  190  N.C.  437. 
Tex. — Fowler  v.  Roden,  105  -S.W.2d 
187,  129  Tex.  599— Hubbard  v.  Tal- 
lal,  Civ.App.,  57  <S.W.2d  226,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  and  ap- 
peal dismissed  92  S.W.2d  1022,  127 
Tex.  242. 

Wash.— Morsbach  v.  Thurston  Coun- 
ty, 268  P.  135,  143  Wash.  87. 
34  C.J.  p  305  note  70. 

Irregular  Judgment  for  defendant, 
rendered  in  plaintiffs  absence, 
should  have  been  vacated  and  case 
restored  to  docket  for-  trial  on  mer- 
its, where  motion  was  made  with 
proper  diligence  after  notice  of  judg- 
ment, and  meritorious  defense  was 
shown,  negligence  before  Judgment 
only  defeating  right  to  vacate  Judg- 
ment regularly  entered. — Snow  Hill 
Live  Stock  Co.  v.  Atkinson,  126  S.R 
610,  189  N.C.  248. 

8QL    N.C.— Gray    v.    King,    104    S.B. 

646,  180  N.C.   667. 
34  OJ.  p  306  note  71. 

92.  Ky. — Horton  v.  Horton,  92  S.W. 
2d  378,  263  Ky.  413. 

34  C.J.  p  306  note  78. 

93.  Attorney  on  military  service 
Prolonged  absence  of  an  attorney 

who  formerly  represented  a  defend- 
ant, due  to  his  military  service 
which  continued  until  after  trial  at 
which  a  final  judgment  was  rendered 
against  absent  defendants  who  had 
been  duly  served,  and  failure  of  such 
defendants  to  obtain  services  of  an- 
other attorney,  and  their  lack  of  In- 
formation that  case  would  be,  or 
was,  tried  and  Judgment  entered,  un- 
til after  its  rendition,  did  not  consti- 
tute good  cause  for  setting  aside 

505 


such  Judgment  during  the  term  of 
court  at  which  it  was  rendered. — Ba- 
ker v.  Gaskins,  W.Va.,  36  S.E.2d  893. 

94.  Iowa. — Ennis  v.  Fourth  St.  Bldg. 
Assoc.,  71  N.W.  426,  102  Iowa  520. 

3'4  C.J.  p  807  note  74. 

95.  Ky.— (Corpus    Juris    quoted    la 
Douthitt  v.  Guardian  Life  Ins.  Co. 
of  America,  81  S.W.2d  877,  380,  235 
Ky.  328. 

34  C.J.  p  307  note  75. 

96.  Ky. — Corpus     Juris     cited     In 
Carter  v.  Miller,  95  S.W.2d  29,  30, 
26*4  Ky.  532— Corpus  Juris  quoted 
in  Douthitt  v.  Guardian  Life  Ins. 
Co,  of  America,  31  S.W.2d  877,  380, 
235  Ky.  328. 

Tex. — Fowler  v.   Roden,   105    S.W.2d 

187,  129  Tex.  599. 
34  C.J.  p  307  note  76. 
Belay  in   obtaining-  deposition 

Where  court  appointed  commis- 
sioner to  take  deposition  of  plain- 
tiff, a  deafmute;  and  plaintiff  delayed 
almost  five  months  without  seeking 
to  have  deposition  taken,  and  made 
no  objection  when  cause  was  submit- 
ted for  Judgment,  refusal  to  set 
aside  judgment  so  as  to  permit 
plaintiff  to  have  proof  taken  was 
held  not  error. — Smith  v.  First  Nat 
Bank,  56  S.W.2d  953,  247  Ky.  171. 

97.  Ky. — Corpus    Jnzis     quoted     In 
Douthitt  v.  Guardian  Idfe  Ins.  Co. 
of   America,    31    S.W.2d    377,    380, 
235  Ky.  328. 

34  C.J.  p  307  note  77. 

Surety's   reliance   on  principal 

In  personal  injury  action  by  bridge 
contractors*  employee  against  con- 
tractor and  surety,  it  was  surety's 
duty  to  defend  its  rights  from  time 
service  was  made  on  it  and  not  de- 
pend on  contractor,  as  regards  right 


280 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


larly,  he  must  find  out  when  his  case  is  set  down 
for  trial  or  when  it  is  likely  to  be  reached  in  its 
order  on  the  calendar,9*  and  must  be  in  attendance 
while  the  court  is  in  session  and  there  is  a  prospect 
of  his  case  being  called." 

e.  Act  or  Fault  of  Counsel . 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Mistake 

(1)  In  General 

A  trial  court  may,  In  Its  discretion,  open  or  vacate 
a  judgment  rendered  against  a  party  as  a  result  of  acci- 
dent, negligence,  or  surprise  of  such  party's  attorney. 

In  a  proper  case*  a  trial  court  may,  in  its  discre- 
tion, open  or  vacate  a  judgment  rendered  against  a 
party  as  a  result  of  the  accident,  mistake,  negli- 
gence, or  surprise, of  such  party's  attorney.1  It  is 
a  general  rule  that  the  negligence  of  an  attorney  is 
imputable  to  his  client,  and  that  the  latter  cannot 


be  relieved  from  a  judgment  taken  against  him  in 
consequence  of  the  neglect,  carelessness,  forgetful- 
ness,  or  inattention  of  the  former,2  unless  such  neg- 
lect was  excusable  under  the  circumstances.3  This 
rule  applies  not  only  where  the  negligence  of  the 
attorney  consisted  in  his  failure  to  enter  an  appear- 
ance, or  to  file  a  plea,  or  answer  in  due  season,4 
but  also  where  it  consisted  in  a  failure  to  pursue 
and  follow  up  the  case  with  due  care  and  watchful- 
ness,5 in  accordance  with  the  diligence  required  of 
suitors,  considered  supra  subdivision  d  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

There  are,  however,  a  considerable  number  of 
cases  in  which  it  has  been  held,  sometimes  by  vir- 
tue of  statutory  provisions,  that,  where  the  party 
himself  has  not  been  guilty  of  negligence,  a  judg- 
ment against  him  may  be  set  aside  because  obtained 
through  the  negligence  of  his  counsel.6  While  such 
relief  has  been  granted  on  a  showing  that  the  at- 


to  set  judgment  aside  for  allegedly 
excusable  neglect. — Detroit  Fidelity 
&  Surety  Co.  v.  Foster,  169  S.E. 
'871,  170  S.C.  121. 
Parent**  reliance  on  oodafendant 

child 

Fact  that  defendant's  child,  who 
was  codefendant,  told  defendant  he 
would  see  counsel  and  advise  as  tt> 
proper  defense,  but  failed  to  do  so, 
was  held  insufficient  to  Justify  "va- 
cating chancery  decree  after  term. — 
Merchants'  &  Planters'  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  TJssery,  38  S.W.2d  1087,  183 
Ark.  838. 

98.  Ala. — McCord  v.  Harrison,  93  So. 
428,  207  Ala.  480. 

34  C.J.  p  307  note  78. 

99.  Iowa.— Hagar  v.   Galles,   244  N. 
W.  700. 

Neb.— Holman    v.     Stull,     267    N.W. 

149,  130  Neb.  876. 
34  C.J.  p  307  note  79. 
Conflict  in  dates  of  two  trials 

Defendant's  motion  to  vacate  Judg- 
ment entered  against  him  in  action 
on  open  book  account,  on  ground 
that  on  date  set  for  trial  his  at- 
tendance was  required  in  another 
court,  was  properly  denied,  where 
defendant  made  no  effort  to  have  the 
dates  of  either  proceeding  changed, 
and  it  was  not  shown  that  he  would 
have  been  unsuccessful  had  he  done 
so. — Palomar  Refining  Co.  v.  Pren- 
tice, 136  P.2d  83,  57  Cal.App.2d  954. 

1.  Mass.— Lovell  v.  Lovell,  176  N. 
E.  210,  276  Mass.  10. 

34  C.J.  p  307  note  80. 

Absence  or  sickness  of  counsel  see 
infra  subdivision  f  of  this  section. 

Misconduct  of  counsel  see  supra  § 
279, 

Liability  of  client  for  acts  of  attor- 
ney generally  see  Attorney  and 

'  Client  §  6*8.  , 


2.  Ark. — Corpus  Jnri*  cited  in 
Dengler  v.  Dengler,  120  S.W.2d  340, 
345,  196  Ark.  913. 

Ga. — Robinson  v.  Tarbrough,  162  S. 
B.  629.  44  Ga.App.  648— Williams 
v.  Swift  &  Co.,  114  S.B.  646,  29 
Oa.App.  239. 

Ind. — Sharp  v.  Grip  Nut  Co.,  App., 
62  N.E.2d  774. 

Ky.— Gorin  v.  Gorin,  167  S.W.2d  52, 
£92  Ky.  562— Childers  v.  Potter, 
165  S.W.2d  3,  291  Ky.  478— Cooper 
v.  Douglas,  77  S.W.2d  49,  256  Ky. 
787 — Corpus  Juris  guoted,  in  Dou- 
thitt  v.  Guardian  Life  Ins.  Co.  of 
America,  31  S.W.2d  377,  379,  235 
Ky.  328. 

Mass. — Silverstein  v.  Daniel  Russell 
Boiler  Works,  .167  N.E.  676,  268 
Mass.  424. 

Mont. — Rieckhoff  v.  Woodhull,  75  P. 
2d  56,  106  Mont.  22— First  State 
Bank  of  Thompson  Falls  v.  Lar- 
sen,  233  P.  960,  72  Mont.  400. 

OkL— Grayson  v.  Stlth,  72  P.2d  '820, 
181  Okl.  131,  114  A.L.R.  276— 
Schneider  v.  Decker,  291  P.  80, 
144  Okl.  213. 

Or. — Western  Land  &  Irrigation  Co. 
v.  Humfeld,  247  P.  143,  118  Or.  416. 

S.D. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Smith  v. 
Wordeman,  240  N.W.  325,  326,  59 
S.D.  368. 

Tex. — Traders  &  General  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Keith,  Civ.App.,  107  S.W.2d  710, 
error  dismissed. 

VL— Haskins  v.  Haskins'  Estate,  35 
A.2d  662,  113  Vt  466. 

34  C.J.  p  307  note  81. 

Corpus  Juris  ha*  been  cited  as 
containing  an  analysis  of  cases  rele- 
vant to  the  issue  of  whether  a  Judg- 
ment may  be  set  aside  because  of 
the  negligence  of  counsel. — Ledwith 
v.  Storkan,  D.C.Neb.,  2  F.R.D.  539, 
544. 

506 


3.  Ky. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    *in 
Douthitt  v.  Guardian  Life  Ins.  Co. 
of    America,    31    S.W.2d    377,    379, 
235  Ky.  328. 

Mont.— First  State  Bank  of  Thomp- 
son Falls  v.  Larsen,  233  P.  960, 
72  Mont.  400. 

S.C.— Martin  v.  Fowler,  28  S.B.  312, 
51  S.C.  164. 

S.D.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Smith  v. 
Wordeman,  240  N.W.  325,  326,  59 
S.D.  36>8. 

4.  Ky. — Childers  v.  Potter,  165  S.W. 
2d  3,  291  Ky.  '478— Cooper  v.  Doug- 
las,   77   S.W.2d  49,   256   Ky.    787. 

Tex.— Collins  v.  National  Bank  of 
Commerce  of  San  Antonio,  Civ. 
App.,  154  S.W.2d  296,  error  re- 
fused. 

34  C.J.  p  808  note  83. 

5.  Minn.— Slatoski  v.  Jendro,  159  N. 
W.  752,  134  Minn.  328. 

34  C.J.  p  309  note  84. 

6.  Mass.— Borst  v.  Young,  18  N.B.2d 
544,  302  Mass.  124. 

S.C.— Detroit  Fidelity  &  Surety   Co. 

v.    Foster,    169    S.B.    871,   170    S.C. 

121. 

34  C.J.  p  309  note  86. 
Party  having  abnormal  mental  con. 

dition 
Mass.— Herlihy  v.   Kane,    38   N.B.23 

620,  310  Mass.  457. 
Foreign  attorney 

The  code  provision  relating  to  the 
setting  aside  of  a  Judgment  entered 
against  a  party  through  neglect  of 
an  "attorney"  of  such  party  to  file  or 
serve  any  paper  within  time  limited 
therefor  refers  to  neglect  of  an  at- 
torney having  authority  and  owing 
duty  to  represent  the  litigant  in  the 
courts  of  the  state,  and  does  not  in- 
clude acts  of  a  foreign  attorney  who 
is  forbidden  by  law  to  practice  in 
the  state. — Cleek  v.  Virginia  Gold 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  280 


torney  is  insolvent  and  therefore  unable  to  make 
good  his  fault  by  paying  damages,7  according  to 
some  decisions  relief  should  be  granted  without  re- 
gard to  the  financial  responsibility  of  the  attorney.8 
The  negligence  of  an  attorney  may  be  excusable, 
when  attributable  to  an  honest  mistake,  an  accident, 
or  any  cause  which  is  not  incompatible  with  prop- 
er diligence  on  his  part,  and  in  these  circumstances 
it  will  be  proper  to  set  aside  or  open  the  judgment 
taken  in  consequence  thereof.9  However,  in  any 
case  the  client  himself  must  be  free  from  fault,  and 
negligence  of  his  counsel  is  not  excusable  negli- 
gence, for  which  a  judgment  will  be  set  aside,  if  the 
client  wholly  neglected  the  case  and  took  no  inter- 
est in  its  issue.10  He  must  show  that  he  employed 
counsel  practicing  habitually  in  the  particular  court, 
or  who  specially  agreed  to  attend  to  the  case.11 

When  an  attorney  is  employed  simply  to  retain 
counsel  to.  appear  at  another  place,  he  is  a  mere 
agent,  and  his  negligence  is  imputable  to  his  cli- 
ent;12 and  likewise  the  negligence  of  any  person 
who  is  delegated  or  employed  by  the  attorney  to  at- 
tend to  the  case  is  imputable  to  the  attorney  himself, 
and  will  not  be  excusable  in  the  one  unless  it  would 
have  been  in  the  other.1^ 

Misunderstanding.  While  it  has  been  held  that 
the  mere  fact  of  a  misunderstanding  between  a 
party  and  his  attorney  is  insufficient  to  deprive  the 
other  party  of  his  judgment,14  it  usually  has  been 
held  that  where  a  defense  is  not  interposed,  and 


judgment  is  consequently  suffered,  through  a  genu- 
ine and  accidental  misunderstanding  between'  the 
party  and  his  counsel,  the  judgment  may  be  set 
aside,15  except  where  either  is  chargeable  with  in- 
excusable negligence  or  carelessness,  without  which 
the  misunderstanding  would  not  have  arisen.16 
The  rule  is  similar  where  the  misunderstanding 
was  between  different  counsel  retained  on  the  same 
side,  or  between  the  attorneys  for  the  opposing  par- 
ties, or  opposing  counsel  and  a  party, 'the  courts 
holding  this  sufficient  ground  for  vacating  the  judg- 
ment17 In  all  such  cases,  however,  in  order  that 
the  judgment  may  be  set  aside,  it  is  necessary  that 
the  facts  shall  be  fully  explained  and  that  the  mis- 
take shall  be  shown  to  be  excusable.18 

(2)  Mistake 

A  genuine  and  reasonable  mistake  of  fact  made  by 
a  party's  attorney  may  be  a  ground  for  opening  or  va- 
cating a  Judgment  against  the  party  resulting  from  such 
mistake. 

A  mistake  of  the  party's  counsel,  as  well  as  a 
mistake  of  his  own,  may  be  pleaded  as  a  reason  for 
opening  or  vacating  a  judgment,  provided  it  was 
genuine  and  reasonable,  and  a  mistake  of  fact  rath* 
er  than  of  law,19  such  as  counsel's  mistaking  the 
case  in  which  he  was  retained  or  becoming  con- 
fused between  several  similar  cases,20  or  his  misun- 
derstanding of  the  real  facts  of  the  case  or  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  transaction  out  of  which  the  suit 
arose,21  or  his  erroneous  impression  that  the  action 


Mining  &  Milling  Co.,  122  P.2d  232, 

63  Idaho  445. 

7.  Minn.— Hildebrandt  v.  Robbecke, 
20  Minn.  100. 

3-4  C.J.  P  309  note  87. 

S.    N.Y.— Sharp    v.    New    York,    31 

Barb.   578,   19   How.Pr.   193. 
.  3*4  C.J.  p  309  note  88. 

9.  Ark. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Met- 
ropolitan Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Duty, 
126  S.W.2d  921,  925,  157  Ark.  1118. 

34  C.J.  p  309  note  89. 

la  N.C.— Allen  v.  McPherson,  84 
S.E.  766,  168  N.C.  435. 

34  C.J.  p  310  note  90. 

11.  N.C.-— Ham    v.    Person,    91    S.E. 
605,  173  N.C.  72. 

34  C.J.  p  310  note  91. 

12.  N.C.— Chatham    Lumber    Co.    v. 
Parsons  Lumber  Co.,   90   S.E.   241, 
172  N.C.  320. 

34  C.J.  p  310  note  92. 

18.    Ky. — Kohlman  v.  Moore,  194   S. 

W.  933,  175  Ky.  710. 
34  C.J.  p  310  note  93. 
14.    Ga.— J.    S.    Schofield's   Sons   Co. 

v.    Vaughn,   150    S.B.    569,    40    Ga. 

App.  568. 
34  C.J.  p  313  note  19. 


15.  Ind.— Beatty  v.  O'Connor,  5  N.E. 
880,  106  Ind.  81. 

34  C.J.  p  313  note  17. 

16.  Del.— Home     Loan     Assoc.     v. 
Foard,   50   A.   537,   19   DeL   165. 

3'4  C.J.  p  313  note  18. 

17.  S.C. — Ex    parte   Charleston    Re- 
public   Truck    Co..    115    S.B.     820, 
123  S.C.  13. 

W.Va.— -Corpus  Juris  cited  fa  Black 
v.  Foley,  185  S.B.  902,  903,  117  W. 
Va.  490. 

34  C.J.  p  313  note  20. 

18.  Iowa. — Tschohl     v.      Machinery 
Mut.    Ins.    Assoc.,    101    N.W.    740, 
126  Iowa  211. 

34  C.J.  p  313  note  21. 

19.  Cal. — Starkweather  v.   Minarets 
Mining  Co.,  43  P.2d  321,  5  Cal.App. 
2d   501 — Callaway  v.  Wolcott,   266 
P.  574,  90  CaLApp.  753. 

I0wa.— Rounds  v.  Butler,  227  N.W. 
417,  20«  Iowa  1391,  followed  in  227 
N.W.  419— Dimick  v.  Munsinger, 
211  N.W.  404,  202  Iowa  784. 

Ky.— Dow  v.  Pearce,  289  S.W.  245, 
217  Ky.  20-2. 

34  C.J.  p  310  note  9*4. 

Mistake  generally  see  supra  subdi- 
vision b  of  this  section. 

507 


•Unauthorized  compromise 

A  judgment  based  on  unauthorized 
compromise  of  claim  by  attorney 
may  be  vacated  on  seasonable  ap- 
plication.— Harris  v.  Diamond  Const. 
Co.,  Va..  36  S.B.2d  573. 
Relief  denied 

(1)  The  trial  court  did  not  abuse 
its  discretion  in  refusing  to  set  aside 
judgment     and      stay      proceedings 
thereon  until  disposition  of  garnish- 
ment    and     execution     proceedings 
against  judgment  debtor  by  creditors 
of  judgment   creditor's   assignor  on 
ground  of  reasonable  and  justifiable 
mistake  of  law  by  judgment  debtor's 
counsel  in  believing  that  proper  rem- 
edy was  interpleader  action  against 
execution  and  gamishee  creditors.—- 
Kent  v.  County  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  Phil- 
adelphia,   80   P.2d  1019,    27   Cal.App. 
2d  340. 

(2)  Other  instances  see  34  C.J.  p 
310  note  94  [b]. 

20.  Mont.— Mantle  v.  Largey,  43  P. 
633,  17  Mont.  479. 

34  C.J.  p  311  note  95. 

21.  Cal. — Underwood  v.  Underwood, 
25  P.  1065,  87  Cal.  523. 

N.T.— McCredy   v.   Woodcock,    58  N. 


280 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


had  been  discontinued22  or  settled.25 

Time  for  appearance  or  pleading  or  trial  A 
judgment  may  be  vacated  or  opened  when  the  fail- 
ure to  defend  was  due  to  a  mistake  or  miscalcula- 
tion of  the  party's  attorney  as  to  the  time  allowed 
him  for  appearing,  pleading,  or  taking  some  other 
step  in  the  action,2*  as  to  -the  term  of  court  at 
which  the  case  would  be  tried,2^  or  the  day  of  the 
term  or  hour  of  the  day,26  or  as  to  its  being  on  the 
calendar  for  trial,2?  Or  as  to  the  time  when  it  would 
probably  be  reached  for  trial  in  its  order,2*  provid- 
ed, always,  there  was  sufficient  excuse  for  the  mis- 
take.29 

Ignorance  or  mistake  of  law.  It  is  a  general  rule 
that  a  party  cannot  be  relieved  from  a  judgment 
taken  against  him  in  consequence  of  the  ignorance 
or  mistake  of  his  counsel  with  respect  to  the  law, 
whether  it  concerns  the  rights  or  duties  of  the  cli- 
ent, the  legal  effect  of  the  facts  in  the  case,  or  the 
rules  of  procedure.30  However,  there  are  cases 
where  relief  has  been  granted  largely,  if  not  en- 
tirely, on  the  ground  of  ignorance  or  mistake  of 


Erroneous  advice.    It  has  generally  been  held  not 
to  be  good  ground  for  setting  aside  a  judgment  that 


it  was  suffered  by  the  party  in  consequence  of  re- 
ceiving erroneous  advice  from  his  attorney  as  to 
the  necessity  of  making  a  defense  or  as  to  tfee  va- 
lidity of  his  defense  ;32  but  some  courts  have  grant* 
ed  relief  on  this  ground.** 

f.  Casualty  or  Misfortune 

A  party  may  have  an  adverse  Judgment  opened  or 
vacated  on  the  ground  that  he  was  prevented  by  un- 
avoidable casualty  or  misfortune  from  properly  pros* 
ecu  ting  or  defending  the  action. 

Under  the  statutes  of  many  states,  a  party  may 
have  a  judgment  adverse  to  him  opened  or  vacated 
on  the  ground  that  he  was  prevented  by  unavoidable 
casualty  or  misfortune  from  properly  prosecuting* 
or  defending  the  action  in  which  it  was  rendered.34 
The  "unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune,"  for 
which  a  judgment  may  be  opened  or  vacated  is  a» 
accident  or  mishap  arising  from  causes  beyond  the 
party's  control,  and  against  which  he  could  not  have 
guarded  in  the  exercise  of  due  foresight  and  dili- 
gence.35 

Absence  of  party.  The  mere  fact  that  a  party 
was  absent  from  the  trial  is  not  cause  for  setting 
the  judgment  aside,  where  his  absence  is  not  ex- 
cused or  shown  to  have  been  unavoidable.88  How- 


T.S.  656,  41  App.Div.  526,  appeal 
dismissed  55  N.E.  1097,  160  N.T. 
676. 

22.  Ky.— Rosen  v.  Galizio,  212  S.W. 
104,  184  Ky.  367. 

34  C.J.  p  311  note  97. 

23.  R.I.— Fox    v.    Artesian   Weil    & 
Supply  Co.,  83  A.  115,  34  R.I.  260. 

34  C.J.  p  311  note  98. 

24.  Iowa.— Banks  v.  C.  C.  Taft  Co., 
1T4  H.W.  576,  188  Iowa  559. 

34  O.J.  p  311  note  99. 

25.  S.D.— Western     Surety     Co.     v. 
Boettcher,    156    N.W.    68,    36    S.D. 
583. 

34  C.J.  p  311  note  1. 

26.  N.C.— Smith  v.  Holmes,  61  S.B. 
631,  148  N.C.  210. 

34  C.J.  p  311  note  2. 

.27.    Mont— Collier  v.  Fitzpatrick,  57 

P.  181,  22  Mont.  553. 
34  C.J.  p  311  note  3. 

28.  N.C.— Grandy  v.  Carolina  Metal 
Products  Co.,  95  S.B.  914,  175  N.C.. 
511. 

34  C.J.  p  311  note  4. 

29.  Ark. — Progressive  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Riley,    88   S.W,2d   66,  191  Ark. 
850. 

Pa. — Silent  Auto  Corporation  of 
Northern  New  Jersey  v.  Folk,  97 
Pa.Super.  688. 

$4  C.J.  p  311  note  5. 

.80.  OaL — Bonestell  v.  Western  Au- 
tomotive Finance  Corporation,  232 
P.  734,  69  CaLApp.  719. 


OkL— Schneider    v.    Decker,    291    P. 

80,  144  Okl.  213. 
34C.J.  p  312  note  6. 
Errors  of  law  generally  see  supra  S 

2T4. 

31.  Ariz. — Central  Bank  v.  Willcox- 
Pima  Overland  Co.,  188  P.  133,  21 
Ariz.  314. 

34  C.J.  p  312  note  7. 

32.  Cal. — Adams  v.  Alexander,  App., 
162  P.2d  647. 

34  QJ.  p  312  note  3. 

33.  Okl.— Hatfleld  v.  Lewis,  236  P. 
611,  110  Okl.  98. 

34  C.J.  p  31-2  note  9. 

34.  U.S.— in  re  Cox,  D.C.Ky.,  33  F. 
Supp.  796, 

Ark/— Kersh  Lake  Drainage  Dist.  v. 

Johnson,  157   S.W.2d  39,   203   Ark. 

315,    certiorari   denied  Johnson  .v. 

Kersh  Lake  Drainage  Dist,  62  S. 

Ct.    1044,    316    U.S.    673,    86    L.Ed 

1-748— Merchants'  &  Planters'  Bank 

&  Trust  Co.  v.  Ussery,  38  S.W.2d 

1087,  183  Ark.  838. 
Okl.— Boaz    v.    Martin,    225    P.    518, 

101  Okl.  243. 

35.  Ark.— Wilder  v.  Harris,  168  S.W. 
2d  804,  205  Ark.  341. 

Okl.— Walker  v.  Gulf  Pipe  Line  Co., 

226  P.  10-46,  102  OkL  7. 
34  C.J.  p  314  note  23. 
Pacts  constituting'  unavoidable  cas- 
ualty 

(1)  Where  trial  court  granted  a 
continuance  to  defendant,  Judgment 
rendered  against  him,  through  over- 

508 


sight  of  judge  and  without  setting 
aside  continuance  and  without  no- 
tifying defendant  or  his  counsel  of 
such  action  was,  as  to  defendant  on 
unavoidable  casualty,  and  was  prop- 
erly vacated. — K.  &  S.  Sales  Co.  v» 
Lee,  261  S.W.  903,  164  Ark.  449. 

(2)  Other  facts  see  34  C.J.  p  314 
mote  23  [a]. 
Xioss  of  papers 

(1)  The    accidental    misplacement 
and  loss  of  papers  essential  to  in- 
form the  party  of  his  rights  or  en- 
able him  to  prepare  his  defense  is- 
a  "casualty  or  misfortune."— North- 
ern Dispensary  Trustees  v.  Merriam, 
59  How.Pr.,  N.Y.,  226—34  C.J.  p  314 
note  23  [c]. 

(2)  However,  fact  that  church  rec- 
ords had  been .  negligently  lost,  and 
that  church's  former  name  had  been 
forgotten,  was  held  not  "unavoidable 
casualty  or  misfortune"  such  as  to 
warrant  setting  aside  order  in  pro- 
bate proceedings  decreeing  that  de- 
vise to  church  having  different  name 
from    applicant    had    failed. — In    re- 
Jones'  Estate,  27  P.2d  237,  138  Kan. 
581,  rehearing  denied  First  Colored 
Baptist   Church   v.   Caldwell,    30    P. 
2d  144, 139  Kan.  45. 

36,    Iowa.— Hagar  v.  Galles,  24*4  N> 

W.  700. 
Pa. — Wanner  v.  Thompson,  Com.Pl., 

27  Del.Co.  455.  . 
Tex.— Kurtz   v.    Carr,    Civ.App.,    261 

S.W.  *79. 
34  C.J.  p  315  note  26. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


280 


ever,  it  is  a  good  excuse  if  he  shows  that  he  was 
compelled  to  absent  himself  from  the  trial  by  a  con- 
straint which  he  was  bound  to  obey,  or  a  cause 
which  he  could  not  control,37  provided  reasonable 
diligence  and  foresight  was  exercised  to  anticipate 
and  avoid,  or  to  overcome,  the  obstacles.88  Sim- 
ilarly the  absence  of  defendant  from  the  state  or  be- 
yond the  seas  at  the  time  of  the  trial  will  be  cause 
for  setting  aside  the  judgment  if  he  could  not  have 
been  present,  and  his  absence  operated  to  his  preju- 
dice,39 provided  he  is  not  chargeable  with  negli- 
gence or  lack  of  proper  attention  to  his  case.40 

Absence  of  counsel.  The  mere  absence  of  one's 
attorney  at  the  time  of  the  trial  is  no  cause  for 
setting  aside  a  judgment41  unless  it  is  shown  that, 
had  he  been  present,  he  could  have  gone  to  trial, 
or  that  he  could  have  presented  good  grounds  for 
a  continuance42  and  that  injustice  and  injury  have 
resulted  to  the  client  in  consequence  thereof43  or 
that  the  attorney's  absence  was  excusable  or  una- 
voidable under  the  circumstances.44  It  has  been 
considered  a  sufficient  excuse  that  the  attorney  was 
engaged  at  the  time  in  trying  a  case  in  another 
court,45  or  was  in  attendance  on  another  court  as 
a  witness46  unless  such  attendance  was  voluntary 
and  without  subpoena,47  or,  being  out  of  town,  was 
unexpectedly  detained48  or  was  delayed  by  obstruc- 
tion to  travel,49  or  even  that  the  mere  multiplicity 
and  pressure  of  his  professional  engagements  pre- 
vented him  from  giving  attention  to  the  case.50 

Some  cases,  however,  take  a  stricter  view  of  the 


attorney's  obligations,  and  hold  that  if  he  has  cases 
coming  on  in  different  courts  he  must  obtain  leave 
of  absence  from  one  court  or  the  other,  and  arrange 
that  neither  case  shall  be  proceeded  with  in  his  ab- 
sence,51 that  if  he  is  likely  to  be  detained  elsewhere 
he  must  apply  for  a  continuance  or  extension  of 
time,52  that  if  he  is  detained  on  his  way  to  the 
place  of  trial  he  should  telegraph  to  the  judges  and 
ask  to  have  the  case  held,53  and  that  it  is  no  excuse 
for  his  voluntary  absence  that  he  believed  the  case 
would  not  be  reached  before  his  return.54  Many 
cases  have  refused  to  accept  the  excuse  that  the 
attorney  was  detained  elsewhere  by  important  busi- 
ness, even  when  it  was  of  a  public  character,  such 
as  his  attendance  on  the  legislature,  of  which  he 
was  a  member.55 

Illness  of  party  or  relative.  If  a  party  is  pre- 
vented by  sickness  from  preparing  his  case  or  at- 
tending the  trial,  and  the  circumstances  are  such 
that  his  personal  attention  and  presence  are  neces- 
sary to  the  due  protection  of  his  rights,  a  judgment 
against  him  may  be  set  aside  on  the  ground  of  "cas- 
ualty or  misfortune,"  or  of  "excusable  neglect."5* 
It  is  otherwise,  however,  where  the  party's  inter- 
ests were,  or  could  have  been,  adequately  protected 
by  attorney  or  agent  without  the  personal  presence 
or  attention  of  the  party,57  or  where  the  character 
and  duration  of  the  illness  were  not  such  as  in  fact 
to  obstruct  the  due  prosecution  or  defense  of  the 
action,58  or  where  the  exercise  of  due  diligence 
would  have  prevented  or  obviated  the  alleged  con- 


37.  Or.— Capalija  v.  Kullsh,   201  P. 
545,  101  Or.  666. 

34  C.JT.  p  315  note  27. 

38.  Tex.— Miller  v.  First  State  Bank 
&   Trust   Co.   of   Santa  Anna  Co., 
Civ.App.,  184  S.W.  614. 

34  C.J.  p  315  note  28. 

39.  Mo. — McElvain  v.  Maloney,  App., 
186  S.W.  745. 

34  C.J.  p  315  note  24. 

40.  Ark. — Trumbull  v.,  Harris,  170  S. 
W.  222,  11'4  Ark.  493*. 

34  C.J.  p  315  note  25. 

41.  Cal, — Startzman    v.    Los    Banos 
Cotton    Gins,    256    P.    220,    82   Cal. 

.App.  624,  followed  in  Brreca  v.  Los 

Banos  Cotton  Gins,  274  P.  1041,  96 

CaLApp.   ?83. 
Okl. — Brockman    v.    Penn   Mut    Life 

Ins.  Co.,  64  P.2d  1208,  179  Okl.  98. 
S.C.— Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sight- 

ler,  127  S.B.   13,   131  S.C.  241. 
34  C.J.  p  315  note  29. 

42.  Mo. — Hurcfc  V.  St  Louis  Exposi- 
tion &  Music  Hall  Assoc.,  28  Mo. 
App.   629. 

43.  Cal.— Bixby    v.    Hotchkis,    App., 
164  P.2d  808. 

34  CjJ.  p  315  note  31. 


44.  Wash.— O'Toole  v.  Phoenix  Ins. 
Co.,  82  P.  175,  39  Wash.  688. 

34  C.J.  p  315  note  32. 
Excuses  held  sufficient 

(1)  Judgment  against  party 'whose 
sole    counsel    is   absent    by   express 
leave  is  properly  vacated,  when  fact 
is  properly  called  to  court's  attention 
by  timely  motion  in  writing.— Donal- 
son  v.  Bank  of  Jakin,  127  S.E.  229, 

33  Ga.App.  '428— McNeill  v.  Morgan, 
68  S.E.  10-20,  8  Ga.App.  323. 

(2)  Other    excuses    see    34    C.J.    P 
315  note  32  [a]. 

45.  Wis.— Koch    v.    Wisconsin    Pea 
Canners    Co.,    131    N.W.    404,    146 
Wis.  267. 

34  C.J.  p  316  note  33. 

46.  N.Y.— Hopkins  v.  Meyer,  78  N.T. 
S.  459,  76  App.Div.  365. 

N.C.— Wynne  v.  Prairie.  -86  N.C.  73. 

47.  Cal.— Gray  v.  Sabin,  25  P.  422, 
87  Cal.  211. 

48.  Iowa.— Ellis  v.  Butter,  43  N.W. 
'    459,  78  Iowa  632. 

34  C.J.  p  316  note  36. 

49.  N.Y.— Hirschfeld     v.     Monahan, 
141  N.Y.S.  520. 

34  C.J.  p  316  note  37. 

509 


50.  Iowa.— McMillan     v.     Osterson* 
183  N.W.  487,  191  Iowa  983. 

34  C.J.  p  316  note  38. 

51.  Ga. — Western    &   A.    R.    Co.    T» 
Pitts,  4  S.E.  921,  79  Ga.  532. 

52.  Wyo. — Luman    v.    Hill,    252    P. 
1019,  36  Wyo.  48,  rehearing  denied 
256  P.  339,  36  Wyo.  427. 

34  C.J.  p  316  note  40. 

53L    Minn. — Caughey      v.      Northern 

Pac.  El.  Co.,  53  N.W.  545,  51  Minn. 

324. 

54.  Cal.— Gray  v.   Sabin,   25   P.  422, 
87  Cal.  211. 

34  C.J.  p  316  note  42. 

55.  Ga.— Bentley   v.    Finch,    18    S.EL 
155,  86  Ga.  809. 

34  CJ.  p  316  note  43. 

56.  Ky. — Baker   v.    Owensboro    Sav» 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.'s  Receiver  Co.» 
130  S.W.  969,  140  Ky.  121. 

34  C.J.  p  316  note  44. 

Insanity  of  party  see  supra   §   276* 

67.    Tex. — Woytek  v.  King,  Civ.App.» 

218  S.W.  1081. 
3-4  C.J.  p  317  note  45. 

58.    lowal— Reiher  v.  Webb,  35  N.W* 

631,  73  Iowa  559. 
34  C.J.  p  317  note  46. 


280 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


sequence  of  such  sickness.59  The  illness  of  a  mem- 
ber of  a  party's  family,  or  of  any  other  relative, 
while  it  may  be  ground  for  a  continuance,  is  gen- 
erally held  to  be  no  cause  for  setting  aside  the  judg- 
ment;60 but  in  many  cases  judgments  have  been 
opened  or  vacated  largely,  if  not  altogether,  on  the 
ground  of  serious  sickness  of  a  close  relative  actu- 
ally preventing  attendance  of  the  party.61 

Ittness  or  death  of  counsel  or  relative.  The  ill- 
ness of  a  party's  counsel,  so  severe  as  to  prevent 
him  from  appearing  and  trying  the  case,  is  good 
ground  for  vacating  the  judgment,  provided  such 
party  did  not  know  of  it  in  time  to  retain  other 
counsel  or  was  prevented  in  some  other  way  from 
doing  so.62  The  same  rule  applies  in  case  of  the 
illness  or  death  of  a  member  of  the  attorney's  fam- 
ily, or  a  near  relative,  withdrawing  his  attention 
from  professional  business,  and  leaving  the  client 
without  legal  aid  and  without  the  opportunity  to 
retain  other  counsel.63  The  death  of  one's  attorney 
has  been  held  to  be  an  "unavoidable  casualty"  andx 
as  such,  ground  for  vacating  a  judgment.64 

§  281.    Other  Grounds 

The  sufficiency  of  various  other  grounds  for  opening 
or   vacating   judgment   has   been    adjudicated,   including 


the  consent  of  the  parties  and  the  disability,  disqualifi- 
cation, or  misconduct  of  the  Judge. 

In  addition  to  the  matters  considered  supra  §§ 
266-280,  the  courts  have  determined  the  sufficiency 
of  other  matters  as  ground  for  opening  or  vacating 
a  judgment.65  The  generality  of  the  court's  judg- 
ment or  decree,66  the  lack  of  authority  of  the  at- 
torneys who  instituted  the  suit,67  and  the  fact  that  ( 
the  judgment  was  obtained  by  duress68  have  been 
held  not  ground  for  opening  or  vacating  a  judg- 
ment. 

Agreement  or  consent.  Where  a  court  has  ju- 
risdiction to  set  aside  a  judgment  for  specified  rea- 
sons, it  may  do  so  on  consent  of  parties  without 
specifying  any  grounds;69  and  where  the  parties 
enter  into  an  otherwise  valid  agreement  for  the 
vacation  of  a  judgment  such  agreement  is  binding 
and  enforceable.70  However,  it  is  error  to  vacate 
a  judgment  on  an  agreement  not  supported  by  a 
consideration.71  Where,  after  the  court  has  ordered 
commissioners  to  partition  land,  defendants  file  ex- 
ceptions and  present  a  valid  written  agreement  for 
partition  made  by  the  parties,  the  court  will  vacate 
its  order,  and  direct  a  partition  according  to  the 
agreement,  the  partition  by  the  parties  being  para- 
mount to  one  made  by  the  officers  of  the  court72 


.59.    Iowa. — Iowa    Savings    &    Loan 

Assoc.  v.  Kent,   109  N.W.  773.  134 

Iowa  444. 

54  C.J.  p  317  note  47. 
60.    Kan. — Gooden   v.   Lewis,    167  P. 

1133,  101  Kan.  482. 
•34  C.J.  p  317  note  48. 
Death  of  party  see  supra  §  276. 
«L    Tex.— Clewis  v.   Snell,  Civ.App., 

59  S.W.  910. 
34  C.J.  p  317  note  49. 
•62.    Neb.— Scott  v.  Wright,  70  N.W. 

396,  50  Neb.  649. 
£4  C.J.  p  317  note  52. 

Mental  incapacity  of  attorney  was 
fteld  to  authorize  vacation  of  Judg- 
ment at  subsequent  term. — Baird  & 
Warner,  Inc.,  v.  Roble,  250  Ill.App. 
255. 
.Ability  to  notify  court  of  condition 

Motion  to  reinstate  case  for  ill- 
ness of  counsel,  not  alleging  that 
•counsel  was  unable  to  notify  court 
of  condition  at  time  of  dismissal, 
held  fatally  defective. — Brannen  v. 
Riggs,  140  S.E.  515,  37  Ga.App.  356, 
-affirmed  T46  S.E.  169,  167  Ga.  493. 
^Belief  denied 

(1)  Where   defendant   had   several 
.attorneys,    one   of   whom   was   ill. — 
'Mays  &  Mays  v.   Flattery.  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  252  S.W.  860. 

(2)  Other  circumstances  see  34  CL 
4*;  p  317  note  52  [a], 

•63.    Iowa. — Norman  v.  Iowa  Cent.  B. 

Co.,  128  N.W.  349,  149  Iowa  246. 
r34  C.J.  p  318  note  53. 


64.  Ark. — Columbia  County  v.  Eng- 
land, 236  S.W.  625,  151  Ark.  465. 

Ky.— Snelling  v.  Lewis,  78  S.W.  1124, 
25  Ky.L.  1856. 

65.  Extension  of  time  for  appeal 
Vacating    Judgment    after    expira- 
tion of  appeal  period  for  purpose  of 
giving  defendant  opportunity  to  ap- 
peal was  held  not  vacation  due   to 
"clerical"    or    "Judicial    error"    and 
was     improper. — Connecticut    'Mort- 
gage   &    Title    Guaranty   Co.    v.    Di 
Francesco.  151  A.  491,  112  Conn.  673. 

Juror's  false  answers  on  voir  dire 

In  statutory  proceeding  to  vacate 
Judgment  because  of  misstatements 
of  Juror  on  voir  dire  examination,  re- 
lief would  not  be  granted  on  mere 
showing  that  Juror  did  not  'answer 
truthfully  and  fully,  but  only  on 
showing  of  prejudice,  and  in  action 
against  railroad  for  Injuries,  where 
juror's  voir  dire  examination  indicat- 
ed that  he  was  more  favorable  to 
railroad,  juror's  misstatements  to 
the  effect  that  no  member  of  his 
family  had  been  involved  in  personal 
injuries  case,  whereas  he  had  been 
involved  in  accidents  resulting  in 
personal  injuries,  and  his  son  had 
been  sued  for  personal  injuries,  were 
held  not  to  require  vacation  of  Judg- 
ment against  railroad  in  statutory 
proceeding,  especially  where  judg- 
ment had  been  affirmed  by  appellate 
court,  and  leave  to  appeal  to  su- 
preme court  had  been  denied. — Maher 

510 


v.  New  York,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  * 
N.E.2d    512,    290    Ill.App.    267. 

66.  U.S.— Swift  &  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  App. 
D.C..  -48  S.Ct.  311,  276  U.S.  311,  72 
L.Ed.  5-87. 

67.  Mo. — Cooper  v.   Armour  &   Co., 
15    S.W.2d    9-46,    222   Mo.App.    1176. 

68.  Or. — Chaney  v.   Chaney,    156    P. 
2d  559. 

69.  Ohio. — National   Home   for  Dis- 
abled Volunteer  Soldiers   v.   Over- 
holser,  60  N.E.  628,  64  Ohio  St.  517. 

34  C.J.  p  295  note  94. 

70.  Ark. — Franzen  v.  Juhl,   32   S.W. 
2d  627,  182  Ark.  663. 

71.  Mo.— State  v.  Broaddus,   111   S. 
W.  508,  212  Mo.  685. 

N.Y.— Schlesser  v.  Pearl,   185  N.Y.S. 

116. 
Oral  agreement 

A  naked  oral  agreement  for  the 
setting  aside  of  a  Judgment  entered 
into  after  the  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment Is  insufficient  to  reauire  that 
the  Judgment  be  set  aside. — Smith  v. 
Cone,  156  S.E.  612,  171  Ga.  697. 
Inability  to  comply  with  agreement 

Equity  will  not  enforce  agreement 
to  vacate  Judgment,  where  judgment 
debtors  seeking  enforcement  have 
not  complied  therewith,  although 
given  ample  opportunity. — Chambers 
v.  Investors'  Syndicate,  10  P.2d  389, 
154  Okl.  142. 

72.  Tex. — High  v.  Tarver,  Civ.App., 
25  S.W.  1098. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


283 


The  effect  of  the  consent  of  the  parties  on  the 
power  of  the  court  to  vacate  a  judgment  after  the 
expiration  of  the  term  in  which  the  judgment  was 
rendered  is  considered  supra  §  230. 

Disability,  disqualification,  or  misconduct  of 
judge.  Insanity  of  the  judge  or  referee  who  tried 
the  case  is  not  necessarily  ground  for  vacating  the 
judgment,73  but  where  the  mental  capacity  to  ren- 
der a  proper  judgment  was  lacking  the  judgment 
should  be  set  aside.74  It  has  been  held  that  dis- 
qualification of  the  judge  rendering  a  judgment  is 
ground  for  vacating  it,75  particularly  where  such 
disqualification  renders  the  judgment  void.76  How- 
ever, it  has  also  been  held  that  disqualification  of 
the  judge  renders  the  judgment  merely  voidable  so 
that  the  remedy  is  by  appeal  and  not  by  motion  to 
vacate.77 

Misconduct  of  judgs  has  been  held  ground  for 
vacating  the  judgment.78 

§  282.    Defenses  to  Relief 

The  sufficiency  of  particular  matters  as  defenses  to 


a  motion  to  open  or  vacate  a  Judgment  has  been  con- 
sidered. 

The  sufficiency  of  particular  matters  as  defenses 
to  a  motion  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  has  been? 
considered  with  respect  to  such  matters  as  the  lapse 
of  the  term,  supra  §  230,  the  expiration  of  the 
statutory  limitation  of  time  or  laches,  infra  §  288,. 
and  other  matters.70 

§  283.    Other  Remedies  Available 

Subject  to  some  exceptions,  a  motion  to  vacate  wtIF 
not  be  entertained  when  the  proper  remedy  is  by  some 
other  proceeding,  such  as  by  appeal. 

Except  where  such  remedies  are  cumulative  under 
the  governing  statutes,80  a  motion  to  vacate  or  set 
aside  a  judgment  will  not  be  entertained  when  the 
proper  remedy  of  the  party  aggrieved  is  by  appeal, 
error,  or  certiorari,81  but  it  has  been  held  that  the 
availability  of  the  remedy  of  appeal  will  not  bar 
the  remedy  of  vacation  of  the  judgment  where  the- 
judgment  is  absolutely  void.82  The  same  rule  has 
been  held  to  apply  where  the  proper  remedy  was- 


73.  N.Y. — Schoenberg  v.   Ulman,    99 
N.T.S.    650,    51    Misc.    83,   18    N.T. 
Ann.Cas.    353,    reversed    on    other 
grounds    101   N.Y.S.    798,    52   Misc. 
104. 

34  C.J.  p  295  note  1. 

74.  N.Y.— R.  A.  Schoenberg  &  Co.  v. 
City  Trust,  Safe  Deposit  &  Surety 
Co.,   101   N.Y.S.   798,   52   Misc.   104. 

75.  Ga.— State    Mut.    Life    Ins.    Co. 
v.    Walton,    83    S.B.    656,    142    Ga. 
765. 

34  C.J.  p  295  note  97. 
tTndgs  beld  not  disqualified 

Trial  Judge,  who  had  been  law 
partner  of  attorney  for  litigant,  was 
not  disqualified,  so  as  to  warrant 
setting  aside  judgment,  where  evi- 
dence showed  that  partnership  had 
been  dissolved  as  to  new  business 
before  litigation  in  question  was  in- 
trusted to  counsel. — Walker  County 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Sweet,  Tex.Civ.App., 
63  S.W.2d  1061,  error  dismissed. 

76.  Ga. — James       v.       Douglasville 
Banking  Co.,  106  S.B.  595,   26  Ga. 
App.  509. 

34  C.J.  p  295  note  9*8. 

77.  Ky. — Duff  v.  Hodges'  Guardian, 
14   S.W.2d  1058,  228  Ky.  29'4. 

78.  U.S. — Newton     v.     Joslin,     C.C. 
Colo.,  30  F.  891. 

34  C.J.  p  295  note  99. 

79.  Inequitable  conduct,  or  unclean 
hands,  on  the  part  of  the  applicant 
is  sufficient  reason  for  denying  re- 
lief.— Bly stone    v.    Bly stone,    51    Pa. 
373—34  C.J.  p  363  note  47. 

Has  Judicata 

Judgment  overruling  contention 
that  fact  findings  were  procured  by 
fraud  practiced  by  successful  party 


which  was  affirmed  on  appeal  was 
held  res  judicata  of  issue  whether 
judgment  was  procured  by  extrinsic 
fraud  in  proceeding  on  petition  to 
vacate  Judgment  on  that  ground. — 
Hazen  v.  Dudley,  61  P.2d  898,  144 
Kan.  467. 

80,  Cal.— Miller  v.  Lee,  125  P.2d  627, 
52  Cal.App.2d  10. 

Idaho. — Baldwin   v.    Anderson,    8    P. 

2d  461,  51  Idaho  614. 
34  C.J.  p  362  note  22. 

81.  U.S. — Woods    Bros.    Const    Co. 
v.  Yankton  County,  S.  D.,  C.C.A.S. 
D.,  54  F.2d  304,  81  A.L.R.  300. 

Ark. — Magnolia  Grocer  Co.  v.  Far- 
rar,  115  S.W.2d  1094,  105  Ark.  1069 
— Dent  v.  Farmers'  &  Merchants' 
Bank,  258  S.W.  322,  162  Ark.  325. 

Cal. — Kupfer  v.  Brawner,  122  P.2d 
268,  19  CaL2d  562. 

111.— Wilson  v.  Fisher,  17  N.E.2d 
216,  369  111.  538. 

Kan. — McLeod  v.  Hartxnan,  253  P. 
109I4,  123  Kan.  110. 

Ky. — Hargis  Commercial  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.'s  Liquidating  Agent  v. 
Bversole.  7-4  S.W.2d  193,  255  Ky. 
377 — Center's  Guardian  v.  Center, 
51  S.W.2d  460,  24'4  Ky.  602— Smith 
v.  Patterson,  2<80  S.W.  930,  213  Ky. 
142— Combs  v.  Allen,  271  S.W. 
598,  208  Ky.  519. 

Minn. — Johnson  v.  Union  Sav.  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  266  N.W.  169,  196 
Minn.  588— Matchan  v.  Phoenix 
Land  Inv.  Co.,  205  N.W.  637,  165 
Minn.  479. 

Mo. — Weatherford  v.  Spiritual  Chris- 
tian Union  Church,  163  S.W.2d  916. 

N.Y.— Sternkopf  v.  Killers,  285  N.Y. 
S.  471,  247  App.Div.  738— In  re 
Evans'  Estate,.  1  N.Y.S.2d  99,  165 

511 


Misc.    752,    affirmed   In   re    Evans* 

Will,    17   N.Y.S.2*    1006,    258    App. 

Div.  1037,  affirmed  29  N.E.2d  392,. 

284  N.Y.  576. 
N.C.— Snow  Hill   Live    Stock   Co.    V- 

Atkinson,    126    S.B.    610,    189    N.O. 

248— In    re    Ricks'   Will,    126    S.B. 

422,  189  N.C.  1-87. 
Okl. — Welden    v.    Home    Owners    & 

Loan   Corporation,    141    P.2d   1010,. 

193  Okl.  167. 
Pa,— Griffith  v.   Hamer,   173   A,  874,. 

113  Pa.Super.  239. 
3*4  C.J.  p  361  note  21. 
Joint  or  several  Judgment 

A  solidary  Judgment  against  co- 
makers of  note  who  were  personally 
cited  would  not  give  rise  to  an  ac- 
tion of  nullity  on  ground  that  judg- 
ment was  erroneous  in  that  it  should' 
have  been  a  Joint  -one  against  co- 
makers each  only  for  virile  share- 
instead  of  against  each  for  the- 
whole,  since  error,  if  any,  could  have 
been  corrected  on  appeal. — Wunder- 
lich  v.  Palmisano,  La. App.,  177  So.. 
843. 
Finding  of  Jtudcdictional  faotg 

When  all  parties  affected  by  judg- 
ment are  actually  or  constructively 
before  the  court  with  an  opportunity 
to  assert  their  contentions  and  to- 
appeal  from  an  adverse  ruling,  the 
finding  of  Jurisdictions!  facts  by  the 
court  may  be  reviewed  only  by  an* 
appeal  or  other  timely  and  availa- 
ble direct  attack. — In  re  Robinson's- 
Estate,  121  P.2d  73*4,  19  Cal.2d  534— 
In  re  Estrem's  Estate,  107  P.2d  36,. 
16  Cal.2d  563. 

82.    La.— Collins  v.  McCook,  136  So* 

204,  17  La.App.  415. 
S.D.— In  re  Shafer*s  Estate,  209  N.W.. 


§•284 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


by  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  in  the  court  rendering 
the  judgment,83  by  motion  to  correct  the  judg- 
ment,84 by  mandamus  requiring  the  court  to  take 
some  action  which  would  give  the  party  what  he 
seeks,85  by  an  independent  action  for  damages,86 
by  a  bill  in  equity  for  injunction  or  other  relief,87 
or  by  other  proceedings.88 

§  284.    Waiver  and  Estoppel 

The   right  to  vacation   of  a  judgment  may  be   lost 
by  waiver  or  estoppel. 

While  it  has  been  held  that  estoppel  may  not  be 
invoked  in  support  of  an  invalid  proceeding  or  a 
void  judgment,89  in  general  a  person  who  would 
ordinarily  be  entitled  to  apply  for  the  vacation  of 


a  judgment  may  waive  the  right  to  such  relief,  or 
be  estopped  by  his  conduct  to  ask  for  it90  The 
right  to  have  a  judgment  opened  on  the  ground  of 
fraud  may  be  waived  by  the  party  injured,  or  he 
may  be  estopped  by  his  subsequent  conduct  to  ap- 
ply for  such  relief.91 

Conduct  constituting  waiver  or  estoppel.  Waiver 
or  estoppel  generally  results  where  the  party  in- 
jured acquiesces  in  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,93 
or  in  the  effect  of  the  judgment  as  rendered,93  or 
acknowledges  its  binding  force,94  or  receives  and 
retains  benefits  accruing  to  him  under  it,95  or  volun- 
tarily pays  the  amount  of  it,96  or  suffers  his  prop- 
erty to  be  sold  on  execution  without  objection,97  or 
where  the  party  against  whom  an  interlocutory 


355,  adhered  to  on  rehearing-  In  re 

Schafer's    Estate,    216    N.W.    948, 

52  S.D.  182. 
Tex. — Dempsey  v.    Gibson,   Oiv.App., 

105  S.W.2d  423,  error  dismissed. 
Va. — Mann  v.  Osborne,  149  S.E.  537, 

153  Va,  190. 

83.  Md. — Brawner  v.  Hooper,  135  A. 
420,  151  Md.  579. 

Ohio.— Horwitz  v.  Franklin,  172  N.E. 

303,  35  Ohio  App.  95. 
34  C.J.  p  362  note  23. 
Remedies  held  cumulative 
Cal.— Miller   v.    Lee,    125    P.2d    627, 

52  Cal.App.2d  10. 
In  Georgia 

(1)  The  rule  stated  in  the  text  has 
been    followed. — Mize     v.     Americus 
Mfg.  &  Imp.  Co.,  34  S.E.  5*83,  109  Ga. 
359 — Clark's  Cove  Guano  Co.  v.  Steed, 
17  S.E.  967,  92  Ga.  440. 

(2)  However,  it  has  also  been  held 
to  be  permissible  to  prosecute  both 
a  motion  for  a  new  trial  and  a  mo- 
tion  to   set  judgment  aside   at   the 
same  time. — Kalil  v,  Spivey,  27  S.E. 
2d  475,  70  Ga.App.  8'4. 

(3)  Certainly    defendant    was    not 
precluded  from  prosecuting-  his  mo- 
tion to  set  aside  judgment  because 
defendant  had  previously  filed  a  skel- 
eton motion  for  new  trial  which  was 
dismissed  by  trial  court  on  ground 
that  defendant  had  abandoned   it — 
Kalil  v.  Spivey,  supra. 

After  time  for  motion  for  new  trial 
Under  statute  so  providing,  where 
the  time  for  filing  a  motion  for  new 
trial  has  elapsed,  and  the  grounds 
for  a  new  trial  could  not  have  been 
discovered  within  such  time  by  the 
application  of  reasonable  diligence, 
the  remedy  of  a  motion  to  set  aside 
the  judgment  may  be  available. — 
Valley  Iron  Works  v.  Independent 
Bakery,  17  P.2d  898,  171  Wash.  349. 

84.  S.D.— McDonald  v.  Egan,  178  N. 
W.  296,  43  S.D.  147. 

34  C.J.  p  362  note  24. 

85.  Md.— Chappell     v.     Real-Estate 
Pooling  Co.,  46  A.  982,  91  Md.  754. 


96.    N.C. — Bradburn    v.    Roberts,    61 

S.E.  617,  T48  N.C.  214. 
34  C.J.  p  362  note  26. 

87.  111. — Pedersen  v.   Logan   Square 
State  &  Savings  Bank,   36  N.E.$d 
732,  377  IlL  408. 

34  CJT.  p  362  note  27. 

88.  N.T. — Railroad  Federal  Savings 
&  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Rosemont  Holding 
Corporation,    290    N.Y.S.    609,    248 
App.Div.        909 — Railroad       Co-op. 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n   v.  Cocks, 
290   N.Y.S.    611,    248   App.Div.    905. 

Pa. — Anderson  v.  Polaszewski,  52  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  659,  27  Erie  Co.  19. 

89.  N.J. — Gimbel  Bros.  v.  Corcoran, 
192   A.    715,    15    N.J.Misc.    538. 

90.  Ky.— Kirk     v.     Springton     Coal 
Co.,    124    S.W.2d   760,    276  Ky.   501. 

N.Y.— Whitney  v,  Chesbro,  280  N.Y.S. 

ISB,  244  App.Div.  594. 
Ba. — Rapp   v.   Schlichtman,   Com.Pl., 

54  Montg.Co.   13. 
34  C.J.  p  362  note  28. 
Waiver    of    mere    irregularities    see 

supra  §  268. 

91.  Fla.— Stehli    v.    Thompson,     10 
So.2d  123,  151  Fla.  566. 

34  C.J.  p  362  note  29. 

92.  N.C. — Crissman    v.    Palmer,    85 
S.E.2d  422,  225  N.C.  472. 

3'4  C.J.  p  362  note  30. 
Facts  held  not  to  snow  waiver  or 
estoppel 

(1)  Filing   answer   did   not   waive 
defendant's  right  to  be  heard  on  mo- 
tion to  set  aside  void  judgment  ren- 
dered before  service  of  summons. — 
Kastner  v.   Tobias,  282   P.   585,   129 
Kan.  321. 

(2)  Where  defendants,  when  judg- 
ments were  first  called  to  their  at- 
tention, asserted  without  any  equivo- 
cation   that    they    had    never    been 
served  with  any  papers  in  the  case, 
and   they  at  no  time  receded  from 
that   position,    defendants   were   not 
precluded  by  "estoppel"   from  mov- 
'ng    to    vacate    the    judgments,    al- 
-hough   they   may   have   known   for 
ibout  eight  years  or  more  that  the 

512 


judgments  had  been  entered. — Baird 
v.  Ellison,  293  N.W.  794,  70  N.D.  261. 

93.  Pa.— In*  re  Mervine's  Estate,  IS 
Pa,Dist.  &  Co.  528 — Kuhns  v.  Chaf- 
fee,   Com.Pl.,   24  Erie  Co,  6. 

34  C.J.  p  362  note  31. 

Consent  to  continuance  of  lien 

Where  court  had  jurisdiction  of 
subject  matter  but  not  person  of  de- 
fendant before  judgment,  defendant 
waived  such  objection  on  motion  to 
strike  out  judgment  by  consenting  to 
let  lien  of  judgment  stand  pending 
trial  on  merits. — C.  I.  T.  Corporation 
v.  Powell,  170  A.  740,  166  Md.  208. 

94.  Ohio.— Mannix  T.  Elder.  1  Ohio 
Cir.Ct  59— Roberts  v.  Price,  2  Ohio 
Dec.,  Reprint,  681,  4  WestL.Month. 
581. 

Compromise  of  liability  and  giving 
of  security  therefor 

Ark.— Brierton  v.  Guaranty  Build- 
ing &  Loan  Ass'n,  120  S.W.2d  570, 
196  Ark.  1177. 

Move    to    guasn    garnishment    pro- 
ceedings 

Refusal  to  vacate  judgment  irreg- 
ularly obtained  was  not  error,  where 
defendant  allowed  judgment  to  stand 
and  moved  to  quash  garnishment 
proceedings  thereon.— Williams  v. 
State,  3  P.2d  443,  151  Okl.  223. 

95.  Fla. — Stehli    v.    Thompson,    10 
So.2d  123,  151  Fla.  "566. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Cratln 

v.    Cratin,    17-4    So.    255,    256,    178 

Miss.   SSI.' 
N.Y.— Whitney  v.  Chesbro,  280  K.Y.a 

13'8,  244  App.Div.  594. 
W.Va. — National   Bank   of   Summers 

of  Hinton  v.  Barton,  155  S.E.  90?, 

109  W.Va.  6*48. 
34  C.J.  p  362  note  33. 

96.  Ohio. — Lynch  v.  Board  of  Edu- 
cation of  City  School  Dist.  of  City 
of    Lakewood,    156    NJE2.    188,    116 
Ohio  St.  361. 

,34  C.J.  p  362  note  34. 

i97.    Kan. — Coffey   v.    Carter,    27    P. 

'     128,  47  Kan.  22. 

134  C.J.  p  363  note  35. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


286 


judgment  is  taken  submits  to  and  ratifies  it  by  par- 
ticipating in  the  further  proceedings  in  the  action,98 
or  generally  by  proceeding  in  the  cause  without  ob- 
jection tp  errors  or  defects  which  may  be  waived, 
and  which  could  have  been  cured  on  timely  objec- 
tion." Where  two  entries  of  a  judgment  for  the 
same  debt  are  made  by  mistake,  and  the  debtor  con- 
trives to  procure  an  entry  of  satisfaction  of  the 
first,  he  is  estopped  to  have  the  second  vacated  for 
irregularity.1 

Pursuit  of  other  remedies.  It  has  generally  been 
held  that  a  party  waives  his  right  to  apply  for  the 
vacation  of  a  judgment  by  pursuing  other  remedies,2 
as  by  taking  an  appeal  from  it,3  or  by  instituting  an 
independent  action  for  substantially  the  same  re- 
lief,4 although  there  is  also  some  authority  to  the 
contrary.5  Where  a  ground  for  the  vacation  of  a 
judgment  is  asserted  as  a  ground  for  a  new  trial 
but  is  withdrawn  before  the  motion  for  new  trial 


is  ruled  on,  it  has  been  held  that  there  is  no  es- 
toppel to  assert  such  ground  in  a  petition  to  vacate 
the  judgment6 

§  285.    Assignment    of    Judgment    or 

Rights  Thereunder 

Subject  to  statutory  qualifications,  the  assignee  or 
purchaser  of  a  judgment  or  rights  thereunder  cannot  set 
up  his  rights  to  prevent  its  being  opened  or  vacated. 

Except  as  the  rule  may  be  affected  by  statute, 
the  assignee  of  a  judgment,  or  a  subsequent  pur- 
chaser of  rights  affected  thereby,  cannot  set  up  his 
rights  to  prevent  its  being  opened  or  vacated,  as 
he  stands  in  no  better  position,  than  his  assignor, 
or  vendor.7 

The  effect  of  the  assignment  of  judgments  on  the 
rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties  generally  is  con- 
sidered infra  §§  521-528. 


2.  PBOOEEDINGS  AND  RELIEF 


§  286.    Nature  and  Form  of  Remedy 

a.  In  general 

b.  Motion  or  petition  in  cause 

c.  Action 

d.  Statutory   petition   or  complaint  and 

summons 

e.  Waiver  of  objections  to  form  of  rem- 

edy 

f.  Indirect  or  implied  vacation 

98.  N.Y.— Koehler  v.  Brady,  81  N.T. 
S.  695,  82  App.Div.  279,  appeal  dis- 
missed 73  KB.  1135,  181  N.T.  503. 

34  C.J.  p  363  note  36. 

Moving1  for  final  judgment 

Plaintiff's  motion  to  set  aside 
Judgment,  dismissing  complaint  on 
merits  for  want  of  Jurisdiction  to 
enter  it  because  of  failure  to  Join 
issue  by  answer  or  demurrer  to 
complaint  and  on  order  to  show 
cause,  was  properly  denied,  where 
plaintiff  moved  for  final  Judgment, 
and  so  acted  as  to  consent  to  deci- 
sion on  agreed  statement  of  facts.— 
Luebke  v.  Cky  of  Watertown,  284 
N.W.  519,  230  Wis.  512. 

99.  N.C.— Ollis    v.    Proffitt,    94    SJB3. 
401,  174  N.C.  675. 

34  C.J.  p  363  note  37. 

Judge's  disqualification 

Judgment  will  not  be  set  aside  on 
attack  by  party  with  knowledge  of 
Judge's  disqualification  before  trial 
on  ground  of  such  disqualification, 
when  record  shows  consent,  and  it  is 
not  necessary  for  reeord  to  use 
word  "consent"  or  its  equivalent- 
Gulf  States  Steel  Co.  v,  Christison, 
154  So.  565,  228  Ala,  622. 

49C.J.S.-33  513 


a.  In  General 

Unless  clearly  so  Intended,  a  statutory  mode  of  pro- 
ceeding for  the  vacation  of  a  Judgment  Is  not  the  exclu- 
sive remedy  for  the  purpose. 

In  order  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  there  must 
be  a  direct  proceeding  for  that  purpose,  not  a  mere 
incident  to  the  progress  of  the  cause  or  to  the  exe- 
cution of  the  judgment,  and  one  which  is  appropri- 
ate to  the  relief  sought;8  and  a  judgment  cannot  be 


Capacity  in  which  party  appears 

If  a  person  submits  himself  to  the 
Jurisdiction  of  court  and  litigates 
throughout  in  any  particular  ca- 
pacity, he  will  not  be  permitted  after 
an  adverse  result  to  impeach  the  de- 
cree as  to  himself  on  the  ground 
that  his  capacity  was  in  fact  differ- 
ent.— Hubbard  v.  Massie,  4  So.2d 
494,  192  Miss.  95. 
Facts  held  not  to  constitute  waiver 

Fact  that  defendants,  discovering 
trial  Judge's  disqualification,  prompt- 
ly but  erroneously  moved  in  supreme 
court  rather  than  trial  court  to  va- 
cate Judgment,  did  not  show  waiver. 
— Cadenasso  v.  Bank  of  Italy,  6  P. 
2d  944,  214  Cal.  562. 

1.  N.Y.— Weed  v.  Pendleton,  1  Abb. 
Pr.  51. 

2.  Bole  held  inapplicable 

(1)  Defects    in    service    of    state- 
ment of  claim  or  entry  of  Judgment 
were  not  waived,  where  rule  to  open 
Judgment  was  entered  at  time  when 
rule    to    strike    ofC    Judgment    was 
pending. — Skrynski  v.  Zeroka,  98  Pa, 
Super.  469. 

(2)  Fact  that  by  virtue  of  appeal 
Judgment     had     become     final     as 


against  one  of  the  parties  would  not 
preclude  another  party  from  mov- 
ing to  set  aside  Judgment  in  a  prop- 
er case. — Nuckolls  v.  Bank  of  Cali- 
fornia Nat.  Ass'n,  74  P.2d  264.  10 
Cal.2d  266,  114  A.L.R.  708. 

3.  La. — Sladovich  v.  Eureka  Home- 
stead Society,  108  So.  4T8,  161  La. 
270. 

34  CU.  p  363  note  38. 

4.  Pa.— Mellerio  v.  Freeman,  -60  A. 
735,  211  Pa,  202. 

3*  C.J.  p  363  note  39. 

5.  Ark.— -Clark  v.  Bowen,  56  S.W.Sd 
1032,  186  Ark.  931. 

Fending1  certiorari  proceeding1 

Since  one  may  pursue  more  than 
one  remedy  simultaneously,  It  is  no 
ground  for  setting  Judgment  aside 
that  there  is  pending  in  another 
court  a  proceeding,  such  as  certio- 
rari, by  defendant  assigning  error  on 
Judgment. — Whitley  v.  Jackson,  129 
S.E.  662,  34  CteuApp.  286. 

6.  OkL— Fellows  v.  Owens,  62  P.2d 
1215,  178  OkL  224. 

7.  S.D.— Weber  v.  Tschetter,  '46  N. 
W.  201,  1  S.D.  205,  215. 

34  C.J.  p  363  notes  41,  42. 

8.  Mass.— Davis    v.    National    Life 


286 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


nullified  by  agreement  of  the  partfes.9  In  a  num- 
ber of  jurisdictions  provision  is  made  by  statute  for 
the  opening  and  vacating  of  judgments,  but,  tin-- 
less  the  statutory  procedure  is  exclusive,10  a  stat- 
utory mode  of  proceeding  for  this  purpose  is  not  the 
exclusive  remedy,  but  is  cumulative  to  the  com- 
mon-law right  to  proceed  in  proper  time  and  form 
for  the  setting  aside  of  the  judgment.11  Where 
the  statutory  procedure  is  followed,  strict  compli- 
ance with  the  statute  may  be  necessary.12 

Proceedings  to  open  a  judgment  have  been  said 
to  be  equitable  in  nature13  and  in  substance;14  but 


at  least  one  court  has  declined  to  entertain  applica- 
tions to  vacate  judgments  except  in  simple  cases,  the 
remedy  in  chancery  being  deemed  a  better  mode  of 
investigation.15 

It  has  been  said  that  the  power  to  vacate  judg- 
ments may  be  exercised  by  the  court  on  suggestion 
by  a  party  or  interested  person,16  that  a  judgment 
procured  by  fraud  on  the  court  may  be  vacated  or 
set  aside  at  any  time  on  the  suggestion  of  any  in- 
terested party,17  that,  during  the  term  at  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered,  the  judgment  may  be  va- 
cated on  mere  suggestion1*  of  a  party  in  interest,19 


Ins.    Co.,    73    N.B.    658,   187    Mass. 
468. 
34  C.J.  p  318  note  63. 

9.  .Pa.— Ferriday  v.  Reinbold,  8  Pa. 
Dist.  637. 

10.  Ariz.— -Paul  v.  Paul,  238  P.  399, 
28  Ariz.  59'8. 

Cal. — Eisenberg  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco,  226  P.  617,  193  Cal.  575 
— McMahan  v.  Baringer,  122  P.2d 
63,  49  Cal.App.2d  431. 
Idaho.— Occidental  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Niendorf,  44  P.2d  1099,  55  Idaho 
521. 

La. — Cohn  Flour  &  Feed  Co.  v. 
Mitchell,  136  So.  782,  18  La.App. 
534. 

N.D.— Bellingham  State  Bank  of  Bel- 
lingham  v.  McCormick,  215  N.W. 
152,  55  N.D.  700. 

Wash. — Pacific  Telephone  &  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Henneford,  92  P.2d 
21'4,  199  Wash,  462,  certiorari  de- 
nied Henneford  v.  Pacific  Tele- 
phone &  Telegraph  Co.,  59  S.Ct. 
483,  306  U.S.  637,  83  L.EdL  1038 
— Betz  v.  Tower  Sav.  Bank,  55 
P.2d  338,  185  Wash.  314. 
34  C.J.  p  $19  note  64—47  C.J.  p  437 

note  36. 
Specific  and  general  statutes 

General  statute  giving  court  con- 
trol of  its  own  records,  with  right 
to  amend  or  expunge  them,  must 
be  read  in  light  of  other  provisions 
of  statute,  and  does  not  alone  con- 
trol method  of  vacating  Judgments, 
since  vacation  of  Judgment  is  spe- 
cifically treated  by  statute.— Work- 
man v.  District  Court,  Delaware 
County,  269  N.W.  27,  222  Iowa  364. 

11.  Cal. — In  re  Sankey's  Estate,  249 
P.  517,  199  Cal.  391. 

Ga. — Donalson    v.    Bank    of    Jakin, 

127  S.E.  229,   33  Ga.App.  428. 
Iowa. — Cedar     Rapids     Finance     & 

Thrift  Co.  v.  Bo  wen,  233  N.W.  495, 

211  Iowa  1207. 
34  C.J.  p  319  note  64. 
During1  or  after  term 

(1)  In  some  Jurisdictions  the  pro- 
cedure for  vacating  Judgments  dur- 
ing term  is  not  controlled  by  stat- 
ute.— Mosher  v.  Mutual  Home  &  Sav- 
ings Ass'n,  Ohio  App.,  41  N.E.2d  87L 


(2)  In  such  a  Jurisdiction,  a  stat- 
ute relating  to  the  vacation  of  Judg- 
ments after  term  provides  a  cumula- 
tive and  not  an  exclusive  remedy. — 
Vida  v.  Parsley,  Ohio  App.,  '47  N.K2d 
663. 

(3)  Courts  may  vacate  a  Judgment 
during    term    without    following   all 
provisions   of  statutes  applicable  to 
vacation  of  Judgments  after  term. — 
National  Guaranty  &  Finance  Co.  v. 
Lindimore,  Ohio  App.,  31  N.E.2d  155. 
Judgment  without  jurisdiction 

(1)  Judgment  void  for  want  of  Ju- 
risdiction   may    be   vacated    at    any 
time    on    motion    of   party    affected 
thereby    without    compliance     with 
statutes  otherwise  applying  to  vacat- 
ing    Judgments. — Taylor     v.     Focks 
Drilling    &    Manufacturing    Corpora- 
tion, 62  P.2d  903,  14'4  Kan.  626. 

(2)  The    statute   relating   to    pro- 
cedure to  vacate  or  modify  Judgment 
does  not  apply  to  proceedings  to  va- 
cate a  Judgment  entered  without  Ju- 
risdiction.—Martin  Bros.  Box  Co.  v. 
Fritz,    292   N.W.    143,    228   Iowa  482. 

Statute   limiting   time   for   proceed- 
ings 

Statute  providing  that  Judgments 
in  any  court  of  record  shall  not  be 
set  aside  for  irregularity,  on  mo- 
tion, unless  such  motion  be  made 
within  three  years  after  term  at 
which  Judgment  was  rendered,  does 
not  make  remedy  there  available  ex- 
clusive or  condition  precedent  to  re- 
view proceedings;  where  more  than 
one  method  of  procedure  is  available 
for  correction  of  irregularities  pat- 
ent on  record  and  errors  of  fact  call- 
ing for  introduction  of  evidence  de- 
hors  record,  and  for  prevention  of 
miscarriage  of  Justice,  litigant 
should  be  permitted  to  exercise  his 
choice  of  methods. — Crabtree  v: 
;Etna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  S.W.2d  103, 
341  Mo.  1173. 

13.    Ariz.— Paul  v.  Paul,  238  P.  399, 

2>8  Ariz.  598. 
S.C. — Anderson  v.  Toledo  Scale  Co., 

6    S.E.2d    465,    192    S.C.    300. 

"The  proceedings  prescribed  by 
such  statutory  provisions  [for  vaca- 
tion of  Judgments]  were  unknown  to 
the  common  law,  and,  being  novel  in 

514 


character,  strict  compliance  with 
such  provisions  is  essential." — Ter- 
ry v.  Claypool,  65  N.E.2d  883,  888.  77 
Ohio  App.  77. 

Judgment  that  is  not  void  on  it* 
face  can  be  attacked  only  under  some 
statutory    provision   and    in   manner 
therein    provided. — Latimer    v.    Van- 
derslice,,  62  P.2d  1197,  178  Okl.  501 — 
Walker  v.   Gulf   Pipe   Line   Co.,   226 
P.  1046,  102  Okl.  7. 
la     Pa.— U.  S.  Savings  &  Trust  Co. 
of  Conemaugh  to  Use  of  Hindes  v. 
Helsel,  188  A.  167,  325  Pa.  1— Hair 
v.  Bernheimer,  185  A.  857,  322  Pa. 
412— Richey  v.   Gibboney,   34  A.2d 
913,  154  Pa.Super.  1— Page  v.  Wil- 
son,   28    A.2d    706,    150    Ba.Super. 
.427— Liberal  Credit  Clothing  Co.  v. 
Tropp,   -4   A.2d   565,    135   Pa.Super. 
53 — Kaufman   v.   Feldman,    180   A. 
101,  118  PsuSuper.  435— Hamborsky 
v.  Magyar  Presbyterian  Church,  7S 
Pa.  Super.    519 — Packet    v.    Packet, 
Com.Pl.,   '47   Lack.Jur.    149 — Sheaf- 
fer  v.  Sheaffer,  Com.Pl.,  45  Lanc.L. 
Rev.  613 — Stetsko  v.  Lea,  Com.Pl., 
26  West.Co.L.J.   97 — Freedman  for 
the  Use  of  Rothbard  V.  Freedman- 
Smotkin,  Com.Pl.,  52  York  Leg.Rec. 
17. 

Bole  as  substitute  for  bill  in  equity 
A  rule  to  show  cause  why  Judg- 
ment should  not  be  opened  and  de- 
fendant let  into  a  defense  is  a  sub- 
stitute for  a  bill  in  eauity.— -Albert 
M.  Greenfield  &  Co.  v.  Roberts,  5  A. 
2d  642,  135  Pa. Super.  328. 

14.  pa.— Richey  v.  Gibboney,   34  A. 
2d  913,  154  Pa.Super.  1. 

15.  Del. — Industrial     Trust    Co.     v. 
Miller,    170    A.    923,    5    W.W.Harr. 
554. 

16.  N.C.— Fowler  v.  Fowler,  130  S.B. 
315,  190  N.C.  536. 

Persons  by  whom  proceedings  may 
be  brought  see  infra  S  293. 

17.  Ariz.— Kendall  v.  Silver  King  of 
Arizona    Mining   Co.,    226    P.    540, 
26  Ariz.  456. 

18.  Mo. — Savings   Trust   Co.    of   St. 
Louis    v.    Skain,    131    S.W.2d    566, 
345  Mo.  46. 

19.  Okl.— Wall  v.  Snider,  219  P.  671, 
93  Okl.  97. 

34  C.J.  p  318  note  61. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


286 


and  that  the  exercise  of  the  broad  power  to  set 
aside  a  judgment  during  the  term  is  not  hampered 
by  the  ordinary  rules  of  procedure.20  The  power 
of  the  court  to  act  on  its  own  motion  is  considered 
infra  §  287. 

The  employment,  at  common  law,  of  a  writ  of  er- 
ror coram  nobis  as  a  remedy  to  obtain  the  vacation 
of  a  judgment,  and  its  supercession,  in  most  juris- 
dictions, by  a  summary  motion  to  vacate  the  judg- 
ment, are  discussed  infra  §§  311-313.  The  former 
and  the  present  status  of  the  writ  of  audita  querela 
as  a  remedy  for  this  purpose  are  treated  in  Audita 
Querela.  Equitable  relief  against  judgments  is 
considered  infra  §§  341-400,  and  the  vacation  of  de- 
crees in  equity,  in  Equity  §§  622-667.  Procedure 
and  relief  in  connection  with  the  opening  or  va- 
cating of  default  judgments  are  considered  infra  § 
337. 

Proceeding  for  new  trial  distinguished.  A  pro- 
ceeding for  opening  a  judgment  is  not  a  proceeding 


for  a  new  trial,21  and  is  not  governed  by  the  same 
rules  of  court.22  A  statute  authorizing  a  proceed- 
ing to  obtain  a  new  trial  on  the  ground  of  newly 
discovered  evidence  and  a  statute  providing  for  oth- 
er relief,  such  as  vacation,  after  judgment,  ordina- 
rily afford  an  alternative  remedy.23 

Plea  or  answer.    Where  a  plaintiff  relies  on  a  < 
judgment  which  is  void  or  voidable,  relief  against 
it  may  be  had  by  plea  or  answer.24    Fraud  in  ob- 
taining a  judgment  is  available  as  an  equitable  de- 
fense.25 

b.  Motion  or  Petition  in  Cause 

Subject  to  some  exceptions,  judgments  may  be  opened 
or  vacated.  In  most  Jurisdictions,  on  simple  motion  or 
petition  In  the  cause. 

In  most  jurisdictions,  judgments  may  be  opened 
or  vacated  on  simple  motion,  or  petition  in  the 
cause,26  with  exceptions,  considered  infra  subdivi- 
sions c  and  d  of  this  section,  obtaining  in  some  ju- 


jW.  Ky. — South  Mountain  Coal  Co. 
v.  Rowland,  265  S.W.  320,  204  Ky. 
820. 

21.  N.J. — Wardell     v.     Warshofsky, 
159  A.  69'4,  10  N.J.Misc.  519— Kohn 
v.  Lazarus,  155  A.  260,  9  N.J.Misc. 
644. 

34  C.J.  p  319  note  64  [c]. 
In  Iowa 

A  statutory  proceeding  to  vacate 
judgment  and  grant  new  trial  is  at 
law,  not  in  equity,  and  must  be  dis- 
tinguished from  application  for  new 
trial  in  original  suit. — Shaw  v.  Ad- 
dison,  Iowa,  18  N.W.2d  796. 

22.  N.J.— Wardell     v.     Warshofsky, 
159  A.  694,  10  N.J.Misc.  519— Kohn 
v.  Lazarus,  155  A.  260,  9  N.J.Misc. 
644. 

23.  Ohio.— Townley  v.  A.  C.  Miller 
Co.,    45    N.E,2d    786,    70   Ohio   App. 
219. 

24.  Kan. — Simpson  v.  Kimberlin,  12 
Kan.  579. 

34  C.J.  p  324  note  8. 

25.  Ind.— Hogg  v.  Link,  90  Ind.  346. 

26.  U.S. — American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lu- 
cas,  D.C.MO.,    38   F.Supp.    926,   ap- 
peals   dismissed   62   S.Ct.    107,    314 
U.S.    575,    86    L.Ed.    '466,    affirmed 
American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scheufler,  129 
F.2d  143,  certiorari  denied  63  S.Ct. 
257,  317  U.S.  687,  '87  L.Ed.  551,  re- 
hearing   denied    63    S.Ct.   '433,    317 
U.S.    T12,    87    L.Bd.    567— U.    S.   v. 
Certain  Land  in  Falls  Tp.,  Bucks 
County,    D.C.,    Pa.,    3'8    F.2d   109. 

Cal.— Gibbons  v.  Clapp,  277  P.  490, 
207  Cal.  221 — King  v.  Superior 
Court  In  and  for  San  Diego  Coun- 
ty, 56  P.2d  268,  12  Cal. App. 2 d  501 
— Fisch  &  Co.  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  43 
P.2£  855,  6  Cal.App.2d  21— Applica- 
tion of  Behymer,  19  P.2d  829,  130 


CaLApp.  200— JTellen  v.  O'Brien,  264 
P.  1115,  89  CaLApp.  505— Fletcher 
v.  Superior  Court  of  Sacramento 
County,  250  P.  195,  79  CaLApp. 
468 — In  re  Dahnke's  Estate  and 
Guardianship,  222  P.  381,  64  Cal. 
App.  555. 

Fla.— McGee  v.  McGee,  22  So.2d  788 
— In  re  Begg*s  Estate,  12  So.2d 
115,  152  Fla.  277. 

Ga. — Grogan  v.  Deraney,  143  S.E. 
912,  38  Ga.App.  287. 

Idaho. — Occidental  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Niendorf,  44  P.2d  1099,  55  Idaho 
521— Savage  v.  Stokes,.  28  P.2d 
900,  54  Idaho  109— Baldwin  v.  An- 
derson, 8  P.2d  461,  51  Idaho  614 
— Jensen  v.  Gooch,  211  P.  551,  36 
Idaho  '457— Miller  v.  Prout,  197 
P.  1023,  33  Idaho  709. 

111. — City  of  Des  Plaines  v.  Boeck- 
enhauer,  50  N.E.2d  4'83,  383  111. 
475— Industrial  Nat.  Bank  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Altenberg,  64  N.E.2d  219, 
327  111. App.  337 — Anderson  v.  An- 
derson, 11  N.E.2d  216,  292  Ill.App. 
421. 

Kan. — Taylor  v.  Focks  Drilling  & 
Manufacturing  Corporation,  62  P. 
2d  903,  144  Kan.  626. 

Mass. — Powdrel  v.  Du  Bois,  174  N. 
E.  220,  274  Mass.  106. 

Minn. — In  re  (Jordan's  Estate,  271  N. 
W.  104,  199  Minn.  53. 

Mo.— Spichard  v.  McNabb,  App.,  180 
S.W.2d  611— National  City  Bank 
of  St  Louis  v.  Pattiz,  App.,  26  S. 
W.2d  8J5— Moutier  v.  Sherman, 
App.,  25  S.W.2d  490. 

Neb.— Netusil  v.  Novak,  235  N.W. 
335,  120  Neb.  751— Foster  v.  Fos- 
ter, 196  N.W.  702,  111  Neb.  414. 

N.J. — Collyer  v.  McDonald,  0.0  A.2d 
284,  123  N-J.Law  5'47. 

N.D.— Taylor  v.  Oulie,  212  N.W.  931, 
55  N.D.  253. 

OkL— Babb  v.   National   Life  Ass'n, 

515 


86  P.2d  771,  184  Okl.  273 — Ritchie 
v.  Keeney.  73  P.2d  397,  181  Okl.  207 
— • Winters  v.  Birch,  36  P.2d  907, 
169  Okl.  237— Maryland  Casualty 
Co.  v.  Apple,  267  P.  239,  130  Okl. 
270— Central  Nat  Oil  Co.  v.  Con- 
tinental Supply  Co.,  2'49  P.  347, 
119  Okl.  190— Grubb  v.  Fay  State 
Bank  of  Fay,  249  P.  341,  119  Okl. 
199— Wall  v.  Snider,  219  P.  671, 
93  Okl.  97 — Mason  v.  Slonecker, 
219  P.  357,  92  Okl.  227. 

S.C. — Ex  parte  Hart,  2  S.E.2d  52, 
190  S.C.  473,  certiorari  denied 
Bowen  v.  Hart,  60  S.Ct.  82,  308  U. 
S.  569,  84  L.Ed.  477— Baker  r. 
Brewer,  123  S.E.  771,  129  S.C.  74. 

Wash. — Nevers  v.  Cochrane,  229  P. 
738,  131  Wash.  225. 

Wis.— Ellis  v.  Gordon,  231  N.W.  585, 
202  Wis.  134— In  re  Meek's  Es- 
tate, 227  N.W.  270,  199  Wis.  602. 

Wyo. — Ramsay  v.  Gottsche,  69  P.2d 
535,  51  Wyo.  516. 

34  C.J.  p  319  note  65. 

Aid  in  equity;    equity  oases 

(1)  Ordinarily,  equitable  interposi- 
tion cannot  be  invoked  in  aid  of  mo- 
tion to  vacate  judgment,  and  a  peti- 
tion in  equity  is  necessary  therefor. 

•Lojagmire  v.  Diagraph-Bradley 
Stencil  Mach.  Corporation,  173  S.W. 
2d  641,  237  Mo.App.  553. 

(2)  "This    remedy    by    motion    Is 
available  in  equity  cases  as  well  as 
those  at  law." — Freeman  v.  Wood,  88 
N.W.  721,  11  N.D.  0,  7. 

(3)  A   proceeding   to   set  aside   a 
final  decree  by  a  court  of  chancery, 
regular  on  its  face  and  alleged  to 
have  been  obtained  by  fraud,  deceit, 
artifice  or  trickery,  or  other  unlaw- 
ful means,  .should  be  instituted  by 
bill  of  complaint  rather  than  a  mo- 
tion  to    set   aside   final    decree   and 
open  up  the  case. — Sauer  v.   Sauer, 


286 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.& 


risdictions   when    certain   grounds   are   relied   on. 
Thus  judgments  may,  it  has  been  held,  be  opened  or 


vacated  on  motion  based  on  any  of  the  following 
grounds:    Irregularity;27   invalidity  or  voidness;** 


19  So.Sd  247,  154  Fla.  827— State 
ex  rel.  Lorenz  v.  Lorenz,  6  So.2d  620, 
149  Fla.  625. 

(4)  Equitable  relief  against  Judg- 
ments see  infra  §§  341-400. 

Motion  for  resettlement  of  Judg- 
ment to  provide  for  striking  out  of 
certain  provision  may  be  deemed  mo- 
tion to  vacate  Judgment. — Gray  v. 
Gray,  278  N.Y.S.  9,  243  App.Div.  793 
—Harlem  Sav.  Bank  v.  Salvador 
Realty  Corporation,  24  N.Y.S.2d  55, 
175  Misc.  504. 
Motion  or  petition  in.  nature  of  bill 

of  review 
Tex. — Galbraith  v.  Bishop,  Com.App., 

287  S.W.  1087 — Jackson  v.  Wallace, 

Civ.App.,    239    S.W.    698,    affirmed 

Com.App.,  252  S.W.  745. 
Motion  to  reverse 
W.Va.— Williams  v.  Stratton,  174  S. 

B.  417,  114  W.Va.  '837. 

Proceeding1  for  new  trial 

(1)A  motion  to  set  aside  and  va- 
cate order  overruling  defendant's 
plea  of  privilege  and  the  Judgment 
on  the  merits  against  defendant  was 
in  .effect  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  on 
both  features  of  the  case. — Joske 
Bros.  Co.  v.  Bddingston,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  123  S.W.2d  405. 

(2)  Petition     for     relief     against 
Judgment  irregularly  or  improperly 
obtained,    although   defect   does   not 
appear  on  record,  is  not  technically 
statutory  petition  to  set  aside  judg;- 
ment,   but  is,   In   effect,   motion  for 
new  trial. — J.  S.  Schofteld's  Sons  Co. 
v.  Vaughn,  150  S.B.  '569,  40  Go. App. 
568 — Grogan  v.  Deraney,  143  S.E.  912, 
38  Ga.App.  287. 

(3)  Application  for  new  trial  may 
be  regarded  as  motion  to  set  aside 
Judgment    as.   void. — Lamereaux    v. 
Dixie  Motor  Co.,   91  S.W.2d  993,  263 
Ky.  67. 

(4)  Action  intended  as  action  for 
new  trial  would  be  treated  as  motion 
to   set  aside,   as  void,   Judgment  in 
original    action    which    was    entered 
without  consent  or  agreement  of  ap- 
pellant and  without  statutory  notice 
after  expiration  of  statutory  term  of 
court. — Green  v,   Blankenship,    91   S. 
W.2d  99*,  26-3  Ky.  29. 

Remedy  by  motion  at  same  term 

Ala. — Ex    parte   Fidelity   &  Deposit 
Co.  of  Maryland,  134  So.  861,  2 
Ala.  98. 

Conn. — Application  of  Title  &  Guar- 
anty Co.  of  Bridgeport  to  Change 
Name  to  Bankers'  Security  Trust 
Co.,  145  A.  151,  109  Conn.  45. 

Ohio.— In  re  Kleinhen's  Estate,  App., 
63  N.B.2d  315. 

.Statutory  rules  were  held  not  In- 
tended as  statement  of  common-law 
rule. — Grogan  v.  Deraney,  143  .S.E. 
3-8  Ga.App.  287. 


Where  grouaid  is  not  based  on 
fraud,  motion  is  the  proper  remedy. 
— Abernethy  Land  &  -Finance  Co.  v. 
First  Security  Trust  Co.,  196  S.B. 
340,  213  N.C.  369. 
In  Pennsylvania 

(1)  Remedy   of   parties   aggrieved 
by  Judgment  regular  on  its  face  is 
by  motion  or  -petition  to  open  Judg- 
ment and  not  to  strike  it  off.— Harr 
v.    Bernheimer,    185   A.   857,    322    Pa. 
412 — Wilson  v.  Vincent,   150  A.    642, 
•300    Pa.    321 — Lincoln   Bank  of  Erie 
v.  Gem  City  Wholesale  Grocery  Co., 
133  A.  554,   286  Pa.  -421— Hotel  Red- 
ington   v.    Guffey,    25    A.2d   773,    148 
Pa.Super.    502 — Lyman    Felheim    Co. 
v.  Walker,  193  A.  69,  128  Pa.Super.  1 
—Broadway  Nat   Bank  of  Scottdale 
v.  Diskin,  161  A.  470,  105  Pa.Super. 
279 — vogt  Farm  Meat  Products  Co. 
v.  Sherman,  5  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  609— 
Bell  v.  -Fitzgerald,  Com.Pl.,    31  Del. 
Co.     3 — Jenkins     v.    Keystone    Mut. 
Casualty   Co.,    Com.PL,   45   Lack.Jur. 
88— Keyser    v.    Cardon,    Com.Pl.,    5$ 
Montg.Co.  366 — 'Faust  v.  Gluck,  Com. 
PL,  6  Sch.Reg.  1— Walters  v.  Dooley, 
Com.Pl.,  5  Sch.Reg.  174. 

(2)  A  motion  or  petition  to  strike 
off  a  Judgment  may  be  regarded  as 
a  petition  to  open,  if  it  is  such  in 
substance. — Curran  v.   James  Regu- 
lator Co.,  36  A.2d  187,  154  Pa.Super. 
2-61-^Scalatis  &  Qalogeros  v.  Cargas, 
10  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  704,  40  .Lanc.Xj.Rev. 
523 — Vogt  Farm  Meat  Products  Co. 
v.  Sherman,  5  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  609. 

(3)  Where  a  Judgment  is  irregular 
on  its  face,  the  remedy  is  to  strike 
it  off  the  record  and  not  a  motion 
to  open. — Sayers  v.  Redbank  Tel.  Co., 
25    PaJMst    655— Keyser   v.   Cardon, 
Com.PL,    55    Montg.Co.   '366— Jenkins 
V.  Keystone  Mut  Casualty  Co.,  Com. 
PI.,  45  Lack.Jur.  88— Faust  v.  Gluck, 
Com.Pl.r  6  SchuReg.  1. 

(4)  A    rule    to    "strike    off    Judg- 
ment"  is   essentially  a  common-law 
proceeding,    a    short    and    summary 
substitute   for  an  audita  querela,  a 
writ  of  error  coraxn  vobis,  or  a  cer- 
tiorari  or  writ  of  error  from  a  su- 
perior court  by  which  the  same  re- 
lief was  formerly  administered,  and, 
being  for  an  irregularity  on  the  face 
of  the  proceedings,  it  is  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  demurrer  to  the  record. — 
Hotel  Redington  v.   Guffey,   25   A.2d 
773,    148    Pa.Super.    502— Albert    M. 
Greenfield  &  Co.  v.  Roberts,  5  A.2d 
642,    135  Pa.Super.   328— Rome  Sales 
&   Service   Station  v.   Finch,    Ii83  A. 
54,  120  Pa.Super.  402. 

(6)  Petitions  to  vacate  and  set 
aside  are  based  on  fatal  defects  ap- 
parent on  the  face  of  the  record, 
while  petitions  to  open  concern  other 
matters  associated  with  the  decree 
or  Judgment,  or  those  on  which  the 
decree  or  judgment  is  based;  where 

516 


a  Judgment  is  being  attacked  for  a 
matter  of  record,  the  proper  motion 
is  to  strike  off  or  vacate,  which  op- 
erates as  a  demurrer  to  the  record. 
— Nixon  v.  Nixon,  198  A.  154,  329  Pa. 
2-56 — Strauch  v.  Miller,  Com.Pl.,  27 
West.Co.L.J.  109. 

(6)  A   rule   to   strike   off  a  Judg- 
ment  is   a    common-law  proceeding, 
raising  questions  of  irregularity  or 
insufficiency  apparent  on  the  face  of 
the  record;   a  rule  to  open  Judgment 
is  an  equitable  proceeding;    the  two 
are  not  interchangeable,  and,  where 
the  parties   do   not  consent  thereto, 
one    cannot   be   substituted   for    the 
other   by   the   court — Hamborsky  v. 
Magyar  Presbyterian  Church,  78  Pa. 
Super.  519 — 'Faust  v.  Gluck,  CJom.PL, 
6  Sch.Reg.  1. 

(7)  A  rule  to  strike-  off  Judgment 
is  not  a  substitute  for  a  rule  for 
more  specific  statement  of  claim  or 
a  rule  to  strike  off  a  pleading. — Ho- 
tel Redlngton  v.  Guffey,  25  A.2d  773, 
148  Pa.Super.  602. 

(8)  Where    defenses    arise    after 
the  rendition  of  a  Judgment,  the  bet- 
ter  practice   now   is   to   proceed  by 
way  of  motion,  or  the  parties  may 
agree   to   the  relief. — German  Trust 
Co.    of   Davenport,    Iowa,   v.   Plotke, 
118  A.  508,  274  Pa.  4'83. 

(9)  Petition  to  open  is  the  proper 
method  to  test  validity  of  Judgment 
entered    on    former    scire    facias. — 
Brusko  v.  Olshefski,  13  A.2d  916,  140 
Pa.Super.  485— Miller  Bros.  v.  Keen- 
an,  90  Pa. Super.  470. 

27.  Mo.— Moutier  v.  Sherman,  App., 
25  S.W.2d  490. 

K.C.— Cox  v.  Cox,  18  S.E.2d  713,  221 

tf.C.  19— Dail  v.  Hawkins,  189  S.-E. 

774,  211  N.C.  283— Duffer  v.  Brun- 

son,  125   S.E.  619,  188  N.C.  789. 

•34  C.J.  p  319  note  65  [h],  p  320  note 

<68. 
Elimination  of  defendant 

Trial  court's  action  in  modifying 
judgment  by  eliminating  therefrom 
one  of  the  defendants  on  the  ground 
that,  at  the  time  of  signing  the 
journal  entry,  court  did  not  know 
that  entry  recited  a  judgment 
against  such  defendant  constituted 
the  vacation  of  a  judgment  irregu- 
larly obtained  and  proceeding  there- 
for was  properly  by  motion. — Good- 
kin  v.  Hough,  130  P.2d  93.  191  OkL 
372. 

28.  Idaho. — Occidental  ILife  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Niendorf,  44  P.2d  1099,  '55  Idaho 
521 — Baldwin  v.  Anderson,   8  P.2d 
461,  51  Idaho  614— Jensen  v.  Gooch, 
211  P.    551,    36   Idaho   457— Miller 
v.  Prout,  197  P.  1023,  33  Idaho  709. 

Kan. — Taylor  v.  'Focks  Drilling  & 
Manufacturing  Corporation,  62  P. 
2d  903,  144  Kan.  626. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§286 


error  or  mistake  of  fact,29  such  as  was  ground  for 
relief  at  common  law  by  writ  of  error  coram  nobis, 
as  discussed  infra  §§  311-313;  fraud  in  obtaining 


judgment;30  perjury;31  accident,  mistake,  inadver- 
tence, surprise,  excusable  neglect,  casualty,  or  mis- 
fortune ;32  and  likewise  judgments  may  be  vacated 


Neb.— Foster  v.  Foster,  196  N.W. 
702,  111  Neb.  414. 

Okl. — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v.  Ap- 
ple, 267  P.  239,  130  Okl.  270— 
Grubb  v.  Fay  State  Bank  of  (Fay, 
249  P.  '341,  119  Okl.  199— Mason  v. 
Slonecker,  219  P.  357,  92  Okl.  227. 

S.D.— -Lessen  v.  Lessert,  263  N.W. 
559,  64  S.D.  3. 

34  C.J.  p  320  note  69. 

Want  of  Jurisdiction  of  person 

U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Sotis,  C.C.A.I1L,  131  IF. 
2d  783. 

Fla.— McGee  v.  McGee,  22  So.2d  788. 

111. — Anderson  v.  Anderson,  11  N.E. 
2d  216,  292  IlLApp.  421. 

29.  Miss.— Lott  v,  Illinois  gent.  R. 
Co.,  10  So.2d  96,  193  Miss.  '443. 

34  C.J.  p  320  note  70. 

In  Illinois 

(1)  Under    the    statute   abolishing 
the  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  and 
providing  that  .errors  of  fact  which 
could  have   been   corrected  by  such 
writ  may  be  corrected  on  motion  by 
the   court    in    which   the   error   was 
committed,   petition  to  vacate  judg- 
ment  under   statute   takes   place   of 
writ  of  error  coram  nobis  at  common 
law. — Josten   Mfg.    Co.   v.   Keeler,   2 
N.E.2d  586,   284  Ill.App.  646. 

(2)  The     courts     of    Illinois,     al- 
though they  refused  to  recognize  the 
writ  of  error  coram  nobis,  have  en- 
couraged    the     development    of    its 
statutory   equivalent   and   have   per- 
mitted   its    use    in    new    situations 
wherever   such  was  consonant  with 
the  history  of  its  common-law  ante- 
cedent,  due  to  the  tendency  of  the 
courts    of    law    to    apply    equitable 
principles     wherever     necessary     to 
prevent    injustice;     tho    Civil    Prac- 
tice Act  has  expanded  the  scope  of 
the  statute  providing  for  motion  in 
nature  of  writ  of  error  coram  nobis. 
— Nikola   v.   Campus   Towers   Apart- 
ment   Bldg.    Corporation,    25    N.B.2d 
583,  303  Ill.App.  516. 

(3)  The  motion  under  the  statute 
is   independent   of  the   suit   or  pro- 
ceeding    in     which     the     Judgment 
sought   to    be    corrected   or   vacated 
was      rendered. — Central     Bond      & 
Mortgage    Co.    v.    Roeser,    153    N.B. 
732,  323  111/  90— Sherman  &  Ellis  v. 
Journal  of  Commerce  and  Commer- 
cial    Bulletin,      259     Ill.App.      453— 
Mitchell    v.    Bareckson,    250    IlLApp. 
508 — Marabia     v.     Mary     Thompson 
Hospital  of  Chicago  for  Women  and 
Children,    224    IlLApp.   -367,    reversed 
on  other  grounds  140  N.B.   836,   309 
111.  147—34  C.J.  p  319  note  65  [g]. 

(4)  Such    a    motion    stands    as    a 
declaration  in  a  new  suit,  in  which 
new    issues    are    presented   and    on 
which  there  must  be  a  finding  and  a 
Judgment. — Christian    v.  .Smirinotis,  i 


57  N.B.2d  457,  388  111.  73— Jacobson 
v.  Ashkinaze,  16-8  N.E.  647,  337  111. 
141 — Central  Bond  &  Mortgage  Co.  v. 
Roeser,  153  N.E.  732,  323  Ill."90— 
Reid  v.  Dolan,  19  N.B.2d  764,  2 
Ill.App.  612 — Topel  v.  Personal  Loan 
&  Savings  Bank,  9  N.B.2d  75,  290 
IlLApp.  558— Adams  v.  Butman,  264 
Ill.App.  378 — Sherman  &  Ellis  v. 
Journal  of  Commerce  and  Commer- 
cial Bulletin,  259  IlLApp.  453— 
Mitchell  v.  Bareckson,  250  IlLApp. 
508— Ness  v.  Bell,  246  IlLApp.  79— 
Marabia  v.  Mary  Thompson  Hospital 
of  Chicago  for  Women  and  Children, 
224  IlLApp.  367,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  140  N.B.  836,  309  111.  147— 
34  C.J.  p  320  note  70  [c]. 

(5)  The  proceeding  on  the  petition 
has   nothing  to  do  with  the  merits 
of  the  original  controversy  between 
the  parties. — Christian  v.  Smirinotis, 
57  N.B.2d  457,  -388  111.  73. 

(6)  In    a    proceeding    under    the 
statute  to  correct  errors  of  fact  in 
the  record  by  motion  after  the  term, 
the  scope  of  inquiry  is  limited  to  er- 
rors  in   fact   not  appearing  on   the 
fiace  of  the  record,  and  which  could 
have  been  inquired  into  by  the  com- 
mon-law writ  of  error  coram  nobis. — 
Jerome    v.     5019-21    Quincy     Street 
Bldg.  Corporation,  53  N.B.2d  444,  385 
111.  524. 

(7)  The  purpose  of  such  motion  is 
to  bring  before  court  matters  of  fact 
not    appearing   of   record   which,    if 
known  at  time  of  rendition  of  Judg- 
ment, would  have  prevented  its  ren- 
dition.— Linehan    v.     Travelers    Ins. 
Co.,    18    N.B.2d    178,    370    111.    157— 
Viedenschek  v.  Johnny  Perkins  Play- 
dium,  49  N.B.2d  339,  319  IlLApp.  523 
—Reid  v.  Dolan,  19  N.B.2d  7-64,  299 
Ill.App.  612 — Swiercz  v.  Nalepka,  259 
IlLApp.  262.     • 

(8)  The  motion  is  not  available  to 
review  questions  of  fact  arising  on 
the  pleadings  in  original  proceeding 
or  to  correct  errors  of  court  on  ques- 
tions   of    law    therein. — Linehan    v. 
Travelers  Ins.  Co.,   supra — Jacobson 
v.   Ashkinaze,   168  N.E.   647,   337   111. 
141 — Marabia     v.     Mary     Thompson 
Hospital  of  Chicago  for  Women  and 
Children,  140  N.B.  836,  -309  111.   147. 

(9)  The  proceeding  under  the  stat- 
ute refers  only  to  a  Judgment  sought 
to  be  set  aside  at  a  term  subsequent 
to  that  at  which  the  Judgment  was 
rendered. — Cooper     y.      Handelsman, 
247  IlLApp.  454. 

(10)  The    statute    and   the    proce- 
dure thereunder  apply  to  law  actions 
and  not  to  equity  actions. — Pedersen 
v.  Logan  Square  State  Bank,  36  N.E. 
2d  732,  377  111.  408— Frank  v.  Salo- 
mon,   34    N.B.2d   424,    376    111.    439— 
Lamons  &  Co.  v.  American  Cast  Iron . 

517 


Pipe  Qo.,  3-8  N.B.2d  779,  312  IlLApp. 
573 — Solomon  v.  Bayles,  56  N.B.2d 
274,  311  IlLApp.  368. 

(11)  The  motion  is  not  appropriate 
in  statutory  proceedings,  but  only  In 
proceedings  at  common  law. — Reid  v. 
Chicago   Rys.   Co.,   231   IlLApp.   58— 
Bishop  v.   Illinois  Western  Electric 
Co.,  221  IlLApp.  141. 

(12)  The  motion    does   not   lie   In 
insanity       proceedings. — People       v. 
Janssen,  263  IlLApp.  101. 

(13)  Motion    filed    forty-five    days 
after   Judgment   for   clarification    of 
new  trial  order  could  not  be  consid- 
ered as  a  motion  brought  under  the 
statute.— Rome     Soap    Mfg.     Co.     v. 
John  T.  La  Forge  &  Sons,  54  N.E. 
2d  252,  322  Ill.App.  281. 

(14)  Relief  under  statute  was  held 
not  unavailable  because  of  interven- 
ing appeal  and  affirmance   of  Judg- 
ment— Maher  v.  New  York,  C.  &  St 
L.  R.  Co.,   8  N.B.2d  512,  290  IlLApp. 
267. 

In  Missouri 

The  scope  of  the  remedy  adminis- 
tered on  the  motion  now  employed 
as  a  substitute  for  the  writ  of  error 
coram  nobis  reaches  far  beyond  the 
ordinary  writ  of  error  as  known  to 
the  common  law. — Moutier  v.  Sher- 
man, App.,  '25  S.W.2d  490. 

3CK    111. — Clausen  v.  Varrin,  11  N.1L 

2d  820,  292  IlLApp.  641. 
Minn. — In  re  Jordan's  Estate,  271  N. 

W.  104,  199  Minn.  53. 
N.D.— Smith  v.  Smith,  299  N.W.  693, 

71  N.D.  110. 
34  C.J.  p  320  note  72. 
Motion  in.  nature   of  writ   of  error 
coram  nobis 

Where  wife,  because  of  husband's 
representation  that  his  divorce  suit 
had  been  dismissed,  did  not  appear 
at  the  trial,  and  husband  continued 
to  live  with  her  until  the  divorce  de- 
cree was  granted,  it  was  held  that, 
even  though  the  Judgment  was  pro- 
cured  by  fraud,  a  motion  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis 
to  set  aside  the  decree  on  the  ground 
of  fraud  on  the  wife  and  on  the 
court  was  not  the  proper  remedy; 
such  motion  cannot  be  considered 
as  a  suit  in  equity;  a  motion  in  the 
nature  of  writ  of  error  coram  nobis 
to  set  aside  Judgment  for  fraud  In 
its  procurement  does  not  reach  any- 
thing occurring  after  final  Judgment. 
— Ragland  v.  Ragland,  Mo. App.,  258 
S.W.  728. 

31.  Minn. — In    re    Jordan's    Estate, 
371  N.W,  104,  199  Minn.  53. 

34  C.J.  p  320  note  74  [a]. 

32.  Colo.— Wharton    v.     De    VInna,    , 
246  P.  279,  79  Colo.  450* 


§286 


.  JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


or  opened  on  various  other  specific  grounds.38 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  the  in- 
sufficiency of  the  evidence  to  support  the  verdict 
cannot  be  attacked  by  a  motion  to  vacate  and  set 
aside  the  judgment,34  and  that  a  final  decree  of 
partition  cannot  be  opened  by  mere  motion  after  the 
term.35 

In  some  jurisdictions  a  judgment  may  be  vacated 
on  motion  only  when  it  is  void  or  irregular  on  its 
face,36  except  pursuant  to  statutory  provisions 
granting  power  to  act  on  motion;37  but  in  other  ju- 
risdictions this  limitation  does  not  prevail.38  It  has 
been  held  that  an  erroneous,  as  distinguished  from 
an  irregular,  judgment, cannot  be  set  aside  on  mo- 
tion.39 A  petition  addressed  to  the  court  wherein 
the  judgment  was  rendered,  with  rule  nisi  or  proc- 
ess served  on  the  necessary  parties,  has  been  deemed 
a  proper  form  of  procedure  to  vacate  a  judgment 
for  defects  not  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord.40 A  motion  to  set  aside  a  judgment  may  not 
be  made  to  perform  the  office  of  an  appeal.41 

While  an  action  is  pending  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment, the  same  relief  will  not  be"  granted  on  mo- 


tion;42 and,  where  an  appeal  is  perfected  before 
a  motion  is  made  to  vacate,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  court  has  no  power  to  vacate  the  judgment  ex- 
cept on  the  ground  of  jurisdiction.43 

During  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered,  the 
court  has  inherent  power  to  vacate  the  judgment  on 
motion,  on  any  ground  appealing  to  the  judicial 
discretion.44 

A  motion  to  set  aside  a  verdict  and  judgment 
has  been  said  to  be  distinguishable  from,4^  and  not 
to  be  subject  to  the  same  rules  of  practice  as,46  a 
motion  to  set  aside  a  judgment  only;  and  that  it 
should  also  be  distinguished  from  an  independent 
suit  in  equity  to  set  aside  a  verdict  and  judgment47 
A  petition  to  vacate  a  verdict  and  judgment  for 
matters  not  appearing  on  the  record  has  been  held, 
in  effect,  a  motion  for  a  new  trial.4* 

Petition  as  independent  proceeding.  A  petition  to 
vacate  a  judgment  has  been  regarded,  in  at  least  one 
jurisdiction,  as  a  new  proceeding,  separate  from, 
and  independent  of,  the  action  in  which  the  judg- 
ment was  entered,49  and  riot  as  a  supplemental  step 


111. — Clausen    v.    Varrin,    11    N.E.2d 

820,  292  Ill.App.  641. 
34  C.J.  p  320  note  73. 

Ground  held  not  shown,  so  that 
motion  was  not  available. — Chavez 
v.  Scully,  232  P.  165,  69  Cal.App.  63-3. 

33.  Particular  grounds 

(1)  Failure  of  complaint  to  state 
cause  of  action. — Alabama  Power  Co. 
v.  Curry,  153  So.  634,  228  Ala.  444.' 

<2)  (Failure  to  serve  process. — Da- 
vis v.  Brigman,  169  S.E.  431,  204  N. 
C.  680—34  C.J.  p  320  note  74  ,[e]. 

(3)  Other  grounds  see  34  C.J.  p 
«20  note  74  [b]-[d],  [f]. 

34.  S.D.— First       Nat.       Bank       v. 
Thompson,    227    N.W.    81,    55    S.D. 
629. 

35.  Wis.— Kane   v.    Parker,    4   Wis. 
123. 

36.  CaL— Jacks  y.  Baldez,  31  P.  899, 
97  CaL  91. 

Ga. — S towers  v.  Harris,  22  S.E.2d 
405,  194  Ga.  636 — Wofford  v.  Van- 
diver,  34  S.E.2d  579,  "92  Ga.App, 
623. 

Okl.— Petty  v.  Roberts,  -98  P.2d  602, 
18*6  Okl.  269— Ritchie  v.  Keeney, 
73  P.2d  397,  181  Okl.  207 — Simmons 
v.  Howard,  276  P.  718,  136  Okl.  118 
— Central  Nfc.  Oil  Co.  v.  Continen- 
tal Supply  Co.,  249  P.  347,  119  OkL 
190 — Grubb  v.  Fay  State  Bank  of 
iFay,  249  P.  341,  119  Okl.  199— 
Steiner  v.  Smith,  242  P.  207,  115 
OkL  205— lie  Clair  v.  Calls  Him, 
233  P.  1087,  106  Okl.  247— Miller  v. 
Madigan,  215  P.  742,  90  Okl.  17. 

34  C.J.  p  S20  note  75. 

Coram,  nobia 
A  motion  to  vacate  a  judgment  on 


an  irregularity  not  appearing  on  the 
face  of  record,  but  to  be  shown  out- 
side of  record,  if  available,  is  in  the 
nature  of  a  writ  of  error  coram  no- 
bis.— Audsley  v.  Hale,  261  S.W.  117, 
303  Mo.  451—34  C.J.  p  320  note  7'5 
[b]. 

Where  rights  of  third  persons  have 
not  intervened,  however,  it  has  been 
held  that  a  judgment  may  be  vacated 
on  motion,  even  though  the  nullity 
of  the  judgment  is  not  apparent 
from  an  inspection  of  the  judgment 
roll. — Sharp  v.  Eagle  Lake  Lumber 
Co.,  212  P.  -9-33,  60  Cal.App.  386. 

37-  CaL— Jacks  v.  Baldez,  31  P.  889, 
97  CaL  91. 

3a    S.C.— Tolbert  v.  Roark,  119  S.E. 

571,  126  S.C.  207. 
34  C.J.  P  321  note  77. 

39.  N.C.— Dail  v.  Hawkins,  189  S.3L 
774,  211  N.C.  283— State  v.  Hol- 
lingsworth,  175  49.BL  99,  206  N.C. 
739. 

S.D. — Janssen  v.  Tusha,  5  N.W.2d 
684,  68  &.D.  639 — Jennings  v.  Des 
Moines  Mutual  Hail  &  Cyclone  Ins. 
Ass'n,  146  N.W.  564,  3-3  S.D.  385. 

40i  Ga, — Grogan  v.  Deraney,  143  S. 
H.  912,  38  Ga.App.  2>87 — Longshore 
v.  Collier,  140  S.B.  «636,  37  Ga.App. 
450,  followed  in  Reddy-Waldhauer- 
Maffiett  Co.  v.  Cranman,  153  S.E. 
616,  41  Oa.App.  563. 

34  C.J.  p  321  note  78. 

41.  S.D. — Janssen  v.  Tusha,  5  N.W. 
2d  684,  68  S.D.  639— Jennings  v. 
Des  Moines  Mutual  Hail  &  Cyclone 
Ins.  Ass'n,  146  N.W.  564,  33  SJD, 
385. 

518 


42.  Wash.— Stolze  v.  Stolze,   191  P. 
641,  111  Wash.  398. 

34  C.J.  p  321  note  79. 

43.  Or. — Blanchard     v.      Makinster, 
290  P.  1098,  137  Or.  58. 

Mistake  of  fact  resulting  in  judg- 
ment  cannot  be  remedied  by  motion 
to  vacate  judgment  after  perfecting 
appeal. — Blanchard  v.  Makinster,  290 
P.  1098,  137  Or.  58. 

44.  Mo.— Reid  v.  Moulton,  210  <S.W. 
34. 

34  C.J.  p  321  note  80. 
Discretion  of  court  generally  see  in- 
fra 8  300. 

45.  Ga.— Wrenn   v.   Allen,    180    S.E. 
104,  180  Ga.  613 — (Lucas  v.  -Lucas, 
177   «S.E.    684.    179    Ga.    821— Fire- 
men's Ins.  Co.  v.  Oliver,   167  S.E. 
99,  176  Ga.  80. 

48.    Ga.—-Louis    K    Liggett    Co.    v. 
•Foster,  136  S.E.  93,  36  Ga.App.  185. 

47.  Ga.— Wrenn    v.    Allen,    1«0    S.B. 
104,  180  Ga.  613 — Lucas  v.  Lucas, 
177   S.B.   684,   179   Ga.   821. 

Equitable   relief   against   judgments 
see  infra  §§  341-400. 

48.  Ga. — Firemen's  Ins,  Co.  v.  Oliv- 
er,   162    S.B.    636,    44    Ga.App.    639, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  167  &B. 
99,    176    Ga.    80— Oliver    v.    Fire- 
man's   Ins.    Co.,    15'5    S.B.    2'27,    42 
Ga.App.   99— J.  S.  Schofield's  Sons 
Co.    v.    Vaughn,    150    S.E.    569,    40 
GaJLpp.  668 — Donalson  v.  Bank  of 
Jakin,  127  S.E.  229,  33  Ga.App.  423. 

49.  Mass. — Noyes    v.    Bankers    In- 
demnity  Ins.   Co.,   -30    N.E.2d   '867, 
307    Mass.    5-67 — Lynch   v.    Spring- 
field Safe  Deposit  &  Trust  Co.,  13 
N.E.2d  611,  300  Mass.  14— Town  of 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  286 


in  the  original  cause.^0 

Interlocutory  judgments  or  orders  may  always  be 
vacated  on  motion  in  the  cause  made  before  the 
action  is  determined  by  final  judgment.61 

c.  Action 

It  is  variously  held,  with  respect  to  particular 
grounds  or  circumstances,  that  an  action,  rather  than  a 
motion,  is  or  is  not  the  proper  mode  for  seeking  vaca- 
tion of  a  Judgment;  some  authorities  permit  the  use  of 
either. 

In  some  jurisdictions  the  vacation  of  a  judgment 
on  certain  grounds,  or  in  certain  circumstances, 
must  be  obtained  by  a  direct  action  with  appropri- 
ate pleadings,  brought  for  the  purpose  of  annulling 
such  judgment,  and  cannot  be  obtained  by  mere 
motion.52  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  the  remedy 
is  by  plenary  action,  and  not  by  motion,  where  va- 
cation of  the  judgment  is  sought  on  any  of  the  fol- 
lowing grounds:  Invalidity  not  apparent  on  the 
face  of  the  record;53  want  of  service  of  process, 


and  of  jurisdiction  of  the  person;54   fraud;55   and 
accident  or  mistake.56 

On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  the 
remedy  by  motion  or  petition  in  the  cause  is  ex- 
clusive, and  that  an  independent  action  will  not 
lie,57  at  least  not  where  based  on  certain  grounds,58 
*  including  irregularity,59  failure  to  serve  process,60 
the  unauthorized  appearance  of  an  attorney,61  the 
premature  entry  of  judgment,62  or  the  death  of  de- 
fendant before  judgment63  The  principle  is  that 
an  independent  action  will  not  be  allowed  where 
the  relief  or  remedy  demanded  may  be  had  in  an 
existing  action.64 

In  some  jurisdictions,  the  rule  is  that  an  inde- 
pendent action  to  vacate  a  judgment  will  lie  where, 
without  plaintiffs  fault,  the  remedy  by  motion  is 
not  available,  or  adequate,  but  not  otherwise.65 

In  some  cases,  it  has  been  held  that  the  remedy 
either  by  motion  or  by  action  is  available.66 


Hopkinton  v.  B.  F.  Sturtevant  Co., 
189  N.E.  107,  285  Mass.  272— Pow- 
drell  v.  Du  Bois,  174  N.E.  220.  274 
Mass.  106 — French  v.  Kemp,  170 
N.E.  815,  271  Mass.  79— -Mellet  v. 
Swan,  168  N.E.  732,  269  Mass.  173 
— Beserosky  v.  Mason,  168  N.E. 
726,  269  Mass.  325— Wr inn  v.  Sel- 
lers, 147  N.E.  899,  252  Mass.  423— 
Maker  r.  Bouthier,  136  N.E.  255, 
242  Mass.  20. 

When  judgment  was  entered  pre- 
maturely, cutting1  off  plaintiff's  right 
to  present  exceptions,  he  could  file 
petition  as  separate  proceeding-  to 
vacate  the  Judgment. — Everett-Mor- 
gan Co.  v.  Boyajian  Pharmacy,  139 
N.E.  170,  244  Mass.  460. 

50.  Mass. — Lynch       v.       Springfield 
Safe  Deposit  &  Trust  -Co.,  13  N.E. 
2d  611,  300  Mass.  14 — Beserosky  v. 
Mason,  168  N.B.  726,  269  Mass.  325. 

51.  N.C.— Vaughan  v.   Gooch,   92  N. 
C.  624. 

34  C.J.  p  321  note  81. 

Bqtiity  doctriB.es  inapplicable 

Doctrines  limiting  the  functions  of 
an  action  in  equity  to  set  aside  a  de- 
cree are  not  applicable  to  a  motion 
made  in  the  action  itself  and  with- 
in the  time  prescribed  by  statute  to 
set  aside  an  interlocutory  decree  of 
divorce  on  ground  of  fraud  and  coer- 
cion.— Wetzel  v.  Wetzel,  CaLApp., 
1*62  P.2d  299. 

52.  N.C.— Cox  r.  Cox,  18  S.E.2d  713, 
221  N.C.  19. 

34  C.J.  p  321  note  <83. 
Judgment  not  void 

Belief  against  judgment  which  is 
not  void  may  be  granted  only  in  In- 
dependent suit  brought  for  such  re- 
lief.— Halbrook  v.  Quinn,  Civ.App., 
286  S.W.  954,  certified  questions  dis- 
missed Quinn  v.  Halbrook,'  28S  S.W. 
1079,  115  Tex.  513.  I 


lapse  of  time;   rights  of  third  per. 

sons 

Where  one  of  the  parties  to  a  par- 
tition has  been  evicted  by  title  par- 
amount, the  decree  cannot  be  set 
aside  on  motion,  where  a  considera- 
ble time  has  elapsed,  the  rights  of 
third  persons  have  intervened,  and 
other  complicated  circumstances  are 
involved,  but  remedy  is  to  be  sought 
by  a  new  action. — Marvin  v.  Marvin, 
1  Abb.N.Cas.,N.Y.,  372,  52  How.Pr. 
97. 

53.  Gal. — People  ex   rel.   Pollock  v. 
Bogart,  138  P.2d  360,  58  CaLApp.2d 
831— -Moran   v.    Superior    Court   in 
and  for  Sacramento  County,  96  P. 
2d  193,  35  Cal.App.2d  629. 

Okl. — Simmons    v.    Howard,    276    P. 

718,  136  Okl.  118. 
34  C. J.  p  321  note  '84. 

54.  Okl. — Simmons   v.   Howard,    su- 
pra. 

34  C.J.  p  321  note  85. 

55.  Ga. — Simpson  v.  Bradley,  5  S.E. 
2d  '893,  189  Ga.  316,  mandate  con- 
formed to  6  S.E.2d  424,  61  Ga.App. 
495,  certiorarl  denied  *0  S.Ct  1105, 
•310  U.S.  643,  84  L.Ed.  1410,  rehear- 
ing denied    61  S.Ct.    56,    811   U.S. 
725,  85  L.Ed.  472. 

N.C.— Cox  V.  Cox,  18  S.E.2d  713,  221 
N.C.  19— Abernethy  Land  & 
•Finance  Co.  v.  First  Security  Trust 
Co.,  19-6  -S.E.  340,  213  N.C.  B69— 
Fowler  v.  (Fowler,  130  S.B.  315,  190 
N.C.  536. 

34  C.J.  p  321  note  86. 

56L  Mo.— Curtiss  v.  Bell,  111  S.W. 
131,  131  Mo.App.  245. 

34  C.J.  p  322  note  87. 

57.  N.D.— Lamb  v.  King,  29^6  N.W. 
185,  70  N.D.  469. 

S.C.— Baker  v.  Brewer,  123  S.E.  771, 
129  S.C.  74. 

34  C. J.  p  322  note  t89. 

519 


58.  Ky. — Thompson    v.    Porter,    210 
S.W.  948,  183  Ky.  848. 

34  C.  J.  .p  322  note  90. 

Grounds  other  than  fraud 

N.C.— Abernethy  JLiand  &  Finance  Co. 

v.  First  Security  Trust  Co.,  196  S. 

E.  340,  213  N.C.  -369. 

59.  N.C. — Scott    v.    Mutual    Reserve 
Fund  Life  Ass'n,  50   S.E.   221,   137 
N.C.   515— Knott,  v.  Taylor,   6  S.E. 
7*8,   99  N.C.  611,  6  Am.-S.R.   547. 

GO,  N.C.— Davis  v.  Brigman,  169  S. 
E.  421,  204  N.C.  680— Grant  v.  Har- 
rell,  13  S.B.  718,  109  N.C.  78. 

61.  N.Y.— Vilas  v.  Plattsburgh  &  M. 
R.   Co.,   25  N.B.   941,  123  N.Y.  440, 
20    Am.S.R.    7fl,    9    'L.R.A.    844. 

34  C.J.  p  322  note  92. 

62.  Minn. — Calhoun    Beach    Holding 
Co.   v.   Minneapolis  Builders'  Sup- 
ply  Co.,   252   N.W.   442,   190   Minn. 
576. 

63.  N.C.— Knott    v.    Taylor,    6    S.BL 
788,  99  N.C.  511,  6  Am.S.R.  $47. 

64*    N.C. — Knott  v.  Taylor,  supra. 

Where  order  of  consolidation  of 
societies  was  obtained  by  fraudulent 
proof  of  compliance  with  statutory 
requirements,  redress  is  by  motion  in 
consolidation  proceeding  and  not  by 
separate  action. — CamemoUa  v.  So- 
ciety of  Citizens  of  Pozzallo,  270  N. 
T.S.  517,  241  App.Diy.  76tf. 

65.  N.D. — 'Freeman  v.  Wood,   88  N. 
W.  721,  11  N.D.  1,  following  Kitz- 
man  v.   Minnesota  Thresher  Mfg. 
Co.,   84  N.W.   585,   10  N.D.   2«. 

34  O.J.  p  322  note  95. 

66.  '  Ariz. — American   -Surety   Co.    of 
New  York  v.  Mosher,  64  P.2d  1025, 
4)8  Ariz.  552. 

Minn.-— In  re  Melgaard's  Will,  274  N. 
W.  641,  200  Minn.  49-3. 


§  286 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


It  has  been  held  that  after  the  term*?  or  after 
long  delay68  relief  should  be  sought  by  action  and 
not  by  motion. 

Without  regard  to  whether  or  not  relief  may  be 
had  by  motion  or  petition,  a  number  of  cases  have 
held  that  relief  may  be  had  by  action.6^ 

d.  Statutory  Petition  or  Complaint  and  Sum- 
mons 

The  statutory  proceedings  for  vacating -a  Judgment 
after  the  term,  on  specified  grounds,  by  verified  com- 
plaint or  petition  and  summons  are  exclusive  in  some  Ju- 
risdictions, but  cumulative  in  others. 


Under  some  statutes  the  proceedings  to  vacate  or 
set  aside  a  judgment  in  the  court  in  which  it  was 
rendered,  after  the  expiration  of  the  term,  on  cer- 
tain grounds  therein  enumerated,  are  by  verified 
complaint  or  petition,  and  not  by  motion,  and  on 
such  complaint  or  petition  a  summons  or  notice  is- 
sues and  is  served,  and  other  proceedings  are  had, 
substantially  as  in  an  action.70  Such  statutory  pro- 
ceeding, while  incidental  to  the  original  action,  has 
been  declared,  in  effect,  a  new  action,71  equitable 
in  character,72  or  an  independent  proceeding7^  or 
action,74  or  in  the  nature  of  an  independent  ac- 


N.C. — Fowler  v.  Fowler,  130  S.E.  315, 

190  N.C.  536. 
34  C.J.  p  322  note  97. 
Fraud;   perjury 

Remedy  afforded  by  statute  au- 
thorizing setting  aside  of  judgment 
obtained  by  means  of  perjury 
fraud  may  be  put  into  effect  either 
by  motion  or  by  an  original  action. — 
In  re  Jordan's  Estate,  271  N.W.  104, 
199  Minn.  53—34  C.J.  p  322  note  97 
[cj,  [e]. 

67.  Conn. — Application    of    Title    & 
Guaranty    Co.     of    Bridgeport    to 
Change   Name   to   Bankers'   Secur- 
ity Trust  Co.,  145  A.  151,  109  Conn. 
45. 

68.  Mich. — Jennison     y.     Haire,     29 
Mich.  207. 

34  C.J.  p  322  note  98. 

69.  Ind. — Scudder  y.  Jones,  -32  N.E. 
221,  134  Ind.  547. 

34  C,J.  p  323  note  99. 
Action   for   review   of   drainage   as- 
sessment see  Drains  S  70. 
Fraud 

A   party   may  attack  a  judgment 
for  fraud  by  an  Independent  action. 
— Dates  v.   Texas  Co.,  166  S.B.   317, 
203  N.C.  474. 
Action  and  motion  for  new  trial 

(Litigant  .may  enter  motion  for  new 
trial,  and  prosecute  appeal,  and  si- 
multaneously therewith,  or  after  ap- 
peal is  decided,  sue  to  vacate  judg- 
ment and  for  new  trial  provided 
ground  on  which  he  relies  In  his 
petition  is  one  of  which  he  did  not 
avail  himself  on  motion  for  new  tri- 
al; but  he  is  not  entitled  to  both 
remedies  on  same  ground. — Ison  v. 
Buskirk-Rutledge  Lumber  Co.,  266 
S.W.  243,  205  Ky.  583. 
In  Louisiana 

(1)  The  action  of  nullity  under 
Code  Pract.  art.  607  is  independent 
of  the  remedy  of  appeal  and  is  not  a 
substitute  for  an  appeal,  its  purpose 
being  to  furnish  relief  against  fraud 
which  has  operated  in  the  obtention 
of  a  judgment  which  makes  no  ap- 
pearance in  the  record,  and  for 
which  an  appeal  would  afford  no 
remedy.— Miller  v.  Miller,  100  So. 
4'5,  15 6  La,  46— State  ex  rel.  Pelle- 
tier  v.  Sommerville,  36  So.  864,  112 


La,  1091— Vinson  v.  Picolo,  La.App., 
15  So.2d  778. 

(2)  A  petition  to  annul  a  defini- 
tive judgment  rendered  in  a  prior 
proceeding,  on  ground  that  court  in 
prior  proceeding  was  without  juris- 
diction ratione  personae  to  adjudge 
the  cause  in  so  far  as  present  plain- 
tiffs were  concerned  because  they 
were  not  cited,  constituted  a  direct 
and  independent  action  attacking  a 
judgment  that  had  become  final,  and 
was  not  an  attempt  to  appear  in  the 
prior  proceedings,  notwithstanding 
-plaintiffs  did  not  found  their  action 
solely  on  lack  of  citation,  but  also 
sought  to  establish  nullity  of  the 
judgment  on  two  other  wholly  un- 
related grounds. — Adkins'  Heirs  v. 
Crawford,  Jenkins  &  Booth,  3  So.2d 
539,  200  La.  561. 

70.  Ky.— Miller  v.  National  Bank  of 
London,  116  S.W.2d  320,  273  Ky. 

*   243. 

Okl.— Grayson  v.  Stith,  72  P.2d  "820, 
181  Okl.  131,  114  A.L.R.  27-6— 
Steiner  v.  Smith,  242  P.  207,  115 
Okl.  205— Cherry  v.  Gamble,  224 
P.  960,  101  Okl.  234. 

Wyo. — Boulter  v.  Cook,  236  P.  245, 
32  Wyo.  461. 

34  C.J.  p  323  note  1. 

Proceeding  entitled  in  original  ac- 
tion, 

Iowa, — Bates  v.  Farmers  Loan  & 
Trust  Co.  of  Iowa  City,  291  N.W. 
184,  227  Iowa  1347— McKee  v.  Na- 
tional Travelers  Casualty  Ass'n, 
282  N.W.  291,  225  Iowa  1200. 

"Application"  sustained;  as  petition 
Iowa, — Newlove  v.   Stern,   196   N.W. 
51,  196  Iowa  1111. 

Contentions    available    on    petition, 
but  not  on  motion 

Contentions  that  a  personal  judg- 
ment could  not  be  had  on  the  aver- 
ments of  an  amended  petition,  that 
lack  of  notice  of  proceedings  under 
amended  petition  constituted  casual- 
ty, and  that  there  was  accident  and 
surprise  on  the  part  of  defendant, 
could  be  relied  on  in  a  petition  to  set 
aside  the  judgment,  but  could  not  be 
presented  on  motion  to  set  it  aside, 
—Williams  v.  Isaacs,  256  S.W.  19, 
201  Ky.  158.  i 

520 


Rehearing  under  Alabama  statute 

The  character  of  judgment  within 
purview  of  statute  authorizing  ap- 
plication for  rehearing  within  four 
months  from  rendition  of  judgment 
when  a  party  has  been  prevented 
from  making  his  defense  by  sur- 
prise, accident,  mistake,  or  fraud, 
without  fault  on  his  part,  is  a  judg- 
ment valid  ex  facia  which  on  prin- 
ciples of  equity  and  justice  should 
not  be  allowed  to  stand. — Marshall 
County  v.  CJritcher,  17  So.2d  540,  245 
Ala.  357. 

71.  Kan.— State  v.   Soffietti,   136  P. 
260,  90  Kan.  742. 

34  C.J.  p  323  note  2. 
In  Alabama 

Rehearing  under  four-month  stat- 
ute is  new  proceeding,  cumulative 
to  remedy  in  equity,  and  sustainable 
on  like  grounds  as  to  diligence  re- 
quired in  presenting  defense  in  orig- 
inal suit— Craft  v.  Hirsh,  149  So. 
683,  227  Ala.  257,  appeal  dismissed 
54  S.Ct  455,  291  U.S.  644,  78  L.Ed. 
1041. 

72.  Wash. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
Roth  v.   Nash,   144   P.2d  271,   27'5, 
19  Wash.2d  731. 

34  CJ.  p  323  note  3. 
Equitable  relief  see  infra  &§  341-400. 
73-    Ark. — United     Order     of     Good 
•Samaritans   v.   Bryant,    57   S.W.2d 
399,  186  Ark.  960,  certlorarl  denied 
54  S.Ct  59,  290  U.S.  641,  78  iLJBd. 
557. 

Piling-  application  under  title  of  orlg- 
-     toal  cause 

If  application  to  be  relieved  from 
judgment  on  ground  of  mistake,  in- 
advertence, surprise,  or  excusable 
neglect  is  filed  under  title  of  cause 
in  which  original  judgment  was  en- 
tered, application  will  be  treated  as 
an  independent  proceeding. — "Vail  v. 
Department  of  Financial  Institutions 
of  Indiana,  17  N.B.2d  854,  106  Ind. 
App.  39. 

74.    Okl. — -Thompson  v.  General  Out- 
door Advertising  Co.,  151  P,2d  379, 
194  'Okl.  300. 
Docketing 

(1)  Such  proceeding  may  be  dock- 
eted as  a  separate  action  or  as  part 
of,  and  in  connection  with,  original 
case  in  which  the  judgment  sought 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§287 


tion  ;75  but  it  has  also  been  said  not  to  be  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  new  or  independent  action,  but  supplemen- 
tary,76 and  not  to  be  a  civil  action,  but  a  special  pro- 
ceeding.77 

Under  some  statutes,  the  statutory  proceeding  is 
an  exclusive  remedy,  in  cases  where  it  is  available, 
and  a  judgment  cannot  be  vacated  after  the  term 
in  any  other  form  of  proceeding,7*  except  by  bill 
of  review  under  equity  practice.™  Under  other 
statutes,  the  statutory  remedy  is  cumulative  and  not 
exclusive;  it  does  not  impair  the  remedies  by  mo- 
tion or  suit  in  equity  which  continue  to  be  available 
in  proper  cases;80  but  an  adverse  decision  in  one 
form  of  proceeding  will  bar  a  subsequent  resort  to 
the  other  form  of  remedy.81 

e.  Waiver  of  Objections  to  Form  of  Remedy 

Failure  to  object  to  the  manner  In  which  an  applica- 
tion to  vacate  a  Judgment  Is  made  may  be  treated  as  a 
waiver  of  such  objection. 

Where  the  manner  in  which  an  application  to  va- 
cate a  judgment  is  made  is  not  objected  to  at  the 
time,  it  has  been  held  that  such  objection  will  be 
considered  waived  and  that  it  comes  too  late  on  ap- 
peal.82 Thus,  where  no  objection  is  made  to  the 
proceedings  being  by  motion  instead  of  by  petition, 
the  appellate  court  will  consider  the  application  as 
regular;83  and  the  action  of  the  court  in  setting 
aside  a  judgment  on  a  petition  instead  of  a  motion 
will  be  considered  a  mere  irregularity,  and  the  ir- 
regular order  will  not  be  void  for  want  of  jurisdic-. 
tion.84  The  irregularity  of  a  motion  instead  of  a 
formal  complaint  may  likewise  be  waived.86 

It  has  been  held  to  be  error  for  the  court  of  its 


own  motion,  and  without  the  consent  of  the  par- 
ties, to  treat  a  motion  as  an  independent  action;86 
but  where,  by  mistake,  a  remedy  is  sought  by  inde- 
pendent action  instead  of  fnotion  in  the  original 
cause,  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  treat  the 
summons  and  complaint  as  a  motion,  to  the  end  that 
the  issues  may  be  (Jetermined  and  the  rights  of 
the  parties  adjudicated.87 

f .  Indirect  or  Implied  Vacation 

A  Judgment  may  be  In  effect  vacated  by  the  taking 
of  subsequent  proceedings  in  the  action  which  are  in- 
consistent with  its  continuing  in  force.  Authorities  dif- 
fer as  to  whether  the  entry  of  a  second  and  different 
Judgment  in  the  ease  has  this  effect. 

A  judgment  may  be  practically,  or  in  effect,  va- 
cated, although  not  in  terms  set  aside,  by  the  taking 
of  subsequent  proceedings  in  the  same  action  which 
are  inconsistent  with  the  judgment's  continuing  in 
force,88  as  by  the  entry  of  a  second  judgment  in 
the  case,  different  from  the  first,89  although  as  to 
the  last  point  there  is  authority  to  the  contrary,90 
or,  as  appears  in  the  CJ.S.  title  New  Trial  §  210, 
also  34  CJ.  p  326(note  21,  46  C.J.  p  436  notes  77-81, 
84-85,  by  an  order  granting  a  new  trial.  The  gen- 
eral rule,  however,  is  that  a  judgment  stands  as 
such  until  it  is  expressly  vacated  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed by  law.91 


§  287. 


Vacation  on  Court's  Own  Motion 


A  court  may,  on  Its  own  motion,  vacate  a  Judgment 
during  the  term  at  which  It  was  rendered;  and,  If  It  Is 
void,  may  do  ao  at  any  time,  even  after  the  term. 

Courts  have  been  broadly  said  to  be  authorized 
to  set  aside  or  vacate  their  judgments  on  their  own 


to  be  vacated  was  rendered. — Thomp- 
son v.  General  Outdoor  Advertising 
Co.,  supra. 

(2)  Docketing  generally  see  supra 
§§  126-128. 

75.  Okl.— Grayson  v.  Stith,   72  P.2d 
*20,  181  Okl.  181,  114  A.L..R.  276. 

76.  Iowa, — Oilman    v.    Donovan,    12 
N.W.  779,  59  Iowa  76. 

34  O.J.  p  828  note  2   [a]   (2). 

77.  Kan.-— Blair  v.  Blair,  153  P.  544, 
96  Kan.  757. 

Ohio.— Vida  v.  Parsley,  App.,  47  N.E. 
2-d  663. 

Wyo.— -Luman  v.  Hill,  256  P.  339,  36 
Wyo.  427. 

7ft,  Okl. — Cherry  v.  Gamble,  224  P. 
960,  101  Okl.  234. 

34  C.J.  p  324  note  4. 

Bxclusiveness  of  statutory  proceed- 
ings generally  see  supra  subdivi- 
sion a  of  this  section. 

79.  Wash.— -Ball   v.   Clothier,    75    P. 
1099,  34  Wash.  299. 

34  C.J.  p  324  note  5. 

80.  Ky.— Southern    Nat     Life     Ins. 


Co.  v.  Ford,  152  S.W.  243,  151  Ky. 
476. 
34  C.J.  p  324  note  6. 

81.  Wash.— Stolze  v.   Stolze,   191  P. 
641,     111     Wash.     398 — Boylan    v. 
Bock,    111   P.    454,   -60  Wash.   423. 

82.  Mass. — Maker   v.    Bouthier,    136 
N.E.  255,  242  Mass.  20. 

34  O.J.  p  324  note  10. 

83.  Ind. — Indiana    Travelers'     Acci- 
dent   Ass'n    v.    Doherty,    123    N.E. 
242,  70  Ind.App.  214. 

Iowa. — Callanan  v.  JEBtna  Nat,  Bank, 
50  N.W.  69,  84  Iowa  -8. 

84.  Neb.— Pollock  v.  Boyd,   54  N.W. 
560,  36  Neb.  369. 

85.  Ind. — Beatty  v.  O'Connor,  5  N.B. 
880,  106  Ind.  81. 

Wash. — State  v.  Washington  Dredg- 
ing &  Improvement  Co.,  86  P.  936, 
43  Wash.  508. 

86.  N.C.— Smith  v.  <Fort,  10  S.E.  914, 
105  N.C.  446,  453,  454. 

34  C.J.  -p  324  note  14. 

87.  N.C. — Abernethy         (Land         & 
•Finance     Co.     v.     First     Security 

521 


Trust   Co.,   196   S.E.    840,   21$  N.C. 
369. 

88.  Mo. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
Marsden  v.  Nipp,  30  S.W.2d  77,  SI, 
825  Mo.  822. 

34  C.J.  p  325  note  1*8. 

89.  Mo. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
Marsden  v.  Nipp,  30  S.W.2d  77,  81, 
325  Mo.  '822.      . 

Contra  Mitchell  v.  Dabney,  Mo.App., 
71  S.W.2d  165,  transferred,  see,  58 
S.W.2d  731,  332  Mo.  410. 

34  C.J.  p  325  note  19. 

One  of  more  judgments  in  same  case 
generally  see  supra  5  •$£. 

90.  Tex. — Mullins  v.  Thomas,  150  S. 
W.2d  83,   136   Tex   215— Bridgman 
v.  Moore,  Cir.App.,  180  S.W.2d  211, 
affirmed,  Sup.,  183  S.W.2d  705. 

Contra  Luck  v.  Hopkins,  49  S.W.  860, 
92  Tex  426— Watson  v.  Harris,  68 
Tex  61. 

34  C.J.  p  325  note  20. 

ML.  Mo.— Marsden  v.  Nipp,  -80  B.W. 
2d  77,  -325  Mo.  822. 

34  C.J.  p  326  note  22. 


287 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


motion,92  and,  independently  of  statutory  provi- 
sions, to  annul  on  their  own  motion,  and  within  a 
reasonable  time,  judgments  inadvertently  made.93 
More  particularly,  during  the  term  at  which  a  judg- 


ment was  rendered,  the  court  has  power  on  its  own 
motion  to  vacate  it  or  set  it  aside.94  It  may  quash, 
vacate,  or  set  aside  a  void  judgment  on  its  own  mo- 
tion,95 at  any  time,96  and,  according  to  the  deci- 


92.    N.M.— Arias   v.   Springer,    78   P. 

2d  153,  42  N.M.  350. 
N.C. — Fowler    v.    Fowler,     130    S.E. 

315,  190  N.C.  53$. 
Setting'  aside  to  allow  new  trial 

Trial  court's  order  of  its  own  mo- 
tion setting  aside  judgment  and  or- 
der allowing  appeal,  for  purpose  of 
allowing  motion  for  new  trial,  was 
held  unauthorized  and  void. — Dough- 
erty v.  Manhattan  Rubber  Mfg.  Co., 
29  S.W.2d  126,  325  Mo.  656. 

Nonpayment  of  fee 

Under  statute  requiring  collection 
of  fee  prior  to  entry  of  final  Judg- 
ment and  court  rule  requiring  depos- 
it of  judgment  fee  prior  to  taking 
of  proofs,  court  could  vacate  judg- 
ment for  defendant,  which  was  en- 
tered without  payment  of  fee,  even 
if  plaintiff  had  no  right  to  move  for 
vacation  of  judgment  because  of 
plaintiff's  noncompliance  with  court 
rule. — Detroit  Edison  Co.  v.  'Hart- 
rick,  278  N.W.  664,  283  Mich.  502. 

In  Texas 

(1)  "The    trial    court   has    control 
of  its  judgments  for  a  period  of  30 
days  after  the  rendition  thereof,  and 
may  set  aside  any  judgment    .     .     . 
on    its    own    motion." — Christner   v. 
Mayer,  Civ.App.f  123  S.W.2d  715,  71*, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct. 

(2)  Where    plaintiff's    motion    for 
new  trial  was  overruled  by  operation 
of  law  for  failure  to  present  motion 
to  trial  court  within  thirty  days  aft- 
er it  was  filed,  judgment  for  defend- 
ant became  final  at  the  end  of  thirty- 
day  period  and  trial  court  was  with- 
out authority  to  set  aside  judgment 
either  on  strength  of  motion  or  on 
court's  own  motion,  where  term  of 
court  at  which  Judgment  was  ren- 
dered had  ended. — Aldridge  v.  Gener- 
al Mills,  Civ.App.,  188  S.W.2d  407. 

(3)  Where  trial   judge  had  juris- 
diction to  render  judgment  in  first 
instance    and    judgment    had    been 
spread   on   minutes   of  court   under 
judge's  written  instructions  in  form 
of  an  approved  decree  and  had  stood 
for  five  years  without  challenge,  tri- 
al judge  had  no  power  to  vacate  the 
judgment  on  his  own  motion,  merely 
because   he   had   no    recollection   of 
having    pronounced    judgment    from 
the     bench;      statutes     empowering 
court  to  correct  certain  clerical  er- 
rors   and    misrecitals    in    judgment 
after  judgment  has  become  final  do 
not   give   court  authority  to   vacate 
and  set  aside  an  entire  judgment  on 
court's  own  motion,  where  judge  had 
directed   clerk   to   enter  such  judg- 
ment.—^Bskridge  &  Williams  v.  Mer- 
chants State  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  173  S,*W.2d  518,  error  refused. 


(4)  Under  Acts  38th  Leg.,  1923,  c 
105  §  1  subds  14-16,  inclusive,  re- 
quiring motions  or  amended  motions 
for  new  trial  to  be  determined  with- 
in forty-five  days  after  motion  is 
filed,  after  filing  of  original  motion, 
trial  court  had  jurisdiction  of  case 
for  at  least  forty-five  days  thereaft- 
er, during  which  time  he  could  set 
aside  his  judgment  without  any  mo- 
tion and  of  his  own  accord. — Townes 
v.  Lattimore,  272  S.W.  435,  114  Tex. 
511. 

93.  Cal.— Burbank      v.      Continental 
Life  Ins.  Co.,   S8  P.2d  4:51,  2  Cal. 
App.2d   -664 — Harris    v.    Minnesota 
Inv.   Co.,    265   P.   306,  39   Cal. App. 
•396. 

94.  Ark. — Stinson  v.  Stinson,  159  $. 
W.2d  446,  203  Ark.  8-88. 

Ga. — Athens   Apartment   Corporation 

v.  Hill,  119  S.B.  631,  156  Ga.  437. 
Mo. — Savings  Trust  Co.  of  St  Louis 
v.  Skain,  131  S.W.2d  566,  345  Mo. 
46 — -Taylor  v.  Cleveland,  C.,  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  63  S.W.2d  69,  333 
Mo.  650,  certiorari  denied  Cleve- 
land, C.  C.  &  St  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tay- 
lor, 54  S.Ct.  121,  290  U.S.  685,  78 
L.Ed.  590— Marsden  v.  Nipp,  30  S. 
W.24  77,  325  Mo.  822— In  re  Henry 
County  Mut  Burial  Ass'n,  77  S.W. 
2d  124,  229  Mo.App.  300— National 
City  Bank  of  St.  Louis  v.  Pattiz, 
App.,  2-6  S.W.2d  815.- 
Neb.— Netusil  v.  Novak,  235  N.W. 

335,  120  Neb.  751. 
Okl. — Roland    Union    Graded    School 
ODist.  No.  1  of  Sequoyah  County  v. 
Thompson,   124  P.2d  400,  190  Okl. 
416— Wall    v.    Snider,    219   P.    671, 
«3  Okl.  97. 
Tex. — Brannon   v.   Wilson,    Civ.App., 

260  S.W.  201. 
34  C.J.  p  325  note  15. 
Power  of  court  over  judgment  dur- 
ing   term    generally    see    supra    § 
229. 

'During  the  term  of  the  court  at 
which  a  judgment  is  rendered,  the 
judgment  is  in  the  breast  of  the 
court  and,  in  the  exercise  of  its  com- 
mon law  right,  it  may,  in  the  inter- 
est of  justice,  set  aside  the  Judg- 
ment upon  its  own  motion." — Cherry 
v.  Cherry,  35  S.W.2d  fr59,  660,  225  Mo. 
App.  998. 

Reason  for  rule 

"The  entire  proceeding  remains  in 
the  breast  of  the  court  throughout 
the  term  in  which  the  judgment  is 
rendered."— Spickard  v.  McNabb,  Mo. 
App.,  180  S.W.2d  611,  6131 
Dismissal 

<1)  Where  a  proceeding  was  dis- 
missed by  inadvertence  or  mistake, 
the  court  had  a  right  on  its  own  mo- 
tion to  set  aside  a  judgment  of  dis-< 

522 


missal,  during  the  term  at  which  it 
was  rendered.— Hallam  v.  -Finch,  195 
N.W.  352,  197  Iowa  224. 

(2)  Vacation  of  entry  of  dismiss- 
al of  judgment  nunc  pro  tune  made 
without  motion  or  petition,  however, 
was  held  to  be  void.— Baylor  v.  Kil- 
linger,  186  N.H.  512,  44  Ohio  App. 
523. 

Prompt  action,  required 
•  However,  a  statute  permitting  a 
trial  court  to  set  aside  a  verdict  on 
its  own  motion,  in  certain  circum- 
stances, was  held  to  contemplate 
prompt  action  by  the  court  on  the 
coming  in  of  the  verdict,  so  that  the 
court  could  not,  on  its  own  motion, 
vacate  a  Judgment  eighty-three  days 
after  the  verdict  was  returned. — 
Mountain  States  Implement  Co.  v. 
Arave,  291  P.  1074,  49  Idaho  710. 

95.  Ind. — Isaacs  v.  Fletcher  Ameri- 
can  Nat   Bank,    1S5   N.EJ.    154,    98 
Ind.App.  111. 

N.C.— Clark  v.  Carolina  Homes,  128 

S.B.  20,  189  N.C.  703. 
Pa. — Stickel    v.    Barron,    Com.PL,    7 

«Fay.L.J.  35. 
Wash. — Ballard     Savings     &     Loan 

Ass'n  v.  (Linden,  62  P.2d  1364,  188 

Wash.  490. 

Tt  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
strike  off  a  void  judgment  of  its  own 
motion  whenever  its  attention  is 
called  to  it — Roml^erger  v.  Romberg- 
er,  139  A.  159,  290  Pa.  454. 

96.  Nev. — Scheeline       Banking       & 
Trust     Co.     v.     Stockgrowers'     & 
Ranchers'  Bank  of  Reno,   16  P.2d 
3-6-8,  54  Nev.  346. 

Pa.— Stickel  v.  Barron,  Com.PL,  7 
Fay.L.J.  35. 

Judgment  void  on  its  face 
Cal.— Gibbons  v.   Clapp,   277   P.   490, 
207  Cal.  221— Application  of  Behy- 
mer,  19  P.2d  «29,  130  Cal.App.  200. 
Idaho. — Occidental   Life   Ins.   Co.    v. 
Niendorf,   44   P.2d   1099,   55   Idaho 
521— Savage  v.  Stokes,  28  P.2d  900, 
54   Idaho   109 — Baldwin  v.   Ander- 
son,  -8    P.2d   461,   -51    Idaho    614— 
Jensen   v.   Gooch,   211   P.   551,    36 
Idaho  457— Miller  v.  Prout,  197  P. 
1023,  33  Idaho  709. 
Judgment  without  Jurisdiction 
Cal.—Jellen  v.  O'Brien,  264  P.  1115, 

89  Cal.App.  505. 

Or. — May  v.  Roberts,  286  P.  546,  133 
Or.  643— Ladd  &  Tilton  v.  Mason, 
10  Or.  308. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  on  its 
own  motion  to  strike  off  a  void  judg- 
ment whenever  its  attention  is  called 
to  it. 

N.J.. — Collyer  v.  McDonald,  10  A.2d 
284,  123  N.J.Law  547— Westfield 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


288 


sions  on  the  question,  even  after  the  term;97  and 
it  may  set  aside,  on  its  own  motion,  a  constructively 
fraudulent  entry,98  and  may  vacate  a  clearly  fraud- 
ulent judgment  on  its  own  motion  after  the  term.99 

The  act  of  a  court  in  setting  aside  a  judgment 
on  its  own  motion  may  be  instigated  by  an  appli- 
cation or  paper  filed  in  the  case  by  a  stranger  to 
the  record.1 

§  288.     Time  for  Application 

a.  In  general 

b.  Statutory  provisions 

c.  Ladies  and  delay 

d.  Irregular  judgments 

e.  Fraudulent  .or  collusive  judgments 

a.  In  General 
An  application  for  vacation  of  a  Judgment,  Invoking 


the  court's  inherent  power  and  not  made  under  statute, 
is  generally  not  subject  to  statutory  limitations  of  time; 
and  under  some  authorities  a  void  Judgment,  at  least  If 
void  on  its  face,  may  be  vacated  at  any  time. 

As  appears  infra  subdivision  b  of  this  section,  any 
statutory  limitation  of  the  time  within  which  an  ap- 
plication to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  may  be  made 
must  be  observed  in  all  applications  to  open  or  va- 
cate made  under,  or  within  the  operation  of,  the 
statute.  Wherer  however,  the  application  is  not 
made  under  the  statute,  or  on  statutory  grounds,  but 
invokes  the  inherent  power  of  the  court,  as  dis- 
cussed supra  §  265,  the  statutory  limitation  is  gen- 
erally deemed  not  applicable2  and  the  power  to  va- 
cate in  proper  cases  is  not  lost  by.  mere  lapse  of 
time  or  expiration  of  the  term.8  Further,  a  void 
judgment  may,  under  some  authorities,  be  set  aside 
or  vacated  at  any  time,4  time  not  barring  a  motion 


Trust  Co.  v.  Court  of  Common 
Pleas,  178  A.  546,  115  N.J.Law  86. 

Pa. — Cadwallader  v.  Firestone,  Com. 
PI.,  7  Fay.L.J.  259. 

97.  Or.— White  v.  Ladd,  68  P.  789, 
41  Or.  324,  93  Am.S.R.  732. 

34  C.J.  p  325  note  16. 

Power  of  court  over  void  judgment 
after  term  see  supra  §  230. 

96.  Ind.— Isaacs  v.  Fletcher  Ameri- 
can Nat  Bank,  185  N.E.  154,  98 
Ind.App.  111. 

99.  N.Y. — Davidson  v/  Ream,  162  N. 
Y.S.  375,  1T5  App.Div.  760. 

1.  Mo. — In    re    Henry    County   Mut. 
Burial    Ass'n,    77   S.W.2d   124,    229 
Mo.App.  300. 

34  C.J.  p  325  note  15  [b]. 

2.  Ariz. — Vasquez    v.    Dreyfus,    2-69 
P.  80,  34  Ariz.  184. 

Colo.—Peterson  v.  Vanderlip,  278  P. 

607,  86  Colo.  130. 
Idaho. — Rice  v.  Rice,  267  P.  1076,  46 

Idaho  41*8. 
CT.D. — corpus   Juris  dtefl  in  Ellison 

v.  Baird,  293  N.W.  793,  794,  70  N.D. 

226— Miller   v.    Benecke,   212  N.W. 

925,  55  N.D.  231. 
•34  C.J.  p  256  note  87. 
Time  for  opening-  default  Judgments 

see  infra  §  337. 

3.  Ariz.— VasQuez    v.    Dreyfus,    269 
P.  80,  34  Ariz.  1-84. 

Colo. — Peterson  v.  Vanderlip,  278  P. 
607,  86  Colo.  130. 

DeL— Hendrix  v.  Kelley,  143  A.  460, 
4  W.W.Harr.  120. 

Idaho.— Rice  v.  Rice,  267  P.  1076, 
4-6  Idaho  418. 

N.D.—- Miller  v.  Benecke,  212  N.W. 
925,  55  N.D.  231. 

34  C.J.  p  256  note  88. 

Vacation  on.  court's  own  motion  aft- 
er term  see  supra  $287. 
"Under  some  circiunstaaces  a  void 

judgment  which  was  a  nullity  in  law 

when    entered    may    or    should    be 

stricken     oft     notwithstanding1     the 


term  has  ended." — U.  S.  v.  Certain 
Land  in  Falls  Tp.,  Bucks  County,  D. 
C.Pa.,  38  F.2d  109,  111. 

4.  Fla. — Chisholm  v.  Chisholm,  125 
So.  694,  98  Fla.  1196— Kroier  v. 
Kroier,  116  So.  753,  95  Fla.  i865— 
Einstein  v.  Davidson,  17  So.  563, 
35  'Fla.  342. 

Idaho.— Rice  v.  Rice,  267  P.  1076,  46 
Idaho  418. 

111.— Barnard  v.  Michael.  63  N.E.2d 
858,  392  111.  130— Thayer  v.  Village 
of  Downers  Grove,  16  N.B.2d  717, 
369  111.  334— Industrial  Nat.  Bank 
of  Chicago  v.  Altenberg,  64  N.B.2d 
219,  327  IlLApp.  337. 

Kan. — Taylor  v.  Focks  Drilling  & 
Manufacturing  Corporation,  <62  P. 
2d  903,  144  Kan.  626. 

Ky.— Hill  v.  Walker,  180  S.W.2d  93, 
297  Ky.  257,  154  A.L.R.  814— 
Brown's  Adm'r  v.  Gabhart,  23  S. 
W.2d  551,  232  Ky.  336. 

Neb.— Foster  T.  Foster,  196  N.W.  702, 
111  Neb.  414. 

Nev. — Scheeline  Banking  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Stockgrowers'  &  Ranchers'  Bank 
of  Reno,  16  P.2d  36'8,  54  Nev.  346. 

jq-.j. — Collyer  v.  McDonald,  10  A.2d 
284,  123  N.J.Law  547— Westfleld 
Trust  Co.  v.  Qourt  of  Common 
Pleas  of  Morris  County,  17-8  A.  546, 
115  N.J.Law  86 — Gimbel  Bros.  v. 
Corcoran,  192  A.  715,  15  N.J.Misc. 
538. 

N.C.— Johnston  County  v.  Ellis,  38 
S.B.2d  31,  226  N.C.  268— City  of 
Monroe  v.  Niven,  '20  S.E.2d  311,  221 
N.C.  862. 

N.D. — Taylor  v.  Oulie,  212  N.W.  931, 
55  N.D.  2:53— Miller  v.  Benecke,  212 
N.W.  925,  55  NJX  231. 

Pa. — School  Dist.  of  Haverford  Tp., 
to  Use  of  Tedesco,  v.  Herzog,  171 
A.  455,  314  Pa.  161— Stickel  v.  Bar- 
ron,  Com.Pl.,  7  FayJUJ.  35 — Yoder 
v.  Universal  Credit  Co*,  Com.Pl., 
8  Sch.Reg.  7*6. 

523 


Utah. — In   re    Goddard's   Estate,   27-8 

P.  961,  73  Utah  298. 
Invalidity  of  judgment  as  ground  for 

vacating  see  supra  $   267. 
Power  of  court  as  to  void  judgments 

after  term  generally  see  supra  8 

230. 

Filing1  false  affidavit 

Decree  against  unknown  defend- 
ants obtained  by  filing  false  affidavit 
may  be  set  aside  at  any  time. — Gra- 
ham v.  O'Connor,  182  N.B.  764,  350 
111.  36. 

Under  statute 

(1)  In  some  jurisdictions  the  text 
rule  has  been  enacted  by  statute. 
Kan. — Board   of    Com'rs    of    Labette 

County    v.    Abbey,    100    P.2d    720, 
151  Kan.  710. 

Okl.— Neal  v.  Travelers  Ins.  Co.,  106 
P.2d  811,  188  Okl.  '131— State  v. 
City  of  Tulsa,  5  P.2d  744,  153  Okl. 
262— Central  Nat  Oil  Co.  v.  Conti- 
nental Supply  Co.,  249  P.  347,  119 
Okl.  190— Le  Clair  v.  Calls  Him, 
233  P.  1087,  106  OkL  247. 

(2)  Under  such  statutes,  action  of 
court  in  denying  motions  to  vacate 
void   judgment,   from   which  no   ap- 
peal   was    taken,    did    not    preclude 
movant   from   obtaining  vacation   of 
judgment    on    motion    subsequently 
filed,  since  void  judgment  may  be  at- 
tacked at  any  time  by  party  affected 
thereby.— Hinkle    v.    Jones,    66    P.2d 
1073,  180  Okl.  17. 

(3)  Also,  a  judgment  entirely  out- 
side the  issues  in  the  case  and  on  a 
matter  not  submitted  to  the  court  for 
its   determination   is   a   nullity   and 
may  be  vacated  and  set  aside  at  any 
time.— Hinkle  v.  Jones,  66  P.2d  1073, 
180  OkL  17— Winters  v.  Birch,  36  P. 
2d  907,  169  OkL  237. 

Told  and  voidable  Judgment* 

Void  judgment  may  be  set  aside 
and  stricken  from  record  on  motion 
at  any  time,  but  judgment  voidable 


§  288 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


to  set  aside  such  a  jtidgment  unless  the  lapse  of 
time  has  been  so  great  that  the  rights  of  innocent 
persons  may  be  prejudicially  affected  by  the  de- 
lay;5 other  authorities  so  hold  with  respect  to  a 


judgment  which  is  void  on  the  face  of  the  record  or 
judgment  roll.6  Within  these  rules  fall  cases  where 
the  judgment  is  vacated  because  it  is  void  for  want 
of  jurisdiction,7  or  because  it  was  entered  as  the 


only  because  irregular  or  erroneous 
must  be  timely  attacked  by  motion 
to  vacate  or  by  appeal  or  it  becomes 
absolute  verity. 
TJ.-S. — Parker  Bros.  v.  Fagan,  C.C.A. 
'Fla.,  (68  F.2d  616,  certiorari  denied 

54  S.Ct  719,  292  U.S.  638,  ?8  (L.Bd. 
1490. 

'Fla. — In  re  Begg's  Estate,  12  So.2d 
115,  152  -Fla.  277— Malone  v.  Meres, 
109  So.  677,  91  Fla.  709. 

5.  Ky.— HU1  v.  Walker,  180  S.W.2d 
93,  297  Ely.  257 — Allen  v.  Sweeney, 
213  S.W.  217,  1-85  Ky.  94. 

&  TJ.S. — Simonds  v.  Norwich  Union 
Indemnity  Co.,  C.C.A.Minn.,  73  F. 
2d  412,  certiorari  denied  Norwich 
Union  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Sim&nds, 

55  S.Ct.  507,  294  U.-S.  711,  79  L.Ed. 
1248 — Woods    Bros.    Qonst.    Co.    v. 
Tankton  County,  C.C.A.S.GD.,  54  «F. 
2d  304,  81  A.L.R.  300. 

Ala.— State  v.  Smith.  Ill  So.  28,  215 
Ala.  449. 

Cal. — In  re  Dahnke's  Estate  and 
Guardianship,  222  P.  381,  64  Cal. 
App.  555 — King  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  San  Diego  County,  56 
P.2d  268,  12  Cal.App.2d  501— Fisch 
&  Co.  v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for 
Los  Angeles  County,  43  P.2d  855, 
6  Cal. App.  2d  21 — In  re  Callaway's 
Guardianship,  26  P.2d  698,  135  CaL 
App.  158. 

(Fla.— McGee  v.  McGee,  22  So.2d  788. 

Idaho. — Occidental  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Niendorf,  44  P.2d  1099,  55  Idaho 
521— Savage  v.  Stokes,  28  P.2d 
900,  -54  Idaho  109— Baldwin  v.  An- 
derson, 8  F.24  461,  51  Idaho  614— 
Jensen  v.  Gooch,  211  P.  551,  36 
Idaho  457— Miller  v.  Prout,  197  P. 
1023,  33  Idaho  709. 

Okl. — Town  of  Watonga  v.  Crane  Co., 
114  P.2d  941,  189  Okl.  184— Petty 
v.  Roberts,  98  P.2d  '602,  186  Okl. 
269 — Caraway  v.  Overholser,  77  P. 
2d  688,  182  Okl.  357— Ritchie  V. 
Keeney,  73  P.2d  397,  181  Okl.  207— 
Weimer  v.  Augustana  pension  and 
Aid  Fund,  67  P.2d  436,  179  Okl.  572 
— Latimer  v.  Vanderslice,  62  P.2d 
1197,  178  Okl.  501 — First  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Darragh,  19  P.2d  651,  162  Okl. 
243 — Roubedcaux  v.  Givens,  292  P. 
•343,  145  Okl.  221— Simmons  v. 
Howard,  276  P.  718,  136  Okl.  118— 
Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v.  Apple, 
267  P.  239,  130  Okl.  270 — Crowther 
v.  Schoonover,  266  P.  777,  130  Okl. 
249— ^Central  Nat  Oil  Co.  v.  Con- 
tinental Supply  Co.,  249  P.  347,  119 
Okl.  190— B-R  Electric  &  Tele- 
phone Mfg.  Co.  v.  Town  of  Wewo- 
ka,-  239  P.  919,  113  Okl.  225— Le 
Clair  v.  Calls  Him,  233  P.  1087, 
106  Okl.  247 — Mason  v.  Slonecker, 
.219  P.  3'57,  92  Okl.  227--Good  v. 


•First  Nat    Bank,   211  P.    1051,    88 

Okl.  110. 
S.D. — Corpus   Juris   cited 'in  Lessert 

v.  Lessert,  263  N.W.  559;  Ml,  64  S. 

D.  3. 
34  C.J.  p  257  note  89  [a]. 

"A  judgment  which  is  void  upon 
its  face  and  requires  only  an  inspec- 
tion of  the  Judgment  roll  to  demon- 
strate its  want  of  validity  is  a  'dead 
limb  upon  the  judicial  tree  which 
may  be  lopped  off  at  any  time;'  it 
can  bear  no  fruit  to  the  plaintiff,  but 
is  a  constant  menace  to  the  defend- 
ant, and  may  be  vacated  by  the  court 
rendering  it  'at  any  time  on  motion 
of  a  party  or  any  person  affected 
thereby,'  either  before  or  after  the 
expiration  of  three  years  from  the 
rendition  of  such  void  judgment. 
Such  motion  is  unhampered  by  a 
limitation  of  time." — Grubb  v.  Fay 
State  Bank  of  (Fay,  249  P.  341,  119 
Okl.  199. 
Invalidity  not  appearing1  on  face 

(1)  At    common    law,    court's   au- 
thority to  vacate  judgment  not  void 
on  face 'of  judgment  roll,  but  void  in 
fact  for  want  of  jurisdiction  of  per- 
son of  defendant,  ceased  with  ending 
of  term  at  which  judgment  was  en- 
tered.— Richert    v.    Benson    Lumber 
Co.,   34  P.2d  «40,  139  CaLApp.   671. 

(2)  It  has  been  held  that  a  void 
judgment  may  be  vacated  on  motion 
made  within  reasonable  time  where 
invalidity  does  not  appear  on  judg- 
ment roll. — Savage  v.   Stokes,   28   P. 
2d  900,  54  Idaho  109— Baldwin  v.  An- 
derson,   8   P.2d    461,    51   Idaho   614 — 
Miller  v.  Prout,  197  P.  1023,  33  Idaho 
709. 

(3)  In    some    jurisdictions,    how- 
ever, a  judgment  that  is  not  void  on 
its  face  can  be  attacked  only  within 
the  time  provided  by  statute. — Lati- 
mer v.  Vanderslice,  62  P.2d  1197,  178 
Okl.    501 — Crowther    v.    Schoonover, 
266  P.  777,  130  Okl.  249. 

Judgment  held  not  void  on  face 
Ala. — Ex  parte  R.  H.  Byrd  Contract- 
ing  Co.,    156   -So.    579,    26   Ala. App. 
171,   certiorari  denied  156  So.  582, 
229  Ala.  248. 
When  judgment  void  on  face 

(1)  Within  this  rule,  a  judgment 
is  void  on  its  face  when  its  invalidity, 
is  apparent  on  inspection  of  judg- 
ment roll. 

Cal.— Gibbons  v.  Clapp,  277  P.  490, 
207  Cal.  221— Application  of  Behy- 
mer,  19  P.2d  829,  130  CaLApp.  200. 
Okl.— Dale  v.  Carson,  2-83  P.  1017, 
141  Okl.  105 — Carson  v.  Carson, 
283  P.  1015,  141  Okl.  106— Savoy 
Oil  Co.  v.  Emery,  277  P.  1029,  137 
Okl.  67 — Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Pot- 
ter, 233  P.  700,  108  Okl.  49.  i 

524 


(2)  Within  this  rule,   a  judgment 
is  void  on  its  face  when  the  judg- 
ment   roll    affirmatively    shows    that 
the   trial   court  lacked   either  Juris- 
diction over  the  person,  jurisdiction 
over  the  subject  matter,  or  judicial 
power  to  render  the  particular  judg- 
ment— Town   of   Watonga   v.    Crane 
Co.,   114  P.2d  941,  189  Okl.  184. 

(3)  A  Judgment  which  on  its  face 
discloses  that  the  court  had  jurisdic- 
tion  of   the   subject   matter  and   of 
the  parties  is  not  void  on  its  face. — 
Pennsylvania   Co.  v.   Potter,   233    P. 
700,  108  Okl.  «49. 

7.    U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Turner,  C.Q.A.N.D., 

47  F.2d  86. 
Cal.— Jellen  v.  O'Brien,   2-64  P.  1115, 

89  CaLApp.  605. 
Fla. — Kroier  v.  Kroier,   118  So.  753, 

95  iFla.  865. 
111.— Barnard   v.    Michael,    63   N.B.2d 

858,  -392  111.  130— Sherman  &  Ellis 

v.  Journal  of  Commerce  and  Com- 
mercial Bulletin,  259  111. App.  453. 
TE^TI, — Taylor    v.    Focks    Drilling    & 

Manufacturing  Corporation,    62   P. 

2d  903,  144  Kan.  626. 
Mont. — Kosonen    v.    Waara,    285    P. 

668,  87  Mont  24. 
N.D.— Corpus  Juris   cited  la  Ellison 

v.  Baird,  293  N.W.  793,  794,  70  N. 

D.   226— Miller  v.  Benecke,   212  N. 

W.   925,   55  N.D.   231-^Freeman  v. 

Wood,  88  N.W.  721,  11  N.D.  1. 
Ohio. — 'Kinsman  Nat.  Bank  v.  Jerko, 

25  Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  445. 
Or.— May  v.  Roberts,  286  P.  546,  133 

Or.  643 — Ladd  &  Tilton  v.  Mason, 

10  Or.  308. 
Pa.— Mintz  T.  Mintz,  -83  Pa. Super.  85 

— Keister    v.    Bitter,    Com.PL,    53 

Dauph.Co.  29$ — Toder  v.  Universal 

Credit  Co.,  Com.PL,  8  Sch.Reg.  76. 
S.D.— iLessert   v.    Lessert,    263   N.W. 

559,  64  S.D.  3. 
Wis.~ In  re  Cudahy's  Estate,  219  N. 

W.  203,  196  Wis.  260. 
.34  C.J.  p  217  note  32,  p  257  note  89. 
Want  of  Jurisdiction  of  person 

(1)  Generally. 

u.-s.— u.  s.  v.  sotis,  c.q.A.iiL,  131 

F.2d  783. 

Ala.— State  v.  Smith,  111  So.  28,  215 
Ala.  449.  , 

Colo. — Peterson  v.  Vanderlip,  278  P. 
607,  86  Colo.  130. 

Fla.— McGee  v.  McGee,  22  So.2d  788. 

I1L — Graham  v.  O'Connor,  182  N.E. 
764,  350  111.  36— Anderson  v.  An- 
derson, 11  N.E.2d  216,  292  IlLApp. 
421. 

Neb.— Foster  v.  Foster,  196  N.W.  702, 
111  Neb.  414. 

(2)  "It  would  be  an  absurdity  to 
suppose  that  a  person,  against  whom 
a  judgment  has  been  rendered  with- 
out any  service  of  process  whatever. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


288 


result  of  clerical  mistake  or  inadvertence,8  or  be- 
cause of  irregularity  by  reason  of  mistake  of  fact,9 
or,  as  appears  infra  subdivision  e  of  this  section, 
because  of  fraud,  deception,  or  collusion  in  obtain- 
ing the  judgment,  in  all  of  which  classes  of  cases  the 
court  has  inherent  power  to  vacate  the  judgment 
after  expiration  of  the  term,  and  without  limitation 
as  to  time,  unless  a  limitation  is  prescribed  by  stat- 
ute,10 and  it  has  also  been  held  that  a  judgment 
made  through  mistake  may  be  vacated  at  any 
time.11 

'  It  has  been  said  that  ordinarily  it  is  a  litigant's 
duty  to  take  steps  during  the  term  of  court  to  set 
aside  any  unsatisfactory  judgment12  The  power  to 
vacate  a  judgment  because  the  court  has  changed 
its  mind,  and  desires  to  change  its  ruling  on  the 


merits,  expires  with  the  term.18    A  premature  mo- 
tion will  not  be  granted.14 

Court  rules.  A  motion  to  open  or  vacate  a  judg- 
ment nlay  be  denied  where  not  made  within  the 
time  prescribed  by  rule  of  court.15 

b.  Statutory  Provisions 

Statutory  limitations  on  the  time  for  making  an  ap- 
plication to  open  or  vacate  a  Judgment  must  be  observed 
in  all  applications  made  under,  or  within  the  operation 
of,  the  statute. 

Statutes  in  many  jurisdictions  expressly  provid- 
ing that  a  judgment  may  be  set  aside,  opened,  or 
vacated  on  grounds  enumerated  therein,  and  speci- 
fying the  time  within  which  the  application  shall 
be  made,  haye  been  construed  and  applied  in  a  num- 
ber of  cases.16  Any  statutory  limitation  of  the 


could  be  precluded  by  any  lapse  of 
time  from  contesting  its  validity. 
Even  though  he  has  become  aware 
of  its  existence,  there  is  no  rule  of 
law  or  of  reason  that  requires  him 
to  take  any  action  for  its  annulment. 
He  may  wait  until  it  is  sought  to  be 
enforced  against  him.  This  is  a  po- 
sition so  well  settled  that  it  would 
be  useless  to  enlarge  upon  it,  or  to 
cite  authorities  in  its  support." — 
Harper  v.  Cunningham,  18  App.D.C. 
430,  439. 
Invalidity  on  face  of  record 

(1)  Judgment   is  not  legally  void 
for  want   of  Jurisdiction  unless  in- 
validity appears  on  face  of  record. — 
Dale  v.  Carson,  283  P.  1017,  141  Okl. 
105— Carson  *•  Carson,   283  P.  1015, 
141  Okl.   106 — Savoy  Oil  Co.  v.  Km* 
ery,  277  P.  1029,  137  Okl.  67. 

(2)  A  Judgment,  void  for  want  of 
valid  service  on  defendant  appearing 
from  an  inspection  of  the  Judgment 
roll,  may  be  vacated  at  any  time. — 
Good  v.  'First  Nat.  Bank,  fill  P.  1051, 
88  Okl.  110. 

Judgment  held  not  void 

Kan.— Westerman  v.  Westerman,  2'47 

P.  863,  121  Kan.  501. 
pkl.— Petty  v.  Roberts,  98  P.2d  602, 

1S'6  Okl.  269. 

8.  Fla.— St.   Lucie  Estates  v.  Palm 
Beach   Plumbing   Supply  Co.,    133 
So.  841,  101  Fla.  205. 

34  C.J.  p  257  note  90. 

9.  N.D. — Martinson  v.  Marzolf,   108 
N.W.  937,  14  N.D.  301. 

34  C.J.  p  257  note  91. 

Irregular    Judgments    generally    see 

infra  subdivision  d  of  this  section. 

10.  Tex. — Watson  v.  Texas  &  P.  R. 
Co.,  Civ.App.,   73   S.W.  830. 

34  C.J.  p  257  note  94. 

11.  Fla. — Zemurray  v.   Kilgore,    177 
So.  714,  130  Fla.  817— Eli  Witt  Ci- 
gar &  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Somers,  127 
So.  333,  99  'Fla,  592. 

12.  Tex. — Dallas  Development  Co.  v. 
Reagan,    Civ.App.,    25   &W.2d   240, 


Petition  during1  term  ordinarily  re- 
quired 

Pa. — Brosch  v.  Brosch,  Com.Pl.,  56 
Dauph.Co.  376. 

13.  Cal.— Hanson  v.   Hanson,    20   P. 
736,  3  Cal.Unrep.Cas.  66. 

14.  N.T.— Woods  v.  Pangburn,  7$  N. 
T.  495. 

34  C.  J.  p  257  note  96. 

15.  Nev.— Scheeline       Banking       & 
Trust     Co.     v.     Stockgrowers'     & 
Ranchers'  Bank  of  Reno,  16  P.2d 
368,  54  Nev.  3'46. 

34  C.J.  p  258  note  97. 

Purpose  and  application,  of  rule 

The  district  court  rule  fixing  a 
period  of  six  months  within  which  a 
Judgment  might  be  vacated  was 
adopted  to  take  place  of  former  rule 
requiring  motions  to  vacate  Judg- 
ments to  be  noticed  during  terms  at 
which  they  were  rendered;  by  vir- 
tue of  rule,  Judgments  which  former- 
ly could  not  be  set  aside  by  a  dis- 
trict court  after  expiration  of  terms 
at  which  they  were  rendered  cannot 
now  be  set  aside  by  motion  noticed 
more  than  six  months  after  they  are 
rendered;  rule  does  not  apply  to  a 
Judgment  void  on  its  face,  or  to  sep- 
arate or  independent  suits  brought 
to  set  aside  Judgments;  rule  applies 
only  to  motions  in  the  original  case 
to  vacate  Judgments.— ILauer  v. 
Eighth  Judicial  District  Court  in 
and  for  Clark  County,  140  P.2d  953, 
62  Nev.  78. 

16.  NJD.— Freeman  v.  Wood,  103  N. 
W.  392,  14  N.D.  95. 

34  C.J.  p  258  note  99. 
In  Alabama 

(1)  Under    statute,    circuit    court 
has  no  power  to  open  or  set  aside  a 
final  Judgment  or  decree  after  the 
lapse  o.f  thirty  days  from  the  date 
of  its  rendition.— Maya  Corporation 
v.   Smith,  196   So.  125,   239  Ala.  470 
— First  Nat   Bank  v.  Garrison,   180 
So.  690,  235  Ala.  687. 

(2)  Under    statute,    *    proceeding 

525 


for  rehearing  must  be  initiated  withr 
in  four  months  from  rendition  of 
:he  Judgment;  otherwise  Jurisdiction 
of  the  court  is  not  quickened  into 
exercise,  and  the  proceedings  are 
void.— Marshall  County  v.  Critcher, 
17  So.2d  540,  245  Ala.  357— Venable 
v.  Turner,  183  So.  644,  236  Ala.  488— 
3-4  C.J.  p  258  note  99  [a]  (1). 

(8)  Other  holdings  under  the  Ala- 
bama statutes  see  34  C.J.  p  258  note 
99   [a]. 
In  (California 

(1)  Under  Code  Civ.Proc.  §  478,  an 
application  for  relief  against  a  Judg- 
ment on  the  ground  of  mistake,  in- 
advertence,   surprise,    or    excusable 
neglect  must  be  made  within  a  rea- 
sonable   time,    but    in    no    case    ex- 
ceeding six  months  after  the  Judg- 
ment -was    taken.— Hewins    v.    Wai- 
beck,    141    P.2d    241,    60    Cal.App.2d 
603—34  C.J.  p  258  note.  99   [b]    (1), 
(6). 

(2)  Under  the   statute,   now  Code 
Civ.Proc.    S    473a,    when    from    any 
cause  the  summons  in  an  action  has 
not  been   personally  *erved   on  de- 
fendant,   the    court   may   allow    de- 
fendant, at  any  time  within  one  year 
after  the  rendition  of  any  Judgment 
in    such   action,    to    answer   to   the 
merits  of  the  original  action. — Rich- 
ert  v.   Benson  Lumber  Co.,   34   P.2d 
840,  139  CaLApp.   671— 84  C.J.  p  258 
note  99   [b]   (2).  * 

(3)  It  has  been  held  that  a  court 
has  no  power  to  set  aside  on  mo- 
tion a  Judgment  not  void  on  its  face 
unless   the  motion  is   made   within 
a    reasonable     time. — Thompson    v. 
Cook,    127   P.2d  909,   20  Cal.2d  564— 
Richert  v.  Benson  Lumber  Co.,  su- 
pra—p.  B.  Young  Co.  v.  Femstrom, 
79    P.2d    1117,    31    CaJUApp.2d    Supp. 
763—34   C.J.  p  258  note  99    [b]    (4). 

(4)  What    constitutes    a    reasona- 
ble time  depends  on  the  circumstanc- 
es   of    the    particular    case. — In    re 
Dahnke'B    Estate   and   Guardianship, 


§288  JUDGMENTS  49    O.J.S. 

time  within  which  an  application  to  open  or  vacate  I  a  judgment  may  be  made  must  be  observed  in  all 


222  P.  381,  ff4  CaLApp.   555—34  C.JT. 
P  258  note  99  [b]  (7). 

(5)  It  has  been  declared  to  have 
been  definitely  determined  that  such 
time    will    not    extend    beyond    the 
time  fixed  by  Code  Civ.Proc,  §  473. 
— In  re  Andrews'  Guardianship,  110 
P.2d  399.  17  Cal.2d  500— Hall  v.  Im- 
perial Water  Co.  No.  3,  251  P,  912, 
200  CaL  77 — Thompson  v.  Thompson, 
101  P.2d  160,  38  Cal.App.2d  377— Ci- 
kuth  v.  Loero,  57  P.2d  1009,  14  Cal. 
App.2d  32— In  re  Callaways  Guard- 
ianship,   26    P.2d    698,    135    Cal.App. 
158— In     re    Dahnke's     Estate    and 
Guardianship,  222  P.  381,  64  CaLApp. 
555. 

(6)  In    determining   what    consti- 
tutes a  reasonable  time,  by  analogy 
to  the  statute,  now  Code  Civ.Proc.  § 
473a,  it  has  been  held  that  the  mo- 
tion must  be  made  within  the  year 
next   following  the   entry  of  Judg- 
ment except  in  the  case  of  bad  faith 
on  the  part  of  the  process  server. — 
P.  B.  Young  Co.  v.  Pernstrom,  79  P. 
2d   1117,    31   Cal.App.2d   Supp.    763— 
Richert  v.   Benson   Lumber   Co.,   34 
P.2d  840,  139  CaLApp.  671— 3'4  C.J.  p 
258  note  99  [b]   (5). 

(7)  To  these  rules,  however,  there 
is  a  well  established  exception  which 
provides    that,    although    the    judg- 
ment  is   valid   on    its   face,   if   the 
party   in   favor  of  whom  the  Judg- 
ment runs  admits  facts  showing  its 
invalidity,    or,   without   objection  on 
his  part,  evidence  is  admitted  which 
clearly  shows  the  existence  of  such 
facts,    it   is   the   duty   of  the   court 
to     declare     the     judgment    void.— 
Thompson  v.  Cook,  127  P.2d  909,  20 
Cal.Sd    564,    prior   opinion    120    P.2d 
54. 


(8)  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  al- 
so been  held  that  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances the  trial  court  has  the 
inherent  power,   but  not   equivalent 
duty,  to  set  aside  its  decrees  after 
the  expiration  of  the  six-month  peri- 
od.—McCarthy  v.  McCarthy,  72  P.2d 
255,  23  Cal.App.2d  151. 

(9)  A  judgment  void  on  its  face  is 
not  within  the  statutory  limitation 
and  may  be  vacated  on  motion  with- 
out regard  to  the  lapse  of  time.— 
Michel  v.  Williams,  56  P.2d  546,  13 
Cal.App.2d   19-8—84   C.J.   p   258   note 
99   [b]   (3), 

(10)  California  legislation  and  de- 
cisions reviewed. — P.  B.  Young  Co.  v. 
Pernstrom,  79  P.2d  1117,  31  CaLApp. 
2d    Supp.     763 — Richert    v.     Benson 
Lumber   Co.,   34   P.2d   8"40,    139   Cal. 
App.  671. 

la  Georgia 

(1)  Under  Code  §  3-702,  proceed- 
ings to  set  aside  judgments  or  de- 
crees must  be  brought  within  three 
years  from  the  rendition  thereof. — 
Sewell  v.  Anderson,  30  S.B.2d  102, 


1197   Ga.  £23—34  C.J.  p  258  note  99  I  In  ICnnesota 
Ed]   (1).  

(2)  Under  Civ.Code,  1910,  §§  4358, 
5957,    5958,    judgment    may    be    set 
aside  within  three  years  from  rendi- 
tion  for  any  defect  not  amendable 
which  appears  on  face  of  record. — 
Byers  v.  Byers,  154  S.E,  456,  41  Ga. 
App.  671. 

(3)  Single  judgment  for  defendant 
on  cross  actions  in  bail  trover  and 
attachment  cases  by  same  plaintiff, 
tried  together,  was  held  voidable  by 
plaintiff  and  his  sureties  on  motion 
within  three-year  limitation  period.— 
Pipkin  v.   Garrett,   162   S.B.   645,   44 
Ga.App.  616. 

(4)  Affidavit  that  affiant  had  new- 
er seen  decree,  enforcement  of  which 
he  sought  to  enjoin,  until  his  prop- 
erty had  been  levied  on  and  adver- 
tised for  sale,  or  known  thereof,  was 
held   not   to   prevent  application   of 
statute  requiring  motion  to  set  aside 
decree    to    be,  made    within    three 
years.— Phillips  v.  Whelchel,  170  S.B. 
480,  177  Ga,  489. 

(5)  Prior  decisions  see   34  C.J.  p 
258  note  99  [dj. 

Ui  Idaho 

(1)  Court    cannot    set    Judgment 


aside  on  motion  after  statutory  time 
for  vacating  it,  which,  under  Comp. 
St  §  6726,  as  amended  by  L.1921, 
c  235,  in  cases  where  defendant  was 
not  personally  served  with  process, 
is  one  year  within  entry  of  Judg- 
ment, unless  judgment  is  void  on 
face  of  record. — Rice  v.  Rice,  267  P. 
1076,  '46  Idaho  418. 

(2)  Under  Code,  1932,  §  5-905,  ap- 
plication  to   vacate  judgment  must 
be  made  within  six  months  after  ad- 
journment of  term  whether  movant 
moves  on  ground  of  mistake,  inad- 
vertence, surprise,  or  excusable  neg- 
lect, or  by  reason  of  neglect  or  fail- 
ure of.  movant's  attorney  to  file  or 
serve  any  paper  within  time  limited 
therefor.— Roberts  v.  Wehe,  27  P.2d 
964,  53  Idaho  783—34  C.J.  p  258  note 
99  Eg]  CD. 

(3)  Other     particulars     of     Idaho 
rules  see  34  OJ.  p  258  note  99  [g]. 

In.  Kentucky 

(1)  Jefferson  circuit  court  is  one 
of    continuous    session,    and    under 
statute   has   control   over   its   Judg- 
ments for  sixty  days;  order  of  Jeffer- 
son circuit  court  of  September  15,  at- 
tempting to  set  aside  decree  of  Feb- 
ruary 13,  was  erroneous  for  want  of 
power    to    set    aside    order    seven 
months    after    expiration    of    term 
during  which  it  was  entered.— Baum- 
lisberger  v.  Dorman,  81  S.W.2d  876, 
259  Ky.  37. 

(2)  Other  decisions  under  the  Ken- 
tucky statutes  see  34  C.J.  p  258  note 
99  CJ3. 

526 


(1)  A  motion  to  set  aside  a  Judg- 
ment for  judicial  error  must  be 
made  within  time  limited  to  ap- 
peal since  relief  asked  for  would  be 
same  as  that  obtainable  on  appeal, 
but,  where  judgment  is  sought  to  be 
modified  or  vacated  for  good  cause 
shown,  the  statutory  limitation  of 
one  year  after  notice  of  entry  of  the 
judgment  is  applicable  and,  within 
the  one  year,  the  party  seeking  to 
vacate  must  act  with  diligence.— 
Holmes  v.  Center,  295  N.W.  649,  209 
Minn.  144 — Alexander  v.  Hutchins, 
197  N.W.  75'4,  158  Minn.  391— Alex- 
ander v.  Hutchins,  197  N.W.  756,  158 
Minn.  396. 

(2)  Other  decisions  under  the  Min- 
nesota statutes  see  34  C.J.  p  258 
note  99  [k]. 

In  Missouri 

(1)  The  motion  permitted  by  stat- 
ute,   Mo.Rev.StAnnot.    $    1267,    pro- 
viding  that  judgment  shall   not  be 
set    aside    for   irregularity   on    mo- 
tion unless  made  within  three  years 
after  term  at  which  such  judgment 
was  rendered,  is  not  an  ordinary  mo- 
tion,  within   the  usual   meaning  of 
that  word,   but  is  in  the  nature  of 
a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis,  or  an 
independent    proceeding. — Poindexter 
v.  Marshall,  App.,  198  S.W.2d  622— 
34  C.J.  p  258  note  99   [ZJ   (1). 

(2)  The   statute   contemplates   as- 
sault on   an  irregularity  patent   on 
record,    and   not   one    depending   on 
proof  dehors  the  record.— Crabtree  v. 
-Eltna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  S.W.2d  103, 
341  Mo.  1173— Buchholz  v.  Manzella, 
App.,  158  S.W.2d  200— Stulz  v.  Len- 
tin,  295  S.W.  487,  220  Mo.App.  840— 
3-4  C.J.  p  258  note  99   HI    (2). 

(3)  Decree  rendering  judgment  for 
improvement  of  two  distinct  projects 
was   not   responsive   to   petition   for 
improvement    of    one    project,    and, 
therefore,   Irregular  on   its  face,   so 
as  to  come  within  statute. — Johnson 
v.  Underwood,  24  S.W.2d  133,  324  Mo. 
578. 

(4)  Other  decisions  under  the  Mis- 
souri statutes  see  34  C.J.  p  258  note 
99  CH. 

In  New  Mexico 

(1)  Under   statute,   after  the   ex- 
piration of  thirty  days  and  within 
a  year  from  the  making  and  entry 
of  a  Judgment,  it  may  be  set  aside 
only  for  an  irregularity. — Miera  v. 
State,    129   P.2d   334,   45   N.M.    369— 
Board   of   Com'rs    of   Quay    County 
v.    Wasson.    24    P.2d   1098,    37    N.M. 
503,  followed  in  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Quay    County   v.    Gardner,    24    P.2d 
1104,  37  N.M.  514. 

(2)  A  denied  motion  filed  within 
statutory  time,  to  vacate  final  judg- 
ment,  cannot  be  refiled  after  such 
time  and  subsequent  motion  consid- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


288 


applications  to  open  or  vacate  made  under,  or  with-  (  in  the  operation  of,  the  statute.17    This  statutory 


ered  as  amended  original  motion. — 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Quay  County  v. 
Wasson,  24  P.2d  109-8,  37  N.M.  503, 
followed  in  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Quay 
County  v.  Gardner,  24  P.2d  1104, 
37  N.M.  51'4. 

la  New  Jersey 

(1)  An  interlocutory  decree  passes 
beyond  the  control  of  the  chancery 
court  one  month  after  date  thereof, 
but    a    final     decree    is    for    three 
months    subject    to    reconsideration 
by    chancery    court.— Reilly    v.    Ma- 
honey,  19  A.2d  887,   129  N.J.Eq,  599. 

(2)  A  decree  in  partition  suit  con- 
firming   report    of   master,    and   adr 
judging  that  complainant  had  no  In- 
terest  in   land  and   that  defendants 
owned    the   whole   of   the   land   and 
ordering  sale  thereof  was  "final  de- 
cree." — Reilly  v.  Mahoney,  supra. 

(3)  The  court  does  not  lose  juris- 
diction  of   a   timely   motion    to  va- 
cate  by  reason   of  a  continuance. — 
Reilly  v.  Mahoney,  supra. 

In  New  York 

(1)  Under    Ciy.Pract.Act    §    528   a 
motion    to    set  'aside   a   final   judg- 
ment for  error  in  fact  not  arising 
on  the  trial   cannot  be  heard  after 
expiration    of   two    years   since   the 
filing   of   the   judgment   roll,   unless 
noticed  for  a  day  within  that  time 
and  adjourned  or  renoticed  for  fail- 
ure  to   hold   the   term. — Petition  of 
Holman,    51   N.T.S.2d   246,   268   App. 
Div.  330—34  C.J.  P  258  note  99  [m] 
(3). 

(2)  This  statute  is  inapplicable  to 
a  motion  to  set  aside  a  judgment  for 
error  of  law.— Siegel  v.  State,  246  N. 
7.S.  652.  138  Misc.  474. 

(3)  Judgment     of     county     court 
without    its    jurisdiction    was    void, 
and    not    mere    irregularity,    within 
statutory  limitation  of  time  on  mo- 
tions   to    vacate    judgments    for   ir- 
regularity.—Kline  v.  Snyder,  231  N. 
Y.S.  275,  133  Misc.  128. 

(4)  Other     decisions    under    New 
York  statutes  see  34  C.J.  p  258  note 
99  [m]. 

T^    Qlf Iftfa  QTM  ft. 

(1)  If  judgment  is  valid  on  its 
face,  or  if  it  is  necessary  to  resort 
to  intrinsic  evidence  to  show  its  in- 
validity, motion  or  petition  to  va- 
cate it  must  be  presented  within 
period,  varying  with  nature  of 
ground  for  vacation  relied  on,  as 
provided  for  in  successive  statutes. 
— Honeycutt  v.  Severin,  98  P.2d  1093, 
186  Okl.  509— Babb  v.  National  Life 
Ass'n,  86  P.2d  771,  18-4  Okl.  273— 
Caraway  v.  Overholser,  77  P.2d 
68-8,  182  Okl.  357— Yahola  Oil  Co.  v. 
.Causey,  72  P.2d  817,  181  Okl.  129 
— Weimer  v.  Augustana  Pension  and 
Aid  Fund,  67  P.2d  436,  179  Okl.  572 
— Clones  v.  Norris,  55  P.2d  984,  176 
Okl.  434— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Bar- 


rough,  19  P.2d  551,  162  Okl.  243— 
Roubedeaux  v.  Givens,  292  P.  343, 
145  Okl.  221— Simmons  v.  Howard, 
276  P.  718,  136  Okl.  118— Crowther 
v.  Schoonover,  266  P.  777,  130  Okl. 
249— B-R  Electric  &  Telephone  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Town  of  Wewoka,  239  P.  919, 
113  Okl.  225—34  C.J.  p  258  note  99 
[P]. 

(2)  Where  service  was  by  publica- 
tion and  journal  entry  of  judgment 
recited  that  service  had  been  made 
t>y  publication  as  required   by  law, 
the   judgment   was  not  void  on  its 
flace,  within  such  statute. — Ritchie  v. 
Keeney,  73  P.2d  397,  181  Okl.  207. 

(3)  Judgment  rendered   on   notice 
by   publication,   requiring   defendant 
to  answer  within  forty-one  days  aft- 
er date  of  first  publication,  is  irregu- 
lar and  may  be  set  aside  on  appeal 
or   timely   motion,   but   is   not  void 
on  its  face,  and  cannot  be  vacated  on 
motion  filed  more  than  three  years 
after  rendition,  under  such  statute. — 
Burns  v.  Pittsburg  Mortg.  Inv.  Co., 
231  P.  887,  105  Okl/150. 

Oregon 

(1)  Under  Code  Civ.Proc.  $  1-1007, 
the  court  may,  at  any  time  within 
one    year   after  notice   thereof,    re- 
lieve a  party  from  a  judgment  tak- 
en against  him  through  his  mistake, 
inadvertence,  surprise,  or  excusable 
neglect— Haas  v.  Scott   239  P.  202, 
115  Or.  580. 

(2)  Fact  that  defendant's  attorney 
had  been  informed  on  inquiry  from 
deputy  clerk  that  decree  was  not  on 
file,  although  the  record  showed  the 
contrary,  was  not  surprise,  mistake, 
or  excusable  neglect  within  statute. 
— Haas  v.  Scott,  supra. 

In,  Texas 

(1)  Under  statute,  the  trial  court 
has  control  of  its  judgments  for  a 
period  of  thirty  days  after  rendition 
thereof,  and  may  set  aside  any  judg- 
ment on  motion  filed,  or  on  its  own 
motion. — Christner    v.     Mayer,    Civ. 
App.,  123  S.W.2d  715,  error  dismiss- 
ed, judgment  correct— American  Soda 
Fountain   Co.   v,   Hairston,   Civ.App., 
69  S.W.2d  546. 

(2)  Where  no   motion   for  a  new 
trial  was  filed  before  expiration  of 
thirty   days   from  the   date  of  the 
judgment,    such-  judgment    became 
final  and,  if  not  void,  could  be  se1 
aside  only  by  a  bill  of  review  and 
not  by  motion  to  set  aside  the  judge- 
ment;   a   motion   made    after    such 
thirty-day  period  to  set  aside  judg- 
ment and  for  judgment  non  obstante 
veredicto  was  a  collateral  attack  on 
judgment  and  court  was  unauthor- 
ized to  set  it  aside  unless  it  was 
void.— Bridgman  v.  Moore,  183  S.W 
2d  705,  143  Tex.  250. 

(3)  Other   decisions    under   Texas 
statutes   see   34   C.J.   p   258   note   99 
Cs3. 

527 


In  Utah 

Under  statute,  judgment  not  void 
on  its  face  cannot  be  opened  or  va- 
cated, in  same  proceeding  except 
within  six  months  after  term.— In 
re  Goddard's  Estate,  273  P.  961,  73 
Utah  29-8— 3'4  C.J.  p  258  note  99  [t]. 

17.  Cal.— Thompson  v.  Cook,  127  P. 
2d  909,  20  Cal.2d  564— King  v.  Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  San  Diego 
County,  56  P.2d  268,  12  Cal.App.2d 
501 — Fisch  &  Co.  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  48 
P.2d  855,  6  Oal.App.2d  21— F.  B. 
Young  v.  Fernstrom,  79  P.2d  1117, 
31  Cal.App.2d  Supp.  763. 

Colo. — Levand  v.  North  America 
Realty  Co.,  271  P.  m,  84  Colo. 
445. 

Ga. — Phillips  v.  Whelchel,  170  S.E. 
'480,  177  Ga.  489 — Mobley  v.  Phin- 
izy,  157  S.E.  182,  172  Ga,  339, 

Idaho.— Rice  v.  Rice,  267  P.  1076, 
46  Idaho  418. 

HI. — Gertz  v.  Neiman,  66  N.E.2d  108, 
328  IlLApp.  356— La  Salle  Mort- 
gage &  Discount  Co.  v.  Continental 
Illinois  Nat  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Chicago,  32  N.B.2d  643,  first  case, 
309  IlLApp.  135— Davis  v.  Bast  St 
Louis  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  9  N.B.2d  254, 
290  IlLApp.  €40. 

Iowa.— Shaw  v.  Addison,  18  N.W.2* 
796. 

Kan. — Brooks  v.  National  Bank  of 
Topeka,  113  P.2d  1069,  153  Kan. 
831— Bemis  v.  Bemis,  98  P.2d  156, 
151  Kan.  186— Harder  v.  Johnson, 

76  P.2d  763,   147  Kan.  <440. 
Minn,— Cox  v.  Selover,  225  N.W.  2«2, 

177  Minn.  369. 

N.D.— Bellingham  State  Bank  of 
Bellingham  v.  McCormick,  215  N. 
W.  152.  55  N.D.  700. 

Ohio.— Baylor  v.  Killinger,  186  N.B. 
512,  44  Ohio  App.  523. 

Okl.— Honeycutt  v.  Severin,  98  P.2d 
1093,  186  Okl.  509— Babb  v.  Na- 
tional Life  Ass'n,  ;86  P.2d  771,  184 
Okl.  273— Caraway  v.  Overholser, 

77  P.2d  688,  182  Okl.  357— Ritchie 
v.   Keeney,   73   P.2d   397,   181   Ofcl. 
207 — Weimer  v.  Augustana  Pension 
and   Aid   Fund,    67    P.2d   436,   179 
Okl.  572— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dar- 
rough,  19  P.2d  551,  162  Okl.  243 — 
Simmons   v.   Howard,   276   P.    718, 
136  Okl.  118 — B-R  Electric  &  Tele- 
phone Mfg.  Co.  v.  Town  of  Wewo- 
ka,   239    P.    919,    113    Okl.    225— 
Burns  v.  Pittsburg  Mortg.  Inv.  Co., 
231  P.   887,   105   Okl.  150— Walker 
v.  Gulf  Pipe  Line  Co.,  226  P.  1046, 
102  OkL  7.    ' 

Utah.— In  re  Goddard's  Estate,  273 
P.  961,  73  Utah  298. 

Wash.— Nevers  v.  Cochrane,  229  F. 
738,  131  Wash.  225— Collins  v.  Sea 
Products  Co.,  215  P.  15,  124  Wash, 
625. 

Wis.— Volland  v.  McGee,  300  N.W. 
506,  238  Wis.  598— Application  of 
Dan*  County  for  Condemnation  of 


288 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


power  of  the  court  over  the  judgment  absolutely 
ceases  on  the  expiration  of  such  time,  and  there- 
after it  has  no  discretion,  or  even  jurisdiction,  to 
grant  relief  under  the  statute  by  opening  or  vacat- 
ing the  judgment.18  A  judgment,  however,  may  be 
vacated  on  statutory  grounds  at  any  time  within  the 
time  limited,  by  statute,  either  during  or  after  the 
term  at  which  it  was  rendered.19 
The  period  within  which  an  application  on  stat- 


utory grounds  may  be  made  begins  to  run,  depend- 
ing on  the  language  of  the  statute,  from  the  rendi- 
tion or  entry  of  the  judgment,20  or  after  notice  or 
knowledge  of  the  judgment,21  or  service  of  a  copy 
of  it,22  or  after  the  adjournment  of  the  .term  at 
which  the  judgment  was  rendered,23  or  from  the 
taking  of  the  proceeding  against  a  party.24  The 
time  of  the  pendency  of  an  appeal  is  not  consid- 
ered as  any  portion  of  the  statutory  period.25  The 


Certain  Lands  for  Park  Purposes, 
298  N.W.  616,  238  Wis.  156— -Har- 
ris v.  Golliner,  294  N.W.  9,  235 
Wis.  572. 

Wyo.— Boulter  v.  Cook,  234  P.  1101, 
32  Wyo.  461,  rehearing-  denied  236 
P.  245,  32  Wyo.  '461. 
34  C.J.  p  255  note  85—47  C.J.  p  437 

note  39. 
Judgment   voidable   as   prematurely 

entered 

After  expiration  of  statutory  pe- 
riod for  attacking:  judgment  prema- 
turely entered  and  therefore  void- 
able, judgment  became  invulnerable 
to  motion. — Merchants'  Collection  Co. 
v.  Sherburne,  290  P.  991,  158  Wash. 
426. 

18.  Ala. — Maya  Corporation  v. 
Smith,  196  So.  125,  239  Ala.  470. 

Ariz. — Hartford  Accident  &  indem- 
nity Co.  v.  Sorrells,  69  P.2d  240, 
50  Ariz.  90 — Dockery  v.  Central 
Arizona  Light  &  Power  Co.,  45  P. 
2d  656,  45  Ariz.  434— Vazquez  v. 
Dreyfus,  269  P.  80,  34  Ariz.  184. 

Cal. — Thompson  v.  Cook,  127  P.2d 
909,  20  Cal.2d  56*4. 

HI. — Rome  Soap  Mfg.  Co.  v.  John 
T.  La  Forge  &  Sons,  54  N.E.2d 
252,  322  Ill.App.  281— Madigan 
Bros.  v.  Garfleld  State  Bank,  34 
N.B.2d  92,  310  IlLApp.  358— Trupp 
v.  First  Englewood  State  Bank  of 
Chicago,  30  N.E.2d  198,  307  Ill.App. 
258. 

Iowa.— Albright  v.  Moeckley,  237  N. 
W.  309. 

Ky. — Baumlisberger  v.  Dorman,  81 
S.W.2d  876,  259  Ky.  37. 

Minn.— In  re  Belt  Line,  Phalen,  and 
Hazel  Park  Sewer  Assessment,  222 
N.W.  520,  176  Minn.  59. 
•  N.J.— Dietsch  v.   Smith,   186  A.   598, 
5  N.J.Misc.  388. 

N.D. — Patterson  Land  Co.  v.  Lynn, 
199  N.W.  766,  51  N.D.  329. 

Or, — Lawson  v.  Hughes,  270  P.  922, 
127  Or,  16. 

Tenn. — Payne  v.  Eureka-Security 
Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  122  S.W.2d 
431,  173  Tenn.  659,  affirmed  133  S. 
W.2d  456,  175  Tenn.  134. 

Utah. — In  re  Goddard's  Estate,  273 
P.  961,  73  Utah  298. 

Wis.— In  re  Cudahy's  Estate,  219  N. 
W.  -203,  196  Wis.  260. 

34  OJ.  p  232.  note  86  [a],  p  260  note 

1. 
"  ''The   judgment    is    immune   from 

attack  by  the  statutory  methods  aft- 
er  the   time  limit  imposed   by   the 


statute."— Foster  v.   Foster,    227   P. 
514,  515,  130  Wash.  376. 

"The  statute  ...  is  as  inflex- 
ible as  to  the  maximum  time  as  any 
of  our  statutes  of  limitations." — 
Kosonen  v.  Waara,  285  P.  668,  673, 
87  Mont  24. 

19.  Ga.— J.   S.  Schofield's  Sons  Co. 
v.   Vaughn,    150    S.E.    569,   40    Ga. 
App.  568 — Grogan  v.  Deraney,  143 
S.E.  912,  38  Ga.App.  2*87. 

111. — Clausen    v.    Van-in,    11    N.E.2d 

820,  292  IlLApp.  641. 
Okl.— Denton  v.  Walker,  217  P,  386, 

90  Okl.  222. 
Or. — Anderson  v.  Guenther,  25  P.2d 

146,  14*4  Or.  4-46. 
34  CJ.  p  261  note  2. 
Laches   within   statutory   period   of 

limitation  see  infra  subdivision  c 

of  this  section. 
Want  of  Jurisdiction 

Remedy  by  statutory  motion  to 
set  aside  judgment  is  proper,  not- 
withstanding lapse  of  judgment  term 
without  appeal  being  perfected,  if 
record  discloses  want  of  jurisdiction. 
— Dewey  v.  Union  Electric  Light  & 
Power  Co.,  Mo.App.,  83  S.W.2d  203. 
Renewal  of  oral  motion  after  term 

Where  plaintiff  orally  moved  to  set 
aside  judgment  of  dismissal,  but 
procured  no  ruling  on  motion  and 
filed  no  written  motion,  a  renewal  of 
the  oral  motion  at  a  subsequent  term 
came  too  late. — Haddon  v.  Brinson, 
148  S.E.  541,  39  Ga.App.  798. 

20,  HI. — Rome    Soap    Mfg.    Co.    v. 
John  T.  La  Forge  &  Sons,  54  N.E. 
2d  252,  322  IlLApp.  281, 

Wash. — Scottish     American     Mortg. 

Co.  v.  Stone,  232  P.  289,  132  Wash. 

487. 
3*4  C.J.  p  261  note  3. 

Judgment  i*  that  of  lower  court, 
not  that  of  higher  court  affirming 
it— Shaw  vr  Addison,  Iowa,  18  N.W. 
2d  796. 

Judgment  need  not  "be  formally  en- 
tered before  motion  may  be  made  to 
vacate  It  if  there  is  sufficient  entry 
of  memorandum  to  sustain  formal 
entry  to  be  made  at  later  date.— Dor- 
rough  v.  Mackenson,  165  So.  575,  231 
Ala.  431. 
Terms  of  court  as  obsolete 

A  statute  providing  that  trial 
courts  may  vacate  judgments  and  or- 
ders for  good  cause  any  time  with- 
in six  months  after  entry  thereof 
affirms  common-law  doctrine  with 

528 


respect  to  right  of  setting  aside 
judgments  and  orders,  but  fixes  pe- 
riod during  which  court  may  act  in 
place  of  obsolete  terms  of  court. — In 
re  Ralph's  Estate,  67  P.2d  230,  49 
Ariz.  391 — Intel-mountain  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Allison  Steel  Mfg.  Co., 
22  P.2d  413,  42  Ariz.  51. 

21.  Minn. — Holmes    v.    Conter,    295 
N.W.  6-49,  209  Minn.  144. 

Or. — Anderson  v.  Guenther,  25  P.2d 

146,  144  Or.  446. 
3-4  C.J.  p  262  note  4. 

22.  Tenn. — Brown  v.  Brown,  6  S.W. 
869,  7  S.W.  640.  86  Tenn.  277. 

34  C.J.  p  262  note  5. 

28.  Colo. — Levand  v.  North  Ameri- 
ca Realty  Co.,  271  P.  177,  84  Colo. 
445. 

Idaho.— Roberts  v.  Wehe,  27  P.2d 
964,  53  Idaho  783. 

Utah.— In  re  Goddard's  Estate,  273 
P.  961,  73  Utah  298. 

3*4  C.J.  p  232  note  86  [a],  p  262  note 
6. 

24.  In  California 

(1)  Under    Code    Civ.Proc.    $    473, 
authorizing   the   court   to   relieve   a 
party   from   a   judgment,    order,    or 
other  proceeding  taken  against  him, 
provided  the  application  therefor  is 
made  within  a  reasonable  time,  but 
in  no 'case  exceeding  six  months  aft- 
er such  judgment,  order,  or 'proceed- 
ing was  taken,  the  signing  and  filing 
of  a  formal  order  constitutes  a  "tak- 
ing."— Brownell  v.  Tolo  County  Su- 
per. Ct,  109  P.  91,  157  CaL  703. 

(2)  Court  cannot  by  antedating  or- 
der or  entry  of  it  cut  off  right  of 
party  to  move  to  set  aside  judgment. 
—In  re  Harris,  52  P.2d  605,  10  CaL 
App.2d  586. 

25.  Wash. — Pacific  Telephone  &  Tel- 
egraph Co.  v.  Henneford,  92  P.2d 
214,  199  Wash.  462,  certlorari  de- 
nied   Henneford    v.    Pacific    Tele- 
phone  &   Telegraph   Co.,   59   S.<2t 
483,  306  U.S.  637,  83  LJBd,  1038. 

Vacation  after  expiration  of  time  for 

appeal 

Where  judgment  was  unauthorized 
because  of  plaintiff's  failure  to  give 
defendant  notice  of  application  for 
order  for  judgment,  rather  than 
merely  erroneous,  it  could  be  vacat- 
ed, notwithstanding  the  time  for  ap- 
peal from  the  judgment  expired  be- 
fore application  for  relief  was  made. 
— Kemerer  v.  State  Farm  Mut  Auto 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


288 


fact  that  a  judgment  does  not  include  costs  and  dis- 
bursements does  not  have  the  effect  of  extending 
the  statutory  period.26 

A  statute  extending  the  time  limit  cannot  be  given 
a  retroactive  effect  so  as  to  authorize  the  vacation 
of  judgments  which  have  become  vested  property 
rights  by  expiration  of  the  time  within  which  they 
could  be  vacated  or  modified;27  but  such  statutes 
may  apply  to  judgments  previously  rendered  pro- 
vided jurisdiction  over  them  has  not  been  lost.28 

Statutory  limitations  of  the  time  within  which  a 
motion  for  a  new  trial  may  be  made  have  no  ap- 
plication to  motions  to  vacate  the  judgment,29  be- 
cause, as  appears  supra  §  265,  a  motion  to  vacate 
a  judgment  is  n'ot  a  motion  for  a  new  trial. 

Where  the  statute  limits  the  time  for  applying 
for  the  vacation  of  a  judgment,  the  moving  party, 
to  bring  himself  within  its  terms,  must  not  only  file 
his  motion  or  petition  within  the  prescribed  time, 
but  must  also  issue  or  serve  such  process  or  notice 
as  may  be  necessary  to  bring  the  opposite  party  in- 
to court,80  and  present  his  case  in  a  condition  to 
be  heard  within  the  limited  time.31  When  this  has 


been  done  in  due  season,  it  has  been  held  that  the 
petition  may  be  amended,  or  a*new  one  substituted, 
after  the  expiration  of  the  time,32  or  new  parties 
added,33  or  the  application  continued  for  further 
hearing.34 

Under  some  statutes  it  has  been  held  'that  the  re- 
lief must  be  granted  as  well  as  the  application  there- 
for made  within  the  time  prescribed  by  statute;35 
but  under  other  statutes,  if  the  motion  was  made 
within  the  limited  time,  it  is  competent  for  the 
court  to  act  on  it  and  grant  the  relief  demanded 
although  the  time  has  expired  before  the  order  is 
made.36 

c.  Laches  and  Delay 

An  application  for  the  opening  OP  vacating  of  a  Judg- 
ment must  be  made  with  reasonable  promptness,  and  de- 
lay amounting  to  laches,  will  Justify  refusal  of  the  ap- 
plication. 

A  party  who  has  knowledge  of  the  judgment 
against  him  is  required  to  exercise  reasonable  dili- 
gence and  promptness  in  seeking  to  have  it  opened, 
vacated,  or  set  aside,  and  his  unexcused  delay  in 
making  the  application,  amounting  to  laches,  will 
justify  the  court  in  refusing  the  relief  asked,37-  es- 


Ins.  Co.  of  Bloomington,  111.,  288  N. 

W.  719,  206  Minn.  325. 

26.    Minn.— Cox    v.    Selover,    225    N. 

W.  282,  177  Minn.  369. 
27*    Minn.— Wieland   v.    Shillock,    24 

Minn.  3*45. 
N.Y.— New    York    Health    Dept    v. 

Babcock,  84  N.T.S.  604. 

28.  Wash. — Marston  v.  Humes,  28  P. 
520,  3  Wash.  267. 

29.  Ariz.— Blair    v.    Blair,    62    P.2d 
1321,  48  Ariz.  501. 

Ohio. — In  re  Kleinhen's  Estate,  App., 

63  N.E.2d  315. 
34  C.J.  p  25*8  note  99   CJ]   (3),  p  262 

note  10. 
Striking-  inadvertent  decree 

Such  a  statute  does  not  apply  to 
order  striking  an  inadvertent  de- 
cree, in  view  of  statute  permitting 
court  to  amend  Judgment. — Nevitt  v. 
Wilson,  285  S.W.  1079,  116  Tex.  29, 
48  A.L.R.  355. 

30.  Cal. — Brownell   v.    Tolo   County 
Super.  Ct.,  109  P.  91,  157  Cal.  703. 

34  C.J.  p  262  note  12. 

31.  Mo. — Underwood   v.   Dollins,   '47 
Mo.  259. 

32.  Neb.— Rine    v.    Rine,    135    N.W. 
1051,  91  Neb,  248. 

34  C.J.  p  262  note  14. 

33.  Ohio. — Bever   v.   Beardmore,    40 
Ohio  St.  70. 

34.  111.— People    v.    Wells,    99    N.B. 
606,   255   111.   450. 

Minn, — Nornborg  v.  Larson,  72  N.W. 
564,  69  Minn.  344. 

49  C.  J.S.-34 


35.  Or. — Lawson  v.  Hughes,   270  P. 
922,  127  Or.  16. 

Wis.— Harris   v.    Golliner,    294   N.W. 

9,  235  Wis.  572.. 
34  C.J.  p  263  note  17. 

36.  Okl.— Hill  v.  Bucy,   219   P.   124, 
95  Okl.  275. 

Tenn.— Payne  v.  Eureka-Security 
Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  122  S.W.2d 
431,  173  Tenn.  659,  affirmed  133  S. 
W.2d  '456,  175  Tenn.  134. 

34  C.J.  p  263  note  18. 

37.  U.S.— Henry    v.    U.    S.,    C.C.A. 
Pa.,  46  F.2d  640. 

Ark.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  O'Neal 
v.  B.  F.  Goodrich  Rubber  Co.,  162 
S.W.2d  52,  54,  204  Ark.  371. 

Cal.— Cowan  v.  Cowan,  App.,  166  P.2d 
21— Sepulveda  v.  Apablasa,  77  P.2d 
530,  25  Cal.App.2d  390. 

Ind. — Harvey  v.  Rodger,  143  N.B.  8, 
84  Ind.App.  409. 

Ky. — Richardson  v.  Louisville  &  N. 
R.  Co.,  164  S.W.2d  602,  291  Ky. 
357— Ballman  v.  Ballman,  67  S.W. 
2d  39,  252  Ky.  332— Alexander  v. 
Tipton,  2-91  S.W.  1019,  218  Ky.  666. 

Mass.— Borst  v.  Young,  18  N.E.2d 
544,  302  Mass.  124. 

Minn.— In  re  Belt  Line,  Phalen,  and 
Hazel  Park  Sewer  Assessment, 
222  N.W.  520,  176  Minn.  59— Brock- 
man  v.  Brockman,  157  N.W.  1086, 
133  Minn.  148. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Car- 
raway  v.  State,  148  So.  340,  844, 
167  Miss.  390. 

N.T.— West  158th  Street  Garage 
Corporation  v.  State,  10  N.T.S.2d 
990,  256  App.Div.  401,  reargument 

529 


denied  12  N.Y.S.2d  759,  257  App. 
Div.  875— In  re  White's  Estate,  46 
N.Y.S.2d  917,  1*2  Misc.  223,  af- 
firmed In  re  Bishop's  Will,  49  N.T. 
S.2d  275,  268  App.Div.  759,  appeal 
denied  51  N.Y.S.2d  83,  268  App. 
Div.  893,  appeal  dismissed  57  N.E. 
2d  &45,  293  N.Y.  767. 

N.C.— Cincinnati  Coffin  Co.  v.  Yopp, 
175  S.E.  164,  206  N.C.  716— Fow- 
ler v.  Fowler,  130  S.E.  315,  190  N. 
C.  536— S.  J.  Bartholomew  &  Co. 
v.  Parrish,  129  S.E.  190,  190  N.C. 
151. 

N.D. — Patterson  Land  Co.  v.  Lynn, 
199  N.W.  766,  51  N.D.  329. 

Or.— Cook  v.  Cook,  118  P.2d  1070, 
167  Or.  474. 

Pa. — Bianca  v.  Kaplan,  160  A.  148, 
105  Pa.Super.  98 — Kupres  v.  Cit- 
izens' Nat.  Bank,  101  Pa.Super.  351 
— McKenzie  Co.  v.  Fidelity  &  De- 
posit Co.  of  Maryland,  Com.Pl., 
54  Dauph.Cc.  294— Stickel  v.  Bar- 
ron,  Com.Pl.,  7  Fay.L.J.  35—- 
Schantz  v.  Clemmer,  Com. PI.,  21 
Lehigh  Co.L.J.  394— Secretary  of 
Banking  v.  Koppenhaver,  Com.Pl., 
8  Sch.Reg.  17. 

W.Va. — Seymour  v.  Alkire,  34  S.E. 
953,  47  W.Va,  302. 

3'4  C.J.  p  263  note  19—47  C.J.  p  436 
note  20. 

Laches  as  bar  to  equitable  relief  see 
infra  §  381. 

First  opportunity 

A  court  has  power  to  open  a  judg- 
ment on  good  cause  shown,  at  any 
time  while  the  cause  remains  under 
its  control,  provided  the  moving  par- 


§  288 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


pecially  where,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  par- 
ticular case,  the  vacating  of  the  judgment  would 
work  undue  hardship  to  the  opposing  party,38  or 
where  rights  of  innocent  third  persons  have  inter- 
vened.39 Even  if  the  application  is  made  within 
the  statutory  time,  it  will  be  regarded  with  dis- 
favor, and  may  be  refused,  if  there  is  unexplained 
delay  in  presenting  it,  or  such  unreasonable  dila- 
toriness  as  amounts  to  laches;40  but  some  cases 
hold  that  a  party  has  the  whole  of  the  statutory  pe- 
riod in  which  to  move,  and  that  laches  cannot  be 
imputed  to  him  within  that  time,41  and  that  delay 
within  the  term  is  immaterial.42 

However  great  the  lapse  of  time,  laches  is  not 
imputable  to  a  party  who  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
judgment  against  him ;  it  is  only  required  of  him  to 
be  diligent  in  seeking  relief  after  he  has  notice  of 
it,43  although  it  has  also  been  held  that  a  person 


asking  that  a  judgment  be  set  aside  must  show 
that  he  used  diligence  to  learn  the  facts.44  A  per- 
son under  legal  disability  is  not  chargeable  with 
laches  for  failure  to  move  during  the  period  of  dis- 
ability,45 but  he  must  exercise  reasonable  diligence 
in  moving  to  vacate  after  the  removal  of  the  dis- 
ability.46 

Laches  is  not  mere  lapse  of  time,  but  is  unrea- 
sonable delay  under  the  circumstances,  generally  in- 
volving injustice  or  injury  to  the  opposite  party,47 
and  accordingly  it  is  impossible  to  lay  down  a  pre- 
cise rule  as  to  what  lapse  of  time  will  constitute 
reasonable  diligence,  or  what  amounts  to  laches  in 
moving  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment;  what  is  a 
reasonable  time  is  a  matter  within  the  court's  sound 
legal  discretion,48  and  depends  on  the  facts  and 
circumstances  of  each  case.49 


ty  embraces  the  first  opportunity  he 
has  of  presenting  his  case. — Assets 
Development  Co.  v.  Wall,  119  .A.  10, 
97  N.J.Law  468. 
Voidable  fragment 

If  party  knows  judgment  which 
was  merely  voidable  was  rendered 
against  him,  unexcused  laches  or  de- 
lay generally  precludes  him  from 
having  it  vacated. 
Fla. — Chisholm  v.  Chisholm,  125  So. 

6$4,  98  Fla.  1196— Kroier  v.  Kroier, 

116  So.  753,  95  Fla.  865. 
Pa. — McK   Beckman   v.   Zerbe,   Com. 

PL,  10  Sch.Reg.  49. 
Vacating  and  opening  judgment  dis- 
tinguished 

Although  there  is  no  time  limit 
within  which  to  act  in  striking  .off 
or  vacating  a  judgment,  it  must  be 
in  a  reasonable  time  after  knowl- 
edge, while  applications  to  open 
judgment,  where  cause  has  been  liti- 
gated, must  be  made  within  term 
time,  except  in  extraordinary  equita- 
ble circumstances  requiring  a  con- 
trary result — Nixon  v.  Nixon,  198  A. 
154,  329  Pa.  256. 

38.  Miss. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in 
Carraway  v.  State,  148  So.  3-40,  344, 
167  Miss.  390. 

34  C.J.  p  265  note  20. 
Injury  to  opposing  party  as  rule  of 
decision  generally  see  infra  §  299. 

39.  Ind.— Harvey  v.  Rodger,  143  N. 
B.  8,  84  Ind.App.  409. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Car- 
raway v.  State,  148  So.  3'40,  34'4, 
167  Miss.  390. 

34  C.J.  p  265  note  21. 

40.  Minn.— Holmes  v.  Conter,  295  N. 
W.   649,   20$  Minn.  144— Alexander 
v.    Hutchins,    197    N.W.    756,    158 
Minn.  396 — Alexander  v.  Hutchins, 
197  N.W.   754,   158   Minn.  391. 

34  CxT.  p  265  note  22. 

41.  111. — Central    Cleaners    and   Dy- 


ers v.  Schild,  1  N.B.2d  90,  284  HI. 
App.  267. 
3*4  C.J.  p  265  note  23. 

42.  Tex.— -Mitchell   v,    Gregory,   Civ. 
App.,  283  S.W.  211. 

43.  111.— Relsman    v.    Central    Mfg. 
Dist.  Bank,  15  N.E.2d  903,  296  111* 
App.    61 — Corpus   Juris   quoted   in 
Cummer   v.    Cummer,    283   111. App. 
220,  239. 

Mass. — Borst    v.    Young,    18    N.E.2d 

544,  302  Mass.  124. 
N.C. — S.    J.    Bartholomew    &    Co.    v. 

Parrish,    129    S.E.    190,    190    N.C. 

151. 
Pa.— Bianca   v.    Kaplan,    160  A.   143, 

105  Pa. Super.  98. 
34  C.J.  p  265  note  24. 
Bights  of  innocent  third  persons 

Delay  in  moving  to  vacate  judg- 
ment, as  long  as  party  had  no  notice 
thereof  and  rights  of  innocent  third 
persons  did  not  intervene,  will  not 
usually  bar  relief. — Chisholm  v. 
Chisholm,  125  So.  694,  98  Fla.  1196— 
Kroier  v.  Kroier,  116  So.  758,  95 
Fla.  .865. 
TTse  of  check 

Debtor  moving  to  vacate  judgment 
was  not  barred  by  laches  from 
claiming  that  use  of  check,  sent  as 
payment,  constituted  accord  and  sat- 
isfaction, where  he  did  not  discover 
use  for  two  years. — Hemingway  v. 
Mackenzie,  244  N.T.S.  4'8,  137  Misc. 
876,  affirmed  245  N.Y.S.  766,  230 
App.Div.  819,  and  249  N.Y.S.  910,  233 
App.Div.  652. 

44.  Ky.— Ballman  v.  Ballman,  67  S. 
W.2d  39,  252  Ky.  332. 

45.  Tenn. — Fitzslmmons  v.  Johnson, 
17  S.W.  100,  90  Tenn.  416. 

84  C.J.  p  265  note  25. 

46.  Tex. — Johnson    v.    Johnson,     85 
S.W.    1023,    38   Tex.Civ.App.    385. 

34  C.J.  p  265  note  26. 

47.  111.— Reisman    v.    Central    Mfg. 

530 


Dist.  Bank,  15  N»E.2d  903,  296 
111. App.  61— -Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Cummer  v.  Cummer,  283  111. App. 
220,  239— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Trott, 
236  IlLApp.  412. 

Pa. — Eastman  Kodak  Co.  v.  Osenider 
193  A.  284,  127  Pa. Super.  332. 

48.  Cal. — McGuinness     v.     Superior 
Court  in  and  for  City  and  County 
of   San   Francisco,    237   P.   42,    196 
CaL  222,  40  A.L..R.  1110— McCarthy 
v.   McCarthy,   72  P.2d  255,   23  Cal. 
App.2d  151 — McKeever  v.  Superior 
Court  of  California  in  and  for  San 
Mateo  County,  259  P.  373,  85  Cal. 
App.  381. 

Pa. — Citizens'  Bank  v.  Gwinner,  170 

A.  471,  112  Pa.Super.  12. 
3*4  C.J.  p  266  note  28. 
Discretion  of  court  as  to  hearing  and 

determination  in  general  see  infra 

§  300. 

Discretion  held  abused  because  of 
excessive    delay. — Ayer    v.    Chicago, 
M.,  St.  P.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  249  N.W.  581, 
189  Minn.  359. 
Discretion  held  not  abused 
Pa.— Philadelphia  Fixture   &  Equip- 
ment Corporation  v.  Carroll,  191  A. 

216,  126  Pa.Super.  454. 
Delay  because  of  attorney's   illness 

Where  motion  to  vacate  was  de- 
layed because  of  attorney's  illness, 
trial  judge  should  exercise  sound  le- 
gal discretion. — Deen  v.  Baxley  State 
Bank,  15  S.E.2d  194,  192  Ga.  300. 

49.  Pa. — Eastman  Kodak  Co.  v.  Ose- 
nider, 193  A.  284,  127  Pa.Super.  332 
—Bianca    v.    Kaplan,    160    A.    143, 
105  Pa.Super.  98. 

34  C.J.  p  266  note  28. 
Delay  held  laches   under  particular 
circumstances: 

(1)  Nine  years. 
TT.S.— Henry   v.   U.    S.,    C.C.A.Pa.,    46 

F.2d  640 — U.  S.  v.  Certain  Land  in 

Falls  Tp.,  Bucks  County,  Pa.,  D.CL 

Pa.,  38  F.2d  109. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  288 


Laches  cannot  run  against  a  void  judgment,50 
at  least  where  no  injury  is  shown,51  and  delay  does 
not  estop  one  from  attacking  a -void  or  invalid  judg- 
ment entered  against  him,52  or  a  judgment  which 
has  been  discharged  in  fact  by  accord  and  satisfac- 
tion.53 

d.  Irregular  Judgments 

Apart  from  statutory  provisions  as  to  time,  which 
must  be  observed,  a  Judgment  will  generally  not  be  va- 
cated aftef  the  term  for  mere  Irregularity  not  render- 
ing it  void;  and  an  application  to  set  aside  a  judgment 
for  mere  technical  Irregularities  has  been  required  to 
be  made  at  the  first  opportunity  or  within  a  reasonable 
time. 

Where  it  is  sought  to  set  aside  a  judgment  for  a 


mere  technical  irregularity,  and  not  a  matter  of  sub- 
stance, the  application,  being  without  merits,  has 
been  required  to  be  made  at  the  first  opportunity, 
or  within  a  reasonable  time,  or  the  irregularity  will 
be  deemed  waived.54  This  rule  does  not  apply  . 
where  the  motion  is  based  on  substantial,  and  not 
merely  technical,  irregularities.55  Application 
should  be  made  to  vacate  before  taking  any  subse- 
quent step  in  the  cause.58 

Generally  a  judgment  will  not  be  vacated  after 
the  end  of  the  term  for  any  mere  irregularity  not 
affecting  the  jurisdiction,  and  therefore  not  render- 
ing the  judgment  void,57  unless  the  statute  grants 
an  extended  time  for  moving  to  vacate  it  on  this 


Pa. — Eastman  Kodak  Co.  v.  Osenider, 
193  A.  284,  127  Pa. Super.  832. 

(2)  Tear   and    eight    months. — Se- 
pulveda  v.  Apablasa,  77  P.2d  530,  25 
Cal.App.2d  390. 

(3)  Other    circumstances. 

Ind. — Harvey  v.  Rodger,  T43  N.E.  8, 
84  Ind.App,  409. 

Ky. — Ballnran  v.  Ballman,  67  S.W.2d 
39,  252  Ky.  332. 

Minn. — Ayer  v.  Chicago,  M.t  St.  P. 
&  P.  R.  Co.,  249  N.W.  581,  189 
.Minn.  359. 

N.J.— Somers  v.  Holmes,  177  A.  434, 
114  N.J.Law  497. 

N.2.— - In  re  White's  Estate,  46  N.T. 
S.2d  917,  182  Misc.  223,  affirmed  In 
re  Bishop's  Will,  49  N.T.S.2d  275, 
268  App.Div.  759,  appeal  denied  51 
N.Y.S.2d  83,  268  App.Div.  893,  ap- 
peal dismissed  57  N.E.2d  845,  293 
N.T.  767. 

N.D. — Patterson  Land  Co.  v.  Lynn, 
199  N.W.  766,  51  N.D.  329. 

Pa. — Liberty  Trust  Co.  of  Emporium- 
v.  Emporium  Land  Co.,  25  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.  619 — Commonwealth  v. 
Jones,  Com.PL,  36  Luz.L.Reg.  190 
— Bridgeport  Realty  Co.  v.  lon- 
none,  Com.Pl.,  61  Montg.Co.  284 — 
Kelly  v.  Dervin,  Com.Pl.,  55  Montg. 
Co.  317. 

S.C.— Gleaton  v.  Gleaton,  151  S.E. 
276,  154  S.C.  140. 

W.Va. — Seymour  v.  Alkire,  3'4  S.E. 
953,  47  W.Va.  302. 

34  C.J.  p  266  note  28  [a]— 19  C.J. 
p  1212  note  69  [b]  CD. 

Delay  held  not  laches  under  particu- 
lar circumstances: 

(1)  Two    years. — Hendrix   V.    Kel- 
ley,    143    A.    460,    4    W.W.Harr.Del. 
120. 

(2)  More  than  one  year.— Pink  v. 
Deering,    4    A.2d    790,    122    N.J.Law 
277,  motion  denied  17  A.2d  603,  125 
N.J.Law  569. 

(3)  Five  months. — Gedrich  v.  Tar- 
oscz,  156  A.  575,  102  Pa.Super.  127. 

(-4)  Other   circumstances. 
U.S. — Edwards    v.    Lathan,    D.C.La., 
24  F.Supp.  138,  reversed  on  other 


grounds,  C.C.A.,  Lathan  v.  Ed- 
wards, 121  F.2d  183. 

111. — Reisman  y.  Central  Mfg.  Disk 
Bank,  15  N.E.2d  903,  296  IlLApp. 
61 — Cummer  v.  Cummer,  283  111. 
App.  220 — First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Trott,  236  IlLApp.  412— Reid  v, 
Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  231  IlLApp.  58. 

Mass. — Borst  v.  Toung,  18  N.E.2d 
544,  302  Mass.  124. 

Mich.— Williams  v.  Truaac,  251  N.W. 
375,  265  Mich.  323. 

N.T. — Hemingway  v.  Mackenzie.  24'4 
N.T.S.  48.  137  Misc.  876,  affirmed 
2-45  N.T.S.  766,  230  App.Div.  819, 
and  249  N.T.S.  910,  233  App.DiY. 
652. 

Pa. — Roundsley  v.  Tuscarora  Tp. 
School  Dist.,  47  Pa.Super.  623— The 
Conestoga  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hallman, 
20  Pa,Dist.  &  Co.  193,  43  Lanc.L. 
Rev.  659,  6  Som.Leg.J.  354. 

34  C.J.  p  266  note  28  [b]. 

Belay  until  after  execution 

Where  evidence  showed  conclusive- 
ly that  summons  was  personally 
served  on  defendant  and  a  judgment 
duly  entered  in  trial  court,  and  de- 
fendant had  knowledge  of  entry  of 
judgment  and  did  not  question  serv- 
ice or  entry  until  after  execution 
was  issued  against  his  salary.  &n 
order  vacating  judgment  was  un- 
authorized.— Suffin  v.  Cavanagh,  29 
N.T.S.2d  170. 

SO. .  111.— Thayer  v.  Village  of  Down- 
ers Grove,  16  N.E.2d  717,  369  111. 
334. 

N-.J.— Collyer  v.  McDonald,  10  A.2d 
284,  123  N.J.Law  547— Westfleld 
Trust  Co.  v.  Court  of  Common 
Pleas,  178  A.  546,  115  N.J.Law  86 
— Gimbel  Bros.  v.  Corcoran,  192 
A.  715,  15  N.J.Misc.  538. 

N.C. — Johnston  County  v.  Ellis,  88 
S.E.2d  31,  226  N.C.  268. 

Pa. — Romberger  v.  Romberger,  139 
A.  159,  290  Pa.  45'4— Peoples  Nat 
Bank  of  Reynoldsville,  to  Use  of 
Mottern,  y.  D.  &  M.  Coal  Co..  187 
A.  452,  124  Pa.Super.  21 — Cadwal- 
lader  v.  Firestone,  Com.PL,  7  Fay. 
L.J.  259. 

531 


Misinterpretation  by  clerk 

Where  court  clerk's  entry  of  judg- 
ment on  record  not  only  misinter- 
preted trial  judge's  entry  on  calen- 
dar, but  was  such  an  interpretation 
as  would  constitute  action  which  was 
beyond  jurisdiction  of  court,  ag- 
grieved party's  right  to  have  Judg- 
ment set  aside  was  not  waived  by 
delay  and  negligence. — Tost  v.  Gadd, 
288  N.W.  667,  227  Iowa  621. 

51.  Del.— Hendrix  v.  Kelley,  1'43  A, 
460,  4  W.W.Harr.  IfcO. 

Condemnation  decree 

Court  should  not  set  aside  con- 
demnation decree  entered  nine  years 
previously,  where  decree,  even  if 
void,  was  consent  decree,  coupled 
with  voluntary  conveyances,  and  for- 
mer owners  failed  to  tender  back 
money  received  or  to  give  notice  of 
proceeding  to  subsequent  purchasers 
of  land. — U.  S.  r.  Certain  Land  in 
Falls  Tp.,  Bucks  County,  Pa.,  D.C.Pa., 
38  F.2d  109. 

52.  111. — Thayer  v.  Tillage  of  Down- 
ers  Grove,  16  N.E.2d  717,   369  111. 
334. 

Pa. — School  Dist  of  Haverford  Tp.f 
to  use  of  Tedesco,  v.  Herzog,  171 
A,  455,  314  Pa.  161— Peoples  Nat. 
Bank  of  Ellwood  City  v.  Wein- 
gartner,  33  A.2d  469,  153  Pa.Super. 
40— Davis  v.  Tate,  Com.PL,  26 
Erie  Co.  141— Smith  v.  Press,  Com. 
PL,  54  Montg.Co.  169. 

53.  Pa.— Peoples  Nat.  Bank  of  Ell- 
wood  City  of  Weingartner,  33  A.2d 
469,  153  Pa.Super.  40. 

54.  Pa, — Eastman  Kodak  Co.  v.  Os- 
enider,   193   A.    284,    127   Pa.Super. 
332. 

34  OJ.  p  26-7  note  29. 

55.  N.T.— Lucas    v.    Geneva   Second 
Baptist  Church,  4  How.Pr.  353. 

56.  N.T. — Chicago  Com  Exch.  Bank 
v.  Blye,  ?3  N.E.  805,  119  N,T.  414. 

34  C.J.  p  267  note  81. 

Appeal  as  waiver  see  supra   $   284. 

57.  U.  S. — Loeser  v.  Savings  Depos- 
it Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  Ohio,  163  F. 
212,  -89  C.CJL  642. 

34  C.J.  p  267  note  32. 


288 


JUDGMENTS 


49 


ground;58    and  in  any  case  the  application  is  too 
late  if  not  made  within  the  statutory  period.59 

Some  cases  hold  that  a  motion  to  vacate  for  ir- 
regularity may  be  made  at  any  time  within  a  rea- 
sonable period.60 

e.  Fraudulent  or  Collusive  Judgments 

Under  some  authorities,  an  application  under  the 
court's  inherent  power  to  set  aside  a  judgment  obtained 
by  fraud  may  be  made  at  any  time;  others  limit  it  to  a 
reasonable  time  after  discovery  of  the  fraud.  A  statute 
limiting  the  time  for  applications  on  statutory  grounds, 
unless  expressly  made  applicable,  does  not  apply  to  an 
application  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  at  least  where  the 
fraud  is  extrinsic. 


Under  some  authorities,  the  inherent  power  of 
courts  to  set  aside  or  vacate  a  judgment  obtained 
through  fraud,  deception,  or  collusion  may  be  ex- 
ercised at  any  time,61  even  after  the  expiration  of 
the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered;62  but  it  has 
also  been  held  that  an  application  to  vacate  must 
be  made  within  a  reasonable  time  after  discovery 
of  the  fraud,63  and  that  laches  is  ground  for  deny- 
ing relief.64 

A  statute  limiting  the  time  within  which  appli- 
cations to  vacate  judgments  on  statutory  grounds 
must  be  made  does  not  apply  to  an  application  to 
vacate  on  the  ground  of  fraud,66  at  least  where 
the  fraud  is  extrinsic,66  and  unless  the  statute  is 


58.  Mo. — Crabtree  v.  Mtna.  Life  Ins. 
Co.,   Ill   S.W.2d  103,   341  Mo.  1173 
— Johnson  v.   Underwood,   24  S.W. 
2d   133,    324    Mo.    578— Buchholz  v. 
Manzella,   App.,    158    S.W.2d    200— 
Stulz  v.  Lentin,   295   S.W.  '487,  220 
Mo. App.   840. 

Okl. — Haggerty  v.  Terwilliger,  16$  P. 

872,  67  Okl.  194. 
Wyo.— Boulter  v.   Cook,  23*4  P.  1101, 

32  Wyo.  461,  rehearing  denied  2 

P.  245,  32  Wyo.  461. 
34  C.J.  p  258  note  99  [i], 

59.  Kan. — Harder  v.  Johnson,  76  P. 
2d  763,  147  Kan.  440. 

Oki. — Weinier  v.  Augustana  Pension 
and  Aid  Fund,  67  P.2d  436,  179 
Okl.  572. 

Wyo.— Boulter  v.  Cook,  234  P.  1101. 
82  Wyo.  461,  rehearing  denied  236 
P.  245,  32  Wyo.  461. 
First  three  days  of  succeeding  term 
Under   some    statutes,   a   proceed- 
ing to  set  aside  a  judgment  on  the 
ground  of  irregularity  in  taking  and 
entering   the   judgment   is    not   lim- 
ited  to    the   period   within   the  first 
three  days  of  the  succeeding  term. 
— Lemieux  v.  Kountz,   140  N.E.  637, 
107  Ohio  St.  *4. 
Irregularity  not  shown. 
N.M.— Miera  v.   State,   129   P.2d  33'4, 

45  N.M.  369. 
Extension  of  time 

Statute  providing  that  judgment 
shall  not  be  set  aside  on  motion  for 
irregularity  unless  such  motion  is 
made  within  three  years  after  term 
at  which  such  judgment  was  ren- 
dered merely  extends  the  time  for 
filing  after  the  term  at  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered,  as  compared 
with  the  common-law  practice  of 
filing  during  the  term. — Poindexter  v. 
Marshall,  Mo.App.,  193  S*W.2d  622. 

60.  N.C. — Cincinnati    Coffin    Co.    v. 
Topp,    175    S.E.    164,    206   N.C.   716. 

84  C.J.  p  267  note  35. 

61.  Ariz. — Vazquez   y.    Dreyfus,    269 
P.     80,    34    Ariz.    184— Kendall    v. 
Silver  King  of  Arizona  Mining  Col, 
226  P.  5-40,  26  Ariz.  456. 

Colo. — Peterson  v.  Vanderlip,  278  P. 
607,  86  Colo.  130.  j 


Fla. — Zemurray  v.  Kilgore,   177   So. 

714,  130  Fla.  317. 
N.Y. — Davidson   v.   Ream,    175   App. 

Div.  760,  162  N.T.S.  375. 
Or.— May  v.  Roberts,  286  P.  546,  133 

Or.  643. 
34  C.J.  p  257  note  92. 

"A  court  .  .  .  has  authority  to 
purge  its  own  records  and  may 
set  aside  a  judgment  at  any  time 
when  it  appears  that  the  court  has 
been  imposed  upon  by  extrinsically 
fraudulent  acts." — Rivieccio  v.  Both- 
an,  CaL,  165  P.2d  677,  680. 
Effect  OIL  property  rights 

The  court's  power  to  set  aside  a 
judgment  at  any  time  when  it  ap- 
pears that   it  has  been  imposed  on 
by   extrinsically   fraudulent   acts   is 
not    dependent   on   whether   or    not 
property   rights   are   involved. — ^Riv- 
ieccio v.  Bo  than,  supra. 
Fraud  held  not  shown 
111. — Madigan  Bros.  v.  Garfield  State 

Bank,    34   N.E.2d    92,    310    Ill.App. 

358. 

62.  Miss. — Home  y.  Moorehead,  153 
So.  668,  169  Miss.  362. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kerr  v. 

Southwest    Fluorite    Co.,    294    P. 

324,  326,  $5  N.M.  232. 
34  C.J.  p  267  note  36. 

Fraud  of  party,  not  perjury  of 
witness,  is  required. — Thome  v. 
Thome,  45  N.E.2d  85,  816  Ill.App. 
451. 

63.  CaL — McGuinness     v.     Superior 
Court  in  and  for  City  and  County 
of   San   Francisco,   237   P.    42,    196 
Cal.    222,    40    A.L..R.    1110— Cowan 
v.  Cowan,  App.,  166  P.2d  21 — Kas- 
parian  v.  Kasparian,  23  P.2d  802, 
132  Cal.App.  773. 

Mont— Gillen  v.  Gillen,  159  P.2d  511. 
Or.— Cook    v.    Cook,    118    P.2d    1070, 

167  Or.  47-4. 
34  C.J.  p  268  note  41. 

What   is    a  reasonable  time   is   a 
matter  within  the  sound  legal  dis- 
cretion of  the  court — McGuJnness  v. 
Superior  Court  in  and  for  City  and 
iounty  of 'San  Francisco,  237  P.  42, 
96  Cal.  222,  40  A.L.R.  1110— McKee- 
ver  v.   Superior  Court  of  California 

532 


in   and  for  San  Mateo  County,   259 

P.  373,  85  CaLApp.  381. 

64.  Minn. — Brockman  v.  Brockman, 
157  N.W.  1086,  133  Minn.  148. 

Laches  generally  see  supra  subdi- 
vision c  of  this  section. 

35.  Ariz.— Vasquez  v.  Dreyfus,  269 
P.  80,  3'4  Ariz.  184. 

Colo. — Peterson  v.  Vanderlip,  278  P. 
607,  «6  Colo.  130. 

Wis. — In  re  Cudahy's  Estate,  219  N. 
W.  203,  196  Wis.  260. 

34  C.J.  p  257  note  92,  p  267  note  37. 

Statutes  held  inapplicable 

(1)  Cases  of  fraud  are  not  within 
statutory  periods  of  limitation  pre- 
scribed for  setting  aside  judgments 
because  of  mistake,  irregularity,  or 
error  in  fact  not  arising  on  trial. — 
Gysin  Y.  Gysin,  189  N.B.  568,  263  N. 
Y.   509,  reargument  denied  191  N.B. 
581,  264  N.T.  595— In  re  Humpfner's' 
Estate,  3  N.T.S.2d  143,  166  Misc.  672. 

(2)  Adjudgment  obtained  by  fraud 
practiced  on  the  court  is  not  validat- 
ed  by  lapse   of  time   prescribed  by 
statute     for     vacation     thereof     on 
ground  of  surprise  or  -excusable  neg- 
lect—Lamb.  v.  King,   296  N.W.   185, 
70  N.D.  469. 

66,    CaL— Chiarodit  r.  Chiarodit,   21 

P.2d  562,  218  CaL  147— Kasparian 

v.  Kasparian,  23  P.2d  802,  134  CaL 

App.  773. 
Mont— Gillen  v.  Gillen,  159  P.2d  511 

— Kosonen  v.  Waara,  285  P.  668,  87 

Mont.  24. 
N.M. — Kerr    T.    Southwest    Fluorite 

Co.,  294  P.  *S24,  35  N.M.  232. 

Where  process  server's  affidavit  of 
personal  service  is  willfully  false 
or  made  with  reckless  disregard  for 
truth,  judgment  is  procured  by  ex- 
trinsic  fraud  practiced  on  court,  so 
that  motion  to,  vacate  is  not  lim- 
ited by  statute  which  by  analogy 
governed  time  limit  within  which 
motion  to  vacate  must  be  brought; 
where  such  affidavit  is  not  true  be- 
cause of  honest  mistake  of  identity 
or  for  some  reason  compatible  with 
good  faith,  judgment  in  such  ease  is 
not  procured  by  extrinsic  fraud  prac- 
ticed on  the  court,  so  that  motion  to 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


289 


made  applicable  by  express  language.67  If  the  stat- 
ute applies,  a  motion  made  after  the  statutory  time 
has  run  comes  too  late,  as  discussed  supra  subdi- 
vision b  of  this  section. 

§  289.    Requisites  and  Sufficiency  of  Applica- 
tion 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  Judgment  must 
conform  to  the  ordinary  requirements  of  a  motion,  pe- 
tition, complaint,  or  bill,  and  must  set. forth  facts  show- 
ing adequate  ground  for  the  relief  requested  and  free- 
dom from  fault  or  negligence. 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  must 
conform  to  the  ordinary  requirements  of  a  motion, 
petition,  complaint,  or  bill,  according  to  the  form 
of  proceeding  adopted.68  Where  applicant  has 


erred  as  to  his  proper  remedy  and  proceeding,  the 
court  may  treat  his  application  as  in  the  proper 
form  if  it  contains  the  matter  and  allegations  re- 
quired in  the  proper  proceeding.69  Where  the  ap- 
plication is  under  a  statute,  the  provisions  of  the 
statute  must  be  substantially  complied  with,  in  or- 
der to  authorize  the  court  to  act,70  but  a  strict  com- 
pliance with  the  statute  is  unnecessary,  trifling  ir- 
regularities not  being  sufficient  to  oust  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  court.71  Harmless  errors  may  be  dis- 
regarded72 and  amendments  may  be  allowed.73 

A  motion,  petition,  or  complaint  to  vacate  a  judg- 
ment must  state  the  nature  of  the  cause  of  action  on 
which  it  was  rendered,74  describe  the  judgment  or 
portion  of  it  sought  to  be  opened  or  vacated,75  show 


vacate  is  limited  by  such  statute.  — 
Richert   v.    Benson   Lumber  Co.,   34 
P.2d  840,  139  CaLApp.  671. 
67.    Okl.  —  Caraway  v.  Overholser,  77 

P.2d  688,  182  Okl.  357. 
34  C.J.  p  268  note  38. 


(1)  Under  statute,  in  order  to  va- 
cate a  judgment  on  ground  of  fraud, 
the  petition  must  be  filed  within  two 
years  from  the  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment. —  Bemis  v.  Bemis,  98  P.2d  156, 
151  Kan.  186—  Sanford  v.  Weeks,  31 
P.  1088,  50  Kan.  339. 

(2)  Statute  applies  to   duress,  as 
being  a  species  of  fraud.  —  Brooks  v. 
National  Bank  of  Topeka,  113   P.2d 
1069,  153  Kan.  831. 

68.    Cal.  —  Liebman   v.    Choynski,    99 

P.2d  1119,   37  Cal.App.2d  565. 
Nature  and  form  of  proceeding  see 

supra  §  286. 
Application  in  Judgment  term 

Motion  to  vacate  judgments  filed 
within  term  at  which  such  judg- 
ments are  entered  are  addressed  to 
trial  court's  sound  discretion,  and 
need  not  conform  to  statutes  relat- 
ing to  vacating  of  judgments  and  de- 
crees after  expiration  of  term  of 
•court  at  which  they  were  rendered. 
—McDonald  v.  Olla  State  Bank,  93  S. 
W.2d  325,  192  Ark.  603. 
•Jurisdiction  not  affected 

Fact  that  an  application  to  vacate 
a  judgment  is  defective  in  form, 
•does  not  deprive  court  of  jurisdic- 
tion.— -Finlen  v.  Skelly,  141  N.E.  388, 
310  111.  170. 
Motion  for  new  trial 

Motion  to  set  aside  verdict  based 
on  matters  not  appearing  on  record 
must  have  substantially  the  form 
and  contents  of  motion  for  new  trial, 
and  must,  comply  with  rules  govern- 
ing such  motion.  —  Wrenn  v.  Allen, 
180  S.E.  104,  180  Ga.  613. 

The  completeness  and  formality  of 
toe  pleading  in  an  ordinary  action 
at  law  are  not  required  in  a  petition 
to  vacate  a  judgment.  —  Herlihy  v. 
Kane,  38  N.E.2d  620,  310  Mass.  '45.7. 


69.  Alaska. — Smith  v.  Coucher,  9 
Alaska  730. 

Ark.— Merriott  v.  Kilgore,  139  S.W. 
2d  387,  200  Ark.  394. 

Cal.— Miller  v.  Lee,  125  P.2d  627, 
52  Cal.App.2d  10. 

Mo. — Harrison  v.  Slaton,  49  S.W.2d 
31. 

Okl.— Petty  v.  Roberts,  9*  P.2d  602, 
186  Okl.  269— Corliss  v.  Davidson 
&  Case  Lumber  Co.,  84  P.2d  7,  183 
Okl.  618— Morgan  v.  City  of  Ard- 
more  ex  rel.  Love  &  Thurmond,  78 
P.2d  785,  182  Okl.  542— Welborn  v. 
Whitney,  $5  P.2d  971,  179  Okl. 
420 — Cooper  v.  State  ex  rel.  Com'rs 
of  Land  Office,  63  P.2d  698,  178 
Okl.  532— Lane  v.  O'Brien,  49  P. 
2d  171,  173  Okl.  475. 

Pa.— Siddall  v.  Burke,  Com.PL,  30 
Del.  Co.  47— Kemmerer,  Inc.  v.  Sny- 
der,  Com.PL,  18  Leh.L.J.  146— 
Franks  v.  Aponick,  Com.Pl.,  42 
Sch.L.R.  24. 

34  C.J.  p  327  note  35  [«,]. 

Particular  applications 

(1)  Motion     for    new     trial     was 
treated  as  motion  to  set  aside  judg- 
ment— Driver  v.  Treadway,  1  S.W.2d 
84,  175  Ark.  1028. 

(2)  Motion  to  set  aside  judgment 
was  treated  as  petition. — Fulton  v. 
National  Finance  &  Thrift  Corpora- 
tion, '4  N.W.2d  406,  232  Iowa  .378. 

(3)  Petition  to  set  aside  judgment 
was  treated  as  motion  therefor. — Fu- 
gate  v.  -Fugate,  '81  S.W.2d  889,   259 
Ky.  18 — Klarer  Provision  Co.  v.  Frey, 
66    S.W.2d    63,    252    Ky.    206— First 
State  Bank  v.  Thacker's  Adm'x,  284 
S.W.  1020,  215  Ky.  186.  % 

74X    Ark.— Moon  v.  Moseley,  167  S.W. 

2d  871,  205  Ark.  134. 
m. — Freedman    v.    Hunt,    Hartford 

Accident  &  Indemnity  Co.,  Inter- 

venor,  22  N.E.2d  864,   301  IlLApp. 

604. 
Okl. — Featherstone   v.    Southwestern 

Lumber  Co.,   243  P.   240,   116  Okl. 

86. 
34  C.J.  p  326  note  25. 

533 


Application  to  court  which  rendered 

The  legislative  intent  is  that  the 
petition  for  vacation  or  modification 
of  judgment  should  be  filed  in  the 
action  in  which  the  judgment  sought 
to  be  vacated  or  modified  is  rendered. 
— Terry  v.  Claypool,  65  N.E.2d  888, 
77  Ohio  App.  77. 
Motion  in  open  court 

The  statutory  provisions  for  set- 
ting aside  judgments  and  orders  on 
notice  contemplate  actual  presenta- 
tion of  motions  for  such  relief  to 
trial  judge  in  open  court,  and  mere 
filing  and  service  of  notice  of  inten- 
tion to  make  such  motions  is  insuffi- 
cient to  give  court  Jurisdiction  to 
consider  and  determine  them. — Mil- 
stein  v.  Sartain,  133  P.2d  '836,  56  CaL 
App.2d  924. 
Signatures  of  attorneys 

Application  to  vacate  judgment  de- 
nied where  application  was  signed 
by  attorneys  from  foreign  state,  sig- 
nature of  resident  attorney  was  in- 
effective because  at  that  time  he  was 
justice  of  supreme  court  and  was 
not  party  on  record,  and  signatures 
of  other  resident  attorneys  were  af- 
fixed more  than  six  months  after  ad- 
journment of  term  at  which  judg- 
ment was  rendered. — Roberts  v. 
Wehe,  27  P.2d  964,  53  Idaho  783. 

71.  Iowa. — Sitzer  v.  Fenzloff,   84  N. 
W.  514,  112  Iowa  491. 

34  C.J.  p  326  note  26. 

72.  Mass. — Magee  v.  Flynn,  139  N.E. 
8*42,  245  Mass.  128. 

34  C.J.  p  326  note  27. 

73.  Ga.— Wilby  v.  McRae,  191   S.E. 
662,   56  Ga.App.   140— Hard  wick  v. 
Shahan,   11*8   S.E.  575,   30  Ga.App. 
526. 

34  C.J.  p  326  note  28. 

74.  Ind. — Thompson   v.    Harlow,    50 
IvT.E.  474,  150  Ind.  450. 

34  C.J.  p  327  note  37. 

75.  Okl.— Richards  v.   Baker,   99  P. 
2d    118,    186    Okl.    533— Myers    v. 
Chamness,  228  P.  988,  102  Okl.  131. 

34  C.J.  p  327  note  38. 


§  289 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


an  interest  in  the  judgment  sufficient  to  entitle  ap- 
plicant to  apply  for  its  vacation,76  show  compliance 
with  all  preliminary  requisites  or  conditions  pre- 
cedent,77 contain  an  appropriate  demand  for  re- 
lief,78 and  show  a  meritorious  cause  of  action,  or 
defense,  available  to  applicant  if  the  judgment  is 
vacated,  as  discussed  infra  §  290.  Unless  prescribed 
by  statute,  no  particular  form  or  formula  of  words 
is  necessary.79  It  is  enough  if  the  application  shows 
a  case  for  relief  under  the  statute,  or  the  inherent 
power  of  the  court.80  An  application  substantially 
in  the  language  of  the  statute  will  generally  be 
sufficient.81  Ordinarily  the,  application  is  required 
to  be  in  writing,82  unless  made  during  the  term  at 
which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  in  which  case  a 


mere  suggestion  will  suffice,88  since  at  such  time,  as 
discussed  supra  §  287,. the  court  may  act  on  its  own 
motion  without  any  form  of  application.  A  statu- 
tory requirement  of  writing  has  been  held  to  be 
directory  only,  and  not  mandatory.84 

An  application  which  is  insufficient  on  its  face  is 
subject  to  demurrer;85  but  a  demurrer  is  not  neces- 
sary to  authorize  the  court  to  dismiss  such  an  ap- 
plication.86 

Separate  and  distinct  judgments  may  not  be  va- 
cated on  one  and  the  same  application.87 

Grounds  for  relief.  Facts  constituting  sufficient 
ground  for  vacating  the  judgment  must  be  set  forth 
in  the  application,88  although  it  is  sufficient  if  such 


76.  Wash. — Kuhn    v.    Mason,    64    P. 
182,  24  Wash.  94. 

34  C.J.  p  327  note  39. 

77.  Mass. — Magee  v.  Flynn,  139  N. 
E.  £42,  245  MASS.  128. 

34  C.J.  p  327  note  43. 

Offer  to  return  "benefits  received 

(1)  A  petition  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment in  condemnation  must  include 
an    offer   to   return   all   benefits   re- 
ceived.— Henry    v.    U.    S.,    C.C.A.Pa., 
46  F.2d   640. 

(2)  Where  suits  by  fire  insurance 
companies   to    enjoin   superintendent 
of   insurance   from   interfering  with 
collection  of  proposed  increased  rates 
were  dismissed,   and  amount  of  in- 
crease which  had  been  collected  and 
impounded     pending    the     litigation 
was  distributed  in  specified  propor- 
tions   to    the    insurance    companies, 
to  trustees,  and  to  the  policyholders, 
the  court  was  not  barred  from  re- 
opening  the   decrees   after  term   by 
fact  that  superintendent  did  not  re- 
store or  offer  to  restore  the  status 
quo  by  returning  to  court  custodian 
the  funds  distributed  to  policyhold- 
ers and  the  portion  of  funds  distrib- 
uted to  trustees  and  paid  by  them  to 
superintendent  for  expenses  and  at- 
torney's  fees. — American  Ins.  Co..  v. 
Lucas,   D.C.Mo.,   38  F.Supp.   926,  ap- 
peals   dismissed    62    S.Ct.    107,    314 
U.S.  575,  86  KEd.  466,  and  affirmed, 
C.C.A.,  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scheufler, 
129  F.2d  143.  certiorari  denied  63  S. 
Ct    257,   317    U.S.   687,   87   UBd.   651, 
rehearing  denied  63  S.Ct  433,  317  U. 
S.  712,  87  'L.Bd.  567. 

78.  N.T.— Lowry  v.  Himmler,  239  N. 
Y.S.  347,  136  Misc.  215. 

34  C.J.  p  327  note  44. 
Errors  of  fact 

Under  statute  authorizing  the 
court  on  motion  in  writing  to  cor- 
rect errors  in  fact  within  five 
years  after  rendition  of  judgment, 
a  motion  to  correct  errors  should  not 
only  point  out  the  errors  of  fact 
committed,  but  should  affirmatively 
show  in  the  prayer  -  for  relief,  in 
what  way  those  errors  could  be  cor- 


rected.—Dressor  v.  Baldwin,  32  N.E. 
2d  959,  309  IlLApp.  182. 

79.  N.Y.— Tudin   v.    Stoller,    142   N. 
T.S.  '484. 

34  C.J.  p  326  note  83. 

80.  Wash. — Chaney   v.    Chaney,   105 
P.  229,  56  Wash.  145. 

34  C.J.  p  327  note  35. 

81.  Ind. — Beatty  v.   O'Connor,    5   N. 
E.  880,  106  Ind.  81,  83. 

34  C.J.  p  327  note  38. 

82.  N.C.— Union  Nat.  Bank  v.  Haga- 
man,    179    S.E.   759,    208   N.C.    191. 

34  OJ.  p  326  note  29. 

83.  111. — Geisler  v.    Bank   of   Brus- 
sels,   44    N.E.2d    754,    316    Ill.App. 
309. 

34  C.J.  p  826  note  30. 

84.  Tex. — Dorsey  v.  Brotherhood  of 
Friends,  Civ.App.,  202  S.W.  350. 

85.  Ga.— Fields  v.  Arnall,  34  S.E.2d 
692,  199  Ga.  491 — Grogan  v.  Dera- 
ney,   143   S.B.   912,   38   Ga.App.   287 
—Hood  v.  Duren,  117  S.E.  260,   30 
Ga.App.  T44. 

111. — Reid    v.    Chicago  Rys.   Co.,   231 

Ill.App.  58. 
Okl.— Wolfe  v.  Freeman,  238  P.  460, 

111    Okl.    123 — Thomas   v.   Deming 

Inv.  Co.,  232  P.  Ill,  105  Okl.  187. 

Well-pleaded    facts    are    admitted 
by  demurrer. 
Alaska.— Smith  v.  Coucher,  9  Alaska 

•730. 
111.— Barnett  v.  Gitlitz,  8  N.E.2d  517, 

290  Ill.App.  212— Marabia  v.  Mary 

Thompson  Hospital  of  Chicago  for 

Women  and  Children,  224  Ill.App. 

367,  reversed  on  other  grounds  140 

N.B.  836,  309  111.  147. 

Where  plaintiffs  elected  to  stand 
on  demurrer  and  refused  to  plead 
further,  defendant  was  not  required 
to  prove  that  he  had  a  valid  defense, 
but  court  could  enter  order  vacating 
judgment,  and  such  order  was  a  suf- 
ficient adjudication  that  defense  al- 
leged was  valid  as  required  by  stat- 
ute.— Federal  Tax  Co.  v.  Board  of 
Oom'rs  of  Okmulgee  County,  102  P. 
Jd  148(  187  Okl.  223. 

534 


86.  Wyo. — Luman    v.    Hill,    256    P. 
339,  36  Wyo.  427. 

87.  Ga. — James  v.  Equitable  Mortg. 
Co.,    60    S.E.    258,    130    Ga.    87. 

88.  Ark.— H.  G.  Pugh  &  Co.  v.  Mar- 
tin,  262   S.W.   308,    164   Ark.   423. 

Ga.— Merritt  v.  Mott,  117  S.B.  252, 
30  Ga.App.  212. 

111. — Trupp  v.  First  Bnglewood  State 
Bank  of  Chicago,  30  N.B.2d  198, 
807  IlLApp.  258— Atkinson  v.  Mc- 
Keogh's  Estate,  1  N.E.2d  267,  284 
IlLApp.  85 — Fitzgerald  v.  Power, 
225  IlLApp.  118. 

Ind. — Vail  v.  Department  of  Finan- 
cial Institutions  of  Indiana,  17  N. 
B.2d  854,  106  Ind.App.  39. 

Iowa.— In  re  Kinnan's  Estate,  255  N. 
W.  632,  218  Iowa  572— Cedar  Rap- 
ids Finance  &  Thrift  Co.  v.  Bowen. 
233  N.W.  495,  211  Iowa  1207— Dil- 
lard  v.  Van  Heukeloxn,  200  N.W. 
567,  198  Iowa  915. 

Ky.— Morris  v.  Morris,  185  S.W.2d 
244,  299  Ky.  235 — Cecil  v.  Dorman, 
97  S.W.2d  797,  265  Ky.  771 — Car- 
ter v.  Carter,  265  S.W.  '478,  205  Ky. 
96. 

La. — Adkins'  Heirs  v.  Crawford,  Jen- 
kins &  Booth,  24  So.2d  246. 

N.Y.— O'Neill  v.  Bender,  25  Hun  189. 

N.C. — Fanners'  &  Merchants'  Bank 
v.  Duke,  122  S.B.  1,  187  N.C.'  386. 

Okl.— Moran  v.  City  Nat  Bank  of 
Lawton,  82  P.2d  682,  183  Okl.  308 
— Carlin  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of 
America,  52  P.2d  721,  175  Okl. 
398 — Myers  v.  Chaxnness,  228  P. 
988,  102  Okl.  131. 

Pa. — Philadelphia  Fixture  &  Equip- 
ment Corporation  v.  Carroll,  191  A. 
216,  126  Pa.Super.  454. 

Tex. — Phoenix  Oil  Co.  v.  Illinois  Tor- 
pedo Co.,  Civ.App.,  261  S.W.  487. 

Wis. — In  re  Coloma  Stale  Bank,  2U2 
N.W.  568,  229  Wis.  475. 

34  C.J.  p  327  note  47. 

Grounds  for  opening  or  vacating  see 
supra  §§  266-281. 

Compared  to  motion  for  new  trial 
A  motion  to  open  up  the  case  after 

judgment  requires  virtually  the  same 

showing  as  for  a  motion  for  a  new 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


290 


facts  appear  from  affidavits  contained  in  the  mo- 
tion papers  instead  of  the  petition  or  motion  it- 
self.89 Facts  as  distinguished  from  conclusions  of 
law  must  be  stated.90  It  is  not  enough  to  allege 
"mistake,"  "surprise,"  "fraud,"  "unavoidable  cas- 
ualty or  misfortune,"  or  the  like,  in  general  terms ; 
the  very  facts  which  led  up  to  the  taking  of  the 
judgment  or  which  prevented  the  party  from  de- 
fenditfg  the  suit  must  be  stated  explicitly.91  An 
averment  of  the  facts,  without  stating  the  legal  con- 
clusion to  be  drawn  therefrom,  is  sufficient.92 

Freedom  from  fault  or  negligence.  The  petition, 
complaint,  or  moving  papers  must  show,  not  gen- 
erally or  inferentially,  but  by  specific  averments, 
that  applicant  has  not  been  in  fault,  or  that  he  has 
exercised  due  diligence  and  vigilance.93  If  a  pri- 
ma  facie  case  of  negligence  appears,  there  must  be 
a  showing  of  facts  excusing  such  negligence.94 

Verification.  Under  a  statute  or  court  rule  so 
providing,  an  application  to  vacate  a  judgment  must 


be  verified,95  but  such  a  statutory  requirement  has 
been  held  to  be  directory  only,  and  not  jurisdiction- 


§  290.    -  Meritorious  Cause  of  Action  or 
Defense  in  General 

a.  In  general 

b.  Sufficiency  of  showing 

c.  Sufficiency  of  cause  of  action  or  de- 

fense 

a.  In  General 

Although  there  are  some  exceptions  to  the  rule,  an 
application  to  open  or  vacate  a  Judgment  generally  must 
be  supported  by  a  showing  of  a  meritorious  cause  of 
action  or  defense. 

To  obtain  an  order  opening  or  vacating  a  judg- 
ment, the  party  applying  therefor  must  generally  al- 
lege and  show  to  the  court  that  he  has  a  good  and 
meritorious  defense,97  or,  if  the  application  is  made 
by  plaintiff,  that  he  has  a  good  and  meritorious 


trial,  and  will  not  be  granted  un- 
less petitioner  shows  that  he  was 
prevented  from  making:  the  defense 
by  surprise,  accident,  mistake,  or 
fraud  of  his  adversary,  without  fault 
on  his  part.— Estes  v.  Nell,  63  S.W. 
724,  163  Mo.  387. 
Waiver 

Failure  to  state  grounds  on  which 
motion  to  vacate  judgment  was  made 
was  waived,  where  opposing  party 
did  not  object  but  filed  counter  affi- 
davit— Heca  v.  Conner,  265  P.  180, 
203  Cal.  504. 

Applications  held  sufficient 
Iowa. — First    Nat.    Bank   v.    Federal 

Reserve   Bank  of  Chicago,   231  N. 

W.    453,    210    Iowa   521,    69   A.L.R. 

1329. 
Okl. — Thompson  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 

of  Okmulgee  County,  102  P.2d  867, 

187  Okl.  312. 
Pa. — Weiner  v.  Targan,  100  Pa,  Super. 

278. 

Applications  held  insufficient 
Fla.— State   v.«  Wright,    145    So.    598, 

107  Fla.  178. 
Ga,— Stowers    v.    Harris,    22    S.E.2d 

405,  194  Ga.  636. 
111. — Emcee    Corporation    v.    George, 

12  N.E.2d  333,   293  Ill.App.   240. 
Kan. — Mayer   v.    Harrison,    166    P.2d 

674,   161  Kan.   80— Rogers  v.  J.  R. 

Oil    &    Drilling    Co.,    89    P.2d    847, 

149  Kan.  807. 
Pa.— Gsell  v.  Helman,  164  A.  '853,  108 

Pa,Super.  258. 
S.C. — Roberts    v.    Drayton,    116    S.E. 

744,  121  S.C.  124. 
Wyo.— Luman   v.    Hill,    252   P.    1019, 

36  Wyo.   48,   rehearing  denied   256 

P.  339,  36  Wyo.  427. 
89.    Iowa. — Comes  v.  Comes,   178  N. 

W.  403,  190  Iowa  547. 
3'4  C.J.  p  328  note  48. 


da    Mo.— Bess  v.  Bothwell,  App.,  163  ' 

S.W.2d  125. 
Tex.— Wadell  Connally  Hardware  Co. 

v.  Brooks,  £75  S.W.  168. 
34  C.J.  p  328  note  49. 

91.  Pa, — Silent  Auto  Corporation  of 
Northern  New  Jersey  v.   Folk,   97 
Pa,Super.  588. 

34  C.J.  p  328  note  50. 

92.  Iowa.— Oliver  v.  Riley,  60  N.W. 
180,  92  Iowa  23. 

34  C:J.  p  329  note  51. 

93.  Ala, — Ex  parte  New  Home  Sew- 
ing Mach.  Co.,  189  So.  374,  238  Ala. 
159. 

Neb. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in,  In  re 
Reikofski's  Estate,  14  N.W.2d  379, 
382,  144  Neb.  735. 

Pa,— Peace  v.  Reinhart,  18  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.  9. 

34  C.J.  p  329  note  52,  p  354  note  71. 

94.  111. — Viedenschek  v.  Johnny  Per- 
kins Playdium,  49  N.E.2d  339,   319 
111. App.  523. 

34  CU.  p  329  note  53. 

95.  Ark. — Farmers  Union  Mut,  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Jordan,  140  S.W.2d  430,  200 
Ark.   711. 

Okl.— Scott  v.  Bailey,  169  P.2d  208 — 

American  Inv.  Co.  v.  Wadlington, 

244  P.  435,  114  Okl.  124. 
34  C.J.  p  343  note  46. 
No  Judgment  rendered 

Failure  of  plaintiff  to  swear  to 
motion  to  set  aside  judgment  was 
immaterial  where  no  judgment  had 
been  rendered. — Greggers  v.  Gleason, 
29  S.W.2d  183,  224  Mo.App.  1108. 
98.  Ky. — Berryhill  v.  Holland,  99  S. 

W.  902,  123  Ky.  615,  30  Ky.L.  831. 
34  C.J.-  p  ,343  note  47. 

Amendment  of  application  so  as 
to  add  verification  permitted. — State 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Llddell,  61  P.2d  1075, 

535 


178  Okl. 
Ca]. 


114— 3*4   C.J.  p   343   note  47 


97.    U.S. — Corpus     Juris      cited      in 

Koen  v.  Beardsley,  C.C.A.Colo.,   63 
F.2d  595,  597. 

Ala.— Fletcher  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Opelika,  11  So.2d  854,  244  Ala,  98 
— Union  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Good- 
man, 144  So.  108,  225  Ala.  499. 

Alaska. — Rubenstein  v.  Imlach,  9 
Alaska  62. 

Ark. — Nichols  v.  Arkansas  Trust  Co., 
179  S.W.2d  857,  207  Ark.  174— 
Davis  v.  Bank  of  Atkins,  167  S.W. 
2d  876,  205  Ark.  144— Merriott  v. 
Kilgore,  139  S.W.2d  387,  200  Ark 
394— Sweet  v.  Nix,  122  S.W.2d  538, 
197  Ark.  284. 

Cal.— Hewins  v.  Walbeck,  141  P.2d 
2'41,  60  Cal.App.2d  603. 

Ga, — Johnson  v.  Lock,  137  S.E.  910, 
36  Ga.App.  $20 — Dabney  v.  Ben- 
teen,  132  S.E.  916,  35  Ga.App.  203. 

111. — Buchanan  v.  Stephens,  26  N.E. 
2d  733,  304  Ill.App.  477— Emcee 
Corporation  v.  George,  12  N.E.2d 
333,  293  Ill.App.  240 — Fitzgerald  v. 
Power,  225  111. App.  118. 

Ky. — Workingmen's  Perpetual  Bldg. 
&  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Stephens,  184  S. 
W.2d  575,  299  Ky.  177— Overstreet 
v.  Grinstead's  Adm'r,  140  S.W.2d 
836,  283  Ky.  73 — Kammerer  v. 
Brown,  27  S.W.2d  959,  234  Ky.  199. 

Md. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  C.  I.  T. 
Corporation  v.  Powell,  170  A.  740, 
743,  166  Md.  208. 

Mass.— Russell  v.  Foley,  179  N.E. 
619f  278  Mass.  145— Lovell  v.  Lov- 
ell,  176  N.E.  210,  276  Mass.  10. 

Mich.— Electric  Ry.  Securities  Co.  v. 
Hendricks,  232  N.W.  367,  251  Mich. 
602. 

> — Hurst  v.  Gulf  States  Creosot- 
ing  Co.,  141  So.  346,  163  Miss.  512. 


290 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


cause  of  action.98  It  must  be  made  to  appear  that 
a  retrial  will  result  in  a  judgment  different  from  the 
one  sought  to  be  vacated."  In  the  absence  of  such 
a  showing,  or  where  the  contrary  affirmatively  ap- 
pears, the  judgment  will  not  be  opened  or  vacated.} 
Statutes  regulating  the  proceedings  sometimes  ex- 


pressly require  such  a  showing  of  merits,2  but,  even 
under  statutes  not  so  providing,  the  courts  generally 
impose  such  requirement  in  the  exercise  of  their  eq- 
uitable discretion.3  The  reason  for  this  rule  is  that 
if  defendant  has  no  valid  defense,  or  plaintiff  has 
no  cause  of  action,  as  the  case  may  be,  so  that  a 


Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Savings 
Trust  Co.  of  St.  Louis  v.  Skain, 
131  S.W.2d  566,  573,  3*45  Mo.  46. 

N.J.— Simon  v.  Calabrese,  46  A.2d  58, 
137  N.J.EQ.  581— Kaffltz  v.  Claw- 
son,  36  A.2d  215,  134  N.J.Eq.  494. 

N.Y.— In  re  Gori's  "Will,  222  N.Y.S. 
250,  129  Misc.  541. 

N.C. — State  v.  O'Connor,  27  S.B.2d 
88,  223  N.C.  469— Roediger  v.  Sa- 
pos,  6  S.E.2d  801,  217  N.C.  95— 
Hooks  v.  Neighbors,  190  S.E.  236, 
211  N.C.  382— Woody  v.  Privett, 
154  S.E.  625,  199  N.C.  378— Fowler 
v.  Fowler,  130  S.E.  315,  190  N.C. 
536. 

Ohio. — Beachler  v.  Ford,  60  N.E.2d 
330,  77  Ohio  App.  41— Kosher  v. 
Mutual  Home  &  Savings  Ass'n, 
App.,  41  N.E.«d  871— In  re  Vesel- 
ich,  154  N.B.  55,  22  Ohio  App.  528. 

OKI. — Jupe  v.  Home  Owners  Loan 
Corp.,  167  P.2d  46 — McVean  v. 
Challes,  69  P.2d  382,  180  Okl.  375 
— Methvin  v.  Mutual  Savings  & 
Loan  Ass'n,  67  P.2d  792,  180  Okl. 
80 — Carlin  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co. 
of  America,  52  P.2d  721,  175  Okl. 
398— Crosbie  v.  Absher,  51  P.2d 
970,  174  Okl.  593— Couch  v.  Gar- 
man,  50  P.2d  1103.  174  Okl.  515 
— Edge  v.  Security  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n,  '45  P.2d  1108,  172  Okl. 
513 — Harlow  Pub.  Co.  v.  Tallant, 
43  P.2d  106,  171  Okl.  579— In  re 
Bruner's  Estate,  256  P.  722,  125 
Okl.  101— Woodley  v.  McKee,  223 
P.  346,  101  OkL  120. 

Pa. — Ferguson  v.  O'Hara,  132  A.  801, 
286  Pa,  37— Moyer  v.  Diehl,  11  A. 
2d  651,  139  Pa.Super.  59— Phila- 
delphia Fixture  &  Equipment  Cor~ 
poration  v.  Carroll,  191  A.  216,  126 
Pa.  Super.  454 — Commonwealth  v. 
Eclipse  Literary  and  Social  Club, 
178  A.  341,  117  Pa.Super.  339— 
Shelinski  v.  Obrekes,  97  Pa. Super. 
340 — Green  v.  Davis,  19  Pa.Dist  & 
Co.  156,  32  Sch.Leg.Rec.  307— Wil- 
liams &  Co.  v.  Orlando,  6  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  153,  19  North  Co.  295— Mc- 
Kenzie  Co.  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.  of  Maryland,  Com.Pl.,  54 
Dauph.Co.  294 — Harr  v.  Kelly, 
Com.Pl.,  43  Lack.Jur.  221 — Dunlap 
Tire  &  Rubber  Corporation  v.  Pow- 
ell, Com.Pl.,  33  Luz.Leg.Reg.  216 
— Kalna  v.  Sopata,  Com.Pl.,  33  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  96 — Favinger  v.  Favinger, 
Com.Pl.,  60  Montg.Co.  149— First 
Baptist  Church  v.  Entress,  Corn.Pl., 
94  Pittsb.Leg.J.  132— Stetsko  v. 
Lea,  Coxn.Pl.,  26  West.  Co.  97 — Eys- 
ter  v.  Peterman,  Com.PL,  55  York 
Leg.Rec.  181.  . 

S.C. — Savage  v.  Cannon,  80  S.E.2d  70, 


204  S.C.'  473— Detroit  Fidelity  & 
Surety  Co.  v.  Foster,  169  S.E.  871, 
170  S.C.  121. 

Tex. — Commercial  Credit  Corp.  v. 
Smith,  187  S.W.2d  263,  143  Tex. 
612— Yellow  Transit  Co.  v.  Klaff, 
Civ.App.,  145  S.W.2d  264— Benson 
v.  Drummond,  Civ.App.,  137  S.W.2d 
125— Hubbard  v.  Tallal,  Civ.App., 
57  S.W.2d  226,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  and  appeal  dismissed  92 
S.W.2d  1022,  127  Tex.  242— Sembera 
v.  Usener,  Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  200. 

Wash. — Morsbach  v.  Thurston  Coun- 
ty, 268  P.  135,  148  Wash.  87. 

Wyo. — Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Wil- 
liams, 69  P.2d  525,  52  Wyo.  I,  110 
A.L.R.  1463. 

34  C.J.  p  329  note  55. 

Confessed  judgments  see  infra  §  324. 

Default  judgments  see  infra  §  336. 

On  bill  for  equitable  relief  see  in- 
fra §  349. 

Coram  nobis 

(1)  On  an  application  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis, 
the   matter   of  a  meritorious   cause 
of 'action  or  defense  is  immaterial. — 
Reid   v.   Chicago    Rys.   Co.,    231    HI. 
App.  58. 

(2)  Writ  of  .error  coram  nobis  gen- 
erally see  infra  §§  311-313. 

On*  seeking1,  as  a  favor  oppor- 
tunity to  reopen  a  litigation,  must 
show  that  a  meritorious  controversy 
exists.— In  re  Gross'  Will,  31  N.Y. 
S.2d  479,  263  App.Div.  818. 
Petition,  to  strike  off  Judgment 

Defendant  filing  a  petition  to 
strike  off  Judgment  is  not  required 
to  set  forth  a  meritorious  defense, 
since  a  rule  to  "strike  off  Judgment" 
is  not  an  equitable  proceeding,  and 
in  that  respect  it  differs  fundament- 
tally  from  a  "rule  to  open  a  judg- 
ment."— Hotel  Redington  v.  Guffey, 
25  A.2d  773,  148  Pa.Super.  502. 
38.  US.— Peters  v.  Mutual  Life  Ins. 

Co.   of  New  York,   D.C.Pa.f  17   F. 

Supp.      246,     reversed     on     other 

grounds,  C.C.A.,   92  F.2d  301. 
Cal. — Doyle   v.   Rice   Ranch   Oil  Co., 

81  P.2d  980,  28  Cal.App.2d  18. 
Mass.— Maki  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  & 

H.  R.  Co.,  199  NJS.  760,  293  Mass. 

223. 
Miss. — Hurst  v.  Gulf  States  Creosot- 

ing  Co.,  141  So*.  3*46,  163  Miss.  512. 
Neb.— Morrill    County    v.    Bliss,    249 

N.W.    98,    125    Neb.    97,   '89    A.L.R. 

932. 
N.Y.— Manzo    v.    AJello,    214    N.Y.S. 

251,  216  App.Div.  733— Lunghino  v. 

Marine  Trust  Co.   of  Buffalo,    298 

N.Y.S.  659,  163  Misc.  765,  affirmed 

536 


6   N.Y.S.2d   650,    254   App.Div.    924, 

reargument  denied  8  N.Y.S.2<%1012, 

255  App.Div.  936 — In  re  Gori's  Will, 

222    N.Y.S.    250,    129    Misc.    541— 

Mandel  v.  Donohue,  208  N.Y.S.  807,       ' 

124  Misc.  861. 
N.C. — Roediger    v.    Sapos,    6    S.E.2d 

801,  217  N.C.  95. 
Okl.— Methvin  v.  Mutual  Savings  & 

Loan  Ass'n,   67  P.2d  792,  180   Okl. 

80 — Carlin  v.    Prudential   Ins.   Co. 

of  America,   52  P.2d  721,  175  Okl. 

398 — In    re    Bruner's    Estate,    256 

P.  722,  125  Okl.  101. 
Pa. — Derbyshire  Bros.  v.  McManamy, 

101  Pa.Super.  514 — Franks  v.  Apon- 

ick,  42  Sch.Leg.Rec.  24. 
S.C. — Savannah  Supply  Co.  v.  Ross, 

122    S.E.    772,    128   S.C.    29«. 
34  C.J.  p  332  note  56. 

99.  N.J. — Somers  v.  Holmes,  177  A. 
434,  114  NJT.Law  497. 

OkL— Murrell  v.  City  of  Sapulpa,  297 

.    P.  241,  148  Okl.  16. 

S.C. — Wise  v.  First  Nat  Ins.  Co., 
172  S.E.  764,  172  S.C.  53. 

Tex. — Harris  v.  Sugg,  Civ.App.,  145 
S.W.2d  149,  error  dismissed,  Judg- 
ment correct 

34  C.J.  p  336  note  '80,  p  272  note  83. 

L  CaL — Bixby  v.  HotchJkis,  App., 
164  P.2d  808. 

Ga.— Louis  K.  Liggett  Co.  v.  Fos- 
ter, 136  S.E.  93,  36  Ga.App.  185— 
Dabney  v.  Benteen,  132  S.E.  916, 
35  Ga.App.  203. 

Iowa.— In  re  Rinnan's  Estate,  255  N. 
W.  632,  218  Iowa  572. 

Mass. — Woods  v.  Woods,  195  N.E. 
377,  290  Mass.  392. 

Pa. — Phillips  &  Sons  Co.  v.  Worley 
Corporation,  97  Pa,  Super.  506 — 
Williams  &  Co.  v.  Orlando,  6  Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  153,  19  North.Co.  295- 
— Bloch  &  Son  v.  Schweitzer,  Com. 
PL,  30  Berks  Co.  81— Markle  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Paladino,  Com.PL, 
81  Luz.Leg.Reg.  210 — Quandel  v. 
Ortt,  Com.Pl.,  4  Sch.Reg.  439— 
Donora  Real  Estate.  Co.  v.  Coulter, 

•  Com.PL,  18  Wash.Co.  26 — Eyster 
v.  Peterman,  Com.Pl.,  55  York  Leg. 
Rec.  181. 

Wyo. — Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Wil- 
liams, 69  P.2d  525,  52  Wyo.  1,  110 
A.L.R.  1463. 

34  C.J.  p  333  note  59,  p  372  note  83. 

2,  Ark. — Nichols  v.  Arkansas  Trust 
Co.,  179  S.W.2d  857,  207  Ark.  174. 

Wyo. — Bales  v.  Brome,  105  P.2d  568, 
56  Wyo.  111. 

3.  Ind. — Wills  v.  Browning,  96  Ind. 
149. 

34  C.J.  p  332  note  58. 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


290 


second  trial  must  result  in  an  identical  judgment, 
then  no  actual  injustice  has  been  done,  and  it  would 
be  a  vain  and  idle  thing  to  disturb  the  judgment  al- 
ready entered.4 

Exceptions  to  the  rule  have  been  made  in  a  vari- 
ety of  cases.5  It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  may 
be  opened  or  vacated  without  the  showing  of  a 
meritorious  action  or  defense  where  the  judgment 
is  void,6  as  for  want  of  jurisdiction,7  although  some 
cases  hold  that  merits  must  be  shown  even  in  the 
case  of  a  void  judgment.8  It  has  been  held  that, 
where  the  judgment  was  obtained  by  fraud,  a  mer- 
itorious defense  or  action  need  not  be  shown,9  al- 
though in  some  jurisdictions  merits  must  be  shown 
in  such  case.10  Where  judgment  was  irregularly 
•  taken  against  a  person  under  legal  disabilities,  such 
as  an  infant  or  an  insane  person,  a  showing  of 
merits  is  not  required,11  but  there  is  also  authftrity 
to  the  contrary.12  It  has  likewise  been  held  that  a 
meritorious  action  or  defense  need  not  be  shown 


where  the  judgment  was  entered  without  authority, 
by  mistake,  or  improvidently,18  or  where  the  ground 
of  objection  to  the  judgment  is  clearly  well  found- 
ed.14 It  has  generally  been  held  that  the  applica- 
tion need  not  show  a  meritorious  defense  or  action 
where  the  application  is  made  during  the  judgment 
term,15  but  the  court,  in  its  discretion,  may  impose 
such  requirement.16 

1).  Sufficiency  of  Showing 

The  facts  constituting  the  cause  of  action  or  defense 
must  be  set  forth  in  an  application  to  open  or  vacate 
a  Judgment;  It  Is  not  sufficient  to  allege  that  the  appli- 
cant has  a  meritorious  cause  of  action  or  defense. 

Where  it  is  necessary  to  show  merits,  it  is  not 
sufficient  to  allege  in  general  terms  that  defendant 
has  a  good  or  meritorious  defense  to  the  action,  or 
that  plaintiff  has  a  good  and  sufficient  cause  of  ac- 
tion;17 the  nature  of  the  defense,  or  cause  of  ac- 
tion, must  be  shown.18  The  facts  constituting  the 
proposed  defense,  or  claimed  cause  of  action,  must 


4.  Wyo. — Bales   v.  Brome.  105   P.2d 
568,  56  Wyo.  111. 

34  C.J.  p  333  note  61. 

5.  N.C.— Campbell  v.   Campbell,   102 
S.E.  737,  179  N.C.  413. 

34  C.J.  p  334  note  72. 

6.  Md.— C.  I.  T.  Corporation  v.  Pow- 
ell, 170  A.  740,  166  Md.  208. 

Ohio. — Snyder  v.  Clough,  50  N.E.2d 
384,  71  Ohio  App,  440— Corpus  Ju- 
ris quoted  in  Kinsman  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Jerko,  25  Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  445, 
457. 
Okl. — Abernathy  v.  Bonaparte,  26  P. 

2d  947,  166  Okl.  192. 
Wash. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  John 
Hancock  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Cooley,  83  P.2d  221,  229,  196  Wash. 
357 — Ballard  Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n 
v.  Linden,  62  P.2d  1364,  188  Wash. 
490. 

Wis. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Chippe- 
wa  Valley  Securities  Co.  v.  Herbst, 
278    N.W.    872,    875,    227    Wis.    422. 
Wyo. — Elstermeyer  v.  City  of  Chey- 
enne, 120  P.2d  599,  57  Wyo.  421. 
Judgment  void  on  face  of  record 
Tex. — Ferguson     v.     Ferguson,     Civ. 
App.,     98     S.W.2d    847— Carson    v. 
Taylor,   Civ.App.,  261  S.W.   824. 
Where    it   is    established  that   no 
Judgment  was  rendered,  the  purport- 
ed judgment  may  be  vacated  in  prop- 
er   proceeding    instituted    for    that 
purpose    by    party   affected    thereby 
without    establishing    a    meritorious 
defense. — City    of    Clinton    ex    rel. 
Richardson  v.  Cornell,  132  P.2d  340, 
191  Okl.  600. 

7.  Ohio. — Beachler  v.  Ford,  60  N.E. 
2d  330,  77  Ohio  App.  41. 

Okl. — Jupe  v.  Home  Owners  Loan 
Corp.,  167  P.2d  46— Methvin  v.  Mu- 
tual Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n,  67  P. 
2d  792.  180  Okl.  80— Carlin  v.  Pru- 


dential Ins.  Co.  of  America,  52 
P.2d  721,  175  Okl.  398— Myers  v. 
Chamness,  228  P.  988,  102  Okl.  131. 

Wis. — Chippewa  Valley  Securities  Co. 
v.  Herbst,  278  N.W.  872,  227  Wis. 
422. 

34  QJ.  p  333  note  62. 

Party  not  served 

Cal. — Shelley  v.  Casa  De  Oro;  Limit- 
ed, 24  P.2d  900,  133  CaLApp.  720. 

Colo. — Bray  v.  Germain  Inv.  Co.,  98 
P.2d  993,  105  Colo.  403. 

Okl.— Jones  v.  Norris,  55  P.2d  984, 
176  Okl.  434— Mayhue  v.  Clapp, 
261  P.  144,  128  Okl.  1— Myers  v. 
Chamness,  228  P.  988,  102  Okl.  131. 

Tex, — Goodman  v.  Mayer,  Civ.App., 
105  S.W.2d  281,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  128  S.W.2d  1156,  133  Tex. 
•319. 

a  Ark.— Nichols  v.  Arkansas  Trust 
Co.,  179  S.W.2d-«57,  207  Ark.  174. 

9.  N.D.— • Williams      v.      Fairmount 
School  Dist.,  129  N.W.  1027,  21  N. 
D.  198. 

34  C.J.  p  334  note  64. 

10.  Ark.— Holland  v.  Wait,   8-6  S.W. 
2d  415,  191  Ark.  405. 

Okl. — Abernathy  v.  Huston,  26  P.2d 
939,  166  Okl.  184— Myers  v.  Chain- 
ness,  228  P.  988,  102  Okl.  131. 

34  C.J.  p  334  note  65. 

11.  N.Y.— Kent  v.   West   50   N.T.S. 
339,  22  Misc.  403,  affirmed  €3  N.Y. 
S.  244,  33  App.Div.  112,  appeal  dis- 
missed 57  N.E.  1114,  163  N.T.  589. 

34  C.J.  p  334  notes  66-6*8. 

12.  Ark.— Ryan  v.  Fielder,  138  <S.W. 
973,  99  Ark.  374. 

34  C.J.  p  334  note  69. 

13.  Ariz.— Gila  Valley  Electric,  Gas 
&  Water  Co.  v.  Arizona  TJrust  & 
Savings  Bank,  215  P.  159,  25  Ariz. 
177. 

34  CJ.  p  334  note  71. 

537 


14.  N.D.— NaderhoftT  v.  Benz,  141  N. 
W.    501,   25   N.D.   165,    47   L.R.A.,N. 
S.,  853. 

34  C.J.  p  334  note  72. 

15.  Mo. — Savings    Trust   Co.    of   St. 
•Louis    v.    Skaln,    131    S.W.2d    566, 
345  Mo.  46— National  City  Bank  of 
St.   Louis  v.   Pattiz,  App.,   2-6  S.W. 
2d  815. 

Neb.— Morrill  County  v.  Bliss,  249  N. 
W.  98,  125  Neb.  97,  89  A.L.R.  932. 

Ohio. — Ames  Co.  v.  Busick,  App.,  47 
N,B.2d  647— Edge  v.  Stuckey,  178 
N.E.  210,  40  Ohio  App.  122. 

Okl.— Long  v.  Hill,  145  P.2d  434,  193 
Okl.  463— Montague  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Commissioners  of  Land  Office  of 
Oklahoma,  89  P.2d  283,  184  Okl.  5*74 
— Methvin  'v.  Mutual  Savings  & 
Loan  Ass'n,  67  P.2d  792,  ISO  Okl. 
80 — Carlin  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co. 
of  America,  52  P.2d  721,  17-5  Okl. 
398. 

Wyo.— Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Wil- 
liams, 69  P.2d  525,  52  Wyo.  1,  110 
A.L.R.  1463. 

16.  Ohio. — Harbine   v.    Davis,    App., 
57  N.E.2d  421. 

17.  Ala.-^Fletcher     v.     'First     Nat 
Bank  of  Opelika,  11  So.2d  854,  244 
Ala.    98 — Union    Indemnity   Co.    v. 
Goodman,  144  So.  108,  225  Ala.  499. 

Ky.— Horn  v.  Green,  178  S.W.2d  430, 

296  Ky.  714. 
Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Cocke  v. 

Wilson,  134  So.  £86,  087,  161  Miss. 

1. 
Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Jeffrey  v. 

Kelly,    App.,    146    S.W.2d   850,    852. 
Tex. — Bishop  v.   Galbralth,  Civ.App., 

246    S.W;.    41-6,    reversed    on    other 

grounds  Galbraith  v.  Bishop,  Com. 

App.,  287  S.W.  1087. 
34  C.J.  p  335  note  76. 
ia    Tex. — Commercial    Credit    Corp. 


290 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


be  set  forth  in  detail,  so  that  the  court  may  judge 
whether  or  not  it  is  meritorious  and  sufficient19 
A  statement  of  the  facts  is  sufficient ;  it  is  not  nec- 
essary to  allege  the  legal  conclusion  that  applicant 
has  a  meritorious  defense  or  cause  of  action.20  It 
has  been  held  that  an  unverified  declaration  or  com- 
plaint is  not  sufficient,21  and  that  the  facts  must  be 
stated  positively,  and  not  merely  on  information  and 
belief.22  Amendments  to  make  a  more  adequate 
showing  as  to  the  meritorious  action  or  defense  may 
be  allowed  in  furtherance  of  justice.23 

c.  Sufficiency  of  Cause  of  Action  or  Defense 

To  constitute  a  meritorious  defense  or  cause  of  ac- 
tion  in  support  of  an   application  to  open  or  vacate  a 


Judgment^  the  claim  must  be  legally  sufficient;    It  must 
not  be  merely  technical,  unjust,  or  inequitable. 

A  meritorious  and  substantial  cause  of  action  or 
defense  must  be  shown  in  support  of  an  application 
to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment,  that  is,  one  which 
raises  questions  of  law  deserving  investigation  or  a 
real  controversy  as  to  the  essential  facts.24  Mat- 
ter which  would  be  a  sufficient  defense  to  an  action 
is  not  necessarily  a  meritorious  defense  warranting 
the  vacation  of  a  judgment  which  has  been  en- 
tered;25 a  judgment  will  not  be  opened  or  vacated 
if  the  defense  or  cause  of  action  is  not  meritorious, 
but  is  purely  technical  in  its  character,  or  is  dis- 
honest or  unconscionable;26  and  the  defense  or 


v.  Smith,  187  S.W.2d  363,  143  Tex. 

612. 
34  C.J.  p  336  note  77. 

Showing  was  liberally  construed  to 
support  order  vacating:  final  judg- 
ment on  motion. — Kerr  v.  Southwest 
Fluorite  Co.,  294  P.  324,  35  N.M.  2! 

19.  111.— Fitzgerald    v.    Power,    225 
ULApp.  118. 

Mo. — Meyerhardt   v.   Fredman,   App., 

131  S.W.2d  916. 
N.C.— Hooks    v.   Neighbors,    190  S.B. 

236,  211  N.C.  382. 
Ohio. — Canal  Winchester  Bank  v.  Ex- 
line.   22  N.E.2S  528,   61   Ohio  App. 

253. 
Pa. — White    v.    Consumers    'Finance 

Service,    Com.PL,    33    Luz.Leg.Beg. 

164 — Kalna  v,    Sopata,  Oom.Pl.,   33 

Luz.Leg.Heg.  96. 
Tex. — Bishop   v.   Galbraith,   Civ.App., 

246    S.W.    416,    reversed    on    other 

grounds,  Galbraith  v.  Bishop,  Com. 

App.,  2S7  S.W.   1087. 
34  C.J.  p  335  note  76. 
Reference  to  record 

Defendant's  sworn  motion  to  va- 
cate Judgment,  setting  up  that  he 
has  meritorious  defense  "upon  rec- 
ord," is  sufficient,  where  record 
showed  a  legal  defense  and  answer, 
which,  although  unverified,  expressly 
denied  allegation  of  unverified  peti- 
tion with  regard  to  notice  for  attor- 
ney's fees. — Donalson  v.  Bank  of  Ja- 
kin,  127  S.E.  229,  33  Ga.App.  428. 

20.  Mass.— Herlihy  v.  Kane,  38  N.E. 
2d  -620,  310  Mass.  457. 

21.  Miss.— Hurst     v.     Gulf     States 
Creosoting    Co.,    141    So.    346,    163 
Miss.  512. 

22.  Wis. — Union   -Lumbering  Co.   v. 
Chippewa  County,  2  N.W.  281,  47 
Wis.  245. 

£4  C.J.  p  336  note  81. 

23.  Kan. — Chandler    v.    Cajples,    144 
P.  191,  93  Kan.  313. 

34  C.J.  p  336  note  82. 

2*.  Cal. — Doyle  v.  Rice  Ranch  Oil 
Co.,  *81  P.2d  980,  28  Cal.App.2d  18. 

Mass.^-Russell  v.  Foley,  179  N.E. 
619,  278  Mass.  145— -Lovell  v.  Lov- 
ell,  176  N.E.  210,  276  Mass.  10. 


Tex.— Miles    v.    Dana,    36    S.W.    848, 

13  Tex.Civ.App.  240. 
Wyo. — Elstermeyer  v.  City  of  Chey- 
enne, 120  P.2d  599,  57  W^o.  421. 
Defenses  passed  on  in  previous  tri- 
al were  not  available  on  motion  to 
vacate  judgment  unless  fraud  in  pro- 
curing   judgment    is    alleged. — Howe 
v.  Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Bank,  263 
P.  673,  129  Okl.  140. 

Defense  not  provable  under  plead- 
ings is  not  sufficient — Sohn  v.  Flav- 
in, 244  N.W.  349,  60  S.D.  305. 
Meritorious  action  or  defense  shown 
Ariz. — Swisshelm  Gold  Silver  Co.   v. 
Farwell,  124  P.2d  544,  59  Ariz.  162. 
Cal. — (Bullion  v.  -Superior  Court  in  and 
for  City  and  County  of  San  Fran- 
cisco.   90    P.2d    858,    33   Cal.App.2d 
48. 
Ga. — Lester  v.  Graham,  123  S.K  37, 

32  Ga.App.  379. 

Iowa.— Rock     Island     Plow     Co.     v. 

Brunkan,    248   N.W.    32,    215   Iowa 

1264— Newlove  v.  Stern,  19-6  N.W. 

51,  196  Iowa  1111. 

Mass.— Herlihy   v.   Kane,    38    N.E.2d 

620,  310  Mass.  457. 
Chip. — Buckeye     State     Building    & 
'Loan  Co.  v.  Ry«n,  157  N.B.  *11,  24 
Ohio  App.  481. 
Okl. — Abernathy  v.  Huston,   26  P.2d 

939,  166  Okl.  184. 

Pa. — Cramer  v.  Sizemore,  Com.Pl., 
48  Dauph.Qo.  169 — Hanover  Trust 
Co.  v.  Keagy,  Com.PL,  51  York  Leg. 
Rec.  157,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  6  A.2d  786,  3S5  Pa,  356. 

Meritorious    action   or    defense    not 

shown 
Ark. — Nichols  v.  Arkansas  Trust  Co., 

179  SLW.2d  857,  207  Ark.  1T4. 
111.— Bird-Sykes    Co.    v.    McNamara, 

252  IlLApp.  262. 
Kan. — Haggart    v.    Wheeler,    229    P. 

357,  116  Kan.  702. 
Mo. — Audsley  v.  Hale,  261  S.W.   117, 

303.  Mo.  451. 
N.J. — Manufacturers'  Finance  Co.  v. 

Miller,  137  A.  717,  5  N.J.Misc.  -676 

— Dtagfeld  v.  McGackin,  132  A.  92, 

4  N.J.Misc.  117. 
N.D.— r Dennis  v.  Pease,  240  N.W.  611, 

61  N.D.  718. 

538 


Okl.— Moran  v.  City  Nat  Bank  of 
Lawton,  82  P.2d  682,  183  Okl.  308 
— Couch  v.  Garman,  50  P.2d  1103, 
174  Okl.  515. 

Pa.— Roper  v.  Scevcnik,  194  A.  333, 
128  Pa.€uper.  453 — Waldman  v. 
Baer,  81  Pa.Super.  390. 

25.  Ohio. — Canal    Winchester    Bank 
v.   Exline,   22  N.E.2d  528,   61   Ohio 
App.  253. 

26.  Okl. — Featherstone      v.      South- 
western  Lumber  Co.,    243    P.    240, 
116  Okl.  86. 

Pa. — Richey  v.  Gibboney,  34  A.2d 
913,  154  Pa.Super.  1— Philadelphia 
Fixture  &  Equipment  Corporation 
v.  Carroll,  191  A.  216,  126  Pa.Super. 
45*4 — Bury  &  Holman  v.  Pezalla, 
Com.Pl.,  27  DeLCo.  405— Hair  v. 
Kelly,  Com.Pl.,  43  Lack.Jur.  221— 
Cronauer  v.  Bayer,  £om.Pl.,  87 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  94. 

Wyo. — Elstermeyer  v.  City  of  Chey- 
enne, 120  P.2d  599,  57  Wyo.  421. 
34  C.J.  p  337  note  83,  note  85-p  339 

note  13. 
Capacity  to  contract 

A  Judgment  will  not  be  opened  on 
the  ground  that  defendant  was  in- 
capacitated by  habitual  drunkenness 
to  make  the  contract  sued  on,  where 
no  fraud  or  imposition  is  charged, 
and  the  evidence  does  not  show  that 
he  was  entirely  incapable  of  making 
a  contract.— Spetz  v.  Howard,  23  Pa, 
Super.  420. 
Compounding  a  felony 

A  judgment  entered  on  a  bond  giv-' 
en  to  secure  any  indebtedness  that 
might  be  found  against  the  obligor 
by  award  of  arbitrators  will  not  be 
opened  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
given  to  compound  a  felony,  where 
the  evidence  shows  that  there  was 
no  actual  agreement  not  to  prose- 
cute, and  that  the  obligor,  although 
charged  with  a  felony,  did  not  actual- 
ly  commit  it — Woelfel  v.  Hammer, 
28  A.  146,  159  Pa.  446. 
Gambling  contract 

The  fact  that  plaintiff's  cause  of 
action  was  based  on  a  contract  made 
in  state  for  purchase  of  "punch 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


293 


cause  of  action  must  be  such  that  the  judgment  in 
disregard  of  it  is  unjust  and  inequitable.27 

§  291.    Proposed  Answer 

The  requirement  that  an  application  for  the  open- 
ing or  vacation  of  a  default  judgment  be  supported 
by  a  showing  of  the  answer  which  defendant  pro- 
poses to  interpose  is  discussed  infra  §  336  e. 

Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 
§  292.     Answer  and  Other  Pleadings 

An  answer  Is  required  where  the  proceeding  to  open 
or  vacate  the  Judgment  is  by  action,  but  not  where  It 
is  by  motion  in  the  cause. 

Where  an  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judg- 
ment takes  the  form  of  a  motion  in  the  cause,  it  is 
governed  by  the  rules  applicable  to  motions  gener- 
ally, and  no  formal  pleadings  in  opposition  are  re- 
quired.28 A  like  rule  has  been  applied  to  a  proceed- 
ing by  complaint  under  a  statute  providing  that  the 
application  may  be  by  complaint  or  motion,29  but  in 
most  jurisdictions,  where  the  application  is  made  by 
formal  action,  or  petition,  the  usual  rules  of  plead- 
ing are  applicable,  and  the  holder  of  the  judgment 
must  controvert  the  allegations  of  the  petition  or 


complaint  by  an  answer.30  The  answer  must  raise 
an  issue  by  direct  and  positive  averments ;  if  it  fails 
to  do  so,  the  petition  or  complaint  may  be  taken 
as  confessed  and  the  judgment  set  aside.31  The 
answer  is  sometimes  required  to  be  verified.32  The 
petition  may  be  dismissed  for  failure  to  file  a  repli- 
cation, if  one  would  be  'required  by  the  ordinary 
rules  of  pleading.33 

A  cross  complaint  seeking  affirmative  relief  may 
not  be  interposed  in  opposition  to  an  application  to 
open  or  vacate  a  judgment.34 

§  293.    Parties;     Persons    by    and    against 
Whom  Proceedings  May  Be  Brought 

a.  In  general 

b.  Who  may  apply 

a.  In  General 

Generally   all   the   parties  to  a  Judgment  should   be 
joined  In  a  proceeding  to  open  or  vacate  the  Judgment. 

As  a  general  rule  all  the  parties  to  a  judgment 
should  be  made  parties  to  a  proceeding  to  vacate  or 
open  it,85  as  well  as  those  who  may  have  acquired 
interests  in  the  judgment,  or  under  it,  and  therefore 
have  an  interest  in  maintaining  it,3^  and  gener- 


board,"  which  was  gambling-  device, 
was  a  prima  facie  showing  of  a  valid 
defense  against  such  judgment — K. 
&  3.  Sales  Co.  v.  liee,  261  8.W.  903, 
164  Ark.  449. 

27.  Wyo. — Elstermeyer    v.    City    of 
Cheyenne,    120   P.2d  599,  -57  Wyo. 
421. 

34  C.J.  p  337  note  <84. 

28.  Md. — Craig  v.  Hebron  Building 
&  Loan  Ass'n  No.  2,  189  A.  218,  171 
Md.  522. 

Mass. — Lynch  v.  Springfield  Safe  De- 
posit &  Trust  Co.,   13  N.E.2d  -611, 
300  Mass.  14. 
$4  C.J.  p  343  note  50. 
Special  matter 

While,  in  general,  pleadings  are  not 
necessary  in  proceeding  under  some 
statutes  to  vacate  Judgments,  defend- 
ant relying  on  special  matter  not  go- 
ing to  merits  of  case  must  raise  it 
by  special  pleading.— Wrinn  v.  Sell- 
ers, 147  N.E.  899,  252  Mass.  423. 

Where  party  did*  not  respond  to 
motion  to  vacate  and  submitted  no 
proof  to  refute  that  offered  by  -plain- 
tiffs, affidavits  submitted  in  support 
would  be  considered  as  prima  facie 
true. — Holland  v.  Wait,  86  S.W.2d 
415,  191  Ark.  405. 

29.  Ind. — Douglass  v.  Keehn,  78  .Ind. 
199. 

34  C.J.  p  343  note  52. 

30.  Pa. — Silent  Auto  Corporation  of 
Northern  New  Jersey  v.  IFolk,  97 
Pa.Super.  58*8. 

34  C.J.  p  343  note  55. 


Waiver 

Answer  on  the  merits  waives  ques- 
tion of  sufficiency  of  the  application. 
—Smyth  v.  -Fargo,  138  N.E.  610,  307 
111.  300. 

A  statutory  motion  in  nature  of 
writ  of  error  ooram  nobis  being  dec- 
laration in  new  suit,  other  party 
thereto  should  be  required  to  file 
pleading  to  such  motion. — Topel  v. 
Personal  Loan  &  Savings  Bank,  9  N. 
E.2d  75,  290  Ill.App.  558. 

81.     N.Y.— iLansing    v.    MeKillup,   '1 

Cow.  35. 
Pa. — Hunter  v.  Mahoney,  23  A*  1004, 

148  Pa,  232. 

32.  Ohio.-— Metzger    v.    Zeissler,    13 
Ohio  N.P.,N.S.f  49. 

Pa.— Appeal  of  Russell,   93  Pa,  384. 

33.  Pa.— Appeal  of  Russell,  supra. 

34.  Ark. — Jerome    Hardwood    (Lum- 
ber Co,  v.  Jackson- Vreeland  Land 
Corporation,  254  S.W.  660,  160  Ark. 
303. 

55.  'XI.S.— U.  S.  v.  Peacock,  D.-C-Fla., 
34  F.Supp.  557. 

Tex. — Hartel  v.  Dishman,  145  <S.W.2d 
865,  135  Tex.  600 — Hannon  v.  Hen- 
son,  Com.App.,  15  S.W.2d  579 — 
Wixom  v.  Bowers,  Civ.App.,  152 
S.W.2d  896,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  3*44  note  59. 
The  real  parties  in  interest  must 

be  brought  before  the  court. 

Ark.— State  v.  West,  254  S.W.  828, 
160  Ark.  413. 


Ky.— Morris    v.    Morris,    185    S.W.2d 

244,  299  Ky.  235. 
Intervention 

Trial  court  could  allow  owner  of 
property  to  be  made  party  on  hear- 
ing to  set  aside  judgment  requiring 
sheriff  to  deliver  tax  deed  of  own- 
er's property  to  purchaser. — Barth- 
olomew v.  RufCner,  273  P.  9t86,  35 
Ariz.  12. 
Bight  to  object 

Maker  of  notes  who  was  not  par- 
ty to  original  suit  thereon  could  not 
question  right  of  holder  of  notes  to 
set  aside,  as  void,  original  judgment 
rendered  against  wrong  party  and 
to  commence  another  suit  thereon.— 
Ford  v.  Vetsch,  La.App.,  167  So.  842. 

36.     Minn.— Aldrich  v.  Chase,  73  N. 

W.  161,  70  Minn.  243. 
34  C.J.  p  344  note  60. 
Assignee  of  Judgment 

(1)  On  a  proceeding  to  vacate  a 
judgment,  the  assignee  of  the  judg- 
ment is  a  necessary  party  and  enti- 
tled to  notice. — Robinson  v.  Ameri- 
can Chemical  Co.,  9  N.Y.Civ.Proc.  78. 

(2)  iPiling1   and   recording   assign- 
ment of  judgment  held  not  construc- 
tive notice  to  judgment  debtors  that 
assignee  had  become  owner  thereof, 
and  thereby  to  oblige  them  to  serve 
notice  and  make  her  a  party  in  pro- 
ceedings to  set  aside  judgment  and 
grant  new  trial,  there  being  no  stat- 
ute  pertaining  to  assignment   of  a 
judgment — Miller  v.  Greenfield   Sav. 
Bank,  203  N.W.  236,  199  Iowa  1039. 


539 


§  293 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ally  one  not  party  to  the  judgment  should  not  be 
joined.37  A  merely  nominal  party  need  not  be 
joined.38  Where  a  judgment  against  joint  defend- 
ants is  not  deemed  an  entirety,  codefendants  are 
not  necessary  parties  to  an  application  by  one  de- 
fendant to  vacate  a  judgment  on  grounds  peculiar 
to  himself,89  such  as  lack  of  jurisdiction.40  A  co- 
defendant  against  whom  no  relief  is  sought,  and 
who  will  not  be  affected  by  an  order  vacating  the 
judgment,  need  not  be  made  a  party  to  the  mo- 
tion*41 

It  has  been  held  that  where  defendant  seeks  to 
avoid  judgment  on  the  ground  that  he  was  not 
duly  served,  and  there  is  an  entry  of  service  pur- 
porting to  have  been  made  by  a  sheriff,  he  must 
traverse  the  return  and  make  the  officer  a  party  to 
the  proceeding.42 


b.  Who  May  Apply 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  may 
generally  be  made  only  by  a  party  to  the  record  who  ha* 
been  prejudicially  affected;  but  In  some  cases  one  not  a 
party  who  has  been  injured  may  apply. 

The  general  rule  is  that  an  application  to  open  or 
vacate  a  judgment  can  be  made  only  by  a  party  to 
the  record43  who  in  some  way  has  been  prejudicial- 
ly affected  by  the  judgment,44  and  that  a  stranger 
to  the  record  who  was  neither  a  party  nor  a  privy 
to  the  action  cannot  make  such  an  application.45 
If  it  appears  that  the  parties  really  in  interest  are 
content  that  the  judgment  shall  stand  and  submit 
to  the  irregularities  affecting  its  validity,  it  should 
not  be  set  aside  at  the  instance  of  a  stranger,46 
and  this  is  particularly  true  where  he  would  not  be 
benefited.47 


37.  Ga.— Buchannon  v.  Park,  104  S. 
B.  20,  25  Ga.App.  635. 

34  C.J.  p  344  note  66. 
Gaxnisher 

Oarnlsher  has  no  standing  to  re- 
sist motion  by  garnishee  to  quash 
judgment  obtained  against  garnishee. 
— Home  Telephone  Co.  v.  North  Ar- 
kansas Highway  Improvement  Dist. 
No.  2,  19  S.W.2d  1014,  179  Ark.  875. 

38.  Ohio.^Fitzgerald    v.    Cross,    30 
Ohio  St.  44'4. 

39.  Ind. — Durre  v.   Brown,  "34  N.E. 
577,  7  Ind.App.  127. 

40.  Ind.— Durre  v.   Brown,  supra. 
W.Va.— Carlon  Y.  Ruffner,  12  W.Va. 

297. 
«L    Cal.— Schart    v.    -Schart,    47    P. 

927,  US  Cal.  91. 
34  C.J.  p  544  note  65. 
44.    Ga. — Green  v.  Grant,  32  S.E.  846, 

108  Ga.  751. 
43,    Ark.— Golightly    v.    New    York 

'Life  Ina  Co.,  120  S.W.2d  69-7,  196 

Ark.  1024. 
Colo.— Scott  v.  Sullivan,  244  P.  466, 

79  Colo.  173. 
DeL— Rhoads  v.  Mitchell,  Super.,  47 

A.2d  174. 
Ga. — Ingram    &   Le    Grand    Lumber 

Co.   v.   Burgin  Lumber  Co.,   13   S. 

B.2d   370,   191  Ga,   584— Thomas  v. 

Lambert,  1  S.E.2d  443,  187  Ga.  616 

— Pope  v.  TJ.-S.  Fidelity  &  Guar- 
anty Co.,  21  S.E.2d  289,  £7  Ga.Ai>p. 

560— Howe      v.      People's      Credit 

Clothing  Co.,  140  S.E.  800,  37  Ga. 

App.  535.   . 
EL— Continental    HI.    Nat.    Bank    & 

Trust  Co.  of  Chicago  v.  University 

of  Notre  Dame  Du  Lac,  63  N.B.2d 

127,  326  IlLApp.  567. 
Ind.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Brokaw 

v.  Brokaw,    192  N.BL  728,   729,   99 

Ind.App.  385. 
Ky.— Brewer   v.    Herndon,    300   &.W. 

858,  222  Ky.  419. 
Mo.— Inter-River   Drainage   Dist   of 

Missouri  v.  Henson,  App.,  99  &W. 

2d  866. 


N.Y.— People  ex  rel.  Ferris  v.  Agos- 

ttnelli,  291  N.T.S.  66,  249  AppJMv. 

638. 
N\D. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Guenther 

v.  Punk,  274  N.W.  839,  £43,  67  N.D. 

543. 
Okl.— 'Fidelity  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 

v.   Newell,    55    P.2d   131,    176   Okl. 

184. 
Pa. — Kupres  v.  Citizens'  Nat  Bank, 

101  PaSfcper.  361. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Standard 

Oil  Co.   v.   State,   Civ.App.,   132   S. 

W.2d    612,     614,    error    dismissed, 

judgment  correct 
Wash. — State  v.   Superior  Court  for 

Pierce    County,    7    P.2d    604,    1«66 

Wash.  502. 
WIs. — Home  Owners'  Loan  Corp.  v. 

Mascari,   19  N.W.2d  283,  247  Wis. 

190,    rehearing   denied   19   N.W.2d 

851,  247  Wis.  190. 
34  C.J.  p  344  note  69. 

Amiens  curtae 

Court  may  set  aside  judgment,  in 
interest  of  justice,  during  term  on 
suggestion  of  amicus  curias. — Cherry 
v.  Cherry,  35  S.W.2d  659,  225  Mo.App. 
998. 

Estoppel 

A  fraudulent  judgment  will  not  be 
set  aside  at  the  instance  of  a  party 
who  has  participated  in  the  fraud. — 
Sherner  v.  Spear,  92  N.C.  1'48— 34  C. 
J.  p  347  note  84. 

Plaintiff's  assignee* 

Where  payee,  after  instituting  ac- 
tion on  note  insured  by  United 
•States,  assigned  all  payee's  right,  ti- 
tle, and  interest  In  note  to  United 
States,  defendant  moved  for  sum- 
mary judgment  against  payee, 
payee  defaulted  on  motion,  and  sum- 
mary judgment  was  granted  dismiss- 
ing complaint  on  merits,  the  'United 
States  was  not  entitled  to  have  the 
judgment  vacated  and  to  be  substi- 
tuted as  party  plaintiff. — Central 
Nat  Bank  of  Tonkers  v.  Richmond, 
22  N.YJS.2d  747,  175  Misc.  '425. 

540 


44.  Mich.— Detroit  -Fidelity  &  Sure- 
ty Co.  v.  Donaldson,  237  N.W.  380, 
255  Mich.  129. 

N.T.— Peters  v.  Berkeley,  219  N.Y. 
S.  709,  219  'App.Div.  261— Gordon 
v.  Sterling,  13  How.Pr.  405. 

Okl. — Savoy  Oil  Co.  v.  Emery,  277 
P.  1029,  137  Okl.  67. 

34  C.J.  p  344  note  69. 

45.  Ark.— Gulf      Refining      Co.      v. 
Haire,  1  S.W.2d  76,  175  Ark.  1036. 

Colo. — Denver  &  R.  G.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 

Town  of  Castle  Rock,  62  P.2d  1164, 

99  Colo.  340. 
Ind. — Corpus  Juris  QLuoted  in  Brokaw 

v.    Brokaw,    192   N.E.   728,    730,   99 

Ind.App.  385. 
Mont. — Moore  v.  Capital  Gas  Corp., 

158  P.2d  302. 
N.C. — In   re    Hood    ex  rel.    Carolina 

State    Bank    of    Gibson,    181    S.E. 

621,  208  N.C.  509. 
Ohio. — Suiter    v.    -Suiter,    57    N.E.2d 

616,  74  Ohio  App.  44. 
Pa. — Mooney   v.    Marchetti,   Com.PL, 

31     Luz.Leg.Reg.     293 — Young-     v. 

Pindley,  Co"m.PL,  4  Sch.Reg.  442. 
Wash.— Ballard     Savings     &     Loan 

Ass'n  v.  Linden,  <62  P.2d  1364,  188 

Wash.  490. 
34  C.J.  p  345  note  70. 

"Privity"  which  will  entitle  per- 
sons not  parties  to  judgment  to 
move  directly  for  its  nullification 
rests  on  some  actual  mutual  or  suc- 
cessive relationship  as  to  the  same 
right  of  property  and  has  no  per- 
sonal basis  as  mere  matter  of  senti- 
ment— Thomas  v.  (Lambert,  1  fi.B.2d 
443,  187  Ga.  616. 

46.  N.Y.— -Assets  Realization  Co.  v. 
Howard,    127  N.Y.S.   798,   70  Misc. 
651,  affirmed  136  N.Y.S.  1130,  1(2 
App.Div.  900. 

34  C.J.  p  345  note  71. 

47.  -XI.S.— Poster  v.  Mansfield,  a  & 
I.  M.  R.  Co.,  Ohio,  13  S.Ct  2ft,  146 
U.S.  88,  36  L.Ed.  899; 

34  aj.  p  345  note  72. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


293 


This  rule  is,  however,  subject  to  the  limitation 
that  a  person  not  a  party  may  apply  for  the  open- 
ing or  vacation  of  the  judgment  where  his  rights 
are  injuriously  affected  thereby.48  .Persons  who, 
while  not  parties  to  the  record,  are  the  real  parties 
in  interest  affected  by  the  judgment  stand  in  such 
relation  to  the  judgment  that  they  are  entitled  to 
move  to  set  aside  or  vacate  it.4  9  Where  the  statute 
under  which  the  proceeding  is  instituted  specifies  the 
persons  entitled  to  relief,  only  persons  within  the 
statute  may  apply.50  An  application  to  vacate  may 
be  made  by  a  receiver  for  a  party,51  by  his  trustee 
in  bankruptcy,52  by  a  garnishee,53  by  a  surety  for 
the  principal  debtor,54  or  by  an  indemnitor.55  A 
subrogee  has  the  necessary  interest  to  procure  the 
revocation  of  an  order  irregularly  rescinding  the 
decree  by  which  he  was  surrogated.56 

Persons  who  by  reason  of  the  filing  of  a  lis  pen- 
dens  are  bound  to  a  judgment  as  though  they  were 


parties  may  move  the  court  and  be  heard  with  ref- 
erence to  any  judgment  affecting  their  rights.57  It 
has  been  held  that  a  void  judgment  may  be  vacated 
and  stricken  from  the  record  as  a  nullity  at  the  in- 
stance of  any  person  interested  or  affected  there- 
by,58 but  a  person  whose  interest  was  acquired  aft- 
er judgment  cannot  have  the  judgment  vacated  for 
irregularities  of  which  the  parties  do  not  com- 
plain.59 

Successful  party.  The  courts  have  power  in  a 
proper  case  to  open  or  set  aside  a  judgment  at  the 
instance  of  the  party  in  whose  favor  it  was  ren- 
dered, since,  although  nominally  in  his  favor,  it 
may  be  really  prejudicial  to  him,  or  not  so  favor- 
able as  it  should  have  been,60  but  a  party  cannot  ob- 
ject to  so  much  of  a  judgment  as  is  clearly  favor- 
able to  him  although  it  is  unauthorized,61  or  to  a 
judgment  in  his  favor  rendered  at  his  instance  with 
knowledge  of  its  irregularity.62 


48.    Alaska.  —  Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 

Smith    v.    Ooucher,    9    Alaska    730, 

738. 
Cal.—  Greif  v.   Dullea,   153  P.2d  581, 

66  Cal.App.2d  986. 
Kan.  —  White    v.    Central    Mut.    Ins. 

Co.,  91  P.2d  1,  150  Kan.  47. 
N.C.—  Carter   v.    Smith,    185  -S.E.   15, 

209  N.C.  78-8. 
N.D.—  <Jorpus  Juris  cited  In  Guenther 

v.  Funk,  274  N.W.  839,  8"43,   67  N. 

D.  543. 
Pa.  —  Holltnger  v.  Lynch,  52  Pa.Dist 

&  Co.   537,  56  Dauph.Co.  159. 
S.C.—  Ex  parte  Hart,  2  S.E.2d  52,  190 

S.C.   473,    certiorari  denied  Bowen 

v.  Hart,  60  S.Ct.  82,  308  U.S.  569, 

84  L.Ed.  477. 
34  C.J.  p  345  note  73. 
Rights   directly   and  necessarily  af- 
fected 

Where  the  rights  of  one  not  a  par- 
ty to  a  judgment  are  directly  and 
necessarily  affected,  he  may  inter- 
vene after  judgment  and  have  his 
rights  protected.  —  Standard  Oil  Co. 
v.  Statue,  Tex.Civ.App.,  132  S.W.2d 
612,  error  dismissed,  judgment  cor- 
rect. 
Judgment  procured  by  fraud 

Exception  to  rule  that  direct  at- 
tack may  not  be  made  on  judgment 
by  one  not  a  party  thereto  exists 
where  such  judgmen.t  was  procured 
by  fraud  and  materially  affects  in- 
terest of  person  making  the  attack. 
—  Turman  Oil  Co.  v.  Roberts,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  96  S.W.2d  724,  error  re- 
fused. 


lands 

Where  lands  are  held  by  the  (Five 
Civilized  Tribes  under  .patents  in  fee 
with  restraints  on  alienation,  a  de- 
cree undertaking  the  alienation  of 
the  Indians'  interest  in  the  lands  in 
a  suit  to  which  the  -United  States  is 
not  a  party  has  no  binding  effect  and 
the  United  -States  may  sue  to  can- 


eel   the    decree.— Town    of   Okemah,  t54.    Ala. — Bean  v.  Harrison,  104  So. 

rvi,i       «.     TT      a       rt  rt  A  f\iri       1  in    HP  9.A          241     ft13    Ala.    33. 


OkL,   v.   U.    S.,   C.C.A.Okl.,    140   'P.2d 

963. 

intervention 

(1)  A  person  not  a  party  of  record 
cannot  be  heard  to  challenge  a  judg- 
ment or  decree  until  he  obtains  leave 
to  become  a  party  by  application  to 
intervene  based  on  sufficient  ground. 
—In  re  Jordan,  1  A.2d  152,  332  Pa. 
270. 

(2)  Order     granting     motion     of 
bankruptcy  trustee  of  one  of  the  liti- 
gants to  vacate  judgment  and  to  per- 
mit trustee  to  appear  in  cause  was 
the   equivalent   of  an   order  making 
the  trustee  a  party  to  the  action. — 
Nuckolls  v.  Bank  of  California,  Nat. 
Ass'n,  74  P.2d  264,  10  Cal.2d  266,  114 
A.L.R.  708. 

49.  N.C— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Buncombe  County  v.  Penland,   173 
S.B.   609,  612,  206  N.C.  299. 

34  C.J.  p  346  note '77. 
Enforcement  unjust 

Where  enforcement  of  a  judgment 
against  petitioners  who  were  not 
parties  to  the  action  would  be  unjust 
because  of  judgment  having  been 
paid  or  its  never  having  been  a  lien 
or  claim  against  the  property,  peti- 
tioners may  apply  for  relief  in  the 
original  action.— Home  Owners'  Loan 
Corp.  v.  Mascari,  19  N.W.2d  851,  247 
Wis.  190. 

50.  Ind.— Bundy  v.  Hall,  60  Ind.  177. 

51.  N.Y.— Kubie  v.  Miller,  64  N.Y.S. 
44'S,  31  Misc.  440. 

34  C.J.  p  346  note  78. 

52.  Cal.— Nuckolls  v.  Bank  of  Cali- 
fornia,   Nat.    Ass'n,    74    P.2d    264, 
10  Cal.2d  266,  114  A.L.R.  708. 

53.  N.B.— Atwood  v.  Tucker,  145  N. 
W.   587,   26  N.D.   622,   51  L.RJL,N. 
S.,  597. 

34  C.J.  p  346  note  79. 

541 


244,  213  Ala. 
34  C.J.  p  346  note  80. 

55.  N.T. — Manahan     v.     Petroleum 
Producing  &  Refining  Co.,   189  N. 
Y.S.   127,   198  App.Div.   192. 

84  C.J.  p  346  note  81. 

56.  La.— Buck  v.   Blair,   34  La,Ann. 
767. 

57.  N.Y.— Ladd  v.  Stevenson,  19  N. 
R  tf42,  112  N.Y.  325,  '8  Am.S.R.  748. 

34  C.J.  p  347  note  83. 

58.  La. — In  re  Webster's  Tutorship, 
177  So.  688,  188  La.  623— Logwood 
v.  Logwood,  148  So.  310,  1*5  La.  1. 

Mich.— Williams  v.  Truax,  251  N.W. 
3J5,  265  Mich.  323. 

N.C. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bun- 
combe County  v.  Penland,  173  S.EL 
609,  612,  206  N.C.  299. 

OkL — Simmons  v.  Howard,  276  P. 
718,  136  OkL  118. 

34  C.J.  p  346  note  75. 

59-    Wis. — Mine.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Aldrich, 

38  Wis.  107. 
34  C.J.  p  345  note  74. 

60.    La. — Ford  v.  Vetsch,   App.,    167 

So.  842. 
Mont.— Meyer  v.  Lemley,  282  P.  268, 

86  Mont.  83. 
N.J. — Grant  Inventions  Co.  v.  Grant 

Oil    Burner    Corporation,    145    A. 

721,  104  N.J.Bq.  341. 
34  C.J.  p  347  note  8-5. 
Void  judgment 

Judgment  entered  without  due 
service  of  process  is  void,  and  can 
be  moved  against  by  prevailing  par- 
ty.— State  v.  Fishing  Appliances,  1$ 
P.2d  822,  170  Wash.  426. 

6L    Cal.— Kellett'  v.   Kellett,   294   P. 
.     755,  110  CaLApp.  691. 
34C.J.  P  3*47  note  86. 

62.    Miss. — Corpus    Juris     cited    in 


293 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Joint  defendants.  A 'judgment  against  several 
defendants  jointly,  which  is  void  or  irregular  as  to 
one  of  them,  may  be  vacated  on  the  application  of 
that  defendant.63  In  such  a  case  it  is  not  necessary 
that  the  judgment  should  be  vacated  as  to  all  the 
defendants  if  their  liability  is  several  as  well  as 
joint,64  unless  they  are  inseparably  connected  in  in- 
terest,65 except  in  those  jurisdictions  where  a  joint 
judgment  is  regarded  as  an  entirety  for  all  purpos- 
es.66 One  joint  defendant  cannot  object  to  errors 
and  irregularities  affecting  only  his  codefendants.67 

Legal  representatives.  Under  statutes  regulating 
the  opening  or  vacating  of  judgments  which  pro- 
vide that  an  application  for  such  relief  may  be 
made  by  the  "legal  representatives  of  the  defend- 
ant," or  by  "any  person  legally  representing  him," 
an  application  may  be  made  not  only  by  the  execu- 
tor or  administrator  of  a  deceased  defendant68  and 
his  widow  and  heirs,69  but  also  one  who  by  deed  or 
other  grant  has  acquired  his  entire  interest  in  the 
subject  matter  of  the  action.70  Even  in  the  absence 
of  such  a  statute,  the  executor  or  administrator  of 
a  deceased  judgment  debtor  is  not  a  stranger  to  the 
record  and  may  move  to  vacate  in  proper  cases.71 
Persons  applying  in  this  character  for  the  vacation 
of  the  judgment  must  show  a  state  of  facts  which 
would  have  supported  the  application  if  made  by 


the  original  party.72 

Creditors  whose  claims  have  not  been  reduced  to 
judgment  have  been  held  to  have  no  standing  on  an 
application  to  vacate  a  judgment  against  their 
debtor.73 

Judgment  creditors  whose  interests  are  affected 
may  maintain  an  application  to  vacate  a  prior  judg- 
ment against  their  debtor  on  the  ground  that  such 
judgment  is  fraudulent  as  to  them,7*  or  wholly  void 
for  want  of  jurisdiction,75  but  mere  irregularities 
not  rendering  the  judgment  void  cannot  be  taken 
advantage  of  by  subsequent  judgment  creditors.76 

A  subsequent  purchaser  of  land,  on  which  a  judg- 
ment has  become  a  lien,  takes  cum  onere,  and  can- 
not maintain  an  application  to  vacate  the  judgment 
for  irregularity,77  although  there  is  also  authority 
to  the  contrary;78  but  a  void  judgment,  as  distin- 
guished from  one  that  is  merely  irregular,™  or  a 
judgment  voidable  as  fraudulent,80  may  be  vacated 
at  the  instance  of  a  subsequent  purchaser.  A  trans- 
feree pendente  lite  of  all  the  interest  of  defendant 
becomes  the  real  party  in  interest,  and  as  such  may 
apply  to  set  aside  the  judgment.81  An  execution 
purchaser  may  have  a  fraudulent  judgment  vacat- 
ed.8* 

Mortgagors  and  lienors  have  sufficient  interest  to 
attack  a  judgment  for  invalidity,83  but  a  prior  mort- 


Cratln  v.  Cratin,  174  So.  255,  256, 
178  Miss.  881. 
Mo.— Downing  v.   Still,  43  Mo.   309. 

63.  Mont— Morse   r.    Callantine,    47 
P.  635,  19  Mont  «7. 

34  CJ.  p  347  note  88. 

64.  N.Y.— Hewlett  v.   Van   Voorhis, 
187   N.Y.-S.    533,    196  App.Div.   322, 
affirmed  135  N.B.  952,  233  N.T.  642. 

34  CJ.  p  347  note  89. 

65.  Neb. — Sturgis,   Cornish  &  Burn 
Co.  v.  Miller,  112  N.W.  595,  79  Neb. 
404. 

34  CJ.  p  347  note  90. 

66.  W.Va.— Steubenville  Nat   Bxch. 
Bank  v.  McElflsh  Clay  Mfg.  Co.,  37 
S.B.  541,  48  W.Va,  406. 

34  C.J.  p  347  note  91. 

•67.    Pa. — Cleary  v.  Quaker  City  Cab 

Co.,  132  A.  185,  285  Pa.  241. 
34  CJ.  p  347  note  92. 
68.    N.Y.— Hartigan  v.  Nagle,  32  N. 

T.S.  220,  11  Misc.  449. 
Pa.— Dick  v.  Mahoney,  21  Pa.Co.  241. 
09.    Iowa.— Wood  v.  Wood,  113  N.W. 

492,    136    Iowa    128,    125    Am.S.R. 

223,  12  L.R.A.,N.S.,  -891. 
34  C.J.  p  348  note  95. 
70.    N.C.— Hood  ex  rel.  Merchants'  & 

Manufacturers'   Bank  of  Andrews 

v.  Freel,  174  S.B.  310,  206  N.C  432. 
34CJ.p348note96/ 
TL    111.— Whitney  v.  Bohlen,  42  N.B. 

162,  157  111.  571. 
34  C.J.  p  348  note  97. 


72.  Cal.— Corwin  v.  Bensley,  43  CaL 
253. 

Iowa.— Wood  v.  Wood,  113  N.W.  '492, 
136  Iowa  128,  125  Am.S.B.  223,  12 
L.R.A..N.S.,  891. 

73.  N.J.— Melville  y.  Brown,  16  N. 
J.Law  363. 

34  C.J.  p  348  note  99. 
Attaching1  creditor 

A  judgment  will  not  be  opened  at 
the  instance  of  plaintiff  in  attach- 
ment against  the  same  defendant, 
since  prior  to  Judgment  he  is  not  a 
creditor  in  legal  contemplation,  but 
merely  one  who  may  turn  out  to  be 
such. — Burtis  v.  Dickinson,  30  N.T. 
S.  886,  81  Hun  343—34  C.J.  p  348  note 
2. 

74.  Mo. — Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 

Shepard  v.  ghepard,  186  S.W.2d 
472,  475,  353  Mo:  1057. 

N.C.— -Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bun- 
combe County  v.  Penland,  173  S.E. 
609,  612,  206  N.C.  299. 

Ohio.— Corpus  Juris  qnoted  in  Hooff- 
stetter  v.  Adams,  35  N.E.2d  896, 
901,  67  Ohio  App.  21. 

34  C.J.  p  346  note  76,  p  348  note  3. 

75.  Wyo. — O'Keefe  y.  (Foster,  40  P. 
525,  5  Wyo.  343. 

34  CJ.  p  348  note  4. 

76.  Pa. — Silverstein    v.   -CJohen,     12 
PaJDist  &  Co.   218,    21   North  Co. 
877 — Zlarko  v.  Harun,  Coxn.Pl.,  17 

542 


Northumb.Leg.J.  53,  59  York  Leg. 

Rec.  25. 
34  CJ.  p  3*48  note  5. 

Statutory  right  of  creditor  to  at- 
tack Judgment  of  another  creditor 
because  of  an  alleged  defect  appear- 
ing on  face  of  record  or  pleadings 
does  not  extend  to  mere  irregulari- 
ties previous  to  judgment,  but  de- 
fects must  be  such  as  are  not 
amendable.— Mell  v.  McNulty,  195  S. 
E.  181,  1-85  Ga.  343. 
77.  Neb.— Powell  v.  McDowell,  20 

N.W.  271,  16  Neb.  424. 
34  C.J.  p  349  note  9. 

7&    Kan.— Leslie  r.   Gibson,    103   P. 

115,  80  Kan.  504,  133  Am.S.R.  219, 

26  Ii.R.A.,N.S.,  1063. 
34  C.J.  p  349  note  10. 

79.  N.J.— In   re   Mullineaux,    69   A. 
968,  76  N.J.Law  39-6. 

34  C.J.  p  349  note  11. 

80.  Mich.— Vincent    v.    Benzie    Cir. 
Judge,  102  N.W.  369,  139  Mich.  90. 

34  CJ.  p  '349  note  12. 

81.  Cal. — McKendrick     v.     Western 
Zinc  Min.  Co.,  130  P.  865,  165  CaL 
24. 

34  CJ.  p  349  note  14. 

82.  N.Y.— Easton  Nat  Bank  v.  Buf- 
falo Chemical  Works,  1  N.T.S.  250, 
•48  Hun  557. 

83.  W.Va.— George  v.   Male,   153   S. 
B.  507,  109  W.Va,  222. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  294 


gagor  or  lienor  who  was  not  a  party,  and  whose 
rights  are  not  affected  by  the  judgment,  cannot  move 
to  vacate  it.84 

"Unknown  parties."  Persons  who  are  actually 
affected  by  a  judgment  by  reason  of  having  been 
made  parties  as  "unknown"  defendants  may  apply 
to  have  such  judgment  opened  or  vacated.85 

§  294.    Notice  or  Process 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  is  gen- 
erally required  to  be  on  notice  to  the  adverse  parties, 
and,  where  the  proceeding  is  by  way  of  action,  process 
must  be  served. 

As  a  general  rule  an  application  to  open  or  va- 
cate a  judgment  must  be  on  notice  to  die  adverse 
parties,86  particularly  where  the  application  is  made 
after  the  expiration  of  the  term.87  It  has  been  held 
that  during  the  term  at  which  a  judgment  is  ren- 
dered it  may  be  set  aside  for  sufficient  cause  without 
notice  to  the  party  affected,88  but  there  is  also  au- 
thority to  the  contrary.89  Where  the  court  would 
have  been  justified  in  setting  the  judgment  aside  on 


its  own  motion,  want  or  insufficiency  of  notice  has 
been  held  to  be  immaterial.90  It  has  likewise  been 
held  that  leave  to  withdraw  a  motion  to  vacate  may 
be  granted  without  notice  to  the  adverse  party,*1 
and  an  order  vacating  a  judgment  may  be  set  aside,- 
and  the  judgment  reinstated,  without  notice.92  No- 
tice may  be  waived  by  appearance  or  otherwise.93 

Where  the  proceedings  are  by  action,  or  by  way 
of  statutory  petition  or  complaint  and  summons,  a 
summons  must  be  served;94  but  process  need  not 
be  served  where  the  proceeding  is  by  motion  in  the 
original  action.95 

Sufficiency.  A  notice  of  motion  to  vacate  should 
be  in  writing96  and  must  be  sufficiently  full  and 
explicit  to  advise  the  party  of  the  nature  of  the 
proceeding,  the  judgment  to  be  affected,  and  the 
grounds  on  which  the  motion  will  be  based,97  as 
well  as  the  time  and  place  of  hearing.98  A  notice 
is  sufficient  when  it  informs  the  party  entitled  there- 
to of  the  thing  which  is  to  be  done  and  leads  him 
to  the  place  of  doing  it  at  the  proper  time.99  Stat- 


Wyo. — O'Keefe  v.  Foster,  40  P.  -525, 
5  Wyo.  343. 

84.  Wis.— Bean  v.  Fisher,  14  WIs. 
67. 

88.    Minn.— Boeing   v.   McKinley,    46 

N.W.  766,  44  Minn.  392. 
34  C.J.  p  349  note  19. 

86.  U.S.— American  Ins.  C.o.  T.  Lu- 
cas, D.C.MO.,  38  F.Supp.  926,  ap- 
peals dismissed  62  S.Ct  107,  314 
U.S.  575/86  L.Bd.  46-6,  and  affirmed, 
C.C.A.,  American  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Scheufler,  129  F.2d  143,  certiorari 
denied  63  S.Ct.  257,  317  U.S.  687, 
87  "L.Ed.  551,  rehearing  denied  63 
S.Ct.  433,  317  U.6.  712,  *7  ,L.Ed. 
567. 

Ark.— State  v.  West,  254  S.W.  828, 
160  Ark.  413. 

Cal.— Harth  v.  Ten  Eyck,  108  P.2d 
675,  16  Cal.2d  829— Bond  v.  "Farm- 
ers &  Merchants  Nat.  Bank,  Los 
Angeles,  149  P.2d  722,  64  Cal.App. 
2d  8'42— Colby  v.  Pierce,  63  P.2d 
778,  17  Cal.App.2d  612— Linstead 
v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for  Men- 
docino  County,  61  P.2d  355,  17  Cal. 
App.2d  9. 

Ga. — Jackson  v.  Jackson,  35  S.E.2d 
258,  199  GSL  71-6— Citizens'  &  Con- 
tractors' Bank  v.  Maddox,  166  S.E: 
227,  175  Ga.  77$. 

BL — Schmahl  v.  Aurora  Nat  Bank, 
35  N.E.2d  689,  311  Ill.App.  228. 

Ind. — Penn  v.  Ducomb,  12  N.E.2d 
116,  213  Ind.  133— State  ex  rel. 
Symons  v.  Wells  County  Bank, 
196  N.B.  873,  208  Ind.  543,  103  A.L. 
R.  611. 

Mich.— McHenry  v.  Merriam,  204  N. 
W.  99,  231  Mich.  479. 

N.J; — Surety  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 


of  Newark  v.  Risack,  179  A.   680, 

118  N.J.EQ.  425. 
N.C.— Virginia-Carolina    Joint    Stock 

Land  Bank  v.  Alexander,  160  <S.E. 

462,  201  N.C.  453. 
Okl.— Neff   v.    Edwards,   226   P.    358, 

99  Okl.  176. 
Pa. — German  Trust  Co.  of  Davenport, 

Iowa,   v.   Plotke,    118   A.    508,    274 

Pa.  483. 
W.Va.— Smith   v.   Wallace,    182    S.E. 

538,  116  W.Va.  546. 
Wis.— In  re  Meek's  Estate,  227  N.W. 

270,  199  Wis.  602. 
34  C.J.  p  351  note  25. 

87.    Alaska. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 

Smith   &  Coucher,    9   Alaska    730, 

•73-6. 
Ind. — Zimmerman  v.   Zumpfe,   33  N. 

E.2d  102,  218  Ind.  476. 
Ky. — First  State  Bank  v.  Thackei"s 

Adm'x,  284  S.W.  1020,  215  Ky.  186. 
Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Holtkamp  v.  Hart- 

mann,  51  S.W.2d  22,  330  Mo.  386. 
34  C.J.  p  350  note  23. 

83.    Alaska. — Corpus  Juris  q,not«d  in 

Smith  v.  Coucher,   D   Alaska   730, 

736. 
Ark.— Stinson  v.  Stinson,  159  S.W.2d 

446,  203  Ark.  88*. 
N.M.— Arias  v.  Springer,  78  P.2d  153, 

42  N.M.  350. 
S.D.— In  re  Barnes'  Estate,  220  N.W. 

€27,  63  S.D.  200. 
Tex. — Brannon   v.   Wilson,    Civ.App., 

260  S.W.  201. 
Wyo.— In  re   Shaul,   30  P.2d  478,  '46 

Wyo.  549. 
34  C.J.  p  349  note  21. 

89.     Mo. — Sayings   Trust   Co.    of   St. 

Louis    v.    Skain,    131    S.W.2d    566, 

345'  Mo.  46. 
34  C.J,  p  350  note  22. 

543 


90.  Kan. — Hetzer  v.  Koogler,  123  P- 
876,  87  Kan.  37. 

3*4  C.J.  p  351  note  27. 

91.  Mont — Jensen  v.  Barbour,  31  K 
592,  12  Mont  566. 

92.  N.C.— Perry  v.   Pearce,   68   N.C. 
367. 

93.  Ind. — Penn  v.   Ducomb,   12  N.1L 
2d  116,  213  Ind.  133. 

S.D.— In   re   Barnes'   Estate,   220   N. 

W,  527,  53  S.D.  200. 
34  C.J.  p  351  note  24. 

Knowledge  of  hearing-  dispenses 
with  notice,  unless  complaint  is 
made  of  date  of  notice  and  postpone- 
ment is  sought  in  order  to  make- 
preparation. — Ex  parte  Fidelity  & 
Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland,  134  So.  861, 
223  Ala,  98. 

94.  Okl. — Ptircell     Wholesale     Gro- 
cery  v.  Cantrell.   255   P.   704,    124 
Okl.     273 — American,    Inv.    Co.    v. 
Wadlington,    244   P.    435,   11'4    OkL 
124 — Myers   T.    Chamness,    228    P. 
988,  102  Okl.  131. 

34  C.J.  p  361  note  32. 

95.  Arkl— iState   v.   West,    254    S.W. 
828,  160  Ark.  413. 

9*    N.C.— Harper   v.    Sugg,    16    S.BL 

1-73,  111  N.C.  324. 
34  C.J.  p  351  note  35. 

97.  Cal.— O'Brien    v.    Leach,    72    P, 
1004,  139  Cal.  220,  96  Am.S.R,  105. 

34  C.J.  p  351  note  36. 

98.  Nev. — Horton  v.  New  Pass  Gold 
&   Silver   Min.   Co.,    27   P.    376,   21 
Nev.   184,  reheard   27  P.   1018,   21 
Nev.  184.. 

34  C.J.  p  351  note  37. 

99.  Neb.— Fisk   v.    Thorp,    70    N.W» 
498,  51  Neb.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  351  note  39. 


294 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


utes  as  to  the  time,  form,  and  manner  of  notice  must 
be  observed.1 

Service.  Process  must  be  served  on  the  party, 
and  service  on  his  attorney  is  insufficient,  where  the 
proceeding  to  vacate  is  by  action,  or  by  statutory  pe- 
tition, or  complaint,  and  summons.2  Notice  of  mo- 
tion may  be  served  either  on  the  party3  or  on  his 
attorney  of  record,4  but  under  some  decisions  serv- 
ice on  the  attorney  is  insufficient.5  If  the  party  is 
dead,  notice  must  be  served  on  his  legal  representa- 
tive.6 

-  Notice  by  publication.  A  motion  to  set  aside  a 
judgment  is  not  such  a  proceeding  as  will  authorize 
notice  to  the  opposing  party  by  publication  pursuant 
to  statutes  providing  for  service  by  publication  in 
actions,7  but  service  by  publication  may  be  had  in 
otherwise  proper  cases,  where  the  proceeding  is  by 
way  of  action,  or  by  statutory  petition  or  complaint 
and  summons.8 

§  295.    Affidavits  on  Application 

A  motion  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  should  be 
supported  by  affidavits  as  to  the  facts  on  which  the  ap- 
plicant relies. 


A  petition  or  motion  to  vacate  a  judgment  should 
be  verified  or  supported  by  affidavits  as  to  the  facts 
set  forth,9  except  where  the  facts  necessary  to  sup- 
port the  application  appear  on  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord,10 or  rest  within  the  personal  knowledge  of  the 
judge,  where  the  application  is  made  at  the  same 
term  at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  and 
while  the  cause  is  still  in  fieri.11  A  copy  of  the 
affidavits  should  be  served  on  the  opposite  party  or 
his  counsel,12  but  ordinarily  the  affidavits  need  not 
be  filed  until  the  hearing  of  the  motion.1* 

Requisites  and  sufficiency.  The  affidavits  in  sup- 
port of  the  application  should  show  the  existence 
and  nature  of  the  judgment  sought  to  be  set  aside,14 
state  the  grounds  on  which  relief  is  asked,  not  infer- 
entially  but  directly,  and  not  generally  but  specifi- 
cally and  in  detail,15  show  the  existence  of  a  meri- 
torious cause  of  action  or  defense,  as  discussed  su- 
pra §  290,  and  show  that  applicant  has  not  been 
negligent  or  lacking  in  due  diligence,  as  discussed 
supra  §  289.  In  all  these  particulars  the  affidavit  is 
to  be  construed  most  strongly  against  the  party 


1.  Cal. — Jameson  v.  Warren,  267  P, 
872,  91  CaLApp.  590. 

£4  C.J.  p  Sol  note  40. 

2.  Wash.— State   v.    Superior   Court 
for  King  County,  3  P. 3d  1098,  164 
Wash.   618,    78  A.L.R.   36-6— Foster 
v.  'Foster,   227  P.   514,   130  Wash. 
376. 

34  C.J.  p  352  notes  41,  42. 

Service  of  summons  in,  another 
county  is  proper. — Buckeye  State 
Building  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Ryan,  157  N. 
E.  811,  24  Ohio  App.  481. 
Waiver 

Attorney's  agreement  that  petition 
to  vacate  judgment  rendered  at  pre- 
vious term  may  be  continued  does 
not  constitute  waiver  of  service  of 
summons.— Purcell  Wholesale  Gro- 
cery v.  Cantrell,  255  P.  704,  124  Okl. 
273. 

3.  X3aL— ' Vallejo    v.    Green,    16    CaL 
160. 

N.Y.— Lusk  v.  Hastings,  1  Hill  656, 
Okl.— Neff  v.   Edwards,    226   P.   358, 

99  Okl.  176. 

Nominal   plaintiff   as   "adverse   par- 
ty" 

Where  a  judgment  is  recovered  by 
one  person  for  the  use  of  others  in 
a  proceeding  to  open  the  judgment 
where  the  statute  requires  notice  to 
be  given  to  the  "adverse  party,"  the 
notice  need  not  be  given  to  the  nom- 
inal plaintiff,  but  it  is  sufficient  to 
notify  the  usee. — Fitzgerald  v.  Cross, 
30  Ohio  St.  444. 

4.  Ark. — State    v.    West,    254    S.W. 
828,  160  Ark,  413. 

N.Y.— Langrick  v.  Rowe,  32  N.Y.-S.2d 
328,    affirmed  '41   N.Y.S.2d   82,    265 


App.Div.  793,  appeal  denied  41  N. 
Y.S.2d  949,  266  App.Div,  7«67,  mo- 
tion denied  50  N.E.2d  309,  290  N. 
Y.  926,  affirmed  52  N.E.2d  964, 
291  N.Y.  756. 

Okl.— Neff  v.  Edwards,  226  P.  358, 
99  Okl.  176. 

Wash.— Poster  v.  Foster,  227  P.  514, 
130  Wash.  376. 

34  C.J.  p  352  note  44. 

5.  Iowa. — McCoy      v.      Philadelphia 
•Fire  Assoc.,  185  N.W.  101,  192  Iowa 
4.52. 

34  C.J.  p  352  note  45. 

6.  Ga. — Grier  v.  Jones,  £4  Ga.  154. 
34  C.J.  p  352  note  46. 

Revocation  of  agency 

Death  of  defendant  prior  to  the 
filing  of  plaintiff's  petition  to  vacate 
judgment  for  defendant  terminated 
the  authority  of  defendant's  attor- 
neys to  act  further  as  his  agents 
and  to  receive  order  of  notice  of  pe- 
tition to  vacate  the  judgment. — 
Noyes  v.  Bankers  Indemnity  Ins.  Co., 
30  N.E.2d  867,  307  Mass.  5B7. 

7.  Ind.— Beck   v.    Koester,    79    Ind. 
135. 

Iowa. — Des  Moines  Union  R  Co.  v. 

Polk   County   Dist    Ct,    153   N.W. 

217,  170  Iowa  56'8. 
&    Ohio. — Whitehead  v.  Post,  2  Ohio 

Dec.,  Reprint,  4-68,  3  WestL.Month. 

195. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  .Parker 

v.  Board  of  County  Com'rs  of  Ok- 

mulgee  County,  102  P.2d  880,  882, 

187  Okl.  308. 
Action  in  ran 

An  action  to  vacate  a  judgment 
was  not  an  action  in  which  service 

544 


of  process  could  be  made  by  publica- 
tion of  summons,  since  it  was  not 
"an  action  in  rem"  in  which  the 
court  already  had  jurisdiction  of  the 
res.— Stevens  v,  Cecil,  199  S.E.  161. 
214  N.CJ  217. 

9.    Cal. — Hecq.  v,  Conner,  265  P.  180, 

203  Cal.  -504. 
Pa. — Elliott-Lewis     Qo.     vl     Clarke, 

Com.Pl.,  28  DeLCol  250. 
3*4  C.J.  p  353  note  62. 

Affidavit  unnecessary  where  petition 

verified 
Neb.— Nelson   v.   Nielsen,    203   N.W. 

640,  113  Neb.  453. 
Requirement  may  be  waived 
I1L— Martin  J.  Hecht  Inc.,  v.  Steig- 

erwald,  24  N.E.2d  394,  302  ULApp. 

'556. 

la    Ind. — Wabash  R   Co.   v.   Gary, 

132  N.B.  737,  191  Ind.  394. 
34  C.J.  p  354  note  63. 

11.  111. — Geisler  v.  Bank  of  Brus- 
sels, 44  N.E.2d  754,  316  ULApp. 
309. 

34  C.J.  p  354  note  64. 

,    111.— Scales  v.  (Labar,  -61  111.  "232. 
34  C.J.  p  354  note  66. 

13.  Cal.— San   Diego   Realty  Co.   v. 
McGinn,   94  P.  374,  7  CaLApp.  2fr4. 

N.C.— Jones  v.  Swepson,  94  N.C.  700. 

14.  N.M. — Corpus    tfuxi*    quoted    in 
Singleton  v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119, 
121,  35  N.M.  491. 

34  C.J.  p  354  note  £8. 

15.  N.M. — Corpus    Juris    guotad    in 
Singleton  v,  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119, 
121,  35  N.M.  491. 

34  C.J.  p  354  note  69. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


297 


making  it.16  The  affidavit  must  state  the  facts  pos- 
itively and  directly;  it  is  not  sufficient  to  allege 
them  on  information  and  belief;17  but  affidavits 
made  only  on  information  and  belief  may  serve  to 
initiate  the  proceeding,  since  the  defect  is  not  juris- 
dictional  and  may  be  cured  by  subsequently  filing 
amended  or  supplemental  affidavits  made  on  knowl- 
edge.18 Substantial  compliance  with  statutory  re- 
quirements is  sufficient.19  Ordinarily  the  applica- 
tion should  be  supported  by  an  affidavit  made  by 
the  party  himself,  but  the  necessary  affidavits  may 
be  made  by  the  attorney,  or  other  person,  provided 
they  are  made  on  knowledge,  instead  of  on  infor- 
mation and  belief,  and  a  sufficient  reason  is  shown 
why  a*a  affidavit  is  not  made  by  the  party.20  An  af- 
fidavit which  fails  to  show  why  it  was  not  made  by 
the  party  has  been  held  to  be  insufficient.21  One 
of  several  defendants,  having  personal  knowledge 
of  the  facts,  may  make  the  affidavit  on  behalf  of 
all.22  Affidavits  used  in  the  original  suit,  but  not 
referred  to,  and  not  made  part  of  the  affidavits  on 
the  proceedings  to  vacate,  cannot  be  considered.23 
An  unsigned  affidavit  of  the  attorney  presented  with 
the  motion  papers  may  be  treated  by  the  court  as  a 
professional  statement  of  counsel.24  .Matters  of 
record  should  be  shown  by  the  record  itself,  or  a 
transcript  thereof,  and  not  merely  by  affidavit.25 


§  296.    Counter-Affidavits 

Counter-affidavits,  In  opposition  to  opening  or  vacat- 
ing the  judgment,  may  be  submitted. 

The  party  seeking  to  sustain  a  judgment,  as 
against  a  motion  to  set  it  aside,  may  present  for  the 
consideration  of  the  court  affidavits  in  opposition  to 
those  of  the  moving  party,  with  regard  to  the  al- 
leged grounds  for  vacating  the  judgment  or  the 
matters  set  up  in  excuse  of  defendant's  failure  to 
make  his  defense  in  due  time,26  but  the  existence  of 
a  meritorious  cause  of  action  or  defense,  as  shown 
by  the  moving  party's  affidavit  of  merits,  cannot  be 
controverted  by  counter-affidavits,27  because,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  §  299,  on  the  application  to  vacate  the 
court  does  not  try  ,and  determine  whether  or  not  a 
cause  of  action  or  defense  exists  in  point  of  fact, 
but  only  whether  such  a  prima  facie  case  has  been 
made  as  ought  to  be  tried  and  determined  in  the  reg- 
ular way. 

Counter-affidavits  must  set  forth  facts,  and  not 
merely  matters  of  inference,  conjecture,  or  be- 
lief.2* 

§  297.    Evidence 

General  rules  of  evidence  apply  In  a  proceeding  to 
open  or  vacate  a  judgment. 

The  party  who  seeks  to  have  a  judgment  opened 
or  set  aside  must  assume  the  burden  of  proving  the 
facts  essential  to  entitle  him  to  the  relief  asked.29 


16.  N.M. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Singleton  v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119, 
122,  35  N.M,  491. 

34  C.J.  p  354  note  72. 

17.  N.M. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Singleton  v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119, 

•       121,  35  N.M.  491. 
34  C.J.  p  354  note  73. 

18.  N.M. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Singleton  v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119, 
121,  35  N.M.  401. 

3*4  C.J.  p  355  note  74. 

19.  W.Va. — Ceranto  v.  Trimboli,   60 
S.E.  138,  63  W.Va.  340. 

20.  Mass. — Magee   v.   Flynn,   139   N. 
E.  842,  245  Mass.  128. 

34  C.J.  p  355  note  76. 

Party  or  bis  legal  representative 

An  affidavit  by  a  lawyer  who  was 
a  regular  employee  of  plaintiff's  at- 
torney and  was  especially  delegated 
to  handle  plaintiff's  case  was  proper- 
ly filed  in  support  of  motion  to  re- 
lieve plaintiff  from  judgment  alleg- 
edly obtained  through  mistake,  not- 
withstanding statute  was  construed 
as  requiring  that  affidavit  be  made 
by  party  or  his  legal  representative. 
— Salazar  v.  Steelman,  71  P.2d  79, 
22  Cal.App.2d  402. 

21.  Okl.— Crowley      -      Souther-land 
Commn.    Co.    v.    Husband,.   140    P. 
1144,  42  Okl.  77. 

34  C.J.  p  355  note  77. 

49C.J.S.-35 


P. 


22.  Cal. — Palmer  v.   Barclay, 
226,  92  Cal.  199. 

34  C.J.  p  355  note  78. 

23.  Ind.— Williams    v.    Kessler,    82 
Ind.  183. 

34  C.J.  p  355  note  79. 

24.  Iowa. — McMillan     y.     Osterson, 
183  N.W.   487,   191  Iowa  983. 

25.  Mo. — Heilburn  v.  Jennings,   111 
S.W.  857,   132  Mo.App.  216. 

26.  111. — Gliwa    v.    Washington   Po- 
lish Loan  &  Building  Ass'n,  34  N. 
B.2d  736,  310  IlLApp.  465. 

N.M.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Sin- 
gleton v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119,  121, 
35  N.M.  491. 

Pa. — Patterson  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  No.  2  v.  Bolif,  18  Pa.Dist.  & 
Co.  119. 

34  C.J.  p  355  note  82. 
Leave  to  file  affidavit 

Trial  court  properly  disregarded 
affidavit  of  defense  in  passing  on  de- 
fendant's motion  to  vacate  an  ex 
parte  judgment,  where  defendant 
had  not  obtained  leave  to  file  affi- 
davit of  defense,— Latham  v.  Salis- 
bury, 61  N.B.2d  306,  326  IU.App.  2-53. 

27.  N.M.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Singleton  v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119, 
121,  35  N.M.  491. 

N.D.— Bothum  v.  Bothum,  10  N.W.2d 

603,  72  N.D.  649. 
34  C.J.  p  355  note  84. 

545 


28.  Cal.— Pelegrinelll     v.      McCloud 
River  Lumber   Co.,    82    P.   -695,    1 
Cal.App.  593. 

34  C.J.  p  356  note  87. 

29.  U.S.— Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Irons,  C.C. 
A.N.J.,   48   F.2d   60,   certiorari   de- 
nied 51  S.Ct.  649,  283  U.S.  857,  75 
L.Ed.  1463. 

Ala. — Bx  parte  New  Home  Sewing 
Mach.  Co.,  189  So.  874,  238  Ala. 
159— Bean  v.  Harrison,  104  So.  244, 
213  Ala.  33. 

Ariz.— Bell  v.  Bell,  39  P.2d  629,  44 
Ariz.  520. 

Ark. — Karnes  v.  Gentry,  172  S.W.2d 
424,  205  Ark.  1112— Farmers  Union 
Mut  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jordan,  140  S.W.2d 
'430,  200  Ark.  711— Merchants'  & 
Planters'  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Us- 
sery,  3-8  S.W.2d  1087,  183  Ark.  838. 

Cal.-— Hewins  v.  Walbeck,  141  P,2d 
241,  60  Cal.App.2d  603— Bruskey  v. 
Bruskey,  41  P.2d  203,  4  Cal.App.2d 
472. 

Ga. — Hamilton  v.  Kinnebrew,  131  & 
B.  470,  161  Ga.  495— Benton  v. 
Maddox,  184  S.B.  7S<8,  €2  GfuApp. 
813. 

111. — Topel  v.  Personal  Loan  &  Sav- 
ings Bank,  9  N.BL2d  75,'  290  111. 
App.  -568-— Central  Cleaners  and 
Dyers  v.  Schild,  1,  N.B.2d  90,  284 
IlLApp.  267. 

Iowa. — In  re  Kinnan's  Estate,  255  N. 
W.  632,  218  Iowa  572. 


297 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


General  inferences  and  presumptions  of  fact  apply 
in  such  proceedings.30  On  an  inquiry  of  this  kind 
presumptions  will  be  indulged,  requiring  evidence 
to  overcome  them,  of  the  regularity  and  validity  of 
proceedings  in  the  case  anterior  to  judgment,31  of 
the  correctness  of  recitals  in  the  record,32  and  of 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.33  In  a  direct  attack 
of  this  character  all  these  presumptions  are  prima 
facie  only,  and  may  be  contradicted  by  proof,34  and 
it  has  been  held  that  no  presumption  of  regularity 
will  be  indulged  in  support  of  the  judgment.35  On 
the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  the  record  can- 
not be  impeached  in  a  proceeding  instituted  at  a 
subsequent  term.36  Where  the  application  is  by 


motion  to  strike,  and  such  proceeding  is  available 
only  to  reach  defects  apparent  on  the  face  of  the 
record,  the  record  must  be  taken  as  true  and  mat- 
ters outside  the  record  cannot  be  considered.37 

Admissibility.  General  rules  govern  as  to  the  ad- 
missibility  of  evidence  in  a  proceeding  to  open  or 
vacate  a  judgment.38  Evidence,  in  order  to  be  ad- 
missible, must  be  competent,  relevant,  and  mate- 
rial.39 The  evidence  should  be  confined  to  the  mat- 
ters stated  in  applicant's  moving  papers.40 

Weight  and  sufficiency.  The  facts  on  which  the 
judgment  is  sought  to  be  opened  or  vacated  must 
be  established  by  clear,  strong,  and  satisfactory 
proof,41  and  this  is  especially  true  where  it  is  nee- 


La. — Smith  v.  Crescent  Chevrolet 
Co.,  App.,  1  So.2d  421. 

N.J.— Strong  v.  Strong,  47  A.2d  427 
— Simon  v.  Calabrese,  46  A.2d  58, 
137  N.J.Eq.  581— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  In  re  Gilbert's  Estate,  15 
A.2d  111,  H4,  18  N.J.Misc.  540. 

N.D.— Jacobson  v.  Brey,  6  N.W.2d 
269,  72  N.D.  2-69. 

Ohio. — Eight  v.  Boren,  APP.,  67  N.E. 
2d  48. 

Okl.— Welden  v.  Home  Owners  Loan 
Corporation,  141  P.2d  1010,  193  Okl. 
167— Pruner  v.  McKee,  258  P.  T49, 
126  OkL  121— Elias  v.  Smith,  246 
P.  409,  117  Okl.  273. 

Pa.— Keystone  Bank  of  Spangler, 
Pa.,  v.  Booth,  6  A.2d  417,  334  Pa. 
545— Griffith  v.  Hamer,  173  A.  874, 
113  Pa.  Super.  239 — Steehler  v. 
Volk,  167  A.  424,  109  Pa.Super.  190 
—Schwartz  v.  Stewart,  Com.Pl.,  55 
Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  633,  5  Lawrence  X* 
J.  1 — Ftazier  v.  Pursel,  6  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.  102,  39  York  Leg.Rec.  117— 
Roth  v.  Cranmer,  Com.Pl.,  21  Leh. 
L.J.  97 — 'Landau  Bros.  v.  Mclntosh, 
Com.Pl.,  35  Luz.Leg.Reg.  16— 
DTavinger  v.  -Favinger,  Com. PI.,  60 
Montg.Co.  149. 

Tex. — Kern  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  164 
S.W.2d  193,  error  refused— Snell  v. 
Knowles,  Civ.App.,  87  S.W.2d  871, 
error  dismissed. 

Wis. — Corpus  Juris  cited' in  Harris 
v.  Golliner,  294  N.W.  9,  11,  235 
Wis.  572. 

34  C.J.  p  352  note  50. 

30.    N.Y.— Vernon  v.  Gillen  Printing 

Co.,  39  N.Y.S.  172,  16  Misc.  507, 
74  C.J.  p  353  note  53. 
Time  of  discovery  of  Judgment 

In  proceeding  to  vacate  a  judg- 
ment, no  intendments  can  be  in- 
dulged to  establish  the  time  of  dis- 
covery of  entry  of  judgment  except 
such  as  are  shown  by  the  record. 
—Harris  v.  Golliner,  294  N.W,  9,  235 
Wis.  572. 

Sim  U.S. — Baumgartner  v.  II.  S.,  C.C. 
A.Mo.,  138  F.2d  29,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  64  S.Ct  1240,  322  U. 
S,  665,  88  L.Ed.  1525. 


Cal.— Bank  of   Italy   v.   E.   N.   Cad- 

enasso,  274  P.  534,  206  Cal.  436. 
Ga.— Bentcm  v.  Maddox,  192  S.E.  316, 

56  Ga.App.  132. 
Ky. — Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Love  v. 

Reynolds,   146   S.W.2d  41,   284  Ky. 

809. 
N.D. — Jacobson    v.    Brey,    6    N.W.2d 

269,  72  N.D.  269. 
Ohio. — McCullough   v.    Luteman,    15 

Ohio  App.  207. 
Tex. — Smith   v.   Pegram,    80    S.W.2d 

354,  error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  353  note  51. 
Absolute  verities 

In  a  suit  to  set  aside  a  judgment 
it  has  been  stated  that  judgments 
and  decrees  import  absolute  verities. 
—Rice  v.  Moore,  109  S.W.2d  148, 
194  Ark.  585. 

32.  Ark.— First   Nat.   Bank   v.    Dal- 
sheimer,    248    S.W.    575,    157    Ark. 
464. 

34  C.J.  p  353  note  52,  p  356  note  93. 

33.  Ariz.— Bell  v.  Bell,  39  P.2d  629, 
44  Ariz.  520, 

Cal. — Spahn  v.   Spahn,   App.,  162  P. 

2d  53. 
Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Everette  v.  Pette- 

way,  179  So.  666,  131  Fla.  516. 
Mass. — Robinson  v.  Freeman,  128  N. 

E.  718,  236  Mass.  446. 

34.  Ariz.— Bell  v.  Bell,  39  P.2d  629, 
44  Ariz.  520. 

Ark.— State  v.  West,  254  S.W.  828, 
160  Ark.  413. 

Cal.— In  re  Dahnke's  Estate  and 
Guardianship,  222  P.  381,  64  CaL 
App.  555. 

111.— Reid  v.  Chicago  Ry.s.  Co.,  231 
IlLApp.  58. 

Miss. — Bank  of  Richton  v.  Jones,  121 
So.  823,  153  Miss.  796. 

Mo. — Crabtree  v.  .SJtna  Life  Ins.  Co., 
Ill  S.W.2d  103,  341  Mo.  1173. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Single- 
ton v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119,  121, 
35  N.M.  491. 

Okl.— City  of  Clinton  ex  rel.  Rich- 
ardson v.  Cornell,  132  P.2d  340, 
191  Okl.  600— Morrissey  v.  Hurst, 
229  P.  431,  107  Okl.  1— Myers  v. 
Chamness,  228  P.  988,  102  Okl.  131. 

Tex.— Levy  v.   Roper,    Civ.App..   230 

546 


S.W.      514,     modified     on     other 

grounds  256  S.W.  251,  118  Tex.  356. 
34  C.J.  p  353  note  55,  p  356  note  94 

-P  357  note  96. 

Presumptions  on  collateral  attack 
are  not  applicable*. — City  of  Clinton 
ex  rel.  Richardson  v.  Cornell,  132 
P.2d  340,  191  Okl.  600. 

35.  U.S.— Blythe    v.    Hinckley,    C.C. 
Cal.,  84  F.  228,  affirmed  111  F.  827, 
49  C.C.A.  647,  certiorari  denied  22 
S.Ct.    941,    184   U.S.    701,   46   L.EO. 
766. 

34  OJ.  p  353  note  56. 

36.  Mo.— Harrison  v.   Slaton,  49   & 
W.2d  31 — In  re  Henry  County  Mut 
Burial   Ass'n,    77   S.W.2d   124.   229 
Mo.App.  300. 

37.  Pa.— Broadway    Nat.     Bank    of 
Scottdale  v.  Diskin,  161  A.  470,  105 
Pa. Super.  279. 

35.    Idaho.— Baldwin  v.  Anderson,  8 

P.2d  461,  51  Idaho  614. 
N.H.— Barclay  v.  Dublin  Lake  Club, 

1  A.2d  633,  89  N.H.  500. 
Va.— Brame  v.  Nolen,   124   S.E.   299, 

139  Va.  413. 
34  C.J.  p  356  note  88. 

A  petition  to   vacate   is   not  evi- 
dence of  allegations   therein. — Topel 
v.  Personal  Loan  &  Savings  Bank, 
9  N.R2d  75,  290  IlLApp.  558. 
Failure  to  object 

Judge  could  consider  statements  of 
petitioner's  counsel  at  hearing  on  pe- 
tition to  vacate  judgment,  in  absence 
of  exception  to  erroneous  ruling  that 
it  was  unnecessary  to  introduce  sup- 
porting evidence, — Mellet  v.  Swan, 
168  N.E.  732,  269  Mass.  173. 

39.  Cal. — Cresta  v.  Ocean  Shore  R. 
Co.,  206  P.  460,  56  Cal.App.  687. 

Pa. — Kines  v.  Grossman,  Com.PL,  51 

Dauph.Co.  58. 
34  C.J.  p  356  note  89. 

40.  N.Y.— Zeltner  v.  Henry  Zeltner 
Brewing  Co.,  83  N.Y.S.  366,  85  App. 
Div.  387. 

34  C.J.  p  356  note  90. 

41.  Ala. — Ex  parte   Dayton   Rubber 
Mfg.  Co.,  122  So.  643,  219  Ala.  482. 

Ark.— Corpus  Juris   quoted  in   Gra- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  297 


essary  to  overcome  an  officer's  return  of  service.42 
According  to  some  authorities,  the  application 
should  be  denied  where  the  evidence  is  evenly  bal- 
anced,48 but  others  hold  that  where  the  court  is  in 


doubt  the  better  course  is  to  give  applicant  the  ben- 
efit of  the  doubt.44  Where  the  proofs  in  support 
of  the  application  are  uncontradicted  and  unim- 
peached,  they  must  be  accepted  as  true.45  Appli- 


ham  v.  Graham,  133  S.W.2d  $27, 
630,  199  Ark.  165. 

Iowa. — In  re  Carpenter's  Estate,  5 
N.W.2d  175,  232  Iowa  919. 

Mont — Burgess  v.  Lasby,  9  P.2d  164, 
91  Mont.  482. 

KM. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Single- 
ton v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119,  121,  35 
N.M.  491. 

Okl. — Welden  v.  Home  Owners  Loan 
Corporation,  141  P.2d  1010,  193 
Okl.  167 — Cummins  v.  Chandler,  97 
P.2d  765,  186  Okl.  200— Burkhart  v. 
Lasley,  75  P.2d  1124,  182  Okl.  43— 
Morrison  v.  Swink,  261  P.  209,  128 
Okl.  97. 

Pa.— Plunkett  v.  Raniszewski,  166  A. 
500,  108  Pa.Super.  506— Nellis  v. 
McSweeney,  6  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  608, 
6  Erie  Co.  166 — Frazier  v.  Pursel, 
6  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  102,  39  York  Leg. 
Rec.  117 — Kines  v.  Grossman,  Com. 
PL,  51  Dauph.Co.  58— Hollenbaugh 
v.  Welchans,  Com.PL,  46  Dauph.Co. 
165— Neon  Electric  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Hultzapple,  Com.PL,  27  DeLCo.  174 
— E.  P.  Wilbur  Trust  Co.  v.  Arm- 
strong, Com.Pl.,  20  Leh.L.J.  112— 
Miller  v.  Miller,  Com.Pl.,  37  Luz. 
Leg.  Reg.  19 — Dinicuola  v.  Agresta, 
Com.Pl.,  34  Luz.Leg.Reg.  204— Pish 
v.  Regula,  Com.Pl.,  33  Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  249 — Lincoln  Deposit  &  Sav- 
ings Bank  v.  Kline,  Com.PL,  33 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  117 — Kurlancheek  v. 
Aruscavage,  Com.PL,  32  Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  272 — Goeringer  v.  Bonner, 
Com.PL,  32  Luz.Leg.Reg.  231 — 
Bridgeport  Realty  Co.  v.  lonnone, 
Com.PL,  61  Montg.Co.  284— Favin- 
ger  v.  Favinger,  Com.Pl.,  60  Montg. 
Co.  149 — Austra  v.  Yurgenc,  Com. 
PL,  8  Sch.Reg,  96. 

Wis. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Harris 
v.  Golliner,  294  N.W.  9.  11,  235 
Wis.  572. 

34  C.J.  p  358  note  99. 

Presumption 

Judgment  or  order  of  court  of 
general  jurisdiction  should  not  be 
set  aside  merely  on  a  statutory  pre- 
sumption, such  as  presumption  of 
regular  performance  of  official  duty. 
—Burgess  v.  Lasby,  9  P.2d  164,  91 
Mont  482.' 

Want  of  Jurisdiction  must  be  es- 
tablished by  more  than  a  preponder- 
ance of  the  evidence  where  the  rec- 
ord recites  Jurisdiction^  facts. — 
Hayes  v.  Kerr,  45  N.T.S.  1050,  19 
App.Div.  91. 

Clerical  misprision  cam  only  fee 
•hown  "by  record,  and,  where  not  so 
shown,  exception  to  Judgment  based 
thereon  cannot  avail. — Newman  v. 
Ohio  Valley  Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co., 
299  S.W.  559,  221  Ky.  616. 


Evidence  held  sufficient 

111. — Central  Cleaners  and  Dyers  v. 
Schild,  1  N.B.2d  90,  284  IlLApp. 
267. 

Iowa.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  Chicago,  231  N. 
W.  453,  210  Iowa  521,  69  A.L.R. 
1329. 

Ky. — Klarer  Provision  Co.  v.  Frey,  66 
S.W.2d  63,  252  Ky.  206. 

Mass.— Maki  v.  New  Tork,  N.  H.  & 
H.  R.  Co.,  199  N.E.  760,  293  Mass. 
223. 

N.T. — Karchman  -v.  Karchman,  230 
N.Y.S.  856,  224  App.Div.  773. 

Okl.— Bastland  v.  Oklahoma  City, 
246  P.  830,  118  Okl.  97. 

Pa.— Bickel  v.  Maddak,  158  A.  614, 
104  Pa.Super.  325-— Safe  Deposit  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Cassella,  83  Pa.Super. 
255 — Trump  v.  Barr,  Com.PL,  48 
Dauph.  Co.  455 — Cramer  v.  Size- 
more,  Com.Pl.,  48  Dauph.Co.  169 — 
Hayes  v.  Mack,  Com.PL,  19  Brie 
Co.  501. 

34  C.J.  p  358  note  99  [a]. 

Evidence  held  insufficient 

U.S. — Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Irons,  C.C.A.N. 
J.,  48  F.2d  60,  certiorari  denied  51 
S.Ct  649,  283  U.S.  857,  75  L.Bd. 
1463. 

Ariz. — Patterson  v.  Connolly,  77  P.2d 
813,  51  Ariz.  443. 

Ga. — Burch  v.  Dodge  County,  20  S.B. 
2d  428,  193  Ga.  890. 

Ky. — Spencer  v.  Martin  Mining  Co., 
83  S.W.2d  39,  259  Ky.  697— Citi- 
zens' Ins.  Co.  of  New  Jersey  v. 
Railey,  77  S.W.2d  420,  256  Ky.  838 
—Barnes  v.  Montjoy's  Adm'r,  290 
S.W.  349,  217  Ky.  465. 

Md.— Wagner  v.  Scurlock,  170  A.  539, 
166  Md.  284. 

Mass.— Mellet  v.  Swan,  168  N.B.  732, 
269  Mass.  173. 

Minn.— Wilcox  v.  HedWall,  243  N.W. 
709,  186  Minn.  504— In  re  Belt 
Line,  Phalen,  and  Hazel  Park  Sew- 
er Assessment,  222  N.W.  520,  176 
Minn.  59 — Hede  v.  Minneapolis 
Const  Co.,  215  N.W.  859,  172  Minn. 
462. 

N.M.— Board  of  Com'rs  of  Quay 
County  v.  Wasson,  24  P.2d  1098,  37 
N.M.  503,  followed  in  Board  of 
Com'ra  of  Quay  County  v.  Gard- 
ner, 24  P.2d  1104,  37  N.M.  514. 

N.T.— Halper  v.  Broadmain  Const. 
Corp.,  60  N.T.S.2d  533. 

OkL — Cummins  v.  Chandler,  97  P. 
2d  765,  186  Okl.  200— State  ex  rel. 
Williams  v.  Smith,  59  P.2d  410, 
177  Okl.  321— Coker  v.  Vierson,  41 
P.2d  95,  170  Okl.  528. 

Pa.— Keystone  Bank  of  Spangler,  Pa., 
v.  Booth,  6  A.2d  417,  334  Pa.  545— 
Kaufman  v.  Feldman,  180  A.  101, 
118  Pa.Super.  435— Ferrainolo  v. 
Locker,  167  A.  651,  110  Pa.Super. 

547 


128— Phillips  &  Sons  Co.  v.  Worley 
Corporation,  97  Pa.  Super.  506 — 
Bixler  &  Co.  v.  Stoker  &  Son,  91 
Pa.Super.  265 — Farmers'  &  Mer- 
chants' Deposit  Co.  v.  McAvoy,  87 
Pa.Super.  569 — Lapensohn  v. 
Swann,  83  Pa. Super.  192 — Common- 
wealth v.  Burke,  84  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
447,  46  Dauph.Co.  270 — Dymond  v. 
DeLong,  Com.Pl.,  38  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
265 — Lincoln  Deposit  &  Savings 
Bank  v.  Kline,  Com. PL,  33  Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  117— Favinger  v.  Favinger, 
Com.PL,  60  Montg.Co.  149. 

S.C.— Detroit  Fidelity  &  Surety  Co. 
v.  Foster,  169  S.B.  871,  170  S.C. 
121. 

Tex — Turner  v.  Larson,  Civ.App.,  72 
S.W.2d  397,  error  dismissed — First 
State  Bank  of  Loraine  v.  Jackson, 
Civ.App.,  13  S.W.2d  979. 

34  C.J.  p  358  note  99  [b]. 

Evidence  held  to  establish  laches 

OkL— Walker  v.  Gulf  Pipe  Line  Co., 
226  P.  1046,  102  Okl.  7. 

42.  Ala. — Ex  parte  New  Home  Sew- 
ing Mach.  Co.,  189  So.  874,  238  Ala. 
159. 

Tex. — Johnson  v.  Cole,  Civ.App.,  138 

S.W.2d  910,  error  refused. 
34  OJ.  p  358  note  1. 

43.  N.M.-^Corpus    Juris    quoted    i* 
Singleton  v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119, 
121,  35  N.M.  491. 

Pa. — Kaufman   v.    Feldman,    180    A* 
101,    118    Pa.Super.    435— Nelly   v. 
Diskin,    173  A.   735,   113   Pa,Super. 
249 — Saslow  v.  Saslow,  100  Pa. Su- 
per. 414 — Frazier  -v.  Pursel,  6  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  102,  39  York  Leg.Rec, 
117 — Charles  B.  Scott  Co.  v.  Oliver, 
Com.PL,  1  Monroe  L.R.  143. 
34   C.J.  p  359  note  3,  p   360  note  8. 
Mere  conflict  of  evidence  or  oaths 
does  not  warrant  opening  of  Judg- 
ment— Pierce,  to  Use  of  Snipes,  v. 
Kaseman,  192  A.  105,  326  Pa.  280— 
Mielcuszny  v.  Rosol,  176  A.  236,  317 
Pa.  91— Kienberger  v.  Lally,  198  A. 
453,  130  Pa.Super.  583— McCarty,  to 
Use    of    Hoblitzell    Nat.    Bank    of 
Hyndman,    v.   Bmerick,   170   A.    326, 
111  Pa.Super.  463— New  York  Joint 
Stock  Land  Bank  v.  Kegerise,  Com. 
PI.,     29    Berks    Co.     296— Kines    v. 
Grossman,  Com.PL,  51  Dauph.Co.  58 
— Aponikas  v.  Skrypkun,  Com.PL,   5 
Sch.Reg.     1 — Gapes     v.     Lawrenitis, 
Com.PL,  4  SctuReg.   403— Stetsko  v. 
Lea,  Com.PL,  26  WestCo.  97— M.  & 
H.  Pure  Food  Stores  v.  Moul,  Com. 
PL,  51  York  Leg.Rec.  197. 

44.  CaL— Salazar  v.  Steelman,  71  P. 
2d  79,  22  Cal.App.2d  402— Callaway 
v.  Wolcott,  266  P.  574,  90  CaLApp. 
753. 

34  C.J.  p  360  note  9.  . 

45.  Colo.— Burlington  Ditch,  Reser- 


§  297 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


cant's  own  sworn  statement  alone  may  be  sufficient 
to  warrant  opening  the  judgment46  Various  cir- 
cumstances may  rende'r  opposing  affidavits  of  un- 
equal weight.47  In  case  of  a  decided  and  irrecon- 
cilable conflict  in  the  evidence  for  and  against  the 
motion,  it  has  been  held  that  the  court  must  decide 
according  to  the  fair  preponderance  of  the  evi- 
dence.48 Thus,  where  there  are  opposing  affidavits, 
but  one  party  or  the  other  is  corroborated  by  cir- 
cumstances, admissions,  or  evidence  drawn  from  the 
record,  the  decision  will  be  in  his  favor.49  The 
court  can  act  on  knowledge  of  facts  which  occurred 
in  open  court  without  formal  proof.50 

Fraud  or  collusion  must  be  clearly  shown  in  or- 
der to  authorize  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  on 
this  ground;51  a  balanced  case  is  not  enough.52 
However,  the  requirement  as  to  proof  is  less  strin- 
gent where  the  application  is  made  during  the  judg- 
ment term.53 

Unauthorised  appearance.  While  a  judgment 
based  on  an  unauthorized  appearance  by  an  attor- 
ney is  generally  voidable,  and  subject  to  be  set 
aside  on  that  ground,  in  order  that  a  judgment  may 
be  vacated  on  such  ground,  want  of  authority  on 
the  part  of  the  attorney  must  be  clearly  shown,54 
especially  where  innocent  third  persons  have  ac- 


quired rights  under  the  judgment  or  decree  sought 
to  be  set  aside.55 

§  298.    Status  of  Judgment  Pending  Applica- 
tion 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  Judgment  does 
not  suspend  or  stay  the  operation  of  the  judgment. 

The  filing  of  a  motion  or  petition  to  vacate  a 
judgment  does  not  suspend  its  operation,  or  prevent 
the  issue  and  execution  of  •  final  process  on  it.5s 
On  the  contrary,  some  cases  hold  that  such  action 
admits  the  regularity  of  the  judgment  and  waives 
any  objections  to  it  on  that  score,57  but  an  appli- 
cation to  vacate  a  void  judgment  does  not  make  it 
effectual  for  any  purpose.58 

§  299.    Hearing  and  Determination  in  Gen- 
eral 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  Is  to  be 
disposed  of  on  equitable  principles.  The  parties  are  en- 
titled to  a  hearing,  and  it  is  proper  to  determine  the 
existence  and  sufficiency  of  alleged  grounds  for  relief  be- 
fore considering  whether  a  meritorious  cause  of  action 
or  defense  exists. 

The  applicant  for  the  opening  or  vacation  of  a 
judgment  is  entitled  to  a  hearing;59  on  a  contested 
application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment,  the  court 
should  hear  both  parties  and  examine  into  all  per- 
tinent facts  and  circumstances,60  and  it  is  error  to 


voir   &   Land    Co.    v.    Ft.    Morgan 

Reservoir  &  Irrigation  Co.,  151  P. 

432,  59  Colo.  571. 
34  C.J.  p  359  note  6. 
46.  Ind. — International  Bldgr.  & 

Loan  Ass'n  v.   Stark,   89  N.E.  611, 

44  Ind.App.  535. 
34  C.J.  p  359  note  2. 
Applicant's  unsupported  oath 

As  a  general  rule,  the  court  will 
not  open  a  judgment  on  the  unsup- 
ported oath  of  defendant,  where  the 
testimony  of  plaintiff  is  directly  con- 
tradictory; but  where  there  is  cor- 
roboration,  or  where  there  are  cir- 
cumstances on  which  corroborative 
inferences  may  be  drawn  in  favor 
of  defendant,  the  court  ordinarily 
will  open  the  judgment  and  submit 
the  Question  in  dispute  to  a  Jury. — 
Hotaling  v.  Fisher,  79  Pa. Super.  103. 

47.  Mont — Hag-gin  v.  Lorentz,  34  P. 
607,  13  Mont  406. 

34  C.J.  p  359  note  4. 

48.  Pa. — Appeal  of  Jenkintown  Nat 
Bank,  17  A.  2,  124  Pa.  337,   345.- 

34  C.J.  p  360  note  7. 

49.  Minn.— Fitzgerald  v.  Fitzgerald, 
152  N.W.  772,   129  Minn.  414. 

34  C.J.  p  359  note  5. 

60.    Iowa. — State   Ins.   Co.   v.   Gran- 
ger, 17  N.W.  504,  62  Iowa  272. 

34  C.J.  p  360  note  10. 
Tacts  within,  the  trial  judge's  per- 

•oaal  knowledge  may  be  considered 


in  determining  whether  a  judgment 
should  be  vacated  on  grounds  of  a 
clerical  error,  and  in  vacating  or  cor- 
recting a  clerical  error  or  mistake 
the  judge  may  give  effect  to  his  own 
recollection. — Bastajian  v.  Brown, 
120  P.2d  9,  19  Cal.2d  209.  , 

51.  U.S.—Fiske  v.  Buder,  C.C.A.MO., 

125  F.2d  841. 

Cal.— Cowan  v.  Cowan,  App.,  166  P. 
2d  21. 

111.— In  re  Togneri's  Estate,  IB  N.E. 
2d  908,  296  IlLApp.  33. 

Iowa.— Watt  v.  Dunn,  17  N.W.2d  811. 

.34  C.J.  p  360  note  12—23  C.J.  P  25 
note  27. 

Evidence  held  insufficient 

U.S. — Sorenson  v.  Sutherland,  C.C.A. 
N.Y.,  109  F.2d  714,  affirmed  Jack- 
son v.  Irving  Trust  Co.,  61  S.Ct 
826,  311  U.S.  494,  85  L.Bd.  297. 

Ark.— Karnes  v.  Gentry,  172  S.W.2d 
424,  205  Ark.  1112— Bank  of  Rus- 
sellville  v.  Walthall,  96  S.W.2d  952, 
192  Ark.  1111. 

N.D. — Jacobson  v.  Brey,  6  N.W.2d 
269,  72  N.D.  269. 

Okl.— Pruner  v.   McKee,   258   P.   749, 

126  Okl.  121. 

Tex. — Surge  v.   Broussard,  Civ. App., 

258  S.W.  502. 
Wash.— Harter  v.  King  County,   119 

P.2d  919,  11  Wash.2d  583. 
34  C.J.  p  360  note  12  [b]. 

52.  N.T.— Hill  v.  Northrop,  9  How. 
Pr.  525. 

34  C.J.  p  361  note  13. 


53.  Iowa. — Cedar  Rapids  Finance  & 
Thrift  Co.  v.  Bowen,  233  N.W.  495, 
211  Iowa  1207. 

54.  Mo. — Patterson  v.  Tancey,  71  S. 
W.    845,   97   Mo.App.   681,    695. 

34  C.J.  p  361  note  16. 

55.  HL — Kenyon   v.    Shreck,    52    111. 
382. 

56.  Mo. — Childs  v.  Kansas  City,  St. 
J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.,  23  S.W.  373,  117 
Mo.  414,  423. 

34  C.J.  p  361  note  18. 

57.  Neb.— Tootle  v.  Jones,  27  N.W. 
635,  19  Neb.  588. 

34  OJ.  p  361  note  19. 

58.  Kan. — Morris  v.  Winderlln,   142 
P.  944,  92  Kan.  935. 

59.  N.C. — Cincinnati    Coffin    Co.     v. 
Topp,    175    S.B.    164,   206   N.C.    716. 

80.  N.M.— Arias  v.  Springer,  78  P:2d 
153,  157,  42  N.M.  350— Corpus  Ju- 
ris quoted  in,  Singleton  v.  Sana- 
brea,  2  P.2d  119,  121,  35  N.M.  491. 

Ofcl. — McNac  v.  Kinch,  238  P.  424, 
113  Okl.  59 — McNac  v.  Chapman, 
223  P.  350,  101  Okl.  121. 

Pa. — Kingston  Nat  Bank  v..Wruble, 
Com.Pl.f  38  Luz.Leg.Reg.  "321. 

Tex. — Kern  v.  Smith,  Civ. App.,  164 
S.W.2d  193,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  363  note  48. 

Hearing    and    determination    of   ap- 
plication to  open  or  vacate: 
Default  judgment  see  infra  §  337. 
Judgment  by  confession  see  infra 
S  326. 


548 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


299 


grant  or  dismiss  the  motion  summarily  or  on  an  ex 
parte  hearing,  unless  the  question  at  issue  is  one 
which  can  be  determined  from  an  inspection  of  the 
record,  or  unless  the  facts  are  such  as  do  not  ad- 
mit of  dispute.61 

Except  where  the  statute  gives  a  right  to  trial  by 
jury,  the  issues  of  fact  arising  on  a  motion  of  this 
kind  are  triable  by  the  court,62  although  it  is  within 
the  power  of  the  court  in  a  proper  case  to  award  an 
issue  to  be  tried  by  a  jury,63  or  to  order  a  refer- 
ence,64 or  itself  to  proceed  to  take  an  accounting.65 
In  conducting  the  investigation,  the  court  possesses 
all  the. powers  of  a  chancellor,66  and  it  is  its  duty 
to  weigh  the  evidence  and  determine  the  credibility 
of  the  witnesses.67  - 

The   application  may  be  tried  on  affidavits  or 


depositions  where  the  proceeding  is  by  motion  or 
petition  in  the  cause,68  or  by  statutory  complaint 
.and  summons,69  although  in  the  latter  case  it  has 
been  said  that  the  trial  should  be  on  legal  evidence, 
as  in  the  case  of  an  action,  and  not  on  affidavit.70 
If  not  satisfied  with  the  affidavits,  the  court  may  re- 
quire the  parties  to  present  oral  evidence.71  It  has 
been  held  that,  where  the  affidavits  are  in  conflict, 
testimony  must  be  taken,72  but  it  has  also  been  held 
that  where  the  conflict  is  not  likely  to  be  resolved 
by  the  taking  of  testimony  it  is  not  necessary.73 

The  inquiry  will  generally  be  limited  to  the  mat- 
ters set  up  in  support  of  the  motion  and  in  oppo- 
sition to  it.74  Since,  as  discussed  supra  §  292,  for- 
mal pleadings  in  opposition  are  often  not  required, 
an  objection  to  the  petition  which  has  not  been  em- 


Consideration  not  limited  to  record 
On  motion  to  set  aside  judg- 
ment for  irregularities  patent  on  rec- 
ord and  errors  of  fact  calling  for  in- 
troduction of  evidence  dehors  the 
record,  contention  that  only  matter 
of  record  proper  could  be  considered 
was  not  well  taken.— Crabtree  v. 
JEtna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  S.W.2d  103, 
341  Mo.  1173. 

Failure  of  court  to  pass  on  all  is- 
sues raised  by  petition  to  vacate 
judgment  was  not  error,  If  it  prop- 
erly determined  determinative  issue 
of  res  judicata.— Harju  v.  Anderson, 
234  P.  15,  133  Wash.  506,  44  A.L.R. 
450. 

61.  N.M, — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Singleton  v.   Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119, 
121,  35  N.M.  491. 

34  C.J.  p  364  notes  49,  50. 

62.  Pa.— McCarty,  to  Use  of  Hoblit- 
zell    Nat.    Bank    of    Hyndman,    v. 
Emerick,  170  A.  326,  111  Pa.Super. 
463. 

34  C.J.  p  364  note  51. 
Questions  of  fact 

Motion  to  set  aside  judgment  on 
ground  that  no  summons,  execution, 
or  other  notice  was  ever  legally 
served  on  defendant  presented  ''ques- 
tions of  fact"  and  not  "issues  of 
fact,"  so  that  it  was  for  the  judge 
to  hear  the  evidence,  find  the  facts, 
and  render  judgment  thereon. — Cleve 
v.  Adams,  22  S.B.2d  567,  222  N.C. 
211. 

63.  Pa.— McCarty,  to  Use  of  Hoblit- 
zell    Nat.    Bank    of    Hyndman,    v. 
Emerick,  170  A.  326,  111  Pa.Super. 
463— Kingston  Nat  Bank  v.  Wru- 
ble,  Com.Pl.,  38  Luz.Leg.Reg.  321 — 
Foulk  v.   Oswald,  Com. PI.,   5   Sen. 
Beg.  164. 

34  C.J.  p  364  note  53. 
Conflicting1  testimony  < 

On  petition  to  open  judgment, 
court  need  not,  in  every  case  of  con- 
flicting testimony,  send  case  to  jury. 


— Bader  v.  Sell,  151  A.  683,  401  Pa. 
139.   . 

Issue  properly  submitted  to  jury 
Tex. — Johnson  v.  Cole,  Civ.App.,  138 

S.W.2d  910,  error  refused. 

Presumption  of  payment  of  judg- 
ment by  virtue  of  lapse  of  more  than 
twenty  years  since  entry  thereof 
was  enough  to  carry  case  to  jury  on 
motion  to  open  judgment. — Ott  v. 
Ott,  166  A.  556,  311  Pa.  130. 
Questions  held  for  Jury 

In  suit  to  vacate  judgment,  wheth- 
er plaintiff  was  served,  whether  debt 
forming  basis  of  judgment  existed, 
and  whether  instrument  transferring 
property  was  Intended  as  mortgage, 
held  question  of  fact  determinable 
only  by  the  jury  which  was  im- 
paneled in  the  case. — Farmers'  State 
Bank  of  Burkburnett  v.  Jameson, 
Tex.Com.App.,  11  S.W.2d  299,  re- 
hearing denied  Farmers'  State  Bank 
of  Burkburnett  v.  Jameson,  16  S.W. 
2d  526. 

Where  several  questions  are  to  be 
determined  by  issue,  the  jury  should 
be  required  to  answer  them  separate- 
ly.—Austen  v.  Marzolf,  161  A.  72, 
307  Pa.  232. 

64.  N.T.— Vilas  v.  Pittsburgh  &  M. 
R.   Co.,  25   N.E.  941,   123   N.T.   440, 
20   Am.S.R.    771,    9   L.R.A.    844,    19 
N.T.Civ.Proc.     333,    26    Abb.N.Cas. 
100. 

34  C.J.  p  364  note  54. 

65.  Kan.— Ross  v.  Noble,  51  P.  792, 
6  Kan.App.  361. 

66.  Pa.— Nelly    v.     Diskin,     173     A. 
735,  113  Pa.Super.  249. 

34  C.J.  P  364  note  56. 

67.  Pa. — Helzlsouer  v.  Golub,  160  A. 
118,     306     Pa.     474— Warren     Sav. 
Bank   &   Trust   Co.   v.   Foley,    144 
A.    84,    294    Pa.    176 — Kaufman    v. 
Feldman,  180  A.  101,  118  Pa.Super. 
435 — McCarty,  to  Use  of  Hoblitzell 
Nat.  Bank  of  Hyndman,  v.  Emer- 
ick, '170  A.  326.  Ill  Pa.Super.  463. 

549 


68.  111.— Bird-Sykes    Co.    v.    McNa- 
mara,  252  Ill.App.  262. 

N.M. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in    Sin- 
gleton   v.    Sanabrea,    2    P.2d    119, 
121,  35  N.M.  491. 
34  OJ.  p  353  note  58. 
Determination  on  pleading's 

Where  an  answer  is  filed,  appli- 
cant may  have  depositions  taken 
and  have  the  application  determined 
on  the  petition,  answer,  and  deposi- 
tions, or  he  may  have  the  applica- 
tion determined  on  the  petition  and 
answer,  in  which  case  the  averments 
of  the  answer  will,  be  taken  as  true. 
— M.  A.  Long  Co.  v.  Keystone  Port- 
land Cement  Co.,  153  A.  429,  302  Pa. 
308. 

On  a  lav  question,  raised  by  the 
answer,  averments  of  petition  for 
rule  to  open  judgment  must  be  taken 
as  true. — Gsell  v.  Helman,  164  A. 
853,  108  PsuSuper.  258. 

69.  Ind. — Lake  v.  Jones,  49  Ind.  297. 
70. %  Kan. — Fullenwider   v.   Bwing,    1 

P.  300,  30  Kan.  15. 
34  C.J.  p  353  note  60. 

71.  Ark.— Union     Sawmill     Co.     v. 
Langley,   66   S.W.2d   300,   188   Ark. 
318. 

34  C.J.  p  364  note  57. 

However,  it  has  also  been  held 
that  oral  testimony  may  not  be  tak- 
en on  a  motion. — ;Carr  v.  Commer- 
cial Bank,  18  Wis.  255. 

72.  N.Y.— -Dege    v.     Mascot    Realty 
Corporation,    275    N.Y.S.    884,    243 
App.Div.     546 — Gaines     v.     Bryant 
Park  Bldg.,  28  N.Y.S.2d  215,  appeal 
denied   32  N.Y.S.2d  1018,   263  App. 
Div.  876. 

73.  N.T. — Halper       v.       Broadmain 
Const   Corp.,   60  tt.Y.S.2d  533. 

74.  Pa. — Keystone     Nat.     Bank     of 
Manheira,  now  to  Use  of  Balmer  v. 
Deamer,  18  A.2d  540,  144  Pa. Super. 
52. 

Wash, — Harter  v.  King  County,   119 

P.2d  919,  11  Wash.2d  583. 
34  O.J.  P  364  note  58. 


299 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.'J.S. 


bodied  in  a  pleading  may  nevertheless  be  urged  at 
the  hearing.75 

A  continuance  or  postponement  of  the  hearing 
may  be  had  at  the  discretion  of  the  court  because 
of  the  absence  of  a  party76  or  to  allow  the  filing  of 
additional  affidavits  or  the  presentation  of  addition- 
al evidence.77 

A  proper  and  timely  motion  must  be  decided  on 
its  merits,  and  not  simply  stricken  from  the  files.78 
The  motion  may  be  dismissed  for  want  of  juris- 
diction if  it  appears  that  notice  of  it  was  not  served 
on  the  party  opposing,79  or  it  may  be  withdrawn  by 
the  party  presenting  it,80  or  dismissed  for  his  fail- 
ure to  appear  at  the  hearing.81 

Rules  of  decision.    An  application  to  open  or  va- 


cate a  judgment  is  an  appeal  to  the  equitable  pow- 
ers of  the  court,82  addressed  to  the  discretion  of  the 
court,  as  discussed  infra  §  300,  and  is  to  be  disposed 
of  on  equitable  principles  so  as  to  do  justice  to  all 
persons  concerned.83  Generally  the  discretion  will 
not  be  favorably  exercised  unless  the  enforcement 
of  the  judgment  would  be  unjust,  oppressive,  or  in- 
equitable as  to  the  moving  party,  who  must  be  actu- 
ally or  prospectively  injured  or  prejudiced  by  it,84 
and  be  benefited  by  its  opening  or  vacation,85  or  un- 
less the  motion  can  be  granted  without  material  in- 
justice or  injury  to  the  opposing  party86  or  preju- 
dice to  the  intervening  rights  of  third  persons.87  It 
has  been  held  that  there  is  no  fixed  rule  which  de- 
termines whether  an  application  to  open  or  vacate  a 
judgment  will  be  granted,  but  that  each  case  is  to  be 


75.  Mass.— Lynch  v.  Springfield 
Safe  Deposit  &  Trust  Co.,  13  N.E. 
2d  611,  300  Mass.  14. 

78.    Iowa.— Wilson  v.  Pfaffe,  103  N. 

W.  992. 
34  C.J.  p  364  note  61. 

77.  111. — Central    Cleaners   and    Dy- 
ers v.   Schild,  •!  N.B.2d  90,  284  111. 
App.  267. 

34  C.J.  p  364  note  62. 

Denial  of  continuance  held  not  abuse 

of  discretion 
HI. — Central   Cleaners  and  Dyers  v. 

Schild,    1    N.E.2d    90,    284    HLApp. 

267. 

78.  Mo. — Dower  v.  Conrad,  232  S.W. 
174,  207  Mo.App.  176. 

79.  Ga.— Alken  v.  Wolfe,  76  Ga.  816. 

80.  Ga. — Cherry   v.   Home    Building 
&  Loan  Assoc.,    55    Ga.   19. 

81.  N.Y.— Levine  v.  Munchik,  101  N. 
Y.S.  14,  51  Misc.  556. 

82.  I1L — Fitzgerald    v.    Power,     225 

m. APP.  us. 

Minn. — Tanfcar  Gas  v.  Lumbermen's 
Mut.  Casualty  Co.,  9  N.W.2d  754, 
215  Minn.  265,  146  A.L.R.  1223. 

N.J. — Grant  Inventions  Co.  v.  Grant 
Oil  Burner  Corporation,  145  A.  721, 
104  N.J.Eq.  341— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Davis  v.  City  of  New- 
ark, 17  A.2d  305,  307,  19  N.J.Misc. 
85 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  West 
Jersey  Trust  Co.  v.  Bigham,  191 
A.  743,  744,  118  N.J.Law  160. 

N.D.— Smith  v.  Smith,  299  N.W.  693, 
71  N.D.  110 — Corpus  Juris  quoted 
in  Guenther  v.  Funk,  274  N.W. 
839,  845,  67  N.D.  543. 

Pa, — Keystone  Bank  of  Spangler, 
Pa.,  v.  Booth,  6  A.2d  417,  334  Pa. 
545 — George  v.  George,  178  A.  25, 
318  Pa.  203 — Reidlinger  v.  Camer- 
on, 134  A.  418,  287  Pa.  24— First 

N  Nat.  Bank  v.  Smith,  200  A.  215,  132 
Pa.Super.  73 — Ferrainolo  v.  Lock- 
er, 167  A.  651,  110  Pa.Super.  128 
— McKenzie  Co.  v.  Fidelity  &  De- 


posit Co.  of  Maryland,  Com.Pl.,  54 

Dauph.Co.  294. 
34  C.J.  ji  371  note  76. 
Questions  determinate  in  equity  . 

Court  has  Jurisdiction  to  deter- 
mine all  questions  which  could  be 
determined  in  an  equity  proceeding. 
— Kowatch  v.  Home  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  of  Latrobe,  200  A.  Ill,  131 
Pa.  Super.  517. 

83.  Md. — Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d 
276,  181  Md.  206: 

Mass. — Town  of  Hopkinton  v.  B.  F. 
Sturtevant  Co.,  189  N.E.  107,  285 
Mass.  272 — Alpert  v.  Mercury  Pub. 
Co.,  172  N.B.  223,  272  Mass.  43. 

N.J.— Davis  v.  City  of  Newark,  17  A. 
2d  305,  19  N.J.Misc.  85. 

N.D.— Smith  v.  Smith,  299  N.W.  693, 
71  N.D.  110. 

Pa. — Richey  v.  Gibboney,  34  A.2d 
913,  154  Pa.Super.  1— Page  v.  Wil- 
son, 28  A.2d  706,  150  Pa. Super, 
427. 

Wash.— <torpus  Juris  cited  in  Roth  v 
Nash,  144  P.2d  271,  275,  19  Wash. 
2d  731, 

34  C.J.  p  371  note  78. 

Application  during1  Judgment  term 

(1)  Courts  usually  act  liberally  in 
those  cases  in  which  application  to 
strike  out  a  judgment  is  made  dur- 
ing term  in  which  judgment  was  en* 
tered. — Pioneer   Oil   Heat   v.   Brown, 
16  A.2d  880,  179  Md.  155. 

(2)  Time   for  application   see   su- 
pra §  288. 

Contempt 

Judgment  of  contempt  is  not  nee- 
essary  to  deny  relief  against  court 
order,  but  relief  will  be  denied  if 
person  stands  in  position  of  con- 
tenmer.— Cooper  v.  Cooper,  143  A. 
559,  103  N.J.Eq.  416. 
Defect  cured 

Garaishee's  motion  to  set  aside 
judgment  on  ground  of  variance  in 
name  of  plaintiff  was  properly 
stricken  after  judgment  had  been 
amended. — Merchants'  Grocery  Co.  v 

550 


Albany  Hardware  &  Mill  Supply  Co., 
160  S.B.  658,  44  Ga.App.  112. 
Irregular  judgment 

Action  of  court  in  passing  on  ap- 
plication to  set  aside  judgment,  void- 
able for  irregularity,  is  largely  con- 
trolled by  promptness  with  which 
application  is  made. — Fowler  v.  Fow- 
ler, 130  S.E.  315,  190  N.C.  536. 

84.    N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  La 
Bell  v.  Quasdorf,   184  A.  750,  753, 
116  N.J.Law  868. 
N.Y.— Adair  v.  Adair,  201  N.T.S.  398, 

206  App.Div.  394. 
N.C. — Fowler  v.  Fowler,  130  S.E.  315, 

190  N.C.  536. 

Pa. — Koenig  v.  Curran's  Restaurant 
&  Baking  Co.,  159  A.  553,  306  Pa. 
345. 

34  C.J.  p  372  note  79. 
Rule  as  to  opening  of  default  judg- 
ments see  infra  §  337. 
Petitions  to  vacate  Judgment  are 
extraordinary  in  nature,  and  should 
be  granted  only  after  careful  consid- 
eration,  and  where  required  to  ac- 
complish justice.— Russell  v.   Foley, 
179  N.B.  -619,   278  Mass.   145. 

There  should  be  finality  and  per- 
manenoy  to  court  decrees,  which 
should  not  be  vacated  and  set  aside 
without  careful  consideration,  but 
court  should  be  slow  to  say  that  an 
injustice  may  not  be  corrected  by 
such  means.— In  re  Macior's  Will,  52 
N.T.S.2d  389. 

85.  N.J. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
West  Jersey  Trust  Co.  v.  Bigham, 
119   A.   743,   744,   118  N.J.Law  160. 

34  C.J.  p  372  note  80. 

86.  N.J. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
West  Jersey  Trust  Co.  v.  Bigham, 
119  A.   743,   744.   118  N.J.Law   160. 

34  C.J.  p  372  note  81. 

87.  N.J.— Corpus    Juris     quoted    In 
West    Jersey    Trust    Co.    v.    Big- 
ham,    119    A.    743,    744,    118    N.J. 
Law  160. 

34  C.J.  p  372  note  82. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  299 


determined  on  its  particular  facts.88  The  applica- 
tion should  be  denied  where  the  averments  of 
the  petition  are  denied  and  are  not  supported  by 
proof.8* 

Grounds  of  application.  A  judgment  should  not 
be  opened  or  vacated  unless  it  is  found  that  one  of 
the  statutory  or  other  recognized  grounds  for  such 
action  exists.90  It  has  generally  been  held  that  the 
court  should  limit  its  consideration  to  such  grounds 
for  opening  or  vacating  the  judgment  as  are  set 
forth  in  the  application,91  but  it  has  bsen  held  that 
the  application  should  be  granted  where  sufficient 
grounds  appear  of  record,  although  not  relied  on 
by  the  party  seeking  relief.92  The  application 
should  not  be  granted  in  any  case  where  the  relief 
to  which  the  party  is  entitled  can  more  appropri- 
ately be  awarded  in  some  other  action  or  proceed- 
ing, as  discussed  supra  §  283,  or  where  another  suit 
is  pending  between  the  same  parties  in  which  the 
court  can  grant  all  the  relief  or  protection  called 
for  by  the  equities  of  the  case.98  After  a  motion 
for  a  new  trial  has  been  denied,  a  motion  to  va- 
cate based  on  the  same  grounds  is  improper  and 
will  be  denied.94  It  has  generally  been  held,  some- 


times under  statutes  so  providing,  that  it  is  proper 
for  the  court  to  try  and  determine  the  existence  and 
sufficiency  of  the  alleged  grounds  for  opening  or 
vacating  the  judgment  before  trying  or  deciding  the 
existence  of  a  meritorious  cause  of  action  or  de- 
fense.95 With  respect  to  the  grounds  of  relief,  ev- 
idence will  be  heard  on  both  sides.96  Should  the 
court  find  that  the  grounds  relied  on  are  not  suffi- 
cient, or  are  not  proved,  it  is  unnecessary  to  go  into 
the  inquiry  as  to  the  validity  of  the  defense.97 
However,  both  issues  may  be  tried  together  where 
the  parties  waive  the  right  to  have  them  tried  sep- 
arately.98 

Merits  of  cause  of  action  or  defense.  Where  a 
meritorious  cause  of  action  or  defense  is  required, 
as  discussed  supra  §  290,  a  judgment  should  not  be 
opened  or  vacated  until  it  is  found  and  adjudged 
that  there  is  a  cause  of  action,  or  a  defense  to  the 
action  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered.99  Aft- 
er it  has  been  decided  that  the  grounds  of  the  ap- 
plication are  sufficient,  in  order  that  the  validity  of 
the  defense  may  be  adjudged,  an  issue  or  issues 
may  be  made  up  and  a  trial  had  thereon.1  The 
court  is  not  to  try  and  decide  the  merits  of  the 
proposed  cause  of  action  or  defense,2  but  is  only  to 


88.  Ga.— Deen  v.  Baxley  State  Bank, 
15  S.E.2d  194,  192  Ga.  300. 

Mont.— Rieckhoff  v.  Woodhull,  75  P. 
2d  56,  106  Mont.  22. 

89.  Pa. — Ferguson  v.  O'Hara,  132  A. 
801,  286  Pa,  37. 

90.  N.T. — Duffield  v.  Franklin  Lum- 
ber Co.,  248  N.T.S.  5,  231  App.Div. 
510. 

Ohio.— Washington   v.   (Levinson,    35 
N.E.2d  .161,    -66    Ohio    App.    461— 
Minetti  v.   Einhorn,  173  N.B.   243, 
36  Ohio  App.  310. 
34  C.J.  p  373  note  85. 
Convenience  of  party 

An  application  will  not  "be  grant- 
ed for  the  mere  convenience  of  the 
moving  party  or  to  restore  to  him 
some  right  or  advantage  which,  he 
has  forfeited.— Davis  v.  Pierce,  52 
Pa.Super.  615—34  C.J.  p  373  note  -86. 
Court's  change  of  view 

The  trial  justice  is  not  authorized 
to  vacate  a  judgment  merely  because 
his  views  have  changed,  and  to  sus- 
tain order  granting  new  trial  the 
record  must  reveal  sufficient  grounds 
for  the  exercise  of  discretionary 
power. — Albright  v.  New  York  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  26  N.Y.S.2d  210,  261  App. 
Div.  '419. 

rinding  of  intent  to  defraud  was 
unnecessary  to  set  aside  judgment 
where  affidavit  for  publication  was 
fraudulent— Wells  v.  Zenz,  256  P. 
484,  83  Cal.App.  137. 

91.  Ga. — White  v.  Hutcheson,  15*4  S. 
E.  157,  41  Ga.App.  602. 


Minn.— Wilcox  v.  Hedwall,  243  N.W. 
709,  186  Minn.  504. 

N.D.— Lee  v.  Luckasen,  204  N.W.  831, 
52  N.£>.  934. 

Pa.— Keystone  Nat  Bank  of  Man- 
helm,  now  to  Use  of  Balmer  v. 
Deamer,  18  A.2d  540,  144  Pa.Su- 
per. 52. 

92.  N.C.— -Skinner  v.  Terry,  12  S.E. 
118,  107  N.C.  103. 

34  C.J.  p  *373  note  88,  p  374  notes  99, 
1. 

93.  N.T.— Wade  v.  De  Leyer,  40  N. 
Y.Super.  541. 

94.  CaL— Treat  v.  Treat,  150  P.  57, 
170  Cal.  337. 

Ga. — Manry  v.  Stephens,  9  S,E.2d  58, 
190  Ga,  305. 

95.  Ark. — Jerome    Hardwood    Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Jackson- Vreeland  Land 
Corporation,     254    S.W.     660,     160 
Ark.  303. 

N.M.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Sin- 
gleton v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119,  121, 
35  N.M.  -491. 

Ohio.— Horwitz  v.  Murri,  156  N.B. 
420,  24  Ohio  App.  109. 

?4  C.J.  p  373  notes  94,  95. 

96.  N.M.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Singleton  v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119, 
121,  35  N.M.  491. 

34  C.J.  p  374  note  96. 

97.  N.M.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Woodson  v.  -Baynoldfi,  76  P.2d  34, 
41,  42  N.M.  161. 

Wash. — Harte*  v.  King  County,   119 

P.2d  919,  11  Wash.2d  583. 
34  C.J.  p  374  note  97. 

551 


98.  N.M. — Corpus    Juris    guoted    in 
Singleton  v.  Sanabrea,  2  P.2d  119, 
121,  35  N.M.  491. 

34  C.  J.  p  374  note  98. 

99.  111. — Emcee       Corporation       v. 
George,    12    N.B.2d    333,    293    I1L 
App.  240. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Crow  v. 

Crow-Humphrey,     73    S.W.2d     807, 

813,  335  Mo.  636. 
Neb.— Morrill  Qounty  v.  Bliss,  249  N. 

W.  98,  125  Neb.  97,  89  A.L.R.  932. 
N.C.— Garrett  v.  Trent,  4  S.E.2d  319, 

216  N.C.  162. 
Ohio.— Minetti  v.   Einhorn,   173   N.B. 

248,  36  Ohio  App.  310— Horwitz  v. 

Murri,  156  N.E.  420,  24  Ohio  App. 

109. 
Pa.— Fidelity  Title   &   Trust  Co.   v. 

Garrett,  194  A.  39$,  327  Pa.  305— 

Helzlsouer  v.  Golub,  160  A.  11-8,  306 

Pa.  474 — Roper  v.  Scevcnik,  194  A. 

333,  128  PfuSuper.  453. 
34  C.J.  p  374  notes  2,  3,  p  375  note  9, 

p  376  notes  10,  11. 
Dismissal 

A  finding  that  applicant  is  without 
a  meritorious  defense  warrants  a 
dismissal  of  the  application.-— 
Braughon  v.  Warren,  199  S.E.  -629, 
214  N.C.  404. 
L,  Kan.— List  v.  Jockheck,  27  P.  184, 

45  Kan.  349,  748. 
34  C.J.  p  37*5  note  5. 
2.  Ohio. — Lutkenhouse  v.  Telia, 

App.,    60    N,E.2d    798— Mosher    v. 

Gross,  App.,  60  N.B.2d  730— Wash- 
ington v.  ILevinson,  85  N.E.2d  161, 

66  Ohio  At>p.  461. 


300 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


inquire  whether  it  is  meritorious,  interposed  in  good 
faith,  and  prima  facie  sufficient.8 

§  300.    Discretion  of  Court 

The  determination  of  an  application  to  open  or  va- 


cate a  judgment  generally  rests  in  the  sound  legal  dis- 
cretion of  the  court. 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  is 
generally  addressed  to  the  sound  legal  discretion  of 
the  court  on  the  particular  facts  of  the  case,4  and 


Okl.— Nero  v.  Brooks,  244  P.  588,  116 

Okl.  279. 
Wash. — State    v.    Superior    Court    ir 

and   for   Spokane    County,    267    P. 

775,  148  Wash,  24. 
34  C.J.  p  375  note  6. 

3.  Ohio. — Luktenhouse      v.      Vella. 
App.,     60    N.E.2d    798— Mosher    v. 
Goss,  App.,   60  N.E.2d  730— Wash- 
ington v.  Levinson,  35  N.E.2d  161, 
66  Ohio  App.  461. 

Okl.—Corpus   Juris    cited  in  Honey- 

cutt  v.  Severin,  98  P.2d  1093,  1095, 

186  Okl.  509. 
Wash. — State   v.    Superior  Court   in 

and    for    Spokane    County,    267    P. 

775,  148  Wash.  24. 
34  C.J.  p  375  notes  7,  8. 

4.  TT.S. — Western    Union    Telegraph 
Co.  v.  Dismang,  C.C.A.Okl.,  106  F. 
2d   362— Coggeshall   v.  U.   S.,  C.C. 
A.S.C.,  95  F.2d  986 — Peters  v.  Mu- 
tual Life  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  D. 
C.Pa.,   17  F.Supp.  246,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  C.C.A.,  92  F.2d  301. 

Ariz. — School  Dist.  No.  9  of  Apache 
County  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Hoi- 
brook,  118  P.2d  78,  5S  Ariz.  -86— 
Blair  v.  Blair,  62  P.2d  1321,  49 
Ariz.  501— Corpus  Juris  cited  to 
Smith  v.  Washburn  &  Condon,  297 
P.  879,  38  Ariz.  149— Faltts  v.  Col- 
achis,  274  P.  776,  35  Ariz.  78. 

Ark.— Clark  v.  Bowen,  -5-6  S.W.2d 
1032,  1°,6  Ark.  931. 

CaL— Miller  v.  -Lee,  125  P.2d  627,  62 
Cal.App.2d  10 — In  re  Bartholo- 
mew's Adoption,  84  P.2d  199,  29 
Cal.App.2d;  343— In  re  McCarthy's 
Estate,  73  P.2d  914,  23  Cal.App.2d 
398. 

Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Moun- 
tain v.  Stewart,  149  P.2d  176,  112 
Colo.  302. 

Conn. — Boushay  v.  Boushay,  27  A.2d 
800,  129  Conn.  347. 

D.C.— Bush  v.  Bush,  63  F.2d  134,  61 
APP.D.C.  357. 

Fla. — Lawyers  Co-op.  Pub.  Co.  v. 
Williams,  5  So.2d  871,  149  Fla. 
390 — Alabama  Hotel  Co.  v.  J.  L. 
Mott  Iron  Works,  98  So.  825,  86 
•Fla,  608. 

Ga. — Raines  v.  Lane,  31  S.E.2d  403, 
198  Ga.  217— Hurt  Bldg.  v.  Atlanta 
Trust  Co.,  182  S.B.  187,  181  Ga,  274 
— Landau  Bros.  v.  Towery,  179  S. 
E.  647,  51  Ga.App.  113.  * 

HI.-— Village  of  La  Grange  Park  v. 
Hess,  163  N.E.  672,  332  111.  236— 
Albers  v.  Martin,  45  N.E.2d  102, 
316  IlLApp.  -44-6— Gliwa  v.  Wasfi- 

*  ington  Polish  'Loan  &  Building 
Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d  736,  310  IlLApp. 
465-^Simon  v.  (Foyer,  17  N.E.2d 
632,  297  IlLApp.  640. 

Iowa. — Scott  v.  Union  Mut.  Casual- 
ty Co.,  252  N.W,  85,  217  low*  390 


—Albright  v.  Moeckley,  237  N.W. 
309— Swan  v.  McGowan,  231  N.W. 
440,  212  Iowa  631. 

Kan. — Hoffman  v.  Hoffman,  135  P.2d 
887,  156  Kan.  647— Ford  v.  Blasdel, 
276  P.  283,  128  Kan.  43. 

La. — Hanson  y.  Haynes,  App.,  170  So. 
257,  rehearing  denied  171  So.  146. 

Mass. — Town  of  Hopkinton  v.  B.  F. 
Sturtevant  Co.,  189  N.E.  107,  283 
Mass.  272— Sweeney  v.  Morey  & 
Co.,  181  N.E.  782,  279  Mass.  495— 
Waltham  Bleachery  &  Dye  Works 
v.  Clark-Rice  Corporation,  175  N. 
B.  174,  274  Mass.  488 — Powdrell  v. 
Du  Bois,  174  N.E.  220,  274  Mass. 
106— Mellet  v.  Swan,  168  N.E.  732, 
•  *9  Mass.  173 — Beserosky  v.  Ma- 
son, 168  N.E.  726,  269  Mass.  325— 
Draper  v.  Draper,  166  N.E.  874,  267 
Mass.  528— Lee  v.  Fowler,  161  N. 
E.  910,  263  Mass.  440. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Mack 
International  Truck  Corporation  v. 
Palmer,  242  N.W,.«98,  259  Mich. 
234— Curtis  v.  Curtis,  229  N.W.  622, 
250  Mich.  105. 

Minn. — In  re  Holum's  Estate,  229  N. 
W.  133,  179  Minn.  315. 

Mo.— Gerber  v.  Schutte  Inv.  Co.,  194 
S.W.2d  25— Allen  v.  Fewel,  87  S. 
W.2d  142,  337  Mo.  955. 

Mont — Kospnen  y.  Waara,  285  P. 
668. 

N.J.— Davis  v.  City  of  Newark,  17  A. 
2d  305,  19  N.J.Misc.  85. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  ^Tot 
Springs  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kenney,  48  P. 
2d  1029,  1031,  39  N.M.  428— Board 
of  Com'rs  of  Quay  County  v.  Was- 
son,  24  P.2d  1098,  37  N.M.  503, 
followed  in  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Quay  Qounty  v.  Gardner,  24  P.2d 
1104,  87  N.M.  514. 

N.Y.— Albright  v.  New  York  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  26  N.Y.S.2d  210,  2-61  App.Div. 
419— Quigg  y.  Treadway,  219  N.Y. 
S.  897,  21$  AppoDiv.  739.  -  . 

N.D.— Bothum  v.  Bothum,  10  N.W.2d 
603,  72  N.D.  649— Jacobson  >.  v. 
Brey,  6  N.W.2d  269,  72  N.D.  269— 
Smith  v.  Smith,  299  N.W.  693,  71 
N.D.  110— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Guenther  v.  (Fink,  274  N.W.  839, 
843,  67  N.D.  5*3. 

Ohio.— Central  Nat.  Bank  of  Cleve- 
land v.  Ely,  App.,  44  N.B.2d  822. 

OkL^Le  Roi  Co.  v.  Grimes,  144  P. 
2d  973,  193  OkL  430— Stull  v. 
Hoehn,  126  P.2.d  1007,  191  Okl.  ISO 
— Donley  v.  Donley,  89  P.2d  312, 
184  Okl.  -5  67— Park  v.  Continental 
OU  Co.,  87  P.2d  324,  184  Okl.  314— 
Babb  v.  National  Life  Ass'n,  86  P. 
2d  771,  1-84  Okl.  273— Sabiu  v.  Sun- 
set Gardens  Co.,  85  P.2d  294,  184 
OkL  106 — Brockman  v.  Fenn  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  <64  P.2d  1208,  179 

552 


Okl.  98 — Fellows  v.  Owens,  62  P.2d 
1215,  178  Okl.  224— Small  v.  White. 
46  P.2d  517,  173  Okl.  83— Stumpf 
v.  Stumpf,  46  P.2d  315,  173  Okl. 
1 — Johnson  v.  Bearden  Plumbing 
&  Heating  Co.,  38  P.2d  500,  170 
Okl.  63 — Vacuum  Oil  Co.  v.  Brett, 
300  P.  632,  150  OM.  153— American 
Inv.  Co.  v.  Wadlington,  277  P.  583, 
136  Okl.  246— Eastland  v.  Okla- 
homa City,  246  P.  830,  118  Okl.  97 
—Bell  v.  Knoble,  225  P.  897,  99 
Okl.  110— Wilson  v.  Porter,  221  P. 
713,  94  OkL  259— Tidal  Oil  Co.  v. 
Hudson,  219  P.  95,  95  OkL  209— 
Dentbn  v.  Walker,  217  P.  386,  90 
Okl.  222— McBride  v.  Cowen,  216 
P.  104,  90  OkL  130. 

Or. — Merryman  v.  Colonial  Realty 
Co.,  120  P.2d  230,  168  Or.  12— 
Bronn  v.  Soules,  11  ±  ,Jd  284,  140 
Or.  308. 

Pa. — Berkowltz  vv.  Kass,  40  A.2d  691, 
351  Pa.  2»63— Bekelja  v.  James  E. 
Strates  Shows,  37  A.2d  502,  349  Pa. 
442— Fidelity  Title  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Garrett,  194  A.  398,  327  Pa.  305— 
Pierce,  to  Use  of  Snipes,  v.  Kase- 
man,  192  A.  105,  326  Pa.  280— 
Schuylkill  Trust  Co.  v.  Sobolewski, 
190  A.  919,  325  Pa.  422— U.  S.  v. 
Savings  &  Trust  Co.  of  Conemaugh 
to  Use  of  Hindes  v.  Helsel,  1-88  A. 
167,  325  -Pa.  1— Bader  v.  Kell,  151 
A.  683,  301  Pa.  139 — Ferguson  v. 

•  O'Hara,  132  A.  801,  286  Pa.  37— 
Tressler  v.  EmeHch,  122  A.  229, 
278  Pa.  128— Brill  v.  Haifetz,  44 
A.23  311,  158  Pa.Super.  158— 
Richey  v.  Gibboney,  34  A.2d  913, 
154  Pa.Super.  1 — Roper  v.  Scev- 
cnik,  194  A.  333,  128  Pa.Super.  453 
— Philadelphia  'Fixture  &  Equip- 
ment Corporation  v.  Carroll,  191  A. 
216,  126  Pa.Super.  454— Kaufman 
v.  IFeldmah,  180  A.  101,  118  Pa.Su- 
per. 435— Landis  v.  Hoch,  164  A. 
828,  108  Pa.Super.  285 — McCoy  ?. 
Royal  Indemnity  Co.,  164  A,  77, 
107  Pa.Super.  486 — Bianca  v.  Kap- 
lan, 160  A.  143,  105  Pa.Super.  98— 
Silent  Auto  Corporation  of  North- 
ern New  Jersey  v.  Folk,  97  Pa.  Su- 
per. '58-8 — J.  S.  Bache  &  Co.  v. 
•Locke,  186  Pa.Super.  501 — Deane  v. 
Geilfuss  &  Co.,  86  Pa, Super.  405 
— Schmitt  v.  Yuhazy,  84  Pa. Super. 
7'6 — Foos  v.  Pogar  &  Pogar,  84  Pa. 
Super.  54 — Rasp  v.  Rasp,  79  Pa. 
Super.  29 — Mann  v.  Schneller,  11 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  205,  21  North.Co. 
240 — Renschler  v.  Piaano,  Com.PL, 
38  Lack.Jur.  157,,  51  York  Leg.Rec. 
109,  affirmed  198  A.  33,  329  Pa. 
249 — Sheaffer  v.  SheofCer,  Com.PL, 
45  Lanc.Revi.  613— Kingston  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Wruble,  ConcuPL,  38  Luz. 
.  Leg.Reg.  32L 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


300 


ordinarily  its  determination  is  conclusive  and  will 
not  be  disturbed  except  for  abuse  of  discretion.5 
This  rule  is  particularly  applicable  where  'relief 


against  the  judgment  is  sought  during  the  term  at 
which  the  judgment  is  entered.6  The  discretionary 
rule  applies  whether  or  not  the  application  to  open 


S.C.— Betsill  v.  Betsill,  196  S.E.  381, 
187  S.C.  50— Jefferson  Standard 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hydride,  141  S.B. 
278,  143  S.C.  127— Ex  parte  Clark, 
118  S.E.  27,  125  S.C.  34. 
Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Both  v. 
Nash,  144  P.2d  271,  275,  19  Wash. 
2d  731 — Agricultural  &  Live  Stock 
Credit  Corporation  v.  McKenzie, 
289  P.  527,  157  Wash.  597— Robert- 
son v.  Wise,  279  P.  106,  152  Wash. 
624. 

Wis. — People's  Trust  &  -Savings  Bank 
v.  Wassersteen,  276  N.W.  330,  226 
Wis.  249— In  re  Meek's  Estate,  227 
N.W.  270,  199  Wis.  802— Erickson 
v.  Patterson,  211  N.W.  775,  191 
Wis.  628. 

34  C.J.  p  365  note  67. 
Purpose  of  rule 

The  discretionary  nature  of  Juris- 
diction to  vacate  a  decree  is  designed 
to  prevent  too  ready  unravelling  of 
judgments,  avoid  putting  a  premium 
on  continued  litigation  and  promote 
considerateness  of  judicial  decision. 
— W.  E.  Hedger  Transp.  Corp.  v.  Ira 
S.  Bushey  &  Sons,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  155 
F.2d  321. 
Wholly  discretionary 

An  application  to  open  a  judgment 
is  addressed  wholly  to  the  discretion 
of  the  court. 
N.J. — Assets     Development     Co.     v. 

Wall,  119  A.  10,  97  N.J.Law  468. 
Pa.— Perri  v.  Perri,   6  A.2d  775,   335 
Pa.  394. 

Largely,  but  not  exclusively,  discre- 
tionary 

The  granting  of  a  petition  for  va- 
cation of  a  judgment  is  addressed 
largely,  although  not  exclusively,"  to 
the  sound  discretion  of  the  court — 
Herlihy  v.  Kane,  38  N.E.2d  £20,  310 
Mass.  457 — 'Lynch  v.  Springfield  Safe 
Deposit  &  Trust  Co.,  13  N.E.2d  611, 
300  Mass.  14 — Kravetz  r.  Lipofsky, 
200  N.B.  865,  294  Mass.  SO— Maki  v. 
New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  199  N. 
E.  760,  293  Mass.  223— Russell  v. 
Foley,  179  N.E.  619,  278  Mass.  145— 
Alpert  v.  Mercury  Pub.  Co.,  172  N.E. 
223,  272  Mass.  43. 

Motion  to  vacate  interlocutory  or- 
der   is    addressed    to    trial    court's 
sound  discretion. — Kirn  v.  Bembury, 
178  S.E.  53,  163  Va.  891. 
Void  Judgment 

Even  where  the  judgment  is  whol- 
ly void,  the  court  may  in  its  discre- 
tion refuse  to  vacate  it  and  leave  the 
party  affected  to  show  that  it  is  void 
whenever  it  is  invoked  against  him. 
— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ouenther 
v.  Funk,  274  N.W.  839,  843,  67  N.D. 
543—34  C.J.  p  369  note  69. 
Attorney's  neglect 

Grant  of  relief  from  consequences 
of  attorney's  neglect  or  denial  there- 


of, on  motion  to  vacate  judgment, 
lies  within  the  discretion  of  the 
court. — First  State  Bank  of  'Thomp- 
son Falls  v.  Larsen,  233  P.  960,  72 
Mont.  400. 

5.  U.S. — Western  Union  Telegraph 
Co.  v.  Dismang,  C.C.A.OkL,  106  F. 
2d  362. 

•Cal.— Potts  v.  Whitson,  125  P.2d  947, 
52  Cal.App.2d  199— Miller  v.  Lee, 
125  P.2d  627,  52  Cal.App.2d  10— 
In  re  Bartholomew's  Adoption,  84 
P.2d  199,  29  Cal.Aj?p.2d  343— In  re 
McCarthy's  Estate,  73  P.2d  914,  23 
Cal.App.2d  398. 
Colo. — Mountain  v.  Stewart,  149  P.2d 

17-6,  112  Colo.  302. 
Ga. — Deen  v.  Baxley,   15  S.E.2d  194, 

192  Ga.  300. 

HI.— Albers  v.  Martin,  45  N.E.2d  102, 
316  Ill.App.  446 — Simon  v.  Foyer, 
17  N.E.2d  632,  297  IlLApp.  640. 

Kan. — Epperson  v.  Kansas  State  'De- 
partment of  Inspections  and  Reg- 
istration, 78  P.2d  850,  147  Kan.  762. 

Mass. — Town  of  Hopkinton  v.  B.  'F. 
-Sturtevant,  189  N.E.  107,  283  Mass. 
272. 

N.C.— Price  v.  Life  &  Casualty  Ins. 
Co.  of  Tennessee,  160  S.E.  367,  201 
N.C.  376. 

Pa.— Berkowitz  v.  Kass,  40  A.2d  691, 
351  Pa.  263— Perri  v.  Perri,  6  A.2d 
775,  335  Pa,  394— Tressler  v.  Emer- 
ick,  122  A.  229,  278  Pa.  128— First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Smith,  200  A.  215, 
132  Pa.  Super.  73 — Kaufman  v. 
Feldman,  180  A.  101,  118  Pa.Super. 
435. 

S.C. — Jefferson    Standard    Life     Ins. 
Co.    v.   Hydrick,    141    S.E.    278,    143 
S.C.  127. 
A  decision  either  way  ordinarily  is 

not  an  abuse  of  discretion. — Davis  v. 

Teachnor,  Ohio  App.,  -53  N.E.2d  208. 

Court's  decision  presumed  to  be  ex- 
ercise of  discretion 

Ga.— Milton  v.  Mitchell  -County  Elec- 
tric Membership  Ass'n,  12  S.E.2d 
367,  -64  Ga.App.  63. 

Discretion  held  not  abused 
(1)  By  denial  of  relief. 

AHZ. — School  Dist.  No.  9  of  Apache 
County  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Hoi- 
brook,  118  P.2d  78,  58  Ariz.  S6. 

CaL — In  re  Mallon's  Estate,  93  P.2d 
245,  34  Cal.App.2d  147. 

Conn. — Kaiser  v.  Second  Nat.  Bank, 

193  A.  761,  123  Conn.  248. 

Ga. — American  Commercial  -Service 
v.  Bailey,  130  S.E.  370,  34  Ga_App. 
540. 

I1L— Herr  v.  Morgan,  57  N.E.2d  141, 
324  IlLApp.  16— Albers  v.  Martin, 
45  N.E.2d  102,  316  IlLApp.  446. 

Mont — -First  State  Bank  of  Thomp- 
son QFalls  v.  Larsen,  233  P.  960, 
72  Mont.  400. 

N.M.— Board  of  Com'rs  of  Quay 
County  v.  Wasson,  24  P.2d  1098, 

553 


37  N.M.  503,  followed  in  Board  of 
Com'rs  of  Quay  County  v.  Gard- 
ner, 24  P.2d  1104,  37  N.M.  51'4. 

Pa, — Bekelja  v.  James  E.  Strates 
Shows,  37  A.2d  502,  849  Pa.  442 — 
Perri  v.  Perri,  6  A.2d  775,  335  Pa. 
394— Griffith  v.  Hamer,  173  A.  874, 
113  Pa.Super.  239 — Meehan  v. 
Shreveport-Eldorado  Pipe  Line  Co., 
164  A.  364,  107  Pa.Super.  580 — 
Roberts  Electric  Supply  Co.  v. 
Crouthamel,  97  Pa. Super.  463 — Pe- 
ters v.  Alter,  89  Pa. Super.  34. 
(2)  By  grant  of  relief. 

Ga. — Deen  v.  Baxley  State  Bank,  15 
•S.E.2d  194,  192  Ga,  300— Allison  V. 
Garber,  178  S.E.  158,  50  GcuApp. 
333. 

Mass.— Smith  v.  Brown,  184  N.E.  383, 
282  Mass.  $1. 

OkL— Long  v.  Hill,  145  P.2d  434,  193 
Okl.  463 — American  Inv.  Co.  v. 
Wadlington,  277  P.  583,  13-6  OKI. 
246. 

Pa, — H.  H.  Robertson  Co.  v.  Pfotzer, 
28  A.2d  721,  150  Pa.Super.  457. 

6.  Ala. — Reese  &  Reese  v.  Burton  & 
Watson  Undertaking  Co.,  184  So. 
'820,  28  Ala.App.  384. 

Colo. — London  Option  Gold  Mining 
Co.  v.  Dempsey,  66  P.2d  327,  100 
Colo.  156. 

Conn. — Kaiser  v.  Second  Nat.  Bank, 
193  A.  761,  123  Conn.  248-^Ideal 
Financing  Ass'n  r.  LaBonte,  180  A. 
.300,  120  Conn.  190 — Connecticut 
Mortgage  &  Title  Guaranty  Co.  v. 
Di  Francesco,  151  A.  491,  112  Conn. 
673. 

Ga. — Hardwick  v.  Shah  an,  118  S.E. 
575,  30  Ga,App.  526. 

Kan. — Epperson  v.  Kansas  State  De- 
partment of  Inspections  and  Reg- 
istration, 78  P.2d  850,  147  Kan.  762 
— Schubach  v.  Hammer,  232  P. 
1041,  117  Kan.  615. 

Ky. — Kentucky  Home  Mut.  'Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Hardin,  126  S.W.2d  427,  277 
Ky.  565. 

Md. — Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d  27-6, 
181  Md.  206— Silverberg  v.  Dear- 
holt,  22  A.2d  588,  180  Md.  38. 

Neb.— Holman  v.  Stull,  267  N.W.  149, 
130  Neb.  876. 

Ohio. — Thompson  v.  Stonom,.  App., 
57  N.E.2d  788— Davis  v.  Teachnor, 
App.,  53  N.E.2d  208— Mosher  v. 
Mutual  Home  &  Savings  Ass'n, 
App.,  41  N.E.2d  871. 

OkL— Long  v.  Hill,  145  P.2d  434,  193 
OkL  463— Pitts  v.  Walker,  105  P.2d 
760,  188  OkL  17— Montague  v. 
State  ex  rel.  Commissioners  of 
Land  Office  of  Oklahoma,  £9  P.2d 
283,  184  Okl.  574— Harlow  Pub. 
Co.  v.  Tallant,  43  P.2d  106,  171  Okl. 
579— Halliburton  v.  Illinois  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  40  P.2d  1086,  170  Okl.  360 
—Goodwin  v.  Scrtfggs,  9  P.2d  4E6, 
156  Okl.  118— Curtis  v.  Bank  of 


300 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


or  vacate  the  judgment  is  made  at  common  law7  or 
under  statutory  provisions.8 

On  the  other  hand,  the  court's  discretion  is  not  to 
be  exercised  arbitrarily,  oppressively,  or  from  mere 
caprice;  it  is  a  judicial  discretion  to  be  exercised 
in  accordance  with  legal  and  equitable  principles,9 
and  should  be  so  exercised  as  to  promote  the  ends 
of  justice.10  The  court's  action  must  rest  on  com- 
petent evidence.11  It  is  an  abuse  of  discretion  to 
open  or  vacate  a  judgment  where  the  moving  party 
shows  absolutely  no  legal  ground  therefor,  or  offers 
no  excuse  for  his  own  negligence  or  default,12  or 
where  the  application  is  granted  purely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  extending  applicant's  time  to  appeal.13  If, 
however,  applicant  shows  himself  plainly  and  justly 
entitled  to  the  relief  demanded,  the  court  must  grant 
the  application  and  it  is  an  abuse  of  discretion  to 
refuse  it.14  Under  no  circumstances  will  the  court 


be  justified  in  refusing  to  receive  and  hear  a  motion 
to  vacate  the  judgment;  its  discretion  is  to  be  ex- 
ercised on  the  facts  as  developed  on  a  hearing,  not 
in  advance  of  it15 

.§  301.    Relief  Awarded 

On  an  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  Judgment,  the 
court  may  generally  grant  such  relief  as  Is  appropriate 
under  the  circumstances. 

On  an  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment, 
the  court  may  award  such  relief  as  is  appropriate 
under  the  circumstances.16  It  has  been  held  that 
the  court,  on  vacating  a  judgment,  may  set  aside 
conclusions  of  law,17  and  that  a  judgment  regular- 
ly entered  on  a  verdict  may  not  be  vacated  unless 
the  verdict  is  also  set  aside;1?  but  it  has  been  held 
that  on  vacating  a  judgment  the  court  is  without 
power  to  make  new  findings  inconsistent  with  thos"e 


Dover.   241  P.   173,   113  Okl.   224—  | 
McNac  v.   Kinch,    238   P.   424,   113 

Okl.  59 — McNac  v.  Chapman,  223  P. 

350,  101  Okl.  121. 
34  C.J.  p  207  note  5. 
Power  of  court  during  Judgment 

term  see  supra  §  229. 
Time  for  application  see  supra  §  288. 

Elapse  of  time  to  appeal  does  not 
terminate    court's    discretion. — Deen 
v.  Baxley  State  Bank,  15  S.B.2d  194, 
192  Ga.  300. 
"Wide  discretion 
Okl.— Welborn   v.   Whitney,    65   P.2d 

971,  179  Okl.  420— Cooper  v.  State 

ex  pel.  Com'rs  of  lLand  Office,  63  P. 

2d  -69*8,  178  Okl.  532. 
7.    Ind. — Bearing-  v.  Speedway  Real- 

ty  Co.,  40  N.E.2d  414,  111  Ind.App. 

585. 
N.J. — Somers  v.  Holmes,  177  A.  434, 

114  N.J.Law  497. 

8-    Ind.— Bearing  v.  Speedway  Real- 
ty Co.,  40  N.E.2d  414,  111  Ind.App. 

585. 
Mont— Rieckhoff  v.  Woodhull,  75  P. 

2d  56,  106  Mont  22. 
9.    Cal. — Elms  v.  Elms,  App.,  164  P. 

2d  936— Potts  v.  Whitson,  125  P.2d 

947,  52  Cal.App.2d  199. 
Ga. — Grogan    v.    Deraney,    143    «S.E. 

912,  38  Ga.App.  287. 
N.Y.— Albright    v.    New    York    Life 

Ins.  -Co.,  26  N.Y.S.2d  210,  261  App, 

DiT.  419. 

Or.— Bratt  v.   State   Industrial  Acci- 
dent Commission,   236  P.  478,   114 

Or.  644. 
34C.J.  p  369.  note  70. 

"Sound  Judicial  discretion."  as  re- 
gards  petition    to    vacate    judgment 
implies    calmness,    conscience,    cour- 
age,  impartiality,   wisdom,   and  dis- 
cernment of  just  result. — Russell  v. 
Foley,  179  N.E.  619,  278  Mass.  145. 
Court  has  reasonable  discretion 
CaL — Palomar  Refining  Co.  v.  Pren- 
tice, 136  P.2d  83,  57  CaLApp.2d  954 


Discretion  held  abused 

(1)  By  denial  of  relief.— Boyd  v. 
Lemmon,   189  N.W.   681,   49  N.D.  «64. 

(2)  By  grant  of  relief.— Holbrook 
v.  Weiss,  3  N.B.2d  915,  52  Ohio  App. 
458. 

ia    Mass.— Alpert   v.   Mercury  Pub. 

Co.,  172  N.E.   223,  272  Mass.  43. 
Okl. — Donley  v.  Donley,  89  P.2d  312, 

184    Okl.    567— Vacuum   Oil  Co.   v. 

Brett,  300  P.  632,  150  Okl.  153. 
Orderly  administration 

Discretion  should  be  exercised  so 
as  to  promote  orderly  administration 
of  justice  and  not  to  encourage  care- 
lessness, Ignorance,  or  laxity  in 
practice.— Kravetz  v.  Lipofsky,  200 
N.E.  865,  294  Mass.  '80. 
Legislative  policy 

In  exercising  discretion  to  set 
aside  judgments,  courts  should  main- 
tain liberal  spirit  prompting  legisla- 
ture to  grant  such  power. — Kosonen 
v.  Waara,  285  P.  668,  87  Mont  24. 

11.  Pa. — Tradesmens   Nat   Bank   & 
Trust  Co.   v.   Lewis,   34   A.2d   818, 
154  Pa.Super.  17— Silent  Auto  Cor- 
poration of  Northern  New  Jersey 
v.  Folk,  97  Pa.Super.  588. 

34  C.J.  p  370  note  71. 

12.  Minn. — Ayer  v.  Chicago,  M.,  St. 
P.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  249  N.W.  581,  189 
Minn.  359. 

Ohio. — Holbrook  v.  Weiss,   8  N.E.2d 

915,  52  Ohio  App.  458. 
34  C.J.  p  370  note  72. 

13.  Conn. — Connecticut  Mortgage  & 
Title  Guaranty  Co.  v.  Di  'Frances- 
co, 151  A.  491,  112  Conn.  673. 

Ohio.— Sullivan  v.  Cloud,   34  N.E.2d 
625,  62  Ohio  App.  462. 

14.  Ga.— Donalson  v.  Bank  of  Jakin 
127  S.E.  229,  33  Ga.App.  428. 

N.D. — Boyd    v.    Lemmon,    189    N.W, 

681,  49  N.-D.  64. 
34  C.J.  p  370  note  73,  p  371  note  74. 

554 


15.  Cal.— Cahill    v.    San    Francisco 
Super.  Ct,  78  P.  4-67,  145  Cal.  42. 

34  C.J.  p  371  note  75. 

16.  CaL — Berning  v.  Colodny  &  Col- 
odny,  284  P.  496,  103  Cal.App.  188. 

Pa.— Sniffer,  to  Use  of  Sniffer,  v. 
Shiffer,  Com.Pl.,  46  Dauph.Co.  313 
— Cadwallader  v.  Firestone,  Com. 
PL,  7  Ffc,y.L,J.  259— Nuss  v.  Kem- 
merer,  Com.Pl,  17  Leh.L.J.  379,  52 
York  SLeg.Rec.  15. 

Decree  should  go  no  further  thaa 
is  necessary  to  correct  the  wrong. — 
Indianapolis  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lund- 
quist,   53  N.E.2d  338,  222  Ind.  359. 
Suspension  of  Judgment 

In  action  to  set  aside  a  judgment 
rendered  at  a  prior  term1,  if  the  court 
finds  that  defendant  has  a  valid  de- 
fense, it  does  not  render  Judgment 
in  the  original  action  but  makes  an 
order  suspending  the  judgment  until 
such  time  as  the  issues  in  the  origi- 
nal action  can  4>e  joined  and  deter- 
mined as  though  no  judgment  had 
ever  been  entered.— Washington  v. 
Levinson,  35  N.E.2d  161,  66  Ohio 
App.  461. 

Violation  of  settlement  agreement 

Judgment  will  not  be  opened 
where  appeal  was  not  taken  due  to 
compromise,  but  issue  will  be  framed 
to  determine  amount  due. — Brader  v. 
Alinikoff,  85  Pa.Super.  28-5. 

Provision  transferring1  cause  to  an- 
other district  court  held  illegal. — 
Schubert  v.  District  Court  of  Third 
Judicial  Dist  of  Bergen  County,  159 
A.  615,  10  N.J.Misc.  414. 

17.  Ind. — Tri-City    Electric    Service 
Co.   v.    Jarvis,    185   N.E.    136,    206 
Ind.  5. 

18.  Ga. — Dabney  v.  Benteen,  132  S. 
E.  916,  35  Ga.App.  203. 

34  C.J.  p  376  note  1-6. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


303 


already  made,19  and  that  it  may  not,  on  opening  or 
vacating  a  judgment  against  applicant,  proceed  to 
enter  a  judgment  in  his  favor20  where  the  parties 
have  the  right  to  a  jury  trial.21  Either  on  opening 
or  vacating  the  judgment,  the  relief  granted  may 
include  the  setting  aside  of  an  execution  or  a  sale 
thereunder.22  Where  a  court  or  judge  is  author- 
ized to  set  aside'  or  vacate  a  judgment,  the  juris- 
diction includes  the  right  to  grant  any  less  or  in- 
cidental relief  by  which  justice  may  be  obtained  and 
the  rights  of  the  parties  may  be  protected.28  Where 
justice  can  be  done  between  the  parties  by  amend- 
ing or  correcting  the  judgment,  or  reducing  its 
amount,  the  court  will  be  warranted  in  entering  a 
new  judgment  in  the  proper  form.24  Under  a  spe- 
cial statutory  motion  to  vacate  a  judgment  and  en- 
ter a  different  judgment  based  on  the  findings,  it 
has  been  held  that  the  court  may  not  consider  any 
facts  except  those  included  in  the  findings,25  and 
that  it  may  not  change  the  findings  of  fact.26  Un- 
der a  statute  so  providing,  the  failure  to  determine 
the  application  within  a  specified  time  constitutes  a 
denial  of  the  application.27 

§  302.    Partial  Vacation 

A  court  having  power  to  vacate  a  judgment  entirely 


may  grant  less  relief  by  vacating  It  In  part  only,  where 
Justice  so  requires. 

A  court  having  power  to  vacate  a  judgment  en- 
tirely may  grant  less  relief  by  vacating  it  in  part 
only,  where  justice  so  requires.28  Where  one  por- 
tion of  the  judgment  is  separable  from  the  balance 
thereof,  and  the  objection  goes  only  to  a  separable 
part,  the  court  should  not  set  aside  the  whole  judg- 
ment but  only  the  objectionable  part.29  A  motion 
to  vacate  the  whole  of  a  judgment  is  too  broad,  and 
may  properly  be  overruled,  if  any  separable  por- 
tion of  the  judgment  is  free  from  objection.80  A 
judgment  against  several  persons  may  be  set  aside 
as  to  one  or  more  of  them,  and  allowed  to  stand  as 
to  the  others,81  except  where  a  judgment  is  entire 
and  indivisible,  when,  being  irregular  and  errone- 
ous as  to  a  part  of  the  defendants,  it  is  of  necessity 
so  as  to  all  and  must  be  opened  or  vacated  as  to 
all.32  A  judgment  may  be  opened  or  vacated  with 
respect  to  a  part  of  the  amount  of  recovery,88  ex- 
cept where  the  recovery  is  not  apportionable,84  or 
as  to  the  recovery  on  one  or  more  separate  counts 
or  causes  of  action  united  in  the  same  suit85 


§  303. 


Terms  and  Conditions 


The   court   may  generally   Impose   reasonable   terms 
and  conditions  on  opening  or  vacating  a  judgment. 


19.  N.Y.— Citizens'     Nat     Bank     of 
Bast  Northport  v.  Caldwell,  251  N. 
Y.S.  319,  233  App.Div.  875. 

20.  Tex. — Marmion         v.         Herrin 
Transp.    Co.,    Civ.App.,    127   S.W.2d 
558,  error  refused. 

21.  Tex. — Schaffer  v.  Speckels,  Com. 
App.,   62   S.W.2d  85— Wichita  Palls 
Traction    Co.    v.    Cook,    60   S.W.2d 

764,  122  Tex.  446. 

22.  Or. — Anderson  v.  Guenther,  25 
P.2d  146,  144  Or.  446. 

34  C.J.  p  376  note  15. 

23.  N.T.— Me  Call  v.  McCall,  54  N.Y. 
541. 

34  C.J.  p  376  note  18. 

24.  Ind. — Marion  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hard- 
ins,   58   N.JE.    194,   155   Ind.    648. 

34  C.J.  p  376  note  17. 

25.  Cal. — Westervelt.v.  McCullough, 
228  P.  734,  68  Cal.App.  198. 

26.  Cal. — Akley    v.    Bassett,    209    P. 
576,    189    Cal.    625— Herz   v.    Here- 
ford,  263   P.  382,   88  CaLApp.  290. 

27.  N.M.— King'  v.  McBlroy,  21  P.2d 
80,  37  N.M.  238. 

BUI  of  review  treated  as  motion,  to 

vacate 

Where  purported  bill  of  review 
was  treated  on  appeal  as  a  motion 
for  rehearing  or  a  motion  to  vacate 
because  filed  .before  judgment  in 
cause  became  final,  bill  was  over- 
ruled by  operation  of  law  where  it 
had  not  been  acted  on  before  Judg- 
ment became  final  and  appellant  had 
made  no  request  to  act  on  it  before 


that  time  or  that  term  of  court  be 

extended   for   purpose   of  acting   on 

the  motion. — Joy  v.  Toung,  Tex.Civ. 

App.,  194  S.W.2d  159. 

2&  Ark.— Taylor  v.  O'Kane,  49  S.W. 
2d  400,  185  Ark.  782. 

Cal.— People  v.  Barnes  City,  288  P. 
442,  105  CaLApp.  618. 

Conn. — Persky  v.  Puglisi,  127  A.  351, 
101  Conn.  658. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  anoteft  in  Mis- 
souri-Kansas-Texas R.  Co.  of  Tex- 
as v.  Pluto,  156  -S.W.2d  265,  269, 
138  Tex.  1 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Kern  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  164  S.W. 
2d  193,  195— Pavelka  v.  Overton, 
Civ.App.,  47  S.W.2d  369,  error  re- 
fused. 

34  C.J.  p  376  note  19. 
,    Cal.— People  v.  Barnes  City,  2 
P.  442,  105  Cal.App.  618. 

Ga.— George  A.  Rheman  Co.  v.  May, 
31  S.E.2d  738,  71  Ga.App.  -651. 

Idaho. — Occidental  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Niendorf,  44  P.2d  1099,  55  Idaho 
521. 

Ky.— Phillips  v.  Green,  155  S.W.2d 
841,  288  Ky.  202. 

Tex, — Corpus   Juris   quoted   in   Mis- 
souri-Kansas-Texas R.  Co.  of  Tex- 
as   v.  Pluto,   156   S.W.2d  265,   269, 
138  Tex.  1. 
34  C.J.  P  876  note  20. 

Collusion 
Judgment   -against    principal    and 

surety,  which  was  canceled  as 
against  surety  on  ground  of  collu 
sion  and  fraud  of  judgment  creditor 
and  principal,  remained  valid  adjudi- 

555 


cation  between  judgment  creditor 
and  principal. — Goldberg  v.  {Fuller, 
172  S.B.  52,  178  Ga.  58. 

30.  Ga. — Smith  v.  Knowles,  7'8  S.U. 
264,  12  Ga.App.  715. 

34  C.J.  p  3T7  note  21. 

31.  Cal.— Michel  Y.  Williams,   56  P. 
2d  546,  13  Cal.App.2d  198— Bishop 
v.   Superior  Court  in  and  for  Los 
Angeles    County,    209    P.    1012,    59 
Cal.App.  46. 

Okl. — Galeener  v.  Reynolds,  69  P.2d 
49,  180  Okl.  200. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mis- 
souri-Kansas-Texas R.  Co.  of  Tex- 
as v.  Pluto,  156  S.W.2d  265,  269, 
138  Tex.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  377  note  22. 

32.  111.— Freflrich  v.  Wolf,  -50  N.BL 
2d  755,  383  111.  638— Central  Clean- 
ers and  Dyers  v.  Schild,  1  N.E.2d 
90,  284  IlLApp.  267. 

Ohio.— Beachler  v.  'Ford,  App.,  60  N. 
B.2d  330. 

Tex. — McClaren  Rubber  Co.  T.  Wil- 
liams Auto  Supply  Co.  of  Big 
Spring,  Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  2-55. 

34  C.J.  p  377  note  23. 

33.  N.Y. — Uptown  Transp.   Corpora- 
tion v.  Fisk  Discount  Corporation, 

271  N.T.S.  723,  151  Misc.  469. 
3-4  C.J.  p  377  note  24. 

34.  jq-.Y. — Irwin  v.  Knox,  10  Johns. 
365. 

34  C.J.  p  377  note  25. 

35.  Kan.— Weaver  v.  Leach,  26  Kan. 
179. 

34  C.J.  P  377  note  26. 


303 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Where,  as  is  generally  the  case,  as  considered  su- 
pra §  300,  the  opening  or  vacation  of  the  judgment 
is  discretionary  with  the  court,  it  is  within  the  sound 
discretion  of  the  court  to  impose,  as  a  condition  to 
granting  the  application,  such  terms  as  may  be  just 
and  reasonable,36  provided,  of  course,  there  are  no 
statutory  provisions  to  the  contrary;37  and  the 
court's  decision  will  not  be  disturbed  except  for 
abuse  of  discretion.38  The  imposition  of  terms, 
however,  is  not  a  necessary  condition  on  opening 
the  judgment ;  and  the  opposing  party  may  not  com- 
plain that  terms  were  not  imposed,  unless  he  can 
also  show  that  the  action  of  the  court  was  arbi- 
trary and  unjust.39  The  circumstances  may  be  such 
that  it  would  be  an  abuse  of  discretion  to  impose 
terms,  and  in  such  cases  terms  should  not  be  im- 
posed.40 Where  the  opening  or  setting  aside  of  the 
judgment  is  demandable  as  of  right,  it  is  not  prop- 
er to  impose  any  terms.41  Where  the  judgment  is 
void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  terms  may  not  be  im- 
posed as  a  condition  to  granting  relief.42  In  any 
event,  the  discretion  of  the  court  wifh  respect  to 
imposing  terms  must  be  exercised  in  a  reasonable 
manner.43  '  Under  some  circumstances,  a  court  may 
refuse  to  open  a  judgment  on  some  condition  to  be 
performed  by  the  successful  party.44  An  order  set- 


ting aside  a  judgment  for  plaintiff  at  his  request, 
should  be  conditioned  on  his  remitting  payments 
made  on  the  judgment46  The  court,  on  opening 
a  judgment,  may  limit  the  issues  to  be  determined.4* 

§  304.    Findings 

In  some  jurisdictions,  but  not  In  others,  the  court  Is 
required  to  make  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions,  of  law 
In  passing  on  an  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judg- 
ment. 

In  some  jurisdictions,  on  an  application  to  open 
or  vacate  a  judgment,  the  trial  court  is  required  to 
find  the  facts  separately  from  the  conclusions  of 
law,  much  as  in  the  case  of  a  special  verdict,  and  to 
set  them  forth  on  the  record;47  in  other  jurisdic- 
tions findings  are  not  required,48  although  it  has 
been  said  that  the  court  ought  to  file  an  opinion  set- 
ting forth  its  findings  of  facts  and  the  grounds  of 
its  decision.49  Findings  are  unnecessary  where  the 
court  exercises  its  plenary  power  and  discretion  to 
set  aside  a  judgment  at  the  same  term  at  which  it 
was  rendered.50  Where  parties  desire  to  insist  on 
findings,  they  must  request  them.51  Except  where 
separate  findings  are  required  by  statute,  an  order 
vacating  a  judgment  is  an  implied  finding  of  the 
facts  necessary  to  support  it.52  Similarly  a  denial 


36.    Fla, — Corpus      Juris      cited     in 

Knabb   v.    Reconstruction  'Finance 

Corporation,    197   So.   707,   711,   144 

Fla.  110. 
iLa. — McCoy     v.     Arkansas     Natural 

Gas   Corporation,    196    So.   23,    195 

La.  82. 
Md. — Pioneer  Oil  Heat  v.  Brown,  16 

A.2d  880,  179  Md.  155 — Commercial 

Sav.  Bank  v.  Quail,  142  A.  488,  156 

Md.  16. 

34  C.J.  p  377  note  28. 
Terms  and  conditions  on  opening: 

Default  judgment  see  infra  §  337. 

Judgment  by  confession  see  infra 
§  326. 

Applicant  cannot  accept  beneficial 
part  of  order  and  reject  part  consid- 
ered burdensome. — Beck  v.  Beck,  192 
N.E.   791,  48  Ohio  App.  105. 
Attorney's  fees 

It  was  erroneous  to  order,  as  a 
condition  to  setting  aside  a  judg- 
ment, that  attorney's  fees  be  paid  to 
plaintiff's  attorney,  since  the  attor- 
ney was  not  a  litigant. — Smith  v. 
Zuta,  347  IlLApp.  203. 
Default  in  paying  compromise  settle- 
ment 

Judgment  entered  pursuant  to 
stipulation  for  settlement,  which 
permitted  entry  of  judgment  on  fail- 
ure to  pay  installment  when  due, 
should  be  set  aside  at  instance  of 
defendants,  on  imposition  of  terms, 
where  defendant's  check  in  payment 
cf  installment  was  returned  for  in- 
sufficient funds  due  to  error  of 


bank's  bookkeeper  or  delay  in  enter- 
ing deposit  to  defendant's  account — 
Goldstein  v.  Goldsmith,  27*  N.Y.S. 
861,  243  App.Div.  268. 

37.  Tex. — Hargrave    v.    Boero,    Civ. 
App.,   23    SAV.    403,   following  Se- 
crest  v.  Best,   6  Tex.  199. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  29. 

38.  Pa. — Huston    Tp.     Co-op.     Mut. 
Fire  Ins.   Co.   v.  Beale,   1  A.   926, 
110  Pa.  321. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  30. 

39.  Cal.— Robinson  v.  Merrill,  22  P. 
260,  80  Cal.  415. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  3L 

40.  Colo.— -Sidwell     v.     IFirst     Nat. 
Bank,  233  P.  153,  76  Colo.  £47. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  32. 

41.  N.T.— Tates  v.  Guthrie,  23  N.B. 
741,  119  N.T.  420. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  37. 

42.  Colo. — Corpus     Juris     cited    in 
Sidwell  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  233  P. 
153,   154,  76  Colo.  547. 

N.Y. — Amusement  Securities  Corpo- 
ration v.  Academy  Pictures  Dis- 
tributing Corporation,  ^295  N.Y.S. 
436,  251  App.Div.  227,  motions  de- 
nied 295  N.Y.S.  472,  250  App.Div. 
749,  affirmed  13  N.B.2d  471,  277  N. 
Y.  557,  reargument  denied  14  N.E. 
2d  383,  277  N.Y.  672. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  33. 

43.  Tex. — Continental     Oil     Co.     v. 
Henderson,    Clv.App.,    180    &W.2d 
998,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  38.      . 

556 


44.  Pa.— Irwin's  Appeal,   12  A.   840, 
9  Pa.Cas.  479. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  39. 

45.  Mich.— Denison  v.  Crowley,  Mil- 
ner  &  Co.,  271  N.W.  735,  279  Mich. 
211. 

Restitution  generally  see  infra  §  307. 

46.  Pa,— Cassler  v.  Gassier,   144  A. 
8*,  294  Pa.  197. 

47.  N.C. — Turner     v.     J.     L     Case 
Threshing  Mach.  Co.,  45  S.E.  781, 
133  N.C.  381. 

34  C.J.  p  384  note  81. 

Formal  finding  as  to  meritorious 
defense  is  required  where  showing  of 
defense  is  by  affidavit,  but  not  where 
defendant  has  filed  a  pleading  set- 
ting forth  his  defense. — Sutherland 
v.  McLean,  154  S.E.  662,  199  N.C.  345. 

48.  Wash.— Frieze  v.  Powell,  140  P. 
•690,  79  Wash.  483. 

34  C.J.  p  384  note  82. 

49.  Pa. — Haines    v.    Elfman,    84    A. 
349,  235  Pa.  '341. 

34  C.J.  p  384  note  83. 
Finding  not  supported  by  evidence 
Pa. — Barnes  v.  Silveus,  19  Pa-Dist  & 
Co.  581. 

50u    N.C.— Allison  Y.  Whlttier,  8  S.B. 
338,  101  N.C.  490. 

51.  Kan. — Moore   v.   Zeman,    200   P. 
270,  109  Kan.  566. 

34  C,J.  p  384  note  -85. 

52.  Kan. — Moore  y.  Zeman,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  '384  note  87. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


306 


of  the  application  is  an  implied  finding  that  grounds 
for  such  relief  do  not  exist.53  The  findings,  if 
proper,  have  the  same  effect  as  a  verdict.54 

§  305.     Order 

General  rules  as  to  orders  apply  to  orders  opening  or 
vacating  judgments. 

An  order  opening  or  vacating  a  judgment  must 
comply  with  the  requirements  of  orders  generally,55 
and  also  with  any  special  statutory  requirements.56 
The  order  must  be  the  judicial  act  of  the  court57 
and  should  show  clearly  what  disposition  of  the 
judgment  the  court  intended  to  make.58  The  judg- 
ment affected,  must  be  described  with  sufficient  ac- 
curacy to  be  identified,59  but  mere  inaccuracy  of 
description  does  not  invalidate  the  order.6(>  While 


it  has  been  held  that  the  order  must  recite  the 
grounds  for  granting  the  application,61  there  is  also 
authority  to  the  contrary.62  The  order  must  be  duly 
entered  of  record.63 


§  306. 


Operation  and  Effect  in  General 


Where  a  judgment  Is  vacated  or  set  aside,  it  is  as 
though  no  Judgment  had  ever  been  entered;  but  a  judg- 
ment which  has  been  opened  generally  remains  opera- 
tive as  security  until  the  termination  of  the  litigation. 

Where  a  judgment  is  vacated  or  set  aside  by  a 
valid  order  or  judgment,  it  is  entirely  destroyed  and 
the  rights  of  the  parties  are  left  as  though  no  such 
judgment  had  ever  been  entered.64  No  further 
steps  can  be  legally  taken  to  enforce  the  vacated 
judgment.65  The  action,  however,  is  left  still  pend- 


53.  Cal. — Chavez    v.    Scully,    232    P. 
165,  69  Cal.App.  633. 

54.  Iowa. — Genco    v.    Northwestern 
Mfg.   Co.,   214  N.W.  545,  203  Iowa 
1390. 

55.  Kyi— Lovill  v.  Hatfteld,  268  S.W. 
807,  207  Ky.  142. 

Order  as  Judgment 

An  order  vacating  a  judgment  or 
an  order  for  a  judgment  is  not  a 
judgment  and  does  not  determine  an 
application  to  enter  another  and  dif- 
ferent judgment. — Prothero  v.  Supe- 
rior Court  of  Orange  County,  238  P. 
357.  196  Cal.  439. 
Improper  caption  and  index 

Where  intent  of  order,  made  in 
term  in  which  judgment  was  entered, 
to  set  aside  judgment  was  unmistak- 
able, court  thereafter  properly  dis- 
regarded judgment  notwithstanding 
order  may  have  been  improperly  cap- 
tioned  and  indexed. — City  of  Haz- 
ard v.  Duff,  175  S.W.2d  357,  295  Ky. 
701. 

68.    N.D.— Harris    v.    Hessin,   151   N. 

W.  4,  30  N.D.  33. 
34  C.J.  p  384  note  89. 
Time  of  entry 

Where  the  court's  inherent  power 
to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  is  lim- 
ited to  the  judgment  term,  an  order 
rendered  under  its  inherent  power  is 
ineffective  if  rendered  after  the  ex- 
.piration  of -the.  judgment  term. — Da- 
vis v.  Oaks,  60  S.W.2d  922,  187  Ark. 
501. 

.67.    Ind. — Barton    v.   Bryant,   2   Ind. 

189. 

34.C.J.  p  384  note  do. 
Sa     Pa.— Fisher  v.  -Hestonville,  M.  & 

F.  Pass.  R.  C.O.,  40  A.  97,  185  Pa. 

602. 

34  C.J,  p  384  note  91.  ; 

Still  relief 

On  a  statutory  proceeding  to  set 
aside  a .  .judgment  as  inconsistent 
with  the  findings  and  to  enter  a  dif- 
ferent judgment  .based  on  the  find- 
Ings,,  the  court  must  grant  full  relief 
^In  one  orde.r;  it  ;  cannpt  vacate  the 


judgment  in  one  order  and  leave  the 
entry  of  a  proper  Judgment  for  an- 
other order. — Stanton  v.  Superior 
Court  within  and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  261  P.  1001,  202  Cal.  478— 
34  C.J.  p  376  note  17  [a]. 
Orders  inconsistent  with  judgment 

(1)  Where,  after  judgment  is   en- 
tered, an  order  is  made  which  is  in- 
consistent with  the  continued  opera- 
tion   of   the   judgment,   as   where   a 
party  is  given  leave  to  file  a  plea  to 
the  complaint,  the  effect  of  the  or- 
der   is    to    vacate    the    judgment — 
Box   v.   Metropolitan   Life    Ins.   Co., 
168  So.  216,  232  Ala.  1. 

(2)  The    granting    of    defendant's 
motion    to    dismiss    complaint   after 
judgment   had   been   entered   in    de- 
fendant's favor  was  equivalent  to  a 
"vacation  of  judgment,"  and  defend- 
ant  was   thereafter   precluded   from 
relying    on    alleged    finality    of    the 
judgment. — Bricson  v.  Slomer,  C.C.A. 
111.,  94  F.2d  437. 

59.  Mont— Morehouse     v.     Bynum, 
152  P.  477,  51  Mont  289. 

60.  Mont. — Morehouse     r.     Bynum, 
supra. 

34  C.J.  p  384  note  93. 

61.  N.Y. — Strassner     v.     Thompson, 
57  N.Y.S.  546,  40  App.Div.  28. 

34  C.J.  p  384  note  94. 

62.  Mo.— Spickard  v.  McNabb,  App., 
1*0  S.W.2d  611. 

63.  Tex.— Witty   v.    Rose,    Civ.App., 
148  -S.W.2d  962,  error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  385  note  97. 

Notation  on  docket  did  not  have 
effect  of  setting  aside  judgment — 
Burleson  v.  Moffett,  Tex.Civ.App.,  3 
S.W.2d  544. 

64.  Conn. — Corpus    Juris     cited     in 
Union  &  New  Haven  Trust  Co.  v. 
Taft  Kealty   Co.,   192   A.   268.    271, 
123  Conn.  9. 

Fla. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Adelhelm 
v.  Dougherty,  176  So.  775,  777,  129 
Fla.  680. 

Kan. — Hoffman  v.  Hoffman,  135  P.2d 
887,  156  Kan.  647— Corpus 

557 


quoted  in  Standard  Life  Ass'n  v. 

Merrill,  75  P.2d  «25,  827.  147  Kan. 

121. 
Ky.— Morris    v.    Morris,    10    S.W.2d 

277,  225  Ky.  823. 
Mich. — Denison  v.  Crowley,  Milner  & 

Co.,  271  N.W.  735,  279  Mich.  211. 
N.Y.— In  re  Grube's  Will,  294  N.Y.S. 

311,    162    Misc.    267— Corpus    Juris 

cited  iii  Hammond  v.  Hammond,  11 

N.Y.S.2d  585,  587. 
Pa. — Bergen    v.    Lit    Bros.,    47    A.2d 

671. 
34  C.J.  p  385  note  98. 

Void  order  vacating  judgment  is 
wholly  ineffective. — Mountain  States 
Implement  Co.  v.  Arave,  2  P.2d  314, 
50  Idaho  624. 

Erroneous   order  is   operative   and 
effective. — Hibben,  Hollweg  &  Co.  v. 
Western   &   Southern   Life   Ins.    Co., 
169  IsT.E.  693,  90  Ind.App.  683. 
Denial  of  application 

Judgment  overruling  defendant's 
motion  to  set  aside  judgment  against 
him  on  ground  that  plaintiff  had  not 
filed  a  verified  petition  was  in  ef- 
fect ruling  that  plaintiff  did  not 
have  to  verify  petition. — Garrison  v. 
Bradford  Supply  Co.,  51  S.W.2d  254, 
244  Ky.  430. 
Partition 

Where  a  partition,  long  before 
made,  is  set  aside,*  the  court  in  de- 
creeing new  partition  will  direct 
that  former  allotments  be  followed 
as  far  as  justice  will  permit — Oneal 
v.  Stimson,  74  S.B.  413,  70  W.Va.  452. 
Merits 

,  In  setting  aside  a  judgment  ob- 
tained by  one  party  litigant  on  mo- 
tion filed  by  other  party  at  same 
term  of  court  at  which  judgment 
was  taken,  the  court  would  provide 
that  action  in  setting  aside  judg- 
ment should  not  prejudice  rights  of 
the  parties  on  a  trial  of  the  merits. 
— South  Texas  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dan- 
haus,  Tex.Civ.App.,  146  S.W.2d  1098. 

65.    Kan. — Corpus    Juris    guoted    IXL 
Standard  Life  Ass'n  v.  Merrill,  76 


§  306 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ing  and  undetermined,  and  further  proceeding  may 
be  had  and  taken  therein.**  The  case  stands  again 
for  trial  or  for  such  other  disposition  as  may  be 
appropriate  to  the  situation.67  It  has  been  held  that 
the  effect  of  setting  aside  a  judgment  based  on  the 
verdict  of  a  jury  is  to  set  aside  the  verdict  and 
grant  a  new  trial,68  but  it  does  not  necessarily  va- 
cate prior  interlocutory  orders  or  judgments.69  The 
vacation  of  a  judgment  vacates  all  proceedings 
taken  under  the  judgment™  Where  the  judg- 
ment is  vacated,  the  lien  falls  with  the  judgment, 
and  cannot  be  made  to  attach  to  the  judgment  ulti- 
mately entered.71  Where  a  judgment  of  which  a 
transcript  has  been  entered  in  another  county  is  set 
aside,  the  judgment  on  the  transcript  falls  with  it.72 
It  has  been  held  that  a  vacated  judgment  affords  no 
justification  for  acts  done  before  the  order  of  va- 
cation,78 except  to  mere  ministerial  officers,74  and 
affords  no  bar  to  a  new  action.75 

Generally  the  rights  of  third  persons,  such  as 
purchasers  in  good  faith  who  have  relied  on  the 
judgment,  will  be  saved  so  far  as  is  consistent  with 
the  rights  of  the  judgment  debtor.76  Where  the 
judgment  vacated  is  void,  the  rights  of  an  interven- 
ing purchaser  of  the  property  affected  will  not  be 


protected.77  Where  the  judgment  is  voidable  but 
not  void,  its  vacation  will  not  divest  the  title  of 
third  persons  acquired  under  it  in  good  faith  for  a 
valuable  consideration.78  One  having  acquired  title 
under  an  irregular  judgment  will  not  be  affected  by 
proceedings  to  set  it  aside  unless  he  is  made  a  party 
thereto.79 

Although  it  has  been  held  that  the  effect  of  open- 
ing the  judgment  is  to  leave  the  case  standing  as 
though  no  judgment  had  ever  been  rendered,80  it  is 
generally  held  that  a  judgment  which  is  opened,  as 
distinguished  from  one  which  is  vacated,  does  not 
lose  its  status  as  a  judgment;81  it  does  not  deter- 
mine any  rights  of  the  parties  in  the  action,  but 
subsists  only  for  the  purpose  of  security,82  its  lien 
remaining  unimpaired.83  Merely  opening  a  judg- 
ment does  not  necessarily  vacate  prior  interlocu- 
tory judgments,  orders,  or  proceedings  in  the  case 
except  such  as  are  dependent  on  the  judgment.84 
If  the  party  who  obtains  the  opening  of  a  judgment 
is  afterward  defeated  in  the  action,  the  effect  is  to 
restore  the  original  judgment  to  full  force  and 
finally  conclude  his  rights  in  the  premises  ;86  if  the 
defense  is  successful,  the  judgment  is  vacated.86 

An  order  denying  a  motion  to  set  aside  a  judg- 


P.2d  825,  827,  147  Kan.  121. 
84  C,J.  p  385  note  99. 

66.  Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Standard  Life  Ass'n  v.  Merrill,  75 
P.2d  825,   827,   147  Kan.   121. 

N.J. — Dorman  v.  Usbe  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n,  180  A.  418,  115  N.J. 
Law  837. 

84  C.J.  p  385  note  1. 

67.  Conn.— Simpson  v.  Young  Men's 
Christian  Ass'n  of  Bridgeport,  172 
A.  855,  118  Conn.  414. 

84  C.J.  p  385  note  2,  p  376  note  12. 

68.  Tex.— Smith  v.   Thornton,   29   S. 
W.2d  314,  119  Tex.  344. 

69.  Mo.— Davidson  v.  I.  M.  Davidson 
Real  Estate  &  Investment  Co.,  155 
S.W.  1,  249  Mo.  474. 

70.  Wash.— Hillman  v.  Gordon,  219 
P.  46,  126  Wash.  614. 

71.  111.— Chicago  Title  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Benjamin  Moore  &  Co.,  277  111. 
App.  340. 

34  C.J.  P  387  note  17. 

72.  Pa. — Nelson    v.    Guffey,    18    A. 
1073,  131  Pa.  273,  289. 

34  C.J.  p  387  note  18. 

73.  Wis. — Anderson  .v.  Sloane,  40  N. 
W.    214,    72    Wis.    566,    7    Am.S.R. 
885. 

34  C.J.  p  385  note  3. 

When  a  Judgment  is  *«t  aside  a» 
void,  all  proceedings  thereunder  are 
also  void. — Newsome  v.  Hall,  161  S. 
W.2d  629,  290  Ky.  486,  140  A.L.R. 
*18. 


74.  Kan.— Morris  v.  Hardie,  118  P. 
308,  84  Kan.  9. 

34  C.J.  p  385  note  4. 

75.  Ind.— Martin  v.   Baugh,   27  N.E. 
110,  1  Ind.App.  20. 

34  CJT.  p  385  note  5. 

76.  Minn. — Go  wen  v.  Conlow,  53  N. 
W.  365,  51  Minn.  213. 

34  C.J.  p  385  note  6. 

77.  Kan. — Bryner  v.  Fernetti,  41  P. 
2d  712,  141  Kan.  446. 

34  C.J.  p  385  note  6  [a]. 

78.  N.J.— Ostrom  v.   Ferris,    134   A. 
305,  99  N.J.Eq.  551,  affirmed  141  A. 
920,  two  cases,  103  N.J.Eq.  22. 

34  C.J.  p  386  note  7. 

Purchaser   must    show   "bona  fides 

Ky. — Rouse  v.  Rouse,  262  S.W.  596, 

203  Ky.  415. 
Interlocutory  Judgment 

Vendee,  granted  new  trial  after 
Judgment  foreclosing  vendor's  lien, 
could  recover  for  conversion  of  oil 
taken  from  land,  Judgment  being 
merely  interlocutory. — Texas  Co.  v. 
Dunlap,  Tex.Com.App.,  41  S.W.2d  42, 
rehearing  denied  43  S.W.2d  92. 

79.  Minn.— Aldrich  v.  Chase,  73  N. 
W.  161,  70  Minn.  243,  247. 

34  C.J.  p  386  note  8. 

80.  Conn. — Padaigis  v.  Kane,  4  A.2d 
335,  125  Conn.  727. 

81.  Ohio. — Washington  v.  Levinson, 
35  N.E.2d  161,  66  Ohio  App.  461. 

Pa.— Markofski  v.  Tanks,  146  A.  569, 
297  Pa.  74. 

558 


a  decree  of  partition  cannot  be 
opened  to  change  results  without 
also  setting  aside  the  titles  obtain- 
ed under  it— Walsh  v.  Varney,  '  88 
Mich.  73. 

L    N.T. — Pomeroy  v.  Hocking  Val- 
ley R.  Co.,  175  N.T.S.  489,  187  App. 
Div.  164. 
34  C.J.  p  386  note  12. 

83.  111.— Park  Ridge  v.  Murphy,  101 
N.E.  524,  258  111.  365. 

34  C.J.  p  386  note  14. 

Vacating  judgment  held  erroneous 

Vacating  Judgment  against  sure- 
ties on  official  bond  before  final  de- 
termination of  cause  was  held  to  be 
error,  since  plaintiff  should  have 
been  allowed  to  retain  his  lien  un- 
til final  determination  of  the  case. 
— City  of  Luverne  v.  Skyberg,  211  N. 
W.  5,  169  Minn.  234. 

84.  Mo.— McLaran    v.    Wilhelm,    50 
Mo.App.  658. 

34  C.J.  p  386  note  9. 

85.  U.S.— Leonard     v.     St     Joseph 
Lead  Co.,  C.C.A.MO.,  75  F.2d  390— 
17.    S,   v.   A.   Bentley  &   Sons  Co., 
D.C.Ohio,  293  F.  229. 

34  C.J.  p  386  note  15. 

86.  U.S. — Leonard     v.     St     Joseph 
Lead  Co.,   C.C.A.MO.,   75   F.2d   390. 

34  OJ.  p  387  note  16. 

Original  judgment  is  superseded 
by  new  judgment  where  applicant  is 
successful  on  motion  to  set  aside 
judgment  and  enter  a  different  judg- 
ment based  on  the  findings. — Karsh 
v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for  Los 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


306 


ment  does  not  give  jurisdiction  where  none  before 
existed  or  confer  on  the  judgment  any  validity  it 
did  not  originally  possess.87  A  refusal  to  set  aside 
a  judgment  alleged  to  be  void  for  want  of  juris- 
diction is  not  a  conclusive  determination  that  the 
judgment  i$  valid.88  An  order  erroneously  award- 
ing relief  against  a  judgment  is  not  void  where  the 
court  had  jurisdiction.89 

Subsequent  proceedings.  It  has  been  held  that 
the  order  opening  the  judgment  rather  than  a  gener- 
al practice  act  controls  the  subsequent  pleadings  in 
the  action.^0  Unless  the  order  otherwise  provides, 
defendant  on  the  opening  of  a  judgment  may  inter- 
pose any  defense,91  including  one  not  previously 
raised.92  Where  a  judgment  is  opened  generally, 
the  burden  is  on  plaintiff  to  prove  his  cause  of  ac- 


Persons  bound.  An  order  granting  or  denying 
a  motion  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  is  binding 
and  conclusive  on  all  parties  to  the  application  and 
on  those  in  privity  with  them.9* 

Renewal  of  application.  The  remedy  of  a  party 
aggrieved  by  the  denial  of  a  motion  to  open  or  va- 
cate a  judgment  is  by  appeal,95  and  not  by  resort 
to  independent  proceedings  to  obtain  the  same  re- 
lief,96 although  it  has  been  held  that  a  denial  of 
relief  on  motion  is  no  bar  to  an  action  on  the  same 
grounds  for  the  same  relief,97  and  particularly  not 
to  an  action  for  the  same  relief  but  on  different 
grounds.98  While  the  decision  on  a  motion  to  va- 
cate or  set  aside  a  judgment  is  not  in  the  strict 
sense  res  judicata,"  it  has  been  held  that  a  plea  of 


res  judicata  may  be  sustained  where  the  second  ap- 
plication is  on  the  same  grounds  as  the  first,1  and  it 
is  general  rule  of  practice  that  a  second  application 
for  the  same  purpose,  based  on  the  same  grounds 
as  the  first,  will  not  be  entertained2  without  first 
obtaining  leave  of  the  court,3  unless  the  order  de- 
nying the  motion  is  made  without  prejudice  to  its 
renewal4  or  is  made  in  a  manner  too  defective  or 
imperfect  to  prevent  a  renewal.5 

A  second  application  to  vacate  a  judgment  found- 
ed on  facts  which  were  known  or  which  should 
have  been  known  to  the  applicant  at  the  time  of 
making  the  first  application  will  not,  as  a  rule,  be 
considered,6  although  a  refusal  to  vacate  a  judg- 
ment on  one  ground  is  no  bar  to  an  application  to 
vacate  it  on  other  grounds.7  If,  however,  the  court 
is  satisfied  that  there  was  excusable  neglect  in  not 
bringing  forward  all  the  grounds  in  the  first  in- 
stance, leave  may  properly  be  granted  to  renew  the 
application.8  A  new  motion  should  always  be  en- 
tertained when  based  on  new  grounds,  not  covered 
by  the  former  motion  and  not  then  known  or  avail- 
able to  the  party.9  Where  leave  to  renew  an  ap- 
plication to  vacate  or  set  aside  a  judgment  is  grant- 
ed, such  second  application  must  be  in  accordance 
with  the  terms  imposed  on  granting  such  relief.10 
Where  the  second  application  is  for  different  re- 
lief, as,  for  instance,  where  the  former  motion  was 
to  vacate  a  judgment  as  a  nullity,  and  the  second  is 
to  open  such  judgment  and  let  applicant  in  to  de- 
fend, or  vice  versa,  the  denial  of  the  first  motion  is 
no  bar  as  to  the  second.11 


Angeles    County,    12    P.2d    658,    124 
CaLApp.  373. 

87.  Cal.— Smith  v.  Los  Angeles  &  P: 
R.  Co.*  34  P.  242,  4  Cal.Unrep.Cas. 
237. 

34  C.J.  p  387  note  19. 

88.  N.Y.— Pendleton  v.  Weed,  17  N. 
Y.   72. 

89.  Wis.— Volland  v.  McGee,  295  N. 
W.  635,  236  Wis.  358. 

90.  Pa. — Cassler  v.  Cassler,   144  A. 
88,  294  Pa.  197. 

81.    Pa. — Austen  v.  Marzolf,   161  A. 

72,  307  Pa,  232. 

Plaintiff  is  not  required  to  antici- 
pate defense  or  sustain  greater  than 
normal  burden  of  proof. — Austen  v. 
Marzolf,  supra. 

92.  Conn.— -Padaigis  v.  Kane,  4  A.2d 
335,  125  Conn.  727. 

93.  Pa.— Austen  v.   Marfcolf,   161  A. 
72,  307  Pa,  232— Knierim  v.  Pfeil, 
Com.Pl.,  6  Sch.Reg.  329. 

34  C.J.  p  386  note  14  [a]. 

94.  N.Y.— Bush  v.  O'Brien,  62  N.Y. 
S.    685,    47   App.Div.   581,   reversed 


on  other  grounds  58  N.E.  106,  164 

N.Y.  205. 

34  C.J.  p  387  note  21. 
95i    111. — Emcee        Corporation       v. 

George,  12  N.E.2d  333,  293  IlLApp. 

240. 
34  C.J.  p  387  note  23. 

98.  Ga. — Palmer  v.  Jackson,  4  S.E. 

2d  28,  188  Ga.  336. 
34  C.J.  p  387  note  24. 

97.  N.Y.— Monroe  v.  Monroe,  21  N.Y. 
S.  655. 

34  C.J.  p  387  note  25. 

98.  Cal. — Estudillo  v.  Security  Loan 
&  Trust  Co.,  87  P.  19,  149  Cal.  556. 

34  C.J.  p  387  note  26. 

99.  Conn.— Santoro    v.    Kleinberger, 
163  A.  107,  115  Conn.  631. 

34  C.J.  p  387  note  27. 

1.  Ga.— Revels    v.    Kilgo,    121    S.R 
209,  157  Ga.  39. 

2.  111. — Emcee    •     Corporation        v. 
George,  12  N.B.2d  333,  293  IlLApp. 
240. 

Mass.— Old  Colony  Trust  Co.  v.  Pep- 
per,  167   N.E.   656,  268   Mass.   467. 
34  C.J.  p  388  note  28. 

559 


3.  Minn. — Carlson  v.  Carlson,  52  N. 
W.  214,  49  Minn.  655. 

34  C.J.  p  388  note  29. 

4.  Mass. — Soper  v.   Manning,   33  N. 
E.  516,  158  Mass.  381. 

34  C.J.  p  388  note  30. 

5.  Va.— Webb   v.    McNeil,    8    Munf. 
184,  17  Va.  184. 

6.  Ga. — Palmer  v.  Jackson,  4  S.E.2d 
28,  188  Ga.  336. 

34  C.J.  %p  388  note  32. 

A  special  plea  setting  up  the  judg- 
ment and  facts  as  to  the  first  attack 
is  not  required. — Palmer  v.  Jack- 
son, supra. 

7.  Ga, — Palmer  v.  Jackson,  supra, 
34  C.J.  p  388  note  33. 

8.  Mont. — Jensen  v.  Barbour,  81  P. 
592,  12  Mont.  566. 

34  C.J.  p  388  note  34. 

9.  S.D. — Olson  v.    Advance   Rumely 
Thresher  Co.,  178  N.W.  141,  43   S. 
D.  90. 

34  C.J.  p  389  note  35. 

10.  N.Y.— People  v.  Samuels,  8  N.Y. 
S.  475. 

34  C.J.  p  389  note  36. 

11.  Pa.— Albert  M.  Greenfield  &  Co. 


307 


JUDGMENTS 


49    (XJ.S. 


§  307.    Restitution 

A  party  who  has  received  benefits  under  a  Judgment 
which  is  vacated  should  be  required  to  make  restitution. 

Where  a  final  judgment  is  absolutely  vacated,  aft- 
er it  has  been  paid,  or  satisfied  by  execution  or  by 
possession  of  the  property  in  controversy,  the  party 
benefiting  by  it  should  be  ordered  to  make  restitu- 
tion,12 but  not  where  the  judgment  is  merely  opened 
to  permit  a  defense;  in  the  latter  case  therS  should 
be  no  order  of  restitution  until  after  trial  and  final 
judgment13  An  attorney  who  has  shared  in  the 
proceeds  of  a  vacated  judgment  may  be  ordered 
to  make  restitution.14 

§  308.    Objections  and  Exceptions 

Objections  to  defects  In  proceedings  to  open  OP  va- 
cate a  Judgment  may  be  waived. 

Defects  or  irregularities  in  the  proceedings  to 
vacate  a  judgment,  or  in  the  action  of  the  court 
thereon,  are  waived  if  the  party  fails  to  object 
in  due  season,  or  shows  his  acquiescence  by  par- 
ticipating in  the  further  proceedings  in  the  action.15 

v.    Roberts,    5    A.2d    642,    135    Pa, 

Super.  328. 
34  C.J.  p  389  note  87. 
12.    U.S.— U.   S.  v.   Morgan,   Mo.,   59 

S.Ct.    795,    307    U.S.    183,    83    L.Ed. 

1211,  mandate  conformed  to,  D.C., 

Morgan  v.   U.    S.,    32   F.Supp.   546, 

reversed  on  other  grounds  U.  S.  v. 

Morgan,     61     S.Ct     999,     313    U.S. 

409,   85  L.Ed.  1429. 
Cal.— -Brown  v.  Howard,  261  P.  732, 

86  Cal.App.  532. 
Fla.— State  ex  rel.  Revell  v.  City  of 

Wauchula,    189    So.    247,    138    Fla. 

184 — Revell    v.    Dishong,    175    So. 

905,    129   Fla,    9— Hazen  v.   Smith, 

135  So.  813,  101  Fla.  767. 
Mo. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in    In    re 

Main's  Estate,  152  S.W.2d  696,  701, 

236  Mo.App.  88. 
K.J.— Westfleld    Trust   Co.   v.    Court 

of  Common  Pleas  of  Morris  Coun- 
ty, 183  A.  165,  116  N.J.Law  191— 

Westfleld  Trust  Co.  v.  Cherry,  183 

A.  165,  116  N.J.Law  190. 
Wyo.— Healy    v.   Wostenberg,    38    P. 

2d  325,  47  Wyo.  375. 
34  C.J.  P  389  note  38. 

Rigftt  to  restitution  is  not  abso- 
lute, to  be  had  by  litigant  regardless 
of  justice  of  matter.— Healy  v.  Wos- 
tenberg, supra. 
One  in  privity  with  successful  party 

When  a  void  judgment  is  set  aside, 
•  party  receiving  benefit  thereof  or  one 
in  privity  with  him  is  obligated  to 
make  restitution  to  other  party  of 
all  property  received  under  judg- 
ment—Peoples Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Wagner,  180  S.W.2d  295,  297 
Ky.  558. 
Trust  fund;  identity 

With  respect  to  the  right  of  bank- 
ruptcy trustee  to  recover  from  judg- 


§  309.    Vacation  and  Review  of  Order 

An  order  opening  or  vacating  a  Judgment  may  Itself 
be  vacated. 

The  court  has  power  to  reverse,  correct,  or  mod- 
ify orders  made  by  it  on  an  application  to  open  or 
vacate  a  judgment.16  An  order  opening  or  vacat- 
ing a  judgment  may  itself  be  vacated  or  rescind- 
ed,17 as  where  the  order  was  made  without  juris- 
diction,1* or  was  obtained  irregularly  or  fraudu- 
lently,19 or  because  it  was  erroneous,20  or  on  fail- 
ure to  comply  with  the  conditions  imposed.21 

An  application  to  vacate  an  order  vacating  or 
opening  a  judgment  must  be  timely  made,22  and  due 
notice  must  be  given.23  It  has  been  held  that  the 
application  must  be  made  to  the  judge  who  ren- 
dered the  order  sought  to  be  vacated.24 

The  effect  of  vacating  such  an  order  is  to  re- 
store the  original  judgment.25  When  this  is  done, 
provision  should  be  made  for  saving  the  interven- 
ing rights  of  third  persons.26  The  court  may  pro- 


ment  creditor  money  obtained  under 
execution  on  judgment  which  was 
subsequently  vacated,  trust  for  mon- 
ey so  obtained  did  not  come  into  be- 
ing until  order  setting  aside  Judg- 
ment became  final,  after  which  time 
law  imposed  on  Judgment  creditor 
obligation  of  returning  money  to 
bankrupt,  notwithstanding  .failure  of 
bankruptcy  trustee  to  identify  trust 
res. — Levy  v.  Drew,  50  P.2d  435,  4 
Cal.2d  456,  101  A.L.R.  1144. 
Discharge  of  lien 

The  tender  of  special  assessments 
was  not  required  as  a  condition  to 
vacate  a  Judgment  void  on  its  face, 
rendered  in  action  to  foreclose  de- 
linquent special  assessments,  where 
property  was  purchased  by  Judgment 
creditor  and  lien  was  not  discharged 
since  Judgment  was  void. — Morgan  v. 
City  of  Ardmore  ex  rel.  Love  & 
Thurmond,  78  P.2d  785,  182  Okl.  542. 
13-  N.Y.— Ketcham  v.  Elliott,  20  N. 

T.S.  745. 

14.  Mo.— Warren  v.   Order  of  Hall- 
way Conductors  of  America,  201  S. 
W.  368,  199  Mo.App.  200. 

15.  111.— National  Lead  Co.  v.  Mor- 
tell,    261    IlLApp.    332— Cooper   v. 
Handelsman,    247   IlLApp.   454. 

34  C-J.  p  389  note  41. 

16.  N.J.— Wardell     v.     Warshofsky, 
159  A.  694,  10  N.J.Misc.  519. 

17.  U.S. — Thomas    v.    Newton,    C.C. 
Pa.,     23    F.Cas.No,13,905,     Pet.C.C. 
4444. 

Kan. — Mayall  v.  American  Well 
Works  Co,,  89  P.2d  846,  149  Kan. 
•781. 

Ky. — Commonwealth  v.  Partin,  3  S. 
W.2d  779,  223  Ky.  405. 

34  C.J.  p  389  note  46. 

560 


Compared    with    power    to     vacate 

Judgment 

The  power  of  court  to  set  aside 
judgment  should  be  no  greater  than 
its  power  to  set  aside  an  order  va- 
cating Judgment. — Morey  v.  Morey, 
299  N.T.S.  161,  164  Misc.  527. 

18.  Fla.— State   v.   Wright,    145    So. 
598,  107  Fla.  178. 

34  C.J.  p  389  note  42. 

19.  Wash.— Hays  v.  Mercantile  Inv. 
Co.,  132  P.  406,   73  Wash.  586. 

34  C.J.  p  389  note  43. 

20.  Mo. — Wilson  v.  Teale,  App.,   88 
S.W.2d  422. 

34  C.J.  p  389  note  44. 

21.  Cal. — Gregory  v.  Haynes,  21  Cal. 
443. 

34  C.J.  p  389  note  45. 

22.  Ind.— Kolb    v.    Raisor,    47    N.E. 
177,  17  Ind.App.  551. 

34  C.J.  p  389  note  47. 

23.  Wash. — Chehalis   County  v.  El- 
lingson,   59   P.  485,   21  Wash.   638. 

34  C.J.  p  390  note  49. 

24.  TJ.S. — Newcomb  v.  Burbank,  C.C. 
N.T.,  159  F.  569. 

Collateral  proceeding 

The  decree  or  order  of  a  court  of 
competent  Jurisdiction,  although  va- 
cated or  modified  by  subsequent  or- 
der fraudulently  procured,  may  not 
be  reinstated  by  decree  in  collateral 
proceeding. — Goodman  v.  Goodman, 
194  A.  866,  15  N.J.Misc.  716. 

25.  Ky. — Vanderpool  v.  Stewart,  279 
S.W.  645,  212  Ky.  373. 

34  C.J.  p  390  note  51. 

26.  N.J.— Keogh  v.  Delany,   40  N.J. 
Law  97. 


49    C.J.S. 


vide  that  the  judgment  be  reinstated  as  of  the  date 
it  was  originally  entered.27 

Review  on  appeal  or  error  of  an  order  granting 
or  denying  an  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judg- 
ment is  considered  in  Appeal  and  Error  §  132. 


JUDGMENTS 
§  310. 


§  311 


Liabilities  on  Bonds   Given  in  Pro- 
ceedings to  Vacate 

The  imposition  of  terms  on  the  opening  or  va- 
cating of  judgments  is  discussed  supra  §  303. 
Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 


D.  WRIT  OF  ERROR  CORAM  NOBIS 


§  311.    In  General 

A  writ  of  error  coram  nobls  Is  a  common-law  writ 
used  in  a  proper  case  to  obtain  a  review  and  correction 
cf  a  judgment  by  the  court  which  rendered  it.  Although 
widely  replaced  by  more  convenient  remedies,  the  writ 
still  obtains  in  some  jurisdictions. 

A  writ  of  error  coram  nobis,  sometimes  called  a 
"writ  of  error  coram  vobis,"28  is  an  ancient  com- 


mon-law writ,29  used  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
a  review  and  correction  of  a  judgment  by  the  same 
court  which  rendered  it,  with  respect  to  some  error 
of  fact  affecting  the  validity  and  regularity  of  the 
judgment.30  The  writ  has  grown  out  of  use  and 
become  substantially  obsolete  both  in  England  and 
in  this  country,31  the  more  convenient  and  sum- 


87.  Neb. — Shafer  v.  Wilsonville  El- 
evator Co.,  237  N.W.  155.  121  Neb. 
280. 

28.  U.S. — Hiawassee  Lumber  Co.  v. 
U.    S.f    C.C.A.N.C.,    64    F.2d    417— 
United   States   v.  One  Trunk  Con- 
taining   Fourteen    Pieces    of    Em- 
broidery, D.C.N.Y.,  155  F.  651— Mc- 
Ginn v.  U.  S.,  D.C.Mass.,  2  F.R.D. 
562. 

Ala, — Snodgrass    v.    Snodgrass,     101 

So.  837,  212  Ala,  74. 
Colo. — Tatarsky   v.   De  Vere,   242  P. 

973,  78  Colo.  49G. 
Md.— Hawks    v.    State,    157    A.    900, 

162  Md.   30. 
34  C.J.  p  390  note  54. 
Distinctions  considered 

(1)  "It   is   called  a  writ  of  error 
coram    nobis    in    King's    Bench,    be- 
cause the  record  and  proceedings  are 
stated  in  the  writ  to  remain  'before 
us*.     It  was  a  fiction  of  old  English 
law  that  the  King  was  supposed  to 
preside  in  person  in  that  court.     In 
the  Court  of  Common  Pleas,  where 
the  king  is  not  supposed  to  reside, 
the   writ    is   called  a  writ  of   error 
coram  vobis,  because  the  record  and 
proceedings  are  stated  in  the  record 
to  remain  'before  ydu,'  meaning  the 
king's    justices.     .    ,     .     The    differ- 
ence referred  only  to  the.  form  ap- 
propriate   to"  each   court,   neither   of 
which    exists    in    the   United   States, 
and  as  a  result  there  is  no  difference 
between  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis 
and  a  writ  of  error  coram  vobis  in 
this  country." — Baker  v.  Smith's  Es- 
tate, 18  S.W.2d  147,  151,  228  Mo.App. 
1234,  226  Mo.App.  510. 

(2)  Other  statements. 

111. — Me  G rath  &  Swanson  Const.  Co. 

v.    Chicago    Kys.   Co.,    252   IlLApp. 

476. 
Md.— Keane  v.  State,  166  A.  410,  164 

Md.  685. 
34  C.J.  p  390  note  54  [a]. 

29.  U.S. — New  England  Furniture  & 
Carpet  Co.  v.  Willcuts,  D.C.Minn., 
55  F.2d  983— McGinn  v.  U.  S.,  D.C. 
Mass.,  2  F.R.D.  562. 

49  C.  J.S.-36 


Til. — McCord  v.  Briggs  &  Turivas, 
170  N.E.  320,  338  111.  158— Mara- 
b'a  v.  Mary  Thompson  Hospital  of 
Chicago  for  Women  and  Children, 
140  N.E.  836,  309  111.  147— Nikola 
v.  Campus  Towers  Apartment 
Bldg.  Corporation,  25  N.E.2d  582, 
303  IlLApp.  516— Frank  v.  New- 
burger,  19  N.E.2d  147,  298  IlLApp. 
548— Swiercz  v.  Nalepka,  259  111. 
App.  262. 
Kan. — Gibson  v.  Enright,  37  P.2d 

1017,  140  Kan.  700. 
Md.— Keane  v.  State,  166  A.  410,  164 
Md.    685— Hawks   v.    State,    157   A. 
900,  162  Md.  30. 

Mo. — Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Go.  v.  Stan- 
fill,    App.f    259    S.W.    867— Ragland 
v.   Ragland,  App.,   258   S.W.   728. 
Wis.— Ernst   v.    State,    192    N.W.   «5, 

179  Wis.   646,   30  A.L.R.   681. 
34  C.J.  p  390  note  55. 

"The  writ  of  error  .coram  nobis 
is  one  of  the  oldest  writs  known  to 
the  English  Common  Law.  Black- 
stone  refers  to  it  as  a  'writ  of  most 
remedial  nature  which  seems  to  have 
been  invented  lest  in  any  way  there 
should  be  an  oppressive  defeat  of 
Justice.'  " — Central  Franklin  Process 
Co.  v.  Gann,  133  S.W.Sd  503,  508, 
175  Tenn.  267. 

"Coram  nobis  means  'before  us* 
or  quae  coram  nobis  resident,  which 
roughly  translated  is  'which  before 
us  remain/  so  called  'from  its  being 
founded  on  the  record  and  process, 
which  are  stated  in  the  writ  to  re- 
main in  the  court  of  the  king  before 
the  king  himself.'  Bouvier's  Law 
Dictionary."— McGrath  &  Swanson 
Const.  Co.  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  252 
IlLApp.  476,  478, 

30.  U.S. — Hiawassee  Lumber  Co.  v. 
U.  S.,  C.C.A.N.C.,  64  F.2d  417— 
New  England  Furniture  &  Carpet 
Co.  v.  Willcuts,  D.C.Minn.,  55  F.2d 
983 — United  States  v.  One  Trunk 
Containing  Fourteen  Pieces  of  Em- 
broidery, D.C.N.T.,  155  F,  651— 
McGinn  v.  U.  S.,  t>.C.Mass.f  2  F. 
R.D.  562. 

561 


Ark. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  State  v. 
Hudspeth,   88  S.W.2d  858,  860,  191 
Ark.  963. 
Colo. — Tatarsky   v.   De  Vere,   242   P. 

973,  78  Colo.  496. 

Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Tweed  v. 
Lockton,  167  A.  703,  705,  5  Harr. 
474. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Waite  v.  Bristow, 
62  N.E.2d  545,  391  111.  101— Maher 
v.  New  York,  C.  &•  St,  L.  R.  Co., 
8  N.E.2d  512,  290  IlLApp.  267— 
Lynn  v.  Multhauf,  279  IlLApp.  210 
—-Swiercz  v.  Nalepka,  259  IlLApp. 
262 — McGrath  &  Swanson  Const. 
Co.  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  252  111. 
App.  476. 
Ind.— Berry  v.  State,  173  N.E.  705, 

202  Ind.  294,  72  A.L.R.  1177. 
Md. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Keane  v. 
State,  166  A.  410,  412,  164  Md.  685 
—Hawks  v.  State,  157  A.  900,  162 
Md.  30. 

Mo.— City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Franklin 
Bank,  173  S.W.2d  837,  351  Mo. 
688 — Townsend  v.  Boatmen's  Nat. 
Bank,  App.,  148  S.W.2d  85— Bank 
of  Skidmore  v.  Ripley,  App.,  84  S. 
W.2d  185 — Kings  Lake  Drainage 
Dist.  v.  Winkelmeyer,  62  S.W.2d 
1101,  228  Mo.App.  1102— Moutier  v. 
Sherman,  App.,  25  S.W.2d  490 — 
Schneider  v.  Schneider,  App.,  273 
S.W.  1081— Ragland  v.  Ragland, 
App.,  258  S.W.  728. 
Tex. — Ex  parte  Minor,  27  S.W.2d  805, 

116  Tex.Cr.  634. 
34  C.J.  p  390  note  56. 

The  earliest  known  use  of  the 
writ  was  to  disclose  misprision  of 
clerk,  infancy,  coverture,  or  death 
of  a  party. — Nikola  v.  Campus  Tow- 
ers Apartment  Bldg.  Corporation,  25 
N.E.2d  582,  303  IlLApp.  516. 

31.    U.S. — New  England  Furniture  & 

Carpet  Co.  v.  Willcuts,  D.C.Minn., 

55  F.2d  983. 
Kan.— Gibson    v.    Enright,    37    P.2d 

1017,  140  Kan.  700. 
Colol — Carpus  Juris  cited  In  Grand- 

bouche  v.  People,  89  P.2d  577,  582, 

104  Colo.  175. 
Md.— Keane  v.  State,  166  A.  410,  164 


§  311 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


mary  remedy  by  motion  having  taken  its  place,  ei- 
ther as  a  matter  of  practice  or  by  express  statu- 
tory provision,32  although,  of  course,  distinctions  do 
exist  between  a  motion  to  open  or  vacate  a  judg- 
ment, and  proceedings  on  a  writ  of  error  coram  no- 
bis.33 

The  writ  is  still  an  available  remedy,  and  is  oc- 
casionally used,34  except  where  it  has  been  abol- 
ished by  statute;35  and  in  some  jurisdictions  the 
writ  is  expressly  authorized  by  statute,36  or  is  pre- 
served by  operation  of  a  general  constitutional  pro- 
vision retaining  common-law  remedies.37  Howev- 
er, in  modern  practice  the  writ  is  not  so  compre- 
hensive as  at  common  law  because  of  the  existence 
of  statutory  remedies,  such  as  motion  to  vacate,  mo- 
tion for  new  trial,  and  appeal.38 

§312.    When  Writ  Lies 

a.  In  general 

b.  Other  adequate  remedies 

c.  Errors  of  fact 

d.  Errors  of  law 


a.  In  General 

Except  as  otherwise  provided  by  statute,  all  courts 
of  record  exercising  general  original  jurisdiction  at  com- 
mon law  have  power  to  issue  the  writ.  The  writ  is  in- 
appropriate in  chancery  proceedings. 

A  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  will  not  ordinarily 
lie  after  affirmance  of  the  judgment  on  writ  of  er- 
ror or  appeal;39  nor  will  the  writ  lie  after  the  dis- 
missal of  a  certiorari  for  want  of  merits  in  the  pe- 
tition.40 Where  a  petition  for  a  writ  is  denied  and 
a  second  petition  is  subsequently  brought  in  the 
same  court  that  court  has  jurisdiction  to  decide 
whether  or  not  the  denial  of  the  first  petition  is 
res  judicata.41 

In  what  courts  and  proceedings.  All  courts  of 
record  exercising  general  original  jurisdiction  at 
common  law  have  power  to  issue  writs  of  error 
coram  nobis,  as  part  of  their  common-law  juris- 
diction,42 except  as  otherwise  provided  by  stat- 
ute.43 It  has  been  held  that,  in  courts  exercising 
only  appellate  jurisdiction,  the  writ  does  not  lie;44 
but  there  is  authority  to  the  contrary,4^  The  ex- 
tent of  the  power  of  other  courts  to  entertain  the 


Md.   685— Hawks  v.   State,   157  A. 

900,  162  Md.  30. 
Mo.—Baker  v.  Smith's  Estate,  18  8. 

W.2d    147,    223    Mo.App.    1234,    226 

Mo.App.    510 — Hartford    Fire    Ins. 

Co.  v.  Stanflll,  App.,  259  S.W.  867. 
34  C.J.  p  391  note  63. 

32.  U.S. — New  England  Furniture  & 
Carpet  Co.  v.  Willcuts,  D.C.Minn., 
55  F.2d  983— McGinn  v.  U.  S.,  B.C. 
Mass.,  2  F.R.D.  562. 

Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Grand- 
bouche  v.  People,  89  P.2d  577,  582, 
104  Colo.  175. 

111.— McCord  v.  Briggs  &  Turivas, 
170  N.E.  320,  338  111.  158— Harris 
v.  Chicago  House-Wrecking  Co., 
145  N.E.  666,  314  111.  500— Marabia 
v.  Mary  Thompson  Hospital  of 
Chicago  for  Women  and  Children, 
140  N.E.  836,  309  111.  147— Nikola 
v.  Campus  Towers  Apartment 
Bldg.  Corporation,  25  N.E.2d  582, 
303  IlLApp.  516— Frank  v.  New- 
burger,  19  N.E.2d  147,  298  IlLApp. 
548— Maher  v.  New  York,  C.  &  St 
L.  R.  Co.,  8  N.E.2d  512,  290  111. 
App.  267 — Josten  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Keel- 
er,  2  N.E.2d  586,  284  IlLApp.  646 
— Lynn  v.  Multhauf,  279  IlLApp. 
210 — Reid  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  231 
IlLApp.  58. 

Kan. — Gibson  v.  Enright,  37  P.2d 
1017,  140  Kan.  700. 

Md.— Hawks  v.  State,  157  A,  900, 
162  Md.  30. 

Mo.—Baker  v.  Smith's  Estate,  18  S. 
W.2d  147,  223  Mo.App.  1234,  226 
Mo. App.  510 — Hartford  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Stanflll,  App.,  259  S.W.  867. 

34  C*J.  p  391  note  64.  j 


33.  Mo.— Scott    v.    Rees,    253    S.W. 
998,  300  Mo.  123. 

34  C.J.  p  391  note  66. 

34.  U.S. — Hiawassee  Lumber  Co.  v. 
U.  S.,  C.C.A.N.C.,  64  F.2d  417. 

Md.— Hawks    v.    State,    157    A.    900, 

162  Md.  30. 
Mo.— Baker  v.  Smith's  Estate,  18  S. 

W.2d    147,    225    Mo.App.    1234,    226 

Mo.App.  510. 

Tex.— Ex  parte  Minor,  27  S.W.2d  805, 
.  115  Tex.Cr.  634. 
34  C.J.  p  392  note  67. 
After  time  for  motion 

A  motion  to  vacate  a  judgment 
made  three  years  after  the  term  at 
which  judgment  was  rendered,  for 
matters  outside  the  record,  will  be 
considered  as  a  motion  for  writ 
coram  nobis,  in  view  of  the  similari- 
ties of  the  two  motions  as  independ- 
ent proceedings. — Scott  v.  Rees,  253 
S.W.  998,  300  Mo.  123. 

35.  Or.— State  v.  Rathie,  200  P.  790, 
101  Or.  368. 

34  OJ.  p  392  note  68. 
Essentials  of  remedy  remain 

While  the  statute  abolishes  the 
writ,  it  does  not  abolish  the  essen- 
tials of  the  proceeding,  which  re- 
main the  same. — People  ex  rel.  Waite 
v.  Bristow,  62  N.E.2d  545,  391  111. 
101— Frank  v.  Salomon,  34  N.E.2d 
424,  376  111.  439— People  v.  Sullivan, 
171  N.E.  122,  339  111.  146— Jacobson 
v.  Ashkinaze,  168  N.E.  647,  337  111. 
141 — Harris  v.  Chicago  House- 
Wrecking,  Co.,  145  N.E.  666,  314  111. 
500 — Marabia  v.  Mary  Thompson 
Hospital  of  Chicago  for  Women  and 
Children,  140  N.E.  836,  309  111.  1'47 — 
Coultry  v.' Yellow  Cab  Co.,  252  111. 

562 


App.  443 — Waldron  v.  Tarpey,  234  I1L 
App.  287 — Reid  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co., 
231  IlLApp.  58—34  C.J.  p  392  note 
68  [c]  (1). 

36.  Tenn. — Gates  v.  City  of  McKen- 
zie,  141  S.W.2d  471,  176  Tenn.  313 
— Central  Franklin  Process  Co.  v. 
Gann,    133    S.W.2d   503,    175   Tenn. 
267 — Hyde  v.  Dunlap,  8  Tenn. App. 
260. 

34  C.J.  p  392  note  69. 

37.  Wis.— Ernst  v.  State,   192  N.W. 
65,   179  Wis.  646,  30  A.L.R.   681. 

38.  Ind.— Berry   v.    State,    173    N.E. 
705,   202   Ind.   294,   72  A.L.R.   1177. 

Wis.— Ernst  v.   State,    192   N.W.    65, 

179    Wis.    646,    30    A.L.R.    681. 
34  C.J.  p  392  note  70. 

39.  N.C.— Latham  v.  Hodges,   35  N. 
C.  267. 

34  C.J.  p  392  note  77. 

40.  Tenn. — Welsh     v,     Harman,     8 
Terg.  103. 

34  C.J.  p  392  note  79. 

41.  Ind.— State   ex   rel.   Emmert   v. 
Hamilton  Circuit  Court,  61  N.E.2d 
182. 

43.    Mo.— Reed  v.   Bright,    134   S.W. 

653,  232  Mo.  399. 
34  C.J.  p  392  note  80. 

43.  Mich.— Teller    v.    Wetherttl,     6 
Mich.  46. 

34  C.J.  p  392  note  81. 

44.  Tenn. — Lamb  v.   Sneed,  4  Baxt 
349. 

34  C.J.  p  392  note  82. 

45.  Ohio. — Dows  v.  Harper,  -6  Ohio 
518,  521,  27  Am.D.  270. 

34  C.J.  p  392  note  83. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


312 


writ  depends  on  the  statutes  controlling  their  ju- 
risdiction and  practice.46  In  England  the  writ  did 
not  lie  either  in  the  house  of  lords,47  or  in  the  ex- 
chequer chamber,48  but  did  lie  in  the  king's  bench 
and  common  pleas.49 

Since  the  writ  of  error  coram  nobis,  is  a  com- 
mon-law writ,  it  is  inappropriate  in  chancery  pro- 
ceedings.50 A  divorce  decree  cannot  be  reviewed 
by  writ  of  error  coram  nobis.51  As  appears  in 
•Criminal  Law  §  1606,  the  writ  may  be  available 
in  criminal,  as  well  as  in  civil,  proceedings. 

b.  Other  Adequate  Remedies 

The  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  will  not  lie  where  there 
is  another  adequate  remedy. 

The  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  will  not  lie  where 
there  is  another  adequate  remedy,52  as  by  motion 
to  vacate  the  judgment,53  which,  as  discussed  supra 
§  311,  is  now  widely  substituted  for  the  writ,  or  by 
motion  for  a  new  trial,54  or  by  appeal.55  As  fall- 


ing within  this  rule,  it  has  been  held  that  a  writ  of 
error  coram  nobis  will  not  lie  on  any  of  the  fol- 
lowing grounds,  namely :  Defenses  available  at  the 
trial  ;56  accident  and  surprise;57  verdict  against 
evidence;58  newly  discovered  evidence;59  and  oth- 
er like  matters.60 

c.  Errors  of  Fact 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Jurisdictional  facts 

(3)  Disability  or  death 

(4)  Fraud,  mistake,  and  clerical  errors 

(5)  New  or  adjudicated  facts 

(1)  In  General 

A  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  lies  for  an  error  of  fact 
not  apparent  on  the  record,  not  attributable  to  the  ap- 
plicant's negligence,  and  which,  if  known  by  the  court, 
would  have  prevented  rendition  of  the  judgment. 

A  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  lies,  sometimes  by 
virtue  of  statutory  provisions,  for  an  error  of  fact,6* 


46.  Ky. — Breckinridge    v.    Coleman, 
7  B.Mon.  331. 

34  CJT.  p  393  note  84. 

47.  111.— Nikola  v.   Campus  Towers 
Apartment    Bldg.    Corporation,    25 
N.E.2d    582,    303    IlLApp.    516. 

34  C.J.  p  393  note  85. 

48.  111.— Nikola  v.   Campus   Towers 
Apartment   Bids.   Corporation,   su- 
pra. 

34  C.J.  p  393  note  86. 

49.  Ohio. — Dows  v.  Harper,   6  Ohio 
518,  27  Am.D.  270. 

34  C.J.  p  393  note  87. 

50.  Ala, — Snodgrass    v.     Snodgrass, 
101  So.  837,  212  Ala.  74. 

111.— Frank  v.  Salomon,  34  N.E.2d 
424,  376  111.  439— Corpus  Jttris  cit- 
ed la,  Frank  v.  Newburger,  19  N.E. 
'2d  147,  153,  298  IlLApp.  548— Cor- 
pus Juris  cited  in  People  v.  Jans- 
sen,  263  IlLApp.  101,  104. 

34  C.J.  p  393  note  89. 

Beason  for  role 

In  chancery  the  court  may  at  any 
time,  either  by  motion  or  by  a  nunc 
pro  tune  order  or  by  a  motion  in 
the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review,  cor- 
rect the  record  or  make  the  decree 
or  judgment  speak  the  truth. — Peo- 
ple v.  Janssen,  263  IlLApp.  101. 

51.  Tenn.— Tarver    v.     Tarver,     10 
Tenn.  App.  677. 

52.  Colo.— Tatarsky  v.  De  Vere,  242 
P.  973,  78  Colo,  496. 

Kan.— Gibson    v.    Enright,    37    P.2d 

1017,  140  Kan.  700. 
Mo. — Bank    of    Skidmore   v.    Ripley, 

App.,  84  S.W.2d  185. 
34  C.J.  p  393  note  90. 
Other  remedy  inadequate    .    . 

Fact  that  motion  to  set  aside  Judg- 
ment for  irregularities  patent  on 
record  and  errors  of  fact  calling  for 
introduction  of  evidence  dehors  the 


record  was  filed  within  one  year 
after  rendition  of  judgment  did  not 
preclude  substitution  of  coram  nobis 
proceeding  for  writ  of  error,  since 
writ  of  error  proceeding  would  pre- 
clude establishment  of  errors  of 
fact  dehors  the  record. — Crabtree  v. 
JEtna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  SlW.2d  103, 
341  Mo.  1173. 

53.  Wis.— Second  Ward  Bank  v.  Up- 
man,  14  Wis.  596. 

54.  Miss.— Fugate   v.    State,    37    So. 
554,  85  Miss.   94,  107  Am.S.R,  268, 
3  Ann.Cas.  326. 

34  C.J.  p  393  note  93. 

55.  Ind.— Sanders  v.   State,   85   Ind. 
318,  44  Am.R.  29. 

56.  111.— Seither    &    Cherry    Co.    v. 
Board  of  Education  of  District  No. 
15,  Town  of  La  Harpe,  283  IlLApp. 
392. 

Ind.— Sanders  v.  State,   85  Ind*   318, 

44  Am.R.  29. 
Mo. — Townsend    v.    Boatmen's    Nat 

Bank,  App.,  148  S.W.2d  85. 

57.  Ind.— Sanders  v.   State,   85   Ind. 
318,  44  Am.R.  29. 

Error  of  fact  caused  by  accident  or 
surprise  see  infra  subdivision  c 
(4)  of  this  section. 

58.  Ind. — Sanders  v.  State,  supra. 

59.  Ind.— Sanders  v.  State,  supra, 
34  C.J.  p  393  note  -98. 

New  evidence  as  showing  error  of 
•fact  see  infra  subdivision  c  (5)  of 
this  section. 

60.  Miss.— Fugate  v.   State,    37   So. 
554,  85  Miss.  94,  107  AnauS.R.  268, 
3  Ann.Cas.  326. 

34  C.J.  p  393  note  99. 

61.  U.S. — Hiawassee  Lumber  Co.  v. 
U.    S.,    C.C.A.N.C.,    64    F.2d    417— 
New  England  Furniture  &  Carpet 
Co.  v.  Willcuts,  D.C.Minn.,  55  F.2d 
983— United  States  v.   One  Trunk 

563 


Containing  Fourteen  Pieces  of  Em- 
broidery. D.C.N.Y.,  155  F.  651— 
McGinn  v.  U.  S.,  D.C.Mass.,  2  F. 
KJX  562. 

Colo. — Tatarsky  v.  De  Vere,  242  P. 
973,  78  Colo.  496. 

Fla. — Catlett  v.  Chestnut,  168  So.  26, 
120  Fla.  636— Williams  v.  Yelving- 
ton,  137  So.  156,  103  Fla.  145. 

111.— McCord  v.  Briggs  &  Turivas, 
170  N.E.  320,  338  111.  158— Harris 
v.  Chicago  House-Wrecking  Co., 
145  N.E.  666,  314  111.  500— Marabift 
v.  Mary  Thompson  Hospital  of 
Chicago  for  Women  and  Children, 
140  N.E.  836,  309  111.  147— Nikola 
v.  Campus  Towers  Apartment 
Bldg.  Corporation,  25  N.E.2d  582, 
303  IlLApp.  516— Reid  v.  Dolan, 
19  N.E.2d  764,  299  IlLApp.  612— 
Martin  v.  Starr,  255  IlLApp.  189 
— Waldron  v.  Tarpey,  234  IlLApp. 
287. 

Ind.— Berry  v.  State,  173  N.E.  705, 
202  Ind.  294,  72  A.L.R.  1177. 

Mo. — Badger  Lumber  Co.  v.  Good- 
rich, 184  S.W.2d  435,  353  Mo.  769 
— Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  City  of 
St  Louis  v.  Franklin  Bank,  173 
S.W.2d  837,  846,  351  Mo.  688— 
Spotts  v.  Spotts,  55  S.W.2d  984, 
331  Mo.  942— Scott  v.  Hees,  253 
S.W.  998,  300  Mo.  123— Pike  v. 
Pike,  App..  193  S.W.2d  637— Town- 
send  v.  Boatmen's  Nat  Bank,  App., 
148  S.W.2d  85— Haines  v.  Jeffrey 
Mfg.  Co.,  App.,  31  S.W.2d  26P— 
Mefford  v.  Mefford.  App.,  26  S.W. 
2d  ,804 — Schneider  v.  Schneider, 
App.,  273  S.W.  1081— Hartford 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stanfill,  App.,  259 
S.W.  867— Bagland  v.  Ragland, 
APP.,  258  S.W.  728. 

Tenn. — Central  Franklin  Process  Co. 
v.  Gann,  133  S.W.2d  503,  175  Tenn. 
267. 

34  C.J.  P  393  note  1,  p  395  note  13. 


§312 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


was 

32.  -g-.S. — New  England  Furniture 
&  Carpet  Co.  v.  Willcuts,  D.C. 
Minn.,  55  F.2d  983— McGinn  v.  U. 
S.,  D.C.Mass.,  2  F.R.D.  562. 
,  Fla.— Cole  v.  Walker  Fertilizer  Co., 
for  Use  and  Benefit  of  Walker,  1 
So.2d  864,  147  Fla.  1— Williams  v. 
Telvington,  137  So.  156,  103  Fla. 
145. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Waite  v.  Bristow, 
62  N.B.2d  545,  391  111.  101— Je- 
rome v.  5019-21  Quincy  Street 
Bldg.  Corporation,  53  N.B.2d  444, 
385  111.  524— Linehan  v.  Travelers 
Ins.  Co.,  18  N.E.2d  178,  370  HI. 
157— People  v.  Sullivan,  171  N.B. 
122,  339  111.  146 — McCord  v.  Briggs 
&  Turivas,  170  N.B.  320,  338  111. 
158— Jacobson  v.  Ashkinaze,  168  N. 
B.  647,  337  111.  141— Marabia  v. 
Mary  Thompson  Hospital  of  Chi- 
cago for  Women  and  Children.  140 
N.B.  836,  309  111.  147— Frank  v. 
Newburger,  19  N.E.2d  147,  298  111. 
App.  548— Maher  v.  New  York,  C. 
&  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  8  N.E.2d  512.  290 
IlLApp.  267— Chicago  Faucet  Co.  v. 
839  Lake  St.  Bldg.  Corporation,  1 
N.E.2d  865,  285  IlLApp.  151— Swi- 
erez  v.  Nalepka,  259  IlLApp.  262— 
Martin  v.  Starr,  255  IlLApp.  189— 
Mitchell  v.  Bareckson,  250  IlLApp. 
508— Waldron  v.  Tarpey,  234  111. 
App.  287. 

Miss.— ^Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Carra- 
way  v.  State,  141  So.  342,  343,  163 
Miss.  639. 

Mo.— Badger  Lumber  Co.  v.  Good- 
rich, 184  S.W.2d  435,  353  Mo.  769— 
City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Franklin  Bank, 
173  S.W.2d  837,  351  Mo.  688— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Crabtree  v. 
JEtna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  S.W.2d 
103,  106,  341  Mo.  1173 — Fadler  v. 
Gabbert,  63  S.W.2d  121,  333  Mo, 
851— Scott  v.  Rees,  253  S.W.  998, 
300  Mo.  123— Pike  v.  Pike,  App., 
193  S.W.2d  637— Townsend  v. 
Boatmen's  Nat.  Bank,  App.,  148 
•  S.W.2d  SS^Jeffrey  v.  Kelly,  App., 
146  S.W.2d  850— State  ex  reL  Cap- 
low  v.  Kirkwood,  App.,  117  S.W.2d 
652— Bank  of  Skidmore  v.  Ripley, 
App.,  84  S.W.2d  185— Kings  Lake 
Drainage, Dist.  v.  Winkelmeyer,  62 
S.W.2d  1101,  228  Mo.App.  1102— 
Hecht  Bros.  Clothing  Co.  v.  Walk- 
er, 35  S.W.2d  372,  224  Mo.App.  1156 
— Schneider  v.  Schneider,  App.,  273 
S.W.  1081. 

Tenn.— Roller  v.  Burrow,  175  S.W.2d 
537,  180  Tenn.  380,  rehearing  de- 
nied 177  S.W.2d  547,  180  Tenn.  380 
— Roy  Newman  Cigar  Co.  v.  Mur- 
phy, 2  Tenn. App.  321. 
Wis.— Ernst  v.  State,  192  N.W.  65 

179  Wis.   646,   30   A.L.R.   681. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Schoo 

,     Dist  No.   7  in  Weston  County  v 

School  Dist.  No.  1  in  Weston  Coun 

ty,  236  P.  1029,  1Q31,  33  Wyo.  65 

-S4  C.J.  p  394  note  2. 


63.  U.S.— McGinn  v.  IT.  S.,  D.C. 
Mass.,  2  F.R.D.  562. 

Colo.— Tatarsky  v.  De  Vere,  242  P. 
973,  78  Colo.  496. 

Fla.— Cole  v.  Walker  Fertilizer  Co., 
for  Use  and  Benefit  of  Walker,  1 
So.2d  864,  147  Fla.  1— Catlett  v. 
Chestnut,  163  So.  26,  120  Fla,  636 
— Williams  v.  Yelvington,  137  So. 
156,  103  Fla.  145. 

HI. — Linehan  v.  Travelers  Ins.  Co., 
18  N.E.2d  178,  370  111.  157— People 
v.  Sullivan,  171  N.B.  122,  339  111- 
146— Marabia  v.  Mary  Thompson 
Hospital  of  Chicago  for  Women 
and  Children,  140  N.B.  836,  309 
111.  147— Joseph  Kaszab,  Inc.  v. 
Gibson,  App.,  63  N.B.2d  629— Reid 
v.  Dolan.  19  N.B.2d  764,  299  111. 
App.  612 — Chicago  Faucet  Co.  v. 
839  Lake  St.  Bldg.  Corporation,  1 
N.B.2d  865,  285  IlLApp.  151— 
Lynn  v.  Multhauf,  279  IlLApp.  210 
—Martin  v.  Starr,  255  IlLApp.  189 
— Hickman  v.  Ritchey  Coal  Co., 
252  IlLApp.  560 — MeGrath  &  Swan- 
son  Const.  Co.  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co., 
252  IlLApp.  476— Mitchell  v.  Bar- 
eckson, 250  IlLApp.  508— Waldron 
v.  Tarpey,  234  IlLApp.  287— Reid 
v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  231  IlLApp. 
58. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Carra- 
way  v.  State,  141  So.  342,  343,  163 
Miss.  639. 

Mo. — Badger  Lumber  Co.  v.  Good- 
rich, 184  S.W.2d  435,  353  Mo.  769— 
City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Franklin  Bank, 
173  S.W.2d  837,  351  Mo.  688 — 
Pike  v.  Pike,  App.,  193  S.W.2d  637 
— Townsend  v.  Boatmen's  Nat. 
Bank,  App.,  148  S.W.2d  85— Ross 
v.  Davis,  139  S.W.2d  542,  234  Mo. 
App.  1079— Ex  parte  Messina,  128 
S.W.2d  1082,  233  Mo.App.  1234— 
Bank  of  Skidmore  v.  Ripley,  App., 
84  S.W.2d  185— Kings  Lake  Drain- 
age Dist  v.  Winkelmeyer,  62  S.W. 
2d  1101,  228  Mo.App.  1102— Hecht 
Bros.  Clothing  Co.  v.  Walker,  35 
S.W.2d  372,  224  Mo.App.  1156— 
Haines  v.  Jeffrey  Mfg.  Co.,  App. 
81  S.W.2d  269— Mefford  v.  Mefford 
App.,  26  S.W.2d  804 — Schneider  v 
Schneider,  App.,  273  S.W.  1081— 
Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stanfill 
App.,  259  S.W.  867. 
•Wy0, — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Schoo 
Dist.  No.  7  in  Weston  County  v 
School  Dist.  No.  1  in  Weston  Coun- 
ty, 236  P.  1029,  1031,  33  Wyo.  65 
34  C.J.  P  394  note  3.  • 

The  Judgment  must  be  silent  as  to 
the  matter  complained  of  as  const! 
tuting  an  error  of  fact — McCord  v 
Briggs  &  Turivas,  170  N.E.  820,  33" 
111.  158. 


64.    Colo. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Grandbouche  v.  People,  89  P:2d  577 
582,  104  Colo.  175— Tatarsky  v.  D 
Vere,  212  P.  973,  78  Colo.  496. 

564 


Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited  iu  Tweed 
v.  Lockton,  167  A.  703,  705,  5  Harr. 
474. 

Pla.— Cole  v.  Walker  Fertilizer  Co., 
for  Use  and  Benefit  of  Walker,  1 
So.2d  864,  147  Fla.  1— Catlett  v. 
Chestnut,  163  So.  26,  120  Fla.  636 
—Williams  v.  Telvington,  137  So. 
156,  103  Fla.  145. 

11.— People  ex  rel.  Waite  v.  Bris- 
tow, 62  N.E.2d  545,  391  111.  101— 
Linehan  v.  Travelers  Ins.  Co.,  18 
N.B.2d  178,  370  111.  157— People  v. 
Sullivan,  171  N.B.  122,  339  111. 
146— McCord  v.  Briggs  &  Turivas, 
170  N.E.  320,  338  111.  158— Jacob- 
son  v.  Ashkinaze,  168  N.B.  647, 
337  111.  141— Loew  v.  Krauspe,  150 
N.E.  683,  320  111.  244— Marabia  v. 
Mary  Thompson  Hospital  of  Chi- 
cago for  Women  and  Children,  140 
N.B.  836,  309  111.  147 — Joseph  Kas- 
zab, Inc.,  v.  Gibson,  App.,  63  N.E. 
2d  629— Reid  v.  Dolan,  19  N.E.2d 
764,  299  IlLApp.  612— Chicago  Fau- 
cet Co.  v.  839  Lake  St.  Bldg.  Cor- 
poration, 1  N.E.2d  '865,  285  111. 
App.  151 — Seither  &  Cherry  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Education  of  District  No. 
15,  Town  of  La  Harpe,  283  Ill.App. 
392 — Heinsius-  v.  Poehlmann,  282 
Ill.App.  472 — Lynn  v.  Multhauf, 
279  IlLApp.  210— Swiercz  v.  Nalep- 
ka, 259  IlLApp.  262 — Martin  v. 
Starr,  255  IlLApp.  189 — Hickman 
v.  Ritchey  Coal  Co.,  252  IlLApp. 
560 — MeGrath  &  Swanson  Const. 
Co.  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  252  111. 
App.  476— Coultry  v.  Yellow  Cab 
Co.,  252  IlLApp.  443 — Mitchell  v. 
Bareckson,  250  IlLApp.  508— Wal- 
dron v.  Tarpey,  234  IlLApp.  287— 
Reid  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  231  111. 
App.  58. 

Md.— Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Keane  v. 
State,  166  A.  410,  412,  164  Md.  685 
—Hawks  v.  State,  157  A.  900,  162 
Md.  30. 

Miss.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Carra- 
way  v.  State,  141  So.  342,  343,  163 
Miss.  639. 
Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Badger 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Goodrich,  184  S.W. 
2d  435,  438,  353  Mo.  769— Corpus 
juris  cited  in  City  of  St  Louis 
v.  Franklin  Bank,  178  S.W.2d  837, 
846,  351  Mo.  688 — Crabtree  v.  ./Etna 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  S.W.2d  103,  341 
Mo.  1173— Pike  v.  Pike,  App.,  193 
S.W.2d  637— Quattrochi  v.  Quat- 
trochi,  App.,  179  S.W.2d  757— 
Townsend  v.  Boatmen's  Nat  Bank, 
App.,  148  S.W.2d  85— Jeffrey  v. 
Kelly,  App.,  146  S.W.2d  850— Ex 
parte  Messina,  128  S.W.2d  1082, 
233  Mo.App.  1234— State  ex  rel. 
Caplow  v.  Kirkwood,  App.,  117  S. 
W.2d  652 — Bank  of  Skidmore  v. 
Ripley,  App,,  84  S.W.2d  185— 
Kings  Lake  Drainage  Dist.  v.  Win- 
kelmeyer, 62  S,W.2d  1101,  228  Mo. 
App.  1102— Hecht  Bros.  Clothing 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


312 


not  consider  any  facts  which  might  have  been  pre- 
sented to  the  court  on  the  trial  of  the  cause;65  and 
the  writ  will  not  lie  where  the  party  complaining 
knew  the  fact  complained  of,  at  the  time  of,  or 
before  trial,  or,  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  dili- 
gence, might  have  known  it,66  or  is  otherwise  guilty 
of  negligence  in  the  matter.67 

While  the  court  will  not  look  into  the  cause  of 
action  on  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,68  or 
consider  facts  going  to  the  merits  of  the  cause,69 


the  error  of  fact  to  be  corrected  by  this  writ  must 
be  an  error  of  fact  pertinent  to  the  issues  in  the 
case,  and  not  mere  extraneous  matters,70  Only 
such  errors  may  be  assigned  as  are  consistent  with 
the  record  before  the  court.71  An  absolutely  cor- 
rect record  cannot  be  annulled,  changed,  or  ex- 
punged by  a  writ  coram  nobis.72 

(2)  Jurisdictional  Facts 
A  mistake  as  to  the  existence  of  a  fact  on  which  Ju- 


Co.  v.  Walker,  35  S.W.2d  372,  224 
Mo.App.  1156 — Haines  v.  Jeffrey 
Mfg.  Co.,  App.,  31  S.W.2d  269— 
Mefford  v.  Mefford,  App.,  26  S.W. 
2d  804 — Degener  v.  Kelly,  App.,  6 
S.W.2d  998— Hartford  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Stanfill,  App.,  259  S.W.  867 
— Ragland  v.  Ragland,  App.,  258 
S.W.  728. 

Tex,— Ex  parte  Minor,  27  S.W.2d  805, 
115  Tex.Cr.  634. 

Wash. — Pacific  Telephone  &  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Henneford,  92  P.2d 
214,  199  Wash.  462,  certiorari  de- 
nied Henneford  v.  Pacific  Tele- 
phone &  Telegraph  Co.,  59  S.Ct 
483,  306  U.S.  637,  83  L.Ed.  1038. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  School 
Dist.  No.  7  in  Weston  County  v. 
School  Dist.  No.  1  in  Weston  Coun- 
ty, 236  P.  1029,  1031,  33  Wyo.  65. 

34  C.J.  p  394  note  4. 

65.  Ark. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
State  v.  Hudspeth,  88  S.W.2d  858, 
861,  191  Ark.  963. 

111. — Seither  &  Cherry  Co.  v.  Board 
of  Education  of  District  No.  15, 
Town  of  La  Harpe,  283  111. App. 
392— Lynn  v.  Multhauf,  27»  111. 
App.  210 — Coultry  v.  Yellow  Cab 
Co.,  252  IlLApp.  443, 

Mo. — Townsend  v.  Boatmen's  Nat. 
Bank,  App.,  148  S.W.2d  85— Kings 
Lake  Drainage  Dist  v.  Winkel- 
meyer,  62  S.W.2d  1101,  228  Mo. 
App.  1102. 

•34  C.J.  p  395  note  7. 

•68.  Ark. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
State  v.  Hudspeth,  88  5.W.2&  858, 
861,  191  Ark.  963. 

Colo. — Tatarsky  v.  De  Vere,  242  P. 
973,  78  Colo.  496. 

E*la.— Cole  v.  Walker  Fertilizer  Co. 
for  Use  and  Benefit  of  Walker,  1 
So.2d  -864,  147  'Fla.  1. 

111. — Carroll,  Schendorf  &  Boenicke 
v.  Hastings,  259  IlLApp.  564— 
Mitchell  v.  Bareckson,  250  IlLApp. 
508. 

3£o. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  City  of 
St.  Louis  v.  'Franklin  Bank,  173  -S. 
W.2d  837,  846,  351  Mo.  688— Pike 
v.  Pike,  App.,  ;i93  S.W.2d  637— 
Quattrochi  v.  Quattrochi,  App., 
179  S.W.2d  757— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Jeffrey  v.  Kelly,  App.,  146  S. 
W.2d  850,  852— State  ex  rel.  Cap- 
low  v.  Kirkwood,  App.,  117  S.W. 
2d  652 — Bank  of  Skidmore  v.-  Rip- 


ley,  App.,  84  S.W.2d  185— State  ex 
rel.  Chadd  v.  American  Surety  Co. 
of  New  York,  App.,  -6-6  S.W.2d  941 
—Kings  Lake  Drainage  Dist.  v. 
Winkelmeyer,  62  S.W.2d  1101,  228 
Mo.App.  1102 — Schneider  v.  Schnei- 
der, App.,  273  S.W.  10S1— Hartford 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stanfill,  App.,  259 
S.W.  867. 

'Tenn. — Hyde  v.  Dunlap,  8  Tenn.App. 
260— Inman  v.  Fox,  1  Tenn.App. 
11.9. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  School 
Dist.  No.  7  in  Weston  County  v. 
School  Dist.  No.  1  in  Weston  Coun- 
ty, 236  P.  1029,  1031,  33  Wyo.  65. 

34  C.J.  p  394  note  5. 

67.  Ark.-— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
State  v.  Hudspeth,  88  S.W.2d  858, 
661,  191  Ark.  963. 

Fla.— Williams  v.  Yelvington,  137 
So.  156,  103  Fla.  145.  . 

111.— McCord  v.  Briggs  &  Turlvas, 
170  N.E.  320,  338  111.  158— Joseph 
Kaszab,  Inc.,  v.  Gibson,  App.,  63 
N.E.2d  629— Blaha  v.  Turk,  12  N. 
E.2d  338,  293  IlLApp.  •626— In  re 
McKeogh's  Estate,  11  N.E. 23  856, 
293  IlLApp.  621— Sixty^Flrst  & 
Calument  Apartments  v.  Woo,  9  N. 
E.2d  491,  291  IlLApp.  607— Lynn  v. 
Multhauf,  279  IlLApp.  210. 

Mo. — Badger  ILumber  Co.  v.  Good- 
rich, 184  S.W.2d  435,  353  Mo.  769 
—Pike  v.  Pike,  App.,  193  S.W.2d 
637— Haines  v.  Jeffrey  Mfg.  Co., 
App.,  31  S.W.2d  269 — Degener  v. 
Kelly,  App.,  6  S.W.2d  998. 

Tenn. — Inman  v.  Fox,  1  Tenn.App. 
119. 

Wash. — Pacific  Telephone  &  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Henneford,  92  P.2d 
214,  199  Wash.  462,  certiorari  de- 
nied Henneford  v.  Pacific  Tele- 
phone &  Telegraph  Co.,  59  S.Ct 
483,  306  U.S.  637,  83  L.Ed  1038. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  School 
Dist  No.  7  in  Weston  County  v. 
School  Dist  No.  1  in  Weston  Coun- 
ty, 236  P.  1029,  1031,  33  Wyo.  65. 

34  C.J.  p  394  note  <6. 

GS.  111.— Seither  &  Cherry  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Education  of  District  No. 
15,  Town  of  La  Harpe,  2-83  IlLApp. 
•392. 

Mo. — Townsend  v.  Boatmen's  Nat 
Bank,  App.,  148  S.W*2d  85 — Gen- 
eral Motors  Acceptance  Corpora- 
tion v.  Lyman,  78  S.W.2d  109,  229 
Mo.App.  455— Kings  Lake  Drainage 

565 


Dist  v.  Winkelmeyer,  62  S.W.2d 
1101,  228  Mo.App.  1102. 

34  C.J.  p  395  note  11. 

69.  111. — Seither  &  Cherry  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Education  of  District  No. 
15,  Town  of  (La  Harpe,  283  111. 
App.  392.  • 

Mo. — Badger  Lumber  Co.  T.  Good- 
rich, 184  S.W.2d  435,  353  Mo.  769 
— Townsend  v.  Boatmen's  Nat. 
Bank,  App.,  148  S.W.2d  85— State 
ex  rel.  Caplow  v.  Kirkwood,  App., 
117  S.W.2d  652— Kings  Lake 
Drainage  Dist.  v.  Winkelmeyer,  62 
S.W.2d  1101,  228  Mo.App.  1102. 

7<X  U.S.— McGinn  v.  U.  S.,  D.C. 
Mass.,  2  F.R.D.  562. 

Mo.— Spotts  v.  Spotts,  55  S.W.2d  984, 
331  Mo.  942— Jeude  v.  Sims,  166  S. 
W.  1048,  258  Mo.  26— Ross  v.  Da- 
vis, 139  S.W.2d  542,  234  Mo.App. 
1079 — Schneider  v.  Schneider,  App.. 
273  S.W.  1081— Hartford  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Stanfill,  App.,  259  S.W.  867 
— Ragland  v.  Ragland,  App.,  258 
S.W.  728. 

71.  111.— McCord  v.  Briggs  &  Turi- 
vas,    170    N.E.    320,    338    111.    158— 
Nikola  v.   Campus  Towers  Apart- 
ment Bldg.  Corporation,  25  N.E.2d 
582,  303  IlLApp.  £16— Reid  v.  Do- 
Ian,  19  N.E.2d  7*64,  299  IlLApp.  612 
— Waldron  v.  Tarpey,  234  IlLApp. 
287— Reid  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  231 
IlLApp.  58. 

Mo. — Jeffrey  v.  Kelly,  App.,  146  S.W. 
2d  850— Kings  Lake  Drainage  Dist 
v.    Winkelmeyer,    62    S.W.2d   1101, 
228       Mo.App.       1102— Baker      v. 
•Smith's  Estate,  18  S.W.2d  147,  223 
Mo.App.    1234,    226   Mo.App.    510. 
Tenn. — Roller   v.   Burrow,    175    S.W. 
2d  537,  180  Tenn.  3-30,  rehearing  de- 
nied 177  S.W.2d  547,  180  Tenn.  380. 
34  C.J.  p  395  note  9. 
sroaessential  recital 

"Writ  of  error  coram  nobis"  can- 
not be  used  to  attack  the  verity  of 
recitals  in  a  judgment  essential  to 
its  validity,  but  a  recital  that  de- 
fendant had  been  duly  notified  could 
be  attacked  thereby,  since  such  re- 
cital was  not  essential  to  validity 
of  the  judgment — General  Motors 
Acceptance  Corporation  v.  Lyman,  78 
S.W.2d  109,  229  Mo.App.  455. 

72.  Iowa. — Coppock  v.  Reed,  178  N* 
W.    382.    189   Iowa  581,    10   A.LJR. 
1407. 


312 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


rlsdictlon  to  proceed  depends,  the  defect  not  appearing 
on  the  record,  is  ground  for  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobls. 

A  mistake  in  regard  to  the  existence  of  a  fact  on 
which  jurisdiction  to  proceed  depends  and  which 
defect  does  not  appear  on  the  face  of  the  record 
is  ground  for  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis.73  How- 
ever, where  the  jurisdictional  defect  appears  on 
the  record,  the  error  in  giving  judgment  without 
jurisdiction  is  one  of  law  and  not  ground  for  this 
writ;74  and  similarly,  if  the  court  erroneously  de- 
termines that  the  jurisdictional  requirements  have 
been  met,  such  determination  is  not  subject  to  re- 
view on  error  coram  nobis.75  The  writ  lies  to  ob- 
tain relief  against  a  judgment  rendered  by  the  court 
without  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  there  has  been 
no  process  or  notice,76  or  that  there  were  such 
defects  in  the  process77  or  in  the  service  of  the 
process78  as  to  have  prevented  the  rendition  of  the 
judgment  had  the  fact  been  known  to  the  court 
The  writ  lies  where  a  resident  defendant  was 
brought  in  by  publication,  or  other  form  of  sub- 
stituted service,  on  the  mistaken  assumption  that 
he  was  a  nonresident  of  the  state.79 

Under  the  rule,  as  considered  in  the  C.J.S.  title 
Process  §  100,  also  50  CJ.  p  574  note  94-p  575 
note  7,  that,  after  the  term  has  ended  in  which  the 
judgment  was  entered,  the  sheriff's  return  of  serv- 
ice, on  which  jurisdiction  of  defendant  depends, 
cannot  be  contradicted  in  the  same  suit,  but  is  con- 
clusive as  between  parties  and  privies,  a  writ  of 


error  coram  nobis  does  not  lie  to  vacate  a  judg- 
ment on  the  ground  that,  contrary  to  the  sheriffs 
return,  there  was  in  fact  no  valid  service,80  unless 
such  false  return  has  been  procured  by  the  fraud  of 
plaintiff;81  but,  where  the  sheriffs  return  is  held 
not  conclusive,  it  may  be  contradicted  on  error  cor- 
am nobis.82 

Where  the  rule  prevails  that  a  judgment  based 
on  an  unauthorized  appearance  by  attorney  is  con- 
clusive, as  discussed  supra  §  26,  the  authority  of 
an  attorney  to  enter  defendant's  appearance  cannot 
be  questioned  on  error  coram  nobis.83  A  mistake 
in  assuming  an  appearance  for  "defendants"  was  an 
appearance  for  all  defendants,  including  those  not  • 
served,  is  ground  for  the  writ  to  vacate  the  judg- 
ment as  against  those  not  served.84 

(3)  Disability  or  Death 

The  writ  lies,  to  correct  a  judgment  where  the  fact 
of  death  or  disability  of  a  party  was  unknown  to  the 
court  when  Judgment  was  rendered. 

The  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  will  lie  to  correct 
a  judgment  for  or  against  a  party  under  a  disability 
which  would  have  prevented  the  rendition  thereof 
had  the  fact  been  known  to  the  court.85 

Infancy.  A  judgment  for  or  against  an  infant 
on  the  assumption  that  he  is  an  adult,  since  he  did 
not  appear  by  next  friend  or  guardian  ad  litem  as 
the  case  may  be,  is  irregular,  and  the  mistake  is 
ground  for  relief  on  writ  of  error  coram  nobis.8e 


73.  111.— Heinsius  v.  Poehlmann,  282 
IlLApp.  472. 

Mo.— Badger  Lumber  Co.  v.  Good- 
rich, 184  S.W.2d  435,  353  Mo.  769 
— City  of  St  Louis  v.  -Franklin 
Bank,  173  S.W.2d  837,  351  Mo.  688 
— Crabtree  v.  ^Btna  Life  Ins.  Co., 
Ill  S.W.2d  103.  341  Mo.  1173— 
Townsend  v.  Boatmen's  Nat.  Bank, 
App.,  148  S.W.2d  85— General  Mo- 
tors Acceptance  -Corporation  v. 
Lyman,  78  S.W.2d  109,  229  Mo.App. 
455— Baker  v.  Smith's  Estate,  18  S. 
W.2d  147,  223  Mo.App.  1234,  226 
Mo.App.  510 — Sowers-Taylor  Co.  v. 
Collins,  App.,  14  S.W.2d  692. 

34  C.J.  p  396  note  23. 

74.  111.— Chapman  v.  North  Ameri- 
can Life  Ins.  Co.,  126  N.B.  732,  292 
111.  179. 

Mo.— Baker  v.  Smith's  Estate,  IS  S. 
W.2d  147,  223  Mo.App.  1284,  226 
Mo. App.  510. 

75.  Mo. — Hadley  v.    Bernero,    78   S. 
W.  64,  103  Mo.App.  $49. 

34  C.J.  p  396  note  24. 

Adjudicated  facts  generally  see  in- 
fra subdivision  c  (5)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

76.  Mo. — Badger     Lumber-    Co.     v. 
Goodrich,  184  S.W.2d  435,  353  Mo. 


759 — Townsend  v.  Boatmen's  Nat 
Bank,  App.,  148  S.W.2d  85. 
34  C.J.  p  396  note  26. 
After  continuance 

Judgment  entered  for  defendant 
after  ex  parte  setting  aside  of  order 
for  continuance,  entered  by  agree- 
ment, is  subject  to  attack  by  motion 
in  nature  of  writ  of  error  coram  no- 
bis.— Carroll,  Schendorf  &  Boenicke 
v.  Hastings,  259  IlLApp.  564. 

77.  111. — Chapman  v.  North  Ameri- 
can Life  Ins.  Co.,  126  N.E.  732,  292 
111.  179. 

34  C.J.  >p  396  note  27. 

78.  U.S.— Phillips  v.  Russell,  Super. 
Ark.,  19  F.Cas.No.ll,105a,  Hempst 
62. 

79.  Mo.— Hadley  v.  Bernero,  78  S.W. 
64,  103  Mo.App.  549. 

34  C.J.  p  396  note  29. 

80.  111. — Nikola  v.  Campus   Towers 
Apartment   Bldg.   Corporation,    25 
N.E.2d  582,   803   IlLApp.   516— Chi- 
cago Faucet  Co.  v.   839  'Lake   St 
Bldg.    Corporation,    1   N.E.2d   '865, 
285    IlLApp.    151— Adams   v.    But- 
man,    264    IlLApp.    378 — Satin    v. 
Twin  City  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  Minne- 
apolis,   Minn.,    238    IlLApp.    440— 
Marquette   Nat.    Fire   Ins.    Co.   v. 

566 


Minneapolis    Fire    &    Marine    Ins. 
Co.,  233  IlLApp.  102. 
34  C.J.  p  39'6  note  31. 

81.  111. — Chicago  Faucet  Co.  v.  83  fr 
Lake  St  Bldg.  Corporation,  1  N.E. 
2d  865,  285  IlLApp.  151— Adams  v. 
Butman,  264  IlLApp.  375. 

34  C.J.  p  396  note  32. 

82.  N.Y. — Tracy  v.  Shannon,  3  N.T. 
S.    245,    16    N.Y.Civ.Proc.    448,    22 
Abb.N.Cas.  136. 

34  C.J.  p  396  note  34. 

88.    Miss.— Miller  v.  Ewing,  16  Miss. 

421. 
34  C.J.  p  396  note  36. 

84.  Mo.— Craig  v.  Smith,  65  Mo.  536. 

85.  I1L — Marabia  v.  Mary  Thompson 
Hospital    of   Chicago    for   Women 
and  Children,  140  N.E.  836,  309  111. 
147. 

86.  U.S.— McGinn    v.     U.     S.,     D.C. 
Mass.,  2  F.R.D.  562. 

I1L — Marabia  v!  Mary  Thompson 
Hospital  of  Chicago  for  Women 
and  Children,  140  N.E.  836,  309  HL 
147. 

Mo. — Schneider  v.  Schneider*  App.,. 
273  S.W.  1081. 

34  C.J.  p  395  note  17. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  312 


Insanity.  It  is  generally  stated  that  a  judgment 
irregularly  entered  against  an  insane  person  may  be 
corrected  by  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis,87  although 
there  is  authority  to  the  contrary.8^  If,  however, 
the  fact  of  insanity  is  known  to  the  court  at  the 
entry  of  the  judgment,  the  writ  will  not  lie.8^ 

Coverture.  Where  coverture  is  a  disability  ren- 
dering a  judgment  for  or  against  a  married  woman 
irregular,  as  discussed  in  Husband  and  Wife  § 
389,  the  irregularity  may  be  remedied  by  writ  of 
error  coram  nobis.90 

Death  tf  party.  Since  a  judgment  for  or  against 
a  party  after  his  death  is  irregular  and  erroneous, 
as  stated  supra  §  29,  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis 
lies  to  correct  it.91 

(4)  Fraud,  Mistake,  and  Clerical  Errors 

There  is  a  conflict  among  the  authorities  on  whether 
the  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  will  lie  for  fraud,  accident, 
or  mistake,  preventing  a  party  from  presenting  his  de- 
fense. The  writ  lies  to  correct  clerical  errors  or  mis* 
prisions. 

According  to  some  authorities,  a  writ  of  error 


coram  nobis  will  not  lie  for  fraud,92  or  for  accident 
or  mistake,93  whereby  the  party  was  prevented  from 
presenting  his  defense;  but  there  is  also  authority 
to  the  contrary.94  Under  some  statutes,  the  writ 
will  lie  as  for  a  material  error  of  fact  where  appli- 
cant was  prevented  from  making  a  defense  through 
fraud,  accident,  mistake,  or  surprise,  without  fault 
on  his  part.95  The  writ  has  been  held  not  to  lie  for 
alleged  false  testimony  at  the  trial.96 

Clerical  errors.  The  writ  of  error  coram  nobis 
lies  to  correct  clerical  errors  or  misprisions.97 

(5)  New  or  Adjudicated  Facts 

A  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  may  not  be  grounded 
on  newly  discovered  evidence  or  newly  arising  facts  after 
judgment,  or  on  facts  adjudicated  on  the  trial. 

Neither  newly  discovered  evidence  on  the  issues 
already  heard  and  determined,98  .nor  facts  newly 
arising  after  judgment,99  are  ground  for  relief  on 
error  coram  nobis.  Facts  which  were  in  issue  and 
adjudicated  on  the  trial  cannot  be  retried  on  writ 
of  error  coram  nobis  j1  and  this  rule  will  be  adhered 
to,  even  though  it  is  shown  that  the  party  applying 


S7.  111. — Marabta  v.  Mary  Thomp- 
son Hospital  of  Chicago  for  Wo- 
men and  Children,  140  N.E.  '838, 
309  111.  147. 

Mo.— Bank  of  -Skidmore  v.  Ripley, 
App.,  84  S.W.2d  185. 

34  C.J.  p  396  note  20. 

£&  W.Va. — Withrow  v.  Smithson,  17 
S.E.  316,  37  W.Va,  757,  19  'L.R.A. 
762. 

•89.  Mo. — Graves  v.  Graves,  164  S.W. 
496,  255  Mo.  468. 

«0t  U.S.— McGinn  v.  U.  S.,  D.C. 
Mass.,  2  P.R.D.  562. 

.111. — Marabia  v.  Mary  Thompson 
Hospital  of  Chicago  for  Women 
and  Children,  140  N.E.  )836,  309 
111.  147. 

"Mo. — Schneider  v.  Schneider,  App., 
273  S.W.  1081. 

34  C.J.  p  395  note  19. 

-U.  U.S.— McGinn  v.  U.  S.,  D.C. 
Mass.,  2  F.R.D.  562. 

111. — Marabia  v.  Mary  Thompson 
Hospital  of  Chicago  for  Women 
and  Children,  140  N.E.  83-6,  309  111. 
147. 

Mo. — -Schneider  v.  Schneider,  App., 
273  S.W.  1081. 

34  C.J.  p  395  note  15. 

£3.  Mo.— Spotts  v.  Spotts,  55  S.W. 
2d  984,  331  Mo.  .  942— -Haines  v. 
Jeffrey  Mfg.  Co.,  App.,  31  S.W.2d 
269 — Schneider  v.  Schneider,  App., 
273  S.W.  1081— Hartford  -Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Stanflll,  App.,  259  S.W.  867— 
Ragland  v.  Bagland,  App.,  258  S. 
W.  728. 

34  C.J.  p  397  note  40. 

.Fraud  as  to  jurisdictional  facts  see 
supra  subdivision  c  (2)  of  this 
section. 


93.  Mo.— Simms  v.  Thompson,  236  S. 
W.    876,    291    Mo.    493— Haines    v. 
Jeffrey  Mfg.  Co.,  App.,   31  S.W.2d 
269. 

94.  111.— People    ex    reL    Waite    v. 
.  Bristow,    62    N.E.2d    545,    391    I1L 

101 — Jerome     v.     5019-21     Quincy 

Street  Bldg.  Corporation,   53   N.E. 

2d   444,    385   111.    524— Jacobson   v. 

Ashkinaze,    168   N.E.    647,    337   111. 

141 — Chapman  v.  North  American 

Life  Ins.  Co.,  126  N.E.  732,  292  111. 

179 — Joseph  Kaszab,   Inc.,   v.   Gib- 
son, App.,  63  N.E.2d  629— Gunn  v. 

Britt,    39   N.E.2d    76,    313    IlLApp. 

13. 
95*    Tenn. — Hyde  v.  Dunlap,  8  Tenn. 

App.   260 — Inman  v.  Fox,  1  Tenn. 

App.  119. 

34  C.J.p  397  note  43. 
Construction  of  allegations 

Whenever  a  petitioner  for  a  writ 
of  coram  nobis  has  a  meritorious 
defense  which  he  has  for  any  rea- 
son failed  to  make  on  trial,  he  is 
entitled  to  as  favorable  a  construc- 
tion of  allegations  of  the  petition 
showing  surprise,  accident,  mistake, 
or  fraud  without  fault  as  is  consist- 
ent with  the  provisions  of  the  stat- 
ute regulating  issuance  of  such  a 
writ.— Central  Franklin  Process  Co. 
v.  Gann,  133  S.W.2d  503,  175  Tenn. 
267— Rose  v.  Morrow,  10  Tenn.App. 
698. 
98.  111.— Conway  v.  Gill,  257  IlLApp. 

606. 
97.    U.S. — Hiawassee  Lumber  Co.  v. 

U.  S.,  C.C.A.N.C.,  64  F.2d  417. 
Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited,  in  Tweed  v. 

Lockton,  167*  A,  703,  705,   5  Harrl 

474. 

567 


111. — Simon  v.  Balasic,  39  N.B;2d  685, 
313    IlLApp.    266— Butterick    Pub. 
Co.  v.  Goldfarb,  242  IlLApp.  228. 
34  C.J.  p  397  note  39. 
What  constitutes  clerical  arror 

Dismissal  of  case  because  of  no 
advancement  in  pleadings  for  a  year 
is  not  a  "clerical  mistake,  error  or 
default,"  cognizable  by  writ  of  error 
coram  nobis.— New  England  -Furni- 
ture &  Carpet  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  D.C.Minn., 
2  'F.Supp.  648. 

98.  Fla.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Cole  v.  Walker  Fertilizer  Co.,  for 
Use  and  Benefit  of  Walker,  1  So.2d 
£64,  147  Fla.  1 — Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Baker  v.  Peavy-Wilson  Lum- 
ber Co.,  200  So.  528,  14«6  Fla.  217 — 
Jennings  v.  Pope,  136  So.  471,  101 

.  Fla.  1476. 

Kan. — Gibson  v.  Enright,  37  P.2d 
1017,  140  Kan.  700. 

Mo. — Callicotte  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  204  S.W.  528— Kings  Lake 
Drainage  Dist  v.  Winkelmeyer,  62 
S.W.2d  1101,  228  Mo.App.  1102. 

34C.J.  p  397  note  44. 

99.  Fla. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Cole  v.  Walker  Fertilizer  Co.  for 
Use  and  Benefit  of  Walker,  1  So.2d 
864,  867,  147  Fla.  1 — Corpus  Juris 
cited    in    Baker    v.    Peavy-Wilson 
Lumber  Co.,  200  So.  628,  146  'Fla. 
217. 

Mo.— Ragland  v.  Raglancl,  App.,   258 

S.W.  728. 

34  C.J.  p  397  note  45. 
1.     Ala. — Snodgrass     T.     Snodgrass, 

101  So.  837,  212  Ala,  74. 
'Fla. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in    Cole 

v.  Walker  Fertilizer  Co.   for  Use 

and  Benefit  of  Walker,  1  So.2d  $64, 


§  312 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


for  the  writ  will  be  able  to  produce  most  convinc- 
ing evidence  which  was  not  available  at  the  time 
of  the  trial.2 

d.  Errors  of  Law 

A  writ  of  error  coram  nobls  has  been  held  not  avail- 
able to  correct  errors  of  law. 

A  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  has  been  held  not 
available  to  correct  errors  of  law.3 

§  313,    Proceedings  and  Relief 

a.  In  general 

b.  Jurisdiction 

c.  Limitations  and  laches 

d.  Parties 

e.  Application 

f.  Allowance  and  issuance  of  writ  and 

supersedeas 

g.  Pleadings 
h.  Evidence 

i.  Trial,  judgment,  and  costs 

a.  In  General 

A  writ  of  error  coram   nobls  Is  In  substance  a  new 
suit  commenced  to  reverse  a  former  Judgment. 


As  will  appear  in  the  succeeding  subdivisions  of 
this  section,  proceedings  to  obtain  a  writ  of  error 
coram  nobis  are  generally  instituted  by  petition  or 
motion,  on  notice  to  the  adverse  party,  and,  after 
the  issuance  of  the  writ,  plaintiff  makes  a  formal 
assignment  of  errors  in  the  nature  of  a  declara- 
tion, and  to  this  assignment  defendant  may  plead 
or  demur;  the  issues  resulting  from  the  pleadings 
are  thereafter  tried,  and  judgment  either  revoking 
or  affirming  the  original  judgment  is  thereupon  ren- 
dered. The  proceeding  is  in  substance  a  new  suit 
commenced  to  reverse  a  former  judgment4  The 
proceeding  is  not  for  irregularity,  but  for  error,5 
and  therefore  is  not  governed  by  statutory  provi- 
sions relating  to  vacation  of  judgments  for  irreg- 
ularity.6 

b.  Jurisdiction 

Jurisdiction  of  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobls  Is  exclu- 
sively In  the  court  which  rendered  the  judgment. 

The  court  which  rendered  the  judgment  has  ex- 
clusive jurisdiction  of  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis 
to  vacate  it.7  The  writ  cannot  be  employed  to  re- 


867,  147  Fla.  1 — Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in.  Baker  v.  Peavy-Wilson  Lum- 
ber Co.,  200  So.  528,  146  Fla.  217— 
Jennings  v.  Pope,  138  So.  471,  101 
•Fla.  1476. 

111. — Joseph  Kaszab,  Inc.,  v.  Gibson, 
App.,  63  N.E.2d  «629— Waldron  v. 
Tarpey,  234  IlLApp.  287. 
Mo.— Callicotte  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  204  S.W.  528— Town- 
send,  v.  Boatmen's  Nat.  Bank,  App., 
148  S.W.2d  85. 

Tenn. — Roller  v.  Burrow,  175  S.W.2d 
537,  ISO  Tenn.  380,  rehearing  de- 
nied 177  S.W.2d  547,  180  Tenn. 
'380— Davis  v.  Robertson,  56  S.W. 
2d  752,  165  Tenn.  609 — Roy  New- 
man Cigar  Co.  v.  Murphy,  2  Tenn. 
App.  321. 

34  C.J.  p  397  note  46. 
Jurisdictional  fact 

Determination  of  fact  necessary  to 
jurisdiction  prevents  new  trial  on 
that  issue  by  writ  of  error  coram  no- 
bis.— Baker  v.  Smith's  Estate,  18  S. 
W.2d  147,  223  Mo.App.  1234,  226  Mo. 
App.  510. 

2.  «Fla.— Baker       v.      Peavy-Wilson 
Lumber  Co.,   200  So.  528,  146  Fla. 
217. 

3.  111.— People     ex    rel.     Waite     v. 
Bristow,  62  N.E.2d  545,  391  111.  101 
— Jerome  v.  5019-21  Quincy  Street 
Bldg.    Corporation,   53   N.E.2d  444, 
385   111.  524—Linehan  v.  Travelers 
Ins.  Co.,  18  N.B.2d  178,  370  111.  157 
— Marabia  v.  Mary  Thompson  Hos- 
pital  of  Chicago  for  Women  and 
Children,  140  N.E.  836,  309  111.  147 
— Fickard    v.    Rice,    App.,    67    N.E. 
2d  425,  appeal  transferred,  se*e,  63 


N.E.2d  743,  391  111.  615— Joseph 
Kaszab,  Inc.,  v.  Gibson,  App.,  -63 
N.E.2d  629— Waldron  v.  Tarpey, 
234  IlLApp.  287. 

Md.— Hawks  v.  State,  157  A.  900,  162 
Md.  30. 

Mo.— City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Franklin 
Bank,  173  S.W.2d  837,  351  Mo.  688 
— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Spotts  v. 
Spotts,  66  S.W.2d  984,  985,  331  Mo. 
942 — Townsend  v.  Boatmen's  Nat. 
Bank,  App.,  148  S.W.2d  85— State 
ex  rel.  Caplow  v.  Kirkwood,  App., 
117  S.W.2d  652— Hecht  Bros. 
Clothing  Co."v.  Walker,  35  S.W.2d 
372,  224  Mo. App.  1156 — Haines  v. 
Jeffrey  Mfg.  Co.,  App.,  31  S.W.2d 
269— Mefford  v.  Mefford,  App.,  26 
S.W.2d  804— Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Stanfill,  App.,  259  S.W.  867. 

Tenn. — Central  Franklin  Process  Co. 
v.  Gann.  133  S.W.2d  503,  175  Tenn. 
267 — Roy  Newman  Cigar  Co.  v. 
Murphy,  2  Tenn. App.  321. 

Wash.— Pacific  Telephone  &  Tele- 
graph Co.  v.  Henneford,  92  P.2d 
214,  199  Wash.  462,  certiorari  de- 
nied Henneford  v.  Pacific  Tele- 
phone &  Telegraph  Co.,  5$  S.Ct. 
483,  306  U.S.  637,  83  L.Ed.  1038. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  School 
Dist  No.  7  in  Weston  County  v. 
School  Dist.  No.  1  in  Weston  Coun- 
ty, 23-6  P.  1029,  1031,  33  Wyo.  65. 

34  C.J.  p  397  note  47. 

Construction,  of  court  rules 
Error   of    court    in   construing   its 

rules  is  error  of  law  to  correct  which 

writ  of  error  coram  nobis  will  not 

He.— -Swiercz  v.  Nalepka,  259  IlLApp. 

262— La  Page  v.  Devine,  195 

140. 

568 


4.  111.— Christian    v.    Smirinotis,    57 
N.E.2d    457,     388     111.     73— Joseph 
Kaszab,    Inc.,    v.    Gibson,    App.,    63 
N.E.2d   629— Reid   v.   Dolan,    19   N. 
E.2d  764,  299  IlLApp.  612 — Topel  v. 
Personal  Loan  &  Savings  Bank,   9 
N.E.2d  75,  290  IlLApp.  •1558— Seither 
&  Cherry  Co.  v.  Board  of  Educa- 
tion,   283    IlLApp.    392— Martin    v. 
Starr,  255  IlLApp.  189. 

Mo. — In  re   Sheldon's  Estate,   189  S. 

W.2d    235 — Bank    of   -Skidmore    v. 

Bartram,    App.,    142    S.W.2d    657— 

State  ex  rel.  Bank  of  Skidmore  v. 

Roberts,   116   S.W.2d   166,    232   Mo. 

App.  1220.' 
Tenn. — Rose    v.    Morrow,     10    Tenn. 

App.   698 — Inman  v.  Fox,   1  Tenn. 

APP.  119. 

34  C.J.  p  398  note  57. 
Statement  qualified 

"While  with  respect  to  process, 
pleadings  and  judgment  the  writ 
may  be  considered  as  a  new  and  in- 
dependent action,  yet  it  is  not  whol- 
ly so  but  is  supplementary  in  its 
nature  for  the  purpose  of  correcting 
errors  committed  in  a  preceding 
cause." — McGrath  &  Swanson  Const. 
Co.  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  252  IlLApp. 
476,  477. 

5.  Mo.— ODugan  v.   Scott,   37   Mo.App. 
663. 

6.  Mo. — Dugan  v.  Scott,  supra. 

7.  Ala.— Snodgrass      v.      Snodgrass, 
101  So.  837,  212  Ala.  74, 

HI. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mc- 
Grath &  -Swanson  Const.  Co.  v. 
Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  252  IlLApp.  476, 
478. 

34  C.J.  p  398  note  60. 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


313 


verse  the  judgment  of  another  court,8  especially  a 
higher  one;9  nor  can  it  be  employed  in  an  appel- 
late court  to  set  aside  the  judgment  of  an  inferior 
court.10 

c.  Limitations  and  Laches 

Unless  prescribed  by  statute,  the  time  for  prosecut- 
ing a  writ  of  error  coram  nobfs  Is  not  limited,  but  the 
relief  may  be  barred  by  laches. 

It  has  been  held  that  there  is  no  limitation  of 
time  within  which  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  lies11 
except  where  such  a  limitation  is  prescribed  by  stat- 
ute.12 Relief  may  be  refused,  however,  on  the 
ground  of  laches.13  A  statute  of  limitations  ap- 
plicable to  writs  of  error  generally  does  not  apply 
to  the  writs  of  error  coram  nobis.14  In  some  ju- 
risdictions statutes  limiting  the  time  for  prosecuting 
the  remedy  in  analogous  proceedings  have  been  held 
applicable,  such  as  motions  for  a  new  trial,15  or 
the  prosecution  of  a  writ  of  review.16 

d.  Parties 

Only  a  party  or  privy  to  the  record  may  procure  a 
writ  of  error  coram  nobis,  and  all  those  who  may  be  af- 
fected by  the  vacating  of  the  Judgment  should  be  joined. 

A  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  can  be  procured  only 
by  one  who  is  a  party,  or  privy  to  the  record,  and 
who  is  prejudiced  thereby,17  and  not  by  a  stranger 
to  the  record.18  It  has  been  held  that  the  petition 


must  be  brought  in  the  names  of  all  the  parties 
against  whom  the  judgment  was  given,19  but  there 
is  authority  holding  that  only  those  parties  as  to 
whom  there  was  error  of  fact  need  be  joined,20 
and  it  has  also  been  held  that  only  those  who  have 
rights  against  petitioner  and  who  may  be  preju- 
diced by  the  vacating  of  the  judgment  are  neces- 
sary parties.21  Where  a  married  woman  is  under 
the  common-law  disability,  her  husband  must  join 
in  the  application.22 

e.  Application 

Ordinarily  notice  of  the  application  for  a  writ  of  er- 
ror coram  nobis  must  be  given  to  the  opposing  party. 
The  application  must  set  forth  with,  certainty  and  par- 
ticularity the  errors  or  defects  on  which  It  Is  based. 

Notice  of  the  application  must  be  given  to  the  op- 
posing party  or  to  his  attorney,23  unless  sufficient 
reason  for  omitting  notice  is  made  to  appear,24  or 
unless  notice  is  waived.25 

Moving  papers.  The  proper  mode  of  proceed- 
ing is  by  petition  or  motion,26  in  writing,27  setting 
forth  with  certainty  and  particularity  the  errors  or 
defects  complained  of;28  but  the  want  of  such  al- 
legations may  be  cured  by  failure  of  the  adverse 
party  to  move  for  a  dismissal.29  If  the  petition  is 
insufficient,  advantage  may  be  taken  of  the  defect 
by  motion  to  dismiss,30  made  at  any  time,31  unless 


a  Wash. — Pacific  Telephone  &  Tel- 
egraph Co.  v.  Henneford,  92  P.2d 
214,  199  Wash.  463,  certiorari  de- 
nied Henneford  v.  Pacific  Tele- 
phone &  Telegraph  Co.,  59  S.Ct 
483,  306  U.S.  637,  83  L.Ed.  1033. 

34  C.J.  p  398  note  61. 

9.  N.C.—Latham  v.  Hodges,  35  N.C. 
267. 

10.  Mo. — Forest   Lumber  Co.   v.   Os- 
ceola   Lead   &   Zinc   Min.   Co.,    222 
S.W.  398. 

11.  U.S.— McGinn     v.     TJ.     S.,     B.C. 
Mass.,  2  F.R.D.  562. 

Mo. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in    In    re 
Sheldon's   Estate,    189    S,W.2d   235, 
237. 
34  C.J.  p  398  note  64. 

Expiration  of  the  term  at  which 
the  challenged  judgment  was  ren- 
dered does  not  prevent  allowance  of 
the  writ  at  a  subsequent  term. — 
Bank  of  Skidmore  v.  Rlpley,  Mo. 
App.,  84  S.W.2d  185. 

12.  Tenn.— Gates  v.  City  of  McKen- 
zie,  141  S.W,2d  471,  176  Tenn.  313. 

34  C.J.  p  398  note  -65. 

The  purpose  of  statute  providing 
that  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis 
may  be  had  within  one  year  from 
rendition  of  the  judgment  is  to  lim- 
it right  to  proceed  thereunder  to 
one  year  from  time  when  matters 
complained  of  in  petition  for  review 
had  been  considered  and  adjudicat- 


ed, having  in  mind  that  such  pro- 
ceedings should  be  brought  before 
such  a  lapse  of  time  as  would  make 
it  unlikely  that  witnesses  could  be 
reproduced  and  the  facts  correctly 
reviewed.— Cates  v.  City  of  McKen- 
zie,  supra. 

13.  Mo.— Gibson   v.   Pollock,    166   S. 
W.    874,    179    Mo.App.    188. 

Tenn.— Sisson    v.    Delaney,    8    Tenn. 
App.  442. 

14.  U.S.— Strode    v.     Stafford     Jus- 
tices,   C.C.Va.,    23    F.Cas.No.13,337, 
1  Brock.  162. 

34  C.J.  p  398  note  67. 

15.  Conn. — Jefltery      v.      (Fitch,      46 
Conn.  601. 

16.  Tex.— "Weaver  v.    Shaw,    5    Tex. 
286. 

17.  Ala.— Snodgrass     v.     Snodgrass, 
101  So.  837,  212  Ala.  74. 

Mo. — Baker  v.  Smith's  Estate,  18  S. 

W.2&    147,    223    Mo.App.    1234,    226 

Mo.App.  510. 
34  C.J.  p  39S  note  70. 
Bank  depositors 

•  Writ  of  error  coram  nobis  to  re- 
verse consent  decree  dismissing  bank 
superintendent's  suit  on  bond  would 
lie  at  instance  of  depositors,  al- 
though not  parties  to  original  suit 
—Davis  v.  Robertson,  56  S.W.2d  752, 
165  Tenn.  609. 
ia  Tenn,— Hillman  v.  Chester,  12 

Heisk.  34. 

569 


19.  Ky. — Watson  v.  Whaley,  2  Bibb. 
392. 

34  C.J.  p  399  note  72. 

20.  N.C.— Roughton  v.  Brown,  53  N. 
C.  393. 

21.  Tenn. — Rose      v.      Morrow,      10 
Tenn. App.  -698. 

22.  N.C. — Houghton  v.  Brown,  53  NT. 
C.  393. 

23.  U.S.— Wetmore  v.  Karrick,  App. 
D.C.,  27  S.Ct.  434,  205  U.S.  141,  51 
L,Ed.  7-45. 

34  C.J.  p  399  note  75. 

24.  N.Y. — Ferris     v.     Douglass,     20 
Wend.  626. 

25.  Tenn. — Crawford  v.  Williams,   1 
Swan  341. 

26.  111. — Topel   v.   Personal  Loan  & 
Savings    Bank,    9    N.E.2d    75,    290 
IlLApp.  558. 

34  C.J.  p  399  note  78. 

27.  Ky. — Handley  v.  Fitzhugh,  Z  A. 
KMarsh.  561. 

34  C.J.  p  399  note  79.  • 

28.  Tenn. — Dunnivant    v.    Miller,    1 
Baxt.  227. 

34  C.J.  p  399  note  80. 

29.  Tenn. — Hicks     v.  .  Haywood,     4 
Heisk.  598. 

30.  Tenn.— Inman   v.   Fox,    1   Tenn. 
App.  119. 

34  C.J.  p*399  note  82. 

31.  Tenn. — Elliott     v.     McNairy,     1 


§  313 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  right  to  do  so  is  waived82  A  motion  to  dismiss 
admits  the  allegations  of  the  petition.83  A  petition 
or  motion  must  be  accompanied  by  an  affidavit 
showing  the  occasion  therefor.34  A  petition  may  be 
amended  but,  in  allowing  it,  the  court  will  exercise 
great  caution.3^  The  papers  on  the  application 
should  not  be  entitled  in  any  suit.36 

Bond.  Petitioner  must  comply  with  a  statutory 
provision  requiring  a  bond  to  be  given  at  the  time 
of  the  filing  of  the  petition.37 

f .  Allowance  and  Issuance  of  Writ  and  Super- 
sedeas 

The  granting  of  the  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  de- 
pends on  a  showing  of  cause  and  is  generally  held  to  be 
a  matter  of  discretion,  not  of  right;  and  the  granting  of 
a  supersedeas  is  likewise  discretionary. 

While  it  has  been  held  that  a  writ  of  error  coram 
nobis  is  a  writ  of  right,3*  it  usually  has  been  held 
that  it  is  not  a  writ  of  right  but  is  granted  only  on 
a  showing  of  cause,39  and  even  then  it  is  in  the 
court's  discretion  whether  or  not,  on  the  affidavits 
presented,  to  allow  the  writ40  However,  if  the 
circumstances  warrant  the  allowance  of  the  writ, 
relief  should  not  be  denied  on  immaterial  grounds.41 
At  common  law,  the  trial  of  the  sufficiency  of  the 
petition  was  preliminary  to  the  trial  on  the  assign- 
ment of  errors,  and  was  independent  of  it,42  but  in 
some  jurisdictions  the  two  are  now  blended  togeth- 


er.48 On  an  application  for  the  writ,  the  fact  as- 
signed is  not  decided  by  the  court  definitively;44 
nor  will  the  court  look  at  the  cause  of  action  on 
which  the  judgment  was  recovered.46  The  fact 
that  applicant  acted  with  palpable  dishonesty  and 
bad  faith  is  not  ground  for  its  refusal.46  If,  on 
an  application  for  such  a  writ,  plaintiff  elects  to 
vacate  the  judgment,4?  or  if  the  writ  will  avail 
nothing,48  the  application  will  be  denied.  It  must 
appear  with  reasonable  certainty  that  there  has 
been  some  error  in  fact,  before  the  writ  will  be  al- 
lowed.49 

Although  the  writ  issues  on  an  order  of  the  court 
allowing  it,50  it  is  necessary  to  obtain  something 
more  than  a  mere  rule  that  writ  of  error  issue.51 
The  usual  rule  in  such  cases  is  that  a  writ  of  er- 
ror in  the  nature  of  error  coram  nobis  be  allowed.52 
In  practice,  however,  the  actual  issuance  of  the  writ 
is  a  fiction,  as  the  writ  never  issues,53  the  writ  be- 
ing presumed  to  issue  on  the  fiat  of  the  judge.54 
In  some  states  the  writ  issues  in  the  name  of  the 
people  and  is  directed  to  the  supreme  court.55  The 
writ  coram  nobis  properly  commands,  "that  the  rec- 
ord and  proceedings  remaining  before  you  being  in- 
spected, you  cause  further  to  be  done/'  etc.,56  and 
it  must  assign  errors.57 

The  name  of  the  parties  in  the  judgment  sought 
to  be  reversed  must  be  correctly  stated,  or  the  writ 


Baxt.   342— Inman  r.  Pox,   1  Tenn. 
App.  119. 

32.  Tenn. — Inman    v.    -Fox,    1   Tenn. 
App.    119— Elliott    v.    McNairy.    1 
Baxt.  342. 

33.  111. — Chapman   v.   North  Ameri- 
can Life  Ins.  12$  N.E.  732,  292  111. 
179. 

34  C.J.  p  399  note  85. 

34.  Tenn. — Reid      v.      Hoffman,      6 
Heisk.  440. 

34  C.J.  p  399  note  86. 

35.  Tenn.— Baxter  v.    Grandstaft,    3 
Tenn.Ch.  244. 

34  C.J.  p  399  note  87. 

36.  N.Y.— Maher     v.     Comstock,     1 
How.Pr.  175. 

34  C.JT.  p  399  note  88. 

317.  Tenn. — Roller  v.  Burrow,  175  S. 
W.2d  537,  180  Tenn.  380,  rehearing 
denied  177  S.W.Sfl  547,  180  Tenn. 
380. 

38.  Ky.— Breckinridge  v.  Coleman,  7 
B.Mon.  331. 

39.  Colo. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Medberry  v.  People,  108  P.2d  243, 
247,  107  Colo.  15 — Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Grandbouche  v.  People,  89  P. 
2d  577,   582,   104   Colo.   175. 

<Fla.— Williams    v.     Yelvington,    137 

So.  156,  103  Fla.  145. 
34  C.J.  p  399  note  90. 

40.  U.S. — Lupfer  v.  <C.arlton,  for  Use 


and  Benefit  of  Board  of  Public  In- 
struction of  Bade  County,  C.C.A. 
Fla.,  64  F.2d  272. 

Colo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Med- 
berry v.  People,  108  P.2d  243,  247 
107  Colo.  15— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Grandbouche  v.  People,  89  P.2d  577, 
582,  104  Colo.  175. 

Fla.— Cole  v.  Walker  'Fertilizer  Co., 
for  Use  and  Benefit  of  Walker,  1 
So.2d  864,  147  Fla,  1— Williams  v. 
Yelvington,  137  So.  156,  103  Fla, 
145. 

Kan.— Gibson  v.  Enright,  37  P.2d 
1017,  140  Kan.  700. 

Mo.— Pike  v.  Pike,  App.,  193  S.W.2d 
*37. 

34  C.J.  p  400  note  91. 

41.  Mo. — Badger     Lumber     Co.     v. 
Goodrich,   184  S.W.2d  435,  353  Mo. 
769 — Bank  of  Skidmore  v.  Ripley, 
App.,  84  S.W.2d  185. 

42.  Tenn. — Jacobs  .v.   Silverman,    93 
•S.W.2d    648,     19    TennApp.     629— 
Boiling    v.    Anderson,    1    Tenn.Ch. 
127. 

43.  Tenn. — Jacobs  v.   Silverman,   93 
S.W.2d    648,    19    Tenn.App.    629— 
Boiling    v.    Anderson,    l    Tenn.Cn. 
127. 

44.  N.C.— Tyler   v.    Morris,    20   N.C. 
487,  34  Am.D.  395. 

45.  N.Y.— Higbie     v.     Comstock,     1 
Den.  652. 

570 


46.  N.Y.— Higbie   v.   Comstock,    su- 
pra, 

47.  N.Y.— Higbie    v.    Comstock,    su- 
pra, 

48.  Mo. — Hartman  v.  Hart  man,   133 
S.W.  669,'  154  Mo.App.  243. 

49.  Fla,—Catlett    v.    Chestnut,     163 
So.  26,  120  'Fla,  63*6. 

Miss.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Carra- 
way  v.  State,  141  So.  342,  343,  163 
Miss.  639. 

N.Y.— Ferris  v.  Douglass,  20  Wend. 
626. 

5a    N.Y.--Comstock  v.  Van  Schoon- 

hoven,  3  How.Pr.  258. 
34  C.J.  p  400  note  1. 

51.  N.Y.— Comstock  v.  Van  Schoon- 
hoven,  supra. 

52.  N.Y. — Comstock  v.  Van  Schoon- 
hoven,  supra. 

53.  Tenn. — Elliott     v.     McNairy      1 
Baxt  342. 

54.  Mo.-^Teude    v.    Sims,    166    S.W. 
1048,  258  Mo.  26,  41. 

34  C.J.  p  400  note  5. 

55.  N.Y.— Comstock  v.  Van  Schoon- 
hoven,  3  How.Pr.  25$. 

50.    N.Y. — Comstock  v.  Van  Schoon- 

hoven,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  400  note  7. 
57.    Miss. — Fellows     v.     Griffln,     17 

Miss.  362. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


313 


will  be  quashed,58  and  a  scire  facias  issued  on  the 
writ  on  the  ground  that  the  adverse  party  is  dead 
must  be  directed  to  the  adverse  party's  legal  rep- 
resentative.59 The  writ  is  not  made  returnable,  as 
it  is  merely  in  the  nature  of  a  commission  to  the 
court  to  examine  the  record  and  rectify  the  er- 
ror.60 While  it  is  usual  to  have  the  allowance  of 
such  a  writ  indorsed  thereon  by  the  clerk  in  open 
court,  it  is  not  indispensable  to  the  regularity  of 
the  writ.61  If  it  appears  that  a  party  is  entitled  to 
the  writ  and  will  be  remediless  if  the  writ  is  quashed 
because  of  an  irregularity  in  the  issuance,  the  writ 
will  be  allowed  as  of  the  time  it  was  filed,  nunc  pro 
tune.62 

While  the  writ  did  not  of  itself  operate  as  a  su- 
persedeas,63  at  common  law  execution  could  not  be 
taken  out  after  the  issuance  of  the  writ  without 
leave  of  court.64  If  an  applicant  wishes  a  stay  he 
should  make  that  a  part  of  a  motion  for  the  allow- 
ance of  the  writ,  stating  the  facts  on  which  the 
stay  is  asked.65  While  a  supersedeas  may  be  grant- 
ed ex  parte  without  notice,66  whether  a  supersedeas 
shall  issue  depends  on  the  discretion  of  the  court67 
In  general,  the  stay  will  be  ordered  only  on  put 
ting  in  and  justifying  bail.68  Where  there  are  sev- 
eral applicants  for  the  writ  of  error  coram  nobis 
and  a  supersedeas,  the  supersedeas  may  be  retained 
as  to  some  of  the  applicants  and  dismissed  as  to  the 
others.69 

g.  Pleadings 

After  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  Is  allowed,  the 
applicant  makes  a  formal  assignment  of  errors  In  the 
nature  of  a  declaration,  to  which  defendant  may  either 
plead  or  demur. 


The  writ  being  allowed,  applicant  makes  a  formal 
assignment  of  errors  in  the  nature  of  a  declara- 
tion,70 which  should  be  verified,71  stating  the  er- 
rors in  fact  on  which  he  relies.72  Errors  in  fact 
and  in  law  cannot  be  assigned  together.73  The 
grounds  set  forth  in  the  petition  must  be  the  basis 
of  the  issue  presented  in  the  more  formal  assign- 
ment of  errors.74  The  assignment  of  errors  having 
been  filed,  the  rules  of  pleading  in  actions  at  law 
obtain.75 

Pleadings  in  defense.  Defendant  may  either 
plead  or  demur  to  the  assignment  of  errors.76  A 
demurrer  admits  the  facts  assigned  as  error.77  The 
common  plea  is  in  nulla  est  erratum,78  which  is  in 
the  nature  of  a  demurrer79  and  admits  the  fact 
to  be  as  alleged,  but  insists  that  in  law  it  is  not  er- 
ror.80 If  the  assignment  of  errors  embraces  the 
reasons  for  the  application  as  well  as  the  grounds 
for  the  revocation  of  the  judgment,  a  general  de- 
murrer to  the  assignment  is  good  if  the  reasons  are 
insufficient.81  If  defendant  would  deny  the  truth 
of  the  error  in  fact  assigned,  he  must  traverse  it 
by  plea  and  take  issue  thereon,82  or,  if  the  case  re- 
quires it,  he  may  plead  specially  matter  in  confes- 
sion and  avoidance,83  such  as  a  statutory  limita- 
tion.84 

Reply.  A  plea  of  new  matter  in  avoidance  may 
be  met  by  a  reply  or  demurrer  as  the  circumstances 
may  demand.85 

L  Evidence 

•  Presumptions  are  In  favor  of  rather  than  against 
the  validity  of  the  Judgment;  evidence  dehors  the  rec- 
ord Is  admissible. 


5a    N.T. — Browa    v.    Davenport,    4 
Wend.  205. 

59.  Ky.— Rochester   v.    Anderson,    2 
Bibb.  569. 

60.  N.T. — Comstock  v.  Van  Schoon- 
hoven,  3  How.Pr.  258. 

'61.    N.Y. — Comstock  v.  Van  Schoon- 
hoven,  supra. 

62.  N.T. — Ferris     v.     Douglass,     20 
Wend.  626. 

63.  N.T.—- Ferris  v.  Douglass,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  400  note  14. 

64.  N.T. — Tyler  v.   Morris,    20   N.C. 
487,  34  Am.D.  395. 

34  C.J.  p  400  note  15. 

65.  N.T.— jFerris     v.     Douglass,     20 
Wend.  626. 

16  C.J.  p  400  note  16. 

66.  Tenn. — Crawford  v.  Williams,  1 
Swan    341. 

Tex.— Milam    County    v.    Robertson, 
47  Tex  222. 

67.  N.C.— Tyler   v.    Morris,   20   N.C. 
487,  34  Am.D.  395. 

34  C.J.  p  400  note  18. 

63.    N.T.— Ferris    Y.     Douglass,     20 


Kingsley,  19 


Wend.  626— Smith  v, 
Wend.  620. 

69.    Miss.— Miller  v.  Swing,  16  Miss. 

421. 
34  C.J.  p  400  note  20. 

7a    Tenn.— Gallsna  v.   Sudheixner,   9 

Heisk.  189. 
34  C.J.  p  400  note  22. 
71.    I1L — Marabia  v.  Mary  Thompson 

Hospital    of    Chicago    for   Women 

and  Children,  140  N.E3.  836,  309  I1L 

147. 
7£    Tenn. — Crawford  v.  Williams,  1 

Swan  341. 
Tex. — Milam  County  v.  Robertson,  47 

Tex.  222. 

73.  Ky.— Rightfoot       v.       Common- 
wealth Bank,  4  Dana  492. 

74.  Tenn.— Elliott  '  v.     McNairy,     1 
Baxt  342 — Gallena  v.  Sudheimer,  9 
Heisk.  189. 

75.  Tenn.— Crouch     v.     Mullinix,     1 
Heisk.  478. 

73,    -Ky. — Case    v.     Ribelin,     1    J.J. 

Marsh.  29. 
34  C.J.  P  401  note  27. 

571 


77.  111. — Chapman  v.  North  Ameri- 
can Life  Ins.  Co.,  126  N.E.  732,  292 
111.  179. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  28. 

78.  Ky. — Case    v.     Ribelin,     1    J.J. 
Marsh.  29. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  29. 

79.  Ky.— Shoffett  v.  Menlf ee,  4  Dana 
150. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  30. 

80.  111. — Chapman  v.  North  Ameri- 
can Life  Ins.  Co.,  126  N.E.  732,  292 
111.  179. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  31. 

81.  Tenn. — Boiling    v.    Anderson,    1 
Tenn.Cn.  127. 

82.  Ky.— Case    v.     Ribelin,     1    J.J. 
Marsh.  29. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  33. 

83.  Tenn. — Crawford  v.  Williams,   1 
Swan  341. 

84.  Va.— Eubank  v.    Rail,   4   {Leigh. 
305,  31  Va,  308. 

85.  Tenn. — Crawford  v.  Williams,  I 
Swan  341. 


§  313 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Any  presumptions  that  are  indulged  on  the  hear- 
ing must  be  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  the  judgment 
rather  than  against  it86  The  petition  is  not  evi- 
dence,87 although  sworn  to,88  as  its  office  is  merely 
to  point  out  the  errors  of  fact  on  which  relief  is 
sought.89  The  record  in  the  original  cause  becomes 
a  part  of  the  proceedings,  without  being  made  so  by 
the  petition.90  Since,  >  as  discussed  supra  §  312  c, 
the  office  of  the  writ  is  to  make  apparent  to  the 
court  some  error  of  fact  not  apparent  on  the  face 
of  the  record  and  which  was  unknown  to  the  court, 
evidence  dehors  the  record  may  be  admitted,91  but 
the  general  rule  is  that  the  record  may  not  be  di- 
rectly contradicted.92  General  rules  are  applicable 
in  determining  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence.9^ 

i.  Trial,  Judgment,  and  Costs 

If  the  pleadings  in  proceedings  on  a  writ  of  error 
coram  nobis  result  In  an  Issue  of  fact,  such  Issue  must 
be  tried,  and  judgment  rendered  in  accordance  with  its 
determination;  costs  are  within  the  discretion  of  the 
court. 

If  the  pleadings  result  in  an  issue  of  fact,  such 
issue  must  be  tried94  by  a  jury.95  Issues  of  law 


are  tried  by  the  court.96  The  writ  does  not  open  up 
the  whole  case  for  a  new  trial,  but  only  those  points 
and  questions  raised  by  the  application  for  it97  In 
some  states  the  matter  must  be  tried  at  the  first 
term;  otherwise  defendant  may  move  to  discharge 
the  supersedeas  on  denying  on  oath  the  facts  stated 
in  the  petition.98 

Judgment.  The  judgment  on  a  writ  of  error 
coram  nobis  is  that  the  judgment  complained  of  be 
recalled,  revoked,  and  annulled,  if  the  issue  is  found 
in  favor  of  petitioner,99  whereupon  the  original  suit 
is  ^placed  in  the  same  position  as  it  was  when  the 
judgment  was  rendered.1  If  the  original  judgment 
has  been  satisfied,  the  court  cannot  order  fhat  the 
money  be  refunded,  but  only  that  the  judgment  be 
vacated  and  annulled.2  The  judgment  complained 
of  is  affirmed  if  the  issue  is  found  in  favor  of  de- 
fendant in  error.3  In  some  jurisdictions  if  the  trial 
court  dismisses  the  writ,  it  may  affirm  the  main 
judgment  with  a  statutory  penalty.4 

Costs.  Unless  otherwise  provided  by  statute,5 
costs  are  discretionary  with  the  court6 


E.  ACTION  TO  REVIEW  JUDGMENT 


314.    In  General 

a.  General  principles 

b.  Presentation  and  reservation  of  error 

at  trial,  and  bill  of  exceptions 

c.  Election  of  remedies 

a.  General  Principles 

Under  some  statutes  an  action  to  review  a  Judgment 


may  be  maintained  in  the  court  which  rendered  the  Judg- 
ment. 

Under  some  statutes,  as  in  Indiana,  an  action  may 
be  maintained  on  specified  grounds  to  review  a  judg- 
ment in  the  same  court  which  rendered  the  judg- 
ment7 This  statutory  action  is  modeled  after  a 


Tex. — Milam  County  v.  Robertson,  47    Tenn. — Hicks  r.   Haywood,   4  Heisk. 
•  Tex.  222.  598. 


86.  111. — Chapman   v.   North  Ameri- 
can Life  Ins.  Co.,  212  IlLApp.  389, 

•aiRrmed  126  N.E.   732,  292  111.  179. 

Tenn, — Inman    v.    Fox,    1    Tenn.App. 

119. 

87.  Tenn. — Inman  v.  Fox,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  401  note  38. 

sa  Ala. — Johnson  7.  Straus  Sad- 
dlery Co.,  56  So.  755,  2  Ala.App. 
300. 

111.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ruehr  v. 
Continental  Illinois  Nat  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.,  16  N.B.2d  180,  182,  296 
IlLApp.  293 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Topel  v.  Personal  Loan  &  Savings 
Bank,  9  N.B.2d  75.  79,  290  IlLApp. 
558— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Mitchell 
v.  Eareckson,  250  IlLApp.  508,  511. 

89.  111. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Ruehr  v.  Continental  Illinois  Nat. 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  16  N.E.2d  180, 
182,  296  IlLApp.  293 — Corpus  Juris 
cited  la  Topel  v.  Personal  Loan  & 

•  Savings  Bank,  9  N.E.2d  75,  79,  290 
IlLApp.  $58 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Mitchell  v.  Eareckson,  250  IlLApp. 
508,  511. 


9a  Tenn. — Hicks  v.  Haywood,  su- 
pra. 

91.  Mo.— State    v.    Riley,    118    S.W. 
647,  219  Mo.  667. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  43. 

92.  111.— McCord  v.  Briggs  &  Turi- 
vas,    170   N.E.    320,    338   111.    158— 
Reid  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  231  I1L 
App.  58. 

Tenn.— Roller  v.  Burrow,  175  S.W.2d 
53*7,  180  Tenn.  380,  rehearing  de- 
nied 177  S.W.2d  547,  ISO  Tenn.  380. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  44. 

93.  Tenn. — Rose     v.     Morrow,      10 
Tenn. App.  698. 

94.  Mo. — Simms  v.  Thompson,  236  S. 
W.  876,  291  Mo.  493. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  45. 

96.  Mol— Simms    v.    Thompson,    su- 
pra. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  4*6. 

99*  Tenn. — Crawford  v.  Williams,  1 
Swan  341. 

97.  111. — Joseph     Kaszab,     Inc.,     v. 
Gibson,  App.,  63  N.E.2d  629. 

572 


Tenn. — Rose    v.    Morrow,    10    Tenn. 

App.  698. 
34  C.J.  p  401  note  48. 

9a  Tenn. — Gallena  v.  Sudheimer,  9 
Heisk,  189. 

99.  111.— Topel  v.  Personal  Loan  & 
Savings  Bank,  9  N.E.2d  75,  290 
IlLAjpp.  558. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  50. 

1.  111. — Topel    v.    Personal   'Loan    & 
Savings  Bank,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  401  note  51. 

2.  Tenn.— Bigham     v.     Brewer,      4 
Sneed  432. 

111, — Topel    v.    Personal    Loan   & 

Savings  Bank,  9  N.E.2d  75,  290  I1L 

App.  558. 
34  C.J.  p  401  note  53. 
4.     Tenn.— Wright  v.   Curtis,   237  S. 

W.  1103,  145  Tenn:  623. 
B.    N.T.— Arnold      v.      Sanford,      15 

Johns.  534. 
34  C.J.  p  402  note  55. 

Va. — Gordon  v.  Frazier,  2  Wash. 

130,  2  Va,  130. 
7.    Ind.— Clark  v.  Hillis,  34  N.B.  13, 

134   Ind.   431— Jones  v.  Tipton,  41 

N.E.    831,   13   IndApp.   393. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§314 


bill  of  review  in  equity,8  and  is  in  the  nature  of  a 
petition  for  a  rehearing0  and  necessarily  involves 
the  merits  of  the  original  cause.10  It  is  not  strictly 
an  independent  action,11  but  is  a  continuation  of 
the  original  action12  and  incidental  to  it.13  The 
object  of  the  action  is  to  set  aside  the  judgment  and 
obtain  a  new  trial,14  but  the  proceeding  is  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,1^  and 
from  an  appeal,16  although  an  action  to  review  for 
error  of  law  at  the  trial  is  4n  the  nature  of  an  ap- 
peal17 and  is  governed  largely  by  the  same  rules 
of  procedure.18  A  void  judgment  may  be  attacked 
by  a  statutory  action  to  review  it;19  but  the  action 
to  review  is  to  be  distinguished  from  an  action  to 
vacate  a  judgment  for  invalidity;  the  latter  is  an 
independent  proceeding  not  governed  by  the  stat- 


b.  Presentation  and  Reservation  of  Error  at 
Trial,  and  Bill  of  Exceptions 

An  error  of  law,  In  order  to  be  the  basis  of  an  ac- 
tion to  review,  must,  unless  waived,  be  presented  to  the 
trial  court  by  proper  and  timely  ob  lection  and  exception; 


and  unless  the  error  is  apparent  on  the  record  It  must 
be  Incorporated  In  a  bill  of  exceptions. 

An  error  of  law  not  presented  to  the  trial  court 
cannot  be  made  the  basis  of  an  action  to  review  the 
judgment.21  In  order  to  reserve  questions  for  such 
review,  objections  must  be  made  at  the  trial  of  the 
original  cause,22  exceptions  reserved  to  the  court's 
rulings,23  and  the  errors  assigned  made  the  ground 
of  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,24  and  exceptions  re- 
served to  the  court's  ruling  thereon.2^ 

Objections  to  a  judgment  must  be  presented  either 
by  a  motion  to  modify  or  correct  the  judgment26  or 
by  a  motion  to  set  the  judgment  aside,27  and  excep- 
tions must  be  taken  to  the  court's  ruling  on  the  mo- 
tion.28 The  sufficiency  of  a  complaint  may  be  pre- 
sented without  having  been  demurred  to,  in  the 
original  action.2^ 

Waiver  of  error.  Ordinarily  failure  to  except  to 
the  ruling  of  the  court  amounts  to  a  waiver  of  the 
error.30  Where,  however,  the  failure  to  except 
does  not  amount  to  a  waiver,31  as  where  the  court 
is  without  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter,32  or 


Writ  of  review,  a  somewhat  similiar 
statutory  remedy  prevailing  in 
some  states,  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
Review  §  1,  also  54  C.J.  p  748  note 
1-p  749  note  19. 

8.  Tnd. — Ross  v.  Banta,  34  N.B.  865, 
140    Ind.    120,   rehearing  denied   39 
N.E.  732,  140  Ind.  120. 

34  C.J.  p  402  note  58. 

Bill  of  review  see  Equity  §§  635-65*5. 

Equitable  means  of  reviewing  judg- 
ments, including  statutory  bills  of 
review  see  infra  §§  341-400. 

9.  Ind. — Attica     Building     &     Loan 
Ass'n  of  Attica  v.  Col  vert,   23  N. 
E.2d  483,  492,  216  Ind.  192. 

"It  is  a  method  by  which  the  court 
that  tried  the  case  may  have  oppor- 
tunity to  correct  its  own  error." — 
Attica  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  of  At- 
tica v.  Colvert,  supra. 

10.  Ind.— Ex    parte    Kiley,    34    N.E. 
989,  135  Ind.  225. 

11.  Ind.— Attica    Building    &    Loan 
Ass'n  of  Attica  v.  Colvert,  23  N.E. 
2d    483,    216    Ind.    192— Ex    parte 
Kiley,   34  N.E.   989,   135  Ind.  225. 

12.  Ind. — Evansville   &  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Maddux,  33  N.B.  345,  134  Ind.  571, 
rehearing  denied  34  N.E.  511,   134 
Ind.  571. 

13.  Ind.— Attica    Building    &    Loan 
Ass'n   of  Attica  v.  Colvert,  23   N. 
E.2d    483,    216    Ind.    192— Jones   v. 
Tipton,    41    N.E.    831,    13    Ind.App. 
392. 

14.  Ind. — Hoppes  v.  Hoppes,  24  N.E. 
139,     123     Ind.     397— Hornaday    v. 
Shields,  21  N.E.  654,  119  Ind.  201. 

15.  Ind.— Hill   v.  Roach,  72  Ind.   57 
—Hall  v.  Palmer,  18  Ind.  5. 

34  C.J.  p  402  note  -67. 


Motion  for  new  trial  generally  see 
the  C.J.S.  title  New  Trial  '§  117, 
also  46  C.J.  p  286  note  40-p  287 
note  62. 

1ft    Ind. — Bartmess   v.   Holliday,    61 

N.E.    750,    27   Ina.App.    544. 
34  C.J.  p  402  note  68. 

17.  Ind. — Calumet         Teaming        & 
Trucking  Co.  v.  Young,  33  N.BJ.2d 
583,  218  Ind.  468— Attica  Building 
&  Loan  Ass'n  of  Attica  v.  Colvert, 
23  N.E.2d  483, '216  Ind.  192— Silts 
v.  Henderlong  Lumber  Co.,  33  N.E. 
2d    373,    109    Ind.App.    559— In    re 
Boyer's     Guardianship.     174     N.B. 
714,  96  Ind.App.  161. 

34  C.J.  p  402  note  69. 

An  action  to  review  presents  same 
question  to  reviewing  trial  court 
that  might  be  presented  to  appellate 
court  on  an  appeal. — Calumet  Team- 
ing &  Trucking  Co.  v.  Young,  33  N.H. 
2d  583,  218  Ind.  468. 

18.  Ind. — Murphy   v.   Branaman,    59 
N.E.  274,  156  In*.  77. 

34  C.J.  p  402  note  70. 

19.  Ind.— Bartmess    v.    Holliday,    61 
N.B.   750,   27  Ind.App.  544. 

34  C.J.  p  402  note  72. 

20.  Ind.— Willman    v.    Willman,    57 
Ind.  500. 

34  C.J.  p  402  note  71. 
Action   in   equity  to   annul   a  judg- 
ment see  infra  §§   341-400. 

21.  Ind. — Shoaf  v.  Joray,  86  Ind.  70. 
34  C.J.  p  403  note  85. 

22.  Ind.— Eilts  v.  Henderlong  Lum- 
ber Co.,  33  N.E.2d  373,  109  Ind.App. 
559. 

34  C.J.  p  403  note  86. 

23.  Ind. — Egoff  v.    Madison   County 

573 


Children's  Guardians,  84  N.B.  151, 
170  Ind.  238. 
34  C.J.  p  403  note  87. 

24.  Ind. — Eilts  v.  Henderlong  Lum- 
ber  Co.,    33    N.E,2d    373,    109    Ind. 
App.  559. 

34  C.J.  j?  404  note  88. 
Insufficiency  of  defense 

An  alleged  insufficiency  of  facts 
pleaded  and  proved  to  constitute  a 
defense  could  not  be  presented  by 
proceeding  to  review  Judgment  for 
defendants  where  such  alleged  error 
was  not  called  to  attention -of  trial 
court  by  motion  for  a  new  trial. — 
Eilts  v.  Henderlong  'Lumber  Co.,  su- 
pra. 

25.  Ind. — Slussman    v.    Kensler,    £8 
Ind.  190. 

26.  Ind.— Egoff   v.    Madison   County 
Children's  Guardians,  84  N.E.  151, 
170  Ind.  238. 

34  C.J.  p  404  note  90. 

27.  Ind.— Baker  v.  Ludlam,  20  N.E. 
648,    118  Ind.  -87— Searle  v.  Whip- 
perman,  79  Ind.  424. 

2a    Ind.— Baker  v.  Ludlam,  20  N.E. 
648,  118  Ind.  87. 

29.  Ind.— 'Ferguson  v.  Hull,  36  NJBL 
254,     136    Ind.     339— Berkshire    v. 
Young,  45  Ind.  461. 

30.  Ind. — Collins    v.    Rose,    59    Ind. 
33 

34  G!J.  p  404  note  96. 

31.  Ind. — Berkshire     v.     Young,     45 
Ind.   461— Davis   v.  Perry,   41  Ind. 
305. 

32.  Ind. — Davis  v.  Perry,  supra. 


§  314 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


where  the  judgment  is  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction 
of  the  person,33  or  where  the  complaint  fails  to 
state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion,34 exceptions  are  not  necessary. 

Bill  of  exceptions.  In  order  to  make  proceedings, 
which  are  not  properly  of  record,  apparent  of  rec- 
ord, they  must  be  incorporated  in  a  bill  of  excep- 
tions,35 filed  within  the  time  limited.36 

c.  Election  of  Remedies 

The  complaining  party  may  appeal  from  the  judg- 
ment to  an  appellate  court  or  he  may  maintain  the  stat- 
utory action  to  review  the  Judgment  In  the  same  court 
in  which  it  was  rendered. 

The  statutory  action  to  review  is  not  an  exclusive 
remedy.37  The  complaining  party  to  a  judgment 
may  appeal  from  the  judgment  in  the  original  ac- 
tion to  an  appellate  court  for  an  error  of  law  or 
bring  an  action,  under  the  statute,  to  review  the 
judgment  in  the  same  court,38  but  he  must  elect 
between  the  two  courses;  he  cannot  pursue  both 
remedies.39 

§  315.     Grounds   of   Action   and   Judgments 
Reviewable 

The  statutory  action  will  lie  to  review  all  Judgments, 


at  law  or  In  equity,  with  certain  exceptions,  on  the 
ground  of  error  of  law  on  the  face  of  the  record  or  be- 
cause of  newly  discovered  material  matter. 

All  judgments,  at  law  or  in  equity,  are  review- 
able  by  this  statutory  action,40  except  judgments  in 
criminal  actions,41  judgments  concerning  decedents' 
estates,42  and,  by  the  express  provisions  of  statute, 
judgments  in  divorce  actions.43 

The  statutory  action  lies  for  error  of  law,44  avail- 
able on  appeal,45  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord.46 It  will  not  lie  because  a  witness  committed 
perjury  at  the  prevailing  party's  solicitation  in  the 
trial  of  the  cause;47  nor  will  it  lie  to  review  the 
act  of  a  clerical  or  ministerial  officer  after  the  ren- 
dition of  the  judgment.48 

The  action  will  lie  for  material  new  matter  dis- 
covered since  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,49  pro- 
vided it  could  not  have  been  discovered  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  reasonable  diligence  before  the  rendition  of 
the  judgment,50  and  provided  it  is  such  new  matter 
of  fact  that,  if  presented  in  the  original  action,  the 
complaining  party  would  have  been  entitled  to  a 
different  judgment.51  An  action  to  review  for  new 
matter  discovered  after  the  rendition  of  the  orig- 


33.  Ind. — McCormack      v.      Greens- 
burgh  First  Nat.  Bank,  53  Ind.  46-6. 

34  G.J.  p  404  note  99. 

34.  Ind. — Berkshire    v.     Young,     45 
Ind.   461 — Davis  v.  Perry,  41   Ind. 
305.      , 

35.  Ind. — Hancher  v.  Stephenson,  46 
N.B.  916,  147  Ind.  498. 

34  O.J.  p  404  note  3. 

36.  Ind. — Graves   v.    State,    36   N.E. 
275,    136    Ind.    -406— Yuknavich    v. 
Yuknavich,  58  N.E.2d  447,  115  Ind. 
App.  $30. 

34  C.J.  p  404  note  4. 

37.  Ind.— Attica    Building    &    -Loan 
Ass'n  of  Attica  v.  Colvert,  23  N.B. 
2d  483,  216  Ind.  192. 

34  C.J.  p  402  note  57  [a]. 

38.  Ind. — Calumet         Teaming        & 
Trucking  Co.  v.   Young,   33  N.B.2d 
583,   218  Ind.   468— Attica  Building 
&  Loan  Ass'n  of  Attica  v.  Colvert, 
23  N.E.2d  483,  216  Ind.  192. 

34  C.J.  p  404  note  5. 

39.  Ind. — McCurdy  v<  'Love,  97  Ind. 
62. 

34  O.J.  p  404  note  <6. 

Right  to  different  remedies  for  re- 
view in  same  case  and  election  of 
remedies  see  Appeal  and  Error  § 
32. 

40.  Ind.— Ross    v.    Banta,    34    N.E. 
865,  140  Ind.  120,  rehearing  denied 
39  N.E.   732,   140  Ind.  120. 

34  O.J.  p  402  note  74. 

41.  Ind. — Frazier    v.    State,    7   N.E. 
378,  106  InO.  562. 


42.  Ind. — McCurdy  v.  Love,  97  Ind. 
62. 

43.  Ind.— Keller  v.   Keller,    38   N.E. 
337,  139  Ind.  38. 

34  C.J.  p  402  note  77. 

Setting    aside    divorce    judgment    or 

decree    generally    see    Divorce    §§ 

168-172. 

44.  Ind.— Attica    Building    &    Loan 
Ass'n  of  Attica  v.  Colvert,  23  N.E. 
2d  483^216  Ind.  192. 

34  C.J.  p  402  note  78. 

Lack  of  Jurisdiction  of  the  sub- 
ject matter  in  the  court  rendering 
the  judgment  constitutes  such,  an 
error  of  law  as  will  support  the  ac- 
tion.— Shoaf  v.  Joray,  86  Ind.  70. 

45.  Ind. — Eilts  v.  Henderlong  Lum- 
ber Co.,  33  N.E.2d  373,  109  Ind.App. 
559 — In   re   Boyer's    Guardianship, 
174  N.E.  714,    96  Ind.App.   161. 

34  C.J.  p  403  note  79. 

48.    Ind. — Hancher  v.  Stephenson,  46 

N.E.  916,  147  Ind.  498. 
34  C.J.  p.  403  note  80. 

47.  Ind. — Yuknavich    v.    Yuknavich, 
58  N.E.2d   447,  115  Ind.App.    530 — 
Walker    v.    State    ex    rel.    Laboy- 
teaux,  8*6  N.E.  502,  43  Ind.App.  605. 

48.  Ind. — Ferguson  v.  Hull,  36  N.E. 
254,  136  Ind.  339. 

34  C.J.  p  403  note  84. 

49.  Ind. — Yuknavich    v.    Yuknavich, 
58  N.E.2d  447,  115  Ind.App.   530. 

34  C.J.  p  403  note  82.     - 

50.  Ind. — Egoff   v.   Madison   County 

574 


Children's  Guardians,   84  N.E.  151, 
170  Ind.  238. 
34  C.J.  p  403  note  83. 

51.    Ind. — Egoff   v.    Madison    County 

Children's  Guardians,  supra. 
34  C-J.  p  403  note  82  [d],  [e]. 
Pacts  held  not  material  new  matter 

(1)  Newly      discovered      receipts, 
documents,    and    other    evidence    of 
facts  set  up  by  defendants'  pleadings 
in  action  for  fraud  and  constituting 
defense  which  was  known   to   exist 
and  was  employed  in  such  action. — 
Yuknavich  v.    Yuknavich,    58   N.E.2d 
447,  115  Ind.App.  530. 

(2)  Other  facts  held  not  material 
see  34  O.J.  p  403  note  -82    [h]. 

Changed  conditions  since  rendi- 
tion of  judgment,  in  that  ju4gments 
were  fully  paid  and  that  there  was 
no  one  to  whom  money  might  be 
paid  if  collected,  do  not  entitle  de- 
fendant to  a  review  of  judgment, 
where  judgments  were  paid  by  sure- 
ties on  order  of  court,  and  who 
therefore  had  right  to  be  subrogated 
to  all  rights  of  creditors  whom  they 
had  paid,  including  their  right  to 
judgment  for  damages: — Trust  & 
Savings  Bank  of  Rensselaer  v. 
Brusnahan,  147  N.E.  168,  88  Ind.App. 
257,  rehearing  denied  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank  of  Rensseiaer  y.  Brusha- 
ham.  148  N.E.  427,  88  Ind.App.  257. 
Matter  already  in  issue 

Newly-discovered  evidence  will 
not  justify  a  review  of  Judgment, 
where  at  most  it  concerns  matter  al- 


49     C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  317 


inal  judgment  is  of  a  different  character  from  an 
action  to  review  for  error  committed  at  the  trial52 
and  is  much  like  a  coram  nobis  proceeding.53 

§  316.    Jurisdiction  and  Procedure  Generally 

A  statutory  action  to  review  a  judgment  may  be 
brought  only  in  .the  court  which  rendered  the  Judgment. 
The  complaint  may  be  filed  only  by  a  party  to  the  Judg- 
ment, or  one  claiming  under  or  representing  him;  it 
must  be  filed  within  the  time  fixed  by  the  statute,  and 
notice  thereof  must  be  given  to  the  defendant. 

The  statutory  action  to  review  a  judgment  may 
be  brought  only  in  the  court  which  rendered  the 
judgment.54  Under  the  statute  the  complaint  to 
review  may  be  filed  without  leave  of  court;55  but 
defendant  must  be  notified  of  the  filing.56  The  fil- 
ing of  a  complaint  for  review  does  not  of  itself  stay 
proceedings  on  the  original  judgment,57  but  at  any 
time  after  the  filing  of  the  complaint  and  before  the 
final  hearing  the  court  may  on  the  application  of 
plaintiff  stay  all  further  proceedings  on  the  judg- 
ment, and  direct  that  bond  be  given  as  in  cases  of 
appeal.58 

Limitations  of  time.  The  action  to  review  must 
be  brought  within  the  time  fixed  by  the  statute59 
in  force  at  the  time  of  the  institution  of  the  action 
to  review,60  and  with  reasonable  promptness  within 
such  time.61  A  person  under  a  legal  disability,  how- 
ever, is  excepted  from  the  operation  of  the  statute 
for  a  fixed  period  of  time  after  the  disability  is  re- 
moved.62 


Parties.  Under  the  express  provisions  of  the 
statute,  the  complaint  may  be  filed  only  by  a  party 
to  the  judgment  sought  to  be  reviewed,  or  by  the 
heirs,  devisees,  or  personal  representatives  of  a 
deceased  party,63  and  ordinarily  all  the  parties  who 
were  in  the  original  proceeding  should  be  before  the 
court,64  either  as  complainants  or  defendants  in  ac- 
cordance with  their  respective  interests  in  the  mat- 
ter to  be  reviewed.65 

§  317.    Pleading  and  Evidence 

a.  Complaint 

b.  Pleadings  in  defense 

c.  Evidence 

a.  Complaint 

A  complaint  In  an  action  to  review  must  be  suffi- 
cient without  resorting  to  the  record.  If  based  on  error 
of  law,  the  complaint  must  set  forth  the  errors  relied 
on,  and  show  that  objections  and  exceptions  were  duly 
taken  and  reserved;  If  based  on  new  matter,  It  must 
allege  all  the  elements  of  this  ground  for  review. 

An  action  to  review  a  judgment  is  commenced 
by  a  complaint,66  which  stands  on  the  same  foot- 
ing as  the  complaint  in  other  actions,67  and  which 
must  be  sufficient  without  resorting  to  the  exhib- 
its.68 A  complaint  stating  a  cause  of  action  in 
general  terms  will  be  good,  after  verdict,  as  against 
a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment69  A  complaint  is 
not  bad  on  demurrer  for  want  of  facts,  if  otherwise 
sufficient,,  merely  because  it  fails  to  show  that  the 
suit  was  commenced  within  the  time  limited  by  the 
statute,70  unless  the  complaint  shows  on  its  face 


ready  in  issue,  and  if  introduced 
would  not  have  produced  different 
result — Trust  &  Savings  Bank  of 
Rensselaer  v.  Brusnahan,  147  N.E. 
168,  88  Ind.App.  257,  rehearing  de- 
nied Trust  &  Savings  Bank  of  Rens- 
selaer v.  Brushaham,  148  N.E.  427, 
88  Ind.App.  257. 

52.  Ind. — Calumet        Teaming        & 
Trucking  Co.  v.  Young,   33  N.E.2d 
583,  218  Ind.  468. 

53.  Ind.— Calumet        Teaming        & 
Trucking  Co.  v.  Young,  supra. 

Writ  of  error  coram  nobis  see  supra 
§§  311-313. 

54.  Ind.— Ex    parte    Kiley,    34    N.E. 
989,  139  Ind.  225. 

34  C.J.  p  404  note  7. 

55.  Ind.-— Hornady  v.  Shields,  21  N. 
B.    554,    119    Ind.   201— Webster  v. 
Maiden,  41  Ind.  124. 

66,  Ind.— Hornady  v.  Shields,  21  N. 
E.  554,  119  Ind.  201. 

57.  Ind.— State  v.  King,  66  N.E.  85, 
30  Ind.App.  339. 

Status  of  judgment  pending  motion 
or  petition  to  vacate  see  supra  § 
298. 

58.  Ind. — State  v.  King,  supra. 

59.  Ind. — Talge    Mahogany    Co.     v. 


Astoria    Mahogany    Co.,    145    N.E. 
495,  195  Ind.  433. 
34  C.J.  p  404  note  9. 

60.  Ind.— Rupert  v.   Martz,   18  N.E. 
381,  116  Ind.  72. 

61.  Ind.— Simpkins     v.    Wilson,     11 
Ind.  541. 

34  C.J.  p  404  note  11  [c], 

62.  Ind.— Rupert  v.   Martz,   18  N.E. 
381,  116  Ind.  72 — Rosa  v.  Prather, 
2  N.E.  575,  103  Ind.  191. 

34  C.J.  p  404  note  11. 
Within,  time  to  appeal 

Where  action  to  review,  for  al- 
leged error,  a  judgment  rendered 
against  plaintiff  while  an  infant  was 
commenced  by  -plaintiff  within  the 
time  in  which  plaintiff  might  have 
perfected  an  appeal  from  such  judg- 
ment, the  action  to  review  judgment 
could  be  maintained  by  plaintiff. — 
Attica  Building  &  'Loan  Ass'n  of  At- 
tica v.  Colvert,  23  N.B.2d  483,  216 
Ind.  192. 

63.  Ind. — Michener     v.      Springfield 
Engine   &   Thresher   Co.,    40    N.E. 
679,  142  Ind.  130,  31  L.R.A.  59. 

34  C.J.  p  404  note  12. 

61.     Ind. — Douglay  v.  Davis.  45  Ind. 

493. 
34  C.J.  p  405  note  13. 

575 


65.  Ind. — Concannon    v.     Noble,     9$ 
Ind.    326 — Burns    v.    Singer    Mfg. 
Co.,  87  Ind.  541. 

34  <XJ.  p  405  note  14. 

66.  Ind.— Hornady  v.  Shields,   21  N. 
E.  554,  119  Ind.  201. 

34  C.J.  p  405  note  17. 

67.  Ind. — Hague       v.       Huntington 
•First  Nat  Bank,   65  N.H   907,  159- 
Ind.  63-6. 

34  C.J.  p  405  note  18. 

6a    Ind.— Clark   v.   Clark,    172   N.H. 

124,.  202  Ind.  104. 
34  C.J.  p  405  note  22. 
Setting  forth  original  pleading- 

The  complaint  should  contain 
enough  of  the  pleading  in  the  cause, 
or  the  substance  or  nature  or  char- 
acter thereof,  to  present  the  ques- 
tion of  the  alleged  error  without  re- 
sorting  to  the  transcript  of  the  rec- 
ord, filed  as  an  exhibit. — Clark  v. 
Clark,  supra — Jamison  v.  Lake  Erie- 
&  W.  R.  Co.,  48  N.E.  223,  149  Ind. 
521. 

69.  Ind. — Johnson  v.  Ahrens,   19  NV 
E.     335,    117    Ind.    600— Jones    v. 
Ahrens,  19  N.E.  334,  116  Ind.  490. 

70.  Ind.— Boyd  v.  'Fitch,  71  Ind.  305 
—Whitehall  v.    Crawford,    67   Ind- 
84. 


§  317 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


that  it  is  barred  by  lapse  of  time.71  A  complaint  to 
review  a  judgment  which  is  insufficient  will  not  be 
held  good  as  an  application  to  be  relieved  from  a 
judgment  on  the  ground  of  mistake,  inadvertence, 
surprise,  or  excusable  neglect72  Leave  to  amend 
the  complaint  may  be  granted  in  a  proper  case.73 
In  action  for  error  of  law.  If  the  action  is  based 
on  an  error  of  law,  the  complaint  must  set  forth  the 
errors  relied  on74  and  show  that  objections  and  ex- 
ceptions to  the  errors  alleged  were  duly  taken  and 
reserved  in  the  original  proceedings  ;75  but  this  rule 
does  not  apply  where  the  error  is  one  which  is  not 
waived  by  a  failure  to  except,76  as  where  the  com- 
plaint does  not  state  any  cause  of  action,77  or  where 
the  court  has  no  jurisdiction  over  the  subject  mat- 
ter.78 The  complaint  should  itself  set  forth  a  com- 
plete record  of  the  case,79  or  as  much  thereof  as  is 
necessary  fully  to  present  the  errors  complained 
of,80  either  by  embodying  it  in  the  complaint  or  by 
referring  to  and  identifying  it  as  an  exhibit  so  as 
to  become  substantially  a  part  of  the  complaint;81 
but  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  copy  of  the  record 
set  forth  in  the  complaint  should  be  a  certified 
copy.82  A  bill  of  exceptions,  even  though  a  part 
of  the  record,  is  not  such  a  written  instrument  as 
may  be  filed  as  an  exhibit  with  the  complaint.83 

In  action  for  new  matter.  When  the  complaint 
is  based  on  material  new  matter  discovered  after 
the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  it  must  set  forth  the 


character  of  the  action,84  the  facts  discovered 
since  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,85  the  materi- 
ality of  the  new  matter,86  plaintiffs  ignorance  of  it 
at  the  time  of  the  trial,87  the  fact  that  the  new  mat- 
ter could  not  have  been  discovered  before  the  judg- 
ment by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence,88  and 
that  the-co.mplaint  was  filed  without  delay  after  the 
discovery.89  The  complaint  must  be  verified  by 
complainant.90  The  pleadings  and  evidence  in  the 
original  case  and  the  newly  discovered  evidence 
may  be  filed  with  the  complaint  as  an  exhibit,91 
but  the  affidavit  of  the  witness  by  whom  the  new 
matter  is  expected  to  be  established  is  not  required 
to  be  filed  with  the  complaint.92 

b.  Pleadings  in  Defense 

The  defendant  may  demur  to  the  complaint,  Inter- 
pose a  general  or  special  denial,  or  plead  proper  affirma- 
tive defenses. 

Defendant  may  demur  to  the  complaint  for  its 
failure  to  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause 
of  action,93  or  he  may  interpose  a  general  or  spe- 
cial denial,94  or  he  may  plead  proper  affirmative 
defenses,95  such  as  would  have  been  available  on 
appeal,96  or  he  may  plead  the  pendency  of  an  ap- 
peal.97 However,  he  cannot  make  any  defense 
which  was  available  in  the  original  action.98 

c.  Evidence 

In  an  action  to  review  for  error  of  law,  the  question 
must  be  determined  by  the  record  Itself;  but  to  review 


71.  Ind. — Harlen  v.  Watson,  63  Ind. 
143. 

72.  Ind. — Baker  v.  Ludlam,   20  N.E. 
648,  118  Ind.  87. 

73.  Ind.— Foster   v.    Potter,    24    Ind. 
363. 

74.  Ind. — Hague       v.        Huntingdon 
First  Nat.  Bank,   65  N.E.   907,   159 
Ind.  63*6. 

34  C.J.  p  405  note  25. 

75.  Ind. — Wohadlo  v.  Fary,   46  N.E. 
2d     489,     221     Ind.     219— Calumet 
Teaming  &  Trucking  Qo.  v.  Young. 
33  N.B.2d  109,  218  Ind.' 468,  rehear- 
ing denied  33  N.E.2d  583,  218  Ind. 
468— ^Lambert  v.  Smith,   23  N.E.2d 
430,  216  Ind.   226— Eilts  v.  Hender- 
long   Lumber   Co.,    33    N.E.2d    373, 
109  Ind.App.  559. 

34  C.J.  p  405  note  26. 
Complaint  held  demurra'ble 
Ind.— Lambert  •  v.    Smith,    23    N.B.2d 
430,  216  Ind.  226. 

76.  Ind. — Calumet        Teaming        & 
Trucking  Co.  v.   Young,   33  N.E.2d 
109,  218  Ind.  468,  rehearing  denied 
33  N.E.  583,  218  Ind.  463— Lambert 
v.  Smith,    23   N.E.2d  430,   21-6   Ind. 
226— Davis  v.  Perry,  41  Ind.  305. 

77.  Ind. — Lambert  v.    Smith,    23   N. 
E.2d  430,  216  Ind.  226. 


78.  Ind. — Lambert  v.  Smith,  supra. 

79.  Ind.— 'Findling  v.  Lewis,  47  N.E. 
831,  148  Ind.  429. 

34  C.J.  p  405  note  27. 

80.  Ind. — Eilts   v.   Henderlong  Lum- 
ber  Co.,    33    N.E.2d    373,    109    Ind. 
App.  559. 

34  C.J.  p  405  note  28. 

81.  Ind.— Findling  v.  Lewis,  47  N.E. 
831,  148  Ind.  429. 

34  C.J.  p  405  note  29. 

82.  Ind. — Hoppes  v.  Hoppes,  24  N.E. 
139,  123  Ind.  397. 

34  C.J.  p  405  note  27  [b]. 

83.  Ind. — Yuknavich    y.    Yuknavich, 
58  N.E.2d  447,  115  Ind.App.   530. 

84.  Ind. — Jamison   v.    Lake   Erie   & 
W.    R.    Co.,    48   N.E.    223,    149    Ind. 
521. 

85.  Ind. — Hornady  v.  Shields,  21.  N. 
E.    554,    119    Ind.    201— Francis   v. 
Davis,  69  Ind.  452. 

I  Ind. — Jamison  v.  Lake  Erie  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  48  N.E.  223,  149  Ind. 
521— Francis  v.  Davis,  69  Ind.  452. 

87.  Ind.— Whitehall  v.  Crawford,  67 
Ind.  84. 

88.  Ind.— Warne  v.   Irwin,   £3   N.E. 
926,  153  Ind.  20. 

34  C.J.  p  406  note  34.  j 

'576 


89.  Ind. — Osgood  v.  Smock,  40  N.E. 
37,  144  Ind.  387. 

34  C.J.  p  406  note  35. 

90.  Ind. — Dippel  v.  Schicketanz,  100 
Ind.  376. 

34  C.J.  p  406  note  3-6. 

91.  Ind.— Hill  v.  Roach,   72  Ind.  57. 
34  C.J.  p  406  note  37. 

92.  Ind. — Hill  v.  Roach,  supra. 

93.  Ind. — Hornady  v.   Shields,   21  N. 
E.  554,  119  Ind.  201. 

34  C.J.  p  406  note  39. 

94.  Ind.— Kiley   v.   Murphy,    34   N.E. 
112,   7   Ind. App.  .239,  rehearing  de- 
nied 34  N.E.    650,   7  Ind.App.   239. 

34  C.J.  p  406  note  40. 

95.  Ind. — Kiley  v.  Murphy,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  406  note  41. 

Cross  errors 

To  a  complaint  pleading  errors  of 
law,  defendant  may  set  up  cross  er- 
rors.— Kiley  v.  Murphy,  supra. 

96.  Ind. — Richardson    v.    Howk,    45 
Ind.  451— Kiley  v.  Murphy,  34  N.E. 
112,   7   Ind.App.  239*  rehearing  de- 
nied 34  N.E.   650,   7   Ind.App.   239. 

97.  Ind. — Kiley    v.    Murphy,    supra. 
34  C.J.  p  406  note  41  EC]. 

98.  Ind. — Richardson    v.    Howk,    45 
Ind.  451— Kiley  v.  Murphy,  24  N.E. 
112,   7   Ind.App.  239,  rehearing  de- 
nied 24  N.E.   650,  7  IndJLpp.  239. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


319 


for  new  matter,  the  plaintiff  must  prove  the  averment 
of  material  new  matter. 

In  an  action  to  review  for  error  of  law  the  ques- 
tion must  be  determined  by  the  record  itself,"  and 
the  recitals  of  the  record  will  control,  and  cannot  be 
contradicted  by,  the  allegations  of  the  complaint.1 
In  an  action  to  review  a  judgment  for  new  matter 
plaintiff  must  prove  the  averment  of  material  new 
matter,2  and  that  it  could  not  have  been  discovered 
by  proper  diligence.3 

§  318.     Hearing,  Determination,  and  Relief 

The  hearing  in  a  statutory  action  to  review  is  by 
the  court,  as  an  appellate  court,  and  It  may  reverse,  af- 
firm, or  modify  the  judgment. 

In  an  action  to  review  a  judgment  for  an  error 
of  law,  the  hearing  is  by  the  court4  which  sits  as 
an  appellate  court.5  No  right  to  a  jury  in  such  an 
action  exists,6  and  the  application  should  be  deter- 
mined on  the  principles  governing  motions  for  a 
new  trial.7  The  judgment  being  reviewed  will  not 
be  disturbed  because  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  evi- 
dence to  sustain  the  finding  of  the  court,  or  the  ver- 
dict of  the  jury,  if  there  is  any  evidence  legally 
tending  to  support  the  finding  or  the  verdict.8 

Judgment.  Under  the  statute  the  court  may  re- 
verse or  affirm  the  judgment  in  whole  or  in  part,  or 
modify  it  as  the  justice  of  the  case  may  require,9 
•the  same  as  on  an  appeal  to  an  appellate  court;10 
but  it  has  been  held  that  a  substantial  error  requires 
reversal  of  the  judgment  and  that  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  show  substantial  error  plus  great  injustice.11 
Leave  to  amend  the  pleadings  in  the  original  case 


cannot  be  granted.12 

At  least  in  the  absence  of  an  appeal,  a  judgment 
for  or  against  a  review  of  a  former  judgment  puts 
an  end  to  the  action  for  review,13  unless,  on  the 
overruling  of  a  demurrer  to  the  complaint,  leave  is 
granted  to  answer  over.14  If  the  judgment  is 
against  the  review,  the  whole  proceedings  are  at 
an  end.15  A  judgment  of  reversal  reverses  and  sets 
aside  the  judgment  in  the  original  action,  leaving 
the  action  to  proceed  as  though  no  trial  had  taken 
place  ;16  and,  moreover,  a  judgment  of  reversal  will 
not  bar  another  suit  for  the  same  cause  of  action.17 
A  judgment  of  affirmance  bars  a  second  action  to 
review  the  same  judgment.18 

§  319.    Review  and  Costs 

An  appeal  may  be  taken  from  the  Judgment  in  an 
action  to  review,  and  costs  may  be  awarded  according 
to  the  rules  for  awarding  costs  on  appeal  in  general. 

An  appeal  lies  from  the  judgment  in  an  action  to 
review,19  provided  the  party  had  a  right  to  appeal 
from  the  judgment  in  the  original  action  when  he 
filed  his  complaint  for  review.20  The  appeal  lies 
to  the  same  court  to  which  an  appeal  from  the 
original  judgment  lies.21  The  determination  of 
an  action  for  relief  from  a  judgment  taken  through 
mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  or  excusable  neglect 
does  not  bar  the  right  of  another  party  to  the  main 
action  to  have  the  judgment  reviewed  for  error.22 

Costs.  Under  the  statute  the  court  may  award 
costs  according  to  the  rule  prescribed  for  the  award- 
ing of  costs  on  an  appeal.23 


99.  Ind. — Eilts  v.  Henderlong  Lum- 
ber Co.,  33  N.E.2d  373,  109  Ind. 
App.  559 — Edwards  v.  Van  Cleave, 
94  N.E.  596,  47  Ind.App.  347. 

34  C.J.  p  406  note  4-6. 

3-  Ind. — State  v.  Holmes,  69  Ind. 
577— Weathers  v.  Doerr,  53  Ind. 
104— Hall  v.  Palmer,  18  Ind.  5. 

2.  Ind.— Hill  v.  Roach,   72  Ind,   57. 

3.  Ind.— Alsop  v.  Wiley,  17  Ind.  452. 

4.  Ind.— Hornady  v.  Shields,  21  N.E. 
554,    119    Ind.    201— Richardson    v. 
Howk,  45  Ind.  451. 

5.  Ind. — Searle    v.    Whipperman,    79 
Ind.      424 — Eilts      v.      Henderlong 
Lumber    Co.,    33    N.B.2d    373,    109 
Ind.App.  559. 

«.     Ind. — Hornady  v.   Shields,    21  N. 

E.  554,  119  Ind.  201. 
7.    Ind. — Hornady  v.  Shields,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  407  note  53. 


Ind.  —  Terry 
Ind.  95. 


v.    Bronnenberg,    87 


9.  Ind.—  Hornady  v.  Shields,   21  N. 
E.  554,  119  Ind.  201. 

3-4  C.J.  p  407  note  55. 

10.  Ind.  —  Wright  v.  '  Churchman,   85 
N.E.  -835,   185   Ind.   683—  Indianapo- 

49  O.J.S.-37 


lis  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Routledge, 
7  Ind.  25. 

Judgment  on  appeal  see  Appeal  and 
Error  §§  1846-1952. 

11.  Ind. — Calumet        Teaming-        & 
Trucking:  Qo.   v.  Young,   33  N.E.2d 
583,  218  Ind.  468. 

Prejudice  presumed 

If  it  appears  that  error  was  com- 
mitted, it  will  be  presumed  to  have 
been  prejudicial  unless  the  contrary 
is  made  to  appear,  and  where  a  par- 
ty's substantial  rights  have  been 
prejudiced  he  has  not  had  a  "fair 
trial,"  and  that  is  injustice  enough 
to  require  a  reversal. — Calumet 
Teaming  &  Trucking  Co.  v.  Young, 
supra. 

12.  Ind.— Leech   v.    Ferry,    77    Ind. 
422. 

13.  Ind. — Brown  v.   Keyser,   53   Ind. 
85. 

34  C.J.  p  407  note  57. 

14.  Ind. — Leech    v.    Perry,    77    Ind. 
422. 

15.  Ind. — Brown  v.  Keyser,  •  53  Ind. 
85. 

16.  Ind. — Leech  v.  Perry,  77  Ind.  422 
— Brown   v.   Keyser,   53   Ind.    85. 

34  C.J.  p  407  note  60. 

577 


17.  Ind.— Maghee  v.  Collins,  27  Ind. 
83. 

18.  Ind. — Coen  v.  (Funk,  26  Ind.  289. 
34  C.J.  p  407  note  62. 

19.  Ind. — Attica    Building    &    Loan 
Ass'n  of  Attica  v.  Colvert,  23  N.E. 
2d    483,    216    Ind.    192— Keepfer    v. 
Force,  86  Ind.   81 — Brown  v.  Key- 
ser, 53  Ind.  85. 

2<X    Ind. — McCurdy  v.  Love,   97  Ind. 

•62 — Klebar  v.  Corydon,  80  Ind.  95. 

A  Judgment  denying  a  petition  to 
review  a  Judgment  from  which  no 
appeal  has  been  taken  within  the 
statutory  period  provided  therefor  is 
not  appealable.— Talge  Mahogany  Co. 
v.  Astoria  Mahogany  Co.,  141  N.E.  50, 
195  Ind.  433,  rehearing  overruled  146 
N.E.  495,  195  Ind.  433. 

21.  Ind.— Ex    parte    Kiley,    84    N.E. 
989,  135  Ind.  225— Jonea  v.  Tlpton, 
41  N.E.  831,  13  Ind. App.  392. 

22.  Ind.— Attica    Building    &    .Loan 
Ass'n  of  Attica  v.  Colvert,  28  N.E. 
24  483,  216  Ind.  192. 

23.  Ind. — Francis  v.    Davis,    69   Ind. 
452— Davidson  v.  King,  49  Ind.  338. 


320 


JUDGMENTS 
F.  CONFESSED  JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  320.    Amendment 

A  Judgment  by  confession  may  be  amended  to  cor- 
rect mistakes  or  omissions,  but  an  Invalid  Judgment  may 
not  be  amended. 

A  judgment  by  confession,  like  other  judgments, 
as  discussed  supra  §  236,  may  be  amended  by  recti- 
fying mistakes,  correcting  lie  form  of  the  judg- 
ment, or  supplying  omissions,24  but  an  invalid  judg- 
ment may  not  be  amended.25  The  court  has  no  au- 
thority at  a  subsequent  term  to  substitute  a  judg- 
ment on  nil  dicit  for  a  judgment  by  confession,  on 
the  ground  that  the  latter  was  entered  by  mistake.26 
Generally  it  is  not  necessary  to  join  in  the  proceed- 
ing to  amend  the  judgment  creditors  or  persons  sub- 
sequently acquiring  interests  in  the  property  affect- 
ed.27 

§  321.    Opening  and  Vacating 
a.  In  general 


b.  Who  may  apply 

c.  Time  for  application 

a.  In  General 

Proceedings  to  open  or  vacate  a  Judgment  by  con- 
fession must  be  In  accordance  with  the  requirements  of 
statutes  and  court  rules. 

Proceedings  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  by  con- 
fession must  be  in  accordance  with  the  requirements 
o.f  statutes  and  court  rules.28  As  a  general  rule  an 
application  to  open  or  set  aside  a  judgment  by  con- 
fession should  be  made  by  petition  or  motion  in  the 
cause.29  In  some  jurisdictions  the  vacation  of  a 
judgment  may  be  secured  on  certain  grounds,  such 
as  fraud  on  creditors,  by  action,80  and  it  has  been 
held  that,  if  the  confession  and  judgment  are  reg- 
ular, they  may  be  impeached  only  by  a  suit  in  eq- 
uity on  the  ground  of  fraud.31  It  has  been  held 
that  an  application  to  open  a  judgment  by  confes- 
sion, is,  or  is  in  the  nature  of,  an  equitable  proceed- 
ing,32 and  that  a  motion  or  petition  to  open  judg- 


Costs  on: 

Appeal  see  Costs  §§  292-350. 
Award  or  refusal  of  new  trial  see 
Costs  §§  404-409. 

24.  N.J.— Haddonfleld   Nat.  Bank  v. 
Hippie,    164    A.    575,    110    N.J.Law 
271. 

Pa. — Harr  v.  Furman,  29  A.2d  527, 
346  Pa.  138,  144  A.-L.R.  828— House- 
hold Finance  Corporation  v.  Mac- 
Morris,  Com.PL,  32  DeLCo.  65. 

34  C.J.  p  407  note  69. 

25.  S.C.— Ex  parte  Carroll,   17   S.C. 
446 — Southern   Porcelain  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Thew,  5  S.C.  5. 

26.  Va. — Richardson    v.    Jones,    12 
Gratt  53,  53  Va.  53. 

27.  111. — Adam    v.    Arnold,    86    111. 
185. 

N.Y.— Mann    v.    Brooks,    7    How.Pr. 

449,  affirmed  8  How.Pr.  40. 
gg.    111. — State  Bank  of  Blue  Island 
v.  Kott,  =54  N.E.2d  897,  323  IlLApp. 
27 — Moore  v.  Monarch  Distributing 
Co.,    32    N.E.2d    1019,    309    IlLApp. 
339— McKenna  v.  'Forman,   283  111. 
•  App.  606. 

Pa. — -Wayne  v.  International  Shoe 
Co.,  18  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  521— Chiara 
v.  Johnston,  Com.Pl.,  55  'Dauph.Co. 
60— Rule  v.  Elchinski,  C?om.PL,  38 
Luz.Legr.Reg.  103. 

Procedure   to .  open   or  vacate  Judg- 
ment generally  see  supra  §  28*6. 
Purpose  of  rule 

(1)  The  purpose  of  the  court  rules 
governing  motions  to  open  a  judg- 
ment by  confession  is  to  regulate 
and  prescribe  the  procedure  where- 
by a  court  may  determine  whether 
or  not  a  defense  exists,  and  to  pre- 
vent frivolous  defenses  and  defeat 
'attempt  to  use  formal  pleadings  as  a 


means  to  delay  the  recovery  of  just 
demands. — Kirchner  v.  Boris  &  Dave 
Goldenhersh,  42  N.E.2d  953,  315  111. 
App.  305. 

(2)  The  rule  requiring  a  defend- 
ant to  be  summoned,  and  to  show 
cause  why  a  judgment  by  confession 
under  power  in  note  should  be  va- 
cated, opened,  or  modified,  provides 
a  means  to  inform  judgment  debtor 
of  the  judgment  and  affords  him  an 
opportunity  to  move  that  it  be  vacat- 
ed, opened,  or  modified. — Foland  v. 
Hoffman,  Md.,  47  A.2d  62. 

Notice  of  application 

(1)  Formal    notice   to   plaintiff   of 
defendant's  motion  and  of  the  court's 
action  in  granting  defendant  leave  to 
plead  is  not  required,  where  he  had 

•actual  notice  thereof. — Rock  Falls 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Deneen,  196  111. 
Aj?p.  427. 

(2)  Issuance  of  rule  to  show  cause 
why  judgment  by  confession  should 
not  be  opened  may  be  waived,  and 
plaintiff  in  judgment  may  appear  by 
counsel  without  service  of  writ,  or 
service  may  be  had  in  usual  way. — 
Chandler  v.  Miles,  193  A.  576,  8  W. 
W.Harr.,Del.,  431. 

(3)  Order  setting  aside  order  de- 
nying motion  to  vacate  judgments  by 
confession,    without    notice    to    mov- 
ant  or  showing  that  first  order  was 
improvidently  made  or  fraudulently 
obtained,    was   void.— Vale   v.   Mary- 
land Casualty  Co.,   281  P.  1058,  101 
CaLApp.  599. 

Motion  to  open  may  be  treated  as 
motion  to  vacate  or  strike  judgment 
and  vice  versa. 
111. — Jefferson  Trust  &  Savings  Bank 

v.  W.  Heller  &  Son.   280   IlLApp. 

578 


399 — 'First    Nat.    Bank    v.    Yakey, 
253  IlLApp.  128. 

Pa. — Fairview  Cemetery  Ass'n  v. 
Goranflo,  Com.Pl.,  23  Erie  Co.  101, 
102 — Hayes  v.  Goranflo,  Com.PL, 
23  Erie  Co.  100. 

29.  Del.— Miles    v.    Layton,    193    A.' 
567,   8  W.W.Harr.  411.   112  A.L.R. 
786. 

111. — Moore  v.  Monarch  Distributing 
Co.,  32  N.E.2d  1019,  309  IlLApp. 
339. 

Md. — Foland  v.  Hoffman,  47  A.2d  62. 

34  C.J.  p  408  note  85. 

30.  N.Y.— Miller    v. '  Earle,    24   N.Y. 
110. 

34  C.J.  p  408  note  90. 

31.  Or. — Miller  v.   Bank  or   .British 
Columbia,  2  Or.  291. 

Equitable  relief  in  general  see  infra 
§  341  et  seq. 

32.  Del.— Chandler  v.  Miles,   193  A. 
576,  8  W.W.Harr.  431. 

Pa. — Perfect  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
v.  Mandel,  29  A.2d  484,  345  Pa.  616 
— Jamestown  Banking  Co.  v.  Con- 
neaut  Lake  Dock  &  Dredge  Co., 
14  A.2d  325,  339  Pa.  26— Welch  v. 
Sultez,  13  A.2d  399,  338  Pa.  583— 
Kweller,  now  for  Use  of  Caplan  v. 
Becker,  12  A.2d  567,  338  Pa.  169— 
Horn  v.  Witherspoon,  192  A.  -654, 
327  Pa.  295— Sferra  v.  TTrling,  188 
A.  185,  324  Pa.  344— Mutual  Build- 
ing &  Loan  Ass'n  of  Shenandoah  v. 
Walukiewicz,  185  A.  648,  322  Pa. 
2-4Q — Mielcuszny  v.  Rosol,  176  A. 
236,  317  Pa.  91— Associates  Dis- 
count Corp.  v.  Wise,  41  A.2d  418, 
156  Pa.Super.  659— First  Nat  Bank 
of  Mount  Holly  Springs  v.  Cumb- 
ler,  21.A.2d  120,  145  Pa.Super.  595 
— Werner  v.  Deutsch,  7  A.2d  511. 


49    C.J.S.  JUDGMENTS 

ment  is  in  effect  a  bill  in  equity.3* 

Where  the  application  is  tinder  a  statute  or  court 
rule,  the  petition  and  supporting  papers  must  com- 
ply substantially  therewith.34  The  petition  or  mo- 
tion and  the  supporting  affidavits  must  set  forth 
the  grounds  for  the  relief  requested,3^  and  where, 
within  the  rules  discussed  infra  §  324,  a  meritorious 


§  321 


defense  must  be  shown,  must  show  that  applicant 
has  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  claim  for  which  the 
judgment  was  entered,36  and  must  account  for  any 
delay  in  instituting  the  proceeding.37  In  stating 
the  grounds  for  relief  or  a  meritorious  defense  the 
application  and  supporting  affidavits  must  set  forth 
the  facts38  in  reasonable  detail,3^  and  the  allegation 
of  mere  conclusions  is  insufficient40  It  has  been 


135  FsuSuper.  519 — Babcock  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Allison,  7  A.2d  374,  136 
Pa.Super.  353 — Miller  v.  Mastroco- 
la,  2  A.2d  550,  133  Pa.Super.  210— 
Michaels  v.  Moritz,  200  A.  176,  131 
Pa. Super.  426 — Kienberger  v.  Lal- 
ly,  198  A.  453,  130  Pa.Super.  5S3— 
Burger,  for  use  of  Henderson  v. 
Township  of  Freedom,  190  A.  387, 
126  Pa. Super.  128 — Gardner  v.  Sa- 
lem, 187  A.  94,  123  Pa.-Super.  418 
— Cramer  Oil  Burner  Co.  v.  'Fergu- 
son, 89  Pa,Super.  471— Mid-City 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Wear,  Com. 
PI.,  31  DeLCo.  219— South  Side 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Hornbaker, 
Com.Pl.,  45  'Lack.Jur.  197. 

33.  Pa. — Commonwealth  v.  Miele,  14 
A.2d   337,    140  Pa.Super.   313— Mil- 
ler v.  Mastrocola,  2  A.2d  550,  133 
Pa. Super.  210 — Rome  Sales  &  Serv- 
ice Station  v.  Finch,  183  A.  54,  120 
Pa. Super.    402 — Lukac    v.    Morris, 
164  A.    834, '108   Pa. Super.   453. 

Motion  may  be  treated  as  beginning 

of  new  suit 
111. — Brinkman    v.    Paulciewski,    245 

IlLApp.  307. 

34.  111. — Kirchner  v..  Boris  &  Dave 
Goldenhersh,    42    N.E.2d    953,    315 
IlLApp.     305 — Moore    v.    Monarch 
Distributing    Co.,    32    N.E.2d    1019, 
309  IlLApp.  339. 

Sufficiency  of  application  to  open  or 
vacate  judgment  generally  see  su- 
pra 5  289. 

Signature 
The  application  must  be  signed  by 

applicant  or  his  attorney. — Wyoming 

Valley    Trust    Co.    v.    Tisch,    18    Pa. 

Disk  &  Co.  581,  27  Luz-Leg.Reg.  277. 

35.  I1L— Houston  v.  Ingels,  48  N.E. 
2d  196,  318  IlLApp.  383— Harris  v. 
Bernfeld,    250   IlLApp.   446. 

Pa. — Stevenson    v.    ODersam,    119    A. 
491,    27-5    Pa.   412— Potter   Title  & 
Trust    Co.    v.    Vance    Engineering 
Co.,  18  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  -682,  13  Wash. 
Co.    10 — Colonial  Lumber  &  Tim- 
ber Co.  v.  Mailander,  Coxn.PL,   32 
•liUZ.Lieg.Heg.  460. 
34  C.J.  p  4 OS  notes  86,  87. 
Grounds  for  opening  or  vacating  see 
infra  §  323. 

If  motion  is  made  on  behalf  of 
creditors  it  should  allege  fraud  or 
collusion  between  the  parties  and 
consequent  injury  to  applicants' 
rights. — Grazebrook  v.  McCreedie,  i> 
Wend.,N.Y.,  437. 

If  application  is  based  on  an  ir- 
regularity, it  should  specify  the  ir- 


regularity.—Winnebrenner  v.  Edger- 
ton,  30  Barb.,N.Y.,  185,  8  Abb.Pr.  419, 
17  How.Pr.  368. 
Piecemeal  application 

Defendant  moving  to  set  aside 
judgment  was  under  duty  to  urge  all 
grounds  tending  to  show  bias  in 
judgment,  .since  courts  do  not  look 
favorably  on  trying  issues  piecemeal. 
— Hot  Springs  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kenney, 
48  P.2d  1029,  39  N.M.  428. 

30.  I1L— Zipperman  v.  Wiltse,  47  N. 
E.2d  365,  317  IlLApp.  654— Lleber- 
man  v.  Kanter,  33  N.E.2d  129,  309 
IlLApp.  444— Automatic  Oil  Heat- 
ing Co.  v.  Lee,  18  N.E.2d  919.  296 
IlLApp.  628 — Mandel  Bros.  v.  Co- 
hen, 248  IlLApp.  188 — Harris  Trust 
&  Savings  Bank  v.  Neighbors,  222 
IlLApp.  201. 

Pa. — Citizens  Bank  of  Wind  (Jap  v. 
Sparrow,  Com.PL,  27  North.Co.  213 
— Hill  Top  Lumber  Co.  v.  Gillman, 
Com.PL,  92  Pittsb.Leg.J.  350— Harr 
v.  Kelly,  Com.PL,  43  Lack.Jur.  221, 
56  York  Leg.Rec.  151. 

37.  111.— Hannan  v.  Biggio,  189  111. 
App.  460. 

Pa. — Cooke   r.    Edwards,    9    Pa.Dist. 

182. 

Diligence  held  properly  shown. 
111. — Stranak  v.  Tomasovic,  32  N.E.2d 

994,  309  IlLApp.  177. 

38.  111. — Bankers  Bldg.  v.  Bishop,  61 
N.E.2d   276,   326   1 11. App.   256,   cer- 
tiorari   denied   Bishop   v.   Bankers 
Bldg.,  66  S.Ct  1352— Prairie  State 
Bank  v.  Baer,  35  N.E.2d  536,  311 
IlLApp.   248 — Davis   v.   Mosbacher, 
252  IlLApp.   536— Parent  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Oil  Products  Appliance  Co.,  246 
IlLApp.  222— Harris  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings  Bank  y.  Neighbors,   222   111. 
App.  201. 

Pa.— Joslin  v.  Albrewczynski,  Com. 
PL,  93  Pittsb.Leg.J.  32— Potts  v. 
Mitchell,  Com.PL,  27  WestCo.L.J. 
63. 

34  C.J.  p  415  note  50. 

Applications  held  sufficient 

111.— Fidler  v.  Kennedy,  62  N.E.2d 
10,  326  IlLApp.  449— Great  North- 
ern Store  Fixture  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
(Lamm,  58  N.E.2d  745,  324  IlLApp. 
1587— Selimos  v.  Marines,  54  N.B.2d 
836,  323  IlLApp.  144— Moore  v. 
Monarch  Distributing  Co.,  32  N.E. 
2d  1019,  309  IlLApp.  339— Jefferson 
Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v.  W.  Heller 
&  Son,  280  IlLApp.  399— Ross  v. 
Wrightwood-Hampden  Bldg.  Cor- 

579 


poration,  271  IlLApp.  22 — Gross- 
man v.  Lifshitz,  261  IlLApp.  523. 

Applications  held  insufficient 

I1L — Chicago  Bank  of  Commerce  v. 
Kraft,  269  IlLApp.  295— Sternberg- 
er  v.  Wright,  239  IlLApp.  490. 

Applications  held  too  vague  and  gen. 
eral 

I1L— University  State  Bank  v.  Kelly, 
35  N.E.2d  559,  311  IlLApp.  24'S— 
Mandel  Bros.  v.  Cohen,  248  IlLApp. 
188. 

Pa.— Potts  v.  Mitchell,  Com.PL,  27 
West.  63. 

39.  Del.— Chandler  v.  Miles,   193  A. 
576,  8  W.W.Harr.  431. 

111. — Parent  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Oil  Products 

Appliance   Co.,    246    IlLApp.   222. 

Damages  claimed  by  buyer  as  re- 
sult of  seller's  alleged  breaches  of 
warranty  constituting  difference  in 
value  between  fixtures  furnished  and 
those  contracted  for  were  general 
damages  and  were  not  required  to  be 
alleged  with  greater  particularity. — 
Great  Northern  Store  Fixture  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Lamm,  58  N.E.2d  745,  324  I1L 
App.  587. 
Degree  of  certainty 

The  facts  need  not  be  stated  with 
the  same  detail  and  certainty  as  is 
required   in  a   formal   pleading. 
Colo.— McGinnis    v.    Hukill,    208    P. 

248,  71  Colo.  476. 
111.— State  Bank  v.  Parkhurst,  155  111. 

App.  101. 

40.  DL— Bankers  Bldg.  v.  Bishop,  61 
N.E.2d  276.    326   IlLApp.    256.    cer- 
tiorari   denied   Bishop   v.   Bankers 
Bldg.,    66    S.Ct    1352— 'Freudenthal 
v.  Lipman,  51  N.E.2d  7IJ4,  320  lil. 
App.     681 — Kirchner    v.    Boris    & 
Dave  Goldenhersh,   42  N.E.2d  953, 
315  IlLApp.  305 — Larson  v.  Lybyer, 
38   N.E.2d    177,    312    IlLApp.    188— 
Chicago    Bank    of    Commerce    v. 
Kraft,    269   IlLApp.    295— Davis   v. 
Mosbacher,   252   IlLApp.   536— Har- 
ris    Trust    &     Savings     Bank    v. 
Neighbors,  222  IlLApp.   201. 

Ohio. — Canal    Winchester    Bank    v. 

Exline,  23  N.E.2d  528,  61  Ohio  App. 

253. 
Pa. — Harr  v.  Kelly,  Com.Pl.,  43  {Lack. 

Jur.   221,  66   York  Leg.Rec.   151. 
34  C.J.  p  415  note  90. 
Fraud 

A  general  allegation  of  fraud  Is 
insufficient;  the  facts  constituting 
the  fraud  must  be  set  forth. — Potter 
Title  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Vance  Engineer- 


321 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


held  that  the  motion  or  petition  and  the  affidavits 
in  support  thereof  must  state  positively,  and  not 
by  way  of  inference  or  belief,  the  facts  on  which  ap- 
plicant relies.41  The  affidavits  should  be  closely 
scrutinized,  and  be  construed  most  strongly  against 
the  party  making  the  motion.42 

Mere  defects  or  irregularities  in  a  petition  are 
amendable,43  and  the  filing  of  an  amended  petition 
averring  additional  facts  may  be  permitted  where 
such  facts  do  not  constitute  a  new  ground  for  the 
opening  of  the  judgment.44 

A  petition  or  motion  to  open -or  vacate  a  judg- 
ment by  confession  is  subject  to  attack  by  demurrer 
or  motion  to  dismiss  where  it  is  insufficient  on  its 
facets 

The  answer  to  an  application  to  open  a  judgment 
by  confession  is  subject  to  much  the  same  pleading 
requirements  as  an  answer  to  a  bill  in  equity.46 

b.  Who  May  Apply 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  Judgment  by  con- 
fession may  be  made  by  the  defendant,  his  personal  rep- 
resentatives, a  judgment  creditor  of  the  defendant,  or, 
in  some  Jurisdictions,  by  a  general  creditor  of  the  de- 
fendant. 

An  application  to  vacate  or  set  aside  a  judgment 


by  confession  may  be  made  by  the  debtor  or  de- 
fendant himself,47  or  his  executors  or  administra- 
tors,48 or,  in  the  case  of  a  dissolved  corporation,  by 
its  receiver.49  A  judgment  against  two  or  more 
defendants  may  be  opened  on  the  application  of  only 
one  of  them;50  and,  where  such  application  is  made 
at  the  term  when  the  judgment  is  entered,  it  may 
be  continued,  and  the  other  debtors  be  joined  by 
amendment.51 

A  judgment  by  confession  may  be  vacated  or  set 
aside,  for  good  cause  shown,  on  an  application  by 
other  judgment  creditors  of  defendant,62  or  by  an 
attaching  creditor,5^  or,  it  has  been  held,  by  any 
general  creditor  of  the  judgment  defendant;54  but 
it  has  also  been  held  that  only  a  judgment  creditor 
has  the  right  to  move  to  set  aside  a  judgment  by 
confession.55  A  judgment  confessed  by  several  de- 
fendants will  not  be  set  aside  on  the  motion  of  a 
creditor  who  has  recovered  judgment  against  some 
only  of  the  defendants,56  and  a  judgment,  although 
defective,  will  not  be  set  aside  on  a  motion  of  a 
creditor  whose  judgment  is  subject  to  the  same  ob- 
jection.57 

A  judgment  entered  without  the  principal  credi- 


ing   Co.,    18   Pa.Dist   &  Co.    682,    13 
Wash.Co.  10. 

41.  111.— Giddings  v.   Senneff,  41  N. 
B.2d  106,   314  I11.APP.  205. 

Pa, — Baldwin    &    Welcoraer    Co.     v. 

Haines,  Com. PI.,  28  Erie  Co.  85. 
34  C.  J.  p  415  note  91. 
Pacts  as  to  which  affiant  competent 
to  testify 

An  affidavit  in  support  of  a  motion 
to  vacate  a  judgment  by  confession 
must  be  made  on  personal  knowledge 
of  affiant  and  must  consist  only  of 
such  facts  as  would  be  admissible 
in  evidence,  and  it  must  affirmatively 
appear  from  affidavit  that  if  affiant 
were  sworn  as  a  witness  he  could 
testify  competently  thereto. — Bark- 
hausen  v.  Naugher,  Ill.App.,  64  N.E. 
2d  561 — Bankers  Bldg.  v.  Bishop,  61 
tf.E.2d  276,  326  IlLApp.  256,  certio- 
rari  denied  Bishop  v.  Bankers  Bldg., 
66  S.Ct.  1352— Kirchner  v.  Boris  & 
Dave  Goldenhersh,  42  N.B.2d  953,  315 
IlLApp.  305. 

42.  111. — Automobile    Supply   Co.    v. 
Scene-in-Action     Corporation,     172 
N.E.  35,  340  111.  196,  69  A.L.R.  10S5 
— Paluszewski  v.  Tomczak,  273  111. 
App.   245 — Chicago   Bank  of  Com- 
merce v.  Kraft,  2-69  IlLApp.  295 — 
Mandel  Bros.  v.  Cohen,  243  IlLApp. 
188— Stemberger    v.    Wright,    239 
ULApp,    490— (Great    Western    Hat 
Works  v.  Pride  Hat  Co.,  224  111. 
App.  249. 

34  C.J:  p  415  note  93. 

43.  Pa. — Standard    Furnace    Co.    v. 
Roth,  156  A.  600,  102  Pa. Super.  341. 


44.  Pa. — Standard    Furnace    Co,    v. 
Lorincz,  161  A.  573,.  106  Pa.Super. 
116. 

45.  111. — Brinkman    v.    Paulciewskl, 
245  IlLApp.  307. 

Pa. — Bekelja    v.    James    E.    Strates 
Shows,  37  A.2d  502,  349  Pa,   442— 
Potts  v.  Mitchell,  Qom.PL,  27  West. 
CoJUJ.  63. 
At  any  time 

If  verified  petition  £or  rule  to 
show  cause  why  Judgment  entered 
on  warrant  of  attorney  should  not 
be  opened  is  insufficient,  motion  to 
dismiss  may  be  made  and  heard  at 
any  time  by  court — Chandler  v. 
Miles,  193  A.  576,  8  W.W.Harr.,DeL, 
431. 
Implication  from  failure  to 'move  to 

strike 

Plaintiff,  by  failing  to  file  motion 
to  strike,  conceded  impliedly  that  de- 
fendant's verified  motion  set  up  mer- 
itorious defense. — Gilmore  v.  Mix, 
IlLApp.,  67  N.E.2d  313— Security 
Discount  Corporation  v.  Jackson,  51 
N.B.2d  618,  320  IlLApp.  440. 

46.  Pa. — George  v.    George,    178   A. 
25,  318  Pa.  203. 

47.  Del.— Hollis    v.    Kinney,    120    A 
356,  13  DeLCh.  366. 

K.J.— Harrison  v.  Dobkin,  168  A,  837, 

11  N.J.Misc.  892. 
Pa.— Arrott   Steam  Power  Mills  Co. 

v.  Philadelphia  Wood  Heel  Co.,  50 

D.  &  C.  462. 
34  C.J.  p  409  note  1. 

48.  N.J.— Young    v.    Stout,    10    N.J. 

580 


Law  302 — Wood  v.  Hopkins,   3  N. 
J.Law  263. 

49.  Del.— Rhoads    v.    Mitchell,    Su- 
per., 47  A.2d  174. 

50.  N.Y. — President  &  Directors   of 
Manhattan  Co.  v.  Elton,  39  N.Y.S. 
2d  327. 

34  C.J.  p  409  note  3. 

51.  Ohio. — Knox     County     Bank     v.. 
Doty,  9  Ohio  St  505,  75  Am.D.  479. 

52.  N.Y. — Johnston  v.  A.  L.  Erlang- 
er  Realty  Corporation,   296   N.Y.S- 
89,  162  Misc.  881. 

34  C.J.  p  349  note  7,  p  409  note  5. 

53.  Cal. — Pehrson  v.   Hewitt,   21   P. 
950,  79  Cal.  594. 

34  C.J.  p  409  note  6. 

54.  Pa.— Potter  Title  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Vance     Engineering    Co.,     13     Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  682,  13  Wash.Co.  10— 
Wansacz  v.  Wansacz,   Com.PL,  43 
Lack.Jur.   127 — Bach  v.   Morley,   1 
!Leh.Val.L.R.  58. 

55.  N.Y,— Williams    v.    Mittlemann, 
20  N.Y.S.2d  690,  259  App.Div.  697, 
appeal  denied  22  N.Y.S.2d  $22,  260 
App.Div.   811,   appeal   denied. 

'34  C.J.  p  410  note  7  [a]. 

53.  Mo. — Powell  v.  January,  35  Mo. 
134. 

57.  N.Y.— Williams  v.  Mittlemann, 
20  N.Y.S.2d  690,  259  App.Div.  697, 
appeal  denied  22  N.Y.S.2d  822,  260 
App.Div.  811,  appeal  denied— Rae 
v.  Lawser,  9  Abb.Pr.  380  note,  IS 
How.Pr.  23. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


321 


tor's  consent  or  knowledge  may  be  vacated  on  his 
motion.58 

A  judgment  by  confession  may  be  vacated  or  set 
aside  for  good  cause  shown  at  the  instance  of  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  or  claimant  of  property  on 
which  the  judgment  is  an  apparent  lien,5^  or  by 
others  whose  rights  or  interests  are  affected  by  the 
judgment,60  but  it  has  been  held  that  one  who  is 
not  a  party  to  the  record  may  not  apply  to  set  aside 
•  the  judgment  for  irregularities  in  entering  it.61 

The  court  may,  in  a  proper  case,  act  on  its  own 
motion.62 

c.  Time  for  Application 
In  the   absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  as  a 


general  rule  there  Is  no  limitation  of  time  for  exercis- 
ing the  equitable  power  of  the  court  to  open  or  set  aside 
a  confessed  judgment,  although  an  application  to  open 
or  set  aside  such  a  Judgment  may  be  denied  where  the 
defendant  has  been  guilty  of  laches. 

As  a  general  rule  there  is  no  limitation  of  time 
for  exercising  the  equitable  power  of  the  court  to 
open  or  set  aside  a  confessed  judgment,63  except 
when  a  limitation  is  fixed  by  statute,64  and  except 
that,  where  the  application  is  made  after  such  un- 
reasonable delay  on  defendant's  part  as  to  make 
him  chargeable  with  laches,  it  is  viewed  with  great 
disfavor,  and  ordinarily  will  not  be  granted65  un- 
less a  sufficient  excuse  for  the  delay  is  shown.66 
Laches,  however,  is  not  necessarily  a  bar  to  the 


58.     Ind. — Chapin  v.  McLaren,  5  N.E. 

688,  105  Ind.  563. 
Iowa. — 'Farmers'  &  Mechanics'  Bank 

v.  Mather,  30  Iowa  283. 
69.    N.Y.— Kendall  v.  Hodgins,  14  N. 

T.Super.  659,  7  Abb.Pr.  309. 
34  C.J.  p  410  note  11. 

60.  Ga. — Ho  well   v.   Gordon,   40   Ga. 
302. 

Pa. — Whi  taker  v.   Whitaker,    28   Pa. 
Dist.  193. 

61.  Pa. — Williams    v.    Robertson,    3 
Pittsb.  32. 

Wis.— Packard  v.  Smith,  9  Wis.  184. 

62.  Ohio.— Roberts  v.  Davis,  35  N.E. 
2d  609,  66  Ohio  App.  527. 

63.  Pa.— Salus  v.  Fogel,  153  A.  547, 
302    Pa.    268 — Dormont   Motors   v. 
Hoerr,    1   A.2d  493,   132   Pa.Super. 
567— Kappel  v.   Meth,   189   A.   793, 
125   Pa. Super.   443 — Rome  Sales  & 
Service  Station  v.  Finch,  183  A,  54, 
120     Pa.  Super.     402 — Rudolph     v. 
Matura,  Com.Pl.,  27  Del.Co.  521. 

34  C.J.  p  409  note  93. 

General   limitation   inapplicable 

A  proceeding-  to  vacate  a  judgment 
obtained  by  confession  on  warrant  of 
attorney  is  not  subject  to  the  same 
limitation  of  time  that  prevails  as 
to  judgments  regularly  entered  aft- 
er service  of  process  or  trial,  but 
time  will  be  considered  in  connection 
with  all  other  features. — Rhoads  v. 
Mitchell,  DeLSuper.,  47  A.2d  174. 

64.  Wis.— Wessling  v.  Hieb,  192  N. 
W.  4.58,  180  Wis.  160. 

34  C.J.  p  409  note  94. 

Defective  statement  of  confession 

Motion  to  set  aside  confession 
judgment  on  ground  of  defective 
statement  of  confession  was  not  sub- 
ject to  one-year  statute  of  limita- 
tions applicable  to  motions  to  set 
aside  judgments  for  Irregularities, 
•since  defective  statement  of  confes- 
sion was  not  a  mere  "irregularity." 
—Johnston  v.  A.  L.  Brlanger  Realty 
Corporation,  296  N.T.S.  89,  162  Misc. 
881. 

Judgment  procured  "by  fraud 
One-year,  statutory  limitation  does 


not  apply  to  Judgment  procured  by 
fraud. — Gardner  v.  Rule,  289  P.  606, 
87  Colo.  544 — Investors'  Finance  Co. 
v.  Luxford,  271  P.  625,  84  Cjolo.  519. 

65.  111.— Tackett  v.  Rebmann,  45  N. 
E.2d  58,  316  Ill.App.  443. 

Pa. — Horn  v.  Witherspoon,  192  A. 
•654,  327  Pa.  295— McDowell  Nat 
Bank  of  Sharon,  to  Use  of  Nathan 
Rosenblum  &  Co.  v.  Rosenblum, 
200  A.  679,  132  Pa.Super.  48— 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Mt.  Holly 
Springs  v.  Cumbler,  Com.Pl.,  50 
Dauph.Co.  203,  affirmed  21  A.2d  120, 
145  Pa.Super.  595 — Duquesne  City 
Bank  v.  McDermott,  Com.Pl.,  94 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  177. 

34  C.J.  p  409  note  95. 

Belay  held  to  constitute  laches 

(1)  In  general. 

Ill,— 'Foreman  v.  Martin,  11  N.E.2d 
856,  292  Ill.App.  640— Sternberger 
v.  Wright,  239  Ill.App.  490. 

Pa. — Horn  v.  Witherspoon,  192  A. 
654,  327  Pa.  295 — Beckman  v.  Ciap- 
ko,  Com.Pl.,  33  Luz.Leg.Reg.  348 — 
North  Wales  Nat  Bank  v.  Nuss, 
.  Com,Pl.,  60  Montg.Co.  94,  58  York 
Leg.Rec.  69. 

34  C.J.  p  409  note  95  [a]. 

(2)  Eight  months. — Jones  v.  Lad- 
erman,  198  A.  528,  9  W.W.Harr.,Del., 
308. 

(3)  Seven      years. — Jankovich      v. 
Lajevich,  57  N.E.2d  216,  324  IlLApp. 
85. 

(4)  Nine  years. — St.  Clair  Savings 
&  Trust  Co.,  for  Use  of  Billhartz  v. 
Hahne,  29  A.2d  21,  345  Pa,  420. 
Delay  held  not  to  constitute  laches 

(1)  In  general. 

Colo.— Mitchell  v.  Miller,  252  P.  886, 
81  Colo.  1. 

111.— Gilmore  v.  Mix,  App.,  67  N.E.2d 
313 — Koknar,  Inc.,  v.  Moore,  55  N. 
E.2d  524,  323  Ill.App.  323. 

Md. — Automobile  Brokerage  Corpora- 
tion v.  Myer,  139  A.  539,  154  Md.  1. 

Pa.— Austen  v.  Marzolf,  143  A.  908, 
294  Pa.  226— Ransberry,  to  Use  of 
Ransberry,  v.  Predmore,  Com.PL, 
1  Monroe  L.R.  141 — Lorey  v. 

581 


Kauffman,    Com.PL,    57    Montg.Co. 
57. 

(2)  Twenty  days,   but  within  one 
day   after   learning    of   judgment — 
Handley  v.  Wilson,   242  Ill.App.  66. 

(3)  Three    months.— Johnstown    & 
S.   Ry.   Co.   v.   Hoffman,   123   A.   302, 
278  Pa.  314. 

(4)  One  year,  where  delay  was  sat- 
isfactorily   explained. — Grossman    v. 
Lifshitz,  261  ULApp.  523. 

(5)  Four  years,  where  there  was 
no  change  in  situation  of  parties. — 
Finance  Co.   of  America  v.   Myerly, 
155  A.  148,  161  Md.  23. 

Delay  in  perfecting  motion  or  pro- 
ceeding with  hearing  may  constitute 
laches. 

Colo. — Parham    v.    Johnson,    292    P. 
599,  88  Colo.  127— Sullivan  v.  Inter- 
national Harvester  Co.   of  Ameri- 
ca,  279  P.  43,  86  Colo.  177. 
111. — Heritage  Coal  Co.  v.  Dreves,  20 

N.E.2d  114,  296  ULApp.  652. 
Pa, — Seaboard    Finance    Corporation 
v.    Harding,    Com.Pl.,    38   Luz.*Leg. 
Reg.  80. 

Delay  short  of  statutory  period  of 
limitations  at  law  may  call  for  the 
application  of  the  doctrine  of  laches 
to  petition  to  open  judgment  by  con- 
fession.— Horn  v.  Witherspoon,  192 
A.  654,  327  Pa.  295. 
Irregularities 

It  has  been  held  that  no  irregular- 
ity in  the  form  of  proceeding  may 
be  inquired  into  after  the  lapse  of 
one  year.— State  ex  rel.  Thompson  v. 
Police  Jury  of  Qatahoula  Parish,  160 
So.  414,  181  La.  789 — Parker  v.  Scog- 
in,  11  La.Ann.  629. 

What    constitutes    laches    depends 
on  the  particular  circumstances. 
Md. — Denton  Nat.  Bank  of  Maryland 

v.  Lynch,  142  A.  103,  155  Md.  333. 
Pa. — Cronauer  v.  Bayer,  13  A.2d  75, 
140  Pa.Super.  91— South  Side  Bank 
&   Trust  Co.    v.   Hornbaker,   Com. 
PI.,  45  Lack-Jur.  197. 
66.    Del. — Jones  v.  -Laderman,  198  A. 

528,  9  W.W.Harr.  308. 
111.— Stranak  v.  Tomasovic,  32  N.E.2d 


§  321 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


opening  or  setting  aside  of  a  confessed  judgment,67 
particularly  where  the  rights  of  third  persons  have 
not  intervened;68  and  laches  will  not  bar  the  ap- 
plication where  the  judgment  is  void.69 

During  or  subsequent  to  term.  A  judgment  by 
confession  may  be  opened  or  vacated  on  motion  dur- 
ing the  term  at  which  it  was  entered,70  and  in  the 
absence  of  a  statutory  limitation  to  the  contrary,  or 
of  circumstances  constituting  laches,  it  may  be 
opened  after  the  end  of  such  term,71  such  as  at  a 
subsequent  term,72  unless,  under  some  statutes,  the 
party  has  in  the  meantime  unsuccessfully  prosecuted 
another  remedy  against  the  judgment.73 


§  322.    Jurisdiction  and   Authority 

The  court   has  equitable  Jurisdiction   and   power  to 
open  or  vacate  a  judgment  by  confession. 

While  a  judgment  by  confession  operates  as  a 
release  or  waiver  of  formal  errors  and  irregulari- 
ties, as  discussed  supra  §  169,  nevertheless  the  judg- 
ment confessed  remains  within  the  control  of  the 
court,74  and  it  may  exercise  an  equitable  juris- 
diction over  a  judgment  entered  in  this  way,  and 
has  power  to  open,  vacate,  or  set  aside  the  judg- 
ment for  good  cause  shown.75 


994,    309    IlLApp.    177— Spindler  v. 

McKay,  13  N.E.2d  864,  294  IlLApp. 

610. 
Md.— Johnson   v.   Phillips,   122   A.   7, 

143  Md.  16. 
Pa. — Jamestown  Banking*  Co.  v.  Con- 

neaut  Lake  Dock  &  Dredge  Co.,  14 

A.2d  325,   3S9  Pa.   2-6— Cronauer  v. 

Bayer,    13   A.2d   75,    140    Pa.Super. 

91 — First  Nat   Bank  &  Trust  Co. 

of  'Ford  City  v.  Stolar,  197  A.  499, 

130  Pa.Super.  480. 
Excuses  held  sufficient 

(1)  Fact  that  defendant  had  been 
patient  in  hospital  in  another  state 
at   time   of   judgment    entry. — Elab- 
orated Ready  Roofing  Co.  v.  Hunter, 
262  IlLApp.  380. 

(2)  Fact  that  defendant  was  away 
from    home    moving    from    place    to 
place  with  no  known  address  during 
period  in  which  judgment  by  confes- 
sion was  obtained,  execution  issued, 
and  defendant's  property  sold. — Lu- 
cero  v.  fimith,  132  P.2d  791.  110  Colo. 
165. 

(3)  Misconception    of   appropriate 
remedy. — Miller  Bros.  v.  Keenan,  94 
Pa.Super.  79. 

Delays  caused  by  judgment  credi- 
tor's attorney  could  not  be  charged 
as  laches  against  defendant. — Kol- 
mar,  Inc.,  v.  Moore,  65  N.B.2d  524, 
323  IlLApp.  323. 
07.  111.— Ross  v.  Wrightwood-Hamp- 

den  Bldg.  Corporation,  271  IlLApp. 

22. 
Pa. — Miller  Bros.  v.  Keenan,  94  Pa. 

Super.  79. 
Application  by  trustee 

Delay  in  applying  to  open  con- 
fessed judgment  against  corporation 
was  immaterial  where  judgment 
debtor's  trustee  in  bankruptcy  was 
not  guilty  of  laches.— Klein  v.  Lan- 
caster Trust  Co.,  138  A.  768,  290  Pa. 
280. 
Question,  not  raised 

The  question  of  laches  should  not 
be  considered  where  it  is  not  raised 
by  the  pleadings. — Warren  -Sav.  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  :Foley,  144  A.  84,  294 
Pa.  176. 
0S.  111. — Kolmar,  Inc.,.  y.  Moore, 

N.B.2d   524,   323   IlLApp.   323. 


69.  Del.— Rhoads    v.    Mitchell,    Su- 
per., 47  A,2d  174. 

111. — Solomon  v.  Dunne,  264  IlLApp. 
415— State  Bank  of  Prairie  du 
Rocher  v.  Brown,  263  IlLApp.  312. 

70.  Md.— Sunderland  v.  Braun  Pack- 
ing Co.,    86   A.    126,    119.  Md.    125, 
Ann.Cas.l914D  156. 

34  C.J.  p  409  note  9<6. 

Courts  usually  act  liberally  in 
those  cases  in  which  application  to 
strike  out  a  judgment  is  made  dur- 
ing term  in  which  judgment  was  en- 
tered.— Pioneer  Oil  Heat  v.  Brown, 
16  A.2d  880,  179  Md.  155. 

71.  Del.— Miles    v.    Layton,    193    A. 
567,    8  W.W.Harr.   411,   112  A.L.R. 
786. 

111. — Solomon  v.  Dunne,  264  IlLApp. 
415— Elaborated  Ready  Roofing 
Co.  v.  Hunter,  262  IlLApp.  380 — 
Lathrop-Paulson  Co.  v.  Perksen, 
229  IlLApp.  400. 

Md. — Denton  Nat.  Bank  of  Maryland 
V.  Lynch,  142  A.  103,  1'55  Md.  333. 

Pa.— Salus  v.  Fogel,  153  A.  547,  302 
Pa.  268— -Markeim-Chalmers-Lud- 
ington,  Inc.,  v.  Mead,  14  A.2d  152, 
140  Pa- Super.  490 — New  Amster- 
dam Building  &  ILoan  Ass'n  v. 
Moyerman,  95  Pa, Super.  47. 

34  C.J.  p  409  note  97. 

72.  Del. — Dover  Motors  Corporation 
r.  North  &  South  Motor  Lines,  193 
A.    592,    8    W.W.Harr.    467— Miles 
v.  Dayton,  193  A.  567,  8  W.W.Harr. 
411,  112  A.L.R.  786. 

111.— Mutual  Life  of  Illinois  v.  Little, 

227  IlLApp.  436. 
34  C.J.  p  409  note  98. 

73.  Ohio. — Kesting     v.     East     Side 
Bank  Co.,   33  Ohio  Cir.Ct   77,  af- 
firmed  81   N.E.    1188,    76   Ohio   St. 
591. 

34  C.J.  p  409  note  99. 

74.  CaL— Vale  v.  Maryland  Casual- 
ty  Co.,    281   P.   1058,    101   CaLApp. 
599. 

I1L— 'First    Nat    Bank'v.    Galbraith, 

271  IlLApp.  240. 
Pa.— Farmers     Trust     Company     v. 

Egulf,    32    Pa.Dist    &    Co.    598— 

Household  Finance  Corporation  v. 

MacMorris,  Com.PL,  32  DeLCo.  «65 

582 


— Sterling  Land  Co.  v.  Kline,  Com. 
PL,  «7  Pittsb.Leg.J.  279. 

— Tost  v.  O'Brien,  130  S.E.  442, 
100  W.Va,  408. 
34  CJ.  p  407  note  75. 

75.  Del. — Smulski  v.  H.  Feinberg 
Furniture  Co.,  193  A.  585,  8  W.W. 
Harr.  451. 

I1L — Kolmar,  Inc.,  v.  Moore,  55  N. 
B.2d  524,  323  IlLApp.  323— Treager 
v.  Totsch,  53  N.E.2d  719,  322  111. 
App.  75— Automatic  Oil  Heating 
Co.  v.  Lee,  16  N.E.2d  919,  296  111. 
App.  628— 'First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Gal- 
braith, 271  IlLApp.  240. 
Ohio.— Bliss  v.  Smith,  156  N.E.  618, 

24  Ohio  App.  366. 
Pa. — Luce   v.   Reed   Colliery   Co.,    78 
Pa.Super.  248 — Barrasso  v.  Catari- 
no,  49  Pa,Dist.  &  Co.  540,  45  Lack. 
Jur.    57 — Evans    v.    Stilley,    8    Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  466— Potts  v.  Mitchell, 
Com.PL,   27  West.Co.L.J.   63. 
Wis. — State  v.  Braun,  245  N.W.  176, 
209    Wis.    483— Wessling   v.    Hieb, 
192  N.W.  458,  180  Wis.   160. 
3-4  C.J.  p  407  note  76,  p  408  notes  77, 

78. 
Inherent  power 

The  superior  court  In  entertaining 
application  to  open  judgment  by  con- 
fession under  warrant  of  attorney 
exercises  jurisdiction  because  of  in- 
herent power  over  Its  own  records, 
and  not  under  statutory  authority. — 
Chandler  v.  Miles,  193  A.  576,  8  W. 
W.Harr.,DeL,  431 — Hollis  v.  Kinney, 
120  A.  356,  13  Del.Ch.  366. 
Exhaustion  of  power 

(1)  Orders   made  after   denial   of 
regularly   submitted   motion    to   va- 
cate judgments  by  confession  were 
invalid. — Vale  v.  Maryland  Casualty 
Co.,  281  P.   1058,  101  CaLApp.  599. 

(2)  Order  opening  judgment   con- 
fessed under  warrant  of  attorney  is 
proper,   although  rule   to  open  such 
judgment    had    been    discharged    at 
previous  term  of  court. — Johnson  v.  * 
Nippert,   133   A.   ISO,    286   Pa,   175. 
Power  to  control  execution 

The  trial  court  had  power  to  con- 
trol judgment  by  confession  and  any 
execution  issued  thereon. — Keystone 
Bank  of  Spangler,  Pa.,  v.  Booth,  6  A- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  323 


§  323. 


Grounds 


In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  a  con- 
fessed  judgment  will  be  opened  or  vacated  only  where 
some  equitable  ground  or  reason  therefor  la  shown. 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  ordi- 
narily is  addressed  to  the  equitable  power  of  the 
court,76  and,  except  where  other  grounds  are  speci- 
fied by  statute,77  the  judgment  will  be  opened  or 
vacated  only  where  some  equitable  ground  or  reason 
therefor  is  shown.78  A  judgment  by  confession  will 
not  be  opened  or  vacated  for  mere  technical  errors 
or  irregularities.79 


A  judgment  by  confession  may,  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court,  be  opened  or  vacated  on  the  following 
grounds:  A  failure  substantially  to  comply  with 
material  requirements  of  the  statute  or  rule  author- 
izing such  judgments  ;80  forgery  of  defendant's  sig- 
nature to  the  confession  or  warrant  of  attorney;81 
that  his  name  was  never  signed  by  him  or  by  any- 
one authorized  to  sign  it  for  him  ;82  that  the  power 
to  confess  judgment  was  void;83  that  the  attorney 
who  assumed  to  appear  for  him  and  confess  the 
judgment  had  no  authority  to  do  so,  or  acted  be- 
yond the  scope  of  his  authority;84  that  there  was 


2d    417,    334    Pa.    545— Markofski   v. 
Yanks,  146  A.  569,  297  Pa,  74— South 
Side  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.   Scheuer, 
Pa.Com.Pl.,    43   Lack.Jur.    95. 
Opening-  in  part 

The  trial  court  was  authorized  to 
open  revived  judgment  by  confession 
to  such  extent  as  might  be  neces- 
sary to  do  justice  between  the  par- 
ties, and  to  continue  it  as  to  the  bal- 
ance.— Keystone  Bank  of  Spangler, 
Pa,,  v.  Booth,  6  A.2d  417,  334  Pa,  545. 
Belief  desired  by  both  parties 
Pa.— McConnell  v.  Bowden,  41  A.2d 

>849,  352  Pa.  48. 

7&  111.— Mayer  v.  Tyler,  19  N.E.2d 
211,  298  Ill.App.  632 — Alton  Bank- 
in?  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Gray,  259  111. 
App.  20,  affirmed  179  K.I!.  469,.  347 
111.  -99. 

N.J. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Knoett- 
ner  v.  Integrity  Corporation  of 
New  Jersey,  1-60  A.  527,  528,  109  N. 
J.Law  186. 

Pa. — Bonebrake  v.  Koons,  5  A.2d  184, 
333  Pa.  443— Newtown  Title  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Underwood,  177  A.  27, 
317  Pa,  212— Certelli  v.  Braum,  144 
A.  403,  294  Pa,  488— Baker's  Es- 
tate v.  Woodworth,  198  A.  469,  130 
Pa.Super.  452 — Lukac  v.  Morris, 
164  A.  834,  108  Pa.Super.  453— 
McBnery  v.  Nahlen,  Qom.Pl.,  21 
Brie  Co.  172— Minet  Motor  Co.  v. 
(Lehn,  Com.Pl.,  54  York  Leg.Rec. 
3. 

34  C.J.  p  408  note  78. 

77.  Ohio. — Ames  Co.  v.  Buslck,  App., 
47  N.B.2d  647. 

Wis.— Wessling  v.  Hieb,  192  N.W. 
458,  180  Wis.  160. 

78.  111. — Elaborated    Ready    Roofing- 
Co,    v.    Hunter,    262    IlLApp.    380 — 
Barrow    v.    Phillips,    250    IlLApp. 
587 — iLong  v.  Coif  man,  230  IlLApp. 
527. 

Md.— Denton  Nat.  Bank  of  Maryland 
v.  Lynch,  142  A.  103,  155  Md.  333. 

N.  J. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Knoett- 
ner  Y.  Integrity  Corporation  of 
New  Jersey,  160  A.  527,  «28,  109 
N.J.Law  1*6. 

Pa. — Grant  Const  Co.,  for  Use  of 
Home  Credit  Co.,  v.  Stokes,  167  A. 
643,  109  Pa.Super.  421— Klein  v. 


Brookside       Distilling       Products 

Corp.,    Com.Pl.,   47   Lack.Jur.   165. 
34  Q  J.  p  410  note  15. 
Existence   of  a  meritorious   defense 

as  ground  for  opening  or  vacating 

see  infra  §  324. 
Excessive  cumulation,  of  remedies 

'Lease  or  bailment  contract,  pro- 
viding for  cumulation  of  remedies  in 
such  manner  as  to  produce  results 
so  grossly  inequitable  as  to  be  un- 
conscionable, will  not  be  sustained. 
—Lukac  v.  Morris,  164  A,  834,  108 
Pa,Super.  453. 

Judgment  held  valid  and  not  to  be 
subject  to  vacation. — Rhoads  v. 
Mitchell,  DeLSuper.,  47  A.2d  174. 

79.  N.J.— Stetz   v.    Googer,   18   A.2d 
41-6,  126  N.J.Law  213. 

Pa.— Albert  M.  Greenfield  &  Co.  v. 
Roberts,  5  A.2d  642,  135  Pa.Super. 
328 — Hefer  v.  Hefner,  95  Pa.Super. 
551— Waldman  v.  Baer,  81  Pa.  Su- 
per. 290 — Casey  Heat  -Service  Co. 
v.  Klein,  55  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  293— 
Industrial  'Fibre  Products  Co.  of 
Caldwell,  N.  J.,  v.  Arters,  49  Pa. 
Disk  &  Co.  304,  26  Brie  Co.  202 — 
Cohen  v.  Stergiakis,  26  PajDlst.  & 
Co.  699 — Scouton  v.  Saunders, 
Com.PL,  39  Luz.Leg.Reg.  102 — Bar- 
ney v.  Nogen,  Com.PL,  35  GLtUZ.Leg. 
Reg.  441 — Ward  &  Wiener  v.  Cas- 
terline,  Com.PL,  33  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
54 — Crane  v.  Harris,  Qom.PL,  8 
Monroe  L.R.  24 — Rapp  v.  Schlicht- 
man,  Com.PL,  54  Montg.Co.  16. 

34  C.J.  p  412  note  57. 

80.  Ga. — Thomas  v.  Bloodworth,  160 
•S.E.   709,   44   Ga,App.  44. 

Pa. — Gorchov  v.  Moran,  17  Pa.Dlst. 
&  Co.  248— Heller  v.  Goldsmith,  14 
Pa.DIst  &  Co.  746,  33  Dauph.Co. 
377— Orner  v.  Hurwitch,  12  Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  403,  affirmed  97  Pa.Su- 
per. 263 — Heller  v.  Bloom,  Com. 
PL,  51  Dauph.Co.  360 — Bell  v.  ILaw- 
ler,  Com.PL,  45  ,Lack.Jur.  181— 
Xiimbert  v.  Nossal,  Com.PL,  32  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  352. 

34  C.J.  p  410  note  16. 

Confession  not  filed 

K.Y.— Williams  v.  Mittlemann,  20  N. 
Y.S.2d  690,  259  App.DIv.  697,  ap- 
peal denied  22  N.7.S.2d  822,  2*60 
App.DiT.  811,  appeal  denied.  , 

583 


Mortgage  foreclosure 

Under  statute  authorizing  recov- 
ery of  deficiency  existing  after  mort- 
gage foreclosure  sale,  obligors  on 
mortgage  bond  who  executed  war- 
rant of  attorney  to  enter  judgment 
by  confession  waived  the  commence- 
ment of  suit  for  deficiency  by  proc- 
ess and  were  not  entitled  to  set  aside 
judgment  for  deficiency  entered  by 
confession  on  bond  and  warrant, 
notwithstanding  statutory  provision 
that  obligor  may  file  an  answer  in 
suit  on  the  bond. — Chambers  v. 
Boldt,  8  A.2d  73.  123  N.J.'Law  111. 
Notice  to  surety 

Failure  to  give  surety  notice  of 
proceedings  for  revocation  of  liquor 
dealer's  license  was  held  not  to  enti- 
tle surety  to  open  Judgment  con- 
fessed on  liquor  license  bond,  where 
statute  did  not  contemplate  that 
surety  should  be  party  to  such  pro- 
ceedings.— Commonwealth  v.  Mc- 
Menamin,  184  A.  679,  122  Pa,Super. 
91. 
Venue 

Judgment  by  cognovit  on  note  au- 
thorizing entry  of  judgment  thereon 
in  any  state  or  county  cannot  be 
disturbed  merely  for  failure  to  lay 
proper  venue. — State  v.  Braun,  245 
N.W.  176,  209  Wis.  483. 

81.  Pa. — Sobieskl   Building  &   Loan 
Ass'n    v.    McGrady,     80    Pa. Super. 
277 — South  Side  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.    Hornbaker,    Com.PL,    45    Lack. 
Jur.  197 — Szabari  v.  Kuzman,  Com. 
PL,  18  Leh.L.J.  421— Makarewicz  v. 
Yova,     Com.PL,     33     Luz.:Leg.Reg. 
336. 

34  C.  J.  p  410  note  17. 

82.  Pa. — Charles    D.    Kaier    Co.    v. 
O'Brien,   51  A.   760,   202  Pa,   153— 
Keystone  Brewing  Co.  v.  Varzaly, 
39  Pa.Super.  155. 

83.  111.— Barrow  v.  Phillips,  250  I1L 
App.  587. 

84.  111.— Handley  v.  Wilson,  242  HL 
App.  66. 

N.Y. — President  and  Directors  of 
Manhattan  Co.  v.  Elton,  39  N.T.-S. 
2d  327. 

Pa. — DIsanto  v.  Rowland,  $3  Pa.Su- 
per. 155 — Medvidovlch  v.  Sterner, 
50  Pa.Dist,  &  CO.  690,  92  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  223 — Guardian  Financial 


323 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


a  material  alteration  in  the  judgment  note;85  that 
a  joint  judgment  was  entered  on  separate  war- 
rants;86 that  judgment  was  not  entered  in  favor  of 
the  proper  party  plaintiff;87  that  plaintiff  has  bro- 
ken an  agreement  with  defendant  as  to  entering  up 
or  enforcing  the  judgment;88  or  that  defendant  had 
died  before  entry  of  the  judgment.^  It  has  been 
held  that  it  is  not  a  ground  for  opening  or  setting 
aside  the  judgment  that  it  was  in  violation  of  an 
injunction  issuing  from  another  court.90 

Time  of  entering  judgment.  A  judgment  by  con- 
fession will  not  be  opened  or  vacated  on  the  mere 
ground  that  it  was  taken  prematurely,91  such  as 
before  the  maturity  of  the  obligation  secured,92  un- 
less it  is  entered  under  a  warrant  of  attorney  which 
authorizes  a  confession  only  after  maturity.93 

Objections  to  affidavit  or  statement.  Mere  defects 
or  irregularities  in  the  affidavit  or  statement  of  the 
indebtedness  required  by  the  statute  constitute  no 
ground  for  vacating  or  setting  aside  the  judg- 
ment;94 although  even  in  such  a  case  some  of  the 


decisions  hold  that  the  judgment  should  not  be  set 
aside  where  no  fraud  or  injustice  is  shown,  and  the 
debt  is  admitted  to  be  due,  unless  some  equitable 
ground  is  shown  for  the  court's  interposition,95 
but  this  relief  may  be  granted  where  the  affidavit 
or  statement  is  wholly  lacking  or  entirely  insuffi- 
cient.96 It  has  been  held  that  before  a  judgment, 
confessed  under  a  warrant  of  attorney  which  is 
over  a  year  and  a  day  old,  will  be  set  aside  because 
an  affidavit  is  not  filed  showing  that  defendant  was 
alive  and  that  the  debt  was  due  an'd  unpaid,  the 
party  making  the  application  must  show  in  addi- 
tion some  equitable  reason  therefor.97 

Defects  in  pleading  or  evidence.  A  judgment  by 
confession  cannot  be  set  aside  because  of  immate- 
rial defects  in  the  pleadings  or  evidence  in  the 
case98  or  because  of  immaterial  variances,99  but  it 
may  be  vacated  for  want  of  proof  of  the  execution 
of  the  power  of  attorney  by  defendant,1  or  where 
the  petition  for  judgment  does  not  state  facts  neces- 
sary to  give  jurisdiction.2 


Corporation    v.    Pish,    Com.Pl.,    32 

Luz.Leg.Heg.  408. 
34  C.J.  p  410  note  19—6  C.J.  p  646 

note  37. 

Judgment  entered  "by  prothonotary 
will  be  stricken  where  the  amount 
of  the  indebtedness  cannot  be  ascer- 
tained from  the  face  of  the  authority 
to  confess  Judgment — Orner  v.  Hur- 
witch,  97  Pa.Super.  263. 

85.  111. — Heldman    v.    Gunnell,    201 
IlLApp.  172. 

Pa. — Colonial  Finance  Co.  v.  Hoover, 

170  A,  338,  112  Pa.Super.  60. 
34  C.J.  p  410  note  20. 

86.  Pa.— Peoples      Nat.      Bank      of 
Reynoldsville,   to  Use  of  Mottern, 
v.   D.   &  M.  Coal  Co.,   187  A.   452, 
124  Pa.Super.  21. 

87.  Pa. — Rome  Sales  &  Service  Sta- 
tion v.  'Pinch,  169  A.  476,  111  Pa. 
Super.    226 — Market   St.    Trust  Co. 
now  for  Use  of  Swails  v.   Grove, 
46  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  605,  53  Dauph.Co. 
114— Hogsett    v.    (Lutrario,    34    Pa. 
DIst  &  Co.  637,  87  PittsbJLreg.J.  73, 
2  Pay.'Co.Leg.J.  1.  affirmed  13  A.2d 
902,  140  PavSuper.  419. 

Agent 

Where  lease  provided  that  certain 
person  who  signed  lease  as  agent, 
was  acting  as  agent,  failure  to  en- 
ter judgment  by  confession  in  lease 
in  favor  of  such  person,  as  well  as 
in  favor  of  admitted  lessors  was  not 
ground  for  striking  off  judgment, 
since  it  sufficiently  appeared,  in  ab- 
sence of  contrary  averment,  that 
such  person  had  no  other  status  than 
that  of  agent. — Forgeng  v.  Blank, 
185  A.  729,  822  Pa.  208. 
Xlctitions  plaintiff 

•Defendant   could   not  have   judg- 


ment entered  pursuant  to  warrant 
of  attorney  stricken  as  void  because 
judgment  designated  allegedly  un- 
registered fictitious  name  as  plain- 
tiff.— Rome  Sales  &  Service  Station 
v.  Finch,  169  A.  476,  111  Pa,Super. 
226. 

88.  Pa.— Byrod  v.  Bweigert,   12  Pa. 
Dist.  565. 

34  C.J.  p  410  note  21. 

89.  Del.— Rhoads    v.    Mitchell,     Su- 
per.. 47  A.2d  174. 

34  C.J.  p  410  note  22. 

90.  N.Y. — Grazebrook  v.   McCreedie, 
9  Wend.  437. 

34  C.J.  p  410  note  23. 

91.  Pa, — Spiese  v.  Shee,  95  A.  555, 
250  Pa.  399. 

34  C.J.  p  411  note  24. 

92.  Miss.— Black    v.     Pattison,     61 
Miss.  599. 

34  C.J.  p  411  note  25. 

93.  Wis.— Reid    v.     Southworth,    36 
N.W.  866,  71  Wis.  288. 

94.  111.— Larson  v.  Lybyer,   38  N.E. 
2d  177,  312  IlLApp.  188. 

N.J. — Harrison  v.  Dobkin,  .168  A. 
837,  11  N.J.Misc.  892. 

Pa. — Prosewicz  v.  Gorski,  30 '  A.2d 
224,  151  Pa.Super.  309— New  Am- 
sterdam Building  &  'Loan  Ass'n  v. 
Moyerman,  95  Pa-Super.  47 — Joyce, 
to  Use  of  v.  Hawtof,  30  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.  642,  affirmed  4  A.2d  599,  135 
Pa.-Super.  30 — Hazleton  Motor  Co. 
v.  Siroski,  ConuPL,  36  Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  237. 

34  C.J.  p  411  note  28. 

95.  N.J.— Ely  v.    Parkhurst,    25    N. 
J.Law  188. 

Tex.— Chestnutt  v.  Pollard,  13  S.W. 
852,  77  Tex.  86. 

584 


96.  111. — Preisler  v.  Gulezynski,   264 
IlLApp.  12. 

N.J. — 'Fortune  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Codomo,  7  A.2d  880,  122 
N.J.Law  565 — Harrison  v.  Dobkin, 
168  A.  837,  11  N.J.Misc.  892. 
N.Y, — Johnston  v.  A.  L.  Brlanger 
Realty  Corporation,  296  N.Y.S.  «9, 
162  Misc.  881. 

Pa. — Advance-Rumely    Thresher    Co. 
v.    Frederick,    98    Pa.Super.    560 — 
Jordan  v.  Kirschner,   94  Pa. Super. 
252— Lillis    v.    Reed,    Com.PL,     21 
Brie    Co.    8 — Newswander   v.    Fox, 
Com.PL,  86  Pittsb.Leg.J.  342. 
34  C.J.  p  411  note  29. 
Objection  available  to  creditor  only 
A  motion  to  vacate  a  judgment  by 
confession  on  ground  of  alleged  de- 
ficiency in  statement   of  confession 
was    properly    denied,    since    alleged 
deficiency  was  not  available  to  judg- 
ment    debtor,     statute     relating     to 
such  judgment  being  intended   only 
to  protect  creditors  of  a  defendant 
from   judgments   entered  on   confes- 
sion    by     collusion. — Magalhaes     v. 
Magalhaes,   5   N.Y.S.2d   43,    254   App. 
Div.  880. 

97.  111. — Larson  v.  ILybyer,   38  N.B. 
2d  177,  312  IlLApp.  188. 

34  C.J.  p  411  note  31. 

9a    111. — Adam    v.    Arnold,     86    111. 
185— -Hall  v.  Jones,   32  111.  38. 

99.    111. — Hall  v.  Jones,   supra. 

1.  111.— Stein   v.    Good,    3    N.B.    735, 
115  111.  93. 

2.  Ohio. — Hower   v.    Jones,    4    Ohio 
Dec,,    Reprint,    302,    1    ClevJLuRep. 
257. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


323 


Fraud.  A  confessed  judgment  may  be  vacated 
on  a  sufficient  showing  that  it  was  obtained  by 
means  of  fraud,  deception,  or  imposition  practiced 
on  defendant,3  although  it  has  been  held  that  the 
judgment  will  not  be  vacated  on  such  ground  where 
the  evidence  in  support  of  the  petition  to  vacate 
shows  that  defendant  has  no  defense  to  the  action.4 
Where  a  judgment  is  confessed  directly  to  a  third 
party,  who  takes  the  same  in  good  faith  and  for 
value,  it  cannot  be  impeached  for  fraud  existing  be- 
tween the  other  parties  ;5  but  it  is  otherwise  if  such 
third  party  takes  such  judgment  as  collateral  se- 
curity only  after  it  has  been  confessed.6  Where 
there  is  no  evidence  of  fraud  or  undue  influence,  it 
is  no  ground  for  setting  aside  the  judgment  that 
defendant  is  of  weak  understanding  and  in  the  habit 
of  making  improvident  bargains,7  that  he  is  illiter- 
ate,8 or  that  he  was  intoxicated  at  the  time,9  or 
that  defendant  did  not  know  that  his  note  contained 
authority  for  confession  of  judgment.10 

Fraud  or  collusion  between  the  original  parties 
to  the  judgment  will  be  cause  for  setting  it  aside 
at  the  instance  of  other  creditors,  as  discussed  in 
Fraudulent  Conveyances  §  44  b,  or  other  parties  in 
interest;11  but  not  at  the  instance  of  defendant  or 


the  other  original  party.12 

Duress.  A  judgment  by  confession  may  be  set 
aside  where  it  was  obtained  by  duress.13  A  judg- 
ment will  not  be  set  aside  for  duress,  however, 
where  it  is  confessed  in  the  presence  of  the  court  ;14 
nor  is  the  mere  fact  that  defendant  makes  the  con- 
fession while  under  arrest  sufficient  ground  for  set- 
ting aside  the  judgment,  where  it  is  shown  that  it 
was  his  voluntary  act.15 

Objection  to  amount  of  judgment.  A  judgment 
by  confession  may  be  opened  or  set  aside  where  the 
amount  of  it  is  excessive.16  The  fact,  however,  that 
the  judgment  includes  costs  is  no  ground  for  set- 
ting it  aside,  if  they  are  reasonable  in  amount;17 
and  the  mere  fact  that  the  judgment  was  confessed 
for  less  than  the  amount  apparently  due  is  no 
ground  for  setting  it  aside  on  the  motion  of  de- 
fendant.18 Where'  a  judgment  for  less  than  au- 
thorized is  confessed  under  a  warrant  of  attorney, 
it  has  been  held  that  an  amended  judgment  there- 
after entered  for  the  proper  sum  is  voidable  and 
that  it  may  be  opened.19 

Distinction  between  grounds  for  striking  and  op- 
ening  judgment.  A  distinction  is  made,  in  some  ju- 


3.  Colo. — Investors'  Finance  Co.  v. 
Luxford,  271  P.  625,  84  qolo.  519. 

HI.— Preisler  v.  Gulezynski,  264  111. 
App.  12 — Beard  v.  Baxter,  242  111. 
App.  480. 

Pa. — Standard  Furnace  Co.  v.  Lor- 
incz,  161  A.  573,  106  PsuSuper.  116 
— Davis  v.  Tate,  Com.Pl.,  26  Brie 
Co.  141 — Guth  v.  Raymond,  Com: 
PL,  19  Leh.'L.J.  126— Bonat  v. 
•Filer,  Com.Pl.,  10  Sch.Reg.  112. 

84  C.J.  p  411  note  36. 

Mistake 
Where  it  is  made  to  appear  that  a 

note  on  which  a  judgment  has  been 

taken    by    confession    was    executed 

in  belief  that  some  other  document, 

not  a  note,  was  being  signed,  leave 

to   plead   should  be  allowed  on  due 

application. — Stranak    v.    Tomasoyic, 

32  N.E.2d  994,  309  IlLApp.  177. 

Fraud  held  shown 

Colo. — Investors'  Finance  Co.  v.  Lux- 
ford,  271  P.  625,  84  Colo.  519. 

Fraud  held  not  shown 

Del. — Testardo  v.  Bresser,  153  A. 
800,  17  Del.Cn.  312. 

Ga. — Thomas  v.  Bloodworth,  160  -S. 
El.  709,  44  Ga.App.  44. 

IlL— Glanz  v.  Mueller,  54  N.E.2d  639, 
322  IlLApp.  507— Stellwagen  v. 
Schmidt,  234  IlLApp.  325. 

Pa. — Keystone  Bank  of  Spangler,  Pa., 
v.  Booth,  6  A.2d  417,  334  Pa.  ,545— 
Vaughan  &  Co.  v.  Hopewell,  79 
Pa.  Super,  23$ — Eastern  Light  Co. 
v.  Wojciechowski,  Com.PL,  3*6  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  233. 

34  C.J.  p  411  note  36  [a]. 


4.  Neb.— Osborn   v.    Gehr,    46    N.W. 
84,  29  Neb.  661. 

Necessity  of  meritorious  defense  see 
infra  §  324. 

5.  N.Y.— Kirby  v.  Fitzgerald,  31  N. 
T.  417. 

a.    N.Y.— Kirby  v.  'Fitzgerald,  supra. 

fl,    Va.— Mason  v.  Williams,  3  Munf. 
126,  17  Va.  126,  -5  Am.D.  505. 

&    N.J.— Modern     Security     Co.     v. 
Lockett,  Sup.,  143  A.  511. 

9.  Wis.— Kissinger  v.  Zieger,  120  N. 
W.  249,  138  Wis.  368. 

34  C.J.  p  411  note  41. 

10.  Md. — International        Harvester 
Co.   v.  Neuhauser,   97   A.   372,   128 
Md.  173. 

11.  CaL— Crescent     Canal     Co.     v. 
Montgomery,    «6    P.    797,    124   CaL 
134. 

12.  Pa,— Harbaugh  v.  Butner,  23  A. 
983,  148  Pa.  273. 

34  C.J.  p  411  note  45. 

Assignee  for  benefit  of  creditors 

A  Judgment  by  confession  good  as 
against  the  debtor,  even  though  it 
is  fraudulent  as  against  creditors, 
cannot  be  set  aside  on  motion  of 
the  assignee  for  the  benefit  of  cred- 
itors.—'Beekman  v.  Kirk,  IS  How. 
Pr.,  N.Y.,  228—34  C.J.  p  349  note  8. 

13.  Pa. — Guadiere  v.  Simeone,  29  A. 
2d  702,    151  Pa.Super.   65. 

34  C.J.  p  411  note  46. 


Threat  of  prosecution 

Fact  that  note  was  procured  by 
threat  of  prosecution  did  not  war- 
rant opening  judgment  confessed  on 
note. — First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Reynolds, 
256  IlLApp.  553. 

14.  Ky.— Hamilton  v.  Clarke,  1  Bibb 
251. 

15.  IlL— Baldwin  v.  Murphy,  82  HL 
485. 

N.Y.— Storm  v.  Smith,  1  Wend.  37. 

16.  IlL— Bnzelis   v.    Bnzelis,    4   N.BL 
2d  750,  287  IlLApp.  617. 

Ohio.— Meyer  v.  Meyer,  158  N.B.  320, . 

25  Ohio  App.  249. 
Pa. — Peerless  Soda  Fountain  -Service 

Co.  v.  Lipschutz,  101  Pa. Super.  '568 

— Rotbstein    v.    Satz,    Com.PL,     7 

Sch.Reg.    124 — York    Concrete    Co. 

v.   Harvey,   Com.PL,   57  Tork  Leg. 

Rec.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  412  note  49. 
Such  error  is  not  Jurisdiotioaal 
111.— Stead    v.    Craine,    256    IlLApp. 

445. 

17.  Wis. — Milwaukee    Second   Ward 
Sav.  Bank  v.  Schranck,  73  N.W.  31, 
97  Wis.  250,  39  L.R.A.  569. 

sa    IlL— Mayer  v.   Tyler,   19  N.B.2d 

211,  298  IlLApp.  632. 
Pa.— Miller  v.  Desher,  12  Pa.Dist.  # 

Co.  315,  41  "Lanc.LuRev.  335. 
Wis.— Blaikie   v.   Griswold,   16   Wis. 

293. 

19.    Pa.— Mars  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hughes, 
89  A.  1130,  243  Pa,  223. 


S85 


324 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


risdictions,  between  grounds  for  striking  off  or  va- 
cating and  opening  the  judgment.  It  can  be  strick- 
en off  or  vacated,  on  petition  or  motion,  only  for  an 
irregularity  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  record.20 
If  it  has  been  regularly  entered,  and  defendant  is 
entitled  to  relief,  such  relief  must  come  through  a 
motion  or  petition  to  open  it  and  let  defendant  into 
a  defense  ;21  and  in  such  a  case  it  cannot  be  strick- 
en off  on  motion.22 


§  324.    Meritorious  Defenses 

Unless  the  judgment  by  confession  Is  void,  a  meri- 
torious defense  to  the  claim  on  which  it  was  entered 
must  be  shown  to  warrant  its  opening  or  vacation,  and 
the  showing  of  a  meritorious  defense  Is  In  itself  suffi- 
cient to  warrant  such  relief. 

It  has  generally  been  held  that  the  fact  that  de- 
fendant has  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  claim  for 
which  judgment  by  confession  was  entered  is  in  it- 
self a  sufficient  ground  for  opening  or  vacating  the 
judgment28  Moreover,  unless  the  judgment  by 


20.  Del.— Miles  v.  .Layton,  193  A 
567,  5  W.W.Harr.  411,  112  A.L.R 
786. 

Pa, — Pacific  Lumber  -Co.  of  Illinois  v 
Rodd,  135  A.  122,  287  Pa.  454 — 
Prosewicz  v.  Qtorski,  30  A.2d  224 
151  Pa.Super.  309 — Peerless  Soda 
Fountain  Service  Co.  v.  'Lipschutz 
101  Pa.Super.  568 — Gintep  v.  Blo- 
ser,  47  Pa,Dist.  &  Co.  660 — Com- 
monwealth v.  Sands,  27  PavDist  & 
Co.  367 — Hunter  v.  Wertz,  Com 
PL.  31  Pittsb.Leg.J.  348,  57  York 
Leg.Rec.  Ill— Gilflllan  v.  Stack, 
Com.Pl.,  85  Pittsb.Leg.J.  720— Mil- 
ler v.  Miller,  Com.PL,  10  Sch.Reg. 
109. 

34  C.J.  p  408  note  82. 
Truth  of  record 

Averments  in  sworn  statement  ac- 
companying confessed  judgment 
must  be  taken  as  true  in  proceedings 
to  strike  off  judgment — Gold  v.  'Fox 
Film  Corporation,  137  A.  605,  289  Pa. 
429. 

21.    Del.— Miles   v.    Layton,    193    A. 

•5-67,   8  W.W.Harr.   411,   112  A.L.R. 

786. 
Pa. — R.  S.  Noonan,  Inc.,  v.  Hoff,  38 

A.2d    53,    350    Pa,    295— Wilson   v. 

Vincent,  150  A.  642,  300  Pa.  321— 

Pacific  Lumber  Co.   of  Illinois  v. 

Rodd,    135   A.    122,    287   Pa,    454— 

Brumbaugh  v.  Brumbaugh,  16  Pa. 

Disk  &  Co.  281— Miners  Sav.  Bank 

of  Pitts  ton  v.  Falzone,  Com.Pl.,  35 

Luz.Leg.Reg.  315. 
34  C.J.  p  408  note  83. 
Existence  of  meritorious  defense  as 

ground    for    opening    or    vacating 

confessed  judgments  generally  see 

infra  §  324. 
Denial  of  motion  to  strike 

Defendant  whose  motion  to  strike 
off  judgment,  entered  by  warrant  of 
attorney,  for  irregularity  on  face 
of  record  was  denied,  was  not  pre- 
cluded from  presenting  defense  to 
judgment  on  petition  to  open  judg- 
ment.— Rome  Sales  &  Service  Sta- 
tion v.  Finch,  183  A.  54,  120  Pa. 
Super.  402. 
Waiver  of  irregularities  in  entry 

(1)  Party  moving  to  open  judg- 
ment and  to  be  let  into  defense  on 
merits  waives  irregularities  in  entry 
of  judgment,  which  might  have  been 
attacked  .  by  motion  to  strike  off. — 
Rome  Sales  &  Service  Station  v. 


Finch,  183  A.  54,  120  Pa.Super.  402— 
Parsons  v.  Kuhn,  45  Pa.Dist.  &  Co 
356 — Noonan  v.  Hoff,  Com.PL,  5 
York  Leg.Rec.  113,  affirmed  R.  S 
Noonan,  Inc.,  v.  Hoff,  3*  A.2d  53,  350 
Pa,  295. 

(2)  Irregularity  in   entering  joinl 
judgment   on   separate   warrants   ol 
attorney  to  confess  judgment  is  not 
waived  by  filing  petition  to  open. — 
Peoples  Nat.  Bank  of  Reynoldsville, 
to  Use  of  Mottern,  v.  D.  &  M.  Coal 
Co.,   187  A.   452,   124  Pa.Super.  21. 
22.     Pa.— Harr    v.    Bernheimer,    185 
A.  857,  322  Pa.  412— Pacific  Lum- 
ber Co.  of  Illinois  v.  Rodd,  135  A- 
122,     287     Pa.     454— Stevenson    v. 
Dersam,  119  A.  451,  275  Pa.  412— 
Collins  v.  Tracy  Grill  &  Bar  Cor- 
poration.   19   A.2d   617,   144   Pa.Su- 
per.    440 — ILyman   'Felheim    Co.    v. 
Walker,   193   A.    69,   128  Pa.Super. 
1 — Durso   v.   Fiorini,    98   Pa.  Super. 
Ill— Melnick  v.  Hamilton,   87  Pa- 
Super.     575 — Picone     v.     Barbano, 
Com.Pl,,  32  Del.Co.  88— Baldwin  & 
Welcomer  Co.  v.  Haines,  Com.PL, 
28  Erie  Co.  85 — Kahler  v.  Shaffer, 
Com.PL,  32  XiUZ.Leg.Reg.  68. 
34  C.J.  p  408  note  84. 

Matters  purely  defensive  and  go- 
ing in  denial  of  plaintiff's  right  to 
recover  do  not  afford  grounds  to  set 
aside  a  judgment  by  confession. — 
Thomas  v.  Bloodworth,  160  S.E.  709, 
4*4  Ga.App.  44. 

23.  Colo.— Lucero  v.  Smith,  132  P. 
2d  791,  110  Colo.  165— Parham  v. 
Johnson,  292  P.  599,  88  Colo.  127 
—Mitchell  v.  Miller,  252  P.  886, 
81  Colo.  1 — Commercial  Credit  Co. 
v.  Calkins,  241  P.  529,  78  Colo. 
257. 

111.— Gilmore  v.  Mix,  App.,  67  N.E. 
2d  313— Fidler  v.  Kennedy,  62  N.B. 
2d  10,  326  IlLApp.  449— Albany  v. 
Phillips,  48  N.E.2d  453,  318  111. 
App.  642— Kirchner  v.  Boris  & 
Dave  Goldenhersh,  42  N.E.2d  953, 
315  IlLApp.  305 — Moore  v.  Mon- 
arch Distributing  Co.,  32  N.B.2d 
1019,  309  IlLApp.  339— Stranak  v. 
Tomasovic,  32  N.B.2d  994,  309  111. 
App.  177 — May  v.  Chas.  0.  Larson 
Co.,  26  *T.E.2d  139,  304  IlLApp.  137 
—Mutual  Life  of  Illinois  v.  Lit- 
tle, 227  IlLApp.  436— Harris  Trust 
&  Savings  Bank  v.  Neighbors,  222 
IlLApp.  201.  i 

586 


Md. — Vane  v.  Stanley  Heating  Co., 
152  A.  511,  160  Md.  24— Cardwell- 
Fisher  Fixture  Co.  v.  Commerce 
Trust  Co.,  141  A.  121,  154  Md. 
366 — Automobile  Brokerage  Corpo- 
ration v.  Myer,  139  A.  539,  154 
Md.  1. 

Pa. — Bonebrake  v.  Koons,  5  A.2d  184, 
333  Pa.  443 — Marshall  v.  Jackson; 
145  A.  584,  296  Pa,  16— Common- 
wealth v.  Cohen,  14  A.2d  362,  140 
Pa.Super.  361 — Improve  Your 
Home  System  v.  Collins,  94  Pa. 
Super.  575— Hoffman  v.  Winston, 
86  Pa.Super.  130— Siddall  v.  Burke, 
Com.PL,  29  DeLCo.  530— Walker  v. 
Oakley,  Com. PL,  43  Lack.Jur.  249, 
56  York  Leg.Rec.  197,  modified  on 
other  grounds  32  A.2d  563,  347  Pa. 
405 — Cleland-Simpson  Co.  v.  Lynch, 
Com.Pl.,  41  Lack.Jur.  94 — Kintzer 
v.  Williams,  Com.PL,  34  Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  285 — Landes  Motor  Co.  v. 
Rhoads,  Com.PL,  54  Montg.Co.  408, 
9  Som.Co.Leg.J.  162 — Gordon  v. 
Brickley,  Com.PL,  92  Pittsb.Leg.J, 
343 — Newswander  v.  Fox,  Com.PL, 
86  Pittsb.Leg.J.  342— Holland  Fur- 
nace Co.  v.  Davis,  Com.PL,  7  Sch. 
Reg.  297 — Williamsport  Auto  Parts 
Co.  v.  Sprenkle,  •  Com.PL,  54  York 
Leg.Rec.  154— Wildwood  Strand 
Realty  Co.  v.  Skipper,  Com.PL,  53 
York  19. 

34  C.J.  p  412  note  55. 

Distinction  between  grounds  for 
striking  and  opening  confessed 
judgments  see  supra  §  323. 

Defense  to  whole  or  part  of  claim 
is  sufficient. 
Ohio.— Edge    v.    Stuckey,    178    N.E. 

210,  40  Ohio  App.  122. 
Pa. — Plympton  Cabinet  Co.  v.  Rosen- 
berg, 96  Pa.  Super.  330. 
Judgments  are  freely  stricken  to  let 

in  defenses 
Md. — Craig    v.    Hebron    Building    & 

Loan  Ass'n  No.  2,  189  A.  218,  171 

Md.  522. 
Opening1  not  mandatory 

Since,  as  discussed  infra  §  326, 
the  opening  of  such  a  judgment, 
rests  largely  in  the  discretion  of  the 
court,  a  judgment  need  not  be  open- 
ed merely  because  testimony  offered 
>y  defendant  would,  if  true,  consti- 
tute a  defense. — St  Clair  Savings  & 
Trust  Co.,  for  Use  of  Billhartz>  v. 
Hahne,  29  A.2d  21,  345  Pa.  420. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


324 


confession  is  void,  it  will  not  be  opened  or  vacated 
for  a  defect  or  irregularity  therein  unless  it  is  shown 
that  defendant  has  a  meritorious  defense  to  the 
claim  for  which  the  judgment  was  entered.24  If  no 
meritorious  defense  is  shown  and  it  appears  to  the 
court  that  an  action  on  the  debt  or  claim  ought  to 
go  against  the  moving  party,  a  judgment  by  con- 
fession will  not  be  disturbed.25  Where,  however, 


a  judgment  by  confession  is  entirely  void,  the  court 
may  vacate  it  without  regard  to  the  question  wheth- 
er defendant  has  a  good  defense  to  the  claim  on 
which  it  was  based.26 

The  proposed  defense  must  be  meritorious;  it 
must  raise  questions  of  law  deserving  investigation 
or  a  real  controversy  as  to  the  essential  facts.27 
The  judgment  may  be  opened  or  set  aside  on  a 


24.  U.S.— Glinski    v.    U.    S.,    C.C.A. 
111.,  93   P.2d  418. 

111. — May  v.  Chas.  O.  Larson  Co.,  26 
N.E.2d  139,  304  IlLApp.  137— Wal- 
rus Mfg.  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  25  N.B.2d 
132.  303  Ill.App.  286— Freedman  v. 
Hunt,  Hartford  Accident  &  Indem- 
nity Co.,  Intervenor,  22  N.B.2d  864, 
301  IlLApp.  604 — Browning  V. 
Spurrier,  245  IlLApp.  276. 

Md. — Crothers  v.  National  Bank  of 
Chesapeake  City,  149  A.  270,  158 
Md.  587. 

Ohio. — Canal  Winchester  Bank  v.  E3&- 
line,  22  N.E.2d  528,  61  Ohio  App. 
253. 

Pa. — Commonwealth  v.  J.  &  A. 
Moeschlin,  Inc.,  170  A,  119,  314 
Pa.  34 — Pacific  Lumber  Co.  of  Illi- 
nois v.  Rodd.  135  A.  122,  287  Pa. 
454 — Commonwealth  v.  Mahoning- 
town  Ry.  Men's  Club,  14  A.2d  356, 
140  Pa.Super.  413 — Commonwealth 
v.  Eclipse  Literary  and  Social 
Club.  178  A.  341,  117  Pa.Super. 
339 — Heyer-Kemner,  Inc.,  v.  Sachs, 
Com.PL.  57  Montg.Co.  73— Citizens 
Bank  of  Wind  Gap  v.  Sparrow, 
Com.Pl.,  27  North.Co.  213. 

34  C.J.  p  412  note  55. 

Defects  held  Insufficient  unless  mer- 
itorious defense  shown 

(1)  Technical  errors  or  irregulari- 
ties. 

111.— Mayer  v.  Tyler,  19  N.E.2d  211, 

298  IlLApp.  632. 
N.J.—  Stetz   v.   Googer,   18   A.2d  416, 

126  N.J.Law  213. 

(2)  Insufficient  power  of  attorney. 
— May    v.    Chas.   O.    Larson   Co.,    26 
N.E.2d    139.    304   IlLApp.   137— Sekela 
v.  Tokarz,  6  N.E.2d  489,  288  IlLApp. 
617— Alton   Banking  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Gray,    259    IlLApp.    20,   affirmed   179 
N.E.   469.  347   I1L  99. 

(3)  Power  of  attorney  revoked  by 
death. — Terendy    v.    Swierski,    15   N. 
E.2d  613,  296  IlLApp.  635. 

(4)  Transfer  of  note  by  payee  to 
cut    off    defenses.— Davis    v.    Wirth, 
249  IlLApp.   544. 

Importance  of  Question 

Generally  on  motion  to  open  a 
Judgment  entered  by  confession  and 
'for  leave  to  defend  the  question  of 
a  meritorious  defense  is  of  much 
more  importance  than  the  Question 
of  defendant's  diligence  or  the  lack 
of  it.— Gilmore  v.  Mix,  IlLApp.,  67 
N.E.2d  313 — Stranak  v.  Tomasovic, 
32  N.B.2d  994,  309  IlLApp.  177. 

25.  Pa. — Sferra   v.    Urling,    188    A. 


185,    324    Pa.    344— Commonwealth 
v.  Miele,  14  A.2d  337,  140  Pa.Super. 
313 — C.    Trevor    Dunham,    Inc.    v. 
Pursel,  12  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  425. 
34  C.J.  p  412  note  56. 

26.  111.— Rixmann  v.  Witwer,  63  N. 
E.2d  607,  327  IlLApp.  205— Gillham 
v.    Troeckler,    26    N.E.2d    413,    304 
IlLApp.  596— Duggan  v.  Kupitz,  22 
N.E.2d  392,  301  IlLApp.  230— Mer- 
rion  v.  O'Donnell,  279  IlLApp.  435 
— Genden   v.    Bailen,    275    IlLApp. 
382. 

Wis. — Chippewa  Valley  Securities  Co. 

v.  Herbst,  278  N.W.  872,  227  Wis. 

422. 

34  C.J.  p  412  note  54. 
Vacation  and   opening  distingiiidhed 

Motion  to  vacate  judgment  by  con- 
fession based  on  court's  lack  of  Ju- 
risdiction does  not  embrace  request 
to  plead  to  merits,  whereas  motion 
to  open  up  Judgment  by  confession 
carries  request  for  leave  to  plead  to 
merits.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Takey, 
253  IlLApp.  128. 

27.  111.— Busse  v.  Muller,  14  N.E.2d 
669,   295   IlLApp.   101— Dixie  Dairy 
Co.  v.  Schultz,   14  N.E.2d  506,   295 
IlLApp.     623— Cohen     v.     Gaytime 
Frocks,   2  N.E.2d   590,  284   IlLApp. 
649. 

Pa.— Shinn  v.  Stemler,  45  A.2d  242, 
158  Pa. Super.  350 — Commonwealth 
v.  Rubenstein,  Iff4  A.  687,  122  Pa. 
Super.  101 — Zanflno  v.  Moretti, 
Com.PL,  86  Pittsb.Leg.J.  605. 
Inconsistent  defenses 

Defendant  who  urges  inconsistent 
defenses  as  grounds  for  opening 
judgment  should  not  be  required  to 
elect  between  them  until  after  appli- 
cation is  granted. — Cole  v.  Hess,  63 
P.2d  882,  99  Colo.  417. 
scatter  already  passed  on 

If  denying  continuance  on  facts 
provable  by  due  diligence  was  not 
abuse  of  discretion,  denying  motion 
on  same  facts  to  vacate  judgment  by 
confession  was  not  abuse  of  discre- 
tion.— Smith  v.  Washburn  &  Condon, 
297  P.  879.  38  Ariz.  149. 
Parties  in  par!  delicto 

The  Judgment  will  not  be  opened 
merely  to  let  in  an  equitable  defense 
that  might  have  been  pertinent  if  no 
judgment  had  been  entered,  where 
under  the  defense  the  parties  were 
in  pari  delicto.— Sebring  v.  Rathbun, 
I  Johns.Cas.,  N.T.,  331. 

Penalty 
Judgment    entered     on    judgment 

587 


note  constituting  pan  of  deposit  on 
sale  of  land  should  be  set  aside 
where  provision  for  forfeiture  of 
deposit  amounted  to  penalty. — Ellis 
v.  Roberts,  98  Pa.Super.  49. 

Meritorious   defense  shown 

Colo. — Denver  Industrial  Corporation 
v.  Kesselring,  8  P.2d  767.  90  Colo. 
295. 

111.— Kolmar,  Inc.,  v.  Moore,  55  N.E. 
2d  524,  323  IlLApp.  323 — Moore  v. 
Monarch  Distributing  Co.,  32  N.E. 
2d  1019,  309  IlLApp.  339 — Stranak 
v.  Tomasovic,  32  N.E.2d  994,  309 
IlLApp.  177 — Bauer  v.  Parker,  17 
N.E.2d  335,  297  Ill.App.  639— Edi- 
son Const.  Co.  v.  Kurzeja,  15  N.E. 
2d  899,  296  IlLApp.  638 — Doss  v. 
Sievers,  14  N.E.2d  677,  295  IlLApp. 
107— Elaborated  Ready  Roofing 
Co.  v.  Hunter,  262  IlLApp.  380— 
Beard  v.  Baxter,  242  Ill.App.  480 
—Mutual  Life  of  Illinois  v.  Little, 
227  Ill.App.  436. 

N.J.— Wills  v.  Atkinson,  192  A.  67. 
15  N.J.Misc.  418. 

Ohio. — Canton  Implement  Co.  v. 
Rauh,  175  N.E.  230,  37  Ohio  App. 
544. 

Pa. — Bonebrake  v.  Koons,  5  A.2d  184, 
333  Pa,  443— Pine  Brook  Bank  v. 
Kearney,  154  A.  365,  303  Pa.  223 
— Lyda  v.  Edwards,  146  A.  Ill,  298 
Pa.  434 — Stevenson  v.  Dersaxn,  119 
A.  491,  275  Pa.  412— First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Smith,  200  A.  215,  132  Pa. 
Super.  73 — Hobart  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rod- 
ziewicz,  189  A.  580.  125  Pa.Super. 
240 — Newman  v.  Herron,  184  A. 
310,  121  Pa.Super.  370 — Rome  Sales 
&  Service  Station  v.  Finch,  188 
A.  54,  120  Pa.Super.  402— McCarty, 
to  Use  of  Hoblitzell  Nat.  Bank  of 
Hyndman  v.  Emerick.  170  A.  326, 
111  Pa,Super.  463— Holland  Fur- 
nace Co.  v.  Gabriel.  157  A.  373, 
102  Pa.Super.  578 — Greco  v.  Wood- 
lawn  Furniture  Co.,  99  Pa.Super. 
290 — Goodis  v.  Stehle,  87  Pa. Super. 
336— Hotaling  v.  Fisher,  79  Pa.Su- 
per.  103 — Commonwealth  v.  Mahon- 
ingtown  Ry.  Men's  Club  and  Con- 
tinental Casualty  Co.,  Com.  PL,  46 
Dauph-Co.  405,  affirmed  14  A.2d  357, 
140  Pa.Super.  413 — Commonwealth 
v.  Coldren,  46  Dauph.Co.  403,  af- 
firmed 14  A.2d  340,  140  Pa,Super. 
321 — Commonwealth  v.  Miele,  46 
Dauph.Co.  400,  affirmed  14  A.2d 
337,  140  Pa.Super.  318— Common- 
wealth v.  Steiner,  C6m.PL,  46 
Dauph,Co.  398— Baldwin  &  Wei- 
comer  Co.  v.  Hat nes,  Com.Pl>,  28 


§  324 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


showing  that  there  was  a  want  of  consideration 
for  the  note,  bond,  or  other  obligation  on  which  it 
was  entered,28  or  a  failure  of  such  consideration,29 
or  that  the  consideration  was  illegal  or  immoral,30 
or  that  the  claim  is  subject  to  the  defense  of 
usury,81  or  that  the  debt  had  already  been  paid  or 


otherwise  released  or  discharged32  or  was  subject 
to  credits  for  which  no  allowance  was  made,33  or 
that  the  debt  was  secured  by  a  mortgage  which,  by 
statute,  must  first  be  resorted  to,34  or  that  defend- 
ant was  under  a  personal  disability  as  to  the  debt 
or  obligation.35 


Brie  Co.  85 — Stickel  v.  Barron, 
Com.PL,  6  Fay.Co.L.J.  213 — Palum- 
bo  Realtors  v.  Occulto,  Com.PL,  46 
Lack.Jur.  66 — Conlon  Keystone 
Coal  Co.  v.  Perugia  Ben.  Soc.,  Com. 
PL,  86  Luz.Legr.Reg.  384 — Empire 
Furniture  Co.  v.  Dryda,  Com.Pl., 
36  Luz.Leg.Reg.  352 — Bokin  v. 
Rusackas,  Com.PL,  82  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
321 — Guarantee  Trust  Co.  v.  Yad- 
lowski,  Com.  PL,  15  Northumb.L.J. 
359 — Burgunder  v.  Cerceo,  Com.PL, 
91  Pittsb.Leg.J.  576— Pennsylvania 
Trust  Co.  v.  Billings,  Com.Pl.,  90 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  614 — Secretary  of 
Banking  v.  Hako,  Com.PL,  23 
Wash.Co.  70. 

Meritorious  defense  not  shown 

111.— Stead  v.  Craine,  256  IlLApp.  445 
—Handel  v.  Curry,  254  IlLApp.  36 
— Davis  v.  Mosbacher,  252  IlLApp. 
636— Harris  v.  Berafeld,  250  111. 
App.  446— Davis  v.  Wirth,  249  111. 
App.  544 — Brinkman  v.  Paulciew- 
ski,  245  IlLApp.  807— Hirsch  v. 
Home  Appliances,  Inc.,  242  IlLApp. 
418 — Sternberger  v.  Wright,  239 
IlLApp.  490— S  tell  wage  n  v. 
Schmidt,  234  IlLApp.  325— Brad- 
shaw  v,  Hansen,  232  IlLApp.  44 
— Harris  Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v. 
Neighbors,  222  IlLApp.  201. 

Md.— Johnson  v.  Phillips,  122  A.  7, 
143  MdL  16. 

N.J.— Modern  Security  Co.  of  Phil- 
adelphia v.  De  Vito,  165  A.  282,  11 
N.J.Misc.  258. 

Ohio.— Roberts  v.  Third  Nat  Ex- 
change Bank  of  Sandusky,  18  Ohio 
App.  185. 

Pa. — Freeman  v.  Greenberg,  40  A.2d 
457,  351  Pa.  206— Ulick  v.  Vibra- 
tion Specialty  Co.,  35  A.2d  332, 
348  Pa.  241— Schuylkill  Trust  Co. 
v.  Sobolewski,  190  A.  919,  325  Pa. 
422 — Nathan  Rosenblum  &  Co.  v. 
Rosenblum,  169  A.  79,  313  Pa.  49, 
followed  in  169  A.  886,  313  Pa.  50 
— Breslin  v.  Mooney,  161  A.  736, 
307  Pa,  473— Gold  v.  Fox  Film 
Corporation,  137  A.  605,  289  Pa. 
429— Werdebach  v.  Abel,  120  A. 
267,  276  Pa.  368— Shinn  v.  Stemler, 
45  A.2d  242,  158  Pa.Super.  350— 
Krewson  v.  Erny,  45  A.2d  240,  158 
Pa.  Super.  380 — Tradesmens  Nat. 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Lewis,  34  A. 
2d  818,  154  Pa.Super.  17— Babcock 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Allison,  7  A.2d  374, 
136  Pa. Super.  353 — Sebastianelli  v. 
Frank,  165  A.  664,  108  Pa.Super. 
550 — Plympton  Cabinet  Co.  v.  Ros- 
enberg, 96  Pa.Super.  330 — Brady  v. 
Laskowsky,  .90  Pa.Super.  370 — 
Wallace  v.  Snifflet,  86  Pa.Super. 
S27 — Graham  v.  Hay,  81  Pa.Super. 


594— Wagner  v.  Lenarth,  80  Pa. 
Super.  547 — Meetoan  v.  De  Leo,  45 
Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  85— New  Tork  Joint 
Stock  Land  Bank  v.  Kegerise,  Com. 
PL,  29  Berks  Co.L.J.  296— Com- 
monwealth v.  Penelope  Club,  Com. 
PL,  46  Dauph.Co.  278,  affirmed  7  A. 
2d  558,  136  Pa.Super.  505 — Com- 
monwealth, v.  Hollo waty,  Com.PL, 
46  Dauph.Co.  248— Picone  v.  Bar- 
bano,  Com.PL,  32  DeLCo.  88— Mid- 
City  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Wear, 
Com.Pl.,  31  DeLCo.  219— Szczepan- 
ski  v.  Filipkowski,  Com.PL,  20  Brie 
Co.  272— Oleski  v.  Oleski,  Com.PL, 
20  Erie  Co.  226— Latrobe  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.  v.  Kahley,  Com.PL,  6  Fay. 
Co.L.J.  242— Pinkus  v.  Frank,  Com. 
PL,  41  Lack^Tur.  173— Billiowski  v. 
Boruch,  Com.PL,  40  Lack.Jur.  135 
— Pienkos  v.  Kulatz,  Com.PL,  36 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  50— Fidelity-Philadel- 
phia Trust  Co.  v.  Watkins,  Com. 
PL,  62  Montg.Co.  191— Hever-Kem- 
ner,  Inc.,  v.  Sachs,  Com.PL,  57 
Montg.Co.  73 — Shoup  v.  North  Dia- 
mond Candy  Co.,  Com.PL,  89 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  357— Kiefer  v.  Rosan- 
off,  Com.PL,  87  Pittsb.Leg.J.  443 
— Balkus  v.  Elchisak,  Com.PL,  6 
Sch-Reg.  21 — Gbpes  v.  Lawrenitis, 
Com.PL,  4  Sch.Reg.  403— Miller  v. 
Glendenning,  Com.PL,  26  Wash.Co. 
164— Peoples  Pittsburgh  Trust  Co. 
v.  Evans,  Com.Pl.,  23  WestCo.L.J. 
86 — Allegheny  Valley  Trust  Co.  v. 
City  of  Monessen,  Com.Pl.,  22 
WestCo.L.J.  36 — Pressel  v.  Har- 
vey, Com.PL,  57  York  Leg.Rec.  5. 

28.  111.— Aidner  v.  Cobin,  258  I1L 
App.  245. 

Pa.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Smith,  200 
A.  215,  132  Pa.Super.  73. 

34  C.J.  p  413  note  59. 

89.    I1L— Automatic  Oil  Heating  Co. 

v.  Lee,   16  N.E.2d  919,  296  IlLApp. 

628 — Continental     Const.      Co.      v. 

Henderson   County   Public   Service 

Co.,  227  IlLApp.  43. 
Md. — Vane   v.    Stanley   Heating   Co., 

152  A.  511,  160  Md.  24. 
Pa.— Welch  v.    Suitez,    13    A.*d   399, 

338    Pa,    583 — Cooper   v.    Frost,    43 

PaJDist.   &   Co.    636,   5    Fay.L.J.    5, 

55     Tork    Leg.Rec.     203 — Lutz    v. 

Helm,   Com.PL,    5    Sch.Reg.    190. 
34  C.J.  p  413  note  60. 

failure  of  plaintiff  to  perform  is 
good  reason  for  opening  judgment 
entered  by  confession  in  warrant  of 
attorney  contained  in  contract — 
Hoffman  y.  Winston,  86  Pa. Super. 
130. 

Breach  of  warranty 
Ohio. — Ames  Co.  v.  Busick,  App.,  47 

N.E.2d  647.      '  { 

588 


Pa. — Plympton  Cabinet  Co.  v.  Rosen- 
berg, 96  Pa.Super.  330. 

34  C.J.  p  413  note  60  [a]. 

note  under  seal 

Judgment  confessed  on   note  may 

be   struck  out  to  let  in  defense   of 

failure    of    consideration,    although 

note    was    under    seal. — Crothers    v. 

National    bank   of   Chesapeake    City, 

149  A.  270,  158  Md.  587. 

Failure  of  consideration  not  shown 

111. — May  v.  Chas.  O.  Larson  Co.,  26 
N.E.2d  139,  304  IlLApp.  137. 

30.  Pa.— Murray  v.  McDonald,  84  A* 
579,  236  Pa.  26. 

34  C.J.  p  413  note  61. 
Purchase  of  contraband  liauor 
Pa. — Brady  v.  Laskowsky,  90  Pa.Su- 
per. 370. 

31.  111.— Morton  v.  Wilson,  3  N.E.2d 
891,  286  IlLApp.  619. 

Pa.— Moll    v.    Lafferty,    153    A.    557, 

302  Pa.  354. 
34  C.J.  p  413  note  62. 

32.  111. — Ford  Roofing  Products  Co. 
v.    Servatius,    20    N.E.2d    126,    299 
IlLApp.    617— Flnley    v.    Paige,    11 
N.E.2d     126,     292     IlLApp.     636— 
Rogers  v.  Cowen,  4  N.E.2d  880,  287 
IlLApp.   617. 

Md.— Redding  v.  Redding,  26  A.2d  18, 
180  Md.  545. 

Pa. — U.  S.  Savings  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Conemaugh  to  use  of  Hindes  v. 
Helsel,  188  A,  167,  324  Pa.  1— 
Gardner  v.  Salem,  187  A.  94,  123 
Pa.Super.  -418 — Witherow  v.  Kess- 
ler,  Com.PL,  28  DeLCo.  81 — Ru- 
dolph v.  Mature,  Com.PL,  27  Del. 
521— South  Side  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Scheuer,  Com.PL,  43  Lack.Jur. 
95 — Flammer  v.  Smith,  Com.PL,  19 
Leh.L.J.  271 — Schneck  v.  Borsos, 
Com.PL,  32  Luz.Leg.Reg.  401 — 
Kerr  v.  Erach,  Com.Pl.,  91  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  245— Potts  v.  Mitchell,  Com. 
PL,  27  WestCo.L.J.  63. 

34  C,J.  p  413  note  63. 

33.  Md. — Webster  v.  People's  Loan, 
Savings  &  Deposit  Bank  of  Cam- 
bridge,   152    A.    815,    160    Md.    57. 

Ohio. — Mosher  v.  Goss.  App.,  60  N.E. 
2d  730. 

Pa. — Jacob  v.  Corey,  83  Pa.Super. 
605 — Central  Nat  Bank  v,  Reisin- 
ger,  31  Pa.DIst  &  Co.  119,  19  Erie 
Co.  446,  51  Tork  Leg.Rec.  162. 

34  C.J.  p  413  note  64.. 

34.  N.J.— Knight  v.  Cape  May  Sand 
Co.,    83  A.   964,   83  N.J.Law  597. 

34  O.J.  p  413  note  65. 

35.  N.J. — Crosby  v.  Washburn,  49  A* 
455,    66  N.J.Law  494. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


325 


It  has  been  held  that  the'  judgment  may  be  opened 
to  permit  defendant  to  interpose  a  counterclaim  or 
set-off,36  unless  the  counterclaim  is  not  liquidat- 
ed37 or  arises  out  of  a  collateral  transaction;38  but 
it  has  also  been  held  that  a  counterclaim  or  set-off 
does  not  meet  the  requirement  of  a  meritorious  de- 
fense.39 

The  judgment  will  not  be  opened  on  the  ground 
that  defendant  had  been  mistaken  as  to  the  legal 
effect  of  a  stipulation  in  the  bond  on  which  the 
judgment  was  entered  ;40  nor  will  it  be  opened  to  let 
in  matters  of  defense  which  arise  subsequent  to 
the  entry  of  the  judgmental 

Statute  of  limitations.  The  court  may  in  its  dis- 
cretion open  a  judgment  where  it  appears  that  the 
statute  of  limitations  had  run  against  the  debt  at 
the  time  the  judgment  was  entered;42  but  a  judg- 
ment should  not  be  opened  for  the  sole  purpose  of 


affording  an  opportunity  to  plead  the  statute  of  lim- 
itations to  a  defendant  who  has  already  had  his  day 
in  court4* 

§  325.    Affidavits  and  Othcir  Evidence 

a.  Affidavits  and  counter-affidavits     • 

b.  Presumptions  and  burden  of  proof 

c.  Admissibility   and   weight   and    suffi- 

ciency 

a.  Affidavits  and  Counter- Affidavits 

It  is  generally  held  to  be  within  the  discretion  of  the 
court  to  hear  and  determine  an  application  to  open  or 
vacate  a  confessed  Judgment  either  on  affidavits  or  on 
oral  testimony  given  In  open  court. 

It  is  generally  held  to  be  within  the  discretion  of 
the  court  to  hear  and  determine  an  application  to 
open  or  vacate  a  confessed  judgment  either  on  affi- 
davits or  on  oral  testimony  given  in  open  court.44 


Pa.— C.  &  S.  Motor  Co.  v.  Schroeder 
Bros.,    Com.PL,    40    LackJTur.    73. 
34  C.J.  p  413  note  66. 


Where  judgment  by  warrant  of 
attorney  was  entered  on  a  note  made 
by  adult  defendant  during  his  mi- 
nority and,  on  motion  to  set  aside 
the  judgment,  defendant  made  no 
showing  of  disafflrmance  of  note, 
there  was  no  "valid  defense"  to  the 
action. — McKenzie  v.  Tellis,  Ohio 
App.,  47  N.E,2d  253. 
Xncompetency  not  shown 
Pa. — Grelner  v.  Brubaker,  16  A.2d 

6*9,  142  Pa.Super.  538. 
36.    Pa.— Walter  v.  Fees,  25  A.  829, 

155  Pa.  65. 
34  C.J.  p  413  note  64. 

Where  the  application  is  made  dur- 
ing the  judgment  term  it  may  be 
based  on  a  counterclaim. — Ames  Co. 
v.  Busick,  Ohio  App.,  47  N.E.2d  647. 
In  Illinois 

(!•)  Denial  of  motion  to  open  up 
judgment  by  confession  on  a  prom- 
issory note,  supported  by  affidavit  of 
defendant  that  he  .had  a  counter- 
claim has  been  held  to  be  error. — 
State  Bank  of  Blue  Island  v.  Kott, 
54  N.E.2d  897,  323  IlLApp.  27. 

(2)  Verified  motion  to  vacate  judg- 
ment by  confession  in  action  on  note 
given  for  part  of  purchase  price  of 
business,  requesting  leave  to  file 
counterclaim  against  plaintiff  for 
damages  for  false  representations  of 
material  facts  by  way  of  inducing 
defendant  to  enter  into  oral  agree- 
ment to  purchase,  and  stating  desire 
to  Include  charge  against  plaintiff 
for  difference  between  contract  pur- 
chase price  of  truck  and  O.P.A.  sell- 
ing price,  alleged  a  good  defense, 
and  court  should  have  set  aside 
judgment  and  permitted  defense  to 
be  made. — Gilmore  v.  Mix,  App.,  67 
N.E.2d  Sta. 


(3)  It  has  also  been  held,  however, 
that  a  judgment  by  confession  will 
not  be  opened  to  permit  a  defendant 
to  file  a  counterclaim  or  cross-state- 
ment.— Bankers  Bldg.  v.  Bishop,  61 
N.E.2d  276,  326  IlLApp.  256,  certio- 
rari  denied  Bishop  v.  Bankers  Bldg., 
66  S.Ct.  1852— Mayer  v.  Tyler,  19  N. 
E.2d  211,  298  IlLApp.  632— Busse  v. 
Muller,  14  N.E.2d  669,  295  Ill-App. 
101 — Smysor  v.  Glasscock,  256  I1L 
App.  29. 

37.  Pa.— Kramer  v.  Moss,  90  Pa- 
Super.  550— Baird  v.  Otto,  90  Pa- 
Super.  452— Trostel  v.  Steinle, 
Com.Pl.,  61  Montg.Co.  187,  59  York 
Leg.Rec.  77. 

88.  Pa.— Pollard  &  Brant,  Inc.,  v. 
Stein,  81  Pa.Super.  374. 

39.  Ohio.— Bulkley  v.  Greene,  120  N. 
E.  216,  98  Ohio  St.  55. 

34  QJ.  p  413  note  64  [b]. 

40.  Pa.— Shields  v.  Hitchxnan,  96  A. 
1039,  251  Pa.  455. 

41.  111.— Handley  v.  Moburg,  266  111. 
App.  356. 

Ohio.— Mosher  v.  Goss,  App.,  60  N.E. 

2d  730. 
Pa. — International    Finance    Co.     v. 

Magilansky,    161    A.    613,    105    Pa, 

Super.  309. 
34  C.J.  p  414  note  68. 

42.  111.— Rixmann  v.  Witwer,   63  N. 
E.2d   607,   327  IlLApp.   205— Fried- 
lund   v.   Cunnally,    48   N.E.2d   747, 
319  IlLApp.   36— Buchanan  v.  Ste- 
phens,  26  N.E.2d  733,   304  IlLApp, 
477. 

Minn. — Berg  v.  Burkholder  Lumber 
Co.,  204  N.W.  923,  164  Minn.  81. 

Pa.— American  Surety  Co.  v.  Mitch- 
neck,  Com.PL,  31  Luz.Leg.Reg.  356. 

34  G.J.  p  414  note  69.. 

43.  Pa.— Woods  v.  Irwin,  21  A.  603, 
141  Pa,  278,  23  Am.S.R.  282. 

34  <XJ.  p  414  note  76. 

589 


44.  Del.— Chandler  v.  Miles,  193  A. 
576,  S  W.W.Harr.  431. 

Md.— Johnson  v.  Phillips,  122  A.  7, 
143  Md.  16. 

Ohio. — Saulpaugh  v.  Born,  154  N.E. 
166,  22  Ohio  App.  275. 

Pa.— Welch  v.  Sultez,  13  A.2d  399, 
338  Pa,  583— Harr  v.  Mahalsky, 
Com.PL,  33  Luz.Leg.Reg.  65 — Penn- 
sylvania Trust  Co.  v.  Billings, 
Com.PL,  90  Pittsb.Leg.J.  614. 

34  C.J.  p  414  note  71. 

Where  issues  were  sharply  con- 
tested, issues  should  not  have  been 
resolved  on  affidavits  and  motion 
should  have  been  denied  without 
prejudice  to  plenary  action  to  vacate 
judgment  since  in  such  an  action, 
court  could  afford  adequate  protec- 
tion to  the  parties. — Smith  v.  Kent, 
18  N.T.S.2d  262,  259  App.Div.  117. 

Plaintiff  entitled  to  hearing 

Where  defendant  against  whom  a 
judgment  on  confession  without  an 
action  had  been  entered  made  ap- 
plication to  vacate  such  judgment, 
plaintiff  was  entitled  to  an  oppor- 
tunity to  present  the  facts  in  con- 
nection with  the  execution,  delivery, 
and  filing  of  the  confession  of  judg- 
ment and  the  entry  thereof. — Gotham 
Credit  Corporation  v.  Ferdman,  13  N. 
T.S.2d  1011. 

Granting  realignment  and  taking 
additional  depositions  at  hearing  on 
matter  of  opening  judgment  entered 
by  confession  held  discretionary. — 
Holland  Furnace  Co.  v.  Gabriel,  157 
A.  373,  102  Pa.Super.  578. 

Testimony  offered 

Where  answer  accompanying  mo- 
tion to  vacate  judgment  showed 
grounds  for  vacation,  court  should 
have  heard  testimony  offered. — Can- 
ton'Implement  €o.  v.  Rauh,  175  N. 
E.  230,  37  Ohio  App.  544. 


325 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


It  has  been  held,  however,  that  the  question  of  a 
meritorious  defense  is  to  be  determined  solely  on 
the  affidavits  submitted  in  support  of  the  applica- 
tion,45 and  that  for  such  purpose  the  allegations  of 
the  affidavits  are  to  be  taken  as  true*46  Under  this 
rule  a  showing  sufficient  to  warrant  opening  the 
judgment  is  made  where  the  evidence  contained  in 
the  affidavits  in  support  of  the  application  makes 
out  a  prima  facie  defense  to  the  claim  for  which 
judgment  was  entered.47 

Counter-affidavits  in  opposition  to  those  submitted 
in  support  of  the  application  may  be  received  and 
considered  where  the  question  involved  is  purely 
one  for  the  court,48  and  the  court  may  refuse  to 
disturb  the  judgment  if  the  counter-affidavits  are 
as  strong  and  convincing  as  the  affidavits  of  the 
moving  party,49  but  it  has  been  held  that  counter- 

45.    111.— Walrus  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Wilcox, 
25   N.E.2d    132,    303   IlLApp.   286. 


affidavits  cannot  be  considered  on  the  question  of 
the  merits  of  defendant's  proposed  defense.50 

b.  Presumptions  and  Burden  of  Proof 

Ordinarily  in  a  proceeding  to  open  or  vacate  a  con- 
fessed  judgment  the  burden  of  proof  Is  on  the  appli- 
cant. 

As  a  general  rule  the  party  who  moves  to  have  a 
judgment  by  confession  opened  or  vacated  must  as- 
sume the  burden  of  proving  the  facts  on  which  he 
relies  as  the  ground  of  his  application,51  except  that 
in  some  jurisdictions,  where  defendant  alleges  that 
the  note  on  which  the  judgment  was  entered  is  a 
forgery,  the  burden  of  establishing  the  genuineness 
of  the  note  is  on  plaintiff  in  the  judgment.52  Gen- 
eral presumptions  and  inferences  of  fact  apply,58 
including  the  presumption  in  favor  of  the  regularity 
and  validity  of  a  judgment.54 


Bight  to  cross-examine 

A  defendant  seeking  to  vacate 
judgment  agaJnst  him  by  confession 
on  a  cognovit  in  a  lease  cannot  be 
examined  by  counsel  for  plaintiff  on 
hearing  of  motion  to  vacate. — Stone 
v.  Levinson,  228  IlLApp.  342. 

46.  111.— Walrus  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Wilcox, 
25   N.E.2d   132,    303   IlLApp.   286. 
Facts  lint  not  conclusions  or  de- 
ductions In  affidavit  must  be  taken 
as   true. — Automobile   Supply  Co.   v. 
Scene-in- Action   Corporation,   172   N. 
E.  35,  340  111.  196,   69  A.L.R.  1085. 

47.  111.— Ruwisch  v.  Theis,  60  N.B. 
2d  108,  325  IlLApp.  307— Nudelman 
v.   Haimowltz,   52   N.E.2d   822,   321 
IlLApp.   306— Bauer  v.   Parker,   17 
N.E.2d   336,    297    IlLApp.    80— Sha- 
piro v.  Masor,  242  IlLApp.  63. 

Showing  held  sufficient 
111.— Becker  v.  Ketter,  56  N.E.2d  649, 
•     323  IlLApp.  656. 
Showing  held  insufficient 
HI. — Davis  v.  Mosbacher,  252  IlLApp. 
536. 

48.  HI.— Jankovich   v.    Lajevich,    57 
N.E.2d  216,  324  IlLApp.  85— Stran- 
ak    v.    Tomasovic,    32   N.E.2d   994, 
309  IlLApp.  177— Elaborated  Ready 
Roofing  Co.  v.  Hunter,  262  IlLApp. 
380. 

34  C.J.  p  416  note  94. 
Allegations  deemed  admitted 

(1)  Where     no     counter-affidavits 
are  filed,   the  court  must  accept  as 
true    the   material   allegations   in   a 
verified    motion    to    vacate   a   judg- 
ment by  confession  on  a  note. — Gil- 
more  v.  Mix,  67  N.E.2d  313,  329  I1L 
App.  177. 

(2)  In  proceeding  by  defendant  to 
vacate    plaintiff's    confession    judg- 
ment,   the    truth   of   allegations   of 
material  facts  contained  in  plaintiff's 
counter-affidavit  was  necessarily  ad- 
mitted, where  such  allegations  were 


not  denied  in  defendant's  additional 
affidavit.— May  v.  Chas.  O.  Larson 
Co.,  26  N.E.2d  139,  304  IllApp.  137. 

(3)  Where    plaintiff  failed    to   file 
a    counter-affidavit    in     defense    of 
judgment,   case   was  properly  heard 
on  motion  to  vacate  and  supporting 
affidavit. — Doss    v.    Sievers,    14   N.E. 
2d  677,  295  IlLApp.  107. 

(4)  If   defendants   placed   applica- 
tion to  open  confession  judgment  on 
argument  list  for  disposition  on  pe- 
tition   and    answer,    pertinent    facts 
set  forth  in  answer  could  be  accept- 
ed as  true. — Matovich  v.  Gradich,  187 
A.  65,  123  Pa.Super.  355. 

49.  111.— Morgan  v.  Bark  Nat.  Bank, 
.  44  IlLApp.  582. 

34  C.J.  p  416  note  95. 

50.  Colo. — Parham  v.   Johnson,    292 
P.    599,    88    Colo.   127— Mitchell   v. 
Byers  State  Bank,  252  P.   887,  81 
Colo.  4— Mitchell  v.  Miller,  252  P. 
886,  81  Colo.  1. 

111.— Fidler  v.  Kennedy,  62  N.E.2d 
10,  326  IlLApp.  449— Bankers  Bldg. 
v.  Bishop,  61  N.E.2d  276,  326  111. 
App.  256,  certiorari  denied  Bishop 
v.  Bankers  Bldg.,  66  S.Ct  1352— 
Kolmar,  Inc.,  v.  Moore,  55  N.E.2d 
524,  323  IlLApp.  323— Stranak  v. 
Tomasovic,  32  N.E.2d  994,  309  111. 
App.  177— Mutual  Life  of  Illinois 
v.  Little,  227  IlLApp.  436— Conti- 
nental Const  Co.  v.  Henderson 
County  Public  Service  Co.,  227  111. 
App.  43. 
Purpose  of  role 

The  rule  preventing  use  of  coun- 
ter-affidavits going  to  the  merits  of 
defense   on   motion  to   vacate  judg- 
ment entered  by  confession  was  in- 
tended to  prevent  depriving  a  party 
of   the   right   of  a  trial  by  jury. — 
Walrus  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  25  N.E.2d 
132,  303  IlLApp.  286. 
61.    Md.— Hart  v.  Hart,  166  A.  414, 
165   Md.   77— Cardwell-Fisher  Fix- 
ture  Co.   v.  Commerce  Trust  Co., 
141  A.  121,  154  Md.  366. 

590 


Pa.— Boggs  v.  Levin,  146  A.  533, 
297  Pa.  131 — Warren  Sav.  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Foley,  144  A.  84.  294 
Pa.  176 — Pacific  Lumber  Co.  of  Il- 
linois v.  Rodd.  135  A.  122,  287 
Pa,  454 — Babcock  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Allison,  7  A.2d  374,  136  PsuSuper. 
353— Fish  v.  Kaye,  4  A.2d  190,  134 
Pa. Super.  49 — Matovich  v.  Gradich, 
187  A.  65,  123  Pa.Super.  355— 
Lukac  v.  Morris,  164  A.  834,  108 
Pa.Super.  453— First  Credit  Cor- 
poration v.  Lindstrom,  Com.PL,  31 
Del.Co.  202 — Eastern  Light  Co.  v. 
Wojciechowski,  Com.PL,  36  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  233— Fidelity-Philadel- 
phia Trust  Co.  v.  Watkins,  62 
Montg.Co.  191 — Campbell  v.  Die- 
rolf,  Com.PL,  58  Montg.Co.  144 — 
Heyer-Kemner,  Inc.,  v.  Sachs,  Com. 
PL,  57  Montg.Co.  73— First  Nat 
Bank  v.  Reidinger,  Com.PL,  14 
Northumb.Leg.J.  22 — Canfield  v. 
Hornung,  Com.PL,  9  Sen. Reg.  Ill — 
Perrino  v.  Benmtre,  ConxPL,  28 
WestCo.  113. 

34  C.J.  p  414  note  72. 

52.  Pa. — Mutual    Building    &    Loan 
Ass'n  of  Shenandoah   v.  Walukie- 
wicz,    185    A.    648,    322    Pa.    240— 
Jones  &  Sons,  Inc.  v.  Rishkofski, 
Com.PL,    37    Luz.Leg.Reg.    229. 

34  C.J.  p  414  note  73. 

53.  111.— Rixmann  v.  Witwer,  63  N. 
E.2d    607,    327    IlLApp.    205. 

Pa, — Little  v.  Gardner-Denver  Co., 
Com.  PL,  41  Lack.Jur.  9. 

54.  N.J.— Stetz   v.   Googer,    18   A.23 
416,  126  N.J.Law  213. 

N.M.— Hot    Springs    Nat.    Bank    v. 

Kenney,  48  P.2d  1029,  39  N.M.  428. 
Judgment  entered  in  vacation 

The  same  presumptions  exist  in 
favor  of  a  judgment  by  confession 
entered  in  term  time  as  in  case  of  a 
judgment  entered  by  service  of  proc- 
ess, but  the  rule  is  different  where 
judgment  is  entered  by  confession  in 
vacation. — Rixmann  v.  Witwer,  6& 
N.E.2d  607,  327  IlLApp.  205. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  325 


c.  Admissibility  and  Weight  and  Sufficiency 

The  general  rules  of  admlsslbllity  of  evidence  apply 
In  proceedings  to  open  or  vacate  a  confessed  Judgment; 
and  the  court  will  open  or  set  aside  the  Judgment  where, 
and  only  where,  there  Is  clear,  positive,  and  satisfactory 
evidence'  of  the  grounds  alleged  In  the  petition  or  mo- 
tion and  of  the  existence  of  a  meritorious  defense. 

The  general  rules  relating  to  the  relevancy,  ma- 
teriality, and  competency  of  the  evidence  in  civil  ac- 


tions apply  in  determining  the  admissibility  of  evi- 
dence.55 

It  has  been  held  that  the  measure  of  proof  re- 
quired to  open  a  judgment  by  confession  cannot  be 
defined  by  rule,56  that  the  court  will  open  or  set 
aside  the  judgment  where,  and  only  where,  there 
is  clear,  positive,  and  satisfactory  evidence  of  the 
grounds  alleged  in  the  petition  or  motion  and  of 
the  existence  of  a  meritorious  defense,57  and  that 


65.    Del. — Dolby  v.  Whaley,    197   A. 

181,  9  W.W.Harr.  155. 
HI.— First    Nat.    Bank   v.    Galbraith, 

271  IlLApp.  240. 
Md.— Denton  Nat  Bank  of  Maryland 

v.  Lynch,  142  A.  103,  155  Md.  333. 
Pa.— Hoffman  v.  Winston,  86  Pa.Su- 

per.  130— Wetzel  v.  Keefer,  20  Pa. 

Dist.  &  Co.  576,  11  Northumb.Leg. 

J.  379. 
34  C.J.  P  414  note  76. 

Comparison  of  disputed  signature 
to  note  with  admitted  signatures  of 
purported  signer  and  peculiarities 
of  such  signature  were  proper  mat- 
ters for  jury's  consideration  .on  ap- 
plication to  open  Judgment  by  con- 
fession thereon.— First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Albright,  170  A,  370,  111  Pa.Super. 
392. 

Consideration  of  testimony,  not 
technically  admissible  under  petition 
to  open  confessed  judgment,  and  or- 
der reopening  case  for  further  tes- 
timony, without  requiring  amend- 
ment is  not  error. — Johnson  v.  Nip- 
pert,  133  A.  150,  286  Pa.  175. 
Pleadings  as  evidence 

Motion  to  vacate  judgment  and  ac- 
companying answer  are  not  evidence, 
but  are  only  basis  for  proof  to  be 
offered  thereon. — Canton  Implement 
Co.  v.  Rauh,  175  N.H.  230,  37  Ohio 
App.  544. 

Payments  on  note  may  %e  shown 
on  rule  to  open  judgment  thereon 
and  determine  amount  due  after  al- 
lowing credit  for  payments. — Keiber 
v.  Keiber,  90  Pa.Super.  116. 

56.  Pa.— Jacob  v.  Corey,   88  Pa.Su- 
per.  605. 

34  C.J.  p  415  note  79. 

57.  Pa.— Schmitt  v.  Tuhazy,  84  Pa. 
Super.   76-nJohnstown  &  Somerset 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Mostollar,  83  Pa.Super. 
492 — Sugarman  v.  Baldini,  Com.Pl., 
28  West.Co.  41. 

Wis.— Harris  v.  Golliner,  294  N.W.  9, 

235  Wis.  572. 
34  C.J.  p  414  note  78. 
Answer  not  responsive 

In  proceeding  on  petition  to  va- 
cate a.  judgment  obtained  on  a  judg- 
ment note,  on  ground  of  failure  of 
consideration,  wherein  plaintiff  filed 
answer  which  was  evasive  in  not 
averring  real  consideration  for  the 
note,  plaintiff  was  held  to  a  higher 
degree,  of  proof  since  his  answer 


not  responsive. — Welch  V.  Sultez,  13 
A.2d  399,  338  Pa.  683. 
Negligence   'barring   defense 

Testimony  of  defendant,  denying 
his  signature  of  note  sued  on,  as  to 
presence  of  rubber  stamp  facsimile 
of  his  signature  on  his  desk,  did  not 
show  negligence  barring  defense  of 
forgery  as  matter  of  law. — First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Albright  170  A.  370, 
111  Pa.Super.  392. 

{Pleadings  <as  well  as  evidence  may 
be  taken  into  consideration  to  deter- 
mine whether  meritorious  defense  is 
indicated.— Lloyd  v.  Jacoby,  39  A.2d 
525,  156  Pa.Super.  105.* 

Evidence  held  sufficient  to  author- 
ize or  require  opening  of  judgment. 
Md.— Denton    Nat.    Bank    of    Mary- 
land v.  Lynch,  142  A.  103,  155  Md. 
333— Cardwell-Fisher    Fixture    Co. 
v.  Commerce  Trust  Co.,  141  A.  121, 
154   Md.    366— Automobile   Broker- 
age  Corporation   v.   Myer,    139   A. 
539,  154  Md.  1. 
N.Y.— Delaney  v.  Wyman,  251  N.Y.S. 

5,  232  App.Div.  607. 
Pa.— Points  •  v.  Gibboney,  17  A.2d 
365,  340  Pa.  522— Lansford  Build- 
ing &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Sheerin,  190 
A.  901,  325  Pa.  474— Austen  v. 
Marzolf,  143  A.  908,  294  Pa.  226 
—Humbert  v.  Meyers,  123  A,  733, 
279  Pa.  171— Riedrich  v.  Mistarz, 
13  A.2d  106,  140  Pa.Super.  73— 
Rosenblum  v.  Edwards,  8  A.2d  468, 
137  Pa.Super.  33— Michaels  v.  Mor- 
itz,  200  A.  176,  131  Pa.Super.  426 — 
Messmer  v.  McLaughlin,  186  A. 
286,  122  Pa.Super.  531— First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Albright,  170  A.  370,  111 
Pa.Super.  392— White  Co.  v.  Fran- 
cis, 95  Pa.Super.  315— Farling  v. 
Urich,  84  Pa.Super.  105— Boyer  v. 
Community  Park  Ass'n  of  Gratz, 
Pennsylvania,  Com.Pl.,  45  Dauph, 
Co.  23— Boyer  v.  Bellis,  Com.Pl.,  45 
Dauph.Co.  21 — Fisher  v.  Bonini, 
Com.Pl.,  39  Lack.Jur.  170— Lumley 
v.  Barrett,  Com.Pl.,  19  Leh.L.J. 
166— National  Radiator  Corpora- 
tion v.  Rydzewski,  Com.Pl.,  36  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  114— Bronson  v.  Milman, 
Com.Pl.,  36  Luz.Leg.Reg.  33— 
Ransberry,  to  the  use  of  Rans- 
berry,  v.  Pre<Jmore,  Com.Pl.,  1 
Monroe  L.R.  141— Lorey  v.  Kauff- 
xnan,  Com.Pl.,  57  Montg.Co.  57 — 
Kerr  v.  Bmch,  Com.Pl.,  91  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  245— Bbert  v.  Wayne,  Com. 
PL,  86  Pittsb.Leg.J.  34— McCooll  v. 

591 


Chowanes,  Com.Pl.,  8  Sch.Reg.  165 
— Williamsport  Auto  Parts  Co.  v. 
Sprenkle,  Com.PL,  54  York  Leg. 
Rec.  154. 

Va. — Hartman  v.  Melfa  Banking  Co., 
174  S.B.  653,  162  Va.  433. 
Evidence   held   insufficient    to   au- 
thorize or  require  opening  of  judg- 
ment. 
111.— Davis  v.  Mosbacher,  252  ULApp. 

536. 

Pa.— Kait  v.  Rose,  41  A.2d  750,  351 
Pa.  560 — Pierce,  to  Use  of  Snipes 
v.  Kaseman,  192  A.  105,  326  Pa. 
280 — Schuylkill  Trust  Co.  v.  Sobo- 
lewski,  190  A.  919,  325  Pa.  422— 
Hallgarten  &  Co.  v.  Schwing,  185 
A.  753,  322  Pa.  255— Spanko  v. 
Trisick,  160  A,  718,  307  Pa.  166— 
Helzlsouer  v.  Golub,  160  A.  118, 
306  Pa.  474— Hein  v.  Fetzer,  152  A. 
388,  301  Pa.  403— Merit  Square 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Atkins, 
149  A.  315,  299  Ba.  244— Certelli  v. 
Braum,  144  A.  403,  294  Pa.  488— 
Tradesmens  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Lewis,  34  A.2d  818,  154  Pa. 
Super.  17 — Greiner  v.  Brubaker,  30 
A.2d  621,  151  Pa.Super.  515,  certio- 
rari  denied  Royer  v.  Greiner,  64  S. 
Ct  42,  320  U.S.  742,  88  L.Bd.  440, 
rehearing  denied  64  S.Ct.  194,  320 
U.S.  813,  88  L.Ed.  491,  rehearing 
denied  64  S.Ct.  434,  320  U.S.  816, 
88  L.Ed.  493— Fish  v.  Kaye,  4  A.2d 
190,  134  Pa.Super.  49 — Kienberger 
v.  Lally,  198  A.  453,  130  Pa.Super. 
583— Landis  v.  Hoch,  164  A.  828, 
108  Pa.Super.  285 — International 
Finance  Co.  v.  Magilansky,  161  A. 
613,  105  Pa.Super.  309— Public  Se- 
curity Co.  v.  Turnbull,  100  Pa- 
Super.  367 — Seidel  v.  Welzel,  94 
Pa.Super.  345 — Kaufman  v.  Leh- 
man, 94  Pa.Super.  306 — Art-Ascep- 
tible  Furniture  Co.  v.  Maratta,  94 
Pa.Super.  263 — Cramer  Oil  Burner 
Co.  v.  Ferguson,  89  Pa. Super.  471 
— Grotefend  v.  Valley  Laundry  Co., 
88  Pa.Super.  510 — C.  Trevor  Dun- 
ham, Inc.  v.  Pursel,  12  Pa.Dist  & 
Co.  425 — Commercial  Credit  Co.  v. 
Toung,  Com.Pl.f  31  Berks  Co.  326 — 
Durbin  v.  Connelly,  Com.Pl.,  55 
Dauph.Co.  349^— Warshall  Bros.  v. 
Hall,  Com.Pl.,  36  Luz.Leg.Reg.  261 
— Schrader  v.  Schrader,  Com,Pl.,  36 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  821— Roth  v.  Mirmak, 
Com.Pl.,  33  Lu2LLeg.Reg.  480 — 
Beckman  v.  Ciapko,  Com.PL,  33 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  348 — Whitenight  Cor- 


325 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  grounds  relied  on  for  opening  or  setting  aside 
the  judgment  must  be  established  by  a  preponder- 
ance of  the  evidence.58  It  has  also  been  held  that 
applicant  is  entitled  to  relief  where  the  evidence  es- 
tablishes that  there  is  a  real  and  substantial  con- 
flict as  to  the  merits  of  the  claim  for  which  the 
judgment  was  entered.59  The  test  has  been  held 
to  be  whether  or  not  the  evidence  would  justify  a 
verdict  or  decree  in  defendant's  favor  on  the  mer- 
its;60 the  mere  fact  alone  that  there  is  a  conflict 
of  evidence  is  not  sufficient,61  and  the  judgment 
should  not  be  opened  where  the  preponderance  of 
the  evidence  is  against  defendant,62  or  where  the 
moving  partys  testimony  is  contradicted,  and  is  in 
no  way  corroborated.63 

On  the  other  hand,  the  judgment  should  be  opened 


and  defendant  allowed  a  trial  where  he  has  made 
out  a  case  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  suf- 
ficient to  sustain  a  verdict  in  his  favor,6*  or  where 
the  evidence  is  such  that  the  contested  matter  is  in 
such  doubt  as  would  warrant  submitting  the  issue 
to  a  jury,65  or  where  defendant,  although  contra- 
dicted, presents  evidence,  which,  if  true,  constitutes 
a  good  defense  to  the  judgment,  and  such  evidence 
is  corroborated  by  one  or  more  witnesses  or  cir- 
oftnstances.66 

Where  the  claim  for  which  judgment  was  entered 
is  attacked  for  fraud,  it  has  been  held  that  the  evi- 
dence of  fraud  must  be  clear,  precise,  and  indubita- 
ble.67 It  has  also  been  held  that,  where  there  is 
clear  evidence  to  sustain  the  averment  of  forgery, 
the  judgment  should  be  opened,  notwithstanding 
such  evidence  is  contradicted.68  More  than  a  pre- 


poratlon  v.  Brezna,  Com.Pl.,  33 
Luz.Leff.Reg.  48 — Campbell  v.  Die- 
rolf,  Com.Pl.,  58  Montg.Co.  144 — 
Heyer-Kemner,  Inc.,  v.  Sachs,  Com. 
PL,  57  Montg.Co.  73 — International 
Finance  Co.  v.  Barnes,  Com.  PI.,  86 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  44— McBurney  v.  Wil- 
liams, Com.PU  22  Wash.Co.  199— 
Deardorff  v.  Witmer,  Com.PL,  57 
York  Leg.Rec.  94— Minet  Motor 
Co.  v.  Lehu,  Com.Pl.,  54  York  Leg. 
Rec.  3. 
34  C.J.  p  414  note  78  [a]. 

68.    Pa. — Jacob  v.   Corey,   83   Pa.Su- 

per.  605. 
34  C.J.  p  415  note  80. 

59.  Md. — Finance  Co.  of  America  v. 
Myerly,    155   A.   148,   161   Md.   23— 
Cardwell-Fisher     Fixture     Co.     v. 
Commerce   Trust  Co.,   141  A.   121, 
154  Md  366. 

Ohio. — Mosher  v.  Goss,  App.,  60  N.B. 

2d  730. 

If  proper  prima  facie  grounds  for 
opening  of  judgment  are  shown  at 
hearing,  rule  to  open  judgment  is 
made  absolute. — Miles  v.  Lay  ton,  193 
A.  567,  8  W.W.Harr.,  Del.,  411,  112 
A.L.R.  786. 

60.  Pa.— Williams   v.   Caples,   12  A. 
2d    566,    338    Pa.    451— Gardner   v. 
Salem,    187    A.    94,    123    Pa,Super, 
418— Landis   v.   Hoch,    164   A.   828, 
108  Pa. Super.  285 — Schultz  v.  Rud- 
man,   81   Pa.Super.   239 — Durbin  v. 
Connelly,     Com.Pl.,     55    Dauph.Co. 
349 — Soutter    v.    Soutter,    Com.Pl., 
52   Dauph.Co.    359 — Palumbo   Real- 
tors v.   Occulto,  Com.PL,   46  Lack. 
Jur.   66 — Household  Finance  Corp. 
v.  Krzywicki,  Com.Pl.,  38  Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  436 — Bokin  v.  Rusackas,  Com. 
PI.,  32  X.uz.Leg.Reg.  321. 

34  C.J.  p  415  note  81. 

61.  Pa. — Stoner  v.  Sley  System  Ga- 
rages,  46  A,2d   172,   353   Pa.   532— 
Machalicka  v.   Lukasevic,   81  A.2d 
164,  346  Pa.  487— Michaels  v.  Mor- 
itz,  200  A.  176,  131  Pa.Super.  426— 
Lukao  v.  Morris,   164  A.   834,  108 


Pa.Super.  453 — Schultz  v.  Rudman, 
81  Pa.Super.  239— Wayne  Title  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Sweet,  Com.Pl.,  32 
Del.Co.  106— Mid-City  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Wear,  Com.Pl.,  31 
Del. Co.  219-rLandau  Bros.  v.  Rev- 
itt,  Com.Pl.,  33  Luz.Leg.Reg.  64— 
Whitenight  Corporation  v.  Brezna, 
Com.Pl.,  33  Luz.Leg.Reg.  48 — King 
v.  Van  Sciver,  Com. PI.,  62  Montg. 
Co.  141. 

34  C.J.  p  415  note  82. 
Oath  against  oath. 

There  must  be  more  than  oath 
against  oath  or  mere  conflict  of  tes- 
timony.— Sferra  v.  Urling,  188  A. 
185,  324  Pa,  344— Mutual  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  of  Shenandoah  v.  Wa- 
lukiewicz,  185  A.  648,  322  Pa.  240— 
Van  Scoten  v.  Botsford  &  Kunes,  98 
Pa.Super.  270 — Voegler  v.  Klingen- 
smith  Co.,  88  Pa.Super.  34 — Schultz 
v.  Rudman,  81  Pa.Super.  239 — Mary- 
land Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Gonzales 
Coal  Mining  Co.,  12  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
311 — Spangler  v.  Zimmerman,  Com. 
PI.,  50  Dauph.Co.  93 — Silver  v.  Palm- 
er, Com.Pl.,  49  Dauph.Co.  219 — Lack- 
awanna  Thrift  &  Loan  Corporation 
v.  Katsanis,  Com.Pl.,  45  Lack. Jur. 
169 — Cassalia  v.  Dushney,  Com.Pl., 
40  Lack.  Jur.  131 — Heyer-Kemner, 
Inc.,  v.  Sachs,  Com.Pl,,  57  Montg. 
Co.  73 — Deardorff  v.  Witmer,  Com. 
PI.,  57  York  Leg.Rec.  94. 

62.  Pa. — Eagler  v.  Cherewfka,  86 
Pa.Super.  122 — Durbin  v.  Connelly, 
Com.PL.  55  Dauph.Co.  349. 

34  C.J.  p  415  note  83. 

68.  Pa.— Fish  v.  Kaye,  4  A.2d  190, 
134  Pa. Super,  49 — Snyder  v.  Ar- 
nold, 36  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  689— Miller 
v.  Leonard,  Com.Pl.,  48  Lanc.Rev. 
337. 

34  OJ.  p  415  notes  84,  85. 
Single  witness  im.corro'borated 

Application  was  denied  where 
supported  only  by  the  oath  of  de- 
fendant without  corroborative  cir- 
cumstances, or  circumstances  from 

592 


which  inferences  could  be  drawn 
corroborative  of  his  statements. — 
Chubb  v.  Kelly,  80  Pa,Super.  487— 
Rasp  v.  Rasp,  79'  Pa.Super.  29. 

64.  Pa.— -Heimgartner  v.  Stewart,  3T 
A.  93,  180  Pa.  500. 

34  C.J.  p  415  note  86. 

65.  Pa.— Stoner  v.  Sley  System  Ga- 
rages,  46  A.2d  172,   353   Pa.   532 — 
Arata    v.    Wright,    101    Pa.Super. 
575— Webber,   Inc.  v.   Gehry,   Com. 
PI.,   38   Berks   Co.  135— Soutter  v. 
Soutter,  Com.Pl.,  -52  Dauph.Co.  359 
— Dailey    v.    Woods,    Com.Pl.,    28 
Brie   Co.    337— Ecoma    Building   & 
Loan   v.   Klemm,  Com.Pl.,   21  Brie 
Co.     153 — Munson     v.     Mummart, 
Com.Pl.,    7    Fay.L.J.    27 — Graft    v. 
Bell,  Com.Pl.,  6  Fay.L.J.  91— Flam- 
mer  v.  Smith,  Com.Pl.,   19   Leh.L. 
J.      271 — Heyer-Kemner,     Inc.,     v. 
Sachs,   Com.Pl.,   57   Montg.Co.    73. 

34  C.J.  p  415  note  87. 

60,    Pa,— Ritter    v.    Henry,    17    Pa. 

Dist.  &  Co.  528. 
34  C.J.  p  415  note  88. 

67.  Pa. — Exchange    Bank    &    Trust 
Co.  v.  Bartley,  39  A.2d  833,  350  Pa. 
585 — Reidlinger    v.    Cameron,    134 
A.    418,    287    Pa.    24— McEnery    v. 
Nahlen,  Com.PL,  21  Brie  Co.  172— 
Security  'Finance  Co.  v.  Stradnick, 
•Com.PL,  35  Luz.Leg.Reg.  308. 

Evidence  heia  sufficient 

Pa.— Simcoe  v.  Szukegs,  13  A.2d  103, 

140      Pa.  Super.      75 — Werner      v. 

Deutsch,  7  A.2d  511,  135  Pa.Super. 

519. 

Evidence  held  Insufficient 
Pa, — Exchange  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 

Bartley,  39  A.2d  833,  350  Pa.  585. 

68.  Pa, — Austen  v.   Marzolf,   143  A. 
908,  294  Pa.  226— Levy  v.  Gilligan, 
90  A.   647,  244  Pa.  272— Bailey  v. 
Brown,  Com.Pl.,  €2  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
56. 

Evidence  may  establish  that  in- 
strument 18  not  a  forgery;  there  is 
no  inflexible  rule  requiring  court  to 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  326 


ponderance  of  evidence  is  required  to  open  a  jtidg-" 
ment  by  confession  on  a  note  given  in  settlement.6^ 

The  sufficiency  of  evidence  to  show  various  mat- 
ters has  been  adjudicated  in  particular  cases.70 

§  326.    Hearing,  Determination,  and  Re- 
lief 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  Judgment  Is  to 


be  determined  In  accordance  with  equitable  principles, 
and  its  determination  rests  largely  in  the  sound  discre- 
tion of  the  court. 

It  is  generally  held  that  an  application  to  open  or 
vacate  a  judgment  by  confession  should  be  deter- 
mined in  accordance  with  equitable  principles,71  and 
that  the  disposition  of  the  application  rests  largely 
within  the  sound  discretion  of  the  court,72  whose 
determination  will  not  be  disturbed  except  for  abuse 


open  judgment  entered  on  a  warran' 
of  attorney  on  an  averment  of  forg- 
ery.— Mutual  Building-  &  Loan  Ass'r, 
of  Shenandoah  v.  Walukiewicz,  18? 
A.  648,  322  Pa.  240— -Jones  &  Sons  v 
Rishkofski,  Pa.,  Com.Pl.,  37  Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  229 — Schrader  v.  Schrader,  Pa. 
Com.Pl.,  35  Luz.Leg.Reg.  321. 

Evidence  held  to  establish  gen- 
Fineness  of  instrument. — Mutual 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  of  Shenan- 
doah v.  Walukiewicz,  185  A.  648,  322 
Pa,  240. 
Weight  given  to  note  itself 

Under  defense  of  forgery,  note  is 
given  no  weight  of  itself,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  proof  that  defendant  actual- 
ly signed  it. — Austen  v.  Marzolf,  143 
A.  908,  294  Pa,  226. 

.69.    U.S.— Willett  v.  Fister,  D.C.,  18 

Wall.  91,  21  L,Ed.  304. 
Pa,— English's  Appeal,  13  A,  479,  119 

Pa,  533,  4  Am.S.R.  656. 

70.  Evidence  held  sufficient 

Md. — Card  well-Fisher  Fixture  Co.  v. 

Commerce   Trust  Co.,    141   A.    121, 

154  Md.  366. 
Pa,— Thompson   v.   Qarns,    93   Pa.Su- 

per.     575 — Eastern   -Light    Co.    v. 

Wojciechowski,    Com.Pl.f    36    Luz. 

Leg. Reg.    233 — Sugarman    v.    Bal- 

dini,  Com.Pl.,  28  WestCo.  41. 
Evidence  held  insufficient 
Colo.— Lucero  v.  Smith,  132  P.2d  791, 

110  Colo.  165. 
Pa.— Kienberger  v.  Lally,  198  A.  453, 

130     Pa.Super.    583— Hobart    Mfg. 

Co.  v.  Rodziewicz,  189  A.  $80,  125 

Pa.Super.  240. 
Former  verdict 

Verdict  in  action  of  scire  facias 
sur  mortgage  which  was  set  aside  by 
court  as  against  weight  of  evidence 
was  without  persuasive  force  in  sub- 
sequent proceeding  on  rule  to  show 
cause  why  judgment  entered  on  bond 
accompanying  mortgage  under  war- 
rant of  attorney  should  not  be 
opened. — Schuylkill  Trust  Co.  v. 
Sobolewski,  190  A.  919,  325  Pa,  422 
—New  York  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 
v.  Kegerise,  Pa.Com.Pl.,  29  Berks  Co. 
296— Gapes  v.  Lawrenitis,  Pa. Com. 
PL,  4  Sch.Reg.  403. 

71.  Del.— Chandler  v.   Miles,   193  A. 
576,  8  W.W.Harr.  431. 

111. — Browning   v.    Spurrier,    245    111. 

App.  276. 
Pa.—Perfect  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 

v.    Mandel,    29    A.2d    48-4,    345    Pa. 

616 — Horn  v.  Witherspoon,   192  A. 

49  C.J.S.— 38 


654,  327  Pa,  295— Mutual  Buildin- 
&  Loan  Ass'n  of  Shenandoah  v 
Walukiewicz,  185  A.  648,  322  Pa 
240 — Mielcuszny  v.  Rosol,  176  A 
236,  317  Pa.  91 — Babcock  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Allison,  7  A.2d  374,  136  Pa. 
Super.  353 — Miller  v.  Mastrocola,  2 
A.2d  550,  133  Pa.Super.  210— Kien- 
berger  v.  Lally,  198  A.  453,  130 
Pa.Super.  583 — Burger,  for  Use  of 
Henderson,  v.  Township  of  'Free- 
dom, 190  A.  387,  12-6  Pa.Super.  128 
— Gardner  v.  Salem,  187  A.  94,  123 
Pa.  Super.  418 — Jacob  v.  Corey,  83 
Pa.-Super.  605— Bates  v.  Kirk,  83 
Pa. Super.  $73 — Luce  v.  Reed  Col- 
liery Co.,  T8  Pa,Super.  248 — Bailey 
V;  Brown,  52  Pa.t>ist.  &  Co.  56— 
McBnery  v.  Nahlen,  Com.PL,  21 
Erie  Co.  172 — Holland  Furnace  Co. 
v.  Davis,  Com.Pl.,  7  Sch.Reg.  297. 
34  C.J.  p  408  note  78. 
Rsmedial  action 

Judgments  entered  by  confession 
on  warrant  of  attorney  are  in  nature 
of  summary  proceedings,  and  re- 
medial action  as  to  them  will  not  be 
unduly  limited. — Miles  v.  Lay  ton,  193 
A.  S67,  8  W.W.Harr.,DeL,  411,  112  A. 
L.R.'  786. 

Where  defendant  shows  no  equita- 
ble reasons  why  the  judgment  should 
not  have  been  rendered  against  him, 
the  court  will  not  inquire  as  to  er- 
rors in  rendering  the  judgment 
against  him  alone,  on  a  declaration 
against  him  and  another  jointly. — 
Robey  v.  Updyke,  61  111. App.  328. 

72.  Ala,— Kendrick  v.  Ward,  21  So. 
2d  676,  246  Ala,  550— Koonce  v. 
Arnold,  14  So.2d  512,  244  Ala.  513. 

Ariz. — Smith  v.  Washburn  &  Condon, 
297  P.  879,  38  Ariz.  149. 

Del.— Chandler  v.  Miles,  193  A.  576, 
8  W.W.Harr.  431. 

111.— Bankers  Bldg.  v.  Bishop,  61  N. 
E.2d  276,  326  1 11. App.  25-6,  certio- 
rari  denied  Bishop  v.  Bankers 
Bldg.,  66  S.Ct.  1352— Mayer  v. 
Tyler,  19  N.E.2d  211,  298  IlLApp. 
632— Automatic  Oil  Heating  Co.  v. 
Lee,  16  N.E.2d  919,  296  Ill.App.  628 
—First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Galbraith,  271 
IlLApp.  240— Mandel  Bros.  v.  Co- 
hen, 248  IlLApp.  188— Parent  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Oil  Products  Appliance  Co., 
246  IlLApp.  222— Handley  v.  Wil- 
son, 242  IlLApp.  66. 

Pa. — Stoner  v.  Sley  System  Garages, 
46  A.2d  172,  353  Pa.  532— Macha- 
licka  v.  Lukasevic,  31  A.2d  164, 
346  Pa.  487 — Kweller,  now  for  use 

593 


of  Caplan  v.  Becker,  12  A.2d  567, 
388  Pa.  189 — Bonebrake  v.  Koons, 
5  A.2d  184,  333  Pa,  443— Mutual 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  of  Shenan- 
doah v.  Walukiewicz,  IS 5  A.  648, 
322  Pa.  240 — George  v.  George,  178 
A.  25,  318  Pa.  203 — Mielcuszny  v. 
Rosol,  176  A.  236,  317  Pa,  91— 
William  B.  Rambo  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Dragone,  166  A.  888, 
311  Pa.  422— Spanko  v.  Trisick,  160 
A.  718,  307  Pa,  166— Stevenson  v. 
Dersam,  119  A.  491,  275  Pa.  412— 
Lloyd  v.  Jacoby,-39  A.2d  525,  156 
Pa.Super.  105— First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Mount  Holly  Springs  v.  Cumbler, 
21  A.2d  120,  145  Pa.Super.  595— 
Sprenger,  now  for  Use  of  Stoecker, 
v.  Litten,  15  A.2d  527,  142  Pa.Su- 
per. 194 — Babcock  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Allison,  7  A.2d  3fr4,  13-6  Pa.Super. 
353— Miller  v.  Mastrocola,  2  A.2d 
550,  133  Pa.Su.per.  210— Baker's 
Estate  v.  Woodworth,  198  A.  469, 
130  Pa.Super.  452 — Kienberger  v. 
Lally,  198  A.  453,  130  Pa. Super. 
5 S3— Philadelphia  Fixture  &  Equip- 
ment Corporation  v.  Carroll,  191  A. 
216,  126  PavSuper.  t54 — Burger,  for 
Use  of  Henderson  v.  Township  of 
Freedom,  190  A.  387,  126  Pa. Super. 
128 — Gardner  v.  Salem,  187  A,.  94» 
123  Pa.Super.  418 — Messmer  v.  Me- 
Laughlin,  186  A.  286,  122  PeuSuper. 
531— Landis  v.  Hoch,  164  A.  828, 
108  Pa. Super.  285 — Brady  v.  Lask- 
owsky,  90  'Pa,Super.  370 — Cramer 
Oil  Burner  Co.  v.  Ferguson,  89  Pa, 
Super.  471 — Jacob  v.  Corey,  83  Pa, 
Super.  605 — Bates  v.  Kirk,  83  Pa. 
Super.  273 — Luce  v.  Reed  Colliery 
Co.,  78  Pa,Super.  248 — Bailey  v. 
Brown,  52  Pa,Dist  &  Co.  56— » 
Klein  v.  Brookside  Distilling  Prod- 
ucts Corp.,  Com. PL,  47  Lack.Jur. 
165— South  Side  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Hornbaker,  Com.PL,  45  Lack. 
Jur.  197 — Keene  v.  Ryman,  Com. 
PL,  38  Lu2.Leg.Reg.  330 — Jones  & 
Sons,  Inc.  v.  Rishkofski,  Com.PL, 
37  LuzvLeg.Reg.  229— Williams- 
port  Auto  Parts  Co.  v.  Sprenkle, 
Com.PL,  54  York  Leg.Rec.  154— 
Minet  Motor  Co.  v.  Lehn,  Com.PL* 
54  York  Leg.Rec.  3. 

Wis.— Wessling  v.  Hieb,  192  N.W. 
458,  180  Wis.  160. 

34  C.J.  p  408  note  78. 

Prior  determination 

Judgment  debtor's  rule  to  show 
cause  why  confession  of  judgment 
should  not  be  stricken  off  and  money 
held  by  garnishee  decreed-  not  sub- 


326 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


of  discretion.7*  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held 
that  where  it  is  shown  that  defendant  has  a  good 
legal  defense,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  set  aside 
or  open  the  judgment  to  let  in  such  defense,  and  a 


refusal  to  do  so  is  erroneous.74 

The  court  may  determine  the  issues  itself75  or 
may  direct  an  issue  to  be  tried  by  a  jury.76  It  has 
been  held  that  the  court  in  submitting  an  issue  to 


ject  to  attachment  did  not  raise  de 
fense    on    merits    of   judgment,   and 
hence    order    discharging   such   rule 
was  not  res  judicata  precluding*  con 
sideration     of     subsequent     rule    to 
show    cause    why    judgment    should 
not  be  opened  and  debtor  let  into  a 
•defense. — Albert  M.  Greenfield  &  Co 
v.  Roberts,  5  A.2d  642,  135  Pa, Super 
328. 
73.    Ala,— Kendrick  v.  Ward,  21  So 

2d  -676,  246  Ala.  550. 

111. — Automatic   Oil    Heating  Co.    v 

Lee,    16    N.E.2d    919,    296    IlLApp 

628. 

Pa. — Bekelja  v.  James  E.  Strates 
Shows,  37  A.2d  502,  349  Pa.  442— 
Machalicka  v.  Lukasevic,  31  A.2d 
164,  346  Pa.  487— Perfect  Building 
&  :Loan  Ass'n  v.  Handel,  29  A.2c 
484,  345  Pa.  616— Kweller,  now  for 
Use  of  Caplan,  v.  Becker,  12  A.2d 
•567,  338  Pa.  169 — George  v.  George, 
178  A.  25,  318  Pa.  203— Lloyd  v. 
Jacoby,  39  A.2d  525,  156  Pa. Super. 
105 — First  Nat.  Bank  of  Mount 
Holly  Springs  v.  Cumbler,  21  A.2d 
120,  145  Pa.Super.  595 — Sprenger, 
now  for  Use  of  Stoecker,  v.  Litten, 
15  A.2d  527,  142  Pa.Super.  194— 
Foos  v.  Pogar  &  Pogar,  $4  Pa.Su- 
per. 54. 
Discretion,  of  court  must  rest  on 

competent  evidence 
Pa. — Baird  v.  Otto,  90  Pa.Super.  452. 
Opening  Judgment  of  revival 

Where  a  judgment  of  revival  is 
entered  on  a  confession  to  revive  an 
old  judgment,  and  evidence  is  of- 
fered in  support  of  the  petition  to 
open  that  the  confession  of  Judg- 
ment was  made  in  pursuance  of  a 
conspiracy  to  cheat  and  defraud,  it 
is  not  an  abuse,  of  discretion  for  the 
court  to  open  the  judgment  of  re- 
vival, but  such  order  should  not  in- 
clude the  original  judgment,  where 
the  petition  does  not  ask  that  it  be 
opened,  or  the  evidence  does  not 
call  for  any  interference  with  it. — 
McPherson  v.  Cole,  87  A.  70S,  240 
Pa,  444,  followed  in  87  A.  709,  240 
Pa,  448—34  C.J.  p  417  note  13. 
Discretion  held  not  abused 

(1)  By  opening  or  vacating  judg- 
ment. 
111. — Treager   v.    Totsch,    53    N.B.2d 

719,  322  m.App.  75. 
Md. — Silverberg  v.  Dearholt,  22  A.2d 

•588,  180  Md.  38. 

Pa. — Commonwealth  v.  Keirsted,  17 
A.2d  188,  .340  Pa.  512— E.  P.  Wil- 
bur Trust  Co.,  now  to  Use  of  Fed- 
eral Deposit  Ins.  Corporation,  v. 
Eberts,  10  A.2d  397,  337  Pa.  161— 
George  v.  George,  178  A.  25,  318 
Pa.  203— William  B.  Rambo  Build- 
ing &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Dragone,  16*6 


A.  888,  311  Pa.  422— Schline  v 
Kine,  152  A.  845,  301  Pa.  §86— 
Slattery  Bros.  v.  Powers,  131  A. 
859,  285  Pa.  286— <Lloyd  v.  Jacoby 
39  A.2d  525,  156  Pa.Super.  105— 
West,  for  Use  of  West  v.  Hotel 
Pennsylvania,  25  A.2d  593,  148  Pa. 
Super.  373 — Sprenger,  now  for  Use 
of  Stoecker,  v.  Litten,  15  A.2d  -527 
142  Pa.Super.  194 — Baker's  Estate 
v.  Woodworth,  198  A.  469,  130  Pa. 
Super.  4*52 — Heilman  v.  Ruther- 
ford, 158  A.  203,  103  Pa.Super.  595 
— Standard  QPurnace  Co.  v.  Roth, 
156  A.  600,  102  Pa.Super.  341— 
Commercial  Acceptance  Corpora- 
tion v.  Burrell,  87  Pa.Super.  571 
— Farting  v.  Urich,  84  Pa. Super. 
105. 

(2)  By  refusal  to  open  or  vacate 
judgment. 
Ariz. — Smith  v.  Washburn  &  Condon, 

297  P.  879,  38  Ariz.  149. 
N.M.— Hot  Springs  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Kenney,  48  P.2d  1029,  39  N.M.  428. 
Pa. — Berkowitz  v.  Kass,  40  A.2d  691, 
351  Pa.  263— Machalicka  v.  Luka- 
sevic, 31  A.2d  164,  346  Pa.  487— 
United  Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  James 
Bros.  Lumber  Co.,  191  A.  12,  325 
Pa.  469— Schuylkill  Trust  Co.  v. 
Sobolewski,  190  A.  919,  325  Pa. 
422— Matovich  v.  Gradich,  187  A. 
•65,  123  Pa.Super.  355 — Howard  v. 
Flanigan,  184  A.  34,  320  Pa,  569 
— Sirant  v.  Solkosky,  166  A.  561, 
311  Pa.  142— First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Mount  Holly  Springs  v.  Cumbler, 
21  A.2d  120,  145  Pa.Super.  '-595 — 
Greiner  v.  Brubaker,  16  A.2d  689, 
142  Pa.Super.  538 — Rosen  v.  Sei- 
denberg,  170  A.  351,  111  Pa.Super. 
534 — Citizens'  Nat  Bank  of  'Le- 
highton  v.  Kupres,  161  A  466,  106 
Pa. Super.  164 — Lutz  v.  Voulopos, 
101  Pa.Super.  359 — Van  Scoten  v. 
Botsford  &  Kunes,  9:8  Pa.  Super. 
270 — Bloom  v.  Lundberg,  96  Pa. 
Super.  248 — Volkmar  v.  Vladi,  95 
Pa.Super.  420 — Commonwealth  v. 
Spine  Hi,  90  Pa.  Super.  502. 
(3)  By  opening,  but  refusing  to 
strike,  judgment — Kweller,  now  for 
Use  of  Caplan,  v.  Becker,  12  A.2d  567, 
338  Pa.  169. 

Discretion  held  abused  by  refusal 
:o  open  or  vacate  judgment. 
Ohio. — Lutkenhouse    v.    "Vella,    App., 

60  N.E.2d  798. 

Pa.— Vidmar  v.  Martincic,  21  A.2d 
470,  146  Pa.Super.  47— Race  v.  No- 
vis,  178  A.  164,  117  Pa.Super.  357 
— Martz  v.  McKinley,  96  Pa.  Super. 
213. 

74,    111.— Handley  v.  Wilson,  242  I1L 

App.  66. 
34  C.J.  p  417  note  10.  j 

594 


Discretion  should  be  exercised  lib. 
erally  where  a  meritorious  defense  is 
shown. — Kolmar,  Inc.  v.  Moore,  55 
N.E.2d  524,  323  IlLApp.  323. 

Where  the  undisputed  evidence 
would  establish  a  defense,  it  is  error, 
in  absence  of  any  legal  barrier,  not 
to  open  the  judgment  and  let  the 
case  go  to  a  jury. — Cronauer  v.  Bay- 
er, 13  A.2d  75,  140  PaSuoer.  91. 

75.    Pa. — Spanko  v.   Trisick,    160   A. 

718,  307  Pa.  166. 
34  C.J.  p  416  note  97. 

The  weig-ht  of  evidence  and  credi- 
bility of  witnesses  are  for  the  judge 
who  sits  as  a  chancellor. — Stoner  v. 
Sley  System  Garages,  46  A.2d  172, 
353  Pa.  532— Schuylkill  Trust  Co.  v. 
Sobolewski,  190  A.  919,  325  Pa.  422 
— Mutual  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  of 
Shenandoah  v.  Walukiewicz,  185  A. 
•648,  322  Pa.  240. 

78.  ODel.— Miles  v.  Layton,  193  A. 
S67,  8  W.W.Harr.  411,  112  A.L.R. 
786. 

Pa.— Martz  v.  McKinley,  96  Pa.Supem* 
213— Olekszyk  v.  Walelko,  92  Pa. 
Super.  565 — Whittaker  v.  Tow- 
kanecs,  86  Pa.Super.  118— Auto  Se- 
curity Co.  v.  Canelli,  80  Pa.Super. 
43 — Vaughan  &  Co.  v.  Hopewell, 
79  Pa. Super.  239 — Sisemore  &  Kier- 
bow  Co.  v.  Nicholas,  Com.Pl.,  27 
North. Co.  193,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  Sizemore  &  Kierbow  Co., 
to  Use  of  Bastian-Blessing  Co.  v. 
Nicholas,  27  A.2fl  473,  149  Pa.Su- 
per. 376. 
34  C.J.  p  416  notes  98,  99. 

A  "feigned  issne"  framed  to  try 
Questions  of  fact,  on  making  abso- 
lute rule  to  open  judgment  to  per- 
mit defendant  to  interpose  defense, 
means  issue  at  instance  of  court  or 
of  parties  to  determine  fact  which 
court  has  either  not  power  or  is  un- 
willing to  decide,  and  such  issue 
proceeds,  not  from  right  of  parties 
:o  have  matter  determined  by  jury, 
but  from  fact  that  in  rule  to  open 
judgment  Court  is  exercising:  its  in- 
herent equitable  powers  and  may 
prefer  question  of  fact  to  be  deter- 
mined by  jury.— Miles  v.  OJayton,  193 
A.  567,  8  W.W.Harr.,Del.,  411,  112 
A-L.R,  786. 
Purpose  of  submission 

Submission  of  issue  to  jury  on 
hearing  of  rule  to  show  cause  why 
judgment  by  confession  entered  on 
warrant  of  attorney  should  not  be 
opened  is  for  purpose  of  informing 
conscience  of  court  on  particular 
questions  embraced  in  issue. — Chan- 
dler v.  Miles,  193  A.  576,  8  W.W. 
Harr.,DeL,  431. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


326 


a  jury  is  in  effect  opening  the  judgment  for  a  lim- 
ited purpose.77 

Scope  of  inquiry*  Where  the  matter  is  heard  on 
motion  or  petition  and  answer,  the  hearing  is  lim- 
ited to  matters  raised  by  such  pleadings,78  and  it 
has  been  held  that  if  the  answer  is  responsive  and 
denies  the  facts  averred  in  the  petition  and  no  evi- 
dence is  taken  in  support  of  the  petition,  the  court 
is  bound  to  decide  all  disputed  facts  in  favor  of 
plaintiff  in  the  judgment,79  and  the  only  question 
remaining  for  discussion  is  as  to  the  validity  of  the 
entry  of  the  judgment80  It  has  been  held  that  the 
hearing  should  be  limited  to  the  questions  whether 
defendant  has  a  valid  defense  prima  facie  and 


whether  he  has  acted  with  due  diligence,81  and  that 
the  court  should  not  pass  on  the  merits  of  the  de- 
fense alleged  where  a  valid  defense  is  prima  facie 
shown,82  since  such  determination  deprives  defend- 
ant of  his  day  in  court  and  of  a  right  to  appeal  from 
the  decision.83  It  has  also  been  held  that  the  court 
should  not  consider  the  question  of  a  meritorious  de- 
fense until  it  has  first  determined  whether  grounds 
to  vacate  the  judgment  exist.84 

Relief.  In  a  proceeding  to  open  or  vacate  a  con- 
fessed judgment,  the  court  may  grant  such  relief 
against  the  judgment  as  is  appropriate  under  the 
circumstances.85  On  a  proper  showing  the  court 
may  vacate  the  judgment,86  open  the  judgment  gen- 


Questions  of  law  and  fact 

(1)  The  question  whether  the  note, 
on  its  face  purported  to  be  a  sealed 
instrument     but     not     question     of 
whether  the  corporation  intended  to 
adopt  the  word  "seal"  as  its  corpo- 
rate   seal    for    the    occasion    was    a 
"question  of  law"  to  be  determined 
by  the  court  on   inspection. — Collins 
v.  Tracy  Grill  &  Bar  Corporation,  19 
A.2d   617.    144    PaJSuper.   440. 

(2)  A   petition    to   open   judgment 
on  a  Judgment  note  under  seal  which 
averred    that    petitioner    "never    re- 
ceived  any    consideration  by  reason 
of    the    execution     ...     of    said 
judgment  note,"  and  answer  averring 
that  petition  did  not  present  a  valid 
defense,    raised    the   issue   and   pre- 
sented a  legal  rather  than  a  factual 
question. — Shinn  v.  Stemler,  45  A.2d 
242,  158  Pa.Super.  350. 

(3)  Particular  questions  held  to  be 
questions    of    fact    for    the    jury. — 
Ouadiere    v.    Simeone,    29    A.2d    702, 
151  Pa.Super.  65 — White  Co.  v.  Fran- 
cis,   95    Pa.Super.    315 — Kaufman    v. 
Karuza,  Pa.Com.Pl.,  33  Luz.Leg.Beg. 
416. 

77.  Del. — Miles    v.    Layton,    193    A. 
567,    8   W.W.Harr.   411,   112   A.L.R. 
786. 

78.  Pa. — Bloom  v.  Lundberg,  96  Pa. 
Super.      248 — Heyer-Kemner,     Inc., 
v,  Sachs,  Com.Pl.,  57  Montg.Co.  73. 

34  C.J.  p  416  note  1. 
Estoppel 

The  court  was  not  required  to  con- 
sider question  whether  defendant 
was  estopped  to  question  validity  of 
note  where  question  of  estoppel  was 
not  raised  in  answer  to  amended  pe- 
tition.—Sprenger,  now  for  Use  of 
Stoecker,  v.  Litten,  15  A.2d  527,  142 
Pa,Super.  194. 
Told  instrument 

A  petition  to  set  aside  confession 
of  judgment  on  a  note  need  not  al- 
lege error  or  fraud  respecting  sign- 
ing of  note,  to  admit  evidence  con- 
cerning proof  of  maturity  of  debt 
subsequent  to  signing  thereof,  where 
note  was  an  absolute  nullity  because 
executed  and  given  in  contravention 


of  prohibitory  law. — Taylor  v. 
Shreveport  Fertilizer  Works,  La. 
App.,  197  So.  164. 

79.  Pa.— McKee  v.  Verner,  86  A.  646, 
239  Pa.  69,  44  L.R.A.,N.S.,  727. 

34  C.J.  p  416  note  2. 

80.  Pa,— United    Security   Life   Ins. 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Vaughn,  8  Pa.Dist 
302,  22  Pa.Co.  167. 

81.  111.— Becker  v.    Ketter,    5-6   N.E. 
2d  649,  323  Ill.App.  656— Elaborat- 
ed  Ready   Roofing  Co.  v.   Hunter, 
262  Ill.App.  380. 

82.  111. — Great  Northern  Store  Fix- 
ture Mfg.  Co.  v.  Lamm,  58  N.E.2d 
745,  324  IlLApp.  587— Kolmar,  Inc., 
v.    Moore,    55    N.E.2d    524,    323    111. 
App.   323— Freudenthal   v.  Lipman, 
51   N.E.2d   794,   320   IlLApp.    681. 

34  C.J.  p  416  note  4. 

83.  Ariz. — Arizona  Mining  &  Trad- 
ing Co.  v.  Benton,   100   P.   952,   12 
Ariz.  373. 

HI. — Great  Northern  Store  Fixture 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Lamm,  58  N.E.2d  745, 
324  IlLApp.  587. 

84.  Ohio. — Canton  Implement  Co.  v. 
Rauh,   175   N.E.  230,   37   Ohio  App. 
544. 

85.  Judgment  may  be  reduced  to  the 
amount  which  the  court  finds  to  be 
justly  due. — Walker  v.  Oakley,  32  A. 
2d    563,    347   Pa.    405—34   C.J.   P.  417 
note  19* 

Vacation  in  part 

If  the  judgment  includes  several 
claims  or  items,  some  of  which  are 
due  and  others  not,  or  some  of  which 
are  sufficiently  described  in  the 
statement  and  others  not,  it  may  be 
vacated  or  set  aside  as  to  those  de- 
mands which  cannot  be  supported 
and  left  standing  as  to  the  others. — 
Wells  v.  Gieseke,  $  N.W.  380,  27 
Minn.  478 — 34  C.J.  p  417  note  18. 
Joint  judgment 

(1)  A  judgment  in  assumpsit  is  an 
entity  and  where  it  is  rendered 
against  several  persons  it  cannot  be 
set  aside  as  to  one  party  without  set- 
ting it  aside  as  to  alL— First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Yakey,  253  IlLApp.  128. 

595 


(2)  Order  made  on  motion  of  one 
of  two  makers  sued  jointly  on  judg- 
ment  note,   directing  court    to   open 
judgment    entered    by    confession    to 
admit  defense  of  material  alteration 
after  execution  of  note,  was  held   to 
reopen  judgment  as  to  both  defend- 
ants.—-First  Nat.  Bank  v.   May,  231 
IlLApp.  509. 

(3)  Where,    however,    a  joint   con- 
fession of  judgment  on  a  note  is  en- 
tered against  the  two  signers  there- 
of, and  one  of  the  signers  had  been 
discharged  from  his  liability  on  the 
note   by   bankruptcy   proceedings,    it 
has  been   held    that   the   court  may 
properly  vacate  the  judgment  as  to 
the  bankrupt  and  open  up  the  judg- 
ment only  as  to  the  cosigner. — Good- 
man   American    Ice    Cream    Co.    v. 
Mendelsohn,  274  IlLApp.  253. 

(4)  Where     court     vacated     joint 
judgment  as  to  deceased  defendant, 
it  could  subsequently  enter  vacation 
as   to   other  joint  defendant — Saul- 
paugh  v.  Born,  154  N.E.  166,  22  Ohio 
App.  275. 

(5)  Where  judgment  is  entered  by 
confession  against  joint  and  several 
obligors  after  the   death   of  one   of 
them  and  the  warrant  of  attorney  is 
joint  and  not  Joint  and  several  and 
the  court,  on  motion  of  the  surviving 
obligor,    vacates    the   judgment,    the 
rights  of  the  obligee  are  not  preju- 
diced  thereby  where   the  obligee   is 
granted    leave    to    file    an    amended 
statement   of   claim   and    to    proceed 
against  the  surviving  obligor. — Gen- 
den  v.  Bailen,  275  IlLApp.  382, 

86^  N.J.— Fortune  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Codomo,  7  A.2d  880,  122  N. 
J.Law  565. 

Pa. — Morris  v.  Chevalier,  Com.Pl.,  20 
Leh.L.J.  133 — Worthlngton  Bldrs, 
v.  Rutt,  Com.PL,  30  North.  Co.  155 
— Turko  v.  Jurkuv,  Com.PL,  87 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  8. 

When  entry  of  judgment  by  con- 
fession was  unauthorized,  order 
striking  off  judgment  was  appropri- 
ate remedy. — ILansdowne  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  T.  Robinson,  154  A.  17,  203 
Pa.  58. 


326 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


erally,87  open  the  judgment,  but  restrict  the  issues 
to  be  tried,88  or  open  the  judgment  and  frame  an 
issue  for  a  jury.89  On  the  other  hand,  relief  will 
be  denied  where  a  proper  showing  is  not  made.90 

Imposition  of  terms.  Terms  or  conditions  may  be 
imposed  on  defendant,  on  granting  his  application 
to  open  the  judgment,91  such  as  the  payment  of 
costs92  and  reasonable  attorney's  fees,93  if  the  judg- 
ment is  confirmed.  It  has  been  held  that  it  is  not 
proper  to  impose  as  a  condition  precedent  that  de- 
fendant shall  bring  into  court  the  sum  which  is  sup- 


posed to  be  due,94  but  the  deposit  of  a  sum  conced- 
edly  due  may  be  required,95  although  it  has  been 
held  that  the  court  may  set  aside  the  judgment  to 
let  in  the  defense  of  usury,  without  a  tender  of  the 
amount  due.96  The  judgment  may  be  allowed  to 
stand  as  security  to  abide  the  result,97  although,  as 
discussed  infra  §  327,  it  has  been  held  that  this  is 
the  normal  effect  of  an  order  which  simply  opens 
the  judgment  as  distinguished  from  an  order  vacat- 
ing or  setting  aside  the  judgment.  Terms  may  also 
be  imposed  on  plaintiff  as  a  condition  of  a  refusal 
to  open  the  judgment.98 


87.  Pa. — Home  Sales  &  Service  Sta 
tion  v.  Finch.  183  A.  54,  120  Pa. 
Super.  402 — Witwer  v.  Baer,  Com. 
PL,  32  Berks  Co.  269— Wayne  Title 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Sweet,  Com.Pl.,  32 
DeLCo.  106 — Dickel  v.  Tyson,  Com. 
PL,  50  Lanc.Rev.  163 — Keene  v 
Ryman,  Com. PI.,  38  Luz.Leg.Reg. 
330 — Mathewson  v.  Lehigh  Valley 
Coal  Co.,  Coxn.Pl.,  38  Luz.Ijeg-.Reg. 
116— Pierce  -Street  Automobile  Co. 
v.  Sparlow,  Com.PL,  33  Luz,Leg. 
Reg.  432 — Wildwood  Strand  Realty 
Co.  v.  Och,  Com.PL,  53  Montg.Co. 
264 — Associates  Discount  Corpora- 
tion v.  Debies,  Com.Pl.,  90  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  569. 
Opening-  the  Judgment  IB  the  ap- 
propriate relief  where  the  court  is 
exercising  its  equitable  power  to  per- 
mit defendant  to  interpose  a  defense. 
Dal.— -Dolby  v.  Whaley,  197  A.  161,  9 

W.W.Harr.  155. 
111. — Farmers    Bank   of   North   Hen- 
derson   v.    Stenfeldt,    258    Ill.App. 
428. 
lack  of  Jurisdiction 

In  suit  to  vacate  decree  pro  con- 
fesso  which  is  void  for  lack. of  serv- 
ice, where  parties  are  the  same,  court 
may   rehear   cause   and    deny   relief 
not  warranted  by  merits. — Snyder  v. 
Abbott,  161  S.B.  11,  111  W.Va.  201. 
83.    Pa. — A.  B.  O.  Oil  Burner  &  En- 
gineering Co.   v.   Duncan,  Com.PL, 
2S  DeLCo.  308. 

89.  Pa. — Lyman  Felheim  Co.  v. 
Walker,  193  A.  69,  128  Pa.Super.  1 
— Peerless  Roofing  &  Siding  Cor- 
poration v.  Bryson,  Com.PL,  29 
DeLCo.  448 — Waterhouse  v.  Bur- 
dick,  Com.PL,  90  PittsbXeg.J.  399, 
24  Erie  Co.  366 — Colonial  'Finance 
Co.  v.  Mitchell,  Com.Pl.,  87  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  383,  2  Fay.L.J.  154— JLatrobe 
Trust  Co.,  for  Use  of,  v.  Ruffner, 
Com.PL,  22  WestuCo.  46. 
•90.  Del.— Miles  v.  Layton,  193  A, 
567,  8  W.W.Harr.  411,  112  A.L.R. 
786. 

.N.Y.— Hays  v.  Smith,  58  N.T.S.2d 
439,  269  App.Div.  1008,  appeal  de- 
nied 6.1  N.Y.S.2d  526,  270  App.Div. 
867,  appeal  dismissed  67  N.E.2d 
527,  295  N.Y.  896. 

Pa.— Held  v.  Held,  45  A.2d  16,  353 
Pa.  389— Wilson  v.  Richard,  147 


A.  833,  298  Pa,  17— Bush  v.  Frutch- 
ey,  83  Pa.Super.  208 — Armitage  v, 
Ulrich,  Com.PL,  3«  Berks  Co.  79— 
Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Reno  v. 
Snyderwine,  Com. PL,  56  Dauph.Co. 
9 — Chiara  v.  Johnston,  Com.PL,  55 
Dauph.Co.  60— First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Mt  Holly  Springs  v.  Cumbler, 
Com.PL,  50  Dauph.Co..  203,  affirmed 
21  A.2d  120,  145  Pa.Super.  595— 
Sipangler  v.  Zimmerman,  Com.PL, 
50  Dauph.Co.  93 — Peerless  Roofing 
&  Siding  Corporation  v.  Bryson, 
Com.PL,  29  DeLCo.  448— Williams 
v.  Puline,  Com. PL,  28  Erie  Co.  256 
— Hebrew  Loan  Society  of  Wyo- 
ming Valley  v.  Margolis,  Com.PL, 
33  IjUZ.Lieg.Reg.  101 — Empire  Fur- 
niture Co.  v.  Yale,  Com.PL,  32  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  397 — Gawinowicz  v. 
Yurkewicz,  Com.PL,  14  Northumb. 
Leg.J.  15— Hill  Top  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Gillman,  Com.PL,  92  Pittsb.Leg.J. 
350 — Automobile  (Finance  Co.  v. 
Varner,  Com.PL,  90  Pittsb.Leg.J. 
169— Sterling  ILand  Co.  v.  Kline, 
Com.PL,  87  Pittsb.Leg.J.  279— 
Lutz  v.  Heim,  Com.PL,  5  Sch-Reg. 
190 — Sugarman  v.  Baldini,  Com. 
PL,  28  WestCo.  41.  ' 
34  C.J.  p  416  note  7. 

If  no  sufficient  ground  is  shown 
for  opening  judgment  by  confession 
on  warrant  of  attorney,  rule  to  show 
cause  is  discharged  and  petition  dis- 
missed.— Chandler  v.  Miles,  193  A. 
57-6,  8  W.W.Harr.,DeL,  431. 

Defects  cured 

(1)  Where  the  objections  relied  on 
in  the  motion  are  corrected  on  the 
hearing  thereof  the  application  will 
be  denied. 

111. — Evans    v.    Barclay,    38    Ill.App. 

•496, 
Pa. — Peerless  Soda  Fountain  Service 

Co.  v.  Hummer,  19  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 

302,   46   York  Leg.Rec.   201. 

(2)  Court    could   on   argument   of 
rule  to   strike  judgment  entered  on 
copy    of   obligation   containing  war- 
rant   of   attorney    to    confess   judg- 
ment grant  leave  to  file  original  ob- 
ligation.— Altoona  Trust  Co.  v.  Fock- 
ler,  165  A.  740,  311  Pa.  426. 

Stay  of  execution 

Recital  in  order  confirming  judg- 
ment by  confession  that  order  was 

596 


without  prejudice  to  any  parties  as 
to  subsequent  action  did  not  permit 
judgment  debtors  subsequently  to  at- 
tack court's  action  in  confirming  the 
judgment  by  applying  for  perpetual 
stay  of  execution. — Local  Loan  Co. 
v.  Norman,  48  N.E.2d  '80S,  319  111. 
App.  114. 

91.  Colo. — Axelson  v.   Dailey  Co-op. 
Co.,  298  P.  957,  88  Colo.  555. 

111.— Western    Cold    -Storage    Co.    v. 

Keeshin,   252   Ill.App.   165. 
34  C.J.  p  417  note  20. 

92.  Wis. — Port     Huron     Engine     & 
Thresher    Co.    v.    Clements,    89    N. 
W.  160,  113  Wis.  249. 

93.  111.— West   v.    McNaughton,    211 
111. App.  259 — Fisher  v.  Wecker,  210 
IlLApp.  345. 

94.  111.— Page  v.  Wallace,  87  111.  84. 
34  C.J.  p  417  note  23. 

95.  Md. — Taylor  v.  Gorman,  126  A. 
897,  146  Md.  207. 

9S.  Ohio. — Riddle  v.  Canby,  2  Ohio 
Dec.,  Reprint,  586,  4  West.'L.Month. 
124. 

97.  111.— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Hahne- 
mann  Institutions  of  Chicago,  190 
N.B.  707,  356  111.  36-6. 

Ohio. — Commercial    Credit    Corp.    v. 

Wasson,    63    N.E.2d    560,    76    Ohio 

App.  181. 

34  C.J.  p  417  note  16. 
Retention  of  lien 

Where  court  strikes  out  a  Judg- 
ment for  plaintiff  on  motion  of  de- 
fendant, whether  court  should  re- 
tain the  lien  is  a  question  entirely 
within  the  court's  discretion. — Sil- 
verberg  v.  Dearholt,  22  A.2d  588,  180 
Md.  38. 

Where  execution  has  been  levied  it 
is  error  to  set  aside  such  execution 
and  the  levies  made  thereunder,  in 
the  absence  of  other  equivalent  se- 
curity substituted  therefor. 
I1L— 'Farmers'  Bank  of  North  Hen- 
derson y.  Stenfeldt,  258  IlLApp. 

428. 
Pa. — Adams  v.  James  L.  !Leefls  Co., 

42  A.  19'5,  189  Pa.  544. 

98.  Pa. — Murray  v.   Auman,   42   Pa. 
Super.     574 — Williams    v.    Puline, 
CoxxLPL,   28  Erie  Co.   250. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  327 


§  327.    - —  Operation  and  Effect  of  Opening 
or  Vacating 

The  opening  of  a  judgment  by  confession  does  not 
vacate  the  judgment,  but  the  vacation  of  such  a  judg- 
ment places  the  action  in  the  same  state  as  though  It 
had  been  commenced  in  the  ordinary  procedure  by  sum- 
mons. 

The  opening  of  a  judgment  by  confession  does  not 
vacate  the  judgment;95  it  stands  as  security  until 
the  determination  of  the  case  on  the  merits.1  The 
vacation  of  a  judgment  by  confession  places  the  ac- 
tion in  the  same  state  as  though  it  had  been  com- 
menced in  the  ordinary  procedure  by  summons.2 

If  the  judgment  is  opened  generally,  and  without 
terms,  plaintiff  is  put  to  the  proof  of  his  cause  of 
action  precisely  as  though  no  judgment  had  been 
entered.3  Where  the  court  in  opening  the  judg- 
ment did  not  direct  the  parties  to  file  pleadings,  the 
petition  to  open  and  the  answer  thereto  may  be 
taken  as  the  pleadings.4  It  has  been  held  that  plain- 
tiff is  restricted  to  the  cause  of  action  for  which  the 
judgment  was  entered  and  that  he  cannot  change 
it,5  but  defendant  may  set  up  on  the  trial  any  de- 


fense which  would  have  been  available  to  him  if  an 
action  had  been  brought,  instead  of  a  judgment  be- 
ing entered,  on  the  debt  or  instrument  in  suit,6  al- 
though he  cannot  set  up  matters  of  defense  which 
have  arisen  subsequent  to  the  judgment.7 

The  court  in  opening  judgment  may  frame  an 
issue,8  and  in  such  case  the  trial  should  be  confined 
to  such  issue.9 

By  asking  for  and  obtaining  leave  to  plead  in  the 
case  of  a  judgment  entered  by  confession,  all  tech- 
nicalities and  objections  to  the  judgment  are 
waived,10  and  defendant  is  limited  to  the  merits.11 
It  is  not  sufficient  for  defendant  to  file  a  general 
demurrer  to  the  declaration,12  and,  if  he  declines  to 
plead  to  the  declaration,  he  may  be  defaulted  for 
failure  to  comply  with  the  rule  to  plead15  An  or- 
der setting  aside  a  judgment  as  to  one  only  of  sev- 
eral defendants  merely  restrains  plaintiff  from  ex- 
ecuting the  judgment  on  defendant  as  to  whom  it 
is  set  aside.14 

On  the  trial  of  the  action  after  the  judgment  is 
opened,  general  rules  apply  as  to  procedure,1^  pre- 


99.    Del.—  -Miles    v.    Layton,    193    A. 

567,    8   W.W.Harr.   411,   112  A.L.R. 

786. 

HI.  —  Sharp  v.  Barr,  284  IlLApp.  214. 
Pa.  —  Braum  v.  Rohrbach,  147  A.  519, 

297  Pa.  496. 

1.  111.  —  Mayer    v.    Tylor.    19    N.E.2d 
•     211,     298     IlLApp.     632—  Ross 

Wrightwood-Hampden  Bldtf.  Cor- 
poration, 271  Ill.App.  22  —  Farmers' 
Bank  of  North  Henderson  v.  Sten- 
feldt,  258  IlLApp.  428—  Streeter  v. 
Junker,  230  IlLApp.  366. 

2.  111.  —  George  J.  Cooke  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 179  IlLApp.  83. 

Attack  on  garnishment 

Judgment  debtor's  rule  to  show 
cause  why  confession  of  Judgment 
should  not  be  stricken  off  -and  mon- 
«y  held  by  garnishee  under  attach- 
ment execution  on  judgment  decreed 
not  subject  to  attachment  and  debt- 
or afforded  opportunity  to  show  that 
attached  money  was  not  his  personal 
funds  was  not  a  rule  to  show  cause 
why  judgment  should  not  be  opened 
generally  and  debtor  let  into  defense 
on  merits,  and  did  not  raise  ques- 
tion of  defense  on  merits  of  judg- 
ment.— Albert  M.  Greenfield  &  Co.  v. 
Roberts,  5  A.2d  -642,  135  Pa.Super. 
328. 


against  maker  of  note 

When  a  judgment  against  the 
maker  on  a  note  is  vacated,  the  same 
relief  is  afforded  the  indorsers.— 
Gilmore  v.  Mix,  67  N,E.2d  313,  329 
IlLApp.  177. 

Judgment  on  transcript 

Where  a  judgment  by  confession  is- 
-stricken  off,  a  judgment  on  a  tran- 
script thereof  entered  In  another 


county  falls  with  the  original  judg- 
ment.—Banning  v.  Taylor,  $4  Pa. 
297. 

Power  over  order  vacating  Judgment 
Where  court  vacated  judgment  by 
confession  instead  of  entering  or- 
der merely  allowing  judgment  to  be 
opened  up,  and  thereafter  court  en- 
tered a  summary  judgment,  and  on 
realizing  within  thirty  days  that  it 
was  a  mistake  to  vacate  the  judg- 
ment, court  still  had  jurisdiction  and 
was  justified  in  rectifying  mistake 
by  setting  aside  the  order  of  vaca- 
tion and  reinstating  judgment  by 
confession,  leaving  two  judgments, 
which  was  permissible  under  stat- 
ute.—National  Builders  Bank  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Simons,  31  N.B.2d  269,  307 
IlLApp.  552. 

3.  111.— Streeter  v.  Junker,   230   I1L 
App,  366. 

Pa.'— Austen   v.   Marzolf,   161  A.   72, 

307    Pa.    232— First   Nat    Bank   v. 

St    John's    Church,    Windber,    146 

A.  102,  296  Pa.  467. 
34  C.J.  p  417  note  28. 
Tiling  of  plea 

Under  rule  requiring  defendant  to 
be  summoned  and  show  cause  why 
judgment  by  confession  under  power 
In  note  should  be  vacated,  opened, 
or  modified,  no  plea  should  have  been 
filed  until  trial  court  reopened  the 
judgment  and  permitted  defendant 
to  file  pleas. — Foland  v.  Hoffman, 
Md.,  47  A.2d  62. 

4.  Pa. — Rzasa    v.    Gorniak,    174    A. 
659,  115  Pa.Super.  47. 

5.  Pa. — Beers  v.  'Fallen  Timber  Coal 
Co.,  161  A.  409,  307  Pa.  2$1— Keal 

597 


v.   Feissner,    Com.PL,    37   Luz.Leg. 
Reg.  3-6. 

6.  Colo. — Axelson    v.    Dailey   Co-op. 
Co.,  298  P.  957,  88  Colo.  555. 

Pa. — Ankeny   v.    Lohr,    99    PaJSuper. 

203. 

34  C.J.  p  417  note  29. 
Fleas  tendered  late 

It  is  not  an  abuse  of  discretion  to 
deny  leave  to  file  additional  pleas 
tendered  after  the  case  had  been 
placed  on  the  calendar  for  trial. — 
Northeastern  Coal  Co.  v.  Tyrrell,  138 
IlLApp.  472. 

7.  Pa.— Curtis  v.  Slosson,  6  Pa.  265. 

8.  Pa. — International  Finance  Co.  v. 
Magilansky,    161    A,    613,    105    Pa, 
Super.  309 — Goenner  v.  Glumicich, 
81   Pa.Super.    521— Fogel   v.    New- 
berg,    Com.PL,    37   Pa.Dist   &   Co. 
254. 

9.  Pa.— Weber  v.  Roland,  39  Pa,  Su- 
per. 611. 

34  C.J.  p  418  note  34. 

10.  111.— Robey    v.    XJpdyke,    61    111. 
App.  328. 

Pa. — Treasurer  Div.  No.  163  A.  A.  of 
S.  R.  E.  of  A.  v.  Keller,  23  Pa- 
Super.  135. 

11.  111. — Dazey  v.  Williams,  252  HL 
App.  329. 

12.  111. — Feldman  v.   Polishuck,   200 
IlLApp.  15. 

13.  111. — (Feldman  v.   Polishuck,   su- 
pra. 

14.  N.J.— Reynolds  v.  Silvers,  18  N. 
J.Law  238. 

15.  111. — Security    Discount    Corpo- 
ration v.   Jackson,   51  N.E.2d   618, 
320  IlLApp.  440. 


§  327 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


sumptions  and  burden  of  proof,16  questions  of  law 
and  fact,17  admissibility  of  evidence,18  the  weight 
and  sufficiency  of  evidence,19  and  instructions.20 

Judgment  on  retrial.  If  on  the  retrial  the  issues 
are  found  for  plaintiff,  the  judgment  should  direct 
that  the  previous  judgment  continue  in  full  force  and 


effect,21  and  should  not  be  for  a  greater  sum  than 
was  allowed  by  the  prior  judgment.22  Under  such 
circumstances  the  entry  of  a  separate  and  inde- 
pendent judgment  is  erroneous.23  Where  the  issues 
are  found  for  defendant  after  the  judgment  is 
opened,  the  judgment  should  be  vacated  and  de- 
clared null  and  void.24 


G.  JUDGMENTS  BY  CONSENT,  OFFER  AND  ACCEPTANCE,  AND  ON  MOTION  OB 

SUMMARY  PROCEEDINGS 


§  328.     Consent  Judgments 

The  amendment,  opening,  or  vacating  of  judg- 
ments by  consent  is  considered  infra  §§  329,  330. 
Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 

§  329.    Amendment 

The  consent  of  all   parties  Is  generally  required  to 


permit  amendment  of  a  consent  judgment,  except  for 
fraud  or  mutual  mistake,  but  this  rule  does  not  preclude 
correction  of  clerical  errors  or  prevent  amendment  where 
the  Judgment  reserves  the  cause  for  further  orders. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  consent  judgment  may  not 
be  amended,  modified,  or  corrected  in  any  essential 
particular  except  with  the  consent  of  all  the  parties 
thereto,25  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  mutual  mis- 


16.  111. — Security  Discount  Corpora- 
tion v.  Jackson.  51  N.E.2d  618,  820 
IlLApp.  440. 

Pa. — Austen  v.  Marzolf,  1-61  A.  72, 
307  Pa.  232 — Jones  &  Sons,  Inc.  v. 
Rtshkofski,  Com.PL,  37  Luz.L,eg. 
Reg.  229. 

17.  I1L — Farmers'     Bank    of    North 
Henderson    v.    Stenfeldt,    258    111. 
App.   428. 

Pa. — Collins  v.  Tracy  Grill  &  Bar 
Corporation.  19  A.2d  617,  144  Pa. 
•Super.  440 — Murray  v.  Flesher,  88 
Pa.Super.  592. 

34  C.J.  p  418  note  34  [c]. 

18.  111. — Teuber   v.    Schumacher,    44 
IlLApp.  577. 

Pa.— Austen    v.    Marzolf,    161   A,    72, 

307  Pa.  232. 
Contradiction  of  writing 

On  a  petition  to  open  judgment 
averring  a  parol  contemporaneous 
agreement  as  one  of  the  inducements 
to  the  signing  of  a  judgment  note, 
the  effect  of  granting  the  petition  is 
not  to  permit  defendant  to  contra- 
dict the  terms  of  a  written  instru- 
ment, but  to  prove  by  parol  evidence 
the  existence  of  the  agreement  and 
the  circumstances  under  which  it 
was  made.— Hotaling  v.  Fisher,  79 
Pa.  Super.  103. 

19.  Fraud 

If  fraud  is  set  up  as  a  defense,  it 
must  be  affirmatively  and  positively 
proved.— Hipps  v.  Wardle,  1  A.  727, 
1  Pa.Cas.  147— Davis  v.  Neel,  61  Pa- 
Super.  299. 
Evidence  held  sufficient 

(1)  To     justify     confirmation     of 
Judgment  by  confession. — Automatic 
Oil  Heating  Co.  v.  Lee,  33  N.E.2d  129, 
309    IlLApp.   444 — Aurora  Nat  Bank 
V.  Funk,   10  N.E.2d  442,  296  IlLApp. 
437. 

(2)  To   sustain,  judgment  for  de- 
fendant. 


111. — Miller  Fur  Co.  v.  Gorabossy,  44 
N.B.2d  341,  316  IlLApp.  159. 

Pa. — Rosenblum  v.  Edwards,  8  A.2d 
46S,  137  Pa.Super.  33. 

(3)  To    show   that   obligation   was 
not     supported     by     consideration.— 
Klovas   v.   Wedeskis,   41   N.E.2d  222, 
314  111. App.  384. 

(4)  To   show   that   obligation   was 
not    conditional. — Mitchell    v.     Corn- 
stock.  27  N.E.2d  620,  305  IlLApp.  360. 

Evidence  held  insufficient 

(1)  To   sustain  judgment. — Carroll 
Graham    Glass    Co.    v.    Stattman,    32 
N.E.2d  930,   309  IlLApp.  132. 

(2)  To     show     payment — Bait     v. 
Hartman,  11  N.E.2d  240,  29*2  IlLApp. 
639. 

20.  Pa. — U.  S.  Savings  &  Trust  Co. 
of  Conemaugh,  to  Use  of  Hindes, 
V.  Helsel,  2  A.2d  823,  332  Pa.  433. 

34  C.J.  p  418  note  34  [6]. 

instruction  held  erroneous 
Pa,— Sears  v.  Birbeck,  184  A.  6,  321 
Pa.  375. 

21.  Colo. — Axelson  v.  Dailey  Co-op. 
Co.,  298  P.  957,  88  Colo.  555. 

ni.— Schrader  v.  Heflebower,  243-  111. 
App.  139— Bowers  v.  Heflebower, 
2-43  Ill.Aj?p.  129 — Sharp  v.  Barr, 
234  IlLApp.  214. 

34  C.J.  p  418  note  40. 

Where  the  judgment  was  improp- 
erly opened,  the  subsequent  proceed- 
ings should  be  vacated  and  the  orig- 
inal judgment  reinstated. 
111. — Shinner  v.  Raschke,  213  IlLApp. 

324. 
Pa. — Rosenblum  v.  Edwards,  8  A,2d 

4-68,  137  Pa.Super.  33. 

On  order  that  judgment  stand  as 
of  date  of  rendition,  case  is  substan- 
tially same  as  when  judgment  was 
entered. — Sharp  v.  Barr,  234  IlLApp. 
214. 

598 


22.  111.— King  v.  Heilig,  203  IlLApp. 
117. 

23.  111. — Excelsior    Stove    &    Manu- 
facturing Co.  v.  Venturelli,  8  N.E. 
2d  702,  290  IlLApp.  502. 

34  C.J.  p  418  note  42. 

24.  111. — Shumway  v.  Shumway,  280 
ULApp.  104. 

25.  U.S. — Steingruber  v.  Johnson,  D. 
C.Tenn.,  35  F.Supp.  662. 

Ky. — Boone   v.    Ohio    Valley   Fire    & 

Marine   Ins.   Co.'s   Receiver,    55    S. 

W.2d  374,  246  Ky.  489. 
Mich.— Orban  v.  Stelle,  290  N.W.  821,. 

292  Mich.  341. 
Neb. — Me  Arthur  v.  Thompson,  299  N» 

W.    519,   140   Neb.   408,    139   A.L.R. 

413. 
N.T.— Fred  Medart  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Raf- 

ferty,  276  N.Y.S.  678.  243  App.Div. 

632— Brooklyn  Children's  Aid  Soc. 

v.   Mein,   218  N.Y.S.   557,   218   App. 

Div.  773. 
N.C.— Deitz   v.    Bolch,    183    S.E.    384* 

209  N.C.  202 — Weaver  v.  Hampton, 

161    S.E.   480.   201   N.C.    798 — Town 

of  Gary  v.  Templeton,  152  S.E.  79 7,. 

198   N.C.   604— First   Nat   Bank   v. 

Mitchell,    131    S.E.    656,    191    N.C. 

190. 
Pa. — Commonwealth  v.  Highland,  28- 

WestCo.UJ.  45. 
34  QJ.  p  418  note  46. 
Judgments  by  consent  generally  see- 
supra  §§  173-178. 
Liability  on  note 

Validity  of  amendment  to  consent 
judgment  entered  by  parties  to  show 
that  one  defendant  was  primarily 
and  other  secondarily  liable  on  notes, 
depended  on  whether  defendant  pri- 
marily liable  consented  to  amend- 
ment—-Delta  v.  Bolch,  188  S.E.  384,. 
209  N.C.  202. 

Where  the  amendment  is  not  ma- 
terial, the  rule  does  not  apply. — Wig- 
gam  Milk  Co.  v.  Johnson,  13  N.E.2d 
522,  213  Ind.  508. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  330 


take,26  and  this  rule  applies  to  cases  where  a  party 
has  acquired  rights  in  the  final  result,  which  would 
be  jeopardized  by  a  change  in  the  terms  of  the  con. 
sent  judgment.27  In  this  connection  it  has  been 
said  that,  if  the  court  should  change  a  consent  judg- 
ment in  any  material  respect  without  the  consent  of 
the  parties,  it  would  cease  to  be  the  judgment  agreed 
on  by  them,28  and  that  such  exercise  of  judicial 
power  would  be  a  practical  denial  of  the  right  of  the 
party  prejudiced  to  be  heard  according  to  law.29 

It  has  been  said,  however,  that  the  power  of  a 
court  to  revise  its  judgments  for  protection  of  ad- 
judicated rights  in  relation  to  changed  conditions 
that  affect  those  rights  in  respect  of  their  judicial 
enforcement  is  inherent,  and  that  such  power  exists 
whether  the  judgment  was  entered  after  litigation 
or  by  consent,30  and  that  a  formal  order  oi  correc- 
tion is  not  essential  to  granting  relief  consistent 
with  the  agreement.81  It  has  also  been  held  that, 
where  a  judgment  fails,  in  a  material  respect,  to 
accord  with  the  stipulation  made,  relief  should  be 
sought  by  motion  for  new  trial  or  appeal,  and  that 
such  a  judgment  cannot  be  corrected  under  code 
provisions  governing  amendment  of  judgments.32 

Clerical  defects  or  omissions  in  the  judgment, 
caused  by  mistake,  may  be  amended  nunc  pro 
tune,33  and  the  court  may  amend  a  judgment  to 
correct  a  misnomer  of  defendant  either  during  or 
after  the  term  at  which  the  judgment  was  ren- 
dered.34 The  rule  requiring  consent  to  effect  a 
modification  or  amendment  of  a  consent  judgment 
or  decree  will  not  be  carried  so  far  as  to  confer 
on  a  party  seeking  to  enforce  an  unconscionable 
penalty  provided  for  in  a  consent  judgment  the 


right  to  obtain  affirmative  relief  contrary  to  the 
paramount  duty  of  the  court  to  do  equity,85  and, 
where  a  consent  decree  or  judgment  may  indirectly 
affect  the  rights  of  many  persons  in  addition  to 
those  of  the  litigants,  the  rule  that  courts  will  not 
modify  a  consent  decree  except  on  the  consent  of 
the  parties  will  not  be  too  rigidly  enforced.36 

Reservation  for  further  orders;  interlocutory 
judgments.  Where  a  consent  judgment  reserves 
the  cause  for  further  orders,  the  court  may  there- 
after modify  the  judgment  as  conditions  may  re- 
quire in  conformity  with  justice  and  the  legal  rights 
of  the  parties.37  It  has  been  held  that  an  interlocu- 
tory consent  judgment  may  be  modified  by  the  court 
to  meet  changed  conditions,38  but  that  such  a  judg- 
ment, in  strict  accordance  with  a  stipulation  en- 
tered into  between  the  parties,  cannot  be  amended 
on  a  motion  made  by  one  of  the  parties  and  opposed 
by  the  other,39  the  remedy  of  the  party  objecting 
to  the  form  of  the  judgment  being  to  make  a  mo- 
tion to  be  relieved  from  the  stipulation  and  to  have 
the  judgment  vacated.40 

§  330.    Opening  or  Vacating 

•  a.  In  general 

b.  Grounds 

c.  Procedure  and  relief 

a.  In  General 

Ordinarily,  a  consent  judgment  may  not  be  opened, 
set  aside,  or  vacated  without  consent  of  the  parties  or 
proof  of  grounds  adequate  for  such  relief,  but,  before 
the  Judgment  has  become  final,  the  trial  court  retains 
plenary  power  to  set  it  aside. 

Generally  speaking,  a  judgment  by  consent  may 


26.    N.Y.— Feinberg  v.   Feinberg,    41 

N.Y.S.2d  868,  180  Misc.  305. 
N.C. — Johnson  v.  Futrell  Bros.  Lum- 
ber Co.,  35  S.R2d  889. 
Wyo. — Midwest      Refining      Co.      v. 

George,  7  P.2d  213,  44  Wyo.  25. 
Boundary  dispute 

Supreme  court  had  jurisdiction  to 
•correct  consent  decree  fixing  bound- 
ary line  between  states,  and  to  es- 
tablish true  boundary  line,  where  de- 
cree was  erroneous  in  certain  re- 
spects due  to  mutual  mistakes. — 
-State  of  Wisconsin  v.  State  of  Mich- 
igan, 55  S.Ct  786,  295  U.S.  455,  79 
L.Ed.  1541. 
•27.  N.C.— Fowler  v.  Winders,  116  S. 

B.  177,  185  N.C.  105. 
«8.    Ky.— Karnes  v.  Black,  215  S.W. 

191,  185  Ky.  410. 
N.C.—- Lynch  v.   Loftin,   69   S.B.   143, 

153  N.C.  270. 
29.    Ky.— Karnes  v.  Black,  215  S.W. 

191,  185  Ky.  410. 

•80.    Fla.-7-State    ex    rel.    Klemm    v. 
Baskin,  150  So.  517,  111  Fla.  667. 


31.  U.S. — Butler  v.  Denton,  D.C.Okl., 
57    F.Supp.    656,    affirmed,    C.C.A., 
150  F.2d  687. 

Wyo. — Midwest      Refining      Co.      v. 
George,  7  P.2d  213,  44  Wyo.  25. 

32.  Cal. — Chavez   v.    Scully,    232    P. 
165,  69  Cal.App.  633. 

33.  111.— People  v.  Quick,  92  111.  580. 
W.Va. — Stewart  v.   Stewart,    20   S.E. 

862,  40  W.Va.  65. 

34.  Ind, — Wiggam  Milk  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 13  N.E.2d  522,  213  Ind.  508. 

Appearance  without  objection 

The  modification  of  consent  Judg- 
ment made  by  court  in  changing 
name  of  defendant  from  a  certain 
"Company  Inc."  to  such  "Company" 
was  not  a  material  change  and  was 
within  authority  of  court,  where 
president  of  company  was  personally 
served  with  summons,  the  company 
appeared  by  attorney  and  filed  an- 
swer in  general  denial,  and  did  not 
make  objection  to  name  under  which 
It  was  being  sued. — Wig-gam  Milk 

599 


Co.    v.    Johnson,   13   N.E.2d   522,    213 
Ind.  508. 

35.  Mich.— Orban  v.  Stelle,  290  N.W. 
821,  292  Mich.  341. 

36-  Mich.— Royal  Oak  Tp.  v.  City 
of  Huntington  Woods,  20  N.W.2d 
840. 

37.  U.S. — Chrysler  Corporation  v.  U. 
S.,  Ind.,  62  S.Ct  1146,  316  U.S.  556, 
86.  L.Ed.  1668. 

N.C.— Harriss  v.  Hughes,  17  S.B.2d 
679,  220  N.C.  473— Coburn  v.  Board 
of  Com'rs  of  Swain  County,  131 
S.E.  372,  191  N.C.  68. 

Tex. — State  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  Civ.App., 
187  S.W.2d  127,  error  refused. 

38.  N.C.— Hales    v.    National    Land 
Exchange,  14  S.E.2d  667,   219  N.C. 
651 — Fowler  v.  Winders,   116   S.E. 
177,  185  N.C.  105. 

39.  N.T.— Beer  v.  Orthaus,  109  N.T. 
S.  997,  125  App.Div.  574— Aronson 
v.  Sire,  '83  N.T.S.  362,  85  App.Div« 
607. 

40.  N.Y.— Aronson  v.  Sire,  supra. 


330 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


not  be  opened,  set  aside,  or  vacated  without  the 
consent  of  all  the  parties,41  except  in  due  proceed- 
ings on  proper  grounds,  as  discussed  infra  subdi- 
visions b  and  c  of  this  section.  The  trial  court  has 
power,  however,  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  en- 
tered by  consent  or  agreement  of  the  parties  where 
a  good  cause  therefor  is  shown,42  the  granting  or 
refusing  of  the  application  being  within  the  sound 
discretion  of  the  court.43  It  has  been  held  that, 
before  lapse  of  the  time  necessary  to  make  a  con- 
sent judgment  final  in  character,  the  court  may 
lawfully  vacate  it,44  and  under  some  practice  the 
court  has  plenary  power  over  consent  judgments 
during  the  term  at  which  they  are  rendered  and 
within  such  time  may  vacate  and  set  aside  such  a 
judgment  whenever  justice  and  equity  so  require.45 

b.  Grounds 

A  consent  Judgment  will  not  be  opened  or  vacated 
In  the  absence  of  adequate  grounds,  but  such  a  Judg- 


ment may  be  opened  or  vacated  for  want  of  consent, 
fraud,  collusion,  or  mutual  mistake  of  fact. 

A  judgment  by  consent  will  not  be  opened  or  va- 
cated in  the  absence  of  adequate  grounds  therefor,4* 
especially  where  the  conditions  have  become  such 
that  the  opposing  party  would  be  prejudiced  there- 
by,47 and,  where  the  court  rendering  the  judgment 
had  jurisdiction  of  both  the  parties  and  the  general 
subject  matter  of  the  action,  no  objection  to  the 
merits  is  reviewable  on  motion  to  vacate  a  consent 
judgment.48  Generally  speaking,  a  judgment  by 
consent  will  not  be  opened  or  vacated  in  the  ab- 
sence of  fraud  or  mistake  or  want  of  consent  in 
fact.49 "  A  consent  judgment  may  not  be  set  aside 
on  such  grounds  as  that  applicant  made  a  bad  bar- 
gain;50 erroneous  advice  of  counsel;51  the  exist- 
ence of  a  legal  defense  which  might  have  been 
pleaded  in  the  action;52  errors  and  irregularities 
of  procedure  ;53  misconduct  or  negligence  of  party's 


41.  Ind. — Scares  v.  Chacker,  App., 
56  N.E.2d  503. 

Mich. — Goldberg  v.  Trustees  of  Elm- 
wood  Cemetery,  275  N.W.  663,  281 
Mich.  647— In  re  Meredith's  Estate, 
266  N.W.  351,  275  Mich.  278,  104 
A.L.R.  34S. 

Neb. — McArthur  v.  Thompson,  299  N. 
W.  519,  140  Neb.  408,  139  A.L.R. 
413. 

N.J.— Fidelity  Union  Trust  Co.  v. 
Union  Cemetery  Ass'n,  40  A.2d  205, 
136  N.J.EQ.  15,  affirmed  45  A.2d 
670,  137  N.J.Eq.  455,  and  45  A.2d 
698,  137  N.J.Eq.  456. 

N.T.— In  re  Kenny's  Will,  220  N.T. 
S.  188,  128  Misc.  553,  modified  on 
other  grounds  230  N.T.S.  74,  224 
App.Div.  152,  affirmed  166  N.B.  337, 
250  N.T.  594. 

N.C. — Weaver  v.  Hampton,  161  S.E. 
480,  201  N.C.  798— Town  of  Gary  v. 
Templeton,  152  S.E.  797,  198  N.C. 
604— Lentz  v.  Lentz,  138  S.E.  12, 
193  N.C.  742— Ellis  v.  Ellis,  136 
S.E.  350,  193  N.C.  216— First  Nat 
Bank  v.  Mitchell,  131  S.E.  656, 
191  N.C.  190— Walker  v.  Walker, 
117  S.E.  167,  185  N.C.  380. 

42,  Ala. — Louisville  &  N.  B.  Co.  v. 
Bridgeforth,    101    So.    807.    20   Ala, 
App.  326. 

Mich. — J.  L.  Hudson  Co.  v.  Barnett, 

238   N.W.   243,    255   Mich.   465. 
34  C.J.  p  418  note  55. 
Improper  order  of  dismissal 

Where  action  was  dismissed  pur- 
suant to  stipulation  of  the  parties 
but  without  any  formal  reference  to 
the  agreement  of  settlement,  trial 
court  had  jurisdiction  under  statute 
to  set  aside  the  order  of  dismissal 
and  to  enter  judgment  on  the  stipu- 
lation.— Anderson  v.  Ludwig,  22  N. 
W.2d  530,  248  Wis.  464. 

43.  Ga. — Raines  v.  Lane,  31  S.E.2d 
403,  198  Ga/217. 


Mich. — J.  L.  Hudson  Co.  v.  Barnett, 

238   N.W.    243,    255    Mich.    465. 
N.Y.— Whitson  v.    Bates,    283   N.T.S. 

663,  246  App.Div.  726. 
•34  C.J.  p  419  note  56. 
Abuse  of  discretion  not  shown 
Mo.— Allen  v.  Fewel,  87  S.W.2d  142, 

337  Mo.  955. 
Okl. — Sherrill    v.    Board    of    Com'rs 

of  Stephens  County,  130  P.2d  100, 

191  OkL  373. 

44.  111.— In  re  Reemts'  Estate,  50  N. 
E.2d  514,  383  111.  447.. 

45.  U.S. — McDonnell  v.  Wasenmiller, 
C.C.A.Neb.,  74  F.2d  320. 

46.  La. — Corpus  Juris  oited  in  Son- 
nier  v.  Sonnier,  140  So.  49,  50,  19 
La.App.  234. 

Okl.— Starr  v.   Tennant,   128   P.   733, 

35  Okl.  125. 
34  C.J.  p  419  note  70. 

47.  Ky. — Karnes  v.  Black,  215  S.W. 
191,  185  Ky.  410. 

34  C.J.  p  419  note  73. 

4a  U.S.— Walling  v.  Miller,  C.C.A. 
Minn.,  138  F.2d  629,  certiorari  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct  781,  321  U.S.  784,  88 
L.Ed.  1076. 

49.  U.S. — Lust  gar  ten  v.  Felt  &  Tar- 
rant  Mfg.  Co.,  C.C.A.N.J.,  92  F.2d 
277--Butler  v.  Denton,  D.C.Okl.,  57 
F.Supp.  656,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  150  F. 
2d  687. 

Ala.— Garrett  v.  Davis,  112  So.  342, 
216  Ala.  74. 

Ind.— Scares  v.  Chacker,  App.,  56  N. 
E.2d  505. 

Ky.— Myers  v.  Myers,  100  S.W.2d  693, 
266  Ky.  831. 

N.H.— Hubley  v.  Goodwin,  17  A.2d 
96,  91  N.H.  200. 

N.C.— King  y.  King,  35  S.B.2d  893— 
Jones  v.  Griggs,  25  S.E.2d  862, 
223  N.C.  279— Smith  v.  Land  & 
Mineral  Co.,  8  S.E.2d  225,  217  N.C. 
346— Keen  v.  Parker,  8  S.E.2d  209, 

600 


217  N.C.  378— Board  of  Education 
of  Sampson  County  v.  Board  of 
Com'rs  of  Sampson  County,  134  S. 
E.  852,  192  N.C.  274— First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Mitchell,  131  S.E.  656,  191 
N.C.  190. 

Tex. — Commercial  Credit  Co.  v.  Ram- 
sey,  Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d  191,   er- 
ror dismissed,  judgment  correct 
34  C.J.  p  419  note  75. 
Change  of  mind 

Consent  decree  confirming  com- 
missioners' report  was  binding  on 
parties,  who  could  npt  have  it  set 
aside  because  they  changed  minds 
and  employed  new  attorneys. — Berg- 
man v.  Rhodes,  165  N.E.  598,  334  111. 
137,  65  A.L.R.  344. 
Threats 

Threat  of  foreclosure  and  agree- 
ment to  extend  time  made  out  of 
court  were  not  ground  for  vacating 
judgment  entered  by  consent. — Arnot 
v  Fischer,  295  P.  1117,  161  Wash. 
67. 

50.  Minn. — Rusch  v.  Prudential  Ins. 
Co.   of  America,  266  N.W.   86,   197 
Minn.  81. 

N.T.— In  re  Del  Drago's  Estate,   36 
N.T.S.2d    811,    179    Misc.    383. 

51.  Ga. — Murray  v.  Willoughby,    66 
S.E.  267,  133  Ga.  514. 

La.— Doll  v.  Doll,   19   So.2d  249,   206 

La.  550. 
34  C.J.  p  420  note  83. 

52.  Ark. — Blair       v.       Askew-Jones 
Lumber  Co.,  55  S.W.2d  78,  186  Ark. 
687. 

34  C.J.  p  420  note  85. 
Limitations 

Ark. — Blair  v.  Askew-Jones  Lumber 
Co.,   55  S.W.2d  78,  186  Ark.   687. 

53.  Mo. — Henry  v.   Gibson,    55    Mo. 
570. 

v.  Webb,  8  S.C.  202. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


330 


attorney,  unmixed  with  collusion  or  fraud  of  the 
other  party;54  failure  of  a  defendant  duly  cited 
to  employ  counsel  or  file  an  answer;55  nonperform- 
ance  of  stipulations  to  be  performed  subsequent  to 
entry  of  judgment;56  improper  distribution  of  the 
proceeds  of  the  judgment;51?  or  breach  of  parol 
agreement  made  out  of  court  consenting  to  entry  of 
judgment  by  default,  where  a  rule  of  court  refuses 
to  recognize  such  parol  agreements.58 

Want  of  consent.  A  purported  consent  judgment 
may  generally  be  opened  or  vacated  where  it  was 
entered  without  the  authority  or  consent  of  the 
-moving  party,59  or  in  violation  of  the  agreement 
Tof  the  parties.60  This  rule  has  been  applied  to  in- 
validate judgments  entered  on  the  unauthorized 
/consent  of  the  attorneys,61  although  there  is  au- 
thority to  the  effect  that  a  judgment  regularly  en- 
tered pursuant  to  agreement  of  the  attorneys  may 
not  be  opened  after  the  term  on  the  ground  that 
the  agreement  was  not  authorized,62  that  showing 
that  a  party  did  not  consent  will  not  justify  vaca- 


tion of  the  judgment  where  there  is  failure  to  show 
nonconsent  of  his  attorney,68  and  that  the  client  is 
bound  by  the  unauthorized  consent  of  his  attorney 
within  the  scope  of  his  apparent  authority  so  as  to 
preclude  the  client  from  securing  -vacation  of  a 
judgment  entered  on  the  unauthorized  consent  or 
agreement  of  the  attorney.64  It  has  also  been  stat- 
ed that  courts  are  not  inclined  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment rendered  pursuant  to  a  compromise,  even 
though  the  attorney  who  agreed  may  have  lacked 
actual  authority  to  do  so,  in  the  absence  of  a  show- 
ing of  injury  to  the  party  seeking  to  set  aside  the 
judgment.65  An  amendment  of  a  consent  judg- 
ment may  be  set  aside  on  proof  that  the  amendment 
was  made  without  consent  of  the  party  concerned.66 
It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  affecting  the  rights 
of  persons  under  disability,  entered  by  consent  of 
representatives  of  such  persons,  may  be  set  aside 
if  found  prejudicial  to  their  interests.67 

Fraud,  collusion,  mistake,  unavoidable  casualty,  or 
usury.    A  consent  judgment  may  be  opened  or  va- 


54.  N.C.— Painter  v.  Norfolk  &  W. 
R.  Co.,  57  S.E.  151,  144  N.C.  436. 

Tex. — Adams  v,  Beaumont  First  Nat. 

Bank,  Civ.App.,  52  S.W.  642. 
Disregard  of  petitioner's  wishes 

Fact  that  consent  judgment  by  in- 
sane petitioner's  counsel  in  prior  lit- 
igation was  against  petitioner's 
wishes  is  not  ground  for  setting 
aside  prior  adjudication  in  absence 
•  of  fraud,  it  not  being  presumed  that 
an  insane  person  is  capable  of  giving 
proper  direction  as  to  conduct  of 
litigation,  and  no  more  appearing 
from-  the  application  to  set  aside 
the  consent  judgment  than  that  pe- 
titioner's guardian  ad  litem  may 
have  been  negligent. — Gray  v.  Geor- 
gia Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  143  S.E.  501, 
166  Ga.  445. 

55.  Tex. — Baldwin       v.       Stamford 
State    Bank,    Civ.App.,    82    S.W.2d 
701,  error  refused. 

56.  N.Y.— Cohen  v,  Orlove,  202  N.Y. 
S.  517,  207  App.Div.  603. 

Wis.— Duras  v. 'Keller,  186  N.W.  149, 
176  Wis.  88. 

57.  Pa, — Automobile-Securities      Co. 
v.  Wilson,  151  A.  889,  301  Pa,  232. 

Payment   of  whole  proceeds  to  one 

plaintiff  ' 

Fact  that  entire  amount  of  settle- 
ment of  judgment  was  paid  to  use- 
plaintiff,  although  nominal  plaintiff 
claimed  part,  was  .held  not  to  require 
setting  judgment  aside,  where  settle- 
ment was  not  challenged  but  only 
distribution  made  thereunder  by  the 
attorney  to  whom  defendant  had 
properly  paid  over  the  money. — Au- 
tomobile Securities  Co.  v.  Wilson, 
151  A.  889,  301  Pa.  232. 

58.  Ind. — Barnes  v.   Smith,   34   Ind. 
516. 


59.  Ala.— National     Bread     Co.    .  v. 
Bird,   145   So.  462,   226  Ala.  40. 

Colo.— Lewis  v.  Vache,  20  P.2d  554, 

92  Colo.  358. 
Tenn. — Cummins  v.  Woody,  152  S.W. 

2d    246,    177    Tenn.    636— Jones    v. 

Williamson,  5  Cold.  371. 
W.Va.— Dwight  v.  Hazlett,   147   S.E. 

877,  107  W.Va.  192,  66  A.L.R.  102. 
34  OJ.  p'420  note  81. 

60.  Ky.— Sebree  v.  Sebree,   99   S.W. 
282,  30  Ky.L.  670. 

34  C.J.  p  420  note  82. 

Ex  parte  extension  of  time 

Judgment  granted  ex  parte  extend- 
ing time  for  payment  under  consent 
decree  was  void  and  could  be  vacat- 
ed at  subsequent  term. — Baker  v. 
McCord,  162  S.E.  110,  173  Ga,  819. 

61.  Ala.— National     Bread     Co.     v. 
Bird,  145  So.  462,  226  Ala.  40. 

Colo. — Lewis   v.  Vache,   20  P.2d  554, 

92  Colo.  358. 
Okl.— Walker  v.  Gulf  Pipe  Line  Co., 

226  P.  1046,  102  Okl.  7. 
34  C.J.  p  420  note  81  [c]. 
Seasonable  application 

Judgment  pursuant  to  compromise 
by  attorney  without  authority  of  cli- 
ent may  be  vacated  on  seasonable 
application.— Dwight  v.  Hazlett,  147 
S.E.  877,  107  W.Va.  192,  66  A.L.R. 
102. 

If  the  parties  can  be  put  in  statu 
<*TLO,  a  consent  judgment  entered  on 
agreement  of  the  attorneys  may  be 
set  aside  on  the,  ground  that  the  at- 
torney of  applicant. acted  against  the 
express  instructions  of  his  client. — 
City  of  Medford  v.  Corbett,  20  N.E. 
2d  402,  302  Mass.  573— Dal  ton  v. 
West  End  St.  Ry.  Co.,  U  N.E.  261, 
159  Mass.  221. 

601 


62.  Ky. — Karnes  v.  Black,  215  8.W. 
191,  185  Ky.  410,  414. 

63.  Ky.— De    Charette    v.    St.    Mat- 
thews Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  283  S.W. 
410,   214   Ky.    400,   50  A.L.R.    34. 

64.  Mich. — Holmes    v.    Heywood,    1 
Mich.,N.P.,  292. 

34  C.J.  p  420  note  81  [b]. 

65.  Tex. — Commercial  Credit  Co.  v. 
Ramsey,  Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d  191, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct. 

66.  N.C.— Deitz   v.    Bolch,    183    S.E. 
384,  209  N.C.  202. 

Consent  of  all  parties  as  prerequisite 
to  amendment  of  consent  -judgment 
see  supra  §  329. 

67.  Tenn. — Ledford  v.  Johnson  City 
Foundry  &  Machine  Co.,  88  S.W.2d 
804,  169  Tenn.  430. 

Tex. — Missouri-Kansas-Texas  R.  Co. 

of  Texas  v.  Pluto,  Civ.App.,  1&0  S. 

W.2d     1048,     reversed     on     other 

grounds  156  S.W.2d  265,  138  Tex.  1. 
Workmen's  compensation 

Where  statutory  provisions  state 
that  no  settlement  or  compromise 
shall  be  made  except  on  the  terms 
provided  by  the  statute  in  work- 
men's compensation  cases,  the  em- 
ployer and  employee  cannot  make 
a  settlement  except  on  the  statutory 
terms,  and  a  consent  judgment  en- 
tered on  agreement  of  counsel  and 
not  in  accordance  with  the  statute 
may  be  set  aside,  and  in  fact  should 
be  set  aside  for  noncompliance  with 
the  statute  even  if  it  is  rendered 
after  proof  and  a.  full  hearing. — Led- 
ford v,  Johnson  City  Foundry  &  Ma- 
chine Co.,  88  S.W.2d  804,  169  Tenn. 
430. 


330 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


cated  on  the  ground  of  collusion68  or  fraud,69  as 
where  defendant  was  tricked  or  misled  by  false  rep- 
resentations,70 but  may  not  be  set  aside  on  this 
ground  where  the  facts  fail  to  disclose  fraud  of  a 
remediable  character.71 

Generally  speaking,  a  trial  court  may  set  aside  or 
vacate  a  consent  judgment  on  the  ground  of  a  mis- 
take of  fact,72  at  least  if  mutual  in  character,™  or 
shared  by  the  court,74  but  it  may  not  vacate  a  con- 
sent judgment  on  the  basis  of  a  mistake  of  law.75 
Where  the  party  or  his  authorized  counsel  consents 
to  entry  of  judgment  with  full  knowledge  of  the 
facts,  ordinarily  it  may  not  be  set  aside  or  vacated 
on  the  alleged  ground  of  inadvertence  or  mistake,76 
surprise  or  excusable  neglect,77  or  unavoidable  cas- 
ualty and  misfortune  ;78  but  it  has  been  held  ground 
for  vacation  of  a  consent  judgment  that  it  resulted 
from  a  mistake  of  fact  arising  from  excusable  neg- 
lect,79 or  that  defendant  was  prevented  from  ap- 
pearing or  defending  by  unavoidable  casualty.80 
While  usury  has  been  held  a  ground  for  vacating 
a  consent  judgment,81  it  has  also  been  held  that 


consenting  to  judgment  waives  the  defense  of  usury 
precluding  defendant  from  having  judgment  vacat- 
ed for  usury  as  matter  of  right.82 

c.  Procedure  and  Belief 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Time  for  application 

(3)  Relief;    effect  of  setting  judgment 

aside 

(1)  In  General 

Ordinarily,  vacation  of  a  consent  Judgment  may  be 
sought  by  motion  or  petition,  although  an  independent 
action  may  lie  In  some  jurisdictions.  The  attack  on  the 
Judgment  by  action  or  motion  should  be  on  notice  to 
the  other  party  and  the  burden  rests  on  the  plaintiff  or 
movant  to  show  grounds  for  the  relief  sought. 

As  a  general  rule  a  consent  judgment  may  be 
vacated  on  a  petition  or  motion,83  addressed  to  the 
court  which  entered  it.84  Under  some  practice  it 
has  been  held  that  ordinarily  the  proper  procedure 
to  vacate  a  consent  judgment  is  by  independent  ac- 
tion,85 but  that,  when  a  party  to  an  action  denies 
that  he  gave  consent  to  the  judgment  as  entered, 


68.  Ala.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bridgeforth,    101    So.    807,    20   Ala, 
App.  326. 

34  C.J.  p  419  note  77. 

69.  U.S. — U.    S.    v.    Radio    Corpora- 
tion   of   America,    D.C.Del.,    46    P. 
Supp.   654,  appeal  dismissed  63   S. 
Ct.  851,  318  U.S.  796,  87  L.Ed.  1161. 

Ala-— Louisville     &    N.     R.     Co.     v. 

Bridgeforth,    101    So.    807,    20   Ala. 

App.  326. 
Ky. — Honaker  v.  Honaker,  101  S.W.2d 

679,  267  Ky.  129. 
34  C.J.  P  419  note  76. 
70u    Tex. — Cetti  v.  Dunman,  64  S.W* 

787,  26  Tex.Civ.App.  433. 
34  CUT.  p  420  note  80. 
71.    Ark.— Haydon    v.    Haydon,    158 

S.W.2d  689,  203  Ark.  1147. 
N.J. — Mathews  v.  American  Tobacco 

Co.,   23   A.2d  301.   130  N.XEq.  470, 

affirmed  37  A.2d  99,  135  N.J.EQ.  11. 
N.Y.— Evans  v.  Stein.  59  N.Y.S.2d 

544,  second  case,  affirmed  59  N.Y.S. 

2d   625,   second  case,   269  App.Div. 

1052,    appeal    denied    60    N.T.S.2d 

288,  270  AppJMv.  810. 
Tex. — Clark  v.  W.  L.  Pearson  &  Co., 

Civ.App..    26    S.W.2d    382,   affirmed 

39   S.W.2d   27,   121  Tex.   34. 
dements  of  remediable  fraud 

Consent  Judgment  will  not  be  set 
aside  for  fraud,  unless  it  is  shown 
that  material  misrepresentation  of 
material  fact  was  made  by  party 
who  knew,  or  should  have  known,  of 
Its  falsity,  for  purpose  of  having 
misrepresentation  relied  on  by  prej- 
udiced party  who  had  right  to,  and 
in  good  JBaith  did,  rely  thereon.— 
Harrel  v.  Tonts.  113  S.W.2d  426, 
in  Ky.  783— Boone  v.  Ohio  Valley 


Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.'s  Receiver,  55 
S.W.2d  374,  246  Ky.  489. 
"Intrinsic"   fraud   insufficient 
Tex.— O'Meara  v.   O'Meara,  Civ.App., 
181  S.W.2d  891.  error  refused. 

72.  Iowa. — Corpus    Juris     cited    to 
Hall   v.   District   Court   of  Taylor 
County,    215    N.W.    606,    607,    206 
Iowa  179. 

R.I.— Everett  v.  Cutler  Mills,  160  A. 

924,  52  R.I.  330. 
34  C.J.  p  419  note  79. 

73.  Iowa.— Hall  v.  District  Court  of 
Taylor  County,   215  N.W.  606,  206 
Iowa  179. 

Mutual  mistake  not  shown 

Minn. — Rusch  v.   Prudential  Ins.  Co. 

of  America,  266  N.W.  86,  197  Minn. 

81. 

74.  R.I.— Everett    v.    Cutler    Mills, 
160  A.  924,  52  R.L  330. 

75.  Iowa. — Steiner  v.  Lenz,  81  N.W. 
190,  110  Iowa  49. 

La.— Doll  v.  Doll,  19   So.2d  249,   206 

La.  550. 

N.C.— King  v.  King,  35  S.E.2d  893. 
Mutual  mistake 

Doubt  has  been  expressed  as  to 
whether  a  mistake  of  law  is  suffi- 
cient ground  for  vacation  of  a  con- 
sent Judgment,  even  though  the  mis- 
take was  mutual  in  character. — The 
Amaranth,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  68  F.2d  893. 

76.  S.C.— Wilson   v.   Wilson,    150  .  S. 
E.     897,    153     S.C.     472— Dixon    v. 
Floyd,   53   S.E.   167,   73   S.C.   202. 

77.  N.C.— Morris    v.    Patterson,    105 
S.E.  25,  180  N.C.  484— Hairston  v. 
Garwood,  81  S.E.  653,  123  N.C.  345. 

S.C.— Wilson  v.  Wilson,  150  S.B.  897, 

602 


153    S.C.    472— Dixon   v.    Floyd,    53 
S.E.  167,  73  S.C.  202. 

78.  Iowa. — Mains     v.     Des     Moines 
Nat  Bank,  85  N.W.  758,  113  Iowa 
395. 

79.  S.C.— Maybank  Fertilizer  Co.  v. 
Jeffcoat,  127  S.E.  835,  131  S.C.  418. 

Confusion  with  different  case 

Affidavit  showing  that  defendant's 
attorney  had  consented  to  Judgment 
without  contest  under  mistake  due 
to  confusion  of  facts  with  those  of 
similar  case  was  held  to  warrant 
finding  of  excusable  neglect  inuring 
to  benefit  of  client,  and  warranting 
court  in  vacating  Judgment. — May- 
bank  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Jeffcoat,  su- 
pra. 

80.  Ark.— Union     Sav.     Building    & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Grayson.  76  S.W.2d 
963,  190  Ark.  62. 

81.  Pa.— Marr  v.    Marr,    20   A.    692. 
110  Pa.  60. 

82.  Wash.— Arnot  v.  Fischer,  295  P. 
1117,  161  Wash.  67. 

83.  N.T.— Fred  Medart  Mfg.   Co.  v. 
Rafferty,  276  N.T.S.   678,  243  App. 
Div.  632. 

34  C.J.  p  419  note  60. 

84.  Ky.— Hargis  v.  Hargis,   66  S.W. 
2d  59,  252  Ky.  198— Boone  v.  Ohio 
Valley    Fire    &   Marine    Ins.    Co.'s 
Receiver,   55   S.W.2d   374,   246  Ky. 
489. 

Special  term 

N.T.— Whitson  v.   Bates,    283   N.T.S. 
663,  246  App.Div.  726. 

85.  N.C.— King   v.    King,    35    S.E.2d 
893 — Weaver  v.  Hampton,  161  S.E. 
480,  201  N.C.  798. 

34  G.J.  p  419  note  61. 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  330 


the  proper  procedure  in  attacking  such  judgment 
is  by  motion  in  the  cause.86  Where  a  motion  to  set 
aside  the  judgment  is  based  solely  on  the  moving 
party's  want  of  consent,  he  may  not  attack  the 
court's  jurisdiction  in  a  motion  for  rehearing  after 
denial  of  the  original  motion  to  set  aside  the  judg- 
ment87 Where  the  court  on  its  own  motion  orders 
a  case  dismissed  "as  to  personal  judgment  of  de- 
fendant," there  is  a  clerical  misprision  not  pre- 
cluding the  court  from  entering  a  personal  consent 
judgment88 

An  action  or  application  to  set  aside  or  vacate  a 
consent  judgment  should  be  instituted  on  due  no- 
tice to  the  other  party,89  and  a  motion  or  petition 
in  the  cause  should  show  adequate  grounds  for  va- 
cating the  judgment,90  and  under  some  practice 
should  be  supported  by  affidavit,  or  sworn  to  by 
applicant  or  his  representative,91  and  then  support- 
ed by  proof.92  It  has  been  held,  however,  that, 
where  allegations  of  a  petition  to  vacate  a  consent 
judgment  are  undenied,  they  may  be  accepted  as 


true.93  One  seeking  to  set  aside  or  vacate  a  con- 
sent judgment  against  him  should  sufficiently  show 
a  meritorious  defense,94  and  the  burden  rests  on 
him  to  prove  his  allegations  as  to  the  grounds  for 
the  relief  sought.95  The  judge  need  not  invoke 
findings  of  fact  by  a  jury  on  his  own  motion  where 
no  such  motion  is  made  by  the  parties,  but  on  the 
contrary  both  counsel  appear  and  enter  on  a  trial 
of  the  application  before  the  court,96  and  it  has 
been  held  that,  where  motion  is  made  to  vacate  the 
judgment  for  lack  of  consent,  the  court  may  de- 
termine the  fact  of  consent  without  allowing  a 
jury  trial  as  matter  of  right97 

(2)  Time  for  Application 

An  application  to  set  aside  or  vacate  a  consent  Judg- 
ment should  be  made  In  due  time  and  ordinarily  dur- 
ing the  term  at  which  the  Judgment  was  entered,  al- 
though under  certain  circumstances  the  application  may 
properly  be  made  after  the  term. 

A  motion  or  other  application  to  vacate  a  consent 
judgment  should  be  timely  made,98  as  within  the 


80.    N.C.— King   v.    King,    35    S.E.2d 
893 — Boucher  v.   Union  Trust  Co., 
190  S.E.  226,  211  N.C.  377— Cason  v. 
Shute,   189   S.E.   494,   211  N.C.   195. 
Grounds  for  opening  or  vacating  con- 
sent judgment  see  supra  §  330  b. 
Incapacity  to  consent 

Where  Judgment  was  entered  on 
compromise  in  action  for  negligence, 
and  plaintiff  did  not  consent,  or  was 
incapable  of  consenting,  proper  pro- 
cedure in  attacking  Judgment  would 
be  by  motion  in  the  cause. — Gibson 
V.  Gordon,  197  S.E.  135,  213  N.C.  666. 

87.  Mo. — Thomas  v.  Craghead,  58  S. 
W.2d  281,  332  Mo.  211,  transferred, 
see,  App.,  22  S.W.2d  1057. 

88.  Ky.— Boone  v.  Ohio  Valley  Fire 
&  Marine  Ins.  Co.'s  Receiver,  55  S. 
W.2d  374,  246  Ky.  489. 

89.  N.C.— Board     of    Education     of 
Sampson     County     v.     Board     of 
Com'rs  -of  Sampson  County,  134  S. 
E.  852,  192  N.C.  274. 

Tex. — Commercial      Credit     Co.      v. 
Ramsey,  Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d  191, 
error  dismissed,  Judgment  correct. 
Aetna!  party 

Pact  that  party  in  whose  name 
former  suit  had  been  brought  was 
not  made  party  to  suit  to  set  aside 
consent  judgment  in  former  suit  was 
not  ground  for  refusing  to  set  such 
Judgment  aside,  where  such  party 
had  not  been  actual  party  to  former 
suit,  had  no  interest  in  subject  mat- 
ter, and  obtained  no  benefit  by  Judg- 
ment therein. — Wilison  v.  Kuhn,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  96  S.W.2d  128,  error  dis- 
missed, rehearing  denied  96  S.W.2d 
236. 

90.  Ga. — Raines  v.  Lane,  31  S.B.2d 
403,  198  Ga.  217. 

91.  Tex. — Commercial  Credit  Co.  w 


Ramsey,  Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d  191, 
error  dismissed,  Judgment  correct. 

92.  Tex. — Commercial  Credit  Co.  v. 
Ramsey,  supra. 

93.  W.Va.— Dwight   v.    Hazlett,    147 
S.E.  877,  107  W.Va.  192,  66  A.L.R. 
102. 

94.  Miss. — Cocke  v.  Wilson,  134  So. 
686,  161  Miss.  1. 

Meritorious    defense    generally    see 

supra  §  290. 

Prima  facie  defense  necessary 
U.S.—The   Amaranth,    C.C.A.N.T.,    68 

F.2d  893. 
Facts  on  which  defense  is  based 

Allegation,  or  proof,  simply  that 
defendant  has  meritorious  defense, 
is  insufficient  to  obtain  setting  aside 
of  Judgment,  but  the  facts  constitut- 
ing the  meritorious  defense  must  be 
set  forth  with  sufficient  detail  to  en- 
able court  to  determine  therefrom 
whether  defense  is  meritorious. — 
Cocke  v.  Wilson,  134  So.  686,  161 
Miss.  1. 

Petition  held  defective 
U.S.—The   Amaranth,.  C.C.A.N.Y.,    68 

F.2d  893. 

95.  U.S.— Watson  v.  U.  S.,  IXC.N.C., 
34  F.Supp.  777. 

34  C.J.  p  419  note  74. 
Prima  facie  showing 
Tex. — Willson  v.  Kuhn,  Civ. App.,   96 
S.W.2d    128,    error   dismissed,    re- 
hearing denied  96  S.W.2d  236. 
Weight  and  sufficiency  of  evidence 

(1)  Evidence  held  sufficient  to  Jus- 
tify   denial    of   application    to    open 
or  vacate  consent  Judgment 
D.C. — Torrens    v.    Proctor,    133    F.2d 

25,  77  U.S.APP.D.C.  55. 
Pa. — Finn    v.    Fiedorowicz,    Com.  PL, 
SI  Luz.Leg.Reg.  448. 

603 


(2)  Bvidence  held  sufficient  to  sus- 
tain the  overruling  of  plaintiff's  mo- 
tion to  strike  defendants'  motion  to 
open   up   consent   Judgment. — Parish 
Bank    &    Trust    Co.    v.    Wennerholm 
Bros.,  39  N.B.2d  383,  313  IH.App.  121. 

(3)  Bvidence  held  to  support  find- 
ing that  Judgment  establishing  road 
was   .entered    by    consent    of    party 
moving    to    set    it    aside. — Thomas 
v.  Craghead,  58  S.W.2d  281,  332  Mo. 
211,   transferred,   see,  App.,   22   S.W. 
2d  1057, 

Waiver 

Where  counsel  impliedly  consents 
that  a  Judgment  not  conforming  to 
the  stipulation  of  the  parties  should 
be  opened  or  modified  in  the  event 
of  a  certain  contingency  as  pro- 
vided by  the  stipulation  but  not  by 
the  Judgment,  he  thereby  waives  the 
necessity  of  any  showing  that  the 
defect  in  the  Judgment  was  not  the 
fault  of  the  other  party  seeking  to 
open  it— Midwest  Refining  Co.  v. 
George,  7  P.2d  213,  44  Wyo.  25.  ' 

98.  Ga.— Raines  v.  Lane,  31  S.E.2d 
403,  198  Ga.  217. 

97.  N.C.— King   v.    King,    35    S.E.M 
893. 

98.  N.J. — Mathews  v.  American  To- 
bacco Co.,  37  A.2d  99,  135  N.J.Ba. 
11. 

Okl.— Walker  v.  Gulf  Pipe  Line  Co.,' 
226  P.  1046,  102  Okl.  7. 

Tex. — Pendery  v.  Panhandle  Refining 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  169  S,W.2d  766,  error 
refused — Sanders  v.  O'Connor,  Civ. 
App.,  98  S.W.2d  401,  error  dis- 
missed. 

Wis. — Amalgamated  Meat  Cutters  & 
Butcher  Workmen  of  N,  A.,  A.  F. 
of  L.,  Local  Union  No.  73,  v. 


§  330 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


period  prescribed  by  statute,9^  and  may  be  denied 
for  delay  amounting  to  laches.1  Where  a  motion  to 
vacate  a  consent  judgment  is  made  within  the  period 
prescribed  by  statute,  the  court  retains  jurisdiction 
to  consider  and  pass  on  the  motion  after  expiration 
of  such  period.2 

In  accordance  with  the  general  rules  discussed 
supra  §§  228-235,  an  application  to  set  aside  or  va- 
cate a  consent  judgment  may  be  made  at  the  same 
term  in  which  the  Judgment  was  entered,3  but  or- 
dinarily may  not  be  made  in  vacation,4  or  at  a  sub- 
sequent term,6  unless  a  sufficient  excuse  for  the 
delay  is  shown,6  or  the  ground  for  vacation  is  one 
available  after  the  term.7  There  is  authority,  how- 
ever, to  the  effect  that  the  common-law  rule  limit- 
ing the  control  of  the  court  over  its  judgments  to 
the  term  at  which  they  were  rendered  applies  only 
to  judgments  in  controversial  cases  and  not  to 
judgments  entered  by  consent  without  contest.8 

(3)  Relief;     Effect    of    Setting    Judgment 
Aside 

A  consent  judgment.  If  vacated,  should  be  set  aside 
in  its  entirety  and  as  to  all  joint  defendants.  The  ef- 
fect of  setting  aside  a  consent  judgment  Is  to  reinstate 
the  former  case. 

If  a  consent  judgment  is  set  aside,  it  must  be  set 
aside  in  its  entirety;9  a  party  may  not  have  it  set 
aside  as  far  as  it  is  unfavorable  to  him,  and  claim 
the  benefit  of  the  favorable  part  ;10  and,  where  the 


judgment  is  against  several  joint  defendants,  if  it  is 
set  aside  as  to  part  of  them,  it  must  be  set  aside  as 
to  all.11  The  fact  that  an  order  vacates  a  con- 
sent judgment,  although  the  notice  of  motion  asked 
merely  for  a  modification,  so  that  the  order  grant- 
ed went  beyond  the  relief  asked  by  the  motion,  does 
not  in  itself  constitute  sufficient  ground  for  vacating 
the  order;12  but  on  appeal  from  such  an  order  the 
superior  court  may,  in  an  otherwise  proper  case, 
reverse  the  order  with  instructions  to  the  trial  court 
to  modify  the  consent  judgment  in  compliance  with 
the  relief  asked  in  the  original  motion.1^ 

Where  a  consent  judgment  is  set  aside,  the  for- 
mer case  will  be  reinstated  and  the  parties  given 
the  same  rights  as  to  the  prosecution  and  defense 
thereof  as  they  would  have  had  before  the  consent 
judgment  was  catered,  together  with  any  additional 
right  germane  to  the  litigation.14 

§  331.    Judgments  on  Offer  and  Acceptance 

A  judgment  entered  on  offer  and  acceptance  may 
be  vacated  on  sufficient  grounds,  such  as  the  absence  of 
an  authorized  offer,  or  noncompliance  with  statutory  re- 
quirements, but  it  may  not  be  amended  without  con- 
sent of  all  parties. 

In  accordance  with  the  general  rules  governing 
amendment  and  vacation  of  consent  judgments,  as 
discussed  supra  §§  329-331,  a  judgment  entered  on 
acceptance  of  defendant's  offer  may  be  vacated  oh 


Smith,    10    N.W.2d    114,    243    Wis. 
390. 
34  C.J.  p  419  note  62. 

99.    Wis. — Amalgamated    Meat    Cut- 
ters &  Butcher  Workmen  of  N.  A., 
A.   P.   of  L,,   Local  Union  No.   73, 
v.  Smith,  supra, 
34  OJ.  p  419  note  63. 
Period   for   review   or    appeal 

Where  statutory  period  for  review 
of  Judgment  entered  under  stipu- 
lation had  elapsed  before  any  mo- 
tion to  review  was  made,  and  time 
for  appeal  had  passed  and  there  was 
no  claim  of  fraud,  mistake,  surprise, 
or  excusable  neglect, '  defendants 
were  not  entitled  to  have  judgment 
set  aside  on  ground  that  the  stipu- 
lation was  a  contract  for  a  penalty 
and  unenforceable. — Amalgamated 
Meat  Cutters  &  Butcher  Workmen  of 
N.  A.,  A.  F.  or  L.,  Local  Union  No. 
73,  v.  Smitb,  supra. 
Mutual  mistake 

A  statute  authorizing  the  court 
within  one  year  after  notice,  in 
its  discretion,  to  relieve  a  party 
from  a  judgment  taken  against  him 
through  his  mistake  refers  to  a 
unilateral  mistake  and  does  not  con- 
trol a  motion  to  vacate  a  consent 
judgment  for  mutual  mistake,  which 
latter  the  court  may  vacate  on  mo- 


tion  after  expiration  of  the  statu- 
tory period. — Elsen  v.  State  Farm- 
ers Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  17  N.W.2d  652,  219 
Minn.  315. 

1.  N.J. — Ma  thews  v.   American   To- 
bacco Co.,   37  A.2d  99,   135  N.J.Eq. 
11. 

Tex. — Pendery  v.  Panhandle  Refining 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  169  S.W.2d  766,  er- 
ror refused. 

34  OJ.  p  419  note  64. 

Laclies  not  shown. 

Minn. — Elsen  v.  State  Farmers  Mut. 
Ins.  Co.,  17  N.W.2d  652,  219  Minn. 
315. 

2.  CaL— Marston  v.  Rood,  144  P.2d 
863,  62  Cal.App.2d  435. 

3.  Ohio. — Sponseller    v.    Sponseller, 
144  N.E.  48,  110  Ohio  St  395. 

34  C.J.  p  419  note  65. 

4.  Ga. — O'Neal    v.    Neal    Veneering 
Co.,  143  S.E.  381,  166  Ga.  376. 

5.  .U.S.— Mallinger   v.   U.   S.,   C.C.A. 
Pa.,  g2  F.2d  705. 

34  C.J.  p  419  note  66. 

6.  Tex. — Lindsley  v.   Sparks,   48   S. 
W.    204,    20    Tex.Civ.App.   56. 

34  C.J.  p  419  note  67. 

7.  .N.C. — People's    Bank    of    Burns- 
ville,   173  S.E.  345,  206  N.C.  323. 

Ohio. — Sponseller  v.  Sponseller,  144 
N.E.  48,  110  Ohio  St  395. 

604 


Jurisdiction  and  power  after  expira- 
tion of  term  generally  see  supra  \ 
230. 
Lack  of  consent  in  fact 

Where  defendant  in  purported  con- 
sent judgment  showed  that  she  nei- 
ther agreed,  nor  authorized  anyone 
to  agree,  to  the  judgment,  court,  on 
defendant's  motion  after  expiration 
of  term,  was  held  authorized  to  set 
aside  such  judgment — People's  Bank 
of  Burns ville  v.  Penland,  173  S.E. 
345,  206  N.C.  323. 

8.  Minn. — Elsen    v.    State    Farmers 
Mut  Ins.  Co.,  17  N.W.2d  652,   219 
Minn.  315. 

9.  N.C.-— Edwards  v.   Sutton,   116  S. 
E.  163,  185  N.C.  102. 

34  C.J.  p  419  note  57. 

10.  Wash.— Connor   v.    Seattle,    144 
P.  52,  82  Wash.  296. 

11.  N.C. — Glade  Spring  Bank  v.  Mc- 
Ewen,    76   S.B.    222,    160   N.C.    414, 
Ann.Cas.19HC  542.. 

Okl.— Outcalt  v.   Collier,    58   P.    642, 
8  Okl.  473,  52  P.  738,  6  Okl.  615. 

12.  CaL— Marston  v.  Rood,  144  P.2d 
863,  62  Cal.App.2d  435. 

13.  CaL — Marston  v.  Rood,  supra. 

14.  Ga.— Davis  v.  Blakely  First  Nat 
Bank,  78  S.E.  190,  139  Ga,  702,  46 
L.R.A.,N.S.,  750. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


333 


sufficient  grounds.15  Thus  the  judgment  may  be 
vacated  if  the  offer  of  judgment  was  made  without 
authority,16  or  the  offer  was  not  accepted  in  time,17 
or  there  was  a  noncompliance  with  statutory  re- 
quirements.18 A  mistake  of  law  is  not  sufficient 
ground  for  vacating  the  judgment.19  However, 
a  judgment  entered  on  acceptance  of  defendant's 
offer  ordinarily  may  not  be.  changed  without  con- 
sent of  all  the  parties.20 

§  332.     Summary  Judgments 

A  summary  Judgment  on  motion  may  be  opened  or 
vacated  for  good  cause. 


A  summary  judgment  on  motion  may  be  opened 
or  vacated  for  good  cause  shown.21  A* statutory 
provision  relating  to  the  opening  and  setting  aside 
of  judgments  by  default  in  actions  does  not,  how- 
ever, apply  to  judgments  in  summary  proceedings.22 
Where  defendant  is  permitted  to  file  an  amended 
answer,  after  plaintiff's  motion  for  judgment  has 
been  sustained,  such  permission  is,  in  effect,  an 
informal  setting  aside  of  the  order  sustaining  the 
motion.23 


H.  JUDGMENTS  BY  DEFAULT 


§  333.    Opening,    Amending,    and    Vacating 
Generally 

A  court  has  Jurisdiction  and  power  to  amend,  open, 
or  vacate  default  judgments  rendered  >by  it  during  the 
term  at  which  they  are  rendered,,  but  not  usually  after 
expiration  of  the  time  prescribed  by  statute  or  at  a 
subsequent  term,  although  the  latter  rule  Is  subject  to 
some  exceptions. 


Subject  to  the  rules  of  general  application  as  to 
opening,  amending,  or  vacating  judgments,  which 
are  discussed  supra  §§  228-235,  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault may  be  amended  or  corrected  in  a  proper 
case,  at  the  instance  of  either  party.24  Likewise  the 
power  to  open  or  to  vacate  a  judgment  extends  to 
judgments  rendered  on  default,25  particularly  under 


15.  Neb. — Becker  v.  Breen,  94  N.W. 
614,  68  Neb.  379. 

34  C.J.  P  420.  note  93. 

16.  N.Y. — Garrison    v.    Garrison,    67 
How.Pr.   271 — Bridenbecker  v.  Ma- 
son, 16  How.Pr.  203. 

17.  Neb.— Becker  v.  Breen,  94  N.W. 
614,  68  Neb.  379. 

18.  Neb.— Becker  v.  Breen,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  420  note  96. 

19.  N.Y.— Walsh  v.  Empire  Brick.fc 
Supply  Co.,  85  N.Y.S.  538,  90  Ap'p. 
Div.  498. 

34  C.J.  p  420  note  98. 

80.    N.Y.—- Shepherd    v.    Moodhe,    44 

N.B.  963,  150  N.Y.  183— Stillwell  v. 

Stillwell,    30    N.Y.S.    961,    81    Hun 

392,  24  N.Y.Civ.Proc.  124. 
21.    Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 

Baldwin  v.  Anderson,  13  P.2d  650, 

655,  52  Idaho  243. 
34  C.J.  p  420  note  2. 
Modification,  held  improper 

Where,  in  action  on  bond  indem- 
nifying owner  against  liability  for 
cost  of  building  constructed  by  les- 
see, summary  judgment  was  grant- 
ed for  amount  of  liens  adjudicated 
to  be  due  in  mechanics'  lien  action, 
order  reducing  summary  judgment 
to  amount  realized  on  sale  of  prop- 
erty in  mechanics'  lien  foreclosure 
action  was  improper,  since  no  new 
situation  arose  subsequent  to  entry 
of  judgment  which  could  not  have 
been  foreseen  and  pleaded  as  de- 
fense in  action  on  bond. — 755  Sev- 
epth  Ave.  Corporation  v.  Carroll,  194 
N.B.  69,  266  N.Y.  157. 
32.  N.Y.— Cochran  v.  Reich,  46  N.Y. 

S.  441,  20  Misc.  593. 
34  C.J.  p  421  note  3. 


23.  Kan.— Fritts    v.    Reidel,    165    P. 
671,  101  Kan.  68. 

24.  GSL — Columbus  Heating  &  Ven- 
tilating Co.  v.  Upchurch,  171  S.E. 
180,  47  Ga.App.  673. 

Kan. — Burris    v.    Beinhardt,    242    P. 

143,  120  Kan.  32. 
La. — Jackson  v.  Bre water,  App.,  169, 

So.  166. 
Mo. — Faulkner  v.  F.  Bieraran  &  Sons 

Metal  &  Rubber  Co.,  App.,  294  S. 

W.  1019. 

N.C. — Federal  Land  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia   v.    Davis,    1    S.E.2d    350,    215 

N.C.  100. 
Pa. — Brummer  v.  Linker,  196  A.  834, 

329  Pa.  192. 
Wis. — Parish   v.   Awschu  Properties, 

10  N.W.2d  166,  243  Wis.  269. 
34  C.J.  p  207  note  5. 
Bringing*  in  additional  defendants 

In  action  against  individuals, 
where  default  judgment  was  entered 
against  individuals,  title  and  judg- 
ment were  not  amendable  by  bring- 
ing in  such  defendants  as  trustees 
and  making  them  additionally  liable 
as  trustees  without  opportunity  to 
defend  as  such.— Greater  New  York 
Export  House  v..  Hurtig,  267  N.Y.S. 
173,  239  App.Div.  183,  appeal  dis- 
missed Greater  New  York  Export 
House  v.  Peirson,  193  N.E.  290,  265 
N.Y.  500. 
Clerical  error 

Where  docket  entry  for  default 
judgment  was  dated  and  judgment 
was  filed  Monday,  October  15,  but 
judgment  as  written  and  recorded 
bore  date  of  Sunday,  October  14,  by 
clerical  error,  nunc  pro  tune  order 
correcting  date  of  judgment  was  not 
erroneous,  as  Against  contention  that 

605 


judgment  could  not  be  corrected 
since  it  was  void  because  it  was 
rendered  on  Sunday. — Hays  v. 
Hughes,  Tex.Civ.App.,  106  S.W.2d 
724,  error  refused. 
Excessive  Judgment 
,  (1)  Trial  court  had  authority  to 
reduce  default  judgment  on  showing 
that  judgment  was  for  a  sum  in 
excess  of  the  amount  due. — Spiking* 
v.  Ellis,  8  N.E.2d  962,  290  111. App. 
585. 

(2)  Court  should  correct  default 
judgment  to  extent  that  it  included 
unauthorized  interest. — Stratton  & 
Terstegge  Co.  v.  Begley,  61  S.W.2d 
287,  249  Ky.  632. 
Belief  unwarranted  by  complaint 

Defendant  is  concluded  by  default 
decree  only  as  far  as  it  is  supported 
by  the  allegations  in  complaint  and, 
if  it  gives  relief  in  excess  of,  or 
different  from,  that  to  which  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  under  complaint,  de- 
cree may  be  modified  to  conform  to 
the  allegations. — Federal  Land  Bank 
of  Columbia  v.  Davis,  1  S.E.2d  350, 
215  N.C.  100. 

Where  defendant  appeared  alter 
entry  of  default  judgment  against 
her,  the  only  relief  to  which  plaintiff 
would  be  entitled  under  its  motion 
to  amend  judgment  would  be  such 
relief  as  might  be  granted  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course. — Irving  Trust  Co.  v. 
Seltzer,  40  N.Y.S.2d  451,  265  App.Div. 
696. 
25.  Ala.— -Marshall  County  v. 

Critcher,  17  So.2d  540,  245  Ala.  857 

— Drennen   Motor  Co.    v.    Patrick, 

141  So.  681,  225  Ala.  36. 
Cal. — Penland  v.  Goodman,  111  P.2d 

913,    44    CaLApp.2d    14— Stuart   v. 


333 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


statutes  expressly  authorizing  or  regulating  the 
opening  or  vacating  of  default  judgments.26  Ac- 
cordingly, the  court  has  power  to  open  or  vacate  its 
default  judgments  during  the  term  at  which  they 
are  rendered,27  and  also  to  the  extent  provided  for 


by  statute,  after  expiration  of  the  term;28  but  as 
a  general  rule  the  court  has  no  power  to  grant  re- 
lief after  expiration  of  the  time  prescribed  there- 
for by  statute,29  or,  except  as  authorized  by  statute, 
after  expiration  of  the  term,30  unless  pursuant  to 


Alexander,  43  P.2d  557,  6  Cal.App. 
2d  27. 
Del. — Terkes    v.    Dangle,    Super.,    33 

A.2d  406. 

111. — Jerome  v.  5019-21  Quincy  Street 
Bids.  Corporation,  45  N.B.2d  878, 
317  IlLApp.  335,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  53  N.E.2d  444,  385  III. 
524 — Nikola  v.  Campus  Towers 
Apartment  Bldg.  Corporation,  25 
N.E.2d  582,  303  IlLApp.  516. 
Md. — Armour  Fertilizer  Works,  Di- 
vision of  Armour  &  Co.  of  Del.  v. 
Brown,  44  A.2d  753. 
N.J.— New  Jersey  Cash  Credit  Cor- 
poration v.  Zaccaria,  19  A.2d  448, 
126  N.J.Law  334. 

N.Y.— Baldwin  v.  Yellow  Taxi  Cor- 
poration, 225  N.Y.S.  423,  221  App. 
Dlv.  717,  followed  in  Woodward  v. 
Weekes,  241  N.Y.S.  842,  228  App. 
Div.  870. 
Okl. — Thompson  v.  Hensley,  281  P. 

931,  128  Okl.  139. 
Pa.— Nixon  v.  Nixon,  198  A.  154,  329 

Pa.  256. 
24  C.J.  p  887  note  78  [a]— 34  C.J.  P 

421  notes  9,  10  [a]. 
Opening  and  vacating   distinguished 

see  supra  §  265. 
At  ott&mberB 

Under  statute  a  default  judgment 
may  be  opened  by  the  judge  at 
-chambers. — Whiteside  v.  Logan,  17 
P.  34,  7  Mont.  373. 

Pailnre  of  party  to  comply  with 
statutes  with  regard  to  motions  for 
new  trial  does  not  affect  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  to  set  aside  a 
default  judgment. — Missouri  Quar- 
ries Co.  v.  Brady,  219  P.  368,  95  Okl. 
279. 

Xa  partition,  suit,  where,  at  time  of 
•default  by  one  defendant,  mortgagee 
defendant  had  not  answered  but  an- 
swer and  cross  petition  of  other  de- 
fendants, which  were  subsequently 
•adopted  by  defaulting  defendant, 
were  on  file,  and  allegations  of  such 
pleadings,  if  true,  would  prevent 
partition  and  invalidate  mortgagee's 
lien  against  defaulting  defendant's 
interest,  court  hod  jurisdiction  to 
set  aside  default.— Redding  v.  Red- 
•ding,  284  N.W.  167,  226  Iowa  327.  ' 
Jffeglect  or  failure  of  attorneys 

Statute  relating  to  the  general 
power  of  courts  to  permit  amend- 
ments and  relieve  from  defaults, 
•etc.,  was  held  to  refer  only  to  de- 
fault judgment  taken  through  neg- 
lect or  failure  of  an  attorney. — At- 
wood  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  217 
P.  600,  37  Idaho  654. 
.Spurious  entry 

A  motion  to  set  aside  default  judg- 
ment on  ground  that  entry  thereof  j 


was  spurious  invoked  power  and 
duty  of  court  to  expunge  from  rec- 
ord spurious  entry  rather  than  dis- 
cretionary power  incident  to  ordi- 
nary motion  to  set  aside  default 
judgment.— Du  Pree  v.  Hart,  8  So.2d 
183,  242  Ala.  690. 

Judgment  taken  in  defendant's  ab- 
sence on  affidavit  of  proof  was  taken 
at  trial  within  contemplation  of  stat- 
ute authorizing  new  trial  in  cases 
tried  by  courts,  provided  application 
therefor  is  made  within  thirty  days 
after  judgment. — Nutley  Finance  Co. 
v.  De  Federicis,  150  A.  241,  8  N.J. 
Misc.  382. 

26.  Neb.— Strine  v.  Kaufman,  11  N. 
W.  867,  12  Neb.  423. 

34  C.J.  p  421  note  11. 

Statutes  were  held  Inapplicable  in 
absence  of  showing  that  case  was 
marked  in  default  or  that  judgment 
was  rendered  before  movant  filed 
motion  to  set  aside  judgment. — 
Guthrie  v.  Spence,  191  S.E.  188,  55 
Ga.App.  669. 

27,  Ala. — Drennen  Motor  Co.  v.  Pat- 
rick, 141  So.  681,  225  Ala.  36. 

Ark. — Supreme  Lodge,  Woodmen  of 
.  Union  v.  Johnson,  17  S.W.2d  323, 
179  Ark.  589. 

Ky. — Guyan  Machinery  Co.  v.  Pre- 
mier Coal  Co.,  163  S.W.2d  284,  291 
Ky.  84 — Zimmerman  v.  Segal,  155 
S.W.2d  20,  288  Ky.  33— Farris  v. 
Ball,  79  S.W.2d  7,  257  Ky.  683— 
Northcutt  v.  Nicholson,  55  S.W. 
2d  659,  246  Ky.  641— Latham  v. 
Commonwealth,  43  S.W.2d  44,  240 
Ky.  826 — Corbin  Bldg.  Supply  Co. 
v.  Martin,  39  S.W.2d  480,  239  Ky. 
272 — Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  of  Som- 
erset v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Pulaski 
County,  8  S.W.2d  401,  225  Ky.  246 
— Hackney  v.  Charles,  295  S.W. 
869,  220  Ky.  574— Sachs  v.  Hens- 
ley,  294  S.W.  1073,  220  Ky.  226. 

Me.— Diplock  v.  Blasi,  149  A.  149, 
128  Me.  528. 

Mo. — Faulkner  v.  F.  Bierman  &  Sons 
Metal  &  Rubber  Co.,  App.,  294  S. 
W.  1019. 

Ohio. — Rabb  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Cuyahoga  County,  173  N.B.  255,  36 
Ohio  App.  481. 

Okl. — Mays  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Creek  County,  23  P.2d  664,  164  Okl. 
231. 

Tex.— Johnson  v.  Henderson,  Civ. 
App.,  132  S.W.2d  458— Gann  v. 
Hopkins,  Civ.App.,  119  S.W.2d  110. 

W.Va. — Sigmond  v.  Forbes,  158  S.B. 
677,  110  W.Va.  442. 

34  C.J.  p  207  note  5. 

Time  for  application  see  infra  §  337. 

Showing  of  good  cause  not  neces- 
sary see  infra  §  334  a. 

606 


28.  Ark.— Hill  v.   Teague,    108   S.W. 
2d  889,  194  Ark.  552. 

Iowa. — Fulton  v.  National  Finance  & 
Thrift  Corporation,   4   N.W.2d  406, 
232  Iowa  378. 
N.J. — Geithner  v.  Paechiana,   150  A. 

240,  8  NJ-.Misc.  384. 
Ohio. — Dayton  Morris  Plan  Bank  v. 
Graham,  App.,  62  N.B.2d  98— Rabb 
v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Cuyahoga 
County,  173  N.E.  255,  36  Ohio  App. 
481. 

24  C.J.  p  887  note  78  [a]   (2),  (3). 
During1  vacation 

Under  statute,  the  judge  of  a  cir- 
cuit court  in  vacation  may,  for  er- 
rors appearing  on  the  record,  set 
aside  a  default  judgment  entered  at 
the  preceding  term  of  court. — State 
v.  O'Brien,  122  S.B.  919,  96  W.Va. 
353. 

29.  Cal.— Washko  v.  Stewart,  112  P. 
2d    306,    44    Cal.App.2d    311— Knox 
v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for  Riv- 
erside County,  280  P.  375,  100  Cal. 
App.  452. 

Fla. — Cornelius  v.  State  ex  rel.  Tam- 
pa West  Coast  Realty  Co.,  183  So. 
754,  136  Fla.  506. 
Idaho.— McAllister   v.   Brickson,    261 

P.  242,  45  Idaho  211. 
Mont. — Housing  Authority  of  City  of 
Butte    v.    Murtha,    144%P.2d    183, 
115  Mont.  405. 

N.J. — Steinhauser  v.  Friedman,  170 
•A.  630,  12  N.J.MISC.  167— New  Jer- 
sey Cash  Credit  Corporation  v. 
Linehan,  142  A.  650,  6  N.J.Misc. 
740. 
N.Y. — Gilmore  v.  De  Witt,  10  N.Y.S. 

2d    903,    256    AppJDiv.    1046. 
Tex.— Ridley  v.  McCallum,  163  S.W. 

2d  833,  139  Tex.  540. 
Utah.— J.   :B.    Colt    Co.    v.    District 
Court    of    Fifth   Judicial    Dist.    in 
and    for    Millard    County,    269    P. 
1017,  72  Utah  281. 

34  C.J.  p  260  note  1,  p  430  note  92. 
Judgment  held  flimi 

Where  defendants  file  no  motion 
to  set  aside,  and  do  not  appeal  from, 
default  judgment  perpetuating  in- 
junction against  them  by  court  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  of  parties  and  sub- 
ject matter,  judgment  becomes  final. 
— Miller-Link  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ste- 
phenson,  Tex.Civ.App.,  265  S.W.  215, 
affirmed  Stephenson  v.  Miller-Link 
Lumber  Co.,  Com.  App.,  277  S.W. 
1039. 

30.  Ark.— Hill  v.  Teague,   108   S.W. 
2d  889,  194  Ark.  552. 

Ga. — Avery  &  Co.  v.  Sorrell,  121  S.B. 
828,  157  Ga.  476,  answers  to  cer- 
tified Questions  conformed  to  122 
S.B.  638,  32  Ga.App.  41. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


333 


proceedings  begun  within  the  proper  time  and  law- 
fully continued  to  the  subsequent  term.31  The  gen- 
eral rule  is  also  subject  to  certain  other  excep- 
tions;32 and  in  at  least  one  jurisdiction  the  court 
has  power  at  any  time  to  open  a  default  judgment 
in  order  to  give  the  parties  a  hearing  or  trial.33 
The  only  remedy  after  the  term  for  irregular  and 
erroneous,  as  distinguished  from  void,  judgments 
is  usually  by  new  trial,  review,  writ  of  error,  or 
appeal,  as  either  may  be  appropriate  and  allowable 
by  law,  or  by  some  other  mode  specially  provided 
by  statute.34 
The  authority  to  relieve  a  party  in  default,  on 


application  made  in  apt  and  proper  time,  is  inher- 
ent in  all  courts  of  record  exercising  general  ju- 
risdiction,35 and  does  not  depend  on  statute  unless 
expressly  regulated  thereby  ;36  but,  where  the  court 
is  of  special  or  limited  jurisdiction,  it  cannot  be 
exercised  unless  conferred  by  statute.37 

In  the  exercise  of  a  sound  judicial  discretion, 
courts  may  take  off  a  default  at  any  time  before 
judgment,38  or  set  aside  a  preliminary  entry  of  de- 
fault,39 and  a  naked  or  simple  default  may  be  set 
aside  at  a  subsequent  term,  on  a  proper  showing.40* 

Interlocutory  judgments.    An  interlocutory  judg- 


111. — National    Lead    Co.    v.    Mortell, 

261  111.  App.  332. 

Ky. — Guyan    Machinery    Co.   v.    Pre- 
mier Coal  Co.,  163  S.W.2d  284,  291 

Ky.   84— Stratton  &  Tersteggre  Co. 

v.  Begley,   61   S.W.2d  287,  249  Ky. 

632. 
Ohio. — Rabb  v.   Board  of  Coin'rs  of 

Cuyahoga  County,  173  N.E.  255,  36 

Ohio  App.  481. 
Or. — Marsters    v.    Ashton,    107    P.2d 

981,  165  Or.  507. 
Tex. — Ridley  v.   McCallum,   163  S.W. 

2d  833,  139  Tex.  540. 
34  C.J.  p  212  note  12. 

Court  having1  Jurisdiction  of  sub- 
ject matter  and  of  parties,  and  ren- 
dering default  Judgment  where  plea 
was  on  Ale,  could  not  set  aside  Judg- 
ment after  term  elapsed. — Mclntosh 
v.  Munson  Road  Machinery  Co.,  145 
So.  731,  167  Miss.  546. 
Inherent  discretionary  power 

It  has  been  held,  however,  that 
the  common-law  right  to  set  aside  a 
default  Judgment,  either  at  term  at 
which  it  is  rendered,  or  at  a  subse- 
quent term,  is  part  of  inherent  dis- 
cretionary power  of  a  court  of  gen- 
eral Jurisdiction. — Kelly  v.  Serviss, 
39  A.2d  336,  114  Vt.  52— Greene  v. 
Riley,  172  A.  633,  106  Vt.  319. 

81.    Ark.— Metz  v.   Melton  Coal  Co., 

47  S.W.2d  803,   185  Ark.  486. 
Ky.— Riggs    v.    Ketner,    187    S.W.2d 

287,  299  Ky.  754. 
34  OJ.  p  214  note  13. 
Nonpayment  of  appearance  fee  with- 
in term 

Where  defendant  presented  peti-, 
tion  to  vacate  Judgment  within  term 
and  defendant's  appearance  fee  was 
paid  after  term,  and  hearing  on  peti- 
tion and  amendment  was  postponed 
by  series  of  continuances  without 
any  break  in  continuity,  court  had 
Jurisdiction  thereafter  to  vacate 
Judgment,  notwithstanding  appear- 
ance fee  required  by  statute  had  not 
been  paid  when  petition  was  present- 
ed and  within  term,  since  statute  re- 
quiring appearance  fee  did  not  re- 
quire defendant  to  pay  fee  until 
court  allowed  defendant  to  come  into 
case  and  defend.— Wolf  v.  Proviso 


Hospital  Ass'n,  33  N.E.2d  632,  309  111. 
App.  479. 
County  court 

Under  some  statutes,  however,  a 
county  court's  order  continuing  to 
next  term  motion  to  set  aside  de- 
fault Judgment  is  void,  and  motion 
to  set  aside  default  Judgment,  not 
acted  on  before  adjournment  of  term 
at  which  made,  is  discharged  by  op- 
eration of  law,  and,  in  effect,  over- 
ruled.— Motor  Inv.  Co.  v.  Killman, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  43  S.W.2d  633. 

32.  Utah.— Park    v.    Higbee,    24    P. 
524,  6  Utah  414. 

34  C.J.  p  215  note  16— p  216  note  24. 

33.  Pa. — Richey  v.  Gibboney,  34  A. 
2d   913,   154   Pa.Super.   1— Dormont 
Motors   v.   Hoerr,   1   A.2d   493,    132 
Pa.Super.  567 — Rome  Sales  &  Serv- 
ice Station  v.  Finch,  183  A.  54,  120 
Pa. Super.  402 — Horrocks  v.  White, 
94  Pa.Super.  413— Rudolph  v.  Ma- 
tura,  Com.Pl.,  27  Del.Co.  521. 

34  C.J.  p  212  note  12  [d],  p  431  note 
97  [a]. 

34.  Ky. — Guyan    Machinery    Co.    v. 
Premier  Coal  Co.,  163  S.W.2d  284, 
291  Ky.   84. 

Tex.— Ridley  v.  McCallum,  163  S.W. 

2d  833,  139  Tex.  540. 
34  CJT.  p  215  note  15. 

35.  Ala. — Sovereign  Camp,  W.  O.  W. 
v.    Gay,    104    So.    $95,   20   Ala.App. 
650,  reversed  on  other  grounds  104 
So.  898,  213  Ala.  5. 

Ark. — Supreme  Lodge,  Woodmen  of 
Union  v.  Johnson,  17  S.W.2d  323, 
179  Ark.  589. 

Ky. — Zimmerman  v.  Segal,  155  S.W. 
2d  20,  288  Ky.  33— Farris  v.  Ball, 
79  S.W.2d  7,  257  Ky.  683— North- 
cutt  v.  Nicholson,  55  S.W.2d  659, 
246  Ky.  641 — Latham  v.  Common- 
wealth, 43  S.W.2d  44,  240  Ky.  826 
— Corbin  Bldg.  Supply  Co.  v.  Mar- 
tin, 39  S.W.2d  480,  239  Ky.  272 — 
Hackney  v.  Charles,  295  S.W.  869, 
220  Ky.  574— Sachs  v.  Hensley,  294 
S.W.  1073,  220  Ky.  226. 

N.Y.— Baldwin  v.  Yellow  Taxi  Cor- 
poration, 225  N.Y.S.  423,  221  App. 
Div.  717,  followed  in  Woodward  v. 
Weekes,  241  N.Y.S.  842,  228  App. 
Div.  870. 

607 


N.D.— Ellison  v.  Baird,  293  N.W.  793, 
70  N.D.  226— Odland  v.  O'Keeffe 
Implement  Co.,  229  N.W.  923,  5fr 
N.B.  335. 

Ohio. — Rabb  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Cuyahoga  County,  178  N.B.  255, 
36  Ohio  App.  481. 

Tex. — Johnson  v.  Henderson,  Civ. 
App.,  132  S.W.2d  458. 

34  C.J.  p  252  note  72,  p  421  note  12. 

Inherent  power  of  court  over  Judg- 
ments generally  see  supra  §§  228— 
235. 

36.  Ky.— Farris  v.  Ball,  79  S.W.2d  7, 
257  Ky.   683— Northcutt  v.  Nichol- 
son,   55    S.W.2d    659,    246    Ky.    641 
— Latham  'v.  Commonwealth,  43  S. 
W.2d  44,  240  Ky.  826— Corbin  Bldg. 
Supply   Co.   v.    Martin,    39    S.W.26? 
480,     239     Ky.     272— Hackney     v. 
Charles,    295     S.W.    869,    220    Ky. 
574. 

34  O.J.  p  253  note  76,  p  254  note  77. 
Inadvertent  or  improvident  Judgment 
A  trial  court,  entering  default 
Judgment  through  inadvertence  or 
improvidence,  has  power,  independ- 
ently of  statute,  to  correct  such  mis- 
take by  amending  or  setting  aside- 
Judgment,  as  such  action  presents, 
no  question  of  Judicial  review  on* 
merits. — Phillips  v.  Trusheim,  156  P. 
2d  25,  25  Cal.2d  913. 

37.  Or. — American  Building  &  Loan. 
Ass'n  v.  Fulton,  28  P.   636,  21  Or. 
492. 

34  C.J.  p  421  note  14. 

Rule  to  show  cans*  why  judgment 
of  nonsuit  by  default  should  not  be 
opened  is  a  supreme  court  issue,  and 
circuit  court  Judge  has  no  Jurisdic- 
tion to  hear  and  determine  such  a. 
rule. — Giordano  v.  Asbury  Park  & 
Ocean  Grove  Bank,  129  A.  202,  3- 
N.J.Misc.  554,  affirmed  134  A.  915, 
103  N.J.Law  171. 

38.  Mass. — Cohen       v;       Industrial) 
Bank'   &   TrusJ    Co.,    176    N.B.    78,. 
274  Mass.  498. 

39.  La.— Wilco*  v.  Huief  18  La.  426. 
34  C.J.  p  190  note  65. 

40.  Iowa.— Weinhart  v.   Meyer.    24T 
N.W.  811,  215  Iowa  1317. 


333 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ment  by  default  remains  in  the  treast  of  the  court 
until  it  is  made  final,  and  may,  for  good  cause 
shown,  be  set  aside  at  any  time,  even  at  a  subse- 
quent term,  before  the  damages  are  assessed,  or 
final  judgment  is  rendered.41 

Void  judgments.  Subject  to  any  existing  statu- 
tory provisions,  where  a  default  judgment  is  entire- 
ly void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  the  power  to  va- 
cate it  or  set  it  aside  is  not  limited  to  the  term  at 
which  it  was  rendered  or  otherwise,  but  may  be 
exercised  at  a  succeeding  term,  or  at  any  time.42 

Jurisdiction  of  particular  courts  end  judge.  Un- 
der some  statutes,  a  judge  is  without  power  to  set 
aside  a  default  judgment  entered  by  another  judge 
unless  the  latter  is  absent  or  unable  to  act,43  but 
generally  the  power  to  open  or  set  aside  default 
judgments  is  inherent  in  the  court,  not  in  the 
judge,44  and  the  fact  that  a  writ  of  inquiry  after 
default  -was  executed  before  another  division  of 
the  court  presided  over  by  a  different  judge  is  im- 
material.4^  The  judge  presiding  in  the  division 
in  which  the  action  was  pending  may,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  rules  specifically  prohibiting  such  pro- 
cedure, order  the  hearing  on  application  to  vacate 
'the  default  to  be  before  the  judge,  then  presiding 
in  another  division,  who  made  the  default  order.46 
Where  a  default  judgment  rendered  in  the  court  of 
one  county  was  opened  on  petition  of  one  defend- 
ant who  had  the  cause  transferred  to  the  court  of 
another  county  on  motion  for  change  of  venue,  a 
codefendant's  subsequent  petition  to  open  the  judg- 


ment is  properly  filed  in  the  court  to  which  the 
cause  had  been  transferred  rather  than  in  the  court 
in  which  the  default  judgment  was  originally  rqn- 
dered.47  The  mere  docketing  of  a  district  court 
judgment  in  common  pleas  court  does  not  deprive 
the  former  of  jurisdiction  thereof  to  the  extent  of 
vacating  it  for  want  of  jurisdiction  over  the  per- 
son of  defendant.48  When  authorized  by  statute,  a 
default  judgment  rendered  by  the  clerk  of  court 
may  -be  vacated  by  the  clerk  or,  on  appeal  from 
the  clerk,  by  the  presiding  judge.49 

Waiver.  A  person  who  ordinarily  would  be  en- 
titled to  apply  for  the  vacation  of  a  default  judg- 
ment may  waive  the  right  to  such  relief,  or  be  es- 
topped to  ask  for  it,  where  he  submits  to  and  rati- 
fies the  judgment  by  participating  in  the  further 
proceedings  in  the  action.60 


§  334.    Right  to  and  Grounds  for  Opening  or 
Vacating 

a.  In  general 

b.  Invalidity  or  irregularity  of  judgment 

c.  Fraud 

d.  Agreement    with,    or    statement   by, 
party  taking  default  or  his  counsel 

e.  Statement  or  order  of  judge  or  clerk 

f.  Defense  to  action 

g.  Error  in  law 

h.   Error  or  mistake  of  fact 
i.    Objections  as  to  parties 


41.  Mo. — O'Connell  v.  Dockery,  App., 
102  S.W.2d  748 — Ornellas  v.  Moyni- 
hanf  App.,   16   S.W.2d   1007. 

34  C.J.  p  216  note  30,  p  422  notes  19, 
20. 

42.  D.C.-T-Ray   v.    Bruce,    Mun.App., 
31  A.2d  693. 

111. — Lewis  v.  West  Side  Trust  & 
Savings  Bank,  36  N.B.2d  573,  377 
111.  384. 

Minn. — Pugsley  v.  Magerfleisch,  201 
N.W.  323,  161  Minn.  246. 

N.J.— New  Jersey  Cash  Credit  Cor- 
poration v.  Zaccaria,  19  A.2d  448, 
126  N.J.Law  334— Westfleld  Trust 
Co.  v.  Cherry,  183  A.  165,  116  N.J. 
Law  190. 

Or.— -Mutzig  v.  Hope,  158  P.2d  110. 

Utah.— Park  v.  Higbee,  24  P.  524,  6 
Utah  414. 

34  C.J.  p  217  note  32,  p  219  note  33, 
p  220  note  46. 

Invalidity  as  ground  for  vacating 
default  judgment  see  infra  §  334  b. 

In,  California 

(1)  The  court  has  power  at  any 

time  on  motion  or  on  the  court's  own 

motion,  to  vacate  a  judgment  void  on 

Ita  face. — Gibbons   v*  Clapp,   277  P. 

490,  207  Cal.  221. 


(2)  The  court  has  power  to  vacate 
a  judgment  not  void  on  the  face 
of  the  judgment  roll,  but  void  in 
fact  for  want  of  jurisdiction  of  the 
person  of  the  defendant  by  reason  of 
nonservice  of  process  on  such  de- 
fendant, independently  of  statute, 
provided  motion  is  made  within  a 
reasonable  time. — In  re  Estrem's  Es- 
tate, 107  P.2d  36,  16  Cal.2d  563— 
Penland  v.  Goodman,  111  P.2d  913, 
44  Cal.App.2d  14. 

43.  Mich. — Jageriskey    v.    Kelemen, 
193  N.W.   208,   222  Mich.  575. 

44.  Ala. — Ex     parte     Richerzhagen, 
113  So.  85,  216  Ala.  262. 

Power  to  amend,  open,  or  vacate 
judgments  generally  see  supra  § 
235. 

Judgfe  sitting  in  motion  part  has 
power  to  open  a  default  taken  after 
a  denial  by  the  trial  judge  of  a  re- 
quest for  an  adjournment. — Dressier 
v.  Baron,  201  N.Y.S.  683. 

45,  '  Ala, — Ex     parte     Richerzhagen, 
113  So.  85,  216  Ala.  262. 

46,  Colo.— Koin     v.     Mutual     Ben. 
Health  &  Accident  Ass'n,  41  P.2d 
306,  96  Colo,  m 

608 


4ff.    Ind. — State    ex    rel.    Karsch    v. 
Eby,  33  N.E.2d  336,  218  Ind.  431. 

48.  N.J. — Andersen    v.    Independent 
Order  of  Foresters,  126  A.  631,  98 
NJT.Law  648. 

49.  N.C.— Gunter  v.  Dowdy,   31  S.E. 
2d     524,     224     N.C.     522— Dunn    v. 
Jones,    142   S.E.    320,    195   N.C.   354 
— A<5me  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Kornegay,  142 
S.E.  224,  195  N.C.  373— Page  Trust 
Co.  v.  Pumpelly,  132  S.E.  594,  191 
N.C.  675. 

50.  N.C.— Burke  v.  Stokely,  65  N.C. 
569. 

34  C.J.  p  363  note  36. 
Error  not  waived 

Error  in  awarding  actual  and  pu- 
nitive damages  by  default  without 
aid  of  jury  on  unliquidated  demand 
in  slander  action  was  not  waived 
where  defendant  filed  motion  to  set 
aside  Judgment  on  two  jurisdictional 
grounds,  and  generally  for  an  order 
opening  the  judgment  and  for  per- 
mission to  answer,  and  motion  was 
refused  on  the  two  jurisdictional 
grounds,  but  was  in  effect  granted 
on  remaining  grounds. — Nettles  v. 
tMacMirian  Petroleum  Corp.,  37  S.E, 


2d  134,  208  S.C.  81* 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  334 


j.   Objections  as  to  pleadings 

k.   Ignorance  or  illiteracy 

/.    Absence  of  party  or  counsel 

m.  Illness  or  death 

n.  Mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  ex- 
cusable neglect,  casualty,  or  misfor- 
tune 

o.   Other  grounds 

a.  In  General 

An  application  to  open  a  default  judgment  will  ordi- 
narily be  granted  where  a  legal  excuse  is  presented  and 
the  default  suffered  was  neither  willful  nor  deliberate; 
but  the  party  seeking  to  be  relieved  must  show  a  good 
excuse  for  failing  to  appear  or  plead  in  due  season  un- 
less the  judgment  is  void  or  irregularly  entered,  or,  ac- 
cording to  some  authority,  unless  the  application  is 
made  during  the  term  at  which  the  judgment  is  ren- 
dered. 


In  accordance  with  the  usual  rules,  as  discussed 
supra  §§  266-281,  as  to  the  grounds  on  which  judg- 
ments may  be  opened  or  vacated  generally,  and  sub- 
ject to  the  rules,  as  considered  infra  §  336,  relat- 
ing to  the  existence  of  a  meritorious  defense,  an 
application  to  open  a  default  judgment  will  be 
granted  where  a  legal  excuse  for  unreadiness  to 
proceed  to  trial  is  presented  and  where  the  default 
suffered  was  neither  willful  nor  deliberate.51  A 
default  judgment  which  has  resulted  in  no  preju- 
dice to  movant,  however,  will  not  be  set  aside,62 
and  the  court  may  refuse  on  defendant's  motion  to 
vacate  a  default  judgment  where  plaintiff  would 
suffer  prejudice  therefrom  and  an  injustice  would 
be  done.53  Each  case  must  depend  on  its  own  par- 


si.  Cal. — Grace  Corset  Co.  v.  Brown 
Bros.,  263  P.  234,  203  Cal.  199— 
Waybright  v.  Anderson,  253  P.  148, 

200  Cal.   374. 

E*la. — Coggin  v.  Barfleld,  8  So.2d  9, 
150  Fla.  551. 

111.— Hogan  v.  Ermovick,  166  N.E. 
503,  335  111.  181. 

Iowa. — Allemang  v.  White,  298  N. 
W.  658,  230  Iowa  626— Tate  v. 
DelU,  269  N.W.  871,  222  Iowa  635. 

Ky. — Vanover  v.  Ashley,  183  S.W.2d 
944,  298  Ky.  722 — Carr  Creek  Com- 
munity Center  v.  Home  Lumber 
Co.,  125  S.W.2d  777,  276  Ky.  840 
—Welch  v.  Mann's  Ex'r,  88  S.W- 
2d  1,  261  Ky.  470— Parris  v.  Bali, 
79  S.W.2d  7,  257  Ky.  683. 

La.— Surgi  v.  McDonough  Motor  Ex- 
press, App.,  187  So.  693. 

Minn.— Pilney  v.  Funk,  3  N.W.2d 
*  792,  212  Minn.  398— Tiden  v.  Shur- 
stead,  254  N.W.  617,  191  Minn. 
518. 

Mo. — Leis  v.  Massachusetts  Bonding 
&  Insurance  Co.,  App.,  125  S.W.2d 
906 — Anspach  v.  Jansen,  78  S.W.2d 
137,  229  Mo.App.  321. 

Mont. — Reynolds  v.  Gladys  Belle  Oil 
Co.,  243  P.  576,  75  Mont.  332. 

N.J. — Ross  v.  C.  D.  Mallory  Corpora- 
tion, 37  A.2d  766,  132  N.J.Law 
1 — Shaw  v.  Morris,  Sup.,  146  A. 
196— Kenter  Co.  v.  Errath,  32  A. 
2d  592,  21  N.J.Misc.  214. 

N.Y.— Hilton  v.-  Mack,  15  N.T.S.2d 
187,  257  A.pp.Div.  709,  appeal  dis- 
missed Hilton  v.  Gaston,  24  N.E.2d 
506,  281  N.Y.  881— Kelly  v.  Braun- 
schweig, 286  N.Y.S.  505,  247  App. 
Div.  809 — Puller  &  Robinson  Co.  v. 
New  York  State  Normal  College 
Alumni  Ass'n,  285  N.Y.S.  108,  246 
App.Div.  884— G.  H.  Crandall  Co.  v. 
Shanley,  280  N.Y.S.  918,  245  App. 
Div.  787— In  re  Schroeder's  Will, 
280  N.Y.S.  905,  245  App.Div.  762— 
Hogan  v.  Johnson,  272  N.Y.S.  113, 
$41  App.Div.  914— Allen  v.  Lake, 

201  N.Y.S.    882,    207    App.Div.    886 
— Decatur  Contracting  Co.  v.  Ed- 
ward S.  Murphy  Bldg.  Co.,  2  N.Y. 

49  C.  J.S.-39 


S.2d  970,  166  Misc.  614— Watsky  v. 
212th  St.  Realty  Corporation,  252 
N.Y.S.  533,  141  Misc.  312 — 210 
West  Fifty-Sixth  Street  Co.  v. 
Pantinakis,  211  N.Y.S.  851,  125 
Misc.  762— Martin  v.  Reiber,  61 
N.Y.S.2d  473— Arlene  Furs  v. 
Kurtz,  53  N.Y.S.2d  884— Kefer  v. 
Gunches.  48  N.Y.S.2d  767— Valeri- 
oti  v.  Brooklyn  &  Queens  Transit 
Corporation,  22  N.Y.S.2d  82. 

N.C.— Carter  v.  Anderson.  181  S.E. 
750,  208  N.C.  529— Dunn  v.  Jones, 
142  S.E.  320,  195  N.C.  354. 

N.D.— Mantel  v.  Pickle,  218  N.W. 
605,  56  N.D.  568— Goddard  v.  Great 
Northwest  Land  Co.,  195  N.W.  656, 
50  N.D.  357. 

Okl. — Wade  v.  Farmers  Union  Co-op. 
Royalty  Co.,  103  P.2d  511,  187  Okl. 
402— Halliburton  v.  Illinois  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  40  ?.2d  1086,  170  Okl. 
360— Standard  v.  Fisher,  35  P.2d 
878,  169  Okl.  18— First  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Kerr,  24  P.2d  985,  165  Okl.  16— 
Claussen  v.  Amberg,  249  P.  330, 
119  Okl.  187— Slyman  v.  State,  228 
P.  979,  102  Okl.  241— Hoffman  v. 
Deskins,  221  P.  37,  94  Okl.  177. 

Or. — Irwin  v.  Klamath  County,  228 
P.  736,  110  Or.  374. 

Pa.— Atkins  v.  Canadian  SKF  Co., 
45  A.2d  28,  353  Pa,  312— Quaker 
City  Chocolate  &  Confectionery  Co. 
v.  Warnock  Bldg.  Ass'n,  32  A.2d 
5,  347  Pa.  186 — Emery  v.  Union 
County,  192  A.  645,  326  Pa.  479— 
.  Linker  v.  Fidelity-Philadelphia 
Trust  Co.,  28  A.2d  704,  150  Pa.Su- 
per.  440 — Sturges  v.  Page,  163  A. 
327,  106  Pa.Super.  520— Esterbrook 
v.  Fisk  Tire  Co.,  13  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
514 — Bott  v.  Aronlmink  Transp. 
Co..  ComuPL,  81  Del.Co.  172— Her- 
ring v.  '  Abromitis,  Com.Pl.,  15 
Northum.lreg.J.  213. 

S.C.— Gaskins  v.  California  Ins.  Co., 
11  S.B.2d  436,  195  S.C.  376— Ex 
p-arte  Peden,  199  S.E.  693,  188  S.C. 
456. 

Tex. — Craddock  v.  Sunshine  Bus 
Lines,  133  S.W.2d  124.  134  Tex. 

609 


388— Hubbard  v.  Tallal,  92  S.W.2d 
1022,  127  Tex.  242— Foster  v. 
Christensen,  Com. App.,  67  S.W.2d 
246 — Southwestern  Specialty  Co. 
v.  Brown,  Civ.  App.,  188  S.W.2d 
1002,  error  refused — Motor  Inv.  Co. 
v.  Killman,  Civ.App.,  43  S.W.2d  633 
— Chaney  v. '  Allen,  Civ.App.,  25 
S.W.2d  1115— Trigg  v.  Gray,  Civ. 
App.,  288  S.W.  1098— Hadad  v.  El- 
lison, Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  193 — Cald- 
well  Oil  Co.  v.  Hickman,  Civ.App., 
270  S.W.  214 — Green  v.  Cammack, 
Civ.App.,  248  S.W.  739. 
Wash. — Johnston  v.  Medina  Improve- 
ment Club,  116  P.2d  272,  10  Wash. 
2d  44. 

Wis. — Welfare      Building     &      Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Breuer,  250  N.W.  846,  218 
Wis.    97,    followed    in    West    Side 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Ander- 
son,   250   N.W.    849,    213   Wis.    104, 
East   Side   Mut.    Building  &   Loan 
Ass'n  v.   Lock,   250   N.W.    849,  -218 
Wis.  105,  Mortgage  Discount  Co.  v. 
Continental   Discount   Corporation, 
250  N.W.  849,   213  Wis.   106,  West 
Side    Building    &    Loan    Ass'n    v. 
Breuer,  250  N.W.  850,  213  Wis.  107, 
West  Side  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
v.    Continental    Discount    Corpora- 
tion,  250   N.W.   850,    213    Wis.    108 
and    East    Side    Mut.    Building   & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Thoreson,  250  N.W. 
850,  213  Wis.  109. 
34  C.J.  p  423  note  34  [e]. 
Discretion  of  court  see  infra  §   337. 
Default  Judgment  against  convict 
in  state  prison  who  never  had  chance 
to  present  defense,  and  who  offered 
affidavit   stating   good   defense,   was 
properly    set    aside. — Roy    v.    Tan- 
guay,  R.I.,  131  A.  553. 

52.  Cal. — Antonsen  v.   San  Francis- 
co Container  Co.,   66   P.2d  716,   20 
Cal.App.2d    214— McCauley   v.    Ey- 
raud,   261  P.  760,  87  Cal.App.  121. 

Ga.— Mulling    v.    First    Nat.    Bank, 
118    S.E.    495,    30    Ga.App.    587. 

53.  Cal. — Hewins    v.    Walbeck,    141 
P.2d  241,    60  Cal.App.2d   608. 


§  334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ticular  facts.54 

A  party  seeking  to  be  relieved  against  a  judgment 
regularly  taken  against  him  by  default  must  show 


a  good  excuse  for  failing  to  appear  or  plead  in  due 
season  ;55  and  that  his  own  conduct  with  regard  to 
the  action  has  not  been  so  reprehensible  from  a  le- 


Tex. — Borger  v.  Mineral  Wells  Clay 
Products  Co.,  Civ.App.,  80  S.W.2d 
333. 

54.  Colo. — Carpenter  -Liebhardt 
Fruit  Co.  v.   Nelson,   234   P.   1067, 
77  Colo.  175 — Drinkard  v.  Spencer, 
211  P.  379,  72  Colo.  396. 

Ind. — United  Taxi  Co.  v.  Dilworth, 
20  N.B.2d  699,  106  Ind.App.  627. 

Iowa.— Hatt  v.  McCurdy,  274  N.W. 
72,  223  Iowa  974— Tate  v.  Belli, 
269  N.W.  871,  222  Iowa  635. 

Mont. — St.  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Freeman,  260  P.  124,  80 
Mont.  266 — Pacific  Acceptance  Cor- 
poration v.  McCue,  228  P.  761,  71 
Mont.  99. 

Okl.— Leslie  v.  Spencer,  42  P.2d  119, 
170  Okl.  642— Morrell  v.  Morrell, 
299  P.  866,  149  Okl.  187— Hale  v. 
Mclntosh,  243  P.  157,  116  Okl.  40 
— Boaz  v.  Martin,  225  P.  516,  101 
Okl.  243. 

Tex. — Sunshine  Bus  Lines  v.  Crad- 
dock,  Civ.App.,  112  S.W.2d  248, 
affirmed  Craddock  v.  Sunshine  Bus 
Lines,  133  S.W.2d  124,  134  Tex, 
888. 

Wash.— Moe  v.  Wolter,  235  P.  803, 
134  Wash.  340,  reheard  240  P.  565, 
136  Wash.  696. 

Wyo.— McDaniel  v.  Hoblit,  245  P. 
295,  34  Wyo.  509. 

55.  Ala.— Harnischfeger  Sales  Co.  v. 
Burge,   129   So.  37,  221  Ala.   387— 
Griffin  Burial  Ass'n  v.  Snead,  149 
So.  875,  25  Ala.App.  543. 

Ariz.— Brown  v.  Beck,  169  P.2d  855 
— Postal  Ben.  Ins.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 165  P.2d  173 — Swisshelm  Gold 
Silver  Co.  v.  Farwell,  124  P.2d  544, 
59  Ariz.  162 — Perrin  v.  Perrin, 
Properties,  86  P.2d  23,  53  Ariz. 
121,  122  A.L.R.  621— Daniel  v.  Tel- 
ford,  75  P.2d  373,  51  Ariz.  197— 
MacNeil  v.  Vance,  60  P.2d  1078,  48 
Ariz.  187— Huff  v.  Flynn,  60  P.2d 
931,  48  Ariz.  175— Michener  v. 
Standard  Accident  Ins.  Co.,  47  P.2d 
438,  46  Ariz.  66— Martin  v.  Sears, 
44  P.2d  526,  45  Ariz.  414— Bryant 
v.  Bryant,  14  P.2d  712,  40  Ariz.  519 
— Faltis  v.  Colachis,  274  P.  776,  35 
Ariz.  78. 

Ark. — Barringer  y.   Whitson,   168   S. 

,  W.2d  395,  205  Ark.  260. 

CaL— Beard  v.  Beard,  107  P.2d  385, 
16  Cal.2d  645— Waybright  v.  An- 
derson, 253  P.  148,  200  Cal,  374— 
Elms  v.  Elms,  App.,  164  P.2d  936 
—Hughes  v.  Wright,  149  P.2d  392, 
64  Cal. App. 2d  897— Weinberger  v. 
Manning,  123  P.2d  531,  50  Cal. 
App.2d  494 — Equitable  Life  Assur. 
Soc.  of  U.  S.  v,  Milstein,  93  P.2d 
843,  34  Cal.App.2d  436— People's 
Finance  &  Thrift  Co.  of  Porterville 
v.  Phoenix  Assur.  Co.,  Limited,  of 
London,  285  P.  857,  104  CaLApp. 
334— Grey  v.  MUligan,  281  P.  656. 


101  CaLApp.  328— BroOks  v.  Nel- 
son, 272  P.  610,  95  OaLApp.  144— 
Williams  v.  McQueen,  265  P.  339, 
89  CaLApp.  659— Fink  &  Schindler 
Co.  v.  Gavros,  237  P.  1083,  72  Cal. 
App.  688. 

Colo. — Carpenter-Llebhardt  Fruit  Co. 
v.  Nelson,  234  P.  1067,  77  Colo.  175. 

B.C.— Bush  v.  Bush,  63  F.2d  134,  61 
AppD.C.  357. 

Fla.— Streety  v.  John  Deere  Plow 
Co.,  109  So.  632. 

Ga. — Brown  v.  Hammond,  128  S.E. 
66,  160  Ga.  446— Cavan  v.  A.  M. 
Davis  Co.,  189  S.E.  684,  55  Ga.App. 
200— Coker  v.  Eison,  151  S.E.  682, 
40  Ga.App.  835— Sherman  v.  Ste- 
phens, 118  S.E.  567,  30  Ga.App.  509 
—Mulling  v.  'First  Nat.  Bank,  118 
S.E.  495,  30  Ga.App.  587. 

Idaho. — Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92  P. 
2d  1053,  60  Idaho  464,  124  A.L.R. 
149— Boise  Valley  Traction  Co.  v. 
Boise  City,  214  P.  1037,  37  Idaho 
20. 

Ind.— Hoag  v.  Jeffers,  159  N.E.  753, 
201  Ind.  249— Falmouth  State  Bank 
v.  Hayes,  185  N.E.  662,  97  Ind.App. 
68. 

Iowa. — Genco  v.  Northwestern  Mfg. 
Co.,  214  N.W.  545,  203  Iowa  1390— 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Marvill,  206 
N.W.  37,  201  Iowa  614. 

Kan.— Sparks  v.  Nech,  26  P.2d  586, 
138  Kan.  343— Farmers*  State  Bank 
of  Whiting  v.  Bokel,  235  P.  1053, 
118  Kan.  491. 

Ky. — Bond  v.  W.  T.  Congleton  Co., 
129  S.W.2d  570,  278  Ky.  829— Mer- 
genthaler  Linotype  Co.  v.  Griffin, 
10  S.W.2d  633,  226  Ky.  159. 

La. — Cutrer  v.  Cutrer,  App.,  169  So. 
807. 

Md. — Armour  Fertilizer  Works,  Di- 
vision of  Armour  &  Co.  of  Del. 
v.  Brown,  44  A.2d  753— Dixon  v. 
Baltimore  American  Ins.  Co.  of 
New  York,  188  A.  215,  171  Md.  695 
—Wagner  v.  Scurlock,  170  A.  539, 
166  Md.  284. 

Mich.— Bartnik  v.  Samonek,  21  N.W. 
2d  817,  313  Mich.  464— First  Nat. 
Tank  v.  Pine  Shores  Realty  Co., 
241  N.W.  190,  257  Mich.  289. 

Minn.— National  Guardian  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Schwartz  Bros.,  14  N.W.2d 
347,  217  Minn.  288— Peterson  v. 
W.  Davis  &  Sons,  11  N.W.2d  800, 
216  Minn.  60— Lodahl  v.  Hedburg, 
238  N.W.  41,  184  Minn.  154— Mar- 
thaler  Machine  &  Engineering  Co. 
v.  Meyers,  218  N.W.  127,  173  Minn. 
606— Moot  v.  Searle,  206  N.W.  447, 
165  Minn.  308. 

Mo.— Allen  v.  Fewel,  87  S.W.2d  142, 
337  Mo.  955 — Quattrochi  v.  Quat- 
trochi,  App.,  179  S.W.2d  757— 
O'Connell  v.  Dockery,  App.,  102 
S.W.2d  748— Williams  v.  Barr, 
App.,  61  S.W.2d  420— Karat  v.  Chi- 

610 


cago  Fraternal  Life  Ass'n,  App., 
22  S.W.2d  178— McFarland  v.  Lass- 
well,  App.,  282  S.W.  447. 

Mont. — Madson  v.  Petrie  Tractor  & 
Equipment  Co.,  77  P.2d  1038,  106 
Mont.  382— Middle  States  Oil  Cor- 
poration v.  Tanner-Jones  Drilling 
Co.,  235  P.  770,  73  Mont.  180. 

N.J. — E.  J.  Davino  &  Co.  v.  National 
Surety  Co.,  141  A.  663,  104  N.J.Law 
475,  6  N.J.Misc.  478. 

N.T.— Perlmutter  v.  Gross,  40  N.T.S. 
2d  37,  266  App.Div.  694— Booraem 
v.  Gibbons,  34  N.T.S.2d  198,  263 
App.Div.  665,  appeal  denied  35  N. 
T.S.2d  717,  264  App.Div.  768— 
Centerville  Creamery  Co.  v.  Wex- 
ler,  30  N.T.S.2d  232,  262  AppJDiv. 
1055— Sobel'  v.  Sobel,  4  N.Y.S.2d 
194,  254  App.Div.  203,  reargument 
denied  6  N.Y.S.2d  328,  254  App. 
Div.  «836 — Falvey  v.  Cornwall  Ter- 
minal Co.,  294  N.T.S.  525,  209  App. 
Div.  448— Hogan  v.  Johnson,  272 
N.Y.S.  113,  241  App.Div.  914— 
Goldstein  v.  Friedland,  271  N.Y.S. 
236,  241  App.Div.  829— Utica  Gas 
&  Electric  Co.  v.  Sherman,  208 
N.Y.S.  594,  212  App.Div.  472— 
Zaza  v.  Zaza,  246  N.Y.S.  148,  138 
Misc.  218— Schulte  Leasing  Corp. 
v.  Friedman,  61  N.Y.S.2d  665— 
General  Exchange  Ins.  Corporation 
v.  Stern,  25  N.Y.S.2d  266— Pesner 
v.  H.  M.  Goldman,  Inc.,  23  N.Y.S.2d 
698. 

N.C. — Johnson  v.  Sidbury,  34  S.E.2d 
67,  225  N.C.  208— Hendricks  v. 
Town  of  Cherryville,  153  S.E.  112, 
198  N.C.  659 — Dunn  v.  Jones,  142 
S.E.  320,  195  N.C.  354— Buchanan 
v.  B.  &  D.  Coach  Line,  140  S.E. 
439,  194  N.C.  812— Crye  v.  Stoltz, 

138  S.E.  167,  193  N.C.  802— Helder- 
man  v.  Hartzell  Mills  Co.,  135  S.E. 
627,  192  N.C.  626. 

N.D.— Croonquist  v.  Walker,  196  N. 

W.  108,  50  N.D.  388. 
Ohio.— Horwitz  v.  Franklin,  171  N.E. 

415,    35    Ohio   App.    32— Balind   v. 

Lanigan,    159    N.E.    103,    26    Ohio 

App.  149. 
Okl.— Nolen  v.  Nolen,  167  P.2d  68— 

Franklin  v.  Hunt  Dry  Goods  Co., 

123   P.2d  258,   190  Okl.   296— Saut- 

bine  v.  Jones,  18  P.2d  871,  161  Okl. 

292— Morrell    v.    Morrell,    299    P. 

866,  149  Okl.  187— New  v.  Elliott, 

211  P.  1025,  88  Okl.  126. 
Or.— Steeves  v.  Steeves,  9  P.2d  815, 

139  Or.   261 — Peterson  v.  Hutton, 
284  P.  279,  132  Or.  252. 

Pa. — Quaker  City  Chocolate  &  Con- 
fectionery Co.  v.  Warnock  Bldg. 
Ass'n,  32  A.2d  5,  347  Pa,  186— 
Linker  v.  Fidelity-Philadelphia 
Trust  Co.,  28  A.2d  704,  150  Pa.Su- 
per.  440— Planters  Nut  &  Choco- 
late Co.  v.  Brown-Murray  Co.,  193 
A.  381,  128  Pa.Super.  239— Dirpy 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  334 


gal  point  of  view  as  to  bar  relief,56  and,  if  he  fails 
to  do  so,  the  fact  that  he  alleges  a  meritorious  de- 
fense is  immaterial.57  It  is  otherwise  where  the 
judgment  is  void,  or  irregularly  entered;  in  such 
cases  applicant  need  show  only  invalidity  of  the 
judgment,  or  prejudicial  or  dangerous  irregularity, 
to  authorize  or  require  the  court  to  open  or  vacate 
it,  and  need  not  excuse  the  default,58  and,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  §  336,  it  is  not  necessary  in  such  case 
to  show  a  meritorious  defense.  Furthermore,  dur- 


ing the  term  at  which  a  default  judgment  is  ren- 
dered, the  court  may  set  it  aside  without  first  re- 
quiring the  party  to  show  good  cause  for  being  in 
default,59  and  it  has  been  held  that  the  trial  court 
should  ordinarily  sustain  a  motion  made  at  the 
same  term  to  set  aside  the  judgment  and  permit  the 
cause  to  be  heard  on  the  merits,60  particularly 
where  no  intervening  rights  have  arisen  between  the 
entry  of  the  judgment  and  the  making  of  the  mo- 


v.  Emerson  C.  Custis  &  Co.,  176  A. 
551,  116  Pa.Super.  274— Kanai  v. 
Sowa,  167  A.  429,  109  Pa.Super.  426 
—Page  v.  Patterson,  161  A.  878, 
105  Pa.Super.  438— Schwartz  v. 
Stewart,  55  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  633,  5 
Lawrence  L.J.  1 — Risser  v.  Kaylor, 
Com.Pl.,  54  Dauph.Co.  202 — Com- 
monwealth v.  Dr.  Crandall's 
Health  School,  Com.Pl.,  51  Dauph. 
Co.  333 — Klein  v.  Brookside  Dis- 
tilling Products  Corp.,  Com.Pl.,  47 
Lack.Jur.  165 — Moyer  v.  Moyer, 
Com.Pl.,  34  Luz.Legr.Reg.  176. 

R.I.— Vingi  v.  Vigliotti,  6  A.2d  719, 
63  R.I.  9— Dimond  v.  Marwell,  190 
A.  683,  57  R.I.  477. 

S.C.— Baitary  v.  Gahagan,  12  S.B.2d 
735,  195  S.C.  520— Rutledge  v. 
Junior  Order  of  United  American 
Mechanics,  193  S.E.  434,  185 
S.C.  142— Lucas  v.  North  Carolina 
Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.,  191  S.E.  711, 
184  S.C.  119— Bissonette  v.  Joseph, 
170  S.E.  467,  170  S.C.  407— Epworth 
Orphanage  of  South  Carolina  Con- 
ference v.  Strange,  155  S.E.  594, 
158  S.C.  379. 

S.D.— Sohn  v.  Flavin,  244  N.W.  349, 
60  S.D.  305 — Squires  v.  Meade 
County,  239  N.W.  747,  59  S.D.  293 
—Connelly  v.  Franklin,  210  N.W. 
735,  50  S.D.  512. 

Tex. — Wear  v.  McCallum,  33  S.W.2d 
723,  119  Tex.  473— Lawther  Grain 
Co.  v.  Winniford,  Com.  App.,  249 
S.W.  195 — Brown  v.  St  Mary's 
Temple  No.  5  S.  M.  T.  United 
Brothers  of  Friendship  of  Texas, 
Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  531— Babing- 
ton  v.  Gray,  Civ.App.,  71  S.W.2d 
293 — Aviation  Credit  Corporation 
of  New  York  v.  University  Aerial 
Service  Corporation,  Civ.App.,  59 
S.W.2d  .870,  error  dismissed— Pe- 
ters v.  Hubb  Diggs  Co.,  Civ.App., 
35  S.W.2d  449,  error  dismissed — 
Hooser  v.  Wolfe,  Civ.App.,  30  S.W. 
2d  728 — Chaney  v.  Allen,  Civ.App., 
25  S.W.2d  1115 — Griffin  v.  Burrus, 
Civ.App.,  24  S.W.2d  805,  affirmed 
Com.App.,  24  S.W.2d  810— Hum- 
phrey v.  Harrell,  Civ.App.,  19  S.W. 
2d  410,  affirmed,  Com.App.,  29  S.W. 
2d  963 — Sneed  v.  Sneed,  Civ.App., 
296  S.W.  643— St  Paul  Fire  &  Ma- 
rine Ins.  Co.  v.  Earnest,  Civ.App., 
293  S.W.  677,  affirmed  296  S.W. 
1088,  116  Tex.  565— Trigg  v.  Gray, 
Civ.App.,  288  S.W.  1098— Colorado 
River  Syndicate  Subscribers  v. 


Alexander,  Civ.App.,  288  S.W.  586 
— Paggi  v.  Rose  Mfg.  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  285  S.W.  852 — Stoudemneier 
v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  Civ.App.,  246 
S.W.  761. 

Wash. — Skidmore  v.  Pacific  Credi- 
tors, 138  P.2d  664,  18  Wash.2d  157 
— Marsh  v.  West  Fir  Logging  Co., 
281  P.  340,  154  Wash.  137— Law- 
rence v.  Rawson,  217  P.  1019.  126 
Wash.  158. 

W.Va.— Winona  Nat  Bank  v.  Frid- 
ley,  10  S.E.2d  907,  122  W.Va.  479 
— Arnold  v.  Reynolds,  2  S.E.2d 
433,  121  W.Va.  91— State  ex  rel. 
Alkire  v.  Mill,  180  S.E.  183,  116 
W.Va.  277— Sands  v.  Sands,  138 
S.E.  463,  103  W.Va.  701— Gainer 
v.  Smith,  132  S.E.  744,  101  W.Va. 
314— Ellis  v.  Gore,  132  S.E.  741, 
101  W.Va.  273. 

Wis.— Farmington  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Gerhardt.  257  N.W.  595,  216 
Wis.  457. 

Wyo.— Kelley  v.  Eidara,  231  P.  678, 
32  Wyo.  271. 

34  C.J.  p  422  note  25—19  C.J.  p  1213 
note  88%. 

Excusable  neglect  generally  see  in- 
fra subdivision  n  (5)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

5ft,    Mass. — Manzl  v.  Carlson,  180  N. 

E.  134,  278  Mass.  267. 
Freedom  from  fault  or  negligence  as 
requisite  to  relief  see  infra  subdi- 
vision n  (5)   (b)  of  this  section. 
"Such  motions  will  be  denied  or- 
dinarily only   when  there  has  been 
some    persistent    wrongful    conduct, 
willfulness,  or  bad  faith  by  a  par- 
ty."—Baldwin   v.   Yellow   Taxi   Cor- 
poration,   225    N.T.S.    423,'  425,    221 
App.Div.  717,  followed  in  Woodward 
v.  Weekes,  241  N.T.S.  842,  228  App. 
Div.  870. 

57.  Ark.— Karnes  v.  Ramey,  287  S. 
W.  743,  172  Ark.  125. 

Tex. — San  Antonio  Paper  Co.  v.  Mor- 
gan, Civ.App.,  53  S.W.2d  651,  er- 
ror dismissed. 

Defense  to  "action  as  ground  for  va- 
cating judgment  see  infra  subdi- 
vision f  of  this  section. 

58.  Iowa.— Dewell    v.    Suddick,    232 
N.W.  118,  211  Iowa  1352. 

Mont— Paramount  Publix  Corpora- 
tion v.  Boucher,  19  P.2d  223,  93 
Mont.  340. 

N.J.— Westfield   Trust   Co.   v.   Court 

611 


of  Common  Pleas  of  Morris  Coun- 
ty, 178  A.  546,  115  N.J.Law  86,  af- 
firmed 183  A.  165,  116  N.J.Law  191. 

34  C.J.  p  423  notes  28,  29. 

Invalidity  or  irregularity  as  ground 
for  relief  see  infra  subdivision  b 
of  this  section. 

50.    Ky. — Latham  v.  Commonwealth, 

43    S.W.2d   44,   240   Ky.    826. 
Ohio. — Davis   v.   Teachnor,    App.,    53 

N.E.2d  208. 
34  C.J.  p  268  note  48. 
Power  of  trial  court  to  open  default 

judgments  during  term  see  supra 

S  333. 

In  Texas 

(1)  A  distinction  is  recognized  be- 
tween cases  in  which  a  good,  suffi- 
cient,  legal,   or   equitable   excuse  is 
required  to  be  shown   to  support  a 
motion  to  vacate,  and  cases  in  which 
only    a    slight    showing,    amounting 
only  to  some  excuse,  would  be  suffi- 
cient.    The  distinction  turns  on  the 
presence,  or  absence,  of  facts  show- 
ing that  by  the  granting  of  the  ap- 
plication the  adverse  party  would  be 
injured.       Presumably     the     setting 
aside  of  a  judgment  at  a  subsequent 
term  would  be  injurious,  and  hence 
in  such  a  case  a  good  excuse  must 
be  shown  which  implies  a  showing 
of  the  absence  of  negligence  or  ex- 
ercise of  ordinary  care.    On  the  oth- 
er hand,  if  the  application  is  made 
promptly  at  the  same  term,  and  the 
facts    show   that    there   will    be   no 
material   delay,    and   the   failure   of 
the    party   to  answer   or  appear  in 
time  is  not  due  wholly  to  his  fault 
or  neglect,  or  that  of  his  attorney, 
but  there  are  some  extenuating  cir- 
cumstances,    then     the     application 
should  be  granted. — Borger  v.   Min- 
eral Wells  Clay   Products  Co.,   Civ. 
App.,  80  S.W.2d  333, 

(2)  During  the   term  at  which  it 
was      rendered,      the      trial      court 
may   set  aside   a  default   judgment 
with,    or   without,    express    cause. — 
Gann  v.  Hopkins,  Civ.App.,  119  S.W. 
2d  110. 

60.  Neb.— Barney  v.  Platte  Valley 
Public  Power  &  Irr.  Dist,  23  N.W. 
2d  335— Britt  v.  Byrkit,  268  N.W. 
83,  131  Neb.  350— Lacey  v.  Citi- 
zens' Lumber  &  Supply  Co.,  248 
N.W.  378,  124  Neb.  813. 


§  334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tion  to  set  it  aside,  and  the  ends  of  justice  will 
be  furthered  thereby.61 

The  default,  for  which  relief  is  provided,  must  be 
that  of  a  litigant  and  not  of  a  stranger  to  the  pro- 
ceeding;62 and  a  stranger  to  the  record  is  not 
in  a  position  to  ask  to  be  relieved  of  a  default  or 
to  have  a  decree  set  aside  which  was  taken  at  a 
time  when  he  was  not  a  party  to  the  action.68 

Statutory  provisions.  Statutes  relating  to  the 
setting  aside  of  default  judgments  have  been  held 
to  be  constitutional,64  and,  being  remedial,  should 
be  liberally  construed  so  as  to  give  litigants  an  op- 
portunity to  have  the  case  disposed  of  on  the  merits 
to  the  end  that  justice  be  done;65  but,  where  the 
matter  is  governed  by  statute,  one  of  the  statutory 
grounds  must  be  shown.66  Statutes  dealing  with 
vacation  and  modification  of  judgments  are  exclu- 
sive on  a  motion  to  vacate  a  default  judgment,  un- 
less by  reason  of  special  circumstances  the  statu- 
tory remedy  is  inadequate.67  A  statute  providing 
that  no  judgment  may  be  set  aside  for  matter  not 
previously  objected  to  if  the  complaint  contain  a 
substantial  cause  of  action  does  not  apply  to  a  de- 
fault judgment  entered  against  an  innocent  par- 
ty.68 In  order  to  have  both  a  default  and  a  judg- 


ment thereon  set  aside  under  some  statutes  a  show- 
ing as  to  mistake,  or  the  like,  must  be  shown  as 
to  each.69  An  amendatory  statute  applies  to  a  mo- 
tion to  set  aside  a  judgment  entered  before  the  stat- 
ute goes  into  effect  where  the  motion  was  made 
after  the  effective  date  of  the  statute  and  within 
the  time  allowed  for  the  motion  by  the  statute  in 
force  at  the  time  the  judgment  was  entered.70  A 
statutory  provision  requiring  the  court  to  render 
judgment  in  specified  actions  if  defendant  does  not 
appear  and  defend  does  not  preclude  defendant 
from  showing  cause  for  a  failure  to  answer  or  de- 
mur within  the  prescribed  time.71 

b.  Invalidity  or  Irregularity  of  Judgment 

(1)  Invalidity  of  judgment  in  general 

(2)  Irregularity  of  judgment  in  general 

(3)  Want  or  insufficiency  of  notice  of 

proceeding's 

(4)  Unauthorized,  inadvertent,  improvi- 

dent, or  premature  entry 

(1)  Invalidity  of  Judgment  in  General 
Invalidity  of  a  default  judgment  rendering  It  void, 
as  distinguished  from    merely  voidable  or  erroneous,   is 
ground  for  vacating  it. 

Invalidity  of  a  default  judgment  rendering  it  void, 


61.  Ky. — Hackney  v.  Charles.  295  S. 
W.  869,  220  Ky.  574 — South  Moun- 
tain Coal  Co.   v.   Kowland,   265   S. 
W.  320,  204  Ky.  820. 

Furtherance  of  justice  as  ground  for 
setting  aside  default  judgment 
generally  see  infra  subdivision  o 
of  this  section. 

Question,  on  motion  to  set  aside 
a  default  judgment  made  promptly 
at  the  same  term  of  court  is  wheth- 
er the  ends  of  justice  will  be  fur- 
thered by  reopening  case*  in  "which 
one  party  has  obtained  a  judgment 
without  the  other  having  been  heard 
when  the  latter  shows  the  court 
that  prima  facie  he  has  a  meritori- 
ous defense. — Columbia  Coal  &  Min. 
Co.  v.  Radcliff.  186  S.W.2d  419,  299 
Ky.  596— Vanover  v.  Ashley,  183  S. 
W.2d  944,  298  Ky.  722 — Latham  v. 
Commonwealth,  48  S.W.2d  44,  240 
Ky.  826. 

62.  Idaho. — Hanson  v.  Rogers,  32  P. 
2d  126,  54  Idaho  360. 

63.  Idaho. — Hanson   v.    Rogers,    su- 
pra. 

Indemnity  insurer  could  not  have 
default  judgment  against  insured 
set  aside  because  insured  had  not 
given  notice  of  automobile  accident, 
Insurer  not  being  party  to  judgment. 
— Earle  v.  Earle,  151  S.B.  884,  198 
N.C.  411. 

64.  N.C. — Foster    v.    Allison    Corpo- 
ration,  131   S.E.   648,   191  N.C.  166, 
44  A.L..R.  610. 


65.  Cal.— Riskin  v.  Towers,  148  P.2d 
611,  24  Cal.2d  274,  153  A.L.R.  442 
— Waybright  v.  Anderson,  253  P. 
148,  200  Cal.  374— Hughes  v. 
Wright,  149  P.2d  392,  64  Cal.App.2d 
897— Tearney  v.  Riddle,  149  P.2d 
387,  64  Cal.App.2d  783— Potts  v. 
Whitson,  125  P.2d  947,  52  CaLApp. 
2d  199 — Thompson  v.  Sutton,  122 
P.2d  975,  50  Cal.App.2d  272— Rose- 
borough  v.  Campbell,  115  P.2d  839, 
46  Cal.App.2d  257— Stub  r.  Harri- 
son, 96  P.2d  979,  35  Cal.App.2d  685 
— Application  of  Mercereau,  14  P. 
2d  1019,  126  Cal.App.  590— Wil- 
liams v.  McQueen,  265  P.  339,  89 
CaLApp.  659 — Corgiat  v.  Realty 
Mortg.  Corporation  of  California, 
260  P.  573,  88  CaLApp.  37— Sofuye 
v.  Pieters-Wheeler  Seed  Co.,  216 
P.  990,  62  CaLApp.  198. 

Ga. — Bradley  v.  Henderson,  193  S.B. 
79,  56  Ga,App.  488. 

Ind. — Padol  v.  Home  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  27  N.B.2d  917,  108  Ind.App. 
401 — Falmouth  State  Bank  v. 
Hayes,  185  N.E,  662,  97  Ind.App. 
68. 

Minn.— Lentz  v.  Lutz,  9  N.W.2d  505, 
215  Minn.  230. 

Mo.— Chilton  v.  Cady,  250  S.W.  403, 
298  Mo.  101. 

Nev. — Bowman  v.  Bowman,  217  P. 
1102,  47  Nev.  207. 

Or. — Snyder  v.  Consolidated  High- 
way Co.,  72  P.2d  932,  157  Or.  479 
—Peters  v.  Dietrich,  27  P.2d  1015, 
145  Or.  589. 

34  C.J.  p  296  note  7, 

612 


66.  Iowa. — Heuer   v.    Hartman,    200 
N.W.  314. 

Mont— Mihelich    v.    Butte    Electric 

Ry.  Co.,   281  P.  540,   85   Mont.   604. 

S.D. — Connelly   v.    Franklin,    210   N. 

W.  735,  50  S.D.  512. 
False  return  of  service 

Where  service  of  original  writ  was 
in  fact  made  by  sheriff  and  judg- 
ment for  default  of  appearance  en- 
tered, statute  permitting  "taking, 
off"  of  judgment  by  following  cer- 
tain procedure  at  or  before,  term  fol- 
lowing entry  of  default  judgment 
did  not  authorize  reopening  of  judg- 
ment, such  statute  covering  only  the 
situations  where  sheriff  had  returned! 
that  defendant  had  been  served, 
when  in  fact  this  was  not  the  case. 
— Yerkes  v.  Dangle,  DeLSuper.,  33 
A.2d  406. 

67.  Okl. — Jupe     v.     Home     Owners 
Loan  Corp.,  167  P.2d  46. 

68.  Ala. — Ex    parte    Crumpton,    109 
So.  184,  21  Ala.App.  446. 

69.  Mont. — State    v.    District   Court 
of  Second  Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for 
Silver    Bow    County,    272    P.    525, 
83  Mont  400. 

TO.  Idaho. — Brainard  v.  Cceur 
d'Alene  Antimony  Mining  Co.,  208 
P.  855,  35  Idaho  742. 

71.  Wash. — State  v.  Superior  Court 
for  Thurston  County,  271  P.  87, 
149  Wash.  443. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§334 


as  distinguished  from  merely  voidable  or  erroneous, 
is  ground  for  vacating  it,72  as  where  the  judgment  is 
invalid  for  want  of  jurisdiction  of  the  person,73  or 
where  the  judgment  is  based  on  a  defective  affida- 
vit for  publication  of  summons,74  or  where  the  court 
is  without  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  the  question  de- 
termined or  to  give  the  particular  relief  granted.75 
A  party  has  a  right  to  presume  that  no  other  or 
different  judgment  will  be  taken  against  him  by  de- 
fault than  the  facts  alleged  will  warrant,76  and  a 
judgment  against  a  party  in  his  individual  capacity 
which  is  void  because  no  facts  were  alleged  in  the 
complaint  which  would  permit  a  judgment  against 
him  in  that  capacity  will  be  vacated.77  Also,  a  final 


judgment  after  default  will  be  set  aside  for  want 
of  jurisdiction  where  summons  was  addressed  to 
defendant  as  an  individual  and  the  declaration  de- 
clared against  him  in  a  representative  capacity.78 

(2)  Irregularity  of  Judgment  in  General 

A  default  judgment  may  be  vacated  for  Irregularity 
In  the  proceedings  leading  to  the  entry  of  the  judg- 
ment, as  distinguished  from  mere  error,  but  not  ordi- 
narily for  merely  technical,  formal,  and  unimportant  Ir- 
regularities. 

A  default  judgment,  like  any  other,  may  be  va- 
cated for  irregularity  in  the  proceedings  leading  to 
the  entry  of  a  judgment,  as  distinguished  from  mere 
error,79  but  such  a  judgment  will  not  ordinarily  be 


72,  Cal.— Baird  v.  Smith,  14  P.2d 
749,  216  Cal.  408— Sheehy  v.  Ro- 
man Catholic  Archbishop  of  San 
Francisco,  122  P.2d  60,  49  Oal.App. 
2d  537. 

Pla.— Kellog-Citizens  Nat.  Bank  of 
Green  Bay,  Wis.  v.  Felton,  199  So. 
50,  145  Fla.  68— Kroier  v.  Kroier, 
116  So.  753,  95  Fla.  865. 

111. — Rau  v.  Village  of  Warrensburg, 
23  N.E.2d  371,  302  Ill.App.  37. 

Ky. — Fugate  v.  Creech,  111  S.W.2d 
402,  271  Ky.  3. 

Md. — Fick  v.  Towers,  136  A.  648,  152 
Md.  335. 

N.J.— New  Jersey  Cash  Credit  Cor- 
poration v.  Zaccaria,  19  A.2d  448, 
126  N.J.Law  334 — Gloucester  City 
Trust  Co.  v.  Goodfellow,  3  A.2d 
561,  121  N.J.Law  546— Westfleld 
Trust  Co.  v.  Court  of  Common 
Pleas  of  Morris  County,  178  A. 

-  546,  115  N.J.Law  86,  affirmed  183 
A.  165,  116  N.J.Law  191— Green- 
baum  v.  Higgins,  147  A.  722,  7  N. 
J.Misc.  1012. 

N.Y.— Valz  v.  Sheepshead  Bay  Bun- 
galow Corporation,  163  N.E.  124, 
249  N.T.  122,  certiorari  denied  49 
S.Ct.  82,  278  U.S.  647,  73  L.Ed. 
560. 

N.D.— Baird  v.  Ellison,  293  N.W.  794. 
70  N.D.  261. 

Okl. — Okmulgee  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Oklahoma  Salvage  &  Supply  Co., 
271  P.  167,  133  Okl.  64— Hoffman 
v.  Deskins,  221  P.  37,  94  Okl.  117. 

Or.— Mutzig   v.    Hope,    158    P.2d   110. 

Pa. — Borough  of  Wilkinsburg  v. 
School  Dist.  of  Borough  of  Wil- 
kinsburg, 148  A.  77.  298  Pa.  193— 
Simko  v.  Kunkle,  Com.Pl.,  36  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  229,  22  WestCo.  149. 

Tex.— Uvaldo  Rock  Asphalt  Co.  v. 
Lacy,  Civ.App.,  131  S.W.2d  698. 

34  C.J.  p  269  note  57,  p  423  note  28. 

Error  in  law  as  ground  for  vacating 
default  judgment  see  infra  sub- 
division g  of  this  section. 

Invalidity  as  ground  for  vacating 
judgment  generally  see  supra  § 
267. 

Necessity  for  excusing  default  see 
supra  subdivision  a  of  this  section. 


"Void  judgment"  within  text  rule 
is  one  which  has  semblance  but 
lacks  some  essential  element,  as  Ju- 
risdiction or  service  of  process. — 
Simms  v.  Sampson,  20  S.E.2d  554, 
221  N.C.  379— Wynne  v.  Conrad,  17 
S.E.2d  514,  220  N.C.  355— Wellons 
v.  Lassiter,  157  S.E.  434,  200  N.C. 
474— Finger  v.  Smith,  133  S.E.  186, 
191  N.C.  818— Duffer  v.  Brunson, 
125  S.E.  619,  188  N.C.  789. 

Judgment  void  on  its  face 

Invalidity    apparent    from    inspec- 
tion of  judgment  roll  renders  judg- 
ment void  on  its  face  and  subject  to 
be  vacated  at  any  time. — Gibbons  v. 
Clapp,   277  P.   490,   207  Cal.   221. 
Judgments  held  not   subject  to  va- 
cation, as  void 
Cal.— Phillips    v.    Trusheim,    156    P. 

2d    25,    25    Cal.2d    913— Pavlovich 

v.    Watts,    115    P.2d    511,    46    Cal. 

App.2d  103. 
Ga. — Southern  Fertilizer  &  Chemical 

Co.  v.  Kirby,  184  S.E.  363,  52  Ga. 

App.   688— McCray  v.  Empire  Inv. 

Co.,  174  S.E.  219,  49  Ga.App.  117. 
Idaho. — Occidental  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Niendorf,    44    P.2d   1099,    55    Idaho 

521. 
Kan.— Hawkins   v.    Smith,    111    P.2d 

1108,  153  Kan.  542. 
Ky. — Stratton    &    Terstegge    Co.    v. 

Begley,    61    S.W.2d    287,    249    Ky. 

632 — Fowler   v.  Wiley,    33    S.W.2d 

14,  236  Ky.  313. 
Mass.— Moll    v.    Town   of  Wakefleld, 

175  N.E.  81,  274  Mass.  505. 
Minn. — City  of  Luverne  v.  Skyberg, 

211   N.W.    5,    169    Minn.    234. 
N.C. — Duffer    v.    Brunson,    125    S.E. 

619,  188  N.C.  789. 
Pa. — Eastman   Kodak   Co.    v.    Oseni- 

der,  193  A.  284,  127  Pa.Super.  332. 

73.  Gal. — Hollywood  Garment  Cor- 
poration v.  J.  Beckerman,  Inc., 
143  P.2d  738,  61  Cal.App.2d  658 — 
Reichert  v.  Rabun,  265  P.  260,  89 
CaLApp,  375. 

Ga.— Davis-Washington  Co.  v.  Tick- 
ers, 155  S.E.  92,  41  Ga.App.  818 
—Anderson  v.  Turner,  133  S.E. 
306,  35  Ga.App.  428 — Smoyer  v. 

613 


Jarman,  114  S.E.*  924,  29  Ga.App. 
305. 

111. — Lewis  v.  West  Side  Trust  & 
Savings  Bank,  36  N.E.2d  573,  377 
111.  384. 

Md. — Piedmont-Mt  Airy  Guano  Co. 
of  Baltimore  v.  Merritt,  140  A.  62, 
154  Md.  226. 

Minn. — Pugsley  v.  Magerfleisch,  201 
N.W.  323,  161  Minn.  246. 

N.D.— Baird  v.  Ellison,  293  N.W. 
794,  70  N.D.  261— Odland  v. 
O'Keeffe  Implement  Co.,  229  N.W. 
923,  59  N.D.  335— Beery  v.  Peter- 
son, 225  N.W.  798,  58  N.D.  273— 
Gallagher  v.  National  Nonparti- 
san  League,  205  N.W.  674. 

Wyo. — Kimbel  v.  Osborne,  156  P.2d 
279. 

34  C.J.  p  269  note  57. 

Judgment  entered  without  sufficient 
service 

D.C. — Ray  v.  Bruce.  Mun.App.,  31  A, 
'  2d  693. 

74.  Cal.— Gibbons   v.    Clapp,    277    P. 
490,   207  Cal.  221. 

75.  Ga. — Woodall  v.  Exposition  Cot- 
ton Mills,  120  S.E.  423,  31  Ga.App. 
269. 

N.T.— Coles  v.  Carroll,  6  N.E.2d  107, 
273  N.T.  86— Seeley  v.  Greene,  247 
N.Y.S.  679,  139  Misc.  90. 

Or. — Leonard  v.  Bennett,  106  P.2d 
542,  165  Or.  157. 

S.C.— Nettles  v.  MacMillan  Petrole- 
um Corp.,  37  S.E.2d  134,  208  S.C. 
81. 

34  C.J.  p  269  note  57. 

Vacation  of  default  judgment  ren- 
dered for  amount  in  excess  of  that 
claimed  in  writ  or  declaration  see 
infra  subdivision  g  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

76.  Wash. — Sandgren   v.    West,    115 
P.2d  724,  9  Wash.2d  494. 

77.  Wash. — Sandgren    v.   West,   su- 
pra. 

78.  Fla. — Frostproof  State  Bank  v. 
Mallett,  131  So.  322,  100  Fla.  1464. 

79.  Ariz. — Burbage  v.  Jedlicka,   234 
P.    32,    27   Ariz.    426 — Gila   Valley 
Electric,  Gas  &  Water  Co.  v.  Arl- 


§  334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


vacated  for  merely  technical,  formal,  and  unimpor-  r  principle  of  harmless  error,8°  or  which  may  be 
tant  irregularities  which  may  be  disregarded  on  the  |  deemed  cured  or  waived  as  by  failure  to  object  in 


zona  Trust  &  Savings  Bank,  215 
P.  159,  25  Ariz.  177. 

Cal.— Harris  v.  Minnesota  Inv.  Co., 
265  P.  308,  89  Cal.App.  396. 

111.— Stanke  v.  Atherton,  7  N.E.2d 
467,  289  IlLApp.  614. 

Iowa. — Brenton  v.  Lewiston,  216  N. 
W.  6,  204  Iowa  892— Chandler  Mill. 
&  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Sinaiko,  208  N.W. 
323,  201  Iowa  791. 

Kan. — Samuel  Ach  Co.  v.  Thorpe, 
278  P.  15,  128  Kan.  296. 

Md.— Martin  v.  Long,  120  A.  875,  142 
Md.  348. 

Mich.— Smak  v.  Gwozdik.  291  N.W. 
270,  293  Mich.  185— Dades  v.  Cen- 
tral Mut.  Auto  Ins.  Co.,  248  N.W. 
616,  263  Mich.  260. 

Mo.— Fleming  v.  McCall,  App.,  35 
S.W.2d  60— Boggess  v.  Jordan, 
App.,  283  S.W.  57. 

Mont— Stenner  v.  Colorado-Montana 
Mines  Ass'n,  149  P.2d  546. 

N.M. — Animas  Consol.  Mines  Co.  v. 
Frazier,  69  P.2d  927,  41  N.M.  389 
— Dallaxn  County  Bank  v.  Burn- 
side,  249  P.  109,  31  N.M.  537. 

N.T.— Hilton  v.  Mack,  15  N.T.S.2d 
187,  257  App.Dlv.  709,  appeal  dis- 
missed Hilton  v.  aaston,  24  N.B.2d 
506  281  N.Y.  881— Cowperthwait  v. 
Critchley,  276  N.T.S.  133,  243  App. 
D1V  70 — Devonia  Discount  Corpo- 
ration v.  Bianchi,  271  N.Y.S.  413, 
241  App.Div.  838— Mills  v.  Nedza. 
227  N.T.S.  156,  222  App.Div.  615— 
Christal  v.  Fifty-Five  Columbus 
Corporation,  5  N.T.S.2d  227,  168 
Misc.  118. 

jq-.C. — Simms  v.  Sampson,  20  S.E.2d 
554,  221  N.C.  379— Everett  v.  John- 
son, 14  SJB.2d  520,  219  N.C.  540— 
Clegg  v.  Canady,  195  S.E.  770,  213 
!^c.  258 — Wellons  v.  Lassiter,  157 
S.E.  434,  200  N.C.  474— Standard 
Supply  Co.  v.  Vance  Plumbing  & 
Electric  Co.,  143  S.E.  248,  195  N. 
C.  629 — Finger  v.  Smith,  133  S.E. 
186,  191  N.C.  818. 

jq-.D. — Ruchverg  v.  Russell,  3  N.W. 
2d  459,  71  N.D.  658,  139  A.L.R. 
1474. 

Ohio.— Morrison  v.  Baker,  App.,  58 
N.E.2d  708 — French  v.  Friesinger, 
App.,  38  N.E.2d  90— Mt.  Ida  School 
v.  Clark,  177  N.E.  604,  39  Ohio 
App.  389. 

Okl.— Gill  v.  Meis,  12  P.2d  692,  158 
OWL  154 — Adachi  v.  Blckford,  275 
P.  306,  135  Okl.  228— McKinney  v. 
Swift,  274  P.  659,  135  Okl.  164— 
Okmulgee  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Oklahoma  Salvage  &  Supply  Co., 
271  P.  167,  133  Okl.  64— Great 
American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Keswater, 
268  P.  258,  131  Okl.  196— Nation  v. 
Savely,  260  P.  32,  127  Okl.  117. 

Pa. — Richard  T.  Camden  Fire  Ins. 
Co.,  46  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  365,  4  Mon- 
roe IuR.  65 — Simko  v.  Kunkle,  36 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  229,  22  WestCo.  149 


— Norton    v.    Frantz,    Com.PL,    42 
Lack.Jur.  97. 

Tex.— Daniel  Miller  Co,  v.  Puett,  Civ. 
App.,  252  S.W.  333. 

Wash.— State  v.  Superior  Court  for 
Thurston  County,  271  P.  87,  149 
Wash.  443. 

.— Federal  Land  Bank  of  St.  Paul 
v.  Olson,  1  N.W.2d  752,  239  Wis. 
448. 

Wyo.— McDaniel  v,  Hoblit,  245  P. 
295,  34  Wyo.  509. 

34  C.J.  p  275  note  81,  p  423  notes  28, 
32. 

Error  in  law  as  ground  for  vacating 
default  judgment  see  infra  subdi- 
vision g  of  this  section. 

Irregularity  as  ground  for  vacat- 
ing judgments  generally  see  supra 
§  268. 

Objections  as  to  pleadings  as  ground 
for  setting  aside  default  judg- 
ments see  infra  subdivision  j  of 
this  section. 

''Irregularity"  defined 

(1)  Irregularity    authorizing    set- 
ting  (aside    judgment   on   motion    is 
want    of    adherence    to    some    pre- 
scribed rule  or  mode  of  proceeding, 
by  omitting  to  do  something  neces- 
sary for  orderly  conduct  of  suit,  or 
doing  it  in  unseasonable  time  or  in 
improper  manner. — Ealy  v.  McGahen, 
21  P.2d  84,  37  N.M.  246. 

(2)  An  irregularity  is  a  departure 
in  legal  procedure  from  things  which 
are  regular;   it  is  something  by  way 
of  procedure  which  is  unusual  and 
irregular. — Rabb  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of  Cuyahoga  County,   173  N.E.   255, 
257,  36  Ohio  App.  481. 

Irregrnlar   and   erroneous   Judgments 

defined  and  distinguished 
An  "irregular  judgment"  is  one 
rendered  contrary  to  the  course  and 
practice  of  the  court,  whereas  an 
"erroneous  judgment"  is  one  ren- 
dered according  to  the  course  and 
practice  of  court,  but  contrary  to 
law,  or  on  a  mistaken  view  of  the 
law,  or  on  an  erroneous  applica- 
tion of  legal  principles,  an  errone- 
ous judgment  being  not  necessarily 
irregular. — Simms  v.  Sampson,  20  S. 
E.2d  554,  221  N.C.  379— Wynne  v. 
Conrad,  17  S.E.2d  514,  220  N.C.  355 
—Wellons  v.  Laseiter,  157  S.E.  434, 
200  N.C.  474— Finger  v.  Smith,  133 
S.E.  186,  191  N.C.  818— Duffer  v. 
Brunson,  125  S.E.  619,  188  N.C.  789. 

Voidable  Judgment 

(1)  Where  a  judgment  by  default 
is  entered  in  an  action  on  a  petition 
not  filed  by  the  date  fixed  in  the  no- 
tice and  ten  days  before  the  term, 
it  is  the  right  of  defendant  directly 
to  attack  the  judgment  as  voidable, 
and  the  duty  of  the  court  to  set  it 
aside  and  have  it  vacated. — Sioux 
County  v.  Kosters,  191  N.W.  315,  194 
Iowa  1300. 

614 


(2)  Fact  that  entry  of  default 
judgment  without  a  Jury  was  with- 
out authority,  however,  was  held 
not  proper  ground  of  motion  to  set 
aside  the  judgment,  but  under  stat- 
ute merely  rendered  it  voidable  on 
direct  bill  of  exceptions. — McDuffie 
Oil  &  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Her,  118  S.E. 
772,  30  Ga.App.  671. 

failure  to  serve  copy  of  statement 

of  claim 

A  judgment  entered  for  want  of 
appearance  will  be  stricken  off  on 
defendant's  application  where  plain- 
tiff failed  to  serve  on  defendant  a 
copy  of  the  statement  of  claim  filed, 
as  required  by  court  rule. — North- 
western Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Heenerfauth,  18  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  534. 
Held  not  Irregularity  within  role 

(1)  Convening    term    hour    before 
customary. — Kingery      v.      Reliance 
Fertilizer  Co.,  158   S.E.   346,   43   Gai 
App.  240. 

(2)  .Correction   of  recorded  notice 
of  materialman's  lien  by  interlinea- 
tion of  correct  description  of  proper- 
ty in  notice  without  new  acknowl- 
edgment or  verification. — Ealy  v.  Mc- 
Gahen, 21  P.2d  84,  37  N.M.  246. 

(3)  Court  order,  allowing  defend- 
ants   to    withdraw    their    pleadings, 
which  specified  answer  only  and  not 
cross  complaint — Sheppard  v.  Sand- 
fer,  102  P.2d  668,  44  N.M.  357. 

(4)  Erroneous    finding    of    fact. — 
Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Williams,   69 
P.2d  525,  52  Wyo.  1,  110  A.L.R.  1463. 

(5)  Failure   to   introduce   evidence 
to  show  that  note  had  been  regis- 
tered with  county  treasurer  and  tax 
paid  thereon  as  provided  by  statute. 
— Thomas  v.   Tucker,   86   P.2d  1011, 
184  Okl.  304. 

(6)  Inclusion    in    judgment    fore- 
closing materialman's  lien  a  nonlien- 
able  item.— Ealy  v.  McGahen,  21  P. 
2d  84,  37  N.M.  246. 

(7)  Making  order  of  revivor  with- 
out first  spreading  on  the  record,  a 
conditional  order  of  revivor  as  pro- 
vided by  code. — French  v.  Friesinger, 
Ohio  App.,  38  N.E.2d  90. 

(8)  Mere   failure   to   plead.— Rabb 
v.    Board    of   Com'rs    of    Cuyahoga 
County,   173  N.E.  255,  36  Ohio  App. 
481. 

(9)  Other  matters. 

Mo.— Allen  v.  Allen,  App.,  14  S.W.2d 

686. 
Mont— Smith    v.    Hamill,    112    P.2d 

195,  111  Mont  585. 

80.    Ala. — Gray  v.  Bank  of  Mound- 

ville,   107   So.   804,   214  Ala.   260. 
Mich.— Bartnik  v.  Samonek,  21  N.W. 

2d  817,  313  Mich.  494. 
Mo. — Daugherty    v.    Lanning-Harris 

Coal   &   Grate   Co.,   265    S.W.    866, 

218  Mo.App.  187. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


334 


due  season,81  particularly  where  the  proceeding  to 
set  aside  the  default  was  belatedly  taken.82  In  or- 
der to  set  aside  a  default  judgment  as  being  irregu- 
larly entered,  the  court  must  test  the  right  of 
movant  by  the  same  principles  as  those  by  which 
it  tests  the  right  of  a  movant  against  whom  a 
judgment  was  entered  in  a  litigated  action.8^ 

(3)  Want  or  Insufficiency  of  Notice  of  Pro- 
ceedings 
Want  or  Insufficiency  of  the  required  notice  of  the 


action  or  Intermediate  proceedings  therein  is  ground  for 
opening  or  vacating  a  default  judgment. 

It  is  good  ground  for  vacating  or  opening  a  de- 
fault judgment  that  defendant  had  no  notice  of  the 
action,  either  because  of  a  failure  to  serve  him  with 
process,  or  because  the  process  or  service  was  fa- 
tally irregular  or  defective,84  and  this  rule  has  been 
applied  where  an  attempted  service  by  publication 


N.M. — Bourgeious  v.  Santa  Fe  Trail 
Stages,  95  P.2d  204,  43  N.M.  453. 

N.Y.— Quist  v.  Gwinup,  46  N.Y.S.2d 
105,  267  App.Div.  224. 

34  C.J.  p  276  note  84. 

Failure   to    demand   appointment   of 

attorney 

Statute  providing  that,  when  one 
party's  attorney  ceases  to  act  as 
such,  adverse  party  must,  before  any 
further  proceedings  may  be  had, 
by  written  notice  require  such  party 
to  appoint  another  attorney  or  to 
appear  in  person,  has  no  application 
where  adverse  party  has  personal 
knowledge  of  withdrawal  of  her  at- 
torney and  of  setting  of  case  for 
trial,  and  denial  of  plaintiff's  mo- 
tion to  vacate  judgment  on  cross 
complaint,  because  no  written  de- 
mand had  been  made  on  plaintiff  by 
defendants  to  appoint  attorney  in 
lieu  of  attorney  of -record  who  had 
withdrawn,  or  to  appear  in  person, 
was  not  abuse  of  discretion  under 
such  circumstances. — Savage  v. 
Stokes,  28  P.2d  900,  54  Idaho  109— 
Smith-Nieland  v.  Reed,  231  P.  102, 
39  Idaho  786.  • 

Failure  to   serve  proposed  form  of 
default 

(1)  Where    defendants,    while   de- 
murrers  to  complaint  were  pending 
before  circuit  court,  knew  that  their 
original     attorney     had     withdrawn 
but    took    no    steps    to    have    other 
counsel     substituted    or    to    notify 
plaintiffs    of    defendants'    addresses, 
and   defendants    did   not   show   that 
plaintiffs    knew     where     defendants 
could  be  found,  and  defendants  made 
no   showing  that  default  order  and 
decree     for     plaintiffs    were    taken 
against     defendants     through    their 
mistake,    inadvertence,    surprise,    or 
excusable    neglect,    refusal    to    set 
aside  default  on  ground  that  plain- 
tiffs did  not  serve  copies  of  proposed 
forms  thereof  on  defendants  person- 
ally   before    order  and   decree   were 
entered   was   not  an  abuse   of  dis- 
cretion.— Merryman  v.  Colonial  Real- 
ty Co.,   120  P.2d  230,  168  Or.  12. 

(2)  Even   if  a  firm   of   attorneys 
were  attorneys  for  defendants  when 
a   default   order  was   taken,   failure 
to  serve  such  form  was  immaterial 
in    determining    whether    order    and 
decree   entered  thereon  should  have 


been  set  aside,  where  defendants 
were  served  with  a  copy  of  order 
overruling  demurrers  and  setting 
time  for  defendants  to  answer  and 
with  a  copy  of  motion  for  default 
and  setting  time  for  hearing  on  mer- 
its.— Merryman  v.  Colonial  Realty 
Co.,  supra. 

81.  Pa, — Caromono    v.    Garman,    42 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  96,  affirmed  23  A.2d 
92,  147  Pa.Super.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  278  note  86. 

82.  Mich. — Bartnik  v.    Samonek,    21 
N.W.2d  817,   313   Mich.  464. 

Time  for  application  to  set  aside 
default  judgment  generally  see 
infra  §  337. 

83.  N.M. — Bourgeious   v.    Santa    Fe 
Trail  Stages,  95  P.2d  204,  43  N.M. 
453. 

84.  Ala. — Murphree  v.  International 
Shoe    Co.,    20    So.2d    782,    246   Ala. 
384 — Ex  parte  Whitehead,   199   So. 
876,  29  Ala.  App.  583,  certiorari  de- 
nied Ex  parte  Whisler,  199  So.  879, 
240  Ala.  447. 

Ariz.— Lore  v.  Citizens  Bank  of  Win- 
slow,  75  P.2d  371,  51  Ariz.  191. 

Ark. — First  Nat  Bank  v.  Turner,  275 
S.W.  703,  169  Ark.  393. 

Cal.— Riskin  v.  Towers,  148  P.2d 
611,  24  CaUd  274,  153  A.L.R.  442 
— Washko  v.  Stewart,  112  P.2d  306, 
44  CaI.App.2d  311— Penland  v. 
Goodman,  111  P.2d  913,  44  CaLApp. 
2d  14— Doxey  v.  Doble,  54  P.2d 
1143,  12  CaLApp.2d  62. 

D.C.— Wise  v.  Herzog,  114  F.2d  486, 
72  App.D,C.  335. 

Ga.— Walker  v.  T.  H.  Sirmans  &  Co., 
148  S.E.  592,  168  Ga.  658— Courier- 
Herald  Pub.  Co.  v.  Georgian  Co., 
128  S.E.  744,  160  Ga.  583— Smoyer 
v.  Jarman,  114  S.E.  924,  29  Ga.App. 
305. 

111. — McCoy  v.  HT-G  Corporation,  47 
N.E.2d  384,  318  IlLApp.  229— Je- 
rome v.  5019-21  Quincy  Street 
Bldg.  Corporation,  45  N.E.2d  878, 
317  Ill.App.  335,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  53  N.E.2d  444,  385  111.  524 
— Nikola,  v.  Campus  Towers  Apart- 
ment Bldg.  Corporation,  25  N.E.2d 
582,  303  Ill.App.  516. 

Ind.— -Kilmer  v.  McCormick,  150  N.E. 
794,  84  Ind.App.  215. 

Iowa. — Jackson  v.  Jones,  300  N.W. 
668,  231  Iowa  106. 

Md. — Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d  276, 

615 


181  Md.  206 — Plummer  v..  Rosen- 
thai,  12  A.2d  530,  178  Md.  149. 

Mont — Housing  Authority  of  City  of 
Butte  v.  Murtha,  144  P.2d  183,  115 
Mont.  405. 

N.J. — Porter  v.  Building  Associates, 
169  A.  515,  127  N.J.Misc.  42— Joyce 
v.  Bauman,  165  A.  425,  11  N.J.Misc. 
237. 

N.T. — Devonia  Discount  Corporation 
v.  Bianchi,  271  N.Y.S.  413,  241  App. 
Div.  838— Katz  v.  Silverberg,  50 
N.T.S.2d  83,  183  Misc.  492. 

N.C. — Hershey  Corporation  v.  Atlan- 
tic Coast  Line  R.  Co.,  165  S.E.  550, 
203  N.C.  184. 

N.D.— -Baird  v.  Ellison,  293  N.W.  794, 
70  N.D.  261— Ellison  v.  Baird,  293 
N.W.  793,  70  N.D.  226. 

Okl.— Roth  v.  Fern  Oil  &  Gas  Co., 
8  P.3d  63,  155  Okl.  154— Hawkins 
v.  Payne,  264  P.  179,  129  Okl.  243. 

Pa. — Sasso's  Inc.  v.  Progansky;  Com. 
PL,  38  Luz.Leg.Reg.  323. 

Tex. — Foster  v.  Christensen,  Com. 
App.,  67  S.W.Sd  246 — Wyman  v. 
American  Mortg.  Corporation,  Civ. 
App.,  45  S.W.2d  629— Motor  Inv. 
Co.  v.  Killman,  Civ.App.,  43  S.W. 
2d  633 — Southern  Trading  Co.  of 
Texas  v.  Feldman,  Civ.App.,  247 
S.W.  702,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com. App.,  259  S.W.  566. 

Utah. — State  Tax  Commission  v. 
Larsen,  110  P.2d  558,  100  Utah  103. 

Wash. — Golson  v.  Carscallen,  283  P. 
681,  155  Wash.  176. 

Wyo.— Kimbel  v.  Osborn,  156  P.2d 
279. 

34  C.J.  p  270  note  63,  p  423  note  34 
Ca]  (2). 

BIffht  to  relief  held  absolute 

N.D. — Odland  v.  O'Keeffe  Implement 
Co.,  229  N.W.  923,  59  N.D.  335— 
Beery  v.  Peterson,  225  N.W.  798. 

58  N.D.  273. 

Right  held  not  absolute 

CaL— Tucker  v.  Tucker,  139  P.2d  848, 

59  Cal.App.2d  557. 

Leaving*  at  defendant's  abode  in  Ills 

absence 

Where  copy  of  petition  and  proc- 
ess was  left  at  defendant's  most  no- 
torious place  of  abode  while  defend- 
ant was  absent  from  county,  and 
first  discovered  after  default  was 
entered,  vacating  default  was  held 
proper. — Carr-Lee  Grocery  Co.  v. 
Brannen,  167  S.E.  536,  46  Ga.App. 
225. 


334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


was  fatally  defective.85  A  judgment  will  not  be 
set  aside,  however,  for  mere  clerical  errors,  omis- 
sions, or  irregularities  in  the  process,  not  affecting 
the  jurisdiction,8^  especially  where  defendant  had 
actual  notice  of  the  commencement  of  the  action,87 
and  it  has  been  held  that  a  defendant  who  knew 
about  the  suit  in  time  to  make  a  defense,  even 
though  he  was  not  served  with  summons,  is  not  en- 
titled to  have  a  default  judgment  against  him  set ' 
aside.88  Where  the  party  knew  of  the  claim  a  co- 
defendant  was  making  against  him,  and  had  actual 
notice  that  he  was  a  codefendant,  the  court  properly 
refused  to  vacate  a  judgment  on  the  ground  that 
the  moving  party  did  not  know  that  a  pleading 


such  as  a  cross  petition  in  which  the  claim  was 
made  had  been  filed.89  A  default  will  not  be  set 
aside  where  defendant's  objections  to  process  or 
service  are  waived  by  his  voluntary  appearance90 
or  by  his  failure  promptly  to  claim  immunity  from 
service  made  on  him.91  A  default  judgment  will 
not  be  set  aside  on  the  ground  of  defective  return  of 
service  where  the  return  could  have  been  amended 
so  as  truthfully  to  show  good  service.92 

It  has  been  held  that  parties  to  litigation  are  en- 
titled to  actual  or  constructive  notice  of  every  step 
to  be  taken,  and,  if  anything  is  done  affecting  their 
rights  without  notice  and  they  apply  in  a  timely 
manner  for  redress,  the  trial  court  should  grant  it,93 


Service  held  proper,  precluding  relief 
111. — Groth     v.     Schueneman-Flynn's 
Logan  Square,  33  N.B.2d  914,  310 
IlLApp.  260. 

Mo.— State  ex  rel.  Fabrico  v.  Trim- 
ble, 274  S.W.  712,  309  Mo.  415. 
N.D.— Beery   v.    Peterson,    225   N.W. 

798,  58  N.D.  273. 

Tex.— Pacific   Mut.   Life   Ins.   Co.  v. 
Williams,  15  S.W.  478,  79  Tex.  633. 
Wash.— Larson  v.  Zabroski,  152  P.2d 
154,    21  Wash.2d   572,   opinion  ad- 
hered to    155   P.2d   284,   21  Wash. 
2d  572. 
Substituted  defendant 

County  treasurer,  substituted  for 
predecessor  without  notice  to  treas- 
urer, was  held  entitled  to  have  de- 
fault set  aside  on  proper  motion. — 
Dewell  v.  Suddick,  232  N.W.  118,  211 
Iowa  1352. 
Want  of  actual  notice 

Judgment  against  foreign  corpora- 
tion, having  constructive  notice  of 
institution  of  suit  but  not  actual 
notice  until  after  rendition,  was 
properly  set  aside  under  statute  au- 
thorizing defense  after  judgment 
"upon  good  cause  shown"  but  pro- 
tecting bona  flde  purchasers. — Fos- 
ter v.  Allison  Corporation,  131  S.B. 
648,  191  N.C.  166,  44  A.L.R.  610. 

86.    Ariz.— Evans  v.  Hallas,  167  P.2d 
94. 

86.    Ark. — Furst  v.  Boatman,  122  S. 

W.2d  189,  197  Ark,  1175. 
Mich.— Foster   v.    Talbot,    241    N.W. 

141,  257  Mich.  489. 
Minn.— Whipple  v.  Mahler,   10  N.W. 

2d  771,  215  Minn.  578. 
N.Y.— Abo  v.  Panish,  239  N.Y.S.  669, 

135  Misc.  792. 
Pa. — Caromono    v.    Garman,    42    Pa. 

Dist.   &   Co.    96,   affirmed   23   A.2d 

92,  147  Pa,Super.  1. 
Tex. — Caldwell   Oil   Co.  v.  Hickman, 

Civ.App.,  270  S.W.  214. 
Wash.— Hurby  v.  Kwapil,  286  P.  664, 

156  Wash.  225. 
34  C.J.  p  271  note  66. 
Failure  to  return  original  »uminons 
with  proof  of  service 

The    tenure    of    the    person   who 


made  service  of  summons  on  corpo- 
rate defendant's  statutory  agent,  and 
who  made  return,  to  return  original 
summons  with  proof  of  service,  as 
required  hy  statute,  was  not  such 
an  irregularity  that  defendant  was 
entitled  to  have  execution  recalled 
and  judgment  vacated  pursuant  to 
statute. — Bourgeious  v.  Santa  Fe 
Trail  Stages,  95  P.2d  204,  43  N.M. 
453. 

87.  Ark. — Furst  v.  Boatman,  122  S. 
W.2d  189,  197  Ark.  1175. 

34  C.J.  p  272  note  67. 

88.  Ark.— O'Neal  v.  B.  F.   Goodrich 
Rubber    Co.,    162    S.W.2d    52,    204 
Ark.    371 — Furst   v.    Boatman,    122 
S.W.2d  189,  197  Ark.  1175— United 
Order  of  Good  Samaritans  v.  Roe- 
buck, 32  S.W.2d  435,  182  Ark.  731— 
Stewart  v.  California  Grape  Juice 
Corporation,    29    S.W.2d    1077,    181 
Ark.  1140— Lambie  v.  W.  T.  Raw- 
leigh  Co.,  14  S.W.2d  245,  178  Ark. 
1019— C.   A.   Blanton   Co.   v.   First 
Nat  Bank,  1  S.W.2d  558,  175  Ark. 
1107 — Karnes  v.   Ramey,   287   S.W. 
743,  172  Ark.  125— First  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Turner,  275  S.W.  703,  169  Ark. 
393— Fore    v.   Chenault,    271    S.W. 
704,  168  Ark.  747. 

Cal. — Tucker    v.    Tucker,    139    P.2d 

348,  59  Cal.App.2d  557. 
Mont — Skinner  v.   Carlysle  Oil  De- 
velopment   Co.,    2feO    P.    1038,    80 
Mont  464. 
Service  by  little  boy 

Where  decree  recited  that  sum- 
mons had  been  duly  served  on  de- 
fendant, sheriff's  return  recited  serv- 
ice on  defendant  defendant  admit- 
ted that  summons  was  brought  to 
him,  allegedly  by  a  little  boy,  and 
defendant  was  in  court  room  while 
case  was  being  tried,  chancery  court 
properly  refused  to  set  aside  decree 
entered  after  defendant's  default  on 
ground  that  defendant  was  not  prop- 
erly served. — Rockamore  v.  Pem- 
broke, 188  S.W.2d  616,  208  Ark.  995. 
Actual  notice  of  some,  but  not  alls 

codefendants 
Fact  that  one  of  many  bondhold- 

616 


ers,  against  whom  a  default  Judg- 
ment was  rendered  without  personal 
service,  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  lien 
for  materials  furnished  to  the  com- 
pany issuing  the  bonds,  had  no  ac- 
tual notice  of  the  action  in  time 
to  appear  and  defend,  did  not  en- 
title another  of  such  bondholders, 
who  had  actual  and  timely  notice, 
to  have  the  judgment  opened  under 
statute,  in  the  absence  of  any  motion 
on  behalf  of  the  former  or  anything 
in  the  latter^  motion  indicating  that 
it  was  made  for  or  on  the  former's 
behalf  or  because  of  any  authority 
or  assignment  from  him. — Clarke  v. 
Shoshoni  Lumber  Co.,  224  P.  845,  31 
Wyo.  205,  error  dismissed  48  S.Ct 
302.  296  U.S.  595,  72  L.Ed.  722. 

89.  Kan.— Suter  v.    Schultz,    7   P.2d 
55,  134  Kan.  538. 

90.  Cal.— James  v.  Hall,  264  P.  516,. 
88  Cal.App.  528. 

34  C.J.  p  272  note  69. 

91.  Kan. — Phcenix  Joint  Stock  Land 
Bank  v.   Eells,    148   P.2d    732,    158 
Kan.  530. 

92.  U.S. — Mandel    Bros.    v.    Victory 
Belt  Co.,   C.C.A.I11.,  15   F.2d  610. 

93.  Ariz.— Daniel  v.  Telfqrd,  75  P.2d 
373,  151  Ariz.  197— Faltis  v.  Cola- 
chis,    274   P.   776,   35   Ariz.   78. 

Tex. — Morris  v.  National  Cash  Reg- 
ister Co.,  Civ.App.,  44   S.W.2d  433, 
error  dismissed. 
Wyo.— Barrett  v.  Oakley,  278  P.  538, 

40  Wyo.  449. 
Alien  property  custodian 

Where  judgment  by  default 
against  a  French  banking  corpora- 
tion was  entered,  at  a  time  when  ex- 
ecutive order  authorizing  alien  prop- 
erty custodian  to  take  measures  in 
representing  alien  In  a  proceeding 
in  interest  of  United  States  was  en- 
tered without  notice  to  custodian 
who  was  entitled  under  executive  or- 
der to  opportunity  of  contesting  the 
action  on  being  appointed  corpora- 
tion's representative,  judgment  was 
vacated  on  custodian's  motion. — 
Metzger  v.  Credit  Industrial  D' Alsace 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


334 


and  this  is  particularly  true  where  a  party  failed  to 
receive  a  notice  to  which  he  was  entitled  by  estab- 
lished custom94  or  rule  of  court;95  and  a  default 
judgment  has  been  opened  where  defendant  ten- 
dered a  good  defense  and  defendant's  counsel  was 
absent  from  court  because  he  unwarrantedly  relied 
on  the  clerk  of  the  court  or  opposing  counsel  to 
give  him  timely  notice  of  the  trial  day.96  On  the 
other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that,  where  a  party  has 
once  been  properly  served  with  proper  process,  he 
is  in  court  for  every  purpose  connected  with  the 
action,  and  cannot  have  the  judgment  vacated  for 
the  failure  to  notify  him  of  some  intermediate  step 
in  the  case;97  and,  where  it  is  the  duty  of  a  party 
and  his  counsel  to  know  when  the  case  will  be  called 
for  trial,  it  is  no  ground  for  setting  aside  a  default 
judgment  that  neither  was  notified  of  the  time  the 
case  was  set  for  trial,98  or  that  neither  had  any 
notice  or  knowledge  that  a  term  of  court  would  be 
held  or  was  being  held  on  the  date  on  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered.99  So,  in  the  absence  of 


statute  requiring  the  clerk  of  the  court  to  notify 
parties  or  attorneys  as  to  the  day  on  which  a  par- 
ticular case  is  set  for  trial,  a  party  who  relies  on 
the-  clerk  so  to  notify  him  acts  at  his  peril,1  and 
failure  of  the  clerk  to  give  him  such  notice  does 
not  require  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  taken  in  his 
absence2  even,  it  has  been  held,  if  the  clerk  prom- 
ised to  do  so.8  It  is  not  error  to  refuse  to  set  aside 
a  default  judgment  for  failure  to  notify  defendant 
of  the  setting  of  the  case  after  the  filing  of  a  for- 
mal answer  where  the  answer  expressly  stated  that 
defendant  disclaimed  interest  in,  or  responsibility 
for,  the  suit.4 

(4)  Unauthorized,  Inadvertent,  Improvident, 
or  Premature  Entry 

A  default  judgment  may  be  set  aside  where  entry 
thereof  was  unauthorized,  Inadvertent,  improvident,  or 
premature. 

A  default  judgment  may  be  set  aside  where  it  was 
entered  by  the  clerk  without  any  authority  therefor,6 


Et    De    Lorraine,    44    N.T.S.2d    575, 

181  Misc.  75. 

Hearing1  set  on  condition  of  notice 

Where  hearing*  was  set  on  condi- 
tion that  attorney  for  plaintiff  no- 
tify attorneys  for  defendants,  find- 
ing- that  one  of  the  attorneys  rep- 
resenting1 defendants  was  notified 
and  that  through  some  oversight, 
lapse  of  memory,  or  misunderstand- 
ing, he  failed  to  notify  defendants 
and  their  other  attorneys,  was  in- 
sufficient to  warrant  the  conclusion 
that  they  had  notice  of  time  and 
place  of  hearing,  and  hence  Judg- 
ment entered  in  their  absence  should 
be  set  aside. — Everett  v.  Johnson,  14 
S.B.2d  520.  219  N.C.  540. 
Failure  to  serve  counterclaim 

In  view  of  statute,  where  defend- 
ant's answer  containing  counterclaim 
was  not  served  on  plaintiff,  and  no 
answer,  demurrer,  or  reply  was  filed 
by  plaintiff,  court  properly  set  aside 
judgment  entered  by  default  and  in- 
quiry on  defendant's  counterclaim. — 
Williams  Fulgham  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Welch,  148  S.E.  250,  197  N.C.  249. 

94.  Colo. — Drinkard  v.  Spencer,  211 
P.  379,  72  Colo.  396. 

Fla.— Segel    v.    Staiber,    144   So.   875, 

106  Fla.  946. 
Iowa. — Lunt  v.  Van  Gorden,  281  N. 

W.  743,  225  Iowa  1120. 

95.  U.S. — Marion  County  Court,  W. 
Va.,    v.   Ridge,   C.C.A.W.Va.,   13   F. 
2d  969. 

111. — Marland  Refining  Co.  v.  Lewis, 

264  Ill.App.   163. 
Utah. — Okerlund  v.  Robinson,  281  P. 

200,  74  Utah  602. 
34  C.J.  p  423  note  34   [a]    (1). 

Judgment  taken,  laomediately  alt- 
er overruling'  demurrer  and  in  vio- 


lation of  a  rule  requiring  notice  and 

time  to  answer  is  properly  vacated 

on  that  ground. 

Cal. — Harris  v.  Minnesota  Inv.  Co., 
265  P.  306,  89  CaLApp.  396. 

Philippine. — FresseH  v.  Agustin,  8 
Philippine  529. 

93.  N.J.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Stone- 
ley,  160  A.  764,  10  N.J.Misc.  785. 

97.  Ark.— Hill  v.   Teague,   108   S.W. 
2d  889,  194  Ark.  552. 

N.H. — Lewellyn  v.  Follansbee,  47  A. 

2d  572. 
Tex. — Grand    United    Order    of    Odd 

Fellows    v.    Wright,    Civ.App.,    76 

S.W.2d  1073— Oldham  v.  Heatherly, 

Civ.App.,  17  S.W.2d  113. 
34  C.J.  p  272  note  70. 
Failure  of  counsel  to  disclose  loca- 
tion 

Where  defendant  was  kept  in  court 
by  adjournments  and  files  did  not 
disclose  location  of  defendant's  coun- 
sel, refusal  to  set  aside  judgment 
taken  without  notice  was  not  abuse 
of  discretion.— O'Neill  v.  Hendrlck- 
son,  147  A,  721,  7  N.J.Misc.  1022. 
Hearing  of  demurrer 

In  absence  of  fraud  or  mistake, 
it  is  not  ground  to  vacate  default 
that  defendant  or  attorneys  had  no 
notice  of  hearing  of  demurrer,  and 
granting  time  to  further  plead  after 
overruling  it,  after  which  judgment 
was  rendered. — Graham  Production 
Co.  v.  Western  Drilling  Co.,  251  P. 
1004,  123  Okl.  79. 

98.  Okl. — MacDonnell    v.    Maiers,    3 
P.2d    681,    152    Okl.    244— Green    v. 
James,   296  P.   743,   147  Okl.   273— 
Wilson   v.    Porter,    221   P.    713,    94 
Okl.  259. 

Duty  of  party  to  know  when  case 
will  be  called  for  trial  see  infra 

617 


subdivision  n  (5)  (b)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

Duty  of  counsel  to  know  when  case 
will  be  called  for  trial  see  infra 
subdivision  n  (6)  (b)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

Mistake  as  to  time  or  place  of  hear- 
ing or  trial  as  ground  for  open- 
ing or  vacating  default  Judgment 
see  infra  subdivision  n  (2)  (c)  of 
this  section. 

99.  Ala. — McCord  v.  Harrison  & 
Stringer,  93  So.  428,  207  Ala.  480. 

1.  Okl.— Colley  v.  Sapp,  216  P.  454, 
90  Okl.  139. 

2.  Okl. — Colley  v.  Sapp,  supra. 

3.  Okl. — Colley  v.   Sapp,   supra. 
Inaccuracy  of  information  given  by, 

or  reliance  on  statements  of,  judge 
or  clerk  of  court  as  ground  for 
opening  default  judgment  see  In- 
fra subdivision  e  of  this  section. 

4.  Tex. — University        Development 
Co.   v.  Wolf,    Civ.App.,    93    S.W.2d 
1187. 

5.  Ala. — Ex  parte   Anderson,    4   So. 
2d  420,  242  Ala.  31. 

Cal.— Baird  v.  Smith,  14  P.2d  749, 
216  Cal.  408 — Crofton  v.  Younff, 
119  P.2d  1003,  48  Cal.App.2d  452. 

Fla.— Albert  M.  Travis  Co.  v.  At- 
lantio  Coast  Line  R.  Co.,  136  So. 
884,  102  Fla.  1117,  rehearing  de- 
nied 102  Fla.  1117,  139  So.  141. 

N.T.— Sobel  v.  Sobel,  4  N.T.S.2d  194, 
254  App.Div.  203,  reargument  de- 
nied 6  N.T.S.2d  328,  254  App.Div. 
836. 

N.C.— Cook  v.  Bradsher,  12  S.B.2d 
690,  219  N.C.  10— Cleggr  v.  Canady, 
195  S.E.  770,  213  N.C.  258. 

Wyo. — Kimbel  v.  Osborne,  156  P.2d 
279. 

34  C.J.  p  294  note  86. 


334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


as  where  default  was  improperly  entered  for  fail- 
ure of  plaintiff  to  answer  a  cross  complaint  which 
under  the  circumstances  was  unnecessary.  6  Also 
a  judgment  entered  contrary  to  the  course  of  the 
court  by  inadvertence,  improvidence,  mistake,  or  the 
like  may  be  set  aside.7  A  judgment  may  be  set  aside 
whether  there  was  a  total  lack  of  authority  to  en- 
ter any  judgment  or  only  lack  of  authority  to  en- 
ter a  particular  judgment,  when  the  entry  of  such 
a  judgment  was  premature,8  as  where  it  was  en- 
tered before  expiration  of  the  time  for  the  filing  of 
an  answer,9  before  expiration' of  a  continuance 
granted  by  the  trial  judge,10  pending  an  applica- 


tion for  a  change  of  venue,11  prior  to  the  day  on 
which  the  cause  was  docketed  for  trial,12  or  prior 
to  the  date  reserved  for  decision  on  a  demurrer.13 
A  default  judgment  erroneously  rendered  where 
defendant  was  not  in  default  may  be  vacated.14 

c.  Fraud 

A   default   judgment    may   be  vacated   for   extrinsic 
and  collateral  fraud   in  obtaining  the  judgment. 

A  default  judgment,  like  any  other,  may  be  va- 
cated for  fraud,15  including  legal  fraud  practiced 
by  the  prevailing  parties  without  it  being  inten- 
tional,16 according  to  the  decisions  on  the  ques- 


Unauthorized,  inadvertent,  improvi- 
dent, or  premature  entry  as  ground 
for  setting  aside  judgments  gen- 
erally see  supra  §  278. 

6.  Cal. — Crofton   v.    Young,    119    P. 
2d  1003,   48  Cal.App.2d  452. 

7.  Cal. — Harris    v.    Minnesota    Inv. 
Co.,    265    P.    306,    89    CaLApp.    396. 

N.M.— Ealy  v.  McGahen,  21  P.2d  84, 

87  N.M.  246. 
84  C.J.  p  294  note  87. 
Inadvertence    in    permitting   default 
as  ground  for  relief  see  infra  sub- 
division n  (4)  of  this  section. 
Adoption  of  pleadings 

In  partition  suit,  where,  at  time 
of  default  by  one  defendant,  mortga- 
gee defendant  had  not  answered  but 
answer  and  cross-petition  of  other 
defendants,  which  were  subsequent- 
ly adopted  by  defaulting  defendant 
were  on  file,  and  allegations  of  such 
pleadings,  if  true,  would  prevent 
partition  and  invalidate  mortgagee's 
lien  against  defaulting  defendant's 
interest,  court  did  not  abuse  discre- 
tion in  setting  aside  default. — Red- 
ding v.  Redding,  284  N.W.  167,  226 
Iowa  327. 
a  U.S.— In  re  Nelson,  D.CJdaho,  36 

F.2d  979. 
111. — Phegley  v.   Kroger    Grocery   & 

Baking  Co.,   281  IlLApp.  544. 
Mont. — Paramount    Publix    Corpora- 
tion  v.    Boucher,   19   P.2d   223,    93 
Mont.  340. 
Ohio.— Ramsey  v.  Holland,  172  N.E. 

411,  35  Ohio  App.  199. 
34  C.J.  p  294  note  88,  p  295  notes  90, 

91. 

9.    Ariz. — Michener  v.  Standard  Ac- 
cident   Ins.    Co.,    47    P.2d    438,    46 
Ariz.  66. 
Cal. — Harris   v.   Minnesota  Inv.  Co., 

265  P.  306,  89  Cal.App.  396. 
Mo, — Poindexter   v.    Marshall,   App., 

193  S.W.2d  622. 

Mont — Paramount  Publix  Corpora- 
tion v.  Boucher,  19  P.2d  223,  93 
Mont.  340. 

N.J. — Gloucester  City  Trust  Co.  v. 
Goodfellow,  3  A.2d  661,  121  N.J. 
Law  546 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Westfleld  Trust  Co.  v.  Court  of 
Common  Pleas  of  Morris  County, 
178  A.  546,  549,  115  N.J. Law  86, 


affirmed   183  A.   165,   116  N.J.Law 

191. 

N.M. — Dallam  County  Bank  v.  Burn- 
side,  249  P.  109,  31  N.M.  537. 
N.D.— Kaull    v.    Johnson,    218    N.W. 

606,  56  N.D.  563. 
Tex. — Andrus    v.    Andrus,    Civ.App., 

168  S.W.2d  891. 
34  C.J.  p  294  note  89. 
Nonappearanoe  within,  time  for  an- 
swer 

Fact  that  defendant  did  not  ap- 
pear before  expiration  of  time  al- 
lowed to  answer  did  not  preclude 
her  from  making  direct  attack  on 
prematurely  entered  default  judg- 
ment by  timely  motion  to  vacate 
judgment — Netland  v.  Baughman, 
Colo.,  162  P.2d  601. 
10.  Tenn.— Fidelity-Phenix  Fire 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Oliver.  152  S.W.2d  254, 

25  Tenn.App.  114. 
After    order    granting    continuance 

was  set  aside  without  notice 
111. — Coen-Berkson  &  Co.  v.  Gordon, 

283  IlLApp.  28. 

11.'  Mo. — Carpenter  v.  Alton  R.  Co., 

App.,  148  S.W.2d  68. 
Flea  of  privilege 

Refusal  to  set  aside  default  was 
held  abuse  of  discretion,  in  view  of 
moving  party's  reliance  on  plea  of 
privilege  to  be  sued  in  county  of  his 
residence,  not*  properly  disposed  of 
before  trial — Sun  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Huttig  Sash  &  Door  Co.,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  36  S.W.2d  561 — Federal  ^Sup- 
ply Co.  v.  Bailey,  Tex.Civ.App.^  297 
S.W.  235. 

12.  Ky. — Clements  v.  Kell,  39  S.W. 
2d  663,  239  Ky.  396. 

13.  Ariz. — Garner  v.  Towler,  218  P. 
390,  25  Ariz.  101. 

14.  111.— Harris  v.  Juenger,  11  N.B. 
2d  929,  367  I1L  478. 

OkL — Joplin  Furniture  Co.  v.  Bank 
of  Picher,  8  P.2d  173,  151  Okl.  158. 

15.  Md.— Martin  v.  Long,  120  A.  875, 
142  Md.  348. 

N.Y.— Mills  v.  Nedza,  227  N.T.S.  156, 
222  App.Div.  615. 

Tex.— Halbrook  v.  Quinn,  Civ.App.. 
286  S.W.  954,  certified  questions 
dismissed  Quinn  v.  Halbrook,  285 ' 

618 


S.W.  1079,  115  Tex.  513— Marsh  v. 
Tiller,   Civ.App.,    279    S.W.    283. 
Wash. — Bishop   v.   Illman,    126    P.2d 
582,   14  Wash.2d  13 — State  v.   Su- 
perior Court  for  Thurston  County, 
271  P.  87,  149  Wash.  443. 
34  OJ.  p-278  note  89. 
Fraud    or    collusion   as    ground    for 
vacating  Judgments  generally  see 
supra  §  269. 
Adverse  interest  of  parties 

Judgment  obtained  against  corpo- 
ration by  default  in  action  wherein 
four  of  five  directors  had  adverse 
interest  constituted  extrinsic  fraud 
or  collusion,  warranting  vacation  of 
Judgment  at  instance  of  stockholder, 
where  directors'  interest  had  not 
been  disclosed  and  was  not  known 
to  the  court. — Kerr  v.  Southwest 
Fluorite  Co.,  294  P.  324,  35  N.M.  232. 
Collusion 

Where  there  was  some  proof  of 
an  understanding  or  collusive  agree- 
ment between  officers  of  Judgment 
debtor  and  judgment  creditor  where- 
by judgment  creditor's  judgment 
was  obtained,  opening  of  default 
judgment  and  permitting  answer  to 
be  filed  was  proper.— Adler  v.  Atlas 
Brick  Corporation,  11  N.T.S.2d  920, 
257  AppJMv.  876,  rehearing  denied 
14  N.T.S.2d  412,  257  App.Div.  1063, 
affirmed  27  N.R2d  434,  283  N.T.  64. 
Fraud  held  not  shown 
Ark. — Magnolia  Grocer  Co.  v.  Farrar, 
115  S.W.2d  1094,  195  Ark.  1069— 
Hill  v.  Teague,  108  S.W.2d  889,  194 
Ark.  552. 

16.    Okl.— Lane   v.   O'Brien,  49   P.2d 

171,  173  Okl.  475. 
Test 

Whether  statements  of  plaintiff's 
attorney  misled  and  induced  defend- 
ant to  omit  assertion  of  right  is 
test  whether  statements  amounted 
to  constructive  fraud  warranting 
setting  aside  default  judgment — Kir- 
by  v.  Hoeh,  21  P.2d  732,  94  Mont 
218. 

Undue    delay   in   bringing    case    to- 
trial 

Where  advantage  has  been  taken 
of  defendant  through  undue  delay  in 
bringing  a  case  to  trial,  a  Judgment 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  334 


tion,  as  well  as  intentional  or  deliberate  fraud.17 
The  authority  to  set  aside  judgments  for  this  cause 
is  limited  to  cases  where  the  fraud  complained  of 
was  practiced  in  the  very  act  of  obtaining  the 
judgment,  and  all  cases  of  fraud  which  might  have 
been  used  as  a  defense  to  defeat  the  action  are  ex- 
cluded; the  fraud  must  be  extrinsic  and  collateral 
to  the  matter  tried,  and  not  a  matter  which  was  po- 
tentially in  issue  in  the  action.18  The  mere  send- 
ing of  statements  by  plaintiff  to  defendant  after 
institution  of  the  suit  showing  that  the  amount  due 
was  different  and  substantially  less  than  that  sued 
for  does  not  amount  to  a  representation  that  a  judg- 
ment would  not  be  taken  for  the  amount  alleged  to 
be  due  in  the  petition.1? 

d.  Agreement  with,   or  Statement  by,  Party 
Taking  Default  or  His  Counsel 

It  Is  ground  for  vacating  a  default  judgment  that  It 
was  entered  In  violation  of  an  explicit  agreement  or 
promise  on  which  the  party  was  entitled  to  rely. 

A  default  which  arises  from  reliance  placed  by 
a  party  or  his  counsel  on  assurances  given  him  by 
the  opposing  party  or  counsel  is  excusable  within 


the  meaning  of  the  law.20  So,  where  there  is  an 
agreement  between  the  parties  or  their  counsel,  such 
as  an  agreement  that  the  case  should  be  continued, 
or  that  time  to  plead  should  be  extended,  or  that 
th  action  should  be  dismissed  as  the  result  of  a  com- 
promise or  settlement,  or  a  promise  of  a  party  that 
he  would  not  press  the  case  to  judgment,  or  a  prom- 
ise that  the  case  would  be  heard  at  a  time  mutually 
to  be  agreed  on,  or  other  agreement  in  violation  of 
which  one  party  without  notice  to  the  other  enters 
a  default,  or  secures  a  judgment  in  his  absence,  it  is 
good  ground  for  vacating  the  judgment.21  The 
agreement  or  promise  must  have  been  explicit,  how- 
ever, and  of  such  a  character  that  the  party  could 
rely  on  it  and  remain  inactive  without  being  thereby 
chargeable  with  negligence  or  lack  of  due  diligence 
in  guarding  his  own  interests.22 

An  oral  agreement,  not  communicated  to  the 
court,  is  entitled  to  little  favor,23  and  when  of  un- 
.  certain  and  indefinite  character  will  not  afford 
ground  for  vacation  of  a  judgment;24  but  relief 
may  be  granted  on  the  basis  of  an  oral  agreement 
satisfactorily  established,26  although  where  a  statute 


taken  against  him  in  his  absence 
should  be  set  aside  and  a  new  trial 
awarded. — Stansberry  v.  Dennison, 
158  S.E.  716,  110  W.Va.  470. 

17.  Okl.— Lane  v.   O'Brien,   49   P.2d 
171,  173  Okl.  475. 

34  C.J.  p  282  note  4. 

18.  Kan. — Irvine  v.  Eysenbach,  267 
P.  995,  126  Kan.  362. 

N.T.— Schlegel  v.  Wagner,  29  N.Y.S. 

2d  389. 

34  CJ.  p  280  note  96. 
Delay    in    giving    notice    of   taking 
judgment 

The  alleged  fact  that  no  notice 
was  given  to  defendants  of  the  tak- 
ing of  a  default  judgment  until  it 
was  too  late  to  have  default  judg- 
ment set  aside  on  motion  was  not 
ground  for  the  setting  aside  of  the 
default  judgment.— Nicholson  v. 
Thomas,  127  S.W.2d  155,  277  Ky. 
760. 
Pailuxe  to  disclose  facts  to  court 

The  alleged  fact  that  assignee  of 
subject  matter  of  suit  did  not  make 
disclosure  of  facts  and  status  of 
case  to  the  trial  court  would  not  au- 
thorize the  setting  aside  of  a  default 
judgment. — Nicholson  v.  Thomas,  127 
S.W.2d  155,  277  Ky.  760. 

False  allegations  in,  pleadings  are 
not  such  fraud  as  will  justify  or  re- 
quire vacation  of  the  judgment — 
Irvine  v.  Eysenbach,  267  P.  995,  126 
Kan.  362—34  C.J.  p  280  note  96  [c]. 

19.  Ga,— Courier-Herald  Pub.  Co.  v. 
Georgian  Co.,  128  S.E.  744,  160  Ga, 
583. 

20.  Gal.— Ackerman  v.  Beach,  285  P. 


895,  104  CaLApp.  299,  followed  in 
285  P.  896,  104  CaLApp.  788. 

Colo. — Mountain  States  Silver  Min- 
ing Co.  v.  Hukill,  244  P.  605,  79 
Colo.  128. 

Conn.— Crane  v.  Loomis,  25  A.2d  650, 
128  Conn.  697. 

Ky. — Hackney  v.  Charles,  295  S.W. 
869,  220  Ky.  574. 

N.Y.— Linden  v.  West  21st  Street 
Holding  Corporation,  12  N.T.S.2d 
77,  257  App.Div.  844— Jacoby  v. 
Jacoby,  280  N.T.S.  611.  245  App. 
Div.  763. 

N.C.— Edwards  v.  Butler,  119  S.E.  7, 
186  N.a  200. 

Or. — Leonard  v.  Bennett,  106  P.2d 
542,  165  Or.  157. 

S.D.—Jones  v.  Johnson,  222  N.W. 
688,  54  S.D.  149. 

Tex. — Metropolitan  Casualty  Ins.  Co. 
of  New  York  v.  City  of  Junction, 
Civ.App.,  55  S.W.2d  655 — Dickinson 
v.  Reeder,  Civ.App.,  22  S.W.2d  725 
—Lewis  v.  Bell,  Civ.App.,  12  S.W. 
2d  237 — Trigg  v.  Gray,  Civ.App., 
288  S.W.  1098— Marsh  v.  Tiller, 
Civ.App.,  279  S.W.  283. 

Wash. — Melosh  v.  Graham,  210  P. 
667,  122  Wash.  299. 

21.  Ariz. — Bartholomew  v.  Ruffner, 
273  P.  986,  35  Ariz.  12. 

Ark,— Wrenn  v.  Manufacturers'  Fur- 
niture Co.,  289  S.W.  769,  172  Ark. 
599. 

Cal.— Waybright  V.  Anderson,  253  P. 
148,  200  Cal.  374— Taranto  v.  Dick, 
6  P.2d  334,  119  CaLApp,  161. 

Conn. — Crane  v.  Loomis,  25  A.2d  650, 
128  Conn.  697. 

Ga. — Landau  Bros.  v.  Towery,  179  S. 
E.  647,  51  Ga.App.  113. 

619 


Kan. — American  Nat.  Bank  v.  Mar- 
shall,' 253  P.  '214,  122  Kan.  793. 

Neb. — National  Co-op.  Hail  Ass'n  v. 
Doran  Bros.  238  N.W.  527,  121 
Neb.  746. 

N.J. — Geithner  v.  Paechiana,  150  A. 
240,  8  N.J.Misc.  384. 

Okl.— Welborn  v.  Whitney,  65  P.2d 
971,  179  Okl.  420— Sudik  v.  Sin- 
clair Oil  &  Gas  Co.,  44  P.2d  954, 
172  Okl.  334. 

Pa.— Welzel  v.  Link-Belt  Co.,  35  A. 
2d  596,  154  Pa.Super.  66. 

34  C.J.  p  285  note  16,  p  423  note  34 
[a]  (1). 

Violation  of  agreement  as  ground  for 
opening  or  vacating  judgments 
generally  see  supra  9  271. 

22.  Ky.— Harris  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
98  S.W.2d  468,  266  Ky.  174. 

N.Y. — Cusano    v.    Mitterloft,    298    N. 

Y.S.  870,  252  App.Div.  803. 
34  OJ.  p  286  note  17. 

Mere  correspondence  about  possi- 
ble settlement  was  held  not  to  ex- 
cuse default  in  pleading. — St.  Paul 
Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Freeman, 
260  P.  124,  80  Mont  266. 

23.  Iowa,— Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Mar- 
vill,   206  N.W.   37,   201  Iowa  614— 
Dixon  v.  Brophey,  29  Iowa  460. 

Mont. — St.  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Freeman,  260  P.  124,  80 
Mont.  266. 

24.  Iowa.— Holtz  v.  Sweet,  206  N.W. 
286. 

Mont— St.  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Freeman,  260  P.  124,  80 
Mont.  266. 

25.  Cal. — Waybright     v.     Anderson,, 
253  P.  148,  200  Cal.  374. 


334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Dr  rule  of  court  requires  agreements  of  the  charac- 
ter relied  on  to  be  reduced  to  writing  and  filed,  or 
communicated  to  the  court,  a  mere  oral  agreement 
of  the  parties  not  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  court 
will  not  be  sufficient  to  authorize  the  vacation  of  a 
judgment  taken  in  violation  of  its  terms.2^ 

Where  the  agreement  to  withhold  proceedings  on 
the  suit  is  terminated  or  expressly  withdrawn,  a 
default  judgment  subsequently  taken  will  not  be  va- 
cated.2? 

e.  Statement  or  Order  of  Judge  or  Clerk 

A  default  judgment  may  be  opened  If  It  Is  due  to 
the  inaccuracy  of  information  given  by,  or  reliance  on 
statements  of,  the  judge  or  clerk  of  court,  although  some 
cases  hold  that  even  official  assurances  will  not  relieve 
litigants  from  the  duty  of  exercising  vigilance  In  watch- 
ing the  progress  of  their  cases. 

Litigants  are  entitled  to  rely  on  statements  by  offi- 
cials charged  with  the  custody  and  control  of  pa- 
pers and  records  relating  to  judicial  proceedings  in 
which  they  are  interested,  and  about  which  informa- 
tion is  sought;  and  accordingly  a  judgment  by  de- 


fault will  be  opened  if  it  is  due  to  the  inaccuracy 
of  information  given  by,  or  reliance  on  statements 
of,  such  officials,28  such  as  a  judge29  or  the  clerk  of 
the  court,80  Accordingly  if  the  court  or  an  officer 
of  the  court  by  his  conduct  has  misled  parties  as  to 
the  time  cases  will  be  tried,  the  absence  of  such 
parties  may  be  excused,31  although  some  cases  hold 
that  even  official  assurances  will  not  relieve  liti- 
gants or  their  counsel  from  the  duty  of  exercising 
vigilance  in  watching  the  progress  of  their  cases.32 

f .  Defense  to  Action 

The  existence  of  a  complete  defense  available  to 
the  defendant  before  entry  of  a  default  judgment  is  not 
ground  for  opening  or  vacating  the  judgment,  although 
the  rule  is  otherwise  as  to  a  defense  which  arose  after 
the  default  or  of  which  the  defendant  was  Ignorant. 

A  default  judgment  regularly  entered  cannot  be 
opened  or  vacated  on  defendant's  motion  on  the 
ground  of  the  existence  of  a  complete  defense 
which  was  available  to  defendant  before  entry  of 
the  judgment,33  but  the  court  may  open  or  vacate 
the  judgment  to  give  the  defaulted  party  the  ad- 


Nib. — Howard  Stove  &  Furnace  Co. 

v.  Rudolf,  260  N.W.  189,  128  Neb. 

665. 
34  C.J.  p  286  note  20. 

23.  Colo.— Newland  v.  Frost,  263  P. 
715,  83  Colo.  207. 

Mont.— St  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Freeman,  260  P.  124,  80 
Mont  266. 

N.J. — O'Neill  v.  Hendrickson,  147  A. 
721,  7  N.J.Misc.  1022. 

Pa, — Planters  Nut  &  Chocolate  Co. 
v.  Brown-Murray  Co.,  193  A.  381, 
128  Pa.Super.  239 — Lucia  v.  Pru- 
dential Ins.  Co.  of  America,  173 
A.  441,  113  Pa.Super.  823. 

34  C.J.  p  286  note  18. 

27.    Iowa. — Iowa   Cord    Tire    Co.   v. 

Babbitt,    192   N/W.    431,    195    Iowa 

922. 
Tex. — Jackson  v.  Manning,  Civ.App., 

287  S.W.  1103. 

TTfcere  agreement  is  conditioned  on 
payment  of  stipulated  sum  in  settle- 
ment of  the  claim  against  defend- 
ant, which  defendant  on  reasonable 
demand  fails  to  pay  notwithstand- 
ing notice  by  plaintiff  that  on  non- 
payment the  case  would  be  set  for 
trial,  defendant  is  not  Justified  in 
concluding  that  the  case  would  not 
be  tried  on  the  date  set,  and  the  cir- 
cumstances afford  no  ground  for  set- 
ting aside  a  default  judgment  taken 
on  that  date. — Walker  County  Fer- 
tilizer Co.  v.  Napier,  149  S.E.  705, 
40  Ga.App.  387. 

£3.  Del.— Corpus  Juris  cited  .  in 
Yerkes  v.  Dangle,  Super.,  33  A.2d 
406,  408. 

34  C.J.  p  299  note  28,  p  300  note  29. 


Mistake  as  to  time  for  appearance  or 
trial  as  ground  for.  vacating: 

Default  judgments  see  infra  sub- 
divisions n  (2)  (c),  n  (6)  (c)  of 
this  section. 

Judgments  generally  see  supra  8 
280. 

29.  Ky.— Cumberland  Fluorspar 
Corp.  v.  Waddell,  183   S.W.2d  641, 
298  Ky.  594. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gard- 
ner v.  Price,  25  So.2d  459,  461. 
34  C.J.  p  '299  note  28. 

30.  Ariz.— Beltran    v.    Roll,    7    P.2d 
248,  39  Ariz.  417. 

Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Yerkes 
v.  Dangle,  Super.,  33  A.2d  406,  408. 

Pa. — De  Kalb  v.  Rollison,  90  Pa. Su- 
per. 128 — Kozuhowski  &  Reuss  v. 
Snigel  &  Snigel,  90  Pa.Super.  75. 

34  C.J.  p  300  note  29. 

81.    Okl. — Carter  v.  Qrimmett,  213  P. 

732,  89  Okl.  37. 

34  C.J.  p  299  note  28,  p  300  note  29. 
Season  for  rule 

It  is  policy  of  law  to  afford  every 
litigant  fair  opportunity  to  present 
his  cause. — Hale  v.  Mclntosh,  243 
P.  157,  116  Okl.  40— -Hoffman  v.  Des- 
kins,  221  P.  37,  94  Okl.  117. 

32.    Cal. — Taecker   v.   Parker,    93    P. 

2d  197,  34  Oal.App.2d  143. 
111.— Blaha   v.    Turk,    12   NJS.2d   338, 

293  Ill.App.  626. 

N.C. — Gaster    v.    Thomas,    124    S.B. 

609,  188  N.C.  346. 
Okl. — Schuman    v.    Sternberg,    65    P. 

2d    410,    179    Okl.    115— Foster    v. 

State.  270  P.   84,   132  Okl.  256. 

620 


S.C.— Kerr  v.  Cleveland,  188  S.E.  S70, 
182  S.C.  29. 

34  C.J.  p  300  note  33. 

Diligence  required  of  suitors  gen- 
erally see  infra  subdivision  n  (5) 
(b)  of  this  section. 

Pacts  not  warranting  relief 

A  default  judgment  would  not  be 
set  aside  because  one  of  the  defend- 
ants had  asked  the  court  not  to  call 
the  matter  up  while  she  was  in  an- 
other city,  and  court  told  her  that 
.the  matter  would  not  be  set  before 
certain  date,  where  the  judgment 
was  not  rendered  until  that  date, 
and  defendant  did  not  leave  the  city 
at  the  time  she  had  specified. — Sabin 
v.  Sunset  Gardens  Co.,  85  P.2d  294, 
184  OkL  106. 

33.    Ariz. — Postal   Ben.    Ins.   Co.    Y. 

Johnson,  165  P.2d  173. 
N.M.— Ealy  v.  McGahen,  21  P.2d  84, 

37  N.M.  246. 
Ohio. — Rabb  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 

Cuyahoga    County,    173    N.E.    255, 

36  Ohio  App.  481. 
Okl.— -Woodruff  v.  Moore,  77  P.2d  62, 

182   Okl.   120— Boles  v.   MacLaren, 

4    P.2d    106,    106    Okl.    265— U.    S. 

Smelting   Co.    v.    McGuire,    253    P. 

79,  123  Okl.  2T2. 
Pa. — Planters  Nut  &  Chocolate   Co. 

v.  Brown-Murray  Co..   193  A.   381, 

128  Pa.Super.  239. 

34  C.J.  p  286  note  21-p  287  note  28. 
Defense    to    action    as    ground    for 

opening    or    vacating     judgments 

generally  see  supra  §  272. 
Existence  of  meritorious  defense  as 

requisite    to    opening  .or   vacating 

default  judgment  see  infra  8  336. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


334 


vantage  of  a  defense  which  arose  after  the  default84 
or  of  which  he  was  ignorant.3^ 

g.  Error  in  Law 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  authorizing  such  relief, 
a  default  judgment  ordinarily  cannot  be  vacated  by  the 
trial  court,  after  expiration  of  the  term  at  which  it  Is 
rendered,  on  the  sole  ground  that  it  Is  erroneous  In 
matter  of  law  not  going  to  the  jurisdiction. 

Unless,  as  shown  supra  subdivision  b  (1)  of  this 
section,  the  error  is  one  going  to  the  jurisdiction, 
a  default  judgment,  in  the  absence  of  statute  au- 
thorizing such  relief,  may  not  be  vacated  or  set 
aside  by  the  trial  court,  after  expiration  of  the 
term  at  which  it  is  rendered,  on  the  sole  ground 
that  it  is  erroneous  in  matter  of  law,36  the  remedy 
in  such  case  being  by  appeal.37  A  judgment  may, 
however,  be  vacated  when  it  improperly  exceeds  the 
relief  prayed  for,  or  is  rendered  for  an  amount  in 
excess  of  that  claimed  in  the  writ  or  declaration.38 


L  Error  or  Mistake  of  Fact 

Error  or  mistake  of  fact  going  to  the  validity  or 
regularity  of  the  judgment,  such  as  furnished  ground  for 
the  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  at  common  law,  is  ground 
for  opening  or  vacating  a  default  Judgment. 

Error  or  mistake  of  fact  going  to  the  validity  or 
regularity  of  the  judgment,  such  as  furnished 
ground  for  the  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  at  com- 
mon law,  is  ground  for  opening  or  vacating  a  de- 
fault judgment.39  Errors  in  fact  within  this  rule 
are  errors  in  material  matters,  prejudicial  to  the 
judgment  debtor,  and  which,  if  known,  would  have 
prevented  rendition  of  the  judgment,40  and  which 
do  not  appear  on  the  face  of  the  record.41 

i.  Objections  as  to  Parties 

A  default  judgment  may,   In  a  proper  case,  be  va- 
cated because  of  defects  or  objections  as  to  parties. 

A  default  judgment  may  be  vacated  as  to  one 
who  was  not  definitely  named  as  a  party  defendant 


34.  Pa.— First    Nat.    Bank   &   Trust 
Co.  of  Bethlehem  v.  Laubach,  5  A. 
2d  139,  333  Pa.  344. 

34  C.J.  p  288  note  32. 

35.  Pa.— First    Nat.   Bank   &   Trust 
Co.  of  Bethlehem  v.  Laubach,  su- 

.    pra. 

Ignorance  as  ground  for  excuse  for 
,    default    generally    see   Infra   sub- 
division k  of  this  section. 

$6.  Ark. — Magnolia  Grocery  Co.  v. 
Farrar,  115  S.W.2d  1094,  195  Ark. 
1069. 

Ind.— Colvert  v.  Colvert,  180  N.B. 
192,  95  Ind.App.  325. 

Ky. — Stratton  v.  Terstegge  Co.  v. 
Begley,  61  S.W.2d  287,  249  Ky.  632 
—Fowler  v.  Wiley,  33  S.W.2d  14, 
*  236  Ky.  313. 

Mass. — Moll  v.  Town  of  Wakefield, 
175  N.E.  81,  274  Mass.  505. 

N.M.— Ealy  v.  McGahen,  21  P.2d  84, 
37  N.M.  246. 

N.C.— Finger  v.  Smith,  133  S.E.  186, 
191  N.C.  818. 

Wash.— Hurley  v.  Wilson,  225  P. 
441,  129  Wash.  567. 

34  C.J.  p  289  note  42,  p  290  note  43. 

Error  of  law  as  ground  for  vacating 
judgment  generally  see  supra  8 
274. 

Mistake  as  ground  for  vacating  de- 
fault judgment  generally  see  infra 
subdivisions  n  (2),  (6)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

Want  or  insufficiency  of  evidence 

A  default  judgment  will  not  be  re- 
opened and  set  aside  because  evi- 
dence or  sufficient  legal  evidence  was 
not  introduced  as  a  basis  for  its  ren- 
dition.— Citizens'  Bank  v.  Brandau, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  466,  error  re- 
fused. 

37.  TIL— Seither  &  Cherry  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Education  of  District  No. 


15,  Town  of  La  Harpe,  283  IlLApp. 
392. 

N.C. — Wellons  v.  Lassiter,  157  S.B. 
434,  200  N.C.  474— Finger  v.  Smith, 
133  S.E.  186,  191  N.C.  818— Duffer 
v.  Brunson,  125  S.E.  619,  188  N.C. 
789. 

Right  of  appeal  from  default  judg- 
ment generally  see  Appeal  and 
Error  §  155. 

38.  Cal. — Pease  v.  City  of  San  Die- 
go, App.,  169  P.2d  973. 

Iowa.— Rayburn  v.  Maher,  288  N.W. 

136,  227  Iowa  274. 
Mo. — Boggess  v.  Jordan,  App.,  283  S. 

W.  57. 
N.C. — Simms  v.   Sampson,   20   S.E.2d 

654,    221    N.C.    379— Federal    Land 

Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Davis,  1  S.E. 

2d  350,  215  N.C.  100. 
Or, — Leonard   v.    Bennett,    106    P.2d 

542,  165  Or.  157. 
S.D. — Jones    v.    Johnson,    222    N.W. 

688,  54  S.D.  149. 
34  C.J.  p  290  note  46. 

39.  111.— Rapp   v.   Goerlitz,    40    N.E. 
2d  766,  first  case,  314  Ill.App.  191 
—Simon  v.  Balasic,  39  N.E.2d  685, 
313   Ill.App.   266— Katauski  v.   El- 
dridge   Coal  &  Coke  Co.,   255  .111. 
App.  41— Marquette  Nat  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Minneapolis  Fire  &  Marine 
Ins.  Co.,  233  IlLApp.  102. 

34  C.J.  p  290  notes  55,  57. 
Error  or  mistake  of  fact  as  ground 
for  opening  or  vacating  judgments 
generally  see  supra  §   275. 
Mistake  of  fact  generally  <as  ground 
for    opening    or   vacating    default 
judgment  see  infra  subdivision  n 
(2)  of  this  section. 
"Clerical  error" 

Clerk's  placing  ot  case,  pleadings 
in  which  were 'not  advanced  for  one 
year,  on  calendar  without  notice,  was 
"clerical  error"  authorizing  vacation 
of  judgment  dismissing  action,  for  | 

021. 


want  of  appearance  within  rule. — 
New  England  Furniture  &  Carpet  Co. 
v.  Willcuts,  D.C.Minn.,  55  F.2d  983. 

Ignorance  of  want  of  notice 

Where  court  was  unaware  at  time 
of  entering  default  and  judgment 
thereon  that  notice  of  such  proceed- 
ings had  not  been  served  on  defend- 
ant or  his  attorney,  court  properly 
set  the  judgment  aside  on  ground  of 
error  of  fact  unknown  to  the  court 
when  judgment  was  rendered. — Lusk 
v.  Bluhm,  53  N.E.2d  135,  321  IlLApp. 
349. 

40.  111. — Seither  &  Cherry  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Education  of  District  No, 
15,  Town  of  ,La  Harpe,  283  Ill.App. 
392— Katauski  v.  Eldrldge  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.,  255  IlLApp.  41 — Loew  v. 
Krauspe,  237  Ill.App.  441,  affirmed 
150  N.E.  683,  320  111.  244— Preci- 
sion Products  Co.  v,  Cady,  233  111. 
App.  77. 

34  C.J.  p  290  note  59. 

Dismissal  of  other  defendant* 
without  notice  was  not  an  error  of 
fact  within  text  rule.— McNulty  v. 
White,  248  Ill.App.  572. 

Pendency  of  another  action 

Where  at  time  plaintiff  obtained 
default  judgment  for  purchase  price 
of  a  fur  coat,  there  was  withheld 
from  the  court  the  information  that 
purchaser's  action  in  small  claims 
court  against  plaintiff  to  recover 
payments  made  on  the  coat  had  been 
continued  that  same  day,  setting 
aside  the  default  judgment  even  aft- 
er expiration  of  the  term  was  prop- 
er.—Marvin's  Credit  v.  Kitching,  D. 
C.Mun.App.,  34  A,2d  866. 

41.'  111. — Sherman  &  Ellis  v.  Journal 
of  Commerce  and  Commercial  Bul- 
letin, 259  IlLApp.  453. 


§  334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


in  the  complaint,42  particularly  where  the  complaint 
did  not  allege  that  plaintiffs  were  ignorant  of  the 
name  of  such  defendant  and  plaintiffs  did  not  seek 
before  entry  of  default  judgment  to  amend  the 
complaint  to  show  that  movant  was  the  party  sued 
as  "J°nn  Doe/*43  Inasmuch  as  nonjoinder  of  a  co- 
maker or  surety  is  a  curable  defect,  and  inasmuch 
as  in  a  suit  against  joint  or  joint  and  several  ob- 
ligors, where  some  are  not  served,  the  judgment  is 
good  as  against  those  served,  there  is  no  error  in 
overruling  a  motion  to  set  aside  the  judgment  on  al- 
legation and  proof  of  such  defects.44 

j.  Objections  as  to  Pleadings 

A  default  Judgment  will  not  be  set  aside  because  of 
mere  defects  or  Insufficiency  In  the  pleadings,  although 
failure  of  the  declaration  or  complaint  to  state  a  cause 
of  action  Is  ground  for  vacating  a  default  Judgment. 

A  default  judgment  will  not  be  set  aside  because 
of  defects  or  insufficiency  in  the  pleadings,45  espe- 
cially where  the  alleged  fault  is  amendable46  or 
the  facts  alleged  are  sufficient  to  challenge  the  at- 
tention of  the  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  sub- 


ject matter  and  parties.47  It  has  been  held,  howev- 
er, that  failure  of  the  declaration  or  complaint  to 
state  a  cause  of  action  is  ground  for  vacating  a  de- 
fault judgment48  A  default  judgment  rendered  on 
a  petition  which  shows  on  its  face  that  the  alleged 
cause  of  action  was  barred  by  the  statute  of  limi- 
tations may,  it  has  been  held,  be  set  aside  for  ir- 
regularity;49 but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  view  has 
been  taken  that  no  ground  to  set  aside  the  judgment 
exists  in  such  case,  since  such  a  petition  does  not 
fail  to  set  out  a  cause  of  action.50 

Default  in  service.  Plaintiff  suing  defendant  in- 
dividually and  as  executor,  but  not  serving  the  com- 
plaint in  both  actions,  may  have  his  default  opened 
and  the  actions  consolidated.51 

k.  Ignorance  or  Illiteracy 

A  party's  ignorance  or  illiteracy,  standing  alone.  Is 
no  excuse  for  a  default,  although  such  Ignorance  In 
connection  with  other  circumstances  may  move  the  court, 
In  the  exercise  of  Its  discretion,  to  vacate  a  default  Judg- 
ment. 

Standing  alone,  ignorance,52  such  as  ignorance 


42.  cal.— Flores  v.  Smith,  117  P.2d 
712,    47   Cal.App.2d    253. 

34  C.J.  p  292  note  63. 

Objection  as  to  parties  as  basis  for 

vacating  judgments   generally  see 

supra  §  276. 

43.  Cal. — Flores  v.  Smith,  supra. 

44.  Ga. — Henderson  v.  Ellarbee,  181 
S.E.  524,  35  Ga.App.  5. 

46.  Qa, — Burch  v.  Woftord-Terrell 
Co.,  184  S.E.  419,  52  Ga.App.  685. 

Ind.T.— Merrill  v.  Martin,  64  S.W. 
539,  3  Ind.T.  571. 

N.C.— Hood  ex  rel.  Citizens  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Stewart,  184  SJE.  36, 
209  N.C.  424. 

34  C.J.  p  293  note  76. 

Setting  aside  judgments  because  of 
defects  or  insufficiency  in  plead- 
ings generally  see  supra  §  277. 

46.  Ga. — Henderson  v.  Ellarbee,  131 
S.E.  524,  35  Ga.App.  «. 

34  CJT.  p  293  note  77. 

47.  Wyo. — James  v.  Lederer-Strauss 
&  Co.,  233  P.  137,  32  Wyo.  377. 

Petition  stating  prima  facie  cause  of 

action 

In  motion  to  vacate  default  judg- 
ment after  expiration  of  term  at 
which  judgment  was  rendered,  de- 
fendant cannot  question  sufficiency 
of  petition,  allegations  of  which 
state  prima  facie  cause  of  action. — 
Royse  v.  Grage,  28  P.2d  732,  138 
Kan.  779. 

48.  Ga.— Tolbert  v.  Tolbert,  154  S.E. 
655,  41  Ga.App.  737. 

Ill,— Baxter  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  35  N.E.2d  563,  310  IlLApp. 
616. 


Minn.— Pilney  v.  Punk,  3  N.W.2d  792, 
212  Minn.  398. 

Pa. — Borough  of  Wilkinsburg  v. 
School  Dist  of  Borough  of  Wil- 
kinsburg, 148  A.  77,  298  Pa.  193— 
Waber  v.  Schaffhauser,  34  PaJDist. 
&  Co.  348. 

34  C.J.  p  293  note  83. 

There  in  a  difference  between  a 
defective  statement  of  a  good  cause 
of  action  and  a  statement  of  no 
cause  of  action  where  the  complaint 
is  wholly  insufficient  to  make  out 
a  cause  of  action.  A  judgment  by 
default  on  the  former  is  erroneous 
and  must  be  appealed  from;  the 
latter  is  irregular  and  can  be  set 
aside  within  a  reasonable  time  where 
merit  is  shown  and  there  is  no  lach- 
es.— Hood  ex  rel.  Citizens  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Stewart,  184  S.E.  36, 
209  N.C.  424. 

Failure  to  file  exhibits 

Where  the  basis  of  plaintiff's  ac- 
tion consisted  of  two  exhibits  said 
to  have  been  filed  therewith,  and  his 
petition  did  not  purport  to  copy  or 
use  the  language  of  either  one  of 
those  exhibits,  and  plaintiff  had 
never  filed  either  one  of  them,  and 
it  appeared  that  attorney  for  defend- 
ants moved  the  court  to  require 
plaintiff  to  file  with  his  petition  the 
exhibits  referred  to  therein,  the 
court  abused  its  discretion  in  over- 
ruling motion  to  set  aside  default 
judgment — Miller  v.  Sachs,  258  S.W. 
84,  201  Ky.  630. 

Default  Judgment  for  want  of  affi- 
davit of  defense  will  be  opened  if 
plaintiff's  statement  was  not  suffi- 
cient to  call  for  such  affidavit — 
Bichey  v.  Gibboney,  34  A.2d  913,  154 

622 


Pa. Super.  1 — Nikulnikoff  v.  Ortho- 
dox Russian  Church  of  St  Andrew, 
Inc.,  97  Pa. Super.  291 — Cadwallader 
v.  Firestone,  Pa.Com.Pl.,  7  Fay.LuJ. 
259. 

Default  Judgment  properly  set  aside 
A  default  judgment  against  indi- 
vidual defendants  doing  business  as 
association,  not  named  in  caption  of 
summons  and  complaint,  or  charged 
in  complaint,  as  defendant,  was 
properly  set  aside  as  against  con- 
tention that  lack  of  partnership  or 
common  name  in  such  caption  could 
not  nullify  judgment,  as  attack  on 
judgment  was  based  on  entire  ab- 
sence of  material  allegations  in  body 
of  complaint,  not  merely  words  in 
caption. — Burns  v.  Downs,  108  P.2d 
953,  42  Cal.App.2d  322. 

49.  Okl. — Nordman  v.  School  Dist. 
No.  32  of  Choctaw  County,  121  P, 
2d  290,  190  Okl.  135. 

Irregularity  as  ground  for  vacating 
default  judgment  generally  see  su- 
pra subdivision  b  (2)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

5<K  Ga. — Burch  v.  Wofford-Terrell 
Co.,  184  S.E.  419,  52  Ga,App.  685. 

51.  N.T. — Von  Wilmowsky  v.   Prin- 
dle,    234    N.T.S.    15,    225    App.Div. 
594. 

52.  Ariz. — Daly  v.  Okamura,  213  P. 
389,  25  Ariz.  50. 

N.J.— Nutley  Finance  Co.  v.  De  Fed- 

ericis,  150  A.  241,  8  N.J.Misc.  382. 
S.D.— Languein  v.   Olson,    227   N.W. 

869,  56  S.D.  1. 
Ignorance  as  ground  for  vacation  of 

judgments   generally  see  supra   9 

280. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  334 


of  the  law53  or  rules  of  court,54  is  not  a  sufficient 
excuse  for  failure  to  plead  or  for  a  default.  So  the 
illiteracy  of  a  defendant,  or  ignorance  of  the  Eng- 
lish language,  of  the  course  of  judicial  procedure, 
or  of  his  rights  and  duties,  will  furnish  no  excuse 
for  failing  to  defend  the  action,  or  justify  the  va- 
cation of  the  judgment,  where  he  at  least  knew 
that  he  had  been  sued,  and  neglected  to  ask  infor- 
mation or  advice  from  others.55  Where,  however, 
defendant  has  failed  to  answer  because  of  ignorance 
of  the  law,  and  it  is  properly  shown  that  he  has  a 
meritorious  defense,  and  that  no  harm  has  resulted 
or  will  result,  the  default  judgment  may,  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  court,  be  vacated.56 

I.  Absence  of  Party  or  Counsel 

The  mere  un excused  absence  of  SL  party  or  his  coun- 


sel from  the  trial  Is  not  ground  for  opening  or  setting 
aside  a  default  judgment,  although  such  relief  may  be 
granted  on  a  showing  of  sufficient  excuse  for  the  ab- 
sence. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise,57 
the  mere  fact  that  a  party  was  absent  from  the 
trial  is  no  cause  for  opening  or  setting  aside  a  de- 
fault judgment  where  his  absence  is  not  excused  or 
shown  to  have  been  unavoidable.58  Also  the  mere 
absence  of  one's  attorney  at  the  time  of  the  trial 
is  no  cause  for  opening  or  setting  aside  a  default 
judgment,5^  and  relief  will  not  be  granted  for  this 
reason  unless  counsel  was  prevented  from  appear- 
ing by  accident,  mistake,  or  other  reasonable 
cause.60  It  has  been  considered  a  sufficient  excuse 
that  the  absent  attorney  was  engaged  at  the  time 
in  trying  a  case  in  another  court,61  or  that  he  was 


63.  Ariz. — Daly  v,  Okamura,  213  P. 
3S9,  25  Ariz.   50. 

Cal.— Williams  v.  McQueen,  265  P. 
339,  89  Cal.App.  659. 

Minn. — Application  of  Bonley,  6  N. 
W.2d  245,  213  Minn.  214. 

Mo.— Reuck  v.  Strickland,  12  S.W.2d 
764,  222  Mo.App.  1171. 

Pa, — Commonwealth  v.  Dr.  Crandall's 
Health  School,  Com.Pl.,  51  Dauph. 
Co.  333. 

S.D.— Languein  v.  Olson,  227  N.W. 
369,  6S  S.D.  1. 

Attorney's  ignorance  of  law  as  ex- 
cuse for  default  see  infra  subdivi- 
sion n  (6)  (d)  of  this  section. 

64.  Mo.— Reuck  v.  Strickland,  12  S. 
W.2d  764,   222  Mo.App.   1171. 

55.  Ariz. — Daly  v.  Okamura,  213  P. 
389,  25  Ariz.  50. 

S.D. — Languein   v.    Olson,    227    N.W. 

369,  56  S.D.  1. 
34  C.J.  p  301  note  44. 

56.  Mo.— Reuck  v.  Strickland,  12  S. 
W.2d  764,  222  Mo.App.  1171. 

.  34  C.J.  p  301  notes  45,  46. 

Discretion  of  court  generally  see  In- 
fra §  337. 

Existence  of  defense  of  which  de- 
faulted party  was  ignorant  as 
ground  for  opening  judgment  see 
supra  subdivision  f  of  this  section. 

57.  Ga.— Lankford   r.    Milhollin,    28 
S.E.2d  752,  197  Ga.  227. 

Judgment  of  partition 

The  statute  providing  that  when 
judgment  of  partition  is  had  any 
party  in  interest  absent  from  state 
or  not  notified  may  move  to  set  aside 
such  judgment  within  twelve  months 
is  not  dependent  on  absence  of  serv- 
ice, but  applies  where  party  in  in- 
terest is  absent  from  state  or  has 
not  been  notified. — Lankford  v.  Mil- 
hollin,  supra. 

58.  Mass. — Beserosky  v.  Mason,  168 
N.E.  726,  269  Mass.  325. 

Mo. — Harrison  v.  McNergney,  App., 
Ill  S.W.2d  191. 


Tex.— Cauble  v.  Key,  Clv.App.,  256  S. 

W.  654. 

34  C.J.  p  315  note  26. 
Absence  of: 

Counsel  as  unavoidable  casualty  or 
misfortune  see  infra  subdivision 
n  (7)  of  this  section. 
Party    or   counsel    as    ground    for 
opening   or   setting   aside    judg- 
ment generally  see  supra  §  280. 
Attendance  at  school 

Fact  that  defendant  was  a  uni- 
versity student,  and  had  to  attend  to 
his  duties  at  time  of  trial,  is  insuffi- 
cient ground  for  vacating  default 
judgment. — Lynch  v.  Powers,  200  N. 
W.  725,  198  Iowa  1060.  . 
59.  Ark. — Morrow  v.  Lindsey,  262 

S.W.  641,  164  Ark.  606. 
Cal.— Taecker  v.  Parker,  93  P.2d  197, 

34  Cal.App.2d  143. 
Kan.— Johnson  v.  Salkeld,  271  P.  385, 

126  Kan.  807. 
La.— Rodick  v.  Jacobs,   116   So.   583, 

166  La.  30. 
Mo. — McFarland   v.    Lasswell,    App., 

282  S.W.  447. 

N.Y. — Dewey  v.  Agostini  Bros.  Bldg. 
Corporation,  283  N.Y.S.  174,  246 
App.Div.  667 — Zaza  v.  Zaza,  246 
N.Y.S.  148,  138  Misc.  218— Bno  v. 
Tracy,  223  N.T.S.  674,  130  Misc. 
198— United  Textile  Print  Works 
v.  Black  Knitting  Mills,  205  N.Y.S. 
196,  123  Misc.  299. 
Ohio.— Balind  v.  Lanigan,  159  N.E. 

1Q3,  26  Ohio  App.  149. 
Okl. — Runyan    v.    Hecker,    66    P.2d 
1072,     179     Okl.    595— Wheeler    v. 
Walker,  294  P.  641,  147  Okl.  63. 
Tex.— ^Briggs   v.    Ladd,    Civ.App.,    64 
S.W.2d  389— Colorado  River  Syndi- 
cate Subscribers  v.  Alexander,  Civ. 
App.,  288  S.W.  586. 
W.Va.— Hill'  v.  Long,  150  S.B.  6,  107 

W.Va.   664. 
34  C.J,  p  315  note  2fc 
Attorney's  abandonment  of,  or  with- 
drawal from,   case  as   ground  for 
vacating  default  see  infra  subdi- 
vision n  (6)  (f )  of  this  section. 

623 


Refusal  of  Jury  trial  on,  tardy  ar- 
rival 

Defendant,  not  present  with  his 
counsel  at  time  assigned  for  trial 
of  case,  which  court  offered  to  hear 
on  its  merits  without  intervention 
of  jury  when  defendant's  attorney, 
appearing  after  default  was  entered 
and  jury  panel  excused,  asked  court 
to  set  aside  default  and  permit  de- 
fense, was  offered  all  he  was  entitled 
to,  and,  having  refused  to  proceed  as 
directed  by  court  cannot  complain  of 
default  and  permission  of  plaintiff 
to  prove  his  case  on  appeal  from 
order  overruling  his  motion  to  set 
aside  default  and  judgment  for  plain- 
tiff.—Vaux  v.  Hensal,  277  N.W.  718, 
224  Iowa  1055. 

60.  Conn. — Barton  v.  Barton,  196  A. 
141,  123  Conn.  487. 

N.M.— Abbott  v.  Sherman  Mines,  71 
P.2d  1037,  41  N.M.  531. 

N.Y.— Posin  v.  Hawley,  232  N.Y.S. 
441,  225  App.Div.  763 — Zaza  v.  Za- 
za, 246  N.Y.S.  148,  138  Misc.  218. 

34  C.J.  p  315  note  32. 

61.  Cal.— Nicol  v.  Davis,  265  P.  867, 
90  CaLApp.  337. 

N.Y.— Kefer  v.  Gunches,  48  N.Y.S.2d 
767. 

Tex, — Yellow    Transit    Co.   v.    Klaff, 

Civ.App.,  145  S.W.Sd  264. 
34  OJ.  p  316  note  33. 

Tolerance  of  court  In  enforcing*  at- 
tendance 

With  respect  to  right  to  set  aside 
a  default  judgment,  generally  courts 
recognize  that  counsel  are  at  times 
unable  to  transact  business  in  court 
at  the  particular  time  required  on 
account  of  urgent  business  or  on  ac- 
count of  being  busily  engaged  with 
other  legal  matters,  and  under  such 
a  showing  they  are  tolerant  in  en- 
forcing attendance  of  counsel. — Unit- 
ed Taxi  Co.  v.  Dilworth,  20  NJB.2d 
699,  106  IndApp.  627. 


334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


delayed  by  obstruction  to  travel,62  or  even  that  the 
multiplicity  and  pressure  of  his  professional  en- 
gagements prevented  him  from  giving  attention  to 
the 


On  the  other  hand  it  has  been  held  to  be  no  ex- 
cuse that  the  attorney  was  absent  because  of  try- 
ing another  case  in  another  court  where  he  took  in- 
sufficient steps  to  notify  the  other  party  and  the 
court  of  the  reason  for  his  absence,64  and  many 
courts  have  refused  to  accept  the  excuse  that  the 
attorney  was  detained  elsewhere  by  important  busi- 
ness, even  when  it  was  of  a  public  character,  such 
as  his  attendance  on  the  legislature,  of  which  he 
was  a  member.65  According  to  some  cases,  if  the 
attorney  is  detained  on  his  way  to  the  place  of 
trial,  he  should  telephone  or  telegraph  to  the  judge, 
and  ask  him  to  have  the  case  held;66  and  one  seek- 
ing to  vacate  a  judgment  obtained  in  his  absence 
must  show  not  only  good  excuse  for  his  absence, 
but  also  that  he  was  unable  to  notify  the  court 
thereof.67  A  judgment  entered  during  the  absence 
of  a  party  and  his  counsel  may  be  set  aside  where 
such  absence  was  due  to  the  mistake,  neglect,  or 
omission  of  the  clerk  of  the  court  in  placing  the  case 
on  a  docket  to  which  it  did  not  belong  without  no- 


tice to  counsel  and  then  not  notifying  them  of  the 
assignment  of  the  case  for  trial.68 

m.  Illness  or  Death 

The  Illness  of  a  party  or  his  close  relative,  the  Ill- 
ness or  death  of  an  attorney  or  his  close  relative,  or 
the  Illness  of  a  material  and  necessary  witness  Is  a 
sufficient  excuse  for  a  default,  provided  the  alleged  con- 
sequence thereof  could  not  have  been  prevented  or  ob- 
viated by  the  exercise  of  due  care  or  diligence. 

Illness  is  not  a  sufficient  excuse  for  a  default 
where  the  exercise  of  due  care  or  diligence  would 
have  prevented  or  obviated  the  alleged  consequences 
of  such  illness.69  If  a  party  is  prevented  by  sickness 
from  preparing  his  case  or  attending  the  trial,  and 
the  circumstances  are  such  that  his  personal  atten- 
tion and  presence  are  necessary  to  the  due  protec- 
tion of  his  rights,  a  default  judgment  against  him 
may  be  set  aside;70  and  default  judgments  have 
been  opened  or  vacated  largely,  if  not  altogether, 
on  the  ground  of  serious  illness  of  a  close  relative 
actually  preventing  attendance  of  the  party.71  It 
is  otherwise  where  the  party's  interests  were,  or 
could  have  been,  adequately  protected  by  attorney  or 
agent  without  the  personal  presence  or  attention  of 
the  party.72 

Of  counsel  or  his  relative.    The  illness  of  a  par- 


62.  Ark. — Supreme  Lodge,  Woodmen 
of   Union,    r.    Johnson,   17    S.W.2d 
323,  179  Ark.  589. 

Cal. — Peterson    v.    Taylor,    152    P.2d 

349,  66  Cal.App.2d  333. 
34  C.J.  p  316  note  37. 

63.  Kan. — Gordan    v.    Tennhardt,    8 
P.2d  328,  134  Kan.  799. 

Miss. — Planters'  Dumber  Co.  v.  Sib- 
ley,  93  So.  440,  130  Miss.  26. 

Mo. — Goodwin  v.  Kochitltzky,  App., 
3  S.W.2d  1051. 

34  C.J.  p  316  note  38. 

64.  Mo. — Williams  v.  Barr,  App.,  61 
S.W.2d  420 — Schopp  v.  Continental 
Underwriters'  Co.,  App.,   284   S.W. 
808 — Daugherty  v.  Lanning-Harris 
Coal  &  Grain  Co.,  265  S.W.  866,  218 
Mo. App.   187 — Case  v.  Arky,  App., 
253  S.W.  484. 

65.  Ark. — Morrow    v.    Lindsey,    262 
S.W.  641,  164  Ark.  606. 

Kan. — Royse  v.   Grage,   42  P.2d  942, 

141  Kan.  702. 
34  C.J.  p  316  note  43. 

66.  Cal.— Hall  v.   Bru,  13  P.2d  716, 
216  Cal.  153. 

Minn. — Caughey  v.  Northern  Pac.  El. 
Co.,  53  N.W.  545,  51  Minn.  324. 

67.  Ga. — Eves  v.  Davison-Paxon  Co., 
161    S.B.    275,    44    Ga.App.   322. 

Ind. — United  Taxi  Co.  v.  Dilworth, 
20  N.R.2d  699,  106  Ind.App.  627. 

68.  Kan. — Samuel       Ach       Co.       v. 
Thorpe,  278  P.  15,  128  Kan.  296. 

69.  Ark. — Thomas   v.    Arnold,   96   S. 
W.2d   1108,    192    Ark.    1127. 


111. — Conard  v.   Camphouse,    230   111. 

App.  598. 

Mont. — Pacific  Acceptance  Corpora- 
tion v.  McCue,  228  P.  761,  71  Mont. 
99. 

34  C.J.  p  317  note  47. 
Illness: 

As  unavoidable  casualty  or  mis- 
fortune authorizing  vacation  of 
default  judgment  see  infra  sub- 
division n  (7)  of  this  section. 
Or  death  as  ground  for  vacating 
judgment  generally  see  supra  S§ 
276,  280. 

70.  Ariz. — Swisshelm  Gold  Silver 
Co.  v.  Farwell,  124  P.2d  544,  59 
Ariz.  162. 

Cal.— Salsberry  v.  Julian,  277  P.  516, 

98  Cal.App.  638,  followed  in  277  P. 

518,   amended   278    P.   257,    98   Cal. 

App.  645— Pink  &  Schindler  Co.  v. 

Gavros,    237   P.    1083,    72    CaLApp. 

688. 
Me.— Bolduc  v.  Nadeau,  148  A.  565, 

128  Me.  542. 
Minn.— Deaver  v.  Nelson,   230   N.W. 

122,  180  Minn.  36. 
Mo. — Anspach   v.   Jans  en,   78   S.W.2d 

137,  229  Mo.App.  321. 
34  C.J.  p  316  note  44. 

Mental  condition 

111.— Kemper  v.  Fournier,  12  N.E.2d 

339,  293  ULApp.  629. 
Neb.— Citizens'  State  Bank  of  Cedar 

Rapids    v.    Toung,    244    N.W     294 

123  Neb.  786. 
34  C.J.  p  316  note  44  [b],  [c], 

624 


Childbirth 

Court  properly  set  aside  Judgment 
granting  writ  of  possession  against 
defendant  who  failed  to  appear  be- 
cause of  childbirth  but  who  immedi- 
ately thereafter  sued  to  set  aside- 
judgment. — Hazard  Lumber  &  Sup- 
ply Co.  v.  Horn,  15  S.W.2d  492,  228. 
Ky.  554. 

nines*  of  officer  of  defendant 

Where  officer  of  defendant  bank,, 
who  attended  to  its  litigation,  be- 
came .ill,  and  as  a  result  services  of- 
attorney  were  not  secured  until  an- 
employee  happened  to  run  across  . 
matter,  and  attorney  on  same  day- 
prepared  plea  of  privilege  and  mail- 
ed it  to  clerk  of  trial  court,  fact 
that  plea  was  not  filed  until  shortly 
after  hour  citation  was  returnable, 
and  default  judgment  entered,  was 
excusable. — First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Southwest  Nat.  Bank  of  Dallas,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  273  S.W.  951. 

71.  Ky.— Welch  v.   Mann's  Ex'r,   81 
S.W.2d  1,  261  Ky.  470. 

34  OJ.  p  317  note  49. 

72.  111. — Conard  v.   Camphouse,   230 
IlLApp.  598. 

N.Y. — Quist  v.   Gwinup,   46   N.Y.S.23 

105,  267  App.Div.  224. 
Philippine.— Adela  v.  Judge  of  Ilocos 

Sur.    Court    of    First    Instance,    & 

Philippine  674,  4  OftGaz.  728. 
W.Va.— State  ex  rel.  Alkire  v.  Mili,. 

180   S,E.   183,   116  W.Va.   277. 
34  C.J.  p  317  note  45. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


334 


ty's  counsel,  so  severe  as  to  prevent  him  from  ap- 
pearing and  trying  the  case,  is  good  ground  for  va- 
cating a  default  judgment,  provided  such  party  did 
not  know  of  it  in  time  to  retain  other  counsel  or 
was  prevented  in  some  other  way  from  doing  so;73 
otherwise  such  illness  of  counsel  is  not  ground  for 
vacating  the  judgment.74  The  same  rule  applies  in 
the  case  of  the  illness  of  a  member  of  the  attorney's 
family,  or  a  near  relative,  withdrawing  his  attention 
from  professional  business  and  leaving  the  client 
without  legal  aid  and  without  opportunity  to  retain 
other  counsel.75  Death  of  one's  attorney  may  be 
ground  for  vacating  a  default  judgment76 

Of  material  and  necessary  witness.  A  default 
judgment  may  be  set  aside  on  the  ground  of  the 
illness  of  a  material  and  necessary  witness  at  the 
time  originally  scheduled  for  trial.77 


n.  Mistake,  Inadvertence,  Surprise,  Excusable 
Neglect,  Casualty,  or  Misfortune 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Mistake 

(3)  Surprise 

(4)  Inadvertence 

(5)  Excusable  neglect 

(6)  Negligence,  mistake,  or  misconduct 

of  counsel 

(7)  Unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune 

(1)  In  General 

A  default  judgment  ordinarily  may  be  opened  or  va» 
eated  for  mistake,  Inadvertence,  surprise,  excusable  neg- 
lect, casualty,  or  misfortune. 

A  default  judgment  ordinarily  may  be  opened  or 
vacated  for  mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  excusa- 
ble neglect,  casualty,  or  misfortune;78  but,  in  or- 


73.  Fla. — Johnson    v.    City    of    Se- 
bring,   140  So.  672,  104  Fla.  584. 

Iowa. — Equitable  Life  Ins.  Co.  of 
Iowa  v.  McNamara,  259  N.W.  231, 
220  Iowa  297,  supplemented  and 
rehearing  denied  262  N.W.  466, 
220  Iowa  297. 

N.J. — Jarrett  v.  Standard  Diesel  En- 
gine Co.,  12  A.2d  671,  124  N.J.Law 
429. 

N.Y.— Gawel  v.  Deluca,  31  N.T.S.2d 
567,  263  App.Div.  838— Allen  v. 
Lake,  201  N.Y.S.  882,  207  App.Div. 
886. 

Pa, — Lichterman  v.  Hanlon,  100  Pa- 
Super.  245. 

R.T. — Hoye  v.  Red  Top  Cab  Co.  of 
Rhode  Island,  150  A.  125. 

Tex. — Stollenwerck  v.  State  Nat. 
Bank  in  Terrell,  Civ.App.,  63  S.W. 
2d  312. 

34  C.J.  p  317  note  52. 

Mental  confusion  or  aberration 

Cal.— Hayes  v.  Pierce,  64  P.2d  728, 
18  Cal.App.2d  531. 

Mental  inoompetency 

N.Y. — Kamelhaar  v.  National  Transp. 
Co.,  29  N.Y.S.2d  745,  176  Misc. 
1005. 

74.  Ala. — Brown  v.  Brown,   105   So. 
171,   213  Ala.  339. 

Cal. — Thomas     v.     Toppins,    272     P. 

1042,  206  Cal.  18. 
Tex, — Welsch    v.    Keeton,    Civ.App., 

287  S.W.   692. 
34  C.J.  p  317  note  52. 

Vacation  properly  denied 

(1)  The  trial  judge  did  not  abuse 
his  discretion  in  refusing  to  vacate 
default  judgment  for  excusable  neg- 
lect on  affidavit  of  defendant's  offi- 
cer that  he  became  suddenly  ill  and 
was  confined  to  his  home  "for  two 
weeks  or  more"  after  placing  sutn- 
mons  and  complaint  on  his  desk, 
that  a  clerk  filed  away  such  papers 
and  failed  to  call  matter  to  affiant's 
attention  after  his  return  to  work, 

49  C.J.S.-40 


and  that  absence  thereof  from  his 
desk  caused  affair  to  escape  his  no- 
tice.— Rutledge  v.  Junior  Order  of 
United  American  Mechanics,  193  S. 
E.  434,  185  S.C.  142. 

(2)  Defendant's  motion  to  vacate 
default  judgment,  on  the  ground 
that  failure  to  appear  was  due  to 
sickness  of  counsel,  was  properly  de- 
nied where  it  did  not  appear  that 
such  counsel  agreed  to  represent  de- 
fendant, defendant  was  present  in 
court  on  the  day  the  case  was  called 
without  attempting  to  have  case  con- 
tinued and  the  application  to  vacate 
default  was  not  timely  made. — Dodd 
v.  State,  Tex.Civ.App.,  193  S.W.2d 
569. 
Inability  to  notify  court 

Defendant  seeking  to  vacate  judg- 
ment entered  in  his  absence,  as  re- 
sult of  serious  illness  of  attorney, 
must  show  attorney's  inability  to 
notify  court. — Eves  v.  Davison-Paxon 
Co.,  161  S.E.  275,  44  Ga.App.  322. 

75.  Ark. — Johnson  v.  Jett,  159  S.W. 
2d  78,  203  Ark.  861. 

Cal.— Stub  v.  Harrison,  96  P.2d  979, 

35  Cal.App.2d  685. 
S.C. — Jenkins    v.    Jones,     38    S.E.2d 

255. 

34  OJ.  p  318  note  53. 
Illness   of  attorney  and  wife 

Where  failure  to  file  an  answer 
was  due  to  illness  and  death  of  at- 
torney's wife,  and  prolonged  illness 
of  attorney  himself  failure  or  neg- 
lect of  attorney  to  file  answer  was 
excusable. — Gunter  v.  Dowdy,  31  S.E. 
2d  524,  224  N.C.  522. 

76.  Fla, — Johnson    v.    City    of    Se- 
bring,  140  So.  672,  104  Fla.  584. 

34  C.J.  P  318  note  54. 

77.  N.Y. — Braverman     v.     Monterey 
Operating  Corporation,   283   N.Y.S. 
874,  246  App.Div.  735. 

78.  U.S.— Little   v.    Cox   &   Carpen- 
ter,   C.C.A.Miss.,    66    F.2d    84,    cer- 

625 


tiorari  denied  54  S.Ct  102,  290  IT* 
S.  678,  78  L.Ed.  585. 

Ala, — Ex  parte  Southern  Amiesite 
Asphalt  Co.,  200  So.  435,  30  Ala. 
App.  3,  certiorari  denied  200  So. 
434,  240  Ala.  618. 

Cal.— McNeil  v.  Blumenthal,  81  P.2d 
566,  11  Cal.2d  566,  followed  in  Le 
Due  v.  Blumenthal,  81  P.2d  567,  11 
Cal.2d  780 — Pease  v.  City  of  San 
Diego,  App.,  169  P.2d  973— Potts  v. 
Whitson,  125  P.2d  947,  52  CaLApp. 
2d'  199 — Sofuye  v.  Pieters-Wheeler 
Seed  Co.,  216  P.  990,  62  CaLApp* 
198. 

Colo.— Calkins  v.  Smalley,  294  P.  534* 
88  Colo.  227. 

D.C. — Barnes  v.  Conner,  Mun.App.» 
44  A.2d  925. 

Ind. — Falmouth  State  Bank  v.  Hayes* 
185  N.B.  662,  97  Ind.App.  68. 

Md.— Martin  v.  Long,  120  A.  875* 
142  Md.  348. 

N.T. — Luckenbach  S.  S.  Co;  v.  Musso, 
16  N.Y.S.2d  378,  258  App.Div.  914. 

N.D. — Chittenden  &  Eastman  Co.  v. 
Sell,  227  N.W.  188,  58  N.D.  664— 
Tesel  v.  Watson,  216  N.W.  199,  66 
N.D.  98— First  State  Bank  of  Cros- 
by v.  Thomas,  208  N.W.  852,  54 
N.D.  108 — Engen  v.  Medberry 
Farmers'  Equity  Elevator  Co.,  204 
N.W.  7,  52  N.D.  681. 

S.C.— Jenkins  v.  Jones,  88  S.E.2d  255. 

Tex. — Sunshine  Bus  Lines  v.  Crad- 
dock,  Civ.App.,  .112  S.W.2d  248, 
affirmed  Craddock  v.  Sunshine  Bus 
Lines,  133  S.W.2d  124,  124  Tex.  388 
— Hadad  v.  Ellison,  Civ.App.,  283: 
S.W.  193. 

W.Va. — Sigmond  v.  Forbes,  158  S.BL 
677,  110  W.Va,  442— Sands  v. 
Sands,  138  S.E.  463,  103  W.Va. 
701. 

34  C.J.  p  296  notes  4-7. 

Mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  ex- 
cusable neglect,  casualty,  or  mis- 
fortune as  ground  for  opening  or 
vacating  judgments  generally  see 
supra  §  280. 


§  334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


der  to  obtain  relief  under  statutes  authorizing  it  in 
such  cases,  the  default  judgment  from  which  relief 
is  sought  must  be  valid  and  regular  in  all  respects,79 
although,  as  shown  supra  subdivision  b  of  this  sec- 
tion, relief  from  void  or  irregular  default  judgments 
may  be  had  in  proper  cases.  The  mistake,  inadver- 
tence, surprise,  or  excusable  neglect  referred  to  in 
such  statutes  does  not  apply  only  to  the  mistake, 
inadvertence,  surprise,  or  excusable  neglect  of  the 
attorney  for  one  of  the  parties,  but  also  applies  to 
that  of  the  parties  themselves;80  and  such  statutes 
do  not  apply  to,  or  afford  relief  from,  errors  of 
law  committed  by  the  court.81  The  mistake  or  neg- 
lect relied  on  as  a  basis  for  relief,  to  be  sufficient, 
must  be  such  as  may  be  expected  on  the  part  of  a 
reasonably  prudent  person  situated  as  was  the  party 
against  whom  the  judgment  was  entered.82 

(2)  Mistake 

(a)  In  general 

(b)  As  to  cause  of  action  or  defense 

(c)  As  to  time  or  place  of  appearance  or 

trial 


(d)  As  to  process 

(e)  As  to  employment  of  counsel 

(a)  In  General 

A  default  Judgment  may  be  opened  or  vacated  where 
the  appearance  of  a  party  or  his  pleading  was  prevented 
by  mistake,  particularly  a  mistake  of  fact,  although  un- 
der  some  circumstances  a  mistake  of  law  may  afford 
sufficient  basis  for  the  relief. 

A  default  may  be  excused  and  a  default  judgment 
opened  or  vacated  where  the  appearance  of  the 
party  or  his  pleading  was  prevented  by  mistake.8* 
To  vacate  a  default  judgment,  it  is  generally  incum- 
bent on  the  defaulted  party  to  show  that  his  mis- 
take was  one  of  fact,  and  not  of  law,8*  but  in  some 
jurisdictions  it  has  been  held  that,  if  a  mistake  of 
law  is  a  reasonable  one  under  the  facts  as  they  are 
made  to  appear,  the  neglect  to  file  an  answer  be- 
cause of  the  belief  entertained  is  at  least  excusa- 
ble.85 According  to  some  authorities,  the  mistake 
contemplated  by  statutes  relating  to  relief  from  de- 
fault judgments  is  such  as  might  be  expected  on 
the  part  of  a  reasonably  prudent  person  under  the 
circumstances.86  If  a  statute  gives  the  right  to  open 


79.  N.C. — Simms  v.   Sampson,   20   S. 
B.2d    554,    221    N.C.    379— Abbitt   v. 
Gregory,    141    S.E.    587,    195    N.C. 
203 — Foster    v.     Allison     Corpora- 
tion, 131  S.B.  648,  191  N.C.  166,  44 
A.L.R.  610 — Duffer  v.  Brunson,  125 
S.E.  619,  188  N.C.  789. 

80.  N.Y.— Pember  v.  Meyer,  45  N.Y. 
S.2d  673. 

81.  Ind. — Colvert  v.  Colvert,  180  N. 
B.  192,  95  Ind.App.  325. 

Brror  in  law  as  ground  for  vacating 
default  judgment  generally  see 
supra  subdivision  g  of  this  section. 

82.  Idaho. — Savage  v.  Stokes,  28  P. 
2d  900,  54  Idaho  109. 

"If  judgment  be  entered  against  a. 
party  in  his  absence  before  he  can 
be  relieved  therefrom  he  must  show 
that  it  was  the  result  of  a  mis- 
take or  inadvertence  which  reasona- 
ble care  could  not  have  avoided,  a 
surprise  which  reasonable  precaution 
could  not  have  prevented,  or  a  neg- 
lect which  reasonable  prudence  could 
not  have  anticipated."— Elms  v. 
Elms,  Cal.App.,  164  P.2d  936,  939. 

"It  is  not  every  inadvertence  or 
negligence  that  warrants  judicial  re- 
lief, but  only  such  inadvertence  or 
negligence  as  may  reasonably  be 
characterized  as  excusable." — Hughes 
v.  Wright,  149  P.2d  392,  395,  64  Cal. 
App.2d  897. 

83.  U.S. — Marion  County  Court,  W. 
V*.,  v.  Ridge,  C.C.A.W.Va.,  13  P.2d 
969. 

Cal.— Bonftlio    v.    Ganger,    140    P.2d 

861,  60  Cal.App.2d  405. 
Or. — Snyder  v.  Consolidated  Highway 

Co.,   72  P.2d  932,   157  Or.  479. 


Pa.— Giles  T.  Ryan,  176  A.  1,  317 
Pa.  65. 

34  C.J.  p  296  note  9. 

Mistake  as  ground  for  opening  or 
vacating  judgments  generally  see 
supra  §  280. 

Opening  or  vacating  default  judg- 
ment for  mistake  of  counsel  see 
infra  subdivision  n  (6)  of  this 
section. 

Vacation  of  judgment  during  term  at 
which  rendered 

Okl. — Illinois  Electric  Porcelain  Co. 
v.  B.  &  M.  Const  Corporation,  117 
P.2d  106,  189  Okl.  336. 

84.  Idaho. — Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92 
P.2d  1053,  60  Idaho  464,  124  A.L.R. 
149. 

111. — Loew  v.  Krauspe,  150  N.E.  683, 
320  111.  244. 

N.C.— Lerch  Bros.  v.  McKinne  Bros., 
122  S.E.  9,  187  N.C.  419— Battle  v. 
Mercer,  122  S.B.  4,  187  N.C.  437, 
rehearing  denied  123  S.B.  258,  188 
N.C.  116. 

Philippine.— Adela  v..  Judge  of  Ilocos 
Sur.  Court  of  First  Instance,  6 
Philippine  674,  4  Off.Gaz.  728. 

S.c. — Savage  v.  Cannon,  30  S.E.2d  70, 
204  S.C.  473 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Lucas  v.  North  Carolina  Mut  Life 
Ins.  €o.,  191  S.B.  711,  712,  184  S. 
C.  119. 

34  C.J.  p  297  note  10. 

Counsel's  ignorance  or  mistake  of 
law  as  affecting  right  to  open  or 
vacate  default  judgment  see  in- 
fra subdivision  n  (6)  (d)  of  this 
section. 

Error  or  mistake  of  fact  going  to 
validity  or  regularity  of  judgment 
as  ground  for  opening  or  vacating 

626 


default  judgment  see  supra  subdi- 
vision h  of  this  section. 
Mistake  as  to  process  as  ground  for 
vacating  default  judgment  see  in- 
fra subdivision  n  (2)  (d)  of  this 
section. 

Vacating  default  judgment  on  ground 
that  it  is  erroneous  in  matter  of 
law  see  supra  subdivision  g  of  this 
section. 
Hfeld  mistake  of  law 

Mistaken  belief  of  defendant  that 
complaint  would  be  served  on  it 
after  summons  had  been  served  was 
a  "mistake  of  law." — Anderson  v. 
Toledo  Scale  Co.,  6  S.E.2d  465,  192 
S.C.  300. 

Mistaken  "belief  as  to  effect  of 
judgment  taken  against  a  party  with 
his  knowledge  and  on  his  willful  de- 
fault is  not  ground  for  vacation 
of  the  judgment. — Messing  v.  Mat- 
tikow,  197  N.Y.S.  620,  120  Misc.  68. 

85.  Cal.— Waite  v.  Southern  Pac. 
Co.,  221  P.  204,  192  Cal.  467 — 
Roehl  v.  Texas  Co.,  291  P.  262, 
107  CaLApp.  728 — Mahana  v.  Al- 
exander, 263  P.  260,  88  CaLApp. 
Ill—Williams  v.  Thompson,  213  P. 
705,  60  CaLApp.  658. 

Or. — Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  San 
Francisco  v.  Weant,  231  P.  134,  113 
Or.  1. 

S.c. — Savage  v.  Cannon,  30  S.B.2d 
70,  204  S.C.  473. 

34  C.J.  p  298  note  11. 

88.  Idaho.— Cleek  v.  Virginia  Gold 
Mining  &  Milling  Co.,  122  P.2d 
232,  63  Idaho  445— Atwood  v. 
Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  217  P.  600, 
37  Idaho  554. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  334 


or  vacate  a  judgment  taken  against  a  party  through 
"his"  mistake,  no  mistake  made  by  any  other  per- 
son will  justify  this  action.87 

(b)  As  to  Cause  of  Action  or  Defense 

A  default  suffered  because  of  a  reasonable  and  ex- 
cusable misapprehension  as  to  the  cause  of  action  or 
defense  may  be  set  aside. 

Where  a  party  suffers  a  default  judgment  because 
of  a  reasonable  and  excusable  misapprehension  as  to 
the  cause  of  action  or  defense,  the  judgment  should 
be  set  aside,88  and  this  has  been  held  to  be  the  rule 
even  though  the  misapprehension  was  as  to  the 
law.89 

(c)  As  to  Time  or  Place  of  Appearance  or 

Trial 

A  party  may  have  a  default  Judgment  opened  or  set 
aside  when  he  has  made  an  honest  and  excusable  mis- 
take as  to  the  time  or  place  for  appearance,  pleading, 
or  trial. 

A  party  may  have  a  default  judgment  opened  or 
set  aside  when  be  has  made  an  honest  and  excusa- 
ble mistake  as  to  the  time  when  he  was  required  to 
plead  or  answer90  or  as  to  the  time  of  trial,91  but 


not  where  the  mistake  was  the  result  of  his  own 
heedlessness  or  lack  of  due  attention  and  care.92 
In  view  of  a  court  rule  that  all  cases  at  issue  on 
the  merits  at  the  commencement  of  a  term  shall 
stand  for  trial  on  the  first  day  of  the  term,  a  party 
is  not  warranted  in  assuming  that  his  case  would 
not  be  reached  on  that  day,  and  his  failure  to  ap- 
pear for  trial  on  that  day  is  not  ground  for  vacat- 
ing a  decree  taken  in  his  absence.9^ 

Where  an  inexperienced  suitor  attempted  to  com- 
ply with  a  summons  by  appearing  in  the  office  of 
plaintiffs  attorney,  understanding  such  appearance 
to  be  sufficient,  a  default  judgment  may  be  opened 
on  the  ground  that  his  failure  to  appear  was  due  to 
excusable  neglect,  other  requisites  being  present94 

(d)  As  to  Process 

A  default  Judgment  may  be  vacated  where  the  de- 
fendant's failure  to  appear  was  due  to  an  excusably  mis- 
taken belief  as  to  process. 

A  default  judgment  may  be  vacated  where  de- 
fendant's failure  to  appear  was  due  to  an  excusa- 
bly mistaken  belief  that  no  process  had  been 
served95  or  where  defendant  thought  the  summons 


87.  N.C.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Earle   v.   Earle,   151   S.E.   884,   887, 
198  N.C.  411. 

34  C.J.  p  298  note  12. 

88.  N.Y.— Zimraer  v.  Wilber,  5  N.Y. 
S.2d   573,    254  AppJDiv.   917. 

Or. — Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  San 
Francisco  v.  Weant,  231  P.  134,  113 
Or.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  298  note  19-p  299  note  24. 

Mistake  as  to  cause  of  action  as 
ground  for.  setting1  aside  judgments 
generally  see  supra  §  280. 

89.  Or. — Federal    Reserve    Bank    of 
San  Francisco  v.  Weant,  supra. 

Vacation  of  default  judgment  for 
mistake  of  la,w  generally  see  su- 
pra subdivision  n  (2)  (a)  of  this 
section. 

90.  Ariz.— Brown  v.  Beck,  169  P.2d 
855. 

N.D.— Burgett    v.    Porter,    205    N.W. 

623,  53  N.D.  312. 
Pa,— Remick  v.   Letterle,   89   Pa.Su- 

per.  322. 

34  C.J.  p  299  note  25. 
Mistake: 

As  to  time  for  pleading  or  trial  as 
ground  for  opening  or  setting 
aside  judgments  generally  see 
supra  §  280. 

Of  counsel  as  to  time  or  place  of 
appearance  or  trial  as  ground 
for  opening  or  vacating  default 
judgment  see  infra  subdivision 
n  (6)  (c)  of  this  section. 

91.  Conn. — Mountain    States    Silver 
Mining  Co.   v.   Hukill,  .244   P.   605, 
79  Colo.  128. 


Kan.— Kansas  City  Power  &  Light 
Co.  v.  City  of  Elkhart,  31  P.2d 
62,  139  Kan.  374. 

Ky. — Lewis  v.  Browning,  4  S.W.2d 
734,  223  Ky.  771. 

N.T.— Kopisar  v.  Paley,  219  N.T.S. 
82,  128  Misc.  463. 

Okl.— Carter  v.  Grimmett,  213  P.  732, 
89  Okl.  37. 

Or. — Snyder  v.  Consolidated  Highway 
Co.,  72'  P.2d  932,  157  Or.  479. 

R.I. — Rhode  Island  Discount  Corpo- 
ration v.  Carr,  136  A.  244. 

S.D. — Johnson  v.  Johnson,  210  N.W. 
155,  50  S.D.  341. 

Tex. — Meckel  v.  State  Bank  of 
Barksdale,  Civ.App.,  256  S.W.  668. 

Va. — Morriss  v.  White,  131  S.E.  835, 
146  Va,  553. 

34  OJ.  p  299  note  25. 

Want  or  insufficiency  of  notice  of 
proceedings  as  ground  for  opening 
or  vacating  default  judgment  see 
supra  subdivision  b  (3)  of  this 
section. 

Time  for  filing  papers 

Where  defendant  had  made  clear 
to  court  and  to  plaintiff  that  defend- 
ant intended  to  defend  the  case,  con- 
tinuance of  one  day  was  granted, 
court's  alleged  intention  that  defend- 
ant should  file  his  papers  prior  to 
call  of  next  day's  calendar  was  not 
clearly  expressed  and  defendant  filed 
his  affidavit  of  defense  and  demand 
for  jury  trial  a  few  hours  after  de- 
fault was  entered,  default  should  be 
vacated. — Barnes  v.  Conner,  D.C.Mun. 
App.,  44  A.2d  925. 

627 


92.  Colo.— Scott  v.  Sullivan,   244  P. 
466,  79  Colo.  173. 

111. — Latham  v.  Salisbury,  61  N.B. 
2d  306,  326  Ill-App.  253— Travelers 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Wagner,  279  111. App. 
13. 

La. — Brownlee-Wells  Motors  v.  Hol- 
lingsworth,  127  So.  754,  13  La. 
App.  19. 

Okl.— Hall  v.  Price,  277  P.  239,  136 
Okl.  202. 

34  C.J.  p  299  note  26. 

Duty  of  party  to  know  when  case 
will  be  called  for  trial  see  infra 
subdivision  n  (5)  (b)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

93.  Conn. — Scott  v.  Sullivan,  244  P. 
468,  79  Colo.  173. 

94.  N.T.— Pember  v.  Meyer,  45  N.T. 
S.2d  673. 

Opening  or  vacating  default  judg- 
ments where  appearance  or  plead- 
ing was  prevented  by  excusable 
neglect  see  infra  subdivision  n  (5) 
of  this  section. 

95.  Mont. — Madson   v.   Petrie   Trac- 
tor &  Equipment  Co.,  77  P.2d  1038, 
106  Mont  382. 

Mistake  as  to  process  as  ground  for 
vacating  judgments   generally  Bee 
supra  §  280. 
Failure  to  file  statutory  return 

Where  return  of  service  was  not 
filed  as  required  by  statute,  defend- 
ant's attorney  was  Justified  in  as- 
suming that  no  service  had  been 
made  within  fifteen-day  period. — 
Reynolds'  v.  Gladys  Belle  Oil  Co., 
243  P.  576,  75  Mont  332. 


§  334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


served  on  him  was  for  his  employer96  or  was  mis- 
led by  a  belief  that  the  process  was  in  a  different 
suit97  Where  defendant  reasonably  entertained  a 
belief  that  the  service  of  process  was  invalid,  a  de- 
fault judgment  based  on  failure  to  answer  will  be 
set  aside  under  the  statutory  rule  obtaining  in  some 
jurisdictions  that  a  reasonable  mistake  of  law  is 
excusable,98  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been 
held  that  relief  will  not  be  granted  merely  because 
defendant,  through  ignorance  of  the  law,  believed 
that  the  process  served  was  invalid,99  and  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  trial  court  in  refusing  to  vacate  a 
judgment  on  failure  of  defendant  to  appear  where 
defendant  was  erroneously  advised  that  the  service 
was  not  good  has  been  held  properly  exercised.1 

(e)  As  to  Employment  of  Counsel 

A  party  ordinarily  cannot  procure  the  setting  aside 
of  a  default  judgment  against  him  on  the  ground  of 
his  mistaken  belief  that  he  had  retained  an  attorney  to 
protect  his  interests,  but  the  circumstances  of  the  case 
may  warrant  the  exercise  of  the  court's  discretion  In 
granting  the  relief. 

A  party  ordinarily  cannot  procure  the  setting 
aside  of  a  default  judgment  against  him  on  the 
ground  of  his  mistaken  belief  that  he  had  retained 


an  attorney  to  protect  his  interests;2  but  there  are 
cases  of  this  kind  where  the  court  in  the  exercise 
of  its  discretion  has  granted  relief.3  Where  the 
mistake  was  as  to  the  employment  of  counsel  by  a 
person  on  whom  defendant  justifiably  relied  to  at- 
tend to  that  matter,  it  may  furnish  cause  for  vacat- 
ing the  judgment.4 

(3)  Surprise 

In  a  number  of  Jurisdictions  a  default  may  be  ex- 
cused  and  a  default  Judgment  opened  or  set  aside  where 
the  appearance  of  the  party  or  his  pleading  was  pre- 
vented by  surprise. 

In  a  number  of  jurisdictions  a  default  may  be  ex- 
cused and  a  default  judgment  opened  or  set  aside 
where  the  appearance  of  the  party  or  his  pleading 
was  prevented  by  surprise,5  and  there  is  authority 
holding  that,  before  a  judgment  by  default  regularly 
entered  will  be  opened  for  the  purpose  of  interpos- 
ing a  defense,  the  one  seeking  to  invoke  the  aid  of 
the  court  must  establish  surprise.6  There  can  be  no 
fixed  formula  by  which  the  necessary  element  of 
surprise  may  be  measured  in  eve'ry  case,7  but  the 
extenuating  factors  of  each  particular  situation 
must  be  the  ultimate  determinants,8  Neglect  of  an 


96.  Ky.— Steuerle  v.   T.   B.   Duncan 
&  Co.,  299  S.W.  205,  221  Ky.  501. 

97.  Colo.— Green  v.  Halsted,  238  P. 
40,  77  Colo.  578. 

Mass.— -Hyde  Park  Sav.  Bank  v. 
Davankoskas,  11  N.E.2d  3,  298 
Mass.  421. 

98.  Cal.— Riskin  v.  Towers,  148  P.2d 
611,   614,  24  Cal.2d  274,  153  A.L..R. 
442,    distinguishing    Thorndyke   v. 
Jenkins,   142   P.2d  848,  61  OaLApp. 
2d  119,  and  Wheat  v.  McNeill,  295 
P.   102,   111   CaLApp.   72— Roehl  v. 
Texas  Co.,  291  P.  262,  107  CaLApP. 
708. 

Vacation  of  default  Judgment  for 
mistake  of  law  generally  see  supra 
subdivision  n  (2)  (a)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

99.  N.D.— Foley  v.  Davis,  211  N.W. 
818,  54  N.D.  864. 

Ignorance  as  excuse  for  default  gen- 
erally see  supra  subdivision  k  of 
this  section. 

1.  Cal.— Moskowitz  T.  McGlinchey, 
259  P.  105,  85  GaLApp.  189. 

Setting  aside  default  judgment  suf- 
fered in  consequence  of  receiving 
erroneous  advice  from  attorney  see 
infra  subdivision  n  (6)  (e)  of  this 
section. 

•2.  Cal. — Noble  v.  Reict-Avery  Co., 
264  P.  841,  8-9  Cal.App.  75. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  qrioted  in  Demp- 
sey  v.  Gibson,  Civ.App.,  100  S.W. 
2d  430,  432 — Colorado  River  Syn- 
dicate Subscribers  v.  Alexander, 
Civ.App.,  288  S.W.  586. 

34  C,J.  p  300  note  89. 


Duty  to  see  that  attorney  under- 
stands and  accepts  retainer  see 
infra  subdivision  n  (5)  (b)  of  this 
section. 

Mistake  as  to  retainer  of  counsel  as 
ground  for  setting  aside  judgments 
generally  see  supra  §  280. 
Miscarriage  of  letter 

Default  judgment  could  not  be  set 
aside  on  mere  showing  that  attorney 
did  not  receive  letter  requesting  him 
to  make  defense. — George  County 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Catlett,  144  So.  704, 
165  Miss.  652. 

3.  Ark. — American  Co.  of  Arkansas 
v.  Wilson,  61  S.W.2d  453,  187  Ark. 
625. 

Cal. — John  A,  Vaughan  Corporation 
v.  Title  Insurance  &  Trust  Co.,  12 
P.2d  117,  123  CaLApp.  709. 
34  C.J.  p  300  note  40. 
Miscarriage  of  letter 

Relief  has  been  granted  where 
foreign  corporation's  letter  to  its 
attorney  directing  him  to  attend  to 
case  miscarried. — Reynolds  v.  Gladys 
Belle  Oil  Co.,  243  P.  576,  75  Mont. 
332. 

4.  Okl. — Bearman    v.    Bracken,    240 
P.  713,  112  Okl.  237. 

34  C.J.  p  300  note  41. 

5.  U.S. — Marion   County  Court,   W. 
Va.,   v.   Ridge,  C.C.A.W.Va.,   13   F. 
2d  969. 

N.J.— Viviano  T.  Service  Bottling 
Works,  158  A*  395,  10  N.J.Misc. 
187, 

34  C.J.  p  301  note  47. 

Surprise   as   ground  for  opening   or 

628 


vacating  judgments   generally  see 
supra  §  280. 

6.  N.J. — Hanover  Trust  Co.  v.  Rizzo, 
166  A.   326,   110  N.J.Law  581— Mc- 
Carthy v.  Guire,  187  A.  739,  14  N. 
J.Misc.  795. 

7.  N.J.— McCarthy  v.   Guire,   supra. 

8.  N.J.— McCarthy  v.   Guire,   supra. 
Circumstances  held   to   warrant   re* 

lief 

(1)  Calling  a  case  for  trial  in  the 
absence  of  a  party  who  had  made 
several     unsuccessful    attempts     to 
learn   the  probable   date  of  trial. — 
McCarthy  v.  Guire,  supra. 

(2)  Entering  judgment  privately  in 
room    adjoining    courtroom    without 
notice   to  .defendant's  attorney  who 
was  present  in  court  waiting  for  the 
case  to  be  called,  and  without  men- 
tion of  case  in  open  court. — Taylor  v. 
Combs,   23   S.W.2d  545,   232  Ky.   333. 
Circumstancei  held  not   to   warrant 

relief 

(1)  Fact  that  plaintiff  took  judg- 
ment against  defendant  without  indi- 
cating  Intention   to   press    claim   to 
final  determination,   defendant  being 
detained  to  answer  criminal  charge. 
—Gainer  v.  Smith,  132  S.B.  744,  101 
W.Va,  314. 

(2)  Fact  that  defendant  erroneous- 
ly thought  he  was  insured  and  sent 
papers  in  suit  to  an  insurance  com- 
pany  for  attention,   which   retained 
them  until  after  the  time  to  answer 
had    expired. — Busching   v.    Vanden- 
berg,  152  A.  704.  9  N.J.Misc.  43. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


334 


attorney  to  file  a  pleading  within  the  time  allowed 
by  law  may  fairly  be  considered  a  surprise  on 
his  client  warranting  the  vacation  of  a  default  judg- 
ment against  the  latter.9 

(4)  Inadvertence 

A  default  Judgment  Inadvertently  permitted  may  be 
opened  or  set  aside. 

The  trial  court  has  great  latitude  in  relieving  a 
party  from  a  default  judgment  inadvertently  per- 
mitted.10 To  be  ground  for  relief,  however,  the 
inadvertence  must  be  based  on  more  than  mere  for- 
getfulness,11  and  must  be  such  as  might  be  expected 
on  the  part  of  a  reasonably  prudent  person  under 
the  circumstances.12 


(5)  Excusable  Neglect 

(a)  In  general 

(b)  Diligence  required  of  suitors 

(a)  In  General 

In  many  jurisdictions  a  default  may  be  excused  and 
a  default  judgment  opened  or  set  aside  where  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  party  or  his  pleading  was  prevented 
by  excusable  neglect  based  on  more  than  mere  forget- 
fulness  or  utter  indifference  and  inattention  to  busi- 
ness. 

In  many  jurisdictions  a  default  may  be  excused 
and  a  default  judgment  opened  or  set  aside  where 
the  appearance  of  the  party  or  his  pleading  was 
prevented  by  excusable  neglect.13  Excusable  neg- 
lect must  be  based  on  more  than  mere  forgetfulness 


(3)  Rendering:    default    Judgment, 
where     defendant    had    notice    that 
complaint  would  be  filed  and  did  not 
show    meritorious    defense. — Perkins 
v.  Sharp,  131  S.B.  584,  191  N.C.  224. 

(4)  Rendering     default     judgment 
where  defendant  was  properly  served, 
and    was    chargeable    with   knowing 
conseauences    of    law-suit,    but    ig- 
nored   such    conseauences. — Hanover 
Trust  Co.   v.   Rizzo,   166  A.   326,   110 
N.J.Law  581. 

9.  S.D.— W.      B.      Poshay      Co.      v. 
Springfield  Light  &  Power  Co.,  206 
N.W.  239,  49  S.D.  92. 

Negligence  of  attorney  as  ground  for 
vacating  default  judgment  general- 
ly see  infra  subdivision  n  (6)  (b) 
of  this  section. 

10.  Cal.— Week    v.    Sucher,    274    P. 
579,  96  CaLApp.  422. 

N.Y.— Baldwin  v.  Yellow  Taxi  Cor- 
poration, 225  N.Y.S.  423,  221  App. 
Div.  717,  followed  in  Woodward  v. 
Weekes,  241  N.Y.S.  842,  228  App. 
Div.  870. 

Inadvertent    entry    of    judgment    as 

ground  for  opening  or  vacating  it 

see  supra  subdivision  b  (4)  of  this 

section. 

Vacation  of  Judgment  during1  term  at 

which  rendered 

Okl. — Illinois   Electric  Porcelain  Co. 
v.  B.  &  M.  Const  Corporation,  117 
P.2d  106,  189  Okl.  336. 
Inadvertence  of  insurance  carrier 

In  trespass  to  recover  damages  fer 
injuries  to  one  struck  by  defendant's 
automobile,  trial  court  did  not  abuse 
discretion  in  opening  default  judg- 
ment on  prompt  application,  where 
default  occurred  through  no  neglect 
of  defendant  or  his  counsel,  but 
through  inadvertence  of  defendant's 
insurance  carrier. — Scott  v.  Mc- 
Ewing,  10  A.2d  436,  337  Pa.  273,  126 
A.L.R.  367. 
Inadvertence  as  to  process  served 

Default  judgment  against  corpora- 
tion was  held  properly  vacated  for 
inadvertent  failure  to  call  president's 
attention  to  summons  and  complaint 
served  on  secretary. — Gorman  v.  Cal- 


ifornia Transit  Co.,   248   P.   923,   199 
Cal.  246. 

Inadvertence  of  clerk  in  placing 
summons  and  complaint  in  a  file 
where  the  mayor  of  respondent  city 
did  not  see  them  does  not  constitute 
such  inadvertence  as  is  contemplated 
by  statute  authoring  relief. — Boise 
Valley  Traction  Co.  v.  Boise  City, 
214  P.  1037,  37  Idaho  20. 

11.  CaL— Gorman       v.       California 
Transit   Co.,    248   P.    923,   199   Cal. 
246. 

12.  Idaho.— Atwood  v.  Northern  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  217  P.  600,  37  Idaho  554. 

Diligence  required  of  suitors  see  in- 
fra subdivision  n  (5)  (b)  of  this 
section. 

13.  U.S. — Marion  County  Court,  W. 
Va.  v.  Ridge,  C.C.A.W.Va.f  13  F.2d 
969. 

CaL— Pease  v.  City  of  San  Diego, 
App.,  169  P.2d  973— Tearney  v. 
Riddle,  149  P.2d  387,  64  CaLApp. 
2d  783— Potts  v.  Whitson,  125  P.2d 
947,  52  Cal.App.2d  199— Wright  v. 
Snyder,  32  P.2d  991,  138  CaLApp. 
495— Toon  v.  Pickwick  Stages, 
Northern  Division,  226  P.  628,  66 
CaLApp.  450. 

Minn.— First  Trust  &  Savings  Bank 
v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co., 
194  N.W.  376,  156  Minn.  231. 

Neb. — Ak-Sar-Ben  Exposition  Co.  v. 
Sorenson,  229  N.W.  13,  119  Neb. 
358. 

N-.Y.— Leslie  I.  Gumport,  Inc.,  v. 
Groell,  232  N.Y.S.  414,  225  App.Div. 
696— Baldwin  V.  Yellow  Taxi  Cozv 
poration,  225  N.Y.S.  423,  221  App. 
Div.  717,  followed  in  Woodward  v. 
Weekes,  241  N.Y.S.  842,  228  App. 
Div.  870 — Union  Trust  Co.  v.  J.  A. 
Smith  Milling  Co.,  216  N.Y.S.  505, 
217  App.Div.  176— Pember  v.  Mey- 
er, 45  N.Y.S.2d  673. 

N.C.— Parker  v.  Smith,  18  S.R2d  118, 
220  N.C.  821— Hershey  Corpora- 
tion v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co., 
165  S.B.  550,  203  N.C.  184-r-J.  B. 
Colt  Co.  v.  Martin,  160  S.B.  287, 
201  KG.  354. 

629 


N.D.— Beehler  v.  Schantz,  1  N.W.Sd 
344,  71  -N.D.  409. 

Okl.— Hasfcell  v.  Cutler,  108  P.2d  146, 
188  Okl.  239. 

S.C. — Jenkins  v.  Jones,  38  S.E.2d  255. 

S.D. — Gubele  v.  Methodist  Deaconess 
Hospital  of  Rapid  City,  225  N.W. 
57,  55  S.D.  100. 

Tex. — Roberts  v.  Schlather  &  Stein- 
meyer,  Civ. App.,  8  S.W.2d  296,  er- 
ror dismissed — Holland  v.  Stark, 
Civ.App.,  281  S.W.  590. 

Wash. — Larson  v.  Zabroski,  152  P.2d 
154,  21  Wash.2d  572,  opinion  ad- 
hered to  155  P.2d  284,  21  Washed 
572— Bishop  v.  Illman,  126  P.2d 
582,  14  Wash.2d  13— Agricultural  & 
Live  Stock  Credit  Corporation  v. 
McKenzie,  289  P.  527,  157  Wash. 
597 — Jacobsen  v.  Defiance  Lumber 
Co.,  253  P.  1088,  142  Wash,  642. 

34  C.J.  p  302  note  58. 

Excusable  neglect  as  ground  for 
opening  or  vacating  Judgments 
generally  see  supra  §  280. 

The  word  "neglect,"  as  In  civil 
procedure  rule  authorizing  court  to 
set  aside  default  for  excusable  neg- 
lect, means  omission  of  proper  atten- 
tion, disregard  of  duty  from  indif- 
ference or  willfulness,  failure  to  do, 
use,  or  heed  anything1,  and  negligence. 
—Booth  v.  Central  States  Mut  Ins 
Ass'n,  15  N.W.2d  893,  235  Iowa  5. 

Carelessness  and  negligence  are 
not  akin  to  "excusable  neglect"  spec- 
ified by  statute  as  grounds  for  va- 
cating default  judgment. — Doyle  v. 
Rice  Ranch  Oil  Co.,  81  P.2d  980,  28 
Cal.App.2d  18. 

Defendant's  failure  to  answer  tro- 
ver' suit,  because  he  was  informed 
different  proceeding  would  have  to 
be  filed,  was  not  excusable  neglect. 
— Coker  v.  Eison,  151  S.E.  682,  40 
Ga.App.  835. 

Failure   to   notify   general   manager 

or  attorney 

The  president  of  board  of  direc- 
tors of  power  and  irrigation  dis- 
trict and  superintendent  of  power 
and  irrigation  were  at  feult  in  not 
notifying  district's  general  manager 


§  334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


on  the  part  of  the  person  or  official  charged  with 
the  duty  of  responding  to  the  legal  process  in  due 
time,14  and  is  such  as  might  be  expected  on  the  part 
of  a  reasonably  prudent  person  under  the  circum- 
stances;15 utter  indifference  and  inattention  to 
business  is  not  excusable  neglect,16  and  failure  to 
pay  personal  attention  to  the  case  is  inexcusable 
negligence.1?  Thus,  although  under  the  -peculiar 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case  a  different  hold- 
ing may  be  required,18  as  a  general  rule,  where 
service  of  process  has  been  made  on  a  duly  appoint- 
ed agent  who  fails  to  notify  his  principal  through 
mere  carelessness,  such  a  showing  does  not  con- 
stitute excusable  neglect,1*  but  constitutes  inexcusa- 
ble neglect,20  and  the  same  rule  applies  where  the 
agent  has  been  made  so  by  law  rather  than  by  ap- 
pointment.21 

Reliance  on  the  assurance  of  one  not  a  party  to 
the  action  that  he  will  take  care  of  the  matter  does 
not  show  such  excusable  neglect  as  would  require 
the  trial  court  to  set  aside  a  default,22  although  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case  may  be  such 
as  to  warrant  the  court,  in  the  exercise  of  its  dis- 

or  attorney  that  action  was  pend- 
ing against  the  district,  but  their 
conduct  was  not  so  inexcusable  as 
to  defeat  the  district's  right  to  a 
trial  of  the  issues  on  the  merits, 
and  hence  default  judgment  against 
the  district  would  be  set  aside  on 
motion  of  district.— Barney  v.  Platte 
Valley  Public  Power  &  Irr.  Dist., 
Neb.,  23  N.W.2d  335. 

Judgment  taken  against  petitioner, 
after  petitioner  failed  timely  to 
amend  petition,  demurrer  to  which 
was  sustained,  was  within  purview 
of  statute  authorizing  relief  from 
judgment  taken  through  excusable 
neglect,  and  order  vacating  judgment 
was  not  clear  abuse  of  trial  court's 
discretion.— Greenamyer  v.  Board  of 
Trustees  of  Lugo  Elementary  School 
Dist.  in  L.OS  Angeles  County,  2  P.2d 
848,  116  CaLApp.  319. 

14.  Cal. — Gorman       v.       California 
Transit   Co.,    248    P.    923,   199   Cal. 
246. 

Idaho.— Boise  Valley  Traction  Co.  v. 

Boise  City,   214  P.  1037,   37   Idaho 

20. 

Minn.— Whipple  v.   Mahler,   10  N.W. 
1     2d  771,  215  Minn.  578. 
Mont.— Mihelich    v.    Butte    Electric 

Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont.  60< 

St.  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co. 

Freeman,  260  P.  124,  80  Mont  266 

— Pacific  Acceptance  Corporation  v. 

McCue,  228  P.  761,  71  Mont  99. 

15.  Idaho.— Cleek   v.   Virginia   Gold 
Mining  &  Milling  Co.,  122  P.2d  232, 
63  Idaho  445 — Atwood  v.  Northern 
Pae.  Ry.  Co.,  217  P.  600,  37  Idaho 
554. 


cretion,  to  grant  the  relief.^  Negligence  of  de- 
fendant's employee  in  mislaying  a  summons  or 
failing  timely  to  notify  defendant  that  he  was  served 
has  under  varying  circumstances  been  held  to  con- 
stitute24 or  not  to  constitute25  sufficient  grounds  for 
vacating  a  default  judgment.  Neglect  attributable 
to  a  miscarriage  of  the  mails  may  be  excusable,26 
although  the  circumstances  of  the  case  may  be  such 
as  to  warrant  a  denial  of  relief.27 

Defendant's  neglect  may  be  excusable  where  de- 
fault was  entered  while  his  proposal  for  settlement 
was  pending,28  or  while  he  believed  negotiations  for 
a  settlement  were  pending,29  or  that  the  action 
against  him  had  been  ended- in  fact  by  virtue  of 
a  compromise.30  Conduct  of  defendant  in  inform- 
ing his  attorney  that  the  facts  alleged  in  the  com- 
plaint were  true  when  in  fact  they  were  not  is  in- 
excusable neglect  and  no  ground  for  setting  aside  a 
judgment  for  plaintiff  in  an  undefended  action.51 

(b)  Diligence  Required  of  Suitors 

Since  Inexcusable  negligence  knputable  to  a  party 
seeking  to  open  or  *et  aside  a  default  Judgment  may  de- 
feat the  application,  such  a  party  must  have  been  dllU 


Duty  to  give  litigation  such  atten- 
tion as  prudent  man  bestows  on 
important  business  see  infra  sub- 
division n  (5)  (b)  of  this  section. 

16.  Idaho. — Atwood  v.  Northern  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  supra. 

17.  Ga,— Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.   Scarboro,   156   S.E.   726,   42    Ga, 
App.  423. 

N.C.— Harrell  v.  Welstead,   175   S.E. 

283,  206  N.C.  817. 
Tex.— Corpna  Juris  gttoted  in  Demp- 

sey  v.  Givson,  Clv.App.,  100  S.W.2d 

430,  432. 
34  C.J.  p  300  note  39. 

18.  Held  excusable  neglect 

Act  of  foreign  corporation's  proc- 
ess agent  in  mailing  papers  to  cor- 
poration's attorney,  and  corporation'^ 
failure  to  notify  agent  of  attorney's 
discharge,  constituted  excusable  neg- 
lect.— Reynolds  v.  Gladys  Belle  Oil 
Co.,  243  P.  576,  75  Mont.  332. 

19.  Ariz.— Postal  Benefit  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Johnson,  165  P.2d  173. 

Del.— Penn  Central  Light  &  Power 
Co.  v.  Central  Eastern  Power  Co., 
171  A.  332,  6  W.W.Harr.  74. 

111. — Marabia  v.  Mary  Thompson 
Hospital  of  Chicago  for  Women 
and  Children,  140  N.E.  836,  309 
111.  147. 

Iowa. — Lawler  r.  Roman  Catholic 
Mut  Protective  Soc.  of  Iowa,  197 
N.W.  633,  198  Iowa  233. 

20.  Ariz. — Postal  Benefit  Ins.  Co.  v, 
Johnson,  165  P.2d  173. 

Ky. — Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v, 
Ditto,  269  S.W.  527,  207  Ky.  434. 

21.  Ariz. — Postal  Benefit  Ins.  Co.  v 
Johnson,  165  P.2d  173. 

630 


Service  on  corporation  commission 

Where  service  of  process  in  suit 
against  benefit  insurance  company 
was  made  on  chairman  of  corpora- 
tion commission,  as  authorized  by 
statute,  proof  that  summons  was 
placed  in  files  of  the  commission, 
uid  nothing  further  done  to  advise- 
defendant  company  of  the  summons* 
did  not  establish  "excusable  neglect", 
so  as  to  authorize  setting  aside  de- 
fault judgment. — Postal  Benefit  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Johnson,  supra. 

22.  Ind.— Carty  v.   Toro,   57  N.E.23 
434. 

23.  Idaho.— Ward    v.    Burley    State 
Bank,  225  P.  497,  38  Idaho  764. 

34  C.J.  p  304  note  66. 

4.    Pa.— McDevitt  v.  Teague,  89  Pa. 
Super.  332. 

25.  Tex. — San  Antonio  Paper  Co.  v» 
Morgan,   Civ.App.,    53    S.W.2d    651» 
error  dismissed. 

26.  Mont — Reynolds  v.  Gladys  Belle- 
Oil  Co.,   243   P.   576,   75   Mont.   332. 

Tex.— Yellow    Transit    Co.    v.    Klaff,. 
Civ.App.,  145  S.W.2d  264. 

27.  Tex. — Texas  Indemnity  Ins.  Co.. 
v.  Rice,  Civ.App.,  271  S.W.  134. 

28.  Or. — Peters  v.  Dietrich,  27  P.24 
1015,  145  Or.  589. 

29.  Or.— Peters   v.   Dietrich,    supra. 

30.  Philippine.— Salazar   v.    Salazar: 
8  Philippine  183. 

31.  g.D. — Rose  v.  Babington,  263  K 
W.  557,  64  S.D.  8. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  334 


gent  and  free  from  culpable  neglect  In  the  proceedings 
leading  up  to  the  default,  and  must  not  have  ignored 
a  writ  willfully  or  through  inattention  or  forgetful  ness, 
or  neglected  to  retain  an  attorney. 

In  order  to  open  or  set  aside  a  default  judgment 
regularly  obtained  by  due  process  of  law,  the  party 


complaining  must  have  been  diligent  in  the  proceed- 
ings leading  up  to  the  default32  and  free  from  culpa- 
ble neglect;33  inexcusable  negligence  imputable  to 
the  applicant  may  defeat  the  application,34  but 
where  the  judgment  is  evidently  unjust  a  certain 


32.  Ga. — Flanigan  v.  Hutchins,  138 
S.B.  793,  164  Ga,  313— Fraser  v. 
Neese,  137  S.B.  550,  163  Ga.  843— 
Fitzgerald  v.  Ferran,  124  S.E.  530, 
158  Ga,  755. 

111.— Harris  v.  Juenger,  7  N.E.2d  376, 
289  IlLApp.  467,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  11  N.B.2d  929,  367  111.  478 
— Whalen  v.  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.,  280  IlLApp.  596,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.  v.  Whalen,  56  S.Ct.  590, 
297  U.S.  714,  80  L.Ed.  1000. 

Ky. — Zimmerman  v.  Segal,  155  S.W. 
2d  20,  288  Ky.  33. 

Md. — Dixon  v.  Baltimore  American 
Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  188  A.  215, 
171  Md.  695. 

N.C. — Carter  v.  Anderson,  181  S.B. 
750,  208  N.C.  529. 

Okl.— Wheeler  v.  Walker,  294  P.  641, 
147  Okl.  63. 

Tex.— Humphrey  v.  Harrell,  Civ.App., 
19  S.W.2d  .410,  affirmed,  Com.App., 
29  S.W.2d  963— Welsch  v.  Keeton, 
Civ.App.,  287  S.W.  692— Thomas  v. 
Goldberg,  Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  230 
— Cauble  v.  Key,  Civ.App.,  256  S. 
W.  654. 

Wyo.— Kelley  v.  Eidam,  231  P.  678, 
32  Wyo.  271. 

34  C.J.  p  305  note  70. 

."Diligence  required  of  suitors  in  pro- 
ceedings : 

Trading  up  to  judgment  general- 
ly see  supra  §  280. 
To  oaen  or  vacate  default  see  in- 
fra §  337. 

:33.  Ala. — Harnischfeger  Sales  Co.  v. 
Burge,  129  So.  37,  221  Ala.  387— 
Dulin  v.  Johnson,  113  So.  397,  216 
Ala.  393. 

_Ariz. — Brown  v.  Beck,  169  P.2d  855 
— Postal  Benefit  Ins.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 165  P.2d  173— Perrin  v.  Per- 
Tin  Properties,  86  P.2d  23,  53  Ariz. 
121,  122  A.L.R.  621— Beltran  v. 
Roll,  7  P.2d  248,  39  Ariz.  417. 

JLrk. — Bickerstaff  v.  Harmonia  Fire 
Ins.  Co.,  133  S.W.2d  890,  199  Ark. 
424. 

'Cal. — Elms  v.  Elms,  App.,  164  P.2d 
936— Hughes  v.  Wright,  149  P.2d 
392,  64  Cal.App.2d  897— Weinberger 
v.  Manning,  123  P.2d  531,  50  Cal. 
App.2d  494 — Gordon  v.  Harbolt, 
App.,  280  P.  701,  rehearing  denied 
281  P.  1048. 

'111. — Bird-Sykes  Co.  v.  McNamara, 
252  IlLApp.  262. 

'Iowa. — Ryan  v.  Phcanix  Ins.  Co.  of 
Hartford,  Conn.,  215  N.W.  749, 
205  Iowa  655. 

JiKy. — Bond  v.  W.  T.  Congleton  Co., 
129  S.W.2d  570,  278  Ky.  829. 

.Mo. — Williams  v.  Barr,   App.,   61  S. 


W.2d  420— Case  v.  Arky,  App.,  253 
S.W.  484. 

N.Y. — Dewey  v.  Agostini  Bros.  Bldg. 
Corporation,  283  N.Y.S.  174,  246 
App.Div.  667. 

N.C.— Crye  v.  Stoltz,  138  S.B.  167, 
193  N.C.  802. 

N.D. — Moos  v.  Northwestern  Im- 
provement Co.,  6  N.W.2d  73,  72 
N.D.  223. 

Tex. — Yellow  Transit  Co.  v.  KlafC, 
Civ.App.,  145  S.W.2d  264— Dempsey 
v.  Gibson,  Civ.App.,  100  S.W.2d 
430— Briggs  v.  Ladd,  Civ.App.,  64 
S.W.2d  389 — Homuth  v.  Williams, 
Civ.App.,  42  S.W.2d  1048— Hooser 
v.  Wolfe,  Civ.App.,  30  S.W.2d  728 
— Humphrey  v.  Harrell,  Civ.App., 
19  S.W.2d  410,  affirmed,  Com.App., 
29  S.W.2d  963 — Colorado  River 
Syndicate  Subscribers  v.  Alexan- 
der, Civ. App.,  288  S.W.  586— Stou- 
denmeier  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  Civ. 
App.,  246 -S.W.  761. 

W.Va.— Winona  Nat.  Bank  v.  Frid- 
'  ley,  10  S.B.2d  907,  122  W.Va.  479 
—State  ex  rel.  Alkire  v.  Mili,  180 
S.E.  183,  116  W.Va.  277— Gainer 
v.  Smith,  132  S.E.  744,  101  W.Va. 
314— Ellis  v.  Gore,  132  S.E.  741, 
101  W.Va.  273— Hill  v.  Long,  150 
S.E.  6,  107  W.Va.  664— Sands  v. 
Sands,  138  S.E.  463,  103  W.Va.  701. 

34  C.J.  p  305  note  70. 

34.  Ariz. — Garden  Development  Co. 
v.  Carlaw,  263  P.  625,  33  Ariz.  232. 

Ark. — Magnolia  Grocer  Co.  v.  Farrar, 
115  S.W.2d  1094,  195  Ark.  1069— 
Stewart  v.  California  Grape  Juice 
Corporation,  29  S.W.2d  1077,  181 
Ark.  1140. 

Cal.— Hughes  v.  Wright,  149  P.2d 
392,  64  Cal.App.2d  897— Bodin  v. 
Webb,  62  P.2d  155,  17  Cal.App.2d 
422— W.  J.  Wallace  &  Co.  v.  Grow- 
ers Sec.  Bank,  57  P.2d  998,  13  Cal.. 
App.2d  743 — Essig  v.  Seaman,  264 
P.  552,  89  CaLApp.  295— Brennan 
v.  Weissbaum,  245  P.  1104,  77  Cal. 
App.  120 — Rudy  v.  Slotwinsky,  238 
P.  783,  73  CaLApp.  459. 

Ga. — Flanigan  v.  Hutchins,  138  S.E. 
793,  164  Ga.  313. 

Idaho. — Cleek  v.  Virginia  Gold  Min- 
ing &  Milling  Co.,  122  P.2d  232,  63 
Idaho  445. 

111.— Maclaskey  v.  Kurz,  45  N.E.2d 
566,  316  IlLApp.  671— Gray  v.  Kro- 
ger Grocery  &  Baking  Co.,  13  N.E. 
2d  672,  294  IlLApp.  151— Alfred  M. 
Best  Co.  v.  Index  Pub.  Co.,  9  N.E. 
2d  439,  291  IlLApp.  612— Whalen 
v.  Twin  City  Barge  &  Gravel  Co., 
280  IlLApp.  596,  certiorari  denied 
Twin  City  Barge  &  Gravel  Co.  v. 
Whalen,  56  S.CL  ,590,  297  U.S.  714, 
80  L.Ed.  1000— Lynn  v.  Multhauf, 

631 


279     IlLApp.     210 — Travelers     Ins. 
Co.   v;  Wagner,    279   IlLApp.   13. 

Ind.— Gibson  v.  Searcy,  137  N.E.  182t 
192  Ind.  515. 

Iowa.— Dewell  v.  Suddick,  232  N.W. 
118,  211  Iowa  1352 — Bossenberger 
v.  Bossenberger,  229  N.W.  833,  210 
Iowa  825 — Anderson,  v.  Anderson, 
229  N.W.  694,  209  Iowa  1143— 
Lawler  v.  Roman  Catholic  Mut. 
Protective  Soc.  of  Iowa,  197  N.W. 
633,  198  Iowa  233. 

Ky. — Zimmerman  v.  Segal,  155  S.W. 
2d  20,  288  Ky.  33 — Kengreen  Gas 
Utilities  Corporation  v.  Crozer,  51 
S.W.2d  262,  244  Ky.  440. 

Md. — Moss  v.  Annapolis  Sav.  Inst.,  8 
A.2d  881,  177  Md.  135. 

Miss. — Strain  v.  Gayden,  20  So.2d 
697,  197  Miss.  353. 

N.H. — Lewellyn  v.  Follansbee,  47  A. 
2d  572. 

N.Y.— Allen  v.  Lake,  198  N.Y.S.  815, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  201  N. 
Y.S.  882,  207  App.Div.  886 — Dewey 
v.  Agostini  Bros.  Bldg.  Corpora- 
tion, 283  N.Y.S.  174,  246  App.Div. 
667. 

N.C.— Standard  Fertilizer  Co.  v. 
Whorton,  195  S.E.  349,  213  N.C. 
211 — Carolina  Discount  Corpora- 
tion v.  Butler,  158  S.E.  249,  200 
N.C.  709— Strickland  v.  Shearon, 
137  S.E.  803,  193  N.C.  599. 

Okl, — Johnson  v.  Bearden  Plumbing 
&  Heating  Co.,  38  P.2d  500,  170 
Okl.  63. 

Pa.— Hamilton  v.  Sechrist,  16  A.2d 
671,  142  Pa.Super.  354— In  re 
Stroud's  Estate,  22  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
591,  40  Dauph.Co.  207 — Cook  v. 
Jenkins,  21  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  381,  19 
West  Co.  166 — Rusynyk  v.  Holy 
Resurrection  Russian  Orthodox 
Greek  Catholic  Church,  Com.PL,  23 
WastuCo.  87. 

Philippine. — Dougherty  v.  Evangelis- 
ta,  7  Philippine  37— Adela  v.  Judge 
of  Court  of  First  Instance  of  no- 
cos  Sur,  6  Philippine  674. 

RX — Tew  v.  Rhode  Island  Coach  Co., 
133  A.  660 — Charles  B.  Maguire  Co. 
v.  Miller,  118  A.  625. 

S.D. — Languein  v.  Olson,  227  N.W. 
369,  56  S.D.  1. 

Tex. — San  Antonio  Paper  Co.  v.  Moi> 
gan,  Civ.App.,  53  S.W.2d  651,  er- 
ror dismissed — Hooser  v.  Wolfe, 
Civ.App.,  30  S.W.2d  728— St.  Paul 
Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Earnest, 
Civ.App.,  293  S.W.  677,  affirmed 
2961  S.W,  1088,  116  Tex.  565— Colo- 
rado River  Syndicate  Subscribers 
v.  Alexander,  Civ.App.,  288  S.W. 
586. 

Wash.— Riddell  v.  David,  23  P.2d  22. 
173  Wash.  370. 

W.Va.— Sands  v.  Sands,  138  S.E.  468, 


§  334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


degree  of  neglect  may  be  held  excusable,85  and  it 
has  been  held,  considering  the  language  of  control- 
ling statutes  and  the  circumstances  of  their  enact- 
ment, that  a  party's  mere  negligence  is  not  fatal  to 
the  exercise  of  discretion  to  vacate  a  final  judg- 
ment against  him  pursuant  to  an  interlocutory  judg- 
ment of  default.86  During  the  term  at  which  it  was 
rendered,  moreover,  a  default  judgment  may  be  va- 
cated in  the  Discretion  of  the  court  notwithstand- 
ing defendant's  negligence.87 

A  person  of  mature  years  and  judgment  may  not 
idly  ignore  a  summons  to  defend  an  action,88  and  the 
courts  will  seldom  relieve  one  who  has  disregarded 
the  command  of  a  writ  willfully39  or  through  mere 
inattention  or  neglect40  or  sheer  forgetfulness,41  or 
who  ignores  a  notice  that  on  a  specified  date  plain- 


tiff will  apply  for  a  default  judgment,42  or  who 
willfully  slumbers  on  his  rights  and  makes  no  ef- 
fort to  protect  himself.43  So  a  party  will  not  be 
relieved  from  a  judgment  taken  against  him  with 
his  knowledge  and  on  his  willful  default,44  as 
where  the  default  was  suffered  as  a  part  of  a  policy 
of  intentional  delay  on  the  part  of  defendant,4*  or 
where  the  judgment  was  not  due  to  an  oversight, 
but  was  the  result  of  a  decision,  after  deliberation, 
not  to  defend,46  although  thereafter  he  changes  his 
mind  and  desires  to  defend  because  of  changing  cir- 
cumstances.47 

Furthermore,  in  order  to  be  able  to  set  aside  a 
judgment  for  excusable  neglect,  a  party  must  give 
the  litigation  such  attention  as  a  man  of  ordinary 
prudence  usually  bestows  on  important  business.4* 


103    W.Va.    701 — Gainer   v.    Smith,  ] 
132    S.E.    744,    101    W.Va.    314. 

34  C-J.  p  305  note  70. 

Effect  of  negligence  where  applica- 
tion  based    on    unavoidable    casu- 
alty or  misfortune  see  infra  sub- 
division n   (7)   of  this  section. 
Negligence  of  defendant's  insurer 

has  been  held  imputable  to  defend-. 

ant,   thus  defeating  the  application. 

— Homuth  v.  Williams,  Tex.Civ.App., 

42  S.W.2d  1048. 

35.  Or.— Astoria  Sav.  Bank  v.  Nor- 
mand,   267   P.   524,   125  Or.  347. 

36.  N.M.— -Dyne  v.  McCullough,  9  P. 
2d    385,    36    N.M.    122— Gilbert    v. 
New  Mexico  Const.  Co.,  295  P.  291, 
35  N.M.  262. 

37.  Okl.— Illinois  Electric  Porcelain 
Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  Const  Corporation, 
117  P.2d  106,   189   Okl.  336. 

Jurisdiction  and  power  to  vacate  de- 
fault Judgment  during  term  see 
supra  §  333. 

38.  111. — Stasel   v.   American  Home 
Security  Corporation,  199  N.E.  798, 
362  111.  350,  affirming  279  111.  App. 
172. 

Ind.— Carty  V.  Torro,  57  N.E.2d  434. 

39.  Wash.— Larson  v.  Zabroski,  152 
P.2d  154,   21  Wash.2d  572,  opinion 
adhered  to  155  P.2d  284,  21  Wash. 
2d  572 — Bishop  v.  Illman,  126  P.2d 
582,  14  Wash.2d  13— Rule  v.  Som- 
ervill,  274  P.  177,  150  Wash.  605 — 
Jacobsen  v.  Defiance  Lumber  Co., 
253  P.   1088,   142  Wash.   642. 

40.  111. — Gray  v.  Kroger  Grocery  & 
Baking  Co.,  13  N.E.2d  672,  294  111. 
App.  151 — Giles  v.  Grady  &  Neary 
Ink   Co.,  8  N.B.2d  120,  284  IlLApp. 
651. 

Ky.— Kengreen  Gas  Utilities  Corpo- 
ration v.  Crozer,  51  S.W.2d  262, 
244  Ky.  440. 

•Rfash. — Larson  v.  Zabroski,  152  P.2d 
154,  21  Wash.2d  572,  opinion  ad- 
hered to  155  P.2d  284,  21  Wash.2d 
572— Rule  v.  Somervill,  274  P. 
177,  150  Wash.  605. 


Mislaying1  summons  and  complaint 

Denial  of  motion  to  open  default 
Judgment  on  ground  that  summons 
and  complaint  were  mislaid  in  the 
confusion  of  moving  and  forgotten 
was  not  an  abuse  of  discretion. — 
Whipple  v.  Mahler,  10  N.W.2d  771, 
215  Minn.  578. 
Preoccupation  with  other  matters 

Fact  that  original  notice  was 
served  on  defendant's  president  at 
his  residence  while  he  was  working 
in  yard  during  afternoon  after  de- 
fendant's office  was  closed,  and  facts 
that  his  duties  as  president  were 
principally  confined  to  defendant's 
production  and  that  he  had  nothing 
to  do  with  its  claim  department,  and 
fact  that  he  devoted  much  time  to 
supervision  of  drives  for  war  bond 
sales,  made  over  three  months  after 
such  service,  were  not  reasonable  ex- 
cuses for  defendant's  default  and 
hence  afforded  no  basis  for  its  mo- 
tion to  set  aside  default  on  ground 
of  excusable  neglect— Booth  v.  Cen- 
tral States  Mut  Ins.  Ass'n,  15  N.W. 
2d  893,  235  Iowa  5. 

41.  S.C.— Rutledge  v.  Junior  Order 
of  United  American  Mechanics,  193 
S.E.  434.  185  S.C.  142. 

42.  Colo. — Mountain  v.  Stewart,  149 
P.2d  176,  112  Colo.  302. 

43.  Cal.— Williams  v.  McQueen,  265 
P.  339,  89  Cal.App.  659. 

Minn.— Barwald  v.  Thuet,  195  N.W. 

768,  157  Minn.  94. 
Pa. — Caromono    v.    Garman,    42    Pa. 

Dist.    &   Co.    96,   affirmed   23   A.2d 

92,  147  Pa.Super.  1. 
Notice  of  orders  or  decrees 

As  respects  negligence  in  suffer- 
ing default,  litigants  were  chargea- 
ble with  notice  of  orders  and  de- 
crees, made  by  the  court  in  their 
case,  especially  when  entered  on  the 
date  set  for  action  thereon,  with  no- 
tice to  litigants  of  such  setting.— Ty- 
ler v.  Henderson,  Tex.Civ.App.,  162 
S.W.2d  170,  error  refused. 

632 


44.  N.T.— Messing  v.  Mattikow,  107 
N.T.S.  620,  120  Misc.  68. 

Wash. — Bishop    v.    Illman,   126    P.2d 
>82,  14  Wash.2d  13. 

45.  Cal. — Steineck   v.    Coleman.    236 
P.  962,  72  CaLApp.  244. 

46.  Idaho. — Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92 
P.2d  1053,  60  Idaho  464,  124  A.L.R. 
149. 

y. — Bond  v.  W.  T.  Congleton  Co., 
129  S.W.2d  570,  278  Ky.  829. 
N.T. — Booraem  v.  Gibbons,  34  N.T.S. 
2d  198,  263  App.Div.  665,  appeal 
denied  35  N.T.S.2d  717,  264  App. 
DJv.  768— Tabakin  v.  Preiman,  217 
N.T.S.  378,  217  App.Div.  665— 
Demuth  v.  Kemp,  129  N.T.S.  249, 
144  App.Div.  287 — Clark  v.  Pear- 
sail,  252  N.T.S.  556,  141  Misc.  387 
— Schlegel  v.  Wagner,  29  N.T.S.2d 
389. 

Pa.— Kanai  v.  Sowa,  167  A.  429,  109 
Pa.Super.  426. 

"Where  a  party  suffers  an  inten- 
tional default  and  abandons  its 
cause,  and  judgment  results  there- 
from, there  is,  in  fact,  no  default, 
and  the  judgment  may  not  be  vacat- 
ed."— Colonial  Fuel  Corporation  v. 
Kahn,  211  N.T.S.  50,  52,  214  App. 
Div.  83. 

47.  Idaho.— Mason  v.   Pelkes,   59   P. 
2d  1087,  57  Idaho  10,  certiorari  de- 
nied   Pelkes    v.    Mason,    57    S.Ct. 
319,  299  U.S.  615,  81  L.Ed.  453. 

Ky. — Bond  v.  W.   T.   Congleton  Co., 

129  S.W.2d  670,  278  Ky.  829. 
43.    N.C. — Sutherland  v.  McLean,  154 

S.E.  662,  199  N.C.  345. 
Excusable    neglect    as    that    which 
might  be  expected  on  part  of  pru- 
dent  person   under   circumstances 
see  supra  subdivision  n  (5)  (a)  of 
this  section. 
Rule  criticized 

"We  do  not  think  the  requests 
[resting  on  the  proposition  that 
whatever  is  or  ought  to  be  the  con- 
duct of  the  reasonable  man  in  stat- 
ed circumstances  sets  the  standard 
by  which  all  must  be  Judged  and  by 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  334 


Thus  he  must,  unless  he  means  to  try  his  own  case, 
retain  an  attorney  practicing  in  the  particular 
court,49  and  see  that  the  attorney  understands  and 
accepts  the  retainer,5**  and  in  case  his  counsel  dies, 
or  withdraws,  or  is  discharged  from  the  case  he 
must  promptly  engage  another.51  It  is  the  duty  of 
a  party  to  take  account  of  the  time  and  place  of 
holding  court,  the  position  of  the  case  on  the  calen- 
dar, and  the  state  of  the  calendar,62  and  to  keep 
himself  informed  of  the.  progress  of  the  case,  when 
it  is  set  for  trial,  or  when  it  is  likely  to  be  reached,53 
and  then  to  attend  court  prepared  to  establish  his 
case,54  but  it  has  been  held  that  a  client  may  rely 
on  his  counsel  to  inform  him  as  to  the  time  the 
case  will  be  set  for  trial  and  to  advise  him  as  to 
all  matters  necessary  to  a  proper  presentation  of 
the  case  to  the  court.55 

(6)  Negligence,  Mistake,  or  Misconduct  of 
Counsel 

(a)  In  general 

(b)  Negligence 

(c)  Mistake  as  to  time  or  place  of  ap- 

pearance or  trial 

(d)  Ignorance  or  mistake  of  law 


(e)  Erroneous  advice 

(f)  Misconduct 

(g)  Misunderstanding: 

(a)  In  General 

Generally  a  default  judgment  may  be  opened  or  va- 
cated for  the  excusable,  but  not  the  inexcusable,  neg- 
lect or  surprise,  or  mistake  or  oversight  of  counsel  for 
the  party  against  whom  the  default  was  taken. 

The  general  rule  is  that  a  default  judgment  may 
be  opened  or  vacated  for  the  excusable  neglect  or 
surprise56  or  mistake  or  oversight57  of  counsel  for 
the  party  against  whom  the  default  was  taken.  The 
law  does  not  look  with  favor,  however,  on  setting 
aside  defaults  resulting  from  inexcusable  inadver- 
tence, surprise,  or  neglect  of  attorneys  in  the  per- 
formance of  their  duties  to  their  clients.58  Such 
failure  on  the  part  of  attorneys  ordinarily  is  im- 
putable  to  their  clients,  unless  their  default  can  be 
excused  as  being  the  result  of  accident  or  surprise, 
that  which  ordinary  prudence  on  their  part  could 
not  have  avoided.59  So  it  has  been  said  that  mis- 
takes of  one's  counsel,  unaccompanied  by  fraud, 
accident,  or  improper  conduct  of  the  opposite  side, 
are  not  ground  for  setting  aside  a  judgment  by  de- 


which  sound  judicial  discretion  must 
•  be  bounded]  state  accurately  the 
pertinent  rule  of  law.  One  may  be 
stupid  or  ignorant,  or  otherwise 
under  disability  so  as  not  to  be  ca- 
pable of  exercising:  reasonable  care 
and  diligence  with  respect  to  an 
action  brought  against  him  in  court, 
and  yet  be  found  by  the  court,  even 
after  judgment  has  been  entered 
against  him,  to  have  such  a  mer- 
itorious defence  as  to  be  the  victim 
of  injustice  if  the  judgment  is  al- 
lowed to  stand.  In  such  circum- 
stances, the  law  does  not  prevent 
remedial  action." — Manzi  v.  Carlson, 
180  N.B.  134,  137,  278  Mass.  267. 
49.  Ga.— Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co. 

v.    Scarboro,   156   S.B.   726,   42   Gteu 

App.  423. 

Idaho.— Cleek  v.  Virginia  Gold  Min- 
ing  &    Milling   Co.,    122    P.2d    232, 

63   Idaho  445— Boyle  v.  Miles,  288 

P.  893,  49  Idaho  412. 
Ind. — Carty  v.  Torro,  57  N.E.2d  434. 
N.C.— Harrell   v.   Welstead,   175    S.E. 

283,    206    N.C.    817— Sutherland    v. 

McLean,    154    S.E.    662,    199    N.C. 

345. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dempsey 

y.     Givson,    £iv.App.,    100    S.W.2d 

430,  432— Thomas  v.  Goldberg,  Civ. 

App.,  283  S.W.  230 — Caubte  v.  Key, 

Civ.App.,  256  S.W.  654. 
34  C.J.  p  306  note  71. 
Inability  after  exercise  of  due  dili- 
gence 

Where  defendant  had  used  dili- 
gence to  procure  an  attorney  to  rep- 
resent him,  but  failed  because  of  re- 


fusal of  one  attorney  to  act,  absence 
of  another,  and  defendant's  own  ill- 
ness, it  was  an  abuse  of  discretion 
to  deny  relief. — Landgraf  v.  Muchow, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  102  S.W.2d  308. 
Reliance  on  advioe  of  another's  at- 
torney 

Surety  on  forthcoming  bond  can- 
not have  new  trial  after  default,  on 
showing  of  reliance  on  advice  of  at- 
torney for  attachment  defendant. — 
Holbrook  v.  Holbrook,  288  S.W.  1039, 
217  Ky.  77. 

50.  N.Y. — Dewey   v.   Agostini   Bros. 
Bldg.   Corporation,   283  N.T.S.   174, 
246  App.Div.   667. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Dempsey 
v.  Gibson,  Civ.App.,  100  S.W.2d  430, 
432. 

34  C.J.  p  300  note  39,  p  306  note  72. 

Mistak-e  as  to  employment  of  coun- 
sel as  ground  for  vacating  default 
judgment  see  supra  subdivision  n 
(2)  (e)  of  this  section. 

51.  Cal.— Hughes  v.  Wright,  149  P. 
2d  392,  64  Cal. App. 2 d  897. 

Idaho. — Cleek  v.  Virginia  Gold  Min- 
ing &  Milling  Co.,  122  P.2d  232,  63 
Idaho  445. 

Ky. — Zimmerman-  v.  Segal,  155  S.W. 
2d  20,  288  Ky.  33. 

34  C.J.  p  306  note  73. 

52.  Wyo. — Corpus     Juris     cited    in 
Boulter  v.  Cook,  234  P.  -1101,  1104, 
32  Wyo.  461,  rehearing  denied  236 
P.  245,  32  Wyo.  461. 

34  OJ.  p  299  note  27,  p  307  notes  77, 
78. 

53.  Ark.— Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co. , 

633 


v.  Duty,  126  S.W.2d  921,   197  Ark. 
1118. 

54.  Ala. — McCord     v.     Harrison     & 
Stringer,  93   So.  428,  207  Ala.  480. 

34  C.J.  p  307  note  79. 

55.  Okl.— Hale  v.   Mclntosh,   243  P. 
157,  116  Okl.  40. 

56.  Colo. — Beyer  v.  Petersen,  21  P. 
2d  1115,  92  Colo.  462. 

34  C.J.  p  307  note  80. 

Negligence,  mistake,  or  misconduct 
of  counsel  as  ground  for  opening 
or  vacating  judgments  generally 
see  supra  §§  279,  280. 

57.  Pa,— Pinsky  v.   Master,   23  A.2d 
727,  343  Pa.  451 — Curran  v.  James 
Regulator  Co.,  36  A.2d  187,  154  Pa, 
Super.  261 — Horning  v.  David,  8  A. 
2d  729,  137  Pa.Super.  252— Planters 
Nut    &    Chocolate    Co.    v.    Brown- 
Murray  Co.,  193  A.  381,  128  Pa, Su- 
per.   239 — Kanai    v.    Sowa,    167    A. 
429,    109    Pa,Super.    426— Page    v. 
Patterson,   161  A.  878,   105   Pa.Su- 
per.  438 — Robert  Baile  Co.  v.  Stong 
&    Stong,     84    Pa.  Super.    241 — Le- 
schinski  v.  W.  C.  Hack  &  Sons,  47 
Pa.Dist   &   Co.    475 — Stevenson   v. 
Rhoades,  Com. PI.,  25  Wash. Co.  82. 

34  OJ.  p  310  note  94. 

58.  Cal. — People's  Finance  &  Thrift 
Co;  of  Porterville  v.  Phoenix  Assur. 
Co.,  Limited,  of  London,  285  P.  857, 
104  Cal. App.  334. 

59.  Cal. — People's  Finance  &  Thrift 
Co.  of  Porterville  v.  Phceniac  Assur. 
Co.,  Limited,  of  London,  supra. 


334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


fault60  In  the  determination  of  motions  to  set 
aside  defaults,  mistakes  of  attorneys  and  those  of 
parties  to  the  action  are  to  be  measured  by  the 
same  rules.61 

(b)  Negligence 

Although  negligence  of  counsel  does  not  necessarily 
bap  relief,  generally  a  client  cannot  be  relieved  from  a 
default  Judgment  taken  against  him  in  consequence  of 
the  neglect,  carelessness,  forgetfulness,  or  inattention  of 


his  attorney  unless  such   neglect  was  excusable   under 
the  circumstances. 

As  a  general  rule,  the  negligence  of  an  Attor- 
ney is  imputable  to  his  client,  and  the  latter  cannot 
be  relieved  from  a  default  judgment  taken  against 
him  in  consequence  of  the  neglect,  carelessness,  for- 
getfulness,  or  inattention  of  the  former"  unless 
the  neglect  was  excusable  under  the  circumstanc- 
es.63 This  rule  applies  where  the  negligence  of 


60.  Tex.— St.    Paul    Fire   &   Marine 
Ins.   Co.  v.  Earnest,   Civ. App.,   293 
S.W.   677,  affirmed  296   S.W.   1088, 
116  Tex.  565. 

61.  CaL— Morgan     v.     Brothers     of 
Christian  Schools,   92  P.2d  925,  34 
Cal.App.2d  14. 

"Ordinarily  a  party  will  not  be 
relieved  from  a  judgment  or  decree 
taken  against  him  through  the  mis- 
take, negligence,  or  inadvertence 
of  his  attorney,  unless  the  act  or 
omission  of  the  attorney  was  such 
that  had  it  been  committed  or  omit- 
ted by  the  party  himself,  he  would 
be  entitled  to  a  vacation  of  the  judg- 
ment or  decree." — Carlson  v.  Bank- 
ers' Discount  Corporation,  215  P.  986 
988,  107  Or.  686.' 

62.  Ala. — Brown  v.  Brown,  105  So. 
171,  213  Ala.  339. 

CaL— Flores  v.  Smith,  117  P.2d  712, 
47  CaL  App.  2d  253 — Zuver  v.  Gener- 
al Development  Co.,  28  P.2d  939, 
136  CaLApp.  411— IT.  S.  v.  Dues- 
dieker,  5  P.2d  916,  118  CaLApp. 
723— Massimino  v.  Taranto,  292  P. 
139,  108  CaLApp.  692. 

Ga.— Smith  v.  Cone,  156  S.B.  612 
171  Ga.  697 — Strother  v.  Harper, 
136  S.E.  828,  36  Ga.App.  445. 

Idaho.— Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92  P.2d 
1053,  60  Idaho  464,  124  A.L.R.  149 

111.— Whalen  v.  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.,  280  IlLApp.  596,  certio- 
rari  denied  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.  v.  Whalen,  56  S.Ct 
590,  297  U.S.  714,  80  L.Bd.  1000 — 
Travelers  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wagner,  279 
111. App.  13 — Gaines  v.  Chicago  Rys 
Co.,  255  IlLApp.  30. 

Ind.— Smith  v.  Heyns,  186  N.B.  563 
78  Ind.App.  565. 

Iowa,— Pride  v.  Kittrell,  257  N.W 
204,  218  Iowa  1247— Anderson  v 
Anderson,  229  N.W.  694,  209  Iowa 
1143— Iowa  Cord  Tire  Co.  v.  Bab 
bitt,  192  N.W.  431,  195  Iowa  922— 
Starkey  v.  Porter  Tractor  Co, 
N.W.  135. 

Mass. — Kravetz  v.  Lipofsky,  200  N.E 
865,  294  Mass.  80. 

Mich.— Petersen  v.  Moynihan,  220  N 
W.  791,  243  Mich.  600. 

Miss. — Britton    v.    Beltzhoover,    11 

So.  346,  147  Miss.  737. 
Mo. — O'Connell  v.  Dockery,  App.,  10 

S.W.2d  748. 
Mont— Mihelich    v.    Butte    Blectri 

"  Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont.  60 
— St  Germain  v.  Vollmer,  216  P 
788,  68  Mont  264. 


sreb.— Lyman  v.  Dunn,  252  N.W.  197, 
125  Neb.   770 — Beem  v.  Davis,  195 
N.W.  948,  111  Neb.  96. 
Sev. — Guardia  v.  Guardia,  229  P.  386, 

48  Nev.  230. 
tf.j. — O'Neill  v.  Hendrickson,  147  A. 

721,  7  N.J.Misc.  1022. 
>hio. — Lazarus  v.   Cleveland  House- 
hold Supply  Co.,  154  N.B.  343,  23 
Ohio  App.  15. 
Okl.— Grayson  T.  Stith,  72  P.2d  820, 

181  Okl.  131,  114  A.KR.  276. 
Pa. — Schweikart    v.    American    Slic- 
ing Mach.  Co.,  173  A.  427,  113  Pa. 
Super.    485— Derbyshire    Bros.    v. 
McManamy,  101  Pa.Super.  514. 
S.C.— Poston  v.   State  Highway  De- 
partment,   5    S.B.2d    729,    192    S.C. 
137. 

S.D.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Smith  v. 
Wordeman,  240  N.W.  325,  326,  59 
S.D.  368. 

Tex.— Briggs  v.  Ladd,  Civ.App.,  64 
S.W.2d  389— Hubbard  v.  Tallal, 
Civ.App.,  57  S.W.2d  226,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  and  a-ppeal  dis- 
missed 92  S.W.2d  1022,  127  Tex. 
242— St-  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Earnest,  Civ. App.,  293  S.W. 
677,  affirmed  296  S.W.  1088,  116 
Tex.  565. 

Wash.— Wolfe  v.  Henry  Gerlich  Tie 
&  Timber  Co.,  211  P.  753,  123 
Wash.  70. 

34  C.J.  p  307  note  81. 
Neglect  of  attorney  timely  to  file 
pleading  as  surprise  on  client  war- 
ranting vacation  of  default  judg- 
ment see  supra  subdivision  n  (3) 
of  this  section. 

Negligence  of  counsel  as  ground  for 
opening  or  vacating  judgments 
generally  see  supra  §  280. 
Bule  held  inapplicable  where  de 
fendant's  lessor  agreed  but  neg 
lected  to  defend  any  suit  brought  by 
plaintiff.— Sofuye  v.  Pieters-Wheelei 
Seed  Co.,  216  P.  990,  62  CaLApp.  198 
Repudiation. 

Defendant  niay  not  repudiate  at 
torney  of  record  after  trial  resulting 
in  adverse  judgment  in  order  to  hav 
judgment  set  aside.— Hendricks  v 
Town  of  Cherry ville,  153  S.B.  112 
198  N.C,  659. 

63.  cal. — Bonfilio  v.  Ganger,  140  P 
2d  861,  60  Cal.App.2d  405— Potts  v 
Whitson,  125  P.2d  947,  52  CaLApp 
2d  199— Hicks  v.  Sanders,  104  P.2 
549,  40  Cal.App.2d  211— Stub  v 
Harrison,  96  P.2d  979,  35  CaLApp 
2d  685. 

634 


olo. — Drinkard    v.    Spencer,    211    P. 

379,  72  Colo.  396. 
Fla.— Segel   v.   Staiber,   144   So.    875, 

106  Fla.  946. 

.1.— Haller  v.  Rieth,  247  IlLApp.  541. 
£y. — South    Mountain    Coal    Co.    v. 

Rowland,    265    S.W.    320,    204    Ky. 

820. 
Mo. — Faulkner  v.  F.  Bierman  &  Sons 

Metal  &  Rubber  Co.,  App.,  294  S. 

W.  1019. 
N«v.— Guardia  v.  Guardia,  229  P.  386, 

48  Nev.  230. 

.C.— Abbitt    v.    Gregory,    141    S.B. 

587,  195  N.C.  203. 

N.D. — Moos     v.     Northwestern     Im- 
provement Co.,  6  N.W.2d  73,  72  N. 

D.  223. 
Or. — McAuliffe   v.   McAuliffe,    298   P. 

239,  136  Or.  168. 
g.C. — Gaskins  v.  California  Ins.  Co.t 

11   S.B.2d  436,   195   S.C.   376. 
S.D.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Smith  v. 

Wordeman,   240  N.W.   325,   326,   59 

S.D.  368. 
Tex.— Presidio  Cotton  Gin  &  Oil  Co. 

v.  Dupuy,  Civ.App.,  2  S.W.2d  341 — 

Paggi  v.  Rose  Mfg.  Co.,  Civ.App., 

259  S.W.  962. 
34  C.J.  p  308  note  82. 

Beliance  on  rule  of  court 

Where  the  rules  of  a  trial  court 
made  every  Monday  law  day,  on 
which  all  matters  then  pending 
would  be  disposed  of,  counsel  is  war- 
ranted in  relying  on  that  rule  and 
in  presuming  that  it  will  be  follow- 
ed unless  informed  to  the  contrary. 
— Garner  v.  Towler,  213  P.  390,  25 
Ariz.  101. 
Reliance  on  official  records 

Attorney  is  justified  in  relying  on 
official  records  showing  condition  of 
case  pending  in  court,  and  court 
should  relieve  client  from  effect  of 
error  in  record.— Reynolds  v.  Gladys 
Belle  OH  Co.,  243  P.  576,  75  Mont 
332. 

Attorney    recently   discharged   from 
army 

In  view  of  difficulties  facing  an 
attorney  recently  discharged  from 
army  in  picking  up  threads  of  hl» 
practice,  some  latitude  should  be  ex- 
tended in  passing  on  such  attorney's 
motion  to  open  default  judgment 
against  his  client  entered  after  ex- 
piration of  time  to  serve  pleading. — 
Cunningham  v.  Port  Washington 
Synagogue,  66  N.T.S.2d  786. 


49 


JUDGMENTS 


334 


the  attorney  consisted  in  his  failure  to  enter  an 
appearance  or  file  a  pleading  in  due  season,64  and 
also  where  it  consisted  of  a  failure  to  pursue  and 
follow  up  the  case  with  due  care  and  watchful- 
nessi65  or  where,  being  present  in  court,  he  refused 
to  proceed  with  the  trial  and  failed  to  avail  himself 
of  the  privileges  which  the  law  affords  to  him  in 
such  case.66 


Negligence  or  misconduct  of  the  petitioner's  at- 
torney, however,  does  not  necessarily  bar  a  petition 
to  vacate  a  judgment,6?  and  a  considerable  number 
of  cases  have  held .  that,  where  the  party  himself 
has  not  been  guilty  of  negligence,  a  judgment 
against  him  may  be  set  aside  because  it  was  obtained 
through  the  negligence  of  his  counsel68  if  it  can  be 
done  without  prejudicing  the  rights  of  the  other 


€4.  Ariz.— Martin  v.  Sears,  44  P.2d 
526,  45  Ariz.  414. 

Ark. — Alger  v.  Beasley,  20  S.W.2d 
317,  180  Ark.  46. 

Cal. — Woolner  v.  Hawthorne  Im- 
provement Co.,  265  P.  194,  203  Cal. 
547— Pickerill  v.  Strain,  239  P. 
323,  196  Cal.  683. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Schwettman  v, 
Oberheide,  App.,  39  S.W.2d  395— 
Allen  v.  Allen,  App.,  14  S.W.2d  686. 

N.J. — Barenson  v.  Zaritsky,  167  A. 
671,  11  N.J.Misc.  530. 

Pa.— Herbst  v.  Derrick,  175  A.  297, 
115  Pa.Super.  205 — Page  v.  Pat- 
terson, 161  A.  878,  105  Pa. Super. 
438. 

Tex. — St.  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Earnest,  Civ. App.,  293  S. 
W.  677,  affirmed  296  S.W.  1088,  116 
Tex.  565. 

34  C.J.  p  308  note  83. 

Tailure  timely  to  plead  held  excusa- 
ble 

(1)  Where  defendant's  motion  for 
security  for  costs  was  undisposed  of, 
notwithstanding    such    motion    was 
not  an  answer  sufficient  to  prevent 
default   from   being-  taken. — Hutt  v. 
Flynn,  60  P.2d  931,  48  Ariz.  175. 

(2)  Where  failure  was  caused  by 
attorney's    absence    from    office    on 
business  when  process  was  forward- 
ed by  defendant.— Collister  v.  Inter- 
State  Fidelity  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
of  Utah,  38  P.2d  626,  44  Ariz.  427,  98 
A.L.R.  1020. 

(3)  Where  failure  was  caused  by 
one  of   defendant's    three   attorneys 
being  away  on  business  at  the  time 
the  plea  was  due,  and  who  supposed 
it  would  be  filed  by  his  associates, 
both  of  whom  were  unavoidably  pre- 
vented    from     doing    so. — Planters' 
Lumber   Co.    v.    Sibley,    93    So.    440, 
130  Miss.  26. 

(4)  Where     defendants'     attorney, 
through  inadvertence,  had  failed  to 
note   expiration  of  time   to  answer 
the  new  pleading. — Shively  v.  Koch- 
man,  73  P.2d  637,  23  Cal.App.2d  420. 

(5)  Where  failure  was  due  to  rush 
of  business  and  associate's  absence. 
— Carbondale   Mach.   Co.  v.   Byraud, 
271  P.  349,  94  Cal.App.  856. 

.  (6)  Where  plaintiff's  attorney  re- 
ceived case  in  1942,  during,  which 
year  he  was  inducted  into  army, 
and  did  not  reestablish  his  office 
until  April,  1945,  and  despite  search 
did  not  locate  file  until  March,  1945. 


— Cunningham   v.    Port   Washington 
Synagogue,  56  N.T.S.2d  786. 

(7)  Other  facts.— Waybright  v. 
Anderson,  253  P.  148,  200  Cal.  374 
—Stub  v.  Harrison,  96  P.2d  979.  35 
Cal. App. 2d  685 — Eberhart  v.  Salazar, 
235  P.  86,  71  CaLApp.  336— Rahn  v. 
Peterson,  218  P.  464,  63  CaLApp.  199. 

65.  Ariz.— MacNeil  v.  Vance,  60  P.2d 
1078,  4$  Ariz.  187— Faltis  v.  Co- 
lachis,  274  P.  776,  35  Ariz.  78. 

Cal. — People's  Finance  &  Thrift  Co. 
of  Porterville  v.  Phoenix  Assur. 
Co.,  Limited,  of  London,  285  P. 
857,  104  CaLApp.  334— Anglo  Cali- 
fornia Trust  Co.  v.  Kelly,  272  P. 
1080,  95  CaLApp.  390. 

Ga. — Henderson  v.  American  Hat 
Mfg.  Co.,  194  S.E.  254,  54  Qa.App. 
10. 

N.Y.— Mandel  v.  Donohue,  208  N.T.S. 
807,  124  Misc.  861. 

N.C. — Chapman  v.  Lineberry,  140  S. 
B.  302,  194  N.C.  811. 

Okl. — Pickering  Lumber  Co.  v.  Lacy, 
44  P.2d  42,  170  Okl.  447— Sautbine 
v.  Jones,  18  P.2d  871,  161  Okl.  292 
— Key  v.  Minnetonka  Lumber  Co., 
241  P.  143,  112  Okl.  301. 

Pa.— East  Pittsburgh  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Teets,  186  A.  166, 
123  Pa.Super.  117. 

Tex. — Brown  v.  St.  Mary's  Temple 
No.  5  S.  M.  T.  United  Brothers  of 
Friendship  of  Texas,  Civ.App.,  127 
S.W.2d  531— Ladd  v.  Coleman,  Civ. 
App.,  285  S.W.  1096. 

34  C.J.  p  309  note  84. 

Duty  to  ascertain  time  for  trial 

(1)  The  duty  rests  on  an  attorney 
to    be    diligent    and    ascertain    the 
time  for  trial. 

Ala. — McCord  v.  Harrison  &  Stringer, 
93  So.  428,  207  Ala.  480. 

Okl. — Thornton  v.  Eoff,  84  P.2d  5, 
183  Okl.  504— Mid-Texas  Petroleum 
Co.  v.  Western  Lumber  &  Hard- 
ware Co.,  52  P.2d  15,  175  OkL  260. 

Wyo.— Boulter  v.  Cook,  234  P.  1101, 
32  Wyo.  461,  rehearing  denied  236 
P.  245,  32  Wyo.  461. 

(2)  Defendant's    attorney    has    no 
right  to  rely  on  counsel  for  plaintiff 
to  notify  him  of  setting  of  cause,  in 
absence  of  agreement  providing  for 
such  notice.— -Grand  United  Order  of 
Odd  Fellows  v.  Wright,  Tex.Civ.App., 
76  S.W.2d  1073. 

(3)  While   courts   frequently,   and 
ordinarily  in  fact,  have  counsel  noti- 
fied or  called  when  a  case  is  reached 
for  trial,  that  is  done  as  a  courtesy 

635 


and  not  as  a  duty. — Boulter  v.  Cook, 
supra. 

66.  111. — Gaines  v.  Chicago  Rys.  Co., 
255  IlLApp.  30. 

67.  Mass. — 3£anzi  v.  Carlson,  180  N. 
£3.  134,  278  Mass.  267. 

Neb.— Beem  v.  Davis,  195  N.W.  948, 

111  Neb.  96. 
N.C.— Helderman    v.    Hartsell    Mills 

Co.,    135    S.B.    627,    192   N.C.    626. 
Negligence  of  co-counsel  named  as 
compliment 

The  alleged  negligence  of  person 
who  had  been  admitted  to  practice 
law  and  whose  name  appeared  on 
some  of  pleadings  as  of  counsel  for 
defendants  did  not  preclude  them 
from  having  set  aside  default  decree 
entered  against  them  without  knowl- 
edge of  their  counsel,  where  it  ap- 
peared that  such  person's  name  had 
been  inserted  merely  as  a  compli- 
ment and  that  he  actually  had  no  re- 
sponsibility for  any  matters  con- 
nected with  case. — Lunt  v.  Van  Gor- 
den,  281  N.W.  743,  225  Iowa  1120. 

68.  Colo. — Calkins    v.    Smalley,    294 
P.  534.  88  Colo.  227. 

Iowa.— Hatt  v.  McCurdy,  274  N.W. 
72,  223  Iowa  974. 

Ky.— Adams  v.  Nelson,  283  S.W.  405, 
214  Ky.  411. 

Minn. — Kennedy  v.  Torodor,  276  N. 
W.  650,  201  Minn.  422— Wagner 
v.  Broquist,  231  N.W.  241,  181 
Minn.  39 — Unowsky  v.  Show,  201 
N.W.  936,  161  Minn.  489— Hasara 
v.  Swaney,  200  N.W.  847,  161  Minn. 
94 — Zell  v.  Friend  Crosby  &  Co., 
199  N.W.  928,  160  Minn.  181. 

Mo. — Goodwin  v.  Kochititzky,  App., 
3  S.W.2d  1051 — Amos  James  Gro- 
cery Co.  v.  Pri chard,  App.,  297  S* 
W.  721. 

Neb. — Lacey  v.  Citizens'  Lumber  & 
Supply  Co.,  248  N.W.  378,  124  Neb. 
813. 

N.J. — Jarrett  v.  Standard  Diesel  En- 
gine Co.,  12  A.2d  671,  124  N.J.Law 
429. 

N.M. — Ambrose  v.  Republic  Mortg. 
Co.,  34  P.2d  294,  38  N.M.  370. 

N.T.— Kyles  v.  City  of  New  York,  80 
N.T.S.2d  314,  262  App.Div.  1033— 
Jensen  v.  Backman,  283  N.T.S.  862, 
246  App.Div.  741 — Marcus  v.  Simo- 
tone  &  Combined  Sound  &  Color 
Films,  237  N.Y.S.  509,  135  Misc. 
228. 

N.C. — Gunter  v.  Dowdy,  81  S.B.2d 
524,  224  N.C.  522— Meece  v.  Com- 
mercial Credit  Co.,  159  S.B.  17, 
201  N.C.  139— Sutherland  v.  Me- 


§  334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.& 


party,69  that  is,  without  loss  to  such  other  party 
other  than  that  which  might  result  from  establish- 
ing the  claim  or  defense  of  the  party  applying.70 
Furthermore,  under  some  statutes  a  default  is  re- 
quired to  be  set  aside  when  taken  against  a  party 
otherwise  without  default  through  the  neglect  or 
failure  of  his  attorney  to  file  or  serve  any  paper 
within  the  time  limited  therefor,71  although  such 
statutes  do  not  apply  where  the  party  asking  for 
relief  was  not  represented  by  attorney  at  the  time  of 
the  default  and  the  default  was  not  taken  by  reason 
of  the  negligence  of  counsel.72  The  negligence  of 
an  attorney  may  be  excusable  when  attributable  to 
an  honest  mistake,  an  accident,  or  any  cause  which 
is  not  incompatible  with  proper  diligence  on  his 
part,  and  in  these  circumstances  it  will  be  proper  to 
set  aside  or  open  a  default  judgment  taken  in  con- 
sequence thereof.78  The  fact  that  an  attorney  was 
lulled  into  a  sense  of  security  by  continued  negoti- 
ations between  the  parties  for  settling  the  case  out 
of  court  has  been  held  a  sufficiently  reasonable  ex- 
cuse for  failure  to  file  an  answer,74  but  there  is 
authority  holding  that  mere  discussion  by  litigants 
of  settlement  pending  action  does  not  excuse  fail- 
ure to  plead.75 


In  any  case,  however,  the  client  himself  must  be 
free  from  fault;  negligence  of  his  counsel  is  not 
excusable  negligence  for  which  a  judgment  will  be 
set  aside  if  the  client  wholly  neglected  the  case  and 
took  no  interest  in  the  issue,76  even  though  fraud 
reasonably  discoverable  exists.77  Efe  must  show 
that  he  employed  counsel  practicing  habitually  in 
the  particular  court,  or  who  specially  agreed  to  at- 
tend to  the  case,78  and  the  relief  will  not  be  grant- 
ed on  this  ground  where  to  do  so  would  delay 
trial  of  the  cause  to  the  consequent  injury  of  the 
party  not  in  default.79  Where  an  attorney  is  em- 
ployed simply  to  retain  counsel  to  appear  at  an- 
other place,  he  is  a  mere  agent  and  his  negligence 
is  imputable  to  his  client.80 

(c)  Mistake  as  to  Time  or  Place  of  Appear- 
ance or  Trial 

A  default  Judgment  may  be  opened  or  vacated  for 
excusable  mistake  of  counsel  as  to  time  or  place  of  ap- 
pearance or  trial. 

A  default  judgment  may  be  opened  or  vacated 
when  the  default  was  due  to  a  mistake  or  miscalcu- 
lation of  the  party's  attorney  as  to  the  time  allowed 
him  for  appearing,  pleading,  or  taking  some  other 
step  in  the  action,81  or  as  to  the  day  at  which  the 


Lean,  154  S.E.  662,  199  N.C.  345— 
Abbitt  v.  Gregory,  141  S.E.  587,  195 
N.C.  203 — Helderman  v.  Hartsell 
Mills  Co.,  135  S.E.  627,  192  N.C. 
626. 

Okl.— State  ex  rel.  Higgs  v.  Musko- 
gee  Iron  Works,  103  P.2d  101,  187 
Okl.  419. 

Or.— Astoria  Sav.  Bank  v.  Nonnand, 
267  P.  524,  125  Or.  347. 

Pa. — National  Finance  Corporation  v. 
Bergdoll,  151  A.  12,  300  Pa,  540— 
Horning  v.  David,  8  A.2d  729,  137 
Pa.  Super.  252 — Robert  Baile  Co.  v. 
Stong  &  Stong,  84  Pa.Super.  241 — 
Public  Ledger  Co.  v.  Kleinman,  75 
Pa.Super.'  345 — Roth  v.  Lehigh 
Valley  Trust  Co.,  Com.Pl.f  18  Leh. 
L.J.  176. 

R.I.— Dooley  v.  Slavit,  165  A.  771, 
53  R.I.  264. 

S.D. — W.  B.  Foshay  Co.  v.  Spring- 
field Light  &  Power  Co.,  206  N.W. 
239,  49  S.D.  92 — Coniey  v.  Lunz- 
mann,  197  N.W.  294,  47  S.D.  241. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  McDan- 
iel  v.  Hoblit,  245  P.  295,  297,  34 
Wyo.  509. 

34  C.J.  p  309  note  86—24  C.J.  p  887 
note  78  [a]  (2). 

69.  Minn. — Kennedy  v.  Torodor,  276 
N.W.  650,  201  Minn.  422. 

Mo. — Goodwin   v.    Kochititzky,   App., 

3  S.W.2d  1051. 

Wyo.— McDaniel  v.  Hoblit,  245  P. 
295,  34  Wyo.  509. 

70i  Wyo.— McDaniel  v.  Hoblit,  su- 
pra. 

71.    Idaho. — State  ex  reL  Sweeley  v.  j 


Braun,  110  P.2d  835,  62  Idaho  258 
—Miller  v.  Brinkman,  281  P.  372, 
42  Idaho  232 — Consolidated  Wagon 
&  Machine  Co.  v.  Housman,  221  P. 
143,  38  Idaho  343 — Weaver  v.  Ram- 
bow,  217  P.  610,  37  Idaho  645. 

72.  Idaho.— Day  v.   Burnett,   224   P. 
427,  38  Idaho  620. 

73.  Ark. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Met- 
ropolitan   Life    Ins.    Co.    v.    Duty, 
126  S.W.2d  921,  925,  197  Ark.  1118. 

34  C.J.  p  309  note  89. 

74.  Cal.— Beard  v.   Beard,   107   P.2d 
885,    16   Cal.2d   645— Pease  v.   City 
of  San  Diego,  App.,  169   P.2d  973. 

Or.— McAuliffe  v.  McAuliffe,  298  P. 
239,  136  Or.  168. 

75.  Mont— Middle  States  Oil  Corpo- 
ration   v.     Tanner-Jones    Drilling 
Co.,   235   P.  770,  73   Mont  180. 

73.    Alaska. — Rubenstein   v.    Imlach, 

9  Alaska  62. 
Ky.— Carter  v.  Miller,  95  S.W.2d  29, 

264  Ky.  532. 
Miss.— Britton    v.    Beltzhoover,    113 

So.  346,  147  Miss.  737. 
N.C.— Kerr  v.  North  Carolina  Joint 

Stock  Land  Bank  of  Durham,  171 

S.E.  367,  205  N.C.  410. 
Wash.— Luger  v.  Littau,  288  P.  277, 

157  Wash.  40. 
34  C.J.  p  310  note  90. 

77.  Miss. — Britton  v.  Beltzhoover, 
113  So.  346,  147  Miss.  737. 

Fraud  as  ground  for  opening  or  va- 
cating default  judgment  see  supra 
subdivision  c  of  this  section. 

636 


78.  N.C.— Kerr    v.    North    Carolina 
Joint  Stock  Land  Bank  of  Durham, 
171  S.E.  367,  205  N.C.  410. 

S.D.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Smith  v. 

Wordeman,   240  N.W.   325,   326,   59 

S.D.-368. 

34  C.J.  p  310  note  91. 
Duty  to  retain  counsel  generally  see 

supra  subdivision  n  (5)  (b)  of  this 

section. 

79.  Miss.— Lee    v.    Spikes,    112    So. 
588,  145  Miss.  897. 

Delaying-  trial  six  mouths  would 
result  in  injury  sufficient  to  justify 
refusal  to  interfere  with  default 
judgment  resulting  from  counsel's 
neglect — Lee  v.  Spikes,  supra. 

80.  Idaho. — B  rainard     v.     Coeur 
d'Alene  Antimony  Mining  Co.,  208 
P.  855,  35  Idaho  742. 

N.C.— Kerr  v.  North  Carolina  Joint 
Stock  Land  Bank  of  Durham,  171 
S.B.  367,  205  N.C.  410— Pailin  v. 
Richmond  Cedar  Works,  136  S.E. 
635,  193  N.C.  256. 

34  C.J.  p  310  note  92. 

81.  Cal. — Morgan    v.     Brother*     of 
Christian  Schools,   92  P.2d  925,   34 
Cal.App.2d  14 — Salsberry  v.  Julian, 
277   P.    516,    98   CaLApp.    638,    fol- 
lowed in  277  P.  518,  amended  278 
P.    257,   98    CaLApp.    645— Week  v. 
Sucher,    274    P.    579,    96    Cal.App. 
422— Rahn  v.  Peterson,  218  P.  464, 
63  Cal.App.  199. 

Colo. — Brennan-Tucker  Motor  Co.  v. 

Tucker,  242  P.  970,  78  Colo.  550. 
34  C.J.  p  311  note  99. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§334 


case  would  be  tried  or  the  hour  of  the  day,82  or 
as  to  the  case  being  on  the  calendar  for  trial,8^  or 
as  to  the  position  of  the  case  on  the  calendar,84 
or  as  to  the  place  of  trial,85  provided,  however, 
there  was  sufficient  excuse  for  the  mistake.86 

(d)  Ignorance  or  Mistake  of  Law 

While  Ignorance  of  the  law  on  the  part  of  an  attor- 
ney ordinarily  is  not  sufficient  ground  for  setting  aside 
a  default  judgment,  a  party  may,  in  a  proper  case,  be 
granted  relief  notwithstanding  an  attorney's  mistake  of 
law. 

Ignorance  of  the  law  on  the  part  of  an  attorney 
ordinarily  is  not  sufficient  ground  for  setting  aside 
a  default  judgment,87  but  the  mere  fact  that  an  at- 
torney erroneously  stated  a  proposition, of  law  in 
court,  which  error  would  not  justify  setting  aside 
a  default  judgment,  does  not  bar  him  from  assert- 
ing other  grounds  for  setting  aside  the  default  which 
the  court  might  find  sufficient.88  Furthermore,  the 
court,  in  its  discretion,  may  grant  relief  from  an 
attorney's  mistake  of  law  as  to  the  legal  effect  of 
an  order89  or  as  to  the  proper  procedure.90 


(e)  Erroneous  Advice 

The  fact  that  a  default  Judgment  was  suffered  by  a 
party  In  consequence  of  receiving  erroneous  advice  from 
his  attorney  Is  generally  no  ground  for  setting  aside  the 
judgment,  although  under  the  facts  of  the  particular  case 
relief  may  be  Justified  on  this  ground. 

The  responsibility  of  a  person  of  mature  years 
and  judgment  is  independent  of  that  of  the  attor- 
ney by  whom  he  is  advised.91  So  it  is  generally 
held  not  to  be  good  ground  for  setting  aside  a  de- 
fault judgment  that  it  was  suffered  by  the  party  in 
consequence  of  receiving  erroneous  advice  from  his 
attorney  as  to  the  necessity  of  making  a  defense  or 
as  to  the  validity  of  the  defense;92  but  under  the 
facts  of  a  particular  case  relief  may  be  justified  on 
this  ground.93 

(f)  Misconduct 

A  default  judgment  may  be  set  aside  where  It  was 
obtained  through  the  misconduct  of  the  party's  attorney 
or  because  of  his  abandonment  of,  or  withdrawal  from, 
the  case  without  timely  notice  to  his  client. 

A  default  judgment  may  be  set  aside  where  it 
was  obtained  through  the  misconduct  of  the  party's 
attorney.94  Abandonment  of,  or  withdrawal  from, 


Mistake  of: 

Counsel  as  to  time  for  appearance, 
pleading,  or  trial  as  ground  for 
opening   or   vacating:  judgments 
generally  see  supra  §  280. 
Party  as  to  time  or  place  of  ap- 
pearance or  trial  as  ground  for 
opening  or  setting  aside  default 
judgment  see   supra  subdivision 
n  (2)    (c)  of  this  section. 
Want    or   insufficiency   of  notice   of 
proceedings  as  ground  for  opening 
or  vacating  default  judgment  see 
supra    subdivision    b    (3)    of   this 
section. 

82.  Ala. — Sovereign    Camp,    W.    O. 
W.,    v.   Gay,   104   So.   895,   20   Ala. 
App.      650,      reversed     on      other 
grounds  104  So.  898,  213  Ala.  5. 

Cal. — Johnston  v.  Liffman,  287  P. 
558,  105  Cal.App.  187. 

N.D. — Central  Metropolitan  Bank  v. 
American  State  Bank  of  Burling^ 
ton,  190  N.W.  813,  49  N.D.  165. 

34  C.J.  p  311  note  2. 

83.  N.Y. — Marcus     v.     Simotone     & 
Combined    Sound   &    Color   Films, 
237  N.Y.S.   509,   135  Misc.  228. 

34  C.J.  p  311  note  3. 

84.  N.J. — Le    Pore   v.    De    Meester, 
147   A.    863,    7  N.J.Misc.   1110.. 

85.  Minn. — Kennedy  v,  Torodor,  276 
N.W.  650,  201  Minn.  422. 

86.  Ga. — Turner    v.    Citizens'    Bank 
of  Valdosta,   121   S.B.   698,   31  Ga. 
App.  549. 

Ill; — Travelers    Ins.   Co.   v.   Wagner, 

279  Ill.App.  13. 
34  C.J.  p  311  note  5. 
Miscalculation,        held        insufficient 
ground 

Attorney's  miscalculation  of  time  I 


to  plead  or  appear  was  held  insuffi- 
cient ground  to  set  aside  default 
judgment. — Guardia  v.  Guardia,  229 
P.  386,  48  Nev.  230. 

87.  Cal.— Beard  v.   Beard,   107   P.2d 
385,    16   CaUd   645— Schoenfeld  v. 
Gerson,   120  P.2d   674,   48   CaLApp. 
2d  739. 

Idaho. — Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92  P.2d 
1053,  60  Idaho  464,  124  A.L.R.  149. 

Minn. — Application  of  Bonley,  6  N. 
W.2d  245,  212  Minn.  214. 

Mont — Mihelich  v.  Butte  Electric 
Hy.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont  604. 

34  C.J.  p  312  note  6. 

Counsel's  ignorance  or  mistake  of 
law  as  ground  for  opening  or  va- 
cating Judgments  generally  see  su- 
pra §  280. 

Ignorance  of  party  as  excuse  for  de- 
fault see  supra  subdivision  k  of 
this  section. 

88.  Cal.— Beard  v.  Beard,   107   P.2d 
385,  16  CaUd  645. 

89.  Cal. — Schoenfeld  v.  Gerson,   120 
P.2d  674,   48  Cal.App.2d  739. 

Bankruptcy  adjudication 

The  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its 
discretion  in  vacating  a  Judgment, 
where  it  appeared  that  defendant 
had  advised  plaintiff's  attorney,  the 
court,  and  the  clerk  that  he  had  been 
adjudicated  a  bankrupt  and  that  he 
left  the  courtroom  in  the  belief  that 
in  view  of  such  bankruptcy  no  fur- 
ther proceedings  would  be  had,  and 
thereafter  plaintiff  and  his  attorney 
appeared  without  further  notice  to 
defendant  and  proved  up  plaintiff's 
case  as  on  default. — Davenport  v. 
Sackett,  288  N.W.  167,  206  Minn.  69. 

637 


dO.  S.C.— -Savage  v.  Cannon,  30  S.B. 
2d  70,  204  S.C.  473. 

91.  Ind. — Carty  v.   Toro,   57   N.E.2fl 
434. 

92.  Ind. — Carty  v.  Toro,  supra. 
Pa.— In   re   Stroud's   Estate,    22   Pa. 

Dist  &  Co.  591,  40  Dauph.Co.  207. 
Tex. — Johnson  v.  Whatley,  Civ.App., 

45   S.W.2d  766,   error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  312  note  8. 
Erroneous     advice     of     counsel     as 

ground  for  setting  aside  judgments 

generally  see  supra  §   280. 

93.  Cal. — Mahana  v.  Alexander,  26$ 
P.  260,  88  CaLApp.  111. 

Wash.— Moe  v.  Wolter,  235  P.  803, 
134  Wash.  340,  affirmed  240  P.  565, 
136  Wash.  696. 

34  C.J.  p  312  note  9. 

94.  Colo.— Calkins  v.  Smalley,  294  P. 
534,  88  Colo.  227. 

34  C.J.  p  312  note  10,  p  313  notes  11- 
14- 

Misconduct  of  counsel  as  ground  for 
opening  or  vacating  judgments 
generally  see  supra  §  279. 

Refusal  to  accept  notice  of  trial 

Where  defendant's  attorney  of  rec- 
ord refused  to  accept  notice  of  trial, 
stating  that  he  intended  to  withdraw 
from  the  case,  and  never  notified  de- 
fendant that  the  case  had  been  no- 
ticed or  set  for  trial,  and  defend- 
ant received  no  information  of  the 
proposed  trial  from  any  source,  a 
judgment  rendered  in  the  absence 
of  defendant  should  be  vacated. — 
Calkins  v.  Smaller,  294  P.  534,  88 
Colo.  227. 


§334 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  case  by  an  attorney  without  timely  notice  to  his 
client 'has  been  held  sufficient  ground  for  vacating 
a  resulting  default  judgment,96  although  relief  on 
such  ground  has  been  denied  in  view  of  the  circum- 
stances of  the  particular  case.96 

(g)  Misunderstanding 

The  fact  that  a  default  Judgment  was  the  conse- 
quence of  a  genuine,  accidental,  and  excusable  misun- 
derstanding of  counsel  is  ground  for  opening  or  vacat- 
ing it. 

A  default  judgment  may  be  opened  or  set  aside 
where  the  default  occurred  when  the  party's  coun- 
sel, who  was  guilty  of  no  negligence  or  omission  of 
duty  to  his  client,  failed,  because  of  a  genuine 
and  accidental  misunderstanding,  to  perform  an 
act  which  would  otherwise  have  been  performed,97 
and  this  rule  applies  where  the  misunderstanding 
was  between  the  party  and  his  counsel,98  between 
opposing  counsel,99  or  between  counsel  and  the 
court,1  or  where,  without  fault  on  their  part,  coun- 
sel were  misled  by  the  record.2  In  all  such  cases, 


however,  in  order  that  the  judgment  may  be  set 
aside,  it  is  necessary  that  the  mistake  shall  be 
shown  to  be  excusable*8 

(7)  Unavoidable  Casualty  or  Misfortune 

Under  some  statutes  a  default  may  be  excused  and 
a  default  judgment  opened  or  vacated  where  the  appear- 
ance of  a  party  or  his  pleading  was  prevented  by  un- 
avoidable casualty  or  misfortune,  which  is  defined  as 
that  which  could  not  have  been  prevented  by  the  exer- 
cise of  reasonable  skill  and  diligence  or  human  prudence 
or  foresight,  and  which  does  not  exist  where  the  com 
plaining  party  was  himself  guilty  of  negligence  in  al- 
lowing the  default  Judgment  to  be  taten. 

Under  statutes  in  some  jurisdictions  a  default 
may  be  excused  and  a  default  judgment  opened  or 
vacated  where  the  appearance  of  the  party  or  his. 
pleading  was  prevented  by  unavoidable  casualty  or 
misfortune.4  While  it  has  been  said  that  such  stat- 
utes are  in  derogation,  not  only  of  the  common  law, 
but  of  the  policy  of  holding  judgments  final  after 
the  close  of  the  term,5  on  the  other  hand,  the  view 
has  been  taken  that  they  are  consistent  with  the 


95.    Oal. — People's  Finance  &  Thrift 

Co.  of  Porterville  v.  Phoenix  Assur. 

Co.,  Limited,  of  London,  285  P.  857, 

104  CaLApp.  334. 
111. — Hogan    v.    Ermovick,    166    N.E. 

503,  335  111.  181. 
Iowa,— Ferris  v.  Wulf,  249  N.W.  156, 

216  Iowa  289. 
N.C.— Gosnell  v.  Hilliard,  171  S.B.  52, 

205  N.C.  297. 
Okl. — Bearman    v.    Bracken,    240    P. 

713,  112  Okl.  237— Shuler  v.  Viger, 

229  P.  280,  103  Okl.  129. 
B.I. — Shapiro  v.  Albany  Ins.  Co.,  163 

A.  747. 

Absence  of  attorney  .from  trial  as 
ground  for  setting  aside  default 
judgment  see  supra  subdivision  I 
of  this  section. 

Withdrawal  of  attorney  as  unavoida- 
ble casualty  or  misfortune  see  in- 
fra subdivision  n  (7)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

•96.    Cal. — De    Recat    Corporation   v. 

Dunn,   242   P.   936,   197   Cal.   787— 

Newman  v.  Menne,  244  P.  951,  76 

CaLApp.  331. 
111. — B.  A.  Railton  Co.  v.  Kearns,  10 

N.E.2d  689,  291  Ill.App.  614. 
Kan. — American  Oil  &  Refining  Co. 

v.    Liberty-Texas    Oil    Co.,    211   P. 

137,  112  Kan.  309.. 
3£y. — Ebner  v.   Official  Board  of  M. 

B.  Church  of  Pineville,   282   S.W. 
785,  214  Ky.  70. 

2T.Y. — Dewey  v.  Agostini  Bros.  Bldg. 
Corporation,  263  N.T.S.  174,  246 
AppJDiv.  667— New  York  State  La- 
bor Relations  Board  v.  Paragon 
Oil  Co.,  45  N.Y.S.2d  152. 

IN.C.— Baer  v.  McCall,  193  S.B.  406, 
212  N.C.  389. 

V?.  Fla. — Stevens-Davis  Co.  v 
Stock,  193  So.  745,  141  Fla.  714. 


Misunderstanding: 
As   unavoidable   casualty  or   mis- 
fortune see  infra  subdivision  n 
(7)  of  this  section. 
Of  counsel  as  ground  for  vacating 
judgments    generally   see   supra 
§  280. 

98.  Ariz. — Avery  v.  Calumet  &  Je- 
rome  Copper  Co.,    284   P.    159,    36 
Ariz.  239. 

34  C.J.  p  313  note  17. 
Language  difficulties 

Default  judgment  on  notes  against 
Japanese  defendants  was  properly 
set  aside  on  showing  of  meritorious 
defense  and  that  defendants  and 
their  attorney  did  not  understand 
each  other,  defendants  having  little 
knowledge  of  the  English  language 
and  the  laws. — Daly  v.  Okamura,  213 
P.  389,  25  Ariz.  50. 

99.  U.S.— Rogers  v.  Arzt,  D.C.N.Y., 
1  F.R.D.  581. 

Ark.— Kochtitzky  &  Johnson  v.  Mal- 

vern    Gravel    Co.,    92    S.W.2d    385, 

192  Ark.  523. 
Cal.— Waybright  v.  Anderson,  253  P. 

148,  200  Cal.  374. 
Or. — Leonard   v.   Bennett,    106    P.2d 

542,  165  Or.  157. 
R.L— De  Santis  r.  Amicarelli,  131  A. 

197. 

S.C.— Jenkins  v.  Jones,  38  S.B.2d  255. 
W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Black 

v.  Foley,  185  S.B.  902,  903,  117  W. 

Va.    490— Sigmond  v.   Forbes,    158 

S.B.  677,  110  W.Va.  442. 
34  C.J.  p  313  note  20. 
Effect    of   court   rule   a*   to   verbal 
agreements 

District  court  rule  providing  that 
verbal  agreement  between  opposing 
counsel  with  respect  to  proceedings 
In  suit  will  not  be  noticed  does  not 

638 


stand  in  the  way  of  granting  a  new 
trial  in  the  interests  of  justice, 
where  a  judgment  has  gone  by  de- 
fault against  defendant  because  of 
misunderstanding  resulting  from 
verbal  negotiations  between  opposing 
counsel,  provided  motion  for  new 
trial  is  timely  filed. — Blchinger  v. 
Lacroix,  189  So.  572,  192  La.  908. 

1.  N.D.— Central  Metropolitan  Bank 
v.  American   State  Bank  of  Bur- 
lington, 190  N.W.  813,  49  N.D.  165. 

2.  Idaho.— Kivett  v.  Crouch,  104  P. 
2d  21,  61  Idaho  536. 

3.  Ky.— Pinnacle  Motor  Co.  v.  Simp- 
son, 287  S.W.  566,  216  Ky.  184. 

Okl.— Key    v.    Minnetonka    Lumber 

Co.,  241  P.  143,  112  Okl.  301. 
34  C.J.  p  313  note  21. 
Reasonableness  of  belief 

Whether  judgments  were  taken 
through  plaintiffs'  excusable  neglect 
depended  on  whether  counsel  rea- 
sonably believed  oral  stipulation 
gave  extension  for  amending  com- 
plaints.— Waybright  v.  Anderson,  253 
P.  148,  200  Oal.  374. 

4.  Ark. — Barringer  v.  Whitson,   168 
S.W.2d   395,   205   Ark.   260— Metro- 
politan Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Duty,  126 
S.W.2d   921,   197  Ark.   1118. 

Ofci, — Tippins  v.  Turben,  19  P.2d 
605,  162  Okl.  136. 

34  C.J.  p  314  note  23. 

Unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune 
as  ground  for  opening  or  vacat- 
ing judgments  generally  see  su- 
pra §  280. 

5.  Ark. — Bickerstaff     v.     Harmonia 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  133  S.W.2d  890,  199 
Ark.  424. 


49    C.J-S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  334 


fundamental  rule  that  each  case  should  be  tried  on 
the  merits,  and  a  strict  construction  of  the  word 
"unavoidable"  as  used  therein  will  not  be  counte- 
nanced.6 A  casualty  within  the  statutes  is  some- 
thing in  the  nature  of  an  accident,7  something  un- 
expected;8 it  is  in  the  nature  of  a  misfortune,  and 
in  a  sense  the  two  words  are  legally  synonymous.9 
Forgetfulness  is  not  in  and  of  itself  a  misfortune; 
if  anything,  it  is  the  basis  of  the  misfortune.10 
While  there  is  some  question  as  to  whether  the  word 
"unavoidable"  in  the  statutory  phrase  "unavoidable 
casualty  or  misfortune"  applies  to  the  word  "mis- 
fortune" as  it  does  to  "casualty,"11  that  has  been 
held  to  be  the  significance  and  legal  effect  of  the 
word  as  it  stands  alone.12  Unavoidable  casualty  or 
misfortune  is  distinguished  from  a  mere  ordinary 
casualty  or  misfortune;13  it  is  such  casualty  or 
misfortune  as  could  not  have  been  avoided  by  the 
exercise  of  reasonable  skill  and  diligence14  or  hu- 
man prudence  or  foresight  ;15  it  is  an  event  or  cas- 
ualty happening  against  the  will  and  without  the 
negligence  or  default  of  a  party,16  and  it  does  not 


exist  where  the  complaining  party  was  himself 
guilty  of  negligence  in  allowing  the  default  judg- 
ment to  be  taken.17 

The  lack  of  diligence  of  a  party  or  his  attor- 
ney,18 an  attorney's  negligence,19  or  the  mere  fail- 
ure of  an  attorney  to  follow  his  client's  instruc- 
tions20 is  not  unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune 
within  the  statute.  Unavoidable  casualty  may  be 
based  on  mistake  of  counsel,21  but  a  mistake  of 
counsel  in  thinking  that  he  had  an  agreement  with 
opposing  counsel  is  not  unavoidable  casualty.22  The 
mere  absence  of  employed  counsel  from  court  be- 
cause of  other  business  engagements  is  not  such 
an  unavoidable  casualty  as  will  necessarily  entitle 
the  defaulting  party  to  a  new  trial,23  although  the 
court  in  its  discretion  may  vacate  a  judgment  for 
this  reason.24 

The  act  of  an  attorney  in  abandoning  his  client's 
case  without  notice  to  the  latter,  and  in  permitting 
a  default  judgment  to  be  rendered  against  his  cli- 
ent without  his  knowledge  or  consent,  has  been  held 


6.  Iowa. — Lunt  v.  Van  Gorden,  281 
N.W.  743,  225  Iowa  1120. 

7.  Ohio. — Rabb  v.  B<rard  of  Com'rs 
of  Cuyahoga  County,  173  N.E.  255, 
36  Ohio  App.  481. 

8.  Ohio. — Rabb  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of  Cuyahoga  County,  supra. 

9.  Ohio.— Rabb  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of  Cuyahoga  County,   sfcpra. 

10.  Ohio. — Rabb  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of   Cuyahoga   County,   supra. 

11.  Ohio. — Rabb  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of  Cuyahoga  County,   supra. 

12.  Ohio. — Rabb  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of   Cuyahoga  County,   supra. 

13.  Ky.— Carter  v.  Miller,  95  S.W.2d 
29,  264  Ky.  532. 

34  C.J.  p  314  note  23  [I]. 

14.  Ky. — Carter  v.  Miller,  supra. 
Okl. — Mid-Texas    Petroleum    Co.    v. 

Western  Lumber  &  Hardware  Co., 
52  P.2d  15,  175  Okl.  260. 
34  C.J.  p  314  note  23. 

15.  Okl. — Sabin    v.    Sunset    Gardens 
Co.,  85  P.2d  294,  184  Okl.  106. 

16.  Okl.— Sabin   v.    Sunset    Gardens 
Co.,  supra. 

17.  Okl. — Sabin    v.    Sunset    Gardens 
Co.,    85    P.2d    294,    184    Okl.    106— 
Thornton   v.   Eoff,    84    P.2d   5,    183, 
Okl.    504 — Schuman    v.    Sternberg, 
65    P.2d    410,    179    Okl.    115— Mid- 
Texas    Petroleum    Co.    v.    Western 
Lumber  &  Hardware  Co.,  52  P.2d 
15,    175    Okl.    260— Upton   v.   Ship- 
ley,   40   P.2d   1048,   170   Okl.   422— 
Foster  v.  State,  270  P.  84,  132  Okl. 
256 — Hunter  v.  National   Bank  of 
Hastings,   241  P.  186,  113  Okl.  220 
— Eagle  Loan  &  Investment  Co.  v. 
Turner,   241   P.   138,   113    Okl.   251. 

34  C.J.  p  314  note  23. 


Negligence  as   defeating  application 
for  relief  generally  see  supra  sub- 
division n  (5)   <b)  of  this  section. 
Negligence  of  agent 

Physician  carrying  Indemnity  in- 
surance against  suits  for  malprac- 
tice, who  referred  defense  of  suit  to 
insurance  carrier,  made  insurance 
company  his  agent  for  conducting 
defense,  and  negligence  of  compa- 
ny's adjuster  in  failing  to  transmit 
information  concerning  suit  to  com- 
pany's attorneys  was  imputed  to 
physician  on  physician's  application 
to  set  aside  default  Judgment 
against  him,  and  physician  was  not 
entitled  to  have  default  judgment 
set  aside  for  "unavoidable  casualty 
or  misfortune." — Leslie  v.  Spencer, 
42  P.2d  119,  170  Okl.  642. 

18.  Neb.— Lyman  v.  Dunn,  252  N.W. 
197,  125  Neb.  770. 

Okl.— Leslie  v.  Spencer,  42  P.2d  119, 
170  Okl.  642. 

19.  Iowa, — Starkey  v.   Porter  Trac- 
tor Co.,  192  N.W.  135. 

Kan. — Johnson  v.  Salkeld,  271  P.  385, 

.    126  Kan.  807. 

Ky.— Carter  v.  Miller,  95  S.W.2d  29, 
264  Ky.  532. 

Neb. — Lyman  v.  Dunn,  252  N.W.  197, 
125  Neb.  770. 

Okl.— Grayson  v.  Stith,  72  P.2d  820, 
181  Okl.  131,  114  A.L.R.  276— Mid- 
Texas  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Western 
Lumber  &  Hardware  Co.,  52  P.2d 
15,  175  Okl.  260 — Pickering  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Lacy,  44  P.2d  42,  170 
Okl.  447— Upton  v.  Shipley,  40  P. 
2d  1048.  170  Okl.  422— Gavin  v. 
Heath,  256  P.  745,  125  Okl.  118— 
Vincent  v.  Kelly,  249  P.  942,  121 
Okl.  £02. 

34  C.J.  p  314  note  23   [b]   (1). 

639 


Negligence  of  counsel  as  ground  for 
opening  or  vacating  default  judg- 
ment generally  see  supra  subdivi- 
sion n  (6)  (b)  of  this  section. 

20.  Ohio. — Rabb  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of  Cuyahoga  County,  173  N.B.  255, 
36  Ohio  App.  481. 

21.  Okl.— Langley  v.  Moulton,  13  P. 
2d  120,  158  Okl.  212. 

Mistake  of  counsel  as  ground  for 
opening  or  vacating  default  Judg- 
ment generally  see  supra  subdivi- 
sion n  (6)  of  this  section. 

22.  Ky. — Pinnacle      Motor     Co.     v. 
Simpson,    287    S.W.    566,    216    Ky. 
184. 

23.  Ark. — Morrow    v.    Lindsey,    262 
S.W.  641,  164  Ark.  606. 

Absence   of    counsel    as    ground    for 
opening  or  vacating  default  judg- 
ment generally  see  supra  subdivi- 
sion Z  of  this  section. 
Attendance  on  legislature 

Facts  that  defendant's  attorney 
depended  on  plaintiff's  attorney  for 
information  regarding  filing  of  ac- 
tion, and  that  after  action  was  filed 
defendant's  attorney  became  member 
of  stats  legislature,  and  by  reason 
thereof  was  absent  from  office  for 
period  of  three  months,  unable  to  re- 
main in  contact  with  source  of  in- 
formation which  would  have  ap- 
prised him  of  pendency  of  action,, 
did  not  constitute  unavoidable  cas- 
ualty or  misfortune,  so  as  to  entitle- 
defendant  to  have  judgment  vacated. 
— Hoyse  v.  Grage,  42  P.2d  942,  141. 
Kan.  702. 

24.  Kan. — Gordon  v.  Tennhardt,  8  P» 
2d  328,  134  Kan.  799. 


334 


JUDOMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


to  constitute  unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune,25 
but  there  is  also  authority  apparently  to  the  con- 
trary.26 Sickness  which  prevents  an  attorney  from 
being  in  attendance  on  the  court  is  an  unavoidable 
casualty,27  whether  it  be  sickness  of  the  attorney 
himself28  or  of  members  of  his  family;29  but  the 
illness  of  defendant  is  not  such  unavoidable  casualty 
or  misfortune  as  will  entitle  him  to  vacation  of  the 
judgment  where  he  was  able  to  attend  to  the  case 
at  his  home  and  his  physical  presence  either  at  the 
courthouse  or  at  his  attorney's  office  was  not  re- 
quired.30 A  misunderstanding  between  opposing 
counsel  and  the  defaulted  party  as  to  the  intent  of 
the  former  to  press  the  suit  may  constitute  unavoid- 
able casualty  or  misfortune  preventing  defendant 
from  appearing  and  defending.31  Loss  or  miscar- 
riage of  mail  may  constitute  unavoidable  casualty 
or  misfortune  ;32  but,  where  service  of  process  has 
been  made  on  a  duly  appointed  statutory  agent  who 
fails  to  notify  his  principal  through  mere  careless- 
ness, such  a  showing  does  not  constitute  unavoid- 
able casualty  or  misfortune.33 


o.  Other  Grounds 

Various  matters  have  been  held,  to  constitute,  or  not 
to  constitute,  grounds  for  opening  or  vacating  default 
judgments. 

In  addition  to  those  discussed  supra  subdivisions 
b-n  of  this  section,  miscellaneous  other  matters 
have  been  held  to  constitute34  or  not  to  constitute35 
grounds  for  opening  or  vacating  default  judgments. 

Advice  of  sheriff.  It  is  no  ground  for  vacating  a 
default  judgment  that  the  sheriff,  in  delivering  the 
summons,  advised  defendant  that  it  would  not  be 
necessary  for  him  to  appear.36 

Conduct  of  codefendant.  Defendant's  reliance  on 
the  promise  of  a  codefendant  to  settle  or  defend  the 
cause  of  action  in  behalf  of  all  defendants  is  not 
in  itself  sufficient  to  require  the  court  to  vacate  a 
default  judgment  against  defendant,37  although  un- 
der the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case  such 
relief  may  be  warranted.38 

Furtherance  of  justice.    Courts  may  not  legally 


25.  Okl.— Grayson  v.   Stith,   72  P.2d 
820,    181   Okl.   181,   114   A.L.R.    276, 

34   C.J.  p  314  note  23   [a]    (4). 

Attorney's  abandonment  of,  or  with- 
drawal from,  case  as  ground  for 
opening  or  vacating  default  judg- 
ment generally  see  supra  subdivi- 
sion n  (6)  (f)  of  this  section. 

Withdrawal  of  attorney 

An  attorney's  act  in  abandoning 
case  and  withdrawing  therefrom 
without  notice  to  client,  thus  per- 
mitting default  judgment  to  be  ren- 
dered against  client  without  client's 
knowledge  and  consent,  is  "unavoid- 
able casualty  and  misfortune"  which 
justifies  setting  such  judgment 
aside;  and,  where  defendants'  attor- 
ney did  not  formally  withdraw,  but 
without  notice  to  clients  stated  to 
court  that  clients  had  no  defense, 
this  amounted  to  withdrawal  as  at- 
torney <and  abandonment  of  clients' 
interests  within  rule. — Grayson  v. 
Stith,  Okl.,  165  P.2d  984. 

26.  Kan. — Johnson  v.  Salkeld,  271  P. 
385,  126  Kan.  807. 

27.  Ark.— Johnson  v.  Jett,  159  S.W. 
2d  78,  203  Ark.  861. 

34  C.J.  p  817  note  52,  p  318  note 
53. 

Illness  as  ground  for  opening  or  va- 
cating default  judgment  general- 
ly see  supra  subdivision  m  of  this 
section. 

28.  Ky. — ^3tna  Ins.   Co.  v.  Hensley, 
284  S.W.  425,  215  Ky.  45. 

Ohio. — Lazarus  v.  Cleveland  House- 
hold Supply  Co.,  154  N.E.  343,  23 
Ohio  App.  15. 

34  C.J.  p  317  note  52. 


29.  Ark.— Johnson  v.  Jett,  159  S.W. 
2d  78,  203  Ark.  861. 

34  C.J.  p  318  note  53. 

30.  Okl.-— Upton  v.  Shipley,  40  P.2d 
1048,  170  Okl.  422. 

31.  Ark. — McElroy     v.     Underwood, 
281    S.W.    368,    170   Ark.    794. 

Misunderstanding  of .  counsel  as 
ground  for  opening  or  vacating  de- 
fault judgment  generally  see  su- 
pra subdivision  n  (6)  (g)  of  this 
section. 

32.  Okl.— Kellogg  v.  Smith,  42  P.2d 
493.  171  Okl.  355— Nevins  v.  Seiber, 
236  P.  415,  110  Okl.  126. 

34  C.J.  p  314  note  23  [f]. 

33.  Ky.— Metropolitan  Life* Ins.  Co. 
v.    Ditto,    269    S.W.    527,    207    Ky. 
434. 

Failure  of  secretary  of  state  to  no- 
tify foreign  corporation  of  service 
of  process  on  him  in  action  against 
corporation  does  not  constitute  such 
unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune 
as  to  warrant  vacation  of  default 
judgment. — Geo.  O.  Richardson  Ma- 
chinery Co.  v.  Scott,  251  P.  482,  122 
Okl.  125,  certiorari  granted  47  S.Ct. 
587,  274  U.S.  729,  71  L.Ed.  1319,  cer- 
tiorari dismissed  48  S.Ct  264,  276 
U.S.  128,  72  L.Bd.  497. 

34.  Tea^— Weatherford   v.    Van   Al- 
styne,  22  Tex.  22. 

34  C.J.  p  423  note  34  [a]   (4),  [d]. 
Appearance  before  execution  of  writ 

of  inquiry 

Default  judgment  on  depositary 
bond  should  be  set  aside  as  to  de- 
fendant filing  before  execution  of 
writ  of  inquiry  affidavit  denying  ow- 
ing any  debt — State  v.  Picklesimer, 
138  S.E.  313,  .103  W.Va.  561.  . 

640 


Variance 

Where  state  of  demand  in  action 
on  guarantee  of  a  sealed  note  al- 
leged that  plaintiff  was  owner  and 
holder  of  note  but  affidavit  on  de- 
fault did  not  so  aver  or  explain  how 
plaintiff  was  the  owner,  it  was  prop- 
er for  the  court  to  open  the  de- 
fault judgment — Ehnes  v.  Quinn,  23 
A.2d  295,  127  N.J.Law  447. 

35.  S.D.— McDonald  v.  Egan,  178  N. 
W.  296,  43  S.D.  147. 

34  C.J.  p  423  note  34  [b]. 
Pendency  of  another  suit 
Tex. — Simpson    v.     Glenn,     Civ. App., 
103   S.W.2d  433— Dempsey  v.   Gib- 
son,  Civ.App.,   100   S.W.2d  430. 
Settlement    "between    parties    stib- 
seqnent   to    entry   of  Judgment    did 
not  entitle  defendant  to  be  relieved 
from  his  default  which  had  occur- 
red   previously. — G.    H.    Poppenberg, 
Inc.,   v.   Martin.   270  N.T.S.   561,   241 
App.Div.  792. 

36.  Cal.— Cann  v.  Parker,  258  P.  105, 
84  Cal.App.  379. 

37.  Cal. — Handy  v.   Samaha,   290   P. 
492,  107  CaLApp.  565. 

Mich.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Pine 
Shores  Realty  Co.,  241  N.W,  190, 
257  Mich.  289. 

N.C. — Elramy  v.  Abeyounis,  126  S.B. 
743,  189  N.C.  278. 

38.  Ariz.— Teast  v.  Fleck,  121  P.2d 
426,  58  Ariz.  469. 

Cal. — John  A.  Vaughan  Corporation 
v.  Title  Insurance  &  Trust  Co.,  12 
P.2d  117,  123  CaLApp.  709. 

Wash, — Johnston  v.  Medina  Improve- 
ment Club,  116  P.24  272,  10  Wash. 
2d  44. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


335 


set  aside  a  judgment  by  default  confirmed  in  strict 
conformity  with  the  requirements  of  the  law  solely 
on  the  alleged  ground  that  such  action  would  be  in 
furtherance  of  justice  where  defendant  has  been 
properly  cited.39  The  action  of  the  trial  court  in 
setting  aside  an  order  adjudging  defendant  in  de- 
fault has  been  upheld,  however,  under  the  broad 
power  of  the  court  to  modify,  set  aside,  or  vacate 
any  order  previously  made  where  to  do  so  would  be, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  to  further  the  princi- 
ples of  justice  and  rights;40  and,  as  shown  supra 
subdivision  a  of  this  section  whether  the  ends  of 
justice  will  be  furthered  thereby  is  a  matter  for  con- 
sideration on  a  motion  to  set  aside  a  default  judg- 
ment made  at  the  same  term.  The  removal  of  a 
default  by  judicial  action  is  proper  where  there  is 
a  substantial  defense,  and  where  it  is  necessary  for 
the  promotion  of  justice.41 

Good  cause  or  adventitious  circumstances.   Under 
some  statutes  a  default  judgment  may  be  vacated  on 


a  showing  of  "good  cause"43  or  some  "adventitious 
drcumstance"  beyond  the  control  of  the  party.48 

§  335.    Judgment  an  Constructive  Service 

In  accordance  with  express  statutory  provisions  which 
are  liberally  construed,  a  defendant  who  has  been  only 
constructively  served  by  publication  of  summons,  and 
against  whom  a  judgment  is  given  by  default,  may  ap- 
pear and  have  the  judgment  vacated  and  be  admitted 
to  defend  the  action,  within  a  limited  period  of  time. 

Under  express  statutes  in  a  number  of  jurisdic- 
tions, a  defendant,  or  a  nonresident  defendant,  who 
has  been  only  constructively  served  by  publication 
of  summons,  and  against  whom  a  judgment  is  giv- 
en by  default,  may  appear  and  have  the  judgment 
vacated  and  be  admitted  to  defend  the  action,  with- 
in a  limited  time  after  the  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment or  after  receiving  notice  of  it44  Such  stat- 
utes are  remedial,  and  should  be  construed  liber- 
ally so  as  to  advance  the  remedy,45  and  the  show- 
ing defendant  is  required  to  make  should  not  be 


Insurer  of  codefendant 

Where  one  defendant  in  good  faith 
believed,  from  what  an  insurance 
Agent  told  him,  that  the  insurance 
company,  having  insured  a  code- 
fendant,  would  defend  the  action  on 
behalf  of  all  the  defendants,  and 
therefore  did  not  appear  to  defend, 
the  court  should  have  set  aside  the 
default — Newton  v.  De  Armond,  212 
P.  630,  60  CaLApp.  231. 

89.  La. — Stout  v.  Henderson,  102  So. 
193,  157  La.  169— Raphiel  v.  Lou- 
isiana Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  99  So.  459, 
155  La.  590— Item  Co.  v.  St.  Tam- 
many Hotel,  App.,  175  So.  421— 
Brownlee-Wells  Motors  v.  Hol- 
lingsworth,  127  So.  754,  13  La.App. 
19. 

40.  Okl. — Bunger  v.  Rogers,  112   P. 
2d  361,  188  Okl.  620. 

41.  Mass.— Cohen  v.  Industrial  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  175  N.E.  78,  274  Mass. 
49$. 

42.  Cal. — Elms   v.   Elms,   App.,    164 
P.2d  936. 

W.Va. — Wagner    v.    Edgington    Coal 

Co.,   180  S.E,  94,  100  W.Va.  117. 
Held  to  constitute  "good  cause" 

(1)  Surprise,   mistake,  and  excus- 
able neglect. — Marion  County  Court, 
W.  Va.,  v.  Ridge,  C.C.A.W.Va.,  13  F. 
2d  969. 

(2)  Error  in  proceeding  with  trial 
as  though  defendant,  whose  answer 
was  on  file,  was  in  default— Turbe- 
ville   v.    McCarrell,    30   P.2d   496,   43 
Ariz.  236. 

(3)  Where    active   Jurisdiction    of 
case  attaches  to  extent  conferred  by 
citation  of  nonresident  defendants  by 
publication,    that    movant    did    not 
know     of     rendition     of    Judgment 

49C.J.S.-41 


against  him  in  time  to  attack  it 
during  term  at  which  rendered  and 
had  good  defense  to  cause  of  action 
on  which  Judgment  •  was  based. — 
Watts  v.  City  of  El  Paso,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  113  S.W.2d  249,  error  refused. 

43.  What  constitutes 
"Adventitious    circumstance,"    au- 
thorizing setting  aside  default  judg- 
ment, is  one  which  is  unusual,  be- 
yond movant' s  control,  and  free  from 
his  neglect — Rollins  v.  North  River 
Ins.  Co.,  149  S.E.  838,  107  W.Va,  602, 
dissenting  opinion  150  S.E.  753,  107 
W.Va.  698. 

Failure  to  receive  registered  snail 

Failure  of  foreign  insurance  cor- 
poration to  receive  summons  by  reg- 
istered mail  was  held  adventitious 
circumstance,  authorizing  setting 
aside  of  default  Judgment — Rollins 
v.  North  River  Ins.  Co.,  149  S.E. 
838,  107  W.Va.  602,  dissenting  opin- 
ion 150  S.E.  753,  107  W.Va.  698. 

44.  Ariz.— Southwest  Metals  Co.  v. 
Snedaker,    129    P.2d    314,    59   Ariz. 
374. 

Cal.— Hiltbrand  v.  Hiltbrand,   23   P. 

2d   277,   218   Cal.   321— Application 

of   Mercereau,    14    P.2d   1019,    126 

Cal. App.  590. 
Ind. — Padol  v.  Home  Bank  &  Trust 

Co.,    27   N.E.2d    917,    108    Ind.App. 

401. 
Kan.— Boiler  v.  Boiler,  150  P.2d  157, 

158  Kan.  742 — Board  of  Com'rs  of 

Wyandotte  County  v.  Axtell,  5  P. 

2d  1078,  134  Kan.   304— Adams  v. 

Snyder,  20  P.2d  827,  137  Kan.  365 

—Martens  v.  Green,  218  P.  642,  113 

Kan.  142. 
La.— Miller  v.  Krouse,  App.,  177  So. 

472. 
Mo,— Chilton  v.  Cady,  250  S.W.  403, 

641 


'298    Mo.    101— Osage    Inv.    Co.   v. 

Sigrlst,   250   S.W.   39,   298   Mo.   139. 
Nev.— Nahas  v.  Nahas,  90  P.2d  223, 

59  Nev.  220,  rehearing  denied  92  P. 

2d  718,  59  Nev.  220. 
N.C.— Blankenship  v.  De  Casco,  189 

S.E.  773,  211  N.C.  290. 
Okl.— Wall  v.  Snider,  219  P.  671,  93 

Okl.  99. 
Tex. — Hunsinger  v.  Boyd,  26  S.W.2d 

905,     119     Tex.     182— Seymour    v. 

Schwartz,  Civ.App.,  172  S.W.2d  138 

— Winn  v.  Federal  Land  Bank  of 

Houston,  Civ.App.,  164  S.W.2d  864, 

error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  424  note  38. 

Personal  service   outside  state 

The  words  "personally  served"  or 
"personal  service"  in  the  statute 
mean  personal,  service  of  summons 
and  complaint  on'  a  defendant  with- 
in the  state,  and  do  not  include  per- 
sonal service  of  summons  and  com- 
plaint on  defendant  without  the 
state. 
Cal.— Tucker  v.  Tucker,  139  P.2d  348, 

59  Cal.App.2d  557. 
Minn. — Kane  v.  Stallman,   296  N.W. 

1,  209  Minn.  138. 
Nev.— Nahas  v.  Nabas,  90  P.2d  223, 

59  Nev.   220,   rehearing  denied  92 

P.2d  718,  59  Nev.  220. 

45.  Ariz. — Gordon  v.  Gordon,  281  P. 
215,  35  Ariz.  532. 

Cal. — Application  of  Mercereau,  14 
P.2d  1019,  126  CaLApp.  590. 

Ind. — Padol  v.  Home  Bank  &  Trust 
Co..  27  NJB.2d  917,  108  Ind.App. 
401. 

Kan. — Board  of  Com'rs  of  Wyan- 
dotte County  v.  Axtell,  5  P.2d  1078, 
134  Kan.  304. 

34  C.J.  p  425  note  89. 


335 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


unnecessarily  strict.46  Under  some  statutes  actual 
knowledge  of  the  pending  action  has  been  held  not 
to  preclude  defendant  from  subsequently  moving  to 
reopen  the  judgment;47  but  generally -a  defendant 
may  not  avail  himself  of  these  statutes,  although 
constructively  summoned,  if  he  had  actual  knowl- 
edge or  notice  of  the  action  in  time  to  make  his  de- 
fense,48 or  if  he  appeared  in  the  action,49  and,  of 
course,  such  statutes  do  not  apply  where  defendant 
was  personally  served,  and  thereafter  suffered  a 
default.5*) 

Defendant  need  not  present  any  excuse  for  his 
failure  to  appear  except  the  fact  that  he  was  not 
personally  served  with  the  summons.51  While  some 
of  this  class  of  statutes  in  terms  require  "cause"  or 
"good  cause"  to  be  shown,52  the  existence  of  a  meri- 
torious defense,  together  with  want  of  notice  of  the 
action  in  time  to  present  it,  is  sufficient  "cause" 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.53  No  irregular- 
ity in  the  proceedings  or  defect  in  the  judgment 
need  be  shown.54  The  application  presupposes  the 


validity  of  the  judgment  by  default,  and  the  regu- 
larity of  the  proceeding  may  not  be  attacked.55 

Defendant  is  not  precluded  from  having  the  judg- 
ment reopened  by  entering  a  general  appearance 
and  attaching  a  cross  petition  to  his  motion.5** 

§  336.    Showing  Meritorious  Defense 

a.  In  general 

b.  Sufficiency  of  showing 

c.  Sufficiency  of  defense 

d.  Affidavit  of  merits 

e.  Proposed  answer 

a.  In  General 

Subject  to  some  exceptions,  as  where  the  judgment 
is  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  an  application  to  open 
or  vacate  a  default  judgment  must  generally  be  supported 
by  a  showing  that  the  applicant  has  a  meritorious  de- 
fense. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  by  default  will  not 
be  opened  or  vacated  unless  defendant  shows  that 
he  has  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  action.5?  It 


46.  Ariz. — Gordon  v.  Gordon,  281  P. 
215,  35  Ariz.  532. 

47.  Mo.— Miners'  Bank  v.  Kingston, 
103  S.W.  27,  204  Mo.  687. 

Kev.— Nahas  v.  Nahas,  90  P.2d  223, 
59  Nev.  220,  rehearing-  denied  92 
P.2d  718,  59  Nev.  220. 

48.  Ark.— Horn    v.    Hull,    275    S.W. 
905,   169  Ark.   463. 

Cal.— Palmer  v.  Lantz,  9  P.2d  821, 
215  Cal.  320— Tucker  v.  Tucker, 
139  P.2d  348,  59  Cal.App.2d  557. 

Kan. — Suter  v.  Schultz,  7  P.2d  55, 
134  Kan.  538. 

Minn.— Kane  v.  Stallman,  296  N.W. 
1,  209  Minn.  138. 

Xex. — Watts  v.  City  of  El  Paso,  Civ. 
App.,  183  S.W.2d  249,  error  refused. 

84  C.J.  p  425  note  44. 

Actual  notice  held  not  given 

Utah.— Naisbitt  v.  Herrick,  290  P. 
950,  76  Utah  575. 

49.  Mo.— Boas   v.   Cliffdale   Land   & 
Farm  Co.,  193  S.W.  806. 

34  C.J.  p  425  note  45. 

50.  Mo. — Boas   v.   Cliffdale  Land   & 
Farm  Co.,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  426  note  46. 

Service  other  than  "by  publication 

A  statute  permitting  an  applica- 
tion to  set  aside  the  default  judg- 
ment if  it  has  been  rendered  with- 
out other  service  than  publication 
in  a  newspaper  has  been  held  not  to 
apply  if  notice  has  been  mailed  to 
defendant. — Lynch  v.  Collins,  233  P. 
709,  106  Okl.  133. 

51.  Ariz. — Collins   v.    Streitz,    54    P. 
2d   264,    47   Ariz.    146,    appeal   dis- 
missed 56   S.Ct.   835,   298   U.S.   640, 
80  L.Ed.  1373. 

Cal.— Randall  v.  Randall,  264  P.  751, 
203  Cal.  462— In  re  Stanfield's 


Guardianship,  89  P.2d  696,  32  Cal. 
App.2d  283. 
3-4  C.J.  p  426  note  49. 

52.  Alaska. — Inland  Finance   Co.   v. 
Standard  Salmon  Packers,  7  Alas- 
ka 131. 

Mo.— Chilton  v.  Cady,  250  S.W.  403, 

298  Mo.  101. 
Tex. — Watts  v.  City  of  El  Paso,  Civ. 

App.,  183  S,W.2d  249,  error  refused. 
34  OJ.  p  426  note  51. 
Good  cause  held  not  shown 
Tex. — Devereauac  v.  Daube,  Civ.App., 

185  S.W.2d  211. 

53.  Alaska. — Inland   Finance   Co.   v. 
Standard  Salmon  Packers,  7  Alas- 
ka 131. 

Ariz.— Collins  v.  Streitz,  54  P.2d  264, 
47  Ariz.  146,  appeal  dismissed  56 
S.Ct.  835,  298  U.S.  640,  80  L.Ed. 
1373 — Gordon  v.  Gordon,  281  P. 
215,  35  Ariz.  532. 
Mo. — Osage  Inv.  Co.  v.  Sigrist,  250 

S.W.  39,  298  Mo.  139. 
Tex. — Devereaux  v.  Daube,  Civ.App., 
185   S.W.2d  211— Ashton  v.  Farrell 
&    Co.,    Civ.App.,    121    S.W.2d    611, 
error  dismissed — Smalley  v.   Octa- 
gon   Oil    Co.,    Civ.App.,    82    S.W.2d 
1049,  error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  427  note  52. 
Personal    service    prevented   by    de- 
fendant 

Defendant  is  not  required  to  show 
affirmatively  anything  more  than 
that  he  has  a  good  defense  on  the 
merits,  but,  if  it  appears  from  the 
record  that  defendant  has  deliberate- 
ly prevented  personal  service  of 
summons  on  him,  there  is  not  "good 
cause"  within  statute  and  trial  court 
does  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  re- 
fusing a  new  trial. — Perrin  v.  Perrin 

642 


Properties,  86  P.2d  23,  53  Ariz.  121, 
122  A.L.R.  621. 

54.  N.Y.~- Marvin  v.  Brandy,  9  N.Y. 
S.    593,    56    Hun    242,    18    N.T.Civ. 
Proc.  343. 

55.  Kan. — Durham   v.   Moore,   29   P. 
472,  48  Kan.  135,  136. 

34  C.J.  p  427  note  54. 

56.  Okl.— Bagsby  v.  Bagsby,  89  P.2d 
345,    184   Okl.   627,    122   A.L.R.   155. 

57.  U.S. — Atlantic  Dredging  &  Con- 
struction Co.   v.  Nashville  Bridge 
Co.,  C.C.A.Fla.,  57  F.2d  519— Man- 
del  Bros.  v.  Victory  Belt  Co.,  C.C. 
A.I1L,  15  F,2d  610. 

Ala. — Ex  parte  Anderson,  4  So.2d 
420,  242  Ala.  31— Harnischfeger 
Sales  Co.  v.  Burge,  129  So.  37, 
221  Ala.  387. 

Ariz.— Brown  v.  Beck,  169  P.2d  855 
— Swisshelm  Gold  Silver  Co.  v. 
Farwell,  124  P.2d  544,  59  Ariz.  162 
— Perrin  v,  Perrin  Properties,  86 
P.2d  23,  53  Ariz.  121,  122  A.L.R. 
621— MacNeil  v.  Vance,  60  P.2d 
1078,  48  Ariz.  187— Huff*  v.  Flynn, 
60  P.2d  931,  48  Ariz.  175— Sturges 
v.  Sturges,  50  P.2d  886,  46  Ariz. 
331 — Michener  v.  Standard  Acci- 
dent Ins.  Co.,  47  P.2d  438,  46  Ariz. 
66— Martin  v.  Sears,  44  P.2d  526, 
45  Ariz.  414— Bryant  v.  Bryant,  14 
P.2d  712,  40  Ariz.  519— Beltran  v. 
Roll,  7  P.2d  248,  39  Ariz.  417— Se- 
curity Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v. 
Moseley,  234  P.  828,  27  Ariz.  562. 

Ark. — Rockamore  v.  Pembroke,  18B 
S.W.2d  616,  208  Ark.  995— Barrin- 
ger  v.  Whitson,  168  S.W.2d  395, 
205  Ark.  260— O'Neal  v.  B.  F. 
Goodrich  Rubber  Co.,  162  S.W.2d 
52,  204  Ark.  371— Mayberry  v. 
Penn,  146  S.W.2d  925,  201  Ark. 
756 — Federal  Land  Bank  of  St 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


336 


Louis  v.  Cottrell,  126  S.W.2d  279, 
197  Ark.  783— Hill  v.  Teague,  108 
S.W.2d  883,  194  Ark.  552— Quirles 
v.  Smith,  56  S.W.2d  427,  186  Ark. 
835— Lambie  v.  W.  T.  Rawleigh 
Co.,  14  S.W.2d  245,  178  Ark.  1019 
— C.  A.  Blanton  Co.  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank,  1  S.W.2d  558,  175  Ark.  1107 
— United  Order  of  Good  Samari- 
tans v.  Brooks,  270  S.W.  955,  168 
Ark.  570— Minick  v.  Ramey,  269  S. 
W.  565,  168  Ark.  180. 

Cal.— Beard  v.  Beard,  107  P.2d  385, 
16  Cal.2d  645 — Elms  v.  Elms,  App., 
164  P.2d  936— Bonfilio  v.  Ganger, 
140  P.2d  861,  60  Cal.App.2d  405— 
Thompson  v.  Sutton,  122  P.2d  975, 
50  Cal.App.2d  272— Doyle  v.  Rice 
Ranch  Oil  Co.,  81  P.2d  980,  28  Cal. 
App.2d  18 — Antonsen  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco Container  Co.,  66  P.2d  716, 
20  Cal.App.2d  214 — Application  of 
Mercereau,  14  P.2d  1019,  126  Cal. 
App.  590 — Sharp  v.  Paulson,  295  P. 
856,  111  CaLApp.  515— Brooks  v. 
Nelson,  272  P.  610,  95  Cal.App.  144. 

Colo. — Connell  v.  Continental  Cas- 
ualty Co.,  290  P.  274,  87  Colo.  573. 

Fla. — State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie  v. 
Raymond,  138  So.  40,  103  Fla.  649. 

Ga.— Golightly  v.  Line,  121  S.E.  878, 
81  Ga.App.  550. 

Idaho. — State  ex  rel.  Sweeley  v. 
Braun,  110  P.2d  835,  62  Idaho  258 
— Voellmeck  v.  Northwestern  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  92  P.2d  1076,  60  Ida- 
ho 412. 

111.— Lusk  v.  Bluhm,  53  N.E.2d  135, 
321  IlLApp.  349— Brown  v.  Zau- 
bawfcy,  52  N.B.2d  725,  321  111. App. 
297,  reversed  on  other  grounds  57 
N.B.2d  856,  388  111.  351— Harris  v. 
Juenger,  7  N.E.2d  376,  289  IlLApp. 
467,  reversed  on  other  grounds  11 
N.B.2d  929,  367  111.  478— Whalen  v. 
Twin  City  Barge  &  Gravel  Co., 
280  IlLApp.  596,  certiorari  de- 
nied Twin  City  Barge  &  Gravel  Co. 
v.  Whalen,  56  S.Ct  590,  297  U.S. 
714,  80  L.Ed.  1000— Crystal  Lake 
Country  Club  v.  Scanlan,  264  111. 
App.  44 — People  v.  Wade,  258  I1L 
App.  138. 

Ind.— Hoag  v.  Jeffers,  159  N.E.  753, 
201  Ind.  249— Ffclmouth  State  Bank 
v.  Hayes,  185  N.E.  662,  97  Ind.App. 
68. 

Iowa. — Bates  v.  Ely  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank,  261  N.W.  614,  219  Iowa  1356 
— Borden  v.  Voegtlin,  245  N.W.  331, 
215  Iowa  882 — Ryan  v.  Phoenix  Ins. 
Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  215  N.W. 
749,  205  Iowa  655— Upmier  v. 
Freese,  202  N.W.  8,  199  Iowa  405— 
Sioux  County  v.  Kosters,  191  N.W. 
315,  194  Iowa  1300. 

Kan.— Pilsen  State  Bank  v.  Riffel,  21 
P.2d  348,  137  Kan.  678— Board  of 
Com'rs  of  Wyandotte  County  v. 
Kerr,  211  P.  128,  112  Kan.  463. 

Ky. — Carr  Creek  Community  Center 
v.  Home  Lumber  Co.,  125  S.W.2d 
777,  276  Ky.  840. 

Mass.— Manzi  v.  Carlson,  180  N.E. 
134,  278  Mass.  267. 

Md. — Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d  276, 


181  Md.  206— Martin  v.  Long,  120 
A.  875,  142  Md.  348. 

Mich. — Feierabend  v.  Manistee,  Cir- 
cuit Judge,  234  N.W.  148,  253  Mich. 
115. 

Mo. — Quattrochi  v.  Quattrochl,  App., 
179  S.W.2d  757— Jeffrey  v.  Kelly, 
App.,  146  S.W.2d  850— O'Connell  v. 
Dockery,  App.,  102  S.W.2d  748— 
Williams  v.  Barr,  App.,  61  S.W.2d 
420,  transferred,  see,  Sup.,  55  S.W. 
2d  467 — Karst  v.  Chicago  Fraternal 
Life  Ass'n,  App.,  22  S.W.2d  178— 
Case  v.  Arky,  App.,  253  S.W.  484. 

Neb. — Ak-Sar-Ben  Exposition  Co.  v. 
Sorensen,  229  N.W.  13,  119  Neb. 
358. 

N.J. — Hanover  Trust  Co.  v.  Rizzo, 
166  A.  326,  110  N.J.Law  581— Mc- 
Carthy v.  Quire,  187  A.  739,  14  N. 
J.Misc.  795— E.  J.  Lavino  &  Co.  v. 
National  Surety  Co.,  141  A.  663, 
104  N.J.Law  475,  6  N.J.Misc.  478— 
Auto  Brokerage  Co.  v.  Ullrich,  134 
A.  885,  4  N,J.Misc.  808. 

N.T.— Hogan  v.  Johnson,  272  N.T.S. 
113,  241  App.Div.  914— Katzenberg 
v.  Land  Estates,  271  N.T.S.  282, 
241  App.Div.  874— Tabakin  v.  Frei- 
man,  217  N.T.S.  378,  217  App.Div: 
665— Titus  v.  Halsted,  204  N.T.S. 
241,  209  App.Div.  66— Procter  & 
Gamble  Distributing  Co.  v.  Scher, 
200  N.T.S.  428,  20B  App.Div.  737— 
Broderick  v.  Saretsky,  39  N.T.S. 
2d  802,  179  Misc.  737— Hutchinson 
v.  Weston,  290  N.T.S.  334,  160 
Misc.  890— Zaza  v.  Zaza,  246  N.T.S. 
148,  138  Misc.  218— Crouse  Grocery 
Co.  v.  Valentine,  226  N.T.S.  613, 
131  Misc.  571— Mandel  v,  Donohue, 
208  N.T.S.  807,  124  Misc.  861— 
Lennox  v.  Meehan,  201  N.T.S.  710, 
121  Misc.  678— Schulte  Leasing 
Corp.  v.  Friedman,  61  N.T.S.2d  665 
— Hospital  Credit  Exchange  v. 
Mintz,  53  N.T.S.2d  JS30— Federal 
Schools  v.  Saponaro,  25  N.T.S. 2d 
313 — General  Exchange  Ins.  Cor- 
poration v.  Stern,  25  N.T.S,2d  266 
— National  Advertising  Agency  v. 
Greco,  201  N.T.S.  704. 

N.C. — Graver  v.  Spaugh,  88  S.E.2d 
525,  226  N.C.  450— Johnson  v.  Sidr 
bury,  34  S.E.2d  67,  225  N.C.  208— 
Cayton  v.  Clark,  193  S.E.  404,  212 
N.C.  374— Carter  v.  Anderson,  181 
S.E.  750,  208  N.C.  529— Fellos  v. 
Allen,  162  S.E.  905,  202  N.C.  375— 
Sutherland  v.  McLean,  154  S.E. 
662,  199  N.C.  345— Bowie  v.  Tuck- 
er, 150  S.E.  200,  197  N.C.  671— 
Dunn  v.  Jones,  142  S.E.  820,  195 
N.C.  354— Baker  v.  Corey,  141  S.E. 
892,  195  N.C.  299— Crye  v.  Stoltz, 
138  S.E.  167,  193  N.C.  802— Helder- 
man  v.  Hartsell  Mills  Co.,  135  S.E. 
627,  192  N.C.  626— Taylor  &  Fetzer 
v.  Gentry,  135  S.E.  327,  192  N.C. 
503— Duffer  v.  Brunson,  125  S.E. 
619,  188  N.C.  789— Hill  v.  Humnes 
Hotel  Co.,  125  S.E.  266,  188  N.C. 
586. 

N.D.— Berry  v.  Berry,  234  N.W.  520, 
«0  N.D.  353— Hart  v.  Hone,  223 
N.W.  346,  57  N.D.  590— Kozak  v. 

643 


Ashbridge,  222  N.W.  620,  57  N.D. 
496 — Warren  v.  Resaake,  208  N.W. 
564,  54  N.D.  65. 

Ohio. — Lazarus  v.  Cleveland  House- 
hold Supply  Co.,  154  N.E.  343,  28 
Ohio  App.  15. 

Okl. — Jupe  v.  Home  Owners  Loan 
Corp.,  167  P.2d  46 — Turner  v.  Dex- 
ter, 44  P.2d  984,  172  Okl.  252 — 
Petros  v.  Fox-Vliet  Drug  Co.,  280 
P.  812,  138  Okl.  253. 

Or. — Snyder  v.  Consolidated  High- 
way Co.,  72  P.2d  932,  157  Or.  479 
— Finch  v.  Pacific  Reduction  & 
Chemical  Mfg.  Co.,  234  P.  296,  113 
Or.  670. 

Pa. — Quaker  City  Chocolate  &  Con- 
fectionery Co.  v.  Warnock  Bldg. 
Ass'n,  32  A.2d  5,  347  Pa.  186 — 
Sturges  v.  Page,  163  A.  327,  106 
Pa.Super.  520 — Page  v.  Patterson, 
161  A.  878,  105  Pa.Super.  438— 
Silent  Auto  Corporation  of  North- 
ern New  Jersey  v.  Folk,  97  Pa. 
Super.  588 — Brown  v.  Bray,  90  Pa. 
Super.  180 — Remick  v.  Letterle,  89 
PsuSuper.  322 — Henderson  v.  Oshi- 
rak,  -56  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  25— Leschin- 
ski  v.  W.  C.  Hack  &  Sons,  47  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  475— Green  v.  Davis,  19 
Pa-Dist.  &  Co.  156,  32  Sch.Leg.Rec. 
307 — Commonwealth  v.  Dr.  Cran- 
dall's  Health  School,  Com.PL,  51 
Dauph.Co.  833 — Davis  v.  Tate, 
Com.PL,  26  Erie  Co.  141 — Kopec  v. 
Sullivan,  Com.PL,  23  Erie  Co.  413 
—Smith  v.  Morris,  Com.PL,  41 
Lack.Jur.  18 — White  v.  Consumers 
Finance  Service,  Com.PL,  33  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  461 — Thomas  Bros.  v. 
Grohowski,  Com.PL,  32  Luz.Legr. 
Reg.  454— Herring  v.  Abromitis, 
Com.PL,  15  Northum.Leg.J.  213. 

Philippine. — Lerma  v.  Antonio,  6 
Philippine  236— Wahl  v.  Donaldson, 
2  Philippine  301. 

R.I. — Chemick  v.  Annelfo,  17  A.2d 
848,  66  R.I.  95— Nelen  v.  Wells, 
123  A.  599,  45  ILL  424— Milbury 
Atlantic  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rocky  Point 
Amusement  Co.,  118  A.  737,  44  R.I. 
458— Whitney  v,  Jenks,  118  A.  689. 

S.C.— Lillard  v.  Searson,  170  S.E.  449, 
170  S.C.  304 — Savannah  Supply  Co. 
v.  Ross,  122  S.E.  772,  128  S.C.  298. 

S.D. — Connelly  v.  Franklin,  210  N.W. 
735,  50  S.D.  512. 

Tex. — Commercial  Credit  Corp.  v. 
Smith,  187  S.W.2d  363,  143  Tex. 
612 — Craddock  v.  Sunshine  Bus 
Lines,  133  S.W.2d  124,  134  Tex.  388 
— City  of  Fort  Worth  v.  Gause, 
101  S.W.2d  221,  129  Tex  25— Law- 
ther  Grain  Co.  v.  Winniford,  Com. 
App.,  '249  S.W.  195 — Southwestern 
Specialty  Co.  v.  Brown,  Civ.Apufc, 
188  S.W.2d  1002,  error  refused- 
Harris  v.  Elm  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App^ 
183  S.W.2d  216,  error  refused- 
Brown  v.  St.  Mary's  Temple  No.  U 
S.  M.  T.  United  Brothers  of 
Friendship  of  Texas,  Civ. App.,  127 
S.W.2d  531 — Ferguson  v.  Chapman, 
Civ.App.,  94  S.W.2d  593,  error  dis- 
missed— University  Development 
Co.  v.  Wolf,  Civ.App.,  93  S.W.2d 


336 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


must  appear  that  a  retrial  will  result  in  a  judgment 
different  from  the  one  sought  to  be  vacated58  The 
existence  of  a  meritorious  defense  is  an  express  or 
implied  condition  of  relief  under  some  of  the  stat- 
utes providing  for  the  opening  or  vacating  of  de- 
fault judgments  taken  on  constructive  service  of 
process,59  but  such  a  showing  is  not  necessary  un- 
der all  of  the  statutes.60 


Exceptions  to  the  rule  have  been  made  in  a  vari- 
ety of  cases.61  A  meritorious  defense  need  not  be 
shown  where  the  application  to  open  or  vacate  the 
default  judgment  is  made  during  the  judgment 
term;62  but  there  is  also  authority  to  the  contra- 
ry.68 It  has  been  held  that  a  meritorious  defense 
need  not  be  shown  where  the  judgment  is  void,64 
or  at  least  where  it  is  void  on  the  face  of  the  rec- 


1187--Babington  v.  Gray,  Civ.App., 
71  S.W.2d  293— Aviation  Credit 
Corporation  of  New  York  v.  Uni- 
versity Aerial  Service  Corporation, 
Civ.App.,  59  S.W.2d  870,  error  dis- 
missed— Peters  v.  A.  Brandt  Up- 
holstering Co.,  Civ.App.,  50  S.W.2d 

409,  error    dismissed — Homuth   v. 
Williams,  Civ.App.,  42  S.W.2d  1048 
— Housewright     v.     Housewright, 
Civ-App.,  41  S.W.2d  1071,  error  re- 
fused— Sun  Lumber  Co.  v.  Huttig 
Sash  &  Door  Co.,  Civ.App.,  36  S.W. 
2d  561 — Peters  v.  Hubb  Diggs  Co, 
Civ.App.,  85  S.W.2d  449,  error  dis- 
missed— Chaney  v.  Allen,  Civ.App., 
25  S.W.2d  1115 — Griffin  v.  Burrus, 
Civ.App.,    24   S.W.2d   805,   affirmed, 
Com.App.,  24  S.W.2d  810 — Humph- 
rey v.  Harrell,  Clv.App.,  19  S.W.2d 

410,  affirmed,  Com.App.,  29  S.W.2d 
963 — Sneed  v.  Sneed,  Civ.App..  296 
S.W.  643— St.  Paul  Fire  &  Marine 
Ins.  Co.   v.  Earnest,  Civ.App.,   293 
S.W.   677,  affirmed   296   S.W.   1088, 
116  Tex.  565 — Thompson  v.  Glover 
Johns  Auto  Co.,  Civ.App.,  289  S.W. 
124 — Trigg  v.   Gray,  Civ.App.,   288 
S.W.   1098 — Colorado  River  Syndi- 
cate Subscribers  v.  Alexander,  Civ. 
App.,  288  S.W.  586— Welsch  v.  Kee- 
ton,  Civ.App.,  287  S.W.  692— Paggi 
v.  Rose  Mfg.  Co.,  Civ. App.,  285  S. 
W.   852 — Thomas  v.  Goldberg,  Civ. 
App.,     283     S.W.     230— First    Nat 
Bank  v.   Southwest  Nat.  Bank  of 
Dallas,    Civ.App.,    273    S.W.    951— 
Allen  v.  Frank,  Civ.App.,  252  S.W. 
£47 — Stoudenmeier    v.    First    Nat 
Bank,   Civ.App.,   246   S.W.   761. 

Vt— Greene  v.  Riley,  172  A,  633,  106 
Vt.  319. 

Wash. — Person  v.  Plough,  24  P.2d 
591,  174  Wash.  160— Luger  v.  Lit- 
tau,  288  P.  277,  157  Wash.  40— 
Hurby  v.  Kwapil,  286  P.  '664,  156 
Wash.  225 — Jacobsen  v.  Defiance 
Lumber  Co.,  253  P.  1088,  142  Wash. 
642 — Boerlnga  v.  Brockway,  234 
P.  1015,  134  Wash.  43— Hurley  v. 
Wilson,  225  P.  441,  129  Wash.  567. 

W.Va. — Arnold  v.  Reynolds,  2  S.B. 
2d  433,  121  W.Va.  91— State  ex  rel. 
Alklre  v.  Mili,  180  S.E.  183,  116 
W.Va.  277— Gainer  v.  Smith,  132 
S.E.  744,  101  W.Va.  314. 

34  C.J.  p  329  note  55,  p  428  note  69. 

Showing  meritorious  defense  gener- 
ally see  supra  §  290. 

Defense  in  whole  or  in,  part 

Kan. — American  Oil  &  Refining  Co. 

v.    Liberty-Texas    Oil   Co.,   211   P. 

137,  112  Kan.  309. 


N.D.— Croonquist  v.  Walker,   196   N, 

W.  108,  50  N.D.  388. 
Default  order  and  Judgment  distin- 
guished 

Under  the  statutes,  the  distinction 
between  an  order  vacating  a  default 
judgment  and  an   order  vacating  a 
default   order   entered   before   judg- 
ment is  that  in  the  former  the  pre- 
requisite  is    showing  a  meritorious 
defense,  while  in  the  latter  only  good 
and  sufficient  cause  need  be  set  out 
—Johnston  v.    Medina  Improvement 
Club,  116  P.2d  272,  10  Wash.2d  44. 
58.    Cal. — Greenamyer    v.    Board    of 
Trustees     of     Lugo     Elementary 
School  Dist  in  Los  Angeles  Coun- 
ty, 2  P.2d  848.  116  CaLApp.  319. 
Colo. — Bray  v.  Germain  Inv.  Co.,  98 

P.2d  993,  105  Colo.  403. 
Kan. — Miner    v.    Blakeman,    210    P. 

1089,  112  Kan.  393. 

Pa.— Citizens'   taat.    Bank   of   Tunk- 
Hannock   v.    Hallock,   154   A.    304, 
303  Pa.  205. 
S.D.— Sohn  v.  Flavin,  244  N.W.  349, 

60  S.D.  305. 
Tex. — Cragin  v.  Henderson  County 
Oil  Development  Co.,  Com.App.,  280 
S.W.  554 — Sanns  v.  Chapman,  Civ. 
App.,  144  S.W.2d  341,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Dickson 
v.  Navarro  County  Levee  Improve- 
ment Dist  No.  3,  Civ.App.,  124  S. 
W.2d  943,  followed  in  Dickson  v. 
Ellis  County  Levee  Improvement 
Dist  No.  10,  124  S.W.2d  946,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  139  S.W. 
2d  260,  135  Tex.  102,  set  aside 
Dickson  v.  Navarro  County  Levee 
Dist  No.  3,  139  S.W.2d  257,  135 
Tex.  95. 
34  C.J.  p  336  note  80—37  OJ.  p  656 

note  15  [a]. 

59.  Alaska. — Inland  Finance  Co.  v. 
Standard  Salmon  Packers,  7  Alas- 
ka 131. 

Kan. — Board  of  ConVrs  of  Sherman 
County  v.  Demaree,  142  P.2d  722, 
157  Kan.  478. 

Tex. — Watts  v.  City  of  El  Paso,  Civ. 
App.,  183  S.W.2d  249,  error  re- 
fused. . 

34  C.J.  p  427  note  55. 
Statutes  of  limitation 

On  motion  to  open  default  judg- 
ments and  to  be  permitted  to  defend, 
statutes  of  limitation  specifically 
pleaded  constituted  a  "full  answer" 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute 
dealing  with  the  opening  of  a  default 
judgment  rendered  on  service  by 
publication  after  the  filing  of  a  "full 

644 


answer." — Tawney  v.  Blankenship,  90 
P.2d  1111,  150  Kan.  41. 

60.  Ala. — May  v.    Granger,    139    So. 
569,  224  Ala.  208. 

34  C.J.  p  427  note  56. 

61.  Ind. — Gary    Hobart    Inv.    Real- 
ty Co.  v.   Barle,   135   N.B.   798,   78 
Ind.App.  412. 

Iowa. — Wagoner  v.   Ring,    240   N.W. 

634.  213  Iowa  1123. 
Pa. — Eastman  Kodak  Co.  v.  Osenider, 

193    A.    284,    127    Pa. Super.    332. 
34  C.J.  p  427  note  65. 
Constructive  service 

A  defendant  who  was  constructive- 
ly served  had  right  under  statute  to 
seek  to  set  aside  default  judgment 
within  two  years  thereafter '  and  to 
make  her  defense  on  giving  bond  for 
costs,  without  first  showing  meri- 
torious defense. — Wright  v.  Burlison, 
128  S.W.2d  2S8,  198  Ark.  187. 
Default  induced  by  plaintiff 

Defendant,  seeking  to  set  aside 
verdict  for  plaintiff  rendered  in  ab- 
sence'of  defendant  and  his  counsel, 
who  was  misled  by  statements  of 
plaintiffs  counsel,  was  not  required 
to  make  showing  on  merits. — Black 
v.  Foley,  185  S.E.  902,  117  W.Va. 
490. 

Default  due  to  negligence  of  defend- 
ant's attorney 
Idaho. — Weaver  v.   Rambow,   217  P. 

610,  37  Idaho  645. 

Where  a  sufficient  answer  Is  on 
file,  a  meritorious  defense  need 
not  be  shown. — Cause  v.  Cities  Serv- 
ice Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  70  S.W.2d  224, 
affirmed  City  of  Fort  Worth  ,v. 
Gause,  101  S.W.2d  221,  129  Tex.  25. 

62.  Mo. — Faulkner  v.  F.  Bierman  & 
Sons  Metal  &  Rubber  Co.,  App.,  294 
S.W.  1019. 

Okl. — Joplin  Furniture  Co.  v.   Bank 

of  Picher,  3  P.2d  173,  151  Okl,  158. 

Tex. — Atkinson  v.  I/eonard,  Civ.App., 

287  S.W.  535. 
Before  Judgment  entered 

A  meritorious  defense  need  not  be 
shown  on  an  application  to  vacate 
a  default,  where  made  before  judg- 
ment is  entered. — Johnston  v.  Me- 
dina Improvement  Club,  116  P.2d 
272,  19  Washed  44. 

63.  Iowa. — Sioux  County  v.  Kosters, 
191  N.W.   315,   194   Iowa  1300. 

L    D.C.— Wise  v.  Herzog,   114  F.2d 
486,  72  APP.D.C.  335. 
Ga. — McCray  v.  Empire  Inv.  Co.,  174 
S.B.  219,  49  Ga.App.  117. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


ord,65  or  where  the  judgment  is  void  for  want  of 
jurisdiction,66  as  where  defendant  was  never 
served;67  but  it  has  been  held  that  a  meritorious 
defense  must  be  shown  where  the  judgment  recites 
facts  sustaining  jurisdiction,68  or  where  the  judg- 
ment is  voidable.69  It  has  been  held  that,  a  meri- 
torious defense  need  not  be  shown  where  the  de- 
fault judgment  was  entered  without  authority,  by 
mistake,  irregularity,  or  improvidently,70  as  where 
a  judgment  was  taken  by  default  before  defendant's 
time  to  answer  had  expired  or  after  the  case  was 
at  issue  ;71  but  it  has  also  been  held  that  the  fact 
that  the  judgment  was  irregularly  entered  does  not 


dispense  with  the  need  of  showing  a  meritorious 
defense.72  It  has  been  held  that  a  meritorious  de- 
fense need  not  be  shown  where  the  judgment  is 
fundamentally  erroneous.78 

b.  Sufficiency  of  Showing 

The  facts  constituting  the  defense  must  be  set  forth 
In  the  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judgment; 
It  Is  not  sufficient  to  allege  that  the  applicant  has  a 
meritorious  defense. 

The  defense  must  be  set  forth  in  sufficient  detail 
in  an  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judg- 
ment to  permit  the  court  to  determine  whether  or 
not  it  is  meritorious  and  sufficient;74  it  is  not  suf- 


N.J.— Westfield   Trust   Co.   v.    Court 
of  Common  Pleas  of  Morris  Coun- 
ty,  178  A.  546,  115  N.J.Law  86,  af- 
firmed 183  A.  165,  116  N.J.Daw  191. 
Tex. — City     of    Corpus     Christ!     v. 
Scruggs,    Civ.App.,    89    S.W.2d  458. 
Wash. — Person    v.    Plough,    24    P.2d 

591,  174  Wash.  160. 
Attorney's  fees 

Where  default  Judgment  entered 
by  clerk  of  district  court  in  action 
on  note  was  void  because  judgment 
included  an  amount  for  reasonable 
attorney's  fees,  defendant  was  enti- 
tled to  have  judgment  opened  at  sub- 
sequent term  without  necessity  of 
showing  a  meritorious  defense  to 
note. — Wunnicke  v.  Leith,  Wyo.,  157 
P.2d  274. 

65.  Tex.— City    of    Fort    Worth    v. 
Gause,    101    S.W.2d    221,    129    Tex. 
25— Hitt  v.   Bell,   Civ.App.,   Ill   S. 
W.2d  1164. 

66.  Cal.— Hollywood    Garment    Cor- 
poration v.  J.  Beckerman,  Inc.,  143 
P.2d  738,  61  Oal.App.2d  658. 

Iowa.— Dewell  v.  Suddick,  232  N.W. 
118,  211  Iowa  1352. 

67.  IXC.— Wise  v.  Herzog,   114  F.2d 
486,  72  App.D.C.  335. 

Minn,— Pugsley  v.  Magerfleisch,   201 

N.W.  323,  161  Minn.  246. 
N.C.—- City   of  Monroe  v.   Niven,   20 

S.B.2d  811,  221  N.C.  362. 
Ohio.— Hayes     v.     Kentucky     Joint 

Stock  Land  Bank  of  Lexington,  181 

N.E.  542,   125  Ohio  St  359. 
Okl. — Burnett  y.  Clayton,  252  P.  397, 

123  Okl.  156. 
Or. — Finch    v.    Pacific    Reduction   & 

Chemical  Mfg.  Co.,  234  P.  296,  113 

Or.  670. 

68.  Tex.— Bell     v.     Cobb,     Civ.App., 
296  S.W.  976— Tanton  v.  State  Nat 
Bank  of  El  Paso,  Civ.App.,  277  S. 
W.  449. 

69.  Okl.— Brazell  v.  Brockins,  217  P. 
847,  95  Okl.  38. 

Tex. — Commercial  Credit  Corp.  v 
Smith,  187  S.W.2d  363,  143  Tex. 
612. 

70.  Ala.— Ex    parte    State    ex    rel. 
Harle  Haas  Co.,  97  So.  680,  19  Ala, 
App.  400. 

Ariz.— Qila   Valley   Electric,    Gas   & 


Water  Co.  v.  Arizona  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank,  215  P.  159,  25  Ariz.  177. 

Colo. — Netland  v.  Baughman,  162  P. 
2d  601. 

Mich.— Flewelling  v.  Prima  Oil  Co., 
189  N.W.  160,  291  Mich.  281. 

Tex. — Sun  Lumber  Co.  v.  Huttig 
Sash  &  Door  Co.,  Civ.App.,  36  S. 
W.2d  561. 

Utah.— Sanders  v.  Milford  Auto  Co., 
218  P.  126,  62  Utah  110. 

34  C.J.  p  428  note  66. 

71.  Mo.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Savings  Trust  Co.  of  St  Louis  v. 
Skain,  131  S.W.2d  566,  575,  345 
Mo.  46. 

Wash. — Batchelor  v.  Palmer,  224  P. 
685,  129  Wash.  150. 

W.Va. — Arnold  v.  Reynolds,  2  S.E. 
2d  433,  121  W.Va,  91. 

34  01.  p  334  note  70,  p  428  note 
67. 

73.  N.C. — Simms  v.  Sampson,  20  S. 
B.2d  554,  221  N.C.  379— Chozen 
Confections  v.  Johnson,  11  S.E.2d 
472,  218  N.C.  500 — Cayton  v.  Clark, 
193  S.E.  404,  212  N.C.  374— Stand- 
ard Supply  Co.:  v.  Vance  Plumbing 
&  Electric  Co.,  143  S.E.  248,  195 
N.C.  629. 

Wash. — Penfound  v.  Gagnon,  20  P.2d 
17,  172  Wash.  311. 

73.  Tex.— City    of    Fort    Worth    v. 
Gause,  101  S.W.24  221,  129  Tex.  25. 

74.  Ala.— Little    v.    Peevy,    189'  So. 
720,  238  Ala,  106. 

Ariz.— Beltran  v.  Boll,  7  P.2d  248,  39 
Ariz.  417 — Security  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank  v.  Moseley,  234  P.  828, 
27  Ariz.  562. 

Ark. — Eockamore  v.  Pembroke,  188  S. 
W.2d  616,  208  Ark.  995— Davis  v, 
Bank  of  Atkins,  167  S.W.Sd  876, 
205  Ark.  144— O'Neal  v.  B.  F.  Good- 
rich Rubber  Co.,  162  &W.2d  52 
204  Ark.  371— Merriott  v.  Kilgore, 
139  S.W.2d  387,  200  Ark.  394— Hill 
v.  Teague,  108  S.W.2d  889,  194  Ark. 
552— Quirles  v.  Smith,  56  S.W.2d 
427,  186  Ark.  835. 

Cal. — Thaler  v.  Thaler,  15  P.2d  192 
127  Cal.App.  28 — Los  Angeles  Bon<! 
&  Securities  Co.  v.  Tyler,  7  P.2d 
1052,  120  CaLApp.  412. 

Idaho.— State  ex  reL  Sweeley  v 
Braun,  110  P.2d  835,  62  Idaho  25 

645* 


— Voellmeck  v.  Northwestern  Mut 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  92  P.2d  1076,  60  Ida- 
ho 412. 
Iowa. — Boody   v.    Sawyer,    207   N.W. 

589,  201  Iowa  49-6. 

Kan. — American  Oil  &  Refining  Qo.  v. 
•Liberty-Texas  Oil  Co.,  211  P.  137, 
112  Kan.  309. 

Miss.— Planters'  Lumber  Co.  v.  Sib- 
ley,  93  So.  440,  130  Miss.  26. 
Mont. — First     Nat     Corporation     v. 
Perrine,  43  P.2d  1073,  99  Mont.  454 
— Reynolds  v.  Gladys  Belle  Oil  Co., 
243  P.  576,  75  Mont.  332 — Brothers 
v.  Brothers,  230  P.  60,  71  Mont  878. 
N.J.— Zippier  v.  Westney,  149  A.  539, 

105  N.J.BQ.  661. 
N.T.— Hannel  v.  Serbert,  255  N.T.-S. 
758,  143  Misc.  61 — Grouse  Grocery 
Co.   v.    Valentine,    226   N.T.S.    613, 
131  Misc.  571 — Lennox  v.  Meehan, 
201  N.T.S.  710,   121  Misc.   678. 
Okl.— 'Fair  Department  Store  v.  'Dal- 
las Jobbing  House,  46  P.2d  $29,  172 
OkL  486. 

Or. — -Finch  v.  Pacific  Reduction  & 
Chemical  Mfg.  Co.,  234  P.  296,  118 
Or.  S70. 

Tex. — Dickson  v.  Navarro  County 
Levee  Improvement  Dist  No.  3, 
Civ.App.,  124  S.W.2d  943,  followed 
in  Dickson  r.  Ellis  County  Levee 
Improvement  Dist  No.  10,  124  S. 
W.2d  946,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  139  S.W.2d  260,  135  Tex. 
102,  set  aside  Dickson  v.  Navarro 
County  Levee  Imp.  Dist.  No.  3,  139 
S.W.2d  257,  135  Tex.  95— Universi- 
ty Development  Co.  v.  Wolf,  Civ. 
App.,  93  S.W.2d  1187. 
Wash. — Penfound  v:  Gagnon,  20  P.2d 
17,  172  Wash.  311. 
Affidavit  by  counsel  was  held  to  be 
sufficient — Bowman  v.  Bowman,  217 
P.  1102,  47  Nev.  207. 

Failure  to  file  affidavit  until  after 
hearing  on  motion  to  vacate  default 
judgment  did  not  vitiate  proceeding, 
where  contents  were  read  in  open 
court — Rhode  Island  Discount  Cor- 
poration T.  Carr,  R.L,  136  A.  244. 
Evidence 

On  motion  by  foreign  mining  cor- 
poration which  was  served  by  pub- 
lication, and  which  did'  not  appear,  to 
set  aside  judgment,  an  affidavit 


336 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ficient  to  allege  that  defendant  has  a  good  and  meri- 
torious defense.75  A  bare  formal  affidavit  of  mer- 
its, while  it  may  be  necessary,  as  discussed  infra 
subdivision  d  of  this  section,  is  not  a  sufficiently 
specific  showing.™  A  verified  answer,  however,  is 
generally  sufficient,77  unless  it  consists  only  of  a 
general  denial.78  The  showing  need  not  be  made 


by  affidavit  where  the  record  of  the  proceeding 
shows  a  meritorious  defense.79 

c.  Sufficiency  of  Defense 

A  defense  to  be  meritorious  must  be  legally  suffi- 
cient, and  it  must  not  be  unjust,  inequitable,  or  merely 
technical. 

A  meritorious  and  substantial  defense  which  must 


showing  «>  meritorious  defense  to  the 
action  was  sufficient  without  the 
presentation  of  evidence  to  support 
such  defense. — Southwest  Metals  Co. 
v.  Snedaker,  129  P.2d  814,  59  Ariz. 
874. 

Xn  trespass  action,  wherein  no  affi- 
davit of  defense  Is  necessary  to  put 
case  at  issue,  court  may  grant  peti- 
tion to  open  default  judgment  in  its 
discretion,  without  requiring  defend- 
ant to  state  exact  nature  of  defense 
in  petition  for  such  relief,  where 
equities  are  clear.— Scott  v.  Mc- 
Bwing,  10  A.2d  436,  337  Pa.  273,  126 
A.L.R.  367. 

Frima  facie  showing1 

(1)  Must  be  made. 

U.S.— The  Amaranth,  C.OA.N.Y.,  68 
F.2d  893. 

Ark. — Smith  v.  Globe  &  Rutgers  fire 
Ins.  Co.,  295  S.W.  388,  174  Ark.  346, 
followed  in  Deatherage  v.  Denni- 
son,  295  S.W.  390,  173  Ark.  1180. 

Pa. — Henderson  v.  Hendricks,  94  Pa- 
Super.  568. 

Tex. — Employer's  Reinsurance  Cor- 
poration v.  Brock,  Civ.App.,  74  S. 
W.2d  435,  error  dismissed. 

(2)  Is  sufficient 

Ark. — O.  O.  Scroggin  &  Co.  v.  Mer- 

rick,  5  S.W.2d  344.  176  Ark.  1205. 
CaL— Hallett  v.   Slaughter,  140  P.2d 

•3,  22  CaL2d  552 — Thompson  v.  Sut- 

ton,    122   P.2d   975,    50    Cal.App.2d 

272. 
Mass. — Hyde  Park  Sav.  Bank  v.  Dav- 

ankoskas,   11  N.B.2d  3,  298  Mass. 

421. 
Mont— Kirby  v.  Hoeh,   21  P.2d  732, 

94  Mont  218. 
N.J.— McArdle    Real    Estate    Co.    v. 

McGowan,   163  A.  24,  109  N.J.Law 

595— McCarthy    v.    Guire,    187    A. 

739,  14  N.J.Misc.  795. 
Pa. — Popky  v.  Shimpkus,  Com.Pl.,  42 

Lack.Jur.  125. 
S.D. — Johnson  v.  Johnson,  210  N.W. 

155,  50  S.D.  341. 

•Written  statement  required 

Pa.— Sturges  v.  Page,  163  A.  327,  10-6 

Pa.Super.  520. 
Pleading  as  evidence 

Verified  complaint  may  be  used  as 
evidence  in  determining  fact  of  good 
cause  of  action,  but  the  allegations 
therein  are  not  conclusive,  nor  will 
they  override  a  finding  of  the  judge 
made  on  conflicting  testimony. — Gra- 
ver v.  Spaugh,  38  S.E.2d  525,  226  N.C. 
450. 


Probative  and  ultimate  facts 

Where  defendants  who  claimed 
easement  on  land  sought  relief  from 
default  and  judgment  entered 
against  them  in  a  suit  to  partition 
the  land,  defendants,  in  alleging 
facts  to  show  that  they  had  a  good 
defense  to  the  action  on  the  merits, 
were  not  required  to  state  probative 
facts  concerning  origin  of  their  title 
to  easement — Thompson  v.  Button, 
122  P.2d  975,  50  Cal.App.2d  272. 
Reference  to  other  documents 

In  determining  sufficiency  of  affi- 
davit of  merits  supporting  motion  to 
vacate  default  judgment,  affidavit 
cannot  be  aided  by  reference  to  doc- 
uments or  records  which  are  not 
part  thereof. — Beltran  v.  Roll,  7  P. 
2d  248,  39  Ariz.  417. 
Sworn  testimony 

In  order  to  Justify  the  setting 
aside  of  a  default  judgment,  a  show- 
ing of  a  meritorious  defense,  if  based 
on  oral  testimony,  contemplates 
sworn  testimony  developed  in  con- 
nection with  the  proceedings  to  set 
aside  the  Judgment — Jeffrey  v.  Kel- 
ly, Mo.App.,  146  S.W.2d  850. 

75.  Ariz.— Beltran  v.  Roll,  7  P.2d 
248,  39  Ariz.  417. 

Ark.— Quirles  v.  Smith,  56  S.W.2d 
427,  186  Ark.  835. 

CaL — Thompson  v.  Sutton,  122  P.2d 
975,  50  Cal.App.2d  272. 

Idaho. — Voellmeck  v.  Northwestern 
Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  92  P.2d  1076, 
60  Idaho  412. 

111.— JLatham  v.  Salisbury,  61  N.E. 
2d  306,  326  IlLApp.  253— Whale n  v. 
Twin  City  Barge  &  Gravel  Co.,  280 
IlLApp.  596,  certiorari  denied  Twin 
City  Barge  &  Gravel  Co.  v.  Whalen, 
56  S.Ct  590,  297  U.S.  714,  80  L.Ed. 
1000. 

Iowa. — Boody  v.  Sawyer,  207  N.W. 
5:89,  201  Iowa  4 £6. 

Mo. — Jeffrey  v.  Kelly,  App.,  146  S. 
W,2d  850. 

OkL— 'Fair  Department  Store  v.  -Dal- 
las Jobbing  House,  46  P.2d  529, 
172  Okl.  486. 

Tex.— Dickson  v.  Navarro  County 
Levee  Improvement  Dist  No.  3, 
124  S.W.2d  943,  followed  in  Dick- 
son  v.  Ellis  County  I/evee  improve- 
ment Dist  No.  10,  Civ.App.,  124  S. 
W.2d  946,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  139  S.W.2d  260,  135  Tex. 
102,  set  aside'  Dickson  v.  Navarro 
County  Levee  Imp.  Dist.  No.  3, 
139  S.W.2d  257,  135  Tex.  95— Hall 
v.  Kynerd,  Civ.App.,  97  S.W.2d  278, 

646 


error  dismissed — Welsch  v.  Keeton, 
Civ.App.,  287  -S.W.  692— Mutual  Oil 
Consolidated  v.  Beavers,  Civ.App., 
272  S.W.  507. 

Wash. — Penfound  v.  Gagnon,  20  P.2d 
17,  172  Wash.  311. 

76.  N.T.— Hannel  v.  Serbert,  255  N. 
T.S.  758,  143  Misc.  61— Grouse  Gro- 
cery Co.   v.  Valentine,   226   N.T.S. 
613,  131  Misc.  571— Lennox  v.  Mee- 
han,  201  N.Y.S.  710,  121  Misc.  678. 

W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State 
ex  rel.  Alkire  v.  Mill,  180  S.E.  183, 
185,  116  W.Va.  277. 

34  C.J.  p  33-6  note  79. 

77.  CaL— Beard  v.   Beard,   107   P.2d 
385,    16    Cal.2d    645— Pulweiler   v. 
Hog's  Back  Cons.  Min.  Co.,  23  P. 
65,  83  Cal.  126. 

Mont. — Brothers  v.  Brothers,   230  P. 

60,  71  Mont  378. 
N.D.— Yesel  v.  Watson,  216  N.W.  199, 

56  N.D.   98 — Jesse  French  &  Sons 

Piano  Co.  v.  Getts,  192  N.W.   765, 

49  N.D.  577. 

Or. — Peters  v.  Dietrich,  27  P.2d  1015, 
145  Or.  589. 

S.C.— Maybank  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Jeff- 
coat  127  S.E.  835,  131  S.C.  418. 

Complaint  was   sufficient  showing 
of  merits  in  application  by  plaintiff 
to  open  default 
Cal. — Waybright  v.  Anderson,  253  P. 

148,  200  Cal.  374. 
Wash. — Graham    v.    Takima    Stock 

Brokers,   72   P.2d  1041,   192  Wash. 

121. 

Deficiencies  in  affidavit  may  be 
cured  by  verified  answer. — Alexander 
v.  Mayer,  102  P.2d  540,  39  Cal.App.2d 
157— Shively  v.  Kochman,  73  P.2d 
637,  23  Cal.App.2d  420-^John  A. 
Vaughan  Corporation  v.  Title  Insur- 
ance &  Trust  Co.,  12  P.2d  117,  123 
CaLApp.  709. 

Exceptions  filed  by  defendant  to  a 
report  of  a  referee  were  held  to  con- 
stitute a  sufficient  showing  of  merit 
to  entitle  him  to  be  heard. — Everett 
v.  Johnson,  14  S.E.2d  520,  219  N.C. 
540. 

78.  Mont. — Reynolds  v.  Gladys  Belie 
Oil  Co.,  243  P.  576,  75  Mont  332. 

N.D.— Kozak  v.  Ashbridge,  222  N.W. 

620,  57  N.D.  496. 
OkL— Petros  v.  Fox-Vliet  Drug  Co., 

280  P.  812,  138  OkL  253. 

79.  Minn. — Unowsky    v.    Show,    201 
N.W.  93-6,  161  Minn.  489. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


336 


be  shown  in  support  of  an  application  to  open  or 
vacate  a  default  judgment  is  one  which  raises  ques- 
tions of  law  deserving  investigation  or  a  real  con- 
troversy as  to  the  essential  facts.8°  A  defense 
which  is  legally  sufficient  is  not  necessarily  a  meri- 
torious defense  which  will  support  such  an  appli- 


cation; a  defense  to  be  meritorious  must  be  just  and 
equitable,81  and  a  defense  which  is  purely  techni- 
cal or  unconscionable  is  not  a  meritorious  defense.82 
It  is  not  necessary  that  the  defense  should  go  to 
the  entire  action;  it  is  sufficient  if  it  purports  to  de- 
feat any  substantial  part  of  plaintiffs  claim,88 


80.    Ala. — -Little    v.    Peevy,    189    So 

720,     238     Ala.     106— Stephens     v 

Bruce,   114  So.  306,  216  Ala.  677. 

111.— Melick  v.  Metropolitan  Casualty 

Ins.    Co.    of   New   York,   4   N.B.2i 

769,  287  IlLApp.  613. 

Kan. — American  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v 

Liberty-Texas  Oil  Co.,  211  P.  137 

112  Kan.  809 — Miner  v.  Blakeman 

210  P.  1089,  112  Kan.  393. 

Mo.— Jeffrey  v.  Kelly.  App.,  146  S.W 

2d  850. 

N.Y.— Larney  v.  S.  &  I.  Lefkowitz 
296  N.Y.S.  679,  2-51  App.-Div.  404— 
City  Bank  Farmers  Trust  Co.  v 
Klein,  283  N.Y.S.  490,  246  App.Div 
633. 
N.C. — Simms  v.  -Sampson,  20  S.B.2d 

554,  221  N.C.  379. 
N.D.— Hart   v.   Hone,   223  N.W.    346 

57  N.D.  590. 
Okl.— Murrell  v.  City  of  Sapulpa,  29 

P.  241,  148  Okl,  1-6. 
Pa. — Planters  Nut  &  Chocolate  Co 
v.  Brown-Murray  Co.,  193  A.  381 
128  Pa.Super.  239 — West  Susque- 
hanna  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v 
Sinclair,  188  A.  371,  124  Pa. Super, 
133 — Page  v.  Patterson,  161  A. 
878,  105  Pa, Super.  438 — Henderson 
v.  Hendricks,  94  Pa.Super.  568 — 
Ensminger  v.  Bentz,  Com.Pl.,  54 
Dauph.Co.  219. 

R.I.— Whitney  v.  Jenks,  118  A.  689. 

Tex. — Lamb-McAshan  Co.  v.  Ellis, 
Com.App.,  270  S.W.  547 — Harris  v. 
Elm  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  183  S.W.2d 
216,  error  refused — Brown  v.  St. 
Mary's  Temple  No.  5  S.  M.  T.  Unit- 
ed Brothers  of  Friendship  of  Tex- 
as, Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  531. 

Defense  denmrrable 

Defense  set  up  in  affidavit  of  mer- 
its in  support  of  motion  to  set  aside 
default  judgment  is  sufficient  unless 
such  defense  would  be  subject  to 
general  demurrer. — Huff  v.  Flynn,  60 
P.2d  931,  48  Ariz.  175. 

Special  defense  not  provable  under 
general  denial  pleaded  is  not  suffi- 
cient.— Security  Nat.  Bank  of  Mo- 
bridge  v.  Boekhout  211  N.W.  $06,  51 
S.D.  31. 

Meritorious  defense  shown 

Ala. — Ex  parte  Southern  Amiesite 
Asphalt  Co.,  200  So.  435,  30  Ala. 
App.  3,  certlorarl  denied  200  So. 
434,  240  Ala.  618 — Ex  parte  Crump- 
ton,  109  So.  184,  21  Ala.App.  446. 

Ariz.— Evans  v.  Hallas,  167  P.2d  94— 
Huff  v.  Flynn,  60  P.2d  931,  48  Ariz. 
175 — Avery  v.  Calumet  &  Jerome 
Copper  Co.,  284  P.  159,  36  Ariz. 
239. 

Cal.— Hallett  v.  Slaughter,  140  P.26V 


3,   22  CaUd  552— Beard  v.  Beard 
107  P.2d  385,  1-6  CaUd  645. 

Colo.— Wenig  v.  -Lyons,  252  P.  889,  81 
Colo.  6. 

Ky.— Columbia  Coal  &  Min.  Co.  v 
Radcliff,  186  S.W.2d  419,  299  Ky 
596— Bishop  v.  Bishop,  2*1  S.W 
824,  213  Ky.  703. 

Minn. — City  of  Luverne  v.  -Skyberg 
211  N.W.  5,  169  Minn.  234-HFirst 
Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v.  U.  S 
Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co.,  194  N.W, 
376,  156  Minn.  231. 

N.Y. — Hogan  v.  Johnson,  272  N.Y.S. 
113,  241  App.Div.  914— Clifton 
Springs  Sanitarium  Co.  v.  De 
Voyst  240  N.Y.S.  729,  136  Misc. 
293 — Grushka  v.  Bentwood  Prod- 
ucts Corporation,  206  N.Y.S.  714, 
123  Misc.  927. 

N.C. — Chozen  Confections  v.  Johnson, 
11  S.E.2d  472,  218  N.C.  500— Byerly 
v.  General  Motors  Acceptance  Cor- 
poration, 145  S.E.  236,  196  N.C.  256 
— Standard  Supply  Co.  v.  Vance 
Plumbing  &  Electric  Co.,  143  8.E. 
248,  195  N.C.  629. 

S.D.— Leech  v.  Brady,  231  N.W.  93-6, 
57  S.D.  271. 

Tenn.— Fidelity-Phenix  Fire  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Oliver,  152  S.W.2d  254,  25  Tenn. 
App.  114. 

Tex. — Commercial  Credit  Corp.  v. 
Smith,  187  S.W.2d  363,  143  Tex. 
612 — Camden  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hill, 
Com.App.,  276  S.W.  887— Yellow 
Transit  Co.  v.  Klaff,  Civ.App.,  145 
S.W.2d  264— 'Lissner  v.  State 
Mortgr.  Corporation,  Civ.App.,  29  S. 
W.2d  849,  error  dismissed— Sneed 
v.  Sneed,  Civ.App.,  296  S.W.  643— 
Missouri  State  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Rhyne,  Civ.App.,  276  S.W.  757,  re- 
versed in  part  on  other  grounds 
and  affirmed  in  part  Rhyne  v.  Mis- 
souri State  Life  Ins.  Co.,  CorruApp., 
291  S.W.  845— Caldwell  Oil  Co.  v.  \ 
Hickman,  Civ.App.,  270  S.W.  214. 

Meritorious  defense  not  shown 

Ala.— Stephens  v.  Bruce,  114  So.  306, 
216  Ala,  677. 

Ark. — 0.  O.  Scroggin  &  Co.  v.  Mer- 
rick,  5  S.W.2d  344,  176  Ark.  1205. 

Cal. — Thompson  v.  Sutton,  122  P.2d 
97o,  50  Cal.App.2d  272. 

Colo. — Connell  v.  Continental  Casual- 
ty Qo.,  290  P.  274,  87  Colo.  «73. 

Ga, — Henderson  v.  American  Hat 
Mfg.  Co.,  194  S.B.  254,  67  Ga.App. 
10. 


11. — Nikola  v.  Campus  Towers 
Apartment  Bldg.  Corporation,  25 
N.E.2d  582,  303  IlLApp.  516. 

owa.— Wade  v.  Swartzendruber,  220 

647 


N.W.  -67,  206  Iowa  637— Starkey  v. 
Porter  Tractor  Co.,   192  N.W.   135. 

Kan.— Board  of  Com'rs  of  Wyandotte  . 
County  v.   Kerr,    211   P.    128.    112 
Kan.  463. 

Minn. — Madsen  v.  Powers,  260  N.W. 
510,  194  Minn.  418. 

N.J.— Warren  v.  Dilkes,  131  A.  98, 
3  N.J.Misc.  1239. 

N.Y. — Municipal  Investors  v.  Hes- 
sian Hills  Corporation,  10  N.Y.S. 
2d  737,  256  App.Div.  1000. 

N.C.— Graver  v.  Spaugh,  38  S.E.2d 
525,  226  N.C.  .450— Duffer  v.  Brun- 
son,  125  S.E.  619,  188  N.C.  789— 
Garner  v.  Quakenbush,  122  S.B. 
474,  187  N.C.  603,  modified  on  other 
grounds  124  S.E.  1&4,  188  N.C.  180, 
36  A.L.R.  1095. 

Tex.— Pacific  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 15  S.W.  478,  79  Tex.  633— 
Lawther  Grain  Co.  v.  Winniford, 
Com.App.,  249  S.W.  195— Aviation 
Credit  Corporation  of  New  York  v. 
University  Aerial  Service  Corpora- 
tion, Civ.App.,  59  S.W.2d  870,  error 
dismissed — Sfiris  v.  Madis,  Civ. 
App.,  13  S.W.2d  750— St.  Paul  'Fire 
&  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Earnest,  Civ. 
App.,  293  S.W.  677,  affirmed  296 
S.W.  1088,  116  Tex.  565— Allen  v. 
Frank,  Civ.App.,  252  S.W.  347. 

Wash.— Hurby  v.  Kwapil,  28-6  P.  664, 
156  Wash.  225. 

81.  N.J. — Cameron  v.  Penn  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  173  A.  344,  116  N.J. 
Eq.  311. 

a. — Krall  v.  Lebanon  Valley  Sav- 
ings &  Loan  Ass'n,  121  A.  405,  277 
Pa,  440. 

Tex.— Rasmussen  v.  Grimes,  Civ. 
App.,  13  S.W.2d  959,  affirmed.  Com. 
A#p.,  24  S.W.2d  346. 

L    Okl. — Murrell  v.  City  of  Sapul- 
pa, 297  P.  241,  148  Okl.  16. 
Pa. — Krall   v.   Lebanon   Valley   Sav* 
ings  &  Loan  Ass'n,  121  A.  405,  277 
Pa,  440. 


Denumev 

A  default  Judgment  will  not  be  va- 
cated merely  to  permit  the  interpo- 
sition of  a  demurrer. 
Mont— Bowen   v.   Webb,    85   P.   739, 

34  Mont  61. 
Neb.— Sloan  v.  Hallowell,   120  N.W. 

449,  83  Neb.  762. 

83.    Fla. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 

State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallle  v.  Ray- 
mond/ 138  So.  40,  42,  103  Fla,  649. 

Wyo. — Wunnicke  v.  Leith,  157  P.2d 
274. 

34  C.J.  p  339  note  12. 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.a 


Among:  the  defenses  which  have  been  held  to  be 
so  technical,  unconscionable,  or  lacking  in  equity  as 
not  to  be  sufficiently  meritorious  to  support  an  ap- 
plication to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judgment  are 
usury,84  coverture  of  defendant,85  plaintiff's  want 
of  capacity  to  sue,86  ultra  vires,87  nul  tiel  record,88 
the  statute  of  frauds,89  a  forfeiture  or  breach  of 
condition,90  fraudulent  conduct  in  which  defendant 
participated91  or  which  he  could  have  discovered 
and  pleaded  by  using  due  diligence,92  and  a  failure 
to  allow  proper  credits,98  although  as  to  the  latter 
there  is  also  authority  to  the  contrary.94 

On  the  other  hand,  a  variety  of  matters  have  been 
held  to  be  sufficiently  meritorious  defenses  to  sup- 
port an  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  ;95 
such  as  a  discharge  in  bankruptcy  or  insolvency,96 
invalidity  of  the  statute  or  ordinance  on  which  the 
action  is  founded,97  release,98  payment  or  tender,^9 
failure  of  consideration,1  non  est  factum,2  denial  of 
partnership  on  which  liability  depends,8  want  of  ti- 
tle in  plaintiff  to  the  property  in  suit,4  want  of 
authority  in  an  agent  or  trustee  to  make  the  con- 
tract or  conveyance  in  suit,5  want  of  service  of 


process,6  contributory  negligence,7  and  res  judi- 
cata.8  The  statute  of  limitations  has  been  held  to 
be9  and  not  to  be10  a  meritorious  defense.  A  spe- 
cific denial  of  material  allegations  on  which  the  al- 
leged liability  rests  is  usually  deemed  sufficient11 
Where  the  amount  of  the  judgment  is  greatly  in 
excess  of  what  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover,  th« 
judgment  may  be  opened  or  vacated.12  A  set-off 
or  counterclaim  will  not  support  an  application  to 
open  or  vacate  a  judgment18 

d.  Affidavit  of  Merits 

An  application  to  open  a  default  judgment  must  In 
some  jurisdictions  be  supported  by  an  affidavit  to  the 
effect  that  the  defendant  has  stated  the  case  to  his 
attorney,  and  that  he  is  advised  and  believes  that  he 
has  a  good  and  substantial  defense. 

Under  the  practice  prevailing  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions, an  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default 
judgment  must  be  supported  by  a  formal  affidavit 
of  merits  substantially  to  the  effect  that  defendant 
has  fully  and  fairly  stated  the  case  to  his  counsel, 
and  that  he  has  a  good  and  substantial  defense  on 
the  merits  to  the  action,  as  he  is  advised  by  his  coun- 
sel and  verily  believes.1*  The  required  affidavit  has 


84.  Pa,— Moll  v.  Lafferty,  153  A.  557, 
302  Pa.  354. 

84  C.J.  p  337  note  85. 

85.  Ala. — Marion   v.    Reg-ens tein,    13 
So.  384,  98  Ala.  475. 

34  C.J.  p  337  note  86. 

86.  Pa. — Wilson's  Estate,  to  Use  of 
Patterson,    v.    Transportation    Ins. 
Co.  of  New  York,  173  A.  722,   113 
Pa.Super.  405. 

34  C.J.  p  337  note  87. 

87.  Ark.— Missouri  &  N.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Killebrew,    132   S.W.   454,   *6  Ark. 
520. 

34  C.J.  p  337  note  8*. 

88.  Iowa. — Stratton  Bank  v.  Dixon, 
74  N.W.  919,  105  Iowa  148. 

34  C.  J.  p  337  note  89. 

89.  Ark.— Missouri   &  N.  A.   5.   Co. 
v.  Killebrew,  132  S.W.  454,  96  Ark. 
520. 

34  C.J.  p  337  note  90. 

90.  Tex. — Union  Cent  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Lipscomb,  Civ.App.,  27  S.W.  307. 

91.  Kan. — Johnson  v.  Richardson,  73 
P.  113,  67  TCa.n.  521. 

N.Y. — Parker  v.   Grant,   1  Johns.Ch. 
•630. 

92.  Ky. — Overstreet  v.  Brown,  62  S. 
W.  885,  23  KyJL.  317. 

93.  N.Y. — Tallman  v.  Sprague,  18  N. 
T.S.  207,  60  N.Y.-Super.  425. 

84  C.J.  p  337  note  92. 

94.  Pa.— -Bright  v.   Diamond,   42  A. 
45,  189  Pa.  476. 

34  OJ.  P  337  note  *2  [a]. 
€6.    Ark.— First  Nat   Bank  v.   Tur- 
ner, 275  S.W.  703,  169  Ark.  393. 
34  C.J.  p  33*  note  10. 


98.    Minn. — Bearman    (Fruit    Qo.     v. 

Parker,    3   N.W.2d  501,   212   Minn. 

327. 
34  C.J.  p  333  note  98. 

97.  Mo.— Welch  v.   Mastin.  71   S.W. 
1090,  98  Mo.App.  273. 

98.  N.C.— Sircey    v.    Rees,    71  '  S.E. 
310,  155  N.C.  296. 

99.  S.D. — Jones  T.   Johnson,  222  N. 
W.  688,  54  S.D.  149. 

Tex. — First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Southwest 
Nat  Bank  of  Dallas,  Civ.App.,  273 
S.W.  951. 

34  C.J.  p  338  note  2. 

1.  N.D.— Racine-Sattley  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Pavlicek,    130    N.W.    228,    21    N.D. 
222. 

34  C.J.  p  338  note  3. 

2.  Wash.— Wheeler  v.  Moore,  38  P. 
1053,  10  Wash.  309. 

34  C.J.  p  338  note  4. 

3.  Ind.— Bristor  v.   Oalvin,   62  Ind. 
352. 

N.T. — Newark  Electric  Supply  Co.  v. 
Sarkjian,  173  N.T.S.  462. 

4.  Mo.— Lindell  Real  Estate  Co.  v. 
Lindell,  43  S.W.  368,  142  Mo.  61. 

34  C.J.  p  338  note  6. 

6.    Iowa.— Wishard  v.  McNeil,  42  N. 

W.  578,  78  Iowa  40. 
Wis.— Bloor  v.   Smith,   87  N.W.  870, 

112  Wls.  340. 

6.  N.C.— City  of  Monroe  v.  Niven,  20 
S.E.2d  311,  221  N.C.  362. 

7.  Iowa. — Barto  v.  Sioux  City  Elec- 
tric   Co.,    93    N.W.    26S,   119    Iowa 
179. 

8.  N.T. — Audubon  v.  Excelsior  Fire 
Ins.  Co..  10  Abb.Pr.  64. 

648 


9.  U.S. — U.  S.  v.  Oregon  .Lumber  Co., 
Or.,  43   S.Ct  100,  260  U.S.  290,  $7 
L.Ed.  261. 

Mich. — Smak  v.  Gwozdik,    291   N.W. 

270,  293  Mich.  185. 
Mo. — Ose.se  Inv.  Co.  v.   Siffrist,   250 

S.W.  39,  298  Mo.  139. 
Okl.— Richards  v.  Baker,  99  P.2d  118, 

186  Okl.  533. 
Pa. — Commonwealth,  for  Use  of  Fay- 

ette  County,  v.  Perry*  199  A.  204, 

330  Pa.  355. 
Tex.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Cain  v. 

Thomson,  Civ.App.,  72  S.W.2d  339, 

340. 
34  C.J.  p  338  note  97. 

10.  Cal.— Eldred  v.  White,  36  P.  944, 
102  Cal.  600. 

34  C.J.  p  338  note  97  [a]. 

11.  Fla. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie  v.  Ray- 
mond, 138  So.  40,  42,  103  (Fla.  649. 

34  C.J.  p  339  note  11. 

12.  Ohio. — Taylor  Bros.   v.   Clinger- 
man,    187   N.E.   578,   45  Ohio  App. 
560. 

Tex. — Roberts  v.  Schlather  &  Stein- 
meyer,  Civ. App.,  8  S.W.2d  296,  er- 
ror dismissed. 

3-4  C.J.  p  339  note  13. 

13.  Pa. — Brown  v.  Bray,   90  Pa.Su- 
per.     180 — Favinger    v.     Favinger, 
Com.PL,  *0  Montg.Co.   149. 

34  C.J.  p  337  note  91. 

14.  CaL— Beard  v.   Beard,    107  P.2d 
385,     16     Cal.2d     645— Pingree     v. 
Reynolds,  73  P.2d  1266,  23  CaLApp. 
2d  649 — Vernon  v.  Deesy,   15  P.2d 
788,     127.     CaLApp.     313— Fin*.     & 


49    O.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


336 


been  held  to  be  a  jurisdictional  prerequisite.15 
Where  such  an  affidavit  is  necessary,  it  has  been 
held  that  its  lack  cannot  be  supplied  by  a  proposed 
answer  or  any  other  paper;16  but  a  verified  plead- 
ing has  been  accepted  as  a  sufficient  affidavit  of 
merits,17  and,  where  it  fairly  appears  from  the  rec- 
ords and  papers  on  which  the  motion  is  based  that 
the  moving  party  has  a  good  defense  on  the  merits, 
the  sufficiency  of  an  affidavit  of  merits,  or  the  ne- 
cessity for  one,  has  been  said  to  be  discretionary 
with  the  trial  court.18 

The  affidavit  should  be  made  by  applicant  him- 
self, unless  good  reasons  exist  for  having  it  made 
by  another  person  ;1&  but  it  may  be  made  by  his  at- 
torney, or  by  some  other  person,  on  showing  a  suf- 
ficient reason  why  the  party  himself  does  not  make 
it.20  In  that  case,  however,  the  affidavit  must  show 


that  affiant  has  personal  knowledge  of  the  facts  of 
the  case,  and  its  averments  must  be  based  on  such 
knowledge,  and  not  on  information  or  belief.21  An 
affidavit  by  a  third  person  not  based  on  personal  in- 
formation has  been  held  to  be  insufficient.22 

e.  Proposed  Answer 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  Judgment 
must  in  some  jurisdictions  be  supported  by  a  copy  of 
the  answer  that  the  defendant  proposes  to  Interpose  In 
the  action. 

In  some  jurisdictions,  applicant  for  the  vacation 
of  a  default  judgment  is  required  to  present  or  file 
with  his  moving  papers  a  copy  of  the  answer  which 
he  proposes  to  put  in  when  the  judgment  is  opened, 
and  the  motion  cannot  be  granted  unless  this  is 
done,23  unless,  it  has  been  held,  the  application  is 


Schlndler    Co.    r.    Gavros,    237    P. 
1083,  72  Cal.App.  68S. 

N.Y.— -Harrison  v.  Gargiulo,  276  N.Y. 
S.  482,  243  App.Div.  616 — Browns- 
ville Lumber  Co.  v.  Weiner,  232  N. 
Y.S.  643,  225  App.Div.  374— Grouse 
Grocery  Co.  v.  Valentine,  226  N.Y. 
S.  613,  131  Misc.  571. 

S.D—  Squires  v.  Meade  County,  239 
N.W.  747,  59  S.D.  293— Wendel  v. 
Wendel,  53-6  N.W.  468,  158  S.D.  438. 

34  C.J.  p  339  note  17. 

Defendant's  case 
Affidavit  was  insufficient  where  it 

alleged  that  defendant  had  fully  and 

thoroughly  stated  his  defense  or  his 

case  to  his  attorney  rather  than  that 

he  had  fully  and  fairly  stated  facts 

of  the  case  to  attorney. 

Cal.— Pingree  v.  Beynolds,  73  P.2d 
1266,  23  Cal.App.2d  649. 

Wis.— Velte  v.  Zeh,  206  N.W.  197, 
188  Wis.  401. 

15.  Cal. — Morgan    v.    McDonald,    11 
P.  350,  70  Cal.  32. 

34  C.J.  p  HO  note  19. 

16.  S.D.— W.    T.    Rawleigh    Co.    v. 
Keely,  220  N.W.  857,  53  S.B.  425. 

34  C.J.  p  340  note  20. 

17.  Cal. — Greenamyer    v.    Board    of 
Trustees     of     Xugo     Elementary 
School  Dist.  in  Los  Angeles  Coun- 
ty,  2  P.2d  848,   116  CaLApp.   319— 
Salsberry  v.  Julian,  277  P.  516,  98 
CaLApp.  638,  followed  in  277  P.  518, 
amended    278   P.    257,    9*   Cal.App. 
645 — EJberhart   v.    Salazar,    235    P. 
86,  71  CaLApp.  338— Park  v.  Hill- 
man,   224   P.   100,   67  CaLApp.   92— 
Montijo  v.  Sherer,  91  P.  2-61,  5  CaL 

.App.  736. 
Minn. — Peterson  v.  W.  Davis  &  Sons, 

11  N.W.2d  800,  216  Minn,  60. 
N.D.— Madden   v.   Dunbar,    201   N.W. 

991,  52  N.D.  74. 
34  C.J.  p  340  note  21. 
Unverified  or  improperly  verified  aau 

swer 
(1)  An   unverified  answer   is   not 


sufficient. — Pingree   v.    Reynolds,    73 
P.2d  1266,   23  Cal. App. 2 d  649. 

(2)  Trial   court  did  not  abuse  its 
discretion  in  granting  motion  of  de- 
fendant to  vacate  default,  although 
motion  was   not  supported  "by   such 
defendant's    affidavit,    and    although 
copy  of  his  proposed  answer  tendered 
on   hearing   of  motion  did  not  pur- 
port to  be  verified,  where  trial  court, 
in  light  of  verified  answers  of  other 
defendants,  which  answers  were  in- 
cluded among  papers  specified  in  the 
notice  of  motion  as  a  basis  thereof, 
might  well  have  concluded  that  such 
defendant  had  a  meritorious  defense. 
— Eustace  v.  Dechter,   128   P.2d  367, 
53  Cal.App.2d  726. 

(3)  Improperly  verified  answer  be- 
ing  equivalent  at  least  to  affidavit 
of  merits,  court  did  not  err  in  set- 
ting aside  default  and  permitting  an- 
swer.—Hubble  v.  Hubble,  279  P.  550. 
130  Or.  177. 

18.    Cal. — Thompson    v.    Sutton,    122 

P.2d  975,  50  CaLApp.2d  272. 
34  C.J.  p  340  note  22. 

1ft,    S.D.— Wendel  v.  Wendel,  236  N. 

W.  468,  58  S.D.  438. 
34  C.J.  p  341  note  23. 

20.  S.C.— Savage  v.  Cannon,  30  S.B. 
2d  70,  204  S.C.  473. 

S.D.— Wendel   v.    Wendel,    236    N.W. 

468,  58  S.D.  438. 
34  C.J.  p  3-41  note  24. 

21.  N.C. — Montague     v.     Lumpkins, 
100  S.BL  417,  178  N.C.  270. 

34  C.X  p  341  note  25. 

22.  Minn. — People's      Ice      Co.      v. 
Schlenker,   52  N.W.  219,  50  Minn. 
1. 

34  C.J.  p  341  note  26. 

23.  Cal.— Beard  v.   Beard,   107   P.2d 
385,  16  CaUd  645— Roseborough  v. 
Campbell,    115    P.2d    839,    46    CaL 
App.2d    257 — Vernon    v.    Deesy,    15 
P.2d     788,     127     CaLApp.     813— La, 

649 


Bonte  &  Ransome  Co.  v.  SceUers, 
265  P.  550,  90  Cal.App.  183. 

D.C. — Cockrell  v.  Fillah,  50  P.2d  500, 
60  APP.D.C.  210. 

Idaho.— Miller  v.  Brinkman,  281  P. 
372,  42  Idaho  232. 

N.Y.— Grouse  Grocery  Co.  v.  Valen- 
tine, 226  N.Y.S.  613,  131  Misc.  571 
— Pember  v.  Meyer,  45  N.Y.S.2d  673 
— Schlegel  v.  Wagner,  29  N.T.S.2d 
389. 

Ohio. — Davis  v.  Teachnor,  App.,  58 
N.R2d  20*. 

Or. — Snyder  v.  Consolidated  Highway 
Co.,  72  P.2d  932,  157  Or.  479— 
Johnston  v.  Braymill  White  Pine 
Co.,  19  P.2d  93,  142  Or.  95— Bronn 
v.  Soules,  11  P.2d  284,  140  Or.  308 
— 'Pinch  v.  Pacific  Reduction  & 
Chemical  Mfg.  flo..  234  P.  296,  113 
Or,  670. 

S.C. — Savage  v.  Cannon,  30  S.B.2d  70, 
204  3.C.  473. 

S.D.— Wendel   v.    Wendel,    236    N.W. 

1  468,  58  S.D.  438. 

Tenn.— Wright  v.  Lindsay,  140  aW. 
2d  793,  24  Tenn.App.  77. 

Wis.— Velte  v.  Zeh,  20-6  N.W.  1*7, 
188  Wis.  401. 

34  C.J.  p  341  note  27. 

Answer  on  file 

Where  defendants  filed  verified 
amended  answer  two  days  after  de- 
fault judgment  was  entered,  it  con* 
stituted  part  of  record  and  files  in 
case,  and  fact  that  no  copy  thereof 
was  served  on  plaintiff  or  produced 
in  court  on  motion  'to  vacate  default 
judgment  was  immaterial,  where  no- 
tice of  motion  stated  that  it  was 
made  on  notice  and  record. — Eber- 
hart  v.  Salazar,  235.  P.  86,  71  CaL 
App.  336. 

The  term  "full  answer"  as  used  in 
statute  requiring  applicant  to  have 
judgment  opened  up,  to  file  a  "full 
answer/'  means  an  answer  setting 
up  a  meritorious  defense  as  to  all 
or  a  material  part  of  the  petition.— 


§  336 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


made  during  the  judgment  term,24  or  the  complaint 
fails  to  state  a  cause  of  action.25  Even  where  not 
required  by  mandatory  statute  or  court  rule,  it  has 
been  deemed  the  better  practice  to  accompany  an 
application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  with  a 
copy  of  the  proposed  answer.2^  While  it  has  been 
held  that  an  affidavit  showing  a  meritorious  defense 
may  be  accepted  in  lieu  of  a  verified  answer,  in  the 
discretion  of  the  court,27  generally  such  answer  is 
required  in  addition  to  an  affidavit  of  merits,  both 
being  required.28  In  cases  where  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  show  merits,  as  where  the  judgment  is  void 
for  want  of  jurisdiction,  it  is  not  necessary  to  pre- 
sent or  file  the  proposed  answer.2^ 

Requisites  and  sufficiency.  The  answer  filed  with 
the  motion  must  present  an  issuable  plea,  to  the 
merits,30  meeting  fully  the  matters  contained  in  the 
declaration  or  complaint,31  or  some  distinct  part 
of  it82  It  has  been  held  that  the  averments  must 
be  made  on  knowledge  and  not  only  on  informa- 
tion and  belief;83  but  there  is  also  authority  that 
the  averments  may  be  on  information  and  belief,34 
except  as  to  matters  peculiarly  within  defendant's 
knowledge.3^  If  the  answer  fails  to  state  a  defense, 
the  motion  must  be  overruled.3^  Facts  as  distin- 
guished from  mere  conclusions  must  be  alleged.37 
An  answer  consisting  only  of  a  general  denial  has 
been  held  insufficient,38  but  such  an  answer  has  been 


held  sufficient  when  supported  by  affidavits  setting 
out  sufficient  facts  to  support  it.39  Verification  of 
the  answer  is  required  by  some  courts,40  but  not 
by  others.41  In  any  event,  the  failure  to  verify 
the  answer  is  a  curable  defect42 

§  337*    Procedure  and  Relief 

a.  In  general 

b.  Time  for  application 

c.  Requisites  and  sufficiency  of  applica- 

tion generally 

d.  Answer  and  other  pleadings 

e.  Parties 

f.  Notice  or  process 

g.  Affidavits  on  application 
h.  Counter-affidavits 

i.   Evidence 

j.  Hearing  and  determination 

k.  Relief  awarded 

I.  Findings 

m.  Order 

n.  Objections  and  exceptions 

o.  Vacation  and  review  of  order 

p.  Costs 

q.  Liabilities  on  bonds 

a.  In  General 
The  proceeding  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  Judgment 


Bemis  v.  Bemls,  98  P.2d  156,  151  Kan. 
186—34  C.J.  p  342  note  37  [a], 

24.  Kan.— Wichita     Motors     Co.    v. 
United  Warehouse  Co..  255  P.  30, 
123  Kan.  235. 

25.  CaL— Reid    v.    Merrill,    52    P.2d 
218,  4  Cal.2d  693. 

96.     CaL— Bailey   v.   Taaffe,    29   CaL 

422. 
Neb.— Barney  v.  Platte  Valley  Public 

Power  &  Irr.  Dist,  23  N.W.2d  335. 
34  C.J.  p  341  note  29. 

27.  Montr— Brothers     v.      Brothers, 
230  P.  60,  71  Mont  878. 

Ohio. — Lutkenhouse    v.    Vella,    App., 

60  N.E.2d  798. 
34  C.J.  p  342  note,  30. 

28.  S.D.— Wendel  v.  Wendel,  236  N. 
W.  468,  58  S.D.  438. 

34  C.  J.  p  342  note  32. 

29.  CaL— Barnett  v.  Reynolds,  18  P. 
2d  514,   124  CaLAjpp.  750. 

3-4  C.J.  p  342  notes  34,  35. 

30.  Fla. — Corpus      Juris     cited     in 
State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie  v.  Ray- 
mond, 138  So.  40,  43,  103  'Fla.  649. 

34  C.J.  p  342  note  36. 

Answer  held  sufficient 

Okl. — Jones    v.    American    Inv.    Co., 

274  P.  -673, 135  Okl.  112. 
Answer  held,  insufficient 
Kan.— Bemis  v.  Bemis,  98  P.2d  156, 

i:51  Kan.  186. 


31.    Fla. — Corpus     Juris     cited 
State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie  v.  Ray- 
mond, 138  So.  40,  43,  103  Fla.  649. 

34  C.J.  p  342  note  37. 


in,   Okl.— Givens  v.  Anderson,  249  P.  339, 

119  Okl.  212. 
34  C.J.  p  342  note  42. 
Specific  and  general  denial  may  be 


32.  Fla. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie  v.  Ray- 
mond, 138  So.  40,  43,  103  Fla.  649. 

34  C.J.  p  342  note  38. 

33.  'Fla. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie  v.  Ray- 
mond, 138  So.  40,  43,  103  Fla.  649. 

3-4  C.J.  p  342  note  39. 

34.  Ariz. — Avery  v.  Calumet  &  Jer- 
ome   Copper   Co.,    284    P.    159,    36 
Ariz.  239. 


35.    CaL— Thompson    v.    Sutton, 
P.2d  975,  50  Cal.App.2d  272. 


122 


36.  U.S.—  Glenn    v.   W.   C.    Mitchell 
Co.,  C.C.A.N.D.,   282  F.  440,  modi- 
fled  on  other  grounds  285  (F.  381. 

Minn.  —  Peterson  v.  W.  Davis  &  Sons, 
11  N.W.2d  800,  216  Minn.  60—  Cen- 
tral Hanover  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Price,  248  N.W.  287,  189  Minn.  36. 

34  C.J.  P  342  note  40. 

37.  Ky,—  Ray  v.  Ellis,  172  S.W.  951, 
162  Ky.  517. 

34  C.J.  p  342  note  41. 

38.  Ohio.  —  Davis  v.  Teachnor, 
53  K.B.2d  208. 


technically  sufficient,  but  good  prac- 
tice requires  full  and  frank  state- 
ment of  fact  relative  to  all  asserted 
defenses.— Kane  v.  Stallman,  296  N. 
W.  1,  209  Minn.  138. 

39.  Mont— Farmers'  Co-op.  Ass'n  v. 
Roper,  1S8  P.  141,  57  Mont  42. 

Okl.— Haskell  v.  Cutler,  108  P.2fl  14-6, 
188  Okl.  239. 

40.  Ariz.— Avery  v.  Calumet  &  Jer- 
ome   Copper   Co.,   284   P.    159,    36 
Ariz.  239. 

Ohio.— Strain    v.    Isaacs,    18    NT.E.2d 

816,  59  Ohio  App.  495. 
Okl. — McAdams  v.  Q.  D.  Shamburger 

Lumber  Co.,  240  P.  124,   112   OkL 

173. 
34  C.J.  p  342  note  44. 

Xf  the  Judgment  is  a  Joint  Judg- 
ment against  two  or  more  as  Joint 
defendants,  the  answer  must  be  ver- 
ified by  all. — Dunlap  v.  Mcllvoy,  3 
Litt,  Ky.,  269—34  C.J.  p  -343  note  46. 

41.  €al. — Eustace  v.  Dechter,  128  P. 
2d    367,   59    CaLApp.2d    726— Rose- 
borough  v.  Campbell,  115  P.2d  839, 
46  Cal.App.2d  257. 

2.    CaL— Williams     v.      Thompson, 
213  P.  705,   60  CaLApp.  6-58. 


650 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


337 


must  be  direct  and  appropriate  to  the  relief  sought,  and 
there  must  be  a  compliance  with  the  statutes  Governing 
the  matter  of  procedure.  As  a  general  rule  the  proper 
procedure  under  the  statutes  Is  by  a  motion  to  open, 
vacate,  or  set  aside  the  Judgment. 

The  proceeding  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judg- 
ment must  be  a  direct  proceeding,  and  one  which  is 
appropriate  to  the  relief  sought,43  unless  the  judg- 
ment is  an  absolute  nullity,  in  which  case  defend- 
ant may  have  it  declared  void  when  plaintiff  seeks 
to  enforce  it,  without  the  necessity  of  a  direct  ac- 
tion to  obtain  its  annulment44  The  proceedings 
are  equitable  in  nature  and  arc!  to  be  governed  by 
equitable  principles.46  Statutory  regulations  or 
court  rules  applicable  to  judgments  by  default  gov- 


ern in  cases  falling  within  the  scope  of  their  pro- 
visions,46 and  the  party  seeking  to  open  or  vacate 
a  default  judgment  must  proceed  in  accordance 
therewith,47  and  such  statutes  are  to  be  given  a 
liberal  construction.48  The  statutory  rules  for  va- 
cating judgments  have  no  application  except  as 
provided  for  therein.4^  Where  both  a  default  and  a 
final  judgment  have  been  rendered,  it  has  been  held 
that  defendant  may  not  have  the  default  opened 
without  first  vacating  the  judgment.50 

As  a  general  rule  under  the  statutes  providing 
for  the  opening  or  vacating  of  default  judgments, 
the  proper  procedure  is  by  a  motion  to  open,  va- 
cate, or  set  aside  the  judgment,51  and  not  by  an 


43.  I1L— Glanz  v.   Mueller,   54  N.B. 
2d  639,  322  IlLApp.  507. 

34  C.J.  p  318  note  63. 

Motion  held  direct  attack 

Cal. — Hollywood  Garment  Corpora- 
tion v.  J.  Beckerman,  Inc.,  143  P. 
2d  738,  61  Cal.App.2d  $58. 

44.  La.— McClelland       v.       District 
Household  of  Ruth,  App.,   151  So. 
24*6. 

45.  Okl. — •'Farmers'    Guaranty   State 
Bank  v.  Bratcher,   241  P.  340,  112 
Okl.  254. 

Pa,— 'Linker  v.  Fidelity-Philadelphia 
Trust  Co.,  28  A.2d  704,  150  Pa.Su- 
per.  440 — Caromono  v.  Garman,  23 
A.2d  92,  147  Pa.Super.  1— Planters 
Nut  &  Chocolate  Co.  v.  Brown- 
Murray  Co.,  193  A.  381,  128  Pa.Su- 
per. 239 — Henderson  v.  Hendricks, 
94  Pa. Super.  568. 
Wash.— Roth  v.  Nash,  144  P.2d  271, 

19  Wash.2d  731. 

Wyo. — Clarke    v.    Shoshoni    Lumber 
Co.,  224  P.  845,  31  Wyo.  205,  error 
dismissed  4S  S.Ct  302,  276  U.S.  595, 
72  L.Ed.  722. 
Substitute  for  Dill  in  equity 

The  practice  of  opening'  of  Judg- 
ments by  default  on  motion  and  rule, 
is  a  substitute  for  bill  in  equity 
adopted  by  Pennsylvania  Judges 
when  no  courts  of  chancery  existed 
in  Pennsylvania  and  continued  after 
establishment  of  such  courts  with 
limited  Jurisdiction.— Welzel  v.  Link- 
Belt  Co.,  35  A.2d  596,  154  Pa.Super. 
66. 

48.    Ga. — McCray  v.  Empire  Inv.  Co., 

174  S.E.  219,  49  Go.App.  117— J.  S. 

Schofteld's  Sons  Co.  v.  Vaughn,  150 

S.E.  569,  40  Ga.App.  568. 
Ind.^01ds   v.   Hitzemann,   42   N.E.2d 

35,  220  Ind.  300. 
N.T.— Redfteld  v.   Critchley,    14   N.B. 

2d   377,   277  N.T.   336,   reargument 

denied  15  N.B.2d  73.  278  N.T.  483. 
34  C.J.  p  428  note  75. 
trnlawful  detainer  action 

Relief  from  default  Judgment  in 
unlawful  detainer  action  may  be  had 
under  either  of  two  sections  of  code 


of  civil  procedure. — Shupe  v.  Evans, 
261   P.   492,    86   CaLApp.    700. 

47.  Ala. — Dulin  v.  Johnson,  113  -So. 
397,  216  Ala.  393. 

Ark.— Merriott  v.  Kilgore,  .139   S.W. 

2d    387,    200    Ark.    394— American 

Inv.  Co.  v.  Keenehan,  291  S.W.  56, 

172  Ark.  -832. 
Ga.— Craft  v.  Miles,  186  S.E.  188,  182 

Ga.  584 — Johnston  v.  Ford,  158  S. 

B.   527,   43   Ga.App.   132— Riggs   v. 

Kinney,    140    S.E.    41,    87    Ga.App. 

307. 

La.— Conn  (Flour  &  Feed  Co.  v.  Mitch- 
ell, 136  So.  782,  18  -La.App.  534. 
Mont— Galbreath  v.  Aubert,  .157  P.2d 

105. 
N.Y. — Walton  'Foundry  Co.  v.  A.  -D. 

Granger   Co.,   196   N.T.S.   719,   203 

App.Div.  226. 
Okl.— Vinson  v.  Oklahoma  City,  66  P. 

2d   933,   179   Okl.   590— Samuels  v. 

Granite  Sav.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  1 

P.2d    145,    150    Okl.    174— Missouri 

Quarries  Co.  v.  Brady,  219  P.  368, 

95  Okl.  279. 
Tex. — Commercial    Credit     Corp.     v. 

Smith,    187    S.W.2d    363,    143    Tex. 

612— Foster  v.  Martin,  20  Tex.  11=8. 
W.Va.— Shenandoah       Valley       Nat. 

Bank  v.  Hiett,  6  S.E.2d  769,  121  W. 

Va.  454. 
Wyo. — Clarke    v.    Shoshoni    Lumber 

Co.,  224  P.  845,  31  Wyo.  205,  error 

dismissed    48    S.Ct.    302,    276    U.S. 

595,  72  L.Ed.  722. 
Judgment  for  lew  than  amount  due 

Where  default  Judgment  was  ren- 
dered for  less  than  amount  allegedly 
due,  because  of  mistake  in  drafting 
original  petition,  plaintiff's  remedy 
was  to  have  the  Judgment  vacated 
or  set  aside  and  to  be  granted  a  new 
trial  pursuant  to  statutory  proce- 
dure, and  an  amendment  of  the 
pleadings  to  state  the  correct  amount 
due  is  not  of  itself  sufficient — John- 
son v.  Dry  Creek  Oil  &  Gas  Co.,  141 
S.W.2d  243.  283  Ky.  340. 
Statute  held  complied  with 
111.— Lusk  v.  Bluhm,  53  N.B.2d  135, 

321  IlLApp.  849. 

48.  Kan.— Wyatt   v.   Collins,   180   P. 

651 


789,   105  Kan.   182,  reheard  180  P. 
992,  105  Kan.  182. 

49.  Ga. — J.  S.  Schofleld's  Sons  Co.  v. 
Vaughn,   150   S.E.   569,   40  CteuApp. 
568. 

Statute  relating*  to  action 

Where  attack  on  default  Judgment, 
based  on  alleged  fraud,  was  made  by 
motion  and  not  by  action,  the  stat- 
ute relating  to  an  action  to  set  aside 
Judgment  for  fraud  was  inapplicable. 
— Lenhart  v.  Lenhart  Wagon  Co.,  2 
N.W.2d  421,  211  Minn.  572. 

50.  Ga. — Cavan  v.  A.  M.  Davis  Co., 
189  S.E.  684,  55  Ga.App.  200— Ten- 
nessee Oil  &  Gas  Co.  v.  American 
Art  Works,  72  S.E.  517,  10  Ga.App. 
45. 

51.  Cal.— Bodin    v.    Webb,    62    P.2d 
155.  17  Cal.App.2d  422. 

Ga. — J.  S.  Schofleld's  Sons  Co.  v. 
Vaughn,  150  S.E.  569,  40  Ga.App. 
568. 

111. — Viedenschek  v.  Johnny  Perkins 
Playdium,  49  N.B.2d  339,  319  111. 
App,  523 — Selther  &  Cherry  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Education  of  -District  No. 
15,  Town  of  La  Harpe,  283  IlLApp. 
392. 

Ky. — Holcomb  v.  Creech,  56  S.W.2d 
998,  247  -Ky.  199. 

Mont. — Paramount  Publix  Corpora- 
tion v.  Boucher,  19  P.2d  223,  93 
Mont.  340 — Rowan  v.  Gazette 
Printing  Co.,  220  P.  1104,  69  Mont 
170. 

N.T,— Coastal  Equipment  Co.  v.  Her- 
rick,  276  N.T.S.  183,  243  AppJMv. 
97— Nelson  v.  Hirsch,  268  N.T.S. 
225,  240  App.Div.  933,  appeal  dis- 
missed 190  N.E.  653,  264  N.T.  31*6 
—White  v.  Sebring,  240  N.T.S.  477, 
228-  App.Div.  413— Ornsteln  v. 
Goldberg,  233  N.T.S.  586,  226  App. 
Div.  746. 

N.C. — City  of  Monroe  v.  Niven,  20  S. 
E.2d  311,  221  N.Q.  362— Wynne  v, 
Conrad,  17  S.E.2d  514,  220  N.C.  355 
— Federal  Land  Bank  of  Columbia 
v.  Davis,  1  S.E.2d  350,  215  N.C. 
100 — Jordan  v.  McKenzie,  155  S.E. 
868,  199  N.C.  750— Simon  v.  Mas- 
ters, 135  S.E.  861,  192  N.C.  781— 


§  337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


appeal,52  or,  as  discussed  in  the  CJ.S.  title  New- 
Trial  §  3,  also  34  CJ.  p  421  note  16,  46  CJ.  p 
62  note  57,  by  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  but  under 
some  statutes  an  application  to  set  aside  a  default 
judgment  is  in  the  nature  of  a  motion  for  a  new 
trial.53  In  some  jurisdictions  the  motion  to  set 
aside  a  default  judgment  made  more,  than  a  pre- 
scribed period  of  time  after  entry  of  the  judgment 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  petition  for  a  writ  of  error 
coram  nobis.54  If  .want  of  jurisdiction  to  render 
the  default  judgment  appears  on  the  face  of 
the  record  the  remedy  has  been  held  to  be  by  ap- 
plication to  the  court  to  expunge  the  judgment  from 
the  court  record.55  Where  the  judgment  is  at- 
tacked because  of  defective  service  of  summons  al- 
though the  return  shows  substantial  compliance  with 
the  statute,  a  rule  to  show  cause  why  the  judgment 
should  not  be  vacated  has  been  held  to  be  the  prop- 
er procedure  in  some  jurisdictions.56 

The  proceedings  to  open  or  set  aside  the  judg- 


ment should  be  instituted  in  the  same  court  in 
which  the  judgment  was  rendered.57 

Petition  or  bitt  to  review.  Under  some  statutes  a 
petition  to  review  a  default  judgment58  or  a  .peti- 
tion in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review59  may  be 
filed  under  proper  circumstances  to  set  aside  a  de- 
fault judgment.  In  accordance  with  some  statutes, 
an  action  to  review  a  default  judgment  will  lie  to 
review  questions  of  jurisdiction  and  of  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  complaint  without  a  motion  to  set 
aside  the  judgment  having  first  been  made,60  but 
an  action  of  review  to  test  the  correctness  of  the 
entry  of  default  will  not  lie  unless  a  motion  to  set 
aside  the  default  was  first  made,  overruled,  and  ex- 
ception taken.61 

As  continued  or  ne^v  proceeding.  Dependent  on 
the  provisions  of  the  statutes  under  which  the  ap- 
plication to  open  or  set  aside  the  default  judgment 
has  been  instituted,  the  proceedings  have  been  held 
to  be  a  continuation  of  the  suit  in  which  the  judg- 
ment complained  of  was  rendered,62  or  they  have 


Whiteburst  v.  Merchants'  &  Farm- 
ers' Transp.  Co.,  13  S.E.  937,  109  N. 

C.  342. 
N.D.— Baird  v.  Ellison,  293  N.W.  794, 

70  N.D.  261. 
Ohio.— Ramsey  v.  Holland,  172  N.E. 

411,  35  Ohio  App.  199. 
OfcL— Arnold  v.   McTon  Oil  Co.,   233 

P.  192,  109  OkL  287. 
S.D. — Sohn  v.  Flavin,  244  N.W,  849, 

60  S.B.  305. 
Tenn.— Wright  v.  Lindsay,  140  S.W. 

,2d  793,  24  Tenn.App.  77. 
Utah.— Madsen  v.  Hodson,  258  P.  792, 

69  Utah  527. 
84  C.J.  p  421  note  15—46  C.J.  p  62 

note  57  [aj. 
During1  and  after  term 

Under  some  statutes  an  applica- 
tion during:  term  should  be  by  mo- 
tion and  subsequent  to  the  term  by 
petition  or  complaint. — National  Life 
Ins.  Co.  of  U.  S.  v.  Wheeler,  137  N. 
E.  529,  79  IndApp.  184. 
Default  in  absence  of  Judgment 

Where  defendants  were  defaulted, 
proper  procedure,  in  absence  of  Judg- 
ment, is  by  motion,  not  new  suit, 
to  set  aside  default. — Commercial 
Acceptance  Co.  v.  Betzler,  182  N.E. 
714,  95  Ind.App.  177. 
Dependent  on  grounds 

Under  some  statutes  after  the  ex- 
piration of  the  term  a  Judgment  can 
be  set  aside  on  motion  only  fOn  cer- 
tain grounds  and  on  all*  other 
grounds  the  proceeding  must  be  by 
petition  or  complaint. — Boulter  v. 
Cook,  284  P.  1101,  32  Wyo.  461,  re- 
hearing denied  236  P.  245,  32  Wyo. 
461. 
Motion  to  strike  judgment 

Proper    practice     to     seek    relief 
against  judgment  by  default  is  by 


motion  to  open  It,  and  not  by  mo- 
tion to  strike  it  off.— Welzel  v.  Link- 
Belt  Co.,  35  A.2d  596,  154  Pa.Super. 
66. 

Error  by  the  clerk  In  entering 
Judgment  may  be  corrected  -on  mo- 
tion.—Bertagnolli  v.  Bertagnolli,  148 
P.  374,  23  Wyo.  228—34  C.J.  p  179 
note  50. 

52.  Neb.— Strine  v.  Kingsbaker,  10 
N.W.  584,  12  Neb.  52. 

84  C.J.  p  422  note  17. 

Default  Judgment  as  a  decision  re- 
viewable  by  appeal  see  Appeal  and 
Error  §  155. 

63.  Ind.— State  ex  ret  Krodel  v.  Gil- 
kison,  198  N.E.  323,  209  Ind.  213. 

La. — Wallace  v.  Martin,  App.,  166  So. 

874— Cohn    Flour    &   Feed   Co.    v. 

Mitchell,    136   So.    782,   18   La,App. 

534. 
Tex.— Callahan  v.  Staples,  161  S.W.2d 

489,  139  Tex  S— Foster  v.  Martin, 

20  Tex,  118. 
Equivalent  to  Mil  of  review 

The  "motion  for  new  trial  on  Judg- 
ment following  citation  by  publica- 
tion" provided  for  In  rules  of  civil 
procedure  is  the  equivalent  of  an 
equitable  bill  of  review. — Rimbow  v. 
Rimbow,  Ter.Civ.App.,  191  S.W.2d  89. 

64.  HI. — Chicago  Securities  Corpora- 
tion v.   Olsen,    14  N.E.2d   893,   295 
HLApp.   615 — Bornman  v.  Rabb,   8 
N.E.2d  374,   290  HLApp.   604— Chi- 
cago Securities  Corporation  v.  Mo- 
Bride,    5    N.E.2d   752,    288    IlLApp. 
65— Lynn  v.  Multhauf,  279  IlLApp. 

«  210— National  Lead  Co.  V.  Mortell, 
261  IlLApp.  332. 

Writ  of  error  coram  nobis  as  remedy 
for  relief  against  Judgment  see  su- 
pra §§  311-313.  i 

652 


55-    Ala. — Marshall  County  v.  Critch- 
er,  17  So.2d  540,  245  Ala,  357. 

56.  N.J.— Sullivan  v.   Walburn,    154 
A.  617,  9  N.J.Misc.  280. 

57.  Ind.— Kemp  v.  Mitchell,  29  Ind. 
163 — Padol  v.  Home  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,    27    N.E.2d    917,    108    Ind.App. 
401. 

N.Y.— Collins  v.  Izzo,  48  N.T.S.2d  192, 

267  App.Div.  1023. 
Jurisdiction  of  particular  courts  and 

Judges  see  supra  $  833. 
58-    Mo.— Garrison  v.  Schmicke,   193 

S.W.2d    614— Dillbeck   v,    Johnson, 

129  S.W.2d  885,  344  Mo.  845. 
59.    Tex. — Ridley  v.    McCaUum,    16S 

S.W.2d  833,  139  Tex.  540. 
Attack  on  Judgment  prior  to  default 

Suit  in  nature  of  bill  of  review 
to  set  aside  default  Judgments  for 
estoppel  by  prior  Judgment  has  been 
held  to  be  neither  direct  nor  collat- 
eral attack  on  the  prior  Judgment 
— Bray  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  Teac.Civ. 
App.,  10  S.W.2d  235,  error  dismissed. 
80.  Ind. — Searle  v.  Whipperman,  79 

Ind.  424. 

84  C.J.  p  402  note  78  [b]. 
Action  to  review  Judgment  generally 

see  supra  §§  314-319. 

61.  Ind. — Calumet        Teaming        & 
Trucking  Co.  v.  Young,   33  N.E.2d 
109,  218  Ind.  468,  rehearing  denied 
33  N.E.2d  583,  218  Ind.  468— Baker 
v.  Ludlam,  20  N.E.  648,  118  Ind.  87 
— Searle  v.   Whipperman,    79    Ind. 
424. 

62.  Tex.— Callahan  v.  Staples,  161  S. 
W.2d  489,  139  Tex.   8— Lovensteln 
v.  Lovenstein,  Civ.App.,  35  S.W.2d 
271,  error  dismissed. 

Wash. — Harju   v.   Anderson,    215    P« 
327.  125  Wash.  161. 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


337 


been  held  to  be  new  or  independent  proceedings63 
even  though  the  application  has  been  filed  under  the 
title  of  the  cause  in  which  the  original  judgment 
was  rendered.64 

Vacation  on  motion  of  court.  -As  a  general  rule, 
where  the  court  has  retained  jurisdiction  of  the 
cause  it  may  set  aside  a  default  judgment  on  its 
own  motion,65  but  it  cannot  set  aside  a  default  judg- 
ment on  its  own  motion  where  the  statute  gives  the 
right  to  act  only  on  request  by  the  aggrieved  par- 
ty.66 

b.  Time  for  Application 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Under  statutory  provisions  generally 

(3)  Under  rule  of  court  generally 

(4)  During  and  after  term  generally 

(5)  Requirement  of  diligence 

(6)  Default  before  final  judgment 

(7)  Void  or  irregular  judgments 

(S)  Commencement  and  termination  of 
time 

(1)  In  General 
The   motion   or  application  for  opening   or  vacating 


a  default  Judgment  must  be  made  while  the  court  may 
exercise  Jurisdiction  over  Its  Judgment. 

The  motion  or  application  for  opening  or  vacating 
a  default  judgment  must  be  made  while  the  court 
may  exercise  jurisdiction  over  its  judgment.67  It 
has  been  held  that,  after  execution  has  been  re- 
turned satisfied,  a  default  judgment  cannot  proper- 
ly be  vacated  on  a  motion  to  set  it  aside,68  but,  as 
discussed  infra  §  379,  a  suit  in  equity  may  be  avail- 
able. A  default  judgment  based  on  service  by  pub- 
lication after  garnishment  may  not  be  set  aside  on 
the  motion  of  the  garnishee  under  the  claim  that  no 
assets  of  the  principal  defendant  are  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  garnishee  until  the  issue  of  whether  or 
not  the  garnishee  holds  assets  is  litigated  in  the 
garnishee  action.69 

(2)  Under  Statutory  Provisions  Generally 

An  application  based  on  atatutory  grounds  to  open  a 
default  Judgment  must  be  made  within  the  time  limited 
by  the  statute. 

Statutes  in  a  number  of  jurisdictions  specify  the 
time  within  which  an  application  to  set  aside  a  de- 
fault judgment  must  be  made,  and,  accordingly, 
the  judgment  may  properly  be  opened  or  vacated 
within  the  period  of  time  specified.70  An  appli- 


Mode  of  service  in  original  case 

A  distinction  exists  between  an 
equitable  bill  of  review  as  against 
a  previously  rendered  judgment  un- 
der, process  served  on  defendant,  and 
similar  action  on  judgment  rendered 
when  process  was  by  publication, 
since,  in  the  former,  actions  are 
docketed  separately  from  action 
sought  to  be  reviewed,  and  are  tried 
out  on  issues  made,  while,  in  latter 
cases,  motions  are  treated  as  mo- 
tions for  new  trials  in  original  case 
and  are  filed  in  that  case  and  heard 
as  part  of  it,  irrespective  of  how 
they  are  indorsed,  styled  or  docketed. 
— Smith  v.  Higginbotham,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  112  S.W.2d  770. 

63.  Ala.— Kelley  v.  Chavis,  142  So. 
423,  225  Ala.  218 — Mosaic  Templars 
of  America  v.  Hall,  124  So.  879, 
220  Ala.  805— Evans  v.  Wilhite,  52 
So.  845,  167  Ala.  587. 

111. — Adams  v.  Butman,  264  Ill.App. 
378. 

Ind.— State  ex  rel.  Krodel  v.  Gilkt- 
son,  198  N.E.  323,  209  Ind.  21$ — 
General  Outdoor  Advertising  Co.  v. 
City  of  Indianapolis,  172  N.E.  309, 
202  Ind,  85,  72  A.L.R.  453. 

Wyo. — Clarke  v.  Shoshonl  Lumber 
Co.,  224  P.  845,  31  Wyo.  205,  error 
dismissed  48  S.Ct.  302,  276  U.S. 
595,  72  LuBd.  722. 

Petition  for  review  of  default 
judgment  is  of  the  nature  of  on  in- 
dependent action. — Garrison  v. , 
Schmicke,  Mo.r  193  S.W.2d  $14— Dill- 


beck  v.  Johnson,  129  S.W.2d  885.  344 
Mo.  845. 


Judgment 

Where  motion  asserts  invalidity  of 
Judgment,  as  where  it  has  been  en- 
tered without  sufficient  service,  the 
attack  may  be  regarded  as  an  inde- 
pendent proceeding.  —  Ray  v.  Bruce, 
D.C.Mun.App.,  31  A.2d  693. 
64.  Ind.  —  Padol  v.  Home  Bank  & 

Trust  Co.,  27  N.E.2d  917,   108  Ind. 

App.  401—  Globe  Mining  Co.  v.  Oak 

Ridge   Coal   Co.,    134   N.E.   508,    79 

Ind.App.  76. 
85.    Mo.  —  Faulkner  v.  P.  Bierman  & 

Sons   Metal   &   Rubber   Co.,    App., 

294  S.W.  1019. 
Or.—  Milton  v.  Hare,  280  P.  511,  130 

Or.  590. 
Tex.  —  Gann  v.  Hopkins,  Civ.App.,  119 

S.W.2d    110—  Allison    v.    American 

Surety  Co.  of  New  York,  Civ.App., 

248  S.W.  829. 
Judgment  prematurely  entered 

Trial  court  had  inherent  power  on 
its  own  motion  to  set  aside  default 
Judgment  prematurely  entered.  — 
Stuart  v.  Alexander,  43  P.2d  557,  6 
Cal.App.2d  27. 

66.  Ariz.  —  Swisshelm     Gold     Silver 
Co.    v.    Farwell,    124    P.2d    544,    59 
Ariz.  162. 

67.  B.C.—  Ray  v.   Bruce,    Mun.App., 
31  A.2d  693. 

Time  for  opening  or  vacating  judg- 
ments generally  see  supra  $  288. 


Mont — State    ex 

653 


reL    Redle    v. 


District  Court  in  and  for  Missoula 
County,  59  P.2d  58,  102  Mont  541 — 
Green  v.  Wiederhold,  181  P.  981. 
56  Mont.  237 — Foster  v.  Hauswirth, 
6  P.  19,  5  Mont.  566. 

69.  Kan. — Herd  v.  Chambers,  122  P. 
2d  784,  155  Kan.  55. 

Opening  or  vacating  default  Judg* 
ments  against  garnishee  see  Gar- 
nishment §  256  b. 

70.  Ala.— -Ex  parte  Haisten,  149  So. 
213,   227  Ala.   183— Ex  parte  Day- 
ton Rubber  Mfg.  Co.,   122   So.  643, 
219  Ala.  482— Ex  parte  Richerzha- 
gen,   113   So.   85,   216  Ala.   262— Ex 
parte  Motley,   170    So.   81,    27   Ala. 
App.  241 — Ex  parte  Crump  ton,  10$ 
So.  184,  21  Ala.App.  446. 

Ariz.— Collister  v.  Inter-State  Fidel- 
ity Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  of  Utah, 
38  P.2d  626,  44  Ariz.  427,  98  A.L.R. 
1020. 

Cal. — Gould  v.  Richmond  School 
Dist,  136  P.2d  864,  -58  Cal.App.2d 
497 — Roseborough  v.  Campbell,  115 
P.2d  839,  46  Cal.App.2d  257. 

Mo. — Garrison  v.  Schmicke,  193  S.W. 
2d  614— Dillbeck  v.  Johnson,  129  8. 
W.2d  885,  344  Mo.  845. 

Mont.— State  v.  District  Court  of 
Second  Judicial  Dist.  in  .and  for 
Silver  Bow  County,  272  P.  526, 
83  Mont  400. 

Nev.— Nahas  v.  Nahas,  92  P.2d  718, 
59  Nev.  220. 

N.M. — Bourgeious  v.  Santa  Fe  Trail 
Stages,  95  P.2d  204,  43  N.M.  453 
— Baly  v.  McGahen,  21  P.2d  84, 
87  N.M.  246. 


337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


cation  based  on  statutory  grounds  to  open  a  de- 
fault judgment  must  be  made  within  the  time  limit- 
ed by  the  statute71  or  the  application  must  be  de- 
nied.72 In  some  jurisdictions  statutes  setting  forth 
the  procedure  for  opening  default  judgments  with- 
in a  limited  time  have  been  construed  as  affording 
an  additional  and  not  an  exclusive  remedy,  and  the 


court  may  exercise  its  inherent  power  to  afford  re- 
lief in  proper  cases,  in  proceedings  not  based  on  - 
such  statutes,  without  regard  to  the  statutory  limi- 
tation of  time.75  An  application  to  open  a  default 
judgment  has  been  held  not  to  come  within  the  time 
limit  prescribed  for  an  application  for  a  new  trial74 
unless  the  statutory  procedure  for  setting  aside  the 


Okl. — Gassin  v.  McJunkin,  48  P.2d 
320,  173  Okl.  .210. 

Tex. — Callahan  v.  Staples,  161  S.W 
2d  489,  139  Tex.  8— Pellum  v 
Fleming,  Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  531 
error  refused  Fleming1  v.  Pellum 
287  S.W.  492,  116  Tex  130. 

34  C.J.  p  258  note  99. 

Before  ease  ripe  for  Judgment 

(1)  Where   defendant   filed  motion 
to  remove  default  day  after  default, 
case  was  not  "ripe  for  judgment"  so 
as  to  go  to  judgment  without  clerk's 
making  note  to  that  effect — Cohen  v. 
Industrial    Bank    &    Trust    Co.,    175 
N.E.  78,  274  Mass.  498. 

(2)  In   general,   case   is   "ripe  for 
Judgment"    wHen    under    last    entry 
case  has   been  brought  to  final  de- 
termination and  everything  seems  to 
have    been    done    that    should    have 
been  done  before  entry  of  final  ad- 
judication.— Cohen  v.  Industrial  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  supra. 

71.  Ark.— Horn  v.  Hull,  275  S.W. 
905,  169  Ark.  463. 

Cal. — Phillips  v.  Trusheim,  156  P.2d 
25,  25  Cal.2d  913— Hunt  Mirk  &  Co. 
v.  Patterson,  253  P.  317,  20  Cal. 
382— Scott-  v.  Crosthwaite,  159  P. 
2d  660.  69  CaLApp.2d  663— Rose- 
borough  v.  Campbell,  115  P.2d  839, 
46  Cal.App.2d  257— Washko  v. 
Stewart,  112  P.2d  306,  44  CaLApp. 
2d  311— Bouvett  v.  Layer,  104  P. 
2d  115,  40  Cal.App.2d  43— Doyle  v. 
Rice  Ranch  Oil  Co.,  81  P.2d  980, 
28  Cal.App.2d  18— Jackson 
Shaw,  68  P.2d  310,  20  Cal.App.2d 
740— McNeill  v.  Wheat,  295  P.  105, 
111  Cal.App.  79— Wheat  v.  McNeill, 
295  P.  102,  111  CaLApp.  72— Jones 
v.  Moers,  266  P.  821,  91  CaLApp.  65 
— Vaughn  v.  Pine  Creek  Tungsten 
Co.,  265  P.  491,  89  CaLApp.  759— 
Keown  v.  Trudo,  234  P.  910,  71 
CaLApp.  155 — Hinds  v.  Superior 
Court  of  Los  Angeles  County,  223 
P.  422,  65  Cal.App.  223. 

Fla. — Atlanta  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hopps, 
183  So.  15,  133  Fla.  300. 

Idaho. — Hanson  v.  Rogers,  32  P.2d 
126,  54  Idaho  360— McAllister  v. 
Erickson,  261  P.  242,  45  Idaho  211 
—Smith  v.  Peterson,  169  P.  290. 
31  Idaho  34. 

Iowa. — Kern  v.  Woodbury  County, 
14  N.W.2d  687,  234  Iowa  1321— 
Vaux  v.  Hensal,  277  N.W.  718,  224 
Iowa  1055 — Borden  v.  Voegtlin,  245 
N.W.  331,  215  Iowa  882. 

La. — Wallace  v.  Martin,  App.,  166 
So.  874.  j 


Mich.— Zirfcaloso  y.  Merriam,  224  N 

W.  361,  246  Mich.  210. 
Minn.— Lentz  v.  Lutz,  9  N.W.2d  505 

215  Minn.  230— Marthaler  Machine 

&  Engineering  Co.  v.  Meyers,  218 

N.W.  127,  173  Minn.  606. 
Miss. — Britton    v.    Beltzhoover,    113 

So.  346,  147  Miss.  737. 
Mont. — Galbreath   v.   Aubert,   157   P 

2d  105 — Kosonen  v.  Waara,  285  P. 

668,  87  Mont.  24. 
N.Y.— Gilmore  v.  De  Witt,  10  N.Y.S. 

2d  903,  256  App.Div.  1046— Schlim- 

mer  v.  Ontario  &  W.  R.  Co.,  209  N, 

T.S.   547,   212  App.Div.   782. 
N.C. — Foster  v.  Allison  Corporation, 

131   S.E.    648,   191  N.C.   166,    44   A. 

L.R.  610. 
Ohio.— In  re  Veselich,  -154  N.E.  55,  22 

Ohio  App.  528. 
Okl. — Rodesney   v.    Robins,    88    P.2d 

333,  184  Okl.  457— VInson  v.  Okla- 
homa  City,    66   P.2d   933,   179   Okl. 

590— Bradshaw   v.    Tinker,    264    P. 

162,  129  Okl.  244. 
Philippine.— Almadin   v.    Almadin,    1 

Philippine  748,  1  Off.Gaz.  142. 
Tex.— Ridley  v.  McCallum,  163  S.W. 

2d  833,  139  Tex.  540. 
Utah.— Intermill    v.    Nash,    75    P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
Wyo. — Boulter  v.  Cook,  234  P.  1101, 

82  Wyo.  461,  rehearing  denied  236 

P.  245,  32  Wyo.  461. 
34  C.J.  p  430  note  91. 

Irregularity  in  taking  default 
judgment  before  cause  stood  for  trial 
in  accordance  with  court  rule  was 
waived  by  failure  to  move  for  va- 
cation of  judgment  within  first  three 
days  of  succeeding  term  of  court  as 
provided  by  statute. — Strain  v. 
Isaacs,  18  N.E.2d  816,  59  Ohio  App. 
495. 

Application*  held  timely 

N.T.— Coles  v.  Carroll,  6  N.E.2d  107, 
273  N.T.  86. 

Or. — Leonard  v.  Bennett,  106  P.2d 
542,  165  Or.  157— Galbraith  v.  Mon- 
arch Gold  Dredging  Co.,  84  P.2d 
1110,  160  Or.  282. 

72.  Ala. — Ex  parte  Cunningham,  99 
So.  834,  19  AUuApp.  584,  certiorari 
denied  Ex  parte  Ewart-Brewer  Mo- 
tor Co.,  99  So.  836,  211  Ala.  191. 

Cal. — Gibbons  y.  Clapp,  277  P.  490, 
207  Cal.  221— Wasko  v.  Stewart, 
112  P.2d  306,  44  Cal.App.2d  311— 
Knox  v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for 
Riverside  County,  280  P.  375,  100 
CaLApp.  452. 

Fla.— Cornelius  v.  State  ex  rel.  Tam- 
pa West  Coast  Realty  Co.,  183  So. 
754,  136  Fla.  506. 

654 


Ga.— Fraser  v.  Neese,  137  S.E.  550, 
163  Ga.  843. 

Tdaho. — Backman  v.  Douglas,  270  P. 
618,  46  Idaho  671— McAllister  v. 
Erickson,  261  P.  242,  45  Idaho  211 
— Commonwealth  Trust  Co.  of 
Pittsburgh  v.  Lorain,  255  P.  909, 
43  Idaho  784. 

TIL— Whalen  v.  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.,  280  IlLApp.  -596,  cer- 
tiorari denied  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.  v.  Whalen,  56  S.Ct  590, 
297  U.S.  714,  80  L.Ed.  1000. 

Iowa.— Kern  v.  Woodbury  County,  14 
N.W.2d  687,  234  Iowa  1321. 

Ky. — Stokes  v.  Commonwealth,  150  S. 
W.2d  892,  286  Ky.  391— Fowler  v. 
Wiley,  33  S.W.2d  14,  236  Ky.  313. 

La. — McClelland  v.  District  House- 
hold of  Ruth,  App.,  151  So.  246.  . 

Mont. — Housing  Authority  of  City 
of  Butte  v.  Murtha,  144  P.2d  183, 
115  Mont.  405— Kosonen  v.  Waara, 
285  P.  668,  87  Mont.  24. 

N.J. — Steinhauser  v.  Friedman,  170 
A.  630,  12  N.J.Misc.  167— New  Jer- 
sey Cash  Credit  Corporation  v. 
LInehan,  142  A.  650,  6  N«J.Misc. 
740. 

N.M.— Clark  v.  Rosenwald,  247  P. 
306,  31  N.M.  443. 

N.T.— Gilmore  v.  De  Witt,  10  N.Y.S. 
2d'  903,  256  App.Div.  1046. 

Okl.— Yahola  Oil  Co.  v.  Causey,  72  P. 
2d  817,  181  Okl.  129. 

Tex.— Ridley  v.  McCallum,  163  S.W. 
2d  833,  139  Tex.  540.  ; 

Utah. — J.  B.  Colt  Co.  v.  District 
Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist  in 
and  for  Millard  County,  269  P. 
1017,  72  Utah  281. 

34  C.J.  p  260  note  1,  p  430  note  92. 

73.    Cal. — Barnett  v.  Reynolds,  18  P. 

2d  514,  124  CaLApp.  750. 
N.T.— Malicky  v.  Rosenberg,   273  N. 

T.S.   818,   152   Misc.   197— White  v. 

Sebring,   233  N.Y.S.  497,   133  Misc. 

784. 
Tex. — Travelodge       Corporation       v. 

Schwake,  Civ.App.,  126  S.W.2d  523. 
34  CJ\  p  430  note  95. 
Time  for  equitable  proceedings   for 

relief  against  judgment  see  infra 

§  379. 

'4.  N.J.— Finkel  v.  District  Court 
for  First  Judicial  Dist.  of  Union 
County,  21  A.2d  306,  127  N.J.Law 
132,  affirmed  28  A.2d  119,  129  N. 
J.Law  97. 
Constructive  service 

Laws  relating  to  time  for  filing 
motions  for  new  trial  were  inapplica- 
ble where  suit  was.  by  publication 
and  only  appearance  by  attorney  ad 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


337 


default  judgment  is  in  the  nature  of  a  motion  for  a 
new  trial.75 

(3)  Under  Rule  of  Court  Generally 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judgment 
which  is  not  made  within  the  time  fixed  by  rule  of  court 
may  properly  be  denied. 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judg- 
ment not  made  within  the  time  fixed  by  rule  oi 
court  may  properly  be  denied.76  The  court  in  its 
discretion  may  grant  relief  after  the  time  limited 
therefor  by  its  own  rule,77  but  if  the  rules  are  made 
by  a  superior  tribunal  the  court  must  deny  an  ap- 
plication made  after  the  prescribed  time.78 

(4)  During  and  after  Term  Generally 
Where  the  application   is  filed  during  the  term  at 


which  the  default  Judgment  was  rendered,  the  Judgment 
may  properly  be  opened  or  vacated  on  any  ground  that 
moves  the  favorable  discretion  of  the  court.  If  the  ap- 
plication  Is  filed  after  the  term,  the  judgment  may  not 
be  opened  or  vacated  except  under  statutory  authoriza- 
tion or  except  on  some  ground  on  which  the  court  has 
inherent  power  to  act  after  term. 

Where  the  application  is  filed  during  the  term  at 
which  the  default  judgment  is  rendered,  the  judg- 
ment may  properly  be  opened  or  vacated  on  any 
ground  that  moves  the  favorable  discretion  of  the 
court79  If  the  application  is  filed  after  the  term, 
the  default  judgment  may  not  be  opened  or  vacat- 
ed80 except  on  some  ground  on  which  the  court  has 
inherent  power  to  act  after  the  term,81  or  where 
statutory  authority  exists  to  open  or  vacate  a  judg- 
ment after  term.82  A  motion  filed  during  the  term 


litem.— Hunsinger  v.  Boyd,  26  S.W.2d 
$05,  119  Tex.  182. 

75.  La.— -Wallace    v.    Martin,    App., 
166  So.  874. 

76.  D.C. — Ray  v.   Bruce,   Mun.App., 
31  A.2d  693. 

Mich. — Tymkiew  v.  Nicolopolus,  22 
N.W.2d  66 — Sczesny  v.  Colling- 
wood,  222  N.W.  759,  245  Mich.  438. 

34  C.J.  P  431  note  2. 

Application  to  set  aside  default  judg- 
ment not  regularly  entered  see  in- 
fra subdivision  b  (7)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

77.  g.c. — Sargent  v.  Wilson,  13  S.C. 
It  512. 

7B.  Mich.— Kunsky-Trendle  Broad- 
casting Corporation  v.  Kent  Circuit 
Judge,  275  N.W.  175,  281  Mich. 
367— Domzalski  v.  Guzynski,  274 
N.W.  753,  281  Mich.  175— Vozbut 
v.  Pomputis,  269  N.W.  149,  277 
Mich.  212-^Watkins  v.  Hunt,  225 
N.W.  554,  247  Mich.  237— Sczesny 
v.  Collingwood,  222  N.W.  759,  245 
Mich.  438 — Rosen  v.  Brennan,  221 
N.W.  276,  244  Mich.  397— Westlawn 
Cemetery  Ass'n  v.  Codd,  213  N.W. 
143,  238  Mich.  119— Newman  v. 
Hunt,  183  N.W.  745,  215  Mich.  185. 

34  C.J.  p  431  note  2  [a]  (2),  (3). 

79.  Ark.— Young  v.  Young,  147  S. 
W.2d  736,  201  Ark.  984. 

Iowa.— Kern  v.  Sanborn,  7  N.W.2d 
801,  233  Iowa  458. 

Kan. — Wichita  Motors  Co.  v.  United 
Warehouse  Co.,  255  P.  30,  123  Kan. 
235. 

Ky. — Corbin  Bldg.  Supply  Co.  v. 
Martin,  39  S.W.2d  480,  239  Ky. 
272. 

Neb.— Fremont  Joint  Stock  Land 
Bank  v.  Harding,  266  N.W.  714,  130 
Neb.  842. 

Ohio.— State  ex  rel.  Hughes  v.  Cra- 
mer, 34  N.B.2d  772,  138  Ohio  St. 
267 — Davis  v.  Teachnor,  App.,  53 
N.E.2d  208.  • 

Tex.— Dorsey  v.  Cutbirth,  Civ.App., 
178  S.W.2d  749,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  431  note  96. 


80u    D.C. — Ray   v.    Bruce,    Mun.App.t 

31  A.2d  693. 

111.— Chicago  Faucet  Co.  v.  839  Lake 
St  Bldg.  Corporation,  1  N.E.2d 
865,  285  IlLApp.  151. 
Iowa.— Clarke  v.  Smith,  192  N.W. 
136,  195  Iowa  1299. 
y.— Wood's  Ex'x  v.  City  of  Middles- 
boro,  90  S.W.2d  1018,  262  Ky.  627 
—National  Surety  Corporation  v. 
Mullins,  90  S.W.2d  707,  262  Ky. 
465 — Stratton  &  Terstegge  Co.  v. 
Begley,  61  S.W.2d  287,  249  Ky. 
632— Pinnacle  Motor  Co.  v.  Simp- 
son, 287  S.W.  -566,  216  Ky.  184. 
Mo.— State  ex  rel.  Sterling  v.  Shain, 
129  S.W.2d  1048,  344  Mo.  891— 
Buchholz  v.  Manzella,  App.,  158 
S.W.2d  200— Boggess  v.  Jordan, 
App.,  283  S.W.  57— Barkwell  v. 
Carlisle.  256  S.W.  513,  215  Mo.App. 
214. 
Neb.— Cronkleton  v.  Lane,  263  N.W. 

388,  130  Neb.  17. 
Ohio.— Ryan  v.  Buckeye  State  Build- 
ing &  Loan  Co..   163  N.B.   719,  29 
Ohio  App.  476. 
34  C.J.  p  431  note  98. 
Trial  term 

•  (1)  Statutory  right  to  open  de- 
fault Judgment  must  be  exercised 
before  beginning  of  trial  term.— Mo- 
Cray  v.  Empire  Inv.  Co.,  174  S.B. 
219,  49  Ga.App.  117— W.  H.  Coker  & 
Son  v.  Lipscomb,  87  S.E.  704,  17  Ga, 
App.  506. 

(2)  Default  Judgment  cannot  be 
opened  after  trial  term  has  passed, 
although  court  may  not  be  held  at 
trial  term. — Miller  v.  Phoenix  Mut, 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  147  S.E.  527,  168  Ga. 
321. 

81.  Pa.— Salus  v.  Fogel,  153  A.  547, 
302  .Pa.  268— Lichterman  v.  Han- 
Ion,  100  Pa.Super.  245 — Ames  Shov- 
el &  Tool  Co.  v.  Schock,  100  Pa- 
Super.  84 — New  Prague  Flouring 
Mill  Co.  v.  Kirschner,  70  Pa.Super. 
74. 

34  C.J.  p  431  notes  97,  99. 

Void  or  irregular  Judgment  see  in- 

655 


fra  subdivision  b  (7)  of  this  sec- 
tion. 
Necessity  for   equitable  ground  for 

relief 

An  adverse  judgment  may  not  be 
opened  after  exgj^tion  of  term  at 
which  it  was  entSfed,  unless  fraud 
or  some  other  recognized  equitable 
ground  for  relief  is  shown. — Kappel 
v.  Meth,  189  A.  795,  125  Pa.Super* 
443. 
Deprivation  of  rights 

Where  it  appears  that  defendant 
has  been  deprived  of  his  rights  by 
a  default  Judgment,  the  common- 
law  principle  that  the  power  of 
courts  to  vacate  their  Judgments 
does  not  extend  beyond  the  term 
at  which  they  were  entered  is  not 
adhered  to,  and  a  Judgment  may 
be  vacated  after  term. — Webb  Pack- 
ing Co.  v.  Harmon,  193  A.  596,  & 
W.W.Harr.,  Del.,  476. 
Substituted  service 

Where  court  was  without  Jurisdic- 
tion to  enter  Judgment  against  non- 
resident motorist  because  of  insuffi- 
cient notice  of  effect  of  service  of 
process  on  secretary  of  state,  peti- 
tion to  vacate  Judgment  by  default, 
although  made  at  subsequent  term, 
was  granted. — Webb  Packing  Co.  v. 
Harmon,  supra. 
82.  111. — Korner  v.  Weinshenk,  7  K. 

E.2d  635,   289  IlLApp.   625. 
Ohio. — State  ex  rel.  Hughes  v.  Cra- 
mer,  34  N.B.2d   772.   138   Ohio   St 
267. 
Okl.— Hoffman  v.  Deskins,  221  P,  37, 

94  Okl.  117. 
34  C.J.  p  431  note  1. 
-Within  time  prescribed  by  statute 

A   default   judgment   may    be    set 
aside  after  the  term  if  within   the 
period  of  time  prescribed  by  statute. 
—Lake  v.  Williams  &  Nobbs,  147  So. 
221,   109   Fla.   78— Ell  Witt   Cigar  & 
Tobacco  Co.  v.  Somers,  127  So.  333, 
99  Fla.  592. 
Statutory  grounds 
The  court  may  set  aside  a  default 


§  337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


at  which  the  judgment  is  rendered  may  be  consid- 
ered at  a  subsequent  term.88 

(5)  Requirement  of  Diligence 

A  defendant  must  proceed  with  reasonable  diligence 
In  moving  to  set  aside  a  default  judgment. 


Defendant  must  proceed  with  reasonable  diligence 
in  moving  to  set  aside  a  default  judgment,84  and  any 
.apparent  laches  or  delay  must  be  explained  and  ex- 
cused.85 Laches  or  undue  delay  will  bar  relief8* 
even  in  cases  where  the  application  has  been  made 


judgment    after    term    only    on    the 

grounds  specified  by  statute. 

Ark. — American    Inv.   Co.   v.    Keene- 

han,  291  S.W.  56,  172  Ark.  832. 
Ky.— Wood's  Ex'x  v.  City  of  Middles- 

boro,  90  S.W.2d  1018,  262  Ky.  627. 
Mo. — Force    v.    Margulius,    App.,    S3 

S.W.2d  1023. 
Neb. — Cronkleton  v.  Lane,  263  N.W. 

388,  130  Neb.  17. 

83.  Okl.— Hawkins  v.  Payne,  264  P. 
179,  129  Okl.  243— Claussen  v.  Am- 
berg,    249    P.    330,    119    Okl.    187— 
Missouri    Quarries    Co.    v.    Brady, 
219  P.  368,  95  Okl.  279. 

84.  Cal. — Massimino  v.  Taranto,  292 
P.  139,  108  CaLApp.  692. 

111.— Lusk  v.  Bluhxn,  53  N.R2d  135, 
•  321  IlLApp.  349— Blackman  v.  Illi- 
nois Cent.  R.  Co.,  52  N.E.2d  825, 
321  IU.APP.  310— Crystal  Lake 
Country  Club  v.  Scanlan,  564  HI. 
App.  44. 

Md. — Harvey  v.  Slacum,  29  A.2d  276, 
181  Md.  206— Weisman  v.  Davitz, 
199  A.  476,  174  Md.  447. 

Minn. — Lentz  v.  Lutz,  9  N.W.2d  505, 
215  Minn.  230— Pilney  v.  Funk,  3 
N.W.2d  792,  212  Minn.  398— In  re 
Belt  Line,  Phalen,  and  Hazel  Park 
Sewer  Assessment,  222  N.W.  520, 
176  Minn.  59. 

Mont — Madson  v.  Petrie  Tractor  & 
Equipment  Co.,  77  P.2d  1038,  106 
Mont.  382 — St.  Paul  Fire  &  Ma- 
rine Ins.  Co.  v.  Freeman,  260  P. 
124,  80  Mont  266 — Middle  States 
Oil  Corporation  v.  Tanner-Jones 
Drilling  Co.,  235  P.  770,  73  Mont. 
180. 

N.J.— Kiefer  v.  Fleming,  134  A,  110, 
4  N-J.Misc.  635. 

Or. — Steeves  v.  Steeves,  9  P.2d  815, 
139  Or.  261. 

Tex.— Callahan  v.  Staples,  161  S.W.2d 
489,  139  Tex.  8 — Stoudenmeier  v. 
First  Nat.  Bank,  Civ.App.,  246  S. 
W.  761. 

Wash. — Moe  v.  Wolter,  235  P.  803, 
134  Wash.  340,  affirmed  240  P.  €65, 
136  Wash.  696. 

34  C.J.  p  263  note  19. 

Necessity  for  diligence  where  Judg- 
ment void  flee  infra  subdivision  b 
(7)  of  this  section. 

Barli«Bt  moment   praoUoaUe 

One  in  default  must  move  to  set 

it  aside  at  the  earliest  moment  prac- 
ticable.— In  re  Bast  Bench  Irr.  Dist, 

224  P.  859,  70  Mont  186. 
Prompt  application  for  relief  after 

learning  of  default  judgment  is  nec- 
essary. 

Or. — Snyder  v.  Consolidated  Highway 
Co.,  72  P.3d  932,  157  Or.  479. 

Pa.— Quaker  City  Chocolate  &  Con- 


fectionery Co.  v.  Warnock  Bldg. 
Ass'n,  32  A.2d  5,  347  Pa.  186— 
Silent  Auto  Corporation  of  North- 
ern New  Jersey  v.  Folk,  97  Pa.Su- 
per.  588 — Commonwealth  v.  Dr. 
Crandall's  Health  School,  Com.Pl., 
51  Dauph.Co.  333— Hotel  Redington 
v.  Guttey.  36  Luz.Leg.Reg.  209,  3 
Monroe  L.R.  €2,  affirmed  25  A.2d 
773,  148  Pa.Super.  502. 
Tex.— Farrell  v.  Truett  Abernathy  & 
•  Wolford,  Civ.App.,  60  S.W.2d  475, 

error  dismissed. 
Claim  of  fraud 

Even  though  defendant  claims  that 
default  judgment  was  .  obtained 
against  him  by  extrinsic  fraud,  de- 
fendant should  not  be  permitted  to 
wait  until  more  than  a  year  after 
he  concededly  had  actual  notice  of 
Judgment  before  attacking  it  by  mo- 
tion to  set  judgment  aside  on  ground 
that  defendant  was  not  served  with 
summons. — Washko  v.  Stewart,  112 
P.2d  306,  44  CaLApp.2d  311. 

Mere  forffetfolaess  has  been  held 
no  excuse  for  failure  to  move 
promptly  to  set  aside  default,  not- 
withstanding disorganization  of  at- 
torneys' business  because  of  death 
of  partner. — St.  Paul  Fire  &  Marine 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Freeman,  260  P.  124,  80 
Mont  266. 

86.    Tex. — Simpson    v.    Glenn,    Civ. 

App:,    103    S.W.2d   433— Welsch   v. 

Keeton,   Civ.App.,    287    S.W.    692— 

Stoudenmeier  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 

Civ.App.,  246  S.W.  761. 
34  C.J.  p  427  note  62. 

86.  Ala.— Craft  v.  Hirsh,  149  So. 
683,  227  Ala.  257,  appeal  dismissed 
54  S.Ct  455,  291  U.S.  644,  78  I* 
Ed.  1041. 

Ariz. — Postal  Ben.  Ins.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 165  P.2d  173— Avery  v.  Calu- 
met &  Jerome  Copper  Co.,  284  P. 
159,  36  Ariz.  239 — Garden  Develop- 
ment Co.  v.  Carlaw,  263  P.  625,  33 
Ariz.  232. 

Ark.— O'Neal  v.  B.  F.  Goodrich  Rub- 
ber Co.,.  162  S.W.2d  52,  204  Ark. 
371 — Bictoerstaff  v.  Harmonia  Fire 
Ins.  Co.,  133  S.W.2d  890,  199  Ark. 
424. 

Cal.— Hlltbrand  v.  Hiltbrand,  23  P.2d 
277,  218  Cal.  321— Scott  v.  Cros- 
thwaite,  159  P.2d  660,  69  CaLApp. 
2d  663 — Sharp  v.  Paulson,  295  P. 
856,  111  CaLApp.  515— Grey  v.  Mfl- 
ligan,  281  P.  656,  101  CaLApp.  328. 

Idaho.— Nielson  v.  Garrett,  43  P.2d 
380,  55  Idaho  240— Savage  v. 
Stokes,  28  P.2d  900,  54  Idaho  109. 

I1L— Shaw  v.  Carrara,  38  N.B.2d 
785,  312  IlLApp.  410. 

656 


Iowa. — Anderson  v.  Anderson,  229 
N.W.  694,  209  Iowa  1143. 

Md. — Wagner  v.  Scurlock,  170  A.  539, 
166  Md.  284. 

Mich. — In  re  State  Highway  Com'r, 
279  N.W.  883,  284  Mich.  414,  certio- 
rarl  denied  Halsted  v.  State  High- 
way Commissioner,  59  S.Ct.  148, 
305  U.S.  644,  83  L.Ed.  416. 

Minn.— Kane  v.   Stallman,   296  N.W. 


1,  209  Minn.  138 — Nystrom  v.  Ny- 
strom,  243  N.W.  704,  186  Minn. 
490— Beelman  v.  Beck,  205  N.W. 
636,  164  Minn.  504— Ladwig  v.  Pe- 
terson, 199  N.W.  226,  160  Minn.  13. 

Mo. — O'Connell  v.  Dockery,  App.,  102 
S.W.2d  748. 

N.J.— Kiefer  v.  Fleming,  134  A.  110, 
4  N.J.Miso.  635— Vanderbilt  v.  Chi- 
oscinski,  129  A.  178,  3  N.J.Misc. 
584. 

N.T. — Booraem  v.  Gibbons,  34  N.T.S. 
2d  198,  263  App.Div.  665,  appeal 
denied  35  N.T.S.2d  717,  264  App. 
Div.  768 — Carpello  v.  Carana,  220 
N.T.S.  81,  219  App.Div.  736— Brod- 
erick  v.  Saretsky,  39  N.Y.S.2d  802, 
179  Misc.  737— Sobel  v.  Steinberg, 
273  N.Y.S.  630,  152  Misc.  443— 
Hannel  v.  Serbert,  255  N.Y.S.  758, 
143  Misc.  61 — Stewart  v.  Barry, 
250  N.Y.S.  67,  139  Misc.  724— Kefer 
v.  Gunches,  49  N.Y.S.2d  554— Rocki 
v.  Chiprut,  203  N.Y.S.  100. 

Pa.— Quaker  City  Chocolate  &  Con- 
fectionery Co.  v.  Warnock  Bldg. 
Ass'n,  32  A.2d  5,  347  Pa.  186— 
Planters  Nut  &  Chocolate  Co.  v. 
Brown-Murray  Co.,  193  A.  381,  128 
Pa. Super.  239 — Commonwealth  v. 
Dr.  Crandall's  Health  School,  Com. 
PL,  51  Dauph.Co.  333— Oltorik  T. 
Bozer,  Com.PL,  40  Lack.Jur.  25. 

S.C.— Brown  v.   Nix,    37   S.B.2d   579. 

SJD.— Heitman  v.  Gross,  19  N.W.2d 
508— Smith  v.  Wordenmn,  240  N.W. 
325,  59  S.D.  368. 

Tex. — Dodd  v.  State,  Civ.App.,  193 
S.W.2d  (69 — Simpson  v.  Glenn,  Civ. 
App.,  103  S.W.2d  433— Farrell  v. 
Truett,  Abernathy  &  Wolford,  Civ. 
App.,  60  S.W.2d  475,  error  dismiss- 
ed— Oldham  v.  Heatherly,  Civ.App., 
17  S.W.2d  113— Cauble  v.  Key,  Civ. 
App.,  256  S.W.  654 — Stoudenmeier 
v.  First  Nat  Bank,  CLv.App.,  246 
S.W.  761. 

Wyo. — Clarke  v.  Shoshoni  Lumber 
Co.,  224  P.  845,  31  Wyo.  205,  error 
dismissed  48  S.Ct  302,  276  U.S. 
695,  72  LJEd.  722. 

34  C.J.  p  427  note  57. 

Necessity  for  knowledge 
Mere  passage  of  time  since  entry 

of  judgment  sought  to  be  enforced 

does  not  create  "laches"  without  pre- 
cedent of  knowledge  on  defendant's 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§337 


within  the  statutory  time,87  but  it  is  not  laches  to 
make  the  application  at  the  latest  period  prescribed 
by  the  statute  where  no  intervening  facts  appear 
which  make  it  inequitable  to  grant  the  application.88 
Under  some  statutes  the  motion  must  be  filed  with- 
in a  reasonable  time,  not  to  exceed  a  specified  peri- 
od, after  rendition  of  the  default  judgment89 

What  constitutes  due  diligence90  or  a  reasonable 
time91  depends  on  the  circumstances  of  the  particu- 
lar case. 

(6)  Default  before  Final  Judgment 

Statutes  limiting  the  period  of  time  within  which 
proceedings  may  be  instituted  to  open  or  set  aside  a 
default  judgment  have  been  held  to  be  applicable  to  de- 
fault judgments  which  are  merely  Interlocutory. 

General  statutory  limitations  on  the  period  of 
time  within  which  proceedings  may  be  instituted  to 
open  or  set  aside  a  default  judgment  have  been  held 
to  apply  only  to  final,  and  not  to  interlocutory,  judg- 
ments,92 but  where  the  limitation  is  inserted  in  a 
statute  pertaining  to  both  interlocutory  and  final 
judgments  it  has  been  held  to  apply  to  interlocutory 


as  well  as  to  final  judgments.**  The  rule  against 
vacating  a  default  judgment  after  expiration  of  the 
term  at  which  it  was  rendered,  discussed  supra  sub- 
division b  (4)  of  this  section,  does  not  apply  to  a 
mere  interlocutory  entry  of  default,  and  such  an  en- 
try  may  be  vacated  on  proper  grounds  after  adjourn- 
ment  of  the  term  at  which  such  default  was  en- 
tered;94 and,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  con- 
trary, a  default  on  which  no  judgment  has  been  en- 
tered may  be  set  aside  on  an  application  made  at 
any  time.95 

(7)  Void  or  Irregular  Judgments 

Statutes  imposing  limitations  on  the  time  within 
which  applications  may  be  made  to  open  or  set  aside 
default  judgments  and  the  doctrine  of  laches  have  been 
held  to  be  inapplicable  to  default  Judgments  which  are- 
void. 

Statutes  imposing  limitations  on  the  time  within 
which  an  application  may  be  made  to  open  or  set 
aside  default  judgments  have  been  held  to  be  inap- 
plicable to  a  default  judgment  which  is  void96  or 
void  on  its  face,97  such  as  where  the  judgment  is  il- 
legal for  want  of  jurisdiction98  due  to  the  lack  of 


part  or  existence  of  such  circum- 
stances that  defendant  should  have 
known  of  judgment  and  acted 
promptly  by  applying  for  vacation 
of  default  judgment  to  protect  his 
rights. — Renter  Co.  v.  Errath,  32  A. 
2d  592,  21  N.J.Misc.  214. 

87.  Ariz. — Perrin  v.   Perrin  Proper- 
ties,  86  P.2d  23,  53  Ariz.  121,  122 
A.L.R.   621. 

Cal.— Hiltbrand  v.   Hiltbrand,    23   P. 

2d  277,  218  Cal.  321. 
Minn. — Kane  v.   Stallman,  296  N.W. 

1,  209  Minn.  138. 
34  C.J.  p  427  note  58. 

88.  N.Y.— Marvin   r.    Brandy,    9   N. 
T.S.   593,   56  Hun  242,  18  N.Y.Civ. 
Proc.  343. 

89.  Cal. — Hollywood    Garment    Cor- 
poration v.  J.  Beckerman,  Inc.,  143 
P.2d  738,  61  Cal.App.2o:  658— Wash- 
ko  v.  Stewart,  112  P.2d  306,  44  Cal. 
App,2d    311 — Weinberger   v.    Man- 
ning,  123   P.2d   531,   50   CaLApp.2d 
494. 

Idaho. — Hanson   y.    Rogers,    32    P.2d 
126,  54  Idaho  360. 

90.  N.D.— Powell  v.  Bach,  217  N.W. 
172,  56  NJ>.  297. 

"Undue  delay  held  not  shown 

Ariz. — Avery   v.   Calumet   &   Jerome 

Copper   Co.,    284   P.    159,    36   Ariz, 

239. 
111.— Lusk  v.   Bluhm,   53  N.E.2d  135, 

321  IlLApp.   349. 
Mont.— Brothers  v.  Brothers,  230  P. 

60,  71  Mont.  378. 
N.D.— First  State  Bank  of  Crosby  v. 

Thomas,    268    N.W.    852,    54    N.D. 

108. 
Wash.— Moe   v.  Wolter,   235   P.   8frS, 

49C.J.S.-42 


134  Wash.  340,  affirmed  240  P.  565, 
136'  Wash.  696. 

91.  Cal.— Wm.  Wolff  &  Co.  v.  Cana- 
dian Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  26  P.  825,  89  Cal. 
332. 

Iiimlt  for  reasonable  time 

Where    the    statute    requires    the 
motion  to  be  filed  within  a  reason- 
able time  not  to  exceed  a  specified 
period,  the  limit  for  reasonable  time 
is  the  specified  period. 
Cal.— Smith  v.  Jones,  163  P.  890,  174 
Cal.  513 — Hollywood  Garment  Cor- 
poration v.  J.  Beckerman,  Inc.,  143 
P.2d  738,   61  CaLApp.2d  658. 
Idaho. — Hanson   y.    Rogers,    32   P.2d 

126,  54  Idaho  360. 

Time  held  reasonable  under  circum- 
stances 

CaL — Waybright  v.  Anderson,  253 
P.  148,  200  CaL  374— Waite  v. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.,  221  P.  204,  192 
Cal.  467— Sofuye  v.  Pieters-Wheel- 
er  Seed  Co.,  216  P.  990,  62  Cal.App. 
198. 

92.  Ala. — Ex  parte  Bozeman,  104  So. 
402,  213  Ala.  223— Ex  parte  Savage, 
186  So.  586,   28  AlfiuApp.  440. 

Tenn. — Gammon  v.  Robbing,  53  S.W. 
2d  223,  165  Tenn.  128.  . 

93.  Del.— Yerkes  v.  Dangle,   Super., 
33  A.2d  406. 

94.  Del.— Yerkes  v.  Dangle,  supra. 
Iowa.— Redding   v.    Redding,    284   N. 

W.  167,  226  Iowa  327— Weinhart  v. 
Meyer,    247    N.W.    811,    215    Iowa 
1317. 
34  CUT.  P  422  note  20. 

95.  Ala.— Ex  parte  Savage,   186  So. 
586,  28  Ala.App.  440. 

657 


Iowa.— Weinhart  v.  Meyer,  547  N.W* 

811,  215  Iowa  1317. 
34  C.J.  p  422  note  19. 

96.  D.C. — Ray   v.  Bruce,    MuxuApp* 
31  A.2d  693. 

Fla. — Kellogg-Citizens  Net  Bank  of 
Green  Bay,  Wls.,  v.  Pelton,  199  So. 
50,  145  Fla.  68— -Kroier  v.  Kroier* 
116  So.  753,  95  Fla,  865. 

111.— Lewis  v.  West .  Side  Trust  & 
Savings  Bank  of  Chicago,  36  N.B. 
2d  573,  377  111.  384. 

N.J.— New  Jersey  Cash  Credit  Cor- 
poration v.  Zaccaria,  19  A.2d  448,, 
126  NJ.Law  334— Gloucester  City 
Trust  Co.  v.  Goodfellow,  3  A.24 
561,  121  N.J.Law  546— Andersen  v. 
Independent  Order  of  Foresters,. 
126  A.  631,  98  N.J.Law  648. 

Tex. — Smith  v.  Lightfoot,  Civ.App.fc 
143  S.W.2d  151. 

97.  Cal. — Vaughn     v.     Pine     Creek 
Tungsten  Co.,   265  P.  491,   89  CaL 
App.  759. 

Idaho. — Hanson   v.    Rogers,    32    P.2d 

126,     54     Idaho     360— Savage     v. 

Stokes,  28  P.2d  900,  54  Idaho  109. 
Mont.— Hodson    v.    O'Keeffe,    229    P» 

722,  71  Mont  322. 
Wash, — Marinovich  v.  Idndh,   220  Pi. 

807,  127  Wash.  349. 
Rule  held  inapplicable  to  valid  jndg~ 


Cal. — Vaughn  v.  Pine  Creek  Tung- 
sten Co.,  245  P.  491,  89  Cal.App. 
759 — Hinds  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Los .  Angeles  County,  223  P.  422, 
65  Cal.App.  223. 

98.  Mont— Hodson  v.  O'Keeffe,  229' 
P,  722,  71  Mont  322. 

N.J. — Andersen  v.  Independent  Or- 
der of  Foresters,  126  A.  631,  98. 


337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


•proper  summons  or  notice,"  or  where  the  default 
judgment  has  been  entered  by  the  clerk  of  the  court 
-without  legal  authority.1  Some  statutes  have  also 
1)een  held  not  to  apply  to  irregular  judgments,2  but 
•other  statutes  have  been  held  to  apply  if  the  judg- 
ment is  merely  irregular  and  voidable.5 

The  doctrine  of  laches  does  not  apply  in  the  case 
of  a  judgment  by  default  which  is  void,4  and  un- 
der such  circumstances  a  showing  of  diligence  is  not 
necessary.6 

During  or  after  term.  A  void  judgment  may 
properly  be  set  aside  at  a  subsequent  term.6  A  judg- 
ment irregularly  entered  may  be  opened  or  vacated 
after  term,7  particularly  where  a  statute  so  pro- 
vides.8 

Rules  of  court.  A  rule  of  court  requiring  an 
application  to  be  filed  within  a  fixed  period  of  time 


has  been  held  to  apply  only  to  a  default  judgment 
which  is  regularly  entered,9  and  not  to  apply  if 
there  has  not  been  a  proper  legal  service  of  proc- 
ess,10 although  only  a  substantial  compliance  with 
the  statute  with  respect  to  notice  is  required.11 
Such  a  court  rule  has  also  been  held  to  require  that 
the  proceedings  after  default  be  regular.12  Where 
the  default  was  due  to  the  judge  having  misled  de- 
fendant, an  order  setting  aside  the  default  has  been 
permitted  even  though  the  application  was  filed  after 
the  time  prescribed  by  rule  of  court.13 

(8)  Commencement  and  Termination  of  Time 
Under  statutes  prescribing  the  time  within  which 
applications  to  open  or  set  aside  default  judgments  must 
be  filed,  the  commencement  of  the  period  limited  depends 
on  the  terms  of  the  particular  statute  under  which  ap- 
plication is  made. 

Under  the  various  statutes  prescribing  the  time 


N.J.Law  648— Palansky  v.  Reich, 
164  A.  701,  11  N.J.Misc.  106,  affirm- 
ed 168  A.  297,  11  N.J.Law  241— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Greenbaum 
v.  Higgins,  147  A.  722,  723,  7  N.J. 
Misc.  1012. 

84  C.J.  P  257  note  89. 

99.  Cal.— Gibbons  v.  Clapp,  277  P. 
490,  207  Cal.  221. 

tf.D. — Ellison  v.  Baird,  293  N.W. 
793,  70  N.D.  226. 

Ohio. — Vida  v.  Parsley,  App.,  47  N. 
E.2d  663. 

1.  Cal. — Potts  v.  Whitson,  125  P.2d 
947,  52  CaLApp.2d  199— Crofton  v. 
Young,   119  P.2d  1003,  48  CaLApp. 
2d  452. 

Fla,— St.  Lucie  Estates  v.  Palm 
Beach  Plumbing  Supply  Co.,  133 
So.  841,  101  Fla,  205— Eli  Witt 
Cigar  &  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Somers,  127 
So.  333,  99  Fla.  592— Kroier  v.  Kro- 
ier,  116  So.  753,  95  Fla.  865— 
Ex  parte  Jones,  110  So.  532,  92 
Fla,  1015— Mickler  v.  Reddick,  21 
So.  287,  38  Fla.  341. 

2.  N.C.— Hood  ex  rel.  Citizens  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Stewart,  184  S.E. 
36,  209  N.C.  424— Foster  v.  Allison 
Corporation,   131    S.B.   648,   191  N. 
C.  166,  44  A.L.R.  610. 

A  mere  clerical  error  which  does 
not  affect  the  substantial  rights  of 
the  parties  will  be  disregarded.— 
Galbreath  v.  Aubert,  Mont.,  157  P. 
2d  105. 
Failure  to  give  notice  of  judgment 

Default  and  judgment  entered 
against  defendant  which  had  filed  af- 
fidavit of  defense  was  held  properly 
vacated,  notwithstanding  that  more 
than  thirty  days  had  elapsed  from 
date  of  entry  of  Judgment  where  no 
notice  was  given  defendant  of  entry 
of  Judgment  as  required  by  rule  of 
court,  since  such  fact,  if  known  to 
.  court,  would  ha"ve  prevented  entry  of 
Judgment — Josten  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Keel- 
er,  2  N.E.2d  586,  284  IlLApp.  646. 


3.  N.M.— Dallam    County    Bank    v. 
Burnside,  249  P.  109,  31  N.M.  537. 

4.  N.J.— Weiner  v.  Wittman,   27  A. 
2d  866,  129  N.J.Law  35— Westfield 
Trust    Co.    v.    Court    of   Common 
Pleas    of   Morris   County,    178   A. 
546,   115  N.J.Law  86,  affirmed  183 
A.   165,    116   N.J.Law  191. 

N.Y. — Valz  v.  Sheepshoad  Bay  Bung- 
alow Corporation,  18%  N.E.  124,  249 
N.Y.  122.  certiorarl  denied  49  S. 
Ct  82,  278  U.S.  647*  73  L.Ed.  560. 

Or.— Mutzig  v.  Hope,  158  P.2£  110. 

Pa. — Borough  of  Wilkinsburg  v. 
School  Dist.  of  Borough  of  Wil- 
kinsburg, 148  A.  77,  298  Pa,  193. 

5.  Minn. — Pugsley   v.    Magerfieisch, 
201  N.W.  323,  161  Minn.  246. 

6.  Ky. — Corbin  Bldg.  Supply  Co.  v. 
Martin,    39    S.W.2d    480,    239    Ky. 
272. 

7.  Pa,— Kappel  v.  Meth,  189  A.  795, 
125  Pa.Super.  443. 

8.  Mo. — Boggess    v.    Jordan,    App., 
283  S.W.  57. 

Ohio.— Levy  v.  Foley,  61  N.B.2d  615, 
75  Ohio  App.  220— Davis  v.  Teach- 
nor,  App.,  53  N.E.2d  208 — Lyons 
v.  Weihe,  24  N.E.2d  835,  62  Ohio 
App.  527. 

OkL— Mayhue  v.  Clapp,  261  P.  144, 
128  Okl.  1— Nation  v.  Savely,  260 
P.  32,  127  Okl.  117. 

9.  Mich.— Smak  v.  Gwozdik,  291  N. 
W.  270,  293  Mich.  185— McHenry  v. 
Village   of   Grosse   Pointe   Farms, 
251  N.W.  783,  265  Mich.  581— Wat- 
kins   V.   Hunt,   225   N.W.   554,    247 
Mich.  237 — Rosen  v.  Brennan,  221 
N.W.  276,  244  Mich.  397— Westlawn 
Cemetery  Ass'n  v.  Codd,  213  N.W. 
143,  238  Mich.  119. 

34  C.J.  p  431  note  2  [a]  (1). 
Determination  from  face  of  record 
Whether  or  not  default  Judgment 
was  irregularly  entered  so  as  to  au- 
thorize setting  it  aside  after  pre- 
scribed period  must  be  determined 

658 


from  face  of  record. — Rosen  v.  Bren- 
nan, 521  N.W.  276,  244  Mich.  S97. 

Defective  caption  to  default  de- 
cree will  not  prevent  tolling  of  cir- 
cuit court  rule  limiting  time  for  va- 
cation of  default — Westlawn  Ceme- 
tery Ass'n  v.  Codd,  213  N.W,  143, 
238  Mich.  119. 
Signature  by  deputy  clerk 

Where  default  was  entered,  the 
fact  that  order  pro  confesso  was 
signed  by  deputy  clerk  instead  of 
plaintiffs  attorney  was  held  not  to 
toll  rule  limiting  time  for  setting 
aside  default — Westlawn  Cemetery 
Ass'n  v.  Codd,  supra, 

10.  Mich. — John  W.  Masury  &  Son 
v.    Lowthsr,    300    N.W.    866,    299 
Mich.  516. 

Where  service  of  writ  of  garnish- 
ment issued  against  foreign  corpora- 
tion was  unauthorized  because  per- 
son served  was  the  principal  de- 
fendant who  was  an  employee  of  the 
corporation,  corporation's  motion  to 
set  aside  default  and  default  Judg- 
ment was  timely,  even  though  not 
made  until  more  than  four  months 
after  entry  of  default  Judgment — 
John  W.  Masury  &  Son  v.  Lowther, 
supra. 

11.  Mich. — Westlawn     Cemetery 
Ass'n  v.   Codd,   213   N.W.  143,   238 
Mich.  119— Kentucky  Wagon  Mfg. 
Co.    v.   Kalamazoo    Circuit   Judge, 
175  N.W.  150,  208  Mich.  267. 

12.  Mich.— Foster  v.  Talbot,  241  N. 
W.   141,   257  Mich.   489— Westlawn 
Cemetery  Ass'n  -v.  Codd,  213  N.W. 
143,  238  Mich.  119. 

34  C.J.  p  431  note  2  [a]  (1). 
Award  of  damages  in  excess  of  claim 
Mich.— Foster    v.    Talbot,    241   N.W- 
.141,  257  Mich.  489. 

13.  Mich.— Geib     v.     Kent     Circuit 
Judge,    19   N.W.2d   124,   311  Mich. 
631. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


337 


within  which  applications  to.  open  or  set  aside  de- 
fault judgments  must  be  filed,  the  period  limited  has 
been  held  to  begin  to  run  at  the  date  of  the  rendition 
of  the  judgment14  and  not  at  the  time  of  the  entry 
of  the  default,15  at  the  time  of  the  entry  of  the  de- 
fault rather  than  at  the  time  of  the  entry  of  the 
judgment  based  on  the  default,16  at  the  date  of  en- 
try of  the  judgment  in  the  default  docket,17  or  at 
the  time  of  notice  of  the  entry  of  the  judgment.18 
Notice,  within  the  contemplation  of  statutes  pro- 
viding for  the  latter  rule,  has  been  held  to  mean 
actual  knowledge  of  the  judgment,19  but  it  has 
also  been  held  that  the  constructive  notice  afforded 
by  recordation  of  the  entry  of  judgment  is  suffi- 
cient.20 Under  some  statutes  notice  must  be  given 
through  actual  service  before  the  period  limited  will 
commence  to  run.21 

Some  statutes  of  this  character  have  been  held 
to  cease  to  run  at  the  time  the  motion  to  set  aside 
the  default  judgment  is  filed  although  it  is  not  heard 


or  disposed  of  within  the  statutory  period,22  but 
under  other  statutes  it  has  been  held  that  not  only 
the  motion,  but  also  the  time  for  the  hearing  on  the 
motion,  must  be  within  the  statutory  period.23 

The  running  of  the  statutory  period  within  which 
default  judgments  may  be  opened  or  vacated  has 
been  held  not  to  be  suspended  by  postponements 
by  consent,24  by  the  pendency  of  negotiations  for  a 
settlement,25  or  by  a  stipulation  of  counsel  to  waive 
the  tardy  filing  of  the  motion.26  Where,  however, 
delay  in  applying  to  vacate  a  default  judgment  is 
attributed  to  the  opposite  party's  acts  and  declara- 
tions, the  lapse  of  time  may  become  more  or  less  im- 
material.27 The  statutory  period  has  been  held  to 
commence  to  run  even  though  a  motion  for  removal 
from  a  state  court  to  a  federal  court  is  pending  at 
the  time  of  the  rendition  of  the  default  judgment.28 

The  period  limited  for  setting  aside  default  judg- 
ments has  been  held  not  to  be  tolled  by  reason  of  de- 
fendant's insanity.29 


14.  Ala. — Marshall  County  v.  Critch- 
er,  17  So.2d  540,  245  Ala.  357. 

Cal. — Bell     v.     McDermoth,     246    P. 

805,  198  Cal.  594.  ' 
Iowa.— Tracy  v.  McLaughlin,  223  N. 

W.  475,  207  Iowa  793. 
Mont— -State    v.    District    Court    of 

Second   Judicial    Dist.    in  and   for 

Silver  Bow  County,  272  P.  525,  83 

Mont.  400. 

34  C.J.  P  430  note  91  [a],  [b]. 
Entry  in  official  minutes 

"Rendition  of  judgment,"  within 
statute  relating  to  vacation  there- 
of, occurred  when  court's  order  for 
Judgment  was  entered  in  official  min- 
utes.—Azadian  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  263  P. 
298,  88  CaLApp.  296. 

15.  Default  without  personal  service 
Period  of  time  from  rendition  of 

default  judgment  in  action  wherein 
defendant  has  not  been  personally 
served  with'  summons  within  which 
default  may  be  set  aside  commences 
at  date  of  rendition  of  judgment  and 
not  entry  of  default. 
Cal. — Doxey  v.  Doble,  54  P.2d  1143, 

12  Cal.App.2d  62. 
I0wa, — Tracy  v.  McLaughlin,  223  N. 

W.  475,  207  Iowa  793. 

16.  CaL — Macbeth  v.  Macbeth,  25  P- 
2d    11,    219    Cal.    47— Title   Ins.   & 
Trust   Co.    v.    King   Land    &   Im- 
provement   Co.,    120    P.    1066,    163 
Cal.    44— Washko   v.   Stewart,   112 
P.2d     306,      44      Cal.App.2d     311— 
Brooks   v.   Nelson,    272   P.   610,   95 
CaLApp.  144 — McLain  v.  Llewellyn 
Iron   Works,    204    P.    869,    56    Cal. 
App.  58. 

Idaho. — Commonwealth  Trust  Co.  of 
Pittsburgh  v.  Lorain,  255  P.  909, 
43  Idaho  784. 

Mont — Galbreath  v.  Aubert,  157  P. 
2d  105. 


17.  Fla.— Security    Finance    Co.    v. 
Gentry,   109  So.  220,   91  Fla,  1015, 
followed   in   109    So.    222,    91   Fla. 
1024. 

18.  N.Y.— Redfield   v.    Critchley,    14 
N.B.2d  377,-  277  N.Y.   336,   reargu- 
ment  denied  15  N.B.2d  73,  278  N.Y. 
483— Cowperthwait     v.     Critchley, 
276  N.T.S.   133,  243  App.Div.   70. 

S.C.— Witt  v.  Leysath,   158  S.E.  226, 

160  S.C.  251. 
34  C.J.  p  430  note  91  [a],  [b],  [d]. 

Actual  knowledge  of  entry  of  de- 
fault judgment  satisfies  requirement 
of  notice. — Walrod  v.  Nelson,  210  N. 
W.  525,  54  N.D.  753. 

19.  Or. — Anderson    T.    Guenther,    25 
P.2d  146,  144  Or.  446 — Chapman  v. 
Multnomah  County,  126  P.  99-6,  63 
Or.    180— Evans   v.   Evans,    118    P. 
177,  60  Or.  195— Fildew  v.  Milner, 
.109  P.  1092,  57  Or.  16. 

20.  S.C.— Anderson  v.   Toledo   Scale 
Co.,    6    S.E.2d   465,    192    S.C.    300— 
Witt  v.  Leysath,  168  S.E.  226,  160 
S.C.  251. 

21.  N.Y.— Redfield    v.    Critchley,    14 
N.E.2d   377,   277   N.Y.   336,   reargu- 
ment  denied  15  N.E.2d  73,   278  N. 
Y.    483— Stapen's    Radio    Shop    v. 
Black,  21  N.Y.S.2d  650. 

34  C.J.  p  430  note  91  [d]. 

22.  Ark. — Davis  v.   Collums,   168   S. 
W.2d  1103,  205  Ark.  390. 

Cal.— Wm.  Wolff  &  Co.  v.  Canadian 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  26  P.  825,  89  Cat  332 
— Roseborough  v.  Campbell,  115  P. 
2d  839,  46  Cal. App. 2d  257. 

Nev.— Bowman  v.  Bowman,  217  P. 
1102,  47  Nev.  207. 

Term. — Lif  e  &  Casualty  Ins. .  Co.  v. 
Baber,  57  S.W.2d  791,  1-66  Tenn.  10. 

Attention,  of  court 
Defendant's  motion  to  take  oft  de- 

659 


fault  need  not  be  brought  to  court's 
attention  for  affirmative  action  be- 
fore time  when  under  general  rules 
case  will  be  ripe  for  judgment. — 
Cohen  v.  Industrial  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  175  N.E.  78,  274  Mass.  49S. 

23.  Okl.— Rodesney  v.  Robins,  188  P. 
2d  333,  184  Okl.  457. 

Calling  judge's  attention  to  motion 

(1)  Duty  to  call  judge's  attention 
to  motion  to  vacate  default  judgment 
is  on  movant  and  not  on  clerk. — Kel- 
ley  v.  Charts,  142  So.   423,  225  Ala. 
218. 

(2)  'Failure  to  cause  judge  to  act 
on  or  continue  motion  to*  vacate  de- 
fault judgment  within  statutory  pe- 
riod of  time  has  been  held  to  require 
the  denial  of  the  motion. — Kelley  y. 
Chavis,  supra. 

(3)  Presence  of  judge  in  another 
county  has  been  held  not  to  be  an 
excuse  for  failure  to  cause  him  time- 
ly to  act  on  or  continue  motion  to 
vacate  default  judgment. — Kelley  v. 
Chavis,  supra. 

24.  Cal.— Colthurst  v.  Harris,  275  P. 
868,  97  CaLApp.  430. 

25.  Mich. — Zirkaloso     v.     Merriam, 
224  N.W.   361,  246  Mich.  210. 

28.  S.D. — Bon  Homme  County  Bank 
v.  Bainbridge,  200  N.W.  107,  47  43. 
D.  563. 

27.  N.D.— Powell  r.  Sach,  217  N.W. 
172,  5-6  N.D.  297. 

8a  Fla. — Hewitt  v.  International 
Shoe  Co.,  154  So.  838,  114  Fla.  743, 
motion  denied  155  So.  725,  115  Fla. 
508. 

29.  N.-D.— Walrod  v.  Nelson,  310  N. 
W.  525,  «4  N.D.  753. 


337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


c.  Requisites   and   Sufficiency  of  Application 
Generally 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judgment 
must  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  statutes  and 
court  rules. 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judg- 
ment must  be  in  compliance  with  the  requirements 
of  the  statutes  and  court  rules,80  although  it  is  gen- 
erally held  that  a  substantial  compliance  therewith 
is  sufficient.31  The  application  must  contain  alle- 


gations which  show  that  defendant  is  entitled  to 
the  relief  sought,32  and  it  has  been  held  that  it 
should  contain  an  offer  to  go  to  trial  immediately.35 
The  allegations  must  set  forth  facts  as  distinguished 
from  mere  conclusions.34  The  application  must  also 
state  a  proper  ground  fpr  setting  aside  the  default 
judgment,35  and  accordingly  it  must  present  facts 
reasonably  excusing  the  failure  to  answer  or  ap- 
pear,36 such  as  by  a  showing  of  surprise,  mistake, 
or  excusable  neglect,37  or  unavoidable  casualty  or 
misfortune,38  and  that  defendant  exercised  due  dil- 


30L    Ala. — Dulin  v.  Johnson*  113  So. 

397,  216  Ala,  393. 
Ark. — American    Inv.    Co.   v.   Keene- 

han,  291  S.W.  56,  172  Ark.  332. 
Ga.— 'Fitzgerald   v.    Ferran,    124   S.EL 

530,  158  Ga,  755. 
Tex.— Commercial     Credit    Corp. .  *v. 

Smith,    187    S.W.2d    363,    143    Tex. 

612. 

Applications  bald  sufficient 
Cal.— Week  v.  Sucher,  274  P.  579,  96 

Cal.App.  422. 
Ga. — Walker  v.  T.  H.  Sinnans  &  Co., 

148  S.B.  592,  168  Ga.  -658. 
111. — Manaster  v.  Harpy's  New  York 

Cabaret,  3  N.E.2d  349.  286  IlLApp. 

609.   . 
K.Y. — ILuckenbach  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Musso, 

16  N.Y.S.2d  378,  258  App.Div.  914. 
Okl.— Hale  v.  Mclntosh.  243  P.  157. 

116  Okl.  40. 

Motions  held  insufficient 
Ark. — American   Inv.    Qo.   v.  Keene- 

han,   291  S.W.  56,   172  Ark.  432. 
m. — Chicago    Securities    Corporation 

V.   McBride,   5  N.B.2d  752.  288  111. 

App.  65. 
Ind.— Hessong  v.  Wolf,  151  N.E.  15, 

85  IndApp.  581. 

81.    Ky. — Cumberland  Fluorspar 

Corp.  v.  Waddell,  183  S.W.2d  641, 
298  Ely.  594— Bishop  v.  Bishop,  281 
S.W.  824,  213  Ky.  703. 
Default  foreclosure  Judgment 

In  mortgage  foreclosure  suit,  to 
which  Junior  mortgagee  Is  party  de- 
fendant, a  motion,  made  by  such 
mortgagee  before  distribution  of  pro- 
ceeds of  foreclosure  sale  and  served 
on  all  parties,  who  are  thereafter 
.given  opportunity  to  plead  and  be 
heard,  is  proper  means  for  opening 
up  default  foreclosure  Judgment  to 
allow  Junior  mortgagee  to  make 
claim  to  surplus  proceeds,  as  such 
motion  Is  equivalent  to  motion  to  set 
aside  default. — Cowan  v.  Stoker,  115 
P.2d  153,  100  Utah  377. 

32.  Ala.— Craft  v.  Hirsh,  149  So.  683, 
227  Ala.  257,  appeal  dismissed  54 
S.Ct.  455,  291  U.S.  644,  78  L.Ed. 
1041. 

I1L— Shaw  v.  Carrara,  38  N.E.2d  785, 
312  IlLApp.  410. 

OkL— Foltz  v.  Deshon,  249  P.  358, 
122  Okl.  42. 

Pa.— Liberal   Credit   Clothing  Co.   v. 


Tropp,   4   A.2d   565,    135  Pa.Super. 
53. 

Tex. — Tyler  v.  Henderson,  Ciy.App., 
162  S.W.2d  170,  error  refused- 
University  Development  Co.  v. 
Wolf,  Civ.App.,  93  S.W.2d  1187. 
Affidavits  in  support  of  application 
see  infra  subdivision  g  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

Necessity  and  sufficiency  of  showing 
of  meritorious  defense  see  supra  S 
336. 
Belief  In  furtherance  of  Justice 

In  order  to  open  a  default  Judg- 
ment there  must  be  a  prima  facie 
showing  from  which  court  itself  may 
infer  that  the  relief  asked  would  be 
in  furtherance  of  Justice. 
•S.C. — Gaskins  v.  California  Ins.  Co., 

11  S.E.2d  436,  195  S.C.  376. 
Wyo. — Kelley  v.  Eidam,   231  P.   S78, 
32  Wyo.  271. 

33.  Fla.— State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie 
v.  Raymond,  138  So.  40,  103  Fla. 
&49 — Benedict  v.  W.  T.  Hadlow  Co., 
42  So.  239,  52  -Fla.  18*. 

34.  Colo. — Redeker  v.  Denver  Music 
Co.,  265  P.  681,  83  Colo.  370. 

111.— Katauski    v.    Eldridge    Coal    & 

Coke  Co.,   255  IlLApp.   41. 
Tex. — Allen  v.  Frank,   Civ.App.,    252 

S.W.  347. 
Injustice  of  Judgment 

It  is  not  sufficient  for  the  moving 
party  to  say  as  a  legal  conclusion 
that  the  Judgment  is  improper  .or  un- 
just.— Gaskins  v.  California  Ins.  Co., 
11  S.B.2d  436,  195  S.C.  376. 
Trial  not  according  to  law 

A  motion  to  set  aside  a  default 
Judgment  and  reinstate  the  case  on 
the  ground  that  the  cause  was  not 
set  down  for  trial  according  to  law 
states  a  mere  conclusion  and  is  in- 
sufficient— Gibson  v.  Searcy,  137  N. 
B.  182,  192  Ind.  51-5. 
Traud 

(1)  A  general  allegation  that  de- 
fault Judgment  resulted  from  fraud 
and  collusion  would  be  a  mere  "con- 
clusion" and  would  not  authorize  va- 
cation of  Judgment  in  absence  of  al- 
legation of  facts  constituting  fraud 
and       collusion. — Higginbothaxn      T. 
Adams,  14  -S.E.2d  856,  192  Ga.  203. 

(2)  Allegations    setting   forth    the 
facts    constituting   fraud   are    suffl- 

660 


dent.— Suttoh  T.   Davia.   140  S.W.2d 

1920,  283  Ky.  146. 

36.    Ark. — American     Inv.      Co.      v. 

Keenehan,    291   S.W.   56,    172   Ark. 

8*32. 
Pa. — Kopec  v.    Sullivan,   Com.PL,   23 

Brie  Co.  413. 
36.     Ariz.— Beltran    v.    Roll,    7    P.2d 

248,  39  Ariz.  417. 
Fla. — State  Bank   of  (Eau  Gallie  v. 

Raymond,  138  So.  40,  103  OTa.  *49. 
Ga. — 'Fitzgerald,  v.  Ferran,  124  S.B. 

530,  158  Ga.  755. 
N.T. — Falvey   v.    Cornwall    Terminal 

Co.,    204   N.Y.S.    525.    209   App.Div. 

448. 
Pa. — Eastman  Kodak  Co.  T.  Osenider, 

193  A.  284,  127  Pa. Super.  332. 

"Good  cause,"  within  statute  pro- 
viding that  defendant  against  whom 
judgment  is  rendered  on  service  by 
publication  may  move  for  new  trial 
on  showing  good  cause,  means  that 
verified  motion  must  show  good 
cause  why  movant  did  not  appear  at 
the  trial  and  present  his  defenses 
shown  by  motion  to  exist. — Smith  v. 
Higginbotham,  Tez.Civ.App.,  112  S. 
W.2d  770. 

Sufficient  excuse  held  not  shown 
Pa. — West  Susquehanna  Building  & 

Iioan  Ass'n  v.  Sinclair,  188  A,  *7J., 

124  Pa.Super.  133. 

87.    Mont. — Madson  v.   Petrie   Trac- 
tor &  Equipment  Co.,  77  P.2d  1038, 

106  Mont.  382. 
Wyo.— Kelley  v.  Eidam,  381  P.- 678, 

32  Wyo.  271. 
Excusable  neglect  of  counsel 

A  motion  to  set  aside  a  default 
judgment  obtained  on  a  cross  com- 
plaint was  not  fatally  defective  be* 
cause  it  specified  the  mistake,  inad- 
vertence, surprise,  and  excusable 
neglect  of  counsel  of  plaintiff,  rather 
than  of  plaintiff,  since  an  attorney  is 
agent  of  his  client,  and  neglect  of 
the  agent  is  the  neglect  of  his  prin- 
cipal.—Hicks  v.  Sanders,  104  P.2d 
549,  40  CaLApp.2d  211. 

3a     Okl.— Gavin    v.    Heath,    2*6    P. 

745,  125  OkL  118. 
Existence  of  complete  defense 

Where  record  on  face  shows  juris- 
diction of  parties  and  subject  mat- 
ter, petition  to  vacate  Judgment  at 
subsequent  term  on  ground  of  un- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


387 


igence;89  and,  where  the  default  judgment  was 
obtained  on  constructive  or  substituted  service,  it 
has  been  held  that  the  application  must  allege  that 
petitioner  had  no  actual  notice  in  time  to  appear 
and  defend.40  The  petitioner's  name  should  be 
correctly  stated  in  the  application  even  though  it 
was  incorrectly  stated  in  the  original  proceedings.41 

Construction  of  pleadings.  The  application  is  to' 
be  construed  most  strongly  against  the  pleader.42 
A  petition  in  an  independent  action  when  timely- 
made  may  be  treated  as  a  statutory  motion  to  set 
aside  the  judgment.4^ 

Bond.  Defendant  cannot  assail  a  default  judg- 
ment where  he  fails  to  file  a  bond,  as  required  by 
statute,  unless  he  is  excused  therefrom.44  Failure 
to  give  a  bond  on  filing  the  petition  has  been  held 
not  to  be  a  fatal  defect  since  the  court  may  re- 
quire the  bond  after  the  order  to  reopen  and  retry 
the  case  is  made.46 

Proposed  answer.  The  answer  filed  with  the  mo- 
tion must  present  an  issuable  plea  to  the  merits,46 
by  averments  made  on  knowledge  and  not  only  on  in- 
formation and  belief.47 


Amendment.  The  amendment  of  an  application 
may  be  permitted,48  and  an  amendment  may  be 
granted  on  the  same  day  that  a  hearing  on  the  mo- 
tion is  had,49  but,  after  the  statutory  period  of 
time  for  moving  to  set  aside  the  judgment  has  ex- 
pired, an  amendment  which  would  add  new  and  dis- 
tinct grounds  may  properly  be  denied.50  The  trial 
court  may  properly  refuse  permission  to  file  an 
amendment  which  is  insufficient  to  entitle  petitioner 
to  the  relief  sought.51  After  an  adverse  ruling  it 
has  been  held  that  the  motion  cannot  be  amended.62 

d.  Answer  and  Other  Pleadings 

Plaintiff  may  raise  an  Issue  of  fact  by  his  answer, 
or  he  may  by  demurrer  test  the  legal  sufficiency  of  the 
motion  to  open  or  vacate  the  default  Judgment. 

Plaintiff  may  raise  an  issue  of  fact  on  a  motion 
to  set  aside  a  default  judgment  by  filing  a  plea  de- 
nying the  facts  alleged  by  the  motion,  or  the  legal 
sufficiency  of  the  motion  may  be  raised  by  demur- 
rer.63 Plaintiffs  motion  to  strike  defendant's  mo- 
tion to  vacate  a  default  judgment  tests  the  sufEcien- 


a voidable  casualty  or  misfortune  is 
subject  to  demurrer  when  facts 
pleaded  do  not  show  unavoidable  cas- 
ualty or  misfortune,  even  though  de- 
fense pleaded  would  be  complete. — 
•Foltz  v.  Deshon,  249  P.  358,  122  Okl. 
42. 

Impossibility    of    attorney's    attend- 
ance at  court 

Petition  to  vacate  a  default  judg- 
ment on  ground  of  unavoidable  cas- 
ualty or  misfortune  was  insufficient 
to  warrant  vacating  the  judgment, 
where  it  merely  stated  that  it  was 
impossible  for  defendants'  attorney 
to  be  present  in  court  on  day  when 
judgment  was  rendered  without  any 
explanation  of  why  it  was  impossi- 
ble.— Stockgrowers  State  Bank  v. 
Clay,  90  P.2d  1102,  150  Kan.  93. 
Ineffectiveness  of  diligence  to  pre- 
vent Judgment 

Defendant  seeking  to  vacate  de- 
fault judgment  because  of  unavoid- 
able casualty  or  misfortune  must 
state  facts  showing  that  no  reason- 
able or  proper  diligence  could  have 
prevented  trial  or  judgment — Geo.  O. 
Richardson  Machinery  Co.  v.  Scott 
251  P.  482,  122  Okl,  125,  certiorari 
granted  47  S.Ct  587,  274  U.S.  729,  71 
L.E<t  1319,  certiorari  dismissed  48 
S.Ct  264,  276  U.S.  128,  72  -L.Ed.  497. 

89.    Iowa. — Hawthorne  v.  Smith,  197 

N.W.  9,  197  Iowa  1306. 
Kan.— -Stockgrowers    State    Bank    v. 

Clay,  90  P.2d  1102,  150  Kan.  93. 
Pa. — Kopec  v.   Sullivan,   Com.Pl.,   23 

Brie  Co.  413. 
Tex.— Knight  v.  Sledge  Mfg.  Co.,  Civ. 


App.,    144    S.W.2d   607,    error   dis- 

.  missed: 

A  mere  conclusion  of  the  pleader 
that  he  exercised  due  diligence  to 
present  his  defense  is  insufficient — 
Allen  v.  Prank,  Tex.Qiv.App.,  252  S. 
W.  347. 

40.  Colo. — Redeker  v.  Denver  Music 
Co.,  265  P.  681,  83  Colo.  370. 

Kan. — Irvine    v.    Eysenbach,    267    P. 

995,  126  Kan.  362. 
Tex.— :Sanns    v.    Chapman,    Civ.App., 

144    S.W.2d    341,    error   dismissed, 

judgment  correct 

41.  RX^Feldman  v.    Silva,    171  A. 
922,  54  R.I.  202. 

42.  111.— Standard    Statistics   Co.    v. 
Davis,  45  N.B.2d  1005,  317  IlLApp. 
377— shaw   v.    Carrara,    38   N.E.2d 
785,  312  Ill.App.  410. 

43.  Ky.— Holcomb  v.  Creech,   56   8. 
W.2d  998,  247  Ky.  199. 

Motion  for  new  trial 

The  pleadings  may  be  construed  as 
a  statutory  motion  for  a  new  trial 
although  a  new  trial  Is  not  specifical- 
ly requested  where  the  facts  alleged 
are  sufficient  to  entitle  petitioner  to 
that  remedy  under  the  prayer  for 
general  relief.— Ashton  v.  Faxrell  & 
Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  121  S.W.Sd  611. 
terror  dismissed. 

44.  N.C.— Jones  v.  Best,  28  S.B.  187, 
121  N.C.  164. 

45.  Ark.— Davis   y.  Collums,   168   S. 
W.2d  1103,  205  Ark.  390. 

46.  Fla.— Corpus     JariJi     cited     in 

661 


State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie  v.  Ray- 
mond, 138  So.  40,  43,  103  -Fla.  649. 
34  C.J.  p  342  note  36. 
Gsneral  denial 

On  motion  to  open  default  Judg- 
ments and  to  be  permitted  to  defend, 
general  denial  constituted  a  "full  an- 
swer" within  statute  dealing  with 
opening  of  default  judgments  ren- 
dered on  service  by  publication  after 
the  filing  of  a  "full  answer." — Taw- 
ney  v.  Blankenship,  90  P.2d  1111,  150 
Kan.  41. 

47.  Fla.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in. 
State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie  v.  Ray- 
mond, 138  So.  40,  43,  103  'Fla.  649. 

34  C.J.  p  342  note  39. 

48.  Iowa,— Fulton        v.        National 
Finance   &   Thrift    Corporation,   4 
N.W.2d  406,  232  Iowa  37S. 

49.  'I1L — Hay  den  v.   Bredemeler,  27 
N.B.2d  477,  305  IlLApp.  484. 

to  correspond  with  evi- 


dence 

Judge  may  order  that  petition  to 
vacate  default  judgment  be  made  to 
correspond  with  evidence. — Mt.  Ida 
School  v.  Clark,  177  N.E.  604,  39  Ohio 
App.  389. 

50.    Ala,— Ex  parte  U.   S.   Shipping 
Board   Emergency  <Fieet  Corpora- 
tion, 110  So.  469,  215  Ala.  321. 
61.    Iowa.— Hawthorne  v.  Smith,  197 
N.W.  9,  197  Iowa  1306. 

52.  Iowa.— Lynch  v.  Powers,  200  N. 
W.  725,  198  Iowa  1060. 

53.  ni.— Marquette    Nat    Fire    Ins. 
Co.  v.  Minneapolis  'Fire  &  Marine 

.  Ins.  Co.,  233  IlLApp.  102. 


337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


cy  of  defendant's  motion.54  A  demurrer55  or  a  mo- 
tion to  strike56  admits  all  well-pleaded  allegations 
of  fact  in  defendant's  motion,  but  not  conclusions 
or  inferences  drawn  by  the  pleader.5? 

By  reason  of  his  unconscionable  conduct  plain- 
tiff may  be  precluded  from  pleading  laches  as  a  de- 
fense to  the  motion.58 

e.  Parties 

A  party  in  Interest  who  Is  prejudiced  by  the  default 
Judgment  may  appiy  to  have  it  set  aside  even  though  he 
Is  not  a  party  to  the  record. 

A  party  in  interest  who  is  prejudiced  by  the  de- 
fault judgment  may  apply  to  have  it  set  aside,59 
even  though  he  is  not  a  party  to  the  record.60  An 
application  may  be  made  only  by  a  person  who 
has  an  interest  in  the  subject  matter  of  the  suit61 


and  who  has  been  in  some  way  prejudicially  affected 
by  the  judgment  or  decree.62  Where  a  person 
seeks  to  have  a  default  judgment  opened  because 
of  the  death  of  a  party  prior  to  the  judgment,  he 
must  show  an  interest  derived  from  the  decedent.63 

Plaintiff  may  apply  to  have  a  default  opened,64 
but  if  plaintiff  is  the  successful  party  he  cannot 
have  a  default  judgment  opened  in  the  absence  of 
a  showing  that  he  has  been  unjustly  deprived  of 
rights  to  which  he  is  entitled.65 

Judgment  on  constructive  service.  Statutes  which 
provide  for  the  vacating  of  default  judgments  ob- 
tained on  constructive  service  have  been  held  to  be 
open  to  any  person  not  personally  served  with  proc- 
ess and  whose  rights  are  affected,  whether  or  not 
he  was  named  in  the  action,66  including  the  rep- 


64.  111.— Standard  Statistics  Co.  v 
Davis.  45  N.E.2d  1005,  317  IlLApp 
377— Adams  v.  Butman,  264  111 
App.  378— McNulty  v.  White,  24 
IlLApp.  572. 
55.  111.— Swiercz  v.  Nalepka,  259 

IlLApp.  262. 
Consideration,  of  demurrer 

A .  demurrer  to  motion  to  strike 
out  default  judgment  can  be  consid- 
ered only  as  an  admission  of  truth  of 
facts  alleged  in  the  motion  and 
sworn  to  by  defendant  and  as  evi- 
dence of  willingness  of  plaintiff  to 
submit  question  on  affidavit  of  de- 
fendant without  filing  counter-affida- 
vits or  testimony  in  contradiction  of 
the  facts  alleged  in  the  motion. — 
Eddy  v.  Summers,  3$  A.2d  812,  183 
Md.  683. 

58.  111.— Standard  Statistics  Co.  v. 
Davis,  45  N.E,2d  1005,  317  IlLApp. 
377— Rapp  y.  Goerlitz,  40  N.E.2d 
766,  first  case,  314  IlLApp.  191. 

57.  Non  compos  mentis 

In  action  on  note,  defendant's  mo- 
tion to  vacate  default  judgment  on 
ground  that  he  was  non  compos  men- 
tis at  time  of  execution  of  note,  com- 
mencement of  suit,  and  entry  of 
judgment  was  vulnerable  to  plain- 
tiff's motion  to  strike  as  against  con- 
tention that  such  motion  admitted 
defendant's  mental  incompetency  at 
such  times,  in  absence  of  allegations 
in  defendant's  motion  as  to  foreign 
state  court  proceedings  and  judg- 
ments by  which  motion  alle'ged  that 
defendant  was  found  non  compos 
mentis  and  restored  to  legal  capaci- 
ty.— Standard  Statistics  Co.  v.  Da- 
vis, 45  N.R2d  1005,  317  IlLApp.  377. 

58.  Imposition  on  court 

Where  plaintiff  in  an  action  of 
ejectment  against  an  owner  in  fee 
and  some  of  his  tenants,  after  the 
cause  had  been  placed  on  the  calen- 
dar of  one  judge,  went  before  a  dif- 
ferent judge,  without  notice  to  the 
owner,  and  without  informing  the 


judge  that  the  answering  defend 
ant  was  the  owner  and  the  other  de- 
fendants his  tenants,  and  procured 
a  dismissal  as  to  the  answering  de- 
fendant and  judgment  by  default 
against  the  other  defendants,  there 
was  such  a  flagrant  imposition  on 
the  court  as  to  preclude  plaintiff 
from  pleading  laches  as  a  defense  to 
a  motion  in  the  nature  of  a  writ  of 
error  coram  nobis  to  vacate  the  order 
of  dismissal  and  default  judgment— 
Chicago  Securities  Corporation  v. 
Olsen,  14  N.E.2d  893,  295  IlLAjpp.  615. 

5ft.    Wash. — Johnston  v.  Medina  Im- 
provement Club,   116  P.2d  272,   10 
Wash.2d  44. 
Guardian  appointed  for  one  who  is 
mentally   incompetent  may  be  enti- 
tled to  have  a  default  judgment  ren- 
dered .against    the   ward   vacated. — 
Citizens'  State  Bank  of  Cedar  Rapids 
v.  Toung,  244  N.W.  294,  123  Neb.  786. 
Payor  of  obligation 

Fact  that  defendant,  a  seed  com- 
pany, paid  to  a  lessor  of  land  all  that 
was  due  to  the  lessee  for  the  serv- 
ices of  the  latter  in  raising  a  crop 
of  seed  on  the  land,  such  payment 
being  made  under  agreement  of  all 
parties  concerned  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  the  rent  due,  did  not  de- 
prive defendant  of  interest,  so  as  to 
preclude  it  from  moving  to  open  a 
default  judgment  against  it  in  favor 
of  an  assignee  of  the  lessee,  al- 
though the  payment  was  made  under 
an  agreement  of  the  lessor  to  defend 
any  suit  for  the  services  rendered. — 
Sofuye  v.  Pieters-Wheeler  Seed  Qo., 
216  P.  990,  62  CaLAPp.  198. 

Grantors  in  aa  absolute  convey- 
ance of  lands  to  secure  payment  of 
debt  had  equitable  interest  in  the 
land,  resulting  in  such  an  interest  in 
subject  matter  of  action  to  set  aside 
such  conveyance  that  they  could, 
maintain  petition  for  review  of  de- 
'ault  judgment  obtained  on  service 
by  publication,  setting  aside  the  con- 

662 


veyance.— Garrison  v.  Schmicke,  Mo.. 

193  «.W.2d  614. 

Transferee 

A  judgment  In  suit  to  quiet  title, 
purporting  to  cancel  trust  deed  se- 
curing payment  of  notes,  which  was 
void  for  lack  of  service  on  notehold- 
ers, was  void  as  to  transferee  of 
notes  after  entry  of  judgment  in- 
quiet  title  suit,  and  such  transferee, 
having  interest  in  realty  forming 
subject  matter  of  quiet  title  suit, 
should  be  permitted  to  defend  such 
suit— Bray  v.  Germain  Inv.  Co.,  9* 
P.2d  993,  105  Colo.  403. 
60.  Cal.— Burns  v.  Downs,  108  P.2d 

953,  42  Cal.App.2d  322. 
63L  Wyo. — Clarke  v.  Shoshoni  Lum- 
ber Co.,  224  P.  845,  31  Wyo.  205, 
error  dismissed  48  S.Ct  302,  276 
U.S.  595,  72  L.Bd.  722. 
A.  board  of  education  has  no  stand- 
ing to  vacate  a  judgment  different 
from  that  of  any  other  defendant — 
Seither  &  Cherry  Co.  v.  Board  of 
Education  of  District  No.  15,  Town 
of  La  Harpe,  283  IlLApp.  392. 

A  stockholder  cannot  in  the  name 
of  the  corporation  move  to  have  a 
default  judgment  against  the  corpo- 
ration set  aside.— Hamill  v.  Great 
Northern  Copper  Co.,  217  N.W.  195,. 
52  S.D.  271. 

62.  Pa.— Young  v.    Findley,    31   Pa* 
Dist.  &  Cd.  630,  5  Sch.Reg.  176. 

63.  Wyo. — Clarke  v.  Shoshoni  Lum- 
ber Co.,   224  P.  -845,   31  Wyo.   205, 
error   dismissed   48   S.Qt    302,   27S- 
U.S.  595,  72  L.B4.  722. 

64.  N.Y. — Wolfert  v.  New  York  City 
Ry.   Co.,   103  N.Y.S.   768,  £3   Misc. 
536. 

66.  Del. — Tweed  v.  Lockton,  187  JL. 
703,  5  W.W.Harr.  474. 

66.  Kan.— Withers  v.  Miller,  34  P.. 
2d  110,  140  Kan.  123,  104  A.L.R.  -692- 
— Board  of  Com'rs  of  Wyandotte- 
County  v.  Axtell,  5  P.2d  1078,  134 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  337 


resentative  or  successor  of  defendant.67  An  ap- 
plication may  not  be  made  by  one  who  has  no  in- 
terest in  the  subject  matter  of  the  action,68  such 
as  a  person  who  has  parted  with  all  his  interest  be- 
fore suit  was  filed,69  but  the  application  may  be 
made  in  the  name  of  a  person  who  has  parted  with 
his  interest  after  suit  was  filed  where  by  statute  or 
rules  of  practice  an  action  may  be  continued  in  the 
name  of  the  original  party  if  the  interest  has  been 
transferred.70 

f .  Notice  or  Process 

Where  a  statute  so  requires,  notice  of  a  motion  to 
set  aside  a  default  Judgment  must  be  given  to  the  ad- 
verse party,  unless  the  notice  Is  waived. 

In  the  absence  of  statute,  notice  of  a  motion  to 


set  aside  a  default  judgment  is  unnecessary,™  but  if 
a  statute  so  requires  notice  must  be  given  to  the  ad- 
verse party,72  unless  notice  is  waived.73  Persons 
who  no  longer  have  an  interest  in  the  subject  mat- 
ter of  the  suit  are  not  adverse  parties  within  such 
a  statute.74  Under  some  statutes  it  has  been  held 
that  plaintiff  must  give  notice  where  he  seeks  to 
reopen  a  default  judgment  in  his  favor  in  order  to 
obtain  additional  relief,75  but  no  notice  to  defend- 
ant is  required  where  plaintiff  seeks  merely  to  va- 
cate a  judgment  in  favor  of  himself.76 

The  notice  must  comply  substantially  with  the  re- 
quirements of  the  statute,77  and  service  of  the  no- 
tice must  be  timely  made.78  A  statute  which  re- 
quires the  grounds  for  the  motion  to  be  stated  in 


Kan.     304 — Board    of    Com'rs     of 
•Cheyenne  County  v.  Walter,  112  P. 
599,  83  Kan.  743. 
34  C.J.  p  425  note  41. 

67.  OP.— Felts  v.  Boyer,  ,144  P.  420, 
73  Or.  83. 

34  C.J.  p  425  note  42. 

68.  Neb. — Browne  v.  Palmer,  92  N. 
W.  315,  66  Neb.  287. 

34  C.J.  p  425  note  43. 

09.    Neb. — Browne  v.  Palmer,  supra. 

70.  Kan.— Withers  v.  Miller,   34  P. 
2d   110,.  It 0  Kan.   123,   104  A.L.R. 
692. 

71.  Okl.-— Crook    v.    Heizer,    263    P. 
447,  129  OkL  36. 

During  term 

A  Judgment  by  default  may  be  set 
aside  during  the  term  at  which  it 
was  rendered,  without  notice  to  the 
party  in  whose  favor  it  was  ren- 
dered. 
Ark. — Metz  v.  Melton  Coal  Co.,  47  S. 

W.2d  803,  185  Ark.  486. 
Miss. — Planters'  ILumber  Co.  v.  -Sib- 
ley,  93  So.  440,  130  Miss.  26. 

•72.    Ala.— Dulin  v.  Johnson,  113  So. 

397,  216  Ala,  393. 
•CaL— Hicks  v,  Sanders,  104  P.2d  549, 

40  Cal.App.2d  211. 
Idaho. — Occidental  Life   Ins.   Co.   v. 

Niendorf,    44   P.2d   1099,    55   Idaho 

521. 
;N.Y.— Walton  Foundry  Co.  v.  A.  D. 

Granger   Co.,    196    N.T.S.    719,    203 

App.Div.  22-6. 
jpa._ Hotel  Bedington  v.  GufCey,  Com. 

PL,  36  Luz.Leg.Reg.  209,  3  Monroe 

L.R.   82,  affirmed  25  A.2d  773,  148 

Pa. Super.  502. 
"V7yo. — Clarke    v.    Shoshoni    'Lumber 

Co.,  224  P.  845,  31  Wyo.  205,  writ 

of    error    dismissed   48    S.Ct    302, 

276  U.S.  595,  72  !L.Ed.  722. 

Purpose  of  statute  requiring  com- 
•plaint  to  be  filed  and  notice  to  be  is- 
sued as  in  original  action  in  proceed- 
ing to  set  aside  default  judgment 
was  to  give  sufficient  notice  to  all  of 
adverse  parties  of  proceeding,  and 
-was  not  to  create  original  civil  action 


in  which  change  of  venue  could  be 
had. — State  ex  rel.  Krodel  v.  Gllki- 
son,  198  N.E.  323,  209  Ind.  213. 
Notice  to  oodefeadant 

(1)  Where     codefendant     was     a 
"necessary  party"  to  defendant's  mo- 
tion to  set  aside  default  judgment 
and  no  notice  of  motion  was  given 
codefendant,  trial  court  was  without 
jurisdiction  to  set  aside  default  judg- 
ment, as  far  as  codefendant  was  af- 
fected thereby.— Washko  v.  -Stewart, 
112  P.2d  306,  44  Cal.App.2d  311. 

(2)  A  motion  to  set  aside  a  de- 
fault judgment,  made  by  one  of  sev- 
eral   codefendants,    need   be    served 
only  on  the  party  in  whose  favor  the 
judgment    runs    where    the    statute 
simply  provides  for  notice  to  the  ad- 
verse   party    without    denning    that 
term.— Consolidated    Wagon    &    Ma- 
chine Co.  v.  Housman,  221  P.  143,  38 
Idaho  843. 

73.  Cal.— Hicks  v.  Sanders,  104  P.2d 
5*19,  40  Cal.App.2d  211. 

Waiver  by  appearance 

(1)  Notice  may  be  waived  by  ap- 
pearing and  participating  in  proceed- 
ings to  open  default  judgment. 
Ind. — Schaffner  v.   Preston   Oil   Co., 

154  N.B.  780,  94  Ind.App.  554. 
Okl. — Lofton    v.    McLucas,    113    P.2d 
966,  159  Okl.  115. 

(2)  An     appearance      to      defend 
against    vacating    the    judgment    in 
proceedings  brought  under  one  stat- 
ute  does   not  waive   the   notice  re- 
quired in  proceedings  under  another 
statute.— Clarke    v.    Shoshoni    Lum- 
ber Co.,  224  P.  845,  31  Wyo.  205,  er- 
ror dismissed  48  S.Ct.  302,  276  U.S. 
595,  72  L.Bd.  722. 

74.  Vxcuisf eror 

In  suit  by  bondholders'  trustee  to 
foreclose  trust  deed  on  patented  min- 
ing claims  which  were  transferred  by 
mortgagor,  wherein  default  judg- 
ment was  rendered  against  trans- 
feree, mortgagor  corporation  and  its 
statutory  trustees  were  held  not  "ad- 
verse parties"  within  statute  requir- 

663 


ing  notice  to  adverse  party  on  mo- 
tion to  vacate  judgment. — Nlelson  v. 
Garrett  43  P.2d  380,  55  Idaho  240. 
75.    Idaho. — Occidental  Life  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Niendorf,  44  P.2d  1099,  *55  Idaho 

521. 
76*    Okl.— 'Franklin     v.     Hunt     Dry 

Goods  Co.,   123  P.2d  258,   190  OkL 

296. 

77,    Wyo. — Clarke  v.  Shoshoni  -Lum- 
ber Co.,  224  P.   845,   31  Wyo.  205, 

error  dismissed  48   S.Ct   302,   276 

U.S.  595,  72  L.Ed.  722. 
Service  at  residence 

Where  attempted  service,  in  suit  to 
set  aside  default  judgment  quieting 
title,  was  defective  because  summons 
was  not  left  at  defendant's  usual  or 
last  place  of  residence,  court  could 
not    set   aside    default    Judgment — 
Papuschak  v.  Burich,   185  N.B.   876. 
97  Ind.App.  100. 
Service  of  copy  of  petition. 
Ala. — Dulin  v.  Johnson,  113  So.  397, 

216  Ala.  393. 
Possible  ambiguity  held  not  fatal  to 

motion 
N.Y.— Conrad  v.  Harbaugh,  287  N.Y. 

S.  1012,  248  App.Div.  655. 
Notice  held  sufficient 
Nev. — Bowman   v.    Bowman,    217   P* 

1102,  47  Nev.  207. 
Okl.— Bagsby  v.  Bagsby,  89  P.2d  345, 

184  Okl.  627,  122  A.L.R.  155. 
7&    N.T.— -Steinberg  v.  Blank,  205  N. 

T.S.  620,  123  Misc.  388. 
Pa. — Hotel  Redington  v.  GufCey,  Com. 

PI.,  36  LrUZ.Leg.Reg.  209,  3  Monroe 

L.R.  82,  affirmed  25  A.2d  773,  148 

Pa. Super.  502. 
Before  presentation  of  application 

Where  the  statute  requires  notice 
by  the  applicant  of  his  intention  to 
make  an  application  to  set  aside  a 
default  judgment,  the  adverse  party 
should  be  given*  notice  prior  to  pres- 
entation of  application  to  court,  but 
need  not  be  given  notice  prior  to  fil- 
ing of  application.— Bagsby  v.  Bags- 
by, «9  P.2d  345,  184  Okl.  627,  122  A. 
L.R.  155. 


§  337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  notice  is  sufficiently  complied  with  if  the  grounds 
for  the  motion  can  be  ascertained  from  the  accom- 
panying affidavits79  or  other  papers  attached  to  the 
.  notice.80  Under  some  statutes  service  may  be  made 
on  plaintiff  outside  the  state.81 

It  has  been  held  that  a  party  who  has  been  served 
with  proper  notice  may  not  raise  an  objection  that 
notice  was  not  given  to  another  party.82 

g.  Affidavits  on  Application 

As  a  general  rule  a  petition  or  motion  to  open  or 
vacate  a  default  Judgment  must  be  verified  or  supported 
by  affidavits  as  to  the  facts  set  forth. 

As  a  general  rule  a  petition  or  motion  to  open 
or  vacate  a  default  judgment  must  be  verified  or 
supported  by  affidavits  as  to  the  facts  set  forth.83 
The  affidavits  in  support  of  the  motion  must  in- 
clude all  the  facts  which  are  essential  to  entitle 


movant  to  the  relief  sought,84  and  a  mere  state- 
ment of  legal  conclusions  is  not  sufficient 8$  A» 
affidavit  need  not  aver  that  defendant  had  no  actu- 
al notice  of  the  pendency  of  the  action  in  time  to 
answer  where  such  condition  is  not  a  prerequisite 
to  a  right  to  relief86  or  where  the  statute  provides 
that  the  party  moving  to  set  aside  the  default  must 
make  it  appear  by  affidavit  or  other  evidence  that 
he  had  no  notice  of  the  pendency  of  the  action.87" 
In  the  absence  of  a  statutory  requirement,  the 
court  may  properly  consider  a  motion  which  is  not 
sworn  to,88  and,  where  an  affidavit  is  required  only 
by  the  court's  own  rule,  the  court  may  dispense  with 
the  affidavit  when  its  action  does  not  prejudice  tile- 
other  party.8* 

A  verification  or  affidavit  may  be  made  by  de- 
fendant's attorney  if  it  states  that  the  matters  sworn 
to  are  true  of  the  attorney's  own  knowledge;90  it  is 


79.  CaL— Steuri    v.    Junkin,    298    P 
823,    in    CaLApp.   653— Gordon  v 
Harbolt  App.,  280  P.  701,  rehear 
ing-  denied  281  P.  1048. 

80.  CaL — Fink   &   Schindler  Co.   v 
Gavros,    237   P.    1083,    72   CaLApp 
688. 

81.  Wash. — Harju  v.  Anderson,   21 
P.  827.  125  Wash,  161. 

Bight  to  longer  period  for  appear 

anee 

Where  an  action  was  still  pending 
in  the  superior  court  for  the  purpose 
of  proceeding  to  vacate  the  Judgmenl 
when  defendant  or  his  attorneys 
were  served  in  a  foreign  state,  he 
cannot  insist,  as  a  matter  of  right, 
o*  a  longer  period  for  his  appear- 
ance than  he  would  have  if  he  or  his 
attorneys  had  been  served  physical- 
ly within  the  state. — Harju  v.  Ander- 
son, 215  P.  327,  125  Wash.  161. 
812.  Kan; — Board  of  Com'rs  of  Wy- 
andotte  County  v.  Axtell,  £  P.2d 
1078,  134  Kan.  304. 
Service  on  codef endanta 

Plaintiff  could  not  .complain  that 
defendant's  notice  of  motion  for  re- 
lief against  default  judgment  was 
served  on  plaintiff  alone  and  not  on 
codefendants  where  defendant  was 
seeking  relief  against  plaintiff  and 
not  against  codefendants,  and  no  co- 
defendant  was  complaining,  and 
plaintiff  had  not  been  injured. — Rose- 
•borough  v.  Campbell,  115  P.2d  839, 
46  gal.App.2d  257. 
83.  Ala.— Dulin  v.  Johnson,  113  So. 

397,  216  Ala.  8-93. 

Ark.— Merriott  T.  Kilgore,  139  S.W. 

2d    387,    200    Ark.    394— Furst    v. 

Boatman,  122  S.W.24  189,  197  Ark. 

117$. 

Cola— Nash  v.  Gurtey,  3  P.2d  791,  89 

Colo.  418. 

N.J. — Kravitz  Mfg;  Corporation  v. 
Style-Kraft  Shirt  Corporation,  21 
A.24  7*1,  127  N-JXaw  253. 


Tenn. — Wright  v.  ILindsay,  140  S.W 

2d  793,  24  Tenn.App.  77. 
Tex. — Peters  v.  Hubb  Biggs  Co.,  Civ 

App.,    35    S.W.2d    449,    error    dis 

missed. 
Wash. — Johnston  v.  Medina  Improve 

ment  Club,  116  P.2d  272,  10  Wash. 

2d  44. 
W.Va.— Sands  v.  Sands,  138  S.B.  463 

103  W.Va.  701. 

Unverified  motion  amended  by  affida- 
vit 

An  unverified  motion  to  set  aside 
a  default  judgment  as  amended  by  a 
supporting  affidavit  was  the  equiv- 
alent of  a  verified  petition,  and  suffi- 
cient compliance  with  statute  relat- 
ing to  proceedings  for  vacating  judg- 
ments after  term  time,  to  warrant 
the  court  in  entertaining  the  pro- 
ceeding.— Fulton  v.  National  Finance 
&  Thrift  Corporation,  4  N.W.2d  406, 
232  Iowa  378. 

84,  Ky.— Guyan  Machinery  Co.  v. 
Premier  Coal  Co.,  1*3  S.W.2d  284, 
291  Ky.  84. 

34  C.J.  p  3fr4  note  71  [a]  [b]. 

Grounds  for  opening  or  vacating  de- 
fault judgment  see  supra  2  334. 

Affidavits  held  insufficient 

(1)  In  general. 

111. — Hayden  v.  Bredemeier,  27  N.E. 
2d  477,  305  IlLApp.  484— McNulty 
v.  White,  248  m.App.  672— Preci- 
sion Products  Co.  r.  Cady,  233  I1L 
App.  77. 

Ky. — Bond  v.  W.  T.  Congleton  Co., 
129  S.W.2d  '570,  278  Ky.  829. 

Wyo.— Kelley  v,  Bidam,  231  P.  678, 
32  Wyo.  271: 

(2)  To   show   excusable  neglect.— 
Elms  v.  Elms,  CaLApp.,  164  P.2d  936 
—Doyle  v.   Rice   Ranch  Oil  Co.,   81 

>.2d  980,  28  CaLAppJtd  18. 
Affidavit*  held  sufficient 

(1)  In  general. 
Cal.— -Bodin  v.  Webb,  62  P.2d  155,  17 
Cal.App.2d  422 — Salsberry  v.  Juli- 

664 


an,  277  P.  516,  98  CaLApp.  638,  fol- 
lowed in  277  P.  518,  amended  27* 
P.  257,  98  CaLApp.  645. 

Mich.— Tallis  v.  Stuart,  255  N.W. 
354,  268  Mich.  84. 

N.T.— Martin  r.  Peters,  60  N.Y.S.23 
122. 

(2)  To  show  lack  of  personal  serv- 
ice.— Thompson  v.    Sutton,   122  P.2d 
975,  50  CaLApp.2d  272. 

(3)  To    show    mistake    of    law. — 
John  A.  Yaughan  Corporation  v.  Ti- 
tle  Insurance  &  Trust  Co.,   12  P.2d 
117,  123  CaLApp.  709. 

8Bb    Idaho.— Occidental  Life  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Niendorf,  44  P.2d  1099,  55  Idaho- 

521. 
HL— McGregor   v.    Lament,    225    I1L 

App.  45.L 

Oversight  and  inadvertence 

An  affidavit  to  set  aside  a  Judg- 
ment or  default  is  insufficient  where 
it  merely  statea  that  the  judgment 
or  order  sought  to  be  vacated  was 
taken  by  oversight  and  inadvertence 
and  does  not  state  the  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances which  it  is  claimed  con- 
stitute the  oversight  and  inadver- 
tence.— Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92  P.2d 
1053,  60  Idaho  464,  124  AJUB.  149— 
Occidental  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  NIendort 
44  P.2d  1099,  55  Idaho  521. 

86.  Nev. — Bowman  v.  Bowman,  217 
P.  1102,  47  Nev.  207. 

87.  OkL — Lofton    v.    McLucas,    lift 
P.2d  9-66,  189  OkL  115. 

L     Ga.— Hooper  v.   Weathers,    165 
S.EL  52,  175  Ga.  133. 

89.  Pa. — McFadden  v.  Pennzoil  Co* 
191  A.  584,  326  Pa.  277. 

90.  Ariz,— Huff   v.    Flynn,    60    P.2d 
931,  48  Ariz.  175. 

Ind. — Padol  v.  Home  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  27  N.m2d  917,  108  Ind.Ap?» 
401. 

Nev. — Bowman  v.  Bowman,  217  P. 
1102,  47  Nev.  207. 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§337 


insufficient  if  it  does  not  allege  personal  knowl- 
edge91 or  the  source  of  the  information.92  Under 
some  statutes  the  affidavit  need  not  be  made  by 
applicant  but  may  be  made  by  anyone  knowing  the 
facts,  for  and  on  behalf  of  all  concerned.98 

Affidavits  are  to  be  construed  most  strongly 
against  the  pleader.94 

The  necessity  and  sufficiency  of  an  affidavit  of 
merits  are  considered  supra  §  336. 

h.  Counter-Affidavits 

The  party  seeking  to  sustain  the  default  Judgment 
•may  present  counter-affidavits  with  respect  to  the  al- 
leged grounds  for  vacating  the  Judgment  or  to  the  mat- 
ters set  up  in  excuse  of  the  defendant's  failure  to  make 
Ills  defense  In  good  time. 

The  party  seeking  to  sustain  the  default  judg- 
ment may  present  affidavits  in  opposition  to  those  of 
the  moving  party  with  respect  to  the  alleged 
grounds  for  vacating  the  judgment  or  to  the  mat- 
ters set  up  in  excuse  of  defendant's  failure  to  make 
his  defense  in  due  time,9^  but  if  a  trial  on  the  mer- 


its is  improper,  as  discussed  infra  subdivision  j  (3) 
of  this  section,  counter-affidavits  on  the  merits  of 
the  defense  are  improper96  and  are  insufficient  as  a 
basis  for  precluding  relief  to  defendant.97 

L  Evidence 

(1)  Presumptions  and  burden  of  proof 

(2)  Admissibility 

(3)  Weight  and  sufficiency 

(1)  Presumptions  and  Burden  of  Proof 

As  a  general  rule  the  defaulted  party  has  the  burden 
of  proving  the  facts,  entitling  him  to  have  the  judgment 
opened  or  vacated.  A  Judgment  regular  on  its  face  will 
be  presumed  to  have  been  properly  entered  where  the 
record  shows  nothing  Inconsistent  with  the-  presump- 
tion. 

As  a  general  rule  the  party  who  seeks  to  have  the 
default  judgment  opened  or  vacated  has  the  bur- 
den of  proving  the  facts  entitling  him  to  the  relief 
asked,98  such  as  excusable  neglect,^9  due  diligence 
or  freedom  from  negligence,1  unavoidable  casualty 


Jgistake  of  attorney 

Where  the  default  is  sought  to  be 
•set  aside  because  of  the  mistake  of 
the  attorney,  an  affidavit  of  the  par- 
ty himself  in  support  of  the  motion 
is  not  necessary. — Morgan  v.  Broth- 
ers of  Christian  Schools,  92  P.2d  925, 
34  Cal.App.2d  14. 
*1.  N.Y.— Titus  v.  Halsted,  204  N. 

Y.S.   241,   209   App.Div.  66— Grouse 

Grocery  Co.  v.  Valentine,  226  N.Y. 

S.  613,  131  Misc.  571. 
•92.    Pa. — Borteck   v.   Goldenburg,   $7 

Pa.Sujper.  602. 
Statements  by  client 

Defaults  are  not  opened  on  attor- 
ney's averments  of  what  client  told 
.  him,  unless  client-  swears  that  in- 
formation imparted  is  true. — Grouse 
Orocery  Co.  v.  Valentine,  226  N.Y.S. 
$13,  131  Misc.  571. 
S3.  Ind.— Padol  v.  Home  Bank  & 

Trust  Co.,  27  N.E.2d  917,  108  Ind, 

App.  401. 

34  C.J.  p  428  note  75  CD]. 
•94    111.— Stellwagen  v.  Schmidt,  234 

IlLApp.  325. 

35.  III.— Sheehan  v.  Pioneer  Lucky 
Strike  Gold  Mining  Co.,  54  P.2d 
72,  11  Cal.App.2d  530— Gilchrist 
Transp.  Co.  v.  Northern  Grain  Co., 
«8  N.R  558,  204  111.  510— Reed  v. 
Curry,  35  111.  636— Crystal  Lake 
Country  Club  v.  Scanlan,  2-64  111. 
App.  44 — Elaborated  Ready  Roof- 
ing Co.  v.  Hunter,  262  IlLApp.  380 
— Kloepher  v.  Osborne,  177  I1L 
App.  384. 

9«.  CaL— Salsberry  v.  Julian,  277  P. 
516,  98,  Cal.App.  638,  followed  in 
277  P.  518,  amended  278  P.  257, 
98  Cal.Ajpp.  645. 

I1L — Gilchrist  Transp.  Co.  v.  North- 


ern Grain  Co.,  68  N.B.  558,  204  111. 

510— Mendell  r.  Kimball,  85  I1L  582 

— Crystal    Lake   Country    Club    v. 

Scanlan,    264    IlLApp.    44— Mutual 

Life  of  Illinois  v.  Little,  227  111. 

App.  436 — Kloepher  v.  Osborne,  177 

IlLApp.    384 — Scrafield    v.    Sheeler, 

18  IlLApp.  507— Kalkaska  Mfg.  Co. 

v.  Thomas,  17  IlLApp.  235— Thelin 

v.  Thelin,  8  IlLApp.  421. 
Waiver  of  objections 

On  a  motion  to  vacate  a  default 
judgment  where  plaintiff  Introduced 
counter-affidavits  on  the  merits  and 
no  objection  was  then  raised  to  their 
consideration  or  motion  made  to 
strike  them  out,  having  failed  to 
make  objection  In  the  court  below, 
defendant  waived  the  right  to  object 
to  them  thereafter  on  appeal. — 
Washington  Mill  Co.  v.  Marks,  67  P. 
565,  27  Wash.  170. 
97.  CaL — Thompson  v.  Sutton,  122 

P.2d  975,  50  Cal.App.2d  272. 
9&    Colo.— Connell     v.      Continental 

Casualty  Co.,  290  P.  274,  87  Colo. 

573 — Redeker  v.  Denver  Music  Co., 

265  P.  6S1,  83  Colo.  370. 
111. — Shaw  v.  Carrara,  38  NJ3L2d  785, 

312  IlLApp.  410. 

Ind. — Carty  v.  Toro,  67  N.B.2d  484. 
Mass.— Kravetz  v.  Lipofsky,  200  N. 

E.  845,  294  Mass.  80. 
Ohio.— Rabinovitz  v.  Novak,  App.,  31 

N.B.2d  161. 
OkL— Gavin  v.  Heath,  256  P.  745,  125 

Okl.  118. 
Or. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Peterson 

.v.  Hutton,  2S4  P.  279,  280,  132  Or. 

252. 
Pa. — Oaromono  v.   Garman,    23   A,2d 

92,   147  Pa.Super.  1— Planters  Nut 

&  Chocolate  Co.  v.  Brown-Murray 

Co.,  193  A.  3*1,  128  Pa.Super.  239. 

665 


Tex. — Commercial  Credit  CJorp.  v. 
Smith,  187  S.W.2d  363,  .143  Tex. 
612— Harris  v.  Sugg,  Civ.App.,  143 
S.W.2d  149,  error  dismissed,  Judg- 
ment correct — Smalley  v.  Octagon 
Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  82  S.W.2d  1049, 
error  dismissed— Babington  v. 
Gray,  Civ.App.,  71  S.W.2d  29S. 
Wash. — Larson  v.  Zabroski,  152  P.2d 
154,  21  Washed  572,  opinion  ad- 
hered to  155  P.2d  284,  21  Wash. 2 d 
572. 

34  C.J.  p  352  note  50. 
Appeal  to  court's  discretion 

Before  trial  court  will  set  aside 
default  judgment,  facts  must  be 
shown  which  appeal  to  court's  dis- 
cretion.— Savage  v.  Stokes,  28  P.2d 
•900,  54  Idaho  109. 

99.    Cal. — Weinberger    v.     Manning, 

123  P.2d  931,  50  Cal.App.2d  494. 
Iowa. — Booth  v.  Central  -States  Mut. 

Ind.  Ass'n,  15  N.W.2d  893,  235  Iowa 

5. 
Ohio. — Rabinovitz  v.  Novak,  A<pp.,  31 

N.E.2d  151. 
Wash. — Jacobsen  v.  Defiance  Lumber  • 

Co.,  253  P.  1088,  142  Wash.  642. 
Absence  of  requirement  at  common 

law 

-  Showing  of  facts  and  circumstanc- 
es constituting  oversight  and  inad- 
vertence, alleged  as  ground  for  vaca- 
tion of  default  and  judgment  there- 
on, cannot  be  dispensed  with  because 
they  are  not  required  at  common 
law.— Occidental  Life  Jns.  Co.  v. 
Nlendorf,  44  F.2d  1099,  55  Idaho  521. 

1.  Mo.— Meyerhardt  v.  Fredxnan, 
App.,  131  S*W.2d  916— Anspach  v. 
Jansen,  78  S.W.2d  137,  229  Mo. 
App.  321. 

Pa. — Caromono  v.   Garman^   23   A.2d 


337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


and  misfortune,2  nonservice  of  summons,3  absence 
of  knowledge  of  the  proceedings  in  time  to  make  a 
defense,4  prompt  action  to  set  aside  the  default,5 
irregularity  in  the  entry  of  the  judgment,6  or  fraud.7 

A  default  judgment  will  be  presumed  to  have  been 
properly  entered  where  it  is  regular  on  its  face  and 
the  record  shows  nothing  inconsistent  with  the  pre- 
sumption,8 but,  if  the  record  does  not  affirmatively 
show  that  the  proceedings  were  according  to  law,  it 
has  been  held  that  nothing  will  be  presumed  in  fa- 
vor of  the  judgment.8  Presumptions  will  be  in- 
dulged, requiring  evidence  to  overcome  them,  that 
the  recitals  in  the  record  are  correct,10  and  that  a 
public  officer  fulfilled  his  duty.11  The  presumptions 


are  prima  facie  only  and  may  be  overcome  by 
proof.12 

There  is  no  presumption  against  a  defendant  only 
constructively  served  of  notice  or  lack  of  dili- 
gence,13 and,  where  the  party  seeking  to  set  aside 
a  default  judgment  rendered  on  constructive  service 
makes  a  prima  facie  showing  for  relief,  the  bur- 
den is  on  plaintiff  to  show  laches  or  inexcusable 
neglect  or  other  circumstances  which  would  make 
the  granting  of  relief  inequitable.14  However, 
where  the  statute  requires  a  showing  that  defend- 
ant had  no  actual  notice,  the  burden  of  proving  the 
absence  of  actual  notice  is  on  defendant.15  In  a 
proceeding  to  vacate  a  judgment  rendered  on  con- 


92,  147  Pa.Super.  1— Planters  Nut 
&  Chocolate  Co.  v.  Brown-Murray 
Co.,  193  A.  881,  128  Pa.Super.  239. 
Tex. — Sunshine  Bus  Lines  v.  Crad- 
dock,  Civ.App.,  112  S.W.2d  248,  af- 
firmed Craddock  v.  Sunshine  Bus 
Lines,  133  S.W.2d  124,  134  Tex. 
388 — San  Antonio  Paper  Co.  v. 
Morgan,  Civ.Apj>.,  53  S.W.2d  651, 
error  dismissed. 

2.  Ky.— Carter  v.  Miller,  95  S.W.2d 
29,  264  Ky.  532. 

3.  Ark.— Rockamore    v.     Pembroke, 
188    S.W.2d    616,    208    Ark.    995— 
O'Neal  v.   B.   P.   Goodrich  Rubber 
Co.,  162  S.W.2d  52,  204  Ark.   371. 

N.D. — Pirst  State  Bank  of  Strasburg 

v.  Schmaltz,  237  N.W.  644,  61  N.D. 

150— Beery  v.  Peterson,  225  N.W. 

798,  58  N.D.  273. 
Or. — Peterson  v.  Button,  284  P.  279, 

132  Or.  252. 
Impropriety  of  service  by  publication 

In  order  to  show  a  lack  of  juris- 
diction in  the  court  to  render  the 
judgment  when  service  was  had  by 
publication,  defendant  must  show 
that  service  by  publication  was  im- 
proper.— Van  Rhee  v.  Dysert,  .191  N. 
W.  53,  154  Minn.  32. 

4.  Ark.— O'Neal   v.    B.   T.   Goodrich 
Rubber    Co.,    1-62    S.W.2d    52,    204 
Ark.  371. 

5.  S.D.— Connelly   v.    Franklin,    210 
N.W.  735,  50  S.D.  512. 

•Within  statutory  limitation 

Defendant  who  sought  to  have  de- 
fault Judgment  against  him  in  action 
on  note  set  aside  because  he  was  des- 
ignated throughout  the  proceedings 
by  the  wrong  middle  initial  had  bur- 
den of  proving  that  he  had  knowl- 
edge of  entry  of  judgment  for  not 
more  than  one  year  prior  to  date 
when  judgment  was  sought  to  be  set 
aside,  where  the  statute  requires  pro- 
ceedings to  be  instituted  within  one 
year  after  knowledge  of  judgment — 
Cacka  v.  Gaulke,  3  N.W.2d  791,  212 
Minn.  404. 

&    Ohio.— Davis   v.    Teachnor,   App., 
53  N.R2d  208. 


7.    Ohio.— Rabinovitz       v.       Novak, 
App.,  31  N.B.2d  151. 

&    Ind. — Walsh  v.  H.  P.  Wasson  & 

Co.,  13  N.E.2d  696,  213  Ind.  556— 

Hoag  v.  Jeffers,  159  N.E.  753,  201 

Ind,  249. 
Ohio. — Davis   v.  Teachnor,   App.,   53 

N.B.2d  208— Strain  v.  Isaacs,  18  N. 

B.2d  816,  59  Ohio  App.  495. 
Pacts  outside  record 

On  petition  to  vacate  default  judg- 
ment against  defendant,  plaintiff  was 
not  required  to  support  judgment  by 
proof  of  facts  outside  record. — Strain 
v.  Isaacs,  18  N.E.2d  816,  59  Ohio  App. 
495. 
Failure  of  attorney  to  act 

Where  motion  for  judgment  by  de- 
fault was  served  on  a  regular  prac- 
ticing attorney  in  the  division,  who 
was  a  clerk  for  defendant's  attorney 
and  who  accepted  service  as  one  of 
defendant's  attorneys,  if  there  was 
any  reason  why  default  judgment 
should  not  have  been  entered,  the  at- 
torney had  duty  to  inform  himself 
and  make  the  proper  showing,  and  on 
failure  to  do  so  the  court  was  re- 
quired to  conclude  that  default  and 
judgment  were  duly  and  regularly 
entered. — Rubenstein  v.  Imlach,  9 
Alaska  62. 

9.  Ark.— Vaccinol  Products  Corpora- 
tion v.  State,  for  Use  and  Benefit 
of    Phillips    County,    148    S.W.2d 
1069,  201  Ark.  1066. 

10.  Sheriffs  return 

Fact  that  no  attempt  had  been 
made  to  levy  on  personal  estate  of 
garnishee  before  proceeding  against 
real  estate  was  held  not  to  justify 
opening  default  judgment  against 
garnishee,  in  view  of  presumption 
that  sheriff's  return  of  nulla  bona 
as  to  personalty  was  true. — Jennings 
v.  Yanovitz,  175  A,  721,  115  Pa.Super. 
427. 

11.  Duty  to  mail  process 

Where  default  judgment  entered 
by  circuit  court  was  made  subject, of 
direct  attack  on  ground  of  insuffi- 

666 


cient  service  of  process  on  agent  of 
defendant,  presumption  that  copy  of 
process  was  duly  mailed  by  clerk  to 
home  office  of  defendant  association 
by  registered  letter  was  held  to  pre- 
vail, in  absence  of  affirmative  show- 
ing that  copy  of  process  was  not 
duly  mailed. — Brotherhood  of  Rail- 
road Trainmen  v.  Agnew,  155  So.  205, 
170  Miss.  604. 

12.  Ark.— JFirst  Nat.  Bank  v.   Tur- 
ner, 275  S.W.  703,  169  Ark.  393. 

Service  of  summons 

(1)  On  a  motion  by  a  defendant 
to  vacate  a  judgment  on  the  ground 
that    no    service    of    summons    was 
made  on  him,   the  proof  of  service 
on  which  the  judgment  is  predicated 
may  be  contradicted,  and  defendant 
may  show  that  such  proof  of  service 
is  untrue.— Baird  v.  Ellison,  293  N. 
W.  794,  70  N.D.  2-61. 

(2)  Defendant    could,    on   petition, 
after  term,  in  order  to  vacate  default 
judgment,    show    that    place    where 
copy  of  summons  was  left  was  not 
defendant's  usual  place  of  residence 
•as  recited  in  sheriff's  return. — Hayes 
v.  Kentucky  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 
of  Lexington,  181  N.B.  542,  125  Ohio 
St  359. 

13.  Cal.— Randall  v.  Randall,  264  P. 
751,  203  CaL  462. 

34  C.J.  p  427  note  61. 

14.  Cal.— Gray  v.  Lawlor,  90  P.  691, 
151  CaL  352,  12  AmvCas.  990. 

Nev.— Nahas  v.  Nahas,   92  P.2d  718, 

59  Nev.  220. 

Service  not  calculated  to  give  actual 
notice 

With  respect  to  opening  default 
judgment,  if  manner  of  constructive 
service  is  not  calculated  to  give  actu- 
al notice,  notice  is  not  presumed,  and 
adversary  has  burden  of  proving  it 
— Naisbitt  v.  Herrick,  290  P.  950,  76 
Utah.  575. 

15.  Wyo. — Clarke  v.  Shoshoni  Lum- 
ber Co.,   224  P.  845,   31  Wyo.  205, 
error  dismissed   48   S.Ct.   302,   276 
U.S.  595,  72  L.Bd.  722. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  337 


structive  service,  it  has  been  held  that  it  is  not 
incumbent  on  applicant  to  show  that  the  original 
judgment  was  wrong.16 

(2)  Admissibility 

As  a  general  rule  in  passing  on  an  application  to 
open  or  set  aside  a  default  Judgment,  the  court  may  ad- 
mit any  evidence  which  may  properly  aid  It  In  reach- 
ing a  conclusion,  but  irrelevant  and  immaterial  evidence 
may  properly  be  excluded. 

Unless  the  decision  in  a  proceeding  to  open  or 
set  aside  a  default  judgment  is  to  be  made  only  on 
the  motion  and  supporting  affidavits,17  or  on  the 
record,18  as  a  general  rule  the  court  may  admit  any 
evidence  which  may  properly  aid  it  in  reaching  a 
conclusion,19  but  irrelevant  and  immaterial  evi-~ 
dence  may  properly  be  excluded.20  The  exclusion 
of  evidence  showing  that  defendant  is  protected  by 
insurance  is  not  necessary.21 

Meritorious  defense.  Evidence  of  a  meritorious 
defense  is  admissible  where  the  existence  of  a  meri- 
torious defense  is  properly  at  issue,22  or  where  the 


court  is  entitled  to  determine  whether  a  prima  facie 
valid  defense  exists,23  but  it  is  not  admissible  where 
the  existence  of  a  defense  is  not  in  issue  ;24  and,  if 
the  existence  of  the  defense  must  be  determined  on 
the  motion  and  affidavits  alone,  evidence  as  to 
whether  the  defense  could  be  sustained  is  inadmis- 
sible.^ 

(3)  Weight  and  Sufficiency 

The  defaulted  party  should  establish  the  facts  on 
which  he  relies  as  grounds,  for  relief  by  a  preponderance 
of  the  evidence,  or  by  clear,  convincing,  and  satisfactory 
proof. 

In  order  to  be  entitled  to  have  a  regularly  en- 
tered default  judgment  opened  or  vacated,  the  de- 
faulted party  should  establish  the  facts  on  which  he 
relies  as  grounds  for  relief  by  a  preponderance  of 
the  evidence,26  or  by  clear,  convincing,  and  satis- 
factory proof  ;27  but  it  has  been  held  that  a  show- 
ing of  the  excusability  of  neglect  need  not  be  strong 
where  the  showing  of  a  meritorious  defense  is  con- 


16.  Ind. — Padol    v.    Home    Bank    & 
Trust  Co.,   27  N.E.2d  917,  108  Ind. 
App.  401 — Gary  Hobart  Inv.  Real- 
ty Co.   v.   Earle,    135   N.B.  798,   78 
Ind.Ap*>.  412. 

17.  Tenn.— Fidelity    -    Phenlx    Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Oliver,  162  S.W.2d  254, 
25  Tenn. App.  114. 

1&    Mo.— Jeffrey  v.  Kelly,  App.,  146 

S.W.2d  850. 
19.    Knowledge  of  action 

Where  defendants'  notice  of  mo- 
tion to  set  aside  default  Judgment 
recited  that  they  did  not  have  knowl- 
edge of  pendency  of  action  until  aft- 
er  judgment  was  rendered,  admitting 
evidence  tending  to  show  that  de- 
fendants had  such  knowledge  before 
judgment  was  rendered,  and  part  of 
which  threw  light  on  issue  of  serv- 
ice, was  held  not  error. — Wood  v.  Pe- 
terson Farms  Co.,  22  P.2d  565,  132 
CaLApp.  233. 

Evidence  of  error  of  fact  unknown 
to  Judge  at  the  time  he  rendered 
judgment  may  be  admissible.— 
Stanke  v.  Atherton,  7  N.B.2d  467,  289 
I11.APP.  614. 

Evidence  of  custom  and  practice  of 
attorneys  may  be  admitted.— Lunt  v. 
Van  Gorden,  281  N.W.  743,  225  Iowa 
1120. 

Evidence  to  rebut  proof  of  service 
may  be  admitted. 
D.C. — James  B.   Colliflower  &  Co.  v. 

McCallum-Sauber  Co.,  63  <F.2d  3-66, 

61  App.D.C.  390. 
K.D.— Baird  v.  Ellison,  293  N.W.  794, 

70  N.D.  261. 

Evidence  in  support  of  judgment 
IU. — Marland  Refining  Co.  v.  Lewis, 

264  IlLApp.  163. 
Tex.— Pellum    v.  .Fleming,    Civ. App., 


283  S.W.  531,  error  refused  Flem- 
ing v.    Pellum,   287   S.W.    492,    116 
Tex.  130. 
Amended,  return  of  service 

Where,  on  hearing  of  motion  to 
set  aside  default  judgment  because 
of  allegedly  defective  service  of  ci- 
tation, amended  return  was  admit- 
ted in  evidence  over  objection  and 
motion  denied,  court's  conclusion  was 
held  tantamount  to  definite  finding 
in  favor  of  validity  of  return  as 
amended,  warranting  inference  that 
amendment  was  made  with  knowl- 
edge and  consent  of  court  and  was, 
therefore,  presumptively  with  Its  au- 
thority.— Employer's  Reinsurance 
Corporation  v.  Brock,  Tex.Civ.App., 
74  S.W.2d  435,  error  dismissed. 

20.  111.— Standard    Statistics   Co.    v. 
Davis,  45  N.E.2d  1005,  317  Ill.App. 
377. 

Okl.— Elias  v.  Smith,  246  P.  409,  117 

Okl.  273. 
Tex.— Allen  v.   Frank,  Clv.Aj?p.f    252 

S.W.  347. 

21.  References  to  insurance  in  affi- 
davit 

Refusal  to-  strike  references  that 
defendant  carried  indemnity  insur- 
ance, inserted  in  plaintiff's  affidavit 
counter  to  defendant's  affidavits  in 
support  of  motion  to  open  default 
judgment  in  automobile  accident 
case,  was  held  not  error,  since  the 
reason  for  refusing  to  admit  evi- 
dence, in  a  trial  before  a  jury,  that 
defendant  is  protected  by  insurance 
does  not  apply. — Bissonette  v.  Jo- 
seph, 170  S.E.  467,  170  S.C.  407. 

22.  Ark. — Metropolitan  iLife  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Duty,  126  S.W.2d  921,  197  Ark. 
1118. 

667 


23.  OkL— Kellogg  v.  Smith,  42  P.2d 
493,  171  Okl.  355. 

Tex. — Lawther  Grain  Co.  v.  Winni- 
ford,  Com.App.f  249  S.W.  19'5— 
Babington  v.  Gray,  Civ.App.,  71  S. 
W.2d  293. 

24.  La. — Cutrer  v.  Cutrer,  App.,  169 
So.  807. 

Absence  of  excuse  for  default 

If  there  has  been  no  excuse  for 
failure  of  defendant  to  answer,  evi- 
dence of  a  meritorious  defense  is 
inadmissible.— Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Duty,  126  S.W.2d  921,  197  Ark. 
1118. 

25.  R.I.— Milbury  Atlantic  Mfg.  Co. 
v.    Rocky    Point    Amusement    Co., 
118  A.  737,  44  R.L  45*. 

26.  Cal. — Weinberger    v.     Manning, 
123  P.2d  531,   50  CaLApp.2d  494. 

27.  CaL — Dunn    v.    Standard    Acci- 
dent Ins.  Co.,  299  P.  575,  114  CaL 
App.  208. 

Colo. — Redeker  v.  Denver  Music  Co., 

265  P.  681,  83  Colo.  370. 
Md.— Weisman  v.  Davitz,  199  A,  476, 

174    Md.    447— Dixon  v.   Baltimore 

American   Ins.   Co.   of  New  York, 

188  A.  215,  171  Md.  695. 
Mo.— State  ex  rel.  Sterling  v.  Shain, 

129  S.W.2d  1048,  344  Mo.  891. 
K.Y.— De  Marco  v.  McConnell,  260  N. 

Y.S.  540,  146  Misc.  9. 
Okl.— Tidal  Oil  Co.  v.  Hudson,  219  P. 

95,  95  Okl.  209. 
Tex. — Grand    United    Order    of    Odd 

Fellows  v.  Wright,  Civ.App.,  76  S. 

W.2d  1073. 
Fraud 

In  petition  to  vacate  Judgment  for 
fraud  evidence  must  be  clear  and 
convincing. — In  re  Veselich,  154  N. 
B.  55,  22  Ohio  App.  528. 


§  337 


JUDGMENT3 


49    C.J.S. 


vincing.28  In  order  to  show  lack  of  notice  or  proc- 
ess, defendant  may  impeach  an  officer's  return  of 
process  by  parol  evidence,29  but  the  evidence  must 
be  clear,  cogent,  and  convincing,8^  and  the  testi- 
mony of  a  single  witness,  however  credible,  has  been 
held  not  to  be  sufficient.81  A  motion  to  set  aside  a 
default  judgment  for  irregularities  on  the  face  of 
the  record  must  be  denied  where  it  is  supported  only 
by  evidence  outside  the  record.32 


Under  the  particular  facts  and  circumstances  of 
the  case,  the  evidence  has  been  held  sufficient33  or 
insufficient34  generally  to  entitle  defendant  to  have 
the  default  judgment  set  aside  or  vacated,  or  it  has 
been  specifically  held  sufficient85  or  insufficient3* 
to  show  lack  of  proper  notice  or  process;  suffi- 
cient37 or  insufficient38  to  show  mistake,  inadver- 
tence, or  excusable  neglect;  sufficient  to  show  un- 


28.  Wash.  —  Jacobsen  v.  Defiance 
Lumber  Co.,  253  P.  1088,  142  Wash. 
642. 


6,  5  N.J. 


29.  N-.C.—  Dunn  v.  Wilson,   187   S.E 
802,  210  N.C.  493. 

30.  Okl.—  -  Neff   T.    Edwards,    230    P 
234,   167   Okl.   101—  Okmulgee  Pro- 
ducing: &  Refining  Co.  v.  Pilsbry- 
Becker  Engineering  &  Supply  Co., 
214  P.  185,  89  Okl.  200. 

Tex.  —  San  Antonio  Paper  Co.  v.  Mor- 

gan,   Civ.App.,    53    S.W.2d   651,   er- 

ror dismissed. 

Clear  and  ULeanivocal  proof 
N.C.—  Dunn  v.  Wilson,   187  -S.E.  *02, 

210  N.C.  493. 
N.D.—  'First  State  Bank  of  Strasburg 

v.   Schmaltz,   237  N.W.   644,   61  N. 

D.  150. 

31.  Tex.—  -San  Antonio  Paper  Co.  v. 
Morgan,    Civ.App.,   53    S.W.2d    651, 
error  dismissed. 
Uncorroborated  parol  testimony  of 

defendant    that    summons    was    not 

served  on  him  is  insufficient  to  war- 

rant the  setting  aside  of  a  default 

judgment. 

N.Y.  —  Biala  v.  Abramow,   277  N.Y.S. 

416,  154  Misc.  536. 
Okl.—  Bates  v.  Goode,  281  P.  558,  139 

Okt   141—  Neff  v.  Edwards,  230  P. 

234,  167  Okl.  101. 

32.  Mo.—  Buchholz       v.       Manzella, 
App.,    158    S.W.2d    200—  Jeffrey    v, 
Kelly.  App.,   146   S.W.£d  850. 

*  3&  Ark.—  Smith  v.  Globe  &  Rutgers 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  295  S.W.  388,  174 
Ark.  346,  followed  in  Deatherage 
v.  Dennison,  295  S.W.  390,  173  Ark. 
1180. 

Cal.  —  Palmer  v.  Lantz,  0  P.2d  821, 
215  Cal.  320  —  Rogers  v.  -Schneider, 
270  P.  451,  205  Cal.  202—  Paul  v. 
Walburn,  26  P.2d  1002,  135  CaL 
App.  364. 

I1L  —  Clausen  v.  Varrin,  11  N.E.2d 
820/292  IlLApp.  641—  Marland  Re- 
fining Co.  v.  Lewis,  264  111.  App, 
163—  Crystal  Lake  Country  Club  v. 
Scanlan,  264  IlLApp.  44. 

Iowa.  —  Fulton  v.  National  Finance  & 
Thrift  Corporation,  4  N.W.2d  406, 
232  Iowa  378. 

^£ass.  —  Almeida  v.  Socony-Vacuum 
Oil  Co.,  49  N.E.2d  217,  314  Mass. 
28. 

N.J.  —  Niagara  Realty  Co.  v.  Consoli- 
dated Indemnity  &  Insurance  Co., 
166  A.  US,  11  N.J.M1SC.  361—  Phil- 


lips  v.  Adams,  138  A. 

Misc.  377. 
N.Y.— Di  Maggio  v.  Magnelli,  16  N. 

T.S.2d  735. 
Okl.— Lane  v.   O'Brien,  49   P.2d  171, 

173  Okl.  475— W.  W.  Bennett  &  Co. 

v.  La  Fayette,  271  P.  248,  133  Okl. 

233— Thompson  v.  Hensley,  261  P. 

931,  128  Okl.  139— Carter  v.  Grixn- 

mett.  213  P.  732,  89  Okl.  37. 
R.I. — Chernick   v.    Annelfo,    17   A.2d 

84$,  66  R.L  $5. 

3*  La.— P.  E.  'Fitzpatrick  &  Co.  v. 
Hessler,  App.,  150  So.  392. 

Miss.— Lee  v.  Spikes,  112  So.  588, 
145  Miss.  897. 

Mo. — Cornoyer  v.  Oppermann  Drug 
Co.,  App.,  56  S.W.2d  612. 

Neb.— Drake  v.  Ralston,  288  N.W. 
377,  137  Neb.  72. 

N.J.— Smith  v.  White,  16  A.2d  628, 
125  N.J.Law  493. 

N.T.— Rose  v.  Romano,  23  N.T.S.2d 
16,  262  App.Dlv.  731. 

N.C.— Pailin  v.  Richmond  Cedar 
Works,  136  S.BL  635,  193  N.C.  256. 

Pa. — Anderson  v.  Shaffer,  18  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.  334 — Sanders  v.  Krater,  Com. 
PL,  57  York  Leg.Rec.  33. 

Tex. — Dickson  v.  Navarro  County 
Levee  Improvement  Dist.  No.  3 
Civ.App.,  124  S.W.2d  943,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  139  S.W.2d  260, 
135  Tex.  102,  and  followed  in  Dick- 
son  v.  Ellis  County  Levee  Improve- 
ment Dist  No.  10,  124  S.W.2d  -946, 
set  aside  Dickson  v.  Navarro  Coun- 
ty Levee  Imp.  Dist  No.  3,  139  S. 
W.2d  257,  135  Tex.  95— Smalley  v. 
Octagon  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  82  S.W. 
2d  .1049,  error  dismissed — Employ- 
er's Reinsurance  Corporation  v. 
Brock.  Civ.App,,  74  S.W.2d  435,  er- 
ror dismissed — Brlggs  v.  Ladd,  Civ. 
App.,  64  S.W.2d  389— Humphrey  v. 
Harrell,  Civ. App.,  19  S.W.2d  410, 
affirmed,  Com.App.,  29  S.W.2d  963. 

Wash. — Turner  v.  Brassesco,  219  P. 
11,  126  Wash.  658. 

35.    N.J. — Deighan  v.   Beverage   Re- 
tailer Weekly  &  Trade  Newspaper 
Corporation,    16   A.2d   612,   18   N.J. 
Misc.  705. 
N.D.— Baird  v.  Ellison,  293  N.W.  794, 

70  N.D.  2-61. 
Agency  to  receive  process 

In  action  against  foreign  corpora- 
:ion  wherein  service  of  process  was 
lad  on  alleged  agent  of  corporation, 
default  judgment  was  entered,  and 
corporation  appeared  specially  and 

668 


moved  to  set  aside  judgment  on 
ground  that  alleged  agent  was  not 
its  agent,  a  letter  appearing  in  rec- 
ord showing  that  alleged  agent  once 
represented  corporation  in  securing 
a  contract  was,  without  more,  insuf- 
ficient to  prove  fact  of  agency  to- 
receive  process. — Consolidated  Radio- 
Artists  v.  Washington  Section,  Na- 
tional Council  of  Jewish  Juniors,  105 
F.2d  785,  70  AppJXC.  262. 
33.  Ark. — Federal  Land  Bank  of  St. 

Louis  v.  Cottrell,  126  S.W.2d  279v 

197  Ark.  783. 
Ky.— Joseph  v.  Bailey,  277  S.W.  466v 

211  Ky.  394. 
Md.— Weisman  v.  Davitz,  1-99  A,  476; 

174  Md.  447. 
Minn.— Van  Rhee  v.  Dysert,   191  N. 

W.  53,  154  Minn.  32. 
Or.— Peterson  v.  Hutton,  284  P.  27fr, 

132  Or.  252. 

Tex. — San  Antonio  Paper  Co.  v.  Mor- 
gan, Civ.App.,  53  S.W.2d  651,  error 

dismissed. 

37.  Cal. — Hadges  y.  Kouris,   162  P. 
2d  476,  71  CaLApp.2d  213— Fink  & 
Schindler   Co.    v,    Gavros,    237    P. 
1033,  72  CatApp.  688. 

Mental  ana  physical  distress 

Evidence  that  plaintiff,  seeking  to 
reform  default  judgment,  was  in- 
mental  and  physical  distress  at  time 
citation  was  served  on  her  was  held 
to  justify  finding  that  her  failure  to- 
answer  was  excusable. — Hadad  v. 
Ellison,  Tex.Civ.App,,  283  S.W.  193. 
Failure  to  receive  notice  of  hearing 

Evidence  was  held  to  sustain  chan- 
cellor's decree  setting  aside  default 
judgment  because  of  failure  of  plain- 
tiff's attorney  to  receive  notice  of 
hearing. — Metz  v.  Melton  Coal  Co.,  47 
S.W.2d  803.,  185  Ark.  486. 

38.  Cal. — Dunn  v.  Standard  Accident 
Ins.   Co.,   299  P.   575,   114  CaLApp.  • 
208. 

Ind. — Walsh  v.  H.  P.  Wasson  &  Co., 
13  N.E.2d  69<6,  213  Ind.  556— Hoag- 
v.  Jeffers,  159  N.B.  753,  201  Ind. 
249 — Kuhn  v.  Indiana  Ice  &  'Fuel 
Co.,  11  N.E.2d  508,  104  Ind.App. 
387. 

Miss.— Lee  v.  Spikes,  112  So.  588,. 
14$  Miss.  897. 

Mo. — Koester  v.  McNealey,  App.,  274 
S.W.  475. 

Mont— Grant  v.  Hewitt,  208  P.  887, 
S3  Mont  422. 

Tex. — Canion  v.  Brown,  Civ.App.f  48 
S.W.24  1031. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


337 


avoidable  casualty  or  misfortune;39  sufficient40  or 
insufficient41  to  show  proper  diligence;  sufficient  to 
show  a  legal  excuse  for  delay  in  filing  the  motion;42 
or  insufficient  to  show  fraud,43  irregularities,44  or 
lack  of  good  faith.45 

j.  Hearing  and  Determination 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Discretion  of  court  generally 

(3)  Merits  of   cause  of  action  or  de- 

fense *     • 

(4)  Principles  and  rules  of  decision 

(1)  In  General 

Generally,  where  Issues  of  fact  are  presented  In  pro- 
ceedings to  open  or  set  aside  a  default  Judgment,  the 
court  should  conduct  a  hearing  or  require  further  dep- 
ositions or  affidavits,  and  thereupon  determine  the  ques- 
tions of  law  and  of  fact  which  are  properly  presented. 

Where  an  application  to  open  or  set  aside  a  de- 
fault judgment  is  contested  and  issues  of  fact  are 
presented,  the  court  should  conduct  a  hearing  or 
require  further  depositions  or  affidavits  on  the  is- 
sues raised,46  and,  unless  the  question  can  be  de- 
termined from  an  -inspection  of  the  record,  it  has 


been  held  to  be  error  to  grant  or  dismiss  the  motion 
summarily  or  on  an  ex  parte  hearing.47  Except 
to  the  extent  to  which  the  proceedings  are  governed 
by  statute,  the  court  has  a  reasonable  discretion 
with  respect  to  the  form  and  manner  of  proof.4* 

Under  some  statutes  the  court  may  receive  oral 
evidence,49  or  it  may  consider  affidavits50  in  addi- 
tion to  those  presented  with  the  motion,51  but  un- 
der the  statutes  or  rules  of  practice  in  some  juris- 
dictions a  verified  petition  which  was  the  basis  of 
the  rule  to  show  cause  and  ex  parte  affidavits  may 
not  be  considered,52  and  applicant  must  supply  proof 
by  deposition  taken  on  notice.53  It  is  proper  for 
the  court  to  try  and  determine  the  existence  and 
sufficiency  of  the  alleged  grounds  for  opening  or 
vacating  a  default  judgment  before  trying,  or  de- 
ciding the  existence  of,  a  meritorious  cause  of  ac- 
tion or  defense.54 

The  credibility  or  veracity  of  affiants  or  wit- 
nesses,55 and  the  weight  of  the  evidence,56  are  for 
the  trial  court's  determination,  and  it  must  deter- 
mine the  questions  of  law  and  of  fact  which  are 
properly  presented  in  the  proceedings.57  Accord- 


39.  Ark.' — Mayberry  v.  Perm,  146  3. 
W.2d  925,  201  Ark.  756. 

40.  Minn.— Van  Rhee  v.  Dysert,  191 
N.W.  53,  154  Minn.  32. 

Mo. — Karst  v.  Chicago  Fraternal 
Life  Ass'n,  App.,  22  S.W.2d  178. 

Tex. — Camden  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hill, 
Com.App.,  276  S.W.  $87. 

Evidence  held  not  to  show  negligence 

Tex. — Hubbard  v.  Tallal,  Civ.App., 
57  S.W.2d  226,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  and  appeal  dismissed  92 
S.W.2d  1022,  127  Tex.  242. 

41.  111. — Rome    v.    D.    Warshafsky, 
Inc.,    19    N.B.2d    759,    299    IlLApp. 
609. 

42.  Tex. — Camden   Fire   Ins*  Co.   Y. 
Hill,  Com.App.,  276  S.W.  887. 

43.  N.D.— Walrod  v.  Nelson,  210  N. 
W.  525,  54  N.D.  753, 

44.  Ohio.— Davis  T.  Teachnor,  App., 
53  N.E,2d  208. 

45.  Kan,— Withers  v.   Miller,   34  P. 
2d  110,   140  Kan.   123,   104  A.L.R. 
692. 

40.    Pa.— Hamilton  v.  Sechrist,  16  A. 

2d   671,   142  Pa.Super.   354. 
Wash.— Baer    v.    Lebek,    219    P.    22, 

ISO  Wash.  576. 

Where   averments  are  not  denied, 
no  depositions  are  required  to  sup- 
port    the     application. — Sockett     v. 
Philadelphia   Toilet  &  Laundry  Co., 
92  PsuSuper.  254. 
Hearing-  held  Jinffldent 
Wls.— Wujcik    v.  '  Globe    &   Rutgers 

•Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  207  N. 

W.  710,  189  Wis.  366. 


47.  Pa.— Hamilton  v.  Sechrist,  16  A. 
2d  671,  142  Pa.Super.   3:54. 

Hat     parte    affidavits     should     be 
strictly  scrutinized. 
U.-S.— Silver   Peak  Gold  Min.   Co.   v. 

Harris,  C.C.Nev.,  116  »F.  439. 
HL— Mendell  v.  Ktmball,  85  111.  582. 

48.  Cal. — Roseborough  v.  Campbell, 
115  P.2d  839,  46  Cal, App. 2 d  257. 

limiting  time  for  proof 

Trial  court  was  held  not  to  have 
abused  discretion  in  limiting  '  time 
within  which  defendant  might  intro- 
duce testimony  in  proof  of  his  con- 
tention that  he  had  received  no  no- 
tice of  intended  hearing  in  case  pri- 
or to  rendition  of  default  judgment 
against  him,  in  view  of  defendant's 
previous  dilatory  conduct. — Woods- 
ville  Fire  Dist.  v.  Cray,  187  A.  47-8, 
88  N.H.  264. 

49.  Cal. — Roseborough  v.   Campbell, 
115  P.2d  839,   46  Cal.App.2d  257. 

111. — Simon  v. 'Foyer,  17  N.B,2d  632, 

297  IlLApp.  640» 
Okl.— Turner  v.  Dexter,  44  P.2d  984, 

172  Okl.  252. 
Pa.— Bott  v.  Aronimink  Transp.  Co., 

Com.Pl.,  31  Del.Co.  172. 

50.  Cal.— Hollywood    Garment    Cor- 
poration v.  J.  Beckerman,  Inc.,  143 
P.2d  738,  61  Cal.App.2d  658. 

D.C.— Marvin's    Credit    v.    Kitching, 

Mun.App.,  34  A.*2d  86$. 
Kan.— York  v.   Bundy,   23   P.2d  447, 

138  Kan.  20. 

Affidavit  attached  to  pleadings  on 
application  to  vacate  default  Judg- 
ment and  for  new  trial  is  not  evi- 
dence respecting  lack  of  negligence 

669 


in  suffering  default. — Canlon  T. 
Brown,  Tex.Civ.App.,  48  S.W.2d  108^ 
A.  motion  for  new  trial  after  judg- 
ment on  service  of  process  against 
defendant  not  appearing,  although 
sworn  to,  was  not  evidence  of  the 
facts  therein  alleged,  especially 
where  answer  thereto  was  a  sworn 
denial. — Harris  v.  Sugg,  Tex.Clv. 
App.,  143  S.W.2d  149,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct 

51.  Cal — Roseborough  v.   Campbell, 
115   P.2d  839,   46   Cal.App.2d  257. 

52.  N.J. — Kravitz   Mfg.    Corporation 
v.    Style-Kraft    Shirt    Corporation, 
21  A.2d  761,  127  N.J.Law  253— At- 
lantic  Casualty  Ins.   Co.   v.   War- 
nock  Bros.,  1  A.2d  482,  121  N.J.Law 

n. 

63.  N.J. — Kravitz  Mfg.  Corporation 
v.  Style-Kraft  Shirt  Corporation, 
21  A.2d  761,  127  N.J.Law  253. 

54.  S.C. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Lucas  v.  North  Carolina  Mut  (Life 
Ins.  Co.,  191  S.R  711,  712,  184  S. 
C.  119. 

34  C.J.  p  373  note  94. 

55.  Ariz.— Beltran   v.    Roll,    7   P.2d 
248,  39  Ariz.  417. 

Cal. — Zuver  v.  General  Development 
Co.,  28  P.2d  939,  136  Cal.App.  411. 

50.  Cal. — Bonfilio  v.  Ganger,  140  P. 
2d  861,  60  Cal.App,2d  405— Zuver 
v.  General  Development  Co..  28  P. 
2d  93d,  136  Cal.App.  411. 

57.  Cal. — Thompson  v.  -Button,  122 
P.2d  975,  50  Cal.App.2d  272— Green- 
amyer  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of 
Lugo  Elementary  School  -Diet.  In 


337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ingly,  the  court  must  decide  whether  defendant  ex- 
ercised reasonable  diligence  in  making  the  motion 
to  open  or  vacate  the  default  judgment,58  whether 
defendant's  failure  to  defend  was  excusable,59 
whether  service  of  notice  was  properly  made,66  and 
whether  the  court  had  jurisdiction  to  enter  judg- 
ment.61 Issues  not  involved  in  the  proceedings  are 
not  to  be  determined.62  In  consonance  with  equity 
practice  the  court  may  elect  to  have  questions  of 
fact  submitted  to  a  jury  for  decision,63  but  in  such 


cases  the  verdict  of  the  jury  is  merely  advisory,  and 
it  is  not  binding  on  the  court.64 

The  trial  court  may  take  all  the  matters  and  cir- 
cumstances bearing  on  the  case  into  consideration,65 
including  events  which  occur  after  entry  of  the  de- 
fault judgment,66  and  it  may  rest  its  action  on  mat- 
ters within  its  own  knowledge.67  Facts  and  cir- 
cumstances which  are  not  material  to  the  motion 
should  not  be  considered.68  Uncontradicted  facts 
stated  in  motions  or  affidavits  should  be  taken  as 


£•05    Angeles   -County,    2    P.2d   548, 

116  CaLApp.  319. 

Pla. — Kellerman        v.        Commercial 

Credit  Co.,    189    So.    689,    138   Pla, 

133. 

Ind. — Haley  v.  Burke-Cadilac  Co.,  170 

N.E.   791,   91  Ind.App.   603. 
Okl.— Turner  v.  Dexter,  44  P.2d  984, 

172  Okl.  252. 
Judgment    entered    in   ignorance    of 

facts 

Whether  motion  to  vacate  default 
judgment  discloses  that  judgment 
has  been  entered  by  court  in  Igno- 
rance of  existing  facts,  which  if 
known  would  have  prevented  entry 
of  the  judgment,  is  question  of  law 
for  the  court. — Katauski  v.  Bldridge 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  255  IlLApp.  41. 
S3.  Minn.— Roe  v.  Widme,  254  N.W. 

274,  191  Minn.  251. 
59.    Ala. — Mosaic  Templars  of  Amer- 
ica v.   Hall,   124   So.   879,   220  Ala, 
305. 

Ariz. — Brown  v.   Beck,   169  P.2d  '855 
— Michener   v.    Standard   Accident 
Ins.  Co.,  47  P.2d  438,  46  Ariz.  66. 
CaL— Tucker  v.  Tucker,  139  P.2d  348, 
59    CaLApp.2d    557 — Thompson    v. 
Sutton,  122  P.2d  975,  50  CaLApp.2d 
272— Cann   v.    Parker,   258   P.   105, 
84  CaLApp.  379. 
•«na. — Streety    v.    John    Deere    Plow 

•Co.,  109  So.  632,  92  Fla.  210. 
Idaho. — Atwood  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry. 

Co.,  217  P.  600,  37  Idaho  554. 
Ind. — Walsh  v.  H.  P.  Wasson  &  Co., 

13  N.E.2d  696,  213  Ind.  556. 
Okl. — Lrott  v.  Kansas  Osage  Gas  Co., 

281  P.  297,  139  Okl.  6. 
S.D. — Jones    v.    Johnson,    222    N.W. 

688,  54  S.D.  149. 

Tex.— Lawther  Grain  Qo.  v.  Winni- 
ford,  Com.App.f  249  S.W.  195-*- 
Sunshine  Bus  (Lines  v.  Craddock, 
Civ.App.,  112  S.W.2d  248,  affirmed 
Craddock  v.  Sunshine  Bus  Lines, 
133  S.W.2d  124,  134  Tex.  388. 
<6O.  N.D. — Beery  v.  Peterson,  225  N. 

W.  798,  58  N.D.  273. 
Wash. — Skidmore    v.    Pacific    Credi- 
tors, 138  P.2d  664,  18  Wash.3d  157. 

<6l.     N.D. — Beery  v.  Peterson,  225  N. 

W.  798,  58  N.D.  273. 
Wash. — Peha's  University  Food  Shop 

v.    Stimpson   Corporation,   31  P.2d 

1023,  177  Wash,  406. 
42.    Cal. — Waite     v.    Southern    Pac. 

Co.,  221  P.  204,   192  CaL  467. 


111.— Marland  Refining  Co.  v.  L«ewis, 

264  IlLApp.  163. 

Defects  In  the  original  declaration 
will  not  be  considered  on  a  motion 
to  vacate  a  default  judgment  entered 
at  a  prior  term  for  the  reason  that 
errors  in  pleading  cannot  be  ques- 
tioned collaterally.— Lynn  v.  Mult- 
hauf,  279  IlLApp.  210. 
Jurisdiction  over  subject  matter 

A  motion  to  set  aside  a  default 
judgment  for  lack  of  proper  service 
does  not  raise  question  of  jurisdic- 
tion over  subject  matter,  but  only 
goes  to  jurisdiction  over  person. — 
State  ex  rel.  Oompagnie  GSnSrale 
TransatlantiQiue  v.  Falkenhainer,  274 
S.W.  758,  309  Mo.  224. 

63.  Wash.— Roth  v.  Nash,  144  P.2d 
271,  19  Washed  731. 

64.  Wash. — Roth  v.  Nash,  supra. 

65.  CaL — Bonfilio  v.  Ganger,  140  P. 
2d  861,    60   Cal.App.2d   405. 

Md. — Dixon    v.    Baltimore   American 

Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  188  A.  215, 

171  Md.  695. 

Failure  to  demand  bill  of  particu- 
lars before  motion  therefor  may  be 
considered  by  trial  court  in  passing 
on  motion  to  vacate  default. — Butler 
v.  Robinson,  244  P.  162,  76  Cal.App. 
223. 
Possibility  of  further  litigation 

On  motion  to  set  aside  default 
judgment  restraining  defendants 
from  discharging  sewage  on  plain- 
tiff's land,  trial  court,  for  purpose 
of  avoiding  "multiplicity  of  actions," 
was  authorized  to  consider  that  de- 
fendants' claim  of  an  easement  for  a 
drainage  ditch  over  plaintiff's  land 
would  result  in  further  litigation. — 
Bonfilio  v.  Ganger,  140  P.2d  861,  60 
Cal.App.2d  405. 
Defects  of  judgment 

Where  defects  of  the  judgment 
are  apparent  on  its  face,  they  may 
be  considered  by  the  court,  although 
they  are  not  alleged  in  the  applica- 
tion.—Watson  Co.,  Builders,  v. 
Bleeker,  Tex.Civ.App.,  269  S.W.  147. 

Local  customs  and  practices  at  bar 
may  "be  considered  by  the  court. — 
Lunt  v.  Van  Gorden,  281  N.W.  743, 
225  Iowa  1120— Chandler  MilL  & 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Sinaiko,  208  N.W.  323, 
201  Iowa  791. 

670 


Proof  offered  under  allegations 

On  motion  to  set  aside  default 
judgment,  in  determining  question 
of  excuse  for  delay  in  filing  answer, 
court  will  look  not  only  to  allega- 
tions in  motions,  but  also  to  proof 
offered  thereunder. — First  Nat.  Bank 
v.  -Southwest  Nat.  Bank  of  Dallas, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  273  S.W.  951. 

66.  Pacts  pertinent  to  diligence  aft- 
er default  are  properly  considered. — 
Hicks   v.    Sanders,   104   P.2d   549,   40 
Cal.App.2d  211. 

67.  Iowa. — Mitchell  v.  Brennan,  241 
N.W.  408,  213  Iowa  1375. 

34  C.J.  p  430  note  90. 

Knowledge  of  issues  in  original  suit 

The  trial  judge,  who  tried  case 
and  entered  judgment  sought  to  be 
set  aside  by  motion  for  new  trial 
under  statute  authorizing  such  mo- 
tion where  judgment  is  rendered  on 
service  by  publication  against  de- 
fendant who  has  not  appeared,  could 
employ  knowledge  of  issues  involved 
in  original  suit  in  passing  on  plain- 
tiff's exception  to  the  motion. — Dev- 
ereaux  v.  Daube,  Tex.Civ.App.,  185 
S.W.2d  211. 
Telephone  conversation 

Where  plaintiff's  showing  in  sup- 
port of  motion  to  set  aside  default 
judgment  was  largely  based  on  claim 
of  an  ex  parte  telephone  conversa- 
tion between  counsel  and  the  trial 
judge,  trial  judge  could  have  appro- 
priately filed  affidavit  setting  out  his 
own  recollection  of  what  telephone 
conversation  was  in  order  to  make 
his  own  account  of  it  a  matter  of 
record  as  preliminary  to  passing  on 
application  to  set  aside  the  default. 
— Taecker  v.  Parker,  93  P.2d  197,  34 
Cal.App.2d  143. 

68.  111.— Standard    Statistics   Co.    v. 
Davis,  45  N.B.2d  1005,  317  IlLApp. 
377. 

Acts  of  other  persons 

On  defendant's  motion  to  set  aside 
a  default  judgment  on  ground  of  in- 
advertence and  excusable  neglect, 
court  could  not  consider  acts  and 
negligence  of  other  persons  which 
were  not  material  to  the  motion. — 
-Gorman  v.  Yorke,  199  S.E.  729,  214  N. 
C,  524. 
Review  of  evidence  in  original  case 

The  right  to  open  a  default  judg- 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


337 


true.69  The  failure  of  defendant  to  produce  avail- 
able evidence  may  authorize  an  inference  that  the 
evidence  would  not  corroborate  him.70 

Rights  of  purchasers.  The  rights  of  purchasers 
of  the  property  which  was  the  subject  of  the  judg- 
ment may  be  determined  in  proceedings  to  open  the 
judgment  or  in  subsequent  proceedings  in  which 
they  are  made  parties.71 

Diligence  after  filing  motion.  Defendant  must 
exercise  diligence  in  ascertaining  the  disposition 
made  by  the  court  of  the  motion.72  Where  defend- 
ant, after  filing  a  motion  to  set  aside  the  default 
judgment,  delays  in  prosecuting  the  motion,  the 
court  should  permit  defendant  to  show,  if  he  can, 
a  sufficient  excuse  for  the  delay  before  dismissing 
the  motion.73 

Proceedings  after  error.  Where  the  court  has 
erred  in  failing  to  sustain  a  motion  to  dismiss  the 
motion  to  set  aside  the  judgment,  the  error  has 
been  held  to  render  further  proceedings  nugatory.74 

Time  of  helvring.  The  mere  fact  that  the  motion 
is  not  heard  until  a  subsequent  term  after-  filing  has 
been  held  not  to  preclude  the  court  from  granting 
relief  on  the  ground  that  the  motion  has  been  over- 
ruled by  operation  of  law.75  Postponement  of  a 


hearing  on  the  motion  does  not  result  in  a  discon- 
tinuance of  the  proceedings.76 

Reopening  case;  rehearing.  The  court  may  prop- 
erly reopen  the  case  after  it  has  been  submitted  for 
decision  to  receive  additional  evidence77  even  on- 
its  own  motion,78  or  it  may  properly  receive  addi- 
tional evidence  without  formally  reopening  the- 
case.79  Plaintiffs  right  to  a  reargument  is  not 
lost  by  accepting  the  costs  ordered  to  be  paid  by 
defendant  as  a  condition  for  reopening,  receiving* 
his  answer,  and  excepting  to  the  sufficiency  of  the 
sureties  to  the  undertaking.80  A  motion  for  a  re- 
hearing filed  after  the  court  has  lost  jurisdiction  is 
ineffectual.81 

(2)  Discretion  of  Court  Generally 
Except  In  cases  where  the  statute  gives  an  absolute- 
right  to  relief,  the  court  may  exercise  a  large  discre- 
tion In  granting  or  denying  an  application  to  open  or 
vacate  a  default  Judgment;  but  the  discretion  Is  not 
to  be  exercised  arbitrarily  or  capriciously. 

Except  in  cases  where  the  statute  gives  an  ab- 
solute right  to  relief,  in  which  case  the  court  can- 
not refuse  to  open  the  default  judgment,82  as  a  gen- 
eral rule,  a  default  judgment  will  not  be  opened  or 
vacated  as  a  matter  of  course;88  but  the  court  may 
exercise  a  large  discretion  in  granting  or  denying- 


ment  is  not  to  be  determined  by  a 
review  of  the  evidence  which  sup- 
ports the  original  Judgment — Nais- 
bitt  v.  Herrick,  290  P.  950,  76  Utah 
575. 

99.    Del.— Yerkes  v.   Dangle,   Super., 

33  A.2d  406. 
Ky. — Bond  v.   W.   T.   Congleton  Co., 

129  S.W.2d  '570,  278  Ky.  829. 
Tex.— Trigg  v.  Gray,  Civ.App.,  288  S. 

W.  1098. 

70.    Ind.— Carty  v.   Toro,   57  N.E.2d 

434. 
'71.    Okl.— Swartz  v.  FarisS,   72  P.2d 

738,  181  Okl.  115. 
lack  of  notice 

For  the  subsequent  purchase  of 
land  to  be  protected  by  the  order 
entered  in  an  action  to  set  aside  de- 
fault judgment  and  for  new  trial, 
burden  is  on  purchaser  to  plead  and, 
if  denied,  to  show  that  he  purchased 
without  notice  of  infirmity  in  judg- 
ment—Rouse V.  Rouse,  262  S.W.  596, 
203  Ky.  415. 
72.  Tex. — Tyler  v.  Henderson,  Civ. 

App,,  162  S.W.2d  170,  error  refused. 
Negligence  of  counsel 

Allegations  in  judgment  debtors' 
petition  to  set  aside  judgment,  filed 
after  debtors  learned  of  order  over- 
ruling their  motion  for  new  trial, 
that  debtors  were  deprived  of  their 
right  to  appear  and  present  their 
grounds  for  new  trial  because  of  al- 
leged negligence  of  their  counsel  in 


failing  to  represent  them  at  hearing 
on  motion,  were  insufficient  to  enti- 
tle debtors  to  the  relief  sought — 
Tyler  v.  Henderson,  supra, 

73.  Tex.— Callahan  v.  Staples,  161  S. 
W.2d  489,  139  Tex.  8. 

74.  Ga.— Coker   v.    Eison,    151    S.E. 
6'S2,  40  Ga.App.  835. 

75.  Tex.— Smith    v.    Higginbotham, 
158    S.W.2d    481,    138    Tex.    227— 
Smith  v.   Higginbotham,   Civ.App., 
112  S.W.2d  770. 

Commencement  and  termination  of 
time  for  application  see  supra  sub- 
division b  (8)  of  this  section.. 

Jurisdiction  of  court  see  supra  §  333. 

78.  Ala.— Ex  parte  Doak,  66  So.  64, 
188  Ala.  406— Ex  parte  Southern 
Amiesite  Asphalt  Co.,  200  So.  435, 
30  AUuApp.  3,  certiorari  denied  200 
So.  434,  240  Ala.  618. 

77.  Ariz. — Avery  v.  Calumet  &  Jer- 
ome Copper  Co.,  284  P.  159,  36  Ariz. 
239. 

After  upholding  service 

Where,  however,  the  trial  court 
had  originally  denied  a  motion  to 
vacate  a  default  judgment  for  non- 
service  of  process  and  had  thus  up- 
held service,  it  was  held  that  the 
court  was  unwarranted  in  subse- 
quently granting  a  motion  to  reargue 
the  motion  to  vacate  the  judgment— 
Danowitz-  v.  -Fero,  21  N.T.S.2d  813. 

78.  Ariz.— Avery  v.  Calumet  &  Jer- 
ome   Copper  Co.,    284    P.    150,    36 
Ariz.  239. 

671 


79.  Ariz.— Avery  v.  Calumet  &  Jer- 
ome Copper  Co.,  supra. 

80.  N.T.— Lanahan  v.   Drew,   17  N_ 
T.S.  840. 

81.  Ohio.— Balind  v.  Lanigan,  15*9  N- 
E.  103,  26  Ohio  App.  149. 

82.  Ala.— Marshall         Qounty        v* 
Critcher,  17  -So.2d  540,  245  Ala.  357. 

Mich.— McDowell     v.     Mecosta     Chv 
Judge,  144  N.W.  498,  17*  Mich.  108. 
In  Georgia 

(1)  The   statutory   right   to   open, 
default  within  thirty  days  or  before- 
the  beginning  of  the  trial  term  is  not. 
dependent  on  discretion  of  judge.™ 
McCray  v.  Empire  Inv.  Co.,  174  S.E. 
219,  49  Ga.App.  117— Rawls  v.  Bow- 
ers,   172   S.E.    6*7,   48   Ga.App.   324 — 
J.  S.  Schofield's  Sons  Co.  v.  Vaughn, 
150  S.B.  569,  40  Ga.App.  &68. 

(2)  At  a  subsequent  term  the  mat- 
ter is  within  the  trial  court's  discre- 
tion.— Hard  wick   Bank  &   Trust   Co.. 
v.  Manis,  183  S.E.  63,  181  Ga.  498— 
Bawl?  v.  Bowers,  supra.  .  . 

83.  Ky. — Bond   v.   W.   T.   Congleton* 
Co.,  129  S.W.2d  570,  278  Ky.  829. 

W.Va.— Winona  Nat  Bank  v.  (Fridles 

10    S.B.2d   907,   122   W.Va.    479. 
34  C.J.  p  422  note  23. 
Beaaoa  for  rule 

Demand  which  has  ripened  into- 
regular  valid  judgment  becomes  es- 
tablished right  which  must  be  pro- 
tected not  only  by  court  which  ren- 
dered it,  but  by  other  courts.— Baly 
V.  MoGahen,  21  P.2d  34,  37  N.M.  246. 


§337  JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.S. 

an  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judg-  •  ment,84  and,  as  discussed  in  Appeal  and  Error  § 


84.  U.S.— Handel  Bros.  v.  Victory- 
Belt  Co.,  C.C.A.I1L,  15  F.2d  610. 

Ala.— Du  Free  v.  Hart,  S  So.2d  183, 
242  Ala.  690— Ex- parte  Anderson, 
4  So.2d  420,  242  Ala.  31— Ex  parte 
Richerzhagen,  113  So.  85,  216  Ala. 
262— Ex  parte  Savage,  186  So.  586, 
28  AUuApp.  440— Ex  parte  Motley, 
170  So.  81,  27  Ala.App.  241— Ex 
parte  Crumpton,  109  So.  184,  21 
Ala.App.  446— Sovereign  Camp,  W. 
O.  W.,  v.  Gay,  104  So.  895,  20  Ala. 
App.  650,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  104  So.  893,  213  Ala.  5. 

Ariz.— Brown  v.  Beck,  169  P.2d  855— 
Swisshelm  Gold  Silver  Co.  v.  Par- 
well,  124  P.2d  544,  59  Ariz.  1-62— 
Huff  v.  Flynn,  60  P.2d  931,  48  Ariz. 
175— Michener  v.  Standard  Acci- 
dent Ins.  C|o.,  47  P.2d  438,  46  Ariz. 
66 — Avery  v.  Calumet  &  Jerome 
Copper  Co.,  284  P.  159,  36  Ariz.  239 
— Western  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Ken- 
dall, 233  P.  583,  27  Ariz.  342— 
Daly  v.  Okamura,  213  P.  389.  25 
Ariz.  €0. 

Ark.-^Tohnson  v.  Jett  159  S.W.2d 
73,  203  Ark.  861— Hamburg  Bank 
v.  Jones,  151  S.W.Sd  -990,  202  Ark. 
622— Urschel  (Lead  &  Zinc  Mines 
v.  Smith,  111  S.W.2d  480,  195  Ark. 
86. 

Cal. — Beard  v.  Beard,  107  P.2d  385, 
16  Cal.2d  645 — McNeil  v.  Blumen- 
thal,  81  P.2d  566,  11  Cal.2d  5-66, 
followed  in  Le  Due  v.  Blumenthal, 
81  P.2d  567,  11  Cal.2d  780— Brill  v. 
Fox,  297  P.  25,  211  Cal.  739— Rog- 
ers v.  Schneider,  270  P.  451,  205 
CaL  202— Gomes  v.  Bragg,  255  P. 
499,  201  Cal.  70— Waybright  v.  An- 
derson, 253  P.  148,  200  Cal.  374— 
Gorman  v.  California  Transit  Co., 
248  P.  923,  199  CaL  246— Pickerill 
V.  Strain,  239  P.  323,  196  QaL  6*3 
— Waite  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  221 
P.  204,  192  Cal.  467— Badges  v. 
Kouris,  162  P.2d  476,  71  Cal.App.2d 
213 — Peterson  v.  Taylor,  152  P.2d 
349,  66  Cal.App.2d  333— Tearney  v. 
Riddle,  149  P.2d  387,  64  CaLApp.2d 
783— Bonfllio  v.  Ganger,  140  P.2d 
8*1,  60  Cal.App.2d  405— Weinberger 
v.  Manning,  123  P.2d  531,  ISO  CaL 
App.2d  4$  4 — Thompson  v.  Button, 
122  P.2d  $75,  -50  Cal.App.2d  272— 
Schoenfeld  r.  Gerson,  120  P.2d  674, 
48  Cal.App.2d  739— >Flores  v.  Smith, 
117  P.2d  71.2,  41  Cal.App.2d  253— 
Hicks  v.  Sanders,  104  P~2d  549,  40 
Cal.Aw>.2d  211 — Stub  v.  Harrison, 
96  P.2d  979,  35  CaLApp.2d  685— 
Taecker  v.  Parker,  93  P.2d  197,  34 
CaLApp.2d  143— Morgan  v.  Broth- 
ers of  Christian  Schools,  92  P.2d 
925,  34  Cal.App.2d  14— Shively  v. 
Kochman,  73  P.2d  637,  23  CaLApp. 
2d  420 — Bodin  v.  Webb,  62  P.2d 
155,  17  Cal.App.2d  422— Wright  v. 
Snyder,  32  P.2d  991,  138  CaLApp. 
495— Bole  v.  McAdams,  28  P.2d 
431,  136  CaLApp.  6 — John  A. 
Vaughan  Corporation  v.  Title  In- 


surance &  Trust  Co.,  12  P.2d  117, 
123  CaLApp.  703— Golish  Y.  Fein- 
stein,  11  P.2d  893,  123  Cal.App.  547 
— U.  S.  v.  Duesdieker,  5  P.2d  916, 
148  Cal.App.  723-^Greenamyer  v. 
Board  of  Trustees  of  Lugo  Ele- 
mentary School  Dist  in  Ix>s  An- 
geles County,  2  P.2d  *4S,  116  Cal. 
App.  319 — Dunn  v.  Standard  Acci- 
dent Ins.  Co.,  299  P.  575,  114  CaL 
App.  208— Roehl  v.  Texas  Co.,  291 
P.  262,  107  CaLApp.  708— Johnston 
v.  Liftman,  287  P.  558,  105  CaLApp. 
187 — Hammond  Lumber  Qo.  v. 
Bloodgood,  3.S1  P.  1101,  101  Cal. 
App.  561— Grey  v.  Milligan,  2-81  P, 
656,  101  CaLApp.  323— Gordon  v, 
Harbolt,  280  P.  701,  rehearing  de- 
nied 281  P.  1048— Anglo  California 
Trust  Co.  V.  Kelly,  272  P.  1080,  95 
CaLApp.  390— Carbondale  Mach. 
Co.  v.  Eyraud,  271  P.  349,  84  CaL 
App.  356— Noble  v.  Reid- Avery  Co., 
264  P.  341,  89  CaLApp.  75— Corgiat 
v.  Realty  Mortgage  Corporation  of 
California,  260  P.  573,  86  CaLApp. 
37— Butler  v.  Robinson,  244  P.  162, 
76  CaLApp.  223— Eberhart  v.  Sala- 
zar,  235  P.  '86,  71  CaLApp.  336. 

Colo. — Koin  v.  Mutual  Ben.  Health  & 
Accident  Ass'n,  41  P.2d  306,  96 
Colo.  163— -(Lock  v.  Berkins,  33  P. 
2d  393,  95  Colo.  135— Connell  v. 
Continental  Casualty  Co.,  2-90  P< 
274,  87  Colo.  573— Mosco  v.  Jean- 
not,  232  P.  874,  86  Colo.  441— 
Diebold  v.  Diebold,  243  P.  630,  73 
Colo.  7 — Carpenter-liiebhardt  Fruit 
Co.  v.  Nelson,  234  P.  1067,  77  Colo. 
.175 — Drinkard  v.  Spencer,  211  P. 
379,  72  Colo.  396. 

Conn. — Barton  v.  Barton,  196  A.  141, 
123  Conn.  487. 

D.C.— Cockrell  v.  OTllah,  50  (F.2d  500. 
60  App.D.C.  210 — Ray  v.  Bruce, 
Mun.App.,  31  A.2d  693. 

(Fla. — Coggin  v.  Barfield,  8  So.2d  9, 
150  Fla.  551— Stevens-Davis  Co.  v. 
Stock,  193  So.  745,  141  Fla.  714— 
Segel  v.  Staiber,  144  So.  875,  106 
•Fla,  946— State  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie 
r.  Raymond,  138  So.  40,  103  Fla. 
649. 

Ga. — McCray  v.  Empire  Inv.  Co.,  174 
S.B.  219,  49  Ga.App.  117— Carr-Lee 
Grocery  Co.  v.  Brannen,  167  S.E. 
536,  46  Ga.App.  225— Nix  v.  Bas- 
sett,  123  S.E.  37,  32  Ga.App.  345— 
Golightly  v.  Line,  121  S.E.  873,  31 
Ga~App.  550. 

Idaho.— Cleek  v.  Virginia  Gold  Min- 
ing &  Milling  Co.,  122  P.2d  232,  «3 
Idaho  445 — Nielson  v.  Garrett,  43 
P.2d  380,  56  Idaho  240—Savage  v. 
Stokes,  28  P.2d  900,  54  Idaho  109— 
Mortgage  Co.  Holland  America  v. 
Yost,  228  P.  282,  33  Idaho  489- 
Day  v.  Burnett,  224  P.  427,  38  Ida- 
ho 620. 

111.— -Borman  v.  Oetzell,  46  N.K2d 
914,  382  m.  110— i Kunde  v.  Pren- 
tice, 160  N.E.  193,  329  HL  32— 
Lusk  v.  Bluhzn,  53  N.E.2d  135,  321 

672 


IlLApp.  349 — Maclaskey  v.  Kurz,  45 
N.E.2d  566,  316  IlLApp.  671— Bax- 
ter v.  Atchlson,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
35  N.E.2d  563,  310  IlLApp.  *16— 
Simon  v.  Foyer,  17  N.E.2d  $32,  297 
IlLApp.  640— Whalen  v.  Twin  City 
Barge  &  Gravel  Co.,  280  IlLApp. 
593,  certiorari  denied  Twin  City 
Barge  &  Gravel  Co.  r.  Whalen/ S« 
S.Ct  590,  597  TJ.S.  714,  80  I*Ed. 
1000. 

Ind.— Carty  v.  Toro,  57  N.E.2d  484. 

Iowa. — Kern  v.  Sanborn,  7  N.W.zd 
801,  233  Iowa  4M— Craig  v.  Welch, 
2  N.W.2d  745,  231  Iowa  1009— Al- 
lemang  v.  White,  2«  N.W.  653,  230 
Iowa  526— Brunswick  -  Balke  - 
Collender  Co.  v.  Dillon,  283  N.W. 
872,  226  Iowa  244— Tate  y.  Delli, 
269  N.W.  871,  222  Iowa  635— Lena- 
ley  v.  Hopson,  232  N.W.  £11 — Bos- 
senberger  v.  Bossenberger,  229  N. 
W.  833,  210  Iowa  825 — Anderson  v. 
Anderson,  229  N.W.  694,  209  Iowa 
1143— Chandler  MilL  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Sinaiko,  208  N.W.  323,  201  Iowa 
791 — Lawler  v.  Roman  Catholic 
Mut.  Protective  Soc.  of  Iowa,  197 
N.W.  633,  198  Iowa  233— Iowa  Cord 
Tire  Co.  v.  Babbitt,  192  N.W.  431, 
195  Iowa  922. 

gait. — American  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v. 
Liberty-Texas  Oil  Co.,  2U  P.  137, 
112  Kan.  309. 

Ky.— Northcutt  Y.  Nicholson,  55  S. 
W-2d  659,  246  Ky.  641— Hackney  v. 
Charles,  295  S.W.  869,  220  Ky.  574. 

(La. — Iberville  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Zito,  125  So.  435,  1*9  La,  421. 

Me.— Diplock  v.  Blasi,  149  A.  149,  128 
Me.  528. 

Mass. — Kravetz  v.  Lipofsky,  200  N.E. 
•865,  294  Mass,  80— Manzi  v.  Carl- 
son, 180  N.E.  134,  27«  Mass.  267— 
Moll  v.  Town  of  Wakefleld,  175  N. 
<E.  '81,  274  Mass.  505. 

Mich.— Orlich  v.  Stone,  424  N.W.  610, 
246  Mich.  487. 

Minn.— Peterson  v.  W.  Davis  &  Sons, 
11  N.W.2d  800,  216  Minn.  60—, 
Whipple  v.  Mahler,  10  N.W.2d  771, 
215  Minn.  578— Application  of  Bon- 
ley,  6  N.W.2d  245,  213  Minn.  £14— 
Pilney  v.  Funk,  3  N.W.2d  792,  212 
Minn.  398 — Isensee  Motors  v. 
Rand,  264  N.W.  782,  196  Minn. 
267 — Central  Hanover  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  r.  Price,  24*  N.W.  287, 
189  Minn.  36— Nystrom  v.  Nfr- 
strom,  243  N.W.  704,  186  Minn.  490 
— McMahon  v.  Peauot  Rural  Tele- 
phone Co.,  242  N.W.  <620,  186  Minn. 
141— Child  v.  Henry,  536  N.W.  202, 
183  Minn.  170— Johnson  v.  Hall- 
man,  225  N.W.  283,  177  Minn.  «19— 
In  re  Belt  Line,  Phalen,  and  Hazel 
Park  Sewer  Assessment,  222  N.W. 
520,  176  Minn.  59— Marthaler  Ma- 
chine &  Engineering  Co.  v.  Meyers, 
218  N.W,  127,  173  Minn.  606— City 
of  Luverne  v.  Skyberg,  211  N.W. 
5,  169  Minn.  234— Zell  v.  Friend, 
Crosby  &  Co.,  199  N.W.  928,  160 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


337 


1632,  the  court's  action  will  not  be  disturbed  on      appeal  unless  it  clearly  appears  that  there  has  been 


%  [inn.  181 — 'First  Trust  &  -Savings 
Bank  v.  U.  S.  -Fidelity  &  Guaranty 
Co.,  194  N.W.  376,  156  Minn.  231. 

Ho.— Hartle  v.  Hartle,  App.,  184  S. 
\Vr.2d  786 — Quattrochi  v.  Quat- 
trochi,  App.,  179  S.W.2d  757— Wil- 
liams v.  Burr,  App.,  61  S.W.2d  420 
— Karst  v.  Chicago  Fraternal  Life 
Ass'n,  App.,  22  S.W.2d  178 — Good- 
win v.  Kochititzky,  App.,  3  S.W.2d 
1051 — Amos  James  Grocery  Co.  v. 
Prichard,  App.,  297  S.W.  721— Bog- 
gess  v.  Jordan,  App.,  283  S.W.  57 
— Case  v.  Arky,  App.,  2*3  S.W.  484. 

Mont. — Madson  v.  Petrie  Tractor  & 
Equipment  Co.,  77  P.2d  1038,  106 
Mont.  382— Mihelich  v.  Butte  Elec- 
tric Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont 
$04 — Skinner  v.  Carlysle  Oil  Devel- 
opment Co.,  260  P.  1038,  80  Mont. 
4g4 — st  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Freeman,  260  P.  124,  80 
Mont.  266— Reynolds  v.  Gladys 
Belle  Oil  Co.,  243  P.  576,  75  Mont. 
330 — Pacific  Acceptance  Corpora- 
tion v.  McCue,  228  P.  761,  71  Mont 
99 — in  re  East  Bench  Irr.  Dist, 

224  P.  859,  70  Mont  186. 

Neb.— Barney  y.  Platte  Valley  Pub- 
lic Power  &  Irr.  Dist.,  23  N.W.2d 
335. 

jf.j. — Becker  v.  Welliver,  34  A.2d  893, 
131  N.J.-Law  64— Jarrett  v,  -Stand- 
ard Diesel  Engine  Co.,  12  A.2d  671, 
124  N.J.Law  429— McDermott  v. 
City  of  Paterson,  4  A.2d  306,  122 
N.J.Law  81 — Benedetto  v.  Flecken- 
stein,  154  A.  769,  108  N.J.Law  1-84 
— Limpert  Bros.  v.  Manufacturers* 
Liability  Ins.  Co.,  137  A.  712,  5  N. 
J.Misc.  675. 

N.M. — Grant  v.  Booker,  249  P.  1013, 
31  N.M.  639. 

N.Y.— Allen  v.  -Fink,  207  N.Y.S.  428, 
211  App.Div.  411,  modified  on  other 
grounds  208  N.Y.S.  827 — Decatur 
Contracting  Co.  v.  Edward  S. 
Murphy  Bldg.  Co.,  2  N.Y.S.2d  970, 
166  Misc.  614— In  re  Mi-Her's  Will, 
295  N.Y.S.  943,  162  Misc.  563,  af- 
firmed 300  N.Y.S.  798,  252  App.Div. 
872— Crouse  Grocery  Co.  v.  Valen- 
tine, 226  N.Y.S.  613,  131  Misc.  571. 

N.C. — Garner  v.  Quakenbush,  122  S. 
E.  474,  187  N.C.  603,  modified  on 
other  grounds  124  S.E.  154,  188  N. 

C.  ISO,  36  A.L.R.  1005. 

N.D.— Beehler  v.  Schantz,  1  N.W.2d 
344,  71  N.D.  409— Chittenden  & 
Eastman  Co.  v.  Sell,  227  N.W.  188, 
58  N.D.  664 — Beery  v.  Peterson, 

225  N.W.  798,  58  N.D.  273— Mantel 
v.    Pickle,    218   N.W.  -605,   56.  N.D. 
588— Powell  v.  Bach,  217  N.W.  172, 
56   N.D.   297— Mueller  v.  Occident 
Elevator  Co.,  .212  N.W.  530,  55  N. 

D.  206— First  State  Bank  of  Cros- 
by v.  Thomas,  208  N.W.  852,  54  N. 
0,   108 — Burgett  v.  Porter,   205  N. 
W.  623,  53  N.D.  312— Croonquist  v. 
Walker,  196  N.W.  108,  50  N,D.  388 
— Farmers'     &     Merchants'     State 

49C.J.S.-43 


Bank  of  Tolna  v.  Stavn,  194  N.W. 
689,  49  N.D.  993. 

Okl.— Franklin  v.  Hunt  Dry  Goods 
Co.,  123  P.2d  258,  190  Okl.  296 — 
State  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Liddell,  61 
P.2d  1075,  178  Okl.  114 — Fair  De- 
partment Store  v.  Dallas  Jobbing 
House,  46  P.2d  529,  172  Okl.  486— 
Leslie  v.  Spencer,  42  P.2d  119,  170 
Okl.  642— Mays  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of  Creek  County,  23  P.2d  664,  164 
Okl.  231 — Tippins  v.  Turben,  19 
P.2d  605,  162  Okl.  136— Sautbine  v. 
Jones,  18  P.2d  -871,  161  Okl.  292 — 
Boles  v.  MacLaren,  4  P.2d  106,  152 
OkL  265— McKinney  v.  Swift,  274 
P.  659,  135  Okl.  164— Nation  v. 
Savely,  260  P.  32,  127  OkL  117— 
Givens  v.  Anderson,  249  P.  339,  119 
Okl.  212— Nave  v.  Conservative 
Loan  Co.,  245  P.  65,  117  Okl.  85— 
•Farmers'  Guaranty  State  Bank  v. 
Bratcher,  241  P.  340,  112  Okl.  254 
—Goodwill  Oil  Co.  v.  Elliott,  230 
P.  902,  107  Okl.  127 — Colley  v. 
Sapp,  216  P.  454,  90  OkL  139. 

Or. — Merryman  v.  Colonial  Realty 
Co.,  120  P.2d  230,  1-68  Or.  12— 
Snyder  v.  Consolidated  Highway 
Co.,  72  P.2d  932,  157  Or.  479 — 
Hubble  v.  Hubble,  279  P.  550,  130 
Or.  177 — E.  J.  -Struntz  Planing  Mill 
Co.  v.  Paget  262  P.  263,  123  Or. 
651,  rehearing  denied  263  P.  389, 
123  Or.  651 — Anderson  v.  Morse, 
222  P.  1083,  110  Or.  39. 

Pa. — Quaker  City  Chocolate  &  Con- 
fectionery Co.  v.  Warnock  Bldg. 
Ass'n,  32  A.2d  5,  347  Pa.  186— 
McFadden  v.  Pennzoil  Co.,  191  A. 
584,  336  Pa,  277— Luzerne  Nat 
Bank  v.  Gosart,  185  A,  640,  822  Pa. 
446 — Krall  v.  Lebanon  Valley  Sav- 
ings &  Loan  Ass'n,  121  A.  405,  2T7 
Pa.  440— Welzel  v.  'Link-Belt  Co., 
35  A.2d  696,  154  Pa,Super.  66— 
Horning  v.  David,  8  A.2d  729,  137 
Pa.Super.  252 — Schweikart  v. 
American  Slicing  Mach.  Co.,  173  A. 
427,  113  Pa,Super.  485. 

Philippine.— Wait  v.  Rogers,  10  Phil- 
ippine 94— Wahl  v.  Donaldson,  5 
Philippine  11 — Quiros  v.  Carman, 
4  Philippine  722 — California-Manila 
Lumber  Commercial  Co.  v.  Gterchi- 
torena,  2  Philippine  628. 

R.I.— Vingi  v.  Vigliotti,  6  A.2d  719, 
63  R.I.  9 — Fudim  v.  Kane,  136  A. 
306,  48  R.I.  155— Rhode  Island  Dis- 
count Corporation  v.  Carr,  136  A. 
244 — Roy  v.  Tanguay,  131  A.  553 
— Nelen  v.  Wells,  123  A,  599,  45  R. 
I.  424— Milbury  Atlantic  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Rocky  Point  Amusement  Co., 
118  A.  737,  44  RJ.  458. 

S.C. — Savage  v.  Cannon,  30  S.E.2d  70, 
204  S.C.  473— Poston  v.  State  High- 
way Department,  5  -S,E.2d  729,  192 
s<Ct  137— Rutledge  v.  Junior  Or- 
der of  United  American  Mechanics, 
193  S.B.  434,  185  S.C.  142— ¥rs. 
Hall's  Cafeteria  v.  Phoenix  Ins. 

673 


Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  122  S.R 
580,  128  S.C.  209. 

S.D. — Smith  v.  Wordeman,  240  N."W. 
325,  59  S.D..  36-8— Squires  v.  Meade 
County,  23$  N.W.  74'7,  59  S.D.  293 
— Gubele  v.  Methodist  Deaconess 
Hospital  of  Rapid  City,  225  N.W. 
57,  55  S.D.  100— Connelly  v.  Frank- 
lin, 210  N.W.  735,  50  S.D.  512. 

Tex. — Lawther  Grain  Co.  v.  Wlnni- 
ford,  Com.App.,  249  S.W.  195— Sun- 
shine Bus  Lines  v.  Craddock,  Civ. 
App.,  112  S.W.2d  248,  affirmed 
Craddock  v.  Sunshine  Bus  Lines, 
133  S.W.2d  154,  134  Tex.  388— 
Simpson  v.  Glenn,  Civ.App.,  103  S. 
W.2d  433 — Employer's  Reinsurance 
Corporation  v.  Brock,  Civ.App.,  74 
S.W.2d  435,  error  dismissed— Far- 
rell  v.  Truett,  Abernathy  &  Wol- 
ford,  Civ.App.,  60  S.W.2d  475,  error 
dismissed — San  Antonio  Paper  Co. 
V.  Morgan,  Civ.App.,  53  S.W.2d  651, 
error  dismissed — Homuth  v.  Wil- 
liams, Civ.App.,  42  «S.W.2d  1048— 
Green  v.  Jackson,  Civ.App.,  42  S. 
W.2d  91— 'Federal  Supply  Co.  v. 
Bailey,  Civ.App.,  297  S.W.  235— 
Sneed  v.  Sneed,  Civ. App.,  296  S.W. 
643— ^Etna  Casualty  &  Surety  Co. 
v.  Austin,  Civ.App.,  285  S.W.  951, 
affirmed;  Austin  v.  ^B3tna  Casualty 
&  Surety  Co.,  Com.App.,  300  S.W. 
638,  rehearing  denied  3  S.W.2d  XT, 
and  followed  in  ^Etna  Casualty  & 
Surety  Co.  v.  Austin,  Civ.App.,  2*5 
S.W.  955,  affirmed  Austin  v.  -fflltna 
Casualty  &  Surety  Co.,  Com.App., 
200  S.W.  639 — Thomas  v.  Goldberg, 
Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  230— Mutual  Oil 
Consolidated  v.  Beavers,  Civ.App., 
272  S.W.  ;507 — Celeste  State  Bank 
v.  Security  Nat.  Bank,  Civ.App., 
254  S.W.  -653— Allen  v.  Frank,  Civ. 
App.,  252  S.W.  347. 

Utah.— Madsen  v.  Hodson,  256  P.  792, 
69  Utah  -527— Cornelius  v.  Mohave 
Oil  Co.,  239  P.  475,  66  Utah  22. 

Wash. — Larson  v.  Zabroski,  152  P.2d 
154,  21  Wash.2d  572,  opinion  ad- 
hered to  155  P.2d  284,  21  Wash. 2 d 
572 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Roth  v. 
Nash,  144  P.2d  271,  275,  19  Washed 
731— Bishop  v.  Illinan,  126  P.2d 
582,  14  Wash.2d  13— Riddell  v.  Da- 
vid, 23  P.2d  22,  173  Wash.  370— 
Penfound  v.  Gagnon,  20  P.2d  17, 
172  Wash.  311— Marsh  v.  West  Fir 
Logging  Co.,  281  P.  340,  154  Wash. 
137— Rule  v.  -Somervill,  374  P.  177, 
150  Wash.  605. 

W.Va.— Arnold  v.  Reynolds,  2  S.B.2d 
433,  121  W.Va.  91. 

Wis. — Welfare  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Breuer,  250  N.W.  846,  213 
Wis.  97,  followed  in  West  -Side 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Ander- 
son, 250  N.W.  849,  213  Wis.  104, 
East  Side  Mut  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Lock,  250  N.W.  849,  218 
Wis.  105,  Mortgage  Discount  Co. 
v.  Continental  Discount  Corpora- 


337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


an  abuse  of  discretion.  The  court's  discretion  is 
not  a  limitless  discretion85  to  be  exercised  arbitra- 
rily or  capriciously^6  without  reference  to  any 
guiding  rule  or  principle,87  and  its  action  must  rest 
on  competent  evidence.88  In  particular  cases  the 
circumstances  may  be  such  as  to  leave  no  room  for 
the  exercise  of  discretion.89 

Principles  and  rules  as  controlling  the  court's  dis- 
cretion are  discussed  infra  subdivision  j  (4)  of  this 
section. 


Judgment  on  constructive  set-vice.  Under  statutes 
which  permit  defendant,  against  whom  a  default 
judgment  was  taken  on  constructive  service  only, 
to  vacate  the  judgment  and  to  be  admitted  to  de- 
fend the  action,  discussed  generally  supra  §  335,  it 
has  been  held  that,  on  complying  with  the  conditions 
of  the  statute,  express  and  implied,  the  moving  party 
acquires  an  absolute  right  to  have  the  judgment 
opened,  which  the  court  has  no  discretion  to  deny,90 
but  under  some  statutes  of  this  nature  it  has  been 


tion,   250   N.W.   849,   213  Wis.   106 
West  Side  Building  &  Loan  Ass1 
v.  Breuer,  250  N.W.  850,  213  Wis 
107,    West    Side   Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Continental  Discount  -Cor 
poration,    250   N.W.    850,    213  Wis 
10S,  and  Bast   Side  Mut.  Buildin, 
&  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Thoreson,  250  N 
W.  850,  213  Wis.  109— Black  Hawk 
State    Bank   v.    Kinzler,    215   N.W 
433,  194  Wis.  29— Marshall  Field  & 
Co.  v.   Fishkin,   192  N.W.  463,   18< 
Wis.  149. 

34  C.J.  p  429  note  79. 

During  term 

(1)  Where  motion  to  set  aside  de- 
fault judgment,  with  supporting  affi- 
davits, is  filed  during:  term  at  which 
default  judgment  was  entered,  trial 
court  exercises  a  wide  discretion. — 
Allemang   v.    White,    298    N.W.    658 
230  Iowa  526. 

(2)  A  motion   to  set  aside  a  de- 
fault  judgment,    made    promptly    a1 
the  same  term  of  court,  is  addressed 
to   judicial   discretion  of  trial  court 
without  the  restrictions  of  code  pro- 
visions relating  to  granting  of  a  new 
trial  when  there  has  been  a  hearing 
on  the  merits  of  the  case.— Vanover 
v.   Ashley,   183   S.W.2d  344,   298   Ely. 
722 — Carr   Creek    Community   Center 
v.  Home  Lumber  Co.,  125  S.W.2d  777, 
276  Ky.  -840. 

(3)  The  rule  that  trial  court  has 
wide  discretion  in  setting. aside  de- 
fault  judgment   and   that   appellate 
court  will  not  intervene  until  such 
discretion    is    abused    is    applicable 
only    when    timely    application    has 
been  made  at  the  same  term  in  which 
judgment    was    rendered. — State    ex 
rel.    Sterling    v.    -Shain,    129    S.W.2d 
1048,  344  Mo.  891. 

(4)  The  granting  of  motion  to  va- 
cate  default  judgment  during  term 
rests  within  trial  court's  sound  dis- 
cretion,  regardless  of  statute  relat- 
ing to  judgments  after  term. — Miller 
v.  -Smith,  12  N.R2d  296,  57  Ohio  App. 
127. 

(5)  Application,    during    term,    to 
vacate  default  judgment,  where  not 
founded  on  statutory  ground,  is  ad- 
dressed     to      court's      discretion. — 
Wheeler  v.  Walker,   294  P.  641,  147 
Okl.    63 — Arrington   v.   Wallace,    288 
P.    986,    143    Okl.    286— Kennedy    v. 
Martin,  223  P.  652,  101  Okl.  87. 


(6)  The  discretion  granted  tria 
judges  in  opening  or  vacating  thei 
judgments  during  the  term  extend 
to  a  reasonable  degree  in  both  direc 
tions. — Woodruff  v.  Moore,  77  P.  2 
62,  182  Okl.  120. 
After  term 

Application  to  vacate  default  judg- 
ment, filed  after  term  in  which  judg- 
ment was  rendered,  is  addressed  to 
sound  legal  discretion  of  court. — Up- 
ton v.  Shipley,  40  P.2d  1048,  170  Okl 
422— Standard  v.  Fisher,  35  P.2d  878 
169  Okl.  IS— First  State  Bank  of 
Vian  v.  Armstrong,  300  P.  763,  150 
Okl.  60— Morrell  v.  Morrell,  299  P 
86-6,  149  Okl.  187-^Lott  v.  Kansas 
Osage  Gas  Co.,  281  P.  297,  139  Okl. 
6— W.  W.  Bennett  &  Co.  v.  La  Fay- 
ette,  271  P.  248,  133  Okl.  233— 
Thompson  v.  Hensley,  261  P.  931,  128 
Okl.  139 — Bearman  v.  Bracken,  240 
P.  713,  112  Okl.  237. 
Before  entry  of  final  judgment 

(1)  Trial   court  has   discretionary 
power,  for  promotion  of  justice,   to 
remove   default   at   any  time   before 
judgment. — Doodlesack    v.    Superfine 
Coal  &  Ice  Corporation,  19S  N.EJ.  773, 
292   Mass.   424,    101  A.L.R.   1247. 

(2)  Under   the   statute,    a   motion 
to  set  aside  an  order  of  default  made 
before    entry    of    final    judgment    is 
within  the  discretion  of  trial  court 
to  grant  or  deny. — Johnston  v.  Medi- 
na Improvement  Club,  116  P.2d  272, 
10  Wash.2d  44. 

85.  N.M. — Ambrose  v.  Republic 
Mortg.  Co.,  34  P.2d  294,  38  N.M. 
370. 

S.D.— Cook  v.  Davis,  230  N.W.  765, 
57  S.D.  82. 

88.  Cal.— Riskin  v.  Towers,  148  P. 
2d  611,  24  Cal.2d  274,  153  A.L.R. 
442 — Peterson  v.  Taylor,  152  P. 
2d  349,  66  Oal.App.2d  333— Wein- 
berger v.  Manning,  123  P.2d  531, 
50  Cal.App.2d  494— Toon. v.  Pick- 
wick Stages,  Northern  Division, 
226  P.  628,  66  CaLApp.  450. 

Ga.— Rawls  v.  Bowers,  172  S.B.  687, 
48  Ga.App.  324. 

Ky.— Farris  v.  Ball,  79  S.W.2d  7, 
257  Ky.  683. 

Wash.— Roth  v.  Nash,  144   P.2d  271, 

19  Wash.2d  731. 
Sound  judicial  discretion" 
Exercise    of    "sound   judicial   dis- 1 

674 


cretion"  in  ruling  on  petition  to  va- 
cate default  judgment  imports  invo- 
cation by  clear  and  trained  mind  of 
reason,  courage,  impartiality,  and 
conscience  to  accomplish  in  calm 
spirit  result  in  conformity  to  law 
and  just  and  equitable  to  all  parties. 
— Kravetz  v.  Lipofsky,  200  N.B.  865, 
294  Mass.  80. 
As  rebuke  or  favor 

(1)  The  trial  court's  power  to  set 
aside  default  judgment  should  never 
be  withheld  as  a  rebuke  for  short- 
comings  in   practice,   and   it   should 
never  be  granted  as  a  favor. — Zim- 
merman v.  Segal,  155  S.W.2d  20,  288 
Ky.    33 — Latham   v.    Commonwealth, 
43    S.W.2d   44,    240   Ky.    826. 

(2)  Court's  discretion  to  set  aside 
default  judgment  is   not  to   be   ex- 
ercised ex  gratia. — Essig  v.  Seaman, 
264  P.  552,  89  Cal.App.  295. 

87.  Tex.— Craddock  v.  Sunshine  Bus 
Lines,    133    S.W.2d    124,    134    Tex. 
388— Southwestern  Specialty  Co.  v. 
Brown,  CUv.App.,  188  S.W.2d  1002, 
error  refused. 

88.  Pa.— Hamilton  v.  Sechrist,  16  A. 
2d    671,    142   Pa.Super.    354. 

Tenn.— Wright  v.  Lindsay,  140  S.W. 
2d  793,  24  Tenn.App.  77. 

89.  Wash.— Roth  v.  Nash,  144  P.2d 
271,  19  Wash.2d  731. 

9a  Cal.— Daniels  v.  Colkins,  255  P. 
182,  201  Cal.  10. 

Ind. — State  ex  rel.  Karsch  v.  Eby, 
33  NJE.2d  336,  218  Ind.  431— Padol 
v.  Home  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  27  N.E. 
2d  917,  108  Ind.App.  401. 

Kan. — Cassell  v.  Cassell,  166  P.2d 
669,  161  Kan.  72. 

Mich. — McDowell  v.  Mecosta  Cir. 
Judge,  144  N.W.  498,  178  Mich.  103. 

Minn. — Kane  v.  Stallman,  296  N.W. 
1,  209  Minn.  138 — Madsen  v.  Pow- 
ers, 260  N.W.  510,  194  Minn.  418. 

Mo.— Osage  Inv,  Co.  v.  Sigrist,  250 
S.W.  39,  298  Mo.  139. 

N'.J. — Security  Trust  Co.  of  Potts- 
town  v.  Anderson,  159  A.  310,  10 
NJT.Misc.  352. 

N".C. — J.  B.  Bassett  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Rhyne,  135  S.B.  926,  192  'N.C.  735. 

Okl. — Richards  v.  Baker,  99  P.2d  118, 
186  Okl.  533— Ambrister  v.  Done- 
hew,  83  P.2d  544,  1S3  Okl.  595 — 
Wise  v.  Davis,  269  P.  248,  132 
OkL  65— Berkey  v.  Rader,  244  P. 


49    C.J.& 


JUDGMENTS 


§337 


held  that  the  granting  of  the  application  by  the 
court  is  not  mandatory  but  is  dependent  on  the 
court's  sound  legal  discretion,91  although  it  is  an 
abuse  of  discretion  to  refuse  to  vacate  the  judg- 
ment if  a  meritorious  defense  is  presented  which,  if 
proved,  would  as  a  matter  of  law  require  a  judg- 
ment in  favor  of  defendant.92 

(3)  Merits  of  Cause  of  Action  or  Defense 
As  a  general  rule  under  the  statutes  providing  for 
proceedings  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judgment  the 
court  must  determine  whether  or  not  the  applicant  has 
a  valid  cause  of  action  or  a  meritorious  defense  before 
it  may  open  or  vacate  a  default  judgment. 

As  a  general  rule  under  the  statutes  the  court  may  I 


not  open  or  vacate  a  default  judgment  until  it  has 
determined  that  applicant  has  a  valid  cause  of  ac- 
tion or  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  judgment  ren- 
dered98 In  proceedings  under  some  statutes  the 
court  is  limited  to  a  determination  of  whether  or 
not  a  valid  defense  is  presented  by  the  motion  and 
affidavits,  and  it  may  not  conduct  a  hearing  on  the 
merits,94  or 'consider  controverting  affidavits  or  ev- 
idence,95 to  determine  whether  the  asserted  cause 
of  action  or  defense  should  prevail,  but  under  other 
statutes  it  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  will  not 
be  vacated  until  a  trial  on  the  merits  has  been  had 
and  the  validity  of  the  defense  asserted  has  been 
established.96  Under  the  latter  statutes  the  court 


184,   116  Okl.  258— Wall  v.  Snider, 
219  P.  671,  93  Okl.  99. 
Tex.— Middleton  v.   Moore,   Civ.App., 
4    S.W.2d    ,9SS,    reversed    on    other 
grounds  Moore  v.  Middleton,  Com. 
App.,  12  S.W.2d  995. 
Utah.— Naisbitt    v.    Herrick,    290    P. 

950,  76  Utah  575. 

•VV.Va. — State  v.  American  Piano- 
graph  Co.,  123  S.B.  410,  96  W.Va. 
574. 

34  C.J.  p  426  note  47. 
laches 

If  the  question  of  laches  is  pre- 
sented, a  case  arises  for  the  exer- 
cise of  th«  discretion  of  the  court, 
and  it  must  determine  whether  or 
not  the  laches  is  of  a  character  that 
should  preclude  the  relief. — Boland 
v.  All  Persons,  Etc.,  117  P.  -547,  160 
Cal.  486— Tucker  v.  Tucker,  139  P. 
2d  348,  59  Cal.App.2d  557. 

Good  cause 

Whether  a  motion  states  "good 
cause,"  within  statute  providing  that 
defendant  against  whom  judgment 
is  rendered  on  service  by  publica- 
tion may  move  for  new  trial  on 
showing  good  cause,  is  within  trial 
court's  discretion. — Smith  v.  Higgin- 
botham,  Tex.Civ.App.,  112  S.W.2d  770 
— Strickland  v.  Baugh,  Tex.Civ.App. 
169  S.W.  181. 
pinng  motion,  and  service  of  notice 

The  filing  and  service  of  a  no- 
tice of  motion  to  set  aside  default 
Judgment,  followed  by  a  motion  for 
relief  from  the  default  and  proof 
that  notice  and  motion  is  seasona- 
bly given  and  made,  constitutes  a 
prima  facie  showing  in  favor  of  a 
defendant  against  whom  a  default 
judgment  has  been  obtained.— Nahas 
v.  Nahas,  92  P.2d  718,  59  Nev.  220 

91.  Ariz.— Southwest  Metals  Co.  v 
Snedaker,  129  P.2d  314,  59  Ariz.  374 
— Perrin  v.  Perrin  Properties,  86  P 
2d  23,  53  Ariz.  121,  122  A.L.R.  621 

Colo. — Redeker  v.  Denver  Music  Co. 
265  P.  681,  83  Colo.  870— Perry  v 
Perry,   219   P.   221,   74  Colo.   106 — 
Bunnell  v.  Holmes,  171  P.  365,  6 
Colo.  345. 

92.  Ariz.— Evans  v.  Hallas,  167  P,2d 


94— Southwest  Metals  Co.  v.  Sned- 

aker,    129    P.2d   314,    59    Ariz.    374. 
93.    Ariz.— Brown  v.  Beck,   169  P.2d 

855— Michener    v.    Standard    Acci- 
dent Ins.  Co.,  47  P.2d  438,  46  Ariz. 

66. 
[owa.— - Allemang  v.  White,  298  N.W. 

658,  230  Iowa  526. 
N.C.— Parnell  v.   Ivey,   197   S.E.   128, 

213  N.C.  644 — Cayton  v.  Clark,  193 

S.E.  404,  212  N.C.  374. 
Ohio.— Morrison   v.    Baker,   App.,    58 

N.E.2d  708. 
Okl. — Turner  v.  Dexter,  44  P.2d  984, 

172  Okl.  252. 
R.I.— Nelen    v.    Wells,    123    A.    599, 

45  R.I.  424. 
Wyo, — James    v.    Lederer-Strauss    & 

Co.,  233  P.  137,  32  Wyo.  377. 
34  C.J.  p  374  note  2,  p  375  note  9- 

p  376  note  11. 
Matters  not  raised  by  pleadings 

On  motion  to  set  aside  default 
judgment,  insurance  companies, 
claiming  defense  of  failure  to  file 
proof  of  loss,  were  not  required  to 
Introduce  question  of  waiver  not 
raised  by  pleadings.— Smith  v.  Globe 
&  Rutgers  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  295  S.W. 
388,  174  Ark.  346,  followed  in  Death- 
erage  v.  Dennison,  295  S.W.  390,  173 
Ark.  1180. 
Postponement  until  retrial 

Final  determination  of  defense, 
claimed  on  motion  to  vacate  judg- 
ment, is  postponed  until  retrial. — 
Smith  v.  Globe  &  Rutgers  Fire  Ins. 
Co.,  295  S.W.  388,  174  Ark.  346,  fol- 
lowed in  Deatherage  v.  Dennison, 
295  S.W.  390,  173  Ark.  1180. 

94.  Cal. — Sheehan  v.  Pioneer  Lucky 
Strike  Gold  Mining  Co.,  54  P.2d 
72,  11  Cal.App.2d  530— Cann  v 
Parker,  258  P.  105,  84  CaLApp.  379, 

Iowa.— Hatt  v.  McCurdy,  274  N.W 
72,  223  Iowa  974— Brotk  v.  Ells- 
worth State  Sav.  Bank,  186  N.W 
3,  192  Iowa  1042. 

N.Y.— Karchman  v.  Karchman,  227  N 
Y.S.  194,  131  Misc.  462,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  230  N.Y.S.  856 
224  App.Div.  773. 

B,I._Nelen  v.  Wells,  123  A.  599,  45 
R.I.  424. 

675 


S.D. — Cleveland  Stone  Co.  v.  Holling- 
worth,   244  N.W.   917,    60   S.D.   499. 
W.Va. — Womeldorff  &  Thomas  Co.  v. 
Moore,  163  S.E.  47,  111  W.Va.  691. 
;4  C.J.  p  375  notes  6-8. 
Availability  of  evidence 

Whether  the  defense  alleged  could 
be  supported  by  evidence  is  not  con- 
sidered on  the  hearing. — Rosebor- 
ough  v.  Campbell,  115  P.2d  839,  46 
Cal.App.2d  257. 

95.  Cal. — Salsberry  v.  Julian,  277  P. 
516,  98  CaLApp.  638,  followed  in 
277  P.  518,  amended  278  P.  257, 
98  CaLApp.  645. 

S.D. — Cleveland  Stone  Co.  v.  Hoi- 
lingworth,  244  N.W.  917,  60  S.D. 
499. 

Counter-affidavits  generally  see  su- 
pra subdivision  h  of  this  section. 

Allegations  deemed  true 

(1)  In  considering  whether  a  mer- 
itorious defense  was  presented  by  de- 
fendant moving  to  have  default  judge- 
ment rendered  on  service  by  publi- 
cation set  aside,   allegations   of  an- 
swer and  cross-complaint  are  deemed 
to  be  true. — Evans  v.  Hallas,  Ariz., 
167  P.2d  94. 

(2)  Statements,  in  verified  petition 
for  review  of  default  Judgment,  that 
allegations     of     plaintiff's     petition, 
were    untrue    and    that    defendants 
had   a   good   defense    to    the    action, 
were    considered    conclusively    true 
for  purpose  of  showing  good  cause 
for    setting    aside    the    judgment. — 
Garrison  v.  Schmicke,  Mo.,  193  S.W. 
2d  614. 

96.    Ohio.— National  Guaranty  &  Fi- 
nance  Co.   v.   Lindimore,   App.,    31 
N.E.2d   155 — Rabinovitz  v.   Novak, 
App.,  31  N.E.2'd  151. 
Wyo. — Cottonwood  Sheep  Co.  v.  Mur- 
phy,   44    P.2d    1000,    48   Wyo.    250, 
98  A.L.R.  1373— James  v.  Lederer- 
Strauss  &  Co.,  233  P.  137,  32  Wyo. 
377. 
34  C.J.  P  375  note  5. 

On  motion  within  term  time  where 
the  court's  jurisdiction  is  not  de- 
pendent on  statute,  the  truth  of  al- 
legations of  valid  defense  is  not  to 
be  considered  on  motion  to  vacate 


§  337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


must  first  adjudicate  that  a  meritorious  ground  for 
vacating  the  judgment  exists,  and  after  it  does  so 
it  proceeds  to  a  trial  on  the  merits.97  Under  some 
statutes,  where  a  default  judgment  is  based  on  per- 
sonal service  of  process,  on  a  motion  to  vacate  made 
on  grounds  such  as  excusable  neglect  or  unavoid- 
able casualty  a  final  determination  of  the  validity 
of  the  defense  may  not  be  made,98  but  at  most  the 
court  can  hear  evidence  only  to  determine  whether 
defendant  could  present  a  prima  facie  defense;99 
but  if  judgment  has  been  rendered  on  constructive 
service  the  merits  of  the  suit  may  be  determined  in 
connection  with  the  hearing  of  the  motion  in  or- 
der to  avoid  trial  of  the  two  issues  by  piecemeal.1 


(4)  Principles  and  Rules  of  Decision 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judg- 
ment should  be  disposed  of  In  accordance  with  fixed  le- 
gal and  equitable  principles,  to  serve  the  ends  of  sub- 
stantial Justice.  The  court  should  exercise  its  power 
liberally  to  relieve  from  the  judgment  and  It  should  re- 
solve a  real  doubt  In  favor  of  the  application. 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judg- 
ment should  be  disposed  of  in  accordance  with  fixed 
legal2  and  equitable3  principles  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  serve,  and  not  to  defeat  or  impede,  the  ends  of 
substantial  justice.4  Courts  usually  are  liberal  in 
opening  judgments  entered  for  want  of  appearance 
if  the  default  was  not  willful,5  and,  where  defend- 
ant has  a  reasonable  excuse  and  appears  to  have  a 


default— Resnick  v.  Paryzek,  154  N. 
B.  350,  23  Ohio  App.  327. 
Judgment  on  constructive   service 

If  judgment  has  been  rendered  on 
constructive  service  the  judgment 
will  not  be  vacated  until  after  a 
hearing  on  the  merits. — Davis  v. 
Collums,  168  S.W.2d  1103,  205  Ark. 
390 — American  Inv.  Co.  v.  Gleason, 
28  S.W.2d  70,  181  Ark.  739— More- 
land  v.  Youngblood,  247  S.W.  385, 
157  Ark.  86 — Gleason  v.  Boone,  185 
S.W.  1093,  123  Ark.  523. 

97.  Ohio. — Rabinovitz      v.      Novak, 
App.,  31  N.E.2d  151. 

98.  Tex.— Cragin       v.       Henderson 
County  Oil  Development  Co.,  Com. 
App.,  280  S.W.  554— Smith  v.  Hig^ 
ginbotham,    Civ.App.,    141    S.W.2d 
752,   affirmed   158    S.W.2d   481,    138 
Tex.   227 — Bablngton  v.  Gray,  Civ. 
App.,     71    S.W.2d    293 — Chaney    v. 
Allen,    Civ.App.,    25    S.W.2d    1115— 
Sneed  v.  Sneed,  Civ. App.,  296  S.W. 
643— First  Nat.  Bank  T.  Southwest 
Nat  Bank  of  Dallas,  Civ. App.,  273 
S.W.  951. 

99.  Tex.— Cragin       v.        Henderson 
County  Oil  Development  Co.,  Com. 
App.,  280  S.W.  554— Lawther  Grain 
Co.  v.  Winniford,  Com.App.,  249  S. 
W.    195 — Babington   v.    Gray,    Civ. 
App.,    71    S.W.2d    293— Chaney    v. 
Allen,    Civ.App.,    25    S.W.2d   1115— 
Sneed   v.    Sneed,   Civ.App.,    296    S. 
W.  643. 

1.  Tex. — Harris  v.  Sugg,  Civ.App., 
143  S.W.2d  149,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct — Smith  v.  Hiff- 
ginbotham,  Civ.App.,  141  ..S.W.2d 
752,  affirmed  158  S.W.2d  481,  138 
Tex.  227 — Ashton  y.  Farrell  &  Co., 
Civ.App.,  121  S.W.2d  611,  error 
dismissed. 
»T0w  cause  of  action 

Where  motion  for  new  trial  was 
filed  by  party  who  was  served  by 
publication  in  action  on  note,  and, 
in  answer  to  the  motion,  plaintiff 
filed  amended  answer  wherein  plain- 
tiff set  up  cause  of  action  on  a  re- 
newal of  the  note,  action  of  trial 
court  in  refusing  to  grant  motion 
to  confine  hearing  to  Question  of  new  1 


trial  and  to  strike  the  new  cause 
of  action  set  up  by  plaintiff  was  not 
error. — Smith  v.  Higginbotham,  158 
S.W.2d  481,  138  Tex.  227. 

2.  Cal. — Weinberger  v.  Manning,  123 
P.2d  531,  50  Cal.App.2d  494. 

Idaho. — Voellmeck  v.  Northwestern 
Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  92  P.2d  1076, 
60  Idaho  412. 

Wash.— Roth  v.  Nash,  144  P.2d  271, 
19  Washed  731— Bishop  v.  Illman, 
126  P.2d  582,  14  Wash.2d  13. 

Statutory  law 

(1)  Court  cannot  ignore  statutory 
law  in  exercising  discretion  in  per- 
mitting default  Judgment  to  be  va- 
cated.— Essig  v.  Seaman,  264  P.  552, 
89  Cal.App.  295. 

(2)  While    trial    court    has    large 
discretion  in  setting  aside  a  default, 
such  discretion   cannot  be  exercised 
in  contravention  of  statute. — Upmier 
v.  Freese,  202  N.W.  3,  199  Iowa  405. 

3.  Ky. — Clements  v.  Kell,  39  S.W.2d 
663,  239  Ky.  396. 

Pa. — Quaker  City  Chocolate  &  Con- 
fectionery Co.  v.  Warnock  Bldg. 
Ass'n,  32  A.2d  5,  347  Pa.  186— Wei- 
zel  v.  Link-Belt  Co.,  35  A.2d  596, 
154  Pa.Super.  66. 

Tex. — Sunshine  Bus  Lines  v.  Crad- 
dock,  Civ.App.,  112  S.W.2d  248,  af- 
firmed Craddock  v.  Sunshine  Bus 
Lines,  133  S.W.2d  124,  134  Tex. 
388. 

4.  Ala. — Sovereign  Camp,  W.  O.  W., 
v.   Gay,    104   So.    895,   20   Ala,App. 
650,    reversed    on  .other    grounds 
104  So.  898,  213  Ala.  5. 

Cal. — Peterson   v.    Taylor,    152    P.2d 

349,    66    CaJ.App.2d    333— Bodin    v. 

Webb,   62   P.2d  155,   17  Cal.App.2d 

422 — Toon     v.     Pickwick     Stages, 

Northern  Division,   226  P.   628,   66 

Cal.App.  450. 
111. — Cooper  v.  Handelsman,  247  111. 

App.  454. 
Ky.— Farris  v.  Ball,  79  S.W.2d  7,  257 

Ky.  683. 
N.T. — Glamore  Motor  Sales  v.  Brod- 

erick,  20  N.Y.S.2d  553,  259  App.Div. 

1022. 
Okl.— State  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Liddell, 

61    P.2d    1075,    178    OkL    114— Up-, 

676 


ton  v.  Shipley,  40  P.2d  1048,  170 
Okl.  422— Standard  v.  Fisher,  35 
P.2d  878,  169  Okl.  18— First  State 
Bank  of  Vian  v.  Armstrong,  300  P. 
763,  150  Okl.  60— Morrell  v.  Mor- 
rell,  299  P.  866,  149  Okl.  187— Lott 
v.  Kansas  Osage  Gas  Co.,  281  P. 
297,  139  Okl.  6 — Thompson  v.  Hens- 
ley,  261  P.  931,  128  Okl.  139— Bear- 
man  v.  Bracken,  240  P.  713,  112 
Okl.  237. 

Or.— Nichols  v.  Nichols,  149  P.2d  572, 
174  Or.  390 — Snyder  v.  Consolidat- 
ed Highway  Co.,  72  P.2d  932,  157 
Or.  479 — Peters  v.  Dietrich,  27  P. 
2d  1015,  145  Or.  589. 

S.C. — Savage  v.  Cannon,  30  S.E.2d  70, 
204  S.C.  473. 

Wash.— Larson  v.  Zabroski,  152  P.2d 
154,  21  Wash.2d  572,  opinion  ad- 
hered to  155  P.2d  284,  21  Wash. 2 d 
572. 

5.    Cal. — Hammond    Lumber    Co.    v. 

Bloodgood,    281    P.    1101,    101    Cal. 

App.  561. 
Iowa. — Allemang  v.  White,  298  N.W. 

658,  230  Iowa  526. 
Mass. — Cohen  v.   Industrial  Bank  & 

Trust  Co.,   175  N.B.   78,   274   Mass. 

498. 
Minn. — Zell  v.  Friend,  Crosby  &  Co., 

199  N.W.  928,  160  Minn.  181. 
N.T.— Iger  v.  Boyd-Scott  Co.,  290  N. 

T.S.    619,    248   AppJDiv.    902— Long 

Island  Trading  Corporation  v.  Tut- 

hill,    276   N.Y.S.    477,    243    App.Div. 

617 — Baldwin  v.  Yellow  Taxi  Cor- 
poration, 225  N.Y.S.  423,  221  App. 

Div.  717,  followed  in  Woodward  v. 

Weekes,   241  N.Y.S.    842,   228   App. 

Div.    870— New   York   State   Labor 

Relations    Board   v.    Paragon,    Oil 

Co.,  45  N.Y.S.2d  152. 
Or. — Marsters    v.    Ashton,    107    P.2d 

981,   165  Or.  507. 
R.I. — Corpus   Juris  cited  la  Borden 

v.  Briggs,  142  A.  144,  49  R.I.  207. 
34  C.J.  p  429  note  80. 

In  ejectment,  where  a  proposed  de- 
fense has  merits  the  courts  are  very 
liberal  in  setting  aside  a  regular  de- 
fault on  equitable  terms. — Tennessee 
Coal,  Iron  &  R.  Co.  v.  Wise,  49  So. 
253,  159  Ala.  632—19  C.J.  p  12U 
notes  82-86. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  337 


meritorious  defense,  the  court  should  freely  and 
liberally  exercise  its  power  to  relieve  .from  the  de- 
fault judgment,6  unless  the  granting  of  the  appli- 
cation will  unduly  prejudice  plaintiff  by  delay  or 


otherwise.7  A  real  doubt  should  be  resolved  in  fa- 
vor  of  the  application,8  as  the  law  favors  a  dispo- 
sition of  cases  on  the  merits.9  Default  judgments 
will  be  opened  or  vacated  more  readily  than  a  judg- 


During  term 

(1)  An  effort  to  set  aside  a  de- 
fault judgment,  made  promptly  at 
the  same  term  of  court  when  no 
such  fixation  of  rights  has  occurred 
that  the  setting  aside  of  judgment 
would  prejudice  anybody,  is  regard- 
ed with  favor. — Vanover  v.  Ashley, 
183  S.W.2d  944,  298  Ky.  722. 

(•S)  Courts  adopt  a  liberal  attitude 
in  setting  aside  default  judgments 
during  the  term  at  which  they  were 
rendered,  and  permitting  defense  to 
be  made,  and  a  party  applying  to 
have  a  default  judgment  set  aside  is 
not  required  to  show  himself  strict- 
ly entitled  to  the  legal  relief  under 
statutes  regulating  granting  of  new 
trial. — Bond  v.  W.  T.  Congleton  Co., 
129  S.W.2d  570,  278  Ky.  829. 

(3)  In  passing  on  applications  to 
strike    out    default    judgment    when 
such   applications   are   made   at   the 
same  term  at  which  judgments  are 
entered,  courts  usually  act  liberally 
and  on  reasonable  proof  of  merit  and 
other  equitable  circumstances,  strike 
out  the  judgment,  and  let  defendant 
in   to   be  heard. — Eddy  v.   Summers, 
He.,  39   A.2d  812. 

(4)  Courts  are  usually  liberal   in 
opening  default  or  setting  aside  de- 
cree  or  judgment  during  term,   but 
different   rule   obtains  after  term. — 
Sleeves   v.   Steeves,   9  P.2d  815,   139 
Or.  261. 

Proceedings   under  statute   or  Inde- 
pendent suit 

The  courts  are  more  inclined  to 
open  up  default  judgment  under 
statute  authorizing  such  relief  for 
mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  or 
excusable  neglect  than  to  vacate 
judgment  in  an  independent  suit. 
Matloon  v.  Cole,  143  P.2d  679,  172 
Or.  CC4— Hartley  v.  Rice,  261  P.  689, 
123  Or.  237. 

6.  Cal. — Dunn  v.  Standard  Accident 
Ins.  Co.,  299  P.  575,  114  CaLApp. 
208— Carbondale  Mach.  Co.  v.  Ey- 
raud,  271  P.  349,  94  CaLApp.  356. 

Colo. — Drinkard  v.  Spencer,  211  P. 
379,  72  Colo.  396. 

Fla. — Coggin  v.  Barfield,  8  So.2d  9, 
150  Fla.  551. 

Iowa. — Lemley  v.  Hopson,  232  N.W. 
811. 

Kan.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Amer- 
ican State  Bank  of  Hill  City  v, 
Richardson,  38  P.2d  96,  97,  140 
Kan.  555. 

Ky. — Bond  v.  W.  T.  Congleton  Co, 
129     S.W.2d    570,     278    Ky.    829— 
Steuerle   v.   T.   B.   Duncan   &  Co, 
299  S.W.  205,  221  Ky.  501. 

Minn, — Bearman  Fruit  Co,  v.  Parker, 
3  N,W.2d  501,  212  Minn.  327. 


Mo. — Henneke  v.  Strack,  App.,  101  S.  | 

W.2d  743. 

Mont. — Madson  v.  Petrie  Tractor  & 
Equipment  Co.,  77  P.2d  103S,  106 
Mont.  382— First  Nat.  Corporation 
v.  Perrine,  43  P.2d  1073,  99  Mont. 
454. 
Okl.— Slyman  v.  State,  228  P.  979, 

102  Okl.   241. 
S.C. — Savage    v.    Cannon,    30    S.E.2d 
70,   204   S.C.  473— Gaskins  v.   Cali- 
fornia Ins.  Co.,  11  S.B.2d  436,  195 
S.C.  376. 

S.D. — Gubele    v.    Methodist    Deacon- 
ess   Hospital   of   Rapid   City,    225 
N.W.  57,  55  S.D.  100. 
Tex. — Gordon   v.   Williams,   Civ.App., 

164  S.W.2d  867. 
34  C.J.  p  372  note  84,  p  430  notes  S4- 

88. 
Default  due  to  counsel's  mistake 

Generally  default  judgment  due 
to  mistake  of  counsel  will  be  opened 
where  application  is  promptly  made, 
reasonable  excuse  is  offered,  and  de- 
fense on  merits  shown. — Page  v. 
Patterson,  161  A.  878,  105  Pa.Super. 
438. 

7.  Tex. — Southwestern  Specialty  Co. 
v.     Brown,     Civ.App.f     188     S.W.2d 
1002,  error  refused — National  Mut. 
Casualty  Co.  v.  Lambert,  Civ.App., 
149    S.W.2d   1086,   error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 

34  C.J.  p  430  note  88. 

Caution  must  toe  used  in  setting 
aside  default  decree,  lest  negligent 
be  rewarded  to  detriment  of  honest 
and  diligent — Hyde  Park  Sav.  Bank 
v.  Davankoskas,  11  N.E.2d  3,  298 
Mass.  421. 
Paotors  for  consideration 

In  considering  whether  plaintiff 
will  suffer  injury  by  vacation  of 
judgment,  it  is  not  considered  that 
plaintiff  has  any  vested  rights  in 
shutting  out  a  meritorious  defense, 
but  questions  of  unreasonable  delay, 
expense,  or  hardship  are  determina- 
tive factors. — Borger  v.  Mineral 
Wells  Clay  Products  Co.,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  80  S,W.2d  333. 
Prejudice  not  shown 

l. — Morgan  v.  Brothers  of  Chris- 
tian Schools,  92  P.2d  925,  34  CaL 
App.2d  14. 

8.  Ariz.— Brown   v.    Beck,    169    P.2d 
855. 

Cal._Brill  v.  Fox,  297  P.  25,  211 
Cal.  739 — Waite  v.  Southern  Pac. 
Co.,  221  P.  204,.  192  Cal.  467— Bodin 
v.  Webb,  62  P.2d  155,  17  CaLApp. 
2d  422 — Endicott  v.  Southern  Cal- 
ifornia Cleaners  and  Dyers,  App., 
6  P.2d  556 — Williams  v.  McQueen, 
265  P.  339,  89  Cal.App.  659 — Cor- 
giat  v.  Realty  Mortg.  Corporation 

677 


of  California,  260  P.  573,  86  Cal. 
App.  37. 

Fla. — state  Bank  of  Eau  Gallie  v, 
Raymond,  138  So.  40,  103  Fla.  649.  , 

Ind.— United  Taxi  Co.  v.  Dilworth,  20 
N.B.2d  699,  106  Ind.App.  627 — Rid- 
dle v.  McNaughton,  163  N.E.  846, 
88  Ind.  App.  352 — Christ  v.  Jo  van- 
off,  151  N.E.  26,  84  Ind.App.  676, 
rehearing  denied  152  N.E.  2,  84 
Ind. App.  676. 

Kan.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ameri- 
can State  Bank  of  Hill  City  v. 
Richardson,  38  P.2d  96,  97,  140 
Kan.  555. 

Okl.— Morrell  v.  Morreil,  299  P.  866, 
149  Okl.  187. 

Utah.— Hurd  v.  Ford,  276  P.  908,  74 
Utah  4C. 

34  C.J.  p  372  note  84,  p  429  note  82. 

9.  Ariz. — Brown  v.  Beck,  169  P.2d 
855. 

Cal.— Kalson  v.  Percival,  20  P.2d  380, 
217  Cal.  568— Waite  v.  Southern 
Pac.  Co.,  221  P.  204,  192  Cal.  467— 
McMahon  v.  McMahon,  160  P.2d 
892,  70  Cal.App.2d  126— Potts  v. 
Whitson,  125  P.2d  947,  52  CaLApp. 
2d  199 — Thompson  v.  Sutton,  122 
P.2d  975,  50  Cal.App.2d  272— Nich- 
olls  v.  Anders,  56  P.2d  1289,  13 
Cal.App.2d  440— Endicott  v.  South- 
ern California  Cleaners  and  Dyers, 
App.,  6  P.2d  556 — Shupe  v.  Evans, 
261  P.  492,  86  CaLApp.  700. 

Colo. — Mountain  States  Silver  Min- 
ing Co.  v.  Hukill,  244  P.  605,  79 
Colo.  128. 

111.— Rapp  v.  Goerlitz,  40  N.E.2d  767, 
314  IlLApp.  191. 

Iowa.— Craig  v.  Welch,  2  N.W.2d  745, 

231  Iowa  1009 — Allemang  v.  Whit*, 
298  N.W.   658,   230  Iowa  526 — Fer- 
ris   V.    Wulf,    249    N.W.     156,    216 
Iowa  289 — Cedar  Rapids  Finance  & 
Thrift  Co.  v.  Bowen,  233  N.W.  495, 
211  Iowa  1207 — Lemley  v.  Hopson, 

232  N.W.    811— Rounds    v.    Butler, 
227  N.W.  417,  208  Iowa  1391,  fol- 
lowed in  227  N.W.  419. 

Miss. — Strain  v.  Gay  den,  20  So.2d 
697,  197  Miss.  353. 

Mo.— Hartle  v.  Hartle,  App.,  184  S. 
W.2d  786 — Karst  v.  Chicago  Fra- 
ternal Life  Ass'n,  App.,  22  S.W.2d 
178. 

Mont — Madson  v.  Petrie  Tractor  & 
Equipment  Co.,  77  P.2d  1038,  106 
Mont.  382 — First  Nat.  Corporation 
v.  Perrine,  43  P.2d  1073,  99  Mont. 
454. 

Okl.— Haskell  v.  Cutler,  108  P.2d  146, 
188  Okl.  239— State  ex  rel.  Higjgrs 
v.  Muskogee  Iron  Works,  103  P.2d 
101,  187  Okl.  419 — Morrell  v.  Mor- 
rell, 299  .P.  866,  149  Okl.  187— 
Bearman  v.  Bracken,  240  P.  713, 
112  Okl.  237. 

Or.— Marsters    v.    Ashton,    107    P.2d 


337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


merit  rendered  after  defendant  has  had  his  day  in 
court  and  been  heard  in  his  own  behalf,10  or  one 
entered  on  a  confession  of  judgment.11  Where 
there  are  circumstances  of  fraud  or  great  oppres- 
sion in  the  case,  a  default  will  be  readily  opened.12 
Generally  courts  look  with  more  favor  on  an  ap- 
plication by  a  defaulted  defendant  than  on  a  similar 
application  by  a  defaulted  plaintiff.18 

The  court  cannot  properly  vacate  a  default  judg- 
ment without  sufficient  cause,14  and  where  defend- 
ant fails  to  show  good  grounds  for  setting  the  de- 


fault judgment  or  decree  aside,15  or  fails  to  bring 
himself  within  the  terms  of  the  statute  granting  re- 
lief,16 the  application  is  properly  denied. 

Whether  or  not  relief  should  be  granted  to  ap- 
plicant or  whether  the  court  has  abused  its  discre- 
tion in  granting  or  refusing  relief  depends  on  the 
peculiar  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  individual 
case,17  and  under  particular  facts  and  circumstanc- 
es the  opening  or  vacating  of  a  default  judgment 
has  been  held  to  be,18  or  has  been  held  not  to  be,19 
improper  or  an  abuse  of  discretion,  or  a  refusal  to 


9  81,      165      Or.      507 — Steeves      v. 

Steeves,  9  P.2d  815,  139  Or.  261. 
34  CJT.  p  429  note  83. 
10.    Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 

American  State  Bank  of  Hill  City 

v.  Richardson,   38  P.2d  96,   97,  140 

Kan.  555. 
Okl.— Haskell  v.  Cutler,  108  P.2d  146, 

188  Okl.  239. 
84  <XJ.  p  429  note  80. 
U.     Pa.— Roth  v.  Pechin,  103  A.  894, 

260   Pa.   450 — Scranton  Supply  Co. 

v.  Cooper,  4  Pa.C.Pl.  103. 
12.     N.Y. — Greer  v.   Tweed.   13   Abb. 

FrMN.S.,  427. 
Tex. — Crosby  v.  Di  Palma,  Civ.App., 

141  S.W.  321. 
18.     Or. — Snyder       v.       Consolidated 

Highway  Co.,  72  P.2d  932,  157  Or. 

479. 
Season  for  rule 

Plaintiff,  who  begins  the  litigation, 
generally  may  withdraw  his  suit 
and  begin  again  without  material 
prejudice,  while  defendant  cannot 
abandon  the  case  against  himself. — 
McAuliffe  v.  McAuliffe,  298  P.  239, 
136  Or.  168. 

ML    N.Y.— Utica  Gas  &  Electric  Co. 

v.    Sherman,    208    N.Y.S.    594,    212 

App.Div.  472. 
SJX— Cook  v.  Davis,  230  N.W.  765,  57 

S.D.  82. 

15.    Ala. — Kaplan  v.  Potera,   105   So. 

177,  213  Ala,  334. 

HL— Pikora  v.  Pilgrim  Nat.  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  10  N.E.2d  894,  292  IlLApp. 
634. 

N.C. — Kerr  v.  North  Carolina  Joint 
Stock  Land  Bank  of  Durham,  171 
S.B.  367,  205  N.C.  410 — Chapman 
v.  Lineberry,  140  S.B.  302,  194 
N.C.  811. 

Pa. — Schwartz  v.  Stewart,  55  PaJMst. 
&  Co.  633,  5  Lawrence  L.J.  1 — 
Wood  v.  Whitmore,  27  Pa.Dist.  & 
Co.  545,  37  Lack.Jur.  57 — Oltorik  v. 
Bozer,  Com.Pl.,  40  Lack.Jur.  25. 
Great  injustice  as  sole  grounds 

Fact  that  refusal  to  open  default 
Judgment  would  result  in  great  in- 
justice to  defendant,  failing  to  an- 
swer without  sufficient  excuse,  does 
not  justify  vacation  thereof. — Rut- 
ledge  v.  Junior  Order  of  United 
American  Mechanics,  193  S.B.  434, 
185  S.C.  142. 


failure  to  redeem 

Where  a  judgment  by  default,  bar- 
ring redemption,  has  been  rendered 
against  a  junior  encumbrancer 
through  his  excusable  neglect,  and 
he  learns  of  the  judgment  while  the 
period  of  redemption  is  running,  but 
fails  to  redeem,  he  cannot  have  the 
judgment  vacated. — Becker  v.  Tell 
City  Bank,  41  N.B.  323,  142  Ind.  99. 
Failure  to  except  to  said 

The  chancellor  properly  refused  to 
reopen  a  mortgage  foreclosure  ac- 
tion wherein  a  default  judgment  was 
rendered  where  parties,  although 
sui  juris  and  properly  before  the 
court  when  judgment  was  rendered, 
failed  to  except  to  the  report  of  sale 
which  was  confirmed. — Colston  v. 
Mitchell's  Adm'x,  175  S.W.2d  1020, 
296  Ky.  1. 

16.  Ga. — Fitzgerald    v.    Perran,    124 
S.E.  530,  158  Ga,  755. 

Iowa. — Upmier  v.  Freese,  202  N.W.  8, 

199  Iowa  405. 
Refusal  of  relief  on  motion 

Where  the  facts  are  not  sufficient 
to  justify  relief  on  motion  filed  un- 
der the  statute,  defendant  may  be 
left  to  his  remedy  by  action  to  have 
it  set  aside. — Warren  v.  Resaake,  208 
N.W.  564,  54  N.D.  65— Campbell  v. 
Coulston,  124  N.W.  689,  19'  N.D.  645. 
Absence  of  objection 

Where  failure  to  comply  with  stat- 
utory provisions  regarding  opening  a 
default  was  not  objected  to  at  time 
of  hearing,  motion  to  set  aside  de- 
fault judgment  was  held  properly 
sustained.— Hooper  v.  Weathers,  165 
S.B.  52,  175  Ga.  133. 

17.  Mont.— Reynolds  v.  Gladys  Belle 
Oil  Co.,  243  P.  576,  75  Mont.  332. 

Okl. — Sudik  v.  Sinclair  Oil  &  Gas 
Co.,  44  P.2d  954,  172  Okl.  334— 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kerr,  24  P.2d 
985.  165  Okl.  16— Hall  v.  Price, 
277  P.  239,  136  Okl.  202 — Shuler 
v.  Viger,  229  P.  280,  103  Okl.  129 
— Boaz  v.  Martin,  225  P.  516,  101 
Okl.  243. 

Or.— Peters  v.  Dtetrich,  27  P.2d  1015, 
145  Or.  589. 

Discretionary  power  of  court  gen- 
erally see  supra  subdivision  j  (2) 
of  this  section. 

Showing'  abuse  of  discretion 
Where  default  judgment  has  been 

678 


set  aside  much  stronger  showing  of 
abuse  of  discretion  must  be  made 
than  where  application  to  set  aside 
such  judgment  has  been  refused. — 
First  State  Bank  of  Vian  v.  Arm- 
strong, 300  P.  763,  150  Okl.  60 — Mor- 
rell  v.  Morrell,  299  P.  866,  149  Okl. 
187 — Bearman  v.  Bracken,  240  P.  713, 
112  Okl.  237—34  C.J.  p  372  note  82 
[b]. 

18.  Ala. — Ex  parte  Motley,   170   So. 
81,  27  Ala.App.  241. 

Cal. — Weinberger  v.  Manning,  123  P. 

2d  531,  '50  Cal.App.2d  494. 
Idaho. — Kingsbury  v.  Brown,  92  P.2d 

1053,  60  Idaho  464,  124  A.L.R.  149. 
Minn.— Cacka    v.    Gaultoe,    3    N.W.2d 

791,  212  Minn.  404. 
Ohio. — Davis   v.    Teachnor,   App.t    58 

N.B.2d  208. 
S.D.— Cook  v.   Davis,    230   N.W.   765, 

57  S.D.  82. 

19.  Ala.— Ex  parte  Haisten,  149  So. 
213,   227   Ala.   183 — Ex  pane   Sav- 
age,  186  So.  586,   28  Ala.App.   440. 

Cal.— Kalson  v.  Percival,  20  P.2d 
330,  217  Cal.  568— Endicott  v. 
Southern  California  Cleaners  and 
Dyers,  App.,  6  P.2d  556— Greena- 
myer  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of  Lugo 
Elementary  School  Dist  In  Los 
Angeles  County,  2  P.2d  848,  116 
Cal.  App.  319 — Hammond  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Bloodgood,  281  P.  1101,  101 
Cal.  App.  561 — Corgiat  v.  Realty 
Mortg.  Corporation  of  California, 
260  P.  573,  86  Cal.Ap&.  37. 

Fla. — Kellerman  v.  Commercial  Cred- 
it Co.,  189  So.  689.  138  Fla,  133. 

111. — Bornman  v.  Rabb,  8  N.E.2d 
374,  290  IlLApp.  604— Cooper  v. 
Handelsman,  247  Ill.App.  454. 

Ind.— Alexander  v.  Pate,  14  N.E.2d 
328,  105  Ind.App.  219. 

Iowa.  —  Brunswick-Balke-Collender 
Co.  v.  Dillon,  283  N.W.  872,  226 
Iowa  244. 

Mass. — Manzi  v.  Carlson,  180  N.B. 
134,  278  Mass.  267. 

Mich. — Rosen  v.  Brennan,  221  N.W. 
276,  244  Mich.  397. 

Minn. — High  v.  Supreme  Lodge  of 
the  World,  Loyal  Order  of  Moose, 
290  N.W.  425,  207  Minn.  228— Isen- 
see  Motors  v.  Rand,  264  N.W.  782, 
196  Minn.  267 — Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  Minneapolis  v.  Thomas, 
214  N.W.  57,  171  Minn.  327. 


49     C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  337 


open  or  vacate  a  default  judgment  has  been  held 
to  be,20  or  has  been  held  not  to  be,21  improper  or 
an  abuse  of  discretion.  The  court  may  refuse  to 
grant  the  application  even  in  cases  where  the  ex- 
istence of  a  meritorious  defense  is  shown,22  but  if 
defendant  shows  a  legal  excuse  for  failure  to  ap- 
pear and  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  action,  and 
in  all  matters  complies  with  the  requisites  of  the 
statute,  it  has  been  held  that  the  court  no  longer 
has  discretion  but  must  set  aside  the  judgment,23 


The  fact  that  defendant  may  have  challenged 
the  validity  of  service  by  publication  and  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  to  render  any  judgment  will  not 
justify  a  denial  of  the  application  to  have  the  judg- 
ment opened.24  Where  the  order  of  default25  or  the 
default  judgment26  has  been  entered  prematurely, 
an  order  setting  aside  the  judgment  is  proper. 
Where  the  judgment  has  been  entered  without  ju- 
risdiction the  court  must  grant  the  application  to 
vacate  the  judgment.2?  It  has  been  held  that  the 


Mont— KIrby  v.  Hoeh,  21  P.2d  732, 
94  Mont.  218. 

N.Y.— Konnight  v.  Terpak,  54  N.Y.S. 
2d  796,  269  App.Div.  759 — People 
ex  rel.  Morgan  v.  Gucci,  22  N.Y.S. 
2d  330,  260  App.Div.  827 — Conrad 
v.  Harbaugh,  287  N.Y.S.  1012,  248 
App.Div.  655. 

N.C.— Spell  v.  Arthur,  171  S.B.  362, 
205  N.C.  405 — Cagle  v.  Williamson, 
158  S.B.  391,  200  N.C.  727. 

N.D. — Mueller  v.  Occident  Elevator 
Co.,  212  N.W.  830,  55  N.D,  206. 

Okl.— Blakeney  v.  Ashford,  81  P.2d 
309,  183  Old.  213— State  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Liddell,  61  P.2d  1075,  178 
Okl.  114— First  State  Bank  of  Vian 
v.  Armstrong,  300  P.  763,  150  Okl. 
60— Morrell  v.  Morrell,  299  P.  866, 
149  Okl.  187 — Farmers'  Guaranty 
State  Bank  v.  Bratcher,  241  P. 
340,  112  Okl.  254. 

Or.— Oeder  v.  Watt,  214  P.  591,  107 
Or.  600. 

Ba. — Bianca  v.  Kaplan,  160  A.  143, 
105  Pa.  Super.  98 — Markovitz  v. 
Ritter,  92  Pa.Super.  394 — Sockett 
v.  Philadelphia  Toilet  &  Laundry 
Co.,  92  Pa. Super.  254 — Kozuhowski 
&  Reuss  v.  Snigel  &  Snigel,  90  Pa. 
Super.  75 — Auberle  v.  Ciliberto, 
Com.PL,  31  Del.Co.  32. 

Tex. — Green  v.  Jackson,  Civ.App., 
42  S.W.2d  91. 

20.  Ark.— Urschel     Lead     &     Zinc 
Mines    v.    Smith,    111    S.W.2d   480, 
195  Ark.  36. 

111.— Revzen    v.    Brown,    17    N.B.2d 

1011,  397  IlLApp.  476. 
Minn. — Bearman  Fruit  Co.  v.  Parker, 

3   N.W.2d   501,   212   Minn.   327. 
Neb. — Ak-Sar-Ben  Exposition  Co.  v. 

Sorensen,    229    N.W.    13,    119    Neb. 

358. 
Okl.— First    Nat.    Bank    v.    Kerr,    24 

P.2d  985,  165  Okl.  16. 
Tex. — Craddock     v.     Sunshine     Bus 

Lines,    133    S.W.2d    124,    134    Tex. 

388 — Travelodge      Corporation      v. 

Schwake,  Civ.App.,  126  S.W.2d  523 

— Watson  Co.,  Builders,  v.  Bleek- 

er,   Civ.App.,   269   S.W.   147. 
Utah.— Naisbitt    v.    Herrick,    290    P. 

950,  76  Utah  575. 
Wash. — Golson  v.  Carscallen,  283  P. 

681,  155  Wash.  176, 

21.  U.S.— Glenn   v.    W.   C.   Mitchell 
Co.,   C.C.A.N.D.,   282  F.  440,   modi- 
fied on  other  grounds  285  F.  381. 

Ark. — Stephenson  v.  Union  Nat. 
Bank  of  Little  Rock,  132  S.W.2d 


173,  198  Ark.  1187— Thomas  v.  Ar- 
nold, 96  S.W.2d  1108,  192  Ark.  1127. 

Cal.— Cooper  v.  Deon,  137  P.2d  733, 
58  Cal.App.2d  789— Flores  v. 
Smith,  117  P.2d  712,  47  Cal.App.2d 
253— Thaler  v.  Thaler,  15  P.2d  192, 
127  Cal.App.  28 — Dwyer  v.  Davis,  8 
P,2d  168,  120  CaLApp.  435— Ratliff 
v.  Ratliff,  2  P.2d  222,  116  CaLApp. 
39 — M-ahana  v.  Alexander,  263  P. 
260,  88  Cal.App.  111. 

Ga. — Jones  v.  Empire  Furniture  Co., 
142  S.B.  694,  3$  Ga.App.  93. 

111.— Whalen  v.  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.,  280  Ill.App.  596,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Twin  City  Barge  & 
Gravel  Co.  v.  Whalen,  56  S.Ct 
590,  297  U.S.  714,  80  L.Bd.  1000. 

Ind.— National  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  Hart- 
ford, Conn.,  v.  Burton,  168  N.B.  37, 
91  Ind.App.  196. 

Iowa. — Bleakley  v.  Long,  268  N.W. 
152,  222  Iowa  76 — Lernley  v.  Hop- 
son,  232  N.W.  811 — Cedar  Rapids 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Todd,  203  N.W.  390, 
199  Iowa  957. 

Kan. — American  Oil  &  Refining  Co. 
v.  Liberty-Texas  Oil  Co.,  211  P. 
137,  112  Kan.  309. 

Md.— Martin  v.  Long,  120  A.  875,  142 
Md.  348. 

Mass. — Burnham  v.  Ellsworth,  60  N. 
B.2d  959. 

Minn.— Scott  v.  Van  Sant,  258  N.W. 
817,  19.3  Minn.  465— Ramsay  v. 
Barnard,  249  N.W.  192,  189  Minn. 
333 — McMahon  v.  Pequot  Rural 
Telephone  Co.,  242  N.W.  620,  186 
Minn.  141— Child  v.  Henry,  236  N. 
W.  202,  183  Minn.  170— Jennrich  v. 
Hoeller,  234  N.W.  638,  182  Minn. 
445 — MacLean  v.  Reynolds,  220  N. 
W.  435,  175  Minn.  112— Lambertz 
v.  Daniels,  199  N.W.  904,  160  Minn. 
180. 

Mo. — Bedell  v.  Garton,  App.,  86  S.W. 
2d  1073 — Acme  Roofing  Co.  v. 
Johnson,  App.,  26  S.W.2d  854 — Ste- 
vens v.  Hurst  Automatic  Switch  & 
Signal  Co.,  App.,  270  S.W.  414— 
Daugherty  v.  Lanning-Harris  Coal 
&  Grain  Co.,  265  S.W.  866,  218  Mo. 
App.  187. 

Mont.— Mihelich  v.  Buttfe  Electric 
Ry.  Co.,  281  P.  540,  85  Mont.  604. 

N.J.— Becker  v.  Welliver,  34  A.2d 
893,  131  N.J.Law  64— Kravitz  Mfg. 
Corporation  v.  Style-Kraft  Shirt 
Corporation,  21  A.2d  761,  127  N.J. 
Law  253 — McDermott  v.  City  of 
Paterson,  4  A.2d  306,  122  N.J.Law 

679 


81 — Benedetto  v.  Fleckenstein,  151 
A.  98,  8  N.J.Misc.  590,  affirmed  154 
A.  769,  108  N.J.Law  184. 

N.M. — McCanna  v.  Mutual  Invest- 
ment &  Agency  Co.,  26  P.2d  231, 
37  N.M.  597— Grant  v.  Booker,  249 
P.  1013,  31  N.M.  639. 

N.C. — Marvin  Wade  Co.  v.  Stewart, 
129  S.E.  192,  190  N.C.  854. 

N.D.— Galloway  v.  Patzer,  226  N.W. 
491,  58  N.D.  443,  followed  in  Paul 
v.  Patzer,  226  N.W.  495,  58  NJX 
442— Madden  v.  Dunbar,  201  N.W* 
991,  52  N.D.  74— Jesse  French  & 
Sons  Piano  Co.  v.  Getts,  192  N.W. 
765,  49  N.D.  577. 

Okl.— Thornton  v.  Soft,  84  P.2d  6, 
183  Okl.  504 — Nave  v.  Conservative 
Loan  Co.,  245  P.  65,  117  Okl.  85— 
Mid-West  Fruit  Co.  v.  Davis.  Ill 
P.  208,  104  Okl.  254. 

Pa. — Caromono  v.  Garman,  23  A.$d 
92,  147  Pa.Super.  1. 

R.I. — Delerson  Press  v.  Silvermaa, 
159  A.  735— Fudim  v.  Kane,  136  A. 
306,  48  R.I.  155. 

S.C. — Bissonette  v.  Joseph,  170  SJJ. 
467,  170  S.C.  407. 

Tex. — Southwestern  Specialty  Co.  v. 
Brown,  Civ.App.,  188  S.W.2d  1002. 
error  refused — Briggs  v.  Ladd,  dv» 
App.,  64  S.W.2d  389— Celeste  Sljato 
Bank  v.  Security  Nat.  Bank,  Civ. 
App.,  254  S.W.  653 — Fay  v.  Rob* 
erts,  Civ.App.,  249  S.W.  533. 

Wash.— Roth  v.  Nash,  144  P.2d  271, 
19  Wash.2d  731. 

22.  Ga.— Taylor  v.  Stovall,  118  BJSL 
795,  30  Ga.App.  678. 

111.— Maclaskey   v.    Kurz,    45   N.E.M 

•566,  316  IlLApp.  671. 
N.M. — McCanna    v.    Mutual    Invest* 

ment  &  Agency  Co.,   26   P.2d  2S1* 

37  N.M.  597. 
34  C.J.  p  422  note  24. 

23.  Idaho. — Wagner   v.    Mower,    257 
P.  118,  41  Idaho  380— Consolidated 
Wagon  &  Machine  Co.  v.  Housman, 
221  P.  143,  38  Idaho  343. 

24.  Okl. — Seekatz    v.     Brandenburg, 
300    P.    678,   150    Okl.    53— Wise  V. 
Davis,  269  P.  248,  132   Okl.   65. 

25.  111. — Barthelemy   v.    Braun,    272 
IlLApp.  321. 

26.  Mont. — Rowan  v.  Gazette  Print- 
ing Co.,  220  P.  1104,   69  Mont.  170, 

27.  D.C.— Consolidated     Radio     AT- 
tists   v.   Washington   Section,   Na- 
tional  Council   of  Jewish  Juniors, 
105  F.2d  785,  70  App.D.C.  262. 


§  337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


court  cannot  vacate  the  judgment  where  the  evi- 
dence does  not  correspond  with  the  petition.28 

Where  a  default  judgment  is  subject  to  be  set 
aside  because  of  the  lack  of  necessary  allegations 
in  the  original  petition  on  which  judgment  was 
rendered,  it  has  been  held  that  allegations  or  proof 
on  the  motion  to  set  aside  the  judgment  may  not  be 
used  to  supply  the  defects  in  the  original  petition.29 

k.  Belief  Awarded 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Modification  or  partial  vacation 

(3)  Terms  and  conditions  of  relief 

(1)  In  General 

The  relief  which  may  be  awarded  In  a  proceeding 
to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judgment  depends  in  a  large 
measure  on  the  terms  of  the  particular  statute  under 
which  the  proceeding  Is  brought. 

In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  statutes 
and  the  interpretation  thereof  in  the  several  juris- 
dictions, the  court  may  render  final  judgment  on 
the  merits  after  vacating  the  judgment;30  it  can 
only  enter  an  order  setting  aside  the  judgment  and 
cannot  give  judgment  on  the  merits;31  or,  before 
it  has  adjudicated  the  merits  of  the  case,  the  only 
order  it  may  make  is  one  suspending  the  operation 
of  the  judgment.32  It  is  improper  for  the  court  to 
restrain  plaintiff  from  collecting  the  judgment  pend- 
ing proceedings  to  have  the  judgment  vacated  where 
there  has  not  been  a  compliance  with  the  statutory 


conditions  for  granting  such  relief.33  Where  the 
court  acts  under  its  inherent  powers  it  may  award 
relief  other  than  that  provided  for  in  proceedings 
solely  under  the  statute.34 

It  is  an  idle  act  for  the  court  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment entered  on  a  default  if  it  has  no  jurisdiction 
to  set  aside  the  default35 

Rights  of  third  persons.  Intervening  rights  of 
third  persons  acquired  in  good  faith  will  be  saved, 
either  by  provision  of  the  statute  itself  or  by  the 
order  of  the  court38 

(2)  Modification  or  Partial-  Vacation 

Where  a  default  judgment  Is  severable,  the  portion 
of  the  Judgment  which  Is  irregular  or  erroneous  may  be 
set  aside  and  other  portions  of  the, judgment  may  be 
permitted  to  stand. 

Where  a  judgment  is  severable,  the  portion  of  the 
judgment  which  is  irregular  or  erroneous  may  be 
set  aside  and  other  portions  of  the  judgment  may 
be  permitted  to  stand,37  and  if  a  partial  defense 
is  presented  the  court  may  modify  or  set  aside  the 
decree  to  that  extent.38  Although  the  court  allows 
the  judgment  itself  to  stand,  it  may  permit  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  quantum  of  damages  to  be  opened  for 
hearing.39  Where  a  default  judgment  is  entered  as 
a  unit  against  two  or  more  defendants  and  is  so 
irregular  or  erroneous  as  to  necessitate  its  vacation 
as  to  one  defendant,  it  has  been  held  that  it  must 
be  set  aside  as  to  all;40  but  where  a  default  judg- 


N.D. — Odland  v.  OTCeeffe  Implement 
Co.,  220  N.W.  923r  59  N.D.  335— 
Beery  v,  Peterson,  225  N.W.  798, 
58  N.D.  273. 

28.  Statutory  ground  not  alleged 
Where   petition   to   vacate   default 

Judgment  alleged  fraud,  court  was 
held  unauthorized  to  vacate  Judg- 
ment on  proved  statutory  ground  of 
irregularity,  in  absence  of  order 
amending  petition  to  correspond  with 
evidence. — Mt.  Ida  School  v.  Clark, 
177  N.B.  604,  89  Ohio  App.  389. 

29.  Tex. — Nueces   Hardware   &   Im- 
plement   Co.    v.    Jecker,    Civ.App., 
56  S.W.2d  474. 

30.  Tex. — Smith    v.     EHgginbotham, 
Civ.App.,    141   S.W.2d  752,   affirmed 
158   S.W.2d   481,   138   Tex.   227. 

Bight  to  determine  merits  see  supra 

subdivision  5  (3)  of  this  section! 
Bight  to  accounting 

Where  there  was  no  dispute  about 
original  amount  of  mortgage  indebt- 
edness and  no  dispute  about  the  pay- 
ments made  or  about  the  fact  that 
payments  were  to  be  made  monthly 
on  mortgage  on  which  a  default 
Judgment  was  taken,  the  mortgagors 
who  filed  suit  to  set  aside  default 
Judgment  as  having  been  obtained 
by  fraud  were  not  entitled  to  an  ac- 


counting.— Brown  v.  Merchants  & 
Planters  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  152  S.W. 
2d  548,  202  Ark.  684. 

31.  N.Y.— Tilney  v.   Gerner,   286  N. 
T.S.  919,. 247  App.Div.  859. 

32.  Ohio. — National  Guaranty  &  Fi- 
nance  Co.   v.    Lindimore,   App.,    31 
N.E.2d   155-— Rabinovitz  v.   Novak, 
App.,  31  N.R2d  151. 

33.  N.Y. — Walton  Foundry  Co.  v.  A. 
D.  Granger  Co.,  196  N.Y.S.  719,  203 
App.Div.  226. 

34.  Vt— Green*  v.  Riley,  172  A.  633, 
106  Vt  319. 

35.  Cal.— Brooks   v.   Nelson,    272    P. 
610,  95  Cal.App.  144. 

Idaho. — Commonwealth  Trust  Co.  of 
Pittsburgh  v.  Lorain,  255  P.  909, 
43  Idaho  784. 

36b  Okl.— Berkey  v.  Rader,  244  P. 
184,  116  Okl.  258. 

34  C.J.  p  427  note  63. 

37.  Cal.— Stack  v.   Welder,   43  P.2d 
270,  3  Cal.2d  71. 

Idaho. — Backman  v.  Douglas,   270  P. 

618,  46  Idaho  671. 
N.J. — Paterson   Stove   Repair  Co.   v. 

Ritzer,    8    A.2d    133.    123    N.J.Law 

145. 

38.  Ark.— Minick  v.   Ramey,    269    S. 
W.  565,  168  Ark.  180. 

680 


Ky.— Welch  v.  Mann's  Ex'r,  88  S.W. 
2d  1,  261  K3'.  470. 

39.  N.J. — Horner    v.    Atchisoa,    132 
A.  513,  4  N.J.Misc.  842. 

Nominal  damages 

Where  error  in  entering  judgment 
in  replevin  action  for  more  than 
nominal  damages  appeared  on.  the 
face  of  record,  defendants  were  en- 
titled to  have  that  part  of  the  judg- 
ment set  aside. — Barslund  v.  Ander- 
son, 103  P.2d  23,  106  Colo.  23S. 

Seduction,  to  amount  admittedly  due 
Pa. — Farmers  Trust  Co.  v.  IBgulf,  32 
Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  '598. 

40.  111. — Skiras  v.  Magenis,  68  N.B. 
2d  322,  324  Ill.App.  250. 

Husband  and  wife 

Where  default  judgment  In  per- 
sonal injury  action  was  entered 
jointly  against  husband  and  wife, 
and  judgment  was  so  defective  as  to 
husband  because  of  insufficiency  in 
the  process  as  to  necessitate  its 
vacation  as  to  him,  judgment  was 
required  to  also  be  set  aside  as  to 
wife  without  regard  to  whether  suf- 
ficient cause  otherwise  existed. — 
Brown  v.  Zaubawky,  57  N.E.2d  856, 
388  HI.  351. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  337 


ment  has  been  rendered  against  codefendants  whose 
interests  are  distinct  and  severable,  and  where  only 
one  defendant  moves  to  vacate  it,  it  may  be  improp- 
er to  vacate  the  judgment  as  a  whole.41 

On  denying  a  petition  to  vacate  based  on  insuf- 
ficiency of  service  and  fraud,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  court  may  not  modify  the  original  judgment42 

(3)  Terms  and  Conditions  of  Relief 

(a)  In  general 

(b)  Paying  or  securing  costs  and   ex- 

penses 

(c)  Limiting  defenses 

(d)  Securing  payment  of  judgment 

(e)  Allowing  judgment  to  stand  as  se- 

curity 

(f)  Performance  of  conditions 

(a)  In  General 

Where  the  court  has  discretion  in  opening  or  vacat- 
ing a  default  Judgment  it  may  Impose,  as  a  condition  to 
granting  the  application,  such  terms  as  may  be  just  and 
reasonable. 

Where  the  opening  or  vacation  of -a  default  judg- 
ment is  discretionary  with  the  court,  the  court  may 


impose,  as  a  condition  to  granting  the  application, 
such  terms  as  may  be  just  and  reasonable'13  and 
which  will  preserve  plaintiff's  rights.44  Likewise, 
under  some  statutes  which  entitle  defendant  to  have 
a  default  judgment  obtained  on  constructive  serv- 
ice opened  or  vacated,  as  discussed  supra  §  334,  the 
court  may  impose  such  terms  as  may  be  just45 
Terms  are  not  properly  imposed  where  the  default 
was  caused  by  the  other  party's  wrongful  conduct,4* 
where  the  judgment  was  taken  without  notice  to 
defendant,47  where  the  judgment  was  entered  pre- 
maturely or  improvidently,48  or  where  it  was  pro- 
cured by  fraud  and  collusion.49  Where  the  power 
to  impose  terms  is  regulated  by  statute  it  has  been 
held  that  the  court  may  not  exceed  the  statutory 
restrictions.50 

The  amount  of  the  judgment  may  be  reduced  to 
correspond  with  the  prayer  for  relief  before  it  is 
vacated  on  condition.51 

Payment  of  amount  admitted  to  be  due.  It  is 
proper,  on  opening  a  default,  to  require  defendant 
to  pay  as  much  of  plaintiff's  claim  as  he  admits  to 
be  due,  as  a  condition  of  allowing  him  to  dispute 
the  rest52 


Judgment  against  cob'wners 

Where  default  Judgment  was  en- 
tered as  unit  against  all  coSwners 
of  tavern  for  automobile  accident  in- 
juries because  driver  of  automobile 
which  caused  injuries  was  intoxi- 
cated on  liquor  purchased  in  such 
tavern,  and  thereafter  court  vacated 
the  default  as  to  infant  coiJwner  be- 
cause no  guardian  ad  litem  had  been 
appointed  to  represent  her,  the  de- 
fault judgment  was  required  to  be 
vacated  as  to  all  other  coSwners. — 
Skiras  v.  Magenta,  58  N.E.2d  322,  824 
IlLApp,  250. 

41.  Ala. — Ex  parte  C.  W.  Hooper  & 
Co.,    93    So.    283,.  18    Ala.App.    490, 
certiorari  denied  Ex  parte  Jones, 
93  So.  661,  207  Ala.  607. 

Colo.— Green  v.  Halsted,  238  P.  40, 
77  Colo.  578. 

42.  Okl. — Holshouser  v.  Holshouser, 
26  P.2d  189,  166  Okl.  45. 

43.  Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cite*  in  Mo- 
saic Templars  of  America  v.  Hall, 
124  So.  879,  220  Ala.  305. 

Cal. — Sheffler  v..  Hutchings,  13  P.2d 
527,  124  CaLApp.  760. 

Fla. — Knabb  v.  Reconstruction  Fi- 
nance Corporation,  197  So.  707,  144 
Fla.  110. 

N.Y.— Iger  v.  Boyd-Scott  Co.,  290  N. 
Y.S.  619,  248  App.Div.  902— Bellin- 
ger v.  Gallo,  224  N.Y.S.  162,  221 
App.Div.  482 — Famigletti  v.  Del 
Terzo,  60  N.Y.S.2d  766. 

Okl.— Halliburton  v.  Illinois  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  40  P.2d  1086,  170  Okl. 
360. 


Or.— Burkitt  v.  Vail,  260  P.  1014,  123 

Or.  461. 
R.I.— Borden  v.   Briggs,   142   A.   144, 

49  R.I.  207. 
Wash.— Roth  v.  Nash,   144  P.2d  271, 

19  Wash.2d  731. 
34  C.J.  p  377  note  28. 
Use   of  testimony  of  deceased  wit- 
ness. 

Defendant's  application  to  open  de- 
fault judgment  which  had  been  en- 
tered on  inquest  sought  favor  of  the 
court,  and,  therefore,  irrespective  of 
whether  under  present  circumstances 
right  of  plaintiff  to  use,  without  de- 
fendant's consent,  testimony  of  wit- 
ness who  had  died  since  taking  of 
inquest  was  sanctioned  by  law,  trial 
court  should  have  required  defendant 
to  stipulate  that  such  testimony 
might  be  used  as  a  condition  to 
opening  the  default. — New  Amster- 
dam Casualty  Co.  v.  Augner,  28  N.Y. 
S.2d  277,  262  App.Div.  113. 

Examination  More  trial 

Trial    court   could   reasonably    re- 
quire defendant  to  submit  to  an  ex- 
amination before  trial  as  a  condition 
of     opening    defendant's     default. — 
Becker  v.  Niagara  Textile  Co.,  26  N. 
Y.S.2d  62,  175  Misc.  963. 
Trial  of  case  without  jury 
N.Y. — Zeesell  Realty  Co.  v.  Cunning- 
ham, 211  N.Y.S.  591,  125  Misc.  444, 
modified  without  opinion  213  N.Y. 
S.  942,  215  App.Div.  811. 
TJnoontroverted,  facts  taken  as  true 
In  imposing   conditions   for  open- 
ing default  of  defendant,  uncontro- 


verted  facts  alleged  in  complaint 
must  be  taken  as  true. — Sheffler  v. 
Hutchings,  13  P.2d  527,  124  CaLApp. 
760. 

44.  N.Y.— O'Neal  v.   Seifert,  -288  N. 
Y.S.  125,  24S  App.Div.  638— Warren 
v.  Boehm,  260  N.Y.S.  474,  236  App. 
Div.  602. 

45.  Cal.— Gray  v.  Lawlor,  90  P.  691, 
151  Cal.   352,  12  Ann.Cas.   990. 

34  C.J.  p  426  note  48. 

46.  N.Y.— Mitzas  v.  Spector,  212  N, 
Y.S.  295,  125  Misc.  923. 

47.  N.Y. — Pearson  Bros.  v.  Fratian- 
ni,  20  N,Y.S.2d  680. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  34. 

48.  Or.— Mitchell  v.  Campbell,  13  P. 
190,  14  Or.  454. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  35. 

49.  N.Y.— Marotta  v.  Marvullo,  160 
N.Y.S.  1003. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  86. 

50.  N.Y.— Wood  v.  Gallagher,  200  HT. 
Y.S.   361,  206   App:Div.   738. 

Utah.— Kurd  v.  'Ford,  276  P.  908,  f4 

Utah  46. 

BL  N.Y.— Famigletti  v.  Del  Terzo, 
57  N.Y.S.2d  ,101,  185  Misc.  4*3, 
modified  on  other  grounds  60  N.Y. 
S.2d  766. 

52.    Cal. — Youngman  v.   Tenner,    & 

P.  120,  82  Cal.  -611. 
34  C.J.  p  382  note  67. 


681 


§  337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


(b)  Paying  or  Securing  Costs  and  Expenses 

Unless  otherwise  provided  by  statute,  the  trial  court 
In  opening  or  vacating  a  default  judgment  may  impose 
such  terms  as  to  the  payment  of  costs  as  in  its  discre- 
tion it  determines  to  be  proper. 

Unless  otherwise  provided  by  statute,53  the  trial 
court  in  opening  or  vacating  a  default  judgment 
may  impose  such  terms  as  to  the  payment  of  costs 
as  in  its  discretion  it  determines  to  be  proper.54  It 
is  usually  proper  for  the  court  to  impose  as  a  con- 
dition a  requirement  that  defendant  shall  pay  the 
accrued  costs  in  the  action,55  and  also,  in  a  proper 
case  and  where  justice  requires  it,  the  disburse- 
ments of  the  opposite  party,56  his  reasonable  per- 
sonal expense  incurred  in  connection  with  the  suit,57 
a  proper  fee  to  his  attorneys,58  and  the  costs  of 
the  motion  itself.59  Where  a  judgment  is  opened 
or  vacated  as  a  matter  of  favor  or  grace  to  de- 
fendant and  on  his  motion,  costs  ordinarily  should 
be  imposed  on  him.60 

Under  some  statutes  payment  of  all  the  costs 
which  have  accrued  is  a  mandatory  condition  for 
opening  the  default,61  but,  if  not  required  by  stat- 


ute, the  court  may  properly  omit  the  imposition  of 
costs  as  a  condition,62  particularly  if  it  is  not  in- 
sisted on  by  plaintiff63  or  if  defendant  is  not  charge- 
able with  any  negligence  or  fault  in  suffering  the 
judgment64  The  imposition  of  a  condition  that  de- 
fendant pay  all  costs  may  be  erroneous.65  The 
court  may  properly  require  the  payment  of  a  lump 
sum  as  a  condition  for  opening  the  judgment.66 

Where  it  is  improper  to  impose  any  terms  as  a 
condition  of  opening  the  judgment,  it  is  not  proper 
to  require  payment  of  costs,  etc.,  as  a  condition  of 
relief,67  as  where  the  court  had  no  jurisdiction  of 
defendant,68  where  the  entry  of  the  default  judg- 
ment was  erroneous,69  or  where  judgment  by  default 
was  entered  at  a  time  when  the  party  was  not  in 
default70  or  in  violation  of  an  agreement  not  to 
do  so.71 

Defendant  may  be  required  to  secure  any  costs 
and  disbursements  that  may  thereafter  be  adjudged 
in  favor  of  plaintiff  in  the  action.72 

Costs  to  abide  event.  It  has  been  held  that  costs 
may  be  left  to  abide  the  event,73  and,  where  this 


53.  Ala. — Mosaic  Templars  of 
America  v.  Hall,  124  So.  879,  220 
Ala.  305. 

9C  Neb.— -Barney  v.  Platte  Valley 
Public  Power  &  Irr.  Dist,  23  N. 
W,2d  335. 

55.  Mo. — Crown  Drug  Co.  v.  Ray- 
mond, App.,  51  S.W.2d  215. 

Pa.— Horning  v.  David,  8  A.2d  729, 
1S7  Pa.Super.  252. 

14  C.J.  p  380  note  47. 

Imposition  of  costs  generally  see  in- 
fra subdivision  p  of  this  section. 

Default   opened  by  plaintiff 

Costs  may  be  awarded  to  defend- 
ant   where   be    is    without    fault    on 

opening     of     default    judgment    by 

plaintiff.— Delbon   v.   Krautwald,    171 

N.Y.S.  &92. 

$6.  Pa.— Homing  v.  David,  8  A.2d 
729,  137  Pa.Super.  252. 

*4  C.J.  p.  S8.1  note  48. 

Reimbursement  for  trouble  caused  by 
defendant's  conduct 

N.Y.— O'Neal  v.  Seifert,  288  N.Y.S. 
125,  248  App.Div.  638. 

ft.  Wis.-^Brihm  v.  <aDtna  Ins.  Co. 
of  Hartford,  Conn.,  211  N.W,  759, 

191  wis.  aas. 

34  C.J.  p  381  note  49. 

Additional  expense  for  witnesses 

Trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  dis- 
cretion in  overruling  defendant's  mo- 
tion to  set  default  Judgment  aside 
«nd  grant  a  new  trial  in  suit  for 
.  damages  sustained  as  result  of  au- 
tomobile accident,  where  plaintiffs 
lost  contact  with  two  witnesses  who 
were  present  at  scene  of  accident 
«nd  defendant  did  not  offer  to  bear 
«&y  additional  expense  to  which 


plaintiffs  would  be  put  in  case  a  new 
trial  should  be  granted  and  defend- 
ant refused  to  agree  to  immediate 
trial. — Southwestern  Specialty  Co.  v. 
Brown,  Tex.Civ.App.,  1&8  S.W.2d 
1002,  error  refused. 

58.  R.I. — Shapiro  v.  Albany  Ins.  Co., 
163  A.  747. 

34  C.J.  p  381  note  50. 

59.  N.J. — 'Fox    v.    Simon    &    Krivlt, 
Inc.,  Sup.,  109  A.  900. 

34  C.J.  p  381  note  51. 

Costs  on  appeal  from  order  denying 

application 
Neb. — Barney  v.  Platte  "Valley  Public 

Power  &  Irr.  Dist,  23  N.W.2d  335. 
Wash.— Melosh    v.    Graham,    210    P. 

667,  122  Wash.  299. 

60.  N.Y.— Linden  .    v.      West      21st 
Street  Holding  Corporation,  12  N. 
Y.S.2d  77,   257   App.Div.   844. 

34  C.J.  p  381  notes  57,  -58. 

61.  Ga.— Miller     v.     Phoenix     Mut 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  147  S.E.  527,  168  Ga. 
321 — Fitzgerald  v.   Ferran,    124  -S. 
E.  530,  158  Ga.  758 — Rawls  v.  Bow- 
ers, 172  S.E.  887,  48  Ga.App.  324 — 
Henderson    v.    Ellarbee,    13.1    S.E. 
524,     35     Ga-App.    $ — Sweat    v.    L. 
Mohr   &   Sons,    94   S.E.   79,   21   Ga. 
App.  93. 

W.Va. — Shenandoah       Valley       Nat. 

Bank  v.  Hiett,  «6  S.B.2d  769,  121  W. 

Va.  454. 
02.     Cal.— Carbondale    Mach.    Co.    v. 

Byraud,  271  P.  349,  94  CaLApp.  356. 
34  C.J.  p  381  note  53. 
63.    Cal. — Robinson  v.  Merrill,  22  P. 

260,  80  Cal.  415. 
Ga. — Butler    v.    Richmond   &   D.    R. 

Co.,  15  S.E.  668,  88  Ga.  594. 

682 


64.  Wis.— Reeves  v.  Kroll,  113  N.W. 
440.  133  Wis.  196. 

34  C.J.  p  351  note  55. 

65.  N.Y. — Voelker  v.   'Fieldman,   221 
N.Y.S.    919,   222  App.Div.   826. 

34  C.J.  p  381  note  -56. 

66.  Twenty-five  dollars 

Cal.— Stub  v.  Harrison,   96  P.2d  97*, 

35  Cal.App.2d  685. 
N.Y.— Iger  v.  Boyd-Scott  Co.,  290  N. 

Y.-S.  619,  248  App.Div.  «02— Voelker 

v.    Fieldman,    226    N.T.S.    919,    222 

App.Div.  826. 
Wash.— Melosh    v.    Graham,    210    P. 

667,  122  Wash.  299. 

67.  N.Y.— Girbekian     Y.     Castikyan, 
111  N.Y.S.  243,  126   App.Div.   812. 

34  C.J.  p  381  note  60. 

68.  Cal.— Waller  -v.   Weston,    57   P. 
892,  125  Cal.  261. 

34  C.J.  p  381  note  61. 

69.  Ohio.— McCabe  v.  Tom,  171  N.E. 
£68,  35  Ohio  App.  73. 

7a    N.Y.— Gillespie  v.    Satterlee,    42 

N.Y.S.  463f  18  Misc.  606. 
71.    N.Y.— Marotta  v.   Marvulla,   160 

N.Y.S.  1003. 
34  C.J.  p  381  note  63. 
72-     Or. — Russell    v.    Piper,    201    P. 

436,  101  Or.  680. 
34  C.J.  p  382  note  66. 
Approval  of  bond  nnno  pro  tuno 

Superior  court  can  approve  bond 
nunc  pro  tune  as  of  time  prior  to 
proceedings  without  objection  subse- 
quently to  entry  of  order  vacating 
judgment  of  dismissal. — Smith  v. 
Brown,  184  N.B.  383,  282  Mass.  81. 

73.    Ky.— Williams     v.     Taylor,     11 
Bush  375. 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  33  < 


is  done,  the  court  may  impose  the  condition  that  de- 
fendant shall  furnish  security  for  them,74  but  it 
has  also  been  held  to  be  error  to  award  costs  of 
the  motion  to  abide  the  event.75 

(c)  Limiting  Defenses 

The  court  In  Its  discretion  may  require,  as  a  con- 
dition to  opening  a  default  Judgment,  that  the  defend- 
ant shall  plead  Issuably  or  to  the  merits,  or  It  may  re- 
strict him  to  the  defenses  set  up  In  his  petition  or  mov- 
ing papers. 

It  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  on  opening  a 
default  judgment  to  require  as  a  condition  that  de- 
fendant shall  plead  issuably  or  to  the  merits,76  and 
that  he  shall  not  resort  to  a  demurrer77  or  dilatory 
plea.78  In  like  manner,  it  may,  if  it  deems  proper, 
restrict  him  to  the  defenses  set  up  in  his  petition 
or  moving  papers.79  So  the  court,  in  its  discretion, 
may  make  it  a  condition  that  defendant  shall  for- 
bear to  set  up  some  particular  defense  which  is  con- 
sidered unconscionable  or  purely  technical.80  It  is 
an  abuse  of  discretion,  however,  to  require  defend- 
ant to  waive  a  meritorious  defense.81  The  statute 
of  limitations  has  been  held  to  be  a  meritorious  de- 
fense which  should  not  be  excluded  as  a  condi- 
tion for  opening  the  default  judgment,82  if  it  would 
have  been  available  as  a  defense  at  the  time  the 
default  judgment  was  entered,83  but  if  the  statute 


of  limitations  would  not  have  been  a  defense  at 
the  time  the  default  was  taken,84  or  if  the  ac- 
tion is  one  to  which  a  statute  of  limitations  cannot 
apply,85  defendant  may  be  required  to  waive  or 
abandon  it  as  a  condition  to  opening  the  judgment 

(d)  Securing  Payment  of  Judgment 

Where  conditions,  may  be  Imposed  on  the  opening 
of  a  default  Judgment  the  court  may  require  the  de- 
fendant to  give  a  bond  or  undertaking  to  pay  any  Judg- 
ment plaintiff  may  eventually  recover. 

Where  conditions  may  be  imposed,  it  is  within  the 
authority  of  the  court,  on  opening  a  default  judg- 
ment, to  impose  the  condition  that  defendant  shall 
give  a  bond  or  undertaking  to  pay  any  judgment 
plaintiff  may  eventually  recover.86  This,  however, 
is  regarded  as  a  severe  condition,  and  will  be  held  to 
be  an  abuse  of  discretion  unless  the  facts  of  the 
case  and  the  situation  of  the  parties  fully  justify 
it.87  Security  for  payment  of  the  judgment  must 
be  made  a  condition  when  so  provided  by  statute.8* 
It  is  also  competent  for  the  court  in  proper  cases 
to  require  defendant  to  give  an  undertaking  that 
he  will  not  sell  or  encumber  any  of  his  property  so 
as  to  hinder  plaintiff  in  the  collection  of  his  claim,** 
or  even  to  require  him  to  deposit  with  the  clerk  of 
the  court  a  su>n  sufficient  to  secure  plaintiffs 
claim.90 


74.    Ky.— Williams  v.  Taylor,  supra, 

34  C.J.  p  382  note  65. 

75*  N.T. — Richardson  v.  Sun  Print- 
Ing-  &  Publishing  Ass'n,  46  N.Y.S. 
814,  20  App.Div.  329 — Roome  v. 
linger,  12  N.T.S.2d  523,  171  Misc. 
293. 

76.  Kan. — Kansas    Torpedo    Co.    v. 
Brie  Petroleum  Co.,  89  P.  913,  75 
Kan.  530. 

34  C.J.  p  379  note  40. 

77.  Iowa.— Perkins      v.      Davis,      3 
Oreene  235. 

rRTis. — Doty  v.    Strong,    1   Pinn.   313, 

40  Am.D.  773. 

Where  no  terms  should  be  imposed 
on  defendant,  a  requirement  that  de- 
fendant shall  answer  by  a  certain 
time  has  been  held  to  be  erroneous, 
since  it  deprives  him  of  the  right  to 
demur.— Berg  v.  Pohl,  63  N.T.-S.  799, 
24  Misc.  740. 
73^  <3ai. — Dennison  v.  Chapman,  36 

P.  943,  102  Cal.  618. 
34  C.J.  p  380  note  42. 

79.  S.C. — Powers  v.  'Fidelity  &  De- 
posit Co.  of  Maryland,  166  S.B.  729, 
167  S.C.  513. 

34  C.J.  p  380  note  43. 

80.  Md.— Cornblatt  v.  Bloch,  103  A. 
137,  .132  Md.  44. 

34  C.J.  p  380  note  44. 
Wont  of  Jurisdiction 

Where   the  court  has   jurisdiction 
of  the  class  of  cases  to  which  the 


one  at  bar  belongs,  but  for  some  rea- 
son failed  to  acquire  jurisdiction  in 
the  -particular  case,  it  has  power,  on 
opening  a  default  at  defendant's  re- 
quest, to  impose  the  condition  that 
he  shall  waive  the  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion.—Putney  v.  Collins,  8  Grant, 
Pa.,  72. 

81.  Or.— Mitchell  v.  Campbell,  13  P. 
190,  14  Or.  454. 

34  C.J.  p  380  notes  45,  46. 

82.  R.I. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Bor- 
den  r.  Briggs,  142  A.  144,  49  R.L 
207. 

34  C.J.  p  380  note  46  [b]  (2),  (3). 

However,  there  are  general  state- 
ments in  son  e  cases  to  the  con- 
trary.— Audubon  v.  Excelsior  Fire 
Ins.  Qo.,  10  Abb.Pr.,N.T.,  64— Fox  v. 
Baker,  2  Wend.,N.T.,  244. 

83.  N.T. — Musgrave     v.     Musgrave, 
176  N.T.S.  314,  188  App.Div.   908. 

84.  Ala. — Sawyer    v.    Patterson,    12 
Ala.  295. 

85.  Wis.— Meiners  v.  Frederick  Mil- 
ler Brewing  Co.,   47  N.W.   430,   78 
Wis.  364,  10  L.R.A.  586. 

86.  Cal.— Sheffler    v.    Hutchings,    13 
P.2d  527,  124  CaLApp.   7-60. 

I^a, — Taylor  v.  Gorman,   126  A.  897, 

146  Md.  207. 
N.T.—- Goldstein  v.  Marks,  59  N.T.S. 

2d   663— Rosenstreich  &  Ballon  v. 

Scher,  202  N.T.S.  2-65. 

683 


Okl.— Halliburton    v.     Illinois 

Ins.  Co.,  40  P.2d  1086,  170  Okl  S60. 
34  C.J.  p  382  note  69. 

87.  N.T— Dietz  v.  Weisthal,  32T  & 
T.S.  568,  131  Misc.  697. 

34  C.J.  p  382  note  70. 
TTnitttentioiial  or  unwillful  default 

Where  defendants'  default  was  nei- 
ther intentional  nor  willful,  it  was 
improper  to  require  the  filing  of  caaa 
or  a  bond  as  a  condition  for  opening 
the  default.-X3-ustavus  J.  Esselen, 
Inc.,  v.  Visor,  45  N.T.S.2d  258,  ISO 
Misc.  537. 

88.  Del.— Penn     Central     Light     A 
Power  Co.  v.  Central  Eastern  Pow- 
er Co.,  171  A.  332,  6  W.W.Harr.  74, 

Applicability  of  statute 

Code  provision,  authorizing1  court, 
without  requiring  security,  to  take 
off  default  judgments  if  defendant 
files  affidavit  of  lack  of  notice  of 
suit,  has  been  held  applicable  only 
to  judgments  in  default  of  appear- 
ance entered  under  same  code  sec- 
tion, not  to  judgments  for  want  of 
affidavit  of  defense  obtained  under 
different  code  section. — Penn  Central 
Light  &  P*wer  Co.  v.  Central  East- 
ern Power  Co.,  171  A.  332,  6  W.W. 
Harr.  74. 

89.  N.T. — Schwartz  v.   Schendel,  S3 
N.T.S.  773,  24  Misc.  701. 

90.  N.T.— Fuchs  &  Lang  Mfg.  Co.  t; 


§  337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


(e)  Allowing  Judgment  to  Stand  as  Security 

On  opening  a  default  judgment  the  court  may  prop- 
erly impose  the  condition  that  the  Judgment  already  en- 
tered shall  stand  as  security  for  the  amount  ultimately 
recovered. 

On  opening  a  default  judgment  to  let  in  a  de- 
fense it  is  proper  to  impose  the  condition  that  the 
judgment  already  entered  shall  stand  as  security  for 
the  amount  ultimately  recovered.91  Where  this  is 
done  the  judgment  exists  only  for  the  purpose  of 
security.52  Such  condition,  however,  need  not  be 
imposed  where  it  is  not  necessary  for  plaintiffs 
protection;98  and,  where  the  judgment  debtor  has 
a  right  to  have  the  judgment  opened  or  vacated  un- 
conditionally, such  right  cannot  be  clogged  with 
the  condition  that  the  judgment  shall  stand  as  se- 
curity.94 

Where  the  statute  requires  security  for  payment 
of  the  judgment,  the  court  cannot  accept  the  judg- 
ment itself  as  security  by  ordering  it  to  remain  cau- 
tionary.96 


(f)  Performance  of  Conditions 

Compliance  with  the  terms  Imposed  on  the  opening 
of  a  default  Judgment  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the 
granting  of  relief. 

Compliance  with  the  terms  imposed  on  the  open- 
ing of  a  default  judgment  is  a  condition  precedent 
to  the  relief  granted;  unless  and  until  they  are  com- 
plied with  the  judgment  remains  in  full  force  and 
effect.96  The  performance  of  the  conditions,  how- 
ever, may  be  waived  by  the  party  for  whose  bene- 
fit they  were  prescribed,97  and,  where  a  judgment 
which  should  never  have  been  entered  is  stricken  off 
on  terms,  an  order  reinstating  it  for  noncompliance 
with  the  terms  is  erroneous.98 

L  Findings 

In  a  proceeding  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  Judg- 
ment, only  the  specific  findings  required  by  statute  need 
be  made  by  the  court. 

In  a  proceeding  to  open  or  vacate  a  default  judg- 
ment, the  court  must  make  specific  findings  required 


Springer   &  Welty  Co.,    37   N.Y.S. 
24,  15  Misc.  443. 
34  C.J.  p  382  note  72. 

91.  Ind.— Christ  v.  Jovanoff,  1*2  N. 
U.  2,  84  Ind.App.  67*. 

OkL— Halliburton  v.  Illinois  Life  Ins. 

Co.,  40   P.2d   1086,   170   Okl.   360. 
S.D.—Boshart  v.  National  Ben.  Ass'n 

of   Mitchell,    273   N.W.   7,    65   S.D. 

260. 
34  C.J.  p  382  note  73. 

92.  111.— Kroer  y.   Smith,   48  N.E.2d 
743,  318  Ill.A^p.  489. 

93.  Wis. — Bond  v.  Neuschwander,  57 
N.W.  54,  86  Wis.  391. 

04  C.J.  p  383  note  75. 

94.  N.T. — Tates  v.  Guthrie,  23  N.M. 
741,  119  N.Y.  420. 

34  C.J.  p  383  note  77. 

95.  DeL— Penn     Central     O^ight     & 
Power  Co.  v.  Central  Eastern  Pow- 
er Co.,  171  A.  332,  6  W.W.Harr.  ?4. 

96.  Ga. — Coker   v.    Llpscomb,   87   S. 
JSL  704,  17  GaJ^pp.  506. 

34  a JT.  p  883  note  73. 

Piling1  answer  originally  tendered 

(1)  Where   order  vacating*  default 
Judgment  was  on  condition  that  de- 
fendant   file    answer   originally    ten- 
dered, defendant  could  not  raise  ju- 
risdictional  questions  invoking  addi- 
tional relief  from  that  contemplated 
In  original  answer. — Powers  v.  Fidel- 
ity &  Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland,  166  S. 
B.  729,  167  S.C.  513. 

(2)  Defaulting  defendant's  serving 
•f  answer  adding  new  matter  was 
held   not   noncompliance   with   order 
vacating  default  judgment,  directing 
defendant   to   file   answer  originally 


tendered,  where  such  order  required 
defendant  to  serve  itemized  state- 
ment and  authorized  plaintiff  to 
plead  thereto. — Powers  v.  -Fidelity  & 
Deposit  QO.  of  Maryland,  1-66  S.B. 
729,  167  S.C.  513. 

Order  requiring-  surety  company  feond 
Bond  signed  by  individual  surety 
was  held  not  to  comply  with  order 
for  setting  aside  default  judgment  on 
filing  surety  company  bond. — Boyle  v. 
Berg,  218  N.W.  757,  242  Mich.  225. 

Payment  of  costs 

Under  statute  dealing  with  the 
opening  of  judgment  after  default  on 
service  by  publication,  the  require- 
ment that  applicant  must  "pay  all 
costs,  if  the  court  require  them  to  be 
paid,"  does  not  require  of  applicant 
a  formal  offer  to  pay  costs  before  the 
court  orders  that  they  be  paid. — 
Bagsby  v.  Bagsby,  89  P.2d  34-5,  .184 
Okl.  627,  122  A.L.R.  155. 

Sending  check  by  registered  mail 

Defendants'  tender  to  plaintiff's  at- 
torney of  cashier's  check,  payable  to 
plaintiff,  for  sum  which  trial  court 
directed  defendants  to  pay  -plaintiff 
as  costs  in  order  conditionally  grant- 
ing defendants'  motion  to  set  aside 
default  and  judgment  thereon,  and 
sending  of  check  by  registered  mail, 
addressed  to  plaintiff  at  room  near 
that  of  plaintiff  in  same  building, 
after  plaintiff's  attorney  had  refused 
check,  but  within  time  limited  by 
court  order,  was  sufficient  compli- 
ance with  terms  thereof,  so  as  to 
authorize  final  order  unconditionally 
setting  aside  default  and  judgment. 
—Hayes  v.  Pierce,  104  P.2d  493,  15 
CaLM  662— Hayes  v.  Pierce,  64  P.2d 
728,  18  Oal.App.2d  531. 

684 


Search  for  accrued  costs 

Where  the  trial  court  orders  a  de- 
fault judgment  reopened  pursuant  to 
statute  on  condition  that  defendant 
pay  costs,  defendant  is  not  ordinar- 
ily required  to  search  beyond  appear- 
ance docket  for  accrued  costs  in  aa 
effort  to  comply  with  order. — 'Lofton 
v.  MclAicas,  113  P.2d  966,  189  OkL 
115. 

Payment  from  account  with  clerk 

Defendant  was  held  not  to  have 
failed  to  pay  costs  required  by  order 
vacating  default  judgment  where 
credit  of  defense  counsel's  running1 
account  with  clerk  of  court  relieved 
plaintiff  from  responsibility  of  pay- 
ment.— Powers  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.  of  Maryland,  166  S.E.  729,  167  S. 
C.  513. 

Belief  from  consequences  of  noncom- 
pliance 

Although  practice  of  moving  at 
special  term  after  same  question  has 
been  passed  on  by  another  special 
term  is  not  approved,  the  special 
term  had  power  under  circumstances 
to  relieve  defendant  from  noncom- 
pliance with  order  of  special  term  as 
made  by  official  referee,  where  the 
order  conditionally  opened  defend- 
ant's default,  which,  however,  was 
never  opened,  since  defendant  de- 
faulted in  complying  with  such  or- 
der.— Schleeter  v.  Bommer,  53 
S.2d  167,  268  App.Div.  1020. 


97.     N.Y.— Bimboni 

157  N.T.S.  314. 
34  C.J.  p  383  note  79. 


v.     McCormack, 


98.     Md.— Wolfe    v,    Murray,    6*4 
876,  96  Md.  727. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


337 


by  statute,"  but  it  need  not  make  specific  findings 
which  arc  not  required  by  statute.1 

m.  Order 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Operation  and  effect 

(3)  Renewal  of  application 

(1)  In  General 

An  order  vacating  a  default  judgment  Is  properly 
limited  to  the  issues  which  are  before  the  court,  and 
which  are  necessary  to  a  decision. 

An  order  vacating  a  default  judgment  is  prop- 
erly limited  to  the  issues  which  are  before  the 
court,2  and  which  are  necessary  to  a  decision.8  Al- 
though a  statute  requires  the  grounds  on  which  a 
new  trial  is  granted  to  be  specified  of  record,  it  has 
been  held  that  the  court  in  setting  aside  a  default 
judgment  need  not  specify  the  grounds  for  its  ac- 
tion.4 On  denial  of  a  motion  to  vacate  a  default 
judgment  it  has  been  held  that  it  is  error  for  the 
court  to  insert  in  the  order  a  provision  permitting 
defendant  to  answer.^  An  order  that  the  judgment 
be  set  aside  and  that  the  cause  be  retained  to  be 
heard  on  the  merits  has  been  held  to  vacate  the 
verdict  on  which  the  judgment  was  based  as  well 
as  the  judgment.6 

Where  the  statute  provides  that  a  judgment  shall 
not  be  vacated  until  it  is  adjudged  that  a  valid  de- 
fense exists,  the  entry  of  the  order  vacating  the 
judgment  must  show  that  the  court  adjudged  that 


a  valid  defense  existed  if  not  otherwise  apparent 
on  the  record.7 

An  order  may  constitute  a  judicial  order  al- 
though it  is  not  entered  in  the  court's  minutes.* 
The  trial  court's  memorandum  may  be  considered 
with  the  order  vacating  the  judgment  to  deter- 
mine the  reason  for  the  order.* 

Nunc  pro  tune  entry.  Where  no  formal  order 
appears  of  record  although  a  hearing  was  had 
and  judgment  reopened,  the  court  may  enter  a 
nunc  pro  tune  order  in  accordance  with  the  facts 
reflected  by  the  minutes.10  An  order  containing  no 
recital  that  it  is  entered  as  of  an  earlier  date  and 
which  relates  to  a  subject  other  than  an  earlier  or- 
der cannot  be  regarded  as  a  nunc  pro  tune  entry 
as  of  the  time  of  the  earlier  order.11 

Right  to  knowledge  of  order.  If  the  court  sus- 
tains defendant's  motion  to  set  aside  a  default  judg- 
ment, plaintiff  is  entitled  to  know  that  fact.12 

(2)  Operation  and  Effect 

An  order  vacating  a  default  Judgment  Is  binding  on 
all  parties  and  must  be  given  full  faith  and  credit  until 
vacated  or  reversed. 

An  order  vacating  a  default  judgment  is  binding 
on  all  parties13  and  must  be  given  full  faith  and 
credit  until  vacated  or  reversed.14  As  a  general 
rule  the  order  leaves  the  case  pending  for  further 
and  final  action  on  the  merits,15  and  the  case  stands 
in  the  docket  in  the  same  condition  as  though  the 
judgment  had  never  been  rendered.16  The  order 


99.  N.C.— Parnell  v.  Ivey,  197  S.B. 
128,  213  N.C.  644— Cayton  v.  Clark, 
193  S.E.  404,  213  N.C.  3-74. 

1.  Cal. — Wood    v.    Peterson    'Farms 
Co.,  22  P.2d  565,  132  Cal.App.  233. 

2.  Ga. — Maynard  v.  Luton,  146  -S.B. 
640,  39  Ga.App.  242. 

Vacating-  judgment  to  bring*  in.  party 

Vacating  default  judgment  in  or- 
der to  allow  the  bringing  in  of  a  nec- 
essary party  did  not  justify  setting 
'aside  the  default  itself  but  only  the 
judgment. — Taylor  v.  Western  States 
Land  &  Mortgage  C|o,,  147  P.2d  36, 
63  Cal.App.2d  401. 
Xack  of  jurisdiction 

An  order  vacating  default  judg- 
ment because  of  lack  of  jurisdiction 
is  not  void  as  transcending  scope  of 
rule  to  show  cause  why  default  judg- 
ment should  not  be  reopened. — Pal- 
ansky  v.  Reich,  164  A.  701,  11  N.J. 
Misc.  106,  affirmed  168  A.  297,  11  N. 
XLaw  341. 
S.  Ky.— Welch  v.  Mann's  Ex'r,  88  S. 

\V.2d  1,  261  Ky.  470. 
4*    Mo. — Crossland  v.  Admire,  24  S. 

W.  154,  118  Mo.  87. 
S.     N.Y.— Levine  v,  Berger,  21  N,Y. 

S.2d  449. 


a    N.C.— Gosnell  v.   Billiard,  171  S. 

B.  52,  205  N.C.  297. 
Default  entered  by  clerk 

An  order  relating  to  vacating  judg- 
ment rendered  by  court  has  been 
held  sufficient  to  vacate  default  en- 
tered by  clerk. — -Week  v.  Sucher,  274 
P.  579,  96  Cal.App.  422. 

7.  Ohio. — National       Guaranty       & 
Finance  Co.  v.  Lindimore,  Apj?.,  31 
N.E.2d  155. 

8.  Tex.— Buttrill  v.  Occidental  -Life 
Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  -636. 

9.  Minn. — Marthaler  Machine  &  En- 
gineering Co,  v.  Meyers,  218  N.W. 
127,  173  Minn.  606. 

10.  Okl.—H Lofton  v.  McLucas,  113  P. 
2d  966,  189  Okl.  115. 

Order  made  by  agreement  of  parties 
Court  erred  in  denying  motion  to 
enter  nunc  pro  tune  in  minutes  of 
court  order  made  by  agreement  of 
parties  vacating  default  judgment  as 
to  sureties  on  waiver  of  jury,  par- 
ticularly where  entry  did  not  con- 
tradict record.— Buttrill  v.  Occidental 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d 
636. 

11.  Ohio.— Levy  v.  Foley,  61  N.B.2d 
615,  75  Ohio  App.  220. 


12.  N.Y.— National  Advertising 
Agency  v.  Greco,  201  N.Y.S.  704. 

13.  Pla. — Adelhelm     v.     Dougherty, 
176  So.  775,  129  Fla.  680. 

14.  111.— Haller    v.    Rieth,    247    111. 
App.  541. 

R.L— 'Feldman  v.   Silva,   171  A.   922, 
•54  RI.  202. 

15.  Ga. — Ryles  v.   Moore,   13  S.B,2d 
672,  191  Ga.  661. 

Ind.— State  ex  rel.  Krodel  v.  Gilki- 

son,   198  N.E.   323,  209  Ind.  213. 
Determination  of  merits  in  the  pro- 
ceedings   see    supra    subdivision   j 
(3)  of  this  section. 
Order  at  same  term 

Setting  aside  default  judgment  on 
motion  at  same  term  judgment  was 
rendered  does  not  affect  merits,  but 
provides  means  whereby  merits  may 
be  tried.— Metz  v.  Melton  Coal  Co., 
47  -S.W.2d  503,  185  Ark.  486. 
Granting'  new  trial 

Setting  aside  of  default  judgment 
amounted  to  granting  of  new  trial 
at  term  of  court  at  which  judgment 
was  entered  and  set  aside. — Saund- 
ers  v.  Hornsby,  Tex.Civ.App.,  173  S. 
W.2d  795,  error  refused. 

16.  Tex.— Trujillo  v.  Piarote,  53  S. 


685 


337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


gives  defendant  only  a  right  to  be  heard  and  does 
not  preclude  the  court  on  final  hearing  from  enter- 
ing such  judgment  as  is  warranted  by  the  facts  of 
the  case.17  In  a  statutory  proceeding  an  order  va- 
cating a  decree  will  not  be  given  greater  effect  than 
that  contemplated  by  the  statute.18 

A  judgment  overruling  a  motion  to  vacate  a  de- 
fault judgment  for  lack  of  jurisdiction  constitutes 
a  decision  that  the  default  judgment  was  valid  in  a 
jurisdictional  sense.19 

A  judgment  setting  aside  a  default  may  be  amend- 
ed during  the  term.20 

Void  orders.  An  order,  entered  without  jurisdic- 
tion, opening  a  judgment  of  default  is  void,21  and 
the  court  may  properly  disregard  such  order.22 
Subsequent  orders  based  on  a  void  order  vacating 
a  default  are  also  invalid.28 

(3)  Renewal  of  Application 

The  strict  rule  of  res  Judlcata  does  not  apply  to  a 
decision  on  a  motion  to  vacate  a  default  judgment  and 
the  court  In  its  discretion  may  allow  and  act  on  a  re- 
newal of  the  motion. 

The  strict  rule  of  res  judicata  does  not  apply  to 
a  decision  on  a  motion  to  vacate  a  default  judgment 
and  the  court  in  its  discretion  may  allow  and  act 
on  a  renewal  of  the  motion,24  at  least  where  the 
order  denying  the  first  motion  is  vacated25  or  where 
^different  grounds  are  alleged  in  the  second  motion,26 
"but  it  may  also  properly  dismiss  a  motion  for  the 
reason  that  it  has  formerly  been  refused.27  In 


some  jurisdictions  a  second  application  may  be  per- 
mitted even  on  the  same  grounds  which  were  pre- 
viously ruled  on  adversely,28  but  in  other  jurisdic- 
tions a  judgment  refusing  to  open  a  default  judg- 
ment concludes  defendant  as  to  a  second  motion  on 
the  same  grounds,29  although  defendant  may  not 
have  been  present  when  the  first  motion  was  heard 
and  a  judgment  was  rendered.30  To  justify  grant- 
ing the  second  motion,  the  motion  must  show  ad- 
ditional facts  to  excuse  the  default  and  not  merely 
newly  discovered  evidence,31  and  if  it  does  not  re- 
fer to  the  first  motion  it  must  contain  a  full  show- 
ing of  facts  to  excuse  the  default.32  Where  the 
second  application  is  for  different  relief,  as,  for 
instance,  where  the  former  motion  was  to  vacate 
a  judgment  as  a  nullity,  and  the  second  is  to  open 
up  such  judgment  and  let  the  applicant  in  to  de- 
fend, or  vice  versa,  the  denial  of  the  first  motion 
is  no  bar  as  to  the  second.33 

Where  defendant  after  two  opportunities  has 
failed  to  show  a  meritorious  defense,  it  has  been 
held  that  an  order  denying  an  application  to  open 
a  default  should  not  grant  leave  to  renew  the  ap- 
plication.34 

Application  in  different  cowt.  After  a  motion 
to  remove  a  default  has  been  denied,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  party  may  not  petition  another  court  of 
concurrent  jurisdiction  for  relief  on  the  same 
grounds.35 

Necessity  for  leave.    It  has  been  held  that  leave 


W.2d  466,  122  Tex.  173 — Saunders 
v.  Hornsby,  Civ.App.,  173  S.W.2d 
795,  error  refused. 

17.  Ky. — Joseph  v.  Bailey,  277  S.W. 
466,  211  Ky.  394. 

jg.  U.S. — tJ.  S,  v.  Mayse,  C.C.A.Or., 
5  F.2d  885,  certiorar!  denied  Leath- 
erman  v.  Mayse,  46  S.Ct.  105,  269 
U.S.  580,  70  L.Ed.  422. 

19.  D.C. — Operative    Plasterers'    and 
Cement      Finishers'     International 
Ass'n  of  U.  -S.  and  Canada  v.  Case, 
93  F.2d   56,   68   App.D.C.  43. 

20.  Ind. — Butcher  v.    Olmstead,    182 
N.E.    235,    99    IndLApp.    92. 

21.  Cal.— Gibbons   v.    Clapp,    277    P. 
490,  207  Cal.  221. 

Ga. — Avery  &  Co.  v.  Sorrell,  121  S. 
B.  828,  157  Ga.  476,  answers  to  cer- 
tified questions  conformed  to  122 
S.E.  638,  32  Ga.App.  41. 

Ohio. — Ryan  v.  Buckeye  State  Build- 
ins  &  'Loan  Co.,  163  N.B.  719,  29 
Ohio  App.  476. 

22.  Cal. — G'bbons   v.   Clapp,    277   P. 
490,  207  CaL  221. 


23.    Fla.— Hewitt     v.     International    25.     Cal.— -Tearney  v.  Riddle,  149  P. 


Shoe  Co.,  154  So.  833,  114  'Fla.  743, 


motion  denied  155  So.  725,  115  Fla. 
508. 

24.  Ariz. — Colllster  v.  Inter-State 
Fidelity  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  of 
Utah,  38  P.2d  626,  44  Ariz.  427,  98 
A.L.R.  1020. 

Minn.— Wilhelm  v.  Wilhelm,  276  N. 
W.  804,  201  Minn.  462— La  Plante 
v.  Knutson,  219  N.W.  184,  174 
Minn.  344. 

N.J.— Finkel  v.  District  Court  for 
First  Judicial  Dist.  of  Union  Coun- 
ty, 21  A.2d  306,  127  N.J.Law  132, 
affirmed  28  A.2d  119,  129  N.J.Law 
97. 

Wis. — State  ex  rel.  C.  W.  'Fischer 
Furniture  Co.  v.  Detlingr,  279  N.W. 
616,  228  Wis.  68. 

Statement  of  doctrine  of  res  judicata 
see  infra  §  592. 

Discretion  held  not  abused 

Cal.— Tearney    v.    Riddle,    149    P.2d 

387,  -64  Cal.App.2d  783. 
Wis. — State    ex    rel.    C.   W.    Fischer 

Furniture    Co.    v.    Detling,    279    N. 

W.  616,  228  Wis.  68. 


2d   387,    64   Cal.App.2d  783. 

686 


26.  Okl. — Tippins  v.   Turben,    19   P. 
2d  605,  162  Okl.  136. 

34  C.J.  p  387  note  56. 

27.  Minn. — Universal     Ins.     Co.     v. 
Brasie,    243   N.W.    393,    186    Minn. 
648. 

28.  Ariz. — Swlsshelm     Gold     Silver 
Co.    v.    Farwell,    124   P.2d   544,    59 
Ariz.    162— Collister  v.    Inter-State 
'Fidelity  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  of 
Utah,  38  P.2d  <626,  44  Ariz.  427,  38 
A.L.R.  1020. 

Minn. — La  Plante  v.  Knutson,  219  N. 
W.  184,  174  Minn.  344. 

29.  Ga.— Miller  v.  Phoenix  Mut.  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  147  S.B.  527,  168  Ga.  321. 

30.  Ga. — Miller  v.  Phoenix  Mut  (Life 
Ins.  Co.,  supra. 

31.  N.T.— White  v.   Sebring,   240  N. 
Y.S.   4T7,  228  App.Div.   413. 

32.  N.T. — White  v.  Sebrins,  supra. 

33.  Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Ford   v.   Blasdel,    276   P.   283,    284, 
123  Kan.  43. 

34  C.J,  p  389  note  37. 

34.  N.T. — De     Fini     v.     Imperatori, 
215  N.Y.S.  175,  127  Misc.  42. 

35.  R.I.— Feldman  v.   -Silva,    171   A. 
922,  54  R.I.  202. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


337 


to  renew  a  motion  to  open  a  default  must  be  pro- 
cured,36 but  the  irregularity  of  failing  to  procure 
leave  is  cured  where  the  court  overrules  an  objec- 
tion to  a  hearing  of  the  second  motion.37 

n.  Objections  and  Exceptions 

By  participating  In  a  trial  on  the  merits  after  entry 
of  an  order  vacating  the  default  Judgment,  the  plaintiff 
waives,  or  Is  estopped  to  question,  the  propriety  of  the 
order. 

Where  plaintiff  participates  in  a  trial  on  the  mer- 
its which  takes  place  after  entry  of  an  order  va- 
cating the  default  judgment  he  waives,  or  is  es- 
topped to  question,  the  propriety  of  the  order,38 
but  he  is  not  estopped  to  raise  the  question  of  the 
court's  jurisdiction.39  Parties  moving  to  set  aside 
a  judgment  as  a  nullity  and  recognizing  it  as  a  nul- 
lity in  the  proceedings  after  the  motion  has  been 
granted  are  estopped  to  deny  the  nullity  of  the  judg- 
ment.40 Where  objections  to  the  introduction  of 
an  amended  return  of  service  of  process  are  spe- 
cifically stated  by  movant,  other  grounds  not  men- 
tioned as  a  basis  of  objection  are  waived.41 

o.  Vacation  and  Review  of  Order 

The  court,  while  it  retains  jurisdiction,  may  cancel 
a  former  order  granting  or  overruling  a  motion  to  set 
aside  a  default  judgment  if  a  sufficient  reason  exista 
for  that  action. 


While  the  court  retains  jurisdiction  of  the  cause, 
it  may  cancel  a  former  order  granting  or  overruling 
a  motion  to  set  aside  or  vacate  a  default  judg- 
ment,42 if  a  sufficient  reason  exists  for  such  ac- 
tion.43 After  a  default  judgment  has  been  set  aside 
and  defendant  has  filed  a  plea,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  court  cannot  vacate  the  order  setting  aside  the 
judgment.44  An  order  signed  by  the  trial  judge 
may  not  be  impeached  in  a  proceeding  against  the 
clerk.4* 

Where  an  affidavit  in  the  original  action  has  not 
been  regarded  as  a  pleading  by  plaintiff,  defendant, 
or  the  court,  it  will  not  be  regarded  as  a  pleading 
in  proceedings  to  review  the  propriety  of  an  order 
refusing  to  vacate  a  default.46 

p.  Costs 

Where  a  default  Judgment  Is  opened  or  vacated  as 
a  matter  of  favor  or  grace  to  the  defendant  and  on  his 
motion,  it  Is  error  to  impose  the  costs  on  the  plaintiff. 

Where  a  judgment  is  opened  or  vacated  as  a  mat- 
ter of  favor  or  grace  to  defendant  and  on  his  mo- 
tion, it  is  error  to  impose  the  costs  on  plaintiff.47 
Plaintiff  will  not  be  compelled  to  pay  costs  as  a 
penalty  for  his  refusal  to  stipulate  for  a  new  trial 
on  defendant's  proffer  of  costs  and  disbursements.48 


36.  N.Y.— -Mandel  v.  Schoenfeld,  233 
N.Y.S.   227,  226  App.Div.   676. 

An  order  to  show  cause  why  a  pre- 
vious order  of  the  court  denying  a 
motion  to  vacate  a  judgment  and 
permit  defendant  to  answer  should 
not  be  vacated,  the  default  removed, 
and  defendant  permitted  to  answer, 
is  equivalent  to  leave  by  the  court 
to  renew  the  first  motion. — First 
Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v.  U.  S.  'Fidel- 
ity &  Guaranty  Co.,  194  N.W.  376, 
156  Minn.  231. 

37.  Minn.— Wilhelm  v,  Wilhelm,  276 
N.W.      804,      201     Minn.     462— La 
Plante   v.   Knutson,   21:9  N.W.  184, 
174  Minn,  344. 

33.     Qa.— Avery  &  Co.  v.  Sorrell,  121 
S.B.   838,   157  Ga.  476,  answers  to 
certified    questions    conformed    to 
122  S.B.  638,  32  Ga.App.  41. 
HI. — Thomas   T.    Melmed,    33    N.B.2d 
919,      310     Ill.App.     2-62 — National 
Lead   Co.    v.    Morteli,    2«1   IlLApp. 
332. 
Piling1  hill  of  particulars 

Plaintiff's  conduct  in  filing  bill  of 
'  particulars  after  entry  of  order  va- 
cating default  judgment  obtained  by 
plaintiff  was  tantamount  to  filing  an 
amended  complaint,  and  constituted 
acquiescence  in  such  order  which 
precluded  writ  of  review.— -Matson 
v.  Rhodes,  149  P.2d  974,  174  Or.  550. 
33.  Cal.— Knox  v.  Superior  Court  in 


and  for  Riverside   County,   280   P. 
375,  100  CaLApp.  452. 

40.  La.— White  v.  Hill,  121  So.  5'85, 
168  La.   92— White  v.  Hill,  124  So. 
578,  12  La.App.  412. 

41.  Tex.— -Employer's       Reinsurance 
Corporation  v.  Brock,  Civ.App.,   74 
S.W.2d  435,  error  dismissed. 

42.  Iowa.— Kern  v.  fianborn,  7  N.W. 
2d   801,   233   Iowa  458— Braverman 
v.  Burns,  224  N.W.  596,  207  Iowa 
1382. 

Renewal    of    application    see    supra 
subdivision  m  of  this  section, 

43.  Order  in  ex  parte  proceeding's 
Where     default     decree     was     set 

aside  ex  parte  during  term  in  which 
it  was  rendered,  but  later  in  the 
term,  case  was  fully  reviewed  in 
presence  of  both  parties,  and  show- 
ing previously  made  as  to  reasonable 
excuse  for  default,  if  any,  was  found 
insufficient,  court  properly  reinstat- 
ed default  decree. — Kern  v.  Sanborn, 
7  N.W.2d  801,  233  Iowa  458. 
Affidavit  filed  but  not  indorsed  as 

filed 

Where,  in  an  action  of  debt  on 
foreign  Judgment,  the  declaration 
was  accompanied  by  affidavit  re- 
Quired  by  statute,  and  at  the  follow- 
ing term,  after  office  Judgment,  de- 
fendant filed  plea  of  nul  tiel  record, 
duly  verified,  and  an  order  was  en- 
tered reciting  tender  and  filing  of 

687 


such  plea  with  affidavit,  and  setting 
aside  the  office  Judgment,  it  was  er- 
ror to  set  aside  such  order,  reject 
the  plea,  and  render  judgment  for 
plaintiff  on  the  ground  that  there 
had  been  no  counter  affidavit  filed 
under  the  statute,  although  a  verified 
affidavit  was  found  in  the  file,  sworn 
to  prior  to  the  entry  of  the  order, 
but  not  indorsed  as  filed  by  the  clerk, 
which  affidavit  the  court  treated  as  a 
stray  paper. — Forest  Glen  Land  Co. 
v.  George,  122  S.B.  543,  96  W.Va.  209. 

44.  111.— Marland     Refining    Co.    v. 
Lewis,  264  IlLApp.  163. 

45.  Mich.— Boyle  v.  Berg,  218  N.W. 
757,  242  Mich.  225. 

48.  Ky.— Pinnacle  Motor  Qo.  v. 
Simpson,  287  S.W.  '566,  216  Ky.  184. 

47.  Wis. — Port     Huron     Engine     & 
Thresher  Co.  v.  Clements,  89  N.W. 
160,  113  Wis.  249. 

34  C.J.  p  381  note  58. 

Payment  of  costs  as  condition  for 
opening  default  see  supra  subdivi- 
sion k  (3)  of  this  section. 

48.  Wis. — Port     Huron     Engine     & 
Thresher  Co.  v.  Clements,  89  N.W. 
160,  113  Wis.  249. 

Reason  for  rule 

Plaintiff  is  under  no  obligation 
voluntarily  to  consent  to  the  open- 
ing of  a  default,  although  defendant 
presents  a  sufficient  excuse. — Camp 
v.  Stewart,  2  E.D.Smith.,  N.T.,  88. 


§  337 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


q.  Liabilities  on  Bonds 


The  surety  on  a  bond  given  In  proceedings  to  open 
or  vacate  a  default  judgment  may  not  be  held  liable  on 
the  bond  unless  Its  conditions  are  violated. 

The  surety  on  a  bond  given  in  proceedings  to  open 
or  vacate  a  default  judgment  is  not  liable  on  the 
bond  unless  its  conditions  are  violated.49  A  judg- 
ment canceling  the  bond  is  conclusive  written  evi- 
dence of  the  termination  of  the  surety's  liability.50 

§  338.    Proceedings   in   Cause   Operating  to 
Open  Default 

A  default  Judgment  may  be  vacated  by  subsequent 
proceedings  In  the  same  action  which  are  Inconsistent 
with  the  Judgment  continuing  In  force. 

A  default  judgment  may  be  vacated  in  effect,  al- 
though not  in  terms  set  aside,  by  subsequent  pro- 
ceedings in  the  same  action  which  are  inconsistent 
with  the  judgment  continuing  in  force.51  As  a 
general  rule,  an  amendment  of  the  complaint  after  a 
default  has  been  taken,  which  introduces  a  new 
cause  of  action  or  goes  to  the  substance  of  the 
pleading  operates  to-  open  the  default,62  but  an 
amendment  in  matters  of  form  rather  than  sub- 


stance does  not  operate  to  open  the  default.53 
Where  the  court  tries  the  case  on  the  merits  it  has 
been  held  that  the  default  judgment  is  impliedly  set 
aside  or  vacated  without  a  specific  order  to  that  ef- 
fect,54 but  it  has  also  been  held  that  the  default 
judgment  is  not  impliedly  vacated  if  there  has  been 
no  finding  as  to  whether  defendant  was  excused 
from  filing  an  answer  in  the  original  proceeding.55 
Where  plaintiff  participates  in  a  trial  on  the  merits 
after  rendition  of  the  default  judgment  he  impliedly 
consents  to  the  vacation  of  the  judgment.66  A  non- 
suit which  is  entered  on  the  motion  of  plaintiff  after 
a  default  judgment  has  been  entered  against  de- 
fendant has  the  effect  of  setting  aside  the  default 
judgment57 

§  339.    Proceedings  after  Opening  Default 

Where  a  default  is  opened  the  defendant  should  be 
allowed  or  required  to  serve  or  file  his  plea  or  answer. 
The  case  should  be  placed  on  the  calendar  or  set  for 
trial,  and  should  thereupon  be  proceeded  with  as  though 
no  default  had  been  entered. 

Where  a  default  is  opened,  defendant  should  be 
allowed  or  required  to  serve  or  file,  within  a  pre- 
scribed or  reasonable  time,  his  plea  or  answer,58 


49.    Failure  of  principal  to  pay 

Where  Judgment  by  default  was 
set  aside  on  defendant's  filing  a  bond 
In  effect  that,  if  the  principal  should 
fail  to  pay  costs  and  judgment  re- 
covered, the  bond  should  be  in  effect, 
judgment  could  not  be  entered 
against  the  surety,  as  until  failure  of 
the  principal  to  pay,  the  conditions 
of  the  bond  were  not  violated. — Sun- 
set Motor  Co.  T.  Woodruff,  22£  P. 
519,  130  Wash.  51-6. 
Limitation  to  defendant  furnishing 
bond 

Words  "any  recovery,"  in  bond, 
were  held  not  to  include  judgments 
against  any  defendants,  where  sure- 
ty undertook  to  answer  only  for  de- 
fendant furnishing  bond. — Guaranty 
Trust  Co.  of  New  York  v.  National 
Surety  Co.,  227  N.Y.S.  189,  131  Misc. 
679. 
5ft,  N.Y.— Guaranty  Trust  Co.  of 

New  York  v.  National  Surety  Co., 

supra. 

51.  Idaho.— Vincent  v.  Black,  166  P. 
923,  30  Idaho  636. 

34  C.J.  p  325  note  18. 

52.  Ark. — Shepherd  v.  Grayson  Mo- 
tor  Co.,    139   fl.W.2d   54,    200   Ark. 
199. 

CaL — Thompson  v.  Cook,  127  P.2d 
909,  20  Cal.2d  564 — Stack  v.  Weld- 
er, 43  P.2d  270.  3  CaL2d  Tl— Lubar- 
sky  v.  Bichardson,  21  P.2d  557, 
218  CaL  27 — Sheehy  v.  Roman 
Catholic  Archbishop  of  San  Fran- 
cisco, 122  P.2d  60,  4$  CaLApp.2d 
637— Bley  v.  Dessin,  87  P.2d  889, 
31  CaLApp.3d  338 — Strosnider  v.j 


Superior  Court  in  and  for  El  Dora- 
do County,  62  P.2d  1394,  17  Cal. 
App.2d  647— Gutleben  v.  Crossley, 
56  P.2d  954,  13  Cal.App.2d  249. 

Ga.— Elrod  v.  Hulett,  9  -S.E.2d  279, 
62  Ga.App.  659— Land  v.  Pikes 
Peak  Lumber  Co.,  132  S.E.  -644,  35 
Ga.App.  159 — Henderson  v.  Ellar- 
bee,  131  S.E.  <524,  35  Ga.App.  5. 

111.— Lusk  v.  Bluhm,  53  N.E.2d  135, 
321  I11.APP.  349— Dahlin  v.  Maytag 
Co.,  238  IlLApp.  85. 

Mont— Price  v.  Skylstead,  222  P. 
1059,  69  Mont.  453. 

34  C.J.  .p  157  note  64. 

Necessity  for  notice  of  amendment 
see  supra  5  1*94. 

53.    Ark. — Shepherd  v.  Grayson  Mo- 
tor  Co.,    139    S.W.2d   54,    200    Ark. 
1-99. 
Cal.— Stack  v.  Welder,   43  P.2d  270, 

3  Cal.2d  71. 
Mont. — Price    T.    Skylstead,    222    P. 

1059,  69  Mont  453. 
Curing'  defects 

While  filing  of  material  amend- 
ment will  open  default,  filing  of 
amendment,  merely  alleging  facts 
defectively  alleged  in  original  peti- 
tion will  not  affect  validity  of  de- 
fault judgment,  since  judgment 
cured  defects. — Henderson  v.  Ellar- 
bee,  131  S.E.  524,  35  GaJlgpp.  5. 
Hi'onnta'teiial  amendment 

An  amendment  to  petition  in  tro- 
ver, amplifying  description  of  arti- 
cle sued  for,  and  alleging  title  or 
right  of  possession,  not  being  ma- 
terial, was  held  not,  after  default  to 
open  case  for  answer. — Land  v.  Pikes 

688 


Peak  Lumber  Co.,   132   S.E.   644,   35 
Ga.App.  159. 

54.  IlL^Green  v.   Drew,   57   N.E.2d 
227,  324  IlLApp.  84. 

S.D. — Boshart  v.  National  Ben.  Ass'n 
of  Mitchell,  273  N.W.  7,  66  S.D. 
260. 

55.  Tex. — Griffin    v.     Burrus,    Com. 
App.,  24  S.W.2d  810. 

58.  CaL— Nlcholls  v.  Anders,  <56  P. 
2d  1289,  13  Cal.App.2d  440. 

57.  Ala. — Green  v.  NuGrape  Co., 
100  So.  84,  19  Ala.App.  66& 

5a  N.Y.^Luke  v.  Polstein,  51  N.Y. 
S.2d  427,  268  App.Div.  921,  followed 
in  51  N.Y.S.2d  429,  268  App.Div. 
921,  appeal  denied  55  N.Y.S.2d  -665, 
269  App.Div.  784.  Motion  granted 
61  N.E.2d  781,  294  N.Y.  775.  Af- 
firmed 63  N.E.2d  27,  294  N.Y.  896. 

34  C.J.  p  431  notes  8,  10. 

Application  for  leave  to  answer 

(1)  Application    for    leave    to    file 
answer,    after    vacation    of    default 
judgment,  is  not  a  pleading  and,  if 
not  required  by  statute,  need  not  be 
in  writing. — Schaffner  v.  Preston  Oil 
Co.,  154  N.E.  780,   94  Ind.App.  554. 

(2)  Although  made  in  writing,  the 
application     is     not     demurrable. — 
Schaffner  v.  Preston  Oil  Co.,  supra. 
Extension  of  time 

(1)  Extension  of  time  to  answer 
may  be  permitted  where  the  court 
is  obliged  to  open  default— Nader- 
hoff  v.  Benz,  141  N.W.  501,  25  N.D. 
501,  47  L.R.A.,N.S.,  853. 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  340 


except  where  the  judgment  is  vacated  because  it  is 
void  for  want  of  jurisdiction  of  defendant,  in  which 
case  it  is  not  proper  to  require  defendant  to  appear 
and  plead.59  The  case  should  be  placed  on  the  cal- 
endar or  set  for  trial,60  and  should  thereupon  be 
proceeded  with  as  though  no  default  had  been  en- 
tered.61 Plaintiff  is  not  bound  to  serve  the  declara- 
tion on  a  party  who  is  let  in  to  defend  after  a  de- 
fault.62 The  issues  of  the  case  should  be  deter- 
mined,63 and  the  trial  should  be  before  a  jury  if, 
under  usual  rules,  a  jury  case  is  presented.64  The 
court  may  require  defendant  to  proceed  with  his 
defense  rather  than  cause  plaintiff  to  prove  his 
case,65  but,  where  judgment  is  entered  generally  and 
without  terms,  plaintiff,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute 
otherwise  providing,  is  put  to  proof  of  the  cause  of 
action  as  though  judgment  had  not  been  entered.66 
The  action  may  be  dismissed  for  want  of  prosecu- 
tion,67 or  it  may  be  dismissed  as  to  defendants 
against  whom  no  cause  of  action  is  stated.68  If  de- 
fendant defaults  again,  a  second  judgment  by  de- 
fault may  be  entered  against  him.69  Where  a  trial 


on  the  merits  results  in  the  same  decision  as  before, 
it  has  been  held  that  a  new  judgment  should  not 
be  rendered  but  that  the  original  judgment  should 
be  reinstated.70  A  partial  reversal  of  the  judgment 
does  not  automatically  work  a  reversal  of  the  en- 
tire judgment.71 

Amendment  of  pleadings.  The  trial  court  may 
use  its  sound  discretion  in  refusing  or  permitting1 
the  amendment  or  withdrawal  of  pleadings.72 

Notice  or  service  of  amended  pleadings  after 
opening  of  default  by  amendment  of  the  declara- 
tion or  complaint  is  considered  supra  §  194. 


§  340. 


Defenses  Available 


Except  to  the  extent  to  which  the  defendant  is  lim- 
ited by  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  court,  he  may 
avail  himself  of  any  meritorious  defense  existing  at  the- 
time  of  the  vacation  of  a  default  judgment. 

Where  the  court,  as  a  condition  of  opening  or 
vacating  the  judgment,  has  limited  the  defenses 
which  defendant  may  make  to  the  action,  defendant 
will  not  be  allowed  to  set  up  matters  outside  the 


(2)  On  motion  to  set  aside  judg- 
ment, extension  of  time  beyond  twen- 
ty days  for  filing-  answer  was  held 
authorized  where  time  for  filing-  an- 
swer had  not  expired  when  Judg- 
ment was  entered,  and  defendants 
had  meritorious  defense. — Town  of 
Greenville  v.  Munford,  131  S.E.  740, 
191  N.C.  373. 

59.  Cal.— Merced  Co.  v.  Hicks,  7  P. 
181,   2  Cal.Unrep.Cas.   483. 

60.  111.— Chicago  v.   English,    64  N. 
E.  976,  198  111.  211. 

N.Y. — Martin  v.  Universal  Trust  Co., 
78  N.Y.S.  465,  76  App.Div.  320. 

61.  Colo. — Swanson    v.    'First    Nat. 
Bank,  219  P.  784,  74  Colo.  135. 

34  C.J.  p  432  note  12. 
After  default  "by  plaintiff 

Plaintiff  who  failed  to  serve  no- 
tice of  controverting  affidavit  to  de- 
fendant's plea  of  privilege,  which  re- 
sulted in  default  judgment,  could, 
after  twenty-eight  terms,  contest 
such  plea,  where  plaintiff,  after  judg- 
ment became  final,  acted  promptly  in 
sotting  aside  judgment  and  giving 
notice  of  hearing  on  such  plea. — 
Gribble  v.  Scruggs,  Tex.Civ.App.,  55 
S.W.2d  567,  error  dismissed. 

62.  N.T.— Hitchcock    v.    Barlow,    2 
Wend.  $29. 

63.  N.J.— Ehnes    v.    Quinn,    23   A.2d 
295,  127  N.J.Law  447. 

Issues  affecting  codefendants 

Where  testator's  widow  at  same 
term  moved  to  set  aside  default 
judgment  against  widow  and  execu- 
tor on  note  and  mortgage  and 
showed  that  executor  was  without 
power  to  make  mortgage  and  that 
testator's  children  had  not  been 

49  C.J.S.-44 


made  parties,  widow's  showing  was 
held  to  have  inured  to  benefit  of 
executor  who  made  no  application 
for  relief  until  subsequent  term,  and 
after  vacation  of  the  judgment  the 
court  was  authorized  to  consider  the 
Issue  as  it  affected  the  executor. — 
Welch  v.  Mann's  Bx'r,  88  S.W.2d  1, 
261  Ky.  470. 
64.  Ohio.— Minetti  v.  Binhorn,  173 

N.B.  243,  36  Ohio  App.  310. 

.    ind. — Butcher  v.   Olmstead,    182 

N.B.  265,  99  Ind.App.  92. 
86.    Pa.— Austen  v.  Marzolf,   161  A, 

72,  307  Pa.  232. 
34  C.J.  p  432  notes  15,  16. 
67.    111. — Charles    H.    Thompson    Co. 

v.   Burns,   199   IlLApp.   418. 
N.T.— Hewlett  v.  Van  Voorhis,  187  N. 

T.S.  533,  196  App.Div.  322,  affirmed 

135  N.B.  952,  233  N.T.  «642. 

L    Ga. — H.    B.    Jarman  &   Sons   v. 

Drew,    21    S.E.2d   444,    67    Ga.App. 

850. 

€9.    La.— White  v.  Hill,  121  So.  &85, 

168  La.  92. 
N.C. — Wilson   v.    Thaggard,    34    S.B. 

2d  140,  225  N.C.  348. 
34  C.J.  p  432  note  17. 
Proposed  answer  as  pleading1 

Although  defendant  filed  proposed 
verified  answer  at  time  of  filing  mo- 
tion to  set  aside  first  default,  order- 
ing second  default  for  failure  to  file 
answer  was  held  within  discretion  of 
court. — James  A.  Clay  &  Co.  v.  Shaf- 
er,  35  P.2d  572,  140  Cal.App.  625. 

Terms 

Where  defendant's  default  was 
twice  opened'  on  identical  terms 
which  were  not  met,  the  default 
should  not  have  been  opened  a  third 

689 


time  on  more  favorable  terms  on  an 
application  for  reargument,  particu- 
larly where  defendant  not  only  de- 
liberately failed  to  comply  with 
original  terms,  but  also  failed  to  an- 
swer a  subpoena  for  his  examination 
in  proceeding  supplementary  to  exe- 
cution of  the  default  judgment,  for 
which  he  was  adjudged  in  contempt 
and  fined. — General  Bxchange  Ins. 
Corporation  v.  Stern,  25  N.Y.S.2d  266. 

70.  111.— Walentarski  v.  Racine,  264 
IlLApp.  369. 

Kan.— Cox  v.  Brown,  224  P.  908,  115. 

Kan.   709,  rehearing  overruled  225 

P.  1044,  116  Kan.  213.  ' 
Right  to  regain  title  after  redemp- 
tion period 

Defendant  who  procures  opening 
of  judgment  based  on  service  by  pub- 
lication without  actual  notice,  after 
sale  of  land  on  execution  and  expira- 
tion of  period  of  redemption,  does 
not  acquire  right  to  end  litigation 
and  regain  title  by  payment  of  debt 
with  interest  and  costs,  unless  final 
decision  is  in  his  favor  on  some  de- 
fense or  partial  defense  set  out  in 
answer.— Cox  v.  Brown,  225  P.  1044, 
116  Kan.  213. 

71.  Ark.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bank 
of  Horatio,  255  S.W.  881,  161  Ark, 
259. 

Judgment  for  reduced  amount 

Judgment,  vacated  as  to  one  de- 
fendant with  permission  to  defend, 
stands  in  reduced  amount  adjudged 
against  such  defendant  after  hearing 
without  further  proceeding. — John- 
son v.  Dakota  Nat.  Bank,  207  N.W. 
217,  49  SJX  381. 

72.  Wyo.— McDaniel    v.   Hoblit,    245 
P.  295,  34  Wyo.  509. 


§  341 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


specifications  of  the  order;75  but  otherwise  he  may 
avail  himself  of  any  meritorious  defense,74  exist- 
ing at  the  time  of  the  judgment  vacated,  but  not 
a  defense  subsequently  accruing.75  Merely  formal 
and  technical  objections76  or  dilatory  pleas77  usu- 
ally will  not  be  permitted,  and  defendant  may  be 
limited  to  issuable  pleas,  excluding  special  demur- 
rers which  do  not  go  to  the  merits,7*  although  de- 


murrers79 or  pleas  in  abatement80  may  be  permit- 
ted Under  statutes  permitting  defendants  served 
only  constructively,  as  by  publication,  to  be  let  in 
to  defend,  as  discussed  supra  §  335,  the  defense  is 
not  limited  to  matters  which  if  pleaded  in  apt  time 
would  defeat  the  action,81  but  includes  any  matter 
of  defense  or  exception  which  would  have  prevented 
or  modified  the  judgment.82 


XL  EQUITABLE  BELIEF  AGAINST  JUDGMENT 
A.  IN  GENERAL 


§  341.    Nature  of  Remedy  and  Right  to  Relief 
in  General 

a.  In  general 

b.  Requisites  of  relief  in  general 

a.  In  G-eneral 

Equitable    relief    against   a   Judgment,    although    not 


regarded  with  favor  by  the  courts,  may  nevertheless 
be  had  where  sufficient  grounds  appear;  and  under  some 
circumstances  the  remedy  in  equity  is  exclusive. 

On  a  showing  of  proper  circumstances,  and  when 
required  by  the  ends  of  justice,  appropriate  relief 
against  a  judgment  may  be  had  in  equity,83  the 


73.  Colo.— Oumaer    v.    Bell,    149    P. 
255,  59  Colo.  213. 

34  C.J.  p  432  note  21. 

74.  Okl. — Pollack     v.     ILeonard     & 
Braniff,  241  P.  15$,  112  Okl.  27*. 

34  C.J.  p  432  note  22. 
Statute     of    limitations     may    be 

pleaded. 

Minn. — Roe  v.  Widme,  254  N.W.  274, 
191  Minn.  351. 

N.Y.— Luke  v.  Polstein,  Cl  N.Y.S.2d 
427,  268  App.Div.  921,  followed  in 
51  N.Y.S.2d  429,  268  App.Div.  -921, 
appeal  denied  55  N.Y.8.2d  665,  269 
App.Div.  7S4.  Motion  granted  61 
N.E.2d  781.  294  N.Y.  775.  Affirmed 
63  N.B.2d  27,  294  N.Y.  89*6. 

34  C.J.  p  432  note  22   £b]. 

75.  Tex. — Howell   v.    Fidelity   Lum- 
ber Oo.,   Com.  App.,    228    S.W.   181. 

34  C.J.  p  432  note  23. 

76.  Pa.— Ekel  v.  Snevily.  3  Watts  & 
S.  272,  38  Am.D.  758. 

34  C.J.  p  432  note  24. 

77.  La. — Citizens'   Bank  v.  Beard,  5 
La.Ann.  41. 

34  C.J.  p  432  note  25. 

78.  Ky.— Vlolett  v.  Dale,  1  Bibb.  144. 
34  C.J.  p  432  note  27. 

79.  111.— Chicago  v.  English,  64  N.B. 
976,  198  111.  211. 

Va. — Syme   v.    Griffin,    4   Hen,   &   M. 

277,  14  Va.  277. 
89.     Ala.— Ex  parte  Haisten,  149  So. 

213,  227  Ala.  183. 
Premature  action 

Allowance  of  plea  in  abatement, 
averring  that  suit  on  group  insur- 
ance certificate  was  premature,  after 
withdrawal  of  demurrer  to  complaint 
and  vacation  of  judgment  thereon, 
was  within  trial  court's  discretion. — 
Box  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Cjo.,  168 
So.  209,  27  AUuApp.  21,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  168  So.  217,  232  Ala.  1 


321,  certiorari  denied  168  So.  220,  232 

Ala.  447. 

Matter  existing  at  time  of  original 

salt 

A  plea  in  abatement  on  the  setting 
aside  of  a  default  Is  improper,  where 
the  matter  in  abatement  existed  at 
the  time  of  the  institution  of  the 
suit. — Bradley  v.  Welch,  1  Munf. 
284,  15  Va,  284. 

81.  N.C.— Rhodes  v.  Rhodes,  34  S.EL 
271,  125  N.C.  191. 

82.  N.C. — Rhodes  v.  Rhodes,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  432  note  31. 

83.  Ala. — Barrow  v.  Lindsey,  159  So. 
232,  230  Ala.  45 — Hanover  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Street,  154  So.  816,  228  Ala. 
677 — Florence    Gin  Co.   v.   City  of 
Florence,  147  So.  417,  226  Ala.  478, 
followed    in     147     So.     420,     three 
cases,  226  Ala.  482,  147  So.  421,  226 
Ala.  482,  and  147  So.  421,  226  Ala. 
483— King  v.  Dent,  93  So.  823,  208 
Ala.  78. 

Cal.— -Hallett  v.  Slaughter,  140  P.2d 
3,  22  Cal.2d  552— Hammell  v.  Brit- 
ton.  119  P.2d  333,  19  Cal.2d  72— 
Caldwell  v.  Taylor,  23  P.2d  758, 
218  Cal.  471,  88  A.L.R.  1194— -Bank 
of  Italy  v.  B.  N.  Cadenasso,  274 
P.  534,  206  Cal.  436— King  v.  Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  San  Diego 
County,  56  P.2d  268,  12  Cal.App.2d 
501 — Fisch  &  Co.  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  43 
P.2d  855,  6  Cal.App.2d  21— Fletch- 
er v.  Superior  Court  of  Sacramen- 
to County,  250.  P.  195,  79  CaLApp. 
468. 

Conn.— -Application  of  Title  &  Guar- 
anty Co.  of  Bridgeport  to  Change 
Name  to  Bankers'  Security  Trust 
Co.,  145  A.  151,  109  Conn.  45. 

Del. — Commercial  Realty  Incorpora- 
tion v.  Jackson,  166  A.  657,  5  W.W. 
Harr.  395. 

690 


Fla. — Gamble  v.  Gamble  Holding 
Corporation,  162  So.  886,  120  Fla. 
340. 

111.— Balsay  v.  Conte,  264  IlLApp. 
60. 

Iowa. — Shaw  v.  Addison,  18  N.W.2d 
796 — Foote  v.  State  Sav.  Bank, 
Missouri  Valley,  Iowa,  206  N.W. 
819,  201  Iowa  174. 

Mass. — Liberty  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Hathaway  Baking  Co.,  28  N.E.2d 
425,  306  Mass.  428 — Connor  v. 
Morse,  20  N.E.2d  424,  303  Mass. 
42. 

Mich.— Blehm  Y.  Hanzek,  262  N.W. 
403,  272  Mich.  541. 

Minn. — Lenhart  v.  Lenhart  Wagon 
Co.,  2  N.W.2d  421,  211  Minn.  572. 

Mo.— Fadler  v.  Gabbert,  63  S.W.2d 
121,  333  Mo.  851 — Overton  v.  Over- 
ton,  37  S.W.2d  565,  327  Mo.  530. 

N.J.— Young  v.  Weber,  175  A.  273, 
117  N.J.Eq.  242— Di  Paola  v.  Trust 
Co.  of  Orange,  156  A.  439,  109  N.J. 
Eq.  80— William  Peter  Brewing 
Corporation  v.  Bernhardt,  137  A. 
828,  101  N.J.EQ.  60. 

Ohio.— Seeds  v.  Seeds,  156  N.E.  193, 
116  Ohio  St.  144,  52  A.L.R.  761— 
Hinman  v.  Executive  Committee  of 
Communistic  Party  of  U.  S.  A.,  47 
N.E.2d  820,  71  Ohio  App.  76— Eck- 
field  v.  State,  155  N.E.  160,  23  Ohio 
App.  150. 

Pa,— Mook  v.  Larsen,  Com.PL,  23 
Erie  Co.  320. 

S.C. — Scott  v.  Newell,  144  S.E.  82, 
146  S.C.  385. 

Tex.— Sedgwick  v.  Kirby  Lumber 
Co.,  107  S.W.2d  358,  130  Tex  163— 
Humphrey  v.  Harrell,  Com.App.,  29 
S.W.2d  963 — Garza  v.  Kenedy,  Com. 
App.,  299  S.W.  231— Stone  v.  Stone, 
Civ.App.,  101  S.W.2d  638— Bonner 
v.  Pearson,  Civ.App.,  7  S.W.2d  930 
— Cook  v.  Panhandle  Refining  Co., 
Civ.App.,  267  S.W.  1070— Waurika 


49     C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  341 


power  of  equity  in  this  connection  being  inherent,84 
and  existing  irrespective  of  any  statute  authorizing 
such  relief.8**  A  bill  attacking  a  judgment  is  not 
regarded  with  favor  by  the  courts,8^  and  will  lie 
only  in  exceptional  cases.8?  Such  relief  may  be 
had,  not  of  right,  but  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound 

Oil  Ass'n  v.  Ellis,  Civ.App.,  267  S. 

W.     523 — Cooper    v.    Cooper,     Civ. 

App.,    260    S.W.    679 — Vacuum    Oil 

Co.   v.    Liberty  Refining   Co.,    Civ. 

App.,  251  S.W.  321. 
W.Va. — Weld  on  v.  Callison,  193  S.E. 

441t    119    W.Va.    306— Williams   v. 

Stratton,    174    S.E,   417,   114  W.Va, 

837. 
Wis. — Ellis  v.  Gordon,  231  N.W.  585, 

202  Wis.  134— Kiel  v.  Scott  &  Wil- 
liams, 202  N.W.  672,  186  Wis.  415. 
Nature    and    form    of    remedy    for 

opening    and    vacating    judgments 

in  general  see  supra  §  286. 

"One  of  the  methods  of  directly 
attacking  a  judgment,  which  is  as 
old  as  the  common  law,  is  by  bill  in 
equity." — McElroy  v.  Puget  Sound 
Nat.  Bank,  288  P.  241,  242,  157  Wash. 
'  43. 


legal  discretion,88  and  each  case  must  stand  on  its 
own  peculiar  merits.89 

Under  some  circumstances,  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment ordinarily  must  or  should  be  sought  by  a  suit 
in  equity.^  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  the  only  re- 


rules.— Wattson   v.    Dillon.    56    P.  2 
220,  6  Cal.2d  33. 


Enjoining-  enforcement  of  judgment 
It  has  been  held  that,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  statutory  authority,  a  court 
has  no  power  to  enjoin  a  judgment 
creditor  from  enforcing  his  judg- 
ment against  a  judgment  debtor. — 
Pisciotta  v.  Preston,  10  N.Y.S.2d  44, 
170  Misc.  376. 

84.     Mont.— Bullard    v.    Zimmerman, 

268  P.  512,  82  Mont.  434. 
N.J.— Miller    v.    Bond    &    Mortgage 

Guaranty  Co.,  188  A.  678,  121  N.J. 

Eq.  197. 
Tex.— McMillan    v.     McMillan,     Civ. 

App.,  72  S.W.2d  611. 
Correction  of  court's  own  record 

In  suit  to  set  aside  decree  entered 
by  chancery  court  clerk  without  ap- 
proval by  such  court  or  aggrieved 
party's  counsel,  court  has  inherent 
right  to  make  its  record  speak  truth 
at  any  time,  either  in  or  out  of 
term,  by  canceling  such  decree  as 
not  that  of  court. — Henderson  v. 
Freeman,  171  S.W.Sd  66,  205  Ark. 
856. 

85.    La.— Vinson  v.  Picolo,  App.,  15 

So.2d  778. 
Ohio. — Northern  Ohio  Power  &  Light 

Co.    v.    Smith,    186    N.E.    712,    126 

Ohio  St.  601. 
Tex.— Bonner  v.  Pearson,  Civ.App.,  7 

S.W.2d  930— Robbie  v.  Upson,  Civ. 

App.,  153  S.W.  406. 
Statute  held  not  to  broaden  power 
of  equity 

A  statute  providing  for  relief  be- 
fore judgment  becomes  final  where 
rendered  against  party  through  his 
neglect  has  been  held  not  to  broad- 
en power  of  equity  court  to  vacate 
final  judgment  in  Independent  pro- 
ceeding calling  for  exercise  of  equi- 
table pewers  based  on  established 


88.    111.— Chandler  v.  Chandler,  App 

63  N.E.2d  272. 
Mo.— Sanders    v.    Brooks,    App.,    18 

S.W.2d  353. 
Or. — Olsen  v.  Crow,   290  P.   233,   13 

Or.     310— Corpus    Juris     citad    in 

Dixon  v.  Simpson,  279  P.  939,  942 

130    Or.    211 — Parker  v.   Reid,    27 

P.  334,  127  Or.  578. 
Tex. — Citizens'     Bank     v.     Brandau 

Civ.App.,   1    S.W.2d    466,    error  re 

fused— King  v.  King,  Civ.App.,  27 

S.W.  899. 

34  C.J.  p  432  note  1. 
Excuse  of  moment 

Although  there  is  no  InflexibL 
rule,  some  excuse  of  moment  mus 
exist  to  carry  rights  over  to  an 
other  judicial  forum. — Blazewicz  v 
Weberski,  208  N.W.  452,  234  Mich. 
431. 

Comparison  with  collateral  attack 

Except  in  cases  of  palpable  fraud 
the  rules  and  limitations  established 
and  recognized  by  courts  of  equity 
render  a  direct  attack  on  a  judg 
ment  almost  as  difficult  of  accom< 
plishment  as  would  be  a  collateral 
attack,— Redfield  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
244  P.  210,  66  Utah  459. 

Rehearing  of  litigated  issues  not  de- 
sired. 

Statute  authorizing  bill  of  review 
to  revise  judgment  must  be  con- 
strued so  as  not  to  allow  unending 
rehearing  of  litigated  issues  or  fur- 
nish uncertainty  of  administration  of 
guardian's  estate. — Watts  v.  Moss, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  63  S.W.2d  1095,  error 
dismissed. 
Adjudication  of  title  to  land 

Statutory  bill  of  review  cannot  be 
employed  directly  to  adjudicate  title 
to  land. — Johnson  v.   Oritz  Oil   Co., 
Tex.Civ.App.,    104    S.W.2d   543. 
Different  interpretation  of  will 

In  the  absence  of  extrinsic  fraud 
or  certain  Jurisdictional  defects,  an 
action  in  equity  does  not  lie  to  se- 
cure an  interpretation  of  a  will  dif- 
ferent from  that  adopted  by  the 
probate  court  whose  decree  of  distri- 
bution has  become  final. — Vincent  v. 
Security-First  Nat.  Bank  of  Los  An- 
geles, 155  P.2d  63,  67  Cal.App.2d  602. 

87.    Mass. — Long  v.  MacDougall,  173 

N.E.  507,  273  Mass.  386. 
Pa. — Frantz  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 
,  3  A.2d  917,  333  Pa.  220. 
Extreme  and  restricted  cases 

Equitable  proceedings  to  set  aside 
a  final  judgment  after  the  term  are 

691 


jealously  watched,  and  granted  only 
in  extreme  and  restricted  cases. — 
Floyd  v.  Eggleston,  Tex.C:v.App.,  137 
S.W.2d  182,  error  refused,  certiorari 
denied  61  S.Ct.  314,  311  U.S.  708, 
S5cL.Ed.  460,  rehearing  denied  61  S. 
Ct.  609,  312  U.S.  713,  85  L.Ed.  1143. 

88.  Cal.— In  re  Davis'  Estate,  101  P. 
2d  761,   38  Cal.App.2d  579,   rehear- 
ing denied   102   P.2d   545,    38    Cal. 
App.2d  579. 

N.M.— Quintana    v.    Vigil,    147    P.2d 

356,  48  N.M.  195. 
Or. — Parker  v.  Reid,   273  P.  334,  127 

Or.  578. 
Pa. — Simcoe  v.  Szukegs,  Com.Pl.,  27 

North.Co.  182. 

89.  Pa.— Sherwood  Bros.  Co.  v.  Ken- 
nedy, 200  A.  689,  132  Pa.Super.  154. 
Proceeding  to  enjoin  execution  of 

garnishment  Judgment  on  replevin 
bond  is  determinate  by  ordinary 
rules  applicable  to  judgments.— 
Southern  Surety  Co.  v.  Texas  Oil 
Clearing  House,  Tex.Com.App.,  281  S. 
W.  1045. 

90.  U.S.— Glinski  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.I1L, 
93  F.2d  418. 

Cal.— Sepulveda  v.  Apablasa,  77  P.2d 

530,  25  Cal.App.2d  300. 
Fla. — Sauer  v.   Sauer,   19   So.2d   247, 

154  Fla.  827 — State  ex  rel,  Lorenz 

v.    Lorenz,    6    So.2d    620,    149    Fla. 

265. 
Iowa.— Shaw  v.  Addison,   18  N.W.2d 

796. 
Mo. — In     re     Beauchamp's     Estate, 

App.,  184  S.W.2d  729. 
Presence  of  innocent  tliird  parties 

Where  a  judgment,   although  not 

id   on  its   face,   is   for   some   col- 
ateral  reason  void,  as,  for  instance, 
where  it  has  been  procured  by  means 
of  fraud  extrinsic  to  the  merits  of 
:he  case,  and  innocent  third  parties 
lave  acquired  interests   through  or 
y  virtue  of  the  judgment,  the  more 
rderly  course  Is  to  proceed  by  an 
ndependent  suit  in  equity  to  set  it 
aside  or  to  restrain  and  prevent  the 
>arty  in  whose  favor  the  judgment 
las  thus  been  procured  from  raak- 
ng  an  equitable  use  thereof.— Sharp 
.   Eagle  Lake   Lumber  Co.,   212  P. 
33,  60  Cal.App.  386. 
Mistake  affecting  rights  of  all  parti. 

tioners 

A    mistake    which,    if    corrected, 
would  affect  the  rights  of  all  parti- 
oners  cannot,  unless  by  agreement 
f  all  the  parties,  be  corrected  ex- 
ept  by  suit  in  equity. — Hutton   v. 
Tard,    128    S.E.    647,    99   W.Va.    364. 
xclnsive  Jurisdiction 
Generally,   courts   of  equity  have 


§  341 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


lief  against  a  judgment  after  adjournment  of  the 
term  of  court  at  which  it  was  rendered  is  by  plenary 
suit  in  equity,9*  and  that  a  judgment  which  is  void- 
able, rather  than  void,  may  be  set  aside  only  in  an 
equitable  proceeding.^  On  the  other  hand,  a  party 
attacking  a  judgment  is  not  always  restricted  to  the 
remedy  of  injunction  against  enforcement  of  the 
judgment,93  and  it  has  been  judicially  observed  that 
in  modern  practice,  the  remedies  at  law  by  amend- 
ing, opening,  vacating,  and  reviewing  judgments  or 
by  granting  new  trials  have  greatly  lessened  the  oc- 
casions for  resorting  to  equity  for  relief  against  a 
judgment94  It  has  been  asserted  that  a  judgment 
which  becomes  unjust  by  subsequent  developments 
may  be  corrected  by  proceeding  in  equity  ;9&  but  it 
has  also  been  asserted  that  an  action  will  not  lie 
in  equity'  to  modify  or  discharge  a  judgment  by 
reason  of  matters  arising  subsequent  to  the  entry 
of  the  judgment.96 

Nature  of  remedy.  A  suit  to  set  aside  a  judgment 
and  retry  the  original  case,  or  an  attack  on  a  judg- 
ment on  the  ground  of  fraud,  is  generally  an  equita- 
ble proceeding  or  in  the  nature  of  such  a  proceed- 
ing.97 The  equitable  remedy  against  a  judgment  is  . 


not  a  proceeding  in  rem,  but  is  a  proceeding  in  per- 
sonam  against  a  party  to  the  judgment  seeking  to 
deprive  him  of  the  benefit  of  the  judgment  by  en- 
joining him  from  enforcing  it.98  The  remedy  in 
equity  does  not  assail  the  court  in  which  the  judg- 
ment was  rendered;99  it  need  not  seek  to  change, 
modify,  suspend,  or  vacate  the  judgment,1  but  may 
be  employed  to  secure  relief  against  the  judgment 
on  the  ground  that  the  rights  acquired  thereunder 
cannot  be  retained  in  good  conscience.2  An  action 
in  equity  to  vacate  a  decree  is  analogous  to  a  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial  in  so  far  as  it  involves  a  re- 
examination  of  the  issues.8 

b.  Requisites  of  Belief  in  General 

In  general,  one  seeking  equitable  relief  against  a 
judgment  must  show  that  there  is  some  recognized 
ground  for  equitable  interference,  and  also  that  his  sit- 
uation is  not  due  to  his  own  fault  and  that  he  Is  entitled 
to  the  favorable  consideration  of  the  court. 

In  order  to  entitle  a  party  to  relief  in  equity 
against  a  judgment,  he  must  show  that  there  is  in 
the  case  a  recognized  ground,  such  as  fr-ard,  acci- 
dent, mistake,  or  the  like,  for  equitablt  interfer- 
ence,4 and,  as  discussed  infra  §  343,  that  there  is 


exclusive  jurisdiction  to  annul  judg- 
ments at  law,  as  well  as  their  own 
decrees  because  of  fraud  or  mistake. 
—  Jordan  v.  Tharp,  137  So.  667,  2 
Ala,  619. 

91.  Tex.  —  Squyres     v.     Rasmussen, 
Civ.App.,    296   S.W.   977—  Peters   v. 
Pursley,   Civ.App.,   278  S.W.   229. 

92.  Tex.  —  Bryan  v.  Jacoby,  Civ.App., 
11  S.W.2d  373. 

93.  B.C.  —  Consolidated     Radio     Ar- 
tists  v.   Washington    Section,   Na- 
tional  Council   of  Jewish  Juniors, 
105  F.2d  785;  70  App.D.C.  262. 

94.  U.S.—  U.    S.    y.    Mani,    D.C.S.D., 
196  F.  160. 

Preferable  procedure 

Procedure  by  petition  to  open  final 
decree  and  order  to  show  cause  is 
substitute  for  bill  of  review  and  is 
preferable  as  simpler  and  more  di- 
rect procedure.  —  Cameron  v.  Penn 
Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  173  A.  344,  116 
811. 


95.  U.S.—  In  re  Drainage  Dlst  No. 
7,  B.C.  Ark.,  25  F.Supp.  372,  affirm- 
ed, C.C.A.,  Lruehrmann  v.  Drainage 
Dist.  No.  7  of  Poinsett  County,  104 
F.2d  696,  certiorari  denied  Haver- 
stick  v.   Drainage  Dist.   No.   7   of 

•  Poinsett  County,  Ark.,  60  S.Ct  141, 
308  U.S.  604,  84  L.Ed.  505,  rehear- 
ing denied  60  S.Ct  260,  308  U.S. 
638,  84  L.Ed.  530. 

96.  Wis.  —  Libby  v.  Central  Wiscon- 
sin  Trust  Co.,    197  N.W.   206,   152 
Wis.  599.  i 

97.  OkL—  Schulte      v.      Board      of] 


Com'rs  of  Pontotoc  County,  250  P. 
123,  119  OkL  261. 
Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  633— Mann  v.  Risher, 
116  S.W.2d  692,  131  Tex.  498— 
Sedgwick  v.  Kirby  Lumber  Co.,  107 
S.W.2d  358,  130  Tex.  163— Winters 
Hut.  Aid  Ass'n  Circle  No.  2  v. 
Reddtn,  ConuApp.,  49  S.W.2d  1095 
— Green  v.  Green,  Com.App.,  288 
S.W.  406— Floyd  v.  Bggleston,  Civ. 
App.,  137  S.W.2d  182,  error  re- 
fused, certiorari  denied  61  S.Ct. 
314,  311  U.S.  708,  85  L.Ed.  460, 
rehearing  denied  61  S.Ct  609,  312 
U.S.  713,  85  LJSd.  1143. 

Bill  of  review 

An  independent  suit  for  relief 
against  a  judgment,  while  not  strict- 
ly speaking  a  bill  of  review,  is  large- 
ly of  the  same  nature. — Halbrook  v. 
Quinn,  Civ.App.,  286  S.W.  954,  cer- 
tified questions  dismissed  Quinn  v. 
Halbrook,  285  S.W,  1079,  115  Tex. 
513. 

A  petition  to  open  a  judgment  is 
essentially  an  equitable  proceeding, 
and  the  opening  of  the  judgment  an 
exercise  of  equity  powers.— Sher- 
wood Bros.  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  200  A. 
689,  132  Pa.Super.  154. 

Motion  treated  as  plenary  suit 

Motion  to  set  aside  judgment  al- 
leging excuse  for  failure  to  defend 
and  meritorious  defense,  on  which 
citation  was  duly  issued,  should  be 
treated  as  plenary  suit  in  equity  to 
obtain  relief  from  Judgment — 
Squyres  v.  Rasmussen,  Tex.Civ.App., 
296  S.W.  977. 

692 


Equity  administered  under  common- 
law  forms 

In  proceeding  to  open  Judgment, 
court  of  common  pleas  administers 
equity  under  common-law  forms. — 
Kowatch  v.  Home  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  of  Latrobe,  200  A,  111,  131  Pa. 
Super.  517. 

Suit  in  partition  by  heirs  against 
other  heirs  who  obtained  property  by 
representing  that  they  were  the  only 
heirs  was  held  neither  direct  nor  col- 
lateral attack  on  judgment,  but  equi- 
ty proceeding  based  on  fraud. — Beat- 
ty  v.  Beatty,  242  P.  766,  114  Okl.  5. 
Proceeding-  held  not  action  in  equity 

A  proceeding  to  vacate  or  set 
aside  an  order  or  Judgment  filed  in 
original  suit  is  not  an  action  in  equi- 
ty, although  it  is  equitable  in  char- 
acter and  relief  is  granted  on  equita- 
ble terms.— In  re  Vanderlip's  Es- 
tate, 12  Ohio  Supp.  123. 

98.  Ohio. — Kundert  v.  Kundert,   156 
X.B.   237,  24  Ohio  App.   342. 

99.  Ohio. — Kundert  v.  Kundert,   su- 

pra. 

1.  U.S. — Hiawassee   Lumber   Co.    v. 
U.   S.,  C.C.A.N.C.,   64  F.2d  417. 

Ohio. — Kundert  v.   Kundert    156   N. 
B.  237,  24  Ohio  App.  342. 

2.  U.S.— Hiawassee    Lumber  Co.   v. 
U.  S.,  C.OA.N.C.,  64  F.2d  417. 

3.  Cal.— Foy    v.    Foy,    73    P.2d    618, 
23  Cal.App.2d  543. 

4.  U.S. — Simonds  v.  Norwich  Union 
Indemnity  Co.,   C.C.A.Minn.,   73   F. 
2d   412,   certiorari  denied  Norwich 
Union  Indemnity  Co*  v.  Simonds, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§341 


tio  other  available  or  adequate  remedy.    It  must  [  neglect,  or  carelessness,6  and  that  he  did  not  pro- 
appear  that  his  situation  is  not  due  to  his  own  fault,  |  cure  Or  consent  to  the  judgment  attacked,  or  ac- 


55  S.Ct  507,  294  U.S.  711,  79  L. 
Ed.  124«  —  Continental  Nat.  Bank  of 
Jacksoo  County,  at  Kansas  City, 
Mo.  v.  Holland  Banking  Co.,  C.C.A. 
Mo.,  66  F.2d  823. 

Ala.  —  Carson  v.  Rains,  187  So.  707, 
237  Ala.  534. 

Cal.  —  Kupfer  v.  MacDonald,  122  P. 
2d  271,  19  Cal.2d  566—  Hendricks 
v.  Hendricks,  14  P.2d  88,  216  Cal. 
821  —  Molema  v.  Molema,  283  P. 
956,  103  CaLApp.  79; 

Fla.  —  Rosenstone  v,  Johnston,  111  So. 
630,  93  Fla,  319. 

«Ga.  —  Groom  v.  Bennett,  147  S.B.  560, 
168  Ga.  178. 

Md.—  Redding  v.  Redding,  26  A2d 
18,  180  Md.  545. 

Mich.—  Barr  v.  Payne,  298  N.W.  460, 
298  Mich.  85—  Broadwell  v.  Broad- 
well,  209  N.W.  923,  236  Mich.  60. 

OKI.—  Kennedy  v.  XJhrich,  62  P.2d 
994,  178  Okl.  366. 

Or.  —  Oregon-Washington  R.  &  Nav. 
Co.  v.  Reid,  65  P.2d  664,  155  Or. 
602. 

Pa.  —  Conenraugh  Iron  Works  Co.  v. 
Delano  Coal  Co.,  148  A.  94,  298 
Pa.  182. 

Tenn.  —  Tallent  v.  Sherrell,  184  S.W. 
2d  561,  27  Tenn.App.  683  —  Johnson 
v.  Sharpe,  7  Tenn.App.  685. 

Tex.  —  Gehret  v.  Hetkes,  Com.App., 
36  S.W.2d  700  —  Humphrey  v.  Har- 
rell,  ComApp.,  29  S.W.2d  963— 
Grayson  v.  Johnson,  Civ.App.,  181 
S.W.2d  312—  Gotten  v,  Stanford, 
Civ.App.,  169  S.W.2d  489—  Union 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  Fort  Worth 
v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  166  S.W.2d 
328  —  Brannen  v.  City  of  Houston, 
Civ.App.,  153  S.W.2d  676,  error  re- 
fused —  Padalecki  v.  Dreibrodt,  Civ. 
App.,  129  S.W.2d  4^1,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct  —  Poland 
v.  Risher,  Civ.App.,  88  S.W.2d  1106, 
affirmed  Mann  v.  Risher,  116  S.W. 
2d  692,  131  Tex.  498—  Ricketts  v. 
Ferguson,  CivApp.,  64  S.W.2d  416, 
error  refused  —  Griggs  v.  Brewster, 
Civ.App.,  16  S.W.2d  839,  affirmed 
62  S.W.2d  980,  122  Tex,  588—  Shaw 
v.  Etheridge,  Civ.App.,  15  S.W.Sd 
722  —  Massa  v.  Guardian  Trust  Co., 
Civ.App.,  258  S.W.  598. 

W.Va.—  Brinegar  v.  Bank  of  Wyo- 
ming, 130  S.E..  151,  100  W.Va.  64. 

34  C.J.  p  433  note  8. 

Grounds  for  relief  see  infra  §§  350- 
376. 

Prlma    facie    case    for   vacation    of 
judgment 

Injunctive  .  relief  to  prevent  en- 
forcement of  judgment  will  not  be 
granted,  unless  prima  facie  case  for 
vacation  of  such  judgment  is  pre- 
sented. —  Smith  v.  Patterson,  280  S. 
W.  930,  213  Ky.  142. 


of  jurisdiction  over  person 
Party   seeking   to   have   judgment 
set  aside  in  equity  on  ground  that 


court  had  acquired  no  jurisdiction 
over  him  must  bring  himself  within 
rules  of  law  or  equity  applicable  for 
such  relief. — Reynolds  v.  Volunteer 
State  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  80 
S.W.2d  1087,  error  refused. 

Question  held  not   cognizable 

Question  whether  attorneys  and 
court  acted  in  pursuance  of  mandate 
of  appellate  court  in  proceedings 
which  followed  receipt  of  mandate 
is  not  cognizable  in  independent  suit 
in  equity  based  on  ground  that  judg- 
ment was  procured  by  fraud. — Math- 
eson  v.  National  Surety  Co.,  C.C.A. 
Alaska,  69  F.2d  914. 

Intent  of  testatrix 

In  an  equity  action  to  amend  and 
construe  a  decree  of  distribution  af- 
fecting a  testamentary  trust,  where 
no  mistake  appeared,  it  was  imma- 
terial that  testatrix  may  have  in- 
tended or  done  something  different 
in  a  former  will,  later  revoked. — 
Vincent  v.  Security-First  Nat.  Bank 
of  Los  Angeles,  155  P.2d  63,  67  Cal. 
App.2d  602. 

Personal    judgment    in    foreclosure 

suit 

Purchaser  of  mortgaged  property 
was  held  not  entitled  to  set  aside 
personal  judgment  against  him  by 
default  in  foreclosure  suit,  wherein 
he  was  personally  served,  and  where- 
in it  was  alleged  that  he  'assumed 
mortgage  indebtedness,  where  decree 
recited  that  cause  was  heard  on  doc- 
umentary and  oral  evidence,  and 
there  was  no  evidence  that  judgment 
was  procured  through  fraud. — Fort 
Smith  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v. 
Hight,  86  S.W.2d  923,  191  Ark.  415. 

5.  U.S.— Simonds  v.  Norwich  Un- 
ion Indemnity  Co.,  C.C.A.Minn.,  73 
F.2d  412,  certiorari  denied  Norwich 
Union  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Simonds, 
55  S.Ct.  507,  294  U.S.  711,  79  L. 
Ed.  1246 — Continental  Nat.  Bank 
of  Jackson  County,  at  Kansas  City, 
Mo.,  v.  Holland  Banking  Co.,  C.C.A. 
Mo.,  66  F.2d  823. 

Ala.— Carson  v.  Rains,  187  So.  707, 
237  Ala.  534 — Timmerman  v.  Mar- 
tin, 176  So.  19S,  234  Ala.  622— 
Leath  v.  Lister.  173  So.  59,  233 
Ala,  595 — Barrow  v.  Lindsey,  159 
So.  232,  230  Ala.  45— Hanover  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Street,  154  So.  816,  228 
Ala.  677. 

111.— Metzger  v.  Horn,  143  N.B.  408, 
312  111.  173— Zimel  v.  Southern  Pac. 
Co.,  40  N.E.2d  830,  314  111. App. 
198. 

La. — Surety  Credit  Co.  v.  Bauer,  1 
La. App.  285. 

Md.— Redding  v.  Redding,  26  A.2d 
18,  180  Md.  545. 

Mich.— Barr  v.  Payne,  298  N.W.  460, 
298  Mich.  85. 

Mo. — Silent  Automatic  Sales  Corpo- 

693 


ration  v.  Stay  ton,  App.,  58  S.W.2d 
800. 

Ohio. — Mosher  v.  Mutual  Home  & 
Savings  Ass'n,  App.,  41  N.E.2d 
871. 

Or.— Mattoon  v.  Cole,  143  P.2d  679; 
172  Or.  664 — Oregon-Washington 
R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Reid,  65  P.2d  664, 
155  Or.  602. 

Tenn. — Tallent  v.  Sherrell,  184  S.W. 
2d  561,  27  Tenn. App.  683 — Johnson 
v,  Sharpe,  7  Tenn. App.  685. 
Tex.— Mann  v.  Risher,  116  S.W.2d 
692,  131  Tex.  498— Stewart  v. 
Byrne,  ComApp.,  42  S.W.2d  234 — 
Humphrey  v.  Harrell,  Com.App.,  29 
S.W.2d  963 — Duncan  v.  Smith  Bros. 
Grain  Co.,  260  S.W.  1027,  113  Tex. 
555 — Grayson  v.  Johnson,  Civ.App., 
181  S.W.2d  312— Union  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  Fort  Worth  v.  Smith. 
Civ.App.,  166  S.W.2d  928— Garcia  v. 
Jones,  Civ.App.,  155  S.W.2d  671, 
error  refused — Bramien  v.  City  of 
Houston,  Civ.App.,  153  S.W.2d  676, 
error  refused — Padalecki  v.  Drei- 
brodt, Civ.App.,  129  S.W.2d  481, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct 
— Hacker  v.  Hacker,  Civ.App.,  110 
S.W.2d  923 — Traders  &  General 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Keith,  Civ.App.,  107  S. 
W.2d  710,  error  dismissed — Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Cooper  v.  Walker, 
Civ.App.,  96  S.W.Sd  847,  848— Po- 
land v.  Risher,  Civ.App.,  88  S.W.2d 
1106,  affirmed  Mann  v.  Risher,  116 
S.W.2d  692,  131  Tex.  498— Ricketts 
v.  Ferguson,  Civ.App.,  64  S.W.2d 
416,  error  refused — Watts  v.  Moss, 
Civ.App.,  63  S.W.2d  1095,  error  dis- 
missed— Lindsey  v.  Dougherty, 
Civ.App.,  60  S.W.2d  300,  error  re- 
fused— Shaw  v.  Etheridge,  Civ. 
App.,  15  S.W.Sd  722— Bray  v.  First 
Nat.  Bank,  Civ.App.,  10  S.W.Sd  235, 
error  dismissed — Citizens'  Bank  v. 
Brandau,  Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  466, 
error  refused — Taylor  v.  Master- 
son,  Civ. App.,  259  S.W,  629 — Bar- 
ton v.  Pochyla,  Civ.App.,  243  S.W. 
785. 

W.Va. — Brinegar   v.    Bank   of   Wyo- 
ming, 130  S.E.  151,  100  W.Va.  64. 
S  C.J.  p  661  note  50—34  CJ".  p  433 
note  3,  p  442  note  14,  p  459  note 
13. 

Defenses   not  interposed  at  law  as 
ground  for  relief  see  infra  55  361, 
362. 
Discovery  of  defense 

Statute  limiting  time  in  which 
proceedings  to  set  aside  judgment 
may  be  commenced  does  not  confer 
right  to  set  taside  judgment  within 
time  limit,  regardless  of  negligence 
or  diligence  of  judgment  debtor  in 
discovering  defense. — W.  T.  Raw- 
leigh  Go.  v.  Seagraves,  173  S.B.  167, 
178  Ga,  459. 

Negligence  held  not  shown 
Tex. — Bddingston  v.  Acorn,  CivApp., 
287  S.W.  98. 


§  341 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


quiesce  in  it,  or  waive  the  errors  complained  of.6 
He  must  also  show  that  he  is  not  liable  for  the 
debt  for  which  judgment  was  rendered;7  that  he  is 
injured  by  the  judgment  as  it  stands  or  will  be  in- 
jured by  its  enforcement  ;8  that  there  is  an  attempt 
or  threat  to  enforce  the  judgment  against  him;9 
that  he  is  in  a  position  equitably  to  seek  relief;10 
and  that  he  comes  into  equity  with  clean  hands  and 
is  entitled  to  the  favorable  consideration  of  the 
court11 

Equity  will  never  interfere  to  vacate  a  judgment 
where  the  party  seeking  the  relief  could  not  possibly 
derive  any  benefit  from  the  relief  sought,12  and  thus 
he  is  generally  required  to  show  that  if  relief  were 
granted  a  different  result  would  obtain  than  that 
reached  in  the  judgment  of  which  he  complains.18 


§  342.    Jurisdiction 

A  court  having  genera!  equity  powers  has  Jurisdic- 
tion to  grant  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  In  a 
proper  case;  but  Its  Jurisdiction  In  this  respect  Is  not 
supervisory  over  courts  of  law,  and  cannot  be  made  to 
serve  the  purpose  of  an  appellate  review. 

A  court  possessing  general  equity  powers  has  au- 
thority in  a  proper  case  to  grant  equitable  relief 
against  a  judgment,14  Courts  of  equity  have  no 
supervisory  jurisdiction  over  courts  of  law,  and,  ac- 
cordingly, a  suit  in  equity  for  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment at  law  cannot  be  made  to  serve  the  purposes 
of  an  appellate  review  of  the  judgment  with  regard 
to  alleged  errors  therein,15  and  the  power  of  a  court 
of  equity  to  enjoin  enforcement  of  a  judgment  is 


6.  Ala. — Henley   v.    Foster,    125    So. 
662,  220  Ala,  420. 

Fla.— Hall  v.   Hall,   112   So.    622,    93 

Fla.  709. 
La, — Napoleon ville  Moss  Mfg.  Co.  v. 

Templet,   139    So.    546,    19   La.App. 

61. 
Mass.— McNally   v.    Clare,    183    N.B. 

173,   281  Mass.  82. 
N.Y.— Franz  v.  Nigri,  249  N.Y.S.  218, 

232  App.Div.  150. 
Tex. — Bearden  v.  Texas  Co.,  Clv.App., 

41  S.W.2d  447,  affirmed,  Com.App., 

60  S.W.2d  1031. 
34  C.J.  p  432  note  2. 
Assent  to  settlement 

Where  parties  to  suit  appeared  be- 
fore judge  in  open  court  and  stated 
that  they  had  settled  suit  on  speci- 
fied terms,  which  judge  noted  on 
docket,  and  parties  and  their  attor- 
neys all  assented  to,  or  made  no 
complaint  of,  such  terms  after  judge 
read  to  them  his  understanding  of 
settlement,  and  judgment  was  ren- 
dered in  accordance  with  such  state- 
ment, defendant  was  not  entitled  to 
have  judgment  set  aside  on  ground 
of  additional  settlement  agreement, 
covering  questions  at  issue  in  anoth- 
er suit  pending  in  different  chancery 
court,  in  absence  of  fraud  or  bad 
faith.— Tallent  v.  Sherrell,  184  S.W. 
2d  561,  27  Tenn.App.  683. 

Waiver  held  not  shown 

Fact  that  defendants,  discovering 
trial  judge's  disqualification,  peti- 
tioned supreme  court  for  rehearing, 
did  not  constitute  waiver  of  right 
to  vacate  judgment. — Cadenasso  v. 
Bank  of  Italy,  6  P.2d  944,  214  Cal. 
562. 

7.  Tex. — Duncan     v.     Smith     Bros. 
Grain  Co.,  260  S.W.  1027,  113  Tex. 
555. 

Meritorious  defense  see  infra  §  349. 

8.  Tex. — Gotten    v.     Stanford,     Civ. 
App.,  169  S.W.2d  489. 

34  C.J.  p  433  note  5,  p  459  note  13.  j 


Proceeds  of  sale  as  sufficient  to  sat- 
isfy  judgment 

Where,  although  personal  judg- 
ment against  a  particular  defendant 
was  not  authorized,  it  was  possible 
that  sufficient  would  be  realized  on 
the  sale  of  the  property  involved  to 
satisfy  the  judgment  in  full,  so  that 
such  defendant  would  not  be  in- 
jured by  a  personal  judgment,  it 
would  be  premature  to  grant  relief 
to  him  in  a  suit  to  set  aside  the  de- 
cree until  the  question  of  injury 
should  be  determined  by  the  result 
of  the  sale. — Marsters  v.  Ashton,  107 
P.2d  981,  165  Or.  507. 
Actual  eviction  held  unnecessary 

It  has  been  held  that  a  purchaser 
in  possession  under  a  contract  of 
sale  need  not  show  that  he  has  been 
actually  evicted  in  order  to  secure 
injunctive  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment obtained  on  a  note  given  for 
the  purchase  price;  it  is  sufficient 
that  a  judgment  of  ejectment  has 
been  rendered  against  him. — Green  v. 
McDonald,  21  Miss.  445. 

9.  Conn. — Chambers  v.  Bobbins,   28 
Conn.  552. 

34  C.J.  p  433  note  4. 

10.  U.S.— Glinski  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.I11., 
93  F.2d  418— Smith  v.  Apple,  C.C. 
A.Kan.,  6  F.2d  559. 

(Fair  conduct  and  dealings 

Complainant,  in  order  to  invoke 
aid  of  equity  to  restrain  execution  of 
judgment,  must  show  that  his  own 
conduct  and  dealings  were  fair  and 
consistent  with  equity. — Harper  v. 
Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Nat  Bank  of 
Cambridge,  142  A.  590,  155  Md.  693. 
Restoration  of  benefits 

Party  accepting  benefits  of  judg- 
ment cannot  challenge  validity  of 
judgment  without  restoring  benefits. 
—State  v.  Marsh,  169  N.E.  564,  121 
Ohio  St.  477— State  v.  Marsh,  168  N. 
B.  473,  121  Ohio  St  321. 

11.  U.S. — Murrell  v.  Stock  Growers' 
Nat    Bank    of    Cheyenne,    C.C.A. 

694 


Wyo.,    74   F.2d   827 — Corpus   Juris 

cited  in  Byrara  v.  Miner,  C.C.A.,  47 

F.2d  112,  119. 
Fla.— Hall  v.  Hall,   112   So.   622,   93 

Fla.  709. 
N.T.— Franz  v.  Nigri,  249  N.Y.S.  218, 

232  App.Div.  150 — Rubin  v.  Yedlin, 

230  N.Y.S.  463,  224  App.Div.  768. 
34  C.J.  p  433  note  6. 
Clean  hands  generally  see  Equity  $§ 

93-99. 
Public  policy 

Even  though  the  parties  are  in 
par!  delicto  and  applicant  does  not 
come  into  court  with  clean  hands, 
equity  may  grant  relief  where  re- 
quired by  reasons  of  public  policy. — 
Dahms  v.  Swinburne,  167  N.E.  486. 
31  Ohio  App.  512. 

12.  Cal. — Hite     v.     San     Francisco 
Mercantile  Trust  Co.,    106   P.   102, 
156  Cal.  765. 

Ga.— Howell  v.  Howell,  9  S.E.2d  149, 

190  Ga.  371. 

Useless  relief  see  Equity  §  16. 
Value  of  collateral 

Burden  is  on  plaintiff,  seeking  to 
set  aside  judgment  on  note  on 
ground  that  it  did  not  direct  sale  of 
collateral,  to  plead  and  prove  that 
collateral  had  some  value,  and  that 
proceeds  thereof  would  at  least  have 
partially  satisfied  judgment. — Red- 
field  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  244  P.  210, 
66  Utah  459. 

13.  Ark.— Horn    v.    Hull,    275    S.W. 
905,  169  Ark.  463. 

Cal. — Wilson  v.  Wilson,  130  P.2d 
782,  55  Cal.App.2d  421— Jeffords  v. 
Young,  277  P.  163,  98  Cal.App.  400 
— Hogan  v.  Horsfall,  266  P.  1002, 
91  CaLApp.  37,  followed  in  266  P. 
1005,  91  CaLApp.  797. 

Tenn.— Whitson  v.  Johnson,  123  S* 
W.2d  1104,  22  Tenn.App.  427. 

34  C.J.  p  433  note  10. 

14.  Tex. — Barton    v.    Pochyla,    C*v. 
App.,  243  S.W.  785. 

15.  N.J.— Weinstein  v.   Chelsea   Se- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  343 


not  dependent  on  its  jurisdiction  to  review  the  pro- 
ceedings on  which  the  judgment  is  based.16  Where 
no  proper  grounds  exist,  equity  has  no  jurisdiction 
to  afford  relief  against  a  judgment.17 

§  343.    Existence  of  or  Resort  to  Other 

Remedy;  Inadequacy  of  Remedy  at 
Law 

a.  In  general 

b.  Statutory  remedies 

c.  Remedy  by  review 

a.  In  General 

Equitable  relief  against  a  Judgment  generally  will 
not  be  granted  where  other  adequate  remedies,  as  by 
motion  for  a  new  trial  or  independent  action  at  law,  are 
available,  or  by  the  exercise  of  proper  diligence  would 
have  been  available;  and  this  rule  has  been  applied  by 
some  authorities  even  to  Judgments,  which  are  void  or 
have  been  procured  by  fraud,  Equity  will  interfere, 


however,  where  there  has  been  a  loss  of  legal  remedies 
without  fault  on  the  part  of  the  one  seeking  relief. 

As  a  general  rule,  equity  will  not  grant  relief 
against  a  judgment  where  the  party  complaining 
of  the  judgment  has,  or  by  exercising  proper  dili- 
gence would  have  had,  an  adequate  remedy  at  law, 
or  by  proceeding's  in  the  original  action,  by  motion, 
petition,  or  the  like  to  open,  vacate,  modify,  or  oth- 
erwise obtain  relief  against,  the  judgment.18  Equi- 
ty will  not  interfere  to  relieve  against  a  judgment 
where  the  complaining  party  has  an  adequate  rem- 
edy by  a  motion  in  an  appellate  court,19  or  by  a 
motion  or  proceedings  to  arrest  judgment,20  or  to 
stay  or  quash  execution.21  Under  some  circum- 
stances, however,  it  has  been  held  that  injunction 
may  be  granted,  although  relief  against  the  judg- 
ment might  be  obtained  at  law,  or  by  motion  to  va- 
cate or  set  aside,  and  the  time  for  obtaining  such 


curities  &  Investment  Co.,   145  A. 

231,  104  N.J.Eq.  258. 
34  C.J.  p  433  note  12. 
Jurisdiction  of  particular  courts  see 

infra  §  382. 

16.  Iowa. — Shaw  v.  Addison,   18  N. 
W.2d  796. 

Mo. — Overton  v.  Overton,   37  S.W.Sd 
565,  327  Mo.  530 — Loveland  v.  Dav- 
enport, App.,   188  S.W.2d  850. 
Wis. — Ambers   v.   Deaton,   271  N.W. 

396,  223  Wis.  653. 
34  CJT.  p  433  note  12. 
Examination  of  evidence 

It  is  not  the  province  of  a  court 
of  equity  to  examine  the  evidence 
Adduced  at  a  former  trial  and  to  de- 
termine whether  the  evidence  sup- 
ports the  judgment  rendered  there- 
on.— Sabin  v.  Levorsen,  145  P.2d  402, 
193  Okl.  320,  certiorari  denied  64  S. 
Ot.  205,  320  U.S.  792,  88  L.Ed.  477, 
rehearing  denied  64  S.Ct  368,  320  TJ. 
S.  815,  88  L.Ed.  492. 

17.  Iowa.— -Shaw  v.  Addison,   18  N. 
W.2d  796. 

34  C.J.  p  433  note  16. 

18.  Ala.— Riley  v.  Wilkinson,  23  So. 
2d  582. 

Ark. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in    Twin 

City  Bank  of  North  Little  Kock  v. 

J.  S.  McWillkims  Auto  Co.,  34  S.W. 

2d  229,  230,  182  Ark.  1086. 
Cal. — Harris  v.  Harris,  52  P.2d  985, 

10  Cal.App.2d  734,  hearing  denied, 

Sup.,    54    P.2d    459,    10    Cal.App.2d 

734 — De  Tray  v.  Chambers,  297  P. 

575,  112  CaLApp.  697. 
Oa. — Cone  v.  Eubanks,  145  S.E.  652, 

167  G-a.  384. 
Idaho. — Lind  v.  Moyes,  20  P.2d  794, 

52  Idaho  785. 
111. — Calbreath  v.   Beckwith,   260   111. 

App.    7 — Kahn    v.    Rasof,    253    111. 

App.  546. 
Ky.— Campbell  v.  Campbell,  4  S.W.2d 

1112,  223  Ky.  836. 

e.— Fort     Fairfteld     Nash    Co.     v. 


Noltemier,  189  A.  415,  135  Me.  84, 
108  A.L.R.  1276. 

Md. — Pioneer  Oil  Heat  v.  Brown,  16 
A.2d  880,  179  Md.  155. 

Mich.— Barr  v.  Payne,  298  N.W.  460, 
298  Mich.  85— Thompson  v.  Doore, 
257  N.W.  864,  269  Mich.  466. 

Mo.— Jones  v.  Overall,  13  S.W.2d  581, 
223  Mo.App.  266. 

Mont— Meyer  v.  Lemley,  282  P,  268, 
86  Mont  83. 

N.J. — Rafferty  v.  Schutzer,  153  A. 
626,  107  N.J.Eq.  613. 

N.Y.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Wil- 
liamsburgh  Sav.  Bank  v.  Bern- 
stein, 12  N.E.2d  551,  553,  277  N.T. 
11— Franz  v.  Nigri,  249  N.Y.S.  218, 
232  App.Div.  150. 

N.D. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ellison 
v.  Baird,  293  N.W.  793,  794,  70  N. 
D.  226. 

Or.— Mattoon  v.  Cole,  143  P.2d  679, 
172  Or.  664 — Oregon- Washington 
TL  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Reid,  65  P.2d  664, 
155  Or.  602 — Corpus  Juris  quoted 
in  Olsen  v.  Crow,  290  P.  233,  235, 
133  Or.  310. 

Pa.— Dunn  v.  Hild,  188  A.  834,  324 
Pa.  530— Rocks  v.  Santella,  38  A. 
2d  718,  155  Pa.Super.  473— Sher- 
wood Bros.  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  200  A. 
689,  132  Pa.Super.  154. 

S.C.— Baker  v.  Brewer.  123  S.E.  771, 
129  S.C.  74. 

Tex. — Stewart  v.  Byrne,  Com.App., 
42  S.W,2d  234 — Arenstein  v. 
Jencks,  Civ.App.,  179  S.W.2d  831, 
error  dismissed — Thomas  v.  Mul- 
lins,  Civ.App.,  175  S.W.2d  276 — 
Brannen  v.  City  of  Houston,  Civ. 
App.,  153  S.W.2d  676,  error  refused 
— Hacker  v.  Hacker,  Civ.App.,  110 
S.W.2d  923— Birge  v.  Conwell,  Civ. 
App.,  105  S.W.2d  407,  error  re- 
fused— Bennett  v.  Carter,  Civ.App.. 
102  S.W.2d  450,  error  dismissed— 
Reynolds  v.  Volunteer  State  Life 
Ins,  Co.,  Civ.App.,  80  S.W.Sd  10S7, 
error  refused — Cox,  Inc.,  v.  Knight, 

695 


Civ.App.,  50  S.W.2d  915— Pass  v. 
Ray,  Civ.App.,  44  S.W.2d  470 — Fort 
Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Great- 
house,  Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d  418,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  Great- 
house  v.  Fort  Worth  &  Denver 
City  Ry.  Co.,  Com. App.,  65  S.W.2d 
762 — Camden  Fire  Ins.  Ass'n  v. 
Hill,  Civ.App.,  264  S.W.  123,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  276  S.W.  887 — Galloway  v. 
Marietta  State  Bank,  Civ.App.,  258 
S.W.  532,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  Marietta  State  Bank  v. 
Galloway,  Com.App.,  269  S.W.  776 
—First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Curtis,  Civ. 
App.,  244  S.W.  225— Taylor  v.  Hu- 
stead  &  Tucker,  Civ. App.,  243  S.W. 
766,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  257  S.W.  232. 
34  C.J.  p  433  note  7,  p  434  note  20, 
p  435  note  28,  p  439  note  67,  p  440 
note  83—24  C.J.  p  888  note  82. 
Adequate  remedy  at  law  as  affecting 
jurisdiction  of  equity  generally  see 
Equity  §§  19-38. 
Intervention 

A  complaint  demanding  an  injunc- 
tion staying  execution  and  opening  a 
default  judgment  to  allow  plaintiffs 
to  intervene  as  parties  to  the  orig* 
inal  action  does  not  involve  the  ap~ 
plication  of  any  equitable  remedy 
not  available  by  a  motion  in  the 
original  action,  and  hence  cannot  be 
maintained. — Tolbert  v.  Roark,  119  S. 
E.  571,  126  S.C.  207. 

19.  Ala. — J.  A.  Roebling  Sons  Co.  v. 
Stevens  Electric  Co.,  9  So.  369,  93 
Ala.  39. 

34  C.J.  p  435  note  30. 

20.  Tex. — Stewart    v.    Byrne,    Com. 
App.,    42    S.W.2d    234 — Brannen   v. 
City  of  Houston,  Civ.App.,  153  S.W. 
2d    676,    error   refused — Hacker   v. 
Hacker,  Civ.App.,   110   S.W.2d  923. 

21.  W.Va. — Howell  v.  Thompson,  12 
S.E.  1088,  34  W.Va.  794. 

34  C.J.  p  435  note  29. 


§  343 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S, 


relief  has  not  yet  expired.22  Equitable  relief  is  of 
course  available  in  a  proper  case  where  there  is 
no  other  or  adequate  remedy;23  and  in  this  connec- 
tion there  is  ordinarily  no  adequate  remedy  at  law 
where  the  facts  relied  on  as  rendering  it  inequita- 
ble to  enforce  the  judgment  did  not  exist  when  the 
judgment  was  rendered.24 

Fraud.  The  general  rule  requiring  inadequacy 
of  other  remedies  as  a  prerequisite  to  equitable  re- 
lief against  a  judgment  is  usually  applied  to  a  judg- 
ment procured  by  fraud.25  In  some  cases,  however, 
it  has  been  held  that,  where  the  element  of  fraud 
is  present,  the  party  aggrieved  may  go  into  either 
a  court  of  equity  or  a  court  of  law  for  relief,26 
and,  having  applied  to  equity,  he  cannot  be  sent 
back  to  a  court  of  law,  although  he  may  also  have 
a  remedy  there.27  Clearly,  a  party  may,  in  a  prop- 
er case,  have  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment 
secured  by  fraud  where  his  remedies  at  law  are 
inadequate  or  have  been  exhausted.28 

Void  judgment.    In  the  case  of  a  void  judgment 


the  cases  are  not  harmonious.29  According  to  some 
decisions,  equity  will  grant  relief  by  injunction,  al- 
though there  may  be  an  adequate  remedy  in  the 
original  cause.30  It  has  generally  been  held,  how- 
ever, that  in  order  to  obtain  relief  on  this  ground* 
it  is  necessary  for  complainant  to  show  that  he- 
has  no  adequate  remedy  at  law,31  or  that  he  has  ex- 
hausted his  legal  remedies  without  obtaining  re- 
lief.32 These  decisions  proceed  on  the  theory  that,, 
where  there  is  an  ordinary  remedy  for  error,  an  ex- 
traordinary one  will  not  be  allowed.33  Equitable 
relief  against  a  void  judgment  will  be  granted  where, 
an  adequate  remedy  at  law  is  not  available.34 

New  trial.  Injunction  will  not  be  granted  to  re-- 
strain the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  or  to  order  a 
new  trial,  where  the  party  still  has  an  opportunity 
to  move  the  trial  court  for  a  new  trial,  or  had  such 
opportunity  and  negligently  omitted  to  avail  himself 
of  it.35  However,  only  parties  to  a  suit  are  re- 
quired to  move  for  new  trials,  and  a  person  against 
whom  a  judgment  is  rendered  in  an  action  to  which. 


22.  Tenn. — Williams  v.  Pile,  56  S.W.  j 
833,  104  Tenn.  27S. 

34  C.J.  p  435  note  32. 

23.  Del. — Hollis    v.    Kinney,   120   A. 
356,  13  Del.Ch.  366. 

111. — Printers  Corporation  v.  Hamil- 
ton Inv.  Co.,  14  N.E.2d  517,  295 
IlLApp.  34. 

Mich.— Doering  v.  Baker,  270  N.W. 
185,  277  Mich.  683. 

N.D.— Vinquist  v.  Siegert,  225  N.W. 
806,  58  N.D.  295. 

34C.J.  p  435  note  33. 

24.  Md.— Michael  v.   Rigler,    120   A. 
382,  142  Md.  125. 

25.  Iowa. — Swartzendruber,  v.  Polke, 
218  N.W.  62,  205  Iowa  382. 

Mont. — Bullard  v.  Zimmerman,  268  P. 

512,  82  Mont  434. 
Neb.— Johnson  v.  Marsh,  19  N.W.2d 

366,  146  Neb.  257. 
34  C.J.  P>34  note  21. 

23,    Cal. — Sontag  v.  Denio,   78  P.2d 

248,  23  CaLApp.2d  319. 
34  C.J.  p  434  note  22. 

27.  Ala.— Merrill  v.  Travis,  26  So.2d 
258. 

Cal. — Sontag  v.   Denio,   73   P.2d  248, 

23  Cal.App.2d  319. 
Ga. — Griffin  v.  Sketoe,  30  Ga.  300. 
Mo. — Crow  v.  Crow-Humphrey,  78  S. 

W.2d  807,  335  Mo.  636. 
Concurrent    Jurisdiction    over    fraud 

generally  see  Equity'  S  49. 

28.  Mont. — Bullard    v.    Zimmerman, 
268  P.  512,  82  Mont  434. 

Or. — Fain  v.  Amend,  100  P.2d  481, 
164  Or.  123. 

29.  Utah.— <3orpns   Juris   quoted   in 
Kramer    v.    Pixton,    268    P,    1029, 
1032,  72  Utah  1. 


30.  Colo.— Watkins  v.  Perry,  139  P. 
551,  25  Colo.App.  425. 

34  C.J.  P  434  note  24. 

31.  111. — Calbreath  v.  Beckwith,  260 
IlLApp.  7. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Blehm 
v.  Hanzek,  262  N.W.  403,  404,  272 
Mich.  541. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Kra- 
mer v.  Pixton,  268  P.  1029,  1032,  72 
Utah  1. 

34  C.J.  p  434  note  25,  p  435  note  31. 

Xn  Texas 

(1)  The  rule  set  forth  in  the  text 
has  been  followed.— Mills  v.  Disney, 
Civ.App.,    54    S.W.2d    596—34    C.J.    P 
434  note  25. 

(2)  However,  it  has  also  been  held 
that   a   judgment  void  on   its    face 
may  be  enjoined  at  any  time  in  an 
independent  action  without  resort  to 
the   remedy   of  appeal. — D.   P.   Con- 
nolly Agency,  Inc.,  v.  Popejoy,   Civ. 
App.,  290  S.W.  881. 

32.  Mich. — Corpus     Juris    cited    in 
Blehm   v.    Hanzek,    262   N.W.    403, 
404,  272  Mich.  '541. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Kra- 
mer v.  Pixton,  268  P.  1029,  1032, 
72  Utah  1. 

34  C.J.  p  434  note  26. 

33.  Utah. — Corpus   Juris   quoted   in 
Kramer    v.    Pixton,    268    P.    1029, 
1032,  72  Utah  1. 

34  C.J.  p  435  note  27. 

34.  Conn. — Clover  v.  Urban,   142  A. 
389,  108  Conn.  13. 

35.  Mo. — Kingshighway   Bridge    Co. 
v.    Parrell,    App.,   136    S.W.2d   335. 

Tex. — Southern  Surety  Co.  v.  Texas 
Oil  Clearing  House,  Com. App.,  281 
S.W.  1045 — Duncan  v.  Smith  Bros. 
Grain  Co.,  Com. App.,  260  S.W.  1027, 

696 


113  Tex,  555 — Arenstera  v.  Jencks^ 
Civ.App.,  179  S.W.2d  831,  error  dis- 
missed—Metropolitan Life  Ins.  Co., 
v.  Pribble,  Civ.App.,  130  S.W.2* 
332,  error  refused — Allen  v.  Trent- 
man,  Civ.App.,  115  S.W.2d  1177 — . 
Universal  Credit  Co.  v.  Cunning- 
ham, Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d  507,  er-- 
ror  dismissed — Birge  v.  Conwell,, 
Civ.App.,  105  S.W.2d  407,  error  re- 
fused— Smith  v.  Poppe,  Civ.App., 
102  S.W.2d  1108 — Chapman  v.  De- 
Bogory,  Civ. App.,  83  S.W.2d  447 — 
Reynolds  v.  Volunteer  State  Life, 
Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  80  S.W.2d  1087,,. 
error  refused — Dennis  v.  McCas-* 
land,  Civ.App.,  69  S.W.2d  506,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  97  S.W.2d 
684,  128  Tex  266— Lindsey  v.. 
Dougherty,  Civ.App.,  60  S.W.2* 
300,  error  refused — Pass  v.  Ray,. 
Civ.App.,  44  S.W.2d  470— Hollis  v.. 
Seibold,  Civ.App.,  23  S.W.2d  811,. 
error  dismissed — Patton  v.  Crisp  &-. 
White,  Civ.App.,  11  S.W.2d  826,  er-- 
ror  dismissed — Davis  v.  Cox,  Civ.. 
App.,  4  S.W.2d  1008,  error  dismiss-- 
ed — Hansen  v.  Bacher,  Civ.App.,. 
295  S.W.  316— Madero  v.  Calzado,. 
Civ.App.,  274  S.W.  657. 
34  C.J.  p  436  note  40. 
lack  of  counsel;  diligence  before. 

trial 

It  is  not  sufficient  to  sustain  an 
action  to  set  aside  a  Judgment  that 
plaintiff,  without  fault  or  negligence, 
was  deprived  of  counsel  at  the  trial 
of  the  case,  but  he  must  show  a 
sufficient  excuse  for  not  filing  a  mo- 
tion for  new  trial  at  the  term  at 
which  the  judgment  was  rendered; 
and,  in  the  absence  of  such  showing, 
the  extent  of  his  diligence  before 
trial  is  immaterial. — Moore  v.  Moore* 
Tex.Civ.App.,  259  S.W.  322. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  343 


lie  has  not  been  made  a  party  need  not  move  for  a 
new  trial  before  suing  to  enjoin  the  judgment36 

Independent  action  or  remedy  at  law.  Equity  or- 
•dinarily  will  refuse  to  enjoin  or  reform  a  judgment 
where  the  party  would  have  an  available  and  ade- 
quate remedy  for  any  damage  he  may  suffer  from 
its  enforcement,  by  means  of  an  independent  action 
.at  law,37  or  an  action  or  remedy  against  some  third 
•person  responsible  over  to  him.38  However,  the 
;action  for  damages  must  be  as  complete,  practical, 
.-and  efficient  as  the  equitable  remedy  in  order  to  bar 
relief.3** 

Loss  of  legal  remedy.  Where  the  party  had  a 
remedy  at  law  by  appeal  or  motion  to  vacate  or  for 
a  new  trial,  and  has  lost  it,  without  fault  on  his 
own  part,  by  causes  which  he  could  not  control, 
preventing  him  from  applying  for  it  in  due  season, 
equity  will  not  refuse  to  enjoin  the  judgment  merely 
because  the  remedy  at  law,  if  it  had  been  available, 
would  have  been  appropriate  and  adequate.40  How- 
ever, the  mere  loss  or  exhaustion  of  legal  remedies 
is  no  ground  for  equity  to  interfere,  unless  it  is  also 


shown  that  there  is  equitable  ground  of  objection 
to  the  judgment  as  it  stands  ;41  and  it  has  been  held 
that  relief  will  not  be  granted  where  the  loss  of  the 
remedy  at  law  was  due  to  accident42  or  a  mistaken 
mode  of  proceeding.43 

Relief  will  in  no  case  be  granted  where  the  loss 
of  the  remedy  at  law  was  due  to  the  party's  own 
negligence  or  fault  or  that  of  his  counsel.44 

b.  Statutory  Remedies 

Statutes  which  provide  remedies  cumulative  to  those 
available  in  equity  do  not  preclude  equitable  relief  against 
Judgments.  However,  equity  will  generally  decline  Ju- 
risdiction where  the  grounds  of  relief  are  equally  with- 
in the  cognizance  of  the  law  courts  under  the  statutes, 
and  complete  and  adequate  relief  may  be  had  at  law 
under  the  statutes. 

The  existence  of  statutes  permitting  courts  of  law 
to  open,  vacate,  modify,  or  set  aside  their  own  judg- 
ments, for  causes  specified,  does  not  exclude  the 
power  of  courts  of  equity  to  relieve  against  judg- 
ments on  sufficient  grounds,  where  the  statutes  are 
deemed  to  furnish  a  cumulative  or  additional  rem- 
edy;45 and,  a  fortiori,  equitable  relief  will  not  be 


36.    Tex. — Owens  v.  Gage,   106   S.W. 

880,  101  Tex.  286. 
37-    Fla.— Allison    v.    Handy    Andy 

Community  Stores,  143  So.  263,  106 

Fla.  274. 
Ga.— Beddingfleld   v.    Old  Nat.   Bank 

&  Trust   Co.,   165   S.E.   61,  175   Ga. 

172 — Bishop  v.  Bussey,  139  S.E. 

212,  164  Ga,  642. 
34  C.J.  p  437  note  54. 

38.  Va, — Drake    v.    Lyons,    9    Gratt. 
54,  50  Va.  54. 

Contribution 

Petition  to  enjoin  enforcement  of 
joint  judgment  against  petitioner 
would  not  lie  where  he  had  an  ade- 
quate legal  remedy  to  compel  con- 
tribution.— Autry  v.  Southern  Ry. 
Co.,  144  S.B.  741,  167  Gto.  136. 

39.  N.M. — Pickering  v.  Palmer,   138 
P.    198,    18    N.M.    473,    50   L.R.A.,N. 
S.,   1-055. 

34  C.J.  p  437  note  56. 

40.  Ark. — Road    Improvement    Dist. 
No.   4,   Prairie   County  v.   Mobley, 
245    S.W.    482,   156   Ark.    242. 

Cal. — In   re  Hartley's  Estate,   142   P. 
2d   423,    23    Cal.2d   120,    149   A.L.R. 
1250. 
•Or. — Marsters    v,    Ashton,    107    P.2d 

981,  165  Or.  507. 

Tex. — Edwards   v.    Riverside   Royal- 
ties Corporation,  Civ.App.,  99  S.W. 
2d  418.     Error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  437  note  57. 
Denial  of  motion  to  vacate 

An  order  denying  a  motion  to  va- 
cate a  judgment  at  law  does  not  de- 
stroy the  jurisdiction  of  equity  to 
entertain  «,  bill  to  set  aside  such 
Judgment,  where  the  motion  was 
made  at  &  time  when  the  court  of 


law  had  lost  jurisdiction  to  entertain 
it.— Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Don- 
aldson, 123  I11.APP.  196. 

41.  111.— Pitcairn  v.  Dreyfuss,  20  N. 
E.2d  161,   299   IlLApp.    618. 

Md.— Pioneer  Oil  Heat  v.  Brown,  16 

A.2d  880,  179  Md.  155. 
34  C.J.  p  438  note  58. 

42.  111. — Ballance  v.  Loomiss,  22  I1L 
82. 

34  C.J.  p  438  note  59. 

43.  N.Y.— Jacobs  v.  Morange,  47  N. 
T.  57. 

34  C.J.  p  438  note  60. 

Mortgagor's  reliance  on .  attorney's 
advice  that  foreclosure  judgment 
rendered  against  him  without  service 
of  citation  was  void  and  no  action 
was  necessary  to  set  aside  judgment 
does  not  excuse  mortgagor  from  first 
exhausting  legal  remedies  as  con- 
dition precedent  to  suing  in  equity  to 
set  aside  judgment. — Reynolds  v. 
Volunteer  State  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  80  S.W.2d  1087,  error  re- 
fused. 

44.  Ala.— Hatton  v.  Moseley,  156  So. 
546,  229  Ala.  240— Kelley  v.  Chavls, 
142  So.  423,  225  Ala.  218. 

Cal. — Gundelflnger  v.  Mariposa  Com- 
mercial &  Min.  Co.,  App.,  165  P.2d 
67— Hogan  v.  Horsfall,  266  P.  1002, 
91  CaLApp.  87,  followed  in  266 
P.  1005,  91  CaLApp.  797. 

Ky. — Hoover  v.  Dudley,  14  S.W.2d 
410,  228  Ky.  110. 

Ma. — Pioneer  Oil  Heat  v.  Brown,  16 
A.2d  880,  179  Md.  155. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bryll 
v.  Karchmarz,  235  N.W.  812,  253 
Mich.  678. 

697 


Miss. — Lamar    v.    Houston,    184    So. 

293, '183  Miss.  260. 

Mo. — -Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Brinker- 
hoff-Faris  Trust  &  Savings  Co.  v. 
Hill,  19  S.W.2d  746,  749,  323  Mo. 
180,  reversed  on  other  grounds  50 
S.Ct.  451,  281  U.S.  673,  74  L.Bd. 
1107,  conformed  to  42  S.W.2d  23, 
328  Mo.  836. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 
Wood,  43  P.2d  136,  138r  171  OkL 
341. 

Or.— Mattoon  v.  Cole,  143  P.2d  679, 
172  Or.  664 — Marsters  v.  Ashton, 
107  P.2d  981,  165  Or.  507 — Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Holmes  v.  Graham, 
80  P.2d  870,  872,  159  Or.  466— Cor- 
pus Juris  quoted  in  Olsen  v.  Crow, 
290  P.  233,  235,  133  Or.  310. 
Tex. — Noble  v.  Empire  Gas  &  Fuel 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  20  S.W.2d  849,  af- 
firmed Empire  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v. 
Noble,  Com.App.,  36  S.W.2d  451— 
Camden  Fire  Ins.  Ass'h  v.  Hill, 
Civ. App.,  264  S.W.  123,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  Com.App.,  276  S.W. 
887. 

34  C.J.  p  438  note  61. 
Knowledge  of  rendition  of  Judgment 
In  suit  to  enjoin  execution  and 
cancel  judgment  on  ground  of  want 
of  service,  relief  was  denied  where 
president  of  defendant  association 
knew  of  pendency  of  suit  and  of  ren- 
dition of  judgment  therein,  had  tried 
to  have  cause  continued,  and  no  ex- 
cuse was  offered  for  failure  to  file 
motion  to  have  judgment  set  aside 
or  for  a  new  trial. — Citizens  Hut. 
Life  &  Accident  Ass'n  of  Texas  v. 
Gillespie,  Tex.Civ.App.,  93  S.W.2d 
200. 
45.  Ala. — Leath  v.  Lister,  173  So. 


§  343 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


denied  where  the  legal  remedy  under  the  statute  is 
inadequate.46  Resort  to  equity  is  cut  off,  however, 
where  the  grounds  of  the  application  and  the  relief 
to  which  the  party  is  entitled  are  within  the  cogni- 
zance of  the  law  court  under  statutes,  and  a  mo- 
tion or  other  proceeding  under  the  statute  will 
furnish,  or  by  the  exercise  of  proper  diligence  by 
the  complaining  party  would  have  furnished,  an  ade- 
quate and  complete  remedy.47 

During  the  period  in  which  the  statutory  reme- 
dies are  available,  courts  of  law  and  courts  of  eq- 
uity sometimes  have  concurrent  jurisdiction,48  but, 
under  the  rule  that  the  latter  will  not  grant  relief 
where  the  former  have  jurisdiction  to  do  so,  courts 
of  equity  generally  will  not  assume  jurisdiction  dur- 
ing such  statutory  period.49  When,  however,  the 
time  within  which  a  motion  may  be  made  has  ex- 


pired, and  no  laches  or  want  of  diligence  is  imputa- 
ble  to  the  party  asking  relief,  equity  will  grant  re- 
lief.50 


c,  Remedy  by  Review 

One  who  has,  or  by  taking  proper  steps  would  have 
had,  an  adequate  remedy  by  appeal  or  error  ordinarily 
can  have  no  relief  against  a  judgment  in  equity.  This 
is  not  an  inflexible  rule,  however,  and  does  not  defeat 
equitable  relief  in  cases  where  the  remedy  by  review 
Is  doubtful  or  Inadequate. 

The  general  rule  is  that  relief  will  not  be  granted 
in  equity  against  a  judgment  where  the  party  has 
an  adequate  remedy  as  to  the  matters  complained 
of  by  review,  appeal,  or  writ  of  error  and  makes  no 
effort  to  avail  himself  of  it,  or  has  lost  such  reme- 
dy by  failing  to  take  proper  steps  to  secure  or  to 
perfect  it51  This  is  equally  true  whether  the  party 


59.  233  Ala.  595— Kelley  v.  Chavis, 
142  So.  423,  225  Ala,  218— Choctaw 
Bank  v.  Dearmon,  134  So.  648,  £23 
Ala,  144. 

Cal.— Winn  v.  Torr,  81  P.2d  457,  27 
Cal.  A  pp.  2  d  623 — Jeffords  v.  Young, 
277  P.  163,  98  Cal.App.  400— Rudy 
v.  Slotwlnsky,  238  P.  783,  73  Gal. 
App.  459. 

Minn. — Lenhart  v.  Lenhart  Wagon 
Co.,  2  N.W.2d  421,  211  Minn.  572. 

Neb.— Pavlik  v.  Burns,  278  N.W.  149, 
134  Neb.  175— Howard  Stove  & 
Furnace  Co.  v.  Rudolf,  260  N.W. 
189,  128  Neb.  665. 

Ohio.— Seeds  v.  Seeds,  156  N.B.  193, 
116  Ohio  St.  144,  52  A.L.R.  761— 
Young  v.  Guella,  35  N.B.2d  997,  67 
Ohio  App.  11. 

Or.— Mattoon  v.  Cole,  143  P.2d  679, 
172  Or.  664. 

34  C:J.  p  435  note  35. 

46.    Mont. — Bullard    v.    Zimmerman, 

268  P.  512,  82  Mont.  434. 
Okl.— Amos  v.  Johnston,  19  P.2d  344, 

162  Okl.  115. 
Utah. — Kramer    v.     Pixton,     268     P. 

1029,  72  Utah  1. 
Belief  limited  to  parties 

A  statute  permitting-  a  party  to 
move  within  a  specified  period  for 
relief  from  a  judgment  taken  against 
him  through  his  mistake,  inadvert- 
ence, or  excusable  neglect  does  not 
afford  an  adequate  legal  remedy, 
which  will  exclude  relief  in  equity, 
to  one  who  was  not  a  party  to  the 
action. — Gill  v.  Frances  Inv.  Co.,  C. 
C.A.Cal.,  19  F.2d  880. 
Broader  power  of  chancellor 

As  respects  availability  of  remedy 
of  injunction  against  collection  of 
judgment  entered  by  confession,  al- 
though courts  exercise  equitable 
powers  in  motions  to  vacate  judg- 
ments entered  by  confession,  the 
courts  do  not  exercise  equity  power 
on  such  motion  as  broad  as  that 
exercised  by  the  chancellor  in  a  suit 
in  equity;  and  the  distinction  be- 


tween the  equitable  powers  exer- 
cised by  court  on  motion  to  vacate 
'and  equity  powers  of  a  chancellor  in 
a  suit  in  equity  is  not  entirely  abro- 
gated by  the  statute  providing  for 
joinder  of  legal  and  equitable  causes 
of  action  and  setting  up  of  all  cross- 
demands  in  counterclaims. — Printers 
Corporation  v.  Hamilton  Inv.  Co.,  14 
N.E.2d  517,  295  Ill.App.  84. 
47.  Cal. — Gundelflnger  v.  Mariposa 
Commercial  &  Min.  Co.,  App.,  165 
P.2d  57. 
Colo. — Wharton  v.  De  Vinna,  246  P. 

279  79  Colo.  450. 
Mont. — Meyer  v.  Lemley,  282  P.  268, 

86  Mont  83. 

Neb.— Johnson  v.  Marsh,  19  N.W.2d 
366,  146  Neb.  257— Bend  v.  Marsh, 
18  N.W.2-d  106,  145  Neb.  780— In 
re  Marsh's  Estate,  .17  N.W.2d  471, 
145  Neb.  559— Lindstrom  v.  Nils- 
son,  274  N.W.  485,  132  Neb.  184— 
Weber  v.  Allen,  238  N.W.  740, 
121  Neb.  833. 
Ohio. — Shedenhelm  v.  Myers,  63  N.E. 

2d  34,  76  Ohio  App.  28. 
Okl. — Flynn   v.   Vanderslice,   44   P.2d 
967,  172  Okl.  320— Reeder  v.  Mitch- 
ell, 32  P.2d  26,  167  Okl.  621— Amos 
v.  Johnston,  19   P.2d  344,  162  Okl. 
115— Kendall  v.  Watts,  273  P.  991, 
135  Okl.  66. 
34  C.J.  p  435  note  86. 
Ctarnisliee'8  ignorance  of  consequenc- 
es of  default 

Where  judgment  creditor  took 
judgment  against  garnishee  by  de- 
fault, and  notified  garnishee,  which 
did  nothing  within  time  allowed  for 
granting  relief  from  judgments,  be- 
cause garnishee  was  not  aware  of 
consequences  following  the  default, 
garnishee  could  not  restrain  enforce- 
ment of  judgment — Plumbers'  Wood- 
work Co.  v.  Merchants'  Credit  and 
Adjustment  Bureau,  226  N.W.  303, 
199  Wis.  466. 

48.    Ind.— Hitt  v.    Carr,   130   N.E,   1, 
77  Ind.App.  488. 

698 


49.  Ala.— Leath    v.    Lister,    173    So. 
59,  233  Ala.  595. 

Iowa. — Bates    v.    Farmers    Loan    & 

Trust  Co.  of  Iowa  City,  291  N.W. 

184,  227  Iowa  1347. 
Wash. — Muller    v.    Hendry,    17    P.2d 

602,  171  Wash.  9. 
34  C.J.  p  436  note  38. 
Statutory  procedure  as  preferable 

The  courts  are  more  inclined  to 
open  up  default  judgment  under 
statute  authorizing  such  relief  for 
mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise  or 
excusable  neglect  than  to  vacate 
judgment  in  an  independent  suit. — 
Mattoon  v.  Cole,  143  P.2d  679,  172 
Or.  664. 

50.  Ala.— Kelley  v.  Chavis,  142   So. 
423,  225  Ala.  218. 

Mont. — Stocking    v.    Charles    Beard 

Co.,    55    P.2d   949,   102   Mont.    65. 
Okl. — Weimer    v.     Augustana     Pen- 
sion  and   Aid   Fund,    67    P.2d   436, 
179  Okl.  573. 
34  C.J.  p  436  note  39. 
Time  of  discovery  of  fraud 

Equity  will  afford  relief  against 
judgment  procured  by  fraud  of  suc- 
cessful party  when  injured  party,  in 
exercise  of  reasonable  diligence,  did 
not  discover,  within  time  allowed  for 
commencing  statutory  proceeding  to 
vacate  judgment,  sufficient  evidence 
of  fraud  to  warrant  reasonable  belief 
and  expectation  that  such  proceeding 
would  be  successful,  if  instituted.— 
Hoeppner  v.  Bruckman,  261  N.W. 
572,  129  Neb.  390— Krause  v.  Long, 
192  N.W.  729,  109  Neb.  846. 

51.  U.S.— Moffett  v.  Bobbins,  C.C.A. 
Kan.,   81  F.2d  431,  denied  56  S.Ct. 
940,   298  U.S.   675,   80   L.Ed.   1397— 
U.  S.  v.  Davis  &  Andrews  Co.,  D. 
C.Tenn.,  3  F.Supp.  535. 

Ark. — Parker  v.  Sims,  51  S.W.2d  517, 
185  Ark.  1111 — Road  Improvement 
Dist.  No.  4,  Prairie  County,  v. 
Mobley,  245  S.W.  482,  156  Ark. 
242. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


has  neglected  altogether  to  take  an  appeal  or  has 
prosecuted  a  defective  or  insufficient  appeal.62  Eq- 
uity will  not  interfere  if  there  has  been  a  failure 
to  resort  to  or  exhaust  an  adequate  remedy  by  cer- 
tiorari53  or  supersedeas.64 

Failure  to  resort  to  or  exhaust  all  remedies  by 
way  of  review,  however,  does  not  always  bar  relief 
in  equity  against  a  judgment,55  and  some  decisions 
make  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  in  cases  where 
fraud  is  alleged  against  the  judgment.66  Resort 


to,  or  exhaustion  of,  remedies  by  way  of  review  has 
been  held  not  a  prerequisite  to  equitable  relief 
against  a  judgment  in  cases  where  an  equitable  de- 
fense fails  because  it  is  not  cognizable  at  law,67  or 
where  a  case  for  equitable  interference,  independ- 
ent of  a  mere  reversible  error,  is  stated,68  and  also 
where  the  remedy  by  review  is  doubtful  or  inade- 
quate,59 as  where  the  matters  alleged  against  it  lie 
outside  the  record  and  therefore  are  not  cognizable 
on  appear  or  writ  of  error60  or,  likewise,  are  not 


Cal. — Doran  v.  Sherman,  $4  P.2d 
442,  18  Cal.App.2d  479. 

Fla.— -Allison  v.  Handy  Andy  Com- 
munity Stores,  143  So.  2§3,  106 
Fla.  274 — Adams  v.  Reynolds,  134 
So.  45,  101  Fla,  271. 

Ga. — Barker  v.  People's  Loan  &  Sav- 
ings Co.,  173  S.E.  704,  178  Ga,  464 
— Futch  v.  Olmstead,  165  S.E.  582, 
175  Ga.  563 — Dixie  Realty  Finance 
Co.  v.  Morgan,  164  S.E.  200,  174 
Ga.  807— Adams  v.  Bishop,  163  S.B. 
148,  174  Ga.  420— Hutchings  v. 
Roquemore,  155  S.E.  675,  171  Ga. 
359. 

111. — Knaus  v.  Chicago  Title  &  Trust 
Co.,  7  N.E.2d  298,  365  111.  588— 
Mohr  v.  Messick,  53  N.E.2d  743, 
322  IlLApp.  56 — Mecartney  v.  Hale, 
48  N.E.2d  '570,  318  IlLApp.  502. 

Kan.— Bitsko  v.  Bitsko,  122  P.2d  753, 
155  Kan.  80. 

Md. — Pioneer  Oil  Heat  v.  Brown,  16 
A.2d  880,  179  Md.  155. 

Mass* — Untersee  v.  Untersee,  13  N.B. 
2d  34,  299  Mass.  425— Morin  v. 
Ellis,  189  N.E.  95,  285  Mass.  370. 

Mich. — Koppas  v.  Hettner  &  Flem- 
ming,  282  N.W.  245,  286  Mich.  562. 

Miss. — Max  N.  Tobias  Bag  Co,  v. 
Delta  Cotton  Oil  Co»,  11  So.2d  210, 
193  Miss.  873. 

Mo. — Gee  v.  Bothwell,  App.,  176  S.W. 
2d  848 — Mutual  Casualty  Co.  of 
Missouri  v.  Sansone,  App.,  17  S.W. 
2d  558. 

Okl.— Wheeler  v.  Ridpath,  259  P.  247, 
126  Okl.  290. 

Tenn. — Peoples  Tel.  £  T«L  Co.  v. 
Prye,  10  Teim.App.  160. 

Tex. — Lynn  v.  Hanna,  296  S.W.  280, 
116  Tex  652— Winters  Mut.  Aid 
Ass'n,  Circle  No.  2,  v.  Reddin, 
Com.App.,  49  S.W.2d  1095— South- 
ern Surety  Co.  v.  Texas  Oil  Clear- 
ing House,  Com.App.,  281  S.W. 
1045— Smith  v.  Lockhart,  Civ.App., 
177  S.W.2d  117— Smith  v.  Zenith 
Corporation,  Civ.App.,  134  S.W«2d 
337— Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Pribble,  Civ.App.,  130  S,W.2d  332, 
error  refused — Smith  v.  Rogers, 
Civ.App.,  129  S.W.2d  776— Hacker 
v.  Hacker,  Civ.App.,  110  S.W.2d 
923— Universal  Credit  Co.  v.  Cun- 
ningham, Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d  507, 
error  dismissed — Robin  v.  Robin, 
Civ.App.,  106  S.W.2d  1082,  error 
dismissed — Birge  v.  Conwell,  Civ. 
App.,  105  S.W.2d  407,  error  refused 


— Snell    v.    Knowles,    Civ.App.,    87 
S.W. 3d  871,  error  dismissed — Trigg 
v.  Trigg,  Civ.App.,  83  S.W.2d  1066, 
error  dismissed — Reynolds  v.  Vol- 
unteer   State    Life    Ins.    Co.,    Civ. 
App.,  80  S.W.2d  1087,  error  refused 
— Murry  v.  Citizens'  State  Bank  of 
Ranger,   Civ.App.,    77   S.W.2d  1104, 
error   dismissed — Inman   v.    Texas 
Land    &    Mortgage    Co.,    Civ.App., 
74   S.W.2d  124— Pass  v.  Ray,  Civ. 
App.,  44  S.W.2d  470— Hollis  v.  Sei- 
bold,  Civ.App.,  23   S.W.2d  811,   er- 
ror   dismissed— Noble    v.    Empire 
Gas  &  Fuel  Co.,  Civ.App.,  20  S.W. 
2d    849,    affirmed    Empire    Gas    & 
Fuel  Co.  v.  Noble,  Com. App.,  36  S. 
W.2d    451— U.    O.    Colson    Co.    v. 
Powell,    Civ.App.,    13    S.W.2d    40S 
— Fatton   v.    Crisp   &  White,    Civ. 
App.,  11  S.W.2d  826,  error  dismiss- 
ed— Crutcher    v.    Wolfe,    Civ.App., 
269    S.W.    841— Getting  v.   Mineral 
Wells  Crushed  Stone  Co.,  Civ.App., 
262    S.W.    93— First   Nat   Bank  v. 
Curtis,    Civ.App.t    244    S.W.    225. 
34  C.J.  p  436  note  42. 
Availability    of    other    remedies    as 
bar  to  opening  or  vacating  Judg- 
ment see  supra  §  283. 
Mere    ignorance    of    rendition    of 
Judgment,  after  due  service  of  proc- 
ess, is  not  sufficient  showing  of  dili- 
gence to  excuse  failure  to  prosecute 
appeal  or  writ  of  error. — Murchison 
Oil  Co.  v.  Hampton,  Tex.Civ.App.,  21 
S.W.2d  59,  error  refused. 
Refusal  to  submit  issues 

Trial  court's  refusal  to  submit 
plaintiffs  requested  issues  is  not 
ground  for  enjoining  enforcement  of 
judgment,  since  court's  action  might 
be  properly  attacked  cm  appeal. — 
Cooper  v.  Walker,  Tex.Civ.App.,  96 
S.W.2d  847. 

52.  Tex. — Long  v.    Smith,    39    Tex. 
160. 

34  C.J.  p  437  notes  42,  44. 

53.  Fla. — Sommers  v.   Colourpicture 
Pub.,   8   So.2d  281,   150  Fla.   659. 

Mich, — Koppas  v.  HefCner  &  Flem- 
ming,  282  N.W.  245,  286  Mich.  562. 

Tex. — Hernandez  v.  Alamo  Motor 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  299  S.W.  272. 

34  C.J.  p  437  note  45. 

54.  Ala, — Leath   v.   Lister,    173    So. 
59,  233  Ala.  595. 

34  C.J.  p  437  note  46. 

699 


Failure  to  give  supersedeas  bond 

One  who  has  appealed  from  judg- 
ment without  giving  supersedeas 
bond  cannot  stay  proceedings  on 
judgment  by  Injunction. — Glenn  v. 
Hollums,  Tex.  Civ.  App.,  73  S.W.2d 
1068. 

55.  Execution  defendants  who  wore 
not  parties  to  suit  or  judgment  were 
held  entitled  to   enjoin   execution  as 
against    contention    that    they    had 
adequate  remedy  by  writ  of  error. — 
Maier  v.   Davis,   Tex.Civ.App.,    72    S. 
W.2d  308. 

56.  Mo. — Baldwin  v.  Davidson,  40  S. 
W.    765,    139    Mo.    118,    61   Am.S.B. 
460. 

34  C.J.  p  437  note  47. 

57.  N.J. — Gallagher   v.    Lembeck    & 
Betz  Eagle  Brewing  Co.,  98  A.  461, 
86  N.J.Eq.  188— Headley  v.  Leavitt, 
55  A.  731,  65  N.J.Ea.  748. 

58.  Ala. — Robinson  v.  Reid,   50  Ala. 
69. 

Tex. — Elstun  v.  Scanlan,  Civ.App., 
202  S.W.  762. 

59.  Colo.— Ferrier  v.  Morris,  122  P. 
2d  880,  109  Colo.  154. 

111. — Bachechi  v.  Inlander  Paper  Co., 

252  IlLApp.   178. 
Ind. — City  of  New  Albany  v.  Lemon, 
149  N.E.  350,  198  Ind.  127,  rehear- 
ing denied   152   N.E.    723,   198   Ind. 
127. 
Mont. — Bullard    v.    Zimmerman,    268 

P.  512,  82  Mont.  434. 
Tex. — Bennett    v.     Carter,     Civ.App., 
102   S.W.2d   450,   error  dismissed — 
Senter  v. 'Garland,  Civ.App.,  298  S. 
W.  614 — Cook  v.  Panhandle  Refin- 
ing Co.,  Civ.App.,  267  S.W.  1070. 
34  C.J.  p  437  note  49. 
Default  judgment 

As  respects  right  to  maintain  pro- 
ceedings to  set  aside  default  judg- 
ment, legal  remedy  of  appeal  is  not 
an  adequate  remedy. — Bennett  v. 
Carter,  Tex.Civ.App.,  102  S.W.2d  450, 
error  dismissed. 

60.  Mo. — Chouteau    v.    City    of    St. 
Louis,  App.,  131  S.W.2d  902. 

Tex. — Edwards  v.  Riverside  Royal- 
ties Corporation,  Civ. App,,  99  S.W. 
2d  418,  error  dismissed — Ritch  v. 
Jarvis,  Civ. App.,  64  S.W.2d  831,  er- 
ror dismissed. 

34  CJ*.  p  437  note  51. 

Agreement  not  of  record 
Where    plaintiffs    took    Judgment 


§  344 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


cognizable  on  certiorari,61  or  where  the  amount 
in  controversy  was  so  small  that  no  appeal  could 
be  taken.62 

§  344.     Persons  Entitled  to  Relief 

Equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  ordinarily  will 
be  granted  only  to  parties  to  the  action  or  their  privies, 
or  persons  directly  Jeopardized  by  the  judgment.  An 
owner  or  purchaser  of  property  affected  by  the  judg- 
ment may  be  entitled  to  relief. 

As  a  rule  relief  in  equity  against  a  judgment 
at  law  is  given  only  to  the  parties  to  the  action63 
or  those  in  privity  of  interest  or  estate  with  them  ;64 
and  a  third  person  or  stranger  to  the  proceedings 
who  is  not  affected  by  the  judgment  cannot  attack 
it  in  equity  or  enjoin  its  enforcement.65  In  proper 
instances,  however,  particularly  in  the  case  of  a 
fraudulent  or  collusive  judgment,  relief  in  equity 
may  be  had  at  the  instance  of  one  who,  although  not 
a  party  to  the  proceeding  in  which  the  judgment  was 
rendered,  shows  that  he  is  directly  injured  or  jeopar- 


dized by  the  judgment  as  it  stands,66  as  where  he 
claims  to  be  the  true  owner  of  the  property  in  con- 
troversy or  sets  up  a  paramount  title  to  it67 

One  who  had  full  knowledge  of  the  pendency  of 
the  suit,  and  neither  sought  to  become  a  party  there- 
to nor  made  any  effort  to  intervene  therein  so  as  to 
protect  his  rights,  may  be  barred,  after  rendition  of 
judgment,  from  suing  to  set  such  judgment  aside  or 
to  restrain  its  enforcement;68  but  voluntary  inter- 
vention is  not  required  as  a  condition  of  equitable 
relief  to  one  who  was  absolutely  entitled  to  a  hear- 
ing, and  such  a  person,  although  not  a  party  to  the 
proceedings  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered, 
may  nevertheless  have  relief  against  it  in  a  proper 
case.6  ^ 

Purchasers,  encumbrancers,  and  creditors.  A  pur- 
chaser of  property  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
to  which  his  grantor  makes  no  objection  cannot 
maintain  a  suit  to  enjoin  its  enforcement,  unless 


without     notice,     contrary    to    vali< 
agreement  not  of  record,  defendants 
had  no  remedy  by  writ  of  error,  bu 
remedy  lay  in  direct  attack  on  judg 
xnent—  -  Caffarelli  v.  Reasonover,  Tex 
Civ.App.,  54  *SAV.2d  170. 
Discharge  in  bankruptcy 

As  respects  right  of  motorist,  aft 
er  discharge  in  bankruptcy,  to  bring 
bill  in  equity  to  vacate  judgment  for 
injuries  to  pedestrian,  quash  body 
execution,  and  discharge  jail  limits 
bond,  discharge  in  bankruptcy  grant- 
ed after  judgment  was  rendered 
would  not  be  ground  for  appeal  from 
Judgment.  —  Doering  v.  Baker,  270  N. 
W.  185,  277  Mich.  683. 

61.  Mich.—  Wilcke  v.  Duross,  107  N. 
W.  907,  144  Mich,  243,  115  Axn.S.R. 
394. 

34  C.J.  p  437  note  52. 

62.  Tex.—  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Henderson,  18  S.W.  432,  83  Tex.  70. 

34  C.J.  p  437  note  53. 

63.  Ga.  —  Martocello    v.    Martocello, 
30  S.E.2d  108,  197  Ga.  629—  Thom- 
as  v.   Lambert,    1   S.B.2d  443,   187 
Ga.  616. 

Tex,  —  Garcia  v.  Jones,  Civ.App.,  155 
S.W.2d  671,  error  refused  —  Hugh 
Cooper  Co.  v.  American  Nat.  Ex- 
change Bank  of  Dallas,  Civ.App., 
30  S.W.2d  364. 

84  C.J.  p  438  note  62  —  47  C.J.  p  438 
note  62. 

Claim  of  interest 
Persons  not  parties  to  a  partition 

action  could  not  petition  to  have  the 

decree  set  aside  merely  because  they 

claimed  an  interest  in  the  property. 

—Gage  v.  Lee,  141  N.B.  397,  309  111. 

614. 


party" 

(1)  Statute  authorizing  suit  to  set 
aside  judgment  to  be  brought  b^ 
"aggrieved  party"  against  "prevail- 


ing  party"  was  held  intended  to  in- 
clude all  those  who  were  parties  t 
action,  although  having  varying  in 
terests  therein. — Tankar  Gas  v.  Lum 
bermen's  Mut.  Casualty  Co.,  9  N.W 
2d  754,  215  Minn.  265,  146  A.L.R 
1223. 

(2)  In  a  proceeding  by  a  minority 
stockholder,  the  corporation  was  the 
"aggrieved  party"  within  meaning  of 
the  statute. — Lenhart  v.  Lehhar 
Wagon  Co.,  '298  N.W.  37,  210  Minn 
164,  135  A.L.R.  833.  mandate  modified 
on  other  grounds  2  N.W.2d  421,  211 
Minn.  572. 

64.  Tex. — Jackson  v.  Wallace,  Com. 
App.,  252  S.W.  745. 

34  C.J.  p  438  note  63. 

65.  Ga. — Thomas  v.  Lambert,  1  S.E. 
2d  443,  187  Ga,  616. 

HI. — Gage  v.  Lee,   141  N.B.  397,   309 

HI.  614. 
Ohio.— Suiter  v.  Suiter,  57  N.E.2d  616, 

74  Ohio  App.  44. 
Tex.— Carlton  v.  Hoff,  Civ.App.,   292 

S.W.  642. 
34  C.J.  p  439  note  64—24  C.J.  p  888 

note  85. 
Parties  to  action  for  equitable  relief 

against  judgment  see  infra  §   884. 
Injury  by  reason  of  nonjoinder 

One  may  not  attack  judgment  void- 
.ble  for  nonjoinder  of  parties  unless 
he  sustained  injury  by  reason  of 
nonjoinder. — State  Mortg.  Corpora- 
tion v.  Garden,  Tex.Civ.App.,  11  S. 
W.2d  212. 

Absence  of  f  rand  on  lienor 

One  claiming  landlord's  lien  could 
iot  enjoin  enforcement  of  .condition- 
al    seller's     judgment     in     detinue, 
where  bill  did  not  allege  facts  show- 
ng  that  judgment  was  concocted  in 
raud    of    lien    claimant's    rights. — 
L«arue  v.   Loveman,  Joseph  &  Loeb, 
32  So.  715,  222  Ala.  472. 

700 


66.    Ala. — Mudd  v.   Lanier,   24   So.26T 

550— Henley  v.  Foster,  125  So.  662,. 

220  Ala.  420. 
Cal. — Difani  v.  Riverside  County  OiP 

Co.,    256-    P.    210,    201    Cal.    210 — 

Harada  v.  Fitzpatrick,  91  P.2d  941, 

33  Cal. App.  2 d  453. 
Mass. — Connor   v.    Morse,    20   !r.E.2cT 

424,  303  Mass.  42. 
Mich.— Casey  v.    Goetzen,    214   N.W. 

948,  240  Mich.  41. 
34  C.J.  p  439  note  65. 

A  taxpayer  is  entitled  to  equitable 
relief  from  a  judgment  entered 
against  a  city  when  it  appears  that 
his  case  comes  within  some  of  the 
recognized  grounds  of  which  a  court 
of  equity  assumes  Jurisdiction,  such 
as  fraud  of  either  of  the  parties  to- 
the  judgment  or  the  collusion  of 
both. — Indiana  Harbor  Belt  R.  Co. 
v.  Calumet  City,  63  N.B.2d  369,  391 
111.  280. 

67.  Cal. — Bernhard  v.  Waring,  2  P.. 
2d  32,  213  Cal.  175. 

Tex. — McCook  v.  Amarada  Petroleum* 
Corporation,  Civ.App.,  73  S.W.2cH 
914. 

34  C.J.  p  489  note  66. 
Cloud  on  title 

Third  person,  if  sufficiently  Inter- 
ested, may  by  suit  attack  validity  of 
Judgment  as  cloud  on  title. — Weld* 
v.  Morris,  291  P.  1048,  49  Idaho  781 
—34  CJT.  p  439  note  66  [b]. 

68,  Ga. — Fitzgerald  v.  Bowen,  40  Sw 
E.  735,  114  Ga.  691. 

La. — Hawthorne  v.  Jackson  Parish 
School  Board,  5  La. App.  508. 

Or.-^Oorpus  Jttris  gnotefl  in  Olsen  v. 
Crow,  290  P.  233,  235,  133  Or.  31fr. 

S9.  U.S.— Chase  Nat.  Bank  v.  City 
of  Norwalk,  Ohio,  54  S.Ct  475,  291 
U.S.  431,  78  L.Ed.  894, 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  346 


he  can  show  that  it  was  fraudulent  or  expressly  de- 
signed to  injure  him;70  and  a  similar  rule  obtains 
in  the  case  of  encumbrancers  by  mortgage  or  oth- 
erwise,71 and  other  creditors  of  the  common  debt- 
or.72 Under  proper  circumstances,  however,  the 
purchaser  of  property  may  have  the  right  to  im- 
peach a  judgment,  and  the  lien  thereof  against  his 
property,  although  not  a  party  to  the  action  in  which 
the  judgment  was  rendered,73  at  least  in  cases  in 
which  the  judgment  is  void  by  reason  of  facts  ap- 
pearing on  the  judgment  roll.74 

Sureties.  Although  there  is  nothing  in  the  mere 
character  of  a  surety  entitling  him  to  special  con- 
sideration in  the  awarding  of  equitable  relief  against 
a  judgment,75  yet  there  may  be  circumstances  ren- 
dering it  inequitable  and  against  conscience  to  al- 
low the  enforcement  of  the  judgment.76  Where 
judgment  is  erroneously  or  wrongfully  taken  against 
one  as  principal,  when  he  is  liable  only  as  surety  or 
indorser,  equity  may  relieve  him  against  the  judg- 
ment, on  evidence  showing  the  true  character  of  his 
liability.77 

§  345.    Persons  against  Whom  Relief  Avail- 
able 

Equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  may  in  general 
be  had  against  any  one  who  attempts  to  enforce  it,  ex- 
cept the  sovereign  and  bona  fide  purchasers  of  property 
affected  by  the  Judgment. 


An  action  to  enjoin  a  void,  fraudulent,  or  uncon- 
scionable judgment  may  generally  be  maintained 
against  any  person  who  attempts  to  enforce  it,78  in- 
cluding the  heirs  at  law  of  the  judgment  creditor.™ 
Relief  ordinarily  will  not  be  awarded  against  pur- 
chasers of  the  property  affected,  who  take  it  in  good 
faith  and  without  notice  of  the  circumstances  af- 
fecting the  validity  of  the  judgment.80  An  excep- 
tion to  this  latter  rule 'exists,  however,  in  the  case 
of  gambling  contracts,  made  void  by  statute,  and 
relief  against  a  judgment  on  such  a  contract  may 
be  obtained  even  against  a  bona  fide  holder  for 
vjue  without  notice.81 

United  States.  Since  the  sovereign  is  beyond  the 
reach  of  any  prohibitory  process,  an  injunction  can- 
not be  issued  to  restrain  the  United  States  from 
collecting  a  judgment  in  its  favor.82 

§  346.    Judgments  against  Which  Relief  May 
Be  Granted 

It  is  generally  considered  that  equity  may  grant  re- 
lief against  judgments  of  any  judicial  tribunal,  and  of 
whatever  form  or  nature,  including  decrees  In  equity  and 
judgments  of  special  tribunals. 

Subject  to  some  limitations  and  exceptions,  a 
court  of  equity,  on  sufficient  cause  shown,  ordinarily 
may  grant  relief  against  a  judgment,  decree,  or  or- 
der of  any  judicial  tribunal,83  and  the  form  or  na- 


70.  Cal.— Whitney  v.   Kelley,   29   P. 
'     624.    94   Cal.    146.    28   Am.S.R.   106, 

15  L..R.A.  813. 
34  C.J.  p  439  note  69. 

71.  Tex. — Llvezey  v.  Putnam  Supply 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  30  S.W.2d  902,  error 
refused. 

34  C.J.  P  439  note  70. 

72.  Mich. — Edson  v.  Cumings,  17  N. 
W.  693,  52  Mich.  52. 

34  C.J.  p  439  note  71. 
Divestiture  of  property  -with  intent 

to  defraud  creditors 
Creditors  of  persons  who  through 
fraudulent  contrivance  or  fraudulent 
complicity  with  others  cause  a  Judg- 
ment to  be.  rendered  whereby  they 
are  divested  of  their  property  with 
a  design  to  defraud  their  creditors 
may  resort  to  courts  having  equity 
Jurisdiction  for  relief  against  such 
injustice,  since  the  fraud  in  those 
cases  is  regarded  not  only  on  the 
person  aggrieved  but  likewise  on  the 
court  itself. — Hooffstetter  v.  Adams, 

35  N.E.2d  896,   67  Ohio  App.  21. 
Future  creditor 

A  Judgment  creditor  may  not  be 
precluded  from  satisfying  his  Judg- 
ment from  a  private  fund  on  the 
ground  that  a  future  creditor  may 
thereby  find  himself  in  the  position 
of  having  an  uncollectable  Judgment 
against  the  debtor.— Pisclotta  v< 


Preston,    10    N.Y.S.2d   44,    170    Misc. 
376. 

73.  N.C.— Helsabeck  v.  Vass,  146  S. 
B.  576,  196  N.C.  603. 

Purchaser  under  judgment  In  attach- 
ment suit 

A  purchaser  at  a  sale  under  the 
Judgment  in  an  attachment  suit  ac- 
quires the  title  of  defendant  in  at- 
tachment, and  has  the  same  right 
to  file  a  bill  to  annul  a  Judgment  in 
a  senior  attachment.— McKinney  v. 
Adams,  50  So.  474,  95  Miss.  832. 

74.  Cal. — Swallow        v.        Tungsten 
Products  Co.,  270  P.  366,  205   Cal. 
207. 

75.  Tex.— Watts   v.   Moss,   Civ.App., 
63  S.W.2d  1095,  error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  P  440  note  73. 

76."  Tex.— Axtell   v.   Lopp,   Civ.App., 

152  S.W.  192. 
24  C.J.  p  888  note  85  [a]. 

77.  S.C.— Baubien  v.  Stoney,  17  S.C. 
Bq.  508. 

34  C.J.  p  440  note  84. 

78.  Kan. — Chambers      v.      King 
Wrought-Iron  Bridge  Manufactory, 
16  Kan.  270. 

Parties  to  action  for  equitable  relief 
against  Judgment  see  infra  §  384. 

Belief  denied  as  against  escrow  hold- 
er 
The  purchasers  of  property  under 

701 


an  unrecorded  deed,  against  whom 
a  subsequent  purchaser  obtained  a 
Judgment  quieting  title  in  him,  were 
held  to  have  no  right  of  action  to 
set  the  judgment  aside  as  against 
a  bank  which  held  the  unrecorded 
deed  and  the  contract  of  sale  in  .es- 
crow.— Jeffords  v.  Young,  277  P.  163, 
98  Cal.App.  400. 

79.  Va. — Evans  v.  Spurgln,  11  Gratt. 
615,  52  Va.  615. 

80.  Tex. — Gar2a  v.  Kenedy,  Civ.App., 
291    S.W.    615,    reversed    on    other 
grounds,    Com. App.,    299    S.W.    231. 

34  C.J.  p  440  note  87. 
PtuKlamental   jurisdlctional    defect 

In  Judgment  debtor's  suit  against 
Judgment  creditor  and  third  party 
to  set  aside  Judgment  and  sale  there- 
under for  fundamental  Jurisdictional 
defect,  third  party  is  not  entitled  to 
protection  of  Judgment  unless  It  ap- 
pears that  he  is  a  purchaser  in  good 
faith  and  that  the  Judgment  is  reg- 
ular on  its  face. — Morris  v.  Soble,  61 
S.W.2d  139. 

81.  Miss.— Lucas  v.  Waul,  20  Miss. 
157. 

34  C.J.  p  440  note  88. 

82.  U.S.— Hill  v.  U.  S.,  Miss.,  9  How. 
386,  13  L.Ed.  185— IT.  S.  v.  McLe- 
more,  Tenn.,  4  How.  286,  11  L.Ed. 
977. 

83.  U.S. — Smith  v.  Smith,  D.C.Mont, 


§  346 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ture  of  the  judgment  is  not  generally  material  in 
this  respect84  While  it  has  been  broadly  held  that 
probate  decrees  may  not  be  set  aside  in  equity,85 
even  for  fraud,86  it  has  also  been  held  that  they 
may  be  set  aside  in  a  proper  case,87  as  for  fraud, 
accident,  or  mistake,  or  the  acts  of  the  adverse  party 
unmixed  with  the  negligence  or  fault  of  complain- 
ant,88 or  where  a  defect  in  jurisdiction  or  other 
fatal  error  affirmatively  appears  on  the  record.89 
A  court  of  equity  may,  on  sufficient  reasons  for 
such  action  being  shown,  grant  relief  against  the 
enforcement  of  a  judgment  at  law  in  favor  of90  or 
against91  an  executor  or  administrator. 

Decrees  in  equity.  If,  through  lapse  of  time  or 
for  other  reasons,  the  remedy  by  way  of  bill  of  re- 
view is  not  available  to  attack  a  decree  in  equity 
which  has  been  improperly  entered,  there  may  be 
relief  by  way  of  an  injunction  in  equity,  where 
justice  so  demands,  and  there  is  no  other  way 
open.92  In  a  proper  case  a  bill  will  lie  to  review 
a  decree  in  equity  against  a  personal  representa- 
tive.93 

Interlocutory  decrees.  A  court  of  equity  will  not 
interfere  to  set  aside  an  interlocutory  decree  in 
a  cause  then  pending  in  another  court94  because  the 
party  complaining  of  such  a  decree  has  a  sufficient 
remedy  by  applying  to  the  court  which  made  it.95 


Judgments  affirmed  on  appeal  It  has  been  held 
by  some  authorities  that  a  judgment  which  has  been 
affirmed  on  appeal  may  not  be  impeached  or  set 
aside  by  a  court  of  equity,  in  a  suit  brought  for  that 
purpose;96  it  has  also  been  held,  however,  that  such 
a  judgment  may  be  enjoined97  on  any  ground  of 
error  apparent  on  the  face  of  such  judgment,  or  on 
the  record  of  the  case  in  which  it  was  rendered,98 
at  least  where  it  appears  that  the  judgment  is  void99 
or  that  it  was  obtained  by  fraud.1 

Pendency  of  an  appeal  or  a  writ  of  error  does  not 
necessarily  affect  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of  equi- 
ty over  a  bill  to  enjoin  a  judgment,2  at  least  where 
the  suit  in  equity  does  not  draw  into  question  the 
judgment  and  proceedings  at  law,  or  claim  a  right 
to  revise  them,  but  sets  up  an  equity  independent  of 
the  judgment,  which  admits  the  validity  thereof, 
but  suggests  reasons  why  the  party  who  has  ob- 
tained it  ought  not  to  avail  himself  of  it.3 

Special  tribunals.  It  has  been  said  that  injunc- 
tion does  not  lie  to  restrain  the  execution  of  a  judg- 
ment of  a  special  tribunal  created  by  statute,  certi- 
orari  being  the  proper  remedy.4  However,  the 
judgment  of  such  a  tribunal  which  is  a  nullity  may 
be  enjoined.6 


210  P.   947,  affirmed  224  F.   1,   139 

C.C.A.   465. 
34  C.J.  p  440  note  91. 
Judgment  of  court  of  another  county 

The  district  court  of  one  county 
liad  no  jurisdiction  to  enjoin  execu- 
tion of  judgment  of  court  of  another 
county  on  ground  that  there  was  no 
service  of  citation  on  defendant, 
where  judgment  on  its  face  appeared 
to  be  valid. — Stewart  v.  Adams,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  171  S.W.2d  ISO. 
«4.  Miss. — Brown  v.  Wesson,  74  So. 

831,  114  Miss.  216. 
34  CUT.  p  441  note  92. 
Cognovit  judgments 
U.S. — Glinski  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.I1L,  98 

F.2d  418. 
Wis.— -Ellis  v.  Gordon,  231  N.W.  585, 

202  Wis.  134. 

35.  Decree  allowing  prolate  account 
Mass. — Grassie   v.    Grassie,    61    N.B. 

2d  526. 

36.  Mass. — Mahoney  v.  Nollman,   35 
N.B.2d    265,    309    Mass.    522— Far- 
quhar  v.  New  England  Trust  Co., 
158    N.B.    836,    261    Mass.    209. 

*7.    Ark.— Hill  v.  Taylor,  135  S.W.2d 

825,  199  Ark.  695. 
Mich.— Kurant  v.   Higbee,    9  N.W.2d 

824,  305  Mich.  411. 
Tex. — Union    Bank    &   Trust   Co.    of 

Fort  Worth  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  166 

S.W.2d  928. 
34  C.J.  p  440  note  91  [a]  (1). 


Acts  of  county  judge 

Exercise  of  circuit  court's  super- 
visory power  over  acts,  proceedings, 
and  doings  of  county  judge  relating 
to  probate  or  guardianship  matters 
can  be  invoked  by  suit  in  equity. — 
Ex  parte  Hansen,  162  So.  715,  120 
Fla,  333 — Pitts  v.  Pitts,  162  So.  708, 
120  Fla.  363. 

88-     Ga. — Bowers  v.  Dolen,   1   S.E.2d 
734,  187  Ga.  653. 

89.  Mass. — Farquhar   v.    New   Eng- 
land  Trust   Co..   158  N.E.   836,   261 
Mass.  209. 

90.  Mo.— Link  v.  Link,    48    Mo.App. 
345. 

24  C.J.  p  888  note  83. 

91.  Tenn. — Hamilton  v.  Newman,  10 
Humphr.  557. 

92.  Mass. — Corbett  v.  Craven,  82  N. 

E.  37,  196  Mass.  319. 
34  C.J.  p  441  note  3. 

93.  Ky.— Head  v.  Perry,  1  T.B.Mon. 
253. 

24  C.J.  p  889  note  94. 

94.  Neb.— James  v.  McNeill,  97  N.W. 
22,  70  Neb.  132. 

34  C.J.  P  441  note  93. 

95.  U.S.— Furnald  v.  Glenn,  N.Y.,  64 

F.  49,  12  C.C.A.  27. 

56.  U.S. — Central  Trust  Co.  of  New 
York  v.  Evans,  Tenn.,  73  F.  562, 
19  C.C.A.  563. 

24  C.J.  p  441  note  95. 

702 


97.  Ind. — Stephenson    v.    State,    186 
N.E.  293,  205  Ind.  141. 

98.  W.Va. — Armstrong  v.  Poole,  5  S. 
E.  257,  30  W.Va.  666. 

99.  Tex. — Chambers    v.    Hodges,    23 
Tex.  104. 

34  C.J.  p  441  note  97. 

1.  Ala. — Chambers  v.  Crook,  42  Ala, 
171,  94  Am.D.  637. 

34  C.J.  p  441  note  98. 

2.  U.S. — Dowagiac  Mfg.  Co.   v.   Mc- 
Sherry  Mfg.  Co.,  Ohio,   155  F.   524, 
84    C.C.A.   38— Platt  v.   Threadgill, 
C.C.Va.,  80  F.  192,  appeal  dismissed 
18  S.Ct   945,  42  L.Ed.  1208. 

3.  U.S. — Johnson  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M. 
&    S.    R.    Co.,   Ark.,    12    S.Ct    124, 
141  U.S.  602,  35  L.Ed.  875— Parker 
v.  Judges  Maryland  Cir.  Ct.,  Md., 
12  Wheat.  561,  6  L.Ed.  729. 

4.  S.C. — Hornesby  v.  Burdell,  9  S.C. 
303. 

5.  Tenn. — Walt    v.    Thomasson,     10 
Heisk.  151. 

34  C.J.  p  441  note  5. 
Compensation  award 

Equity  court  has  been  held  to  have 
jurisdiction  to  enjoin  enforcement  of 
judgment  based  on  compensation 
award  on  ground  that  judgment  was 
fraudulently  obtained,  as  against 
contention  that  jurisdiction  of  courts 
over  compensation  awards  is  limited 
to  review  provided  by  statute,  which 
does  not  include  fraud,  since  juris- 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  349 


§  347. 


By  Confession  or  on  Consent  or 


Offer 


Equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  by  confession 
or  on  consent,  although  not  readily  granted,  may  never- 
theless be  had  on  a  showing  of  sufficient  grounds. 

Where  a  party  to  an  action  at  law  voluntarily 
confesses  judgment,  usually  he  is  not  entitled  to 
equitable  relief  against  the  judgment,  unless  with- 
out negligence  on  his  part  he  was  prevented  from 
making  his  defense  by  fraud,  accident,  surprise,  or 
mistake.6  However,  if  sufficient  grounds  appear, 
equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  by  confession 
may  properly  be  granted.7  If  judgment  is  confessed 
for  a  balance  claimed,  with  the  privilege  of  cor- 
recting errors,  if  any,  it  can  be  enjoined  only  on 
proof  of  errors.8 

Consent  judgment.  Although  equity  is  little  dis- 
posed to  overhaul  judgments  settled  by  consent  or 
compromise,9  yet  on  a  showing  of  proper  circum- 
stances, such  as  fraud  or  mistake  in  the  procurement 
of  the  judgment,  relief  against  it  may  be  obtained 
in  equity.10 

§  348.    By  Default 

A  court  of  equity  may  grant  relief  against  a  de- 
fault judgment  provided  the  complaining  party  was  not 
at  fault  in  falling  to  defend. 

A  court  of  equity  will  not  grant  relief  against  a 
judgment  taken  by  default  where  the  applicant, 


diction  of  equity  to  enjoin  a  judg- 
ment founded  on  a  compensation 
award  has  nothing  to  do  with  a  re- 
view of  the  award.  —  Amberg  v.  Dea- 
ton,  271  N.W.  396,  223  Wis.  653. 

6.  Ala.  —  Moore   v.    Barclay,   23  Ala. 
739. 

34  C.J.  P  441  note  7. 

7.  Colo.—  Sarchet  v.  Phillips,   78  P. 
2d  1096,  102  Colo.  318. 

Pa.  —  Sherwood  Bros.  Co.  v.  Kennedy, 

200  A.   689,  132  Pa.Super.   154. 
34  C.J.  p  441  notes  8-10. 

altered  power  of  attor- 


ney 

Equity  may  enjoin  a  judgment  on 
a  note  entered  on  a  fraudulently  al- 
tered power  of  attorney  to  confess 
judgment.  —  Hodge  v.  Oilman,  20  111. 
437. 

8.  U.S.—  Gear    v.    Parish,    Wis.,    5 
How.  168,  12  L.Ed.  100. 

9.  Ala.—  State   v.    Neuhoff,    196    So. 
130,  239  Ala.  584. 

Ga.—  Elliott  v.  Elliott,  191   S.E.  465, 

184  Ga.  417. 
34  C.J.  p  442  note  16. 

10.  Ala.—  Mudd  v.  Lanier,   24   So.2d 


550. 


—  Hanrahan  v.  Andersen,  90  P. 


3d  494,  108  Mont  218. 
Tenn.  —  Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Coley 


v.  Family  Loan  Co.,  80  S.W.2d  87, 

88,  168  Tenn.  631. 
Tex. — Texas  Employers'  Ins.  Ass'n  v. 

Arnold,    88    S.W.2d    473,    126    Tex. 

466. 

34  C.J.  p  442  note  16. 
•Unauthorized  obligations  of  munici- 
pality 

Equity  may  set  aside  a  consent 
judgment  rendered  against  a  munici- 
pality on  unauthorised  obligations. — 
Village  of  Hartford  v.  First  Nat 
Bank  of  Wood  River,  30  N.E.2d  524, 
307  IlLApp.  447. 
11.  Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Ol- 

sen  v.  Crow,  290  P.  233,   235,   133 

Or.  310. 
Tex.— Murry  v.  Citizens'  State  Bank 

of    Ranger,    Civ.App.,     77    S.W.2d 

1104,     error     dismissed — Winn     v. 

Houston   Building   &   Loan   Ass'n, 

Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  631,  error  re- 
fused. 

34  C.J.  p  442  note  18. 
Negligence  or  misconduct  of  counsel 

as  excuse  for  not  defending  at  law 

see  infra  §  368. 

Confirmation  of  default  against  in- 
solvent 

Injunction  by  surety  of  insolvent 
will  not  lie  to  prevent  confirmation 
of  default  against  insolvent — Levee 
Const.  Co.  v.  Equitable  Casualty  & 
Surety  Co.  of  New  York,  138  So.  431, 
173  La.  648. 

703 


shown  to  have  been  duly  served  with  summons, 
failed  to  avail  himself  of  an  opportunity  to  defend, 
such  failure  not  being  the  result  of  fraud,  accident, 
mistake,  or  the  like.11  On  a  showing  of  sufficient 
grounds,  however,  a  court  of  equity  will  grant  re- 
lief against  a  default  judgment  which  was  obtained 
without  fault  on  the  part  of  the  one  seeking  re- 
lief.12 Where  a  judgment  by  default  is  obtained 
against  a  party  by  his  own  neglect,  it  constitutes  no 
ground  for  equitable  intervention  that  his  adver- 
sary obtained  more  relief  than  he  was  entitled  to.13 

§  349.    Meritorious  Cause  of  Action  or  De- 
fense 

A&  a  general  rule,  the  plaintiff  must  show  a  meri- 
torious cause  of  action,  and  the  defendant  a  meritorious 
defense,  as  a  condition  of  equitable  relief  to  him  against 
a  Judgment.  Some  authorities,  however,  do  not  require 
such  a  showing  where  the  attack  is  made  on  a  void 
judgment. 

A  court  of  equity  will  not  interfere  with  the 
enforcement  of  a  judgment  recovered  at  law, 
unless  it  is  unjust  and  unconscionable;  and  there- 
fore as  a  general  rule  such  relief  will  not  be 
granted  unless  complainant  shows  that  he  has  a. 
good  and  meritorious  defense  to  the  original  action, 
or,  where  the  party  seeking  relief  was  the  plain- 
tiff in  the  action  in  which  the  judgment  was  ren- 
dered, that  he  has  a  meritorious  cause  of  action.1* 
This  is  the  rule  where  the  judgment  was  procured 

12.  Ala,— Alabama  Chemical  Co.  Y- 
Hall,  101  So.  456,  212  Ala.  8. 

Cal. — Jeffords  v.  Young,  277  P.  163,. 
98  CaLApp.  400. 

111. — Marquette  Nat.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Minneapolis  Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 
Co.,  233  IlLApp.  102. 

Mo. — Crown  Drug  Co.  v.  Raymond, 
App.,  51  S.W.2d  215. 

Tex. — Gehret  v.  Hetkes,  Com.App., 
36  S.W.2d  700— Guaranty  State- 
Bank  of  New  Braunfels  v.  Kuehler, 
Civ.App.,  114  S.W.Sd  622,  error  re- 
fused. 

13.  Cal.— Murdock  v.   De   Vries,    37* 
Cal.  527. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Olsen 
v.  Crow,  290  P.  233,  235,  133  Or. 
310. 

14.  U.S. — Simonds  v.  Norwich  XTnion 
Indemnity  Co.,   C.C.A.Minn.,   73  F. 
2d  412,   certiorari  dented  Norwich. 
Union   Indemnity   Co.  v.    Simonds, 
55  S.Ct.  507,  204  U.S.  711,  79  L.Ed. 
1246— Continental    Nat     Bank    of 
Jackson   County,   at   Kansas   City, 
Mo.,  v.  Holland  Banking  Co.,  C.C. 
A.Mo.,    66    F.2d    823— Miller    Rub- 
ber Co.  of  New  York  v.  Massey,  C. 
C.A.I11.,  36  F.2d  4fl6,  certiorari  <^- 
nied  Massey  v.  Miller  Rubber  Co* 
of    New    York,    50    S.Ct.    354,    281 
U.S.    749,    74    L.Bd.    1161— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  David  A.  Manville- 


§  349 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


by  fraud,  accident,  or  mistake,15  and  although  the 
judgment  is  by  default16  or  confession.17  It  has 
been  said,  however,  that  the  rule  and  the  reason  for 
it  entirely  fail  when  defendant  comes  into  court 
with  the  money  and  offers  to  pay  the  judgment  as 
a  condition  precedent  to  its  being  set  aside.1^ 

Although  the  party  seeking  relief  must  show  at 
least  presumptively  that  he  has  a  defense,19  the  re- 


quirement of  a  meritorious  case  does  not  necessi- 
tate an  absolute  guarantee  of  victory20  or  a  con- 
clusive showing  of  sufficient  cause  of  action  or  de- 
fense.21 It  is  enough  to  present  facts  from  which 
it  can  be  ascertained  that  the  complaining  party  has 
a  sufficiently  meritorious  claim  to  entitle  him  to  a 
trial  of  the  issue  at  a  proper  adversary  proceed- 
ing;22 it  suffices  to  establish  good  faith  and  to  ten- 
der a  seriously  litigable  issue.23 


&   Co.   v.   Francis   Oil  &  Refining 
Co.,    C.C.A.Okl.f    20    F.2d    473,    474 

Ala. — Fletcher  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Apelika,  11  So.2d  854,  244  Ala.  98 
— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hanover 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Street,  176  So.  350, 
353,  234  Ala.  537 — Timmerman  v. 
Martin,  176  So.  198,  234  Ala.  622 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Snyder  v. 
Woolf,  166  So.  803,  805,  232  Ala. 
07 — Barrow  v.  Lindsey,  159  So. 
232,  230  Ala.  45— Hanover  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Street,  154  So.  816,  228 
Ala.  677— Oden  v.  King,  114  So.  1, 
216  Ala.  597. 

Ark. — Sweet  v.  Nix,  122  S.W.2d  538, 
197  Ark.  284 — Greer  v.  Keathly,  87 
S.W.2d  26,  191  Ark.  529— McDonald 
Land  Co.  v.  Shapleigh  Hardware 
Co.,  260  S.W.  445,  163  Ark.  524. 

Cal. — Olivera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d  564, 
19  Cal.2d  570,  140  A.L.R.  1328— 
Frost  v.  Hanscome,  246  P.  53,  198 
Cal.  500. 

Colo. — Wagner  v.  Johnson,  247  P. 
1053,  79  Colo.  664. 

Conn. — Bellonio  v.  V.  R.  Thomas 
Mortg.  Co.,  149  A.  218,  110  Conn. 
103. 

Ga. — Felker  v.  Johnson,  7  S.E.2d  668, 
189  Ga,  797— Kilburn  v.  Mechanics' 
Loan  &  Savings  Co.,  165  S.E.  76, 
175  Ga.  146,  83  A.L.R.  1292. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hocken- 
berry  v.  Cooper  County  State  Bank 
of  Bunceton,  88  S.W.2d  1031,  1037, 
338  Mo.  31. 

Ohio.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Barn- 
hart  v.  Aiken.  177  N.B.  284,  285, 
39  Ohio  App.  172. 

Or. — Oregon-Washington  R.  &  Nav. 
Co.  v.  Reid,  65  P.2d  664,  155  Or. 
602. 

Tenn.— Tallent  v.  Sherrell,  184  S.W. 
2d  561,  27  TemuApp.  683. 

Tea:. — Stewart  v.  Byrne,  Com.App., 
42  S.W.2d  234 — Empire  Gas  &  Fuel 
Co.  v.  Noble,  Com. App.,  36  S.W.2d 
451 — Humphrey  v.  Harrell,  Com. 
App.,  29  S.W.2d  963 — Southern 
Surety  Co.  v.  Texas  Oil  Clearing 
House,  Com.App.,  281  S.W.  1045 — 
Gray  v.  Moore,  Civ. App.,  172  S.W. 
3d  746,  error  refused — American 
Red  Cross  v.  Longley,  Civ.App.,  165 
S.W.2d  233,  error  refused — Goldapp 
v.  Jones  Lumber  Co.,  Civ.App.,  163 
S.W.2d  229,  error  refused — Garcia 
v.  Jones,  Civ.App.,  155  S.W.2d  671, 
error  refused — Brannen  v.  City  of 
Houston,  Civ. App.,  153  S.W.2d  676, 
error  refused — Hicks  v.  Wallis 


Lumber  Co.,  Civ.App.,  137  S.W.2d 
93 — Smith  v.  Zenith  Corporation, 
Civ.App.,  134  S.W.2d  337— Smith 
v.  Rogers,  Civ.App.,  129  S.W.2d  776 
— Donovan  v.  Young,  Civ.App.,  127 
S.W.2d  '517,  error  refused— Allen 
v.  Trentman,  Civ.App.,  115  S.W.2d 
1177 — Hacker  v.  Hacker,  Civ.App., 
110  S.W.2d  923— Smith  v.  Poppe, 
Civ.App.,  102  S.W.2d  1108— Fowzer 
v.  Huey  &  Philp  Hardware  Co., 
Civ.App.t  99  S.W.2d  1100,  error  dis- 
missed— Finlayson  v.  McDowell, 
Civ.App.,  94  S.W.2d  1234,  error  dis- 
missed— Hill  v.  Lester,  Civ.App., 
91  S.W.2d  1152,  error  dismissed — 
Snell  v.  Knowles,  Civ.App.,  87  S. 
W.2d  871,  error  dismissed — Trigg 
v.  Trigg,  Civ.App.,  83  S.W.2d  1066, 
error  dismissed — Graves  v.  Slater, 
Civ.App.,  83  S.W.2d  1041,  error  dis- 
missed— Schultz  v.  Mabry,  Civ. 
App.,  60  S.W.2d  1045 — Stevenson  v. 
Thomas,  Civ.App.,  56  S.W.2d  1095, 
error  dismissed— National  Loan  & 
Investment  Co.  v.  L.  W.  Pelphrey 
&  Co.,  Civ.App.,  39  S.W.2d  926 — 
Hollis  v.  Seibold,  Civ.App.,  23  S. 
W.2d  811,  error  dismissed — First 
State  Bank  of  Loraine  v.  Jackson, 
Civ.App.,  13  S.W.2d  979— U.  O.  Col- 
son  Co.  v.  Powell,  Civ. App.,  13  S. 
W.2d  405— Smith  v.  Kraft,  Civ. 
App.,  9  S.W.2d  472 — Cunningham 
v.  Carpenter,  Civ.App.,  258  S.W. 
607— Broocks  v.  Lee,  102  S.W.  777, 
46  Tex.Civ.App.  372,  error  refused. 
Wash. — John  Hancock  Mut.  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Gooley,  83  P.2d  221,  196 
Wash.  357,  118  A.L.R.  1484. 
W.Va. — Brinegar  v.  Bank  of  Wyo- 
ming, 130  S.E.  151,  100  W.Va.  64. 
34  C.J.  p  334  note  63,  p  442  note  27. 
Showing  meritorious  cause  of  ac- 
tion or  defense  on  application  to 
open  or  vacate  generally  see  su- 
pra §  290. 
Necessity  of  ground  for  relief 

The  question  of  a  meritorious  de- 
fense is  immaterial  and  is  not  reach- 
ed if  the  complaining  party  fails 
otherwise  to  establish  sufficient 
cause  or  ground  for  equitable  relief 
against  the  judgment. — Baldwin  v. 
Stamford  State  Bank,  Tex.Civ.App., 
82  S.W.2d  701,  error  refused— Win- 
ter v.  Davis,  Tex.Civ.App.,  10  S.W. 
2d  181,  error  refused. 
15.  Cal.— Kupfer  v.  MacDonald,  122 

P.2d  271,  19  Cal.2d  566. 
111.— Crane   Co;  v.   Parker,   136   N.E. 
733,  304  111.  331.  ' 

704 


Okl. — Fernow  v.  Fernow,  247  P.  106, 

114  Okl.  298. 
Tex. — Southern  Sales  Co.  v.  Parker, 

Civ.App.,  54  S.W.2d  217. 
34  C.J.  p  443  note  28. 

16.  U.S.— Miller  Rubber  Co.  of  New 
York   v.    Massey,   C.C.A.I11.,    36    F. 
2d  466,  certiorari  denied  Massey  v. 
Miller   Rubber   Co.    of  New   York, 
50    S.Ct.    354,    281   U.S.    749,    74   L. 
Ed.  1161. 

Neb.— Staben  v.  Mehrens,  241  N.W. 
108,  122  Neb.  683. 

Tex, — Honey  v.  Wood,  Civ.App.,  46 
S.W.2d  334— Citizens'  Bank  v. 
Brandau,  Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  466, 
error  refused — Ellis  v.  Lamb-Mc- 
Ashan  Co.,  Civ.App.,  264  S.W.  241, 
affirmed  Lamb-McAshan  Co.  v.  El- 
lis, Com.App.,  270  S.W.  547. 

34  C.J.  p  443  note  29. 

17.  WJs.— Ford  v.  Hill,  66  N.W.  115, 
92  Wis.   188,- 53  Am.S.R.   902. 

34  C.J.  p  443  note  30. 

18.  Mont.— Hauswirth  v.  Sullivan,  9 
P,  798,  6  Mont  203. 

19.  -U.S.— William  Lane,  Inc.,  v.  Sel- 
by    Shoe   Co.,    C.C.A.N.Y..    45    F.2d 
581. 

Presumptive   chance    of   success   on 

appeal 

Plaintiff  suing  to  set  aside  judg- 
ment and  claiming  that  he  was  de- 
prived of  an  appeal  must  show  that 
appeal  had  at  least  presumptive 
chance  of  success. — William  Lane, 
Inc.,  v.  Selby  Shoe  Co.,  C.C.A.N.Y., 
45  F.2d  581. 

20.  Cal.— Olivera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d 
564,  19  Cal.2d  570,  140  A.L.R.  1328. 

21.  Mo. — Corpus      Juris      cited      in. 
Hockenberry     v.     Cooper     County 
State  Bank  of  Bunceton,  88  S.W.2d 
1031,  1037,  338  Mo.  31. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Oregon- 
Washington  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Reid, 
65  P.2d  664,  668,  155  Or.  602. 

34  C.J.  p  443  note  31. 

L    Cal.— Olivera   v.    Grace,    122    P. 

2d   5C4,   19   Cal.2d  '570,    140  A.L.R. 

1328. 
Prima  facie  meritorious  defense 

All  that  is  required  is  for  him 
to  show  that  he  had  a  prima  fticie 
meritorious  defense. — Missoula  Trust 
&  Savings  Bank  v.  Boos,  77  P.2d  385, 
106  Mont  294— Stocking  v.  Charles 
Beard  Co*,  55  P.2d  949,  102  Mont  65. 

23.    Mo. — Corpus      Juris      cited     in 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§349 


Void  judgment.  The  authorities  are  not  in  har- 
mony in  requiring  a  meritorious  defense  where  the 
judgment  is  void,  as  where  it  was  obtained  without 
service  of  process,  and  where  defendant  had  no 
opportunity  to  be  heard;  in  some  jurisdictions  de- 
fendant is  not  required  to  show  a  good  defense  in 
such  case.24  However,  it  has  generally  been  held 
that  a  showing  that  defendant  has,  or  at  the  time 
of  the  judgment  had,  a  meritorious  defense,  is  none 
the  less  necessary  because  the  judgment  is  allegedly 
void,25  as  in  the  case  of  a  judgment  obtained  with- 
out proper  service  of  the  summons  or  appearance 
of  defendant,26  or  on  an  unauthorized  appearance,27 
or  on  a  false  return  of  service,28  especially  where 
the  lack  of  jurisdiction  does  not  appear  on  the 
face  of  the  record.29 


Nature  of  defense.  It  has  been  said  that  equity 
will  not  relieve  against  a  judgment  on  the  showing 
of  a  merely  technical  defense30  or  one  which  would 
be  considered  unconscionable.31  However,  it  has 
also  been  asserted  broadly  that  a  meritorious  de- 
fense is  one  which,  if  established  on  another  trial, 
would  produce  a  different  result.32  The  question 
of  whether  or  not,  in  any  given  case,  the  claim  of 
the  complaining  party  is  meritorious  must  be  deter- 
mined  by  the  particular  facts  presented.83  While 
there  is  some'  authority  to  the  contrary,34  it  is  gen- 
erally considered  that  the  statute  of  limitations  is 
a  meritorious  defense  within  the  meaning  of  the 
rule.35  A  discharge  in  bankruptcy  has  also  been 
held  a  meritorious  defense.36 


Hockenberry  v.  Cooper  County 
State  Bank  of  Bunceton,  88  S.W.2d 
1031,  1037,  338  Mo.  31. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Oregon- 
Washington  K.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Reid, 
65  P.2d  664,  668,  155  Or.  602. 

34  C.J.  p  443  note  31. 

24.  Ky. — Holcomb  v.  Creech,  56  S. 
W.2d  998,  247  Ky.  199. 

Term.— Martin  v.  Slagle,  156  S.W.2d 
403,  178  Tenn.  121. 

Tex. — Empire  Gas  &  l£uel  Co.  v.  No- 
ble, Com.App.,  36  S.W.2d  451— 
Rosenfleld  v.  Bevill,  Civ.App.,  143 
S.W.2d  414,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Jameson  v.  Farm- 
ers' State  Bank  of  Burkburnett, 
Civ.App.,  299  S.W.  458,  affirmed 
Farmers'  State  Bank  of  Burkbur- 
nett v.  Jameson,  Com.App.,  11  S. 
W.2d  299,  rehearing  denied  16  S. 
W.2d  526 — Alexander  v.  Svoboda, 
Civ.App.,  297  S.W.  560,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  Svoboda  v.  Alexan- 
der, Com.App.,  3  S.W.2d  423 — Perez 
v.  B.  P.  Lipscomb  &  Co.,  Civ.App., 
267  S.W.  748. 

Wash. — Hancock  Mut  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Gooley,  83  P.2d  221,  196  Wash. 
357,  118  A.L.R.  1484. 

34  C.J,  p  443  note  32. 

35.  Cal.— Kupfer  v.  MacDonald,  122 
P.2d  271,  19.Cal.2d  566. 

III. — Adams  &  Pigott  Co.  v.  Allen, 
141  N.B.  386,  310  111.  119. 

3£ule  inapplicable  to  enforcement  of 

Rule  whereby  party  seeking  aid 
against  void  judgment  is  required  to 
disclose  meritorious  defense  does  not 
apply  if  plaintiff  is  seeking  to  en- 
force judgment. 
Ala. — McCarty  v.  Yarbrough,  128  So. 

786,  221  Ala.  330. 
Neb, — Campbell     Printing    Press    & 

Mfg.  Co.  v.  Harder,  Luse  &  Co.,  69 

N.W.  774,  50  Neb.  283. 

26.  Ala. — Murphree  v.  International 
Shoe  Co.,  20  So.2d  782,  246  Ala. 
384. 

Ark.— Adams  v.  Mitchell,  74  S.W.2d 

49  C.J.S.-45 


969,  189  Ark.  696— North  Ameri- 
can Provision  Co.  v.  Fischer  Lime 
&  Cement  Co.,  269  S.W.  993,  168 
Ark.  106. 

111.— Nasti  v.  Cook  County,  180  N.B. 
'847,  348  111.  342. 

Miss.— Walton  v.  Gregory  Funeral 
Home,  154  So.  717,  170  Miss.  129. 

Neb.— Braun  v.  Quinn,  199  N.W.  828, 
112  Neb.  485,  39  A.L.R.  411. 

Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Barn- 
hart  v.  Aiken,  177  N.B.  284,  285,  39 
Ohio  App.  172. 

34  C.J.  p  443  note  33. 

27.  Miss. — Harris  v.  Gwin,  18  Miss. 
563. 

34  C.J.  p  444  note  34. 

28.  Kan. — Hope   v.    Biashor,    163    P. 
463,  99  Kan.  804. 

34  C.J.  p  444  note  35. 

29.  Neb.— Pilger  v.  Torrence,  61  N. 
W.  99,  42  Neb.  903. 

34  C.J.  p  444  note  36. 

30.  U.S.— Skirving  v.  National  Life 
Ins.  Co.  of  Montpelier,  Neb.,  59  F. 
742,  8  C.C.A.  241. 

34  C.J.  p  444  note  40. 

31.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  By- 
ram  v.    Miner,   C.C.A.Minn.f    47   F. 
2d  112,  119,  certlorari  denied  51  S. 
Ct.    648,    283    U.S.    854,    75    L.Ed. 
1461. 

34  C.J.  p  444  note  41. 

32.  Tex. — Fowzer  v,  Huey  &  Philp 
Hardware  Co.,  Civ.App.,  99  S.W.2d 
1100,  error  dismissed. 

33.  Okl. — Fernow  v.  Fernow,  247  P* 
106,  114  Okl.  298. 

34  C.J.  p  444  note  42  [a]. 

.  The  matter  of  contribution  among 
signers  of  notes  Is  not  a  meritorious 
defense  against  payment  of  Judge- 
ment secured  by  payee,  so  as  to 
warrant  equitable  relief  against  such 
judgment  at  the  suit  of  individual 
signer  against  whom  judgment  was 
entered  by  confession  under  war- 
rants of  attorney. — Chandler  v. 
Chandler,  63  N.E.2d  272,  326  Ill.App. 
670. 

705 


Lack  of  title 

A  mortgagor  was  not  entitled  to 
open  judgment  entered  on  bond  ac- 
companying purchase-money  mort- 
gage on  ground  that,  at  time  of  sale, 
mortgagee  had  no  title,  where  con- 
tract of  sale  by  its  terms  was  made 
subject  to  mortgagee's  acquisition  of 
title  under  decree  in  partition. — 
Stoner,  now  for  Use  of  Dinch,  v. 
Wise,  200  A.  320,  331  Pa.  446. 

Showing  as  to  merits  of  cause  of 
action,  or  defense  held  sufficient  to 
justify  equitable  relief  against  judg- 
ments rendered  in  actions  for  or  re- 
lating to: 

(1)  Alimony. — Crow       v.        Crow- 
Humphrey,    78    S.W.2d   807,   335   Mo. 
636. 

(2)  Contracts. 

NJT. — William  Peter  Brewing  Corpo- 
ration v.  Bernhardt,  137  A.  828, 
101  N.J.Bq.  60. 

Tex. — Taylor  v.  Hustead  &  Tucker, 
Com. App.,  257  S.W.  232. 

(3)  Foreclosure. — Wade   v.    Saffell, 
9  S.W.2d  803,  177  Ark.  1186. 

(4)  Insurance. — Collier  v.    Missis- 
sippi Beneficial  Life  Ins.  Co.,  261  S. 
W.  39,  164  Ark.  54. 

(5)  Mining    claims. — Nevada    Cor- 
nell Silver  Mines  v.  Hankins,  279  P. 
27,  51  Nev,  420, 

(6)  Notes.— Adams    v.    First    Nat. 
Bank,  Tex.Civ.App.,  294  S.TV.  909. 

(7)  Sale  of  personalty. — Clarke  v. 
Smith,  192  N.W.  136,  195  Iowa  1299. 

(8)  Other   matters.— Hill   v.   Fain, 
175  S.B.  921,  179  Ga.  310. 

34.  Fla. — Budd  v.    Gamble,    13   Fla. 
265. 

Tenn. — Bstis  v.  Patton,  3  Terg.  382. 

35.  Tex. — Fowzer  v.  Huey  &  Philp 
Hardware  Co.,  Civ.App.,  99  S.W.2d 
1100,     error     dismissed — Cain     v. 
Thomson,  Civ. App.,  72  S.W.2d  339. 

34  C.J.  p  444  note  42   [b]    (1). 

36.  Tex. — Kerby    v.     Hudson,    Civ, 
App.,  13  S.W.2d  724. 


§  350 


JUDGMENTS 
B.  GBOUNDS  FOR  BELIEF 


49     C.J.S. 


§  350.    In  General 

a.  General  principles 

b.  Disability  or  privilege  of  party;   un- 

authorized suit 

a.  General  Principles 

Generally,  any  fact  showing  it  to  be  against  good 
conscience  to  enforce  a  judgment  may  afford  ground  for 
equitable  relief  to  a  complainant  otherwise  entitled  there- 
to; but  equitable  power  to  relieve  against  a  judgment 
at  law  will  be  exercised  sparingly  and  confined  to  cases 
clearly  of  equitable  cognizance. 

Injunctive  relief  from  invalid  judgments  must  rest 
on  grounds  cognizable  in  equity.37  As  a  general 
rule  any  fact  which  dearly  proves  it  to  be  against 
good  conscience  to  execute  a  judgment,  and  of 
which  the  injured  party  could  not  have  availed  him- 


self in  a  court  of  law,  or  of  which  he  might  have 
availed  himself  there,  but  was  prevented  by  fraud 
or  accident  unmixed  with  any  fault  or  negligence 
in  himself  or  his  agents,  will  authorize  a  court  of 
equity  to  set  aside  or  to  enjoin  the  adverse  party 
from  enforcing  such  judgment.88 

Since  the  power  to  set  aside  or  enjoin  the  en- 
forcement of  judgments  is  liable  to  abuse,  and  the 
abuse  thereof  is  extremely  mischievous,  as  tending 
to  conflicts  of  jurisdiction,  its  exercise  will  be  close- 
ly and  carefully  scrutinized,  and  confined  to  clear 
cases  and  well  recognized  grounds  of  equitable  in- 
terference.39 In  other  words,  equitable  relief 
against  a  judgment  will  not  be  granted  in  the  ab- 
sence of  clear  and  sufficient  grounds  of  an  equita- 
ble character.40  It  should  appear  that  it  would  be 


37.  Tex. — Svoboda      v.      Alexander, 
Com.App.,  2  S.W.2d  423. 

38.  U.S.— Continental   Nat.   Bank   v. 
Holland-Banking     Co.,      C.C.A.Mo., 
66    P.2d     823 — Realty    Acceptance 
Corporation    v.    Montgomery,    D.C. 
Del.,   6   F.Supp.   593,   affirmed,  C.C. 
A.,    77   F.2d   762,   certiorari  denied 
56  S.Ct.  103,  296  U.S.  590,  80  L.Ed. 
418,  rehearing  denied  56  S.Ct.  167, 
296   U.S.    662,    SO   L.Ed.    472— Har- 
rington   v.    Denny,    D.C.Mo.,    3    F. 
Supp.  584 — Exchange  Nat.  Bank  of 
Shreveport,     La.    v.    Joseph    Reid 
Gas   Engine   Co.,   C.C.A.La.,   287   P. 
870 — Mineral    Development    Co.    v. 
Kentucky  Coal  Lands  Co.,  D.C.Ky., 
285  P.  761,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  285  P. 
1021. 

Ala. — Timmerman  v.  Martin,  176  So. 
198,  234  Ala.  622— Hanover  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Street,  154  So.  816,  228 
Ala.  677 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Prestwood  v.  Bagley,  149  So.  817, 
818,  227  Ala.  316. 

Cal. — Brown  v.  Jernigan,  241  P.  108, 
74  CaLApp.  524. 

Conn. — Hoey  v.  Investors'  Mortgage 
&  Guaranty  Co.,  171  A.  438,  118 
Conn.  226. 

Ga,— Bailey  v.  McElroy,  6  S.E.2d  140, 
61  Ga.App.  367,  transferred,  see  2 
S.E.2d  634,  188  Ga.  40. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Lind  v. 
•Moyes,  20  P.2d  794,  795,  52  Idaho 
785. 

111. — Kulikowski  v.  North  American 
Mfg.  Co.,  54  N.E.2d  411,  322  111. 
App.  202— Stade  v.  Stade,  42  N.E. 
2d  631,  315  Ill.App.  136. 

Mo. — Jefferson  City  Bridge  &  Trans- 
it Co.  v.  Blaser,  300  S.W.  778,  318 
Mo.  373. 

N.J. — Palisade  Gardens  v.  Grosch, 
185  A.  27,  120  N.J.EQ.  294,  af- 
firmed 189  A.  622,  121  N.J.Eq.  240 
— Crandol  v.  Garrison,  169  A.  507, 
115  N.J.Eq.  11. 

N.T. — 755   Seventh  Ave.   Corporation  , 


v.    Carroll,    194   N.E.    69,    266   N.T. 

157. 
Or.— Adams    v.    McMickle,    158    P.2d 

648. 
Tenn. — Coley  v.  Family  Loan  Co.,  80 

S.W.2d  87,  168  Tenn.  631. 
Tex. — Thomas    v.    Mullins,    Civ.App., 

175  S.W.2d  276— Coffman  v.  Meeks, 

Civ.App.,     119     S.W.2d    96— Brooks 

Supply  Co.  v.  Hardee,  Civ.App.,  32 

S.W.2d  384,  error  refused. 
Wis.— Lau  v.  Harder,  270  N.W.  341, 

223  Wis.  208. 
21  C.J.  p  85   note  16—34  C.J.  p  444 

note  43. 

Xaofc  of  legal  remedy  warranting 
equitable  relief 

U.S. — Laycock  v.  Hidalgo  County 
Water  Control  and  Improvement 
Dist.  No.  12,  C.C.A.Tex.,  142  F.2d 
789,  155  A.L.R.  460,  certiorari  de- 
nied 65  S.Ct  68,  323  U.S.  731,  89 
L.Ed.  587. 

Md.— Michael  v.  Rigler,  120  A.  382, 
142  Md.  125. 

Partition 

(1)  Injustice    may    afford    ground 
for  equitable  relief  from  a  judgment 
or    decree    in    partition. — Carter    v. 
Carter,  5  Munf.  108,  19  Va.  108. 

(2)  Equitable  relief  may  be  award- 
ed  to   secure  protection  against  an 
eviction  of  a  party  by  a  paramount 
title. — Ross    v.    Armstrong,    25    Tex. 
Suppl.  354,  78  Am.D.  574. 
Executors  and  administrators 

(1)  In  the  case  of  suits  involving 
decedents'   estates  and  funds  in  the 
hands  of  executors  and  administra- 
tors,  it  is  sufficient  ground  for  the 
intervention    of    a    court    of    equity 
that    the    Judgment    defendant,    al- 
though having  a  good  equitable  de- 
fense to  the  claim,  had  no  legal  de- 
fense to  the  action  at  law. — Lyon  v. 
Howard,   16   Ga,    481—24   C.J.  p   888 
note  87. 

(2)  It  is  sufficient  that,  having  a 

706 


legal  defense,  the  Judgment  creditor 
was  unable  for  sufficient  reason  to 
present  it. — Pickett  v.  Stewart,  1 
Rand.  478,  22  Va*  478—24  C.J.  p  888 
notes  88,  89. 

(3)  In  a  proper  case  an  executor 
or  administrator  may  be  relieved  in 
equity  from  personal  liability  under 
a  Judgment  at  law,  as  where  there 
are  no  assets  or  there  is  a  deficien- 
cy of  assets. — Pendleton  v.  Stuart,  6 
Munf.  377,  20  Va.  377—24  C.J.  p  888 
note  90. 

(4)  On  the  other  hand,  in  a  num- 
ber of  instances,  equitable  relief  on 
the   foregoing  ground  has  been   de- 
nied.— Brenner   v.    Alexander,    19    P. 
9,  16  Or.  349,  8  Am,S.R.  301—24  C.J. 
p  888  note  91. 

Grounds  of  relief  available  to  sure- 
ties 

(1)  Extension  of  the  time  of  pay- 
ment of  the  debt,  without  surety's 
knowledge  or  consent. — Kennedy  v. 
Evans,  31  111.  258—34  OJ.  p  440  note 
74. 

.  (2)  Release  of  the  principal  or  of 
cosureties. — Johnson  v.  Givens,  3 
Mete.,  Ky.,  91—34  C.J.  p  440  -note  75. 
(3)  Promise  to  the  surety  not  to 
hold  him  liable  or  enforce  the  debt 
against  him. — Cage  v.  Cassidy,  Miss., 
23  How.,  U.S.,  109,  16  L.Ed.  430—34 
C.J.  p  440  note  76. 

39.  Ky.— Byron  v.  Evans,  91  S.W.2d 
548,  263  Ky.  49. 

Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W.2d 

94,  134  Tex.  633— Citizens'  Bank  v. 

Brandau,    Civ.App.t    1    S.W.2d    466, 

error  refused. 
Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pisch 

v.    Mkrbler,    97    P.2d    147,    152,    1 

Wash.2d  698. 
34  C.J.  p  445  note  44. 

40.  Ala,— Mudd  v.  Lanier,   24   So.2d 
550 — Exalted  Most  Excellent  Grand 
Chapter  Royal  Arch  Masons  of  Al- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  350 


unjust  and  against  good  conscience  to  enforce  the 
judgment,41  that  some  rule  or  law  of  public  policy 
has  been  violated,42  or  that  the  defense  available  to 
the  party  seeking  relief  is  one  of  purely  equitable 
cognizance,43  and  equity  will  not  interfere  merely 
on  account  of  hardship,44  because  of  prejudice 'in 
the  community,45  or  because  an  equity  court  in 
deciding  the  same  case  would  have  reached  a  dif- 
ferent conclusion.46  It  must  also  reasonably  ap- 
pear that  the  result  would  be  different  from  that 


already  reached  if  the  judgment  were  set  aside  and 
a  new  trial  granted.47  Where  a  proper  case  for 
equitable  relief  is  made  out,  the  fact  that  the  judg- 
ment creditor  is  of  undoubted  solvency  and  able  to 
refund  the  money  which  may  be  collected  on  an  exe- 
cution will  not  prevent  the  interposition  of  equity.48 
The  principal  grounds  for  equitable  relief  against 
a  judgment  are  lack  of  power  or  jurisdiction 
in  the  court  rendering  it,49  or  procurement  of  the 
judgment  through  fraud,  accident,  mistake,50  or  oth- 


abama  v.  Calloway,  165  So.  254, 
231  Ala.  420 — Ex  parte  Cunning- 
ham, 99  So.  834,  19  Ala. App.  584, 
certiorari  denied  Ex  parte  Ewart- 
Brewer  Motor  Co.,  99  So.  836,  211 
Ala.  191. 

Cal. — Miller  v.  Turner,  8  P.2d  1057, 
121  Cal.App.  365 — Bruno  v.  Gugliel- 
mo,  297  P.  967,  113  CaLApp.  148. 

Colo. — Rogers  v.  Bruce,  193  P.  1076, 
69  Colo.  298. 

pla, — Adams  v.  Reynolds,  134  So.  45, 
101  Fla.  271. 

Ga. — Nolan  v.  Southland  Loan  &  In- 
vestment Co.,  169  S.E.  370,  177  Ga. 
59— Whiteside  v.  Croker,  142  S.E. 
139,  165  Ga.  765— John  Hancock 
Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ross,  134  S.E. 
762,  162  Ga.  654. 

111.— Reinhold  v.  Lingbeek,  52  N.B. 
2d  294,  321  Ill.App.  119— Gray  v. 
First  Nat.  Bank,  13  N.E.2d  497, 
294  Ill.App.  62. 

Ky.— Mason  v.  Lacy,  117  S.W.2d 
1026,  274  Ky.  21. 

La. — Couret  v.  Couret,  18  So.2d  661, 
206  La.  85— Wunderlich  v.  Pal- 
misano,  App.,  177  So.  843. 

Mich.— Racho  v.  Woeste,  9  N.W.2d 
827,  305  Mich.  522 — Brewster  Loud 
Lumber  Co.  v.  General  Builders' 
Supply  Co.,  220  N.W.  697,  243 
Mich.  557 — Blazewicz  v.  Weberski, 
208  N.W.  452,  234  Mich.  431. 

N.Y. — Gerseta  Corporation  v.  Grama- 
tan  Nat.  Bank  of  Bronxville,  198 
N.Y.S.  385,  205  App.Div.  868. 

Pa.— Nixon  v.  Nixon,  198  A.  154,  329 

Pa.  256. 

Tex.1 — Grayson  v.  Johnson,  Civ.App. 
181  S.W.2d  312— American  Red 
Cross  v.  Longley,  Civ.App.,  165 
S.W.2d  233,  error  refused — Johnson 
v.  Ortiz  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  104  S.W 
2d  543 — Browning-Ferris  Machin- 
ery Co.  v.  Thomson,  Civ. App.,  55 
S.W.2d  168— Bearden  v.  Texas  Co. 
Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d  447,  affirmed 
Com.App.,  60  S.W.2d  1031— Smith 
v.  Switzer,  Civ.App.,  293  S.W.  850 
affirmed  Switzer  v.  Smith,  Com 
App.,  300  S.W.  31,  68  A.L.R.  377. 
Wash.— Puett  v.  Bernhard,  71  P.2d 

406,  191  Wash.  657. 
Wis. — Amalgamated  Meat  Cutters  ^ 
Butcher  Workmen  of  N*.  A.,  A.  F 
of  L.,  Local  Union  No.  73,  v 
Smith,  10  N.W.2d  114,  243  Wis 
390. 


JTonresidence  or  insolvency  j 

Judgment   will   not    be    interfered 

with  merely  because  of  nonresidence 
r  insolvency  of  judgment   creditor. 

—Parker  v.  Reid,  273  P.  334,  127  Or. 
78. 

Whim  of  survivor 

It  is  against  public  policy  of  state 
o  permit  vacation  of  decree  after 
hange  in  conditions,  assumption  of 
iew  relations  by  parties,  and  death 
>f  one  of  them,  at  whim  of  surviv- 
ng  party,  particularly  in  absence  of 
'raud.— Rice  v.  Moore,  109  S.W.2d 
48,  194  Ark.  '685. 

Judgment  or  decree  of  partition 
La.— Haas  v.  Reese,  196  So.  564,  195 
La.  376 — Amerada  Petroleum  Cor- 
poration v.  Reese,  196  So.  558,  195 
La,  359—47  C.J.  p  438  note  58. 

41.    U.S.— In    re     Innis,     C.C.A.Ind., 

140  F.2d  479,   certiorari  denied   64 
S.Ct.    1048,   322   U.S.    736,    88   L.Ed. 
1569 — Missouri  Pac.  Transp.  Co.  v. 
Priest,  C.C.A.Ark.,  117  F.2d  32. 

Iowa.— Shaw  v.  Addison,   18   N.W.2d 

796 — Coulter   v.    Smith,    206    N.W. 

827,     201    Iowa    984 — Bingman    v. 

Clark,    159    N.W.     172,    178    Iowa 

1129. 
La.— First  Nat.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell, 

141  So.  379,  174  La.  692. 

Mich. — Barr  v.  Payne,  298  N.W.  460, 

298  Mich.  85. 
Ohio.— Bamhart  v.   Aiken,    177  N.B. 

284,  39  Ohio  App.  172. 
g.C. — Cathcart  v.  Jennings,   135   S.B. 

658,  137  S.C.  450. 
34  C.J.  p  445  note  45. 

A  Judgment  in  a  court  of  law  wil 
not  be  set  aside  by  a  court  of  equity 
unless  such  judgment  is  so  manifest- 
ly wrong  that  it  is  against  good 
conscience.— Barr  v.  Payne,  298  N.W 
460,  298  Mich.  85— Smith  v.  Pontiac 
Citizens  Loan  &  Investment  Co.,  293 
N.W.  661,  294  Mich.  312— Bassett  v 
Trinity  Bldg.  Co.,  236  N.W.  237,  254 
Mich.  207. 
Unconscionable  advantage 

It  is  essential  to  relief  in  equity 
against   judgment    that   plaintiff,    i 
permitted  to  enforce  it,  will  obtain 
unconscionable    advantage. — Ellis    v 
Gordon,  231  N.W.  585,  202  Wis.  134 

42.    La. — Edison  Electric  Co.  v.  New 
Orleans,  58  So.  512,  130  La.  693. 

707 


3.    N.J.— Raimondi    v.   Bianchi,    140 

A.  584,  102  N.J.EQ.  254. 

L    CaL— Hersom  v.  Hersom,  226  P. 

937,  67  CaLApp.  116. 
Tex. — Browning-Ferris         Machinery 

Co.  v.  Thomson,  Civ.App.,  55  S.W. 

2d  168. 

4  C.J.  p  445  note  47. 
45.    W.Va. — Graham  v.  Citizens'  Nat. 

Bank,  32  S.E.  245,  45  W.Va.  701. 

.    U.S. — Town  of  Boynton  v.  White 
Const  Co.,  C.C.A.Fla.,  64  F.2d  190. 
Fla. — Peacock  v.  Feaster,  42  So.  889, 
52  Fla.  565. 

47.  Iowa. — Shaw  v.  Addison,    18   N. 
W.2d   796 — Bingman   v.  Clark,    159 
N.W.  172,  178  Iowa  1129. 

Necessity    of    showing    meritorious 
defense  to  action  see  supra  §  349. 

48.  Conn.— Carrington    v.    Holabird, 
19  Conn.  84. 

49.  Tex.— Bearden  v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  41  S.W.2d  447,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.,  60  S.W.2d  1031. 

Invalidity  of  judgment  as  ground  for 
relief  generally  see  infra  §  351. 

50.  Ala,— Barrow  v.  Lindsey,  159  So. 
232,  230  Ala.  45 — Hanover  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Street,  154  So.  816,  228  Ala. 
677. 

Cal. — Anglo   California  Trust   Co.  v. 

Kelley,    4    P.2d    604,    117    Cal.App. 

692— Jeffords  v.  Young,  277  P.  163, 

98  Cal.App.  400. 
Ga. — Jackson  Discount  Co.  v.  Merck, 

173  S.E.  647,   178  Ga.  660— Ehrlich 

v.   Bell,  136  S.E.  423,   163  Ga.   547. 
Mass. — Byron  v.  Concord  Nat.  Bank, 

13  N.E.2d  13,  299  Mass.  438. 
Mo. — Overton  v,  Overton,   37   S.W.2d 

565,  327  Mo.  530. 
N.J.— Simon    v.    Henke,    139    A,    887, 

102  N.J.Ea.  115. 
Tex. — Bearden  v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ.App., 

41  S.W.2d  447,  affirmed,  Com.App., 

60  S.W.2d  1031. 
Accident   or  mistake   as   excuse    for 

not  defending  at'  law  see  infra  §8 

365,  366. 
Fraud,    perjury,    collusion,    or   other 

misconduct    as    ground    for    relief 

generally  see  infra  §§  371-375. 
Rule  applied  to  Judgment  or  decree 

in  partition 
N.T. — Douglass  v.  Viele,  3  Sandf.Ch. 

439. 
47  C.J.  p  437  notes  50,  51,  54. 


350 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


er  adventitious  circumstance  beyond  complainant's 
control,51  without  fault,  negligence,  or  fraud  on  his 
part.52  It  has  been  said,  however,  that  equity  will 
afford  relief  against  a  judgment  irrespective  of  any 
issue  of  inattention  or  neglect,  where  the  circum- 
stances under  which  the  judgment  was  rendered 
show  deprivation  of  the  legal  rights  of  the  litigant 
seeking  relief  and  enforcement  of  the  judgment 
would  be  unconscientious  and  inequitable,53  at  least 
where  the  other  party  has  not  changed  his  position 
in  reliance  on  complainant's  actions.54 

Effect  of  statutory  provisions.  Statutes  provid- 
ing for  the  setting  aside  or  vacating  "of  judgments 
in  equity  authorize  relief  on  grounds  specified  there- 
in*55 Some  statutes  specifying  grounds  on  which 
a  judgment  may  be  annulled  have  been  construed 
as  not  restrictive  and  as  permitting  equitable  relief 
against  a  judgment  under  general  equitable  prin- 
ciples, even  though  the  statutory  grounds  for  re- 
lief are  not  shown,56  but  under  other  statutes  the 
grounds  for  relief  must  be  among  those  enumerat- 
ed therein.57 


b.  Disability  or  Privilege  of  Party;  Unauthor- 
ized Suit 

There  Is  a  conflict  of  authority  as  to  whether  equity 
will  grant  relief  against  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment 
rendered  against  one  in  violation  of  a  privilege  or  dis- 
ability precluding  suit;  it  has  been  held  that  relief  is 
warranted  from  a  Judgment  entered  in  a  suit  brought 
without  authority  of  the  ostensible  party  plaintiff. 

It  has  been  held  that  a  personal  disability,58  or 
privilege59  of  defendant  in  a  judgment  is  not  a 
ground  for  equitable  interference  with  the  judg- 
ment, the  defect  not  being  jurisdictional,  and  the 
remedy  being  at  law.  Other  decisions,  however,  re- 
garding a  judgment  against  such  a  person  as  void, 
hold  it  proper  for  chancery  to  restrain  its  enforce- 
ment60 Execution  on  a  judgment  against  a  person 
deceased,  it  has  been  held,  will  not  be  enjoined,  the 
remedy  being  at  law.61 

Judgment  on  suit  brought  without  authority.  En- 
forcement *of  a  judgment  obtained  by  an  attorney 
who  had  no  authority  from  plaintiff  to  bring  the 
suit  may  be  enjoined;62  and  a  similar  rule  prevails 
where  complainant  was  joined  as  a  plaintiff  in  the 
suit  without  his  consent,63  or  where  the  suit  was 


Btatnal  mistake  of  fact 

Equity  will  not  permit  Judgment 
based  on  mutual  mistake  of  fact  to 
be  enforced  so  as  to  work  injustice 
to  judgment  debtor. — Bankers  Trust 
Co.  v.  Hale  &  Kilburn  Corporation, 
C.C.AJN-.Y.,  84  F.2d  401. 

Relief  from  consent  decree,  enter- 
ed as  result  of  unilateral  mistake 
induced  by  fraudulent  concealment 
of  facts  by  party  against  whom  re- 
lief is  sought,  is  available,  whether 
on  ground  of  fraud  or  mistake,  but, 
in  absence  of  such  concealment  or 
other  inequitable  conduct,  relief  is 
not  available  on  either  theory. — 
Mudd  v.  Lanier,  Ala.,  24  8o.2d  550. 
51.  Tex. — Smith  v.  Rogers,  Civ.App., 

129  S.W.2d  776. 
W.Va. — Parsons  v.  Parsons,  135  S.E. 

228,  102  W.Va,  394. 

62.  N.J.— Raimondi   v.   Bianchi,    140 
A.  584,  102  N.J.EQ.  254— Simon  v. 
Henke,    139    A.    887,    102    NXT.Eq. 
115. 

Tex. — Fidelity  Trust  Co.  of  Houston 
v.  Highland  Farms  Corporation, 
CivJlpp.,  109  S.W.2d  1014,  error 
dismissed — Hill  v.  Lester,  Civ.App., 
91  S.W.2d  1152,  error  dismissed. 

63.  La. — Succession  of  G-ilmore,  102 
So.  94,  157  La.  130 — Bell  v.  Hold- 
craft,  App.,   196   So.   379 — Engeran 
r.    Consolidated    Companies,   App., 
147  So.  743. 

64.  Mont.— Little  Horn  State  Bank 
of  Wyola  v.  Gross,  300  P.  277,  89 
Mont.  472. 

66.  Iowa.— Atkin  v.  Westfall,  17  N. 
W.2d  532,  235  Iowa  618. 


Inability  to  procure  record 

Inability  to  procure  record  in  case 
after  motion  for  new  trial,  by  dili- 
gent search  and  inquiry  of  clerk  and 
counsel,  while  a  misfortune,  is  not 
character  of  "casualty"  or  "misfor- 
tune" for  which  judgment  may  be 
vacated  on  petition  in  equity. — Ison 
T.  Buskirk-Butledge  Lumber  Co.,  266 
S.W.  243,  205  Ky.  583. 

"Praud  or  other  ill-practices"  re- 
quire more  than  a  mere  error  or 
mistake  of  a  party  to  warrant  re- 
lief.— Sonnier  v.  Sonnier,  140  So.  49, 
19  La-App.  234. 
Patent  error 

Under  some  statutes  a  bill  of  re- 
view lies  for  error  apparent  on  the 
face  of  the  judgment  or  decree. 
Md.— Bailey  v.  Bailey,   30  A.2d  249, 

181  Md.  3851 
Mo.— Fadler   v.    Gabbert,    63    S.W.2d 

121,  333  Mo.  851. 

56.  La. — Succession  of  Gilmore,  102 
So.   94,   157  La.  130— Sandfield  Oil 
&  Gas  Co.  v.   Paul,  App.,  7   So.2d 
725 — Engeran  v.  Consolidated  .Com- 
panies, App.,  147  So.  743 — Schneck- 
enberger  v.  John  Bonura  &  Co.,  130 
So.  870,  14  La.App.  692. 

57.  Cal. — Molema  v.  Molema,  283  P. 
$56,  103  CaLApp.  79. 

Iowa. — Shaw  v.  Addison,  18  N.W.2d 
796 — Montagne  v.  Cherokee  Coun- 
ty, 205  N.W.  228,  200  Iowa  534. 

Ky.— McGuire  v.  Cope,  9  S.W.2d  528, 
225  Ky.  521. 

Me. — Jason  v.  Goddard,  149 .  A.  622, 
129  Me.  483. 

Tex.— Turner  v*  Parker,  Civ.App.,  14 
S.W,2d  931. 

708 


58.    Ark.— Church  v.  Gallic,  88  S.W. 

307,  88  Ark.  507. 
34  C.J.  p  449  note  98. 
Defects   or  objections  as   to  parties 

generally  see  infra  §    357. 

Infancy  may  afford  no  ground  for 
equitable  relief  against  a  judgment. 
— Weinstein  v.  Chelsea  Securities  & 
Investment  Co.,  145  A.  231,  104  N.J. 
Eq.  258—34  C.J.  p  449  note  98  [a]. 

89.    Md. — Peters  v.   League,   13   Md. 

58,  71  Am.D.  622. 
34  C.J.  p  449  note  99. 

60.  Tex. — Buhrman-PhaxT  Hardware 
Co.  v.  Medford  Bros.,  Civ.App.,  118 
S.W.2d  345,   error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  449  note  1. 
Unenforceable  Judgment 

Judgment  debtor  against  whom 
assignee  of  judgment,  a  joint  tort- 
feasor,  could  not  enforce  judgment 
was  entitled  to  have  judgment  can- 
celed as  to  himself. — Manowitz  v. 
Kanov,  154  A.  326,  107  N.J.Law  S23, 
75  A.L.R.  1464. 

61.  U.S. — Wynn  v.  Wilson,  C.C.Ark., 
30  F.Cas.No.18,116,  Hempst.  698. 

Va. — -Williamson  v.  Appleberry,  1 
Hen.  &  M.  206,  11  Va.  206. 

62.  N.H.— Smyth  v.   Balch,   40   N.H. 
363. 

S.C. — Latimer  v.  Latimer,  22  S.G. 
257. 

Unauthorized  appearance  of  attorney 
for  defendant  as  ground  for  relief 
in  suit  by  judgment  debtor  see  in- 
fra §  354. 

3.    Mo.— Lillibridge  v.  Boss,  59  Mo. 

217. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  351 


brought  by  a  nominal  plaintiff  who  had  no  authority 
from  the  real  party  in  interest.64 

§  351.    Invalidity  of  Judgment 

Some  authorities  have  held  that  equity  will  afford 
relief  against  a  void  judgment,  such  as  one  rendered 
without  Jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter  or  of  the  par- 
ties, while  others  take  the  view  that  the  mere  fact  that 
a  judgment  is  void  will  not  alone  suffice  aa  a  basis  for 
equitable  relief,  but  that  there  must  exist  further  grounds 
for  equitable  cognizance. 

Some  authorities  hold  broadly  to  the  effect  that  a 
void  judgment  is  open  to  equitable  attack,65  and 
that  equity  may  set  aside,  cancel,  or  annul  a  void 
judgment,66  or  enjoin  its  enforcement67  Equita- 
ble relief  has  been  held  available  against  a  judg- 
ment where  the  court  had  no  jurisdiction68  of  the 
subject  matter69  or  of  the  person.70  While  it  has 
been  held  that  the  rule  applies  where  the  judg- 
ment is  regular  on  its  face  and  does  not  disclose  the 
grounds  of  its  invalidity,71  and  that  a  suit  in  eq- 


uity will  not  lie  to  set  aside  a  judgment  void  on 
its  face,72  it  has  also  been  held  that  equitable  re- 
lief may  be  obtained  against  a  judgment  void  for 
lack  of  jurisdiction  appearing  from  the  face  of  the 
record.78  •<* 

On  the  other  hand,  according  to  some  decisions, 
the  fact  that  the  judgment  is  void74  because  of  a 
mere  defect  in  jurisdiction75  of  the  subject  mat- 
ter76 will  not  justify  equitable  relief  in  the  ab- 
sence of  some  further  ground  of  equitable  cogni- 
zance,77 as  where  the  judgment  is  inequitable  as 
between  the  parties.78 

Where  it  affirmatively  appears  that  the  court 
had  jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and  the  subject  mat- 
ter, the  judgment  is  at  most  merely  voidable,  its 
enforcement  may  not  be  enjoined  for  mere  error,73 
and  it  has  been  stated  that  complainant  is  entitled 
to  enjoin  enforcement  of  a  judgment  only  if  it  is 
void.80  However,  there  are  also  decisions  to  the 


64.  Ga.  —  Marchman  v.  Sewell,  21  3. 
E.  172,  93  Ga.  653. 

Ohio.—  Abbott  v.  Hughes,  3  Ohio  278. 

65.  Cal.  —  Newport  v.  Superior  Court 
of  Stanislaus  County,   230  P.   168, 
192  Cal.  92. 

Ohio.  —  Snyder  v.    Clough,   50   N.E.2d 

384.  71  Ohio  App.  440. 
Tex.  —  Waurika    Oil    Ass'n    v.    Ellis, 

Civ.  App.,  267  S.W.  523/ 
Judgment  against  insane  person 

Where  one  is  deprived  of  liberty 
and  property  by  a  void  Judgment, 
as  in  the  case  of  one  adjudicated  to 
be  insane,  it  has  been  held  the  duty 
of  equity  to  provide  him  with  a  rem- 
edy if  one  does  not  already  exist.  — 
Hitter  v.  Hitter,  38  N.B.2d  997,  219 
487. 


"66.    Colo.—  Ferrier  v.  Morris,  122  P. 

2d  880,  109  Colo.  154. 
Ga.  —  Henry  &  Co.  v.  Johnson,  173  S. 

E.    659,   178   Ga,   641—  Anderson  v. 

Turner,    133    S.E.    306,    35    Ga.App. 

428. 

A  consent  decree,  authorizing  cor- 
poration to  issue  preferred  stock 
to  common  stockholder  in  satisfac- 
tion of  money  Judgment  awarded 
him  by  same  decree  against  corpora- 
tion, was  invalid  and  subject  to  va- 
cation by  proper  party  cis  based  on 
contract  without  valid  consideration, 
regardless  of  whether  contract  as  a 
whole  was  detrimental  to  such  par- 
ty. —  Mudd  v.  Lanier,  Ala.,  24  So.2d 
550. 
67.  Iowa.  —  Shum  v.  Prow  &  Letter, 

298  N.W.  868,  230  Iowa  778. 
Okl.—  Black  v.   Kussell,   266   P.   448, 

130  Okl.  180. 
Tex.—  Smith  v.  Givens,  Civ.App.,  97 

S.W.2d   532—  Maier  v.    Davis,   Civ. 

App.,  72  S.W,2d  308. 
34  C.J    p  446  note  59—32  C.J.  p  116 

not&  (L  [a]- 


68.  Fla.— Krivitsky  v.   Nye,    19    So. 
2d  563,  155  Fla.  45. 

Ohio. — Young    v.    Guella,    35    N.E.2d 

997,  67  Ohio  App.  11. 
Okl.— Kenoly  v.  Hawley,  202  P.  494, 

84  Okl.  120. 
Or. — Dixie     Meadows     Independence 

Mines  Co.   v.   Kight,    45   P.2d  909, 

160  Or.  395. 

Compliance    with    statutory    provi- 
sions 

It  has  been  held  that  a  Judgment 
illegal  for  failure  to  comply  with 
mandatory  statutory  provisions  pre- 
requisite to  the  judge's  Jurisdiction 
to  grant  the  Judgment  is  open  to 
equitable  attack.— Pitts  v.  Pitts,  182 
So.  708,  120  Fla.  363. 

^legality  of  partition  Judgment 
N.Y.— Corwithe  v.  Grifflng,  21  Barb. 

9, 
34  OJ.  p  437  note  52. 

Judgment  by  confession  entered 
without  authority  is  open  to  equita- 
ble attack. — Christy  v.  Sherman,  10 
Iowa  535—34  C.J.  p  441  note  10. 

69.  Tenn.— Culwell   v.   Culwell,   133 
S.W.2d  1009,  23  Tenn.App.  389. 

34  C.J.  p  446  note  60. 

70.  Okl. — Honeycutt   v.    Severin,    98 
P.2d  1093,  186  Okl.  609. 

Tenn.— Myers  v.  Wolf,  34  S.W.2d 
201,  162  Tenn.  42— Culwell  v.  Cul- 
well, 133  S.W.2d  1009,  23  Tenn. 
App.  389. 

34  C.J.  p  446  note  61. 

71.  Kan. — Nelson  v.  Gossage,  107  P. 
2d  682,  152  Kan.  805. 

Mo. — Tokash  v.  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Commission,  139  S.W.2d  978, 
346  Mo.  100. 

Tex. — Ferguson  r.  Ferguson,  Civ. 
App.,  98  S.W.2d  847. 

34  C.J.  p  446  note  62. 

709 


72.  Mo. — Tokash       v.       Workmen's 
Compensation  Commission,    139   S. 
W.2d    978,    346    Mo.    100— National 
Union  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Vermillion, 
App.,  19  S.W.2d  776. 

73.  Ga,— Stanley  v.  Metts,   149  S.E. 
786,  169  Ga.  101. 

74.  TT.S. — Harrington  v.  Denny,  D.C. 
Mo.,  3  F.Supp.  584. 

Qualification  of  rule 

It  has  been  held  that  the  rule  that 
injunction  will  not  lie  to  restrain 
collection  of  a  void  Judgment  ap- 
plies only  where  the  Judgment  cred- 
itor threatens  to  enforce  its  collec- 
tion and  nobody  is  involved  except 
the  Judgment  creditor  and  Judgment 
debtor,  and  does  not  apply  as  against 
a  gamishee,  where  he  is  threatened 
with  several  suits  and  files  a  bill  of 
interpleader. — Pfeiffer  v.  McCul- 
lough,  115  IlLApp.  251. 

75.  Colo. — Wagner  v.   Johnson,   247 
P.  1058,  79  Colo.  664. 

76-  U.S. — Donham  v.  Springfield 
Hardware  Co.,  Mo.,  62  P.  110,  10 
C.C.A.  294. 

34  C.J.  p  445  note  52. 

77.  Mo.— St  Louis  &  S.  F.  By.  Co. 
v.   Lowder,    3D   S.W.    799,   138   Mo. 
533,  60  Am.S.R.  565. 

34  C.J.  p  445  note  56. 

78.  IT.S. — Harrington    v.   Denny,    D. 
C.Mo.,  3  F.Supp.  584. 

Colo. — Wagner    v.    Johnson,    247    P. 

1058,  79  Colo.  664. 
34  C.J.  p  445  note  55,  p  446  note  65. 

79.  Tex. — Richardson  v.  Kelly,  Civ. 
App.,     179     S.W.2d    991,    affirmed, 
Sup.,   191   S.W.2d    857— Dearinff  v. 
City  of  Port  Neches,  Civ.App.f  65 
S.W.2d  1105,  error  refused. 

80.  N.C. — Cameron   v.    McDonald,    $ 
S.E.2d  497,  216  N.C.  712. 


§  351 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


effect  that,  while  a  court  of  chancery  will  not  en- 
join enforcement  of  a  judgment  merely  because  it  is 
erroneous,  it  will  enjoin  one  which  is  either  void 
or  voidable  for  certain  reasons  recognized  as 
grounds  of  equitable  relief.81 

Where  no  judgment  at  all  was  in  fact  rendered, 
equity  will  relieve  against  enforcement  of  what 
purports  to  be  a  judgment.82  Enforcement  of  a 
judgment  may  be  enjoined  where  it  was  obtained  in 
violation  of  a  restraining  order.83  If  it  is  deter- 
mined that  the  judgment  is  neither  void  nor  void- 
able, relief  will,  of  course,  be  denied.84 

§  352.    Want  of,  or  Defects  in,  Process 

or  Service 

a.  In  general 

b.  Defective   process  or  service 

a.  In  General 

As  a  general  rule,  one  may  secure  equitable  relief 
from  a  judgment  rendered  against  him  without  service 
of  process  or  essential  notice  in  the  suit,  unless  he  has 
duly  waived  the  defect. 

It  has  generally  been  held  that  a  party  may  ob- 


tain equitable  relief  from  a  judgment  rendered 
against  him  without  service  of  process  or  other  nec- 
essary notice  in  the  suit,  by  reason  whereof  he  fails 
to  appear  and  defend,85  and  the  rule  has  been  held 
applicable,  even  though  it  is  not  shown  that  com- 
plainant lacked  independent  knowledge  of  the  pend- 
ency of  the  action  against  him,86  unless  the  cir- 
cumstances were  sufficient  to  amount  to  a  waiver 
of  notice.87  This  rule  has  been  held  to  apply  wheth- 
er the  record  affirmatively  shows  want  of  service  of 
process,88  or  merely  omits  to  show  the  service,  leav- 
ing it  to  be  presumed  prima  facie.89  There  are 
some  decisions,  however,  which  seem  to  hold,  with- 
out any  qualification,  that  a  judgment  void  because 
defendant  was  not  served  with  process  cannot  be 
relieved  against  in  equity  by  injunction  or  other- 
wise,90 unless  there  is  some  further  ground  of  eq- 
uitable cognizance,  as  discussed  supra  §  351. 

Where,  on  a  proceeding  for  final  distribution  of 
an  estate,  personal  notice  is  not  required  by  statute, 
the  want  of  such  notice  furnishes  no  ground  for 
enjoining  the  judgment.91  Failure  to  give  notice 
in  the  manner  directed  by  a  statute  which  is  not 
mandatory  has  been  held  not  to  render  the  jtidg- 


83-  Term. — New  York  Casualty  Co. 
v.  Lawson,  24  S.W.2d  881,  160 
Tean.  329 — Clemmons  v.  Haynes,  3 
Tenn.App.  20. 

82.  Okl.— Cone  v.  Harris,  230  P.  721, 
104  Okl.  114. 

83.  Term. — Hutsell  v.  Harrington,  12 
S.W.2d  370,  157  Tenn.  553. 

84.  Tex.— Richardson   v.    Kelly,    191 
S.W.2d  857. 

86.    Ala. — Murphree  v.  International 

Shoe  Co.,  20  So.2d  782,  246  Ala.  384 

— Timmerman   v.    Martin,    176    So. 

198,    234    Ala,    622— King   v.   Dent, 

93  So.  823,  208  Ala.  78. 
Ark.— Morgan    v.    Leon,    12     S.W.2d 

404,  178  Ark.  768. 
Cal.— Husar  v.   Husar,   119  P.2d  798, 

48  Cal.App,2d  326. 
j>,C.— Consolidated  Radio   Artists   v. 

Washington        Section,       National 

Council  of  Jewish  Juniors,   103  F. 

2d  785,  70  App.D.C.  262. 
Fla. — Fleming    v.    Fleming,    177    So. 

607,  130  Fla.  264. 
Ga. — Napier  v.  Bank  of  La  Fayette, 

189    S.E.    822,    183    Ga.    865. 
Ind. — Traders'    Loan    &   Inv.    Co.    v. 

Houchins,    144   N.E.    879,    195    Ind. 

256. 
Iowa. — Sloan    v.    Jepson,    252    N.W. 

535,  217  Iowa  10S2. 
Kan.— Gibson  v.  Enright,  9  P.2d  971, 

185  Kan.  181. 
Xy.— Newsome    v.    Hall,    161    S.W.2d 

629,  290  Ky.  486,  140  A.L.R.  818. 
IA. — Adkins'  Heirs  v.  Crawford,  Jen- 
kins &  Booth,  8  So.2d  539,  200  La. 

$61— Weldon   v.    Gandy,   App.,    195 


So.  655— Dickey  v.  Pollock,  App., 
183  So.  48 — Davis  v.  Southland 
Inv.  Co.,  App.,  149  So.  303. 

Md. — Parker  v.  Berry  man,  198  A. 
708,  174  Md.  356. 

Mich.— Gross  v.  Kellner,  219  N.W. 
620,  242  Mich.  656. 

Mo.— Smoot  v.  Judd,  61  S.W.  854,  161 
Mo.  673,  84  Am.S.R.  738— State  ex 
rel.  Woolman  v.  Guinotte,  282  S, 
W.  68,  221  Mo.App.  466— Patterson 
v.  Tancey,  71  S.W.  845,  97  Mo.App. 
681. 

N.J. — C.  &  D.  Building  Corporation 
v.  Grifflthes,  157  A.  137,  109  N.J. 
EQ.  319. 

Tex. — Galbraith  v.  Bishop,  Com.App., 
287  S.W.  1087— Gotten  v.  Stanford, 
Civ.App.,  169  S.W.2d  489— Lee  v. 
Massey,  Civ.App.,  135  S.W.2d  529 
— Kerby  v.  Hudson,  Civ. App.,  13 
S.W.2d  724. 

Utah.— Kramer  v.  Pixton,  268  P. 
1029,  72  Utah  1. 

Wash. — John  Hancock  Mutj  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Gooley,  83  P.2d  221,  196 
Wash.  357,  118  A.L.R.  1484. 

34  C.J.  P  447  note  70. 

Notice  to  complainant's  agent  may 
be  regarded  as  equivalent  to  no- 
tice to  complainant  so  as  to  pre- 
clude equitable  relief. — Avant  v. 
Broun,  Tex.Civ.App.,  91  S.W.2d  426, 
error  dismissed. 

Constructive  service 

Equitable  relief  may  be  obtained 
against  a  judgment  rendered  on  con- 
structive service,  as  by  publication 
or  by  substitution,  where  personal 

710 


service   should   have    been   made   or 

attempted. 

La. — National  Park  Bank  v.  Concor- 

dia  Land  &  Timber  Co.,  97  So.  272, 

154  La.  31. 
Utah. — Liebhardt    v.    Lawrence,    120 

P.  215,  40  Utah  243. 
34  C.J.  p  447  note  70  [a]. 
Expiration  of  time  for  other  reme- 
dies 

When  the  time  set  by  statute  for 
other  remedies  has  expired,  defend- 
ant may  pursue  his  remedy  of  a  sep- 
arate suit  in  equity  to  secure  relief 
from  a  judgment  rendered  against 
him  without  his  being  served  with 
process. — Washko  v.  Stewart,  112  P. 
2d  306,  44  Cal.App.2d  311—34  C.J.  P 
447  note  70  [b]. 

86.  Md.— Kartman    v.    Miliman,    125 
A.  170,  144  Md.  502. 

Or. — Dixie  Meadows  Independence 
Mines  Co.  v.  Kight,  45  P.2d  909, 
150  Or.  395. 

34  C.J.  p  447  note  71. 

87.  Cal. — Maple  v.  Walser,   21   P.2d 
984,  131  Cal. App.  631. 

34  C.J.  p  447  note  72. 

88.  Colo. — San    Juan    &    St.    Louis 
Mining   &   Smelting   Co.   v.    Finch, 
6  Colo.  214. 

Tenn.— Bell  v.  Williams,  1  Head  229. 

89.  Ind. — Hill   v.    Newman,    47    Ind. 
187. 

90.  Mo. — St.   Louis  &  S.  F.   Ry.  Co. 
v.    Lowder,    39    S.W.    799,    138   Mo. 
533,  60  Am.S.R.  565. 

34  C.J.  p  446  note  68. 

91.  Cal. — Daly  v.  Pennie,   25   P.   67, 
86  Cal.  552,  21  Am.S.R.  61. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


353 


ment  subject  to  equitable  attack  if  actual  notice 
was  duly  received.92 

Joint  defendants.  Where  judgment  was  rendered 
against  two  defendants,  although  process  was  served 
on  only  one  of  them,  defendant  not  served  may  have 
relief  in  equity  against  the  judgment.93  However, 
a  defendant  who  has  been  served  with  process  may 
not  attack  the  judgment  in  equity  on  the  ground 
that  his  codcfendant  had  not  been  served.94 

b.  Defective  Process  or  Service 

Defective  process  or  notice,  or  defective  service  of 
process,  may  afford  ground  for  equitable  relief,  although 
such  relief  will  ordinarily  be  denied  where  the  complain- 
ant had  an  adequate  remedy  at  law. 

Defects  in  the  process  so  radical  that  it  docs  not 
serve  its  purpose  of  notifying  defendant  of  the  suit 
and  the  time  for  proceeding  in  it  will  be  ground  for 
an  injunction  against  the  judgment;95  but  it  is  oth- 
erwise where  the  process  or  notice  is  sufficient  to 
put  him  on  inquiry  as  to  the  action,  which  inquiry 
he  negligently  fails  to  pursue.96  Ground  for  the 
interposition  of  equity  may  be  laid  by  showing  a 
fatal  defect  in  the  manner  of  serving  the  process,97 
but  a  defective  return  or  proof  of  process  duly 
served  has  been  held  not  a  sufficient  ground  for 
equity  to  interfere.98  Equitable  relief  may  be  de- 
nied where  the  circumstances  are  such  that  com- 
plainant had  an  adequate  remedy  at  law  of  which 
he  negligently  failed  to  avail  himself,99  as  where 
the  service  was  merely  irregular,1  or  not  in  strict 


compliance  with  the  statute.2 

§  353.    False  Return  of  Service 

There  is  a  conflict  of  authority  as  to  whether  equita- 
ble relief  may  be  granted  against  a  Judgment  obtained 
where  there  was  a  false  return  without  due  service  of 
process. 

It  has  been  acknowledged  that  there  is  some  dif- 
ference of  judicial  opinion  as  to  whether  or  not 
equitable  relief  may  be  granted  against  a  judgment 
where  there  was  a  false  return  without  due  service 
of  process.8  Some  authorities  hold  that  if  the  proc- 
ess is  returned  executed  on  defendant  at  law,  and 
was  not  in  fact  executed,  and  judgment  was  ren- 
dered without  appearance  or  opportunity  to  defend, 
chancery  has  power  to  enjoin  the  judgment.4  Ac- 
cording to  these  decisions,  the  return  of  the  officer 
to  the  writ  is  only  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  fact 
stated  by  it,  and  may  be  contradicted,5  and,  while 
complainant  may  be  denied  the  right  to  attack  the 
sheriffs  return  regarding  service  under  statutes  pro- 
viding for  remedy  by  motion,  nevertheless  he  re- 
tains the  right  to  equitable  relief.6 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  authorities  to  the* 
effect  that  a  return  is  so  far  conclusive  as  between 
the  parties  that  the  judgment  is  not  open  to  equita- 
ble attack  on  the  ground  that  the  return  was  false 
and  complainant  not  duly  served  with  process  unless 
some  further  ground  for  equitable  relief  appears,? 
as  that  complainant  had  a  meritorious  defense8  or 


92.  Tex. — Stewart     v.     Byrne,     Civ. 
App.,  42  S.W.2d  234. 

93.  Iowa. — Gerrish  v.  Seaton,  34  N. 
W.  485,  73  Iowa  15. 

34  C.J.  P  447  note  76. 

94.  «peXt — Taylor     v.      Hustead      & 
Tucker,    Com.App.,    257    S.W.    232. 

95.  Ala. — Roberts  v.  Henry,  2  Stew. 
42. 

La,— -Bird  v.  Cain,  6  La.Ann.  248. 

90.    Tex. — Stewart    v.    Byrne,    Com. 

App.,  42  S.W.2d  234. 
34  C.J.  p  447  note  79. 

97.  Cal. — Petersen  v.  Vane,  134  P.2d 
6,  57  Cal.App.2d  58. 

Fla. — MacKay  v.  Bacon,  20  So.2d  904. 
34  C.J.  p  447  note  80. 
Service  on  attorney  after  disbarment 
Cal. — Antonsen   v.    Pacific   Container 

Co.,    120    P.2d    148,    48    Cal.App.2d 

535. 

98.  Tex.— Johnson  v.  Cole,  Civ.App., 
138    S.W.2d    910,    error    refused. 

34  C.J.  p  448  note  84. 

False  return  see  infra  §  353. 

99.  Ala. — Murphree  v.  International 
Shoe   Co.,    20    So.2d   782,    246 

384. 
34  C.J.  p  448  note  81* 


1.  Neb.— Mayer  v.   Nelson,   74  N.W. 
841,  54  Neb.  434. 

34  C.J.  p  44S  note  82. 

2.  Iowa.— Ballinger    v.    Tarbell,    16 
Iowa  491,  85  Am.D.  527. 

34  C.J.  p  448  note  S3. 

3.  Mich. — Garey    v.     Morley    Bros., 
209  N.W.   116,   234   Mich.  675. 

o. — Ellis  v.  Nuckols,  140  S.W.  867, 
237  Mo.  290. 
Va. — Caskie    v.    Durham,     147    S.E. 
218,  152  Va.  345. 

4*  111.— Marnik  v.  Cusack,  148  N.E. 
42,  317  111.  362— Marabia  v.  Mary 
Thompson  Hospital  of  Chicago  for 
Women  and  Children,  140  N.B.  836, 
309  111.  147— Hilt  v.  Heimberger, 
85  N.E.  304,  235  111.  235— Kochman 
v.  O'Neill,  66  N.B.  1047,  202  111. 
110— Michalowski  v.  Stefanowski, 
58  N.B.2d  264,  324  Ill.App.  363 — 
Kulikowski  v.  North  American 
Mfg.  Co.,  54  N.B.2d  411,  322  111. 
App.  202 — Nikola  v.  Campus  Tow- 
ers Apartment  Bldg.  Corporation, 
25  N.E.2d  582,  303  IlLApp.  516— 
Harper  v.  Mangel,  98  Ill.App.  526. 
See  Rosenthal  v.  Loeber,  27  N.B. 
2d  539,  305  IlLApp.  624. 

Kan. — Board   of   Com'rs   of   Jjabette 


County  v.  Abbey,  100  P.2d  720,  151 
Kan.  710. 

Mich. — Argo  Oil  Corporation  v.  IL 
D.  Mitchell,  Inc.,  257  N.W.  852, 
269  Mich.  418— Gross  v.  Kellner, 
219  N.W.  620,  242  Mich.  656— Gar- 
ey v.  Morley  Bros.,  209  N.W.  116, 
234  Mich.  675. 

Okl. — Seekatz  v.  Brandenburg,  300  P. 
678,  150  Okl.  53. 

Tenn. — Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Webb,  61  B. 
W.  79,  106  Tenn.  191. 

W.Va. — Nuttalburg  Smokeless  Fuel 
Co.  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  145  S.B. 
824,  106  W.Va.  487. 

34  C.J.  p  448  note  85. 

5.  111. — Owens   v.   Ranstead,    22   HL 
161. 

6.  HI. — Nikola    v.    Campus    Towers 
Apartment    Bldg.    Corporation,    35 
N.B.2d  582,  303  IlLApp.  516. 

7.  Fla. — Cox    v.    Stuckey,     153     So. 
898,  114  Fla.  488— Allison  v.  Han- 
dy Andy  Community  Stores,  Inc., 
143   So.   263,   106  Flsu   274— Lewter 
v.  Hadley,  66  So.   567,  68  Fla.  131. 

34  C.J.  p  448  note  87. 

Defective  return  see  supra  §   352  bi 

8-  Ind. — Meyer  v.  Wilson,  76  N.E, 
748,  166  Ind.  651— Brown  T, 


711 


§  353 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


that  his  adversary  was  guilty  of  fraud  in  connec- 
tion with  the  matter.9  Il  has,  however,  been  held 
that  a  court  of  equity  has  power  to  entertain  a 
bill  containing  clear  and  convincing  allegations 
which,  on  being  proved,  would  establish  that  no 
service  of  process  whatsoever  was  had  on  a  neces- 
sary party  defendant  in  contradiction  of  the  facts 
appearing  on  the  record,10  and  that  statutes  preclud- 
ing attack  on  a  sheriffs  return  do  not  prevent  com- 
plainant from  attacking  a  judgment  on  the  .ground 
that  he  was  not  legally  cited,  as  the  real  basis  of 
such  an  attack  is  in  respect  of  the  citation  and  not 
of  the  return,  which  latter  is  simply  evidence  of  the 
citation.11 

Where  defendant  appears  and  pleads  to  the  ac- 
tion, the  judgment  will  not  be  enjoined  notwith- 
standing a  false  return  of  service.12 

§  354.    Unauthorized  Appearance 

There  Is  a  conflict  of  authority  as  to  whether  a  Judg- 
ment resting  on  an  unauthorized  appearance  may  be 
canceled  or  Its  enforcement  restrained  In  equity. 

According  to  some  decisions,  a  judgment  obtained 
and  resting  on  an  unauthorized  appearance  for  the 
party  may  be  canceled  or  its  enforcement  restrained 
in  equity,  irrespective  of  the  question  whether  the 
attorney  entering  the  appearance  is  responsible  or 
irresponsible,  or  acted  by  procurement  or  collu- 
sion with  his  antagonist.18  According  to  other 
decisions,  where  a  regular  attorney  of  the  court 
appears  and  answers  for  a  defendant  in  a  suit 
at  law,  a  judgment  recovered  by  plaintiff  will  not 
be  vacated  and  execution  enjoined  by  a  court  of 
equity,  although  the  attorney  appeared  without  au- 


thority from  defendant,  unless  it  is  shown  that  the 
attorney  is  not  of  sufficient  ability  to  answer  for 
the  damages  caused  by  his  unauthorized  appear- 
ance, or  there  has  been  collusion  between  him  and 
plaintiff  in  the  suit  at  law;  in  such  a  case  redress 
must  be  sought  against  the  attorney.14 

There  are  also  authorities  to  the  effect  that  a 
judgment  obtained  on  an  unauthorized  appearance 
of  an  attorney  will  not  be  enjoined,  whether  the 
attorney  is  or  is  not  solvent  and  able  to  respond 
in  damages,15  unless  special  circumstances  render 
it  necessary,16  as  where  the  question  of  unauthor- 
ized appearance  is  complicated  by  fraud,17  or  where 
it  would  be  "against  conscience"  to  execute  the 
judgment,18  or  where  it  is  evident  that  the  court 
cannot  properly  determine  on  motion  all  the  inter- 
ests affected,  the  only  proper  method  of  procedure 
in  such  cases  being  in  equity.19  It  has  also  been 
held  that  relief  will  be  denied  unless  it  is  shown 
that  the  attorney's  appearance  and  answer  were 
prejudicial  to -the  rights  of  the  complaining  party 
and  resulted  in  the  judgment  against  him.20  With- 
drawal by  attorneys  of  their  appearance  with  con- 
sent of  the  court  has  been  held  not  of  itself  to  de- 
prive the  latter  of  jurisdiction  so  as  to  authorize 
cancellation  of  the  judgment  in  equity.21 

§  355.    Payment  or  Satisfaction  of  Judgment 

In  an  otherwise  proper  case  the  complainant  may 
secure  equitable  relief  against  enforcement  of  a  Judg- 
ment previously  paid  or  satisfied. 

It  has  generally  been  held  that  equity  may  enjoin 
a  judgment  creditor  from  proceeding  to  collect  a 
judgment  which  has  been  in  fact  paid,  discharged, 


Rhodes,   155  N.E.  614,  86  IndApp. 
12. 

Necessity     of     meritorious     defense 
generally  see   supra   §   349. 

9.  U.S. — Knox  County  v.  Harshman, 
Mo.,  10  S.Ct  257,  133  U.S.  152,  33 
L.Ed.  5S6. 

Ky. — Doty    v.    Deposit    Building    & 

Loan  Ass'n,   46  S.W.  219,  103  Ky. 

710,    20   Ky.L.    625,   43   L.R.A.    551, 

rehearing-  denied  47  S.W.  433,  103 

Ky.  710,  20  Ky.L.  625,  43  L.R.A. 

'554. 
Mo.— Ellis  v.  Nucfcols,  140  S.W.  867, 

237  Mo.  290. 
Va, — Caskie  v.  Durham,  147  S.E.  218, 

152  Va.    345 — Ramsburg  v.  Kline, 

31  S.E.  608,  96  Va.  465. 
W.Va. — McClung    v.    McWhorter,    34 

S.B.    740,   47  W.Va.   150,   81  Am.S. 

R.  785. 
34  C.J.  p  448  notes  87,  88. 

10.  Fla. — Fleming   v.    Fleming,    177 
So.  607.  130  Fla.  264. 

11.  La. — Dickey    v.    Pollock,    App., 
183  So.  48* 


12.  U.S.— Walker  v.  Robbins,  Miss., 
14  How.   584,   14  L.Ed.  552. 

13.  GfcL— • Moon    v.    Moon,    35    S.EL2d 
439,  199  Ga.  808. 

Iowa. — Sloan    v.    Jepson,    252    N.W. 

535.  217  Iowa  1082. 
Miss. — Hirsch  Bros.  &  Co.  v.   R.  E. 

Kennington  Co.,    124    So.    344,    155 

Miss.  242,  88  A.L.R.  1. 
34  C.J.  p  449  note  96. 
Party  joined  "by  attorney 

Judgment  entered  against  party 
joined  by  attorney  without  authority 
may  be  set  aside,  vacated,  or  en- 
joined in  appropriate  proceedings. — 
Hirsch  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  R.  B.  Kenning- 
ton  Co.,  supra. 

14.  N.H. — Everett  v.  Warner  Bank, 
1>8  N.H.  340. 

34  C.J.  p  449  note  90. 

15.  N.Y.— Vilas  v.  Pittsburgh  &  M. 
R.  Co.,  25  N.E.  941,  123  N.T.  440, 
34   N.Y.St.    67,   20   Am.S.R.    771,    9 
L.R.A.  844. 

34  C-J.  p  449  note  9. 
Belief  in  original  cause 

Relief    from    domestic    judgment, 

712 


obtained  through  attorney's  unau- 
thorized appearance,  must  be  sought 
in  original  cause. — Hunter  v.  Har- 
rell,  163  N.E.  295,  88  Ind.App.  68. 

16.  N.Y.— U.  S.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hel- 
linger,  114  N.T.S.  885,  130  App.Div. 
415— New  York  v.  Smith,  20  N.Y.S. 
666,  61  N.Y.Super.  374,  appeal  dis- 
missed 34  N.B.  400.   138  N.Y.   676. 

17.  N.Y.— Vilas    v.     Pittsburgh    & 
M.   R.   Co.,    25   N.B.    941,    123   N.Y. 
440,  34  N.Y.St  67,  20  Am.S.R.  771, 
9  L.R.A.  844. 

34  C.J.  p  449  note  93. 

18.  Fla. — Budd  v.    Gamble,    13    Fla. 
265. 

19.  N.Y.— Vilas  v.  Plattsburgh  &  M. 
R.  Co.,   25   N.B.  941,  123  N.Y.  440, 
34  N.Y.S.  67,  20  Am.S.R.  771,  9  U 
R.A.  844— Oilman  v.  Prentice,  3  X. 
Y.St.  544,  11  N.Y.Civ.Proc.  310. 

20.  OkL— Homaokla  Oil  Co.  v.  M.  K. 
Tank  Co.,  247  P.  346,  118  Okl.  144. 

21.  Iowa. — Sloan  v.   Jepson,   252  N. 
W.  535,  217  Iowa  1082. 


'49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


356 


or  satisfied,22  provided,  of  course,  payment  was 
made  to  some  one  having  authority  to  receive  the 
money.23  Under  some  circumstances  such  equitable 
relief  may  be  proper  notwithstanding  the  court  in 
which  the  judgment  was  rendered  may  have  the 
power  to  grant  the  same  relief  on  motion  to  stay 
the  execution.24  However,  it  has  been  held  that 
equity  has  no  jurisdiction  to  relieve  against  a  judg- 
ment which  has  been  satisfied,  where  the  remedy  at 
law  is  adequate,26  either  by  the  ancient  writ  of  audi- 
ta  querela  26  or  by  motion  made  in  the  court  in  which 
such  judgment  was  rendered,27  unless  there  are 
questions  of  law  and  fact  which  may  be  better  tried 
in  a  court  of  equity  than  in  a  law  court,  or  there 
is  an  equitable  right  involved  more  appropriate  for 
the.  jurisdiction  of  the  former  tribunal  than  the  lat- 
ter,28 Similarly,  one  who  might  have  set  up  the  fact 
of  payment  or  discharge  of  a  judgment,  by  way  of 
defense  to  an  action  at  law  on  it,  or  in  a  proceeding 


to  revive  it,  cannot  claim  equitable  relief  against 
its  enforcement.29  In  any  case,  where  the  legal 
remedy  is  not  available,80  or  where  fraud31  or  in- 
justice32 appears,  the  judgment  may  be  enjoined. 
It  has  been  held  that  a  court  cannot  rescind  or  an- 
nul a  judgment  theretofore  paid  by  one  of  several 
solidary  judgment  debtors.83 

§  356.    Errors  and  Irregularities 

Errors  and  Irregularities  in  a  judgment  will  not  af- 
ford ground  for  relief  by  a  court  of  equity  unless  facts 
extrinsic  to  the  error  bring  the  case  within  one  of  the 
recognized  grounds  for  equitable  cognizance  or  the  er- 
rors are  fundamental. 

Equity  will  not  set  aside  or  enjoin  a  judgment  re- 
covered at  law,  against  a  party  who  had  a  full  op- 
portunity to  defend  himself,  in  a  case  of  which  the 
court  had  jurisdiction,  simply  on  the  ground  that 
the  judgment  is  irregular  or  erroneous,34  as  a 
court  of  equity  may  not  review  judgments  of  other 


22.  N.Y. — Allgeier  v.  Gordon  &  Co., 
9   N.Y.S.2d  848,  170   Misc.   607. 

34  C.J.  p  440  note  78,  p  450  note  7. 
Payment  to  fall  liability  on,  "bond 

Sureties  on  officers'  bonds,  having 
paid  Judgment  for  full  penalty,  as- 
signed to  judgment  creditor's  attor- 
ney, were  entitled  to  restrain  judg- 
ment creditor's  wife,  who  also  recov- 
ered judgment,  from  enforcing  her 
judgment — Southern  Surety  Co.  v. 
Bender,  180  N.E.  198,  41  Ohio  App. 
541. 
Tender  of  property 

Injunction  lies  to  restrain  enforce- 
ment of  alternative  money  judgment 
obtained  in  action  to  recover  person- 
alty, where  property  had  been  ten- 
dered in  good  condition. — Lindsey  v. 
Faylor,  1  P.2d  755,  151  Okl.  46. 
Satisfaction  not  shown 

Enforcement  of  judgment  regular 
on  its  face  could  not  be  restrained 
by  virtue  of  alleged  settlement 
agreement,  where  application  for  in- 
junction showed  that  applicant  had 
paid  only  part  of  amount  due  and 
failed  to  show  tender  of  balance. — 
Bond  v.  Dugat,  Tex. Civ. App.,  81  S.W. 
2d  786. 

23.  Md.— Akin  v.  Denny,  87  Md.  81. 
34  C.J.  p  450  note  9. 

24.  Call — Thompson  v.  Laughlin,  27 
P.  752,  91  Cal.  313. 

85.  Cal. — Schwartz  v.  California 
Claim  Service,  125  P.2d  883,  52  Cal. 
,  App.2d  47. 

Del.— White  v.  Osserman,  139  A,  761, 
16  Del.Ch.  39. 

N.Y. — Allgeier  v.  Gordon  &  Co.,  Inc., 
9  N.T.S.2d  848,  170  Misc.  607. 

14  C.J.  p  450  note  10. 

•ft,  HL— -Pyle  v.  Crebs,  112  IlLApp. 
480. 


27.  111. — Chandler  v.  Chandler,  63  N. 
B.2d  272,   326  IlLApp.   670. 

34  C.J.  p  450  -note  12. 

28.  Va. — Crawford  v.    Thurmond,    3 
Leigh  85,  30  Va.  85. 

29.  Va. — Barnett  v.  Barnett,  2   S.ES. 
733,  83  Va,  504. 

34  C.J.  p  450  note  14. 

30.  N.Y.— Mallory     v.     Norton,     21 
Barb.  424. 

31.  N.T.— Shaw  v.  Dwight,  16  Barb. 
536. 

34  C.J.  p  450  note  16. 

32.  111.— Edwards    v.    McCurdy,    13 
111.  496. 

N.Y. — Remington  Paper  Co.  v. 
O'Dougherty,  81  N.Y.  474. 

33.  La.— Swift  &  Co.   v,  Villemeur, 
131  So.  855,  15  La.App.  503. 

34.  U.S. — Town  of  Boynton  v.  White 
Const.  Co.,  C.C.A.Fla.,   64  F.2d  190 
— Mineral  Development  Co.  v.  Ken- 
tucky Coal  Lands  Co.,  D.CKy.,  285 
F.    761,    affirmed,     C.C.A.,    285    F. 
1021. 

Ala.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Miller 
v.  Miller,  189  So.  768,  769,  238  Ala, 
228 — Ex  parte  Cunningham,  99  So. 
834,  19  Ala.App.  584,  certiorari  de- 
nied Ex  parte  Ewart-Brewer  Motor 
Co.,  99  So.  836,  211  Ala,  191. 

Colo. — Schattinger  v.  Schattinger, 
250  P.  851,  80  Colo.  261. 

Fla. — Adams  v.  Reynolds,  134  So.  45, 
101  Fla.  271. 

Ga. — Flowers  v.  Thompson,  124  S.B. 
720,  158  Ga,  844. 

Ill,— Gray  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  13  N. 
E.2d  497,  294  IlLApp.  62. 

Iowa, — Jensen  v.  Martinsen,  291  N. 
W.  422,  228  Iowa  307. 

La, — National  Park  Bank  v.  Concor- 
dia  Land  &  Timber  Co.,  97  So.  272, 
154  La.  31. 

Md.— Hansel  v.  Collins,  23  A.2d  1," 
180  Md.  100. 

713 


Mich.— Craig  v.  Black,  229  N.W.  411, 
249  Mich.  485 — Broadwell  v.  Broad- 
well,  209  N.W.  923,  236  Mich.  60. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Caplow  v.  Kirk- 
wood,  App.,  117  S.W.2d  652— State 
ex  rel.  Woolman  v.  Guinotte,  282 
S.W.  68,  221  Mo.App.  466 — Bulli- 
vant  v.  Greer,  264  S.W.  95,  216  Mo, 
App.  324 — State  ex  rel.  and  to  Use 
of  Clinkscales  v.  Scott,  261  S.W. 
680,  216  Mo.App.  114,  record  quash- 
ed State  ex  rel.  Scott  v.  Trimble, 
272  S.W.  66,  308  Mo.  123. 

N.J. — Arons  v.  Haberman,  176  A. 
680,  114  N.J.Law  403— Rogers- 
Ebert  Co.  v.  Century  Const  Co., 
23  A.2d  905,  131  N.J.Equ  67,  affirm- 
ed 25  A.2d  635,  131  N.J.Eq.  469. 

N.Y.— Harvey  v.  Comby,  28C  N.Y.S. 
958,  245  App.Div.  318. 

N.C.— Cameron  v.  McDonald,  6  S.E. 
2d  497,  216  N.C.  712. 

Ohio. — Barnhart  v.  Aiken,  177  N.E. 
284,  39  Ohio  App.  172. 

Tenn. — New  York  Casualty  Co.  v. 
Lawson,  24  S.W.2d  881,  160  Tenn. 
329 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Clem- 
mons  v.  Haynes,  3  Tenn. App.  20, 
28. 

Tex.— Winters  Mut.  Aid  Ass'n,  Circle 
No.  2,  v,  Reddin,  Com. App.,  49  S. 
W.2d  1095— Petty  v.  Mitchell,  Civ. 
App.,  187  S.W.2d  138,  error  refused 
— Gray  v.  Moore,  Civ. App.,  172  S. 
W.2d  746,  error  refused — Urbanec 

.  v,  Jezik,  Clv.App.,  138  S.W.2d  1008 
— Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Pribble,  Civ.App.,  130  S.W.2d  332, 
error  refused — Snell  v.  Knowles, 
Civ.App.,  87  S.W.2d  871,  error  dis- 
missed— Morris  v.  Soble,  Civ.App., 
61  S.".V.2d  139— Coffman  v.  Nation- 
al Motor  Products  Co.,  Civ.App.,  26 
S.W.M  921,  error  dismissed — 
Crutcher  v.  Wolfe,  Civ.App.,  269  S. 
W.  841. 

Utah. — Logan  City  v.  Utah  Power 
&  Light  Co.,  16  P.2d  1097,  86  Utah 


§  356 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


courts  of  competent  jurisdiction,35  or  afford  eq- 
uitable relief  for  mistakes  of  fact86  or  errors  of 
law,37  unless  the  judgment  is  against  good  con- 
science,38 or  there  are  facts  extrinsic  to  the  error 
justifying  relief,39  as  where  the  errors  are  the  re- 
sult of  fraud  or  collusion40  or  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  deprive  the  party  of  all  opportunity  of  making 
his  defense  in  the  action  at  law.41 

Mere  irregularities  or  errors  in  the  proceedings 
leading  up  to  a  judgment  constitute  no  ground  for 
equitable  interference,42  and  it  has  been  held  im- 
material that  the  judgment  is  unjust43  or  that  the 
error  was  such  as  to  warrant  a  new  trial,44  although 
under  statutes  regulating  bills  of  review  it  has  been 
held  that  such  a  bill  will  lie  only  if  the  grounds  pre- 
sented are  such  as  would  have  required  granting  of 
a  new  trial  at  law.45  Where  there  was  in  legal 


contemplation  no  error  committed,  equitable  relief 
will,  of  course,  be  denied.46  On  the  other  hand, 
fundamental  errors  going  to  the  power  or  juris- 
diction of  the  court  to  render  the  judgment  may  af- 
ford a  basis  for  equitable  relief,47  except,  it  has 
been  said,  where  the  interests  of  third  persons  in- 
tervene which  should  be  protected  under  broad  prin- 
ciples of  public  policy  ;48  and  where  the  errors  com- 
mitted are  of  a  character  making  the  judgment  a 
nullity,  and  it  would  be  against  good  conscience  to 
enforce  it,  enforcement  of  the  judgment  may  be 
enjoined.49 

§  357.    Defects  or  Objections  as  to  Par- 
ties or  Pleadings 

Equity  will  not  grant  relief  against  a  Judgment  for 
defects  or  objections  as  to  parties  or  pleadings  consti- 
tuting mere  irregularities. 


340,    adhered    to    44    P.2d    698,    86 

Utah  354. 
Wash.— Hanson  v.  Foltz,  17  P.2d  616, 

170  Wash.  652. 
Wyo.— North    Laramie    Land   Co.    v. 

Hoffman,  219  P.  561,  30  Wyo.  238, 

affirmed  45  S.Ct  491,  268  U.S.  276, 

69  L.Ed.   953. 
S4  C.J.  p  451  note  18—47  C.J.  p  1015 

note  74. 

judgment  "by  confession 

(1)  A  judgment   by   confession   is 
not   subject   to    equitable   relief   for 
mere  defects  or  Irregularities  in  the 
instrument  of  confession. — Burch  v. 
West,    25    N.E.    658,    134    IlL    258— 
84  C.JL  P  441  note  11. 

(2)  Likewise    such    relief    cannot 
be  granted  merely  because  the  affi- 
davit to  the  complaint  on  which  the 
judgment   was   rendered   was   defec- 
tive.— Reiley    v.    Johnston,    22    Wis. 
879. 

Jfcnl*  applied  in  partition  suit 

Or.— Howell   v.    Howell,    152   P.    217, 

77  Or.  539. 
47  C.J.  p  437  note  67.  p  438  note  79. 

35.  N.J. — Rogers-Ebert  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tury Const  Co.,  23  A.2d  905,  131 
N.J.Eq.  67,  affirmed  25  A.2d  635, 
131  N.J.EQ.  469— Red  Oaks  v.  Dor- 
ez,  Inc.,  184  A.  746,  120  N.J.EQ. 
282 — Raimondi  v.  Bianchi,  140  A. 
684,  102  N.J.EQ.  254— Boulton  v. 
Scott,  3  N.J.Eq.  231. 

Term.— New  York  Casualty  Co.  v. 
Lawson,  24  S.W.2d  881,  160  Tenn. 
329. 

judgments  not  appealable 

Courts  of  equity  will  not  Interfere 
to  control  the  judgment  of  an  in- 
ferior court  although  erroneous 
where  the  matters  are  cognizable  In 
the  inferior  court  and  have  been  de- 
cided there  even  though  the  judg- 
ment is  not  appealable. — Zurich  Gen- 
eral Accident  &  Liability  Ins.  Co.  v. 
-Dyesa,  Tez.CXv.App.,  167  S.W.2d  294 


—Hayes    v.    Bone,    Tex.Civ.App.,    69 

S.W.2d  180. 

33.    N.M.— Caudill  v.  Caudill,  44  P.2d 

724,  39  N.M.  248. 
Tex. — Metropolitan   Life   Ins.    Co.   v. 

Pribble,   Civ.App.,   130   S.W.2d  332, 

error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  452  note  22,  p  462  note  45. 

37.  U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Irving  Trust  Co., 
D.C.N.Y.,  49  F.Supp.   683. 

Ind. — Attica  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 

of  Attica  v.  Colvert,  23  N.E.2d  483, 

216  Ind.  192. 
Mont. — Cocanougher  v.  Montana  Life 

Ins.    Co.,    64    P.2d    845,    103    Mont 

536. 
N.J.— Red  Oaks  v.  Dorez,  Inc..  184  A. 

746,  120  N.J.Eq.  282. 
Tex. — Metropolitan   Life   Ins.   Co.   v. 

Pribble,    Civ.App.,   130   S.W.2d   332, 

error  refused. 
34  aj.  p  452  note  23. 

38.  Iowa.— Shaw  v.  Addison,  18  N. 
W.2d  796. 

34  C.J.  p  462  note  43. 

39.  Tex. — Bearden  v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  41  S.W.2d  447,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.,  60  S.W.2d  1031. 

40.  Wyo. — Miller  v.  Hagie,  140  P.2d 
746,  5-9  Wyo.  383. 

34  C.J.  p  452  note  24. 

41.  Wyo. — Miller  v.  Hagie,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  462  note  25. 

42.  CaL— Bley    v.    Dessin,    87    P.2d 
889,  31  Cal.App.2d  338. 

Ind. — Globe  Mining  Co.  v.  Oak  Ridge 
Coal  Co.,  177  N.E.  868,  204  Ind.  11. 

Ky. — Sexton  v.  Dorman,  147  S.W.2d 
703,  285  Ky.  270— Bass  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.,  288  S.W.  738,  216 
Ky.  796. 

Md.— Hansel  v.  Collins,  23  A.2d  1, 
180  Md.  100. 

Tex. — Richardson  v.  Kelly,  Civ.App., 
179  S.W.2d  991,  affirmed,  Sup.,  191 
S.W.2d  857. 

Wyo.— Miller  v.  Hagie,  140  P.2d  746, 
59  Wyo.  383. 

34  C.J.  p  451  note  21. 

714 


Misconduct  of  jury,  in  discussing 
facts  not  in  evidence,  did  not  au- 
thorize setting  aside  judgment  in 
separate  suit  in  nature  of  bill  of 
review. — Reed  v.  Bryant,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  291  S.W.  605. 

43.  Tex.— Petty     v.     Mitchell,     Civ. 
App.,  187  S.W.2d  138,  error  refused 
—Wood  v.   Lenox,   23   S.W.    812,    5 
Tex.Civ.App.  318. 

44.  Ky.— Reynolds  v.  Horine,  13  B. 
Mon.  234. 

Tenn. — Nicholson     v.     Patterson,     6 
Humphr.  394. 

45.  Tex. — Pearl  Assur.    Co.   v.   Wil- 
liams,  Civ.App.,   167   S.W.2d   808. 

46.  111. — Carroll,   Schendorf  &   Boe- 
nicke  v.  Hastings,  £59  Ill.App.  564. 

Md.— Hansel    v.    Collins,    23    A.2d    1, 

ISO  Md.  100. 
Mich. — Koppas    v.    Heffner   &   Flem- 

ming,  282  N.W.  245,  286  Mich.  562. 
Neb.— Wistrom  v.  Forsling,  9  N.W.2d 

294,  143  Neb.  294,  rehearing  denied 

and     opinion     modified     on     other 

grounds   14   N.W.2d   217,    144   Neb. 

638. 
Tex. — Maytag    Southwestern    Co.    v. 

Thornton,  Civ.App.,  20  S.W. 3d  383, 

error  dismissed. 
Wash. — Puett   v.    Bernhard,    71    P.2d 

406,  191  Wash.  557. 
Alleged  error  as  to  analiflcation  of 

Judge 
Ala. — Hanover     Pire     Ins.     Co.     v. 

Street,  154  So.  816,  228  Ala.  677. 
Tex. — Crutcher    v.    Wolfe,    Civ.App., 

269  S.W.  841. 

47.  Colo. — Ferrier  v.  Morris,  122  P. 
2d  880,  109  Colo.  154. 

Tex. — Morris   v.    Soble,   Civ.App.,    61 
S.W.2d  139. 

48.  Tex. — Morris  v.  Soble,  supra. 

49.  Colo.— Ferrier  v.  Morris,  122  P, 
2d  880,  109  Colo.  154. 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  359 


Where  the  trial  court  had  jurisdiction  to  render 
judgment,  defects  and  objections  as  to  parties 
amounting  to  no  more  than  irregularities  do  not 
constitute  grounds  for  equitable  relief  against  the 
judgment.50  Nonjoinder  of  a  proper  party  defend- 
ant will  not  authorize  equitable  relief  to  other  de- 
fendants who  were  properly  cited,51  but  failure  to 
join  a  necessary  party  defendant  may  justify  equi- 
table relief  in  an  action  by  such  party.52  A  court  of 
equity  may  not  amend  a  judgment  so  as  to  add  a 
new  party  where  there  is  no  statutory  provision 
authorizing  such  procedure.53 

If  the  trial  court  had  jurisdiction  of  the  person 
and  subject  matter,  equity  ordinarily  will  deny  re- 
lief against  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  defects, 
objections,  mistakes,  or  insufficiency  with  respect  to 
the  pleadings,54  especially  where  the  defects  are 
due  to  the  mistake  or  negligence  of  complainant 
himself55  and  he  failed  to  avail  himself  of  his  rem- 
edy at  law.56  So  it  has  been  held  that  a  court  of 
equity  will  not  restrain  enforcement  of  a  judgment 
because  the  complaint  in  the  action  was  fatally  de- 
fective.57 Equitable  relief  may  be  afforded,  how- 
ever, where  the  defect  in  the  pleadings  is  of  such 
character  as  to  deprive  the  court  of  jurisdiction,58 
and  an  independent  bill  may  lie  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment where  it  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  pleadings59 
or  issues.60 


§  358.    Objections  to  Evidence 

Ordinarily  equity  will  not  afford  relief  against  t 
Judflment  for  insufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  support  it, 
or  for  erroneous  rulings  of  the  trial  court  In  respect  of 
admissibility  of  evidence. 

Ordinarily  equity  will  not  afford  relief  or  enjoin 
the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  at  law  on  the  ground 
of  the  insufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  support  it61 
or  the  lack  of  evidence  of  essential  facts62  or  be- 
cause of  erroneous  action  of  the  court  in  admitting 
or  excluding  particular  evidence.63 

§  359.    Error  in  Amount  of  Judgment 

or  Relief  Granted 

Error  in  respect  of  the  amount  of  the  Judgment  or 
the  relief  awarded  affords  no  ground  for  equitable  re- 
lief where  the  court  had  Jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and 
subject  matter,  unless  other  grounds  of  equitable  cogni- 
zance appear,  such  as  fraud  or  mistake,  coupled  with 
lack  of  an  adequate  remedy  at  law. 

Where  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  person 
and  the  subject  matter,  and  there  is  no  special 
ground  for  equitable  interference,  the  fact  that  a 
judgment  is  erroneous  as  to  the  amount  awarded,64 
as  for  a  greater  amount  than  claimed,65  or  fails  in 
other  respects  to  grant  the  proper  relief,66  affords 
no  ground  for  vacating  it  in  equity  or  enjoining  its 
enforcement.  Similarly,  mere  error  in  the  taxation 
of  costs,67  or  in  the  allowance  of  interest  where  the 


50.  La, — Surety  Credit  Co.  v.  Bauer, 
1  LsuApp.  285, 

Ohio. — Rauch  v.  Immel,  8  N.E.2d  569, 
55  Ohio  App.  71. 

Tex. — Duncan  v.  Smith  Bros.  Grain 
Co.,  260  S.W.  1027,  113  Tex.  555— 
Smith  v.  Zenith  Corporation,  Civ. 
App.,  134  S.W.2d  337— Arcola  Sug- 
ar  Mills  Co.  v.  Doherty,  Civ.App., 
254  S.W.  650. 

Disability  and  privilege  see  supra  § 
350  b. 

51t-  Qa. — Thomasson  v.  Farmers'  & 
Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  of  Rock- 
mart,  153  S.E.  419,  170  Ga.  555. 

52.    Okl. — Phelps  v.   Theime,   217   P. 

376,  92  Okl.  8. 
Purchaser  in  possession 

Enforcement  of  Judgment  in  sum- 
mary proceedings  for  restitution  was 
properly  enjoined,  where  purchaser 
in  possession  was  not  party. — Hepp- 
ner  v.  Smith,  213  N.W.  119,  238 
Mich.  245. 
63,  Ga.— Bishop  v.  Bussey,  139  S.B. 

212,  164  Ga.  642. 

54.     Ga. — Walters  v.  Southern  Brigh- 
ton Mills,  147  S.B.  87,  168  Ga.  15. 
Ky. — Dorsey   v.    Lawrence,    Hard,    p 

508. 

Tex.— .Empire  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  No- 
ble, Com.App.,  36  S.W.2d  451— Fin- 
layson  v.  McDowell,  Civ.App.,  94 
S.W.2d  1234,  error  dismissed. 


Utah.— Redfield  v.   First  Nat  Bank, 

244  P.  210,  66  Utah  459. 
34  C.J.  p  452  note  26. 

Overruling-  of  demurrer  to  com- 
plaint in  suit  at  law,  if  error,  would 
be  mere  irregularity  reviewable  on 
appeal,  and  could  not  be  made  basis 
for  bill  to  vacate  Judgment. — Han- 
over Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Street,  154  So. 
816,  228  Ala.  677. 

55.  Tex. — Cooper    v.    Walker,    Civ. 
App.,  96  S.W.2d  847. 

56.  Tex. — Allen   v.    Jones,   Civ.App., 
192  S.W.2d  298,   error  refused,  no 
reversible  error. 

57.  Utah.— Redfleld    v.    First    Nat. 
Bank,  244  P.  210,  66  Utah  459. 

58.  Tex. — Morris  v.  Soble,  Civ. App., 
61  S.W.2d  139. 

Unsigned  petition 

Tex. — Morris  v.  Soble,  supra. 

59.  Tenn. — Culwell   v.   Culwell,    133 
S.W.2d   1009,    23    Tenn.App.    389. 

60.  Kan. — Southern     Kansas     Stage 
Lines  Co.   v.  Webb,   41  P.2d  1025, 
141  Kan.  476. 

61.  U.S. — Mineral    Development    Co. 
v.  Kentucky  Coal  Lands  Co.,  D.C. 
Ky.,    285    F.    761,   affirmed,   C.C.A., 
285  F.  1021, 

Ark. — Malkin  v.  Cramer  Cotton  Co., 
252  S.W.  596,  159  Ark.  508. 

715 


Iowa.— Harris    v.    Blgley,    111    N.W. 

432,  136  Iowa  307. 
Tenn. — Life  &  Casualty  Ins.    Co.   v. 

Clark,    54    S.W.2d    965,    165    Tenn. 

219. 
Wash.— Manson  v.  Foltz,  17  P.2d  616, 

170  Wash.   652. 
34  C.J.  p  453  note  27. 

62.  CaL— Pico  v.  Sunol,  6  Cal.  294. 
34  C.J.  p  453  note  28. 

63.  Nev.— Douglas  Milling  &  Power 
Co.  v.  Rickey,  217  P.  590,  47  Nev. 
148. 

34  C.J.  p  453  note  29. 

64.  Neb. — Kramer  v.  Bankers'  Sure- 
ty Co.,   133  N.W.  427,  90  Neb.  801. 

34  C.J.  p  453  note  31. 
Attorneys'  fees 

Dissatisfaction  of  Judgment  debt- 
ors with  amount  of  attorney's  fees 
for  which  default  Judgment  was  ren- 
dered was  not  ground  for  annulling 
Judgment. — Treichlingrova  v.  Layne, 
139  So.  659,  19  La,  A  pp.  71. 

65.  Ind. — Gum-Elastic    Roofing    Co. 
v.    Mexico   Pub.   Co.,    39   N.B3.   443, 
140    Ind.    158,    30    L.B.A.    700. 

66.  Tex. — Kalmans     v.     Baumbush, 
CiV.App.,  187  S.W.   697. 

Utah.— Redfleld  v.  First  Nat.   Ban*, 
244  P.  210,  66  Utah  459. 

67.  Or.— Nicklta  v.  Hobin,  10  P.  835, 
13  Or.  406. 

34  C.J.  p  453  note  37. 


359 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


verdict  gives  none,68  affords  no  ground  f°r  enjoin- 
ing the  judgment. 

On  the  other  hand,  where  through  fraud,  acci- 
dent, mistake,  or  miscalculation  a  judgment  is  en- 
tered for  an  amount  or  in  terms  not  intended,  or 
inconsistent  with  the  pleadings,  equity  may  give  re- 
lief on  dear  and  satisfying  proof.60  Relief  will  not 
he  granted,  however,  where  the  party  has  an  ade- 
quate remedy  by  appeal,  motion,  or  other  proceeding 
in  the  law  court,70  or  where  he  is  chargeahle  with 
negligence  in  permitting  the  mistake  to  occur  or  in 
failing  to  seek  his  remedy  in  due  time.71 

§  360*    Irregular  Rendition  or  Entry 

Errors  in  the  time,  form,  or  manner  of  rendition  or 
entry  of  a  judgment  ordinarily  afford  no  ground  for 
equitable  relief;  but  where  there  are  additional  grounds 
of  equitable  cognizance  relief  may  be  granted. 

Irregularities  or  errors  in  the  time,  form,  or  man- 
ner of  the  rendition  or  entry  of  a  judgment  furnish 
no  ground  for  equity  to  reform  it  or  enjoin  its  col- 
lection.72 On  the  other  hand,  some  cases  recognize 
the  right  of  equity  to  interfere  in  a  grave  emer- 
gency produced  by  an  erroneous  entry  of  judg- 
ment73 where  there  is  no  other  way  of  obtaining 
relief74  or  where  the  party  has  been  prevented 
from  obtaining  relief  at  law  by  fraud,  accident,  or 
the  act  of  the  opposite  party,  without  fault  or  neg- 
lect on  his  own  part75  So,  where  the  clerk  of  the 


law  court  has  made  mistakes  or  erroneous  entries 
in  the  record  of  the  judgment,  it  is  proper  for  eq- 
uity to  grant  relief.76  It  has  been  held  that  a  de- 
fect in  rendition  of  a  judgment  going  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  may  constitute  ground  for  suit 
in  equity.77 

§  361.    Defenses  Not  Interposed  in  Former 
Action 

a.  In  general 

b.  Particular  defenses 

a.  In  General 

A  defendant  who  negligently  fails  to  interpose  an 
available  defense  in  an  action,  and  who  Is  not  prevented 
from  interposing  it  by  fraud,  accident,  or  the  like,  can- 
not  assert  such  defense  as  a  ground  for  equitable  re- 
lief  against  the  judgment. 

A  defendant  in  an  action  who  has  a  defense  of 
which  he  is  or  should  be  fully  aware,  which  is  cog- 
nizable by  and  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
in  which  the  action  is  brought,  and  which  he  has 
an  opportunity  to  interpose,  is  chargeable  with 
negligence  if  he  fails  to  set  up  such  defense 
and  insist  on  it,  not  being  prevented  from  doing 
so  by  any  fraud,  accident,  or  surprise;  and  he 
cannot  have  relief  in  equity  against  the  judgment 
in  that  action  on  the  same  grounds  which  consti- 
tuted such  defense.78  This  proposition  has  been  so 


68.  La.— McMicken   v.    Milaudon,    2 
La,  180. 

69.  La. — Engeran     v.     Consolidated 
Companies,  App.,  147  So.  743. 

Mo. — Chouteau  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 

App.,  131  S.W.2d  902. 
Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Midwest 

Refining  Co.  v.  George,  7  P.2d  213, 

214,  44  Wyo.  25. 
34  C.J.  p  453  note  34. 
Violation,  of  agreement 

Judgment  taken  in  violation  of 
agreement  should  have  been  set 
aside  and  defendant  given  opportuni- 
ty to  defend.— Riddle  v.  McNaugh- 
ton,  163  K.E.  846,  88  Ind.App.  352. 

If  jurisdictions!  facts  do  not  ap- 
pear, equity  will  deny  relief. — Prest- 
wood  v.  Bagley,  149  So.  817,  227  Ala. 
S16. 

70.  U.S.— Furnald   v.    Glenn,    C.C.N. 
Y.,   56   F.   372,   affirmed   64   F.   49, 
12  C.C.A.  27. 

34  C.J.  p  453  note  35. 

71.  Wyo. — Edwards  v.  City  of  Chey- 
enne,  114  P.   677,   687,   122  P.  900, 
19  Wyo.  110. 

34  C.J.  p  453  note  36. 

72.  Mass. — Bromfield  v.   Gould,   193 
N.B.  796,  289  Mass.  80. 

Old. — Missouri,   O.   &   G.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Riley,  127  P.  391,  34  Okl.  760. 
34  C.J.  p  453  note  40* 


Entry  of  default  in  vacation  is 
insufficient  ground  for  an  injunction 
where  the  rules  of  the  court  in 
which  the  Judgment  was  rendered 
authorize  the  entry  of  judgments  in 
vacation.— Porter  v.  Moffett,  Morr., 
Iowa,  108. 

73.  Tex. — Houston,   E.  &  W.   T.  R. 
Co.  v.  Skeeter  Bros.,  98  S.W.  1064, 
44  Tex.Civ.App.  105. 

34  C.J.  p  454  note  41. 

Supplying  imperfections  in  partition 

decree  or  judgment 
U.S. — Gay    v.    Parpart,    111.,    1    S.Ct. 

456,  106  U.S.  679,  27  L.Ed.  256. 
47  C.J.  p  437  note  56. 

74.  Iowa. — Partridge  v.  Harrow,   27 
Iowa  96,  99  Am.D.  643. 

Okl.— -Ellis  v.  Akers,  121  P.  258,  32 
Okl.  96. 

75.  OkL — Ellis  v.  Akers,  supra. 
34  OJ.  p  454  note  43. 

76.  Va. — Smith  v.  Wallace,  1  Wash. 
254,  ,1  Va.  254. 

34  C.J.  p  454  note  44. 

77.  Ariz. — American    Surety  Co.    of 
New  York  v.  Mosher,  64  P.2d  1025, 
48  Ariz.  552, 

7a  U.S.— In  re  Innls,  C.C.AJnd.,  140 
F.2d  479,  certiorari  denied  64  S.Ct 
1048,  322  U.S.  736,  88  L.Ed.  1569— 
Helms  v.  Holmes,  C.C.A.3ST.C.,  129 
F.2d  263,  141  A.UEU  1367— Town 

716 


of  Boynton  v.  White  Const.  Co.,  C. 

C.A.Fla.,    64    F.2d    190— Jenner    v. 

Murray,  C.C.A.Fla.,  32  F.2d  625. 
Ala.— Leath  v.  Lister,  173  So.  59,  233 

Ala.  595 — Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Street,    154    So.    816,    228   Ala.    677 

— Oden    v.    King,    114    So.    1,    216 

Ala,  597. 
Cal.— Hammell   v.   Britton,    119    P.2d 

333,     19    Cal.2d    72— De    Tray    v. 

Chambers,  297  P.  575,  112  Cal.App. 

697. 
Ga. — Lester  v.  Southern  Security  Co., 

147  S.B.  529,  168  Ga.  307. 
111.— Mohr    v.     Messick,     53     N.E.2d 

743,  322  111. App.  56 — Meyer  v.  Sur- 

kin,  262  111. App.  83. 
Ind. — Jullen  v.  Lane,   157  N.E.   114, 

second   case,   95   Ind. App.   139. 
Ky.— Holt  v.  Mahoney,  270  S.W.  795, 

208  Ky.  330. 
La.— Wunderlich  v.  Palmisano,  App., 

177     So.     843 — Treichlingrova     v. 

Layne,  139  So.  659,  19  La.App.  71 

— Mercantile    Adjustment    Co.     v. 

Powers,  5  La.App.  534. 
Md. — Bedding   v.    Redding,    26    A.2d 

18,  180  -Md.  1545. 
Mich. — Westin  v.  Hatfield,  10  N.W.2d 

840,    306   Mich.    235— Broadwell   v. 

Broadwell,  209  N.W.  923,  236  Mich. 

60. 
Mo. — Hockenberry  v.  Cooper  County 

State  Bank  of  Bunceton,   88   S.W. 

3d  1031,  338  Mo.  31— State  ex  reL 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  361 


repeatedly  affirmed  that  it  has  become  a  well  rec- 
ognized principle  and  maxim  of  equity,79  and  will 
not  be  abrogated  merely  because  the  judgment  may 
be  wrong  in  law  or  fact,80  or  may  work  injustice 
and  hardship,81  as,  for  instance,  when  the  effect  of 
allowing  the  judgment  to  stand  will  be  to  compel 
the  payment  of  a  debt  which  defendant  does  not  owe 
or  which  he  owes  to  a  third  person.82  An  excep- 
tion to  this  rule  has  been  held  to  exist,  however,  in 
cases  where  relief  is  sought  by  persons  incapacitat- 
ed to  contract  generally  or  specially  ;83  and,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  §§  363-368,  relief  in  equity  may  be  had 
where  there  was  an  adequate  excuse  for  not  pre- 
senting the  defense  in  the  original  action. 

Defensrt  available  either  at  law  or  in  equity. 
Where  a  party's  defense  to  an  action  is  cognizable 
either  at  law  or  in  equity,  it  has  been  held  in  some 


jurisdictions  that  he  may  choose  in  which  form  he 
will  make  his  defense,  and  if  he  omits  to  do  so  at 
law  he  may  then  have  recourse  to  equity  for  re- 
lief against  the  judgment.84  However,  if  in  any 
such  case  the  party  makes  his  defense  in  the  trial 
at  law,  he  will  be  regarded  as  having  made  his  elec- 
tion, and  if  he  fails  he  will  have  no  ground  for  a 
bill  in  equity  for  relief  against  the  judgment85  un- 
less his  defeat  occurred  through  fraud,  surprise, 
accident  or  the  like.86 

In  other  jurisdictions  where  a  suit  is  first  brought 
in  a  court  of  law,  in  which  defendant  may  make  his 
defense  as  fully  and  adequately  as  he  could  in  a 
court  of  equity,  he  must  make  his  defense  there,  and 
if  he  neglects  to  do  so  a  court  of  equity  has  no  ju- 
risdiction to  relieve  him,87  except  where  some  spe- 


Ellsworth  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.  of  Maryland,  147  S.W.2d  181, 
235  Mo.App.  850. 

N.J.— Brengel  v.  O'Toole,  148  A.  861, 
103  N.J.EQ.  339— Raimondi  v.  Bian- 
chi.  140  A.  584,  102  N.J.EQ.  254— 
Simon  v.  Henke,  139  A.  887,  102 

N.J.EQ.  115. 

N.Y. — 755  Seventh  Ave.  Corporation 
v.  Carroll,  194  N.E.  69,  266  N.Y. 
157 — Fuhrmann  v.  Fanroth,  173  N. 
E.  685,  254  N.Y.  479— Home  v.  Mc- 
Ginley,  299  N.Y.S.  1,  252  App.Div. 
296. 

Okl.— Sabin  v.  Levorsen,  145  P.2d 
402,  certiorari  denied  64  S.Ct.  205, 
320  U.S.  792,  88  LEd.  477,  rehear- 
ing denied  64  S.Ct.  368,  320  U.S. 
815,  88  L.Ed.  492— Wheeler  v.  Rid- 
path,  259  P.  247,  126  Okl.  290. 

Or. — Dixon  v.  Simpson,  279  P.  939, 
130  Or.  211. 

Pa. — Graham  Roller  Bearing  Corpo- 
ration v.  Stone,  126  A.  235,  281  Pa. 
229. 

Tenn. — Sharp  v.  Kennedy,  13  Tenn. 
App.  170. 

Tex. — Wear  v.  McCallum,  33  S.W.2d 
723,  119  Tex.  473— Winters  Mut 
Aid  Ass'n,  Circle  No.  2,  v.  Reddin, 
Com.App.,  49  S.W.2d  1095 — Empire 
Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Noble,  Com.App., 
36  S.W.2d  451— Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Smith  v.  Lockhart,  Civ.App.,  177 
S.W.2d  117,  119— American  Red 
Cross  v.  Longley,  Civ.App.,  165  S. 
W.2d  233,  error  refused — Smith  v. 
Rogers,  Civ.App.,  129  S.W.2d  776— 
Sanders  v.  O'Connor,  Civ.App.,  98 
S.W.2d  401,  error  dismissed— Smith 
v.  Dunnam,  Civ.App.,  57  S.W.2d 
S73,  error  refused — Hetkes  v.  Geh- 
ret,  Civ.App.,  16  S.W.2d  395,  af- 
firmed, Com. App.,  36  S.W.2d  700 — 
Garza  v.  Kenedy,  Civ.App.,  291  S. 
W.  615,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  299  S.W.  231— Reed  v. 
Bryant,  Civ.App.,  291  S.W.  .  605— 
D.  F.  Connolly  Agency,  Inc.,  v. 
Popejoy,  Civ.App.,  290  S.W.  831. 


Utah.— Redfield  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 

244  P.  210,  66  Utah  459. 
Wash.— Fisch  v.  Marler,  97  P.2d  147, 
1   Wash.2d   698 — Manson  v.   Foltz, 
17  P.2d  616,  170  Wash.  652. 
24  C.J.  p  889  note  92—34  C.J.  p  454 
note  45,  p  440  notes  80,  82,  p  442 
note  13 — 47  C.J.  p  1015  note  75. 
Cancellation  of  insurance 

Insurance  company's  suit  to  set 
aside  judgment  on  additional  insur- 
ance certificates,  issued  to  injured 
employee  covered  by  group  policy, 
was  held  not  maintainable  where 
there  was  negligence  and  lack  of  dil- 
igence in  failing  to  present  defense 
of  cancellation  of  additional  insur- 
ance.— Wheiles  v.  ^Btna  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  C.C.A.Tex.,  68  F.2d  99. 

Defect  patent  on  face  of  record 

Surety  on  garnishment  bond  was 
held  not  entitled  to  enjoin  enforce- 
ment of  garnishor's  judgment  on 
bond  on  ground  of  discovering  after 
such  judgment  was  rendered  that  the 
former  judgment  on  which  breach  of 
bond  was  predicated  was  void,  where 
alleged  defect  was  patent  on  face  of 
record. — JEtna  Casualty  &  Surety  Co. 
v.  McDougall  Co.,  150  So.  632,  112 
Pla.  408. 
Pendency  of  unit  "by  third  person 

Where,  at  the  time  of  a  suit  to 
require  a  partnership  accounting 
from  the  defendant  in  respect  of  a 
lease  held  in  his  name,  a  suit  by  a 
third  person  against  such  defendant 
to  establish  a  prior  lease  was  pend- 
ing in  another  court,  but  defendant 
did  not  plead  such  fact,  and  a  decree 
for  accounting  was  entered  against 
him,  he  cannot  maintain  a  suit  in 
equity  to  enjoin  enforcement  of  such 
decree  because  of  a  subsequent  de- 
cree against  him  in  the  other  suit. 
—Smith  v.  Apple,  C.C.A.Kan.,  6  F.2d 
559. 

79.    Va. — Holland     v.     Trotter,     52 
Gratt  136,  63  Va.  136. 

717 


80.  U.S.— In  re  Innis,  C.C.A.Ind., 
140  F.2d  479,  certiorari  denied  64 
S.Ct.  1048,  322  U.S.  736,  88  L.Ed. 
1569. 

Tex, — Ridge  v.  Wood,  Civ.App.,  140 
S.W.2d  536,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct. 

Utah.— Redfleld  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 
244  P.  210,  66  Utah  459. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  47. 

8L  U.S. — In  re  Innis,  C.C.A.Ind., 
140  F.2d  479,  certiorari  denied  64 
S.Ct.  1048,  322  U.S.. 736,  88  L.Ed. 
1569. 

Utah.— Redfield  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 
244  P.  210,  66  Utah  459. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  48. 

82.  W.Va. — Braden  v.  Reitzenberger, 
18  W.Va.  286. 

83.  La, — Medart  v.  Fasnatch,  15  La. 
Ann.  621. 

84.  Ark. — Arrington  v.  Washington, 
14  Ark.  218. 

34  C.J.  p  457  note  78. 

85.  Ark. — Conway  v.  Ellison,  14  Ark. 
360. 

34  OJ.  p  457  note  79. 
Matters  determined  in  original  action 
see  infra  §  369. 

86.  Ark. — Arrington  v.  Washington, 
14  Ark.  218. 

,87.    U.S. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Coos  Bay  Lumber  Co.   v.   Collier, 
C.C.A.,    104    F.2d    722,    725. 
Md.— Redding  v.  Redding,  26  A.2d  18, 

180  Md.  545. 
34  O.J.  p  457  note  81. 
Statutes    requiring'   interposition    of 

all  defenses 

The  rule  set  forth  in  the  text  ap- 
plies   under    statutes    requiring    de- 
fendant   in   an    action    to    interpose 
all    defenses    which    he    may    have, 
whether  legal  or  equitable. 
Ky.— Chinn  v.  Mitchell,  2  Mete.  92. 
Minn. — Fowler  v.  Atkinson,  S  Minn. 
603.. 


§  361 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.  J.  S. 


cial  ground  for  relief  can  be  established,88  or  where 
the  statutes  provide  otherwise.89 

b.  Particular  Defenses 

(1)  Insufficiency  or  illegality  of  cause  of 

action 

(2)  Other  defenses 

(1)  Insufficiency  or  Illegality  of  Cause  of 
Action 

Insufficiency  or  Illegality  of  the  cause  of  action  on 
which  the  judgment  was  based  Is  generally  considered 
not  a  ground  for  equitable  relief  against  the  Judgment 
where  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  the  interposition  of 
such  defense  in  the  original  action. 

The  fact  that  the  cause  of  action  stated  by  plain- 
tiff is  not  sufficient  to  support  the  judgment  or  does 
not  entitle  him  to  the  relief  awarded  is  a  defense 
which  must  be  interposed  at  law,  and  equity  will  not 
enjoin  the  judgment  on  this  ground,90  unless  it  ap- 
pears that  there  was  some  good  reason  why  defend- 
ant did  not  or  could  not  plead  it91  or  there  are  cir- 
cumstances impeaching  the  justice  or  validity  of 
the  judgment.92  The  fact  that  the  contract  or  cause 
of  action  was  illegal,  immoral,  or  contrary  to  pub- 
lic policy  is  good  ground  for  enjoining  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  judgment,93  although,  according  to 
some  cases,  only  when  the  defense  could  not  have 
been  made  at  law  or  was  prevented.94  It  has  been 
held  that  equity  will  not  interfere  where  the  party 
seeking  relief  is  in  pari  delicto  with  the  other,95 
except  in  so  far  as  the  contract  remains  in  whole  or 
in  part  executory.96 

Gambling  contracts.     Under  statutes  which  ex- 


pressly declare  that  judgments  based  on  gaming  con- 
tracts shall  be  void,  it  is  the  rule  that  equity  will 
grant  relief  against  a  judgment  founded  on  a  gam- 
ing consideration  although  no  defense  was  made 
at  law.97  This  is  true  although  the  judgment  was 
obtained  by  default98  or  by  confession.99  In  ju- 
risdictions where  there  is  no  statutory  declaration 
that  judgments  founded  on  gaming  contracts  shall 
be  void,  the  party  is  bound  to  make  his  defense  at 
law,  and,  having  failed  to  do  so,  cannot  come  into 
equity  to  enjoin  the  judgment  on  the  ground  of  il- 
legality of  consideration.1  Where  a  party  has  un- 
successfully attempted  to  resist  the  payment  of  a 
debt  for  which  he  is  sued  at  law,  on  the  ground  of 
its  being  based  on  a  gaming  transaction,  he  cannot 
afterward  have  relief  in  equity.2 

Usury.  While  it  has  been  held  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions that  it  is  competent  for  a  party  to  a  usurious 
contract  to  go  into  equity  for  relief  as  to  the  in- 
terest, even  after  a  judgment  at  law,  and  without 
assigning  any  reason  for  have  failed  to  defend  him- 
self at  law,3'  the  general  rule  is  well  settled  that 
where  defendant  at  law  failed  to  make  his  defense 
of  usury  and  was  not  prevented  by  fraud  or  the 
fault  of  the  other  party,  or  by  accident,  unmixed 
with  negligence  on  his  part,  a  court  of  chancery 
will  not  take  jurisdiction  to  afford  relief,4  unless 
under  the  circumstances  such  defense  could  not  have 
been  established  at  law,  or  would  have  involved 
an  embarrassing  and  complicated  inquiry.5 

(2)  Other  Defenses 
The    rule    prohibiting    equitable    relief    for    defenses 


88.  111.— Hopkins   v.  Medley,   99  111. 
509. 

34  C.J.  P  457  note  82. 

89.  Va. — Hoge    v.    Fidelity   Loan   * 
Trust    Co.,    48    S.B.    494,    103    Va. 
1. 

34  C.J.  p  457  note  83. 
Zfenitalle  set-off 

Va. — Hoge  v.  Fidelity  Loan  &  Trust 
Co.,  supra. 

90.  U.S. — Griswold   v.    Hazard,    C.C. 
"  R.L,    28    F.    578,    affirmed   11    S.Ct. 

972,  999,  141  U.S.  260,  35  L.Ed.  678. 
34  C.J.  p  457  note  88. 

91.  U.S. — Mather  v.  Stokely,  Mass., 
236   F.   124,   149   C.OA.   334. 

34  C.J.  p  458  note  89. 

92.  Term. — Scurlock  v.   Scurlock,  22 
S.W.  858,  92  Tenn.  629. 

34  C.J.  p  458  note  90. 

98.     Pa.— Given's  Appeal,  15  A.  468, 

121  Pa.   260,   6  Am.S.R.  795. 
34  C.J.  p  458  note  91. 

94.    Idaho.— Donovan  v.  Miller,  88  P. 

82,   12  Idaho  600,  10  Ann.Cas.  444, 

9  L.R.A..N.S.,  524. 
34  C.J.  p  458  note  92. 


Excessive  loams 

Judgment  debtor  was  held  not  en- 
titled to  cancellation  of  judgments 
obtained  on  loans  made  in  excess  of 
the  amount  permitted  by  Small  Loan 
Act,  where  he  did  not  assert  viola- 
tions in  suits  leading1  to  judgments, 
and  did  not  show  that  he  was  pre- 
vented from  asserting  violations  by 
fraud,  accident,  or  act  of  adverse 
party  unmixed  with  his  own  fraud 
or  negligence. — Nolan  v.  Southland 
Loan  &  Investment  Co.,  169  S.E. 
370,  177.  Ga.  59. 

95.  Cal. — Pacific    Debenture    Co.    v. 
Caldwell,   81  P.   314.  147  Cal.   106. 

34  C.J.  p  458  nota  93. 

96.  N.Y.— Schley  v.  Andrews,  121  N. 
B.  812,  225  N.Y.  110. 

34  C.J.  p  458  note  94. 

97.  HI. — Boddie   v.   Brewer  &  Hof- 
mann    Brewing   Co.,    68    N.E.    394, 
204  111.  352. 

34  C.J.  p  458  notes  95   [a],  96. 

96.    Ala.— Paulding    v.    Watson,    21 
Ala.  279. 

718 


Ky.— Clay  v.  Fry,  3  Bibb,  248,  6  Am. 
D.  654. 

99.     IIL— West  v.  Carter,  21  N.E.  782, 

129  111.  249. 
N.Y. — Everitt  v.  Knapp,  6  Johns.  331. 

1.  Ga. — OT7ens  v.  Van  Winkle  Gin  & 
Machinery  Co.,  23  S.E.  416,  06  Ga. 
408,  31  L.R.A.  767. 

34  C.J.  p  458  note  1. 

2.  Va.— White     v.     Washington,     5 
Gratt.  645,  46  Va.  645. 

34  C.J.  p  458  note  2. 

3.  Va. — Greer  v.  Hale,   28   S.E.   873, 
95  Va.  533,  64  AmuS.R.  814. 

34  C.J.  p  458  note  3. 

4.  N.Y. — Home  v.  McGintey,  299  N. 
Y.S.  1,  252  App.Div.  296. 

Tex. — Dallas  Trust  &  Savings  Bank 
v.  Brashear,  Civ.App.,  39  S.W.2d 
148,  modified  on  other  grounds, 
ConouApp..  65  S.W.2d  288. 

34  C.J.  p  459  note  4. 

5.  Tenn. — BumpaPs     v.     Reams,     1 
Sneed  505. 

34  C.J.  p  459  note  5. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  361 


which  should  have  been  Interposed  in  the  original  ac- 
tion has  been  applied  to  a  great  many  defenses,  includ- 
ing such  defenses  as.  want  of  consideration,  and  pay- 
ment or  discharge  of  the  claim  underlying  the  Judgment. 

Although  some  decisions  favor  the  right  of  equi- 
ty to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment,  be- 
cause of  the  want  or  failure  of  consideration  for 
the  contract  on  which  it  is  founded,  on  the  broad 
ground  that  it  would  be  against  conscience  to  per- 
mit the  collection  of  the  judgment  under  such  cir- 
cumstances,6 it  has  generally  been  held  that  this  is 
a  defense  which  should  be  interposed  in  the  original 
action,  and  will  furnish  no  ground  for  relief  in 
equity  if  the  party  raised  it  in  the  original  action 
or  might  have  done  so.7  Relief  may  be  granted 
under  some  circumstances,  however,  as  where  the 
failure  of  consideration  occurs  or  is  discovered  aft- 
er the  rendition  of  the  judgment,8  provided  the  in- 
jured party  has  then  no  adequate  remedy  at  law,9 
which  is  the  case,  for  instance,  where  his  remedy 
would  be  by  an  action  against  the  other  party  and 
the  latter  is  insolvent,10  and  provided  complainant 
himself  is  free  from  all  fraud  or  dishonesty  and 
is  injured  by  the  judgment  as  it  stands.11 

Payment,  settlement,  or  discharge  of  the  claim 
in  suit  must  generally  be  set  up  as  a  defense  before 
judgment,  and  will  furnish  no  ground  for  a  court  of 
equity  to  enjoin  the  judgment  unless  the  party  was 


prevented  from  making  his  defense  by  fraud,  cir- 
cumvention, or  deceit,  or  by  an  accident.12  This 
applies  to  a  defense  that  defendant  in  the  original 
suit  was  discharged  from  liability  as  surety  by  an 
extension  of  time  granted  to  the  principal.13  Clear- 
ly a  party  is  not  entitled  to  enjoin  the  collection  of 
the  entire  judgment  because  of  the  payment  of  a 
part14 

Miscellaneous  defenses.  The  rule  prohibiting 
equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  where  the 
ground  of  relief  is  based  on  matters  which  should 
have  been  interposed  as  a  defense  in  the  original 
action  has  been  applied  to  a  great  many  defenses  in 
addition  to  those  already  considered,  including  de- 
fenses based  on  breach  of  warranty,15  coverture,16 
a  discharge  in  bankruptcy,17  duress  or  threats,18 
forgery,19  infancy,20  invalidity  of  a  statute,21  limi- 
tation of  liability  under  an  insurance  policy,22  mis- 
representation in  securing  a  contract,23  non  est  fac- 
tum,24  the  pendency  of  another  action,25  rescission 
of  the  contract  in  suit  prior  to  judgment,26  the  stat- 
ute of  limitations,27  and  ultra  vires.28  The  rule  has 
also  been  applied  to  a  defense  that  plaintiff  in  the 
action  at  law  was  not  legally  incorporated;29  that 
plaintiff,  a  foreign  corporation,  was  without  au- 
thority to  sue  because  of  noncompliance  with  the 
requirements  of  domestic  statutes;80  that  because 
of  collusion  complainant's  right  to  a  set-off  was  de- 


6.  W.Va. — Jarrett  v.  Goodnow,  20  S. 
B.    675,    39    W.Va,    602,    32    L.R.A. 
321. 

34  C.J.  P  459  note  6. 

7.  N.T. — Fuhrmann  v.  Fanroth,  173 
N.E.  685,  254  N.T.  479. 

Tex. — Browning-Ferris  Machinery 
Co.  v.  Thomson,  Civ.App.,  55  S.W. 
2d  168. 

34  C.J.  p  4=59  note  7. 

8.  Md. — Michael    v.    Rigler,    120    A. 
382,  142  Md.  125. 

34  C.J.  p  459  note  10. 
Newly    discovered   evidence    see    in- 
fra §  376. 

9.  Minn. — Hulett  v.  Hamilton,  61  N. 
W.  672,  60  Minn.  51. 

34  C.J.  p  459  note  11. 

10.  Ind.— Gillett  v.  Sullivan,  26  N.E. 
827,  127  Ind.  327. 

34  C.J.  p  459  note  12. 

11.  Kan. — Cheney  v.  Hovey,  44  P. 
605,  56  Kan.  637. 

34  a JT.  p  459  note  13. 

12.  Ark.— Smith  v.  Thomas,  78  S.W. 
2d  880,  190  Ark.  261. 

111.— Moore  v.  Robbins  Machinery  & 
Supply  ۥ.,  '252  IlLApp.  24. 

Ky. — Nicholson  v.  Ausmus,  132  S. 
W.2d  748,  280  Ky.  99. 

Tex. — Corcanges  v.  Childress,  Civ. 
App.,  280  S.W.  892. 

34  C.J.  p  459  note  15,  p  440  note  82 


Payment  or  satisfaction  of  judgment 

see  supra  §  855. 

Conveyance   to   mortgagee  in   satis- 
faction, of  delft 

In  foreclosure  proceedings  where 
mortgagors  were  served  with  sum- 
mons and  failed  to  interpose  defense 
to  the  suit,  mortgagor  could  not 
thereafter  have  the  decree  of  fore- 
closure set  aside  on  ground  of  al- 
leged conveyance  to  mortgagee  in 
satisfaction  of  debt  prior  to  rendi- 
tion of  decree.— White  v.  Milburn, 
122  S.W.2d  589,  197  Ark.  373. 

13.  N.Y.— Vilas  v.  Jones,  1  N.Y.  274, 
How.A.Cas.  759. 

14.  Tex. — Alexander    v.    Baylor,    20 
Tex.  660. 

34  C.J.  p  460  note  18. 

16.  Tex. — Browning-Ferris  Machin- 
ery Co.  v.  Thomson,  Civ. App.,  55 
S.W.2d  168. 

16.  Tex. — City  Nat.  Bank  of  Colora- 
do,   Tex.,   v.    Gamel,   Civ. App.,    241 
S.W.    735,   affirmed  Gamel  v.   City 
Nat.     Bank,    Com.  App.,     258     S.W. 
1043. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  58. 

17.  Ind. — Burke  v.   Pinnell,   93   Ind. 
540. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  53. 

15.  Va. — Hendricks    v.    Compton,    2 
Rob.  192,  41  Va.  192. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  60. 

719 


19.  Minn. — Watklns    v.    Landon,    69 
N.W.  711,  67  Minn.  136. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  59. 

20.  Ohio. — Clark  v.  Bond,  Wright  p 
282. 

21.  Fla.— Crum    v.    Baily,    184    So. 
774,  135  Fla.  192. 

22.  Tex. — Southern   Travelers   Ass'n 
v.    Stillman,    Civ.App.,    109    S.W.2d 
285,  error  dismissed. 

(.    N.J. — Raimondi   v.   Bianchi,   140 
A.  584,  102  N.J.Eq.  254. 

24.  N.C.— Partin  v.  Luterloh,   59  N. 
C.  341. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  56. 

25.  Cal. — Brown  v.   Campbell,  43  P. 
12,  110  Cal.  644. 

26.  Ala.— Moore  v.  Dial,  3  Stew.  155. 

27.  Tex. — Griffin     v.     Burrus,     Civ. 
App.,  24  S.W.2d  805,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.,  24  S.W.2d  810. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  54. 

28.  111. — Atwater  v.  American  Exciu 
Nat  Bank,  40  IlLApp.  501,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  38  N.B.  1017,  152 
111.  605. 

29.  La. — Mahan    v.    Accommodation 
Bank,  26  La. Ann.  34. 

30.  Mont— Schilling   v.   Reagan,    48 
P.  1109,  19  Mont.  €08. 


§  362 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


feated;31  that  a  credit  to  which  he  was  entitled  was 
not  given  to  complainant;32  that  the  issues  on  re- 
trial of  the  original  action  were  not  limited  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  decision  of  the  appellate  court  ;33 
and  other  defenses.34 


§  362. 


Equitable  Defenses 


Relief  against  a  Judgment  at  law  may  be  had  In 
equity  on  grounds  constituting  an  equitable  defense 
which  could  not  have  been  Interposed  in  the  law  action. 

If  a  party's  defense  to  an  action  at  law  is  not 
within  the  cognizance  of  a  court  of  law,  being  pure- 
ly equitable  in  its  nature,  he  is,  of  course,  not 
chargeable  with  negligence  in  failing  to  make  it 
effectual  at  law;  and  he  may  have  relief  in  equity 
against  the  judgment,  if  it  is  unjust  and  inequitable, 
on  the  grounds  constituting  such  defense.35  The 
rule  applies  whether  the  party  suffers  judgment  to 
go  against  him  without  attempting  to  make  the  de- 
fense,36 or  whether,  on  attempting  it,  it  is  adjudged 
to  be  purely  equitable  and  not  a  defense  to  an  ac- 
tion at  law.37  If  defendant  has  both  a  legal  and  an 


equitable  defense,  the  latter  not  cognizable  at  law, 
a  failure  to  use  diligence  in  making  his  legal  de- 
fense will  not  prevent  a  court  of  equity  from  grant- 
ing an  injunction  on  proof  of  the  equitable  de- 
fense*38 

Under  codes  of  practice  which  blend  legal  and 
equitable  powers,  or  confer  extensive  equitable  pow- 
ers on  the  courts  of  common  law,  it  has  been  held 
that  a  defense,  if  available  under  the  code,  must  be 
set  up  in  the  original  action,  and  cannot  be  made 
the  basis  of  a  subsequent  application  to  equity,  al- 
though it  is  inherently  equitable  in  its  nature.39 

§  363.    Excuses  for  Not  Defending 

Failure  to  interpose  a  defense  will  not  bar  equitable 
relief  against  a  judgment  where  a  sufficient  excuse  ex- 
ists for  such  failure,  provided  the  party  asserting  the 
excuse  was  not  guilty  of  any  fault  or  negligence. 

Equity  may  grant  relief  against  a  judgment  which 
is  unjust  and  inequitable,  where  the  party  had  a 
good  defense  to  the  action,  but  had  no  opportunity 
to  avail  himself  of  it,  or  lost  such  defense  through 
the  wrongful  acts  of  the  adverse  party.40  Thus 


31.  U.S. — Marine   Ins.  Co.   of  Alex- 
andria v.  Hodgson,  B.C.,  7  Cranch 
332,  3  L.Ed.  362. 

Tenn. — Thurmond  v.  Durham,  3 
Yerg.  99. 

32.  Tenn. — Reeves  v.  Hogan,   Cooke 
175,  5  Am.D.  684,  1  Overt  513. 

33.  Cal. — Harris  v.  Hensley,  6  P.2d 
253,  214  Cal.  420. 

34.  CaL — De  Tray  v.  Chambers,  297 
P.  575,  112  CaLApp.  697. 

Iowa. — West  v.  Heyman,  241  N.W. 
461,  214  Iowa  1173. 

Mass. — Lynn  Sand  &  Stone  Co.  v. 
TardiO,  6  N.E.2d  349,  296  Mass. 
470. 

Mo.— McFadln  v.  Simms,  273  S.W. 
1050,  309  Mo.  312. 

Pa. — Graham  Roller  Bearing-  Corpo- 
ration v.  Stone,  126  A.  235,  281 
Pa.  229. 

Tex. — Blackman  v.  Blackman,  Civ. 
App.,  128  S.W.2d  433,  error  dis- 
missed, Judgment  correct. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  72. 

Remarriage  of  widow 

Equity  will  not  grant  relief 
against  judgment  for  death  of  hus- 
band because  widow  did  not  disclose 
fact  of  remarriage,  where  matter 
was  available  in  law  action. — Simon 
v.  Henke,  139  A.  887,  102  N.J.Eq.  115. 
Agreement  to  cancel  note* 

Where  defendant  in  an  action  to 
enforce  payment  of  notes,  failed  to 
set  up  his  defense  that  plaintiff  had 
agreed  to  cancel  notes,  he  could  not 
afterward  apply  to  a  court  of  equity 
for  an  injunction  to  restrain  enforce- 
ment of  a  Judgment  rendered  in  such 
action,  and  in  such  proceeding  assert 
that  defense. — Corcanges  v.  Chil- 
dress,  Tex.Civ.App.,  264  S.W.  175. 


Severance  of  coupons  from  bonds 

The  rule  has  been  applied  to  a 
defense  that  coupons  which  com- 
plainant had  contracted  to  buy  were 
invalid  because  they  were  severed 
from  the  bonds  before  issuance. — 
McMullen  v.  Ritchie,  C.C.Ohio,  64 
F.  253,  modified  on  other  grounds 
79  F.  522,  25  C.C.A.  50,  certiorari 
denied  18  S.Ct  945,  168  U.S.  710,  42 
L.Ed.  1212. 
Claim  of  reinsurer  against  insurer 

In  insured's  action  against  rein- 
surers after  insurer's  insolvency,  re- 
insurer who  failed  to  plead  claim 
against  insurer  waived  it  as  defense 
against  insured. — Southern  Surety 
Co.  v.  Globe  Nat.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  228 
N.W.  56,  210  Iowa  359. 

35.    U.S. — Coos   Bay  Lumber  Co.   v. 

Collier,    C.C.A.Or.,    104    F.2d    722— 

Town  of  Boynton  v.  White  Const. 

Co.,   C.C.A.Fla.,    64   F.2d   190-^Ten- 

ner  v.  Murray,  C.C.A.Fla.,  32  F.2d 

625 — Mineral    Development    Co.    v. 

Kentucky  Coal  Lands  Co.,  D.C.Ky., 

285  F.  761,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  285  F. 

1021. 

Ga. — Simmons  v.  Camp,   65  Ga.   673. 
111.— Mohr  v.  Messick,  53  N.R2d  743, 

322   111. App.   56 — Meyer  v.    Surkin, 

262  IlLApp.  83— Peck  v.  Peck,  238 

IlLApp.  396. 
N.J. — Palisade    Gardens    v.    Grosch, 

189  A.  622,  121  NJT.Eq.  240. 
Or.— Adams    v.    McMickle,    158    P.2d 

648. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  73. 
Equitable  defenses  as  barred  under 

doctrine  of  res  judicata  see  infra 

§  683. 
Partly  executed  accord 

Equitable  relief  based  on  a  partly 

720 


executed  accord  was  not  foreclosed 
by  Judgment  in  the  law  court,  as  in 
that  court  the  defense  of  a  partly 
executed  accord  was  unavailable. — 
American  Mut  Liability  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Volpe,  C.C.A.N.J.,  284  F.  75. 

A  claim  constituting  in  effect  a 
recoupment  rather  than  an  equitable 
defense  does  not  Justify  equitable  re- 
lief under  a  statute  permitting  a  de- 
fendant, who  has  failed  to  set  up  an 
equitable  defense,  thereafter  to  seek 
equitable  relief.— McGhee  v.  Stevens, 
3  S.E.2d  615,  121  W.Va.  430. 

36.  111.— Meyer   v.    Surkin,    262    111. 
App.  83. 

34  C.J.  p  457  note  74. 

37.  N.J.— Palisade         Gardens         v. 
Grosch,    189    A.    622,    121    N.J.Eq. 
240. 

34  C.J.  p  457  note  75. 

38.  Tenn. — Winchester  v.  Gleaves,  3 
Hayw.    213 — Cornelius   v.    Thomas, 
1  Tenn.Ch.  283. 

39.  U.S. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Coos    Bay  Lumber   Co.   v.   Collier, 
C.C.A.Or.,  104  F.2d  722,   725. 

34  C.J.  p  457  note  76. 
Equitable  matters  available  in  par- 
tition proceedings 
Equity  will  not  enjoin  a  Judgment 
for   partition   at   law   to   enable   de- 
fendant to  set  up  equitable  matters 
as  to  which  complete  relief  could  be 
had    in    the    proceedings    at    law. — 
Hopkins  v.  Medley,  99  111.  509. 

40.  Ala,— Wise    v.    Miller,    111    So. 
913,  215  Ala.  660, 

Fla. — Sommers  v.  Colourpicture  Pub., 
8  So.2d  281,  150  Fla.  659. 

Ky. — Johnson  v.  Gernert  Bros.  Lum- 
ber Co.,  75  S.W.2d  857,  255  Ky.  734. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  363 


equity  may  relieve  against  a  judgment  at  law  where 
the  defense  could  not  have  been  set  up  at  law,41  as 
where  payment  or  settlement  was  made  after  the 
institution  of  the  suit  and  was  not  then  pleada- 
ble.42-  A  judgment  may  be  enjoined  if,  according 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of  common  law,  it  is 
doubtful  whether  the  grounds  of  plaintiff's  defense 
were  legally  available,43  or  if  there  would  have 
been  great  difficulty  and  embarrassment  in  com- 
plainant's legal  remedy,44  especially  where  such 
difficulty  and  embarrassment  were  produced  by  the 
conduct  of  defendant.45 


The  party  asserting  the  excuse  must  have  been 
without  fault  as  to  the  rendition  of  the  judgment 
and  must  have  exercised  due  diligence,  for  a  court 
of  equity  will  not  grant  relief  against  a  judgment  in 
a  former  action  when  the  failure  to  have  a  full  and 
fair  presentation  of  the  case  therein  resulted  from 
the  negligence  or  fault  of  the  party  seeking  relief 
or  that  of  his  agents.46  As  a  rule  it  must  appear 
that,  notwithstanding  the  exercise  of  ordinary  dili- 
gence, the  circumstances  on  which  the  complaining 
party  relies  were  unknown  to  him  before  judg- 
ment.47 A  defendant  is  not  justified  in  failing  to 


Mich. — Lake  v.  North  Branch  Tp., 
22  N.W.2d  248. 

N.J. — Commercial  Nat  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Ham- 
ilton, 133  A.  703,  99  N.J.Eq.  492, 
affirmed  137  A.  403,  101  N.J.EQ. 
249. 

Tex. — Peaslee-Gaulbert  Corporation 
v.  Hughes,  Civ.App.,  79  S.W.2d  149. 
error  refused — Kerby  v.  Hudson, 
Civ.App.,  13  S.W.2d  724. 

34  C.J.  p  460  notes  19,  20. 

Gambling  contract  see  supra  §  361. 

Reasonableness  of  attorney's  charg- 
es 

Where  a  client  has  not  had  an  op- 
portunity in  a  court  of  law  to  test 
the  reasonableness  or  fairness  of  his 
attorney's  charges,  he  will  not  be 
precluded  in  equity  from  so  doing. — 
Raimondi  v.  Bianchi,  134  A.  866,  100 
N.J.EQ.  238. 

41.    111.— Hawkins  v.  Harding,  31  N. 

B.  307,  141  111.  572,  33  Am.S.R.  347. 
34  C.J.  p  4*59  note  8,  p  460  notes  16, 

19   [a]. 


Oompj 


rith  joint  tort-feasor 


Defendant  tort-feasor's  failure  to 
present  plaintiff's  compromise  with 
another  joint  tort-feasor  in  damage 
action  was  held  not  to  bar  present- 
ment thereof  in  subsequent  proceed- 
ing to  prohibit  enforcement  of  judg- 
ment, where,  under  the  statutes,  the 
compromise  was  not  defense  in  dam- 
age action. — New  River  &  Pocahon- 
tas  Consol.  Coal  Co.  v.  Eary,  174  S.B. 
573,  115  W.Va^46. 

Defense    originating1   after   rendition 

of  judgment 

It  has  been  said  to  be  poor  prac- 
tice to  open  a  judgment,  to  estab- 
lish a  defense  which  has  originated 
since  the  rendition  of  the  judgment; 
but  when  the  subject  matter  of  de- 
fense is  attached  to  the  judgment 
or  to  the  consideration  on  which  it 
rests,  the  court  under  its  equitable 
powers  will  entertain  a  petition  and, 
if  the  facts  warrant,  will  open  the 
judgment. — Pollard  &  Brant,  Inc.,  v. 
Stein,  81  Pa,  Super.  374. 

42.  Ohio. — Southern  Surety  Co.  v. 
Bender,  180  N.E.  198,  41  Ohio  App. 
541. 

49  O.J.S.-46 


43.  Va. — Crawford   v.   Thurmond,    8 
Leigh  85,  30  Va.  85. 

34  C.J.  p  460  note  2ti. 

44.  Tenn. — Cornelius  v.  Morrow,   12 
Heisk.  630. 

34  C.J.  p  460  note  23. 

45.  Tenn. — Bedford    v.     Brady,     10 
Terg.  350. 

46.  U.S.— Mclntosh  v.  Wiggins,  C.C. 
A.Mo.,  123  F.2d  316,  certiorari  de- 
nied 62  S.Ct  800,  315  U.S.  815,  86 
L.Ed.  1213,  rehearing  denied  62  S. 
Ct.    914,    315    U.S.    831,    86    L.Ed. 
1224 — Smith   v.  Apple,   C.C.A.Kan., 
6  F.2d  559. 

Ala.— Leath  v.  Lister,  173  So.  59,  233 
Ala.  595— Oden  v.  King,  114  So. 
1,  216  Ala.  597 — Damon  v.  Gaston, 
Williams  &  Wigmore,  104  So.  512, 
213  Ala.  164— Alabama  Chemical 
Co.  v.  Hall,  101  So.  456,  212  Ala.  8. 

Cal.— Wattson  v.  Dillon,  56  P.2d  220, 
6  Cal.2d  33— Wilson  v.  Wilson,  130 
P.2d  782,  55  Cal.App.2d  421— Jef- 
fords v.  Young,  277  P.  163,  98  Cal. 
App.  400. 

Conn. — Palverari  v.  Finta,  26  A.2d 
229,  129  Conn.  38. 

Ga. — Beavers  v.  Cassells,  196  S.E. 
716,  186  Ga.  98— W.  T.  Rawleigh 
Co.  v.  Seagraves,  173  S.B.  167,  178 
Ga,  459 — Garrison  v.  Toccoa  Elec- 
tric Power  Co.,  171  S.E.  564,  177 
Ga.  850,  followed  in  Hayes  v.  Too- 
coa  Electric  Power  Co.,  171  S.E. 
566,  177  GfcL  856— Nolan  v.  South- 
land Loan  &  Investment  Co.,  169 
S.E.  370,  177  Ga,  59— Beddingfleld 
-v.  Old  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  165 
S.E.  61,  175  Ga.  172. 

Idaho. — Boise  Payette  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Idaho  Gold  Dredging  Corporation, 
58  P.2d  786,  56  Idaho  660,  certio- 
rari denied  57  S.Ct  40,  299  U.S. 
577,  81  L.Bd.  425. 

111.— Crane  Co.  v.  Parker,  136  N.B. 
733,  304  111.  331— Mohr  v.  Messick, 
53  N.E.2d  743,  322  IlLApp.  56— 
Goelitz  v.  Lathrop,  3  N.E.2d  305, 
286  Ill.App.  248. 

Ind. — Vail  v.  Department  of  -Finan- 
cial Institutions  of  Indiana,  17  N. 
B.2d  854,  106  IndJVpp.  39— Bran- 
ham  v.  Boruff,  145  N.E.  901,  82 
Ind. App.  370. 

Ky. — Byron  v.  Evans,  91  S.W.2d  548, 
263  Ky.  49 — Mussman  v.  Pepples, 

721 


49    S.W.2d    592,    243    Ky.    674— Lee 

v.  Lee,  38  S.W.2d  223,  238  Ky.  477. 

Mo.— Milltkin  v.  Anderson,   269  S.W. 

675. 
N.J. — Simon    v.    Henke,    139    A.    887, 

102  N.J.EQ.  115. 

Ohio. — Buckeye  State  Building  & 
Loan  Co.  v.  Ryan,  157  N.E.  811,  24 
Ohio  App.  481. 

Tex.— Kelly  v.  Wright,  Sup.,  188  S. 
W.2d  983— Petty  v.  Mitchell,  Civ. 
App.,  187  S.W.2d  138,  error  refused 
— Thomas  v.  Mullins,  Civ.App.,  175 
S.W.2d  276 — Donovan  v.  Young, 
Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  517,  error  re- 
fused— Universal  Credit  -Co.  v. 
Cunningham,  Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d 
507,  error  dismissed — Ricketts  v. 
Ferguson,  Civ.App.,  64  S.W.2d  416, 
error  refused — Honey  v.  Wood, 
Civ.App.,  46  S.W.2d  334— Davis  v. 
Cox,  Civ.App.,  4  S.W.2d  1008,  error 
dismissed — Kahl  v.  Porter,  Civ. 
App.,  296  S.W.  324— R.  A.  Toombs 
Sash  &  Door  Co.  v.  Jamison,  Civ. 
App.,  271  S.W.  253— Levine  v.  Cul- 
lum  Boren  Co.,  Civ.App.,  253  S.W. 
.  894. 
Utah.— Anderson  v.  State,  238  P.  557, 

65  Utah  512. 
Wash.— Fisch  v.  Marler,  97  P.2d  147, 

1  Wash.2d  698. 
Wis.— Grady  v.  Meyer,  236  N.W.  569, 

205  Wis.  147. 

21  C.J.  p  86  note  17—34  C.J.   p  460 
note    20 — 47   C.J.    p    438    notes    80, 
81. 
failure  to  present  evidence 

Fact  that  existing  evidence  was 
not  presented  because  of  accident, 
mistake,  or  misfortune  Is  not  suffi- 
cient reason  for  revocation  of  final 
decree  in  equity  suit — Holyoke  Nat 
Bank  v.  Dulitzky,  173  N.E.  405,  273 
Mass.  125. 

Negligence  induced  "by  adverse  party 
Alleged  negligence  of  the  com- 
plaining party  superinduced  by  neg- 
ligence of  the  party  opposing  re- 
lief cannot  be  invoked  to  estop  the 
former  to  set  aside  Judgment — Ov- 
erton  v.  Overton,  37  S.W.2d  565,  327 
Mo.  530. 

47.  Mich.— Lake  v.  North  Branch 
Tp.,  22  N.W.2d  248. 

N.J. — Commercial  Nat  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Ham- 


363 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


present  his  defense  at  law  simply  because  plaintiff 
verbally  assures  him  that  he  will  not  be  held  re- 
sponsible according  to  the  terms  of  the  judgment 
prayed  for.48  Equity  will  not  enjoin  a  judgment 
where  the  only  reason  alleged  for  the  failure  of  de- 
fendant to  avail  himself  of  a  legal  defense  is  an 
erroneous  ruling  of  the  trial  court  excluding  such 
defense,  for  this  is  to  be  remedied  by  appeal.49 

Availability  of  evidence  at  law.  Where  defend- 
ant cannot  make  good  his  defense,  because  the  only 
evidence  to  sustain  it  is  not  admissible  or  cannot 
be  produced  in  a  court  of  law,  but  can  be  supplied 
in  equity,  he  may  be  relieved  against  the  judg- 
ment.50 Relief  will  not  be  granted,  however,  where 
the  same  grounds  of  objection  to  the  proposed  evi- 
dence are  equally  prohibitive  in  equity  as  at  law.51 

Reliance  on  advice,  statements,  or  acts  of  others. 
It  is  not  a  sufficient  excuse  for  failing  to  defend  an 
action  at  law  that  the  party  relied  on  others,  who 
were  not  officially  bound  to  give  him  correct  infor- 
mation or  any  information  at  all,  to  advise  him  con- 
cerning the  character  or  purpose  of  the  suit,  the 
necessity  of  defending  it,  the  progress  of  the  cause, 
or  its  probable  time  of  trial.52  An  exception  to  the 
rule  has  been  made  in  the  case  of  executors  and  ad- 
ministrators, who  are  obliged,  from  the  nature  of 
their  office,  to  rely  on  the  information  of  others.53 
It  has  been  held  that  one  of  two  defendants  has  the 
right  to  rely  on  the  assurance  of  the  other  that  he 
will  take  care  of  the  matter.54  A  party  is  not  at 
fault  for  assuming  that  commissioners  making  a 
partition  acted  impartially.55 


§  364. 


Ignorance  of  Facts  or  Law 


A  party's  Ignorance  of  facts  which  constitute  a  de- 
fense, and  which  he  could  not  have  discovered  by  the 
exercise  of  due  diligence,  may  furnish  a  ground  for  equi- 
table relief  against  a  judgment;  but  ignorance  of  the 
law  generally  will  afford  no  ground  for  equitable  inter- 
ference. 

Equity  may  grant  relief  against  a  judgment  at 
law,  where  there  was  a  good  and  valid  defense  to 
the  action,  of  which  defendant  was  ignorant  during 
the  pendency  of  the  original  action,  and  which  he 
could  not  have  discovered,  by  the  exercise  of  rea- 
sonable and  proper  diligence,  in  time  to  set  it  up.56 
However,  he  must  show  the  exercise  of  due  dili- 
gence to  discover  his  defense,  or  that  he  was  pre- 
vented from  employing  such  diligence  by  fraud,  ac- 
cident, or  the  act  of  the  opposite  party,  unmixed 
with  fault  or  negligence  on  his  own  part;  other- 
wise equity  will  do  nothing  for  him.57  Although 
a  party  may  have  suspected  the  existence  of  a  fact 
which  would  have  given  him  a  good  defense  to  the 
action  at  law,  this  will  not  preclude  him  from  relief 
in  equity,  if  his  suspicions  did  not  amount  to  legal 
or  moral  certainty,  and  if  he  is  not  chargeable  with 
laches  in  failing  to  make  efforts  to  discover  the 
truth.58 

Special  favor  to  administrators.  Some  courts  are 
disposed  to  show  special  indulgence  in  this  particu- 
lar to  administrators,  on  the  ground  that  they  are 
obliged,  from  the  nature  of  their  office,  to  rely  on 
the  information  which  they  may  derive  from 
others.5^ 

Necessity  of  seeking  discovery.  If  defendant  in 
an  action  at  lavp  could  obtain  information  concern- 


ilton,  133  A.  703,  99  N*.J.Eq.  492, 
alarmed  137  A.  403,  101  N.J.Eq.' 
249. 

W.Va. — Smith  Pocahontas  Coal  Co.  v. 
Morrison,  117  S.E.  152,  93  W.Va. 
356. 

48.  Ala.— Weakley  v.  Gurley,  60  Ala. 
399— Wilson  v.  Randall,  37  Ala,  74, 
76  AmJX  347. 

49.  U.S. — Griswold  v.   Hazard,  R.I., 
11    S.Ct.    972,     999,    141    U.S.    260, 
35  KEd.   678. 

14  OJ.  p  460  note  21. 

50.  Iowa. — Partridge  v.  Harrow,   27 
Iowa  96,  99  Am.D.  643. 

84  aX  p  461  note  33. 

51.  U.S. — Hendrickson   v.    Hinckley, 
Ohio,    17   How.    443,    15   L.Ed.   123. 

34  C.J.  p  462  note  34. 

52.  Ky. — Hoover  v.  Dudley,  14  S.W. 
2d  410,  228  Ky.  110. 

34  C.J.  P  465  note  75. 
Character  of  process 

Failure  of  debtor  to  appear  and 
assert  defense  in  response  to  sum- 
mons served  on  him,  because  per- 


son serving-  process  told  him  it  was 
subpoena  to  appear  as  witness,  is 
not  sufficient  ground  to  set  aside 
Judgment  against  him. — Brinegar  v. 
Bank  of  Wyoming,  130  S.E.  151,  100 
W.Va.  64. 
Availability  of  remedy  in  another 

proceeding 

In  action  by  maker  of  a  note 
against  surety  thereon,  court's  state- 
ment in  opinion  that  equities  be- 
tween makers  and  surety  could  be 
worked  out  in  another  proceeding  did 
not  excuse  surety's  failure  to  set  up 
prima  facie  defense  to  such  action, 
so  as  to  authorize  equitable  relief. 
— Graham  Roller  Bearing  Corpora- 
tion v.  Stone,  126  A.  235,  281  Pa. 
229. 


53.    N.Y.— Hewlett     v. 
Bdw.  7. 


Hewlett,     4 


54.    Va.— Lee  v.  Baird,  4  Hen.  &  M. 

453,  14  Va.  453. 
34  C.J.  p  465  note  77. 

56.    Mich. — Adair  v.  Cummin,  12  N. 
W.  495,  48  Mich.  375. 

722 


56.  Ga. — Toung  v.   Toung,   2   S.E.2d 
622,  188  Ga.  29. 

111.— Tabero  v.  Stutkowski,  3  N.B.2d 

115,  286  Ill.App.  225. 
Tex.— Walker  v.  State,  Civ.App.,  103 

S.W.2d  404. 

34  C.J.  p  460  notes  20,  26. 
Death  of  principal 

Judgments  rendered  against  sure- 
ties on  bonds  without  knowledge 
that  principal  was  dead  at  time  of 
forfeitures  were  subject  to  review  by 
bill  of  review. — Walker  v.  State,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  103  S.W.2d  404. 

57.  Ga.— W.     T.     Rawleigh    Co.     v. 
Seagraves,    173    S.E.    167,    178    Ga. 
459. 

Tex. — American  Red  Cross  v.  Longu 
ley,  Civ.App.,  165  S.W.2d  233,  er- 
ror refused. 

34  C.J.  p  461  note  26. 

Fraud  preventing  defense  see  infra 
§  372. 

58.  Va. — West  v.  Logwood,  6  Munf. 
491,  20  Va.  491. 

59.  N.T.— Hewlett     v.     Hewlett.     4 
Edw.   7. 

34  C.J.  p  456  note  52. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


365 


ing  the  facts  which  constitute  his  defense,  and 
which  are  necessary  to  make  his  defense  effectual, 
by  the  aid  of  a  bill  in  equity  for  a  discovery  from 
the  adverse  party,  his  failure  to  avail  himself  of 
this  means  of  information  will  preclude  him  from 
afterward  obtaining  an  injunction  against  the  judg- 
ment.60 

Ignorance  of  the  law,  of  the  nature  or  conse- 
quences of  the  action,  or  of  the  party's  legal  rights 
and  duties,  will  generally  afford  no  ground  for  eq- 
uitable interference.61  However,  in  some  cases  it 
has  been  held  that  ignorance  of  the  unconstitution- 
ality  of  an  act  is  excusable,  and  that  mistake  caused 
by  proceeding  under  such  a  law  is  a  ground  for 
relief.62  A  party  cannot  be  permitted  to  defeat  a 
judgment  on  the  ground  that  he  did  not  understand 
the  legal  effect  of  papers  served  on  him.63 


§  365.    Mistake  or  Surprise 

a.  Mistake 

b.  Surprise 

a.  Mistake 

An  honest,  mutual,  and  extrinsic  mistake  of  fact 
which  deprives  a  party  of  an  opportunity  to  present  his 
case  affords  ground  for  equitable  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment. A  mistake  of  law,  however,  ordinarily  is  not  suf- 
ficient. 

While  in  a  proper  case  equity  may  grant  relief 
against  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  mistake,64  a 
mere  showing  of  a  mistake  of  some  kind  is  not 
of  itself  sufficient  to  justify  such  relief.65  The  mis- 
take must  be  one  of  fact;66  usually  it  must  relate  to 
matters  which  prevented  a  party  from,  making  a 
valid  defense,67  and  it  must  be  unmixed  with  the 
fault,  negligence,  or  laches  of  the  injured  party.68 


60.  Ala. — Standard  Coal  Co.  v.  Wei- 
sel,  74  So.  935,  199  Ala.  468. 

34  C.J.  p  461  note  32. 

61.  Idaho. — Corpus    Juris    cited    In 
Scanlon.  v.   McDevitt,   296  P.   1016, 
1017,  50  Idaho  449. 

Mont.— Federal  Land  Bank  of  Spo- 
kane v.  Gallatin  County,  274  P. 
288,  84  Mont  98. 

Ohio. — Mosher  v.  Mutual  Home  & 
Savings  Ass'n,  App.,  41  N.B.2d 
871. 

Tex.— Universal  Credit  Co.  v.  Cun- 
ningham, Civ.App.,  109  S,W.2d  507, 
error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  P  461  note  29. 

Mistake  of  law  see  infra  §  365. 

62.  Tex. — Cobbs  v.  Coleman,  14  Tex. 
594. 

34  C.J.  P  461  note  30. 

$3.  cal.— Tolcr  v.  Smith,  23  P.2d 
788,  133  Cal.App.  199. 

34.  tJ.S. — Russell  v.  Superior  Jour- 
nal Co.,  D.C.Wis.,  47  F.Supp.  282. 

Ala.— Phoenix  Chair  Co.  v.  Daniel, 
155  So.  363,  228  Ala.  579. 

Cal.— Wattson  v.  Dillon,  56  P.2d  220, 
6  CaUd  33— Vincent .  v.  Security- 
First  Nat  Bank  of  Los  Angeles, 
155  P.2d  63,  67  Oal.App.2d  602— 
Wilson  v,  Wilson,  130  P.2d  782, 
55  Cal.App.2d  421 — Antonsen  v. 
Pacific  Container  Co.,  120  P.2d  148, 
48  Cal.App.  535— Boyle  v.  Boyle, 
276  P.  118,  97  CaLApp.  703. 

Conn. — Hoey  v.  Investors' "Mortgage 
&  Guaranty  Co.,  171  A,  438,  118 
Conn.  226. 

Ga.— Bailey  v.  McElroy,  2  S.B.2d  634, 
188  Ga.  40,  transferred,  see  6  S. 
E.2d  140,  61  Ga.App.  367. 

111.— Mohr  v,  Mosslck,  53  N.K.2d  743, 
822  IlLApp.  66— Izzi  v.  lalongo,  248 
111. App.  'JO. 

It. 3.— Globe  Mining  Co.  v.  Oak  Ridge 
Coal  Co.,  177  N.E.  868,  204  Ind. 
11 — Livengood  v.  Munns,  27  N.B. 
2d  92,  108  Ind.App.  27. 

Mass. — Byron  v.  Concord  Nat  Bank, 


13  N.E.2d  13,   399   Ma^s.   438. 

Miss. — Robertson  v.  ^E3tna  Ins.  Co., 
98  So.  833,  134  Hiss.  398. 

Mo. — Overton  v.  Overton,  37  S.W.2d 
565,  327  Mo.  530— Krashin  v.  Griz- 
zard,  31  S.W.2d  984,  326  Mo.  606— 
Loveland  v.  Davenport,  App.,  188 
S.W.2d  850. 

N.H.— Lancaster  Nat  Bank  v.  White- 
field  Sav.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  30  A. 
2d  473,  92  N.H.  337— Lamarre  v. 
Lamarre,  152  A.  272,  84  N.H.  441. 

Ohio.— Toung  v.  Guella,  35  N.E.2d 
997,  67  Ohio  App.  11— In  re  Van- 
derlip's  Estate,  12  Ohio  Supp.  123. 

Tenn.— Winters  v.  Allen,  62  S.W.2d 
51,  166  Tenn.  281— Tallent  v.  Sher- 
rell,  184  S.W.2d  561,  27  Tenn.App. 
683. 

Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  633— Love  v.  State 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  San  Antonio, 
90  S.W.2d  819,  126  Tex.  591— Pet- 
ty v.  Mitchell,  Civ.App.,  187  S.W. 
2d  138,  error  refused — Peaslee- 
Gaulbert  Corporation  v.  Hughes, 
Civ.App.,  79  S.W.2d  149,  error  re- 
fused—Kerby  v.  Hudson,  Civ.App., 
13  S.W,2d  724— Hudson  v.  Kerby, 
Civ.App.,  5  S.W.2d  1007— Rachel  v. 
Bland,  Civ.App.,  259  S.W.  230— 
Galloway  v.  Marietta  State  Bank, 
Civ.App.,  258  S.W.  532,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  Marietta  State  Bank 
v.  Galloway,  Com. App.,  269  S.W. 
776. 

34  C.J.  p  440  note  77,  p  460  note  20. 

Rights  of  third  persons 

An  independent  suit  to  equity  may 
be  brought  to  correct  an  unjust 
judgment  on  the  ground  of  mistake, 
if  the  rights  of  others  have  not  in- 
tervened.— Ramsey  v.  McKamey,  152 
S.W.2d  322,  137  Tex.  91. 

Mistake  held  not  shown 

U.S.— Mclntosh  v.  Wiggins,  C.C.A. 
Mo.,  123  F.2d  316,  certiorari  de- 
nied 62  S.Ct  800,  313  U.S.  815,  86 
L.Ed.  1213,  rehearing  denied  62 

723 


S.Ct    914,    315    U.S.    831,    86    L.Ed. 
1224. 

65.  Cal. — De  Tray  v.  Chambers,  297 
P.  575,  112  Cal.App.  697. 

Ky. — Mussman  v.  Pepples,  49  S.W.2d 

592,  243  Ky.  674— Lee  v.  Lee,  38  S. 

W.2d  223,  238  Ky.. 477. 
Tex.— Kelly  v.  Wright,   Sup.,    188   S. 

W.2d     983 — Maytag    Southwestern 

Co.  v.  Thornton,  Civ.App.,  20  S.YP. 

2d  383,  'error  dismissed — Davis  v. 

Cox,  Civ.App.,  4  S.W.2d  1008,  error 

dismissed. 

Availability     of    funds     to     satisfy 
claim 

The  surety  on  a  replevy  bond  of 
a  defendant  was  held  not  entitled  to 
have  a  judgment  against  him  on 
the  bond  set  aside  on  the  ground  of 
mistake  based  on  a  claim  that  he 
was  induced  to  sign  the  bond  by  a 
representation  that  defendant  had 
deposited  with  the  attorney  sufficient 
funds  to  satisfy  the  note  and  mort- 
gage involved,  and  that  after  judg- 
ment was  entered  the  money  was 
returned  to  defendant  without  the 
surety's  knowledge  or  consent,  in  the 
absence  of  anything  connecting 
plaintiff  with  the  transaction. — 
Reeves  v.  Chapman,  Tex.Civ.App., 
19  S.W.2d  132. 

66.  Miss. — Robertson   v.   ^BStna  Ins. 
Co.,    98    So.    833,    134    Miss.    398. 

67.  Tax.— Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.    Pribble,    Civ.App.,    130    S.W.2d 
33$,  error  refused. 

68.  Cal. — Wilson  v.  Wilson,    180   P. 
•2d   782,    55    Cal.App.2d   421. 

Comx. — Hoey  v.  Investors'  Mortgage 
&  Guaranty  Co.,  171  A.  438,  118 
Conn.  226. 

HI.— Mohr  v.  Messick,  €3  N.E.2d  743, 
322  Ill.App.  56. 

Mo. — Gorg  v.  Rutherford,  App.,  31 
S.W.2d  585. 

N.H.— Lancaster  Nat  Bank  v.  White- 
field  Sav.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  30  A. 


365 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


As  the  rule  is  sometimes  expressed,  a  mistake  of 
fact,  provided  it  is  honest  and  genuine,  and  such 
as  a  man  might  reasonably  make,  will  be  a  suffi- 
cient excuse  for  not  defending  an  action  at  law,  and 
will  warrant  a  court  of  equity,  if  the  judgment  is 
against  conscience,  in  enjoining  its  enforcement.69 
The  mistake  relied  on  as  a  ground  for  equitable 
relief  against  a  judgment  must  be  a  mutual  mis- 
take,70 or  a  unilateral  mistake  of  the  complaining 
party  coupled  with  some  act  of  the  opposing  party 
which  brings  about  the  mistake.71  The  mistake 
must  be  extrinsic  rather  than  intrinsic.72 

Mistake  of  lew.  It  is  no  ground  for  relief  in 
equity  that  the  party  was  prevented  from  making 
his  defense  at  law  by  a  mistake  of  law,  not  induced 
by  the  fraud  or  misconduct  of  the  other  party,73 
or  by  reason  of  mistaking  or  misunderstanding  his 
rights  in  the  premises.74  This  is  true  even  where 
the  mistake  is  due  to  an  erroneous  statement  made 
by  the  trial  judge.75  Relief,  however,  may  be  de- 


creed in  cases  of  mistakes  in  law  induced  by  the 
fraud  or  circumvention  of  the  party  profiting  there- 
by76 or  where  there  are  other  facts  sufficient  to 
take  the  case  out  of  the  general  rule.77 

Mistake  of  court  officers.  Relief  is  sometimes 
granted  for  mistake  made  by  officers  of  the  court,78 
at  least  when  the  mistake  is  of  a  ministerial  rather 
than  a  judicial  character.™ 

b.  Surprise 

Equity  may  grant  relief  against  a  Judgment  on  the 
ground  of  surprise  unmixed  with  negligence  on  the  part 
of  the  complaining  party;  but  surprise  caused  by  the 
evidence  given  at  the  trial,  and  against  which  the  in- 
jured party  could  have  protected  himself  by  proper  care, 
Is  insufficient. 

Equity  may  relieve  a  party  from  a  judgment  ob- 
tained against  him  by  surprise,80  especially  where 
the  facts  constituting  the  surprise  are  tantamount  to 
a  perpetration  of  fraud  by  the  opposite  party.81 
Thus  a  party  will  be  entitled  to  equitable  relief 


2d   473,    92  N.H.    337— Lamarre  v. 

Lainarre,  152  A.  272,  84  N.H.  441. 
Tex. — American    Law    Book    Co.    v. 

Chester,   Civ.App.,   110   S.W.2d  950, 

error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  462  note  37,  p  460  note  20. 
69.    Ala, — Hanover  Fire   Ins.  Co.  v. 

Street,   154   So.   816,   228   Ala.   677. 
34  C.J.  p  462  note  35. 
70t    Ind.— Wohadlo  v.  Fary,  46  N.E. 

2d  489,  221  Ind.  219— Livengood  v. 

Munns,  27  N.E.2d  92,  108  Ind.App. 

27. 
Miss. — Robertson   v.   .SStna   Ins.   Co., 

98  So.  833,  134  Miss.  398. 
Mo. — Gorg   v.    Rutherford,    App.t    31 

S.W.2d  585. 

Tex. — Universal    Credit   Co.    v.   Cun- 
ningham, Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d  507, 

error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  462  note  36. 

71.  Tex. — Universal    Credit    Co.    v. 
Cunningham,   Civ.App.,   109  S.W.2d 
507,  error  dismissed. 

Fraudulent  concealment  or  inequita- 
ble conduct 

Relief  from  consent  decree,  en- 
tered as  result  of  unilateral  mistake 
induced  by  fraudulent  concealment 
of  facts  by  party  against  whom  re- 
,  lief  is  sought,  is  available;  but  in 
absence  of  such  concealment  or  oth- 
er inequitable  conduct,  relief  is  not 
available.— Mudd  v.  Lanier,  Al^u,  24 
So.2d  550. 

72.  CaL— Hallett   v.    Slaughter,    140 
P.2d  3,  22  Cal.2d  552— Westphal  v. 
Westphal,   126  P.2d  105,  20  Cal.2d 
393— Olivera    v.    Grace,    122    P.2d 
564,  19  Cal.2d  570,  140  A.L.R.  1328 
—Rogers  v.   Mulkey,   147   P.2d  62, 
63  Cal.App.2d  567 — Antonsen  v.  Pa- 
cific  Container  Co.,   120   P.2d   148, 

.48  CaJUApp.2d  535. 

A  •mlitaTre  is  extrinsic  when  it  de- 


prives the  unsuccessful  party  of  an 
opportunity  to  present  his  case  tr 
the  court.— Westphal  v.  Westphal, 
126  P.2d  105,  20  Cal.2d  393— Roger? 
v.  Mulkey.  147  P.2d  62.  63  Cal.App.2d 
567 — Rosenbaum  v.  Tobias*  Estate, 
130  P.2d  215.  55  Cal.App.2d  39. 

73.  Ariz. — Snyder  v.  Betsch,  130  P. 
2d  510,  59  Ariz.  535. 

Kan.— Bitsko  v.  Bitsko,  122  P.2d  753, 

155  Kan.  80. 
Mich.— Barr  v.  Payne,  298  N.W.  460, 

298  Mich.  85. 

Mont — Federal  Land   Bank  of  Spo- 
kane  v.    Gallatin    County,    274    P. 
288,  84  Mont  98. 
KM.— Caudill  v.  Caudill,  44  P.2d  724, 

39  N.M.  248. 

Tex. — Universal   Credit   Co.  v.   Cun- 
ningham, Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d  507, 
error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  462  note  38. 
Time  for  perfecting  appeal 

A  mistake  of  law  as  to  the  time 
in  which  an  appeal  could  be  per- 
fected is  not  a  ground  for  relief. — 
Wardlow  v.  McGhee,  63  S.W.2d  332, 
187  Ark.  955. 

74.  Or.— French  v.  Goin,   146  P.   91, 
75  Or.  255. 

34  C.J.  p  462  note  39. 

75.  Mo. — Risher  v.  Roush,  2  Mo.  95, 
22  Am.D.  442. 

Mistake  of  court  see  supra  §  356. 
Opinions  or  suggestions  of  Judge 

In  the  absence  of  some  element 
of  fraud  or  misconduct  on  the  part 
of  the  adverse  party,  equity  will  not 
interpose  to  vacate  or  enjoin 'a  judg- 
ment on  the  ground  of  a  mistake  of 
law  caused  by  opinions  or  sugges- 
tions of  the  judge  before  whom  the 
cause  was  tried. — Universal  Credit 
Co.  v.  Cunningham,  Tex.Civ.App., 
109  S.W.2d  507,  error  dismissed. 

724 


76.  Ala. — Jones  Y.  Watkins,  1  Stew. 
81. 

111.— Paine  v.  Doughty,  96  N.m  212, 
251  I1L  396. 

77.  U.S. — Wellman   v.    Bethea,   S.C., 
228  F.   882,  143  C.C.A.   280. 

34  C.J.  p  462  note  42. 

78.  Ind. — Livengood  v.  Munns,  27  N. 
B.2d  92,  108  Ind.App.  27. 

Mo. — Anderson  Motor  Co.  v.  Ster- 
ling, App.,  121  S.W.2d  275,  opin- 
ion quashed  on  other  grounds 
State  ex  rel.  Sterling  v.  Shaln,  129 
S.W.2d  1048,  344  Mo.  891— State  ex 
rel.  Woolman  v.  Guinotte,  282  S. 
W.  68,  221  MoJlpp.  466. 
Failure  to  mark  motion  as  filed 

Where  motion  to  stay  proceedings 
was  actually  filed,  but  through  mis- 
take of  clerk  was  not  marked  as  filed, 
default  judgment  thereafter  taken 
against  party  having  meritorious  de- 
fense could  be  set  aside  in  equity. — 
Krashin  v.  Grizzard,  31  S.W.2d  984, 
326  Mo.  606. 

79.  Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Woolman  v. 
Guinotte,    282    S.W.    68,    221    Mo. 
App.  466. 

80.  Ala.— Craft    v.    Hirsh,    149    So. 
683,  227  Ala.  257,  appeal  dismissed 
54    S.Ct   455,    291   U.S.    644,    78    L. 
Ed.  1041. 

Conn. — Hoey  v.  Investors'  Mortgage 

&   Guaranty  Co.,    171   A.    438,    118 

Conn.  226. 
111.— Mohr  v.  Messick,  53  N.E.2d  743, 

322  IlLApp.  56. 
Ind. — Globe  Mining  Co.  v.  Oak  Ridge 

Coal  Co.,  177  N.E.  868,  204  In.d.  11. 
Mass. — Byron  v.  Concord  Nat  Bank, 

13  N.E.2d  13,  399  Mass.  438. 
34  C.J.  p  462  note  46,  p  460  note  20. 

81.  N.Y.— Post     v.     Boardman,     10 
Paige  580.. 

34  CJ.  p  462  note  47. 


49     C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


366 


where  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the  suit  until  after 
judgment  had  been  obtained,82  where  a  party  for 
good  and  sufficient  reasons,  and  without  any  neg- 
ligence or  inattention,  believes  that  his  case  will  not 
be  reached  for  trial  during  the  current  term  or  with- 
in a  certain  time,  but  nevertheless  it  is  called  and 
he  is  defaulted,83  or  where  at  a  subsequent  day  of 
the  term  judgment  was  taken  in  a  litigated  case, 
defendant  and  his  counsel  having  in  the  meantime 
left  the  court,  relying  on  an  order  of  continuance 
of  all  cases  until  the  next  term.84  On  the  other 
hand,  an  injunction  will  not  be  allowed  where  the 
surprise  relied  on  was  such  as  might  reasonably 
have  been  guarded  against,85  where  the  party  has  a 
remedy  in  the  trial  court,86  or  where  the  surprise 
was  occasioned  by  his  own  negligence  or  lack  of 
care  or  attention.87 

Surprise  caused  by  evidence  or  witnesses.  Relief 
in  equity  against  a  judgment  ordinarily  cannot  be 
had  on  the  ground  of  surprise  caused  by  the  absence 
of  a  witness  from  the  trial,88  by  the  unexpected 
character  of  the  testimony  given  by  a  witness,89 
by  the  introduction  of  unanticipated  evidence,90 


or  by  a  discovery  that  a  witness  who  was  relied  on 
to  testify  is  incompetent  or  privileged,91  at  least 
where  the  party  could  have  guarded  himself  against 
such  a  surprise  by  the  exercise  of  proper  care  and 
vigilance.92  However,  where  a  witness  who  imme- 
diately before  the  trial  assured  defendant  that  he 
could  prove  material  facts  either  designedly  or 
from  lapse,  of  memory  failed  to  do  so,  equity  will 
grant  relief.93 


§  366. 


Accident  or  Misfortune 


Accident  or  misfortune,  such  as  that  preventing  a 
party  or  his  counsel  from  attending  the  trial,  may  af- 
ford ground  for  equitable  interference  with  a  Judgment, 
provided  the  accident  or  misfortune  was  unavoidable  and 
not  attributable  in  any  way  to  the  fault  of  the  party 
aeeking  relief. 

Unavoidable  accident,  misfortune,  or  casualty  pre- 
venting the  party  from  making  his  defense  is  suf- 
ficient ground  for  the  interference  of  equity  in  an 
otherwise  meritorious  case.94  However,  it  must 
appear  that  the  accident,  casualty,  or  misfortune 
was  in  fact  unavoidable  or  in  no  way  attributable 
to  the  negligence  or  lack  of  diligence  of  the  party 
seeking  equitable  relief,96  and  relief  will  not  be 


32. 


Hen. 


980, 


Va.— Mosby  v.  Haskins,  4 
;  M.  427.  14  Va-  427. 
S3.    Vt— Weed  v.  Hunt,   56   A. 

76  Vt.  212. 
34  C.J.  p  463  note  49. 
34.    Mo.— Beck  v.  Jackson,  140  S.W. 

019,  160  Mo.App.  427. 
34  C.J.  p  463  note  50. 
S5.    Iowa.— Finch    v.    Hollinger,    47 

Iowa  173. 

34  C.J.  p  463  note  51. 
$6.    U.S. — Crim  v.  Handley,   Ga.,   94 

U.S.  652,  24  L.Ed.  216. 
Minn. — Wieland  v.  Shillock,  23  Minn. 

227. 
S7.    Ky.— Logan    v.    Outen,    4    Bibb 

399. 

34  C.J.  p  463  note  53. 
Sale  of  property  to  complaining'  par- 
ty's agent 

Defendants  could  not,  on  petition 
to  open  foreclosure  decree  pro  con- 
fesso,  complain  of  surprise  in  inade- 
quacy of  price  of  the  property,  which 
was  sold  to  their  agent— Etz  v. 
Weinmann,  150  A.  436,  106  N.J.Bq. 
309. 

S3.    U.S. — Chapman  v.   Scott,   C.C.D. 

C.,  5  F.Cas.No.2,609,  1  Cranch  C.C. 

302. 
34  C.J.  p  468  note  54. 

39.    111.— Bell  v.  Gardner,  77  111.  319. 
34  C.J.  P  463  note  55. 

90.    U.S.— Hendrickson   v.   Hinckley, 

Ohio,  17  How.  443,  15  L.Ed  123. 
34  C.J.  p  463  note  56. 

SI.    IlL — Abrama    v.    Camp,    4    HL 
290. 


92.  U.S,— Hendrickson   v.   Hinckley,  j 
Ohio.  17  How.  443,  15  L.Ed.  123. 

34  C.J.  p  463  note  58. 

93.  Va. — White    v.    Washington,     5 
Gratt.  645,  46  Va.  645. 

94.  U.S.-^Town  of  Boynton  v.  White 
Const.  Co.,  C.C.A.Fla,,  64  F.2d  190 
— Jenner    v.    Murray,     C.C.A.Fla., 
32    F.2d    625— Russell   v.    Superior 
Journal   Co.,   D.C.Wis.,   47   F.Supp. 
282. 

Ark.— United  Order  of  Good  Samari- 
tans v.  Bryant,  '57  S.W.2d  399,  186 
Ark.  960,  certiorari  denied  54  ,  S. 
Ct.  59,  290  U.S.  641,  78  L.Ed.  557. 

Cat— Hallett  v.  Slaughter,  140  P. 
2d  3,  22  Cal.2d  552. 

Conn. — Hoey  v.  Investors'  Mortgage 
&  Guaranty  Co.,  171  A.  438,  118 
Conn.  226. 

Fla. — Sommers  v.  Colourpicture  Pub., 
8  So.2d  281,  150  Fla.  659. 

Ga.— Bailey  v.  McBlroy,  2  S.B.2d  634, 
188  Ga.  40,  transferred,  see  6  S. 
B.2d  140,  61  Ga.App.  367— Young 
v.  Young,  2  S.E.2d  622,  188  Ga.  29. 

III.— Mohr  v.  Messick,  53  N.B.2d  743, 
322  IlLApp.  56— Izzi  v.  lalongo,  248 
Ill.App.  90. 

Iowa.— Clarke  v.  Smith.  192  N.W. 
136,  195  Iowa  1299. 

. — Byron  v.  Concord  Nat  Bank, 
13    N.E.2d   13,    299    Mass.   438. 

. — Robertson  v.   ^Gtna  Ins.   Co., 
98  So.  833,  134  Miss.  398. 

Mo. — Krasbin  v.  Grizzard,  31  S.W.2d 
984,  326  Mo.  606— Boeckmann  v. 
Smith,  App.,  189  S.W.2d  449— Love- 
land  v.  Davenport,  App.,  188  S.W. 
2d  850— State  ex  rel.  Woolman  v. 

725 


Guinotte,  282  S.W.  68,  221  Mo. 
App.  '466. 

Tenn. — Winters  v.  Allen,  62  S.W.2d 
51,  166  Tenn.  281— Tallent  v.  Sher- 
rell,  184  S.W.2d  561,  27  Tenn.App. 
683. 

Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  633— Love  v.  State 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  San  Antonio, 
90  S.W.2d  819,  126  Tex  691— Petty 
v.  Mitchell,  Civ.App.,  187  S.W.2d 
138,  error  refused — American  Law 
Book  Co.  v.  Chester,  Civ.App.,  110 
S.W.2d  950,  error  dismissed — Peas- 
lee-Gaulbert  Corporation  v. 
Hughes,  Civ.App.,  79  S.W.2d  149, 
error  refused — Kerby  v.  Hudson, 
Civ.App.,  13  S.W:2d  724— Hudson 
v.  Kerby,  Civ.App.,  5  S.W.2d  1007 
— Rachel  v.  Bland,  Civ.App.,  259  S. 
W.  230— Galloway  v.  Marietta 
State  Bank,  Civ.App.,  258  S.W.  532, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Mariet- 
ta State  Bank  v.  Galloway,  Com. 
App.,  269  S.W.  776. 

34  C.J.  p  463  note  60,  p  440  note  77, 
p  460  note  20. 

95.  Ark.— Lamhie  v.  W.  T.  Rawleigh 
Co.,  14  S.W.2d  245,  178  Ark.  1019. 

Ky. — Mason  v.  Lacy,  117  S.W.2d 
1026,  274  Ky.  21— Blkhorn  Coal 
Corporation  v.  Cuzzort,  284  S.W. 
1005,  215  Ky.  254. 

34  C.J.  p  464  note  63. 

Unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune 

held  not  shown 

(1)  Neglect  of  a  party  and  his  at- 
torney in  failing  to  examine  the  rec- 
ord to  determine  whether  the  case 
had  been  stricken  from  the  docket 
was  held  not  to  constitute  an  un- 


366 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


granted  on  this  ground  where  no  counsel  was  em- 
ployed, or  witnesses  summoned,  or  any  other  steps 
taken  to  defend  the  action.96  Misunderstandings 
between  counsel,  or  between  counsel  and  clients, 
may  constitute  unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune 
justifying  relief  against  a  judgment.97  It  has  been 
held  that  the  required  unavoidable  casualty  and 
misfortune  has  reference  to  the  inability  of  a  party 
to  be  present  and  participate  in  the  proceedings, 
and  has  no  application  to  the  inability  of  a  party  to 
discover  evidence  necessary  to  constitute  a  de- 
fense^* 

Absence  or  incapacity  of  counsel.  The  unavoid- 
able or  excusable  absence  of  the  party's  attorney 
from  the  court  at  the  time  of  the  trial  may  in  some 
circumstances  entitle  the  party  to  relief  in  equity," 
although  the  courts  are  not  very  much  disposed  to 
interfere  on  this  account,1  and  will  not  do  so  where 
it  appears  that  defendant  could  have  saved  himself 
by  the  timely  employment  of  other  counsel2  or  where 
he  had  another  attorney  in  the  case.3  Equity  will 
furnish  relief  where,  without  the  knowledge  or  fault 
of  a  party,  his  attorney  becomes  physically  or  men- 
tally incapacitated  causing  his  acts  or  conduct  to 


lead  to  damaging  result  so  detrimental  and  unjust  as 
to  shock  the  conscience.4 

Sickness  of  party  or  relative.  The  severe  illness 
of  defendant,  or  of  a  near  relative,  preventing  him 
from  attending  the  trial  may  be  ground  for  relief 
in  equity  against  the  judgment,5  provided  his  per- 
sonal presence  was  necessary  to  the  successful  de- 
fense of  the  action,6  and  it  appears  that,  had  he 
been  present,  there  would  probably  have  been  a  dif- 
ferent result  and  one  more  favorable  to  him.7  How- 
ever, a  party  in  this  situation  must  use  diligence  in 
endeavoring  to  prepare  for  the  trial,  employing 
counsel,  summoning  witnesses,  asking  for  a  contin- 
uance or  for  a  new  trial,  or  otherwise  making  suit- 
able efforts  to  save  himself;  and,  if  he  fails  in  this, 
equity  will  not  relieve  him.8 


§  367. 


Excusable  Neglect 


Excusable  neglect,  unmixed  with  any  carelessness  on 
the  part  of  the  complaining  party,  may  justify  equitable 
relief  against  a  judgment. 

Equity  may  relieve  a  party  from  a  judgment 
taken  against  him  through  his  excusable  neglect.9 
However,  if  he  has  carelessly  or  foolishly  omitted 


avoidable  casualty.— McCoimnas  v. 
McCawley,  14  S.W.2d  1057,  228  Ky. 
263. 

(2)  Where   grantee  of  realty  lent 
money   to   owner,    took   a   warranty 
deed  to  realty,  and  pledged  realty  to 
secure  grantee's  debt,  fact  that  when 
pledgee    sued    for    foreclosure    and 
served    summons    on    owner,    owner 
was  informed  by  attorney  that  gran- 
tee would  bid  in  the  realty  for  own- 
er's benefit,  which  grantee  failed  to 
do,    did    not    constitute    unavoidable 
casualty    or    misfortune    preventing 
owner  from  defending,  so  as  to  en- 
title  owner  to  vacation  of  foreclo- 
sure Judgment — Mason  v.  Lacy,  117 
S.W.Sd  1028,  274  Ky.  21. 

(3)  Where  mortgagor  and  wife  did 
not   file   answer   to   foreclosure  suit 
and    evidence   showed   that  wife   at 
time  of  service  of  summons  on  hus- 
band was  not  too  ill  to  accept  serv- 
ice   and    that    illness    did    not    take 
place  until  after  summons  was  serv- 
ed on  husband  with  whom  copy  of 
summons    was    left   for  wife,    Judg- 
ment of  foreclosure  would  not  be  set 
aside  on  ground  of  unavoidable  cas- 
ualty.—White  v.  Milburn,  122  S.W.2d 
589,  197  Ark.  373. 

(4)  Other  cases. 

U.S.— Mclntosh  v.  Wiggins,  C.C.A. 
Mo.,  123  F.2d  316,  certiorari  de- 
nied 62  S.Ct.  800,  315  U.S.  815,  86 
KEd.  1213,  rehearing  denied  62  S. 
Ct.  914,  816  U.S.  831.  86  KBd.  1224. 

Tex. — Reeves  v.  Chapman,  Civ.App., 
19  S.W.2d  132. 


96.  Ky.— Mason  v.  Lacy,  117  S.W.2d 
1026,  274  Ky.  21. 

34  C.J.  p  464  note  61. 
Discharge  of  attorney 

In  suit  to  vacate  judgment,  record 
indicating  that  plaintiff  had  dis- 
charged his  attorney  after  attorney 
had  taken  preliminary  steps  for  an 
appeal  precluded  contention  that 
plaintiff  was  prevented  from  appeal- 
ing such  judgment  by  reason  of  un- 
avoidable casualty. — Fernow  v.  Gub- 
ser,  Okl.,  162  P.2d  529. 

97.  Ark. — Baskin  v.  .SBtna  Life  Ins. 
Co.,   79   S.W.2d   724,   190  Ark.    448. 

Iowa. — Thoreson  v.  Central  States 
Electric  Co.,  283  N.W.  253,  225 
Iowa  1406. 

98.  Okl — Burton  v.  Swanson,  285  P. 
839,  142  Okl.  134. 

Identification  of  allottee 

The  facts  that  an  allottee  was  too 
young  at  the  time  he  was  enrolled  to 
know  who  could  identify  him,  that 
the  witnesses  to  his  enrollment  were 
dead,  and  that  he  was  unable  to 
learn  the  names  of  individuals  who 
could  identify  him  as  the  allottee 
have  been  held  not  to  constitute  un- 
avoidable casualty  and  misfortune 
justifying  an  attack  on  a  judgment. 
— Burton  v.  Swanson,  285  P.  839,  142 
Okl.  134. 

99.  Ga, — Pratt  v.   Rosa   Jarmulow- 
sky  Co.,  170  S.B.  365,  177  Ga.  522 
— Eatonton  Oil  &  Auto  Co.  v.  Led- 
better,    163    S.E.   891,   174  Ga.   715. 

34  OJ»  p  464  .note  64. 

726 


3U    Ark, — Izard  County   v.   Huddles- 
ton,  39  Ark.  107. 
34  C.J.  p  464  note  65. 

2.  Ky. — Elkhorn  Coal  Corporation  v. 
Cuzzort,    284    S.W.    1005,    315    Ky. 
254. 

Tex. — Harrell  v.  Humphrey,  Civ.  Apr*.. 

292  S.W.  920. 
34  C.J.  p  464  note  66. 

3.  Kan. — Brenneisen  v.   Phillips,    45 
P.2d  867,  142  Kan.  98. 

34  C.J.  p  464  note  67. 

4.  Col. — Jeffords    v.    Young,    277    P. 
163,  98  CaLApp.  400. 

Serious  illness  of  complainant's 
counsel,  preventing  his  appearance 
at  trial  on  fair  presentation  of  case, 
may  warrant  equitable  intervention 
to  set  aside  judgment. — Jeffords  v. 
Young,  277  P.  163,  98  CaLApp.  400 
—34  C.J.  p  464  note  64  [a], 

5.  Mo. — Jackson  v.  Chestnut,  131  S. 
W.  747,  151  Mo.App.  275. 

34  C.J.  p  464  note  68. 

6.  Miss.— McDonald    v.     Myles,     20 
Miss.  279. 

34  C.J.  p  464  note  69. 

7.  Ga.— McCall    v.    Miller,    47    S.E. 
920,  120  Ga.  262. 

8.  Mich.— Kelleher  v.  Boden,   21  N- 
W.  346,  55  Mich.  295. 

34  C.J.  p  464  note  71. 

9.  Cal.— Wilson  v.  Wilson.  130  P.2d 
782,  55  Cal.App.2d  421. 

Or.— Hartley    v.    Rice,    261    P.    689, 

123  Or.  237. 
34  C.J.  p  464  note  72. 
Excuse  held  sufficient 

In  a  suit  to   vacate  and  restrain 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


368 


to  attend  to  his  case,  to  retain  and  instruct  coun- 
sel, to  gather  his  witnesses,  or  otherwise  to  prepare 
for  the  trial,  he  is  in  no  position  to  invoke  the  aid 
of  equity,  and  it  will  be  refused.10  If  a  litigant  au- 
thorizes another  to  look  after  the  defense  of  the 
action,  the  failure  of  such  other  person  to  employ 
an  attorney  or  to  take  other  proper  and  necessary 
measures  will  bar  relief  in  equity  in  the  absence  of 
fraud.11 

A  distinction  must  be  made  between  such  neglect 
as  is  attributable  solely  to  the  party  himself  and 
such  as  is  brought  about  by  the  improper  or  deceit- 
ful conduct  of  the  other  side;  the  former  is  not 


excusable,  the  latter  sometimes  is.12 

§  368.    Negligence   or   Misconduct   of 

Counsel 

Negligence  or  misconduct  of  a  party's  counsel  Is 
generally  attributable  to  the  party  himself,  and  ordina- 
rily furnishes  no  ground  for  equitable  relief  against  a 
judgment.  Under  some  circumstances,  however,  as 
where  the  party  has.  been  betrayed  by  his  attorney,  or 
where  the  opposite  party  has  caused  the  misconduct,  re- 
lief against  the  Judgment  may  be  granted. 

It  is  not  sufficient  ground  for  relief  in  equity  that 
a  judgment  was  obtained  against  a  party  in  conse- 
quence of  the  neglect,  inattention,  mistake,  or  in- 
competence of  his  attorney,13  unless  it  was  caused 


collection  of  a  judgment  entered  by 
a  real  estate  agent  against  a  land- 
owner for  a  commission  for  selling 
the  land,  letters  written  by  the 
agent  to  the  landowner  to  the  effect 
that  he  was  suing  the  one  who  had 
contracted  to  purchase,  and  that 
although  the  landowner  would  be  a 
necessary  party  the  suit  could  not 
hurt  him,  presented  a  sufficient  ex- 
cuse for  failure  of  the  landowner  to 
.appear  and  defend. — Walberg  v.  Rog- 
ers, Tex.Civ.App.,  250  S,W.  297. 

10.    Ala. — Choctaw    Bank    v.    Dear- 

mon,  134  So.  648,  223  Ala,  144. 
Cal.— Wattson  v.  Dillon,  56  P.2d  220, 

6  Cal.2d  33. 
111. — Goelitz  v.  Lathrop,  3  N.E.2d  305, 

286  Ill.App.  248. 

jCy. — Johnson  v.  Gernert  Bros.  Lum- 
ber Co.,  75  S.W.2d  357,  255  Ky. 
734. 

•Tex. — Smith  v.  Ferrell,  Com.App.,  44 
S.W.2d  962— Stewart  v.  Byrne, 
Com.App.,  42  S.W.2d  234— Maytag 
Southwestern  Co.  v.  Thornton,  Civ. 
App.,  20  S.W.2d  383,  error  dis- 
missed. 

tVie. — Schulteis  v.  Trade  Press  Pub. 
Co.,    210    N.W.   419,    191   Wis,    164. 
34  C.J.  p  464  note  73. 
Failure  to  verify  time  of  trial 

Where  judgment  was  rendered  in 
absence  of  defendants  and  their 
counsel  because  of  reliance  by  one 
defendant  on  alleged  announcement 
of  opposing  Counsel  in  open  court 
during  sounding  of  docket  that  case 
would  not  be  tried  during  week  for 
which  it  had  been  set  and  such  de- 
fendants' notice  to  their  counsel  of 
such  announcement,  without  seeking 
to  verify  it,  defendants  were  held 
not  entitled  to  have  judgment  vacat- 
ed.— Poland  v.  Risher,  Civ. App.,  88 
S.W.2d  1106,  affirmed  Mann  v.  Rish- 
er,  116  S.W.2d  692,  131  Tex.  498. 
Discharge  of  attorneys 

Plaintiffs'  discharge  of  attorneys 
on  false  assumption  that  trial  would 
remain  in  abeyance  pending  subse- 
quent action  has  been  held  negli- 
gence precluding  equitable  relief 
jigainst  judgment — Davis  v.  Cox, 


Tex.Civ.App.,    4    S.W.2d    1008,    error 

dismissed. 

Belief  as  to  abandonment  of  case 

The  fact  that  the  party  seeking 
relief  believed  that  case  had  been 
abandoned,  because  he  had  not  heard 
from  it  for  a  long  time,  does  not  ex- 
cuse his  default — Millikin  v.  Ander- 
son, Mo.App.,  269  S.W.  675. 
Failure  to  file  caveat 

Petitioner,  although  nonresident, 
was  held  not  entitled  to  set  aside 
judgment  setting  apart  statutory 
support  for  widow  and  children, 
where  he  filed  no  caveat  to  applica- 
tion on  which  citation  had  issued 
and  been  published. — Beddingfleld  v. 
Old  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  165  S.B. 
61,  175  Ga.  172. 

11.  111.— Goelitz  v.  Lathrop,   3  N.E. 
2d  305,  286  IlLApp.  248. 

Neglect  of  codefendant 

One  intrusting  entire  defense  of 
action  to  codefendant,  who  employed 
attorney,  received  notice  of  latter's 
withdrawal,  employed  no  other  attor- 
ney, and  was  present  and  represent- 
ed complaining  party  when  judg"- 
ment  was  entered  against  them,  was 
held  not  entitled  to  injunction 
against  enforcement  of  judgment. — 
Goelitz  v.  Lathrop,  supra. 

12.  Tenn. — Rowland     v.     Jones,     2 
Heisk.  321. 

13.  Ala.— Williams    v.    Martin,    188 
So.  677,  237  Ala.  624. 

Cal,— City  of  San  Diego  v.  California 
Water  &  Tel.  Co.,  162  P.2d  684, 
71  Oal.App.2d  261— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  Greenwood  v.  Greenwood, 
297  P.  589,  591,  112  CaLApp.  691. 

Conn.— Palverari  v.  Finta,  26  A.2d 
229,  129  Conn.  38. 

Ga. — W.  T.  Rawleigh  Co.  v.  Sea- 
graves,  173  S.B.  167,  178  Ga.  459— 
Coleman  v.  Morris,  168  S.B.  9,  176 
Ga.  467. 

Iowa. — Ware  v.  Eckman,  277  N.W. 
725,  224  Iowa  78$. 

Kan. — corpus  Juris  cited  in  Huls  v. 
Gafford  Lumber  &  Grain  Co.,  243 
P.  806,  310,  120  Kan.  209. 

Ky. — Fuson  v.  Fuson,  132  S.W.2d 
508,  280  Ky.  91 — Mussman  v.  Pep- 

727 


pies,  49  S.W.2d  592,  243  Ky.  674 
—Lee  v.  Lee,  38  S.W.2d  223,  23S 
Ky.  477. 

Mo.— Texier    v.    Texier,    119    S.W.2d 
778,     342     Mo.     1220— Wuelker    v. 
Maxwell,    App.,    70    S.W.2d    1100. 
Mont— Khan  v.  Khan,  105   P.2d  665, 
110  Mont.  591 — Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Federal  Land  Bank  of  Spokane 
v.  Gallatin  County,  274  P.  288,  291 
84  Mont  98. 
N.J.— Simon   v.    Henke,    139    A.    887, 

102  N.J.Eq.  115. 

N.M.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Sow- 
der  v.  Citizens  Nat.  Bank  of  Lub- 
bock,  50  P.2d  856,  858,  39  N.M.  508, 
Tex.— Kelly  v.  Wright,  188  S.W.2d 
983— Whitehurst  v.  Estes,  Civ.App., 
185  S.W.2d  154,  error  refused— 
Collins  v.  National  Bank  of  Com- 
merce of  San  Antonio,  Civ.App., 
154  S.W.2d  296,  error  refused- 
Universal  Credit  Co.  v.  Cunning- 
ham, Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d  507,  er- 
ror dismissed~£icketts  v.  Fergu- 
son, Civ.App.,  64  S.W.2d  416,  error 
refused — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Caldwell  Oil  Co.  v.  Hickman,  Civ. 
App.,  270  S.W.  214,  218. 
Va.— Lockard  v.  Whitenack,  144  S. 

E.  606,  151  Va.  143. 
34  C.J.  p  465  note  78. 

"The  'mere  employment  of  counsel 
is  not  sufficient  to  excuse  a  party 
from  giving  his  personal  attention 
to  a  case.  .  .  .  There  must  be 
something  more  than  misplaced  con- 
fidence in  a  negligent  attorney  to 
constitute  unavoidable  casualty  or 
misfortune." — Byron  v.  Evans,  91  S. 
W.2d  548,  550,  263  Ky.  49. 
Suspension  of  attorney 

The  fact  that  an  attorney  was 
suspended  shortly  after  the  proceed- 
ings complained  of  is  not  of  itself 
sufficient  to  justify  relief  in  equity. 
— De  Tray  v.  Chambers,  297  P.  675, 
112  CaLApp.  697. 
Failure  of  third  person  to  follow  at. 

toraey's  directions 
A  litigant  is  not  entitled  to  have 
default  judgment  against  him  va- 
cated by  fact  that  attorney,  em- 
ployed by  him  to  defend  suit,  on  be* 
ing  called  out  of  town,  directed  third 


§  368 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


by  the  opposite  party,14  the  fault  of  the  attorney  be- 
ing attributed  to  the  party  himself.15  The  rule  is 
in  no  way  affected  by  the  fact  that  the  attorney  is 
insolvent  and  unable  to  respond  in  damages.16  Not 
every  act  of  inadvertence  on  the  part  of  an  attorney, 
however,  is  negligence  imputable  to  the  client,17  and 
the  courts  have  thought  proper  to  grant  relief  in 
some  cases  of  misunderstanding  or  misapprehension 
on  the  part  of  the  attorney,18  especially  where  the 
mistake  arose  from  misinformation.19  Relief  may 
also  be  granted  where  the  party  has  been  deceived 
or  betrayed  by  his  attorney,20  or  where  the  attorney 


withdrew  from  the  case  without  notice  and  without 
lawful  cause.21 

In  applying  the  rule  prohibiting  relief  for  neg- 
ligence or  misconduct  of  counsel,  it  has  been  held 
no  ground  for  relief  against  a  judgment  under  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case  that  counsel 
neglected  to  answer  or  file  a  plea  for  a  party,  or 
failed  properly  to  present  the  defenses  of  his  cli- 
ent;22 that  counsel  managed  the  trial  of  the  cause 
unskillfully;23  absented  himself  from  court  during 
the  trial,  intentionally  or  otherwise;24  failed  to 
notify  his  client  of  the  time  of  trial  ;25  advised  his 
client  to  remain  away  from  court;26  failed  to  in- 


person  to  file  answer  that  attorney 
had  prepared,  but  third  person  for- 
got to  do  so. — Roberts  v.  Seymore,  73 
P.2d  395,  181  Okl.  201. 

14.  Cal. — Corpus      Juris      cited     in. 
Greenwood    v.    Greenwood,    297   P. 
589,  691,  112  CaLApp.  691. 

Fla. — Peacock  v.  Feaster,  43  So.  889, 

52  Fla.  565. 
Mont. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Federal 

Land  Bank  of  Spokane  v.  Gallatin 

County,   274   P.   288,   291,  84  Mont. 

98. 
N.M. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Sowder 

v.  Citizens  Nat.  Bank  of  Lubbock, 

50  P.2d  856,   858,  39  N.M.   508. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Caldwell 

Oil  Co.  v.  Hickman,  Civ.App.,  270 

S.W.  214,  218. 

15.  Ind. — Branham  v.  Boruflt,  145  N. 
E.  901,  82  Ind.App.  370. 

Ky. — Byron  v.  Evans,  91  S.W.2d  548, 

263  Ky.  49. 
Mo.— MiHikin  v.  Anderson,  App.,  269 

S.W.  675. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Sow- 
der v.  Citizens  Nat.  Bank  of  Lub- 

bock,    50    P.2d    856,    858,    39    N.M. 

508. 
Tex. — Kahl   v.    Porter,   Civ.App.,   296 

S.W.    324— Corpus    Juris    cited   in. 

Caldwell  Oil  Co.  v.  Hickman,  Civ. 

App.,  270  S.W.  214,  218. 
34  C.J.  p  442  note  20,  p  466  note  80. 

"It  is  a  general  rule  that  no  mis- 
take, inadvertence,  or  neglect  at- 
tributable to  an  attorney  can  be 
successfully  used  as  a  ground  of  re- 
lief, unless  it  would  have  been  ex- 
cusable if  attributable  to  the  cli- 
ent"— Ferrara  v.  Genduso,  14  N.E.2d 
580,  581,  214  Ind.  99. 
Tailure  to  set  up  cancellation  of  in- 
surance 

Negligence  of  insurance  company's 
attorney  In  failing  to  set  up  cancel- 
lation of  additional  insurance  as  de- 
fense to  injured  employee's  action  on 
group  policy  and  additional  insur- 
ance certificates  was  equivalent  to 
insurance  company's  negligence. — 
Wheiles  v.  JBtna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  C.C. 
A.Tex.,  68  F.2d  99. 

16.  111.— Bardonski  v.  Bardonski,  33 
N.3L  39,  144  111.  284* 

34  OX  p  466  note  SI.  • 


17.  Cal.— Hallett  v.    Slaughter,    140 
P.2d  3,  22  Cal.2d  552. 

Iowa,— Clarke    v.    Smith,    192    N.W. 
136,  195  Iowa  1299. 

18.  Tex.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Caldwell  Oil  Co.  v.  Hickman,  Civ. 
App.,  270  S.W.  314,  218. 

84  C.J.  p  466  note  83. 

Custom  of  notifying  attorneys 

Where  judgment  was  entered  In 
the  absence  of  defendant  after  the 
case  had  been  twice  set  for  trial,  and 
defendant  had  no  knowledge  of  such 
judgment,  until  execution  was  pre- 
sented by  the  sheriff,  it  was  not  er- 
ror to  grant  a  temporary  injunction 
restraining  plaintiffs  and  the  sheriff 
from  proceeding,  it  appearing  that  it 
was  customary  to  notify  defendant's 
attorneys  of  the  time  of  trial  when 
they  resided  in  another  county. — 
Dallas  Cooperage  &  Wooden  Ware 
Co.  v.  Southwestern  Cooperage  Co., 
Tex.Civ.App.,  254  S.W.  1116. 

19.  Iowa, — Buena   Vista   County   v. 
Iowa  Falls  &  S.  C.  R  Co.,  49  Iowa 
657. 

20.  CaL — Crow  v.  Madsen,  App.,  Ill 
P.2d  7,  rehearing  denied  111  P.2d 
663— Jeffords  v.  Toung,  277  P.  163, 
98  Cal.App.  400. 

La. — Richardson    v.    Hells,    189    So, 

454,  192  La.  856. 
Neb. — Seward   v.   Churn   Ranch  Co.. 

287  N.W.  610,  136  Neb.  804. 
Tex. — Corpns    Juris    cited    In    Cald- 

well  Oil  Co.  v.  Hickman,  Civ.App,, 

270  S.W.  214,  218. 
34  C.J.  p  466  note  82. 

21.  Tex. — Stanley    v.     Spann,     Civ, 
App.,    21    S.W.2d    305,    error    dis- 
missed. 

Withdrawal  after  notice 

A  judgment  was  held  not  void  or 
voidable  on  the  ground  that  a  par* 
ty's  counsel  abandoned  his  defense 
where  such  counsel,  after  being  em- 
ployed, advised  the  party  that  they 
held  a  retainer  from  the  adverse  par- 
ty and  dropped  out  of  the  suit,  after 
which  other  counsel  took  up  the  de- 
fense.— Spence  v.  State  Nat  Bank  of 

728 


El  Paso,  Tex.Civ.App.,  294  S.W.  618, 
affirmed,   Com.App.,   5   S.W.2d   754. 

22.  Ark.— White  v.   Milburn,  122   S, 
W.2d  589,  197  Ark.  373. 

Iowa. — Ware    v.    Eckman,    277    N.W. 

725,  2-24  Iowa  783. 
Ky. — Byron  v.  Evans,  91  S.W.2d  548, 

263  Ky.  49. 
N.J. — Red   Oaks   v.   Dorez,    Inc.,    184 

A.  746,  120  N.J.Eq.  282. 
Ohio. — MosHer   v.    Mutual    Home    & 
Savings  Ass'n,  App.,  41  N.E.2d  871, 
Okl.— Luna   v.    Miller,    42    P.2d    809, 

L71  Okl.  260. 

Tex.— Wear  v.  McCallum,  33  S.W.2d 
723,  119  Tex.  473— Thomas  v.  Mul- 
lins,    Civ.App.,    175    S.W.2d    276— 
White  v.  Glenn,  Civ.App.,  138  S.W, 
2d  914,  error  dismissed,  judgment 
correct — Winn  v.  Houston  Building 
&  Loan  Ass'n,  Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d 
631,  error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  466  note  86. 
Failure  to  set  up  oral  agreement 

Fact  that  defendants'  attorney* 
did  not  set  up  oral  agreement  alleg- 
edly constituting  a  defense  to  action, 
but  permitted  judgment  to  be  en- 
tered in  favor  of  plaintiff,  did  no* 
entitle  defendants  to  have  judgment 
vacated,  In  absence  of  any  claim  of 
fraud  on  part  of  attorneys,  or  that 
failure  to  present  defense  resulted 
from  connivance  or  fraud  of  plain- 
tiff.—Ferrara  v.  Genduso,  14  N.E.2* 
580,  214  Ind.  99. 

23.  Cal.— Julien  v.  West,  274  P.  421». 
96  CaLApp.  558. 

34  C.J.  p  466  note  85. 

24.  U.S.— Miller  Rubber  Co.  of  New- 
Tork  v.    Massey,   C.C.A.I11.,    36   F:. 
2d  466,  certiorari  denied  Massey  v. 
Miller  Rubber  Co.  of  New  York,  50- 
S.Ct    354,    281   U.S.    749,    74    L.Ed.. 
1161. 

34  C.J.  p  466  note  87. 

25.  Ga. — W.  T.  Rawleigh  Co.  v.  Sea-~ 
graves,   173  S.B.   167,   178  Ga,   459. 

Mo. — Bowman  v.   Field,    11   Mo.App.. 
595. 

26.  Ga.— Sasser    v.    Olliff,    16    S.E.. 
312,  91  Ga.  84. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


369 


troduce  material  witensses;27  failed  to  file  a  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial  ;28  neglected  to  take  an  appeal 
in  the  proper  time  and  manner;29  lost  the  right  of 
appeal  through  delay  in  signing  the  bill  of  excep- 
tions,30 or  filing  the  statement  of  facts,81  or  by  neg- 
lect to  assign  errors,82  or  by  failure  to  call  up  a 
motion  for  a  new  trial  through  the  mistaken  im- 
pression that  such  motion  had  been  overruled,88  or 
to  take  any  other  requisite  step  in  the  case;84  ad- 
vised the  party  that  the  proof  of  a  material  fact 
was  unnecessary,  whereby  the  party  failed  to  prove 
it;85  failed  to  enter  a  credit  on  the  execution  ac- 
cording to  agreement;86  caused  the  rendition  of  a 
judgment  on  a  stipulation,  in  disobedience  of  the 
client's  instructions;87  or  lost  the  right  to  new  trial 
by  adopting  the  statement  of  the  reporter  of  the 
testimony  taken  down  by  him,  without  observing 
the  errors  in  such  statement.88 

§  369.    Matters  Determined  in  Original  Ac- 
tion 

Matters  determined  in  the  original  action,  including 


matters  determined  on  motions  fop  a  new  trial,  to  va- 
cate the  Judgment,  or  for  a  continuance,  generally  can- 
not again  be  advanced  as  a  ground  for  equitable  relief 
against  the  Judgment  rendered. 

Equity  will  not  entertain  a  bill  for  relief  against 
a  judgment,  founded  on  any  matters  which  were 
tried  and  determined  in  the  prior  action,  or  which 
were  there  so  put  in  issue  that  they  might  have  been 
adjudicated,89  however  unjust  the  judgment  may 
appear  to  be.40  This  rule  assumes,  however,  that 
there  has  been  a  trial  in  which  the  respective  par- 
ties have  had  an  opportunity  fully  to  present  their 
claims.41 

On  motion  for  new  trial  or  to  vacate.  Equity  will 
refuse  to  interfere  by  injunction,  when  the  grounds 
presented  for  its  action  have  been  already  consid- 
ered and  held  insufficient  on  a  motion  made  in  the 
trial  court  to  open  or  vacate  the  judgment  or  for  a 
new  trial.42 

On  motion  for  continuance.    A  bill  for  an  injunc- 


27.  Ala. — Ex  parte  Walker,  64  Ala, 
577. 

Tex. — Estey  v.  Luther,  Civ.App.,  142 
S.W.  649. 

28.  Mont. — Khan  y.  Khan,  105  P.2d 
665,  110  Mont.  591. 

29.  Fla. — Sommers   v.   Colourpicture 
Pub.,   8   So.2d  281,   150  Fla.   659. 

Mass. — Barron  v.   Barronian,   175   N. 

E.  271.  275  Mass.  77. 
Mo. — Bowman    v.    Field,    11    Mo.App. 

595. 
Tex. — Thomas    v.    Mullins,    Civ.App., 

175  S.W.2d  276. 
80.    Md. — Ruppertsberger    y.    Clark, 

53  Md.  402. 
31.    Tex. — Avocato  v.   Dell'Ara,   Civ. 

App.,  91  S.W.  830. 
"32.    Fla. — Peacock  y.  Feaster,  42  So. 

889,  52  Fla.  565. 
Mo.— Miller  y.  Bernecker,  46  Mo.  194. 

33.  Ark. — Scroggtn  v.  Hammett  Gro- 
cer Co.,  49  S.W.  820,  66  Ark.  183. 

34.  Fla. — Peacock  y.  Feaster,  42  So. 
$89,  52  Fla.  565. 

35.  Fla. — Peacock  y.  Feaster,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  466  note  97. 

36.  Ga. — Brown   v.   Wilson*    56    Ga. 
534. 

37.  U.S. — Cowley    v.    Northern   Pac. 
R.   Co.,    C.C.Wash.,    46   F.    325,   re- 
versed  on   other  grounds   16   S.Ct. 
127,    159   U.S.   569,   40   LuEd.   263. 

38.  Cal. — Quinn    v.    Wetherbee,    41 
Cal.  247. 

39.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Coos 
Bay  Lumber  Co.  v.  Collier,  C.C.A. 
Or.,  104  F.2d  722,  725. 

Ala. — Worthington    v.    Worthington, 

117  So.  645,  218  Ala,  80. 
Ark. — Oliver    v.    Franklin    Fire    Ins. 


Co.    of    Philadelphia,    114    S.W.2d 

1071,  195  Ark.  840. 
Cal. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Rudy  v. 

Slotwinsky,  238  P.  783,  785,  73  Cal. 

App.  459. 
Fla.— Crura  v.  Baily,  184  So.  774,  135 

Fla.   192. 
Ga.— Felker  v.  Still,  169  S.B.  897,  177 

Ga.  160. 
Mich. — Graure  v.  Detroit  Lumber  Co., 

244  N.W.   225,   260   Mich.  47— Bas- 
se tt  v.  Trinity  Bldg.  Co.,  236  N.W. 

237,  254  Mich.  207. 
Minn. — Spears    v.    Drake,    258    N.W. 

149,     193     Minn.     162— Betcher    v. 

Midland  Nat.  Bank,  209  N.W.  325, 

167  Minn.  484. 
Mo. — Overton  v.  Overton,   37  S.W.2d 

565,  327  Mo.  530—- Loveland  v.  Dav- 
enport,    App.,     188     S.W.2d     850 — 

Crowley  v.   Behle,  App.,   131   S.W. 

2d  383. 
Neb.— Brandeen  v.   Beale,    220   N.W. 

298,  117  Neb.  291. 
N.J.— Raimondi    v.    Bianchi,    140    A. 

584,     102     N.J.BQ.     254— Simon    v. 

Henke,  139  A.  887,  102  N.J.Bq,  116. 
Okl.— Scott  v.   Bailey,   169   P.2d   208 

— Yellow  Taxicab  &  Baggage   Co. 

v.  Pettyjohn,  21  P,2d  743,  163  Okl. 

103. 
Or. — Walker   v.    Sutherland,    299    P. 

335,   136  Or.   355,  certiorari  denied 

52  S.Ct.  30,  284  U.S.   649,  76  L.BdL 

551. 
Pa.-— Petition    of    Wilwohl,     166    A. 

654,  311  Pa,  152. 
R.I. — Havens  v.  Crandall,  150  A.  76, 

51  B.I.  8. 
Tex. — Ferguson    v.     Ferguson,     Civ. 

App.,  98  S.W.2d  847. 
Wash.— Manson  v.  Foltz,  17  P.2d  616, 

170  Wash.  652. 
34  C.JT.  p  440  note  81,  p  466  note  2. 

729 


Payment 

Mortgagor's  petition  to  vacate 
foreclosure  judgment  alleging  that 
mortgage  was  paid,  which  was  de- 
fense to  foreclosure,  was  held  de- 
mure-able as  attempt  to  obtain  retrial 
after  adjournment. — Simpson  v. 
Zuehlke,  Tex.Civ.App.,  26  S.W.2d  663. 
AflCenibersliip  in  firm 

Party  who  was  Joined  as  codef end- 
ant  as  being  a  member  of  debtor 
firm,  but  allowed  Judgment  to  be  en- 
tered, cannot  attack  Judgment  on 
ground  that  he  was  not  member  of 
firm,  since  that  was  defense  to  for- 
mer action  and  was  concluded  by 
Judgment. — Quinn~Marshall  Co.  v. 
Hurley,  272  S.W.  402,  209  Ky.  154. 

40.  Cal. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ru- 
dy v.  Slotwinsky,  238  P.  783,  785, 
73  CaJLApp.  459. 

34  C.J.  p  466  note  2. 

41.  Cal. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ru- 
dy v.   Slotwinsky,   238  P.  783,  785, 
73  Cal. App.  459. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Oregon- 
Washington  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Reid, 
65  P.2d  664,  668,  155  Or,.  602. 

34  C.J.  p  467  note  4. 

42.  U.S. — American  Bakeries  Co.   v. 
Vining,    D.C.Fla.t    13    F.Supp.    323, 
affirmed,  C.C.A.,   80  F.2d  932. 

Ala. — Trognitz  v.  Touart,  122  "So.  620, 

219  Ala.  404. 
Ariz. — American  Surety  Co.  of  New 

York  v.  Mosher,   64   P.2d  1025,   48 

Ariz.  552. 
Iowa. — Martin  Bros.  Box  Co.  v.  Fritz, 

292   N.W.  143,   228   Iowa  482. 
Kan. — Corpus   Juris    quoted   in   Me* 

Nergney  v.  Harrison,  84  P.2d  944, 

948,  148  Kan.  843. 
Tex. — Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 


370 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tion  cannot  be  maintained  on  grounds  which  were 
presented  and  overruled  on  a  motion  for  a  continu- 
ance, or  on  the  ground  that  the  refusal  to  continue 
forced  the  party  to  trial  at  a  disadvantage.43 

§  370.     Compelling  Set-Off  or  Reduction  of 
Damages 

a.  In  general 

b.  Subject  matter  of  set-off 

a.  In  General 

Equitable  relief  against  a  Judgment  may  sometimes 
be  had  to  enable  the  judgment  debtor  to  set  off  a  claim 
against  the  judgment  creditor  which  by  reason  of  the 
judgment  creditor's  nonresidence  or  insolvency,  or  for 
some  other  sufficient  reason,  would  otherwise  be  uncol- 
iectable;  but  in  order  to  justify  such  relief  it  must  ap- 
pear that  the  complaining  party  has  not  been  guilty  of 
inexcusable  failure  to  plead  his  set-off  in  the  original 
action. 

As  equity  may  order  one  judgment  to  be  set  off 
against  another,  so  it  has  power  to  restrain  the  ex- 
ecution of  a  judgment  to  the  extent  that  the  judg- 
ment debtor  has  a  claim  against  the  judgment  credi- 
tor which  the  judgment  debtor  cannot  otherwise 
collect.44  If  a  case  for  equitable  relief  is  present- 
ed, but  the  amount  due  on  the  set-off  is  less  than  the 
amount  of  the  judgment,  the  court  should  not  en- 
join the  whole  judgment,45  but  should  permit  the 
balance  to  be  collected  by  execution.46  A  party  go- 
ing into  equity  to  enjoin  a  judgment  on  the  ground 


of  a  set-off  must  show  as  strong  a  claim  to  be  paid 
the  amount  of  his  demand  as  if  he  were  suing  on 
it  at  law  or  in  equity,47  and  such  relief  will  not  be 
granted  where  the  judgment  debtor  has  an  adequate 
remedy  at  law,48  or  where  he  has  been  guilty  of 
such  negligence  or  lack  of  diligence  as  to  render  in- 
equitable his  demand  for  an  offset49  In  order  to 
justify  relief  of  this  nature  it  must  appear  that  the 
judgment  creditor  is  -in  some  way  unable  to  respond 
to  the  claim  against  him,  so  that  complainant  is  in 
danger  of  losing  it.50 

Insolvency  or  nonresidence  of  judgment  creditor. 
According  to  some  decisions  the  mere  insolvency  of 
the  judgment  creditor  will  not  of  itself  justify  an 
injunction  against  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment 
at  law  in  order  to  let  in  a  set-off  which  might  have 
been  pleaded  at  law  at  the  time  when  such  judg- 
ment was  recovered.51  The  rule  laid  down  by  the 
weight  of  authority,  however,  is  to  the  effect  that 
the  insolvency  of  the  party  seeking  to  enforce  a 
judgment  furnishes  a  sufficient  ground  for  the  in- 
terposition of  a  court  of  equity  to  enable  the  debtor 
to  avail  himself  of  a  set-off;52  and  even  though 
insolvency  may  not  of  itself  be  considered  a  suffi- 
cient ground  on  which  to  base  equitable  relief,  it  is 
always  an  important  factor  and  may  with  other 
grounds  of  equitable  relief  justify  the  interposition 
of  the  court  of  equity  by  the  process  of  injunc- 
tion." 


Greathouse,  Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d 
418,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
Greathouse  v.  Fort  Worth  &  Den- 
ver City  By.  Co.,  Com.App.,  65  S. 
W.2d  762. 
34  C.J.  p  467  note  5—19  C.J.  p  1212 

note  69  [D]  (2). 
Application  for  rehearing1  based  on 

lack  of  service 

Where,  after  default,  defendant 
filed  application  for  rehearing:  al- 
leging that  summons  and  complaint 
had  not  been  served  on  him  and  that 
he  had  no  notice  until  after  judg- 
ment was  rendered,  and  judgment 
was  rendered  against  him  on  this 
application,  which  was  afterward  af- 
firmed, there  was  an  adjudication, 
and  relief  against  the  judgment  will 
be  denied  In  equity.— Handy  v.  Gray, 
93  So.  614,  207  Ala,  615. 

43.  Kan. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
McNergney   v.    Harrison,    84    P.2d 
944,  94%,  148  Kan.  843. 

34  C.J.  p  467  note  6. 

44.  Ala. — Adams  v.  Alabama  Lime  & 
Stone    Corporation,    127    So.     544, 
221  Ala.  10— Stewart  v.  Burgin,  121 
So.  420,  219  Ala.  131. 

La,— Sliman  v.  Mahtook,  136  So.  749, 

17  La.App.  635,      * 
Miss. — Corpus    Juris   cited   in   Bett- 

man-Dunlap   Co.   v.   Gertz,   116  So. 

299,  300,  149  Miss.  892. 


Mo.— Jegglin  v.  Orr,  29  S.W.2d  721, 
224  Mo.App.  773. 

Neb. — Rogers  v.  Buettgenback,  211 
N.W.  168,  114  Neb.  834— State  v. 
Farmers'  State  Bank  of  Bayard, 
203  N.W.  629,  113  Neb.  497,  fol- 
lowed in  203  N.W.  632,  113  Neb. 
503. 

34  C.J.  p  467  note  8. 

Set-off  of  claim  against  judgment 
see  infra  §  572. 

45.  La.— Salter  v.   McHenry,   17  La. 
507— Palfrey  v.  Shuff,  2  Mart.,N.S., 
51. 

46.  Md.— Levy  v.  Steinbach,  43  Md. 
212. 

47.  Iowa. — Walker  v.  Ayres,  1  Iowa 
449. 

48.  Ala. — Adams  v.  Alabama   Lime 
&  Stone  Corporation,  127  So.   544, 
221  Ala.  10. 

34  C.J.  p  468  note  9. 

49.  Mo. — Kansas   City  Rapid   Motor 
&  Transp.  Co.  v.  Young,  175  S.W. 
95,  188  Mo.App.  289. 

Disclosure    of    set-off    in    corporate 

books 

Neglect  was  imputable  to  corpo- 
ration seeking  to  enjoin  collection 
of  judgment  in  having  previously 
failed  to  assert  set-off,  where  set-off 

730 


appeared  from  books  and  ordinary 
diligence  would  have  disclosed  it? 
existence. — Adams  v.  Alabama  Lime 
&  Stone  Corporation,  127  So.  544,  221 
Ala.  10. 
Absence  of  injury  to  assignee 

A  judgment  debtor  was  held  not 
barred  from  equitable  relief  against 
an  assignee  of  the  judgment  be- 
cause of  delay  in  bringing  his  ac- 
tion where  it  appeared  that  the  judg- 
ment had  been  assigned  for  a  pre- 
existing debt  and  that  the  assignee 
had  not  been  injured  by  the  delay. 
-^Tegglin  v.  Orr,  29  S.W.2d  721,  224 
Mo.App.  773. 

50.  U.S. — Montgomery  Water  Power 
Co.    v.    Chapman,    C.C.R.I.,    128    F. 
197. 

34  C.J.  p  468  note  11. 

51.  S.C. — Rives  v.  Rives,  28  S.C.Eq. 
353. 

34  C.J.  p  469  note  37. 

52.  Ala.— Stewart  v.  Burgin,  121  So. 
420,  219  Ala.  131. 

Mo.— Jegglin  v.   Orr,   29   S.W.2d   721, 

224  Mo.App.  773. 
Neb. — Rogers   v.    Buettgenback,    211 

N.W.  168,  114  Neb.  834. 
34  C.J.  p  469  note  38. 

53.  111. — Matson   v.    Oberne,    25    111. 
App.  213. 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  370 


It  has  been  held  by  some  decisions  that  the  non- 
residence  of  the  party  against  whom  the  set-off  is 
asserted  is  good  ground  for  equitable  relief,54  pro- 
vided he  became  a  nonresident  after  the  rendition 
of  the  judgment,55  particularly  if  he  has  no  property 
within  the  state;56  but  there  are  decisions  to  the 
contrary.57 

Failure  to  plead  set-off  in  original  action.  Equity 
will  not  enjoin  a  judgment  on  account  of  matters 
which  might  have  been  pleaded  by  way  of  set- 
off  in  the  action  in  which  the  judgment  was  re- 
covered, where  the  party  neglected  his  opportunity 
in  that  respect,58  unless  he  shows  a  good  and  suffi- 
cient excuse  for  his  neglect.59  Still  less  will  equity 
grant  relief  because  of  any  set-off  or  counterclaim 
which  was  set  up  in  the  action  at  law  and  rejected 
or  decided  adversely  to  him.60  However,  if  the 
remedy  in  equity  is  more  adequate,  or  rests  on  eq- 
uitable principles,  the  failure  to  present  the  set-off 
at  law  is  no  defense,61  and  injunction  will  not  be 
denied  on  the  ground  of  an  adequate  remedy  at 
law  where  a  remedy  at  law  was  not  in  fact  avail- 
able or  was  extremely  doubtful.62 

Relief  to  vendee  on  failure  of  title.  Where  a 
vendor  of  property  has  recovered  judgment  for  the 
purchase  money  and  become  insolvent,  and  the  ven- 
dee is  damnified  by  a  failure  of  title  or  possession,63 
or  by  having  to  pay  off  an  encumbrance,64  equity 
may  enjoin  the  judgment  to  the  extent  of  the  loss 
which  the  vendee  has  suffered ;  but  such  relief  will 


not  be  granted  where  the  vendee  has  a  plain  and 
adequate  remedy  at  law  by  action  for  breach  of  the 
covenant  of  warranty  or  against  encumbrances,65  or 
where  he  has  neglected  an  opportunity  to  set  off  his 
damages  when  sued  for  the  purchase  price.66 

b.  Subject  Matter  of  Set-Off 

In  a  proper  case,  equitable  relief  may  be  had  to  set 
off  one  judgment  against  another,  or  an  equitable  debt 
against  a  legal  one;  but  relief  ordinarily  will  not  be 
granted  to  permit  the  debtor  to  assert  a  contingent  or 
unliquidated  claim. 

Where  equitable  grounds  are  shown,  injunction 
may  be  used  as  a  means  of  setting  off  one  judgment 
against  another.67  Equity  possesses  the  power  to 
set  off  an  equitable  debt  against  a  legal  one,  where 
there  are  special  circumstances  of  which  only  a 
court  of  chancery  may  take  notice,68  and,  although 
the  claims  may  not  appear  on  their  face  to  be  mu- 
tual, a  court  of  equity  will  look  beyond  the  nom- 
inal parties  to  the  real  parties  in  interest  and  ad- 
judge accordingly.69  Where  a  judgment  creditor 
is  insolvent,  the  debtor  may,  in  equity,  set  off 
against  the  judgment  in  the  hands  of  an  assignee 
thereof  a  demand  against  the  creditor  which  became 
due  before  the  assignment.70  So,  also,  a  judgment 
debtor  may  in  this  way  set  off  an  amount  which  he 
has  paid  in  the  character  of  a  surety  for  the  judg- 
ment creditor.71 

Equity  ordinarily  will  not  grant  this  relief  where 
the  claim  set  up  is  contingent,  uncertain,  or  unliq- 


54.  Miss. — Corpus     Juris     cited    to, 
Bettman-Dunlap  Co.  v.  Gertz,  116 
So.    299,   300,   149   Miss.   892. 

34  C.J.  p  470  note  40. 

55.  Ky. — Walker  v.   Thomas,    11    S. 
W.   434,   88  Ky.   486,   11  Ky.L.   20. 

53.  Q-a, — Livingston  v.  Marshall,  11 
S.E.  542,  82  Ga.  281. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bett- 
man-Dunlap Co.  v.  Gertz,  116  So. 
299,  300,  149  Miss.  892. 

57.  Md.— Smith  v.  Washington  Gas- 
light Co.,  31  Md.  12,  100  Am.D.  49 
— Beall  v.  Brown,  7  Md.  393. 

58.  Ala. — Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Street,  154  So.  816,  228  Ala.  677— 
Adams  v.  Alabama  Lime  &  Stone 
Corporation,   127  So.   544,  221  Ala. 
10. 

34  C.J.  p  469  note  34. 

59.  Tox. — Corpus     JTnris     cited     to 
Jackson   v.    Birk,    Civ.App.,    88    S. 
W.2d  632,   633. 

34  C.J.  p  469  note  35. 
Concealment  or  fraud 

No  advantage  will  accrue  to  judg- 
ment creditor  if  debtor  seeking  to 
enjoin  collection  was  precluded  from 
discovering  set-off  by  concealment  or 
fraud.— -Adams  v.  Alabama  Lime  & 


Stone  Corporation,   127   So.   544,   221 
Ala,  10. 

60.  Ky.— Carlyle    v.    Long,    5    Litt. 
167. 

34  C.J.  p  469  note  36. 
Matters   determined   in   original   ac- 
tion see  supra  §  369. 

61.  Ala.— Adams    v.   Alabama   Lime 
&  Stone  Corporation,  127  So.  544, 
221  Ala.  10. 

62.  Mo.— Jegglin  v.   Orr,   29   S.W.2d 
721,  224  Mo.App.  773. 

63.  va.— Jaynes  v.  Brock,  10  Gratt. 
211,  51  Va.  211. 

34  C.J.  p  469  note  30. 

64.  Ind.— Shelby     v.     Marshall,     1 
Blackf.  384. 

Va.— Shores  v.  Ware,  1  Rob.  1,  40 
Va.  1. 

65.  N.C.— Henry  v.   Elliott,   59   N.C. 
175. 

34  C.J.  p  469  note  32. 

06.    Ga.— Hambrick  v.  Dickey,  48  Ga. 

578. 
Mo,— Hall  v.  Clark,  21  Mo.  415. 

67.  Ohio. — Barbour  v.  National 
Exch.  Bank,  33  N.B.  542,  50  Ohio 
St.  90,  20  L.R.A.  192. 

34  C.J.  p  468  note  18. 

Payment,   satisfaction,   or  discharge 

731 


of  judgment  by  set-off  of  another 
judgment  see  infra  §§  566-570. 

8.    Del.— Small   v.   Collins,    11   Del. 

273. 
34  C.J.  p  468  note  19. 

69.  Cal.— Hobbs  v.  Duff,  23  Cal.  596. 
34  C.J.  p  468  note  20. 

Insolvency  of  owner  of  beneficial  in- 
terest in  judgment 
Where  one  defendant  had  legal  ti- 
tle to  judgment  against  plaintiff,  but 
the  beneficial  interest  in  the  judg- 
ment was  in  another  defendant  who 
was  insolvent  and  against  whom 
plaintiff's  assignor  had  obtained  a 
judgment  which  had  been  assigned 
to  plaintiff,  and  which  was  larger 
than  the  judgment  against  plaintiff, 
plaintiff  was  entitled  to  a  permanent 
injunction  enjoining  the  enforcement 
of  the  judgment. — Sherwood  v.  Salis- 
bury, 299  N.W.  185,  139  Neb.  838. 

70.  Iowa. — De  Laval   Separator  Co. 
v.    Sharpless,    111    N.W.    438,    134 
Iowa  28. 

34  C.J.  p  468  note  21. 

71.  W.Va. — Hughes     v.     McDermitt, 
102   S.B.   767,    86  W.Va.    86. 

34  C.J.  P  468  note  22. 


§  371 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


uidated,72  unless  tte  circumstances  are  such  as  to 
warrant  the  interference  of  equity  to  prevent  wrong 
and  injustice,™  as  where  defendant  is  insolvent;74 
and  it  is  immaterial  whether  the  demand  arises  out 
of  the  same75  or  different™  transactions.  Equity 
will  not  grant  relief  where  the  claim  accrued  or  was 
acquired  by  complainant  after  the  recovery  of  the 
judgment  at  law;77  but  it  is  otherwise  where  the 
claim  was  acquired  before  the  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment at  law,  but  too  late  to  plead  it  by  way  of  set- 
off  in  that  action.78 

§  371.    Fraud,   Perjury,  Collusion,  or  Other 
Misconduct 

Duress  or  other  mfsconduct  practiced  by  the  suc- 
cessful party  on  his  adversary  furnishes  ground  for  equi- 
table relief  against  a  Judgment,  provided  the  complain- 
ing party  is  not  himself  guilty  of  fault  or  negligence  in 
the  matter. 

Courts  of  equity  may  grant  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment for  misconduct  preventing  a  bona  fide  adver- 
sary trial  ;79  but  their  willingness  so  to  act  is  lim- 
ited to  cases  where  the  unsuccessful  party  has  been 
prevented  from  presenting  the  full  strength  of  his 
case  by  reason  of  some  wrongful,  misleading,  or  de- 
ceptive, act  or  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  success- 
ful party,80  unmixed  with  any  fault  or  negligence 
on  the  part  of  the  complaining  party.81 


Duress.  A  judgment  may  be  attacked  in  equity 
on  the  ground  of  duress,82  although  entered  pursu- 
ant to  ostensible  agreement  or  consent  of  the  par- 
ties.83 In  order  to  warrant  the  vacation  of  a  judg- 
ment for  coercion,  the  means  of  coercion  must  be 
extrinsic  or  collateral  to  the  subject  of  dispute  in 
the  action  wherein  the  order  or  judgment  com- 
plained of  was  entered,84  aiid,  where  evidence  of 
the  coercion  or  duress  could  have  been  presented  to 
the  court  or  to  an  attorney  of  complainant's  own 
choosing  during  the  pendency  of  the  action  so  that 
full  examination  of  the  facts  could  have  been  made 
and  full  protection  given  to  the  rights  of  the  par- 
ties, equity  will  not  interfere.86 

§  372.    Fraud  or  Concealment 

a.  In  general 

b.  Nature  of  fraud 

a,  In  General 

Equity  has  inherent  power  to  grant  relief  against  a 
judgment  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  especially  if  it  was 
practiced  on  the  court,  inducing  It  wrongfully  to  assume 
Jurisdiction.  To  justify  such  relief,  the  fraud  must  be 
perpetrated  by  the  successful  party  or  his  agents,  and 
must  be  unmixed  with  any  fault  or  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  complaining  party. 

A  court  of  equity  on  a  proper  application  will 
relieve  against,  or  enjoin  a  party  from  enforcing,  a 


72.  Iowa. — Baker  v.  Ryan,  25  N.W. 
890,  67  Iowa  708. 

34  O.J.  p  468  note  23. 

73.  Neb. — Rogers    v.    Buettgenback, 
211  N.W.  168,  114  Neb.  834— State 
v.  Farmers*  State  Bank  of  Bayard, 
203    N.W.    659,    113   Neb.    497,   fol- 
lowed  in   203   N.W.    632,   113   Neb. 
503. 

34  aj.  p<468  note  24. 

74.  Tenn. — Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Greer,  11  S.W.  931,  87  Tenn.  698,  4 
L.R.A.  858. 

34  C.J.  p  468  note  25. 

75.  Ark. — Dugan  v..  Cure  ton,  1  Ark. 
31,  31  Am.D.  727. 

34  C.J.  p  469  note  26. 

76.  Ky. — Brown    v.    Scott,    2    Bibb 
635. 

N.J.— Jackson  v.  Bell,  31  N.J.Eq.  554, 
affirmed  32  N.J.Ea.  411. 

77.  Miss. — Desearn    v.     Babers,     62 
Miss.  421. 

34  C.J.  p  469  note  28. 

78.  Tex. — Ellis  v.  Kerr,  Civ.App.,  23 
S.W.  1050. 

79.  U.S.— Miller  Rubber  Co.  of  New 
Tork  v.  Massey,  C.C.A.I11.,  36  F.2d 
466,    certiorari    denied    Massey    v. 
Miller  Rubber  Co.  of  New  York,  60 
S.Ct.    354.    381    U.S.    749,    74    L.Ed. 
1161. 

Cal. — Olivera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d  564, 
19  Cal.2d  570,  140  A.L.R.  1328— 
Sears  v.  Rule,  114  P.2d  57,  45  Cal. 
App.2d  374. 


80u  U.S.— Miller  Rubber  Co.  of  New 
Tork  v.  Massey,  C.C.A.I11..  36  F.2d 
466,  certiorari  denied  Massey  v. 
Miller  Rubber  Co.  of  New  Tork,  50 
S.Ct.  354,  281  U.S.  749,  74  I*Ed. 
1161. 

Tex. — Ridge  v.  Wood,  Civ.App.,  140 
S.W.2d  536,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Kost  v.  Rose,  Civ. 
App.,  103  S.W.Sd  429— Landa  v. 
Bogle,  Civ.App.,  62  S.W.Sd  579, 
set  aside  on  other  grounds  Bogle 
v.  Landa,  94  S.W.2d  154,  127  Tex. 
317. 

Misconduct  of  jury 

Failure  of  plaintiff  to  discover 
jury's  misconduct  in  motion  for  new 
trial  did  not  authorize  setting  aside 
judgment  where  his  failure  was  not 
chargeable  to  defendant,  notwith- 
standing plaintiff  was  not  negligent 
in  failing  sooner  to  discover  alleged 
misconduct. — Brannen  v.  City  of 
Houston,  Tex.  Civ.  App.,  153  S.W.2d 
676,  error  refused. 

A.  definitive  Judgment  may  be  an- 
nulled,   except   for  defects   of  form 
prescribed  in  statute,  only  where  it 
appears    that    it   has   been   obtained 
through  wrong  practices  of  party  in 
whose   favor   it   was   rendered. — Ad- 
kins'  Heirs  v.  Crawford,   Jenkins  & 
Booth,  La.,  24  So.2d  246. 
Misconduct  held  not  shown, 
Tex.— Traders  &  General  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Keith,    Civ.App.,    167    S.W.2d    710, 

error  dismissed. 

732 


81.  Tex. — Brannsn  v.  City  of  Hous- 
ton,  Civ. App.,   153   S.W.2d  676,   er- 
ror refused — Ridge  v.  Wood,   Civ. 
App.,    140    S.W.2d   636,    error   dis- 
missed, judgment  correct-— Kost  v. 
Rose,    Civ.App.,    103    S.W.2d    429— 
Landa  v.  Bogle,  Civ.App.,  62  S.W. 
2d  579,  set  aside  on  other  grounds 
Bogle  v.  Landa,  94  S.W.2d  154,  127 
Tex  317. 

Estoppel  may  arise  precluding  the 
granting  of  relief  against  judgment 
obtained  by  means  of  fraudulent  act. 
practice,  or  representation  of  prevail- 
ing party. — Bloomguist  v.  Thomas,  91 
N.W.2d  337,  215  Minn.  35. 

82.  Ga.— Toung  v.   Toung,    2   S.E.2d 
622,  1*88  Ga.  29— Colclough  v.  Bank, 
of  Penfield,  103  S.E.   489,   150   Ga. 
316. 

83.  U.S.— Griffith  v.  Bank  of  N.  T... 
C.C.A.N.T.,  147  F.2d  899,  160  A.L.R.. 
1340,    certiorari    denied    Bank    or 
New  Tork  v.  Griffith,  65  S.Ct.  1414r 
325  U.S.  874,  89  L.Ed.  1992. 

Ky.— Hargis  v.  Hargis,  66  S.W.2d  59; 

252  Ky.  198. 
34  C.J.  p  441  note  9. 

84.  Cal. — Hendricks  v.  Hendricks,  14 
P.'2d  83,  216  Cal.  321. 

85.  CaL — Hendricks     v.     Hendricks, 
supra — Johnson  v.  Johnson,  128  P. 
2d   617,   53   Cal.App.2d   805,   appeal 
denied  128  P.2d  919,  53  Cal.App.2£ 
805. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  372 


judgment  obtained  by  means  of  fraud,8^  and  espe-  /  cially  where  the  fraud  has  been  imposed  or  prac- 


86.  U.S.— Griffith  v.  Bank  of  N.  Y., 
C.C.A.N.Y.,  147  F.2d  899,  160  A.L. 
H.  1340,  certiorari  denied  Bank  of 
New  York  v.  Griffith,  65  S.CL  1414, 
325  U.S.  874,  89  L.Ed.  1992— Whit- 
taker  v.  Brictson  Mfg.  Co.,  C.C.A. 
S.D.,  43  F.2d  485— Twist  v.  Prairie 
Oil  &  Gas  Co.,  C.C.A.Okl.,  27  F.2d 
470,  vacated  on  other  grounds  28 
F.2d  1021 — Russell  v.  Superior 
Journal  Co.,  D.C.Wls.,  47  F.Supp. 
282 — Mineral  Development  Co.  v. 
Kentucky  Coal  Lands  Co.,  D.C.Ky., 
285  F.  761,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  285  F. 
1021. 

Ala,— Mudd  v.  Lanter,  24  So.2d  550— 
Farrell  v.  Farrell,  10  So.2d  153, 
243  Ala.  389— Fowler  v.  Nash,  144 
So.  831.  225  Ala.  613— Ex  parte 
Cade,  127  So.  154,  220  Ala.  666— 
Fowler  v.  Fowler,  122  So.  440, 
219  Ala.  453 — Garvey  v.  Inglenook 
Const.  Co.,  104  So.  639,  213  Ala.  267 
— Danne  v.  Stroecker,  98  So.  479, 
210  Ala,  483. 

Ark. — Chronister  v.  Robertson,  185  S. 
W.2d  104,  208  Ark.  11. 

Cal. — Newport  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Stanislaus  County,  230  P.  168,  192 
Cal.  92 — Cowan  v.  Cowan,  App.,  166 
P.2d  21— Hosner  v.  Skelly,  App., 
164  P.2d  573— Vincent  v.  Security- 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Los  Angeles, 
155  P.2d  63,  67  Cal.App.2d  602— 
Crow  v.  Madsen,  App.,  Ill  P.2d  7, 
rehearing  denied  111  P.2d  663— An- 
glo California  Trust  Co.  v.  Kelley, 
4  P.2d  604,  117  CaLApp.  692— 
Wells  v.  Zenz,  256  P.  484,  83  Cal. 
App.  137. 

Colo.— Wilson  v.  Birt,  235  P.  563,  77 
Colo.  206. 

Conn. — Hoey  v.  Investors'  Mortgage 
&  Guaranty  Co.,  171  A.  438,  118 
Conn.  226. 

Fla. — Gross  v.  Gross,  18  So.2d  538, 
154  Fla.  649— State  ex  rel.  War- 
ren v.  City  of  Miami,  15  So.2d  449, 
153  Fla.  644— State  ex  rel.  Fulton 
Bag  &  Cotton  Mills  v.  Burnslde,  15 
So.2d  324,  153  Fla.  599— Miller  v. 
Miller,  7  So.2d  9,  149  Fla.  722— 
Reybine  v.  Kruse,  174  So.  720,  128 
Fla.  278. 

Ga. — Beavers  v.  Williams,  33  S.E.2d 
343,  199  Ga.  113— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Walker  v.  Hall,  166  S.E. 
757,  759,  176  Ga.  12— Clark  v.  Ten- 
nessee Chemical  Co.,  145  S.E.  73, 
167  Ga.  248 — Branan  v.  Feldman, 
123  S.E.  710,  158  Ga.  377— Bailey 
v.  McElroy,  6  S.E.2d  140,  61  Ga. 
App.  367 — Mullis  v.  Bank  of 
Chauricey,  150  S.E.  471,  40  Ga.App. 
582. 

Idaho. — Idaho  Gold  Dredging  Corpo- 
ration v.  Boise  Payette  Lumber 
Co.,  90  P.2d  688. 

111.— Moore  v.  Silvers,  168  N.B.  259, 
336  111.  316— Meyer  v.  Meyer,  83 
N.E.2d  738.  309  Ill,App.  643,  af- 
firmed 39  N.E.2d  311,  379  111.  97, 
140  A.L.R.  484— Village  of  Hart- 


ford v.  First  Nat  Bank  of  Wood 

River,   30  N.E.2d  524,   307   IlLApp. 

447 — Reisman  v.  Central  Mfg.  Dist. 

Bank,   15   N.E.2d   903,   296   IlLApp. 

61 — Hughes    v.    First    Acceptance 

Corporation,    260    IlLApp.    176. 
Ind.— Wohadlo    v.    Fary,    46    N.E.2d 

489,    221    Ind.    219— Livengood    v. 

Munns,  27  N.E.2d  92,  108  Ind.App. 

27. 
Iowa. — Foote    v.    State    Sav.    Bank, 

Missouri    Valley,    Iowa,    206    N.W. 

819,  201  Iowa  174. 
Kan.— Brown  v.  Wilson,   286   P.  247, 

130  Kan.  359. 
Ky.— Metropolitan    Life   Ins.    Co.    of 

New    York   v.    Myers,    109    S.W.2d 

1194,  270  Ky.  523— Hargis  v.  Har- 

gis,   66  S.W.2d  59,   252  Ky.  198. 
La.— Hebert  v.  Hebert,  App.,  187  So. 

317. 
Md.— Fetting    v.    Flanigan,    45    A.2d 

355— Green  v.  Green,   35  A.2d  238, 

182   Md.   571— Bailey  v.   Bailey,   30 

A.2d  249,  181  Md.  385. 
Mass. — Commonwealth  v.  Aronson,  44 

N.E.2d  679,  312  Mass.  347. 
Mich.— Racho    v.   Woeste,    9    N.W.2d 

827,    305    Mich.    522— Corpus   Juris 

cited  in  Grigg  v.  Hanna,  278  N.W. 

125.    130,    283    Mich.    443— Wabash 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Marshall,  195  N.W.  134, 

224  Mich.  593. 
Miss. — Keanum  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 

119   So.   301,   151   Miss.   784. 
Mo. — Crow  v.  Crow-Humphrey,  73  S. 

W.2d   807,   335   Mo.   636— Spotts   v. 

Spotts,  55  S.W.2d  984,  331  Mo.  942 

— Krashin  v.   Grizzard,   31   S.W.2d 

984,    326    Mo.    606— Boon  v  ill  e    Nat. 

Bank  v.  Schlotzhauer,  298  S.W.  732, 

317  Mo.  1298,  55  A.L.R.  489— Love- 
land  v.  Davenport,  App.,  188  S.W. 

2d  850. 
Mont — Bullard    v.    Zimmerman,    268 

P.  512,  82  Mont.  434. 
Neb. — Kielian  v.  Kent  &  Burke  Co., 

268  N.W.  79,  131  Neb.  308— Selleck 

v.  Miller,   264  N.W.   754,  130  Neb. 

306. 
NML — Lamarre   v.    Lamarre,    152   A. 

272,  84  N.H.  441. 
N.J.— Simon  v.  Henke,  139  A.  887,  102 

N.J.Eq.  115 — Nugent  v.  Hayes,  125 

A.  576,  96  N.J.EQU  485. 
N.T.— Arcuri  v.  Arcuri.  193  N.E.  174, 

265  N.T.   358— Boston  &  M.  R.  R. 

v.  Delaware  &  H.  Co.,  264  N.Y.S. 

470,     238    App,Div.    191— Herring- 

Curtiss  Co.  v.  Curtiss,   200  N.Y.S. 

7,  120  Misc.  733,  modified  on  other 

grounds   227   N.Y.S.   489,   223   App. 

Div.  101. 
N.C. — Scales    v.    Wachovia    Bank    & 

Trust  Co.,   143   S.E.   868,   195  N.C. 

772. 
N.D.— Elm  Creek  School  Dist  No.  21, 

Mercer  County  v.  Jung-era,  205  N. 

W.  676,  53  N.D.  231. 
Ohio. — Harig  v.  Lepasky,  App.,  49  N. 

E.2d  694,  first  case. 
OkL— Hill  v.  Cole,  137  P.2d  679,  192 

733 


Okl.  476 — Fellows  v.  Owens,  62  P. 
2d  1215,  178  Okl.  224. 

Or.— Fain  v.  Amend,  100  P.2d  481, 
164  Or.  123— Hartley  v.  Rice,  261 
P.  689,  123  Or.  237. 

Pa. — In  re  Culbertson's  Estate,  152 
A.  540,  301  Pa.  438. 

Tenn.— Winters  v.  Allen,  62  S.W.2d 
51,  166  Tenn.  281 — Larus  v.  Bank 
of  Commerce  &  Trust  Co.,  257  S. 
W.  94,  149  Tenn.  126 — Tallent  v. 
Sherrell,  184  S.W.2d  661,  27  Tenn. 
App.  683— Culwell  v.  Culwell,  133 
S.W.2d  1009,  23  Tenn.App.  389— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hartman  v. 
Spivey,  123  S.W.2d  1110,  1114,  22 
Tenn. App.  435. 

Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  633— Love  v.  State 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  San  Antonio, 
90  S.W.2d  819,  126  Tex  591— 
Strickland  v.  Ward,  Civ.App.,  185 
S.W.2d  736 — Pearl  Assur.  Co.  v. 
Williams,  Civ.App.,  167  S.W.2d. 
808 — American  Law  Book  Co.  v. 
Chester,  Civ.App..  110  S.W.2d  950, 
error  dismissed — Peaslee-Gaulbert 
Corporation  v.  Hughes,'  Civ.App., 
79  S.W.2d  149,  error  refused — 
State  v.  Wright,  Civ.App.,  56  S.W. 
2d  950 — Hudson  v.  Kerby,  Civ.App., 
5  S.W.2d  1007— Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Marsh  v.  Tiller,  Civ.App.,  279 
S.W.  283,  284— Eldridge  v.  El- 
dridge,  Civ.App.,  259  S.W.  209— 
Galloway  v.  Marietta  State  Bank, 
Civ.App.,  258  S.W.  532,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  Marietta.  State 
Bank  v.  Galloway,  Com. App.,  269 
S.W.  776. 

34  C*J.  p  441  note  8,  p  442  note  23, 
p  459  note  9,  p  460  note  20,  p 
470  note  44—47  C.J.  p  437  note  51, 
p  1015  note  73. 

Judgment  or  decree 

Belief  in  equity  on  the  ground  of 

fraud  may  be  had  against  any  judg- 
ment or  decree,   legal   or  equitable. 

U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Gallucci,  D.C.Mass., 
54  F.Supp.  964. 

Ala.— Hooke  v.   Hooke,   25    So.2d   33. 

Unconscionable  or  fraudulent  agree- 
ment 

Equity  may  relieve  against  a  judg- 
ment founded  on  an  unconscionable 
or  fraudulent  agreement,  particularly 
where  it  arose  out  of  confidential  re- 
lations, or  was  obtained  by  undue  in- 
fluence.— Raimondi  v.  Bianchi,  134  A. 
866,  100  N.J.Eq.  238. 

Solvency  of  defendant 

Where  a  party  has  obtained  a 
judgment  by  fraud,  it  is  no  ground 
for  refusing  to  enjoin  the  judgment 
that  he  is  solvent — Sanderson  v. 
Voelcker,  51  Mo.App.  328. 

When  proceeding  to  in  rem,  injured 
party,  without  notice  of  proceeding, 
and  not  wanting  in  diligence,  may 
have  equitable  relief  against  decree 
procured  by  fraud. — Quick  v.  McDon- 
ald, 108  So.  529.  214  Ala.  587. 


§  372 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ticed  on  the  court.87  The  power  of  equity  in  this 
respect  is  inherent.88  Equitable  relief  may  be  had 
on  the  ground  of  fraud  in  inducing  the  court  to  as- 
sume jurisdiction  which  it  did  not  have  or  would 
not  otherwise  have  exercised.89  Relief  will  also  be 
granted  where,  by  reason  of  fraud,  the  party  loses 
his  right  to  obtain  or  move  for  a  new  trial90  or  to 
take  an  appeal.91  To  justify  relief  on  the  ground 


87.  Cal.— Scott    v.    Dilks,    117    P.2d 
700,   47  Cal.2d  207 — Crow  v.  Mad- 
sen,  App.,  Ill  P.2d  7,  rehearing  de- 
nied 111  P.2d  663. 

Ga. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Walker 

v.  Hall,  166  S.E.   757,  759,  176  Ga. 

12. 
XT. — Boston  &  il.  R.  R.  v.  Delaware 

&  H.  Co.,  260  X.Y.S.  817,  146  Misc. 

221,  reversed  on  other  grounds  264 

itf.Y.S.    470,    238    App.Div.    191. 
Ohio.— Young   v.    Guella,    35    N.B.2d 

997,    67    Ohio    App.    11 — Byrne    v. 

Vanderbilt,   187   X.B.    731,   46   Ohio 

App.   304 — Laird  v.   Holan,   192   N. 

B.  806,  48  Ohio  App.  127. 
Okl.— Cone  v.  Harris,  230  P.  721,  104 

Okl.  114. 

04  C.J.  p  471  note  46. 
Conspiracy  to   give   false   testimony 

Conduct  of  attorney  in  conspiring 
with  ostensibly  disinterested  wit- 
ness who  did  not  in  fact  witness  ac- 
cident to  give  false  testimony  as  to 
cause  of  collision  and  in  using  such 
testimony  to  obtain  verdict  for 
plaintiff  amounted  to  a  fraud  on  the 
court  for  which  equity  should  grant 
relief.— gutter  v.  Easterly,  Mo.,  189 
S.W.2d  284. 

88.  Mo. — Wm.  H.  Johnson  Timber  & 
Realty  Co.  v.  Belt,  46  S.W.2d  153, 
329  Mo.  515. 

Mont— Gillen  v.  Gillen,  159  P.2d  511 
— Bullard  v.  Zimmerman,  292  P. 
730,  88  Mont.  271— State  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Sixteenth  Judicial 
District  in  and  for  Custer  County, 
214  P.  85,  66  Mont.  496,  33  A.L.R. 
464. 

Or.— Fain  v.   Amend,    100    P.2d   481, 
164  Or.  123 — State  Bank  of  Sher- 
idan   v.    Heider,    9    P.2d    117,    139 
Or.  185. 
Origin  and  flexibility  of  rule 

''Equitable  relief  against  fraudu- 
lent judgments  is  not  of  statutory 
creation.  It  is  a  Judicially  devised 
remedy  fashioned  to  relieve  hard- 
ships which,  from  time  to  time,  arise 
from  a  hard  and  fast  adherence  to 
another  court-made  rule,  the  gen- 
eral rule  that  judgments  should  not 
be  disturbed  after  the  term  of  their 
entry  has  expired.  Created  to  avert 
the  evils  of  archaic  rigidity,  this 
equitable  procedure  has  always  been 
characterized  by  flexibility  which  en- 
ables it  to  meet  new  situations 
which  demand  equitable  intervention, 
and  to  accord  all  the  relief  neces- 
sary to  correct  the  particular  injus- 
tices involved  in  these  .situations." 


— Hazel-Atlas  Glass  Co,  v.  Hartford- 
Empire  Co.,  64  S.Ct.  997,  1002,  322 
U.S.  238,  88  L.Ed.  1250,  rehearing  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct.  1281,  322  U.S.  772,  88 
L.Ed.  1596. 
Statutes  held  not  controlling 

(1)  Statutory  limitation  for  filing 
petitions    to    review    judgments    by 
persons    served   by   publication   who 
did  not  appear  and  defend  does  not 
deprive  equity  of  power  to  set  aside 
after    such    period    judgments    pro- 
cured by  fraud. — Fadler  v.  Gabbert, 
63    S.W.2d    121,    333    Mo.    851. 

(2)  Statutes  specifically  providing 
grounds   for   the    vacation   of  judg- 
ments in  the  court  of  common  pleas, 
which,   by  virtue  of  other  statutes, 
apply  equally  to  the  probate  court, 
have  been  held  to  have  no  control- 
ling effect  where  the  proceedings  in 
the  probate  court  are  in  equity  for 
the   purpose   of  impeaching  a  judg- 
ment     for     fraud. — Hooffstetter     v. 
Adams,   35  N.E.2d  896,  67  Ohio  App. 
21. 

89.     Ala. — Wright  v.  Ffcnnin,  156  So. 

849,   229  Ala.  278— Nichols  v.  Dill, 

132  So.  900,  222  Ala.  455. 
Ga. — Abercrombie   v.   Hair,    196    S.E. 

447,  185  Ga.  728— Hamilton  v.  Bell, 

132  S.E.  S3.  161  Ga.  739. 
111.— People  v.  Sterling,  192  N.E.  229, 

357  111.  354,  followed  in  People  v. 

Small,    192    N.E.    235,    357    111.    388 

— Hintz    v.    Moldenhauer,    243    111. 

App.  227. 
Ky.— Metropolitan   Life   Ins.    Co.   of 

New    York   v.    Myers,    109    S.W.2d 

1194,  270  Ky.  523. 
Mass. — McLaughlin    v.    Feerick,    176 

N.E.  779,  276  Mass.  180. 
Miss. — Lamar    v.    Houston,    184    So. 

293,  183  Miss.  260. 
Okl.— Johnson  v.   Petty,   246   P.   848, 

118  Okl.  178. 

Fraudulent   concoction  of  simulated 
cause  of  action 

Equity  will  afford  relief  against  a 
judgment  where  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court  was  acquired  by  the  fraud- 
ulent concoction  of  a  simulated 
cause  of  action. — Wright  v.  Fannin, 
156  So.  849,  229  Ala.  278— Bolden  v. 
gloss-Sheffield  Steel  &  Iron  Co.,  110 
So.  574.  215  Ala.  334,  49  A.L.R.  1206. 

Necessity   of   fraud   affecting  juris- 
diction 

(1)  A  fraud  which  justifies  the 
court  in  setting  aside  a  judgment 
must  relate  to  jurisdictional  mat- 
ters, and  not  to  such  matters  as 
may  be  available  as  a  defense. — 

734 


of  fraud  it  must  be  shown  that  the  fraud  was  suc- 
cessfully perpetrated  and  that  the  judgment  com- 
plained of  would  not  have  been  rendered  had  it  not 
been  for  the  fraud ;  there  is  no  ground  for  equita- 
ble intervention  where  the  fraud,  if  attempted,  would 
have  been  unsuccessful.92  It  should  appear  that 
the  judgment  complained  of  is  unjust93  and  that 

Mason  v.  Lacy,  117  S.W.2d  1026, 
274  Ky.  21— Metcalf  v.  Metcalf,  61 
S.W.2d  1083,  250  Ky.  202— Greene  v. 
Pitzpatrick,  295  S.W.  896,  220  Ky. 
590. 


(2)  "It  is  the  general  rule  that  a 
judgment  cannot  be  impeached  for 
fraud  .  .  .  unless  the  fraud  al- 
leged affects  the  Jurisdiction  of  the 
court  or  appears  on  the  face  of  the 
judgment  roll  itself."— Dr.  P.  Phil- 
lips Co.  v.  Billo,  147  So.  579,  581, 
109  Fla.  316. 

90.  Cal. — Thompson  v.  Laughlin,  27 
P.  752,  91  Cal.  313. 

Or. — State  Bank  of  Sheridan  v.  Hei- 
der, 9  P.2d  117,  139  Or.  185. 

91.  Mo. — Sanderson  v.   Voelcker,    51 
Mo.App.  328. 

92.  Cal. — Karlslyst  v.  Fraxier,  2  P. 
.     2d    362,    213    Cal.    377— Church    v. 

Church,   105  P.2d  643,   40   CaLApp. 
2d  701. 

Kan.— BItsko  v.  Bitsko,  122  P.2d  753, 
155  Kan.  80 — McNergney  v.  Har- 
rison, 84  P.2d  944,  148  Kan.  843. 

Or.— Mattoon  v.  Cole,  143  P.2d  670, 
172  Or.  664 — Oregon-Washington 
R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Reid,  65  P.2d  664, 
155  Or.  602. 

Utah. — Anderson  v.  State,  238  P.  557, 
65  Utah  512. 

34  C.J.  p  471  note  56. 

y  of  concealed  evidence 


A  suit  in  equity  cannot  be  main- 
tained to  set  aside  a  judgment  for 
insurer  in  an  action  on  a  policy  on 
the  ground  that  insurer  fraudulently 
concealed  certain  evidence,  where 
such  evidence  would  have  been  in- 
admissible because  irrelevant  to  the 
issues  in  the  former  action. — Kith- 
cart  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co., 
C.C.A.MO.,  119  F.2d  497,  certiorari  de- 
nied U.  S.  ex  rel.  Kithcart  v.  Gard- 
ner, 62  S.Ct  793,  315  U[.S.  808,  86  L. 
Ed.  1207— Kithcart  v.  Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  C.C.A.MO.,  88  F.2d  407. 

93.    Cal.— Karlslyst  v.  Frazier,   2  P. 

2d    362,    213    Cal.    377— Church    v. 

Church,   105   P.2d  643,  40   Oal.App. 

2d  701. 
Or. — Oregon-Washington   R.    &   Nav. 

Co.   v.   Reid,   65   P.2d   664,   155   Or. 

602. 
Belief  against  annulment  decree 

In  considering  equities  of  wife 
seeking  to  set  aside  default  annul- 
ment decree  obtained  by  husband 
through  extrinsic  fraud,  and  woman 
who  subsequently  married  husband 
in  good  faith,  haste  of  the  woman  in 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  372 


some  detriment  or  injury  has  been  occasioned  or 
contributed  to  by  the  fraud.94 

Fraudulent  alteration.  It  is  good  ground  for 
the  intervention  of  equity  that  a  judgment  fairly  and 
regularly  obtained  has  afterward  been  fraudulent- 
ly altered  so  as  to  increase  the  amount  for  which  it 
stands95  or  so  as  to  include  a  person  not  originally 
named  in  it  or  made  a  party  to  the  action.96  . 

By  and  on  whom  perpetrated.  In  order  to  obtain 
relief  against  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  fraud 
it  must  appear  that  the  fraud  was  practiced  or  par- 
ticipated in  by  the  judgment  creditor9 7  or  his 
agent98  or  attorney.99  The  fraud  must  have  been 


practiced  on  the  opposite  party1  or  his  agents2  or 
attorneys,3  or  on  the  court;4  fraud  between  code- 
fendants  will  not  affect  the  plaintiff,  however  gross 
it  may  be.5 

Fault  or  fraud  of  complaining  party.  The  party 
seeking  relief  on  the  ground  of  fraud  must  show 
that  he  is  free  from  fault,  negligence,  or  lack  of  due 
attention  to  his  case;  relief  will  not  be  granted 
where  the  injured  party  is  chargeable  with  such 
timely  knowledge  of  the  facts  alleged  as  would  have 
enabled  him  to  prevent  the  entry  of  the  judgment, 
if  he  had  used  proper  diligence.6  Further,  relief 
will  not  be  granted  to  one  whose  conduct  has  been 


marrying  the  husband  was  a  factor 
for  consideration. — Bloomquist  v. 
Thomas,  9  N.W.2d  337,  215  Minn.  35. 

94.  u.S. — Brady  v.  Beams,  132  F.2d 
985,  certiorari  denied  63  S.Ct.  1032, 
319  U.S.  747,  87  L.Ed.  1702,  rehear- 
ing denied  63  S.CL   1315,  319  U.S. 
784,   87  L.Ed.  1727. 

Ala. — Quick    v.    McDonald,    108    So. 

529,  214  Ala.  587. 
Cal. — Church    v.    Church,    105    P.2d 

643,  40  Cal.App.2d  701. 
Judgment  correct  as  matter  of  law 

Alleged  fact  that  plaintiff  bribed 
juror  did  not  constitute  ground  for 
suit  in  nature  of  bill  of  review  to 
vacate  judgment  where  plaintiff  was 
entitled  to  judgment  on  facts  as  a 
matter  of  law,  since  alleged  fraud 
of  plaintiff  and  juror  if  true  would 
not  taint  or  impair  judgment  ren- 
dered.— Elder  v.  Byrd-Frost,  Inc., 
Tex.Civ.App.,  110  S.W.2d  172. 

95.  111.— Babcock   v.   McCamant,    53 
111.  214. 

96.  Cal.— Chester  v.  Miller,  13  Cal. 
558. 

97.  Ga.— Rivers   v.   Alsup,    2    S.E.2d 
632,   188  Ga.  75— Elliott  v.  Elliott, 
191  S.E.  465,  184  Ga.  417. 

Iowa. — Ware   v.   Ecknmn,    277   N.W. 

725,  224  Iowa  783. 
Okl.— Davis  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.  for 

Insurance    on    Lives    &    Granting 

Annuities,    103   P.2d   880,   187   Okl. 

436. 
Or.— Mattoon  v.  Cole,   143   P.2d  679, 

172  Or.   664. 
34  C.J.  p  471  note  -51. 
Traud  of  officer  of  complaining'  cor- 
poration 

Insurer  was  not  entitled  to  have 
default  judgment  set  aside  on  ground 
that  its  own  secretary  and  mem- 
ber of  board  of  directors  had  fraud- 
ulently failed  to  disclose  that  he  had 
been  served  with  process  and  that 
suit  had  been  filed.— Southern  Trav- 
elers Ass'n  v.  Stlllman,  Tez.Civ.App., 
109  S.W.2d  285,  error  dismissed. 
Dispute  involving  one  of  several  de- 
fendants 

Where  plaintiff  is  induced  by  one 
of  several  defendants  to  exchange 


parcel  awarded  to  plaintiff  in  parti- 
tion for  tract  awarded  to  such  de- 
fendant and  judgment  is  entered  ac- 
cordingly, plaintiff  may  not  maintain 
a  separate  action  to  set  aside  such 
judgment  for  extrinsic  fraud  perpe- 
trated on  him  where  none  of  other 
defendants  are  involved  in  the  dis- 
pute and  all  other  parties  received 
their  own  awards  and  none  of  them 
participated  in  alleged  misrepresen- 
tations.— Machado  v.  Machado,  152 
P.2d  457,  66  Cal.App.2d  401. 
Correspondence  with  clerk  of  court 
A  defendant  who  received  due  no- 
tice of  the  pendency  of  the  action 
and  filed  an  answer,  but  failed  to 
appear  for  trial  due  to  correspond- 
ence with  the  clerk  of  the  court 
whereby  he  was  informed  that  the 
case  would  not  be  called,  neither 
plaintiff  nor  his  attorney  having 
knowledge  of  such  correspondence, 
could  not  have  a  judgment  thereafter 
rendered  for  plaintiff  set  aside  on 
the  ground  of  fraud. — Farmers'  Mut. 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Defries,  1  S.W.2d 
19,  175  Ark.  548. 

98.    Ga. — Rivers   v.   Alsup,    2    S.E.2d 

632,  188  Ga.  75. 
Okl. — Davis  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.  for 

Insurance    on    Lives    &    Granting 

Annuities,   103    P.2d   380,    187   Okl. 

436. 
34  C.J.  p  471  note  52. 

99-     Ga. — Rivers   v.   Alsup,    2    S.B.2d 

632,  188  G*,.  75. 
Iowa. — Ware   v.    Eckman,    277    N.W. 

725,  224  Iowa  783. 
N.Y. — Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Delaware 

&  H.  Co.,  264  N.Y.S.  470,  238  App. 

Div.  191. 
34  C.J.  p  471  note  53. 

1.  u.S. — Continental  Nat.  Bank  of 
Jackson  County,  at  Kansas  City, 
Mo.,  v.  Holland  Banking  Co.,  C.C.A. 
Mo.,  66  F.2d  823. 

Ind.— State   v.  Holmes,   69   Ind.   577. 

Okl. — Davis  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.  for 
Insurance  on  Lives  &  Granting 
Annuities,  103  P.2d  380,  187  Okl. 
436. 

Wis.— In  re  MacCormick,  190  N.W. 
108,  178  Wis.  408. 

735 


Omitting*    necessary    parties 

A  decree,  obtained  without  making 
those  persons  whose  rights  are  af- 
fected thereby  parties  to  the  suit  in 
which  the  decree  is  had,  is  fraudu- 
lent and  void  as  to  those  parties. 
— Elieff  v.  Lincoln  Nat.  Life  Ins.  Co., 
17  N.E.2d  47,  369  111.  408. 

2.  Okl. — Davis  v.    Pennsylvania  Co. 
for  Insurance  on  Lives  &  Granting 
Annuities,    103    P.2d   380,    187   Okl. 
436. 

3.  Okl.— Davis  v.   Pennsylvania  Co. 
for  Insurance  on  -Lives  &  Granting 
Annuities,  supra. 

4.  Ga,— White  v.  Roper,  167  S.E.  177, 
176  Ga.  180. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Ellsworth  v.  -Fidel- 
ity &  Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland,  147 
S.W.2d  131,  235  Mo.App.  '850. 

Wis.— In  re  MacCormick,  190  N.W. 
108,  178  Wis.  408. 

5.  Ind. — State    v.    Holmes,    69    Ind. 
577. 

6.  Ark. — Berry  v.   Sims,   112   S.W.2d 
25,  195  Ark.  326— Matkin  v.  Cramer 
Cotton  Co.,  252  S.W.  596,  159  Ark. 
508. 

Cal. — Hosner  v.  Skelly,  App.,  164  P. 
2d  573. 

Ind.— Atha  v.  Glenn,  174  N.E.  826,  92 
Ind. App.  449 — Branham  v.  Boruft 
145  N.E.  901,  82  Ind.App.  370. 

Ky. — Overstreet  v.  Grinstead's  Adm'r, 
140  S.W.2d  836,  283  Ky.  73— Com- 
monwealth v.  Harkness'  Adm'r,  246 
S.W.  803,  197  Ky.  198. 

La.— First  Nat.  !Lif e  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell, 
.141  So.  379,  174  La.  -692. 

Mo. — Wuelker  v.  Maxwell,  App.,  70  S. 
W.2d  1100. 

Neb. — Pinches  v.  Village  of  Dickens, 
268  N.W.  645,  131  Neb.  573. 

N.T.— In  re  Gray's  Will,  8  N.T.S.2d 
850,  169  Misc.  985. 

Tex.— Adams  v.  -First  Nat.  Bank,  Civ. 
App.,  294  S.W.  909— Moore  v. 
Moore,  Civ.App.,  259  S.W.  322. 

Utah. — Wright  v.  W.  B.  Callahan 
Const  Co.,  156  P.2d  710 — Anderson 
v.  State,  238  P.  557,  65  Utah  512. 

34  C.J.  -p  473  note  TO,  p  474  note  86. 

Misplaced  confidence 

Fact  that  one  has  placed  confidence 


372 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


improper  or  fraudulent,7  except  in  some  cases  where 
the  parties  are  not  in  pari  delicto.8 

b.  Nature  of  Fraud 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Extrinsic  or  intrinsic  fraud 

(3)  Concealment  or  deceit 

j 
(1)  In  General 

In  determining  whether  the  circumstances  amount 
to  fraud  so  as  to  justify  equitable  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment, each  case  must  be  judged  on  its  own  facts.  Mere 


error  of  fact  or  law  is  Insufficient,  and  It  Is  sometimes, 
necessary  to  show  the  elements  of  actionable  fraud. 

As  respects  the  right  to  equitable  relief  against  a 
judgment  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  the  term  "fraud" 
is  a  generic  term,9  and  while  it  has  been  held  that 
equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  may  be  granted 
for  extrinsic  fraud,  but  not  for  intrinsic  fraud,  as 
discussed  infra  subdivision  b  (2)  of  this  section, 
in  the  final  analysis  each  case  must  be  judged  on 
its  own  facts  in  determining  whether  the  circum- 
stances amount  to  fraud  so  as  to  justify  equitable 
relief  against  a  judgment.10  Broadly  speaking,  if 


in  another  is  not  sufficient  to  excuse 
lack  of  diligence  in  investigating 
facts  respecting  fraud.—  Lindsey  v. 
Dougherty,  Tex.Civ.Ajpp.,  60  S.W.2d 
300,  error  refused. 


of  pleading 


In  an  action  on  a  note  where  the 
answer  was  sufficient  to  render  a  co- 
defendant  served  with  summons,  hut 
who  made  default,  primarily  liable, 
and  the  answer  was  afterward 
amended  by  adding  an  allegation  of 
his  liability  and  a  prayer  for  judg- 
ment accordingly,  and  he  had  knowl- 
edge of  the  contents  of  the  original 
answer,  but  was  not  notified  of  the 
amendment,  a  judgment  pursuant  to 
the  prayer  is  not  subject  to  vacation 
on  the  ground  of  fraud.  —  Scott  v. 
Johnson,  224  P.  41,  115  Kan.  661. 

Tault  of  complaining  party  held  not 
shown 

(1)  Generally. 

Ga.  —  Bryant   v.    Bush,    140   S.E.    366, 

165  Ga.  252. 
Minn.  —  BloomQuist  v.   Thomas,   9  N. 

W.2d  337,  215  Minn.  35. 

(2)  In  a  suit  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment on  a  fraudulent  contract,  proof 
that  men,  apparently  working  in  his 
interest,    were    participating    in    the 
conspiracy  to  defraud,  excused  plain- 
tiff's lack  of  diligence  to  discover  the 
fraud  until  after  judgment—Paulson 
v.  Kenney.  224  P.  634,  110  Or.  688. 

(3)  Payment    of   taxes    for   single 
year  was  held  not  sufficient  notice  of 
procurement     of     judgment     accom- 
plished  by   fraudulent   practices,    so 
as    to    bar   relief   against   the   judg- 
ment,  where  adverse   claimant   paid 
taxes   for  other  years.  —  Bernhard  v. 
Waring,  2  P.2d  32,  213  CaL  175. 

7.  Ky.—  Hoover  v.   Dudley,  14  S.W. 
2d  410,  228  Ky.  110. 

Mo.  —  Crane  v.  Deacon,  253  S.W.  1065. 
N.H.  —  Lamarre    v.    Lamarre,    152    A. 

272,  84  N.H.  441. 
34  C.J.  p  474  note  87. 

8.  Attorney  and  client 

Where  parties  to  fraudulent  trans- 
action occupy  fiduciary  relationship 
of  client  and  attorney,  and  client 
r&Ues  on  advice  of  counsel,  client  is 
not  in  pari  delicto  with  attorney; 
attorney  is  deemed  more  culpable 


than  client,  and  equity  can  relieve 
client  from  burden  of  unjust  and 
fraudulent  judgment  obtained  by  at- 
torney against  client.— Sontag  v. 
Denio,  73  P.2d  248,  23  Cal.App.2d  319. 

9.  N.C.— McCoy  v.  Justice,  155  -S.E. 
452,  199  N.C.  602. 

10.  CaL — 'Larrabee  v.  Tracy,   134  P. 
2d  265,   21  Cal.2d  645,  followed  in 
Salvation   Army   v.    Security-First 
Nat  Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  134  P.2d 
271,  21  €al.2d  892. 

N.C. — McCoy  v.  Justice,  155  S.E.  452, 

199  N.C.  602. 

Circumstances     held     to     constitute 
fraud 

(1)  Plaintiff    knowing    that    notes 
sued  on  were  given  to  suppress  crim- 
inal prosecution  was  guilty  of  fraud 
in    initiating    litigation. — Dahms    v. 
Swinburne,    167    N.B.    486,    51    Ohio 
APp.  512. 

(2)  Prosecution    of    appeal,    after 
representations  that  appeal  without 
notice   would  not  be    taken,    consti- 
tutes fraud. — American  Ry.  Express 
Co.  v.  Murphy,  234  Ill.App.  346. 

(3)  Fraud    was    held    established 
where  it  appeared  that  counsel  for 
plaintiffs  assisted  judge  in  preparing 
findings     and     conclusions     without 
knowledge  of  defendant's  counsel. — 
•Fellows  v.   Owens,   62  P.2d  1215,  178 
Okl.  224. 

(4)  Other  circumstances. 

Ark.— Parker    v.    Nixon,    44    S.W.2d 

1088,  184  Ark.  1085. 
Ga. — Bryant  v.    Bush,    140    S.B.   366, 

165    Ga.    252— Phillips   v.    Phillips, 

137  S.E.  561,  163  Ga.  599. 
Ky. — People's  Bank  &  Trust   Co.   v. 

Sleet,  4  S.W.2d  689,  223  Ky.  749. 
La. — Cilluffa  v.  Monreate  Realty  Co., 

24  So.2d  606. 
Okl. — Western  Paint  &  Chemical  Co. 

v.    Board    of   Com'rs    of    Garfleld 

County,  18  P.2d  888,  161  Okl.  300. 
Tex. — Pearl  Assur.   Co.  v.  Williams, 

Civ.App.,   167  S.W.2d  -508. 
Wash.— Bates  v.  Qlaser,   227    P.    15, 

130  Wash,  328. 

Circumstances  held  not  to  constitute 
fraud 

(1)  The  fact  alone  that  the  com- 
plaining party  was  without  business 
experience  does  not  establish  fraud, 

736 


so  as  to  warrant  relief  against  a 
judgment. — McLaughlin  v.  Feerick, 
176  N.B.  779,  276  Mass.  180. 

(2)  Entry    of    judgment    without 
notice  to  defendant,  on  tetter's  fail- 
ure to  perform  settlement  agreement, 
is    not    fraud    for   which    injunction 
will    lie.— Mutual    Casualty    Co.    of 
Missouri  v.   Sansone,  Mo.App.,   17  8. 
W.2d  558. 

(3)  Fact  that  creditor  knew  debt- 
or had  been  discharged  in  bankrupt- 
cy as  against  debt  sued  on  could  not 
be  made  basis  of  charge  of  fraud  in 
taking  judgment  by  default. — Hard- 
ing  v.    Quinlan,    229    N.W.    672,    209 
Iowa  1190. 

(4)  Failure  of  a  party  or  his  attor- 
ney to  advise  the  adverse  party  re- 
garding  the   competency   of  the  at- 
torney for  such  adverse  party  does 
not    constitute    fraud   justifying    an 
attack    on    the    judgment — Luna    v. 
Miller,  42  P.2d  809,  171  Okl.  260. 

(5)  Failure   to   advise   defendant's 
attorney  of  setting  of  case  for  trial 
did   not   constitute   fraud   justifying 
vacation  of  judgment  for  plaintiff. — 
Hanover  'Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Street,  154 
So.  816,  228  Ala.  677. 

(6)  A  mistake  of  judgment  where- 
by a  party  consented  to  or  permit- 
ted a  decree  to  be   entered  against 
him  and  from  which  he  did  not  ap- 
peal   does    not    constitute    extrinsic 
fraud  or  misrepresentation  warrant- 
ing    equitable     relief. — Eskridge     v. 
Brown,  94  So.  353,  208  Ala.  210. 

(7)  Failure    of    debtor    to    appear 
and   assert    defense    in   response    to 
summons    served    on    him,    because 
person   serving  process  told  him   it 
was  subpoena  to  appear  as  witness, 
is  not  sufficient  ground  to  'set  aside 
judgment  against  him  as  -procured  by 
fraud. — Brinegar  v.    Bank    of   Wyo- 
ming,  130   S.E.   151.   100  W.Va.  «64. 

(8)  Fact  that  judgment  in   parti- 
tion  was   not  fraudulently  obtained 
was  held  shown  by  recital  that  par- 
ty opposed  its  entry. — Bennls  v.  CJon- 
ley,  231  N.Y.S.  635. 

(9)  A  party  may  in  separate  and 
contemporaneous  actions  against  dif- 
ferent  defendants   pursue   inconsist- 
ent   remedies    for    demands    arising 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  372 


the  result  complained  of  is  a  consequence  of  fraud, 
the  mode  or  manner  in  which  the  fraud  was  effect- 
ed is  immaterial  j11  where  there  is  no  question  that 
gross  fraud  has  been  committed,  technicalities  of 
interpretation  or  refinement  of  distinction  will  not 
be  permitted  to  embarrass  the  court  in  exercising  its 
power  to  do  justice.12 

In  order  to  have  a  judgment  set  aside  on  the 
ground  of  fraud,  the  essential  elements  of  action- 
able fraud  are  sometimes  required  to  be  shown.13 
Thus,  for  representations  to  be  sufficient  to  amount 
to  fraud  justifying  relief  against  the  judgment,  it 
must  appear  that  the  representations  were  made  as 
to  existing  facts,14  that  they  were  false,15  that  the 
complaining  party  was  ignorant  of  such  falsity  and 


believed  and  relied  on  them,16  and  that  by  reason 
of  such  belief  and  reliance  he  was  injured.17  A 
mere  error  of  fact18  or  law19  does  not  constitute 
fraud.  Fraud  is  not  established  by  the  fact  that  a 
larger  judgment  was  rendered  than  the  facts  justi- 
fied,20 or  by  the  fact  that  voluminous,  ambiguous, 
and  disorderly  testimony  has  been  offered  and  re- 
ceived on  a  trial.21 

Fraud  as  actual  or  constructive;  breach  of  fiduci- 
ary relation.  It  is  generally  considered  that  the 
wrong  constituting  the  basis  of  the  fraud  must  be 
intentional  and  done  with  knowledge22  or  consti- 
tute the  breach  of  a  duty  growing  out  of  a  fiduciary 
relation.23  Fraud  cannot  be  predicated  on  a  state- 
ment or  representation  which  was  made  without 


from  a  single  transaction  without 
advising  court  thereof,  and  judgment 
obtained  by  such  party  is  not  subject 
to  attack  as  being  obtained  by  fraud 
on  court. — Savery  v.  Mosely,  76  P.2d 
902,  182  Okl.  133. 

(10)  Other    circumstances. 

U.S.— Mclntosh  v.  Wiggins,  C.C.A. 
Mo..  123  -F.2d  316,  certiorari  de- 
nied 62  S.Ct.  800,  315  U.S.  515,  86 
L.Ed.  1213,  rehearing  denied  62  3. 
Ct.  914,  315  U.S.  831,  86  LuEd.  1224 
— Murrell  v.  Stock  Growers'  Nat. 
Bank  of  Cheyenne,  C.C.A.Wyo.,  74 
F.2d  827 — American  Surety  Co.  of 
New  York  v.  Baldwin,  D.C. Idaho, 
51  F.2d  596,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  C.C.A.,  55  F.2d  555,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Baldwin 
v.  American  Surety  Co.,  53  S.Ct 
98,  287  U.S.  156,  77  L.Ed.  231,  '86 
A.L.R.  298— U.  S.  v.  Irving  Trust 
Co.,  D.C.N.Y.,  49  F.Supp.  663. 

Ala.— Wright  v.  Fannin,  15-6  So.  849, 
229  Ala.  278. 

Ark. — Thornton  v.  Commonwealth 
Federal  Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n,  152 
S.W.2d  304,  202  Ark.  670. 

Cal.— Rudy  v.  Slotwinsky,  238  P.  783, 
73  CaLApp.  459. 

Ga. — Lloyd  v.  Milner  Motor  Co.,  190 
S.E.  641,  184  Ga.  181. 

til. — Slocum  v.  -First  Nat  Bank,  27 
N.E.2d  479,  305  IlLApp.  488,  cer- 
tiorari denied  61  S.Ct  450,  312  U. 
S.  678,  85  L.Bd.  1117— Francis  v. 
Legris,  17  N.E.2d  359,  297  IlLApp. 
164 — Moore  v.  Bobbins  Machinery 
&  Supply  Co.,  252  IlLApp.  24. 

Ky. — Elkhorn  Coal  Corporation  v. 
Cuzzort,  284  S.W.  1005,  215  Ky. 
254. 

La. — Rowe  v.  Crichton  Co.,  123  So. 
442,  38  La.Apj>.  454. 

Me.— Fort  Fairfield  Nash  Co.  v.  Nol- 
temier,  189  A.  415,  135  Me.  84,  108 
A.L.R.  1276. 

OkL— Stout  v.  Derr,  42  P.2d  136,  171 
Okl.  132. 

Or.— Hartley  v.  Rice,  261  P.  689,  123 
Or.  237. 

Tex. — O'Quinn  v.  Tata,  Civ.App.,  187 
S.W.Sd  241. 

49  C.J.S.-47 


11.  N.Y.— Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Del- 
aware   &   H.    Co..    264    N.Y.S.    470, 
238  App.Div.  191. 

OkL— Jones  v.  Snyder,  249  P.  813,  121 

Okl.  254. 

Any  conduct  which  tends  to  trick 
an  adversary  out  of  a  defense  or  to 
blind  him  to  the  pendency  of  an  ac- 
tion constitutes  an  act  of  fraud. — 
Fadler  v.  Gabbert,  63  S.W.2d  121, 
333  Mo.  851. 

12.  Ky.— Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co. 
of  New  York  v.  Myers,  109  S.W.2d 
1194,  270  Ky.  523. 

13.  Cal. — Gundelflnger    v.    Mariposa 
Commercial  &  Min.  Co.,  App.,  165 
P.2d  57. 

14L    Tex.— Moore  v.  Moore,  Civ.App., 

259  -S.W.  322. 
Expression  of  opinion, 

A  statement  of  plaintiff's  counsel, 
that  there  was  no  question  but  that 
plaintiff  could  go  into  court  and  re- 
cover judgment  on  the  facts,  was 
held  a  mere  expression  of  opinion, 
which  could  not  be  made  the  basis 
of  a  charge  of  fraud. — Moore  v. 
Moore,  Tex.Civ.App.,  259  S.W.  322. 

15.  Tex. — Moore  v.  Moore,  supra. 

16.  Ky. — Commonwealth    v.     Hark- 
ness'  Adm'r,  246  S.W.  803,  197  Ky. 
198. 

Tex. — Moore  v.  Moore,  Civ.App.,  259 

S.W.  322. 

Statements  in  brief  on  appeal  could 
not  have  misled  defendant  in  its 
preparation  for  trial,  so  as  to  enti- 
tle it  to  have  the  decree  set  aside  as 
for  fraud.— Toledo  Scale  Co.  v.  Com- 
puting Scale  Co.,  Ohio,  43  S.Ct  458, 
261  -U.S.  399,  67  L.Bd.  719. 

17.  Tex.— Moore  v.  Moore,  Civ.App., 
259  S.W.  322. 
Misrepresentation  which  would  not 

have  prevented  recovery  of  Judgment 
will  not  warrant  eauitable  relief 
against  the  judgment — Ellis  v.  Gor- 
don, 231  N.W.  585,  202  Wis.  134. 

18.  Kan. — Peterson  v.  Peterson,  246 
P.  506,  121  Kan.  212. 

737 


19.  Kan. — Peterson  v.  Peterson,  su- 
pra, 

N.M.— Caudill  v.  Caudill,  44  P.2d  724, 

39  N.M.  248. 

Misconception  of  the  law  control- 
ling the  issues  by  counsel  for  either 
party  is  not  a  fraud  for  which  equi- 
ty can  or  will  give  relief. — Phoenix 
Finance  Corporation  v.  Iowa-Wiscon- 
sin Bridge  Co.,  C.C.A.Iowa,  115  F.2d 
1,  139  A.L.R.  1430,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  62  S.Ct.  139,  314  U.S.  118,  ,86 
L.Bd.  100,  137  A.L.R.  967. 
Banning-  of  statute  of  limitations 

Fact  that  court  may  have  given  an 
erroneous  judgment  in  holding  that 
statute  of  limitations  had  not  run 
would  not  support  a  decree  to  annul 
judgment  for  fraud  in  procurement 
of  judgment — Bullivant  v.  Greer,  264 
-S.W.  95,  216  Mo.App.  324. 

20.  Ark.— Parker  v.  Sims,  51  S.W.2d 
517,  185  Ark.  1111. 

21.  U.S. — Phoenix   Finance   Corpora- 
tion v.  Iowa-Wisconsin  Bridge  Co., 
C.C.A.Iowa,  115  F.2d  1,  139  A.L.R. 
1490,    reversed    on    other    grounds 
62  S.Ct  139,  314  U.S.  118,  86  L.Ed. 
100,  137  A.L.R.  967. 

22.  Ga.— Rivers   v.   Alsup,    2    S.B.2d 
632,    188    Ga.    75 — Abercrombie   v. 
Hair,   196  -S.E.   447,   185   Ga.   728— 
Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Walker  v. 
Hall,  166  S.E.  757,  759,  176  Ga,  12. 

Or.— Mattoon  v.   Cole,   143   P.2d   679, 

172  Or.  664. 
34  C.J.  p  471  note  49. 
Circumstances  consistent  with  hon- 
esty 

'Fraud  which,  will  warrant  the  set- 
ting aside  of  a  judgment  is  not  to 
be  presumed  where  the  parties  do 
not  stand  in  fiduciary  relation,  and 
will  not  be  imputed  when  the  facts 
and  circumstances  from  which  it  is 
supposed  to  arise  are  fairly  and  rea- 
sonably consistent  with  honesty  of 
intention. — Farrell  v.  'Farrell.  10  So. 
2d  153,  243  Ala,  389. 

23.  Ga. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
Walker  v.  Hall,  166  S.E.  757,  759, 
176  <*a.  12. 


§  372 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  alleged  wrongdoer  of 
its  falsity,  or  without  an  intent  to  deceive,24  or 
which  was  made  in  the  belief  that  it  was  true,25 
however  implicitly  it  may  have  been  acted  on.  It 
has  been  held  that  the  fraud  must  be  actual  and 
positive,26  and  not  merely  constructive.27  Other 
authorities,  however,  have  held  that  intentional 
wrongdoing  or  actual  fraud  is  not  essential  to  the 
granting  of  relief  in  equity,28  and  that  equity  will 
grant  relief,  under  appropriate  circumstances,  on 


the    ground    of    constructive,    as   well    as    actual, 
fraud.2** 

(2)  Extrinsic  or  Intrinsic  Fraud 
While  the  authorities  are  not  unanimous,  the  gen- 
eral rule  is  that  the  fraud  which  will  justify  equitable 
relief  against  a  judgment  must  be  extrinsic  or  collateral 
to  the  issues  tried  in  the  original  action,  and  that  in- 
trinsic fraud,  or  fraud  In  the  cause  of  action  or  Instru- 
ment In  suit,  will  not  suffice. 

Generally    speaking    equitable    relief    against    a 
judgment  may  be  granted  for  extrinsic  fraud30  but 


Or.— Mattoon   v.   Cole,   143   P.2d   679, 

172  Or.  664. 
34  C.J.  P  471  note  50. 
Inducing-   person  not  to   protect   his 

interests 

Where  a  person  holding  confiden- 
tial relationship  with,  and  charged 
with  duty  to,  another  person,  induces 
him  not  to  protect  his  interests  in  a 
legal  proceeding  for  first  person's 
own  gain,  with  result  that  judgment 
is  rendered  against  such  other  per- 
son, invocation  of  equity  to  right 
such  wrong  is  warranted. — Rosen- 
baum  v.  Tobias'  Estate,  130  P.2d  215, 
55  Cal.App.2d  39. 

Where  there  1*  a  duty  to  speak  be- 
cause of  a  trust  or  confidential  rela- 
tion, the  failure  to  do  so  is  a  fraud 
for  which  equity  may  afford  relief 
from  a  judgment  thereby  obtained, 
whether  such  fraud  be  regarded  as 
extrinsic  or  as  an  exception  to  the 
extrinsic  fraud  rule. 
U.S. — Ferguson  v.  Wachs,  C.C.A.I1L, 

96  F.2d  910. 

CaL— JLarrabee  v.  Tracy,  134  P.2d 
265,  21  Cal.2d  645,  followed  in  Sal- 
vation Army  v.  Security-First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  followed  in 

134  P.2d  271,  21  CaL2d  892. 
D.C.— Earll  v.  Picken,  113  -F.2d  150, 

72  App.D.C.  91. 

24.  Cal.— Heller    v.    Dyerville    Mfg. 
Co.,  47  P.  1016,  116  CaL  127. 

25.  Kan. — Page    v.    Sawyer,    168    P. 
878,  101  Kan.  612. 

36.  Ala,— Farrell  v.  Farrell,  10  So.2d 
153,  243  Ala.  389— Quick  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 108  So.  529,  214  Ala,  587. 

Ga. — Rivers  v.  Alsup,  2  S.E.2d  632, 
188  Ga.  *75 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Abercrombie  v.  Hair,  196  S.E.  447, 
450.  185  Ga.  728— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Walker  v.  Hall,  166  S.E. 
757,  759,  17-6  Ga.  12. 

Me.— In  re  Baker's  Estate,  195  A.  202, 

135  Me.  277. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Grigg 
v.  Hanna,  278  N.W.  125,  130,  283 
Mich.  443. 

34  C.J.  p  471  note  48. 

27.  Ga. — Bivers  v.  Alsup,  2  S.B.2d 
632,  188  Ga.  75— Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Abercrombie  v.  Hair,  196  S.E. 
447,  450,  185  Ga.  728— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Walker  v.  Hall,  166  S.E. 
757,  769,  176  Ga,  12. 


Mich.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  G-rigg  v. 

Hanna,     278     N.W.     125,     130,    283 

Mich.   443— Ombrello  v.  Duluth,   S. 

S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  233  N.W.  357,  252 

Mich.   396. 
34  C.J.  p  471  note  48. 

28.  Mo. — Chouteau    v.    City    of    St. 
Louis,   App.,   131   S.W.2d  902. 

•Wicked  motive  unnecessary 

The  fraud  for  which  relief  will  be 
afforded  against  a  judgment  is  not 
confined  to  vicious  import  of  a  wick- 
ed motive  or  deliberate  deceit,  or 
the  like,  purposely  conceived,  but  em- 
braces merely  leading  astray,  throw- 
ing off  guard,  or  lulling  to  security 
and  inaction,  be  its  intention  or  mo- 
tives good  or  bad. — Triplett  v.  Stan- 
ley, 130  S.W,2d  45,  279  Ky.  148. 

29.  Cal. — Antonsen    v.    Pacific   Con- 
tainer Co.,  120  P.2d  148,  48  CaLApp. 
2d  535. 

Mont. — State  ex  rel.  Clark  v.  District 
Court   of  Second  Judicial  Dist.   in 
and  for  Silver  Bow  County,  57  P. 
2d  509,  102  Mont.  227. 
interested   persons    misled   and    de- 
ceived 

Relief  has  been  granted  where  the 
circumstances,  if  not  constituting 
actual  fraud,  at  least  showed  legal 
or  constructive  fraud,  and  interested 
persons  were  misled  and  deceived  to 
such  an  extent  that  they  suffered  an 
unavoidable  casualty. — Kersh  (Lake 
Drainage  Dist.  v.  Johnson,  157  S,W. 
2d  39,  203  Ark.  315,  certlorari  denied 
Johnson  v.  Kersh  Lake  Drainage 
Dist.,  62  S.CL  1044,  316  U.S.  673,  86 
L.Bd.  1748. 

30.  U.S. — Cohen  v.  Randall,  C.C.A.N. 
Y.,   137  F.2d  441,  certiorari  denied 
64  S.Ct  263,  320  U.S.  796,  88  -L.Bd. 
480. 

Arias.— Dragoon  Marble  &  Mining  Co. 
v.  McNeish,  235  P.  401,  28  Ariz. 
96. 

CaL — Larrabee  v.  Tracy,  134  P.2d 
265,  21  Cal.2d  -645,  followed  in  Sal- 
vation Army  v.  Security-'First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  134  P.2d  271, 
21  Cal.2d  892— Olivera  v.  Grace, 
122  P.2d  564,  19  Cal.2d  570,  140  A. 
L.B.  1328 — In  re  Estrem's  Estate, 
107  P.2d  36,  16  CaL2d  563— Purin- 
ton  v.  Dyson,  65  P.2d  777,  8  Cal.2d 
322,  113  A.L.R.  1230— Wattson  v. 
Dillon,  56  P.2d  220,  6  CaL2d  33— 
Baker  v.  Raker,  18  P.2d  61,  217  Cal. 

738 


216 — Hendricks  v.  Hendricks,  14 
P.2d  83,  216  Cal.  321— Wilson  v. 
Wilson,  130  P.2d  782,  55  Cal.App.2d 
421 — Rosenbaum  v.  Tobias'  Estate, 
130  P.2d  215,  55  Cal.App.2d  39 — 
Kallmeyer  v.  Poore,  125  P.2d  924, 
52  Cal.App.2d  142— Antonsen  v.  Pa- 
cific Container  Co.,  120  P.2d  148, 
48  Cal.App.2d  535 — Gump  v.  Gump, 
108  P.2d  21,  42  Cal.App.2d  64 — 
Giavocchini  v.  Bank  of  America 
Nat.  Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n,  103 
P.2d  603,  39  Cal.App.2d  444— Hara- 
da  v.  -Fitzpatrick,  91  P.2d  941,  33 
Cal.App.2d  453 — Young  v.  Young 
Holdings  Corporation,  80  P.2d  723, 
27  Cal. App. 2d  129 — Sontag  v.  iDenio, 
73  P.2d  248,  23  Cal.App.2d  319 — 
Mitchell  v.  Rasey,  33  P.2d  1056,  139 
CaLApp.  350 — Jones  v.  Moers,  266 
P.  821,  91  CaLApp.  65. 

Fla.— Reybine  v.  Kruse.  174  So.  720, 
128  Fla.  278. 

Minn. — Bloomquist  v.  Thomas,  -9  N. 
W.2d  337,  215  Minn.  35. 

Mo. — Chouteau  v.  City  of  -St.  Louis, 
App.,  131  S.W.2d  903. 

Mont.— Minter  v.  Minter,  62  P.2d  233, 
103  Mont.  219— Frisbee  v.  Coburn, 
52  P.2d  882,  101  Mont.  58. 

OkL — Kauffman  v.  McLaughlin,  114 
P.2d  929,  189  Okl.  194— Harjo  v. 
Johnston,  104  P.2d  985,  187  Okl. 
561 — Schulte  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Pontotoc  County,  250  P.  123,  119 
Okl.  261 — Jones  v.  Snyder,  233  P. 
744,  superseded  249  P.  313,  121  Okl. 
254— Ross  v.  Breene,  211  P.  417,  88 
OkL  37. 

Or. — Oregon-Washington  R,  &  Nav. 
Co.  v.  Reid,  65  P.2d  664,  1=55  Or. 
602. 

Pa. — In  re  Culbertson's  Estate,  152 
A.  540,  543,  301  Pa.  438. 

Inherent  power  of  equity 

The  power  of  a  court  of  equity  to 
give  relief  against  judgment  ob- 
tained by  extrinsic  fraud  is  inherent. 
— Moore  v.  Capital  Gas  Corp.,  Mont., 
158  P.2d  302. 

Public  policy 

The  demand  of  public  policy  that 
there  should  be  an  end  of  litigation 
for  repose  of  society  yields  to  ends 
of  justice  where  extrinsic  fraud  has 
been  practiced  only  because  main 
characteristic  of  such  fraud  is  that 
it  deprives  party  of  opportunity  of 
presenting  his  case  or  defense  and 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  372 


not  for  intrinsic  fraud.31  The  fraud  which  will  af- 
ford ground  for  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment 
must  be  extrinsic,  extraneous,  or  collateral  to  the 


matters  or  issues  tried  in  the  action  in  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered;32  relief  on  the  ground  of 
fraud  cannot  be  predicated  on  matters  or  issues 


renders  result  as  to  him  no  trial  at 
all  in  legal  sense. — Home  v.  Ed- 
wards, 3  S.E.2d  1.  215  N.C.  622. 
Extrinsic  or  intrinsic  nature  of  fraud 
as  affecting  remedy 

Generally,  where  fraud  is  extrinsic 
or  collateral,  operating  from  without, 
remedy  also  may  be  from  without, 
and  judgment  may  be  set  aside  by  an 
independent  action;  but  when  the 
fraud  is  intrinsic,  operating  from 
within  upon  some  matter  within  the 
line  of  consideration  of  the  court  on 
the  merits,  remedy  must  also  be 
from  within  by  motion  in  the  cause 
made  in  apt  time. — Home  v.  Ed- 
wards, 8  S.E.2d  1,  215  N.C.  -622. 

The  submission  of  stipulation  for 
Judgment  to  court  for  signing  of  for- 
mal judgment  did  not  put  it  beyond 
power  of  court  of  equity  to  set  aside 
judgment  on  ground  of  extrinsic 
fraud.— Scott  v.  Dilks,  117  P.2d  700, 
47  Cal.App.2d  207. 

31.  U.S. — T.  J.  Moss  Tie  €o.  v.  Wab- 
ash  Ry.  Co.,  C.C.A.I11.,  71  «F.2d  107, 
certiorari  denied  American  Surety 
Co.  of  New  York  v.  Conroy,  55  S. 
Ct  90,  293  U.S.  578,  79  L.Ed.  675— 
Toledo  Scale  Co.  v.  Computing 
Scale  Co.,  C.C.A.I11.,  281  F.  488, 
affirmed  43  S.Ct.  458,  261  U.S.  399, 
67  L.Ed.  719 — Harrington  v.  Den- 
ny, D.C.Mo.,  3  F.-Supp.  584. 

Cal.— Hnmmell  v.  Britton,  119  P.2d 
333,  19  Cal.2d  72— «La  Salle  v.  Pe- 
terson, 32  P.2d  612,  220  Cal.  739— 
O.  A.  Graybeal  Co.  v.  Cook,  60  P.2d 
525,  16  Cal.App.2d  231— Harvey  v. 
Griffiths,  23  P.2d  532,  133  Cal.App. 
17— Jeffords  v.  Young,  277  P.  163, 
98  Cal.App.  400. 

Kan. — Huls  v.  Gafford  Lumber  & 
Grain  Co.,  243  P.  306,  120  Kan. 
209. 

Minn. — Tankar  Gas  v.  Lumbermen's 
Mut.  Casualty  Co.,  9  N.W,2d  754, 
215  Minn.  265,  146  A.L.R.  1223. 

Mo.— Winchell  v.  Gaskill,  190  S.W.2d 
266. 

N.C. — Home  v.  Edwards,  3  S.E.2d  1, 
215  N.C.  -622. 

Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  633— Mills  v.  Baird, 
Civ.App.,  147  S.W.2d  312,  error  re- 
fused— Reed  v.  Bryant,  Civ.App., 
291  S.W.  605. 

32.  U.-S. — Brady  v.  Beams,  C.Q.A. 
Okl.,  132  F.2d  985,  certiorari  denied 
63  S.Ct  1032,  319  U.S.  747,  87  L.Bd. 
1702,  rehearing  denied  63  S.Ct. 
1315,  319  U.-S.  784,  87  L.Bd.  1727— 
wSEtna  Casualty  &  Surety  Co.  v. 
Abbott,  C.C.A.Md.,  130  F.2d  40— 
Angle  v.  Shinholt,  C.C.A.Tex.,  90 
*F.2d  294,  certiorari  denied  5*8  S.Ct 
40,  302  U.S.  719,  82  'L.Ed.  555— 
T.  J.  Moss  Tie  Co.  v.  Wabash  Ry. 
Co.,  C.C.A.I1L,  71  F.2d  107. •certio- 


rari denied  American  Surety  Co. 
of  New  York  v.  Conroy,  55  S.Ct. 
90,  293  U.S.  578,  79  L.Ed.  675— 
Continental  Nat.  Bank  of  Jackson 
County,  at  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  v. 
Holland  Banking  Co.,  C.C.A.MO., 
F.2d  823— Toledo  -Scale  Co.  v.  Com- 
puting Scale  Co.,  C.C.A.I11.,  281  F. 
488,  affirmed  43  S.Ct.  458,  261  U.S. 
399,  67  L.Ed.  719— Pittsburgh 
Forgings  Co.  v.  American  Foundry 
Equipment  Co.,  D.C.Pa.f  41  OBVSupp. 
841. 

Ala.— Farrell  v.  Farrell,  .10  So.2d  153, 
243  Ala.  389— Miller  v.  Miller,  175 
So.  284,  234  Ala.  453— Kelen  v. 
Brewer,  129  So.  23,  221  Ala.  445 — 
Bskridge  v.  Brown,  94  So.  353,  20-8 
Ala.  210. 

Ariz. — Schuster  v.  Schuster,  73  P.2d 
1345,  51  Ariz.  1 — Dockery  v.  Cen- 
tral Arizona  Light  &  Power  Co.,  45 
P.2d  656,  45  Ariz.  434. 

Ark.— Gulley  v.  Budd,  189  S.W.2d  385 
—Parker  v.  Sims,  51  S.W.2d  517, 
185  Ark.  1111— American  Liberty 
Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Washington,  36  S. 
W.2d  963,  183  Ark.  497. 

Cal.— Neblett  v.  Pacific  Mut.  Life  Ins. 
Co.  of  California,  139  P.2d  934,  22 
Cal.2d  393,  certiorari  denied  64  S. 
Ct.  428,  320  U.-S.  802,  188  L.Ed.  484 — 
Westphal  v.  Westphal,  126  P.2d 
105,  20  Cal.2d  393— Hammell  v. 
Britton,  119  P.2d  333,  19  Cal.2d  72 
— Horton  v.  Horton,  116  P.2d  605, 
18  Cal.2d  579— La  Salle  v.  Peter- 
son, 32  P.2d  612,  220  Cal.  739 — 
Caldwell  v.  Taylor,  23  P.2d  758, 
218  Cal.  471,  88  A.-L.R.  1194— Rog- 
ers v.  Mulkey,  147  P.2d  62,  63  Cal. 
App.2d  567 — Johnson  v.  Johnson, 
128  P.2d  617,  53  Cal.App.2d  805,  re- 
hearing denied  128  P.2d  91-9,  53  Cal. 
App.2d  $05— Stiebel  v.  Roberts,  109 
P.2d  22,  42  Cal.App.2d  434— Mc- 
Laughlin  v.  Security-«First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  6'7  P.2d  726, 
20  CaLApp.2d  602— Harvey  v.  Grif- 
fiths, 23  P.2d  532,  133  CaLApp.  17— 
Abels  v.  Frey,  14  P.Sd  594,  12-6 
CaLApp.  48 — Jeffords  v.  Young,  277 
P.  163,  98  Cal.App.  400— Stanley  v. 
Westover,  269  P.  468,  93  Cal.App. 
97. 

D.C. — Fidelity  Storage  Co.  v.  Urice, 
12  F.2d  143,  56  App.D.C.  202. 

Ga. — Stephens  v.  Pickering,  15  S.E.2d 
202,  192  Ga.  199— Elliott  v.  Marsh- 
all, 185  S.E.  831,  .182  Ga.  513. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Scan- 
Ion  v.  MoDevitt,  296  P.  1016,  1017, 
•50  Idaho  449. 

Iowa. — Shaw  v.  Addison,  1«  N.W.2d 
796. 

Kan.— -Bitsko  v.  Bitsko,  122  P.2d  753, 
155  Kan.  80 — McNergney  v.  Harri- 
son, 84  P.2d  944,  148  Kan.  843— 
Elfert  v.  Elfert,  294  P.  921,  132 
Kan.  218 — Huls  v.  Gafford  Lumber 

739 


&  Grain  Co.,  243  P.  306,   120  Kan. 
209. 

Md. — Bachrach  y.  Washington  Unit- 
ed Co-op.,  29  A.2d  822,  181  Md.  315. 

Mass. — Stephens  v.  Lampron,  30  N.E. 
2d  838,  308  Mass.  50,  131  A.L.R. 
1516. 

Mich.— Fawcett  v.  Atherton,  299  N. 
W.  105,  298  Mich.  362. 

Minn. — Tankar  Gas  v.  Lumbermen's 
Mut.  Casualty  Co.,  9  N.W.2d  754, 
215  Minn.  265,  146  A.-L.R.  1223— 
Nichols  v.  Village  of  Morristown, 
283  N.W.  748,  204  Minn.  212 — In 
re  Jordan's  Estate,  271  N.W.  104, 
199  Minn.  53. 

Miss. — Lamar  v.  Houston,  184  -So. 
293,  183  Miss.  2-60. 

Mo.— Winchell  v.  Gaskill,  190  S.W.2d 
266 — Sutter  v.  Easterly,  189  S.W. 
2d  284— Bodine  v.  'Farr,  182  S.W. 
2d  173,  353  Mo.  206— Texier  v 
Texier,  11-9  S.W.2d  778,  342  Mo, 
1220 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hock- 
enberry  v.  Cooper  County  State 
Bank  of  Bunceton,  88  S.W.2d  1031, 
1036,  338  Mo.  31— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Phillips  v.  Air  Reduction 
Sales  Co.,  85  £.W.2d  551,  559,  337 
Mo.  587— Fadler  v.  Gabbert,  63  S. 
W.2d  121,  333  Mo.  851— Peeters  v. 
Schultz,  254  -S.W.  182,  300  Mo.  324 
—Crane  v.  Deacon,  253  S.W.  1068 
— State  ex  rel.  Ellsworth  v.  -Fidel- 
ity &  Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland,  147 
S.W.2d  131,  235  Mo.App.  850. 

Mont— Khan  v.  Khan,  105  P.2d  665, 
110  MonL  591— Moser  v.  Fuller,  ,86 
P.2d  1,  107  Mont.  424— Bullard  v. 
Zimmerman,  268  P.  512,  '82  Mont. 
434. 

Ner. — Chamblin  v.  Chamblin,  27  P.2d 
1061,  55  Nev.  146.  * 

1ST.J. — Giehrach  v.  Rupp,  1-64  A.  465, 
112  N.J.Ea.  296. 

N.Y.— Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Delaware 
&  H.  Co.,  264  N.Y.S.  470,  238  App. 
Div.  191— In  re  Gray's  Will,  8  N. 
Y.S.2d  850,  169  Misc.  985— Ei del- 
berg  v.  Snyder,  44  N.Y.S.2d  60. 

N.C.— Home  v.  Edwards,  3  S.E.2d  1, 
215  N.C.  622. 

Ohio.— Minetti  v.  Einhorn,  173  N.E. 
243,  36  Ohio  App.  310. 

OkL— Lewis  v.  Couch,  154  P.2d  51, 
194  Okl.  632 — Park  v.  Continental 
Oil  Co.,  -87  P.2d  324,  184  Okl.  314— 
Calkin  v.  Wolcott,  77  P.2d  96,  182 
Okl.  278— Smith  v.  Smith,  69  P.2d 
392,  393,  180  Okl.  312— Stout  v. 
Derr,  42  P.2d  136,  171  OkL  132 — 
Burton  v.  Swanson,  285  P.  839,  142 
Okl.  ,134— Estes  v.  Pickard,  283  P. 
1004,  141  Okl.  60. 

Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw.  138  S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  633— Traders  &  Gen- 
eral Ins.  Co.  v.  Rhodabarger,  Civ. 
App.,  109  S.W.2d  1119,  error  dis- 
missed— State  v.  Wright,  Civ.App., 
56  S.W.2d  950. 


§  372 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


which  actually  were,  or  which  with  due  diligence 
could  have  been,  presented  and  adjudicated  in  the 
original  proceedings.83  As  the  rule  is  sometimes 
expressed,  fraud  in  the  matter  on  which  the  judg- 
ment or  decree  was  rendered  is  not  sufficient;34 
the  fraud  must  not  be  something  which  was  actually 


or  potentially  in  issue  in  the  case,  unless  the  inter- 
position of  the  defense  was  prevented  by  fraud  or 
conduct  of  the  opposite  party.35  On  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  said  that  relief  lies  in  cases  of 
intrinsic  as  well  as  extrinsic  fraud.36 


Utah.— Wright  v.  W.  B.  Callahan 
Const.  Co.,  156  P.2d  710 — Logan 
City  v.  Utah  Power  &  Light  Co., 
16  P.2d  1097,  86  Utah  340,  adhered 
to  44  P.2d  698,  56  Utah  354— Ander- 
son v.  State,  238  P.  557,  65  Utah 
512. 
Va. — Taylor  v.  Taylor,  165  S.E.  414, 

159  Va.  338. 

TT.Va. — Corpus  JTozig  quoted  In  Par- 
sons v.  Parsons,  135  S.R  228,  229, 
102  W.Va.  394. 

Wis.— Grady  v.  Meyer,  236  N.W.  569, 
205   Wis.    147— In   re   MacCormick, 
190  N.W.  108,  178  Wis.  408. 
34  C.J.  p  472  note  66. 
Matters  previously  presented 

Decree  could  not  be  impeached  on 
ground  of  extrinsic  fraud  consisting 
mainly  of  alleged  bribery  of  witness- 
es and  prevention  of  plaintiff  from 
presenting  his  evidence,  where  same 
matters  had  theretofore  been  pre- 
sented to  the  court  and  found  to  be 
without  merit. — Harris  v.  Jackson,  D. 
C.Okl.,  30  P.Supp.  185. 

33.  U.S. — Brady  v.  Beams,  C.C.A. 
Okl.,  132  F.2d  985,  certiorari  denied 
63  act  1032,  319  U.S.  747,  87  L.Ed. 
1702,  rehearing  denied  63  S.Ct. 
1315,  319  U.S.  784,  87  L.Ed.  1727 
— Harrison  v.  Triplex  Gold  Mines, 
C.C.A.Mass,,  33  F.2d  667. 

Ala.— Wynn  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  159 
So.  58,  229  Ala.  639. 

Ariz. — Schuster  v.  Schuster,  73  P.2d 
1345,  51  Ariz.  1 — Dockery  v.  Cen- 
tral Arizona  Light  &  Power  Co., 
45  P.2d  656,  45  Ariz.  434. 

Ark.— Gulley  v.  Budd,  189  S.W.2d  385 
— Parker  v.  Sims,  51  S.W.2d  517, 
185  Ark.  1111. 

Cal.— Horton  v.  Horton,  116  P.2d  605, 
18  Cal.2d  -579— Hendricks  v.  Hen- 
dricks,  14  P.23  53,  216  CaL  321 — 
Johnson  v.  Johnson,  128  P.2d  £17, 
53  Cal.App.2d  805,  appeal  denied 
128  P.2d  919,  53  Cal.App.2cL.  805— 
Crow  v.  Madsen,  App.,  Ill  P.2d  '7, 
rehearing  granted  111  P.2d  663 — 
Godfrey  v.  Godfrey,  86  P.2d  357, 
30  CaLApp.2d  370 — Hersom  v.  Her- 
som,  226  P.  937,  67  CaLApp.  .116. 

Idaho. — Boise  Payette  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Idaho  Gold  Dredging  Corporation, 
58  P.2d  786,  56  Idaho  660,  certio- 
rari denied  57  «S.Ct.  40,  299  U.S. 
577,  81  -UEd.  425. 

Ky. — Mason  v.  Lacy,  117  S.W.2d  1026, 
274  Ky.  21. 

Md. — Bachrach  v.  Washington  Unit- 
ed Co-op.,  29  A.2d  822,  181  Md.  315. 

Mo.— Winchell  v.  Gaskill,  190  S.W.2d 
266 — Hockenberry  v»  Cooper  Coun- 
ty State  Bank  of  Bunceton,  88  S. 
W.2d  1031,  338  Mo.  31— State  ex 


rel.    Ellsworth    v.    Fidelity   &   De- 
posit Co.  of  Maryland,   147  S.W.2d 
131,    235    Mo.App.    S50— Crowley  v. 
Behle,  App.,  131  S.W.2d  383. 
XT.— Arcuri  v.  Arcuri,  193  N.BL  174, 
265  N.Y.  35 S — Lerner  v.  Sheinhorn, 
54  N.Y.S.2d  678,  184  Misc.  361. 
Okl.— Park    v.    Continental    Oil    Co., 

87  P.2d  324,  184  Okl.  314. 
S.D.— Seubert   v.    Seubert,   '7   N.W.2d 

301. 

Tex. — Elder  v.  Byrd-Frost,  Inc.,  Civ. 
App.,  110  -S.W.2d  172 — Simpson  v. 
Zuehlke,  Clv.App.,  26  S.W.2d  &63— 
Halbrook  v.  Quinn,  Civ. App.,  286  S. 
W.  954,  certified  questions  dis- 
missed Quinn  v.  Halbrook,  285  S. 
W.  1079,  115  Tex.  513. 
Wis.— Grady  v.  Meyer,  236  N.W.  569, 
205  Wis.  147. 

Fraud  is  not  extrinsic  where  the 
court  rendering  the  judgment  had  be- 
fore it  the  same  issue  of  fraud  on 
the  same  essential  facts. — Mills  v. 
Baird,  Tex.Civ.App.,  147  S.W.2d  312, 
error  refused. 

Intrinsic  fraud  is  that  which  aris- 
es within  the  proceeding  itself  and 
concerns  some  matter  necessarily  un- 
der the  consideration  of  the  court  on 
the  merits. — Home  v.  Edwards,  3  S. 
B.2d  1,  215  N.C.  622. 

Equitable  fraud 

It  has  been  held  that  chancery 
may,  for  equitable  fraud,  restrain  the 
enforcement  of  a  judgment  at  law 
even  though  legal  fraud  in  respect 
of  the  same  matter  has  been  unsuc- 
cessfully pleaded  in  the  action  at 
law. — Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Tarnowski,  20  A.2d  421,  130  N.J.Eq.. 
1. 
Allegation  as  to  conveyance  of  title 

In  action  to  cancel  deed,  grantees' 
allegation  that  deed  conveyed  legal 
and  equitable  title  was,  if  untrue,  a 
misstatement  as  to  an  issue  in  con- 
troversy, and  hence  constituted  in- 
trinsic and  not  extrinsic  fraud. — 
Crockett  v.  Root,  146  P.2d  -555,  194 
OkL  3. 

Time  of  discovery  of  facts 

(1)  Discovery  of  the  alleged  fraud 
after,  not  before,  the  commencement 
of  the  original  action  or  the  entry 
of  the  judgment  attacked  ordinarily 
is  an  essential  element  to  the  grant- 
ing of  relief. 
U.S.— Brady  v.  Beams^  C.CJLOkl.,  132 

F.2d  985,  certiorari  denied  63  S.Ct. 

1032,   319    U.S.    747,   87  LJBd.   1702, 

rehearing  denied  63  S.Ct  1315,  319 

U.S.  784,  87  L.Bd.  1727. 
Wis. — Nehring   v.    Niemerowicz,    276 

N.W.  325,  226  Wis.  285. 


(2)  Bill  of  review  would  only  be 
allowed  if  court  were  satisfied  that 
evidence  was  not  available  at  time 
that  original  suit  was  litigated  and 
that  it  was  presented  without  undue 
delay  after  discovery. — Sorenson  v. 
Sutherland,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  109  F.2d  714, 
reversing  27  F.Supp.  44,  affirmed 
Jackson  v.  Irving  Trust  Co.,  61  S.Ct. 
326,  311  U.S.  494,  S5  L.Ed.  297. 

34.  U.S. — Pittsburgh  Forgings  Co.  v. 
American  Foundry  Equipment  Co., 
D.C.Pa.,  41  F.Supp.  841. 

Cal. — Crow  v.  Madsen,   App.,    Ill  P. 

2d   7,    rehearing   granted   111   P-2d 

663. 
Fla.— Dr.  P.  Phillips  Co.  v.  Billo,  147 

So.  579,  109  Fla.  316. 
Mass.— McLaughlin    v.    Feerick,    176 

N.E.    779,   276   Mass.   180. 
Miss. — Lamar    v.    Houston,    184    So. 

293,  .183  Miss.  260. 
Mo.— Bodine  v.  'Farr,  182  S.W.2d  173, 

353  Mo.  206. 
Mont.— Moser  v.   Fuller,    86   P.2d   1, 

107  Mont.  424. 
N.J.— Giehrach   v.   Rupp,   164  A.   465, 

112  N.J.Eq.  296. 
N.Y. — Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Delaware 

&  H.  Co.,  264  N.T.S.  470,  235  App. 

Div.  191. 

The    rule    rests    on    public    policy 
which  requires  that  there  be  an  end 
to  litigation. 
CaL — Caldwell  v.  Taylor,  23  P.2d  758, 

218  Cal.   471,   88  A.L.R.  1194. 
R.I. — Broduer  v.  Broduer,  1»67  A.  104, 

53  R.I.  450. 

35.  Ariz. — Schuster  v.    Schuster,   73 
P.2d  1345,  51  Ariz.  1. 

Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  -S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  633 — Traders  &  Gen- 
eral Ins.  Co.  v.  Rhodabarger,  Civ. 
App.,  109  S.W.2d  1119,  error  dis- 
missed. 
Exaggeration,  of  injuries 

Employer,  not  demanding  physical 
examination  of  injured  employee, 
was  held  not  entitled  to  annulment 
of  judgment  awarding  damages  on 
ground  of  employee's  fraud  in  exag- 
gerating effect  of  injury  by  appear- 
ing in  court  on  crutches  and  not  ris- 
ing from  chair  without  assistance. — 
First  Nat  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell,  141 
So.  379,  174  La.  692. 

36.  U.S.— Fiske  v.  Buder,  C.C.A.MO., 
125  F.2d  841. 

Wis.— Nehring    v.    Niemerowicz,    276 

N.W.  325,  226  Wis.  285. 
34  C.J.  p  471  note  64  [a]. 
Difficulty  in.  applying  rule 

(1)  It  has  been  judicially  observed 
that  the  line  of  distinction  between 
extrinsic  and  intrinsic  fraud  is  some- 


740 


49    G.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  372 


In  general  the  fraud  must  be  such  as  prevented 
the  unsuccessful  party  from  fully  and  fairly  pre- 
senting his  case  or  defense;87  it  must  be  such  as 
prevented  the  losing  party  from  having  an  adver- 


sary trial  of  the  issue.38  Where  a  party  to  an  ac- 
tion had  a  good  case  or  defense  but  was  prevented 
from  setting  it  up  by  the  fraud,  artifice,  deceit,  or 
misrepresentation  of  the  opposite  party,  without 


times  indistinct. — Brady  v.  Beams,  C. 
C.A.Okl.,  132  F.2d  985,  certiorari  De- 
nied 63  S.Ct.  1032,  319  U.S.  747,  87 
L.Ed.  1702,  rehearing  denied  63  S.Ct 
1315,  319  U.S.  784,  -87  L.Ed.  1727. 

(2)  Practical  application  of  the 
distinction  Is  often  difficult — Eaton 
v.  Koontz,  25  P.2d  351,  138  Kan.  267. 
37.  U.S. — Toledo  Scale  Co.  v.  Com- 
puting- Scale  Co.,  Ohio,  43  S.Ct.  458, 
261  U.S.  399,  67  L.Ed.  719— -Brady 
v.  Beams,  C.C.A.Okl.,  132  F.2d  985, 
certiorari  denied  63  S.Ct  1032,  319 
U.S.  747,  87  'L.Ed.  1702,  rehearing 
denied  63  S.Ct.  1315,  319  U.S.  784, 
87  L.Ed.  1727— Fiske  v.  Buder,  C.C. 
A.Mo.,  125  F.2d  541— Continental 
Nat*  Bank  of  Jackson  County,  at 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  v.  Holland  Bank- 
ing Co.,  C.C.A.MO.,  66  F.2d  823— 
Harrison  v.  Triplex  Gold  Mines,  C. 
C.A.Mass.,  33  «F.2d  667. 
Ariz. — Dockery  v.  Central  Arizona 
Light  &  Power  Co.,  45  P.2d  656, 
45  Ariz.  434. 

Cal.— Neblett  v.  Pacific  Mut.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  of  California,  139  P.2d 
934,  22  Cal.2d  393,  certiorari  denied 
64  S.Ct  428,  320  U.S.  802,  88  L.Ed. 
484_ westphal  v.  Westphal,  126  P. 
2d  105,  20  Cal.2d  393— Ringwalt  v. 
Bank  of  America  Nat.  Trust  & 
Savings  Ass'n,  45  P.2d  967,  3  Cal.2d 
680— Rogers  v.  Mulkey,  147  P.2d 
62,  63  Cal.App.2d  567— Rosen- 
baum  v.  Tobias'  Estate,  130  P.2d 
215,  55  Cal.App.2d  39 — Larrabee  v. 
Tracy,  104  P.2d  61,  39  Cal.App.2d 
593— McLaughlin  v.  Security-First 
Nat.  Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  67  P.2d 
726,  20  Cal.App.2d  602, 
Fla. — Sommers  v.  Colourpicture  Pub., 

8  So.2d  281,  150  Fla.  659. 
Ga. — Young  v.  Young,  2  S.E.2d  622, 

188  Ga.  29. 

Ky. — Overstreet  v.  Grinstead's 
Adm'r,  140  S.W.2d  836,  283  Ky.  73 
—Mason  v.  Lacy,  117  S.W.2d  1026, 
274  Ky.  21. 

Mo.— Winchell  v.  Gaskill,  190  S.W.2d 
266— Bodlne  v.  Fair,  182  S.W.2d 
173,  353  Mo.  20-6— Texier  v.  Texier, 
119  S.W.2d  778,  342  Mo.  1220— 
Hockenberry  v.  Cooper  County 
State  Bank  of  Bunceton,  88  S.W.2d 
1031,  338  Mo.  31— State  ex  reL 
Ellsworth  v.  'Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co. 
of  Maryland,  147  S.W.2d  131,  235 
Mo.App.  850. 
Mont. — Bullard  v.  Zimmerman,  292  P. 

730,  88  Mont.  271. 

Nev. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Chamb- 
lin  v,   Chamblin,   27  P.2d  1061,   55 
Nev.  146. 
Okl.— Stutsman  v.  Williams,   209  P. 

406,  87  Okl.  64. 

Dr. — Oregon-Washington  R.  &  Nav. 
Co.  v.  Reid,  65  P.2d  664,  155  Or. 
602. 


Tex. — Hermann  Hospital  Estate  v. 
Nachant,  Com.App.,  55  S.W.2d  505 
—Mills  v.  Baird,  Civ.Ap-p.,  147  «S. 
W.2d  312,  error  refused — American 
Law  Book  Co.  v.  Chester,  Civ.App., 
110  S.W.2d  950,  error  dismissed— 
Price  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  109  S.W. 
2d  1144— State  v.  Wright,  Civ.App., 
56  S.W.2d  350. 

Utah.— Wright  v.  W.  E.  Callahan 
Const  Co.,  156  P.2d  710. 

34  C.J.  p  472  note  66  [a]— 25  C.J.  p 
332  note  16  [b]. 

Lack   of  interference  in  search  for 
evidence 

The  alleged  fraud  of  the  owner  of 
a  patent  in  conspiring  to  monopolize 
the  business  of  making  and  selling 
scales  by  means  of  suits  brought  on 
a  patent  which  it  knew  to  be  invalid 
because  of  prior  use,  and  in  buying 
up  as  many  of  the  anticipating  scales 
as  it  could  secure,  was  held  not  to 
have  interfered  with  defendant  in  its 
search  for  evidence  of  prior  use,  so 
as  to  justify  setting  aside  a  decree. — 
Toledo  Scale  Co.  v.  Computing  Scale 
Co.,  Ohio,  43  S.Ct.  458,  261  U.S.  399, 
67  L.Bd.  719. 
aa  U.S.— Fiske  v.  Buder,  C.C.A.Mo., 

125  F.2d  841— Angle  v.  Shtnholt,  C. 

C.A.Tex.,  90  F.2d  294,  certiorari  de- 
nied 58   S.Ct   40,    302  U.S.   719,  «82 

L.Ed.  555. 
Ariz.— Dockery    v.    Central    Arizona 

Light  &  Power  Co.,  45  P.2d  656,  45 

Ariz.  434. 
Cal.— Scott  v.  Dilks,  117  P.2d.  700,  47 

Cal.2d    207 — Ringwalt   v.   Bank   of 

America    Nat.    Trust    &    Savings 

Ass'n,  45  P.2d  967,  969,  3  Cal.2d  680 

— Thompson  v.  Thompson,  101  P.2d 

160,  38  Cal.App.2d  377— Godfrey  v. 

Godfrey,  86  P.2d  357,  30  Cal.App.2d 

370— Jeffords  v.  Young,  277  P.  1-63, 

165,  38  Cal.App.  400. 
Ga. — Young  v.  Young,  2  S.E.2d  622, 

188  Ga.  29. 
Kan. — Eaton  v.  Koontz,  25  P.2d  351, 

138  Kan.  267— Stillie  v.  Stillie,  249 

P.  672,  121  Kan.  591. 
Mich. — Fawcett  v.   Atherton,   299  N. 

W.  108,  298  Mich.  362. 
Minn. — Tankar  Gas  v.  -Lumbermen's 

Mut   Casualty  Qo.,   9   N.W.2d  754, 

215   Minn.   265,   146   A.IL.R.   1223. 
Mont. — Bullard  v.  Zimmerman,  292  P. 

730,  88  Mont.  271. 
Nev.— Chamblin  v.  Chamblin,  27  P.2d 

1061,  55  Nev.  146. 
N.Y.— In  re  Gray's  Will,  8  N,Y.S.2d 

850,  169  Misc.  985. 
Okl.— Smith  v.   Smith,    69   P.2d   392, 

180  Okl.  312— Wood  v.  Wood,  216  P. 

936,  92  Okl.  297. 
Pa. — In  re  CuJbertson's  Estate,   152 

A.     540,     301    Pa.     438— Carey    v. 

Carey,    183   A.    371,   121  Pa.Super. 

251. 


Tex.— Mills    v.    Baird,    Civ.App.,    147 

S.W.2d  312,  error  refused. 
Wash.-^Farley    v.    Davis,    116    P.2d 

263,    10    Washed    62,    155    A.L.R. 

1302. 
34  C.J.  p  472  note  66  [a]   (2). 

Extrinsic  fraud  held  shown 

(1)  In  general. 

U.S.— Park  v.  Park,  C.C.A.Ga.,  123  F. 
2d  370. 

Cal.— Young  v.  Young  Holdings  Cor- 
poration, 80  P.2d  723,  27  CaLApp. 
2d  129. 

(2)  Where  a  court  is  deceived  and 
misled  by  a  fraudulent  concealment 
of   jurisdictional   facts,    such   fraud 
woulcl    necessarily    be    extraneous.— 
Jones  r.  Snyder,  249  P.  313,  121  Okl. 
254. 

(3)  It    is   always    extrinsic   fraud 
for  an  attorney  to  fail  fully  to  dis- 
close to  his  client  all  material  facts 
in  any  transaction  in  which  their  in- 
terests are  adverse,  resulting  in  the 
failure   of   client   to   defend   against 
claim  of  his  attorney.— Fiske  v.  Bud- 
er, C.C.A.M6.,  125  F.2d  841. 

(4)  Where  husband  who  flled  an- 
nulment proceeding  against  wife  by 
his  words  and  actions  led  her  to  be- 
lieve after  service  of  process  on  her 
that  proceeding  was  abandoned  and 
obtained  a  default  annulment  decree, 
he  was   guilty  of  extrinsic  fraud.— 
Bloomquist  v.  Thomas,  9  N.W.2d  337, 
215  Minn.  35. 

(5)  Where    trust    deed    secured    a 
usurious    note,    but   mortgagees    ac- 
quired the  mortgaged  land  by  fraud- 
ulently representing  that  they  would 
reconvey    if    mortgagor    would    not 
op-pose    foreclosure,    the    fraud    was 
extrinsic  to  the  judicial  proceedings, 
so    as    to   authorize   attack    on    the 
foreclosure      judgment — Smith       v. 
Schlein,  144  F.2d  257,   79  U.S.App,D. 
C.  166. 

Extrinsic  fraud  held  not  shown 
Cal.— Smith  v.  Young,  122  P.2d  624, 

50  Cal.App. 2 d  152. 
N.Y.— Eidelberg  v.  Snyder,  44  N.Y.S. 

2d  60. 

Knowledge  and  wrongful  intent 

Extrinsic  fraud  has  been  defined 
to  be  actual  fraud,  such  that  there 
is  on  the  part  of  the  person  charge- 
able with  it  malus  animus,  the  mala 
mens,  putting  itself  in  motion  and 
acting  in  order  to  take  an  undue  ad- 
vantage of  some  other  person  for  the 
purpose  of  actually  and  knowingly 
defrauding  him. — Continental  Nat. 
Bank  of  Jackson  County,  at  Kansas 
City,  Mo.,  v.  Holland  Banking  Co., 
C.C.A.MO.,  66  F.3d  823—34  C.J.  p  471 
note  48  [a],  p  472  note  64  [a]  (1). 


§  372 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


negligence  or  fault  on  his  own  part,  and  a  judg- 
ment was  thereby  obtained  against  him,  a  proper 
case  is  made  out  for  equitable  relief.39 

Fraud  in  procurement  of  judgment.  The  rule  has 
frequently  been  laid  down  that  the  fraud  must  have 
been  in  the  procurement  of  the  judgment,40  and 
such  fraud  is  sufficient,41  since  it  is  regarded  as 
perpetrated  on  the  court  as  well  as  on  the  injured 


party.42  This  may,  for  example,  consist  in  deceit 
and  imposition*practiced  on  the  court  as  a  means  of 
obtaining  a  judgment  which  otherwise  would  not  be 
rendered,43  or  in  the  act  of  the  successful  party  in 
illegally  tampering  with  the  jury,44  or  in  wrongfully 
obtaining  a  judgment  by  the  surreptitious  use  of  le- 
gal process  and  proceedings.45  Deception  practiced 
by  the  successful  party  in  keeping  his  opponent  in 


39.    U.S.— Fiske  v.  Buder,  C.C.A.MO., 

125  -P. 3d  8 4 I—Mineral  Development 

Co.  v.  Kentucky  Coal  Lands  Co.,  D. 

C.Ky.,  285  P.  761,  affirmed,  C.C.A., 

2*5  F.  1021. 
Ala, — Garvey  v.  Inglenook  Const.  Co., 

104  -So.  639,  213  Ala.  267— Hooper  v. 

Peters  Mineral  Land  Co.,  98  So.  6, 

210  Ala.  346. 
CaL — Rosenbaum   v.   Tobias1   Estate, 

130   P.2d    215,    55    Cal.App.2d    39— 

Crow  v.  Madsen,  App.,  Ill  P-2d  7, 

rehearing  granted  111  P.2d  663. 
Ga. — Morris  Const  Co.  v.  Randolph, 

135  S.E.  72,  163  Ga.  6. 
111.— Mohr  v.  Messick,  53  N.E.2d  743, 

322  111. App.  56 — Stade  v.  Stade,  42 

N.E.2d  631,  315  IlLApp.  136. 
Ky.— Triplett  v.  Stanley,  130  S.W.2d 

45,  279  Ky.  148 — Metropolitan  Life 

Ins.  Co.  of  New  York  v.  Myers,  109 

S.W.2d  1194,  270  Ky.  523. 
La.— Richardson    v.    Helis,    189    So. 

454.  1^2  -La.  856. 
Mass. — McLaughlin    v.    'Feerick,    176 

N.E.  779,  276  Mass.  180. 
Mo.— corpus  Juris  cited  in  Phillips 

v.  Air  Reduction  Sales  Co.,   85   S. 

W.2d  551,  559,  337  Mo.  587. 
Mont.— state    ex   rel.    Clark   v.    Dis- 
trict Court  of  Second  Judicial  Dist. 

in  and  for  Silver  Bow  County,  57 

P.2d  809,  102  Mont.  227. 
N.D. — Elm  Creek  School  Dist  No.  21, 

Mercer  County,  v.  Jungers,  205  N. 

W.  676,  53  N.D.  231. 
Or. — Pain   v.    Amend,    100   P.2d   481, 

164  Or.  123— Oregon-Washington  R. 

&  Nav.  Co.  v.  Reid,  65  P.2d  664,  155 

Or.  -602 — State  Bank  of  Sheridan  v. 

Heider,  9  P.2d  117,  .139  Or.  185. 
S.D. — Seubert   v.   Seubert,   7  N.W.2d 

301. 
Tex. — McAfee  v.  Jeter  &  Townsend, 

Civ.App.,  147  S.W.2d  884— Kerby  v. 

Hudson,  Civ.App.,  13  S.W.2d  724— 

Corpus    Juris    cited   in   Marsh    v. 

Tiller,  Civ.App.,  279  S.W.  283,  284. 
34  C.J.  p  440  note  77,  p  473  note  78. 

ientation    as    to    dismissal    of 


Bepx 

suit 

Where  defendant  was  prevented 
from  defending  action  by  plaintiff's 
fraudulent  representation  before  tri- 
al that  he  would  have  suit  dismissed 
because  of  settlement  between  par- 
ties, the  judgment  could  be  set  aside 
as  fraudulently  obtained. — Doyal  v. 
Tomraey,  127  SJB.  750,  160  Ga.  378. 

40.     AI«L— MUler   v.    Miller,    175   So, 
284,  234  Ala,  453— Kelen  v.  Brew- 


er, 129  So.  23,  221  Ala.  445— Esk- 
ridge  v.  Brown,  94  So.  353,  208  Ala. 
210. 

Ariz.— Schuster  v.  Schuster,  73  P.2d 
1345,  51  Ariz.  1. 

Ark.— Gulley  v.  Budd,  139  S.W.2d  385 
— Hendrickson  v.  Farmers'  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.,  73  S.W.2d  725,  189  Ark. 
423— American  Liberty  Mut.  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Washington,  36  S.W.2d  963, 
183  Ark.  497. 

CaL— Borg  v.  Borg,  76  P.2d  218,  25 
Cal.App.2d  25. 

I1L— Mohr  v.  Messick,  53  N.E.2d  743, 
322  IlLApp.  56. 

Mich.— Pawcett  v.  Atherton,  299  N.W. 
108,  298  Mich.  362— Grigg  v.  Han- 
na,  278  N.W.  125,  283  Mich.  443. 

Mo.— Winchell  v.  Gaskill,  190  S.W.2d 
266— Bodine  v.  Parr,  182  S.W.2d 
173,  353  Mo.  206 — Texier  v.  Texier, 
119  S.W.2d  778,  342  Mo.  1220— 
Hockenberry  v.  Cooper  County 
State  Bank  of  Bunceton,  88  S.W.2d 
1031,  338  Mo.  31— Crow  v.  Crow- 
Humphrey,  73  S.W.2d  807,  335  Mo. 
636— Sanders  v.  Brooks,  App.,  183 
S.W.2d  353— State  ex  rel.  Ellsworth 
v.  Pidelity  &  Deposit  Qo.  of  Mary- 
land, 147  S.W.2d  131,  235  Mo.App. 
850— Wuelker  v.  Maxwell,  App.,  70 
S.W.2d  1100— Gurley  v.  St.  Louis 
Transit  Co.  of  St.  Louis,  App.,  259 
S.W.  895. 

N.Y. — Fuhrmann  v.  Panroth,  .173  N.B. 
685,  254  N.Y.  479— Home  v.  Mc- 
Ginley,  299  N.Y.S.  1,  252  App.Div. 
296— Re  v.  Diamond,  2-84  N.T.S. 
405,  246  App.Div.  776,  830— Boston 
&  M.  R.  R.  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Co., 
2-64  N.Y.S.  470,  238  App.Div.  191— 
In  re  Gray's  Will,  8  N.Y.S.2d  850, 
169  Misc.  985. 

N.C.— McCoy  v.  Justice,  155  S.E.  452, 
199  N.C.  602. 

Tex. — Bearden  v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ.App., 
41  S.W.2d  447,  affirmed,  Com. App., 
60  S.W,2d  1031. 

W.Va. — Parsons  v.  Parsons,  135  S.E. 
228,  102  W.Va.  394. 

The   gravamen   of  the   offense   of 

fraud  in  procuring  a  judgment  is  the 
deceit  which  is  practiced. — Beavers 
v.  Williams,  33  S.E.2d  343,  199  Ga. 
113. 

41.     U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Bischof,  C.C.A.N. 

Y.,  48  P.2d  538. 
CaL — Crow  v.  Madsen,  App.,  Ill  P.2d 

7,  rehearing  granted  111  P.2d  663 
Ga.— Phillips  v.  Phillips,  137  S.E.  561, 

163  Ga,  899. 

742 


Idaho. — Swinehart  v.   Turner,   224  P. 

74,  38  Idaho  602. 
La. — Vinson  v.  Picolo,  App.,  15  So.2d 

77-8. 
Mich. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Oliver 

Iron  Mining  Co.  v.  PnefC,  247  N.W. 

126,  127,  262  Mich.  116. 
Mo.— Corpus   Juris   cited  in  Phillips 

v.  Air  Reduction  Sales  Co.,  So  S.W. 

2d  551,  559,  337  Mo.  587— Crow  v. 

Crow-Humphrey,     73     S.W.2d    807, 

3*35  Mo.  636. 
N.Y.— Scopano  v.  U.  S.  Gypsum  Co.. 

3    N.Y.S.2d    300,    166    Misc.    805— 

Herring-Curtiss  Co.  v.  Curtiss,  200 

N.Y.S.    7,    120    Misc.    733,   modified 

on   other   grounds   227   N.Y.S.   489, 

223  App.Div.  101. 
Okl. — Roland    Union    Graded    School 

Dist  No.  1  of  Sequoyah  County  v. 

Thompson,    124  P.2d  400,   190   Okl. 

416— Cone    v.    Harris,    230    P.    721, 

104  Okl.  114. 
Or.— Fain  v.  Amend,  100  P.2d  481,  164 

Or.  123. 
Tenn.— Coley  v.  'Family  Loan  Co.,  SO 

S.W.2d  87,  168  Tenn.  631. 
Tex. — Mendlovitz    v.    Samuels    Shoe 

Co.,  Civ.App.,  5  S.W.2d  559. 
34  C.J.  p  473  note  80. 

Extrinsic  fraud  operates  not  on  the 
matters  pertaining  to  the  Judgment 
itself,  but  to  the  manner  in  which  it 
is  procured. 
Ga. — Young  v.  Young,   2   S.E.2d  622, 

188  Ga.  29. 
Nev.— Chamblin  v.  Chamblin,  27  P.2d 

1061,  55  Nev.  146. 
Or. — Oregon-Washington   R.   &   Nav. 

Co.   v.   Reid,   65  P.2d   664,   155   Or. 
602. 
Tex.— Mills    v.    Baird,    Civ.App.,    147 

•S.W.2d   312,   error   refused. 

42.  Mich. — Corpus   Juris    quoted    in 
Oliver   Iron   Mining   Co.    v.    Pneff, 
247  N.W.  126,  127,  262  Mich.  116. 

34  C.J.  P  473  note  80. 

43.  Mich.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    la 
Oliver    Iron   Mining  Co.   v.    Pneff, 
247  N.W.  126,  127,  262  Mich.  116. 

34  C.J.  p  474  note  81. 

44.  U.S.— Platt    v.    Threa<Jgill,    C.C. 
Va,,  80  P.  192. 

Bribery  of  a  Jury  is  fraud  suffi- 
cient to  set  aside  the  verdict  of  Jury 
and  to  vacate  judgment  dependent  on 
that  verdict — Elder  v.  Byrd-Prost, 
Inc.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  110  S.W.Sd  172. 

45.  Or.— Kirk  v.  Mullen,  197  P.  300, 
100  Or.  563. 

34  C.J.  p  474  note  83. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  372 


ignorance  of  the  proceeding  is  extrinsic  or  collat- 
eral fraud.46  Wrongfully  preventing  the  complain- 
ing party  or  his  material  witnesses  from  appearing 
in  court  or  attending  the  trial,47  or  inducing  his  at- 
torney to  professional  delinquency  or  infidelity  in 
connection  with  the  case,48  also  constitutes  extrinsic 
or  collateral  fraud. 

Fraud  in  cause  of  action  or  instrument  in  suit. 
Although  some  of  the  earlier  cases  support  the  right 
of  equity  to  enjoin  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of 
fraud  in  the  instrument  or  transaction  on  which  it  is 
founded,49  for  example,  a  judgment  for  the  price 
of  property  sold,  where  the  sale  was  induced  by 


false  representations  or  concealment  of  the  truth, 
with  regard  to  quantity,  character,  or  title,50  it  has 
been  generally  held  that  fraud  in  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion or  instrument  in  suit  must  be  set  up  in  the 
original  action,  and  furnishes  no  ground  for  relief 
in  equity,51  unless  the  interposition  of  the  fraud  as 
a  defense  was  prevented  by  fraud  of  the  opposite 
party52  or  the  judgment  was  rendered  in  a  court 
where  such  defense  was  not  available  to  him.63  The 
fact  that  allegations  set  forth  in  the  pleadings  of 
the  successful  party  were  false  cannot  be  success- 
fully urged  as  a  ground  for  equitable  interference 
with  the  judgment  rendered  thereon.64 


43.  Cal.— Neblett  v.  Pacific  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  of  California,  139  P. 
2d  934,  22  Cal.2d  393,  certlorari  de- 
nied 64  S.Qt.  428,  320  U.S.  802,  88 
L.Ed.  484 — Zaremba  v.  Woods,  -61 
P.2d  976,  17  Cal.App.2d  309. 
Tex. — State  v.  Wright,  Civ.App.,  56 
S.W.2d  950. 

Presenting1  false  affidavit  for  serv- 
ice by  publication  is  fraud  for  which 
judgment  will  be  set  aside,  where 
rights  of  innocent  parties  have  not 
intervened. — Wells  v.  Zenz,  256  P. 
484,  83  CaLApp.  137. 

Fraudulent  omission  to  post  copy 
of  summons  on  the  premises  in  all 
persons  action  would  constitute  ex- 
trinsic fraud. — Bernhard  v.  Waring, 
2  P.2d  32,  213  Cal.  175. 
Failure  to  notify  heir  of  probate  pro- 

oeedingrs 

Where  proponent  and  residuary 
legatee  and  executor  under  will,  with 
knowledge  of  existence  of  pretermit- 
ted  heir,  failed  to  disclose  her  exist- 
ence in  the  petition  for  probate  and 
gave  her  no  notice  of  the  proceeding 
with  result  that  a  decree  was  made 
distributing  the  residue  of  the  estate 
to  him,  the  fraud  was  extrinsic  so 
as  to  authorize  relief  in  equity. — 
Purinton  v.  Dyson,  65  P.2d,  777,  8 
Cal.2d  322,  US  AJL.R.  1230. 

47.  U.S. — Brady    v.    Beams,     C.C.A. 
Okl.,  132  'F.2d  955,  certiorarl  denied 
63  S.Ct.  1032,  319  U.S.  747,  87  L.Bd. 
1702,     rehearing    denied     63    -S.Ct. 
1315,  319  U.S.  784,  87  L.Bd.  1727. 

Cal.— Larrabee  v.  Tracy,  104  P.2d 
61,  39  CaLApp.2d  593 — Thompson 
v.  Thompson,  101  P.2d  160,  38  Cal. 
App.2d  377 — Godfrey  v.  Godfrey, 
86  P.2d  357,  30  Cal.App.2d  370. 

48.  U.S. — Brady    v.    Beams,    C.C.A. 
Okl.,  132  F.2d  985,  certiorari  denied 
63  S.Ct.  1032,  319  U.S.  747,  87  L.Bd. 
1702,     rehearing    denied    63     S.Ct. 
1315,   319   U.S.  784,   87  L.Bd.   1727. 

49.  U.S. — Trefz     v.     Knickerbocker 
•Life  Ins.  Co.,  C.C.N.J.,  8  P.  177. 

34  C.J.  p  471  note  64. 

50.  N.C.— Cox    v.    Jerman,    41    N.C. 
526. 

34  C.J.  p  472  note  -65. 


51.  Cal. — Crow  v.  Madsen,  App.,  Ill 
P.2d  7,  rehearing  granted  111  P.2d 
663. 

111.— Mohr  v.  Messick,  53  N.E.2d  743, 
322  I11.APP.  56. 

Mich,— Smith  v.  Pontiac  Citizens 
Loan  &  Investment  Co.,  293  N.W. 
661,  294  Mich.  312— Bassett  v. 
Trinity  Bldg.  Co.,  236  N.W.  237, 
254  Mich.  207. 

Mo. — Crow  v.  Crow-Humphrey,  73  S. 
W.2d  :S07,  335  Mo.  636 — Crowley  v. 
Bahle,  App.,  131  S.W.2d  383— Na- 
tional Union  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ver- 
million,  App.,  19  S.W.2d  776. 

Okl.— Stutsman  v.  Williams,  209  P. 
406,  87  Okl.  $4. 

S.D.— Seubert  v.  Seubert,  7  N.W.2d 
301. 

Tex. — Browning  -  Ferris  Machinery 
Co.  v,  Thomson,  Civ.App.,  55  S.W. 
2  d  168 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bear- 
den  v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ.App.,  41  S. 
W.2d  447,  462,  affirmed,  Com. App., 
60  S.W.2d  1031. 

W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Par- 
sons v.  Parsons,  135  S.E.  228,  229, 
102  W.Va.  394. 

34  C.J.  p  472  note  67. 

Intrinsic  frau4  includes  fraud 
based  on  the  presentation  of  forged 
or  fraudulent  instruments  or  other 
fraudulent  matter  that  was  or  could 
have  been  considered  in  rendering 
the  judgment  against  which  relief  is 
sought 

U.S.— Brady  v.  Beams,  C.C.A.Okl., 
132  'F.2d  985,  certiorari  denied  63 
S,Ct.  1032,  319  U.S.  747,  87  L.Bd. 
1702,  rehearing  denied  63  S.Ct. 
1315,  319  U.S.  784,  87  L.Bd.  1727— 
Angle  v.  Shinholt,  C.C.A.Tex.,  90 
F.2d  294,  certiorari  denied  58  S.Ct. 
40,  302  U.S.  719,  82  L.Bd.  555. 
Cal.— Hammell  v.  Britton,  119  P.2d 
333,  19  Cal.2d  72— Horton  v.  Hor- 
ton,  116  P.2d  605,  118  Cal.2d  579— 
Harvey  v.  Griffiths,  23  P.2d  532,  133 
CaLApp.  17— Julien  v.  West,  274  P. 
421,  96  Cal-App.  558. 
Tex. — Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  $33— Mills  v.  Baird, 
Civ.App,,  147  S.W.2d  312,  error  re- 
fused.— Traders  &  General  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Rhodabarger,  Civ.App.,  109  S.W. 

743 


2d  1119— State  v.  Wright,  Civ.App., 

56  S.W.2d  950. 

Where  a  party  falls  to  defend  an 
action  after  being  given  an  opportu- 
nity by  proper  notice,  fraud  in  ob« 
taining  the  judgment  against  him  is 
usually  held  to  be  intrinsic. — West- 
phal  v.  Westphal,  12-6  P.2d  105,  20 
Cal. 2 a  393 — Hosner  v.  Skelly,  App., 
164  P.2d  573 — Rosenbaum  v.  Tobias* 
Estate,  130  P.2d  215,  55  Cal. App. 2 d 
39. 

Fraud  in  the  procurement  of  a  note 
is  not  ground  for  equitable  relief 
against  a  judgment  rendered  on  the 
note  since  that  circumstance  could 
and  should  have  been  urged  as  a  de- 
fense in  the  original  action. 
Ky.— Ring  v.  Freeland,  300  S.W.  341, 

222  Ky.  147. 
W.Va. — McGhee  v.  Stevens,  3  S.E.2d 

615,  121  W.Va.  430. 
Wis.— Grady  v.  Meyer,  236  N.W.  569, 

205  Wis.  147. 

fating-  fictitious  cause  of  action 
and  supporting  it  by  false  testimony 
is  intrinsic  fraud. — Potts  v.  West, 
262  P.  569,  124  Kan.  815. 

Fraudulent  assertion  of  cross  ac- 
tion would  be  intrinsic  fraud.— Davis 
v.  Cox,  Tex.Civ.App.,  4  «S.W.2d  1008, 
error  dismissed. 

62.  111.— Mohr  v.  Messick,  53  N.B. 
2d  743,  322  IlLAp-p.  56. 

Mo.— Crow  v.  Crow-Humphrey,  73  S. 
W.2d  807,  335  Mo.  636. 

W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Par- 
sons v.  Parsons,  135  S.E.  228,  229, 
102  W.Va.  394. 

34  C.J.  p  473  note  6'8. 

53.  N.C.— North  Carolina  Mutual  & 
Provident  Ass'n  v.  Edwards,  84  S. 
E.  359,  168  N.C.  378. 

W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Par- 
sons v.  Parsons,  '135  S.E.  238,  229, 
102  W.Va.  394. 

54.  Cal. — Horton  v.   Horton,   116  P. 
2d  605,  18  Cal.2d  579. 

N.C.— McCoy  v.  Justice,  155  S.E.  452, 

199  N.C.  602. 
Or.— Dixon   v.    Simpson,    279    P.    039, 

130  Or.  211. 


§  372 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Exceptions  to  the  rule  prohibiting  relief  for  fraud 
in  the  cause  of  action  or  instrument  sued  on  have 
been  made,55  as,  for  example,  in  cases  where  the 
judgment  was  based  on  service  by  publication  and 
defendant  had  no  actual  knowledge  of  the  suit,56 
where  the  court  in  which  the  action  was  brought 
and  the  trial  had  was  without  jurisdiction  to  pass 
on  the  question  of  fraud,57  or  where  the  transac- 
tion on  which  the  judgment  was  based  was  against 
public  policy.58  Under  statutes  in  some  states  au- 
thorizing relief  against  decrees  and  judgments  ob- 
tained by  fraud,  such  as  perjured  testimony,  fraud- 
ulent documents,  forged  instruments,  and  the  like, 
the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of  equity  has  been  held 
limited  to  the  granting  of  relief  on  the  grounds  enu- 
merated.59 

Strangers  to  record.  The  rule  that  a  judgment  by 
a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  will  be  set  aside 
only  for  fraud  which  is  extrinsic  or  collateral  has 
l)een  held  applicable  to  strangers  as  well  as  to  par- 
ties to  the  action.60  It  has  also  been  held,  however, 
that  a  stranger  to  the  record  may,  when  he  has  been 
injured  thereby,  have  -a  judgment  set  aside  for 
fraud  in  the  cause  of  action  on  which  it  is  found- 
ed61 because  he  has  not  had  his  day  in  court  to 
plead  it  sooner.62 


(3)  Concealment  or  Deceit 


Concealment  or  deceit,  at  least  where  there  Is  a  le- 
gal duty  to  disclose  the  facts,  Is  ground  for  equitable  re- 
lief against  a  judgment.  In  the  absence  of  such  a  duty, 
however,  mere  silence  Is  not  fraud  justifying  such  relief. 

Relief  against  an  unjust  judgment  obtained  by 
means  of  deceit,  artifice,  or  concealment  may  be 
had  in  equity,  provided  there  is  no  adequate  reme- 
dy at  law.63  Fraud  justifying  such  relief  may  con- 
sist in  the  suppression  of  truth  as  well  as  a  sugges- 
tion of  what  is  false;64  it  may  be  based  on' silence 
when  there  is  a  legal  duty  to  disclose  the  facts,  as,  § 
for  example,  in  the  case  of  a  trust  or  confidential 
relation.65  However,  in  order  that  fraudulent  con- 
cealment shall  be  ground  for  any  equitable  relief, 
there  must  be  a  duty  to  disclose.66  In  the  absence 
of  such  a  duty,  no  party  is  bound  to  furnish  weapons 
to  his  adversary  or  plead  himself  out  of  court;  and 
the  mere  fact  that  he  keeps  silent  and  does  not  com- 
municate to  the  court  or  to  the  adverse  party  facts 
which  would  defeat  his  recovery  is  not  such  fraud 
as  will  justify  a  court  of  equity  in  granting  relief 
against  the  resulting  judgment.67 

Where  fraudulent  concealment  of  a  fact  is  relief 
on,  it  must  be  an  intentional  concealment  of  a  ma- 
terial and  controlling  fact,  for  the  purpose  of  mis- 
leading and  taking  advantage  of  the  opposite 


55.  Ga. — Corpus   Juris   cited  In  El- 1 
liott  v.  Marshall,  1S5  S.E.  831,  182 
Ga.  513. 

Audit  obtained  "by  fraud 

N.Y.— Brennan  v.  New  York,  8  Daly 

426. 
34  C.J.  p  473  note  72. 

56.  Mo. — Irvine    v.    L,eyh,    14    S.W. 
715,   16   S.W.   10,   102  Mo.   200. 

57.  N.T. — Sanders  v.  Soutter,  27  N. 
B.  263,  126  N.Y.  193. 

5a     Ohio. — Dahms  v.  Swinburne,  167 
N.E.  486,  31  Ohio  App.  512. 

59.  Iowa. — Richards   v.    Moran,    114 
N.W.   1085,   137   Iowa  220. 

34  C.J.  p  473  note  77. 

60.  Vt. — 'Fillmore  v.  Morgan,  108  A. 
840,  93  Vt.  491. 

61.  Ind.— State   v.    Holmes,    69   Ind. 
577. 

62.  Ind. — State  v.  Holmes,  supra. 

63.  U.S. — Ferguson   v.   Wachs,    C.C. 
A.I1L,  96  F.2d  910.       . 

Fla.— Miller  v.  Miller,  7  So.2d  9,  149 

Fla.  722. 
111.— Stade  v.   Stade,   42  N.B.2d  631, 

315  IlLApp.  136. 
N.J.— Simon    v.    Henke,    139   A.    887, 

102  N.J.EQ.  115. 
Tex. — Eldridge  v.  Eldridge,  Civ. App., 

259  S.W.  209. 

34  C.J.  p  459  note  9,  p  475  note  98. 
Judgment  against  interests  of  minor 

Where  agreed  Judgment  in  minor's 
action  is  against  interests  of  minor 


and  facts  making  it  so  are  not  dis- 
closed to  court  approving  agreement 
for  Judgment,  minor  may,  as  between 
parties  to  Judgment,  have  it  set  aside 
by  bill  of  review. — Missouri-Kansas- 
Texas  R.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Pluto,  156 
S.W.2d  265,  138  Tex.  1. 

64.  N.Y.— Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Del- 
aware &  H.  Co.,  264  N.Y.S.  470.  238 
App.Div.  191. 

"It  seems  to  be  generally  held  that 
the  fraudulent  concealment  of  facts, 
which  would  have  caused  the  Judg- 
ment or  decree  not  to  have  been  ren- 
dered, will  constitute  extrinsic  fraud 
sufficient  to  authorize  the  court 
.  to  vacate  such  Judgment  or 
decree."— State  v.  Vincent,  52  P.2d 
203,  205,  152  Or.  205. 

65.  U.S. — 'Ferguson  v.  Wachs,  C.C.A. 
111.,  96  F.2d  910— Hewitt  v.  Hewitt, 
C.C.A.Cal.,  17  F.2d  716. 

Caj. — Larrabee  v.  Tracy,  134  P.2d 
265,  21  Cal.2d  -645,  affirmed  Salva- 
tion Army  v.  Security-First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  134  P.2d  271, 
21  Cal.2d  892 — Crow  v.  Madsen, 
App.,  Ill  P.2d  7,  rehearing  grant- 
ed 111  P.2d  663. 

D.C.— Earll  v.  Picken,  113  F.2d  150, 
72  App-D.C.  91. 

Okl. — Kauffman  v.  McLaughlin,  114 
P.2d  929,  189  Okl.  194. 

34  C.J.  p  475  note  98  [b]. 

66.  Ala.— Hooper  v.   Peters  Mineral 
Land  Co.,  98  So.  6,  210  Ala.  346* 

744 


N.Y. — Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Delaware 
&  H.  Co.,  264  N.T.S.  470,  238  App. 
Div.  191. 

Settlement 

Where  a  settlement  was  pleaded 
as  a  defense,  plaintiff  owed  no  duty 
to  defendant  or  the  court  to  prove 
such  defense,  and  hence  fact  that 
plaintiff's  attorneys,  who  testified  at 
the  trial  were  not  questioned  as  to 
the  alleged  settlement  did  not  show 
fraud  on  part  of  plaintiff  in  obtain- 
ing Judgment. — May  v.  May,  50  N.E. 
2d  790,  72  Ohio  App.  82. 

67.  Okl.— Crockett  v.  Root,  146  P.2d 
555,  194  Okl.  3 — Corpus  Juris  quot- 
ed in  Wright  v.  Saltmarsh,  50  P. 
2d  694,  705,  174  Okl.  226. 

34  C.J.  p  US  note  99. 

Failure  to  give  details  of  counter- 

claim 

Failure  of  buyer,  sued  for  price  of 
merchandise,  to  advise  seller  in  ad- 
vance of  details  of  counterclaim  was 
not  fraud. — Zapon  Co.  v.  Bryant,  28-6 
P.  282,  156  Wash.  161. 

Failure  to  disclose  resale  price 

Failure  of  vendor,  suing  for  breach 
of  contract  to  trade  property,  to  dis- 
close resale  price  of  premises  under 
subsequent  exchange  contract  did 
not  constitute  fraud  warranting  va- 
cation of  default  Judgment  against 
first  vendee. — Minetti  v.  Binhorn,  173 
N.B.  243,  36  Ohio  App.  310. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


party.68  A  judgment  will  not  be  set  aside  on  the 
ground  that  the  prevailing  party  practiced  a  fraud 
on  the  court  and  the  adverse  party,  by  concealing 
the  evidence  of  his  fraud,  where  the  particular 
fraud,  evidence  to  establish  which  is  alleged  to 
have  been  concealed,  was  the  issue  in  trial  and 
there  adjudicated.69 


§  373. 


Collusion 


Collusion  or  fraudulent  conspiracy  In  the  procure- 
ment of  a  Judgment,  which  could  not  have  been  Inter- 
posed as  a  defense  in  the  action,  furnishes  ground  for 
equitable  relief  to  an  innocent  person  injured  thereby. 

Equity  may  grant  relief  to  an  innocent  person 
against  a  judgment  which  was  unjustly  obtained  by 
means  of  a  conspiracy  or  fraudulent  collusion.70 
This  rule  is  applied  where  the  collusive  agreement 
was  between  plaintiff  or  his  attorney  and  the 
judge,71  between  plaintiff  or  his  attorney  and  de- 
fendant's attorney,72  between  plaintiff  and  one  of 
several  defendants,  to  the  prejudice  of  another  de- 
fendant,73 between  plaintiff  and  the  officers  of  a 
defendant  corporation  or  municipality  who  are 
bound  to  protect  its  interests,74  between  the  par- 
ties to  the  action75  or  between  a  party  and  another 
person76  to  the  injury  of  a  third  person  having  an 
interest  in  the  property  in  suit,  or  between  plain- 
tiff and  an  executor  or  administrator,  being  de- 


fendant, resulting  in  the  establishment  of  an  in- 
valid claim  against  the  estate.77 

Collusion  between  codefendants,  however  gross 
it  may  be,  will  not  affect  plaintiff.78  Collusion  is  no 
ground  for  relief  in  equity  if  it  could  have  been 
pleaded  in  defense  to  the  original  action.79  Ordi- 
narily a  court  of  equity  will  not  grant  relief  to 
those  who  were  parties  to  the  collusion;80  but  an 
exception  to  this  rule  exists  where  a  fiduciary  re- 
lationship existed  between  the  parties  and  they  were 
not  in  pari  delicto.81 

§  374.    Perjury  and  Subornation  of  Per- 
jury 

According  to  the  weight  of  authority,  perjury  or 
subornation  of  perjury,  not  accompanied  by  any  ex- 
trinsic or  collateral  fraud,  ordinarily  does  not  constitute 
ground  for  equitable  relief  against  a  Judgment. 

Although  some  cases  sustain  the  doctrine  that 
equity  may  grant  relief  against  a  judgment  obtained 
by  means  of  false  testimony,82  provided  it  was  pro- 
cured, concocted,  and  intentionally  produced  by  the 
successful  party,83  the  weight  of  authority  is  to  the 
effect  that  ordinarily  there  is  no  ground  for  equita- 
ble interference  with  a  judgment  in  the  fact  that 
perjury  or  false  swearing  was  committed  by  such 
party  or  his  witnesses  at  the  trial,84  at  least  where 


€8,    Ala. — McDonald    v.    Pearson,    21 

So.  534,  114  Ala.  -630. 
N.Y.— Ward  v.  Southfleld,  6  N.B.  660, 

102  N.Y.  287. 

09.  Ga. — Thomason  v.  Thompson,  59 
S.E.  236,  129  Ga.  440,  26  L.R.A.,N. 
S.  -536. 

7<X  Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Warren  v. 
City  of  Miami,  15  So.2d  449,  153 
<Fla.  -644 — State  ex  rel.  Fulton  Bag 
&  Cotton  Mills  v.  Burnside,  15  So. 
2d  324,  153  Fla.  599. 

Ga. — Branan  v.  Feldman,  123  S.B. 
710,  158  Ga.  377. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hark- 
ness  v.  Village  of  McCammon,  298 
P.  676,  678,  50  Idaho  569. 

111.— Meyer  v.  Meyer,  33  N.B.2d  738, 
309  Ill.App.  643,  affirmed  39  N.E.2d 
3X1,  379  111.  97,  140  A.L.R.  484. 

Ind. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mer- 
cantile Commercial  Bank  v.  South- 
western Indiana  CJoal  Corporation, 
169  N.B.  91,  98,  93  Ind.Ap-p.  313,  re- 
hearing denied  171  N.E.  310,  93 
Ind.App.  313. 

Mass. — Commonwealth  v.  Aronson, 
44  N.E.2d  679,  312  Mass.  347. 

Mo.— Spotts  v.  Spotts,  56  S,W.2d  984, 
331  Mo.  942. 

N.Y.— Harvey  v.  Comby,  280  N.Y.S. 
968,  246  App.Div.  318. 

Okl. — Oorpiur  Juris  cited  in  Hill  v. 
Cole,  137  P.2d  579,  583,  192  Okl. 
476. 


Tex. — Missouri-Kansas-Texas  R.  Co. 
of  Texas  v.  Pluto,  Civ.App.,  130  S. 
W.2d  1048,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  156  S.W.2d  265,  138  Tex.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  474  note  88. 

71.  Utah.— McMillan     v.     Forsythe, 
154  P.  -9-50,  47  Utah  571. 

34  C.J.  p  474  note  89. 

72.  TT.S.— Sanford    v.    White,    C.C.N. 
Y.,  132  F.  531. 

34  C.J.  p  474  note  90. 

73.  U.S. — Young?  v.  Sigler,  C.C.Iowa, 
48  'F.  182. 

34  C.J.  P474  note  91. 

74.  Ind. — Mercantile          Commercial 
Bank  v.  Southwestern  Indiana  Coal 
Corporation,    169    N.E.    91,    93   Ind. 
App.   313,  rehearing  denied  171  N. 
E.  310,  93  Ind.App.  313. 

34  C.J.  IP  474  note  92. 

Express  agreement  not  necessary 

Wis.— Balch  v.  Beach,  95  N.W.   132, 

.119  Wis.  77. 
11  C.J.  p  1221  note  29  [a]. 

75.  Kan. — Leslie  v.  Proctor  &  Gam- 
ble Mfg.  Co.,  169  P.  193,  102  Kan. 
159. 

34  C.J.  p  475  note  93. 

7G.    Philippine. — Anuran    v.    Aquino, 

38  Philippine  29. 
34  C.J.  p  475  note  94. 

77.    N.Y. — In  re  Abramowitz'  Estate, 

9  N.Y.S.2d  846,  170  Misc.  68. 
34  C.J.  p  475  note  95. 

745 


78.  Ind. — State   v.    Holmes,    69    Ind. 
«77. 

79.  Mo.— Murphy   v.   De   France,    13 
S.W.  756,  101  Mo.  151. 

Availability  and  presentation,  of  evi- 
dence 

In  order  to  justify  setting  aside 
decree  on  ground  of  fraudulent  collu- 
sion, evidence  must  be  presented 
which  not  only  entitles  plaintiff  to 
relief  sought,  but  which  was  unavail- 
able at  time  of  original  suit  and 
which  has  been  presented  without 
undue  delay  after  discovery. — <U.  S. 
v.  Irving  Trust  Co.,  D.C.N.Y.,  49  F. 
Supp.  663. 

80.  Cal.— Hendricks  v.  Hendricks,  14 
P.2d    83,    216    Cal.    321— Sontag   v. 
Denio,    73   P.2d  248,    23  CaLApp.2d 
319. 

81.  Cal. — Sontag  v.  Denio,  supra. 

82.  Ky. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Nor- 
heimer  v.  Keiper,  73  -S.W.2d  36,  37, 
255  Ky.  232. 

Wis.— Amberg   v.    Deaton,    271   N.W. 

396,     223    Wis.     653— Schulteis    v. 

Trade    Press    Pub.    Co.,    210    N.W* 

419,  191  Wis.  164. 
34  C.J.  p  475  note  4. 

83.  Neb. — Miller  v.   Miller,   95  N.W. 
1010,  69  Neb.  441. 

34  C.J.  p  475  note  5. 

84.  Ala,— Hooke  v.  Hooke,   25  So.2d 
33— Wright  v.  Fannin,  156  So.  849, 


§  374 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  perjurious  or  false  evidence  was  not  accompa- 
nied by  any  extrinsic  or  collateral  fraud,  and  relat- 
ed to  issues  or  matters  which  were  or  could  have 
been  considered  in  the  original  cause.85 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  relief 


may  be  granted  where  the  false  matter  goes  to  the 
ground  or  right  of  invoking  the  power  or  action 
of  the  court,86  or  where  the  perjury  is  accompanied 
by  any  fraud  extrinsic  or  collateral  to  the  matter  in- 
volved in  the  original  case  sufficient  to  justify  the 


229  Ala.  278— Ex  parte  Cade,  127 
So.  154,  220  Ala.  666 — Bolden  v. 
Sloss-Sheffleld  Steel  &  Iron  Co.,  110 
So.  574,  215  Ala.  334,  49  A.L.R, 
1206 — Sloss-Sheffleld  'Steel  &  Iron 
Co.  v.  Langr,  104  So.  770,  213  Ala. 
412. 

Ariz. — In  re  Hannerkam's  Estate,  77 
P.2d  814,  51  Ariz.  447— Schuster  v. 
Schuster,  73  P.261  1345,  51  Ariz.  1 
— Drag-con  Marble  &  Mining-  Co.  v. 
McNeish,  235  P.  401,  28  Ariz.  96. 

Ark.— Rice  v.  Moore.  109  S.W.2d  14-8, 
194  Ark.  585 — Hendrickson  v. 
'Farmers'  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  73  S. 
W.2d  725,  189  Ark.  423. 

Cal.— Hammell  v.  Britton,  119  P.2d 
333,  19  Cal.2d  72— Crow  v.  Madsen, 
App.,  Ill  P.2d  7,  rehearing-  granted 
111  P.2d  663— Rudy  v.  Slotwinsky, 
238  P.  783,  73  CaLApp.  459. 

Ga. — Hutchings  v.  Roquemore,  155  S. 
E.  675,  171  Ga.  359. 

I1L— Hintz  .y.  Moldenhauer,  243  111. 
App.  227. 

Iowa.— Hewitt  v.  Blaise,  211  N.W. 
481,  202  Iowa  1114. 

Mich. — Graure  v.  Detroit  'Lumber  Co., 
244  N.W.  225,  260  Mich.  47— Colum- 
bia Casualty  Co.  v.  Klettke,  244  N. 
W.  164,  259  Mich.  564— Bassett  v. 
Trinity  Bid*.  Co..  236  N.W.  237, 
254  Mich.  207. 

Minn. — Nichols  v.  Village  of  Morris- 
town,  283  N.W.  748,  204  Minn.  212. 

Mo.— Winchell  v.  Gaskill,  190  S.W. 
2d  266 — Sutter  v.  Easterly,  189  S. 
W.2d  284— Neevel  v.  McDermand, 
27-8  S.W.  818,  220  Mo.App.  812. 

Mont — Khan  v.  Khan,  105  P.2d  665, 
110  Mont.  591. 

N.Y.— Jacobowitz  v.  Metselaar,  197 
N.E.  169,  268  N.Y.  130,  99  A.L.R. 
1198,  reargument  denied  198  N.E. 
528,  263  N.Y.  630. 

N.Q. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Home 
v.  Edwards,  3  S.E.2d  1,  3,  215  N.C. 
622. 

S.D. — Seubert  v.  Seubert  7  N.W.2d 
301. 

Tenn. — Sharp  v.  Kennedy,  13  Tenn. 
App.  170. 

Utah.— Wright  v.  W.  E.  Callahan 
Const.  Co.,  156  P.2d  710 — Anderson 
v.  State,  238  P.  557,  65  Utah  512. 

34  C.J.  p  475  note  6,  p  476  note  8. 

Ownership  of  property 

Insurer  could  not  attack  Judgment 
for  insured  on  ground  that  insured 
made  false  representation  about 
ownership  of  insured  property  and 
gave  false  testimony  to  that  effect 
before  court  in  which  Judgment  was 
obtained. — American  Liberty  Mut. 
Ins,  Co.  v.  Washington,  36  S.W.2d 
963,  183  Ark.  497. 


Federal  role 

(1)  The  federal  courts  are  in  con- 
flict   on    the    subject. — Publicker    v. 
Shallcross,    C.C.A.Pa.,    106    F.2d    949, 
126  A.L.R.   386,   certiorari  denied  60 
S.Ct.  379,  308  U.S.  624,  84  L.Ed.  521. 

(2)  Some   of  the  decisions  in  the 
federal  courts  adhere  to  the  rule  set 
forth  in  the  text.— ^Stna  Casualty  & 
Surety  Co.  v.  Abbott  C.C.A.Md.,  130 
F.2d    40— Angle    v.    Shinholt,    C.C.A. 
Tex.,    90   F.2d   294,   certiorari  denied 
58    S.Ct    40,    302    U.S.    719,    82   L.Ed. 
555 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Harring- 
ton v.  Denny,  D.CMo.,  3  F.Supp.  584, 
594— Hughes   v.   U.   S.  Borax  Co.,  C. 
C.A.CaL,  286  <F.   24.  certiorari  denied 
43   S.Ct.   699,   262   U.S.   753,   67  L.Ed. 
1216. 

(3)  Others  assert  that  relief  may 
be    granted   against   a   Judgment   on 
the  ground  of  perjury  in  its  procure- 
ment.—Publicker   v.    Shallcross,   C.C. 
A.Pa.,   106   F.2d  949,   126  A.L.R.    386, 
certiorari  denied  60  S.Ct.  379,  308  U. 
S.  624,  84  L.Ed.  521. 

In  Texas 

(1)  It    has    been    held    that   relief 
will  not  be  granted  on  the  ground  of 
perjured         testimony.— Kelly         v. 
Wright,    188   -S.W.2d   383— Crouch   v. 
McGaw,  138  S.W.2d  94,  134  Tex.  633 
— Elder  v.  Byrd-Frost  Inc.,  Civ.App., 
110  S.W.2d  172— State  v.  Wright,  Civ. 
App.,  56  S.W.2d  950. 

(2)  In  other  cases,  however,  it  has 
been  asserted  that  false  and  perjured 
testimony,    at    least    if    willful,    is 
ground  for  relief. — Stanley  v.  Spann, 
Civ.Apj>.,    21    S.W.2d    305,    error   dis- 
missed— Ellis  v.  SLamb-McAshan  Co., 
Civ.App.,     264     S.W.     241,     affirmed 
Lamb-McAshan    Co.    v.    Ellis,    Com. 
App.,  270  S.W.  547—34  C.J.  p  -475  note 
5. 

85.  U.S.— T.  J.  Moss  Tie  Co.  v.  Wa- 
bash  Ry.  Co.,  C.C.A.I11.,  71  F.2d  107, 
certiorari  denied  American  Surety 
Co.  of  New  York  v.  Conroy,  55  -S.Ct. 
90,  293  U.S.  578,  79  L.Ed.  675. 

Ark. — H.  G.  Pugh  &  Co.  v.  Ahrens, 
19  S.W.2d  1030,  179  Ark.  829. 

D.C.— Fidelity  Storage  Co.  v.  Urice, 
12  F.2d  143,  56  App.D.C.  202. 

Iowa. — Hewitt  v.  Blaise,  211  N.W. 
481,  202  Iowa  1114. 

Kan.— Brenneisen  v.  Phillips,  45  P.2d 
867,  142  Kan.  98. 

Mich. — Hofweber  v.  Detroit  Trust 
Co.,  294  N.W.  108,  295  Mich.  96 — 
Smith  v.  Pontiac  Qitlzens  Loan  & 
Investment  Co.,  293  N.W.  6-61,  294 
Mich.  312. 

Minn. — Bloomquist  v.  Thomas,  9  N. 
W.2d  337,  215  Minn.  35— Nichols  v. 

746 


Village    of    Morristown,    283    N.W. 

748,   204  Minn.  212 — Saari  Bros.  v. 

Puustinen,  201  N.W.  434,  161  Minn. 

367— Penniston  v.  Miller,  194  N.W. 

944,  156  Minn.  403. 
Mo.— Crane  v.  Deacon,  253  S.W.  1068 

— Crowley  T.  Behle,  App.,  131  -8.W. 

2d  383. 
Okl.— Nolen  v.  Nolen,   167  P.2d  68— 

Lewis  v.  Couch,   154  P.2d   51,    194 

Okl.  £32— Calkin  v.  Wolcott  77  P. 

2d    96,     182    Okl.    278— Reeder    v. 

Mitchell,  32  P.2d  26,  167  Okl.  621— 

Reynolds  v.  Grant,  299  P.  870,  149 

OkL   261 — Burton  v.   Swanson,   2S5 

P.    839,    142    Okl.    134— Douglas    v. 

Hoyle,    240    P.    1072,    115    Old.    7— 

Hartsog   v.    Barry,    219    P.    94,    95 

Okl.    274— Wood    v.    Wood,    216    P. 

936,  92  Okl.  297— Clinton  v.  Miller. 

216  P.  135,  96  Okl.  71— McBrld^  v. 

Cowen,   216   P.   104,    90   Okl.   130. 
Or. — Oregon-Washington   R,    &   Nav. 

Co.   v.   Reid,    65   P.2d   664,   155    Or. 

602 — Dixon  v.  Simpson,  279  P.  939, 

130  Or.  211. 
R.I. — Broduer  v.  Broduer,  167  A.  104, 

53  R.I.  450. 
Tex. — Elder  v.  Byrd-Frost  Inc.,  Civ. 

App.,  110  S.W.2d  172. 
Wash.— Zapon  Co.   v.  Bryant,   286   P. 

282,     15*    Wash,    161— Raisner    v. 

Raisner,  283  P.  704,  155  Wash.  52— 

Colburn  v.  Denison,  271  P.  885,  149 

Wash,  591. 

Bztent  of  personal  injuries 

False  testimony  as  to  the  extent 
of  a  plaintiff's  injuries  does  not  jus- 
tify equitable  interference  with  a 
judgment  where  the  extent  of  the 
injuries  was  a  question  in  issue  and 
defendant  was  not  prevented  from 
making  a  full  defense. 
U.S. — International  Indemnity  Co.  v. 

Peterson,  -D.CMinn.,   6   F.2d  230. 
Tex. — Houston  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Chambers,  Qiv.App.,  284  S.W.  1063. 

Place  of  accident 

In  action  for  injuries  received  in 
fall,  defendant  was  held  not  entitled 
to  vacation  of  adverse  judgment  aft- 
er expiration  of  term  on  ground  that 
plaintiff  had  falsely  testified  as  to 
place  at  which  she  fell,  where  peti- 
tion alleged  exact  place  of  fall  and 
surrounding  circumstances  so  that 
defendant  at  time  of  trial,  could 
have  located  witnesses  who  allegedly 
would  have  testified  to  seeing-  plain- 
tiff fall"  at  different  place.— Pinches 
v.  Village  of  Dickens,  268  N.W.  645, 
131  Neb.  573. 

6.  Ala. — Wright  v.  Fannin,  156  So. 
849,  229  Ala.  278 — Ex  parte  Cade, 
127  So.  154,  220  Ala.  666. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  374 


conclusion  that  but  for  such  fraud  the  result  would 
have  been  different.87  There  is  usually  no  ground 
for  equitable  interference  on  the  ground  of  perjury 
even  though  the  opposite  party  did  not  know  of 
the  real  facts,88  especially  where  it  might  have 
been  established  at  the  trial  by  cross-examination;89 
but  in  some  cases,  where  it  appears  that  the  perjury 
was  not  discovered  in  time  to  enable  the  complain- 
ing party  to  avail  himself  of  the  knowledge  on  the 
original  trial,  a  bill  to  set  aside  the  judgment  has 
been  entertained.90  It  has  been  held,  in  applying  the 
rules  respecting  the  granting  of  equitable  relief 
against  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  perjury,  that 
there  is  no  distinction  between  introducing  false 
and  forged  instruments  in  evidence  and  swearing 
falsely  as  a  witness.91 

In  some  jurisdictions  equity  will  not  grant  relief 
against  a  judgment  obtained  in  consequence  of  per- 


jury unless  it  appears  that  the  perjurer  .was  duly 
convicted92  and  that  the  judgment  could  not  have 
been  obtained  without  the  evidence  of  the  perjurer.98 
In  any  event,  before  a  court  of  equity  will  interfere 
with  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  perjury,  it  must 
appear  that  the  injured  party  has  exercised  due  dil- 
igence94 and  that  he  is  clearly  entitled  to  the  relief 
sought.95 

Perjury  as  intrinsic  or  extrinsic  fraud.  Perjury 
or  false  swearing  is  a  species  of  intrinsic,  not  ex- 
trinsic, fraud,96  and  hence  the  rule  against  granting 
relief  for  perjury  is  in  accordance  with  the  general 
rule  discussed  supra  in  §  372  b  (2)  that  relief  in  eq- 
uity ordinarily  cannot  be  had  for  intrinsic  fraud. 
However,  perjury  as  to  jurisdictional  facts,  where- 
by a  court  is  imposed  on  and  induced  to  assume  ju- 
risdiction where  in  reality  none  exists,  and  which 
never  could  have  been  exercised  if  the  truth  had 


87.  Or.— Corpus     Juris     quoted     la 
Oregon- Washington  R.  &  Nav.  Co. 
v.  Reid,   65  P.2d  664,  -667,   155  Or. 
602. 

34  C.J.  p  476  note  12. 

88.  s.D.— Seubert  v.  Seubert,  7  N.W. 
2d  301. 

34  C.J.  p476  note  10. 

89.  Wash.— Robertson    v.   'Freebury, 
152    P.    '5,    87    Wash.    558,    L..R.A. 
1916B  883. 

90.  U.S.— Marshall   v.    Holmes,   'La., 
12   S.Ct.  62,  141  U.S.  5-89,  35  li.Bd. 
870. 

34  C.J.  p  476  note  1'3. 

91.  Mo. — Lieber  v.  Lieber,  143  S.W. 
458,  239  Mo.  1. 

34O.J.  p  476  note  9. 

92.  Ga. — Stephens    v.    Pickering,    15 
S.E.2d    202,    192    Ga,    199— Bird   v. 
•Smith,  197  S.B.  642,  186  Ga,  301— 
Beavers  v.  Oassells,  19-6   S.B.   716, 
186  Ga.  98— Elliott  v.  Marshall,  185 
S.B.  831,  182  Ga.  513— Hutchings  v. 
Roquemore,   155   S.E.   675,   171  Ga. 
359. 

In  North  Carolina 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  judgment 
cannot  be  vacated  in  equity  because 
shown   to   have  been  based  on  per- 
jured testimony,  unless  witness  has 
been    convicted    of    perjury.— McCoy 
v.  Justice,  155  S.B.  4'52,  199  N.C.  602. 

(2)  It  has  also  been  held  that  in- 
trinsic fraud  consisting  of  perjured 
testimony   or   false   evidence   is   not 
ground  for  equitable  relief  against  a 
judgment  regardless  of  whether  per- 
jured witnesses  have  previously  been 
convicted   of  perjury,    or  falsity   of 
evidence   established  by  deed,   writ- 
ing,  or  unimpeachable  record,   since 
public  policy  demands  end  of  litiga- 
tion.—-Horne  v.  Edwards,  3  S.E.2d  ,1 
215  N.C.  622. 


93.  Ga,— Stephens  v.  Pickering,  15 
S.E.2d  202,  192  Ga.  199— Bird  v. 
Smith,  197  S.E.  642,  186  Ga,  361— 
Hutchings  v.  Roquemore,  155  S.E. 
675,  171  Ga.  359. 

Tex. — Elder  v.  Byrd-Frost,  Inc.,  Civ. 
App.,  110  S.W.2d  172. 

Materiality  of  testimony 

(1)  A  party  is  not  entitled  to  have 
verdict    and    judgment    against    him 
set  aside  on  ground  that  certain  tes- 
timony was  false,   where  it  appears 
that   allegedly  false   testimony   con- 
cerned a  subject  immaterial  to  any 
proper  issue  before  the  court — Ste- 
phens v.  Pickering,  15  S.E.2d  202,  192 
Ga,  199. 

(2)  Court  refused  to   annul  judg- 
ment where  allegedly  false  testimo- 
ny  could   have   been   entirely  disre- 
garded   and    same    conclusion    still 
have  been  reached  in  original  action. 
—Silver  Fleet  of  Memphis  v.  Hester 
Truck  Lines,  La.App.,   180   So.  451— 
Silver  Fleet  of  Memphis,  Inc.  v.  Rog- 
ers, L.a,App.,  180  So.  450. 

94,     Nefc. — Gutru  v.  Johnson,  212  N. 

W.  622.  115  Neb.  309. 
Okl. — Reynolds  v.  Grant,  299  P.  870, 

149  Okl.  261— Miller  v.  White,  265 

P.  64*,  129  Okl.  184. 
Utah.— Anderson  v.  State,  238  P.  557, 

65  Utah  512. 
Wis.— Schulteis  v.  Trade  Press  Pub 

Co.,  210  N.W.  419,  191  Wis.  164. 

Employee's  earnings  after  discharge 
Bill  would  not  lie  by  former  em- 
ployer to  set  aside  judgment  for 
damages  for  wrongful  discharge  on 
ground  that  former  employee  had 
fraudulently  misstated  earnings  aft 
er  discharge,  where  facts  could  hav< 
been  ascertained  by  diligent  invest! 
gation  before  trial.— Realty  Accept 
ance  Corporation  v.  Montgomery,  C 
C.A.Del.,  77  F.2d  762,  certiorari  de 
nied  66  S.Ct  103,. 296  U.S.  590,  80  " 

747 


Ed.    418,    rehearing    denied    56    S.Ct. 
167,  296  U.S.  662,  80  L.Ed.  472. 

95.  Okl.— Reynolds  v.  Grant,  299  P. 
870,  149  Okl.  261— Miller  v.  White, 
2-65  P.  646,  129  Okl.  184. 

90.  U.S.— Brady  v.  Beams,  C.C.A. 
Okl.,  132  'F.2d  985,  certiorari  denied 
63  S.Ct.  1032,  319  U.S.  747.  87  IL. 
Ed.  1702,  rehearing  denied  63  S.Ct 
1315,  319  U.S.  784,  87  L.Ed.  1727 — 
Angle  v.  Shinholt,  C.C.A.Tex.f  90 
•F.2d  294,  certiorari  denied  58  S.Ct. 
40,  302  U.S.  719,  -82  L.Ed.  555 — 
Hughes  v.  U.  S.  Borax  Co.,  C.C.A. 
Cal.,  286  F.  24,  certiorari  denied 
43  S.Ct  699,  262  U.S.  753,  67  I*.Ed. 
1216. 

Cal.— Hammell  v.  Britton,  119  P.2d 
333,  19  Cal.2d  72— La  Salle  v.  Pe- 
terson, 32  P.2d  612,  220  Cal.  739— 
Zaremba  v.  Woods,  61  P.2d  976,  17 
Cal.App.2d  309—0.  A,  Graybeal  Co. 
v.  Cook,  60  P.2d  525,  16  Cal.App.2d 
231— Harvey  v.  Griffiths,  23  P.2d 
532,  133  Cal. App.  17. 

Kan.— Brenneisen  v.  Phillips,  45  P.2d 
867,  142  Kan.  98. 

Mich. — Fawcett  v.  Atherton,  299  N. 
W.  108,  298  Mich.  362. 

Minn.— Bloomquist  v.  'Thomas.  9  N. 
W.2d  337,  215  Minn.  35. 

Mont.— Khan  v.  Khan,  105  P.2d  $65, 
110  Mont  591. 

N.Y.— Jacobowitz  v.  Metselaar,  197 
N.E.  169,  268  N.Y.  130,  99  A.L.R. 
1198,  reargument  denied  Jacobo- 
witz v.  Herson,  198  N.E.  "528,  268  N. 
T.  630— O'Neil  v.  Meccia,  £  N.Y.S. 
2d  850,  169  Misc.  985. 

Tex.— Crouch  v.  McGaw,  138  S.W.2d 
94,  134  Tex.  633— Mills  v.  Baird, 
Civ.App.,  147  S.W.2d  312,  error  re- 
fused— Traders  &  General  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Rhodabarger,  Qiv.App.,  109  S.W. 
2d  1119 — State  v.  Wright,  CivJlpp,, 
56  S.W.2d  950. 


374 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S, 


been  known,  is  extrinsic,  and  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment so  obtained  may  be  had  in  equity.97 

Subornation  or  conspiracy.  It  is  not  a  ground  for 
equitable  relief  that  the  successful  party  suborned 
the  witnesses  and  conspired  with  them  to  secure  a 
judgment  in  his  favor.9*  However,  it  has  been  held 
that  where  a  lawyer  engages  in  a  conspiracy  to  com- 
mit a  fraud  on  the  court  by  the  production  of  fabri- 
cated evidence,  and  by  such  means  obtains  a  judg- 
ment, a  court  of  equity  may  grant  relief  against  the 
judgment" 


§  375. 


Violation  of  Agreement 


A  party's  violation  of  an  agreement,  as,  for  example, 
with  respect  to  the  time  of  trial  or  settlement  of  the 
ease,  whereby  his  adversary,  without  negligence,  was 
prevented  from  presenting  his  case,  has  frequently  been 
held  to  furnish  ground  for  equitable  relief  against  a 
Judgment. 

The  jurisdiction  of  equity  to  relieve  against  judg- 
ments obtained  by  fraud  is  exercised  very  frequent- 
ly where  a  party  is  prevented  from  presenting  his 
defense,  or  taking  advantage  of  remedies  to  which 
he  is  entitled,  because  of  the  violation  by  his  adver- 
sary of  some  express  agreement  with  him,1  and  it 
is  not  necessary  that  the  judgment  creditor  should 
have  directly  threatened  to  enforce  the  judgment.2 


Equity  will  enjoin  a  judgment  taken  in  violation  of 
an  agreement  to  dismiss  or  to  discontinue  a  suit,3 
to  submit  the  matter  in  controversy  to  arbitration,4 
or  to  credit  a  sum  paid  after  the  commencement  of 
suit.5 

The  rule  permitting  equitable  relief  for  violation 
of  an  agreement  does  not  apply  where  complainant 
has  been  guilty  of  negligence,6  or  where  there  is  an 
adequate  legal  remedy,7  as  by  action  at  law  for  the 
breach.8  Likewise  the  breach  of  an  agreement  will 
not  constitute  a  ground  for  relief  where  the  suit  at 
law  was  in  pursuance  of  an  illegal  act  participated 
in  by  complainant.9 

It  has  been  held  that  a  consideration  for  the 
agreement  must  be  shown,  and  also  that  the  appli- 
cant for  relief  must  have  been  injured  by  his  re- 
liance on  it.10  However,  it  has  also  been  consid- 
ered that  the  right  to  relief  does  not  depend  on  the 
legal  validity  of  the  agreement  but  rather  on  the 
question  whether  it  has  been  relied  on  by  the  one 
party,  and  made  use  of  by  the  other  to  obtain  an 
unjust  judgment.11  If  the  agreement  relied  on  is 
made  by  the  attorney  of  the  adverse  party,  the  vio- 
lation of  it  will  not  constitute  a  ground  for  eq- 
uitable interference,  unless  it  is  shown  that  the 
attorney  had  authority  to  make  such  agreement,  or 
that  it  has  been  ratified.12 


97.    Okl.— Johnson   v.  Petty,   246  P. 

848,  118  OkL  178. 
Pa.— Carey  v.  Carey,  183  A.  371,  121 

Pa.Super.  251. 

9&  Cal.— La  Salle  v.  Peterson,  32  P. 
2d  612,  «20  Cal.  739. 

N.Y. — Jacobowitz  v.  Metselaar,  197 
N.E.  169,  268  N.Y.  130,  99  A.X..R. 
1198,  reargument  denied  Jacobo- 
witz v.  Herson,  198  N.E.  52S,  268 
N.Y.  630. 

34  C.J.  P  476  note  7. 

99.    Mo.— Sutter  v.  Easterly,   189  S. 

W.2d  284. 
1.    Tex. — Sloan  v.  Newton,  Civ.App., 

134  S.W.2d  697. 
34  C.J.  p  477  note  14. 
Promise  to  do  equity 

Equity  will  relieve  against  a  judg- 
ment obtained  by  inducing  defend- 
ants thereto  to  withdraw  an  equita- 
ble plea  that  they  had  filed  in  the 
case,  by  the  promise  of  plaintiff  that 
if  such  -plea  was  withdrawn  he  would 
do  the  equity  set  up  in  the  plea,  and 
would  enter  into  writing  to  that  ef- 
fect, all  of  which  he  failed  to  "do. — 
Markham  v.  Angler,  57  Ga.  43. 
Agreement  not  to  enforce  Judgment 

Relief  may  be  granted  against  a 
judgment  for  violation  of  an  agree- 
ment, on  payment  of  a  certain  sum 
of  money,  not  to  enforce  a  judgment 
already  obtained. — Thompson  v. 
Laughlin,  27  P.  752,  91  Cal.  313. 


Personal  judgment  in  ejectment  suit 
An  agreement  that  plaintiff  In  the 
action  at  law  was  not  to  take  a  per- 
sonal judgment  against  defendant  in 
a  suit  in  ejectment  will  Justify  equi- 
table relief. 
Cal.— Heim  v.  Butin,  40  P.  39,  5  Cal. 

Unrep.Cas.  19. 
Ind.— Brake   v.    Payne,   37  N.E.   140, 

137  Ind.  479. 
Maker's  liability  on  note 

(1)  Relief  has  been  granted  where 
the  maker  of  a  note  held  a  receipt 
acknowledging  payment  thereof  from 
the  indorsee,  who  sued  on  the  note, 
representing   to  the  maker   that   he 
did  not  intend  to  enforce  its  collec- 
tion   against   him,    but   against   the 
payee,  and  judgment  was  accordingly 
rendered  by  default. — Baker  v.  Redd, 
44  Iowa  179. 

(2)  Where  maker  of  note  had  nev- 
er made  any  payments  thereon  and 
had   not    acknowledged   his   liability 
in    writing,    either    before    or    after 
running  of  statute  of  limitations,  ac- 
tion of  payee  in  lulling  maker  into 
security  by   repeated  promises  that 
no  harm  would  come  to  him  if  he 
ignored    summons    which   had    been 
served   on  him   constituted  fraud. — 
Pavlik  v.   Burns,   278  N.W.   149,   134 
Neb.  175. 

2.    Conn.— Chambers  v.  Robbins,   28 

Conn.  552. 
34  C.J.  p  477  note  15. 

748 


3.  Ind. — Cory  v.   Howard,   164  N.BL 
639,  88  Ind.App.  503. 

Tex. — Sloan  v.  Newton,  Civ.App,,  134 

S.W.2d  697. 
34  C.J.  p  477  note  16. 

4.  Mo. — Bresnahan  v.  Price,  57  Mo. 
422. 

5.  Tex. — Dickenson    v.     McDermott, 
13  Tex.  248. 

34  C.J.  p  477  note  19. 

6.  Tex. — Coleman  v.  Goyne,  37  Tex. 
552. 

34  C.J.  p  477  note  26. 

7.  Ala, — J.  A.  Roebling  Sons  Co.  v. 
Stevens    Electric    Co.,    9    So.    369, 
93  Ala.  39. 

34  C.J.  p  477  note  27. 

8.  Iowa. — Lumpkin  v.  Snook,  19  N. 
W.  333,  63  Iowa  515. 

34  C.J.  p  478  note  28. 

9.  Va,— Barnett    v.   Barnett,   2   S.E. 
733,  83  Va.  504. 

34  C.J.  p  478  note  29. 

10.  Cal.-— Heim  v.  Butin,  42  P.  13$, 
109    Cal.    500,    50    Am.S.R.    54. 

11.  Wis. — Blakesley  v.   Johnson,   13 
Wis.  530. 

34  C.J.  p  478  note  30. 

lO,    Tex. — Anderson    v.    Oldham,    18 

S.W.  557,  82  Tex  '228. 
34  C.J.  .  478  note  31. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


376 


Necessity  that  agreement  be  written.  According 
to  some  authorities,  violation  of  an  agreement  with 
regard  to  the  suit  will  furnish  no  ground  for  eq- 
uitable interference  unless  the  agreement  is  in 
writing.13  It  has  also  been  held,  however,  that 
fraud  involving  the  violation  of  an  agreement  may 
constitute  ground  for  equitable  relief  notwithstand- 
ing the  existence  of  a  court  rule  requiring  stipu- 
lations and.  agreements  of  counsel  to  be  in  writ- 
ing, 


14 


Agreement  as  to  time  of  trial.  Equity  may  grant 
relief  against  a  judgment  obtained  in  violation  of 
an  agreement  between  counsel  respecting  the  time 
of  trial  and  notice  thereof  to  counsel  for  the  com- 
plaining party,15  particularly  where  the  agreement 
had  been  approved  by  the  trial  judge.16  Violation 
of  an  agreement  that  the  cause  shall  not  be  called 
for  trial  except  by  consent  has  been  held  ground 
for  relief.17 

Agreement  as  to  compromise  or  settlement. 
Where  a  judgment  is  fraudulently  taken  by  default 
in  violation  of  an  agreement  for  a  compromise  or 
settlement,  the  interposition  of  a  defense  being  thus 
prevented,  its  enforcement  will  be  restrained,1-8  if 
defendant  is  not  chargeable  with  negligence  in  fail- 
ing to  prevent  the  entry  of  judgment  when  he  could 


have  done  so,1^  and  provided  there  is  no  longer  an 
adequate  remedy  at  law.20 

§  376.    Newly  Discovered  Evidence 

a.  In  general 

b.  Character  and  effect  of  evidence 

a.  In  General 

Some  authorities  hold  that  equity  will  not  grant  re- 
lief against  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  newly  discov- 
ered evidence,  while  others  permit  such  relief  under  cer- 
tain circumstances.  The  authorities  are  agreed  that  re- 
lief on  such  ground  will  in  no  case  be  granted  where  the 
complaining  party  failed  to  exercise  due  diligence  In 
securing  the  evidence  in  time  to  present  it  in  the  orig- 
inal action. 

In  some  cases  it  has  been  held  that  equity  will 
not  relieve  against  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of 
newly  discovered  evidence,21  unless  there  are  also 
circumstances  of  fraud,  accident,  or  mistake  pre- 
venting a  defense,22  on  the  ground  that  courts  of 
law  now  have  ample  jurisdiction  to  grant  relief,  and 
the  reason  for  the  exercise  of  equity  jurisdiction  has 
therefore  ceased  to  exist.23  Other  cases,  however, 
hold  that  where  a  defendant  was  prevented  from 
making  good  his  defense  by  the  lack  of  evidence  to 
support  it,  being  ignorant  of  the  existence  of  such 
evidence  and  unable  to  discover  it  by  the  exercise  of 
due  diligence,  equity  will  relieve  him  against  the 
judgment,  on  the  subsequent  discovery  and  produc- 


13.  Ala. — Brunnier   v.    Hill,    85    So. 
691.  204  Ala.  403. 

34  C.J.  p  478  note  32. 
Belief  as  to  existence  of  agreement 
A  claim  that  the  complaining  par- 
ty assumed  and  believed  that  the 
parties  had  tacitly  agreed  that  the 
trial  would  remain  in  abeyance  pend- 
ing- disposition  of  a  subsequent  suit 
was  held  insufficient  to  show  any 
equitable  ground  for  relief  where  it 
did  not  appear  that  the  opposing  par- 
ties or  counsel  were  responsible  for 
the  belief  and  were  not  parties  to 
the  subsequent  suit,  particularly 
where  a  court  rule  required  agree- 
ments between  attorneys  or  parties 
to  be  in  writing. — Davis  v.  Cox,  Tex. 
Clv.App.,  4  S.W.2d  1008,  error  dis- 
missed. 

14.  Mont. — Bullard    v.    Zimmerman, 
292  P.  730,  58  Mont.  271— Bullard 
v.  Zimmerman,  268  P.  512,  82  Mont. 
434. 

1£  Ind.— Globe  Mining  Co.  v.  Oak 
Ridge  Coal  Co.,  177  NUB.  868,  204 
Ind.  11, 

Ky. — Johnson  v.  Gernert  Bros.  Lum- 
ber Co.,  75  S.W.2d  357,  255  Ky.  734. 

La. — Schneckenberger  v.  John  Bon- 
ura  &  Co.,  130  So.  870,  14  La.App, 
692. 

Mich.— Skibe  v.  Johnson,  228  N.W. 
716,  249  Mich.  303* 

Tex.— Adams  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  Civ. 


App.,  294  S.W.  909— Huddleston  v. 

Texas  Pipe  Line  Co.,  Civ. App..  230 

S.W,  250. 
Mere  misapprehension  insufficient 

It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  com- 
plaining party  was  under  some  mis- 
apprehension with  reference  to 
whether  the  case  would  be  tried,  un- 
less it  appears  that  either  the  court 
or  the  opposite  party  was  in  some 
measure  responsible  for  the  false 
impression. — Davis  v.  Cox,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  4  S.W. 2 d  1008,  error  dismissed. 

16.  Tex. — Caffarelli    v.    Reasonover, 
Civ.App.,  54  S.W.2d  170. 

17.  Tex.— Gulf,  C.  &  S.  «F.  B.  Qo.  v. 
King,  16  S.W.  641,  80  Tex.  6-81. 

ia    Conn. — Gates    v.    Steele,    20    A. 

474,  58  Conn.  316,  18  Am.S.R.  2*68. 
34  C.J.  p  478  note  34. 

19.     Ga. — Lowry  v.  Sloan,  51  Ga.  633. 

34  C.J.  p  478  note  35. 

Lack  of  diligence  held  not  shown 

Where  party  suing  on  note  agreed 
to  dismiss  suit  after  settlement 
agreement  was  made,  fact  that  de- 
fendant therein  did  not  investigate 
court  records  to  ascertain  whether 
plaintiff  had  complied  with  agree- 
ment to  dismiss  case  could  not  be 
considered  lack  of  diligence  -preclud- 
ing the  vacating  of  default  Judg- 


ment— Sloan    v.     Newton,     TexCiv. 
App.,  134  S.W.2d  697. 

20.  Ala. — J.  A.  Roebling  Sons  Co.  v. 
Stevens  Electric  Light  Co.,   9   So. 
369,  93  Ala.  39. 

21.  S.D.— Seubert  v.  Seubert,  7  N.W. 
2d  301. 

Tex. — Metropolitan   Life   Ins.   Co.   v. 

Pribble,  Civ.App.,   130  S.W.2d  332, 

error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  478  note  37. 

28.    Tex.— Strickland  v.   Ward,   Civ. 

App.,  185  S.W.2d  736. 
34  C.J.  p  478  note  38. 
Effect  of  reformed  code  procedure 

Where  reformed  code  procedure 
was  part  of  the  state  procedure  from 
the  time  the  constitution  was  adopt- 
ed, equity  jurisdiction  to  grant  re- 
lief from  a  judgment  on  ground  of 
newly  discovered  evidence  was  not 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  old  courts  of 
equity,  but  the  jurisdiction  of  equity 
under  the  reformed  code  procedure, 
whereby  nothing  short  of  a  showing 
of  absolute  extrinsic  fraud  would 
justify  granting  a  practical  extension 
of  relief  offered  under  the  code. — 
Wasem  v.  Ellens,  4  N.W.2d  850,  68 
S.D.  524. 

23.  Ala.— Be  £oto  Coal  Mining  & 
Development  Co.  v.  Hill,  65  So.  988, 
188  Ala.  667. 


749 


§  376 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tion  of  such  evidence,24  unless  he  had  a  legal  rem- 
edy, and  failed  to  avail  himself  of  it,25  and  that 
statutes  authorizing  courts  of  law  to  grant  new 
trials  on  the  ground  of  newly  discovered  evidence 
do  not  divest  courts  of  equity  of  the  power  to  grant 
a  new  trial  in  cases  where  the  facts  justify  it.26 

In  determining  whether,  in  the  particular  case, 
equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  will  be  granted 
on  the  ground  of  newly  discovered  evidence,  the 
same  rules  govern  as  the  rules  prescribing  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  a  new  trial  will  be  granted 
on  the  ground  of  newly  discovered  evidence.27  It 
must  appear  that  the  judgment  is  unjust,28  that  re- 
lief is  necessary  to  protect  a  meritorious  complain- 
ant from  a  clear  miscarriage  of  justice,29  and  that 
relief  can  be  granted  without  mischief  to  the  rights 
of  innocent  persons.30 

Diligence  in  former  proceedings.  Equity  will  not 
grant  relief  against  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of 
newly  discovered  evidence,  where  the  evidence 
could  have  been  discovered  before,  and  produced 
on,  the  trial  by  the  exercise  of  care  and  diligence 
in  searching  foY  it  or  in  interrogating  persons  cog- 
nizant of  the  facts.31  The  same  diligence  is  re- 
quired as  is  required  of  a  litigant  who  moves  for 
a  new  trial  under  statute.32  Thus,  where  it  appears 
that  the  evidence  is  matter  of  record,  accessible  to 
defendant,  and  from  its  nature  necessarily  within 
his  knowledge,33  or  where  the  facts  might  have  I 


been  established  at  the  trial  by  cross-examination,34 
no  ground  for  relief  is  shown.  However,  the  fact 
that  defendant  might  have  obtained  evidence  by  a 
bill  of  discovery  or  otherwise  will  not  affect  his 
right  to  relief  where  he  had  no  reason  to  suspect 
the  existence  of  such  evidence;35  and  even  the  fact 
that  the  existence  of  the  defense  was  suspected,  and 
that  it  was  unsuccessfully  set  up  at  law,  will  not 
necessarily  preclude  relief,  where  there  was  no  lack 
of  diligence  in  making  the  discovery.36 

b.  Character  and  Effect  of  Evidence 

The  additional  evidence  for  which  equitable  relief 
against  a  Judgment  is  sought  must  in  fact  be  newly  dis- 
covered; in  addition,  It  must  be  material  and  calculated 
to  produce  an  opposite  result,  evidence  which  is  merely 
cumulative  being  insufficient. 

Relief  will  not  be  granted  against  a  judgment  on 
additional  evidence  which  is  not  in  fact  newly  dis- 
covered;37 the  evidence  must  have  been  discovered 
too  late  for  use  in  the  original  action.38  Evidence 
is  not  newly  discovered  where  the  party  relying  on 
it  knew  about  it  and  that  it  existed,  but  had  for- 
gotten the  circumstances  or  failed  to  appreciate 
their  significance  and  value.39 

To  justify  a  court  of  equity  in  enjoining  a  judg- 
ment on  the  ground  of  newly  discovered  evidence, 
it  must  appear  that  such  evidence  is  material  and 
competent40  and  is  of  such  a  character  and  strength 
that  it  is  reasonably  certain  that  it  would  have 


24L     111. — Crane  .Co.  v.  Parker,  136  N. 

E.  733,  304  111.  881. 
Md.— Bailey   v.   Bailey,    30   A.2d  249, 

181  Md.  385. 
34  O.J.  p  478  note  40. 
25.    Iowa.— Abell  v.  Partello,  211  N. 

W.  868,  202  Iowa  1236. 
34  C.J.  p  478  note  41. 
28.     Neb. — Horn  v.  Queen,  4  Neb.  108. 
34  C.J.  p  478  note  43. 

27.  Va. — McCloud  v.  Virginia  Blec- 
trio  &  Power  Co.,  180  S.E.  299,  164 
Va,  604. 

28.  HI. — Crane  Co.  v.  Parker,  136  N. 
E.  733,  304  111.  331. 

29.  Tex.— Kelley     v.     Wright,     Civ. 
App.,     184     S.W.2d     649,     affirmed, 
Sup.,  188  S.W.2d  983. 

30.  Tex. — Kelley  v.  Wright,  supra. 

31.  U.S. — Harrington  v.  Denny,  D.C. 
Ho.,  '3  F.Supp.  584. 

111.— Wackerle  v.  Nies,  3  N.B.2d  126, 

286  Ill.App.  51. 
Ky. — Elkhorn    Coal    Corporation    v. 

Cuzzort,    284    S.W.    1005,    215    Ky. 

254. 
Tex. — Reed  v.  Bryant,  Civ. App.,  291 

S.W.  *05. 
34  C.J.  p  479  note  44. 

32.  Idaho.*— Boise    Payette    Lumber 
Co.  T.  Idaho  Gold  Dredging  Corpo- 1 


ration,  58  P.2d  786,  56  Idaho  660, 
certiorari  denied  57  S.£t.  40,  299  U. 
S.  577,  -81  L.E<t  425. 

33.  111.— Palmer  v.   Bethard,    66   111. 
529. 

34  C.J.  p  479  note  45. 

A  discharge  in  bankruptcy  which 
occurred  before  the  rendition  of 
Judgment  is  not  "a  defense  which 
has  arisen  or  been  discovered  since 
the  judgment  was  rendered"  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statute  providing 
that  a  judgment  obtained  in  an  ac- 
tion by  ordinary  proceedings  shall 
not  be  annulled  or  modified  in  equita- 
ble proceedings  except  for  such  a  de- 
fense.— Harding  v.  Quinlan,  229  N. 
W.  672,  209  Iowa  1190. 

34.  Wash. — Robertson   v.    Preebury, 
152  P.  5,  87  Wash.  558,  L.R.A.1916B 
883. 

35.  N.  J. — Cairo  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Titus, 
32  N.J.Eq.  397. 

34  C.J.  p  479  note  47. 

38.  U.-S. — Ocean  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fields, 
C.C.Mass.,  18  'F.Cas.No.10,406,  2 
Story  59. 

34  C.J.  p  479  note  48. 

37.    U.S. — Harrington  v.  Denny,  D.C. 

Mo.,  3  F.Supp.  584. 
Miss.— Miller  v.  Doxey,  1  Miss.   329. 

750 


Wis. — Marsh  v.  Edgerton,  2  Pinn. 
230,  1  Chandl.  198. 

Wyo.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  School 
Dist  No.  7  in  Weston  County  v. 
School  Dist.  No.  1  in  Weston  Coun- 
ty, 236  P.  1029,  1032,  '33  Wyo.'  *5. 

38.  Idaho. — Boise    Payette    -Lumber 
Co.  v.  Idaho  Gold  Dredging  Corpo- 
ration,  58  P.2d  786,   56   Idaho   660, 
certiorari  denied  57  S.Ct.  40,  299  U. 
S.  577,  81  Ii.Ed.  425. 

N.J.— Simon   v.    Henke,    139    A,    887, 

102  N.J.EQ.  115. 
N.Y. — Schenck  v.  Underbill,  199  N.Y. 

S.  6G6,  205  App.Div.  162. 
Documents  passing  between  parties 

Documents  produced  in  suit  to  en- 
join enforcement  of  judgment  were 
held  not  newly  discovered  evidence, 
where  bill  alleged  that  documents 
had  passed  between  parties  before 
trial. — Harrington  v.  Denny,  D.C.Mo., 
3  F.Supp.  584. 

39.  U.6. — Harrington,  v.  Denny,  su- 
pra. 

40.  U.S. — Harrington  v.  Denny,   su- 
pra. 

N.J.— Cairo  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Titus,  28 

N.J.Eq.  269. 
Tex.— Kelley  v.  Wright,  Civ.App.,  184 

S.W.2d  649,  affirmed,  Sup.,  188  S. 

W.2d  983. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  377 


caused  an  opposite  result  if  produced  at  the  trial,41 
some  cases  even  going  so  far  as  to  hold  that  the 
new  evidence  must  be  incontrovertible  and  conclu- 
sive.42 Evidence  which  is  uncertain  and  inconclu- 
sive in  character  and  of  slight  probative  value  is 
insufficient.43  Evidence  will  not  be  sufficient  to 
warrant  equitable  relief  if  it  appears  to  be  merely 


cumulative  or  corroborative44  or  merely  intended  to 
impeach  some  of  the  witnesses  at  the  former  trial.45 
The  rule  in  this  respect  is  the  same  in  both  courts 
of  equity  and  at  law.46 

Necessity  of  writing.  Newly  discovered  evidence 
need  not  be  in  writing  to  justify  equitable  relief 
against  a  judgment.47 


C.  PROCEDURE 


§  377.    Form  of  Proceedings 

Equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  is  generally 
sought  In  a  separate  and  independent  proceeding,  equi- 
table In  nature,  commenced  by  bill  or  complaint. 

As  a  general  rule,  where  application  is  to  be 
made  to  a  court  possessing  equitable  jurisdiction, 
for  relief  against  a  judgment,  it  may  and  should  be 
in  the  form  of  a  separate  and  independent  proceed- 
ing commenced  by  bill  or  petition,48  or,  under  the 
code  practice,  by  complaint.49  Where  the  adjudi- 


cation to  be  impeached  is  a  decree  in  equity,  relief 
may  be  sought  either  by  petition  in  the  original  ac- 
tion, by  bill  of  review,  or  by  original  bill  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  bill  of  review,  according  to  the  circum- 
stances, as  discussed  in  Equity  §§  622-667.  Under 
some  statutes,  however,  a  bill  of  review  may  also 
lie  as  an  independent  proceeding  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  at 
law,50  and,  while  it  has  been  held  that  such  a  pro- 
ceeding is  in  the  nature  of,  and  has  the  same  scope 


Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited,  in  School 
Dist.  No.  7  in  Weston  County  v. ! 
School  Dist.  No.  1  in  Weston  Coun- 
ty, 236  P.  1029,  1032,  33  Wyo.  65. 

41.  111. — Crane  Co.  v.  Parker,  136  N. 
B.  733,  304  111.  331. 

Iowa.— Abell    v.    Partello,    211    N.W. 

-S6S,  202  Iowa  1236. 
Tex.— Kelley  v.  Wright,  Civ.App.,  184 

S.W.2d   649,  affirmed,   Sup.,   188  S. 

W.2d  98'3. 
34  C.J.  p  479 'note  51. 

42.  U.S. — Harrington  v.  Denny,  D.C. 
Mo.,  3  F.Supp.  584. 

34  C.J.  p  479  note  52. 

43.  Tex.— Kelley     v.     Wright,     Civ. 
App.,     184    -S.W.2d    649,     affirmed, 
Sup.,  183  S.W.2d  983. 

44.  U.S.— Harrington  v.  Denny,  D.C. 
Mo.,  3  'F.Supp.  584. 

Neb.— Kielian  v.  Kent  &  Burke  Co., 
268  N.W.  79,  131  Neb.  308— Gutru 
v.  Johnson,  212  N.W.  622,  115  Neb. 
309— Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Skaggs,  211  N.W.  1007,  115  Neb. 
176. 

34  C.J.  P  479  note  53. 

45.  111.— Hintz   v.   Moldenhauer,   243 
IlLApp.  227. 

34  C.J.  p  479  note  54. 

46.  111.— Yates    v.    Monroe,    13    111. 
212. 

W.Va. — Bloss  v.  Hull,  27  W.Va.  503. 

47.  S.C. — Cantey   v.    Blair,    18    S.C. 
Bq.  41. 

48.  Ga.— Mullis  v.   Bank  of  Chaun- 
cey,  150  S.E.  471,  40  GteuApp.  582. 

111.— Pedersen  v.  Logan  Square  State 
&  Savings  Bank,  36  N.E.2d  732, 
377  111.  408. 

Kan.-^Tohnson  v.  •Schrader,  95  P.2d 
273,  150  Kan.  545— In  re  Hardesty's 
Adoption,  92  P.2d  49,  150  Kan.  271. 

La.— -Dickey  v.  Pollack,  App.,  1*3  So. 
43. 


Mo. — Force  v.  Margulius,  App.,  33  S. 

W.2d  1023. 
Okl.— Lewis   v.    Couch,    154    P.2d   51, 

194  Okl.  632— Sawyer  v.  Sawyer,  77 

P.2d  703,  182  Okl.  348— Seekatz  v. 

Brandenburg,  300  P.   678,   150  Okl. 

53. 
Tex.— McCook  v.  Amarada  Petroleum 

Corporation,    Civ.App.,    73    S.W.2d 

914.   ' 
W.Va.— Williams  v.  Stratton,  174  S. 

E.  417,  114  W.Va.  837. 
34  C.J.  p  479  note  57. 

dgmBxit  of  dismissal 

Petition  to  vacate  Judgment  was 
proper  proceeding  to  take  following 
judgment  of  dismissal. — Smith  v. 
Brown,  184  N.E.  393,  282  Mass.  £1. 

Original  bill  or  bill  of  review 

(1)  A  bill  to  set  aside  a  decree  for 
fraud    in    its    procurement,    or    for 
fraud  extrinsic  and  collateral  to  mat- 
ter on  which  the  decree  rests,  and 
under  which  a  third  person  has  ac- 
quired an  interest,  is  an  original  bill 
and  not  a  bill  of  review. — Ostrom  v. 
Ferris,    134   A,    305,    99   N.J.Eq.    551, 
affirmed  141  A.  920  (two  cases),  103 
N.J.EQ.  22. 

(2)  The    position    of    parties    who 
filed  petition  to  set  aside  decree  in 
equity  suit  more  than  two  years  aft- 
er entry  on  ground  that  court  had 
no  jurisdiction  over  subject  matter, 
if  question  could  be  raised  by  peti- 
tion rather  than  by  bill  of  review, 
was  no  stronger  than  it  would  have 
been  had  they  raised  it  by  bill  of 
review. — Fooks'    Ex'rs    v.    Ghingher, 
192   A.   782,    172   Md.    612,   certiorari 
denied  Phillips  v.  Ghingher,  58  S.Ct 
47,  '302  U.S.  726,  82  L.Ed.  561. 
Statutory  procedure  held  inapplica- 
ble 

Service    on   defendant   by   leaving 

751 


copy  of  summons  and  petition  at  his 
dwelling  with  member  of  family  con- 
stituted "personal  service,"  so  that 
statutory  provisions  for  vacating 
judgment  by  petition  for  review 
were  inapplicable.— Force  v.  Mar- 
gulius, Mo.App.,  33  S.W.2d  1023. 
Foreclosure 

Equitable  relief  from  action  for  de- 
ficiency judgment  can  be  had  only 
when  sought  by  petition  to  review 
original  foreclosure  proceeding  and 
not  by  bill  to  restrain  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  deficiency  judgment. — 
Meranus  v.  Lawyers'  &  Homemak- 
ers'  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  180  A. 
665,  118  N.J.Eq.  586. 

49.  Ind. — Vail     v.     Department     of 
Financial   Institutions   of  Indiana, 
17  N.E.2d  -854,  106  Ind. App.  39. 

N.T. — People  v.  Judges   of  Court  of 
Common  Pleas,   3  Abb.Pr.  181. 

50.  Tex.— Crouch  v.   McGaw,   138  S. 
W.2d    94,    134    Tex    633— Wear  v. 
McCallum,  33  S.W.2d  723,  119  Tex. 
473 — Gray  v.   Moore,  Civ.App.,  172 
S.W.2d  746,  error  refused — Ameri- 
can   Red   Cross    v.    Longley,    Civ. 
App.,  165  S.W.2d  233,  error  refused 
— Allen  v.  Trentman,  Civ.App.,  115 
S.W.2d  1177— Griffith  v.  Tipps,  Civ. 
App.,  69  S.W.2d  '846. 

Effectuation  of  relief  sought 

An  equitable  bill  of  review  must 
effectuate  the  relief  sought  complete- 
ly within  the  particular  proceedings. 
— Cheney  v.  Norton,  Civ.App.,  126  S. 
W.2d  1011,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
Norton  v.  Cheney,  161  S.W.2d  73,  138 
Tex.  622. 

Distinction  based  on,  service  of  proc- 
ess 

A  distinction  exists  between  equi- 
table bill  of  review  as  against  a  pre- 
viously rendered  judgment  under 


§  377 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


and  purpose  as,  a  motion  for  new  trial51  or  writ  of 
error  in  an  action  at  law,52  it  has  also  been  held  that 
the  remedy  is  distinct  from,  and  not  an  alternative 
for,  such  remedies  as  a  motion  for  new  trial,  ap- 
peal, or  writ  of  error.53  Jn  those  jurisdictions 
where  legal  and  equitable  powers  are  vested  in  the 
same  courts,  jurisdiction  of  equity  to  grant  relief 
against  a  judgment  may  be  invoked  by  means  of  a 
motion  addressed  to  the  court  which  rendered  the 
judgment  as  well  as  by  an  independent  action  in  eq- 
uity,54 and  under  some  practice  a  rule  to  show 
cause  is  proper  to  bring  the  matter  of  cancellation 
of  a  judgment  before  a  court  of  equity.55  A  di- 
rect attack  on  a  judgment  may  sometimes  be  set  up 


by  a  cross  action  or  cross  bill,56  and  it  may  be  per- 
missible for  the  judgment  debtor,  when  suit  is 
brought  on  the  judgment,  to  set  up  in  his  answer 
the  grounds  on  which  he  claims  that  it  should  be 
vacated  or  enjoined,  and  demand  appropriate  re- 
lief, whereupon  the  answer  will  be  treated  as  equiv- 
alent to  a  bill  in  equity.57 

An  application  to  vacate  a  judgment,  made  after 
the  expiration  of  the  term  at  which  the  judgment 
was  rendered,  may  be  considered  an  independent 
proceeding,  although  it  was  entitled  as  a  part  of 
the  original  action  and  designated  as  a  motion.5* 
On  the  other  hand,  where  a  party  by  mistake  brings 


process  served  on  defendant,  and 
similar  action  on  judgment  rendered 
when  process  was  by  publication, 
since,  in  the  former,  actions  are 
docketed  separately  from  action 
sought  to  be  reviewed,  and  are  tried 
out  on  issues  made,  while,  in  latter 
cases,  motions  are  treated  as  mo- 
tions for  new  trials  in  original  case 
and  are  filed  in  that  case  and  heard 
as  part  of  it,  irrespective  of  how 
they  are  Indorsed,  styled  or  docketed. 
— Smith  v.  Higginbotham,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  112  S.W.Sd  770. 
Statute  not  mandatory 

Bill    of    review    is    not    exclusive 
method  by  which  new  trial  may  be 
obtained  after  judgment  on  service 
by  publication,  statute  providing  for 
bill  of  review  not  being  mandatory. 
—Dennis  v.  McCasland,  Civ.App.,  69 
S.W.2d      :506,      reversed      on      other 
grounds  97  S.W.2d  684,  128  Tex.  266. 
Proceedings  held  bill  of  review 
Tex. — Pope    v.    Powers,    120    S.W.2d 
432,  132  Tex.  80— Moon  v.  Weber, 
Civ.App.,  103  S.W.2d  807,  error  re- 
fused— Texas       Employers'       Ins. 
Ass'n    v.    Shelton,    Clv.App.,    74    S. 
W.2d  280. 
Proceedings  held  not  bill  of  review 

(1)  Generally. — 'Love       v.        State 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  San  Antonio,'  90 
S.W.2d  819,  126  Tex.  591. 

(2)  Proceeding  to  set  aside  Judg- 
ment which  is  in  effect  only. a  mo- 
tion  for  a   new  trial. — Bridgman   v. 
Moore,  183  S.W.2d  705,  143  Tex.  250 
— Trujillo  v.  Piarote,  53  S.W.2d  4-66, 
122    Tex.    173— Smith   v.   Poppe,   Civ. 
App.,   102  S.W.2d  1108 — Cox,  Inc.,  v. 
Knight,  Civ.App.,  50  S.W.2d  915. 

(3)  A  petition  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment, filed  years  after  judgment  ren- 
dered, where  complaining  party  had 
instituted  original  suit,  tried  it,  and 
failed.^— Warne   v.    Jackson,    Tex.  Civ. 
App.,  273  S.W.  '315. 

51.  Tex. — Gotten  v.  Stanford,  Civ. 
App.,  169  S.W.2d  489— Staples  v. 
Callahan,-  Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d  206, 
affirmed  Callahan  v.  Staples,  161  S. 
W.2d  489,  139  Tex.  8— Dennis  v. 
McCasland,  Civ.App.,  69  S.W.2d 


506,  reversed  on  other  grounds  97 
S.W.2d  684,  128  Tex.  266. 

52.  Tex. — Hugh  Qooper  Co.  v.  Amer- 
ican Xat.  Exchange  Bank  of  Dal- 
las, Civ.App.,   30   S.W.2d   364. 

53.  Tex. — Dixon     v.     McNabb,.    Civ. 
App.,    173    S.W.2d    228,    error    re- 
fused—Union Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Fort  Worth  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  166 
S.W.2d  928 — Smith  v.  Rogers,  Civ. 
App.,  129  S.W.2d  776. 

Error  not  apparent  on  record 

Where  record  would  not  disclose 
error  complained  of  in  bill  of  review 
to  set  aside  judgment,  appeal  there- 
from or  writ  of  error  would  not  be 
available  as  remedy  precluding  re- 
sort to  such  bill. — Pearl  Assur.  Co.  v. 
Williams,  Tex.Civ.App.,  1-67  S.W.2d 
808. 

54.  Cal.— Olivera  v.  Grace,  122  P.2d 
564,  19  Cal.2d  570,  140  A.L.R.  1328, 

In  Ohio 

(1)  While  relief  from  judgment  or 
order  may  be  granted  in  suit  in  equi- 
ty, ordinarily  a  separate  suit  is  not 
required,  but  relief  may  be  granted 
In  same  proceedings. — In  re  Vander- 
lip's  Estate,  12  Ohio  Supp.  123. 

(2)  Where  other  relief  from  Judg- 
ment   than   that   obtainable   in    case 
wherein   judgment   was   rendered   is 
sought,    and    impeachment   of  judg- 
ment is  only  necessary  to  the  further 
relief  sought,  original  action  is  prop- 
er remedy. — Young  v.  Guella,  35  N. 
B.2d  997,  67  Ohio  Apj>.  11. 

55.  N.J. — Manowitz  v.  Kanov,  154  A. 
326,    107    N.J.Law    523,    75    A.L.R. 
1464. 

5ft,    Va.— • Sutherland  v.  Rasnake,  192 

S.E.  695,  169  Va.  257. 
Proceeding  for  bill  of  discovery 

Defendant  could  file  cross  action  to 
cancel  judgment  held  by  plaintiffs 
against  him  in  proceeding  for  bill  of 
discovery  to  have  defendant  disclose 
his  assets.— Briggs  v.  Ladd,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  64  S.W.2d  389. 

57.     Tex. — CundifC  v.  Teague,  46  Tex  ' 
475.  i 

752 


Wis. — Brown  v.  Parker.  2,8  Wis.  21 — 
Stowell  v.  Eldred.  26  Wis.  504. 

58.  Ind.— Globe  Min.  Co.  v.  Oak 
Ridge  Coal  Co.,  134  N.E.  508,  79 
Ind.  App.  76. 

Sufficiency  of  pleadings  generally  see 
infra  §  389. 

BUI  of  review 

(1)  A  bill  which  states  substance 
of  -proceedings  sought  to  be  revised 
and  facts  relied  on  for  relief  will  be 
considered  a   "bill   of  review*'  if  in 
fact  it  is  an  original  proceedings  to 
set    aside    a    judgment    and    shows 
equitable     grounds     for     relief,     al- 
though it  is  denominated  a  motion. — 
Qaster  v.  McGough,  Tex.Civ.App.,  184 
S.W.2d     668 — City     of    Eastland     v. 
Owen,    Civ.App.,   49    S.W.2d    534,    re- 
versed on  other  grounds  Owen  v.  City 
of  Eastland,  78  S.W.2d  178.  124  Tex. 
419— Smith  v.  Kraft,  Tex.Civ.App.,  9 
S.W.2d  472. 

(2)  Pleading     styled     motion     for 
new   trial,    containing   essential   ele- 
ments of  bill  of  review,  will  be  re- 
garded as  such  if  motion  for  new  tri- 
al could  not  have  been  filed. — Box  v. 
Pierce,  Tex.Civ.App.,  278  S.W.  226. 

(3)  If  pleading  possesses  essential 
elements  of  bill  of  review,  it  is  im- 
material that  it  was  filed  under  num- 
ber and  style  of  former  suit. — City  of 
Eastland  v.  Owen,  Civ.App.,  49  S.W. 
2d    534,    reversed    on    other   grounds 
Owen  v.  City  of  Eastland,  7<8  S.W.2d 
178,  124  Tex.  419. 

(4)  However,  where  essential  ele- 
ments of  a  bill  of  review  are  lacking, 
motion  will  not  be  treated  as  such  a 
bill. — OLindsey    v.    Panhandle    Const. 
Co.,    Civ.App.,     46    S.W.2d    339,    af- 
firmed Panhandle  Const.  Co.  v.  Liind- 
say,  72  S.W.2d  1068,  123  Tex.  613. 

(5)  -So  defendant's  motion  to  dis- 
solve   injunction    subsequent   to    ex- 
piration of  judgment  term  could  not 
be    treated   as.  a    statutory    petition 
for  review  so  as  to  warrant  court  in 
acting    on    it,    where    it    was    not 
claimed    that    injunction    proceeding 
wus  irregular,   but  only  that  decree 
entered  was  erroneous. — State  ex  reL 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  378 


an  independent  action,  when  his  remedy  is  by  mo- 
tion in  the  original  cause,  the  court  may,  in  its  dis- 
cretion, treat  the  summons  and  complaint  as  a  mo- 
tion,59 although  a  bill  or  action  to  vacate  or  enjoin 
a  judgment  in  which  the  only  relief  asked  is  a  per- 
petual injunction,60  or  an  action  for  reformation,  in 
which  it  is  merely  alleged  that  the  prior  judgment 
does  not  constitute  a  bar  to  recovery,61  may  not  be 
treated  as  a  motion  in  the  original  cause  or  a  pe- 
tition for  a  new  trial.  A  cause  of  action  to  set  aside 
a  judgment  or  decree  has  been  regarded  as  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  original  suit  in  which  the  judgment 
or  decree  was  entered.62 

In  Louisiana,  if  it  is  claimed  that  an  adjudica- 
tion is  absolutely  void  for  illegality  or  other  cause, 
resort  should  be  had  to  an  action  of  nullity,  and 
not  an  injunction.63  Such  a  suit  may  not  be 
brought  by  way  of  intervention  or  third  opposition ; 
it  must  be  brought  in  the  ordinary  form,  by  peti- 
tion and  citation.64 


An  action  for  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment 
is  equitable  in  nature  and  is  governed  by  equitable 
principles.65 

§  378.    Conditions  Precedent 

A  party  seeking  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment 
must  on  his  part  do  whatever  equity  requires,  but  leave 
to  sue  Is  usually  not  required. 

A  party  coming  into  equity  to  obtain  relief 
against  a  judgment  at  law  must  on  his  part  do 
whatever  equity  requires.66  In  particular,  if  com- 
plainant does  not  dispute  the  validity  of  the  judg- 
ment with  respect  to  the  entire  amount  of  it,  he 
must  first  pay  or  offer  to  pay  whatever  amount  he 
admits  to  be  due,67  or  show  some  sufficient  excuse 
for  his  failure  to  do  so,68  unless  the  circumstances 
are  such  that  no  payment  or  tender  is  required.60 
However,  it  is  not  usual  or  necessary,  before  filing 
a  bill  for  this  purpose,  to  obtain  leave  of  the  court 
whose  judgment  is  to  be  impeached  or  of  that  in 
which  the  bill  is  filed.70 


Caplow  v.  Kirk  wood,  Mo.App.,  117  S. 
W.2d   652. 

59.  N.C.— Craddock   v.   Brinkley,    98 
S.B.  280,  177  N.C.  125. 

60.  U.S. — Bdmanson  v.  Best,  HI.,  57 
F.  501,  6  C.C.A.  471. 

N.C. — Poard    v.    Alexander,    64    N.C. 
69. 

61.  N.C.— Virginia  -   Carolina  Joint 
Stock  Land  Bank  v.  Alexander,  160 
S.E.  462,  201  N.C.  453. 

62.  U.S.— Hanna    v.    Brictson    Mfg. 
Co.,   C.C.A.S.D.,   62  «F.2d  139. 

63.  La.— Cook  v.  State,  16  La.  288. 
34  C.J.  p  480  note  67. 

64.  La.— Woolfolk   v.   Woolfolk,    30 
La.  Ann.  139. 

65.  Minn. — Bloomquist  v.  Thomas,  9 
N.W.2d    337,   215   Minn.   35. 

Tex.— Hubbard  v.  Tallal,  Civ.App.,  57 
S.W.2d  226,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  and  appeal  dismissed  92 
S.W.2d  1022,  127  Tex.  242. 
A  bill  of  review  for  equitable  re- 
lief from  a  judgment  is  addressed  to 
equitable  powers  of  the  court  and 
equity  principles  and  maxims  must 
be  observed. — Kelley  v.  Wright,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  184  S.W.2d  649,  affirmed, 
Sup.,  188  S.W.2d  983— Harris  v.  Elm 
Oil  Co.r  Tex.Civ.App.,  183  S.W.2d  216, 
error  refused — American  Red  Cross 
v.  Longley,  Tex.Civ.App.,  165  S.W.2d 
233,  error  refused— Smith  v.  Rogers, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  129  S.W.2d  776— Dono- 
van v.  Young,  Tex.Civ.App.,  127  S.W. 
2d  517,  error  refused — Hacker  v. 
Hacker,  Tex.Civ.App.,  110  S.W.2d 
923 — Murry  v.  Citizens'  State  Bank 
of  Ranjger,  Tex. Civ.App.,  77  S.W,2d 
1104,  error  dismissed. 
Prayer  for  rule  nisi 

The  equitable  character  of  a  peti- 

49  C.J.S.-48 


tion  to  set  aside  a  judgment  or  de- 
cree is  not  affected  by  the  fact  that 
it  contains  a  prayer  for  a  rule  nisi 
in  addition  to  the  prayers  for  equi- 
table relief.— Williamson  v.  Had- 
dock, 140  S.B.  '373,  165  Ga.  1-68. 

06.    U.S.— Hazard    v.     Park,     C.C.A. 

Colo.,  294  F.  40. 
Fla. — Adams  v.  Reynolds,  134  So.  45, 

101  Fla.  271. 
Ga. — Autry  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  144 

S.B.  741,  167  Ga,  136. 
34  C.J.  p  480  note  69. 

Payment  or  security 

It  was  improper  to  include,  in  an 
order  to  show  cause  why  a  default 
judgment  should  not  be  vacated,  a 
provision  restraining  plaintiff  from 
collecting  the  judgment,  where  there 
was  no  compliance  with  statute  re- 
quiring payment  or  security  as  a 
condition  of  the  granting  of  an  In- 
junction to  stay  proceedings  on  a 
judgment— Walton  Foundry  Co.  v. 
A.  D.  Granger  Co.,  196  N.Y.S.  719, 
203  App.Div.  226. 

67.  Ga.— 'Felker  v.  Still,  169  S.B.  897, 
77  Ga.  160 — Autry  v.  Southern  Ry. 
Co.,  144  S.B.  741,  167  Ga.  136. 

Ky. — Overs  treet  v.  Grinstead's 
Adm'r,  140  S.W.2d  836,  283  Ky.  73 
— Grooms  v.  National  Bank  of 
Kentucky,  292  S.W.  513,  218  Ky. 
846. 

Tex. — Early  Grain  &  Seed  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Callum,  Cir.App.,  128  -S.W.2d  469 
— Dallas  Joint  Stock  -Land  Bank  of 
Dallas  v.  'Lancaster,  Civ.App.,  122 
S.W.2d  659,  error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  480  note  70. 

Materlaamaa's  lien 

Defendants   who   failed  to   tender 

753 


sum  covered  by  materialman's  lien 
on  homestead  could  not  have  judg- 
ment foreclosing  lien  set  aside  be- 
cause rendered  for  amount  in  excess 
of  sum  secured  by  lien. — Scott  v. 
Lewis,  Tex.Civ.App.,  64  S.W.2d  365. 

68.  Ala.— Zavelo  v.  Goldstein,  59  So. 
618,  178  Ala.  321. 

69.  Or. — Paulson  v.   Kenney,   224  P. 
634,  110  Or.  688. 

Tex.— Dallas  Coffee  &  Tea  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  724,  er- 
ror dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  480  note  72. 
Money  collected  by  another 

In  action  by  minors  to  set  aside  a 
judgment  in  their  favor  because  ot 
death  of  father,  obtained  by  fraud, 
it  was  not  necessary  for  plaintiffs  to 
tender  back  the  money  collected  un- 
der the  judgment,  it  appearing1  that 
the  money  was  paid  to  a  so-called 
next  friend  not  authorized  to  receive 
it,  and  was  spent  during  minority  of 
plaintiffs  and  before  commencement 
of  suit — Gurley  v.  St.  Louis  Transit 
Co.  of  St.  Louis,  Mo.App.,  259  S.W. 
895. 

70.  Ala.— Nichols    v.    Dill,    132    So. 
900,  222  Ala.  455. 

N.J. — Ostrom   v.   Ferris,   134   A.   305, 
99  N.J.Eq.  551,  affirmed  141  A.  920, 
two  cases,  103  N.J.Eq.  22. 
34  C.J.  p  481  note  73. 
Appellate  court 

A  bill  in  equity  to  restrain  the  en- 
forcement of  a  judgment  at  law  is 
not  a  bill  of  review,  for  which  leave 
from  the  appellate  court  to  file  is  re- 
quired.— Mineral  Development  Co.  v. 
Kentucky  Coal  Lands  Co^  D.C.Ky., 
285  F.  7-61,  affirmed,  C.C.A..,  285  F. 
1021. 


I  379 

§  379.    Time  to  Sue  and  Limitations 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  controlling  the  time  of 
application  to  a  court  of  equity  for  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment, no  particular  lapse  of  time  will  be  marked  off  as 
barring  a  complainant's  right  to  relief,  the  question  be- 
ing merely  one  of  laches  or  diligence. 

Ordinarily  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment 
may  not  be  sought  prior  to  the  time  permitted  by 
statute,71  and,  where  a  statutory  remedy  for  va- 
cation of  a  judgment  is  exclusive  for  a  specified 
period  of  time,  a  party  may  not  maintain  an  ac- 
tion in  equity  to  set  aside  the  judgment  prior  to 
the  expiration  of  that  period  of  time.72 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  controlling  the  time 
of  application  to  a  court  of  equity  for  relief  against 
a  judgment,  no  particular  lapse  of  time  will  be 
marked  off  as  barring  complainant's  right  to  relief, 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  question  being  merely  one  of  laches  or  dili- 
gence,73 and  statutes  authorizing  courts  of  law  to 
vacate  or  open  their  own  judgments  for  fraud,  mis- 
take, surprise,  or  other  cause,  generally  do  not  pre- 
clude relief  in  equity  after  the  time  which  they  fix 
as  a  limit74  It  is  generally  sufficient  and  necessary 
for  the  party  seeking  relief  to  show  due  diligence 
and  to  file  suit  within  a  reasonable  time,75  either  in 
term  or  in  vacation,76  and  it  is  not  required  that 
the  proceeding  be  instituted  at  the  term  at  which 
the  judgment  was  rendered.77  A  suit  in  equity  may 
be  available  to  set  aside  a  default  judgment  on 
which  execution  was  issued,  even  after  the  execu- 
tion has  been  returned  satisfied.78 

In  many  states  there  are  statutes  of  limitation 
specifically  applicable  to  proceedings  in  equity  for 
relief  against  judgments,79  and,  by  analogy,  statu- 


71.  Tex. — Joy    v.    Young,    Civ.App., 
194  S.W.2d  159. 

72.  Wash.— Muller  v.  Hendry,  17  P. 
2d  602,  171  Wash.  9. 

73.  U.-S.— McGinn     v.     TL     S.,     B.C. 
Mass.,  2  F.R.D.  562. 

Ark.— Parker    v.    Nixon,    44    S.W.2d 

1088,  184  Ark.  1085. 
Cal.— Cadenasso  v.  Bank  of  Italy,  6 

P.2d  944,  214  Cal.  562. 
Iowa. — Des  Moines  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 

v.   Marks   Inv.   Co.,   195   N.W.    597, 

197    Iowa    5*89,    modified   on   other 

grounds    197    N.W.    628,    197    Iowa 

589. 

34  C.J.  p  481  note  74. 
Laches  see  infra  §  381. 
Time  for  appeal 

A  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  to  im- 
peach a  decree  for  fraud  practiced 
in  the  procurement  of  service  of 
process  was  maintainable  notwith- 
standing the  time  to  appeal  had  ex- 
pired.— MacKay  v.  Bacon,  (Bla.,  20 
So.2d  904. 
Partition 

Mere  lapse  of  time  will  not  pre- 
vent equity  court  from  correcting  or 
reversing  decrees  of  partition  en- 
tered erroneously  on  testimony  plain- 
ly incorrect  as  to  location  of  land. — 
Crandol  v.  Garrison,  1-69  A.  507,  115 

N.J.EQ.  11. 

Liability  created  "by  statute 

•Limitation  statute  affecting  ac- 
tions on  liability  created  by  statute 
was  inapplicable  to  equitable  action 
to  vacate  judgment  because  of  trial 
judge's  disqualification. — Cadenasso 
*.  Bank  of  Italy,  6  P.2d  944,  214  CaL 
562. 

74.  Ala.— Quick  v.  McDonald,  10$  So. 
529,  214  Ala.  587. 

Cal. — Westphal  v.  Westphal,  126  P.2d 
105,  20  Cal.2d  393— Rogers  v.  Mul- 
key,  147  P.2d  62,  63  Cal.App.2d  567 
— Bartell  v.  Johnson,  140  P.2d  878, 
60  CaLApp.2d  432 — F.  B.  Young  Co. 


v.  Pemstrom,  79  P.2d  1117,  31  Cal. 
App.2d  Supp.  763. 

Ga.— Williamson  v.  Haddock,  140  S. 
E.  373,  165  Ga.  168. 

Nev.— Lauer  v.  Eighth  Judicial  Dis- 
trict Court  in  and  for  Clark  Coun- 
ty, 140  P.2d  953,  62  Nev.  78. 

Okl. — Caraway  v.  Overholser,  77  P.2d 
688,  182  OkL  357. 

Wash.— Dale  v.  Cohn,  127  P.2d  412, 
14  Wash.2d  214 — Fisch  v.  Marler, 
97  P.2d  147,  1  Wash.2d  698. 

34  C.J.  p  481  note  75. 

Time  for  motion  to  vacate  see  supra 
§  288. 

75.  Ala. — Cassady  v.  Davis,  15  So.2d 
909,  245  Ala.  93— Quick  v.  McDon- 
ald, 108  So.  529,  214  Ala.  587. 

HI.— Allen  v.  220  B.  Walton  Place 
Bldg.  Corporation,  26  N.E.2d  662, 
304  IlLApp.  585. 

Salt  held  not  brought  in  time 

Tex. — Bddingston  v.  Allen,  Civ.App., 
126  S.W.2d  1008. 

70.  Ga. — Williamson  Y.  Haddock, 
140  S.E.  373,  165  Ga.  168. 

77.  Ga. — Longshore    v.    Qollier,    140 
S.E.   636,   37  Ga.App.   450,  followed 
in  Reddy-Waldhauer-Maffett  Co.  v. 
Cranman,  153  S.E.  616,  41  Ga.App. 
563. 

Tex.— Mann  v.  Risher,  116  S.W.2d 
692,  131  Tex  498— Universal  Cred- 
it Co.  v.  Cunningham,  Civ.App.,  109 
S.W.2d  507,  error  dismissed — Old- 
ham  v.  Heatherly,  Civ.App.,  3  S. 
W.2d  484 — Barton  v.  Montex  Cor- 
poration, Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  950. 

Wyo. — Rock  Springs  Coal  &  Mining 
Co.  v.  Black  Diamond  Coal  Co.,  272 
P.  12,  39  Wyo.  379. 

78.  Cal.— Hallett    v.    Slaughter,    140 
P.2d  3,  22  Cal.2d  552. 

Mont. — State  ex  rel.  Hedle  v.  District 
Court  in  and  for  Missoula  County, 
59  P.2d  58,  102  Mont.  541. 

79.  Ind. — Globe   Mining  Co.   v.   Oak 
Ridge   Coal  Co.,   177  N.E.   868,   204 
Ind.  11. 

754 


Minn.— Lenhart    v.    Lenhart    Wagon 

Co.,    298   N.W.    37,    210   Minn.    164. 

135    A.L.R.    833,   mandate   modified 

on  other  grounds  2  N.W.2d  421,  211 

Minn.  572 — Murray  v.  Calkins,  254 

N.W.  605,  191  Minn.  460. 
Mo.— Fadler   v.    Gabbert,    63    S.W.2d 

121,  333  Mo.  551. 
Ohio.— Baylor  v,  Killinger,   186  N.K 

512,  44  Ohio  App.  523. 
Okl. — Caraway  v.   Overholser,    77   P. 

2d  688,  1S2  Okl.  357— Savoy  Oil  Co. 

v.  Emery,  277  P.  1029,  137  Okl.  67 

—Miller  v.  White,   265   P.   646,   129 

Okl.  184. 
Pa,— 'Frantz  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  3 

A.2d  917,  333  Pa.  220. 
34  C.J.  p  481  note  7-6. 
In  California 

The  limitation  of  six  months  pre- 
scribed by  Civ.Code  §  473,  in  suits 
for  relief  from  a  judgment  taken 
against  one  through  his  mistake,  etc., 
does  not  apply  to  suits  for  relief  be- 
cause of  extrinsic  fraud,  but  ap- 
plies where  the  fraud  is  intrinsic.— 
Rogers  v.  Mulkey,  147  P.2d  62,  63 
Cal.App.2d  567 — Tomb  v.  Tomb,  7  P. 
2d  1104,  120  Cal.App.  438—34  C.J.  p 
481  note  76  [a]. 

In  Iowa 

(1)  If  party  discovers  or  by  rea- 
sonable diligence  might  have  discov- 
ered   fraud    in    securing    judgment 
within    year,    he    may    not    sue    In 
equity  to  vacate  Judgment  after  ex- 
piration of  year. — Gehle  v.  Hart,  229 
N.W.    149,    209    Iowa  736— Swartzen- 
druber   v.    Polke,    218    N.W.   -62,    205 
Iowa  382— Haas  v.  Nielsen,  206  N.W. 
253,  200  Iowa  1314. 

(2)  Judgment  will  not  be  vacated 
after  one  year  on  ground  that  plain- 
tiff    committed     perjury.  — Abell     v. 
Partello,  211  N.W.  868,  202  Iowa  1236. 


(1)  An  action  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment for  fraud  practiced  by  the  suc- 
cessful party  in  obtaining  it  must  be 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  379 


tory  limitations  applicable  to  proceedings  by  bill  of 
review80  or  appeal81  have  been  held  applicable ;  and 
in  all  cases  within  the  terms  of  such  statutes  suit 
may  and  should  be  brought  within  the  time  limit- 
ed.82 It  has  been  held  that  a  statute  of  limitations 
does  not  bar  suit  where  the  ground  of  the  appli- 
cation for  an  injunction  did  not  exist  when  the 


judgment  was  rendered,88  where  the  institution  of 
proceedings  within  the  time  limited  was  prevented 
by  the  fraud  of  the  adverse  party,84  or  where  he 
was  a  nonresident  during  the  running  of  the  statu- 
tory period.85 
In  the  case  of  fraud  it  is  generally  provided  that 


brought  within  two  years,  unless 
plaintiff  is  under  some  disability. — 
Johnson  v.  -Schrader,  95  P.2d  273, 
150  Kan.  545— Elfert  v.  Elfert,  294 
P.  921,  132  Kan.  218— Harvey  v.  Do- 
Ian,  176  P.  1*34,  103  Kan.  717. 

(2)  Proceedings  to  open  up  judg- 
ment obtained  without  other  service 
than  publication  in  newspaper  must 
be  brought  within  three  years.— El- 
fert v.  Elfert,  supra. 
In  Louisiana 

(1)  An  action  to  annul  a  judgment 
must    be    brought   within    one    year 
from  its  rendition;    if  on  the  ground 
of  fraud,  within  one  year  from  the 
discovery     of     the     fraud.— Adkins' 
Heirs  v.  Qrawford,  Jenkins  &  Booth, 
24  So.2d  246 — Succession  of  Raphael, 
144   So.    429,    175   La,   715—34   C.J.   p 
481  note  76  [f]. 

(2)  However,    prescription   of  one 
year  does  not  apply  to  action  to  an- 
nul confession  of  judgment  made  in 
violation  of  law  or  public  policy. — 
Cilluffa  v.    Monreale  Realty  Co.,   24 
So.2d  606— Phillips  v.  Bryan,  134  So. 
88,  172  OLa,  269. 

(3)  A  judgment  against  one  who 
has  not  been  cited  and  who  has  not 
appeared  is  a  nullity  so  that  attack 
thereon   is   not   barred  by   two-year 
prescriptive  period  relating  to  suits 
attacking    judgments    for    mere    in- 
formalities.—Dickey  v.  Pollock,  App., 
183  So.  4.8. 

In  South  Dakota 

The  code  provisions  limiting  to 
one  year  the  trial  court's  authority 
to  grant  new  trials  for  newly  discov- 
ered evidence  or  relief  from  a  judg- 
ment because  of  mistake,  inadver- 
tence, surprise,  or  excusable  neglect 
were  adopted  as  a  part  of  the  re- 
formed code  procedure  to  the  end 
that  there,  might  be  a  certain  finality 
to  judgments,  and  were  made  applic- 
able to  suits  in  equity  as  well  as  ac- 
tions at  law.— Wasem  v.  Ellens,  4  N 
W.2d  850,  68  S.D.  524. 
In  Texac 

(1)  A  direct  attack  in  equity  on  < 
judgment   is  subject  to  the  bar  o 
the  four-year  statute  of  limitations 
— Whitehurst  v.  Estes,  Civ.App.,  185 
S.W.2d  154,  error  refused — Litton  v 
Waters,    Civ.App.,    161    S.W.2d    1095 
error  refused — Laird  v.  Gulf  Produc 
tion   Co.,   Civ.App.,    64    S.W.2d   1080 
error  dismissed — Burge  v.  Broussard 
Civ.App.,  258  S.W.  502—34  C.J.  P  4S 
note  7-6   [13. 

(2)  Such  statute  applies  to  suit  t 


••acate  a  judgment  by  default  ren- 
dered on  constructive  service  by  pub- 
ication.— Snell  v.  Knowles,  Civ.App., 
7  S.W.2d  871,  error  dismissed— 
Seastrunk  v.  Kidd,  Civ.App.,  53  S. 
W.2d  678. 

(3)  Where  defendant  is  cited  by 
mblication  and  judgment  rendered, 
le  may  file  within  two  years  a  bill 

jf  review. — Texas  Co.  v.  Dunlap,  Civ. 

App.,    21    S.W.2d   707,   affirmed,  Com. 

App.,  41  S.W.2d  42,  rehearing  denied 

3  S.W.2d  92. 

(4)  A  petition  for  bill  of  review  is 
iot  a  "suit  at  law"  governed  by  four- 

/ear  statute  of  limitations,  but  is  an 
'equitable  proceeding"  governed  by 
the  rule  of  equity  relating  to  stale 
demands  and  laches.— Garcia  v. 
Jones,  Civ.App.,  155  S.W.2d  671,  er- 
ror refused. 

(5)  Statute   prohibiting   injunction 
to  stay  execution,  after  expiration  of 
one  year,  is  not  applicable,  where  in- 
iunction  is  auxiliary  to  suit  to  va- 
cate    judgment— West     v.     Dugger, 
Civ.App.,  278  S.W.  239. 

SO,  111. — Knaus  v.  Chicago  Title  & 
Trust  Co.,  7  N.E.2d  298,  *365  111. 
588. 

Md.— Fooks'   Ex'rs   v.   Ghingher,   192 
A.   782,  172  Md.  612,  certiorari  de- 
nied Phillips  v.  Ghingher,  58  -S.Ct. 
47,  302  -U.S.  726,  52  L.Ed.  561. 
Xa  Alabama 

(1)  "In  a  long  line  of  decisions 
this  court  has  declared  bills  in  equi- 
ty to  enjoin  or  cancel  judgments  at 
law  because  of  mistake,  accident,  or 
fraud,  are  bills  in  the  nature  of  bills 
of  review,  and  by  analogy,  a  limita- 
tion of  three  years  has  been  applied; 
with  proviso  that  one  year  must  be 
allowed  after  discovery  of  the  fraud 
mistake,  etc.,  upon  which  the  equity 
of  the  bill  rests." — Hatton  v.  Mose- 
ley,  156  So.  546,  547,  229  Ala.  240. 

(2)  There  are  a  number  of  cases 
which  have  held  in  accordance  with 
this  statement  of  the  rule. — Swoope 
v.  Darrow,  188  So.  879,  237  Ala.  692 
— Wynn  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  159  So 
58,  229  Ala.  639— Nichols  v.  Dill,  132 
So.   900,   222  Ala.  455— Quick  v.  Me 
Donald,   108   So.   529,   214  Ala,   587— 
34  C.J.  p  481  note  76  [a]. 

(3)  A  complainant  seeking  in  equi 
ty  to  set  aside  a  judgment  at  law 
was  not  precluded  \  by  statute  of  lim 
itations    from    maintaining    suit,    i 
she  had  good  excuse  for  delay. — Me 
Williams  v.  Martin,  188  So.  677,  23 
Ala.  <624. 

755 


1.  111.— Knaus  v.  Chicago  Title  & 
Trust  Co.,  7  N.E.2d  298,  365  111. 
588. 

Md.— Hunter  v.  Baker,  141  A.  368, 
154  Md.  307  certiorari  denied  49 
S.Ct  28,  278  U.S.  627,  T3  L.Ed.  546. 

82.  U.S.— McCampbell  v.  Warrich 
Corporation,  C.C.A.I1L,  109  F.2d 
115,  certiorari  denied  60  <S.Ct.  1077, 

310  U.S.  631,  54  L.Ed.'  1401,  rehear- 
ing denied  -61  S.Ct  55,  second  case, 

311  U.S.   612,  85  L.Ed.   388,  and  61 
S.Ct    1089,   313   U.S.   599,  «5  LuEd. 
1551. 

\la.— Miller  v.  Miller,  175  So.  284, 
234  Ala.  453 — Hatton  v.  Moseley, 
156  So.  546,  229  Ala.  240. 

Ark.— Berry  v.  Sims,  112  S.W.2d  25, 
195  Ark.  326. 

Ga.— Crane  v.  Stratton,  194  -S.E.  182, 
185  Ga.  234. 

Iowa. — Harding  v.  Quinlan,  229  N. 
W.  672,  209  Iowa  1190— Swartzen- 
druber  v.  Polke,  218  N.W.  62,  205 
Iowa  "382. 

N.M.— Caudill  v.  Caudill,  44  P.2d  724, 
39  N.M.  248. 

Ohio.— Baylor  v.  Killinger,  186  N.E. 
512,  44  Ohio  App.  523. 

S.D.— Wasem  v.  Ellens,  4  N.W.2d  850, 
68  S.D.  524. 

Tex. — Jones  v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  153  S. 
W.2d  571,  137  Tex.  353— White- 
hurst  v.  Estes,  Civ.App.,  185  S.W. 
2d  154,  error  refused — Litton  v. 
Waters,  Civ.App.,  161  S.W.2d  1095, 
error  refused — Snell  v.  Knowles, 
Civ.App.,  87  S.W.2d  871,  error  dis- 
missed— First  Texas  Joint  Stock 
Land  Bank  of  Houston  v.  Webb, 
Civ.App.,  82  S.W.2d  159,  error  dis- 
missed. 

Proceeding-  held  taronglit  within  time 

Ga. — Longshore  v.  Collier,  140  S.E. 
636,  37  Ga.App.  450,  followed  in 
Reddy-Waldhauer-Maffett  Co.  v. 
Cranman,  153  S.E.  616,  41  Ga.App. 
563. 

y. — Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  of 
New  York  v.  Myers,  109  S.W.2d 
1194,  270  Ky.  523. 

83.  Tex. — Trammel!  v.  Chamberlain, 
128  S.W.  429,  60  Tex.Civ.Ap-p.  238. 

34  C.J.  p  481  note  77. 

84.  Iowa. — Lumpkin  v.  Snook,  19  N. 
W.  333,  63  Iowa  515. 

Wash. — Denny-Renton  Clay  &  Coal 
Co.  v.  Sartori,  151  P.  1088,  87 
Wash.  545. 

35.  Kan,— Hentig  v.  Sweet,  27  Kan. 
172. 


§  379 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


limitations  do  not  begin  to  run  until  after  the  dis- 
covery of  the  fraud,86  and,  even  in  the  absence  of 
specific  provision,  lapse  of  the  statutory  period  does 
not  bar  suit  under  such  circumstances;87  but  suit 
may88  and  should89  be  brought  within  a  reasonable 
time  after  discovery  of  the  fraud.  Knowledge  of 
the  fraud,  with  respect  to  running  of  the  statute  of 
limitations,  may  be  constructive,90  and  may  be  im- 
puted to  a  party  deriving  his  claim  from  one  who 
had  knowledge.91  Under  some  statutes  ignorance 
of  the  judgment,93  or  of  the  alleged  mistake,  neg- 
lect, or  omission  rendering  the  judgment  voida- 
ble,93 will  not  extend  the  running  of  the  statute 
beyond  the  statutory  period,  and,  in  any  case,  pas- 
sage of  the  twenty-year  period  of  prescription  may 
preclude  attack  on  a  judgment  regardless  of  when 
the  alleged  fraud  was  discovered.94  In  case  of  a 


person  under  disability,  the  limitation  begins  to  run 
from  the  removal  of  the  disability.95 

It  is  generally  held  that,  where  a  judgment  or 
decree  is  utterly  void,  suit  for  equitable  relief 
against  its  enforcement  may  be  brought  at  any  time 
regardless  of  the  statute  of  limitations.96 

§  380.    Defenses 

Any  ground  destructive  of  the  plaintiff's  equity  may 
constitute  a  defense  to  a  bill  for  equitable  relief  against 
a  judgment. 

A  bill  for  an  injunction  against  a  judgment  may 
be  defended  on  any  ground  destructive  of  the  eq- 
uity set  up  by  complainant,97  and  his  negligence 
may  sometimes  preclude  the  granting  of  relief.98 
The  judgment  attacked  may  not  be  pleaded  as  a  bar 
or  as  res  judicata.99  A  transfer  of  plaintiff's  inter- 


as.    Cal. — Antonsen   v.    Pacific   -Con- 
tainer  Co.,    120    P.2d    148,    48   Cal. 
App.2d  535. 
La. — Hanson  v.  Haynes,  App.,  171  So. 

146. 

34  C.J.  p  481  note  80. 
When,  fraud  perpetrated 

Where  note  containing  confession 
of  judgment  was  not  to  be  presented 
for  collection  until  after  maker's 
death,  fraud  was  perpetrated  against 
maker  only  on  institution  of  suit  on 
note  and  rendition  of  executory  judg- 
ment therein  during  maker's  life- 
time, and  not  from  date  of  execu- 
tion of  note,  as  regards  question  of 
prescription. — Hanson  v.  Hayn.js,  La. 
App.,  170  So.  257,  rehearing  denied 
171  So.  146. 
Disclosure  of 

Under  (Louisiana  statute  requiring 
that  suit  for  declaration  of  nullity 
of  judgment  because  of  fraud  be 
brought  within  one  year  from  dis- 
covery of  fraud,  suit  in  federal  court 
to  set  aside  mortgage  foreclosure 
„  sale  on  ground  of  fraud  could  not  be 
maintained  when  filed  more  than  a 
year  after  suit  in  state  court  disclos- 
ing full  knowledge  of  the  alleged 
fraud. — McCrory  v.  Harp,  D.C.La,,  31 
•F.Supp.  "354. 

87.  Wash.— Bates  v.  Glaser,  227  P. 
15,  130  Wash.  328. 

88.  Wash. — Bates  v.   Glaser,   supra. 

89.  Iowa, — Reppert  v,   Reppert.  241 
N.W.  487,  214  Iowa  17. 

90.  Okl. — Caraway  v.  Overholser,  77 
P.2d  688;  182  Okl.  357. 

91.  La. — Jackson  v.  Florsheim  Bros. 
Dry  Goods  Co.,  131  So.  725,  171  La. 
605. 

92.  Kan. — Irrigation  .Loan  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Oswald,  176  P.  134,  103  Kan. 
676. 

93.  Ohio.— Baylor   v.   Killinger,   186 
N.B.  512,  44  Ohio  App.  523. 


94.  Ala.— Bailey    v.    Bond,    185    So. 
411.  237  Ala.  59. 

95.  Okl.— Miller  v.  White,  265  P.  646, 
129  Okl.  184. 

34  C.J.  p  481  note  82. 
Supervening-  disability 

The  disability  existing  at  time  de- 
cree was  entered  determines  right  of 
party  to  decree  to  institute  action 
questioning  validity  of  decree  within 
two  years  after  such  disability  is  re- 
moved, and  no  supervening  disabil- 
ity can  be  tacked  onto  former  dis- 
ability in  computing  time  within 
which  direct  attack  can  be  made  on 
decree. — McCampbell  v.  Warrich  Cor- 
poration, C.C.A.I1L,  109  F.2d  115,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  60  S.Ct.  1077,  310  U.S. 
631,  84  L.Ed.  1401,  rehearing  denied 
61  S.Ct.  55,  second  case,  311  U.S.  612, 
85  L.Ed.  388,  and  61  S.Qt.  1089,  313 
U.S.  599,  85  L.Ed.  1551. 

96.  Md. — Fooks'    EJx'rs    v.    Ghinger, 
192  A.   782,  172  Md.  612,  certiorari 
denied  Phillips  v.  Ghinger,  58  S.Ct. 
47,  302  U.S.  726,  82  L.Bd.  561. 

Wash. — In  re   Randall's  Estate,   113 

P.2d  54,  8  Wash.2d  ^622. 
lack  of  service 

Statutory  limitation  on  proceed- 
ings to  set  aside  Judgments  was  in- 
applicable, where  attack  on  judg- 
ment is  based  on  ground  that  Judg- 
ment is  void  for  lack  of  service. — 
Strickland  v.  Willingham,  175  S.E. 
605;  49  Ga.App.  355. 

97.  U.S. — Benjamin  Schwarz  &  Sons 
v.  Kennedy,  C.C.Or.,  156  F.  316. 

Waiver  of  right  to  equitable  relief 
against  judgment  see  supra  §§  341, 
343. 

Matters  constituting-  defense 
(1)  Generally. 

Ohio. — Briggs  v.  Hutson,  160  N.E. 
860,  27  Ohio  App.  93,  affirmed  Hut- 
son  v.  Briggs,  165  N.E.  534,  120 
Ohio  St.  58. 

Tex— Smith  v.  Lockhart,  Civ.App., 
177  S.W.2d  117. 

756 


(2)  Order,  on  motion  for  new  tri- 
al, overruling  contention  that  judg- 
ment was  recovered  on  perjured  tes- 
timony, could  be  pleaded  in  bar  of 
action  to  set  aside  judgment.  —  Pucek 
v.  Koppa,  Tex.Civ.App.,  32  S.W.2d 
248. 


not  constituting'  defense 

(1)  Generally. 

Ark.—  Holthoff  v.  State  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  Wellston,  Mo..  186  S.W.2d 
162,  208  Ark.  307. 

Or.  —  Maywood  Inv.  Co.  v.  Blair,  64 
F.2d'  1W  155  Or.  -696. 

34  C.J.  p  481  note  83  [a]. 

(2)  Subsequent  discharge  in  bank- 
ruptcy of  judgment  creditor  who  did 
not  schedule  judgment  among  assets 
was  no  defense  to  bill,  filed  before 
judgment  creditor  received  his  dis- 
charge,   to    enjoin    enforcement    of 
judgment  because  of  fraudulent  as- 
signment   and    bankruptcy    proceed- 
ing   to    prevent    offset  —  Dickey    v. 
Turner,  C.C.A.Tenn.,  4*9  F.2d  998. 

<3)  Heirs  joining  in  petition  to  be 
placed  in  possession  of  intestate's 
property  were  not  estopped  to  sue 
for  reformation  of  Judgment  there- 
on where  petition  provided  that  no 
one  should  be  estopped  or  bound  by 
proceedings  thereon,  with  certain 
exceptions.  —  Succession  of  Williams, 
121  So.  171,  168  La.  1. 

98.  Wis.—  Kiel  v.  Scott  &  Williams, 
202  N.W.  672,  186  Wis.  416. 

Neglect  of  party  or  negligence  of 
counsel  as  excuse  for  not  defend- 
ing at  law  see  supra  §§  '367,  368. 

Negligence  resulting  in  loss  of  rem- 
edy* at  law  as  affecting  right  to  ra- 
lief  see  supra  $  343. 

99.  La.  —  Couret  v.  Couret  1*8  So.2d 
661,   206   La.   85—  Haley  v.  Woods, 
113  So.  144,  163  La.  911—  Quinn  v. 
Brown,  105  So.  624,  159  (La.  570. 

34  C.J.  p  482  note  84. 

Res  judicata  see  infra  $$  592-848. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


381 


^st,  pending  a  suit  to  set  aside  a  judgment  in  par- 
tition on  the  ground  of  fraud,  may  not  be  pleaded  in 
of  the  proceeding.1 


Laches 


§381. 


A  party  seeking  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment 
must  act  with  reasonable  promptness  or  his  suit  may 
toe  barred  by  laches,  especially  where  the  rights  of  other 
persons  have  been  prejudiced  by  the  delay;  but  delay 
due  to  legal  disability,  ignorance  of  the  facts,  or  pur- 
.suit  of  other  remedies  generally  does  not  constitute 
Jaches. 
One  who  desires  to  invoke  the  assistance  of  eq- 


uity  as  against  a  judgment  at  law  must  act  with 
reasonable  promptness,  and  relief  will  not  be  grant- 
ed to  a  complainant  who  has  delayed  his  application 
to  equity,  without  adequate  excuse,  for  such  a  con- 
siderable period  of  time  as  to  be  chargeable  with 
laches,2  especially  where  the  situation  of  the  ad- 
verse party  has  changed  to  his  disadvantage,3  or 
where  the  rights  of  innocent  third  persons  have 
intervened,4  as  where  the  judgment  has  been  col- 
lected by  execution  and  title  to  real  estate  would  be 
invalidated  by  the  setting  aside  of  the  judgment.5 
However,  the  court  has  a  large  discretion  as  to  the 


1.    Iowa,— Wright  v.  Meek,  3  Greene 
472. 

fl<  U.S.— Chase  Nat.  Bank  v.  City  of 
Norwalk,  Ohio,  54  S.Ct.  475,  291 
US  431,  78  L.Ed.  894— Morse  v. 
Lewis,  C.C.A.W.Va.,  54  F.2d  1027, 
-certiorari  denied  52  S.Ct.  640,  286 
U.S.  557,  76  L.Ed.  1291— Ha2ard  v. 
Park,  C.C.A.Colo.,  294  F.  40. 
Ala.— McWilliams  v.  Martin,  188  So. 

677,  237  Ala.  624. 

yia.— Columbus  Hotel  Corporation  v. 

Hotel  Management  Co.,  156  So.  893, 

116  Fla.  464 — Adams  v.  Reynolds. 

134  So.  45,  101  Fla,  271. 

1U. — Hintz    v.   Moldenhauer,    243   111. 

App.  227. 

X,a.— First  Nat.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell, 

141  So    379,  174  La.  692 — Roque  v. 

Henry,   App.,    189    So.   358— Surety 

Credit  Co.  v.  Bauer,  1  La.App.  285. 

Mich.— Barr  v.  Payne,  298  N.W.  460, 

298  Mich.  85. 
Minn.— -Bloomquist  v.  Thomas,   9  N. 

W.2d  337,  215  Minn,  35. 
3£iss. — Lainar    v.    Houston,    184    So. 
293,  183  Miss.  260— Cratin  v.  Cra- 
tin,  174  So.  255,  178  Miss.  881. 
Ho.— Kingshighway    Bridge    Co.    v. 

Farrell,  App.,  136  S.W.2d  335. 
Neb.— Lindstrom  v.   Nilsson,   274  N. 

W.  485,  132  Neb.  184. 

N.J — Cameron    v.    Penn    Mut.    Life 

Ins.    Co.,    173   A.    344,    116   N.J.Eq. 

311 — Etz  v.  Weinmann,  150  A.  436, 

106    N.J.Bq.    209— Shields   v.   Cape 

May  Real  Estate  Co.,  135  A.  669,  5 

N.J.Misc.  92,  affirmed,  Err.  &  App., 

Shields  v.  Cape  May  Realty  Estate 

Co.,   143  A.   919,  105  N.J.Law  247, 

Pa.— Bailey  v.    Bailey,    12   A.2d  577 

338    Pa.    221— Di  Trolio  v.   Parisi 

176  A.  733,  317  Pa.  507. 

R.I.— Gilbane    v.    Union    Trust    Co., 

118  A.  577. 

Tex.— Whitehurst  v.  Estes,  Civ.App. 
185    S.W.2d    154,    error    refused- 
Thomas   v.    Mullins,   Civ.App.,    175 
*     S.W.2d  276— Litton  v.  Waters,  Civ 
App.,    161    S.W.2d   1095,    error   re 
fused— Garcia   v.    Jones,    Civ.App. 
155    S.W.2d    671,    error    refused — 
Floyd  v.   Eggleston,  Civ.App.,    13" 
S.W.2d   182,   error  refused,   certio 
rari  denied  61  S.Ct   314,   311  TJ.S 
708,  85  L.Ed.  460,  rehearing  denied 
61  S.Ct.  609,  312  U.S.  713,  85  L.Bd 
1143— -Dunlap  v.  Villareal,  Civ.App. 


91   S.W.2d  1124— Bryan  v.  Jacoby, 

Civ.App.,    11    S.W.2d   373— Kahl   v. 

Porter,  Civ.App.,  296  S.W.  324. 
Vash.— Fisch  v.  Marler,  97  P.2d  147, 

1  Wash.2d  698. 
,4  C.J.  p  482  note  85—24  C.J.  p  888 

note  86. 
Laches  generally  see  Equity  §§  112- 

132. 

"The  question  of  laches  on  the 
part  of  the  petitioner  will  be  deter- 
mined largely  on  the  question  as  to 
whether  the  parties  have  changed 
their  position  irrevocably  or  rights 
of  innocent  third  parties  have  inter- 
vened, and,  while  laches  alone  will 
not  necessarily  defeat  such  action, 
it  may  under  the  circumstances  of 
the  individual  case  justify  the  court 
in  denying  relief."— Fernow  v.  Fer- 
now, 247  P.  106,  107,  114  Okl.  298. 

Delay  held  laches 

(1)  Fifty  years. — Barnes  v.  Boyd, 
C.C.A.W.Va.,    73   F.2d    910,   certiorari 
denied  55  S.Ct.  550,  294  U.S.  723,  79 
L.Ed.  1254,  rehearing  denied  55  S.Ct. 
647,  295  U.S.  768,  79  L.Ed.  1708. 

(2)  Twenty   years. — Scully   v.    Co- 
lonial Trust  Co.,  147  A.  776,  105  N.J. 
Eq.    309—34   C.J.   p  482   note   85    [a] 
(3). 

(3)  Fifteen      years.— Metzger      v. 
Horn,  143  N.E.  408,  312  111.  173. 

(4)  Eleven  years.— Craig  v.  Black, 
229   N.W.  411,  249  Mich.  485. 

(5)  Ten  years. — Swoope  v.  Darrow, 
188  So.  879,  237  Ala.   692—34  C.J.  ~ 
482  note  85  [a]  (5). 

(6)  Five  years.— Walling  v.  Lebb, 
15  P.2d  370,  140  Or.  691—34  C.J.  482 
note  85  [a]  (9). 

(7)  Four  years.— Kiel   v.   Scott   & 
Williams,  202  N.W.  672,  186  Wis.  415. 

(8)  Three  years. 

Ark.— Horn    v.    Hull,    275    S.W.    905 

169  Ark.  463. 
Or.— Olsen  v.  Crow,  290  P.  233,  133 

Or.  310. 
34  OJ.  P  482  note  85   [a]   (10). 

(9)  One  year. 

Cal.— Rudy  v.  Slotwinsky,  238  P.  783 

73  Cal. App.  459. 
Mont— St  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins 

Co.    v.    Freeman,    260    P.    124,    8' 

Mont.  266. 

757 


(10)  Other  periods   see   34    C.J.   P 
82  note  85  [a]. 
Failure  to  join  in  previous  suits 

Suit   to   set  aside  judgments   was 
not  maintainable  where  plaintiff,  al- 
hough    knowing   of    previous    suits 
wrought   for  same  relief  by  parties 
having  same  interest  which,  if  suc- 
cessful,     would     have      established 
plaintiff's  rights,  did  not  join  therein 
nit  waited  until  previous  suits  were 
adversely      determined. — Barnes      v. 
Boyd,  D.C.W.Va.,   8  F.Supp.  584,  af- 
firmed, C.C.A.,  73  F.2d  910,  certiorari 
denied  55  S.Ct  550,  294  U.S.  723,  79 
L.Ed.  1254,  rehearing  denied  55  S.Ct. 
647,  295  U.S.  768,  79  L.Ed.  1708. 
3.    Ark. — Thornton  v.  Commonwealth 
Federal  Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n,  152 
S.W.2d  304,  202  Ark.  670. 
111.— South  East  Nat   Bank  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Board  of  Education  of  City 
of  Chicago,  18  N.E.2d  599,  298  111. 
App.  621— South  East  Nat.  Bank  of 
Chicago  v.  Board  of  Education  of 
City  of  Chicago,  18  N.E.2d  601,  298 
IlLApp.  621— South  East  Nat  Bank 
of  Chicago  v.  Board  of  Education 
of  City  of  Chicago,  18  N.E.2d  602, 
298  IlLApp.   621— South  East  Nat. 
Bank  of  Chicago  v.  Board  of  Edu- 
cation of  City  of  Chicago,  18  N.E. 
2d    603,     298    IlLApp.     621— South 
East    Nat.    Bank    of    Chicago    v. 
Board  of  Education  of  City  of  Chi- 
cago,   18    N.E.2d   584,    298   IlLApp. 
92. 
Mich.— Craig  v.  Black,  229  N.W.  411, 

249  Mich.  485. 
Okl.— Fernow  v.  Fernow.  247  P.  106, 

114  Okl.  298. 
34  C.J.  p  482  note  86. 
4.    Ind. — Indiana  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bird,    18    N.E.    837,    116    Ind.    217, 
9  Am.S.R.  842 — Dausman  v.  Daus- 
mah,   33   N.B.2d  775,   110   Ind.App. 
238. 

Miss. — Lamar    v.    T'ouston,.   184    So. 
293,  183  Miss.  260. 
kl. — Fernow  v.  Fernow,  247  P.  106, 
114  Okl.  298. 
RJ.— Gilbane  v.  Union  Trust  Co.,  118 

A.  577.' 

5-    Ark. — Jackson  v.  Becktold  Print- 
ing &  Book  Mfg.  Co.,  112  S.W.  161, 
86  Ark.  591,   20  L.R.A.,N.SM  454. 
Pa.— Gould  v. 'Randal,  81  A.  809,  232 
Pa.  612. 


§  381 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


lapse  of  time  which  will  show  laches,6  and  a  suit 
will  not  be  barred  for  mere  delay,  in  the  absence  of 
other  elements  of  laches,7  as  where  it  is  not  shown 
that  other  persons  were  prejudiced  by  such  delay.8 
Accordingly,  where  plaintiff  acts  within  a  reason- 
able time,  considering  the  circumstances  of  the 
case,  he  will  not  be  barred  by  laches  from  seeking 
relief.9  Ordinarily  laches  is  not  imputable  to  a 
complainant  who  takes  all  the  time  which  the  stat- 
ute allows  him,10  but  under  certain  circumstances 
laches  may  operate  to  bar  suit  prior  to  the  run- 
ning of  the  statutory  period,11  as  where  the  delay 
has  been  such  as  to  justify  the  presumption  that 
defendant  may  have  been  prejudiced  thereby.12 

However  great  the  lapse  of  time  since  the  rendi- 
tion of  the  judgment,  applicant  is  not  to  be  charged 
with  laches  where  he  was  ignorant  of  its  existence, 


or  of  his  defenses  against  it,  and  acts  promptly  aft- 
er discovering  the  facts;13  nor  is  laches  imputable 
to  a  party  who,  during  the  interval,  has  been  con- 
testing the  validity  of  the  judgment  in  the  courts  of 
law  or  attempting  to  obtain  relief  against  it  in  oth- 
er proceedings.14  One  against  whom  a  void  judg- 
ment has  been  rendered  will  not  be  estopped  by  lach- 
es to  seek  relief  from  such  judgment  at  any  time;15 
and,  with  respect  to  laches  in  seeking  correction  of 
a  decree  in  partition,  one  in  peaceable  possession  of 
realty  under  a  claim  of  right  may  rest  in  security 
until  his  title  or  possession  is  attacked.16 

Person  under  legal  disability.  As  a  rule  laches  is 
not  imputable  to  a  person  while  he  is  under  legal 
disability,17  but  in  some  circumstances  the  laches  of 
a  parent  or  guardian  may  be  imputable  to  a  mi- 
18 


nor.A 


6.  Tex.— Wright     v.     "Wright,     Civ. 
App.,  55  S.W.2d  578. 

7.  NX—Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co, 
v.    Tarnowski,    20    JL2d    421,    130 
N.J.Eq.  1. 

Tex. — Ramsey  v.  McKamey,  152  S.W. 

2d  322,  137  Tex.  91. 

Ordinary  rales  as  to  diligence  in 
moving  for  new  trial  and  appealing 
from  judgment  have  been  held  not  to 
apply  to  statutory  bill  of  review. — 
Stillwell  v.  Standard  Savings  &  Loan 
Ass'n,  Tex.Civ.App.,  30  S.W.2d  690, 
error  dismissed. 

8.  Cal.— Hallett    v.    Slaughter,    140 
P.2d  3,  22  Cal.2d  552. 

Fla. — MacKay  v.  Bacon,  20  So.2d  904, 

155  Fla.  577. 
Twenty-three  yean 

The  fact  that  mutual  mistake  con- 
cerning size  of  tract  partitioned  was 
not  discovered  for  twenty-three 
years  after  entry  of  judgment  in 
partition  proceeding  did  not  preclude 
the  granting  of  repartition  of  the 
land  in  order  to  correct  the  mistake, 
in  absence  of  intervening  rights  of 
third  persons. — Ramsey  v.  McKam- 
ey, 152  S.W.2d  322,  137  Tex.  91. 

9.  Ark. — Kersh  Lake  Drainage  Dial, 
v.  Johnson,  157  S.W.2d  39,  203  Ark. 
315,    certiorari    denied   Johnson   v. 
Kersh  Lake  Drainage  Dist,   62  S. 
Ct.    1044,    316    U.S.    673,    86    L.Ed. 
1748. 

Ga. — Turner  v.  Koske,  160  S.B.  398, 

173  Ga.  390. 
Minn. — Bloomquist  v.  Thomas,  9  N. 

W.2d  337,  215  Minn.  35. 
N.J.— Di     Paola    v.     Trust    Co.     of 

Orange,  156  A.  439,  109  N.J.Eq.  80. 
Okl.— Wheeler  v.  BIgheart,  43  P,2d 

1028,  172  Okl.  262— Fernow  v.  Fer- 

now,  247  P.  106,  114  Okl.  298. 
Wis. — Nehring   v.    Niemerowic^   276 

N.W.  325.  226  Wis.  285* 

State  cannot  be  barred  of  right 
of  action  by  laches. — Application  of 


Title  &  Guaranty  Co.  of  Bridgeport 
to  Change  Name  to  Bankers'  Securi- 
ty Trust  Co..  145  A.  151,  109  Conn. 
45. 

10.  Iowa. — Independent  School  Dist 
v.  Schreiner,  46  Iowa  172. 

Equitable  defense 

In  absence  of  statutory  duty  to  in- 
terpose an  equitable  defense  in  an 
action  at  law,  it  is  not  necessarily 
"laches"  for  a  defendant  having  such 
a  defense  to  wait  deliberately  until 
judgment  at  law  has  been  rendered 
against  him  and  then  bring  a  suit 
to  restrain  enforcement  of  judgment. 
— Liberty  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hathaway 
Baking  Co.,  28  N.E.2d  425,  306  Mass. 
428. 
Other  remedy 

One  against  whom  judgment  is 
rendered  may  proceed,  under  statute 
or  in  equity,  for  rehearing  on  ground 
of  want  of  notice  or  knowledge  of 
pendency  of  suit,  or  fraud  prevent- 
ing defense,  and  is  not  guilty  of 
laches  in  filing  bill,  without  having 
sought  to  avail  herself  of  such  stat- 
ute.— Alabama  Chemical  Co.  v.  Hall, 
101  So.  456,  212  Ala.  8. 

11.  Tex.— Williams  v.  Coleman-Ful- 
ton   Pasture  Co.,  Civ. App.,   157  S. 
W.2d  995,  error  refused. 

12.  Cal. — Ex-Mission  Land  &  Water 
Co.    v.    Flash,    32    P.    600,    97   Cal. 
610. 

Miss. — Lamar  v.  Houston,  184  So. 
293,  183  Miss.  260. 

13. '  Cal. — Antonsen  v.  Pacific  Con- 
tainer Co.,  120  P.2d  148,  48  Cal. 
App.2d  535. 

111. — Reisman  v.  Central  Mfg.  Dist. 
Bank,  15  N.E.2d  903,  296  IlLApp. 
61. 

34  C.J.  p  482  note  91. 

14.  Ark. — Parker  v.  Nixon,  44  S.W. 
2d  1088,  184  Ark.  1085. 

758 


Cal. — Cadenasso  v.  Bank  of  Italy,   6 

P.2d  944,  214  Cal.  562. 
34  C.J.  p  482  note  93. 

15.  Cal.— Gray  v.  Hall,   265   P.  246, 
203  Cal.  306. 

Iowa. — Cooley    v.    Barker,    98    NWV> 

289,  122  Iowa  440,  101  Am.S.R.  276. 
La. — Franek  v.  Turner,  114  So.  14  S, 

164  La.  532 — Frank  v.  Currie,  App., 

172  So.  843. 
Pa.— In  re  Galli's  Estate,  17  A.2d  899, 

340  Pa.  561. 
Judgment   rendered  without   service 

Mere  knowledge  of  pendency  of 
suit  placed  no  duty  to  act  on  defend- 
ant who  could  rely  on  statute  pro- 
viding that  no  judgment  shall  be 
rendered  against  defendant  without 
service,  as  respects  laches  barring 
suit  to  vacate  default  Judgment 
against  defendant — Panhandle  Const. 
Co.  v.  Casey,  Tex. Civ. App.,  66  S.W. 
2d  705,  error  refused. 

16.  N.J. — Crandol   v.    Garrison,    169 
A.  507,  115  N.J.Bq.  11. 

17.  Tex. — Garza    v.    Kenedy,    Com. 
App.,   299  S.W.  231,  rehearing  de- 
nied 5  S.W.2d  xx. 

34  C.J.  p  482  note  92. 

An  insane  person  is  not  guilty  of 
laches. 
Ala. — Edmondson    v.    Jones,    85    So. 

799,  204  Ala.  133. 
Mo. — Crow  v.  Crow-Humphrey,  73  S. 

W.2d  807,  335  Mo.  636. 

18.  U.S.— Morse  v.  Lewte,  C.C.A.W. 
Va.,  54  F.2d  1027,  certiorari  denied 
52    S.Ct    640,    286   U.S.    557,    76   L. 
Ed.  1291. 

Claim  derived  from  parent 

One  suing  to  set  aside  judgments 
confirming  arbitrators'  award  of  land 
was  chargeable  with  her  mother's 
laches,  although  plaintiff  was  non- 
^esident  infant  at  time  of  arbitration 
*nd  knew  nothing  thereof  until 
shortly  before  bringing  suit,  where 
•JaintifTs  claim  was  derived  from 
her.  mother. — Morse  v.  Lewis,  supra. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


382 


Suit  by  person  not  a  party  to  judgment.  Gener- 
ally the  rule  that  an  action  for  equitable  relief 
against  a  judgment  must  be  diligently  pursued  with- 
in a  reasonable  time  after  rendition  of  a  judgment 
does  not  apply  where  relief  is  sought  by  one  not  a 
party  or  privy  to  the  judgment  involved,19  but  one 
deriving  his  claim  of  right  from  a  party  to  the  judg- 
ment who  was  guilty  of  laches  may  be  barred  there- 
by from  seeking  relief.20 

§  382.    Jurisdiction  of  Particular  Courts 

Equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  may  be  sought 
only  in  a  court  having  the  requisite  power  and  author- 
ity, and,  while  usually  it  is  proper  to  sue  in  the  court 
-which  rendered  the  judgment,  suit  in  another  court  of 
concurrent  or  equal  jurisdiction  is  permitted  In  some 
states;  and  a  federal  court  may  in  a  s.uit  within  its 
jurisdiction  grant  relief  against  a  void  Judgment  of  a 
state  court. 

As  a  general  rule,  equitable  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment may  be  sought  only  in  a  court  having  the  pow- 


er and  authority  to  consider  such  an  application,22 
and  ordinarily,  if  the  court  which  rendered  the 
judgment  has  equitable  powers,  it  is  proper  to  bring 
suit  in  that  court  to  enjoin  or  set  aside  the  judg- 
ment22 

In  some  states  it  is  generally  the  rule,  that  any 
court  of  equitable  powers,  having  jurisdiction  of 
the  parties  and  the  subject  matter,  may  enjoin  the 
enforcement  of  a  judgment,  although  it  was  ren- 
dered by  a  court  of  concurrent  or  equal  jurisdic- 
tion,23 and,  where  this  rule  prevails,  a  court  of 
chancery  jurisdiction  may  enjoin  a  judgment  ob- 
tained in  another  chancery  court,24  or  in  the  su- 
preme court  of  the  state,25  or  even  in  a  court  in 
another  state.26  In  other  jurisdictions,  either  by 
statute  or  settled  practice,  a  suit  to  enjoin  a  judg- 
ment must  be  brought  in  the  same  court  which  ren- 
dered it,  and  will  not  -be  entertained  by  another 
court  of  coordinate  jurisdiction,27  unless  such  judg- 


13U    U.S.— Chase   Nat.   Bank  v.   City 
of    Norwalk,    Ohio,    54    S.Ct    475, 
291  U.S.  431,  78  L.Ed.  894. 
20.    U.S.— Barnes    v.    Boyd,    D.C.W. 
Va.,  8  F.Supp.  584,  affirmed,  C.C.A., 
73    F.2d    910,    certiorarl   denied   55 
S.Ct    550,    294    U.S.    723,    79    L.Ed. 
1254,  rehearing  denied  55  S.Ct.  647, 
295    U.S.    768,    79    L.Ed.    1708. 
31.    La. — McClelland       v.       District 
Household  of  Ruth,  App.,  151  So. 
246. 
?*.M.— Vermejo  Club  v.  French,  85  P. 

2d  90,  43  N.M.  45. 

N.Y.— Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Dela- 
ware &  H.  Co.,  264  N.Y.S.  470,  238 
App.Div.  191. 

Or. — McLean  v.  Sanders,  23  P.2d  321, 
143  Or.  524,  followed  in  Conrad  v. 
Sanders,   23  P.2d  323,   143  Or.  531. 
«rex. — Petroleum  Corporation  v.  Rod- 
den,  Civ.App..   139   S.W.2d  218. 
Jurisdiction: 

Generally  see  supra  §  342. 
Of  courts  of  particular  states  gen- 
erally see  Courts  §§  249-297. 
Court  held  to  have  jurisdiction 
tu.— Louis  B.  Bower,  Inc.,  v.  Silver- 
stein,    13   N.E.2d    385,    298   Ill.App. 
145. 
Mich.— McFarlane  v.  McFarlane,  293 

N.W.  895,  294  Mich.  648. 
Ohio.— Young   v.    Guella,    35    N.E.2d 

997,  67  Ohio  App.  11. 
Judgment  made  final  by  statute 

The  county  court  was  without  ju 
risdiction  to  issue  injunction  re- 
straining enforcement  of  county 
court's  final  judgment  in  forcible  de- 
tainer proceeding  which  was  insti- 
tuted in  justice  court  and  appealed 
to  county  court,  notwithstanding  no- 
tice of  appeal  was  not  given  as  re- 
quired by  statute,  where  county 
court's  judgment  on  appeal  from 
forcible  detainer  proceeding  institut- 
ed in  justice  court  was  made  final 


by  statute,—  Urbanec   v.   Jezik,   Tex. 
Uiv.App.,  138  S.W.2d  1098. 

22.  U.S.  —  Torquay  Corporation  v. 
Radio  Corporation  of  America,  IXC. 
N.Y.,  2  F.Supp.  841. 

Cal.  —  Cadenasso  v.  Bank  of  Italy,  6 
P.2d  944,  214  Cal.  562—  Tomb  v. 
Tomb,  7  P.2d  1104,  120  Cal.App. 
438. 

La.—  Pullen  v.  Pullen,  109  So.  400, 
161  La,  721. 

N.D.  —  Lamb  v.  Northern  Imp.  Co.,  3 
N.W.2d  77,  71  N.D.  481. 

Tex.  —  Texas  Employers'  Ass'n  v. 
Cashion,  Civ.App.,  130  S.W.2d  1112, 
error  refused  —  Elder  v.  Byrd-Frost, 
Inc.,  Civ.App.,  110  S.W.2d  172— 
Shipman  v.  Wright,  Civ.App.,  288 
S.W.  281  —  Home  Ben.  Ass'n  of 
Henderson  County  v.  Boswell,  Civ. 
App.,  268  S.W.  979. 
Municipal  courts  have  the  same 

jurisdiction  as  equity  courts  to  set 

aside  judgments  on  ground  of  fraud. 

—  Louis    E.    Bower,    Inc.,    v.    Silver- 
stein,  18  N.E.2d  385,  298  Ill.App.  145. 
Transfer  of  cause 

Where  suit  to  vacate  district  court 
judgment  was  properly  filed  in  that 
court  and  legally  transferred  to  an- 
other district  court,  such  other  dis- 
trict court  had  jurisdiction  to  try  is- 
sues.— Snell  v.  Knowles,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  87  S.W.2d  871,  error  dismissed 

—  Brox    v.    Kelly,    Tex.Civ.App.,    87 
S.W.2d    753,    error   dismissed   agree- 
ment. 

23.     Miss.—  Rockett    v.    Finley,     184 

So.  78,  183  Miss.  308. 
Ohio.  —  Young   v.    Guella,    35    N.E.2d 
-  997,  ,67  Ohio  App.  11. 
34  C.J.  p  483  note  96. 


(1)  It  has  been  held  that  the  fact 
that  a  fraudulent  judgment  was  ob- 
tained in  one  court  does  not  deprive 

759 


other  courts  of  general  and  equal 
Jurisdiction  from  exercising  their 
equity  powers  to  annul  it — Bullard 
v.  Zimmerman,  268  P.  512,  82  Mont. 
434. 

(2)  It  has  also  been  said,  however, 
that  one  court  is  without  power  to 
nterfere  with  the  judgments  of  an- 
other court  of  concurrent  Jurisdic- 
tion unless  the  court  in  which  the 
suit  is  pending  cannot  for  lack  of 
jurisdiction  grant  the  .relief  desired. 
— Beck  v.  Fransham,  53  P.  96,  21 
Mont  117. 

24.  Tenn. — Douglass    v.    Joyner,     1 
Baxt  32. 

25.  Ga.— Wade   v.   Watson,    66    S.E. 
922,  133  Ga.  608. 

34  C.J.  p  483  note  98. 

28.    N.Y.— Davis  v.  Cornue,   45   N.E. 

449,  151  N.Y.  172. 
34  C.J.  p  483  note  99. 

37.  I1L — Simmons  v.  Hefter,  139  N. 
E.  404,  308  111.  292— American  Ry. 
Express  Co.  v.  Murphy,  234  111. 
App.  346. 

Ky.— Davis  v.  Caudill,  92  S.W.2d  62, 
263  Ky.  214— Davis  v.  Davis,  10 
Bush  274. 

Mass. — Town  of  Hopkinton  v.  B.  F. 
Sturtevant  Co.,  189  N.E.  107,  285 
Mass.  272. 

Tex. — Waples  Platter  Co.  v.  Miller, 
Civ.App.,  139  S.W.2d  833^-Duncan 
Coffee  Co.  v.  Wilson,  Civ.App.,  139 
S.W.2d  327,  error  dismissed — Tex- 
as Employers'  Ass'n  v.  Cashion, 
Civ.App.,  130  S.W.2d  1112,- error 
refused — Brox  v.  Kelly,  Civ.App., 
87  S.W.2d  753,  error  dismissed 
agreement— Landa  v.  Bogle,  Civ. 
App.,  62  S.W.2d  579,  set  aside  on 
other  grounds  Bogle  v.  Landa,  94 
S.W.2d  154,  127  Tex.  317— Halbrook 
v.  Quinn,  Civ.App.,  286  S.W.  954, 
certified  questions  dismissed  Quinn 


§  382 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ment  is  void  and  its  invalidity  is  apparent  on  the 
face  of  the  record,28  or  the  enforcement  of  the 
judgment  is  sought  to  be  restrained  for  some  pur- 
pose collateral  to  the  subsequent  suit,29  or  it  ap- 
pears that  the  court  rendering  the  judgment  is  un- 
able by  reason  of  its  limited  jurisdiction  to  afford 
the  relief  sought30  It  has  been  held  that  the  rule 
is  the  same  whether  the  second  action  is  brought 
by  a  party  or  a  stranger  to  the  first,81  but  there  is 
also  authority  to  the  contrary.32  The  consent  of 
the  parties  cannot  change  the  rule  requiring  suit  in 
the  court  which  rendered  the  judgment,  or  relax  its 
binding  force  in  any  particular  case.33 

The  federal  courts  are  prohibited  by  statute  from 
granting  injunctions  to  stay  proceedings  in  the 
state  courts,34  but  such  statute  does  not  prevent  a 
federal  court  in  a  suit  within  its  jurisdiction,  by 
reason  of  diversity  of  citizenship  and  the  amount  in- 
volved, from  granting  relief  against  a  judgment  of 


a  state  court  on  the  ground  that  it  was  procured  by 
fraud  or  was  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,35  where 
such  relief  could  be  granted  if  the  judgment  was 
that  of  a  federal  court.36  Conversely,  state  courts, 
have  no  power  or  jurisdiction  to  enjoin  the  enforce- 
ment of  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  court  of  the 
United  States37  unless  such  judgment  was  procured 
by  fraud.38 

§  383.    Venue 

A  suit  for  equitable  relief  against  a  Judgment  gen- 
erally should  be  brought  in  the  county  or  other  judicial 
district  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  but  the: 
proper  venue  may  sometimes  be  elsewhere. 

A  bill  in  equity  for  relief  against  a  judgment 
should  as  a  general  rule  be  brought  in  the  county 
or  other  judicial  district  in  which  the  judgment  was 
rendered,39  unless  an  objection  on  this  ground  is, 
waived,40  or  a  change  of  venue  is  granted  for  due 


v.    Halbrook,    285    S.W.    1079,    115 
Tex.    513 — Borders    v.    Highsmith, 
Civ.App.,  252  S.W.  270. 
34  C.J.  p  483  note  1. 

Bale 

Where  a  Judgment  itself  orders  the 
sale  of  specific  property,  such  sale 
cannot  be  restrained  by  another 
court  on  the  application  of  a  party 
to  the  Judgment. — Carey  v.  Looney, 
251  S.W.  1040,  113  Tex.  93. 

Zn  Connecticut 

(1)  Under  a  statute  so  providing, 
all     actions     for     equitable     relief 
against   Judgments   rendered   in   the 
superior  court   must   be   brought  in 
that     court     exclusively. — Smith    v. 
Hall,   42  A.  86,  71  Conn.  427. 

(2)  However,    the    superior    court 
has  power  in  its  equitable  Jurisdic- 
tion to  afford  relief  against  decrees 
of  court  of  probate. — Folwell  v.  How- 
ell,  169  A.  199,  117  Conn.  565. 

In  Iowa 

Under  a  statute  so  providing,  when 
proceedings  on  a  judgment  are 
sought  to  be  enjoined,  the  suit  must 
be  brought  in  the  county  and  court 
in  which  the  judgment  was  obtained. 
—Ferris  v.  Grimes,  215  N.W.  646, 
204  Iowa  587—34  CJ.  p  483  note  1 
Cb]. 

In,  Louisiana 

(1)  As  a  general  rule,  suit  to  set 
aside  a  judgment  is  properly  insti- 
tuted  in   the   court   which   rendered 
Judgment. — Trichel    v.    Bordelon,     9 
Rob.  191— Clark  v.  Christine,  12  La. 
394— Dickey    v.    Pollock,    App.,    183 
So.  48. 

(2)  The  action  of  nullit7  of  judg- 
ment must  usually  be  brought  before 
the  court  which  rendered  the  Judg- 
ment, and  it  may  not  be  brought  in 
another  court  unless   the   judgment 
is  absolutely  .void  on  its  face. — Abra- j 


ham  Land  &  Mineral  Co.  v.  Marble 
Sav.  Bank,  D.C.La.,  35  P.Supp.  500. 
(3)  However,  a  judgment  on  ap- 
peal rendered  by  a  court  without  ju- 
risdiction ratione  materise  may  be 
attacked  before  the  court  in  which 
the  Judgment  appealed  from  was 
rendered, — Hibernia  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Standard  Guano  &  Chemical  Mfg. 
Co.,  26  So.  274,  51  La.Ann.  1321. 

28.  U.S. — Abraham  Land  &  Mineral 
Co.  v.   Marble  Sav.  Bank,  D.C.La., 
35  F.Supp.  500. 

Tex. — Carey  v.  Looney,  251  S.W. 
1040,  113  Tex.  93— Allen  v.  Jones, 
Civ.App.,  192  S.W.2d  298,  error  re- 
fused, no  reversible  error. 

34  C.J.  p  483  note  2. 

29.  Tex. — Carey  v.  Looney,  251  S.W. 
1040,  113  Tex.  93. 

34  C.J.  p  483  note  3. 

30.  La. — Trichel  v.  Bordelon,  9  Rob. 
191— Clark  v.  Christine,  12  La.  394. 

34  C.J.  p  483  note  4. 

31.  Wis.— Stein  v.  Benedict,  53  N.W. 
891,  83  Wis.  603. 

34  C.J.  p  483  note  5. 

32.  Tex. — Carey   v.   Looney,    251    S. 
W.  1040,  113  Tex.  93. 

33.  Cal.— Crowley  v.  Davis,   37  Cal. 
268. 

34*  U.S. — National  Surety  Co.  v. 
Humboldt  State  Bank,  Neb.,  120 
P.  593,  56  C.C.A.  657,  61  L.R.A. 
394. 

34  C.J.  p  483  note  7. 

Jurisdiction  of  federal  courts  to  en- 
join proceedings  in  federal  courts 
generally  see  Courts  §  543. 

35.  U.S. — Simon  v.  Southern  R.  Co., 
La.,  35  S.Ct  255,  236  U.S.  115,  59 
L.Ed.  492. 

34  C.J.  p  483  note  8. 

3ft,  U.S. — Lehman  v.  Graham,  Fla., 
135  F.  39,  67  C.C.A.  513. 

760 


37.  U.S.— Central  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ste- 
vens,  N.T.,   18    S.Ct.   403,    169   U.SL 
432,  42  L.Ed.  807. 

34  C.J.  p  483  note  10. 

Jurisdiction  of  state  courts  to  en- 
join proceedings  in  state  courts 
generally  see  Courts  §  542. 

38.  Mo. — Wonderly      v.      Lafayette 
County,   51   S.W.  745,   150   Mo.   635. 
73  Am.S.R.  474,  45  L.R.A.  386. 

Tenn. — Keith   v.    Alger,    85    S.W.    71* 

114  Tenn.  1. 
33.    Iowa. — Ferris  v.  Grimes,  215  N.. 

W.  646,  204  Iowa  587. 
Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  ia  Rush: 

v.  Rush,  133  P.2d  366,  372,  68  Wyo.. 

406. 

34  C.J.  p  484  note  12. 
Situs  of  judgment 

For  the  purpose  of  a  proceeding- 
on  petition  and  service  of  summons* 
to  vacate  a  judgment  after  expira- 
tion of  term  at  which  it  was  ren- 
dered, on  ground  that  it  was  ob- 
tained by  fraud,  situs  of  Judgment 
was  in  county  in  which  judgment 
was  rendered. — Parker  v.  Board  of* 
Com'rs  of  Okmulgee  County,  102  P. 
2d  880,  187  Okl.  308,  followed  in  Par- 
ker v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Okmulgee 
County,  102  P.2d  883,  187  Okl.  311^ 

Statutory  rule  of  venue  that  suit 
to  enjoin  execution  of  Judgment 
must  be  brought  in  county  in  which 
judgment  was  rendered  does  not 
control  fundamental  jurisdiction  or 
courts. — Burris  v.  Myers,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  49  S.W.2d  931. 
40.  Ala. — Shrader  v.  Walker,  8  Ala. 

244. 
Colo. — Smith  v.  Morrill,  55  P.  824,  12- 

Colo.App.  233. 
Special  pleading 

Objection,  to  venue  in  suit  to  en- 
Join  execution  of  judgment  as  not 
brought  in  county  in  which  judg- 
ment was  rendered  must  be  specially 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


384 


•cause,41  or  unless  the  judgment  is  void,  in  which 
case  it  may  be  attacked  in  any  court  having  equita- 
ble jurisdiction.42  It  has  been  held,  however,  that 
the  suit  may  be  brought  in  any  county,  subject  to 
defendant's  right  to  have  the  case  transferred.43  In 
some  cases  the  proper  venue  of  the  action  has  been 
held  to  be  the  place  where  defendant  resides,  al- 
though it  is  other  than  the  place  of  the  rendition  of 
the  judgment,44  and  in  others  that,  when  the  judg- 
ment is  sought  to  be  enforced  against  specific  prop- 
erty, an  action  to  restrain  such  enforcement  may 
l>e  maintained  at  the  place  where  the  property  is 
situated.45 

|  384.    Parties 

a.  In  general 

pleaded   under  oath. — Burris  v.   My- 
•ers,  Tex.Civ.App.,  49  S.W.2d  931. 


b.  Plaintiffs 

c.  Defendants 

a.  In  General 

Generally  all  the  parties  to  the  original  action  or 
their  representatives,  and  any  other  persons  whose  rights 
are  Involved,  are  proper  and  necessary  parties  to  an  ac- 
tion for  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment,  but  per- 
sons having  no  interest  in  the  controversy  need  not  be 
Joined  as  parties. 

To  a  bill  in  equity  to  set  aside,  vacate,  or  enjoin 
the  enforcement  of,  a  judgment  recovered  at  law, 
all  the  parties  to  the  original  action,46  or  their  rep- 
resentatives47 or  privies,48  and  also  any  other  per- 
sons whose  rights  would  or  might  be  affected  by 
the  grant  of  the  relief  asked,49  may  and  should  be 
made  parties.  On  the  other  hand,  persons  not  par- 
ties to  the  original  suit  and  having  no  interest  in 
the  controversy  are  not  proper5**  or  necessary51 


•41.    Mo. — State     v.     Price,     38     Mo. 

382. 
•42.    Tex. — Automobile  Finance  Co.  v. 

Bryan,  Civ.App.,  3  S.W.Sd  835. 
34  C.J.  p  484  note  15. 
Trand 

Action  for  relief  against  judgment 
on  the  ground  of  fraud  in  its  pro- 
curement may  be  brought  before 
court  of  equitable  jurisdiction  in  any 
•county,  and  it  is  not  essential  that 
the  action  be  brought  in  the  county 
in  which  the  judgment  was  render- 
ed.— Young  v.  Young  Holdings  Cor- 
poration, 80  P.2d  723,  27  Cal.App.2d 
129. 

43.  Mont — Bullard    v.    Zimmerman, 
268  P.  512,  82  Mont  434. 

44.  Ala.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pox 
*v.  Fox,   179   So.  237,   23S,   235  Ala. 

338. 
Ga.— Whiteley    v.    Downs,    164    S.E. 

318,  174  Ga.  839. 
Kan.— Heston  v.  Finley,  236  P.  841, 

118  Kan.  717. 
34  C.J.  p  484  note  16. 

45.  Kan.— Busenbark  v.  Busenbark, 
7  P.  245,  33  Kan.  572. 

34  C.J.  p  484  note  17. 

46.  U.S.— Continental    Inv.     Co.     v. 
Toelle,    C.C.A.Kan.,    5    F.2d    907. 

Ark.— Parker    v,    Nixon,    44    S.W.2d 

1088,   184  Ark.  1085. 
Ga. — Sewell   v.   Anderson,    30    S.E.2d 

102,   197  Ga.  623. 
111. — Gaumer   v.    Snedeker,    162   N.B. 

137,  330  111.  511. 
Okl.— Fidelity  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 

v.    Newell,    55    P.2d    131,    176   Okl. 

184. 
Tex. — Wells  v.  Stonerock,  37  S,W.2d 

712,    120   Tex.   287 — Nymon  v.  Eg- 

gert,    Civ.App.,    154    S.W.2d    167— 

Mills  v.  Baird,  Civ.App.,  147  S.W.2d 

312,       error      refused — Avant      v. 

Broun,    Civ.App.,    91    S.W.2d    426, 


error  dismissed — Brox  v.  Kelly, 
Civ.App.,  87  S,W.2d  753,  error  dis- 
missed agreement — Glenn  v.  Con- 
nell,  Civ.App.,  74  S.W.2d  451,  fol- 
lowed in  74  S.W.2d  455— Panhandle 
Const.  Co.  v.  Casey,  Civ.App.,  66 
S.W.2d  705,  error  refused — Dial  v. 
Martin,  Civ.App.,  8  S.W.2d  241,  er- 
ror dismissed — Christensen  v.  Fos- 
ter, Civ.App.,  297  S.W.  657 — Rone 
v.  Marti,  Civ.App.,  244  S.W.  639. 
34  CJT.  p  484  note  18. 
Pavoratle  or  unfavorable  effect 

In  suit  to  annul  a  judgment,  all 
parties  to  previous  suit  from  which 
the  judgment  resulted  must  be  made 
parties,  irrespective  of  whether  they 
were  affected  favorably  or  unfavora- 
bly by  the  judgment. — O' Sullivan  v. 
Knop,  195  So.  366,  reheard  198  So. 
191. 
Severafcle  interest 

A  bill  of  review  attacking  a  judg- 
ment in  trespass  to  try  title  in  so 
far  as  it  awarded  an  interest  in 
land  to  one  of  several  defendants, 
where  interest  of  the  defendant  was 
severable  from  that  of  other  parties 
whose  rights  were  not  challenged, 
was  not  defective  for  failure  to  make 
all  parties  to  judgment  parties  to 
the  bill. — Lamb  v.  Isley,  Tex.Civ, 
App.,  114  S.W.2d  673,  rehearing  de- 
nied 115  S.W.2d  1036. 

Suit  to  annul  partition  judgment 
La. — Cornish  v.  Chaney,  147  So.  363, 

177  La,  10. 
47  C.J,  p  43£  note  66. 

47.  Tex. — In  re  Supples1  Estate,  Civ. 
App.,  131  S.W.2d  13. 

34  C.J.  p  484  note  19. 

48.  Tex. — Nymon    v.     Bggert.     Civ. 
App.,     154     S.W.2d     157— Brox     v. 
Kelly,  Civ.App.,  87  S.W,2d  753,  er- 
ror dismissed  agreement 

49.  U.S. — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  y. 
Waldrep,  C.C.A.Okl.,   126  F.2d  55S. 

111. — Gaumer  v.   Snedeker,   162   N.B. 
137,  330  111.  «11. 

761' 


Neb. — Howard    v.    Spragins,    200    N. 

W.  799,  112  Neb.  641. 
Tex. — Sedgwick  v.  Kirby  Lumber  Co., 
107  S.W.2d  358,  130  Tex.  163— Pure 
Oil  Co.  v.  Reece,  78  S.W.2d  932,  124 
Tex.  476 — Dallas  County  Bois 
D'Arc  Island  Levee  Dist.  v.  Glenn, 
Com. App.,  288  S.W.  165 — Bragdon 
v.  Wright,  Civ.App.,  142  S.W,2d 
703,  error  dismissed — Johnson  v. 
Ortiz  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  104  S.W.2d 
543 — Moore  v.  Evans,  Civ.App.,  103 
S.W.2d  850— Reed  v.  Harlan,  Civ. 
App.,  103  S.W.2d  236,  error  refused 
—Dallas  Coffee  &  Tea  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  724,  er- 
ror dismissed — -Rone  v.  Marti,  Civ. 
App.,  244  S.W.  639. 
34  C.J.  p  484  note  20. 
Persons  against  whom  relief  may 

be  had  see  supra  §  345. 
Parties  interested  in.  maintenance  of 

judgment 

Tex. — Dallas    Coffee    &    Tea   Co.    v. 
Williams,  Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  724, 
error  dismissed. 
Marital  relation 

The  state  is  an  "interested  party" 
in  cases  brought  under  statute  pro- 
viding that  any  judgment  obtained 
by  means  of  perjury  or  any  fraudu- 
lent act,  practice,  or  representation 
of  prevailing  party  may  be  set  aside, 
where  marital  relation  is  involved, 
but,  where  death  intervenes  and 
there  are  no  children  but  only  prop- 
erty rights  involved,  the  state  has 
no  concern  and  equitable  principles 
should  govern. — Bloomaulst  v.  Thom- 
as, 9  N.W.2d  337,  215  Minn.  35. 

50.  La. — Succession  of  Moore,  App., 
193  So.  222. 

51.  U.S.— Hanna    v.    Brictson    Mfg. 
Co..  C.C.A.S.D.,  62  F.2d  139. 

Tex. — Williams    v.    Tooke,    Civ.App., 
116  S.W.2d  1114,  error  dismissed. 

Loan  deed 
Order  arresting  and  setting  aside 

void  decree   canceling  loan  deed  to 


§  384 


JUDGMENTS 


49    CTJ.S. 


parties,  and  parties  to  the  former  suit  sometimes 
may  not  be  necessary  parties  where  they  will  not  be 
affected  by  the  relief  sought.52  Under  proper  cir- 
cumstances a  third  person  may  be  allowed  to  in- 
tervene.53 

b.  Plaintiffs 

All  persons  interested  In  the  relief  sought  may  Join 
as  parties  plaintiff  but  persons  whose  interests  are  hos- 
tile  to  those  of  the  plaintiff,  or  against  whom  no  relief 
is  sought,  and  who  cannot  be  adversely  affected  by  the 
decree  entered  in  the  action  are  not  necessary  parties. 

All  persons  interested  in  the  relief  sought  may 
join  as  parties  plaintiff  to  a  suit  to  enjoin  or  set 
aside  a  judgment.5*  Where  a  judgment  is  recov- 
ered against  two  or  more  as  joint  defendants,  all 
should  join  as  plaintiffs  in  an  action  to  enjoin  its 
enforcement,55  or  be  joined  as  defendants,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  general  rule  in  equity.56  The 
rule  is  the  same  where  the  judgment  was  recovered 
jointly  against  a  principal  and  surety.57  This  rule, 
however,  is  one  of  convenience,  and  must  yield 
where  its  rigid  enforcement  would  be  attended  with 
inconvenience,58  and  persons  whose  interests  are 
hostile  to  those  of  plaintiff,  or  against  whom  no  re- 
lief is  sought,  and  who  cannot  be  adversely  affected 

premises  purchased  under  warranty 
deed  duly  recorded  after  entry  of 
decree  was  not  erroneous  because  of 


by  any  decree  entered  therein,  are  not  necessary 
parties.^  So,  where  one  of  several  joint  judgment 
debtors  sues  to  restrain  the  enforcement  of  the 
judgment  against  himself  alone,  he  need  not  join  the 
others  as  parties  plaintiff.60  Tenants  in  common 
may  sue  jointly  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a 
judgment  in  ejectment,  although  they  were  not  all 
made  defendants  in  the  ejectment.61  A  judgment 
debtor  and  his  grantee  may  properly  join  as  com- 
plainants in  a  suit  to  restrain  an  execution  sale  and 
to  cancel  the  judgment,62  but  it  has  been  held  that 
a  grantor  disclaiming  any  interest  in  realty  against 
which  a  judgment  foreclosed  a  lien,  and  who  was 
not  a  party  to  the  prior  suit,  may  not  be  properly 
joined  as  a  plaintiff  with  his  grantee.63 

c.  Defendants 

In  an  action  for  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment, 
all  persons  really  and  beneficially  interested  in  the  judg- 
ment, OP  whose  rights  are  likely  to  be  affected  by  the 
injunction,  including  necessary  or  proper  parties  who 
refuse  to  join  as  plaintiffs;,  should  be  Joined  as  defend- 
ants. 

A  bill  in  equity  fdr  relief  against  a  judgment 
may  and  should  join  as  defendants  all  persons  really 
and  beneficially  interested  in  the  judgment,  or  whose 
rights  are  likely  to  be  affected  by  the  injunction,64 


was    obtained    was 
Land    Development 


failure  to  make  purchaser  party  to 
proceeding  to  arrest  decree  or  to 
give  him  notice  of  pendency  there- 
of, it  being  sufficient  that  opposite 
party  in  controversy  wherein  decree 
given  notice. — 

Corporation    v. 

Union  Trust  Co.  of  Maryland,  180  S. 
E.  836,  180  Ga.  785. 

52.  Idaho.— Welch    v.     Morris,     291 
P.  1048,  49  Idaho  781. 

Tex. — Bonner    v.    Pearson,    Civ.App., 

7  S.W.2d  930. 
Apparent  rights 

In  suit  to  annul  judgment  on 
ground  that  judgment,  valid  on  its 
face,  was  void  as  to  those  seeking 
its  annulment  because  they  were  not 
parties  to  suit  in  which  judgment 
was  rendered,  only  those  parties  who 
have  apparent  rights  under  judgment 
need  be  joined.— Willson  v.  Kuhn, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  96  S.W.2d  236. 

53.  Fla. — Eyles    v.    Southern    Ohio 
Sav.   Bank  &  Trust  Co.,   19    So.2d 
105,  154  Fla.  782. 

34  C.J.  p  484  note  21. 
Claim  in  equity 

A  person  need  not  be  a  judgment 
creditor  in  order  to  intervene  in 
suit  to  enjoin  enforcement  of  judg- 
ment, but  claim  in  equity  is  equally 
as  good  a  basis  to  support  such 
right. — Eyles  v.  Southern  Ohio  Sav. 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  supra. 


Creditor  of  successful  defendant,  j 
holding  security  deed  which  would 
lose  priority  by  setting  aside  of  de- 
cree, could  intervene  in  suit  to  set 
aside  decree. — Williamson  v.  Had- 
dock, 1'40  S.E.  373,  165  Ga.  168. 

54.  Mo.— Fadler  v.  Gabbert,  63  S.W. 
2d  121,  333  Mo.  851. 

Bights  invaded 

Plaintiff  in  such  action  must  be 
one  whose  rights  have  been  directly 
invaded. — Arcuri  v.  Arcuri,  193  N.E. 
174,  265  N.Y.  358. 

55.  Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 

Panhandle    Const.    Co.    v.    Casey, 

Civ.App.,  66  S.W.2d  705,  708,  error 

refused. 

34  C.J.  p  485  note  22. 
Persons    entitled   to   sue   in   general 

see  supra  §   344. 

A  Judgment  in  trespass  to  try  title 
against  four  defendants  cannot  be 
revised  by  a  suit  in  the  nature  of  a 
bill  of  review  brought  by  one  of 
such  defendants  who  had  purchased 
interest  of  two  of  other  defendants, 
in  which  no  mention  is  made  of 
fourth  defendant  and  no  excuse 
pleaded  for  not  making  him  a  party. 
— Sedgwick  v.  Kirby  Lumber  Co., 
107  S.W.2d  358,  130  Tex  163. 

56.  Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 

Panhandle  Const.  Co.  v.  Casey, 
CivJV.pp.,  66  S.W.2d  705,  708,  error 
refused. 

Naming  as  defendants  parties  who 
refuse  to  join  as  plaintiffs  see  in- 
fra subdivision  c  of  this  section. 

762 


57.  Ky. — Love  v.  Cofer.  1  J.J.Marsh. 
327. 

34  C.J.  p  485  note  25. 

58.  Md.— Michael  v.   Rigler,   120   A. 
382,  142  Md.  125. 

59.  Ark. — North  Arkansas  Highway 
Improvement  Dist.  No.  2  v.  Home 
Telephone   Co.,    3    S.W.2d    307,    176 
Ark.   553. 

Md.— Michael  v.   Rigler,   120  A.   382, 
142  Md.  125. 

60.  Cal. — Merriman    v.    Walton,    &8 
P.    1108,   105  Cal.   403,   45   Am.S.R. 
50,  30  L.R.A.  786. 

34  C.J.  p  485  note  28. 

61.  Mo. — Russell    v.    Def ranee,     39 
Mo.  506. 

62.  Ala.— May   v.    Granger,    139    So. 
569,  224  Ala.  208. 

63.  Tex. — Citizens'    Bank    v.    Bran- 
dau,  Civ.App.,   1  S.W.2d  466,  error 
refused. 

64.  Ga, — Beacham    v.    Beacham,    22 
S.B.2d  787,  195  Ga,  9, 

111. — Gaumer   v.    Snedeker,    162   N.E. 

137,  330  111.  611. 
Mo. — Terminal  Railroad  Ass'n  of  St. 

Louis   v.    Schmidt,    182    S.W.2d   78, 

353  Mo.  79. 
N.C. — Pegram  v.   Wachovia   Bank   & 

Trust  Co.,   13   S.E.2d  249,   219  N.C. 

224. 
Tex. — Garza    v.    Kenedy,"    Com.App., 

299    S.W.    231,   rehearing   denied   5 

S.W.2d  xx— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 

Panhandle  Const.  Co.  v.  Casey.  Civ. 

App.,  66  S.W.2d  705,  708,  error  re- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  384 


including  plaintiff  or  joint  plaintiffs  in  whose  name 
the  judgment  stands,65  the  party  .for  whose  use  the 
action  was  really  brought,  although  he  is  not  the 
nominal  plaintiff,66  persons  claiming  or  acquiring 
interests  in  the  property  specifically  affected  by  the 
judgment,67  and  any  persons  who  participated  in 
an  alleged  fraud,  charged  as  the  means  whereby  the 
judgment  was  obtained,  although  they  were  not  par- 
ties to  the  original  action.68  Necessary  or  proper 
parties  who  refuse  to  join  as  plaintiffs  should  be 
made  defendants.6^  On  the  other  hand,  persons 
against  whom  no  relief  is  sought  and  who  have  no 
interest  in  the  controversy  adverse  to  plaintiff  are 
not  necessary  parties.70 

Where  the  owner  of  a  judgment  has  assigned  it 
to  a  third  person,  both  the  assignor71  and  the  as- 
signee72 are  proper  and  necessary  parties,  unless 
the  latter  is  the,  only  one  having  an  interest  in  the 
judgment.73  However,  the  assignor  of  a  cause  of 
action  which  is  afterward  merged  in  a  judgment  is 


not  a  necessary  party  to  an  action  to  enjoin  the  en- 
forcement of  the  judgment  by  the  assignee.74 
Where  plaintiff  sues  to  enjoin  enforcement  of  two 
judgments,  rendered  in  favor  of  different  parties, 
such  parties,  who  are  not  jointly  affected  by  the 
two  judgments,  may  not  be  joined  as  defendants.75 

If  the  action  is  brought  against  the  sheriff  or  oth- 
er officer  holding  process  under  the  judgment  to  re- 
strain him  from  proceeding  for  its  collection,  the 
judgment  plaintiff  may  be  joined  as  a  defendant,76 
and  sometimes  is  required  to  be  joined  as  a  party  ;77 
but  where  the  suit  is  against  the  judgment  creditor 
it  is  neither  necessary  nor  proper  to  make  the  sher- 
iff a  party78  unless  a  statute  so  provides79  or  the 
sheriff  has  joined  with  the  creditor  in  the  commis- 
sion of  the  fraud  of  which  complaint  is  made.80 
Where  the  judgment  is  in  the  name  of  the  sheriff, 
he  is  properly  made  a  party  to  a  bill  to  set  it  aside, 
although  he  may  have  no  personal  interest.81 

The  judge  who  rendered  the  judgment,82  the  clerk 


fused — Dallas  Coffee  &  Tea  Co.  v. 

Williams,  Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  724, 

error  dismissed. 
Utah.— Logan  City  v.  Utah  Power  & 

Light   Co.,    16   P.2d   1097,    86   Utah 

340,    adhered    to    44    P.2d    698,    86 

Utah  354. 

34  C.J.  p  485  note  30. 
Partition 

In  suit  to  set  aside  judgment  of 
partition,  parties  to  partition  suit 
who  had  conveyed  their  lands  were 
necessary  parties,  notwithstanding 
their  grantees  had  been  made  par- 
ties, where  they  might  be  liable  on 
warranties  and  their  rights  would  be 
adversely  affected  by  a  new  parti- 
tion.—Davis  v.  Caudill,  92  S.W.2d  62, 
263  Ky.  214. 

85.    B.C.— Ray  v.  Carr,  107  F.2d  238, 

71  App.D.C.  37. 
111.— Gaumer   v.    Snedeker,    162   N.B. 

137,  330  111.  511. 
Neb.— Howard  v.  Spragins,  200  N,W. 

799,  112  Neb.  641. 
Tex. — Glenn  v.  Connell,  Civ.App.,  74 

S.W.2d  451,   followed  in  74  S.W.2d 

455. 
34  C.J.  p  485  note  31. 

la  direct  attack  OIL  personal  judg- 
ment, regular  on  face,  plaintiff  in 
original  action  is  necessary  party. — 
Bonougli  v.  Guerra,  Tex.Civ.App., 
286  S.W.  344. 

«6.  Ky. — Triplett  v.  Vandegrift,  S 
B.Mon.  420 — Turner  v.  Cox,  5  Litt, 
175. 

67.  Ala.— Nichols  v.  Dill,  132  So. 
900,  222  Ala.  465. 

Tex. — Garza  v.  Kenedy,  Com.App., 
299  S.W.  231,  rehearing  denied  5 
S.W.2d  xx — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Panhandle  Const  Co.  v.  Casey,  Civ. 


App.,  66  S.W,2d  705,  708,  error  re- 
fused. 

34  C.J.  p  485  note  33. 
Bonds 

Money  judgment  against  town, 
duly  issuing  bonds  for  funding 
thereof  under  appropriate  statute, 
cannot  be  set  aside  by  court  without 
having  bondholders  before  it  as  par- 
ties to  action. — Denver  &  R.  G.  W. 
R.  Co.  v.  Town  of  Castle  Rock,  62  P. 
2d  1164,  99  Colo.  340. 

68.  Ala.— Nichols    v.    Dill,    132    So. 
900,  222  Ala.  455. 

La. — Green  v.  Barnett,   120   So.    666, 

10  La.App.  212. 
34  C.J.  p  485  note  34—47  C.J.  p  438 

note  67. 

69.  W.Va.— Wyatt  v.  Wyatt,  92  S.E. 
117,  79  W.Va.  708. 

34  C.J.  p  486  note  49. 

70.  Ind. — Pattison    v.    Grant    Trust 
&    Savings    Co.,    144   N.E.    26,    195 
Ind.  313. 

71.  111. — Gaumer    v.    Snedeker,    162 
N.E.  137,  330  111.  511. 

34  C.J.  p  485  note  35. 

72.  Ga. — Winn    v.    Armour    &    Co., 
193  S.E.  447,  184  Gu.  769. 

111. — Gaumer  v.  Snedeker,  162  N.E. 
137,  330  111.  511— Mumford  v. 
Sprague,  11  Paige  438. 

73.  Tex. — Ellis    v.    Kerr,    Civ.App., 
23  S.W.  1050. 

74.  Va. — Drake   v.   Lyons,    9    Gratt. 
54,  50  Va.  54. 

34  C.J.  p  485  note  38. 

75.  Cal.— Miller   v.    Curry,    53    Cal. 
665. 

76.  Cal. — Bast   Riverside    Irr.    Dist. 
v.    Holcomb,    58    P.    817,    126    Cal. 
315. 

77.  Tex. — Glenn     v.     Connell,     Civ. 

763 


App.,    74    S.W.2d   451,    followed  in 
74  S.W.2d  455. 

78.  Tex.— Gulf,    C.   &   S.    P.    R.    Co. 
v.  Blankenbeckler,  35  S.W.  331,  13 
Tex.Civ.App.  249. 

34  C.J.  p  485  note  41. 
Expired  execution 

Where  sheriff  was  made  party  to 
proceedings  to  set  aside  default 
judgment  solely  so  that  it  would  be 
possible  to  enjoin  him  from  enforc- 
ing the  judgment  by  levying  out- 
standing execution,  and  the  execu- 
tion expired  while  case  was  pending 
and  it  then  became  apparent  that 
judgment  would  be  set  aside,  sheriff 
was  no  longer  a  necessary  party. — 
Kulikowski  v.  North  American  Mfg. 
Co.,  54  N.E.2d  411,  322  Ill.App.  202. 

79.  Ohio. — Howard    v.    Levering,     8 
Ohio    Cir.Ct.    614,    4    Ohio    Cir.Dec. 
236 — Adams    v.    Boynton,    4    Ohio 
Dec.,    Reprint,    348,    1    Clev.L.Rep. 
352. 

34  C.J.  p  485  note  42. 

80.  Ohio.— Allen  v.  Medill,   14  Ohio 
445. 

81.  N.Y.— Campbell    v.    Western,    3 
Paige  124. 

82.  Tex.— Gulf,    C.   &   S.    F,    R.   Co. 
v.  Blankenbeckler,  35  S.W.  331,  13 
Tex. Civ. App.  249. 

34  C.J.  p  486  note  45. 
Improper  Joinder 

In  proceedings  to  expunge  differ- 
ent judgments  and  orders,  various 
clerks  of  court  and  groups  of  judg- 
es from  common  pleas  courts  and 
courts  of  appeal  could  not  be  Joined. 
—State  v.  Marsh,  165  N.E.  843,  120 
Ohio  St.  222. 


§  384 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


of  court,83  or  other  officers  of  the  law84  usually 
are  not  proper  parties  to  a  suit  of  this  kind;  and 
in  any  case  they  may  not  be  sued  alone  without 
joining  the  real  parties  in  interest.85  Officials  in- 
terested in  the  proceeds  of  a  judgment  levying  a 
fine,  and  not  the  state,  are  necessary-  parties  defend- 
ant.8* 

Persons  not  formally  named.  Where  persons  are 
not  formally  named  as  defendants,  but  employ  an 
attorney  to  represent  them,  who  appears  in  court 
and  conducts  a  defense  in  their  name,  they  are  par- 
ties to  the  suit  authorizing  the  court  to  adjudicate 
issues  involving  their  interests.87 

§  385.    Process  and  Appearance 

In  a  suit  for  equitable  relief  against  a  Judgment, 
Jurisdiction  of  the  person  generally  must  be  acquired  by 
proper  service  or  by  appearance,  but  the  decisions  are 
in  disagreement  as  to  whether  service  by  publication  is 
sufficient. 

As  a  general  rule,  in  a  suit  in  equity  to  enjoin 
or  set  aside  a  judgment,  jurisdiction  of  the  person 
must  be  acquired  either  by  proper  service88  or  by 
appearance,89  but  such  a  suit  has  also  been  regarded 
as  a  continuation  of  the  original  suit  in  which  the 
judgment  or  decree  was  entered  so  that  service  of 
subpcena  within  the  state  on  parties  to  the  original 


suit  was  unnecessary.90  According  to  some  deci- 
sions service  by  publication  will  not  give  jurisdic- 
tion91 since  the  action  is  one  in  personam  requir- 
ing personal  service,92  but  according  to  other  deci- 
sions such  a  suit  is  in  the  nature  of  one  in  rem  in 
which  constructive  service  is  authorized,93  and  serv- 
ice by  publication  is  proper  where  the  case  is  such 
as  to  come  within  the  statute  authorizing  such  serv- 
ice.94 Where  the  statute  requires  service  of  proc- 
ess of  the  party  himself,  sen-ice  may  not  be  made 
on  the  attorney  of  record  for  plaintiff  in  the  original 
action,95  but  service  on  the  attorney  may  be  prop- 
er where  plaintiff  in  the  original  action  is  a  non- 
resident or  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court96" 
unless  some  other  mode  of  service,  such  as  by  pub- 
lication, is  provided  for  in  such  cases.97 

§  386.    Release  of  Errors 

Although  a  bill  for -equitable  relief  against  a  Judg- 
ment does  not  of  Itself  constitute  a  release  of  errors, 
some  statutes  require  such  a  release,  or  make  the  in- 
junction operate  as  one,  in  the  case  of  attack  on  Judg- 
ments at  law  which  are  not  void;  such  a  release  ap- 
plies only  to  errors  in  the  legal  proceeding  which  might 
be  taken  advantage  of  in  the  appellate  court. 

A  bill  in  equity  to  enjoin  a  judgment  at  law  is  not 
of  itself  a  release  of  errors.98    By  statute,  however, 


83.  N.C.— Edney    v.    Kins,    39    N.C. 
465. 

34  C.J.  p  486  note  46. 

84.  N.C.— McLane  v.  Manning,  60  X. 
C.  608. 

34  C.J.  p  486  note  47. 

Sheriff  was  not  necessary  party  in 
suit  to  set  aside  default  judgment 
based  on  his  alleged  false  return.— 
Gross  v.  Kellner.  219  N.W.  620.  242 
Mich.  656. 

85.  -D.C. — Ray  v.  Carr,  107  F.2d  238, 
71  App.D.C.  37. 

Neb.— Howard  v.  Spragins,  200  N.W. 

799,  112  Neb.  641. 
88.    Ky. — Harris  v.  Beaven,  11  Bush 

254. 
Tex.— Smith    v.    State,    9    S.W.    274, 

26  Tex.App.  49. 
34  C.J.  p  486  note  48. 

87.  Tex.— Bragdon  v.  Wright,  Civ. 
App.f  142  S.W.2d  703,  error  dis- 
missed. 

88-  Ga. — -Ingram  &  Le  Grand  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Burgin  Lumber  Co.,  13 
S.B.2d  370,  191  Ga,  584. 

Ind. — Vail  v.  Department  of  Finan- 
cial Institutions  of  Indiana,  17  N. 
E.2d  854,  106  Ind.App.  39. 

Kan. — Johnson  v.  Schrader,  95  P.2d 
273,  150  Kan.  545. 

Neb. — State  v.  Westover,  186  N."W. 
998;  107  Neb.  593. 

Tex. — Green  v.  Green,  Com.App.,  288 
S.W.  406. 


In  equity  cases  generally  see  Equity 

§§  171-178. 

In  injunction  cases  generally  see  In- 
junctions §§  179,  180. 
Dissolution  of  temporary  injunc- 
tion against  collection  of  probate 
judgment  against  sureties  on  guard- 
ian's bond,  on  guardian  and  ward 
giving  refunding  bond,  was  harmless 
and  not  error,  although  guardian, 
who  had  moved  beyond  court's  ju- 
risdiction, had  not  been  brought  into 
court,  complainants  being  bound  to 
take  necessary  steps  to  bring  her 
into  court. — Scott  v.  Boyd,  101  So. 
424,  211  Ala.  623. 

In  "bill  of  review,  only  original 
parties  need  be  given  notice. — Texas 
Co.  v.  Dunlap,  Tex.Civ.App.,  21  S.W. 
2d  707,  affirmed,  Com.App.,  41  S.W. 
2d.  42,  rehearing  denied  43  S.W.2d  92. 

89.  Ind. — Vail  v.  Department  of  Fi- 
nancial Institutions  of  Indiana,  17 
N.B.2d   854,    106   Ind.App.   39. 

Neb.— State    v.   Westover,    186-  N.W. 

998,  107  Neb.  593. 
Tex. — Green      v.    Green,      Com.App., 

288  S.W.  406. 

90.  U.S. — Hanna    v.    Brictson    Mfg. 
Co.,   C..C.A.S.D.,   62  F.2d  139. 

91.  Ho. — Fisher   v.    Evans,    25    Mo. 
App.  582. 

92.  D.C. — Indemnity     Ins.     Co.     of 
North  America  v.  Smoot,  152  F.2d 
667,  certiorari  denied  66  S.Ct.  981. 

764 


Judgment  in  favor  of  nonresident 

In  equity  suit  in  Illinois  court  to 
set  aside  a  judgment  in  favor  of  a 
nonresident  who  had  no  property  in 
Illinois,  Illinois  court  acquired  no- 
jurisdiction  by  publication  of  notice 
to  the  nonresident  and  decree  of  Illi- 
nois court  declaring  the  judgment 
void  did  not  vitiate  money  judgment 
rendered  by  United  States  district 
court  for  District  of  Columbia  on  the 
Illinois  judgment. — Indemnity  Ins- 
Co,  of  North  America  v.  Smoot,  su- 
pra. 

93.  Fla, — Reybine  v.  Kruse,  174  So«. 
720,  128  Fla.  278. 

94.  Fla. — Reybine  v.  Kruse,  supra. 
N.J. — Englander   v.   Jacoby,    28   A.2d 

292,  132  N.J.Eq.  336. 
Okl.— Parker  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 

Okmulgee    County,    102    P.2d    880. 

187  Okl.  308,  followed  in  Parker  v. 

Board     of     Com'rs     of     Okmulgee 

County,  102.P.2d  883,  187  Okl.  31U 
34  C.J.  p  486  note  54. 

95.  Wyo.— Boulter   v.   Cook,    236    P- 
245,  32  Wyo.  461. 

96.  U.S.— Oglesby  v.  Attrill,  C.C.Da., 
12    F.    227 — Doe   v.    Johnston,   C.C. 
Ohio,    7   F.Cas.No.3,958,    2   McLean. 
323. 

97.  Iowa. — Death  v.  Pittsburg  Bank* 
1  Iowa  382. 

98.  Ohio. — Gano  v.  White,  3  Ohio  20. 
Waiver  of  right  to   equitable  relief 


49    C.3T.S. 


it  is  frequently  provided  that  complainant  in  a  bill 
in  equity  for  relief  against  a  judgment  at  law  shall 
file  or  indorse  on  his  bill  a  release  of  errors,"  if 
required  to  do  so  by  the  court,1  or  that  the  injunc- 
tion, when  granted,  shall  operate  as  such  a  release.2 
In  order  that  the  granting  of  an  injunction  shall  op- 
erate as  a  release  of  errors,  there  must  be  an  injunc- 
tion of  a  judgment  at  law.3  The  statutes  do  not 
apply  where  the  relief  asked  does  not  amount  to  a 
stay  of  proceedings  on  the  judgment,4  or  where  it 
is  sought  to  stay  proceedings  prior5  or  subsequent6 
to  the  judgment,  and  not  to  affect  the  judgment  it- 
self ;  nor  do  they  apply  to  proceedings  in  chancery 
or  those  in  their  nature  equitable,7  or  where  the 
judgment  is  not  merely  erroneous  but  is  void,8  or 
where  it  is  sought  to  enjoin  proceedings  in  viola- 
tion of  law.9 

A  release  of  errors  applies  only  to  errors  in  the 
legal  proceedings  of  which  advantage  might  be  tak- 
en in  the  appellate  court10  It  does  not  prevent  the 
correction  of  clerical  errors,11  or  preclude  the  party 
from  assailing  the  judgment  for  matters  dehors  the 
record,12  as  that  the  judgment  was  obtained  by 
fraud,18  or  affect  the  remedy  of  the  party  in  eq- 
uity.14 The  omission  of  a  release  is  ground  for 
dissolving  the  injunction,15  but  not  for  dismissing 
the  bill.16  A  subsequent  dismissal  of  the  injunc- 
tion will  not  affect  the  release.17 


JUDGMENTS  §  387 

§  387.    Preliminary  or  Temporary  Injunction 

a.  In  general 

b.  Continuance  or  dissolution 


a.  In  General 

In  a  proper  case,  a  preliminary  or  temporary  Injunc- 
tion may  be  granted  in  a  suit  for  equitable  relief  against 
a  judgment,  provided  there  has  been  compliance  with 
requirements  as.  to  notice  of  application  and  furnishing 
of  security. 

In  a  suit  in  equity  for  relief  against  a  judgment 
at  law,  a  preliminary  or  temporary  injunction  may 
be  granted  in  a  proper  case  to  await  the  determina- 
tion of  the  validity  of  the  judgment  where  it  ap- 
pears that  the  judgment  was  obtained  by  fraud,  mis- 
take, or  surprise,18  or  to  await  the  determination 
of  issues  on  which  the  rights  of  the  parties  de- 
pend.19 However,  this  action  will  ordinarily  be  tak- 
en only  where  plaintiffs  equity  is  clear,  or  at  least 
is  supported  by  a  strong  prima  facie  case,20  and 
not  where  the  judgment  appears  to  rest  on  a  good 
and  valuable  consideration,21  pending  an  appeal 
from  the  judgment,22  where  the  judgment  has  al- 
ready been  enforced  by  execution  before  the  filing 
of  the  bill,23  or  where  it  is  not  shown  that  the  re- 
fusal of  the  injunction  will  cause  serious  injury  to 
complainant.24 

Proceedings  to  obtain.  Where  a  temporary  in- 
junction against  a  judgment  is  asked,  notice  of  the 


against  judgment  see  supra  §§  341, 

343. 
99.    Va. — Branch  v.  Burnley,  1  Call. 

147,  153,  5  Va.  147,  153. 
34  C.J.  P  486  note  58. 

1.  Ind.— Dickerson  v.  Rlpley  Coun- 
ty, 6  Ind.  128,  63  Am.D.  373. 

2.  111.— McConnel    v.    Ayres,    4    111. 
210. 

34  C.J.  p  486  note  60. 

3.  111.— St.    Louis,    A.    &   T.    H.    R. 
Co.  v.  Todd,  40  111.  89— McConnel 
v.  Ayres,  4  111.  210. 

4.  Iowa.— Burge    v.     Burns,    Morr. 
287. 

Miss.— Sevier  v.  Ross,  Freem.  510. 
34  C.J.  p  486  note  62. 

5.  111.— McConnel    v.    Ayres,    4    111. 
210. 

6.  111.— St.    Louis,    A.    &   T.    H.    R, 
Co.  v.  Todd,  40  111.  89. 

7.  Colo.— San  Juan  &  St.  Louis  Min- 
ing  &    Smelting   Co.    v.    Finch,  '  6 
Colo.  214. 

111.— McConnel   v.  Ayres,   4  111.   210. 

8.  Minn.— Hirsch  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  R. 
B.  Kennington  Co.,  124  So.  344,  155. 
Miss.  242,  88  A.L.R.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  486  note  66. 

Jurisdictions!     defects     are     not 
cured   by   a   statute   providing1  that 


an  injunction  staying  execution  shall 
operate  as  a  release  of  all  errors. — 
Hirsch  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  R.  B,  Kenning- 
Co., supra. 

9.  Iowa. — Burge  v.  Burns,  Morr.  p 
287. 

10.  Miss.— Hirsch  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  R. ! 
B.    Kennington    Co.,    124    So.    344, 
155  Miss.  242,  88  A.L.R.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  486  note  68. 

11.  Tenn.— Blake       v.       Dunn,       5 
Huraphr.  578. 

12.  Miss.— Bass  v.  Nelms,  56  Miss, 
502. 

13.  Miss.— Bass  v.  Nelms,  supra. 

14.  Tenn. — Patterson    v.    Gordon,    3 
Tenn.Ch.  18. 

15.  Ala.— Paulding    v.    Watson,    21 
Ala.  279. 

Ky. — Bradley  v.  Lamb,  Hard.  527. 

ie.    Ala,— Paulding    v.    Watson,    21 

Ala.  279. 
Ky. — Vance    v.     Cummins,     Ky.Dec. 

247. 

17.  Tenn.— Henly    v.    Robertson,    4 
Terg.  172. 

18.  Ga. — Pratt  v.  Rosa  Jarmulowsky 
Co.,  170  S.B.  365,  177  Ga.  522. 

34  C.J.  p  487  note  77. 

19.  La. — Hursey  Transp.  Co.  v.  Koss 

765 


Const.    Co.,    131    So.    43,    171    La. 

347. 

34  C.J.  p  487  note  78. 
Settlement  of  cause  of  action 

A  petition,  alleging  parties'  agree- 
ment to  settle  cause  of  action  car- 
ried into  judgment  for  stated  sum, 
payable  in  monthly  installments,  and 
performance  of  agreement  except 
for  payment  of  small  balance  and 
costs  tendered  into  court,  sufficient- 
ly alleged  grounds  for  temporary  in- 
junction, restraining  enforcement  of 
judgment  pending  final  determination 
of  issue  involved. — Coffman  v. 
Meeks,  Tex.Civ.App.,  119  S.W.2d  96. 

20.  U.S.— Foley  v.  Guarantee  Trust 
.   Co.,  Minn.,  74  F.  759,  21  C.C.A.  78. 
34  C.J.  p  48?  note  79. 

21.  U.S.— Sohier  v.   Merril,   C.C.Me., 
22  F.Cas.No.13,158,  3  Woodb.  &  M. 
179. 

22.  111. — Andrews  v.  Rumsey,  75  111. 
598. 

34  C.J.  p  487  note  81. 

23.  U.S.— Kamm  v.  Stark,  C.C.Ark., 
14   F.Cas.No.7,604,    1   Sawy.   647. 

24.  U.S.— Pierce  v.  National  Bank  of  ' 
Commerce,  C.C.A.Mo.,  268  F.  487. 

N.Y. — Ingalls  v.  Merchants'  Nat 
Bank,  64  N.Y.S.  911,  51  App.Div- 
305. 


§  387 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


application  must  be  served  on  defendant,2*  unless 
it  appears  that  injury  will  be  likely  to  occur  before 
a  hearing  can  be  had,  in  which  case  the  facts  as  to 
injury  must  be  set  forth  either  in  the  bill  or  by  an 
affidavit  accompanying  it26    As  a  further  condition, 
complainant  is  usually  required  to  furnish  securi- 
ty, at  least  in  cases  provided  for  by  statute.27    In 
some  states  the  ordinary  injunction  bond  is  consid- 
ered sufficient  for  this  purpose,  and  complainant  is 
not  required  to  bring  into  court  the  amount  of  the 
judgment,  unless  under  extraordinary  circumstanc- 
es.28   In  others,  sometimes  under  statute,  it  is  nec- 
essary to  pay  the  amount  of  the  judgment  and  costs 
into  court,  and  give  security  for  damages  which 
may  be  sustained,  or,  as  an  alternative  within  the 
discretion  of  the  court,  to  give  a  bond  conditioned 
to  pay  the  amount  of  the  judgment,  damages,  and 
costs.29    A  statute  requiring  the  giving  of  a  bond 
must  be  strictly  complied  with;    the  court  has  no 
discretion  to  fix  the  t  condition  or  penalty  of  the 
bond  variant  from  that  directed  thereby.30    Where 
there  is  no  statutory  provision  on  the  subject,  the 
matter   is   left   to  the   discretion   of  the   court.31 
Where  an  injunction  is  obtained  without  complying 
with  such  statutes,  defendant  is  entitled  to  sum- 
mary relief,  and  is  not  put  on  his  motion  to  dis- 
solve.32   A  bond  given  to  obtain  an  injunction  will 
not  operate  as  a  supersedeas,  if  it  describes  a  judg- 
ment different  from  that  sought  to  be  enjoined.33 

b.  Continuance  or  Dissolution 

In  a  proper  case,  a  temporary  Injunction  may  be  con- 
ttnued  until  the  hearing  and  determination,  but  the  in- 
junction will  be  dissolved  on  the  furnishing  of  a  refund- 


ing bond  where  it  appears  that  the  compiainant  is  not 
entitled  to  relief  against  the  Judgment,  or  where  the  re- 
spondent's answer  sufficiently  denies  the  equity  of  the 
bill. 

Whether-  a  temporary  injunction  will  be  contin- 
ued or  dissolved  is  generally  a  matter  within  the 
discretion  of  the  court  in  which  equitable  relief  is 
sought34  Where  the  rights  of  the  parties  depend 
on  unsettled  issues  of  fact,3*  or  it  appears  that  dis- 
solution might  work  irreparable  mischief  to  com- 
plainant,36 the  preliminary  injunction  ordinarily 
will  be  continued  until  the  hearing  and  determina- 
tion. On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  dissolved  if  the 
court  becomes  satisfied  that  complainant  is  not  en- 
titled to  relief  against  the  judgment37  and  that  the 
injunction  ought  never  to  have  been  granted,38 
or  where  relief  must  be  denied  for  want  of  a  re- 
lease of  errors39  or  for  want  of  prosecution  of  the 
suit,40  or  where  the  amount  proposed  to  be  set  off 
against  the  judgment,  for  which  purpose  the  injunc- 
tion was  sued  out,  bears  an  insignificant  propor- 
tion to  the  amount  of  the  judgment.41 

The  injunction  should  not  be  dissolved  for  a 
mere  defect  of  parties42  or  for  amendable  defects  in 
the  bill  or  petition.43  Where  the  judgment  was 
recovered  by  a  vendor  of  land  for  the  purchase 
money,  and  was  enjoined  on  the  ground  of  a  defect 
or  failure  of  title,  it  should  be  dissolved  on  his  ex- 
hibiting a  good  title  or  tendering  a  good  and  suffi- 
cient deed,  as  the  case  may  be,44  but  time  to  pro- 
cure a  good  title  will  not  be  allowed.4^  Where  an 
injunction  against  a  judgment  at  law  is  dissolved,  it 
should  also  be  dissolved  as  to  costs.46 


35.    Iowa. — Burlington  v.   Cox,   8  N. 

W.  360,  55  Iowa  752. 
34  C.J.  p  487  note  84. 
Misnomer  of  party 

Granting  interlocutory  injunction 
against  enforcement  of  default  Judg- 
ment was  not  error,  where  suit 
therefor  was  brought  against  iden- 
tical parties  who  procured  Judgment, 
notwithstanding  Judgment  creditor 
was  not  made  party  defendant  under 
allegedly  correct  name. — Pratt  v. 
Hosa  Jarmulowsky  Co.,  170  S.E.  365, 
177  G«u  522. 

.28,     111.— Ebann    v.    Brown,    139    111. 
App.  213. 

27.    Mich.— Gross  v.  Kellner,  219  N. 

W.  620,  242  Mich.  656. 

Except  where  suit  is  brought  for 
actual  fraud,  plaintiff  suing  to  set 
aside  a  default  judgment  is  required 
to  give  a  bond  as  a  condition  to 
obtaining  a  stay,  under  a  statute  so 
•providing. — McFarlane  v.  McParlane, 
i3S  N.W.  895,  294  Mich.  648— Gross 
v.  Kellner.  219  N.W.  620,  242  Mich. 
656. 


28.     Tenn. — Chester    v.    Apperson,    4 

Heisk.  639. 
34  C.J.  p  487  note  88. 
>.     N.J.— Phillips   v.    Pullen,    16   A. 

915,  45  N.J.EQ.  157. 
34  C.J.  p  487  note  89. 
30.  I1L — Ebann  v.  Brown,  139  111. 

App.  213. 
34  C.J.  p  487  note  90. 


31.     Md.  —  Wagner  v. 
313. 


Shank,   59   Md. 
Perrine,  17  N. 


32.  N.J.—  Marlatt  v. 
J.EQ.  49. 

34  C.J.  p  487  note  92. 

33.  Ala.  —  Wiswell  v.  Munroe,  4  Ala. 
9. 

34.  Tex.  —  Reilly   v.  Delmore  Corpo- 
ration, Civ.App.,   11   S.W.2d   327. 

35.  Tex.—  Lott  v.   Lofton,    Civ.App., 
280  S.W.  312. 

34  01.  p  487  note  94. 

36.  Del.  —  Kersey  v.  Rash,  3  Del.Ch. 
321. 

37.  Ala.  —  Choctaw    Bank    v.    Dear- 
mon,   134  So.  648,  223  Ala.  144. 

766 


j.    Tex.— Lewright    v.    Reese,    Civ. 
App.,  223  S.W.  270. 
34  C.J.  p  487  note  96. 

39.  Ky.— Bradley    v.     Lamb,     Hard. 
527. 

Necessity   of   release    of   errors    see 
supra  §   386. 

40.  W.Va.— McCoy  v.    McCoy,    2   S. 
B.  809,  29  W.Va.  794. 

34  C.J.  p  488  note  98. 

41.  La. — Barrow    v.    Robichaux,    15 
La. Ann.   70. 

34  C.J.  p  488  note  99. 

42.  Fla.— Scarlett  v.  Hicks,   13  Fla. 
314. 

34  C.J.  p  488  note  1. 

43.  Ala. — Choctaw    Bank    v.     Dear- 
mon,  134  So.  -648,  223  Ala.  144. 

44.  Va. — Young  v.  McClung,  9  Gratt 
336,  50  Va.  336. 

34  C.J.  p  488  note  2. 

45.  Ky.— Hays  v.  Tribble,  3  B.Mon. 
106. 

46.  Ky.— Burrows  v.  Miller,  3  Bibb 
77. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


38& 


On  answer.  When  respondent's  answer  denies 
the  equity  of  complainant's  bill,  and  fully  and  ex- 
plicitly negatives  all  its  essential  allegations,  the 
preliminary  injunction  should  in  general  be  dis- 
solved,47 but  this  will  not  be  done  where  the  denials 
of  the  answer  are  vague,  general,  or  lacking  in  par- 
ticularity,48 or  where  the  answer  admits  the  sub- 
stantial rights  of  complainant,49  or  where  there  ap- 
pears to  be  some  good  reason  for  retaining  it.50 
If  the  answer  shows  that  complainant  is  entitled  to 
some  equitable  relief,  but  not  to  the  extent  claimed 
by  the  bill,  the  injunction  may  be  dissolved  in  part, 
or  continued  on  such  terms  as  will  insure  the  ulti- 
mate ends  of  justice  between  the  parties.51  If  it  ap- 
pears that  a  part  of  a  judgment  at  law  only  should 
be  enjoined,  the  injunction  may  be  perpetuated  as 
to  such  part,  and  dissolved  as  to  the  residue.52 

Refunding  bond.  When  the  preliminary  injunc- 
tion is  dissolved  on  the  answer,  it  is  proper  to  re- 
quire of  respondent  a  bond  conditioned  to  refund 
the  amount  he  may  collect  on  the  judgment  in  case 
the  equity  proceedings  should  finally  be  determined 
against  him.53 

§  388.     Pleading 

Pleadings  are  required  In   proceedings  for  equitable 
relief  against  a  Judgment. 

In  accordance  with  the  rules  as  to  equity  plead- 


ings generally,  discussed  in  Equity  §§  179-198, 
pleadings  are  required  in  proceedings  for  equitable 
relief  against  a  judgment,  and  the  court  may  not  as- 
sume jurisdiction  on  its  own  motion  to  modify  a 
judgment  in  the  absence  of  proper  pleadings.54  The 
rules  of  pleading  must  be  strictly  observed  in  such 
proceedings.55 


§  389. 


Bill  or  Complaint 


a.  In  general 

b.  Specific  grounds  for  relief 

c.  Allegations  as  to  specific  matters 


a.  In  General 

In  a  suit  for  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment,, 
jurisdiction  of  the  court  Is  Invoked  by  the  filing  of  a 
properly  verified  bill  or  complaint,  and  such  pleading 
must  state  a  good  cause  of  action. 

The  jurisdiction  of  a  court  to  entertain  a  suit 
for  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  is  ordinarily 
invoked  by  the  filing  of  a  bill,  petition,5^  com- 
plaint, or  motion  in  writing.57  In  accordance  with, 
the  general  rules  as  to  equity  pleading,  discussed 
in  Equity  §§  217-232,  the  bill,  petition,  or  complaint 
must  show  good  and  sufficient  equitable  reason  why 
the  judgment  complained  of  should  be  enjoined  or 
set  aside,  or,  in  other  words,  it  must  state  a  good 
cause  of  action  for  equitable  relief.58  Thus  there 
must  be  proper  and  sufficient  allegations  setting 


Attorney's  fees 

Where  a  judgment  debtor  procured 
an  injunction  restraining  sheriff 
from  taking  and  holding  him  under 
a  capias  ad  satisfaciendum,  but  in- 
junction did  not  enjoin  payment  of 
judgment,  judgment  creditor  was  not 
entitled  to  attorneys'  fees  incurred  in 
having  debtor's  complaint  in  injunc- 
tion suit  dismissed  under  statute  re- 
quiring debtor  to  pay  damages  on 
dissolution  of  an  injunction,  since 
injunction  did  not  prevent  the  is- 
suance of  an  execution  and  levy  on 
any  property  belonging  to  debtor. — 
Bransky  v.  Lebow,  14  N.E.2d  509, 
295  Ill.App.  31. 

47.  Ala.— Rice  v.  Tobias,  3  So.  670, 
83  Ala.  348. 

34  C.J.  p  488  note  6. 

48.  Iowa. — Gates  v.  Ballou,   6  N.W. 
701,  54  Iowa  485. 

34  C.J.  p  488  note  6. 

49.  N.C.— Myers   v.   Daniels,    59   N. 
C.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  488  note  7. 

50.  Ala.— Collier    v.    Falk,    61    Ala. 
105. 

51.  Ala.— Maulden  v.  Armistead,  18 
Ala.  500. 

34  C.J.  p  488  note  9. 

52.  Ala. — Maulden  v.  Armistead,  su- 
pra. 


53.  Ala.— Jackson  v.   Elliott,   13   So. 
690,  100  Ala.  669. 

34  C.J.  p  488  note  11. 

54.  Tex.— -Hardy  v.   McCulloch,  Civ. 
App.,  286  S.W.  629. 

55.  U.S.— U.   S.  v.  Korner,  D.OCaL, 
56  F.Supp.  242. 

Pa. — Keystone  Nat  Bank  to  Use 
of  Balmer  v.  Deamer,  Com.Pl.f  32 
Berks  Co.  124,  affirmed  Keystone 
Nat.  Bank  of  Manheim,  now  to 
Use  of  Balmer  v.  Deamer,  18  A. 
2d  540,  144  Pa.Super.  52. 

56.  Kan.— Johnson    v.    Schrader,    95 
P.2d  273,  150  Kan.  545. 

Exceptions  not  treated  as  petition, 

In  suit  to  obtain  sale  of  realty  in 
which  plaintiff  claimed  an  interest 
under  deed  from  his  father  which 
widow  asserted  was  void  because 
father  was  of  unsound  mind  when 
deed  was  executed  and  because  of 
fraud  and  undue  influence,  widow's 
exceptions  to  judgment  and  master 
commissioner's  report  of  sale  could 
not  be  treated  as  petition  to  vacate 
or  modify  judgment  within  statute, 
where  widow  advanced  claim  to 
homestead  in  property  in  answer 
and  counterclaim  and  participated 
in  trial  of  the  case. — Pugh  v.  Pugh, 
130  S.W.2d  40,  279  Ky.  170. 

57.  Ind. — Vail  v.  Department  of  Fi- 

767 


nancial  Institutions  of  Indiana,  IT 
N.E.2d  854,  106  Ind.App.  39. 

58.  Cal.— Machado  v.  Machado,  15? 
P.2d  457,  66  Cal. App. 2 d  401. 

Ga. — Hanleiter  v.  Spearman,  36  S.E. 
2d  780— Oglesby  v.  Oglesby,  32  S- 
E.2d  906,  198  Ga.  864. 

Iowa.— Shaw  v.  Addison,  18  N.W.2d 
796. 

Ky.— McKim  v.  Smith,  172  S.W.2d 
634,  294  Ky.  835 — Ohio  Valley  Fire 
&  Marine  Ins.  Co.'s  Receiver  v. 
Newman,  13  S.W.2d  771,  227  Ky. 
554. 

Or. — Marsters  v.  Ashton,  107  P.26T 
981,  165  Or.  507— Dlxon  v.  Simp- 
son, 279  P.  939,  130  Or.  211. 

Tex. — Smith  v.  Ferrell,  Com.App., 
44  S.W.2d  9*2— Kelley  v.  Wright, 
Civ.App.,  184  S.W.2d  649,  affirmed, 
Sup.,  188  S.W.2d  983— Quails  v. 
Siler,  Civ.App.,  183  S.W.2d  750— 
Dorsey  v.  Cutbirth,  Civ.App.,  178. 
S.W.2d  749,  error  refused — Ameri- 
can Bed  Cross  v.  Lon-gley,  Civ. 
App.,  165  S.W.2d  233,  error  refused 
— Fidelity  Trust  Co.  of  Houston  v. 
Highland  Farms  Corporation,  Civ. 
App.,  109  S.W.2d  1014,  error  dis- 
missed— Universal  Credit  Co.  v, 
Cunningham,  Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d 
507,  error  dismissed — Moon  v. 
Weber,  Civ.App.,  103  S.W.2d  807, 
error  refused — Pope  v.  Powers,. 
Civ.App.,  91  S.W.2d  873,  reversed 


§  3SS  JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.S. 

forth  the  judgment  in  question,59  the  court  in  which  I  it  was  rendered,  who  the  parties  were,  what  issues 


on  other  grounds  120  S.W.2d  432. 
182  Tex.  80— Sedgwick  v.  Kirby 
Lumber  Co.,  Civ.App.,  78  S.W.2d 
1107,  affirmed  107  S.W.2d  358,  130 
Tex.  163— Stillwell  v.  Standard 
Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n,  Civ.App., 
30  S.W.2d  690,  error  dismissed — 
Slider  v.  House,  Civ.App.,  271  S. 
W.  644^— Phcenix  Oil  Co.  v.  Illinois 
Torpedo  Co.,  Civ.App.,  261  S.W. 
487 — Cooper  v.  Cooper,  Civ.App., 
260  S.W.  679. 

Wis.— Nichols  v.  Galpin,  202  N.W. 
153,  186  Wis.  485. 

47  C.J.  p  438  notes  69-71. 

Fraud 

Where  a  petitioner  for  the  review 
of  a  default  judgment  has  complied 
with  the  statutory  provisions,  the 
petition  need  not  allege  that  the 
judgment  was  procured  by  fraud  in 
order  to  secure  a  review  of  such 
judgment. — Dillbeck  v.  Johnson,  129 
S.W.2d  885,  344  Mo.  845. 

Restrictions  of  eq.uitable  practice 

In  proceeding  to  review  probate 
court  orders,  petition  need  not  con- 
form to  rules  and  is  not  limited  to 
restrictions  of  equitable  practice  ap- 
plicable to  bill  of  review,  as  such 
proceeding  is  not  strictly  speaking 
a  "bill  of  review"  but  in  nature  of 
such  a  bill  in  eauity. — Union  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  Port  Worth  v.  Smith, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  166  S,W.2d  928. 
Bill  or  petition  held  sufficient 

(1)  Generally. 
U.S. — Dickey  ;v.  Turner,  C.C.A.Tenn., 

49  F.2d  998. 

Ala. — Timmerman  v.  Martin,  176  So. 
198,  234  Ala.  622— Hanover  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Street,  154  So.  816,  228 
Ala.  677 — Alabama  Chemical  Co. 
v.  Hall,  101  So.  456,  212  Ala,  8. 
CaL — Bartell  v.  Johnson,  140  P.2d 
878,  60  Cal.App.2d  432— Johnson  v. 
Home  Owners'  Loan  Corporation, 
116  P.2d  167,  46  Cal.App.2d  546. 
Fla. — Allison  v.  Handy  Andy  Com- 
munity Stores,  156  So.  521,  116 
Fla.  574— Willard  v.  Barry,  152  So. 
411,  113  Fla.  402. 

Ga. — Ward  v.  Master  Loan  Service, 
33  S.E.2d  313,  199  Ga,  108— Rog- 
ers v.  MacDougald,  165  S.E.  619, 
175  Ga.  642— Martin  v.  Peacock, 
155  S.E.  182,  171  Ga.  219. 
111. — Louis  E.  Bower,  Inc.,  v.  Silver- 
stein,  18  N.E.2d  385,  298  IlLApp. 
145 — Myers  v.  American  Nat.  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  of  Chicago,  277  111. 
App.  378 — Hudson  v.  Hooper,  265 
IlLApp.  325. 
Iowa. — Martin  Bros.  Box  Co.  v.  Fritz, 

292  N.W.  143,  228  Iowa  482. 
Ky. — Thacker  v.  Thacker,  75  S.W.2d 
3,  255  Ky.  523 — Parsons  v.  Arnold. 
31  S.W.2d  928,  235  Ky.  600— Combs 
v.  Beaton,  251  S.W.  638,  199  Ky. 
477. 

La. — Succession  of  Williams,  121  So. 
171,  168  La.  1— Sandfield  Oil  & 


Gas  Co.  v.  Paul,  App.,  7  So.2d 
725 — Hanson  v.  Haynes,  App.,  170 
So.  257,  rehearing  denied  171  So. 
146— Smith  v.  Williams,  2  La. App. 
24. 

Mo. — Cherry  v.  Wertheim,  App.,  25 
S.W.2d  118. 

N.J. — Di  Paola  v.  Trust  Co.  of 
Orange,  156  A.  439,  109  N.J.Eq.  80. 

N.Y. — Hammond  v.  Citizens  Nat. 
Bank  of  Potsdam,  22  N.T.S.2d  656, 
260  App.Div.  374,  motion  denied  23 
N.Y.S.2d  559,  260  App.Div.  894. 

Ohio. — Hamilton  v.  Ohio  State  Bank 

6  Trust  Co.,  152  N.E.  731,  20  Ohio 
App.  493. 

Tex.— Hubbard  v.  Tallal,  92  S.W.2d 
1022,  127  Tex.  242— McAfee  v.  Jet- 
er &  Townsend,  Civ.App.,  147  S. 
W.2d  884 — Peaslee-Gaulbert  Corpo- 
ration v.  Hughes,  Civ.App.,  79  S.W. 
2d  149,  error  refused — Ritch  v. 
Jarvis,  Civ.App.,  64  S.W.2d  831, 
error  dismissed — Karr  v.  Brooks, 
Civ.App.,  50  S.W.2d  1103— Campbell 
v.  Wm.  Cameron  &  Co.,  Civ.App., 
38  S.W.2d  865,  error  dismissed — 
Cook  v.  Panhandle  Refining  Co., 
Civ.App.,  267  S.W.  1070. 
Utah. — Kramer  v.  Pixton,  268  P. 
1029,  72  Utah  1. 

(2)  Petition,  in  suit  to  enjoin  col- 
lection of  judgment,  demonstrating 
that  judgment  was  utterly  unintel- 
ligible on  its  face,  was  good  as 
against  general  demurrer.— Wells  v. 
Stonerock,  37  S.W.2d  712,  120  Tex. 
287. 

BUI  or  petition  held  insufficient 

(1)  Generally. 
Ark.— Wardlow  v.   McGhee,  63   S.W. 

2d  332,  187  Ark.  955. 
Gal.— Vincent  v.   Security-First  Nat. 

Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  155  P.2d  63, 

67  Cal.App.2d  602. 
Ga. — Stowers    v.    Harris,    22    S.E.2d 

405,  194  Ga.   636 — Green  v.  Spires, 

7  S.E.2d  246,  189  Ga.  719— Shepard 
v.  Veal,  173  S.E.  644,  178  Ga.  535 
— Watters    v.    Southern    Brighton 
Mills,    147    S.E.    87,    168    Ga.    15— 
Walker  v.  Mizell,  121  S.E.  816,  157 
Ga.  518 — Haskins  v.  Clements,  116 
S.E.  594,  155  Ga.  283. 

111.— Nicoloft   v.    Schnipper,    233    111. 

App.  591. 
La. — Salter  v.  Walsworth,  App.,  167 

So.  494. 
Mass. — Bartholomew   v.   Stobbs,    182 

N.E.  846,  280  Mass.  559. 
Miss. — Armistead   v.   Barber,    35    So. 

199,  82  Miss.  788. 
N.D.— Tibbs   v.    Hancock,    255    N.W. 

572,  64  N.D.  647. 
Okl.— Metzger    v.    Turner,    158    P.2d 

701,  195  Okl.  406— Lewis  v.  Couch, 

154  P.2d  51,  194  Okl.  632. 
Or. — Dixon  v.   Simpson,   279   P.    939, 

130  Or.  211. 
Pa. — Cesare  v.  Caputo,  100  Pa.Super. 

188. 
Tex.— Kelly   v.   Wright,    188    S.W.2d 

983 — Sedgwick    v.    Kirby    Lumber 

768 


Co.,  107  S.W.2d  358,  130  Tex.  163 
— Wear  v.  McCallum,  33  S.W.2d 
723,  119  Tex.  473— Smith  v.  Fer- 
rell,  Com.App.,  44  S.W.2d  962— 
Whitehurst  v.  Estes,  Civ.App.,  185 
S.W.2d  154,  error  refused — Loom- 
is  v.  Balch,  Civ.App.,  181  S.W.2d 
849— Dixon  v.  McNabb,  Civ.App., 
173  S.W.2d  228,  error  refused — 
Gray  v.  Moore,  Civ.App.,  172  S.W. 
2d  746— Smith  v.  City  of  Dallas, 
Civ.App.,  163  S.W.2d  681,  error  re- 
fused— Ridge  v.  Wood,  Civ. App.,  14  C 
S.W.2d  536,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Miller  v.  Texas  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d  756, 
error  refused — Bailey  v.  American 
Casualty  Co.,  Civ.App.,  119  S.W.2d 
697 — Williams  v.  Tooke,  Civ. App., 
116  S.W.2d  1114,  error  dismissed— 
Willard  v.  Phillips,  Civ.App.,  43 
S.W.2d  170— Dunn  v.  Redfield,  Civ. 
App.,  293  S.W.  338 — Box  v.  Pierce, 
Civ.App.,  278  S.W.  226— Slider  v. 
House,  Civ.App.,  271  S.W.  644. 

(2)  In   action   to    set   aside   judg- 
ment on  note,  petition  alleging  that 
plaintiffs  had  not  been  served  with 
process   and  were   not   before   court 
in  action  on  the  note,  but  containing 
allegations  from  which  it  might  be 
inferred  that  plaintiffs  took  part  in 
proceedings,  especially  subsequent  to 
entry  of  judgment,  failed  to  state  a 
cause    of    action. — Hibbard   v.    Clay 
County,  186  S.W.2d  423,  299  Ky.  560. 

(3)  A  bill  of  review  presents   no 
cause  of  action  where  gravamen  of 
complaint    is    merely    that    counsel 
failed  to  present  his  client's  cause  or 
defense. — Whitehurst  v.  Estes,   Tex. 
Civ.App.,    185   S.W.2d   154,   error   re- 
fused. 

(4)  Disclosure     of     garnishee     in 
amended  petition  to  set  aside  judg- 
ment was   too   late  when  delay   in- 
creased   hazard    in    overcoming    ad- 
verse claims. — Ellis  v.  Lamb-McAsh- 
an   Co.,   Tex.Civ.App.,   278   S.W.    858. 

59.     U.S. — U.  S.  v.  Kusche,  D.C.Cal., 

56  F.Supp.  201. 
Pa.— Rocks  v.  Santella,  38  A.2d  718, 

155  Pa.Super.  473. 
34  C.J.  p  488  note  14  [b]. 
Incorporation  of  record 

(1)  Compliance  with  text  rule  was 
shown  where  plaintiffs,  who  were  de- 
fendants in  prior  action,  made  rec- 
ord in  prior  action  a  part  of  their 
petition     as     though      incorporated 
therein.— Triplett  v.   Stanley,   130   S. 
W.2d  45,  279  Ky.  148. 

(2)  However,  rules  of  pleading  do 
not    require   that   record    in    former 
suit  be  completely  exhibited  by  pe- 
tition seeking  bill  of  review. — Sloan 
v.  Newton,  Tex.Civ.App.,  134  S.W.2d 
697. 

(3)  Necessity      of      incorporating 
transcript   of  record  as   an  exhibit 
see  infra  §  390. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


389 


were-  made,  how  they  were  finally  determined,60 
and  for  what  reason  the  judgment  is  void.61  The 
necessity  of  allegations  as  to  the  existence  of  a  mer- 
itorious defense,  plaintiff's  diligence  and  lack  of 
fault,  injury  or  injustice  to  complainant  resulting 
from  enforcement  of  the  judgment,  and  lack  or  loss 
of  remedy  at  law  are  considered  infra  subdivision 
c  of  this  section. 

The  allegations  of  the  bill  or  complaint  must  be 
positive,  explicit,  and  certain.62  The  bill  must  set 
forth  facts,  and  not  mere  conclusions  of  law,63  and, 
if  conclusions  are  used,  they  must  be  supported  by 
allegations  of  fact.64  However,  mere  informality 
of  statement  in  the  petition  will  not  prevent  it  from 
being  considered  on  its  merits,65  and  the  fact  that 
it  contains  inconsequential  misstatements  of  fact  is 


not  fatal  where  defendant  was  not  harmed  there- 
by.66 The  improper  designation  of  a  pleading  is  im- 
material where  it  alleges  the  elements  required  of  a 
bill  or  complaint  for  equitable  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment67 A  petition  substantially  following  the  stat- 
ute authorizing  the  proceeding  is  sufficient.68 

In  a  proper  case,  a  defective  pleading  may  be 
amended.69 

Verification.  In  accordance  with  the  general 
rules  as  to  verification  of  equity  pleadings  general- 
ly, discussed  in  Equity  §§  183-190,  a  bill  for  an  in- 
junction against  a  judgment,70  or  a  petition  to  set 
aside  a  judgment,71  must  be  verified  by  complain- 
ant in  person,  unless  there  is  some  sufficient  reason 
for  its  verification  by  his  attorney.75 


60.  Ga. — Hanleiter  v.  Spearman,  36 
S.E.2d  780. 

Tex. — Kelley  v.  Wright,  Civ.App., 
184  S.W.2d  649,  affirmed,  Sup.,  188 
S.W.2d  983. 

Pleadings  and  result 

(1)  A  bill  of  review  must  clearly 
recite  pleadings  and  result  of  orig- 
inal  suit,   so  as   to   enable  court  to 
determine  with  reasonable  certainty 
the  issues  involved. — Bevill  v.  Rosen- 
field,    Tex.Civ.App.,    113    S.W.2d    340, 
error    dismissed — Griffith    v.    Tipps, 
Tex.Civ.App.,    69    S.W.2d    846— Winn 
v.  Houston  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  631,  error  re- 
fused. 

(2)  Any  fact  averred  in  bill  of  re- 
view inconsistent  with,  or  contradic- 
tory  of,    pleadings    or   judgment   in 
main  case  will  be  given  no  effect  in 
determining  legal  sufficiency  of  bill. 
— Bevill    v.    Rosenfleld,   supra. 
History  of  proceedings 

A  bill  of  review  to  set  aside  pro- 
bate court  order  appointing  defend- 
ant as  attorney  to  represent  interests 
of  plaintiff  in  an  estate  was  suffi- 
cient where  bill  set  forth  history  of 
probate  proceedings  and  circum- 
stances under  which  appointment 
was  made. — Bevill  v.  Rosenfield,  su- 
pra. 

61.  Ala. — Copeland    v.    Copeland,    7 
So.2d  87,  242  Ala.  507, 

Ga. — Hanleiter  v.  Spearman,  36  S.K 

2d  780. 
Ky.— Triplett  v.  Stanley,  130  S.W.2d 

45,  279  Ky.  148. 
Invalidity  on  face 

In  a  direct  attack  on  a  judgment, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  allege  that 
the  judgment  showed  its  invalidity 
on  its  face, — Garza  v.  Kenedy,  Tex. 
Com.App.,  299  S.W.  231,  rehearing 
denied  5  S.W.2d  xx. 
63.  Ala.— Fletcher  v.  First  Nat. 

Bank  of  Opelika,  11  So.2d  854,  244 

Ala,  98. 
Ga.— -Felker    v.    Still,    169    S.B.    351, 

177  Ga.  30. 

49  C.J.S.— 49 


Tex. — Dunlap   v.   Villareal,   Civ.App., 

91  S.W.2d  1124. 
34  C.J.  p  488  note  14. 
Mere  inference  insufficient 

A  pleading  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment should  be  definite,  and  the  non- 
existence  of  facts  which  invalidate 
the  judgment  should  not  be  evaded, 
and  mere  inference  is  insufficient  to 
show  the  invalidity  of  the  judgment 
when  the  question  is  raised  by  prop- 
er demurrer. — Roy  v.  Abraham,  96 
So.  883,  209  Ala.  691. 
Allegations  on,  information  and  be- 
lief 

(1)  Chancery  will  not  restrain  the 
collection  of  a  judgment  at  law  on 
a  bill  in  which  all  the  material  facts 
are  charged  on  information  and  be- 
lief only,  without  any  allegation  as 
to  whence  the  information  was  de- 
rived or  any  affidavit  connected  with 
the  bill.— McGraw  v.  Walsh,  W.Va., 
232  F.  122,  146  C.C.A.  314—34  C.J.  p 
488  note  14  [c]. 

(2)  However,  in  an  action  to  have 
a    judgment    declared    void    and    to 
have  it  expunged  from  the  record  on 
the  theory  that  no  personal  service 
was  ever  effected  on  plaintiff,  it  was 
proper   for  plaintiff   to   allege   facts 
leading  to  entry  of  judgment  on  in- 
formation and  belief,  since,  presum- 
ably,    plaintiff     had     no     personal 
knowledge  of  the  service  on  a  per- 
son   other   than   himself   or   of   the 
facts  concerning  the  lack  of  service. 
—Hammond   v.    Citizens    Nat.    Bank 
of    Potsdam,     22    N.Y.S.2d    656,    260 
App.Div.  374,  motion  denied  23  N.Y.S. 
2d  559,  260  App.Div.  894. 

63.    Ala. — Copeland    v.    Copeland,    7 

So.2d  87,  242  Ala.  507. 
Ga. — Whiteside   v.   Croker,    142    S.B. 

139,  165  Ga.  765. 
Tex. — Gray   v.   Moore,   Civ.App.,   172 

S.W.2d   746,    error   refused. 
34  C.J.  p  489  note  15. 
Irregularities  and  omissions 

In    action    to    set    aside    a    judg- 
ment, it  is  not  sufficient,  with  ref- 

769 


erence  to  the  stating  of  a  cause  of 
action,  to  make  general  allegations 
of  irregularities  and  omissions,  but 
plaintiff  must  clearly  set  forth  defi- 
nite facts  from  which  there  can  be 
drawn  the  conclusion  that  a  recon- 
sideration or  the  conducting  of  fur- 
ther proceedings  .will  result  in  a  dif- 
ferent decree. — Termini  v.  McCor- 
mick,  23  So.2d  52,  208  La.  221. 

64.  111.— Reed    v.    New    York    Nat. 
Exch.   Bank,   82   N.E.   341,   230    111. 
50. 

65.  Mass.— Smith  v.  Brown,   184  N. 
E.  383,  282  Mass.  81. 

66.  Mass. — Smith   v.   Brown,   supra. 

67.  Ark, — Brookfield     v.     Harrahan 
Viaduct  Improvement  Dist,   54   S. 
W.2d  689,  186  Ark.  599. 

Tex. — Turman  Oil  Co.  v.  Roberts, 
Civ.App.,  96  S.W.2d  724,  error  re- 
fused. 

Pleading  considered  as  independent 
proceeding  for  equitable  relief  not- 
withstanding designation  as  "mo- 
tion" see  supra  §  377. 

68.  Ala. — Garvey        v.        Inglenook 
Const   Co.,    104    So.    639,    213    Ala. 
267. 

Matter  not  discretionary 

If  a  petition  for  review  of  a  de- 
fault judgment  follows  the  statutory 
provisions,  the  court  is  without  dis- 
cretion in  the  matter  and  must  hold 
the  petition  sufficient. — Dillbeck  v. 
Johnson,  129  S.W.2d  885,  344  Mo. 
845. 

69.  OkL— Cook    v.    Bruss,    30     P.2d 
686,  167  Okl.  466. 

7fc    Ind. — Ross    v.    Crews,    33    Ind. 

120. 
Mo. — Karicofe  v.  Schwaner,  196  S.W. 

46,  196  Mo.App.  565. 

71.  Tex. — Warne    v.    Jackson,    Civ. 
App.,    273    S.W.    315 — Batrucio    v. 
Selkirk,  Civ.App.,   160    S.W.    635. 

72.  Ala. — Smothers  v.  Meridian  Fer- 
tilizer Factory,  33  So.  898,  137  Ala. 
166. 


§  389 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Filing.  Where  a  party  has  performed  every  act 
required  to  place  his  case  before  the  only  court 
which  may  entertain  his  bill,  the  omission  of  the 
clerk  of  court  to  make  a  proper  indorsement  in  filing 
the  bill  does  not  prejudice  the  rights  of  the  com- 
plaining party.7$ 

b.  Specific  Grounds  for  Belief 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Fraud  or  perjury 

(1)  In  General 

The  existence  of  the  specific  ground  for  relief  against 
the  judgment  must  be  shown  by  specific  averments  set- 
ting forth  in  detail  the  particular  facts  constituting  the 
ground  alleged. 

Whatever  the  specific  ground  on  which  equity  is 
asked  to  interfere — whether  fraud,  accident,  mis- 
take, want  of  jurisdiction,  or  excusable  neglect — the 
bill  or  complaint  must  sufficiently  show  the  exist- 


ence of  such  ground  by  specific  averments,  setting 
forth  in  detail  the  particular  facts  constituting  the 
ground  alleged7*  In  order  to  show  the  invalidity 
of  the  judgment  on  the  ground  of  want  of  juris- 
diction, the  bill  must  set  out  in  detail  facts  from 
which  it  is  apparent  that  under  no  circumstances 
could  the  law  court  have  had  jurisdiction  to  ren- 
der it.™ 

Nezvly  discovered  evidence.  A  bill  for  relief  in 
equity  against  a  judgment  at  law  on  the  ground  of 
newly  discovered  evidence  must  set  forth  such  evi- 
dence in  detail,  so  that  the  court  may  judge  of  its 
nature,  materiality,  and  weight.76  It  must  also  aver 
that  complainant  was  ignorant  of  such  evidence  at 
the  time  of  the  trial  at  law,77  that  it  could  not  have 
been  discovered  by  due  diligence,  before  judgment 
was  rendered,78  what  efforts  he  made  for  that  pur- 
pose and  what  degree  of  diligence  he  employed,79 
that  the  evidence  was  discovered  after  judgment, 


La. — Boykin    v.    Holden,    6    La.Ann. 

120. 
78.    Tex. — Texas  Employers'  Ass'n  v. 

Cashion,  Civ.App.,  130  S.W.2d  1112, 

error  refused. 

74.    Ala. — Copeland    v.    Copeland,    7 

So.2d  87,  242  Ala.  507. 
Ark. — Better   Way   Life   Ins.    Co.   v. 
Linder,    181   S.W.2d    467,    207  Ark. 
533. 
Ga. — Qglesby   v.    Oglesby,    32    S.B.2d 

906,  198  Ga.  864. 
111.— Mohr    v.     Messick,     53     3ST.E.2d 

743,  322  IlLApp.  56. 
Ind.— Wohadlo    v.    Fary,    46    N.E.2d 
489,  221  Ind.  219— Bedron  v.  Baran, 
155  N.E.   611,   85   Ind.App.   649. 
Ky. — Board   of  Education   of  Pulas- 
ki  County  v.  Nelson,  88  S.W.2d  17, 
261  Ky.  466. 
La. — Sonnier  v.  Sonnier,  140  So.  49, 

19  La.App.  234. 
Okl.— Oklahoma  Ry.  Co.  v.  Holt,   17 

P.2d  955,  161  Okl.  165. 
Tenn. — Corpus   Juris   cited  iu  Hart- 
man   v.    Spiv«y,    123    S.W.2d    1110, 
'      22  Tenn.App.  435. 
Tex. — Sedgwick     v.    Kirby    Lumber 
Co.,   107   S.W.2d  358,   130  Tex.   163 
— Texas   Employers'   Ins.   Ass'n  v. 
Arnold,  88  S.W.2d  473,  126  Tex.  466 
— Union  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  Port 
Worth   v.   Smith,    Civ.App.,    166   S. 
W.2d  928 — Stone  v.  Stone,  Civ.App., 
101    S.W.2d   638— Dunlap   v.   Villa- 
real,    Civ.App.,     91    S.W.2d    1124 — 
Bray  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  Civ.App., 
10    S.W.2d    235,    error   dismissed — 
Citizens'    Bank    v.    Brandau,    Civ. 
App.,  1  S.W.2d  466,  error  refused — 
Cook    v.    Panhandle    Refining1   Co., 
CiY.App.f  267  S.W.  1070. 
34  C.J.  p  491  note  31. 
Allegation  consistent  with  recitation 
Allegation  of  bill  to  review  judg- 
ment  that   complainant  had   no   no- 
tice of  setting  of  case  wherein  judg-  J 


ment  was  rendered  was  not  incon- 
sistent with  recitation  in  Judgment 
that  cause  came  on  for  trial  at  regu- 
lar setting  and  in  its  due  order. — 
Peaslee-Gaulbert  Corporation  v. 
Hughes,  Tex.Civ.App.,  79  S.W.2d  149, 
error  refused. 

Averments  held  sufficient 

(1)  Generally. 

Ark. — North  Arkansas  Highway  Im- 
provement Dist  No.  2  v.  Home 
Telephone  Co.,  3  S.W.2d  307,  176 
Ark.  553. 

Fla.— Moore  v.  Avriett,  125  So.  351, 
98  Fla.  554. 

Tex. — Ramsey  v.  McKamey,  152  S. 
W.2d  322,  137  Tex.  91 — Perez  v.  E. 
P.  Lipscomb  &  Co.,  Civ. App.,  267 
S.TV.  748. 

34  C.JT.  p  491  note  31  [a]. 

(2)  Averment  that  judgment  cred- 
itor does  not  have  assets  sufficient 
to    meet   Indebtedness    to   judgment 
debtor  is   sufficient  averment  of  in- 
solvency,   in    suit   to    enjoin    collec- 
tion of  judgment  on  ground  of  set- 
oft — Adams     v.     Alabama    Lime    & 
Stone  Corporation,   127  So.   544,    221 
Ala.  10. 

Averments  held  insufflcieat 

(1)  Generally. 

Ala. — Choctaw  Bank  v.  Dearmon,  134 
So.  648,  223  Ala.  144. 

Cal.— O.  A.  Graybeal  Co.  v.  Cook,  60 
P.2d  525,  16  Cal.App.2d  231. 

Ga. — Green  v.  Spires,  7  S.E.2d  246, 
189  Ga.  719 — Block  v.  Information 
Buying  Co.,  153  S.E.  182,  170  Ga. 
466,  followed  in  Wallace  v.  Jack- 
son, 153  S.E.  523,  170  Ga.  549. 

Tex. — Browning-Ferris  Machinery  Co. 
v.  Thomson,  Civ.App.,  55  S.W.2d 
168. 

34  C.J.  p  491  note  31  £b]. 

(2)  Petition    to    set    aside    judg- 
ment  for   fraud   in   subjecting   land  I 

770 


to  execution  did  not  entitle  claim- 
ants to  set  aside  judgment  for  mis- 
take.—Bryant  v.  Bush,  140  S.E.  366, 
165  Ga.  252. 

(3)  Bill  was  held  not  to  show  that 
proceeding  was  void  on  its  'face. — 
Keenum  v.  Dodson,  102  So.  230,  212 
Ala.  146. 

75.     Ind. — Gum-Elastic    Roofing    Co. 

v.    Mexico   Pub.    Co.,    39    N.E.    443, 

140  Ind.  158,  30  L.R.A.  700. 
34  C.J.  p  491  note  32. 
Complaint  held  sufficient 
Or. — Dixie     Meadows      Independence 

Mines  Co.   v.  Kight,    45    P.2d    909, 

150  Or.  395. 

7S.  N.Y.— Crouse  v.  McVickar,  100 
N.E,  697,  207  N.T.  213,  45  L.R.A., 
N.S.,  1159. 

34  C.J.  p  492  note  42. 

77.  Va. — McCloud  v.  Virginia  Elec- 
tric &  Power  Co.,  180  S.E.  299,  164 
Va.  604. 

34  C.J.  p  492  note  43. 

78.  111.— Wood  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Woodlawn,   50  N.E.2d  830,   383   111. 
515,  certiorari  denied  64  S.Ct.  521, 
321    U.S.    765,    88   L.Ed.    1061. 

Ky.— Campbell    v.    Chriswell,    144    S. 

W.2d  802,  284  Ky.  328. 
N.M. — Ringle   Development   Corp.    v. 

Town  of  Tome  Land  Grant,  160  P. 

2d  441,  49  N.M.  192. 
Or.— Dixon   v.    Simpson,    279    P.    939, 

130  Or.  211. 
Va. — McCloud  v.  Virginia  Electric  & 

Power  Co.,    180    S.E.    299,    164   Va. 

•604. 
34  C.J.  p  492  note  44. 

79.  Or.— Dixon   v.    Simpson,    279   P. 
939,  130  Or.  211. 

Tenn. — Levan  v.  Patton,  2  Heisk. 
108. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


389 


and  too  late  to  take  any  action  in  the  law  case,80 
and  that  it  is  now  within  his  control,  and  that  he 
will  be  able  to  produce  it  on  another  trial.81  It 
must  also  appear  why  no  motion  for  a  new  trial 
was  made  in  the  trial  court  before  the  lapse  of  the 
term,82  that  the  complaint  was  filed  without  delay 
after  the  discovery  was  made,83  and  that  the  evi- 
dence will  produce  a  different  result  if  a  new  trial 
is  granted.84 

80.  Cal. — Mulford   v.    Cohn,    18   Cal. 
42. 

34  C.J.  P  492  note  46. 

81.  Cal. — Mulford   v.    Cohn,   18    Cal. 
42. 

Ga, — Hill  v.  Harris,  42  Ga.  412. 

82.  Cal. — Mulford  v.    Cohn,    18    Cal. 
42. 

83.  Ind. — State   v.   Holmes,    69   Ind. 
577. 

84.  Va. — McCloud  v.  Virginia  Elec- 
tric &  Power  Co.,  180  S.B.  299,  164 
Va.  604. 

85.  U.S.— U.   S.  v.  Kusche,  D.C.Cal., 
56  P.Supp.  201. 

Ala,— Copeland  v.  Copeland,  7  So. 
2d  87,  242  Ala.  507— Quick  y.  Mc- 
Donald, 108  So.  529,  214  Ala.  587. 

Cal. — Hammell   v.   Britton,   119   F.2d 

333,  19  Cal.2d  72— See  v.  Joughin, 
64    P.2d   149,    18    Cal.App.2d    414. 

Pla. — State  ex  rel.  Lorenz  v.  Lorenz, 

6  So.2d  620,  149  Fla.  625. 
Ga.— Elliott  v.   Elliott,   191   S.E.   465, 

184  Ga.  417 — Dorsey  v.  Griffin,  161 

S.E.  601,  173  Ga,  802. 
111.— Barzowski     v.     Highland     Park 

State  Bank,  31  N.E.2d  294,  371  111. 

412. 
Mo. — Wm.    H.     Johnson    Timber    & 

Realty  Co.  v.  Belt,  46  S.W.2d  153, 

329  Mo.  515. 
N*.M. — Bowers  v.  Brazell,  244  P.  893, 

31  N.M.  316. 
N-.Y.— Boylan    v.    Vogel,    264    N.Y.S. 

209,  147  Misc.  554,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  265  N.Y.S.  990,  240  App. 

Div,  "756. 
Okl.— Metssger    v.    Turner,    158    P.2d 

701,  195  Okl.  406. 
Tex. — Johnston  v.  Stephens,  Civ.App., 

300    S.W.    225,    reversed   on   other 

grounds    49    S.W.2d   431,    121   Tex. 

374. 
34  OJ.  p  491  note  33—47  C.J.  p  438 

note  72. 

Bill  or  complaint  held  sufficient 
U.S. — Hanna  v.  Brictson  Mfg.  Co.,  C. 

C.A.S.D.,  62  F.2d  139. 
Ala. — Bolden  v.   Sloss-Sheffleld  Steel 

&  Iron  Co.,   110   So.   574,   215   Ala. 

334,  49    A.L.R.    1206— Keenum    v. 
Dodson,   102  So.  230,  212  Ala,   146. 

Ark. — Martin  v.  Street  Improvement 

Dist   No.    349,    11   S.W.2d  469,    178 

Ark.   588. 
Cal. — Bernhard  v.  Waring,  2  P.2d  32, 

213  Cal.   175— Newport  v.  Hatton, 

231  P.  987,  195  Cal.  132. 
Pla. — Reybine  v.  Kruse,  190  So.  711, 

139  Pla.  577. 


(2)  Fraud  or  Perjury 

Where  a  Judgment  Is  attacked  for  fraud  or  perjury, 
the  bill  or  petition  must  state  a  cause  of  action  for  re- 
lief on  this  ground  and  set  forth  particularly  the  specific 
facts  constituting  the  alleged  fraud  or  perjury. 

Where  the  aid  of  equity  in  relieving  against  a 
judgment  is  sought  for  fraud,  the  bill  or  complaint 
must  state  a  cause  of  action  for  relief  on  this 
ground,85  by  establishing  extrinsic  fraud,86  rather 


Ga. — White  v.  Roper,  167  S.E.  177, 
176  Ga,  180— Groom  v.  Bennett,  147 
S.E.  560,  168  Ga.  178— Branan  v. 
Feldman,  123  S.E.  710,  158  Ga.  377 
— Mullis  v.  Bank  of  Chauncey,  150 
S.E.  471,  40  Ga,App.  582. 

Kan.— Laidler  v.  Peterson,  92  P.2d 
18,  150  Kan.  306. 

Ky. — Jarvis  v.  Baughman,  137  S.W. 
2d  1076,  282  Ky.  115— Stewart  v. 
Carter  County,  36  S.W.2d  7,  237 
Ky.  600. 

La. — Terry  v.  Womack,  20  So.2d  365, 
206  La,  1069— McHenry  v.  Wall, 
App.,  157  So.  632. 

Minn. — Lenhart  v.  Lenhart  Wagon 
Co.,  298  N.W.  37,  210  Minn.  164, 
135  A.L.R.  833,  mandate  modified 
on  other  grounds  2  N.W.2d  421, 
211  Minn.  572. 

N.Y.— Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Delaware 

&  H.  Co.,  264  N.Y.S.  470,  238  App. 

Div.   191. 
N. C.— McCoy  v.  Justice,  146  S.E.  214, 

196  N.C.  553. 
Okl.— Federal   Tax  Co.   v.   Board  of 

Com'rs   of  Okmulgee   County,    102 

P.2d  148,  187  Okl.  223. 
Or. — Oregon-Washington   R.   &  Nav. 

Co.   v.   Reid,   65   P.2d  664,   155   Or. 

602. 

Tex. — Mauldin  v.  American  Liberty 
Pipe  Line  Co.,  Civ.App.,  185  S.W.2d 
158,  ref.w.m — Early  v.  Burns,  Civ. 
App.,  142  S.W.2d  260,  error  refused 
— Lamb  v.  Isley,  Civ.App.,  114  S.W. 
2d  673,  rehearing  denied  115  S.W. 
2d  1036 — Sedgwick  v.  Kirby  Lum- 
ber Co.,  Civ.App.,  78  S.W.2d  1107, 
affirmed  107  S.W.2d  358,  130  Tex. 
163— Ritch  v.  Jarvis,  Civ.App.,  64 
S.W. 2 d  831,  error  dismissed — Dal- 
las Coffee  &  Tea  Co.  v.  Williams, 
Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  724,  error  dis- 
missed. 

Wash. — Rennebohm  v.  Rennebohm, 
279  P.  402,  153  Wash.  102. 

Wis. — Amberg  v.  Deaton,  271  N.W. 
396,  223  Wis.  653. 

Sill  or  complaint  held  insufficient 

U.S. — Toledo  Scale  Co.  v.  Computing 
Scale  Co.,  Ohio,  43  S.Ct.  458,  261 
U.S.  399,  67  L.Ed.  719— Morse  v. 
Lewis,  C.C.A.W.Va,,  54  F.2d  1027, 
certiorari  denied  52  S.Ct  640,  286 
U.S.  557,  76  L.Ed.  1291. 

Ala. — Prestwood  v.  Bagley,  149  So. 
817,  227  Ala.  316— Kelen  v.  Brew- 
er, 129  So.  23,  221  Ala.  445— Quick 
v.  McDonald,  108  So.  529,  214  Ala, 
587. 

Ga, — Abercrombie   v.   Hair,   196   S.E. 

771 


447,   185   Ga.   728— Walker  v.  Hall, 

166   S.E.    757,    176   Ga,   12— Ellis   v. 

Ellis,  163  S.E.  155,  174  Ga,  559. 
Ky. — Board  of  Education  of  Pulaski 

County   v.    Nelson,    88    S.W.2d    17, 

261  Ky.  466. 
Mich. — Hofweber    v.    Detroit    Trus* 

Co.,   294  N.W.   108,  295   Mich.   96. 
N.M.— Bowers  v.  Brazell,  244  P.  893, 

31  N.M.  316. 
N.Y.— Joelson  v.  Mayers,  4  N.Y.S.  2d 

232,  254  App.Div.   749,  appeal  dis- 
missed   18    N.E.2d    312,     279    N.Y. 

681,    appeal    dismissed    18    N.E.2d 

868,  279  N.Y.  785. 
N.C. — Stevens  v.  Cecil,  199  S.E.  163, 

214  N.C.  273. 
Ohio.— May  v.  May,  50  N.E.2d  790,  72 

Ohio  App.  82. 
Okl.— Clinton   v.   Miller,    216   P.    185, 

96  Okl.  71. 
Or. — Mattoon  v.  Cole,   143   P.2d   679, 

172  Or.  664. 
Tex. — Crouch  v.   McGaw,  138   S.W.2d 

94,  134  Tex.  '633— Kelley  v.  Wright, 

Civ.App.,  184  S.W.2d  649,  affirmed, 

Sup.,  188  S.W.2d   983— Sedgwick  v. 

Kirby    Lumber    Co.,    Civ.App.,     78 

S.W.2d    1107,    affirmed   107    S.W.2d 

358,  130  Tex.  163. 
Utah.— Wright    v.    W.    E.    Callahan 

Const.  Co.,  156  P.2d  710. 
Wash.— Zapon  Co.  v.  Bryant,  286  P. 

282,  156  Wash.  161. 
Pacts   not    warranting    conclusion 

A  general  allegation  that  a  Judg- 
ment was  procured  by  fraud  is  no 
stronger  than  recital  of  facts  from 
which  the  general  conclusion  is 
drawn,  and,  if  such  facts  do  not 
warrant  the  conclusion  the  petition 
is  insufficient. — Oglesby  v.  Oglesby, 
32  S.E.2d  906,  198  Ga.  864. 

Plea  of  prescription  against  peti- 
tion to  annul  judgment  will  not  be 
sustained,  if  petition  is  sufficient  to 
prove  date  of  discovery  of  fraud. — 
Smith  v.  Williams,    2   La-App.   24. 
Particular  allegations  construed 
Ga,— Bird  v.  Smith,  197  S.E.  642,  186 

Ga.  301. 
86.     U.S. — Montgomery  v.  Gilbert,  C 

C.A.Mont.,  77  F.2d  29. 
Ariz. — Dockery    v.    Central    Arizona 

Light  &  Power  Co.,  45  P.2d  656,  45 

Aria.  434. 
Ark. — Ready  v.  Ozan  Inv.  Co.,  79  S. 

W.2d  433,  190  Ark.  606. 
Fla. — Hamilton   v.   Flowers,    183    So. 

811,  134  Fla,  828. 
Procurement  of  decree 

In  order  to  sustain  bill  to  vacate 


389 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


than  intrinsic  fraud,8?  and  by  showing  that  the 
judgment  is  wrong.88  It  is  not  sufficient  to  incor- 
porate in  the  bill  a  general  allegation  of  fraud,  de- 
ceit, or  concealment,  but  the  specific  facts  consti- 
tuting the  alleged  fraud  must  be  set  forth  particu- 
larly.89  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  facts  constitut- 
ing fraud  are  so  set  forth,  the  bill  is  sufficient,  al- 
though it  lacks  a  specific  allegation  of  fraud,90  un- 
less any  reliance  on  fraud  as  a  ground  for  relief 
is  specifically  abandoned  by  statement  to  the  court91 
Where  the  fraud  charged  consists  of  acts  of  third 
persons,  it  must  appear  from  the  bill  that  the  judg- 


ment creditor  was  a  party  to  it.92 

Perjury.  Where  a  judgment  is  attacked  on  the 
ground  of  perjury,  the  bill  or  complaint  must  con- 
tain all  necessary  allegations  warranting  the  relief 
sought.93  The  bill  should  name  the  witnesses,  and 
wherein  they  swore  falsely,94  and  set  forth  facts 
tending  to  show  that  their  testimony  was  false,95 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  judgment  creditor,96  and 
that  complainant  has  witnesses  to  prove  such 
facts,97  giving  their  names  and  addresses.98  Plain- 
tiff must  also  allege  the  means  by  which  the  perjury 


decree  for  fraud,  bill  must  allege 
facts  showing-  that  fraud  was  in  con- 
coction or  procurement  of  decree. — 
Jones  v.  Henderson,  153  So.  214,  228 
Ala.  273. 

Extrinsic  fraud  sufficiently  alleged 

Gal. — Stenderup   v.    Broadway    State 

Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  28  P.2d  14, 

219    Cal.    593— Caldwell  v.   Taylor, 

23  P.2d  758,  218  Cal.  471,  88  A.L.R. 

1194— Larrabee  v.  Tracy,  104  P.2d 

61,  39  Cal.App.2d  593 — Bogardus  v, 

O'Dea,  287  P.  149,  105  CaLApp.  189, 

Mo.— Fadler   v.    Gabbert,    63    S.W.2d 

121,  333  Mo.  851. 

Mont. — Bullard  v.  Zimmerman,  268  P. 
512,  82  Mont  434. 

87.  U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Kusche,  D.C.CaL, 
56  F.Supp.  201. 

Cal.— La  Salle  v.  Peterson,  32  P.2d 
612,  220  Cal.  739— O.  A.  Graybeal 
Co.  v.  Cook,  60  P.2d  525,  16  Cal. 
App.2d  231. 

Kan.— Bitsko  v.  Bitsko,  122  P.2d  753, 
155  Kan.  80. 

Mont. — Moser  v.   Fuller,    86   P.2d   1, 

107  Mont  424. 

Okl.— Metzger  v.  Turner,  158  P.2d 
701,  195  Okl,  406. 

88.  Cal. — Machado  v.   Machado,   152 
P.2d   457,    66  Cal.App.2d   401. 

89.  U.S. — Kithcart    v.    Metropolitan 
Life    Ins.   Co.,    C.C.A.MO.,    88    F.2d 
407— Barnes  v.  Boyd,  D.C.W.Va.,  8 
F.Supp.  584,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  73  F. 
2d   910,   certiorari   denied   55    S.Ct 
550,    294    U.S.    723,    79    L.Ed.    1254, 
rehearing  denied  55  S.Ct   647,  295 
U.S.  768,  79  L.Bd.  1708. 

Ala.— Hooke  v.  Hooke,  25  So.2d  33 — 
Copeland  v.  Copeland,  7  So.2d  87, 
242  Ala.  507— Quick  v.  McDonald, 

108  So.  529,  214  Ala.  587. 

Cal. — Hammell  v.   Britton,    119   P.2d 

333,   19   Cal.2d  72— O.  A.   Graybeal 

Co.   v.  Cook,   60   P.2d  525,  16  Cal. 

App.2d  231. 
Ga. — Stanton  v.  Galley,  33  S.B.2d  747, 

7-2  GeuApp.  428. 
Idaho. — Inman  v.  Round  Valley  Irr. 

Co.,  238  P.  1018,  41  Idaho  482. 
111.— Woodworth  v.  Sandin,  20  N.E.2d 

603,  371  111.  302. 
Iowa. — Shaw  v.  Addison,  18  N.W.2d 

796. 
Ky. — Board  of  Education  of  Pulaski 

County  v.   Kelson,   88   S.W.2d   17, 


261  Ky.  466 — Hargis  Commercial 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.'s  Liquidating 
Agent  v.  Eversole,  74  S.W.2d  193, 
255  Ky.  377. 

Minn.— Murray  v.  Calkins,  242  N.W. 
706,  186  Minn.  192— Hawley  v. 
Knott  216  N.W.  800,  173  Minn.  149. 

Mo.— Dorman  v.  Hall,  101  S.W.  161, 
124  Mo.App.  5. 

N.C.— Home  v.  Edwards,  3  S.E.2d  1, 
215  N.C.  622— Gates  v.  Texas  Co., 
166  S.E.  317,  203  N.C.  474. 

Okl. — Southwick  v.  Jones,  60  P.2d 
774,  177  Okl.  409— Finley  v.  Riley, 
215  P.  950,  91  Okl.  58. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hart- 
man  v.  Spivey,  123  S.W.2d  1110, 
1114,  22  TenruApp.  435. 

Tex.— Petty  v.  Mitchell,  Civ.App., 
187  S.W.2d  138,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  491  note  33. 

Averments  held  sufficient 
Ark. — Brookfleld  v.  Harrahan  Viaduct 
Improvement  Dist,  54  S.W.Sd  689, 

186  Ark.  599. 

Ga. — Mullis  v.  Bank  of  Chauncey, 
150  S.E.  471,  40  Ga.App.  582. 

Kan.— Laidler  v.  Peterson,  92  P.2d 
18,  150  Kan.  306. 

Okl.— Parker  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Okmulgee  County,  102  P.2d  880, 

187  Okl.   308— Parker  v.  Board  of 
Com'rs  of  Okmulgee  County,  102  P. 
2d  883,  187  Okl.  311. 

Or. — Oregon-Washington   R.   &  Nav. 

Co.  v.   Reid,   65   P.2d  664,   155   Or. 

602. 
Tex.— Reitz  v.  Mitchell,  CivJLpp.,  256 

S.W.  697. 
34  C.J.  p  491  note  33  [a]. 

Averments  held  insufficient 

U.S. — Morse   v.    Lewis,    C.C.A.W.Va., 

54  F.2d  1027,  certiorari  denied  52 

S.Ct    640,   286   U.S.    557,    76   L.Ed. 

1291. 
Cal. — O.  A.  Graybeal  Co.  v.  Cook,  60 

P.2d  525,    16  Cal.App.2d   231. 
N.C. — Hawkins  v.  Federal  Land  Bank 

of   Columbia,    S.C.,    18    S.E.2d   823, 

221  N.C.  73. 

The  alleged  fraudulent  statement* 
of  the  petition  on  which  jurisdiction 
of  the  court  was  invoked  to  render 
the  decree  complained  of  must  be  set 
forth. — Copeland  v.  Copeland,  7  So.2d 
87,  242  Ala.  €07. 

772 


Admissions 

A  petition  to  vacate  judgment  for 
fraud,  based  on  admissions  made 
after  trial  by  plaintiff's  attorney, 
was  not  demurrable  on  ground  of  in- 
admissibility  of  such  admissions,  in 
absence  of  allegation  that  such  ad- 
missions were  in  some  way  part  of 
an  offer  to  compromise. — Laidler  v. 
Peterson,  92  P.2d  18,  150  Kan.  306. 

90.  Ga. — Sylvania  Ins.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 160  S.E.  788,  173  Ga.  679. 

34  C.J.  p  492  note  34. 

91.  Tex1. — Sedgwick  v.   Kirby  Lum- 
ber Co.,   107  S.W.2d   358,   130  Tex. 
163. 

92.  Or.— Mattoon  v.   Cole,    143   P.2d 
679,   172  Or.  664. 

34  C.J.  p  492  note  35. 

93.  Okl.— Lewis  v.  Couch,   154   P.2d 
51,   194  Okl.  632. 

S.D.— Seubert  v.  Seubert,  7  N.W.2d 
301. 

Averments  held  sufficient 

La. — Adkins'  Heirs  v.  Crawford,  Jen- 
kins &  Booth,  3  So.2d  539,  200  La. 
561. 

Neb.— Krause  v.  Long,  192  N.W.  729, 
109  Neb.  846. 

94.  Del. — Kersey  v.  Rash,  3  DeLCh. 
321. 

Tex. — Stringer  v.  Robertson,  Civ. 
App.,  140  S.W.  502. 

95.  111.— Nicoloff   v.    Schnipper,    233 
IlLApp.  591. 

34  C.J.  p  492  note  37. 
Conviction 

Judgment  would  not  be  set  aside 
on  ground  that  certain  testimony 
was  false,  where  there  was  no  alle- 
gation that  the  witness  giving  the 
allegedly  false  testimony  had  been 
found  guilty  of  perjury. — Stephens  v. 
Pickering,  15  S.E.2d  202.  192  Ga. 
199— Bird  v.  Smith,  197  S.B.  642, 
186  Ga.  301— Foster  v.  Cotton  States 
Electric  Co.,  157  S.E.  -636,  172  Ga. 
231. 

96.  N.C. — Burgess  v.  Lovengood,  55 
N.C.  457. 

94  C.J.  p  492  note  38. 

97.  111.-— Ames  v.  Snider,  55  111.  4%S. 

98.  Iowa. — Dixon    v.     Graham,     *6 
Iowa  310. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  389 


was  discovered,"  and  that  such  discovery  could  not 
have  been  made  in  time  to  have  been  available  as 
a  defense  in  the  law  action.1 

c.  Allegations  as  to  Specific  Matters 

Where  such  a  showing  Is  a  prerequisite  to  relief, 
the  bill  must  contain  proper  and  sufficient  allegations  as 
to  the  existence  of  a  meritorious,  defense,  the  plaintiff's 
diligence  and  lack  of  fault,  injury  or  injustice  resulting 
from  the  enforcement  of  the  Judgment,  and  lack  or  loss 
of  remedy  at  law. 


Where  the  existence  of  a  meritorious  cause  of 
action  or  defense  is  a  prerequisite  to  relief,  as  dis- 
cussed supra  §  349,  the  bill  must  allege  and  show 
that  complainant  has  a  good  and  meritorious  claim 
or  defense  to  the  action  at  law,2  that  he  is  able  to 
present  to  the  court  the  evidence  constituting  such 
defense,3  and  that  a  different  judgment  would  en- 
sue if  the  judgment  at  law  were  set  aside  and  the 
action  tried  anew.4  Ordinarily,  a  general  allega- 
tion that  complainant  has  a  meritorious  defense  to 


99.  Idaho. — Boise  Payette  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Idaho  Gold  Dredging:  Cor- 
poration. 58  P.2d  786,  56  Idaho  660, 
certiorari  denied  57  S.Ct  40,  299 
U.S.  677.  81  L.Ed.  425. 

1.  Idaho. — Boise     Payette     Lumber 
Co.  v.  Idaho  Gold  Dredging  Corpo- 
ration, supra* 

2.  U.S. — Matheson  v.  National  Sure- 
ty Co.,   C.C.A.Alaska,    69   F.2d  914. 

Ala. — Murphree  v.  International  Shoe 
Co.,  20  So.2d  782.  246  Ala.  384— 
Fletcher  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Opelika,  11  So.2d  854,  244  Ala.  98 
— Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Street, 
176  So.  350,  234  Ala,  537— Hatton 
v.  Moseley,  156  So.  546,  229  Ala. 
240— Ikard  v.  Walker,  104  So.  129, 
213  Ala.  13— King  v.  Dent,  93  So. 
823,  208  Ala.  78. 

Ark.— Holthoff  y.  State  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  Wellston,  Mo.,  186  S. 
W.2d  162,  208  Ark.  307— Baskins  v. 
Hosalc  Templars  of  America,  4  S. 
W.2d  932,  176  Ark.  940. 

D.C.— Ray  v.  Carr,  107  F.2d  238,  71 
App.D.C.  37. 

Ga. — Huson  Ice  &  Coal  Co.  v.  City  of 
Covington,  172  S.B.  56,  178  Ga.  6. 

111.— Nasti  v.  Cook  County,  180  N.E. 
847,  348  111.  342. 

Kan. — Fitzhugh  v.  Central  Trust  Co., 
72  P.2d  959,  146  Kan.  585. 

Ky. — Workingmen's  Perpetual  Bldg. 
&  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Stephens,  184  S. 
W.2d  575,  299  Ky.  177— Curtis  v. 
Reed,  176  S.W.2d  385,  296  Ky.  221 
— McKim  v.  Smith,  172  S.W.2d  634, 
294  Ky.  835— Ohio  Valley  Fire  & 
Marine  Ins.  Co.'s  Receiver  v.  New- 
man, 13  S.W.2d  771,  227  Ky.  554 
— Collins'  Ex'rs  v.  Bonner,  294  S. 
W.  1027,  220  Ky.  212— Holt  v.  Ma- 
honey,  270  S.W.  795,  208  Ky.  330. 

Miss.— Strickland  v.  Webb,  120  So. 
168,  152  Miss.  421. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hocken- 
berry  v.  Cooper  County  State 
Bank,  88  S.W.2d  1031,  1037,  338  Mo. 
31. 

Mont. — Frisbee  v.  Co  burn,  52  P.2d 
882,  101  Mont.  58. 

Ohio. — Mosher  v.  Mutual  Home  & 
Savings  Ass'n,  App.,  41  N.E.2d 
871. 

Okl. — Honey cutt  v.  Severin,  98  P.2d 
1093,  186  Okl.  509— Oklahoma  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Holt,  17  P.2d  955,  161  Okl. 
165. 


Or. — Dixon  v.  Simpson,  279  P.  939, 
130  Or.  211. 

Tex.— Mann  v.  Risher,  116  S.W.2d 
692,  131  Tex.  498— Brown  v.  Clip- 
penger,  256  S.W.  254,  113  Tex. 
364— Winters  Mut  Aid  Ass'n,  Cir- 
cle No.  2  v,  Reddin,  Com.App.,  49 
S.W.2d  1095— Smith  v.  Ferrell, 
Com. App.,  44  S.W.2d  962 — Dorsey 
v.  Cutbirth,  Civ.App.,  178  S.W.2d 
749,  error  refused — Union  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  Fort  Worth  v.  Smith, 
Civ.App.,  166  S.W.2d  928— Goldapp 
v.  Jones  Lumber  Co.,  Civ.App.,  163 
S.W.2d  229,  error  refused — Barrow, 
Wade,  Guthrie  &  Co.  v.  Stroud,  Civ. 
App.,  125  S.W.2d  365— Allen  v. 
Trentman,  Civ.App.,  115  S.W.2d 
1177— Fort  Worth  &  Denver  City 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Reid,  Civ.App.,  115  S.W. 
2d  1156— Universal  Credit  Co.  v. 
Cunningham,  Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d 
507,  error  dismissed — Stone  v. 
Stone,  Civ.App.,  101  S.W.2d  638— 
Murry  v.  Citizens'  State  Bank  of 
Ranger,  Civ.App.,  77  S.W.2d  1104, 
error  dismissed — Texas  Employers' 
Ins.  Ass'n  v.  Shelton,  Civ.App.,  74 
S.W.2d  280— Smith  v.  Dunnam,  Civ. 
App.,  57  S.W.2d  873,  error  refused 
— Settles  v.  Milano  Furniture  Co., 
Civ.App.,  51  S.W.Sd  655,  error  re- 
fused— Dallas  Coffee  &  Tea  Co.  v. 
Williams,  Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  724, 
error  dismissed — Scott  v.  McGloth- 
lin,  Civ. App.,  30  S.W.2d  511,  af- 
firmed McGothlin  v.  Scott,  Com. 
App.,  48  S.W.2d  610— R.  A.  Toombs 
Sash  &  Door  Co.  v.  Jamison,  Civ. 
App.,  271  S.W.  253— Crutcher  v. 
Wolfe,  Civ.App.,  269  S.W.  841— 
Cooper  v.  Cooper,  Civ.App.,  260  S. 
W.  679 — Bergeron  v.  Security  Nat 
Bank,  Civ.App.,  252  S.W.  856 — Cole 
v.  Varner,  Civ.App.,  246  S.W.  410 
— Taylor  v.  Hustead  &  Tucker, 
Civ.App.,  243  S.W.  766,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  Com. App.,  257  S.W. 
232. 

Utah. — Taylor  v.  Guaranty  Mortg. 
Co.,  220  P.  1067,  62  Utah  520. 

34  C.J.  P  489  note  18. 

Prlma  facie  showing  of  meritori- 
ous defense  in  plaintiffs  petition  is 
sufficient  in  suit  to  cancel  judgment. 
—Adams  v,  First  Nat.  Bank,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  294  S.W.  909. 

Averments  held  trafllcient 

Colo.— Ferrier  v.  Morris,  122  P.2d 
880,  109  Colo,  154. 

773 


Del. — Battaglino  v.  Industrial  Trust 

Co.,  175  A.  50,  20  DeLCh.  344. 
Idaho. — Inman  v.  Round  Valley  Irr. 

Co.,  238  P.  1018,  41  Idaho  482. 
111. — Adams   &   Pigott    Co.    v.   Allen, 

141  N.E.  386,  310  111.  119. 
Ky. — Holcomb  v.   Creech,   56   S.W.2d 

998,  247  Ky.  199. 
Mo. — Cherry   v.   Wertheim,   App.,    25 

S.W.2d  118. 
Or. — State  Bank  of  Sheridan  v.  Hei- 

der,   9   P.2d  117,   139  Or.   185. 
Tex. — Farmers'  State  Bank  of  Burk- 
burnett  v.   Jameson,   Com.App.,   11 
S.W.2d  299,  rehearing  denied  Farm- 
ers' State  Bank  of  Burkburnett  v. 
Jameson,  Coxn.App.,  16  S.W.2d  52$ 
— McAfee    v.    Jeter    &    Townsend, 
Civ.App.,  147  S.W.2d  884, 
Averments  held  insufficient 
Ark.— Pullen    v.    Smith,    139    S.W.2d 

245,  200  Ark.  420. 
111.— Adams   &   Pigott   Co.   v.    Allen, 
228  IlLApp.  230,  affirmed  141  N.E. 
386,  310  111.  119. 
Mont. — Frisbee    v.    Coburn,    52    P.M 

882,  101  Mont.  58. 

Ohio. — Mosher    v.    Mutual    Home    & 
Savings  Ass'n,  App.,  41  N.E.2d  871. 
Allegations  of  original  bill 

Failure  to  allege  good  and  meri- 
torious defense  against  defendants' 
supplemental  answer  and  cross  bill, 
on  which  defendants  obtained  decree 
pro  confesso,  was  supplied  by  aver- 
ment of  plaintiffs  original  bill  that 
plaintiff  had  recovered  judgment  for 
enforcement  of  which  he  was  then 
invoking  aid  of  chancery  jurisdiction 
of  court,  which  judgment  had  been 
recorded  as  provided  by  statute,  and 
that  judgment  was  valid. — McCarty 
v.  Yarbrough,  128  So.  786,  221  Ala. 
330. 

3.  Ala. — Murphree    v.    International 
Shoe   Co.,    20    So.2d    782,    246   Ala. 
384. 

Idaho. — Inman  v.  Round  Valley  Irr. 

Co.,   238   P.   1018,   41  Idaho   482. 
34  C.J.  p  489  note  19. 

4.  U.S.— Kithcart     v.     Metropolitan 
Life   Ins.   Co.,   C.C.A.Mo.,   119   F.2d 
497,  certiorari  denied  U.  S.  ex  rel. 
Kithcart  v.  Gardner,   62  S.Ct.   793, 

'    315  U.S.-  808,  86  L.Ed.  1207. 
Cal.— Wilson    v.    Wilson,     130     P.2d 

782,  55  Cal.App.2d  421. 
Tex. — Allen    v.    Trentman,    Clv.App., 

115  S.W.2d  1177. 


389 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


the  original  suit  is  not  sufficient,  and  the  facts 
which  constitute  such  defense  must  be  pleaded,5 
but  it  has  been  held  that  a  pleading  in  general  terms 
may  be  sufficient  in  the  absence  of  special  excep- 
tion thereto.6  It  is  not  enough  for  complainant  to 
aver  that  he  has  stated  the  facts  to  his  attorney  and 
that  he  is  advised  by  him  that  he  has  a  good  de- 
fense.? 

The  rule  that  a  meritorious  defense  must  be 
pleaded  does  not  apply  where  the  judgment  is  at- 
tacked as  void,  rather  than  voidable,8  as  where  the 
judgment  was  rendered  without  obtaining  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  person  of  defendant,9  and  it  has  been 
held  that  this  is  the  case  whether  the  invalidity  of 
the  judgment  appears  on  its  face  or  must  be  shown 


by  evidence  dehors  the  record.10  A  complaint  to 
set  aside  a  judgment  rendered  through  mistake  or 
the  like  need  not  show  a  meritorious  defense  where 
the  defense  has  already  been  made.11 

Diligence  and  lack  of  fault.  As  a  general  rule, 
complainant  in  a  suit  in  equity  for  relief  against  a 
judgment  at  law  must  exonerate  himself  from  blame 
for  the  situation  in  which  he  finds  himself,  that  is, 
his  bill  must  contain  proper  averments  to  show  that 
the  judgment  against  him  was  not  attributable  to 
his  own  negligence  or  fault,  and  that  he  has  been 
diligent  in  seeking  to  make  his  defense,  and  he 
must  set  forth  the  facts  which  he  relies  on  as  show- 
ing such  diligence,12  or,  where  it  appears  that  the 
judgment  was  obtained  as  a  result  of  his  neglect,  he 


5.  Ala.— Murphree    v.    International, 
Shoe    Co.,    20    So.2d    782,   246   Ala. 
384— Fletcher  v.   First  Nat.   Bank 
of  Opelika,  11  So.2d  S54,   244  Ala. 
98— Corpus    Juris    cited    in    Little 
v.  Peevy,  189  So.  720,  725,  238  Ala. 
106. 

Cal. — Brozey    v.    Alesen,    3    P.2d    68, 

116  OaLApP.  641. 
H.C.— Hinton  v.  whitehurst,  19  S  S.E. 

579,   214  N.C.  99. 
Tex. — Poland  v.  Kisher,  Civ.App.,  88 

S.W.2d     1106,     affirmed     Mann     v. 

Risher,    116    S.W.2d   692,   131   Tex. 

498 — "Winn  v.  Houston  Building  & 

Loan    Ass'n,    Civ.App.,    45    S.W.2d 

631,  error  refused. 
Va. — Lockard   v.   Whitenacfc,    144    S. 

E.  606,  151  Va.  143. 
84  C.J.  p  489  note  20. 

6.  Tex. — Edwards  v.  Riverside  Roy- 
alties Corporation,  Civ.App.,  99  S. 
W.2d   418.     Error   dismissed. 

7.  U.S.— Christy  v.   Atchison,   T.   & 
S.  F.  R.  Co.,  D.C-Colo.,  214  F.  1016. 

Cal.— Eldred  v.  White,  36  P.  944, 
102  Cal.  600. 

&  Cal. — Cadenasso  v.  Bank  of  Italy, 
6  P.2d  944,  214  Cal.  562. 

Idaho. — Johnson  v.  J.  A.  Barrett  Au- 
to Co.,  4  P.2d  344,  51  Idaho  95. 

Or. — Dixie  Meadows  Independence 
Mines  Co.  v.  Kight,  45  P.2d  909, 
150  Or.  395. 

9.  Wash. — John  Hancock  Mut.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Gooley,  83  P.2d  221,  196 
Wash.  357,   118  A.L.R.   1484. 

10.  Wash. — John  Hancock  Mut  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Gooley,  supra. 

11.  Ind. — Globe   Mining  Co.   v.   Oak 
Ridge  Coal  Co.,   177  N.B.   868,  204 
Ind.  11. 

13.    U.S. — Barnes    v.    Boyd,    D.C.W. 

Va.,    8   F.Supp.   584,  affirmed,   C.C. 

A.,    73   F.2d   910,   certiorari  denied 

55    S.Ct,    550,    294   U.S.    723,    79   L. 

Ed.  1254,  rehearing  denied  55  S.Ct. 

647,  295  U.S.  768,  79  L.Ed.  1708. 
Ala. — Fletcher  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of 


Opelika,  11  So.2d  S54,  244  Ala.  98 
— Farrell  v.  Farrell,  10  So.2d  153, 
243  Ala.  3S9 — McWillrams  v.  Mar- 
tin, 188  So.  677,  237  Ala.  624— 
Leath  v.  Lister,  173  So.  59,  233 
Ala.  595— Hatton  v.  Moseley,  156 
So.  546.  229  Ala.  240— Florence  Gin 
Co.  v.  City  of  Florence,  147  So.  417, 
226  Ala.  478,  followed  in  147  So. 

420,  three  cases,  226  Ala.  482,  147 
So.  421,   226  Ala.   482,  and  147  So. 

421,  226  Ala.   483— Adams  v.  Ala- 
bama Lime   &   Stone   Corporation, 
127  So.  544,  221  Ala.  10— Quick  v. 
McDonald.    108    So.    529,    214    Ala. 
587. 

Ark.— Holthoff  v.  State  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  Wellston,  Mo.,  186  S.W.Sd 
162,  208  Ark.  307— Smith  v.  Thom- 
as, 78  S.W.2d  380,  190  Ark.  261— 
Farmers'  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Defries,  1  S.W.2d  19,  175  Ark. 
548. 

Cal.— Hammell  v.  Britton,  119  P.2d 
333,  19  Cal.2d  72— Fisher  v.  George, 
216  P.  974,  62  Cal.App.  399— Hogan 
v.  Horsfall,  266  P.  1002,  91  Cal. 
App.  37,  followed  in  266  P.  1005, 
91  CaLApp.  797. 

Del.— Di  Luchio  v.  Otis  Oil  Burner 
Corporation,  135  A.  482,  15  Del.Ch. 
229. 

G-a. — Scarborough  v.  Information 
Buying  Co.,  154  S.E.  350,  170  Ga. 
872 — Brown  v.  Verekas,  139  S.E. 
344,  164  Ga.  733. 

Idaho. — Boise  Payette  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Idaho  Gold  Dredging  Corporation, 
58  P.2d  786,  56  Idaho  660,  certio- 
rari denied  57  S.Ct  40,  299  U.S. 
577,  81  L.Ed.  425. 

Ind.— Cooper  v.  Farmers'  Trust  Co., 
146  N.E.  336,  82  Ind.App.  442. 

Kan.— Bitsko  v.  Bitsko,  122  P.2d 
753,  155  Kan.  80. 

Ky.— Campbell  v.  Chriswell,  144  S.W. 
2d  802,  284  Ky.  328— Chriswell  v. 
Campbell,  127  S.W.2d  872,  278  Ky. 
30— Smith  v.  Patterson,  280  S.W. 
930,  213  Ky.  142. 

Neb. — Kielian  v.  Kent  &  Burke  Co., 
268  N.W.  79,  131  Neb.  308.  , 

N.Y. — Harvey  v.  Comby,  280  N.T.S. 
958,.  245  App.Div.  318. 

774 


Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Metzger 
v.  Turner,  158  P.2d  701,  704,  195 
Okl.  406— Weimer  v.  Augustana 
Pension  and  Aid  Fund,  67  P.2d  436, 
179  Okl.  572. 

Or. — Dixon-  v.  Simpson,  279  P.  939, 
130  Or.  211. 

Tex.— Kelly  v.  Wright,   Sup.,   188   S. 
W.2d    983— Mann    v.    Risher,    116 
S.W.2d  692,  131  Tex  498— Winters 
Mut.    Aid   Ass'n,   Circle   No.    2,    v. 
Reddin,   Com.App.,   49   S.W.2d  1095 
— Smith    v.    Ferrell,   Com. App.,    44 
S.W.2d    962 — Grayson    v.    Johnson, 
Civ.App.,  181  S.W.2d  312— Dixon  v. 
McNabb,  Civ.App.,  173  S.W.2d  228, 
error  refused — Ramsey  v.  McKam- 
ey,    Civ.App.,    138    S.W.2d   167,   re- 
versed on  other  grounds  152  S.W. 
2d  322,  137  Tex.  91— Barrow,  Wade, 
Guthrie  &  Co.  v.  Stroud,  Civ.App., 
125    S.W.2d    365— Allen    v.    Trent- 
man,    Civ.App.,    115    S.W.2d    1177— 
Fort  Worth  &  Denver  City  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Reid,  Civ.App.,  115  S.W.2d  1156 
— Stone  v.   Stone,  Civ.App.,   101   S. 
W.2d  638 — Finlayson  v.  McDowell, 
Civ.App.,  94  S.W.2d  1234,  error  dis- 
missed— Dunlap   v.    Villareal,    Civ. 
App.,    91    S.W.2d    1124— Mercer    v. 
Campbell,  Civ.App.,  86  S.W.2d  811 
— Smith   v.   Dunnam,    Civ.App.,    57 
S.W.2d   873,   error  refused — Staley 
v.    Vaughn,    Civ.App.,     50     S.W.2d 
907,  error  refused — Honey  v.  Wood, 
Civ.App.,  46  S.W.2d  334— Whitting- 
hill  v.  Oliver,  Civ.App.,   38   S.W.2d 
896,        error       dismissed — Maytag 
Southwestern  Co.  v.  Thornton,  Civ. 
App.,  20  S.W.2d  383,  error  dismiss- 
ed— Davis  v.  Cox,  Civ.App.t  4  S.W. 
2d    1008,    error    dismissed — Wake- 
field    v.    Burchers,    Civ.App.,    4    S. 
W.2d  218— Citizens'  Bank  v.  Bran- 
dau,    Civ.App.,    1    S.W.2d    466,    er- 
ror   refused — Crutcher    v.    Wolfe, 
Civ.App.,  269  S.W.  841— Home  Ben. 
Ass'n     of    Henderson     County    v. 
Boswell,   Civ.App.f   268   S.W.   979 — 
Cook    v.    Panhandle    Refining    Co., 
Civ.App.,    267    S.W.    1070 — Cole    v. 
Varner,    Civ. App.,    246    S.W.    410 — 
Taylor  v.  Hustead  &  Tucker,  Civ. 
App.,    243    S.W.    766,    reversed    on 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  389 


must  sufficiently  allege  that  such  neglect  was  ex- 
cusable.13 Plaintiff  must  also  allege  a  sufficient  ex- 
cuse for  delay  in  instituting  suit,14  and  for  his  fail- 
ure to  move  for  a  new  trial  during  the  term  of  the 
court  at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,1^  or  to 
seek  relief  from  the  judgment  by  appeal  to  a  higher 
court.16  However,  where  the  ground  relied  on 
could  not  have  been  set  up  as  a  defense  at  law,  no 
excuse  for  failure  to  prevent  the  judgment  need  be 
alleged.17  So,  where  the  facts  make  out  a  case  from 
which  it  appears  doubtful  whether  there  is  any 
remedy  at  law,  or  show  an  existing  remedy  to  be 
inadequate  to  do  complete  justice,  failure  to  make 
defense  at  law,  or  failure  to  defend  successfully, 
need  not  be  excused.18  A  party  filing  a  petition  un- 
der a  statute  authorizing  equitable  relief  against  a 
judgment  is  not  required  to  acquit  himself  of  neg- 
ligence in  failing  to  apply  to  the  court  of  law  for 
relief  before  going  into  equity  to  obtain  the  same 


relief." 

Injury  or  injustice  to  complainant.  The  bill  must 
allege  that  it  would  be  against  conscience  to  allow 
the  enforcement  of  the  judgment,  or  that  it  would 
work  injury  or  injustice  to  complainant  in  some  spe- 
cific manner.20  Facts  must  be  alleged;  a  general 
allegation  of  injury  is  not  sufficient.21 

Lack  or  loss  of  remedy  at  law.  Where  the  non- 
existence  or  inadequacy  of  a  remedy  at  law  is  a 
condition  to  the  granting  of  equitable  relief  against 
a  judgment,  as  discussed  supra  §  343,  complainant 
must  sufficiently  allege  that  he  has  no  adequate  rem- 
edy at  law  against  the  judgment,  or  if  the  case  is 
so,  that  he  has  unavailingly  exhausted  his  legal  rem- 
edies,22 and  an  averment  of  the  insolvency  of  re- 
spondent may  be  a  necessary  part  of  this  allega- 
tion.23 However,  a  bill  to  enjoin  the  execution  of 
a  fraudulent  judgment  need  not  aver  that  plaintiff 
in  such  judgment  is  insolvent.24 


other    grounds,    Com.App.,    257    S. 

W.  232. 

34  C.J.  p  490  note  23. 
Lack  of  notice  of  Judgment 

(1)A  bill  seeking-  to  set  aside  a 
judgment  at  law  must  allege  want  of 
notice  of  judgment — Murphree  v.  In- 
ternational Shoe  Co.,  20  So.2d  782, 
246  Ala.  384. 

(2)  Petition  alleging  that  plaintiff 
had   no   notice   of  filing-  of   suit   or 
rendition  of  judgment  until  several 
months  after  rendition  of  judgment 
was  demurrable  in  failing  clearly  to 
allege  that  he  had  no  knowledge  of 
rendition    of    judgment    during    six 
months  within  which  remedy  of  ap- 
peal by  writ  of  error  was  available. 
— Avant  v.  Broun,  Tex.Civ.App.,  91  S. 
W.2d  426,  error  dism. 

(3)  Complaint    in    action    to    set 
aside    default   judgment,    which   did 
not  allege  that  judgment  was  taken 
by  surprise,  inadvertence,  or  excus- 
able  neglect,    was   demurrable,    not- 
withstanding allegation    that   plain- 
tiff's attorney  withdrew  his  appear- 
ance without  plaintiffs  knowledge. — 
Sweetman  v.  Peru  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n,  200  N.BJ.  82,  101  Ind.App.  505. 
Averments  held  sufficient 

Ala. — Garvey  v.  Inglenook  Const 
Co.,  104  So.  639,  213  Ala.  267. 

Mont. — Stocking  v.  Charles  Beard 
Co.,  55  P.2d  949,  102  Mont.  65. 

Tex.— Lamb  v.  Isley,  Civ.App.,  114  S. 
W.2d  673,  rehearing  denied  115  S. 
W.2d  1030— Stanley  v.  Spann,  Civ. 
App.,  21  S.W.2d  305,  error  dismiss- 
ed— Cook  v.  Panhandle  Reflning 
Co.,  Civ.App,,  267  S.W.  1070. 

Averments  beld  insufficient 

Tex.— Whittinghill  v.  Oliver,  Civ. 
App.,  38  S.W.2d  896,  error  dis- 
missed. 

13.  Or.— Marsters  v.  Ashton,  107  P. 
2d  981,  165  Or.  507. 


Tex.— Padalecki  v.  Dreibrodt,  Civ. 
App.,  129  S.W.2d  4S1,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — McOau- 
ley  v.  Northern  Texas  Traction 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  21  S.W.2d  309,  er- 
ror dismissed — Davis  v.  Cox,  Civ. 
App.,  4  S.W.2d  1008,  error  dis- 
missed. 

14.  Ala,— Wynn  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
159  So.  58,  229  Ala.  639. 

Neb. — Hoeppner  v.  Bruckman,  261 
N.W.  572,  129  Neb.  390. 

Tex.— Garcia  v.  Jones,  Civ.App.,  155 
S.W.2d  671,  error  refused — Ramsey 
v.  McKamey,  Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d 
167,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
152  S.W.2d  322,  137  Tex.  91. 

34  C.J.  p  490  note  24. 

15.  Tex. — Gehret    v.    Hetkes,    Com. 
App.,  36  S.W.2d  700— Lamb  v.  Is- 
ley,  Civ.App.,   114   S.W.2d   673,   re- 
hearing denied   115   S.W.2d  1036 — 
Finlayson   v.    McDowell,    Civ.App., 
94   S.W.2d  1234,  error  dismissed— 
Whittinghill  v.  Oliver,  Civ.App.,  38 
S.W.2d   896,   error  dismissed— Cole 
v.  Varner,  Civ.App.,  '246  S.W.  410— 
Republic    Supply  Co.    v.    Weaver, 
Civ.App.,  235  S.W.  684. 

16.  Tex.— Scott  v.  McGlothlin,   Civ. 
App.,  30  S.W.2d  511,  affirmed  Mc- 
Gothlin   v.   Scott,  Com.App.,   48  S. 
W.2d  610 — Republic  Supply  Co.  v. 
Weaver,    Civ.App.,    235    S.W.    684. 

17.  Ala. — Stevens  v.  Hertzler,  22  So. 
121,  114  Ala.  563. 

34  C.J.  p  400  note  27. 

18.  Ala. — Graham  v.  Gray,  6  So.  87, 
87  Ala.  446. 

Conn. — Carrington  v.  Holabird,  17 
Conn.  531— Carrington  v.  Holabird, 
19  Conn.  84. 

19.  Ala. — Garvey  v.  Inglenook  Const. 
Co.,  104  So.  639,  213  Ala.  267. 

20.  U.S.— Matheson       v.       National 
Surety  Co.,   C.C.A.Alaska,   69  F.2d 

775 


914— David  A.    Manville   &   Co.   v. 

Francis  Oil  &  Reflning  Co.,  C.C.A. 

Okl.,  20  F.2d  473. 
Cal.— Machado  v.  Machado,  152  P.2d 

457,  66  OaLApp.  401. 
Tex.— Stone   v.    Stone,    Civ.App.,    101 

S.W.2d     638— Citizens'      Bank     v. 

Brandau,    Civ.App.,    1    S.W.2d    466, 

error  refused— Crutcher  v.  Wolfe, 

Civ.App.,    269    S.W.     841— Cole    v. 

Varner,  Civ.App.,  246  S.W.  410. 
Utah.— Taylor    v.    Guaranty    Mbrtg. 

Co.,  220  P.  1067,  62  Utah  520. 
34  C.J.  p  490  note  29. 
Necessity  of  injury  to  afford   right 

to  relief  see  supra  §§  341,  350. 

Where  a  judgment  is  procured  T>y 
fraud,  the  complaint  must  show  not 
only  the  commission  of  the  fraud, 
but  also  damages  resulting  there- 
from to  plaintiff. — Machado  v.  Ma- 
chado. 152  P.2d  457,  66  Cal.App.2d 
401—34  C.J.  p  490  note  29  [a]. 

21.  Ark.— Lawson    v.    Bettison,     W 
Ark.  401. 

Cal.— Machado  v.  Machado,  152  P.2d 
457,  66  Cal.App.2d  401. 

22.  Mont — Housing     Authority     of 
City  of  Butte  v.  Murtha,  144  P.2d 
183,  115  Mont  405. 

N.T.— Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Delaware 

&  H.  Co.,  264  N.T.S.  470,  238  App. 

Div.  191. 
Okl. — Dardenne    v.    Daniels,    225    P» 

152,  101  Okl.  -201. 
Tex.— Reynolds    v.    Volunteer    State 

Life  Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,   80  S.W.2d 

1087,  error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  492  note  50. 

23.  Ga, — McLendon  v.  Hooks,  15  Ga, 
533. 

34  C.J.  p  493  note  51. 

24.  U.S.— Smith  v.  Schwed,  C.C.MO., 
6  F.  455,  2  McCrary  441. 

34  C.J.  p  493  note  52. 


389 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Wliat  judgment  should  be  rendered.  Where  the 
cause  is  one  in  which  the  court  of  equity  may  fully 
determine  the  rights  of  the  parties  and  enter  a  final 
decree,  as  discussed  infra  §  397,  the  bill  must  not 
only  plead  sufficient  facts  to  show  that  a  judgment 
different  from  that  under  attack  should  have  been 
rendered,  but  also  what  that  different  judgment 
should  be.25  The  facts  pleaded  must  be  sufficient 
to  authorize  the  court  to  determine  the  issues  pre- 
sented in  the  former  suit  and  to  render  such  judg- 
ment as  will  be  an  effective  substitute  for  the  one 
set  aside.26 

Prayer  for  relief.  Under  a  prayer  for  general 
relief,  there  may  be  awarded  the  appropriate  re- 
lief to  which,  on  the  allegations  and  proof,  plain- 
tiff may  appear  to  be  entitled27  A  petition  is  not 
defective  for  failure  to  include,  in  addition  to  the 
general  prayer  for  relief,  a  request  for  a  new  trial.28 
It  has  been  held  that,  where  a  judgment  or  decree 
has  been  executed,  the  proper  prayer  for  a  bill  to 
review  such  determination  is  that  it  be  reversed,  and 
that  plaintiff  be  restored  to  his  former  condition  or 
status  as  though  the  judgment  or  decree  had  not 
been  rendered.29 


§  ago.    -  Exhibits 


The  bill  should  Incorporate  such  exhibits  as  are  nec- 
essary to  enable  the  court  to  determine  the  validity  of 
the  Judgment  and  the  right  to  relief. 


As  a  general  rule,  where  relief  is  sought  in  eq- 
uity against  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment,  com- 
plainant should  incorporate  in  his  bill  or  file  as  an 
exhibit  a  transcript  of  the  record,30  including  the 
judgment,81  pleadings,32  'and  the  substance  of  the 
evidence,83  when  necessary  to  enable  the  court  to 
determine  the  validity  of  the  judgment  and  the 
right  to  relief,  and  also  any  other  documents  which 
may  be  necessary  to  present  the  case  fully  and 
clearly  to  the  mind  of  the  court.34  However,  where 
the  reason  thus  stated  for  the  production  of  exhib- 
its does  not  exist,  the  rule  is  not  applied,35  and  it 
may  be  sufficient  merely  to  make  specific  reference 
to  the  judgment  or  decree  sought  to  be  vacated.36 

§  391.    Answer,  Motion  to  Dismiss,  and 

Demurrer 

The  defendant  is  entitled  to  file  an  answer  to  a  pe- 
tition for  equitable  relief  against  a  Judgment,  or  he  may 
take  objection  to  defects  In  the  petition,  in  a  proper 
case,  by  motion  to  dismiss  or  demurrer.  A  cross  bill 
may  sometimes  be  maintained. 

In  a  proceeding  for  equitable  relief  against  a 
judgment,  defendant  is  entitled  to  file  an  answer.37 
Such  answer  should  be  responsive  to  the  charges  of 
the  bill,38  and  should  answer  its  allegations  specifi- 
cally and  in  detail,39  and  negative  every  hypothesis 
on  which  complainant's  equity  could  be  founded.40 
If  want  of  jurisdiction  in  the  equity  court  appears 


25.  Tex. — Moon  v.  Weber,   Civ.App., 
103  S.W.2d  807.  error  refused. 

26.  Tex. — Murry    v.    Citizens'    State 
Bank  of  Ranger,  Civ.App.,  77  S.W. 
2d    1104,    error    dismissed — Texas 
Employers'   Ins.   Ass'n  v.   Shelton, 
Civ.App.,  74  S.W.2d  280. 

27.  Tex. — Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler,   Civ.App.,   171    S.W.    1069. 

Belief  afforded  see  infra  §  397. 

28.  Ky.— Triplett  v.  Stanley,  130  S. 
W.2d  45,  279  Ky.  148. 

29.  111.— -Wood   v.    First   Nat    Bank 
of  Woodlawn,    50   N.E.2d   830,   383 
111.    515,    certiorari    denied    64    S. 
Ct.  521,  321  U.S.  765,  88  L.Ed.  1061. 

30.  Ky.— Curtis  v.  Reed,  176  S.W.2d 
385,  296  Ky.  221— Harding  v.  Board 
of  Drainage  Com'rs  of  McCracken 
County,    13    S.W.2d   1011,   227   Ky. 
661. 

34  C.J.  p  493  note  59. 

31.  Mo. — Parsons    v.   Wilkerson,    10 
Mo.  713. 

N.C.— -Neville  'v.   Pope,    95   N.C.   346. 

33.    Ala.— Wiggins  v.  Steiner,  16  So. 

8,  103  Ala.  655. 
34  OJ.  p  493  note  61. 

83.    Ark.— Whitehill  v.  Butler,  11  S. 

W.  477,  51  Ark.  341. 
34  C.J,  p  493  note  62. 


120 


34.  Md.— Michael   v.   Kigler, 
382,  142  Md.  125. 

34  C.J.  p  493  note  63. 
Sufficient  exhibits  held  filed 
Md. — Michael  v.  Higler,  supra. 

35.  Ark.— Baskin  v.  -S3tna  Life  Ins. 
Co.,    79    S.W.2d   724,   190  Ark.    448. 

34  C.J.  p  493  note  64. 
Brief  of  evidence 

Petition  to  set  aside  judgment  for 
fraud  is  not  defective  because  of 
failure  to  file  brief  of  evidence. — 
Sylvania  Ins.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  160  S. 
E.  788,  173  Ga.  679. 

36.  Ark.— Baskin  v.  -ffitna  Life  Ins. 
Co.,    79    S.W.2d   724,   190  Ark.    448. 

37.  111.— Burton    v.    Cahill,    34   N.E. 
2d  127,  310  Ill.App.  393. 

Pa. — Keystone  Nat.  Bank  to  Use  of 
Balmer    v.    Deamer,    Com.Pl.,     32 
Berks    Co.L.J.    124,    affirmed   Key- 
stone Nat.  Bank  of  Manheim,  now 
to  use  of  Balmor  v.  Deamer,  18  A. 
2d  540,  144  Pa.Super.  52. 
Wash. — Harju    v.    Anderson,    234    P. 
15,   133  Wash.   506,   44  A.L.R.  450. 
34  C.J.  p  493  note  66. 
Denomination,  of  pleas 

In  a  suit  to  annul  a  judgment, 
the  fact  that  pleas  presenting  wheth- 
er parties  were  bound  by  consent 
judgment  on  compromise  of  contro- 
versy were  denominated  a  plea  of 

776 


estoppel  as  well  as  an  exception  of 
no  cause  or  right  of  action  was  im- 
material.— Couret  v.  Couret,  18  So. 
2d  661,  206  La.  85. 

38.  N.J. — Hazelhurst.  v.     Sea     Isle 
City  Hotel  Co.,  Ch.,  25  A.  201. 

34  C.J.  p  493  note  67. 
Special  defense 

In  suit  to  set  aside  a  judgment, 
the  fact  that  judgment  must  be  al- 
leged in  complaint  does  not  pre- 
clude defendant  from  asserting  res 
judicata  as  a  special  defense  or 
claiming  that  other  facts  and  issues 
were  adjudicated  which  do  not  ap- 
pear on  face  of  complaint. — U.  S.  v. 
Kusche,  D.QCal.,  56  F.Supp.  201. 

39.  U.S.— Mound  City  Co.  v.  Castle- 
man,  C.C.MO.,  177  F.  510,  affirming 
187  F.  921,  110  C.C.A.  55. 

34  C.J..p  403  note  68. 

40.  Mich.— Blehm  v.  Hanzek,  262  N. 
W.  403,  272  Mich.  541. 

34  C.J.  p  493  note  69. 

Answer  held  to  state  a  defense 

(1)  Generally.— Willard    v.    Barry, 
152  So.  411,  113  Fla.  402. 

(2)  Answer    pleading    fully    facts 
constituting     plaintiffs'      negligence 
was  sufficient  pleading  of  laches. — 
Olsen  v.   Crow,   290  P.   233,   133   Or. 
310. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


392 


on  the  face  of  the  bill,  the  objection  may  be  taken 
by  motion  to  dismiss,41  or,  if  the  bill  appears  to 
lack  equity,  and  fails  to  state  sufficient  facts  to  war- 
rant the  relief  prayed,  respondent  may  demur,42  in 
which  case  the  court  may  determine  the  suit  on 
such  demurrer,43  but  the  demurrer  or  other  excep- 
tion should  be  overruled  if  the  petition  sufficiently 
states  grounds  for  the  relief  sought44  Where  the 
bill  fails  to  show  circumstances  warranting  equita- 
ble relief  against  the  judgment,  it  must  be  dismissed 
for  want  of  jurisdiction,  even  though  no  demurrer 
is  filed.45  On  exceptions  to  plaintiffs  pleadings,  the 
facts  alleged  therein  must  be  considered  as  true.46 

Cross  bill.  In  a  proper  case,  defendant  may  file 
a  cross  bill  for  such  relief  as  he  may  be  entitled 
to,47  but  it  has  been  held  that  a  cross  bill  which 
states  purely  a  cause  of  action  at  law,  without  any 
independent  equity,  may  not  be  maintained.48 


§  392.    Issues,  Proof,  and  Variance 

In  a  suit  for  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment,  the 
hearing  and  the  proof  will  be  restricted  to  the  issues 
raised  by  the  pleadings;  plaintiff  must  prove  all  ma- 
terlal  allegations  of  his  bill  which  are  not  admitted. 

In  order  to.  enable  the  court  to  act  on  an  appli- 
cation for  relief  against  a  judgment,  it  is  necessary 
that  the  parties  should  frame  and  present  distinct  is- 
sues as  to  the  matters  they  mean  to  contest,49  and 
the  hearing  will  be  restricted  to  the  issues  thus 
raised  and  presented.50  Ordinarily,  if  the  judgment 
is  assailed  on  the  ground  of  fraud  or  want  of  juris- 
diction, the  court  will  not  enter  on  an  inquiry  as 
to  the  validity  of  the  obligation  sued  on  or  the  mer- 
its of  the  original  action,51  further  than  to  require 
complainant  to  offer  enough  proof  of  his  alleged  de- 
fense to  show  that,  if  given  a  trial  on  the  merits,  he 
could  at  least  make  a  prima  facie  case.52  According 
to  some  authority,  however,  the  proof  should  be  suf- 


Matters  to  "be  specially  pleaded 

(1)  In      judgment      debtor's      suit 
against    third    person    to    set    aside 
judgment    and    sale    thereunder    for 
fundamental      jurisdictional     defect, 
regularity    of    judgment    and    good 
faith     of    purchaser    are    defensive 
matters    to    be    specially    pleaded. — 
Morris   v.   Soble,   Tex.Civ.App.,   61   S. 
W.2d  139. 

(2)  A  defense  that  plaintiff  had  an 
adequate   remedy   at   law   should   be 
affirmatively       pleaded. — Blehm       v. 
Hanzek,  262  JNT.W.  403,  272  Mich.  641. 

41.  Tenn. — Shaw     v.     Patterson,     2 
Tenn.Ch.  171. 

42.  Okl. — Sawyer  v.   Sawyer,    77   P. 
2d  703,  182  Okl.  348— Stout  v.  Derr, 
42    P.2d    136.     171    Okl.    132— Bur- 
ton   v.    Swanson,    285    P.    839,    14'2 
Okl.  134. 

34  C.J.  p  493  note  71. 
Demurrer  held  too  general 

A  demurrer  alleging  that  the  peti- 
tion failed  to  set  forth  facts  con- 
stituting fraud  is  too  general  to 
raise  any  question  as  to  whether  or 
not  the  petition  should  have  alleged 
fraud  with  greater  particularity. — 
Mullis  v.  Bank  of  Chauncey,  150  S.E. 
471,  40  Ga.App.  582. 

Effect  of  Judgment  must  fee  con- 
sidered when  determining  whether 
complaint  states  a  cause  of  action 
on  a  demurrer  or  on  a  motion  to 
dismiss. — U.  S.  v.  Kusche,  D.C.Cal., 
56  F.Supp.  201. 

43.  Ga. — Huson   Ice   &   Coal   Co.   v. 
City  of  Covington,  172  S.B.  56,  178 
Ga.  6. 

Prior  knowledge 

Trial  court  which  tried  case  and 
entered  Judgment  from  which  relief 
was  sought  by  bill  of  review  could 
employ  knowledge  of  issues  involved 
in  original  suit  in  passing  on  de- 
murrers to  petition  for  review. — Dix- 
on  v.  McNabb,  Tex.Civ.App.,  173  S. 
W.2d  228,  error  refused. 


BUI  held  properly  dismissed  on  de- 
murrer 

Tex. — Fort  Worth  &  Denver  City  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Reid,  Civ.App.,  115  S.W.2d 
1156 — Sedgwick  v.  Kirby  Lumber 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  78  S.W.2d  1107,  af- 
firmed 107  S.W.2d  358,  130  Tex. 
163— Griffith  v.  Tipps,  Civ.App.,  69 
S.W.2d  846— Whittinghill  v.  Oliver, 
Civ.App.,  38  S.W.2d  896,  error  dis- 
missed. 

44.  Okl.— Arnold  v.  Arnold,  153  P.2d 
224,  194  Okl.  571. 

Tex. — Pearl  Assur.  Co.  v.  Williams, 
Civ.App.,  167  S.W.2d  808— Sloan  v. 
Newton,  Civ.App.,  134  S.W.2d  697 
— Dallas  Development  Co.  v.  Rea- 
gan, Civ.App.,  25  S.W.2d  240. 

45.  Va. — McCloud  v.   Virginia  Elec- 
tric &  Power  Co.,  180  S.E.  299,  164 
Va.  604. 

4ft.  Tex. — Pearl  Assur.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, Civ.App.,  167  S.W.2d  808. 
On  general  demurrer  to  applica- 
tion to  set  aside  default  judgment 
entered  at  prior  term  of  court,  al- 
legations must  be  accepted  as  true 
except  that  court  may  consider  rec- 
ord in  original  cause,  and  any  fact 
averred  in  application  that  is  in- 
consistent with  record  will  be  given 
no  effect. — Barrow,  Wade,  Guthrie  & 
Co.  v.  Stroud,  Tex.Civ.App.,  125  S.W. 
2d  365. 
Conclusions  not  admitted 

A  demurrer  to  bill  for  injunction 
did  not  admit  allegations  of  bill  as 
to  irregularity  of  former  proceeding 
and  as  to  invalidity  of  judgment,  en- 
forcement of  which  was  sought  to  be 
enjoined,  since  such  allegations  were 
mere  "conclusions  of  law." — Viator 
v.  Edwins,  14  So.2d  212,  195  Miss. 
220,  certiorari  denied  64  S.Ct.  518, 
321  U.S.  744,  88  KEd.  1047,  rehear- 
ing denied  64  S.Ct  779,  321  U.S.  804, 
88  L.Ed.  1090. 

777 


47.  Miss. — Prudential     Ins.     Co.     v. 
Gleason,  187  So.  229,  185  Miss.  243. 

Interest  in  partitioned  property 

In  suit  to  set  aside  void  partition 
proceeding,  allegations  and  prayer 
of  cross  bill  which  averred  that  pro- 
ceedings were  valid,  or  if  not,  that  it 
had  been  ratified,  or  if  not  ratified 
that  cross  complainant  was  owner  of 
an  undivided  interest  in  entire  prop- 
erty, or  was  entitled  to  general  re- 
lief, was  sufficient  to  require  action 
by  court  on  alternate  contention  of 
cross  complainant  as  to  manner  in 
which  its  interest  should  be  adjust- 
ed.— Prudential  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gleason, 
supra. 

48.  Ala.— Leath  v.  Lister,  173  So.  59, 
233  Ala.   595. 

49.  Ind. — Dobbins  v.   McNamara,   14 
N.E.    887,    113    Ind.    54,    3    Am.S.R. 
626. 

34  OJ.  p  493  note  73. 

50.  Ky. — Elkhorn    Coal    Corporation 
v.  Cuzzort,  284  S.W.  1005,  215  Ky. 
254. 

La. — National    Park    Bank    v.    Con- 

cordia  Land  &  Timber  Co.,  97  So. 

272,   154  La.   31. 
Pa. — Miller    v.    Mastrocola,    2    A.2d 

550,    133    Pa. Super.    210— Teutonic 

Building   &   Loan   Ass'n   v.    Stein, . 

190  A.  189,  125  Pa.  Super.  589. 
34  C.J.  p  493  note  74. 
Issue    of   lack    of    jurisdiction    held 

raised 
W.Va. — Perkins    v.    Hall,    17    S.B3.2d 

795,  123  W.Va.  707. 

51.  Ky. — Green    v.    Blankenship,    91 
S.W.2d  996,  263  Ky.  29. 

La. — National  Park  Bank  v.  Con- 
cordia  Land  &  Timber  Co.,  97  So. 
272,  154  La.  31. 

34  OJ.  p  494  note  75. 

52.  Mo.— Hess  v.  Fox,  124.  S.W.  83, 
'140  Mo.App.  437. 


§  392 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ficient  to  enable  the  court  to  retry  the  issue  of  de- 
fendant's liability  and  to  render  such  judgment  as 
should  be  entered  in  lieu  of  the  one  attempted  to  be 
set  aside.53 

The  testimony  must  be  limited  to  the  points  made 
by  the  pleadings;54  and  as  far  as  it  goes  to  sup- 
port any  point  not  in  issue,  it  is  irrelevant,  and 
•will  be  rejected.55  The  pleadings  and  the  proof 
must  correspond.56  Plaintiff  must  prove  all  the 
material  allegations  of  his  bill5?  which  are  not  ad- 
mitted.58 

§  393.     Evidence 

a.  Presumptions  and  burden  of  proof 

b.  Admissibility 

c.  Weight  and  sufficiency 


a.  Presumptions  and  Burden  of  Proof 

With  some  exceptions,  In  a  proceeding  to  obtain 
equitable  relief  against  a  judgment,  presumptions  will  be 
indulged  In  favor  of  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  court  In  which 
the  Judgment  complained  of  was  rendered,  the  regularity 
of  its  proceedings,  and  the  validity  of  the  Judgment.  The 
burden  is  on  the  party  seeking  relief  to  sufficiently  estab- 
lish all  the  facts  on  which  he  relies  as  the  basis  of  his 
application. 

As  a  general  rule,  on  a  bill  in  equity  for  relief 
against  a  judgment  at  law,  presumptions  will  be  in- 
dulged in  favor  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  the 
regularity  of  its  proceedings,  and  the  validity  of  the 
judgment,59  at  least  where  the  judgment  appears 
valid  on  its  face.60  So  it  will  be  presumed  that  an 
appearance  entered  for  a  party  by  an  attorney  was 


Neb. — Bankers'  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rob-    Okl. — Southwick   v.    Jones,    60    P.2d 
bins.    73    N.W.    269,    53    Neb.    44.  774,  177  Okl.  409. 


53.  Tex. — Port     Worth     &     Denver 
City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reid,  Civ.App.,  115 
S.W.2d  1156. 

54.  Ky. — Cowan  v.  Price,  1  Bibb  173, 
4  Am.D.   627. 

Proof  lield   admissible  under  plead. 

ing's 
La. — Smith    v.    Williams,    2    La.  App. 

.24. 
N.Y. — Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Delaware 

&  H.  Co.,  264  N.Y.S.  470,   23S  App. 

Piv.  191. 

55.  Ky.— Cowan  v.  Price,  1  Bibb  173, 
4  Am.D.   627. 

84  C.J.  p  494  note  78. 

56.  Tenn. — Banks  v.  Kentucky  Live 
Stock    Ins.    Co.,     7    Tenn.Civ.App. 
419. 

84  C.J.  p  494  note  79. 

87.    Ala. — King  v.  Dent,   93   So.   823, 

208  Ala,  78. 
Gal.— Wilson    v.    Wilson,     130     P.2d 

782,  55  Cal.App.2d  421. 
HI.— Mohr  v.  Messick,  53  N.B.2d  743, 

822  111. App.   56. 
Okl. — Honeycutt  v.   Severin.  98  P.2d 

1093,   186  Okl.   509— Oklahoma  Ry. 

Co.  v.  Holt,   17  P.2d  955,   161  Okl. 

165. 
Or.— Marsters    v.    Ashton,    107    P.2d 

981,  165  Or.  507. 
Tex. — Sedgwick     v.     Kirby     Lumber 

Co.,   107   S.W.2d  358,   130   Tex.  163 

•~-Texas  Employers'  Ins.   Ass'n  v. 

Arnold,  88  S.W.2d  478,  126  Tex.  466 

—-Reynolds     v.     Volunteer     State 

Life  Ins.   Co.,   Civ.App.,   80  S.W.2d 

1087,  -error  refused. 
84  C.J.  p  494  note  80. 
Particular  matters 

(1)  Fraud. 
El. — Carroll,    Schendorf   &   Boenicke 

v.  Hastings,   259   Ill.App,   564. 
Ky. — Harris     Commercial     Bank    & 

Trust   Co/s   Liquidating  Agent  v. 

Eversole,   74   S.W.2d   193,    255    Ky. 

877. 


(2)  Meritorious  defense. 

Ala. — Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Street, 

176  So.  350,  234  Ala.  537. 
Mont. — Frisbee    v.    Coburn,    52    P.2d 

882,  101  Mont  58. 

(3)  Diligence  and  lack  of  fault. 
Ala.— Farrell  v.  Farrell,  10  So.2d  153, 

243  Ala.   3S9. 
Neb. — Kielian  v.  Kent  &  Burke  Co., 

268  N.W.    79,   131  Neb.   308. 
Okl. — Weimer  v.  Augustana  Pension 

and    Aid    Fund,    67    P.2d   436,    179 

Okl.  572. 
Tex. — Goldapp  v.  Jones  Lumber  Co., 

Civ.App.,  163  S.W.2d  229,  error  re- 
fused. 
Judgment  rendered 

In  suit  to  restrain  filing  of  ab- 
stract of  void  judgment  in  another 
county,  plaintiff  should  have  intro- 
duced judgment  rendered. — Scruggs 
v.  Gribble,  Tex.Civ.App.,  17  S.W.2d 
153. 

Evidence  adduced  at  former  trial 

On  petition  to  vacate  judgment  be- 
cause of  fraud  and  perjury,  petition- 
er must  introduce  evidence  adduced 
at  former  trial  which  constitutes  ba- 
sis of  complaint. — Weber  v.  Allen, 
238  N.W.  740,  121  Neb.  833. 

58.  111.— Nicoloff   v.    Schnipper,    233 
IlLApp.  591. 

Va. — Page  v.  Winston,  2  Munf.  298, 

16  Va.   298. 
34  C.J.  p  494  note  81. 

59.  Ga. — Watters  v.  Southern  Brigh- 
ton Mills,  147  S.E.  87,  168  Ga.  15. 

111.— Himmel  v.  Straus,  6  N.B.2d  494, 

288  IlLApp.   566. 
Mo.— Hidden   v.   Edwards,    285    S.W. 

462,  313  Mo.  642. 
Or. — Sturm   v.    Cooper,   28   P.2d   231, 

145  Or.  583. 
Tex. — Jackson  v.  Wallace,  Com.App., 

252   S.W.   745— Williams   v.   Tooke, 

Civ.App.,    116    S.W.2d    1114.    error 

dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  494  note  82.  \ 

778 


Regularity  of  service 

Presumption    arising    from    judg- 
ment   is    in    favor   of   regularity    of 
service    of    summons    on    judgment 
debtor. 
Cal. — Christie  v.    Superior   Court   in 

and  for  City  and  County  of   San 

Francisco,    23    P.2d    757,    218    Cal. 

423.     . 
Tex. — Smith  v.  Dunnam,  Civ.App.,  57 

S.W.2d   873,  error  refused. 
Beoital 

(1)  Where   Judgment   recited   that 
matters  of  law  and  fact  were  heard 
at  term  at  which  it  was  rendered, 
and  court  which  rendered  judgment 
had  jurisdiction  of  the   parties  and 
subject    matter,     court    determining 
suit  to  set  aside  judgment  was  re- 
quired to  presume  that  such  recital 
was  true. — Gann  v.  Putman,  Tex.Ci.v. 
App.,   159  S.W.2d  931,  error  refused. 

(2)  Where    decree    recites     cause 
was   heard   on   process   duly   issued, 
served,  and  returned,  presumption  is 
court  had  process  before  it.— Stepp 
v.  State  Road  Commission,  151  S.E. 
180,  108  W.Va.  346. 

Incompetent  testimony 

Trial  court,  which  had  admitted 
incompetent  testimony  in  prior  ac- 
tion, would  presumably  have  exclud- 
ed that  testimony,  if  objection  had 
been  urged  thereto,  based  on  statute 
rendering  the  testimony  incompetent. 
— Blackman  v.  Blackman,  Tex. Civ. 
App.,  128  S.W.2d  433,  error  dismiss- 
ed, judgment  correct. 
Presumption  held  not  successfully 

rebutted 

W.Va. — Stepp  v.  State  Road  Com- 
mission, 151  S.B.  180,  108  W.Va. 
346. 

ea    Tex.— Empire   Gas    &   Fuel   Co. 

v.  Noble,  Com.App.,  36  S.W.2d  451. 
Matters  of  record 

Verity  of  judgment  in  all  matters 
of  which  it  contains  record  will  be 
presumed  in  absence  of  contradict- 
ing evidence. — Starkweather  v.  Min- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  393 


duly  authorized61  and  that  the  judgment  is  based 
on  evidence  supporting  it.62  It  has  been  held,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  where  a  judgment  is  directly 
attacked  as  void  there  is  no  presumption  as  to  its 
validity63  with  respect  to  the  particular  in  which  it 
is  attacked.64  It  has  been  held  that  fraud  in  pro- 
curing the  judgment  will  neither  be  presumed  nor 
inferred  from  circumstances  which  are  not  incon- 
sistent with  good  faith,65  but  there  is  also  authority 
holding  that  fraud  will  be  presumed  where  the  par- 
ties stand  in  a  relationship  of  trust  and  confidence, 


and  there  is  no  evidence  of  fair  dealing.66  The  pro- 
priety of  other  particular  presumptions  has  been 
adjudicated.67 

Burden  of  proof.  In  general  the  burden  of  proof 
is  on  the  party  demanding  relief  against  the  judg- 
ment to  establish  by  sufficient  evidence  all  the  facts 
on  which  he  relies  as  the  basis  of  his  application.65 
Thus  the  party  seeking  relief  has  the  burden  of 
showing  want  of  jurisdiction,69  want  of  valid  serv- 
ice of  process,70  or  fraud  or  duress  in  the  procure- 


arets    Mining    Co.,    43    P.2d    321,    5 
Cal.App.-3d  501. 

61.  Or. — Handley  v.  Jackson,   50  P. 
915,   31  Or.  552,   65  Am.S.R.   839. 

34  C.J.  p  494  note  83. 

62.  U.S.— Moffett    v.    Robbins,    D.C. 
Kan.,   14   F.Supp.   602,  affirmed,  C. 
C.A.,  81  F.2d  431,  certiorari  denied 
56    S.Ct    940,    298   U.S.   675,    80   L. 
Ed.  1397 — Harrington  v.  Denny,  D. 
C.Mo.,  3  F.Supp.  584. 

Ky. — Karr's   Adm'r  v.   Harmon,    116 

S.W.2d  947,  273  Ky.  394. 
34  OJ.  p  494  note  82  [a]. 
In  absence  of  contrary  averments 
Tex. — Slider  v.  House,  Civ.App.,  271 

S.W.  644 — Barton  v,  Pochyla,  Civ. 

App.,  243  S.W.  785. 
Fraud  in  procurement 

However,  the  rule  that,  in  an  ap- 
peal from  a  judgment  rendered  by 
trial  court  without  a  jury,  presump- 
tion will  be  Indulged  that,  trial  judge 
based  his  judgment  on  competent 
evidence  found  in  record  and  suffi- 
cient to  support  the  judgment,  to 
exclusion  of  improper  evidence  ad- 
mitted, was  not  applicable  on  a  di- 
rect attack  by  bill  of  review  on  a 
former  judgment,  for  fraud  in  its 
procurement. — Blackman  v.  Black- 
man,  Tex.Civ.App.,  128  S.W.2d  433, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct. 

63.  Ky.— Wilburn    v.    Wilbum,    178 
S.W:2d  585,  296  Ky.  781— Ramsey's 
Ex'r  v.  Ramsey,  2C  S.W.2d  37,  233 
Ky.  507. 

Pacts  essential  to  jurisdiction 

In  direct  attack  on  judgment  for 
plaintiff,  no  fact  essential  to  court's 
jurisdiction  over  defendant  is  pre- 
sumed.— Starkweather  v.  Minarets 
Mining  Co.,  43  P.2d  321,  5  CaLApp. 
2d  501. 

64.  Tex.— First  State  Bank  of  Lor- 
aine  v.  Jackson,  Civ.App.,  13  S.W. 
2d  979. 

65.  Cal. — Otis  v.  Zeiss,   165  P.  524, 
175  Cal.  192. 

34  C.J.  p  494  note  $4. 

66.  Cal. — Young  v.  Young  Holdings 
Corporation,    80   P.2d   723,   27   Cal. 
App.2d  129. 

67.  Tex.— Snell     v.     Knowles,     Civ. 
App.,    87    S.W.2d    871,    error    dis- 
missed. 


Particular    presumptions    indulged 

(1)  That  matter  was  still  pending 
in  probate  court. — Larrabee  v.  Tracy, 
104   P.2d    61,    39    Cal.App.2d   593. 

(2)  That  a  party  was  legally  cited 
by    publication    as    recited    in    the 
judgment. — Ward     v.     Hinkle,     Civ. 
App.,  252  S.W.  236,  reversed  on  oth- 
er  grounds    8   S.W.2d   641,    117   Tex. 
566. 

Retention  of  knowledge  of  defend- 
ant's residence  was  not  presumed. 

— Snell  v.  Knowles,  Tex.Civ.App.,  87 

S.\V.2d    871,    error   dismissed. 

68.  Ala.— Wise  v.  Merritt,  134  So. 
468,  223  Ala.  54,  certiorari . denied 
Wise  v.  Miller,  52  S.Ct.  30,  284  U. 
S.  650,  76  L.Ed.  552. 

111. — Nikola  v.  Campus  Towers 
Apartment  Bldg.  Corporation,  25 
N.E.M  582,  303  Ill.App.  516. 

Ind.— Julien  v.  Lane,  157  N.E.  114, 
second  case,  95  Ind. App.  139. 

Iowa. — Thoreson  v.  Central  States 
Electric  Co.,  283  'N.W.  253,  225 
Iowa  1406 — Sloan  v.  Jepson,  252  N. 
W.  535,  217  Iowa  1082. 

La. — Succession  of  St.  Ange,  109  So. 
909,  161  La.  1085. 

Miss.— Walton  v.  Gregory  Funeral 
Home,  154  So.  717,  170  Miss.  129 
— Hirsch  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  R.  E. 
Kennington  Co.,  124  So.  344,  155 
Miss.  242,  88  A.L.R.  1. 

Ohio.-— Washing  ion  v.  Levinson,  35 
N.B.2d  161,  66  Ohio  App.  461. 

Okl.— McBride  v.  Cowen,  216  P.  104, 
90  Okl.  130. 

Or. — Davidhizar  v.  Gaulke,  280  P. 
499,  130  Or.  492. 

Pa.— Sears  v.  Birbeck,  184  A.  $,  321 
Pa.  375. 

Tex. — Pennlngton  v.  Severing,  Com. 
App.,  17  S.W.2d  772— Kelley  v. 
Wright,  Civ.App.,  184  S.W.2d  649, 
affirmed,  Sup.,  188  S.W.2d  983 — 
Loomis  v.  Balch,  Civ.App.,  181  S. 
W.2d  849— Panther  Oil  &  Grease 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Crews,  Civ.App.,  124  S. 
W.2d  436— Williams  v.  Tooke,  Civ. 
App.,  116  S.W.2d  1114,  error  dis- 
missed— Snell  v.  Knowles,  Civ. 
App.,  87  S.W.2d  871,  error  dis- 
missed— Baldwin  v.  Stamford  State 
Bank,  Civ.App.,  82  S.W.2d  701,  er- 
ror refused— Rltch  v.  Jarvis,  Civ. 
App.,  64  S.W.2d  831,  error  dismiss- 
ed— Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Greathouse,  Civ.App.f  41  S.W. 

779 


2d  418,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
Greathouse  v.  Port  Worth  &  Den- 
ver City  Ry.  Co.,  Com.App.,   65   S. 
W.2d  762. 
Utah.— Redfleld  v.   First   Nat.   Bank, 

244  P.  210,  66  Utah  459. 
34  C.J.  p  446  note  65,  p  494  note  '85. 
Issue  of  execution 

However,  plaintiff  was  relieved  of 
burden  to  prove  no  execution  issued, 
where  defendant  pleaded  as  execu- 
tion order  of  sale  which  was  insuffi- 
cient— Carl  ton  v.  HofC,  Tex.  Civ.  App., 
292  S.W.  642. 
Judgment  valid  on  record 

Where  judgment  attacked,  when 
record  was  consulted,  was  shown  to 
be  a  valid  Judgment,  burden  rested 
on  judgment  debtor  seeking  to  set 
aside  the  judgment  to  show  the  con- 
trary.— Johnson  v.  Cole,  Tex.Civ.App., 
138  S.W.2d  910,  error  refused. 
Release  or  satisfaction 

Burden  of  showing  release  or  equi- 
table satisfaction  of  judgment  was 
on  judgment  debtor,  suing  to  en- 
join collection. — Davidhizar  v.  Gaul- 
ke,  280  P.  499,  130  Or.  492. 

69.  Cal. — Del    Campo    v.    Camarillo, 
98  P.  1049,  154  Cal.  647. 

34  C.J.  p  494  note  86. 

70.  Ark. — Davis    v.    Ferguson,    261 
S.W.  905,  164  Ark.  340. 

Cal. — Christie  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco,  23  P.2d  757,  218  CaL 
423. 

111. — Michalowski  v.  Stefanowski,  58 
N.E.2d  264,  324  Ill.App.  363 — 
Nikola  v.  Campus  Towers  Apart- 
ment Bldg.  Corporation,  .25  N.E. 
2d  582,  303  IlLApp.  516. 

Ky. — Billingsly  v.  Pearcy,  -65  S.W. 
2d  699,  251  Ky.  546. 

Mich.— Gross  v.  Kellner,  219  N.W. 
620,  242  Mich.  656. 

Tex.— Citizens  Mut.  Life  &  Accident 
Ass'n  of  Texas  v.  Gillespie,  Civ* 
App.,  93  S.W.2d  200— Winter  v, 
Davis,  Civ.App.,  10  S.W.2d  181,  er- 
ror refused. 

W.Va. — Brinegar  v.  Bank  of  Wyo- 
ming, 130  S.E.  151,  100  W.Va.  44. 

34  C.J.  p  494  note  87. 

JTotice  to  manager 
However,  where,  in  a  suit  to  set 

aside  a  judgment  on  the  ground  that 

no    notice    of    suit    was    served   on 


§  393 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ment  of  the  judgment,™  and  also,  in  a  proper  case, 
that  he  had  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  former 
suit72  which  he  was  prevented  from  urging  by 
fraud,  accident,  or  the  act  of  the  other  party7*  with- 
out fault  or  negligence  on  his  "part,74  that  he  has 
not  been  negligent  in  failing  to  seek  his  remedy  at 
Iaw75  or  in  delaying  institution  of  the  present  suit,76 
and  that  enforcement  of  the  judgment  would  re- 
sult in  injury  or  injustice  to  him.77 

On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held 'that,  where 
the  complaint  alleged  sufficient  facts  to  show  prima 
facie  the  invalidity  of  the  judgment,  the  burden  is 
on  defendant  to  establish  its  validity,78  and  that, 
where  the  parties  stand  in  a  relationship  of  trust 
and  confidence  to  each  other,  defendant  may  have 
the  burden  of  establishing  his  fair  dealing  in  ob- 
taining judgment.79  Where  the  complainant  has 


established  a  right  in  equity  to  set  aside  the  judg- 
ment on  some  recognized  ground  and  shows  the 
existence  of  a  substantial  controversy,  which  is 
predicated  on  a  plea  denying  the  allegations  of  the 
complaint  by  which  the  burden  would  be  on  plain- 
tiff in  the  action  at  law,  the  same  burden  should  be 
the  rule  in  the  trial  of  that  issue  in  the  equity  suit80 

b.  Admissibility 

In  proceedings  for  equitable  relief  against  a  judg- 
ment, only  legal  evidence  tending  to  establish  or  dis- 
prove the  facts  in  issue  is  admissible. 

In  proceedings  to  set  aside  a  judgment,  or  to  en- 
join the  enforcement  thereof,  evidence  is  admissi- 
ble on  the  part  of  defendant  as  well  as  on  the  part 
of  complainant.81  The  record  of  the  case  in  which 
the  judgment  was  rendered  is  ordinarily  admissible 
in  evidence,82  including  a  transcript  of  the  evidence, 


plaintiff  company,  the  officer's  re- 
turn on  the  original  notice  purport- 
ed to  show  service  on  two  of  plain- 
tifTs  officers,  and  such  officers  deniec 
having:  been  served,  no  burden  of 
proof  rested  on  plaintiff  to  show 
they  notified  the  manager  of  the 
company. — Des  Moines  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  v.  Marks  Inv.  Co.,  195  N.W.  597, 
197  Iowa  589,  modified  on  other 
grounds  on  rehearing  197  N.W.  628, 
197  Iowa  5S9. 
71.  Cal. — Church  v.  Church,  105  P. 

2d  643.  40  Cal.App.2d  701. 
111. — Woodworth   v.    Sandin,   20   N.E. 

2d  603,  371  111.  302. 
Ind.— Postal  v.  Postal,  136  NJE.  570, 

192  Ind.  376. 
Ky.— - Hargis    v.    Hargis,    66    S.W.2d 

59,  252  Ky.  198. 
Me.— In    re    Baker's   Estate,    195   A. 

202,  135  Me.  277. 

Mich. — Karasek     v.     People's     State 

Trust    &    Savings    Bank    of    Pon- 

tiac.  247  N.W.   765,  262  Mich.  636. 

Mo. — Wuelker  v.    Maxwell,    App.,    70 

S.W.2d  1100. 
N.J. — Mittenbuhler  v.  Kessler  Truck- 
ing Co.,  181  A.  163,  119  N.J.EQ.  100. 
Or. — Sturm  v.   Cooper,    28    P.2d   231, 

145  Or.  583. 
Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hart- 
man   v.    Spivey,    123    S.W.2d   1110, 
1114,  22  Tenn.App.  435. 
34  C.J.  p  494  note  88. 

72.    U.S.— Wheiles     v.     JBtna     Life 

Ins.  Co.,   C.OA.Tex.,   68  F.2d  99. 
Ala.— Wise   v.   Merritt,    134   So.   468, 

223  Ala.  54,  certiorari  denied  Wise 

v.  Miller,  53  S.Ct.  30,  284  U.S.  650. 

76  L.Ed.  552. 
Miss. — Walton    v.    Gregory    Funeral 

Home,   154   So.   717,   170  Miss.   129. 
Ohio. — Washington    v.    Levinson,    35 

N.E.2d    161,    66    Ohio    App.    461. 
O!il.— McBride  v.  Cowen,  216  P.  104, 

90  Okl.  130. 
Pa. — Miljer  v.  Mastrocola,  2  A.2d  550, 

133  Pa.Super.  210. 
Tex. — Stewart    v.    Byrne,    Com.App., 


42    S.W.2d    234— Hicks    v.    Wallis 

Lumber  Co.,   Civ.App.,   137   S.W.2d 

93 — Citizens  Mut  Life  &  Accident 

Ass'n  of  Texas  v.    Gillespie,    Civ 

App.,    93    S.W.2d    200— Baldwin    v, 

Stamford  State  Bank,  Civ. App.,  82 

S.W.2d    701,    error   refused. 

34  C.J.  p  495  note  89. 

Prima  lade  showing 

In  suit  to  set  aside  judgment,  bur- 
den is  on  plaintiff  to  offer  proof  suf- 
ficient to  make  a  prima  facie  show- 
ing of  meritorious  action  and  some- 
thing more  than  mere  allegations 
are  necessary. — Thoreson  v.  Central 
States  Electric  Co.,  283  N.W.  253,  225 
Iowa  1406. 

73.  U.S. — Wheiles  v.  Mtua,  Life  Ins. 
Co.,   C.C.A.Tex.,   68   F.2d   99. 

Tex.— Hicks   v.   Wallis   Lumber  Co., 

Civ.App.,   187  S.W.2d  93. 
34  C.J.  p  495  note  90. 

74.  U.S.— Wheiles  v.  JBtna  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  C.C.A.Tex.,   68  F.2d  99. 

La.— Mercantile    Adjustment    Co.    v. 

Powers,  5  La. App.  534. 
Neb.— Martindale   v.   Panter,   289  N. 

W.  «69,  137  Neb.  522. 
Okl.—McBride  v.  Qowen,  216  P.  104, 

90  Okl.  130. 
Tex. — Hicks   v.  Wallis   Lumber  Co., 

Civ.App.,  137  S.W.2d  93. 
34  C.J.  p  495  note  91. 
Bebnttal  of  presumption 

Petitioner  seeking  to  set  aside 
judgment  must  rebut  presumption  of 
negligence  In  not  objecting  when 
court  rendered  judgment. — Scarbor- 
ough v.  Information  Buying  Co.,  154 
S.B.  350,  170  Ga.  872. 

75.  Neb. — Martindale  v.  Panter,  289 
N.W.   869,    137  Neb.    522. 

Tex.— Stewart  v.  Byrne,  Com. App.,  42 
•S.W.2d  234 — Petty  v.  Mitchell,  Civ. 
App.,  187  S.W.2d  138,  error  refused 
— Citizens  Mut  Life  &  Accident 
Ass'n  of  Texas  v.  Gillespie,  Civ. 
App.,  93  S.W.2d  200. 

34  C.J.  p  495  note  92. 

780 


7«,  Ala. — Fletcher  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Opelika,  11  So.2d  854,  244 
Ala.  98. 

77.  Utah.— Redfleld    v.    'First    Nat. 
Bank,  244  P.  210,  66  Utah  459. 

78.  Colo.— terrier  v.  Morris,  122  P. 
2d  880,  109  Colo.  154. 

79.  Cal. — Young  v.  Young  Holdings 
Corporation,   «0   P.2d   723,   27   CaL 
App.2d  129. 

SO.    Ala. — Hanover  Fire   Ins.  Co.   v. 

Street,  176  So.  350.  234  Ala.  '537. 
Existence  of  verbal  contract 

Where  only  matter  as  to  which  bill 
in  equity  to  set  aside  a  judgment 
against  complainant  showed  a  con- 
troversy was  the  existence  of  verbal 
contract  sued  on  in  law  action,  bur- 
den was  on  defendants,  as  plaintiffs 
in  law  action,  to  establish  the  con- 
tract after  complainant  established  a 
right  to  set  aside  judgment,  while  all 
other  matters  set  up  as  a  meritori- 
ous defense  were  by  way  of  confes- 
sion and  avoidance  and  burden  was 
on  complainant  to  establish  them.— 
Hanover  Fire  Ins.  C.o.  v.  Street,  su- 
pra. 

81.     Okl. — Travis  v.  Aaronson,  228  P. 

958,  102  Okl.  210. 
34  C.J.  p  495  note  98. 
Absence  of  fraud 

In  action  to  set  aside  judgment  for 
fraud,  any  evidence  tending  to  prove 
no  fraud  is  admissible,  whether  un- 
der general  denial  or  specific  allega- 
tions of  answer. — Travis  v.  Aaron- 
son,  228  P.  958,  102  Okl.  210. 

L    W.Va. — Stewart  v.   Tennant,   44 

S.E.  223,  52  W.Va.  559. 
34  C.J.  p  495  note  93. 
Petition  and  judgment 

In  suit  to  set  aside  decree  remov- 
ing minor's  disabilities,  court  might 
use  petition  and  judgment  in  former 
suit  to  determine  whether  or  not 
that  court  had  jurisdiction.— Hobbs 
v.  Boyd,  Tex.Civ.App.,  292  S.W.  947. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


393 


if  properly  authenticated,83  and  also  the  record  of 
another  judgment  bearing  on  the  facts  in  contro- 
versy,84 as  well  as  any  collateral  memorandum  or 
agreement  between  the  parties85  or  other  legal  evi- 
dence tending  to  establish  the  facts  in  issue.8*5  On 
the  other  hand,  evidence  which  is  not  competent  01 
relevant  to  the  issues  in  controversy  is  not  admis- 
sible.87 Independent  transactions,  not  in  any  way 
connected  with  the  transaction  between  the  parties 
to  the  suit,  are  not  admissible  in  evidence.88 

Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  prove  such  facts 
as  naturally  rest  in  pais,89  such  as  lack  of  negli- 
gence90 or  complainant's  knowledge  of  the  penden- 
cy of  the  action  against  him,91  but  not  to  modify  or 
explain  away  the  purport  or  terms  of  the  judg- 
ment,92 except  where  the  judgment  is  attacked  on 
the  ground  of  fraud  or  mistake.93 


c.  Weight  and  Sufficiency 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Fraud,  perjury,  Collusion,  or  other 

misconduct 

(1)  In  General 

In  order  to  warrant  equitable  relief  against  a  Judg- 
ment, the  complainant's  case  must  be  supported  by  clear, 
satisfactory,  and  convincing  evidence,  preponderating  dis- 
tinctly in  his  favor. 

In  order  to  justify  a  court  of  equity  in  setting 
aside  or  enjoining  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment, 
the  complainant's  case,  including  alike  the  specific 
grounds  on  which  he  asks  equitable  relief,  his  ex- 
cuse for  not  making  his  defense  in  the  original  ac- 
tion, and  the  showing  that  he  himself  is  free  from 
fault  or  negligence,  must  be  supported  by  clear, 
satisfactory,  and  convincing  evidence,  preponderat- 
ing distinctly  in  his  favor,94  and  this  rule  has  been 


3>ocket  entries 

In  action  in  nature  of  bill  of  re- 
view to  set  aside  judgment,  docket 
entries  made  in  suit  wherein  judg- 
ment was  rendered  were  competent 
on  issue  whether  or  not  defendants 
in  that  suit  were  negligent  in  failing 
to  appear  and  defend  suit. — Hill  v. 
Lester,  Tex.Civ.App.,  01  S.W.2d  1152, 
error  dismissed. 
S3,  in. — Brown  v.  Luehrs,  79  111. 

575. 

84.  Tex. — Watson  v.  Rainey,  6  S.W. 
840,  69  Tex.  319— Bilger  v.  Buchan- 
an, 6  S.W.  408. 

85.  Ky.— Mason  v.  Holmes,  4  Bibb. 
203. 

j$j, — Sanders  v.  Wagner,  32  N.J.Eo;. 
506. 

86.  111.— Marnik  v.  Cusack,  148  N.E. 
42,  317  111.  362— Myers  v.  American 
Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  Chicago, 
277  IlLApp.  378. 

Ind.— Bearing    v.    Speedway    Realty 

Co.,    40    N.K2d    414,    111    IncLApp. 

585. 
Ky.— Turner  T.  Gambia,  121  S.W.2d 

705,  275  Ky.  330. 
Mass. — Town  of  Hopkinton  v.  B.  'F. 

Sturtevant  Co.,   189  N.B.  107,  285 

Mass.  272. 
Miss.— Hirsch  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  R,  B. 

Kennington   Co.,    124    So.  -344,    155 

Miss.  242,  88  A.L.R.  1. 
Wis^Federal  -Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Thay- 

er,   269  N.W.   547,  222  Wis.   658. 
34  C.J.  p  495  note  97—47  C.J.  p  438 

note  74  [a]. 
Extrinsic  evidence 

Where  attack  on  judgment  is  di- 
rect or  of  such  nature  as  to  be  gov- 
erned by  rules  relating  to  direct 
attacks,  extrinsic  evidence  is  ad- 
missible to  establish  any  facts  which 
will  furnish  basis  for  decree  vacat- 
ing judgment  in  equitable  action  for 
such  purpose* 


Cal.— Stevens  v.  Kelley,  134  P.2d  56, 
57  Cal.App.2d  318. 

Utah. — Boston  Acme  Mines  Develop- 
ment Co.  v.  Clawson,  240  P.  165, 
66  Utah  103. 

87.    Ga. — Continental    Casualty    Co. 

v.  White,  173  S.E.  117,  178  Ga.  287 

— Brannan  v.  Mobley,  150  S.B.  76, 

169  Ga.  243. 
111.— Marnik  v.  Cusack,  148  N.B.  42, 

317  111.  362. 

a. — Davis    v.    Southland    Inv.    Co., 

App.,  149  So.  -303. 
Mo.— Winchell  v.  Gaskill,  190  S.W.2d 

266— National  Union  Fire  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Vermillion,  App.,  19  S.W.2d  776 

— State  ex  rel.  Woolman  v.  Guin-. 

otte,  282  S.W.  68,  221  Mo.App.  466. 
N.C.— McCoy  v.  Justice,  155  S.B.  452, 

199  N.C.  602. 
Tex, — Panhandle  Const  Co.  v.  Casey, 

Civ.App.,   66  S.W.2d  705,  error  re- 
fused. 

34  QJ.  p  495  note  97  [bj,  [c]. 
Particular  evidence  held  inadmissible 

(1)  Record    in    action    in    which 
judgment  sought  to  be  set  aside  for 
fraud  was  obtained  would  be  inad- 
missible, where  tendered  to  show  in- 
trinsic  fraud  rather   than   extrinsic 
fraud. — McCoy   v.   Justice,    155    S.B. 
452,  199  N.C.  602. 

(2)  Plaintiffs'  testimony,  in  spous- 
es'   suit  to   set  aside   judgment  on 
their   confession  of  judgment  note, 
that  they  never  read  instrument  be- 
fore   signing   it   and    were   not   in- 
formed that  it  contained  homestead 
waiver,  was  inadmissible  to  support 
their  allegations  of  fraud  and  error 
in  connection  with  signing  thereof.— 
Jeffcoat   v.    Hammons,    La,App.,    160 
So.  182. 

Bx  part*  affidavits 

In  equity  suit  to  vacate  judgment, 
ex  parte  affidavits  are  not  competent 
evidence  to  establish  allegations  of 

781 


meritorious  defense  to  original  ac- 
tion.— Honeycutt  v.  Severin,  98  P.2d 
1093,  186  Okl.  509. 

88.  Tex. — Lyon-Taylor  Co.  v.  John- 
son,  Civ.App.,  195  S.W.  875. 

34  C.J.  p  495  note  99. 

89.  Miss. — Keanum  v.  Southern  Ry. 
Co.,    119   So.   301,   151  Miss.   784. 

34  C.J.  p  495  note  1. 

Evidence  held  inadmissible  to  modify 

terms  of  will 
Cal.— Vincent  v.  -Security-First  Nat. 

Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  155  P.2d  63, 

67  CaLApp.2d  602. 

90.  Tex. — Dalhart  Heal  -Est  Agency 
v.    Le   Master,    132    S.W.    860,    62 
Tex.Civ.App.  579. 

91.  Conn. — Blakeslee  v.  Murphy,   44 
Conn.  188. 

92.  Ark.— Fowler    v.    Williams,     20 
Ark.  641. 

34  C.J.  p  495  note  4. 

93.  Mo.— Bngler  v.   Knoblaugh,  110 
S.W.  16,  131  Mo.App.  481. 

Tex.— Weir  v.  Carter,  Civ.App.,  169 
S.W.  111*3. 

94.  Ga. — Jones    v.    Jones,    184    S.B. 
271,  181  Ga.  747. 

y.— Walker  v.  Perkins,  76  S.W.2d 
251,  256  Ky.  442. 

Mich. — Denison  v.  Crowley,  Milner  & 
Co.,  271  N.W.  735,  279  Mich.  211. 

Neb.— Messing  v.  Dwelling  House 
Mut  Ins.  Co.,  226  N.W.  914,  119 
Neb.  36. 

Pa.— Stoner,  now  for  Use  of  Pinch, 
v.  Wise,  200  A.  320,  331  Pa.  446— 
Miller  v.  Mastrocola,  2  A-2d  550, 
133  Pa.Super.  210 — Mook  v.  Larsen, 
Com.Pl.,  23  Brie  Co.  320 — Simcoe 
v.  Szukegs,  Com.Pl.,  27  NorthuCo. 
132 — Williams  Valley  Sav.  'Fund 
v.  Daub,  CowuPL,  8  Sch.Reg.  104— 
Nauyalis  v.  White,  Com.PL,  7  Sen. 
Reg.  1-66 — Sugarman  v.  Baldini, 
Com-PL,  28  West.Co.L.J.  99. 


§'393 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


applied  in  determining  the  sufficiency  of  evidence  in 
suits  for  relief    against  a  judgment  because  of  un- 


avoidable  rnsnalty,   mistake,  inadvertence,  or  ex- 
cusable neglect.95     An  injunction  restraining  the 


Tex. — Ansley  v.  Moody,  Civ.App.,  146 

S.W.2d  24'3,  error  refused — Mendlo- 

vitz  v.  Samuels  Shoe  Co.,  Civ.App. 

5  S.W.2d  559. 

34  C.J.  p  495  note  6. 

Measure  of  proof 

Same  measure  of  proof  as  in  pro- 
ceeding to  reform  instrument  was 
not  necessarily  required  in  suit  to 
open  judgment  on  note  to  interpose 
defense  of  payment,  where  maker 
admitted  note's  validity. — Nescopeck 
Nat  Bank  v.  Smith,  165  A.  526,  108 
Pa.  Super.  553. 
Records  good  on  face 

In  proceeding  to  vacate  previous 
decree,  wherein  complaint  alleged 
that  decree  was  rendered  without 
notice  and  obtained  by  fraud,  and 
brought  decree  and  records  previ- 
ously made  into  issue,  such  records 
were  good  on  their  face  until  prop- 
erly impeached. — Berry  v.  Sims,  112 
S.W.2d  25,  195  Ark.  326. 
Evidence  held  sufficient 

(1)  To   establish  no  negligence  of 
plaintiff   in   failing   to    discover  de- 
fault judgment  within  time  allowed 
for  vacation  of  Judgment  by  default. 
— Stocking  v.  Charles  Beard  Co.,  55 
P.2d  949,  102  Mont.  65. 

(2)  To   show   that  defendant   was 
not  negligent  in  failing  to  answer. — 
Hanson  v.  Pratt,  Tex.Civ.App.,  51  S. 
W.2d  629,  error  dismissed. 

(3)  To  support  finding  that  answer 
and  copy  thereof  were  mailed  so  as 
to   permit   setting   aside   of   default 
judgment. — Hallett  v.  Slaughter,  140 
P.2d  3,  22  Cal.2d  552. 

(4)  To    support    finding   that   for- 
mer judgment  was   erroneous. — Riv- 
ers v.   Griffin,  Tex.Civ.App.,   16   S.W. 
2d  874. 

(5)  To  warrant  denial  of  relief. 
Fla. — Miami    Bank    &    Trust   Co.    v. 

Frank  T.  Budge  Co.,  145  So.  192, 
107  Fla,  581. 

La. — (Love  v.  Woodard,  190  So.  396, 
193  La.  251 — Saucier  v.  McLean, 
125  So.  163,  12  La.App.  158. 

Mass.— Oliver  v.  Brazil,  192  N.E. 
486,  288  Mass.  252. 

Mich.— Racho  v.  Woeste,  9  N.W.2d 
827,  305  Mich,  522. 

Tex. — Fowler  v.  Roden,  105  S.W.2d 
187,  129  Tex.  599— Richardson  v. 
Kelly,  Civ.App.,  179  S.W.2d  991, 
affirmed,  Sup.,  191  S.W.2d  -857 — 
Stevenson  v.  Thomas,  Civ. App.,  56 
S.W.2d  1095,  error  dismissed — 
Shaw  v.  Etheridge,  Civ.App.,  16 
S.W.2d  722. 

(6)  To    warrant    setting    aside    of 
judgment 

Ind.— Globe  Mining  Co.  v.  Oak  Ridge 
Coal  Co.,  177  N.E.  868,  204  Ind.  11. 

Ky.— Harris  v.  Sparks,  1  S.W.2d  772, 
222  Ky.  472. 

La. — National    Park    Bank    v.    Con- 


cordia  Land  &  Timber  Co.,  97  So 
272,  154  -La.  31 — Engeran  v.  Con- 
solidated Companies,  App.,  147  So 
743. 

Mo. — Hockenberry  v.  Cooper  County 
State  Bank  of  Bunceton,  -88  S.W.2d 
1031,  338  Mo.  31. 

Mont. — Stocking  v.  Charles  Beard 
Co.,  55  P.2d  949,  102  Mont.  65. 

N.J. — Crandol  v.  Garrison,  169  A. 
507,  115  N.J.Ed.  11. 

Pa. — Price  v.  Shultz,  85  Pa. Super 
78. 

Tex. — McAfee  v.  Jeter  &  Townsend, 
Civ.App.f  147  -S.W.2d  SS4— Hanson 
v.  Pratt,  Civ.App.,  51  S.W.2d  629, 
error  dismissed — Hadad  v.  Ellison, 
Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  193. 

47  C.J.  p  438  note  77. 

(7)  As  to  other  particular  matters. 

Cal. — Kupfer  v.  MacDonald,  122  P. 
2d  271,  19  Cal.2d  566— Kupfer  v. 
Brawner,  122  P.2d  268,  19  Cal.2d 
562. 

IlL^Francis  v.  Legris,  17  N.E.2d  359, 
297  IlLApp.  164— Goelitz  v.  Lath- 
rop,  3  N.E.2d  305,  286  IlLApp.  24S. 

3klont — Stocking  v.  Charles  Beard 
Co.,  55  P.2d  949,  102  Mont.  65. 

Tex. — Early  v.  Burns,  Civ.App.,  142 
S.W.2d  260,  error  refused — Clark- 
son  v.  Ruiz,  Civ.App.,  140  S.W.2d 
206,  error  dismissed,  judgment 
correct — Johnson  v.  Cole,  Civ.App., 
138  S.W.2d  910,  error  refused — 
Snell  v.  Knowles,  Civ.App.,  57  S. 
W.2d  871,  error  dismissed. 

Va. — Lockard  v.  Whitenack,  144  S.E. 
606,  151  Va,  143— Fitchette  v.  Cape 
Charles  Bank,  132  S.E.  688,  146 
Va.  715,  affirmed  133  S.E.  492,  146 
Va.  715. 

Wash.— Puett  v.  Bernhard,  71  P.2d 
406,  191  Wash.  557. 

34  C.J.  p  495  note  6  [d]  (1) — 47  C.J. 
p  438  note  74  [d]. 


Evidence  held 

(1)  To  establish  agreement  of  de- 
fendant   to    buy    judgment    against 
plaintiff    at    discount    for    plaintiff's 
benefit— Davidhizar   v.    Gaulke,    280 
P.  499,  130  Or.  492. 

(2)  To  warrant  recovery  for  com- 
plainant. 

Ala. — Greer  v.  Altoona  "Warehouse 
Co.,  20  So.2d  513,  246  Ala.  297. 

111. — Knaus  v.  Chicago  Title  &  Trust 
Co.,  7  N.E.2d  298,  365  111.  588— 
Crane  Co.  v.  Parker,  136  N.E.  733, 
304  111.  •331— Ryan  v.  Wilson,  23 
N.E.2d  566,  302  IlLApp.  18— Cal- 
breath  v.  Beckwith,  260  IlLApp.  7. 

Iowa. — Snyder  v.  Federal  Land  Bank 
of  Omaha,  284  N.W.  157,  226  Iowa 
341 — Galvin  v.  Taylor,  212  N.W. 
709,  203  Iowa  1139. 

Ky.— Nicholson  v.  Ausmus,  132  S.W. 
2d   748,    280    Ky.    99— Frederick  v. 
Rowe,  93  S.W.2d  349,  263  Ky.  706. 
SL— Whitbeck    v.    Hughes,    134    So. 

782 


255,  1T2  La.  3SO— Henderson  v.  C 
M.  Thibodeaux  Co.,  App.,  177  So. 
414. 

N.J. — Wolf  v.  Federal  Deposit  Ins. 
Corporation,  28  A.2d  219,  132  N.J. 
Eq.  389. 

Okl. — Oklahoma  Ry.  Co.  v.  Holt,  17 
P.2d  955,  161  Okl.  165. 

Pa. — Stoner.  now  for  "Use  of  Dinch. 
v.  Wise,  200  A.  320,  331  Pa.  446. 

Tex.— Richardson  v.  Kelly,  191  S.W. 
2d  857 — Empire  Gas*  &  'Fuel  Co. 
v.  Noble,  Com. App.,  36  S.W.2d  451 
— Panther  Oil  &  Grease  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Crews,  Clv.App.,  124  S.W.2d  436— 
Williams  v.  Tooke,  Civ.App.,  116 
S.W.2d  1114,  error  dismissed — 
Reasonover  v.  Reasonover,  Civ. 
App.,  43  S.W.2d  174,  error  dis- 
missed— Crutcher  v.  Wolfe,  Civ. 
App.,  269  S.W.  841. 

Utah. — Anderson  v.  State,  238  P.  557, 
65  Utah  512. 

Va. — Lockard  v.  Whitenack,  144  S.E. 
606,  151  Va.  143. 

W.Va. — 'Lyons  v.  Steele,  169  S.E.  4S1, 
113  W.Va.  652. 

(3)  As  to  other  particular  matters. 
Ariz. — American  Surety  Co.  of  New 

York  v.   Mosher,    64   P.2d   1025,    4S 

Ariz.  552. 
Ky. — Sowards   v.    Sowards,    61    S.W. 

2d  609,  249  Ky.  742. 
La.— Green   v.   Barnett,    120   So.    666, 

10  La.App.  212. 
34  C.J.  p  495  note  6  [e]. 

Joint  complaint 

Where  complaint  for  new  trial  aft- 
default  was  joint,  evidence  must 
warrant  granting  of  new  trial  as  to 
both  applicants. — Julien  v.  Lane,  157 
N.E.  114  (second  case),  95  Ind.App. 
139. 

95.  Wis.— Kiel  v.  Scott  &  Williams, 
202  N.W.  672,  156  Wis.  415. 

Proof  beyoad  reasonable  doubt 

"Sufficient  evidence,"  within  rule 
that  action  in  equity  to  set  aside  de- 
fault judgment  entered  because  of 
mistake  of  officer  of  court  in  failing 
to  record  filing  of  answer  must  be 
based  on  sufficient  and  substantial 
evidence,  is  that  amount  of  proof 
which  ordinarily  satisfies  an  unprej- 
udiced mind  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt — State  ex  pel.  Sterling  v. 
Shain,  129  S.W.2d  1048,  344  Mo.  891. 

Authority  of  counsel 

In  proceeding  to  be  relieved  from 
[udgment  on  ground  that  it  was  en- 
:ered    through    defendant's    mistake, 
nadvertence,  and  excusable  neglect, 
the  appearance  of  counsel  for  defend- 
ant in  action  wherein  judgment  was 
rendered   was   prima  facie   evidence 
of  counsel's  authority  to  appear  for 
defendant.— -Vail    v.    Department    of 
Financial  Institutions  of  Indiana,  17 
N.E.2d  854,  106  Ind.App.  3d. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


393 


collection  of  a  judgment  will  not  be  granted  if 
there  is  reasonable  doubt  of  the  existence  of  the 
fp,c'cs  on  which  the  application  is  founded.96  Where 
the  rights  of  innocent  third  persons  have  become  in- 
volved, the  courts  will  be  more  exacting  as  to  the 
quantum  of  proof  required.97 

Where,  as  discussed  supra  §  349,  a  meritorious 
defense  to  the  cause  of  action  is  required  to  be 
shown,  such  defense  must  be  fully  set  forth  and 
clearly  proved.98  It  is,  however,  sufficient  to  make 
a  prima  facie  showing  of  the  truth  or  existence  of 


the  defense.99  The  same  certainty  of  proof  is  not 
required  to  establish  an  excuse  for  not  making  a 
defense  at  law  that  would  be  required  to  establish 
the  existence  of  that  defense;1  but  if  the  excuse  is 
not  proved  it  avails  nothing  to  prove  the  defense.2 

Lack  of  proper  citation  or  notice  of  proceedings. 
Where  it  is  sought  to  set  aside  a  judgment  for  lack 
of  proper  citation  or  notice  of  the  proceedings,  the 
proof  must  be  clear  and  convincing  to  entitle  com- 
plainant to  relief.8  While  the  recital  in  a  judg- 


Evidence  held  sufficient 

Ark.— Halliday  v.  Fenton,  260  S.W. 
961.  164  Ark.  11. 

Ga.— Thomas  v.  Fred  W.  Amend  Co., 
26  S.E.2d  415,  196  Ga,  455. 

Iowa, — Thoreson  v.  Qentral  States 
Electric  Co.,  28"3  N.W.  253,  225 
Iowa  1406 — Clarke  v.  Smith,  192 
N.W.  136,  195  Iowa  1299. 

Ky. — Ohio  Valley  -Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 
Co.'s  Keceiver  v.  Newman,  13  S. 
W.2d  771,  227  Ky.  554 — Collins' 
Bx'rs  v.  Bonner,  294  S.W.  1027, 
220  Ky.  212. 

Evidence  held  insufficient 

Ark.— Beth  v.  Harris,  188  S.W.2d  119, 
208  Ark.  90*3 — "Farmers'  Mut.  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Defries,  1  S.W.2d  19, 
175  Ark.  -548. 

Ga.— Gladden  v.  Mobley,  159  S.B.  569, 
173  Ga.  48. 

Ind.— Vail  v.  Department  of  Finan- 
cial Institutions  of  Indiana,  17  N. 
E.2d  854,  106  Ind.App.  39— Julien 
v.  Lane,  157  N.B.  114  (second 
case),  95  Ind.App.  139. 

Ky. — Overstreet  v.  Grinstead's  Adm'r, 
140  S.W.2d  836,  283  Ky.  73— Mc- 
Commas  v.  McCawley,  14  S.W.2d 
1057,  228  Ky.  263. 

Mo.— Millikin  v.  Anderson,  App.,  269 
S.W.  «75. 

96.  -U.S.— Nelson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank 
of  Killingley,  C.C.Minn.,  70  F.  526. 

37.  Tex.— Pierce  v.  Pierce,  Civ.App., 
218  S.W.  144— Pierce  v.  Southern 
Baptist  Convention  Foreign  Mis- 
sion Bd.,  Civ.App.,  218  S.W.  140. 

98w  Tex.— Humphrey  v.  Harrell, 
Com.App.,  2*  S.W.2d  96*. 

34  C.J.  p  496  note  10. 

Evidence  held  sufficient 

(1)  To  show  meritorious  defense. 
^rj^ — McClintock  v.  Lankford,  224  S. 

W.  485,  145  Ark.  264. 
Moi— Crown   Drug   Co.   v.  Raymond, 

App.,  51  S.W.2d  215. 
.  Tex.— Hadfcd  v.  Ellison,  Civ.App.,  283 
S'.W.  19*3. 

(2)  To   support  finding  of  insuffi- 
cient defense. — National  Hardware  & 
Stove  Co.   v.   Walters,   Tex.Civ.App., 
58  &W.2d  146>  error  refused— Walker 
v.    Chatterton,    Tex.Civ.App.,    192    S. 
W..  10-85, 

Evidence  held  insufficient 
XoWa._-Thoresox*    v.    Central    States 


Electric    Co.,    283    N.W.    253,    225 

Iowa  1406. 
Tex. — First  State  Bank  of  Loraine  v. 

Jackson,   Civ.App.,    13   S.W.2d    979. 
99.    Iowa.— Clarke  v.   Smith,   192  N. 

W.  136,  195  Iowa  1299. 
Ohio.— Minetti  v.   Einhorn,    173   N.E. 

243,  36  Ohio  App.  "310. 
34  C.J.  p  496  note  11. 

1.  Tenn. — Rice  v.  Railroad  Bank,  7 
Humphr.  39. 

2.  Va.— Turner    v.    Davis,    7    Leigh 
227,  *34  Va,   227,  30  Am.D.  502. 

3.  Ala. — Bastian   -   Blessing   Co.    v. 
Gewin,  117  So.  197,  217  Ala.  592. 

Cal.— Petersen  v.  Vane,  134  P.2d  6, 
57  Cal.App.2d  58— De  Tray  v. 
Chambers,  297  P.  -575,  112  Cal-App. 
697. 

111.-— Nikola  v.  Campus  Towers 
Apartment  Bldg.  Corporation,  25 
N.E.2d  582,  303  Ill.App.  516. 

Ky.— McGuire  v.  Cope,  9  S.W.2d  528, 
225  Ky.  521. 

Mich. — Garey  v.  Morley  Bros.,  209  N. 
W.  11-6,  234  Mich.  675. 

Miss. — Hirsch  Bros.   &  Co.   v.   B.   E. 
Kennington   Co.,   124    So.    344,    155 
Miss.  242,  88  A.L.R.  1. 
j.C. — Laurens  Trust  Co.  v.  Copeland, 
151  -S.B.  617,  154  S.C.  390. 

Tex. — Panhandle  Const.  Co.  v.  Casey, 
Civ.App.,  66  S.W.2d  705,  error  re- 
fused. 

34  C.J.  p  495  note  6   [b],   [c]. 

Evidence  held  sufficient 

(1)  To  sustain  Judgment  for  com- 
plainant generally. 

Ark.— Collier  v.  Mississippi  Benefi- 
cial Life  Ins.  Co.,  261  S.W.  39,  164 
Ark.  54. 

111.— Kulikowski  v.  North  American 
Mfg.  Co.,  54  N.E.2d  411,  322  111. 
App.  202. 

Ky.— Newsorae  v.  Hall,  161  S.W.2d 
629,  290  Ky.  486,  140  A.L.R.  818. 

La. — Dickey  v.  Pollock,  App.,  183  So. 
48 — Model  Cleaners  &  Dyers  v. 
Falcone,  123  So.  483,  11  La.App. 
218. 

(2)  To   sustain  Judgment   for   de- 
fendant generally. 

Ala. — Wright  v.  Fannin,  156  So*.  849, 
229  Ala.  278. 

Ky. — Miller  v.  National  Bank  of  Lon- 
don, 116  S.W.2d  320,  273  Ky.  243. 

Tex. — Murry  v.  Citizens'  State  Bank 

783 


of    Ranger,    Civ.App.,    77    S.W,2d 
1104,  error  dismissed. 

(3)  To  show  service  of  process. 
Ark.— Horn    v.    Hull,    275    S.W.    905, 

169  Ark.  463. 

Cal. — Christie  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco,  23  P.2d  757,  218  Cal. 
423. 

Iowa. — Sloan  v.  Jepson,  252  N.W.  535, 
217  Iowa  1082. 

Ky.— Billingsly  v.  Pearcy,  65  S.W.2d 
699,  251  Ky.  546. 

Mich.— Schlussel  v.  Ruhf,  229  N.W. 
514,  249  Mich.  647. 

W.Va. — Stepp  v.  State  Road  Com- 
mission, 151  S.B.  180,  108  W.Va. 
346. 

34    C.J.   p   495   note   6    [d]    (3). 

(4)  To   show   want   of   service   of 
process. 

Ark. — Brookfleld  v.  Harrahan  Viaduct 
Improvement  Dist.,  54  S.W.2d  689, 
186  Ark.  599. 

Kan.— Gibson  v.  Enright,  9  P.2d  971, 
135  Kan.  181. 

La.— Nolan  v.  Schultze,  126  So.  «13, 
169  La.  1022. 

Mich. — Argo  Oil  Corporation  v.  R. 
D.  Mitchell,  Inc.,  257  N.W.  852, 
269  Mich.  418— Reves  v.  Hillmer, 
239  N.W.  328,  256  Mich.  239. 

Tex. — Panhandle  Const.  Co.  v.  Casey, 
Civ.App.,  66  S.W.2d  705,  error 
refused — Laurenson  v.  Carrell,  Civ. 
App.,  289  S.W.  1024. 

34  C.J.  p  495  note  6   [d]    (4). 

(5)  To  support  findings  favorable 
to  plaintiff  on  Question  of  plaintiff's 
knowledge    or   notice    of   commence- 
ment or  pendency  of  action  wherein 
Judgment    was     entered. — Husar    v. 
Husar,    119    P.2d    798,    48   Cal. App. 2 d 
326. 

(6)  To  sustain  finding  that  plain- 
tiff was  properly  served  as  «t  ficti- 
tious  defendant. — Petersen  v.   Vane, 
134   P.2d   6,   57   Cal.App.2d  58. 

Evidence  held  insufficient 

(1)  To     warrant     Judgment     for 
plaintiff.— First  Nat*   Bank  v.   Dals- 
heimer,  248  S.W.   575,   157  Ark.   464. 

(2)  To  show  service  of  process. 
Cal. — Noble    v.     Blanchard,     8     P.<2d 

523,  120  Cal.App.  664. 
La. — polk  v.   Saunders,   133   So.  777, 
16  La.App.  174. 


§  393 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ment  that  process  was  served  is  not  conclusive,4 
the  falsity  of  the  recital  must  be  shown  by  clear 
and  convincing  testimony  and  not  merely  by  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence.5  It  has  been  held  that 
the  officer's  return  showing  service  may  not  be  im- 
peached by  the  testimony  of  one  witness  unless  it 
is  strongly  corroborated  by  other  evidence.6 

(2)  Fraud,  Perjury,  Collusion,  or  Other  Mis- 
conduct 
To  warrant  equitable  relief  against  a  Judgment  on 


the  ground  of  fraud,  collusion,  or  other  misconduct,  the 
proof  In  support  of  the  allegations  must  be  clear,  dis- 
tinct, and  certain,  and  an  especially  high  degree  of  proof 
is  required  in  the  case  of  a  charge  of  perjury. 

To  entitle  a  complainant  to  relief  in  equity 
against  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  collu- 
sion, or  other  misconduct,  the  proof  in  support  of 
the  allegations  must  be  clear,  distinct,  and  certain,7 
and,  according  to  some  decisions,  so  cogent  and 


(3)  To   show  want   of   service   of 
process. 

Ark. — Davis    v.    Ferguson,    261   S.W. 

905,  164  Ark.  340. 
Ky. — Nicholson    v.    Thomas,    127    S. 

W.2d  155.  277  Ky.  760. 
La. — KoQize  v.  Henry,  App.,  189   So. 

358. 
Tex. — Wedgeworth  v.  Pope,  Civ.App., 

12    S.W.2d    1045,    error    refused — 

Joseph  v.   Kiber,   Civ. App.,    260   S. 

W.  269. 
34  C.J.  p  495  note  6   [e]    (2). 

(4)  To  overcome  verity  of  return 
filed. 

Tex. — Winter  v.  Davis,  Civ.App.,  10 
S.W.2d  181,  error  refused. 

Wash. — Thompson  v.  Short,  106  P.2d 
720,  6  Wash.2d  71. 

(5)  To    excuse    default. — Cornelius 
v.    Early,    Civ.App.,    24    S.W.2d    757, 
affirmed  Early  v.  Cornelius,  39  S.W. 
2d  6,  120  Tex.  335. 

4.  Ky.— Walker  v.  Perkins,  76  S.W. 
2d  251,  256  Ky.  442. 

5.  Ark. — Federal  Land  Bank  of  St. 
Louis  v.   Cottrell,   126   S.W.2d  279, 
197  Ark.  783. 

6.  Okl.— Canard    v.    Ryan,    45    P.2d 
122,  172  Okl.  339. 

Tex. — Panhandle  Const.  Co.  v.  Casey, 
Civ.App.,   66  S.W.2d  705,  error  re- 
fused— Joseph  v.   Kiber,    Civ.App., 
260  S.W.  269. 
Nature   of   evidence    required 

In  suit  to  vacate  default  judg- 
ment, corroborating  evidence  to  im- 
peach officer's  return  on  citation 
showing  service  in  original  suit 
against  plaintiff  may  consist  of  facts 
and  circumstances  showing  that  di- 
rect evidence  is  worthy  of  credit,  but 
need  not  be  direct  and  positive;  cor- 
roborating evidence  must  come  from 
other  sources  than  witness  whose 
testimony  requires  corroboration. — 
Panhandle  Const  Co.  v.  Casey,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  66  S.W.2d  705,  error  re- 
fused—Joseph v.  Kiber,  Tex.Civ.App., 
260  S.W.  269. 

7.  U.S.— Continental    Nat    Bank    of 
Jackson   County,   at   Kansas  City, 
Mo.,  v.  Holland  Banking  Co.,  C.C. 
A,Mo.,   66  F.2d  823— Jack,  v.  Hood, 
D.C.OkL,   28  F.2d  118,  affirmed,  a 
C.A.,  39  F.2d  594. 

Ala.— Quick  y.  McDonald,  108  So.  529, 
214  Ala.  587.  , 


Cal. — Frost  v.  Hanscome,  246  P.  53, 
198  Cal.  500 — Gundelfinger  v.  Mari- 
posa  Commercial  &  Min.  Co.,  App., 
165  P.2d  57. 

Mich.— Grigg  v.  Hanna,  278  N.W. 
125,  283  Mich.  443. 

Mo.— Wright  v.  Wright,  165  S.W.2d 
870,  350  Mo.  325— Elliott  v.  Mc- 
Cormlck,  19  S.W.2d  654,  323  Mo. 
263. 

Neb.— Selleck  v.  Miller,  264  N.W.  754, 
130  Neb.  306. 

N.Y. — Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  v.  Delaware 
&  H.  Co.,  260  N.Y.S.  817,  146  Misc. 
221,  reversed  on  other  grounds  264 
N.Y.S.  470,  238  App.Div.  191. 

Or.— Mattoon  v.  Cole,  143  P.2d  679, 
172  Or.  -664. 

Pa.— Miller  v.  Mastrocola,  2  A.2d 
550,  133  Pa, Super.  210 — Teutonic 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Stein, 
190  A.  189,  125  Pa.Super.  389 — Ohl 
v.  Zimmerman,  Com.PL,  7  Sch.Reg. 
169. 

Tex. — Smith  v.  Ferrell,  Civ. App.,  30 
S.W.2d  371,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com. App.,  44  S.W.2d.  962. 

Wls. — Federal  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Thay- 
er,  269  N.W.  547,  222  Wis.  658. 

34  C.J.  p  496  note  14. 

Evidence  held  sufficient 

(1)  To   show   fraud,    collusion,   or 

other  misconduct 

Ark.— Brick  v.  Sovereign  Grand 
Lodge  of  Accepted  Free  Masons  of 
Arkansas,  117  S.W.2d  1060,  196 
Ark.  372. 

Iowa.— 'Foote  v.  State  Sav.  Bank, 
Missouri  Valley,  Iowa,  206  N.W. 
819,  201  Iowa  174. 

Ky.— Webb  v.  Niceley,  151  S.W.2d 
768,  286  Ky.  632— Triplett  v.  Stan- 
ley, 130  S.W.2d  45,  279  Ky.  148— 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  New 
York  v.  Myers,  109  S.W.2d  1194, 
270  Ky.  523 — Johnson  v.  Gernert 
Bros.  Lumber  Co.,  75  S.W.2d  357, 
255  Ky.  734 — Rouse  v.  House,  262 
S.W.  £M.  203  Ky.  415. 

Mo. — Shepard  v.  Shepard,  180  S.W. 
2d  472,  353  Mo.  1057— Hockenberry 
v.  Cooper  County  State  Bank  of 
Bunceton,  88  S.W.2d  1031,  338  Mo. 
;31 — Gurley  v.  St.  'Louis  Transit 
Co.  of  St.  Louis,  App.,  259  S.W. 
$95. 

N.J. — Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Tarnowski,  20  A.2d  421,  130  N.J.Eq. 
L 

784 


Ohio. — Northern  Ohio  Power  &  Light 
Co.  v.  Smith,  186  N.E.  712,  126  Ohio 
St.  601. 

Tex. — Early  v.  Burns,  Civ.App.,  142 
S.W.2d  260,  error  refused — ^Black- 
man  v.  Blackman,  Civ.App.,  12  S 
S.W.2d  433,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Dockery  v.  Hanan, 
Cir.App.,  54  S.W.2d  1017,  error  re- 
fused— Rivers  v.  Griffin,  Civ.App.. 
16  S.W.2d  874 — Chapman  v.  Clark, 
Civ.App.,  262  S.W.  161,  affirmed, 
Com.App.,  276  S.W.  197. 

34  C.J.  p  496  note  14   [a]   (1),  (2). 

(2)  To  show  absence  of  fraud  or 
other  misconduct. 

Cal.— Voinich  v.  Roller!,  264  P.  240, 
203  Cal.  379— Rogers  v.  Mulkey, 
147  P.2d  62,  -63  Cal.App.2d  567— 
Church  v.  Church,  105  P.2d  643,  40 
Cal.App.2d  701 — Be  Tray  v.  Cham- 
bers, 297  P.  575,  112  Cal.App.  697. 

Fla. — Gamble  v.  Gamble  Holding 
Corporation,  162  So.  886,  120  Fla. 
•340. 

I1L— Allen  v.  Kahn,  26  N.E.2d  152, 
304  IlLApp.  256. 

Mich.— Racho  v.  Woeste,  9  N.W.2d 
827,  '305  Mich.  522. 

Mo.— Winchell  v.  Gaskill,  190  S.W. 
2d  266 — .Terminal  R.  R.  Ass'n  of 
St.  Louis  v.  Schmidt,  163  S.W.2d 
772,  349  Mo.  890. 

N.Y.— Penski  v.  Jacobs,  6  N.Y.S.2d 
861,  255  App.Div.  745. 

Pa,— Miller  v.  Mastrocola,  3  A.2d  550, 
133  Pa.Super.  210 — Teutonic  Build- 
ing &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Stein,  190  A. 
189,  125  Pa-Super.  589. 

Tex. — Hoelscher  v.  Ehlinger,  Civ. 
App.,  57  S.W.2d  283. 

34  C.J.  p  496  note  14  [a]   (3). 

(3)  To     present     issue     requiring 
finding  as  to  fraud. — Ellis  v.  Gordon, 
2-31  N.W.  555,  202  Wis.  134, 

(4)  To     show     conclusively     that 
complainant  did  not  believe,  and  was 
not  misled  by  alleged  fraudulent  rep- 
resentations of  defendant's  attorney. 
— Moore  v.  Moore,  Tex.Civ.App.,  259 
•S.W.  '322. 

Evidence  held  insnfflcient 

(1)  To   show  fraud,   collusion,  or 

other  misconduct 

U.S.— Continental  Nat  Bank  of  Jack- 
son County,  at  Kansas  City,  Mo., 
v.  Holland  Banking  Co.,  C.C.A.Mo.» 
66  F.2d  823 — Grimes  v.  -Grimes,  D. 
CJXTev.,  52  'F.2d  171. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  394 


strong  as  to  leave  no  reasonable  doubt.8  The  evi- 
dence may  be  circumstantial^  but  it  must  be  un- 
equivocal,10 persuasive,11  and  something  more  than 
a  suspicion.12  It  has  been  held  that  the  judgment 
or  decree  will  not  be  set  aside  on  affidavits  with- 
out the  examination  and  cross-examination  of  wit- 
nesses, particularly  where  the  affidavits  are  contra- 
dictory with  respect  to  important  issues.18  The 
proof  must  be  especially  clear  to  induce  the  court 
to  enjoin  a  judgment  at  the  instance  of  strangers  to 
the  suit,  although  incidentally  affected  by  the  de- 
cision of  the  question  involved.14 


Perjury.  It  is  established  by  all  the  authorities 
that  a  very  high  degree  of  proof  is  required,  where 
relief  is  sought  on  the  ground  of  perjury,15  the 
cases  generally  holding  that  it  must  be  established 
either  by  a  conviction  for  the  alleged  perjury16  or 
by  documentary  evidence.17  A  voluntary  admission, 
of  perjury  may  be  sufficient  proof,18  but  the  affi- 
davit of  a  former  witness  impeaching  his  prior  tes- 
timony may  be  insufficient  where  a  charge  of  per- 
jury could  not  well  be  predicated  on  it19 

§  394.    Pleadings  as  Evidence 

Although  the  complainant's  verified  bill,   if  not  con- 


Ark.— Parker  v.  Sims,  51  S.W.2d  517, 
185  Ark.  1111— Childs  v.  Linton, 
252  S.W.  21,  159  Ark.  529. 

Cal. — Gundelflnger  v.  Mariposa  Com- 
mercial &  Min.  Co.,  App.,  165  P.2d 
57. 

111. — Carroll,  Schendorf  &  Boenicke  v. 
Hastings,  259  111. App.  564. 

Ky. — Overstreet  v.  Grinstead's 
Adm'r,  140  S.W.2d  836,  283  Ky.  73 
—Hoover  v.  Dudley,  14  S.W.2d  410, 
228  Ky.  110— Commonwealth  v. 
Harkness1  Adm'r/  246  S.W.  803,  197 
Ky.  198. 

•La.— First  Nat.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bell, 
141  So.  379,  174  La.  692— Whitbeck 
v.  Hughes,  134  So.  255,  172  La.  380 
— Herold  v.  Jefferson,  134  So.  104, 
172  La.  315 — Reinecke  v.  Pelham, 
App.,  199  So.  521 — Treichlingrova 
v.  Layne,  139  So.  659,  19  La.App. 
71 — Young  v.  Glynn,  126  So.  559, 
14  La.App.  619,  affirmed  131  So. 
51,  171  La.  371— Rowe  v.  Crichton 
Co.,  123  So.  442,  38  La.App.  454. 

Mo.— Elliott  v.  McCormick,  19  S.W. 
2d  654,  323  Mo.  263— First  Nat. 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  King  City  v. 
Bowman,  15  S.W.2d  842,  322  Mo. 
654— McFadin  v.  Simms,  273  S.W. 
1050,  309  Mo.  312— Nieman  v.  Nie- 
man,  App.,  127  S.W.2d  34 — Wuelker 
v.  Maxwell,  App.,  70  S.W.2d  1100— 
National  Union  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Vermlllion,  App.,  19  S.W.2d  776— 
Neevel  v.  McDermand,  278  S.W. 
818,  220  Mo.App.  812— Bullivant  v. 
Greer,  264  S.W.  95,  216  Mo.App. 
324. 

N.J.— Mittenbuhler  v.  Kessler  Truck- 
ing Co.,  181  A.  163,  119  N.J.Eq.  100. 

N.Y. — 'Fuhrmann  v.  Fanroth,  173  N. 
JED.  685,  254  N.Y.  479. 

Ohio.— Shriner  v.  Price,  59  N.E.2d 
152,  74  Ohio  App.  373. 

Tex. — Graves  v.  Slater,  Civ. App.,  83 
S.W.2d  1041,  error  dismissed. 

Va.— Deeds  v.  Gilmer,  174  S.E.  37, 
162  Va.  157. 

34  C.J.  p  496  note  14  [b]  (1)— 47  C.J. 
p  438  note  74  [b]. 
(2)  To  show  that  Judgment  would 

have    been    otherwise    but    for    the 

fraud. — Anderson    r.    State,    2*38    P. 

557,  (5  Utah  312. 

49C.J.S.-50 


(3)  To  establish  duress. 
Kan. — Johnson  v.   Schrader,   95   P.2d 

273,  150  Kan.  545. 
Md.— Pearce  v.  Arnold,   13  A.2d  549, 

178  Md.  356. 
Collusion  to  secure  lease 

The  fact  that  plaintiffs  colluded 
to  secure  execution  of  lease  to  give 
them  equitable  right  to  file  bill  does 
not  show  fraud  in  procuring  decree 
by  falsely  alleging  jurisdictional 
facts. — Jones  v.  Henderson,  153  So. 
214,  228  Ala.  273. 
Evidence  accepted  as  true 

With    respect    to    whether   or   not 
judgment  on  note  in  favor  of  attor- 
ney was  void  for  fraud,  evidence  of 
attorney's  employment  by  judgment 
debtor  who  promised  to  compensate 
attorney  would  be  accepted  as  true 
where  there  was  no  contradiction  of 
testimony  and  no  ground  on  which  it 
could  be  rejected. — Marcus  v.  Hudg- 
ins,  176  A,  271,  168  Md.  79. 
&    Mo.— Terminal  R.  R.  Ass'n  of  St 
Louis  v.  Schmidt,   163   S.W.2d  772, 
349  Mo.  890 — Elliott  v.  McCormick, 
19  S.W.2d  -654,  323  Mo.  263— Reger 
v.    Reger,    293    S.W.    414,    316   Mo. 
1310— McFadin  v.  Simms,  273  S.W. 
1050,  309  Mo.  312— Sutter  v.  Cava- 
lier, App.,  185  S.W.2d  304— Nieman 
v.  Nieman,   App.,   127   S.W.2d  34— 
Neevel    v.    McDermand,    278    S.W. 
818,   220  M6.App.   812— Bulivant  v. 
Greer,    264    S.W.    95,    216    Mo.App. 
324. 
34  C.J.  p  406  note  15. 

9.  U.S.— Holton  v.  Davis,  Mont,  108 
•F.  138,  47  C.C.A.  246. 

10.  Minn.— Wann    v.    Northwestern 
Trust  Co.,  139  N.W.  1061,  120  Minn. 
493. 

34  C.J.  p  496  note  17. 

11.  U.S.— Holton    v.    Davis,    Mont, 

108  F.  138,  47  C.C:A.  346. 

Pa. — Teutonic  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
v.  Stein,  190  A.  189,  125  Pa.-Super. 
389. 

12.  Mo. — McFadin  v.  Simms,  273  S. 
W.  1050,  30$  Mo.  312. 

34  C.J.  p  496  note  19. 

13.  U.S.— Sorenson     v.     Sutherland, 

109  «F.2d   714,  affirmed  Jackson  v. 

785 


Irving  Trust  Co.,  61  S.Ct  326,  311 
U.S.  494,  85  L,Ed.  297.          * 
14.    Mo. — W.  E.  Bowen  Impr.  Co.  \\ 
Van  Hafften,  238  S.W.  147,  209  Mo.. 
App.   629. 

ISb    Okl.— McBride  v.  Cowen,  216  fV 

104,  90  Okl.  130. 
34  C.J.  p  497  note  21. 
Perjury  as  ground  for  relief  see  su->- 

pra  §  374. 
Proof  required  of  criminal  acts 

Perjury  must  be  established  by 
the  same  degree  of  proof  as  general- 
ly required  in  proof  of  criminal  acta 
in  civil  cases. — Am  berg  v.  Deaton, 
271  N.W.  396,  223  Wis.  653. 
Farol  testimony 

A  judgment  will  not  be  vacated  on 
parol  testimony  alone,  even  in  de- 
fault cases  where  the  judgment  is, 
alleged  to  have  been  obtained 
through  perjury  of  plaintiff  on  in^ 
trinsic  issues,  but  in  such  case  the 
alleged  perjury  must  be  clearly  and 
conclusively  established  by  actual 
physical  facts  which  render  the  ques- 
tion of  perjury  unmistakable. — Me-. 
Bride  v.  Cowen,  216  P.  104,  90  Okl. 
130. 
Evidence  held;  sufficient  to  warrant 

relief 
Mo.— Sutter  v.  Easterly,   189  S.W.2d 

284. 
Neb.— Krause  v.  Long,  192  N.W.  729, 

109  Neb.  846. 
Evidence    held    insufficient    to    wor^ 

rant  relief 

La. — Jackson  v.  Dixon,  8  La. App.  761. 
Neb.— Gutru   v.    Johnson,    212    N.W, 

622,  115  Neb.  -309. 

16.  N.C.— Moore   v.   Gulley,   «6   -S.E, 
681,    144    N.C.    81,    10    'L.R.A.,N.S... 
242. 

34  C.J.  p  497  note  22. 

17.  N.C.— Kinsland  v.  Adams,  90  S,. 
B.  899,  172  N.C.  765. 

34  C.J.  P  497  note  23. 

18.  111. — Seward    v.    Cease,    50    111*. 
228. 

N.H.— Craft  v.  Thompson,  51  N.H, 
536. 

19-  Mich. — Cleveland  Iron  Min,  Cot 
v.  Husby,  40  N.W.  168,  72  Mich, 
•61. 


§  394 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tradictedf  may  be  sufficient  to  justify  a  decree  In  his 
favor,  the  interposition  of  an  answer  denying  the  charges 
of  the  bill  requires  the  complainant  to  furnish  corrobora- 
tive evidence. 

According  to  some  authority,  complainant's  veri- 
fied bill,  if  not  contradicted,  may  be  sufficient  to 
justify  a  decree  in  his  favor;20  but  it  has  also  been 
held  that  the  mere  introduction  of  pleadings  alleg- 
ing facts  warranting  the  setting  aside  of  the  judg- 
ment does  not  meet  the  requirement  of  proof,21  and 
that  the  answer  of  the  respondent,  if  denying  pos- 
itively the  charges  of  the  bill,  will  be  so  far  evi- 
dence in  his  favor  that  the  bill  must  be  dismissed 
unless  complainant  sustains  his  case  by  corrobora- 
tive evidence.22  The  answer  of  one  defendant  can- 
not be  considered  as  evidence  against  another.23 

§  395.    Trial  or  Hearing 

An  action  to  enjoin  or  vacate  a  judgment  proceeds 
to  trial  in  accordance  with  the  rules  and  principles,  of 
equity,  and  the  court  may  and  should  determine  the  is- 
sues Involved,  and,  in  Its  discretion,  may  grant  or  deny 
relief. 

An  action  to  enjoin  or  vacate  a  judgment  pro- 
ceeds to  trial  in  accordance  with  the  rules  and  prin- 
ciples of  equity.24  The  proceeding  is  tried  on  the 
allegations  of  the  new  petition  and  the  answer  of 
the  other  party.25  Generally,  the  court  may  and 
should  determine  the  issues  involved,26  and,  in  its 
discretion,  may  grant  or  deny  the  requested  re- 
lief.27 The  trial  and  hearing  should  be  confined  to 
the  question  of  the  judgment  against  which  relief 


is  sought,2*  and,  ordinarily,  the  court  should  not 
enter  on  a  trial  of  complainant's  defense  to  the 
original  action  once  he  makes  a  prima  facie  show- 
ing of  a  meritorious  defense;29  but,  if  the  pro- 
ceeding is  one  in  which  the  court  is  authorized  to 
grant  full  relief  to  the  parties  in  the  one  action,  as 
discussed  infra  §  397,  it  may  try  and  determine  all 
questions  involving  the  merits  of  the  controversy.30 

In  determining  whether  the  judgment  from  which 
relief  is  sought  should  be  opened,  the  court  may  and 
should  consider  the  evidence  and  the  credibility  of 
the  witnesses,  and  give  due  effect  to  writings,31 
but,  where  the  facts  are  undisputed  and  only  ques- 
tions of  law  are  raised,  the  cause  may  be  deter- 
mined without  the  introduction  of  evidence  or  the 
intervention  of  a  jury.32  If  there  are  disputed  ques- 
tions of  fact  involved,  or  the  evidence  appears  to 
be  conflicting  or  contradictory,  it  is  in  the  discre- 
tion of  the  court  to  send  the  issues  to  a  master  or 
commissioner  for  determination,33  or  to  a  jury  on 
interrogatories  or  under  proper  limitations  as  to 
the  questions  they  are  to  consider  in  accordance 
with  the  rules  discussed  in  the  C.J.S.  title  Juries  § 
37,  also  33  C.J.  p  497  notes  31,  32;  35  C.J.  p  173 
notes  90-94,  and  in  this  case  the  court  should  make 
its  decree  in  accordance  with  the  facts  as  found 
by  the  jury,34  unless  manifest  error  has  intervened 
during  the  course  of  the  trial.36  Issues  should  not 
be  submitted  to  a  jury  where  the  evidence  is  in- 
sufficient to  warrant  such  submission,36  but  direct- 


20.  Ala. — Givens  v.  Tidmore,  8  Ala. 
745. 

21.  OkL — Honeycutt    v.    Severin,    98 
P.2d  1093,  186  Okl.  509. 

Tex. — Empire  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  No- 
ble, Com.App.,  36  S.W.2d  451. 

22.  Tex. — Scales  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  -P. 
R.  Co.,   Civ.App.,   35   S.W.   205. 

34  C.J.  p  497  note  27. 

23.  Ky.— Timberlake  v.  Cobbs,   2  J. 
J.Marsh.  13$. 

24.  Minn. — Geisberg   v.    O'Laughlin, 
9-3  N.W.  310,  88  Minn.  431— -Spooner 
T.    Spooner,   1  N.W.   835,   26   Minn. 
137. 

Hearing-  and  submission  of  issues  to 
jury  in  equity  generally  see  Equi- 
ty §§  480-512. 

25.  Tex. — Owen  v.  City  of  Bastland, 
Civ.App.,   37  S.W.2d  1053. 

Failure  to  file  written  pleading* 

Where  defendant,  on  plaintiffs  ap- 
peal from  a  judgment  of  a  justice's 
court  had  not  filed  written  pleadings 
until  after  judgment  adverse  to 
plaintiff  was  rendered  in  county 
court,  the  case  was  treated  in  a  suit 
to  enjoin  enforcement  of  such  judg- 
ment as  though  defendant  had  filed 
no  written  pleadings. — Allen  v.  Jones, 


Tex.Clv.App.,    192   -S.W.2d   298,    error 
refused   no   reversible   error. 

28.  Tex. — Adams  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 
Clv.App.,  294  S.W.  909. 

Sufficiency  of  excuse  for  absence  at 

former  trial 

Tex. — Adams  v.  'First  Nat  Bank,  su- 
pra. 
fl7.    U.S. — W.     B.     Hedger     Transp. 

Corp.  v.  Ira  S.  Bushey  &  Sons,  C 

C.A.N.T.,  155  F.2d  321. 
Pa.— Barnes   v.    Silveus,    173  A.   837, 

114      Pa.Super.      214 — Simcoe      v. 

Szukegs,  Com.Pl.,  27  North.Co.  182. 
Tex.-— McMillan     v.     McMillan,     Civ. 

App.,  72  S.W.2d  611. 
Extent  of  discretion 

The  court  does  not  have  discre- 
tion to  set  aside  a  judgment  on  the 
ground  that,  if  it  had  been  sitting 
in  the  trial  of  the  case,  it  would 
have  granted  a  new  trial  on  the 
ground  of  newly  discovered  evidence. 
—Anderson  v.  State,  2'38  P.  557,  65 
Utah  =512. 
28L  Tenn.— Tallent  v.  -Sherrell,  184 

S.W.2d   561,   27  Tenn.App.   683. 

29.  Tex. — Adams  v.  First  Nat 
Civ.App.,  294  S.W.  909. 

30.  Tex.— Hubbard  v.   Tallal,    92 
W.2d  1023,  127  Tex.  242. 

786 


Title 

In  suit  to  set  aside  judgment  ad- 
judicating title  and  to  quiet  title,  re- 
trial of  question  of  title  was  author- 
ized.—Bonner  v.  Pearson,  Tex,Civ. 
App.,  7  S.W.2d  9-30. 

31.  Pa.— Barnes    v.    Silveus,    1T3    A. 
837,   114  Pa.  Super.   214 — Sugarman 
v.  Baldini,  Com.PL.  28  WestCo.  $9. 

Tex. — Griffin  v.  Burrus,  Civ.App.,  24 
S.W.2d  805,  affirmed,  ConuApp.,  24 
S.W.2d  810. 

Wis.— Federal  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Thay- 
er,  269  N.W.  547,  222  Wis.  65*. 

32.  Ga.— Swift  &  Co.  v.   First  Nat 
Bank,   132   -S.E.  $9,   161   Ga.   543. 

33.  Va. — Rust  v.  Ware,  •$  Gratt,  50, 
47  Va.  50,  52  Am.D.  100. 

Reference  of  issues  in  equity  see 
Equity  §§  513-562. 

34.  Mont— Daly  v.  Milen,  a$  P.  m, 
14  Mont.  20. 

34  C.J.  p  497  note  33. 

Effect  of  verdict  in  equity  cases  gen- 
erally see  Equity  §  510. 

36.  Pa.— Quick  v.  Van  Auken,  3 
Pennyp.  476. 

36.  Ga. — Adams  v.  Higginbotham,  21 
S.B.2d  616,  194  Ga.  292. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  397 


ing  a  verdict  for  plaintiff37  or  defendant38  is  error 
when  the  evidence  would  have  authorized  a  verdict 
for  the  other  party.  After  enjoining  a  judgment 
and  directing  issues  to  be  tried  by  a  jury,  the  court 
may  afterward,  although  no  verdict  has  been  cer- 
tified, set  aside  the  order  and  dissolve  the  injunc- 
tion if  it  becomes  satisfied  that  a  new  trial  ought 
not  to  be  had.39 

§  396.     Dismissal 

A  bill  for  equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  may 
be  dismissed  for  failure  to  follow  up  the  application,  or 
to  establish  the  allegations  of  the  bill,  or  to  comply  with 
a  statutory  condition  precedent  to  the  Issuance  of  an 
injunction;  but  a  dismissal  on  the  merits  without  a 
hearing  is  usually  erroneous. 

The  bill  or  petition  for  equitable-  relief  from  a 
judgment  may  be  dismissed  for  failure  of  com- 
plainant to  appear  and  follow  up  his  application,40 
for  want  of  necessary  parties,41  for  failure  to  es- 
tablish the  allegations  of  his  bill42  or  to  comply  with 
a  statutory  condition  precedent  to  the  issuance  of 
an  injunction,43  or  where  it  appears  from  the 
pleadings  and  the  proof  that  complainant  is  not 
entitled  to  the  relief  requested.44  When  an  in- 
junction is  the  sole  object  of  the  suit,  and  it  is  dis- 
solved because  of  the  want  of  equity  in  the  peti- 
tion, the  case  should  be  dismissed,  if  plaintiff  de- 
clines to  amend.45 

On  the  other  hand,  where  a  bill  sets  forth  a 
ground  for  equitable  relief,  ordinarily  it  is  error  to 
dismiss  it  without  a  hearing  on  the  merits,46  so  that, 
where  an  injunction  is  dissolved  on  an  answer  con- 
taining an  unqualified  denial  of  the  charges  of  the 


bill,  the  court  should  not  dismiss  the  bill,  if  there 
is  sufficient  equity  on  its  face  to  give  the  court  ju- 
risdiction, since  complainant  has  a  right  after  his 
injunction  is  dissolved  to  prove  his  bill.47  In  such  a 
case  it  is  error  to  dismiss  the  bill,  although  plain- 
tiff makes  no  request  for  trial  of  the  case  on  its 
merits.48  It  is  error  to  dismiss  a  suit  on  the  mer- 
its on  trial  of  a  rule  for  a  preliminary  injunction, 
since  the  only  question  presented  is  whether  pre- 
liminary injunction  should  be  granted.49 

§  397.    Judgment     or     Decree,     and    Relief 
Awarded 

a.  In  general 

b.  Relief  awarded 

a.  In  General 

The  form  of  the  Judgment  or  decree  In  an  equitable 
proceeding  to  secure  relief  against  a  judgment  must  be 
justified  by  the  frame  of  the  bill. 

The  decree,  as  far  as  form  is  concerned,  must  be 
justified  by  the  frame  of  the  bill.50  As  far  as  re- 
lief is  concerned,  it  should  not  go  beyond  the  prayer 
of  the  petition,  as  discussed  infra  subdivision  b  of 
this  section.  A  decree  perpetuating  an  injunction 
is  irregular  where  no  injunction  was  granted  be- 
cause of  failure  to  execute  a  bond.51  It  is  error 
to  render  a  final  judgment  on  overruling  defend- 
ant's motion  to  dissolve  the  injunction;  he  should 
be  allowed  to  answer.52  Where  a  new  trial  is  nec- 
essary, it  is  error  at  once  to  set  aside  the  judg- 
ment; the  decree  should  await  the  result  of  the 
new  trial,  the  judgment  meanwhile  standing  as  se- 
curity for  what  may  be  found  to  be  justly  due.53 


37.  Ga. — Adams     v.     Higginbotham, 
supra. 

38.  Ga. — Rogers  v.  MacBougald,  165 
S.B.  619,  175  Ga.  642. 

39-  Va.— Vass  v.  Magee,  1  Hen.  &  M. 
2,  11  Va.  2. 

4D.  Ala. — Smothers  v.  Meridian  Fer- 
tilizer Factory,  33  So.  898,  137 
Ala.  166. 

Pa. — Williams  Valley  Sav.  Fund  v. 
Daub,  €om.Pl.,  8  Sch.Reg.  104 — 
Nauyalis  v.  White,  Com.Pl.,  7  Sch. 
Keg.  166. 

41.    Tex. — In  re  Supples'  Estate,  Civ. 

App.,  131  S.W.2d  13. 
Administration,  of  estate 

While  bill  of  review  must  be  dis- 
missed in  so  far  as  it  affects  ad- 
ministration of  an  estate  where  nec- 
essary parties  are  not  brought  in,  it 
may  not  be  dismissed  as  to  another 
estate  as  to  which  all  parties  are 
present.— In  re  Supples'  Estate,  su- 
pra. 


42.    Cal. — Frost    v.    Hanscome, 
P.  53,  198  Cal.  500. 


246 


Ga. — Burden  v.  Burden,  142  S.B.  151, 

165*Ga.  813. 
34  C.J.  p  497  note  37. 
Dismissal  held  improper 
Ga. — White   v.   Koper,    167   S.B.   177, 

176  Ga.  180. 

43.  Tex. — Dallas  Joint   Stock  Land 
Bank  of  Dallas  v.  Lancaster,  Civ. 
App.,    122    S.W.2d    659,    error   dis- 
missed. 

44.  Tex. — Arenstein  v.   Jencks,   Civ. 
App.,    179    S.W.2d    831,    error    dis- 
missed—Dixon     v.     McNabb,     Civ. 
App.,  173  S.W.2d  228,  error  refused. 

Disposal  of  all  rights 

Where  all  possible  rights  were 
disposed  of  under  the  pleadings  of 
the  parties  in  the  suit  from  which 
relief  is  sought,  a  judgment  dis- 
missing with  prejudice  an  action  to 
stay  the  proceedings  is  proper. — 
Ballard  v.  Cox,  75  P.2d  126,  193 
Wash.  299. 
Judgment  entered  on.  dismissal  held 

final 
Iowa. — Swartzendruber  v.  Polke,  218 

N.W.  62,  205  Iowa  382. 

787 


45.  Tex. — Avocato   v.   Dell'Ara,   Civ. 
App.,   84  SW.  443. 

46.  111. — Nicoloffl   v.    Schnipper,    233 
HLApp.  591. 

Tex. — Mauldin  v.  American  Liberty 
Pipe  Line  Co.,  Civ.App.,  185  S.W. 
2d  158,  refused  for  want  of  man- 
date. 

47.  Tex. — Avocato  v.  Dell'Ara,  Civ. 
App.,  84  S.W.  443. 

34  C.J.  p  497  note  39. 

48.  Tex. — Love    v.    Powell,    $    S.W. 
456,   67   Tex.   15— Avocato  v.  Bell- 
'Ara,  Civ.App.,   84   S.W.  443. 

49.  La. — Terry  v.  Womacfc,  20  So.2d 
365,  206  La.  1069. 

50.  Mass. — Brooks   v.    Twitchell,    65 
N.B.  843,  182  Mass.  443,  94  Am,S. 
B.  662. 

51.  Ky. — Pilcher  v.  Higgins,   2  J.J. 
Marsh.  16. 

52.  La. — Knox   v.    Coroner,    13    La. 
Ann.  88. 

53.  W.Va. — Grafton  &  G.  R.   Co.  v. 
Bavisson,    29    S.E.    1028,   45   W.Va. 
12,  72  Am.S.R,  799. 


1  397 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


On  voluntary  dismissal  of  a  bill,  defendant  is  en- 
titled to  judgment  by  motion  against  plaintiff  and 
the  sureties  on  his  injunction  bond  for  the  amount 
of  the  judgment  and  interest54 

b.  Belief  Awarded 

On  a  properly  framed  bill  for  an  Injunction  or  other 
equitable  relief  against  a  judgment  at  law,  the  court 
has  authority  to  grant  the  parties  any  and  all  relief  to 
which  they  may  appear  entitled,  and  to  Impose  condi- 
tions on  the  granting  of  such  relief  so  as  equitably  to 
adjust  the  rights  of  the  parties.. 

On  a  bill  for  an  injunction  or  other  equitable 
relief  against  a  judgment  at  law,  properly  framed, 
the  court  has  authority  to  grant  the  parties  any  and 
all  relief  to  which  they  may  appear  to  be  entitled,55 
although  the  decree  should  not  go  beyond  the  prayer 
of  the  petition  or  bill,56  and  relief  should  be  de- 
nied if  it  appears  that  complainant  is  not  entitled 
.  thereto.57  It  is  within  the  authority  of  a  court  of 
equity  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment 
at  law,  whenever  sufficient  equitable  grounds  are 


shown,5*  and  ordinarily  this  is  the  proper  method 
of  granting  relief;  but  in  so  doing  the  equity  court 
does  not  undertake  to  interfere  with  the  judgment 
itself,  but  lays  its  prohibition  on  the  party  other- 
wise entitled  to  enforce  it.5**  So,  if  the  judgment 
is  attacked  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  want  of  no- 
tice, or  other  like  cause,  a  decree  restraining  its 
enforcement  and  putting  the  parties  in  statu  quo 
will  generally  be  proper,60  or  the  court  may  ingraft 
a  trust  on  the  property  in  the  hands  of  the  bene- 
ficiary of  the  fraud,  and  leave  the  judgment  undis- 
turbed.61 Complainant  may  sometimes  be  entitled 
to  the  restitution  of  money  already  collected  on  the 
judgment,62  or  damages  for  the  attempted  or  suc- 
cessful enforcement  of  the  judgment  by  execu- 
tion;63 but  restitution  will  not  be  ordered  where 
the  court,  on  consideration  of  all  the  evidence,  feels 
that  complainant  is  not  entitled  to  such  relief.64 

In  a  proper  case,  the  relief  awarded  may  in- 
clude the  vacation  or  annulment  of  the  judgment,65 


Allowing:  judgment  to  stand  as  se- 
curity see  supra  §  303. 

54.  Tenn.— Ashby     v.      Lyles-Black 
Co.,  1  Tenn.Civ.A.  160. 

55.  Ala.— Hanover  Fire   Ins.   Co.  v. 
Street,    176   So.    350,   234  Ala.   537. 

Cal.— Walsh  v.  Majors,  49  P.2d  598, 

4  Cal.2d  3S4. 
Ky. — Taylor  v.  Webber.  83  S.W.  567, 

26  Ky.L.  1199. 
Minn. — Bloomquist  v.  Thomas,   9  N. 

W.2d  337,  215  Minn.  35. 
Mo.— National  Union  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 

Vermillion,  App.,  19  S.W.2d  776. 
Tex. — Peters    v.    Pursley,    Civ.App., 

278  S.W.  229. 
34  C.J.  p  498  note  47. 
Amendment   and   correction   in   trial 

court  see  supra  §§  236-264. 
Adjudication  of  legality  of  service 

Where  Judgment  on  its  face  show- 
ed that  legal  service  was  had,  and 
sheriff  testified  that* he  had  served 
all  parties,  but  did  not  return  writ 
into  court,  having  failed  to  sign  it 
at  all,  the  court  was  empowered  at 
a  subsequent  term,  in  action  to  set 
aside  such  judgment  and  with  all 
interested  parties  before  It,  to  ad- 
judge that  legal  service  had  original- 
ly been  made,  and  to  correct  its  rec- 
ords accordingly. — O'Quinn  v.  Harri- 
son, Tex.Civ.App.,  271  S.W.  137. 
Claim  for  betterment* 

Grantee  under  unregistered  deed 
is  not  entitled  to  assert  claim  for 
betterments,  in  suit  for  injunction 
against  enforcement  of  judgment  ob- 
tained against  claimant's  grantor. — 
Baton  v.  Doub,  128  S.E.  494,  190  N.C. 
14,  40  A.L.R.  273. 
Continuing  tmpasM* 

In  suit  to  enjoin  enforcement  of 
judgment,  equity  had  jurisdiction  to 


enjoin  continuing  trespasses.— -Elliott 
v.  Adams,  160  S.E.  336,  173  Ga.  312. 
Damages  for  fraud 

In  an  equitable  action  to  set  aside 
judgment  allegedly  obtained  by 
fraud,  plaintiff  may  plead  a  claim 
for  damages  because  of  the  alleged 
fraud.— Scopano  v.  IT.  S.  Gypsum  Co., 
3  N.T.S.2d  300,  166  Misc.  805. 
Impounding1  proceeds  of  judgment 

Where  it  was  apparent  that  there 
existed  a  financial  obligation  which 
was  asserted  as  an  equitable  set-off 
to  a  judgment,  but  court  in  which 
relief  was  sought  did  not  have  ju- 
risdiction to  determine  amount  there- 
of, and  delay  in  the  proceeding  to  en- 
able tribunal  having  jurisdiction  to 
determine  the  liability  would  be  im- 
practicable, court  could  make  such 
reasonable  orders  as  might  be  nec- 
essary to  avoid  any  inequity  either 
by  staying  enforcement  of  judgment 
or  by  permitting  collection  of  the 
judgment  and  impounding  of  the 
proceeds  thereof. — Southern  Surety 
Co.  of  New  York  v.  Maney,  121  P.2d 
295,  190  Okl.  129. 

56.  La.— Leverich  v.  Adams,  11  La. 
Ann.  510. 

34  C.J.  p  498  note  48. 

Limitation  to  relief  sought  by  plead- 
ings generally  see  supra  §  49. 

Relief  in  equity  generally  as  lim- 
ited by  prayer  of  petition  see 
Equity  §  607. 

57.  Tex.— American    Red    Cross    v. 
Longley,  Civ.App.,  165  S.W.2d  233, 
error  refused— Jones  v.  Lockhart, 
Civ.App.,     144    S.W.2d    426,    error 
dismissed,  judgment  correct 

58.  Ala. — Timmerman  v.  Martin,  176 
So.  198,  234  Ala.  622. 

Ga. — Campbell  v.  Gormley,  192  S.E. 
430,  184  Ga,  647. 

788 


Idaho. — Idaho    Gold    Dredging    Cor- 
poration   v.    Boise    Payette    Lum- 
ber Co.,  90  P.2d  688,  60  Idaho  127. 
34  C.J.  p  498  notes  50,  56. 

A  bond  is  not  required  of  judg- 
ment debtor  on  quashing  execution 
and  enjoining  collection  of  judgment, 
since  injunction  is  part  of  final  judg- 
ment.— Sandy  Hook  Bank's  Trustee 
v.  Bear,  61  S.W.2d  1045,  250  Ky.  177. 
iBnjoininflf  garnishment 

In  suit  to  cancel  void  judgment, 
plaintiff  nay  obtain  additional  equi- 
table relief,  such  as  injunction 
against  prosecution  of  garnishment 
proceedings  based  on  judgment  can- 
celed.— Henry  &  Co.  v.  Johnson,  173 
S.E.  659,  178  Ga.  541. 

59.  Ala. — Timmerman  v.  Martin,  176 
So.  198,  234  Ala.  622. 

34  C.J.  p  498  note  57. 

60.  Iowa. — Brown  v.  Byam,  12  N.W. 
770,  59  Iowa  52. 

34  C.J.  p  499  note  58. 

61.  Cal. — Purinton  v.  Dyson,   65   P. 
2d    777,    8    Cal.2d    322,    113    A.L.R. 
1230— Walsh    v.    Majors,    49    P.2d 
-598,  4  Cal.2d  384. 

Tex. — Johnston  v.  Stephens,  Civ.App., 
300  S.W.  225,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  49  S.W.2d  431,  121  Tex. 
374. 

62.  Minn.— Geisberg  v.    O'Laughlin. 
93  N.W.  310,  88  Minn.  431. 

34  C.J.  p  498  note  51. 

63.  Minn.— Baker  v.  Sheehan,  12  N. 
W.  704,  -29  Minn.  235. 

64.  N.D.— Abdellah    v.    Hodge,    213 
N.W.  4*5,  55  N.D.  392. 

85.    Tex. — Sloan  v.  Newton.  Civ.App., 

134  S.W.2d  697. 
34  C.J.  p  498  note  49. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  397 


"but  it  has  been  held  that  a  court  of  equity  has  no 
•power  in  a  strict  sense  of  the  term  to  set  aside  a 
judgment  at  law,66  or  peremptorily  to  order  a  new 
trial  in  the  law  action,67  and  that  the  usual  and 
proper  course  is  not  to  award  a  new  trial  in  express 
terms,  but  to  decree  that,  unless  the  party  consents 
to  have  the  judgment  set  aside  and  a  new  trial  had, 
lie  shall  be  perpetually  enjoined  from  collecting  his 
judgment.68  Under  some  practice,  however,  the 
•court  of  equity  may  decree  a  new  trial  and  rein- 
•statement  of  the  cause  on  the  docket  of  the  law 
court.69  It  has  been  held  that,  if  a  new  trial  is 
-proper,  the  court  should  order  an  issue  to  be  tried 
as  other  issues  out  of  chancery  are  tried.70  If  the 
grounds  of  action  or  defense  are  purely  legal,  it  has 
"been  held  that  the  parties  may  be  sent  back  to  the 
law  court  for  this  purpose  ;71  but,  if  they  are  suit- 
able for  the  cognizance  of  equity,  the  chancellor  will 
generally  try  the  merits  of  the  cause  and  close  the 
controversy  by  a  final  decree.72  Relief  may  be 
granted  as  to  one  of  two  or  more  complainants,  and 


denied  as  to  the  rest.73  Where  it  appears  that  any 
part  of  the  judgment  is  justly  due,  the  injunction 
may  be  so  framed  as  to  permit  the  collection  of 
that  part,  while  forbidding  proceedings  to  enforce 
it  as  to  the  residue.74  However,  where  there  is 
no  means  of  ascertaining  how  far  it  is  correct  or 
justly  due,  but  only  that  it  is  unconscionable  to 
some  extent,  it  will  be  set  aside  in  toto.75  Relief 
will  generally  be  granted  to  the  extent  of  credits, 
or  unjust  amounts,  admitted  by  the  judgment  credi- 
tor, although  the  bill  makes  out  no  case  for  equita- 
ble relief.76  In  setting  aside  a  compromise  judg- 
ment in  favor  of  plaintiff  and  awarding  him  a 
larger  recovery,  defendant  is  entitled  to  credits  for 
payments  made  under  the  vacated  judgment.77  In 
denying  relief  in  a  suit  to  enjoin  enforcement  of 
judgment,  the  court  may  not  enjoin  enforcement  of 
a  stipulation  whereby  securities  were  deposited  for 
payment  of  judgment78 

Decree  against  complainant.   In  refusing  to  grant 
relief  against  a  judgment  a  court  of  equity  may  not 


<66.    N.J.-^-C.    &    D.    Building   Corpo- 
ration v.  Griffithes,  157  A.  137,  109 
N.J.EQ.  819. 
-34  C.J.  p  498  note  53. 
belief  against  conseq.nen.ceg 

Court  of  chancery  is  without  pow- 
er to  set  aside  judgment  at  law, 
tout  merely  grants  equitable  relief 
against  consequences  of  judgment. — 
C.  &  D.  Building  Corporation  v. 
Grifflthes,  supra. 

€7.  Idaho. — Idaho  Gold  Dredging 
Corporation  v.  Boise  Payette  Lum- 
ber Co.,  90  P.2d  688,  60  Idaho  127. 

34  C.J.  p  498  note  54. 

•68.    Ala. — Timmerman  v.  Martin,  176 

So.  198,  234  Ala.  622. 
34  C.J.  p  498  note  55. 

-69.  Mo. — Sutter  v*  Easterly,  189  3. 
W.2d  284. 

70.  Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Han- 
over  Fire   Ins.   Co.   v.   Street,   176 
So.  350,  353,  34  Ala.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  499  note  59. 
Trial  issues  out  of  chancery  general- 
ly see  Equity   §§   503-508. 

71.  Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Han- 
over Fire   Ins.  Co.  v.   Street,   176 
So.  350,  353,  34  Ala.  537. 

Tenn. — Peoples    Tel.    &    Tel.    Co.    v. 

Prye,  10  Tenn.App,  160. 
34  C.J.  p  499  note  60. 
Jurisdiction  of  court  of  law 

If  a  court  of  equity  orders  a  judg- 
ment at  law  to  be  set  aside  and  a 
new  trial  awarded,  a  court  of  law 
has  jurisdiction,  after  the  lapse  of 
the  judgment  term,  to  set  aside  the 
judgment  in  question,  redocket  the 
case,  and  subsequently  to  dismiss 
the  action  for  want  of  prosecution. 
— Brown  v.  Bbann,  165  111.  App.  218. 


72.  Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Han- 
over Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Street,  176  So. 
350,  353,  34  Ala.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  499  note  61. 

Complete  relief  in  one  proceeding 

(1)  Where    an    equitable    suit    is 
brought    to    set   aside   judgment,    it 
is  not  contemplated  that  there  shall 
be  two  trials,  the  one  in  which  judg- 
ment is  rendered  setting  aside  for- 
mer judgment,  and  other  on  trial  of 
the  merits,  but  every  issue  arising 
on  the  merits  may  and  should  be  dis- 
posed of  and  only  one  judgment  ren- 
dered.— Texas  Employers'  Ins.  Ass'n 
v.   Arnold,   88    S.W.M   473,    126   Tex. 
466 — Humphrey  v.  Harrell,  Tex.Com. 
App.,   29   S.W.2d  963 — Garza  v.  Ken- 
edy,  Tex.Com.App.,  299  S.W.  231,  re- 
hearing   denied    5    S.W.2d    xx— Port 
Worth    &   Denver   City    Ry.    Co.    v. 
Reid,   Tex.Civ.App.,  115   S.W.2d  1156 
— Stone   v.    Stone,   Tex.Civ.App.,    101 
S.W.2d  638— Corbett  v.  Rankin  Inde- 
pendent   School    Dist,    Tex.Civ.App., 
100   S.W.2d  113— Shaw  v.  Etheridge, 
Tex.Civ.App.,    15    S.W.2d    722— Wise 
v.    Lewis,    TexCtv.App.,    11    S.W.2d 
329,    affirmed,    Com.App.,    23    S.W.2d 
299 — Squyres  v.  Rasmussen,  Tex. Civ. 
App.,  296  S.W.  977— Peters  v.  Purs- 
ley,     Tex.Civ.App.,     278     S.W.     229— 
Cooper  v.  Cooper,  Tex.Civ.App,,  260 
S.W.  679. 

(2)  Judgment   setting  aside  judg- 
ment  without   adjudicating   original 
action  on  its  merits  is  not  "final." — 
Dallas  Coffee  &  Tea  Co.  v.  Williams, 
Tex.Civ.App.,    45    S.W.2d    724,    error 
dismissed. 

(3)  Where    judgment    adjudicating 
title  was  obtained  by  perjured  tes- 
timony without  notice  to   plaintiffs, 
and   where   defendant  asserting  'ad- 

789 


verse  possession  paid  rent,  decree 
setting  aside  judgment  and  quieting 
title  in  plaintiffs  was  proper. — Bon- 
ner  v.  Pearson,  Tex.Civ.App.,  7  S. 
W.2d  930. 

73.  Tex. — Automobile  Finance  Co.  v. 
Bryan,    Civ.App.,    3    S.W.2d    835. 

34  C.J.  p  499  note  62. 

74.  111. — Printers      Corporation      v. 
Hamilton  Inv.  Co.,   14  N.E.2d   517, 
295  IlLApp.  34. 

N.Y. — Leemor  Realty  Corporation  v. 
Tonkin,  150  N.E.  549,  241  N.Y. 
546,  motion  denied  152  N.E.  416, 
242  N.Y.  635— Allgeier  v.  Gordon 
&  Co.,  9  N.Y.S.2d  848,  170  Misc. 
607. 

34  C.J.  p  499  notes  63,  64   [a]. 
Injunction  to  extent  of  damages 

In  action  by  holder  of  judgment 
on  past-due  purchase-money  note  for 
land  sold  under  bond  for  title,  to  re- 
quire vendor  to  quitclaim  land  to 
purchaser  for  purposes  of  execution 
sale  under  judgment,  wherein  pur- 
chaser Intervened  and  alleged  exist- 
ence of  outstanding  paramount  title 
to  land  and  vendor's  insolvency  and 
asked  that  damages  for  defective 
title  "be  awarded1'  and  for  general 
relief,  purchaser  was  entitled  to  in- 
junction against  judgment  to  extent 
of  damages. — Campbell  v.  Gormley, 
192  S.E.  430,  184  Ga.  647. 

75.  Va. — McRae  v.  Woods,  2  Wash. 
•    80,  2  Va.  80. 

76.  Md.— Webster    v.    Hardisty,    28 
Md.  592. 

34  C.J.  p  499  note  65. 

77.  Tex. — Dallas  Coffee  &  Tea  Co.  v. 
Williams,  Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  724, 
error  dismissed. 

78.  U.S. — Harrington  v.  Denny,  D.C. 
Mo.,   3  F.Supp.  584. 


397 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


decree  against  complainant  the  amount  due  on  the 
judgment,79  unless  such  relief  is  permitted  by  stat- 
ute.80 

Conditions  on  granting  relief.  He  who  seeks  re- 
lief in  equity  against  a  judgment  must  do  equity; 
and  it  is  competent  and  proper  for  the  court  to  im- 
pose such  terms  on  him,  or  require  him  to  submit 
to  such  orders  or  conditions  as  may  be  necessary 
to  adjust  the  rights  of  all  parties  in  entire  accord- 
ance with  equity.81  So  the  court  may  require  that 
the  adverse  party  free  from  fault  be  compensated 
for  expenses  incurred  in  securing  the  judgment.82 
It  is  also  competent  for  the  parties  to  agree  that  a 
judgment  may  be  set  aside  and  enjoined,  on  con- 
dition that  it  shall  not  affect  the  right  of  plaintiff 
therein  to  prosecute  a  suit  on  his  original  cause  of 
action,  which  formed  the  basis  of  the  judgment.83 
An  order  for  an  injunction  against  a  sale  under  ex- 
ecution does  not  become  effectual  until  there  has 
been  a  compliance  with  any  conditions  required  by 
the  order,  such  as  the  execution  of  a  bond.84 


§  398.    Review  and  Costs 

General  rules  relating  to  appeal  and  error  usually 
govern  the  review  of  decisions  granting  or  denying  equi- 
table relief  against  judgments.  Costs,  are  ordinarily  al- 
lowable to  a  successful  complainant,  but  generally  a 
judgment  debtor  who  seeks  relief  on  the  ground  that  he 
has  been  prevented  from  making  his  defense  at  law  Is 
himself  chargeable  with  the  costs. 

The  decision  of  the  court  of  chancery  on  a  bill  for 
an  injunction  or  other  equitable  relief  against  a 
judgment  will  not  be  disturbed  on  appeal  where  the 
evidence  was  conflicting  and  the  determination  of 
the  court  was  one  within  its  discretion,86  or  for 
immaterial  irregularities  in  its  action,86  or  on  ob- 
jections to  the  judgment  not  presented  to  the  eq- 


uity court.87  However,  a  decree  for  complainant 
will  be  reversed  where  the  bill  states  no  cause  of 
action,  or  its  want  of  equity  is  apparent  on  its 
face.58  Assignments  of  error  alleged  to  have  been 
committed  on  the  trial  of  the  former  case  may  not 
be  considered.89  It  has  been  held  that  the  evidence 
should  be  set  forth  in  the  record.90 

Costs.  Where  a  judgment  debtor  seeks  relief  in 
equity,  on  the  ground  of  his  having  been  prevented 
from  making  his  defense  at  law,  he  is  generally 
chargeable  with  the  costs  of  the  proceeding,91  espe- 
cially where  he  might  have  obtained  the  same  relief 
on  application  to  the  court  of  law,92  or  where  his  in- 
junction is  dissolved,93  but  otherwise  costs  are  al- 
lowable to  a  successful  complainant.94  The  success- 
ful complainant,  however,  is  not  entitled  to  costs  in 
the  action  in  which  the  judgment,  set  aside  at  his 
suit,  was  rendered.95  While  it  has  been  held  that 
counsel  fees  are  not  properly  allowed  to  plaintiff  as 
damages,  in  a  suit  to  annul  a  judgment  and  enjoin 
its  execution,96  it  has  also  been  held  that  such 
fees  may  be  allowed  as  a  beneficial  p^rt  of  the 
judgment,  although  not  a  matter  of  right,  in  an 
action  to  set  aside  a  former  judgment.97 

§  399.    Operation  and  Effect  of  Injunction 

An  Injunction  against  a  Judgment  operates  against 
the  person,  and,  while  it  does  not  necessarily  vacate  the 
Judgment,  It  does  prevent  the  maintenance  of  any  action 
on  it. 

An  injunction  against  a  judgment  is  strictly  in 
person.am  to  restrain  respondent  from  using  the 
judgment  unconscientiously.98  It  does  not  neces- 
sarily negative  the  authority  of  the  court  render- 
ing the  judgment  or  the  legality  of  its  action;  nor 
does  it,  by  relation  back,  make  the  proceedings  at 


79.  Colo. — San    Juan    &    St.    Louis 
Mining  &   Smelting  Co.   v.  Pinch, 
6  Colo.  214. 

34  C.J.  p  499  note  66. 

80.  W.Va. — Ho  well  v.  Thomason,  12 
S.B.  1088,  34  W.Va.  794. 

34  C.J.  p  499  note  67. 

81.  N.D. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Ab- 
dellah  v.  Hodge,  213  N.W.  495,  498, 
55  N.D.  392. 

Okl. — Southern  Surety  Co.  of  New 
York  v.  Maney,  121  P.2d  295,  190 
Okl.  129. 

34  C.J.  p  499  note  68. 

82.  Mo. — Crown   Drug:  Co.   v.    Ray- 
mond,  App.,    51    S.W.2d   215. 

N.D.— Abdellah  v.  Hodgre,  213  N.W. 
495.  55  N.D.  392. 

83.  Mo.— Wilson  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M. 
&  S.  R.  Co.,  87  Mo.  431. 

84.  Ky.— Pell  v.   Lander,    8   B.Mon. 
554. 


85.    Tex. — Turner     v.     Parker,     Civ. 

App.,  14  S.W.2d  931. 
34  C.J.  p  500  note  71. 
Affirmance  held  proper  under  plead- 


and evidence 
Ga. — Bayne  v.  A.  J.  Deer  Co.,  123  S. 
E.   693,  158  Ga.  401. 

86.  Ky. — Bradley    v.    Lamb,     Hard. 
527. 

87.  La. — Smith  v.  Barkemeyer,  McG. 
139. 

88.  Cal. — Gregory   v.    Ford,    14   Cal. 
138,  73  Am.D.  639. 

S.C. — Henderson   v.   Mitchell,    8    S.C. 
Eq.  113,  21  Am.D.  526. 

89.  Ariz.— MacRitchie  v.  Stevens,  76 
P.  478,  8  Ariz.  410. 

90.  Neb.— Barr    v.    Post,    80    N.W. 
1041,  59  Neb.  361,  80  Am.S.R.  680. 

34  C.J.  p  500  note  76. 

790 


91.  Va. — Degrraffenreid  v.   Donald,    2 
Hen.  &  M.  10,  12  Va.  10. 

34  C.J.  p  500  note  77. 

92.  N.Y.— Gridley     v.     Garrison,     4 
Paige  647. 

93.  111. — Fisher  v.  Tribby,  5  IlLApp. 
335. 

34  C.J.  p  500  note  79. 

94.  Va. — Reeves  v.  Dickey,  10  Gratt. 
138,  51  Va,  138. 

95.  Tex. — Marsh  v.  Tiller,  Civ.App., 
293  S.W.  223. 

96.  La. — Flynn    v.    Rhodes,    12    La. 
Ann.  239. 

97.  Kan.— Fadely  v.   Fadely,    276   P. 
826,  128  Kan.  287.' 

98.  Wis.— Kiel  v.  Scott  &  Williams, 
202   N.W.   672,   186  Wis.   415. 

34  C.J.  p  500  note  83. 
As    release    of    errors    see    supra    $ 
386. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


400 


law  irregular,"  or  strip  the  judgment  of  its  usual 
incidents  and  consequences,  except  with  respect 
to  proceedings  to  enforce  it.1  The  injunction  will 
prevent  the  maintenance  of  an  action  on  the  judg- 
ment,2 either  at  law  or  in  equity,3  or  even  an  ac- 
tion against  the  surety  on  a  bond  given  in  an  ef- 
fort to  appeal  from  that  judgment.4  However,  this 
does  not  prevent  a  proceeding  to  revive  the  judg- 
ment, on  the  death  of  a  party,  by  scire  facias,  al- 
though the  injunction  will  operate  on  the  revived 
judgment  as  well  as  on  the  original.5  Where  a 
judgment  contains  a  mandamus  compelling  payment, 
the  dissolution  of  a  subsequent  injunction,  enjoin- 
ing payment  of  such  judgment,  has  been  held  to 
restore  the  mandamus  in  the  judgment  and  to  ren- 
der issuance  of  a  second  mandamus  unnecessary.6 
An  injunction  effective  only  as  to  one  of  the  par- 
ties to  the  judgment  will  not  prevent  its  enforcement 
against  the  others.7  When  complainant  seeks  not 
only  injunctive  relief  but  also  vacation  of  the  judg- 
ment and  a  determination  of  his  interest  in  the  sub- 
ject matter,  a  decision  in  his  favor  may  be  broad 
enough  to  constitute  an  adjudication  of  his  inter- 
est* 

§  400.    Damages  on  Dissolution  of  Injunction 

On  the  dissolution  of  an  injunction,  the  statutes 
usually  permit  recovery  of  damages  sustained  by  the 
interference;  in  an  action  on  an  injunction  bond  the 
extent  to  which  the  amount  collectable  on  the  judgment 
has  been  reduced  by  the  injunction  is  a  proper  element 
of  damage  and  costs,  interest  on  the  judgment,  and 
counsel  fees  Incurred  in  its  dissolution  may  also  be  re- 
covered in  a  proper  case. 

On  the  dissolution  of  an  injunction,  the  statutes 
usually  permit  damages  sustained  by  the  interfer- 


ence to  be  assessed  by  the  court  against  complain- 
ant and  his  sureties,  the  amount  of  which  may  be 
fixed  at  a  certain  percentage  on  the  amount  of  the 
judgment.9  It  is  not  proper  to  include  in  the  award 
of  damages  the  amount  of  the  judgment  enjoined, 
or  the  whole  of  the  original  debt,10  unless  the  whole 
judgment  or  debt  was  lost  in  consequence  of  the 
injunction.11  Such  statutes  relate  only  to  judg- 
ments for  money;  when  the  judgment  is  of  a  dif- 
ferent character,  the  amount  of  damages  becomes  a 
question  of  fact  which  must  be  determined  in  an 
action  on  the  bond.12  Where  the  injunction  did  not 
extend  to  the  whole  judgment,  but  only  stayed  the 
collection  of  a  part  of  it,  damages  should  be 
awarded  on  that  part  only,  when  the  injunction  is 
dissolved.13  Where  an  order  of  seizure  against 
two  joint  vendees  is  enjoined  by  one  of  them,  dam- 
ages are  allowed  only  on  the  amount  due  by  the 
vendee  who  enjoined  the  proceedings.14  Such  dam- 
ages are  allowed  only  in  cases  in  which  the  injunc- 
tion is  obtained  at  the  instance  of  a  party  to  the 
judgment  enjoined,15  unless  the  terms  of  the  act 
are  sufficiently  broad  to  cover  an  injunction  sued 
out  by  a  stranger.1^ 

Liability  on  injunction  bond.  In  an  action  on  an 
injunction  bond  given  in  a  suit  to  restrain  enforce- 
ment of  a  judgment,  the  extent  to  which  the  amount 
collectable  on  the  judgment  has  been  reduced  in 
consequence  of  the  injunction  is  a  proper  element  of 
damage.17  Damages  may  be  allowed  for  tying  up 
an  excessive  amount  of  tie  judgment.18  The  dam- 
ages in  such  an  action  may  also  include  costs19 
and  interest  on  the  judgment.20  Counsel  fees  in- 


99.    Ky. — Young  v.  Davis,  1  T.B.Mon. 

152. 
1.    Wis.— Kiel  v.  Scott  &  Williams, 

302    N.W.    672,    186   Wis.    415. 
.14  C.J.  p  500  note  85. 
Operation  and  effect  of  opening  and 

vacating-    judgment    .generally    see 

supra  §  306. 

a,  Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Or- 
egon-Washington R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v. 
Reid,  65  P.2d  664,  669,  155  Or. 
602. 

34  C.J.  p  500  note  86. 

3.  Md.— Little    v.    Price,    1    Md.Ch. 
182. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Oregon- 
Washington  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Reid, 
65  P.2d  664,  669,  155  Or.  602. 

4.  Ill,— Strong   v.   Wesley  Hospital, 
125  Ill.App.  201. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Oregon- 
Washington  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Reid, 
65  P.2d  664,  669,  155  Or.  602. 

.6.  Va,. — Richardson  v.  Prince  George 
Justices,  11  Gratt.  190,  52  Va.  190. 

•a    Tex. — Donna   Irr.    Dist,   Hidalgo 


County  No.  1  v.  Magnolia  Petro- 
leum Co.,  Civ.App.,  62  S.W.2d  207, 
error  dismissed. 

7.  Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Rock 
Springs  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Black 
Diamond  Coal  Co.,  272  P.  12,  21,  39 
Wyo.   379. 

34  C.J.  p  500  note  90. 

8.  U.S.— Moore  v.  Harjo,  C.C.A.Okl., 
144  F.2d  318. 

9.  Iowa.— Western   Fruit   &   Candy 
Co.  v.  McFarland,  174  N.W.  57,  188 
Iowa  204. 

34  C.J.  p  500  note  92. 

Damages  arising  from  issuance  of 
injunction  generally  see  Injunc- 
tions §§  278-316. 

10.  Tex. — Fernandez  y.  Casey,  14  S. 
W.  149,  77  Tex.  452. 

34  C.J.  p  501  note  93. 

11.  La. — Hefner    v.    Hesse,    29    La. 
Ann.  149. 

34  C.J.  p  501  note  94. 

12.  La. — Green    v.    Reagan,    32    La. 
Ann.  974. 

34  C.J.  P  501  note  97. 

791 


13.  Ky. — Mitcherson  v.  Dozier,   7  J. 
J.Marsh.   53,   22  Am.D.   116. 

34  C.J.  p  501  note  98. 

14.  La. — Gorham  v.  Hayden,  6  Rob. 
450. 

15.  Miss. — Armstrong  v.  Fusz,  16  So. 
532. 

34  CJ-.  p  501  note  1. 

16.  Va.— Claytor    v.     Anthony,     15 
Gratt  518,  56  Va.  518. 

17.  Tex.— -Corpus      Juris      cited      in 
Green  v.  Hodge,  Civ.App.,  102  S.W. 
2d  500,  501. 

32  C.J.  p  481  note  97. 

18.  Ky. — Bimbas  v.  Liberty  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.,  25  S.W.2d  1019,  233  Ky. 

.    430. 

19.  Ala. — Moore  v.  Harton.  1  Port 
15. 

32  C.J.  p  471  note  48  [b], 

20.  Neb.— Harvard  First  Nat  Bank 
v.  Hackett,    89   N.W.   412,   2   Neb., 
UnofC.,  512. 

32  C.J.  p  479  note  53. 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


curred  in  procuring  the  dissolution  of  the  injunc- 
tion and  sustaining  the  judgment  are  usually  re- 
coverable in  an  action  on  the  bond,21  but  fees  for 
sendees  rendered  prior  to  the  execution  of  the  bond 
are  not.22  Although  it  has  been  held  that  attor- 
neys' fees  should  not  be  included  if  the  effect  would 
be  to  make  the  damages  greater  than  the  statutory 
limit,23  it  has  also  been  held  that  it  is  no  objection 
to  an  allowance  for  such  counsel  fees  that  the 
amount  of  a  judgment  collected  by  execution  from 


the  judgment  debtor  exceeds  the  penalty  of  a  bond 
given  under  an  injunction  against  the  judgment,24 
and  that  the  right  to  an  allowance  is  not  affected 
by  a  statute  providing  that,  on  dissolution  of  the 
injunction,  damages,  in  lieu  of  interest  at  a  given: 
per  cent,  shall  be  incorporated  in  the  debt25  Lia- 
bility on  an  injunction  bond  is  not  dependent  on 
the  form  of  procedure  pursued  to  procure  dissolu- 
tion of  the  injunction.26 


XIL  COLLATERAL  ATTACK 
A.  IN  GENERAL 


§  401.     General  Rule 

A  Judgment  which  is  not  void  is  not  subject  to  col- 
lateral attack,  but  a  void  judgment  may  be  attacked  at 
any  time  by  any  person  in  any  proceeding. 

A  judgment  rendered  by  a  court  having  jurisdic- 


tion of  the  parties  and  the  subject  matter,  unless  re- 
versed or  annulled  in  some  proper  proceeding,  is  not 
open  to  contradiction  or  impeachment,  in  respect 
of  its  validity,  verity,  or  binding  effect,  by  parties  or 
privies,  in  any  collateral  action  or  proceeding,27 


21.  Idaho. — Idaho      Gold      Dredging 
Corporation  v.  Boise  Payette  Lum- 
ber Co.,  90  P.2d  6S8,  60  Idaho  127. 

22.  Idaho. — Idaho      Gold     Dredging 
Corporation  v.  Boise  Payette  Lum- 
ber Co.,  supra. 

23.  111. — Moriarity   v.   Gait,   17  N.B. 
714,  125  111.  417. 

34  C.J.  p  501  note  95. 

24.  W.Va.— State  v.   Graham,   69   S. 
E.  301.  68  W.Va.  1. 

25.  W.Va. — State  v.  Graham,  supra. 
32  C.J.  p  473  note  83. 

26.  Idaho. — Idaho      Gold     Dredging 
Corporation  v.  Boise  Payette  Lum- 
ber Co.,  90  P.2d  688,  60  Idaho  127. 

27.  U.S. — Benitez  v.   Bank  of  Nova 
Scotia,   C.C.A.Puerto   Rico,    125    F. 
2d    519,    certiorari    denied    Benitez 
Sampayo  v.  Bank  of  Nova  Scotia, 
62  S.Ct.  1308,  316  U.S.  702,  86  L.Ed. 
1770,  rehearing  denied  63  S.Ct.  24, 
317  U.S.   706,  87  L.Ed.  563,  certio- 
rari denied  63  S.Ct.  31,  317  U.S.  624, 
87  L.Ed.  505,  rehearing  denied  63 
S.Ct    153,    317   U.S.    708,    87   L.Ed. 
565— Guettel    v.    U.    S.,    C.C.A.Mo., 
95  F.2d  229,   118  A.L.B.  1060,  cer- 
tiorari denied  59  S.Ct.  64,  305  U.S. 
603,   83  KEd.  383— Moffett  v.  Rob- 
bins,  D.<2.Kan.,  14  F.Supp.  602,  af- 
firmed, C.C.A.,  81  F.2d  431,  certio- 
rari  denied   56   S.Ct   940,   298   U.S. 
675,    80   L.Ed.   1397— Cuff  v.  U.   S., 
C.C.A.Cal.,    64   F.2d   624,   certiorari 
denied   54   S.Ct.    96,   290   U.S.    676, 
78  L.Ed.  583 — Mitchell  v.  Cunning- 
ham,   C.C.A.Wash.,    8    F.2d    813— 
Jackson  v.  Kentucky  River  Mills, 
D.C.Ky.,    65    F.Supp.    601— Griffith 
v.  Bank  of  New  York,  D.C.N.Y.,  59 
F.Supp.  271— Corpus  Jtuls  cited  in 
Prichard    v.    Nelson,    D.aVa.,    55 
F.Supp.  506*  515,  affirmed,   C.C.A., 
137  F.2d  312— Nicolson  v.  Citizens 
&  Southern  Nat  Bank,  D.C.Ga.,  50 


F.Supp.  92 — Gaskins  v.  Bonfils,  D. 
C.Colo.,  4  F.Supp.  547. 

Ala. — A.  B.  C.  Truck  Lines  v.  Kene- 
mer,  25  So.2d  511— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  Bond  v.  Arondale  Baptist 
Church,  194  So.  833,  835,  239  Ala. 
366. 

Ariz. — City  of  Phoenix  v.  Banner,  95 
P.2d  987,  54  Ariz.  363— Hill  v. 
Favour,  84  P.2d  575,  52  Ariz.  561 
— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Varnes  v. 
White,  12  P.2d  870,  871,  40  Ariz. 
427. 

Ark.— Allison  v.  Bush,  144  S.W.2d 
1087,  201  Ark.  315— Sailer  v.  State, 
92  S.W.2d  382,  192  Ark.  514— Hobbs 
v.  Lenon,  87  S.W.2d  6,  191  Ark. 
509— State  v.  Wilson,  27  S.W.2d 
106,  181  Ark.  683— Stumpff  v.  Lou- 
ann  Provision  Co.,  292  S.W.  106, 
173  Ark.  192— Power  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Arkansas  Rice  Growers'  Co-op. 
Ass'n,  281  S.W.  379,  170  Ark.  771. 

Cal.— Baird  v.  Smith,  14  P.2d  749, 
216  Cal.  40 S — Rico  v.  Nasser  Bros. 
Realty  Co.,  137  P.2d  861,  58  Cal. 
App.2d  878— Kirkpatrick  v.  Harvey, 
124  P.2d  367,  51  Cal.App.2d  170— 
Gerinl  v.  Pacific  Employees  Ins. 
Co.,  80  P.2d  499,  27  Cal.App.2d  52, 
followed  in  80  P.2d  502,  27  Cal. 
App.2d  767 — Fisch  &  Co.  v.  Superi- 
or Court  in  <and  for  Los  Angeles 
County,  43  P.2d  855,  6  Cal.App.2d 
21 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Associ- 
ated Oil  Co.  v.  Mullin,  294  P.  421, 
423,  110  Cal.App.  385. 

Colo. — Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Fremont 
County,  37  P.2d  761,  95  Colo.  435 
— Bieser  v.  Stoddard,  216  P.  707, 
73  Colo.  554. 

D.C. — Citizens  Protective  League  v. 
Clark,  155  F.2d  290— Fishel  v.  Kite, 
101  F.2d  685,  69  App,D.C.  360,  cer- 
tiorari denied  Kite  v.  Fishel,  59 

792 


S.Ct.  645,  306  U.S.  656,  83  L.Ed, 
1054. 

Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Friedrich  v.  How- 
ell,  23  So.2d  153— Town  of  Bel- 
leair  v.  Newberry,  8  So.2d  7,  150 
Fla.  511 — Adams  v.  Adams,  180  So. 
516,  131  Fla.  777,  followed  in 
Adams  v.  Dommerich,  180  So.  519, 
131  Fla,  782— Bemis  v.  Loftin,  173: 
So.  683,  127  Fla.  515. 

Ga. — Chappell  v.  Small,  20t  S.E.24' 
916,  194  Gte.  143— Payne  v.  Mc- 
Crary,  1  S.E.2d  742,  187  Ga.  573 — 
Williams  v.  Maddox,  134  S.E.  29 D. 
162  Ga.  589 — Chance  v.  Chance,  5: 
S.E.2d  399,  60  Ga.App.  889. 

Idaho. — Moyes  v.  Moyes,  94  P.2d  7.82,. 
60  Idaho  601 — Corpus  Juris  quoted" 
in  Rogers  v.  National  Surety  Co.,. 
22  P.2d  141,  142,  53  Idaho  128 — 
Peterson  v.  Hague,  4  P.2d  350,  Si: 
Idaho  175. 

111.— Walton  v.  Albers,  44  N.B.2d  145;. 
380  111.  423— Baker  v.  Brown,  23r 
N.B.2d  710,  372  111.  336 — Gunnell 
v.  Palmer,  18  N.E.2d  202,  370  111. 
206,  120  A.L.R.  871— Brown  v.  Ja- 
cobs, 12  N.E.2d  10>  367  111.  545— 
Green  v.  Hutsonville  Tp.  High, 
School  Dist.  No.  201,  190  N.E.  267;. 
356  111.  216— Madison  &  Kedzie- 
State  Bank  v.  *  Cicero-Chicago.  Cor- 
rugating Co.,  184  N.B.  218,  351  111:. 
180— Balzer  v.  Pyles,  183.  N.B.  215,. 
350  111.  344— Healea  v.  Verne/  17R 
N.E.  562,  343  111.  325— Crane  v. 
Crane,  173  N.B.  352*  341  111.  36$— 
Wyman  v.  Hageman,  148  N.B.  852,. 
318  111.  64— Holt  v.  Snodgrass,  146 
N.E.  562,  315  111.  548— Hummel! 
v.  Cardwell,  55  N.B.2d  881,  323 
Ill.App.  440,  affirmed  in  part  and. 
reversed  in  part  on  other  grounds. 
62  N.B.2d  433,  390  111.  526,  certio- 
rari denied  66  S.Ct.  819,  three  cas- 
es, rehearing  denied  66  S.Ct.  898, 
three  cases — Molner  v.  Arendt,  55> 


49    C.J.S.  JUDGMENTS  §401 

except,  as  discussed  infra  §  434,  for  fraud  in  its  |  procurement.     Even  if  the  judgment  is  voidable, 


N.E.2d  407,  323  IlLApp.  289— Lord 
v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Kane  County, 
41  N.K2d  106,  314  IlLApp.  161— 
Schnur  v.  Bernstein,  32  N.E.2d  675, 
309  Ill.App.  90. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  New 
York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Breen,  289  N. 
W.  16,  22,  227  Iowa  738. 

Kan. — Federal  Savings  &  Loan  Ins. 
Corporation  v.  Hatton,  135  P.2d 
559,  156  Kan.  673 — Smith  v.  Pow- 
er, 127  P.2d  452,  155  Kan.  612— 
Brotlon  v.  Luther,  41  P.2d  1017, 
141  Kan.  489 — Corpus  Juris  cited 
In.  Kansas  City  Power  &  Light  Co. 
v.  City  of  Elkhart,  31  P.2d  62,  64, 
139  Kan.  374. 

Ky.— -Wells  v.  Miller,  190  S.W.2d  41, 
300  Ky.  680— Wiiburn  v.  Wilburn, 
178  S.W.2d  585,  296  Ky.  781— 
White  v.  White,  172  S.W.2d  72, 

294  Ky.  563— Poynter  v.  Smith,  160 
S.W.2d    380,    290   Ky.    169— Nichol- 
son   v.    Thomas,    127    S.W.2d    155, 
277    Ky.    760 — Flinn   v.    Blakeman, 
71  S.W.2d  961,  254  Ky.  416— Hous- 
ton's Guardian  (now  Luker)  v.  Lu- 
ker's  Former  Guardian,  69  S.W.2d 
1014,  253  Ky.  602— Wells'  Adm'x  v. 
Hell,   47   S.W.2d  1041,   243  Ky.  282 
— Mussman  v.   Pepples,   22   S.W.2d 
605,  232  Ky.  254— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Parker  v.  White,   4   S.W.2d 
380,  382,  223  Ky.  561— Hoffman  v. 
Shuey,   2  S.W.2d  1049,   223  Ky.  70, 
58  A.L.R.  842— Hays  v.  Adams,  294 
S.W.    1039,    220    Ky.    196— Cain   v. 
Hall,    278    S.W.    152,    211    Ky.    817 
— Woollums    v.    Fowler,    269    S.W. 
721,   207   Ky.   532— Moore  v.   Carr, 
269   S.W.   302,   207  Ky.   388— Logs- 
don  v.  Logsdon,  263  S.W.  728,  204 
Ky.   104. 

La. — Poise  v.  St.  Bernard  Parish  Po- 
lice Jury,  10  So.2d  892,  201  La. 
1048 — Ethridge-Atkins  Corporation 
v.  Tilly,  App.,  178  So.  669— Meyer 
v.  Reid,  8  La. App.  23. 

Me. — Leavitt  v.  Youngstown  Press- 
ed Steel  Co.,  166  A.  505,  132  Me. 
70 — Crockett  v.  Borgerson,  152  A. 
407,  129  Me.  395. 

Md. — Spencer  v.  Franks,  195  A.  306, 
173  Md.  73,  114  A.L.R.  263. 

Mass. — Noyes  v.  Bankers  Indemnity 
Ins.  Co.,  30  N.E.2d  867,  307  Mass. 
567— SciarafCa  v.  Debler,  23  N.E.2d 
111,  304  Mass.  240— Bennett  v. 
Powell,  187  N.E.  559,  284  Mass. 
246 — City  of  Boston  v.  Jenney,  184 
N.E.  464,  282  Mass.  168— Bremner 
v.  Hester,  155  N.E.  454,  258  Mass. 
425. 

Mich. — Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Detroit  v. 
Burton,  10  N.W.2d  315,  306  Mich. 
81— Adams  v.  Adams,  8  N.W.2d 
70,  304  Mich.  290— Rudell  v.  Union 
Guardian  Trust  Co.,  294  N.W.  132, 

295  Mich.    157— Hoadley   v.    Gafill 
Oil   Co.,    216   N.W.   407,   241   Mich. 
15— Broad  well  v.  Broadwell,  209  N. 
W.  923,  236  Mich.  60. 

Minn.— In    re   Melgaard's   Will,    274 


N.W.  641,  200  Minn.  493— Hawley 
v.  Knott,  226  N.W.  697,  178  Minn. 
225. 

Miss.— Neely  v.  Craig,  139  So.  835, 
162  Miss.  712. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Spitcauf- 
sky  v.  Hatten,  182  S.W.2d  86,  100, 
853  Mo.  94— Oldham  v.  Wright,  85 
S.W.2d  483,  337  Mo.  170— Jefferson 
City  Bridge  &  Transit  Co.  v.  Bla- 
ser,  300  S.W.  778,  318  Mo.  373— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  State  v.  Dor- 
ris,  App.,  168  S.w!2d  167,  168— 
Davis  v.  Morgan  Foundry  Co.,  23 
S.W.2d  231,  224  Mo.App.  162— 
Aufderheide  v.  Aufderheide,  App., 
18  S.W.2d  119— State  ex  rel.  Wool- 
man  v.  Guinotte,  282  S.W.  68,  221 
Mo.App.  466. 

Mont.— Missoula  Light  &  Water  Co. 
v.  Hughes,  77  P.2d  1041,  106  Mont. 
355— Coburn  v.  Coburn,  298  P.  349, 
89  Mont.  386. 

Neb.— Stanton  v.  Stanton,  18  N.W.2d 
654,  146  Neb.  71. 

Nev. — State  ex  rel.  Smith  v.  Sixth 
Judicial  Dist.  Court,  Humboldt 
County,  167  P.2d  648. 

N.H. — Strong  v.  New  Hampshire  Box 
Co.,  131  A.  688,  82  N.H.  221. 

N.J.— Nitti  v.  Public  Service  Ry.  Co., 
139  A.  62,  104  N.J.Law  67— Lippin- 
cott  v.  Godfrey,  136  A.  174,  103 
N.J.Law  407— Stout  v.  Sutphen,  29 
A.2d.  724,  132  N.J.Eq.  583— McMa- 
hon  v.  Amoroso,  154  A.  840,  108 
N.J.Eq.  263,  certiorari  denied  Dia- 
mond v.  McMahon,  52  S.Ct.  31,  284 
U.S.  652,  76  L.Ed.  553— Kaplan  v. 
Heiles,  152  A.  855,  107  N.J.EQ. 
443 — Westerhoff  v.  Citizens  Trust 
Co.,  190  A.  84,  15  N.J.Misc.  202, 
affirmed  190  A.  88,  117  N.J.Law 
453 — Matawan  Bank  v.  Feldman, 
174  A.  442,  12  N.J.Misc.  785— 
North  Hudson  Bond  &  Mortgage 
Co.  v.  Luberto,  155  A.  259,  9  N.J. 
Misc.  637. 

N.Y.— Hiser  v.  Davis,   137   N.E.   596, 

234  N.Y.  300— People  v.  Paterno,  50 
N.T.S.2d    713,    182    Misc.   491— Cor- 
pus  Juris  cited  in  McCarthy  v.  Mc- 
Carthy,   39   N.Y.S.2d   922,    925,    179 
Misc.     623,    affirmed    52     N.Y.S.2d 
817,    268    App.Div.    1070— Shaul    v. 
Fidelity   &  Deposit   Co.   of  Mary- 
land, 227  N.Y.S.  163,  131  Misc.  401, 
affirmed   230   N.Y.S.    910,    224   App. 
Div.  773 — In  re  Chambers'  Will,  7 
N.Y.S.2d  250,  169  Misc.  124. 

N.C.— Newton  v.  Chason,  34  S.E.2d 
70,  225  N.C.  204— State  v.  Adams, 
195  S.E.  822,  213  N.C.  243— Pate 
Hotel  Co.  v.  Morris,  171  S.E.  779, 
205  N.C.  484 — Duffer  v.  Brunson, 
125  S.B.  619,  188  N.C.  789. 

N.D. — Rasmusson  v.  Schmalenberger, 

235  N.W.   496,    60    N.D.    527— Len- 
hart  v.  Lynn,  194  N.W.  937,  50  N. 
D.  87, 

Ohio.— State  v.  Le  Blond,  140  N.E. 
510,  108  Ohio  St.  126,  certiorari  de- 
nied and  error  dismissed  State  of 

793 


Ohio  ex  rel.  Hawke  v*  Le  Blond,  44 
S.Ct.  134,  263  U.S.  679,  714,  68  L. 
Ed.  503,  and  followed  in  State  v. 
Darby,  144  N.E.  611,  109  Ohio  St. 
632 — Risman  v.  Krupar,  186  N.E. 
830,  45  Ohio  App.  29. 

Okl. — Collingsworth  v.  Hutchison,  90 
P.2d  416,  185  Okl.  101— Chicago, 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Excise  Board 
of  Oklahoma  County,  33  P.2d  1081, 
168  Okl.  428— First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Darrough,  19  P.2d  551,  162  Okl. 
243 — Protest  of  St.  Louis-San 
Francisco  Ry.  Co.,  19  P.2d  162,  162 
Okl.  62— Orth  v.  Hajek,  259  P. 
854,  127  Okl.  59— Lynch  v.  Collins, 
233  P.  709,  106  Okl.  133. 

Or. — Linn  County  v.  Rozelle,  162 
P.2d  150 — Travelers  Ins.  Co.  of 
Hartford,  Conn.,  v.  Staiger,  69  P. 
2d  1069,  157  Or.  143— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  McLean  v.  Sanders,  23 
P.2d  321,  322,  143  Or.  524 — Corpus 
Juris  auoted  in  Glickman  v.  Solo- 
mon, 12  P.2d  1017,  140  Or.  358— 
Title  &  Trust  Co.  v.  U.  S.  Fidel- 
ity &  Guaranty  Co.,  7  P.2d  805, 
138  Or.  467 — Corpus  Juris  quoted 
in  Abel  v.  Mack,  283  P.  8,  10,  131 
Or.  586. 

Pa. — Hoff  v.  Allegheny  County,  23  A. 
2d  338,  343  Pa.  569 — Common- 
wealth ex  rel.  Howard  v.  Howard, 
10  A.2d  779,  138  Pa.Super.  505— 
Mulvihill  T.  Philadelphia  Sav. 
Fund  Soc.,  177  A.  487,  117  Pa. 
Super.  455 — Marshall  v.  Keystone 
Mut.  Casualty  Co.,  Com.PL,  56 
Dauph.Co.  343. 

R.I. — Corpus  Juris  cited  la  McDuff 
Estate  v.  Kost,  158  A.  373,  375, 
52  R.I.  136. 

S.C. — Greenwood  County  v.  Watkins, 
12  S.E.2d  545,  196  S.C.  51— First 
Carolinas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 
"of  Columbia  v.  Knotts,  1  S.E.2d 
797,  191  S.C.  384— Piedmont  Press 
Ass'n  v.  Record  Pub.  Co.,  152  S. 
E.  721,  156  S.C.  43,  followed  in 
Spartanburg  Herald-Journal  Co.  v. 
La  Varre,  152  S.E.  728,  155  S.C. 
425. 

Tenn.— Fransioli  v.  Podesta,  134  S.W. 
2d  162,  175  Tenn.  340 — Green  v. 
Craig,  51  S.W.2d  480,  164  Tenn.  445 
— Fidelity  Phenix  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Ford  &  Cantrell,  47  S.W.2d  558, 
164  Tenn.  107 — Sloan  v.  Sloan,  295 
S.W.  62,  155  Tenn.  422 — Brown  v, 
Jarvis,  123  S.W.2d  852,  22  Tenn. 
App.  394. 

Tex. — Producers'  Refining  Co.  v.  Mis- 

*  souri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  of  Texas, 
Com.App.,  13  S.W.2d  679 — Produc- 
ers' Refining  Co.  v.  Missouri  K,  & 
T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas,  Com. App.,  13 
S.W.2d  680 — Galbraith  v.  Bishop, 
Com.App.,  287  S.W.  1087 — Southern 
Surety  Co.  v.  Texas  Oil  Clearing 
House,  Com.App.,  281  S.W.  1045 — 
Witty  v.  Rose,  Civ.App.,  148  S.W, 
2d  962,  error  dismissed — Childers 
v.  Johnson,  Civ.App.,  143  S.W.2d 


§  401 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


that  is,  so  irregular  or  defective  that  it  would  be 
set  aside  or  annulled  on  a  proper  direct  applica- 
tion for  that  purpose,  it  is  well  settled  as  a  general 
rule  that  it  is  not  subject  to  collateral  impeachment 
as  long  as  it  stands  unreversed  and  in  force.28 


On  the  other  hand,  a  judgment  which  is  absolutely 
void  is  entitled  to  no  authority  or  respect,  and  there- 
fore may  be  impeached  at  any  time,  in  any  proceed- 
ing in  which  it  is  sought  to  be  enforced  or  in  which 
its  validity  is  questioned,  by  anyone  with  whose 
rights  or  interests  it  conflicts.29  By  the  weight  of 


123 — Eakin  v.  Glenn,  Civ.App.,  141 
S.W.2d  420— Gamble  v.  Banneyer 
Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  955,  affirmed 
151  S.W.2d  586,  137  Tex.  7— Allen 
v.  Trentman,  Civ.App.,  115  S.W.2d 
1177 — Jones  v.  Griffith,  Civ.App., 
109  S.W.2d  565 — Longmire  v.  Tay- 
lor, Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d  525— 
Olton  State  Bank  v.  Howell,  Civ, 
App.,  105  S.W.2d  287— Southern 
Ornamental  Iron  Works  v.  Morrow, 
Civ.App.,  101  S.W.2d  336— Cruse 
v.  Mann,  Civ.App.,  74  S.W.2d  545, 
error  dismissed — Barfield  v.  Miller, 
Civ.App.,  70  S.W.2d  632,  error  dis- 
missed—Corpus Juris  cited  in 
Commercial  State  Bank  of  Nacog- 
doches  v.  Van  Dorn,  Civ.App.,  25 
S.W.2d  192,  193— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  National  Surety  Co.  v.  Hemp- 
hill,  Civ.App.,  13  S.W.2d  921,  9 
error  refused — Mills  v.  Snyder, 
Civ. App.,  8  S.W.2d  790 — Sederholm 
v.  City  of  Port  Arthur,  Civ.App, 
3  S.W.2d  925,  affirmed  Tyner  v.  La 
Coste,  Com.  App.,  13  S.W.2d  685 
and  Tyner  v.  Keith,  13  S.W.2d  687 
— Burleson  v.  Moffett,  Civ.App., 
3  S.W.2d  544— Johnston  v.  Ste- 
phens, Civ.App.,  300  S.W.  225,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  49  S.W. 
2d  431,  121  Tex.  374. 
Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 

Va. — Law  v.  Commonwealth,  199  S. 
B.  516,  171  Va.  449— Buchanan  v. 
Buchanan,  197  S.E.  426,  170  Va. 
458,  116  A.L.R.  688— Mayes  v. 
Mann,  180  S.B.  425,  164  Va.  584— 
Cottrell  v.  Reams,  145  S.B.  317, 
151  Va.  773. 

AVash. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bas- 
kin  v.  Livers,  43  P.2d  42,  43,  181 
Wash.  370 — Levinson  v.  Vander- 
veer,  13  P.2d  448,  169  Wash.  254 
— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Treosti 
v.  Treosti,  13  P.2d  45,  46,  168 
Wash.  672. 

W.Va. — Crickmer  v.  Thomas,  200  S.B. 
353,  120  W.Va.  769— Newhart  v. 
Pennybacker,  200  S.B.  350,  120  W. 
Va.  774,  concurring  opinion  200  S. 
B.  754,  120  W.Va.  774— Fink  v. 
Fink,  137  SJE.  703,  103  W.Va,  423. 
Wis.— State  v.  Williams,  245  N.W. 
663,  209  Wis.  541— Milwaukee  Cor- 
rugating Co.  v.  Flagge,  198  N.W. 
394,  184  Wis.  139. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 
District  Court  of  Eighth  Judicial 
Dist.  in  and  for  Natrona  County, 
238  P.  545,  547,  33  Wyo.  281. 
34  C.J.  p  511  note  46—25  C.J.  p  767 
note  51. 

TTnf&ir  methods 
Judgment      procured      by     unfair 


methods,  after  statutory  require- 
ments essential  to  jurisdiction  have 
been  complied  with,  will  not  be  dis- 
turbed to  injury  of  innocent  third 
persons. — Crabb  v.  Uvalde  Paving 
Co.,  Tex.Com. App.,  23  S.W.2d  300. 

28.    U.S.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 

Prichard    v.    Nelson,    C.C.A.W.Va., 

137  F.2d  312,  314— Parker  Bros.  v. 

Fagan,  C.C.A.Fla.,  68  F.2d  616,  cer- 

tiorari  denied  54  S.Ct.  719,  292  U.S. 

638,  78  L.Ed.  1490. 
Ariz. — Dockery    v.    Central    Arizona 

Light   &   Power   Co.,   45   P.2d   656, 

45  Ariz.  434. 
111.— Walton  v.  Albers,  44  N.E.2d  145, 

380    111.    423— Lord    v.    Board    of 

Sup'rs  of  Kane  County,  41  N.E.2d 

106,    314    IlLApp.    161— Schnur    v. 

Bernstein,    32   N.E.2d   675,   309    111. 

App.   90. 
Ind. — Fidelity  &  Casualty  Co.  of  New 

York    v.    State,    184    N.E.    916,    98 

Ind.App.  485. 
Iowa. — Educational   Film   Exchanges 

of  Iowa  v.  Hansen,  266  N.W.  487, 

221  Iowa  1153. 
Ky.— Hopkins  v.  Cox,  174  S.W.2d  418, 

295  Ky.  286— May  v.  Sword,  33  S. 

W,2d  314,  236  Ky.  412— Grooms  v. 

Grooms.  7  S.W.2d  863,  225  Ky.  228 

—Cain  v.   Hall,    278   S.W.   152,   211 

Ky.  817— Haddix  v.  Walter,  266  S. 

W.     631,     205    Ky.     740— Oliver    v. 

Belcher,    265    S.W.    942,    205    Ky. 

417. 
Mass. — Sullivan  v.  Jordan,  36  N.E.2d 

387,  310  Mass.  12. 
Mich. — Attorney      General      ex     rel. 

O'Hara  v.    Montgomery,   267  N.W. 

550,  275  Mich.  504. 
Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 

Ragland,    97    S.W.2d   113,   116,    339 

Mo.  452. 

Nev. — State  ex  rel.  Smith  v.  Sixth 
Judicial  Dist.  Court,  Humbolt 
County,  167  P.2d  648. 

N.C.— Clark  v.  Carolina  Homes,  128 
S.B.  20,  189  N.C.  703. 

Ohio.— Steiner  v.  Rainer,  42  N.E.2d 
684,  69  Ohio  App.  «. 

Okl.— Slemp  v.  City  of  Tulsa,  281  P. 
280,  139  Okl.  76,  appeal  dismissed 
and  certiorari  denied  50  S.Ct.  407, 
281  U.S.  703,  74  L.Ed.  1127. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Abel  v. 
Mack,  283  P.  8,  10,  131  Or.  586. 

Pa.— In  re  Limber's  Estate,  131  A. 
244,  284  Pa.  346— In  re  Murray's 
Estate,  45  A.2d  411,  158  Pa.Super. 
504. 

Tenn. — State  ex  rel.  Hooten  v.  Hoot- 
en,  1  Tenn.  App.  154. 

Tex. — Gehret  v.  Hetkes,  Com.App.,  36 
S.W.2d  700 — Clark  v.  Puls,  Civ. 
App.,  192  S.W.2d  905,  error  refused  J 

794 


no  reversible  error — Wilson  v. 
King,  Civ.App.,  148  S.W.2d  442— 
Walton  v.  Stinson,  Civ. App.,  140  S. 
W.2d  497,  error  refused — Darling- 
ton v.  Allison,  Civ.App.,  12  S.W. 
2d  839,  error  dismissed — State 
Mortg.  Corporation  v.  Garden,  Civ. 
App.,  11  S.W.2d  212 — Robins  v. 
Sandford,  Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  520, 
affirmed,  Com.App.,  29  S.W.2d  969 
— Gathings  v.  Robertson,  Civ.App., 
264  S.W.  173,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com. App.,  276  S.W.  21 S — 
Getting  v.  Mineral  Wells  Crushed 
Stone  Co.,  Civ.App.,  262  S.W.  93. 
Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  R2d 
157,  94  Utah  271— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  Salt  Lake  City  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  22  P.2d  1046. 
1048,  82  Utah  179. 

Va. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Barnes  v. 
American   Fertilizer    Co.,    130    S.E. 
902,  906,  144  Va.  692. 
34  C.J.  p  513  note  48. 

"Good  faith,  as  well  as  sound  pub- 
lic policy  demands  that  erroneous 
and  voidable  judgments  be  set  aside 
or  modified  in  courts  in  which  they 
are  rendered." — Jackson  City  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Fredrick,  260  X.YT. 
908,  910,  271  Mich.  538. 

The  distinction  between  erroneous 
and  void  judgments  is  based  on 
wholesome  public  policy  which  facil- 
itates final  determination  of  disputed 
issues  by  decreeing  that  erroneous 
judgments  may  be  attacked  only  di- 
rectly, that  is,  by  appeal  or  in  man- 
ner prescribed  by  statute,  and  void 
judgments  collaterally  only  where 
fact  which  rendered  them  void, 
namely,  lack  of  jurisdiction  in  court 
to  render  them,  appears  on  face  of 
the  record. — Commonwealth  ex  rel. 
Dummit  v.  Jefferson  County,  189  S. 
W.2d  604,  300  Ky.  514. 
Dormant  Judgment 

A  dormant  judgment  is  not  void, 
but    only    voidable,    and    an    order 
of  sale  of  execution  on  dormant  judg- 
ment   is    merely    voidable,    and    not 
subject     to    collateral    attack.— Mc- 
Glothlin  v.  Scott,  Tex. Civ. App.,  6  S. 
W.2d  129—34  C.J.  p  513  note  48  [a]. 
.    U.S. — State  of  Missouri  ex  rel. 
and  to  Use  of  Stormfeltz  v.  Title 
Guaranty  &  Surety  Qo.,  C.C.A.MO., 
72  «F.2d  595,  certiorari  denied  Title 
Guaranty  &  Surety  Co.  v.  State  of 
Missouri    ex    rel.    and    to    Use    of 
Stormfeltz,   55   S.Ct.   404,   294  U.S. 
70'8,  79  L.Ed.  1242— Abraham  Land 
&  Mineral  Co.  v.  Marble  Sav.  Bank, 
D.C.La.,     -35     F.Supp.     500— In     re 
American  -Fidelity  Corporation,  B. 
C.0al.,  28  F.Supp.  462. 


49    C.J.S.  JUDGMENTS  '  §401 

authority,  whether  a  judgment  is  void  or  voidable  f  is  to  be  determined  from  an  inspection  of  the  reo 


Ala, — Robertson  v.  State,  104  So. 
561,  20  Ala.App.  514. 

Ariz. — Hallford  v.  Industrial  Com 
mission,  159  P.2d  305. 

Ark.— McClellan  v.  Stuckey,  120  S 
W.2d  155,  196  Ark.  516— Taylor  v 
O'Kane,  49  S.W.2d  400,  185  Ark. 
782— Stahl  v.  Sibeck,  40  S.W.2d  442 
183  Ark.  114-3 — Bragg  v.  Thomp- 
son, 9  S.W.2d  24;  177  Ark.  870— 
Hart  v.  Wimberly,  296  S.W. 
173  Ark.  1083. 

Cal. — Texas  Co.  v.  Bank  of  America 
Nat.  Trust  &  -Savings  Ass'n,  53  P 
2d  127,  5  Cal.2d  35— Conlin  v 
Blanchard,  28  P.2d  12,  219  Cal 
632— Associated  Oil  Co.  v.  Mullin 
294  P.  421,  110  QaLApp.  385— Pen- 
nell  v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for 
Los  Angeles  County,  262  P.  48,  87 
Cal.App.  375. 

Colo.— Perdew  v.  Perdew,  -64  P.2d 
602,  99  Colo.  544. 

Fla. — In  re  Begg's  Estate,  12  So.2d 
115,  152  «Fla.  277— Watkins  v. 
Johnson,  191  So.' 2,  139  Fla.  712— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Adams  v. 
Adams,  180  So.  516,  519,  1'31  Fla. 
777 — Goodrich  v.  Thompson,  118 
So.  -60,  96  Fla.  '327— Kroier  v.  Kroi- 
er,  116  So.  7'53,  95  Fla.  865— Ma- 
lone  v.  Meres,  109  So.  677,  91  Fla. 
709. 

Qa. — Montgomery  v.  Suttles,  13  S.E. 
2d  781,  191  Go.  781— Patten  v. 
Miller,  8  S.E.2d  757,  190  Ga.  123— 
Drake  v.  -Drake,  1  S.E.2d  573,  1'87 
Ga.  423 — Jones  v.  Jones,  184  -S.E. 
271,  181  Ga,  747— Shotkin  v.  State, 
App.,  35  S.B.2d  556 — Nixon  v.  £i. 

A.  Russell  Piano  Co.,  180  S.B.  743, 

51  Ga.App.  '399. 

Idaho. — Weil  v,  Defenbach,  208  P. 
1025,  36  Idaho  '37. 

111. — Barnard  v.  Michael,  63  N.B.2d 
858,  392  111.  130 — Anderson  v.  An- 
derson, 44  N.B.2d  54,  380  111.  435 
— Noorman  v.  Department  of  Pub- 
lic Works  and  Buildings,  8  N.E.2d 
637,  36<6  111.  216,  dismissed  door- 
man v.  Department  of  Public 
Works  and  Buildings  of  State  of 
Illinois,  58  S.Ct.  30,  302  U.S.  637, 

52  L.Ed.  496 — People  ex  rel.  Lange 
v.  Old  Portage  Park  Dist.,  190  NT. 

B.  664,  356  111.  '340— People  v.  Mil- 
ler,   171    N.E.    672,    339    111.    573— 
People  v.  Brewer,  160  N.B.  76,  328 
111.   472— Meyer  v.  Meyer,   66  N.B. 
2d  457,  338  IlLApp.  408— Industrial 
Nat.  Bank  of  Chicago  v.  Altenberg, 
64    N.B.2d   219,    327    Ill.App.  'M7— 
Walton    v.    Albers,    -40    N.B.2d    90, 
313  Ill.App.  304,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  44  N.B.2d  145,  380  111.  423 
—Schillinger  v.  O'Connell,    7  N.B. 
2d  153,  289  Ill.App.  271— Mclnness 
v.    Oscar   F.   Wilson  Printing  Co., 
258   IlLApp.   161— Levin  v.   Sylvan 
Metal    Products    Co.,    252    IlLApp. 
140— .Levy    v,    Odell,    237    IlLApp. 
606. 

Ind. — Calumet  Teaming  &  Trucking 


Co.  v.  Young,  33  N.E.2d  109,  21 
Ind.  468,  rehearing  denied  '33  N.B 
2d  583,  215  Ind.  468. 
Iowa.— Brown  v.  Tank,  297  N.W.  801 
230  Iowa  370— Gohring  v.  Koonce 
278  N.W.  283,  224  Iowa  1186— Day 
ton  v.  Patterson,  250  N.W.  595.  216 
Iowa  13S2. 
Kan.— Starke  v.  Starke,  125  P.2d  738 
second  case,  155  Kan.  3'31 — Patter- 
son v.  Board  of  Corn'rs  of  Mont 
gomery  County,  66  P.2d  400,  145 
Kan.  559 — Hoover  v.  Roberts,  58 
P.2d  S3,  144  Kan.  58— Franklin  v 
Jennings,  264  P.  1041,  U5  Kan 
553. 

Ky. — Morris  v.  Morris,  185  S.W.2d 
244,  299  Ky.  2-35— Miller  v.  Hill 
168  S.W.2d  769,  293  Ky.  242— 
Booth  v.  Copley,  140  S.W.2d  662, 
283  Ky.  23 — Commonwealth  v.  Min- 
iard,  99  S.W.2d  166,  266  Ky.  405— 
Bwing  v.  Union  Central  Bank,  72 
S.W.2d  4,  254  Ky.  623— Grooms  v. 
Grooms,  7  S.W.2d  863,  225  Ky.  22-8 
— Bowies'  Guardian  v.  Johnson,  291 
S.W.  29,  218  Ky.  221. 

La. — Nottingham  v.  Hoss,  141  So. 
'391,  19  La.Ajpp.  643— Jones  v.  Cres- 
cent City  Ice  Mfg.  Co.,  3  «La.App. 
7. 

Md.— -JCorpns  Juris  cited  in  Fooks' 
Ex'rs  v.  Ghingher,  192  A.  752,  785, 
172  Md.  612,  certiorari  denied  Phil- 
lips v.  Ghingher,  58  S.Ct  47,  302 
U.S.  726,  82  L.Ed.  561. 

Mass.— Carroll  v.  Berger,  150  N.B. 
870,  255  Mass.  132. 

Mich. — Adams  v.  Adams,  8  N.W.2d 
70,  304  Mich.  290— Attorney  Gen- 
eral ex  rel.  O'Hara  v.  Montgomery, 
2-67  N.W.  550,  275  Mich.  504— Mor- 
ris v.  Barker,  235  N.W.  174,  253 
Mich.  '334. 

Miss. — Stephenson  v.  New  Orleans  & 
N.  B.  R.  Co.,  177  -So.  509,  180  Miss. 
147 — City  of  Pascagoula  v.  Krebs, 
118  So.  286,  151  Miss.  676. 

Mo.— Faris  v.  City  of  Caruthersville, 
162  S.W.2d  237,  349  Mo.  454— Da- 
vison  v.  Arne,  155  S.W.2d  155,  348 
Mo.  790 — Rhodus  v.  Oeatley,  147  S. 
W.2d  631,  347  Mo.  397— Merz  v. 
Tower  Grove  Bank  &  Trust  Co., 
130  S.W.2d  611,  344  Mo.  1150— 
Truesdale  v.  St.  Louis  Public  Serv- 
ice Co.,  107  S.W.2d  778,  341  Mo. 
402,  112  A.L.R.  135-XJorpus  Juris 
cited  in  State  ex  rel.  National  Lead 
Co.  v.  Smith,  App.,  184  S.W.2d  1061, 
1069 — Simplex  Paper  Corporation 
v.  Standard  Corrugated  Box  Co., 
97  S.W.2d  862,  231  Mo.App.  764— 
Drake  v.  Kansas  City  Public  Serv- 
ice Co.,  41  S.W.2d  1066,  22-6  Mo. 
App.  365,  rehearing  denied  54  S. 
W.2d  427,  226  Mo.App.  -365— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  National  Union  'Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Vermillion,  App.,  19  S. 
W.2d  776,  783. 

Mont — Barnes  v.  Montana  Lumber 
&  Hardware  Co.,  216  P.  335,  67 
Mont.  481. 

795 


Neb.— Oorptis  Juris  cited  in  Drainage 
Dist.  No.  1  v.  Village  of  Hershey, 
296  N.W.  879,  882,  139  Neb.  205— 
Garrett  v.  State,  224  N.W.  860,  118 
Neb.  373. 

Nev.— State  ex  rel.  Smith  v.  Sixth 
Judicial  Dist.  Court,  Humboldt 
County,  167  P.2d  648 — Corpus  Ju- 
ris cited  in  State  ex  rel.  Wood  v. 
Haeger,  33  P.23  753,  754,  55  Nev. 
331. 

N.J.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Novo- 
grad  v.  Kayne's,  199  A.  59,  -61,  16 
N.J.Misc.  283." 

N.Y.— In  re  Rudgers,  294  N.Y.-S.  142, 
250  App.Div.  359— Cantor  v.  Killen, 
5  N.Y.S.2d  798,  167  Misc.  620— 
Shaul  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland,  227  N.Y.S.  163,  131  Misc. 
401,  affirmed  230  N.Y.S.  910,  224 
App.Div.  773. 

N.C. — Holden  v.  Totten,  31  S.B.2d 
635,  224  N.C.  547— Butler  v.  Win- 
ston, 27  S.E.2d  124,  223  N.C.  421— 
Casey  v.  Barker,  14  S.B.2d  429,  219 
N.C.  465— Abernethy  v.  Burns,  188 
S.B.  97,  210  N.C.  6S6— Pridgea  v. 
Pridgen,  166  S.E.  591,  203  N.C.  533 
—Ellis  v.  Ellis,  130  S.B.  7,  190  N. 
C.  418— Clark  v.  Carolina  Homes, 
128  S.B.  30,  189  N.C.  703. 
Ohio. — Steiner  v.  Rainer,  42  N".E.2d 
6-84,  69  Ohio  App.  6— State  v.  Price, 
164  N.E.  765,  30  Ohio  App.  218,  af- 
firmed Price  v.  State,  165  N.B.  44, 
119  Ohio  St.  558. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Porter  v. 
Hansen,  124  P.24  391,  396,  190  Okl. 
429— Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of  Ameri- 
ca v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Garvin 
County,  92  P.2d  359,  185  OkL  362 
— Independent  Oil  &  Gas  Co.  v. 
Clark,  52  P.2d  789,  175  Okl.  257— 
Henson  v.  Oklahoma  State  Bank, 
23  P.2d  709,  165  Okl.  1— Baton  v. 
St  Louis-San  'Francisco  Ry.  Co., 
251  P.  1032,  122  Okl.  143. 
Or.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Dixie 
Meadows  Independence  Mines  Co. 
v.  Kight,  45  P.2d  909,  911,  150  Or. 
895 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Abel 
v.  Mack,  283  P.  8,  10,  131  Or.  5'86. 
Pa.— In  re  Patterson's  Estate,  19  A. 
2d  16-5,  341  Pa.  177— In  re  Omber's 
Estate,  131  A,  244,  284  Pa.  346— 
Mamlin  v.  Tener,  23  A.2d  90,  146 
Pa.Super.  593 — Commonwealth  ex 
pel.  Howard  v.  Howard,  10  A.2d 
779,  138  Pa.Super.  505— Mehalko  v. 
Dauphin.  County,  Quar.Sess.,  54 
Dauph.Co.  363 — Commonwealth  v.  - 
Boyer,  Quar.Sess.,  6  Fay.L.J.  233. 
11  Som.Leg.J.  385. 

Tenn. — Tennessee  Marble  &  Brick  Co. 
v.  Young,  163  'S.W.2d,  71,  179  Tenn. 
11-6— Blumberg  v.  Abbott,  21  S. 
W.2d  396,  159  Tenn.  &S6— West  v. 
Jackson,  App.,  186  S.W.2d  915— 
Long  v.  Alford,  14  Tenn. App.  1. 
Tex. — Grant  v.  Ellis,  Com.App.,  50  S. 
W.2d  1093 — Switzer  v.  Smith,  Com. 
App.,  300  S.W.  31,  68  A.L.R.  377— 
Southern  Surety  Co.  v.  Texas  Oil 


§401  JUDGMENTS  49    C.J.SL 

ord.     If  the  record  discloses  the  jurisdiction^  de-  |  feet,  the  judgment  is  void;30   if  it  does  not,  the 


Clearing-  House,  Com.  App.,  281  S. 
W.  1045 — Maury  v.  Turner,  Com. 
App.,  244  S.W.  809— Miller  v.  State 
ex  rel.  Abney,  Civ.App.t  155  S.W.2d 
1012,  error  refused— Dittmar  v.  St. 
Louis  Union  Trust  Co.,  Civ.App., 
155  S.W.2d  388,  error  refused — 
Burrage  v.  Hunt,  Civ.App.,  147  S. 
W.2d  532,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Lipscomb  v.  Lofland, 
Civ.App.,  141  S.W.2d  983— Cheney 
v.  Norton,  Civ.App.,  126  S.W.2d 
1011,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Norton  v.  Cheney,  161  S.W.2d  73, 
138  Tex.  622— Klier  v.  Richter, 
Civ.App.,  119  S.W.2d  100,  error  re- 
fused— Longmire  v.  Taylor,  Civ. 
App.,  109  S.W.2d  525,  error  dis- 
missed— Reynolds  v.  Volunteer 
State  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  SO  S. 
W.2d  1087,  error  refused— San  Lor- 
enzo Title  &  Improvement  Co.  v. 
Caples,  Civ.App.,  48  S.W.2d  329, 
affirmed  73  S.W.2d  516,  124  Tex. 
'33 — Prazier  v.  Hanlon  Gasoline 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  29  S.W.2d  461,  error 
refused — Coffman  v.  National  Mo- 
tor Products  Co.,  Civ.App.,  26  S. 
W.2d  921,  error  dismissed— 
Scruggs  v.  Gribble,  Civ.App.,  17  S. 
W.2d  153— Dyer  v.  Black,  Sivalls 
&  Bryson,  Civ.App.,  13  S.W.2d  142, 
error  dismissed— White  v.  Hidalgo 
County  Water  Improvement  Dist. 
No.  2,  Civ.App.,  6  S.W.2d  790— 
Pumphrey  v.  Hunter,  Civ. App.,  270 
S.W.  237— Aleman  v.  Gonzales,  Civ. 
App.,  246  S.W.  726— Reed  v.  State, 
Cr.,  1ST  S.W.2d  660. 

Utah.— Cooke  v.  Cooke,  248  P.  83,  67 
Utah  371. 

Va. — Robertson  v.  Commonwealth,  25 
S.E.2d  352,  181  Va.  520,  146  A.L.R. 
966— Broyhill  v.  Dawson,  191  S.E. 
779,  168  Va.  321— Powers  v.  Suth- 
erland, 160  S.E.  57,  157  Va.  336— 
American  Mut.  Liability  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Hamilton,  1'35  S.B.  21,  145  Va. 
391— Hunt  v.  Kennedy  Coal  Corpo- 
ration, 124  S.B.  189,  140  Va.  17. 

Wash.— King  County  v.  Rea,  152  P. 
2d  310,  21  Wash.2d  593— France  v. 
Freeze,  102  P.2d  687,  4  Wash.2d  120 
—State  v.  Bayles,  209  P.  20,  121 
Wash.  215. 

W.Va.— Pettry  v.  Hedrick,  19  S.E.2d 
583,  124  W.Va.  113. 

Wyo.— Boulter  v.  Cook,  234  P.  1101, 
32  Wyo.  461,  rehearing  denied  236 
P.  245,  32  Wyo.  461. 

34  C.J.  p  514  note  49. 

Power  of  court  to   dispose  of  void 

judgment 

A  court  of  general  jurisdiction 
may,  by  virtue  of  its  inherent  pow- 
ers and  without  the  aid  of  statutes, 
clear  its  records  of  a  void  judgment, 
no  matter  in  what  form  or  in  what 
manner  the  application  to  do  so  is 
made, — John  Hancock  Mat,  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Gooley,  8$  P.23  221,  196  Wash. 
$57,  118  A.L.R.  1484. 


Estoppel 

(1)  Where  circumstances  are  such 
as  might   otherwise  afford  sufficient 
grounds  for  successful  collateral  at- 
tack on  judgment  or  decree,  the  con- 
duct of  the  attacking  party  may  be 
such  as  to  estop  him  from  availing 
himself  of  those  grounds. — Askew  v. 
Rountree,    Tex.Civ.App.,    120    S.W.2d 
117,  error  dismissed. 

(2)  A  party  is  not  estopped  from 
assailing  a  void  Judgment,  especially 
where  the  prima  facie  effect  of  such 
judgment  is  to  confer  on  the  party  a 
false  marital  status.— Coast  v.  Coast, 
Tex.Civ.App.,   135  S.W.2d  790. 

(3)  In  attacking  a  decree  based  on 
an   application    to   have   land   regis- 
tered  under   the   Torrens   Title   Act, 
and  void   on   its  face,   petitioner   is 
not  reauired   to  excuse   himself  for 
negligence     in     not     asserting     his 
claim,  the  fact  that  he  failed  to  an- 
swer the  application,  in  the  absence 
of  other  facts  creating  an  estoppel, 
being   immaterial.— Petition   of  Fur- 
ness,  218  P.  61,  62  Cal.Aj>p.  753. 

(4)  One  is  not  estopped  from  ob- 
jecting to  a  determination  made  by 
an  administrative  body,  including  in- 
dustrial commission,  or  by  a  court, 
that  body  or  court  had  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  make. — Zimmermann  v.  -Scan- 
drett,  D.C.Wis.,  '57  F.Supp.  799. 
laches  or  limitations  no  bar 

Neither  doctrine  of  laches  nor 
statute  of  limitations  applies  to  col- 
lateral attack  on  judgment  void  be- 
cause of  want  of  jurisdiction,  since 
there  is  no  time  limiting  collateral 
attack  on  void  judgment. — Garrison 
v.  Blanchard,  16  P.2d  273,  127  Cal, 
App.  -616. 

Statute    m airing1   judgment    absolute 
not  applicable 

The  statute  providing  that  if  pe- 
tition for  review  is  not  filed  within 
three  years  after  final  judgment  is 
rendered,  the  judgment  shall  stand 
absolute  applies  only  to  special  pro- 
cedure on  petition  for  review  of  a 
valid  default  judgment,  as  provided 
in  statute  concerning  time  when  final 
judgment  may  be  vacated,  based  on 
grounds  set  out  in  statute  concerning 
what  must  be  shown  by  petition  to 
set  aside  judgment,  and  the  statute 
concerning  time  when  judgment  shall 
stand  absolute  is  not  applicable  to  a 
judgment  which  is  void  for  lack  of 
jurisdiction  to  enter  it. — Hankins  v. 
Smarr,  137  S.W.2d  499,  345  Mo.  973. 
Judgment  after  dismissal 

Judgment  of  restitution,  rendered 
after  suit  for  possession  of  premises 
was  dismissed,  is  subject  to  collat- 
eral attack  in  suit  to  set  it  aside. — 
Woods  v.  Wark,  209  N.W.  76,  235 
Mich.  90. 

In  ejectment 

The  rule  which  permits  a  collater- 

796 


al  attack  on  a  void  judgment  when- 
ever it  is  called  to  the  attention  or 
the  court  in  any  proceeding  in  which: 
it  is  material  to  the  issue  presented 
is  particularly  apposite  in  an  eject- 
ment suit  in  which  a  party  may- 
show  that  any  instrument  relied  on 
by  his  adversary  as  evidence  of  title- 
is  void. — Powell  v.  Turpin,  29  S.R2d 
26,  224  N.C.  67. 
On  appeal 

Void  decree  could  be  first  attacked' 
on  appeal. — Powers  v.  Sutherland,. 
160  S.E.  57,  157  Va,  336. 

30.  U.S. — State  of  Missouri  ex  reU. 
and  to  Use  of  Stormfeltz  v.  Title- 
Guaranty  &  Surety  Co.,  C.C.A.Mo.,. 
72  F.2d  595,  certiorari  denied  Ti- 
tle Guaranty  &  Surety  Co.  v.  State 
of  Missouri  ex  rel.  and  to  Use  of 
Stormfeltz,  55  S.Ct  404,  294  U.S: 
708,  79  L.Ed.  1242. 

Ariz. — Maricopa  County  v.  Bloomer, 
78  P.2d  993,  52  Ariz.  28. 

Ark.— Lambie  v.  W.  T.  Rawleigh  Co., 
14  S.W.2d  245,  178  Ark.  1019. 

Cal.— In  re  Smead's  Estate,  -82  P.2d 
182,  12  Cal.2d  20— Texas  Co;  v. 
Bank  of  America  Nat.  Trust  & 
Savings  Ass'n,  53  P.2d  127,  5  Cal.2<T 
35 — Security-First  Nat.  Bank  or 
Les  Angeles  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  37  P. 
2d  69,  1  Cal.2d  749— Scoville  v. 
Keglor,  84  P.2d  212,  29  Cal.App.2d 
66— Ex  parte  Wyatt,  300  P.  132; 
114  CaLAPP.  557— Petition  of  Fur- 
ness,  218  P.  61,  62  Cal.App.  753. 

D.C. — U.  S.  ex  reL  Rauch  v.  Davis;, 
8  F.2d  907,  56  App.D.C.  46,  certio- 
rari denied  4-6  S.Ct.  '352,  270  U.-S:. 
653,  70  L.Ed.  782. 

Idaho. — Rogers  v.  National  Surety- 
Co.,  22  P.2d  141,  53  Idaho  12S. 

111. — Lord  v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Kane- 
County,  41  N.E.2d  106,  314  IlLApp. 
161. 

Kan. — Corpui  Juris  quoted  in  Harder 
v.  Johnson,  76  P.2d  763,  764,  14 T 
Kan.  440 — Corpus  Juris  guoted  in: 
Skaer  v.  Capsey,  273  P.  464,  466, 
127  Kan.  383. 

Miss. — Home  v.  Moorehead,  153  So- 
668,  169  Miss.  362. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Holtkamp  v.  Hart- 
mann,  51  S.W.2d  22,  330  Mo.  386— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  ex  rel.- 
National  Lead  Co.  v.  Smith,  App.,. 
134  S.W.2d  1061,  1069— Citizens' 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Moore,  263' 
S.W.  530,  215  Mo.App.  21. 

Nev.— -Beck  v.  Curti,  45  P.2d  -601,  36" 
Nev.  72. 

N.Y. — Corpus  Jurii  quoted  in  Nervo 
v.  Mealey,  25  N.T.S.2d  632,  634,  175- 
Misc.  952. 

N.C.— -Wyatt  v.  Berry,  170  S.E.  131, 
205  N.C.  118— Fowler  v.  Fowler, 
130  S.B.  315,  190  N.C.  5-36. 

N.D. — Johnson  v.  Ranum,  244  N.W. 
-642,  62  N.D.  607 — Zimmerman  v. 
Boynton,  229  N.W.  '3,  59  N.D. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  401 


judgment  is  merely  voidable.31    In  some  jurisdic-  I  tions,  however,  as  discussed  infra  §  421,  extrinsic 


Okl.— Mid-Continent  Pipe  Line  Co.  v. 
Seminole  County  Excise  Board,  146 
P.2d  996,  194  Okl.  40— Crawford  v. 
Le  -Fevre,  61  P.2d  196,  177  Okl.  508 
— Sinclair  Prairie  Pipe  Line  Co.  v. 
Excise  Board  of  TuJsa  County,  49 
P.2d  114,  173  Okl.  375— Excise 
Board  of  Le  Flore  County  v.  Kan- 
sas City  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  47  P. 
2d  5SO,  173  Okl.  238 — Moroney  v. 
State  ex  rel.  Southern  Surety  Co., 
31  P.2d  926,  168  Okl.  69— Adams  v. 
Carson.  25  P.2d  653,  165  Okl.  161— 
State  v.  Armstrong,  13  P.2d  198, 
158  Okl.  290— Protest  of  Kansas 
City  Southern  Ry.  Co.»  11  P.2d  500, 
157  Okl.  246— Excise  Board  of  Car- 
ter County  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  3  P.2d  1037,  152  Okl.  120 
—Bird  v.  Palmer,  3  P.2d  890,  152 
Okl.  '3,  followed  in  3  P.2d  894,  152 
Okl.  7— Jent  v.  Jent,  291  P.  529, 
145  Okl.  74— Rock  Island  Imple- 
ment Co.  v.  Pearsey,  270  P.  846,  133 
Okl.  1 — Eaton  v.  St.  Louis-San 
Frnncisco  Ry.  Co..  251  P.  1032,  122 
Okl.  143. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Abel  v. 
Mack,  283  R  8,  10,  131  Or.  586. 

S.C.— Chamberlain  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Greenville,  24  S.E.2d  158, 
202  S.C.  115 — First  Carolinas  Joint 
Stock  Land  Bank  of  Columbia  v. 
Knotts,  1  S.B.2d  797,  191  S.C.  3-S4 
—Stone  v.  Mincey,  185  S.E.  619,  180 
S.C.  317— Hood  v.  Cannon,  182  S. 
E.  306,  178  S.C.  94. 

Tenn. — Lynch  v.  State  ex  rel.  Kille- 
brew,  166  S.W.2d  397,  179  Tenn. 
339 — New  York  Casualty  Qo.  v. 
Lawson,  24  S.W.2d  881,  160  Tenn. 
329. 

Tex. — Ringgold  v.  Graham,  Com.App., 
13  S.W.2d  355— Gehret  v.  Hetkes, 
Com.App.,  36  S.W.2d  700— Smith  v. 
Paschal,  Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  1086, 
rehearing  denied  5  S.W.2d  135 — 
Hatch  v.  Kubena,  Civ.App.,  190  S. 
W.2d  175,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Sup.,  Kubena  v.  Hatch, 
193  S.W.2d  175— Litton  v.  Waters, 
Civ.App.,  161  S.W.2d  1095,  error 
refused — Buhrman  -  Pharr  Hard- 
ware Co.  v.  Medford  Bros.,  Civ. 
App.,  11$  S.W.2d  345,  error  refused 
—•Ferguson  v.  Ferguson,  Civ.App., 
98  S.W.2d  847 — Adams  v.  Epstein, 
Civ.App.,  77  S.W.2d  545— Simms 
Oil  Co.  v.  Butcher,  Civ.App.,  55  S. 
W.2d  192,  error  dismissed — Ter- 
rell v.  Alpha  Petroleum  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  54  S.W.2d  821,  affirmed  Alpha 
Petroleum  Co.  v.  Terrell,  59  S.W.2d 
364,  122  Tex.  257,  amended  59  S. 
W.2d  372,  122  Tex.  257,  and  fol- 
lowed in  Alpha  Petroleum  Co.  v. 
Walker,  59  S.W.2d  3T3,  122 'Tex. 
246 — Edinburg  Irr.  Co.  v.  Ledbet- 
ter,  Civ.App.,  247  S.W.  335,  modi- 
fled  on  other  grounds,  Com. App., 
286  S.W.  185— Aleman  v.  Gonzales, 
Civ.App.,  24$  S.W.  726. 

Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d  157, 


94  Utah  271 — Frankey  v.  Patten, 
284  P.  318,  75  Utah  231— Stock- 
yards Nat.  Bank  of  South  Omaha 
v.  Bragg,  245  P.  966,  67  Utah  60. 
Va.— Wood  v.  Kane,  129  S.E.  327,  143 
Va.  251. 

C.J.  p  514  note  50. 

A  test  in  determining  whether 
judgment  is  void  and  subject  to  "col- 
lateral attack"  is  whether,  if  party 
attacking  it  had  been  a  party  there- 
to, a  motion  in  arrest  could  have 
been  sustained  for  defects  appearing 
in  face  of  pleadings,  which  could  not 
have  been  aided  by  amendment  or 
cured  by  verdict.— Deck  v.  Shields, 
25  S.E.2d  514,  195  Ga.  697. 

Judgment  constituting'  collateral  at- 

tack  on  judgment 
Where  first  final  decree  of  county 
court  in  probate  proceeding  was  val- 
id and  not  subject  to  collateral  at- 
tack, orders  made  in  connection  with 
special  administration  proceedings 
and  second  Anal  decree  constituted  a 
collateral  attack"  on  the  first  final 
decree,  and  were  void  on  the  face  of 
the  judgment  roll  and  subject  to 
collateral  attack,  and  county  court 
properly  vacated  all  orders  made  in 
connection  therewith. — Porter  v. 
Hansen,  124  P.2d  391,  190  Okl.  429. 

31.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Prichard  v.  Nelson,  C.C.A.W.Va., 
137  F.2d  '312,  314— State  of  Mis- 
souri ex  rel.  and  to  Use  of  Storm- 
feltz  v.  Title  Guaranty  &  Surety 
Co.,  C.C.A.MO.,  72  F.2d  595,  certio- 
rari  denied  Title  Guaranty  &  Sure- 
ty Co.  v.  State  of  Missouri  ex  rel. 
and  to  Use  of  Stormfeltz,  55  S.CL 
404,  294  U.S.  708,  79  L.Ed.  1242. 

Ala.— Wise  v.  Miller,  111  So.  913,  215 
Ala.  660. 

Ariz. — Dockery  v.  Central  Arizona 
Light  &  Power  Co.,  45  P.2d  656,  45 
Ariz.  434. 

Cjal. — Wells  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  City  and 
County  of  San  Francisco,  152  P.2d 
625 — Kaufmann  v.  California  Min- 
ing1 &  Dredging  Syndicate,  104  P. 
2d  1038,  16  Cal.2d  90— Texas  Co.  v. 
Bank  of  America  Nat  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Ass'n,  53  P.2d  127,  5  Cal.2d 
36 — Hamblin  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Los  Angeles  County,  233  P.  337,  195 
Cal.  -364,  4'3  A.L.R.  1509— Rico  v. 
Nasser  Bros.  Realty  Co.,  137  P.2d 
861,  68  Cal.App.2d  878— Stevens  v. 
Kelley,  134  P.2d  66,  57  Cal.App.2d 
.318— Kirkpatrick  v.  Harvey,  124  P. 
2d  367,  51  CaLApp.2d  170— People 
v.  Spivey,  77  P.2d  247,  25  Cal.App. 
2d  279 — Burrows  v.  Burrows,  52  P. 
2d  606,  10  Cal.App.2d  749— Ream  v. 
Barr,  291  P.  451,  108  CaLApp.  172. 

Ga. — Payne  v.  McCrary,  1  S.E.2d  742, 
187  Ga.  573 — Thomas  v.  Lambert,  1 
S.E.2d  443,  187  Ga.  616. 

Idaho.— Welch  v.  Morris,  291  P.  1048, 
49  Idaho  781. 

797 


Ind.— Cooper  v.  Morris,  200  N.B.  222, 
210  Ind.  162. 

Kan.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Harder 
v.  Johnson,  76  P.2d  763,  764,  147 
Kan.  440 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Skaer  v.  Capsey,  273  P.  464,  466, 
127  Kan.  38-3. 

Ky.— Bailey  v.  Jones,  14  S.W.2d  152, 
228  Ky.  42— Collier  v.  Peninsular 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  America,  263  S. 
W.  353,  204  Ky.  1. 

Mont— Frisbee  v.  Coburn,  52  P.2d 
S82,  101  Mont.  58 — Coburn  v.  Co- 
burn,  29-8  P.  349,  89  Mont.  386— In 
re  Ft  Shaw  Irr.  Dist,  261  P.  962, 
81  Mont.  170. 

N.C.— Clark  v.  Carolina  Homes,  128 
S.B.  20,  189  N.C.  703. 

N.D. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Rasmus- 
sen  v.  Schmalenberger,  235  N.W. 
496,  499,  60  N.D.  527. 

Okl.— >Lee  v.  Harvey,  156  P.2d  134, 
195  Okl.  178— Mid-Continent  Pipe 
Line  Qo.  v.  Seminole  County  Excise 
Board,'  146  P.2d  996,  194  Okl.  40— 
Sabin  v.  Levorsen,  145  P.2d  402, 
193  Okl.  320,  certiorari  denied  64 
S.Ct  205,  '320  U.S.  792,  88  L.Ed. 
477,  rehearing  denied  -64  S.Ct  368, 
320  U.S.  815,  88  L.Ed.  492— Adams 
v.  Carson,  25  P.2d  653,  165  Okl.  161 
— Protest  of  St.  Louis-San  Fran- 
cisco Ry.  Co.,  19  P.2d  162,  162  Okl. 
62 — Protest  of  Kansas  City  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  11  P.2d  500,  157  Okl, 
246— Protest  of  St  Louis-San 
•Francisco  Ry.  Co.,  11  P.2d  189,  157 
Okl.  131— Reliance  Clay  Products 
Co.  v.  Rooney,  10  P.2d  414,  157  Okl. 
24— Excise  Board  of  Creek  County 
v.  Gulf  Pipe  Line  Co.  of  Oklahoma, 
9  P.2d  460,  156  Okl.  103— Bird  v. 
Palmer,  3  P.2d  890,  152  Okl.  3.  fol- 
lowed in  3  P.2d  894,  152  Okl.  7. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  auoted  in  Abel  v. 
Mack,  283  P.  8,  10,  131  Or.  586. 

S.C. — Stone  v.  Mincey,  185  S.E.  619, 
180  S.C.  317— Scott  v.  Newell,  144 
S.E.  82,  146  -S.C.  385. 

Tex. — Gehret  v.  Hetkes,  Com.App.,  36 
S.W.2d  700 — Ringgold  v.  Graham, 
Com.App.,  13  S.W.2d  355— Williams 
v.  Coleman-Fulton  Pasture  Co., 
Civ.App.,  157  S.W. 3d  995,  error  re- 
fused— Perdue  v.  Miller,  Civ.App., 
64  S.W.2d  1002,  error  refused — 
Edinburg  Irr.  Co.  v.  Ledbetter,  Civ. 
App.,  247  S.W.  335,  modified  on  oth- 
er grounds,  Com. App.,  286  S.W. 
185. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 22  P.2d  1046,  1048,  82  Utah 
179. 

Va.— Wood  v.  Kane,  129  S.B.  327,  143 
Va.  281. 

Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Thompson  v.  Short,  106  P.2d  720, 
724,  6  Washed  7L 

34  C.J.  p  514  note  51. 


402 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


evidence  is  admissible  to  show  the  jurisdictional 
defect.  In  order  to  make  a  judgment  subject  to 
collateral  attack  it  must  have  been  rendered  by  a 
court  without  legal  organization  ;32  or,  as  discussed 
infra  §§  421-427,  by  a  court  without  jurisdiction. 
Where  an  attack  is  collateral,  the  ordinary  rules 
governing  a  direct  attack  on  a  judgment  have  no 
bearing  in  determining  the  contention,33  and  the 
only  question  before  the  court  is  whether  the  judg- 
ment or  decree  is  void.34 

§  402.    To  What  Judgments  and  Courts  Rule 
Applies 

In   general  the  rule  against  collateral  attack  applies 


to  all  varieties  of  valid  Judgments  In  all  kinds  of  judi- 
cial proceedings. 

The  rule  against  the  collateral  impeachment  of 
judgments  applies  generally  to  all  varieties  of  judg- 
ments, decrees,  or  orders  made  by  courts  of  compe- 
tent jurisdiction,  in  all  kinds  of  judicial  proceed- 
ings,35 such  as,  among  others,  contempt  proceed- 
ings,38 summary  proceedings,37  tax  proceedings,38 
garnishment,39  judgments  against  political  subdivi- 
sions of  a  state,40  proceedings  against  partnerships 
or  partners,41  judgments  in  interpleader  suits,42 
mortgage  foreclosures,43  or  proceedings  relating  to 


32.  Tex.— Hill    v.    Lofton,   Civ.App., 
165  S.W.  67. 

34  C.J.  p  514  note  53. 

33.  Cal. — Kaufmann     v.     California 
Mining  &  Dredging  Syndicate,  104 
P.2d  1038,  16  Cal.2d  90. 

G«L  Neb.— Douglas  County  v.  Fee- 
nan,  18  N.W.2d  740,  146  Neb.  156. 

35.     CaL — Lieberman       v.       Superior 

Court    of    California    in    and    for 

Orange  County,  236  P.  570,  T2  Cal. 

App.  18. 

Fla. — Kennedy  v.  Seville  Holding  Co., 

169  So.  &60,  125  Fla.  415. 
111. — Brown  v.  Jacobs,  12  N.E.2d  10, 
267    111.    545— Murphy   v.    Murphy, 
175    N.B.    378,    343   111.    254— -Union 
Trust  Co.  v.  <First  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank,  252  Ill.App.  337. 
Mass.— McKay    v.    Polep,    42    N.E.2d 

538,  311  Mass.  567. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  and  to  Use  of 
Conran  v.  Duncan,  63  S.W.2d  135, 
3*33  Mo.  673. 

X.J. — Lane  v.  Rushmore,  198  A.  872, 
123  N.J.EQ.  531,  affirmed  4  A.2d 
55,  125  N.J.Eq.  310,  certiorari  de- 
nied Rushmore  v.  Lane,  59  S.Ct. 
1033,  307  U.S.  636,  S3  L.Ed.  1518. 
N.C. — Mclver  Park,  Inc.,  v.  Brinn,  27 

S.E.2d  548,  223  N.C.  502. 
34  C.J.  p  :515  notes  58,  59. 
Decrees  in  equity  see  Equity  §  615. 
Motions  and  orders  see  the  C.J.S.  ti- 
tle Motions  and  Orders  §   66,  also 
42  C.J.  p  560  note  85  et  seq. 
Proceedings  in  rem  see  infra  §  910. 
Interlocutory  orders 

The  rule  against  collateral  attack 
on  judgments  applies  to  protect  in- 
terlocutory orders  and  proceedings 
as  well  as  final  judgments. — Daven- 
port v.  East  Texas  Refining  Co.,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  312,  error  re- 
fused—34  C.J.  p  515  note  58  [cj. 

Order  directing'  arbitration  is  not 
assailable  collaterally,  unless  void. — 
Marchant  v.  Mead-Morrison  Mfg.  Co., 
169  N.E.  386,  25'2  N.T.  284,  reargu- 
ment  denied  171  N.E.  770,  253  N.Y. 
534,  appeal  dismissed  Mead-Morrison 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Marchant,  51  S.Ct.  104, 
282  U.S.  808,  75  «L.Ed.  725. 


BKtension   of  time   for  payment   of 
guaranty 

Trial  court's  orders  granting  bank 
deposit  guarantors  extension  of  time 
for  payment  of  guaranty  were  held 
"judgments"  which  could  not  be  col- 
laterally attacked  in  action  on  guar- 
anty, by  bank's  receiver,  since  there 
was  issue  for  judicial  determination 
in  proceedings  before  trial  court, 
which  issue  was  whether  guarantors 
were  entitled  to  have  time  of  pay- 
ment of  their  guaranty  extended  and 
bank's  receiver  enjoined  from  selling 
collateral  and  bank's  realty  in  mean- 
time, which  issue,  in  nature  of  things 
court  could  not  determine  without 
adjudging  that  guaranty  was  in 
force. — Hopkins  v.  Woodside,  180  S. 
E.  454,  176  S.C.  463. 

36.  Pa. — Hoskins   v.    Somerset   Coal 
Co.,  68  A.  843,  219  Pa.  373,  123  Am. 
S.R.  667. 

37.  Mich. — Hafner   v.    A.    J.    Stuart 
Land  Co.,  224  N.W.  630,  246  Mich. 
465. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  National 
Surety  Corporation  v.  Smith,  123 
P.2d  203,  218,  168  Or.  265. 

34  C.J.  p  515  note  -63. 

38.  Wis. — State  v.  Baker,   286  N.W. 
535,  232  Wis.  383,  rehearing  denied 
287  N.W.  690,  232  Wis.  383,  certio- 
rari denied  Baker  v.  State  of  Wis- 
consin,   60   S.Ct.   582,   309   U,S.  662, 
84  L.Ed  1010. 

39.  Mich* — Walden    v.    Crego's    Es- 
tate, 285  N.W.  457,  288  Mich.  564. 

34  C.J.  p  515  note  65. 

40.  Okl.— Mid-Continent    Pipe    Line 
Co.    v.     Seminole    County    Excise 
Board,  146  P.2d  996,  194  Okl.  40— 
Standish   Pipe   Line   Co.    v.    Okla- 
homa   County    Excise    Board,    102 
P.2d    606,    187    Okl.    245— Sinclair 
Prairie    Pipe    Line    Co.    v.    Excise 
Board    of    Tulsa    County,    49    P.2fl 
114,  173  Okl.  375— Excise  Board  of 
Le    Flore    County  v.   Kansas   City 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  47  P.2d  580,  173 

798 


Okl.  238— Protest  of  Kansas  City 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  11  P.2d  500,  157 
Okl.  246— Paught  v.  City  of  Sapul- 
pa,  292  P.  15,  145  Okl.  164. 

41.  Ga. — Burson  v.  Shields,  129  S.E. 
22,  160  Ga.  723. 

47  C.J.  p  1015  note  72. 

42.  Tex. — Texas-Pacific   Coal   &  Oil 
Co.   v.   Ames,  Com. App.,   292   S.W. 
191. 

43.  U.S. — McCampbell     v.     Warrich 
Corporation,     C.C.A.I11.,     109     F.2d 
115,  certiorari  denied  60  S.Ct.  1077, 

310  U.S.  631,  84  X,.Ed.  1401,  rehear- 
ing denied  61  S.Ct.  55,  second  case, 

311  U.S.   612,  !85  L.Ed.  388,  and  61 
S.Ct.   1089,  '313  U.S.  599,   85   L.Ed. 
1551 — In  re  7000  South  Shore  Drive 
Bldg.  Corporation,  C.C.A.I11.,  86  P. 
2d  499. 

Ark.— Hobbs  v.  Lenon,   87  S.W.2d  6, 

191    Ark.    509— Lambie    v.    W.    T. 

Rawleigh   Co.,   14   S.W.2d   245,   178 

Ark.  1019. 
Idaho. — Gerken  v.  Davidson  Grocery 

Co.,  296  P.  192,  50  Idaho  315. 
111.— Weber  v.  Kemper,  150  N.E.  339, 

•320  111.  11. 
Iowa, — 'Fremont    Joint    Stock    Land 

Bank  of  Premont,  Neb.,  v.  Poster, 

247    N.W.    815,  .  215    Iowa    1209— 

Lyster  v.  Brown,   228  N.W.  3,  210 

Iowa  317. 
Mich.— Detroit  Fidelity  &  Surety  Co. 

v.    Donaldson,    237    N.W.    380,    255 

Mich.  129. 
Minn. — Brown  v.  Gallinger,  246  N.W. 

473,  188  Minn.  '22. 
Mo. — Owen  v.  Long,  104  -S.W.2d  365, 

•340  Mo.  539. 
Okl.— Pappe  v.  -Law,  tfo  P.2d  941,  169 

Okl.  15,  95  A.L.R.  939. 
Tex. — Tanton  v.  State  Nat.  Bank  of 

El  Paso,   Civ.App.t   43    S.W.2d   857, 

affirmed   79    S.W.2d    833,    125    Tex. 

16,    97    A.L.R.    1093— Sederholm    v. 

City    of   Port   Arthur,    Civ.App.,    3 

S.W.2d  925,  affirmed  Tyner  v.   La 

Coste,  13  S.W.2d  685  and  Tyner  v. 

Keith,  Com. App.,  13  S.W.2d  687. 
Wis. — Mason    v.    West    Park   Realty 
,      Co.,  213  N.W.  286,  193  Wis.  14. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  402 


realty,44  such  as  suits  for  partition45  or  water 
rights.46  The  rule  applies  to  orders  or  judgments 
dismissing  the  cause  ;4?  vacating,  modifying,  or 
setting  aside  former  judgments,*  8  allowing  amend- 
ments;49 decrees  of  reformation  of  instruments,50 
setting  aside  sales  on  execution  ;51  distributing  pro- 
ceeds of  execution  sales;52  distributing  assigned  es- 


tates;53 settling  accounts;54  or  authorizing  a  re- 
ceiver to  pay  claims,55  to  levy  an  assessment,56  or 
to  sue  debtors.57  The  rule  also  applies  to  nunc  pro 
tune  judgments,58  judgments  in  actions  on  foreign 
judgments  subsequently  reversed,5^  proceedings  to 
revive  a  judgment,60  judgments  or  orders  for 
costs61  or  fixing  attorney's  fees,62  judgments  for- 


44.  Pla. — State   ex   rel.    Everette   v. 
Petteway,  179  So.  666,  131  'Pla.  516. 

111. — Wyman  v.  Hageman,  148  N.E. 
852,  318  111.  64. 

S.C. — Cox  v.  American  Oil  Co.,  191 
S.E.  704,  18'3  -S.C.  519. 

Tex. — Forrest  v.  Coppard,  Civ.App., 
300  S.W.  959. 

34  C.J.  p  515  note  69. 

Proceeding's  to  quiet  title 

U.S. — Bruun  v.  Hanson,  C.C.A.Idaho, 
103  F.2d  685,  certlorari  denied 
Hanson  v.  Bruun,  60  S.Ct.  86,  308 
U.S.  571,  84  L.Ed.  479,'  mandate 
conformed  to  Bruun  v.  Hanson,  30 
F.Supp.  602. 

Cal.— Hollyfleld  v.  Geibel,  66  P.2d 
755,  20  Cal.App.2d  142— Alameda 
County  Title  Ins.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  Fi- 
delity &  Guaranty  Co.,  8  P.2d  912, 
121  Cal.App.  73. 

N.J. — Hoffmeyer  v.  Kieran,  14'3  A. 
425,  103  N.J.Eq.  254. 

Collateral  attack  on  decree  of  regis- 
tration of  land  title  see  the  C.J.S. 
title  Registration  of  Land  Titles 
§  20,  also  53  C.J.  p  1117  notes  20- 
22. 

45.  U.S. — Dunscombe  v.  Loftin,  C.C. 
A.'Fla.,  154  F.2d  963. 

111.— Katz  v.   Berkos,   45  N.E.2d   566, 

316  Ill.App.  569. 
Mo.— Miller  v.  Proctor,  49  S.W.2d  84, 

330  Mo.  43. 
Tex. — 'Ferguson    v.     Ferguson,     Civ. 

App.,  181  S.W.2d  601,  error  refused. 
47  C.J.  p  438  notes  85,  89. 
Confirmation  of  sale 

A  judgment  confirming  partition 
sale  and  impounding  money  share  of 
certain  party  was  final  and  could  not 
be  collaterally  attacked,  and  hence 
subsequent  judgment  quieting  title 
in  such  party  and  restraining  sale  of 
his  interest  was  not  res  judicata  and 
was  ineffective,  since  title  had  passed 
to  purchaser  at  partition  sale. — 
Drake  v.  Morrow,  299  N.W.  545,  140 
Neb.  258. 
County  court 

Under  Civ.Code  Pract  §  499,  the 
county  court  is  made  a  court  of  gen- 
eral jurisdiction  for  the  partition  of 
lands  among  joint  owners,  and  as 
such  its  judgments  in  partition  are 
immune  from  collateral  attack  on 
jurisdictional  grounds  as  other  judg- 
ments of  courts  of  general  jurisdic- 
tion, and  are  supported  by  the  same 
presumptions  as  support  the  judg- 
ments of  any  other  court  of  general 
jurisdiction. — Morgan  v.  Big  Woods 
•Lumber  Co.,  249  S.W.  329,  198  Ky. 
88. 


Under  special  statute 

It  is  immaterial  that  the  partition 
proceedings  were  had  in  a  .court  of 
general  jurisdiction  under  a  special 
statute.— Falkner  v.  Guild,  10  Wis. 
563. 
49.  Idaho. — McLean  v.  Row,  57  P.2d 

689,  56  Idaho  -646. 
34  C.J.  p  515  note  70. 

47.  U.S. — Olsen  v.  Muskegon  Piston 
Ring  Co.,  C.C.A.Mich.,  117  F.2d  163 
— O'Brien  v.  New  York  Edison  Co., 
D.C.N.T.,    26  'F.Supp.   290. 

Ky.— Clark's  Adm'x  v.  Callahan,  288 

S.W.  301,  216  Ky.  674. 
N.Y. — People  v.  Townsend,  233  N.Y. 

S.  -632,  133  Misc.  -843. 
34  C.  J.  p  515  note  71. 
Dismissal  on  motion. 

Dismissal  of  one  defendant  on  mo- 
tion of  plaintiff  cannot  be  collateral- 
ly attacked.— Sharp  v.  Hall,  Tex.Civ. 
A-pp.,  49  S.W.2d  523,  error  refused. 
Dismissal  on  consent 

Judgment  of  dismissal  entered  in 
accordance  with  statute  and  with 
consent  of  intervener  was  valid  and 
binding  on  intervener  and  not  sub- 
ject to  collateral  attack. — Dollert  v. 
Pratt-Hewit  Oil  Corporation,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  179  S.W.2d  '346,  error  re- 
fused, certiorari  denied  65  S.Ct.  713, 
324  U.S.  853,  89  L.Ed.  1412,  rehearing 
denied  65  S.Ct.  912,  324  U.S.  889,  £9 
L.Ed.  1437. 

48.  U.S.— Mootry  v.  Grayson,  Idaho, 
104  F.  613,  44  C.C.A.  83. 

34  C.J,  p  515  note  72—56  C.J.  p  881 

note  38. 
Decree  that  default  judgment  is  void 

Where  the  trial  court  found  that 
an  agreed  judgment  was  entered  on 
theory  that  a  default  judgment  was 
void,  decreed  that  default  judgment 
was  void,  and  reinstated  cause  as  a 
pending  cause,  the  decree  was  a  final 
decree  not  subject  to  collateral  at- 
tack.—Slattery  v.  Uvalde  Rock  As- 
phalt Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  140  S.W.2d 
987,  error  refused. 
Oertiorari 

Judgment  of  the  circuit  court  in 
certiorari  proceedings,  quashing  rec- 
ord of  civil  service  commission  dis- 
charging- relator,  was  a  legal  deter- 
mination that  relator  was  entitled  to 
be  restored  to  his  office,  and  cannot 
be  collaterally  attacked  until  re- 
versed or  set  aside. — People  v. 
Thompson,  146  N.B.  473,  '316  111.  11. 

49.  Pa. — Maloney  v.  Simpson,  75  A. 
675,  226  Pa.  479. 

34  C.J.  p  515  note  7-3. 

799 


60.  Tex.— Peters  v.  Allen,  Civ.App., 
296  S.W.  929. 

61.  Me. — International  Wood  Co.   v. 
National  Assur.  Co.,  59  A,  544,   99 
Me.  415,  105  Am.S.R.  288. 

34  C.J.  p  515  note  74. 

62.  Pa.— Noble  v.  Cope,   50  Pa.  17— 
Appeal  of  Yerke,  8  Watts  &  S.  224. 

53.  Ohio. — Hellebush  v.  Rtchter,   37 
Ohio  St.  222. 

Pa. — Commonwealth  v.  Steacy,  100 
Pa.  613. 

54.  U.S.— Mattingly  v.  Nye,  D.C.,   8 
Wall.  370,  19  L.Bd.  380. 

55.  N.M. — Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Atchi- 
son,   T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,   42  P.   89, 
'8  N.M.  159. 

56.  Md.— Mister    v.    Thomas,    89    A. 
844,  122  Md.  445. 

34  C.J.  p  516  note  79. 

57.  Ga. — Graves    v.    Denny,    54    S.E. 
187,  15  Ga.App.  '718. 

111.— Broch  v.  French,  116  IlLApp. 
15. 

58.  Ind.— Miller  v.   Muir,  86   N.E.2d 
496,  115  Ind.App.  335. 

Mo.— Allen    v.    Bagley,    133    S.W.2d 

1027,  234  Mo.App.  891. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 

Cannon's     Guardianship,     77     P.2d 

64,  66,  182  Okl.  171. 
34  C.J.  p  516  note  81,  p  82  note  14. 

69.  U.S. — Sanger  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Western  Lumber  Exchange,  O.C.A. 
Wash.,  11  F.2d  489. 

60.     Ga. — Helms  v.  Marshall,  49  S.E. 

733,  121  Ga.  769. 
34  C.J.  p  516  note  82. 

81.    Ky. — Commonwealth,     for     Use 
and  Benefit  of  Bouteiller,   v.   Ray, 
122   S.W.2d  750.   275  Ky.   758. 
34  C.J.  p  516  note  83. 
Confirmation  of  order  of  sale 

Where  circuit  court  confirmed  or- 
der of  sales  made  by  its  master  com- 
missioner, which  embodied  taxation 
of  his  costs,  without  exception  being 
filed  thereto,  the  judgment  became- 
"final"  and  was  not  subject  to  collat- 
eral attack  by  means  of  suit  to  re- 
cover excessive  costs  allegedly  taxed 
by  the  master  commissioner. — Com- 
monwealth, for  Use  and  Benefit  of 
Bouteiller,  v.  Ray,  supra. 

62.  Ark.— Western  Casualty  &  Sure- 
ty €o.  v.  Independent  Ice  Co.,  80- 
S.W.2d  626,  190  Ark.  684. 

La. — In  re  Phoenix  Building  &  Home- 
stead Ass'n,  14  So.2d.447,  203  La. 
565. 

34  C.J.  p  516  note  84. 


403 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


felting  recognizances,68  or  orders  of  restitution  on 
vacating  or  reversing  judgments.64  Even  conflict- 
ing orders  made  by  a  court  of  superior  jurisdiction 
cannot  be  collaterally  attacked  in  a  court  of  in- 
ferior jurisdiction.65 

§  403.    By  Confession  or  on  Consent  or 

Offer 

The  rule  against  collateral  attack  applies  to  Judg- 
ments on  confession  or  by  consent. 

The  rule  against  collateral  attack  applies  to  judg- 
ments entered  on  confession,66  either  in  open  court 


or  under  warrants  of  attorney,67  and  also  to  such  as 
are  rendered  by  consent  of  parties,  as  the  result  of 
a  compromise  or  settlement.68  A  stipulation  for 
judgment  by  a  trustee  in  his  individual  capacity  has 
been  held  not  to  prevent  his  raising  a  question  of 
error  therein  in  his  capacity  as  trustee.69 


§  404. 


By  Default 


A  valid  default  judgment  may  not  be  attacked  col- 
laterally. 

A  judgment  entered  by  default,  the  court  having 
jurisdiction,  is  as  conclusive  against  collateral  im- 


lien 


establishing      attorney's 


Evidence  respecting  contract  be- 
tween plaintiffs  in  execution  and  de- 
fendant, and  respecting  services  ren- 
dered, was  properly  rejected  as  col- 
lateral attack  on  judgment  establish- 
ing attorneys'  lien.—  Dyal  v.  Watson, 
162  S.E.  682,  174  Ga.  3-30. 

63.  Ind.—  Rubush  v.    State,   13  N.E. 
877,  112  Ind.  107. 

Ky.  —  Kelly  v.  Lank,  7  B.Mon.  220. 

64.  Ohio.  —  Hiler   v.    Hiler,    35   Ohio 
St.  645. 

Pa.—  Breading  v,  Blocher,  29  Pa.  347. 

65.  CaL  —  Galvin    v.    Palmer,    66    P. 
572,  134  Cal.  426. 

N.Y.—  Hennessey  v.    Sweeney,   57  N. 

Y.S.  901,  28  N.Y.Civ.Proc.  332. 
34C.J.  p  516  note  37. 

ee.    111.—  Alton  Banking  &  Trust  Co. 

v.   Gray,    259   IlLApp.    20,   affirmed 

179  N.E.  469,  347  111.  99  —  Stead  v. 

Craine,  256  IlLApp.  445. 
ST.J.—  'Fidelity  Realty  Co.  v.  Fidelity 

Corporation    of    New    Jersey,    157 

A.  154,  109  N.J.Eq.  SSI. 
Ohio.  —  State   ex   rel.   Fulton  v.   Sol- 

lars,   7   N.E.2d    818,   54   Ohio   App. 

450. 
Pa.  —  Scheide  v.  Home  Credit  Co.,  162 

A.   321,   107   Pa.  Super.   204  —  Wayne 

v.   International   Shoe   Co.,   18   Pa. 

Dist.  &  Co.  521. 
34  C.J.  p  516  note  -88. 
Void  Judgment 

A  challenge  addressed  to  the  Juris- 
diction of  the  court  to  render  judg- 
ment may  be  advanced  at  any  time 
by  any  party,  including  the  Judg- 
ment debtor  against  whom  a  Judg- 
ment by  confession  has  been  entered. 
—American  Cities  Co.  v.  Stevenson, 
60  N.Y.S.Sd  685. 
617.  Ohio.—  McAllister  v.  Schlemmer 

&  Graber  Co.,  177  N.E.  841.  39  Ohio 

App.  434. 

34  C.J.  p  516  note  89. 
Payment  'before  Judgment 

Since  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  con- 
'  f  ess  judgment  is  founded  on  the  fact 
of  a  present  indebtedness,  on  pay- 
ment the  warrant  fails  and  a  judg- 
ment entered  thereon  would  be  void 
and  subject  to  collateral  attack. 


U.S.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cunning- 
ham, C.C.Ky.,  48  P.  510. 

111.— Rea  v.  Forrest,  88  111.  275. 

Wash.— Cowen  v.  Culp,  166  P.  789, 
97  Wash.  480. 

68.  U.S.— Coggeshall  v.  U.  S.,  C.C. 
A.S.C.,  95  F.2d  986 — Rector  v.  Sun- 
crest  Lumber  Co.,  C.C.A.N.C.,  52 
F.2d  946. 

Ala.— A.  B.  C.  Truck  Lines  v.  Kene- 
mer,  25  So.2d  511. 
C. — Bloedorn  v.  Bloedorn,  76  F.2d 
812,  64  App.D.C.  199,  certiorari  de- 
nied 55  S.Ct  658,  295  U.S.  746,  79 
L.E<L  1691. 

Ga.— Valdosta  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Davis,  122  S.E.  187,  157  Ga.  746. 

. — Pulley  v.  Chicago,  R,  I.  &  P- 
Ry.  Co.,  251  P.  1100,  122  Kan.  269. 

Ky.— Haddix  v.  Walter,  266  S.W.  631, 
205  Ky.  740. 

LA.— Napoleonville  Moss  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Templet,  139  So.  546,  19  La.App. 
61. 

. — Warren  v.  Stanton  County,  15 
N.W.2d  757,  145  Neb.  220. 

N.T. — People  v.  Townsend,  233  N. 
T.S.  632,  133  Misc.  843. 

N.C. — La  Londe  v.  Hubbard,  164  S. 
E.  359,  202  N.C.  771. 

Ohio. — Sponseller  v.  Sponseller,  144 
N.E.  48,  110  Ohio  St  395. 

Tex.— Logan  v.  Mauk,  Civ.App.,  126 
S.W.2d  513,  error  dismissed— Per- 
due v.  Miller,  Civ.App.,  64  S.W.2d 
1002,  error  refused— Posey  v. 
Plains  Pipe  Line  Co.,  Civ.App.,  39 
S.W.2d  1100,  error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  516  note  90. 

An  agreed  Judgment  fixing  bound- 
aries between  certain  lands  was  not 
subject  to  collateral  attack  in  an  ac- 
tion for  alleged  trespass. — Pierce  v. 
Huff.  143  S.W.2d  183,  283  Ky.  753. 

m  condemnation  proceedings 

Where  a  consent  Judgment  in  con- 
demnation suit  recited  that  all  par- 
ties interested  in  tract  of  land  had 
been  served  with  process  and  that 
they  had  agreed  on  a  purchase  price 
and  that  the  United  States  should 
hold  title  to  the  land  free  of  all 
claims  and  judgment  was  signed  by 
attorney  representing  landowners 
the  judgment  was  valid  and  not  sub- 

800 


ject  to  collateral  attack  by  those 
owning  interests  in  land  who  were 
over  twenty-one  years  of  age  at  time 
consent  Judgment  was  entered. — 
Watson  v.  U.  S.,  D.C.N.C.,  «4  F.Supp. 
777. 

Consent  decree,  even  though  of 
interlocutory  nature,  within  purview 
of  pleadings  and  scope  of  Issues  is 
valid  and  binding  on  all  parties  con- 
senting, and  not  open  to  collateral 
attack. — Curry  v.  Curry,  79  F.2d  172, 
65  App.D.C.  47. 

Injunction  decree  entered  by  con- 
sent is  not  subject  to  impeachment  in 
application  to  conditions  then  exist- 
ing.—U.  S.  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  App.D.C., 
52  S.Ot  460,  286  U.S.  106.  76  L.Ed. 
999. 

Judgment  coram  non  Judioa 

Where  a  court  adjudicates  a  mat- 
ter not  embraced  In  issues  as  made 
by  pleadings,  that  part  of  judgment 
is  coram  non  Judice  and  void,  and 
fact  that  judgment  is  by  consent  of 
all  parties  does  not  affect  right  of 
any  of  them  to  dispute  its  validity. 
— Texas  Empire  Pipe  Line  Co.  v. 
Stewart,  App.,  35  S.W.2d  627,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  55  S.W.2d 
283,  331  Mo.  525— Owens  v.  McCleary, 
MO.APP.,  273  S.W.  145. 

A  "Judgment  in  retraadt"  can  be 
attacked  on  grounds  of  mental  In- 
capacity of  plaintiff  only  by  motion 
in  the  cause. — Steele  v.  Beaty,  2  S. 
E.2d  854,  215  N.C.  680— Gibson  v. 
Gordon,  197  S.E.  135,  213  N.C.  666. 

The  void  contractual  provisions  of 
an  agreed  judgment  are  subject  to 
collateral  attack  and  if  judgment  en- 
tered in  state's  suit  to  cancel  oil 
leases  of  university  lands  was  an 
agreed  judgment  and  agreements  ev- 
idenced thereby  were  unenforceable 
because  of  lack  of  authority  of  at- 
torney general  to  bind  state  there- 
by, it  was  immaterial  whether  at- 
tack thereon  was  direct  or  collateral. 
— State  v.  Reagan  County  Purchas- 
ing Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  18S  S.W.2d  128, 
error  refused. 

89.     Conn. — Shaw  v.    Spelke,    147  A. 
675,  110  Conn.  208. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


405 


peachment  as  any  other  form  of  judgment.70  How- 
ever, a  default  judgment,  rendered  by  a  court  not 
having  jurisdiction,  like  any  other  void  judgment, 
is  subject  to  collateral  attack  at  any  time  when  it  is 
sought  to  be  made  the  basis  of  a  right,  where  the 
record  itself  in  such  case  discloses  the  infirmity.71 


§  405.    In  Criminal  Cases 

As  a  general  rule,  the  Judgment  of  a  court  having 
Jurisdiction  of  an  offense  and  of  the  party  charged  with 
Its  commission  is  not  open  to  collateral  attack. 

As  a  general  rule;  the  judgment  of  a  court  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  of  an  offense  and  of  the  party 
charged  with  its  commission  is  not  open  to  collateral 
attack.72  Where,  however,  the  judgment  is  void,73 


70.     Ark. — Banks  v.  Qorning  Bank  & 

Trust  Co.,  68  S.W.2d  452,  188  Ark. 

341,  certiorari  denied  54  S.Ct.  863, 

292  U.S.  653,  78  L.Ed.  1502. 

Cal.— Gray  v.   Hall,   265   P.  246,   20'3 

Cal.  306. 
Colo.— Smith  v.  Smith,  230  P.  597,  76 

Colo.  119. 
Fla.— Ennis  v.  Giblin,  2  So,2d  382,  147 

Fla.   113. 

Idaho. — U.  S.  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 

v.  Soule,  68  P.2d  40,  57  Idaho  691. 

Kan. — Pattison      v.      Kansas      State 

Bank,   247  P.   643,   121  Kan.  471. 
Ky. — Perry  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Miller, 

25   S.W.2d  35,   233  Ky.  148. 
Neb.-rScheumann  v.   Prudential  Ins. 
Co.  'of  America,  19  N.W.2d  48,  146 
Neb.  173. 

N.Y.— Pape  v.  Red  Cab  Mut.  Casual- 
ty   Co.,   219   N.Y.S.    135,   128   Misc. 
456. 
N.D. — Erker    v.    Delchert,    222    N.W. 

615,  57  N.-D.  474. 
34  C.J.  p  516  note  91. 
Default  judgment  against  partners 
Where  partnership,  as  maker,  and 
firm  members,  as  accommodation  in- 
dorsee or  sureties,  were  sued  joint- 
ly on  firm  note,  indorsed  by  members, 
and  where  some  members  filed  -pleas 
and  answers,  but  none  were  filed  by 
firm  an<3t  other  accommodation  in- 
dorsers  or  sureties,  and  case  was 
marked  in  default  as  to  firm  and  lat- 
ter sureties,  and  where  verdict  and 
judgment  were  rendered  against 
members  filing  no  pleas  or  answers, 
but  no  judgment  was  rendered 
against  firm,  judgment  against  such 
members  was  not  void,  and  was  not 
subject  to  collateral  attack  by  one  of 
defendants  thereto,  In  petition  to  re- 
strain sheriff  and  one  claiming  un- 
der purchaser  of  his  land  under  such 
judgment  from  interfering  with  his 
possession  thereof. — Burson  v. 
Shields,  129  S.E.  22,  160  Ga.  723. 
71*  U.S. — Commonwealth  of  Ken- 
tucky, for  Use  and  Benefit  of  Kern 
v.  Maryland  Casualty  Co.  of  Balti- 
more, Md.,  C.C.A.Ky.,  112  F.2d  352. 
34  C.J.  p  516  note  92. 
Becord  in  default  oases 

When  defendant  has  defaulted  the 
judgment  roll  ordinarily  includes  the 
complaint,  summons,  affidavit  of 
service,  memorandum  of  defendant's 
default  indorsed  on  the  complaint, 
and  the  judgment — Petition  of  Fur- 
ness,  '218  P.  61,  62  Cal.App.  753. 
72.  U.S.— Bo  wen  v.  Johnston,  59  S. 
Ct  442,  306  U.S.  19,  83  L.Bd.  455— 

49  O.J.S.— 51 


Lucas  v.  Sanford,  C.C.A.'G-a.,  145 
F.2d  229— Northwestern  Oil  Co.  v. 
Socony- Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  C.C.A.Wis., 
138  'F.2d  967,  certiorari  denied  64 
S.Ct  790,  321  U.S.  792,  88  L.Ed. 
1081 — Price  v.  Johnston,  C.C.A.Cal., 
125  -F.2d  806,  certiorari  denied  62 
•S.Ct  1106,  316  U.S.  677,  86  L.Ed. 
1750,  rehearing  denied  62  S.Ct 
1289,  316  U.S.  712,  86  L.Bd.  1777— 
Forthoffer  v.  Swope,  CLC.A.Wash., 
10'3  F.2d  707— In  re  Tinkoff,  C.C.A. 
111.,  95  F.2d  651,  certiorari  denied 
Ex  parte  Tinkoff,  58  S.Ct  1049,  304 
U.S.  573,  82  L.Ed.  1538,  rehearing 
denied  59  S.Ct  249,  305  U.S.  675, 
S3  L.Bd.  437— Aderhold  v.  Soileau, 
C.C.A.Ga.,  67  'F.2d  259— Bledsoe  v. 
Johnston,  D.C.Cal.,  58  'F.Supp.  129 
— Barnsdall  Refining  Corporation 
v.  Birnamwood  Oil  Co.,  D.C.Wis.f 
32  F.Supp.  308. 

Ala.— State  v.  Riddle,  105  So.  259, 
•213  Ala.  430— Grayson  v.  State,  182 
So.  579,  28  Ala.App.  210— James  v. 
State,  181  So.  709,  28  Ala.App.  225. 

Cal.— People  v.  Titus,  259  P.  465,  85 
CaLApp.  41'3. 

Colo.— Smith  v.  Phelps,  28  P.2d  1004, 
94  Qolo.  "33— Marchi  v.  People,  224 
P.  1053,  75  Colo.  254. 

D.C.— Bowles  v.  -Laws,  45  F:2d  669, 
59  App.D.O.  399,  certiorari  denied 
51  S.Ct  488,  283  U.S.  841,  75  L.Ed. 
1452. 

Ga, — Kinman  v.  Clark,  195  S.B.  166, 
185  Ga.  338— Wells  v.  Pridgen,  114 
S.B.  355,  154  Ga.  397. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Kerner  v.  Hunter, 
17  N.E.2d  29,  369  111.  427— People 
v.  Allen,  14  N.B.2d  397,  '368  111.  368, 
certiorari  denied  Allen  v.  People 
of  State  of  Illinois,  -60  S.Ct  132, 
308  U.S.  511,  -84  L.Ed.  436— People 
ex  rel.  Courtney  v.  Thompson,  192 
N.E.  693,  358  111.  81. 

Ind.— Kunkel  v.  Moneyhon,  17  N.E.Sd 
82,  214  Ind.  606. 

Kan. — Brockway  v.  Wagner,  268  P. 
96,  126  Kan.  285. 

Mich. — Kougoulas  v.  Sorlas,  233  N.W. 
414,  252  Mich.  557— Turbessi  v, 
Oliver  Iron  Mining  Co.,  229  N.W. 
454,  250  Mich.  110,  69  A.L.R.  1059. 

Okl.— Morgan  v.  State,  90  P.2d  683, 
66  OkLCr.  "205. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Capos  v. 
Clatsop  County,  25  P.2d,903,  907, 
144  Or.  510,  90  A.L.R.  289. 

Pa.— in  re  Moskowitz,  196  A.  498, 
329  Pa.  183 — Commonwealth  v, 
Cauffiel,  148  A.  -311,  298  Pa.  319. 

Teac.— Pridemore      v.      San     Angelo 

801 


Standard,  .Qiv.APp.,  164  S.W.2d  859, 
error  refused — Xiitchfleld  v.  State, 
179  S.W.2d  507,  147  Tex.Cr.  201— 
Lutz  v.  State,  176  S.W.2d  317,  146 
Tex.Cr.  503 — Bx  parte  Brown,  165 
•S.W.2d  718,  145  TexXJr.  39— Toone 
V.  State,  161  S.W.2d  90,  144  Tex.Cr. 
98 — Ex  parte  Seymour,  1-28  S.W. 
2d  46,  137  Tex.Cr.  103 — Ex  parte 
Butler,  31  S.W.2d  827,  116  Teac.Cr. 
134. 

Va.— Eagle,  Star  and  British  Domin- 
ions  Ins.    Co.    v.   Heller,    140    S.E. 
314,  149  Va.  S2,  57  A.X..R.  490. 
Wash.— State  v.  -Lindsey,   272   P.   72, 

150  Wash.  121. 
34  C.J.  p  517  note  9'8. 
Habeas   corpus  as   collateral   attack 

see  Habeas  Corpus  §  26. 
Sentence  on  record  of  court  control- 
ling" 

As  against  a  claim  of  variance  be- 
tween a  commitment  and  the  sen- 
tence as  orally  pronounced,  the  only 
sentence  known  to  law  is  the  sen- 
tence or  judgment  entered  on  rec- 
ords of  court,  and,  if  entry  Is  inac- 
curate, there  is  remedy  by  motion 
to  correct  it,  but  judgment  imports 
verity  when  collaterally  assailed. — 
Hill  v.  U.,S.  ex  rel.  Wampler,  Pa,,  56 
act.  760,  298  U.-S.  460,  80  L.Bd.  1283 
— U.  S.  v.  Rollnick,  D.C.Pa.,  'SS  F. 
Supp.  863. 
Nolle  prosequi 

Record^  judgment  docket  in  county 
recorder's  court  showing  a  nolle 
prosequi  has  been  held  not  impeach- 
able  collaterally  by  parol  evidence  of 
defendant's  indictment  and  judge's 
disposition  of  case  therein  on  subse- 
quent superior  court  trial  for  same 
offense. — State  v.  Norris,  173  S.B.  14, 

6  N.C.  191. 
Suspension  of  sentence  and  probation 
Where  owner  of  vessel  took  vessel 
from  lien  claimant  and  on  complaint 
of  lien  claimant  was  convicted  of 
grand  theft,  sentence  for  which  was 
suspended  and  (probation  granted, 
owner's  subsequent  action  for  declar- 
atory relief  to  determine  whether 
such  lien  existed  was  not  barred  as 
a  "collateral  attack"  on  a  judgment 
which  had  become  final  by  reason  of 
failure  to  appeal,  since  on  suspen- 
sion of  sentence  and  granting  of  pro- 
bation there  could  be  no  final  judg- 
ment and  an  appeal  was  precluded. — 
Balestreiri  v.  Arques,  122  P.2d  277, 
49  €al.App.2d  £64. 

73.     m. — People   v.    Buffo,    149   N.E, 
271,  318  111.  380. 


§  406 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


or  rendered  tinder  an  unconstitutional  statute74  ot 
by  a  court  wholly  unauthorized  by  law,75  it  is  a 
nuflity,  and  as  such  may  be  collaterally  assailed. 
A  collateral  attack  may  be  made  in  a  criminal  case 
when  its  purpose  is  to  punish  a  crime  committed  by 
means  of  the  decree,  judgment,  or  record  collat- 
erally attacked.76 

§  406.    Judgments  and  Orders  in  Spe- 
cial Proceedings 

Judgments    and    orders    in    special    proceedings    are 
within  the  rule  prohibiting  collateral   attack. 

The  rule  against  collateral  attack  applies  to  or- 
ders and  judgments  made  by  the  courts  in  special 
proceedings  taken  before  them,  although  not  in  the 
nature  of  contested  actions,  or  purely  ex  parte,  pro- 
vided the  matter  involves  a  judicial  determination 
and  carries  the  sanction  of  the  court's  authority.77 

§  407.    Judgments  of  Particular  Courts 

or  Tribunals 

a.  In  general 

b.  Probate  courts 

c.  Coordinate  courts 

d.  Boards  and  officers  acting  judicially 


a.  In  General 

The    rule   against   collateral    attack   applies   to   valid 
Judgments  of  courts  of  limited  or  inferior  jurisdiction. 

A  domestic  judgment  rendered  by  a  court  of  in- 
ferior jurisdiction  is  not  open  to  collateral  attack 
when  the  facts  requisite  to  confer  jurisdiction  ap- 
pear affirmatively  on  the  face  of  the  proceeding,78 
but  if  the  facts  do  not  so  appear  it  may  be  attacked 
collaterally.79  These  rules  apply  to  judgments  ren- 
dered by  justices  of  the  peace,  as  discussed  in  the 
CJ.S.  title  Justices  of  the  Peace  §  US,  also  35  CJ. 
p  684  note  33-p  687  note  67,  or  on  appeal  from,80  or 
founded  on,81  judgments  of  inferior  courts.  By 
statute  it  is  often  provided  that  on  the  filing  of  a 
transcript  of  a  judgment  of  a  magistrate  or  justice 
of  the  peace,  the  judgment  shall  become  a  judgment 
of  the  higher  court,  and  in  such  a  case  it  is  not  open 
to  collateral  attack  if  valid  on  its  face.82 

Absence  of  provision  for  review.  Some  cases 
hold  that,  when  no  appeal  or  other  form  of  review 
is  provided  for,  the  judgments  of  inferior  courts 
may  be  assailed  collaterally  ;83  but  there  is  also  au- 
thority to  the  contrary.84 


Pa.— In  re  Moskowitz,  196  A.  498,  329 

Pa,  183. 
Tex. — Ex    parte  /Brown,    165    S.W.2d 

718,  145  Tex.Cr.  39. 
34  C.J.  p  517  note  99. 

The  judgment  of  a  police  court 
convicting"  a  child  under  sixteen 
years  of  age  is  open  to  collateral  at- 
tack for  lack  of  jurisdiction  and  the 
absence  of  jurisdiction  may  be  shown 
by  extrinsic  evidence.— Ex  parte 
Swehla,  220  P.  299,  114  Kan.  712. 

74.  N.J.— Ex  parte  Rose,  6  A.2d  ESS, 
122    N.J.Law   507,   followed   in   Ex 
parte  Miller,   6   JL2d  389,   122  N.J. 
Law  511  and  Ex  parte  Sterling,   6 
A.2d  390,   122  N.J.Law  S10. 

34  C.  J.  «p  517  note  1. 

75.  'Fla. — McDonald  v.  Smith,  66  So. 
430,  68  Fla.  77. 

76.  U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Bradford,  C.C.La., 
148  F.  413,  affirmed  152  F.  616,  81 
C.C.A.   606,   certiorari  denied  27  S. 
Ct.  795,  208  U.S.  563,  51  L.Ed.  1190. 

77.  Cal. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pe- 
tition of  Header,  89  P.2d  654,  656, 
32  Cal.App.2d  309. 

34  C.J.  p  517  note  4. 

Judgments  or  orders  to  which  rule 

has  been  applied 
(1)  Judgment  appointing  justice  of 

peace. 

Ark. — Adams  v.  Van  Buren  County, 
139  S.W.2d  9,  200  Ark.  269. 

Mo. — state  ex  reL  General  Motors 
Acceptance  Corporation  v.  Brown, 
48  S.W.-2d  «57,  330  Mo.  220— Bul- 
lock v.  B.  JL  Electric  Supply  Co., 
60  S.W.2d  733,  227  Mo.App.  1010. 


(2)  Judgment  in  a  mandamus  case. 
Mich.— Brachman   v.   Hyman,   299   N. 

W.  101,  298  Mich.  344. 
N.T. — Congregation  Anshe  Sefard  of 
Keap  Street  v.  Title  Guarantee  & 
Trust  Co.,  50  N.E.2d  534,  291  N.T. 
35,  148  A.'L.R.  647,  motion  denied 
51  N.E.2d  939,  291  N.T.  669. 

(3)  Other  judgments   or  orders. 
Ga. — Bradley    v.    Simpson,    2    S.E.2d 

238,    59    Ga.App.    844,    reversed    on 
other  grounds  -Sim-pson  v.  Bradley, 

5  S.E.2d  893,  189  Ga.  316,  mandate 
conformed  to  Bradley  v.  Simpson, 

6  S.E.2d  424,  61  Ga.App.  495,  cer- 
tiorari denied  60  S.Ct.  1105,  310  U. 
S.  643,  84  L.Ed.  1410,  rehearing  de- 
nied 61   S.Ct.   56,   311  U.S.   725,   85 
L.Ed.  472. 

Ky. — Lippold  v.  Hagner,  10  S.W.2d 
619,  226  Ky.  103. 

Mo. — State  ex  inf.  Mansur  v.  Huff- 
man, 2  S.W.2d  582,  318  Mo.  991. 

Pa. — Edwards  v.  Prutzman,  165  A. 
255,  108  Pa.Super.  184. 

Tex. — Shaw  v.  Strong,  96  S.W.2d  27£, 
128  Tex.  65— Trozzi  v.  McColl,  Civ. 
App.,  276  S.W.  961. 

34  C.J.  p  517  note  4  [a]. 

78.    FUu — Corpus      Juris      cited     in, 

Crosby   v.    Burleson,    195    So.    202, 

142  Fla.  443. 
N.J.— Mangani  v.  Hydro,  Inc.,  194  A. 

264,  119  N^T.Law  71. 
Or. — Corpus   Juris   cited   in   McLean 

v.    Sanders,    23    P.2d   321,    322,    143 

Or.  524. 
Va.— Kiser  v.  W.  M.  Ritter  Lumber 

Co.,   18   S.B.2d  319,.  179  Va.   128. 

802 


W.Va. — State  v.  Thompson,  130  S.E. 

456,  100  W.Va.  253. 
34  C.J.  p  517  note  5. 
Particular  courts  within,  rule 

(1)  United    States   district    courts. 
—Sells    v.    Jones,    9    So.2d    160,    151 
Fla.  38. 

(2)  Land  court. 

Ky. — Givens  v.   U.   S.   Trust  Co.,    65 

S.W.2d  682,  251  Ky.  587. 
Mass.— Bell  v.  Eames,  39  N.E.2d  582, 

310  Mass.   642. 
Okl. — Pennington  Grocery  Co.  v.  Ortr 

wein,  88  P.2d  331,  184  Okl.  501. 

79.  Colo. — In  re  Zupancis'  Heirship, 
111   P.2d   1063,   107  Colo.   323. 

Fla,— Krivitsky  v.  Nye,  19  So.2d  563, 
155  Fla.  45— State  ex  rel.  Everette 
v.  Petteway,  179  So.  666,  131  Fla. 
516. 

34  C.J.  p  518  note  6. 

80.  Cal.— Breeze   v.    Ayres,    49    Gal. 
208. 

34  C.J.  p  518  note  8. 

81.  Cal'.— Moore   v.   Martin,   38   Cal. 
428. 

82.  111. — Toung   v.    Zacher,    80    N.E. 
945,  226  111.  327. 

B.C. — Love  v.  Dorman,  ,74  S.E.  829, 
91  S.C.  384. 

83.  N.T. — Wilcox  v.  Supreme  Coun- 
cil R.  A.,  136  N.T.S.  377,  151  App. 
Div.  297,  affirmed  104  N.E.  624,  210 
N.T.    370,    52    L.R.A.,N.S.,    806. 

34  C.J.  p  518  note  12. 

84.  Cal. — Lucey  v.  Municipal  Court 
of  City  of  Los  Angeles,   150  P.2d 
549,  65  CaLApp.2d  228. 

34  C.J.  p  518  note  13, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  407 


b.  Probate  Courts 

Orders  and  decrees  of  courts  having  probate  Juris- 
diction in  any  cas.e  in  which  Jurisdiction  has  attached 
generally  are  not  open  to  contradiction  or  regxami nation 
in  any  collateral  proceeding. 


Orders  and  decrees  of  courts  having  probate  ju- 
risdiction, in  any  case  in  which  jurisdiction  has  at- 
tached generally  are  not  open  to  contradiction  or 
reexamination  in  any  collateral  proceeding,85  al- 


85.  U.S. — Harlan  v.  Sparks,  C.C.A. 
N.M.,  125  P.2d  502— Stuart  v.  Tapp, 
C.C.A.Okl.,  81  F.2d  155— Palmer  v. 
Palmer,  D.C.Conn,,  31  F.Supp.  861. 

Ala. — Cassady  v.  Davis,  15  So.2d 
909,  245  Ala.  93— Venable  v.  Tur- 
ner, 183  So.  644,  236  Ala.  483— 
Albright  v.  Creel,  182  So.  10,  236 
Ala.  286 — Montgomery  v.  Ham- 
mond, 153  So.  654,  228  Ala.  449— 
Ex  parte  Wilkinson,  126  So.  102, 
220  Ala.  '529. 

Ark.— Reed  v.  Putrall,  115  S.W.2d 
542,  195  Ark.  1044— Levinson  v. 
Treadway,  78  S.W.2d  59,  190  Ark. 
201 — Branch  v.  Veterans'  Admin- 
istration, 74  S.W.2d  800,  189  Ark. 
662— Sewell  v.  Reed,  71  S.W.2d  191, 
189  Ark.  -50 — Sullivan  v.  Times 
Pub.  Co.,  24  S.W.2d  865,  181  Ark. 
27 — Sharum  v.  Meriwether,  246 
S.W.  501,  156  Ark.  331. 

CaL— In  re  Keet's  Estate,  100  P.2d 
1045,  15  Cal.2d  328— Texas  Co.  v. 
Bank  of  America  Nat  Trust  & 
Savings  Ass'n,  53  P.2d  127,  5  Cal. 
2d  35— Wood  v.  Roach,  14  P.2d 

170,  125  CaLApp.  631. 

Fla. — Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Crosby 
v.  Burleson,  195  So.  202,  207,  142 
Fla.  443. 

Ga. — Beavers  v.  Williams,  23   S.B.2d 

171,  194  Ga.  875— Zeagler  v.  Zeag- 
ler,    15    S.B.2d    478,    192   Ga,   453— 
Scarborough  v.  Long,  197  S.B.  796, 
186    Ga.    412,    certiorari   denied   59 
S.Ct    107,    305    U.S.    637,    83   L,Ed. 
410 — Murphy  v.  Hunt,  App.,  37  S. 
B.2d  823— Davis  v.  Tyson,  4  S.B.2d 
704,  60  Ga.App.  714. 

Idaho. — Horn  v.  Cornwall,  139  P.2d 
757,  65  Idaho  115— Penn  Mut.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Beauchamp,  66  P.2d 
1020,  57  Idaho  530— Short  v. 
Thompson,  55  P.2d  163,  56  Idaho 
361 — Knowles  v.  Kasiska,  268  P. 
3,  46  Idaho  379 — Larsen  v.  Larsen, 
256  P.  369,  44  Idaho  211. 

111.— Healea  v.  Verne,  175  N.B.  562, 
343  111.  325. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ander- 
son v.  Schwitzer,  20  N.W.2d  67,  71 
— Atkin  v.  Westfall,  17  N.W.2d 
532,  235  Iowa  618— Gibbs  v.  Beck- 
ett, 295  N.W.  165,  229  Iowa  619— 
Reidy  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry,  Co., 
249  N.W.  347,  216  Iowa  415. 

Me.— In  re  Roukos'  Bstate,  35  A.2d 
861,  140  Me.  183— Neely  v.  Ha- 
vana Electric  Ry.  Co.,  10  A.2d  358, 
136  Me.  352— Hines  v.  Ayotte,  189 
A.  835,  135  Me.  103 — Chaplin  v. 
National  Surety  Corporation,  185 
A.  516,  134  Me.  496— Goodwin  v. 
Boutin,  155  A.  738,  130  Me.  322. 

Mass.— Wilbur  v.  Hallett,  26  N.E.2d 
322,  ,305  Mass.  554— Lee  v.  Wood, 
181  N.E,  229,  279  Mass.  293— 


Brackett  v.  Fuller,  180  N.B.  664, 
279  Mass.  62 — Healy  v.  Granahan, 
175  N.B.  735,  275  Mass.  338— 
Judge  v.  National  Sec.  Bank  of 
Boston,  172  N.B.  76,  272  Mass.  286 
— Farquhar  v.  New  England  Trust 
Co.,  158  N.B.  836,  261  Mass.  209. 

Mich.— In  re  Ives,  23  N.W.2d  131, 
314  Mich.  690— Dodge  v.  Detroit 
Trust  Co.,  2  N.W.2d  509,  300  Mich. 
575— Heap  v.  Heap,  242  N.W.  252, 
258  Mich.  250— Dudex  v.  Sterling 
Brick  Co.,  212  N.W.  92,  237  Mich. 
470. 

Minn. — Brotton  v.  Donovan,  224  N. 
W.  270,  177  Minn.  34— De  Wolf  v. 
Bricson,  220  N.W.  406,  175  Minn. 
68 — State  v.  Freeman,  210  N.W. 
14,  168  Minn.  374. 

Mo. — In  re  Sheldon's  Bstate,  189  S. 
W.2d  235— Linville  v.  Ripley,  146 
S.W.2d  581,  347  Mo.  95— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Blattel  v.  Stallings, 
142  S.W.2d  9,  13,  346  Mo.  450— 
Sheehan  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  140 
S.W.2d  1,  346  Mo.  227— Jones  v. 
Peterson,  72  S.W.2d  76,  335  Mo. 
242— Hidden  v.  Edwards,  285  S.W. 
462,  313  Mo.  642— Viehmann  v. 
Viehmann,  250  S.W.  565,  298  Mo. 
356 — Citizens'  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Moore,  263  S.W.  530,  215  Mo. 
App.  21. 

Neb.— Mead  Co.  v.  Doerfler,  18  N.W. 
2d  524,  146  Neb.  2— In  re  Robinson 
Heirship,  228  N.W.  852,  119  Neb. 
285,  followed  in  In  re  Clark,  228 
N.W.  858,  119  Neb.  306. 

N.J. — The  Ordinary  of  New  Jersey  v. 
Webb,  170  A.  672,  112  N.J.Law  395 
— Charles  Wiener  &  Sons  v.  Fisch- 
er, 179  A.  632,  118  N.J.Ba.  387. 

N.M. — Ware  v.  Farmers'  Nat.  Bank 
of  Danville,  24  P.2d  269,  37  N.M. 
415. 

N.T.— Fisher  v.  Fisher,  170  N.B.  912, 

253  N.T.   260,   69  A.L.R.   918. 
Ohio. — State  ex  rel.  Young  v.   Mor- 
row,   2    N.E.2d    595,    131    Ohio    St. 
266— Gibbons    v.   Daykin,    App.,    37 
N.B.2d  389— Reitz  v.  Smith,  10  N. 
B.2d  150,  56  Ohio  App.  72. 

Okl. — Petroleum  Auditors  Ass'n  v. 
Landis,  77  P.2d  730,  182  Okl.  297— 
Calkin  v.  Wolcott,  77  P.2d  96,  182 
Okl.  278— Flynn  v.  Vanderslice,  44 
P.2d  967,  172  Okl.  320— Baird  v. 
Patterson,  44  P.2d  90,  172  Okl. 
158— Harrison  v.  Orwig,  299  P.  143, 
149  Okl.  54— Stevens  v.  Dill,  285  P. 
845,  142  Okl.  138— Dill  v.  Stevens, 
284  P.  60,  141  OkL  24— Manuel  v. 
Kidd,  258  P.  732,  126  Okl.  71— 
Dill  v.  Anderson,  256  P.  31,  124 
Okl.  299— McNaughton  v.  Lewis, 

254  P.    972,    124    Okl.    181— Cum- 
mings   v.    Inman,    247   P.    379,    119 
Okl.    9 — Johnson   v.    Petty,    246   P. 

803 


848,  118  Okl.  178— O'Neill  v.  Cun- 
ningham, 244  P.  444,  119  Okl.  157 
— Gallaghar  v.  Petree,  230  P.  477, 
103  Okl.  295— Tiger  v.  Drumright, 
217  P.  453,  95  Okl.  174,  certiorari 
denied  44  S.Ct  452,  264  U.S.  592, 
68  L.Ed.  865,  and  error  dismissed 
45  S.Ct.  350,  267  U.S.  578,  69  L.Ed. 
797— Bowling  v.  Merry,  217  P.  404, 
91  Okl.  176— In  re  Green's  Estate, 
196  P.  128,  80  Okl.  256. 

Or.— Wilson  v.  Hendricks,  102  P.2d 
714,  164  Or.  486. 

Pa. — In  re  Tourison's  Estate,  184  A. 
95,  321  Pa.  299— Swartz  v.  Crum, 
167  A.  414,  110  Pa.Super.  102. 

S.D.— Higgins  v.  Higgins,  20  N.W.2d 
523 — In  re  ReQua's  Estate,  18  N. 
W.2d  791. 

Tenn. — Shelby  County  v.  Anderson, 
10  Tenn.App.  437. 

Teac.-rDallas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 
of  Dallas  v.  Forsyth,  109  S.W.2d 
1046,  130  Tex.  563,  rehearing  de- 
nied 112  S.W.2d  173,  130  Tex.  563— 
Sloan  v.  Woods,  Com.App.,  25  S.W. 
2d  309 — Hannon  v.  Henson,  Com. 
App.,  15  S.W.2d  579— Moore  v. 
Wooten,  Com.App.,  280  S.W.  742, 
rehearing  denied  283  S.W.  153 — 
Barker  v.  Graham,  Civ. App.,  149  S. 
W.2d  316 — Lipscomb  v.  Lofland, 
Civ.App.,  141  S.W.2d  983,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Loew- 
enstein  v.  Watts,  Civ.App.,  119  S. 
W.2d  176,  affirmed  137  S.W.2d  2, 
134  Tex  660,  128  A.L.R.  910— 
White  v.  Baker,  Civ.App.,  118  S.W.. 
2d  319— McLeod  v.  Carroll,  Civ. 
App.,  109  S.W.2d  316,  affirmed  Car- 
roll v.  McLeod,  130  S.W.2d  277, 
133  Tex.  571— Reed  v.  Harlan,  Civ, 
App.,  103  S.W.2d  236,  error  refused 
— Rodden  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  95 
S.W.2d  997 — Armstrong  v.  Ander- 
son, Civ.App.,  91  S.W.2d  775,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  Anderson 
v.  Armstrong,  120  S.W.2d  444,  132 
Tex.  122,  rehearing  denied  132  S. 
W.2d  393,  132  Tex.  122— Kreis  v. 
Kreis,  Civ.App.,  36  S.W.2d  821,  er- 
ror dismissed — Askey  v.  Power, 
Civ.App.,  58  S.W.2d  1041,  affirmed 
94  S.W.2d  13ff,  127  Tex.  335— Math- 
ews  v.  Myers,  Civ.App.,  42  S.W.2d 
1099— Dial  v.  Martin,  Civ.App.,  37 
S.W.2d  166,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  Martin  v.  Dial,  Com.App., 
57  S.W.2d  75,  89  A.L.R.  571— Kreis 
v.  Kreis,  Civ.App.,  36  S.W.2d  821, 
error  dismissed — Tannery  v.  Pirtle, 
Civ.App.,  19  S.W.2d  862— Paschal 
v.  Hobby,  Civ.App.,  296  S.W.  336, 
reversed  in  part  on  other  grounds 
and  affirmed  In  part  Smith  v.  Pas- 
chal, Com. App.,  1  S.W.2d  1086,  re- 
hearing denied  5  S.W.2d  135— Mc- 
Grady  v.  Clary,  Civ.App.,  247  S.W. 
1099. 


§  407 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


though  their  decrees  have  been  held,  in  at  least  one 
jurisdiction,  not  conclusive  as  to  the  fact  of  juris- 
diction.8^ The  general  rule  applies,  for  example,  to 
decrees  of  partition  made  by  a  probate  court  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  for  that  purpose,87  to  an  order  of 
sale,88  and  to  judgments  determining  inheritance 
taxes.80  On  the  other  hand,  since  the  jurisdiction 
of  probate  courts  is  confined  to  particular  matters, 
if  it  affirmatively  appears  that  the  jurisdictional 
facts  did  not  exist,  their  decrees  are  subject  to  col- 
lateral attack.90  The  general  principle  that  decrees 
of  a  probate  court  are  not  subject  to  collateral  at- 
tack should  not  be  stretched  to  the  extent  of  fur- 
nishing a  shield  to  one  who,  without  actual  or  con- 
structive notice  to  anyone  in  interest,  fraudulently 
obtains  a  decree  for  the  purpose  of  swindling  an 
estate.91 


c.  Coordinate  Courts 

Decisions  In  courts  of  law  may  not  be  collaterally 
attacked  In  courts  of  equity,  and  vice  versa. 

A  judgment  at  law  may  not  be  impeached  collat- 
erally in  a  court  of  equity,02  nor  can  the  validity  of 
a  decree  rendered  by  a  court  of  equity  be  impeached 
in  a  collateral  action  at  law.03  The  effect  of  state 
judgments  in  federal  courts  and  that  of  federal 
judgments  in  state  courts  are  discussed  infra  §§ 
900,  901, 

d.  Boards  and  Officers  Acting  Judicially 

The  rule  against  collateral  attack  applies  to  deci- 
sions of  state  and  county  or  municipal  boards  and  offi- 
cers acting  judicially. 

The  rule  against  collateral  impeachment  of  judi- 
cial decisions  applies  to  the  determinations  of  state 
and  county  officers  or  boards  of  officers,  who,  al- 
though not  constituting  a  court,  are  called  on  to 
act  judicially  in  matters  of  administration,94  such 


Va, — Denny  v.  Searles,  143  S.R  484, 
150  Va,  701. 

Wash. — Federal  Land  Bank  of  Spo- 
kane v.  Schidleman,  75  P.2d  1010, 
193  Wash.  435. 

34  C.J.  p  S18  note  14—15  C.J.  p  1021 
note  82. 

Statutory  and  limited  Jurisdiction, 

Where  jurisdiction  to  set  aside  ex- 
emptions to  widow  in  the  absence  of 
administration  is  statutory  and  lim- 
ited, the  probate  court's  judgments 
and  decrees  in  such  a  case  ere  un- 
impeachable only  where  the  court 
proceeds  to  final  decree  in  accord- 
ance with  provisions  of  statute. — 
Dake  v.  Inglis,  194  So.  673,  239  Ala. 
241. 

Proceeding*  in  rem 

Where  petition  was  sufficient  to 
invoke  statutory  jurisdiction  of  pro- 
bate court  and  proceeding  was  in 
rem,  no  subsequent  errors  or  irregu- 
larities are  available  on  collateral 
attack.— Bedwell  v.  Dean,  132  So.  20, 
222  Ala.  276. 

Foreclosure 

Probate  court  having  acquired  ju- 
risdiction of  decedent's  estate,  par- 
ties, and  subject  matter,  its  order 
authorizing  executrix  to  mortgage 
specified  realty  for  expense  of  alter- 
ation and  repair  could  not  be  col- 
laterally attacked  by  decedent's  heirs 
intervening  in  action  to  foreclose 
mortgage,  interveners'  remedy  being 
by  appeal  from  order,  or  by  mo- 
tion or  other  proceeding  in  probate 
court  to  have  order  set  aside. — 
Walker  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Steely, 
84  P.2d  56,  54  Idaho  591. 

In  suit  for  specific  performance  of 
agreement  to  purchase  realty,  to 
which  plaintiff  derived  title  under 
residuary  clause  of  will,  it  was  not 


open  to  defendant  to  object  that 
payments  of  unpaid  balance  of  lega- 
cy therein  to  deceased  legatee's 
heirs,  as  shown  by  executors'  ac- 
counts, allowed  without  objection  by 
probate  court  decrees  not  appealed 
from  or  sought  to  be  opened,  were 
not  properly  made  in  satisfaction 
of  such  legacy. — Mahoney  v.  Noll- 
man,  35  N.E.2d  265,  309  Mass.  522. 

Suit  for  attorney's  fee* 

Order  and  judgment  of  probate 
court,  in  which  estate  was  being 
probated,  authorizing  employment  of 
attorneys  to  protect  interest  of  es- 
tate could  not  be  collaterally  attack- 
ed in  attorney's  suit  for  fees  for 
services  rendered  estate,  on  ground 
that  probate  court  did  not  have  au- 
thority prior  to  rendering  of  services 
to  determine  whether  services  were 
necessary.— Bearden  v.  McParlane, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  103  S.W.2d  392,  error 
dismissed. 

86.    Conn.— Lewis  v.  Klingberg,   123 
A.  4,  100  Conn.  201. 

United  Jurisdiction, 

Probate  courts  are  courts  of  lim- 
ited jurisdiction  and  on  application 
for  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  regarding 
custody  of  a  minor,  refusing  an  of- 
fer of  proof  that  minor  was  an  il- 
legitimate child,  having  a  living 
mother,  that  the  decree  of  the  pro- 
bate court  appointing  respondent 
guardian  of  minor's  person  was 
made  without  notice  to  the  mother 
and  without  proceedings  to  remove 
the  mother  as  guardian,  as  required 
by  statute  and  that  it  was  void  for 
want  of  jurisdiction,  was  error,  since 
the  decree  of  the  probate  court  was 
not  conclusive  and  could  be  attacked 
collaterally.— Lewis  v.  Klingberg, 
supra, 

804 


87.  Mich. — Scripps  Corp.  v.  Parkin* 
son,  153  N.W.  29,  186  Mich.  663. 

34  C.J.  p  519  note  15 — 17  C,J.  p  438 
note  88. 

88.  Mo.— Linville  v.   Ripley,   146   S. 
W.2d  581,  347  Mo.  95. 

89.  Wis.— Beck  v.    State,    219    N.W. 
197,  196  Wis.  242  and  Beck  v.  Mil- 
waukee County,  219  NVW.  205,  196 
Wis.  259,  certiorari  denied  Beck  v. 
Milwaukee  County,   Wis.,   49    S.Ct. 
34,  278  U.S.  639,  73  L.Bd.  554. 

OO.  Idaho. — Moyes  v.  Moyes,  94  P. 
2d  782,  60  Idaho  601. 

Mo. — Viehmann  v.  Viehmann,  250  S. 
W.  565,  298  Mo.  356— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in,  In  re  Main's  Estate,  App., 
152  S.W.2d  696,  700. 

N.T. — Jones  v.  R.  Toung  Bros.  Lum- 
ber Co.,  45  N.T.S.2d  308,  180  Misc. 
565. 

Tex.— Buss  v.  Smith,  Civ.App.,  125  S. 
W.2d  712,  affirmed  Smith  v.  Buss, 
144  S.W.2d  529,  135  Tex.  566— Cline 
v.  NIblo,  286  S.W.  298,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  Com.App.,  292  S.W. 
178,  modified  on  other  grounds  8 
S.W.2d  633,  117  Tex.  474,  66  A.L.R. 
916. 

Vt. — Probate  Court,  District  of  La- 
moile,  v.  American  Fidelity  Co., 
35  A.2d  495,  113  Vt.  -418. 

34  C.J.  p  519  note  16. 

91.  Mass. — Commonwealth  v.  Aron- 
son,  44  N.E.2d  679,  312  Mass.  347. 

92.  N.J.— Delling  v.  Bill,  108  A.  761, 
91  NJT.Eq.  213. 

34  C.J.  p  519  note  17. 

93.  U.S.— Bryan    v.    Kennett,    Mo., 
5   S.Ct.  407,  113  U.S.  179,  28  I*Ed. 
908. 

34  C.J.  p  519  note  18. 

94.  Ala. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Grayson   v.    Schwab,    179    So.    377, 
380,  235  Ala.  398. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


408 


as  statutory  boards  of  claims95  or  civil  service  com- 
missions.96 The  rule  has  also  been  held  applica- 
ble to  the  judicial  acts  of  a  referee  in  bankruptcy97 
and  to  the  quasi-judicial  acts  of  an  executive  offi- 
cer of  the  government.98  The  rule  does  not  apply, 
however,  to  attack  on  an  administrative  act99  or  to 
a  determination  which  the  administrative  body  had 
no  jurisdiction  to  make.1 

§  408.     What  Constitutes  Direct  or  Collateral 
Attack 

a.  Direct  attack 

b.  Collateral  attack 


a.  Direct  Attack 

A  direct  attack  on  a  Judgment  Is  an  attempt  to  avoid, 
correct,  vacate,  annul,  review,  cancel,  or  set  aside  the 
'Judgment  In  a  proceeding  or  manner  provided  by  law 
for  such  purpose.  ; 

The  terms  "direct"  and  "collateral/'  as  used  with 
reference  to  attacks  on  judgments,  apply  to  the 
purpose  of,  or  method  employed  in,  the  attacks  and 
are  not  descriptive  of  the  attack  itself.2  A  direct 
attack  on  a  judgment  is  an  attempt  to  avoid  or 
correct  it  in  some  manner  provided  by  law,3  in  a 


Ariz. — City  of  Phoenix  v.  "Wright, 
150  P.2d  93,  61  Ariz.  458— City  of 
Phoenix  v.  Sanner,  95  P. 3d  987,  !54 
Ariz.  363. 

Minn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Martin 
v.  Wolfson,  16  N.W.  884,  888,  218 
Minn.  557. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Jefferson 
City  Bridge  &  Transit  Co.  v.  Blas- 
er,  300  S.W.  778,  780,  318  Mo.  373. 

Tex. — Ashburn  Bros.  v.  Edwards 
County,  Com,App.f  58  S.W.2d  71 — 
Coryell  County  v.  Fegette,  Civ. 
App.,  68  S.W.2d  1066,  error  dis- 
missed— Kirby  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Adams,  Civ.App.,  62  S.W.2d  366, 
modified  on  other  grounds  93  S.W. 
2d  382,  127  Tex.  376. 

Utah. — State  Tax  Commission  of 
Utah  v.  Katsis,  62  P.2d  120,  90 
Utah  406,  107  A.L..R.  1477— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in.  State  v.  Cragun,  20 
P.2d  247,  249,  81  Utah  457. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  May  v. 
Penton,  16  P.2d  35,  36,  45  Wyo.  82. 

34  C.J.  p  519  note  22. 

Effect  of  acts  and  adjudications  of 
authorities  allotting  land  to  In- 
dians see  Indians,  §  486. 

Secretary  of  interior 

Where  Indian  left  will  disposing 
of  his  property  and  will  was  ap- 
proved by  secretary  of  interior  who 
delivered  restricted  funds  freed  of 
restrictions  to  testamentary  benefi- 
ciaries, the  legal  title,  vested  in  the 
beneficiaries  through  administrative 
action  of  the  secretary,  was  not  open 
to  collateral  attack. — Hanson  v.  Hoff- 
man, C.C.A.OW.,  113  F.2d  780. 

Jurisdiction  must  appear 

No  presumption  of  regularity  ac- 
companies findings  of  tribunal  of 
limited  Jurisdiction,  such  as  work- 
men's compensation  commissioner,  in 
absence  of  evidence  that  such  tribu- 
nal found  jurisdictional  facts,  which 
cannot,  as  in  case  of  courts  of  gen- 
eral Jurisdiction,  be  inferred  from 
mere  exercise  of  jurisdiction. — Hoff- 
man v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co., 
C.C.A.N.Y.,  74  F.2d  227,  certiorari  de- 
nied New  York.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hoffman,  55  S.Ct.  513,  294  U.S. 
715,  79  L.Ed.  1248,  stating  Connecti- 
cut rule. 


95.  Pa. — Merchants'  Warehouse   Co.  i 
v.  Gelder,  36  A.2d  444,   349  Pa.  1. 

96.  Ariz.— City   of  Phcenix   v.    San- 
ner, 95  P.2d  987,  54  Ariz.   363. 

Xn  action  to  recover  salary  due 
plaintiff  as  assistant  chief  of  police 
during  certain  period,  city's  offered 
evidence  to  effect  that  plaintiff  had 
never  qualified  for  appointment 
claimed,  and  that  no  qualifying  ex- 
amination had  ever  been  given,  was 
properly  excluded  as  a  collateral  at-1 
tack  on  decisions  and  certifications 
of  civil  service  board  to  effect  that 
plaintiff  was  assistant  chief  of  po- 
lice.—City  of  Phoenix  v.  Wright,  150 
P.2d  93,  61  Ariz.  458. 

97.  U.S. — In    re    Fox    West    Coast 
Theatres,  B.C.Cal.,  25  F.Supp.  250, 
affirmed,  C.C.A.,   88  F.2d  212,   cer- 
tiorari denied  Tally  v.  Fox  Film 
Corporation,  57  S.Ct.  944,  301  U.S. 
710,   81   L.Ed.   1363,   rehearing  de- 
nied  68    S.Ct.    7,    302   U.S.    772,    82 
L.Ed.  598. 

98.  Tex. — Kirby     Lumber     Co.      v. 
Adams,    Civ.App.,    62    S.W.2d    366, 
modified  on  other  grounds  93  S.W. 
2d  382,  127  Tex.  376. 

99.  Minn.— Martin    v.    Wolfson,    16 
N.W.2d   884,   218   Minn.   557. 

1.  Wis. — Lakelands,  Inc.,  v.  Chippe- 
wa  &  Flambeau  Improvement  Co., 
295  N.W.  919,  237  Wis.  326. 

2.  Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 
157,  94  Utah  271. 

3.  Ala.— Williams   v.    Overcast,    155 
So.  543,  229  Ala.  119. 

,— Semis,  v.  Loftin,  173  So.  683, 
127  Fla.  515. 

Iowa, — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in-  An- 
derson v.  Schwitzer,  20  N.W.2d 
67,  71 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Brown  v.  Tank,  297  N.W.  801,  803, 
230  Iowa  370. 

Ky.— White  v.  White,  172  S.W.2d  72, 
294  Ky.  563— Ohio  Oil  Co.  V.  West, 
145  S.W.2d  1035,  284  Ky.  796— 
Commonwealth  v.  Miniard,  99  S.W. 
2d  166,  266  Ky.  405 — Mussman  v 
Pepples,  22  S.W.2d  605,  232  Ky, 
254 — Logsdon  v.  Logsdon,  263  S 
W.  728,  204  Ky.  104. 

Minn.— In  re  Melgaard's  Will,  274  N 
W.  641,  200  Minn.  493. 

80S 


N.C.— Oliver  v.   Hood,    183   S.E.    657,  . 

209  N.C.  291. 
tt.D. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Olson 

v.    Donnelly,    294    N.W.    666,    669, 

70  N.D.  370. 
Ohio.— In  re  Gingery's  Estate,  134  N. 

E.   449,   451,   103   Ohio  St   559. 
Okl.— Kauffman    v.    McLaughlin,    114 

P.2d  929,  189  Okl.  194— Seekatz  v. 

Brandenburg,   300  P.   678,   150   Okl. 

53— Cochran  v.  Barkus,  240  P.  321, 

112  .Okl.   180 — Ward  v.   Thompson, 

237   P.   509,   111   Okl.   52— Watkins 

v.  Jester,  229  P.  1085,  103  Okl.  201 

— Ross   v.   Breene,   211   P.   417,   88 

Okl.  37. 
Or. — Corpus    Juris    quoted  in   In   re 

Armstrong's   Estate,    82    P.2d    880, 

884,  159  Or.  698. 
Tenn.— Myers  v.  Wolf,  34  S.W.Sd  201, 

162  Tenn.  42. 
Tex..— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Sharp 

v.    Hall,    Civ.App.,    49    S.W.2d    623, 

525 — Corpus  Juris   quoted  in   Mc- 

Glothlin    v.    Scott,    Civ.App.,    6    S. 

W.2d  129,  131. 
Utah.— Intermill    v.    Nash,    75    P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
Va.— Broyhill    v.    Dawson,    191    S.E. 

779,  168  Va.  321. 
Wash.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 

Peterson's    Estate,    123    P.2d    733, 

751,  12  Wash.2d  686. 
34  C.J.  p  520  note  34. 

General  principles  of  law  and  equity 

control 

While  distinctions  in  forms  of 
pleading  have  been  abolished  and 
equitable  and  legal  relief  may  be 
sought  in  same  action,  substantive 
principles  of  law  and  equity  and 
general  rules  of  procedure  govern- 
ing such  actions,  in  so  far  as  form 
and  nature  of  relief  are  concerned, 
still  exist,  and  question  of  whether 
action  is  direct  proceeding  to  attack 
a  judgment,  or  one  merely  collateral, 
must  be  determined  by  general  prin- 
ciples of  law  and  equity. — Dockery 
v.  Central  Arizona  Light  &  Power 
Co.,  45  P.2d  656,  45  Ariz.  434. 

Nature  of  relief 

One  of  the  primary  tests  of  wheth- 
er or  not,  a  subsequent  suit  is  a  "di- 
rect attack"  on  a  former  judgment 
is  nature  of  the  relief  sought. — Ram- 


408 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S, 


proceeding  instituted  for  that  very  purpose,4  in  the 
same  action  and  in  the  same  court;5  and  the  fact 
that  other  incidental  relief  is  also  asked  is  imma- 


terial.6    Such  is  a  motion  or  other  proceeding  to 
vacate,  annul,  cancel,  or  set  aside  the  judgment;7 


sey  v.  McKamey,  Civ.App.,  138  S.W. 
2d  167,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
152  S.W.2d  322.  137  Tex.  91. 

4.  Ala. — -Williams  v.  Overcast,  155 
So.  543,  229  Ala.  119— Knight  v. 
Garden.  71  So.  715,  716,  196  Ala. 
516. 

Ariz.— Hershey  v.  Banta,  99  P.2d 
81,  55  Ariz.  93,  followed  in  Hersh- 
ey  v.  Republic  Life  Ins.  Co.,  99  P. 
2d  85,  55  Ariz.  104. 
Ark. — Brooks  v.  Baker,  187  S.W.2d 
169,  208  Ark.  654— Wilder  v.  Har- 
ris, 168  S.W.2d  804,  205  Ark.  341 
— Sewell  v.  Reed,  71  S.W.2d  191, 
189  Ark.  50. 

111.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  City  of 
Des  Plaines  v.  Boeckenhauer,  50 
N.E.2d  483,  486,  383  111.  475. 
Iowa.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  An- 
derson v.  Schwltzer,  20  X.W.2d  67, 
71 — corpus  Juris  cited  in  In  re 
Hall's  Estate,  11  N.W.2d  379,  381, 
233  Iowa  1148— Corpus  Juris  quot- 
ed in  Brown  v.  Tank,  297  N.W. 
801,  803,  230  Iowa  370. 
Ky.— Farmers'  Bank  of  Salvisa  v. 

Riley,    272    S.W.    9,    209   Ky.   54. 
Mo. — Ray    v.    Ray,    50    S.W.2d    142, 
330   Mo.   530 — Reger  v.  Reger,  293 
S.W.  414,  316  Mo.  1310. 
Mont — Hanrahan  v.  Andersen,  90  P. 

2d  494.  108  Mont.  218. 
Okl.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Jones  v. 
Snyder,  249  P.  313,  121  Okl.  254— 
Lucas    v.    Lucas,    163    P.    943,    65 
OfcL  96. 

Or.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 
Armstrong's  Estate,  82  P.2d  880, 
884,  159  Or.  698. 

Tex. — Garza  v.  Kenedy,  Com.App., 
299  S.W.  231 — Johnson  v.  Ortiz 
Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  104  S.W.2d  543 — 
Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Sharp  v. 
Hall,  Civ.App.,  49  S.W.2d  523,  525 
—Corpus  juris  quoted  in  McGloth- 
lin  v.  Scott.  Civ.App.,  6  S.W.2d  129, 
131. 
Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 

W.Va. — Nelson  Transfer  &  Storage 
Co.  v.  Jarrett,  157  S.E.  46,  110  W. 
Va.  97. 

34  C.J.  p  520  note  35. 
Bankruptcy  proceeding 

A  bankrupt  who  included  in  sched- 
ule of  liability  a  judgment  obtained 
against  him  under  alleged  separation 
agreement  and  who  was  discharged 
in  bankruptcy  was  not  precluded 
from  seeking  cancellation  of  the 
Judgment  on  theory  that  by  so  doing 
he  sought  to  impeach  the  judgment 
collaterally,  since  inclusion  of  such 
judgment  in  schedule  of  liabilities 
is  not  an  attack  on  such  judgment, 
and,  even  if  it  is,  such  attack  is 
made  in  a  proceeding  provided  by 
law  for  such  purpose. — In  re  Collis, 
53  N.Y.S.2d  316.  184  Misc.  717. 


Suit  to  set  aside  a  judgment  and  to 

obtain  new  judgment 
Where  plaintiff  had  in  a  previous 
action  recovered  judgment  on  a  note 
against  defendant  a  "first  amended 
original  petition"  filed  under  the 
same  docket  number  as  that  assign- 
ed to  the  original  action  claiming 
that  the  original  judgment  was  in- 
valid because  of  a  defect  in  citation, 
but  that  issuance  thereof  prevented 
running  of  limitation  statute  and 
that  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  judg- 
ment on  the  note  was  the  institution 
of  a  new  suit  and  an  attempted  "di-- 
rect  attack"  upon  the  former  judg- 
ment.—Litton  v.  Waters,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  161  S.W.2d  1095,  error  refused. 
Defective  direct  attack 

When  a  suit  is  brought  with  a 
view  of  directly  attacking  a  judg- 
ment and  the  suit  fails  for  some 
reason  to  meet  all  the  requirements 
of  a  direct  attack,  it  will  be  disposed 
of  as  a  collateral  attack.— "56"  Pe- 
troleum Corporation  of  Texas  v. 
Rodden,  Tex.Civ.App.,  98  S.W.2d  269. 
Suit  to  engraft  constructive  trust  on 

property 

Suit  by  deceased's  heirs  to  engraft 
constructive  trust  on  legal  title  to 
land  on  ground  that  executor  indi- 
rectly and  fraudulently  acquired  title 
to  land  was  authorized  under  court's 
equity  powers  as  distinguished  from 
statutory  action  of  trespass  to  try 
title  and  as  relief  against  extrane- 
ous fraud,  and  was  not  collateral  at- 
tack on  probate  court's  orders  au- 
thorizing and  confirming  sale. — Dil- 
beck  v.  Blackwell,  Tex.Civ.App.,  126 
S.W.2d  760,  error  refused. 


5.  Ark.— Wilder  v.  Harris,  168  S.W. 
2d  804,  205  Ark.  341 — Turley  v. 
Owen,  69  S.W.2d  882,  188  Ark.  1067 
—State  v.  Wilson,  27  S.W.2d  106, 
181  Ark.  683. 

Cal. — Rico  v.  Nasser  Bros.  Realty 
Co.,  137  P.2d  861,  58  Cal.App.2d 
g7g_ Stevens  v.  Kelley,  134  P.2d 
56,  57  Cal.App.2d  318. 

Ga, — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hughes 
v.  Cobb,  23  S.B.2d  701,  704,  195  Ga. 
213.  • 

111.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  City  of 
0es  Plaines  v.  Boeckenhauer,  50 
N.E.2d  483,  486,  383  111.  475. 

Iowa.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  An- 
derson v.  Schwitzer,  20  N.W.2d  67, 
71 — corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Brown 
v.  Tank,  297  N.W.  801,  230  Iowa 
370. 

N.T. — James  Mills  Orchard  Corpo- 
ration v.  Frank,  244  N.T.S.  473,  137 
Misc.  407. 

S.C.— Scott  v.  Newell,  144  S.E.  82, 
146  S.C.  385. 

S.D.— Porman  v.  Hall,  212  N.W.  866, 
51  S.D.  144. 

Tex.— Livingston  v.  Stubbs,  Civ.App., 

806 


151  S.W.2d  285,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct— Gann  v.  Put- 
man,  Civ.App.,  141  S.W.2d  758,  er- 
ror dismissed,  judgment  correct — 
Duncan  Coffee  Co.  v.  Wilson,  Civ. 
App.,  139  S.W.2d  327,  error  dis- 
missed— McLeod  v.  Carroll,  Civ. 
App.,  109  S.W.2d  316,  affirmed  130 
S.W.2d  277,  133  Tex.  571— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Sharp  v.  Hall,  Civ. 
App.,  49  S.W.2d  523,  525— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  McGlothlin  v. 
Scott,  Civ.App.,  6  S.W.2d  129,  131. 
Utah. — State  Tax  Commission  v.  Lar- 

sen,  110  P.2d  558,  100  Utah  103. 
34  C.J.  p  520  note  36. 

A  petition  lor  rul*  to  show  cause 
why  order  admitting  will  to  probate 
in  common  form  in  Colleton  County 
should  not  be  revoked  was  not  a 
"collateral  attack"  on  the  order,  but 
was  a  "direct  attack,"  and  therefore 
latent  defect  that  testatrix'  residence 
had  been  fixed  in  Charleston  County 
by  her  commitment  therefrom  to  the 
state  hospital  was  properly  asserted 
as  a  ground  for  the  petition.— Reed 
v.  Lemacks,  28  S.E.2d  441,  204  S.C. 
26. 

Attack  regarded  as  motion  in  origi- 
nal cause 

In  creditors'  suit  by  mortgagee 
bank,  where  bank  attacked  judg- 
ments foreclosing  other  mortgages 
executed  by  debtor  in  actions  to 
which  bank  was  not  a  party,  and  all 
parties  to  such  foreclosure  actions 
were  parties  to  creditors'  suit,  at- 
tack on  judgments  could  not  be  com- 
plained of  as  improper  collateral  at- 
tack, since  judge  in  his  discretion 
could  deem  the  proceeding  to  be  a 
motion  in  the  original  cause. — First 
Carolinas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank  of 
Columbia  v.  Knotts,  1  S.E.2d  797,  191 
S.C.  384. 


6.  Iowa. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Anderson  v.  Schwitzer,  20  N.W.2d 
69,     71— ^Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Brown  v.  Tank,  297  N.W.  801.  230 
Iowa  370. 

Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in    Mc- 
Glothlin v.  Scott,  Civ.App.,  6  S.W. 
2d  129,  131. 
34  C.J.  p  520  note  37. 
Trespass  to  try  title 

"Direct  attack"  does  not  require 
sole  purpose  of  suit  to  be  to  attack 
original  judgment,  but  it  may  be  in- 
cident to  trespass  to  try  title  action. 
— Griggs  v.  Montgomery,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  22  S.W.2d  688. 

7.  U.S.— Illinois     Printing     Co.     v. 
Electric   Shovel   Coal   Corporation, 
D.C.I1L,  20  P.Supp.  181. 

Ala.— Snyder  v.  Woolf,   166  So.   803, 

232  Ala.  87. 
Ariz.— Bell  v.   Bell,   39   P.2d   629,   44 

Ariz.  520. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  408 


a  direct  action  to  impeach  and  avoid  the  judgment,8 
or  declare  it  void  ab  initio,9  as  where  it  was  entered 


without  notice;10  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment,11 
for  a  rehearing,12  or  for  a  new  trial  j1^    or  any 


Ark. — Brookfleld  v.  Harrahan  Via- 
duct Improvement  Disk,  54  S.W. 
2d  689,  186  Ark.  599— Woods  v. 
Quarles,  13  S.W.2d  617,  178  Ark. 
1158. 

Cal. — Hollywood  Garment  Corpora- 
tion v.  J.  Beckerman,  Inc.,  143  P. 
2d  738,  61  Cal.App.2d  658— Gould  v. 
Richmond  School  Dist,  136  P.2d 
864,  58  Cal.App.2d  497 — Stevens  v. 
Kelley,  134  P.2d  56,  57  Cal.App. 
2d  318— Potts  v.  Whitson,  125  P. 
2d  947,  52  Cal.App.2d  199— Shelley 
v.  Casa  De  Oro,  Limited,  24  P.2d 
900,  133  CaLApp.  720— Reichert  v. 
Rabun,  265  P.  260,  89  Cal.App. 
375 — In  re  Dahnke's  Estate  and 
Guardianship,  222  P.  381,  64  Cal. 
App.  555 — Sharp  v.  Eagle  Lake 
Lumber  Co.,  212  P.  933,  60  Cal. 
App.  386. 
Fla. — Skipper  v.  Shumacher,  169  So. 

58,  124  Fla,  384. 
Idaho. — Baldwin    v.    Anderson,    8    P. 

2d  461,  51  Idaho  614. 
Kan. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kansas 
City  Power  &  Light  Co.  v.  City  of 
Elkhart,  31  P.2d  62,  64,  139  Kan. 
374— Board  of  Com'rs  of  Crawford 
County  v.  Radley,  8  P.2d  386,  134 
Kan.  704. 

Ky. — Gardner  v.  Lincoln  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.,  64  S.W.2d  497,  251  Ky. 
109 — Holcomb  v.  Creech,  56  S.W. 
2d  998,  247  Ky.  199— May  v.  Pratt, 
35  S.W.2d  642,  237  Ky.  369— Joseph 
v.  Bailey,  277  S.W.  466,  211  Ky, 
394. 

Mo. — State    ex    rel.    Aquamsi    Land 
Co.    v.    Hostetter,    79    S.W.2d   463, 
336  Mo.  391. 
N.J.— Hinners  v.  Banville,  168  A.  618, 

114  N.J.Ba.  348. 

K.T. — Conyne  v.  McGibbon,  37  N.Y. 
S.2d  590,  179  Misc.  54,  transferred, 
see  39  N.Y.S.2d  609,  265  App.Div. 
976,  affirmed  41  N.Y.S.Sd  189,  266 
App.Div.  711. 

Okl. — City  of  Clinton  ex  rel.  Rich- 
ardson v.  Cornell,  132  P.2d  340, 
191  Okl.  600— Roland  Union  Graded 
School  Dist.  No.  1  of  Sequoyah 
County  v.  Thompson,  124  P.2d  400, 
190  Okl.  416. 
Tex.— Sharp  v.  Hall,  Civ.App.,  49  S. 
W.2d  523,  error  refused — Bonner 
v.  Pearson,  Civ.App.,  7  S.W.2d  930 
— Carl  ton  v.  Hott,  Civ.App.,  292 
S.W.  642 — Perez  v.  E.  P.  Lipscomb 
&  Co.,  Civ.App.,  267  S.W.  748. 
Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
34  C.J.  p  520  note  38. 
Parties 

(1)  Whether  a  proceeding  to  va- 
cate or  set  aside  a  judgment  is  a 
direct  or  collateral  attack  depends 
on  whether  all  the  parties  to  be  af- 
fected are  before  the  court;  if  they 
are  not,  the  attack  is  collateral. — 
Hartel  v.  Dishman,  145  S.W.2d  865, 
135  Tex  600 — Pure  Oil  Co.  v.  Reece, 


78  S.W.2d  932,  124  Tex.  476— Han- 
non  v.  Henson,  Tex. Com. App.,  15  S. 
W.2d  579— Williams  v.  Coleman-Ful- 
ton  Pasture  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  157 
S.W.2d  995,  error  refused— Wixom  v. 
Bowers,  Tex.  Civ.  App.,  152  S.W.2d 
896,  error  refused— Rhoads  v.  Daly 
General  Agency,  Tex.Civ.App.,  152 
S.W.2d  461,  error  refused — Scott  v. 
Fort  Worth  Nat.  Bank,  Tex. Civ. App., 
125  S.W.2d  356,  error  dismissed— 
McLeod  v.  Carroll,  Civ.App.,  109  S. 
W.2d  316,  affirmed  Carroll  v.  McLeod, 
130  S.W.2d  277,  133  Tex.  571— Moore 
v.  Evans,  Tex.Civ.App.,  103  S.W.2d 
850 — Rodden  v.  Smith,  Tex.Civ.App., 
95  S.W.2d  997 — Avant  v.  Broun,  Tex. 
Civ.App.f  91  S.W.2d  426,  error  dis- 
missed— Perdue  v.  Miller,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  64  S.W.2d  1002,  error  refused — 
Griggs  v.  Montgomery,  Tex.Civ.App., 
22  S.W.2d  688— State  Mortg.  Corpo- 
ration v.  Garden,  Tex.Civ.App.,  11 
S.W.2d  212 — Burton  v.  McGuire,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  3  S.W.2d  576,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.,  41  S.W.2d  238— Carlton  v.  Hoff, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  292  S.W.  642. 

(2)  Original  parties  being  parties 
to  suit,  nature  of  suit  as  direct  at- 
tack on  judgment  is  not  altered  be- 
cause others  were  made  parties. — 
Garza  v.  Kenedy,  Tex.Com. App.,  299 
S.W.  231. 

Seasonable  motion 

(1)  A  seasonable  motion  to  vacate 
judgment  is  a  direct  attack  on  the 
judgment. — City   of  Los   Angeles  v. 
Glassell,   262  P.  1084,   203  Cal.  44. 

(2)  An    application    to    vacate    a 
judgment  made  to  court  that  render- 
ed it  within  thirty  days  after  its  en- 
try is  a  "direct  attack"  on  the  judg- 
ment, but  if  made  after  expiration  of 
thirty   days   it   is   a   "collateral   at- 
tack."—Barnard  v.  Michael,   63  N.B. 
2d  858,  392  111.  130,  appeal  transfer- 
red,  see  61  N.E.2d  '578,   326   IlLApp. 
69. 

(3)  A   motion   to   vacate   a  judg- 
ment,  made  after  the  expiration  of 
the   period   allowed   by   statute    for 
a  motion  to  set  aside  default  judg- 
ment, is  governed  by  the  rules  ap- 
plicable to  a  collateral  attack.— Wells 
Fargo  &  Co.  v.  City  and  County  of 
San  Francisco,  152  P.2d  625,  25  Cal. 
2d  37—- City  of  Salinas  v.  Luke  Kow 
Lee,  18  P.2d  335,  217  Cal.  252— Peo- 
ple v.  Herod,  295  P.  383,  111  CaLApp. 
246. 

(4)  After  expiration  of  time  for  a 
direct    appeal    a    motion    to    quash 
service  of  summons  by  publication 
must   be  considered  as   a  collateral 
attack. — Butler  v.  McKey,  C.C.A.Cal., 
138    F.2d    873,    certiorari    denied    64 
S.Ct.  636,  321  U.S.  780,  88  L.Ed.  1073. 

(5)  Where   district    court's    power 
over  its  default  judgment  had  ceased 
with  end  of  term  at  which  judgment 

807 


was  rendered,  a  proceeding  on  de- 
fendant's motion  at  a  subsequent 
term  to  recall  execution  issued  on 
judgment  and  to  vacate  judgment 
stood  on  same  footing  as  a  "collat- 
eral attack"  on  a  judgment. — Ridley 
v.  McCallum,  163  S.W.2d  833,  139 
Tex.  540. 

(6)  Motion  to  vacate  judgment,  en- 
tered some  twenty  months  prior 
thereto,  against  sureties  on  forth- 
coming bond  given  after  levy  of  ex- 
ecution, and  to  cancel  execution  is- 
sued on  the  judgment,  was  a  "col- 
lateral attack"  and  was  improperly 
sustained  in  absence  of  fraud  or 
collusion. — State  ex  rel.  Fulton  Bag 
&  Cotton  Mills  v.  Burnside,  15  So.2d 
324,  153  Fla.  599. 

Proceeding1  to  set  aside  default  de- 
cree 

A  proceeding  by  curator  of  minors* 
estate  and  trustee  under  trust  deed, 
securing  note  for  money  loaned  by 
curator  on  minor's  behalf,  to  set 
aside  default  decree  for  cross  com- 
plainant, claiming  title  to  mortgaged 
land  as  purchaser  at  tax  sale,  in 
foreclosure  suit,  on  grounds  of  fraud 
in  obtaining  decree,  lack  of  notice 
to  or  service  on  minor  cross  defend- 
ants and  valid  defense  to  cross  com- 
plaint, is  not  collateral  attack  on 
such  decree. — Arkansas  Trust  Co.  v. 
Sims,  133  S.W.2d  854,  198  Ark.  1148. 

Dissolution  or  setting1  aside  of  at- 
tachment execution  Judgment  against 
garnishee  after  discharge  of  original 
judgment  on  which  attachment  pro- 
ceeding is  based  would  not  constitute 
"collateral  attack"  on  attachment 
Judgment  or  deprive  original  judg- 
ment creditor  of  "vested  right"  in 
attached  property. — Sophia  Wilkes 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  to  Use  of 
Wiehe,  v.  Rudloff,  35  A.2d  278,  348 
Pa.  477. 

8.  Mo. — Inter-River  Drainage    Dist. 
of  Missouri  v.  Henson,  App.,  99  S. 
W.2d  865. 

34  C.J.  p  520  note  39. 

9.  Ark. — Brick  v.    Sovereign    Grand 
Lodge    of   Accepted    Free    Masons 
of  Arkansas,  117  S.W.2d  1060,  196 
Ark.  372 — Morgan  v.  Leon,  12  S.W. 
2d  404,  178  Ark.  768. 

10.  Ark. — Brick  v.  Sovereign  Grand 
Lodge  of  Accepted  Free  Masons  of 
Arkansas,    117    S.W.2d    1060,     196 
Ark.  372. 

11.  Mo. — Robinson  v.  Robinson,  129 
S.W.  725,  149  Mo.  733. 

12.  Tex. — Crawford  v.  McDonald,  33 
S.W.  325,  88  Tex.  626. 

34  C.J.  p  520  note  41. 

13.  Tex. — Goodman    v.    Mayer,    Civ. 
App.,  105  S.W.2d  281,  reversed  on 
other    grounds    128    S.W.2d    1156, 
133  Tex  319. 

34  C.J.  p  520  note  42. 


408 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


proceeding  to  review  it  in  an  appellate  court,  wheth- 
er by  appeal,  error,  or  certiorari,14  action  to  re- 
view,15  bill  of  review,16  writ  of  review,"  or,  in 
general,  any  statutory  method  for  avoiding  or  cor- 
recting a  judgment.18 


Under  some  circumstances,  an  action  to  quiet 
title  is  a  direct  attack  on  the  judgment;"  under 
others  it  is  considered  a  collateral  attack;20  but  a 
suit  to  quiet  title,  which  attacks  proceedings  subse- 
quent to  the  judgment  has  been  held  to  be  neither  a 


Timely  filing  essential 

Where  no  motion  for  a  new  trial 
was  filed  before  expiration  of  a  spec- 
ified number  of  days  from  date  of 
judgment,  a  motion  made  after  such 
period  to  set  aside  judgment  and 
for  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto 
was  a  collateral  attack  on  Judgment 
and  court  was  unauthorized  to  set  it 
aside  unless  it  was  void. — Bridgman 
v.  Moore,  183  S.W.2d  705,  143  Tex. 
250. 

14.    Ark.— Krumpen  v.  Taylor,  40  S. 

W.2d  775,  183  Ark.  1046. 
Cal.— Stevens  v.  Kelley,  134  P.2d  56, 

57  Cal.App.2d  318. 
pla, — Skipper  v.  Schumacher,  169  So. 

58,  124  Fla.  384. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.   Lane  v.   Corneli, 

171   S.W.2d   687,   351  Mo.   1— State 

ex  rel.  Aauamsi  Land  Co.  v.  Hos- 

tetter.  79  S.W.2d  463,  336  Mo.  391. 

N.J.— Ccffey   v.   Coffey,   14  A.2d  485, 

125  N.J.Law  205. 

Tex. — Stewart  Oil  Co.  v.  Lee,  Civ. 
App.,  173  S.W.2d  791,  error  re- 
fused—McKinley  v.  Salter,  Civ. 
App.,  136  S.W.2d  615,  error  dis- 
missed, Judgment  correct,  appeal 
dismissed  61  S.Ct  734,  312  U.S. 
659,  85  L.Ed.  1106. 
34  C.J.  p  520  note  43. 

By  bringing  error  in  suits  on  Judg- 
ments "based  on  Judgment  taken  by 
default,  plaintiff  in  error  attacked 
default  Judgment  directly,  not  col- 
laterally.—Cheshire  v.  Palmer,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  44  S.W.2d  438. 
Appeal  from  ruling  on  motion 

Plaintiff's  appeal  to  circuit  court 
from  grant  of  defendants'  motion 
to  require  plaintiff  to  satisfy  com- 
mon pleas  court  Judgment  for  plain- 
tiff held  not  collateral  attack  on 
common  pleas  court  judgment — Mc- 
Carty  v.  Cook,  71  S.W.2d  1053,  189 
Ark.  309. 

Appeal  from  order  allowing  claims 
under  statute  providing  that  on  levy 
of  attachment,  garnishment,  or  ex- 
ecution, not  founded  on  claim  for 
labor,  any  person  who  has  performed 
work  for  defendant  within  ninety 
days  prior  to  levy  may  file  claim 
not  exceeding  two  hundred  dollars 
constituted  a  "direct  attack,"  on  the 
order. — Driver  v.  International  Air 
Race  Ass'n  of  America,  129  P.2d  771 
54  Cal.App.2d  614. 
Certiorari  to  review  contempt  con- 
viction 

A  certiorari  proceeding  to  review 
relator's  conviction  for  contempt  1 
violating   temporary  injunction  wa 
a  "collateral   attack"   on  injunction 
which,  would   fail  unless  injunction 


was  shown  to  be  a  nullity  so  that, 
nder    statute    prohibiting    issuance 
f  injunction  in  suit  involving  labor 
ispute    except    after    "findings    of 
act,"    where    temporary    injunction 
was  issued  without  "findings  of  fact" 
whether  court  erred  in  determining 
hat  suit  involved  no  labor  dispute 
ould  not  be  determined  on  certiorari 
o  review  conviction  of  contempt  for 
violation  of  injunction.— Reid  v.  In- 
dependent Union  of  All  Workers,  275 
S".W.  300,  200  Minn.  599,  120  A.L.R. 
97. 

5.    Ind. — Deputy   v.    Dollarhide,    86 
N.E.  344,  42  Ind.App.  554. 

16.    Ala.--Johnson  v.  Pugh,  193  So. 
317,  239  Ala.  12 — Midgley  v.  Rails, 
176   So.   799,   234  Ala.   685— Corpus 
Juris    cited   In    Snyder   v.   Woolf, 
166  So.  803,  804,  232  Ala,  87. 
Tex. — Texas    Employers'    Ins.    Ass'n 
v.    Cashion,    Civ. App.,    130    S.W.2d 
1112— Johnson  v.  Ortiz  Oil  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  104  S.W.2d  543— City  of  Ty- 
ler v.   First  Nat.  Bank   of  Beau- 
mont    Civ.App.,     46     S.W.2d     454, 
error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  521  note  45. 
Bill  of  review  in  equity  as  collateral 
attack  see  Equity  §  635. 

In  same  court  or  action  es- 
sential 

(1)  A  bill  of  review  not  filed  in 
the  same  court  where  the  judgment 
or  order  under  attack  was  made  is 
a  collateral  attack.— Whitehurst  v. 
Estes.  Tex.Civ.App.,  185  S.W.2d  154, 
error  refused — Cheney  v.  Norton, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  181  S.W.2d  835,  error 
refused. 


(2)  Statutory  bill  of  review  is  not 
available  to  interested  person  to  nul- 
lify orders  of  probate  court,  such 
as  appointing  a  guardian  authorizing 
sale  of  land  or  approving  report  of 
such  sale,  so  as  to  create  an  estoppel 
against  purchasers  in  other  actions 
against  them  in  the  district  courl 
to  try  title  to  land,  where  the  land 
has  actually  been  conveyed  to  per- 
sons having  no  interest  in  such  or- 
ders save  as  they  constitute  links 
in  their  'chain  of  title,  since  such 
orders  are  voidable  only  on  a  direct 
attack  and  under  the  circumstances 
the  bill  of  review  is  not  a  direc 
attack. — Johnson  v.  Ortiz  Oil  Co. 
Tex.Civ.App.,  104  S.W.2d  543. 

17.  Mont. — State  ex  rel.  Haynes  v 
District  Court,    Sixteenth  Judicia 
District    Custer    County,    81    P.2 
422,  106  Mont.  578. 

34  C.J.  p  521  note  46. 

18.  Tenn. — Clements       v.      Holmes 

808 


App.,  120  S.W.2d  988,  22  Tenn.App. 
230. 

Action  of  nullity 

Suit  on  same  subject  matter,  by 
same  parties,  not  containing  aver- 
ment that  former  judgment  is  null, 
is  not  action  of  nullity  under  stat- 
ute.—-Smith  v.  Salmen  Brick  &  Lum- 
ber Co.,  8  La.App.  75. 

9.    Ark. — Grayling    Lumber   Co.    v. 

Tillar,  258  S.W.  132,  162  Ark.  221. 
Mo. — Shepard  v.  Shepard,  186  S.W. 

2d  472,  353  Mo.  1057. 
4  C.J.  P  521  note  47. 

20.  Ala.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pen- 
ton  v.  Brown-Crummer  Inv.  Co., 
131  So.  14,  19,  222  Ala,  155. 

Cal.— Swartfager  v.  Wells,  128  P.2d 
128,  53  Cal.App.2d  522. 

111.— Murch  v.  Epley,  52  N.E.2d  125, 
385  111/138— Knaus  v.  Chicago  Ti- 
tle &  Trust  Co.,  7  N.E.2d  298,  365 
111.  588. 

Mo.— Linville  v.  Ripley,  146  S.W.2d 
581,  347  Mo.  95— Baker  v.  Lamar, 
140  S.W.2d  31. 

Mont.— Sanborn  v.  Lewis  and  Clark 
County,  120  P.2d  567,  113  Mont  1 
— E.  J.  Lander  &  Co.  v.  Brown, 
99  P.2d  216,  110  Mont  128— Frisbee 
v.  Coburn,  52  P.2d  882,  101  Mont 
58 — price  v.  Skylstead,  222  P.  1059, 
69  Mont.  453. 

Okl. — Porter  v.  Hansen,  124  P.2d  391, 
190  Okl.  429— Collingsworth  v. 
Hutchison,  90  P.2d  416,  185  Okl. 
101. 

Or.— Morrill  v.  Morrill,  25  P.  362,  20 
Or.  96,  23  Am.S.R.  95,  11  L.B.A. 
155. 

Te3C — Carroll  v.  McLeod,  Com.App., 
130  S.W.2d  277,  133  Tex.  571. 

Wash. — Zintheo    v.    B.    F.    Goodrich 
Rubber  Co.,  239  P.  391,  136  Wash. 
196. 
34  C.J.  p  521  note  48. 


Declaratory  Judgment  action  to  quiet 

title 

Where  adopted  son,  as  only  heir 
at  law  of  deceased  to  whom  land 
was  allegedly  conveyed  for  life  with 
remainder  to  his  heirs,  brought  de- 
claratory judgment  action  to  have 
title  to  such  land  quieted  in  him 
against  parties  who  were  adjudged 
owners  in  fee  simple  thereof  in  ac- 
tion to  settle  estate  of  deceased  be- 
cause of  conveyance  to  them  by  de- 
ceased, and  adopted  son  was  made 
party  to  such  action,  and  such  judg- 
ment was  not  void,  declaratory  Judg^ 
ment  action  constituted  a  "collateral 
attack"  on  prior  judgment  and  would 
not  lie.— Eversole  v.  Smith,  178  S.W. 
2d  970,  297  Ky.  53.  • 


49    C.XS. 


JUDGMENTS 


408 


direct  nor  a  collateral  attack  on  the  judgment.21 

Where  the  element  of  fraud  or  mistake  is  in- 
volved in  the  issue  it  is  a  general  rule  that  the  at- 
tack is  direct.22 

Where  a  judgment  is  pleaded  as  a  defense  to 
an  action,  plaintiff  has  a  right  to  challenge  and 
have  the  court  pass  on  the  validity  of  the  judgment 
and  the  proceedings  under  which  it  was  obtained.23 


b.  Collateral  Attack 

A  collateral  attack  is  an  attempt  to  avoid,  defeat, 
or  evade  a  Judgment,  or  to  deny  Its  force  and  effect,  in 
some  incidental  proceeding  not  provided  by  law  for  the 
express  purpose  of  attacking  it. 

A  collateral  attack  is  an  attempt  to  impeach  the 
judgment  by  matters  dehors  the  record,24  before 
a  court  other  than  the  one  in  which  it  was  ren- 
dered,25 in  an  action  other  than  that  in  which  it 
was  rendered;26  an  attempt  to  avoid,  defeat,  or 


impeachment  for  fraud 

(1)  Under  a  bill  to  quiet  title,  any 
attempted    impeachment    of   probate 
decree    allotting:    homestead    exemp- 
tion to  widow,  on  ground  that  it  was 
infected  with  fraud,  is  a  mere  col- 
lateral attack  and  unavailable.— Cog- 
burn  v.  Callier,  104  So.  328,  213  Ala. 
38. 

(2)  Where,  in  bill  to  quiet  title,  re- 
spondents   set   up   a  homestead   ex- 
emption decree  as  their  muniment  of 
title,     and    thereupon    complainants 
amended   their  original  bill,  and  al- 
leged fraud  in  procurement  of  such 
decree,    and   -prayed   that   it   be    set 
aside,  such  amendment  constituted  a 
direct  attack  on  decree,  giving  court 
jurisdiction,    and   placing  burden  of 
proof  on  complainants,  and  Anal  de- 
cree thereon  is  conclusive. — Cogburn 
v.  Callier,  104  So.  '3'30,  213  Ala.  46— 
Cogburn  v.  Callier,  104  So.   328,  213 
Ala.  38. 

(3)  Complainants'     averments     of 
fraud  in  procuring  homestead  allot- 
ment decree,  which  were  made  in  an- 
swer to  respondents'  cross  bill,  and 
not  in  their  bill  of  complaint,  con- 
stituted but  a  collateral  attack  on 
such  decree,  and  is  not  available  for 
its    impeachment. — Cogburn    v.    Cal- 
lier, 104  So.  330,  213  Ala.  46. 

21.  Ky.— Newsome   v.    Hall,    161    S. 
W.2d  629,  200  Ky.  486,  140  A.JUR. 
818. 

22.  Cal.— Stevens  v.  Kelley,   134  P. 
2d  66,  57  Cal.App.2d  318— Borg  v. 
Borg,    76    P.2d   218,    25   Cal,App.2d 
25. 

Okl.— Roland  Union  Graded  School 
Dlst.  No.  1  of  Sequoyah  County  v. 
Thompson,  124  P.2d  400,  100  Okl. 
416— Parker  v.  Board  of  Cpm'rs  of 
Okmulgee  County,  102  P.2d  880, 
187  Okl.  308,  followed  in  Parker  v. 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Okmulgee 
County,  102  P.2d  833,  187  Okl.  311. 

Tenn.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kates  v. 
Anderson,  Dulin,  Varaell  Co.,  9 
Tenn.App.  306,  401. 

Tex. — Moyers  v.  Carter,  Civ.Ajpp.,  61 
S.W.2d  1027,  error  refused. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Rock 
Springs  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Black  Dia- 
mond Coal  Co.,  272  P.  12,  30  Wyo. 
370. 

34  C.J.  p  520  note  40. 


Application  to  vacate  Enoch  Azden 
decree 

An  application  of  second  husband 
to  vacate  decree  procured  by  his 
present  wife  against  her  former  hus- 
band in  a  so-called  Enoch  Arden 
proceeding  for  dissolution  of  mar- 
riage on  ground  of  former  husband's 
absence  for  five  years  on  charge  that 
wife  procured  decree  through  fraud 
was  a  "direct  attack"  and  not  a  "col- 
lateral attack"  on  the  decree,  and 
therefore  could  be  maintained,  but 
application  would  be  denied  where  it 
appeared  that  former  husband  was 
living  and  had  received  no  notice  of 
motion,  since  former  husband  was  a 
"party"  to  proceedings  within  con- 
templation of  the  law. — Application 
of  Neiman,  28  N.Y.S.2d  100,  176  Misc. 
552. 
Action  to  cancel  deed 

In  action  to  cancel  for  fraud  a 
deed  to  property  registered  under 
Torrens  Law,  evidence  that  defend- 
ant had  purchased  land  and  paid  con- 
sideration held  not  collateral  attack 
on  judgment. — Whitham  v.  Whitham, 
15  P.2d  1105,  127  CaLApp.  481. 

23.  Okl. — St.     Louis-San     Francisco 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Bayne,  40  P.2d  1104,  170 
Okl.    542 — Southern    Pine   'Lumber 
Co.  v.  Ward,  85  P.  450,  16  Okl.  131. 

24.  U.S.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Trustees  of  Somerset  Academy  v, 
Picher,  C.C.A.M6.,  90  'F.2d  741,  744. 

Cal.— Stevens  v.  Kelley,  134  P.2d  56, 
57  Cal.App.2d  318— Kirkpatrick  v. 
Harvey,  124  P.2d  367,  51  CaLApp. 
2d  170— Hollyfleld  v.  <*eibel,  66  P. 
2d  755,  20  Cal.App.2d  142— Nielsen 
v.  Emerson,  6  P.2d  281,  110  Cal. 
App.  214. 

Ga. — Hadden  v.  -Fuo.ua,  22  S.B.2d  377, 
104  Ga,  621. 

Ind.— Clark  v.  Clark,  172  N.B.  124, 
202  Ind.  104. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  An- 
derson v.  Schwitzer,  20  N.W.2d  67, 
71— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Brown 
v.  Tank,  207  N.W.  -801,  503,  '230 
Iowa  370. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Board 
of  Commissioners  of  Crawford 
County  v.  Radley,  8  P.2d  386,  388, 
134  Kan.  704. 

K.Y.—  Collier  v.  Peninsular  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  263  S.W.  353,  204 
Ky.  1. 

809 


N.T. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 
Collis,  53  N.T.S.2d  316,  318,  184 
Misc.  717— James  Mills  Orchards 
Corporation  v.  Frank,  244  N.Y.S. 
4T3,  137  Misc.  407. 

N.C.— Fowler  v.  'Fowler,  130  S.E.  315, 
100  N.C.  636. 

S.C.— Tolbert  v.  Roark,  110  S.R  571, 
126  S.C.  207. 

Tex. — Agey  v.  Barnard,  Civ.App.,  123 
S.W.2d  484,  error  dismissed,  Judg- 
ment correct — Smith  v.  Burns,  Civ. 
App.,  107  S.W.2d  397— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Sharp  v.  Hall,  Civ.App., 
40  S.W.2d  523,  525— Lipscomb  v. 
Japhet,  Civ.App.,  18  S.W,2d  786, 
error  dismissed — Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Reeves  v.  Fuqua,  Civ.App., 
277  S.W.  418,  423. 

Wash.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 
Peterson's  Estate,  123  P.2d  733, 
12  Wash.2d  686— Corpus  Juris: 
quoted  in  Thompson  v.  Short,  106; 
P.2d  720,  6  Wash.2d  71^-Corpu* 
Juris  cited  in  Hanna  v.  Allen,  279 
P.  1008,  1101,  15'3  Wash.  485. 

34  C.J.  ?  521  note  50. 

25.  Tex. — McLeod    v.    Carroll,    Civ. 
App.,  109  S.W.2d  316,  affirmed  Car- 
roll v.  McLeod,  130  S.W.2d  277,  133 
Tex.    571— Perdue    v.    Miller,    Oiv. 
App.,  64  S.W.2d  1002,  error  refused 
— Reeves   v.    Fuqua,    Civ.App.,    277 
S.W.  418. 

Creation  of  new  judicial  district 

Statute  creating  judicial  district 
was  held  not  to  supersede  rule  that 
suit  to  vacate  judgment  must  be 
brought  and  tried  in  court  which 
rendered  judgment,  as  against  con- 
tention that  attack  in  124th  district 
court  of  Gregg  County  on  judgment 
rendered  by  71st  district  court  could 
not  be  deemed  collateral  attack. — 
Snell  v.  Knowles,  Tex.Civ.App.,  87 
S.W.2d  871,  error  dismissed. 

26.  U.S.— Warmsprings  Irr.  Dist.  v. 
May,  C.C.A.Or.,  117  F.2d  ,8 0'2— Cor- 
pus  Juris   quoted  in  Trustees   of 
Somerset  Academy  v.  Picher,  C.£ 
A.Me.,  00  F.2d  741,  744. 

Ariz.— Metcalf  v.  Phoenix  Title  & 
Trust  Co.,  274  P.  632,  35  Ariz.  73. 

Cal. — Rico  v.  Nasser  Bros.  Realty 
Co.,  137  P.2d  -861,  58  Cal.App.2d 
878 — Bank  of  America  Nat.  Trust 
ft  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Hill,  71  P.2d 
258,  0  CaUd  405— See  v.  Joughin, 
-64  P.2d  140,  18  CaLApp.2d  414. 


§  408 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


evade  it,  or  deny  its  force  and  effect,  in  some  in-  i  press  purpose  of  attacking  it;27    any  proceeding 
cidental  proceeding  not  provided  by  law  for  the  ex-  j  which  is  not  instituted  for  the  express  purpose  of 


111. — City  of  Des  Plalnes  v.  Boecken 
hauer,  50  N.E.2d  483,  383  111.  475- 
Beckman  v.  Alberts,  178  N.E.  367 
346  IlL  74. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  An 
•derson  v.  Schwitzer,  20  N.W.2d  69 
71 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Brown 
v.  Tank,  297  N.W.  801,  803,  23i 
Iowa  370. 

Kan. — Goodman  v.  Cretcher,  294  P 
868,  132  Kan.  142. 

Ky.— May  v.  Sword,  33  S.W.2d  314 
236  Ky.  412. 

La. — Federal  Securities  Co.  v 
Swayze,  125  So.  518,  14  La.App 
418. 

Hontu — E.  J.  Lander  &  Co.  v.  Brown 
99  P.2d  216,  110  Mont.  128. 

N.Y. — James  Mills  Orchards  Corpo 
ration  v.  Frank,  244  N.T.S.  473 
137  Misc.  407. 

N.D.— Erker  v.  Deichert,  222  N.W 
615,  57  N.D.  474. 

S.C. — First  Qarolinas  Joint  Stock 
Land  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Knotts 
1  S.K2d  797.  191  S.C.  384— Tolbert 
v.  Roark,  119  S.E.  571,  126  S.C 
207. 

Tenn. — Esch  v.  Wilcox,  178  S.W.2d 
•770,  181  Tenn.  165. 

Tex. — Security  Trust  Co.  of  Austin 
v.  Lipscomb  County,  ISO  S.W.2d 
151,  142  Tex  572— -Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  Empire  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v. 
Albright,  87  S.W.2d  1092,  126  Tex. 
485 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Sharp 
v.  Hall,  Civ.App.,  49  S.W.2d  523, 
525 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Reeves 
v.  'Fuqua,  Civ.App.,  277  S.W.  418, 
423. 

Utah. — Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 
157,  94  Utah  271. 

Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Hanna 
v.    Allen,    279    P.    1098,    1101,    153 
Wash.  485. 
Wis.— In  re  Cawker's  Estate,  290  N. 

W.  281,  233  Wis.  648. 
34  C.J.  p  521  note  51—11  Q.J.  P  960 
note  21.    . 

Any  attack  in  interpleader  action 
on  an  order  made  in  a  prior  action, 
was  a  "collateral  attack"  on  the  or- 
der and  was  governed  by  the  rules 
pertaining  to  such  attack. — Driver  v. 
International  Air  Race  Ass'n  of 
America,  129  P.2d  771,  54  Cal.APp.2d 
614. 

Xa  receivership  suit,  attack  made 
on  orders  entered  in  -prior  receiver- 
ship suit  in  same  court  involving 
same  corporations  was  a  collateral 
attack,  requiring  proof  of  want  of 
jurisdiction,  where  objections  went 
only  to  particular  judge  sitting  at 
hearing  and  to  particular  receivers, 
and  consolidation  of  the  two  pending 
receivership  suits  in  same  court  did 
not  render  attack  in  subsequent  suit, 
"on  orders  entered  in  prior  suit,  di- 
rect attack,  which  would  reach  mere 
errors.— Johnson  v.  Manhattan  Ry. 


Co.,  N.Y.,   53  S.Ct  721,  289  U.S.  479 
77  L.Ed.  1'331. 

Consolidated  actions  which  were  in 
effect  one  action  attempting  to  se 
aside  former  judgment  in  order  tha 
plaintiff  might  attack  a  judgmen 
rendered  in  another  and  distinct  ac 
tion  constituted  a  "collateral  attack* 
on  judgment  in  former  action,  an< 
hence  could  be  maintained  only  1 
former  judgment  was  void  on  its 
face. — Hershey  v.  Banta,  99  P.2d  81 
55  Ariz.  93,  followed  in  Hershey  v 
Republic  Life  Ins.  Co.,  99  P.2d 
55  Ariz.  104. 
Escheat  proceedings 

A  decree  determining  that  named 
nationals  and  residents  of  Germany 
were  the  only  heirs  of  deceased  was 
conclusive,  and  could  not  be  collat- 
erally attacked  in  escheat  proceed 
ings  subsequently  brought  by  the 
state. — In  re  Giebler's  Estate,  Mont. 
162  P.2d  368. 
Defense  as  collateral  attack 

(1)  In  mortgage  foreclosure  ac- 
tion, affirmative  defense  that  mort- 
gagee agreed  to  transfer  exclusive 
patent  license  to  mortgagor,  and 
that,  by  judgment  in  a  prior  action, 
It  was  adjudged  that  mortgagor  had 
acquired  exclusive  license,  and  aver- 
ring that  mortgagor  had  since  ascer- 
tained existence  of  prior  transfers 
of  licenses  to  third  persons,  was  held 
properly  stricken  out  as  collateral 
attack  on  a  final  judgment. — Bank 
of  America  Nat.  Trust  &  Savings 
Ass'n  v.  Harriscolor  Films,  31  P.2d 
189,  220  Cal.  383. 

(2)  In  suit  for  fees  which  sheriff, 
pursuant  to  judgments,  collected  for 
attorney   whom   court  appointed  for 
nonresidents  in  tax  suits,  plea  that 
attorney  was   not  licensed  attorney 
was  held  objectionable  as  collateral 
attack  on  judgments. — Turner  v.  Wil- 
lacy  County,   Tex.Com.App.,   58  S.W. 
2d  12. 

(3)  Defense  that  trustee  for  bond- 
xolders  bid  in  property  in  name  of 

dummy  at  owner's  direction,  and  that 
no  cash  was  received,  was  held  not 
objectionable  as  collateral  attack  on 
foreclosure  record  showing  cash  sale, 
n  action  by  owner  of  bonds  to  re- 
cover from  trustee  proceeds  of  fore- 
closure sale.— White  v.  Central  Trust 
.  of  Illinois,  259  IlLApp.  68. 

Cross  complaint 

Where  defendant  filed  a  cross  com- 
)laint  to  foreclose  his  Hen,  claim  by 
rtaintiff  that  defendant's  lien  was 
obtained  by  subrogation  in  action  to 

cancel  deed  for  fraud,   which  court 

had  no  right  to  do,  was  a  collateral 
ttack  on  a  judgment  of  court  of 
ompetent  jurisdiction,  which  could 

not  be  set  up.— Rooker  v.  Leary,  149 
".E.  358,  84  Ind.App.  77. 

810 


27.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Trustees  of  Somerset  Academy  v. 
Picher,  C.C.A.Me.,  90  F.2d  741,  744. 
Ala. — Williams  v.  Overcast,  155  So. 
543,  229  Ala.  119 — Florence  Gin  Co. 
v.  City  of  Florence,  147  So.  417,  226 
Ala.  478,  followed  in  147  So.  420, 
three  cases,  226  Ala.  482,  147  So. 
421,  226  Ala.  482,  and  147  So.  421, 
226  Ala.  483— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Warren  v.  Southall,  141  So.  632, 
224  Ala.  653 — Penton  v.  Brown- 
Crummer  Inv.  Co.,  131  So.  14,  222 
Ala.  155— Hill  v.  Hooper,  110  So. 
323,  21  Ala.App.  584. 
Ark.— Wilder  v.  Harris.  168  S.W.2d 
804,  205  Ark.  341— Brick  v.  Sov- 
ereign Grand  Lodge  of  Accepted 
Free  Masons  of  Arkansas,  117  S. 
W.2d  1060,  196  Ark.  372 — Sewell  v. 
Reed,  71  S.W.2d  191,  189  Ark.  50— 
Turley  v.  Owen,  69  S.W.2d  882,  188 
Ark.  1067— State  v.  Wilson,  27  S. 
W.2d  106,  181  Ark.  683. 
D.C. — Edward  Thompson  Co.  v. 
Thomas,  49  F.2d  500,  60  App.D.C. 
118. 

Fla,— Bemis  v.  Loftin,  173  So.  683, 
127  Fla.  515 — Skipper  v.  Schu- 
macher, 169  So.  58,  124  Fla.  384. 
Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  An- 
derson v.  Schwitzer,  20  N.W.2d  69, 
71 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Brown 
v.  Tank,  297  N.W.  '801,  803,  230 
Iowa  370. 
Ky. — Furlong  v.  Finneran,  4  S.W.2d 
378,  223  Ky.  558— Woollums  v. 
Fowler,  269  S.W.  721,  207  Ky.  532. 
Minn.— Brotton  v.  Donovan,  224  N. 

W.  270,  177  Minn.  34. 
Mo. — Sheehan    v.    First    Nat.    Bank, 
140   S.W.2d  1,  346  Mo.   227— Reger 
v.    Reger,    293    S.W.    414,    316    Mo. 
1310. 

Mont.— State  ex  reL  Delmoe  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist., 
46  P.2d  39,  100  Mont.  131. 
Neb.— Douglas  County  v.  Feenan,  18 
N.W.2d  740,  146  Neb.  156— In  re 
Warner's  Estate,  288  N.W.  39,  137 
Neb.  25. 

Nev.— State    ex  rel.   Smith   v.    Sixth 
Judicial     Dist.     Court,     Humboldt 
County,  167  P.2d  648. 
N.J. — Sikora   v.   Smuc,    2$   A.2d   211, 

132  N.J.EQ.  396. 

Ohio.— State  v.  Marsh,  165  N.E.  843, 
120  Ohio  St.  222— Starr  v.  Weir, 
172  N.E.  537,  35  Ohio  App.  '374,  er- 
ror dismissed  Guaranty  Trust  Co. 
of  New  York  v.  -Starr,  172  N.E. 
381,  121  Ohio  St.  626. 
Okl. — Mid-Continent  Pipe  Line  Qo.  v. 
Seminole  County  Excise  Board,  146 
P.2d  996,  194  Okl.  40— Shefts  v. 
Oklahoma  Co.,  137  P.2d  589,  192 
OkL  483— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Porter  v.  Hansen,  124  P.2d  391,  190 
Old.  429 — Kauffman  v.  McLaughlin, 
114  P.2d  929,  189  Okl.  194 — May  v. 
Casker,  110  P.2d  287,  185  OkL  448 


49    (J.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  408 


annulling,  correcting,  or  modifying  such  decree;28 
an  objection,  incidentally  raised  in  the  course  of  the 
proceeding,  which  presents  an  issue  collateral  to  the 
issues  made  by  the  pleadings.29 

In  other  words,  if  the  action  or  proceeding  has 


an  independent  purpose  and  contemplates  some  oth- 
er relief  or  result,  although  the  overturning  of  the 
judgment  may  be  important  or  even  necessary  to 
its  success,  then  the  attack  on  the  judgment  is  col- 
lateral.30 This  is  the  case  where  the  proceeding  is 


— Robison  v.  Hamm,  64  P.2d  894, 
179  Okl.  79— Wright  v.  Saltmarsh, 
50  P.2d  694,  174  Okl.  226— Powers 
v.  Brown,  252  P.  27,  122  Okl.  40 — 
Ward  v.  Thompson,  237  P.  569,  111 
Okl.  52— Watkins  v.  Jester,  229  P. 
1085,  103  Okl.  201~Tidal  Refining 
Co.  v.  Tivis,  217  P.  163,  164,  91 
Okl.  189 — Ross  v.  Breene,  211  P. 
417,  88  Okl.  37. 

Tex. — Lipscomb  v.  Lofland,  Civ.App., 
141  S.W.2d  'S3,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  ct . .  ect — Smith  v.  Burns, 
Civ.Ajp>p.,  107  S.W.2d  397— Johnson 
v.  Ortiz  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.,  104  S.W. 
2d  543 — 'Foster  v.  Christensen,  Civ. 
•  App.,  42  S.W.2d  460,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  Com.App.,  67  S.W. 
2d  246. 

Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 
157,  94  Utah  271. 

Wash. — Globe  Const.  Co.  v.  Tost,  13 
P.2d  433,  169  Wash.  319— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Hanna  v.  Allen,  279 
P.  1098,  1101,  153  Wash.  485. 

W.Va. — Nelson  Transfer  &  Storage 
Co.  v.  Jarrett,  157  S.E.  46,  110  W. 
Va.  97 — Lough  v.  Taylor,  124  S.R 
585,  97  W.Va.  180. 

34  C.J.  p  S21  note  52. 

A  motion  to  quash  service  of  sum- 
mons after  judgment  and  after  term 
on  ground  that  service  was  not  duly 
made  was  properly  dismissed  as  be- 
ing an  indirect  attack  on  judgment 
beyond  authority  of  court  to  enter- 
tain.—Hinman  v.  Executive  Commit- 
tee of  Communistic  Party  of  U.  S. 
A.,  47  N.H.2d  820,  71  Ohio  App.  76. 

Proceeding  before  court  of  tax  re- 
view, wherein  validity  of  judgment 
against  city  rendered  by  state  dis- 
trict court  is  questioned  constitutes 
"collateral  attack"  on  judgment 
which  must  fail  unless  shown  to  be 
void  by  judgment  roll.— Protest  of 
St.  Louis-San  Francisco  Hy.  Co.,  42 
P.2d  537,  171  Okl.  180— Protest  of 
Gulf  Pipe  Line  Co.  of  Oklahoma,  32 
P.2d  42,  168  Okl.  136. 

Attack  by  supplemental  petition 
held  collateral  attack, — Duke  v.  Gil- 
breath,  TexCiv.App.,  2  S.W.2d  324, 
error  dismissed— Cockrell  v.  Steffens, 
Tex.Civ.A'pp.,  284  S.W.  608— -Texas 
Pacific  Coal  &  Oil  Co.  v.  Ames,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  254  S.W.  315,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  ConxApp.,  292  S.W. 
191. 

Appeal  or  motion  after  term 

'^Collateral  proceeding,"  within 
rule  that  party  may  not  deny  validi- 
ty of  judgmen^  rendered  at  his  in- 
stance, is  proceeding  other  than  ap- 
peal or  motion  during  the  term. — 


Poston  T.   Delfelder,    273   P.   176,    39 
Wyo.  163. 

Suit  on  insurance  policy  was  held 
collateral  attack  on  conviction  for 
burning  identical  property  with  in- 
tent to  injure  insurer. — Eagle,  Star 
and  British  Dominions  Ins. v  Co.  v. 
Heller,  140  S.E.  314,  149  Va,  82,  57 
A.L.R.  490. 

A  proceeding-  to  set  aside  two 
mortgages  executed  by  an  adminis- 
tratrix pursuant  to  authority  granted 
by  the  probate  court  was  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  collateral  attack  on  the 
judgment  of  the  probate  court,  and 
complainant  could  not  -prevail  unless 
the  judgments  were  void  on  the  face 
of  the  record,  or  unless  the  court 
lacked  jurisdiction  of  the  subject 
matter.— Reed  v.  Futrall,  115  S.W.2d 
542,  195  Ark.  1044. 

28.  U.S.— <Jorpns    Juris     quoted    in 
Trustees  of  Somerset  Academy  v. 
Picher,  C.C.A.Me.,  90  F.2d  '741,  744. 

Alaska.— ILynch  v.  Colllngs,  7  Alaska 

84. 
Ark. — Turley  v.  Owen,  69  S.W.2d  882, 

188  Ark.  1067. 
Or.— Gatt  v.  Hurlburt,  284  P.  172,  131 

Or.    554,   rehearing   denied   286   P. 

151,  132  Or.  415. 
Tex. — Burton    v.    McGuire,    Civ.App., 

3    S.W.2d  576,   affirmed,   Com. App., 

41  S.W.2d  238. 
Utah.— Intel-mill    v.    Nash,    75    P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hanna 

v.    Allen,    279    P.    1098,    1101,    153 

Wash.  485. 
34  C.J.  p  521  note  53. 

29.  U.S.— -Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 

Trustees  of  Somerset  Academy  v. 

Picher,  C.C.A.Me.,  90  F.2d  741,  744. 
34  C.  J.  p  521  note  54. 
Objection  by  way  of  evidence 

In  action  against  corporate  direc- 
tors as  statutory  trustees  on  judg- 
ment obtained  against  corporation 
before  forfeiture  of  its  charter,  evi- 
dence tending  to  show  that  indebted- 
ness for  which  judgment  against  cor- 
poration had  been  entered  had  been 
paid  prior  to  its  entry  was  properly 
excluded  as  a  ''collateral  attack"  on 
original  judgment.~-Caxton  Printers 
v.  Ulen,  86  P.2d  468,  59  Idaho  688. 

30.  U.S. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 

Trustees  of  Somerset  Academy  v. 
Picher,  •C.C.A.Me.,  90  'F.2d  741,  744 
— Murrell  v.  Stock  Growers'  Nat. 
Bank  of  Qheyenne,  C.C.A.Wyo.,  74 
F.2d  827 — Watts  v.  Alexander, 
Morrison  &  Co.,  -D.C.N.Y.,  34  F.2d 
66,  afllrmed,  C.C.A.,  Watts  v.  Van- 
derbilt,  45  F.2d  963. 

811 


Ariz.— Hershey  v.  Banta,  99  P.2d  81, 
55  Ariz.  93,  followed  in  Hershey  v. 
Republic  Life  Ins.  Co.,  99  P.2d  85, 
55  Ariz.  104 — Dockery  v.  Central 
Arizona  Light  &  Power  Co.,  45  P. 
2d  656,  45  Ariz.  434. 

Ark. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in'  Brooks 
v.  Baker,  187  -S.W.2d  169,  208  Ark. 
654 — Person  v.  Miller  Levee  Dist. 
No.  2,  150  S.W.2d  950,  202  Ark.  173 
— Bndsley  v.  Arkansas  Power  & 
Light  Co.,  115  S.W.2d  1070,  196 
Ark.  94— State  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Graue,  79  S.W.2d  268,  190  Ark. 
460. 

Cal. — Kaufmann  v.  California  Mining 
&  Dredging  Syndicate,  104  P.2d 
1038,  16  Cal.2d  90. 

Ga.— Marshall  v.  Marthin,  15  S.B.2d 
861,  192  Ga.  613— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Thomas  v.  Lambert,  1  S.B.2d 
443,  444,  187  Ga.  616— Rosenberg 
v.  Phelps,  126  S.B.  788,  159  Ga. 
607. 

Idaho.— Moyes  v.  Moyes,  94  P.2d  782, 
60  Idaho  -601— Welch  v.  Morris,  291 
P.  1048,  49  Idaho  781— Simonton  v. 
Simonton,  236  P.  863,  40  Idaho  751, 
42  A.L.R.  1363. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  An- 
derson v.  Schwitzer,  20  N.W.2d  69, 
71— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Brown 
v.  Tank,  297  N.W.  801,  80S,  230 
Iowa  370 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Newcomber  v.  Newcomber,  201  N. 
W.  S79,  580,  199  Iowa  290. 

Ky.— White  v.  White,  172  «S.W.2d  72, 
294  Ky.  563 — Newsome  v.  Hall,  161 
S.W.2d  629,  290  Ky.  486,  140  A.'L.R. 
818 — Haas  v.  Kentucky  Title  Trust 
Co.,  98  S.W.2d  494,  266  Ky.  215 — 
McFarland  v.  Hudson,  89  S.W.2d 
1877,  262  Ky.  183— Hays  v.  Adams, 
294  S.W.  1039,  220  Ky.  196. 

Minn. — In  re  Melgaard's  Will,  274 
N.W.  641,  200  Minn.  49*3. 

Mo. — Inter-River  Drainage  Dist.  of 
Missouri  v.  Henson,  App.p  99  S.W. 
2d  865. 

Neb.— In  re  Ramp's  Estate,  201  N.W. 
676,  113  Neb.  3. 

N.T.— Conyne  v.  McGibbon,  37  N.T. 
S.2d  590,  179  Misc.  54,  transferred, 
see  39  N.T.S.2d  609,  265  App.Div. 
976,  affirmed  41  N.T.S.2d  189,  266 
App.Div.  711. 

Okl.— 'Fidelity  &  -Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Clanton,  28  P.2d  566, 
167  Okl.  106— Moffer  v.  Jones,  169 
P.  652,  656,  67  Okl.  171. 

S.D. — Adamson  v.  Minnehaha  County, 
293  N.W.  542,  67  S.D.  423. 

Tex.— Griggs  v.  Montgomery,  Civ. 
App.,  22  S.W.2d  688— Reitz  v. 
Mitchell,  Civ.App.,  256  <S.W.  697. 


408 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


founded  directly  on  the  judgment  in  question,  or 
on  any  of  its  incidents  or  consequences  as  a  judg- 
ment,31 or  where  the  judgment  forms  a  part  of 


plaintiffs  title  or  of  the  evidence  by  which  his  claim 
is  supported.32  Where  no  relief  is  sought  against 
a  judgment,33  as,  for  instance,  where  the  proceed- 


Utah.— Intermill    v.    Nash,    75    P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
34  C.J.  p  522  note  55. 

In  action  to  foreclose  mortgage, 
executed  by  heir  of  deceased  owner 
of  mortgaged  land  as  security  for 
note  given  administrator  of  dece- 
dent's estate  for  money  borrowed  by 
mortgagor,  separate  answer  of  mort- 
gagor's grantee,  alleging  that  such 
instruments  were  void  because  of 
administrator's  acts  In  causing  un- 
lawful claims  to  be  filed  against  es- 
tate, «paying  them  without  allowance 
thereof  by  probate  court,  and  procur- 
ing probate  judge's  indorsement 
thereof  as  allowed  in  furtherance  of 
scheme  to  induce  mortgagor  to  bor- 
row money  on  land,  was  not  direct 
proceeding  in  equity  to  set  aside 
probate  court's  Judgment,  but  col- 
lateral proceeding,  wherein  question 
of  fraud  invalidating  such  claims 
could  not  be  raised.— Nelson  v.  Gos- 
sage,  107  P.2d  682,  152  Kan.  805. 

31.  Proceeding*   founded    on   jndff. 
meat  or  incidents  or  consequenc- 
es thereof 

(1)  Where,  pursuant  to  decree  re- 
forming statutory  appeal  bond  and 
determining  amount  due  thereunder, 
execution  was  levied  on  realty  and 
sheriffs  sale  was  held  pursuant  to 
writ  of  execution,  motion  to  set  aside 
levy  and  sheriff's  sale  was  in  effect 
a  collateral  attack  on  decree  reform- 
ing surety  bond  and  was  improper 
where  court  had  Jurisdiction  of  par- 
ties and  authority  to  reform  bond. — 
Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Detroit  v.  Burton, 
10  N.W.2d  315,  308  Mich.  81. 

(2)  Other  instances  see  34  C.J.  p 
522  note  56  [a]. 

32.  Ky.— Wells'   Adm'x  v.  Heil,   47 
S.W.2d  1041,   543   Ky.   282— Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Bays'  Adm'x, 
295  S.W.  452,  220  Ky.  458— Tarter 
v.  Wilson,   269  S.W.   715,   207  Ky. 
535— Decker    v.    Tyree,    264    S.W. 
726,  204  Ky.  302. 

Neb.— In  re  Warner's  Estate,  288  N. 

W.  39,  137  Neb.  25. 
N.C. — Clark  v.  Carolina  Homes,  128 

S.E.  20,  189  N.C.  703. 
34  C.J.  p  522  note  57. 
Trespa«s  to  try  title 

(1)  In  this  action  any  attack  on  a 
Judgment  which  forma  the  basis  of 
the  title  of  one  of  the  parties,  or 
enters  into  his  title,  will  be  consid- 
ered, a  collateral  impeachment  of 
such  judgment — Gamble  v.  Banney- 
er,  151  S.W.2d  586,  137  Tex.  7— Per- 
mian Oil. Co.  v.  Smith,  107  S.W.24 
564,  129  Tex.  413,  111  A.L.R.  1152— 
Stewart  Oil  Co.  v.  Lee,  Tex.Civ.Apip., 
173  S.W.2d  791,  error  refused^-Don- 
aldson  v.  Cleveland,  Tex.Civ.App.,  157 
&W.2d  689,  error  refused— Smoot  v. 


Chambers,  Tex.Civ.App.,  156  S.W.2d 
314,  error  refused— Dittmar  v.  St. 
Louis  Union  Trust  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App., 
155  S.W.2d  3SS,  error  refused— Clay- 
ton v.  Reamer,  Tex.Civ.App.,  153  S. 
W.2d  1020,  error  refused— Livingston 
v.  Stubbs,  Tex.Civ.App.,  151  S.W.2d 
285,  error  dismissed,  Judgment  cor- 
rect— Gann  v.  Putman,  Tex.Civ.App., 
141  S.W.2d  758,  error  dismissed, 
Judgment  correct — Mercer  v.  Rubey, 
Tex.Clv.App.,  108  S.W.2d  677,  error 
refused— Waitz  v.  Uvalde  Rock  As- 
phalt Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  58  S.W.2d 
8  84 — Burton  v.  McGuire,  Tex.  Civ. 
App.,  3  S.W.2d  576,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.,  41  S.W.2d  238— Bonougli  v. 
Guerra,  Tex.Civ.App.,  286  S.W.  '344 
—34  C.J.  p  522  note  56  [a], 

(2)  In   suit  to   quiet  title,  where 
complaint   did   not  mention  foreclo- 
sure  decree  through  which  defend- 
ant   deraigned    title    and    defendant 
counterclaimed  to  quiet  title  without 
referring  to  decree,  answer  to  coun- 
terclaim alleging  that  decree  was  en- 
tered     in      foreclosure      proceeding 
wherein  service  was  by  publication 
without   any    sufficient    affidavit    of 
jurisdictional  facts  authorizing  such 
service  constituted  collateral  attack 
on  foreclosure  decree  and  did  not  au- 
thorize introduction  of  evidence  de- 
hors  record,  such  as  the  affidavit,  to 
show  invalidity  of  decree. — Intermil-1 
v.  Nash,  75  P.2d  157,  94  Utah  271. 

(3)  Amended   petition   in  trespass 
to  try  title,  alleging  that  property 
had    been   sold   under  Judgment   on 
trust  deed  which  had  been  executed 
to  secure  Judgment  against  property, 
that    property    was    homestead    of 
judgment  debtor  and  not  subject  to 
debt  and  lien  asserted,  and  that  prop- 
erty was  sold  for  inadequate  consid- 
eration, was  held  not  subject  to  spe- 
cial exception  as  collateral  attack  on 
Judgment — Milliken    v.    Coker,    Civ. 
App.,  90  S.W.2d  902,  modified  on  oth- 
er grounds  115  S.W.2d  620,  132  Tex. 
23. 

(4)  In  trespass  to  try  title  to  real- 
ty which  had  been  purchased  with 
money  which  heir  had  enabled  pur- 
chaser  to   borrow   under  agreement 
with  heir  that  purchaser  would  pur- 
chase realty  for  heir's   benefit  and 
then  convey  realty  to  the  heir,  testi- 
mony showing  lack  of  consideration 
received  by  heir  for  sale  of  realty 
was  not  inadmissible  on  ground  that 
it  amounted  to  a  collateral  attack  on 
orders   of  probate  court  confirming 
sale   to  purchaser  where  purchaser 
held  realty  in  trust  for  benefit  of 
the  heir  and  evidence  showing  trust 
relation  did  not  amount  to  collateral 
attack  on  order  of  probate  court — 
Berry  v.  Chadwick,  Tex.Civ.App.,  137 

812 


S.W.2d    859,    error   dismissed,    Judg- 
ment correct, 
famishment 

(1)  The    validity    of   a    Judgment 
cannot  be  questioned  in  garnishment 
proceedings  based  thereon. — Aach  v. 
Pippart,    Mo.Ap.p.,    261    S.W.    929—34 
C.J.  p  522  note  57  [b]. 

(2)  In     garnishment     proceedings 
against    bank    having    deposits    for 
benefit  of  several  classes  of  claims 
against  mutual  benefit  society,  mere 
showing  of  nature  of  claim  on  which 
Judgment   against   society  was   ren- 
dered was  held  not  collateral  attack 
on  Judgment — Spain  v.  'First   State 
Bank  of  Stamford,   Tex.Civ.App.,   39 
S.W.2d  184,  error  dismissed. 

33.  U.S. — Strates  v.  Dimotsis,  C.C.A. 
Tex.,  110  F.2d  374,  certiorari  denied 
•61  S.Ct  24,  '311  U.S.  666,  *5  (L.Bd. 
427— Pueblo  De  Taos  v.  Archuleta, 
C.C.A.N.M.,  64  F.2d  807. 

Ark.— Newton  v.  Stewart,  148  S.W. 
2d  1072,  202  Ark.  62— Wyatt  v. 
Beard,  15  S/W.2d  990,  179  Ark.  305 
— Hicks  v.  Nors worthy,  4  S.W.2d 
897,  176  Ark.  786. 

111. — Leviton  v.  Board  of  Education 
of  City  of  Chicago,  53  N.B.2d  596, 
385  ill.  599. 

Kan.— Kirwin  v.  Mclntosh,  9*  P.2d 
160,  151  Kan.  289 — Farmers'  State 
Bank  of  Cunningham  v.  Crow,  267 
P.  1100,  126  Kan.  395. 

Ky. — Ballew  v.  Denny,  177  S.W.2d 
152,  296  Ky.  "368,  150  A.L.R.  770— 
Sell  v.  Pierce,  140  S.W.2d  1027,  283 
Ky.  143 — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v. 
Huffaker's  Adm'r,  13  S.W.2d  260, 
227  Ky.  358. 

Mass. — Mahoney  v.  Nollman,  35  N. 
E.2d  265,  '309  Mass.  522— City  of 
Boston  v.  Santosuosso,  30  N.E.2d 
278,  307  Mass.  302. 

Mo. — Boatmen's  Nat.  Bank  of  St. 
Louis  v.  Cantwell,  App.,  161  8.W. 
2d  431. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  lit  Cas- 
cade County  v.  Weaver,  90  P.2d 
164,  169,  108  Mont.  1. 

Nev.— Butzbach  v.  Siri,  5  P.2d  533, 
53  Nev.  453. 

N.J.— Ash  v.  Cohn,  194  A.  174,  119  N. 
J.Law  54. 

N.C. — Johnson  v.  (Futrell  Bros.  Luxn- 

-  ber  Co.,  35  S.E.2d  -889,  225  N.C. 
595— North  Carolina  Joint  Stock 
Land  Bank  of  Durham  v.  Kerr,  .175 
S.B.  102,  206  N.C.  610. 

Ohio.— Petitt  v.  Morton,  176  N.B.  494, 
38  Ohio  App.  '348,  affirmed  Morton 
v.  Petitt,  177  N.E.  591,  124  Ohio 
St  241 — Poehl  v.  Cincinnati  Trac- 
tion Co.,  151  N.E.'  806,  20  Ohio 
Ajvp.  145.  ' 

Okl.— Gragg  v.  PrUitt,  65  P.2d  994, 
179  Okl.  369. 

S.D. — Salem      Independent      School 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§409 


ing  is  for  the  purpose  of  construing  the  judgment,34 
or  determining  its  scope  and  effect35  or  its  nature,36 
there  is  no  infraction  of  the  rule  against  collateral 
attack. 

The  introduction  of  evidence  to  show  the  actual 
owner  of  a  judgment  has  been  held  not  a  collateral 
attack  on  the  judgment.37  Inquiry  into  the  circum- 
stances under  which  a  judgment  was  obtained  is 
not  necessarily  a  collateral  attack.3^ 


§  409.    Proceedings 

ment 


to  Enforce    Judg- 


A  proceeding  to  enforce  a  judgment  Is  collateral  to 
the  judgment,  and  therefore  no  inquiry  into  its  reg- 
ularity or  validity  can  be  permitted  in  such  a  proceed- 
ing. 


A  proceeding  to  enforce  a  judgment  is  collateral 
to  the  judgment,  and  therefore  no  inquiry  into  its 
regularity  or  validity  can  be  permitted  in  such  a 
proceeding,  whether  it  is  a  direct  action  on  the 
judgment39  or  on  a  note  given  in  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment,40  or  a  proceeding  to  revive  the  judg- 
ment,41 or  proceedings  supplementary  to  execu- 
tion,42 or  a  bill  in  equity  in  aid  of  execution  or  to 
enforce  the  lien  of  the  judgment,43  or  a  rule  to 
show  cause  why  a  writ  of  possession  should  not  is- 
sue,44 or  an  action  or  suit  to  set  aside  a  convey- 
ance and  subject  property  to  satisfaction  of  a  judg- 
ment45 The  rule  also  applies  whether  the  pro- 
ceeding is  for  an  injunction  to  protect  rights  ac- 
quired by  a  judgment,48  or  presentation  of  the 


Dist  No.  17  of  McCook  County  v. 
Circuit  Court  of  McCook  County 
in  Second  Judicial  Circuit  244  N. 
W.  373,  60  S.D.  341. 

Tex. — Jagoe  Const  Co.  v.  U.  S.  Fi- 
delity &  Guaranty  Co.,  Civ.App., 
58  S.W.2d  503— Smith  v.  Gaines, 
Civ.App.,  243  S.W.  665— Chappel  v. 
State,  126  S.W.2d  984,  136  Tex.Cr. 
528. 

34  C.J.  ,p  522  note  58. 

34.  Mont.— Corpus   Juris  Quoted  in 
Cascade  County  v.  Weaver,  90  P. 
2d  164,  169,  108  Mont.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  522  note  59. 

35.  Ind.— Au-lt    v.    Clark,    112    N.E. 
843,  846,  62  Ind.App.  55. 

Tex. — State   v.   Reagan  County  Pur- 
chasing  Co.,    Civ.App.,    186   S.W.2d 
128,  error  refused. 
Admission  of  parol  evidence  to  ex- 
plain Justice's  judgment  entered  on 
docket  for  amount  beyond  his  juris- 
diction, so  as  to  show  judgment  for 
amount  within  his  jurisdiction,  does 
not    constitute    collateral   attack   on 
judgment,   as   purpose  of  such  evi- 
dence is  not  to  destroy,  but  to  vivi- 
fy, an  imperfect  judgment. — Fleming 
v.  Kemp,  Tenn.App.f  178  S.W.2d  397. 

36.  Mont — Corpus   Juris   quoted   in 
Cascade  County  v.  Weaver,   90  P. 
2d  164,  169,  108  Mont  1. 

34  C.J.  p  522  note  60. 
Adjudication  of  nature 

Decision  holding  judgment  on  bank 
stockholder's  statutory  liability  un- 
enforceable by  assignee  was  held  not 
collateral  attack  on  judgment,  but 
adjudication  of  its  nature. — Roe  v. 
King,  251  N.W,  81,  217  Iowa  213, 

37.  Md. — Green    v.    Green,    35    A.2d 
238,  182  Md.  571. 

38.  Mass.— Harvey  v.  Waitt,  44  N.E. 
2d  629,  312  Mass.  333. 

.39.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in 
City  of  Wheeling  v.  John  P.  Casey 
Co.,  89  F.2d  308,  310. 

Ala'.— Naftel  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Mitch- 
ell, 101  So.  653,  212  Ala.  32. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Boeh- 


mer  v.  Herlingf,  227  N.W.  755,  756, 
248  Mich.  380— Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Cook  v.  Casualty  Ass'n  of  Amer- 
ica, 224  N.W.  341,  342,  246  Mich. 
278. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Rawl- 
ings  v.  American  Oil  Co.,  161  So. 
851,  853,  173  Miss.  68*. 

N.J. — Henderson  v.  Weber,  28  A.2d 
90,  129  N.J.Law  59. 

N.Y. — Greenwich  Sav.  Bank  v.  Sam- 
otaa,  17  N.Y.S.2d  772. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Travelers 
Ins,  Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  v.  Stai- 
ger,  69  P.2d  1069,  1071,  157  Or.  143. 

Pa. — Secretary  of  Banking  v.  Miller, 
Com.Pl.,  40  (Lack.Jur.  17. 

Tenn. — Robertson  v.  Johnson,  177  S. 
W.2d  860,  27  Tenn.App.  59— Corpus 
Juris  quoted,  in  Clements  v. 
Holmes,  120  S.W.Sd  988,  991,  22 
Tenn.App.  230. 

Tex. — Hunt  Production  Co.  v.  Bur- 
rage,  Civ.App.,  104  S.W.2d  84,  er- 
ror dismissed — Newman  v.  City  of 
Bl  Paso,  Civ.App.,  77  S.W.2d  721, 
error  dismissed. 

Wash.— Petition  of  City  of  Seattle, 
138  P.2d  667,  18  Wash.2d  167. 

34  C.J.  p  523  note  61. 

Defenses 
In  an  action  on  a  judgment  the 

rule     forbidding     contradiction     of 

judgment  is   not  to  be  avoided  by 

calling  the  contradiction  an  eauita- 

ble  defense. — Bremner  v.  Hester,  155 

N.B.  454,  258  Mass.  425. 

40.  Ind. — Citizens  Loan  &  Trust  Co. 
v.   Boyles,    1  N.B.2d  292,   102  Ind. 
App.  157. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Clem- 
ents v.  Holmes,  120  S.W.2d  988, 
991,  22  Tenn.App.  230. 

34  C.J.  p  523  note  -62. 

41.  Idaho.— Tingwall    v.    King    Hill 
Irr.  Dist,  155  P.3d  605. 

La. — Henry  v.  Roque,  App.,  18  So,2d 

917. 
Mo. — Coombs    v.    Benz,    114    S.W.2d 

713,  232  MO.APP.  1011. 
Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  guoted  in  Clem- 

813 


ents   v.   Holmes,    120   S.W.2d   988, 
991,  22  Tenn.App.  230. 
34  C.J.  p  523  note  -63. 

42.  Ind.— Draper  v.  Zebec,   37  N.B. 
2d  952,  219  Ind.  "362,  rehearing  de- 
nied 38  N.E.2d  995,  219  Ind.  362. 

Mo. — Row  v.  Cape  Girardeau  'Foun- 
dry Co.,  App.,  141  S.W.2d  113. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Clem- 
ents v.  Holmes,  120  S.W.2d '  988, 
991,  22  Tenn.App.  230. 

'34  C.J.  p  £23  note  64. 

43.  Tenn. — Clements  v.  Holmes,  120 
S.W.2d  988,  22  Tenn.App.  230. 

Tex. — McGehee  v.  Brookins,  Civ. 
App.,  140  S.W.2d  963,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct 

W.Va. — Lough  v.  Taylor,  124  S.B. 
585,  $7  W.Va.  ISO. 

34  C.J.  p  52$  note  65. 

44.  La.— Maloney  v.  Wilkinson,   129 
So.  374,  170  La.  868. 

Default  Judgment 

Where  default  judgment  had  been 
rendered  determining  that  plaintiff 
was  entitled  to  peaceable  and  un- 
disturbed possession  of  land  which 
was  in  defendant's  possession,  on 
rule  to  show  cause  why  plaintiff's  as- 
signee should  not  be  put  into  posses- 
sion of  land,  refusal  to  allow  defend- 
ant to  seek  to  nullify  the  default 
judgment  was  not  error  where  de- 
fendant failed  to  set  up  in  her  an- 
swer any  legal  ground  for  annulling 
the  judgment  rendered  against  her 
more  than  five  years  before  the  rule 
was  issued. — Bodcaw  -Lumber  Co.  of 
•Louisiana  v.  Wallette,  La, App.,  19  So. 
2d  663. 

45.  Ky.— Hopkins  v.  Cox,   174   S.W. 
2d  418,  295  Ky.  286. 

N.Y.— Collins  v.  Burr,  204  N.Y.S.  357, 

209  AppJDiv.  116. 
W.Va. — Crickmer  v.  Thomas,  200  S. 

B.  353,  120  W.Va,  769. 

46.  Mont— Missoula  Light  &  Water 
Co.  v.  Hughes,   77   P.2d  1041,   10-6 
Mont.  355. 


§  409 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


judgment  to  the  probate  court  for  classification  as 
a  demand  against  the  judgment  debtor's  estate,47 
or  an  action  of  ejectment,48  or  a  proceeding  by 
mandamus  to  compel  the  payment  of  a  judgment49 
or  award,50  or  to  compel  the  levy  and  collection 
of  a  tax  to  provide  funds  for  the  payment  of  the 
judgment,  the  debtor  being  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion,51 or  an  action  to  enjoin  the  collection  of  a 
tax  levied  to  pay  a  judgment  against  a  municipal 
corporation.52  In  a  proceeding  of  this  kind,  it  may 
be  shown  that  the  judgment  is  absolutely  void  for 
want  of  jurisdiction.53  In  a  suit  on  a  judgment,  a 
contention  that  the  judgment  was  not  final  is  not  a 
collateral  attack.54  In  garnishment  proceedings  on 
a  judgment,  a  motion  to  dismiss  which  raises  the 
point  that  on  the  face  of  the  proceeding  there  is 
no  judgment  in  existence  and  that  it  is  conclusively 
presumed  to  have  been  paid  is  not  a  collateral  at- 
tack on  the  judgment.55 


Reversal  of  judgment.  A  final  judgment  revers- 
ing a  judgment  can  not  be  collaterally  attacked  by 
mandamus  proceedings  to  compel  the  clerk  of  court 
to  issue  execution  on  the  reversed  judgment.56 

§  410.    Proceedings  to  Prevent  Enforce- 
ment of  Judgment 

Proceedings  to  prevent  the  enforcement  of  a  judg- 
ment are  direct  or  collateral  attacks  depending  on  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  nature  of  the  pro- 
ceeding. 

It  has  been  broadly  stated  that  a  proceeding  for 
equitable  relief  from  the  effect  of  a  judgment,  or- 
der, or  decree  is  not  a  collateral  attack.5?  Accord- 
ing to  some  decisions,  and  under  some  circumstanc- 
es, a  suit  in  equity  to  enjoin  or  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment constitutes  a  direct  attack  on  it;58  according 
to  others,  or  under  other  circumstances,  such  a  pro- 


47.  Mo. — Gunby    v.    Cooper,    164    S. 
W.    152,   177   Mo.App.   354. 

48.  Ala.— Rosebrook    v.    Martin,    76 
So.  950,  200  Ala.  592. 

34  C.J.  p  523  note  67. 

40.     U.S. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
City  of  Wheeling  v.  John  F.  Casey 
Co.,  C.C.A.W.VE.,  89  F.2d  308,   310, 
certiorarl   denied   58   S.Ct.    15,    302 
U.S.  697,  82  L.Ed.  538. 
CaL — Johnson     v.     Fontana     County 
Fire    Protection    Dist.,     101     P.2d 
1092,  15  Cal.2d  380. 
111. — People  ex  rel.   Baird  &  Warner 
v.   Lindheimer,   19  N.E.2d  336,   370 
111.   424— Wille  v.   Hodes,   1  N.E.2d 
1015,  285  IlLA-pp.  331. 
W.Va.— State   v.   Hall,   119   SJBL   166, 

94  W.Va.  400. 
34  C.J.  p  523  note  68. 
Where  judgment  not  assailed 

In  mandamus  proceedings  to  com- 
pel city  to  pay  balance  on  condemna- 
tion judgment  awards  after  relator 
and  city  had  entered  into  a  binding 
stipulation  requiring  relator  to  re- 
move relator's  buildings  from  con- 
demned land  at  relator's  expense,  ad- 
mitting the  stipulation  in  evidence 
did  not  constitute  a  collateral  at- 
tack on  condemnation  judgment,  and 
holding  relator  to  performance  of  its 
undertaking  to  remove  buildings  did 
not  modify  or  contradict  judgment 
either  as  to  its  amount  or  finality. — 
People  ex  ret  Moody  Bible  Institute 
of  Chicago  v.  City  of  Chicago,  "37  N. 
E.2d  895,  312  IlLApp.  126,  error  dis- 
missed 46  N.E.2d  918,  382  111.  70,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Moody  Bible  Institute 
of  Chicago  v.  City  of  Chicago,  64  S. 
Ct.  37,  '320  U.S.  705,  -88  XuEd.  413. 

50.  Mich. — Detroit  Trust  Co.  v.  Van 
Wagoner,  295  N.W.  222,  295  Mich. 
449,  followed  in  Judson  Bradway 
Co.  v.  Van  Wagoner,  295  N.W.  224, 
295  Mich.  455. 


51.  U.S.— City    of    Mohall    v.    'First 
Nat.     Bank,    C.C.A.X.D.,     105    F.2d 
315,   certiorari  denied  City  of  Mo- 
hall,   North   Dakota   v.   First   Nat. 
Bank,    60    S.Ct.    110,    308    U.S.    587, 
S4  L.Ed.  491 — Corpus  Juris  quoted 
in    City   of   Wheeling   v.    John    F. 
Casey    Co.,    C.C.A.W.Va.,    89    F.2d 
308,   certiorari  denied   58   S.Ct   15, 
302  U.S.  697,  82  JJ.Ed.  538. 

Alaska. — Dickinson  v.  Town  of  Pe- 
tersburg, 6  Alaska  488. 

•Fla. — Campbell  v.  State  ex  rel.  Gar- 
rett,  168  So.  33,  124  Fla.  244. 

111. — Moore  v.  Town  of  Browning,  27 
N.E.2d  533,  373  111.  583. 

Wis. — Slama  v.  Young,  225  N.W.  830, 
199  Wis.  82. 

34  C.J.  p  523  note  69. 

52.  Wyo. — Grand  Island  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.    v.    Baker,    45   P.    494,   6   Wyo. 
369,  71  Am.S.R.  926,  34  -L..R.A.  835. 

53.  111. — Chambers  v.  City  of  Chica- 
go, 270  IlLApp.  217. 

Miss. — Schwartz  Bros.  &  Qo.  v.  Staf- 
ford,  148  So.   794,  166  Miss.   397. 
Nev. — State   ex   rel.   Smith  v.    Sixth 
Judicial     Dist.     Court,     Humboldt 
County,  167  P.2d  648. 
N.Y.— Finkelstein      v.     William     H. 
Block  Co.,  208  N.T.S.  401,  124  Misc. 
610. 

N.D. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Lyons  v. 
Otter    Tail    Power    Co.,    280    N.W. 
192,  195,  68  N.D.  403. 
34  C.J.  p  523  note  71. 
Want  of  service  of  process 

(1)  Where  property  after  foreclo- 
sure of  trust  deed  was  sold  to  pur- 
chaser who  refused  to  comply  with 
his  bid,  answer  by  purchaser  in  pro- 
ceeding by  commissioner  to  compel 
purchaser  to  comply  with  bid  that 
decree  of  foreclosure  was  void  on 
ground  that  minor  defendants  had 
never  been  served  or  represented  con- 
stituted a  permissible  direct  attack 

814 


and  not  a  collateral  attack,  notwith- 
standing it  was  not  made  until  after 
expiration  of  the  term  at  which  the 
decree  was  entered,  where  chancellor 
had  specifically  retained  control  of 
proceedings.— Fisher  v.  Wilkerson, 
139  S.W.2d  689,  199  Ark.  31. 

(2)  In  suit  by  mortgagee's  as- 
signee to  Quiet  title  under  sheriff's 
deed  procured  on  foreclosure  where- 
in mortgagor  filed  cross  complaint 
attacking  default  foreclosure  decree 
as  void  on  ground  that  no  process 
had  been  served  on  mortgagor  and 
wife,  cross  complaint  and  answer 
constituted  a  "direct  attack"  on  the 
foreclosure  decree. — John  Hancock 
Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gooley,  83  P.2d 
221,  196  Wash.  357,  118  A.L.R.  1484. 
Pleading  an&  proof 

Parties  purportedly  making  direct 
attack  on  judgment  in  another  case 
were  required  to  plead  and  prove 
such  facts  as  would  show  direct  at- 
tack thereon.— O'Quinn  v.  Tate,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  187  S.W.2d  241. 
Proceeding  to  revive  judgment 

Where  jurisdictional  defects  are 
apparent  on  face  of  record,  judgment 
may  be  attacked  collaterally  in  scire 
facias  proceeding,  regardless  of  pur- 
pose for  which  scire  facias  is  issued. 
—Woods  v.  Spoturno,  183  A.  319,  7 
W.W.Harr.,  Del.,  295,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  Spoturno  v.  Woods, 
192  A.  689,  8  W.W.Harr.  378. 

54.  Tex. — Gathings     v.     Robertson, 
Com.App.,   276   S.W.  218. 

55.  Ala.— Second  Nat.  Bank  v.  All- 
good,    176    So.    363,   234   Ala.   654. 

56.  Mo. — State  ex  rel.  McGrew  Coal 
Co.  v.  Ragland,  97  S.W.2d  113,  339 
Mo.  452. 

57.  Cal.— Caldwell  v.   Taylor,    23   P. 
2d  758,  218  Cal.  471,  88  A.L.R.  1194. 

58.  U.S.— Seay    v.    Hawkins,    C.C.A. 
OkL,  17  F.2d  710. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§410 


cceding  is  collateral59  unless  fraud  is  alleged;60 
still  others  hold  that  a  suit  to  set  aside  a  judgment 


is  neither  the  one  nor  the  other,6!  but  is  properly 
designated  an  indirect  attack.62 


Ala.— Martin  v.  State,  13  So.2d  206, 
244  Ala.  323— 'Fowler  v.  Fowler, 
122  So.  440,  219  Ala.  453. 

Ark. — Brick  v.  Sovereign  Grand 
Lodge  of  Accepted  Free  Masons  of 
Arkansas,  117  S.W.2d  1060,  196 
Ark.  372. 

Cal. — Rico  v.  Nasser  Bros.  Realty 
Co.,  13'7  P.2d  '?61,  58  Cal.App.2d 
378— Wilson  v.  Wilson,  130  P.2d 
782,  55  Cal.App.2d  421— Hammell 
v.  Britton,  119  P.2d  333,  19  Cal. 
App.2d  72. 

Ky._- Hill  v.  Walker,  180  S.W.2d  93, 
297  Ky.  257,  154  A.L.R.  814— New- 
some  v.  Hall,  161  S.W.2d  -629,  290 
Ky.  486,  140  A.L.R.  818. 

Mich. — Grigg  v.  Hanna,  278  N.W. 
125,  283  Mich.  443. 

Mo. — Jefferson  City  Bridge  &  Transit 
Co.  v,  Blaser,  300  S.W.  778,  318 
Mo.  373. 

X.J. — Giehrach  v.  Ruj>p,  164  A.  465, 
112  N.J.Eq.  296. 

N.Y. — Citizen's  Bank  of  White  Plains 
v.  Oglesby,  39  N.T.S.2d  500,  265 
App.Div.  1062,  appeal  denied  41  N. 
Y.S.2d  219,  266  App.Div.  682. 

Okl. — Seekatz  v.  Brandenburg,  300  P. 
678,  150  Okl.  53. 

Or. — Dixie  Meadows  Independence 
Mines  Co.  v.  Kight,  45  P.2d  909, 
150  Or.  395 — State  Bank  of  Sheri- 
dan v.  Heider,  9  P.2d  117,  139  Or. 
185. 

Tenn.— Wood  v.  Elam,  4  Baxt.  341 — 
Kates  v.  Anderson,  Dulin,  Varnell 
Co.,  9  Tenn.App.  "396. 

Wash. — McElroy  v.  Puget  -Sound  Nat. 
Bank,  288  P.  241,  157  Wash.  43. 

34  C.J.  p  523  note  72. 

Satisfaction  of  judgment 

A  suit  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of 
a  judgment  on  the  ground  that  it 
has  been  satisfied  has  been  held  not 
to  be  a  collateral  attack. — Smith  v. 
Morrill,  55  P.  824,  12  Colo.App.  233. 

Guardian's  suit  to  enjoin  enforce- 
ment  of  alimony  judgment  against 
insane  ward  for  fraud  in  procuring 
it  was  held  not  barred  as  collateral 
attack  on  judgment  granting  defend- 
ant divorce.— Crow  v.  Crow-Humph- 
rey, 73  S.W.2d  807,  335  Mo.  -636. 

Injunction   to    restrain   trespass    on 

land  condemned 
Where  a  county  court  condemned 
land  for  highway  purposes  and  dis- 
allowed landowners'  claims  for  com- 
pensation because  of  insufficient 
funds  from  which  to  -pay  claims,  a 
subsequent  injunction  issued  by  a 
chancery  court  of  county  wherein 
land  was  located  restraining  persons 
from  trespassing  upon  land  was  not 
a  collateral  attack  on  county  court's 
judgment.— Arkansas  State  Highway 
Commission  v.  Hammock,  148  S.W.2d 
a24,  201  Ark.  927. 


In  Texas 

(1)  Generally  an  action  to   enjoin 
enforcement  of  a  judgment,  rendered 
:>y  the  court  in  which  the  action  is 
brought,   is   considered  a   direct  at- 
tack, not  a  collateral  attack,  on  the 
Judgment. — Switzer    v.    Smith,    Com. 
App.,   *300    S.W.    31,    68   AJL..R.    377— 
Willbanks   v.   Montgomery,   Civ.App., 
189  S.W.2d  337— Bragdon  v.  Wright, 
Civ.App.,   142   S.W.2d   703,   error  dis- 
missed—Settles v.   Milano  Furniture 
Co.,    Civ.App.,    51    S.W.2d    655,    error 
refused — Citizens'   Bank  v.   Brandau, 
Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  466,  error  refused 
— Carlton    v.    Hoff,    Civ.App.,    292    S. 
W.   642. 

(2)  If   brought    in    a    court    other 
than  the  one  in  which  the  judgment 
was  rendered  it  is  collateral. — Stew- 
art  v.   Adams,   Civ.App.,    171   S.W.2d 
180— Getting       v.       Mineral      Wells 
Crushed  Stone  Co.,   Civ.App.,    262   S. 
W.  93. 

(3)  Even  though  injunction  suit  to 
restrain  the  enforcement  of  a  judg- 
ment constituted  a  collateral  attack, 
such  suit  was  proper  where  the  judg- 
ment   was    void. — Lewis    v.    Terrell, 
Civ.App.,    154    S.W.2d   151,    error  re- 
fused. 

(4)  A    suit    to     enjoin    judgment 
creditors    and    sheriff    from    selling 
realty    under    execution    to    satisfy 
judgment,      which      was      rendered 
against   plaintiff  by  court  in  which 
suit  was   brought  and  grew  out  of 
same  case  under  same  docket  num- 
ber, constituted  direct  attack,  rather 
than  collateral  attack,  on  judgment, 
— Willbanks     v.     Montgomery,     Civ. 
App.,  189  S.W.2d  337. 

(5)  Judgment    rendered    by    court 
without  jurisdiction  may  be  set  aside 
on   direct   attack   by   suit   instituted 
for    such    purpose. — Ezell    v.    Texas 
Employers'    Ins.    Ass'n,    Civ.App.,    5 
S.W.2d      594,      reversed      on      other 
grounds  Texas  Employers'  Ins.  Ass'n 
v.   Ezell,   Com.App.,   14   S.W.2d   1018, 
rehearing  denied  16  S.W.2d  523. 

(6)  Suit    to    set    aside    judgment, 
brought  by  one  who  was  served  and 
defaulted,  on  ground  that  all  neces- 
sary   parties    were    not    joined,    in- 
volves  collateral  attack  on  voidable 
judgment— State  Mortg.  Corporation 
v.  Garden,  Civ.App.,  11  S.W.2d  212. 

(7)  Judgment   in    judgment    debt- 
or's proceeding  to  set  aside  Judgment 
could  not  be  collaterally  attacked  in 
suit  to   enjoin  execution  sale  under 
judgment. — Simmons    v.    Sikes,    Civ 
App.,  56  S.W.2d  193,  error  dismissed 

59.  Ark.— Lambie  v.  W.  T.  Raw- 
leighf  Co.,  14  S.W.2d  245,  178  Ark. 
1019. 

815 


Fla.— Richart  v.  Roper,  25  So.2d  80 
— Bemis  v.  Loftin,  173  So.  683,  127 
Fla.  515. 

Iowa.— Hawkeye    Life    Ins.    Co.     v. 

Valley-Des   Moines   Co.,    260   N.W. 

669,  220  Iowa  556,  105  A.L.R.  1018. 
Ky. — Breeding  v.  Commonwealth,  264 

S.W.  1050,  204  Ky.  433. 
Mich.— Sablain   v.    National   Refining 

Co.,  2-86  N.W.  611,  289  Mich.  269. 
N.D.— Olson  v.  Donnelly,  294  N.W. 

666,  70  N.D.  370. 
34  C.J.  p  523  note  73. 

As  against  innocent  purchasers 

A  suit  to  set  aside  judgment  fore- 
closing vendor's  liens  in  which  there 
was  an  admission  that  the  owners 
and  holders  of  interests  in  the  land 
were  innocent  purchasers  for  value 
without  notice  except  the  notice  re- 
flected by  the  record  in  the  action, 
the  Judgment  of  which  was  sought 
to  be  set  aside,  constituted  a  collat- 
eral attack  on  the  Judgment  and 
could  be  maintained  only  If  the  Judg- 
ment was  void  on  its  face  or  cir- 
cumstances surrounding  its  entry 
would  cause  a  prudent  person  to 
make  inquiry  which,  if  pursued  with 
reasonable  diligence,  would  reveal 
the  vice  of  the  judgment. — Williams 
v.  Tooke,  Tex.Civ.App.,  116  -S.W.2d 
1114,  error  dismissed. 

Extraordinary  equitaWe  remedy 

A  collateral  attack  on  a  judgment 
of  a  court  having  jurisdiction  of  par- 
ties and  subject  matter  is*  an  "extra- 
ordinary equitable  remedy"  and  is 
closely  circumscribed. — In  re  Gray's 
Will,  8  N.Y.S.Sd  850,  169  Misc.  985. 

Motion  to  set  avide 

In  suit  in  equity  to  establish  and 
enforce  a  lien,  a  tenant's  motion  to 
set  aside  order  for  writ  of  possession 
to  put  landlord  in  possession  of  ten- 
ant's house,  purchased  by  landlord 
under  decree  for  sale  thereof  to  en- 
force landlord's  statutory  lien,  was 
collateral  attack  on  such  decree. — 
Chandler  v.  Price,  15  So.Sd  462,  244 
Ala.  667. 

60.  Ind.— 'Frankel  v.  Garrard,  6-6  N. 
E.    687,    160    Ind.    209 — Graham   v. 
L,oh,  69  N.B.  474,  32  InoLAjpp.  153— 
Greensburg  v.  Zoller,  60  N.E.  1007, 
28  Ind.App.  126. 

61.  Tex. — Bray  v.   First  Nat.  Bank, 
Civ.App.,  10  S.W.2d  235,  error  dis- 
missed. 

34  C.J.  p  524  note  '75. 

62.  Cal.— Le  Mesnager  v.  Variel,  77 
P.    988,    144   Cal.   463,   103   Am.S.R. 
91. 

34  C.J.  p  524  note  76. 


§  410 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


In  some  jurisdictions  a  distinction  is  made  be- 
tween a  suit  to  enjoin,  and  a  suit  to  set  aside,  a 
judgment.  If  an  injunction  only  is  sought,  the  suit 
has  been  held  to  be  a  collateral  attack,63  but  if 
plaintiff  seeks  also  to  have  the  judgment  set  aside 
and  the  case  retried  on  the  merits  it  has  been  held 
to  be  a  direct  attack.64  It  has  also  been  held  that 
a  suit  to  prevent  an  inequitable  advantage  being 
taken  of  a  judgment,  by  adjudging  the  guilty  bene- 
ficiary or  his  successor  with  notice  a  trustee  for  the 
defrauded  party,  is  a  direct  attack,65  but  conceding 
that  the  attack  is  collateral  it  is  no  objection  to  the 
maintenance  of  a  suit  for  that  purpose  that  it  in- 
volves a  collateral  impeachment  of  the  judgment, 
provided  the  demand  for  relief  is  based  on  want  of 
jurisdiction,  fraud,  or  some  other  distinctive  ground 
of  equitable  interference,  although  it  is  not  permis- 
sible in  such  an  action  to  review  mere  errors  or 
overthrow  the  judgment  for  mere  irregularities.66 
An  injunction  to  restrain  enforcement  of  an  ad- 
ministrative order  of  a  court  has  been  held  not 
objectionable  as  a  collateral  attack  on  a  judg- 
ment67 

An  application  for  a  writ  of  prohibition  to  forbid 
the  court  to  enforce  its  judgment  is  generally  re- 
garded as  a  collateral  attack.68 

A  cross  complaint**  or  cross  bill™  seeking  af- 
firmative relief  against  a  judgment  is  a  direct,  not 
a  collateral,  attack  on  the  judgment.  Where  in- 


junction to  stay  enforcement  of  a  judgment  must 
be  in  the  court  rendering  the  judgment,  a  cross 
action  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  judgment  lien  brought 
in  another  court  is  a  collateral  attack.71 

Motion  to  vacate.  Where  the  action  may  prop- 
erly be  regarded  as  a  motion  to  vacate  the  judg- 
ment it  has  been  held  not  to  be  a  collateral  attack 
on  the  judgment72 

A  motion  to  annul  a  judgment  of  conviction  in 
a  criminal  case  is  a  collateral  attack.73 

A  writ  of  mandamus,  as  far  as  it  seeks  to  avoid 
the  effect  of  a  judgment  or  order  of  a  court,  is  a 
collateral  attack.74 

§  411.    Separate  Action  against  Party  or 

Officer 

The  validity  or  correctness  of  a  Judgment  may  not 
be  impeached  in  a  subsequent  action  by  the  unsuccess- 
ful party  against  the  successful  party  involving  the  same 
issues  or  seeking  to  avoid  the  effects  of  the  Judgment. 

The  validity  or  correctness  of  a  judgment  cannot 
be  impeached  in  a  subsequent  action  brought  by  the 
unsuccessful  party  against  the  successful  party,  in- 
volving the  same  issues,75  or  in  an  action  to  recover 
back  the  money  paid  under  the  judgment,76  or  for 
damages  in  obtaining  a  judgment  because  of  no 
proper  service,77  or  for  fraud  and  conspiracy  in  ob- 
taining the  judgment.78  Also  a  judgment  may  not 


03.     Cal. — Gray    v.    Bybee,    141   P.2d 

32,  -60  Cal.App.2d  564. 
34  C.J.  p  524  note  T7. 

64.  Tex. — Rowland  v.  Klepper,  Com. 
App.,  227  S.W.  1096. 

34  C.J.  p  524  note  78. 

65.  Cal. — Campbell  -  Kawannanakoa 
v.  Campbell,  92  P.  184,  152  Cal.  201. 

66.  Idaho. — Swinehart     v.     Turner, 
224  P.  74,  38  Idaho  602. 

Okl.— Kauffman   v.    McLaughlin,    114 

P.2d  929,  189  Okl.  194. 
34  C.J.  p  524  note  80. 

e7B  U.S.— Roth  v.  Hood,  C.C.A.Ohio, 
106  F.2d  -616. 

63.  CaL— Tulare  Irr.  DIst.  v.  Superi- 
or Court  of  California  in  and  for 
Tulare  County,  242  P.  725,  197  CaL 
649— McAllister  v.  Superior  Court 
In  and  For  Alameda  County,  82  P. 
2d  4*62,  28  CaLAo>p.2d  160— Hogan 
v.  Superior  Court  of  California  in 
and  for  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco,  241  P.  584,  74  CaLApp. 
704 — Lieberman  v.  Superior  Court 
of  California  in  and  for  Orange 
County,  236  P.  570,  72  CaLApp.  18. 

Ind. — State  ex  rel.  Allman  v.  Superi- 
or Court  for  Grant  County,  19  N.E. 
2d  467,  215  Ind.  249. ' 

Mo.— State   ex  rel.  Compagnie  G€n- 


6rale    Transatlantic;^    v.    'Falken- 
hainer,  274  S.W.  758,  309  Mo.  224. 
W.Va. — Newhart  y.  Pennybacker,  200 
S.B.  350,  120  W.Va,  774,  concurring 
opinion       200       S.B.       754 — Nelson 
Transfer  &  Storage  Co.  v.  Jarrett, 
157   S.B.  46,  110  W.Va,  97. 
34  C.J.  p  524  note  81. 
Guardianship 

Prohibition  to  prevent  judge  from 
taking  further  cognizance  of  guard- 
ianship matter  is  direct  proceeding 
attacking  judgment  appointing 
guardian. — Davidson  v.  Hough,  65  S. 
W.  731,  165  Mo.  561— State  ex  reL 
Woolman  Y.  Guinotte,  282  S.W.  68, 
221  Mo.App.  466. 
a?.  Cal. — Conlin  v.  Blanchard,  28  P. 

2d  12,  219  Cal.  632. 

Wash. — City   of   Tacoma  v.   Nyman, 
281  P.  484,  154  Wash.  154— Renne- 
bohm   v.    Rennebohm,    279    P.   402, 
153  Wash.  102. 
34  C.J.  p  524  note  82. 

70.  Tex. — Chapman    v.    Clark,    Civ. 
A-pp.,  262  -S.W.  161,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.,  276  S.W.  197. 

Va. — Sutherland   v.    Rasnake,    192    S. 

B.  695,  169  Va.  257. 
34  C.J.  p  524  note  83. 

71.  Tex. — Switzer    v.    Smith,    Com. 
App.,  300  S.W.  31,  68  A.L.R,  377. 

816 


72.  U.S.— Burke    v.    Morphy,    C.C.A. 
Vt.,  109  F.2d  572,  certiorari  denied 
Morphy  v.  Burke,  60  S.Ct.  1078,  310 
U.S.  635,  84  L.Ed.  1404. 

73.  Cal.— People  v.    Spivey,    77   P.2d 
247,  25  Cal.App.2d  279. 

74.  Cal. — Grivi  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  45  P. 
2d  181,  3  Cal.2d  463. 

75.  Ohio. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    In. 

Risman   v.   Krupar,    186   N.B.    830, 

831,  4  Ohio  App.  29. 
Wash. — Corpus  Jtuto  cited  in  Hanna 

v.    Allen,    279    P.    1098,    1101,    153 

Wash.  485. 
34  C.J.  p  524  note  86. 

76.  Ohio.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 

Risman   v.   Kru-par,    186   N.B.    830, 

831,  4  Ohio  App.  29. 
Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hanna 

v.    Allen,    279    P,    1098,    1101,    153 

Wash.  485. 
34  C.J.  p  524  note  87. 

77.  Wash. — Hanna  v.   Allen,   279  P. 
1098,  153  Wash.  485. 

78.  CaL — Gerini     v.      Pacific      Em- 
ployees   Ins.   Co.,    80   P.2d   499,    27 
Cal.App.2d  52,  followed  in  80  P.2d 
502,  27  Cal.App.2d  7-67. 

Fla.— Kessler    v.    Townsley,    182   So. 
232,  132  Fla,  744. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  413 


be  impeached  in  an  action  of  replevin  or  trespass,79 
or  trover,80  or  a  suit  against  the  officers  concerned 
in  the  entry  of  the  judgment  or  its  execution.81 

§  412.    Parties  Affected  by  Rule  against  Col- 
'     lateral  Attack 

The  persons  or  parties  affected  by  the  rule  against 
collateral  attack  on  a  judgment  or  order  are  dis- 
cussed infra  §§  413-415. 

Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 


§  413. 


Parties  and  Privies 


The  rules  against  collateral  attack  apply  to  all  par- 
ties to  the  proceeding  In  which  the  judgment  was  ren- 
dered and  to  their  privies. 

The  rule  forbidding  the  collateral  impeachment 
of  judgments  applies  to  all  persons  who  were  par- 
ties to  the  action  in  which  the  judgment  was  ren- 
dered82 and  to  all  those  who  are  in  privity  with 
them.83  On  the  other  hand,  jurisdictional  defects 
which  appear  on  the  face  of  the  proceedings  may  be 


Ind.— Hermon  v.  Jobes,  198  N.B.  316, 

209  Ind.  196. 
Ohio. — Corpus  Juris   quoted  in  His- 

man   v.  Krupar,  186  N.B.  830,  831, 

4  Ohio  App.  29. 
34  C.J.  P  524  note  88. 
79.     Kan. — Westenberger    v.    Wheat- 

on,  8  Kan.  169. 
34  C.J.  p  524  note  89. 
80-     111.— Gilmore  v.  Bidwell,  191  111. 

App.  152. 

81.  Miss.— Vicksburg  Grocery  Co.  v. 
Brennan,  20  So.  845. 

34  C.J.  p  525  note  91. 

82.  U.S.— -Cohen   v.    Randall,    C.C.A. 
N.Y.,    137   F.2d   441,  certiorari   de- 
nied 64  S.Ct.  263,  320  U.S.  796r  88 
L.Ed.  480— Prichard  v.  Nelson,  C.C. 
A.Va.,  137  F.2d  312— Schodde  v.  U. 
S.,   C.C.A.Idaho,   69   F.2d  866. 

Ala. — Bond  v.  Avondale  Baptist 
Church,  194  So.  833,  239  Ala.  366— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Cobbs  v.  Nor- 
ville,  151  So.  576,  579,  227  Ala.  621 
—Harbin  v.  Burrow,  172  So.  910, 
27  Ala.App.  381. 

Cal. — Mitchell  v.  Automobile  Owners 
Indemnity  Underwriters,  118  P. 3d 
815,  19  Cal.2d  1,  137  A.L.R.  923— 
Driver  v.  International  Air  Race 
Ass'n  of  America,  129  P.2d  771, 
54  Cal.App.2d  614— Liuzza  v.  Bell, 
104  P.2d  1095,  40  Cal.App.2d  417. 

D.C. — Peckham  v.  Union  Finance  Co., 
48  F.2d  1016,  60  App.D.C.  104. 

111.— Sippel  v.  Wolff,  164  N.E.  678, 
333  111.  284. 

Ind.— Clark  v.  Clark,  172  N.B.  124, 
202  Ind.  104. 

Kan.— Poss  v,  Steiner,  236  P,  640, 
118  Kan.  595. 

Me.— Graney's  Case,  124  A.  204,  123 
Me.  571. 

Mass. — "Long  v.  George,  195  N.B.  377, 
290  Mass.  316. 

Mo. — Kaufmann  v.  Annuity  Realty 
Co.,  256  S.W.  792,  301  Mo.  638— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v.  Holt- 
kamp,  51  S.W.2d  13,  17,  330  Mo. 
608— Sisk  v.  Wilkinson,  265  S.W. 
536,  305  Mo.  328— Hoken  v.  Allstate 
Ins.  Co.,  147  S.W.2d  182,  235  Mo. 
App.  991. 

N.J.— In  re  Leupp,  153  A.  842,  108  N. 
J.EQ.  49. 

N.T. — Krause  v.  Krause,  26  N.B.2d 
290,  282  N.T.  355— Brown  v.  Brown, 
272  N.Y.S.  877,  242  App.Div.  33, 
affirmed  195  N.B.  186,  266  N.T. 

49  C.J.S.-S2 


532— Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Stephen  Realty  Co.,  33  N.T.S.2d 
146,  178  Misc.  53— In  re  Martin's 
Adoption,  56  N.Y.S.2d  95— Mirsky 
v.  Mirsky,  35  N.T.S.2d  858— Hunt- 
er v.  Hunter,  24  JST.Y.S.2d  76— 
Blume  v.  Blume,  6  N.Y.S.2d  516. 

N.D.— Lamb  v.  King,  296  N.W.  185, 
70  N.D.  469. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Wilson- 
Harris  v.  Southwest  Telephone  Co., 
141  P.2d  986,  990,  193  Okl.  194— 
Hill  v.  Cole,  137  P.2d  579,  192 
Okl.  476. 

Pa. — Gordon  v.  Hartford  Sterling  Co., 
38  A.2d  229,  350  Pa.  277. 

S.C. — Chamberlain  v.  First  Nat  Bank 
of  Greenville,  24  S.E.2d  158,  202 
S.C.  115. 

Tex. — Levy  v.  Roper,  256  S.W.  251, 
113  Tex.  356 — Ramsey  v.  McKam- 
ey,  Civ.App.,  138  S.W.Sd  167,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  152  S.W. 
2d  322,  137  Tex.  91— Hertzka  v. 
Van  Rosen,  Civ.App.,  51  S.W.2d 
1111— Kreis  v.  Kreis,  Civ.App.,  36 
S.W.2d  821,  error  dismissed — Fra- 
zier  v.  Hanlon  Gasoline  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  29  S.W.2d  461,  error  refused. 

Va. — Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v.  Cole, 
158  S.B.  873,  156  Va.  707. 

Wash. — France  v.  Freeze,  102  P.2d 
687,  4  Wash.2d  120. 

34  C.J.  p  525  note  93. 

Stakeholder 

Corporation  having  paid  to  hus- 
band dividends  declared  on  stock 
registered  in  the  name  of  wife  was 
sufficiently  connected  with  contro- 
versy as  to  ownership  of  stock  and 
right  to  dividends  thereon  as  to  be 
bound  by  the  same  rule  relative  to 
collateral  attack  on  judgment  deter- 
mining ownership  of  stock  as  that 
applicable  to  parties  to  action  in 
which  such  judgment  was  entered, 
and  hence  would  have  no  greater 
right  than  husband  collaterally  to 
attack  judgment  in  action  between 
husband  and  wife  on  ground  that 
it  was  based  on  wife's  perjured  tes- 
timony.— Perkins  v.  Benguet  ConsoL 
Mining  Co.,  132  P.2d  70,  55  CaLApp. 
2d  720,  certiorari  denied  Benguet 
Consol.  Mining  Co.  v.  Perkins,  63  S. 
Ct.  1435,  319  U.S.  774,  87  L.Ed.  1721, 
rehearing  denied  64  S.Ct.  429,  320 
U.S.  803,  815,  88  L.Ed.  485,  reheard 
141  P.2d  19,  60  Cal.App.2d  845,  cer- 

817 


tiorari    denied    64    S.Ct.    429,    320   U. 
S.  803,  815,  88  L.Ed.  485. 
Posthumous  child 

Judgment  in  death  action  for  ben- 
efit of  unborn  child,  being  binding 
on  him,  was  held  not  subject  to  col- 
lateral attack  in  action  by  child. — 
Brantley  v.  Boone,  Tex.Civ.App.,  34 
S.W.2d  409. 
Zxi  partition  proceedings 

(1)  Following  the  general  rules,  a 
decree  or  judgment  for  partition  is 
not   subject   to   collateral   attack  as 
being  erroneous  by  any  of  the  par- 
ties  to   it.— State   v.    Rogers,   31   N. 
B.    199,    131   Ind.   458—47  C.J.  p   438 
note  91. 

(2)  However,  where  judgment  was 
null  as  to  one  defendant  in  partition 
suit,    any    of    other   parties    to    suit 
could  avail  themselves  of  such  nul- 
lity,   although    only    interest    such 
defendant     had     in     property     was 
through  estate  of  mother  which  was 
still    under    executorship. — Kelly    v. 
Kelleher,   171   So.   569,   186   La.   51. 
Priority  of  lien 

An    adjudication    that   a    person's 
lien  was  subordinate  to  lien  of  an- 
other may  not  be  questioned  by  him 
collaterally. — Pagano  v.  Arnstein,  55 
N.E.2d  181,  292  N.Y.  326. 
83.    Ala. — Bond  v.  Avondale  Baptist 
Church,  194  So.  833,  239  Ala.  366— 
Corpus    Juris    cited    in    Cobbs    v. 
Norville,  151  So.  576,  227  Ala.  621. 
111.— Sippel    v.   Wolff,    164    N.B.    «78, 

333  111.  284. 

Ind.— Niven  v.   Crawfordsville  Trust 

Co.,  26  N.B.2d  58,  108  Ind.App.  272. 

Mo.— (Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 

Holtkamp,    51    S.W.2d    13,    17,    330 

Mo.     608 — Kaufmann    v.     Annuity 

Realty  Co.,  256  S.W.  792,   301  Mo. 

638— Hocken   v.   Allstate   Ins.   Co., 

147    S.W.2d    182,    235    Mo.App.    991. 

N.J.— In  re  Leupp,   153  A.    842,   108 

N.J.EQ.  49. 
N.D.— Lamb  v.  King,   296  N.W.   185, 

70  N.D.  469. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  191  Wilson- 
Harris  v.  Southwest  Telephone 
-Co.,  141  P.2d  986,  990,  193  Okl.  302 
—Hill  v.  Cole,  137  P.2d  579,  192 
Okl.  476. 
Pa. — Gordon  v.  Hartford  Sterling  Co., 

38  A.2d  229,   350   Pa.   277. 
S.D.— Deming    v.    Nelson,    210    N.W. 
726,  50  S.D.  484. 


§  414 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


raised  at  any  time  between  the  parties,  even  in  a 
collateral  proceeding.84  The  term  "parties,"  in  the 
sense  of  those  concluded  by  a  judgment,  includes 
all  those  who  had  the  right  to  control  or  defend  the 
proceedings  and  appeal,85  while  "privies"  are  those 
who  succeeded  to  the  rights  or  property  of  parties 
to  the  judgment86  If  the  judgment  is  void  on  its 
face  the  right  of  parties  or  their  privies  to  attack 
it  collaterally  does  not  depend  on  any  showing  of 
prejudice  to  their  interests.87 

§  414.    Third  Persons  in  General 

A  stranger  to  the  record  may  impeach  a  judgment 


in  a  collateral  proceeding  where  he  has  rights,  claims, 
or  Interests  which  would  be  prejudiced  or  adversely  af- 
fected by  its  enforcement,  and  which  accrued  prior  to 
its  rendition. 

A  stranger  to  the  record,  who  was  not  a  party 
to  the  action  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered  or 
in  privity  with  a  party  is  not  prohibited  from  im- 
peaching the  validity  of  the  judgment  in  a  collat- 
eral proceeding;88  but  in  order  to  do  so  he  must 
show  that  he  has  rights,  claims,  or  interests  which 
would  be  prejudiced  or  injuriously  affected  by  the 
enforcement  of  the  judgment,89  and  which  accrued 


Tex. — Ramsey  v.  McKamey,  Civ.App.. 

138  S.W.2d  167,  reversed  on  other 

grounds   152   S,W.2d  322,  137  Tex. 

91. 
Wash, — France   v.    Freeze,    102    P.2d 

687,  4  Wash.2d  120. 
34  O.J.  p  525  note  94. 

A  grantee  of  plaintiff  in  whose 
favor  a  judgment  had  been  rendered 
In  prior  qr»*et  title  action  could  de- 
fend a  subsequent  action  commenced 
by  a  defendant  against  whom  the 
first  judgment  was  rendered  and  al- 
leging the  invalidity  of  the  first 
judgment  on  the  ground  that  the  sec- 
ond action  constituted  an  unauthor- 
ized collateral  attack  on  the  judg- 
ment In  the  first  action.— Warren  v. 
Stansbury,  126  P.2d  251,  190  OkL 
554. 

Insurer 

Party  issuing  motor  vehicle  liabil- 
ity policy  pursuant  to  statute  is  a 
party  privy  to  judgment  recovered 
against  insured,  and  may  only  at- 
tack judgment  for  fraud  by  direct 
proceeding  to  vacate,  the  judgment 
and  not  collaterally  in  suit  by  party 
recovering  the  Judgment  to  recover 
the  amount  from  the  insurer. — Bosse 
v.  Wolverine  Ins.  Co.,  190  A.  715,  88 
N.H.  440. 

Policy  holder*  of  mutual  insurance 

company 

A  decree  or  order  of  circuit  court 
liquidating  insolvent  mutual  insur- 
ance corporation,  formed  under  spec- 
ified statutes,  under  direction  of  in- 
surance commissioner  and  forming 
basis  of  obligation  of  policy  holders, 
was  final  and  binding  on  policy 
holders  and  not  subject  to  collateral 
attack. — In  re  Whitman,  201  N.W. 
812,  186  Wis.  434. 

Stockholder 

Default  judgment  recovered  by 
bank  against  corporation  could  not 
be  collaterally  attacked  in  subse- 
quent suit  by .  bankruptcy  trustee  of 
sole  stockholder  against  certain 
claimants,  mortgagees,  and  pledgees, 
on  theory  that  debt  on  which  judg- 
ment was  based  was  that  of  sole 
stockholder  and  not  of  corporation. 


—Salmon  v.   Fitts,  C.C.A.Ala.,   67  F. 

2d  681. 

34.    Mich.— In  re  Phillips,  122  N.W. 

554,  158  Mich.  155. 
34  C.J.  p  526  note  95. 
86.  Tex.— Ferrell-Michael  Abstract 

&  Title  Co.  v.  McCormac,  Civ.App., 

184  S.W.  1081. 

86.  Tex.— Ferrell-Michael     Abstract 
&  Title  Co.  v.  McCormac,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  526  note  97. 

One  claiming-  interest  in  land 
through  party  to  former  action  can- 
not impeach  former  decree  collateral- 
ly where  no  defects  were  disclosed 
by  face  of  that  record  and  proceed- 
ing rendering  such  decree  void. — 
Cobbs  v.  Norville,  151  So.  576,  227 
Ala.  621. 

87.  Cal. — In    re    Hampton's    Estate, 
131    P.2d    565,    55    Cal.App.2d    543. 

88.  U.S.— Stubbs  v.  U.  S.,  D.C.N.C., 
21  F.Supp.  1007. 

Ala. — Brasher  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 
163  So.  42,  232  Ala.  340. 

Alaska. — Bowersox  v.  B.  M.  Behrends 
Bank,  7  Alaska  476. 

Cal. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Con- 
solidated Rock  Products  Co.  v. 
Higgins,  129  P.2d  929,  930,  54  Cal. 
App.2d  779. 

Colo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Atchi- 
son,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Board 
of  County  Cozn'rs  of  Fremont,  37 
P.2d  761,  769,  95  Colo.  435. 

La. — Rosenthal  Sloan  Millinery  Co. 
v.  Picone,  App.,  141  So.  494 — Ex- 
change Nat.  Bank  v.  Palace  Car 
Co.,  1  La.App.  307. 

Mo. — Hocken  T.  Allstate  Ins.  Co.,  147 
S.W.2d  182,  235  Mo.App.  991— Cor- 
pus Juris  quoted  in  McEwen  v. 
Sterling  State  Bank,  5  S.W.2d  702, 
707,  222  Mo.App.  660. 

N.J.— Oswald  v.  Seidler,  47  A.2d  437. 

N.C.— Downing  v.  White,  188  S.B. 
815,  211  N.C.  40. 

Tex. — Urban  v.  Bagby,  Com.App., 
291  S.W.  537— Edens  v.  Grogan 
Cochran  Lumber  Co.,  Civ. App.,  172 
S.W.2d  730,  error  refused — Thomas 
v.  Farris,  Civ.App.,  132  S.W.2d  435, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct 
— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  National 
Loan  &  Investment  Co.  v.  L.  W. 

818 


Pelphrey  &  Co.,  Civ. App.,  39  S.W. 
2d  926,  928— Cavers  v.  Sioux  Oil  & 
Refining  Co.,  Civ.App.,  23  S.W.2d 
421,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com. App.,  39  S.W.2d  862,  rehearing 
denied  43  S.W.2d  578. 

Wash. — France  v.  Freeze,  102  P.2d 
687,  4  Wash.2d  120— Baskin  v.  Liv- 
ers, 43  P.2d  42,  181  Wash.  370. 

34  C.J.  p  526  note  98. 

Foreign  judgment 

Where,  in  partition  suit  in  one 
state,  complainant  was  denied  right 
to  litigate  her  claim  of  equitable 
ownership  of  interest  in  the  land, 
and  brought  action  in  another  state 
against  one  of  parties  to  partition 
suit,  claiming  his  share  of  proceeds, 
such  suit  was  held  not  a  collateral 
attack  on  decree  of  first  court  dis- 
tributing proceeds  of  sale. — Horst  v. 
Barret,  104  So.  530,  213  Ala.  173. 

Grantee  in  trust  deed  to  secure  a 
loan,  not  party  to  suits  foreclosing 
paving  liens,   could  question  unrea- 
sonableness of  attorney's  fees  in  col- 
lateral   proceeding,    on    ground   that 
foreclosure  could  have  been  accom- 
plished by  one  suit — National  Loan 
&  Investment  Co.  v.  L.  W.  Pelphrey 
&  Co.,   Tex.Civ.App.,   39   S.W.2d   92S. 
89.    U.S.— Meyer  v.   Meyer,   C.C.A.S. 
D.,    79    F.2d    55— The    W.    Talbot 
Dodge,   D.C.N.Y.,   15    F.2d  459. 
Cal.— Mitchell    v.    Automobile    Own- 
ers   Indemnity    Underwriters,    118 
P.2d   815,   19  CaL2d   1,   137  A.LJI. 
923 — In  re  Hampton's  Estate,  131 
P.2d   565,   55  Cal.App.2d  543— Cor- 
pus Juris  quoted  in  Consolidated 
Rock  Products  Co.  v.  Higgins,  129> 
P.2d  929,  930,  54  CaI.App.2d  779. 
Fla. — Tallentire  v.  Burkhart,  14   So. 
2d  395,  153  Fla.  278— Beaty  v.  In- 
let  Beach,    9   So.2d    755,    151    Fla. 
495,    motion    denied    and    opinion 
modified  on  other  grounds  10-  So, 
2d  807,  152  Fla.  276. 
HI.— Espadron    v.    Davis,    48    KT.R2d 
962,    380   111.    199— Grove  T.   Kerr, 
149   N.E.   517,   lift   111.   591. 
Ky. — Middleton     v.     Commonwealth, 

254  S.W.  754,  200  Ky.   237. 
Mich.— Allen  v.  Merrill,  Lynch  &  Cow 

194  N.W.  131,  223  Mich.  467. 
Minn.— Hurr  v.  Davis,  193  NJW.  943, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  414 


prior  to  its  rendition,^  unless  the  judgment  is  ab- 
solutely void.91  Thus  situated  he  may  attack  the 
judgment  on  the  ground  of  want  of  jurisdiction^2 
or  for  fraud98  or  collusion;94  but  he  cannot  object 


to  it  because  of  mere  errors  or  irregularities95  or 
for  any  matters  which  might  have  been  set  up  in 
defense  to  the  original  action.96 


155  Minn.  456,  rehearing:  denied 
194  N.W.  379,  155  Minn.  456,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  44  S.Ot.  36,  263  U. 
S.  709,  68  L.Ed.  518,  error  dis- 
missed -45  S.Ct.  227,  267  U.S.  572, 
69  L.Ed.  794. 

Mo.-— Hocken  v.  Allstate  Ins.  Co.,  147 
S.W.2d  182,  235  Mo.App.  991— Cor- 
pus Juris  quoted  in  McEwen  v. 
Sterling  State  Bank,  5  S.W.2d  702, 
707,  222  Mo.App.  660. 

N"ev. — In  re  Manse  Spring  and  Its 
Tributaries,  Nye  County,  108  P. 
2d  311,  60  Nev.  280. 

Okl. — Cook  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  236 
P.  883,  110  Okl.  111. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Magev- 
ney  v.  Karsch,  65  S.W.2d  562,  568, 
167  Tenn.  32,  92  A.L.R.  343. 

Tex. — State  Mortg.  Corporation  v. 
Traylor,  36  S.W.2d  440,  120  Tex. 
148 — Texas  Soap  Mfg.  Corporation 
v.  McQueary,  Civ.App.,  172  S.W.2d 
177 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Na- 
tional Loan  &  Investment  Co.  v. 
L.  W.  Pelphrey  &  Co.,  Civ.App.,  39 
S.W.2d  926,  938— Weber  v.  Page, 
Civ.App.t  38  S.W.2d  833— Sciraffa 
v.  Flores,  Civ.App.,  274  S.W.  260. 

Wash. — France  v.  Freeze,  102  P.2d 
687,  4  Wash.2d  120— Shoemaker  v. 
White-Dulaney  Co.,  230  P.  162,  131 
Wash.  347,  affirmed  232  P.  695,  131 
Wash.  347,  132  Wash.  699. 

34  C.J.  p  526  note  99. 

Judgment  in  partition 

(1)  A  judgment  in  partition  can- 
not be  attacked  by  a  stranger  who 
shows    no    title    to    the    property. — 
Lair  v.  Hunsicker,  28  Pa.  115. 

(2)  Also    it    cannot    be    attacked 
collaterally  for  fraud  by  a  stranger 
to  it — Grassmeyer  v.  Beeson,  18  Tex. 
753,  70  Am.D.  309. 

(3)  Nor  may  it  be  attacked  by  one 
who  subsequently  acquired  from  the 
person  defrauded  a  mere  naked,  equi- 
table, and  uncertain  interest. — Brace 
v.  Held,  3  Greene,  Iowa,  422. 

(4)  Persons    whose    only    title    is 
that   derived   from   a   partition   pro- 
ceeding may  not  attack  collaterally 
the   validity   of   that   proceeding   on 
the    ground   that   the   court   had   no 
power  to  lay  out  or  establish  a  road 
on   the   land   partitioned. — Turpin  v. 
Dennis,    28    N.B.    1065,    139    111.    274. 

90.  Cal. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Consolidated  Rock  Products  Co.  v. 
Higgins,  129  P.2d  929,  930,  64  Cal. 
App.2d  779. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  McEwen 
v.  Sterling  State  Bank,  5  S.W.2d 
702,  707,  222  Mo.App.  660. 

Tenn.— Davis  v.  Mitchell,  178  S.W. 
2d  889,  27  TennuApp.  182. 

Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in   Na- 


tional  Loan  &  Investment   Co.   v. 

L.    W.    Pelphrey   &    Co.,    Civ.App., 

39  S.W.2d  926,  928. 
Wyo.— May   v.    Penton,    16    P.2d    35, 

45  Wyo.  82. 
34  C.J.  p  526  note  1. 

Successors  to  title  by  unrecorded 
deed  before  suit  against  grantor 
may  collaterally  attack  validity  of 
judgment  rendered  therein. — Urban 
v.  Bagby,  Tex.Com.App.,  291  S.W. 
537. 

91.  Cal. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Consolidated    Rock    Products    Co. 
v.    Higgins,    129    P.2d   929,    930,    54 
Cal.App.2d  779. 

La. — Burt  v.  Watson  Oil  &  Gas  Co., 
App.t  150  So.  425. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  McEw- 
en v.  Sterling  State  Bank,  5  S.W. 
2d  702,  707,  222  Mo.App.  660. 

Tex.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Nation- 
al Loan  &  Investment  Co.  v.  L.  W. 
Pelphrey  &  Co.,  Civ.App.,  39  S.W. 
2d  926,  928. 

34  C.J.  p  526  note  2. 

92.  Cal.— Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
Consolidated  Rock  Products  Co.  v. 
Higgins,  129  P.2d  929,  930,  54  Cal. 
App.2d  779. 

Mo.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  McEw- 
en v.  Sterling  State  Bank,  5  S.W. 
2d  702,  707,  222  Mo.App.  66Q. 

34  C.J.  p  526  note  3. 

93.  Cal. — Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 
Consolidated  Rock  Products  Co.  v. 
Higgins,  129  P.2d  929,  930,  54  Cal. 
App,2d  779— Associated  Oil  Co.  v. 
Mullin,    294    P.    421,    110    Cal.App. 
385. 

Fla. — Crosby    v.    Burleson,    195    So. 

202,  142  Fla,  443. 
Ga. — Ingram  &  Le  Grand  Lumber  Co. 

v.   Burgin  Lumber  Co.,   18   S.E.2d 

774,  193  Ga.  404. 
111. — Bernero    v.    Bernero,    2    N.E.2d 

317,  363  111.  328 — Green  v.  Hutaon- 

ville  Tp.  High  School  Dist.  No.  201, 

190  N.E.  267,  356  111.  216. 
La. — Intercity     Express      Lines      v. 

Litchfleld,  App.,  174  So.  149. 
Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  McEw- 
en v.  Sterling  State  Bank,  5  S.W. 

2d   702,   707,   222   Mo.App.    660. 
Pa.— In    re    Vetter's   Estate,    162   A. 

303,  308  Pa.  447. 
Tex. — Urban  v.  Bagby,  Civ.App.,  286 

S.W.  519,  affirmed,  Com.App.,  291  S. 

W.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  527  note  4. 
Partition  suit  by  stranger  to  record 

Suit  in  partition  by  heirs  not  par- 
ties to  probate  proceedings  against 
other  heirs  who  secured  estate  by 
representing  themselves  only  heirs 
was  held  neither  direct  nor  collater- 

819 


al  attack  on  judgment,  being  equity 
proceeding  based  on  extrinsic  fraud. 
— Beatty  v.  Beatty,  242  P.  766,  114 
Okl.  5. 

94.  Cal. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Consolidated  Rock  Products  Co.  v. 
Higgins,  129  P.2d  929,   930,  54  Cal. 
App.M   779— Associated  Oil  Co.   v. 
Mullin,    294    P.    421,    110    CaLApp. 
385. 

111. — Bernero  v.  Bernero,  2  N.E.2d 
317,  363  111.  328— Green  v.  Hutson 
Tp.  High  School  Dist.  No.  201,  190 
N.E.  267,  356  111.  216. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  McEw- 
en v.  Sterling  State  Bank,  5  S.W. 
2d  702,  707,  222  Mo.App.  660. 

34  C.J.  p  527  note  5. 

Judgment   held  not   collusive 

Judgment  reciting  that  court  heard 
testimony,  on  which  judgment  for 
plaintiff  as  father  and  guardian  of 
injured  minor  was  rendered,  was 
held  not  void  as  collusive  so  as  to 
entitle  minor's  divorced  mother  to 
recover  proceeds  of  Judgment  from 
defendant  in  father's  suit. — Swindle 
v.  Rogers,  66  S.W.2d  630,  188  Ark. 
503. 

95.  Cal. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Consolidated  Rock  Products  Co.  v. 
Higgins,  129  P.2d  929,  930,  54  Cal. 
App.2d  779. 

111.— Hoit  v.  Snodgrass,  146  N.E.  562, 
315  111.  548. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  McEw- 
en v.  Sterling  State  Bank,  5  S.W. 
2d  702,  707.  222  Mo.App.  660. 

Pa. — Home  Sav.  Fund  v.  King,  173 
A.  891,  113  Pa.Super.  400. 

Tex. — Davis  v.  West,  Civ.App.,  5  S. 
W.2d  870,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  527  note  6. 

96.  Cal.— Salter  v.  Ulrich,  138  P.2d 
7,    22   Cal.2d   263,    146    A.L.R.    1344 
— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Consol- 
idated Rock  Products   Co.  v.  Hig- 
gins, 129  P.2d  929,  930,  54  Cal.App. 
2d  779. 

Fla.— Lyle  v.  Hunter,  136  So.  633,  102 

Fla.   972. 
La. — Burt  v.  Watson  Oil  &  Gas  Co., 

App.,  150  So.  425. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  McEw- 
en v.  Sterling  State  Bank,  5  S.W. 
2d  702,   707,  222  Mo.App.   660. 
34  C.J.  p  527  note  7. 
Where  right  to  intervention  lost 

Judgment,  in  action  for  account- 
ing determining  owners  of,  and  their 
respective  interests  in,  corporation's 
entire  production,  was  held  conclu- 
sive on  claimants  not  parties  there- 
to, absent  fraud;  hence  orders  pur- 
porting to  modify  judgment  were 
void. — Selby  v.  Allen,  6  P.2d  285, 
119  CaLApp.  257. 


§  415 

§  415.    Creditors 

A  creditor  whose  rights  or  claims  would  be  injuri- 
ously affected  by  enforcement  of  a  judgment  against  his 
debtor  may  impeach  it  for  fraud  in  a  proper  case.. 

It  is  always  open  to  creditors,  whose  rights  or 
claims  would  be  injuriously  affected  by  the  enforce- 
ment of  a  judgment  against  their  debtor,  to  impeach 
its  validity  on  the  ground  that  it  is  fraudulent  as 
against  them,97  but  as  the  law  favors  the  stability 
and  finality  of  judgments,  a  stranger  who  seeks  in 
a  collateral  action  to  impeach  a  judgment  as  a  fraud 
on  his  rights  must  show  the  fraud  by  clear  and  sat- 
isfactory proof.98  The  fraud  which  will  justify 
such  an  attack  must  be  fraud  designed  to  injure  the 
attacking  creditor,  or  at  least  such  as  directly  af- 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


fects  his  interests;  fraud  practiced  on  the  debtor 
is  not  sufficient.99  The  privilege  can  be  claimed 
only  by  a  party  having  rights  which  had  vested  or 
accrued  at  the  time  the  judgment  was  rendered, 
and  which  would  be  impaired  or  prejudiced  if  it  was 
allowed  full  effect  as  against  them.1  Subsequent 
creditors  generally  cannot  assail  a  prior  judgment,2 
but  the  rule  is  otherwise  where  such  an  attack  is 
permitted  by  statute.*  An  attack  is  to  be  regarded 
as  collateral  where  the  petitioner,  as  a  stranger  to 
the  record,  merely  claims  to  have  become  inci- 
dentally interested  in  the  judgment  after  a  termi- 
nation of  the  case.*  Where  the  objecting  party 
should  have  intervened  and  objected  in  the  proceed- 
ing in  which  the  order  or  decree  was  rendered  he 
is  thereafter  barred  from  collaterally  attacking  it.5 


B.  GROUNDS 


§  416.     Invalidity  of  Judgment  Generally 

A  Judgment  or  decree  has  been  heid  not  subject  to 
collateral  attack  merely  because  it  is  invalid,  as  where 
it  is  based  on  an  unconstitutional  statute. 

A  judgment  or  decree  has  been  held  not  subject 
to  collateral  attack  merely  because  it  is  invalid,6 
as  where  it  is  based  on  an  unconstitutional  stat- 
ute.7 However,  it  has  been  held  that  inquiry  may 
be  made  as  to  the  validity  of  a  warrant  of  attorney 
to  enter  a  judgment  by  confession.* 

As  a  general  rule  a  judgment  may  be  collaterally 
attacked  only  where  it  is  void  because  of  fraud  in 
obtaining  it,  as  discussed  infra  §  434,  or  because 


of  lack  of  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  the  court  in 
rendering  the  judgment,  infra  §§  421-427. 

§  417.    Insufficient  or  Illegal  Cause  of 

Action 

A  judgment  is  not  subject  to  collateral  attack  be- 
cause  of  illegality  or  Insufficiency  in  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion on  which  it  is  based. 

A  judgment  cannot  be  impeached  collaterally  be- 
cause of  any  illegality  or  insufficiency  in  the  cause 
of  action  on  which  it  is  founded,  this  not  being  a 
jurisdictional  defect  or  sufficient  to  render  the  judg- 
ment void.9  Under  this  rule  it  is  not  permissible 


97.  U.S.— Botz  v.   Helvering,   C.C.A., 
134  F.2d  538. 

Fla. — Ryan's  Furniture  Exchange  v. 
McNalr,  162  So.  483,  120  Fla.  109. 

S.C. — First  Carolinas  Joint  Stock 
Land  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Knotts, 
1  S.E.2d  797,  191  S.C.  384. 

34  C.J.  P  527  note  8. 

98.  U.S.— American    Nat.    Bank    of 
Denver  v.  Supplee,  Pa.,  115  F.  657, 
52  C.C.A.  293. 

S4  C.J.  p  528  note  9. 

99.  U.S.— Safe-Deposit  &  Trust  Co. 
of   Pittsburg   v.    Wright,    Pa.,    105 
F.  155,  44  C.C.A.  421. 

34  C.J.  p  528  note  10. 
Participation,  "by  debtor 

It  has  been  stated  that  fraud 
which  will  authorize  creditor  to  im- 
peach Judgment  must  be  fraud 
against  such  creditor  participated  in 
by  the  debtor. — Ryan's  Furniture 
Exchange  v.  McNair,  162  So.  483, 
120  Fla.  109. 

1.  Ga.— BurkhaUer  v.  Virginia-Car- 
olina Chemical  Co.,  15$  S.E.  272, 
42  GsuApp.  312. 

34  C.J.  p  528  note  11. 


2.  Pa.— Zug  v.   Searight,   24  A.   746, 
150  Pa.  506. 

34  C.J.  p  528  note  13. 

3.  Ind.— Feaster  v.  Woodflll,  23  Ind. 
493. 

4.  Ga. — Martocello  v.  Martocello,  30 
S.E.2d  108,  197  Ga.  629. 

5.  U.S. — Johnson  v.   Manhattan  Ry. 
Co.,    C.C.A.N.Y.,    61    F.2d    934,    af- 
firmed In  part  53  S.Ct  721,  289  U. 
S.  479,  77  L.Ed.  1331. 

6.  Cal.— Liuzza    v*    Bell,    104    P.2d 
1095,  40  CaLApp.2d  417. 

La. — Hawthorne    v.    Jackson    Parish 

School  Board,  5  La.App.  508. 
Erroneous  judgment  where  court  has 
jurisdiction  see  infra  §  421  et  seq. 
Judgment  based  on  invalid  Judgment 
A  judgment,  valid  on  its  face  and 
affirmed  on  appeal,  which  decreed 
realty  was  subject  to  lien  in  favor 
of  plaintiffs  for  payment  of  a  judg- 
ment in  a  tort  action,  could  not  be 
collaterally  attacked  by  administra- 
tor of  judgment  debtor's  estate  by 
showing  some  infirmity  in  judgment 
obtained  in  tort  action. — Liuzaa  v. 
Bell,  104  P.2d  1095,  40  Cal.App.2d 
417. 

820 


7.  Wis.— Beck    v.    State,    219    N.W. 
197,     196    Wis.     242,     followed     in 
Beck    v.    Milwaukee    County,    219 
N.W.  205,   196  Wis.   259,   certiorari 
denied  Beck  v.  Milwaukee  County, 
Wis.,    49    S.Ct    34,    278    U.S.    639, 
73  L.Ed.   554. 

Chancery  decree,  based  on  uncon- 
stitutional statute,  is  not  open  to 
collateral  attack,  since  chancery 
court's  power  to  decide  case  includes 
judicial  power  to  decide  that  stat- 
ute involved  therein  is  valid. — In 
re  Newkirk,  154  So.  323,  114  Fla. 
552. 

8.  U.S. — Bower  v.   Casanave,  D.C.N. 
T.,  44  F.Supp.  501. 

9.  Cal.— In  re  Keet's  Estate,  100  P. 
2d    1045,    15    Cal.2d    328— Miller   v. 
Turner,    8   P.2d   1057,   121   CaLApp. 
365. 

La. — Harding  v.  Monjure.  App.,  1  So. 

2d  116. 
Mo. — Coombs    v.    Benz,    114    S.W.2d 

713,  232  Mo.App.  1011. 
Okl. — Warren  v.  Stansbury,  126  P.2d 

251,     190     Okl.     554— Campbell     v. 

Wood;  278  P.  281,  137  Okl.  90. 
Tex. — Coxpxui   Juris   cited  in   Tanton 

v.    State   Nat.    Bank   of  El   Paso, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


420 


to  collaterally  attack  the  judgment  on  the  ground 
that  the  claim  in  suit  had  been  paid  or  satisfied,10 
or  was  not  supported  by  a  consideration,11  or  was 
not  justly  due,12  or  was  not  yet  due  at  the.  time  the 
action  was  brought,13  or  on  the  grounds  that  the 
creditor,  proceeding  by  attachment,  had  no  such  de- 
mand as  would  entitle  him  to  use  that  process,14 
or  on  the  ground  that  the  cause  of  action  was  based 
on  a  gambling  transaction,15  or  was  in  violation  of 
the  Sunday  laws,16  or  was  otherwise  tainted  with 
illegality.17 


§  418. 


Legal  Disability  of  Parties 


A  judgment  against  a  party  under  a  legal  disability 
is  generally  not  open  to  collateral  attack. 

A  judgment  against  a  party  who  is  under  a  legal 
disability  is  generally  not  subject  to  a  collateral  at- 
tack for  that  reason,18  'as  where  the  judgment  is 
against  a  person  under  the  disability  of  coverture, 
discussed  in  Husband  and  Wife  §  456,  infancy,  dis- 
cussed in  Infants  §  122  a,  or  of  insanity,  discussed 
in  Insane  Persons  §  151  d. 


§  419. 


Death  of  Party  before  Judgment 


'  A  judgment  rendered  for  or  against  a  party  after 
his  death  generally  is  not  subject  to  a  collateral  attack, 
except  where  the  action  was  commenced  after  the  party 
had  died. 


Ordinarily,  where  jurisdiction  of  the  parties  to 
an  action  has  duly  attached,  the  fact  that  one  of 
them  died  before  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  for 
or  against  him  does  not  make  the  judgment  abso- 
lutely yoid,  as  discussed  supra  §  29,  and  therefore 
it  is  not  open  to  impeachment  in  a  collateral  pro- 
ceeding.19 According  to  some*  decisions,  however, 
a  judgment  rendered  under  such  circumstances  is 
absolutely  void,  as  discussed  supra  §  29,  and  there- 
fore is  subject  to  collateral  attack.20  Even  where 
the  party  was  dead  before  the  institution  of  the 
suit,  it  has  been  held  that  this  does  not  make  the 
judgment  a  mere  nullity,  within  the  meaning  of 
the  rule  against  collateral  impeachment,21  but  it 
generally  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  rendered 
in  an  action  begun  after  the  death  of  defendant 
therein  is  null  and  void  and  may  be  attacked  col- 
laterally.22 


§  420. 


Disqualification  of  Judge 


A  judgment  rendered  by  a  disqualified  judge  Is  sub- 
ject to  collateral  attack  only  where  it  is  regarded  as 
void. 

Where  a  judgment  rendered  by  one  who  is  dis- 
qualified to  sit  as  judge  in  the  case  is  regarded  as 
void,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  discussed 
supra  §  17,  it  may  be  collaterally  attacked.23 
Where,  however,  such  judgments  are  held  to  be 


Civ.App.,  4$  S.W.2d  957,  959— Cor- 
pus Juris  quoted  In  Sederholm  v. 
City  of  Port  Arthur,  Civ.App.,  3 
S.W.2d  925,  927,  affirmed  Tyner  v. 
La  Coste,  Com.App.,  13  S.W.2d 
685  and  Tyner  v.  Keith,  13  S.W.2d 
687. 

34  C.J.  p  554  note  53. 
Defective  statement  of  cause  of  ac- 
tion in  pleadings  see  infra  §  43$. 
Failure  to  state  cause  of  action  as 
not   rendering  judgment  void   see 
supra  §  40. 
Defective  execution  of  mortgage 

Where'  judgment  is  entered  on  a 
mortgage,  it  will  conclusively  es- 
tablish the  due  execution  of  the 
mortgage,  although  the  latter  may 
have  been  in  flact  void;  the  mort- 
gage is  merged  in  the  judgment, 
which  cannot  be  collaterally  im- 
peached unless  for  fraud. — Corpus 
Juris  quoted  In  Sederholm  v.  City  of 
Port  Arthur,  Tex.Civ.App.,  3  S.W.2d 
$25,  928,  affirmed  Tyner  v.  La  Coste, 
Com.App.,  13  S.W.2d  685  and  Tyner 
v.  Keith,  13  S.W.2d  687—34  C.J. 
p  554  note  53  [b]. 

10.  Tenn. — Hyder  v.  Smith,  Ch.App., 
52  S.W.  884. 

34  C.J.  p  554  note  54. 

11.  Ind. — Watson  v.  Camper,  21  N.B. 
323,  119  Ind.  60. 

34  C.J.  p  554  note  55. 


12.  N.Y.—  Revere  Copper  Co.  v.  Di- 
mock,  90  N.Y.  33,  affirmed  6  S.Ct. 
573,  117  U.S.  559,  29  L.Ed.  994. 

13.  Fla.—  Lord  v.  F.  M.  Dowling  Co., 
42  So.  585,  52  Fla.  313. 

La.  —  Harding    v.    Monjure,    App.,    1 

So.2d  116. 
34  C.J.  p  554  note  57. 

14.  3ST.J.  —  Brantingham  v.  Branting- 
ham,  12  N.J.EQ.  160. 

N.C.—  Harrison  v.  Fender,  44  N.C. 
78,  57  Am.D.  573. 

15.  111.  —  Chicago    Driving    Park    v. 
West,  35  111.  App.  496,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  21  N.B.  782,  129  111. 
249. 

34  C.J.  p  554  note  59. 

Validity  of  judgment  based  on  gam- 

bling   transaction    generally    see 

Gaming  §  23. 

16.  N.H.  —  Jenness  v.  Berry,  17  N.H. 
549. 

17.  Ky.  —  Roberts  v.   Yancey,   21   S. 
W.  1047,  94  Ky.  243,  15  Ky.L.  10, 
42  Am.S.R.  357. 

34  C.J.  p  554  note  61. 

18.  Ark.—  Kindrick  v.  Capps,  121  S. 
W.2d  515,  196  Ark.  1169. 

Collateral  attack  on  judgment 
against  dissolved  corporation  see 
Corporations  §  1780. 

Id.  U.S.—  Streeter  v.  Chicago  Title 
&  Trust  Co.,  B.C.I11.,  14  F.2d  331. 


Ark.— Black  v.  Burrell,  1  S.W.2d  805, 

175  Ark.  1138. 
Cal.— Liusza   v.   Bell,   104   P.2d   1095, 

40  Cal.App.2d  417. 
Colo. — Parsons    v.    Parsons,    198    P. 

156,  70  Colo.  154. 
Mass. — Noyes  v.  Bankers  Indemnity 

Ins.  Co.,  30  N.E.2d  867,  307  Mass. 

567. 
34  C.J.  p  555  note  67—33  C.J.  p  1107 

note  68, 

26.    Kan. — Kager   v.   Vickery,    59    P. 

628,    61   Kan.    342,    49    L.R.A.    153. 
La. — Edwards  v.  Whited,  29  La. Ann. 

647. 

33  C.J.  p  1107  notes  66,  67. 

21.  Ky. — Fuqua  v.  Mullen,  13  Bush 
467. 

W.Va.— McMillan  v.  Hickman,  14  S. 
B.  227,  35  W.Va,  705. 

22.  Cal. — Garrison  v.  Blanchard,  16 
P.2d  273,  127  CaLApp.   616. 

Conn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  O'Leary 
v.  Waterbury  Title  Co.,  166  A.  673, 
676,  117  Conn.  39. 

34  C.J.  p  555  note  70. 

23.  Mich.— Bliss   v.    Caille    Co.,    113 
N.W.   317,   149   Mich.   601,   12  Ann. 
Gas.  513. 

Tex.— Woodland  v.  State,  178  S.W.2d 
528,  147  Tex.Cr.  84. 

34  C.J.  p  555  note  73. 

Disqualification  of  judges  see  Judg- 
es §S  72-97. 


821 


421 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S, 


merely  voidable,  they  are  not  liable  to  collateral  at- 
tack.2* The  fact,  however,  that  the  regular  judge 
has  improperly  disqualified  himself  is  not  ground 
for  collaterally  attacking  a  judgment  entered  by  a 
judge  ad  litem,^  particularly  where  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  latter  judge  was  agreed  to  by  counsel.26 

§  421.    Jurisdictional  Defects, 

A  judgment  or  decree  which  Is  void  for  want  of  ju- 


risdiction is  open  to  contradiction  or  impeachment  In 
a  collateral,  as.  well  as  a  direct,  proceeding.  In  order  to 
be  collaterally  attacked  the  want  of  jurisdiction  must 
affirmatively  appear  on  the  face  of  the  record,  and  the 
facts  showing  the  vtent  of  jurisdiction  must  be  alleged. 

A  judgment  or  decree  void  for  want  of  juris- 
diction is  open  to  contradiction  or  impeachment  in 
a  collateral  proceeding,27  or  it  may  be  attacked  di- 
rectly.28 Moreover,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  a 
judgment  may  be  collaterally  attacked  only  where 


24.  Kan.— In  re  Hewes,  62  P.  673 
62  Kan.  288. 

34  C.J.  p  555  note  74. 

25.  Fla.— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guarant. 
Co.  v.  Tucker,  159  So.  7S7,  US  Pla. 
430. 

26.  U.S.— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty 
Co.  v.  Tucker,  supra. 

27.  U.S.— Nardi    v.    Poinsatte,    D.C 
Ind.,   46  F.2d  347— Rheinberger  T 
Security  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  America 
D.C.I1L,   51  F.Supp.   1SS,   cause  re 
manded  on  other  grounds,   C.C.A. 
146  F.2d  680 — Petition  of  Taffel,  D 
C.N.Y.,  49  F.Supp.  109 — In  re  Ost 
lind  Mfg.   Co.,  D.C.Or.,   19   F.Supp 
836. 

Ala- — Boyd  v.  Garrison,  19  So.2d  385 
246  Ala.  132— Avery  Freight  Lines 
v.  White,  18  So.2d  394,  245  Ala. 
618.  154  A.L.R.  732— Corpus  Juris 
cited  In  T.  S.  Faulk  &  Co.  v.  Bout- 
well,  7  So.2d  490,  492,  242  Ala.  546 
— Dawkins  v.  Hutto,  131  So.  228 
222  Ala.  132. 

Ariz. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Varnes 
v.  White,  12  P.2d  870,  871,  40  Ariz. 
427. 

CaL— Rico    v.    Nasser   Bros.    Realty 

Co.,    137    P.2d    861.    58    Cal.App.2d 

878 — Stewart  v.    Stewart,    89    P.2d 

404,  32  Cal.App.2d  148. 

Colo.— Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.   Ry.  Co. 

v.    Board    of   Com'rs    of   Fremont 

County,   37  P.2d  761,  95  Colo.  435. 

Fla.— Krivitsky  v.  Nye,  19  So.2d  563, 

155  Fla.  45— Beaty  v.  Inlet  Beach, 

9   So.2d   735,   151   Fla.   495,  motion 

denied     and     modified     on     other 

grounds  10  So.2d  807,  152  Fla,  276. 

Ga. — Montgomery  v.  Suttles,  13  S.B. 

2d    781,    191    Ga.    781— Patten    v. 

Miller,    8   S.E.2d   757,    190   Ga.   123 

—Drake  v.  Drake,  1  S.E.2d  573,  187 

Ga.  423. 

111. — Anderson  v.  Anderson,  44  N.E. 
2d  54,  380  111.  435— People  ex  rel. 
Lange  v.  Old  Portage  Park  Dist., 
190  N.E.  664,  356  111.  340— Chi- 
cago Title  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Mack, 
180  N.E.  412,  347  111.  480— People 
v.  Miller,  171  N.E.  672,  339  111. 
573 — Monahan  v.  City  of  Wilming- 
ton, 159  N.E,  199,  328  111.  242— 
Howard  v.  Howard,  26  N,E.2d  421, 
304  IU.APP.  637— Mclnness  v.  Os- 
car F.  Wilson  Printing  Co.,  258  111. 
App.  161 — Eddy  v.  Dodson,  242  I1L 
App.  508. 
Kan.— Starke  v.  St&rke,  125  P.2d  738, 


second  case,  155  Kan.  331 — Hoover 
v.  Roberts,  58  R2d  83,  144  Kan.  58 

Ky. — Covington    Trust    Co.    of    Cov 
ington  v.   Owens,    129    S.W.2d   186 
278  Ky.  695 — Grooms  v.  Grooms, 
S.W.2d  863,  225  Ky.  228. 

Mich. — Attorney  General  ex  re 
O'Hara  v.  Montgomery,  267  N.W 
550,  275  Mich.  504. 

Mo.— Hankins  v.  Smarr,  137  S.W.2c 
499,  345  Mo.  973— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Kristanik  v.  Chevrolet  Mo 
tor  Co.,  70  S.W.2d  890,  894, 
Mo.  60— Simplex  Paper  Corporation 
v.  Standard  Corrugated  Box  Co, 
97  S.W.2d  862,  231  Mo.App.  764 

Mont — Scilley  v.  Red  Lodge-Rosebu 
Irr.  Dist,  272  P.  543,  83  Mont.  282 

N.J.— Riddle  v.  Cella,  15  A.2d  59 
128  N.J.EQ.  4. 

N.Y.— Shea  v.  Shea,  60  N.Y.S.2d  823 

270  App.Div.  527,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  63  N.E.2d  113,  294  N.Y 
909 — MacAffer  v.   Boston  &  M.  R 
R.,    273    N.Y.S.    679,    242    App.Div 
140,  affirmed  197  N.E.  328,  268  N 
Y.    400— Copperfretti  v.   Shephard 

271  N.Y.S.  284,  241  App.Div.  872— 
Canton  v.   Killen,   5   N.Y.S.2d   796 
167    Misc.    620— Morris   v.   Morris 
289  N.Y.S.  636,  160  Misc.  59— Koz- 
ba  v.   Kozba,    289  N.Y.S.    632,   160 
Misc.  56. 

Okl.— Tulsa  Terminal,  Storage  & 
Transfer  Co.  v.  Thomas,  18  P.2d 
891,  162  Okl.  5. 

Pa. — Bricker  v.  Brougher,  14  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.  530 — Commonwealth  v. 
Phelps,  Quar.Sess.,  44  Lack.Jur. 
85,  5  Monroe  L.R.  40,  11  Som.Co. 
264,  affirmed  Commonwealth  ex 
reL  Phelps  v.  Phelps,  35  A.2d  530, 
154  Pa.Super.  270. 

Tex. — Employers'  Indemnity  Corpo- 
ration v.  Woods,  Com.App.,  243  S. 
W.  1085 — Ferguson  v.  Ferguson, 
Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  1018,  error 
dismissed — Williams  v.  Tooke,  Civ. 
App.,  116  S.W.2d  1114,  error  dis- 
missed—Hicks v.  Sias,  Civ.App., 
102  S.W.2d  460,  error  refused- 
Texas  Gas  Utilities  Co.  v.  City  of 
Uvalde,  Civ.App.,  77  S.W.2d  750— 
Salamy  v»  Bruce,  Civ.App.,  21  S. 
W.2d  380— Taylor  v.  Masterson, 
Civ.App.,  259  S.W.  629— Reed  v. 
State,  Cr.,  187  S.W.2d  660. 

"a. — Barnes   v.   American   Fertilizer 
Co.,  130  S.E.  902,  144  Va.  692. 
Wash.— France   v.    Freeze,   102   P.2d 
687,  4  Wash.2d  120. 

4  C.J.  p  528  note  14, 

822 


,  In  personam  or  in  rem 

"If  court  in  fact  had  no  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  subject  matter,  whether 
the  case  be  in  rem  or  in  personam. 
or,  in  cases  in  personam,  of  the  par- 
ties, and  there  is  no  finding  of  court 
that  it  had  jurisdiction  of  the  par- 
ties, any  judgment  or  order  which 
may  be  rendered,  however  regular 
it  may  be  in  matter  of  form,  is  a 
mere  nullity,  and  may  be  so  treated 
in  a  collateral  as  well  as  in  a  direct 
attack."— Wehrle  v.  Wehrle,  39  Ohio 
St.  365,  366 — Terry  v.  Claypool,  £5 
N.E.2d  883,  887,  77  Ohio  App.  77. 

Court's  lack  of  jurisdiction  to  is- 
sue a  foreign  attachment  where  de- 
fendant is  not  a  nonresident  can  be 
attacked  collaterally. — Powers,  to 
Use  of  Finn,  v.  Slattery,  3  A.2d  780, 
~3  Pa.  54. 

A  mortgage  foreclosure  judgment 
or  decree  is  subject  to  collateral  at- 
tack for  jurisdictional  defects. 
Colo.— Paul  v.  Citizens'  State  Bank, 

223  P.  758,  75  Colo.  14. 
111.— Schnur    v.    Bernstein,    32    N.E. 

2d  675,  309  Ill.App.  90. 
42  C.J.  p  172  note  56. 

A  judgment  or  decree  for  partition, 
which  is  void  for  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion, may  be  attacked  in  a  collater- 
al proceeding. — Gray  v.  Clement,  227 
S.W.  111,  286  Mo.  100—34  C.J.  p  531 

note  20  [a]— 47  C.J.  p  438  note  99. 

% 

2a  Cal.— Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246, 
203  Cal.  306. 

Colo. — Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Fremont 
County,  37  P.2d  761,  95  Colo.  435. 

Fla.— Malone  v.  Meres,  109  So.  677, 
91  Fla.  709. 

111.— Barnard  v.  Michael,  63  N.E.2d 
858,  392  111.  130— Eddy  v.  Dodson, 
242  IlLApp.  508. 

Miss. — Paepcke-Leicht  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Savage,  101  So.  709,  137  Miss.  11. 

N.Y.— Shea  v.  Shea,  60  N.Y.S.2d  823, 
270  App.Div.  527,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  63  N.E.2d  113,  294  N.Y. 
909 — Battalico  v.  Knickerbocker 
Fireprooflng  Co.,  294  N.Y.S.  481, 
250  App.Div.  258— MacAffer  v.  Bos- 
ton &  M.  R.  R.,  273  N.Y.S.  679, 
242  App.Div.  140,  affirmed  197  K. 
E.  328,  268  N.Y.  400— Canton  v. 
Killen,  5  N.Y.S.2d  796,  167  Mis*, 
620 — Morris  v.  Morris,  289  N.Y.S. 
636,  160  Misc.  59— Kozba  v.  Kozba, 
289  N.Y.S.  632,  160  Misc.  56. 

>kl.— Tulsa     Terminal,     Storage     * 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  421 


it  is  void  because  of  jurisdictional  defects,29  and 
accordingly  the  inquiry  on  a  collateral  attack  is 
generally  confined  to  jurisdictional  infirmities  or  de- 
iects.30 


By  the  weight  of  authority,  in  order  that  a  judg- 
ment may  be  collaterally  attacked,  such  want  of  ju- 
risdiction must  affirmatively  appear  on  the  face  of 
the  record,81  and  generally  cannot  be  established 


Transfer   Co.    v.    Thomas,    18    P.2d 

891,  163  Okl.  5. 
Tex. — Lewis  v.  Terrell,  Civ.App.,  154 

S.W.2d  151,  error  refused. 
"Va. — Barnes    v.    American   Fertilizer 

Co.,    130    S.B.    902,    144   Va.    692. 
Wash,-— King  County  v.  Rea,   152  P. 

2d  310,  21  Washed  593. 
W.Va, — Hayhurst  v.  J.  Kenny  Trans- 
fer  Co.,    158    S.EJ.    506,    110   W.Va. 

395. 
Appeal  from  judgment  for  want  of 

jurisdiction  see  Appeal  and  Error  § 

110. 
Equitable    relief    against    judgment 

see  supra  §§  341-400. 
Opening  and  vacating  judgment  see 

supra  §§  265-310. 
29.    U.S. — Iselin  v.  Lacoste,  D.C.La., 

55    F.Supp.    977,    affirmed,    C.C.A., 

147  F.2d  791. 
Ala. — Fife    v.    Pioneer    Lumber    Co,, 

185  So.  759,  237  Ala,  92. 
Ariz.— Lisitzky  v.  Brady,  300  P.  177, 

38  Ariz.  337. 
Cal. — Kirkpatrick  v.  Harvey,   124  P. 

2d    367,    51    Cal.App.2d    170.      ', 
Idaho. — Harkness  v.   Utah  Power  & 

Light    Co.,    291   P.    1051,   49    Idaho 

756. 
III.— Beckman    v.   Alberts,    178    N.E. 

367,  346  111.  74. 
•N'eb.— Selleck  v.  Miller,  264  N.W.  754, 

130   Neb.   306 — Billiter  v.   Parriott, 

258  N.W.  395,  128  Neb.  238. 
jNT.j.— Moran   v.    Joyce,    11   A.2d    420, 

124  N.J.Law  255. 
Tex.— Stewart   Oil   Co.    v.   Lee,    Civ. 

App.,  173  S.W.2d  791,  error  refused 

— Williams    v.    Borcher,    Civ.App., 

244  S.W.  1053. 
-\Vyo.-Whitaker  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 

.231  P.  691,  32  Wyo.  288. 
84  C.J.  p  514  note  54. 
Fraud  as   ground  for  collateral  at- 
tack generally  see  infra  §   434. 

30-    Fla. — Norwich  Union  Indemnity 

Co.  V.  Willis,  168  So.  418,  124  Fla. 

137,  127  Fla.  238— Fisher  v.  Guidy, 

142  So.  818,  106  Fla.  94— Fiehe  v. 

R.  E.  Householder  Co.,  125  So.  2, 

98  Fla.  627. 
IH.~City  of  Des  Plaines  v.  Boecken- 

hauer,   50  N.E.2d  483,  383   111.   475. 
Ky.— Lowe  v.  Taylor,  29  S.W.2d  598, 

235  Ky.  21. 
Or. — Northwestern   Clearance   Co.   v. 

Jennings,   210  P.  884,  106  Or.   291. 
Utah.— Intermill    v.    Nash,    75    P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
31.    U.S.— Jelliffe   v.    Thaw,    C.C.A.N. 

Y.,  67  F.2d  880 — Campbell  v.  Ader- 

hold,  C.C.A.Ga.,  67  F.2d  246— Lane 

v.    Brown,    D.C.Mich.,    63    F.Supp. 

684. 
_Ala.— A.  B.  C.  Truck  Lines  v.  Kene- 

mer,  25  So.2d  511 — Fife  v.  Pioneer 

Lumber  Co.,  185  So.  759,  237  Ala. 

92— Florence    Gin    Co.    v.    City   of 


Florence,  147  So.  417,  226  Ala.  478, 
followed  in  147  So.  420,  three  cas- 
es, 226  Ala.  482,  147  So.  421,  226 
Ala.  482,  and  147  So.  421,  226 
Ala.  483— Ex  parte  Kelly,  128  So. 
443,  221  Ala.  339— Wise  v.  Miller, 
111  So.  913,  215  Ala.  660. 

Alaska. — Lynch  v.  Collings,  7  Alaska 
84. 

Ariz. — Latham  v.  McClenny,  285  P. 
6S4,  36  Ariz.  337. 

Ark. — Weeks  v.  Arkansas  Club,  145 
S.W.2d  738,  201  Ark.  423— Reed 
v.  Futrall,  115  S.W.2d  542,  195  Ark. 
1044— Black  v.  Burrell,  1  S.W.2d 
805,  175  Ark.  1138. 

Cal.— Salter  v.  Ulrich,  138  P.2d  7, 
22  Cal.2d  263 — Rico  v.  Nasser  Bros. 
Realty  Co.,  137  P.2d  861,  58  Cal. 
App.2d  878— Stevens  v.  Kelley,  134 
P.2d  56,  57  Cal.App.2d  318— Kirk- 
patrick v.  Harvey,  124  P.2d  367, 
51  Cal. App.  2d  170— Olson  v.  Mary- 
land Casualty  Co.,  44  P.2d  412,  6 
Cal. App. 2d  421 — Johnson  v.  Superi- 
or Court  in  and  for  Fresno  County, 
17  P.2d  1055,  128  CaLApp.  ~S4— 
Associated  Oil  Co.  v.  Mullin.  294 
P.  421,  110  CaLApp.  385— Petition 
of  Furness,  218  P.  61,  62  Cal.App. 
753. 

Colo. — In  re  Zupancis'  Heirship,  111 
P.2d  1063,  107  Colo.  323— LaFitte 
v.  Salisbury,  126  P.2d  1104,  22 
Colo. App.  641. 

D.C. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Bowles 
v.  Laws,  45  F.2d  669,  672,  59  App. 
B.C.  399,  certiorari  denied  51  S. 
Ct  488,  283  U.S.  841,  75  L.Bd. 
1452. 

HI.— Herb  v.  Pitcairn,  51  N.B.2d  277, 
384  111.  237,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  65  S.Ct.  954,  325  U.S.  77, 
89  L.Ed.  1483,  rehearing  denied  65 
S.Ct.  1188,  325  U.S.  893,  89  L.Bd. 
2005,  and  opinion  supplemented  64 
N.E.2d  318,  392  111.  151, 

Ky. — Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Dummit 
v.  Jefferson  County,  189  S.W.2d 
604,  300  Ky.  514 — Davis  v.  Tug- 
gle's  Adm'r,  178  S.W.2d  979,  297 
Ky.  376— White  v.  White,  172  S. 
W.2d  72,  294  Ky.  563— Warfield 
Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  Ward,  149  S. 
W.2d  705,  286  Ky.  73— Mussman 
v.  Pepples,  22  S.W.2d  605,  232  Ky. 
254 — Dye  Bros.  v.  Butler,  272  S.W. 
426,  209  Ky.  199. 

Mich.— Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Detroit  v. 
Burton,  10  N.W.2d  315,  306  Mich. 
81. 

Minn. — Martin  v.  Wolfson,  1-6  N.W.2d 
884,  218  Minn.  557— Miller  v.  Ahne- 
man,  235  N.W.  622,  183  Minn.  12— 
In  re  Button's  Estate,  201  N.W. 
925,  161  Minn.  426. 

Mo. — Coipus  Juris  cited  in  Kristanik 
v.  Chevrolet  Motor  Co.,  70  S.W.2d 
890,  894,  335  Mo.  60— Leahy  v. 
Mercantile  Trust  Co.,  247  S.W.  396, 

823 


296  Mo.  561— Williams  v.  Luecke, 
App.,  152  S.W.2d  991— Inter-River 
Drainage  Dist  of  Missouri  v.  Hen- 
son,  App.,  99  S.W.2d  865 — Hemp- 
hill  Lumber  Co.  v.  Arcadia  Timber 
Co.,  App.,  52  S.W.2d  750— Weil  v. 
Richardson,  24  S.W.2d  175,  224  Mo. 
App.  990. 

Nev. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Beck  v. 
Curti,  45  P.2d  601,  603,  56  Nev. 
72. 

K.J.— Weiner  v.  Wittman,  27  A.2d 
866,  129  N.J.Law  35. 

N.D. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ras- 
musson  v.  Schmalenberger,  235  N. 
W.  496.  499,  60  N.D.  527. 

Okl.— Sabin  v.  Levorsen,  145  P.2d 
402,  193  Okl.  320,  certiorari  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct.  205,  320  U.S.  792, 
88  L.Ed.  477,  rehearing  denied  64 
S.Ct.  368,  320  U.S.  815,  88  L.Ed. 
492 — Reliance  Clay  Products  Co. 
v.  Rooney,  10  P.2d  414,  157  Okl. 
24 — Samuels  v.  Granite  Sav.  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  1  P.2d  145,  150  Okl. 
174. 

Or. — Laughlin  v.  Hughes,  89  P.2d 
568,  161  Or.  295. 

Pa. — Maxnlin  v.  Tener,  23  A.2d  90, 
146  Pa.Super.  593 — Kimple  v. 
Standard  Life  Ins.  Co.,  53  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  174,  3  Lawrence  L.J.  126. 

S.C.— Chamberlain  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Greenville,  24  S.E.2d  158, 
202  S.C.  115. 

Tex. — Security  Trust  Co.  of  Austin 
v.  Lipscomb  County,  180  S.W.2d 
151,  142  Tex.  572-— White  v.  White, 
179  S.W.2d  503,  142  Tex.  499— 
Lewis  v.  Terrell,  Civ.App.,  154  S. 
W.2d  151— Walton  v.  Stinson,  Civ. 
App.,  140  S.W.2d  497,  error  refused 
—Williams  V.  Tooke,  Civ.App.,  116 
S.W.2d  1114 — Salamy  v.  Bruce,  Civ. 
App.,  21  S.W.2d  380 — Texas  Pa- 
cific Coal  &  Oil  Co.  v.  Ames,  Civ. 
App.,  284  S.W.  315,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  Com.App.,  292  S.W. 
191. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion. 22  P.2d  1046,  1048,  82  UtaTi 
179. 

W.Va.— Bell  v.  Brown,  182  S.B.  579, 
116  W.Va.  484. 

34  C.J.  p  530  note  15. 

What  record  includes 

(1)  The  term  "record"  or  "record 
proper"  or  "complete  record,"  as 
variously  used  within  this  rule,  gen- 
erally includes  the  pleading,  proc- 
ess, verdict  and  judgment. 
111. — Cullen  v.  Stevens,  58  N.B.2d  456, 
389  111.  35. 

. — Lipscomb  County  v.  Security 
Trust  Co.,  Civ.App.,  175  S.W.2d 
723,  reversed  on  other  grounds  Se- 
curity Trust  Co.  of  Austin  v.  Lips- 
comb  County,  180  S.W.2d  151,  142 


8  -121 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


by  extrinsic  evidence,32  although  there  are  decisions 
to  the  contrary,^3  and  extrinsic  evidence  has  been 
held  admissible  to  contradict  the  record  in  this  re- 
spect, as  considered  infra  §  426  b.  Even  though  a 
judgment  is  valid  on  its  face,  if  the  parties  admit 
facts  which  show  that  it  is  void,  or  if  such  facts 


are  established  without  objection,  the  case  is  sim- 
ilar to  one  wherein  the  judgment  is  void  on  its 
face  and  is  subject  to  collateral  attack.34 

A  judgment  is  subject  to  collateral  attack  where 
the  want  of  jurisdiction  is  with  respect  to  the  sub- 
ject matter,35  or  where,  although  the  court  has  ju- 


Tex.    572 — Bearden    v.    Texas    Co., 
Civ.App.,    41    S.W.2d    447,   affirmed, 
Com.App.,   60  S.W.2d  1031. 
(2)  It  does  not  include  bill  of  ex- 
ceptions   or    certificate    of    evidence, 
particularly    in    view    of    failure    of 
Practice  Act  to  require  that  a  cer- 
tificate of  evidence  be  filed  in  sup- 
port   of   decree. — Cullen   v.    Stevens, 
58  N.E.2d  456,  389  111.  35. 

Judgment  roll  has   been  held  the 
only  record  that  may  be  considered. 
Cal.— Stevens  v.  Kelley,  134  P.2d  56, 
57     Cal.App.2d     318 — Burrows     v. 
Burrows,   52   P.2d   606,   10  CaLApp. 
2d  749 — Fletcher  v.  Superior  Court 
of  Sacramento  County,  250  P.  195, 
79  CaLApp.  468 — Ho&an  v.  Superior 
Court  of  California  in  and  for  City 
and  County  of  San  Francisco,  241 
P.  584,  74  CaLApp.  704. 
Mont. — State  ex  rel.  Enochs  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fourth  Judicial  Dist 
in  and  for  Missoula  County,  123  P. 
2d     971,     113    Mont.    227— Holt    v. 
Sather,-  264   P.    108,    81   Mont.   442. 
Okl. — Fitzsixnmons  v.  Oklahoma  City, 
135   P.2d  340,  192  Okl.   248. 
Judgment  of  conviction  is  always 
subject    to    collateral    attack    where 
want  of  jurisdiction  is  apparent  on 
face    of    judgment    roll. — Lesser    v. 
Collins,    36    P.2d    411,    1    Cal.App.2d 
161. 

JL  Judgment  of  foreclosure  of  a 
mortgage  generally  may  be  collater- 
ally attacked  only  where  the  want 
of  jurisdiction  is  apparent  on  the 
face  of  the  record. — Bryan  v.  Mc- 
Caskill,  Mo..  175  S.W.  961—42  C.J. 
p  172  note  57. 

32.  Cal.— Stevens  v.  Kelley,  134  P.2d 
56,  57  Cal.App.2d  318. 

Ky.— Davis    v.    Tuggle's    Adm'r,    178 
S.W.2d  979,  297  Ky.  376 — Warfield 
Natural   Gas  Co.  v.  Ward,   149   S. 
W.2d  705,  286  Ky.  73. 
Mo.— Leichty  v.  Kansas  City  Bridge 
Co.,  190  S.W.2d  201,  certiorari  de- 
nied   Kansas    City   Bridge    Co.   v. 
Leichty,  66  S.Ct  682. 
Invalidity  of  prior  Judgment  quiet- 
ing title   cannot  be   established,   on 
collateral   attack,    by   extrinsic    evi- 
dence.— Warfleld  Natural  Gas  Co.  v. 
Ward.  149  S.W.2d  705,  286  Ky.  73. 

33,  U.S.— Campbell  v.  Aderhold,  C.C. 
A.Ga.,  67  F.2d  246. 

N.T. — O*Donoghue  v.  Boies,  53  N.E. 
537,  159  N.Y.  87— Stevens  v.  Breen, 
16  N.T.S.2d  909,  258  App.Div.  423, 
affirmed  27  N.E.2d  987,  283  N.T. 
196— Battalico  v.  Knickerbocker 


Fir  ep  roc  fins    Co.,    294    N.T.S.    481 

250  App.Div.  258. 
Clear  and  strong  evidence 

Where  want  of  jurisdiction  does 
not  appear  on  face  of  record,  it  may 
be  shown  by  evidence  dehors  the 
record,  provided  the  evidence  is  clear 
and  strong  and  the  rights  of  third 
persons  have  not  intervened.—  Espa- 
dron  v.  Davis,  43  N.E.2d  962,  380 
111.  199. 

Extraneous  matter  may  be  exam- 
ined for  the  purpose  of  determining 
whether  the  court  had  jurisdiction 
of  the  person  or  of  the  subject  mat- 
ter of  the  suit,  and,  where  this  is 
found,  other  Questions  affecting  the 
validity  of  the  judgment  must  be  de- 
termined from  the  judgment  record. 
—State  v.  Wilson,  27  S.W.2d  106, 
181  Ark.  683. 

34.  Cal.—  Salter  v.  Ulrich,  138  P.2d 
7,  22  Cal.2d  263,  146  A.L.R.  1344 
—  Akley  v.  Bassett,  209  P.  576,  18? 
Cal.  625  —  San  Francisco  Unified 
School  Dist  v.  City  and  County 
of  San  Francisco,  128  P.2d  696,  54 
Cal.App.2d  105  —  Jones  v.  Walker, 
118  P.2d  299,  47  Cal.App.2d  566. 
Idaho.—  Welch  v.  Morris,  291  P.  1048, 

49  Idaho  781. 

Tex.  —  Texas  Pacific  Coal  &  Oil  Co.  v. 
Ames,  Civ.App.,  284  S.W.  315,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com.App., 
292  S.W.  191. 

If  the  party  In  favor  of  whom  the 
judgment  runs  admits  facts  showing 
its  invalidity,  or,  without  objection 
on  his  part,  evidence  is  admitted 
which  clearly  shows  the  existence 
of  such  facts,  it  is  court's  duty  to 
declare  the  judgment  void  on  col- 
lateral. attack.—  Marlenee  v.  Brown, 
134  P.2<I  770,  21  Cal.2d  668—  San 
Francisco  Unified  School  Dist.  v. 
City  and  County  of  San  Francisco, 
128  P.2d  696,  54  Cal.App.2d  105. 


of  service  of  process 

(1)  The  rule  that  judgment  may 
be  declared  void  on  collateral  attack 
for  admitted  lack  of  jurisdiction  of 
party,   although  otherwise   valid  on 
its  lace,  presupposes  that  party  re- 
sisting attack  admits  facts  showing 
that  constructive  or  personal   serv- 
ice of  summons  was  not  made  on 
party    attacking   judgment    and    al- 
lows introduction  of  evidence  of  such 
fact     without     objection.  —  Security- 
First  Nat  Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v. 
Superior  Court  in  and  for  Los  An- 
geles   County,   37   P.2d  69,   1  Cal.2d 
749, 

(2)  If  lack  of  service  is  ^tipulated 

824 


to.    the   judgment   must   be   read   as- 
though    that    fact    appeared    on    the 
face  of  the  judgment,  in  which  event 
the    judgment    is    then    void    on    its 
face  and  subject  to  collateral  attack. 
—Lake  v.  Bonynge,  118  P.  535,   540, 
161   Cal.   120— In  re  Ivory's   Estate, 
98  P.2d   761,  37  Cal.App.2d  22. 
35.    U.S. — Tooley  v.  Commissioner  of 
Internal  Revenue,  C.C.A.,  121  F.2d: 
350 — Warmsprings     Irr.     Dist.     v. 
May,  C.C.A.Or.,  117  F.2d  802— Com- 
monwealth  of  Kentucky,    for   Use 
and   Benefit  of  Kern  v.   Maryland; 
Casualty    Co.    of   Baltimore,    Md.. 
C.C.A.Ky.,    112   F.2d   352— Zimmer- 
mann  v.  Scandrett,  D.C.Wis.,  57  F. 
Supp.   799 — Iselin  v.  Lacoste,   D.C. 
La.,   55  F.Supp.   977,  affirmed,   C.C.. 
A.,   147  F.2d  791. 

Ariz. — Hallford  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 159  P.2d  305 — Hershey  v. 
Banta,  99  P.2d  81,  55  Ariz.  93— 
Hershey  v.  Republic  Life  Ins.  Co., 
99  P.2d  85,  55  Ariz.  104— Collins  v. 
Superior  Court  in  and  for  Maricopa. 
County,  62  P.2d  131,  48  Ariz.  381. 
Ark.— Reed  v.  Futrall,  115  S.W.2d 

542,  195  Ark.  1044. 
Cal.— Ex    parte    Cohen,    290    P.    512, 

107  CaLApp.  288. 

Fla. — Horn  v.  City  of  Miami  -Beach, 

194   So.   620,   142  Fla.   178 — Malone 

v.  Meres,  109  So.  677,  91  Fla,  709. 

Ga. — Thompson   v.    Continental    Gin 

Co.,  App.,  37  S.E.2d  819. 
HI.— Barnard  v.  Michael,  68  N.E.2d: 
858,  392  111.  130— Martin  v.  Schillo, 
60  N.E.2d  392,  389  111.  607,  certio-- 
rari  denied  65  S.Ct.  1572,  325  U.S.. 
880,  89  L.Ed.  1996— Herb  v.  Pit- 
cairn,  51  N.E.2d  277,  384  111.  237.. 
reversed  on  other  grounds  65  S.Ct. 
954,  325  U.S.  77,  89  LuEd.  1483,, 
rehearing  denied  65  S.Ct.  1188,  325 
U.S.  893,  89  L.Ed.  2005,  and  opin- 
ion supplemented  64  N.E.2d  318,. 
392  111.  151— Wood  v.  First  Nat.. 
Bank  of  Woodlawn,  50  N.E.2d  830, 
383  111.  515,  certiorari  denied  64  S.. 
Ct  521,  321  U.S.  765,  88  L.Ed.  1061 
—Meyer  v.  Meyer,  66  N.E.2d  457,, 
328  IlLApp.  408. 

Ind. — Calumet  Teaming  &  Trucking- 
Co.  v.  Toung,    33   N.E.2d   109,    218: 
Ind.  468,  rehearing  denied  33  N.E. 
2d  583,  218  Ind.  468. 
Ky. — Rollins   v.   Board   of   Drainage- 
Com'rs   of  McCracken  County  for- 
Mayfield  Drainage  Dist  No.  1,  13 6< 
S.W.2d  1094,  281  Ky.  771— Coving-, 
ton  Trust  Co.  of  Covington  v.  Ow- 
ens, 129  S.W.2d  186f  278  Ky.  695— 
Dean  v.  Brown,  88  S.W.2d  298,  261 
Ky.  593— Dye  Bros.  v.  Butler,  272: 
S.W.  42^,  209  Ky.  199. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  421 


risdiction  of  the  parties  and  subject  matter,  the 
judgment  is  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction  with  re- 
spect to  the  power  of  the  court  to  render  the  par- 
ticular judgment  or  decree,36  as  where  the  court, 
in  entertaining  jurisdiction  and  rendering  judgment 


in  a  particular  case,  exceeds  the  powers  conferred 
on  it  by  constitutional  or  statutory  provisions37  or 
violates  a  provision  which  prohibits  it  from  doing  a 
particular  act  or  taking  jurisdiction  over  particular 
matters,38  or  where  the  judicial  determination  is 


.Md. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Fooks' 
Ex'rs  v.  Ghingher,  192  A.  782,  786, 
172  Md.  612,  certiorari  denied  Phil- 
lips v.  Ghingher,  58  S.Ct.  47,  302 
U.S.  726,  82  L.Ed.  561. 

Mich. — Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Detroit  v. 
Burton,  10  N.W.2d  315,  30(5  Mich. 
81— Adams  v.  Adams,  8  N.W.2d  70, 
304  Mich.  290— Jackson  City  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Fredrick,  260  N.W. 
DOS,  271  Mich.  538. 

Mo. — United  Cemeteries  Co.  v. 
Strother,  119  S.W.2d  762,  342  Mo. 
1155. 

Mont. — Ex  parte  Lockhart,  232  P. 
183,  72  Mont.  136. 

N.J.— Coffey  v.  Coffey,  14  A.2d  485, 
125  N.J.Law  205. 

N.Y.— Universal  Credit  Co.  v.  Blind- 
erman,  288  N.Y.S.  79,  158  Misc. 
917— Shaul  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.  of  Maryland,  227  N.Y.S.  163, 
131  Misc.  401,  affirmed  230  N.Y.S. 
910,  224  App.Div.  773. 

Ohto. — Terry  v.  Claypool,  65  N.E.2d 
883,  77  Ohio  App.  77. 

Pa. — In  re  Patterson's  Estate,  19  A. 
2d  165,  341  Pa.  177— Mamlin  v. 
Tener,  23  A.2d  90,  146  PsuSuper. 
593 — Commonwealth  ex  rel.  How- 
ard v.  Howard,  10  A.2d  779,  138 
Pa.Super.  505. 

Tenn. — Lynch  v.  State  ex  rel.  Kille- 
brew,  166  S.W.2d  397,  179  Tenn. 
339. 

Tex. — Easterline  v.  Bean,  49  S.W.2d 
.  427,  121  Tex.  327— Employers'  In- 
demnity Corporation  v.  Woods, 
Com. App.,  243  S.W.  1085 — Burrage 
v.  Hunt,  Clv.App.,  147  S.W.2d  532 
— Walton  v.  Stinson,  Civ.App.,  140 
JS.W.2d  497 — Harrison  v.  Barngrov- 
er,  Civ.App.,  72  S.W.2d  971,  error 
refused,  certiorari  denied  55  S. 
Ct.  C39,  294  U.S.  731,  79  L.Ed.  1260 
— Wilkinson  v.  Owens,  Civ.App., 
72  S.W.2d  330— Bearden  v.  Texas 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d  447,  af- 
firmed, Com.App.,  60  S.W.2d  1031. 

Wash.— King  County  v.  Rea,  152  P. 
2d  310,  21  Wash.2d  593. 

34  C.J.  p  531  note  19. 

«36.  U.S. — Tooley  v.  Commissioner  of 
Internal  Revenue,  C.C.A.,  121  F.2d 
350 — Rheinberger  v.  Security  Life 
Ins.  Co.  of  America,  D.C.I11.,  51  F. 
Supp.  188,  cause  remanded  on  oth- 
•  er  grounds,  C.C.A.,  146  F.2d  680 
—Shields  v.  Shields,  D.C.Mo.,  26 
F.Supp.  211. 

Ariz.— Hallford  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 159  P.2d  305 — Vargas  v. 
Qreer,  131  P.2d  818,  60  Ariz.  110 
— Hershey  v.  Banta,  99  P.2d  81,  55 
Ariz.  93,  followed  in  Hershey  v. 
Republic  Life  Ins.  Co.,  99  P.2d  85, 
55  Ariz.  104— Hill  v.  Favour,  84  P. 
2d  575,  52  Ariz.  561— Co{iins  v.  Su- 


perior Court  in   and  for  Maricopa 
County,    62   P.2d  131,   48  Ariz.   381. 

Cal. — Rico  v.  Nasser  Bros.  Realty 
Co.,  137  P.2d  861,  58  Cal.App.2d 
878. 

D.C. — Rapeer  v.  Colpoys,  85  F,2d  715, 
66  App.D.C.  216— Scholl  v.  Tibbs, 
Mun.App.,  36  A.2d  352. 

111.— Barnard  v.  Michael,  63  N.E.2d 
858,  392  111.  130 — Mclnness  v.  Os- 
car F.  Wilson  Printing  Co.,  258  111. 
App.  161. 

Ky.— Wells  v.  Miller,  190  S.W.2d  41, 
300  Ky.  680. 

Md. — Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  Fooks' 
Ex'rs  v.  Ghingher,  192  -A.  782,  786, 
172  Md.  612,  certiorari  denied 
Phillips  v.  Ghingher,  58  S.Ct.  47, 
302  U.S.  726,  82  L.Ed.  561. 

Mo.— In  re  Main's  Estate,  152  S.W. 
2d  696,  236  Mo.App.  88, 

Mont. — Ex  parte  Lockhart,  232  P. 
183,  72  Mont.  136. 

N.J.— Maguire  v.  Van  Meter,  1  A.2d 
445,  121  N.J.Law  150— Ex  parte 
Hall,  118  A.  347,  94  N.J.Eq.  108.  . 

N.Y.— In  re  Chase  Nat.  Bank  of  City 
Of  New  York,  28  N.E.2d  868,  283 
N.Y.  350— Nervo  v.  Mealey,  25  N.Y. 
S.2d  632,  175  Misc.  952— Sullivan 
v.  McFetridge,  55  N.Y.S.2d  511. 

N.C. — Abernethy  v.  Burns,  188  S.E. 
97,  210  N.C.  636. 

Ohio. — Binns  v.  Isabel,  12  Ohio  Supp. 
113,  affirmed  51  N.E.2d  501,  72 
Ohio  App.  222. 

Okl.— Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of  America 
v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Garvin 
County,  92  P.2d  359,  185  Okl.  362 
— Cochran  v.  Norris,  51  P.2d  736, 
175  Okl.  126— Protest  of  Kansas 
City  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  11  P.2d 
600,  157  Okl.  246— Glover  v.  War- 
ner, 274  P.  867,  135  Okl.  177— 
Lynch  v.  Collins,  233  P.  709,  106 
Okl.  133— Roth  v.  Union  Nat.  Bank, 
1GO  P.  505,  58  Okl.  604. 

Pa. — Kimple  v.  Standard  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  53  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  174,  3  Law- 
rence -L.J.  126. 

Tenn. — Lynch  v.  State  ex  rel.  Kille- 
brew,  166  S.W.2d  397,  179  Tenn.  339 
— Magevney  v.  Karsch,  65  S.W.2d 
562,  167  Tenn,  32,  92  A.L.R.  343.  . 

Tex.— White  v.  White,  179  S.W.2d 
503,  142  Tex.  499— Farmers'  Nat. 
Bank  of  Stephensville  v.  Daggett, 
Com.App.,  2  S.W.2d  834— Smith  v. 
Paschal,  Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  108$, 
rehearing  denied  5  S.W.2d  135— 
Walton  v.  Stinson,  Civ.App.,  140 
S.W.2d  497 — Harrison  v.  Barngrov- 
er,  Civ.App.,  72  S.W.2d  971,  error 
refused,  certiorari  denied  55  S.Ct. 
639,  294  U.S.  731,  79  L.Ed.  12*0— 
Bearden  v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ.App.,  41 
S.W.2d  447,  affirmed,  Cora.App,,  60 

825 


S.W.2d  1031— L.  E.  Whitham  &  Co. 

v.  Hendrick,  Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d  907, 

error  refused — Richardson  v.  Bean, 

Civ.App.,  246  S.W.  1096. 
Wash. — Lally   v.    Anderson,    78    P.2d 

603,  194  Wash.  536. 
Wyo. — State    v.     District    Court    of 

Eighth   Judicial    Dist.    in   and    for 

Natrona    County,    238    P.    545,    33 

Wyo.  281. 
34  C.J.  p  531  note  20. 

"Jurisdiction"  in.  its  fullest  sense 
is  not  restricted  to  the  subject  mat- 
ter and  the  parties,  but  if  the  court 
lacks  jurisdiction  to  render  or  ex- 
ceeds its  jurisdiction  in  rendering 
the  particular  judgment  in  particular 
case  the  judgment  is  subject  to  col- 
lateral attack  even  though  the  court 
had  juris.  «.tion  of  the  parties  and 
of  the  subject  matter. — Nervo  v. 
Mealey,  25  N.Y.S.2d  632,  175  Misc. 
952. 

Exceeding  Jurisdictiona!  amount 
N.J. — Novograd  v.  Kayne's,  199  A.  59, 

16  N.J.Misc.  283. 
34  C.J.  p  531  note  20  [b]. 

37.  U.S. — Corpus    Juris     quoted,    in 
McLellan    v.    Automobile    Ins.    Co. 
of  Hartford,  Conn.,  C.C.A.Ariz.,  80 
<F.2d   344,    346— Robinson  v.   Edler, 
C.C.A.Nev.,  78  F.2d  817. 

111. — Mclnness  v.  Oscar  F.  Wilson 
Printing  Co.,  258  IlLApp.  1-61. 

Mass.— Carroll  v.  Berger,  150  N.E. 
870,  255  Mass.  132. 

N.T. — 'Lynbrook  Gardens  v.  Ullmann, 
36  N.Y.S.2d  888,  179  Misc.  132,  af- 
firmed "37  N.Y.S.2d  -671,  265  App. 
Div.  859,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
53  N.E.2d  353,  291  N.Y.  472,  152  A. 
L.R.  959,  certiorari  denied  64  S.Ct. 
1144,  322  U.S.  742,  83  L.Ed.  1575. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Fitzsim- 
mons  v.  City  of  Oklahoma,  135  P. 
2d  340,  343,  192  Okl.  248— White- 
head  v.  Bunch,  2-72  P.  878,  134  Okl. 
63 — Dawkins  v.  People's  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.,  245  P.  594,  117  Okl.  181. 

Tex. — Nacogdoches  County  v.  Jink- 
ins,  Civ.App.,  140  S.W.2d  901,  error 
refused — Commander  v.  Bryan, 
Civ.App.,  12;3  S.W.2d  1008. 

Wyo. — State  v.  District  Court  of 
Eighth  Judicial  Dlst  in  and  for 
Natrona  County,  238  P.  545,  33 
Wyo.  281. 

34  C.J.  p  531  note  22. 

38.  Mo.— Smith  v.   Black,    132    S.W. 
1129,  231  Mo.  681. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Grant 
v.  Ellis,  Com.App.,  50  S.W.2d  1093, 
1094— Cline  v.  Niblo,  Civ.App.,  286 
S.W.  398,  reversed  t  on  other 
grounds,  Com.App.,  292  S.W.  178, 
modified  on  other  grounds  8  S.W. 


§  421 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


not  within  the  issues  presented  by  the  pleadings  and 
evidence.39  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  court  has 
obtained  jurisdiction  of  both  the  parties  and  the 
subject  matter,  and  has  power  to  enter  the  judg- 
ment, unless  the  record  shows  that  such  jurisdic- 
tion was  thereafter  lost,40  the  judgment  is  not  sub- 
ject to  collateral  attack  because  it  is  not  in  the  form 
required  by  statute41  or  is  contrary  to  the  limita- 
tions of  such  a  statute,42  or  resulted  from  an  er- 
roneous interpretation  thereof43  or  an  erroneous 
ruling  as  to  the  operative  force  of  one  of  two  stat- 
utes, apparently  conflicting;44  or  because  it  is  oth- 


erwise defective  or  erroneous.45 

A  distinction  is  to  be  noted  between  those  facts 
which  involve  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  over  the 
parties  and  subject  matter  and  those  quasi-jurisdic- 
tional  facts  without  allegation  of  which  the  court 
cannot  properly  proceed,  and  without  proof  of 
which  a  decree  should  not  be  made,  or,  as  other- 
wise stated,  between  want  of  jurisdiction  and  er- 
ror in  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction ;  a  judgment  be- 
ing void  and  assailable  collaterally  in  the  former 
case,  but  not  in  the  latter  case.46 


2d    683.    117    Tex.    474,    66    A.L.R. 
916. 

39.  Ind.— Waugh  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of   Montgomery   County,    115   N.E. 
356,  €4  Ind.App.  123. 

Md. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Fooks' 
Ex'rs  v.  Ghingher,  192  A.  7-82,  786, 
172  Md.  -612,  certiorari  denied  Phil- 
lips v.  Ghingher,  5S  S.Ct.  47,  302 
U.S.  726,  -82  L.Ed.  561. 

Mo. — Garrison  v.  Garrison,  188  S.W. 
2d  644— Raymond  v.  Love,  180  S. 
W.  1054,  192  Mo.App.  396. 

KJ.— Riddle  v.  Cella,  15  A.2d  59,  128 
N.J.EQ.  4. 

N.D.— Schmidt  v.  'First  Nat.  Bank, 
232  N.W.  314,  60  N.D.  19. 

34  C.J.  P  531  note  21. 
Court  cannot  consider  evidence  to 

ascertain  whether  order  or  judgment 

was    supported     thereby.— Cooke    v. 

Cooke,  248  P.  83,  67  Utah  371. 

40.  CaL — Hogan    v.    Superior   Court 
of  California  in  and  for  City  and 
County   of   San   Francisco,    241   P. 
584,  74  CaLApp.  704. 

41.  CaL— Seaver    v.    Fitzgerald,    23 
Cal.  85. 

42.  Mo. — Mississippi  and  Fox  River 
Drainage  Dist.  of  Clark  County  v. 
Ruddick,    64    S.W.2d    306,    228    Mo. 
App.  1143. 

34  C.J.  *p  532  note  25. 

43.  111. — Lord  v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of 
Kane    County,    41   N.E.2d   106,   314 
IlLApp.  161. 

34  C.J.  p  532  note  26. 

44.  Cal. — Ex   parte   Henshaw,   15   P. 
110,  73  CaL  486. 

45*  U.S. — Cole  v.  Blankenship,  C.C. 
A.W.Va.,  30  F.2d  211— 'Fuller  v. 
Vanwagoner,  D.C.Mlctu,  49  F.Supp. 
281— Fleming  v.  Miller,  D.C.Minn., 
47  F.Supp.  1004,  modified  on  other 
grounds,  C.C.A.,  Walling  v.  Miller, 
138  <F.2d  629,  certiorari  denied  Mil- 
ler v.  Walling,  64  S.Ct.  781,  321 
U.S.  784,  88  L.Ed.  733— E^sher  v. 
'Jordan,  D.C.Tex.,  32  F.Supp.  608, 
reversed  on  other  grounds,  C.C.A., 
116  F.2d  183,  certiorari  denied  Jor- 
dan r.  Fisher,  61  S.Ct  734,  312  U. 
S.  697,  85  ILuEd.  1132— In  re  Amer- 
ican (Fidelity  Corporation,  D.CCaL, 


2S  F.Supp.  462— In  re  Ostlind  Mfg. 
Co.,  D.C.Or.,  19  F.Supp.   836. 
Alaska.— Lynch  v.  Collings,  7  Alaska 

84. 
Ariz. — Brecht    v.    Haxnmons,    278    P. 

381,  35  Ariz.  383. 
Cal.— Shaw  v.  Palmer,  224  P.  106,  -65 

CaLApp.  441. 

111.— Anderson   v.    Anderson,   44   N.E. 

2d  54,  380  111.  435— Moore  v.  Town 

of    Browning,    27    N.E.2d    533,    373 

111.  583 — Baker  v.  Brown,   23  N.E. 

2d  710,  372  111.  336. 

Iowa.— Watt  v.  Dunn,  17  N.W.2d  811. 

Ky. — Commonwealth    v.    Miniard,    99 

S.W.2d     166,     2£6    Ky.     405— Swift 

Coal  &  Timber  Co.  v.  Cornett,  61 

S.W.2d  625,   249  Ky.  760— Mitchell 

Machine   &  Electric  Co.   v.   Sabin, 

291   S.W.   381,   218  Ky.  289. 

Mich.— Adams    v.    Adams,   S    N.W.2d 

70,   304  Mich.  290— Walden  v.  Cre- 

go's    Estate,    285    N.W.    457,    288 

Mich.    564— Attorney    General    ex 

pel.  O'Hara  v.  Montgomery,  267  N. 

W.  550,  275  Mich.  504. 

Mo.— Farrell         v.         Kingshighway 

Bridge  Co.,  App.,  117  S.W.2d  693. 
N.Y.— In  re  Albroza,  19  N.Y.S.2d  329, 

173  Misc.  385. 

Or. — Ulrich  v.  Lincoln  Realty  Co., 
153  P.2d  255,  175  Or.  296— State  v. 
Young,  257  P.  806,  122  Or.  257. 
Tex. — Laney  v.  Cline,  Civ.App.,  150 
S.W.2d  176,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Commander  v.  Bry- 
an, Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d  1008— 
Southern  Ornamental  Iron  Works 
v.  Morrow,  Civ.App.,  101  S.W.2d 
336 — Gathings  v.  Robertson,  Civ. 
App.,  264  S.W.  173,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  Com.App.,  276  S.W. 
218 — Houston  Nat.  Exch.  Bank  v. 
Chapman,  Civ. App.,  263  S.W.  929. 
Wash.— Dare  v.  Hall,  250  P.  106,  141 

Wash.  389. 
Uncertainty 

Although  a  judgment  may  be  so 
uncertain  and  incomplete  as  to  be 
void  on  its  face  and  incapable  of  exe- 
cution, that  does  not  go  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court,  and  is  not  cause 
for  avoiding  it  on  that  ground  in  a 
collateral  proceeding. — Wood  v.  City 
of  Mobile.  C.C.Ala,,  99  F.  615,  af- 
firmed 107  F.  846,  47  C.C.A.  9. 

46.    U.S. — Johnson  v.  Manhattan  Ry. 

826 


Co.,  N.Y.,  53  S-Ct  721,  289  U.S. 
479,  77  L.Ed,  1331— National  Ex- 
change Bank  of  Tiffin  v.  Wiley. 
Neb.,  25  S.Ct  40,  195  U.S.  257,  49 
L.Ed.  184— Thompson  v.  Whitman. 
N.Y.,  18  Wall.  457,  21  L.Ed.  897— 
Rheinberger  v.  Security  Life  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  D.C.I11.,  51  F.Supp. 
188,  cause  remanded  on  other 
grounds,  C.C.A.,  146  F.2d  680— IT. 
S.  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty 
Co.,  D.C.Okl.,  24  F.Su'pp.  961,  mod- 
ified on  other  grounds,  C.C.A.,  106 
•F.2d  804,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  60  S.Ct.  653,  309  U.S.  506, 
•S4  L.Ed.  894. 

Ark.— Monks  v.  Duffle,  259  S.W.  735. 
163  Ark.  118. 

Cal. — Behrens  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  Yuba  County,  23  P.2d  42$. 
132  CaLApp.  704. 

Colo. — Game  well  v.  Strumpler,  271  P. 
ISO,  84  Colo.  459. 

D.C.— National  Ben.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Shaw-Walker  Co.,  Ill  F.2d  497,  71 
App.D.C.  276,  certiorari  denied 
Shaw-Walker  Co.  v.  National  Ben. 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  «1  S.Ct.  35,  311  U.S. 
673,  85  L.Ed.  432. 

Fla. — Quigley  v.  Cremin,  113  So.  892, 
194  Fla,  104. 

I1L— Gunnell  v.  Palmer,  18  N.R2d 
202,  370  111.  206,  120  A.L.R.  871. 

Ind.— Pattison  v.  Hogston,  157  N.E. 
450,  90  Ind. App.  59,  rehearing  de- 
nied 158  N.E.  516,  90  Ind.App.  59. 

Mich. — Rudell  v.  Union  Guardian 
Trust  Co.,  294  N.W.  132,  295  Mich. 
157. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Steph- 
enson  v.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R. 
Co.,  177  So.  509,  516,  180  Miss.  147. 

N.Y. — Jones  v.  R.  Young  Bros.  Lum- 
ber Co.,  45  N.Y.S.2d  308,  180  Misc. 
565. 

Okl.— Noel  v.  Edwards,  260  P.  58,  127 
Okl.  163— Kehlier  v.  Smith,  240  P. 
708,  112  Okl.  183— Abraham  v.  Ho- 
mer, 226  P.  45,  102  Okl.  12. 

Or. — Ulrich  v.  Lincoln  Realty  Co., 
153  P.2d  255,  175  Or.  296. 

S.D. — Steuerwald  v.  Steuerwald,  218 
N.W.  597,  52  S.D.  448. 

Tex. — Commander  v.  Bryan,  Civ. 
App.,  123  S.W.2d  1008 — Sederholm 
V.  City  of  Port  Arthur,  Civ.App.,  3 
S.W.2d  925,  affirmed  Tyner  v.  La 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  421 


Want  of  jurisdiction  of  person.  Where  the  court 
undertaking  to  try  an  action  and  render  judgment 
never  acquired  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  de- 
fendant, a  judgment  against  him  is  entirely  void, 
and  may  be  so  held  in  a  collateral  proceeding,47 
unless  defendant,  by  appearance  in  the  action,  has 
waived  the  original  want  of  jurisdiction.4 8  This 


want  of  jurisdiction  may  be  shown  to  establish  the 
invalidity  of  the  judgment,  even  though  the  court 
has  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter.49 

Pleading  and  proof  of  want  of  jurisdiction. 
Where  a  collateral  attack  is  made  on  a  judgment 
of  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction,  facts  must  be 
alleged  which  show  a  want  of  jurisdiction50  and 


Coste,  Com.App.,  13  S.W.2d  685  and 
Tyner  v.  Keith,  18  S.W.2d  687. 
34  C.J.  p  532  note  28—33  C.J.  P  1079 
note  '82. 

Errors  in  the  exercise  of  jurisdic- 
tion, no  matter  how  gross,  cannot  be 
urged  in  a  collateral  proceeding*  to 
impeach  a  court's  judgment  or  de- 
cree. 

U.S. — Commonwealth  of  Pennsyl- 
vania v.  Williams,  Pa.,  55  S.Ct. 
380,  294  U.S.  176,  79  L.Ed.  841,  96 
A.L.R.  1166— Iselin  v.  La  Coste,  C. 
C.A.L8,,  147  F.2d  791— Murrell  v. 
Stock  Growers'  Nat  Bank  of  Chey- 
enne, C.C.A.Wyo.,  74  »F.2d  82-7. 
Cal.— • -Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246,  203 

Cal.  306. 
D.C. — Suydam  v.  Ameli,  Mun.App.,  46 

A.2d  763. 

Mich. — Jackson  City  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Fredrick,  260  N.W.  908,  271 
Mich.  538. 

34  C.J.  p  555  note  75  [a]. 
Scope  of  inquiry 

(1)  On  collateral  attack  on   Judg- 
ment of  court  of  record  in  the  ab- 
sence of  fraud,  the  court  cannot  in- 
quire into  existence,  in  original  ac- 
tion,  of  "quasi  jurisdictional  facts" 
or  facts  constituting  cause  of  action, 
even  though  it  appears  on  the  face 
of  the  judgment  itself  that  the  court 
had  erred  both  in  fact  and  in  law 
as  to  existence  of  such  facts  and  the 
right    of    the    parties    to    the    relief 
granted. — Noel    v.    Edwards,    260    P. 
58,    127   Okl.  163— Nolan  v.  Jackson, 
231  P.  525,  107  Okl.  163— Abraham  v. 
Homer,  226  P.  45,  102  Okl.  12. 

(2)  The     court     may     decide     as 
against  a  collateral  attack  both  ques- 
tions of  law  as  well  as  of  fact  that 
may  arise  in  the  particular  case,  un- 
less  the  rendition  of  the  judgment 
clearly  violates  one  of  the  rules  for 
the    determination    of    jurisdictional 
defects. — State  v.   District  Court  of 
Eighth  Judicial  Dist  in  and  for  Na- 
trona  County,   238   P.   545,   33  Wyo. 
281. 

"Jurisdiction,"  as  regards  collater- 
al attack  on  a  judgment,  is  but  the 
power  to  hear  and  determine,  and 
does  not  depend,  on  the  correctness 
of  the  decision  made. — Mueller  v. 
Elba  Oil  Co.,  WO  P.2d  961,  21  Cal.2d 
188— Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246,  203 
Cal.  306. 

failure  to  allege  quasi-Jurisdio- 
-tional  facts,  without  which  court 
cannot  properly  proceed,  does  not 
render  judgment  void  or  assailable 


collaterally.— Mai  one  v.  Meres,  109 
So.  677,  91  Fla,  709. 

Jurisdiction  of  appellate  court 
judge  serving  in  district  other  than 
his  residence  cannot  be  challenged 
for  irregularity  in  procedure  desig- 
nating judge  by  collateral ,  attack  on 
judgment  rendered. — State  v.  Marsh, 
168  N.E.  473,  121  Ohio  St.  321,  de- 
murrer sustained  169  N.E.  564,  121 
Ohio  St.  477. 

Whether  a  judgment  is  correct  on 
facts  or  based,  on  a  valid  complaint 
is  a  question  of  exercise  of  jurisdic- 
tion, not  of  lack  of  jurisdiction. — 
Schuster  v.  Schuster,  73  P.2d  1345, 
51  Ariz.  L 

47.  U.-S. — Warmsprings  Irr.  Dist  v. 
May,  C.C.A.Or.,  117  F.2d  802— Com- 
monwealth of  Kentucky,  for  Use 
and  Benefit  of  Kern  v.  Maryland 
Casualty  Co.  of  Baltimore,  Md.,  C. 
C.A.Ky.,  112  «F.2d  352— Wyman  v. 
Newhouse,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  93  F.2d  313, 
115  A.L.R.  4-60,  certiorari  denied  58 
S.Ct.  -831,  303  U.S.  £64,  82  L.Ed. 
1122. 

Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bond  v. 
Avondale  Baptist  Church,  194  So. 
833,  835,  239  Ala.  366. 

Ariz. — Hallford  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 159  P.2d  305 — Hershey  v. 
Banta,  99  P.2d  '81,  55  Ariz.  93,  fol- 
lowed in  Hershey  v.  Republic  'Life 
Ins.  Co.,  99  P.2d  85,  55  Ariz.  104— 
Collins  v.  Superior  Court  in  and 
for  Maricopa  County,  62  P.2d  131, 
48  Ariz.  381. 

Cal.— Bx  parte  Cohen,  290  P.  512,  107 
CaLApp.  288. 

Fla. — Horn  v.  City  of  Miami  Beach, 
194  So.  620,  142  Fla.  178— Malone 
v.  Meres,  109  So.  6'77,  91  Fla.  709. 

Ga. — Thompson  v.  Continental  Gin 
Co.,  App.,  37  S.E.2d  819. 

111. — Barnard  v.  Michael,  6*3  N.E.2d 
858,  392  111.  130— Wood  v.  'First 
Nat.  Bank  of  Woodlawn,  50  N.E.2d 
830,  383  111.  515,  certiorari  denied 
64  S.Ct.  521,  321  U.S.  765,  88  L.Ed. 
1061. 

Ind.— Calumet  Teaming  &  Trucking 
Co.  v.  Young,  33  N.E.2d  109,  218 
Ind.  46.8,  rehearing  denied  33  N.E. 
2d  583,  218  Ind.  468. 

Ky. — Rollins  v.  Board  of  Drainage 
Com'rs  of  McCracken  County  for 
Mayfield  Drainage  Dist.  No.  1,  136 
S.W.2d  1094,  281  Ky.  -771— -Coving- 
ton  Trust  Co.  of  Covington,  v. 
Owens,  129  S.W.2d  186,  '278  Ky. 
695 — Dean  v.  Brown,  88  S.W.2d 
298,  261  Ky.  593. 

827 


Md. — Fooks'  Ex'rs  v.  Ghingher,  192 
A.  782,  786,  172  Md.  612,  certiorari 
denied  Phillips  v.  Ghingher,  58  S. 
Ct.  47,  302  U.S.  726,  82  L.Ed.  561. 

Mich. — Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Detroit  v. 
Burton,  10  N.W.Sd  315,  306  Mich. 
81— Adams  v,  Adams,  8  N.W.2d  70, 
304  Mich.  290— Jackson  City  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Fredrick,  260  N.W. 
908,  271  Mich.  538. 

Mont — Ex  parte  Lockhart,  232  P. 
133,  72  Mont.  136. 

N.J.— Weiner  v.  Wittman,  27  A.2d 
•86-6,  129  X.J.Law  35. 

N.Y.— In  re  Rudgers,  294  N.Y.S.  142. 
250  App.Div.  359 — Universal  Credit 
Co.  v.  BHnderman,  288  N.Y.S.  79, 
158  Misc.  917. 

Ohio.— Terry  v.  Claypool,  -65  N.E.2d 
883,  887,  77  Ohio  App.  77. 

Pa.— Mamlin  v.  Tener,  23  A.2d  90, 
146  Pa.Super.  593 — Commonwealth 
ex  rel.  Howard  v.  Howard,  10  A. 
2d  779,  138  Pa.Super.  505— Klmple 
v.  Standard  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Com.Pl., 
53  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  174,  3  Lawrence 
!L.J.  126. 

Tenn. — Lynch  v.  State  ex  rel.  Kille- 
brew,  166  S.W.2d  397,  179  Tenn. 
339. 

Tex. — Burrage  v.  Hunt,  Civ. App.,  147 
S.W.2d  532 — Walton  v.  Stinson, 
Civ.App.,  140  -S.W.2d  497,  error  re- 
fused— Harrison  v.  Barngrover, 
Civ.App.,  72  S.W.2d  971,  error  re- 
fused, certiorari  denied  55  S.Ct. 
639,  294  U.S.  731,  79  L.Ed.  1260— 
Wilkinson  v.  Owens,  Civ.App.,  72 
S.W.2d  330 — Bearden  v.  Texas  Co., 
Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d  447,  affirmed, 
Com.App.,  60  S.W.2d  1031. 

34  C.J.  p  532  note  35. 

Necessity  of  jurisdiction  of  person 
see  supra  $19. 

4a  U.S. — First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cun- 
ningham, C.C.Ky.,  48  F.  510. 

Okl.— Welch  v.  Ladd,  116  P.  573,  29 
Okl.  93. 

Appearance    conferring    jurisdiction 
see  supra  §  26. 
•Withdrawing     motion,     to     vacate 

fraudulent  Judgment  obtained  In  the 

absence  of  defendant  does  not  con- 
stitute   "appearance,"   and  judgment 

is  impeachable  collaterally. — Dyer  v. 

Johnson,  Tex.Civ.App.,  19  S.W.2d  421, 

error  dismissed. 

49.  Va.— Moore  v.  Smith,  15   S.B.2d 
48,  177  Va.  621— Raub  v.  Otterback, 
1-6  S.E.  933,  89  Va.  645. 

50.  Colo.— Lafltte   v.  -Salisbury,    126 
P.  1104,  22  Colo.App.  641. 

Okl. — In  re  Protest  of  St.  Louis-San 


§  421 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S- 


which  will  justify  the  trial  court  in  determining 
the  matter.51  Any  question  as  to  jurisdiction  or 
as  to  the  validity  of  the  judgment  which  does  not 
show  on  the  face  of  the  record  must  be  raised  and 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  court  by  appropri- 
ate pleadings.52  In  jurisdictions  in  which  the  want 
of  jurisdiction  must  appear  on  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord, it  is  not  sufficient  merely  to  allege  and  prove 
the  absence  of  jurisdictional  facts,  but  it  must  be 
alleged  and  proved  that  the  record  affirmatively 
shows  the  absence  of  such  facts.53 

Orders  and  decisions  of  administrative  boards  and 
tribunals  acting  in  a  judicial  or  quasi- judicial  ca- 
pacity, with  respect  to  which  a  direct  or  indirect 
means  of  judicial  review  is  available,  cannot  be 
collaterally  attacked  except  for  jurisdictional  de- 
fects appearing  on  the  face  of  the  record.54 

§  422.    Want  of  or  Defects  in  Process  or 

Service 

a.  Want  of  process  or  service 


b.  Defects  in  process  or  service 

c.  Substituted  or  constructive  service 

a.  Want  of  Process  or  Service 

A  failure  to  Issue  process  or  to  make  service  there- 
of on  defendant  Is  ground  fop  collateral  attack,  unless 
such  service  Is  waived  by  a  voluntary  appearance  or 
otherwise. 

In  a  personal  action  the  issuance  of  process  and 
the  service  thereof  on  defendant  is  necessary  to 
confer  jurisdiction  on  the  court,  as  discussed  supra 
§  23,  and  if  no  process  is  issued,55  or  if  service  is. 
not  made  on  defendant,56  the  judgment  will  be  sub- 
ject to  collateral  attack  unless  service  is  waived  by 
voluntary  appearance  or  otherwise.57  However,  a, 
judgment  rendered  in  accordance  with  the  require- 
ments of  statute,  although  without  actual  notice  to 
defendant  of  the  pendency  of  the  action,  has  been 
held  conclusive  on  the  parties  until  set  aside  by 
some  direct  proceeding  for  that  purpose.58  A  judg- 
ment will  not  be  set  aside,  on  collateral  attack,  be- 
cause of  the  want  of  service  of  a  certified  copy  of 
the  complaint  or  bill,  such  service  not  being  neces- 


'Francisco  Ry.  Co.,  11  P.2d  1S9,  157 

Okl.  131— Wilson  v.  Hornecker,  249 

P.  317,  119  Okl.  120. 
84  C.J.  p  532  note  31. 

A  judgment  of  a  probate  court  can 
be  impeached  on  jurlsdictiona] 
grounds  only  where  party  attacking 
it  alleges  definite  reasons  why  it  is 
void,  a  mere  qualified  general  denial 
of  jurisdiction  being  insufficient. — 
Winter  v.  Klein-Schultz,  76  P.2d 
1051,  182  Okl.  231. 

51.  Fla. — Beaty  v.  Inlet  Beach,  9  So. 
2d  735,  151  Fla.  495,  motion  denied 
and  modified  on  other  grounds  10 
So.2d  807,  152  Fla.  266. 

52.  Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,   75  P. 
2d  157,  94  Utah  271. 

Jurisdiction  not  lost  by  factual  rev- 

elation* 

Where  diversity  of  citizenship  ex- 
isted and  both  parties  in  action  in- 
volving title  to  realty  submitted  to 
jurisdiction  of  federal  court  in  Mis- 
sissippi and  were  in  accord  with 
view  that  land  was  in  Mississippi 
rather  than  in  Louisiana,  and  no 
factual  revelations  in  contrariety 
with  jurisdictional  averments  in 
complaint  were  developed,  federal 
court  in  Mississippi  retained  juris- 
diction and  resulting  judgment  was 
not  void  on  its  face  and  could  not  be 
collaterally  attacked  In  subsequent 
proceeding  in  federal  court  in-Louisi- 
ana  involving  identical  land. — Iselin 
v.  La  Coste,  C.C.A.La.,  147  F.2d  791. 

53.  -Fla. — Corpus     Juris     oited     in 
White  v.  Crandall,  143  So.  871,  580, 
105  Fla.  70: 

Ky.— White  v.  White,  172  S.W.2d  72, 
294  Ky.  583— May  v.  Sword,  33  S.  | 


W.2d  314,  236  Kv.  412 — Mussman 
v.  Pepples,  22  S.W.2d  605,  232  Ky. 
254. 

Okl. — Mid-Continent  Pipe  Line  Co.  v. 

Seminole  County  Excise  Board,  146 

P.2d   996,    194   Okl.    40— Protest   of 

Stanolind   Pipe   Line  Co.,   32  P.2d 

869,  168  Okl.  2S1— Protest  of  Gulf 

Pipe  Line  Co.  of  Oklahoma,  32  P. 

2d  42,  168  Okl.  136. 

34  C.J.  p  532  note  32. 

Want  of  notice 

To  impeach  judgment  collaterally 
for  want  of  notice  to  parties,  com- 
plaint must  allege  what  record  of 
judgment  discloses  on  subject  of  no- 
tice.—Clark  v.  Clark,  172  N.B.  124, 
202  Ind.  104. 

54.  Minn.— Martin  v.  Wolfson,  16  N. 
W.2d  884,  218  Minn.  557. 

Tex. — Nacogdoches  County  v.  Jink- 
ins,  Civ.App.,  140  S.W.2d  901. 

Orders  and  decisions  of  administra- 
tive boards  as  subject  to  collateral 
attack  see  supra  §  407. 

65.  Ala. — Guy  v.  Pridgen  &  Holman, 
118  So.  229,  22  Ala.App.  595. 

La.— Key  v.  Jones,  App.,  181  So.  831. 

Miss. — Schwartz  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Staf- 
ford, 148  So.  794,  166  Miss.  397. 

34  C.J.  p  533  note  38. 

58.  Cal. — Regoli  v.  Fancher,  34  P. 
2d  477,  1  CaL2d  276— Gray  v.  Hall, 
265  P.  246,  203  Cal.  306— McAllister 
v.  Superior  Court  In  and  For  Ala- 
meda  County,  82  P.2d  462,  28  Cal. 
App.2d  160. 

Ky.— Ely  v.  U.  S.  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  49 
S.W.2d  1021,  243  Ky.  725. 

La.— Key  v.  Jones,  App.,  181  So.  -631. 

Miss. — Paepcke-lLeicht     Lumber    Co. 

828 


v.   Savage,   101  -So.   709,   1-37   Miss. 

11. 
Pa. — In  re  Komara's  Estate,   166  A. 

577,  311  Pa.  135. 
Tex.— Lipscomb  v.   Japhet,  Civ.App.. 

18    S.W.2d    786,    error   dismissed — 

Cauble  v.  Cauble,  Civ.App.,  283  S- 

W.  914. 

W.Va.— Hayhurst  v.  J.  Kenny  Trans- 
fer  Co.,    158    S.B.    506,    110   W.Va. 

395. 
34  C.J.  p  533  note  39. 

A  partition  Judgment  or  decree,  en- 
tered without  service  of  process,  is-, 
subject  to  collateral  attack. 
La.— Spears  v.   Spears,   136   So.   614, 

173  La.  294. 
N.Y.— Stevens  v.  Breen,  16  N.Y.S.2o7 

909,  258  App.Div.  423,  affirmed  27 

N.E.2d  987,  283  N.Y.  196. 

57.  Fla.— Baptist  v.  Baptist,  178  So. 
846,  130  -Fla.  702. 

Ind.— Sonken   v.    Gemmill,    151   N.E. 

355,  94  IndApp.  114. 
La.— Key  v.  Jones,  App.,  181  So.  631. 
Okl.— Miller  v.  Madigan,  215  P.  742r 

90  Okl.  17. 
W.Va.— Hayhurst  v.  J.  Kenny  Trans- 
fer Co.,  158  S.E.  506,  110  W.Va.  395. 
34  C.J.  p  533  note  40. 
^resumption 

It  will  be  presumed  that,  by  waiv- 
ing service  of  process  and  entry  of 
appearance,  defendant  consented  to 
confer  jurisdiction  on  court  render- 
ing judgment,  precluding  collateral 
attack. — Grand  Lodge,  Colored  K.  P., 
v.  Kidd,  Tex.Civ.App.,  10  S.W.2d  420. 

58.  Conn. — Hurlbut    v.    Thomas,    10 
A.  556,  55  Conn.  181,  3  Am,S.K.  43. 

Pa. — Ferguson  v.  Yard,  30  A.  517,  1-6* 
Pa.  586. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  422 


sary  to  confer  jurisdiction.59  A  judgment  correct- 
ing a  former  entry  by  a  nunc  pro  tune  order  cannot 
be  attacked  collaterally  by  showing  that  notice  was 


not  given 


60 


b.  Defects  in  Process  or  Service 

A  defect  in  the  form  of  the  process,  or  in  the  man- 
ner of  service  thereof,  is  ground  for  a  collateral  attack 
only  where  the  defect  is  such  that  the  process  amounts 
to  no  process  at  all  or  the  service  does  not  constitute  a 
legal  service. 

A  defect  in  the  form  or  matter  of  the  summons 
or  other  process  not  absolutely  destructive  of  its 
validity,61  or  an  irregularity  or  defect  in  the  serv- 
ice of  the  process  on  defendant  which,  although  ma- 


terial and  available  on  a  direct  attack,  is  sufficient 
to  give  notice  of  the  proceedings,62  does  not  de- 
prive the  court  of  jurisdiction  and  therefore  does 
not  expose  the  judgment  to  collateral  impeachment, 
particularly  where  the  defect  or  irregularity  is 
amendable,  and  is  cured  by  a  failure  to  object  there- 
to in  time.63  Where,  however,  the  defect  in  the 
process  is  so  radical  that  it  amounts  to  no  process 
at  all,64  as  where  it  wholly  fails  to  give  the  party 
the  information  it  is  expected  to  convey,65  or  where 
the  attempted  service  is  so  faulty  that  it  does  not 
constitute  a  legal  service  on  defendant  or  amounts 
to  no  service  at  all,66  there  is  a  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion and  the  judgment  will  be  impeachable  collater- 
ally. 


59.    Ariz. — Jeter  v.  Sapp,  55  P.2d  812,  | 

47  Ariz.  325. 
Wash. — Munch  v.  McLaren,  38  P.  205. 

9  Wash.  676. 
34  C.J.  p  534  note  44  [d]. 

In  action  against  several  defend- 
ants, failure  to  deliver  copy  of  peti- 
tion to  defendant  first  served  as  re- 
quired by  statute,  does  not  subject 
the  judgment  to  collateral  attack. — 
Burkard  v.  Hahne,  Mo.A-pp.,  17  S.W. 
2d  636. 
GO.  Ark. — Hall  v.  Castleberry,  161  S. 

W.2d     948,     204    Ark.     200— Miller 

Land  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  Gurley,  208 

S.W.    426,    137    Ark.    146— King   v. 

Clay,  34  Ark.  291. 

61.  Mo. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    In 
Zorn    v.    Farrel,    142    S.W.2d    879, 
883,  235  Mo.App.  118— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Burkard  v.  Hahne,  App., 
17  S.W.Sd  636. 

•34  C.J.  p  534  note  43. 
tmsigned  writ 

A  writ  commencing  suit,  if  not 
signed  by  court  clerk,  is  voidable 
only,  and  decree  or  proceeding  based 
.thereon  is  not  subject  to  collateral 
attack. — Nicholas  Land  Co.  v.  Crow- 
der,  W.Va.,  32  S.R2d  563—34  C.J.  P 
534  note  43  [e]. 
Omission  of  seal 
Tex. — Rhoads  v.  Daly  General  Agen- 
cy, Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  461,  error 
refused. 
34  C.J.  p  534  note  43  [f]. 

62.  Fla.— State  ex  rel.  Gore  v.  Chil- 
llngworth,    171    So.    -649,    126    Fla. 
645. 

Ky.-HFurlong  v.   Finneran,  4  S.W.2d 

378,  223  Ky.  558. 
Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Zorn  v. 

Farrel,  142  S.W.2d  879,  88'3,  235  Mo. 

App.    118 — Corpus    Juris    cited    in 

Burkard  v.  Hahne,  App.,  17  S.W.2d 

636. 
N.C.— Nail    v.    McConnell,    190    S.B. 

210,  211  N.C.  258. 
Tex.— Weaver  v.  Garrietty,  Civ.App. 

84    S.W.2d    878— Oarlton    v.    Hoff, 

Civ.App.,  292  S.W.  642— Cockrell  v. 

Steffens,  Civ.App.,  284  S.W.  608. 


Va.— Wood  v,  Kane,  129  S.E.  327,  143 

Va.  281 — American  Ry.  Express  Co. 

v.  F.  S.  Royster  Guano  Co.,  126  S. 

E.  678,  141  Va.  602,  affirmed  47  S. 

Ct.  355,  273  U.S.  274,  71  L.Bd.  -642. 
Wash.— Peha's  University  Food  Shop 

v.    Stimpson    Corporation,    31    P.2d 

1023,  177  Wash.  406. 
Wyo.— Whitaker  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 

231  P.  691,  32  Wyo.  288. 
34  C.J.  P  534  note  44. 


_  summons 

Default  judgment  may  not  be  col- 
laterally attacked  merely  because 
alins  summons  was  served  on  de- 
fendant after  plaintiff's  death  and 
before  revivor, — Adams  v.  Carson,  25 
P.2d  653,  165  Okl.  161. 

Service  by  an  unauthorized,  or  dis- 
qualified person  has  been  held  a  mere 
irregularity  which  does  not  expose 
the  judgment  to  collateral  attack.— 
Burke  v.  Interstate  Savings  &  Loan 
Ass'n,  64  P.  379,  25  Mont.  315—34  C. 
J.  p  534  note  44  [b]. 
Service  on  officer  or  agent  of  corpo- 
ration held  mere  irregularity 

— Mclntosh    v.     Munson     Road 

Machinery    Co.,    145    So.    731,    167 
Miss.  546. 
34  C.J.  p  534  note  44  [c]. 

Service  on  nominal  defendant 

In  a  personal  action,  the  service  of 
summons  on  a  nominal  defendant  in 
county  where  action  is  brought  does 
not  authorize  the  issuance  of  sum- 
mons to  another  county  for  real  de- 
fendant but  such  issue  must  be 
raised  directly  where  subject  matter 
of  action  is  within  jurisdiction  of 
court  and  is  not  available  in  a  col- 
lateral action. — Wistrom  v.  "Forsling, 
14  N.W.2d  217,  144  Neb.  638. 

Defect  in  acceptance  of  service 

The  omission  of.  the  statement  of 
the  place  of  acceptance  of  service  of 
summons  in  mortgage  foreclosure 
action  in  the  written  record  of  the 
acceptance  does  not  render  the  fore- 
closure decree  subject  to  collateral 
attack  by  the  mortgagor  in  proceed- 
ings by  him  on  a  fire  policy,  wherein 

829 


he  seeks  to  establish  an  insurable 
interest  in  the  property  by  proof 
that  the  mortgage  foreclosure  pro- 
ceeding was  invalid. — Abraham  v. 
New  York  Underwriters  Ins.  Co.,  196 
S.B.  531,  187  -S.C.  70. 

63.  Miss.— Mclntosh       v.        Munson 
Road   Machinery   Co.,   145   So.  '731, 
167  Miss.  546. 

Tex.— Smith  v.  Switzer,  Civ.App.,  293 
S.W.  850,  affirmed  Switzer  v. 
Smith,  Com.App.,  300  S.W.  31,  68 
A.L.R.  377. 

34  C.J.  p  535  note  43. 

64.  W.Va. — New  Eagle  Gas  Coal  Co. 
v.    Burgess,    111    S.B.    508,    90   W. 
Va.  541. 

34  C.J.  p  535  note  45. 
Warning  order 

In  action  against  nonresident  in- 
fants, warning  order  attorney's  let- 
ter addressed  to  infants'  father  did 
not  satisfy  statutory  requirements 
for  notice,  and  therefore  Judgment 
could  be  collaterally  attacked. — Ely 
v.  U.  S.  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  49  S.W.2d 
1021,  243  Ky.  725. 

65.  Mo.— Howell  v.  Sherwood,  112  S. 
W.  50,  213  Mo.  5-65. 

34  C.J.  p  535  note  46. 

66.  Cal.— Gray  v.   Hall,   265   P.   246, 
203  Cal.  306. 

Mo. — Liechty  v.  Kansas  City  Bridge 

Co.,  162  S.W.2d  275. 
Okl.— Lynch   v.    Qollins,    233   P.    709, 

106  Okl.  133. 
Pa.— Wood  v.  Kuhn,  Com.Pl.,  22  Brie 

Co.  236. 
34  C.J.  p  535  note  47. 

Service  of  process  on  an  agent  of 
a  corporation  who  was  beneficially 
interested  in  suit  as  an  adversary 
against  corporation,  was  void,  and 
was  subject  to  collateral  attack  in 
case  where  it  appeared  from 'face  of 
record  that  such  service  was  not 
made  in  compliance  with  statute. — 
Boston  Acme  Mines  Development  Co. 
v.  Clawson,  240  P,  165,  66  Utah  103. 

Personal  service  out  of  state  on  a. 
nonresident  defendant  in  a  personal 


§  422 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


c.  Substituted  or  Constructive  Service 


A  defect  in  substituted  or  constructive  service  is 
ground  for  collateral  attack  where  it  constitutes  a  fail- 
ure to  comply  with  the  statutory  requirements  In  some 
essential  particular. 

A  judgment  rendered  on  constructive  service  of 
process,  the  requirements  of  the  statute  having  been 
complied  with,  is  as  much  protected  against  collat- 
eral impeachment  as  any  other  judgment,67  and  it 
cannot  be  shown  collaterally  that  defendant  was 
•not  in  fact  a  nonresident  as  alleged,68  that  he 
had  no  property  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court,69  or  that  the  published  notice  did  not  in  fact 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  defendant.70  A  judg- 
ment against  a  resident,  however,  is  subject  to  col- 
lateral attack  where  it  is  based  on  notice  given  in 
conformity  with  a  statutory  provision  for  service 
on  a  nonresident  only  by  publication,71  unless  an 
appearance  is  made  by  or  for  the  resident.72 

Failure  to  comply  strictly  with  the  provisions  of 
the  statute  in  some  essential  and  vital  particular 
will  deprive  the  court  of  jurisdiction,  and  so  expose 
the  judgment  to  collateral  impeachment,7 *  as  where 


the  published  notice  is  wholly  insufficient  to  warn 
defendant  of  the  action  or  to  give  him  the  informa- 
tion he  is  entitled  to  expect  from  it,74  but  a  mere 
defect  or  irregularity  in  making  service  by  publi- 
cation will  not  have  this  effect;75  nor  will  the  judg- 
ment be  collaterally  assailable  although  the  affida- 
vit on  which  the  order  of  publication  was  based  was 
defective  or  insufficient,76  or  false  in  fact,77  and 
this  is  especially  true  where  the  court  has  judicially 
considered  or  adjudicated  its  sufficiency.78  Where, 
however,  the  affidavit  fails  in  any  jurisdictional  par- 
ticular, the  judgment  is  void  and  subject  to  collat- 
eral attack.79 

§  423.    Defects  in  Return  or  Proof  of 

Service 

Mere  defects,  irregularities,  or  informalities  In  the 
return  or  proof  of  service  of  process  do  not  constitute 
grounds  for  collateral  impeachment  of  the  judgment. 

A  judgment  cannot  be  impeached  in  a  collateral 
proceeding  on  the  ground  that  the  return  or  proof 
of  service  of  process  was  defective,  irregular,  or 
informal  ;80  nor,  as  has  been  held,  can  it  be  so  im- 


actlon  for  a  money  judgment,  or  to 
bar  the  right  of  a  beneficiary  to  col- 
lect insurance  policy,  is  void  and 
subject  to  collateral  attack. — Royal 
Neighbors  of  America  v.  Fletcher, 
227  P.  426,  99  Okl.  297. 

67.  Ala. — Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 
Bond  v.  Avondale  Baptist  Church, 
194  So.  833,  835,  239  Ala.  366. 

Fia. — Cone  Bros.  Const.  Co.  v.  Moore, 
193  So.  288,  141  Pla.  420. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bar- 
rett v.  Hurd,  18  P.2d  184,  185,  136 
Kan.  799. 

Neb. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Doug- 
las County  v.  Peenan,  18  N.W.2d 
740,  743,  146  Neb.  156. 

Tex. — Wilson  v.  Beck,  Civ.App.,  286 
S.W.  315. 

34  C.J.  p  535  note  50. 

Sufficiency  of  substituted  or  con- 
structive service  generally  see  su- 
pra §  24. 

68.  Neb.-<k>xptts    Juris    quoted    in 
Douglas  County  v.  'Peenan,  IS  N.W. 
2d  740,  743,  146  Neb.  156. 

34  C.J.  p  535  note  51. 

69.  Minn.— Stone  v.  Myers,  9  Minn. 
303,  36  Am.D.  104. 

S.D. — Bunker  v.  Taylor,  83  N.W.  555, 
13  ELD.  433. 

70.  Colo.— Brown  v.  Whetstone,  138 
P.  -61,  25  Colo.App.  371. 

gan, — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Bar- 
rett V.  Hurd,  18  P.2d  184,  185,  136 
Kan.  799. 

71.  Neb. — Coffin  v.   Maitland,   20   N. 
W.2d  310,  146  Neb.  477. 

34  C.J.  p  535  note  54. 

72.  Neb. — Coffin  v.  Maitland,  20  N. 
W.2d  310,  146  Neb.  477. 


73.  Mo. — Dent     v.     Investors'     Sec. 
Ass'n,  254  S.W.  1080,  300  Mo.  552— 
Haake  v.  Union  Bank  &  Trust  Co., 
App.,  54  S.W.2d  459. 

N.Y. — Copperfretti   v.   Shephard,    271 

N.Y.S.   2S4,   241  App.Div.  872. 
34  C.J.  p  535  note  55. 

74.  Ind. — Schissel  v.  Dickson,  28  N. 
B.  540,  129  Ind.  139. 

34  C.J.  p  535  note  56. 

75.  Ariz. — Noonan    v.    Montgomery, 
209  P.  302,  24  Ariz.  311,  25  A.OL..R. 
1251. 

Iowa.— State  v.  Smith,  188  N.W.  659. 
Mo.— Williams   v.   Luecke,   App.,   152 

S.W.2d  991. 
34  C.J.  p  535  note  57. 

76.  U.S. — Butler    v.    McKey,    C.C.A. 
CaL,  138  P.2d  373,  certiorari  denied 
64  S.Ct.  636,  321  U.S.  780,  88  L.Ed. 
1073 — Fisher  v.  Jordan,  C.C.A.Tex., 
116  P.2d  183,  certiorari  denied  Jor- 
dan v.  Fisher,  61  S.Ct.  734,  312  U. 
S.  697,  85  L.Ed.  1132. 

Ariz.— Hershey  v.  Banta,  99  P.2d  -81, 
55  Ariz.  93,  followed  in  Hershey  v. 
Republic  Life  Ins.  Co.,  99  P.2d  85, 
55  Ariz.  104 — Noonan  v.  Montgom- 
ery, 209  P.  302,  24  Ariz.  311.  25  A. 
L.R.  1251. 

Kan. — Scott  v.  -Linn,  2-68  P.  84,  126 
Kan.  195. 

Okl. — Robins  v.  Lincoln  Terrace 
Christian  Church,  75  P.2d  874,  181 
Okl.  615. 

Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 
157,  94  Utah  271. 

34  C.J.  p  536  note  58. 

Construction  in  support  of  Judgment 

Idaho. — Harpold  v.  Doyle,  102  P.  158, 
16  Idaho  671,  694. 

830 


77.  Kan. — Marler   v.    Stewart  QBVirm 
Mortg.    Co.,    207   P.    823,    111  Kan. 
488. 

34  C.J.  p  536  note  59. 

78.  Or. — George  v.  Nowlan,  -64  P.  1, 
38  Or.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  536  note  60. 

Decision  of  court  as  to  its  own  ju- 
risdiction generally  see  infra  § 
427. 

79.  Okl. — Chaplin  v.   First  Bank  of 
Hitchcock,  181  P.  497,  72  Okl.  293. 

34  C.J.  p  536  note  61. 

Affidavit  for  warning1  order  in  ver- 
ified petition,  alleging  that  defendant 
was  nonresident  and  giving  postofflce 
address,  but  not  alleging  belief  that 
he  was  then  absent  from  state,  did 
not  warrant  issuance  of  warning  or- 
der, and  judgment  rendered  thereon 
was  subject  to  collateral  attack. — 
Leonard  v.  Williams,  265  S.W.  -618, 
205  Ky.  218. 

80.  Ariz. — Noonan    v.    Montgomery, 
209  P.  302,  24  Ariz.  311,  25  A.L.R. 
1251. 

Cal. — City   of  Salinas  v.   Luke  Kow 

Lee,  IS  P.2d  335,  217  Cal.  252. 
Idaho. — Blandy  v.   Modern  Box  Mfg. 

Co.,    232    P.    1095,    40    Idaho    356. 
Mo. — McEwen  v.  Sterling  State  Bank, 

5  S.W.2d  702,  222  Mo.App.  660. 
Tex. — Carlton  v.   Hott,   Civ.App.,   292 

S.W.  642. 
Va. — Wood  v.  Kane,  129  S.B.  327,  143 

Va.  2.81. 

34  C.J.  p  536  note  63. 
Conclusiveness    of    return    generally 

see  the  C.J.S.  title  Process  §   100, 

also   50   C.J.   p   574   note   94-p   577 

note  17. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


425 


peached  on  the  ground  that  the  return  showing 
service  was  false,81  particularly  after  the  lapse  of 
a  long  period  of  time.82  A  judgment,  however,  may 
be  collaterally  impeached  on  the  ground  that  there 
was  no  return,83  that  the  return  was  made  by  the 
wrong  person,84  or  that  the  return  or  proof  wholly 
failed  to  show  the  facts  necessary  to  give  the  court 
jurisdiction.85 


§  424. 


Unauthorized  Appearance 


By  the  weight  of  authority,  an  attorney's  unauthor- 
ized appearance  for  a  party  against  whom  a  judgment 
is  rendered  is  no  ground  for  collaterally  attacking  the 
judgment.  This  rule  has  been  held  not  to  apply  in  case 
cf  a  judgment  against  a  nonresident. 

By  the  weight  of  authority,  it  is  not  permissible, 
in  any  collateral  proceeding,  for  a  party  to  contest 
the  validity  of  a  domestic  judgment  against  him  on 
the  ground  that  an  attorney  who  appeared  for  him 
in  the  action  had  no  authority  to  do  so.86  In  some 
states,  however,  the  rule  obtains  that  the  authority 
of  the  attorney  may  be  controverted  in  such  a 
case.87 

Nonresidents.  In  an  action  on  a  domestic  judg- 
ment against  nonresidents,  it  has  been  held  that  it 
may  be  shown  that  such  judgment  was  rendered  on 
an  unauthorized  appearance  for  defendant,  and 
without  service  of  process.88 


§  425.    Presumptions  as  to  Jurisdiction 

a.  Courts  of  general  or  superior  jurisdic- 

tion 

b.  Courts  or  tribunals  of  inferior  or  lim- 

ited jurisdiction 

c.  Federal  courts 

d.  Probate  courts 

a.  Courts  of  General  or  Superior  Jurisdiction 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Process  and  service 

(3)  Exercise  of  special  statutory  pow- 

ers 

(1)  In  General 

In  case  of  a  collateral  attack  on  a  domestic  Judg- 
ment of  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction,  every  reason- 
able presumption  will  be  indulged  in  support  of  the  reg- 
ularity and  validity  of  the  judgment;  and,  unless  the 
contrary  affirmatively  appears  from  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord, It  generally  will  be  presumed  that  the  court  had 
jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter  and  of  the  parties, 
and  that  facts  existed  which  were  necessary  to  give  the 
court  Jurisdiction  or  power  to  render  the  particular  Judg- 
ment. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  court 
of  competent  jurisdiction  is  presumed  to  be  regular 
and  valid  until  it  is  shown  to  be  invalid  by  alle- 
gations and  proof  .in  a  direct  action  or  proceeding 
instituted  for  that  purpose.89  Accordingly,  in  case 


81.  Ala. — Smith    v.    G-aines,    97    So. 
739,  210  Ala.  245. 

:ST.J.— Fidelity  Union  Trust  Co.  v. 
Gerber  Bros.  Realty  Co.,  199  A. 
7,  123  N.J.EQ.  511— C.  &  D.  Bldg. 
Corporation  v.  Griffithes,  157  A. 
137,  109  N.J.Eq.  319. 

82.  W.Va.— Hatfleld  v.  IT.  S.  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.,  1*1  S.R  572,  111  W.Va. 
289. 

83.  Colo. — Munson  v.  Pawnee  Cattle 
Co.,  126  P.  275,  53  Colo.  337. 

84.  Mo. — Stuckert  v.  Thompson,  164 
S.W.   692,   181  Mo.App.   518. 

34  C.J.  p  537  note  65.     » 

86.    Cal.— Regoli  v.  Bencher,  -34  P.2d 

477,  1  Cal.2d  27-6. 
34  C.J.  p  537  note  66. 
Proof  held  insufficient 

Where  a  Judgment  is  silent  as  to 
notice,  evidence  of  an  application  for, 
and  issuance  of,  citation  to  be  served 
by  publication  on  a  nonresident  of 
the  state  does  not  constitute  such 
proof  as  is  required  to  show  that  the 
judgment  was  rendered  on  notice  by 
publication  alone,  in  the  absence  of 
the  sheriff's  return  on  such  citation, 
or  of  any  evidence  as  to  what  else 
the  record  may  show  respecting 
service  thereof. — McCarthy  v.  Burtis, 
22  S.W.  422,  3  Tex.Civ.App.  439. 
86.  Ala.— -Zorn  v.  Lowery,  181  So, 

249,  236  Ala.  62. 


Ind. — Holllnger  v.  Reeme,  36  N.E. 
1114.  138  Ind.  363,  46  Am.S.R.  402, 
24  L.R.A  46— Wiley  v.  Pratt,  23 
Ind.  628 — Sherrard  v.  Nevius,  2 
Ind.  241,  52  Am.D.  508— Hunter  v. 
Harrell,  193  N.E.  295,  88  Ind.App. 
68. 
Mass. — Long  v.  MacDougall,  173  N.E. 

507,  273  Mass.  38$. 

Mo. — Johnson  v.  Baumhoff,  18  S.W. 
2d  13,  322  Mo.  1017— Stuart  v. 
Dickinson,  235  S.W.  446,  290  Mo. 
•516 — Hemphill  (Lumber  Co.  v.  Ar- 
cadia Timber  Co.,  App.,  52  S.W.2d 
750. 

34  C.J.  p  537  note  68. 
Impeachment    of    foreign    judgment 
for    unauthorized    appearance    see 
infra  §  893. 
Statute  not  applicable 

A  statute  providing  that  court  may 
at  any  stage  of  proceedings  relieve 
party  for  whom  attorney  has  as- 
sumed to  act  without  authority  from 
consequences  of  attorney's  acts  ap- 
plies only  where  party  challenges  at- 
torney's authority  during  progress 
of  suit,  and  does  not  apply  to  col- 
lateral attack  four  years  after  ad- 
verse decree  was  rendered. — Louth  v. 
Woodard,  236  P.  480,  114  Or.  603. 

87.    111. — Weber  v.   Powers,  72   N.E. 

1070,  213  111.  370,  68  L.R.A.  -610. 
34  C.J.  p  537  note  69. 
'Unauthorized  appearance  as  fraud  as 

831 


ground  for  collateral  attack  see  in- 
fra §  434. 

88.  N.T.— Vilas  v.  Plattsburgh  &  M. 
R.  Co.,   25  N.B.   941,   123  N.Y.  440, 
20  Am.S.R.   771,   9  (L.R.A.   844. 

34  C.J.  p  537  note  70. 

89.  Ala.— Hurt  v.  Knox,  126  So.  110, 
220  Ala.  448. 

Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Everette  v.  Pette- 

way,  179  So.  666,  131  'Fla.  51-6. 
Ga.— Coclin  v.  Taylor,   137  S.E.   852, 

36  Ga.App.  577. 
La. — Navarrette  v,  Joseph  Laughlin, 

Inc.,  App.,   20   So.2d   313,   reversed 

on    other    grounds    Navarrette    v. 

Laughlin,  24  So.2d  672,  209  La.  417 

— Bell  v.  Canal  Bank  &  Trust  Co., 

App.,  184  So.  382,  reheard  187  So. 

295,  affirmed   190   So.   359,   193   La, 

142. 
Miss. — Brotherhood       of       Railroad 

Trainmen   v.   Agnew,   155   So.    205, 

170  Miss.  604. 
Mo. — Lewis  v,  Lewis,  App.,  176 'S.W. 

2d  556. 
N.J. — Henderson   v.    Weber,    28   A-2d 

.90,  129  N.J.Law  59. 
N.D.— Olson    v.    Donnelly,    294    NVW. 

•666,  70  N.D.  370. 
Okl. — Drum    v.    .SStna    Casualty    £ 

Surety  Co.,  116  P.2d  715,  189  Okl. 

307. 
Pa. — Moeller  v.  Washington  County, 

44  A.2d  252,  352  Pa.  640. 


§  425 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


of  a  collateral  attack  on  a  judgment  of  a  domestic 
court  of  general  or  superior  jurisdiction,  by  a  party 
thereto,  the  judgment  imports  verity,  and  even-  rea- 


sonable presumption  will  be  indulged  in  support  of 
its  regularity  and  validity,90  and  the  burden  is  on 
a  party  collaterally  attacking  a  judgment  to  over- 


Utah.—  Intermill    v.    Nash,    75    P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
In  proceeding  for  equitable  relief  see 

supra  §  393. 
In  proceeding"  to  vacate  or  set  aside 

see  supra  §  297. 

Tile  chief  distinction  between  "col- 
lateral" and  "direct  attacks"  on  a 
judgment  is  that  in  the  former  the 
record  alone  may  be  inspected,  and 
is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  cor- 
rect, while  in  the  latter  the  facts 
may  be  shown,  and  thus  the  judg- 
ment itself  on  appeal  may  be  re- 
versed or  modified. 
Ala.— A.  B.  C.  Truck  Lines  v.  Kene- 

mer,  25  So.2d  oil—- Wise  v.  Miller, 

111  So.  913,  215  Ala,  660. 

Cal.— Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246,  254, 
203  Cal.  306— People  ex  rel.  Pol- 
lock v.  Bogart  13S  P.2d  360,  5S 
Gal.App.2d  831— Application  of 
Behymer,  19  P.2d  829,  130  CaLApp. 
200. 

90.  U.S.— Kalb  v.  Feuerstein,  Wis., 
60  S.Ct.  343,  308  U.S.  433,  84  L.Ed. 
370,  mandate  conformed  to  291  N. 
W.  840,  234  Wis.  507— Kalb  v. 
Luce,  60  S.Ct.  343,  308  U.S.  433,  34 
iL.Ed.  370,  mandate  conformed  to 
291  N.W.  841,  234  Wis.  509— John- 
son v.  Zerbst,  Ga,,  58  S.Ct.  1019, 
304  U.S.  458,  82  LuEd.  1461— Mich- 
ener  v.  Johnston,  C.C.A.Cal.,  141  P. 
2d  171— Pen-Ken  Gas  &  Oil  Co.  v. 
Warfteld  Natural  Gas  Co.,  C.C.A. 
Ky.,  13*7  P.2d  871,  certiorari  denied 
64  -S.Ct.  431,  320  U.S.  800,  88  L. 
Ed.  483,  rehearing-  denied  64  S.Ct 
634,  321  U.S.  -803,  '88  L.Ed.  1089— 
Mothershead  v.  King,  C.C.A.MO., 

112  «F.2d  1004 — Franzeen  v.  Johns- 
ton,    C.C.A.CaL,     111     F.2d     817— 
Thompson  v.  King,  C.C.A.MO.,   107 
P.2d  307 — In  re  Maier  Brewing  Co., 
DC/CaL,  38  P.Supp.  80-6— Erwin  v. 
Sanford,   D.C.Ga.,   27  F.Supp.  892— 
U.  S.  v.  U.  S.  'Fidelity  &  Guaranty 
Co.,  D.C.Okl,,  24  F.Supp.  961,  mod- 
ified   on   other   grounds   106    F.2d 
S04,  reversed  on  other  grounds  60 
S.Ct.    653,    309    U.S.    506,    84    L.Ed. 
894. 

Ala. — Anthony  v.  Anthony,  128  So. 
440,  221  Ala.  221— Hurt  v.  Knox, 
126  -So.  110,  220  Ala.  448. 

Ark. — Adams  v.  Van  Buren  County, 
139  S.W.2d  9,  200  Ark.  269— Kice 
v.  Moore,  109  S.W.2d  148,  194  Ark. 
585 — Brown  v.  Arkebauer,  31  S.W. 
2d  530,  182  Ark.  354— Hicks  v. 
Norsworthy,  4  S.W.2d  897,  176  Ark. 
786 — Stumpff  v.  Louann  Provision 
Co.,  292  S;W.  106,  173  Ark.  192— 
Road  Improvement  Dist  No.  4  of 
Saline  County  v.  Ball,  281  S.W.  5, 
'170  Ark.  522. 

Cal. — Wells  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  City  and 
County  of  San  -Francisco,  152  P.2d 
625,  25  Cal.2d  37— Ex  parte  Bell, 


122  P.2d  22,  9  Cal.2d  488— City  of 
Salinas  v.  Luke  Kow  -Lee,  18  P.2d 
335,  217  Cal.  252— Hamblin  v.  Su- 
perior Court  of  Los  Angeles  Coun- 
ty, 233  P.  337,  195  Cal.  364,  43  A. 
L.R.  1509 — Hosner  T.  Skelly,  App., 
164  P.2d  573— Rico  v.  Nasser  Bros. 
Realty  Co.,  137  P.2d  S'81,  5S  Cal. 
App.2d  878 — Marvin  v.  Marvin,  116 
P.2d  151,  46  Cal.App.2d  551— Mc- 
Allister v.  Superior  Court  In  and 
For  Alameda  County,  82  P.2d  462, 
28  Cal.App.2d  160— Greenwood  v. 
Greenwood,  297  P.  589,  112  Cal. 
App.  691— Fletcher  v.  Superior 
Court  of  Sacramento  County,  250 
P.  195,  79  CaLApp.  468— Hogan  v. 
Superior  Court  of  California  in  and 
for  City  and  County  of  San  Fran- 
cisco, 241  P.  584,  74  QaLApp.  704. 

Conn. — Doris  v.  McFarland,  156  A. 
52,  113  Conn.  594. 

Fla. — Horn  v.  City  of  Miami  Beach, 
194  So.  620,  142  Fla.  178— Sawyer 
v.  State,  113  So.  736,  94  'Fla.  60, 
followed  in  Dwyer  v.  State,  116  So. 
726,  95  Fla.  846. 

Ga. — Chance  v.  Chance,  5  -S.E.2d  399, 
60  Ga.App.  8S9 — Georgia  Creosot- 
ing  Co.  v.  Moody,  154  S.E.  294,  41 
Ga.App.  701. 

Idaho. — State  v.  Mundell,  158  P.2d 
818— State  v.  Miller.  10  P.2d  955, 
52  Idaho  33 — Karlson  v.  National 
Park  Lumber  Co.,  269  P.  591,  46 
Idaho  595 — Blandy  v.  Modern  Box 
Mfg.  Co.,  232  P.  1095,  40  Idaho  356. 

I1L — People  ex  rel.  Warner  v.  Lind- 
helmer,  19  N.E.2d  336,  370  111.  424 
— People  v.  Brewer,  160  N.E.  76, 
328  111.  472. 

Ind.— Clark  v.  Clark,  172  N.E.  124, 
202  Ind.  104— Berry-Enright  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Gardner,  7  N.E.2d  523, 
104  Ind.App.  9. 

Iowa. — In  re  Haga's  Estate,  294  N.W. 
539,  229  Iowa  3 SO. 

Ka.n. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  la  John 
Hancock  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Van- 
deventer,  44  P.2d  251,  254,  141  Kan. 
767. 

Ky.— Skldmore  v.  Napier,  166  S.W.2d 
439,  292  Ky.  311— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Goosling  v.  Varaey's 
Trustee,  105  S.W.2d  178,  182,  268 
Ky.  394 — McFarland  v.  Hudson,  89 
S.W.2d  877,  2-62  Ky.  183— Dean  v. 
Brown,  88  S.W.2d  298,  261  Ky.  593 
—Hall  v.  Bates,  77  S.W.2d  403,  257 
Ky.  61 — Houston's  Guardian  (now 
Luker)  v.  (Luker*s  -Former  Guard- 
ian, 69  S.W.2d  1014,  253  'Ky.  602— 
Well's  Adm'x  v.  Hell,  47  S.W.2d 
1041,  243  Ky.  282— Ramsey's  Ex'r 
v.  Ramsey,  26  S.W.2d  37,  233  Ky. 
507 — Wolverton  v.  Baynham,  10  S. 
W.2d  837,  226  Ky.  214— Mitchell 
Mill  Remnant  Corporation  v.  Long, 
3  S,W.2d  639,  "223  Ky.  242— Dye 

832 


Bros.  v.  Butler,  272  S.W.  426,  209 
Ky.  199. 

Me.— Bisbee  v.  Knight,  26  A.2d  637, 
139  Me.  1. 

Mich.— Life  Ins.  Co.  of  Detroit  v. 
Burton,  10  N.W.2d  315,  306  Mich. 
81. 

Mo.— State  ex  rel.  Lane  v.  Cornell, 
171  S.W.2d  £87,  351  Mo.  1 — Thomp- 
son v.  Farmers'  Exchange  Bank, 
62  S.W.2d  803,  333  Mo.  437— Ray 
v.  Ray,  50  S.W.2d  142,  330  Mo.  530 
— Van  Emelen  v.  Van  Emelen, 
App.,  166  S.W.2d  802— Colorado 
Milling  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  Rolla 
Wholesale  Grocery  Co.,  App.,  102 
S.W.2d  681. 

Mont. — Coipng  Juris  quoted  in  West 
v.  Capital  Trust  &  Savings  Bank, 
124  P.2d  572,  575,  113  Mont  ISO- 
State  ex  rel.  Enochs  v.  District 
Court  of  Fourth  Judicial  Dist.  in 
and  for  Missoula  County,  123  P.2d 
971,  113  Mont.  227— State  .ex  rel. 
Delmoe  v.  District  Court  of  Fifth 
Judicial  Dist.,  46  P.2d  39,  100  Mont. 
131. 

Nev.— State  Bar  of  Nevada  v.  Mc- 
Cluskey,  71  P.2d  1046,  J58  Nev.  114 
—Pease  v.  Pease,  217  P.  239,  47 
Nev.  124. 

jj-.j. — Henderson  v.  Weber,  2-8  A.2d 
90,  129  N.J.Law  59— McMahon  v. 
Amoroso,  154  A.  840,  108  N.J.Eq. 
263,  certiorari  denied  Diamond  v. 
McMahon,  52  S.Ct  31,  2.84  U.S.  652, 
76  L.Ed.  553. 

N.Y.— In  re  Wade's  Will,  61  N.T.S.2d 
16,  270  App.Div.  712,  appeal  grant- 
ed 62  N.Y.S.2d  850,  270  App.Div. 
982. 

N.D. — Olson  v.  Donnelly,  294  -N.W. 
666,  70  N.D.  370— Tuttle  v.  Tuttle, 
181  N.W.  898,  48  N.D.  10. 

Ohio. — Central  Hyde  Park  Sav.  & 
Loan  Co.  v.  Feck,  67  N.E.2d  44,  77 
Ohio  App.  343— P.  A.  Requarth  Co. 
v.  Holland,  App.,  66  N.E.2d  329 — 
Michigan  State  Industries  v. 
Fischer  Hardware  Co.,  197  N.E. 
785,  50  Ohio  App.  153'. 

Okl. — fFernow  v.  Gubser,  162  P.2d 
529— Lee  v.  Harvey,  156  P.2d  134, 
195  OkL  178— Mid-Continent  Pipe 
Line  Co.  v.  Seminole  County  Excise 
Board,  146  P.2d  996,  194  Okl.  40— 
In  re  Crouch's  Estate,  126  P.2d  994, 
191  Okl.  74— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Warren  vi  Stansbury,  126  P.2d  251, 
253,  190  OkL  554— Town  of  Waton- 
ga  v.  Crane  Co.,  114  P.2d  941,  189 
Okl.  184— Myers  v.  Carr,  47  P.2d 
156,  173  Okl.  335— Protest  of  St. 
Louis-San  Francisco  Ry.  Co.,  19 
P.2d  162,  162  Okl.  -62— Protest  of 
St  Louis-San  Francisco  Ry.  Co., 
11  P.2d  189,  157  OWL  131— Reliance 
Clay  Products  Co.  v.  Rooney,  10 
P.2d  414,  157  Okl.  24— Harris  v. 
Spurrier  Lumber  Co.*  26-5  P.  637, 


49    C.J.S.  JUDGMENTS  §425 

come  such  presumption  and  establish  the  invalidity  I  of  the  judgment91  by   competent  and  convincing 


130  Okl.   99 — Thomason  v.  Thomp- 
son. 253  P.  99,  123  Okl.  218. 
Or. — American  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wel- 

ler,  212  P.  803,  106  Or.  494. 
Pa. — Commonwealth  ex  rel.  McGlinn 
v.  Smith.  24  A.2d  1,  344  Pa,  41— 
Commonwealth  ex  rel.  McClenach- 
an  v.  Reading,  6  A.2d  '776,  336  Pa. 
165. 

Tenn. — Page  v.  Turcott,  167  S.W.2d 
350,  179  Tenn.  491— Redmond  v. 
Wardrep,  257  S.W.  394,  149  Tenn. 
35. 

Tex.— White  v.  White,  179  S.W.2d 
503,  142  Tex.  499— Burton  v.  Mc- 
Guire,  Com.App.,  41  S.W.2d  238— 
Corpus  Juris  quoted  in,  Jackson  v. 
Slaughter,  Civ.App.,  185  S.W.2d 
759,  761 — Burgess  v.  City  and 
County  of  Dallas  Levee  Imp.  Dist., 
Civ.App.,  155  S.W.2d  402,  error  re- 
fused— Clark  v.  Pecos  County  State 
Bank,  Civ.App.,  147  S.W.2d  917— 
Hudson  v.  Norwood,  Civ.App.,  147 
S.W.2d  826,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Gamble  v.  Banney- 
er,  Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  955,  af- 
firmed 151  S.W.2d  586,  137  Tex.  7 
— Straus  v.  Shamblin,  Civ.App., 
120  S.W.2d  598,  error  dismissed — 
Askew  v.  Rountree,  Qiv.App.,  120 
S.W.2d  11'7— Williams  v.  Tooke, 
Civ.App.,  116  S.W.2d  1114— Husel- 
by  v.  Allison,  Civ.App.,  25  S.W.2d 
1108 — State  Mortg.  Corporation  v. 
Garden,  Civ.App.,  11  S.W.2d  212— 
Bendy  v.  W.  T.  Carter  &  Bro.,  Civ. 
App.,  5  S.W.2d  579,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.,  14  S.W.2d  813— Cockrell  v. 
Steffens,  Civ.App.,  284  S.W.  608. 
Utah.— Salt  Lake  City  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  22  P.2d  1046,  1048,  82 
Utah  179. 

Vt. — Town  of  Manchester  v.  Town  of 
Townshend,  2  A.2d  207,  110  Vt.  136. 
Va, — Cole    v.    Farrier,    22    S.E.2d    18, 
180     Va.     231 — Mack    v.    Common- 
wealth, 15  S.E.2d  62,  177  Va.  921— 
Beck  v.   Semones'  Adm'r,  134  &2B. 
677,  145  Va.  429. 
34  C.J.  p  537  note  72. 
Presumption  of  regularity  and  valid- 
ity of  judicial  proceedings  in  gen- 
eral see  Evidence  §  145. 
"The  presumption  in  favor  of  the 
validity  of  a  judgment  arises  from 
the  fact  that  the  judgment  was  ren- 
dered, and  legal  evidence  of  its  ren- 
dition has  been  preserved." — Hannon 
r.    Henson,    Tex.Civ.App.,    7    S.W.2d 
613,  619,  affirmed,  Com. App.,  15  S.W. 
2d  579. 

Courts  within  rule 
(1)  Circuit  court 

Ky.— Goodman  v.  Board  of  Drainage 
Com'rs  of  McCracken-  County, 
Mayfleld  Creek  Drainage  Dist  No. 
1,  16  S.W.2d  1036,  229  Ky.  189. 

Mo.— Ray  v.  Ray,  50  S.W.2d  142,  330 
Mo.  530 — Van  Emelen  v.  Van  Erne- 
len,  App,,  166  S.W.2d  802.  . 

49  C.J.S.-53 


(2)  County  court 

Ark. — Fisher   v.    Cowan,    170    S.W.2d 

*03,  205  Ark.  722. 
111. — People  ex  rel.  Baird  &  Warner 

v.  Lindheimer,   19  N.E.2d   336,   370 

111.  424. 
Okl.— Vinson  v.   Cook.   184   P.   97,   76 

Okl.  46. 

(3)  Superior       Court. — Clark       v. 
Clark,  172  N.E.  124,  202  Ind.  104. 

(4)  Other   courts   within   rule    see 
34  C.J.  p  537  note  72  [b]. 
Collateral    attack    on    judgment    of 

justice's  court  see  Justices  Of  The 
Peace  §  115. 

Particular  judgments  within  rule 

(1)  A  deficiency  decree  on  foreclo- 
sure.— Roebke  v.   Love,   191   So.   122, 
186  Miss.  609. 

(2)  A  judgment  foreclosing  a  land 
contract  and  awarding  plaintiff  ven- 
dor one  fourth  of  the  grain  crops. — 
Sukut   v.    Sukut,    12    N.W.2d   536,    73 
N.D.  154. 

(3)  A  judgment  forfeiting  a  land 
patent  for  failure  to  list  it  for  taxa- 
tion.—'Flinn    v.    Blakeman,    71    -S.W. 
2d  961,  254  Ky.  416. 

(4)  A  judgment  or  decree  in  parti- 
tion. 

Ky. — Morgan  v.  Big  Woods  Lumber 
Co.,  249  S.W.  329,  198  Ky.  -88. 

Tex. — Smoot  v.  Qhambers,  Civ.App., 
156  S.W.2d  314.' 

47  C.J.  p  439  note  1. 

(5)  A  mortgage  foreclosure  judg- 
ment. 

Ark. — Games    v.    De   Witt    Bank    & 

Trust    Co.,    147    S.W.2d    1002,    201 

Ark.  1037. 
N.Y.— Lauder  v.  Meserole,  133  N.Y.S. 

•340,  148  App.Div.  739. 
Tex. — Flack  v.  Braman,  101  S.W.  537, 

45  Tex.Civ.App.  47'3. 
42  C.J.  p  172  note  58. 

Presumption  for  and,  not  against  va- 
lidity 

(1)  "Any  .  condition   of   facts   con- 
sistent with  its  validity,  and  not  af- 
firmatively contradicted  by  the  judg- 
ment roll,  will  be  presumed  to  have 
existed  rather  than  one  which  will 
defeat    it."— Wells   Fargo    &   Co.    v. 
City  and  County  of  San  'Francisco, 
152    P.2d    625,    25    Cal.2d    37— Boren- 
stein  v.  Borenstein,  125  P.2d  465,  46*6, 
20    CaUd    379— -City    of  .Salinas    v. 
Luke  Kow  Lee,  18  P.2d  335,  217  Cal. 
252. 

(2)  Facts  to  avoid  judgment  will 
not  be  imported  by  way  of  inference, 
unless  invalidating  inference  is  ob- 
vious  and  reasonably  inescapable. — 
Scott  County  v.  Dubois,  130  So.  106, 
158  Miss.  245. 

Resolving  doubts 

A  court  in  considering  whether  a 
decree  of  a  court  of  coordinate  juris- 
diction is  void  should  resolve  every 

833 


doubt  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  the 
decree  and  of  the  authority  of  the 
court  otherwise  having  jurisdiction 
to  enter  it. — St.  Louis  Amusement 
Co.  v.  Paramount  Pictures,  D.C.Mo., 
61  -F.Supp.  854,  appeal  dismissed,  C. 
C.A.,  St.  Louis  Amusement  Co.  v. 
Paramount  Film  Distributing  Corp., 
156  F.2d  400. 

91.    U.S.— Hentschel    v.    -Fidelity    & 

Deposit    Co.    of    Maryland,    C.C.A. 

Mo.,  87  F.2d  833. 
Iowa. — Yungclas  r.  Yungclas,  239  N. 

W.  22,  213  Iowa  413. 
Kan. — John  Hancock  Mut  Life   Ins. 

Co.    v.    Vande venter,    44   P.2d    251, 

254,  141  Kan.  767. 

Ky. — Davis  v.  Tuggle's  Adm'r,  178  S. 
W.2d  979,  297  Ky.  '376— Skidraore 
v.  Napier,  166  S.W.2d  439,  292  Ky. 
311 — Goosling  v.  Varney's  Trustee, 
105  S.W.2d  178.  268  Ky.  394. 

Mo.— Blattel  v.  Stallings,  142  S.W.2d 
9,  346  Mo.  450— Colorado  Milling  & 
Elevator  Co.  v.  Rolla  Wholesale 
Grocery  Co.,  App.,  102  S.W.2d  681. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  West 
v.  Capital  Trust  &  Savings  Bank, 
124  P.2d  572,  675,  113  Mont.  130. 

Neb.— Salistean  v.  -State,  215  N.W. 
107,  115  Neb.  838,  53  A.L.R.  1057. 

N.T.— Nankivel  v.  Omsk  All  Russian 
Government,  197  N.Y.S.  4-67,  203 
App.Div.  "740,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  142  N.B.  569,  237  N.T.  150 
— Hope  v.  Seaman,  119  N.Y.S.  713, 
modified  on  other  grounds  Hope  v. 
Shevill,  122  N.Y.S.  127,  137  Aj?p. 
Div.  86,  affirmed  Hope  v.  Seaman, 
97  N.B.  1106,  204  N.Y.  563. 

Pa. — Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Mc- 
Clenachan  v.  Reading,  6  A.2d  776, 
336  Pa.  165. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  auoted  in.  Jack- 
son v.  Slaughter,  Civ.App.,  185  S. 
W.2d  759,  761,  refused  for  want  of 
merit— Williams  v.  Tooke,  Civ. 
App.,  116  S.W.2d  1114— Pennebaker 
v.  Thrash,  Civ.App.,  84  S.W.2d 
1081,  error  dismissed — Tanton  v. 
State  Nat.  Bank  of  El  Paso,  Civ. 
App.,  43  S.W.2d  957,  affirmed  79 
S.W.2d  833,  126  Tex  16,  97  A.L.R. 
1093 — Bendy  v.  W.  T.  Carter  & 
Bro.,  Civ.App.,  5  S.W.2d  579,  af- 
firmed, Com.App.,  14  S.W.2d  813. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 22  P.2d  1046,  1048,  82  -Utah 
179. 

Va.— Howe  v.  Howe,  18  S.E.2d  294, 
1'79  Va.  111. 

34  C.J.  p  538  note  73. 

Where  parties  attacking-  judgment 
introduced  no  evidence,  the  presump- 
tion attaching  to  judgment  regular 
on  its  face  stands.— Yungclas  v. 
Yungclas,  239  N.W.  22,  213  Iowa  413. 


§  425 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


proof.92 

It  will  be  presumed,  as  against  a  collateral  at- 
tack, that  the  court  had  jurisdiction  of  the  subject 
matter  and  of  the  persons  or  parties,9^  and  that  all 


the  facts  necessary  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction  or 
power  to  render  the  particular  judgment  existed, 
and  were  duly  proved  and  found,94  unless  the  fact 
of  want  of  jurisdiction,  and  consequent  invalidity 


92.  Ky. — Goosling  v.  Varney's  Trus- 
tee, 105  S.W.2d  178,  268  Ky.  394. 

La. — Key  v.  Jones,  App.,  181  So.  631. 

X.Y. — Xankivel  v.  Omsk  All  Russian 
Government,  197  X.Y.S.  467,  2 
App.Div.  740,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  142  X.E.  569,  237  X.Y.  150 
— Hope  v.  Seaman.  119  X.Y.S.  713, 
modified  on  other  grounds  Hope  v. 
Shevill,  122  X.Y.S.  127,  137  App. 
Dlv.  86,  affirmed  Hope  v.  Seaman, 
97  X.E.  1106,  204  X.Y.  563. 

Tex. — Williams  v.  Tooke,  Civ.App., 
116  S.W.2d  1114,  error  dismissed. 

Contradicting    recitals    see    infra    § 
426. 
Mortgage  foreclosure  judgment  is 

within  this  rule. — Reedy  v.  Canfteld, 

42   3ST.E.    833,    159    111.   254—42   C.J.   P 

172  note  58. 

dear,  satisfactory,  and  convincing 
evidence,  to  the  exclusion  of  every 
fact  that  would  support  the  Judg- 
ment, has  been  held  necessary. — Pen- 
Ken  Gas  &  Oil  Corporation,  v.  War- 
field  Xatural  Gas  Co.,  C.C.A.Ky.,  137 
F.2d  871,  certiorari  denied  64  S.Ct 
431,  320  U.S.  800,  88  L.Ed.  483,  re- 
hearing denied  64  S.Ct.  634,  321  U.S. 
SOS,  83  L.Ed.  1089. 

93.  U.S.— Pen-Ken    Gas   &   Oil   Cor- 
poration  v.   Warfleld   Natural   Gas 
Co.,   C.C.A.Ky.,    137   F.2d  5*71,   cer- 
tiorari denied  64  S.Ct.  431,  320  U.S. 
800,  88  L.Ed.  483,  rehearing  denied 
64  S.Ct.  634,  321  U.S.  803,  88  L.Ed. 
1089 — McCampbell  v.  Warrich  Cor- 
poration,   C.C.A.I1L,    109    F.2d   115, 
certiorari  denied  -60  S.Ct.  1077,  310 
U.S.   631,  84  L.Ed.  1401,  rehearing 
denied  61  S.Ct.  55,  second  case  311 
U.S.  612,  85  L.Ed.  388,  and  61  S.Ct 
1089,  -313  U.S.  599,  85  L.Ed.  1551 — 
Montgomery  v.  Equitable  -Life  As- 
sur  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  C.C.A.I11.,   83  -F. 
2d  758. 

Cal.— Godfrey  v.  Godfrey,  86  P.2d 
357,  30  Cal.App.2d  370— Fletcher  v. 
Superior  Court  of  Sacramento 
County,  250  P.  195,  79  CaLApp.  468 
— Lieberman  v.  Superior  Court  of 
California  in  and  for  Orange  Coun- 
ty, 236  P.  570,  72  CaLApp.  18. 

D.C.— 'Fishel  v.  Kite,  101  F.2d  685, 
69  App.D.C.  360,  certiorari  denied 
59  S.Ct.  645,  30-6  U.S.  656,  83  L.Ed. 
1054. 

Fla. — Horn  v.  City  of  Miami  Beach, 
194  So.  620,  142  -Fla.  178 — Catlett  v. 
Chestnut,  146  So.  241,  107  Fla.  498, 
91  A.L.R.  212— Seaboard  All-Flori- 
da By.  v.  Leavitt  141  So.  886,  105 
Fla.  -600. 

111.— People  v.  Miller,  171  X.E.  672, 
339  m.  57-3— Sharp  v.  Sharp,  164 
X.E.  685,  333  111.  26*7. 

Kan. — John  Hancock  Mut.  Life  Ins. 


Co.    v.    Vandeventer,    44    P.2d   251, 

254,  141  Kan.  767. 

Ky. — Corpus   Juris   gtioted  in   Goos- 

ling  v.  Varney's  Trustee,  105  S.W. 

2d  178,  1S2,  26S  Ky.  394. 

Me. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bis  bee 

V.  Knight,  26  A.2d  *37.  638,  139  Me. 

1. 

Mo. — Hemphill  Lumber  Co.  v.  Arca- 
dia Timber  Co.,  App.,  52  S.W.2d 
750. 

Mont.— West  v.  Capital  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank,  124  P.2d  572,  575,  113 
Mont.  130— E.  J.  Lander  &  Co.  v. 
Brown,  99  P.2d  216,  110  Mont.  128 
— Hanrahan  v.  Andersen,  90  P.2d 
494,  108  Mont.  21S— Frisbee  v.  Co- 
burn,  52  P.2d  882,  101  Mont  58— 
Price  v.  Skylstead,  222  P.  1059,  69 
Mont.  453. 

N.Y.— In  re  Fine's  Estate,  44  X.Y.S. 
2d  62,  181  Misc.  261— Standish  v. 
Standish,  40  X.Y.S.2d  538,  179  Misc. 
564. 

X.C.— Corpus  Juris  cited  la  State  v. 
Adams,  195  S.E.  822,  823,  213  N.C. 
243. 

Term. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Kirk 
v.  Sumner  County  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  153  S.W.  139,  142,  25  Tenn.App. 
150. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Jack- 
son v.  Slaughter,  Civ.Ap-p.,  185  S. 
W.2d  759,  761 — Smoot  v.  Chambers, 
Civ.App.,  156  S.W.2d  314,  error  re- 
fused. 
Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
Wis. — Duel  v.  Ramar  Baking  Co.,  18 

X.W.2d   345,   246  Wis.   604. 
34  C.J.  p  438  note  74. 
Presumptions  as  to  jurisdiction  of: 
Courts  generally  see  Courts  §§96- 

100. 
Federal  courts  see  Federal  Courts 

§  8. 
Jurisdiction,  of  parties 

Where  a  court  of  general  jurisdic- 
tion has  jurisdiction  of  the  subject 
matter  of  an  action  in  which  judg- 
ment is  pronounced,  jurisdiction  of 
the  parties  will  be  presumed. 
Mo. — Lewis  v.  Lewis,  App.,  176  S. 

W.2d  55-6. 
Tex. — Henry  v.  Beauchamp,  Civ.App., 
39   S.W.2d  -642,   followed  in  Henry 
v.   Carter,    39    S.W.2d   645. 
34  C.J.  p  538  note  74  [a]. 

Objection,  to  court's  Jurisdiction  of 
parties,  even  If  made  on  trial,  is  not 
available  on  collateral  attack  on 
judgment— Road  Improvement  Dist. 
No.  4  of  Saline  County  v.  Ball,  281 
S.W.  6,  170  Ark.  -522. 

84.    U.S.— Warmsprings  Irr.  Dist.  v. 

May,   aC.A.Or.,   117  <F.2d  802. 
Ark.— Carnes    v.    De   Witt   Bank   & 

Trust    Co.,    147    S.W.2d    1002,    201 

834 


Ark.  1037— Sargent  v.  Citizens 
Bank,  139  S.W.2d  44,  200  Ark.  121 
— Dowell  v.  Slaughter,  50  S.W.2d 
572,  185  Ark.  918 — Lambie  v.  W.  T. 
Rawleigh  Co.,  14  S.W.2d  245,  17S 
Ark.  1019— Winfrey  v.  People's 
Sav.  Bank,  5  S.W.Sd  360,  176  Ark. 
941. 

Cal.— Hosner  v.  Skelly,  App.,  164  P. 
2d  573— People  v.  Herod,  295  P. 
383,  111  CaLApp.  246. 

Ga.— Kaiser  v.  Kaiser,  173  S.E.  6SS. 
178  Ga.  355 — Chance  v.  Chance,  5 
S.E.2d  399,  60  Ga.App.  889. 

111. — Oulvey  v.  Little,  233  Ill.App. 
553. 

Ind. — Grantham  Realty  Corporation 
v.  Bowers,  22  X.E.2d  832,  215  Ind. 
672— State  ex  rel.  Allman  v.  Su- 
perior Court  for  Grant  County,  19 
X.E.2d  467,  215  Ind.  249 — Bowser 
V.  Tobin,  18  X.E.2d  T73,  215  Ind.  99. 

Iowa,— Watt  v.  Dunn,  17  X.W.2d  811. 

Kan.— John  Hancock  Mut.  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Vandeventer,  44  P.2d  251, 
254,  141  Kan.  767. 

Ky. — Goosling  v.  Varney's  Trustee, 
105  S.W.2d  178,  268  Ky.  394. 

Me.— Bisbee  v.  Knight,  2£  A.2d  637, 
139  Me.  1. 

Mass.— Jones  v.  Swift,  15  X.E.2d  274. 
300  Mass.  177 — Durfee  v.  Durfee, 
200  X.E.  3D5,  293  Mass.  472. 

Miss. — Brotherhood  of  Railroad 
Trainmen  v.  Agnew,  155  So.  205, 
170  Miss.  604— Whitely  v.  Towle, 
141  So.  571,  163  Miss.  418— Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  St.  Louis  v.  Wall, 
103  So.  5,  138  Miss.  204. 

Mo. — Thompson  v.  'Farmers'  Ex- 
change Bank,  62  S.W.2d  803,  333 
Mo.  437 — State  ex  rel.  Townsend 
v.  Mueller,  51  S.W.2d  S,  330  Mo.  641 
— First  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
King  City  v.  Bowman,  15  S.W.2d 
842,  322  Mo.  654— Lewis  v.  Lewis, 
App.,  176  S.W.2d  556. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in,  West 
v.  Capital  Trust  &  Savings  Bank, 
124  P.2d  572,  113  Mont.  130— Thom- 
son v.  Xygaard,  41  P.2d  1,  98  Mont. 
529 — State  v.  District  Court  of 
Fourth  Judicial  Dist  in  and  for 
Missoula  County,  Department  No. 
2,  282  P.  1042,  86  Mont.  193— State 
v.  District  Court  of  Tenth  Judicial 
Dist  in  and  for  Judith  Basin 
County,  227  P.  579,  71  Mont.  S9. 

X.J.— Mangani  v.  Hydro,  Inc.,  194  A. 
264,  119  X.J.Law  71. 

N.Y.— People  v.  Harmor,  57  N.Y.S.2d 
402,  185  Misc.  596. 

Okl.— Lee  v.  Harvay,  156  P.2d  134, 
195  Okl.  178— Mid-Continent  Pipe 
Line  Co,  v.  Seminole  County  Ex- 
cise Board,  146  P.2d  99-6,  194  Okl. 
40 — In  re  Crouch's  Estate,  126  P. 
2d  994,  191  Okl.  74— Town  of  Wa- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  425 


of  the  judgment,  affirmatively  appears  on  the  face  I  ord,95  or  is  made  to  appear  in  some  other  permissi- 
of  the  judgment,  or  of  the  judgment  roll  or  rec-  I  ble   manner.9*     However,  it  has   been  held  that, 


tonga  v.  Crane  Co.,  114  P.2d  941, 
189  Okl.  184 — Protest  of  -St.  Louis- 
San  (Francisco  Ry.  Co.,  42  P.2d  537, 
171  Okl.  180— Protest  of  Standard 
Pipe  Line  Co.,  32  P.2d  869,  168  OkL 
281— Protest  of  Gulf  Pipe  Line  Co. 
of  Oklahoma,  32  P.2d  42,  168  Okl. 
136 — Protest  of  St.  Louis-San 
Francisco  Ry.  Co.,  19  P.2d  162,  162 
Okl.  62— Protest  of  St.  Louis-San 
Francisco  Ry.  Co.,  11  P.2d  189,  157 
Okl.  131— Hawkins  v.  Bryan,  261 
.  P.  167,  128  Okl.  27— Orth  v.  Hajek, 
259  P.  854.  127  Okl.  59— Miller  v. 
Madigan,  215  P.  742,  90  Okl.  1'7. 

Tenn. — Bass  v.  Southern  Surety  Co., 
12  S.W.2d  714,  158  Tenn.  233-^Oor- 
pus  Juris  quoted  in  Kirk  v.  Sum- 
ner  County  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  153 
S.W.2d  139,  142,  25  Tenn.Apj>.  150. 

Tex.— White  v.  White,  179  S.W.2d 
503,  142  Tex.  499 — Smoot  v.  Cham- 
bers, Civ.App.,  156  S.W.2d  "314— 
Williams  v.  Tooke,  Civ.App.,  11-6 
S.W.2d  1114,  error  dismissed — Mc- 
Leod  v.  Carroll,  Civ.App.,  109  S.W. 
2d  31-6,  affirmed  Carroll  y.  MoLeod, 
130  S.W.Sd  277,  133  Tex.  571— 
Jackson  v.  Slaughter,  Civ.App.,  185 
S.W.2d  759 — Griggs  v.  Jefferson 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  Civ.App.,  57  S. 
W.2d  390,  error  dismissed. 

Wash. — Thompson  v.  Short,  106  P.2d 
720,  6  Wash.2d  71. 

Wyo.— State  v.  Underwood,  86  P.2d 
707,  54  Wyo.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  539  note  75. 

It  is  not  essential  that  every  juris, 
dictional  fact  appear  on  the  face  of 
the  record,  and,  if  the  petition  sets 
out  facts  sufficient  to  show  a  cause 
of  action  within  the  general  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  court,  and  no  facts  ap- 
pear on  the  face  of  the  record  estab- 
lishing that  no  jurisdiction  exists, 
all  presumptions  are  resolved  in  fa- 
vor of  the  power  of  the  court  to  act. 
—In  re  Warner's  Estate,  288  N.W.  39, 
137  Neb.  25-— Brandeen  v.  Lau,  201 
N.W.  605,  113  Neb.  686. 

Particular  facts  presumed 

(1)  That  the  cause  of  action  had 
accrued    at    the    time   the   suit   was 
brought. — Austin    v.    Austin,    43    111. 
App.   4-88. 

(2)  That   the    parties   were   living 
when  the  action  was  commenced,  and 
when  the  judgment  was  rendered. — 
Hillyard    v.    Banchor,    118   P.    67,   85 
Kan.  516. 

(3)  That  an  attorney  was  author- 
ized to  compromise  the  suit. — Hart- 
ford Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  King,   73   S.W. 
71,  31  Tex.Civ.App.  636. 

(4)  That  attorney  was  authorized 
to  stipulate  for  a  change  of  venue. — 
Hall    v.  Dickinson,  170  N.W.  646,  204 
Mich.  545. 

(5)  That  the  necessary  conditions 
existed    for    holding    an    adjourned 


term  of  court. — Haughton  v.  Order 
of  United  Commercial  Travelers,  93 
S.E.  393,  108  S.C.  73. 

95.  U.S.— Hall  v.  Johnston,  C.C.A. 
Cal.,  86  F.2d  820— Chase  v.  Hiatt, 
D.C.Pa.,  54  F.Supp.  270. 

Ark.— Person  v.  Miller  Levee  Dist. 
No.  2,  150  S.W.2d  950,  202  Ark. 
173— Ladd  v.  Stubblefield,  111  S. 
W.2d  555,  195  Ark.  261— Moffett  v. 
Texarkana  Forest  Park  Paving, 
Sewer,  and  Water  Dist.  No.  2,  26 
S.W.2d  589,  181  Ark.  474— Road 
Improvement  Dist.  No.  4  of  Sa- 
line County  v.  Ball,  281  S.W.  5, 
170  Ark.  522. 

Cal.— Godfrey  v.  Godfrey,  86  P.2d 
357,  30  Cal.App.2d  370 — McMur- 
ray  v.  Sivertsen,  83  P.2d  48,  28 
Cal.App.2d  541— McAllister  v.  Su- 
perior Court  In  and  For  Alameda 
County,  82  P.2d  462,  28  Cal.App. 
2d  160— Fletcher  v.  Superior  Court 
of  Sacramento  County,  250  P.  195, 
79  CaLApp.  468— Hogan  v.  .Superior 
Court  of  California  in  and  for  City 
and  County  of  San  Francisco,  241 
P.  584,  74  CaLApp.  704— Lieber- 
man  v.  Superior  Court  of  Califor- 
nia in  and  for  Orange  County,  236 
P.  570,  72  CaLApp.  18. 

D.C.— Fishel  v.  Kite,  101  F.2d  685, 
69  App.D.C.  360,  certiorari  denied 
Kite  v.  Fishel,  59  S.Ct.  645,  306 
U.S.  656,  83  L.Bd.  1054. 

Fla. — Horn  v.  City  of  Miami  Beach, 
194  So.  620,  142  Fla.  178— Catlett 
v.  Chestnut,  146  So.  241,  107  Fla, 
498,  91  A.L.R.  212— Seaboard  All- 
Florida  Ry.  v.  Leavitt,  141  So.  886, 
105  Fla.  600. 

Idaho.— State  v.  Mundell,  158  P.2d 
818 — State  v.  Miller,  10  P.2d  955, 
52  Idaho  33. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Baird  &  Warner 
v.  Lindheimer,  19  N.E.£d  336,  370 
111.  424— People  v.  Miller,  171  N. 
E,  672,  339  111.  573— People  v. 
Brewer,  160  N.E.  76,  328  111.  472. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  John 
Hancock  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Van- 
deventer,  44  P.2d  251,  254,  141  Kan. 
767. 

Ky.— Newsome  v.  Hall,  161  S.W.2d 
629,  290  Ky.  486,  140  A.L.R.  818— 
Goosling  v.  Varney's  Trustee,  105 
S.W.2d  178,  268  Ky.  394— McFar- 
land  v.  Hudson,  89  S.W.2d  877,  262 
Ky.  183 — Dean  v.  Brown,  88  S.W. 
2d  298,  261  Ky.  593— Wells'  Adm'x 
v.  Heil,  47  S.W.2d  1041,  243  Ky. 
282— May  v.  Sword,  33  S.W.2d  314, 
236  Ky.  412. 

Me. — Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  Bisbee 
v.  Knight,  26  A.2d  637,  638,  139 
Me.  1. 

Miss. — Prudential  Ins.  Co.  v.  Glea- 
son,  187  So.  229,  185  Miss.  243— 
Brotherhood  of  Railroad  Trainmen 
v.  Agnew,  155  So.  205,  170  Miss. 
604. 

835 


Mo. — Row  v.  Cape  Girardeau  Foun- 
dry Co.,  App.,  141  S.W.2d  113 — 
Sanders  v.  Savage,  129  S.W.2d 
1061,  234  Mo.App.  9— Rubber  Tire 
Supply  Co.  v.  American  Utilities 
Co.,  App.,  279  S.W.  751. 

Mont.— West  v.  Capital  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank,  124  P.2d  572,  113  Mont. 
130 — State  ex  rel.  Enochs  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fourth  Judicial  Dist. 
in  and  for  Missoula  County,  123  P. 
2d  971,  113  Mont.  227. 

Neb. — Salistean  v.  State,  215  N.W. 
107,  115  Neb.  838,  53  A.L.R.  1057. 

N.M.— State  v.  Patten,  69  P.2d  931, 
41  N.M.  395. 

OkL— Shefts  v.  Oklahoma  Co.,  137  P. 
2d  589,  192  Okl.  483— Petroleum 
Auditors  Ass'n  v.  Landis,  77  P.2d 
730,  182  Okl.  297— First  Nat.  Bank' 
v.  Darrough,  19  P.2d  551,  162  OkL 
243 — Hawkins  v.  Bryan,  261  P.  167, 
128  OkL  27— Bowling  v.  Merry,  217 
P.  404,  91  Okl.  176. 

Or. — Capos  v.  Clatsop  County,  25  P. 
2d  903,  144  Or.  510,  90  A.L.R.  289. 

Tenn. — Kirk  v.  Sumner  County  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  153  S.W.2d  139,  25 
Tenn.  App.  150. 

Tex.— State  Mortg.  Corporation  v. 
Ludwig,  48  S.W.2d  950,  121  Tex. 
268 — Jackson  v.  Slaughter,  Civ. 
App.,  185  S.W.2d  759,  refused  for 
want  of  merit— Williams  v.  Tooke, 
Civ.App.,  116  S.W.2d  1114,  error 
dismissed— Huselby  v.  Allison,  Civ. 
App.,  25  S.W.2d  1108, 

Utah. — Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 
157,  94  Utah  271. 

Va. — Mack  v.  Commonwealth,  15  S. 
E.2d  62,  177  Va.  921. 

Wash, — Thompson  v.  Short,  106  P.2d 
720,  6  Wash.2d  71— Peha's  Univers- 
ity Food  Shop  v.  Stimpson  Corpo- 
ration, 31  P.2d  1023,  177  Wash,  406. 

Wyo. — State  v.  Underwood,  86  P.2d 
707,  54  Wyo.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  540  note  76. 

No  presumption  against  record  see 
infra  §  426. 

Only    manner    of    overcoming    pre- 
sumption 

Presumption  of  Jurisdiction  as 
against  collateral  attack  may  be 
overcome  only  by  record  affirmative- 
ly showing  want  of  jurisdiction. — 
First  Nat  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of  King 
City  v.  Bowman,  15  S.W.2d  842, 
322  Mo.  654. 

If  the  record  in  the  former  case  is 
not  presented}  the  judgment  or  de- 
cree therein  cannot  be  held  void,  on 
collateral  attack,  for  want  of  juris- 
diction.— Fisher  v.  Guidy,  142  So.  818, 
106  Fla.  94. 

96.    111.— Dickinson  v.  Belden,  108  N. 
E.  1011,  268  111.  105. 
y.— Potter   v.   Webb,.  216    S.W.    66, 
186  Ky.  25. 


§  425 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


where  the  record  purports  to  show  what  was  done 
for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  jurisdiction,  it  will  not 
be  presumed  in  aid  of  the  court's  action  that  any- 
thing different  or  additional  was  done.97  In  the  ab- 
sence of  an}T  affirmative  showing  to  the  contrary  on 
the  face  of  the  record,  the  presumption  of  juris- 
diction will  generally  be  regarded  as  conclusive,98 
except  where  evidence  aliunde  may  be  introduced, 
as  discussed  infra  §  426. 


These  presumptions  of  regularity  and  validity, 
and  those  as  to  jurisdiction,  will  be  indulged  where 
the  record,  although  failing  to  show  jurisdiction  af- 
firmatively, does  not  distinctly  show  a  want  of  ju- 
risdiction,99 as  where  the  record  of  a  judgment  of 
a  court  of  general  jurisdiction  is  silent  as  to  the 
facts  conferring  jurisdiction,1  or  is  defective  in  con- 
sequence of  the  omission  of  proper  recitals,2  or  the 
loss  or  absence  of  parts  of  the  record,3  as  where 


Wash. — Jorgenson  v.  Winter,  125  P. 

957,  69  "Wash.  573. 
34  C.J.  p  540  note  76. 

If  the  decree  refers  to  the  evidence 
on  which  it  is  based,  and  an  exami- 
nation of  such  evidence  discloses 
that  it  is  not  sufficient  to  give  the 
court  jurisdiction,  the  presumption 
that  the  court  had  jurisdiction  is 
overcome. — Oulvey  v.  Little,  233  111. 
App.  553. 

Express  allegation  and  claim  to  con- 
trary 

YTis. — Duel  v.  Ramar  Baking  Co.,  18 
N.W.2d  345.  246  Wis.  604. 

97.  Cal. — Lieberman       v.       Superior 
Court    of    California    in    and    for 
Orange  County,  236  P.  570,  72  Cal. 
App.  18. 

98.  Ky. — Wolverton  v.  Baynham,  10 
S.W.2d  837,  226  Ky.  214. 

Hiss.— Whitley  v.  Towle,  141  So.  571, 
163  Miss.  4  IS — Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  St  Louis  v.  Wall,  103 
So.  5,  138  Miss.  204. 

Mont. — E.  J.  Lander  &  Co.  v.  Brown, 

99  P.2d  216,  110  Mont.  128— Hanra- 
han  v.  Andersen,   90  P.2d  494,  108 
Mont.    218— Frisbee  v.   Coburn,   52 
P.2d   882,    101   Mont   58— State   ex 
rel.    Delmoe   -v.    District    Court   of 
Fifth    Judicial    Dist.,    46    P.2d   39f 

100  Mont.    '31— Price  v.  Skylstead, 
223    P.    1059,    69    Mont.   453. 

Tex. — Security  Trust  Co.  of  Austin 
v.  Lipscomb  County,  180  S.W.2d 
151,  142  Tex.  592. 

If  record  does  not  negative  exist- 
ence of  facts  authorizing  court  to 
render  judgment,  law  conclusively 
presumes  that  such  facts  were  es- 
tablished before  court  when  such 
judgment  was  rendered,  and  evidence 
dehors  the  record  to  the  contrary 
will  not  be  received. — White  v. 
White,  179  S.W.2d  503,  142  Tex.  499. 

99.  Ga. — Chance   v.    Chance,   5    S.E. 
2d  399,  60  Ga-App.  889. 

Ky. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Goos- 
ling  v.  Varney's  Trustee,  105  S.W. 
2d  178,  182,  268  Ky.  394— Muss  man 
v.  Pepples,  22  S.W.2d  605,  232  Ky. 
254— Tarter  v.  Wilson,  269  S.W. 
715,  207  Ky.  535. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  QLuoted  in  Kirk 
v.  Sumner  County  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  153  S.W.2d  139,  142,  25  Tenn. 
App.  150. 

34  C.J.  p  540  note  77. 

!•  U.S. — In  re  Williams  Supply  Co., 
C.CJLN.Y.,  77  F.2d  909,  certiorari 


denied   Witt    v.    Berman,    56    S.Ct 

131,    296    U.S.    612,    SO   L.Ed.    434— 

Campbell    v.    Aderhold,    C.C.A.Ga., 

67  F.2d  246. 
Ark.— Fisher   v.    Cowan,    170    S.W.2d 

603,  205    Irk.  722. 
Ga. — Thomas   v.    Lambert,    1    S.E.2d 

443,  187  Ga.   616. 
Idaho. — Baldwin  v.  Anderson,   13   P. 

2d   650,   52   Idaho  243— Knowles  v. 

Kasiska,  268  P.  3,  46  Idaho  379. 
Ind.— Bowser    v.     Tobin,    18    N.E.2d 

773,  215  Ind.  99. 
Ky. — Goosling   v.    Varney's   Trustee, 

105  S.W.2d  178,   268  Ky.  394— Cor- 

pus   Juris    cited   in   Dye   Bros.    v. 

Butler,  272  S.W.  426,  427,  209  Ky. 

199. 
Miss. — Brotherhood       of       Railroad 

Trainmen   v.   Agnew,    155   So.   205, 

170     Miss.     604 — Federal    Reserve 

Bank  of  St.  Louis  v.  Wall,  103  So. 

5,  138  Miss.   204. 
Mo.— Lewis  v.  Lewis,  App.,  176  S.W. 

2d  556. 
Mont. — Corpus   Juris   cited  in  West 

v.  Capital  Trust  &  Savings  Bank. 
'  124  P.2d  572,  575,  113  Mont.  130. 
Neb.— In  re  Warner's  Estate,  288  N. 

W.   39,   137   Neb.   25— Brandeen   v. 

Lau,   201   N.W.   665,   113  Neb.   34. 
N.J. — Mangani    v.    Hydro,    Inc.,    194 

A.    264,    119    N.J.Law   71— Stout   v. 

Sutphen,   29   A.2d  724,  132  N.J.Eq. 

583. 
Okl.— Lee  v.  Harvey,   Okl.,  156  P.2d 

134,   195   Okl.   178— In  re  Crouch's 

Estate,  126  P.2d  994,  191  Okl.  74— 

Warren  v.  Stansbury,  126  P.2d  251, 

190  Okl.  554 — Town  of  Watonga  v. 

Crane  Co.,   114  P.2d  941,  189  OkL 

184— Dill   v.   Anderson,    256    P.    31, 

124  Okl.  299 — Cummings  v.  Inman, 

247  P.  379.  119  Okl.  9— Bowling  v. 

Merry,   217  P.  404,   91  Okl.  176. 
Pa»-— Commonwealth  ex  rel.  McClen- 

achan  v.  Reading,  6  A.2d  776,  336 

Pa.  165. 
Tenn. — New    York    Casualty    Co.    v. 

Lawson,  24  S.W.2d  881,   160  Tenn. 

329 — Kirk  v.  Sumner  County  Bank 

&  Trust  Co.,   153   S.W.2d  139,   142, 

25  Tenn. App.  150. 
Tex.— White    v.    White,    179    S.W.2d 

503,     142     Tex.     499— Williams    v. 

Tooke,  Civ.App.,  116  S.W.2d  1114. 
Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
34  C.J.  p  540  note  78. 

Every  fact  not  negatived  by  rec- 
ord is  presumed  in  support  of  a 
judgment  of  a  court  of  general  juris- 

836 


diction,  in  absence  of  fraud  extrinsic 
to  record. — Warren  v.  Stansbury.  126 
P.2d  251,  190  Okl.  554— Petroleum 
Auditors  Ass'n  v.  Landis,  77  P.2d 
730,  182  Okl.  297— Yahola  Oil  Co.  v. 
Causey,  72  P.2d  817,  181  Okl.  129— 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Darrough,  19  P. 
2d  551,  162  Okl.  243— Samuels  v. 
Granite  Sav.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  1  P. 
2d  145,  150  Okl.  174— Hawkins  v. 
Bryan,  261  P.  167,  128  Okl.  27— Orth 
v.  Hajek,  259  P.  854,  127  Okl.  59— 
Manuel  v.  Kidd,  258  P.  732,  126  Okl. 
71— Bowl>-T  v.  Merry,  217  P.  404, 
91  Okl.  178. 

2.  Idaho. — Baldwin  v.  Anderson,   13 
P.2d  650,  52  Idaho  243. 

Mont. — West  v.  Capital  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank,  124  P.2d  572,  113  Mont. 
130. 

Neb. — In  re  Warner's  Estate,  288  N. 
W.  39,  137  Neb.  25. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Kirk 
v.  Sumner  County  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  153  S.W.2d  139,  142,  25  Tenn. 
App.  150. 

Tex. — Southern  Ornamental  Iron 
Works  v.  Morrow,  Civ.App.,  101  S. 
W.2d  336. 

34  C.J.  p  540  note  79. 
The   omission  in  record  of  every 

step  in  proceeding  does  not  overcome 

presumption   of   regularity. — Hall   v. 

Johnston,    C.C.A.CaL,   86   F.2d   820. 

Omission  cured  by  proof 
The  omission  of  on  allegation  of 

a  jurisdictional  fact,  in  a  judgment 

of  a    court   of   record,    is    cured   by 

proof  of  the  existence  of  such  fact. 

— In  re  Warner's  Estate,  288  N.W.  39, 

137   Neb.    25— Brandeen  v.   Lau,    201 

N.W.  665,  113  Neb.  34. 

3.  Mont. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 

West  T.  Capital  Trust  &  Savings 

Bank,  124  P.2d  572,  575,  113  Mont. 

130. 
Tenn. — Kirk  v.  Sumner  County  Bank 

&   Trust    Co.,    153    S.W.2d   139,    25 

Tenn.App.  150. 
34  C.J.  p  541  note  80. 

Absence  from  record  of  papers 
which  ought  to  have  been  included 
within  judgment  roll  is  not  enough 
to  make  it  appear  affirmatively  that 
court  had  no  jurisdiction. — State  ex 
rel.  Delmoe  v.  District  Court  of 
Fifth  Judicial  Dist.,  46  P.2d  39,  100 
Mont.  131. 

The  misplacement  of  papers  in  a 
case  cannot  affect  integrity  of  the 
judgment  and  other  entries  in  trial 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


425 


the  judgment  roll  is  defective  or  incomplete.4  Ju- 
risdiction also  will  be  presumed  where  the  bill  col- 
laterally attacking  the  judgment  or  decree  contains 
no  disclosure  as  to  whether  the  court  had  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  subject  matter  and  parties,  or  as  to 
whether  there  was  fraud  affecting  the  jurisdic- 
tion.5 

Long  lapses  of  time  greatly  strengthen  the  pre- 
sumptions in  favor  of  the  validity  of  judgments.6 


Particular  presumptions.  It  will  be  presumed,  in 
consonance  with  the  presumptions  of  regularity  and 
validity,  that  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  maintain  the 
action;7  that  all  the  proceedings  were  regular,8 
and  all  jurisdictional  steps  were  taken;9  that  all 
necessary  parties  were  represented;10  that  an  ap- 
pearance by  an  attorney  was  authorized;11  that  the 
judgment  was  supported  by  the  pleadings  and 
proof;12  that  all  matters  covered  by  the  judgment 


court's  records,  since  pleadings  and 
exhibits  become  only  evidential  after 
judgment  is  entered  and  are  pre- 
sumed to  support  the  record. — ^War- 
field  Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  Ward,  149 
S.W.2d  705,  286  Ky.  73— Wolverton 
v.  Baynham,  10  S.W.2d  837,  226  Ky. 
214. 

4.  Cal. — Eccleston  v.  Roseberg,   199 
P.  859,  53  Cal.App.  14. 

34  C.J.  p  541  note  80  [b]. 
Missing1  papers 

The  fact  that  papers  which  ought 
to  have  been  included  in  the  judg- 
ment roll  are  missing  therefrom  is 
not  enough  to  make  it  affirmatively 
appear  that  the  court  had  no  juris- 
diction.—Williams  v.  Tooke,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  116  S.W.2d  1114,  error  dis- 
missed. 

5.  U.S.— McCampbell      v.      Warrich 
Corporation,     C.C.A.I11.,     109     F.2d 
115,  certiorari  denied  60  S.Ct,  1077, 

310  U.S.  631,  84  L.Ed.  1401,  rehear- 
ing denied  61  S.Ct.  55,  second  case, 

311  U.S.   612,   85  L.Bd.  388,  and  61 
S.Ct.    1089,   313   U.S.   599,   85   LJEd. 
1551. 

Pleading  absence  of  Jurisdictional 
fact  generally,  see  supra  §  421. 

6.  U.S.— Pen-Ken    Gas    &    Oil    Cor- 
poration  v.   Warfield  Natural  Gas 
Co.,    C.C.A.Ky.,   137   F.2d   871,   cer- 
tiorari   denied    64    S.Ct.    431,    320 
U.S.    800,    88    L.Ed.    483,   rehearing 
denied   64   S.Ct.   634,   321  U.S.   803, 
88   L.Ed.   1089-HCOrpus  Juris  cited 
in  Drummond  v.  Lynch,  C.C.A.Tes., 
82  F.2d  806,   809. 

Ark. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  ^  can- 
non  v.  Price,  150  S.W.2d  755,  757, 
202  Ark.  464 — Corpus  Juris  quoted 
in  Parsley  v.  Ussery,  132  S.W.2d 
1,  4,  198  Ark.  910. 

Cal. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  In  re 
Wiechers'  Estate,  250  P.  397,  398, 
199  Cal.  523,  certiorari  denied  Wie- 
chers v.  Wiechers,  47  S.Ct.  476,  273 
U.S.  762,  71  L.Ed.  879. 

Ky.— Davis  v.  Tuggle's  Adm'r,  178  S. 
W.2d  979,  297  Ky.  376— Steel  v. 
Stearns  Coal  &  Lumber  Co.,  146 
S.W.  721,  148  Ky.  429. 

La. — Key  v.  Jones,  App.,  181  So. 
631. 

Tenn. — Wilcox  v.  Cannon,  1  Coldw. 
369. 

34  C.J.  p  541  note  96. 

Partition 

(1)  This  rule  applies  to  a  partition 


judgment  on  a  collateral  attack. 
Ala.— Baker  v.  Prewitt,  64  Ala.  551. 
111. — Lane    v.    Bommelmann,    17    111. 
95. 

(2)  After  the  acquiescence  and  oc- 
cupation under  a  partition  by  a 
court  of  probate  for  a  period  of 
twenty  years,  t£e  proceedings  must 
be  held  to  have  been  regular  and 
conclusive  on  the  question  of  notice. 
—Campbell  v.  Wallace,  12  N.H.  362, 
37  Am.D.  219. 

If  the  record  is  ancient  and  does 
not  affirmatively  show  all  that  was 
done,  presumption  is  that  things  not 
shown  to  have  been  done  that  should 
have   been  done  were  done,  and  on 
collateral   attack   omissions   will   be 
treated  as  erroneous  but  not  void. 
U.S. — Pen-Ken    Gas    &   Oil    Corpora- 
tion v.  Warfleld  Natural  Gas  Co., 
C.C.A.Ky.,  137  F.2d  871,  certiorari 
denied  64   S.Ct.  431,  320  U.S.   800, 
88  L.Ed.  483,  rehearing  denied  64 
S.Ct.    634,    321   U.S.    803,    88    L.Ed. 
1089. 
Ky. — Baker  v.  Baker,  Eccles  &  Co., 

173   S.W.   109,   162  Ky.   683. 
dear    and    convincing    evidence    to 

contrary 

Attack  on  judicial  proceedings  reg- 
ular on  records,  first  made  many 
years  after  party  to  them  was  no- 
tified by  suit  of  claim  of  his  liabil- 
ity, requires  clear  and  convincing 
evidence  to  sustain  it. — August  v. 
Collins,  251  N.W.  565,  265  Mich.  389. 
Where  titles  have  passed  and  val- 
uable improvements  have  been  made 
on  the  strength  of  a  proceeding  had 
more  than  thirty  years  before,  such 
proceedings  ought  not  to  be  upset  in 
partition  proceeding  except  for  com- 
pelling reasons. — Perry  v.  Bassenger, 
15  S.E.2d  365,  219  N.C.  838. 

7.  Me.— Bisbee    v.   Knight,    26   A*2d 
637,  639,  139  Me.  1. 

Mo.— Glidden-Felt  Mfg.  Co  v.  Rob- 
inson, 143  S.W.  1111,  163  Mo.App. 
488. 

34  C.J.  p  541  note  83. 

8.  U.S. — Pen-Ken    Gas    &    Oil    Cor- 
poration v.  Warfleld  Natural   Gas 
Co.,  C.C.A.Ky.,  137  F.2d  871,  certio- 
rari denied  64  S.Ct.  431,  320  U.S. 
800,  88  L.Ed.  483,  rehearing  denied 
64  S.Ct.  634,  321  U.S.  803,  88  L.Ed. 
1089. 

Cal.— People  v.  Bayne,  28  P.2d  1068, 
136  Cal.App.  341. 

837 


Fla.— Dwyer   v.    State,    116    So.    726, 

95  Fla.   846— Sawyer  v.  State,  113 

So.  736,  94  Fla.  60. 
Ky. — Leonard    v.    Williams,    265    S. 

W.  618,  205  Ky.  218. 
Compliance  with  statute 

Trial  court's  compliance  with  stat- 
utory provisions  will  be  conclusively 
presumed  as  against  collateral  attack 
on  judgment. — Pennington  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 21  S.W.2d  808,  231  Ky. 
494. 

9.  Mo. — Thompson  v.  Farmers'  Ex- 
change Bank,  62  S.W.2d  803,  333 
Mo.  437— First  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  of  King  City  v.  Bowman,  15 
S.W.2d  842,  322  Mo.  654. 

1<X  Tex. — Burton  v.  McGuire,  Civ. 
App.,  3  S.W.2d  576,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.f  41  S.W.2d  238. 

11.  Nev. — Deegan  v.  Deegan,   37   P. 
360,    22    Nev.    185,    58    Am.R.    742. 

Tenn. — Kirk  v.  Sumner  County  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  153  S.W.2d  139,  142, 
25  Tenn.App.  150. 

34  C.J.  p  541  note  85. 

12.  Cal. — Hise  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Los  Angeles  County,  134  P.2d  748, 
21    Cal.2d    614— Hosner    v.    Skelly, 
App.,  164  P.2d  573. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Baird  &  Warner 
v.  Lindheimer,  19  N.B.2d  336,  370 
111.  424. 

Ky. — Morgan  v.  Big  Woods  Lumber 
Co.,  249  S.W.  329,  198  Ky.  88. 

Me.— Bisbee  v.  Knight,  26  A.2d  637, 
139  Me.  1. 

N.Y. — Holmes  v.  City  of  New  York, 
42  N.Y.S.2d  359,  180  Misc.  364. 

Ohio. — Central  Hyde  Park  Sav.  & 
Loan  Co.  v.  Feck,  67  N.E.2d  44,  77 
Ohio  App.  343. 

Okl. — Mclntosh  v.  V.  &  L.  Inv.  Co., 
162  P.2d  176— Lee  v.  Harv  —,  156 
P.2d  134,  195  Okl.  178— Mid-Conti- 
nent Pipe  Line  Co.  v.  Seminole 
County  Excise  Board,  146  P.2d  996, 
194  Okl.  40 — Warren  v.  Stansbury, 
126  P,2d  251,  190  OW.  554— Town 
of  Watonga  v.  Crane  Co.,  114  P.2d 
941,  189  Okl.  184— Protest  of  St. 
Louis-San  Francisco  By.  Co.,  42  P. 
2d  537,  171  Okl.  180— Protest  of 
Stanolind  Pipe  Line  Co.,  32  P.2d 
869,  168  Okl.  281— Protest  of  Gulf 
Pipe  Line  Co.  of  Oklahoma,  32  P. 
2d  42,  168  Okl.  136— Protest  of  St 
Louis-San  Francisco  Ry.  Co.,  19 
P.2d  162,  162  Okl.  62— Protest  of 
St.  Louis-San  Francisco  Ry.  Co., 
11  P.2d  189,  157  Okl.  131. 


§  425 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


were  in  fact  litigated  by  the  parties;13  that  some 
disposition  was  made  of  every  defendant  in  the 
case;14  and  that  the  judgment  was  rendered  at  a 
regular  term  of  the  court  j1^  and  that  the  land, 
when  land  is  the  subject  of  the  suit,  was  situated 
within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court.16 

Presumptions  not  applicable.  A  presumption  of 
jurisdiction  will  not  be  indulged  where  there  is  a 
direct  admission,  in  the  collateral  proceeding,  that 
it  did  not  exist  in  the  original  action;17  nor  will 
such  presumptions  be  indulged  in  favor  of  a  judg- 
ment entered  by  the  clerk  as  attend  a  judgment  en- 
tered in  pursuance  of  judicial  action  by  the  court.18 
Moreover,  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  a  defend- 
ant is  presumed  in  support  of  the  judgment  only 
when  he  is  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  court, 
and,  if  he  is  not  within  such  limits,  the  record  must 
show  service  on  him.19  A  presumption  of  juris- 
diction as  to  one  defendant  will  not  attach  to  a 
judgment  on  a  new  cause  of  action  included  in  an- 
other defendant's  counterclaim;20  and,  where  the 


judgment  or  decree  attacked  contains  an  affirma- 
tive recital  that  defendants  were  summoned  before 
the  cross  complaint  was  filed,  a  presumption  of  ju- 
risdiction under  the  cross  complaint  does  not  arise.21 
It  has  been  held  that  the  presumption  of  regularity 
and  validity  does  not  apply  to  a  collateral  attack  by 
a  stranger,  who  may  make  such  attack  on  the  judg- 
ment on  any  ground  which  could  be  urged  against 
it  on  direct  attack;22  but  that  he  cannot  attack  on 
the  ground  that  he  was  not  a  part}'  to  the  action  in 
which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  since  the  court, 
not  having  required  his  presence,  would  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  had  jurisdiction  without  him.23 

(2)  Process  and  Service 

Generally,  unless  the  contrary  affirmatively  appears 
from  the  record,  It  will  be  presumed,  In  support  of  a 
judgment,  that  legal  and  proper  process  was  issued  and 
duly  and  regularly  served  and  return  made. 

In  support  of  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  gen- 
eral jurisdiction,  as  against  a  collateral  attack,  it 
will  be  presumed,  unless  expressly  contrary  to  what 


Tenn.— Sloan  v.    Sloan,  295   S.W.   62, 

155  Tenn.  422. 
Tex. — Dallas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 

of  Dallas  v.  Street,  Civ.App.,  76  S. 

W.2d  780,  error  refused.     Followed 

Street  v.  Dallas  Joint  Stock  Land 

Bank  of  Dallas,  84  S.W.2d  1119. 
34  C.J.  p  541  note  88. 

A  recital  that  cause  came  on  to  "be 
heard  on  petition  therefor,  and  that 
petition  was  considered,  is  conclusive 
that  petition  was  filed  prior  to  rendi- 
tion of  decree. — Eastman-Gardner  Co. 
v.  Leverett,  106  So.  106,  141  Miss. 
96. 

In.  determining  whether  jurisdic- 
tions! averments  have  "been  made,  on 
collateral  attack  that  construction 
will  be  adopted  that  will  support 
the  judgment,  guarding:  against  the 
supplying  thereby  of  omitted  essen- 
tials.— Boyd  v.  Garrison,  19  So.2d 
885,  246  Ala.  122— Sams  v.  Sams, 
5  So.2d  774,  242  Ala.  240— Martin 
v.  Martin,  55  So.  633,  173  Ala.  106. 
XTiuLO  pro  tune  order 

In  absence  of  evidence  to  con- 
trary, presumption  obtained  that 
nunc  pro  tune  orders  correcting 
Judgment  were  based  on  satisfactory 
evidence  or  personal  recollections  of 
chancellor  as  to  court  proceedings 
in  the  foreclosure  suit — Hall  v.  Cas- 
tleberry,  161  S.W.2d  948,  204  Ark. 
200. 

Where  the  Judgment  10  beyond  the 
pleading1    and    issues,    the    presump- 
tions do  not  apply. 
CaL — Morrow    v.    Morrow,    105    P.2d 

129,    40     CaI.App.2d    474— Petition 

of  Furness,  218  P.  61,  62  Cal.App. 

753. 
Minn.— Sache   v.    Gillette,    112    N.W. 


386,  101  Minn.  169,  118  Am.S.R. 
612,  11  L.R.A.,N.S.,  803,  11  Ann. 
Cas.  348. 

13.  U.S. — U.    S.    v.    Sommers,    Mo., 
171  F.  57,  96  C.C.A.  299. 

Ark. — Adams  v.  Van  Buren  County, 

139   S.W.2d  9,   200  Ark.   269. 
N.D.— Sukut  v.  Sukut,  12  X.W.2d  536, 

73  N.D.  154. 
Ohio. — Bennett   v.   Bennett,   15   Ohio 

Supp.  16. 
Tenn.— Kirk  v.  Sumner  County  Bank 

&    Trust    Co.,    153    S.W.Sd    139,    25 

Tenn.App.  150. 

14.  Tex.— Conner    v.    McAfee,    Civ. 
App.,   214   S.W.  646 — Dunn  v.  Tay- 
lor,   93    S.W.    347,   42   Tex.Civ.App. 
241. 

15.  Tex. — Baldridge  v*  Penland,  4  S. 
W.  565,  68  Tex.  441. 

16.  U.S. — Foster  v.  Givens,  Ky.,   67 
F.  684,  14  C.C.A.  625. 

Land  outride  territorial  Jurisdiction 
The  general  rule  is  that  a  judg- 
ment of  a  court  purporting  to  ad- 
judicate the  title  to  land  outside 
the  limits  of  its  territorial  juris- 
diction is  void  for  lack  of  jurisdic- 
tion and  will  be  treated  as  a  nullity 
wherever  encountered. — Ferguson  v. 
Babcock  Lumber  &  Land  Co.,  N.C., 
252  F.  705,  164  C.C.A.  545,  certiorari 
denied  39  S.Ct  10,  248  U.S.  570,  -63 
L.Ed.  426,  and  appeal  dismissed  39 
S.Ct,  132,  248  U.S.  540,  63  L.Ed. 
411. 

17.  Ind. — Doe   v.    Anderson,    5    Ind. 
83. 

18.  Cal.— Shirran  v.   Dallas,   132   P. 
454,  462,  21  Cal.App.  405. 

838 


13.    U.S.— Galpin  v.   Page,    18  Wall. 

350,  21  L.Ed.  959. 
34  OJ.  p  541  note  97. 
Presumptions  as  to  process  and  serv- 
ice see  infra  subdivision  a  (2)  of 

this  section. 
20.    Mont. — Hanrahan    v.    Andersen, 

90   P.2d  494,   108  Mont.   218. 
As  to  nonanswering1  defendant 

Where  judgment  affirmatively  show- 
ed that  it  was  entered  after  exam- 
ination of  the  issues  only  as  between 
plaintiff  and  answering  defendant, 
and  that  nonanswering  defendant 
was  not  even  considered  an  interest- 
ed or  necessary  party  for  purposes 
of  counterclaim  filed  by  one  of  de- 
fendants, no  presumption  could  be 
indulged  that  court  had  jurisdiction 
of  nonanswering  defendant  as  to 
issue  raised  by  counterclaim. — Han- 
rahan v.  Andersen,  supra. 

The  presumption  of  jurisdiction  of 
a  plaintiff  against  whom  a  defend- 
ant's counterclaim  was  directed  can- 
not be  accompanied  by  a  further  pre- 
sumption of  jurisdiction  over  an- 
other defendant  whose  interests  were 
affected  and  who  was,  therefore,  a 
necessary  party  to  a  valid  adjudica- 
tion of  the  counterclaim,  but  against 
whom  it  was  not  directed. — Hanra- 
han v.  Andersen,  supra. 
31.  Ark.— Taylor  v.  Harris,  54  S.W. 

2d  701,  186  Ark.  580. 

22.  Tex. — Turner    v.     Maury,     Civ. 
App.,  224  S.W.  255. 

Collateral    attack   by    strangers   eee 
supra  §§  414,  415. 

23.  U.S.— Fidelity  &  Casualty  Co.  of 
New  York  v.   Geneva,   C.C.A.Ohio, 
90  F.2d  874. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


425 


is  affirmatively  shown  by  the  record,2*  that  all  par- 
ties to  the  action  or  proceeding  were  properly  served 
with  notice  or  processes  that  legal  and  proper 
process  was  issued  in  the  action  and  that  it  was 
duly  and  regularly  served  on  defendant  or  defend- 
ants^ or  was  waived  ;27  and  that  return  or  proof 
of  service,  when  necessary,  was  regularly  and  prop- 
erly made  and  filed.2"  If  the  record  is  silent  as  to 
service,  the  record  of  the  cause  may  be  examined 
as  to  the  validity  of  the  presumed  service,2^  but 


extrinsic  evidence  may  not  be  considered  for  this 
purpose.30  The  burden  of  proving  lack  of  service 
of  process  ordinarily  is  -on  the  party  alleging  the 
invalidity  of  the  judgment  on  that  ground;31  but 
where  the  record  shows  service  of  the  complaint, 
and  not  service  of  the  summons,  the  burden  is  on 
one  seeking  to  sustain  the  judgment  as  against  a 
collateral  attack  to  prove  actual  service  thereof.32 

Generally  it  will  be  presumed  that  constructive 


24.  Ark. — Parsley  v.  Ussery,  132  S 
W.2d  1,  198  Ark.  910— Union  Inv 
Co.  v.  Hunt,  59  S.W.2d  1039,  18 
Ark.  357. 

Cal. — Westphal  v.  Westphal,  126  P.2d 
105,  20  Cal.2d  393. 

Ind.— Clark  v.  Clark,  172  N.E.  124 
202  Ind.  104. 

Ky. — Davis  v.  Tuggle's  Adm'r,  17J 
S.W.2d  979,  297  Ky.  376— Hall  v 
Bates,  77  S.W.2d  403,  257  Ky.  61 

La. — Spears  v.  Spears,  136  So.  614 
173  La.  294. 

Ohio. — In  re  Frankenberg's  Estate 
47  N.B.2d  239,  70  Ohio  App.  495. 

Tex. — Weaver  v.  Garrietty,  Civ. App. 
84  S.W.2d  878,  error  refused — 
Mariposa  Mining:  Co.  v.  Waters 
Civ. App.,  279  S.W.  576. 

Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 
157,  94  Utah  271. 

Recitals  showing  want  of  Jurisdic- 
tion generally  see  infra  §  426. 

25.    Ark.— McLeod  v.  Mabry,   177  S, 

W.2d    46,    206    Ark.    618— Dicus   v, 

Bright,   94   S.W.   925,   79  Ark.  16. 
Cal.— Westphal  v.  Westphal,   126  P. 

2d  105,  20  Cal.2d  393. 
Ky. — Davis    v.    Tuggle's   Adm'r,    178 

S.W.2d  979,  297  Ky.  376. 
S.C. — Clark    v.    Neves,    57    S.E.    614, 

76    S.C.   484,    12    L.R.A..N.S.,    298. 
Tenn. — Kirk  v.  Sumner  County  Bank 

&    Trust    Co.,    153    S.W.2d    139,    25 

Tenn.  App.  150. 

Partition 

Where  a  court  of  general  Jurisdic- 
tion has  rendered  a  Judgment  of 
partition,  Jurisdiction  of  the  parties 
is  presumed  in  collateral  proceedings, 
although  the  record  of  the  court  is 
silent  as  to  service. 
Ga. — Mayer  v.  Hover,  7  S.B.  562, 

81  Ga.  308. 
111.— Nickrans  v.  Wilk,   43  N.E.  741, 

161  111.  76. 
Ind. — Crane  v.  Kimmer,  77  Ind.  215. 

26.    U.S. — Montgomery  v.   Equitable 

Life   Assur.    Soc.   of  U.   S.,   C.C.A. 

111.,  83  P.2d  758. 
Ala. — Cox   v.    Thomas,    113    So.    261, 

216  Ala.  282. 
Fla.— Bemis    v.    Loftin,    173    So.    683, 

127  Fla.  515, 
Ind. — Grantham    Realty    Corporation 

v.  Bowers,  22  N.E.2d  882,  215  Ind. 

672. 
Iowa.— Voll   v.   Zelch,    201   N.W.   33, 

198  Iowa  1338, 


Ky.— Dye  Bros.  v.  Butler,  272  S.W 
426,  209  Ky.  199. 

La. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Log 
wood  v.  Logwood,  168  So.  310,  185 
La.  1— Breazeale  v.  Peters,  6  La 
App.  676. 

Mont.— State  ex  rel.  Delmoe  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist. 
46  P.2d  39,  100  Mont.  131. 

Okl.— Shefts  v.  Oklahoma  Co.,  13. 
P.2d  589.  192  Okl.  483— Myers  v 
Carr,  47  P.2d  156,  173  Okl.  335. 

S.C. — Coogler  v.  Crosby,  72  S.E  149 
89  S.C.  508. 

Tex.— Bendy  v.  W.  T.  Carter  & 
Bro.,  Com.App.,  14  S.W.2d  813— 
Weaver  v.  Garrietty,  Civ.  A  pp.,  84 
S.W.2d  878 — Dallas  Joint  Stock 
Land  Bank  of  Dallas  v.  Street, 
Civ.App.,  76  S.W.2d  780,  error  re- 
fused, followed  Street  v.  Dallas 
Joint  Stock  Land  Bank  of  Dallas, 
84  S.W.2d  1119. 

34  C.J.  p  542  note  98. 

Rule  not  confined  to  ancient  rec- 
ords 

Ky. — Dye  Bros.  v.  Butler,  272  S.W. 
426,  209  Ky.  199. 

Service  of  copy  of  petition  presumed 

Mo.— McEwen  v.  Sterling  State  Bank, 
5  S.W.2d  702,  222  Mo.App.  660. 

27.  Tex.— Radford  v.   Radford,   Civ. 
App.,  42  S.W.2d  1060. 

Where  Judgment  contained  recital 
that  defendant  waived  service  of  ci- 
tation as  required  by  law,  presump- 
tion existed  that  court  duly  ac- 
quired Jurisdiction  of  defendant  by 
waiver  of  citation. — Radford  v.  Rad- 
ford, supra. 

28.  Va.— Wood    v.    Kane,    129    S.E. 
327,  143  Va.  281. 

34  C.J.  p  540  note  78  [a]. 

Necessity  of  return  and  proof  of 
service  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Proc- 
ess §  90,  also  50  C.J.  p  562  notes 
92-97. 

Clerk's  testimony  from  memory 
and  dehors  the  record  is  incompe- 
:ent  to  show  that  there  was  no  re- 
turn of  service. — Dye  Bros.  v.  But- 
er,  272  S.W.  426,  209  Ky.  199. 

Pact    that    return    of    service    of 

process  is  missing   from   record   is 

nsufflcient  to  warrant  setting  aside 

lecree  on  collateral  attack. — Whitley 

v.  Towle,  141  So.  571,  163  Miss.  418. 

Where  a  return  of  service  has  not 

>een   filed  with  the    clerk,    but   the 

839 


Judgment  recites  that  service  was 
duly  made,  giving  the  date,  it  will 
be  presumed  that  the  return  was 
exhibited  in  court. — Rhyne  v.  Mis- 
souri State  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Tex.Com. 
App.,  291  S.W.  845. 

29.    Tex.— Stockyards   Nat   Bank   v. 

Presnall,    194    S.W.    384,    109    Tex. 

32— Cockrell   v.    Steffens,    Civ.App., 

284  S.W.  608. 

Original  summons  is  evidentiary 
and  conclusive  unless  it  bears  an 
affirmative  showing  of  no  service  on 
party  attacking  Judgment  or  unless 
showing  of  service  has  been  de- 
stroyed by  direct  attack. — Davis  v. 
Tuggle's  Adm'r,  178  S.W.2d  979,  297 
Ky.  376. 

Absence  of  original  summons 

In  absence  of  original  summons 
from  record,  it  is  conclusively  pre- 
sumed that  there  was  proper  service 
thereof  on  party  attacking  Judgment 
for  want  of  Jurisdiction  and  indorse- 
ment on  petition  that  summons  was 
issued  is  of  value  as  secondary 
evidence  and  entitled  to  more  weight 
than  parol  testimony  to  contrary, 
although  absolute  verity  is  not  to  be 
imported  to  such  entry;  and,  in  ab- 
sence of  clear  and  convincing  evi- 
dence of  error  or  fraud,  a  docket  en- 
try showing  service  of  process  on 
litigant  is  conclusive. — Davis  v.  Tug- 
gle's Adm'r,  supra. 

30.  Fla.— Bemis  v.   Loftin,    173    So. 
683,  127  Fla.  515. 

Extrinsic    evidence    in    contradiction 
of  recitals  see  infra  §  426. 

31.  Okl. — Carr    v.     Cobble,     232    P. 
108,  107  Okl.  225. 

Extent  of  burden 

A  defendant,  attacking  Judgment 
by  court  of  general  Jurisdiction  as 
void  for  want  of  service,  must  not 
only  show  affirmatively  that  he  has 
not  been  served,  but  that  he  has  not 
waived  service  by  appearance,  plead- 
ng,  or  otherwise,  unless  there  is  a 
recital  in  Judgment  showing  affirm- 
atively that  return  of  service  made 
by  sheriff  was  the  only  basis  of  Ju- 
risdiction of  court  over  person  of 
defendant. — Green  v.  Spires,  7  S.B.2d 
246,  189  Ga.  719. 

32.  Minn.— Brown  v.  Reinke,  199  N. 
W.   235,   139   Minn.  458.   35   A.L.R. 
413. 


§  425 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


service  of  process,  such  as  by  publication,  was  duly 
and  regularly  made32  and  that  an  affidavit  for  such 
service  was  regularly  and  properly  made  and  filed.34 
Some  of  the  decisions,  however,  are  to  the  con- 
trary in  the  case  of  constructive  service  by  leaving 
a  copy  of  the  writ,  or  by  publication,  or  other  form 
of  substituted  service.35 

Where  the  judgment  is  against  a  nonresident  de- 
fendant, and  jurisdiction  was  acquired  by  publi- 
cation of  notice,  some  cases  hold  that  the  judgment 
is  not  impeachable  collaterally  merely  because  the 
record  does  not  show  compliance  with  all  the  re- 
quirements of  the  statute  authorizing  that  manner 
of  citation,  as  a  full  compliance  will  be  presumed.36 
Other  cases,  however,  hold  that  a  presumption  of 
jurisdiction  does  not  arise  in  such  a  case,  and  that 
to  sustain  a  judgment  the  record  must  itself  disclose 
facts  affirmatively  indicating  the  several  steps  by 
which  jurisdiction  has  been  acquired.87  If  defend- 
ant was  a  nonresident  at  the  institution  of  the  ac- 
tion, but  returned  to  the  state  a  considerable  period 
of  time  before  the  entry  of  final  judgment,  it  will 
be  presumed  that  he  was  served  with  notice.38 


(3)  Exercise  of  Special  Statutory  Powers 

Where  special  statutory  powers  are  exercised  by 
the  court,  a  presumption  of  Jurisdiction  will  be  indulged 
In  support  of  its  judgment  where  it  is  rendered  in  the 
usual  course  of  common-law  or  chancery  practice. 

Where  special  statutory  powers  are  to  be  exer- 
cised by  the  usual  common-law  or  chancery  prac- 
tice, the  proceedings  and  judgments  will  have  all 
the  characteristics  of  the  proceedings  and  judgments 
in  other  cases,  including  the  presumption  of  juris- 
diction,39 and  this  rule  has  been  held  to  apply  to  a 
judgment  rendered  in  vacation  by  a  judge  acting 
under  constitutional  authority.40  The  rule  has  like- 
wise been  held  to  apply  in  attachment  proceedings,41 
but  there  is  also  authority  to  the  contrary.42 

Proceedings  not  according  to  course  of  common 
law.  Where  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction  pro- 
ceeds in  the  exercise  of  special  powers,  wholly  de- 
rived from  statute,  and  not  exercised  according  to 
the  course  of  the  common  law,  or  not  pertaining  to 
its  general  jurisdiction,  its  jurisdiction  must  appear 
in  the  record,  and  cannot  be  presumed  in  a  collat- 
eral proceeding,4*  although  the  court  proceeds  in 
accordance  with  the  course  of  the  common  law  as 
far  as  applicable  to  the  proceedings.44  This  rule 


33.  Ark. — Hobbs  v.  Lenon,  87  S.W. 
2d  6,  191  Ark.  509. 

Ga. — De    Lay    v.    La  timer,    117   S.E. 

446,  155  Ga.  463. 
Miss. — Brotherhood       of       Railroad 

Trainmen   v.   Agnew,    155   So.   205, 

170  Miss.  604. 
Utah.— Intermill    v.    Nash,    75    P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
34  C. J.  p  542  note  99. 

34.  Okl.— Core  v.  Smith,  102  P.  114, 
23  Okl.  909. 

Utah.— Intermill    v.    Nash,    75    P.2d 

157,  94  Utah  271. 
34  C.J.  p  542  note  99  [a]. 

35.  U.S. — Hartley    v.    Boynton,   C.C. 
Iowa,    17   P.   873,   5   McCrary,   453. 

Fla. — Myakka    Co.    v.    Edwards,    67 

So.  217,  68  Fla.  372,  Ann.Cas.l917B 

201. 
Iowa,— Hawk  v.  Bay,   126 'N.W.  955, 

148  Iowa  47. 
Neb. — Vandervort  v.  Pinnell,  148  N. 

W.  332,  96  Neb.  515. 
34  C.J.  p  542  note  1. 

38.    I1L— Figge   v.    Rowlen,    57   N.E. 

195,  185  111.  234. 
34  C.J.  p  542  note  2. 

37.  Or. — Furgeson    v.   Jones,    20    P. 
842,    17    Or.    204,    11    Am.S.R.    808, 
3  L.R.A.  620. 

34  C.J.  p  542  note  3. 

38.  Tex.— Bendy  v.  W.  T.  Carter  & 
Bro.,   Civ.App.,    5    S.W.2d    579,   af- 
firmed.   CoxxLApp.,    14    S.W.2d   813. 

39.  Or. — Laughlin  v.  Hughes,   89  P. 
2d  568,  161  Or.  295. 

34  C.J.  p  543  note  4. 

40.  Ga. — Southeastern  Pipe  Line  Co. 


v.  Garrett  ex  rel.  Le  Sueur,  16  S. 

B.2d  753,  192  Ga.  817. 

Trader  constitutional  amendment 
declaring  that  the  judges  of  superior 
court  may,  on  reasonable  notice  to 
the  parties,  at  any  time  in  vaca- 
tion, at  chambers,  hear  and  deter- 
mine by  interlocutory  or  final  judg- 
ment any  matter  or  issue  where  a 
jury  verdict  is  not  required  or  may 
be  waived  a  judge  in  vacation  will 
act  as  a  court  of  general  jurisdic- 
tion where  previously  his  authority 
or  jurisdiction  may  have  been  lim- 
ited, or  conditional,  and  a  necessary 
corollary  is  that  any  judgment  au- 
thorized by  the  amendment  may  be 
attended  by  a  presumption  of  reg- 
ularity, which  could  not  be  indulged 
where  the  jurisdiction  is  special  or 
limited. — Southeastern  Pipe  Line  Co. 
v.  Garrett  ex  rel.  Le  Sueur,  supra. 

41.  Colo.— Burris  v.  Craig,  82  P.  944, 
34  Colo.  383. 

34  C.J.  p  543  note  5  [b]   (2). 
Attack  permissible 

In  ejectment  action,  wherein  plain- 
tiff offered  sheriff's  deed  based  on 
judgment  in  attachment  proceedings, 
the  rule  respecting  integrity  of  judg- 
ments did  not  prevent  attack  by  de- 
fendant on  the  judgment  and  attach- 
ment proceeding  on  ground  that  no- 
tice of  attachment  was  returnable 
sixty-five  days  from  the  first  publi- 
cation.— Johnson  v.  Clark,  198  So. 
842,  145  Fla,  258. 

42.  111. — Star   Brewery  v.   Otto,    63 
IlLApp.  40. 

34  C.J.  p  543  note  5  [b]  (1). 

840 


43.  111.—, Ashlock  v.  Ashlock,  195  N. 
E.  657,  360  111.  115— Keal  v.  Rhyd- 
derck,   148  -N.E.   53,   317   111.   231— 
Payson  v.  People,  51  N.E.  588,  175 
111.  267. 

Me.— Bisbee  v.  Knight,   2$  A.2d  637, 

139  Me.  1. 
Or. — Laughlin    v.    Hughes,    89    P.2d 

568,  161  Or.  295— Fishburn  v.  Lon- 

dershausen,  92  P.  1060,  50  Or.  363, 

14    L.R.A.,N.S.,    1234,    15    Ann.Cas. 

975. 
Wash. — Corpus  Jnris  quoted  in  Jun- 

kin  v,  Anderson,   123  P.2d  759,   12 

Washed  58. 
34  C.J.  p  543  note  5. 

Where  it  appears  on  the  face  of 
tlie  proceedings  that  the  court  has 
active  jurisdiction  in  a  matter  in 
which  it  is  exercising  limited  and 
special  statutory  authority,  the 
court's  action  cannot  be  collaterally 
attacked  for  error  not  appearing  on 
the  face  of  the  proceedings. — Farant 
Inv.  Corporation  v.  Francis,  122  S. 
E.  141,  138  Va.  417. 

{Finding  of  evidentiary  facts 

On  collateral  attack  of  a  judgment 
rendered  by  court  of  general  juris- 
diction pursuant  to  authority  con- 
ferred by  statute,  every  reasonable 
presumption  will  be  indulged  that 
court  in  prior  proceedings  found  evi- 
dentiary facts  after  conferment  of 
jurisdiction,  but  not  that  court  found 
facts  giving  jurisdiction. — Bisbee  v. 
Knight,  26  A.2d  637,  139  Me.  1. 

44.  Mo. — Cooper  v.    Gunter,    114    S. 
W.  943,  215  Mo.  558. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  425 


has  been  held  to  apply  to  a  judgment  rendered  in 
a  summary  proceeding.45 

"Judicial"  and  "ministerial"  acts  distinguished. 
Where  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction  has  conferred 
on  it  special  powers  by  special  statutes,  which  are 
exercised  only  ministerially  and  not  judicially,  no 
presumption  of  jurisdiction  will  attend  its  judg- 
ments, and  the  facts  essential  to  the  exercise  of 
special  jurisdiction  must  appear  on  the  face  of  the 
record.46 

b.  Courts  or  Tribunals  of  Inferior  or  Limited 
Jurisdiction 

As  a  general  rule,  nothing  Is  presumed  In  favor  of 
the  validity  of  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  inferior  or 
limited  jurisdiction;  but  the  usual  presumptions  apply 
'in  a  case  in  which  such  court  or  tribunal  has  exclusive 
or  general  jurisdiction. 

Nothing  is  presumed  in  favor  of  the  judgment  of 
a  court  of  inferior  or  limited  jurisdiction,  as  against 
a  collateral  attack ;  but  the  jurisdictional  facts  must 
affirmatively  appear  either  on  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord,47 or,  according  to  some  authorities,  by  evi- 
dence aliunde,  except  as  to  facts  required  to  be 
spread  on  the  record,48  and,  as  a  corollary  to  this 
rule,  it  has  been  held  that  it  is  not  necessary  for 
defendant  to  appear  in  such  court  and  object  to 
its  jurisdiction  as  a  prerequisite  to  challenging  such 
jurisdiction  in  a  subsequent  suit.4^  This  rule,  how- 
ever, applies  -only  to  questions  of  jurisdiction  as  to 


the  subject  matter,  for  where  the  jurisdiction  has 
once  vested  as  to  such  matter,  the  rules  which  gov- 
ern its  exercise  as  to  the  person,  with  respect  to 
process,  evidence,  etc.,  are  generally  the  same  as 
those  applicable  to  courts  of  general  jurisdiction.50 
Although  the  court  may  be  a  limited  or  inferior  tri- 
Dunal,  yet  if  it  has  general  or  exclusive  jurisdic- 
tion of  any  one  subject,  its  proceedings  and  judg- 
ments with  respect  to  that  subject  will  be  sustained,, 
against  collateral  attack  by  the  same  presumptions 
which  obtain  in  the  case  of  superior  courts.51 

Where  the  records  of  inferior  courts  and  tri- 
bunals show  either  affirmatively  or  by  necessary  im- 
plication that  the  court  or  tribunal  had  jurisdiction 
of  the  parties  and  the  subject  matter,  such  juris- 
diction cannot  be  avoided  by  adverse  inferences 
from  the  judgment  or  order  rendered,52  and  the 
same  presumptions  will  then  be  indulged  as  to  the 
regularity  of  the  proceedings  as  are  indulged  in 
proceedings  of  courts  of  general  jurisdiction.53  A 
pleading,  in  order  to  be  sufficient  to  show  such  a 
judgment  subject  to  collateral  attack,  must  set  out 
enough  of  the  record  to  show  that  the  court  did 
not,  in  fact,  have  jurisdiction.54 

Administrative  tribunal.  The  judgment  or  award 
of  an  administrative  tribunal  purports  jurisdiction, 
as  against  collateral  attack,  unless  the  judgment  or 
award  shows  on  its  face  that  the  tribunal  did  not 
have  jurisdiction,55 


Wash. — Junkin  v.  Anderson,  12 3  P. 
2d  759,  760,  12  Wash.2d  58. 

45.  Tenn. — Hamilton    v.    Burum,    3 
Yerg.  355. 

34  C.J.  p  543  note  5  [a]. 

46.  Va.— Bryan  v.  Nash,  66  S.B.  69, 
110  Va.  329. 

34  C.J.  p  543  note  7. 

47.  U.S. — Warmsprings  Irr.  Dist.  v. 
May,   C.C.A.Or.,   117  F.2d  802. 

Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Chand- 
ler v.  Price,  15  So.2d  462,  463,  244 
Ala.  667. 

Fla.— Krivitsky  v.  Nye,  19  So.2d  563, 
155  Fla.  45 — State  ex  rel.  Bverette 
v.  Petteway,  179  So.  666,  131  Fla, 
516. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Lane  v.  Cornell, 
171  S.W.2d  687,  351  Mo.  1. 

N.J. — Mangani  v.  Hydro,  Inc.,  194 
A.  264,  119  N.J.Law  71— Crawford 
v.  Lees,  93  A.  201,  84  N.J.Eq.  324. 

Tenn. — New  York  Casualty  Co.  v. 
Lawson,  24  S.W.2d  881,  160  Tenn. 
329. 

34  C.J.  p  544  note  8. 

Judgment  of  justice  see  the  C.J.S. 
title  Justices  of  the  Peace,  $  115, 
also  35  C.J.  p  686  note  48-p  687 
note  57. 

Verity  and  validity 
A  judgment   of  an  inferior  court 

of  limited  jurisdiction  is  not  open 


to  the  presumption  of  verity  and 
validity  accorded  to  judgments  of 
superior  courts  of  general  jurisdic- 
tion.— Ex  parte  Swehla,  220  P.  299, 
114  Kan.  712. 
Pleading 

When  court  is  exercising  special 
or  limited  jurisdiction  and  complaint 
does  not  allege  jurisdictional  mat- 
ter, judgment  for  plaintiff  is  void 
on  collateral  attack. — Chandler  v. 
Price,  15  So.2d  462,  244  Ala.  667. 

48.  Ark.— Albie   v.    Jones,    102    S.W. 
222,   82  Ark.   414,   12  Ann.Cas.  433. 

Va.— Moore   v.    Smith,    15    S.B.2d   48, 

177  Va.  621. 
3 4, C.J.  p  545  note  9. 

49.  Ca].— Lowe  v.  Alexander,  15  Cal. 
296 — Schuler-Knox    Co.    v.    Smith, 
144    P.2d    47,    62    Cal.App.2d    86. 

50.  Cal.— In    re    Sutro,    77    P.    402. 
143  Cal.  487. 

34  C.J.  p  545  note  10. 

51.  111. — Moore    v.    Sievers,    168    N. 
E.  259,  336  111.  316. 

Ky. — Decker  v.  Tyree,  264  S.W.  726, 
204  Ky.  302. 

N.T.— Daley  v.  Dennis,  242  N.Y.S. 
408,  137  Misc.  1. 

Wyo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Camp- 
bell v.  Wyoming  Development  Co., 
100  P.2d  124,  134,  55  Wyo.  347. 

34  C.J.  p  545  note  11. 

841 


Mayor's  judgment  convicting  de- 
fendant for  speeding  is  presumed 
valid  until  annulled  by  appeal  to 
circuit  court,  notwithstanding  mayor 
has  pecuniary  interest. — Brooks  v. 
Town  of  Potomac,  141  S.E.  249,  149 
Va.  427. 

52.  Miss. — Scott   County   v.    Dubois, 
130   So.   106,   158  Miss.   245. 

53.  Ala,— -Ex    parte    Griffith,    95    So. 
551,  209  Ala.  158— Bowden  v.  State, 
97    So.    4G7,    19    Ala.App.    377. 

Ark. — Austin  Western  Road  Machin- 
ery Co.  v.  Blair,  82  S.W.2d  528,  190 
Ark.  996. 
Va, — Kiser  v.  W.  M.  Rltter  Lumber 

Co.,   18   S.E.2d  319,   179   Va.   128. 
34  C.J.  p  545  note  12. 

Recitals  in  the  decree  of  such  a 
court,  of  the  requisite  jurisdictional 
facts  are  sufficient  to  show  jurisdic- 
tion at  least  prima  facie  when  offer- 
ed as  evidence  in  a  collateral  pro- 
ceeding.— Miller  v.  Thompson,  96  So. 
481,  209  Ala.  469— Ex  parte  Griffith, 
95  So.  551,  209  Ala,  158. 

54.  Ind. — Larimer  v.  Krau,  103  N.E. 
1102,  57  Ind.App.  33,  reheard  105  N. 
E.  936,  57  Ind.App.  33. 

55.  Utah, — State  Tax  Commission  v. 
J.  &  W.  Auto  Service,  66  P.2d  141, 
92  Utah  123. 


§425 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


c.  Federal  Courts 


A  judgment  or  decree  of  a  federal  court  will  be  pre- 
sumed regular  and  valid  on  a  collateral  attack. 

Courts  of  the  United  States,  although  of  statu- 
tory and  limited  jurisdiction,  are  regarded,  within 
their  limitations  as  to  subject  matter,  as  courts  of 
general,  rather  than  inferior,  jurisdiction,  as  dis- 
cussed in  Federal  Courts  §  6,  and  therefore  their 
judgments  and  decrees  stand  on  the  same  footing 
as  those  of  state  courts  of  general  jurisdiction,  when 
collaterally  attacked,  and,  unless  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion affirmatively  appears  from  the  record,56  the 
authority  and  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  render  the 
judgment  or  decree  will  be  presumed,57  although 
the  facts  conferring  jurisdiction  do  not  appear  in 
the  record58  Accordingly,  when  a  judgment  ren- 
dered by  a  federal  court  is  collaterally  attacked  in 
a  state  tribunal,  the  latter  tribunal  will  presume  that 
the  federal  court  had  jurisdiction,  unless  the  con- 
trary appears  on  the  face  of  the  record.59  The 
rule  applies  to  a  judgment  of  a  federal  court  sit- 
ting in  another  state.60  The  rule  that,  unless  the 
contrary  appears  from  the  record,  a  cause  is  deemed 


to  be  without  the  jurisdiction  of  a  federal  court,  as 
discussed  in  Federal  Courts  §  8,  does  not  apply 
where  the  judgment  of  such  a  court  is  collaterally 
attacked.61 

d.  Probate  Courts 

The  Judgment  of  a  probate  court  within  the  limits 
of  its  Jurisdiction  ordinarily  is  entitled  to  the  same 
favorable  presumptions,  as  against  collateral  attack,  as 
are  accorded  the  Judgments  of  other  courts  of  general 
Jurisdiction. 

Generally,  although  courts  of  probate  are  limited 
in  their  sphere  to  matters  pertaining  to  the  set- 
tlement of  decedents'  estates,  their  jurisdiction  is  not 
special  or  inferior,  but,  with  respect  to  matters  to 
which  their  powers  extend,  are  usually  regarded  as 
courts  of  general  jurisdiction,  as  discussed  in  Courts 
§  298,  and  therefore  the  judgment  of  such  a  court 
is  entitled  to  the  same  presumptions  as  to  jurisdic- 
tion, regularity,  and  validity,  as  against  collateral 
attack,  as  are  accorded  the  judgments  of  other 
courts  of  general  jurisdiction,62  unless  it  affirmative- 
ly appears  from  the  record  that  the  court  had  no 
jurisdiction  in  the  matter;63  and  the  recitals  in  the 


56.  U.S.— Hatten  v.   Hudspeth,   C.C. 
A.Kan.,     99     F.2d    501— Archer    v. 
Heath,  C.C.A.Wash.,  30  F.2d  932— 
In    re    Ostlind    Mfg.    Co.,   P.C.Or., 
19  F.Supp.  836. 

57.  U.S. — Hatten   v.   Hudspeth,  C.C. 
A.Kan.,     99    F.2d    501— Archer    v. 
Heath,  C.C.A.Wash.,  30  F.2d  932. 

N.Y.— New  Tork  Institution  for  In- 
struction of  Deaf  and  Pumb  v. 
Crockett,  102  N.Y.S.  412,  117  App. 
Piv.  269. 

34  C.J.  p  545  note  14. 
Power  to  vacate  Judgment  of  con- 
viction 

In  absence  of  anything-  to  show 
that  federal  district  court  was  with- 
out power  to  vacate  judgment  of 
conviction  against  deputy  sheriff,  it 
will  be  assumed,  in  proceeding  to 
oust  deputy  from  office  because  of 
conviction,  that  court  had  proceeded 
within  general  scope  of  its  powers 
end  that  order  vacating  judgment 
was  given  with  authority. — Common- 
wealth ex  rel.  McClenachan  v.  Head- 
ing, -6  A.2d  776,  336  Pa.  165. 

58.  U.S.— Jenner  v.   Murray,  C.C.A. 
Fla.,  32  F.2d  625. 

34  C.J.  p  545  note  14. 

59.  N.T. — Chemung   Canal   Bank   v. 
Judson,  8  N.Y.  254,  Seld.  p  49. 

25  C.J,  p  692  note  66. 

'J60.     Tex. — New      Orleans      Southern 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Woverton  Hardware  Co., 

19'S.W.  615. 
61.    U.S. — Hatten  v.  Hudspeth,   C.C. 

AJKCan.,  99  F.2d  501. 
€2.    Cal.— In  re  Keel's  Estate,  100  P. 

2d  1045,   15  Cal.2d  328— Texas  Co. 

v.  Bank  of  America  Nat  Trust  & 


Savings  Ass'n,  53  P.2d  127,  5  Cal. 
2d  35— Security-First  Nat.  Bank  of 
Los  Angeles  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  37  P. 
2d  69,  1  Cal.2d  749— Wood  v. 
Roach,  14  P.2d  170,  125  CaLApp. 
631. 

Ga. — Morris  v.  Nicholson,  31  S.B.2d 
786,  198  Ga,  450— Jones  v.  Smith, 
48  S.B.  134,  120  Ga,  642— Camp- 
bell v.  Atlanta  Coach  Co.,  200  S. 
E.  203,  58  GteLApp.  824. 

Idaho. — Knowles  v.  Kasiska,  268  P. 
3,  46  Idaho  379. 

Iowa. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ander- 
son v.  Schwitzer,  20  N.W.2d  67, 
71. 

Mo.— Boss  v.  Pitcairn,  179  S.W.2d 
35,  153  A.L.R.  215— Linville  v. 
Ripley,  146  S.W.2d  581,  347  Mo. 
95— Blattel  v.  Stallings,  142  S.W. 
2d  9,  346  Mo.  50 — Crohn  v.  Modern 
Woodmen  of  America,  129  S.W. 
1069,  145  Mo.App.  158— Hamilton 
v.  Henderson,  117  S.W,2d  379,  232 
Mo.  App.  1234. 

N.J. — Assets  Development  Co.  v. 
Wall,  119  A.  10,  97  N.J.Law  468. 

Okl. — Porter  v.  Hansen,  124  P.2d  391, 
190  Okl.  429— Pill  v.  Anderson,  256 
P.  31,  124  Okl.  299— Powers  v. 
Brown,  252  P.  27,  122  Okl.  40— 
Cummings  v.  Inman,  247  P.  379, 
119  Okl.  9— Adams  v.  Tidal  Oil  Co., 
237  P.  443,  113  Okl.  15— Jones  v. 
Snyder,  233  P.  744,  superseded 
249  P.  313,  121  Okl.  254— Galla- 
ghar  v.  Petree,  230  P.  477,  103 
Okl.  295— Bowling  v.  Merry,  217 
P.  404,  91  Okl.  176. 

Tex.— Pallas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 
of  Pallas  v.  Forsyth.  109  S.W.2d 

842 


1046,  130  Tex.  563— Goolsby  v. 
Bush,  Civ. App.,  172  S.W.2d  758— 
Burton  v.  McGuire,  Civ.App.,  3 
S.W.2d  576,  affirmed,  Com.  App., 
41  S.W.2d  238— Tucker  v.  Imperial 
Oil  &  Development  Co.,  Civ.App., 
233  S.W.  339. 
34  C.J.  p  545  note  15. 

Existence  of  necessary  facts 

Where  record  is  silent  as  to  the 
existence  of  any  fact  necessary  to 
the  validity  of  a  county  court's  judg- 
ment in  probate  matters,  it  will  be 
presumed  on  collateral  attack  that 
the  court  inquired  into  and  found 
the  existence  of  such  fact 

Mo.— Hidden   v.   Edwards,    285    S.W. 

462,  313  Mo.  642. 
Okl.— Porter  v.  Hansen,  124  P.2d  391, 

190  Okl.  429. 

Date  of  entry 

As  against  collateral  attack,  it  will 
be  presumed  that  order  entered  on 
probate  minutes  was  entered  on  its 
date. — Burton  v.  McGuire,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  3  S.W.2d  576,  affirmed,  Com. 
App.,  41  S.W.2d  238. 

Service  of  process  will  be  presum- 
ed when  record  of  probate  court 
showing  adjudication  is  silent. — Han- 
non  v.  Henson,  Tex.Civ.App.,  7  S.W. 
2d  613,  affirmed,  Com.App.,  15  S.W.2d 
579. 

63.  Cal. — Texas  Co.  v.  Bank  of 
America  Nat.  Trust  &  Savings 
Ass'n,  53  P.2d  127,  5  CaL2d  35. 

Ga. — Campbell  v.  Atlanta  Coach  Co., 
200  S.E.  203,  58  Ga.App.  824. 

Mo.— Linville  v.  Ripley,   146  S.W.2d 

-    581,  347  Mo.  95. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  426 


record  as  to  jurisdiction  may  not  be  contradicted 
by  evidence  of  facts  different  from  those  appearing 
on  the  record.64  There  are  some  authorities,  how- 
ever, which  hold  that  probate  courts  are  courts  of 
special  or  limited  jurisdiction,  and  that  their  or- 
ders or  decrees  do  not  raise  any  presumption  of 
jurisdiction  unless  the  jurisdictional  facts  appear  on 
the  face  of  the  proceeding.65 

Special  proceedings  in  probate  court.  With  re- 
gard to  matters  not  within  the  Ordinary  probate 
jurisdiction,  but  involving  the  exercise  of  special 
statutory  powers,  it  has  been  held  that  the  pre- 
sumption of  jurisdiction  does  not  obtain,  but  the 
court,  as  concerns  such  matters,  is  a  court  of  spe- 
cial jurisdiction ;  and  the  rule  is  the  same  as  where 
a  court  of  general  jurisdiction  exercises  special  stat- 
utory powers.66 

§  426.    Recitals  of  Jurisdictional  Facts 

a.  In  general 


b.  Contradicting  recitals 

c.  Recitals  showing  want  of  jurisdiction 

a.  In  General 

Recitals  as  to  jurisdictional  facts,  contained  in  a 
judgment  or  judgment  roll  or  record,  are  deemed  to  im- 
port absolute  verity,  and  are  generally  conclusive  as 
against  a  collateral  attack  unless  they  are  contradicted 
by  other  portions  of  the  record  or  unless  there  is  an 
averment  and  proof  of  fraud. 

In  accordance  with  the  rule  that  the  judgment 
roll,  or  record  proper,  is  of  such  uncontrollable 
credit  and  verity  as  to  admit  of  no  averment,  plea, 
or  proof  to  the  contrary,  as  discussed  supra  §  132, 
where  a  judgment,  or  judgment  roll  or  record,  of  a 
domestic  court  of  general  jurisdiction  contains  re- 
citals as  to  the  jurisdictional  facts,  such  recitals 
generally  are  deemed  to  import  absolute  verity  and 
to  be  conclusive  as  against  a  collateral  attack6?  un- 
less they  are  contradicted  by  other  portions  of  the 


Tex.— Goolsby  v.  Bush,  Civ.App.,  172 

S.W.2d  758. 
34  C.J.  p  546  note  16. 

64.  Cal. — Marlenee  v.  Brown,  134  P. 
2d  770,  21  Ckl.2d  668. 

Contradicting:  recitals  generally  see 
infra  §  426. 

65.  Alaska. — Sylvester  v.  Willson,  2 
Alaska  325. 

34  C.J.  p  546  note  17. 

66.  Ala. — Ho  well  v.  Hughes,  53  So. 
105,  168  Ala,  460. 

34  C.J.  p  546  note  18. 

Rule  in  case  of  exercise  of  special 
statutory  powers  see  supra  sub- 
division a  (3)  of  this  section. 

67.  U.S. — Merrell    v.    U.    S,,    C.C.A. 
Okl.,  140  P.2d  602. 

Ala. — Ex  parte  Tanner,  121  So.  423, 
219  Ala.  7,  answer  to  certified 
Question  conformed  to  Tanner  v. 
State,  121  So.  424,  23  Ala.App.  61, 
certiorari  denied  121  So.  427,  219 
Ala.  139. 

Ark.— Kindrick  v.  Capps,  121  S.W.2d 
515,  196  Ark.  1169— -Union  Inv.  Co. 
v.  Hunt,  59  S.W.2d  1039,  187  Ark. 
357— Holt  v.  Manuel,  54  S.W.2d 
66,  186  Ark.  435— State  v.  Wilson, 
27  S.W.2d  106,  181  Ark.  683-- Avery 
v.  Avery,  255  S.W.  18,  160  Ark. 
375. 

Fla. — Newport  v.  Culbreath,  162  So. 
340,  120  Fla.  152— Kroier  v.  Kro- 
ier,  116  So.  753,  95  Fla.  865. 

Idaho.— Weil  v.  Defenbach,  208  P. 
1025,  36  Idaho  37. 

111. — People  ex  rel.  Baird  &  Warner 
v.  Lindheimer,  19  N.B.2d  336,  370 
111.  424. 

Ky. — Wolverton  v.  Baynham,  10  S. 
W.2d  837,  226  Ky.  214. 

La. — Scovell  v,  Levy,  30  So.  322,  106 
La.  118. 


Mich.— Burger  v.  Beste,  57  N.W.  99, 
98  Mich.  156. 

Miss. — Mclntosh  v.  Munson  Road 
Machinery  Co.,  145  So.  731,  167 
Miss.  546 — Vicksburg  Grocery  Co. 
v.  Brennan,  20  So.  845. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  and  to  Use  of 
Bair  v.  Producers  Gravel  Co.,  Ill 
S.W.2d  521,  341  Mo.  1106— State 
ex  rel.  Spratley  v.  Maries  County, 
98  S.W.2d  623,  339  Mo.  577— Auf- 
derheide  v.  Aufderhelde,  App.,  18 
S.W.2d  119. 

N.D. — Zimmerman  v.  Boynton,  229  N. 
W.  3,  59  N.D.  112. 

Okl. — Protest  of  Stanolind  Pipe  Line 
Co,,  32  P.2d  569,  168  Okl.  281— 
Protest  of  Gulf  Pipe  Line  Co.  of 
Oklahoma,  32  P.2d  42,  168  Okl.  136 
— Adams  v.  Carson,  25  P.2d  653, 
165  Okl.  161— Protest  of  St.  Louis- 
San  Francisco  Ry.  Co.,  19  P.2d  162, 
162  Okl.  -62— Protest  of  St  Louis- 
San  Francisco  Ry.  Co.,  11  P.2d  189, 
157  Okl.  131— Foster  v.  Wooley,  220 
P.  938,  93  Okl.  53. 

Tenn. — Page  v.  Turcott,  167  S.W.2d 
350,  179  Tenn.  491 — Green  v.  Craig, 
•51  S.W.2d  480,  164  Tenn.  445. 

Tex. — Empire  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Al- 
bright, 87  S.W.2d  1092,  126  Tex. 
485 — Brown  v.  Clippenger,  256  S. 
W.  254,  113  Tex.  364— Levy  v. 
Roper,  256  S.W.  251,  113  Tex.  356 
— Robins  v.  Sandford,  Com. App.,  29 
S.W.2d  969 — Bemis  v.  Bayou  De- 
velopment Co.,  Civ.App.,  184  S.W. 
2d  645,  error  refused;  certiorari 
denied  Bemis  v.  Humble  Oil  &  Re- 
fining Co.,  66  S.Ct  43— Stewart 
Oil  Co.  v.  Lee,  Civ.App.,  173  S.W. 
2d  791,  error  refused — Wixom  v. 
Bowers,  Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  896 
— Kveton  v.  Farmers  Royalty 
Holding  Co.,  Civ.App.,  149  S.W.2d 
998 — Gann  v.  Putman,  Civ. App., 

843 


141  S.W.2d  758,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct — Askew  v.  Roun- 
tree,  Civ.App.,  120  S.W.2d  117,  er- 
ror dismissed — Longmire  v.  Taylor, 
Civ.App.,  109  S.W.2d  525,  error  dis- 
missed— Mercer  v.  Rubey,  Civ.App., 
108  S.W.2d  677,  error  refused — 
Henry  v.  Beaucnamp,  Civ.App.,  39 
S.W.2d  642,  followed  in  Henry  v. 
Carter,  39  S.W.2d  645— Bonougli  v. 
Guerra,  Civ.App.,  286  S.W.  344. 
Utah.— Pincock  v.  Ximball,  228  P. 

221,  64  Utah  4. 
Va. — Cole   v.    Farrier,    22    S.E3.2d    18, 

180  Va.  231. 

Wash.— Ex   parte    Gordon,    144    P.2d 
238,   19  Wash.2d  714— Peha's  Uni- 
versity   Food    Shop    v.     Stimpson 
Corporation.     31     P.2d     1023,     177 
Wash.  406. 
34  C.J.  p  547  note  19. 
Judgment  by  court  having  Jurisdic- 
tion of  parties  and  subject  matter 
as    not   open   to    collateral    attack 
generally  see  supra   §   401. 
Jurisdiction  and  power  distinguished 
Where  question  of  validity  of  judg- 
ment   arises    collaterally,    recitation 
therein    of   jurisdictional    facts    im- 
ports  absolute  verity,    while   recita- 
tion of  power  to  execute  deed  which 
is    an    ancient    instrument    imports 
prima  facie   verity. — Loving  County 
v.    Higginbotham,    Tex.Civ.App.,    115 
S.W.2d  1110,  error  dismissed. 
Diversity  of  citizenship 

Where  record  in  district  court 
foreclosure  action  affirmatively  dis- 
closed diversity  of  citizenship  of 
parties,  validity  of  title  acquired  by 
purchaser  at  foreclosure  sale  could 
not  be  challenged  by  collateral  at- 
tack on  jurisdiction  of  district 
court  in  such  foreclosure  action. — 
Bostwick  v.  Baldwin  Drainage  Dist., 
C.C.A.Fla.,  133  F.2d  1,  certiorari  de- 


§426 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


record68  or,  according  to  some  authorities,  by  ex- 
trinsic evidence,  as  discussed  infra  subdivision  b 
of  this  section,  or  unless  there  is  an  averment  and 
proof  of  fraud.69 

Where  a  judgment  or  decree  of  a  domestic  court 
recites  that  proper  notice  of  the  action  was  given, 


that  process  was  duly  served,  or  that  the  parties 
were  duly  summoned  or  cited,  such  recital  gener- 
ally is  conclusive  on  collateral  attack,70  even  though 
there  may  have  been  defects  in  some  of  the  docu- 
ments constituting  part  of  the  judgment  roll  and  re- 
lating to  the  sen-ice  of  process;71  but  it  has  been 


nied   63   S.Ct   1030,   319  U.S.   742,   8 

L.Ed.  1699. 

Judgment  "by  agreement 

Where  judgment  recited  that  it 
was  by  agreement  of  the  parties 
it  was  presumed  that  all  the  par- 
ties were  present  in  open  court  and 
entered  into  the  agreement,  and  the 
contention  of  any  party  that  he  did 
not  in  fact  agree  to  the  judgment 
must  be  made  in  a  direct  attack  on 
the  Judgment;  it  could  not  be  col- 
laterally attacked  in  an  action  to  re- 
move clouds  from  title  to  realty  on 
the  ground  that  all  parties  to  prior 
cause  had  not  in  fact  agreed  to  the 
judgment — Brennan  v.  Greene,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  154  S.W.2d  523,  error  re- 
fused. 
Partition 

When  the  recitals  in  the  record  of 
a  statutory  partition  show  the  ju- 
risdiction of  the  court  and  its  com- 
pliance with  the  statute,  the  order 
appointing  commissioners  to  make 
partition  is  an  adjudication  of  the 
sufficiency  of  the  application,  which 
cannot  be  questioned  collaterally. — 
Hall  v.  Law,  Ind.,  102  U.S.  461,  26 
L.Ed.  217. 

Bscitals  as  to  trial  at  certain  term 
Tex. — Gann  v.  Putman,  Civ.App.,  141 
S.W.2d  758,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct 

68.  U.S.— Merrell    v.    U.    S.,    C.C.A. 
OkL,  140  P.2d  602. 

Ala. — Ex  parte  Tanner,  121  So.  423, 
219  Ala.  7,  answer  to  certified 
Question  conformed  to  Tanner  v. 
State,  121  So.  424,  23  Ala.App.  61, 
certiorari  denied  121  So.  427,  219 
Ala.  139. 

Ark.— Holt  v.  Manuel,  54  S.W.2d  66, 
186  Ark.  435. 

Fla. — Newport  v.  Culbreath,  162  So. 
340,  120  FUsu  152. 

Idaho.— Weil  v.  Defenbach,  208  P. 
1025,  36  Idaho  37. 

N.D. — Zimmerman  v.  Boynton,  229 
N.W.  3,  59  N.D.  112. 

34  C.J.  p  -547  note  20. 

Recitals  showing  want  of  Jurisdic- 
tion see  infra  subdivision  c  of  this 
section. 

69.  Ky. — Slier  v.    Carpenter,   160   S. 
W.  186,  155  Ky.  640. 

W.Va. — Plant  v.  Humphries,  66  S.B. 
94,  £6  W.Va.  88,  26  L.R.A.,N.S., 
558. 

Fraud  as  ground  for  collateral  at- 
tack see  infra  8  434. 

70u  CaL — fcaufmann  v.  California 
Mining  &  Dredging  Syndicate,  104 
P.2d  1038,  16  Cal.2d  90— Sheehan  v. 


All  Persons,  etc.,  252  P.  337,  80 
CaLApp.  393. 

Ind. — Grantham  Realty  Corporation 
v.  Bowers,  18  N.E.2d  929,  affirmed 
22  N.E.2d  832,  215  Ind.  672. 

Ky.— Newhall  v.  Mahan,  54  S.W.2d 
26,  245  Ky.  626. 

N.J.— In  re  Leupp,  153  A.  842,  108 
N.J.Eq.  49. 

N.C.— Powell  v.  Turpin,  29  S.E.2d 
26,  224  N.C.  67. 

N.D.— Baird  v.  City  of  Williston,  226 
N.W.  608,  58  N.D.  478. 

Ohio. — Hinman  v.  Executive  Com- 
mittee of  Communistic  Party  of 
U.  S.  A.,  47  X.E.2d  S20,  71  Ohio 
App.  76 — Zingale  v.  Integrity 
Mortg.  Co.,  163  N.E.  214,  30  Ohio 
App.  94 — Union  Ice  Corporation  v. 
City  of  Niles,  13  Ohio  Supp.  115. 

OkL— Jones  v.  Snyder,  233  P.  744, 
superseded  249  P.  313,  121  Okl. 
254. 

Tex. — Switzer  v.  Smith,  Com.App., 
300  S.W.  31,  68  A.L.R.  377— Bemis 
v.  Bayou  Development  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  184  S.W.2d  645,  error  refused; 
certiorari  denied  Bemis  v.  Humble 
Oil  &  Refining  Co.,  66  S.Ct.  43 — 
Edens  v.  Grogan  Cochran  Lumber 
Co.,  Civ.App..  172  S.W.2d  730,  er- 
ror refused — Stewart  v.  Adams, 
Civ.App.,  171  S.W.2d  180— Litton  v. 
Waters,  Civ.App.,  161  S.W.2d  1095, 
error  refused — TTixom  v.  Bowers, 
Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  896,  error 
refused — Jordan  v.  Texas  Pac.  Coal 
&  Oil  Co.,  Civ.App.f  152  S.W.2d 
875— Laney  v.  Cline,  Civ. App.,  150 
S.W.2d  176 — Henry  v.  Beauchamp, 
Civ.App.,  39  S.W.3d  642,  followed  in 
Henry  v.  Carter,  39  S.W.2d  645 — 
Murchison  Oil  Co.  v.  Hampton, 
Civ.App.,  21  S.W.2d  59,  error  re- 
fused— Barton  v.  Montex  Corpo- 
ration, Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  950— 
Reitz  v.  Mitchell,  Civ.App.,  256  S. 
W.  697— Landa  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v. 
Watkins,  Civ.App.,  255  S.W.  775 — 
Borders  v.  Highsmith,  Civ.App., 
252  S.W.  270. 

34  C.J.  p  547  note  23. 

Particular  service  recited  in  Judg- 
ment and  found  in  record  will,  ac- 
cording to  its  sufilciency  or  insuffi- 
ciency, determine  validity  of  judg- 
ment— Henry  v.  Beauchamp,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  39  S.W.Sd  643,  followed  in 
Henry  v.  Carter,  39  S.W.2d  645. 

Partition 

(1)  A  recital  in  the  record  of  par- 
tition proceedings  that  the  parties 
were  duly  cited  is  conclusive  as 
against  collateral  attack. 

844 


Mo. — Brawley    v.    Ranney,     67     Mo. 

280. 

Pa.— Vensel's  Appeal,   77  Pa.   71. 
Tex.— Bassett    v.    Sherrod,    35    S.W. 

312,  13  Tex.Civ.App.  327. 

(2)  This    rule    applies    where    un- 
known   heirs    were    made    parties. — 
Bassett  v.  Sherrod,  supra — Gillon  v. 
Wear,    28    S.W.    1014,    9    Tex.Civ.App. 
44. 

(3)  Where  the  recitals  in  the  rec- 
ord   show    the    jurisdiction    of    the 
court   and   its   compliance   with    the 
statute,    the   order   appointing   com- 
missioners  to  make  partition  is   an 
adjudication  of  the  sufficiency  of  the 
notice,    which   cannot    be   questioned 
collaterally.— Hall  v.  Law,  Ind.,   102 
U.S.  461,  26  L.Ed.  217. 

Hscital  in  mortgage  foreclosure 
decree  that  cause  came  on  regularly 
to  be  heard  on  complaint  taken  as 
confessed  by  defendant  on  whom 
due  and  regular  service  of  summons 
and  complaint  was  made  must  on 
collateral  attack  be  accepted  as  true, 
particularly  if  judgment  roll  does 
not  affirmatively  show  that  recital  is 
false. — West  v.  Capital  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank,  124  P.2d  572,  113  Mont 
130. 

Recitals  held  insufficient 

A  recital  in  a  judgment  that  more 
than  a  specified  number  of  days  had 
elapsed  since  the  service  of  the  sum- 
mons and  complaint  falls  short  of  a 
finding  that  the  summons  and  com- 
plaint were  served  on  defendant. — 
Illinois  Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v. 
Town  of  Roscoe,  194  N.W.  649,  46 
S.W.  477. 

Prima  facie  proof 

A  recital  that  all  parties  to  suit 
had  notice  of  hearing  is  prima  facie 
proof  of  that  fact,  not  to  be  over- 
thrown except  by  substantial  evi- 
dence.— Maryland  Casualty  Co.  v. 
Cox,  C.C.A.Tenn.,  104  F.2d  354. 

71.    Oal.— Kaufmann     Y.     California 

Mining  &  Dredging  Syndicate,  104 

P.2d  1038,  16  Cal.2d  90. 
Ohio. — Aldrich  v.  Friedman,  18  Ohio 

App.  302. 
Defects    or   omissions    in   record   as 

affecting    presumptions     generally 

see  supra  §  425. 

Service  on  wrong  spouse 

Fact  that  process  intended  for 
husband  was  served  on  wife,  and 
that  directed  to  wife  was  served  on 
husband,  did  not  render  default  judg- 
ment, reciting  fact  of  due  service, 
subject  to  collateral  attack  as  void. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  426 


held  that  where  the  recital  is  a  general  one,  of  due 
service  of  process,  it  is  limited  to  process  actually 
found  in  the  record,  and  the  validity  of  the  judg- 
ment depends  on  the  sufficiency  of  such  process  and 
service.72  A  similar  presumption  arises  from  a  re- 
cital that  the  defendant  or  parties  appeared,73  al- 
though it  has  been  held  that  the  recital  of  an  ap- 
pearance is  never  conclusive,  and,  where  the  ex- 
pression is  general,  it  is  confined  to  those  parties 
who  have  been  served  with  process.74 

An  ambiguous  or  imperfect  recital  in  the  judg- 
ment will  be  so  construed,  if  possible,  as  to  make 
it  show  jurisdiction.75  If  however,  the  recital  is 


meaningless,  it  is  void  and  affords  no  presumption 
in  favor  of  service.76 

Service  by  publication.  In  the  case  of  a  judg- 
ment against  a  nonresident  defendant  on  service  by 
publication  of  the  summons,  if  the  judgment  recites 
that  publication  was  "duly  made,"  or  was  "in  all 
respects  regular  and  according  to  law,"  or  that  de- 
fendant was  "duly  notified,"  this  is  sufficient  to  sus- 
tain the  validity  of  the  judgment  on  collateral  at- 
tack77 unless  such  recital  conflicts  with  the  record 
proper,  which  shows  a  failure  to  comply  with  the 
statutory  requirements.78  The  same  effect  has  been 
given  a  recital  that  a  default  judgment  was  regu- 


— Switzer    v.     Smith,    Tex.Com.App. 
300  S.W.  81,  68  A.L.R.  377. 

Judgment  reciting1  personal  serv- 
ice, not  contradicted  by  record,  when 
In  reality  there  was  no  such  service, 
is  not  subject  to  collateral  attack, 
not  being  void. — Getting  v.  Mineral 
Wells  Crushed  Stone  Co.,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  262  S.W.  93. 

72.  Okl.— Johnson  v.  Hood,  46  P.2d 
533,    173    Okl.    108— Seal   v.   Banes, 
35  P.2d  704,  168  Okl,  550. 

73.  Ala. — Ex    parte   Fidelity   &   De- 
posit Co.  of  Maryland.  134  So.  861, 
22?  Ala.  98. 

Cal.— Associated    Oil    Co.    v.    Mullin, 

294  P.  421,  110  Cal.App.  385. 
Fla.— Bemis    v.   Loftin,    17.3   So.    683, 

127  Fla.  515. 
Ky.— Newhall   v.    Mahan,   54    S.W.2d 

26,  245  Ky.  626. 
Tex. — Henry  v.  Beauchamp,  Civ.App., 

39   S.W.2d  642,  followed  in  Henry 

v.  Carter,  39  S.W.2d  645. 
34  C.J.  p  5(8  note  25. 
"Come  the  parties" 

(1)  A  'recital   that   "now,   at  this 
day,  come  the  said  parties,  by  their 
respective    attorneys,"    without    any 
further  showing  that  the  court  ac- 
quired   jurisdiction    against    one    of 
defendants,    has    been    held    insuffi- 
cient    to     support     the     judgment 
against   him   in   collateral   attack. — 
Bell  v.  Brinkmann,  27  S.W.  374,  123 
Mo.  270,  275. 

(2)  Such   a   recital,    however,   has 
been   held   prima   facie   sufficient   to 
render  the  Judgment  or  decree  valid 
as  against  a  collateral  attack. — Hunt 
v.  Allison,  32  Ala.  173—34  C.J.  p  548 
note  25  [a]. 

Piling1  answer 

Where  judgment  recited  that  an 
answer  was  filed,  presumption  arose 
that  answer  was  properly  filed,  as 
respects  whether  sufficiency  of  de- 
fendant's appearance  could  be  ques- 
tioned in  a  collateral  proceeding. — 
State  ex  rel.  and  to  Use  of  Bair  v. 
Producers  Gravel  Co.,  Ill  S.W.2d 
521,  341  Mo.  1106. 
Pailure  to  appear 

A  Judgment   on  a  petition  which 


1  -tated  a  valid-  cause  of  action  for 
personal  judgment  against  one  de- 
fendant with  foreclosure  of  asserted 
lien,  and  which  recited  on  its  face 
that  the  defendants,  although  duly 
cited,  failed  to  appear,  was  not  void 
and  could  not  be  collaterally  attack- 
ed.— Livingston  v.  Stubbs,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  151  S.W.2d  285,  error  dismiss- 
ed, judgment  correct. 
Prima  facie  true 

The  recital  in  proceedings  for  par- 
tition, and  in  the  decree  rendered 
therein,  that  the  heirs  appeared 
and  consented  thereto,  is  prlma  facie 
true.— Millican  v.  Millican,  24  Tex. 
426. 
Waiver 

Where  judgments  recited  that  de- 
fendants entered  their  appearance 
and  filed  answers,  question  as  to 
whether  a  defendant  was  in  court  be- 
cause of  alleged  insufficiency  of 
waiver  of  process  and  entry  of  ap- 
pearance could  not  be  raised  in  a 
collateral  attack  on  the  judgment  by 
motion  to  quash  execution  and  stay 
sale. — State  ex  rel.  and  to  Use  of 
Bair  v.  Producers  Gravel  Co.,  supra, 

74.  Cal.— Chester  v.  Miller,   13   Cal. 
558. 

Mo.— Bell  v.  Brinkman,  27  S.W.  374, 
123  Mo.  270. 

75.  Ala. — Stephens   v.   International 
Harvester  Co.,  80  So.  686,  16  Ala. 
App.  612. 

34  C.J.  p  548  note  27. 

76.  Tex. — Perry  v.  Whiting,   121   S. 
W.   903,  56  Tex.Clv.App.  550. 

34  C.J.  p  548  note  28. 

77.  Okl.— Smith   v.    Head,    134    P.2d 
973,    192    Okl.    216— Washbum    v, 
Culbertson,    75    P.2d   190,    181   Okl. 
476. 

Tex. — State  v.  Humble  Oil  &  Refining 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  187  S.W.2d  93,  opin- 
ion supplemented  on  other  grounds 
194  S.W.2d  811— Smith  v.  Walker, 
Civ.App.,  163  S.W.2d  857,  error 
refused — Underwood  v.  Pigman, 
Civ.App.,  21  S.W.2d  703,  reversed 
on  other  grounds,  Com. App.,  32  S. 
W.2d  1102,  modified  on  other 
grounds  36  S.W.2d  1114— Mariposa 

845 


Mining  Co.  v.  Waters,  Civ.App.,  279 
S.W.  576. 
34  C.J.  p  548  note  30. 

The  record  must  toe  treated  as  » 
whole  and  as  including  affidavit  for 
citation  by  publication,  in  determin- 
ing court's  statutory  jurisdiction  to 
render  judgment  against  nonresident 
on  citation  by  publication. — Fisher 
v.  Jordan,  D.C.Tex.,  32  F.Supp.  608, 
reversed  on  other  grounds,  C.C.A., 
116  F.2d  183,  certiorari  denied  Jor- 
dan v.  Fisher,  61  S.Ct  734,  312  U.S. 
697,  85  L,.Ed.  1132. 

Beoitals  held  insufficient 

(1)  Recital  in  a  judgment  that  an 
attorney  was  appointed  to  represent 
defendant  on  the  suggestion  of  plain- 
tiff's attorney  that  he  had  been  cit- 
ed by  publication  as  required  by  law 
was  not  such  a  recital  of  due  serv- 
ice as  would  preclude  defendant  from 
collaterally  attacking   the  Judgment 
on    the    ground    that    he    was    not 
served  as  required  by  law. — Shipley 
v.    Pershing,   Tex. Civ. App.,   5    S.W.2d 
799,  error  dismissed. 

(2)  Recitals    that    defendant    had 
been  cited  to  appear  and  answer  by 
a  citation  published  in  a  newspaper 
more  than  the  time  required  by  law 
before  the  first  day  of  the  term  was 
not    equivalent   to   a   recital   of  due 
service  on  a  nonresident,  precluding 
attack    on    the    judgment. — Reitz    v. 
Mitchell,  Tex.Civ.App.,  256  S.W.  697. 

78,    Fla. — Johnson  v.   Clark,   198   So. 

842,  145  Fla.  258. 
Okl.— Smith   v.   Head,    134   P.2d   973, 

192  Okl.  216. 
34  C.J.  p  548  note  30. 
Notice  of  attachment 

Where  default  Judgment  was  based 
on  attachment  proceedings,  but  rec- 
ord showed  that  notice  of  attach- 
ment was  returnable  a  specified  num- 
ber of  days  from  the  first  publication 
so  that  court  obtained  no  jurisdiction 
over  defendant's  person,  the  judg- 
ment was  not  immunized  from  col- 
lateral attack  by  a  recital  of  due 
service  of  summons,  such  recital  be- 
ing a  mere  conclusion  which  con- 
flicted with  the  record  proper. — John- 


5  426 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


larly  entered  according  to  law.79  In  some  jurisdic- 
tions, however,  statutes  relating  to  constructive 
service  are  strictly  construed,  and  in  order  to  sus- 
tain the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  based  on  such  serv- 
ice, the  record  must  affirmatively  show  that  the 
statute  has  been  complied  with,  and  a  formal  recital 
that  service  has  been  had  does  not  change  this  prin- 


ciple 


$0 


b.  Contradicting  Recitals 
Recitals   of  jurisdictional  facts   In   a  judgment   may 


be  contradicted  by  other  parts  of  the  record?  but  gen- 
erally  they  cannot  be  contradicted  or  disproved  by  ex- 
trinsic  evidence,  except  for  fraud. 

In  the  case  of  a  judgment  of  a  domestic  court  of 
general  jurisdiction,  the  great  majority  of  the  de- 
cisions sustain  the  rule  that  its  recitals  concerning 
the  service  of  process  or  the  other  facts  on  which 
its  jurisdiction  is  founded  import  absolute  verity, 
and  that  such  recitals  cannot  be  contradicted  or  dis- 
proved, in  a  collateral  proceeding,  by  any  evidence 
outside  the  record,81  except  for  fraud  in  procuring 


son  v.   Clark,   198   So.   842,   145   Fla. 
258. 

A  warning'  order  which  states  that 
it  was  issued  on  verified  petition, 
but  not  alleging  belief  that  nonresi- 
dent defendant  was  then  absent  from 
state,  cannot  be  presumed  on  col- 
lateral attack  to  have  been  made  on 
proper  affidavit. — Leonard  v.  Wil- 
liams, 265  S.W.  618,  205  Ky.  218. 

79.  Cal. — Sacramento  Bank  v.  Mont- 
gomery, 81  P.  138,  146  Cal.   745. 

80.  Neb.— Vandervort  v.  Finnell,  148 
N.W.    332,    96    Neb.    515— Duval   v. 
Johnson,    133    N.W.    1125,    90   Xeb. 
503,  Ann.Cas.l913B  26. 

34  C.J.  p  549  note  32. 
Presumptions  as  to  process  and  serv- 
ice see  supra  §  425. 

81.  U.S.— Bennett  v.  Hunter,  C.C.A. 
Kan.,     155     F.2d    223— Thomas    v. 
Hunter,    C.C.A.Kan.,    153    F.2d    S34 
— Shields    v.    Shields,    D.C.Mo.,    26 
F.Supp.  211. 

Ala, — Watson  v.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co., 
173  So.  43,  233  Ala.  690. 

Cal.— Marlenee  v.  Brown,  134  P.2d 
770,  21  Cal.2d  668— Burrows  v. 
Burrows,  52  P.2d  606,  10  CaLApp. 
2d  749 — Hogan  v.  Superior  Court 
of  California  in  and  for  City  and 
County  of  San  Francisco,  241  P. 
584,  74  CaLApp.  704. 

Fla. — Bemis  v.  Loftin,  173  So.  683, 
127  Fla.  515. 

Ga. — Hodges  v.  Stuart  Lumber  Co., 
79  S.E.  462,  140  Ga.  569. 

111.— People  ex  rel.  Baird  &  Warner 
v.  Lindheimer,  19  N.E.2d  336,  370 
111.  424— People  ex  rel.  Com'rs  of 
North  Fork  Outlet  Drainage  Dist. 
v.  Schwartz,  244  111.  App.  137. 

Ky.— Warfield  Natural  Gas  Co.  v. 
Ward,  149  S.W.2d  705,  286  Ky.  73 
— Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  West,  145  S.W.2d 
1035,  284  Ky.  796. 

Mo.— Sisk  v.  Wilkinson,  265  S.W.  536, 
305  Mo.  328 — Row  v.  Cape  Girar- 
deau  Foundry  Co.,  App.,  141  S.W. 
2d  113 — Inter-River  Drainage  Dist. 
of  Missouri  v.  Henson,  App.,  99  S. 
W.2d  865 — State  ex  rel.  Gregory  v. 
Henderson,  88  S.W.2d  893,  230  Mo. 
App.  1 — Mississippi  and  Fox  River 
Drainage  Dist.  of  Clark  County  v. 
Ruddick,  64  S.W.2d  306,  228  Mo. 
App.  1143. 

Mont. — State  ex  rel.  Enochs  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fourth  Judicial  Dist 


in  and  for  Missoula  County,  123  P. 
2d  971,  113  Mont.  227. 

Neb.— Exchange  Elevator  Co.  v. 
Marshall.  22  N.W.2d  403. 

Tex. — Wixom  v.  Bowers,  Civ.App., 
152  S.W.2d  896,  error  refused- 
Jordan  v.  Texas  Pac.  Coal  £  Oil 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  875,  error 
refused — Laney  v.  Cline,  Civ.App., 
150  S.W.2d  176— Childers  v.  John- 
son, Civ.App.,  143  S.W.2d  123— 
Harvey  v.  Wichita  Nat.  Bank, 
Civ.App.,  113  S.W.2d  1022— Dallas 
Joint  Stock  Land  Bank  of  Dallas 
v.  Street,  Civ.App.,  76  S.W.2d  780, 
error  refused,  followed  Street  v. 
Dallas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank  of 
Dallas,  84  S.W.2d  1119— Bearden 
v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d 
447,  affirmed,  Com. App.,  60  S.W.2d 
1031— Duke  v.  Gilbreath,  Civ,App., 
2  S.W.Sd  324,  error  dismissed — 
Cockrell  v.  Steffens,  Civ.App.,  284 
S.W.  60S— Texas  Pacific  Coal  &  Oil 
Co.  v.  Ames,  Civ.App.,  284  S.W. 
315,  reversed  on  other  grounds. 
Com.App.,  292  S.W.  191. 

Utah.— IntermiJl  v.  Xash,  75  P.2d 
157,  94  Utah  271. 

Wash. — Thompson  v.  Short,  106  P. 
2d  720,  6  Washed  71— Globe  Const. 
Co.  v.  Tost,  13  P.2d  433,  169  Wash. 
319. 

Ya, — Broyhill  v.  Dawson,  191  S.E. 
779,  168  Va.  321. 

34  C.J.  p  549  note  33. 

Rules  excluding  extrinsic  evidence 
to  impeach  or  contradict  Judicial 
record  in  general  see  Evidence  §§ 
865-875. 

Evidence  without  pleading-  and 
without  su"bgtanoe  is  unavailing  to 
prove  that  docket  entries  showing 
service  on  litigant  of  process  in  a 
prior  proceeding  were  irregular  or 
fraudulent  so  as  to  relieve'  litigant 
of  binding  effect  of  former  judgment. 
—Davis  v.  Tuggle's  Adm'r,  178  S.W. 
2d  979,  297  Ky.  376. 

judgment  in  favor  of  employee  for 
damages  sustained  during  employ- 
ment cannot  be  collaterally  attacked 
on  ground  of  lack  of  court's  jurisdic- 
tion by  extraneous  evidence,  even 
though  such  evidence  might  con- 
ceivably have  shown  an  injury  com- 
pensable  under  workmen's  compen- 
sation law. — Row  v.  Cape  Girardeau 
Foundry  Co.,  Mo.App.,  141  S.W.2d 
113. 

846 


Nonresident 

Where  judgment  foreclosing  an 
equitable  lien  against  defendant's 
interest  in  land  recited  that  defend- 
ant was  personally  served  with  non- 
resident notice  as  prescribed  by  stat- 
ute, that  the  sheriff's  return  on  the 
order  of  sale  had  been  duly  made, 
and  that  a  notice  of  such  sale  had 
been  mailed  to  defendant,  defendant 
could  not  go  behind  recitals  in  judg- 
ment by  attempting  to  prove  in  sub- 
sequent trespass  to  try  title  suit 
that  he  was  a  nonresident  at  time 
of  rendition  of  Judgment  or  that  he 
was  not  physically  in  the  state  on 
that  date  or  that  the  service  speci- 
fied in  the  judgment  was  not  legal. 
— Bemis  v.  Bayou  Development  Co.. 
Tex.Civ.App.,  184  S.W.2d  645,  error 
refused.  Certiorari  denied  Bemis  v. 
Humble  Oil  &  Refining  Co.,  66  S.Ct. 
43. 

Personal  Judgment  against   nonresi- 
dent 

Rule  that,  in  collateral  proceeding, 
inquiry  cannot  be  made  into  facts 
dehors  the  record  for  purpose  of 
showing  invalidity  of  Judgment  has 
been  held  not  operative  to  support 
personal  judgment  against  nonresi- 
dent of  state  which  was  rendered 
without  personal  service  within  the 
state.— Hicks  v.  Sias,  Tex.Civ.App., 
102  S.W.2d  460,  error  refused. 
Pleading  and  evidence 

A  judgment  record  which  showed 
that  a  matter  was  submitted  to 
court  on  pleadings  and  evidence 
could  not  be  impeached  in  a  collat- 
eral proceeding  to  enforce  the  judg- 
ment by  parol  evidence  that  judg- 
ment was  taken  without  proof  being 
offered;— Exchange  Elevator  Co.  v. 
Marshall,  Neb.,  22  N.W.2d  403. 
Entry  on  appearance  docket 

The  presumption  arising  from  a 
recital  in  a  decree  that  defendant 
had  been  duly  served  with  notice, 
where  supported  only  by  an  entry 
on  the  appearance  docket,  no  return 
of  service  being  found  in  the  files, 
is  overcome  by  defendant's  posi- 
tive testimony  that  no  notice  was 
served  on  him  and  the  testimony 
of  the  sheriff  by  whom  the  service 
was  supposed  to  have  been  made 
that  he  had  no  recollection  of  mak- 
ing it. — Shehan  v.  Stuart,  90  N.W. 
614,  117  Iowa  207. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  426 


it.82  Under  this  rule  evidence  aliunde  is  not  ad- 
missible for  the  purpose  of  showing  lack  of  proper 
service  of  process  on  defendant83  or  as  to  any  fact 
on  which  the  court  must  have  passed  in  rendering 
the  judgment.84  By  some  decisions,  however,  it 
has  been  held  that  a  record  does  not  import  uncon- 
trollable verity  when  want  of  jurisdiction  is  alleged, 
and  that  it  is  permissible  in  a  collateral  proceeding 
to  controvert  the  recitals  of  the  record  on  this  point 
by  evidence  aliunde,85  except  where  jurisdiction  de- 
pends on  a  litigated  fact  adjudged  in  favor  of  the 
party  averring  jurisdiction.86 

Contradiction  by  record.  In  accordance  with  the 
rule  precluding  the  consideration  of  extrinsic  evi- 
dence, the  judgment  itself  together  with  other  parts 


of  the  record  which  affirmatively  show  want  of  ju- 
risdiction are  ordinarily  the  only  matters  of  evi- 
dence that  may  be  considered  to  collaterally  con- 
tradict and  impeach  the  judgment,87  and  the  col- 
lateral attack  will  not  be  sustained  where  the  only 
part  of  the  record  offered  in  evidence  shows  noth- 
ing to  indicate  the  invalidity  of  the  judgment.88 
It  is  open  to  a  party  to  contest  the  alleged  jurisdic- 
tion by  producing  other  parts  of  the  recorder  judg- 
ment roll,  which  contradict  the  recitals  of  service  of 
process  or  of  other  jurisdictional  facts  in  the  judg- 
ment,89 as,  by  producing  the  original  writ  or  the 
return  on  it,  which  in  case  of  conflict  will  control 
the  recitals-  of  the  judgment,90  although  the  en- 
deavor will  always  be  made  to  reconcile  apparent 


82.  U.S. — Bennett  v.   Hunter,   C.C.A. 
Kan.,     155     P.2d     223 — Thomas    v. 
Hunter,    C.C.A.Kan.,    153    P.2d    834. 

Mo. — Mississippi  and  Pox  River 
Drainage  Dist.  of  Clark  County  v. 
Ruddick,  64  S.W.2d  306,  228  Mo. 
App.  1143 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Aufderheide  v.  Aufderheide,  App., 
18  S.W.2d  119,  120. 

YT.Va.— Central  District  &  Printing 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Parkersburg  & 
O.  V.  B.  R.  Co.,  85  S.B.  65,  76  W. 
Va.  120. 

Fraud  as  ground  for  collateral  at- 
tack generally  see  infra  §  434. 

83.  Ark. — Weeks  v.   Arkansas   Club, 
145   S.W.2d  788,  201  Ark.  423. 

Cal.— Peig    v.    Bank    of    Italy    Nat. 
Trust    &    Savings    Ass'n,    21    P.2d 
421,  218  Cal.  54. 
Ky.— Hall    v.    Bates,    77    S.W.2d    403, 

257  Ky.  61. 
Mich. — Garey    v.    Morley    Bros.,    209 

N.W.  116,  234  Mich.  «75. 
Minn. — Miller  v.  Ahneman,  235  N.W. 

622,  183  Minn.  12. 

Tex. — Rhoads  v.  Daly  General  Agen- 
cy, Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  461,  error 
refused — Childers  v.  Johnson,  Civ. 
App.,  143  S.W.2d  123— Simms  Oil 
Co.  v.  Butcher,  Civ.App.,  55  S.W.2d 
192,  error  dismissed — Bonougli  v. 
Guerra,  Civ.App.,  286  S.W.  344. 
W.Va.— Williams  v.  Monico,  132  S.B. 

652,  101  W.Va.  304. 
34  C.J.  p  549  note  33. 
Citation  not  admissible 

Where  judgment  recited  that  de- 
fendant was  personally  served  in 
terms  of  law  with  citation  command- 
ing him  to  appear  and  answer,  but 
that  he  neither  appeared  nor  filed  an 
answer,  and  wholly  defaulted,  reci- 
tation of  service  of  citation  could  not 
be  impeached  in  subsequent  pro- 
ceedings by  the  introduction  of  ci- 
tation in  evidence. — Williams  v.  Cole- 
man-Pulton  Pasture  Co.,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  157  S.W.2d  995,  error  refused. 

84.  Tex. — Crowley  v.  Redmond,  41  S. 
W.2d    274,    123    Tex.    315 — Stewart 
Oil  Co.  v.  Lee,  Civ.App.,  173  S.W. 


2d  791,  error  refused — Simms  Oil 
Co.  v.  Butcher,  Civ.App.,  55  S.W.2d 
192,  error  dismissed — Kreis  v. 
Kreis,  Civ.App.,  36  S.W.2d  821.  er- 
ror dismissed. 
Bnla  not  applicable 

In  suit  to  enforce  judgment 
against  apparent  surety  on  super- 
sedeas  bond,  judgment  could  be  col- 
laterally attacked  on  ground  that  ap- 
parent surety's  signature  to  bond 
was  forged,  and  fact  of  forgery  es- 
tablished by  evidence  aliunde  rec- 
ord, since  no  inquiry  was  made  as 
to  the  genuineness  of  the  signature, 
and  the  matter  of  jurisdiction  was 
not  adjudicated. — Simms  Oil  Co.  v. 
Butcher,  Tex.Civ.App.,  55  S.W.2d  192, 
error  dismissed. 

85.  N.Y.— Shea  v.  Shea.  60  N.Y.S.2d 
823,      270     App.Div.      527.     appeal 
granted  62  N.Y.S.2d  618,   270  App. 
Div.  906— MacAffer  v.  Boston  &  M. 
R.  R.,  273  N.Y.S.  679,  242  App.Div. 
140,     affirmed    197    N.B.     328,     268 
N.Y.  400 — Standish  v.  Standish,  40 
N.Y.S.2d   -538,    179    Misc.    564— Pin- 
kelstein  v.  William  H.  Block  Co., 
208    N.Y.S.    401,    124    Misc.    610. 

34  C.J.  p  547  note  21,  p  550  note  35. 

86.  N.Y. — O'Donoghue    v.    Boies,    53 
N.B.    537,    159    N.Y.    87— Shea    v. 
Shea,    60    N.Y.S.2d    823,    270    App. 
Div.  527.  appeal  granted  62  N.Y.S. 
2d  618,  270  App.Div.  906 — MacAffer 
v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.,   273  N.Y.S. 
679,  242  AppJMv.  140,  affirmed  197 
N.E.  328,  268  N.Y.  400. 

Conclusiveness  of  decision  of  court 
as  to  its  own  jurisdiction  gener- 
ally see  infra  §  427. 

87.  Cal. — Burrows  v.  Burrows,  52  P. 
2d  606,  10  Cal.App.2d  749. 

Mo.— Linville  v.  Ripley,  146  S.W.2d 
581,  347  Mo.  95 — Sisk  v.  Wilkinson, 
265  S.W.  536,  305  Mo.  328— Row  v. 
Cape  Girardeau  Foundry  Co.,  App., 
141  S.W.2d  113— State  ex  rel.  Na- 
tional Lead  Co.  v.  Smith,  App.,  134 
S.W.2d  1061— Inter-River  Drainage 
Dist.  of  Missouri  v.  Hensoru  App., 
99  S.W.2d  865. 

847 


Necessity  of  want  of  jurisdiction  af- 
firmatively appearing  on  face  of 
record  generally  see  supra  §  425  a 
(1). 

88.  Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,   75  P. 
2d  157,  94  Utah  291. 

Entire  record  considered 

In  determining  whether  court  had 
jurisdiction,  the  whole  record  must 
be  inspected,  and,  if  the  judgment  it- 
self recites  service  but  the  return 
found  shows  no  service  or  a  service 
which  is  insufficient  or  unauthorized 
by  law,  the  judgment  is  void.  Such 
a  recital  in  the  judgment  is  deemed 
to  refer  to  the  kind  of  service  shown 
in  other  parts  of  the  record,  and 
must  be  read  in  connection  with  that 
part  of  the  record  which  sets  forth 
the  proof  of  service;  and  It  is  pre- 
sumed that  the  service  found  in  the 
record  is  the  same  and  the  only 
service  referred  to  in  the  general 
recital  in  the  judgment,  and  that  the 
court  acted  on  the  service  appear- 
ing in  the  record. — Powell  v.  Turpin, 
29  S.B.2d  26,  224  N.C.  67. 

89.  Mo.— Linville  v.   Ripley,    146   S. 
W.2d  581,  347  Mo.  95— Sisk  v.  Wil- 
kinson, 265  S.W.  536,  305  Mo.  328— 
Inter-River  Drainage  Dist.  of  Mis- 
souri v.   Henson,   App.,   99    S.W.2d 
865 — General     Motors     Acceptance 
Corporation  v.   Lyman,    78   S.W.2d 
109,  229  Mo.App.  455. 

N.Y.— Shea  v.  Shea,  60  N.Y.S.2d  823, 
270  App.Div.  527,  appeal  granted 
62  N.Y.S.2d  618,  270  App.Div.  906 
—Standish  v.  Standish,  40  N.Y.S. 
2d  538,  179  Misc.  564. 

N.C.— Powell  v.  Turpin,  29  S.B.2d  26, 
224  N.C.  67. 

Ohio. — Hinman  v.  Executive  Commit- 
tee of  Communistic  Party  of  U.  S. 
A..  47  N.B.2d  820,  71  Ohio  App.  76 
— In  re  Prankenberg*s  Bstate,  47 
N.E.2d  239,  70  Ohio  App.  495. 

34  C.J.  p  550  note  36. 

90.  Colo. — Ernst  v.  Colburn,   268  P. 
576,  84  Colo.  170. 

III. — Town  of  Hutton  v.  Ingram,  255 
IlLApp.  97 — People  ex  rel.  Com'rs 


§  426 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


inconsistencies  by  construction,  or  by  the  aid  of 
presumptions.91  It  has  been  held,  however,  that 
i£  the  judgment  contains  satisfactory  recitals  of  ju- 
risdictional  facts  such  recitals  are  controlling  on 
the  question  of  jurisdiction  and  the  remainder  of 
the  record  may  not  be  considered,92  and  that  it  is 
only  when  the  judgment  is  silent  or  ambiguous  as 
to  jurisdictional  facts  that  other  parts  of  the  record 
may  be  considered  in  determining  whether  the  judg- 
ment is  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction.93 

c.  Recitals  Showing  Want  of  Jurisdiction 

Where  the  facts  recited  in  the  record,  on  which  the 
court  assumes  Jurisdiction,  are  not  such,  as  would  in 
law  confer  jurisdiction,  the  presumption  of  regularity 


and  validity  does  not  apply  and  the  Judgment  may  be 
collaterally  impeached. 

Where  the  facts  on  which  a  court  assumes  juris- 
diction are  recited  in  the  record,  and  appear  by  it 
to  have  been  such  as  would  not  in  law  confer  ju- 
risdiction, the  judgment  may  be  impeached  collater- 
ally, for  in  such  a  case  there  can  be  no  presump- 
tion, in  aid  of  the  regularity  and  validity  of  the 
judgment,  that  the  recitals  of  the  record  are  incor- 
rect or  incomplete,94  or  that  something  was  done 
which  the  record  does  not  show  to  have  been 
done,95  the  whole  record  being  taken  together  for 
this  purpose.96  This  rule  applies  where  the  rec- 
ord affirmatively  shows  the  absence  of  conditions 
necessary  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction97  or  that 


of    North    Fork    Outlet    Drainage 
Dist.  v.  Schwartz,  244  IlLApp.  1ST. 
34  C.J.  p  550  note  37. 

91.  W.Va.— Point  Pleasant  v.  Green- 
lee,  60  S.B.  601,  63  W.Va.  207,  212, 
129  Am.S.R,  971. 

34  C.J.  p  551  note  38. 

92.  Tex. — Watson   v.    Rochmill,    155 
S.W.2d  783,  137  Tex.  565,  137  A.L. 
R.  1032 — Martin  v.  Burns,  16  S.W. 
1072,     80     Tex.     676 — Chapman    v. 
Kellogg.    Com.App.,    252    S.W.    151 
— Smith   v.   Walker,   Civ.App.,   163 
S.W.2d    857,    error  refused— Litton 
v.    Waters,    Civ.App.,    161    S.W.2d 
1095,    error    refused — Williams    v. 
Colenmn-Fulton    Pasture    Co.,    Civ. 
App.,  157  S.W.2d  995,  error  refused 
— Laney    v.    Cline,    Civ.App.,    150 
S.W.2d  176,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Watson  v.  Rochmill, 
Civ.App.,   134   S.W.2d  710,  modified 
on  other  grounds  155   S.W.2d  783, 
137    Tex.    565,    137    A.L.R.    1032 — 
Smith  v.  Burns,  Civ.App.,  107  S.W. 
2d  397 — Henry  v.  Beauchamp,  Civ. 
App.,  39  S.W.2d  642. 

Xesort  may  "be  had  to  former 
pleading's  only  when  a  judgment  col- 
laterally attacked  is  ambiguous  and 
not  complete  within  itself. — Stewart 
Oil  Co.  v.  Lee,  Tex.Civ.App.,  173  S. 
W.2d  791,  error  refused. 

93.  Tex.— Litton     v.     Waters,     Civ. 
App.,    161    S.W.2d    1095,    error   re- 
fused— Pumphrey   v.    Hunter,    Civ. 
App.,  270  S.W.  237. 

The  "record"  in  such  a  case  in- 
cludes the  pleadings  of  the  parties 
and  the  processes  by  which  defend- 
ant was  brought  into  court. — Scruggs 
v.  Gribble,  Tex.Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d 
643. 

9^    US.— Butler    v.    McKey,    C.C.A. 
Cal.,    138    F.2d    373,    certiorari   de- 
nied   64    S.CL    636,    321    U.S.    780, 
88  L.Bd.  1073. 
Ariz. — Brecht    v.    Hammons,    278    P. 

381,  35  Ariz.  383. 

Cal.— Rogers  v.  Cady,  38  P.  81,  104 
CaL  288,  43  Am.S.R.  100 — In  re 
Prowenfeld,  40  P.2d  552.  3  CaLApp. 
24  678. 


Colo. — In  re  Zupancis'  Heirship,  111 
P.2d  1063,  107  Colo.  323— Kavanagh 
v.  Hamilton,  125  P.  512,  53  Colo. 
157,  Ann.Cas.l914B  76. 

Fla.— Fisher  v.  Guidy,  142  So.  818, 
106  Fla.  94. 

111.— Sharp  v.  Sharp,  164  N.E.  685, 
333  111.  267. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  P.mden- 
tial  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gleason,  187  So. 
229,  233. 

Mo.— Ray  v.  Ray,  50  S.W.2d  142,  330 
Mo.  530. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  West 
v.  Capital  Trust  &  Savings  Bank, 
124  P.2d  572,  575,  113  Mont.  130. 

N.D. — Zimmerman  v.  Boynton,  229 
N.W.  3,  59  N.D.  112. 

Ohio.— Terry  v.  Claypool,  65  N.E.2d 
883,  77  Ohio  App.  77— Wainscott  v. 
Young.  59  N.E.2d  609,  74  Ohio  App. 
463 — Union  Ice  Corporation  v.  City 
of  Niles,  13  Ohio  Supp.  115. 

S.C. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Cannon 
v.  Haverty  Furniture  Co.,  183  S.B. 
469,  477,  179  S.C.  1.  ' 

Tex. — Bragdon  v.  Wright,  Civ.App., 
142  S.W.2d  703,  error  dismissed — 
Tire  Finance  Corporation  v.  Ilift, 
Civ.App.,  129  S.W.2d  1208— Scruggs 
v.  Gribble,  Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d  643 
— State  Mortg.  Corporation  v.  Af- 
fleck, Civ.App.,  27  S.W.2d  548,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com.App., 
51  S.W.2d  274— Scruggs  v.  Gribble, 
Civ.App.,  17  S.W.2d  153 — Pumphrey 
v.  Hunter.  Civ.App.,  270  S.W.  237. 

Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 
157,  94  Utah  271. 

34  C.J.  p  551  note  39. 

Not  showing1  or  negativing  jurisdic- 
tion 

Where  a  judgment*  undertaking  to 
recite  process  or  facts  on  which 
jurisdiction  of  court  is  based,  does 
not  show  jurisdiction  or  negative 
it,  judgment  is  void  on  its  face. — 
Pumphrey  v.  Hunter,.  Tex.Civ.App., 
270  S.W.  237. 

AM  tantamount  to  proving  Judgment 
Where  the-  recitals  in  a  judgment 
and  the  record  proper  show  a  judg- 
ment  to   be   defective,   showing   the 

848 


judgment  to  be  defective  by  intro- 
ducing the  judgment  and  the  record 
proper,  this  is  tantamount  only  to 
proving  what  the  judgment  itself 
shows,  and  is  not  prohibited  as  a 
collateral  attack." — State  ex  rel. 
National  Lead  Co.  v.  Smith,  Mo.App., 
134  S.W.2d  1061. 

Objection  to  record 

If  it  affirmatively  appears  from 
record  of  probate  court  itself,  either 
that  court  did  not  have  jurisdiction 
of  subject  matter  or  of  person,  in 
case  where  such  is  required,  or  that 
jurisdiction  did  not  attach  in  a 
particular  case,  jurisdictional  ques- 
tion can  be  raised  on  objection  to 
the  record  when  offered  in  evidence 
in  another  proceeding,  and  no  affirm- 
ative proceeding  need  be  prosecuted 
to  vacate  judgment. — Buss  v.  Smith, 
Civ.App.,  125  S.W.2d  712,  affirmed 
Smith  v.  Buss,  144  S.W.2d  529,  135 
Tex.  566. 

95.  Mont.— West  v.  Capital  Trust  & 
Savings    Bank,    124    P.2d   572,    575, 
113  Mont.  130. 

Okl. — Gallaghar    v.    Petree,    230     P. 

477,  103  Okl.  295. 
S.C. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Cannon 

v.  Haverty  Furniture  Co.,  183  S.E. 

469,  477,  179  S.C.  1. 
34  C.J.  p  551  note  40. 

96.  111.— Sharp    v.    Sharp,    164    N.E. 
685,  333  111.  267. 

Mont.— West  v.  Capital  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank,  124  P.2d  572,  575,  113 
Mont.  130. 

S.C. — Cannon  v.  Haverty  Furniture 
Co.,  183  S.B.  469,  477,  179  S.C.  1. 

Tex. — Henry  v.  Beauchamp,  Civ.App., 
39  S.W.2d  642,  followed  in  Henry 
v.  Carter,  39  S.W.2d  645. 

34  C.J.  p  551  note  41. 

Petition,  "bill,  answer,  and  decree  in- 
cluded in  record 

I1L— Sharp  v.  Sharp,  164  N.B.  6S5, 
333  111.  267. 

97.  Ohio. — Wainscott   v.    Toung,    59 
N.B.2d  609,  74  Ohio  App.  463. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  427 


the  court  did  not  have  authority  to  grant  the  par- 
ticular judgment98  Although  the  judgment  recites 
that  defendant  was  duly  served  with  process,  if 
the  record  shows  that  no  service  was  made,"  or 
shows  a  service  which  is  insufficient  and  unauthor- 
ized by  law,1  the  judgment  may  be  collaterally  im- 
peached. 

§  427.    Decision  of  Court  as  to  Its  Own 

Jurisdiction 

The  decision  of  a  court,  of  either  general  or  limited 


jurisdiction,  as  to  the  fact  of  its  Jurisdiction  of  a  case 
generally  is  not  subject  to  collateral  attack  unless  It  is 
in  irreconcilable  conflict  with  facts  otherwise  disclosed 
by  the  record  of  the  proceedings. 

Where  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction  judicially 
considers  and  adjudicates  the  question  of  its  juris- 
diction, and  decides  that  the  facts  exist  which  are 
necessary  to  give  it  jurisdiction  of  the  case,  the  find- 
ing is  conclusive,  as  discussed  in  Courts  §115,  and 
generally  cannot  be  controverted  in  a  collateral  pro- 
ceeding,2 even  though  the  decision  or  finding  as  to 
jurisdiction  was  erroneous,3  and  although  the 


98.  Mo. — State  ex  rel.  National  Lead 
Co.    v.    Smith,    App.,    134    S.W.2d 
1061. 

Okl.— Sims  v.  Billings,  18  P.2d  1084, 
162  Okl.  51— Appeal  of  Sims'  Es- 
tate, 18  P.2d  1077,  162  Okl.  35— 
Cummings  v.  Inman,  247  P.  379, 
119  Okl.  9— Dill  v.  Anderson,  256 
P.  31,  124  Okl.  299. 

Tex. — Milner  v.  Gatlin,  Com. App.,  261 
S.W.  1003. 

99.  Ala. — Guy  v.  Pridgen  &  Holman, 
118   So.  229,   22  Ala.App.  595. 

Ark. — Union  Inv.  Co.  v.  Hunt,  59  S. 

W.2d  1039,  187  Ark.  357. 
Mont.— West  v.  Capital  Trust  &  Sav- 
ings Bank,   124   P.2d  572,  575,  113 
Mont.  130. 
N.C.— Dunn  v.  Wilson,  187  S.E.  802, 

210  N.C.  493. 
S.C. — Cannon    v.    Haverty    Furniture 

Co.,    183    S.E.    469,    179    S.C.    1. 
Wash. — Columbia  Basin  Land  Co.  v. 
Peters  C.  Chalmers  Co.,  218  P.  217, 
126  Wash.  307. 
34  C.J.  p  552  note  42. 

Record  in  case  of  failure  of  judg- 
ment to  recite  service  must  consti- 
tute sole  evidence,  If  any,  of  want 
of  service  and  consequent  invalidity 
of  judgment. — Henry  v.  Beauchamp, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  39  S.W.2d  642,  followed 
in  Henry  v.  Carter,  39  S.W.2d  645. 
Copy  of  affidavit 

Failure  to  serve  on  defendant  copy 
of  plaintiffs  controverting  affidavit 
to  plea  of  privilege  rendered  judg- 
ment void  without  reference  to  re- 
citals in  judgment. — Scruggs  v.  Grib- 
ble,  Tex.Civ.App.,  41  S.W.2d  643. 
1.  Cal.— Steuri  v.  Junkin,  82  P.2d  34, 

27  Cal.App.2d  758. 
III.— Sharp   v.    Sharp,    164  N.B.    686, 

333  HI.  267. 

S,C. — Cannon    v.    Haverty   Furniture 
Co.,    183   S.B.   469,   477,   179   S.C.   1. 
S.D.— Illinois  Trust  &  Savings  Bank 
v.  Town  of  Roscoe,  194  N.W.   649, 
46  S.D.  477. 
34  C.J.  p  552  note  43. 
8.     U.S. — Stoll    v.    Gottlieb,    111.,    59 
S.Ct.    134,    305    U.S.    165,    83    L.Ed. 
104,  rehearing  denied  59  S.Ct  250, 
305   U.S.   675,   83  L.Ed.   437— Bald- 
win v,  Iowa  State  Traveling  Men's 
Ass'n,   Iowa,   51   S.Ct.   617,   283   U. 
S.    522,     75    L.Ed.    1244— Davis    v. 
Johnston,  C.C.A.GaL,  144  F.2d  862, 

49C.J.S.-64 


certiorari  denied  65  S.Ct.  311,  323 
U.S.  789,  89  L.Bd.  629,  rehearing 
denied  65  S.Ct.  558,  323  U.S.  819, 
89  L.Bd.  650— Walling  v.  Miller, 
C.C.A.Minn.,  138  F.2d  629,  certio- 
rari denied  64  S.Ct.  781,  321  U.S. 
784,  88  L.Bd.  1076— Burgess  v. 
Nail,  C.C.A.I11.,  103  F.2d  37— Rus- 
sell v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.Minn.,  86  F.2d 
389 — Greene  v.  Uniacke,  C.C.A.Fla., 
46  F.2d  916,  certiorari  denied  51 
S.Ct.  493,  283  U.S.  847,  75  L.Bd. 
1455 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mc- 
Combs  v.  West,  D.C.Fla.,  63  F. 
Supp.  469,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  155  F. 
2d  601 — Nicolson  v.  Citizens  & 
Southern  Nat.  Bank,  D.C.Ga.,  50  F. 
Supp.  92. 

Ariz. — Brecht  v.  Hammons,  278  P. 
381,  35  Ariz.  383. 

Cal. — Ex  parte  Tassey,  253  P.  948, 
81  Cal. App.  287. 

Ga. — Thomas  v.  Lambert,  1  S.B.2d 
443,  187  Ga.  616. 

Iowa.— Watt  v.  Dunn,  17  N.W.2d  811. 

Ky. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Pendle- 
ton  County  Board  of  Education  v. 
Simpson,  91  S.W.2d  557,  560,  262 
Ky.  844. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pruden- 
tial Ins.  Co.  v.  Gleason,  187  So. 

nnn      ooo 
«Z9,    loo. 

Mo. — State,  on  Inf.  Gentry,  v.  Toliv- 
er,  287  S.W.  312,  315  Mo.  737— 
'State  ex  rel.  Compagnie  Generale 
Transatlantique  y.  Falkenhainer, 
274  S.W.  758,  309  Mo.  224. 

N.Y. — Battalico  v.  Knickerbocker 
Fireprooflng  Co.,  294  N.Y.S.  481, 

•  250  App.Div.  258— Nankivel  v. 
Omsk  All  Russian  Government,  197 
N.Y.S.  467,  203  App.Div.  740,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  142  N.B. 
569,  237  N.Y.  150— Keating  v.  Equi- 
table Surety  Co.  of  New  York,  235 
N.Y.S.  281,  134  Misc.  491— People 
ex  rel.  Davis  v.  Jennings,  232  N. 
Y.S.  603,  133  Misc.  538— Finkelstein 
v.  William  H.  Block  Co.,  208  N.Y.S. 
401,  124  Misc.  610— Eastman  Kodak 
Co.  v.  Richards,  204  N.Y.S.  246,  123 
Misc.  83 — People  v.  Harmor,  57  N. 
Y.S.2d  402. 

Ohio. — Busse  &  Borgmann  Co.  v.  Up- 
church,  21  N.B.2d  349,  60  Ohio  App. 
349. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Fitzsim- 
mons  v.  Oklahoma  City,  135  P.2d 
340,  342,  192  Okl.  248— Winter  v. 

849 


Klein-Schultz,    76    P.2d    1051,    182 
Okl.   231— Foshee  v.   Craig,   237  P. 
78,  110  Okl.  189. 
Pa. — Askew  v.  S;  C.  Loveland  Co.,  9 

PaJDist.  &  Co.  635. 

Tex. — Highland  Farms  Corporation 
v.  Fidelity  Trust  Co.,  of  Houston, 
82  S.W.2d  627,  125  Tex.  474— Man- 
ry  v.  McCall,  Civ.App.,  22  S.W.2d 
348. 
Va. — Kiser  v.  W.  M.  Ritter  Lumber 

Co.,    18   S.E.2d   319,    179   Va.   128. 
W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bell 
v.  Brown,  182  S.E.  579,  580,  116  W. 
Va.  484. 

34  C.J.  p  552  note  44. 
Judgment  against  municipality  with- 
in rule 

Okl.— Mid-Continent  Pipe  Line  Co.  v. 
Seminole    County     Excise    Board, 
146  P.2d  996,  194  Okl.  40. 
Consent  to  judgment 

Judge's  finding  set  out  in  judg- 
ment, that  consent  was  given  to  en- 
ter judgment  out  of  term  and  out  of 
district,  is  binding  in  absence  of 
fraud.— Killian  v.  Maiden  Chair  Co., 
161  S.B.  546,  202  N.C.  23. 

Jurisdiction  over  subject  matter 

Where  a  court  has  jurisdiction 
over  the  parties  and  determines  that 
it  has  jurisdiction  over  the  subject 
matter,  parties  cannot  collaterally 
attack  judgment  on  ground  that 
court  did  not  have  jurisdiction  over 
subject  matter. — Peri  v.  Groves,  50 
N.Y.S.2d  300,  183  Misc.  579. 

Where  record  shows  evidence  on 
which  court  acted  in  determining 
jurisdiction,  no  presumption  of  juris- 
diction as  to  prior  judgment  can  be 
considered. — Sharp  v.  Sharp,  164  N. 
E.  685,  333  111.  267. 

3.  U.S.— Nye  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.N.C., 
137  F.2d  73,  certiorari  denied  64 
S.Ct.  62,  320  U.S.  755,  88  L.Bd. 
449— National  park  Bank  v.  Mc- 
Kibben  &  Co.,  D.CGa.,  43  F.2d 
254. 

N.Y. — People  v.  Harmor,  57  N.Y.S. 
2d  402. 

Tex. — Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  of  Ste- 
phensville  v.  Daggett,  Com.App.,  2 
S,W.2d  834. 

Va.— Kiser  v.  W,  M.  Ritter  Lum- 
ber Co.,  18  S.B.2d  319,  179  Va. 
128. 


§  427 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ground  on  which  the  decision  was  rested  has  sub- 
sequently been  overruled.4  A  judgment  is  not  sub- 
ject to  collateral  attack,  where  it  is  rendered  un- 
der a  decision  of  the  court  that  it  has  jurisdiction, 
based  on  a  special  as  well  as  a  general  appearance,5 
or  on  a  writ  or  notice  which,  although  defective,  or 
the  service  of  which  was  irregular  or  informal,  has 
been  adjudged  sufficient,6  or  on  service  of  process 
by  publication.7  However,  a  collateral  attack  may 
be  made  on  such  decision  where  it  is  in  irreconcila- 
ble conflict  with  facts  otherwise  disclosed  by  the 
record  of  the  proceedings,8  or  where  the  facts  are 
admitted  in  the  pleadings,  or  agreed  on,  and  the 
court's  determination  is  based  on  an  error  of  law 
arising  out  of  such  state  of  facts.9 


Where  general  jurisdiction  over  a  particular  class 
of  cases  is  conferred  on  a  certain  tribunal,  its  deci- 
sion on  the  facts  essential  to  its  jurisdiction  in  a 
case  belonging  to  that  class  is  generally  not  subject 
to  a  collateral  attack,10  as  in  the  case  of  courts  of 
the  United  States11  and  probate  courts.12 

Court  or  tribunal  of  inferior  or  limited  jurisdic- 
tion. The  rule  is  not  confined  to  courts  of  general 
jurisdiction,  but  it  has  been  held  that  if  an  inferior 
court  or  one  of  limited  jurisdiction  is  charged  with 
the  ascertainment  of  a  jurisdictional  fact,  and  its 
proceedings  show  that  the  fact  was  ascertained,  the 
finding  cannot  be  collaterally  attacked13  unless  want 
of  jurisdiction  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord.1* 


Error  in  exercise  of  jurisdiction  see 

supra  §  19. 

Error  in  determination  of  ques- 
tions of  law  or  fact  on  which  the 
court's  jurisdiction  in  particular  case 
depends,  the  court  having  general 
Jurisdiction  of  the  cause  and  of  the 
person,  is  "error  in  exercise  of  juris- 
diction" and  affords  no  ground  for 
collateral  attack. — Burgess  v.  Nail, 
C.C.A.OU.,  103  F.2d  37. 

4.  U.S.— Ripperger  v.  A.  C.  Allyn  & 
Co.,  C.C.A.N.Y.,   113   F.2d  332,   cer- 
tiorari  denied  61  S.Ct   136,  311  U. 
S.  695,  85  L.Ed.  450. 

5.  N.Y.— Peri   v.    Groves,    50    N.Y.S. 
2d  300.  183  Misc.  579. 

6.  U.S. — Pen-Ken  Gas  &  Oil  Corpo- 
ration   v.    Warfleld    Natural    Gas 
Co.,    C.C.A.Ky.,   137   F.2d   871. 

Iowa. — Giberson  v.  Henness,   258  N. 

W.  708,  219  Iowa  859. 
XT.— Keating    v.    Equitable    Surety 

Co.  of  New  York,   235  N.Y.S.  281, 

134  Misc.  491. 
<U  C.J.  p  553  note  46. 
Admissibility  of  evidence 

Where  a  judgment  determining 
that  court  had  jurisdiction  of  person 
of  foreign  corporation  is  not  subject 
to  collateral  attack,  evidence  im- 
peaching sheriff's  return  and  contra- 
dicting recitals  in  record  is  inad- 
missible.— Ellis  v.  Starr  Piano  Co.,  49 
S.W.2d  1078,  226  Mo.App.  1209. 

7.  Fla.— Catlett  v.  Chestnut,  146  So. 
241,   107   Fla.   498,   91  A.L.R.  212. 

34  C.J.  p  553  note  50. 

&    U.S. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mc- 

Combs    v.    "West,    D.C.Fla.,    63    F. 

Sujxp.  469,  471,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  155 

F.2d  601. 
Va. — Beck  v.  Semones'  Adm'r,  134  S. 

E.  677,  145  Va.  429. 
W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bell 

r.  Brown,  182  S.E.  579,  580,  116  W. 

Va.  484. 
Wyo.— Boulter  v.  Cook,  236  P.  245,  32 

Wyo.  461. 
S4  C.J.  p  553  note  45. 


of  necessary  steps  to  confer 
Jurisdiction  affirmatively  shown  by 
record. — Quigley  v.  Cremin,  109  So. 
312,  reheard  113  So.  892,  194  Fla.  104. 

9.  Ariz. — Brecht    v.    Hammons,    278 
P.  381,  35  Ariz.  383. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Compagnie  Ge"n- 
Srale  Transatlantique  r.  -Falken- 
hainer,  274  S.W.  758,  309  Mo.  224. 

Tex. — Highland  Farms  Corporation  v. 
Fidelity  Trust  Co.,  of  Houston,  82 
S.W.2d  627,  125  Tex.  474. 

10.  Ind. — Delphi  v.  Startzman,  3  N. 
E.  937,  104  Ind.  343. 

34  C.J.  p  553  note  47. 

11.  U.S. — Young  Realty  Co.  v.  Dar- 
ling   Stores    Corporation,    C.C.A.N. 
Y.,  128  F.2d  556 — Sorenson  v.  Suth- 
erland,   C.C.A.N.Y.,    109    F.2d    714, 
affirmed   Jackson   v.    Irving   Trust 
Co.,  -61  S.Ct  326,  311  U.S.  494,  «5 
L.Ed.  297. 

34  C.J.  p  553  note  43. 
Determination  of  jurisdiction  by  fed- 
eral   court   see   'Federal   Courts    § 
83  d. 

The  determinations  of  lower  feder- 
al courts  regarding  whether  they 
have  jurisdiction  to  entertain  cause 
cannot  be  assailed  collaterally. — 
Chicot  County  Drainage  Dist.  v.  Bax- 
ter State  Bank,  Ark.,  -60  S.Ct.  317, 
308  U.-S.  371,  84  L.Ed.  329,  rehearing 
denied  60  S.Ct  581,  309  U.S.  695,  84 
L.Ed.  1035. 

A  collateral  attack  on  district 
court  foreclosure  judgment  cannot 
be  sustained  unless  the  record  on 
its  face  shows  that  requisite  divers- 
ity of  citizenship  to  sustain  federal 
jurisdiction  did  not  and  could  not  ex- 
ist and  that  court  did  not  find  and 
adjudicate  that  it  had  jurisdiction.— 
Bostwick  v.  Baldwin  Drainage  Dist., 
C.C.A.Fla.,  133  F.2d  1,  certiorari  de- 
nied 63  S.Ct.  1030,  319  U.S.  742,  87  L. 
Ed.  1699. 

12.  Ala. — Gray  son    v.    Schwab,    179 
So.  377,  380,  235  Ala,  398. 

Mo.— Baker  v.  Smith's  Estate,  18  S. 
W.2d  147,  223  Mo.App.  1234,  226 
Mo.App.  510. 

850 


N.Y. — Lapiedra  v.  American  Surety 
Co.,  159  N.E.  710,  247  App.Div.  25. 

34  C.J.  p  553  note  49. 

Determination  of  jurisdiction  by  pro- 
bate court  see  Courts  §  305. 

13.  U.S. — Noble  v.  Union  River  Log- 
ging Co.,  D.C.,  13  S.Ct.  871,  147  U. 
•S.  165,  37  L.Ed.  123. 

Ala. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Grayson 

r.    Schwab,    179    So.    377,   380,    235 

Ala,  398. 
Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Everette  v.  Pette- 

way,    179    So.    666,    131   Fla.   516— 

Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  'Fiehe  v.  R. 

E.  Householder  Co.,  125  So.  2,  11, 

98  Fla.  627. 
Ind. — Ward  v.   Board   of  Com'rs   of 

Lake  County,  157  N.E.  721,  199  Ind. 

467— Delphi  v.    Startzman,    3    N.E. 

937,  104  Ind.  343. 
Ky.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Pendle- 

ton  County  Board  of  Education  v. 

Simpson,    91   S.W.2d   557,    560,    262 

Ky.  844. 
Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Steph- 

enson  v.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R. 

Co.,  177  So.  509,  516,  180  Miss.  147. 
Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Dew  v.  Trimble, 

269  -S.W.  61'7,  306  Mo.  657. 
N.Y.-— People    r.    Harxnor,    57   N.Y.S. 

2d  402. 
W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ohio 

Savings  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Bal- 

lard,  161  S.E.  445,  111  W.Va,  235— 

Shank  v.  Town  of  Ravens  wood,  27 

S.B.  223,  43  W.Va.  242. 
34  C.J.  p  553  note  51. 

An  executive  officer,  respecting 
rule  against  collateral  attack,  acts  in 
"q.uasi  judicial  capacity"  when  re- 
quired to  pass  on  facts  and  deter- 
mine his  action  thereby. — Kirby 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Adams,  Tex.Civ.App., 
62  S.W.2d  366,  modified  on  other 
grounds  93  S.W.2d  382,  127  Tex.  376. 

14.  Fla. — Corpus    Juris    guoted    in 
Fiehe  v.  R.  E.  Householder  Co.,  125 
So.  3,  11,  98  Fla,  -627. 

Ind.— Ward  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Lake  County,  157  N.E.  721,  199  Ind. 
467— Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
•Freeze,  82  N.E.  761,  169  Ind.  370. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  428 


§  428.    Errors  and  Irregularities 

A  Judgment  Is  not  subject  to  collateral  attack  for 
errors  and  Irregularities  which  do  not  render  the  Judg- 
ment void. 

When  jurisdiction  has  once  attached,  the  court 


has  a  right  to  decide  every  question  arising  in  the 
case,  and  errors  of  judgment  or  irregularities,  how- 
ever gross,  which  do  not  render  the  judgment  ab- 
solutely void,  are  not  available  on  collateral  at- 
tack,1^  and,  moreover,  this  rule  as  to  the  nonavail- 


N.Y. — People  v.  Harmor,  57  N.T.S. 
3d  402. 

S.C. — State  v.  Scott,  17  S.C.L.  294. 

W.Va. — Ohio  Savings  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Ballard,  161  S.E.  445,  111  W. 
Va.  235 — Shank  v.  Town  of  Ra- 
venswood,  27  S.E.  223,  43  W.Va. 
242. 

15.  U.S. — Iselin  v.  OLa  Qoste,  C.C.A. 
La.,  147  F.2d  791— Kelling  Nut  Co. 
v.  National  Nut  Co.  of  Cal.,  C.C. 
A.,  145  F.2d  415,  certiorari  denied 
65  S.Ct.  562,  323  U.S.  802,  89  L.Ed. 
640— Walling  v.  Miller,  C.C.A. 
Minn.,  138  F.2d  629,  certiorari  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct  781,  321  U.S.  784,  88 
L.Ed.  1076 — McCampbell  v.  War- 
rich  Corporation,  C.C.A.I1L,  109  F. 
2d  115,  certiorari  denied  60  <S.Ct. 
1077,  310  U.S.  631,  84  Xj.Ed.  1401, 
rehearing  denied  -61  S.Ct.  -55,  sec- 
ond case,  311  U.S.  612,  85  L.Ed.  388, 
and  61  S.Ct.  1089,  313  U.S.  599,  85 

"  L.Ed.  1551— Mudge  v.  New  York 
Trust  Co.,  C.C.A.I1L,  103  «F.2d  -625 
— Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Holley  v. 
General  American  'Life  Ins.  Co., 
C.C.A.MO.,  101  -F.2d  172,  174— In  re 
7000  South  Shore  Drive  Bldg.  Cor- 
poration, C.C.A.I1L,  86  F.2d  499— 
Seaboard  Surety  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  for 
Use  and  Benefit  of  Marshall-Wells 
Co.,  C.C.A.Idaho,  84  F.2d  348— 
State  of  Missouri  ex  rel.  and  to 
Use  of  Stormfeltz  v.  Title  Guaran- 
ty &  Surety  Co.,  Q.C.A.MO.,  72  F.2d 
595,  certiorari  denied  Title  Guar- 
anty &  Surety  Co.  v.  State  of  Mis- 
souri ex  rel.  and  to  Use  of  Storm- 
feltz, 55  S.Ct.  404,  294  U.S.  708,  79 
UEd.  1242 — Schodde  v.  U.  S.,  C.C. 
A.Idaho,  69  F.2d  866 — Johnson  v. 
Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  61 
<F.2d  934,  affirmed  in  part  53  S.Ct. 
721,  289  U.S.  479,  77  L.Ed.  1331— 
Owens  v.  Battenfleld,  C.C.A.Okl.,  33 
F.2d  753,  certiorari  denied  50  S.Ct 
88,  280  U.S.  605,  74  L.Ed.  649— 
Lolita  Holding  Co.  v.  Aronson  & 
Co.,  C.C.A.Cal.,  28  F.2d  869,  certio- 
rari denied  49  S.Ct  482,  279  U.S. 
868,  73  L.Ed.  1005— Prichard  v. 
Nelson,  D.C.Va.,  55  F.Supp.  506 — 
Rheinberger  v.  Security  Life  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  D.C.I11.,  51  'F.Supp. 
188,  cause  remanded,  C.C.A.,  146  F. 
2d  680 — U.  S.  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  & 
Guaranty  Co.,  D.C.OkL,  24  F.Supp. 
$61,  modified  on  other  grounds,  C. 
C.A.,  106  F.2d  804,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  60  S.Ct  653,  309  U.S. 
506,  84  .L.Ed  -394. 

Ala.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Cobbs  v. 

Nonrille,  151  So.  576,  577,  227  Ala. 

621— Hill   v.  Hooper,   110  -So.   323, 

21  AUuApp.  584. 

Ariz. — Wahl  v.  Hound  Valley  Bank, 


300  P.  955,  38  Ariz.  411 — Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Western  'Land  & 
Cattle  Co.  v.  National  Bank  of  Ari- 
zona at  Phoenix,  239  P.  299,  300, 
29  Ariz.  51. 

Ark.— Person  v.  Miller  Levee  Dist., 
No.  2,  150  S.W.M  950,  202  Ark.  173 
—Allison  v.  Bush,  144  S.W.2d  10-87, 
201  Ark.  315— Ex  parte  O'Neal,  87 
S.W.2d  401,  191  Ark.  696. 

Cal.— Wells  -Fargo  &  Co.  v.  City  and 
County  of  San  Francisco,  152  P.2d 
625,  25  Cal.2d  37—San  Diego  Trust 
&  Savings  Bank  v.  Young,  119  P.2d 
133,  19  Cal.2d  98— In  re  Keet's  Es- 
tate, 100  P.2d  1045,  15  Cal.2d  328— 
Gray  v.  Hall,  2-65  P.  246,  203  Cal. 
306— Marvin  v.  Marvin,  116  P.2d 
151,  46  Cal.App.2d  551— People  v. 
Spivey,  77  P.2d  247,  25  Cal.App.2d 
279— Christy  v.  Dra-peau,  71  P.2d 
940,  22  Cal.App.2d  582— Ex  parte 
Sargen,  27  P.2d  407,  135  CaLApp. 
402— Associated  Oil  Co.  v.  Mullin, 
294  P.  421,  110  CaLApp.  385. 

D.C.— Hodge  v.  Huff,  140  F.2d  686, 
78  U.S.App.D.C.  329,  certiorari  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct.  946,  322  U.S.  733,  88 
L.Ed.  1567— Fishel  v.  Kite,  101  F. 
2d  685,  69  App.D.C.  360,  certiorari 
denied  Kite  v.  'Fishel,  59  -S.Ct.  645, 
306  U.S.  656,  83  L.Ed.  1054— Scholl 
V.  Tibbs,  Mun.App.,  36  A.2d  352. 

Fla. — Skipper  v.  Schumacher,  169  So. 
58,  124  Fla.  384,  appeal  dismissed 
and  certiorari  denied  -57  S.Ct  39, 
299  U.S.  507,  81  L.Ed.  376— Ryan's 
Furniture  Exchange  v.  McNair,  162 
So.  433,  120  Fla.  109— Palm  Beach 
Estates,  v.  Croker,  152  So.  416,  111 
•Fla.  671— Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Hogan,  135  So.  825, 
102  Fla.  196 — Cragin  v.  Ocean  & 
Lake  Realty  Co.,  133  So.  569,  101 
Fla.  1324,  followed  in  Mabson  v. 
Christ,  134  So.  43,  rehearing  denied 
140  So.  671,  104  Fla.  606,  and  af- 
firmed Cragin  v.  Ocean  &  Lake 
Realty  Co.,  135  So.  795,  101  Fla. 
1324,  appeal  dismissed  Girard 
Trust  Co.  v.  Ocean  &  Lake  Realty 
Co.,  52  S.Ct.  494,  286  U.S.  523,  7-6 
L.Bd.  126-7— Merchants'  &  Me- 
chanics' Bank  v.  Sample,  125  So.  1. 
98  'Fla.  759. 

Ga.— Gray  v.  Riley,  170  S.E.  537,  47 
Ga.App.  348. 

Idaho. — U.  S.  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
v.  Soule,  68  P.2d  40,  57  Idaho  691— 
Peterson  v.  Hague,  4  P.2d  350,  51 
Idaho  175. 

HI.— Walton  v.  Albers,  44  N.B.2d  145, 
380  111.  423— People  ex  rel.  Court- 
ney v.  Fardy,  39  N.E.2d  7,  378  111. 
501— Baker  v.  Brown,  23  N.E.2d 
710,  372  111.  336— People  ex  rel, 
Anderson  v.  Village  of  Bradley,  11* 

851 


N.E.2d  415,  367  111.  301— Knaus  v. 
Chicago  Title  &  Trust  Co.,  7  N.E. 
2d  298,  365  111.  588— Woodward  v. 
Ruel,  188  N.B.  911,  355  111.  163— 
Chicago  Title  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Mack, 
180  N.E.  412,  347  111.  480— Gens- 
linger  v.  New  Illinois  Athletic  Club 
of  Chicago,  163  N.E.  707,  332  111. 
316,  transferred,  see,  252  IlLApp. 
298,  reversed  on  other  grounds  171 
N.E.  514,  339  111,  426— Eich  v. 
Czervonko,  161  N.E.  8-64,  330  111. 
455,  certiorari  denied  49  S.Ct.  37, 
278  U.S.  642,  73  L.Ed.  557— Grove 
V.  Kerr,  149  N.E.  517,  318  111.  591 
— Wyman  v.  Hageman,  148  N.E. 
852,  31-8  111.  64— East  -St.  Louis 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Schnipper,  141  N.E. 
542,  310  111.  150— Finlen  v,  Skelly, 
141  N.E.  388,  310  111.  170— Lem- 
mons  v.  Sims,  61  N.E.2d  764,  326 
IlLApp.  460— Davis  v.  Oliver,  25  N. 
E.2d  905,  304  IlLApp.  71,  trans- 
ferred, see,  20  N.E.2d  582,  371  111. 
287— Roy  v.  Upton,  234  Ill.App.  53 
— People  v.  Mortenson,  224  IlLApp. 
221. 

Ind.— Olds  v.  Httzemann,  42  N.E.2d 
35,  220  Ind.  300 — Grantham  Realty 
Corporation  v.  Bowers,  22  N.E.2d 
832,  215  Ind.  672— State  ex  rel.  Un- 
employment Compensation  Board 
of  Unemployment  Compensation 
Division  v.  Burton,  44  N.E.2d  506, 
112  Ind.App.  268 — Niven  v.  Craw- 
fordsville  Trust  Co.,  26  N.E.24  58, 
108  Ind.App.  272— Fidelity  &  Cas- 
ualty Co.  of  New  York  v.  State,  184 
N.B.  916,  98  Ind.App.  485— Agness 
v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Grant  Coun- 
ty, 1-66  N.E.  30,  89  Ind.App.  537. 

Iowa,— Mahaffa  v.  Mahaffa.  298  N.W. 
916,  230  Iowa  679 — In  re  Haga's 
Estate,  294  N.W.  589,  '229  Iowa  380 
— Reinsurance  Life  Co.  of  America 
v.  Houser,  227  N.W.  116,  208  Iowa 
1226. 

Kan. — Brockway  v.  Wagner,  26>8  P. 
96,  126  Kan.  285. 

Ky.— Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Dummit 
v.  Jefferson  County,  189  S.W.2d 
604,  300  Ky.  514— Eversole  v. 
Smith,  178  S.W.2d  970,  297  Ky.  53 
— Wolff  v.  Employers  -Fire  Ins.  Co., 
140  S.W.2d  640,  282  Ky.  824,  130 
AJL.R.  682 — Commonwealth  v. 
Miniard,  99  S.W.2d  166,  266  Ky. 
405 — Corpus  Juris  q.uot*d  in.  Pen- 
dleton  County  Board  of  Education 
v.  Simpson,  91  £.W.2d  557,  560,  262 
Ky.  844 — Thompson  v.  Board  of 
Drainage  Com'rs  of  Muhlenberg 
County,  79  S.W.2d  381,  258  Ky.  68 
— Bell  County  Board  of  Education 
v.  Taylor,  71  S.W.2d  1005,  254  Ky. 
447 — Redwine  v.  Dorman,  70  S.W. 
2d  933,  254  Ky.  348— Brooks  v.  Stu- 


§  428 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ability  on  collateral  attack  has  been  held  to  be  ap- 
plicable even  where  such  errors  or  irregularities 
appear  on  the  face  of  the  record.16  This  rule  ap- 
plies to  the  orders  and  judgments  of  probate 


courts.17  A  judgment  cannot  be  collaterally  im- 
peached merely  because  it  was  based  on  a  mistake 
of  fact18  or  a  mistake  of  law.19 


art,  37  S.W.2d  56,  238  Ky.  235— 
Lowe  v.  Taylor,  29  S.W.2d  598, 
235  Ky.  $1 — Perry  Mercantile  Co. 
v.  Miller,  25  S.W.2d  35,  233  Ky. 
148— 'Furlong  v.  Finneran,  4  S.W. 
2d  378,  223  Ky.  558— National  Sure- 
ty Co.  v.  Taylor's  Guardian,  255  S. 
W.  542,  200  Ky.  728. 

La. — Gumbel  v.  New  Orleans  Termi- 
nal Co.,  183  -So.  212,  190  La.  904, 
certiorari  denied  59  S.Ct.  249,  305 
U.S.  654,  83  L.Ed.  423— Howell  v. 
Kretz,  131  So.  204,  15  La.A«pp.  454— 
Milliken  &  Farwell  v.  Taft  Mer- 
cantile Co.,  7  La.  App.  150. 

Me. — Harvey  v.  Roberts,  122  A.  409, 
123  Me.  174. 

Md. — Rowan  v.  State,  to  Use  of 
Grove,  191  A.  244,  172  Md.  190. 

Mass. — Elf  man  v.  Glaser,  47  N.E.2d 
925,  313  Mass.  370— -Long-  v.  Mac- 
Dougall,  173  N.E.  507,  273  Mass. 
3S6. 

Miss. — Willisford  v.  Meyer-Kiser 
Corporation,  104  So.  293,  139  Miss. 
387. 

Mo. — Troost  Ave.  Cemetery  Co.  v. 
Kansas  City,  154  S.W.2d  90,  34S 
Mo.  561 — Row  v.  Cape  Girardeau 
'  Foundry  Co.,  App.,  141  S.W.2d  113 
— Mississippi  and  Fox  River 
Drainage  Dist  of  Clark  County  v. 
Ruddick,  64  S.W.2d  306,  228  Mo. 
App.  1143 — Burns  v.  Ames  Realty 
Co.,  App.,  31  S.W.2d  274. 

Mont. — Coburn  v.  Coburn,  298  P.  349, 
89  Mont  386— Scilley  v.  Red 
Lodge-Rosebud  Irr.  Dist.,  272  P. 
543,  83  Mont.  282. 

Neb.— McCormack  v.  Murray,  274  N. 
W.  383,  133  Neb.  125— School  Dist 
D.  of  Dawes  County  v.  School  Dist 
ISTo.  80  of  Dawes  County,  201  N.W. 
964,  112  Neb.  867.  ' 

Nev.— State  ex  rel.  Smith  v.  Sixth 
Judicial  Dist  Court,  Humboldt 
County,  167  P.2d  648. 

N.J.— Ex  parte  Hall,  118  A.  347,  94 
N.J.EQ.  108. 

N.Y,— In  re  Chase  Nat.  Bank  of  City 
of  New  York,  28  N.E.2d  -868,  283 
N.Y.  350 — Salerno  v.  Holden,  15  N. 
Y.S.2d  549,  258  App.Div.  50,  af- 
firmed '31  N.B.2d  513,  284  N.Y.  759. 

N.C. — Simms   v.   Sampson,  '20   S.E.2d 

.  554,  221  N.C.  3-79— King-  v.  North 
Carolina  R.  Co.,  115  S.B.  172,  184  N. 
C.  442. 

N.D.— Kelsch  v.  Dickson,  1  N.W.2d 
347,  71  2ST.D.  430. 

Ohio.— Huffer  v.  Prindle,  153  N.B. 
527,  22  Ohio  App.  241. 

Okl.— Lee  v.  ,  Harvey,  156  P.2d  134, 
195  Okl.  178— Mid-Continent  Pipe 
Line  Co.  v.  Seminole  County  Ex- 
cise Board,  146  P.2d  996,  194  Okl. 
40 — Protest  of  Kansas  City  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  11  P.2d  500,  157  Okl. 
246— Matthews  v.  Morgan,  259  P.] 


867,  127  Okl.  74,  followed  in  Mat- 
thews v.  Morgan,  259  P.  868,  869, 
127  Okl.  76— Miller  v.  Madigan,  215 
P.  742,  90  Okl.  17. 

Or.— Booth  v.  Herberlie,  2  P.2d  1108, 
137  Or.  354— Hills  v.  Pierce,  231  P. 
652,  113  Or.  386. 

Pa.— In  re  Levi's  Estate,  38  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.  251,  56  Montg.Co.  148. 

&.C. — Gladden  v.  Chapman,  91  S.E. 
796,  106  S.C.  486. 

S.D.— In  re  ReQua's  Estate,  18  N.W. 
2d  791— Hall  v.  Carlson,  215  N.W. 
494,  51  S.D.  513. 

Tenn.— Myers  v.  Wolf,  34  S.W.2d 
201,  162  Tenn.  42 — Covington  v. 
Bullefin,  1  Tenn. App.  603. 

Tex. — Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  of 
Stephensville  v.  Daggett,  Com. 
App.,  2  S.W.2d  834— Dittmar  v.  St. 
Louis  Union  Trust  Co.,  Civ. App., 
155  S.W.2d  38-8,  error  refused- 
Sugg  v.  Sugg,  Civ. App.,  152  S.W. 
2d  446,  error  dismissed — Wilson 
V.  King,  Civ.App.,  148  -S.W.2d  442 
— Walton  v.  Stinson,  Civ.App.,  140 
S.W.2d  497,  error  refused — Klier 
v.  Richter,  Civ.App.,  119  S.W.2d 
100,  error  refused — Witt  v.  Uni- 
versal Automobile  Ins.  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  116  S.W.2d  1095,  error  dis- 
missed— Mercer  v.  Rubey,  Civ. 
App.,  108  S.W.2d  677,  error  refused 
— Henderson  v.  Stone,  Civ.A-pp.,  95 
S.W.2d  772,  error  dismissed— Snell 
V.  Knowles,  Civ.App.,  87  S.W.2d 
871,  error  dismissed— Grant  v.  El- 
lis, Civ.App.,  35  S.W.2d  460,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  50  S.W.2d  1093— Coffman  v. 
National  Motor  Products  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  26.  S.W.2d  921,  error  dis- 
missed— Star  Cash  Grocery  Co.  v. 
Retailers'  'Fire  Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App., 
12  S.W.2d  -608— Sederholm  v.  City 
of  Port  Arthur,  Civ.App.,  3  S.W.2d 
925,  affirmed  Tyner  v.  La  Coste, 
Com.App.,  13  S.W.2d  685  and  Tyn- 
er v.  Keith,  Qom.App.,  13  S.W.2d 
68-7— King  v.  King,  Civ.App.,  291  S. 
W.  645 — Garza  v.  Kenedy,  Civ.App., 
291  S.W.  615,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com. App.,  239  S.W.  231 — 
Wright  v.  Shipman,  Civ. App.,  279 
S.W.  296. 

Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d  157, 
94  Utah  271— Salt  Lake  City  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  22  P.2d  1046, 
82  Utah  179— Tracey  v.  Blood,  3 
P.2d  263,  78  Utah  385. 

W.Va. — Bailey  v.  Firemen's  Ins.  Co., 
150  S.E.  365,  108  W.Va.  75. 

33  C.J.  p  1079  note  82—34  C.J.  p  555 
note  75 — 42  C.J.  p  172  note  59—47 
C.J.  p  439  notes  15,  17. 

Brror  in  exercise  of  jurisdiction  see 
supra  §  421. 

Validity  of  erroneous  and  irregular 
judgments  see  infra  §  449. 

852 


16.  U.S.— Iselin  v.  "La  Coste,  C.C.A. 
La.,  147  F.2d  791. 

Cal.— Sontag  Chain  Stores  Co.  v.  Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  Los  An- 
geles County,  113  P.2d  689,  18  Cal. 
2d  92— Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246, 
203  Cal.  306— Union  Oil  Co.  of  Cali- 
fornia v.  Reconstruction  Oil  Co., 
135  P.2d  621,  58  CaLApp.2d  30. 

Ky. — Collier  v.  Peninsular  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  363  S.W.  353,  204 
Ky.  1. 

Mo. — Central  Paving  &  Construction 
Co.  v.  Eighth  &  Morgan  Garage  & 
Filling  Station,  159  S.W.2d  660— 
Abernathy  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
228  S.W.  486,  287  Mo.  30. 

N.C.— King  v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co., 
115  S.E.  172,  184  N.C.  442. 

Okl.— Lee  v.  Harvey,  156  P.2d  134, 
195  Okl.  178— Johnston  v.  Guy,  25 
P.2d  625,  165  Okl.  156. 

17.  Ark.— Sewell  v.  Reed,  71  S.W.2d 
191,  189  Ark.  50. 

34  C.J.  p  558  note  77 — 47  C.J.  p  439 
note  16. 

ia  Tex. — Jeff  Davis  County  v.  Da- 
vis, Civ.App.,  192  S.W.  291. 

19.  U.S. — Baltimore  S.  S.  Co.  v. 
Phillips,  N.Y*,  47  S.Ct  600,  274  U. 
S.  316,  71  L.Ed.  1069— Montgomery 
v.  Eauitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U. 
S.,  C.C.A.I11.,  83  «F.2d  758— U.  S.  v. 
U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co.,  D. 
C.Okl.,  24  F.Supp.  961,  modified  on 
other  grounds,  C.C.A.,  106  'F.2d  804, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  -60  <S.Ct. 
653,  '309  U.S.  506,  -84  L.Ed.  894. 

Ariz.— Varnes  v.  White,  12  P.2d  870, 
40  Ariz.  427. 

Cal.— Sontag  Chain  Stores  Co.  v.  Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  'Los  An- 
geles County,  113  P.2d  689,  18  CaL 
2d  92— Gray  v.  Hall,  265  P.  246, 
203  CaL  306— Union  Oil  Co.  of  Cali- 
fornia v.  Reconstruction  Oil  Co., 
135  P.2d  621,  58  Cal.App.2d  30. 

D.C.— Fishel  v.  Kite,  101  <F.2d  685, 
•69  App.D.C.  360,  certiorari  denied 
Kite  v.  Fishel,  59  S.Ct  645,  306 
U.S.  656,  83  L.Ed.  1054— Edward 
Thompson  Co.  v.  Thomas,  49  F.2d 
500,  -60  App.D.C.  11-8. 

La. — Gumbel  v.  New  Orleans  .Termi- 
nal Co.,  183  So.  212,  190  La.  904, 
certiorari  denied  59  S.Qt.  249,  305 
U.S.  654,  83  L.Ed.  423. 

Mo. — Freedy  v.  Trimble-Compton 
Produce  Co.,  46  S.W.2d  822,  329  Mo. 
879. 

N.Y.— In  re  McCollough's  Estate,  2 
N.Y.S.2d  777,  166  Misc.  576. 

Okl.— Lee  v.  Harvey,  156  P.2d  134, 
195  Okl.  178— Strange  v.  Arm- 
strong, 252  P.  1099,  123  Okl.  216— 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Co- 
operative Pub.  Co.,  247  P.  974,  119 
OkL  76— Chicago,  R.  L  &  P.  By. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


429 


Where  a  judgment  is  void,  and  not  merely  ir- 
regular and  erroneous,  because  the  court  exceeded 
its  jurisdiction  and  rendered  a  particular  judgment 
which  it  was  wholly  unauthorized  to  render  under 
any  circumstances,  as  considered  supra  §  19,  the 
rule  against  collateral  attack  does  not  apply.2^ 

Special  and  statutory  proceedings.  The  rule 
against  collateral  attack  on  the  ground  of  mere  er- 
ror or  irregularity  applies  not  only  in  the  case  of 
formal  suits  at  law  or  in  equity,  but  also  to  the  ju- 
dicial determinations  of  the  courts  in  special  pro- 
ceedings, out  of  the  course  of  the  common  law,  or 
founded  wholly  on  statutes.21 

Judgments  of  inferior  courts.  Although  the  va- 
lidity of  a  judgment  rendered  by  an  inferior  court 
is  not  sustained  by  any  presumptions  as  to  juris- 
-diction,  when  it  is  established  that  such  a  court  had 
jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and  the  subject  matter, 


it  will  be  presumed  to  have  proceeded  in  due  order, 
and  its  judgment  cannot  be  attacked  in  any  collat- 
eral proceeding  for  mere  error  or  irregularity.22 

§  429.    Defects    and    Objections    as   to 

Parties 

A  judgment  cannot  be  impeached  in  a  collateral  pro- 
ceeding for  some  defects  and  objections  as  to  parties, 
such  as  an  alleged  mlsjolnder  or  nonjoinder  of  parties. 

A  judgment  may  not  be  impeached  collaterally  for 
some  defects  and  objections  as  to  parties,25  such  as 
an  alleged  misjoinder  or  nonjoinder  of  parties,24 
or  a  misnomer,25  or  for  objections  to  an  amendment 
adding  new  parties.26  In  addition,  the  judgment 
may  not  be  collaterally  impeached  for  any  techni- 
cal objection  to  plaintiffs  capacity  to  sue,27  or  be- 
cause the  judgment  may  be  irregular  or  voidable  as 
against  another  person  who  was  a  joint  plaintiff  or 


Co.    v.    Oklahoma   State    Bank   of 

Atoka,   247  P.  21,   118  Okl.   129. 
Tex.— jPrazier     v.     Hanlon     Gasoline 

Co.,  Civ.App.,  29  S.W.2d  461,  error 

refused. 
Va. — Robertson     v.     Commonwealth, 

25   S.E.2d  352,  181  Va.  520,  146  A. 

L.R.  966. 
34  C.J.  p  558  note  79. 

20.  U.S. — Rheinberger     v.     Security 
Life    Ins.    Co.   of   America,    C.C.A. 
111.,  146  P.2d  680. 

Cal.— Baar  v.  Smith,  255  P.  S27,  201 
Cal.  87 — Tonningsen  v.  Odd  Pel- 
lows'  Cemetery  Ass'n,  213  P.  710, 
60  Cal.App.  568. 

Colo. — People  v.  Burke,  212  P.  837, 
72  Colo.  486,  30  A.'L.R.  1085. 

Hawaii. — Wong  Kwai  Tong  v.  Choy 
Yin,  31  Hawaii  603. 

Mo.— Gray  v.  Clement,  246  S.W.  940, 
296  Mo.  497 — Burns  v.  Ames  Real- 
ty Co.,  App,,  31  S.W.2d  274. 

S.D.— Reddin  v.  Prick,  223  N.W.  50, 
54  S.D.  277. 

Va. — Buchanan  v.  Buchanan,  197  S. 
E.  42-6,  170  Va.  458,  116  A.L..R.  68-8. 

Wyo. — State  v.  District  Court  of 
Eighth  Judicial  Dist.  In  and  for 
Natrona  County,  23'8  P.  545,  33 
Wyo.  281. 

34  C.J.  p  558  note  82. 

Judgment  beyond  pleadings  and  is- 
sues see  infra  $  433. 

21.  U.S.— Briscoe   v.    Rudolph,   D.C., 
31  S.Ct.  679,  221  U.S.  547,  55  L.Bd. 
848. 

34  C.J.  p  559  note  S3. 

22.  Fla, — 'Piehe  v.  R.  B.  Household- 
er Co.,  125  So.  2,  98  Pla.  627. 

Me.— Harvey  v.  Roberts,  122  A,  409, 

123  Me.  174. 
«4  C.J.  p  559  note  85. 

23.  U.S.— Schodde    v.    U.    S.f    C.C.A. 
Idaho,  69  P.2d  866. 

24.  U.S. — Bruun    v.    Hanson,    C.C.A. 
Idaho,   103  F.2d  685,  certiorari  de- 


nied Hanson  v.  Bruun,  60  S.Ct.  86, 
308  U.S.  571,  84  L.Ed.  479,  man- 
date conformed  to,  D.C.,  Bruun  v. 
Hanson,  30  'P.Supp.  602 — Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Schodde  v.  U.  S., 
C.C.A.Idaho,  69  P.2d  866,  «871— 
Rheinberger  v.  Security  Life  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  D.C.I11.,  51  P. 
Supp.  188,  cause  remanded,  C.C.A., 
146  P.2d  6'80. 

Cal. — Sanderson  v.  Niemann,  110  P. 
2d  1025,  17  Cal.2d  563,  prior  opin- 
ion 100  P.2d  508. 

Ind.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Miller  v. 
Muir,  56  N.B.2d  496,  504. 

Mo.:— Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Brady  v. 
Kirby,  22  S.W.2d  52,  56,  224  Mo. 
App.  184,  certiorari  quashed  State 
ex  rel.  Kirby  v.  Trimble,  23  S.W.2d 
569,  326  Mo.  675. 

N.M. — Cost  ilia  Estates  Development 
Co.  v.  Mascarenas,  267  P.  74,  33 
N.M.  356. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Moody  v. 
Branson,  136  P.2d  925,  928,  192  Okl. 
327. 

Tex — Williams  v.  Howard,  31  S.W. 
835,  10  Tex.Civ.App.  527 — Grayson 
v.  Johnson,  Civ.App.,  181  S.W.2d 
312 — Gathings  v.  Robertson,  Civ. 
App.,  264  S.W.  173,  reversed  on 
other  grounds,  Com.App.,  27-6  S.W. 
218. 

W.Va. — Commonwealth  Trust  Co.  of 
Pittsburgh  v.  Citi2ens'  Nat.  Bank 
of  Connellsville,  128  S.E.  104,  99 
W.Va.  166. 

34  C.J.  p  559  note  86—47  C.J.  p  439 
note  19. 

Indispensable  parties 

Judgment  of  probate  court  au- 
thorizing trustee  to  exchange  stock 
in  national  bank  for  stock  in  state 
bank  rendered  in  proceeding  to 
which  beneficiaries  of  trust,  some  of 
whom  were  minors  and  some  of 
whom  were  residents  of  state,  were 
not  made  parties  was  subject  to  col- 

853 


lateral  attack  in  proceeding  to  re- 
cover stockholder's  liability  for 
debts  of  insolvent  state  bank. — Hood 
v.  Cannon,  182  S.E.  306,  178  S.C.  94. 

As  to  one  not  a  party  to  the  suit 
in  which  a  judgment  is  rendered  the 
judgment  is,  in  a  sense,  "void"  and 
subject  to  collateral  attack. — Texas 
Soap  Mfg.  Corporation  v.  McQueary, 
Tex.Civ.A«pp.f  172  S.W.2d  177. 

Judgment  rendered  against  person 
voluntarily  appearing  in  action  as 
defendant  is  not  collaterally  assail- 
able, although  his  name  was  not  in- 
serted in  complaint. — Associated  Oil 
Co.  v.  Mullin,  294  P..  421,  110  Cal. 
App.  385. 
Death 

Record  held  to  sustain  finding 
heirs  not  mentioned  were  dead  at 
time  of  judgment  in  partition. — Bur- 
ton v.  McGuire,  Tex, Com. App.,  41  S. 
W.2d  238. 

26.    Tenn. — Magevney  v.   Karsch,    65 

S.W.2d  562,   167  Tenn.   32,   92  A.X.. 

R.  343. 
Tex. — Corpus   Juris    cited,   in    Otten- 

house  v.   Abfernathy,  Civ. App.,   110 

S.W.2d  968,  970. 
34  C.J.  p  559  note  iS7. 

26.  Miss.— Alabama  &  V.  R,  Co.   v. 
Thomas,  38  So.  770,  86  Miss.  27. 

27.  Okl.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  War- 
ren v.  Stanbury,  126  P.2d  251,  253, 
190  Okl.  554. 

34  C.J.  p  559  note  89. 

Legal  disability  of  parties  see  supra 

§  418. 
Real  party  in  interest 

It  is  no  ground  for  collateral  im- 
peachment of  a  judgment  that  plain- 
tiff was  not  the  real  party  in  inter- 
est.— Hentschel  v.  Fidelity  &  Depos- 
it Qo.  of  Maryland,  C.C.A,Mo.,  87 
•P.2d'  833—34  C.J.  p  559  note  89  \f\. 


§  430 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


defendant,28  or  because  the  judgment  was  rendered 
against  a  defendant  personally  instead  of  in  the 
representative  capacity  in  which  he  was  sued,29 
or  because  minors  or  incompetents  were  not  prop- 
erly represented  in  the  action.30 

§  430.    Defects    and   Objections   as   to 

Pleadings 

A   judgment   may   not   be   collaterally   attacked   be- 
cause of  defects  In  the  pleadings  which  are  amendable, 


even  though  such  pleadings  are  bad  on  general  demur- 
rer. 

A  judgment  may  not  be  impeached  collaterally  be- 
cause of  any  defects  in  the  pleadings31  which  are 
amendable,32  even  though  such  pleadings  are  bad 
on  general  demurrer.33  Thus  the  validity  of  a 
judgment  cannot  be  impugned  by  showing  that  a 
wrong  form  of  action  was  chosen,3*  or  that  the 
complaint  did  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute 
a  cause  of  action35  or  stated  the  cause  of  action 


2&     Ky.— Capper  v.  Short,  11  S.W.2d 

71-7,  226  Ky.  -689. 
34  C.J.  p  560  note  90. 

29.    Ky. — McConnell   v.    Halve,    1   S. 

W.  582,  8  Ky.L.  343. 
Miss. — Barringer  v.   Boyd,    27   Miss. 

473. 

30u  Mo. — Spltcaufsky  v.  Hatten,  182 
S.W.2d  86. 

34  C.J.  p  560  note  92. 

Minors  held  sufficiently  represented 

Ark. — Thomas  v.  McCollum,  144  S.W. 
2d  467,  201  Ark.  320. 

31.  Ariz.— Corpus  Juris  cited  to* 
Long  v.  Stratton,  72  P.2d  939,  941, 
50  Ariz.  427 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Llsitzsky  v.  Brady,  300  P.  177,  179, 
3S  Ariz.  337. 

Cal.— Kelsey  v.  Miller,  263  P.  200, 
203  Cal.  61. 

I1L— Holt  v.  Snodgrass,  146  N.E.  562, 
315  111.  548— Harris  v.  -Chicago 
House-Wrecking  Co.,  145  tf.E.  666, 
314  111.  500— Molner  v.  Arendt,  55 
N.E.2d  407,  323  IlLApp.  289. 

Ind. — Bowser  v.  Tobin,  18  N.E.2d  773, 
215  Ind.  99. 

Mo. — Dusenberg  v.  Rudolph,  30  S.W. 
2d  94,  325  Mo.  '881. 

Okl. — Thompson  v.  General  Outdoor 
Advertising  Co.,  151  P.2d  379,  194 
OkL  300— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
State  v.  Douglas,  89  P.2d  298,  299. 
185  Okl.  3. 

Tex.— Hartel  v.  Dishman,  145  S.W.2d 
865,  135  Tex  600— Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Permian  Oil  Co.  v.  Smith, 
73  S.W.2d  490,  501,  129  Tex.  413, 
111  A.L.R.  1152,  rehearing  denied 
107  S.W.2d  564,  129  Tex.  413,  111 
A.D.R,  1152— Jackson  v.  Slaugh- 
ter. Civ.Ap«p.,  185  S.W.2d  759,  re- 
fused for  want  of  merit — Cheney 
v.  Norton.  Civ.App.,  168  S.W.2d 
697 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ben- 
son v.  Mangum,  Civ.App.,  117  S. 
W.2d  169,  172,  error  refused — Rea- 
gan County  Purchasing  Co.  v. 
State,  Civ.App.,  65  S.W.2d  353— 
Sederholm  v.  City  of  Port  Arthur, 
Civ.App.,  3  S.W.'Sd  925,  affirmed 
Tyner  v.  La  Coste,  Com.App.,  13 
S.W.2d  685  and  Tyner  v.  Keith,  13 
S.W.2d  687. 

W.Va. — Noder  v.  Alexander,  172  S.E. 
613,  114  W.Va.  563. 

34  C.J.  p  560  note  94. 
Court    will    give    complaint    such 

construction    as    will    uphold    judg- 


ment  should    the   complaint  be  am 
biguous. — Boyd  v.  Garrison,  19  So.  2*. 
385,  246  Ala.  122. 
Residence  of  parties 

(1)  Judgment    defective    only    for 
failure  to  allege  residence  of  parties 
giving  jurisdiction  must  be  attacked 
in  original  cause  or  for  fraud. — Cole 
v.    Blankenship,    QC.A.W.Va.,    30    P. 
2d  211. 

(2)  Failure  of  petition  to  set  forth 
residences  of  parties  did  not  subject 
judgment  to  collateral  attack  where 
such  parties  voluntarily  appeared. — 
Morgan  v.  Farned,  "3  So.  798,  83  Ala. 
367. 

Allowance  of  substituted  declara- 
tion without  notice  was  held  not  to 
justify  collateral  attack  on  judg- 
ment.— Savage  v.  Walshe,  140  N.B. 
787,  24-6  Mass.  170. 

32.  Ariz. — Long  v.  Stratton,  72  P.2d 
939,  50  Ariz.  427. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 

Cragun,  20  P.2d  247,  249,  81  Utah 

457. 
34  C.J.  p  560  note  95—47  C.J.  p  439 

note  24. 

33.  Idaho.— U.  S.  Nat.  Bank  of  Port- 
land v.  Humphrey,  288  P.   416,  49 
Idaho  363. 

111.— Holt  v.  Snodgrass,  146  N.B.  562, 

315  111.  548. 

Tex. — Benson  v.  Mangum,  Civ.App., 
117  S.W.2d  169,  error  refused — 
Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Sederholm 
v.  City  of  Port  Arthur,  Civ.App.,  "3 
S.W.2d  925,  928,  affirmed  Tyner  v. 
La  Coste,  Com.App.,  13  S.W.2d  6»S5 
and  Tyner  v.  Keith,  13  S.W.2d  687 
—Hart  v.  Hunter,  114  S.W.  SS2,  52 
Tex.Civ.App.  75. 

Unless  deficiency  is  one  which  af- 
fects or  deprives  court  of  jurisdic- 
tion, fact  that  petition  is  subject  to 
general  demurrer  does  not  subject 
judgment  to  col-lateral  impeachment. 
— Tanton  v.  State  Nat.  Bank  of  El 
Paso,  Civ.App.,  43  S.W.2d  957,  af- 
firmed 79  -S.W.2d  833,  125  Tex.  16,  97 
A.L.R.  1093. 

34.  Tex. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Benson  v.   Mangum,   Civ.App.,    117 
S.W.2d  169,  172,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  560  note  97. 

35.  Ariz. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Hawkins    v.    Leake,    22    P.2d    833, 
835,  42  Ariz.  121. 

854 


7aL— In  re  Keet's  Estate,  100  P.2d 
1045,  15  Cal.2d  328— Moran  v.  Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  Sacramen- 
to County,  96  P.2d  193,  35  CaLApp. 
2d  -629 — Ex  parte  Sargen,  27  P.2d 
407,  135  CaLApp.  402. 

Mo. — Dusenberg  v.  Rudolph,  30  S. 
W.2d  94,  325  Mo.  881. 

Mont. — State  ex  rel.  Delmoe  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Fifth  Judicial  Dist., 
46  P.2d  39,  100  Mont  1'31. 

Neb. — Wistrom  v.  Forsling,  14  N.W. 
2d  217,  144  Neb.  638. 

N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Epstein 
v.  Bendersky,  21  A.2d  815,  818,  130 
K.J.EQ,  180. 

N.M.— In  re  Field's  Estate,  60  P.2d 
945,  40  N.M.  423. 

Okl.— Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Excise  Board  of  Oklahoma  County, 
33  P.2d  1081,  168  OkL  428— Foster 
v.  Focht,  229  P.  444,  102  OkL  261. 

Tenn. — Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Baskette, 
133  S.W.2d  49*,  175  Tenn.  253. 

Tex. — Rhoads  v.  Daly  General  Agen- 
cy, Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  461,  error 
refused — Benson  v.  Hangum,  Civ. 
A'pp,,  117  S.W.2d  169,  error  refused 
— Lutz  v.  State,  176  S.W.2d  317, 
146  Tex.Cr.  503. 

Wyo. — Rock  Springs  Coal  &  Mining 
Co.  v.  Black  Diamond  Coal  Co., 
272  P.  12,  39  Wyo.  379. 

34  C.J.  p  560  note  98. 

Insufficient  or  Illegal  cause  of  action 
as  ground  for  attack  in  general  see 
supra  §  417. 

Unless  it  affirmatively  appears 
from  petition  that  no  valid  cause  of 
action  could  be  stated,  judgment  of 
court  having  jurisdiction  of  subject 
matter  and  of  parties  is  not  subject 
to  collateral  attack  on  ground  that 
petition  failed  to  state,  or  defective- 
ly stated,  cause  of  action.— Schmid 
v.  Farris,  37  P.2d  596,  1<69  OkL  446. 

Default  judgment  is  not  void   on 
collateral  attack,   even  though  peti- 
tion on  which  it  was  rendered  did  not 
state  a  cause  of  action. 
Cal.— Associated   Oil    Co.    v.    Mullin, 

294  P.  421,  110  CaLApp.   385. 
Kan. — Brunbaugh  v.  Wilson,   107   P. 

792,  82  Kan.  53. 

Sufficiency  on  direct  attack 

'Fact  that  complaint  would  be  in- 
sufficient to  support  judgment  when 
attacked  directly  does  not  necessar- 
ily make  complaint  vulnerable  to 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  431 


defectively,36  if  the  complaint  contained  sufficient 
matter  to  challenge  the  attention  of  the  court  as  to 
its  merits.37  Even  the  absence  of  pleadings  has 
been  held  not  to  render  a  judgment  void  and  sub- 
ject to  collateral  attack,38  but  there  is  authority  for 
holding  that  the  judgment  will  be  void  and  impeach- 
able  collaterally  if  not  supported  by  any  pleadings.39 

It  is  not  ground  for  collateral  attack  that  the  com- 
plaint was  not  verified,40  or  was  defectively  veri- 
fied,41 that  there  was  a  misjoinder  of  causes  of  ac- 
tion42 or  a  splitting  of  a  cause  of  action,43  or  that 


the  action  appeared  from  the  face  of  the  papers  to 
have  been  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations.44 


§  431. 


Irregularities  in  Procedure 


Where  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  has  attached, 
the  judgment  rendered  ordinarily  is  not  subject  to  col- 
lateral attack  for  irregularities  In  procedure. 

Where  it  is  made  to  appear  that  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court  has  attached,  and  that  the  court  has 
proceeded  in  the  exercise  of  that  jurisdiction,  no 
irregularity  in  the  subsequent  proceedings  can  avail 
to  avoid  or  annul  the  decree  rendered  on  collateral 
attack,45  especially  if  it  would  be  subject  to  amend- 


collateral   attack. — State   v.   Cragun, 
20  P.2d  247,  81  Utah  457. 

Fact  that  court  of  record,  errs  in 
holding  petition  sufficient,  if  it  has 
jurisdiction,    does    not   render  Judg- 
ment subject  to  collateral  attack. — 
Wistrom  v.  Forsling,  14  N.W.2d  217, 
144  Neb.  638— In  re  Warner's  Estate, 
288  N.W.  39,  137  Neb.  25— Brandeen 
v.  Lau,  201  N.W.  665,  113  Neb.  34. 
Judgment  on,  cross  petition, 
•Okl. — Fowler   v.    Marguret   Pillsbury 

General   Hospital,   229   P.  -442,    102 

Okl.   20'3 — Horstman  v.  Bowermas- 

ter,  217  P.  167,  90  Okl.  262. 
Tex. — Collins   v.   Jones,  Civ.App.,  79 

S.W.2d  175,  error  refused. 
Cause  of  action  held  stated 
Ala.— Chandler  v.  Price,  15  So.2d  462, 

244  Ala.  667. 
Mo. — Bullock    v.     Peoples    Bank    of 

Holcomb,   173  S.W.2d  753,   351  Mo. 

587. 

36.  111. — Baker  v.  Brown,  23  N.B.2d 
710,  372  111.  336. 

Okl.— Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Excise  Board  of  Oklahoma  County, 
33  P.2d  1081,  168  Okl.  428— Kan- 
sas City  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ex- 
cise Board  of  Le  Flore  County,  33 
P.2d  493,  168  Okl,  408— Protest  of 
Stanolind  Pipe  Line  Co.,  32  P.2d 
869,  1-68  Okl.  2-81— -Lindeberg  v. 
Messman,  218  P.  £44,  95  Okl.  64. 

37.  Cal.— Associated  Oil  Co.  v.  Mul- 
lin,  294  P.  421,  110  Cal.App.  385. 

Kan. — Eberhardt  Lumber  Co.  v.  Le- 
cuyer,  110  P.2d  757,  153  Kan.  386— 
Pattison  v.  Kansas  State  Bank,  247 
P.  643,  121  Kan.  471. 

Okl.— Ciesler  v.  Simpson,  105  P.2d 
227,  187  Okl.  641,  followed  in  Cies- 
ler  v.  Sykes,  105  P.2d  229,  187  Okl. 
643— Spence  v.  Yell,  71  P.2d  701, 
180  Okl.  475— Goldsmith  v.  Owens, 
68  P.2d  849,  180  Okl,  268— Horst- 
man v,  Bowermaster,  217  P.  167, 
90  Okl.  262. 

"Tex.— Benson  v.  Mangum,  Civ.App., 
117  S.W.2d  1"69,  error  refused. 

Wyo. — State  v.  District  Court  of 
Eighth  Judicial  Dist  in  and  for 
Natrona  County,  238  P.  545,  53 
Wyo.  281. 

24  C.J.  p  561  note  99. 


If  initial  pleading  is  so  wanting 
substance  as  not  to  be  colorable  or 
amendable,  or  to  justify  relief,  order 
or  judgment  is  subject  to  collateral 
attack. 

Mo. — Gunman  v.  Grothe,  142  S.W.2d 

1,    346   Mo.    427 — Coombs   v.    Benz, 

114  S.W.2d  713,  232  Mo.App.   1011. 

Mont — Hanrahan  v.  Andersen,  90  P. 

2d  494,  108  Mont  218. 
Utah.— State  v.  Cragun,  20  P.2d  247, 
81  Utah  457. 

Default    judgment,    resting   solely 
on  allegations  of  complaint,  so  de- 
ficient in  substance  as  conclusively 
to  negative  cause  of  action  at  time 
of  its  rendition  may  be  successfully 
assailed  collaterally. 
Mont. — State  ex  rel.  Delmoe  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  'Fifth  Judicial  Dist, 
46  P.2d  39,  100  Mont  131. 
Wash. — Roche   v.   McDonald,    239    P. 
1015,  136  Wash.  322,  44  A.L.R.  444, 
reversed   on   other   grounds   48    S. 
Ct  142,  275  U.S.  449,  72  L.Ed.  -365, 
53  A.L.R.  1141. 

sa    N.Y.— Sutherland    v.    -St.     Law- 
rence   County,    «5    N.T.S.    696,    42 
Misc.  38,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
91  N.Y.S.   962,  101  App.Div.   299. 
34  C.J.  p  561  note  6. 
Necessity    of    pleadings    to    support 
judgment  see  supra  §  40. 
Parties  may  Tby  consent  dispense 
with  written   pleadings    entirely   at 
least  to  extent  that  they  cannot  at- 
tack a  judgment  rendered  in  such  a 
case  collaterally  on  ground  of  lack 
of  written  pleadings. — State  v.  Un- 
derwood, 86  P.2d  707,  54  Wyo.  1. 

39.  Tex.— Tanton  v.  State  Nat. 
Bank  of  El  Paso,  Civ.App.,  43  S. 
W.2d  957,  affirmed  79  S.W.2d  '833, 
125  Tex.  16,  97  A.L.R.  1093. 

34  C.J.  p  5*61  note  7. 

Partnership  sued  as  corporation 

Default  judgment  in  action,  where- 
in partnership  was  sued  as  corpora- 
tion, and  in  which  neither  partner 
appeared  or  made  defense,  was  sub- 
ject to  collateral  attack  by  partners. 
— McGeorge  v.  Danforth,  Mo.App.,  39 
S.W.2d  565.  | 

855 


40.  Mo.— Gilkeson  v.  Knight,  71  Mo. 
403. 

Wash.T.— McCoy  v.  Ayres,  3  P.  273, 
2  Wash.T.  203. 

41.  Fla. — Beverette  v.    Graham,   135 
So.  847,  101  Fla.  566. 

34  C.J.  p  561  note  2. 

42.  N.M.— Costilla  Estates   Develop- 
ment Co.  v.  Mascarenas,  267  P.  74, 
33  N.M.  356. 

Okl. — Thompson  v.   General  Outdoor 

Advertising  Co.,   151  P.2d  379. 
34  C.J.  p  561  note  3. 

43.  Okl.— Hardwicke-Etter      Co.      v. 
Durant,  187  P.  484,  77  Okl.  202. 

•44.  U.S. — Herron  v.  Dater,  Pa.,  7  S. 
Ct.  620,  120  U.S.  464,  30  L.Ed.  748. 

34  C.J.  p  561  note  5. 

45.  U.S.— Iselin  v.  La  Coste,  C.C.A. 
La,,  147  F.2d  791— Read  v.  Elliott, 
C.C.A.S.C.,  94  F.2d  55— Bohenik  v. 
Delaware  &  H.  Co.,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  49 
F.2d  722,  certiorari  denied  52  S.Ct 
23,  284  U.S.  643,  76  L.Ed.  546— 
Prichard  v.  Nelson,  D.C.Va.,  -55  F. 
Supp.  506. 

Ark. — Lambie  v.  W.  T.  Rawleigh  Co., 
14  S.W.2d  245,  178  Ark.  1019. 

Cal. — Bank  of  America  Nat  Trust 
&  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Hill,  71  P.2d 
258,  9  Cal.2d  495. 

Fla. — Polk  v.  Chase  Nat  Co.,  162 
So.  521,  120  Fla.  243— Catlett  v. 
Chestnut,  146  So.  241,  107  Fla.  498, 
91  A.L.R.  212— Malone  v.  Meres, 
109  So.  677,  91  Fla.  709. 

Ga. — Campbell  v.  Atlanta  Coach  Co., 
200  S.E.  203,  58  Ga.App.  824. 

Ind. — Shedd  v.  Northern  Indiana 
Public  Service  Co.,  182  N.W.  278, 
98  Ind.App.  42. 

Kan. — Eberhardt  Lumber  Co.  v.  Le- 
cuyer,  110  P.2d  757,  153  Kan.  386. 

Mich. — Richardson  v.  Richardson,  15 
N.W.2d  660,  809  Mich.  336,  certio- 
rari denied  65  S.Ct  912,  324  U.S. 
864,  89  L.Ed.  1420— Walden  v.  Cre- 
go's  Estate,  285  N.W.  457,  288 
Mich.  564. 

Ohio.— Binns  v.  Isabel,  51  N.E.2d  501, 
72  Ohio  App.  222. 

Okl.— Mid-Continent  Pipe  Line  Co. 
v.  Seminole  County  Excise  Board, 
146  P.2d  996,  194  Okl.  40 — Strange 
v.  Armstrong,  252  P.  1099,  123  Okl. 


§  431 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ment.46  Thus  it  is  no  ground  of  collateral  objec- 
tion that  the  action  was  tried  by  the  court  alone, 
where  it  was  properly  triable  by  a  jury,  or  vice  ver- 
sa,47 and  the  same  rule  applies  to  erroneous  or  ir- 
regular action  with  regard  to  continuances  or  ad- 
journments,48 dismissal,49  consolidation,50  amend- 
ments,51 references,52  change  of  venue,53  security 
for  costs,54  or  rulings  on  motions55  or  on  a  demur- 
rer.56 

It  has  been  stated,  however,  that  the  mode  of 
procedure,  after  jurisdiction  of  the  person  is  ob- 
tained, must  be  in  accordance  with  law,  and  a  clear 
violation  thereof,  if  fundamental,  vitiates  the  judg- 
ment, and  subjects  it  to  collateral  attack,  where  the 


violation  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record  prop- 
er.57 

§  432.    Objections  to  Evidence 

A  Judgment  may  not  be  collaterally  attacked  on 
the  ground  that  it  was  based  on  illegal,  inadmissible, 
or  insufficient  evidence. 

A  judgment  of  a  court  having  jurisdiction  cannot 
be  impeached  collaterally  by  showing  that  the  evi- 
dence on  which  it  was  based  was  illegal,58  inadmis- 
sible,59  or  insufficient  to  sustain  the  judgment.60 
Indeed,  the  courts  have  gone  so  far  as  to  state  that 
a  judgment  entered  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence 
is  not  subject  to  collateral  attack.61 

A  judgment  cannot  be  collaterally  impeached  be- 
cause of  the  erroneous  exclusion  of  evidence.62 


216 — Schulte  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 

Pontotoc   County,    250   P.    123,   119 

Okl.  2S1. 
Term. — Covington  v.  Bullefln,  1  Tenn. 

App.  603. 
Tex. — Fitzgerald  v.   Le  Grande,  Civ. 

App.,  187  S.W.2d  155 — Lipscomb  v. 

Lofland,  Civ.App.,   141   S.W.2d  983, 

error  dismissed,  judgment  correct. 
Utah.— Redfield   v.   First  Nat.   Bank, 

244  P.  210,  66  Utah  459. 
34  C.J.  p  561  note  8. 
Judgment  in  partition 
Mo.— Virgin   v.    Kennedy,   32    S.W.2d 

91,  326  Mo.  400. 
34  C.J.  p  561  note  8  [d]. 

Where  supreme  court  had  Juris- 
diction of  appeal,  its  Judgment  was 
not  subject  to  collateral  attack  for 
errors  committed  by  court  in  course 
of  proceedings,  regardless  of  how 
irregular  proceedings  might  have 
been.— State  ex  rel.  McGrew  Coal  Co. 
v.  Ragland,  97  S.W.2d  113,  339  Mo. 
452. 
Particular  irregularities 

(1)  Court's  appointment  of  receiv- 
er   contrary    to    statute. — Spence    v. 
State   Nat.    Bank   of  £21   Paso,    Tex. 
Com.App.,  5  S.W.2d  754. 

(2)  Failure    of    court    to    comply 
with  statute   directing  court  not  to 
try  a  person  for  a  crime  while  that 
person  is   in   a  state  of  insanity. — 
State   ex  rel.  Novak  v.  Utecht,   281 
N.W.  775,  203  Minn.  448. 

(3)  Inadequate      presentation      of 
case  at  hearing. — Coughlin  v.  Cough- 
lin,  45  N.E.2d  388,  312  Mass.  452. 

(4)  Lack  of  arraignment  and  plea. 
— Brackeen    v.    State,    154    N.E.    10, 
198  Ind.  480 — Pritchard  v.  State,  127 
N.E.  545,  190  Ind.  49. 

(5)  Lack  of  petition  and  order  ap- 
pointing minor's   next   friend. — Nitti 
v.  Public  Service  By.  Co.,  139  A.  62, 
104  N.J.Law  67. 

(6)  Violation  of  court  rules  as  to 
division  of  business  among  Judges. 
— Johnson  v.  Manhattan  By.  Co.,  C. 
CJLN.Y.,    61    F.2d  .934,    affirmed    in 


part  53  S.Ct.  721,  2S9  U.S.  479,  77  L. 
Ed.  1331. 

(7)  Other  irregularities. 
S.D.— Michels    v.    Kirfel,     6    N,W.2d 

162. 
Tex. — Livingston  v.  Stubbs,  Civ.App., 

151    S.W.2d    285,    error    dismissed, 

judgment  correct — Wilson  v.  Beck, 

Civ.App.,   286  S.W.  315. 
34  C.J.  p  561  note  8  [b]. 

Irregularities  in  proceeding  occur- 
ring- between  decree  and  sale  there- 
under are  cured  by  confirmation  or- 
der, and  decree  may  not  be  collater- 
ally attacked  where  court  had  juris- 
diction. 
Ark. — Lambie  v.  W.  T.  Kawleigh  Co., 

14  S.W.2d  245,  178  Ark.  1019. 
Or. — Skinner  v.    Silver,    75   P.2d    21, 

158  Or.  81. 

46.  Ga. — Chapman  v.  Taliaferro,  58 
S.E.  128,  1  Ga~App.  235. 

47.  Conn. — Corpus    Juris     cited    in 
Halligan  v.  Carlson,  135  A.  39,  40, 
105  Conn.  245. 

111.— Wlckiser  v.   Powers,   57   N.E.2d 

522,  324  IlLApp.  130. 
Mich. — Peters  v.   Sturmer,   248  N.W. 

875,  263  Mich.  494. 
Tex. — Bearden  v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ.App., 

41  S.W.2d  447,  affirmed,  Com.App., 

60  S.W.2d  1031. 
34  C.J.  p  562  note  10. 

48.  Neb.-— Steben  v.  Mehrens,  241  N. 
W.  108,  122  Neb.  683. 

34  C.J.  p  562  note  11. 

49.  Va. — Pocahontas  Wholesale  Gro- 
cery Co.  v.   Gillesple,   60  S.E.   597, 
63  W.Va.  578. 

34  C.J.  p  562  note  12. 

50.  Nev. — Daly  v.   Lahontan   Mines 
Co.,  151  P.  514,  39  Nev.  14,  reheard 
158  P.  285,  39  Nev.  14. 

51.  U.S. — Goodman    v.    Ft.    Collins. 
Colo.,    164    F.    970,    91   C.C.A.   98. 

Ohio. — Paulin    v.    Sparrow,    110    N. 
E.  528,  91  Ohio  St.  279. 

52.  Tex. — Youngstown  Bridge  Co.  v. 
North   Galveston,   H.   &  K.   C.   R. 
Co.,  Civ.App.,   31  S.W.   420. 

856 


53.  Mo. — Bank  of  Kennett  v.  Cotton- 
Exchange  Bank,  72  S.W.2d  842,  228. 
Mo.App.   859. 

34  C.J.  p  562  note  16. 

54.  W.Va.— State  v.  Fidelity  &  De- 
posit Co.,    112   S.E.    319,    91  W.Va, 
191. 

55.  Okl. — Equitable    Surety    Co.    v^ 
Oil   Field   Supply  Co.,   202   P.   293,. 
84  Okl.  31. 

56.  N.C. — Brown  v.   Harding,    89    S. 
E.  222,  171  N.C.  686,  relaxation  of 
costs  denied  90  S.E.  3,  172  N.C.  835. 

57.  Wyo. — State  v.  District  Court  of" 
Eighth   Judicial   Dist.    in   and   for- 
Natrona    County,    238    P.    545,    33 
Wyo.  281. 

58.  N.T.— Herring  v.  New  York,  L. 
E.   £  W.   R.  Co.,   12   N.E.   763,   105- 
N.T,    340,    19    Abb.N.Cas.    340,    2T 
N.Y.Wkly.Dig.  45. 

Tex.— Odle  v.  Frost,   59,  Tex.    684. 

53.  Mich. — Springett  v.  Circuit 
Court  Com'r  for  Jackson  County,, 
283  N.W.  857,  287  Mich,  271. 

34  C.J.  p  562  note  21. 

60.  Ky.— Starbird  v.  Blair.  12  S.W:. 
2d  693,  227  Ky.  258. 

Mich.— Heap  v.  Heap,  242  N.W.  252;. 

258  Mich.  250. 
34  C.J.  p  562  note  22. 

Existence  or  nonexistence  of  facts 
authorizing1  judgment  does  not  jus- 
tify  collateral  attack. — Shaveland  v. 
Shaveland,  228  P.  1090,  112  Or.  173:. 

61.  N.Y. — Grieshaber    v.     KnoepfeU 
198  N.Y.S.  302,  119  Misc.  827. 

Tenn. — Globe  &  Republic  Ins.  Co.  of: 

America  v.  Shields,  96  S.W.2d  947,. 

170  Tenn.  485. 
34  C.J.  p  563 -note  23 — 42  C.J.  p  17* 

note  59  [a]. 

Allowance  of  claims  without  proof 
other  than  the  agreement  as  to  the- 
amounts  does  not  affect  a  decree 
on  collateral  attack. — Missouri  Pac^ 
R,  Co.  v.  Sears,  265  S.W.  653,  16& 
Ark.  104. 

62.  Wis.— Beck  v.    State,    219   N.W. 
197,    196    Wis.    242,    and    Beck   v. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


433 


§  433.    Defects  in  Entry  or  Contents  of 

Judgment 

Mere  Irregularities  in  the  rendition  or  entry  of  judg- 
ments, including  judgments  by  confession  or  consent, 
are  not  grounds  for  collateral  attack. 

A  decree  rendered  in  advance  of  the  period  at 
which  the  court  may  lawfully  acquire  jurisdiction 
over  defendant  is  subject  to  collateral  attack.63 
However,  where  no  question  of  jurisdiction  is 
raised,  a  judgment  or  decree  cannot  be  collaterally 
impeached  because  it  was  prematurely  rendered,64 
or  not  rendered  within  the  time  required  by  stat- 
ute,65 or  entered  in  vacation  without  consent  of  the 
parties,66  or  because  it  was  based  on  defective  find- 
ings by  the  court,  or  given  without  any  findings  at 
all67  or  is  inconsistent  with  the  findings  or  conclu- 
sions of  law.68 

Also  a  judgment  may  not  be  attacked  collaterally 


because  it  appears  from  the  record  or  the  opinion 
of  the  court  that  there  was  a  mistake,  and  that  the 
judgment  should  have  been  different  from  that  ac- 
tually rendered,69  or  because  of  any  irregularity  in 
the  entry,  record,  or  docketing  of  the  judgment,70 
or  for  any  informality  or  incompleteness  in  the 
judgment  itself,  provided  its  defects  or  omissions 
are  not  such  as  to  render  it  absolutely  unintelligible 
and  therefore  void  for  uncertainty;71  neither  can 
it  be  urged  against  a  judgment  collaterally  that  it 
was  changed  by  way  of  amendment  or  correction 
after  its  entry  or  after  the  expiration  of  the  term.72 

Judgment  beyond  pleadings  and  issues.  Where 
the  court  goes  beyond  and  outside  the  pleadings  and 
issues  and  assumes  to  adjudicate  a  matter  not  with- 
in the  issues  made  up  in  the  pleadings,  and  the 
judgment  is  to  that  extent  void,  as  considered  su- 
pra §§  49,  SO,  the  judgment  may  be  attacked  collat- 


Milwaukee  County,  219  N.W.  205, 
196  Wis.  259,  certiorari  denied 
Beck  v.  Milwaukee  County,  Wis., 
49  S.Ct  34,  278  U.S.  639,  73  L. 
Ed.  554. 

•63.  D.C. — Morse  v.  U.  S.,  29  App.D. 
C.  433. 

Form,  contents,  rendition,  entry,  rec- 
ord, and  docketing1  of  judgment 
see  supra  §§  62-86,  100-133. 

64.  Colo. — Netland     v.     Baughman, 
162  P.2d  601,  114  Colo.  148. 

Ind.— Agness     v.    Board    of    Com'rs 

of  Grant  County,   166  N.E.   30,   89 

Ind.App.  537. 
Ky.— Flinn   v.    Blakeman,    71    S.W.2d 

961,  254  Ky.  416. 
Mont.— State    v.    District    Court    of 

Fourth    Judicial   Dist.    in   and   for 

Missoula   County   Department   No. 

2,   282   P.   1042,   86  Mont.  193. 
N.M.— Field    v.    Otero,    290    P.    1015, 

35  N.M.  68. 
Or.— Booth  v.  Herberlie,  2  .P.2d  1108, 

137  Or.  354. 
Tenn.— Davis    v.    Mitchell,    178    S.W. 

2d  889,  27  Tenn.App.  182. 
Wash. — Merchants'   Collection  Co.  v. 

Sherburne,   290   P.  991,   158  Wash. 

426. 
34  C.J.  p  563  note  26. 

65.  S.D.— Barker  v.  Cowie,  173  N.W. 
722,  42  S.D.  159. 

66.  Mo.— Bracken   v.    Milner,    73    S. 
W.  225,  99  Mo.App.  187. 

67.  Ark.-nCorpus     Juris     cited     in 

Brooks   v.   Baker,   187   S.W.2d  169, 

172,  208  Ark.  654. 
Neb.— Cizek  v.  Cizek,  99  N.W.  28,  69 

Neb.  797,  -5  Ann.Cas.  464— State  v. 

Duncan,  56  N.W.  214,  37  Neb.  631, 
N.T.— Shaul    v.    Fidelity    &    Deposit 

Co.    of   Maryland,    227   N.T.S.    163, 

131   Misc.  401,  affirmed  230  N.Y.S: 

910,  224  App.Div.  773. 


Or. — Glickman   v.    Solomon,    12    P.2d 
1017,  140  Or.  358,  followed  in  Sol- 
omon  v.    Glickman,    12   P.2d   1018, 
140  Or.  364. 
34  C.J.  p  563  note  29. 

Findings  of  fact  cannot  be  used 
for  purpose  of  showing  erroneous 
judgment — Permian  Oil  Co.  v.  Smith, 
73  S.W.2d  490,  129  Tex.  413,  111  A.L. 
R.  1152,  rehearing  denied  107  S.W.2d 
564,  129  Tex.  413,  111  A.L.R.  1152. 
•Collateral  attack  on  finding 

Where  court  had  jurisdiction  in 
foreclosure  suit,  Its  finding  as  to 
land  covered  by  mortgage  might  not 
be  collaterally  attacked.— Sederholra 
v.  City  of  Port  Arthur,  Tex.Civ.App., 
3  S.W.2d  925,  affirmed  Tyner  v.  La 
Coste,  Com.App.,  13  S.W.2d  685,  fol- 
lowed in  Tyner  v.  Keith,  13  S.W.2d 
687. 

68.  Ark.— Brooks  v.  Baker,  187  S.W. 
2d  169,  208  Ark.  654. 

Cal.— Tulare  Irr.  Dist  v.  Superior 
Court  of  California  in  and  for 
Tulare  County,  242  P.  725,  197 
Cal.  649— Wellborn  v.  Wellborn, 
131  P.2d  48,  55  Oal.App.2d  516. 
ex.i— Permian  Oil  Co.  v.  Smith,  73 
S.W.2d  490,  129  Tex.  413,  111  A.L. 
R.  1152,  rehearing  denied  107  S. 
W.2d  564,  129  Tex,  413,  111  A.L.R. 
1152. 

69.  U.S. — Iselin  v.  La  Coste,  C.C.A. 
La.,  147  F.2d  791. 

Cal. — McAllister    v.    Superior    Court 
In   and   For   Alameda   County,    82 
P.2d  462,  28  Cal.App.2d  160. 
Miss. — Mclntosh    v.     Munson     Road 
Machinery    Co.,    145    So.    731,    167 
Miss.  546. 
34  C.J.  p  563  note  30. 

Whether  decision  is  sound  or  un- 
sound is  immaterial  on  collateral  at- 
tack.—Eagle,  Star  and  British  Do- 
minions Ins.  Co.  v.  Heller,  140  S.E. 
314,  149  Va.  82,  57  A.L.R.  490. 

857 


Judgment  held  correct 

Evidence  established  that  decree 
of  state  court  as  entered  approving 
compromise  and  settlement  of  pro- 
ceeding correctly  reflected  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court. — Butler  v.  Denton, 
D.C.Okl.,  57  F.Supp.  656,  affirmed,  C. 
C.A.,  150  F.2d  687. 

70.  Fla.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
State  ex  rel.  McGuire  v.  Mayo,  175 
So.    732,    733,    128    Fla.    699— Fiehe 
v.  R.  E.  Householder  Co.,   125  So. 
2,  98  Fla.  627. 

Neb.— School  Dist  D.  of  Dawes 
County  v.  School  Dist.  No.  80  of 
Dawes  County,  201  N.W.  964,  112 
Neb.  867. 

Tenn. — Whitson  v.  Johnson,  123  S.W. 
2d  1104,  22  Tenn.App.  427. 

Utah.— Intermill  v.  Nash,  75  P.2d 
157,  94  Utah  271— Farmers'  &  Mer- 
chants' Sav.  Bank  v.  Hudson,  218 
P.  93,  62  Utah  131. 

34  C.J.  p  563  note  31. 

71.  U.S.— Prichard  v.  Nelson,  C.C.A. 
Va.,  137  F.2d  312. 

Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Warren  v.  City 
of  Miami,  15  So.2d  449,  153  Fla. 
644 — State  ex  rel.  Fulton  Bag  & 
Cotton  Mills  v.  Burnside,  15  So.2d 
324,  153  Fla.  599— Crosby  v.  Burle- 
son,  195  So.  202,  142  Fla.  443— 
Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  v. 
Mayo,  175  So.  732,  733,  128  Fla. 
699. 

La. — Gumbel  v.  New  Orleans  Termi- 
nal Co.,  183  So.  212,  190  La.  904, 
certiorari  denied  59  S.Ct  249,  305 
U.S.  654,  83  L.Ed.  423. 

Tex. — Bridgman  v.  Moore,  183  S.W. 
2d  705,  143  Tex.  250. 

34  C.J.  p  564  note  32. 

72.  U.S.— Groton  Bridge  &  Mfg.  Co. 
v.   Clark   Pressed  Brick  Co.,    C.C. 
Ark.,   126   F.   552,   affirmed   136   F. 
27,  68  C.C.A.  <577. 

54  C.J.  D  564  note  33. 


§  433 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


erally,7S  at  least  in  default  cases.74  However,  it 
has  been  held  that  a  judgment  or  order  is  not  sub- 
ject to  collateral  impeachment  because  it  was  not 
warranted  by  the  allegations  of  the  pleadings.75  A 
judgment  relating  to  the  subject  of  a  proceeding,  as 
stated  in  the  pleadings,  is  not  subject  to  collateral 
attack  because  the  pleader  has  asked  for  other  re- 
lief than  that  which  may  properly  be  awarded.76 

Excessive  recovery  or  relief.  Where  a  judgment 
is  merely  erroneous,  as  considered  supra  §  54,  be- 
cause it  is  excessive,77  either  as  being  greater  than 
the  amount  demanded,78  greater  than  the  facts  or 
the  evidence  would  justify,79  or  as  improperly  in- 
cluding interest,80  penalties,81  costs,82  or  counsel 
fees,83  or  as  allowing  excessive  interest84  or  costs,85 


it  may  not  be  impeached  in  a  collateral  proceeding. 
Judgments  by  confession  or  consent.  The  rule 
prohibiting  the  collateral  impeachment  of  judgments 
for  mere  errors  or  irregularities  in  their  entry  or 
rendition  applies  equally  to  judgments  by  confes- 
sion as  to  any  others,86  and  to  judgments  entered  on 
consent  or  agreement.87  On  the  other  hand,  a  judg- 
ment by  confession  may  be  attacked  collaterally 
where  the  attorney  exceeded  his  authority,88  where 
defendant  was  not  bound  by  the  warrant  of  attor- 
ney,89 where  the  statement  on  which  it  is  entered 
is  so  essentially  defective  that  the  court  acquired  no 
jurisdiction  or  authority  to  enter  the  judgment,90 
or  where  the  required  affidavit  of  the  execution  of 
the  power  of  attorney  is  lacking.91 


73.  CaL— Baar  v.  Smith,  255  P.  827, 
201   Cal.    87 — Petition   of  Furness, 
218   P.    81.   62   CaLApp.   753. 

Mo. — Weatherford  v.  Spiritual  Chris- 
tian Union  Church,  163  S.W.2d 
916 — Brandt  v.  Farmers  Bank  of 
Chariton  County.  App.f  177  S.W. 
2d  667,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
182  S.W.2d  281,  353  Mo.  259— Dick- 
ey v.  Dickey,  App.,  132  S.W.2d  1026 
— Burns  v.  Ames  Realty  Co.,  App., 
31  S.W.2d  274 — Raney  v.  Home 
Ins.  Co.,  246  S.W.  57,  213  Mo.App. 
1. 
Neb. — Branz  v.  Hylton,  265  N.W.  16, 

130  Neb.  385. 
N.Y.— Coles     v.     Carroll,     6     N.E.2d 

107,  273  N.Y.  86. 

Ohio. — Binns  v.  Isabel,  12  Ohio 
Supp.  113,  affirmed  51  N.E.2d  501, 
72  Ohio  App.  222. 

Tex.— Edinburg  Irr.  Co.  v.  Ledbetter, 
Civ.App.,  247  S.W.  335,  modified 
on  other  grounds,  CoouApp.,  286 
S.W.  185, 

33  C.J.  p  1152  note  22,  p  1168  note 
33. 

Presumption  that  judgment  collat- 
erally attacked  was  supported  by 
pleadings  should  not  be  indulged, 
where  complaint  is  before  court. — 
State  v.  District  Court  of  Eighth 
Judicial  Dist.,  284  P.  128,  86  Mont 
387. 

74.  Wyo. — State  v.  District  Court  of 
Eighth   Judicial    Dist.   in   and  for 
Natrona    County,    238    P.    545,    33 
Wyo.  281. 

75.  Mont.— State    v.    District   Court 
of  Tenth  Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for 
Judith   Basin   County,   227   P.   579, 
71  Mont.  89. 

33  C.J.  p  1153  note  24,  p  1169  note 
34. 

76*  Cal. — Luckey  v.  Superior  Court 
in  and  for  Los  Angeles  County, 
287  P.  450,  209  Cal.  360. 

77.  Or. — Linn  County  v.  Rozelle,  162 
P.2d  150. 

78.  Cal. — Wallace    v.    Wallace,    295 
P.    1061,    111   CaLApp.    500. 


Ga. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hardin 
v.  Dodd,  167  S.E.  277,  279,  176  Ga. 
119. 

Mo.— Meierhoffer  v.  Kennedy,  263  S. 
W.  416,  304  Mo.  261. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Linn 
County  v.  Rozelle,  162  P.2d  150, 
165— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Trav- 
elers Ins.  Co.  of  Hartford,  Conn., 
v.  Staiger,  69  P.2d  1069,  1071,  157 
Or.  143. 

34  C.J.  p  564  note  35. 
Ztefanlt      judgment      for      larger 

amount  than  demanded  in  summons 

and    complaint    cannot    be    attacked 

collaterally. — Munson  v.  Bensel,   211 

N.W.  838,  169  Minn.  434. 

79.  111. — People  ex  rel.  Anderson  v. 
Village  of  Bradley,  11  N.E.2d  415, 
367  111.  301. 

Mich.— Corpus  Jurig  cited  in  Morris 

v.   Barker,   235   N.W.   174,   175,   253 

Mich.  334. 
Or.— Linn  County  v.  Rozelle,  162  P.2d 

150. 
R.L— McDufC  Estate  v.  Kost,  158  A. 

373,  52  R.I.  136. 
34  C.J.  p  564  note  36. 
Failure  to  credit  debtor  with  sums 

paid 
Mass. — Thompson  v.  Horgan,   157  N. 

E.  599,  260  Mass.  589. 

80.  U.S. — Huddles  ton  v.  Dwyer,  C.C. 
A.Okl.,  145  F.2d  311. 

Cal.— Wells  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  City  and 
County  of  San  Francisco,  152  P. 
2d  625,  25  Cal.2d  37. 

34  C.J.  p  564  note  37. 

81.  U.S. — Huddleston    v.    Dwyer,    C. 
C.A.Okl.,  145  F.2d  311. 

82.  Cal. — Wells  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  City 
and  County  of  San  Francisco,  152 
P.2d  625,  25  Cal.2d  37. 

Mont — Thompson  v.  Chicago,  B.  & 
Q.  R.  Co.,  253  P.  313,  78  Mont. 
170. 

Or. — Linn  County  v.  Rozelle,  162  P.2d 
150. 

34  C.J.  p  564  note  38. 

83.  Ga. — Van    Dyke    v.    Van    Dyke, 
54  S.B.  537,  125  Ga.  491. 

858 


Utah. — Mary    Jane    Stevens    Co.    v, 
Foley,    248  P.   815,    67   Utah  578. 

84.  Kan. — Dickson  v.  Patterson,  18* 
P.  912,  106  Kan.  794. 

34  C.J.  p  564  note  40. 

85.  Or. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Na- 
tional      Surety      Corporation      v. 
Smith,   123   P.2d   203,    221.   168   Or. 
265. 

34  C.J.  p  564  note  41. 

86.  Fla.— Wilds  v.  State,  84  So.  664, 
79  Fla.  -575, 

34  C.J.  p  129  note  60,  p  564  note  42. 

87.  Cal. — Nielsen  v.   Emerson,    6   P- 
2d  281,  119  CaLApp.  214. 

34  C.J.  p  564  note  43. 

Judgment  for  plaintiffs  in  amount 
agreed  on  with  defendant  was  not 
subject  to  impeachment,  qualifica- 
tion, or  modification  by  testimony,  in 
subsequent  action  against  joint  tort- 
feasor,  as  to  stipulation  that  satis- 
faction of  judgment  would  but  par- 
tially satisfy  claim  and  reservation 
of  right  to  pursue  joint  tort-feasor 
for  further  satisfaction. — Hunt  v. 
Ziegler,  Teac.Civ.App.,  271  S.W.  936, 
affirmed  Ziegler  v.  Hunt,  Com.App., 
280  S.W.  546. 
Judgment  not  in  accordance  with 

agreement 
Cal. — Nielsen  v.  Emerson,  6  P.2d  281, 

119  CaLApp.  214. 
34  C.J.  p  564  note  43  [a]. 

88.  111. — Hughes  v.  First  Acceptance 
Corporation,   260   111. App.   176. 

N.Y. — Hubbard  v.  Spencer,  15  Johns. 

244. 
Unauthorized  appearance  as   ground 

for   collateral  attack   see  supra   § 

424. 

89.  Colo. — Sproul    v.    Monteith,    185 
P.  270,  66  Colo.  541. 

90.  N.Y. — Dunham  v.  Waterman,  17 
N.T.  9,  72  Am.D.  406. 

91.  111. — Gardner   V.    Bunn,    23   N.E. 
1072,  132  111.  408,  7  L..R.A.  729. 

N.J. — Cliver  v.  Applegate,  5  N.J.Law 
479. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  434 


§  434.    Fraud,  Collusion,  or  Perjury 

a.  Fraud  and  duress 

b.  Collusion 

c.  False  testimony  or  perjury 

a.  Fraud  and  Duress 

A  judgment  may  be  collaterally  attacked  on  the 
ground  of  fraud  where  the  fraud  goes  to  the  Jurisdic- 
tion of  the  court. 

Where   the    fraud  alleged  was  inherent  in  the 
cause  of  action,  or  in  the  character  or  procurement 


of  the  instrument  sued  on,  it  does  not  furnish  a  le- 
gitimate ground  for  impeaching  the  judgment  in  a 
collateral  proceeding^2  and  there  are  many  deci- 
sions stating  the  broad  general  rule  that,  where  the 
court  has  jurisdiction,  it  is  not  permissible  for  a 
party  or  privy  to  attack  a  judgment  in  a  collateral 
proceeding  because  of  fraud,93  such  a  judgment  be- 
ing voidable  only,  and  not  void.94 

A  judgment  obtained  by  fraud  may,  however,  be 
void  under  some  circumstances,  and  subject  to  col- 
lateral attack,95  as  where  such  fraud  appears  on 


92.  U.S. — Phoenix  Finance  Corpora- 
tion v.  Iowa-Wisconsin  Bridge  Co., 
C.C.A.Iowa,  115  F.2d  1,  139  A.L.R. 
1490,  reversed  on  other  grounds  62 
S.Ct.  139,  314  U.S.  118,  86  L.Ed. 
100,  137  A.L.R.  967. 

Ariz.— Kendall  v.  Silver  King  of 
Arizona  Mining  Co.,  226  P.  '540,  26 
Ariz.  456. 

Cal. — Mason  v.  Drug,  Inc.,  88  P.2d 
929,  31  Cal.App.2d  697— Godfrey  v. 
Godfrey,  86  P.2d  357,  30  Cal.App.2d 
370 — Sontag  v.  Denio,  73  P.2d  248, 
23  Cal.App.2d  319 — Harvey  v.  Grif- 
fiths, 23  P.2d  €32,  133  CaLApp.  17— 
Clavey  v.  Loney,  251  P.  232,  80 
CaLApp.  20. 

N.J. — Goodman  v.  Goodman,  194  A. 
866,  15  N.J.Misc.  716. 

34  C.J.  p  565  note  49,  p  567  note  67 
[a]  (3)— 42  OJ.  p  173  notes  -61, 
62. 

Equitable  relief  against  judgments 
on  ground  of  fraud  generally  see 
supra  §§  372-374. 

Jurisdiction  of  federal  courts  with 
respect  to  state  court  judgments 
see  Courts  §  538. 

Opening   or  vacating   judgment   for 

fraud  see  supra  §  269. 
At  least  to  the  parties  themselves 

or   their   privies   fraud   inhering   in 

proceeding   itself    is   not    ordinarily 

available    as    ground    for    collateral 

attack.— Abbott    v.    Mtna,    Casualty 

&    Surety   Co.,    D.C.Md.,    42    F.Supp. 

793,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  -S3tna  Casualty 

&  Surety  Co.  v.  Abbott,  130  F.2d  40. 

Fraud  must  "be  extrinsic 

U.S.— Molfett  v.  Robbins,  D.C.Kan., 
14  F.Supp.  602,  affirmed,  C.C.A., 
81  F.2d  431,  certiorari  denied  56 
S.Ct.  940,  298  U.S.  675,  80  L.Ed. 
1397. 

Ark. — Fawcett  v.  Khyne,  63  S.W.2d 
349,  187  Ark.  940. 

Idaho. — Tingwall  v.  King  Hill  Irr. 
Dist,  155  P.2d  605. 

N.Y.— Arcuri  v.  Arcuri,  193  N.E.  174, 
265  N.Y.  358. 

Okl.— Steil  v.  Leverett,  272  P.  412, 
133  Okl.  300. 

Wash.— Ryan  v.  Plath,  140  P,2d  968, 
18  Wash.2d  839. 

93.  U.S. — Iselin  v.  La  Coste,  C.C.A. 
La.,  147  F.2d  791 — Montgomery  v. 
Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U. 
S.,  C.C.AJ11.,  83  F.2d  758— Johnson 


v.    Mississippi    Power   Co.,    C.C.A. 

Miss.,  68  F.2d  545. 
Ariz. — Schuster  v.   Schuster,   73  P.2d 

1345,  51  Ariz.  1 — Herman  v.  Thom- 
as, 19  P.2d  685,  41  Ariz.  457. 
Ark. — Swindle  v.  Rogers,   66  S.W.2d 

630,  188  Ark.  503— Lambie  v.  W.  T. 

Rawleigh  Co.,   14   S.W.2d  545,   178 

Ark.  1019. 
Cal. — Nielsen  v.  Emerson,  6  P.2d  281, 

119  CaLApp.  214. 
Colo.— Atchison,  T,  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 

v.    Board   of    Com'rs    of    Fremont 

County,  37  P.2d  761,  95  Colo.  435. 
Fla.— Dr.  P.  Phillips  Co.  v.  Billo,  147 

So.  579,  109  Fla.  316. 
Ga.— Wood   v.   Wood,   38    S.E.2d   545 

—Marshall   v.    Marthin,    15    S.E.2d 

861,  192  Ga.  613— Tuff  v.  Loh,  144 

S.E.  670,  38  Ga.App.  526,  followed 

in   Tuff  v.  Continental  Trust  Co., 

144  S.E.  671,  38  Ga.App.  529.   • 
Hawaii. — Corpus      Juris      cited      in 

Springer  v.  Rose,   31  Hawaii   443, 

44-5. 
Iowa. — Reidy  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry. 

Co.,  249  N.W.  347,  216  Iowa  415. 
La. — Caldwell  v.  Caldwell,  114  So. 

96,  164  La.  458. 
Minn. — Geo.  Benz  &  Sons  v.  Hassie, 

293  N.W.  133,  208  Minn.  118. 
Neb. — Warren    v.     Stanton    County, 

15   N.W.2d  757,    145   Neb.   220. 
N.Y.— People  v,   Townsend,   233  N.Y. 

S.  632,  133  Misc.  £43. 
N.D.— Olson   v.    Donnelly,    294    N.W. 

666,  70  N.D.  370. 
Ba. — Greiner   v.    Brubaker,    30    A.2d 

621,    151    Pa.Super.    515,    certiorari 

denied    64    S.Ct.    42,    320    U.S.    742, 

88   L.Ed.   440,   rehearing  denied   64 

S.Ct.    194,    320    U.S.    813,    88    L.Ed. 

491,  rehearing  denied  64  S.Ct.  434, 

320  U.S.   816,   88   L.Ed.  493. 
S.C.— Stone  v.  Mincey,  185   S.B.   619, 

180  S.C.  317— Bailey  v.  Cooley,  150 

S.E.  473,  153  S.C.  78. 
Tex. — Bragdon  v.   Wright,   Civ.App., 

142  S.W.2d  703,  error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  565  note  50 — 47  C.J.  p  439 

note  12. 
Right  of  third  persons  and  creditors 

to  assert  fraud  see  supra  §§  414, 

415. 

Fraud  not  going"  to  the  jurisdiction 
is  not  ground  for  collateral  attack 
on  domestic  judgment  by  parties  or 
privies.— Hill  v.  Cole,  137  P.2d  579, 
192  Okl.  476. 

859 


94.  Colo.— Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.   v.    Board   of   Com'rs   of   Fre- 
mont County,  37  P.2d  761,  95  Colo. 
435. 

Ga.— Tuff  v.  Loh,  144  S.E.  670,  38 
Ga.App.  526,  followed  in  Tuff  v. 
Continental  Trust  Co.,  144  S.E. 
671,  38  Ga.App.  529. 

Iowa. — Swartzendruber  v.  Polke,  218 
N.W.  62,  205  Iowa  382— Montagne 
v.  Cherokee  County,  205  N.W.  228, 
200  Iowa  534 — Newcomer  v.  New- 
comer, 201  N.W.  579,  199  Iowa  390. 

Minn.— In  re  Melgaard's  Will,  274  N. 
W.  641,  200  Minn.  493. 

Tex. — Johnston  v.  Stephens,  Civ.App., 
300  S.W,  225,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  49  S.W.2d  431,  121  Tex. 
374— Uvalde  Paving  Co.  v.  Crabb, 
Civ.App.,  7  S.W.2d  678,  reversed 
on  other  grounds  Crabb  v.  Uvalde 
Paving  Co.,  Com.App.,  23  S.W.2d 
300 — Urban  v.  Bagby,  Civ.App., 
286  S.W.  519,  affirmed,  Com.App., 
291  S.W.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  565  note  €0,  p  566  note  51. 

95.  U.S. — Bruun    v.    Hanson,    C.CJL 
Idaho,  103  F.2d  685,  certiorari  de- 
nied Hanson  v.  Bruun,  £0  S.Ct  86, 
308  U.S.  571,  84  L.Ed.  479,  mandate 
conformed  to  Bruun  v.  Hanson,  30 
F.Supp.    602— New   York  Life   Ins. 
Co.  v.  Gay,  C.C.A.Ky.,  36  F.2d  634 
—Standard  Steel  Car  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
60  CtCl.  736. 

Cal. — Crow  v.  Madsen,  App.,  Ill  P. 
2d  7,  rehearing  granted  111  P.2d 
663. 

Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Warren  v.  City  of 
Miami,  15  So.2d  449,  153  Fla.  644 
— State  ex  rel.  Fulton  Bag  &  Cot- 
ton Mills  v.  Burnside,  15  So.2d 
324,  153  Fla.  599. 

Gteu — Ingram  &  Le  Grand  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Burgin  Lumber  Co.,  18  S.E. 
2d  774,  193  Ga.  404. 

Idaho. — Harkness  v.  Utah  Power  & 
Light  Co.,  291  P.  1051,  49  Idaho 
756. 

111.— Meyer  v.  Meyer,  39  N.E.2d  811, 
379  111.  97,  140  A.L.R.  484— Moore 
v.  Sievers,  168  N.E.  259,  336  111. 
316— Reisman  v.  Central  Mfg.  Dist. 
Bank,  15  N.E.2d  903,  296  IlLApp. 
61. 

Ind. — Town  of  Woodruff  Place  v. 
Gorman,  100  N.E.  296,  179  Ind.  1— 
Guydon  v.  Taylor,  60  N.E.2d  750, 
115  Ind.App.  685. 


§434 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.8. 


the  face  of  the  record96  or  goes  to  the  method  of 
acquiring  jurisdiction.97  Likewise,  the  judgment 
may  be  attacked  collaterally  where  fraud  has  been 


practiced  in  the  very  act  of  obtaining  the  judg- 
ment,98 or  on  the  party  against  whom  the  judg- 
ment was  rendered,  so  as  to  prevent  him  from  hav- 


Ky. — Houston's  Guardian  (now  Lu 
ker)  v.  Luker's  Former  Guardian 
69  S.W.2d  1014,  253  Ky.  602. 

La.— -Miller  v.  Miller,  100  So.  45 
15$  La.  46. 

Neb.— Mead  Co.  v.  Doerfler,  18  N.W 
2d  524,  146  Neb.  2. 

N.Y. — Fisher  v.  Fisher,  237  N.Y.S 
162,  227  App.Div.  160,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  170  N.E.  912,  25J 
N.Y.  260,  69  A.L.R.  918— Oberlan 
der  v.  Oberlander,  39  N.Y.S.2d  139 
179  Misc.  459. 

Ohio. — Dahms  v.  Swinburne,  167  N.E 
486,  31  Ohio  App.  512. 

Okl. — Cochran  v.  Barkus,  240  P 
321,  112  Okl.  ISO. 

Or.— May  v.  Roberts,  286  P.  546 
133  Or.  643. 

Pa. — In  re  Stetson's  Estate,  155  A. 
856,  305  Pa.  62 — Biddle  v.  Tomlin- 
son,  8  A.  774,  115  Pa.  299,  20  Wkly 
N.C.  74,  44  Leg.Int.  318— Moyer  v 
Meray,  25  A.2d  612,  148  Pa.Super 
284. 

S.C. — First  Carolinas  Joint  Stock 
Land  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Knotts, 
1  S.E.2d  797,  191  S.C.  384. 

Tex.— Benson  v.  Mangum,  Civ.App., 
117  S.W.2d  169,  error  refused — 
Urban  v.  Bagby,  Civ.App.,  286  S. 
W.  519,  affirmed,  Com.App.,  291 
S.W.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  566  note  52. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  fraud  to 
be  considered:  First,  the  kind  of 
fraud  which  prevents  the  court 
from  acquiring  jurisdiction  or  which 
merely  gives  it  colorable  Jurisdiction; 
second,  that  kind  of  fraud  which  oc- 
curred in  the  proceedings  of  the  court 
after  jurisdiction  had  been  obtained, 
such  as  perjury,  concealment  and 
other  chicanery.  The  first  variety 
of  fraud  will  invalidate  the  judg- 
ment while  the  second  class  has  no 
such  legal  effect. — Wood  v.  First 
Nat.  Bank  of  Woodlawn,  50  N.E.2d 
830,  383  111.  515,  certiorari  denied  64 
S.Ct  521,  321  U.S.  765,  88  L.Ed.  1061 
—•People  v.  Sterling,  192  N.E.  229, 
357  111.  354— Beck  v.  Lash,  136  N.E. 
475,  303  111.  549— In  re  Goldberg's 
Estate,  5  N.E.2d  863,  288  IlLApp. 
203,  certiorari  denied  Goldberg  v. 
Goldberg,  58  S.Ct  12,  302  U.S.  693,  82 
L.Ed.  535. 
Extrinsic  fraud 

(1)  Judgments  obtained  by  extrin- 
sic fraud  may  be  attacked  collater- 
ally. 

U.S.— Griffith  v.  Bank  of  N.  Y.,  C.C.A. 
N.T.,  147  F.2d  899,  certiorari  de- 
nied Bank  of  New  York  v.  Grif- 
fith, 147  F.2d  899. 

Okl. — Dill  v.  Stevens,  284  P.  60,  141 
Okl.  24 — Stevens  v.  Dill,  285  P. 
845,  142  Okl.  138— Schulte  v.  Board 
of  Com'rs  of  Pontotoc  County,  250 
P.  123,  119  Okl.  261.  j 


(2)  Extrinsic   fraud   such   as   wil 
render  judgment  subject  to  collatera 
attack   is   fraud   which,   rather  than 
joing    to    merits    of    judgment,    has 
prevented    cause    from    being    full* 
considered  on  its  merits,  as  by  pre- 
venting party   from  attending  hear- 
ing   or    from    presenting    his    cas< 
fully. 

Cal. — Howard   v.    Howard,    163    P.2d 
439 — McLaughlin  v.   Security-Firs 
Xat.  Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  67  P.2d 
726,  20  Cal.App.2d  602. 

N.J.— Wolff    v.    Wolff,    34    A.2d    150 
134  N.J.Eq.  8. 

(3)  When  a  judgment  is  assailed 
for  fraud   extraneous  to   the  issues 
it  is  immaterial  whether  it  is  denom- 
inated a  "direct  attack"  or  a  "collat- 
eral attack." — Gray  v.  McKnight,  183 
P.   489,   75   Okl..  268— Griffin  v.  Culp, 
174  P.  495,  68  Okl.  310. 

Where  fraud  is  regarded  as  hav- 
ing been  perpetrated  on  the  court  as 
well  as  on  the  injured  party,  the 
judgment  is  a  mere  nullity  and  may 
be  attacked  and  defeated  because  of 
the  fraud  in  any  collateral  proceed- 
ing in  the  same  court  in  which  it 
was  rendered. — State  ex  rel.  Hussey 
v.  Hemmert,  Ohio  App.,  37  N.E.2d 
668. 

Judgment  may  be  collaterally  at- 
tacked  at  subsequent  term  in  court 
rendering  it.— Home  v.  Moorehead, 
153  So.  668,  169  Miss.  362,  overrul- 
ing suggestion  of  error  152  So.  495, 
169  Miss.  362. 

By  statute  in  some  states  any  ju- 
dicial record  may  be  impeached  on 
ground  of  fraud  in  party  offering 
t — Stewart  v.  Stewart,  89  P.2d  404, 
32  Cal.App.2d  148. 

Ariz. — Hershey  v.  Banta,  99  P. 
2d  81,  55  Ariz.  93,  followed  in 
Hershey  v.  Republic  Life  Ins.  Co., 
99  P.2d  85,  55  Ariz.  104— Dockery 
v.  Central  Arizona  Light  &  Power 
Co.,  45  P.2d  656,  45  Ariz.  434— 
Grand  International  Brotherhood 
of  Locomotive  Engineers  v.  Mills, 
31  P.2d  971,  43  Ariz.  379— Bermon 
v.  Thomas,  19  P.2d  685,  41  Ariz. 
457.  . 

daho.— Tingwall    v.   King  Hill    Irr. 
Dist,  155  P.2d  605. 
4  C.J.  p  666  note  53. 
Where  fraud  does  not  appear  on 
ace  of  record,  collateral  attack  has 
een  held  not  available. 

Ky.— Collier  v.  Peninsular  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  of  America,  363  S.W.  353,  204 
Ky.  1. 

Wash. — Thompson  v.  Short,  106  P.2d 
720,  6  Wash.2d  71. 

97.  Ariz. — G  rand  International 
Brotherhood  of  Locomotive  Engi- 
neers v.  Mills,  31  P.2d  971,  43  Ariz. 
379.  : 

860 


Colo.— Wilson  v.  Birt,  235  P.  563,  77" 

Colo.  206. 
Ind. — McKinney  v.   Bassett,    61   N.E.- 

2d  79,  115  Ind.App.  614. 
Iowa.— Watt    v.    Dunn,     17    N.W.2d 

811. 
Miss. — Lamar    v.    Houston,    184    So.. 

293,  183  Miss.  260. 

Okl.— Oklahoma      Stockyards       Nat., 
Bank  v.  Pierce,  243  P.  144,  114  Okl. 
25. 
Tex. — Dyer  v.  Johnson,  Civ. App.,   19' 

S.W.2d   421,   error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  566  note  54 — 42  C.J.  p  173: 

note  60. 

98.  U.S.— Nardi  v.  Poinsatte,  IXC.. 
Ind.,  46  F.2d  347— McMurray  v.. 
Chase  Nat  Bank  of  City  of  New- 
York,  D.CWyo.,  10  F.Supp.  960— 
Stephens  Fuel  Co.  v.  Bay  Parkway 
Nat.  Bank  of  Brooklyn,  D.CJST.Y.,. 
10  F.Supp.  395. 

Ariz. — Grand   International    Brother- 
hood of  Locomotive   Engineers  v:. 
Mills,   31  P.2d  971,   43  Ariz.   379. 
Ark. — Featherston   v.    Lamb,    178    Si. 
W.2d  492,  206  Ark.  1078— Levinson 
v.    Treadway,    78    S.W.2d    59,    190 
Ark.  201. 
Cal.— Slater  v.  Shell  Oil  Co.,  103  P- 

2d  1043,  39  Cal.App.2d  535. 
111. — Hughes     v.     First     Acceptance- 
Corporation,    260    IlLApp.    176. 
Ky. — Houston's   Guardian    (now   Lu- 
ker)   v.  Luker's  Former  Guardian.. 
69  S.W.2d  1014,  253  Ky.  602— Com- 
monwealth v.  Smith,  46  S.W.2S  474V 
242  Ky.  365. 
Miss. — Carr  v.  Miller,  139  So.  851,  162' 

Miss.  760. 
Neb.— Warren  v.  Stanton  County,  lo". 

N.W.2d   757,    145   Neb.    220. 
Okl. — Cochran  v.  Barkus,  240  P.  321,. 

112  Okl.  180. 

Pa. — Gribben  v.  Carpenter,  185  A- 
712,  323  Pa,  243. 

C.J.  p  566  note  55 — 42  C.J.  p  173: 
note  60. 

Allegation  that  assignment  of  note 
and  mortgage  by  bank  was  illegal, 
n   that   bank  was   insolvent  at   the- 
time   did   not  allege   such  fraud   in. 
procurement    of   judgment    on    note 
and  mortgage   in   favor  of  assignee- 
would  afford  basis  for  a  collat- 
ral  attack  on  such  judgment — Had- 
ey  v.  Mooresville  Bldg.   Savings  & 
Loan  Ass'n,  47  N.E.2d  156,  113  Ind. 
App.  1.43. 

Attorney  who  makes  one  a  party 
ompZainant    to    suit    without    his; 
knowledge  or  consent,  and  who,  by 
means    of    such    unauthorized    act, 
causes  judgment  against  such  party,, 
ommits    a   legal    fraud,    and   judg- 
ment  may   be   enjoined   or  canceled 
n  equity  where  there  is  no  element 
f  estoppel  or  acquiescence  after  no- 
ice  of  such  judgment. — Hirsch  Bros. 
&  Co.  v.  R.  E.  Kennington  Co.,  124 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  434 


ing  a  fair  opportunity  to  present  his  case,99  or 
where  it  gives  an  undue  advantage  to  the  prevailing 
party,1  or  where  the  judgment  was  obtained  through 
corruption  of  the  judge,  induced  by  the  opposite 
party,2  notwithstanding  the  court  had  jurisdiction 
of  the  proceedings  resulting  in  the  judgment.3 

Duress  and  coercion.  Judgments  obtained 
through  duress  and  coercion  are  not  necessarily,  and 
in  all  cases,  void  and,  as  such,  subject  to  collateral 
attack.4 

b.  Collusion 

A  judgment  ordinarily  may  not  be  impeached  col- 
laterally  by  a  party  or  privy  to  the  Judgment  on  the 
ground  that  It  was  obtained  by  means  of  collusion  be- 
tween the  other  parties  to  the  action  or  the  attorneys. 

A  party  or  privy  to  a  judgment  ordinarily  is  not 
permitted  to  impeach  it  collaterally  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  obtained  by  means  of  collusion  between 
the  other  parties  to  the  action  or  the  attorneys  in 
the  case,5  although,  as  considered  supra  §  414,  this 


may  be  done  by  a  stranger  to  the  proceeding,  when 
his  rights  or  interests  in  a  subsequent  litigation  are 
threatened  by  the  judgment.  A  judgment  procured 
through  the  collusion  of  plaintiff  and  the  city  and 
its  agents  is  subject  to  collateral  attack  by  a  tax- 
payer whenever  it  comes  into  conflict  with  his 
rights  as  a  taxpayer,6  notwithstanding  the  rule  that 
the  taxpayer  is  in  privity  with  the  city.7 

When  the  only  collusion  is  a  union  of  the  adverse 
interests,  and  the  facts  are  fully  disclosed  to  the 
court  having  full  and  complete  jurisdiction,  there  is 
no  fraud  and  the  judgment  is  binding  on  collateral 
attack.8 

c.  False  Testimony  or  Perjury 

False  testimony  or  perjury  ordinarily  Is  not  ground 
for  a  collateral  attack  on  the  Judgment  unless  the  falsity 
goes,  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court. 

It  is  no  ground  for  impeaching  a  judgment  col- 
laterally that  the  testimony  on  which  it  was  based 
was  false  or  perjured9  unless  the  fraud  goes  to  the 


So.  344,  155  Miss.  242,  88  A.L.R.  1 
—  Weems  v.  Vowell,  84  So.  249,  122 
Hiss.  342. 

Insufficiency  of  proof  to  sustain. 
decree  did  not  constitute  "fraud  in 
the  procurement  of  the  decree" 
which  would  authorize  collateral  at- 
tack. —  Bond  v.  Avondale  Baptist 
Church,  194  So.  833,  239  Ala.  366. 

Evidence  held  lyffn 


To  show  fraud. 
U.S.  —  Bruun  v.  Hanson,  C.C.A.Idaho, 

103     F.2d     685,     certiorari    denied 

Hanson  v.  Bruun,  60  S.Ct.  86,  308 

U.S.    571,    84    L.Ed.    479,    mandate 

conformed  to,  D.C.,  Bruun  v.  Han- 

son, 30  F.Supp.  602. 
Ark.  —  Turley  v.  Owen,  69  S.W.2d  882, 

188  Ark.  1067. 
Cal.—  McLaughlin    v.    Security-First 

Nat.  Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  67  P.2d 

726,   20  Cal.App.2d  602. 
111.  —  Indiana  Harbor  Belt  R.  Co.  v. 

Calumet  City;  63  N.B.2d  369—  Wal- 

ton v.  Albers,   44  N.E.2d  145,   380 

111.  423. 
Mich.  —  Harden   v,   R.   D.   Baker  Co., 

271  N.W.   712,   279  Mich.   145,  cer- 

tiorari denied  R.  D.  Baker  Co.  v. 

Rarden,   58   S.Ct   15,  302  U.S.   697, 

82  L.Ed.  538. 
Okl.—  Warren   v.    Stansbury,    126    P. 

2d    251,    190    Okl.    554—  Jackson  v. 

Sadler,    44    P.2d    838,    172    Okl.    56. 
Tex.  —  Hughes    v.    Wright,    Civ.App., 

127  S.W.2d  215. 
Wash.  —  Petition   of  City  of  Seattle, 

138   P.2d   667,   18  Washed  167. 
34  C.J,  p  566  note  55  [b]. 

99.  Cal.—  McLaughlin  v.  Security- 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  67 
P.2d  726,  20  Cal.App.2d  602. 

N.J.—  -Wolff  v.  Wolff,  34  AJd  150,  134 
N.XEq.  8,  ' 


Okl. — Cochran  v.  Barkus,  240  P.  321, 

112  Okl.  180. 
34  C.J".  p  566  note  56. 

Public  administrator's  failure  to 
appear  and  defend  on  behalf  of  es- 
tate in  action  to  quiet  title  wherein 
plaintiff's  case  rested  on  foreclosure 
decree  against  testator  and  known 
to  be  void  by  plaintiff  and  adminis- 
trator was  fraud  on  heirs  against 
whom  decree  rendered  was  of  no 
effect. — Conlin  v.  Blanchard,  28  P.2d 
12,  219  Cal.  632. 

Where  party  has  been  given  prop- 
er notice  of  action  and  has  not  been 
prevented  from  full  participation 
therein  and  has  had  opportunity  to 
'protect  himself  from  any  fraud, 
fraud  perpetrated  is  intrinsic  even 
though  unsuccessful  party  does  not 
avail  himself  of  opportunity  to  ap- 
pear before  court,  and  he  cannot  at- 
tack judgment  once  time  has  elapsed 
for  appeal  or  other  direct  attack. — 
Howard  v.  Howard,  Cal.,  163  P.2d 
439. 

1.  Mo. — Einstein   v.    Strother,   App., 
182   S.W.  122. 

2.  Ga. — Lockett  v.  Gress  Mfg.   Co., 
70  S.B.  255,  8  Ga.App.  772. 

3.  Okl.— Sockey  v.  Winstock,  144  P. 
372,  43  Okl.  758. 

4.  N.Y.— Finan  v.   Finan,   47  N.Y.S. 
2d  429. 

5.  Neb. — Warren  v.  Stanton  County, 
15  N.W.2d  757,   145  Neb.  220. 

34  C.J.  p  566  note  60. 
Bights  of  third  persons 

A  judgment  which  has  been  en- 
tered by  collusion  between  the  par- 
ties will  be  disregarded  as  respects 
rights  and  liens  held  by  third  per- 

861 


sons. — Krug  v.  John  B.  Toakum  Co., 
80    P.2d   492,    27   Cal.App.2d   91. 

6.  Okl.— In   re    Gypsy    Oil   Co.,    285 
P.  67,  141  Okl.  291. 

7.  111.— Indiana  Harbor  Belt  R.  Co. 
v.    Calumet    City,    63    N.E.2d    369. 

8.  U.S. — Schmertz  Wire  Glass  Co.  v. 
Western  Glass  Co.,  C.C.I1L,  178  F. 
973. 

34  C.J.  p  566  note  62. 

9.  Ariz. — Corjpns      Juris      cited      in 
Grand    International    Brotherhood 
of  Locomotive  Engineers  v.  Mills, 
31  P.2d  971,  987,  43  Ariz.  379. 

Cal. — Perkins  v.  Benguet  Consol. 
Mining  Co.,  132  P.2d  70,  55  CaLApp. 
2d  720,  certiorari  denied  Benquet 
ConsoL  Mining  Co.  v.  Perkins,  63 
S.Ct.  1435,  319  U.S.  774,  87  L.Bd. 
1721,  rehearing  denied  64  S.Ct. 
429,  320  U.S.  803,  815,  88  L.Ed  485 
—Godfrey  v.  Godfrey,  86  P.2d  357, 
30  Cal.App.2d  370. 

D.C.— Hodge  v.  Huff,  140  F.2d  686, 
78  U.S.App.D.C,  329,  certiorari  de- 
nied 64  S.Ct.  946,  322  U.S.  733,  88 
L.Bd.  1567— Fidelity  Storage  Co. 
v.  Urice,  12  F.2d  143,  56  App.D.C. 
202. 

Idaho.— Moyes  v.  Moyea,  94  P.2d  782, 
60  Idaho  601. 

Mass. — Coughlin  v.  Coughlln,  45  N.E. 
2d  388,  312  Mass.  452. 

Mich.— Moebius  v.  McCracken,  246 
N.W.  163,  261  Mich.  409. 

Mont. — Friedrichsen  v.  Cobb,  275  P. 
267,  84  Mont.  238. 

N.J.— Kantor  v.  Kessler,  40  A.2d  607, 
132  N.J.Law  336. 

N.T.— Arcuri  v.  Arcuri,  193  N.E. 
174,  265  N.Y.  358. 

Or. — Masterson  v.  Pacific  Live  Stock 
Co.,  24  P.2d  1046,  144  Or.  396. 

Pa. — Greiner  v.  Brubaker,  30  A.2d 
621,  151  Pa.  Super.  515,  certiorari 


§  435 

jurisdiction  of  the  court.10 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  435.    Defenses  AvaUable  in  Original  Action 

A  judgment  may  not  be  attacked  collaterally  by 
setting  up  any  matter  which  was,  or  might  have  been, 
raised  as  a  defense  in  the  original  action. 

A  judgment  cannot  be  impeached  collaterally  by 


setting  up  any  matter  which  was  or  might  have 
been  raised  as  a  defense  in  the  original  action11 
or  on  appeal.12  Thus,  when  proceedings  in  manda- 
mus are  instituted  to  compel  the  levy  and  collection 
of  a  tax  to  pay  a  judgment  against  a  municipal 
corporation,  the  judgment  is  conclusive  as  to  the 
existence  and  validity  of  the  debt,  and  cannot  be 
controverted  as  to  those  facts.18 


2HL  CONSTRUCTION  AND  OPEEATION  OP  JUDGMENT 


A.  CONSTRUCTION 


436.    In  General 

a.  General  rules  of  construction 

b.  Aids  to  construction 

a.  General  Boles  of  Construction 

An   ambiguous  judgment  should   be  construed   as   a 


whole  so  as,  If  possible,  to  give  effect  to  all  parts  there- 
of and  to  effectuate  the  intent  and  purpose  of  the  court. 

The  legal  operation  and  effect  of  a  judgment 
must  be  ascertained  by  a  construction  and  interpre- 
tation of  its  terms,14  and  this  presents  a  question 


denied  64  S.Ct.  42.  320  U.S.  742, 
88  L.Ed.  440,  rehearing  denied  64 
S.Ct.  194,  320  U.S.  813,  88  L.Bd. 
491,  rehearing  denied  64  S.Ct. 
434,  320  U.S.  816,  88  L.Ed.  493. 

Tex. — Glenn  v.  Dallas  County  Bois 
D'Arc  Island  Levee  Dist.,  268  S. 
W.  452,  114  Tex.  325,  answer  to 
certified  questions  conformed  to, 
Civ.App.,  275  S.W.  137,  in  which 
judgment  is  reversed  on  rehearing 
282  S.W.  339,  which  was  reversed 
Dallas  County  Bois  D'Arc  Island 
Levee  Dist.  v.  Glenn,  Com.App., 
288  S.W.  165. 

34  C.J.  p  566  note  63. 

Civil  action  against  witness  for  per- 
jury see  the  C.J.S.  title  Perjury  §§ 
92-94,  also  48  C.J.  p  918  note  42 
et  seq. 

10.  Ariz. — G  rand         International 
Brotherhood   of  Locomotive   Engi- 
neers   v.    Mills.    31    P.2d    971,    43 
Ariz.  379. 

34  C.J.  p  567  note  64. 

11.  U.S.— Iselin  v.  La  Coste,  C.C.A. 
La.,   147  F.2d  791— Rheinberger  v. 
Security  Life  Ins.  Co.  of  America, 
D.C.I1L,   51  F.Supp.   188,   cause  re- 
manded, C.C.A.,  146  F.2d  680. 

Ala,— Cobbs  v.  Norville,  151  So.  576, 

227  Ala.  621. 
Ark. — Carnes    v.    De  <•  Witt    Bank    & 

Trust    Co.,    147    S.W.2d    1002,    201 

Ark.  1037. 
Cai. — Salter  v.  Ulrich,  138  P.2d  7,  22 

Cal.2d  263,  146  A.L.R.  1344. 
Conn. — Lehrman    v.    Prague,    162    A. 

15,  115  Conn.  484. 
111.— Mutual    Ben.    Life    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Lyons.  20  N.B.2d  784,  371  111.  341— 

Lord  v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Kane 

County,  41  N.B.2d  106,  314  IlLApp. 

161. 
Ky.— Oliver  v.  Belcher,  265  S.W.  942, 

205  Ky.  417. 
Mass. — Bremmer  v.  Hester.  155  N.E. 

454,  258  Mass.  425. 
Mich. — Cook    v.    Casualty    Ass'n    of 


America,  224  N.W.  341,  246  Mich. 
278. 

Minn. — Weber  v.  Arend,  222  N.W. 
646,  176  Minn.  120. 

Miss. — Schwartz  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Staf- 
ford, 148  So.  794,  166  Miss.  397. 

Mo. — Crary  v.  Standard  Inv.  Co., 
285  S.W.  459,  313  Mo.  448. 

Neb. — Clayton  v.  Evans,  290  N.W. 
447,  137  Neb.  574. 

N.T.— Haacke  v.  Marx,  205  N.T.S. 
487,  210  App.Div.  248,  affirmed  148 
N.B.  70S,  240  N.T.  568— Collins 
v.  Burr,  204  N.Y.S.  357,  209  App. 
Div.  116. 

N.D.— Sukut  v.  Sukut  12  N.W.2d 
536,  73  N.D.  154. 

Okl.— Campbell  v.  Wood,  278  P.  281, 
137  Okl.  90. 

Pa. — Graham  Roller  Bearing  Corpo- 
ration v.  Stone,  126  A.  235,  281  Pa. 
229— Sholtz  v.  Drone,  Coxn.PL,  33 
DeLCo.  551. 

S.C.— Stone  v.  Mincey,  185  S.E.  619, 
ISO  S.C.  317. 

Tex. — Texas-Pacific  Coal  &  Oil  Co. 
v.  Ames,  Com. App.,  292  S.W.  191 — 
Gathings  v.  Robertson,  Civ.App., 
264  S.W.  173,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com.App.,  276  S.W.  218. 

Wash.— Baskin  v.  Livers,  43  P.2d  42, 
181  Wash.  370. 

W.Va, — G.  W.  C.  Land  Co.  v.  Geb- 
hardt,  35  S.E.2d  725. 

34  C.J.  p  567  note  67. 

Matters  concluded  by  judgment  see 
infra  §§  712-736. 

Particular  defenses 

(1)  Discharge      in      bankruptcy. — 
Reining   v.    Nevison,    213    N.W.    609, 

203  Iowa  995. 

(2)  Intrinsic  fraud  or  collusion. — 
Kendall   v.    Silver  King   of  Arizona 
Mining  Co.,  226  P.  540,  26  Ariz.  456 
—34  C.J.  p  567  note  67  [a]  (3). 

(3)  Paramount  or  adverse  title. 
111.— Sielbeck  v.    Grothman,    94   N.E. 

67,    248    111.  .436,    21   Ann.Cas.    229. 
Okl. — Ciesler    v.    Simpson,    105    P.2d 

862 


227,  187  Okl.  641,  followed  in  Cies- 
ler v.  Sykes,  105  P.2d  229,  187  Okl. 
643. 

(4)  Res    Judicata. — Commonwealth 
ex  rel.  Esenwein  v.  Esenwein,  33  A. 
2d  675,  153  Pa.Super.  69,  affirmed  35 
A.2d  335,  348  Pa,  455,  affirmed  65  S. 
Ct.  1118,  157  A.L.R.  1396. 

(5)  Usury. — Dallas    Trust   &   Sav- 
ings Bank  v.  Brashear,  Tex.Civ.App., 
39    S.W.2d    148,    modified    on    other 
grounds,  Coxn.App.,   65  S.W.2d  288. 

(6)  Other  defenses. 

Okl.— Davidson  v.  Whitfield,  99  P.2d 

156,  186  Okl.  536. 
S.C.— Stone  v.  Mincey,   185   S.E.   619, 

180  S.C.  317. 
34  C.J.  p  567  note  67  [a]. 

12.  N.D.— Fischer  v.  Dolwig,  166  N. 
W.  793,  39  N.D.  161. 

13.  U.S. — State  of  Louisiana  v.  Po- 
lice Jury  of  the  Parish  of  St.  Mar- 
tin, La.,  4  S.Ct.  648,   111  U.S.  716, 
28  L.Ed.  574. 

34  C.J.  p  567  note  70. 

14.  Idaho. — Evans  v.  City  of  Ameri- 
can Falls,  11  P.2d  363,  52  Idaho  7. 

Ky.— Ratlitt  v.  Sinberg,  79  S.W.2d 
717,  258  Ky.  203— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Turner  v.  Begley,  39  S.W.2d 
504,  506,  239  Ky.  281. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Gans 
&  Klein  Inv.  Co.  v.  Sanford,  8  P. 
2d  808,  811,  91  Mont  512. 

Nev.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Asel- 
tine  v.  Second  Judicial  Dist  Court 
in  and  for  Washoe  County,  De- 
partment No.  1,  62  P.2d  701,  702, 
57  Nev.  269. 

N.T.— Inglehart  v.  Slauson,  292  N.T. 
S.  325,  249  App.Div.  793. 

Ohio.— HCoxpns  Juris  quoted  in  Hofer 
v.  Hofer,  App.,  42  N.B.2d  165. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mag- 
nolia Petroleum  Co.  v.  Caswell, 
Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  653,  656,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing  de- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


436 


of  law  for  the  court.15  If  the  language  used  in  a 
judgment  is  ambiguous  there  is  room  for  construc- 
tion,16 but  if  the  language  employed  is  plain  and 
unambiguous  there  is  no  room  for  construction  or 
interpretation,1?  and  the  effect  thereof  must  be  de- 
clared in  the  light  of  the  literal  meaning  of  the 
language  used.18  A  court  will  not  construe  a 
judgment  or  decree  in  the  absence  of  the  assertion 
of  some  claim  or  right  to  be  litigated  in  a  proceed- 
ing which  the  court  has  jurisdiction  to  determine, 


and  in  which  the  questioned  meaning  bears  on  the 
question  to  be  determined.19 

The  general  rules  of  construction  of  written  in- 
struments have  been  held  to  apply  to  the  construc- 
tion of  judgments.20  The  intention  of  the  court 
must  be  determined21  from  all  parts  of  the  instru- 
ment,22 and  words  and  clauses  thereof  should  be 
construed  according  to  their  natural  and  legal  im- 
port.23 The  judgment  must  be  read  in  its  entire- 
ty,24 and  it  must  be  construed  as  a  whole25  so  as  to 


nied  7  S.W.2d  867,  certiorari  de- 
nied Caswell  v.  Magnolia  Petrole- 
um Co.,  49  S.Ct.  34,  278  U.S.  640,  73 
L.Ed.  555. 

Challenge  to  validity  is  not  in- 
volved in  the  mere  interpretation  of 
a  judgment. — Ballew  v.  Denny,  177 
S.W.2d  152,  296  Ky.  368,  150  A.L.R. 
770. 
Judgment  in  evidence 

A   judgment   which  has   been  ad- 
mitted  as   evidence  in  another  case 
must  be  construed  by  the  court  the 
same    as    other    documents    in    evi- 
dence.— Grasso  v.  Frattollllo,   149  A. 
838,  111  Conn.  209. 
15.    Mo. — Charles  v.  St.  Louis,  M.  & 
S.  B.  R.  Co.,  101  S.W.  680,  124  Mo. 
App.  293. 

Nev. — Corpus  Juris  auoted  in  Asel- 
tine  v.  Second  Judicial  Dist.  Court 
in  and  for  Washoe  County,  Depart- 
ment No.  1,  62  P.2d  701,  702,  57 
Nev,  269. 

Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hofer 
v.  Hofer,  App.,  42  N.B.2d  165,  167. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mag- 
nolia Petroleum  Co.  v.  Caswell, 
Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  653,  656,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com.App., 
1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing  denied  7 
S.W.2d  867,  certiorari  denied  49 
S.Ct.  34,  278  U.S.  640,  73  L.Ed. 
555. 

Court's    construction   of   own   Judg- 
ment 

(1)  A  court  has  the  right  to  con- 
strue   and    clarify    its    own    judg^ 
ment.— Hofer  v.  Hofer,  Ohio  App.,  42 
N.E.2d  165. 

(2)  Construction  of  own  judgmen 
by  trial  court  held  conclusive  on  ap- 
peal.—Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Bank- 
ers,   etc.,   Tel.   Co.,   23   N.B.   173,   11J 
N.T.  15— Hubbell  v.  Buhler,  21  N.B 
176,  113  N.Y.  653. 

16-  Tex. — General  Exchange  Ins 
Corporation  v.  Appling,  Civ.App. 
144  S.W.2d  699. 

17.  Tex. — Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v 
Caswell,    Com.App.,    1   S.W.2d   597 
rehearing  denied  7  S.W.2d  867,  cer 
tiorari  denied  Caswell  v.  Magnolia 
Petroleum  Co.,  49  S.Ct.  34,  278  U 
S.  640,  73  L.Ed.  555— General  Bx 
change    Ins.    Corporation    v.    Ap 
pling,   Oiv.App.,   144   S.W.2d   699. 

18.  Tex.— General     Exchange     Ins, 
Corporation  v.  Appling,  supra. 


Order  following  words,  "It  is  by 
he  court  ordered,  adjudged  and  de- 
reed,"  is  final  and  controlling  por- 

on  of  judgment,  and,  if  clear  and 
nambiguous,  will  be  given  effect. — 
mo  Oil  &  Gas  Co.  v.  Charles  E. 
Knox  Oil  Co.,  250  P.  117,  120  Okl.  13. 

9.  N.M.— Village  of  Springer  v. 
Springer  Ditch  Co.,  144  P.2d  165,  47 
N.M.  456. 


20.  Idaho. — Evans  v.  City  of  Ameri- 
can Falls,  11  P.2d  363,  52  Idaho  7. 

owa.— Whittier  v.  Whittier,  23  N.W. 
2d  435. 

Ky. — Toms  v.  Holmes,  171  S.W.2d 
245,  294  Ky.  233 — Decker  v.  Tyree, 
264  S.W.  726,  204  Ky.  302. 
e. — Milo  Water  Co.  v.  Inhabitants 
of  Town  of  Milo,  7  A.2d  895,  136 
Me.  228. 

Miss. — Rayl  v.  Thurman,  125  So.  912, 
156  Miss.  8. 

Tex.— Permian  Oil  Co.  v.  Smith,  107 
S.W.2d  564,  129  Tex.  413,  111  A.L. 
R.  1152— Larrison  v.  Walker,  Civ. 
App.,  149  S.W.2d  172,  error  re- 
fused— In  re  Supples1  Estate,  Civ. 
App.,  131  S.W.2d  13— Austin  v. 
Conaway,  Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  189. 

Character  of  instrument 

(1)  Decrees  are  usually  to  be  in- 
terpreted  in   accordance   with   theii 
true  character  without  much  regard 
to  their  title.— Hays  v.  The  Georgian 
Inc.,   181  N.B.  765,  280   Mass.   10,  85 
A.L.R.  1251. 

(2)  Character  of  decree   is  deter- 
mined  by    particular   facts    of   case 
and    equitable    rights    of    parties.— 
Sanders    v.    Sheets,    Mo.App.,    287    S 
W.  1069. 

(3)  The  character  of  a  particular 
judgment   has    been    determined    by 
construction  of  the  judgment— Mills 
Novelty  Co.  v.  Spurdis,  Tex.Civ.App 
29  S.W.2d  893,  error  dismissed. 
Ejusdem  generis 

(1)  In   construction    of   judgment 
rule  of  "ejusdem  generis"  is  applica 
ble    where    enumeration    of    specifi 
things  is  followed  by  some  genera 
word  or  phrase  in  which  case  such 
general   word  or  phrase   is  held  t 
refer  to  things  of  the  same  kind.— 
Stevenson  v.  Record  Pub.   Co.,  Tex 
Civ.App.,  107  S.W.2d  462,  error  dis 
missed. 

(2)  The  rule  is  inapplicable  wher 
general    words    or    phrase    precede 


peciflc  words  and  when  language 
f  judgment  wholly  fails  to  indicate 
ntention  to  limit  or  qualify  gen- 
ral  descriptive  language. — Stevenson 

Record  Pub.  Co.,  supra, 

Meaning  of  undefined  terms  may 
e  ascertained. — Anderson  v.  Palla- 
ine,  237  P.  758,  72  CaLApp.  433. 

Relative  terms,  including  word 
said,"  generally  refer  to  next  pre- 
eding  antecedent,  unless  it  is  clear 
rora  the  context  that  a  different  one 
was  intended. — Sharp  v.  Sharp,  164 
685,  333  111.  267. 


21.  Iowa.— Whittier  v.  Whittier,  23 
N.W.2d    435— Rank    v.    Kuhn,     20 
N.W.2d  72— Weir  &  Russell  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Kempf,   12  N.W.2d   857, 
234  Iowa  450— Button  v.   Schnack, 
275  N.W.   870,   224   Iowa,  251. 
Purpose  of  construction  is  to  de- 
ermine    intention    and    meaning    of 

author  of  the   judgment.— Cundy   v. 
Weber,   300  N.W.   17,   68   S.D.   214. 

22.  Iowa.— Whittier  v.  Whittier,  23 
N.W.2d  435— Rank  v.  Kuhn,   20  N.- 
•W.2d  72 — Weir  &  Russell  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Kempf,   12  N.W.2d  857,  234 
Iowa  450. 

Intention  as  expressed  in  Judgment 

(1)  Intention     as     expressed     in 
judgment  governs. — Gila  Valley  Irr. 
Dist.  v.  U.   S.,   C.C.A.Ariz.,   118    F.2d 
507. 

(2)  The    controlling    intention    of 
court's   judgment   is    that   expressed 
on  its  face  and  not  an  intention  that 
may  be  deduced  from  evidence  that 
court    had    before    it.— Harrison    v. 
Manvel  Oil  Co.,  180  S.W.2d  909,  142 
Tex.  669. 

23,  Neb.— Whaley  v.  Matthews,  287 
N.W.  205,  136  Neb.  767. 

24.  U.S.— National   Surety  Corpora- 
tion v.  Williams,  C.C.A.Ark.,  110  F. 
2d  873,  certiorari  denied  Williams 
v.  National  Surety  Corporation,  61 
S.Ct.  40,  311  U.S.  674,  85  L.Bd.  433. 

Conn. — Christiano  v.  Christiano,  41 
A.2d  779,  131  Conn.  589. 

Tex.— Campbell  v.  Schrock,  Com. 
App.,  50  S.W.Sd  788— Texas  Em- 
ployers' Ins.  Ass'n  v.  Ezell,  Com. 
App.,  16  S.W.2d  523— Cook  v. 
Smith,  Civ.App.,  96  S.W.2d  318, 
error  dismissed— Shawver  v.  Mas- 
terson,  Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  236,  er- 
ror refused. 

26.    U.S.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 


§  436 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


firing  all  of  its  parts  into  harmony  as  far  as  this 
can  be  done  by  fair  and  reasonable  interpretation26 
and  so  as  to  give  effect  to  every  word  and  part,  if 
possible,27  and  to  effectuate  the  obvious  intention28 
and  purpose29  of  the  court,  consistent  with  the  pro- 
visions of  the  organic  law.30 


Judgments  should  be  liberally  construed31  so  as 
to  make  them  serviceable  instead  of  useless.32  Nec- 
essary legal  implications  are  included  although  not 
expressed  in  terms.33  In  construing  a  judgment, 
however,  the  adjudication  should  not  extend  be- 


Boundary  County,  Idaho,  v.  Wold- 
son.  C.C.A.Idaho,  144  F.2d  17,  20, 
certiorari  denied  65  S.Ct  678,  324 
U.S.  843,  89  L.Ed. . 

Ala. — Floyd  v.  Jackson,  164  So.  121, 
26  Ala.App.  575. 

Ark. — Young  v.  City  of  Gurdon,  275 
S.W.  890,  169  Ark.  399. 

Cal.— Ex  parte  Carr,  151  P.2d  164, 
65  Cal.App.2d  681. 

Ind. — Pottenger  v.  Bond,  142  N.E. 
616,  81  Ind.App.  107. 

Iowa. — Button  v.  Schnack,  275  N. 
W.  870,  224  Iowa  251. 

Ky.— Deboe  v.  Brown,  22  S.W.2d  111, 
231  Ky.  682. 

Mass.— Dondis  v.  Lash,  186  N.B. 
549,  283  Mass.  353. 

Miss. — Rayl  v.  Thurman,  125  So.  912, 
156  Miss.  8. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  ex 
rel.  Anderson  Motor  Service  Co. 
v.  Public  Service  Commission,  134 
S.W.2d  1069,  1075,  234  Mo.App. 
470,  transferred  and  opinion  adopt- 
ed 154  S.W.2d  777,  348  Mo.  613. 

Neb.— Whaley  v.  Matthews,  287  N. 
W.  205,  136  Neb.  767. 

Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hof er 
v.  Hofer,  App.,  42  N.E.2d  165,  167. 

Tex. — Larrison  v.  Walker,  Civ.App., 
149  S.W.2d  172,  error  refused— 
General  Exchange  Ins.  Corpora- 
tion v.  Appling,  Civ.App.,  144  S. 
W.2d  699— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Caswell, 
Civ. App:,  295  S.W.  653,  656,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com.App., 
1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing  denied  7 
S.W.2d  867,  certiorari  denied  Cas- 
well v.  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.,  49 
S.Ct.  34,  278  U.S.  640,  73  L.Ed.  555. 

Utah.— Salt  Lake  City  v.  Telluride 
Power  Co.,  17  P.2d  281,  82  Utah 
607,  rehearing  denied  26  P.2d  822, 
82  Utah  622. 

34  C.J.  p  501  note  6. 

Every  phrase  must  "be  read  in  con- 
nection with  the  whole  instrument. 

— Milo  Water  Co.  v.  Inhabitants  of 

Town  of  Milo,   7  A.2d  895,   136  Me. 

228. 

26.  Neb.— Whaley  v.  Matthews,  287 
N.W.  205,  136  Neb.  767. 

N.C. — Lamb  v.  Major  &  Loomis  Co., 

60  S.E.  425,  146  N.C.  531. 
Tex. — Larrison  v.  Walker,   Civ.App., 

149  S.W.2d  172,  error  refused. 

27.  U.S. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Boundary  County,  Idaho  v.  Wold- 
son,   C.C.AJdaho,   144   F.2d  17,   20, 
certiorari  denied  65  S.Ct  678,  324 
U.S.  843,  89  LJBd.  1405. 

Iowa.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Weir  & 
Russell  Lumber  Co.  v.  Kempf,  12 
N.W.2d  857,  860,  234  Iowa  450* 


Kan.— McHenry   v.    Smith,    119    P.2d 

493,  154  Kan.  528. 
Ky.— Toms    v.    Holmes,    171    S.W.2d 

245,  294  Ky.  233. 
La. — In  re  Clover  Ridge  Planting  & 

Manufacturing    Co.,    193    So.    468, 

194  La.  77. 
Miss.— Rayl  v.  Thurman,  125  So.  912, 

156  Miss.  8. 
Mont. — State    v.    District    -Court    of 

First    Judicial    Dist.    ill    and    for 

Lewis  &  Clark  County,  233  P.  957, 

72  Mont.  374. 
Neb.— Whaley  v.  Matthews,  287  N.W. 

205,  136  Neb.  767— Burke  v.  Unique 

Printing  Co.,  88  N.W.  488,  63  Neb. 

264. 
Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hofer 

v.  Hofer,  App.,  42  N.E.2d  165,  167. 
Okl.— Pffle  v.  Sarkeys,  SO  P.2d  647, 

183    Okl.    201— Gade   v.   Loffler,    42 

P.Sd  815,  171  Okl.  313— McNeal  v. 

Baker,   274  P.  655,  135  Okl.  159. 
Tex. — Larrison  v.  Walker,   Civ.App., 

149    S.W.2d    172,    error    refused — 

Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Magnolia 

Petroleum    Co.    v.    Caswell,    Civ. 

App.,   295    S.W.   653,   656,   reversed 

on   other  grounds,   Com.App.,   1   S. 

W.2d  597,  rehearing  denied  7  S.W. 

2d    867,    certiorari   denied  Caswell 

v.   Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.,   49   S. 

Ct   34.   278  U.S.   640,   73  L.Ed.   555 

— Austin  v.  Conaway,  Civ.App.,  283 

S.W.  189. 
Utah.— Salt    Lake  City  v.    Telluride 

Power   Co.,   17  P.2d   281,    82   Utah 

607,  rehearing  denied  26  P.2d  822, 

82  Utah  622. 
34  C.J.  p  501  note  7. 

"No  particular  part  or  clause  in 
the  judgment  is  to  be  seized  upon 
and  given  the  power  to  destroy  the 
remainder  if  such  effect  can  be 
avoided." — Larrison  v.  Walker,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  149  S.W.2d  172,  178,  error 
refused. 

Weaning  of  words 

In  determining  meaning  of  words, 
courts  must  take  into  consideration 
their  conjunction  with  other  words 
and  the  purpose  of  their  use. — Spil- 
ler  v.  St  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  C.C. 
A.Mo.,  14  P.2d  284,  affirmed  in  part 
and  reversed  in  part  on  other 
grounds  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Spiller,  274  U.S.  304,  47  S.Ct.  635, 
71  L.Ed.  1060,  motion  denied  48  S. 
Ct.  96.  275  U.S.  156,  72  L.Ed.  214. 

28.  Cal. — Lazar  v.  Superior  Court  in 
and  for  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco,  107  P.2d  249,  16  Cal.2d 
617— Ex  parte  Carr,  151  P.2d  164, 
65  Cal.App.2d  681— Rinaldo  v. 
Board  of  Medical  Examiners  of 

864 


California,    12    P.2d    32,    123    Cal. 

App.  712. 
Fla. — City  of  Winter  Haven  v.  A.  M. 

Klemm  &  Son,  181  So.  153,  132  Fla. 

334,  rehearing  denied  182  So.   841, 

133  Fla.  525. 
Ky.— Clark  v.   McGrann,    117   S.W.2d 

1021,  274  Ky.  1 — Decker  v.  Tyree, 

264   S.W.   726,   204  Ky.   302. 
Miss. — Rayl  v.  Thurman,  125  So.  912, 

156  Miss.  8. 

29.  Ky. — Stearns    Coal    &    Lumber 
Co.  v.  Duncan,  113  S.W.2d  436,  271 
Ky.  800. 

30.  Fla. — City  of  Winter  Haven  v. 
A.   M.  Klemm  &  Son,   181  So.   153, 
132  Fla.  334,  rehearing  denied  182 
So.  841,  133  Fla.  525. 

31.  Mo. — Sanders    v.    Sheets,    App., 
287  S.W.  1069. 

Tex. — Lindsey  v.  Hart,  Com. App.,  276 
S.W.  199— Middlebrook  v.  Texas 
Indemnity  Ins,  Co.,  Civ. App.,  112 
S.W.2d  311,  error  dismissed  Texas 
Indemnity  Ins.  Co.  v.  Middlebrook, 
114  S.W.2d  226,  131  Tex,  163. 
Intention,  of  parties 

A  judgment  which  was  ambiguous 
in  certain  respects  due  to  some  over- 
sight or  inadvertence  either  on  part 
of  court  or  counsel  in  drawing  the 
judgment  was  to  be  liberally  con- 
strued with  a  view  to  giving  effect 
to  real  intention  of  parties. — Bank 
of  America  Nat.  Trust  &  Savings 
Ass'n  v.  Hill,  71  P.2d  258,  9  Cal.2d 
495. 

32.  Tex. — Lindsey    v.     Hart,     Com. 
App.,  276  S.W.  199— Middlebrook  v. 
Texas  Indemnity  Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App., 
112    S.W.2d    311,    error    dismissed 
Texas  Indemnity  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mid- 
dlebrook, 114  S.W.2d  226,  131  Tex. 
163. 

Xiiteral  construction. 
Tex. — In  re  Supples*  Estate,  Civ.App., 
131  S.W.2d  13. 

3.    Iowa.— Whittier  v.  Whittier,   23 

N.W.2d  435— Rank  v.  Kuhn,  20  N. 

W.2d    72— Corpus    Juris    cited    in 

Weir    &    Russell    Lumber    Co.    v. 

Kempf,    12    N.W.2d    857,    860,    234 

Iowa  450. 
Ky. — Toms    v.    Holmes,    171    S.W.2d 

245,  294  Ky.  233. 
La. — In  re  Clover  Ridge  Planting  & 

Manufacturing  Co.,  193  So.  468,  194 

La.  77. 
Mont. — State    v.    District    Court    of 

First    Judicial    Dist.    in    and  ,for 

Lewis    and   Clark   County,    233    P. 

957,  72  Mont  374. 
Neb.— Whaley  v.   Matthews,   287   N. 

W.  205,  136  Neb.  767. 
Nev. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Asel- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§436 


yond  that  which  the  language  used  fairly  war- 
rants,34 since  the  purpose  and  function  of  construc- 
tion is  to  give  effect  to  that  which  is  already  latent 
in  the  judgment,36  and  the  court  may  not  by  con- 
struction add  new  provisions  to  a  judgment  which 
were  omitted  or  withheld  in  the  first  instance.36  In 
construing  judgments  the  legal  effect,  rather  than 
the  mere  language  used,  governs,37 


Doubtful  or  ambiguous  judgments  are  to  have  a 
reasonable  intendment38  to  do  justice  and  avoid 
wrong.39  Where  a  judgment  is  susceptible  of  two 
interpretations,  that  one  will  be  adopted  which  ren- 
ders it  the  more  reasonable,  effective,  and  conclu- 
sive40 and  which  makes  the  judgment  harmonize 
with  the  facts  and  law  of  the  case  and  be  such  as 


tine  v.  Second  Judicial  Dist.  Court 
in  and  for  Washoe  County,  De- 
partment No.  1,  62  P.2d  701,  702, 
57  Nev.  269. 

Ohio. — Kosinski  v.  Rochowiak,  178 
N.E.  591,  40  Ohio  App.  299. 

Okl.— - Pflle  v.  Sarkeysz  SO  P.2d  647, 
183  Okl.  201— Gade  v.  Loffler,  42  P. 
2d  815,  171  Okl.  313— -McNeal  v. 
Baker,  274  P.  655,  135  Okl.  159. 

Tex. — Lindsey  v.  Hart,  Com.App., 
276  S.W.  199— Middlebrook  y.  Tex- 
as Indemnity  Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App., 
112  S.W.2d  811,  error  dismissed 
Texas  Indemnity  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mld- 
dlebrook,  114  S.W.2d  226,  131  Tex. 
163 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Keton 
v.  Clark,  Civ.App.,  67  %S.W.2d  437, 
439 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mag- 
nolia Petroleum  Co.  v.  Caswell, 
Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  653,  656,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com.App., 
1  S,W.2d  597,  rehearing  denied  7 
S.W.2d  867,  certiorari  denied  Cas- 
well v.  Magnolia  Petrole'um  Co.,  49 
S.Ct.  34,  278  U.S.  640,  73  L.Ed.  555. 

34'C.J.  p  502  note  9. 

Judgment  of  dismissal 

A  judgment  dismissing  a  complaint 
or    cross    complaint    is    in    effect    a 
judgment  against  the  pleader  on  the 
claim    presented    by    his    pleading. 
Cal.— Peterson    v.    Gibbs,    SI    P.    121, 

147  Cal.  1,  109  Am.S.R.  107. 
Ind. — Dickerson  v.  Dickerson,  10  N. 
E.2d  424,  104  Ind.App.  686,  af- 
firmed on  rehearing  11  N.E.2d  514, 
104  Ind.App.  686 — Smith  v.  Linton 
Trust  Co.,  121  N.E.  92,  68  Ind.App. 
691. 

Silence 

(1)  Generally   all   claims   not   ex- 
pressly disposed  of  are  by  implica- 
tion    disallowed     by     a     judgment 
against  the  party  asserting  such  in- 
terests or  claims. 

La. — Perot's  Estate  v.  Perot,  148 
So.  903,  177  La.  640— McMichael  v. 
'Thomas,  113  So.  828,  164  La.  233 
—Williams  v.  Ralph  R.  Miller 
Shows,  App.,  15  So.2d  249,  adhered 

•  to  17  So.2d  67,  amended  17  So.2d 
389 — Rains  v.  Thomason  &  Cham- 
pion, 135  So.  92,  17  La.App.  120. 

Tex. — Texas  Employers  Ins,  Ass'n  v. 
Shackelford,  Civ.App.,  158  S.W.2d 
572,  reversed  on  other  grounds  164 
S.W.2d  657,  139  Tex.  653. 

34  C.J.  p  502  note  9  [a]   (1). 

(2)  If   two   causes   of  action  are 
alleged  and  put  in  .issue,  and  judg- 
ment awards  recovery  on  one  but  is 
silent    as    to    the    other,    judgment 

49  0.  J.S.-35 


is  prima  facie  an  adjudication  that 
plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  recover 
on  the  other  cause. — Keystone  Cop- 
per Min.  Ce.  v.  Miller,  Ariz.,  164  P.2d 
003—34  C.J.  p  502  note  9  [a]  (6). 

(3)  Failure  of  judgment  to  allow 
full  amount  of  claim  constitutes  re- 
j  action  of  balance  of  claim,  as  much 
as   though  decree   expressly  so   pro- 
vided.— Merrill    v.    Louisiana    Mate- 
rials Co.,  174  So.  349,  187  La.  259. 

(4)  Where      judgment,      in      suit 
against  owners  of  realty  for  judg- 
ment    for     amount     advanced     and 
paid  for  taxes   by  plaintiff  and  for 
lien  and  privilege  on  realty  resulting 
from  alleged  tax  subrogations,   was 
for    plaintiff   for   amount   advanced, 
without  any  recognition  being  given 
to  lien  and  privilege,  demands  with 
respect    to    the    lien    and    privilege 
must   be   deemed   to   have   been   re- 
jected.— Lacaze   v.    Kardee,    La. App., 
7  So.2d  719. 

(5)  However,    judgment    for    debt 
without    mention    of    lien    does    not 
constitute  denial  of  fact  that  debt  is 
secured   by  lien,    where   no   demand 
was  made  for  recognition  of  lien. — 
Perot's  Estate  v.  Perot,  148  So.  903, 
177  La,  640.  . 

Time  of  payment 

Where  final  decree  did  not  fix  time 
for  payment,  the  implication  was 
that  payment  was  to  be  made  forth- 
with.—Boyer  v.  Bowles,  54  N.E.2d 
925,  316  Mass.  90. 
34,  La.— Schultz  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  186  So.  49,  191  La.  624. 
Pa. — Nether      Providence      Tp.      v. 

Young,  Com.Pl.,  33  Del. Co.  213. 
34  C.J.  p  502  note  10. 

Absence  of  ambiguity 
.  Where  language  of  judgment  was 
in  the  present  tense  and  adjudged 
that  plaintiff's  inheritable  interest  in 
land  "is  found  to  be"  an  undivided 
interest,  judgment  was  a  determina- 
tion as  to  plaintiff's  present  interest 
and  not  merely  a  determination  that 
at  some  past  time  plaintiff  inherited 
an  interest  therein, — Moore  v.  Harjo, 
C.C.A.Okl.,  144  F.2d  318. 

36.    U.S.— Butler    v.    Denton,    C.C.A. 
Okl.,  150  F.2d  687. 

36.  U.S. — Butler   v.    Denton,    supra. 

37.  Mo.— Corpus      Juris      cited      in 

State  ex  rel.  Anderson  Motor  Serv- 
ice Co.  v.  Public  Service  Commis- 
sion, 134  S.W.2d  1069,  1076,  234  Mo. 
App.  470,  transferred  and  opinion 

865 


adopted  154  S.W.2d  777,  348  Mo. 
613. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Gans 
&  Klein  Inv.  Co.  v.  Sanford,  8  P. 
2d  808,  811,  91  Mont.  512. 

Ohio. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hofer 
v.  Hofer,  App.,  42  N.B.2d  165,  167. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  oited  in  Keton 
v.  Clark,  Civ.App.,  67  S.W.2d  437, 
439,  error  refused — Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co. 
v.  Caswell,  Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  653, 
656,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing 
denied  7  S.W.2d  867,  certiorari  de- 
nied Caswell  v.  Magnolia  Petro- 
leum Co.,  49  S.Ct.  34,  278  U.S. 
640,  73  L.Ed.  555. 

34  C.J.  p  502  note  11. 

38.  Cal. — Corpus      Juris      cited     in 
Treece   v.   Treece,   14   P.2d   95,   125 
CaLApp.  726. 

Ga. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Jordan 
v.  Russell,  172  S.B.  469,  470,  48 
Ga.App.  200. 

Iowa.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Weir  & 
Russell  Lumber  Co.  v.  Kempf,  12 
N.W.2d  857,  860,  234  Iowa  450. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  ex 
rel.  Anderson  Motor  Service  Co.  v. 
Public  Service  Commission,  134  S. 
W.2d  1069,  1079,  234  Mo.App.  470, 
transferred  and  opinion  adopted 
154  S.W.2d  777,  348  Mo.  613. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Gans 
&  Klein  Inv.  Co.  v.  Sanford,  8 
P.2d  808,  811,  91  Mont.  512. 

Tex.— Wink  v.  Wink,  Civ.App.,  169 
S.W.2d  721— In  re  Supples'  Estate, 
Civ.App.,  131  S.W.2d  13— Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Magnolia  Petro- 
leum Co.  v.  Caswell,  Civ.App.,  295 
S.W.  653,  £56,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com. App.,  1  S.W.2d  597, 
rehearing  denied  7  S.W.2d  867, 
certiorari  denied  Caswell  v.  Mag- 
nolia Petroleum  Co.,  48  S.Ct.  34, 
278  U.S.  640,  73  L.Bd.  555. 

34  C.J.  p  502  note  13. 
Common-sense  construction  will  be 

put  on  language  as  a  whole. — In  re 

Supples'  Estate,  Tex.Civ.App.,  131  S. 

W.2d    13— Cook    v.    Smith,    Tex.Civ. 

App.,  96  S.W.2d  318,  error  dismissed. 

39.  U.S.— Rothschild  &  Co.  v.   Mar- 
shall, D.C.Wash.,  47  F.2d   919,  re- 
versed on    other   grounds.    C.C.A., 
51  F.2d  897. 

Mont — Gans  &  Klein  Inv.  Co,  v. 
Sanford,  8  P.2d  808,  91  Mont.  512. 

40.  U.S. — Hendrie  v.  Lowmaster,  C. 
C.A.Mich.,    152    F.2d    83— Pen-Ken 
Gas  &  Oil  Corporation  v.  Warfleld 


§  436 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ought  to  have  been  rendered.41  If  possible,  that 
construction  will  be  adopted  which  will  support  the 
judgment,  rather  than  one  which  will  destroy  it.42 


All  presumptions  are  in  support  of  the  judgment; 
nothing  will  be  presumed  against  it.43 


Natural  Gas  Co.,  C.C.A.Ky.,  137  P. 
2d  871,  certiorari  denied  64  S.Ct. 
431,  320  U.S.  800,  88  L.Ed.  483, 
rehearing  denied  64  S.Ct.  634,  321 
U.S.  803,  88  L.Ed.  1089. 

Ga. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  In  Jordan 
v.  Russell,  172  S.E.  469,  470,  48  Ga. 
App.  200. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Evans 
Y.  City  of  American  Falls,  11  P. 
2d  363,  368,  52  Idaho  7. 

Kan. — McHenry  v.  Smith,  119  P.2d 
493,  154  Kan.  528. 

Ky. — Toms  v.  Holmes,  171  S.W.2d 
245,  294  Ky.  233. 

La. — Harrison  v.  Godbold,  McG.  p 
178. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Gans 
&  Klein  Inv.  Co.  v.  Sanford,  8 
P.2d  808,  811,  91  Mont.  512. 

N.C.— Seip  v.  Wright,  91  S.E.  359, 
173  N.C.  14. 

Tex. — Agey  v.  Barnard,  Civ. App.,  123 
S.W.2d  484,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Keton  v.  Clark,  Civ. App.,  67 
S.W.2d  437,  439,  error  refused — 
Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Magnolia 
Petroleum  Co.  v.  Caswell,  Civ.App., 
295  S.W.  653,  £56,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds,  Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d 
597,  rehearing  denied  7  S.W.2d 
867,  certiorari  denied  Caswell  v. 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.,  49  S.Ct. 
34,  278  U.S.  640,  73  L.Ed.  555. 

W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Farmers  of  Greenbrier  County  v. 
Greenbrier  County  Court,  143  S.E. 
347,  105  W.Va.  567. 

41.  u.s. — Hendrie  v.  Lowmaster,  C. 
C.A.Mich.,  152  P.2d  83— Pen-Ken 
Gas  &  Oil  Corporation  v.  Warfield 
Natural  Gas  Co.,  C.C.A.Ky.,  137  P. 
2d  871,  certiorari  denied  64  S.Ct. 
431,  320  U.S.  800,  88  L.Ed.  483, 
rehearing  denied  64  S.Ct.  634,  321 
U.S.  803,  88  L.Ed.  1089— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Burton  v.  Equitable 
Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S.,  D.C. 
Okl.,  21  F.Supp.  62,  65. 

Cal. — Treece  v.  Treece,  14  P.2d  95, 
125  Cal-App.  726— McAlister  v. 
Dungan,  291  P.  419,  108  CaLApp. 
185— Boyer  v.  Crichton,  279  P.  677, 
100  CaLApp.  24. 

Ga. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Jordan 
v.  Russell,  172  S.E.  469,  470,  48 
Ga.App.  200. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Evans 
v.  City  of  American  Palls,  11  P.2d 
363,  368,  52  Idaho  7. 

Minn.— Parten  v.  Pirst  Nat  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  283  N.W.  408,  204 
Minn.  200,  120  A.L.R.  962. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Wilkerson  v.  Kel- 
ly, 142  S.W.2d  27,  346  Mo.  416. 

Mont— Quigley  v.  Mclntosh,  103  P. 
2d  1067,  110  Mont.  495— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Gans  &  Klein  Inv.  1 


Co.    v.    Sanford,   .8    P.2d    808,    811, 
91  Mont.  512. 

Xev. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Asel- 
tine  v.  Second  Judicial  Dist.  Court 
in  and  for  Washoe  County,  De- 
partment No.  1,  62  P.2d  701,  702, 
57  Nev.  269. 

N.C. — Berrier  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Davidson  County,  120  S.E.  328, 
186  N.C.  564. 

Tex. — In  re  Supples*  Estate,  Civ.App., 
131  S.W.2d  13— Cook  v.  Smith,  Civ. 
App.,  96  S.W.2d  318,  error  dismiss- 
ed— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Keton 
v.  Clark,  Civ.App.,  67  S.W.2d  437, 
439,  error  refused — Corpus  Juris 
quoted  in  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co. 
v.  Caswell,  CivJlpp.,  295  S.W.  653, 
656,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing 
denied  7  S.W.2d  867,  certiorari 
denied  Caswell  v.  Magnolia  Petro- 
leum Co.,  49  S.Ct.  34,  278  U.S. 
640,  73  L.Ed.  555 — Austin  v.  Con- 
away,  Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  189. 

W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Farmers  of  Greenbrier  County  v. 
Greenbrier  County  Court,  143  S.E. 
347,  105  W.Va.  567. 

34  C.J.  p  502  note  15. 

42.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bur- 
ton v.  Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc. 
of  U.  S.,  D.CXOkl.,  21  P.Supp.  62, 
65. 

Cal.— Williams  v.  Williams,  56  P.2d 
1253,  13  Cal.App.2d  433. 

Ga. — Byrd  v.  Goodman,  25  S.E.2d 
34,  195  Ga.  621— Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed in  Chappell  v.  Small,  20  S.E.2d 
916,  920,  194  Ga.  143. 

Ky. — Decker  v.  Tyree,*264  S.W.  726, 
204  Ky.  302. 

Tex. — Jackson  v.  Slaughter,  Civ.App., 
185  S.W.2d  759,  refused  for  want 
of  merit — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Keton  v.  Clark,  Civ.App.,  67  S.W. 
2d  437,  439,  error  refused — Corpus 
Juris  quoted  in  Magnolia  Petro- 
leum Co.  v.  Caswell,  Civ.App.,  295 
S.W.  653,  656,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  597, 
rehearing  denied  7  S.W.2d  867,  cer- 
tiorari denied  Caswell  v.  Magnolia 
Petroleum  Co.,  49  S.Ct.  34,  278  U. 
S.  640,  73  L.Ed.  555— Austin  v. 
Conaway,  Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  189. 

W.Va. — McClung  v.  Sewell  Valley  R. 
Co.,  159  S.E.  521,  110  W.Va.  621, 
amended  on  other  grounds  State  v. 
Sharp,  160  S.E.  302,  111  W.Va. 
39. 

Wis.— In  re  Corse's  Will,  217  N.W. 
726,  195  Wis.  88. 

34  C.J.  p  502  note  16. 

Conformity  to  pleadings 

If   decree    is    susceptible   of   more 

than    one    construction,    it    must   be 

interpreted  to  conform  to  pleadings 

and  proceedings  as  -evidenced  by  rec- 
ord.— Tilton  v.   Horton,   137   So.   801, 

866 


103  Pla.  497,  rehearing  denied  139 

So.  142,  103  Pla.  497. 

Correct  application  of  law  to  facts 

When  language  of  decree  is  sus- 
ceptible of  two  constructions,  from 
one  of  which  it  follows  that  law 
has  been  correctly  applied  to  facts 
and  from  other  that  law  has  been  in- 
correctly applied,  that  construction 
should  be  adopted  which  correctly 
applies  the  law. 
Ind. — In  re  Summers,  137  N.E.  291, 

79  Ind.App.  108. 
Tex. — Davis   v.   Pirst   Nat.    Bank   of 

Waco,    Civ.App.,     145     S.W.2d    707, 

affirmed  161   S.W.2d   467,   139   Tex. 

36,     144     A.L.R.      1— Robinson     v. 

Hays,   Civ.App.,   62   S.W.2d   1007. 
"trt  res  tnagis  valeat  quam  pereat" 

In  construing  a  judgment  the  max- 
im, "Ut  res  magis  valeat  quam  pe- 
reat," has  been  employed. — Texas  Co. 
v.  Martin,  C.C.A.Tex.,  109  P.2d  305. 
"Ut  res  magis  valeat  quam  pereat" 

denned  see  66  C.J.  p  381  note  79. 

43.  Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Pagras  v.  Marks,  43  P.2d  108,  109, 
171  Okl.  413. 

Tex. — Jackson  v.  Slaughter,  Civ.App., 
185  S.W.2d  759,  refused  for  want 
of  merit — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Cas- 
well, Civ.App.t  295  S.W.  653,  656, 
reversed  on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing  de- 
nied 7  S.W.2d  867,  certiorari  denied 
Caswell  v.  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co., 
49  S.Ct  34,  278  U.S.  640,  73  L. 
Ed.  555. 

34  C.J.  p  503  note  19. 
Grounds  for  Judgment 

Where  a  general  judgment  may 
have  been  based  on  two  or  more 
grounds,  one  of  which  would  be  er- 
roneous, and  the  others  proper,  it  is 
presumed  that  the  judgment  was 
based  on  the  proper  ground. — West- 
ern Paving  Co.  v.  Board  of  Com'rs 
of  Lincoln  County,  81  P.2d  652,  183 
Okl.  281. 
Judgments  of  other  courts 

(1)  In    construing    the    judgment 
of  another  court  of  equal  rank  in  the 
same   system,    it   will   be   presumed, 
in  the  absence  of  clear  expressions 
to    the    contrary,     that    such    other 
court   holds    the    same   view   of   the 
law  on  which  the  Judgment  is  based 
as  that  held  by  the  construing  court. 
— Adoue  v.  Wettermark,  68  S.W.  553, 
28  Tex.Civ.App.  593. 

(2)  Courts     in      construing     final 
judgments  of  other   courts  of  com- 
petent   jurisdiction   will   not   go    be- 
hind  them   or  question   the   wisdom 
thereof. — Burton    v.    Equitable    Life 
Assur.    Soc.    of    U.    S.,    D.C.Oklv    21 
P.Supp.  62. . 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


436 


A  judgment  must  be  construed  in  light  of  the  sit- 
uation of  the  court,44  what  was  before  it,45  and 
the  accompanying  circumstances.46  In  cases  of  am- 
biguity or  doubt  the  meaning  of  the  judgment  must 
be  determined  by  that  which  preceded  it  and  that 
which  it  was  intended  to  execute.47 

A  construction  adopted  or  acquiesced  in  by  the 
parties  will  not  be  changed  without  strong  rea- 
son.48 

Abbreviations.  In  construing  a  judgment  the 
court  may  ascertain  the  meaning  of  abbreviations 
used  therein.49 

Party   preparing   decree.     Where   a    decree 


is 


agreed  on  in  open  court,  the  fact  that  one  of  the 
parties  prepared  the  decree  does  not  require  it  to 
be  construed  more  strongly  against  such  party.50 

b.  Aids  to  Construction 

In  case  of  doubt  or  ambiguity  a  Judgment  may  be 
construed  in  the  light  of  the  entire  Judgment  roil  OP 
record. 

As  a  general  rule,  the  meaning,  effect,  and  legal 
consequences  of  a  judgment  must  be  ascertained 
from  its  own  provisions  and  language,  if  possible.51 
If,  however,  the  judgment  is  ambiguous  or  obscure, 
or  a  satisfactory  interpretation  cannot  be  deter- 
mined from  the  judgment  itself,52  the  entire  judg- 


(3)  They  must  presume  that  court 
rendering    Judgment    would    render 
proper  Judgment   within   limitations 
of   statute   fixing   its   Jurisdiction. — 
Burton  v.  Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc. 
of  U.  S.,  supra. 

(4)  Where  effect  of  a  Judgment  of 
another   court  is   questioned  and   in 
absence  of  clarity  of  such  judgment, 
a  court  should  look  to  source  of  ju- 
risdiction from  which  power  to  ren- 
der judgment  is  derived. — Burton  v. 
Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.  of  U.  S., 
supra. 

44.  Cal.— Rinaldo  v.  Board  of  Med- 
ical   Examiners    of  California,    12 
P.2d  32,  123  CaLApp.  712. 

45.  U.S. — Pen-Ken   Gas  &  Oil  Cor- 
poration v.  Warfleld  Natural  Gas 
Co.,   C.C.A.Ky.,    137   F.2d    871,    cer- 
tiorari denied  64  S.Ct.  431,  320  U.S. 
800,  88  L.Ed.  483,  rehearing  denied 
64    S.Ct.   -634,    321   U.S.    803,    88   L. 
Ed.  1089* 

Cal. — Newport  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Stanislaus  County,  230  P.  168,  192 
Cal.  D2. 

Ky. — Toms  v.  Holmes,  171  S.W.2d 
245,  294  Ky.  233— Hays  v.  Madi- 
son County,  118  S.W.2d  197,  274 
Ky.  116. 

46.  Cal. — Rinaldo  v.  Board  of  Medi- 
cal   Examiners    of   California,    12 
P.2d  82,  123  CaLApp.  712. 

Conn. — Christiaaao  v.  Christiano,  41 
A.2d  779,  131  Conn.  589. 

Idaho.— Evans  v.  City  of  American 
Falls,  11  P.2d  363,  52  Idaho  7. 

Iowa.— Hargrave  v.  City  of  Keokuk, 
223  N.W.  274,  208  Iowa  559. 

Tex.— In  re  Supples'  Estate,  Civ.App., 
131  S.W.2d  13— Corpus  Juris  quot- 
ed in,  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v. 
Caswell,  Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  653, 
656,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing 
denied  7  S.W.2d  867,  certiorari  de- 
nied Caswell  v.  Magnolia  Petro- 
leum Co.,  49  S.Ct  34,  278  U.S.  640, 
73  L.Ed.  555. 

34  C.J.  p  506  note  58. 

47.  U.S.— Union    Pacific    R.    Co.    v. 
Mason  City  &  Fort  Bodge  B.  Co., 
Neb.,    32    S.Ct    86,    227    U.S.    237, 


56  L.Ed.  180— Hendrie  v.  Lowmas-  j 
ter,  C.C.A.Mich.,   152   F.2d   83. 
Ohio.— Silver  v.  McKnight  App.,   49 

N.E.2d  89. 
Pa.— Catanzaritti   v.   Bianco,    198-  A. 

806,  131  Pa.Super.  207. 
Tex. — Royal  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Good- 
bar   &   Page,   Civ. App.,    48    S.W.2d 
1021 — Prince      v.       Frost- Johnson 
Lumber    Co.,    Civ. App.,    250    S.W. 
785. 
{Purport  and  intent  of  action, 

When  the  wording  of  a  Judgment 
is  not  clear,  it  should  be  construed 
so  as  to  carry  out  the  evident  pur- 
port and  intent  of  the  action,  rather 
than  defeat  it — Gade  v.  Loffler,  42  P. 
2d  815,  171  Okl.  313— McNeal  v.  Ba- 
ker, 274  P.  655,  135  Okl.  159. 

The  situation  to  which  the  judg- 
ment   was    to    be    applied    and    the 
purpose   sought  to   be  accomplished 
must  be  considered. 
Okl.— Gade   v.    Loffler,    42    P.2d    815, 

171  Okl.  313. 
Tenn. — Southwestern        Presbyterian 

University  v.  City  of  Clarksville, 

259  S.W.  550,  149  Tenn.  256. 

48.  Minn.— Parten     v.     First     Nat 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,   283   N.W.  408, 
204  Minn.  200,  120  A.L.R.   962. 

Mont.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Wal- 
lace v.  Goldberg,  231  P.  56,  58,  72 
Mont  234. 

N.M.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  La  Luz 
Community  Ditch  Co.  v.  Town  of 
Alamogordo,  279  P.  72,  77,  34  N.M, 
127. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Magno* 
lia  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Caswell,  Civ. 
App,,  295  S.W.  653,  656,  reversed 
on  other  grounds,  Com.App.,  1  S. 
W.2d  597,  rehearing  denied  7  S.W. 
2d  867,  certiorari  denied  Caswell  v. 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.,  49  S.Ct. 
34,  278  U.S.  640,  73  L.Ed.  555. 

34  C.J.  p  503  note  20. 

49.  "P*." 

In  suit  on  Swiss  judgment  court's 
finding  that  abbreviation  "fr."  indi- 
cated franc  was  held  not  error. — In- 
dian Refining  Co.  v.  Valvoline  Oil 
Co.,  C.C.A.I11.,  75  F.2d  797. 

867 


50.  Ark.— Gregory  v.  Bubel,  41  S.W. 
2d  771,  184  Ark.  55. 

Reason  for  rule 

Who  prepared  the  decree  is  im- 
material because  it  would  have  to  be 
prepared  in  accordance  with  the  find- 
ing of  the  court. — Gregory  v.  Rubel, 
supra. 

51.  N.J.— Parmly  v.  Parmly,  1  A.2d 
646,  16  N.J.Misc.  447,  affirmed  5  A. 
2d  789,  125  N.J.Eq.  545. 

Tex. — Agey  v.  Barnard,  Civ.App., 
123  S.W.2d  484,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 

Reference  to   extraneous  factor* 

(1)  Judgment  which  is   plain  and 
unambiguous  may  not  be  interpreted 
in  light  of  subsequent  or  prior  state- 
ments or  acts  of  court  evincing  ju- 
dicial intention  when  Judgment  was 
rendered,  nor  can  Judgment  be  sus- 
tained or  -explained  by  reference  to 
understanding      of      parties,       even 
though  entered  pursuant  to  stipula- 
tion.— Cook   v.    Smith,    Tex.Civ.App., 
96  S.W.2d  318,  error  dismissed. 

(2)  Judgment  may  not  be  explain- 
ed  by  understanding   of  parties  al- 
though entered  by  stipulation  nor  by 
prior   or    subsequent    statements    of 
the  court — Austin  v.  Conaway,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  189. 

Xiaaguage  of  Judgment 

(1)  Legal    effect    of   Judgment   as 
written  must  prevail,  regardless   of 
what    trial    court    had    in    mind, — 
•Schrock    v.    Campbell,    Tex.Civ.App., 
34    S.W.2d    324,    modified    on    other 
grounds  Campbell  v.   Schrock,   50   S. 
W.2d  788. 

(2)  Judgment     that     plaintiff     is 
owner   of   undivided   one-fourth   in- 
terest to  property  is  not  adjudica- 
tion of  partnership. — James  v.  Hall, 
264  P.  516,  88  CaLApp.  528. 

52.  U.S.— Moore  v.  Harjo,  C.C.A.Okl., 
144   F.2d   318— Mueller  v.   Mueller, 
C.C.A.Ark.,  124  F.2d  644,  certiorari 
dismissed    62    S.Ct    1288,   316   U.S. 
649,  86  L.Bd.  1732— Louisiana  Land 
&    Exploration    Co.    v.    Parish    of 
Jefferson,  La.,  D.C.La.,  69  F.Supp. 
260. 


§  436 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.& 


ment  roll  or  record  may  be  looked  to,  examined, 
and  considered  for  the  purpose  of  interpreting  the 
judgment58  and  determining  its  operation  and  ef- 
fect.54 


A  judgment,  plain  and  unambiguous  in  its  terms, 
may  not  be  modified,  enlarged,  restricted,  or  demin- 
ished  by  reference  to  the  opinion  or  decision  of  the 
court;55  but  it  is  generally  held  that  the  opinion 


Ala. — Taunton   v.  Dobbs,   199   So.    9, 

240  Ala,  287. 
Cal. — Vasiljevich   v.    Radanovich,    31 
P.2d    802,    138    CaLApp.    97— ^line- 
ban   v.    Silveria,    21   P.2d    617,    131 
CaLApp.    317 — Boyer    v.    Crichton, 
279    P.    677,    100    Cal.App.    24. 
Fla. — McGregor    v.    Provident    Trust 
Co.    of .  Philadelphia,    162    So.    323, 
119  Pla.  71S. 
Ind. — State    ex    rel.    Booth    v.    Beck 
Jewelry  Enterprises,   Inc.,  41  N.E. 
2d  622,  220  Ind.  276,  141  A.L.R.  876. 
Iowa. — Sutton  v.  Schnack,   275  N.W. 

870,  224  Iowa  251. 
Kan. — Shelley   v.   Sentinel   Life    Ins. 

Co.,  69  P.2d  737,  146  Kan.  227. 
Ky.— Culton  v.  Couch,  20  S.W.2d  451, 

230  Ky.  586. 

Me. — Milo  Water  Co.  v.  Inhabitants 

of  Town  of  Milo,  7  A.2d  895,   136 

Me.   22S. 

Minn. — Parten  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.,  283  N.W.  408,  204  Minn. 
200,   120  A.L.R.  962. 
Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  ex 
reL  Anderson  Motor  Service  Co.  v. 
Public  Service  Commission,  134  S. 
W.2d  1069,  234  Mo.App.  470,  trans- 
ferred and  opinion  adopted  154  S. 
W.2d  777,  348  Mo,  613. 
Mont. — Quigley   v.   Mclntosh,   103   P. 

2d  1067,  110  Mont.  495. 
Nev. — Corpus  Juris  guoted  in  Asel- 
tine  v.  Second  Judicial  Dist.  Court 
in  and  for  Washoe  County,  De- 
partment No.  1,  62  P.2d  701,  702, 
57  Nev.  269. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  La  Luz 
Community  Ditch  Co.  v.  Town  of 
Alamogordo,  279  P.  72,  77,  34  N. 
M.  127. 

N.Y. — People  v.  Shoemaker,  239  N.Y. 
S.  71,  228  App.Div.  314— In  re 
Cullen's  Estate,  297  N.Y.S.  280,  163 
Misc.  410. 

Ohio.— Corpus  JUris  quoted  in  Hof er 
v.  Hofer,  App.,  42  N.E.2d  165,  167. 
Tenn. — Fleming  v.  Kemp,  178  S.W. 
.  2d  397,  27  Tenn.App.  150. 
Tex. — Campbell  v.  Schrock,  Com. 
App.,  50  S.W.2d  788 — Walston  v. 
Price,  Civ.App.,  159  S.W.2d  548 — 
General  Exchange  Ins.  Corporation 
v.  Appling,  Civ.App.,  144  S.W.2d 
699 — Agey  v.  Barnard,  Civ.App., 
123  S.W.2d  484,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct — Shawver  v.  Mas- 
terson,  Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  236, 
error  refused — Corpus  Juris  quoted 
in  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Cas- 
well,  Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  653,  656, 
reversed  on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing-  de- 
nied 7  S.W.2d  867,  certiorari  de- 
nied Caswell  v.  Magnolia  Petro- 
leum Co.,  49  S.Ct.  34,  278  U.S.  640, 
73  LJEd.  -555— Banister  v.  Eades, 
Civ.App..  282  S.W.  851— -Prince  v. 


Frost-Johnson  Lumber  Co,,  Civ. 
App.,  250  S.W.  785. 

Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ta- 
coma  Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n  v. 
Nadham,  128  P.2d  982,  990,  14 
Wash.2d  576 — George  v.  Jenks,  85 
P.2d  1083,  197  Wash.  551— Gollehon 
v.  Gollehon,  34  P.2d  1113,  178 
Wash.  372. 

Wis.— In  re  Kehl's  Estate,  254  N.W. 
639,  215  Wis.  353. 

34  C.J.  p  502  note  12. 

Hatters  considered 

(1)  In  construing  ambiguous  Judg- 
ment, court  may  look  to  entire  rec- 
ord,  including  such  matters  as  the 
citation,  the  pleadings,  issues  made, 
testimony     offered     in     support     of 
pleadings,     trial    court's    charge    to 
jury,    facts    found    by    such    court, 
and  other  proceedings  leading  up  to 
judgment. — Lipsitz     v.     First     Nat. 
Bank,    Tex.Civ.App.,     293     S.W.    563, 
modified  on  other  grounds,  Com.App., 
296  S.W.  490 — Wagner  v.  Hogan,  Tex. 
Civ. App.,  161  S.W.2d  849 — In  re  Sup- 
pies'   Estate,   Tex.Civ.App.,   131   S.W. 
2d  13 — Dagley  v.  Leeth,  Tex.Civ.App., 
106   S.W.2d  730— Dearing  v.  City  of 
Port  Neches,  Tex.Civ.App.,  65  S.W.2d 
1105,  error  refused. 

(2)  The  full  scope  and  meaning  of 
a  judgment  is  often  determined  by 
an  examination  of  the  pleadings,  ver- 
dict, or  findings. — Miller  v.  Madigan, 
215  P.  742,  90  Okl.  17. 

(3)  In     determining     validity     of 
judgment,    resort    may    be    had    to 
judgment  roll,  or  record,  which  in- 
cludes the  pleadings,  and  one  is  not 
restricted  to  face  of  judgment  alone. 
Okl. — Kansas  City  Southern  Ry.  Co. 

v.  City  of  Heavener,  54  P.2d  165, 
175  Okl.  517.  . 
Tex. — Jackson  v.  Slaughter,  Civ.App., 
185   S.W.2d   759,   refused  for  want 
of  merit. 

(4)  Matters  outside  the  judgment 
roll    cannot    be    considered. — Kansas 
City    Southern    Ry.    Co.    v.    City    of 
Heavener,  supra. 

(5)  A   person  whom  it  is   sought 
to   bind   by  a  judgment   ia   not   re- 
quired to  seek  beyond  the  judgment 
roll  or  to  indulge  in  surmise. — Peo- 
ple v.  Rio  Nido  Co.,  85  P.2d  461,  29 
Cal.App.2d  486. 

53.  U.S. — S(c)holtz  for  Use  of  Bar- 
nett  Nat.  Bank  of  Jacksonville  v. 
Hartford  Accident  &  Indemnity 
Co.,  C.C.A.Fla.,  88  F.2d  184. 

La. — Snyder  v.  Davidson,  129  So. 
185,  15  La.App.  695,  reheard  Snyder 
v.  Davis  on,  131  So.  64,  15  La.  App. 
695,  affirmed  134*  So.  89,  172  La. 
274. 

Neb.— Whaley  v.  Matthews,  287  N.W. 
205,  136  Neb.  767. 

868 


Tex. — Glasscock  v.  Bryant,  Civ.App., 
185  S.W.2d  595,  refused  for  want 
of  merit — Corpus  Juris  auoted  in 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Caswell, 
Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  653,  656,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Coni.App., 
1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing  denied  7 
S.W.2d  867,  certiorari  denied  Cas- 
well v.  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co., 
49  S.Ct  34,  278  U.S.  640,  73  L. 
Ed.  555. 

34  C.J.  p  502  note  8. 

54.  U.S. — Ferd  Brenner  Lumber  Co. 
.  v.  Davis,  D.C.La.,  9  F.2d  960. 

Cal. — Downs  v.  Kroeger,  254  P.  1101, 

200  Cal.  743. 
Ind. — State    ex    reL    Booth    v.    Beck 

Jewelry  Enterprises,  Inc.,  41  N.E. 

2d    622,    220    Ind.    276,    141    A.L.R. 

876. 
Mont. — Brennan    v.    Jones,    55    P.2d 

697,     101    Mont.     550— Wallace    v. 

Goldberg,  231  P.  56,   72  Mont  234. 

55.  U.S.— Rothschild  &.  Co.  v.  Mar- 
shall,   C.C.A.W;ash.,    44   F.2d    546— 
Wo   Kee   &  Co.   v.   U.   S.,    28    C.C. 
P. A.   272 — U.   S.  v.  Penn  Commer- 
cial Corporation  of  America,  15  Ct. 
Cust.App.    206 — Roessler    &    Hoss- 
locher   Chemical   Co.   v.   U.    S.,    13 
Ct.Cust.App.  451,  Treas.Dec.  41347. 

Cal. — Bank  of  America  Nat.  Trust 
&  Savings  Ass'n  v.  Hill,  71  P.2d 
258,  9  Cal.2d  495— Martin  v.  Board 
of  Trustees  of  Leland  Stanford, 
Jr.  University,  99  P.2d  684,  37 
Cal.App.2d  481— Magarian  v.  Mos- 
er,  42  P.2d  385,  5  Cal.App.2d  208. 

Colo. — City  of  Alamosa  v.  Holbert, 
262  P.  87,  82  Colo.  582. 

Ky. — Mason  v.  Thomas  W.  Briggs  & 
Co.,  297  S.W.  1106,  221  Ky.  127. 

Md.— Greif  v.  Teas,  144  A.  231,  156 
Md.  284. 

N.J. — J.  J.  Hockenjos  Co.  v.  Lurie, 
173  A.  913,  12  N.J.Misc.  545. 

Wash. — North  River  Transp.  Co.  v. 
Denney,  271  P.  589,  149  Wash.  489. 

34  C.J.  p  503  note  17. 

Effect  of  conflict  between  judgment 
and  opinion  see  supra  §  22. 
Courts    speak    through    judgment 

and  decrees,  not  opinions. — Boyle  v. 

Berg,  218  N.W.  757,  242  Mich.  225. 

Scope  of  judgment  cannot  be  de- 
termined by  opinion  rendered. — Doyle 

v.  Hamilton  Fish  Corp.,  N.T.,  234  F. 

47,    148   C.C.A.    63,    certiorari   denied 

37   S.Ct.  476,  243   U.S.   649,   61  LJBJd. 

946. 
Technical    terms    of    a   Judgment 

cannot  be  limited  or  controlled  by 

the  opinion  of  the  court. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  ex 
rel.  Anderson  Motor  Service  Co.  v. 
Public  Service  Commission,  134  S. 
W.2d  1069,  1079,  234  Mo.App.  470, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  437 


may  be  considered  on  the  question  of  the  construc- 
tion and  effect  of  the  judgment,6^  and  the  judgment 
may  be  construed  in  the  light  of  the  opinion,5?  al- 
though its  intent  and  effect  are  not  to  be  determined 
from  isolated  passages  in  the  opinion.6* 

Statutes  affecting  a  judgment  at  the  time  of  its 
issuance  or  entry  become  a  part  of  such  judgment 
and  must  be  read  into  it  as  though  express  provision 
to  that  effect  were  inserted  therein.59 

§  437.     Recitals 

Unless  contradicted  by  the  record,  recitals,  In  a  Judg- 


ment are   presumed  to  be  true.     An   express   adjudica- 
tion, however,  prevails  over  recitals. 

Recitals  in  a  judgment  are  presumed  to  be  true 
and  correct60  unless  contradicted  by  other  parts  of 
the  record.61  Unambiguous  recitals  have  even  been 
held  to  be  conclusive  and  controlling  as  to  matters 
which  must  appear  in  the  judgment  entry.^2  Re- 
citals will  be  construed  according  to  the  legal  im- 
port of  the  terms  used,  considering  the  judgment 
as  a  whole,63  but  will  not  be  extended  by  interpre- 
tation beyond  that  which  is  expressed  or  follows  by 


transferred    and    opinion    adopted 

154    S.W.Sd   777,    348   Mo.   613. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Fagras 

v.  Marks,  43  P.2d  108,  109,  171  Okl. 
*     413. 
Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Harrison 

v..  Manvel  Oil  Co.,  180  S.W.2d  909, 

917,  142  Tex.  669. 
34  C.J.  p  503  note  17. 
Status  of  Judgment 

Opinion  of  trial  judge  and  of  coun- 
sel as  to  status  of  judgment  may 
not  change  legal  effect. — Security- 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Superior  Court  of 
California  in  and  for  San  Diego 
County,  23  P.2d  1055,  132  Cal.App. 
683,  remittitur  recalled  Security- 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v. 
Superior  Court  in  and  for  San  Diego 
County,  25  P.2d  234,  134  Cal.App. 
195. 
Formal  Judgment  as  decision 

Where  a  formal  judgment  is  sign- 
ed by  the  judge,  it,  rather  than  a 
statement  in  an  opinion  or  a  docket 
entry,  is  prima  facie  the  decision  or 
judgment. — Bowles  v.  Rice,  C.C.A. 
Ky.,  152  F.2d  543.  4 
Further  hearing  not  authorized 

Opinion  enjoining  enforcement  of 
award  and  directing  deputy  commis- 
sioner to  proceed  accordingly  did 
not  warrant  taking  further  testi- 
mony, in  absence  of  authority  in  de- 
cree.— Rothschild  &  Co.  v.  Marshall, 
C.C.A.Wash.,  44  F.2d  546. 

56.  Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Fagras  v.  Marks,  43  P.2d  108,  109, 
171  Okl.  413. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mag- 
nolia Petroleum  Co.  v.  Caswell, 
Clv.App.,  295  S.W.  653,  656,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing  de- 
nied 7  S,W.2d  867,  certiorarl  denied 
Caswell  v.  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co., 
49  S.Ct,  34,  278  U.S.  640,  73  L.Ed. 
555 — Austin  v.  Conway,  Civ. App., 
283  S.W.  189. 
33  C.J.  p  1105  note  42—34  C.J.  p  503 

note  18. 

Reasons  for  judgment  as  part  there- 
of see  supra  §  22. 

Judgment    as   final   or  interlocutory 
Opinion  of.  trial  judge  and  state- 
ments   of    counsel   as    to   status    of 


judgment  may  be  considered  in  de- 
termining whether  judgment  is  in- 
terlocutory or  final. — Security-First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Superior  Court  of  Cal- 
ifornia in  and  for  San  Diego  Coun- 
ty, 23  P.2d  1055,  132  Cal.App.  683, 
remittitur  recalled,  Security-First 
Nat.  Bank  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Su- 
perior Court  in  and  for  San  Diego 
County,  25  P.2d  234,  134  Cal.App. 
195. 

57.  U.S. — Great     Lakes     Dredge     & 
Dock  Co.  v.  Huffman,  La.,  63  S.Ct. 
1070,    319    U.S.    293,    87    L.Ed.    1407 
— Fagin  .v.    Quinn,    C.C.A.Tex.,    24 
F.2d  42,   certiorari  denied  48   S.Ct. 
602,  277  U.S.   606,   72  L.Ed.  1012. 

Md.~ Greif  v.  Teas,   144  A.   231,   156 

Md.   284. 
Or. — Emerick   v.    Emerick,    135    P.2d 

802,  171  Or.  276. 

58.  U.S. — State     of      Oklahoma     v. 
State  of  Texas,  47  S.Ct.   9,   272  U. 
S.    21,    71    L.Ed.    145— United   Shoe 
Machinery    Corporation    v.    U.    S., 
Mo.,    42    S.Ct.    363,    258    U.S.    451, 
66   L.Ed.   708,   rehearing  denied  42 
S.Ct.    585,    259    U.S.    575,    66    L.Ed. 
1071— Norfolk    &    W.    Ry.    Co.    v. 
Board  of  Education  of  City  of  Chi- 
cago,  C.C.A.I1L,   114  F.2d  859. 

59.  U.S. — Blair    v.    Durham,    C.C.A. 
Tenn.,  139  F,2d  260. 

Statute  in  aid  of  judgment 

(1)  Ambiguity   in  judgment   based 
on    statutory    right    is    curable    by 
reading     statute     into     judgment. — 
State  v.  Wright,  145  So.  598,  107  Fla. 
178. 

(2)  In  statutory  proceeding  where 
judgment  is  ambiguous,   the  statute 
may    be    examined    in    aid    of    the 
judgment. — Pen-Ken  Gas  &  Oil  Cor- 
poration   v.    Warfleld    Natural    Gas 
Co.,   C.C.A.Ky.,   137   F,2d   871,   certio- 
rarl   denied    64    S.-Ct.    431,    320    U.S. 
800,   88   L.Ed.   483,   rehearing   denied 
64   S.Ct.    634,   321   U.S.   803,   88   L.Ed. 
1089. 

60.  Ariz.— Mosher   v.   Dye,    39    P.2d 
639,  44  Ariz.  555. 

Cal.— Woods  v.  Hyde,  222  P.  168, 
64  Cal.App.  433. 

Fla. — corpus  Juris  cited  in  Phillips 
v.  Phillips,  1  So.2d  186,  188,.  146 
Fla.  311— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 

869 


Beale,  Inc.  v.  Hawley,  156  So. 
529,  116  Fla.  445. 

Ga. — Nolan  v.  Southland,  169  S.E. 
370,  177  Ga.  59. 

Iowa. — Martin  Bros.  Box  Co.  v.  Fritz, 
292  N.W.  143,  228  Iowa  482. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Schu- 
man's  Inc.  v.  Missy  Dress  Co.,  44 
P.2d  862,  863,  172  Okl.  211. 

34  C.JT.  p  503  note  22. 

Recitals  as  part  of  judgment  see 
supra  §  71. 

Judgment  of  court  of  general  Juris- 
diction 

Ala. — Robertson  v.  State,  181  So. 
705,  28  Ala.App.  95,  certiorari  de- 
nied 181  So.  706,  236  Ala.  217. 

61.  Ala. — Robertson  v.  State,  supra. 
Fla. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Phillips 

v.  Phillips,  1  So.2d  186,  188,  146 
Fla.  311 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Beale,  Inc.  v.  Hawley,  156  So.  529, 
116  Fla,  445. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State 
ex  rel.  Regis  v.  District  Court  of 
Second  Judicial  Dist.,  Silver  Bow 
County,  55  P.2d  1295,  1300,  102 
Mont.  74. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Schu- 
man's,  Inc.,  v.  Missy  Dress  Co., 
44  P.2d  882,  863,  172  Okl.  211. 

Effect  of  conflict  in  record  see  in- 
fra §  443.  • 

62.  Ala. — State   Tax   Commission   v. 
Commercial  Realty  Co.,  182  So.  31, 
236  Ala.  358. 

Verity  and  conclusiveness  of  record 

see  supra  §  132. 
Aacital  as  to  hearing 

Recital  in  judgment  that  on  cer- 
tain day  when  case  came  on  to  be 
heard  court  sustained  defendant's 
general  demurrer  to  amended  peti- 
tion is  conclusive. — Starnes  v.  West- 
ern Union  Telegraph  Co.,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  27  S.W.2d  561. 

63.  Okl. — Corpus      Juris      cited      in 
Washburn   v.    Culbertson,    75   P.2d 
190,  192,  181  Okl.  476. 

34  C.J.  p  503  .note  24. 

An  ambiguous  or  imperfect  recital 
concerning  jurisdictions,!  matters 
will  be  construed,  if  possible,  to 
make  it  show  Jurisdiction. — ^Wash- 
bum  v.  Culbertson,  75  P.2d  ISO,  131 
Okl.  476. 


438 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


necessary  implication  from  the  language  em- 
ployed.64 Since,  as  is  discussed  supra  §  71,  a  judg- 
ment rests  on  the  mandatory  parts  thereof  rather 
than  on  the  recitals  therein,  express  adjudication 
controls  mere  recitals.65 

§  438.    Pleadings 

In   case   of  doubt   or   ambiguity  the  judgment   may 


Where  the  language  of  a  judgment  is  ambiguous 
or  its  meaning  doubtful,  reference  may  be  had  to 
the  pleadings  in  the  case,  and  the  judgment  inter- 
preted in  the  light  which  they  throw  on  it.66  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  meaning  of  the  judgment  is 
clear  and  plain  on  its  face,  it  cannot  be  changed, 


be  construed  In  the  light  of  the  pleadings. 

Misita  v.   Inter-City  Express  Lines,    S.C.— Jackson   v.    Johnson,    195    S.E. 


Construction  in  light  of  pleadings 
Ala. — State  Tax  Commission  v.  Com- 
mercial Realty  Co.,  181  So.  31,  236 
Ala.  358. 
Particular   recitals    construed 

(1)  Judgment,  sending  legatees  in- 
to   possession    of    decedent's    estate 
and  declaring  it  was  rendered  with 
inheritance  tax  collector's  approval, 
showed  inheritance  taxes  were  paid. 
— Tridico  v.  Merenda,  120  So.  857,  167 
La.  1063. 

(2)  A  recital  in  a  state  court  judg- 
ment  dismissing  action   on  note   in 
accordance  with  stipulation  referring 
to  stipulation  of  specified  date  was 
merely  descriptive  of  stipulation  and 
not  an  adjudication  of  the  date  when 
it  became  effective.— Bair  v.  Bank  of 
America  Nat.  Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n, 
C.C.A.Mont,  106  F.2d  794. 

64.  Okl.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  City 
of  Wagoner  v.   Block,   97  P.2d   11, 
21,  186  Okl.  249. 

34  C.J.  p  503  note  25. 
Suit  at  law  or  in  equity 

Recitals  cannot  convert  a  suit  in 
equity  to  an  action  or  proceeding  at 
iaw. — state  Tax  Commission  v.  Com- 
mercial Realty  Co.,  182  So.  31,  236 
•Ala.  "358. 

65.  Miss. — First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bian- 
ca,  158  So.  478,  171  Miss.  866. 

Tex. — Magnolia     Petroleum     Co. 

Caswell,    Clv.App..    1    S.W.2d    597; 

rehearing   denied,    Com.App.,    7    S. 

W.2d  867,  certiorari  denied  Caswell 

v.  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.,  49  S.Ct 
*34,  278  U.S.  -640,  73  L.Bd.  555. 
34  C.J.  p  503  note  26. 

legal  effect  of  judgment  is  deter- 
mined from  its  substance,  not  re- 
citals therein. — Jacobs  v.  Norwich 
Union  'Fire  Ins.  Soc.,  40  P.2d  899,  4 
Cal.A-pp.2d  1. 
Issues  adjudicated 

Since  recitals  of  facts  in  judgment 
are  merely  foundational  so  that  error 
with  respect  thereto  will  not  vitiate 
judgment,  issues  which  have  been 
adjudicated  must  be  determined  from 
mandatory  portion  of  judgment,  and 
not  recitals  of  fact— Blaser  v.  Clin- 
ton Irr.  Dist,  53  P.Sd  1141,  100  Mont 
459. 
»ecital  as  to  evidence  and  law 

Where  the  judgment  declares  the 
evidence  and  law  to  be  in  favor  of 
plaintiff,  but  the  decree  favors  de- 
fendant the  decree  controls  making 
the  judgment  one  for  defendant — 


La.App.,  143  So.  £77. 

Recital  as  to  finding's 

If  a  finding  recited  in  the  judg- 
ment is  inconsistent  with  the  judg- 
ment proper  or  the  decretal  part 
thereof  the  latter  must  control.— 
Lackender  v.  Morrison,  2  N.W.2d  286, 
231  Iowa  899— Leach  v.  State  Sav. 
Bank  of  -Logan,  209  N.W.  422,  202 
Iowa  265. 

86.  Okl.— Moore  v.  Harjo,  C.C.A.Okl., 
144  F.2d  318— Gila  Valley  Irr. 
Dist.  v.  U.  S.,  C.C.A.Ariz.,  118  F.2d 
507— Louisiana  Land  &  Explora- 
tion Co.  v.  Parish  of  Jefferson,  B.C. 
La.,  59  F.Supp.  260. 

Ala. — Taunton  v.  Dobbs,  199  So.  9, 
240  Ala.  2S7— State  Tax  Commis- 
sion v.  Commercial  Realty  Co.,  182 
So.  31,  236  Ala.  35S — Floyd  v.  Jack- 
son, 164  So.  121,  26  Ala.App.  575. 

CaL— People  v.  Rio  Nido  Co.,  85  P.2d 
461,  29  Cal.App.2d  48-6. 

Ga.— Bentley  v.  Still,  32  S.B.2d  814, 
198  Ga,  743— Chappell  v.  Small,  20 
S.B.2d  916,  194  Ga.  143— Stanfield 
v.  Downing  Co.,  199  S.E.  113,  186 
Ga.  568. 

Id$ho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Evans 
v.  City  of  American  Falls,  11  P.2d 
363,  367,  52  Idaho  7. 

Ind. — Trook  v.  Crouch,  137  N.E.  7-73, 
82  Ind.  App.  309. 

Iowa.— Sutton  v.  Schuack,  275  N.W. 
870,  224  Iowa  "251. 

Ky. — Toms  v.  Holmes,  171  S.W.2d 
245,  294  Ky.  233— Sell  v.  Pierce, 
140  S.W.2d  1027,  283  Ky.  148— 
Oglesby  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  of 
America,  82  S.W.2d  824,  259  Ky, 
620— Ratliff  v.  Linberg,  79  S.W.2d 
717,  258  Ky.  203 — Corpus  Juris  cit- 
ed to  Turner  v.  Begley,  39  S.W.2d 
504,  506,  239  Ky.  281 — Reed  v.  Run- 
yan,  10  S.W.2d  824,  "226  Ky.  261. 

La. — In  re  Clover  Ridge  Planting  & 
Manufacturing  Co.,  193  So.  46«8,  194 
La,  77— Davis  v.  McCain,  132  So. 
758,  171  La.  1011— Williams  v.  Wil- 
liams, App.,  17  So.2d  641— Blunson 
v.  Brocato,  App.,  172  So.  180,  af- 
firmed 175  So.  441,  187  lLa.  637— 
Snyder  v.  Davidson,  129  So.  185,  15 
La.App.  695,  reheard  Snyder  v.  Da- 
vison,  131  So.  64,  15  La.App.  695 
affirmed  134  So.  89,  172  La.  274. 
Mo. — Sanders  v.  Sheets,  App.,  287 
W.  1069 — Raney  v.  Home  Ins.  Co. 
246  S.W.  57,  213  Mo.App.  1. 
Mont.— Quigley  v.  Mclntosh,  103  P 
2d  1067,  110  Mont  495. 

870 


239,  186  S.C.  155. 
Tenn.— Southwestern  Presbyterian 
University  v.  City  of  Clarksville, 
259  S.W.  550,  149  Tenn.  256. 
Tex. — Sharp  v.  Womack,  125  S.W.2d 
270,  132  Tex.  507— Lipsitz  v.  First 
Nat.  Bank,  Com.App.,  293  S.W.  563, 
reheard  296  S.W.  490— Wagner  v. 
Hogan,  Civ.App.,  161  S.W.2d  849 — 
Walston  v.  Price,  Civ. App.,  159  S. 
W.2d  548 — In  re  Supples'  Estate, 
Civ.App.,  131  S.W.2d  13— Agey  v. 
Barnard,  Civ.App.,  12-3  S.W.2d  484, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct 
—Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of  Mary- 
land v.  Citizens  Nat  Bank  of  log- 
book, Civ.App.,  120  S.W.2d  113,  er- 
ror dismissed — Dagley  v.  Leeth, 
Civ.App.,  106  S.W.2d  730— Snell  v. 
Knowles,  Civ.App.,  87  S.W.2d  871, 
error  dismissed— Angelo  v.  Sted- 
man  Co.,  Civ.App.,  77  S.W.2d  92*6 — 
Dearing  v.  City  of  Port  Neches, 
Ciy.App.,  65  S.W.2d  1105,  error  re- 
fused—Royal Indemnity  Co.  v. 
Goodbar  &  Page,  Civ.App.,  48  S. 
W.2d  1021 — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in. 
Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Caswell, 
Civ.App.,  295  S.W.  653,  656,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  Com.App., 
1  S.W.2d  597,  rehearing  denied  7  S. 
W.2d  867,  certiorari  denied  Caswell 
v.  Magnolia  Petroleum  Co.,  49  S.Ct. 
34,  273  U.S.  640,  73  'L.Ed.  555— 
.  Prince  v.  Frost-Johnson  Lumber 

Co.,  Civ.App.,  250  S.W.  785. 
Utah. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  Telluride  Power  Co., 
17  P.2d  281,  2«S3,  82  Utah  607,  re- 
hearing denied  26  P.2d  822,  '82 
Utah  622. 

Wash.— George    v.     Jenks,     85     P.2d 
1083,  197  Wash.  551— Reed  v.  Na- 
tional Grocery  Co.,  238  P.  990,  136 
Wash.  7. 
Wis.— In  re  Kahl's  Estate,  254  N.W. 

639,  215  Wis.  -353. 
34  C.J.  p  503  note  28. 
Conformity  to  pleadings  see  supra  §§ 

47-54. 

In  determining-  validity  of  judgment 
Tex.— Jackson     v.     Slaughter,     Civ. 
App.,  185   S.W.2d  759,  refused  for 
want  of  merit 
Pleadings  as  limiting1  judgment 

On  direct  attack,  judgments  other 
than  judgments  by  agreement  are 
limited  and  controlled  by  the  plead- 
ings, irrespective  of  the  nature  or 
contents  of  the  judgments. — Downey 
v.  Downey,  Tex.Civ.App.,  117  S.W.2d 
830. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  440 


extended,  or  restricted  by  anything  contained  in  the 
pleadings.67 

§  439.    Verdict  or  Findings 

The  judgment  should   be  construed   in  the  light  of 
the  verdict  of  the  Jury  or  the  findings  of  the  court. 

Although  it  has  been  held  that  findings  and  con- 
clusions of  law  in  a  case  which  are  not  carried  into 
the  judgment  therein  may  not  serve  .to  limit  the 
judgment  in  effect,68  as  a  general  rule,  a  judgment 
should  be  interpreted  with  reference  to,  and  in  the 
light  of,  the  verdict  of  the  jury69  or  the  findings  of 
fact  and  conclusions  of  law  of  the  court  or  ref- 
eree,70 and,  if  possible,  so  as  to  harmonize  them.71 
If  the  judgment  is  ambiguous  or  obscure,  and  fails 
to  express  the  final  determination  of  the  court  with 
clarity  and  accuracy,  reference  may  be  had  to  the 
verdict  and  findings  for  the  purpose  of  ascertain- 
ing what  was  determined.72 

The  requirement  that  a  judgment  conform  to  the 
verdict  or  findings  in  the  case  is  considered  supra 
§§  55-58. 


§  440.    Parties 

a.  In  general 

b.  Joint  or  several  liability 

c.  Operation  as  between  codefendants 

a.  In  General 

A  judgment  which  is  ambiguous  or  uncertain  with 
respect  to  the  parties  will  be  construed  In  the  light  of 
the  entire  Judgment  roil  or  record. 

If  there  is  ambiguity  or  uncertainty  in  a  judg- 
ment with  respect  to  the' party  for  or  against  whom 
it  is  rendered,  or  the  capacity  in  which  he  recov- 
ers or  is  held  liable,  the  judgment  will  be  read  in 
the  light  of  the  entire  judgment  roll  or  record.73 
Thus,  where  there  are  two  or  more  defendants  in 
the  action,  the  pleadings,  findings,  and  other  parts 
of  the  judgment  roll  or  record  may  be  considered, 
in  case  of  ambiguity  or  uncertainty,  in  determining 
against  which  defendant  the  judgment  is  rendered.74 
A  plural  designation  will  be  read  as  singular,  and 
vice  versa,  if  necessary  to  make  the  judgment  agree 
with  the  facts  and  law  of  the  case.75  Where  a 
judgment  provides  for  the  payment  of  money  to  a 
particular  person,  it  means  to  such  person  or  to 


67.  La. — A  very    v.    Iberville    Police 
Jury,  15  La. Ann.  223. 

34  C.J.  p  504  note  29. 

Reference  to  pleading-  unnecessary 

U.S. — Louisiana  Land  &  Exploration 

Co.  v.  Parish  of  Jefferson,  La.,  D. 

CJLa.,  59  F.Supp.  260. 

68.  Cal. — Martin  v.  Board  of  Trus- 
tees  of  Leland  Stanford  Jr.  Uni- 
versity, 99  P.'2d  -684,  37  Cal.App.2d 
481. 

Oonolnsl9ns  axe  not  part  of  Judg- 
ment where  not  carried  into  the 
judgment. — Neilsen  v.  Neilsen,  !3  P. 
2d  715,  216  Cal.  150. 

69.  Okl.— Miller  v.  Madigan,  215  P. 
742,  90  Okl.  17. 

Tex.— Dearing  v.  City  of  Port  Nech- 
es,  Civ.App.,  65  S.W.2d  1105,  error 
refused. 
34  C.J.  p  504  note  31. 

Form,  and  language  used  in  a  ver- 
dict assist  in  determination  of  scope 
of  judgment — Phipps  v.  Superior 
Court  In  and  for  Alameda  County,  89 
P.2d  698,  32  Cal.App.2d  371. 

70.  U.S. — Great     Lakes     Dredge    & 
Dock  Co.  v.  Huffman,  La.,  63  S.Ct. 
1070,  319  U.S.  293,  87  L.Ed.  1407 — 
Armstrong    v.    De    Forest    Radio 
Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.,  C.C.A. 
N.Y.,  10  F.2d  727,  certlorari  denied 
De  Forest  Radio  Telephone  &  Tel- 
egraph Co.  v.  Armstrong,  46  S.Ct. 
471,   270   U.S.   663,  70  L.Bd.  787. 

Cal. — Ampuero  v.  Luce,  157.P.23  899, 
618  Cal.A-pp.2d  811. 

Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  la  Permian 
Oil  Co.  v.  Smith,  117  S.W.2d  564, 
578,  129  Tex.  413,  111  A.L.R.  1152 


— Lipsltz  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  Com. 

App.,  293  S.W.  563,  reheard  296  S. 

W.  490 — In  re  Supples'  Estate,  Civ. 

App.,     131    S.W.2d    13— Durden    v. 

Roland,    Civ.App.,    269    S.W.    274— 

Barnes    v.    Hobson,    Civ. App.,    250 

S.W.  238. 
Utah.— -Huber  v.   Newman,    145   P.2d 

780,  106  Utah  363. 
Wash. — George    v.    Jenks,     85    P. 3d 

1083,  197  Wash.  551. 
34  C.J.  p  504  note  33. 
Findings  construed 

In  prior  suit  against  lessor  and 
lessees,  finding  that  lease  had  been 
executed  in  bad  faith  did  not  effect 
annulment,  but  lease  remained  val- 
id.— Bennett  v.  Casavant,  150  A.  '319, 
129  Me.  123. 

71.  Kan. — Armel  v.  Lay  ton,  29  Kan. 
576. 

72.  U.S.— Moore     v.     Harjo,     C.C.A. 
Okl.,  144  F.2d  318. 

Cal. — Ramacciotti  v.  Ramacciotti,  20 

P.2d  961,  131  CaLApp.  191. 
Tex.— Wagner  v.  Hogan,  Civ.App,,  161 

S.W.2d  849 — In  re  Supples'  Estate, 

Civ.App.,  131  S.W.2d  13. 
Judgment  and  findings  read  together 
N.T. — People    v.     Reinforced    Paper 

Bottle     Corporation,     26     N.T.S.2d 

251,  176  Misc.  464. 

73.  Ala.— CoryoM  Juris  cited  in,  Grif- 
fin v.    Proctor,    14    So.2d   116,    120, 
244  Ala.  537. 

La. — Glen    Falls    Indemnity    _Qo.    v. 

Manning,  App.,  168  So.  787. 
Tex. — State    Mortg.    Corporation    v. 

Traylor,    36   S.W.2d   440,    120    Tex. 

148 — Bendy  v.  W.  T.  Carter  &  Bro., 

871 


Com. App.,    14    S.W.2d    813— Greene 

v.  Elerding,  Civ.App.,  291  S.W.  271. 

Wash. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gol- 

lehon   v.    Gpllehon,   *34    P.2d    1113, 

1114,  178  Wash.  372. 

33  C.J.  p  1198  note  -81—34  C.J.  p  504 

note  '37. 

Requisites  and  sufficiency  of  designa- 
tion of  parties  in  judgment  see  su- 
pra §  75. 
Capacity  in  which  party  recovers  or 

is  liable 

The  whole  record  may  be  consid- 
ered in  determining  whether  the 
judgment  is  for  or  against  a  party 
in  his  individual  or  representative 
capacity  or  both. 
HI. — Schmidt  v.  Kellner,  138  N.K. 

•604,  507  111.  331. 

Tex. — Banister    v.    Eades,     Civ.App., 
282  S.W.  351. 

33  C.J.  p  1199  note  92. 

Joint  Judgment  for  three  plaintiffs 
on  its  face  entitled  each  plaintiff  to 
one  third  of  sum  due. — State  ex  rel. 
Bromschwig  v.  Hartman,  300  S.W. 
1054,  221  Mo.App.  215. 

74,  Cal.— Minehan  v.  Silveria,  21  P. 
2d  617,   131   CaLAnp.   317— Bradley 
v.   McDonald,    169   P.    427,  '36   Cal. 
Anp.  807.. 

34  C.J.  p  504  note  40. 

Judgment  caption,  not  referred  to, 
cannot  be  considered  in  clarifying 
uncertainty  as  to  judgment  debtors. 
—Minehan  v.  Silveria,  21  P.2d  61'7, 
131  CaLApp.  317. 

75.  Mich. — Barnes   v.   Michigan  Air 
Line  R.  Co.,  20  N.W.   36,   54  Mich. 
243. 

34  C.J.  P  504  note  38. 


§440 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


anyone  whom  he  may  legally  and  properly  author- 
ize to  act  for  him.76 

In  case  of  several  defendants  who  are  jointly 
and  severally  liable,  a  judgment  in  favor  of  plaintiff 
without  indication  of  which  defendant  it  is  intended 
to  run  against  will  be  construed  as  being  an  award 
against  all  the  defendants.™  Also  a  judgment 
against  a  named  defendant  "et  al."  or  "et  als."  in- 
cludes all  defendants  in  the  actionJS 

A  judgment  will  in  general  bind  a  party  only  in 
the  capacity  in  which  he  appears  in  the  action  and 
is  designated  in  the  judgment,™  and  even  though  he 
is  not  described  in  the  judgment  in  that  capacity.80 
However,  a  judgment  against  a  named  person,  ad- 
ministrator of  a  named  deceased,  is  an  individual 
judgment  against  the  former,  where  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  the  judgment  is  to  be  satisfied  out  of  the 
estate  of  deceased.81  In  a  suit  by  an  attorney  in 
fact,  a  judgment  for  defendant  is  a  judgment 
against  the  attorney  in  fact.82 

Persons  not  parties  are  not  affected  by  the  judg- 
ment83 

b.  Joint  or  Several  Liability 

In  the  absence  of  express  directions  to  the  contrary, 
a  judgment  entered  against  two  or  more  defendants 
Jointly  is  a  Joint  and  several  obligation,  available  against 
either  of  the  judgment  debtors  separately. 


In  the  absence  of  express  directions  to  the  con- 
trary, a  judgment  entered  against  two  or  more  de- 
fendants jointly  is  a  joint  and  several  obligation, 
available  against  either  of  the  judgment  debtors 
separately.84  However,  there  is  also  authority  that 
in  the  absence  of  a  contrary  indication  each  of  the 
defendants  is  liable  only  for  his  proportionate  share 
of  the  judgment  obligation.85  If  a  separate  judg- 
ment is  rendered  against  each  of  the  defendants  for 
a  different  amount,  the  judgments  cannot  be  regard- 
ed as  imposing  a  joint  and  several  liability.86 

c.  Operation  as  between  Oodef  endants 

As  a  general  rule  a  Judgment  against  two  or  more 
defendants  decides  nothing  as  to  their  rights  or  liabil- 
ities inter  sese. 

As  a  general  rule  a  judgment  against  two  or  more 
defendants  decides  nothing  as  to  their  rights  or  lia- 
bilities inter  sese,  but  only  their  liability  to  plain- 
tiff.87 

Relief  between  codefendants  is  considered  supra 
§37. 

§  441.    Issues 

A  judgment  Is  to  be  construed  in  the  light  of  the 
issues  raised  in  the  case. 

A  judgment  should  be  construed  with  reference 
to  the  issues  raised  in  the  case88  and  which  are  in- 


76*  N.Y.— Lythgoe  v.  Smith,  35  N.E. 
646,  140  N.Y.  442. 

77.  TJ.S. — Oklahoma      Natural      Gas 
Corporation  v.  Municipal   Gas  Co. 
of  Muskogee,  C.C.A.OkL,   113  F.2d 
80'S. 

Tex. — International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Dawson,  Civ.App.,  193  S.W.2d 
1145. 

78.  La. — Glen   Falls    Indemnity  Co. 
v.  Manning:,  App.r  168  So.  787. 

Tenn.— Williams  v.  Williams,  156  S. 
W.2d  363,  25  Tenn.App.  290. 

79.  S.D. — Green  v.  Mahoney,   13  N. 
W.2d  806. 

Effect  of  addition  of  designation  de- 
scriptio   person®  to  party's  name 
see  supra  §  75. 
Judgment  against  association 

Judgment  for  loss  on  fire  policy, 
against  unincorporated  fire  insurance 
association  paying  losses  by  assess- 
ments was  held  one  against  the  as- 
sociation as  such,  and  not  against 
the  officials  named  as  defendants  in- 
dividually.—Marsden  v.  Williams, 
App.,  282  S.W.  478,  certiorari 
Quashed  State  ex  ret  Williams  v. 
Daues,  292  S.W.  58. 

8a  N.Y. — Graham  v.  -Lawyers'  Title 
Ins.  Co.,  46  N.Y.S.  1055,  20  Ajpp. 
3>iv.  440,  4  N.Y.Ann.Cas.  379. 

34  C.J.  p  504  note  41. 


Death  of  party  pending  proceedings 
"Where  an  administrator  ad  litem 
was  appointed  for  cross  complainant 
on  the  latter's  death  before  final  de- 
cree, a  final  decree,  reciting  that 
complainant  and  cross  complainant, 
naming  decedent,  should  he  separate- 
ly and  severally  denied  the  relief 
prayed  for  in  their  bill  and  cross 
bill,  should  be  construed  as  denying 
the  relief  to  the  administrator  ad 
litem. — Griffin  v.  Proctor,  14  So.2d 
116,  244  Ala.  '537. 

81.  W.Va. — Thomson  v.  Mann,  44  S. 
E.  246,  53  W.Va,  432. 

82.  Ky.— -Herndon.  v.  Bartlett,  7  T.B. 
Mon.  449. 

83.  Mo.— State  v,  Johnson,  239  S.W. 
•844,  293  Mo.  302. 

Propriety  of  judgment  for  or  against 

one  not  a  party  see  supra  §  28. 

Recital  in  execution  issued  on 
Judgment  cannot  extend  scope  of 
judgment  to  parties  not  named  there- 
in.—Blenkiron  v.  Birkhauser,  282  P. 
984,  102  CaLApp.  172. 
84L  Kan. — Richardson  y.  Painter, 

102  P.  1099,  .80  Kan.  574. 
33.C.J.  p  1126  note  20—34  C.J.  p  505 

note  44. 
Requisites  and  sufficiency  of  Joint  or 

several  Judgments  see  supra  §  36. 

Judgment  against  makers  of  note 
bound    each    to    payment    of    whole 

872 


thereof,  with  respect  to  Judgment 
creditor.—  Biggs  v.  Davis,  43  -S.W.2d 
724,  184  Ark.  834. 

85.     Philippine.  —  De  (Leon   v.    Nepo- 
muceno,  37  Philippine  ISO. 


(1)  It  has  been  held  that,  unless 
bound  in  solido  by  covenant  or  op- 
eration of  law,  Judgment  defendants 
are  Jointly  bound  and  liable  each  for 
proportionate  share.  —  Barlow  v.  'Fife, 
133    So.    436,    172    La.    176—  IT.    S.    v. 
Hawkins'  Heirs,  4  Mart.N.S.,  '317. 

(2)  It  has  also  been  held  that  a 
Judgment  against  more  than  one  de- 
fendant,   not    Jointly    and    severally, 
is    a    several    Judgment.  —  Pemberton 
v.  Gross,  1  La.  30. 

86.  Tex.—  Missouri,  K.   &  T.  R.   Co. 
v.  .Lawson,   119   S.W.   921,  55  Tex. 
Civ.App.  388. 

87.  N.C.  —  Gregg  v.   Wilmington,   70 
S.E.  1070,  155  N.C.  18. 

34  C.  J.  p  505  note  45. 

88.  Ark.—  Pa  wee  tt   v.    Rhyne,    63    S. 
W.2d  349,  187  Ark.  940—  Nakdimen 
v.   Brazil,   208   S.W.   431,   137  Ark. 
188. 

Ky.  —  Toms    v.    Holmes,    171    S.W.2d 

245,  294  Ky.  233. 
Mo.  —  Savings  Trust  Co.  of  St.  Louis 

V.  Beck,  App.,  73  S.W.2d  282. 
Or.—  Barnes  v.  Anderson,  217  P.  836, 

10$  Or.  503* 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§442 


tended  to  be  decided,89  and  the  scope  of  the  judg- 
ment is  not  to  be  extended  beyond  the  issues  raised 
in  the  case,  or  the  state  of  facts  and  situation  of 
the  parties  existing  at  the  time  of  the  action.90  If 
there  is  ambiguity  in  the  judgment,  the  entire  rec- 
ord may  be  examined  to  determine  the  issues  de- 
cided.^1 

A  .judgment  is  to  be  construed  as  disposing  of 
all  the  issues  and  controversies  raised  in  the  case,92 
unless  questions  are  reserved  or  leave  given  to  the 
parties  to  take  further  proceedings,  in  which  case 
the  unadjudicated  matters  are  left  entirely  open, 
except  in  so  far  as  their  determination  in  a  par- 


ticular way  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  general 
tenor  of  the  original  judgment.93 

§  442.    Recovery  and  Relief 

A  Judgment  which  U  ambiguous  with  respect  to  the 
amount  of  the  recovery  or  the  relief  granted  may  be 
construed  in  the  light  of  the  other  parts  of  the  record, 
but  it  should  not  be  construed  as  granting  more  than 
prayed  for  In  the  complaint. 

If  the  judgment  is  ambiguous  or  silent  as  to  the 
amount  of  the  recovery  or  the  relief  granted,  ref- 
erence may  be  had  to  the  pleadings,  the  verdict, 
findings,  and  other  parts  of  the  record,  and  the  judg- 
ment will  be  presumed  to  be  in  accordance  with 
what  they  show  to  be  due.94  It  has  been  held,  how- 


Tex.— Lipsitz  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
Com.App.,  "293  -S.W.  663,  reheard 
296  S.W.  490 — Wagner  v.  Hogan, 
Civ.App.,  161  S.W.2d  849— In  re 
Supples'  Estate,  Civ.App.,  131  S. 
W.2d  13. 

89.  U.S.— State      of     Oklahoma     v. 
State  of  Texas,  47  S.Ct.  9,  272  U. 
S.    21.   71   L.Ed.   145— United   Shoe 
Machinery   Corporation    v.    U.    S., 
Mo.,   42  S.Ct.   3-63,  258  U.S.  451,  -66 
L.Bd.   70S,   rehearing  denied  42   S. 
Ct    585,    259    U.S.    575,    66    L.Ed. 
1071 — City  of  Vicksburg  v.  Henson, 
Miss.,  34  S.Ct  95,  231  U.S.  219,  58 
L.Ed.   209— Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.   Co. 
v.  Board  of  Education  of  City  of 
Chicago,  C.C.A.I11.,   114  F.2d  859— 
Great  Northern  Ry,  Co.  v.  General 
Ry.   Signal  Co.,  C.C.A.Mlnn.,  57  F. 
2d  467— Graham  v.  Hollister,  D,C. 
Mich.,  13  'F.2d  $94. 

111.— -Aloe  v.  Lowe,  131  N.B.  612,  298 
111.  404— Yedor  v.  Chicago  City 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  54  N.B.2d  728, 
323  Ill.App.  42. 

Tex.— In  re  Supples'  Estate,  Civ.App., 
131  S.W.2d  13. 

Intent  of  adjudication,  must  be  de- 
termined, not  from  isolated  parts  of 
court's  opinion,  but  from  considera- 
tion of  all  issues  submitted  and  in- 
tended to  be  disposed  of,  that  is, 
from  what  decree  is  really  designed 
to  accomplish. — Norfolk  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Board  of  Education  of  City  of 
Chicago,  C.C.A.I11.,  114  F.2d  859. 

90.  111. — Yedor  v.  Chicago  Qlty  Bank 
&   Trust    Co.,    64    N.E.2d~  728,    323 
Ill.Ajyp.  42. 

La. — Continental  Land  &  Fur  Co.  v. 

Lacoste,  188  So.  700,  192  'La.  561. 
Pa. — Rosenheck  v.  Stape,  3  A.2d  678, 

332  Pa.  287. 
34  C.J.  p  505  note  52. 
Counterclaim 

A  judgment  of  no  cause  of  action 
in  favor  of  defendant  filing  a  coun- 
terclaim determined  only  that  plain- 
tiff failed  to  establish  his  own. case, 
where  counterclaim  was  invalid. — 
Central  New  York  Coach  Lines  v. 


Syracuse  Herald  Co.,  13  N.K2d  598, 
277  N.Y.  110. 
Limitation  to  issues 

If  language  of  judgment  is  broad- 
er than  is  required,  it  will  be  limit- 
ed by  construction  so  that  its  effect 
will  be  such  only  as  is  needed  for 
purposes  of  case  which  has  been 
made  and  issues  which  have  been  de- 
cided.— Aloe  v.  Lowe,  131  N.E.  612, 
298  111.  404— Yedor  v.  Chicago  City 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  54  N.E.2d  72-8,  323 
IlLApp.  42. 
One  of  several  issues 

Judgment  for  plaintiff  on  only  one 
of  several  dependent  causes  of  ac- 
tion does  not  determine  other  causes 
adversely  to  him. — Miller-Vidor 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Adams,  Tex.Civ.App., 
16  S.W.2d  312,  error  dismissed. 

91.  Or. — Barnes  v.  Anderson,  217  P. 
836,  10*  Or.  503. 

92.  Wis.— Bakula  v.  Schwab,  168  N. 
W.  378,  167  Wis.  546. 

34  C.J.  p  505  note  50. 
General  judgment 

(1)  Judgment  for  one  party  gen- 
erally involves  finding  in  his  favor 
on  all  issues. — In  re  Evans*  Estate, 
291  N.W.  460,  228  Iowa  908. 

(2)  Recital  that  issues  are  found 
for  plaintiff  or  defendant  implies,  in 
absence  of  evidence  to  contrary,  that 
all   issues  'are   so    found. — Sessa   v. 
Barney,   37  A.2d  233,  130  Qonn.  718. 
issues  raised  by  complaint 

-In  the  absence  of  proof,  it  will  be 
assumed  that  a  litigation  involved 
everything  alleged  in  the  complaint 
and  that  an  adjudication  covered  the 
whole  ground  of  the  complaint. — In 
re  Straut,  27  N.E.  259,  12<6  N.Y.  201— 
Jacob  v.  Oyster  Bay,  96  N.Y.S.  626i 
109  App.Div.  626. 
Flea  in  abatement 

A  judgment  in  favor  of  plaintiff 
in  a  case  tried  on  the  merits  was 
held  to  overrule  a  plea  in  abatement 
which  was  by  agreement  heard  with 
the  trial  of  the  case  on  the  merits. 
— U.  S.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Adams,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  115  S.W.2d  788. 

873 


93.  Minn. — Hollingsworth  v.   Camp- 
bell, 8  N.W.  873,  28  Minn.  18. 

Va.— Paup  v.  Mingo,  4  Leigh  163,  31 
Va.  163. 

94.  Ky.— Sell  v.  Pierce,   140   S.W.2d 
1027,  283  Ky.  143— Coffey  v.  Clark, 
43   S.W.2d  1002,   241  Ky.   336. 

N.Y. — People  v.  Reinforced  Paper 
Bottle  Corporation,  26  N.Y.S.  2d 
251,  176  Misc.  464. 

Tex.— Fidelity     &     Deposit     Co.     of 
Maryland  v.  Citizens  Nat  Bank  of 
Lubbock,  Civ.App.,  120  S.W.2d  113, 
error      dismissed — Kasprowicz     v. 
Tate,  Civ.App.,  **  S.W.2d  435. 
34  C.J.  p  505  note  -53. 
Effect  of  silence  as  to  particular  de- 
mands see  supra  §  436. 
Determination,  of  amount 

In  suit  by  remaindermen  to  assert 
right  in  land  so-ld  for  taxes,  judg- 
ment for  rents  and  certain  other 
amount  for  improvements,  taxes,  and 
interest  will  be  construed  to  require 
rents  to  be  deducted  from  the  other 
item  to  determine  amount  due  from 
plaintiffs. — Jones  v.  'Fowler,  285  S. 
W.  363,  171  Ark.  594. 
Judgment  general  in  form 

Where  first  count  of  petition  was 
based  on  breach  of  contract  and  sec- 
ond count  on  Quantum  meruit  for 
services  rendered,  and  plaintiff  aban- 
doned first  count  and  submitted  case 
to  jury  on  second  count,  judgment 
for  plaintiff,  although  general  in 
form,  was  deemed  to  have  been  based 
on  second  count — Pemberton  v.  La- 
due  Realty  &  Construction  Co.,  180 
S.W.2d  766,  237  Mo.App.  971. 
Defendant's  demands 

(1)  A   judgment   that   cross   com- 
plainants take  nothing  by  their  cross 
action  was  held  not  limited  by  a  fur- 
ther provision  in  the  disjunctive  that 

.they  take'  nothing  for  reconvention 
for  damages. — Ware  v.  Jones,  Tex. 
Com.App.,  250  S.W.  663. 

(2)  Where. a  set-off  is  pleaded  as  a 
defense  to  an  action,  a  judgment  for 
defendant  is  in  effect  a  judgment  for 
the  amount  of  the  set-off. — Shrlver  v. 
Bowen,  57  Ind.  266. 


§442 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ever,  that,  in  order  to  determine  the  extent  of  the 
relief  awarded  by  a  judgment,  the  judgment  only 
may  be  looked  to,  aided  by  other  instruments  to 
which  it  refers,^5  and  that  the  final  judgment  or 
decree  itself  is  the  only  measure  of  the  obligation 
of  the  defendants  thereunder.96 

The  judgment  should  be  construed,  if  possible,  as 
not  awarding  more  or  other  relief  than  was  prayed 
for  in  the  complaint,97  or  as  granting  relief  beyond 
the  power  of  the  court  to  award.98  A  decree  di- 
recting the  sale  of  premises  unless  a  specified  sum 
is  paid  within  a  limited  time  is  not  to  be  construed 
as  a  personal  decree  for  the  payment  of  the  money, 
but  as  in  the  alternative.99  Where  a  judgment  pro- 
vides for  periodical  payments  in  the  future,  as  long 
as  a  given  relation  or  state  of  affairs  continues,  the 
amounts  due  from  time  to  time  may  be  fixed  by 
successive  applications  to  the  court1 

§  443.     Conflict  in  Record 

In  general  a  conflict  In  the  judgment  record  will  be 
resolved  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  the  judgment.  Pro- 
visions of  the  judgment  itself  usually  prevail  over  other 
parts  of  the  record. 


It  has  been  broadly  stated  that  any  doubt  or  am- 
biguity in  the  record  should  be  resolved  in  favor  of 
the  validity  of  the  judgment  or  decree.2  In  other 
words,  where  there  is  a  conflict  or  inconsistency  be- 
tween statements  in  different  parts  of  a  judgment 
record,  that  one  will  govern  which  will  sustain  the 
validity  and  correctness  of  the  judgment,  when  it 
is  apparent  from  the  face  of  the  record  that  the 
other  statement  is  a  clerical  error.3  In  case  of 
conflict  between  provisions  of  a  judgment,  the  first 
part  thereof  will  be  construed  in  the  light  of  sub- 
sequent provisions.4  Where  there  is  a  variance  be- 
tween an  express  provision  of  a  judgment  and  the 
prayer  for  judgment  brought  into  the  judgment  by 
reference,  the  former  prevails.5 

As  between  the  judgment  and  other  parts  of  the 
record,  the  terms  of  the  judgment  prevail  over  en- 
tries made  by  the  clerk;6  a  formal  judgment  en- 
rolled in  the  minutes  of  the  court  prevails  over 
bench  notes7  or  the  judge's  trial  docket;8  and  ju- 
risdictional  recitals9  and  other  declarations  in  the 
judgment10  prevail  over  file  marks  on  papers  in  the 
case.  Jurisdictional  recitals  also  prevail  over  a  de- 


Judgments  construed  together 

(1)  In    order    to    determine    what 
has  been  decided  in  a  cause,  all  of 
the    orders    ajid    judgments    entered 
therein  must  be  construed  together. 
— Wilson  v.  Foster  Creek  Lumber  & 
Mfg.  Qo.,  99  So.  437,  134  Miss.  &8< 

(2)  In    determining    whether    pro- 
bate court  construed  testator's  will, 
both  homestead  order  and  decree  of 
distribution,  entered  on  same  day  as 
the  homestead   order,   would   be  re- 
quired to  be   considered,   since  both 
decrees  were  made  at  the  same  ses- 
sion of  the  court,  regarding  the  same 
general  subject  matter  and  were  in- 
tended to  and   did  operate  to  make 
disposition  of  the  estate  as   far  as 
could  be  done  at  any  time  prior  to 
the    death    of   the    testator's   widow 
who  was  bequeathed  the  income  from 
the  testator's  estate  for  life. — In  re 
Taylor's  Estate,  2  A.2d  317,  110  Vt. 
80. 

(3)  Decree  in  taxpayer's  suit  en- 
Joining  town  from  levying  taxes  or 
expending  moneys  because  of  paving 
contract  or  lien  certificates  and  de- 
cree  In    consolidated   suit   by   town 
whereby  chancellor  refused  to  enjoin 
assignee    of   •paving    contract    from 
suing  thereon  at  law  were  required 
to  be  construed  together  and  to  con- 
fine such  assignee  to  suing  at  law  for 
reasonable   worth   of  paving. — Town 
of  Boca  Baton  v.  Moore,  165  So.  '279, 
122  Fla.  350. 

95.  Tex. — Barrage  v.  Hunt  Produc- 
tion Co.,  Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d  1228, 
error  dismissed. 


90.     Mass. — Boyer  v.  Bowles,  54  NJ3, 

2d  925.  316  Mass.  900. 
97.    Ky.— Ratliff  v.  Sinberg,  79  S.W. 

2d  717,  258  Ky.  203. 
Limitation    of    judgment    to    relief 

sought   by  pleadings   see  supra   § 

49. 
93.     U.S.— Texas   Co.   v.   Marlin,   C.C. 

A.Tex.f  109  F.2d  305. 
Construction  to  uphold  judgment  see 

supra  §  33*6  a. 
99.    Ill— Arentz  v.  Reilly,  -67  HLApp. 

307. 

1.  La. — Smith  v.  Barkemeyer,  McG. 
139, 

2.  Ala. — Falkner    v.     Christian,     51 
Ala.  495. 

Kan. — State  v.  'Frishman,  144  P.  994, 

93  Kan.  595. 
34  C.J.  p  506  note  62. 
Construction  to  uphold  judgment  see 

supra  §  436. 
Effect  of  conflict  between  judgment 

and  opinion  see  supra  §  22. 
Verity  and  collusiveness  of  record 

see  su'pra  §  132. 

3.  Ala.— King  v.  Martin,  67  Ala.  177. 
Ark.— Thorn  v.  Delany,  6  Ark,  219. 
34  C.J.  ;p  506  note  &3. 

Tex.— In  re  -Supples*  Estate,  Civ. 
App.,  131  S.W.2d  13. 

5.  S.C.— In  re  Wilson,  139  S.B.  171, 
141  S.C.  60. 

Ariz.— Punk  v.   Fillman,   36   P.2d 
574,  44  Ariz.  263. 

Nev. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Morti- 
mer v.  Pacific  States  Savings  & 
Loan  Co.,  145  P.2d  733,  73'6,  -62  Nev. 
147. 

874 


Wash.— Hanley  v.  Most,  115  P.2d  951, 
9  Wash. 2 d  474,  opinion  adhered  to 
118   P.2d   946,   9   Wash.2d   474. 
34  C.J.  p  506  note  64. 
TTnaaubignoiui  order 

A  formal  written  order  allowing 
fees  to  a  receiver's  attorney  and  re- 
serving to  trial  court  the  right  to 
consider  any  additional  allowance 
was  not  ambiguous  so  as  to  be  gov- 
erned by  minute  order  allowing  fees 
for  the  calendar  year  and  reserving 
to  trial  court  the  right  to  fix  future 
fees  for  future  services. — Mortimer 
v.  Pacific  States  Savings  &  Loan  Co., 
145  P.2d  733,  62  Nev.  147. 

7.  Ala. — Lockwood  v.  Thompson,  73 
So.  504,  198  Ala.  295. 

Ind.— Pittsburgh,   C.  C.   &  St.  (L.   R. 

Co.  v.  Johnson,  93  N.E.  683,  49  Ind. 

App.  126,  rehearing  denied  95  N.E. 

610,  49  Ind.App.  126. 
Merger 

Minute  orders  of. judge  preceding 
judgment  are  merged  in,  and  con- 
trolled by,  judgment.— Prothero  v. 
Superior  Court  of  •  Orange  County, 
238  P.  357,  196  CaL  439. 

8.  Tex. — Stark  v.  Hardy,  Com.App., 
29    S.W.2d    967 — Daniel   v.    Sharpe, 
Civ.App.,  '69  S.W.2d  50-8. 

9.  Nev.— Blasdel    v.    Kean,    $    Nev 
305. 

34  C.J.  p  507  note  66. 

Tex. — Sanger  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
Civ.App.,    170    S.W.    1087— Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Jackson,  46  S.W, 
279,  19  Tex.Civ.App.  -m, 
Date  of  rendition 
Where  no  minute  entry  appeared 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  444 


fective  proof  of  service  filed  with  the  judgment 
roll,11  although  a  mere  recital  that  the  court  has 
jurisdiction  contrary  to  what  is  shown  by  the  rec- 
ord is  insufficient  to  confer  jurisdiction.12  It  has 
also  been  held  that,  where  a  recital  or  statement  in 
a  judgment  constituting  a  mere  conclusion  directly 
conflicts  with  the  record  proper,  the  latter  pre- 
vails.13 Accordingly  a  judgment  reciting  that  de- 
fendant admitted  allegations  in  the  complaint  to  be 
true,14  or  reciting  the  granting  of  a  motion  for 
judgment  on  the  pleadings,15  or  purporting  to  have 
been  entered  on  the  verdict  of  a  jury,16  does  not 
prevail  over  a  record  which  discloses  that  such  was 
not  the  case. 

A  recital  in  a  judgment  overruling  a  demurrer 
that  the  demurrer  came  on  regularly  to  be  heard 
has  been  held  not  to  nullify  an  entry  in  the  record 
showing  that  the  demurrer  was  not  filed  until  sev- 
eral terms  after  the  pleading  was  opened  to  demur- 
rer, the  recital  being  considered  as  not  in  conflict 
with  the  record  entry.17  Similarly  a  recital  in  a 
judgment  that  defendant  filed  his  demurrer  to  the 
complaint  and  that  "said  demurrers  be  and  they  are 


hereby  dismissed"  has  been  held  not  to  change  the 
fact  shown  by  the  record  that  the  demurrer  was 
addressed  to  each  count  in  the  complaint  separate- 
ly, and  not  to  the  complaint  as  a  whole.18  There 
is  no  inconsistency  between  a  formal  judgment  dis- 
missing a  cause  with  prejudice  and  a  minute  entry 
reciting  that  the  motion  to  dismiss  is  granted.19 

Where  the  record  contains  two  judgments,  the 
last  in  point  of  time  must  be  treated  as  the  true 
and  final  judgment,  and  the  other  disregarded,20 
although  there  is  authority  to  the  effect  that,  where 
a  judgment  is  entered  and  signed  as  of  a  certain 
date,  a  second  judgment  entry  will  be  vacated, 
leaving  the  record  of  the  case  as  originally  authen- 
ticated to  stand.21 

As  between  different-  entries,  an  entry  in  the  rec- 
ord book22  or  an  entry  in  an  appearance  docket2S 
has  been  held  to  prevail  over  an  entry  in  the  judg- 
ment docket.  As  between  an  entry  in  an  order 
book  and  an  original  petition  which  is  on  file,  the 
entry  in  the  order  book  is  controlling.24 

Matters  not  properly  a  part  of  the  record  do  not 
overthrow  a  judgment  entry.25 


B.  OPERATION  AND  EFFECT 


§  444.    In  General 

The  operation  and  effect  of  a  Judgment  are  purely 
matters  of  law,  and  as  a  general  rule  a  Judgment  does 
not  directly  affect  the  title  to  property. 


The  operation  and  effect  of  a  judgment  are  pure- 
ly matters  of  law2^  and  are  not  affected  by  an  un- 


in  record  showing  when  Judgment 
was  rendered,  statement  in  written 
Judgment,  signed  by  trial  Judge,  that 
he  rendered  Judgment  on  a  specified 
date  is  accepted  as  true,  notwith- 
standing filing  mark  showed  that 
written  Judgment  was  not  filed  until 
a  later  date.— Mosher  v.  Dye,  39  P.2d 
639,  44  Ariz.  555. 

li«    KY.— Maples  v.  Mackey,  89  N. 

Y.  146. 

34  C.J.  p  507  note  68. 
12:    111. — Sherman  &  Ellis  v.  Journal 
of  Qommerce  and  Commercial  Bul- 
letin, 259  Ill-App.  453. 
Recital  of  appearance 

Mere  recital  in  Judgment  that  de- 
fendant appeared  is  insufficient  to 
sustain  Judgment  against  defendant 
not  served  with  summons. — Ameri- 
can Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  House,  118  So. 
722,  153  Miss.  170,  &8  A.L.B.  380. 

13.  »edtm  as  to  service  of  procew 
Fla. — Johnson  v.  Clark,  19'8  So.  -842, 

145  <Fla,  258, 

Dr.— In  re  Stewart's  Estate,  223  P. 
727,  110  Or.  408. 

14.  Tex. — Tackett      v.       Middleton, 
Com.ApOp.,  280  S.W.  563,  44  A.L.R. 
1143,    motion   overruled  '281   8.W. 

.  1047. 


15.    K.T.— Levey  v.  Allien,  25  N.T.S. 

•352,  72  Hun  321. 
10,    U.S.— Moss  v.  City  of  Pittsburg, 

Pa.,  184  F.  325,  106  C.C.A.  348. 

17.    Ga.— Smith  v.  Aultman,  118  S.E. 

459,  30  Ga.App.  507. 
ia    Ala.— Birmingham  Ry.,  Light  & 

Power  Co.  v.  Weathers,  51  So.  303, 

164  Ala.  23. 

19.  Ariz. — Tootle    -    Campbell    Dry 
Goods  Co.  v.  Knott,  29  P.2d  1066, 
43  Ariz.  210. 

Season  for  rule 

Since  a  dismissal  after  a  hearing 
on  the  merits  is  presumed  to  be 
with  prejudice  in  the  absence  of  an 
express  statement  to  the  contrary, 
the  legal  effect  of  each  was  the  same. 
—Tootle-Campbell  Dry  Goods  Co.  v. 
Knott,  supra. 

20.  Tex.— Witty  v.   Rose,   Civ.App., 
148  S.W.2d  9'62,  error  dismissed. 

yt -^Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Cootey  v. 

Remington,  189  A.  151,  153,  108  Vt 

441. 

34  C.J.  P  507  note  71. 
Operation   and    effect    of   conflicting 

judgments  see  infra  $   445. 
2L,    Mich.— Wulff  v.  Bossier,  165  N. 

W.  1048,  199  Mich.  70. 


22.    Iowa.—  Case    v.    Plato,    6    N.W. 

128,  54  Iowa  64. 

Me.  —  Willard  v.  Whitney,  49  Me.  235. 
34  C.J.  P  507  note  73. 

5.    Pa.—  Appeal  of  Hance,  1  Pa.  408 

—  Appeal  of  Nicholson,   11  A,  562, 

8  Pa.Cas.  396. 
34  C.J.  ;p  507  note  74. 

24.  Ind.—  Doe  v.  Smith,  1  Ind.  451. 

25.  Mo.  —  Missouri,  K.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v. 
Holschlag,   45    S.W.   1101,   144  Mo. 
253,  66  Am.S.R.  417. 

26.  N.H.—  Burleigh   v.    Wong    Sung 
Leon,  1'39  A.   184,  -83  N.H.   115. 

A  judgment  cannot  "be  a  mere  recom- 


. 

U.S.  —  U.   S.  v.  Carrollo,   D.C.Mo.,   -30 

•F.Supp.  3. 
Final  Judgment 

(1)  Use   of   term    "Judgment"   or- 
dinarily implies  a  "final  Judgment" 
—  Hazzard  v.  Alexander,  178  A.  873, 
6  W.W.Harr.,Del.,  512. 

(2)  Final  and   interlocutory  Judgp- 
ments  distinguished  see  supra  S  8. 
"Adversary  proceeding" 

Proceeding  instituted  by  order  of 
supreme  court  for  purpose  of  en- 
abling court  to  inform  itself  on  qu3s- 
tions  arising  under  statute  providing 
for  integration  of  state  bar  was  not 


875 


§444 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


derstanding  of  the  court  or  parties.27  Although  a 
judgment  may  in  certain  circumstances  operate  to 
create  a  title  to  property,  or  to  transfer  the  title,28 
as  a  general  rule  judgments  do  not  directly  affect 
the  title  to  property.29  A  money  judgment  does  not 
give  the  judgment  creditor  an  estate  or  interest  in 
the  judgment  debtor's  land,30  although  it  may  give 
him  the  right  to  have  the  land  appropriated  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  judgment.31  Every  unsatisfied 
judgment  is  necessarily  a  liability.32 

The  doctrine  of  res  judicata  is  discussed  infra  §§ 
592-848. 

§  445.    Conflicting  Judgments 

It  is  generally  held  that,  of  two  conflicting  judg- 
ments on  the  same  rights  of  the  parties,  the  one  which 
is  later  in  time  will  prevail. 

Where  there  have  been  two  former  actions  in 
which  the  claim  or  demand,  fact  or  matter  sought 
to  be  religated  has  been  decided  contrarily,  the  rule 
that,  where  there  is  an  estoppel  against  an  estop- 
pel, it  "setteth  the  matter  at  large"  has  been  applied 


by  some  authorities,  and  in  such  case  both  parties 
may  assert  their  claims  anew.33  Other  authorities 
have  held  that,  of  two  conflicting  judgments  on  the 
same  rights  of  the  same  parties,  the  one  which  is 
later  in  time  will  prevail,34  although  it  has  also  been 
held  that  the  judgment  prior  in  time  will  prevail.35 
It  has  been  held  that  a  decision  of  a  court  of  last 
resort  is  binding  on  the  parties,  although  afterward, 
in  another  cause,  a  different  principle  was  de- 
clared.3* 

"Contradictory  judgment."  In  Louisiana  this 
term  is  used  to  designate  a  judgment  given  after 
the  parties  have  been  heard,  either  in  support  of 
their  claims  or  in  their  defense,  as  distinguished 
from  a  judgment  by  default.37 

§  446.    Time  of  Taking  Effect 

A  judgment  generally  takes  effect  on  the  rights  and 
titles  of  the  parties,  to  the  action  as  they  exist  at  the 
time  of  the  rendition  of  the  Judgment. 

With  respect  to  the  rights  and  titles  of  the  par- 
ties to  an  action,  it  is  generally  held  that  a  judgment 


an  "adversary  proceeding:,"  and  ef- 
fect of  Judgment  Is  limited  by  na- 
ture of  proceeding.  —  Integration  of 
the  Bar  Case,  12  N.W.2d  699,  244 
Wis.  8,  151  A.1..R.  588. 
Statutory  judgments 

It  has  been  held  that  judgments1 
are  statutory  creations  and  that 
their  effect  is  to  be  determined  by 
the  statute  creating  them.  —  Sullivan 
State  Bank  v.  'First  Nat.  Bank,  146 
N.E.  403.  82  Ind.App.  419. 

27.  N.H.—  Burleigh   v.    Wong    Sung 
Leon,  1-39  A.  184,  83  N.H.  115. 

28.  U.S.—  McDaniel     Nat.     Bank    v. 
Bridwell,   C.C.A.MO.,  »65   F.2d  428. 

34  C.J,  p  507  note  84. 
Operation  and  effect  of  judgment  in: 
Hem  see  infra  §  910. 
Trover  and  conversion  see  the  C.J. 

S.  title  Trover  and  Conversion  § 

160,  also  65  C.J.  p  129  note  69-p 

130  note  77. 
Fixtures 

Buildings  and  other  articles  af- 
fixed to,  or  used  in  connection  with, 
realty  so  as  to  constitute  appur- 
tenances or  fixtures  pass  as  a  matter 
of  course  by  the  deed,  devise,  or 
decree  passing  the  title  to  the  realty, 
in  the  absence  of  a  reservation  there- 
in, —  Pickrell  v.  Pickrell,  Tex.Civ. 

.,  134  S.W.2d  740. 


29.  N.Y.-^-Thurst   v.   West,    81   N.Y. 
210. 

34  C.J.  P  507  note  86. 

30.  N.C.  —  Farrow  v.  American  Eagle 
•    Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  New  York.  134  S. 

E.  427,  192  N.C.  148. 
34  C.J.  p  507  note  88—21  C.J.  p  916 
note  59. 


31.  1ST. Y.— White's  Bank  v.  -Farthing, 
4   N.E.   -734,   101  N.Y.   '344,    9   N.Y. 
Civ.Proc.  64. 

N.C.— Farrow  v.  American  Eagle  Fire 
"Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  134  S.B.  427, 

192  N.C.  148. 
Lien  of  judgment  see  infra  §§   454- 

511. 

32.  Cal.— Woehrle  v.  Canclini,  109  P. 
£88,  15S  Cal.  107. 

33.  U.S.— Kahl    v.   Chicago   Title   & 
Trust  Co.,  D.C.I1L,  299  F.   793. 

34  C.J.  p  749  note  7. 

Merger  of  judgments  see  infra  §  599. 

Time  of  commencement  of  action  as 
affecting  application  of  doctrine  of 
res  judicata  see  infra  §  602. 

Waiver  of  estoppel  or  bar  of  res  ju- 
dicata see  infra  §  597. 

34.  u.S. — Donald    v.     J.    J.    White 
Lumber    Co.,   C.C.A.Miss.,    68    F.2d 
441. 

Cal. — Maloney  v.  Massachusetts 
Bonding.  &  Insurance  Co.,  123  P.2d 
449,  20  Cal.2d  1 — Standard  Oil  Co. 
of  California  v.  John  P.  Mills  Or- 
ganization, 43  P.2d  797,  3  Cal.2d 
128— California  Bank  v.  Traeger,  10 
P.2d  51,  215  Cal.  346— Nicholls  v. 
Anders,  56  P.2d  12S9,  13  Cal.App.2d 
440— Wood  v.  Pendola,  35  P.2d  5S6, 
1  CaLApp.2d  435. 

Colo.— In  re  Water  Rights  in  Water 
Dist.  No.  17,  277  P.  763,  So  Colo. 
555. 

Iowa. — Mornyer  v.  Cooper,  35  Iowa 
257. 

Ky. — Sipple  v.  Catron,  265  S.W.  491. 
205  Ky.  81. 

Mont. — Gans  &  Klein  Inv.  Co.  v.  San- 
ford,  8  P.2d  SDS,  91  Mont  512. 

Ohio.— State  ex  rel.  Young  v.  Mor- 
row, 2  N.E.2d  595,  131  Ohio  St.  266 

876 


— Clark   v.    Baranowski,    145    N.E. 

760,  111  Ohio  St.  436. 
Vt.->-Cootey    v.    Remington,    189    A. 

151,  108  Vt.  441. 
Wash.— Watkins  v.  Siler  Logging  Co., 

116  P.2d  315,  9  Wash.2d  70*3— State 

v.   Barnes,   291   P.   710,    158  Wash. 

648. 

34  C.J.  p  508  note  91,  p  749  note  8. 
Conflict  in  record  see  supra  §  443. 
Presumption  of  merger  or  vacation 

Where  two  judgments  of  the  same 
purport  are  rendered  in  the  same 
case  at  the  same  term  of  court,  it 
will  be  presumed  that  the  first  judg- 
ment merged  in  the  second  or  was 
constructively  vacated  by  it,  ctnd  in 
such  case  the  first  judgment  will  not 
sustain  a  plea  of  res  judicata. — John- 
son v.  Hesser,  «5  N.W.  894,  61  Neb. 
631. 
35.  Tex. — Witty  v.  Rose,  Civ.App., 

148  S.W.26L  962,  error  dismissed. 
Conflict  "between  final  and  interlocu- 
tory judgment 

Order  made  on  exceptions,  if  in- 
consistent with  judgment  on  merits, 
must  give  way  thereto. — Wells  v. 
Stonerock,  Tex.Civ.App.,  1  S.W.2d 
425,  reversed  on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  12  S.W.2d  961. 
New  trial 

Where  a  record  showed  two  in- 
consistent verdicts  and  judgments 
in  the  same  case,  a  new  trial  having 
been  had  without  setting  aside  the 
first  verdict  and  judgment,  it  was 
held  that  the  proceedings  subsequent 
to  the  entry  thereof  should  be  re- 
versed on  error. — Conrad  v.  Commer- 
cial Mut  Ins.  Co.,  81*  Pa.  66. 
3S.  S.C.— 'Frost  v.  Frost,  21  S.C.  501. 
37.  Black  L..D. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  447 


takes  effect  on  them  as  they  exist  at  the  time  of  the 
rendition  thereof,  and  not  as  they  existed  at  the 
commencement  of  the  suit  or  before  that  time.38  It 
has  been  variously  held  that  a  judgment  becomes 
operative  and  effective  when  it  is  entered,39  or 
when  it  is  announced40  or  signed,41  even  though  the 
judgment  is  not  entered  until  a  later  date.42  It  has 
been  held  that  a  judgment  does  not  become  final 
until  the  end  of  the  term  during  which  it  is  ren- 
dered.43 

The  presumption,  discussed  supra  §  113,  that  a 
judgment  rendered  during  -a  term  is  presumed  to 
have  been  rendered  on  the  first  day  of  the  term  will 
not  be  applied  so  as  to  cut  off  intervening  rights  ac- 
quired in  good  faith44  or  where  it  will  not  promote 
the  ends  of  justice,45  and  it  is  not  to  be  allowed  to 


prevail  over  the  substantial  equities  of  third  per- 
sons.46 

§  447.    Conditions  and  Alternative  Provisions 

The  party  claiming  the  benefit  of  a  Judgment  must 
comply  with  any  terms  and  conditions  which  It  may 
Impose  on  him. 

The  party  who  claims  the  benefit  of  a  judgment 
rendered  in  his  favor  must  comply  with  any  terms 
or  conditions  which  it  may  impose  on  him,  and  fail- 
ure to  do  so  will  destroy  the  effect  of  the  adjudi- 
cation.47 Where  the  judgment  is  in  the  alternative, 
granting  defendant  an  option  to  do  a  specified  act 
or  suffer  judgment  for  a  designated  sum,  his  elec- 
tion eliminates  the  alternative,  and  is  binding  on 
both  parties.48 


38.  Ala. — Autrey'  v.  Latta,  t76  So. 
457,  234  Ala,  662— Ex  parte  Lacy, 
168  So.  554,  232  Ala,  525— Corpus 
Juris  cited  in  Wilson  v.  Coffey,  $ 
P.2d  62,  64,  116  Cal.App.  635. 
111.— Snook  v.  Shaw,  43  N.B.2d  417, 

315  Ill.App.  594. 
Iowa. — Andrew    v.    Winegarden,    219 

N.W.  326,  205  Iowa  1180. 
N.Y.— -Langrick  v.  Rowe,   212  N.Y.S. 

240,  126  Misc.  2£6. 
Ohio. — Friedman  v.  Brown,  172  N.E. 

565,  35  Ohio  App.  450. 
Tex. — Cleburne  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bowers, 
Civ. App.,   113  S.W.2d  578 — Amason 
v.  Harrigan,  Civ. App.,  288  S.W.  566. 
34  C.J.  P  508  note  93. 
Operation  and  effect  of  nunc  pro  tune 

judgment  see  supra  §   121. 
Time  of  rendition  and  entry  of  judg- 
ments generally  see  supra  §§  113- 
116. 
When  equity  decree  takes  effect  see 

Equity  §  614. 
Evidence  of  debt 

Judgment,  speaks  from  its  date  and 
is  not  evidence  of  existence  of  the 
debt  prior  thereto,  and,  in  absence 
of  proof,  debt  must  be  considered 
contracted  as  of  date  of  judgment. — 
Wiggins  v.  Stewart  Bros.,  109  So. 
•  101,  215  Ala.  9. 

Presumption  is  Judgment  is  pay- 
able    immediately,    unless    contrary 
appears. — Barber  v.  Warland,  247  N. 
•Y.S.  455,  139  Misc.  -398. 
Time  for  rehearing 

<1)  Generally  judgments  and  de- 
crees are  effective  from  date  of  en- 
try thereof  for  most  purposes,  but 
such  rule  is  inapplicable  to  judg- 
ments and  decrees  of  supreme  court 
of  appeals  during  thirty-day  period 
within  which  petitions  for  rehearing 
may  be  filed,  particularly  where  or- 
der or  decree  is  self-executing  in  its 
nature. — Shields  v.  Romtne,  14  S.B. 
2d777,  123  W.Va.  21 S, 

(2)  -Under  judgment  ordering  lum- 
ber company  to  remove  defective 
house  from  homestead  within  thirty 


days,  thirty-day  period  did  not  start 
running  until  after  fifteen-day  re- 
hearing period  following  .affirmance 
on  appeal. — Davis  v.  Sloan  Lumber 
Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  37  S.W.2d  225. 

39.  Cal. — Barstow-San  Antonio  Oil 
Co.  v.  Whitney,  271  P.  477,  205  Cal. 
420,  certiorari  denied  49  S.Ct  345, 
279  U.S.  848,  73  L.Ed.  992— Wilson 
v.  Coffey,  3  P.2d  62,  116  Cal.App. 
635. 
A  Judgment  speaks  as  of  the  time  of 

its  entry- 
Ohio. — Magnolia  Bldg.  &  Inv.  Co.  v. 
Sulzman,    14   N.E.2d    623,    57    Ohio 
A«pp.  431 — Steigert   v.   Steigert,    13 
N.B.2d  583,  57  Ohio  App.  255. 
Statutory   change   between   dates   of 

announcement  and  entry 
In  action  to  review  order  of  state 
department  of  social  security  deny- 
ing applicant  his  claim  for  old  age 
assistance  where  trial  court  on  ££br. 
21,  1939,  orally  announced  its  deci- 
sion in  favor  of  claimant  but  did  not 
sign  and  enter  judgment  until  Igarch 
24,  19.39,  and  existing  old  age  assist- 
ance law  was  amended  on  Febr.  25, 
i£39,  the  amending  act  became  effec- 
tive prior  to  entry  of  judgment  and 
hence  was  controlling  of  method  and 
amount  of  assistance.— Adams  v. 
Ernst,  95  P.2d  799,  1  Wash.2d  254. 
Judgment  is  "entered"  when  it  is 
signed  by  the  court  and  delivered  to 
the  clerk  for  filing,  and  clerk's  fail- 
ure to  perform  the  ministerial  act  of 
entering  the  filing  of  the  judgment 
on  the  appearance  docket  or  spread- 
ing the  judgment  on  the  journal 
would  not  affect  the  validity  of  the 
judgment  or  invalidate  sale  there- 
under.— Cinebar  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v, 
Robinson,  97  P.2d  128,  1  Wash.2d  620. 

49,,  U.S.— Humphrey  v.  Bankers 
Mortg.  Co.  of  Topeka,  C.C.A.Kan., 
79  F.2d  345. 

I1L — People  ex  rel.  McDonough*  v. 
Jarecki,  185  N.B.  570,  352  111.  207 


— Wickiser   v.    Powers,    57    N.E.23 

522,  "324  IlLApp.  130. 
Tex. — Cleburne  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bowers, 

Civ.Ajppi,    113    S.W.2d   578. 

Date  announced,  not  date  signed,  is 
the  effective  date  of  a  judgment. — 
•First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fallon,  26  P.2d 
232,  55  Nev.  102. 

41.  N.Y.— Langrick  v.  Rowe,  212  N. 
T.S.  240,  126  Misc.  256. 

Either  in  open  court  or  in  chambers 
U.S. — Humphrey   v.    Bankers    Mortg. 

Co.  of  Topeka,  C.C.A.Kan.,  79  F.2d 

345. 

42.  U.S.— Humphrey      v.       Bankers 
Mortg.  Co.  of  Topeka,  supra. 

111. — People    ex    rel.    McDonough    v. 

Jarecki,  185  N.E.  570,   352   111.   207 

— Wickiser   v.    Powers,    67    N.E.2d 

522,  324  IlLApp.  130. 
N.Y.— Langrick  v,   Rowe,   212   N.Y.S. 

240,  126  Misc.  256. 
Tex. — Cleburne  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bowers, 

Civ.App.,  113  S.W.2d  57-8. 

43.  Va. — Carney   v.    Poindexter,    1&5 
S.E.  639,  170  Va.  233. 

44.  Ala. — Pope  v.  Brandon,   2  Stew. 
401,  20  Am.D.  49. 

Iowa. — Campbell  v.  Williams,  39 
Iowa  646. 

45.  U.S.— Newhall  v.  Sanger,  Cal.,  92 
U.S.  761,  23  L.Ed.  769. 

46.  Ala. — Powe  v.   McLeod,   76  Ala. 
41-S. 

47.  Iowa. — Blankenhorn     v.     Edgar, 
186  N.W.  893,  193  Iowa  184. 

Tex. — Giraud  v.  Reserve  Realty  Co., 
Civ.App.,  94  S.W.2d  198,  error  re- 
fused. 

34  C.J.  p  508  note  94. 

48.  Utah. — Parish    v.    McConkie,    35 
P.2d  1001,  84  Utah  396. 

Wash.— State  v.  Smith,  167  P.  *1, 
98  Wash.  100,  modified  on  other 
grounds  and  petition  denied  169  P. 
468,  98  Wash.  100. 

34  C.J.  P  508  note  95. 

Alternative  judgments  generally  see 
supra  §  74. 


877 


§  MS 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


§  448.    Extraterritorial  Operation 

A  judgment  does  not  have  extraterritorial  effect. 
Judgments  of  courts  of  a  sister  state  or  of  a  for- 
eign country  may  be  entitled  to  recognition  by  a 
domestic  court,  but  they  have  no  extraterritorial 
operation  or  effect  as  judgments.49  No  court  may 
enforce  its  process  beyond  the  limits  of  the  sover- 
eignty which  ordained  and  established  such  court,50 

§  449.    Void  and  Voidable  Judgments 

A  void  judgment  is  a  nullity,  but  a  voidable  judg- 
ment Is  as  operative  as  a  valid  Judgment  until  prop- 
erly set  aside. 

A  void  judgment  is  one  that  has  merely  the  sem- 


blance of  a  judgment  without  some  essential  element 
or  elements  on  which  its  validity  as  such  depends.51 
It  is  only  jurisdictional  defects  which  render  a  judg- 
ment void ;  mere  irregularities  or  errors  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  jurisdiction  may  or  may  not  render  the 
judgment  reversibly  erroneous,  or  voidable,  but 
they  do  not  render  it  void.52  A  judgment  is  void 
on  its  face  when  that  fact  appears  affirmatively 
from  inspection  of  the  judgment  roll,53  and  it  has 
been  held  that  a  judgment  is  void  only  where  the 
invalidity  appears  on  the  face  of  the  record.54 

A  judgment  which  is  void,  as  distinguished  from 
one  which  is  merely  voidable,  or  liable  to  be  vacated 


Accounting  by  plaintiff 

Under    Judgment    which    provided 
that  on  defendant's  failure  to  pay  a 
certain     sum     within     ninety     days 
plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  decree, 
and  which  required  an  accounting-  by 
plaintiff  as  trustee,  plaintiff  was  not 
entitled  to  decree  on  ground  that  de- 
fendant had  not   made  an  uncondi- 
tional deposit  to  credit  of  plaintiff, 
where  plaintiff  was  not  ready  to  ac- 
count and  where  in  accordance  with 
suggestion  of  plaintiffs  attorney  de- 
fendant   deposited   amount    required 
in  escrow  and  attorney  was  advised 
of  such   deposit. — Adams  v.   Bloom, 
142  P.2d  775,  61  Cal.App.2d  94. 
49.    U.S.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  -Car- 
penter v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  C.C.A. 
Mo.,  103  F.2d  996,  1000,  vacated  on 
other  grounds  60  S.Qt  416,  309  U. 
S.  23,  84  L.Ed.  55S,  rehearing  de- 
nied 60  S.Ct.  585,   309  U.S.  695,  84 
L.Ed.  1035. 
Mich.— Henkel  v.   Henkel,   276  N.W. 

522,  282  Mich.  473. 

N.Y.— Hutchison    v.    Ross,    187   N.EL 
65,    262   N.Y.    381,    89   A.-L.R.   1007, 
reargument   denied   188   N.E.    102, 
262  N.Y.  643,  89  A.L.R.  1023. 
34  C.J.  p  508  note  98. 
Foreign  judgments  generally  see  in- 
fra §§  888-906. 
60.    U.S. — Baskin  v,  Montedonico,  C. 

C.A.Tenn.,  115  F.2d  83-7. 
N.J. — Elizabethtown     Sav.     lust.     v. 
Gerber,  34  N.J.Eq.  130,  affirmed  35 
N.J,Eq.  153. 
Enforcement  of  judgments  generally 

see  infra  §§  585-591. 
51.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  In  re 
Dixie  Splint  Coal  Co.,  D.C.Va.,  31 
OF.Supp.  290,  295,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  C.C.A.,  Litton  y.  Pepper, 
100  F.2d  830  reversed  on  other 
grounds  60  S.Ct  238,  30-6  U.S.  295, 
84  L.Ed.  281. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Board 
of  Com'rs  of  Crawford-  County  v. 
Radley,  8  P.2d  386,  387,  134  Kan. 
704. 

Neb.— -Corpus  Jurii  quoted  in  Drain- 
age Dist.  No.  1  v.  Village  of 
Hershey,  296  N*W.  579,  882,  139 
Neb.  205. 


N.C.— City   of  Monroe   v.   Niven,    20 

S.E.2d  311,  221  N.C.  362. 
34  C.J.  p  509  note  12. 

52.  Ala. — Ex  parte  Harper,  112  So. 
96,  22  Ala.App.  60. 

Ark. — Axley  v.  Hammock,  50  S.W.2d 
60S,  185  Ark.  939. 

Fla. — Malone  v.  Meres,  109  So.  677, 
91  Fla,  709. 

111.— Herb  v.  Pitcairn,  51  N.E.2d  277, 
384  111.  237,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  65  S.Ct  954,  323  U.S.  77, 
89  L.Ed  1483,  rehearing  denied  -65 
S.Ct.  1188.  325  U.S.  893,  89  L.Ed. 
2005,  opinion  supplemented  64  N. 
E.2d  318,  392  111.  151. 

N.C. — Hinton  v.  Whitehurst  198  S.E. 
579,  214  N.C.  99. 

Tex. — Grayson  v.  Johnson,  Civ.App., 
181  S.W.2d  312— Livingston  v. 
Stubbs,  Civ.App.,  151  S.W.2d  285, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct 
—Sing  v.  Somer,  Civ.App.,  129  S. 
W.2d  501,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Askew  v.  Rountree, 
Civ-App.,  120  S.W.2d  117,  error  dis- 
missed— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Dearing  v.  City  of  Port  Neches, 
Civ.App.,  65  S.W.2d  1105,  error  re- 
fused. 

34  C.J.  p  509  note  13. 

Essentials  of  validity  of  judgment 
see  supra  §§  13-22. 

Curable  defects 

Mere  Irregularity  is  amendable 
and  is  cured  by  judgment,  and  any- 
thing which,  if  objected  to,  could 
have  been  amended  does  not  render 
judgment  void. — Gray  v.  Riley,  170 
S.E.  53-7,  47  Ga.App.  -34-8. 

Judgment  based  on  unconstitutional 

statute 

Where  the  unconstitutionality  of  a 
statute  goes  only  to  the  merits  of 
the  cause  of  action  and  not  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court,  a  judgment 
In  a  civil  suit  based  thereon  is  not  a 
"void  judgment"  but  merely  an  "er- 
roneous judgment"  and  remains  ef- 
fective until  regularly  set  aside  or 
reversed. — Commonwealth  of  Massa- 
chusetts v.  Davis,  1-68  S.W.2d  21-6,  140 
Tex.  398,  certiorari  denied  Davis  v. 
Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts,  63 

878 


S.Ct    1447,    320    U.S.    210,    87    lL.Ed. 
liS4S,    rehearing   denied   64    S.Ct   41, 
320  U.S.  811,  88  L.Ed.  490. 
Judgment  violative  of  statute  or  con. 

stitution 

Where  a  judgment  or  any  part 
thereof  clearly  violates  the  plain 
provisions  of  the  constitution  or 
statutes,  such  judgment  or  the  part 
thereof  that  is  in  direct  conflict 
with  the  constitution  or  statutes  is 
to  that  extent  void  and  cannot  be  en- 
forced.— City  of  Norman  -v.  Van 
Camp,  209  P.  925,  87  Okl.  182. 

53.  111.— Herb  v.  Pitcairn,  51  N.E.2d 
277,  384  111.  237,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  65  S.Ct.  954,  325  U.S.  77, 
89  L.Ed.  1483,  rehearing  denied  65 
S.Ct  1188,  325  U.S.  893,  89  L.Ed. 
2005,  opinion  supplemented  64  2ST.E. 
2d  318,  392  111.  151. 

Okl.— Bradshaw  v.  Tinker,  264  P.  162, 
129  Okl.  244. 

34  C.J.  p  510  note  23. 

Recital  of  service  of  process 

Where  citation  was  served  on  de- 
fendant in  original  suit,  judgment 
was  not  void  on  its  face  because  it 
did  not  recite  service  of  process  and 
purported  only  to  be  judgment  by 
confession  of  attorney  and  petition 
was  not  verified  and  no  «power  of  at- 
torney to  confess  judgment  was  filed 
or  its  contents  recited  in  judgment, 
where  record  showed  that  citation  to 
defendant  was  duly  issued  and  prop- 
erly returned  showing  service,  and 
officer's  return  was  not  successfully 
impeached— Johnson  v.  Cole,  Tex, 
Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d  910,  error  re- 
fused. 

54U  Okl.— Femow  v.  Gubser,  162  P. 
2d  529 — Harjo  v.  Johnston,  104  P. 
2d  985,  187  Okl.  561— Bradshaw  v* 
Tinker,  264  P.  162,  129  Okl.  244 — 
Smith  v.  Page.  246  P.  217,  117  Okl. 
223. 

Tenn. — Clemmons  v.  Haynes,  3  Tenn. 
App.  20. 

Tex. — O'Quinn  v.  Harrison,  Civ.App., 
271  S.W.  137— A.  B.  Richards  Med- 
icine Co.  v.  Reeves,  £iv.App.,  2-6S 
S.W.  S94. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  449 


or  set  aside  for  irregularity  or  other  cause,  or  re- 
versed for  error,  is  a  mere  nullity55  and  has  no 
force  or  effect.56  It  is  not  binding  on  anyone;57 
it  raises  no  lien58  or  estoppel;59  and  it  does  not 


impair  or  affect  the  rights  of  anyone.60  It  confers 
no  rights  on  the  party  in  whose  favor  it  is  given, 
and  affords  no  protection  to  persons  acting  under 
it;61  and  it  does  not  even  operate  as  a  discontinu- 


55.  U.-S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kel- 
leam  v.  Maryland  Casualty  Co.  of 
Baltimore,  C.C.A.Okl.,  112  'F.2d  940, 
944,  reversed  on  other  grounds  61 
S.Ct.  595,  312  U.S.  377,  -85  L.Ed. 
399 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In  re 
Pixie  Splint  Coal  Co.,  D.C.Va.,  31 
F.Supp.  290,  295,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  C.C.A.,  Litton  v.  Pepper, 
100  F.2d  830,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  60  S.Ct  238,  306  U.S.  295, 
84  !L.Ed.  281 — In  re  American  Fi- 
delity Corporation,  D.Q.Cal.,  28  F. 
Supp.  462. 

Ark. — Taylor  v.  Bay  St  (Francis 
Drainage  Dist.,  284  S.W.  770,  171 
Ark.  285 — Axley  v.  Hammock,  50 
S.W.2d  608,  185  Ark.  939. 

Cal. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Casner  v. 
San  Diego  Trust  &  -Savings  Bank, 
94  P.2d  65,  76,  34  Cal.App.2d  524. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Union 
Central  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Albrethsen, 
294  P.  842,  846,  '50  Idaho  196. 

HI.-— Herb  v-  Pitcairn,  51  N.E.2d  277, 
384  111.  237,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  65  S.Ct.  954,  525  U.S.  77, 
•89  GLuEd.  1483,  rehearing  denied  -6-5 
S.Ct  1188,  325  U.S.  '893,  180  L.Ed. 
2005,  opinion  supplemented  64  N. 
B.2d  318,  392  111.  151. 

Iowa.— S  tier  v.  Iowa  State  Traveling 
Men's  Ass'n,  201  N.W.  328,  199 
Iowa  118,  59  A.L.R.  1384. 

Ky.— Hill  v.  Hill,  185  S.W.2d  245,  299 
Ky.  351— Hill  v.  Walker,  180  S.W. 
2d  93,  297  Ky.  257,  154  A.L.R.  814 
— Soper  v.  Foster,  51  S.W.2d  927, 
244.  Ky.  «658. 

3L,a. — Ludeau  v.  Jacob,  185  -So.  458, 
191  La,  427. 

Mo.— Coombs  v.  Benz,  114  S.W.2d  -713, 
232  Mo.App.  1011. 

3STeb.— Sedlak  v.  Duda,  13  N.W.2d  892, 
144  Neb.  567,  154  AJL.R.  490— 
Hassett  v.  Durbln,  '271  N.W. -867, 
132  Neb.  315. 

N.C.— Moore  v.  Moore,  31  S.E.2d  690, 
224  N.C.  552— Casey  v.  Barker,  14 
S.B.2d  429,  219  N.C.  465— Clark  v. 
Carolina  Homes,  128  S.R  20,  T89 
N.C.  703. 

N.D.— State  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
City  of  Fargo,  246  N.W.  243,  63  N 
D.  #5. 

Okl. — Le  -dair  v.  Calls  Him,  '233  P 
1087,  106  Okl.  247. 

•Tex. — Dollert  v.  Pratt-Hewit  Oil  Cor- 
poration, Civ.App.,  179  S.W.2d  -346 
error  refused,  certiorari  denied  -61 
S.Ct.  713.  324  U.S.  853,  i89  L.Ed. 
1412,  rehearing  denied  65  S.Ct  912 
324  U.S.  889,  89  L.Ed.  1437— Com 
mander  v.  Bryan,  Civ.App.,  123  -S 
W.2d  1008. 

Utah, — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Stat 


v.    Lee   -Lim,   7   P.2d   825,    827,    79 

Utah  68. 

4  C.J.  p  509  note  14. 
At  all  times 

Judgment  which  is  absolutely  void 
s  at  all  times  a  nullity.— Fowler  v. 
Fowler,  130  S.E.  315,  190  N.C.  536. 
For  all  purposes 

A  void  Judgment  is  a  nullity  for 
all  purposes. — Texas  Pacific  Coal  & 
Oil  Co.  v.  Ames,  Tex. Civ.App.,  284  S. 
W.  315,  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
Com.App.,  '292  S.W.  191. 

A  void  Judgment  of  an  appellate 
court  has  no  more  validity  than  a 
void  Judgment  of  any  other  court. — 
Faris  v.  City  of  Caruthersville,  1'62 
S.W.2d  237,  349  Mo.  454— Ralph  v. 
Annuity  Realty  Co.,  28  S.W.2d  662, 
325  Mo.  410. 

56.  Ark. — Taylor  v.  Bay  St.  Francis 
Drainage  Dist,   284   S.W.   770,   171 
Ark.  285. 

Tex. — Commander  v.  Bryan,  Civ.App., 

123  S.W.2d  1008. 
34  C.J.  p  509  note  14. 
As  though  no  Judgment  entered 

A  void  Judgment  leaves  the  parties 
in  the  same  position  as  though  no 
Judgment  had  been  entered. — Hill  v. 
Hill,  1-85   S.W.2d  245,   289  Ky.   351. 
Basis  or  evidence  of  right 

An  absolutely  void  Judgment  is  a 
nullity,  can  be  neither  a  basis  for, 
nor  evidence  of,  any  right  whatever, 
and  may  be  attacked  anywhere,  di- 
rectly or  collaterally,  by  parties  or 
strangers. — In  re  American  Fidelity 
Corporation,  D.C,CaL,  28  F.Supp.  462. 

57.  Ark.— Axley  v.  Hammock,  50  S. 
W.2d  £08,  185  Ark.  939. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Union 
Central  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Albreth- 
sen, 294  P.  842,  846,  50  Idaho  196. 
Neb.— Sedlak  v.  Duda,  13  N.W.Sd 
892,  144  Neb.  567,  154  A.L.R.  490 
—Hassett  v.  Durbin,  271  N.W.  867, 
132  Neb.  315. 
Tex.— -Commander  v.  Bryan,  Civ.App., 

123  S.W.2d  1008. 
34  C.J.  p  509  note  14. 

Only  by  proceedings  which  direct- 
ly bind  a  Judicial  tribunal  or  judge 
thereof  may  the  parties  to  a  con- 
troversy pending  before  such  tribu- 
nal or  Judge  become  bound. — New- 
port v.  Culbreath,  162  So.  340,  120 
Fla.  152. 

58.  Neb.— Sedlak  v.  Duda,  13  N.W.2d 
892,   144  Neb.  567,   154  A.L.R.  490 

34  C.J.  p  509  note  14. 

59.  Idaho. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in. 
Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Al 
brethsen,  294  P.  842,  846,  50  Idaho 
196. 

879 


sreb. — Sedlak    v.    Duda,     13     N.W.2d 
892,    144   Neb.    567,   154  A.L.R.   490. 
4  C.J.  p  509  note  14. 

6O.  Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Al- 
brethsen, 294  P.  842,  846,  50  Idaho 
196. 

Mo. — Coombs  v.  Benz,  114  S.W.2d 
713,  232  Mo.App.  1011. 

Neb. — Sedlak  v.  Duda,  13  N.W.2d 
892,  144  Neb.  567,  154  A.L.R.  490. 

Tex.— Dollert  v.  Pratt-Hewit  Oil  Cor- 
poration, Civ.App.,  179  S.W.2d  346, 
error  refused,  certiorari  denied  65 
S.Ct.  713,  324  U.S.  853,  89  L.Ed. 
1412,  rehearing  denied  65  S.Ct.  912, 
324  U.S.  889,  89  L.Ed.  1437. 

34  C.J.  p  509  note  14. 

61-  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kel- 
leam  v.  Maryland  Casualty  Co.  of 
Baltimore,  C.C.A.Okl.,  112  F.2d 
940,  944,  reversed  on  other  grounds 
61  S.Ct.  595,  312  U.S.  377,  85  L.Ed. 
899. 

y.— Hill  v.  Walker,   180   S.W.2d  93, 
297  Ky.   257,    154   A.L.B.   814. 

Mo. — Coombs  v.  Benz,  114  S.W.2d 
713,  232  Mo.App.  1011. 

Neb.— Sedlak  v.  Duda,  13  N.W.2d 
892,  144  Neb.  567,  154  A.L.R.  567. 

N.T.— Mirsky  v.  Mirsky,  35  N.T.S.2d 
858. 

N.C.— Casey  v.  Barker,  14  S.E.2d  429, 
219  N.C.  465. 

Tex. — Dollert  v.  Pratt-Hewit  Oil  Cor- 
poration, Civ.App.,  179  S.W.2d  346, 
error  refused,  certiorari  denied  65 
S.Ct.  713,  324  U.S.  853,  89  L.Ed. 
1412,  rehearing  denied  65  S.Ct.  912, 
324  U.S.  889,  89  L.Ed.  1437 — Com- 
mander v.  Bryan,  Civ.App.,  123  S. 
W.2d  1008. 

34  C.J.  p  510  note  16. 

Trespassers 

Parties  attempting  to  enforce  a 
void  Judgment  are  trespassers. — Le 
Clair  v.  Calls  Him,  233  P.  1087,  106 
Okl.  247. 

Title  of  one  olaianing  through  void 
Judgment  fails  with  failing  of  such 
Judgment. — San  Lorenzo  Title  &  Im- 
provement Co.  v.  City  Mortg.  Co., 
Civ.App.,  48  S,W.2d  310,  affirmed  73 
S.W.2d  513,  124  Tex.  513.  followed 
in  San  Lorenzo  Title  &  Improvement 
Co.  v.  Clardy,  73  S.W.2d  516,  124  Tex. 
31,  and  San  Lorenzo  Title  &  Im- 
provement Co.  v.  Caples,  78  S.W.2d 
516,  124  Tex.  33. 

Collateral  or  subsequent  proceeding" 
dependent  on  validity  of  a  void  Judg- 
ment may  be  vacated  on  proper  mo- 
tion by  person  affected  thereby. — 
Hinkle  v.  Jones,  66  P.2d  1073,  180 
Okl.  17. 


§  449 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S, 


ance  of  the  action.62  Such  a  judgment  may  be 
attacked  at  any  time  by  anyone,63  including  the 
party  in  whose  favor  it  is  given,64  and  may  be  im- 
peached in  any  action,  direct  or  collateral.65  It  is 
not  necessary  to  take  any  steps  to  vacate  or  avoid 
a  void  judgment;  it  may  simply  be  ignored.66  A 
valid  judgment  may  be  entered  subsequently  in  dis- 
regard of  the  void  judgment.67 

Voidable  judgments.  As  discussed  supra  §  191, 
where  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  parties,  of 
the  subject  matter  or  cause  of  action,  and  of  the 


question  determined  or  relief  granted,  that  is,  where 
the  court  has  jurisdiction  to  render  the  particular 
judgment,  mere  errors  or  irregularities  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  jurisdiction,  although  sufficient  to  ren- 
der the  judgment  erroneous,  and  subject  to  be  re- 
versed or  set  aside  in  a  proper  proceeding  for  that 
purpose,  do  not  render  the  judgment  void,  and  un- 
til so  set  aside  it  is  valid  and  binding  for  all  pur- 
poses.68 Until  set  aside  in  a  proper  proceeding  for 
that  purpose,  a  voidable  judgment  has  the  same 
force  and  effect  as  though  no  error  had  been  com- 
mitted;69 it  will  support  proceedings  taken  under 


63.     Tex.— Isbill  v.  Stovail,  Civ.App., 

92  S.W.2d  1067. 
Utah. — Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  State 

v.    Lee    Lim,    7    P.2d    825.    827,    79 

Utah  68. 

34  C.J.  p  510  note  17. 
Decision  under   advisement 

Where  a  trial  judge  takes  a  case 
under  advisement  and  thereafter 
purports  to  render  a  judgment  which 
is  void,  the  status  of  the  cause  re- 
mains as  one  continuing  to  be  held 
under  advisement  and  not  yet  de- 
cided or  determined. — City  of  Clin- 
ton ex  rel.  Richardson  v.  Keen,  138 
P.2d  104,  192  Okl.  S83. 

63.  La. — Ludeau   v.    Jacob,    185    So. 
458,   191  La.  427. 

yr.C. — Casey  v.  Barker,  14  S.E.2d  429, 
219  N.C.  465. 

Okl.— Lehman  v.  Tucker,  55  P.2d  62, 
176  Okl.  286. 

Tex. — Cheney  v.  Norton,  Civ.App., 
126  S.W.2d  1011,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  Norton  v.  Cheney,  161 
S.W.2d  73,  138  Tex.  622. 

Enforcement  of  void  judgment  may 
Toe  enjoined 

U.S.— North  Pacific  S.  S.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Accident  Commission,  D. 
C.Cal.,  23  F.2d  109. 

64.  La. — May    v.    Ball,    12    La.Ann. 
416. 

Utah. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  State 
v.  Lee  Lim,  7  P.2d  825,  827,  79 
Utah  68. 

65.  Neb. — Drainage   Dist.    No.    1    v. 
Village  of  Hershey,  296  N.W.  879, 
139   Neb.    205 — Hassett   v.   Durbin, 
271  N.W.  867,  132  Neb.  315. 

N".C. — Casey  v.  Barker,  14  S.E.2d  429, 
219  N.C.  465. 

Tex. — Cheney  v.  Norton,  Civ.App., 
'  126  S.W.2d  1011,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  Norton  v.  Cheney,  161 
S.W.2d  73,  138  Tex.  622. 

Collateral  attack  see  supra  §  401  et 
seq. 

Opening  or  vacating  judgment  see 
supra  §  267. 

66.  Nev.— State    ex    rel.    Smith    v. 
Sixth  Judicial   Dist.  Court,  Hum- 
boldt  County,    167   P.2d   648. 

N.C. — Casey    v.    Barker,     14     S.E.2d 

429,  219  N.C.  465. 
Tex. — Cheney    v.    Norton,    Civ.App., 

126  S.W.2d  1011,  reversed  on  other 


grounds  Norton  v.  Cheney,  161  S. 

W.2d  73,  138  Tex.  622. 
34  C.J.  p  510  note  19. 

defendant  need  not  take  advantage 
of  any  particular  legal  remedy  at 
risk  of  being  precluded  from  at- 
tacking void  judgment  in  habeas  cor- 
pus proceeding. — State  v.  Branaman, 
183  N.E.  653,  204  Ind.  238. 

67.  Utah.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Boley, 
61  P.2d  621,  90  Utah  341,  followed 
in  Boley  v.  District  Court  of  Sec- 
ond Judicial  Dist.  in  and  for  Mor- 
gan County,  SI  P.2d  624,  90  Utah 
347 — Corpus  Jnrts  quoted  in  State 
v.    Lee    Lim,    7   P.2d    825,    827,    79 
Utah  68. 

Wash.— Morrison  v.  Berlin,  79  P. 
1114,  37  Wash.  600. 

68.  U.S.— Spencer  v.  Gypsy  Oil  Co., 
C.C.A.OkL,  .142  F.2d  935,  certiorari 
denied   65   S.Ct.  439,   323  U.S.   798, 
89  L.Ed.  636— Mclntosh  v.  Wiggins, 
C.C.A.MO.,   123   F.2d  316,  certiorari 
denied   62    S.Ct.   800,   315   U.S.   815, 
86  L.Bd.  1213,  rehearing  denied  62 
S.Ct.    914,    315    U.S.    831,    86    L.Ed. 
1224. 

Ala.— Farrell  v.  Farrell,  10  So.2d  153, 

243  Ala.  389. 
Ark.— Kirchoff  v.  Wilcox,  36  S.W.2d 

667,  183  Ark.  460. 
Cal. — Wells  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  City  and 

County    of   San   Francisco,    152    P. 

2d  625,  25  Cal.2d  37 — Gray  v.  Hall, 

265  P.  246,  203  CaL  306— Hogan  v. 
Horsfall,   266  P.  1002,   91   Cal.App. 
37,  followed  in  266  P.  1005,  91  Cal. 
App.  797. 

D.C. — Swofford  v.  International  Mer- 
cantile Marine  Co.,  113  F.2d  179, 

,   72  App.D.C.  225. 

Fla. — State  ex  rel.  Fulton  Bag  &  Cot- 
ton Mills  v.  Burnside,  15  So.2d  324, 
153  Fla.  599— Malone  v.  Meres,  109 
So.  677,  91  Fla.  709. 

Ga.— Pope  v.  '  Shipp,  144  S.B.  345, 
38  Ga.App.  483. 

III. — Chicago  Title  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Mack,  180  N.B.  412,  347  111.  480— 
Petition  of  Volpe,  66  N.E.2d  146, 
328  IlLApp.  311— Hampton  v.  Gris- 
som,  4  N.B.2d  895,  287  IlLApp.  294. 

Iowa. — Hansen  v.   McCoy  &  McCoy, 

266  N.W.   1,  221  Iowa  523— Harris 
v.  Randolph,  23$  N.W.  51,  213  Iowa 
772. 

880 


Ky. — Pruett  v.  Pruett's  Adm'x,  192  S. 
W.2d  722,  301  Ky.  568, 

Me. — Mitchell  v.  Mitchell,  11  A.2d 
898,  136  Me.  406. 

Miss.— Todd  v.  Todd,  20  So.2d  827. 
197  Miss.  819. 

Mo. — Electrolytic  Chlorine  Co.  v. 
Wallace  &  Tiernan  Co.,  41  S.W.2d 
1049,  328  Mo.  782,  78  A.L.R.  930 
— Dickey  v.  Dickey,  App.,  132  S.W. 
2d  1026. 

N-.M.— In  re  Field's  Estate,  60  P.2d 
945,  40  N.M.  423. 

Okl.— Mid-Continent  Pipe  Line  Co.  v. 
Semtnole  County  Excise  Board,  146 
P.2d  996,  194  Okl.  40. 

S.C. — Cathcart  v.  Jennings,  135  S.E. 
55S,  137  S.C.  450. 

Tex.— Easterline  v.  Bean,  49  S.W.2d 
427,  121  Tex.  327 — Bearden  v.  Tex- 
as Co.,  Com.App.,  60  S.W.2d  1031 
— Stewart  Oil  Co.  v.  Lee,  Civ.App.. 
173  S.W.2d  791,  error  refused- 
Wright  v.  Shipman,  Civ.App.,  279 
S.W.  296. 

Utah. — Plutus  Mining  Co.  v.  Orme. 
289  P.  132,  76  Utah  286. 

Vt. — Santerre  v.  Sylvester,  189  A* 
159,  108  Vt.  435. 

Va.— Mayes  v,  Mann,  180  S.E.  423, 
164  Va.  584. 

Wash. — Thomas  v.  Phelan,  289  P.  51. 
157  Wash.  471. 

34  C.J.  p  508  note  7. 

A  court  may  misconstrue,  misap- 
ply, or  disobey  the  law,  in  pronounc- 
ing judgment;  yet  so  long  as  its 
judgment  remains  unreversed,  it  un- 
alterably binds  the  parties. — Epstein 
v.  Bendersky,  21  A.2d  815,  130  N. 
J.Eq.  180. 

Judgments  of  courts  of  general  Ju- 
risdiction are  never  mere  nullities. — 
Malone  v.  Meres,  109  So.  677,  91  Fla. 
709. 

69.    U.S. — Liken  v.  Shaffer,  D.C.Iowa» 

64  F.Supp.  432. 
Miss. — Todd   v.   Todd,    20    So.2d    827* 

197  Miss.  819. 
N.M.— State  v.  Pattenj  69  B.2d  931,  41 

N.M.  395. 
N.C.— Ex  parte  Steele,  18  S.E.2d  132. 

220     N.C.     685.     certiorari     denied 

Steele  v.  State  of  North  Carolina,, 

62  S.Ct,  1275,  316  U.S.  686,  86  L.E6\ 

1758. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


450 


it,70  and,  as  discussed  supra  §§  42S-433,  it  is  not 
subject  to  collateral  attack. 


§450. 


Partial  Invalidity 


A  judgment  is  wholly  void  where  It  Is  void  in  part 
and  the  part  which  is.  void  is  not  separable,  but  it  is 
generally  held  that  the  fact  that  a  Judgment  is  void  in 
part  will  not  invalidate  a  separable  remainder  of  the 
judgment. 

A  judgment  is  wholly  void  where'  it  is  void  in 
part  and  the  part  which  is  void  is  not  separable  and 
divisible  from  the  balance.71  It  has  been  said  that 
a  judgment  must  be  either  valid  or  void  as  a1 
whole,72  and  that  a  judgment  cannot  be  bad  in  part 
and  good  in  part,  but  is  wholly  void  if  void  in 
part.73  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  generally  been 


held  that  a*  judgment  may  be  valid  in  part  and  void 
in  part74  where  the  parts  which  are  valid  and  void 
are  separable;75  the  fact  that  part  of  the  judgment 
is  void  does  not  necessarily  invalidate  the  entire 
judgment,76  nor  does  the  fact  that  part  of  the  judg- 
ment is  valid  validate  the  portion  of  the  judgment 
that  is  void.77  The  court  may  treat  the  void  part 
of  the  judgment  as  erroneous  surplusage  which  may 
be  disregarded,  leaving  the  remainder  of  the  judg- 
ment standing.78  Where  a  judgment  declares  a 
personal  liability,  and  also  determines  rights  in 
property,  the  judgment  may  be  good  as  a  personal 
judgment,  although  bad  in  so  far  as  it  affects  the 
property,79  or  it  may  be  good  as  to  the  property  in- 
volved and  void  as  a  personal  judgment.80  As  to 
jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter,  it  seems  that,  al- 


Ohio. — Frankenstein  v.  Behrendt,  21 
N.B.2d  678,  60  Ohio  App.  403, 

34  C.J.  p  509  note  8. 

70.  U.S. — Berthold-Jcnnings  Lumber 
Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M,  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  C.C.A.MO,,  80  F.2d  32,  102.  A. 
L.R.  688,  certtorari  denied  56  S.Ct. 
591,  207  U.S.  715,  80  L.Ed.  1001. 

Ok!. — Griggs  v.  Brandon,  269  P.  1052, 
132  Okl.  180. 

34  C.J.  p  509  note  9. 

Tli  Cal. — Capital  Bond  &  Invest- 
ment Co.  v.  Hood,  24  P.2d  765, 
218  Oal.  729 — Reichert  v.  Rabun, 
265  P.  260,  89  Cal.App.  375. 

Okl.— Central  Nat.  Oil  Co.  v.  Con- 
tinental Supply  Co.,  249  P.  347, 
119  Okl.  190. 

Tex. — Missouri-Kansas-Texas  R.  Co. 
of  Texas  v.  Pluto,  156  S.W.2d  265, 
138  Tex.  1 — Taylor  v.  Dinsmora. 
Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d  269,  error  dis- 
missed. 

72.  Me. — Consolidated  Rendering  Co. 
v.  Martin,  145  A.  896,  128  Me.  96, 
64  A.L.R.  700. 

.34  C.J.  p  510  note  24. 
Entirety  of  judgments  see  supra  $ 
3. 

73.  Me. — Consolidated  Rendering  Co. 
v.  Martin,  supra. 

33  C.J.  p  1051  note  26. 

74.  U.S. — In  re  Denney,  47  F.Supp. 
36,   affirmed,   C.C.A.,   135   F.2d   184, 
certiorari    denied    Denney    v.    Fort 
Recovery  Banking  Co.,  64  S.Ct.  50, 
320  U.S.  747,  88  L.Ed.  444,  rehear- 
ing denied   61   S.Ct.   155,   320   U.S. 
812,  88  L.Ed.  49.1. 

Colo. — French  v.   Commercial  Credit 

Co.,  64  P.2d  127,  99  Colo.  447. 
Kan. — Hoover    v.    Roberts,    74    P.£d 

152,   146  Kan.  785,  115  A.L.R.  182. 
Md. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Spencer 

v.  Franks,  195  A.  306,  173  Md.  73, 

114  A.L.R.   263. 
Nev. — State   ex  rel.   Smith  v.   Sixth 

Judicial     Dist.     Court,     Humboldt 

County,  167  P.2d  648. 
N.C. — Lane  v.  Becton,  35  S.E.2d  334, 

225  N.C.  457. 

49  0.  J.S.--56 


Tex. — Bevill  v.  Young,  Civ.App.,  167 
S.\V.2d-573,  error  refused — John- 
son v.  Stalcup,  Civ.App.,  74  S.W. 
2d  751— Patton  v.  Mitchell,  Civ. 
App,,  13  S.W.2d  146— Automobile 
Finance  Co.  v.  Bryan,  Civ.App.,  3 
S.W.2d  835. 

33  C.J.  p  1052  note  27. 

75.  Idaho.— Angel  v.  Mellen,  285  P. 
461,  48  Idaho  750. 

111. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  People  v. 

Skarbaro,    54   N.E.2d   559,   563,   386 

III.  581. 
Md. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Spencer 

v.  Franks,  195  A.  306,  309,  173  Md. 

73,  114  A.L.R.  263. 
Tex.— Kubena  v.  Hatch,   193   S.W.2d 

175 — Missouri-Kansas-Texas  R.  Co. 

of  Texas  v.  Pluto,  156  S.W.2d  265, 

138    Tex.    1 — Taylor   v.    Dinsmore, 

Civ.App.,     114    S.W.2d    269,    error 

refused. 
33  C.J.  p  1052  note  28. 

Independent  and  separable  questions 

or  matters 

A  judgment  or  decree  including  a 
decision  of  an  independent  and  sepa- 
rable subject  matter  or  question 
within,  and  an  independent  and  sep- 
arable subject  matter  or  question 
beyond,  court's  jurisdiction,  is  not 
void  in  toto,  but  is  .valid  as  to  deci- 
sion of  matter  within  court's  Juris- 
diction, and  a  mere  nullity  as  to 
other  matter. — Joseph  v.  Coffey,  85 
P.2d  425,  184  Okl.  143— Askin  v.  Tay- 
lor-Skinner Pub.  Co.,  56  P.2d  379, 
176  Okl.  438— In  re  Jackson's  Es- 
tate, 245  P.  874,  117  Okl.  115. 

76.  Ariz. — Western    Land    &    Cattle 
Co.   v.   National   Bank  of  Arizona 
at   Phoenix,    239    P.    299,    29    Ariz. 
51. 

Cal.— Liuzza  v.  Bell,   104   P.2d  1095, 

40  Cfal.App.2d  417. 
Okl. — In    re    Jackson's    Estate,    245 

P.  874,  117  Okl.  151. 
Va.— Barnes   v.   American   Fertilizer 

Co.,    130   S.E,   902,   144  Va,    692. 
Wis.— State    ex   rel.    Long   v.    Civil 

881 


Court    of   Milwaukee    County,    280 
N.W.  347,  228  Wis.  411. 

77.  Colo. — French      v.      Commercial 
Credit    Co.,    64    P.2d    127,    99    Colo. 
447. 

Affirmative    action    required 

"Where  a  part  of  a  judgment  is 
valid,  it  will  stand  unless  proper 
steps  have  been  taken  by  objection, 
duly  presented  to  the  trial  court,  to 
secure  a  modification  or  amendment 
by  amending  or  rejecting  the  part 
which  is  wrong." — Fisher  v.  Rosan- 
der,  151  N.E.  12,  13,  84  Ind.App.  694. 

Fart  of  judgment  that  is  beyond 
court's  Jurisdiction  is  void. 
Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Riggs  v.  Seehorn, 

125   S.W.2d  851,   344  Mo.  186. 
Wis.— State    ex    rel.    Lang    v.    Civil 

Court    of    Milwaukee    County,    2-80 

N.W.  347,  228  Wis.  411. 

The  Invalid  divisible  part  may  b* 
treated  as  a  nullity. — Lane  v.  Bec- 
ton, 35  S,E.2d  334,  $25  N.C.  457. 

78.  Colo. — French     v.     Commercial 
Credit   Co.,    64    P.2d   127, -99   Colo. 
447.' 

Kan. — First  Colored  Baptist  Church 

v.  Caldwell,  30  P.2d  144,  139  Kan. 

45. 
N.C.— Keen  v.  Parker,   8  S.E.2d  200, 

217  N.C.  378. 
33  C.J.  p  1052  note  31. 
Adoption  decree 

The  invalidity  of  provision  in 
adoption  decree  giving  leave  to  nat- 
ural parents  occasionally  to  see  child 
did  not  invalidate  rest  ,of  decree. — 
Spencer  v.  Franks,  195  A.  306,  173 
Md.  73,  114  A.L.R.  263. 

79.  Tex.— Seguin    v.    Maverick,     24 
Tex.  526,  76  Am.D.  117. 

33  C.J.  p  1052  note  29. 

80.  Ga. — Chastain  v.  Alford,  20  S.E. 
2d  150,  67  Ga.App.  316. 

Tex.— Reitz  v.  Mitchell,  Civ.App.,  256 

S.W.  697. 
33  C.J.  p  1052  note  30. 


§  451 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


though  the  judgment  may  go  beyond  the  issues  and 
grant  relief  not  asked  for,  or  not  within  the  com- 
petence of  the  court,  yet  it  may  be  good  for  as  much 
as  the  court  had  power  and  authority  to  include  in 
it.81  It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  in  excess  of 
the  relief  authorized  is  void  only  as  to  the  excess.82 
The  validity  of  a  judgment  which  is  void  as  to 
some  of  the  parties  is  discussed  supra  §§  31,  33. 


§  45L 


Validating  Void  Judgment 


Generally,  a  void  Judgment  cannot  be  validated  and 
made  operative,   even   by  legislative  or  Judicial  action. 

It  has  been  held  that  the  validity  of  a  judgment 


is  to  be  determined  as  of  the  date  of  its  rendition, 
and,  if  void  then,  it  remains  so  forever;83  it  is 
not  validated  and  made  operative  by  the  lapse  of 
time,84  by  subsequent  proceedings  based  on  the 
judgment,85  by  afterward  supplying  the  elements 
which  were  lacking  to  its  validity,86  or  by  resulting 
equities  in  favor  of  third  persons.87  A  void  judg- 
ment cannot  be  made  valid  and  operative  by  judi- 
cial action,88  such  as  its  subsequent  approval  by  the 
judge,89  by  his  approval  of  a  sale  on  execution  held 
under  it,90  by  a  subsequent  proceeding  instituted 
for  that  purpose,91  by  citing  the  party  against  whoir; 
-it  was  entered  to  show  cause  why  it  should  not  be 
declared  valid,92  by  a  revival  of  the  judgment,93  or 


81.     Cal.— Liuzza    v.    Bell,    104    P.2d 

1095,  40  Cal.App.2d  417.'     * 
Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Bean 

v.  State,  79  P.2d  540,  542,  5$  Idaho 

797. 
Ky. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Wayman 

v.  North  Kentucky  Fair,  162  S.W. 

2d  228,  229,  290  Ky.  652. 
Xeb. — State   ex   rel.   Nebraska   State 

Bar    Ass'n    v.    Merten,    7    N.W.2d 

874,  142  Neb.  780. 
OkL — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Fluke 

v.   Douglas,   IS   P.2d   210,   213,   158 

Okl.  300— Arnold  v.  Willis.  232  P. 

15,  105  Okl.  172. 
34  CUT.  p  510  note  27.* 

Construction     and     reformation     of 

win 

Portion  of  judgment  which  con- 
strued will  was  valid,  although  por- 
tion which  reformed  will  was  void 
as  beyond  court's  jurisdiction. — 
Hoover  v.  Roberts,  74  P.2d  152,  146 
Kan.  785,  115  A.L.R.  182. 

Bec*ivership 

The  court  having  jurisdiction  to 
appoint  a  receiver  for  a  corpora- 
tion and  place  its  assets  in  his  hands 
and  order  sale  thereof  by  him,  as 
was  done,  such  part. of  the  proceed- 
ings were  not  Invalidated  by  any  in- 
validity in  the  part  of  the  judg- 
ment dissolving  the  corporation,  as 
being  beyond  the  court's  power  un- 
der the  pleadings  and  facts. — Tount 
v.  Fagin,  Tex.Civ.App.,  244  S.W.  1036, 
motion  denied  289  S.W.  187. 

Personal  judgment 

As  much  of  a  judgment  of  sepa- 
ration against  a  nonresident  served 
by  publication  as  decrees  that,  on 
personal  notice  to  defendant  or  on 
such  notice  as  the  court  shall  direct, 
plaintiff  may  apply  for  her  alimony 
and  expenses  payable  out  of  his  real 
and  personal  property  within  the 
state,  must  be  reversed  where  no 
jurisdiction  of  the  property  was  ob- 
tained by  seizure  before  judgment 
and  the  portion  of  the  decree  ap- 
pointing a  receiver  of  such  property 
and  giving  directions  to  him  falls 


with  it—Matthews  v.  Matthews,  159 
N.E.  713,  247  N.T.  32. 

82.  Tenn.— Gaylor  v.  Miller,  59  S.W. 
2d  502,  166  Tenn.  45. 

Tex. — State    Mortg.    Corporation    v. 

Ludwig,    48    S.W.2d   950,   121   Tex. 

268. 
Attorney's  fees 

Judgment  on  note  separately  stat- 
ing amounts  for  principal,  interest, 
and  attorney's  fees  was  not  rendered 
entirely  void  by  improper  inclusion 
of  fees. — Fowler'  v.  Bank  of  Com- 
merce, 143  S.E.  512,  38  Ga.App.  226 
— Henderson  v.  Ellarbee,  131  S.E. 
524,  35  Ga.App.  5. 

Costs 

Where  cost  bill  was  not  filed  in 
time,  inclusion  in  judgment  of 
amount  claimed  in  bill  rendered 
judgment  to  that  extent  contrary  to 
law. — Openshaw  v.  Openshaw,  12  P. 
2d  364,  80  Utah  9. 
Interest 

The  entry  of  judgment  by  confes- 
sion in  the  amount  confessed,  plus 
interest  from  date  of  note  set  forth 
in  statement,  was  unauthorized,  but 
invalidated  judgment  only  to  the 
extent  of  the  amount  of  interest  in- 
cluded.— Keller  v.  Greenstone,  2  N. 
Y.S.2d  977,  253  App.Div.  -573. 
Rescission 

Judgment  granting  rescission  and 
other  relief  entered  on  vendor's  pe- 
tition seeking  rescission  of  convey- 
ance is  not  void  as  to  rescission 
because  petition  does-  not  support 
other  relief  granted. — Albright  v. 
Collins.  Civ.App.,  64  S.W.2d  1096, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  Empire 
Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Albright,  87  S.W. 
2d  1092.  126  Tex.  485. 

83.  Vt— In  re  Hanrahan's  Will,  194 
A,  471,  109  Vt.  108. 

84.  Ala.— Anthony  v.   Anthony,    128 
So.  440,  221  Ala,  221. 

Nev.— State  ex  rel.  Smith  v.  Sixth 
Judicial  Dist  Court,  Humboldt 
County,  167  P.2d  £48. 

N.CX— City  of  Monroe  v.  Niven,  20 
S.E.2d  311,  221  N.C.  362. 

882 


N.D.— Baird  v.  Ellison,  293  N.W.  794. 

70  N.D.  561. 
Pa.— Clineff  v.   Rubash,  190    A.   543. 

126  Pa.Super.  82. 
Tex. — Commander  v.  Bryan,  Civ.App., 

123  S.W.2d  1008. 

85.  Ga. — Langston  v.  Nash,  15   S.E. 
2d  481,  192  Ga,  427. 

The  issuance  of  execution  on  void 
judgment  will   not   give   vitality   to 
such  judgment. — Winn  v.  Armour  & 
Co.,   193   S.E.  447,   184   Ga,    769. 
Sale 

Personal  judgment  wanting  in  ju- 
risdiction cannot  be  validated  by 
fact  that  there  has  been  sale  under 
it.— Wise  v.  Miller,  111  So.  913,  215 
Ala.  660. 

86.  Iowa. — Hodson    v.    Tibbetts,    IS 
Iowa  97. 

Mo. — Robinson  v.  Rinehart,  App.,  297 
S.W.  439. 

87.  Mont — Scilley    v.    Red    Lodge- 
Rosebud  Irr.  Dist,  272  P.  543,   83 
Mont  282. 

88.  Ind. — Zaring  v.  Zaring,  39  N.E. 
2d  734,  219  Ind.  514. 

Tex. — Commander  v.  Bryan,  Civ.App., 

123  S.W.2d  1008. 

A  Judgment  based  on  a  void  Judg- 
ment is  valueless. — Walton  v.  Albers, 
40  N.E.2d  99,  313  IlLApp.  304,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  44  N.E.2d 
145,  380  111.  423. 

89.  Iowa. — Townsley  v.  Morehead,  9 
Iowa  565. 

90.  Or. — Willamette  Real  Estate  Co. 
v.  Hendrix,   42  P.  '514,   28  Or.  485, 
52  Am.S.R.  800. 

91.  Idaho. — Ray    v.    Ray,    1    Idaho 
'566. 

Ky.— Hill  v.  Hill,  185  S.W.2d  245,  298 
Ky.  351. 

98.  Minn. — Jewett  v.  Iowa  Land  Co., 
•67  N.W.  639,  64  Minn.  531,  58  Am. 
S.R.  555. 

93L    S.C.— Woods   v.   Bryan,    19    S.B. 

218,   41   S.C.   74,   44  Am.S.R.   688. 
34  CU.  p  510  note  33. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  452 


by  the  taking  of  an  appeal  from  it,  or  even  by  an 
affirmance  on  appeal.94  A  void  judgment  cannot 
be  cured  and  validated  by  a  subsequent  legislative 
enactment.95 

§  452.    Ratification  and  Estoppel 

While  a  void  judgment  cannot  be  validated  by  con- 
sent, ratification,  waiver,  or  estoppel,  one  may,  by  his 
conduct,  bar  or  estop  himself  from  attacking  the  judg- 
ment. 

Generally,  a  void  judgment  cannot  be  made  valid 
by  ratification,  waiver,  consent,  or  estoppel.96 
However,  one  may  by  his  conduct  bar  or  estop  him- 
self from  attacking  a  void  judgment,97  and,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  §  453,  one  who  accepts  or  shares  in 
the  benefits  of  a  void  judgment  may  be  estopped 
from  attacking  it  One. is  estopped  to  attack  as 
void  a  judgment  which  he  has  set  up  as  a  bar  or 
defense  to  a  subsequent  action.98  He  is  also  es- 


topped by  a  compromise  and  satisfaction  of  his  lia- 
bility under  the  judgment.99  It  has  been  held  that 
one  who  makes  payments  on  a  judgment  with 
knowledge  of  its  defects  cannot  attack  the  judg- 
ment.1 

It  has  generally  been  held  that  one  who  with 
full  knowledge  of  the  facts  and  after  legal  notice 
fails  to  interpose  timely  objection  to  the  rendition 
of  a  judgment  affecting  his  rights  adversely  will  be 
held  to  have  acquiesced  therein  and  to  have  waived 
any  right  to  object  thereto  unless  the  judgment  is 
void  or  the  circumstances  show  fraud,  mistake, 
duress,  or  coercion.2  Mere  acquiescence  in  a  judg- 
ment does  not  necessarily  constitute  a  ratification 
thereof,8  and  still  less  can  this  result  follow  where 
the  party  affected  moves  to  set  it  aside  or  moves 
for  a  new  trial.4 

Where  a  judgment  is  entered  by  mutual  consent, 


94.  Okl. — O.    C.    Whifcaker,    Inc.,    v. 
Dillingham,   152  P.2d  371,  194  Okl. 
421. 

34  C.J.  p  510  note  34. 

Judgment    of    ftdBBLxfm&XLOo    is    void 
where    judgment    appealed    from    is 
void. 
Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Aquamsi  Land  Co. 

v.    Hostetter,    79    S.W.2d   463,    336 

Mo.  391. 
Tex. — "56"  Petroleum  Corporation  v. 

Hodden,  Civ.App.,   139   S.W.2d  218. 

95.  Mont. — Sciley    v.    Red    Lodge- 
Rosebud  Irr.  Dist.,  272  P.  543,  83 
Mont.   282. 

Tex. — Engelman    v.    Anderson,    Civ. 

App.,  244  S.W.  650. 
34  C.J.  p  510  note  36. 

Although  there  is  no  "vested 
rig-lit"  in  procedure,  neither  -can  a 
procedural  change  operate  to  confer 
jurisdiction  as  of  time  of  commence- 
ment of  an  action  where  cause  of 
action  has  ripened  into  a  judgment. 
-—Prey  v.  Allard,  300  N.W.  13,  239 
Wis.  151. 

96.  Del. — City  Loan  System  of  Del- 
aware v.  Nordquist,  165  A.  341,  5 
W.W.Harr.  371. 

111.— Herb  v.  Pitcairn,  51  N.E.2d  277,. 

384    111.     237,    reversed    on    other 

grounds     65     S.Ct.     954,     325     U.S. 

77,  89  L.Ed.  1483,  rehearing  denied 

65    S.Ct.   1188,   325   U.S.   893,   89  L. 

Ed.  2005,  opinion  supplemented  64 

N.E.2d  318,  392  111.  151. 
Kan. — Taylor    v.    Focks    Drilling    & 

Manufacturing  Corporation,  62  PJBd 

903,  144  Kan.  626. 
Tex. — Easterline  v.  Bean,  49  S.W.2d 

427,    121   Tex.    327 — Commander  v. 

Bryan,  Civ.App.,  1^3  S.W.2d  1008. 
Va. — Beck  v.  Sememes'  Adm'r,  134 

S.E.    677,    145    Va.    429— -Staunton 

Perpetual  Building  &  Loan  Co.  v. 

Haden,  23  S.E.  285,  92  Va.  201. 
34  C.J.  p  -510  note  38. 


Appearance  as  curing  lack  of  proc- 
ess 

(1)  A  general  appearance  to  move 
to  vacate  a-  void  Judgment  does  not 
validate  a  judgment  rendered  with- 
out service  of  process. — City  of  Mon- 
roe v.  Niven,   20  S.B.2d  311,   221  N. 
C.   362. 

(2)  Nonresident  judgment  debtors' 
ratification  of  levy  and  sale  of  their 
personalty  to  satisfy  judgment  cured 
jurisdictional     defect     in     judgment 
arising  out  of  lack  of  personal  serv- 
ice  of   summons   on  debtors   in   the 
state  or  their  personal   appearance, 
and  rendered  valid  the  lien  on  the 
personalty  created  by  the  levy. — Mc- 
Dougald  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  194  S.E.  899, 
185  S.C.  537. 

Negligence 

Parties  cannot  by  any  acts,  how- 
ever negligent,  lose  right  to  assail 
void  judgment— White  v.  Hidalgo 
County  Water  Improvement  Dlst. 
No.  2,  Tex.Civ.App.,  6  S.W.2d  790. 
Ratification  of  unauthorized  appear- 
ance 

Although  an  unauthorized  appear- 
ance will  not  confer  jurisdiction  over 
a  nonresident  defendant  so  as  to 
make  the  judgment  of  the  court 
binding  on  him,  the  unauthorized  act 
may  be  affirmed  and  ratified  so  as 
to  validate  that  which  would  other- 
wise be  a  void  judgment. — Lafetra  v. 
Beveridge.  1  A.2d  68,  124  N.J.Eq. 
184. 

97.    Del. — City  Loan  System  of  Del- 
aware v.  Nordquist,  165  A.  341,  5 

W.W.Harr.  371. 

Miss.— Peeler  v.  Peeler,  24  So.2d  338. 
Vt.— -In  re  Hanrahan's  Will,   194  A, 

471,  109  Vt  108. 
Va. — Eubank   &   Caldwell  v.   Fuller, 

158  S.E.  884,  156  Va.  635. 
34  C.J.  p  510  note  39. 
Compliance  with  order 

Supervisor   of   permits   failing    to 

883 


appeal  from  order  directing  tempo- 
rary permit  and  complying  with  or- 
der by  issuing  permit  could  no' 
thereafter  question  Jurisdiction  to 
make  order. — Wynne  v.  Superior  Mf  g 
Co.,  C.C.A.N.J.,  54  F.2d  270. 
Belay  in  attacking  judgment 

Where  no  application  for  reargu- 
ment  or  review  of  water  appropria- 
tion rights  decree  had  been  made 
within  two  years,  and  no  suit  to 
set  aside  decree  had  been  brought 
within  four  years  after  rendition, 
subsequent  collateral  attack  even  on 
jurisdictional  grounds  will  not  be 
considered  except  for  fraud. — Hin- 
derlider  v.  Town  of  Berthoud,  238  P. 
64,  77  Colo.  504. 

98.    Mo, — Kennedy  v.    Bambrick,    20 

Mo. App.  630. 
34  C.J.  p  511  note  41. 

Where  the  judgment  is  voidable, 
defendant's  right  to  attack  it  is 
waived  by  pleading  it  in  bar  of  an 
action  on  the  original  demand. — 
Henderson  v.  Staniford,  105  Mass. 
504,  7  Am.R.  561. 

93.    Ala.— Standif er  v.  McWhorter,  1 

Stew.  532. 
Or.-— Handley  v.  Jackson,   50   P.   915, 

31  Or.  552,   65  Am.S.R.   839. 

1.  La.— Fullilove    v.    Central    State 
Bank,    107   So.   590,   160   La.   831. 

2.  Md. — Moss     v.     Annapolis     Sav. 
Inst,  8  A.2d  881,  177  Md.  135. 

3.  Tex. — Sneed  v.  Townsend,  2  Tex. 
Unrep.Cas.  350. 

34  C.J.  p  511  note  44. 

4.  Minn.— Roberts  v.  Chicago,  St.  P., 
1C.   &  O.   XL  Co.,   51  N.W.   478,   48 
Minn.  521. 

Tex.— Martin  v.  Cqbb,  14  S.W.  162,  77 
Tex.  -644. 


§  453 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


it  may  have  validity  as  a  contract,  even  though  it 
is  void  as  a  judgment.5 

§  453.    Acceptance  by   Prevailing   Party   of 
Part  of  Judgment 

One   may  not  attack  a  judgment  as  void  where  he 
has  accepted  the  benefits  of  the  judgment. 


It  has  been  held  that  a  party  is  barred  or  estopped 
from  attacking  a  judgment  as  void  where  he  ac- 
cepts or  shares  in  the  fruits  or  benefits  of  the  judg- 
ment6 A  party  who  successfully  opposes  an  ob- 
jection made  by  the  adverse  party  that  the- court 
has  no  jurisdiction  cannot  question  the  jurisdiction 
after  an  adverse  decision  on  appeal.? 


XIV.  LTPN  OF  JUDGMENT 


§  454.     In  General 

A  Judgment  lien  on  real  property  does  not  exist  at 
common  law  and  is  a  creature  of  statute. 

At  common  law,  in  accordance  with  the  policy  of 
the  feudal  law  introduced  into  England  after  the 
conquest,8  the  lands  of  a  debtor  were  not  liable 
to  the  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  against  him,  ex- 
cept for  debts  due  the  king,9  and  consequently  no 
lien  thereon  is  acquired  under  a  judgment.10  In 
England  this  common-law  rule  continued  in  force 
until  the  passage  in  1285  of  the  Statute  of  Westmin- 
ster II  (13  Edward  I),  by  which,  in  the  interest  of 
trade  and  commerce,  the  writ  of  elegit  was  for  the 
first  time  provided  for,11  and  by  construction  of 


the  courts  it  was  held  under  this  act  that  the  judg- 
ment was  a  lien  on  such  lands  from  the  date  of  its 
rendition  on  the  first  day  of  the  term  of  the  court 
at  which  it  was  rendered.12  As  a  result  of  this 
act,13  and  also  in  some  states  as  a  result  of  the  act 
of  parliament  of  5  George  II  c  7,  subjecting  lands 
in  the  colonies  to  execution  as  chattels  in  favor  of 
British  merchants,14  the  modern  judgment  lien  has 
been  developed,  the  Statute  of  Westminster  having 
been  substantially  adopted  in  several  jurisdictions  in 
the  United  States  at  an  early  date.16 

The  judgment  lien  as  it  exists  to-day  is  a  crea- 
ture of  statutes  which  in  express  terms  or  by  nec- 
essary implication  give  judgments  such  effect,16 


5.  Ga.— Bedenbaugh    v.    Burgin,    28 
S.E.2d  652,  197  Ga,  175. 

34  C.J.  p  510  note  15. 

6.  U.S. — Wilson    v.    Union    Electric 
Light   &   Power  Co.,   C.C.A.MO.,    59 
F.2d  5SO. 

Cal.— People  v.  Rio  Nido  Co.,  85  P. 

2d  461,  29  Cal.App.2d  486. 
Colo.— Fort   v.    Bietsch,    274    P.    812, 

85  Colo.  176. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Harden 

v.   Harden,    77    P.2d    721,   728,    182 

Okl.  364. 
Tex. — Bearden  v.  Texas  Co.,  Civ.App., 

41  S.W.2d  447,  affirmed,  Com.App., 

60  S.W.2d  1031. 
34  C.J.  p  510  note  40. 
Exercise  of  functions  of  Judge  un- 
der void  judgment 

In  an  action  by  removed  county 
Judge  against  a  county  judge  on  de- 
fendant's appointment  to,  and  plain- 
tiff's removal  from,  such  office  by 
a  judgment  of  district  court,  subse- 
quently reversed,  defendant  was  es- 
topped to  deny  validity  of  the  judg- 
ment of  district  court,  although  the 
latter  was  without  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject-matter,  where  that  judg- 
ment was  the  source  of  authority  un- 
der which  defendant  county  judge 
•executed  the  duties  and  enjoyed  the 
benefits  of  that  office. — Lowe  v. 
Johnson,  Tex.Civ.App.,  259  S.W.  1004. 

7.  N.T.— Griggs  v.  Brooks,  29  K.Y. 
3.  794,  79  Hun  394. 

8.  Mont. — McMillan    v.     Davenport, 
118  P.  756,  44  Mont.  23,  Ann.Cas. 
1912D  984. 

34  C.J.  p  567  note  73. 


9.  Fla.— Protective    Holding   Corpo- 
ration v.  Cornwall  Co.,  173  So.  804, 
127  Fla.  252. 

34  C.J.  p  568  note  74. 

10.  U.S.— U.    S.    v.    Harpootlian,    C. 
C.A.N.Y.,  24  F.2d  646— In  re  Schu- 
neman,   C.C.A.HL,  290  F.  200. 

Cal. — Helvey  v.  Bank  of  America 
Nat  Trust  &  Savings  >ss'n,  m 
P.2d  390,  43  Cal.App.2d  532. 

Fla. — Protective  Holding  Corpora- 
tion v.  Cornwall  Co.,  173  So.  804, 
127  Fla.  252. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Platts 
v.  Pacific  Federal  Savings  &  Loan 
Ass'n  of  Tacoma,  111  P.2d  1093, 
1095,  62  Idaho  340. 

111.— Johnson  v.  Zahn,  44  N.E.2d  15, 
380  111.  320 — Smith  v.  Toman,  14 
N.B.2d  478,  368  111.  414,  118  A.L. 
R.  924 — Holmes  v.  Fanyo,  63  N.B. 
2d  627,  327  Ill.App.  1— Haugens  v. 
Holmes,  41  N.E.2d  109,  314  IlLApp. 
166. 

N.M. — Pugh  v.  Heating  &  Plumbing 
Finance  Corp.,  161  P.2d  714,  49 
N.M.  234— Kaseman  v.  Mapel,  195 
P.  799,  26  N.M.  639. 

N.Y. — Grygorewiez  v.  Domestic  and 
Foreign  Discount  Corporation,  40 
N.T.S.2d  676,  179  Misc.  1017— Nle- 
mi  Bros.  v.  Rosenbluh,  263  N.T.S. 
445,  147  Misc.  159. 

Okl. — Long  Bell  Lumber  Co.  v.  Et- 
ter,  251  P.  997,  123  Okl.  54. 

Tenn. — Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick  Co.,  30 
S.W.2d  253,  161  Tenn.  298. 

34  C.J.  p  568  note  75. 

UU    N.T.— Hulbert    v.    Hulbert.    Ill 

884 


N.B.  70,  216  N.T.  430,  L.R.A.1916D 
661,  Ann.Cas.l917D  180. 
34  C.J.  p  568  note  76. 

12.  Tenn. — Stahlman  v.  Watson,  Ch. 
A.,  39  S.W.  1055. 

Commencement  of  lien  of  judgment 
in  general  see  infra  §  466. 

13.  Puerto  Rico. — Hernandez  v.  Me- 
dina, 19  Puerto  Rico  84. 

14.  U.S. — Tayloe  v.  Thomson's  Les- 
see, D.C.,  5   Pet.  358,  8  L.Ed.  154. 

34  C.J.  p  568  note  79. 

15.  U.S. — Burton  v.    Smith,   Va.,    13 
Pet.  464,  10  L.Ed.  248. 

34  C.J.  p  568  note  80. 

16.  U.S. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Von    Segerlund   v.    Dysart,    C.C.A. 
Cal.,  137  F.2d  755,  757— In  re  Mich- 
ael, D.C.Pa.,  31  F.Supp.  41,  apply- 
ing law  of  Ohio— In  re  Staples,  D. 
C.Okl.,  1  F.Supp.  620 — In  re  Schu- 
neman,  C.C.A.I11.,  290  F.  200. 

Ariz.— Tway  v.  Payne,  -101  P.2d  455, 
55  Ariz.  343. 

Cal. — Evans  v.  Superior  Court  of  Los 
Angeles  County,  124  P.2d  820,  20 
Cal.App.2d  186 — Helvey  v.  Bank 
of  America  Nat.  Trust  &  Savings 
Ass'n,  111  P.2d  390,  43  Cal,App.2d 
532. 

D.C. — Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  McQuade,  123  F.24 
337,  74  App.D.C.  383. 

Fla. — Protective  Holding  Corpora- 
tion v.  Cornwall  Co.,  173  So.  804, 
127  Fla.  252 — Massey  v.  Pineap- 
ple Orange  Co.,  100  So.  170,  87 
Fla.  374. 

Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Platts 
v.  Pacific  First  Federal  Savings 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  455 


and,  in  the  absence  of  such  a  statute,  a  lien  does 
not  arise  as  the  result  of  a  judgment  before  an  exe- 
cution has  been  delivered  to  an  officer  authorized 
to  execute  it.17  Accordingly,  the  terms  and  legal 
effect  of  the  statute  are  controlling  with  respect  to 
the  existence  of  a  judgment  lien18  and  with  respect 
to  the  rights  of  the  judgment  creditor  under  such  a 
lien.19  Generally  speaking,  a  statute  making  pro- 
vision for  a  judgment  lien  is  construed  strictly.20 

§  455.    Nature  of  Lien 

The  lien  of  a  Judgment  does  not  constitute  or  cre- 
ate an  estate.  Interest,  or  right  of  property  In  real  prop- 
erty subject  to  the  lien;  usually  the  lien  Is  not  a  lien 
on  specific  real  property  of  the  Judgment  debtor,  but  Is 
a  general  lien  on  all  his  real  property. 

It  has  been  stated  broadly  that  a  judgment  lien, 
which  is  a  matter  of  public  record,  has  always  been 


regarded  as  the  highest  form  of  security  to  a  credi- 
tor.21 Usually,  however,  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
does  not  constitute  or  create  an  estate,  interest,  or 
right  of  property  in  the  lands  which  may  be  bound 
for  its  satisfaction;  it  gives  merely  a  right  to  levy 
on  such  lands  to  the  exclusion  of  adverse  interests 
subsequent  to  the  judgment  ;22  and  the  rule  applies 
even  where  the  judgment  is  declared  a  specific  lien 
on  a  particular  piece  of  property.^  In  the  absence 
of  statutory  provision  to  the  contrary,  until  the  real 
property  subject  to  the  lien  is  actually  seized,24  or, 
in  some  jurisdictions,  until  sale  under  execution 
and  execution  of  the  deed  pursuant  thereto,25  the 
judgment  debtor  may  continue  in  undisturbed  pos- 
session, with  full  power  to  use  such  real  property, 
and  he  may  sell  or  otherwise  dispose  of  it26  The 
lien  is  not  a  conveyance  within  the  meaning  of  the 


&  Loan  Ass'n  of  Tacoma,  111  P.2d 
1093,  1095,  £2  Idaho  340. 

HI. — Johnson  v.  Zahn,  44  N.E.2d  15, 
380  111.  320— Smith  v.  Toman,  14 
N.E,2d  478,  368  111.  414,  118  A. 
L.R.  924— Holmes  v.  Fanyo,  63  N. 
B.2d  627,  327  Ill.App.  1 — Haugens 
v.  Holmes,  41  N.B.2d  109,  314  111. 
App.  166. 

Ind.— Petrovitch  v.  Witholm,  152  N. 
B.  849,  85  Ind.App.  144. 

Mo.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hage- 
mann  v.  Pinska,  37  S.W.2d  463, 
465,  225  Mo.App.  521. 

N.J.— McLaughlin  v.  Whaland.  13  A. 
2d  573,  127  N.J.EQ.  393. 

KM.— Pugh  v.  Heating  &  Plumbing 
Finance  Corp.,  161  P.2d  714,  49 
N.M.  234— Kaseman  v.  Maple,  195 
P.  799,  26  N.M.  639. 

N.Y.— H.  R.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Smith,  151 
N.B.  448,  242  N.Y.  267,  45  A.L.R. 
554 — Grygorewicz  v.  Domestic  and 
Foreign  Discount  Corporation,  40 
N.Y.S.2d  676,  179  Misc.  1017. 

N.D.— Qroth  v.  Ness,  260  N.W.  700, 
65  N.D.  580. 

Ohio.— Waldock  v.  Bedell,  18  N.B.2d 
828,  59  Ohio  App.  520. 

Okl. — Long  Bell  Lumber  Co.  v.  Btter, 
251  P.  997,  123  Okl.  54. 

Puerto  Rico. — Fernandez  v.  Bsmoris, 
1  Puerto  Rico  Fed.  483. 

Tenn. — Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick  Co.,  30 
S.W.2d  253,  161  Tenn.  298. 

Tex. — McGlothlin  v.  Coody,  Com. 
App.,  69  S.W.2d  819— Askey  v. 
Power,  Com. App.,  36  S.W.2d  446 
— Womabk  v.'  Paris  Grocer  Co., 
Civ.App.,  166  S.W.2d  366,  error  re- 
fused 168  S,W.2d  645,  140  Tex.  423 
— Cheatham  v.  Mann,  Civ.App.,  133 
S.W.2d  264,  error  refused — For- 
dyce-Crossett  Sales  Co.  v.  Brwin, 
Civ.App.,  121  S.W.2d  491— Cham- 
lee  v.  Chamlee,  Civ.App.,  113  S.W. 
3d  290. 

W-Va. — Robertson  v.  Campbell,  186 
S.E.  310,  UZ  W.Va.  576. 


34  C.J.  p  568  note   81,  p  569   notes 

82,  84. 
Lien   of  judgment   of  federal   court 

in   general    see   Federal   Courts    § 

144  i. 

17.  U.S.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Von    Segerlund    v.    Dysart,    C.C.A. 
Cal.,  137  F.2d  755,  757. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Otero  v. 
Dietz,  37  P.2d  1110,  1112,  39  N. 
M.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  569  note  83. 

Lien  of  execution  in  general  see  Ex- 
ecutions §§  123-164. 

Necessity  of  issue  of  execution  to 
render  lien  operative  in  general 
see  infra  §  468. 

18.  U.S. — In   re    Schuneman,    C.C.A. 
111.,  290  F.  200. 

Ariz. — Tway  v.  Payne,  101  P.2d  455, 

55  Ariz.  343. 
Fla. — Protective  Holding  Corporation 

v.   Cornwall  Co.,   173   So.   804,   127 

Fla.  252. 

19.  Ind.— Petrovich  v.  Witholm,  152 
N.E,    849,    85    Ind.App.    144. 

Md.— O'Neill  &  Co.  v.  Schulze,  7  A. 
2d  263,  177  Md.  64— Caltrider  v. 
Caples,  153  A.  445,  160  Md.  392,  87 
A.L.R.  1500. 

20.  Tenn.— Fidelity    &    Deposit    Co. 
of  Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick  Co., 
30  S.W.2d  253,  161  Tenn.  298. 

21.  Cal. — Corporation  of  America  v. 
Marks,  73  P.2d  1215,  10  Cal.2d  218, 
114  A.L.R.  1162 — Morton  v.  Adams, 

•  56  P.  1038,  124  Cal.  229,  71  Am. 
S.R.  53. 

22.  Ala. — Hargett  v.  Hovater,  15  So. 
2d  276,  244  Ala.  646. 

Fia. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Smith  v. 
Pattishall,  176  So.  -568,  574,  127 
Fla.  474,  129  Fla.  498— Massey  v. 
Pineapple  Orange  Co.,  100  So.  170, 
87  Fla.  374. 

111.— Bednarczyk  v.  Kudla,  18  N.B. 
2d  449,  370  111.  204,  transferred, 
see  23  N.B.2d  199,  301  IlLApp.  610 

8S5 


—Quell  v.  Jachino,  17  N.B.2d  256, 
297  IlLApp.  650. 
Md.— Lee  v.  Keech,   133   A.   835,   151 

Md.  34,  46  A.L.R.  1488. 
N.C.— Byrd  v.  Pilot  Fire  Ins.  Co., 
160  S.B.  458,  201  N.C.  407— Far- 
row v.  American  Bagle  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  .of  New  York,  134  S.E.  427, 
192  N.C.  148— Eaton  v.  Doub,  128 
S.B.  494,  190  N.C.  14,  40  A.L.R. 
273. 

Va. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Jones 
v.  Hall,  J5  S.E.2d  108,  111.  177  Va. 
658. 

Wis. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Musa 
v.  Segelke  &  Kohlhaus  Co.,  272 
N.W.  657,  658,  224  Wis.  432,  111  A. 
L.R.  168. 

34  C.J.  p  569  note  92. 
lauds  held  Jointly  or  as  tenants  in 

common 

A  person  entitled  to  the  benefit 
of  a  judgment  lien  does  not  ac- 
quire an  estate  in,  or  become  a  joint 
owner  of,  lands  held  by  the  judg- 
ment debtor  and  a  third  person  as 
joint  owners  or  tenants  in  common. 
— Hargett  v.  Hovater,  15  So.2d  276, 
244  Ala.  646. 
Rights  of  some  description 

Rights  of  some  sort  vest  in  judg- 
ment creditor  when  his  judgment 
lien  attaches  to  realty,  legal  title  to 
which  is  in  judgment  debtor,  since 
prima  facie  legal  title  is  evidence  of 
beneficial  interest  also  until  contrary 
is  established.— Smith  v.  Pattishall, 
176  So.  568,  127  Fla.  474,  129  Fla. 
498. 

23.  N.C. — Farrow  v.  American  Eagle 
Fire   Ins.   Co.   of  New  York,    134 
S.E.  427,  192  N.C.  148. 

24.  Va.— James   v.    Hall,    15    S.E.2d 
108,  177  Va.  658. 

35.  u.S. — Newberry  v.  Davlson 
Chemical  Co.,  C.C.A.N.C.,  65  F.2d 
724,  certiorari  denied  54  S.Ct.  75, 
290  U.S.  660,  78  L.Ed.  571. 

28.  U.S. — Comard  v.  Atlantic  Ins. 
Co,,  Pa.,  1  Pet  386,  7  L.Ed.  189. 


§455 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


recording  acts,27  but  it  is  an  encumbrance  for  cer- 
tain purposes.28 

A  judgment  lien  ordinarily  is  not  a  specific  lien 
01?  any  specific  real  property  of  the  judgment  debt- 
or, but  it  is  a  general  lien  on  all  his  real  proper- 
ty,2^  although  it  has  been  held  that,  where  mort- 
gaged premises  have  been  sold  under  a  judgment 
junior  to  the  mortgage  and  the  time  for  redemp- 
tion has  not  expired,  the  general  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment is  turned  into  a  specific  lien  on  the  premises, 
to  the  extent  of  the  amount  of  the  bid  at  the  sher- 
iff's sale  and  the  interest  thereon.80  It  has  also 
been  held  that  in  a  scire  facias  against  the  heir 
and  a  terre-tenant,  on  a  judgment  against  the  an- 
cestor, a  judgment  entered  generally,  without  speci- 
fying the  lands  which  it  is  to  affect,  binds  only  the 
lands  of  the  ancestor  in  the  hands  of  such  heir 
or  terre-tenant,31  and,  if  a  judgment  against  execu- 
tors for  a  legacy  charged  on  land  is  entered  against 
the  land  of  certain  only  of  the  devisees,  and  the 
land  of  another  devisee  is  sold  on  execution  issued 
on  such  judgment,  it  will  not  pass  by  such  sale.82 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  is  merely  an  incident  of 
the  judgment,83  and  may  not  exist  independently  of 
the  judgment;34  nor  does  the  loss  of  the  lien  nec- 
essarily impair  the  validity  of  the  judgment  as  a 
personal  security.35  The  lien  of  a  judgment  credi- 
tor on  real  property  is  a  legal  lien,86  and  is  a  right 


as  distinguished  from  a  remedy.37 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  is  usually  regarded  as 
arising  from  the  right  to  sell  property  thereun- 
der,38 and  in  general  there  is  no  lien  where  the 
right  to  sell  may  not  be  exercised.39  In  some  ju- 
risdictions, however,  a  judgment  lien  stands  by  it- 
self and  is  not  necessarily  coextensive  with  the 
remedy  by  execution  in  the  sense  that  it  lies  when- 
ever execution  may  issue.40  A  judgment  lien  on 
land  attached  in  the  suit  in  which  the  judgment  was 
rendered  is  not  regarded  as  a  mere  continuance  of 
the  attachment.41  The  lien  created  by  a  mortgage 
or  deed  of  trust  has  been  distinguished  from  a 
judgment  lien  in  that  the  former  is  confined  to  the 
specific  land  described  in  the  mortgage  or  deed  of 
trust,  whereas  a  judgment  lien  covers  every  piece 
or  parcel  of  land  owned  by  the  judgment  debtor,42 
and  the  fact  that  a  judgment  lien  is  merely  inci- 
dental to  the  judgment  has  been  regarded  as  im- 
portant in  distinguishing  such  a  lien  from  the  lien 
of  a  mortgage.43  The  term  "judicial  mortgage"  is, 
however,  sometimes  applied  to  a  final  or  definite 
judgment,  when  duly  recorded.44 

Lien  of  verdict.  Under  a  statute  providing  that 
a  verdict  may  constitute  a  lien  on  real  property  and 
directing  the  verdict  to  be  entered  in  the  judgment 
docket,  the  Hen  of  a  verdict  partakes  of  the  nature 
of  a  judgment  lien.45 


Va,— James  v.  Hall,  15  S.E.2d  108,  j 
177  Va.  658. 

34  C.J.  P  570  note  93. 

Transfer  of  property  subject  to  judg- 
ment lien  see  Infra  5  488. 

S7.  Cal.— Wilcoxson  v.  Miller,  49 
CaL  193. 

28.  N.T. — Fuller  v.  Scribner,  78  N. 
T.  190. 

S.D.— Willsie  v'  JEtaPid  Valley  Horse- 
Ranch  Co.,  63  N.W.  546,  7  S.D.  114. 

29.  CaL — Finch  v.  Finch,  228  P.  553, 
68  CaLApp.  72. 

G-a. — Bostwick  v.  Felder,  App.,  85  S. 

E.2d  783. 
Iowa. — Burns    v.    Burns,    11   N.W.2d 

461,    283    Iowa    1092,    150    A.L.R. 

306— Stiles    v.    Bailey,    219    N.W. 

537,  205  Iowa  1385. 
Md. — Messinger  v.  Eckenrode,  158  A. 

357,  162  Md.  63 — Lee  v.  Keech,  133 

A,  835,  151  Md.  34,  46  A.L.R.  1488. 
Va. — Kidwell   v.    Henderson,    143    S. 

B.  336,  150  Va.  829. 
34  C.J.  P  570  note  96. 

A  lien  of  Judgment  on  bond  ac- 
companying- mortgage,  given  to  se- 
cure purchase  price  of  business,  was 
not  required  to  be  limited  to  realty 
mentioned  in  agreement  of  sale, 
where  bond  was  unrestricted,  and 
there  was  no  evidence  that .  restric- 
tion was  omitted  from  bond  by 
fraud,  accident,  or  mistake.— ArrigM 


to  Use  of  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ren- 
wick,  192  A.  655,  326  Pa.  508. 
Effect  of  adjudication  of  want  of  in- 
terest 

Decree  holding  that  Judgment 
creditor  has  no  right  or  interest  in 
certain  property  of  Judgment  debtor 
is  not  inconsistent  with  existence  of 
judgment  lien  thereon,  as  Judgment 
lien  is  not  specific  interest  in  the 
property. — Grim  v.  Thompson,  229 
P.  916,  112  Or.  399. 
80.  N.T.— Snyder  v.  Stafford,  11 

Paige  71. 
31-    Pa.— Coyle  v.  Reynolds,  7  Serg. 

&  R.  328. 
32.    Pa,— Lapsley  v.  Lapsley,   9   Pa. 

130. 
K.    Fla.— Gilpen  v.  Bower,  12  So.2d 

884,  152  Fla.  733. 
Iowa.— Beatty  v.  Cook,  185  N.W.  360, 

192  Iowa  542. 

34.  Fla. — Gilpen  v.  Bower,  12  So.2d 
884,  152  Fla.  733. 

35.  Pa.— Appeal  of  Esterly,  109  Pa. 
222. 

36.  Va. — Savings   &   Loan  Corpora- 
tion   v.    Bear,    154    S.E.    587,    155 
Va.  312,  75  A.L.R.  980— Flanary  v, 
Kane,  46  S.E.  312,  102  Va.  547,  re- 
hearing   denied    46    S.B.    681,    102 
Va.  547. 

37.  N.M.— Pugh      v.      Heating      & 

886 


Plumbing  Finance  Corp.,  161  P.2d 
714,  49  N.M.  234. 

38.  111.— Lehman  v.  Cottrell.   19  N. 
E.2d  111,   298  Ill.App.   434. 

39.  111.— Lehman  v.  Cottrell,   supra. 
Md.— Caltrider  v.  Caples,  153  A.  445, 

160  Md.  392,  87  A.L.R.  1000. 

40.  Conn.— City      Nat       Bank      v. 
Stoeckel,  132  A.  20,  108  Conn.  732. 
It  is  the  Judgment  itself  and  not 

the  execution  that  constitutes  a  lien 
on  realty. — City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Wall, 
124  S.W.2d  616,  235  Mo.App.  9. 
Issuance  of  execution  as  condition 
precedent  to  attachment  of  judg- 
ment lien  see  infra  §  468. 

41.  Conn. — Beardsley  v.  Beecher,  47 
Conn.  408. 

42.  Fla. — Gilpen  v.  Bower,  12  So.2d 
884,  152  Fla.  733. 

Va.— Boggs    v.    Fatherly,    18    S.E.2d 
298,  177  Va.  259. 

43.  Fla. — Gilpen  v.  Bower,  12  So.2d 
884,  152  Fla.  733. 

44.  La. — ChafEe    v.    Walker,    1    So. 
290,  39  La.Ann.  35. 

34  C.J.  P  1182  note  20. 

45.  Pa.— Fuellhart  v.  Blood,   21  Pa. 
Co.  601. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  458 


§  456.    Control  of  Lien 

Judgment  liens,  as  creatures  of  statutes,  are  sub- 
ject to  the  control  of  the  legislature,  but  generally  speak- 
ing are  not  subject  to  control  or  regulation  by  the  courts. 

Since  the  lien  of  a  judgment  is  entirely  the  crea- 
ture of  statute,  as  shown  supra  §  454,  it  may  be 
withheld  or  divested  by  the  legislature  at  any  time 
before  rights  have  become  vested  thereunder,46  and 
its  character  and  extent,  the  nature  or  identity  of 
the  property  to  which  it  attaches,  the  steps  neces- 
sary to  secure  it,  and  the  means  of  enforcement  are 
under  the  control  of  the  legislature47  and  usually 
cannot  be  prescribed  or  regulated  by  the  court  pro- 
nouncing or  rendering  the  judgment,48  or  by  the 
court  which  is  called  on  to  enforce  the  lien.49  So, 
also,  as  a  general  rule,  the  nature  or  extent  of  the 
lien  or  the  property  which  shall  be  subject  there- 
to may  not  be  regulated  or  prescribed  by  the  agree- 
ment of  parties  ;50  but  it  seems  that  the  general  lien 
of  a  judgment  may  by  agreement  be  limited  to  spe- 
cific lands.51 

§  457.    Amount  of  Lien 

In  general  a  judgment  lien  is  for  a  definite  amount, 
unaffected  by  contingencies,  or  by  changes  in  the  value 
of  the  property  subject  to  the  lien. 


A  judgment  lien  is  for  a  definite  amount,  and 
is  not  dependent  on  any  contingency,  or  affected  by 
changes  in  the  value  of  the  property  to  which  it 
attaches.52  As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  may  op- 
erate as  a  lien  to  the  extent  of  the  amount  recov- 
ered in  the  judgment,53  but  not  for  a  greater 
amount.54  The  interest  accruing  on  a  judgment 
recovered,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  authorizing  it 
to  be  collected  on  execution,  has  been  held  not  to 
become  a  lien  on  land  until  it  is  included  in  a  fresh 
judgment;55  but  under  statutes  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions it  has  been  held  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
covers  the  interest  which  may  accrue  on  the  judg- 
ment as  well  as  on  the  principal  debt.56 

Costs.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  has  been  held  that 
the  costs  of  the  proceedings  are  included  in  the 
judgment  lien.57 

§  458.    What  Judgments  Create  Lien 

As  a  general  rule,  In  order  to  create  a  judgment 
Hen,  there  must  be  a  judgment  which  Is  final,  valid,  and 
subsisting,  rendered  by  a  duly  constituted  court  for  the 
payment  of  a  definite  and  certain  amount  of  money 
which  may  be  collected  by  execution  on  property  of  the 
Judgment  debtor. 

It  is  essential  to  the  creation  of  a  judgment  lien 
that  there  shall  be  a  judgment58  and  it  is  essential, 


46.    Cal. — Evans    v.    Superior    Court 

of  Los   Angeles   County,    124   P.2d 

820,  20  Cal.2d  186. 
Ind. — Snyder   v.    Thieme   &   Wagner 

Brewing    Co.,    App.,    87    N.E.    155, 

reversed   on   other   grounds    90   N. 

B.  814,  173  Ind.  659. 
After  lien,  attached 

Lien  created  by  statute  provid- 
ing for  automatic  imposition  of  lien 
on  docketing  of  judgment  was  held 
inseparably  connected  with  judgment 
And  not  subject  to  impairment  by 
legislature. — Jones  v.  Union  Oil  Co. 
of  California,  25  P.2d  6,  218  Cal.  775. 
Constitutional  restrictions  on  power 

of    legislature    see    Constitutional 

Law  §§  233,  408. 

-47.  Mont. — McMillan  v.  Davenport, 
118. P.  756,  44  Mont.  23,  Ann.Cas. 
1912D  984. 

34  C.J.  p  569  note  87. 

•48.    Cal.— Pinch  v.  Finch,  228  P.  553, 

68  CaLApp.  72. 
N.D. — Groth  v.  Ness,   260  N.W.   700, 

65  N.D.  580. 
Va. — Kidwell  v.  Henderson,  143  S.E. 

336,  1-50  Va.  829. 
.34  C.J.  p  569  note  88. 
Specific  property 

(1)  A  court  cannot  render  a  judg- 
ment which  would  be  a  special  lien 
-or   charge   on   specific   property  not 
-described  in  the  pleadings  or  judg- 
ement.— Coombs  v.   Benz,   114   S.W.2d 
T13,  232  Mo.App.  1011. 

(2)  Court  was   not  authorized  to 


render  .  decree  that  judgment  for 
damages  should  be  an  equitable  lien 
on  specific  property  and  direct  its 
sale  under  execution  to  enforce  such 
lien.— Westervelt  v.  McCullough, 
228  P.  734,  68  Cal.App.  198. 
Creation  T>y  court 

(1)  A  court  cannot  create  a  judg- 
ment Hen,   that  being  a  prerogative 
of    the    legislature. — Sullivan    State 
Bank  v.   First  Nat  Bank,    146  N.E. 
403,  82  Ind.App.  419. 

(2)  The  fact  that  a  judgment  for 
plaintiff  in  an  action  against  a  rail- 
road company  for  personal  injuries 
contained  a  provision  for  a  lien  on 
defendant's  property  did  not  invali- 
date   the  judgment   where   statutes 
justified  the  lien.— Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hancock,  114  S.W.2d  1076,  195 
Ark.  911. 

Imposition  of  lien  by  court  of  equity 
see  infra  §  459. 

49.  Va.— Kidwell  v.  Henderson,   143 
S.E.  336,  150  Va.  829. 

50.  Ind.— Wells    v.    Benton,    8    N.E. 
444,    108    Ind.    585,    rehearing    de- 
nied 9  N.E.  601,  108  Ind.  585. 

34  C.J.  p  569  note  89. 

51.  Pa. — Stan  ton   v.   White,    32   Pa. 
358. 

34  C.J.  p  569  note  90. 

52.  U.S.— Kelly   v.    Minor,   Va..    252 
F.  115,  164  C.C.A.  227. 

53.  W.Va. — Bensimer  v.  Fell,   12   S. 
B.  1078,   85  W.Va.  15,   29  Am.S.R. 
774. 

887 


54.  W.Va. — Bensimer  v.  Fell,  12  S.E. 
1078,  35  W.Va.  15,  29  Am.S.R.  774. 

Wis.— Fischbeck  v.   Mieleny,    154   N. 

W.  701,  162  Wis.  12. 
34  C.J.  p  570  note  7. 

55.  N.T. — De   La   Vergne  v.   Evert- 
son,  1  Paige  181,  19  Am.D.  411. 

34  C.J.  p  570  note  8. 

56.  Ohio. — Loomls    v.    Second    Ger- 
man Bldg.  Ass'n,  37  Ohio  St.  392. 

34  C.J.  p  '570  note  9. 

57.  N.JV— Edmunds  V.   Smith,    27  A, 
827,  52  N.J.EQ.  212. 

34  C.J.  p  570  note  10. 

58.  Cal.— Gordon  v.  Vucinich,  142  P. 
2d  71,  61  OaLApp.2d  78. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hage- 
mann  v.  Pinska,  37  S.W.2d  463,  465, 
225  Mo.App.  521. 

OkL— Harriss  v.  Parks,  187  P.  470,  77 
Okl.  197. 

34  C.J.  p  571  note  11. 

Sufficiency 

(1)  An  abstract  of  judgment  which 
named  G  W  A  as  defendant  created 
a  lien  against  land  belonging  to   G 
M  A,  when  identity  of  parties  was 
fully     established.— Mullins     v.     Al- 
bertson,     Tex.Civ.App.,     136     S.W.2d 
263,  error  refused. 

(2)  A  judgment  against  J  Me  is 
not  a  lien  against  property  held  in 
name  of  J  J  Me. — Union  Trust  Co. 
v.   McCarthy,  10  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  243, 
76  Pittsb.Leg.J.  262,  15  WestCo.  92. 

C3)  Judgment       merely       reciting 
jury's  findings  that  plaintiff  was  en- 


§  458 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


under  the  authorities,  that  the  judgment  be  final,59 
valid  and  subsisting,60  and  rendered  by  a  lawfully 
and  validly  constituted  court,61  for  the  payment 
of  a  definite  and  certain  sum  of  money,62  capable  of 
collection  by  execution  against  the  debtor's  prop- 
erty.63 Where  these  conditions  have  been  met,  the 
lien  may  arise  from  a  judgment  by  confession  or 
consent  as  well  as  one  rendered  adversely,64  or 
from  a  final  judgment  by  default.65 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  against  an  executor  or 
administrator  is  discussed  in  Executors  and  Ad- 
ministrators §  804,  and  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
against  an  insane  person  in  Insane  Persons  §  151  e. 

Judgment  for  costs.  A  final  judgment  of  a  court 
of  record  may  be  a  lien  on  the  debtor's  land,  even 
though  the  money  judgment  is  for  costs  only.66 

§  459.    Decrees  in  Equity 

A  decree  in  equity  may  create  a  lien  on  lands. 

A  decree  in  chancery  may  create  a  lien  on  lands 
equally  with  a  judgment  at  law,67  where  it  is  for 


the  payment  of  a  definite  and  liquidated  sum  of 
money.68  A  decree  merely  setting  aside  a  fraudu- 
lent conveyance  of  land  without  more  does  not 
give  rise  to  a  lien,69  and  a  decree  of  foreclosure  of 
a  mortgage  does  not,  like  an  ordinary  judgment  at 
law,  create  a  general  lien  on  the  lands  of  the  mort- 
gagor, as  discussed  in  the  CJ.S.  title  Mortgages  § 
701,  also  42  CJ.  p  164  note  2. 

While,  in  some  jurisdictions,  the  court  of  chan- 
cery may  not,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  imposi- 
tion, directly  or  indirectly  impose  the  debt  involved 
in  a  general  judgment  as  a  lien  on  the  real  proper- 
ty involved,70  according  to  some  cases,  equity  may 
create  a  lien  directly  by  decree  for  that  purpose71 
on  personalty  as  well  as  on  realty,72  and  all  persons 
having  notice  of  such  a  lien  are  bound  thereby.73 
A  decree  providing  that,  if  defendant  does  not  in  a 
given  time  pay  plaintiff  a  designated  sum  of  money, 
certain  real  and  personal  property  of  defendant,  on 
which  plaintiff  has  a  specific  lien,  shall  be  sold  is 
not  a  judgment  which  creates  a  lien  on  other  real 
estate  of  defendant74 


titled  to  described  personalty  and 
damages  for  its  detention  and  di- 
recting execution  created  no  lien 
thereon,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
actually  there  Tinas  no  judgment 
against  any  party  or  parties,  in  fa- 
vor of  any  party  or  parties. — Reed 
v.  Bank  of  Mulberry,  149  So.  609, 
111  Fla.  577. 

(4)  Order  approving  borrowing  by 
administrator  for  benefit  of  dece- 
dent's estate  did  not  operate  as  a 
judgment  lien  against  which  stat- 
ute of  limitations  would  run,  but 
simply  determined  amount  due  to 
lender,  as  step  in  the  orderly  admin- 
istration of  the  estate  pending  final 
settlement  and  closing  thereof. — 
In  re  Marsh's  Estate,  139  P.2d  284, 
18  Wash.2d  308. 

Judgments    or    decrees    specifically 
creating1  liens 

Statute  providing  that  Judgments 
and  decrees  of  courts  of  record  shall 
be  liens  on  real  property  does  not 
apply  to  Judgments  and  decrees 
which  specifically  create  liens  on 
real  property,  but  only  to  Judgments 
in  personam. — Rosensweig  v.  Fergu- 
son, 158  S.W.2d  124,  348  Mo.  1144. 

59.  Mo. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
Hagemann    v.    Pinska,    37    S.W.2d 
463,  465,  225   Mo.App.  521. 

34  C.J.  p  571  note  12. 

60.  Mo. — Corpus     Juris    quoted    in 
Hagemann    v.    Pinska,    37    S.W.2d 
463,  465,  225  Mo.App.  521. 

Tftac. — Urban  v.  Bagby,  Civ.App.,  286 
8.W.  519,  affirmed,  Com.App.,  291 
S.W.  537. 

34  C.J.  p  571  note  13. 
A  dormant  Judgment  is  not  a  lien 

on  real  estate. — Compagna  v.  Home 


Owners'    Loan   Corporation,    3    N.W. 
2d  750,  141  Neb.  429. 

61.  Mo. — Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 
Hagemann    v.    Pinska,    37    S.W.2d 
463,  465,  225  Mo.App.  521. 

Okl.— Harriss   v.   Parks,    187   P.   470, 

77  Okl.  197. 
34  C.J.  p  571  note  14. 

62.  Fla. — Dlckenson  v.   Sharpe,    113 
So.  638,  94  Fla.  25. 

Mo.-^Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kelly  v. 
City  of  Cape  Girardeau,  89  S.W.2d 
693,  698,  230  Mo.App.  137— Coitus 
Juris  quoted  in  Hagemann  v.  Pin- 
ska,  37  S.W.2d  463,  465,  225  Mo. 
App.  521. 

34  C.J.  p  571  note  15. 

Installment  payments  for  indefinite 

period 
Judgment  for  periodic  installments 

for    an    indefinite    time    was    not    a 

lien  on  real  property  in  the  absence 

of  a  provision  in  Judgment  for  a  lien. 

— Yager  v.  Yager,  60  P.2d  422,  7  Cal. 

2d     213,     106     A.L.R.     664— Bird     v. 

Murphy,  256  P.  258,  82  CaLApp.  691, 

certiorari    denied    Murphy    v.    Bird, 

48    S.Ct.    38,    275    U.S.    487,    72    L. 

Ed.  387,  and  motion  denied  53  S.Ct. 

114. 

A  mistake  in  the  amount  of  a 
Judgment  does  not  render  the  lien 
ineffective,  and  a  correction  does 
not  destroy  the  lien.— First  State 
Bank  v.  Jones,  Civ.App.,  171  S.W. 
1057,  reversed  on  other  grounds  183 
S.W.  874,  107  Tex.  623. 

63.  Mo.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Kel- 
ly v.  City  of  Cape  Girardeau,  89  S. 
W.2d   693,    698,    230   Mo.App.   137— 
Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Hagemann 


v.  Pinska,  37  S.W.2d  463,  465,  225 
Mo.App.  521. 
34  C.J.  p  571  note  16. 

64.  N.C.— Keel   v.    Bailey,    198    S.E. 
654,   214  N.C.  159— Farmers'  Bank 
of  Clayton  v.  McCullers,  160  S.E. 
494,  201  N.C.  440. 

34  C.J.  p  571  note  17. 

65.  Pa,— Sellers  v.  Burk,  47  Pa.  344. 
34  C.J.  p  571  note  18. 

66.  Ala.— Forrest  v.  Camp,   16  Ala. 
642. 

34  C.J.  p  571  note  19. 

67.  Mont — Raymond  v.  Blancgrass, 
93  P.  648,  38  Mont.  449,  15  L.R.A., 
N.S.,  976. 

34  C.J.  p  572  note  21. 

68.  Fla. — Dickenson  v.   Sharpe,   113 
So.  638,  94  Fla.  25. 

34  C.J.  p  572  note  21. 

69.  Neb.— State      v.       Chamberlain 
Banking  House,   100  N.W.  205,   72 
Neb.  201. 

N.Y.— New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Mayer,  14  Daly  318,  affirmed  15 
N.E.  444,  108  N.Y.  655. 

70.  N.J.— McKibbin  v.  Pekarsky,  143 
A.    553,    103    N.J.EQ.    450— Cutter 
v.  Kline,  35  N.J.Eq.  534. 

71.  S.C.— Carmichael  v.  Abrahams,  1 
S.C.Eq.  114. 

72.  Iowa,— Kithcart  v.  Kithcart,  124 
N.W.  305,  145  Iowa  549,  30  L.R.A., 
N.S.,  1062. 

73.  Iowa. — Kithcart  v.  Kithcart,  su- 
pra. 

34  C.J.  p  572  note  26. 

74.  W.Va.— Linn  v.   Patton,   10   W. 
Va,  187. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  462 


Organization  and   Character  of 
Court 

Judgments  of  a  court  of  record  may  create  a  lien, 
whether  or  not  the  court  is  one  of  original  jurisdiction. 

The  incident  of  a  lien  commonly  attaches  to  the 
judgments  of  all  courts  of  record,?5  whether  or  not' 
the  particular  court  is  one  of  original  jurisdiction.76 
Judgments  of  inferior  courts  do  not  in  the  first  in- 
stance create  liens  under  some  statutes,77  but  pro- 
vision is  frequently  made  by  statute  for  the  trans- 
fer of  such  judgments  by  transcript  to  superior 
courts  for  the  purpose  of  constituting  such  judg- 
ments liens,  as  discussed  infra  §  462,  and  under 
some  statutes  judgments  of  inferior  courts  operate 
as  liens.78 

§  461.     Statutory  Requirements  in  General 

There   must   be   due   compliance  with  statutory  re- 
quirements In  order  to  create  a  judgment  lien. 

Since  judgment  liens  are  the  creatures  of  stat- 
utes, as  discussed  supra  §  454,  they  can  be  obtained 
only  by  complying  with  the  requirements  of  the 


statutes  by  which  they  are  created,79  While  in  gen- 
eral such  statutes  must  be  construed  strictly,80  they 
must  be  given  full  meaning  that  the  language  em- 
ployed reasonably  imports,81  and  it  has  been  held 
necessary  and  sufficient  to  comply  substantially  with 
the  provisions  of  the  statutes.82 

§  462.    Transcript  or  Abstract 

a.  In  general 

b.  Judgments  of  inferior  courts 

c.  Fixing   lien  on  property  in  another 

county 

d.  Sufficiency 

a.  In  General 

Under  some  statutes  a  Judgment  lien  does  not  at- 
tach  unless  a  certified  transcript,  abstract,  or  certificate 
of  the  Judgment  is  recorded  or  filed  in  a  designated  of- 
flee. 

Under  some  statutes  the  lien  of  a  judgment  does 
not  attach  to  any  real  property  unless  a  transcript, 
abstract,  or  certificate  of  the  judgment  or  a  tran- 
script of  th.e  docket  has  been  recorded83  or  has  been 


75.  Ala. — ^3Dtna  Auto  Finance,  Inc., 
v.  Kirby,  198  So.  356,  240  Ala.  228. 

34  C.J.  p  572  note  32. 
Lien  of  judgments  of  federal  courts 
see  Federal  Courts  §  144  i. 

76.  111.— Durham  v.   Heaton,   28   111. 
264,  81  Am.D.  275. 

34  C.J.  p  572  note  32. 

77.  N.C. — Ledbetter   v.    Osborne,    66 
N.C.  379. 

34  C.J.   p  572  note  34   [a]   (2),   [b]. 

Judgment  of  justice  of  peace  see 
the  C.J.S.  title  Justices  of  the 
Peace  §  118,  also  35  C.J.  p  687  note 
69-p  688  note  75. 

78.  111.— Kirk    v.    Vonberg,    34    111. 
440. 

34  C.J.  p  572  note  34   [a]   (1). 

79.  U.S. — In    re    Schuneman,    C.C.A. 
111.,   290  F.  200— In  re  Staples,  D. 
C.Okl.,  1  F.Supp.  620. 

Neb. — Citizens'  Bank  v.  Young,  110 
N.W.  1003,  78  Neb.  312. 

N.M. — Pugh  v.  Heating  &  Plumbing 
Finance  Corp.,  161.  P.2d  714,  49 
N.M.  234— Breece  v.  Gregg,  13  P. 
2d  421,  36  N.M.  246. 

N.Y.— -H.  R.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Smith,  151 
N.E.  448,  242  N.Y.  267,  45  A.L.R. 
554 — Niemi  Bros.  v.  Rosenbluh, 
263  N.Y.S.  445.  147  Misc.  159. 

N.D.— Groth  v.  Ness,  260  N.W.  700, 
$5  N.D.  580. 

Tex.— Barron  v.  Thompson,  45  Tex. 
235— McGlothlin  v.  Coody,  Com. 
App.,  £9  S.W.2d  819— Cheatham  v. 
Mann,  Civ.App.,  133  S.W.2d  264, 
error  refused — Barton  v.  Parks, 
Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  376,  error 
refused — Hampton  v.  C.  0;  Sham- 
burger  Lumber  Co.,  Civ.App.,  127 
S.W.2d  245,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct — Chamlee  v.  Chamlee,  ( 


Civ.App.,  113  S.W.2d  290— Traweek 
v.  Simmons,  Civ.App.,  72  S.W.2d 
349 — Burton  Lingo  Co.  v.  Warren, 
Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  750,  error  re- 
fused. 
Indexing  writ  of  scire  facias 

(1)  Under    a    statute    regulating 
scire  facias  to  extend  the  lien  of  a 
judgment  to  after-acquired  real  prop- 
erty   and    providing    that    all    such 
writs   shall   be   properly   indexed   in 
the    judgment    docket,    it    was    held 
that   the  writ  was  not  effective  to 
extend    the    lien    to    after-acquired 
property  where  the  writ  was  not  in- 
dexed.— Philadelphia  Plumbing  Sup- 
ply Co.  v.  D'Appollo,   20   Pa.Dist.  & 
Co.  21. 

(2)  Where    the    scire    facias    was 
duly  indexed,   it  was  held  that  the 
lien  was  extended  to  after-acquired 
real    property   which    was   conveyed 
to  a  third  person  by  the  -judgment 
debtor  after   the   commencement   of 
the    scire    facias    proceedings    and 
before    judgment    in    such   proceed- 
ings.— Calhoon    v.    Newlon,    40    Pa, 
Dist.  &  Co.  123. 

80.  Tenn. — Fidelity   &   Deposit   Co. 
of  Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick  Co., 
30    S.W.2d   253,    161   Tenn.   298. 

Tex. — Kingman  Texas  Impl.  Co.  v. 
Borders,  Civ.App.,  156  S.W.  614. 

81.  Tex. — Kingman  Texas  Impl.  Co. 
v.  Borders,  supra. 

82.  N.M,— Breece  v.  Gregg,  13  P.2d 
421,  36  N.M.  246. 

Okl.— Richards  v.  Tynes,  ,300  P.  297, 
149  Okl.  235— Long  Bell  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Etter,  251  P.  997,  123  Okl. 
54. 

Tex. — Askey  v.  Power,  Com. App.,  36 

889 


S.W.2d  446— Womack  v.  Paris  Gro- 
cer Co.,  Civ.App.,  166  S.W.2d  366, 
error  refused  168  S.W.2d  645,  140 
Tex  423— Fordyce-Crossett  Salefc 
Co.  v.  Brwin,  Civ.App.,  121  S.W.2d 
491. 
34  C.J.  p  572  note  39. 

83.  U.S.— In  re  B.  P.  Lientz  Mfg. 
Co.,  D.C-Mo.,  32  F.Supp.  233. 

Tex.— Cheatham  v.  Mann,  Civ.App., 
133  S.W.2d  264,  error  refused- 
Hampton  v.  C.  D.  Shamburger 
Lumber  Co.,  Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d 
245,  error  dismissed,  judgment  cor- 
rect. 

34  C.J.  p  572  note  40,  p  576  notes  68, 
69. 

Recording  and  docketing  judgment 
see  infra  §§  463-465. 

(Purpose   and  effect  of  statute 

(1)  The   purpose   of  statutes   pro- 
viding   for    the    creation    of   a    lien 
on  real  estate  by  recording  a  cer- 
tified  transcript   of  a   judgment   or 
decree    is    to    establish    and    attach 
liens    under    judgments    or    decrees 
in  cases  in  which  no  specific  statu- 
tory  or   contract   lien   is   the   basis 
of  the  judgment  or  decree,  and  not 
to  abrogate  or  destroy  a  lien  which 
has   become   merged  in  a  judgment 
or  decree. — Nassau  Realty  Co.  v.  City 
of  Jacksonville,  198  So.  581,  144  Fla. 
754. 

(2)  The  requirement  of  such  stat- 
ute  with   respect   to   recording    the 
transcript  does   not  apply  to  judg- 
ments enforcing  liens  theretofore  ex- 
isting as   against   specific   property, 
such   as    decrees    in    foreclosure    of 
statutory  or  contract  liens. — Nassau 
Realty  Co.  v.  City  of  Jacksonville, 
supra. 


§  462 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


filed84  in  the  proper  office,  after  being  certified  by 
the  clerk  of  the  court  wherein  the  judgment  was 
rendered,85  and  some  statutes  require  that  the  re- 
corded abstract  shall  be  indexed  in  order  to  create 
a  lien.86  On  due  compliance  with  statutory  provi- 
sions of  this  type,  the  lien  attaches87  to  property 
in  the  county  in  which  it  is  filed.88  The  clerk's 
certificate  authenticating  an  abstract  need  not  be  re- 
corded where  the  statute  does  not  so  require.89  It 
has  been  held  that  a  certificate  of  a  judgment  lien 
is  not  invalid  because  it  includes  two  distinct  judg- 
ments.90 


Filing  transcripts  of  judgments  in  other  courts  in 
general  is  discussed  supra  §  129. 

b.  Judgments  of  Inferior  Courts 

Some  statutes  require  the  filing  or  recording  In  a 
superior  court  of  a  transcript  or  abstract  of  a  judgment 
of  an  Inferior  court  In  order  to  render  such  judgment 
effective  as  a  lien. 

The  filing,  or  filing  and  recording,  in  a  superior 
court  of  transcripts  or  abstracts  of  judgments  ren- 
dered by  inferior  courts  are  generally  required  in 
order  to  render  such  judgments  effective  as  liens.91 
Where  there  has  been  due  compliance  with  the  stat- 


(8)  It  has  also  been  stated  that 
the  object  of  the  statutory  proceed- 
ing for  abstract  of  judgment  and 
recordation  thereof  is  to  put  subse- 
quent purchasers  or  encumbrancers 
of  property  sought  to  be  charged  on 
notice  of  lien  thereby  created. — Citi- 
zens State  Bank  of  Clarinda,  Iowa  v. 
Del-Tea:  Inv.  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  123 
S.W.2d  450,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct. 
Mere  decision,  or  opinion. 

Recording  of  a  certified  copy  of 
mere  decision  or  opinion  directing 
entry  of  order  allowing  attorney's 
fees  against  estate  was  held  not  to 
create  lien  against  realty.— Zagoren 
v.  Hall,  10  P.2d  202,  122  CaLApp. 
460. 
Proper  comity 

Registry  of  mortgagee's  Judgment 
against  mortgagor  in  mortgage  book 
of  another  parish  than  that  in  which 
land  was  situated  according  to 
boundary  line  commonly  recognized 
for  many  years  must  be  denied  effect 
and  title  from  mortgagor,  as  subse- 
quently recorded  in  proper  parish, 
given  effect. — Commercial  Bank  v. 
Meaux,  La.App.,  158  So.  688. 

84.    Ala.— Reuf    v.    Fulks,     122     So. 

14,  219  Ala,  252. 
N.M.— Pugh  v.  Heating  &  Plumbing 

Finance    Corp.,    161    P.2d    714,    49 

N.M.  234. 
34  C.J.  p  573  note  41,  p  572  note  21 

[c]. 
Xn  prolate  court 

Such  a  statute  was  held  not  to 
authorize  the  filing  and  recording  of 
judgments  in  the  probate  court  but 
authorizes  a  certificate  of  the  clerk 
or  register  of,  the  court  by  which 
the  judgment  was  rendered  to  be 
filed  and  registered  in  the  office  of 
the  judge  of  probate. — Saenger  The- 
atres Corporation  v.  McDermott,  196 
So.  265,  239  Ala.  629, 

86.    Tex. — Traweek  v.  Simmons,  Civ. 

App.,    72    S.W.2d    349— Herring    v. 

Walker,    22    S.W.    819,    3    Tex.Civ. 

App.  614. 
County  clerk 

Until  statutory  change  of  consti- 
tutional designation,  transcript  of 
judgment  may  properly  be  certified 


by  county  clerk  as  clerk  of  district 
court. — Cannon   v.   First  Nat.   Bank, 
291  P.  924,  35  N.M.  193. 
Certification    "by    clerk    of    superior 

court 
Pa.— Commonwealth,  ex  pel.  v.  Thur- 

kins,  Com.Pl.,  23  WestCo.  104. 
Erroneous  certification 

The  filing  and  recording  of  ab- 
stract of  judgment  erroneously  cer- 
tifying that  a  judgment  had  been  en- 
tered in  guardianship  proceeding 
against  one  ward  in  favor  of  anoth- 
er, although  it  created  a  cloud  on 
first  mentioned  ward's  interest  in 
guardianship  realty,  did  not  create 
a  lien  thereon. — Gordon  v.  Vucinich, 
142  P.2d  71,  61  CaLApp.2d  7>8. 

86*  Neb. — Metz  v.  Brownville  State 
Bank,  7  Neb.  165. 

Tex. — McGlothlin  v.  Goody,  Com. 
App.,  59  S.W.2d  S19 — Cheatham  -w. 
Mann,  Civ.App.,  133  S.W.2d  264, 
error  refused — Barton  v.  Parks, 
Cir.App.,  127  S.W.2d  376,  error  re- 
fused— Moore  v.  Ray,  Civ. App.,  '282 
S.W.  671 — Security  Nat.  Bank  of 
Wichita  Falls'  v.  Allen,  Civ.App., 
261  S.W.  1057— Whitaker  v.  Hill, 
Civ.App.,  179  S.W.  539. 

34  C.J.  p  577  note  88. 

Indexing  record  of  judgment  see  in- 
fra §§  463-4*65. 

Purpose  and  effect  of  statute 

(1)  The  object  of  statute  requiring 
that  names  of  plaintiff  and  defendant 
in  judgment  be  indexed  in  their  al- 
phabetical    order    is     that    persons 
searching    the    record    to    determine 
the  existence  of  judgment  liens  may 
have  the  means  of  ascertaining,  with 
promptness    and    certainty,    whether 
such  liens  exist,  without  having  to 
search   the    entire    record. — Womack 
v.  Paris  Grocer  Co.,  Civ.App.,  166  S. 
W.2d   366,   error  refused  168   S.W.2d 
645,  140  Tex.  423. 

(2)  Recording    and    indexing    ab- 
stract of  judgment,  as  required  by 
some    statutes,    do   not   merely   give 
notice    of   preexisting  lien,    but  are 
statutory  means  by  which  previously 
nonexistent  lien  comes  into  being. — 
Spence    v.    Brown,    25    S.W.    413,    86 
Tex.  430 — Burton  Lingo  Co.  v.  War- 
ren, Tex. Civ. App.,  45  B.W.2d  750,  er- 

890 


ror  refused — McGlothlin  v.  Coody, 
Tex. Civ. App.,  39  S.W.2d  33,  affirmed 
Com.App.,  59  S.W.2d  819— Wicker  v. 
Jenkins,  108  S.W.  188,  49  Tex.Civ. 
App.  366. 

Actual  notice  will  not  take  the 
place  of  the  index. — Glasscock  v. 
Stringer,  Tex.Civ.App.,  32  S.W.  920 — 
34  C.J.  p  578  note  89. 

87.  Tex. — Simmons     v.     Sikes,     Civ. 
App.,    56    S.W.2d    193,    error    dis- 
missed. 

Recording  abstract  pending-  appeal 

Appellant's  creation  of  lien  on  re- 
spondent's realty  by  recording  ab- 
stract of  judgment  appealed  from 
provided  security  for  enforcement  of 
judgment  if  it  should  become  final 
on  appeal. — Menges  v.  Robinson,  23 
P.2d  526,  132  Cal.App.  647. 
Several  liens  in  same  county 

Under  some  statutes  of  the  type 
here  considered,  more  than  one  lien 
to  secure  same  judgment  may  exist 
in  same  county. — Burton  Lingo  Co.  v. 
Warren,  Tex. Civ. App.,  45  S.W.2d  750, 
error  refused. 

88.  Ala. — JEtna  Auto  Finance,  Inc., 
v.  Kirby,  198  So.  356,  240  Ala.  22<S 
— Second    Nat.    Bank    v.    Allgood, 
176  So.  363,  234  Ala.  654 — Reuf  v. 
Fulks,    122    So.    14,    219   Ala,    252 — 
Morris  v.  Waldrop,  105  So.  172,  213 
Ala.  435 — Birmingham  News  Co.  v. 
Barren  G.  Collier,  Inc.,  103  So.  '839, 
212  Ala.  655— Robinson  v.  Shearer, 
99  So.  179,  211  Ala.  16. 

89.  Tex. — Spence   v.    Brown,    25    S. 
W.    413,    86    Tex.    430— Wicker    v. 
Jenkins,  108  S.W.  188,  49  Tex.Civ. 
App.  366. 

Failure  of  record  to  *how  seal 

A  clerk's  certificate  to  abstract  of 
judgment  need  not  be  recorded,  and 
hence  failure  of  the  record  to  show 
seal  by  clerk  is  immaterial  as  re- 
spects validity  of  the  lien  created 
thereby. — Texas  Building  &  Mort- 
gage Co.  v.  Morris,  Tex.Oiv.App.,  123 
S.W.2d  365,  error  dismissed. 

90.  Conn. — Parmalee    v.    Bethlehem, 
18  A,  94,  57  Conn.  '270. 

91.  DeL— Weintraub  v.  Rudnick,  143 
A.  456,  4  W.W.Harr.  111. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§462 


utory  requirements  in  this  regard,  the  lien  contem- 
plated by  the  statute  attaches  to  the  property  of  the 
judgment  debtor.92  This  requirement  applies  in 
some  jurisdictions  to  judgments  of  probate  courts,93 
but  in  other  jurisdictions,  in  which  probate  courts 
are  courts  of  record,  their  judgments  may  consti- 
tute Hens  as  in  the  case  of  any  other  court  of  rec- 
ord.94 

Under  some  statutes,  where  the  transcript  of  the 
judgment  of  the  inferior  court  has  been  duly  filed  in 
the  proper  superior  court,  the  judgment  becomes 
substantially  a  judgment  of  such  superior  court  for 
purposes  of  a  lien.95  Only  such  judgments  or  de- 
crees as  are  contemplated  by  the  statute  may  con- 
stitute the  basis  for  filing  the  transcript  and  impos- 
ing the  lien,96  and  an  invalid  judgment  of  an  in- 
ferior court  is  not  sufficient  to  support  a  lien,  not- 
withstanding the  transcript  or  abstract  is  filed  in 
the  superior  court.97  The  transcript  must  be  cer- 


tified and  authenticated  in  accordance  with  the  di- 
rections of  the  statute,98  and  under  some  statutes 
an  execution  must  have  been  issued  and  returned 
nulla  bona  before  the  transcript  may  be  made  and 
filed.99  Delay  in  filing  the  transcript  until  after  the 
judgment  has  become  dormant  defeats  the  right  to 
acquire  a  lien  under  some  statutes.1 

c.  Fixing  Lien  on  Property  in  Another  County 
Statutes  frequently  authorize  the  fixing  of  the  Hen  of 
a  judgment  on  real  property  of  the  Judgment  debtor  In 
a  county  other  than  the  county  in  which  Judgment  Is 
rendered  by  recording,  docketing,  or  filing  a  transcript 
or  abstract  of  the  Judgment  In  such  other  county. 

Various  statutes  authorize  a  transcript  or  abstract 
of  a  judgment  recovered  in  one  county  to  be  re- 
corded, docketed,-  or  filed  in  another,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  binding  real  property  of  the  judgment  debt- 
or situated  in  the  latter  county,2  and,  in  order  to 
impose  a  lien  on  such  real  property,  there  must  be 
due  compliance  with  the  statutory  requirements.3 


Fla.-- JFerrell  v.  Reed,  -53  So.  935,  "60 

Fla.  -62. 
Mo.— Bank  of  Qlever  v.  Cook,  24  -S. 

W.2d  698,  223  Mo.App.  1092. 
Or.— Yeaton  v.  Barnhart,  150  P.  742, 

78     Or.     249,     modified     on    other 

grounds   152  P.   192,   78  Or.   249. 
34  C.J.  p  574  note  50. 

92.  Minn.— Keys  v.  Schultz,  "2  N.W. 
549,  212  Minn.  109. 

Pa.— Commonwealth  v.  Thurkins, 
Com.Pl.,  23  WestCo.  104. 

Tex. — Horton  v.  Gibson,  Civ.App.,  274 
S.W.  292. 

34  C.J.  p  574  note  50. 

93.  Pa. — Catanzaritti  v.  Bianco,  198 
A.   806,    131   PiuSuper.   207. 

34  C.J.  P  574  note  51. 

94.  MO.— Haeussler    v.    Scheilin,    9 
Mo.App.  303. 

34  C.J.  p  #74  note  53. 

95.  Del. — McCoy  v.  Hickman,  15  A. 
2d  427,  1  Terry  687. 

Minn.— Keys  v.  Schultz,  2  N.W.2d 
549,  "212  Minn.  109— Clark  v.  Butts, 
76  N.W.  199,  73  Minn.  361. 

Mo. — Mahen  v.  Tavern  Rock,  37  S. 
W.2d  562,  327  Mo.  391. 

96.  Pa.— Catanzaritti  v.  Bianco,  198 
A.    '806.    131    Pa.Super.    207— Wil- 
liamson   v.    Hanmer,    Com.Pl.,    85 
Pitteb.-Leg.J.  751. 

Adjudication  of  orphan's  court 

The  court  of  common  pleas  may 
properly  enter  a  judgment  on  a  tran- 
script of  proceedings  in  an  orphans' 
court  only  on  a  transcript  or  extract 
showing  the  amount  appearing  to  be 
due  from  or  In  the  hands  of  any 
fiduciary  on  the  settlement  of  his  ac- 
counts in  the  orphans'  court  or  by 
virtue  of  a  decree  of  the  court. — 
Catanzaritti  v.  Bianco,  19«8  A.  806 
131  Pa.Super.  207. 

97.  Del.— McCoy  v.  Hickman,  15  A. 


2d  427,  1  Terry  5S7— Weintraub  v.1 

Rudnick,  143  A.  456,  4  W.W.Harr. 

111. 
Mont. — Novack    v.    Pericich,    300    P. 

240,  90  Mont  91. 
Judgment  not  void 
Pa.— Davies  v.  Lewis,  91  Pa.Super. 

172. 

98.  Mo. — Bank  of  Clever  v.  Cook,  24 
S.W.2d  698,  223  Mo.App.  1092. 

99.  111.— Brockway  v.  Trinity  M.  E. 
Church,  68  N.E.  749,  205  HI.  238. 

34  C.J.  p  574  note  5-6. 

1.  N.C.— Lowdermilk  v.  Butler,   109 
S.E.  571,  182  N.C.  502. 

2.  U.S.— Reconstruction          Finance 
Corporation    v.    Maley,    C.C.A.I1L, 
125  F.2d  131. 

HI. — Haugens  v.   Holmes,   41  N.B.2d 

109,  314  IlLApjp.  166. 
Ind.— Echelbarger      v.      (First      Nat. 

Bank,  5  N.E.2d  966,  211  Ind.  199. 
Neb.— Talich    v.    Marvel,    212    N.W. 

543,  115  Neb.  246,  followed  in  212 

N.W.  544,  115  Neb.  .250. 
N.M,— Scheer  v.    Stolz,   72   P.2d   606, 

41  N.M.  585. 
Tex. — Texas    Building    &    Mortgage 

Co.  v.  Morris,  Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d 

365,      error     dismissed— Hicks     v. 

Price.  Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  116. 
34  C.J.  p  '573  note  45,  «p  574  note  53 

[b],  p  586  note  9. 
Transcript  of  original  docket  or  rec- 
ord 

(1)  Where  judgment   roll  is   file<3 
and    judgment    docketed    in   district 
court    clerk's    office,    judgment    be- 
comes   lien    on    judgment    debtor's 
property    in    any     county     wherein 
transcript  of  docket  is  filed.— Finch 
Van  Slyck  &  McConville  v.  Jackson 
220  N.W.  130,  57  N.D.  17. 

(2)  The   judgment  of  a   court   o: 
common   pleas    may   be   transferred 

891 


from  the  county  in  which  it  is  en- 
lered  to  any  other  county  of  the  com- 
monwealth by  filing  of  record  in  the 
prothonotary's  office  of  such  other 
county  a  certified  copy  of  the  whole 
record  in  the  case  and  docketing  it 
therein. — Shotts  &  Co.  v.  Agnew  & 
Barnett,  81  Pa.Super.  458. 
Filing  of  copy  of  Judgment  roll  un- 
necessary 

Where  a  judgment  is  transcripted 
and  docketed  in  a  county  other  than 
the  one  in  which  judgment  was  ren- 
dered, it  is  not  necessary  to  file  a 
copy  of  the  judgment  roll  in  such 
other  county,  in  order  to  create  a 
Lien  on  real  property  in  such  other 
county.— Brown  v.  Harding,  89  S.E. 
222,  171  N.C.  686. 
Necessity  for  creation  of  deficiency 

judgment 

Abstracting  in  another  county  a 
judgment  foreclosing  a  lien  on  prop- 
erty described  in  such  Judgment  cre- 
ates a  lien  on  property  in  the  other 
county,  irrespective  of  whether  the 
property,  lien  on  which  was  fore- 
closed, has  been  sold  and  deficiency 
judgment  created.— Texas  Building  & 
Mortgage  Co.  v.  Morris,  Tex.Civ.App., 
123  S.W.2d  3«65,  error  dismissed. 

property  of  married,  woman 
Foreign  judgment  at  law  rendered 
in  proceedings  ex  contractu  against 
married  woman  cannot  be  made  ef- 
fectual as  lien  on  lands  of  such  mar- 
ried woman  outside  county  in  which 
judgment  was  rendered  by  mere  fil- 
ing and  recording  of  certified  tran- 
script of  judgment  in  county  where 
her  land  lies.— Protective  Holding 
Corporation  v.  Cornwall  Co.,  173  So. 
804,  127  'Fla.  252. 

3.  Ind.— Sullivan  -State  Bank  .  v. 
(First  Nat  Bank,  146  N.B.  403,  '82 
Ind.App.  419. 


§  462 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Under  some  statutes  filing  in  another  county  of  a 
certificate  of  a  judgment  which  has  become  dor- 
mant does  not  create  a  lien  on  real  property  of 
the  judgment  debtor  in  such  other  county,4  but,  un- 
der other  statutes,  a  judgment  may  be  transferred 
to  another  county  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a  lien 
on  real  property  in  such  other  county,  even  though 
it  is  not  a  lien  on  real  property  at  the  time  of 
transfer,5  or  is  not  at  that  time  immediately  en- 
forceable by  execution,6  or  even  though  at  the  time 
of  transfer  the  statutory  period  for  the  duration  of 
judgment  liens  has  elapsed.7  Under  the  construc- 
tion given  some  statutes,  the  transfer  of  a  judg- 
ment to  another  county  creates  a  new  lien,8  but, 
under  other  statutes,  the  docketing  of  a  transcript 
in  another  county  does  not  create  a  new  lien,  but 
at  most  constitutes  a  transfer  of  the  lien.9 

Inferior  court  judgments.  With  respect  to  judg- 
ments of  inferior  courts,  under  some  statutes  the 
transcript  must  be  filed  in  the  proper  court  of  the 
county  where  the  judgment  was  recovered,  and  can- 
not in  the  first  instance  be  filed  in  the  court  of  an- 
other county  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a  lien  on 
real  property  in  such  other  county.10 


d.  Sufficiency 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Recording  and  filing 

(3)  Indexing 

* 
(1)  In  General 

There  must  be  at  least  substantial  compliance  with 
statutory  requirements  for  the  creation  of  liens  by  re- 
cording or  filing  transcripts  or  abstracts  of  Judgments. 

In  general  there  must  be  at  least  substantial  com- 
pliance with  statutory  requirements  for  the  crea- 
tion of  a  lien  by  the  recording  or  filing  of  a  tran- 
script or  abstract  of  the  judgment.11  The  tran- 
script, abstract,  or  certificate  must  satisfy 'the  re- 
quirements of  the  statute  governing  the  creation  of 
a  lien,12  and  should  contain  all  the  essential  par- 
ticulars of  the  judgment,  so  as  to  give  reasonably 
certain  and  definite  information  to  subsequent  pur- 
chasers or  lienors.13  While  the  rule  has  been  an- 
nounced that  a  statute  prescribing  the  contents  of 
a  certificate  of  judgment  is  mandatory14  and  that 
there  must  be  strict  compliance  with  such  statute 
in  order  to  create  a  lien,15  the  provisions  of  some 
statutes  prescribing  the  contents  of  a  transcript  or 
certificate  have  been  regarded  as  directory  rather 
than  mandatory  so  that  compliance  therewith  is  not 


Iowa. — Harrington   v.   Clark,    202   N. 

W.  84,  199  Iowa  340. 
34  C.J.  p  573  note  45,  p  5S6  note  9. 

Becordiug'  of  transcript  required 
Neb.— Rathbone  Co.  v.  KImball,  220 
N.W.  244,  117  Neb.  229,  certiorari 
denies  Kimball  v.  Rathbone  Co.,  49 
S.Ct  179,  27-8  U.S.  655,  73  L.Ed. 
564. 

4.  Ohio.— -Kline  v.  Falbo,   56  N.B.2d 
•701,  73  Ohio  App.  417. 

5.  Pa — Shotts   &  Co.   v.   Agnew 
Barnett,  -81  Pa.Super.  45  S. 

6.  Pa. — Shotts   &   Co.   v.   Agnew   & 
Barnett,  supra. 

7.  Pa. — Shotts   &   Co.    v.    Agnew   & 
Barnett,  supra. 

8.  Pa, — Shotts   &   Co.   v.   Agnew   & 
Barnett,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  574  note  47. 

Force  and  effect  of  lien 

The  new  lien  has  the  same  force 
and  effect  as  though  judgment  had 
originally  been  entered  in  the  coun- 
ty to  which  it  was  transferred. — 
Shotts  &  Co.  v.  Agnew  &  Barnett, 
supra. 
Independent  liens 

Each  abstract  of  same  judgment 
recorded  in  different  counties  creates 
independent  lien. — Burton  Lingo  Co. 
v.  Warren,  Tex.Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d 
750,  error  refused. 


0.    Ind.— Bradfleld  v.  Newby,  28  N.E. 
619,  130  Ind.  59. 

10.  ArlL-rWinkler  v.  Baxter,  170  S. 
W.  94,  114  Ark.  422. 

34  C.J.  p  574  note  57. 
Xilen  held  to  attach 
Mo. — Mahen  v.   Tavern  Rock,   37  -S. 
W.2d  562,  327  Mo.  391. 

11.  Mo. — Bank  of  Clever  v.  Cook,  24 
S.W.2d  698,  223  Mo.App.  1092. 

12.  Tex. — Barton  v.  Parks,  Civ. App., 
127    S.W.2d    376,    error    refused — 
Hampton    v.     C.    D.     Shamburger 
Lumber  Co.,  Civ.App.,   127   S.W.2d 
245,  error  dismissed,  Judgment  cor- 
rect— Chamlee    v.     Chamlee,     Civ. 
App.,    113    S.W.2d   290— Gordon-Se- 
wall  &  Co.  v.  Walker,  Civ.App.,  258 
S.W.  233. 

34  C.J.  p  575  notes  60,  61.  p  578  note 

92,  p  579  note  8. 
Strict  compliance 

In  order  to  create  a  lien  by  filing 
for  registration  a  certificate  of  judg- 
ment, the  existence  of  a  certificate 
issued  and  registered  in  strict  com- 
pliance with  the  statute  is  essential, 
since  the  provisions  %are  in  deroga- 
tion of  the  common  law. — Hargett  v. 
Hovater,  15  So.2d  27-6,  244  Ala,  646 — 
Morris  v.  Waldrop,  105  So.  172,  213 
Ala.  435. 
Transcript  of  docket 

Under  a  statute  requiring  the 
docketing  of  the  judgment  and  mak- 
ing the  existence  of  a  lien  depend- 

892 


ent  on  the  filing  in  a  particular  office 
of  a  transcript  of  the  docket  of  the 
judgment,  merely  filing  an  abstract 
of  the  '  judgment  without  docketing 
the  judgment  is  not  suflacient. — 
Breece  v.  Gregg,  13  P.2d  421,  36  N. 
M.  246. 

Jurisdiction  of  court  rendering  judg- 
ment 

The  transcript  of  a  judgment  of  a 
justice's  court  filed  in  a  superior 
court  must  show  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  justice's  court  with  respect  to 
the  residence  of  the  parties. — Wein- 
traub  v.  Kudnick,  143  A.  456,  4  W.W. 
Harr.,Del.,  111. 

Transcript  or  abstract  sufficient 
Ind. — Chadwick    v.    (Louisville    Joint 
Stock    Land    Bank,    6    N.E.2d    741, 
103  Ind.App.  224. 

Tex. — Guaranty  -State  Bank  of  Donna 
v.  Marion  Qounty  Nat.  Bank,  Civ. 
App.,  293  S.W.  248— Fikes  v.  Buck- 
holts  State  Bank,  Civ.A'pp.,  273  S.. 
W.  957. 

13.  Tex. — Traweek  v.  Simmons,  Civ. 
App.,  72  S.W.2d  349. 

34  C.J.  P  575  note  61. 

14.  Ala. — Duncan  v.  Autauga  Bank- 
ing &  Trust  Co.,  136   So.  733,   223 
Ala.  434. 

15.  Ala. — Duncan  v.  Autauga  Bank- 
ing &  Trust  Co.,  supra — Roney  v. 
Dothan   Produce  Co.,    117    So.   -36, 
217  Ala.  475. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


462 


an  essential  element  of  the  validity  of  the  transcript 
or  certificate.16  A  certificate  or  abstract  is  suffi- 
cient if  it  can  be  rendered  certain  by  the  construc- 
tion of  its  own  terms  and  if  within  its  terms  it  sup- 
plies the  information  required  by  law  without  look- 
ing elsewhere.17  An  immaterial  defect  in  the 
clerk's  certificate  authenticating  a  transcript  of  a 
judgment  docket  has  been  held  not  to  nullify  the 
effect  of  such  transcript  where  there  has  other- 
wise been  due  compliance  with  statutory  require- 
ments.18 According  to  some  cases  the  requirement 
of  an  authenticated  abstract  of  a  judgment  is  ful- 
filled by  presenting  an  attested  copy  of  the  judgment 
in  lieu  of  an  abstract,18  or  by  presenting  an  authen- 
ticated instrument  which  contains  a  copy  of  the 


judgment  and  also  all  matters  of  substance  required 
by  the  statute.20  Mere  surplusage  does  not  invali- 
date an  abstract  or  certificate.21 

Parties.  There  must  be  due  compliance  with  a 
statutory  requirement  that  the  transcript,  abstract, 
or  certificate  shall  show  the  name  of  the  parties,  in 
order  to  create  a  lien,22  and  an  error  in  the  name 
of  a  party  to  the  judgment  may  prevent  the  crea- 
tion of  a  lien,23  but  a  slight  and  immaterial  error 
in  describing  a  party  does  not  necessarily  prevent 
the  creation  of  a  lien.24 

Amount,  interest,  and  costs.  Some  statutes  re- 
quire a  statement  of  the'  amount  for  which  judg- 
ment was  rendered,25  and  the  balance  or  amount 
due,26  and  the  rate  of  interest  specified  in  the 


18.    N.M. — Cannon     v.     First     Nat. 

Bank,  291  P.  924,  35  N.M.  193. 
Ohio. — Hower  Corp.  v.  Vance,  59  N.B. 

2d  377,  144  Ohio  St.  443. 

17.  Ala.— Gunter  v.    Belser,   45    So. 
582,  154  Ala.  489. 

Tex.— Kinsman    Texas    Impl.   Co.    v. 

Borders,    Civ.App.,    156   S.W.    614. 
34  C.J.  p  575  note  62. 
Matters  not  rendering"  abstract  void 
or  insufficient 

Use  of  abbreviations  which  were 
in  common  use  and  easily  under- 
standable.— Weadon  v.  Shahen,  123 
P.2d  88,  50  Cal.App.2d  254. 

18.  Or.— Budd  v.  Gallier,  89  P.  638, 
50  Or.  42. 

34  C.J.  p  575  note  -64  [a]  (1). 

19.  W.Va.— Calwell    v.    Prindle,    19 
W.Va.  604. 

34  C.JT.  p  575  note  63. 

20.  Cal. — Robbins  Inv.  Co.  v.  Rob- 
bins,    122    P.2d    91,    49    Cal.App.2d 
446. 

21.  Ala.— Reuf  v.  'Fulks,  122  So.  14, 
219  Ala.  252. 

Cal. — Robbins    Inv.   Co.    v.    Robbins, 
122  P.2d  91,  49  Cal.App.2d  446. 

22.  Ala.— Booth   v.    Bates,    112    So. 
209,  215  Ala.  632. 

Tex.— McGlothlin  v.  Goody,  Com.App., 
59  S.W.2d  819— Cheatham  v.  Mann, 
Civ.App.,  133  S.W,2d  264,  error  re- 
fused— Barton  v.  Parks,  Civ.App., 
127  S.W.2d  37-6,  error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  575  note  60  [a],  [b],  [d],  p 

5)80  note  24  [a]. 
Parties  to  Judgment 

Some    statutes    refer   to   a    state- 
ment of  the  names  of  the  parties  to 
the  judgment  or  decree  and  not  nec- 
essarily to  a  statement  of  the  names 
of  the  parties  to  the  cause.. 
Ala.— Reuf  v.  Fulks,  122  So.  14,  219 
Ala.    252— Ladd   v.    Smith,    95   So 
280,  209  Ala.  114. 
Tex. — Womack  v.  Paris  Grocer  Co. 
Civ.App.,  166  S.W.2d  366,  error  re- 
fused 168  S.W.2d  645,  140  Tex.  423. 


XTames  of  all  defendants 

Where  abstract  did  not  contain 
names  of  all  defendants,  it  was  not 
sufficient,  even  though  plaintiffs  re- 
covered no  judgment  for  debt 
against  defendants  whose  names 
were  so  omitted,  but  were  allowed 
costs  against  one  of  such  defendants, 
and  another  of  such  defendants  was 
allowed  costs  against  plaintiffs. — 
Shirey  v.  Trust  Co.  of  Texas,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  98  S.W.2d  243— Shirey  v. 
Trust  Co.  of  Texas,  Tex.Civ.App.,  69 
S.W.2d  835,  error  refused. 
Partnership  as  party 

(1)  Under  a  statute  requiring  the 
certificate  of  judgment  to  show  the 
names  of  tall  parties  to  the  judgment, 
a  certificate  which  showed  merely  a 
firm  name  of  a  partnership  as  the 
name   of   a  party  was  held   insuffi- 
cient.— Duncan  v.   Autauga  Banking 
&  Trust  Co.,  136  So.  733,  223  Ala,  434 
—Ladd  v.  Smith,  95  So.  280,  209  Ala. 
114— Conn  v.  Sellers,  73  So.  961,  198 
Ala.  606. 

(2)  Where,  however,  a  'partnership 
may  be  sued  in  the  firm  name,  fail- 
ure to  state,  in  a  certificate  of  judg- 
ment against  defendant  partnership, 
the  names  of  the  individual  partners 
or  whether  defendant  was  a  partner- 
ship or  corporation  was  held  not  to 
render  the  certificate  insufficient  un- 
der such  statute.— Reuf  v.  Fulks,  122 
So.  14,  219  Ala.  252. 

Abstract  or  certificate  held  sufficient 
Tex.— womack  v.  Paris  Grocer  Co., 
Civ.App.,  166  S.W.2d  366,  error  re- 
fused 168  S.W.2d  645,  140  Tex.  423. 
84  C.J.  p  575  note  62  [a]  (3). 
23.    Tex.— Traweek  v.  -Simmons,  Civ. 

App.,  72  S.W.2d  349. 
Middle  initial 

An  error  in  the  middle  initial  of  a 
party  to  the  Judgment  may  render 
the  abstract  or  certificate  insuffi- 
cient—Lnture  v.  Little,  60  So.  474,  6 
Ala. App.  278—34  C.J.  p  581  note  34. 
24L  Ala,— Reuf  v.  Fulks,  122  So.  14 
219  Ala.  252. 

893 


25.  Tex. — Lemons  v.  Bpley  Hard- 
ware Co.,  Civ.App.,  197  S.W.  1118— 
Glasscock  v.  Stringer,  Civ.App.,  32 
S.W.  920. 

34  C.J.  p  575  note  60  [a]. 

Statute  construed  strictly 

Tex. — Texas  Building  &  Mortgage- 
Co,  v.  Morris,  Civ.App.,  123  S.W. 
2d  365,  error  dismissed. 

Omission  of  dollar  mark 

(1)  Such  omission  from  statement 
of  amount  of  judgment  is  not  neces- 
sarily a  fatal  defect. 

Cal.— Weadon  v.  Shahen,  123  P.2d  88", 
50  Cal.App.2d  254. 

Tex. — Texas  Building  &  Mortgage- 
Co,  v.  Morris,  Civ.App.,  123  S.W.26! 
365,  error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  -575  note  60  £c]. 

(2)  However,  the  use  of  mere  nu- 
merals  in  an  abstract  of  judgment 
without    any    indication    that    they 
represent    dollars    or    other    denom-  . 
inations  of  money  has  been  held  not  . 
sufficient,    and   an    omission   in   this 
particular  cannot  be  supplied  by  ref- 
erence to  the  record  of  the  judgment. 
—Bush  v.  'Farris,  Tex.,  71  P.  770,  18- 
C.C.A.  315. 

Abstract  held  sufficient 

Tex.— Willis  v.  Somerville,   23   S.W. 

781,  3  Tex.Civ.Ajpp.  509— First  Nat. 

Bam*  v.  Cloud,  21  S.W.  770,  2  Tex. 

Civ.App.  -627. 
34  C.J.  P  575  notes  60  [a],  62  [a]. 

20.  Tex. — Cheatham  v.  Mann,  Civ. 
App.,  133  S.W.2d  264,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  575  note  60  [a], 

Statute  strictly  construed 

Tex. — Texas  Building  &  Mortgage- 
Co,  v.  Morris,  Civ.App.,  123  S.W.24 
365,  error  dismissed. 

Showing  credits 

(1)  Under  the  statute  described  in 
the  text,  failure  to  show  credits  on 
the  judgment  may  render  the  ab- 
stract insufficient — Evans  v.  Frisbie, 
19  S.W.  510,  84  Tex.  $41 — 84  C.J.  p 
582  note  5£ 


§  462 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


judgment27 

In  some  jurisdictions  a  certificate  of  judgment  is 
insufficient  if  it  fails  to  show  the  amount  of  costs 
as  required  by  statute,28  but  failure  of  a  tran- 
script to  show  the  amount  of  costs  was  held  not 
to  prevent  the  creation  of  a  lien  where  the  tran- 
script shows  that  costs  were  awarded  and  it  was 
not  possible  to  determine  the  amount  of  costs  at 
the  time  of  filing  the  transcript,29  and  the  only 
effect  of  failure  to  state  the  amount  of  costs,  as 
required  by  some  statutes,  is  to  defeat  the  lien  to 
the  extent  of  the  costs.30 

(2)  Recording  and  Filing 

The  transcript,  abstract,  or  certificate  of  judgment 
must  be  properly  recorded  or  filed  In  order  to  create  a 
Hen  under  some  statutes. 

In  order  to  create  a  lien  under  some  statutes,  the 
transcript,  abstract,  or  certificate  of  judgment  must 


be  properly  recorded  or  filed,31  and  a  substantial  er- 
ror on  the  part  of  the  clerk  in  recording  will  pre- 
vent the  creation  of  a  lien,32  even  though  the  ab- 
stract itself  is  correct.33  It  has  been  stated  broadly, 
however,  that  the  true  object  of  the  statute  is  served 
if  the  record  is  such  as  to  charge  third  persons  with 
notice  of  the  lien  or  to  excite  inquiry  which,  if  rea- 
sonably or  diligently  pursued,  would  disclose  the 
existence  of  the  lien,34  and  that  slight  irregularities 
with  respect  to  filing  an  abstract  do  not  necessarily 
prevent  the  creation  of  a  lien.35 

(3)  Indexing 

A  recorded  transcript  or  abstract  of  judgment  must 
be  properly  Indexed  in  order  to  create  a  Hen  under  aome 
statutes. 

In  order  to  create  a  lien  under  some  statutes, 
there  must  be  due  compliance  with  statutory  re- 
quirements regarding  the  indexing  of  a  recorded 
transcript  or  abstract  of  judgment.36  Slight  irreg- 


(2)  Where,  however,  a  judgment 
•was  rendered  for  a  certain  amount 
with  Interest,  tog-ether  with  foreclo- 
sure of  a  Hen  on  certain  property, 
jfiven  to  secure  payment  of  the  judg- 
ment debt,  and  the  judgment  creditor 
purchased  the  property  at  foreclo- 
sure sale,  failure  to  show  in  the  ab- 
stract a  credit  for  the  amount  bid  by 
the  judgment  creditor  at  such  sale 
did  not  render  the  abstract  insuffi- 
cient in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
sale  was  incomplete  when  the  ab- 
stract was  filed. — Texas  Building  & 
Mortgage  Co.  v.  Morris,  Tex.Civ.App., 
123  S.W.2d  365,  error  dismissed. 
3FT*  Tex. — Lemons  v.  Epley  Hard- 
ware Co.,  Civ.APp.,  197  S.W.  1118. 
34  C.J.  p  575  note  £0  [a]. 
^Erroneous  Inclusion  of  interest 

Where  Judgment  did  not  bear  in- 
terest, no  lien  was  created  by  filing 
in  another  county  an  abstract  of 
Judgment  reciting  that  judgment 
bore  ten  per  cent  interest  and  that 
balance  due  thereon  included  inter- 
est.— Midland  County  v.  Tolivar's  Es- 
tate, 155  S.W.Sd  921,  137  Tex.  600. 
.Abstract  held  sufficient 

Omission  from  an  abstract  of 
.judgment  in  another  county  of  re- 
cital that  interest  was  to  be  calcu- 
lated from  the  date  of  the  judgment, 
on  the  amount  of  the  judgment,  did 
mot  invalidate  the  abstract,  since  in- 
terest was  fixed  by  law. — Texas 
Building  &  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Morris, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d  365,  error 
•dismissed— -Willis  v.  Somerville,  22 
£.W.  7*81.  3  Tex.Civ.App.  509— First 
Nat  Bank  v.  Cloud,  21  S.W.  770,  21 
Tex.Civ.App.  627. 

38.    Ala. — Morris  v.  Waldrop,  105  So. 
1*72,  213  Ala.  435. 

3&.     Ind. — Chadwick      7.     'Louisville 


Joint   Stock  Land  Bank,   6  N.E.2d 
741,  103  Ind.-4pp.  224. 

30.  Wash. — Lamey  v.  Coffman,  39  P. 
682,  11  Wash.  301. 

31.  Ind.— Sullivan     State    Bank    y. 
First  Nat.  Bank,  146  N.B.  403,  82 
Ind.App.  419. 

Tex. — Askey  v.  Power,  Com.  App.,  36 
S.W.2d  446 — Cheatham  v.  Mann, 
Civ.App.,  183  S.W.2d  264,  error  re- 
fused. 

34  C.J.  p  572  note  40,  p  573  notes  41, 
45  [a],  p  575  note  60  [a]  (10),  p 
577  note  88  [c],  «p  578  note  92,  p 
579  notes  97  [b],  8,  p  580  note  15. 

Recording'  held  sufficient 

Hawaii. — Nichols  v.  Wan  Qliong  Sun, 
28  Hawaii  395. 

32.  Tex. — Noble  v.  Earner,   55  S.W. 
382,  22  Tex.Civ.App.  357. 

Bntry  as  to  credits 

(1)  In  view  of  a  statutory  re- 
quirement that  the  abstract  shall 
show  the  amount  or  balance  due  on 
the  judgment,  the  record  of  an  ab- 
stract was  insuflftcient  to  create  a 
lien  where  the  record  erroneously 
stated  the  date  of  a  credit  thereon, 
so  that  a  proper  calculation  of  the 
interest  due  on  the  judgment  as  re- 
corded would  not  show  the  amount 
actually  due. — Noble  v.  Earner,  su- 
pra. 

(2)  Where  clerk,  in  recording  ab- 
stract of  judgment,  placed  amounts 
totaling  within  eighteen  cents  of 
amount  of  judgment  in  credit  column 
through  mistake,  which  amounts  ap- 
parently should  have  been  entered  in 
the  column  for  rate  of  interest,  the 
record  was  insuftlcient  to  establish 
judgment  lien. — Askey  v.  Power,  Tex. 
Com.AppM  36  S.W.2d  446. 
Error  in  name  of  party 

The    record    of    an    abstract,    in 

894 


which  the  surname  of  plaintiff  who 
recovered  judgment  was  misspelled, 
was  held  insufficient  to  create  lien. — 
Anthony  v.  Taylor,  4  S.W.  531,  -63 
Tex.  403. 

33.  Tex. — Noble  v.  Earner,  55  S.W. 
382,  22  Tex.Civ.App.  357. 

34.  Tex. — Citizens     State     Bank     of 
Clarinda,  Iowa.  v.  Del-Tex  Inv.  Co., 
Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d  450,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct. 

Misnomer  of  court 

Record  showing  name  of  court  by 
which  judgment  was  rendered  as 
"92d  District  Court  of  Hidalgo  Coun- 
ty" was  sufficient  to  render  lien  op- 
erative against  subsequent  purchas- 
ers or  encumbrancers  where  the 
statute  was  otherwise  complied  with, 
notwithstanding  the  judgment  was 
actually  rendered  by  the  ninety- 
third  district  court  of  such  county 
and  that  fact  was  shown  by  the  ab- 
stract— Citizens  State  Bank  of  Clar- 
inda, Iowa  v.  Del-Tex  Inv.  Co.,  supra. 

35.  Tex.— 'First  State  Bank  of  Mo- 
bee  tie  v.  Goodner,  Civ.App.,  168  S. 
W.2d  941. 

.    Neb. — Metz  v.  Brownville  State 
Bank,  7  Neb.  165. 

Tex. — McGlothlin  v.  Coody,  Com. 
App.,  59  S.W.2d  819— Askey  v. 
Power,  Com. App.,  36  S.W.2d  446 — 
Cheatham  v.  Mann,  Civ.App.,  133 
S.W.2d  264,  error  refused — Barton 
V.  Parks,  Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  376, 
error  refused— Fordyce  -  Crossett 
Sales  Co.  v.  Erwin,  Civ.App.,  121  S. 
W.2d  491 — Chamlee  v.  Chamlee, 
Civ.App.,  113  S.W.2d  290— McDan- 
iel  v.  Milner,  .Civ.Ajpp.,  19  S.W.2d 
426,  affirmed  Milner  v.  McDaniel, 
36  S.W.2d  992,  120  Tex.  160 — Moore 
v.  Ray,  Civ.App.,  28-7  S.W.  671 — 
Security  Nat  Bank  of  Wichita 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


462 


ularities  with  respect  to  indexing  do  not,  however, 
necessarily  prevent  the  creation  of  a  lien.87  It  is 
the  intent  of  some  statutes  that  the  index  should 
indicate  merely  the  source  from  which  full  infor- 
mation may  be  obtained,38  and  it  is  not  necessary 
to  include  complete  information  concerning  the  ab- 
stract.^ 

Parties.  Under  some  statutes  it  is  essential  that 
the  index  shall  show  the  names  of  the  parties  to 
the  judgment,40  and  that  the  designation  of  the 
parties  shall  be  accurate.41  The  index  should  be 
both  direct  and  reverse,  or,  as  sometimes  stated, 
there  should  be  a  cross  index,  with  respect  to  the 


names  of  the  parties,42  and  it  is  essential  that  the 
index  shall  list  the  names  of  the  parties  in  alpha- 
betical order.43  It  has  been  laid  down  broadly, 
however,  that  a  statute  requiring  the  indexing  of 
the  names  of  parties  should  not  be  construed  so 
technically  as  to  impose  unnecessary  difficulties  on 
a  judgment  creditor  seeking  to  secure  a  lien,44  and 
that  an  entry  which  is  substantially  correct,  should 
be  regarded  as  sufficient.45 

Under  some  statutes,  where  there  are  several 
parties  plaintiff  or  parties  defendant  to  the  judg- 
ment, the  names  of  all  parties  to  the  judgment  must 
duly  be  indexed  in  order  to  create  a  lien,4^  and  a 


Falls  v.  Allen,  Civ.App.,   261  S.W. 

1057. 
34  C.J.  p  575  note  -60  [a]  (10),  p  577 

note  '88,  p  579  notes  97  [c],  2,  8. 
Number  of  pag-e  of  record 

(1)  Under  some  statutes  the  index 
must  show  the  number  of  the  page 
of  the  book  on  which  the  abstract  is 
recorded. — J.  M.  Radford  Grocery  Co. 
v.    Speck,    Tex.Civ.App.,    152    S.W.2d 
7«87,  error  refused — 34  C.J.  p  579  note 
2. 

(2)  Where  the  index  refers  to  the 
wrong    page,    no    lien    is    created. — 
Fordyce-Crossett  Sales  -Co.  v.  Erwin, 
Tex.Civ.App.,   121   S.W.2d  491— Askey 
v.    Power,    Tex.Civ.App.,    21    S.W.2d 
326,  reversed  on  other  grounds,  Com. 
App.,  36  S.W.2d  446. 

37.  Tex. — First  State  Bank  of  Mo- 
beet  ie  v.  Goodner,  Civ.App.,  168  «S. 
W.2d  041. 

38.  Tex. — Womack  v.   Paris   Grocer 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  166  S.W.2d  366,  error 
refused   168    S.W.2d   645,   140  Tex. 
423 — Carver  v.  Gray,  Civ.App.,  140 
S.W.2d  227,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct. 

39.  Tex.— Womack  v.  Paris   Grocer 
Co.,   Civ.App.,   166   S.W.2d  3-66,   er- 
ror   refused    168    S.W.2d    645,    140 
Tex.  423 — Carver  v.  Gray,  Civ.App., 
140    S.W.2d    227,    error   dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 

40-    Tex.— McGlothlin       v.       Coody, 

Com.App.,  59  S.W.2d  819. 
34  C.J.  p  579  note  S, 

41.  Tex.— McLarry     v.     Studebaker 
Bros.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  146  -S.W.  676. 

34  C.J.  p  579  note  8,  p  580  notes  15, 

17,  p  581  note  36. 
Capacity 

In  indexing  recorded  abstract  of 
judgment  obtained  against  party  in 
capacity  as  executor  of  will,  statute 
does  not  require  index  to  show  such 
capacity.— Willis  v.  Smith,  17  S.W. 
247,  66  Tex.  31 — Moseley  v.  Evangeli- 
cal Theological  College,  Tex.Civ.App., 
34  <S.W.2d  638. 

42.  Xa  Texas 

(1)  The  rule  stated  in  the  text 
has  been  announced. — McGlothlin  v. 
Coody,  *Com.App.,  59  S.W.2d  819— J. 


M.  Radford  Grocery  Co.  v.  Speck, 
Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  787,  error  re- 
fused—San Antonio  Loan  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Davis,  Civ.App.,  235  S.W.  612— 
Central  Coal  &  Qoke  Co.  v.  Southern 
Nat.  Bank,  34  S.W.  383,  12  Tex.Civ. 
App.  334. 

(2)  In  some  earlier  cases,  how- 
ever, a  contrary  view  was  taken. — 
Semple  v.  Bubanks,  35  -S.W.  509,  13 
Tex.Civ.App.  418— Von  Stein  v.  Trex- 
ler,  23  S.W.  1047,  5  Tex.Civ.App.  299. 

43.  Tex.— J.  M.  Radford  Grocery  Co. 
V.  Slpeck,  Civ.App.,  152  S.W.2d  787, 
error  refused — Barton  v.  Parks, 
Civ.App.,  127  S.W.2d  37-6,  error  re- 
fused—McGlothlin  v.  Coody,  Civ. 
App,,  39  S.W.2d  133,  affirmed.  Com. 
App.,  59  S.W.2d  819— Guaranty 
State  Bank  of  Donna  v.  Marion 
County  Nat  Bank,  Civ.App.,  293 
S.W.  248. 

34  C.J.  p  579  note  «8,  p  «81  note  45. 
Surname  controlling1 

The  entry  should  be  placed  under 
the  letter  which  begins  the  surname 
of  a  party  to  the  judgment. — Avery 
v.  Texas  Loan  Agency,  Tex.Civ.App., 
62  -S.W.  793—34  Q.J.  p  580  note  19. 
Names  of  both  plaintiff  and  defend- 
ant 

(1)  The  abstract  must  be  indexed 
alphabetically  in  the  names  both  of 
plaintiff    and    defendant. — Guaranty 
State  Bank  of  Donna  v.  Marion  Coun- 
ty  Nat.    Bank,    Tex.Civ.App.,    293    S. 
W.  248—34  C.J.  p  579  note  8. 

(2)  Where  an  abstract  of  a  judg- 
ment was   indexed  in  •  the  name   of 
each  defendant  against  whom  judg- 
ment was  taken  but  was  not  indexed 
alphabetically  in  the   name   of  any 
plaintiff,  no  lien  was  created. — Guar- 
anty State  Bank  of  Donna  v.  Marion 
County  Nat.  Bank,  supra. 

(3)  In  a  comparatively  early  case, 
however,  the  view  was  taken  that  the 
index  was  sufficient  to  fix  a  lien  on 
defendant's  property  if  his  name  is 
correctly    stated    under    the    proper 
letter,   even  though  plaintilTs  name 
is  Indexed  under  a  wrong  letter. — 
Franke  v.  Lone  Star  Brewing  Co.,  42 
S.W.  861,  17  Tex.Civ.App.  9. 

895 


Insufficient  space  under  correct  let- 
ter 

Even  where  the  name  of  a  party  is- 
entered  under  the  wrong  letter  in  the- 
index  because  of  want  of  space  under 
the  correct  letter,  a  lien  is  not  creat- 
ed.— Cocke  v.  Conquest,  Civ.App.,  2  S. 
W.2d  992,  afflrmed,  Com.App.,  13  S.W. 
2d  348,  afflrmed   35  S.W.2d  £73,  120 
Tex.  43 — Fairmont  Creamery  Co.  v. 
Minter,  Tex.Civ.App.,   274  S.W.  281. 
Index  held  sufficient 
Tex. — Womack  v.   Paris   Grocer  Co.,. 
Civ.App.,  166  S.W.2d  366,  error  re- 
fused 168  S.W.2d  645,  140  Tex.  42$ 
— Carver  v.  Gray,  Civ.App.,  140  «S. 
W.2d   227,    error   dismissed,    judg- 
ment correct — McDermott  v.  Steck 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  138  S.W.2d  1106,  er- 
ror refused. 
34  C.J.  p  579  note  8. 

44.  Tex. — Bradley   v.    Janssen,    Civ. 
App.,  93  S.W.  506— Burnett  v.  Cock- 
shatt  '21  S.W.  950,  2  Tex.Civ.App. 
304. 

45.  Tex.— Bradley   r.    Janssen,   Civ.. 
App.,  93  S.W.  506. 

48.  Tex. — McGlothlin  v.  Coody,  Com.. 
App.,  59  S.W.2d  819 — Cheatham  v. 
Mann,  Civ.App.,  133  S.W.2d  264,  er- 
ror refused— Barton  v.  Parks,  Civ. 
App.,  127  S.W.2d  376,  error  refused.. 
34  C.J.  p  581  note  36. 
Separate  listing-  of  copaxttes . 

The  statute  requiring  entry  of  ab- 
stract of  judgment  on  alphabetical 
index  showing  the  name  of  each 
plaintiff  and  each  defendant  does  not 
require  that  in  indexing  under  the 
letter  proper  to  one  defendant,  other 
defendant's  name  be  shown. — Texas 
Building  &  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Morris, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d  365,  error 
dismissed. 
Index  held  insufficient 

(1)  Where  abstract  of  judgment 
did  not  contain  names  of.  all  defend- 
ants and  when  recorded  in  another 
.county  was  indexed  only  in  names 
appearing  in  abstract  no  lien  was 
created,  notwithstanding  plaintiffs*, 
recovered  no  judgment  for  debt 
against  defendants  whose  names- 
were  so  omitted,  but  were  allowed 


§  462 


JVDGMEXTS 


49    C.J.S. 


lien  is  not  imposed  on  the  property  of  a  party  whose 
name  has  duly  been  indexed  where  the  name  of  a 
coparty  in  the  judgment  has  not  been  indexed.47 
\Vhere,  however,  the  statute  requires  the  indexing 
of  the  parties  in  the  judgment,  it  is  not  necessary 
to  index  the  name  of  a  person  who  was  made  a 
coparty  to  the  action,  where  he  is  not  a  party  to 
the  judgment48 

\Yhere  a  partnership  is  a  party  to  the  judgment, 
tinder  a  statutory  provision  for  an  alphabetical  in- 
dex showing  the  name  of  each  plaintiff  and  of  each 
defendant,  indexing  in  the  firm  name  may  be  suf- 
ficient if  the  firm  name  consists  of  the  full  name  of 
each  of  the  partners,49  but  the  rule  is  otherwise 
where  the  index  does  not  show  the  names  of  the 
individual  partners  in  the  case  either  of  a  judgment 
in  favor  of  a  partnership,50  or  against  a  partner- 
ship.51 Where  the  individual  names  of  the  part- 
ners are  duly  indexed,  the  index  is  not  rendered  in- 
sufficient by  the  fact  that  the  firm  name  is  omitted 
or  is  stated  incorrectly.52 

Where  a  corporation  is  a  party  to  the  judgment, 
the  index  of  the  recorded  abstract  should  show  the 
complete  name  of  the  corporation.53  If  a  corpo- 
rate name  is  composed  of  a  surname  preceded  by 


initials,  the  name  should  be  indexed  under  the  first 
letter  of  the  surname,54  and,  where  the  first  word 
of  the  corporate  name  is  the  article  "The,"  the 
name  is  properly  indexed  under  the  first  letter  of 
another  word  which  actually  identifies  the  cor- 
poration.55 Indexing  in  the  name  of  a  company, 
which  is  actually  a  corporation,  as  judgment  credi- 
tor, is  not  fatally  defective  because  the  index  fails 
to  show  whether  the  judgment  creditor  is  a  corpo- 
ration, joint  stock  company,  or  a  partnership.56 
Where  a  judgment  is  recovered  by  the  receiver  of 
a  corporation,  it  has  been  held  not  essential  that 
the  index  contain  the  name  of  the  corporation.57 

§  <63.    Recording,   Docketing,  and   Indexing 
Judgment 

Under  various  statutory  provisions,  It  Is  generally 
held  that  the  docketing  or  recording  of  a  judgment  cre- 
ates a  Hen  on  the  property  of  the  judgment  debtor,  and 
that  in  the  absence  of  due  compliance  with  such  statu- 
tory provisions  there  is  no  lien. 

While  at  common  law  a  judgment  did  not  create 
a  lien,  as  is  discussed  supra  §  454,  under  many 
statutes  a  judgment  which  is  recorded  or  docketed 
becomes  a  lien  on  the  judgment  debtor's  realty.58 
On  the  other  hand,  unless  the  statutory  requirement 


•costs  against  one  of  such  defend- 
ants, and  another  of  such  defendants 
was  allowed  costs  against  plaintiffs. 
— Shirey  v.  Trust  CD.  of  Texas,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  98  S.W.2d  243— Shirey  v. 
Trust  Co.  of  Texas,  Tex.Civ.App.,  69 
S.W.2d  835,  error  refused. 

(2)  Where  plaintiff  recovered  per- 
sonal Judgment  against  defendant 
landowner  and  judgment  for  foreclo- 
sure of  a  vendor's  lien  against  de- 
fendant and  codefendant,  and  where, 
•on  defendant's  cross  action  against 
codefendant,  latter  recovered  judg- 
ment for  costs  against  defendant, 
failure  to  index  judgment  in  code- 
fendant's  name  prevented  lien  from 
arising  in  plaintiffs  favor  on  defend- 
ant's land,  notwithstanding  the  in- 
dexing complied  with  the  statute  in 
•other  respects.— McGlothlin  v.  Coody, 
Tex.Com.App.,  59  S.W.2d  819. 

47.  In  Texas 

(1)  The  rule  stated  in  the  text  has 
been  applied  or  recognized. — Barton 
v.    Parks,   Civ.App.,    127   S.W.2d   376, 
error  refused — McGlothlin  v.   Coody, 
Civ.App.,     3d    S.W.2d    133,    affirmed, 
Com.App.,  59  S.W.2d  819. 

(2)  In  an  earlier  case,  however,  In 
which    a    similar    statute    was    in- 
volved* there  were  expressions  appar- 
ently contrary  to  the  rule  stated  in 
the  text. — Blum  v.  Keyser,  2-8  S.W. 
561,  8  Tex.Civ.App.  6?5. 

48.  Tex. — Womack  v.   Paris   Grocer 
Co.,  Civ.App.,   166   S.W.2d  366,  er-. 


ror    refused    168    S.W.2d    645,    140 

Tex.  423. 
49.     Tex. — Oppenheimer  v.  Robinson, 

27  S.W.  95,  87  Tex.  174. 
34  C.J.  p   581  note  40   [a]. 
59.    Xn  Texas 

(1)  The  rule  stated  in  the  text  has 
been    recognized    or    applied. — Pierce 
v.  Wimberly,  14  S.W.  454,  78  Tex.  1S7 
— 34  C.J.  p  581  note  40. 

(2)  In  a  case,   however,   in  which 
the  applicability  of  the  same  Texas 
statute    was    assumed,    a    contrary 
view   apparently   was    taken. — Cooke 
v.  Avery,  Tex.,  13  S.Ct  340,  147  U.-S. 
375.  37  L.Ed.  209. 

51.  Tex. — G-ullett  Gin  Co.  v.  Oliver, 
14  S.W.  451,  78  Tex.  182. 

34  C.J.  p  581  note  40. 

52.  Tex. — Willis     v.     Downes,    '  Civ. 
App.,   46   S.W.   920 — Semple  v.  Eu- 
banks,  35  S.W.  509,  13  Civ.App.  418. 

53.  Tex. — McLarry     v.      Studebaker 
Bros.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  146  S.W.  -676. 

34  C.J.  p  581  notes  42,  45  [a]  (1). 

Index  held  snflclent 

Tex, — Texas    Building    &    Mortgage 

Co.  v.  Morris.  -Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d 

365,  error  dismissed. 

54.  Tex. — B.    F.    Avery    &    Sons    v. 
Texas   Loan  Agency,   Civ.App.,    62 
S.W.  793. 

34  C.J.  p  581  note  43. 

55.  Tex. — McDermott   v.    Steck    Co., 
Civ.App.f  138  S.W.2d  1106,  error  re- 
fused. 

34  C.J.  p  581  note  43. 

896 


58.    Tex.— Bradley   v.    Janssen,    Civ. 
App.,  93  S.W.  506. 

57.  Tex. — Carver  v.   Gray,  Civ.App., 
140    S.W.2d    227,    error    dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 

58.  U.S. — Newberry       v.       Davison 
Chemical    Co.,    C.C.A.N.C.,    65    F.2d 
724,   certiorari  denied  54   S.Ct   75, 
two   cases,   290   U.S.   660,   7'8   L.Ed. 
571 — Bortman     v.     Urban     Motion 
Picture    industries,    O.C.A.N.Y.,    4 
F.2d  913. 

111. — Haugens   v.   Holmes,   41  N.E.2d 

109.  314  IlLApp.  1-66. 
La. — Eacat   v.   Kraus,   App.,    141    So. 

94".    * 
N.T.— Bartol  v.  Bennett,  56  N.Y.S.2d 

314. 
N.C.— Moore  v.  Jones,   86   S.E.2d  920 

— Jones  v.  Currie,  129  S.E.  605,  190 

N.C.  260. 
N.D.—JFinch,    Van    Slyck    &    McCon- 

ville  v.  Jackson,  220  N.W.  130,  57 

N.D.  17. 

19  C.J.  p  381  note  77. 
Docketing  or  recording  transcript  of 

judgment   see   supra    §    462. 
Object  of  docketing 

(1)  The  object  of  docketing  is  to 
create  a  judgment  lien   on   realty. 
N.T.— Rosenthal  v.  Graves,  6  N.Y.S. 

2d  766,  168  Misc.  '845. 
Or.— State  ex  .rel.  Tolls  v.  Tolls,   85 
P.2d   366,   160   Or.   317,   119   AO-.R. 
1370. 

(2)  The  true  purpose  of  statutes 
providing  that  where  a  judgment  of 
a  specified  inferior  court  is  docketed- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§463 


of  recording  and  docketing  is  complied  with,  the 
judgment  will  not  attach  as  a  lien,5^  at  least  as 
against  third  persons  acting  in  good  faith  and  with- 
out actual  notice,60  such  as  subsequent  purchasers61 
and  subsequent  attaching  creditors,62  although  it 
may  be  otherwise  as  between  the  original  parties,63 
and  under  some  provisions  protection  is  afforded 
only  to  purchasers  but  not  to  creditors.64 

Under  some  statutes  it  is  the  duty  of  the  judg- 
ment creditor  to  see  to  it  that  his  judgment  is  right- 
ly and  properly  recorded  or  docketed,  under  penalty 
of  losing  his  lien,65  although  the  failure  properly 
to  record  or  to  docket  the  judgment  is  wholly  the 
fault  of  the  clerk,66  the  only  remedy  of  the  judg- 
ment creditor  in  such  cases  being  against  the  clerk 
for  any  loss  suffered.67  Under  other  statutes,  the 
lien  of  a  judgment  is  not  lost  by  the  failure  of  the 
clerk  to  docket  the  judgment,68  or  by  his  delay  in 
docketing  it,69  but  he  will  be  liable  in  damages  to 
any  person  injured  by  reason  of  his  default.™ 

Where  subsequent  purchasers  or  encumbrancers 
have  actual  notice  of  the  judgment,  they  will  be 
bound  thereby,  this  being  equivalent  to  the  con- 
structive notice  required  to  be  given  by  entry  on 
the  judgment  docket.71  The  docketing  of  a  judg- 
ment is  constructive  but  conclusive  notice  to  all  the 
world  of  the  lien  of  such  judgment,72  and  has  been 


said  substantially  to  effect  a  seizure  of  the  judg- 
ment debtor's  land  and  to  deposit  it  in  custodia  le- 
gis,73  although  it  has  been  held  that  the  docketing 
does  not  in  itself  sequestrate  any  property.74 
Where  a  court  of  equity  decrees  a  lien  on  specified 
land,  such  lien  exists  independently  of  statutes  pro- 
viding for  the  docketing  of  money  judgments,75  and 
such  a  lien  is  no  more  dependent  on  such  statute 
than  a  mechanic's  lien  or  the  lien  created  by  a 
mortgage.76 

Judgments  affirmed  on  appeal.  Where  a  judgment 
has  been  affirmed  on  appeal,  it  must  be  redocketed 
in  order  to  make  it  a  lien  for  the  damages  and 
costs  in  the  appellate  court,77  although  without  such 
redocketing  it  remains  a  lien  on  real  estate,  by  vir- 
tue of  the  original  docketing,  for  the  amount  of  the 
original  judgment  and  accumulated  interest.78 

Cancellation  of  docket.  The  clerk  is  generally 
authorized  by  statute  to  cancel  and  discharge  the 
docket  of  a  judgment,  on  the  filing  with  him  of  an 
acknowledgment  of  satisfaction,  signed  by  the  party 
in  whose  favor  the  judgment  is  obtained,  and  au- 
thenticated in  the  prescribed  manner ;  without  such 
acknowledgment  the  act  of  the  clerk  in  canceling 
the  docket  is  without  jurisdiction,  and  is  void  as  to 
the  parties  whose  rights  are  affected  by  it79 

Place  of  docketing.    A  judgment  has  been  held 


in  a  specified  superior  court,  it  shall 
become  a  judgment  of  the  latter  is  to 
provide  for  making  the  Judgment  a 
lien  on  real  estate. — Paley  v.  Solo- 
mon, D.C.D.C.,  59  F.Supp.  887. 

59.  U.S. — In    re    Flushing*    Queens - 
boro  Laundry,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  90  -F.2d 
•601. 

Ga. — Tanner  v.  Wilson,  19-2  S.B.  425, 

184  Ga.  628. 
Miss. — Johnson  v.  Cole  Mfg.  Co.,  110 

•So.  428,  144  Miss.  482. 
Neb. — Pontiac    Improvement    Co.    v. 

Leisy,  14  N.W.2d  384,  144  Neb.  70-5. 
N.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Breece 

Y.  Gregg,  13  P.2d  421,  422,  36  N.M. 

246. 
N.C. — Jones  v.  Currie,  129  S,E.  605, 

190  N.C.  260. 
S.C. — Powers   v.    Fidelity  &  Deposit 

Co.  of  Maryland,  186  S.B.  523,  180 

S.C.  601. 
34  C.J.  p  576  note  68. 

60.  Ga. — Roberson   v.    Roberson,    34 
S.E:2d  836,  199  Ga,  627. 

La. — Robin  v.  Harris  Realty  Co.,  152 

So.  573,  178  La.  946. 
61-     Okl.— Wilson      v.      (First.    Nat 

Bank,   8*  P.2d  '628,   184  Okl.  5*8— 

Richards  v.  Tynes,  300  P.  297,  149 

OkL  235. 

34  C.J.  p  576  note  69. 
Title  passing  before  enrollment 

It  is  the  enrollment  of  the  judg- 
ment which  creates  the  lien,  and  ti- 

49  0-  J.S.-457 


'  tie  passing  from  Judgment  debtor  to 
third  person  for  consideration  before 
enrollment  of  judgment  is  not  af- 
fected thereby- — Johnson  v.  Cole 
Mfg.  Co.,  110  So.  428,  144  Miss.  482. 

62.  Mont.— Sklower  v.  Abbott,  47  P. 
901,  19  Mont  228. 

N.Y. — Buchan  v.  Sumner,  2  Barb.Ch. 
165,  47  Am.D.  305. 

63.  W.Va. — Richardson     v.     White, 
127  S.B.  636,  99  W.Va.  81. 

34  C.J.  p  577  note  71. 

64.  Va. — American    Bank    &    Trust 
Co.   v.   National   Bank   of   Suffolk, 
196  -S.B.  693,  170  Va.  169. 

66.    Pa. — Jaczyszyn  v.  Paslawski,  124 

A.2d  116,  147  Pa,Super.  97. 
34  a J.  p  577  note  72. 

66.  Miss. — Planters'  Bank  v.  Conger, 
20  Miss.  527. 

67.  N.C.— Holman  v.    Miller,    9    S.E. 
429,  103  N.C.  118. 

34  C.J.  p  577  note  -74. 

68.  Ind. — Johnson  v.    Schloesser,  45 
N.B.  702,  146  Ind.  509,  58  Am.S.R. 
367,  36  L.R.A.  59. 

69.  Or.— Budd  v.  Gallier,  89  P.  638, 
50  Or.  42. 

70.  Ind. — Johnson  v.   Schloesser,  45 
N.E.  702,  143  Ind.  509,  58  Am.S.R. 
367,  3-6  L.R.A.  59. 

897 


71.  Pa. — Appeal   of   York   Bank,    36 
Pa.  458. 

34  C.J.  p  577  note  78. 
Duty  to  inquire 

While  a  purchaser  may  ordinarily 
assume  from  an  entry  of  satisfac- 
tion in  the  judgment  index  that  the 
lien  formerly  existing  has  been  dis- 
charged, nevertheless,  where  record 
discloses  circumstance  in  addition  to 
entry  of  satisfaction  of  judgment 
calculated  to  put  purchaser  on  in- 
quiry, he  must  make  inquiry. — First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Walker,  145  A.  804, 
296  Pa.  192. 

72.  Pa.— Coral  Gables  v.  Kerl,  6  A. 
2d  275,  334  Pa.  441,  122  A.L.R.  903. 

Va. — Citizens  Nat   Bank  v.  Manoni, 
76  Va.  802. 

73.  N.T.— In  re  Guarneri's  Will,  26«8 
N.Y.-S.  244,  149  Misc.  759. 

74.  N.Y.— Koudelka  v.  Koudelka,   12 
N.Y.S.2d  148,  171  Misc.  519, 

75.  ,  Minn.— Pye  v.  Magnuson,  227  N. 
W.  '895,  178  Minn.  531. 

76.  Minn. — Pye    v.    Magnuson,    su- 
pra. 

77.  CaL — Chapin  v.  Broder,  16  Cal. 
403. 

34  C.J.  p  577  note  80. 

78.  Minn.-^Daniels    v.    Winslow,    4 
Minn.  818. 

79.  N.Y.— Booth  v.  Farmers'  &  Me- 


§464 


JUDGMENTS 


49    dJ.S. 


not  a  lien  on  real  estate  unless  it  is  docketed  in  the 
county  in  which  the  land  is  situated.80  Where  the 
judgment  does  not  affirmatively  provide  that  it  shall 
be  a  lien  on  real  property,  it  is  essential  under  some 
statutes  that  it  be  docketed  in  the  county  where 
it  was  rendered  in  order  to  become  a  lien  on  real- 
ty,81 and  that  the  judgment  be  docketed  first  in  the 
county  where  it  was  rendered  before  it  may  be  dock- 
eted in  another  county.82 


§  464. 


Indexing 


The  purpose  of  a  judgment  index  is  to  afford  con- 
structive notice  of  the  Judgment  to  interested  third  per- 
sons, and  under  some  statutes  absence  of  such  an  in* 
dex  of  the  judgment  precludes  its  attaching  as  a  lien 
as  far  as.  concerns  the  rights  of  third  persons  lacking 
actual  notice  of  the  judgment. 

The  object  of  a  judgment  index  is  to  furnish  no- 
tice to  purchasers,  subsequent  encumbrancers,  and 
other  interested  parties  of  the  existence  of  the 
judgment,83  and  due  indexing  serves  as  constructive 
notice  of  a  judgment  lien  on  the  property  in- 
volved.84 Under  the  statutes  of  many  states  judg- 
ments will  not  operate  as  liens,  except  as  against 
persons  with  actual  notice,85  unless  they  are  not 
only  docketed  or  recorded  as  discussed  supra  §  463, 
but  are  also  indexed.86  However,  under  a  statute 
requiring  merely  that  the  judgment  must  be  "dock- 


eted" before  it  can  be  binding  as  against  a  pur- 
chaser for  valuable  consideration  without  notice, 
indexing  is  not  necessary  even  as  against  such  a 
purchaser.87  Under  some  statutes  the  judgment 
must  be  properly  cross-indexed.88 

§  465.    Sufficiency  to  Create  Lien 

a.  In  general 

b.  Names  and  descriptions  of  parties 

a.  In  General 

The  record  and  index  of  a  Judgment  should  be  suf- 
ficiently accurate  and  complete  to  afford  due  notice  to 
the  searcher  of  all  essential  facts,  although  minor  in- 
accuracies may  not  be  fatal  to  the  lien.  Ordinarily  the 
entry  should  show  the  court  in  which  the  judgment  was 
rendered,  the  date  of  docketing,  and  the  amount  of  the 
Judgment. 

For  the  purposes  of  a  lien,  the  record  or  docket 
of  a  judgment,  and  the  index,  should  be  sufficiently 
full,  accurate,  and  explicit  to  inform  intending  pur- 
chasers or  mortgagees  of  the  facts  which  it  is  es- 
sential for  them  to  know,  and  such  that  a  reasonably 
careful  search  in  the  proper  quarters  will  not  fail 
to  disclose  the  judgment  j8^  and  since  the  lien  of 
a  judgment  is  the  creation  of  statute,  it  is  necessary 
to  its  existence  that  statutes  requiring  certain  for- 
malities of  docketing  and  indexing  should  be  fol- 
lowed in  all  substantial  particulars.90  The  judg- 


chanics'    Nat.    Bank,    4   Lans.    301, 

reversed  on  other  grounds  50  N.Y. 

396. 
80.    Ind. — Pfeiffer   Hardware    Co.    v. 

Auburn    State    Bank    of    Auburn, 

Ind.,    8    N.E.2d    398,    104    Ino^App. 

472. 
Tex, — K'.nsey  v.  Button,  Civ.App.,  100 

S."W.2d  1025,  error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  577  note  82. 
Territorial  extent  of  lien  of  federal 

court      Judgments      see      Federal 

Courts  §  144  1 
Strict  compliance  with  statute 

Statutory  requirement  that  a  judg- 
ment .must  be  docketed  in  county 
where  realty  is  situated  must  be 
strictly  complied  with  for  a  lien  to 
be  obtained  on  realty. — Southern 
Dairies  v.  Banks,  C.C.A.N.C.,  92  F.2d 
282,  certiorari  denied  Banks  v. 
Southern  Dairies,  58  S.Ct  368,  302 
U.S.  761,  82  L.Ed.  590. 

81.  Or. — Mason   v.    Mason,    34    P.2d 
328,  148  Or.  34. 

82.  N.C.—-Essex  Inv.   Co.  v.   Pickel- 
simer,  137  S.E.  '813,  210  N.C.  541. 

83.  Pa.— Coral  Gables  v.  Kerl,  6  A, 
2d  275,  334  Pa.  441,  122  A.L.R.  903. 

Indexing  transcript  of  judgment  see 
supra  §  4<62. 

84.  Pa. — Lambert    v.    K-Y    Transp. 
Co.,  172  A.  180,  U3  Pa.Super.  82. 

.86.    Iowa. — State    Savings    Bank    v. 


Shinn.  109  N.W.  921,  130  Iowa  365, 
114  Am.S.R.  424. 

34  C.J.  p  577  note  86. 

88*  Ind.— Sullivan  State  Bank  v. 
•First  Nat  Bank,  146  N.EJ.  403,  82 
Ind.App.  419. 

N.J.— Englese  v.  Hyde,  166  A.  468, 
111  N.J.Law  1. 

Okl.— Wilson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  88 
P.2d  628,  184  Okl.  518— Long  Bell 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Etter,  251  P.  997, 
123  Okl.  54. 

Pa.— Houser  v.  Childs,  196  A.  547, 
129  Pa.Super.  "565 — In  re  Tourison's 
Estate,  22  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  704,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  184  A.  95, 
321  Pa,  299. 

34  C.J.  p  577  note  '8-8. 

87.  Va. — Old  Dominion  Granite  Co. 
v.  Clarke,  28  Gratt  617,  69  Va.  $17. 

W.Va. — Calwell  v.  Prindle,  19  W.Va. 
604. 

88.  N.C. — Jones  v.  Currie,   129   S.B. 
605,  190  N.C.  2-60. 

34  C.J.  p  578  note  91. 

89.  Pa.— Coral  Gables  v.  Kerl,  6  A. 
2d  275,  334  Pa.  441,  122  A.L.R.  903. 

34  C.JT.  p  5'78  note  92. 
Degree  of  accuracy  required 

(1)  "The  law  places  a  burden  up- 
on one  who  would  establish  a  lien  to 
docket  and  index  his  judgment  with 
a  degree  of  accuracy  sufficient  to 
lead  a  reasonably  careful  searcher  to 

898 


conclude  that  the  lien  is  against  the 
object  of  his  search,  or  to  suggest 
to  the  searcher  the  necessity  of  in- 
quiry to  ascertain  the  fact." — Tioga 
Trust  Co.  v.  Home  Owners'  Loan 
Corp.,  42  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  165,  167. 

(2)  The  law  merely  requires  an 
index  that  will  naturally  lead  the 
investigator  to  a  discovery  of  the 
judgment  and  the  Identity  of  defend- 
ant, and,  if  the  index  meets  such  re- 
quirement, it  has  served  its  legal 
purpose. — Coral  Gables  v.  Kerl,  6  A. 
2d  275,  334  Pa.  441,  122  A.L.R.  903. 

Duty  of  inquiry 

(1)  Where  indexing  and  docketing 
of   judgment   contains   sufficient   in- 
formation to  put  an  ordinarily  pru- 
dent person  upon  guard,  inquiry  be- 
comes a  duty,  and,  if  an  investiga- 
tion, reasonably  pursued,  would  dis- 
close  identity    of   Judgment    debtor, 
subsequent  lienor  is  bound  by  notice 
of  previous  Judgments,  even  though 
inaccurately  recorded. — Coral  Gables 
v.  Kerl,  supra. 

(2)  A  purchaser  of  land  is  affect- 
ed with  such  notice  as  the  judgment 
docket  and  index  entries  afford,  and 
is  under  a  duty  to  make  such  investi- 
gation as  the  entries  would  suggest 
to  a  prudent  man. — Henry  v.  Sand- 
ers, 193  S.B.  15,  212  N.C.  239. 

90.    Or.— Western   Loan    &    Savings 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  465 


ment  should  be  entered  in  the  proper  book,9*  and 
in  the  proper  county  or  district,92  and  the  record 
should  show,  among  other  things,  the  court  in  which 
the  judgment  was  rendered,93  the  date  of  docket- 
ing,94 and  the  name  of  the  judgment  creditor  or 
owner  of  the  judgment,  and  that  of  the  debtor,  as 
discussed  infra  subdivision  b  of  this  section.  Re- 
quirements that  the  judgment  docket  show  the  na- 
ture of  the  case,  and  the  name  of  the  attorney  for 
the  creditor,  have  been  held  to  be  directory  only.95 

Immaterial  inaccuracies  are  not  fatal  to  the  lien.96 
If  a  judgment  was  by  mistake  rendered  and  en- 
rolled against  the  wrong  party,  it  cannot  be  correct- 
ed except  as  between  the  real  parties  to  the  judg- 
ment, and  before  the  rights  of  bona  fide  purchasers 
intervene.97  The  recording  of  the  judgment  or  or- 
der of  the  court,  and  not  of  its  mere  opinion  or  di- 
rection to  enter  an  order,  is  required  to  create  a 
lien  on  real  property.98 

Amount  of  judgment.  The  entry  should  show 
the  amount  of  the  judgment  debt.99  This  require- 
ment involves  the  necessity  of  showing  the  kind  of 
money  in  which  it  is  payable,1  and  the  amount  or 
rate  of  interest.2  Failure  of  the  record  of  the  judg- 
ment to  include  the  amount  of  the  costs  will  de- 
feat the  lien  only  to  the  extent  of  the  costs.8  The 
use  of  numerals  without  a  dollar  sign  or  other  in- 
dication that  the  figures  represent  dollars  in  stating 
the  amount  of  the  judgment  is  not  fatal  where,  the 


omission  is  supplied  by  an  accompanying  entry, 
which  is  properly  a  descriptive  part  of  the  judg- 
ment, showing  that  the  figures  refer  to  dollars;4 
and  it  has  been  held  that  such  an  omission  is  not 
fatal  if  the  columns  of  figures  are  separated  by  a 
vertical  line  marking  off  the  cents  from  the  dollars 
according  to  the  practice  of  bookkeepers.6 

b.  Names  and  Descriptions  of  Parties ' 

Generally,  the  docket  and  Index  should  name  and 
describe  the  parties  to  the  Judgment  with  a  degree  of 
accuracy  sufficient  to  afford  constructive  notice  of  the 
judgment,  and  the  surname  and  Christian  name  of  the 
party  should  be  given  with  substantial  correctness,  al- 
though initials  may  sometimes  be  used  for  first  and  mid- 
dle names. 

As  between  the  judgment  creditor  and  judgment 
debtor  a  judgment  may  afford  a  valid  lien  despite 
inaccuracies  or  omissions  in  the  docket  or  index  in 
respect  of  the  names  or  descriptions  of  the  parties.6 
In  order  to  make  the  lien  of  a  judgment  effective  as 
against  third  persons,  however,  it  is  ordinarily  nec- 
essary that  the  docket  and  index  should  disclose  the 
names  of  both  parties,  plaintiff  as  well  as  defend- 
ant, and  designate  them  with  such  a  degree  of  .ac- 
curacy as  to  charge  persons  searching  such  records 
with  notice  of  the  judgment  or  to  put  them  on  in- 
quiry.7 An  entry  substantially  correct  is  sufficient 
especially  as  against  a  person  who  has  not  been 
misled  thereby.8  Generally  speaking*  the  question 


Co.  v.  Currey,  65  P.  360,  39  Or.  407,< 
87  Am.S.R.  -660. 
34  C.J.  p  578  note  93. 

91.  Fla. — Curry  v.   Lehman,  49   So. 
673,  57  Fla,  385. 

34  C.J.  p  579  note  94. 

92.  N.Y. — Lanning  v.  Carpenter,   48 
N.Y.  408. 

34  C.J.  p  579  note  95. 
Place  of  recording:  generally  see  su- 
pra §  463. 

93.  Or. — Western    Loan   &   Savings 
Co.  v.  Currey,  <6£  P.  360,  39  Or.  407, 
87  Am.S.R.  660. 

34  C.J.  p  '579  note  96. 

94.  Pa,— Home   Sav.   Fund  v.    Bang, 
173   A.   891,    113   Pa.Super.   400. 

34  C.J.  p  579  note  97. 
Failure  to  enter  hour  not  fatal 
Pa. — Home   Sav.  Fund  v.  King,  su- 
pra. 

95.  N.M. — Cannon     v.     First     Nat. 
Bank,  291  P.  924,  35  N.M.  193. 

9ft,    ET.Y. — Sears   v.    Mack,   -2    Bradf. 

Surr.    394,   affirmed  17  N.Y.   445. 
34  C.J.  P  579  note  3. 

97.    Miss. — Allen  West  Commn.   Co. 

v.   Millstead,    46   So.  256,   92  Miss. 

837,  131  Am.S.R.  -556. 
Judgment    or   amendment   nunc  pro 

tune  see  infra  §  469. 


96.    Cal.— Zagoren   v.    Hall,    10    P.2d 
202,  122  CaLApp.  460. 

99.    La. — Lirette  v.  Carrane,  27  La. 

Ann.  29*8. 
34  C.J,  p  532  note  49. 

1.  U.S.— In   re   Boyd,    C.C.Or.f    3   'F. 
Cas.No.1,746,  4  Sawy.  262. 

34  C.J.  p  532  note  50. 

2.  U.S.— In  re  Boyd,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  582  note  51. 

3.  Mo. — Green   v.   Meyers,    72   6.W. 
128,  98  MO.AP-P.  438. 

Wash.— ^Lamey  v.  Coffman,  39  P.  682, 
11  Wash.  301. 

4>    U.S.— In  re   Boyd,    C.C.Or.,   3   F. 
Cas.No.1,746,  4  Sawy.  262. 

5.    CaL — Dyke  v.  Orange  Bank,  27  P. 
•304,  90  Cal.  397. 

6-    U.S.— In    re    MacNulty,    D.C.Pa., 
4  'F.Supp.  93. 

7.    N.C. — Jones   v.   Currie,    129    S.E. 

605,  190  N.C.  260. 
Pa.— Houser  v.  Childs,  196  A.  547,  129 

Pa. Super.  -565. 
34  C.J.  p  579  note  8. 
Appearance  in  transcript  insufficient 

Where  name  of  judgment  creditor 
did  not  appear  in  judgment  entered 

899 


on  docket  of  superior  court  of  coun- 
ty in  which  debtor's  realty  was  sit- 
uated, or  in  cross  index  of  such 
docket,  Judgment  was  not  valid  lien 
on  such  land,  although  judgment 
creditor's  name  appeared  in  caption 
and  body  of  transcript  from  county 
in  which  judgment  was  rendered. — 
Jones  v.  Currie,  129  S.B.  605,  190  N. 
C.  '260. 
Same  name  in  which  asset  registered 

If  a  judgment  creditor  desires  to 
bind  a  particular  asset  of  the  debtor 
as  against  a  future  purchaser  or  a 
mortgagee,  the  burden  is  on  him  to 
see  that  his  judgment  is  recorded 
and  indexed  in  the  same  name  as 
that  in  which  the  asset  is  registered. 
— Tioga  Trust  Co.,  to  Use  of  v.  Home 
Owners'  Loan  Corporation,  42  Pa. 
I>ist  &  Co.  165. 
Basis  of  judgment 

Where  a  judgment  is  correctly  in- 
dexed in  the  name  of  the  judgment 
debtor*  the  indexing  constitutes  le- 
gal notice  of  the  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment, even  though  the  latter  was 
rendered  on  a  note  signed  by  the 
judgment  debtor  by  an  undeciphera- 
ble, although  genuine,  signature. — 
Ad>lson  v.  Kocher,  36  A.2d  737,  154 
Pa*  Super.  548. 
8.  Ind. — Day  v.  Worland,  92  Ind.  75. 


§465 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


whether  an  error,  omission,  or  variance  in  the  dock- 
et or  index  in  respect  of  the  names  of  the  parties 
is  of  such  material  or  substantial  character  as  to 
render  it  ineffective  as  constructive  notice  of  the 
judgment  is  one  on  which  it  is  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible, to  formulate  a  rule;*  eaph  case  is  depend- 
ent on  its  peculiar  facts,  and  the  question  whether 
the  name  found  in  the  index  is  such  as  to  put  the 
searcher  on  inquiry  is,  as  a  rule,  one  of  fact  and 
not  of  law.10 

Alphabetical  order.  It  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment will  not  be  deemed  to  have  been  indexed  if 
the  names  are  not  listed  in  alphabetical  order;11 
there  is,  however,  authority  to  the  contrary.12  The 
surname  should  precede  the  Christian  name  and  it 
determines  the  alphabetical  order.13 

Joint  plaintiffs  or  defendants;  firm  name.  Where 
there  are  several  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  the  names 
of  all  the  parties  should  be  indexed  correctly,14  al- 
though, if  the  names  of  all  the  defendants  are  not 
indexed,  the  judgment  has  been  held  to  operate  as 
a  lien  on  the  property  of  defendant  against  whom 
the  index  is  made.1*  Where  the  judgment  is 


against  a  firm,  the  names  of  the  individual  partners 
must  be  set  out.16 

Surnames.  A  misspelling  of  the  surname  has 
been  held  to  defeat  the  lien,1?  although  in  other 
cases  such  a  misspelling  may  be  immaterial  because 
of  the  application  of  the  rule  of  idem  sonans,  where 
the  names  would  be  pronounced  alike,"  and  the  va- 
riance to  the  eye  is  not  substantial.1*  While  the 
term  "junior"  or  "senior"  may  be  a  means  of  dis- 
tinguishing between  a  father  and  son  who  bear  the 
same  name,  it  has  been  held  no  part^of  either's 
name,  and  hence  not  required  to  be  included  in 
the  docket  entry  of  a  judgment  against  either,  al- 
though the  other  bearing  the  same  name  resides  in 
the  same  county.20  There  is,  however,  authority  to 
the  effect  that,  if  such  term  is  used,  it  becomes  mat- 
ter of  material  description  and  will  operate  to  post- 
pone the  lien  of  a  judgment  so  entered  and  indexed 
to  judgments  subsequently  entered  and  indexed 
without  such  suffix.21 

Christian  names.  Although  there  is  some  author- 
ity to  the  contrary,22  it  is  the  general  rule  that  the 
index  and  docket  must  show  the  correct  first  or 
Christian  name23  or  the  first  initial  thereof.24  This 


9.  Iowa.— Gilbert  v.    Berry,   180  N. , 
W.  148,  190  Iowa  170. 

10.  Iowa.— Gilbert  v.  Berry,  supra. 

11.  OkL — -Wilson      v.      First     Nat. 
Bank,  88  P.2d  628,  184  Okl.  518— 
Long   Bell   Lumber  Co.   v.   Etter, 
251  P.  997,  123  Okl.  54. 

34  C.J.  p  &81  note  45. 

12.  CaL— Hibberd  v.  Smith,  30  CaL 
511. 

13.  CaL — Hibberd  v.  Smith,  supra. 

14.  Va.— Richardson  v.  Gardner,  105 
S.E.  225,  12-8  Va.  -678. 

34  C.J.  p  581  note  36. 
Bfo  lieu  as  affaburt  omitted  defendant 
Where  a  Judgment  was  obtained 
against  five  defendants,  but  was  en- 
tered in  Judgment  dockets  only  once, 
and  was  not  repeated  under  name  of 
each  defendant  in  alphabetical  order, 
as  reauired  by  statute,  the  Judgment 
not  indexed  under  Judgment  debtor's 
name  did  not  become  a  Hen  on  his 
real  estate  located  in  such  county, — 
Sullivan  State  Bank  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank,  146  N.R  403,  Sa.md.App.  419. 

15.  MfnT*. — Whitacre   v.   Martin,   -53 
N.W.  806,  51  Minn.  4'21. 

Tex. — Blum  v.  Keyser,  28  S.W.  561, 

8  Tex.Civ.App.  675. 
16L    Miss. — Hughes    T.     Lacock,     63 

Miss.  112. 
34  CXJ.  p  581  note  40. 

17.    Iowa.— -SStna    Life   Ins.    Co. 
Hesser,  42  N.W.  825,  77  Iowa  381, 
14   Am.S.R.    297,   4  L.K.A.   122. 

34  <XJ.  p  580  note  15. 


Creditor's  duty 

A  Judgment  creditor  must  see  that 
the  docket  of  the  Judgment  is  in 
debtor's  correct  name.— Berkowitz  v. 
Dam,  202  N.Y.S.  584,  122  Misc.  143, 
affirmed  207  N.Y.S.  811,  "212  ApP-Div. 
836. 
Particular  namei  misspelled 

(1)  Judgment     recovered     against 
"Max  Soicher,"  but  docketed  against 
"Max  SorcheT."-i-Berkowitz  v.  Dam, 
supra, 

(2)  Judgment     docketed     against 
"Weisner"  was  not  lien  on  premises 
purchased  from  "Wiesner." — Stark  v. 
Wiesner,    214   N.Y.S.   292,   12«6  Misc. 
620. 

ia    Pa.— Myer  v.  -Fegaly,  39  Pa.  429, 

80  Am.D.  534. 
34  C.J.  p  580  note  17. 
Idem    sonans    see    the    C.J.S.    title 

Names  §  14,  also  45  C.J.  «p  383  note 

10-p  390  note  42. 

19.  Pa.— Appeal  of  Bergman,  #8  Pa. 
123. 

34  C.J,  p  5-80  note  18. 

20.  Minn. — Bidwell  v.   Coleman,   11 
Minn.  7-8. 

21.  Pa. — Rusterholtz   v.    Brown,    10 
PaJMst.  21. 

22.  Cal.— Hibberd  v.  Smith,  50  CaL 
511. 

34  C.J.  p  580  note  22. 

23.  N.J.— Bnglese   v.   Hyde,    166   A- 
468,  111  N.J.Law  1. 

34  C.J.  p  580  note  23. 
OmiffvLoiL  from  docket 
If  the  first,  or  Christian,  name  of 

900 


a  defendant  is  not  entered  on  Judg- 
ment docket  the  Judgment,  although 
valid  as  between  the  parties,  will  not 
affect  subsequent  purchasers  or 
udgment  creditors. — Coral  Gables  v. 
Kerl,  -6  A.2d  275,  334  Pa.  441,  122  A. 
L.R.  903. 
Incorrect  Christian  name 

(1)  A  Judgment  recorded  and  in- 
dexed in  the  name  of  "Mikola  Borys" 
did  not  constitute  "constructive  no- 
tice" of  a  Judgment  against  "Nikolai 
Borys."— Jaczyszyn  v.  Paslawski,  24 
A.2d  116,  147  Pa.Super.  97. 

(2)  The    indexing   of   a   Judgment 
against    "Lucy"    Christopher   is    not 
constructive   notice   of   a   Judgment 
against  "Lucille"  Christopher  so  as 
to  afford  a  lien  against  the  land  of 
the  latter. — Troffo  v.  Camlone,  16  Pa. 
Dist   &  Co.   92,   79  Pittsb.Leg.J.  SI, 
21  DeLCo.  234,  45  York  Leg.Bec.  83, 
13  Erie  Co.  25. 

24.    Pa. — Coral  Gables  v.  Kerl,  6  A. 

2d  275,  334  Pa,  441,  122  A.L.K.  903. 
34  C.J.  p  580  note  24. 
Sufficiency  of  Initial 

A  Judgment  indexed  and  docketed 
against  the  Judgment  debtor's  cor- 
rect surname  and  initial  of  Christian 
name  is  sufficient  to  constitute  con- 
structive notice  to  subsequent  en- 
cumbrancers, at  least  where  debtor 
is  well  known  by  the  shortened  des- 
ignation,, but,  if  initials  are  em- 
ployed instead  of  Christian  names, 
errors  therein  are  as  fatal  as  in  the 
names  themselves.— Coral  Gables  v. 
Kerl,  supra. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§465 


rule,  however,  must  have  a  reasonable  construc- 
tion.25 While  the  indexing  of  the  Christian  name 
by  which  defendant  is  generally  known  is  not,  as  a 
general  rule,  sufficient,26  it  is  generally  known  that 
certain  first  or  Christian  names  are  interchangeably 
used,  and  the  initial  and  dominant  letters  of  each 
are  identical,  indicating  to  the  eye  that  they  are 
the  same  and  giving  the  same  sound  and  substance 
to  each,  and  the  judgment  index  must  be  searched 
for  each;27  and  it  has  been  suggested  that,  where 
two  Christian  names  are  in  original  derivation  the 
same,  and  are  taken  to  be  the  same  in  common  use, 
although  they  differ  in  sound  or  spelling,  a  judg- 
ment entered  under  one  is  notice  of  a  lien  against 
property  held  under  the  other.28  Where  the  judg- 
ment debtor  has  ceased  to  use  the  first  of  his  two 
Christian  names,  a  judgment  docketed  against  him 
by  the  second  of  such  names  only  has  been  held  in- 
sufficient, even  though  the  judgment  itself  was  ren- 
dered in  that  form  ;29  but  it  has  been  held  otherwise 
where  it  appeared  that  the  person  attacking  the  lien 
knew  that  the  judgment  debtor's  name  was  used  in 
several  forms  and  it  also  appeared  that  he  had  not 
been  prejudiced  by  the  fact  that  only  the  second  of 
the  debtor's  riames  was  used  in  docketing.80 

Middle  initial.    The  erroneous  omission  or  intro- 
duction of  a  middle  initial  in  defendant's  name,  or  a 


mistake  in  such  middle  initial,  has  been  held  to  pre- 
vent the  judgment  from  having  effect  as  a  lien,31  al- 
though such  an  error  or  omission  may  be  immate- 
rial where  the  circumstances  are  such  that  the  iden- 
tification is  sufficient,32  and  some  decisions  follow 
the  view  that  middle  initials  are  generally  unimpor- 
tant83 

Married  women.  If  defendant  is  a  married  wo- 
man, the  docket  and  index  must  show  her  own 
Christian  name,  the  use  of  that  of  her  husband  be- 
ing insufficient,34  except  as  against  a  person  who 
knows  her  identity.35  A  subsequent  innocent  pur- 
chaser from  a  judgment  debtor,  conveying  by  her 
married  name  property  acquired  under  such  mar- 
ried name,  takes  title  freed  from  the  lien  of  a  judg- 
ment docketed  against  the  debtor  by  her  maiden 
name,36  and  it  has  been  held  that  this  is  the  rule, 
even  though  the  purchaser  knew  of  her  maiden 
name,37  but  it  has  also  been  held  that  such  knowl- 
edge permits  the  judgment  to  operate  as  a  lien.38 
The  rule  requiring  use  of  a  party's  middle  initial  to 
render  the  judgment  effective  as  a  lien  has  been  ap- 
plied to  invalidate  a  claimed  judgment  lien  against 
property  held  by  husband  and  wife  as  tenants  by 
the  entirety  where  the  husband's  name  was  correct- 
ly indexed  in  the  judgment  docket  but  the  wife's 
middle  initial  was  omitted.39 


25.    Pa.— Burns  v,  Ross,  64  A.   526, 

•215  Pa.  203,  7  L.R.A..N.S.,  415,  114 

Am.S.R.  963, 
Letter  perfect 

In  order  to  constitute  'constructive 
notice,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
name  of  the  Judgment  debtor  as 
docketed  and  indexed  be  letter  per- 
fect.—Coral  Gables  v.  Kerl,  6  A.2d 
275,  334  Pa.  441,  122  A.L.R.  903. 
2Qt  pa. — Burns  v.  Ross,  64  A.  S26, 

215  Pa.  293,  114  Am.S.R.  963,  7  L. 

R.A..N.S.,  415. 
34  C.J.  P  580  note  26. 

27.  Pa.— Burns  v,  Ross,  supra. 
•34  C.J.  p  580  note  27. 

A  common  variant  of  the  first 
name  in  indexing  and  docketing:  a 
judgment  is  unobjectionable. — Coral 
Gables  v.  Kerl,  6  A.2d  275,  334  Pa. 
441,  122  A.L.R.  903. 

28.  N.T.— H.  R.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
151  N.B.  448,  242  N.T.  267,  45  A.L. 
R.  554. 

Derivatives      and      corruptions      of 
names  generally  see  the  C.J.S.  ti- 
tle Names  §  8,  also  45  C.J.  p  375 
note  97-p  376  note  1. 
Limitation  of  decision 

The  court  offering  this  suggestion 
was  careful  to  limit  its  actual  deci- 
sion to  a  holding  that  "Bess"  and 
"Elizabeth"  were  so  far  the  same  as 
to  make  docketing  of  a  Judgment  un- 
der one,  notice  of  a  lien  against 


property    listed   under   the    other. — 
H.  R.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Smith,  supra. 

.    Ind.^Johnson  v.  Hess,   25  N.E. 

445,  126  Ind.  298,  9  X..R.A.  471. 
34  C.  J.  p  580  note  28. 
3a    N.J.— Tucker   v.    Morris,    9'8   A. 

•259,  86  N.J.Eq.  131. 
34  C.J.  p  580  note  29. 
31.    N.D. — Turk  v.  Benson,  152  N.W. 

354,  '30  N.D.  200,  L.R.A.1915D  1221. 
Pa.— Arch  St.  Building  &  -Loan  Ass'n 

v.  Sook,  158  A.  595,  104  Pa.Super. 

269. 
34  C.J.  p  581  note  34. 

l    Pa.— Coral  Gables  v.  Kerl,  6  A. 

2d  273,  334  Pa.  441,  122  A.L.R.  903. 
34  C.J.  p  581  note  35. 
TTnturoai  name 

A  Judgment  docketed  and  indexed 
in  the  name  of  "Caroline  Kerl"  con- 
stituted constructive  notice  of  a 
judgment  against  "Caroline^.  Kerl," 
in  view  of  fact  that  name  was  un- 
usual and  used  by  no  other  person 
in  the  county  and  that  debtor  was 
not  more  generally  known  by  name 
with  initial  than  without  it;  and 
hence  Judgment  creditor  owning 
judgment  docketed  in  name  of  "Car- 
oline Kerl".  was  entitled  to  a  prior 
lien  on  Judgment  debtor's  real  estate 
as  against  owner  of  a  subsequently 
acquired  Judgment  docketed  against 
Caroline  C.  Kerl."— Coral  Gables  .v 
Kerl,  supra. 

901 


33.  N.T. — Grygorewicz  v.  Domestic 
and  Foreign  Discount  Corporation, 
40  N.T.S.2d  676,  179  Misc.  1017. 

34C.J.  p'581  note  3 5. 

t.    Va.— Mulford  v.  Aiken,   39   S.E. 
•231,  99  Va.  60-6,  86  Am.S.R.  914. 
34  C.J.  p  581  note  30. 

35.  Mont. — Poulos   v.    Lyman   Bros. 
Co.,  208  P.  598,  -63  Mont.  561. 

34  C.J.  p  581  note  31. 

36.  Cal. — Huff    v.    Sweetser,    97    P. 
705,  8  CalJVpp.  689. 

37.  Cal. — Huff  v.  Sweetser,  supra. 

38.  N.C.— Henry  v.   Sanders,   193   S. 
B.  15,  212  N.C.  239. 

ailure  to  inform  title  searcher 
A  Judgment  entered  against  an  un- 
married woman  in  her  name  at  that 
time  and  docketed  shortly  after  her 
marriage  and  consequent  change  of 
name  constituted  lien  on  her  after- 
acquired  realty  enforceable  against 
purchaser  who  had  actual  knowledge 
of  the  vendor's  name  before  her  mar- 
riage, notwithstanding  purchaser  did 
not  inform  his  attorney  employed  to 
examine  title  of  former  name  of  ven- 
dor.—Henry  v.  Sanders,  supra, 

39,  pa.— Arch  St  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Sook,  158  A.  -595,  104  Pa. 
Super.  269. 


§  466  JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


§  466*    Commencement  of  Lien 

a.  In  general 

b.  Relation  back 

a.  In  General 

The  date  when  a  judgment  Hen  commences  is  gen- 
erally fixed  by  statute,  and  may  attach  on  rendition,  fil- 
ing, or  recording  of  the  Judgment.  A  judgment  lien  ordi- 
narily attaches  to  after- acquired  property  on  the  date 
of  its  acquisition. 

Statutes  may  validly  fix  the  time  of  commence- 
ment of  a  judgment  lien,40  and,  depending  on  the 
provisions  thereof,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  may  com- 
mence from  the  date  of  its  actual  rendition  or  pro- 
nouncement,41 or  entry,42  or  from  the  time  of  filing 
the  judgment  for  record,43  or  from  the  day  on 
which  it  is  recorded,  docketed,  or  registered,44  or 
from  the  date  of  filing  or  recording  of  an  abstract 
of  the  judgment.45  Under  some  practice,  where  two 
or  more  judgments  are  rendered  against  the  same 
person  at  the  same  term,  the  liens  may  be  regard- 
ed as  concurrent  and  as  commencing  on  the  last  day 
of  the  term.46  Where  two  judgments  rendered  be- 


tween the  same  parties  at  different  times  are  entire- 
ly distinct  from  one  another  and  the  Hen  of  the  ear- 
lier judgment  has  expired  before  the  recovery  of  the 
other,  the  latter  judgment  does  not  become  a  lien  on 
land  subject  to  the  earlier  judgment  but  conveyed 
prior  to  the  entry  of  the  later  judgment.47 

Fractions  of  day.  Where  justice  so  requires,  the 
law  will  take  account  of  the  fraction  of  a  day  in  de- 
termining when  the  lien  of  a  judgment  took  effect.48 

Judgments  against  nonresidents.  The  statutes  of 
some  jurisdictions  provide  that  in  the  case  of  judg- 
ments rendered  in  a  county  other  than  that  in  which 
the  debtor  resides  the  lien  takes  effect  only  from  the 
time  when  a  certified  copy  of  the  judgment  is 'reg- 
istered in  the  county  where  he  resides  or,  if  he  does 
not  reside  in  the  state,  in  the  county  where  the  land 
lies.49 

The  judgment  of  an  appellate  court  does  not  be- 
come a  judgment  of  the  court  appealed  from  so  as 
to  effect  a  lien  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  lower  court 
until  the  judgment  is  adopted  by  the  lower  court 
and  entered  on  its  minutes,  the  mere  filing  of  the 


40.  'Wash.— Seattle  Brewing  &  Malt- 
ing:  Co.    v.    Donofrio,    109    P.    335, 
59  Wash.  98. 

Statute-  construed. 

Pa, — Calhoon  v.  Newton,  40  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  123. 

41.  U.S.— Whitaker  &  Co.  v.  Grable, 
C.C.A.Ark.,     109     F.2d    710— In    re 
Levinson,  D.C.Wash.,   5  F.2d  75. 

111.— Rawlins  v.  Launer,  17  N.E.2d 
330,  369  111.  494— Normal  State 
Bank  v.  Killian,  4-8  N.E.2d  212,  318 
IlLApp.  637,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  54  IST.E.2d  539,  386  111.  449. 
Neb. — Guaranty  Fund  Commission 
v.  Teichmeier,  229  N.W.  121,  119 
Neb.  3S7. 

Pa. — Moore   v.    Schell,    99    Pa.Super. 
81 — Irwin'  v.  Zahniser,  Com.PL,  21 
Erie  Co.  120. 
Va.— Jones  v.  Hall,  15  S.E.2d  108,  177 

Va.  658. 

34  C.J.  p  582  note  58. 
Bate  from  which  judgment  lien  is 
computed    for   purposes    of   deter- 
mining- its   duration  see  infra   §§ 
489-491. 
Date   of   lien  as   affecting  priorities 

see  infra  §§  483-485. 
Statute  held  operative 

Statute  providing  that  judgments 
bind  defendant's  property  from  date 
thereof,  except  as  otherwise  provid- 
ed in  code,  was  not  repealed  by,  or 
did  not  conflict  with,  statute  provid- 
ing exception  to  rule  thereof.-rCom- 
mercial  Credit  Co.  of  Georgia  v. 
Jones  Motor  Co.,  167  S.E.  7'68,  46  Ga. 
App.  464. 

42.  Del. — In  re  Andrews'  Estate,  34 
A.2d  700,  3  Terry  376. 


Md. — Messinger  v.  Eckenrode,  158  A. 

357,  162  Hd.  63. 
Wash.— Heath    v.    Dodson,    110    P.2d 

845,  7  Wash.2d  667. 

43.     La. — Godchaux   Sugars,   Inc.   v. 

Leon   Boudreaux   &   Bros.,    96   So. 

532,  153  La.  685. 

Time  of  fll*ing  rather  than  of  record- 
ing- 

Under  statute,  judgments  are  ef- 
fective against  third  persons  from 
the  time  of  filing,  and  not  from  the 
date  of  recording;  mere  deposit  of 
judgment  with  clerk  to  be  recorded, 
without  being  stamped  with  clerk's 
filing  mark,  is  not  a  "filing"  as  to 
time  of  taking  effect,  especially  when 
deposit  was  made  in  court  room,  and 
not  in  clerk's  office. — Godchaux  Su- 
gars, Inc.,  v.  Leon  Boudreaux  & 
Bros.,  supra. 

4ft.  CaL— McGrath  v.  Kaelin,  225  P. 
34,  66  CaLApp.  41. 

La. — Henry  v.  Roque,  App.,  18  So.2d 
917. 

Minn. — Lowe  v.  Reierson,  276  N.W. 
224,  201  Minn.  280. 

N.C.— Jones  v.  Rhea,  151  S.E.  255, 
198  N.C.,190. 

Okl. — Walters  Motor  Co.  v.  Mus- 
grove,  75  P.2d  471,  Ml  Okl.  540. 

Wis.— R.  F.  Gehrke  Sheet  Metal 
Works  v.  Mahl,  297  N.W.  373,  237 
Wis.  414— C.  Hennecke  Co.  v.  Co- 
lumbia Lodge,  No.  11,  K.  P.,  287  N. 
W.  742,  233  Wis.  24. 

34  C.J.  p  &S2  note  59. 

Relation  back  of  lien  to  date  of  ren- 
dition of  judgment  after  due  en- 
rollment see  infra  subdivision  b  of 
this  section. 

902       . 


Entry  in  docket  rather  than  journal 
Judgment  is  a  lien  from  time  of 
entry  in  judgment  docket,  not  jour- 
nal, "judgment  docket"  and  "jour- 
nal" being  different. — In  re  Staples, 
D.C.Okl.,  1  F.Supp.  -620. 
Docketing1  without  entry  in  county 

recorder's  office 

Under  statute  pr&viding  that 
judgment  is  lien  on  realty  then  own- 
ed by  judgment  debtor  or  thereafter 
acquired  by  him  from  the  time  the 
judgment  is  docketed,  lien  of  judg- 
ment of  district  court  exists  from 
the  time  of  docketing  judgment,  even 
though  judgment  is  not  carried  into 
records  of  county  recorder. — Gaines 
v.  Van  Demark,  74  P.2d  454,  106 
Mont.  1. 

45.  U.S. — In      re      Levinson,      D.C. 
Wash.,  5  F.2d  75. 

Tex. — John  F.  Grant  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Hunnteutt,  Civ.  App.,  143  S.W.2d 
976 — Cheatham  v.  Mann,  Civ. App., 
133  S.W.2d  264,  error  refused. 

46.  Mo. — Bradley   v.    Hefferman,    57 
S.W.  763,  156  Mo.  653. 

34  C.J.  p  583  note  63   [a],  [b]. 

47.  CaL— Murphy  v.   Riecks,   180   P. 
15,  40  CaLApp.  1. 

48.  'N.J.— Gallagher  v.  True  Ameri- 
can Pub.  Co.,  71  A.  741,  75  N.J.Eo;. 
171,  138  Am.S.R.  514. 

Tenn. — Murfree  v.  Carmack,  4  Yerg. 
270,  26  Am.D.  232. 

49.  Tenn. — Massachusetts  Mut.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Taylor  Implement  &  Ve- 
hicle Co.,   195  S.W.  762,  138  Tenn. 
28. 

34  C.J.  p  584  note  79. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


466 


mandate  to  the  lower  court  directing  a  decree  be- 
ing insufficient.50  Where  an  appellate  court  ren- 
ders such  judgment  as  the  lower  court  should  have 
rendered,  the  lien,  in  some  jurisdictions,  dates  from 
the  filing  in  the  lower  court  of  a  special  mandate 
from  the  appellate  court.51 

Lien  on  after-acquired  lands.  Ordinarily,  the  lien 
on  after-acquired  property  attaches  at  the  time  of 
the  acquisition  of  the  property,  not  as  of  the  time 
of  docketing  of  the  judgment52  The  date  of  dock- 
eting the  judgment  rather  than  the  date  of  acquir- 
ing the  property  may,  however,  be  considered  the 
date  of  commencement  for  purposes  of  computing 
the  duration  of  the  lien,  as  discussed  infra  §  489. 
The  lien  of  a  judgment  at  law  on  an  equitable  in- 
terest in  land  attaches  only  as  of  the  date  of  filing  a 
bill  in  chancery.53 

b.  Relation  Back 

Under  varying  local  practice,  the  Hen  of  a  Judgment 
may  relate  back  and  attach  at  some  time  previous  to 
the  date  of  its  rendition,  entry,  or  enrollment,  as  where 
a  judgment  rendered  during  the  term  becomes  a  lien  as 
of  the  fir  sit  day  thereof;  but  exceptions  to  the  rule  of 
relation  back  may  be  made  where  necessary  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  intervening  rights  of  innocent  third  per- 
sons. 

Under  some  practice,  either  by  deduction  from 
the  common-law  rule  that  judgments  of  a  court  of 
record,  on  whatever  day  of  the  term  they  may  in 
fact  be  rendered,  relate  to  and  are  considered  as 


judgments  of  the  first  day  of  the  term,  or  under 
express  statutory  enactments,  judgment  liens  relate 
back  to  the  first  day  of  the  term  at  which  they  were 
rendered.54  Under  other  practice  a  judgment  may 
relate  back  to  the  date  of  its  rendition  on  due  en- 
rollment within  the  time  limited  by  statute,55  but, 
where  a  judgment  is  enrolled  after  expiration  of 
the  time  limit,  the  lien  of  the  judgment  does  not 
relate  back  but  dates  only  from  the  time  of  enroll- 
ment.56 It  has  also  been  held  that  as  between  the 
parties  the  effective  date  of  a  judgment  rendered  on 
one  day  and  entered  on  another  may  relate  back  to 
the  date  of  rendition  by  an  order  nunc  pro  tune,  as 
discussed  infra  §  469,  and  that,  under  particular 
statutes  and  rules  of  court,  judgment  entered  five 
days  after  rendition  is  a  lien  from  the  date  of  ren- 
dition notwithstanding  an  order  giving  plaintiff  four 
days  in  which  to  enter  judgment.57  Where  at  the 
time  of  the  filing  of  an  abstract  of  judgment  the 
judgment  debtor  no  longer  owns  certain  property, 
the  filing  cannot  relate  back  and  make  the  judgment 
a  lien  on  the  property  theretofore  owned  by  the 
debtor.58 

While  as  a  rule  the  lien  of  a  judgment  does  not 
relate  back  to  the  time  of  the  accrual  of  the  cause 
of  action^  it  may  relate  back  to  the  time  of  a  lien 
obtained  under  another  proceeding  or  transaction, 
as  in  the  case  where  there  has  been  an  attach- 
ment,60 likewise  as  in  the  case  where  there  has 


50.  Tenn. — Massachusetts  Mut.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Taylor  Implement  &  Ve- 
hicle Co.,  supra. 

51-  Neb. — Harvey  v.  Godding,  109  N. 
W.  220,  7*7  Neb.  289,  124  Am.S.R. 
841. 

52.     U.S. — Commercial  Credit  Co.  v, 
Davidson,  C.C.A.Miss.,  112  F.2d  54, 
Ala.— W.  T.  Rawleigh  Co.  v.  Patter- 
son, 195  So.  729,  '239  Ala.  309. 
Cal.— Hertweck  v.  Fearon,  179  P.  190, 

179  Cal.  71. 
Fla.— B.  A.  Lott,  Inc.,  v.  Padgett,  14 

So.2d  667,  153  Fla.  304.     , 
Ind.— Peet  v.  Beers,  4  Ind.  4<6. 
Tex.— Baker  v.  West,  36  S.W.2d  -695, 

120  Tex.  113. 
34  C.J.  p  591  note  49. 
After-acquired  property  as  subject  to 

judgment  lien  see  infra  §  477. 
Property  acqtilred  "by  inheritance 

A  recorded  judgment  against  dece- 
dent's daughter  attached  to  daugh- 
ter's interest  in  decedent's  land  eo 
instante  on  decedent's  death,  and  co- 
incident with  vesting  of  title  to  in- 
heritance in  daughter. — Coomes  v. 
Finegan,  7  N.W.2d  729,  233  Iowa  448. 
An  estate  toy  the  entireties  of  a 
husband  and  wife  in  a  tract  of  land 
ceased  on  wife's  death  and  tract 
vested  in  husband,  whereupon  lien  of 
judgment  confessed  by  husband  in 


favor  of  wife  -prior  to  her  death,  and 
duly  docketed  by  transcript  in  coun- 
ty where  tract  was  situate,  immedi- 
ately attached  and  took  precedence 
over  lien  created  by  deed  of  trust 
executed  by  husband  without  joinder 
of  his  wife  subsequent  to  confession 
of  the  judgment  but  prior  to  wife's 
death.— Keel  v.  Bailey,  198  S.E.  454, 
214  N.C.  169. 
Order  of  rendition  immaterial 

All  judgments  which  are  in  exist- 
ence when  the  property  is  acquired 
attach  to  it  as  of  that  instant,  with- 
out reference  to  the  order  of  their 
rendition.— Hulbert  v.  Hulbert,  111 
N.BL  70,  216  N.Y.  430,  L.R.A.1916D 
661,  Ann.Cas.l917D  180—34  C.J.  P 
591  note  51. 

53.  N.J.— McLaughlin    v.    Whaland, 
13  A.2d  573,  127  N.J.Bq.  393. 

54.  Ohio.— Cleveland     Ry.     Co.     v. 
Williams,   155  N.E.   133,  115   Ohio 
St.  584 — Casaro  v.  Humphrey,  162 
N.B.  645,  28  Ohio  App.  255. 

34  C.J.  p  583  note  61. 

55.  Miss.— Kalmia  Realty  '&  Insur- 
ance Co.  v.  Hopkins,  141 'So.  903, 
163  Miss.  556. 

56.  Miss.— Kalmia  Realty  &  Insur- 
ance Co.  v.  Hopkins,  supra. 

903 


57.  B.C.— Gilfillin  v.  Rector,   126   S. 
B.  761,  131  S.C.  '84. 

58.  Tex. — Gamer  v.   Love,   Civ.App., 
41  S.W.2d  356,  error  dismissed. 

59.  111.— Heckmann    v.    Detlafl,    119 
N.B.  639,  2-83  111.  505. 

34  C.J.  s>  583  note  64. 

The  mere  bringing-  of  suit  by  cred- 
itor does  not  create  a  lien  on  real  es- 
tate.—In  re  Michael,  I>.C.Pa.,  '31  -P. 
Supp.  41. 

60.  Fla. — McClellan   v.    Solomon,    2 
So.  -825,  23  OTa.  437. 

34  C.J.  p  583  note  65. 
Finding-  for  defendant  on  attachment 
If,  after  an  issue  on  a  traverse 
to  'plaintiffs  affidavit  is  found  for 
defendant,  judgment  is  obtained  on 
merits,  it  does  not  date  from  time  of 
levy  as  provided  by  statute  but  takes 
lien  on  property  attached  from  date 
of  judgment  only. — Blakely  Milling  & 
Trading  Co.  v.  Thompson,  128  S.E. 
688,  34  Ga.App.  129. 

Tardy  filing 

Where  statute  provides  that,  if  a 
judgment  lien  be  placed  on  real  es- 
tate attached  in  the  suit  within  four 
months  after,  such  judgment  was 
rendered,  it  shall  hold  as  a  lien  from 
the  date  of  the  attachment,  filing  of 
a  lien  based  on  the  judgment  is  too 


§466 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


been  a  statutory  lien,81  or  mortgage,62  where  a 
judgment  is  rendered  on  a  bond  payable  to  the 
state,6*  on  a  forfeited  writ  of  error  bond,64  or  on 
a  scire  facias  to  revive  an  original  judgment.65 

Exceptions  to  the  doctrine  that  a  judgment  re- 
lates back  may  be  made  in  the  case  of  default  judg- 
ments,66 or  judgments  rendered  prior  to  the  statute 
creating  the  lien.67  or  where  it  is  held  that  a  judg- 
ment could  not  relate  back  to  the  first  day  of  the 
term  because  the  case  was  not  then  in  condition  for 
judgment,68  or  because  the  court  was  not  then  in 
session,69  and,  generally,  the  doctrine  of  relation 
back  may  be  held  inapplicable  where  it  is  necessary 
to  protect  the  rights  of  an  intervening  purchaser 
in  good  faith.70  A  judgment  by  confession  ordi- 
narily becomes  a  lien  from  the  date  of  confession,71 
or  from  the  date  of  the  confirmation  of  the  confes- 
sion,72 and  the  rule  that  a  judgment  becomes  a  lien 
as  of  the  first  day  of  the  term  at  which  it  was  en- 
tered has  been  held  inapplicable  to  a  judgment  by 
confession  on  the  theory  that  the  date  of  signing 
a  confession  judgment  controls  as  the  date  on  which 
the  lien  attaches.73 


§  457.    Lien  of  Transferred  Judgment 

The  Hen  of  a  transferred  Judgment  ordinarily  at- 
taches  as  of  the  date  of  transfer,  provided  there  has 
been  due  compliance  with  statutory  requirements. 

Where,  in  order  to  render  the  judgment  a  lien 
on  property  in  a  county  other  than  that  in  which 
the  judgment  was  rendered,  a  statute  requires  an 
abstract  or  transcript  of  the  judgment  to  be  filed, 
entered,  or  docketed  in  such  other  county,  the  lien 
will  not  commence  in  such  county  until  the  statute 
is  complied  with.74  It  has  been  held  that  a  trans- 
ferred judgment  becomes  a  lien  in  the  county  to 
which  it  has  been  transferred  as  of  the  date  of 
transfer,75  even  though  the  lien  in  the  county 
where  the  judgment  was  entered  has  expired  from 
lapse  of  time.76 

§  468.    Necessity  of  Issue  of  Execution 

Under  many  statutes  a  Judgment  is  a  lien  against 
the  debtor's  realty,  but  not  his  personalty,  irrespective 
of  the  issuance  of  execution,  but,  where  the  Judgment 
has  not  been  duly  filed  or  docketed,  etc.,  in  compliance 
with  statutory  requirements,  levy  of  execution  may  be 
essential  to  subject  realty  to  a  lien. 

Except  in  the  few  jurisdictions  where  a  judgment 
does  not  of  itself  bind  land,77  it  has  generally  been 


late  to  relate  back  to  the  date  of  the 
attachment  where  the  filing:  occurs 
more  than  four  months  from  the 
date  of  the  original  trial  court  judg- 
ment, even  though  within  four 
months  of  its  affirmance  by  an  appel- 
late court. — Qity  Nat  Bank  v. 
Stoeckel,  132  A.  20,  103  Conn.  732. 

81.  Pa.— Moore  v,  Schell,  99  Pa.Su- 
per.  81. 

34  C.J.  p  583  note  66. 
Mechanic1*  lien. 

(1)  While  a  fieri  facias  issued  on 
a  special  judgment  would  cover  the 
entire  estate  which  an  owner  had  in 
lands  at  the  time  when  building  was 
begun,    or   which   he   thereafter  ac- 
quired, .a   general   judgment   cannot 
relate  back  to  the  date  of  the  statu- 
tory mechanic's  lien  or  become  a  lien 
on  the  lands  of  the  owner  and  de- 
fendant prior  to  the  date  of  entering 
such  judgment. — McKibbin  v.  Pekar- 
sky,  143  A.  553,  103  N.J.Eq.  450. 

(2)  Where  a  laborer,  mechanic,  or 
material    furnisher    files    notice    of 
claim  in  the  clerk's  office,  and  judg- 
ment is  subsequently  entered  in  an 
action  by  him  in  his  favor,  but  only 
as  a  general  creditor,  his  right  to  a 
statutory  lien  being  specifically  de- 
nied, the  lien  of  such  judgment  does 
not  relate  back  to  the  date  when  the 
notice  of  claim  was  filed,  but  the  lien 
attaches  only  from  the  date  of  the 
judgment — Francisco  v.  Pine  Clifte 
Camp  and  Country  Club*  139  S.E.  443, 
194  N.C,  3-20. 

82.  Pa.— In  re  Moore,  3  A.2d  31,  133 


Pa.Super.  419— Fisher,  for  Use  of 
Buck  v.  McFarland,  167  A.  877,  110 
Pa.Super.  184 — Moore  v.  Schell, 
Pa.Super.        81 — Hollenbach        v. 
Kuhns,  Com.Pl.,  18  LehjLuJ.  418. 
34  C.J.  p  '583  note  67. 

63.  Ind. — Shane  v.  (Francis,  30  Ind. 
92. 

64.  Tex.— Hickcock  v.  Bell,  46  Tex, 
610 — Berry  v.  Shuler,  25  Tex.Su-ppL 
140. 

65.  Pa. — Appeal  of  Beta,  1  Penr.  & 
W.  271. 

66.  Del. — Citizens'    -Loan    Ass'n    v. 
Martin,  40  A.  1108,  15  Pel.  213. 

34  C.J.  p  584  note  75. 

67.  D.C.— Ohio  Nat  Bank  v.  Berlin, 
26  App.  218. 

68.  Va. — Tates  v.  Robertson,  *0  Va. 
475. 

34  C.J.  p  584  note  72. 
Cross  petition 

Lien  of  judgment  given  holder  of 
second  mortgage  in  foreclosure  suit 
was  held  not  to  date  back  to  first  day 
of  term  where  mortgagee  filed  cross 
petition  as  to  indebtedness  secured 
by  second  mortgage  during  term  at 
which  judgment  was  rendered. — Ex- 
change Nat  Bank  of  Osborne  v. 
Warne,  «7  P.2d  46,  143  Kan.  797. 

69.  Neb.-— Parrott   v.    Wolcott,    106 
N.W.  607,  75  Neb.  530. 

34  C.J.  p  584  note  73. 

70.  N.C.— Fowle  v.  McLean,  84  S.E. 
852,  168  N.C.  537. 

34  C.J.  -p  584  note  77. 

904 


71.  Va. — American  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  National  Bank  of  Suffolk, 
196  S.E.  693,  170  Va.  169. 

W.Va. — Hockman  v.  Hockman,  25  S. 
E.  534,  93  Va.  45'5. 

73.  Miss.— Bass  v.  Estill,  50  Miss. 
300. 

73.  Ohio.— Riddle  v.  Bryan,  5  Ohio 
48. 

74.  Neb.— Rathbone  Co.  v.  Kimball, 
220  N.W.  244,  117  Neb.  229,  certio- 
rari    denied  Kimball   v.   Rathbone 
Co.,  49  S.Ct  179,  278  U.S.  655,  73 
L.Ed.  564. 

34  C.J.  p  584  note  82. 
Entry  on  judgment  record 

Transcript  of  judgment  of  district 
court  filed  in  another  county  is  not 
lien  on  property  until  entered  on 
latter  county's  judgment  record. — 
Rathbone  Co.  v.  Kimball,  220  N.W. 
244,  117  Neb.  229,  certiorari  denied 
Kimball  v.  Rathbone  Co.,  49  S.Ct 
179,  '278  U.S.  655,  73  I/.Bd.  564. 

75.  Pa.— In  re  Higgins'  Estate,  188 
A.  831,  325  Fa.  106— Shotts  &  Co. 
v.  Agnew  &  Barnett,  'SI  Pa. Super. 
45<8. 

76.  Pa.— In  re  Higgins'  Estate,  Ii88 
A.  831,  325  Pa.  106. 

77.  U.S. — Coxpn*    Juris    gaoted    in 
Von   Segerlund   v.    Dysart,   C.C.A. 
CaL,  137  P.2d  755,  737. 

•34  C.J.  p  584  note  84. 
Xa  Cteoxgi* 

(1)  It  is  -provided  that  a  judgment 
shall  not  constitute  a  lien  on  the 
property  of  defendant  from  the  ren- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


469 


the  rule  under  the  statutes  that  a  judgment  attach- 
es as  a  lien  without,  the  use  of  any  process,78  ex- 
cept as  to  property  which  is  not  usually  subject  to 
the  lien  of  a  judgment,  but  can  be  made  so  by  the 
levy  of  an  execution,  as  trust  property  or  person- 
alty,79 or  where  the'  lien  is  to  be  extended  to  the 
property  of  a  person  other  than  the  principal  de- 
fendant, such  as  a  surety,80  or,  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions, against  property  in  a  foreign  county.81 
Where,  however,  there  has  been  a  failure  to  com- 
ply with  statutory  requirements  as  to  docketing  or 
filing  the  judgment  or  an  abstract  thereof,  issuance 
of  execution,  and  in  some  instances  levy  thereof, 
may  become  essential  to  creation  of  a  lien  even  on 
real  property.82 


As  discussed  supra  §  454,  in  the  absence  of  stat- 
ute, no  lien  results  from  a  judgment  before  issu- 
ance of  execution. 

§  469.    Judgment  or  Amendment  Nunc 

Pro  Tune 

A  judgment  entered  nunc  pro  tune  may  afford  a 
lien  as  of  the  earlier  date  as  between  the  Immediate  par- 
ties;- but  as  respects  the  intervening  rights  of  third 
persons  the  lien  will  generally  be  held  to  run  from  the 
later  date,  and  an  amendment  of  judgment  will  not  as 
a  rule  affect  the  rights  of  such  persons. 

As  between  the  parties  a  judgment  entered  nunc 
pro  tune  has  the  same  force  and  effect  as  if  en- 
tered at  the  time  the  judgment  was  rendered,83 
and  the  effective  date  of  a  judgment  rendered  one 
day  and  entered  on  a  later  day  may  relate  back  to 


dition  thereof,  as  against  third  par- 
ties acting-  in  good  faith  and  with- 
out notice,  who  may  have  acquired 
a  transfer  of  the  property,  unless  the 
execution  shall  have  been  entered  on 
the  general  execution  docket  of  the 
court  within  ten  days  from  the  time 
the  judgment  was  rendered. — Brad- 
ley v.  Booth,  9  S.E.2d  8*61,  62  GsuApp. 
770—34  C.J.  p  584  note  84  [a]. 

(2)  Removal  of  a  judgment  debtor 
from   county   of   rendition   of  judg- 
ment  will   not   require   entry   of  an 
execution   issued  on  such  judgment 
on  general  execution  docket  of  coun- 
ty to  which  judgment  debtor  has  re- 
moved, but  if  within  ten  days  from 
date   of   judgment  execution  is   en- 
tered on  docket,  in  county  of  rendi- 
tion,  judgment  lien  attaches   to  all 
judgment    debtor's    property   in   the 
state,  but,  if  such  entry  is  postponed 
beyond  ten  days,  judgment  lien  at- 
taches from  date  when  entry  of  exe- 
cution is  actually  made. — Bradley  v. 
Booth,  supra. 

(3)  Judgment  must  be  entered  on 
verdict  within  time  required  and  ex- 
ecution must  be  duly  and  properly 
issued  and  recorded,  since  a  verdict 
In  itself  is  not  a  lien  on  any  proper- 
ty of  defendant  against  whom  It  is 
returned. — Tanner  v.  Wilson,   102  S. 
E.  425,  184  Ga.  628. 

(4)  Where  judgment  was  followed 
by  execution  duly  issued  thereon  and 
appropriate  entries  of  nulla  bona  on 
execution,   each  within  seven  years, 
which  were  also  entered  on  execution 
docket,   judgment   was   a  lien   from 
its   date   on   all  property  ^oWned  by 
judgment    debtor    or    thereafter   ac- 
quired.— Howell    v.    Farmers    Bank, 
196  S.E.  387,  185  Ga.  768. 

78.    U.S. — Corpn*    Juris    quoted:    in 

Von    Segerlund   v.    Dysart,    C.C.A. 

Cal.,  137  F.2d  755,  757— In  re  'Fell, 

D.C.Pa.,  18  F.Supp.  989. 
Hawaii.— Nichols  v.  Wan  Chong  Sun, 

28  Hawaii  395. 
N.J.— Tuttle  v.  State  Mut  Liability 


Ins.   Co.,    127   A.   W2,   2   N.J.Misc. 
973. 
34  C.J.  p  '584  note  '85. 

79.    U.S.— Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 

Von   Segerlund   v.    Dysart,    C.C.A. 

Cal.,  137  F.2d  755,  757— Bortman  v. 

Urban   Motion  Picture   Industries, 

C.C.A.N.Y.,  4  F.2d  913— In  re  Fell, 

D.C.Pa.,  18  F.Supp.  989. 
Ind.— Rothchild    v.    State,    165    N.B. 

60,  200  Ind.  501. 
Mo. — Brown  v.  Deal,  App.,  236  -S.W. 

114. 
Ohio. — Langel  v.  Moore,  168  N.E.  57, 

32  Ohio  App.  352,  affirmed  164  N. 

E.   118,  119  Ohio  St.   299. 
34  C.J.  p  585  note  86. 

Xdea  from  date  of  execution, 

Under  some  practice  the  lien  on 
personalty  dates  not  from  the  ob- 
taining of  the  judgment,  but  from 
the  issuance  or  levy  of  the  execu- 
tion. 

U.S. — Claude  D.  Reese,  Inc.,  v.  U.  S. 
ex  rel.  Collector  of  Internal  Reve- 
nue, C.C.A.Fla.,  75  F.2d  9. 
Pa.— Rush  v.  "First  Nat  Bank,  188  A. 
164,  324  Pa.  285. 

Bights  of  purchaser 

Where  no  lien  on  personalty  exists 
until  the  levy  of  an  execution,  an  In- 
nocent purchaser's  rights  are  not 
subject  to  a  prior  judgment  tinder 
which  no  execution  has  been  issued. 
—Brown  v.  Deal,  Mo. App.,  256  S.W. 
114. 

Statutes  affording  lien  without 

oution. 

Under  a  statute  providing  that 
"where  execution  shall  be  stayed  on 
any  judgment  rendered  by  a  justice 
of  the  peace,  such  judgment  shall  be 
a  lien  on  all  the  personal  property 
subject  to  execution  belonging  to  the 
defendant  at  the  time  of  the  rendi- 
tion of  the  judgment,"  on  the  giving 
of  a  stay  bond,  whether  or  not  exe- 
cution had  issued  on  the  judgment, 
it  becomes  a  lien,  but  only  for  the 

90S 


term  of  six  months,  to  which  the 
time  of  stay  is  limited.— McBride  v. 
Mullinlx,  C.C.A.Ark.,  299  F.  1S2. 

80.  Ky. — Johnson   v.   Catron,    57    S. 
W.  13,  108  Ky.  568,  22  Ky.L.  27-5. 

81.  111.— Todd-v.  Todd,   214   IlLApp. 
282— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wheeling, 
Lake  Brie  &  Pittsburg  Coal  Co.,  11 
Ohio   Cir.Ct.   412,   5   Ohio   Cir.Dec. 
421. 

82.  U.S.— Southern  Dairies  v.  Banks, 
C.C.A.N.C.,   92   F.2d  2«82,   certiorari 
denied  Banks  v.  Southern  Dairies, 
5.8  S.Ct  368,  302  U.S.  761,  82  LJEd. 
590. 

Necessity  of.  execution  to  continue 
lien  see  infra  §  493. 

Necessity  of  levy 

(1)  The  rule  that  Issuance  of  exe- 
cution and  return  thereof  unsatisfied 
create  no  lien  on  property  In  absence 
of  levy  applies  to  realty  as  well  as 
to  personalty,  and  becomes  material 
In  case  of  realty  where  no  lien  has 
been   created  by  properly  docketing 
judgment. — Southern       Dairies       v. 
Banks,  C.C.A.N.C.,  92  F.2d  282,  cer- 
tiorari   denied    Banks    v.    Southern 
Dairies,  58  S.Ct  368,  302  U.S.  761,  82 
L.Ed,  590. 

(2)  Generally,  a  judgment  with  ex- 
ecution    issued     thereon,     but     not 
levied  on  any  property  and  not  other- 
wise   satisfied   and    no   abstracts   of 
which  have  been  filed  for  record  un- 
der  statute,    does   not    constitute   a 
"lien"  on  any  property  real  or  per- 
sonal.— C.  L  T.  Corporation  v.  Hay- 
nie,   Tex.Civ.App.,   135   S.W.2d   618. 

83.  Or.— Davidson  v.  Richardson, 
89  P.  742,  50  Or.  323,  126  AnxS.R. 
738,  17  L.R.A-,N.S.,  319,  reheard 
91  P.  1080,  SO  Or.  323,  126  Am.3.R. 
738,  17  «L,.R.A.,N.S.,  319. 

Tenn. — Southern  Mortg.  Guaranty 
Corporation  v.  King,  77  S.W.2d 
8-10,  168  Term,  -809. 


§  469 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  date  of  rendition  by  an  order  nunc  pro  tune.84 
As  far,  however,  as  it  affects  intervening  rights  of 
third  parties  a  judgment  entered  nunc  pro  tune  does 
not  relate  back,  for  the  purpose  of  a  lien,  to  the 
day  as  of  which  it  is  entered,  but  takes  effect  only 
from  the  time  of  its  actual  entry-85  Under  a  stat- 
ute providing  that  a  judgment  is  a  lien  from  the 
first  day  of  the  term  at  which  it  is  entered,  a  judg- 
ment rendered  nunc  pro  tune,  at  a  term  of  court  suc- 
ceeding that  at  which  the  record  was  complete  up 
to  and  including  verdict,  is  as  operative,  as  between 
the  parties,  as  if  it  had  been  rendered  at  the  pre- 
vious term,  but  as  to  other  parties,  it  is  effective,  as 
a  lien,  only  from  the  first  day  of  the  term  at  which 
it  was  actually  entered.8^ 

The  amendment  of  a  judgment  will  not  as  a  rule 
affect  intervening  rights  of  third  parties,87  and  a 
judgment  by  confession,  invalid  for  want  of  a  suffi- 
cient statement  or  for  other  defects,  cannot  be 
amended  nunc  pro  tune  so  as  to  make  it  effective 
from  its  original  date,  as  against  intervening  pur- 
chasers or  encumbrancers.88  Where,  however,  a 
judgment  as  originally  entered  created  a  lien  and, 
taken  together  with  the  record,  carried  notice  of  the 
right  to  the  amended  judgment,  the  amendment  may 
relate  back  to  the  date  of  the  original  judgment.89 


I  470. 


Effect  of  Stay  of  Execution 


Ordinarily  a  stay  of  execution  does  not  postpone  or 
destroy  a  judgment  lien. 


Since  the  lien. of  a  judgment  on  realty  is  not  or- 
dinarily dependent  on  the  issuance  of  an  execution 
or  other  act  of  the  judgment  creditor,  as  discussed 
supra  §  468,  the  attachment  of  the  lien  is  not  post- 
poned by  a  stay  of  execution  ;90  nor  is  the  lien  of  a 
judgment  destroyed  by  such  a  stay,  as  considered 
infra  §  503. 

§  471.    Property  Affected  by  Lien 

The  statutory  lien  of  a  judgment  attaches  only  to 
property  against  which  the  judgment  can  be  enforced. 

A  judgment  is  a  lien  on  all  property  of  the  debtor 
subject  thereto.91  Accordingly  the  statutory  lien 
of  a  judgment  attaches  only  to  property  not  exempt 
from  execution,92  and,  under  statutes  providing  that 
the  judgment  shall  be  a  lien  on  all  property  of  de- 
fendant which  is  subject  to  levy  and  sale  under  ex- 
ecution, the  lien  applies  to  and  covers  only  prop- 
erty which  is  subject  to  levy  and  sale  under  exe- 
cution.93 

§  472.    Nature  of  Property 

Under  statute  in  some  Jurisdictions  the  lien  of  the 
judgment  attaches  to  real  property,  but  not  to  personal 
property,  of  the  judgment  debtor. 

Except  as  provided  by  statute,  a  mere  judgment 
is  never  a  lien  against  the  real  estate  of  the  judg- 
ment debtor.9*  Thus  at  common  law  land  was  not 
subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment,95  but  under  the 
statutes  of  most  jurisdictions  the  lien  attaches  to 


84.  Term. — Southern    Mortg.     Guar- 
anty Corporation  v.  King,  supra. 

Relation  back  of  judgment  lien  gen- 
erally see  supra  §46-6. 

85.  Ala.— Conn    v.    Sellers,    73    So. 
961,  198  Ala.  '606. 

34  C.J.  p  585  note  93. 

88.  N.C. — Pfeifer  v.  Love's  Drug 
Store.  88  S.R  342,  171  N.C.  214 — 
Ferrell  v.  Hales,  25  S.E.  821,  119  N. 
C.  19&. 

87.  Pa. — Union    Trust    Co.    v.    Mc- 
Carthy, 10  Pa.Dlst  &  Co.  243,  76 
Plttsb.Leg.J.  262,  15  WestCo.  92. 

34  C.J.  p  585  note  &5. 

88.  Minn.— Auerbach  v.  Behnke,  41 
N.W.  946,  40  Minn.  258. 

34  C.J.  p  585  note  96. 

89.  U.S.— Gunn  v.  Plant,  Ga.,  94  U. 
S.  664,  24  KEd.  504. 

34  C.J.  p  585  note  97. 

90.  Conn. — Hobbs  v.   Simmonds,   23 
A.  962.  >61  Conn.  235. 

34  C.J.  p  585  note  99. 

91.  >Fla.— Gilpen  v.  Bower,  12  So.2d 
854,  152  FUu  733. 

OkL— Wagoner  Oil  &  Gas  Co.  v.  Mar- 
low,  278  P.  294,  187  OkL  116. 

Va.— Miller  v.  Kemp,  160  S.R  203, 
157  Va.  178,  84  A.L.R.  930. 


Shares  of  stock 

In  proceeding  to  enforce  trust  as 
to  fifteen  thousand  two  hundred 
ninety-nine  of  sixteen  thousand 
shares  of  stock  held  by  defendants, 
where  state  trial  court  decreed  to 
plaintiff  title  to  seven  thousand  six 
hundred  forty-nine  shares,  and  state 
supreme  court  decreed  to  plaintiff  ti- 
tle to  fifteen  thousand  two  hundred 
ninety-nine  shares  and  directed 
Judgment  for  dividends  collected  by 
defendants,  remaining  seven  hundred 
one  shares  and  dividends  thereon 
were  subject  to  lien  of  such  directed 
judgment. — Sunshine  Mining  Co.  v. 
Treinies,  I>.C.Idaho,  19  F.Supp."  587, 
affirmed  Treinies  v.  Sunshine  Mining 
Co.,  99  >F.2d  -651,  affirmed  60  &Ct.  44, 
308  U.S.  66,  84  L.Ed.  85,  rehearing 
denied  60  S.Ct.  464,  309  U.S.  693,  84 
L.Ed.  1034. 

No  Judgment  constitutes  a  Hen  OIL 
property  against  which  it  cannot  be 
enforced. — Hart  v.  Atwood,  119  So. 
116,  96  Fla.  66-7. 

92.  CaL — Evans .  v.  Superior  Court 
of  Los  Angeles  County,  124  P.2d 
820,  20  CaX2d  186. 

Iowa.— Starits  v.  Avery,  213  N.W. 
769,  204  Iowa  401. 

906 


Neb.— Brownell  v.  Svoboda,  223  N. 
W.  641,  118  Neb.  7=6. 

93.  Ala.— Hargett  v.  Hovater,  15  So. 
2d    276,    244    Ala.    646— Ex    parte 
Scharnagel,   136   So.   834,   223  Ala. 
4,    certiorari    denied    136    So.    835, 
223   Ala.   487— Morris   v.  Waldrop, 
105  So.  172,  213  Ala.  435. 

Property  subject  to  lien 

Where  Judgment  for  a  certain  sum 
became  money  in  hands  of  a  stake- 
holder, such  money  was  property 
subject  to  levy,  and,  when  such  judg- 
ment became  leviable  property,  the 
lien  of  a  recorded  judgment  obtained 
against  the  judgment  creditor  fast- 
ened itself  on  such  money  and  sub- 
jected it  to  payment  of  the  Judg- 
ment.— Huckabee  v.  Stephens,  195  So. 
295,  29  Ala.Aftp.  259. 
Property  not  subject  to  lien 

Mortgage  given  to  judgment  debt- 
or.—White  v..  Gibson,  128  So.  734, 
221  Ala.  279. 

94.  111. — East  St.  Louis  'Lumber  Co. 
v.  Schnipper,  141  N.E.  -542,  3*10  m. 
150. 

N.Y.— H.  B.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Smith,  151 
N.B.  448,  242  N.T.  267,  45  A.L.R. 
554. 

95.  HI.— East  St  Louis  Lumber  Co. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  472 


the  land  of  the  judgment  debtor,9*  with  its  inci- 
dences and  appurtenances,97  provided  it  is  subject 
to  execution,9*  but  not  to  the  rents,  issues,  and 


w 

profits  of  such  land,"  although  they  may  be  sub- 
jected to  the  lien  in  equity.1 

The  lien  does  not  attach  to  personal  property2 


v.  Schnipper,  141  N.E.  S42,  310  111. 

150 — Lehman   v.   Cottrell,    19   N.E. 

2d  111,  298  Ill.App.  434. 
Md. — Messinger  v.  Eckenrode,  15i8  A. 

357,    162   Md.    63— Caltrider  v.  Ca- 

ples,    153   A.    445,   160   Md.   392,  «7 

A.L.R.  1500. 
Mont. — Gaines    v.    Van    Remark,    74 

P.2d  454,  106  Mont.  1. 
S.C. — Ex  parte  Johnson,  145  -S.E.  113, 

147  S.C.  259.      . 
34  C.  J.  p  -568  note  81. 
Judgment  lien  as  creature  of  statute 

generally  see  supra  §  454. 

98.  'U.S.— Ton  Segerlund  v.  Dysart, 
C.C.A.Cal.,  137  F.2d  755— Ackroyd 
v.  Brady  Irr.  Co.,  D.CMont,  27  F. 
Supp.  503,  cause  reversed  and  re- 
manded on  other  grounds,  C.C.A., 
Ackroyd  v.  Winston  Bros.  Co.,  113 
F.2d  657— -In  re  Day,  D.CMd.,  22 
•F.Supp.  946. 

Ariz. — Steinfeld  v.  Copper  State  Min- 
ing Co.,  290  P.  155,  37  Ariz.  151. 

Cal. — Parsons  v.  Robinson,  274  P. 
528,  206  Cal.  378 — Wellborn  v. 
Wellborn,  131  P.2d  48,  55  CaLApp. 
2d  516 — Helvey  v.  Bank  of  Amer- 
ica Nat.  Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n,  111 
P.2d  390,  43  Cal.A-pp.2d  532. 

Fla.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Peel,  145 
So.  177,  107  Fla.  413. 

111.— Logar  v.  O'Brien,  171  N.E.  «629, 
339  111.  628. 

Kan.— Staker  v.  Gillen,  53  P.2fl  821, 
143  Kan.  212. 

Mont.— Siuru  v.  Sell,  91  P.2d  411,  108 
Mont.  438,  123  A.L.R.  423— Gaines 
v.  Van  Demark,  74  P.2d  454,  106 
Mont.  1. 

N.M.— National  Mut  Savings  &  .Loan 
Ass'n  v.  Lake,  141  P.2d  188,  47  N. 
M.  223. 

U.C. — City  of  Durham  v.  Pollard,  14 
S.E.2d  818,  219  N.C.  750— Thomp- 
son v.  Avery  County,  5  S.B.2d  146, 
216  N.C.  405. 

N.D.— Aberle  v.  Merkel,  291  N.W. 
913,  70  N.D.  89. 

S.C.— Ex  parte  Johnson,  145  S.E.  113, 
147  S.C.  259 — Weatherly  v.  Medlin, 
139  -S.E.  633,  141  S.C.  290. 

Tex. — Texas  Building  and  Mortgage 
Co.  v.  Morris,  Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d 
365,  error  dismissed. 

Va.— Clones  v.  Hall,  15  S.E.2d  108, 
177  Va.  658— Boggs  v.  .Fatherly,  13 
S.E.2d  '295,  177  Va.  259— Miller  v. 
Kemp,  WO  S.B.  203,  157  Va.  178, 
84  A.L.R.  980— Kidwell  v.  Hender- 
son, 143  S.B.  336,  150  Va.  829. 

W.Va. — McFarland  v.  Fish,  12  S.E. 
548,  34  W.Va.  548. 

34  C.J.  p  587  note  13. 

97.    u.S. — La  Crosse  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 

James,  Wis.,  6  WalL  750,  18  JlEd. 

854. 
34  C.J.  p  587  note  14. 


Timber 

(1)  Timber  located  on  real  estate 
subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment  was 
included  within  the  lien. 

La. — Creston  Lumber  Co.  v.  Cocker- 
ham's  Estate,  2  La.  App.  29. 

Pa. — Havens  v.  Pearson,  6  A.2d  84, 
334  Pa.  570,  122  A.L.R.  512. 

(2)  Judgment  lien  on  land  was  a 
lien    on    the    timber   thereon    before 
and  after  the  timber  was  cut,  and,  in 
equity,  followed  the  proceeds  of  sale 
thereof. — Stuart  v.  Picfcett,  10  So.2d 
207,  193  Miss.  455. 

(3)  A    contract   whereby    a    judg- 
ment debtor  sold  standing  timber  on 
land  and  allowed  purchaser  twenty 
years  for  removal  did  not  create  an 
immediate  severance  and  conversion 
of  the  timber  such  as  to  withdraw 
timber  from  lien  of  judgment  cred- 
itor, the  standing  timber  continuing 
to  be  realty  as  to  the  judgment  not- 
withstanding  a    sale    of    personalty 
was   intended  as  between  judgment 
debtor  and  purchaser;   fiction  of  im- 
mediate  severance  as   between   ven- 
dor and  vendee   did  not  operate   to 
permit   judgment   debtor   to   remove 
standing     timber     from     judgment 
creditor's  lien  against  land  by  pur- 
ported sale  to  third  person. — Havens 
v.   Pearson,    6  A.2d  84,   334  Pa.  €70, 
122  A.L.R.  512. 

Minerals  on  laud 

An  agreement  by  which  landown- 
ers "granted,  bargained,  sold,  let  and 
leased"  limestone  under  land,  with 
right  of  ingress  to  mine  to  remove 
limestone,  in  consideration  of  royal- 
ty for  limestone  mined,  was  a  "sale 
of  limestone  in  place  as  land," 
and  landowners  retained  interest  in 
limestone  to  which  lien  of  judgment 
against  landowners  attached. — Burke 
v.  Kerr,  19  A.2d  382,  341  Pa,  304. 

Oil  royalty  interest 

The  recording  and  indexing  of 
judgment  against  grantor  of  oil 
royalty  interest,  which  is  realty  and 
which  was  transferred  to  grantee  by 
conveyance  that  was  not  recorded 
until  after  recording  of  the  Judg- 
ment, caused  judgment  lien  to  at- 
tach to  the  royalty  Interest  under 
statute  providing  that,  when  any 
judgment  has  been  recorded  and  in- 
dexed, it  shall,  from  date  of  such 
record  and  index,  operate  as  a  lien 
on  all  "realty"  of  defendant  in  the 
county. — Munzeshelmer  v.  Leopold, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  163  S.W.2d  663,  error 
refused.  -  . 

Judgment  on.  bond  accompanying 
mortgage  acquires  no  higher  right 
against  fixtures  sold  under  condi- 
tional sales  contract  than  mortgage. 

907 


— Ridgway  Dynamo  &  Engine  Co.  v. 
Werder,  135  A.  216,  287  Pa.  358. 
98:     Ala.— Robinson    v.    Shearer,     99 

•So.  179,  211  Ala.  16. 

la. — First   Nat.    Bank  v.    Peel,  .145 

So.  1'77,  107  Fla.  413. 
Mont.— Siuru    v.    Sell,    91    P.2d    411, 

108  Mont.  43-8,  123  A.L.R.  423. 
S.C. — Ex  parte  Johnson,  145  S.E.  113, 

147  S.C.  259. 
34  C.J.  p  587  note  15. 
Assignment  of  homestead  as  affect- 
ing judgment  lien  see  Homesteads 

§  149  a. 
Homesteads  as  subject  to  judgment 

liens  see  Homesteads  §  109. 

99.    Pa.— Leedon  v,  Plymouth  R.  Co., 

5  Watts  &  S.  265. 
34  C.J.  p  587  note  16. 

1.  U.S.— tJ.    S.    v.    Butler,    C.C.N.T., 
25  F.Cas.No.14,696,   2  Blatchf.   201. 

34  C.J.  p  587  note  17. 

2.  U.S.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Von 
Segerlund    v.     Dysart,    C.OA,Cal., 
137  F.2d  755,  757. 

Ark. — Industrial    Machinery    Co.    v. 

Timbrook,  151  S.W.2d  665,  202  Ark. 

609. 
Kan.— Staker  v.  Gillen,  53  P.2d  821, 

143   Kan.   212— Beren  v.    Marshall 

Oil  &  Gas  Corporation,  251  P.  192, 

122  Kan.  134. 
La.— Hankins    v.    Sallard,    App.,    188 

So.  411. 

N.C.— Moore  v.  Jones.  36  S.E.2d  920. 
34  C.J.  p  587  note  22. 
Share    of    stock    in    corporation    as 

personal  property  see  Corporations 

§  194  c  (2). 
Property  not  subject  to  lien 

(1)  Timber  when  cut  and  removed. 
— Creston    Lumber    Co.    v.    Cocker- 
ham's  Estate,  2  La. App.  29. 

(2)  Vendor's  lien  notes  on  realty, 
and  unsatisfied  judgment  foreclosing 
lien. — Sugg  v.  Mozoch,  Tex.Civ.App., 
293  S.W.  907. 

(3)  Vendor's   and   mechanic's   lien 
notes    and   contractor's    lien. — South 
Texas  Lumber  Co.  v.  Nicoletti,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,    54    S.W.2d   893,    error   dis- 
missed. 

(4)  Other  property  see  34   C.J.  p 
587  note  22  [a]. 

DeTbt 

(1)  The  lien  of  an  enrolled  Judg- 
ment does  not  cover  the  right  to  re- 
ceive or  recover  a  debt  due  to  the 
judgment  debtor. — Shuptrine  v.  Nat- 
albany  Lumber  Co.,   198  So.  24,  189 
Miss.  409. 

(2)  Injured     persons'     judgments 
against  insured  held  not  lien  on  in- 
surer's  indebtedness   under  automo- 
bile liability  policy. — Michel  v.  Amer- 
ican Fire  &  Casualty  Co.,  C.C.A.Fla,, 
£2  F.2d  583. 


472 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


except  where  a  statute  so  provides,5* as  where  the 
statute  makes  the  judgment  a  lien  on  all  property 
of  the  judgment  debtor  which  is  subject  to  levy 
and  sale  under  execution,4  although  it  has  been  held 
that  a  chancery  decree  may,  in  terms,  establish  liens 
on  personalty  so  as  to  bind  all  persons  having  no- 
tice thereof.5  In  jurisdictions  where  the  lien  does 
attach  to  personal  property,  such  property  has  been 
held  not  subject  to  the  lien  unless  it  is  also  subject 
to  execution,6  and  therefore  that  the  lien  does  not 
attach  to  choses  in  action,7  except  as  provided  by 
statute.8  The  lien  attaches  to  chattels  real  in  some 
jurisdictions,^  although  not  in  others.10 

Crops.  Under  some  statutes  the  lien  of  a  judg- 
ment attaches  to  mature  crops  ready  for  harvest,  but 
not  to  growing  crops.11 


§.473. 


Location  of  Property 


The  Hen  of  a  Judgment  extend*  to  property  of  the 
Judgment  debtor  located  in  the  county  in  which  the  judg- 
ment Is  entered,  and  under  statutes  generally  In  force 
Is  ordinarily  confined  to  the  limits  of  the  county  In  which 
it  was  rendered  and  docketed. 


The  lien  of  a  judgment  extends  to  property  of 
the  judgment  debtor  located  in  the  county  in  which 
the  judgment  is  entered  or  docketed12  and,  although 
under  some  statutes  the  lien  may  extend  to  all 
property  of  the  debtor  in  the  state,1*  under  the  stat- 
utes generally  in  force  the  lien  of  a  judgment  is  con- 
fined to  the  limits  of  the  particular  county  in  which 
it  was  rendered  and  docketed,  and  does  not  affect 
lands  of  the  judgment  debtor  lying  in  another  coun- 
ty,14 unless  it  be  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the  state,15 
or  unless  the  land  in  such  other  county  is  seized  in 
execution,18  or,  as  considered  supra  §  462,  unless  it 
is  transferred  to  such  other  county  by  filing  a  tran- 
script of  the  judgment  there.  Where,  however,  a 
judgment  lien  attaches  on  lands  in  a  certain  county, 
and  afterward  a  new  county  is  set  off,  within 
which  these  lands  or  part  of  them  fall,  the  lien  does 
not  cease  by  reason  of  such  new  organization,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  it  holds  during  the  full  statutory 
period  without  any  further  record.17  Where  a 
judgment  is  docketed  in  two  counties  it  becomes  a 
lien  on  the  land  of  the  judgment  debtor  in  both 
counties.18 


Judgment 

Under  decree  allowing:  solicitor's 
fee  for  services  in  conducting  par- 
tition suit  solicitor's  right  was  in- 
tangible property,  and  such  decree 
was  not  subject  to  lien  of  judg- 
ment against  solicitor. — Bank  ol 
Monticello  v.  L.  D.  Powell  Co.,  130 
So.  292,  159  Miss.  183. 

3.  U.S. — Corpus  {Taxis  quoted  in  Yon 
Segerlund    v.    Dysart,    C.C.A.CaU 
137  P.2d  755,  767. 

Gsu— Bradley  v.  Booth,  9  S.K2d  861, 

62  Ga.App.  770. 
34  C.J.  p  588  note  23. 
Statute  held  not  to  provide  for  lie* 
on  personalty 

Statute  providing  that  any  money 
judgment  shall  be  a  lien  on  the  debt- 
or's realty  from  the  date  of  filing  a 
transcript  of  the  docket  of  such 
judgment — Von  Segerlund  v.  Dy- 
sart, C.C.A.Cal.,  137  F.2d  755. 

4.  Ala. — Birmingham    News    Co.    v. 
Barren    G.    Collier,    Inc.,    103    So. 
839,     212    Ala.     655— Johnston    v. 
Bates,   95   So.  375,  209  Ala,  IS. 

34  C.J.  p  588  note  23. 

5.  Iowa.— Kithcart  v.  Kithcart,  124 
N.W.  305,  145  Iowa  549,  30  L.R.A., 
N.S.,  1062. 

6.  Ala, — Gaston   v.   Marengo    Impr. 
Co.,  36  So.  738,  139  Ala,  465. 

34  C.J.  p  588  note  25. 

7.  Ga. — Citizens'  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.    Pendergrass   Banking  Co.,    138 
S.E.  223,  164  Ga,  302— Norris  v.  Ai- 
kens,  117  S.E.  248,  155  Ga.  488. 

34  C.J.  p  588  note  26. 

Share    of    stock    in    corporation    as 

chose  in  action  see  Corporations  § 

194  c  (4), 


8.  Corporate  stock 

Under  statutes  lien  of  judgment 
was  held  not  to  attach  to  shares  of 
corporate  stock  which  are  choses  in 
action  on  rendition  of  judgment,  but 
only  after  notice  to  the  corporation 
as  prescribed  by  law. — Fourth  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  127  S.B.  729, 
160  Ga.  372. 
34  C.J.  p  -588  note  26  [a]  (2). 

9.  Ind.— Ball    v.    Barnett,    39    Ind. 
53. 

N.T.— Holland  v.   Grote,   86  N.E.  30, 

195  N.T.  262. 
Leasehold    interest    as    subject    to 

judgment  lien  see  infra  §  482. 

10.  Tex. — Bourn    v.    Robinson,    107 
S.W.  873,  49  Tex.Civ.App.  157. 

11.  Miss.— Harris  v.  Harris,  116  So, 
731,  150  Miss.  729. 

34  C.J.  p  588  note  23  .[a]. 

12.  Md. — Messinger    v.     Eckenrode, 
158  A.  357,  162  Md.  63. 

Mo.— Dano    v.    Sharpe,    152    S.W.2d 

693,  236  Mo.App.  113. 
Mont.— Siuru    v.    Sell,    91    P.2d    411, 

108  Mont  438,  123  A.L.K.  423. 
N.C.— Moore  v.  Jones,  36  S.E.2d  920 
— City  of  Durham  v.   Pollard,   14 
S.E.2d   818,   219  N.C.   750— Thomp- 
son v.  Avery  County,  5  S.E.2d  146, 
216  N.C.  405. 
Okl. — White    House    Lumber   Co.   v. 

Howard,  286  P.  327,  142  Okl.  163. 
Tex. — John  F.  Grant  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Hunnicutt.    Civ.App.f     143    S.W.2d 
976. 
34  C.J.  p  586  note  7. 

A  decree  entered  in.  United  States 
district  court  in  Bade  County,  Flor- 
ida, became  a  lien  on  real  estate  be- 
longing to  judgment  debtor  in  that 

908 


county. — B.  A.  Lott,  Inc.,  v.  Padgett, 
14  S6.2d  667,  153  Ma.  304. 

13.  Va. — Gatewood     v.     Goode,     23 
Gratt,  880,  64  Va.  880. 

34  C.J.  p  586  note  9  [a],  [f]. 
Judgment  docketed  in  county  of  de- 
fendant's residence 
Where  a  statute  provides  that  a 
judgment  obtained  and  properly 
docketed  in  the  county  of  defendant's 
residence  is  a  lien  on  all  personal 
property  of  the  judgment  debtor  in 
any  county  in  the  state,  removal  of 
the  debtor*  from  the  county  in  which 
the  judgment  is  so  docketed  does  not 
affect  the  lien. — Bradley  v.  Booth,  9 
S.E.2d  861,  62  Ga.App.  770. 

14.  Ala. — Morris    v.    Waldrop,     105 
So.  172,  213  Ala,  435. 

111. — Haugens  v.  Holmes,  41  N.E.2d 
109,  314  ULApp.  166. 

Iowa.— Bates  v.  Nichols,  274  N.W. 
32,  223  Iowa  878. 

34  C.J.  p  586  note  7. 

Lien  of  judgment  against  railroad 
see  Railroads  §  260,  also  51  C.J.  p 
809  notes  40-45. 

Transfer  of  judgment  by  transcript 
from  one  county  to  another  gen- 
erally see  supra  8  129. 

15.  Miss. — Josselyn     v.     Stone,     28 
Miss.  753. 

16.  Iowa. — Harrington  v.  Clark,  202 
N.W.  84,  199  Iowa  340. 

34  C.J.  p  586  note  10. 
Lien  of  execution  see  Executions  $$ 
123-138. 

17.  Pa,— Clough    v.    Welsh,    78    A. 
1000,  229  Pa,  386. 

34  C.J.  p  587  note  11. 

18.  N.D.— Aberle  v.  Merkel,   291  N. 
W.  913,  TO  N.D.  89.. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  474 


Lands  in  another  state  or  country.  A  judgment 
rendered  in  one  state  or  country  does  not  operate 
extraterritorially  so  as  to  constitute  a  lien  on  lands 
in  another  state  or  country.1^ 

Purchaser  acknowledging  lien.  Where  a  judg- 
ment debtor  sells  lands,  both  he  and  the  purchaser 
supposing  them  to  be  bound  by  the  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment, and  the  purchaser  undertaking  to  pay  the 
judgment  as  a  part  of  the  consideration,  the  lat- 
ter cannot  afterward  refuse  to  pay  the  judgment 
on  discovering  that  it  was  never  recorded  in  the 
county  where  the  lands  lie.20 


§  474. 


Property  Previously  Transferred 


A  judgment  does  not  attach  as  a  lien  on  property 
which  formerly  belonged  to  the  judgment  debtor  but 
which,  before  rendition  of  the  judgment,  had  been  sold 
or  aliened  in  good  faith. 

A  judgment  does  not  attach  as  a  lien  on  property 


which  before  its  rendition  had  been  sold  -  or  aliened 
by  the  owner  in  good  faith,21  or  given  away  by  him 
under  a  valid  donation,22  or,  except  as  otherwise 
provided  in  the  decree  for  sale,23  sold  at  judicial 
sale,24  or  which  -had  passed  under  an  assignment 
for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors,25  or  which  had  been 
transferred  to  liquidating  trustees  in  accordance 
with  a  plan  of  reorganization  for  the  purpose  of 
liquidation,26  or  which  had  come  into  the  custody 
or  possession  of  the  court  in  another  proceeding;27 
but  a  deed  given  as  "collateral  security"  does  not 
divest  the  grantor  of  interest  in  the  land  so  as  to 
prevent  a  subsequent  judgment  against  him  from 
becoming  a  lien  against  it,28  nor  does  a  void  deed 
to  a  dissolved  corporation  have  this  effect29 

Generally  the  fact  that  the  prior  conveyance  by 
the  judgment  debtor  was  not  recorded  before  the 
entry  of  judgment  does  not  make  the  judgment  a 


19.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Carpenter  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  C.C. 
A.Mo.,  103  F.2d  996,  1000,  vacated 
60  S.Ct.  416,  309  U.S.  23,  84  L.Ed. 
558,  rehearing  denied  60  S.Ct  585, 
309  U.S.  695,  84  L.Ed.  1035. 

Mo. — Dano  v.  Sharpe,  152  S.W.2d 
693,  236  Mo.App.  113. 

$4  C.J.  p  586  note  5. 

Extraterritorial  operation  of  judg- 
ment generally  see  supra  §  448. 

30.  N.Y.— -Haverly  v.  Becker,  4  N.Y. 
169. 

21.    Ark. — Oliver  v.  Henry  Quellmalz 

Lumber  &  Mfg.  Co.,  282  S.W.  355, 

170  Ark.  1029. 
Cte. — S.   T.   &  W.  A.   Dewees  Co.  v. 

Paul  B.  Carter  &  Co.,  8  S.E.2d  376, 

190  Ga.  68. 
111.— Schaeffer  v.  Potzel,  238  Ill.App. 

335. 
Iowa. — Nagl   v.  Hermsen,    257   N.W. 

583,  219  Iowa  223. 
Ky.— Gilbert  v.  Watts,  Hitter  &  Co., 

60    S.W.2d   142,    249   Ky.    27— Oder 

v.    Jump,    108    S.W.   292,    32   Ky.L*. 

1276. 
N.J.— McLaughlin  v.  Whaland,  13  A. 

2d  573,  127  N.J.EQ.  893. 
Pa. — Corpus   Juris   quoted  in  Davis 

v.    Commonwealth    Trust    Co.,     7 

A.2d  3V   6,   335  Pa.   387— Schuler  v. 
.      Kovatch,    28    Pa.Dist    &    Co.    485, 

17  Lehigh  CO.L..J.  147. 
,Tex. — Fitzgerald  v.  Le  Grande,  Civ. 

App.,    187    S.W.2d    155— Steele    v. 

Harris,  Civ.App.,   2  S.W.2d  537. 
V«u— Jones    v.    Hall,    15    S.E.2d    108, 

177  Va.   658. 
54  C.J.  p  588  note  29. 
Interests  of  parties  to  executory  con- 
.    tract  of  sale  see  infra  §  480. 
Property  fraudulently  conveyed  see 

infra  §  475: 

Subsequent    registration   of   convey- 
ance to  Judgment  debtor 

A  judgment  was  not  a  lien  on  land; 


which  judgment  debtor  had  conveyed 
by  deed  duly  registered  more  than 
five  years  prior  to  entry  and  dock- 
eting of  judgment,  notwithstanding 
the  deed  by  which  judgment  debtor 
acquired  the  title  thus  conveyed  was 
not  registered  until  after  entry  and 
docketing  of  judgment  and  notwith- 
standing- statute  making  unregistered 
deed  invalid  to  pass  title  as  against 
creditors  of  grantor  until  registered. 
—City  of  Durham  v.  Pollard,  14  S.E. 
2d  818,  219  N,C.  750. 
Subcontract 

Creditor  who  obtained  judgment 
against  subcontractor  after  subcon- 
tractor assigned  subcontract  was 
held  not  entitled  to  balance  due  on 
subcontract  from  principal  contrac- 
tor.— Albert  Pipe  Supply  Co.  v.  Cal- 
lanan,  283  N.Y.S.  716,  157  Misc.  136, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  288  N.Y.S. 
307,  159  Misc.  547. 
Foreclosure  of  vendor's  Hen, 

Filing  abstract  of  judgment  after 
foreclosure  of  vendor's  lien  created 
no  lien. — Home  Trading  Co.  v.  Hicks, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  296  S.W.  627,  reversed 
on  other  grounds,  Com. App.,  11  S.W. 
2d  292. 

22.  111.— Snow  v.   Hogan,   38  N.E.2d 
934,  312  Ill.App.  636. 

34  C.J.  p  588  note  30. 

23.  U.S.— Mills  v.  Smith,  C.C.A.Ind., 
113     F.2d    404,     certiorart    denied 
Smith  v.  Mills,  61  S.Ct  73,  311  U. 
S.  692,  85  L.Ed.  447. 

24.  Del. — In  re  Republic  Engineer- 
ing Co.,   130  A,   498,  3  W.W.Harr. 
81. 

34  C.J.  p  588  note  31. 

25.  Pa. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 

Davis  v.  Commonwealth  Trust  .Co., 
7  A.2d  3;  6,  335  Pa*  387. 
34  C.J.  p  588  note  32. 

909 


26.  Pa. — Davis     v.     Commonwealth 
Trust  Co.,  7  A.2d  3,  335  Pa,  387. 

27.  U.S. — Davis     v.     Seneca     Falls 
Mfg.     Co.,    D.C.N.Y.,     8     F.2d    546, 
modified  on  other  grounds,  C.CJU 
17  F.2d  546. 

Tex. — First  Nat.  Bank  of  Bowie  v. 
Cone,  Civ.App.,  170  S.W.2d  782,  er- 
ror refused. 

34  C.J.  p  595  note  4  [a]. 
Application,  pending  at  time  of  filing 

of  abstract  of  Judgment 
Record  qf  abstract  of  judgment 
against  corporation  was  ineffective 
to  secure  to  judgment  creditor  pref- 
erence lien  on  corporation's  land, 
where  corporation  was  insolvent  long 
before  abstract  of  judgment  was  filed 
for  record,  and  at  time  of  filing  of 
abstract  application  for  general  re- 
ceiver of  corporation  on  ground  of 
insolvency  was  pending  and  receiv- 
er was  afterwards  appointed  and 
qualified,  since  appointment  of  re- 
ceiver related  back  to  presentation 
of  application. — Baylor  University  v. 
Chester  Sav.  Bank,  Tex.Civ.App.,  82 
S.W.2d  738,  error  refused. 

After  order  of  conversion  by  chan- 
cery court,  a  judgment  creditor  can- 
not acquire  a  lien  on  land  as  such, 
and,  where  circuit  court  in  partition 
proceeding  had  previously  ordered 
land  sold,  judgment  creditor  of  par- 
ty interested  in  land  obtained  no  lien 
on  the  land  or  proceeds  thereof  by 
filing  in  circuit  clerk's  office  judg- 
ment that  had  been  obtained  in  dif- 
ferent county. — P.  Crigler  &  Son  v. 
Gire,  83  S.W.2d  529,  190  Ark.  1107. 

28.  N.T.— Graves    El.    Co.    v.    Seitz. 
,    104  N.T.S.  852,   54   Misc.   652. 
Attachment    of    judgment    lien    to 

equity  of  grantor  in  security  deed 
see  infra  §  479  b. 

29.  Or.— Klorfine  v.  Cole,  254  P.  200, 
121  Or.  76. 


§  474 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


lien  on  the  land  so  conveyed,30  at  least  where  the 
grantee  is  in  possession,  thus  affording  notice,31 
although  the  opposite  view  prevails  in  some  juris- 
dictions,82 and  the  lien  has  been  held  to  attach 
where  the  prior  conveyance  contained  a  wrong  de- 
scription of  the  property  so  that,  at  the  time  of  the 
judgment,  the  judgment  debtor,  rather  than  the 
vendee,  appeared  on  the  record  to  be  the  owner.33 
However,  if  the  circumstances  were  such  as  to  give 
the  judgment  creditor  notice  of  the  conveyance  not- 
withstanding the  misdescription,  the  judgment  is  in- 
valid as  a  lien  on  the  land.34  If  real  estate  is  trans- 
ferred while  a  judgment  is  dormant,  the  lien  of 
the  judgment  cannot,  on  revivor  thereof,  be  assert- 
ed against  such  real  estate.35  Where  the  lien  of  a 
judgment  did  not  originally  attach  to  certain  prop- 
erty because  it  had  been  conveyed  prior  to  the  judg- 
ment, revival  of  the  judgment  prior  to  a  decree  set- 
ting aside  the  conveyance  did  not  make  the  judg- 
ment a  lien  upon  the  property.36 

Effect  of  nunc  pro  tune  entry  of  judgment.  A 
judgment  entered  nunc  pro  tune  cannot  create  a 
lien  on  the  debtor's  lands  sold  or  mortgaged  prior 
to  the  date  of  its  actual  entry.37 

§  475.    Property  Fraudulently  Conveyed 

In  some  Jurisdictions,  but  not  In  others,  a  judgment 
rendered  after  a  fraudulent  transfer  becomes  a  Hen  on 
the  property  that  has  been  fraudulently  conveyed. 

There  is  some  dispute  among  the  authorities  as 
to  whether  or  not  a  judgment  rendered  after  a 


fraudulent  transfer  becomes  a  lien  on  the  property 
that  has  been  fraudulently  conveyed.3*  Thus  it  has 
been  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  an  after-ac- 
quired judgment  against  the  vendor  attaches  as  a 
lien  on  property  fraudulently  conveyed,39  and  this  is 
the  rule  generally  applied  where,  in  accordance  with 
the  principles  discussed  in  Fraudulent  Conveyances 
§  56,  a  conveyance  in  fraud  of  creditors  is  regarded 
as  void.40  In  other  jurisdictions,  however,  it  has 
been  held  that  a  judgment  is  not  a  lien  on  lands 
fraudulently  conveyed  before  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment,41 particularly  where  such  conveyance  is  re- 
garded as  merely  voidable,42  although  this  rule  does 
not  apply  to  a  case  where  there  is  a  secret  trust  and 
the  grantor  is  still  the  real  owner.43  If  a  judgment 
lien  does  exist  against  land  held  fraudulently  it 
ceases  to  operate  when  such  land  is  transferred  to  a 
bona  fide  purchaser.44 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  against  the  fraudulent 
grantee  attaches  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  gran- 
tor's creditors.45 

§  475.    Lands  Instantaneously  Seized 

Where  a  person  parts  with  a  freehold  estate  at  the 
same  time  and  as  a  part  of  the  same  act  or  transaction 
by  which  he  acquires  it,  his  seizin  for  an  Instant  does 
not  subject  the  estates  conveyed  to  him  to  the  lien  of  a 
Judgment  against  him. 

It  results  from  the  doctrine  limiting  the  judgment 
lien  to  the  actual  interest  of  the  judgment  debtor, 
discussed  infra  §  478,  that  as  a  general  rule,  where 


30.  N.Y. — Trenton    Banking    Co.    v. 
Duncan,  86  N.Y.  221. 

34  C.J.  p  589  note  34. 
Purpose  of  statutes 
Tenn. — Jefferson     County     Bank     v. 
Hale,  280  S.W.  408.  152  Tenn.  648. 

31.  Tex.— Steele  v.  Harris,  Civ.App., 
2  S.W.2d  537. 

32.  N.J. — Brink    v.    Flannagan,    101 
A.  274,  87  N.J.Eq.  630. 

jq-.C. — Eaton   v.    Doub,    128    S.E.   494, 

190  N.C.   14,   40  A.L.R.   273. 
34  C.J.  p  589  note  35. 

33.  La. — Adams  v.  Smith,  6  La.App. 
187. 

34.  N.J.— Charette     v.     Fruchtman, 
159  A.   318,    110   N.J.EQ.   256. 

35.  Neb. — Campagna  v.  Home  Own- 
ers'   Loan    Corporation,    3    N.W.2d 
750,  141  Neb.  429. 

36.  111.— Snow  v.   Hogan,   38   N.E.2d 
934,  312  Ill.App.  €36. 

37.  N.C.— Perrell  v.   Hales.   25   S.B. 
821,  119  N.C.  199. 

34  C.J.  p  589  note  36. 
Commencement  of  lien  of  judgment 
.  entered  or  amended  nunc  pro  tune 
see  supra  I  469. 


38.  Wyo.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Snyder  v.  Ryan,  270  P.  1072,  1075, 
39  Wyo.  266.  rehearing  denied  275 
P.  127,  39  Wyo.  266. 

34  C.J.  p  589  notes  38,  40. 

39.  Cal.— McGee    v.    Allen,    60    P.2d 
1026,  7  Cal.2d  468— Liuzza  v.  Bell, 
104    P.2d   1095,    40    CaLApp.2d   417. 

D.C.— Reilly  v.  Sabin,  81  F.2d  259, 
65  App.D.C.  125. 

Mo.— Dano  v.  Sharpe,  152  S.W.2d 
693,  236  Mo.App.  113. 

Va. — Matney  v.  Combs,  198  S.E.  469, 
171  Va.  244— Tucker  v.  Foster,  152 
S.E.  376,  154  Va,  182,  69  A.L.R. 
220. 

W.Va. — Nicholas  v.  Huffman,  5  S.E. 
2d  789,  121  W.Va.  615. 

34  C.J.  p  589  note  38. 

Execution  against  property  convey- 
ed before  judgment  see  Fraudu- 
lent Conveyances  §  308. 

Remedies  of  creditor  against  fraud- 
ulent conveyance  see  Fraudulent 
Conveyances  §§  304-465. 

40.  N.J.— McLaughlin    v.    Whaland, 
13  A.2d  573,  127  N.J.Eq.  393. 

Ohio. — Ecker    v.    Switzer,    17    Ohio 

App.  90. 
34  C.J.  p  589  note  38. 

910 


Intent  known  to  grantee 

Under  statute  making  such  con- 
veyance void  as  to  creditors,  judg- 
ments bind  all  property  conveyed 
by  defendant  prior  to  Judgment  with 
intent  to  defraud  creditors,  where 
intent  is  known  to  grantee. — Coleman 
v.  Law,  154  S.E.  445,  170  Ga.  906, 
74  A.L.R.  684. 

41.  Ark.— Leonard   v.    State,    278    S. 
W.  654,  170  Ark.  41. 

Ill,— De  Martini  v.  De  Martini,  52 
N.E.2d  138,  385  111.  128— Cutler  v. 
Hicks,  268  Ill.App.  161. 

34  C.J.  p  589  note  40. 

42.  111.— De  Martini  v.  De  Martini, 
52  N.E.2d  138,  385  111.  128. 

34  C.J.  p  589  note  40. 

43.  111.— Pease   v.   Frank,    105    NJ3. 
299,  263  111.  500. 

44.  Wyo. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Snyder  v.  Ryan,  270  P.  1072,  1075, 
39  Wyo.  266,  rehearing  denied  275 
P.  127,  39  Wyo.  266. 

34  C.J.  p  589  note  39. 

45.  Tex. — York  v.  Robins,  CiY.App., 
240  S.W.  603, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  477 


a  person  parts  with  a  freehold  estate  at  the  same 
time  and  as  a  part  of  the  same  act  or  transaction 
by  which  he  acquires  it,  his  seizin  for  an  instant 
does  not  subject  the  estates  conveyed  to  him  to  the 
lien  of  a  judgment  against  him.4^  Thus,  where  a 
third  person  is  made  a  medium  for  the  conveyance 
by  a  husband  to  his  wife,  a  judgment  lien  against 
such  third  person  does  not  attach  to  the  property.47 


§  477. 


After- Acquired  Property 


Although  In  a  few  jurisdictions  the  rule  is  otherwise, 
generally  the  lien  of  a  judgment  attaches  not  only  to 
property  owned  by  the  debtor  at  the  time  of  the  judg- 
ment, but  also  to  all  that  he  may  subsequently  acquire 
during  the  life  of  the  lien. 

In  a  few  jurisdictions  a  judgment  is  not  a  lien 
on  after-acquired  property,48  but  under  the  statutes 
of  most  jurisdictions  the  lien  of  a  judgment  attach- 
es, not  only  to  property  owned  by  the  debtor  at  the 


time  of  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  but  also  to 
all  that  he  may  subsequently  acquire  during  the  life 
of  the  lien.4^  The  lien  of  a  judgment  does  not  at- 
tach to  property  acquired  by  the  judgment  debtor 
after  the  lien  has  ceased  to  be  effective.5**  The  lien 
has  been  held  to  attach  to  after-acquired  real  es- 
tate although  the  instrument  by  which  the  title  is 
acquired  is  unrecorded,51  but  there  is  also  authority 
holding  that  the  lien  attaches  only  after  the  debtor's 
title  is  disclosed  of  record.52  The  lien  on  after-ac- 
quired property  is  superior  to  any  equity  which  the 
grantor  could  retain  by  a  parol  agreement  or  sub- 
sequent recorded  conveyance.58 

Under  the  rule  as  to  instantaneous  seizin,  dis- 
cussed supra  §  476,  it  has  been  held  that  if  one 
sells  and  conveys  real  estate  to  which  he  has  no 
title  or  an  imperfect  title  at  the  time  of  the  sale, 
and  subsequently  acquires  a  perfect  title,  it  inures 


46.  U.S. — Edwards  v.  Weil,  Term.,  99 
P.   822,  40  C.C.A.  105. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Johan- 
nes v.  Dwire,  23  P.2d  971,  972,  94 
Mont.  590. 

34  C.J.  p  590  note  44. 

Transitory  seizin  by  judgment  debt- 
or in  trust  for  another  as  not  sub- 
jecting lands  to  judgment  lien  see 
infra  §  481  a. 

47.  N.Y.— O'Donnell     v.     Kerr,     50 
How.Pr.  334. 

48.  U.S. — In  re  Marcus,  D.C.Pa.,  32 
F.2d  719— Corpns  Juris  cited  in  U. 
S.  v.  Taft,  D.G.Oal.,  44  F.Supp.  564, 
567,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  Citizens  Nat. 
Trust  &  Savings  Bank  of  Los  An- 
geles v.  U.  S.,  135  P.2d  527. 

Ariz. — Steinfeld  v.  Copper  State  Min- 
'ing  Co.,  290  P.  155,  37  Ariz.  151. 

Pa. — General  Casmir  Pulaski  Build- 
ing &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Provident 
Trust  Co.  of  Philadelphia,  12  A.2d 
336,  338  Pa.  198— Calhoon  v.  New- 
Ion,  40  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  123. 

34  C.J.  P  590  note  45. 

Execution  lien  see  Executions  §  125. 

49.  U.S. — Commercial  Credit  Co.  v. 
Davidson,  C.C.A.Miss,,  112  F.2d  54 
—Corpus  Juris   cited  in  U.   S.   v. 
Taft,  D.C.Cal.,  44  F.Supp.  564,  567, 
affirmed,      C.C.A.,      Citizens      Nat. 
Trust  £  Savings  Bank  of  Los  An- 
geles v.  U..  S.,   135   F.2d  527. 

Ala.— W.  T.  Kawleigh  Co.  v.  Pat- 
terson, 195  So.  729,  239  Ala,  309. 

Cal. — Parsons  v.  Robinson,  274  P. 
528,  206  Cal.  378— Helvey  v.  Bank 
of  America  Nat.  Trust  &  Savings 
Ass'n,  111  P.2d  390,  43  Cal.App.2d 
532.  v 

Fla.— B.  A.  Lott,  Inc.  v.  Padgett,  14 
So.2d  667,  153  Fla.  304 — Porter- 
Mallard  Co.  v.  Bugger.  157  So,  429, 
117  Fla.  137. 

Ga.— Bostwick    v.    Felder,    App.,    35 


S.E.2d    783— Bradley    v.    Booth,    9 
S.B.2d    861,    62    Ga.App.    770. 

IncL — Peet  v.   Beers,   4   Ind.   46. 

Md. — Messinger  v.  Eckenrode,  158  A. 
357,  162  Md.  63. 

Minn. — Farmers'  &  Merchants'  State 
Bank  of  Thief  River  Rails  v. 
Stageberg,  201  N.W.  612,  161  Minn. 
413. 

Mont — Gaines  v.  Van  Demark,  74  P. 
2d  454,  106  Mont.  1— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  Johannes  v.  Dwire,  23  P. 
2d  971,  972,  94  Mont.  590 — Isom 
v.  Larson,  255  P.  1049,  78  Mont. 
395. 

N.C.— City  of  Durham  v.  Pollard,  14 
S.B.2d  818,  219  N.C.  750— Thomp- 
son v.  Avery  County,  5  S.E.2d  146, 
216  N.C.  405— Keel  v.  Bailey,  198 
S.E.  654,  214  N.C.  159. 

N.D.— Aberle  v.  Merkel,  291  N.W. 
913,  70  N.D.  89. 

Okl.— Miller  v.  J.  I.  Case  Threshing 
Mach.  Co.,  300  P.  399,  149  Okl.  281. 

Or.— Duke  v.  Low,  296  P.  45,  135  Or. 
460— Budd  v.  Gallier,  89  P.  638, 
50  Or.  42. 

S.D.— Security  Nat.  Bank  of  Sioux 
Falls  v.  Lowrie,  238  N.W.  304,  59 
S.D.  102. 

Va.— Jones  v.  Hall,  15  S.E.2d  108, 
177  Va.  658— Miller  v.  Kemp,  160 
S.E.  203,  157  Va.  178,  84  A.L.R.  980. 

Wis.— Musa  v.  Segelke  &  Kohlhaus 
Co.,  272  N.W.  657,  224  Wis.  432, 
111  A.L.R.  168. 

34  C.J.  p  590  note  47. 

Commencement  of  judgment  lien  as 
to  after-acquired  property  see  su- 
pra §  466. 

Property    held    not    "acviired"    "by 

debtor  on  Ms  death 
Where,  at  time  of  recovery,  dock- 
eting, and  recording  of  judgment 
on  debtor's  separate  indebtedness, 
realty  involved  was  community  prop- 
erty of  debtor  and  his  wife  and 
debtor  died  within  five  years  after 

911 


the  docketing  of  the  judgment,  the 
lien  of  judgment  did  not  attach  on 
debtor's  separate  interest  in  the 
community  realty  on  death  of  debtor 
since  when  debtor  passed  away  his 
interest  in  the  community  which 
during  his  lifetime  was  exempt  from 
the  lien  of  judgment  was  not  "later 
acquired"  by  him  within  statute  pro- 
viding that,  after  recording,  a  judg- 
ment shall  become  a  lien  for  period 
of  five  years  on  all  real  property  of 
the  debtor  whether  the  property  is 
then  owned  by  debtor  or  is  "later 
acquired." — Tway  v.  Payne,  101  P. 
2d  455,  55  Ariz.  343. 
Joint  tenancy 

When  a  creditor  has  a  judgment 
lien  against  interest  of  one  joint 
tenant  he  can  keep  his  lien  alive  and 
wait  until  joint  tenancy  is  terminat- 
ed by  death  of  one  of  joint  tenants, 
and,  if  judgment  debtor  survives, 
judgment  lien  immediately  attaches 
to  entire  property. — Zeigler  v.  Bon- 
nell,  126  P.2d  118,  52  Cal.App.2d  217. 

50.  U.S. — In   re    Schuneman,    C.C.A. 
111.,  290  F.  200. 

Mo. — Woods   v.   Wilson,    108    S.W.2d 

12,  341  Mo.  479. 
Duration'  of  lien  see  infra   §§   489- 

491. 

51.  La.— Gallaugher       v.       Hebrew 
Cong.,    35    La. Ann.    829 — Logan   v. 
Herbert,  30  La.Ann.  727. 

52.  Mont. — Johannes    v.    Dwire,    23 
P.2d    971,    94    Mont    590— Isom   v. 
Larson,  255  P.  1049,  78  Mont  395. 

Every  interest  shown  by  record 

Judgment  lien  reaches  every  in- 
terest of  judgment  debtor  in  land 
which  record  of  title  shows  he  had, 
either  before  or  after  judgment  was 
docketed.— Miller  v.  Kemp,  160  S.E. 
203,  157  Va.  178,  84  A.L.R.  980.  » 

53.  N.C. — Colonial  Trust  Co.  v.  Ster- 
chie,  85  S.B.  40,  169  N.C.  21. 


§  478 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


immediately  to  the  benefit  of  the  grantee,  and,  if 
between  the  date  of  the  conveyance  and  the  acqui- 
sition of  the  perfect  title  a  judgment  is  rendered 
against  the  grantor,  the  title  of  the  grantee  is  supe- 
rior to  that  of  the  judgment  creditor,  since  there  is 
no  moment  of  time  at  which  the  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment could  attach;54  but  there  is  some  authority 
to  the  contrary.55 

§  478.    Estate  or  Interest  Affected  by  Lien 
.  a.  In  general 

b.  Curtesy  and  dower 

c.  Interests  derived  from  judicial  sale 

d.  Interests  of  cotenants 

e.  Lands  subject  to  power  of  appoint- 

ment 

f.  Life  estates 


g.  Property  acquired  by  descent  or  de- 
vise 
h.  Remainders  and  reversions 

a.  In  General 

Except  as  modified  by  registration  laws,  the  (ten  of 
a  judgment  attaches  to  the  precise  Interest  or  estate 
which  the  Judgment  debtor  has  actually  and  effectively 
in  the  property,  and  only  to  such  interest. 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  attaches  to  the  precise 
interest  or  estate  which  the  judgment  debtor  has 
actually  and  effectively  in  the  property,  and  only 
to  such  interest;  the  lien  cannot  be  made  effectual 
to  bind  or  to  convey  any  greater  or  other  estate 
than  the  debtor  himself,  in  the  exercise  of  his 
rights,  could  voluntarily  have  transferred  or  alienat- 
ed,56 except,  according  to  the  decisions  on  the 


54.  Mont. — Corpus     Juris     cited    la 
Johannes   v.    Dwire,    28    P.2d    971. 
972,  94  Mont.  590. 

34  C.J.  p  591  note  53. 

55.  Kan. — Leslie    v.    Harrison    Nat. 
Bank,    154    P.    209,    97    Kan.    22— 
Bliss  v.  Brown,  96  P.  945,  78  Kan. 
467. 

34  C.J.  p  591  note  54. 

56.  U.S. — Commercial   Credit  Co.   v. 
Davidson,  C.C.A.Miss.,  112  F.2d  54 
— Wiltshire    v.    Warburton,    C.C.A. 
Va.,  59  F.2d  611— U.  S.  v.  Certain 
Lands    in    Borough    of    Brooklyn, 
Kings   County,   N.   T.    (Parcel  No. 
$),   D.C.N.Y.,   44   F.Supp.   830. 

Ala.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  T.  J.  Per- 
ry &  Son,  140  So.  616,  second  case, 
224  Ala.  420,  certiorari  dismissed 

140  So.    616,    first   case,    224   Ala, 
13. 

Ark. — Snow   Bros.   Hardware  Co.   v. 

Ellis,  21  S.W.2d  162,  180  Ark.  238. 
Cal. — In   re  Bennett's   Estate,    90   P. 

2d    84,    13    Cal.2d   354,    126   A.L.R. 

771— McGee  v.  Allen,  60  P.2d  1026, 

7   Cal.2d  468 — Homeland  Bid?.  Co. 

v.   Reynolds,  121  P.2d  59,  49  Cal. 

App.2d   176 — Spear  v.  Farwell,   42 

P.2d   391,   5  Cal.App.2d   111— Davis 

v.  Perry,  8  P.2d  514.  120  CaLApp. 

670— Iknoian  v.  Winter,  270  P.  999, 

94  OaLApp.   223. 
Fla. — Arundel  Debenture  Corporation 

v.  Le  Blond,  190  So.  765,  139  Fla. 

668— Smith   v.    Pattishall,   176    So. 

568,   127   Fla,   474,    129   Fla.   498— 

First  Nat.   Bank  v.   Peel,  145   So. 

177,  107  Fla,  413. 
Ga, — Hartsfield  Loan  &  Savings  Co. 

v.    Garner,    191    S.E.    119,   184 '  Go. 

283. 
111. — Mauri cau  v.  Haugen,  56  N.B.2d 

367,     387     111.     186— Sturdyvin    v. 

Ward.   168  N.E.  666,  336  111.  594 — 

Hooper  v.  Haas,   164  N.E.  23,  332 

111.    561,    63   A.L.R.    £58— East    St. 

Louis    Lumber    Co.    v.    Schnipper, 

141  N.E.  542,  310  111.  150. 


Ind. — Stroup  v.  Myers,  21  NJE.2d  75, 
106  Ind.App.  538. 

Iowa. — Johnson  v.  Smith,  231  N.W. 
470,  210  Iowa  591— Stiles  v.  Bailey, 
219  N.W.  537,  205  Iowa  1385— 
Berg  v.  Shade,  214  N.W.  513,  203 
Iowa  1352 — Lefebure  v.  Henry  Le- 
febure  Sons  Co.,  208  N.W.  853,  202 
Iowa  1053. 

Md.— Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Biggs,  137 
A.  509,  153  Md.  50— Kinsey  v. 
Drury,  126  A.  125,  146  Md.  227. 

Minn. — Scott  v.  Marquette  Nat  Bank, 
217  N.W.  136,  173  Minn.  225. 

Miss. — Candler  v.  Cromwell,  57  So. 
554,  101  Miss.  161. 

Mont. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Clack 
v.  Clack,  41  P.2d  32,  37,  98  Mont. 
552 — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Johan- 
nes v.  Dwire,  23  P.2d  971,  972,  94 
Mont.  590. 

Neb.— Knaak  v.  Brown,  212  N.W.  431, 
115  Neb.  260,  51  A.L.R.  237. 

N.M. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Sylvanus 
v.  Pruett,  9  P.2d  142,  146,  36  N.M. 
'112. 

N.T.— Ptaszynski  v.  Flack,  31  N.T.S. 
2d  599,  263  App.Div.  831— Newark 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brill,  7  N.Y.S.Sd 
773. 

N.C. — Thompson  v.  Avery  County,  5 
S.E.2d  146,  216  N.C.  405— Wadford 

.  v.  Davis,  135  S.E.  353,  192  N.C. 
484— Eaton  v.  Doub,  128  S.E.  494, 
190  N.C.  14,  40  A.L.R.  273 — Spence 
v.  Foster  Pottery  Co.,  117  S.E.  32, 
185  N.C.  218. 

Okl.— Harry  v.  Hertzler,  90  P.2d  656, 
185  OkL  151— Kennedy  v.  Rolf,  61 
P.2d  1041,  178  Okl.  71— Oklahoma 
State  Bank  of  Ada  v.  Crumley,  293 
P.  218,  146  Okl.  12— Oil  Well  Sup- 
ply Co.  v.  Cremin,  287  P.  414,  143 
Okl.  67,  68  A.L.R.  1471— White 
House  Lumber  Co.  v.  Howard,  286 
P.  827,  142  Okl.  163. 

Or.— Duke  v.  Low,  296  P.  45,  135 
Or.  460. 

Pa. — Schuler  v.  Kovatch,  28  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  485,  17  Lehigh  Co.L.J.  147. 

912 


S.C.— Fallaw  v.  Oswald,  9  S.E.2d  793, 
194  S.C.  387. 

S.D.— Ruden  v.  Kirby,  241  N.W.  791, 
59  S.D.  631 — In  re  Hornstra's  Es- 
tate, 226  N.W.  740,  55  S.D.  513. 

Tex. — Payne  v.  Bracken,  115  S.W.2d 
903,  131  Tex.  394— Berry  v.  Chad- 
wick,  Civ.App.,  137  S.W.2d  859, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct 
— South  Texas  Lumber  Co.  v.  Nic- 
oletti,  Civ.App.,  54  S.W.2d  893,  er- 
ror dismissed — Garrison  v.  Citi- 
zens' Nat.  Bank  of  Hillsboro,  Civ. 
App.,  25  S.W.2d  231,  error  refused 
— Steele  v.  Harris,  Civ.App.,  2  S.W. 
2d  537 — Sugg  v.  Mozoch,  Civ. App., 
293  S.W.  907. 

Va.— Miller  v.  Kemp,  160  S.E.  203, 
157  Va,  178,  84  A.L.R.  980— Sav- 
ings &  Loan  Corporation  v.  Bear, 
154  S.E.  587,  155  Va.  312,  75  A. 
L.R.  980 — Holland  Jones  Co.  v. 
Smith,  148  S.E.  581,  152  Va.  707. 

V7ash.— Heath  v.  Dodson,  110  P.2d 
845,  7  Wasn.2d  667— Vandin  v. 
Henry  McCleary  Timber  Co.,  289 
P.  1016,  157  Wash.  635. 

W.Va. — Brown  v.  Hodgman,  19  S.E. 
2d  910,  124  W.Va.  136— Guaranty 
Co.  of  Maryland  v.  Hubbard,  187 
S.E.  313,  117  W.Va.  563— Eagle  v. 
McKown,  142  S.E.  65,  105  W.Va. 
270. 

Wis.— Wenzel  v.  Roberts,  294  N.W. 
871,  236  Wis.  315— Corpus  Joris 
quoted  in.  Musa  v.  Segelke  &  Kohl- 
haus  Co.,  272  N.W.  657,  224  Wis. 
432,  111  A.L.R.  168. 

34  C.J.  p  591  note  55 — il  C.J.  p  521 
notes  42,  43. 

Reason  for  rule 

A  judgment  lien  holder  is  not  in 
the    same    attitude    as    an    innocent 
purchaser    for    value     without    no* 
ti<5e. 
Iowa. — Richardson  v.  Estle,  243  N.W. 

611,  214  Iowa  1007. 
Minn. — Farmers'  &  Merchants'  State 

Bank    of    Thief    River    Falls    v. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  478 


question,  as  modified  by  registration  laws,57  as 
where,  by  reason  of  the  language  and  construction 
of  the  recording  acts,  a  judgment  creditor  is  put 
substantially  on  the  basis  of  a  bona  fide  purchaser, 
if  without  actual  notice,  and  protected  against  such 
unrecorded  conveyances,  encumbrances,  and  the  like 
as  fall  within  the  operation  of  the  recording  acts.58 

Generally  it  is  immaterial  whether  or  not  the  judg- 
ment debtor's  interest  appears  of  record;  whatever 
it  is,  it  is  bound  by  the  lien.59  Under  some  statutes, 
however,  the  judgment  debtor's  title  must  appear  of 
record,  or  the  judgment  Hen  will  not  attach  there- 
to.60 The  interest  of  a  tenant  in  possession  is  not 


bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judgment  against  the  holder 
of  the  legal  title,  because  possession  is  notice  of 
the  tenant's  rights,61  but  a  judgment  against  the 
tenant  in  possession  attaches  as  a  lien  tq  his  inter- 
est, whatever  it  may  be.62  If  the  debtor's  interest 
is  subject  to  any  infirmity  or  condition  by  reason  of 
which  it  is  eliminated  or  ceases  to  exist,  the  lien 
attaching  thereto  ceases  with  it.63 

After  the  death  of  the  judgment  debtor,  the  fil- 
ing of  a  transcript  of  a  judgment  does  not  render 
the  judgment  a  lien  on  land  belonging  to  the  estate 
of  such  debtor.64 


Stageberg,  201  N.W.  612,  161  Minn. 

413. 

34  C.J.  p  591  note  55  [a]. 
Judgement  against  vendee;  legal  title 
in  vendor 

A  vendor  by  expressly  reserving 
vendor's  lien  in  deed  retained  legal 
title  to  land  and,  where  land  was 
reconveyed  to  vendor  by  vendee  in 
consideration  of  cancellation  of  pur- 
chase money  notes  and  vendor's  lien, 
title  was  never  in  vendee  so  as  to 
make  land  subject  to  lien  of  judg- 
ment obtained  against  vendee. — 
Mostyn  v.  Griffith,  Tex.Civ.App.,  130 
S.W.2d  906,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct. 

lands  owned  "by  persons  not  parties 

to  Judgment 

Judgment  can  attach  only  against 
lands  owned  by  judgment  debtor  and 
not  in  first  instance  against  lands 
owned  by  parties  who  were  not  par- 
ties to  judgment. — Oakwood  State 
Bank  of  Oakwood  v.  Durham,  Tex 
Civ.App.,  21  S.W.2d  586. 

Affiliated  corporations 

Where  one  corporation  acquired 
controlling  interest  in  other,  judg- 
ment against  former  did  not  become 
lien  on  latter's  property. — Steinfeld 
v.  Copper  State  Mining  Co.,  290  P. 
155,  37  Ariz.  151. 

Judgment  against  adininistrator 
did  not  entitle  Judgment  creditor  to 
equitable  lien  as  against  proceeds  of 
insurance  on  real  estate  belonging 
to  deceased. — First  Carollnas  Joint 
Stock  Land  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Liv- 
erpool &  London  &  Globe  Ins.  Co., 
158  S.E.  273,  160  S.C.  164. 

57.  Tex. — South  Texas  Lumber  Co. 
v.  Nicoletti,  Civ.App.,  54  S.W.2d 
893,  error  dismissed — Garrison  v. 
Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  of  Hillsboro, 
Civ.App.,  25  S.W,2d  231,  error  re- 
fused— Sugg  v.  Mozoch,  Clv.App., 
293  S.W.  907. 

34  C.J.  p  592  note  56. 

Deed  wrongfully  recorded 

Third  person  extending  credit  in 
reliance  on  borrower's  record  title  to 
realty  and  without  any  notice  or 
knowledge  of  defect  in  title  occupies 

49C.J.S.-58 


position  of  innocent  purchaser  for 
value,  and  by  reducing  claim  to 
judgment  during  borrower's  record 
ownership  acquires  valid  judgment 
lien  thereon.  So,  where  deed  execut- 
ed and  deposited  by  grantor  with 
person  of  his  own  choice  for  deliv- 
ery to  grantee  on  grantor's  death 
was  wrongfully  recorded  deed  was 
valid  and  absolute  as  to  subsequent 
judgment  creditor  of  grantee  who 
extended  credit  in  reliance  on  gran- 
tee's record  title  to  property. — Mick- 
lethwait  v.  Fulton,  196  N.E.  166, 
129  Ohio  St.  488. 

58.  111.— Thorpe  v.   Helmer,   113   N. 
E.  954,  275  111.  86. 

34  C.J.  p  592  note  57. 

59.  Tex. — Steele  v.  Harris,  Civ.App., 
2  S.W.2d  537. 

34  C.J.  p  593  note  58. 
In  Minnesota 

(1)  The  text  rule  has  been  applied. 
— Corpus    Juris    cited    in    Emerson- 
Brantingham  Implement  Co.  v.  Cook, 
206  N.W.  170,  171,  165  Minn.  198,  43 
A.L.R.  41. 

(2)  Occasional    language    used    in 
some  cases  may  suggest  that  there 
is  no  lien  unless  record  title  is  in 
the      judgment      debtor. — Emerson- 
Brantingham  Implement  Co.  v.  Cook, 
206  N.W.  170,  165  Minn.  198,  43  A.L. 
R.  41—34  C.J.  p  593  note  59. 

(3)  Such  language,  however,  must 
be    interpreted   with   the   subject   to 
which  it  is  used  in  view, — Emerson- 
Brantingham      Implement      Co.      v. 
Cook,  supra. 

60.  Mont. — McMillan   v.    Davenport, 
118  P.  756,   44  Mont.  23,  Ann.Oas. 
1912D    984 — Isom    v.    Larson,    255 
P.   1049,   78   Mont.   395— Piccolo   v. 
Tanaka,   253  P.  890,   78  Mont.  445. 

Rule  applied  to  after-acquired  prop- 
erty see  supra  §  477. 

61.  Neb.— Uhl  v.  May,   5   Neb.   157. 
34  C.J.  p  593  note  60. 

62.  N.T. — Jackson  v.  Town,  4  Cow. 
599,  15  Am.D.  405. 

63.  Ark. — Snow  Bros.  Hardware  Co. 
v.   Ellis,    21   S.W.2d   162,   180   Ark. 
238. 

913 


Fla.— Smith    v.    Pattishall,    176    So. 

568,    127   Fla.    474,    129   Fla.   498. 
Iowa.— Stiles  v.  Bailey,  219  N.W.  537, 

205  Iowa  1385. 
Minn. — Peterson  v.  Siebrecht,  247  N. 

W.  6,  188  Minn.  272. 
Tex. — Thompson  v.  Mayhew  Lumber 

Co.,   Civ.App.,   103   S.W.2d  1005. 
Wis.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Musa 

v.  Segelke  &  Kohlhaus  Co.,  272  N. 

W.   657,   658,   224  Wis.   432,   111  A. 

L.R.  168. 
34  C.J.  p  593  note  62. 

Conveyance  to  Judgment  debtor  set 
aside  for  fraud 

111.— Waterman  v.  Hall,  270  IlLApp. 
558. 

Pa. — Lackawanna  Thrift  &  Loan  Cor- 
poration v.  Sanderson,  50  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  242. 

Recording   statute  held   inapplicable 

Where  intervener  docketed  judg- 
ment which  became  a  lien  on  de- 
fendant's equitable  title  under  land 
contract,  and  plaintiff  as  holder  of 
legal  title,  to  enable  defendant  to 
obtain  a  loan  wherewith  to  acquire 
legal  title,  made  and  recorded  deed 
to  defendant  without  consideration 
whereby  intervener's  judgment  be- 
came an  apparent  lien  on  legal  title 
in  defendant,  but  the  loan  failed,  re- 
cording statute  did  not  apply  and  in- 
tervener was  not  protected  by  it  as 
good  faith  lienor. — Farmers'  &  Mer- 
chants' State  Bank'  of  Thief  River 
Falls  v.  Stageberg,  201  N.W.  612,  161 
Minn.  413. 

64,    N.T. — Henderson    v.    Brooks,     3 

Thomps.  &  C.  445. 
Tex. — Harms  v.  Ehlers,  Civ.App.,  179 

S.W.2d    582,    error    refused — First 

Nat,  Bank  of  Bowie  v.  Cone,  Civ. 

App.,  170  S.W.2d  782,  error  refused. 

Reason  for  rule 

The  title  to  real  property  passed 
Immediately  on  the  death  of  dece- 
dent under  the  terms  of  the  will; 
therefore  the  title  to  such  real  prop- 
erty was  not  in  decedent  at  the 
time  the  transcript  was  filed. — In 
re  Wakefield's  Estate,  260  N.T.S.  633, 
146  Misc.  58. 


I  478 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Lien  on  lands.  A  judgment  lien  attaches  only  to 
an  estate  in  lands,  not  to  a  lien  on  lands.65 

b.  Cnrtesy  and  Dower 

It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  against  a  husband 
Is  a  lien  on  his,  life  Interest  in  the  wife's  lands;  but 
an  unassigned  dower  or  an  inchoate  right  of  dower  has 
been  held  not  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment  against 
a  married  woman. 

A  judgment  against  a  husband  is  a  lien  on  his 
life  interest  in  the  wife's  lands,  although  execution 
is  suspended  until  her  death,66  but  binds  only  the 
tenant's  actual  interest,  and  therefore  is  liable  to  be 
extinguished  by  the  breach  of  a  condition  subse- 
quent which  divests  the  life  estate67  or  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  a  power  to  sell.6*  It  has  also  been  held, 
however,  that  during  the  wife's  lifetime  the  hus- 
band has  no  interest  in  her  lands  to  which  the  lien 
of  a  judgment  can  attach.69 

An  unassigned  dower70  or  an  inchoate  right  of 
dower71  has  been  held  not  subject  to  the  lien  of  k 
judgment  against  a  married  woman ;  and  an  answer 
by  the  holder  of  an  inchoate  right  of  dower,  in 
proceedings  to  sell  realty,  waiving  assignment  of 
such  right  by  metes  and  bounds  and  asking  that  she 
be  awarded  the  same  in  money  has  been  held  not 
to  transfer  a  judgment  lien  to  the  purchase  money 
in  favor  of  the  judgment  creditor.72 

c.  Interests  Derived  from  Judicial  Sale 

The  inchoate  or  inceptive  title  of  a  purchaser  at  a 
judicial  sale,  in  advance  of  its  confirmation  or  before 
issuance  of  a  deed,  is  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
against  him;  but  the  judgment  creditor  of  one  who 
has  caused  a  sale  pursuant  to  execution  against  a  third 
person  has  no  lien  against  the  fund  so  created. 

The  inchoate  or  inceptive  title  of  a  purchaser  at 
a  judicial  sale,  in  advance  of  its  confirmation  by  the 
court,  or  before  the  issuance  of  a  deed,  may  be 


bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judgment  against  him  ;73  but 
the  judgment  creditor  of  one  who  has  caused  a  sher- 
iffs sale  to  be  held  pursuant  to  execution  against  a 
third  person  has  been  held  to  have  no  legal  or  eq- 
uitable lien  against  the  fund  so  created.74 

d.  Interests  of  Cotenants 

A  Judgment  against  a  tenant  in  common  is  a  Hen 
on  the  Interest  of  the  debtor  in  the  land. 

A  judgment  against  a  tenant  in  common  is  a  lien 
on  the  interest  of  the  debtor  in  the  land,75  but  not 
on  that  of  the  debtor's  cotenant,76  and,  in  case  of 
partition,  the  lien  will  attach  to  the  part  allotted  to 
defendant,77  or,  if  the  land  is  sold  on  partition,  to 
his  share  of  the  fund,78  the  purchaser  under  a  de- 
cree for  partition  taking  the  land  discharged  of  the 
lien.79  According  to  some  authority,  however,  the 
lien  does  not  attach  while  the  debtor's  title  is  un- 
disclosed of  record80  A  voluntary  partition  made 
by  tenants  in  common  will  not  prevail  against  the 
lien  of  a  judgment  rendered  against  one  of  the  co- 
tenants  prior  to  the  partition.81 

e.  Lands  Subject  to  Power  of  Appointment 

Where  a  person  has  a  general  power  of  appoint- 
ment, and  executes  the  power,  the  property  appointed 
is  deemed,  in  equity,  part  of  his  assets  and  subject  to 
the  demands  of  his  judgment  creditors;  but  a  Judgment 
has  been  held,  in  equity,  to  be  subordinate  to  a  power 
of  appointment  In  a  third  person. 

At  common  law,  a  judgment  against  a  party  hav- 
ing a  power  of  appointment,  with  the  estate  vested 
in  him  until  and  in  default  of  appointment,  is  de- 
feated by  the  subsequent  execution  of  the  power  ;82 
but  where  a  person  has  the  general  power  of  ap- 
pointment, either  by  deed  or  will,  and  executes  this 
power,  the  property  appointed  is  deemed,  in  equity, 
part  of  his  assets,  and  subject  to  the  demands  of  his 


65.    Ark. — Snow  Bros.  Hardware  Co. 

v.   Ellis,    21    S.W.2d    162,    180  Ark. 

238. 
Vendor's  lien, 

Even  though  defendant  had  ven- 
dor's lien  for  balance  grantee  paid 
for  delivery  of  escrow  deed,  plain- 
tiff's judgment  lien  did  not  attach, 
since  vendor's  lien  is  not  interest  in 
land  subject  to  execution. — Snow 
Bros.  Hardware  Co.  v.  Ellis,  supra. 

68.    Pa. — Lancaster  County  Bank  v. 

Stauffer,  10  P*L.  898. 
34  C.J.  p  593  note  66. 

67.  N.Y.— Moore    v.    Pitts.    53    N.Y. 
85. 

68.  N.J.— Leggett  v.  Doremus,  25  N. 
J.Eq.   122. 

69.  Va. — Bankers'    Loan    &    Invest- 
ment Co.  v.  Blair,  39  S.E.  231.   99 
Va.  606.  86  Am.S.K,  914. 


70.  Ohio.— Good    v.    Crist,    156    N.B. 
146,  23  Ohio  App.  484. 

71.  N.T. — Crawford    v.    Woods,    191 
N.Y.S.  786,  117  Misc.  150,  affirmed 
196    N.Y.S.    922,   203   App.Div.    862. 

Ohio. — Good   v.   Crist,    156  N.E.    146, 

23  Ohio  App.  484. 
34  C.J.  p  593  note  70. 

72.  Ohio. — Good  v.  Crist,  supra. 

73.  Pa.— Holmes'  Appeal,  108  Pa.  23. 
34  C.J.  p  593  note  63. 

74.  Pa.— McHugh    v.    Landherr,    52 
Pa.Dist.    &   Co.    481,    46    Lack.Jur. 
129. 

7B.    Ala.— Hargrett  v.  Hovater,  15  So. 

2d  276,  244  Ala.  646. 
Mont — Corpus   JUris   cited  in   Isom 

v.    Larson,    255    P.    1049,    1051,    78 

Mont.  395. 

34  C.J.  p  598  note  27. 
Property  held  as  estate  in  entirety 

914 


as    subject   to   judgment   lien    see 
Husband    and   Wife    §    34    e. 

76.  Okl.— Burke   v.   Marshall,    83    P. 
2d  395,  183  Okl.  505. 

Va. — Miller  v.    Kemp,   160    S.E.    203, 
157   Va,    178,    84   A.L.R.    980. 

77.  Va.— Miller  v.  Kemp,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  598  note  28. 

78.  •  Fla. — Eldridge   v.    Post,    20    Fla. 
579. 

S.C. — Garvin  v.  Garvin,   1  S.C.   55. 

79.  Ohio. — Cradlebaugh  v.  Pritchett 
8  Ohio  St.  646,  72  Am.D.  610. 

S.C. — Burris   v.    Gooch,    39    S.C.L.    1. 

80.  Mont— Isom   v.    Larson,    255    P. 
1049,  78  Mont  395. 

81.  N.J. — Emson  v.  Polhemus,  28  N*. 
XEq.  439. 

82.  U.S.— Brandies  v.  Cochrane,  HI., 
5    S.Ct    194,    112    U.S.    344,    28    L. 
Ed.  760. 

84  OJ.  p  597  note  19. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§478 


judgment  creditors  in  preference  to  the  claims  of 
his  voluntary  appointees  or  legatees,83  A  judgment 
has  been  held  in  equity  to  be  subordinate  to  a  power 
of  appointment  in  a  third  person,  as,  for  instance,  a 
power  of  sale  vested  in  executors  by  will;8*  and 
the  same  principle  has  been  applied  to  a  power  of 
appointment  resting  in  the  discretion  of  trustees, 
qualified  only  by  the  necessity  of  obtaining  the  con- 
sent of  the  judgment  debtor  to  the  exercise  of  that 
discretion.85 

f .  Life  Estates 

A  Judgment  lien  attaches  on  a  verted  life  estate. 

A  judgment  lien  attaches  on  a  vested  estate  for 
life.8* 

g.  Property  Acquired  by  Descent  or  Devise 

The  Interest  of  a  Judgment  debtor  as  heir  or  devisee 
and  legatee  before  distribution  has  been  held  subject  to 
the  Hen  of  the  Judgment,  and,  in  case  of  sale  of  the 


property  before  distribution,  the  right  of  the  Judgment 
creditor  Is  transferred  from  the  property  to  the  pro- 
ceeds. 

Before  distribution,  a  creditor  may  obtain  a  judg- 
ment lien  on  the  interest  of  his  debtor  as  heir  or 
devisee  and  legatee,87  but  where  the  executor,  to 
pay  debts  of  the  testator,  or  pursuant  to  a  power 
contained  in  the  will,  sells  realty  devised  to  a  judg- 
ment debtor,  such  sale  deprives  the  devisee  of  his 
interest  in  the  land,  and  also  deprives  the  judgment 
creditor  of  any  right  to  proceed  against  the  land 
itself  for  satisfaction  of  the  judgment.88  In  the 
case  of  sale  of  land  under  order  of  a  probate  court89 
or  under  a  testamentary  power,90  the  lien  has  been 
held  to  be  transferred  from  the  land  and  to  attach 
to  the  interest  of  the  judgment  debtor  in  the  pro- 
ceeds. Under  a  statute  providing  that  the  surplus  of 
proceeds  of  such  sale  over  and  above  the  debts  of 
the  deceased  shall  belong  to  the  person  owning  the 
premises  at  the  time  of  the  sale,  the  surplus  must 


83.  U.S.  —  Brandies  v.  Cochrane,  su- 
pra. 

N.Y.—  Tallmadge  v.  Sill,  21  Barb.  34. 
34  C.J.  P  597  note  20. 

84.  N.J.—  Wetmore  v.  Midmer,  21  N. 
J.EQ.  242. 

85.  N.J.—  Leggett  v.  Doremus,  25  N. 

122. 


86.  N.Y.—  Verdin  v.  Slocum,  71  N.T. 
345. 

34  C.J.  p  693  note  65. 
Restriction  on  use  of  principal 

Where  life  tenant's  use  of  princi- 
pal of  the  estate  was  restricted  to 
use  for  her  comfortable  maintenance, 
the  estate  could  not  be  charged  with 
debts  incurred  for  benefit  of  business 
conducted  by  life  tenant  and  her 
husband  and  not  for  life  tenant's 
maintenance  and  support,  and  realty 
which  remained  unconverted  by  sale 
at  death  of  life  tenant  could  not  be 
subjected  to  lien  of  confession  judg- 
ment on  such  debt.  —  In  re  Stannert's 
Estate,  15  A.2d  360,  339  Pa.  439. 
Judgment  confessed  prior  to  acqui- 
sition of  status 

Even  though  mother  and  daughter 
as  successive  life  tenants  of  father's 
residuary  estate  had  unlimited  power 
to  consume  principal,  where  judg- 
ment by  confession  was  entered 
against  daughter  during  mother's 
lifetime  and  therefore  before  daugh- 
ter had  acquired  status  of  life  ten- 
ant, daughter's  confession  of  judg- 
ment could  not  constitute  a  con- 
sumption of  principal  by  her  so  as  to 
subject  realty  contained  in  residuary 
estate  to  judgment  lien.  —  In  re  Stan- 
nert's Estate,  supra. 

87.  Oal.—  Noble  v.  Beach,   180  P.2d 
426,  21  Cal.2d  91—  McGee  y.  Allen, 
60  P.2d  1026,  7  CaL2d  468. 

Del.—  In  re  Harris'  Estate,  44  A.2d 
18. 


|  111.— Wickiser  v.  Powers,   57  N.E.2d 

522,  324  IlLApp.  130. 
Iowa. — In  re  Duffy's  Estate,  292  N. 

W.  165,   228  Iowa  426,   128  A.L.R. 

943— Chader  v.  Wilkins,  284  N.W. 

183,  226  Iowa  417. 
Elan. — Caple    v.    War  burton,    264    P. 

47,  125  Kan.  290. 
Minn. — Rusch  v.  Lagerman,  261  N.W. 

186,  194  Minn.  469. 
Mont. — Gaines  v.  Van  Demark,  74  P. 

2d  454,  106  Mont.  1. 
Tex.— Hart   v.   Bstelle,    Civ.App.,    34 

S.W.2d    665,    affirmed    Estelle    v. 

Hart,   Com.App.,    55    S.W.2d    510 — 

Fikes    v.    Buckholts    State    Bank, 

Oiv.App.,  273  S.W.  957. 
Utah.— In   re   Miles'   Estate,    223   P. 

337,  63  Utah  144. 
Wis.— Qualley    v.    Zimmerman,    285 

N.W.  735,  231  Wis.  341. 

i  C.J.  p  1249  notes  46-49. 

Interest  of  debtor  in  testator's  con- 
tract to  sell 

Where  vendor  under  contract  for 
deed  had  not  executed  deed  at  time 
of  death,  lien  of  judgment  against 
devisee  was  held  to  attach  to  extent 
of  share  of  unpaid  purchase  money 
on  share  of  contract  devised  to  dev- 
isee by  vendor.— Bauermeister  v.  Mc- 
Donald.' 247  N.W.  424,  124  Neb.  142. 

Additional  acts  necessary 

(1)  Judgment    creditors    held     to 
have  no  specific  claim  or  lien  against 
fund  due  beneficiary  under  will  pri- 
or to  establishment  of  lien  by  levy 
or  extension  of  receivership. — In  re 
Kaufman's   Estate,    266    N.T.S.    890, 
149  Misc.  287. 

(2)  Judgment  creditors  of  a  dev- 
isee   acquire    no    lien    on    the    real 
estate  of  the  testator  until  the  levy 
of  an  execution,  and  even  then,  prior 
to  a  sale  and  conveyance,  they  ac- 
quire only  a,  lien  and  not   title. — 
Thompson's  Ex'rs  v.  Stiltz,  96  S.W. 

915 


884,    29   Ky.L.   1075—69   C.J.   p   1249 
note  59. 

(3)  The  lien  of  a  judgment  against 
an  heir  to  the  real  estate  of  an 
intestate  attaches  only  to  that  por- 
tion of  the  real  estate  of  the  intes- 
tate, if  any,  distributed  by  the  coun- 
ty court  to  the  judgment  debtor, 
and,  when  any  portion  of  such  real 
estate  is  so  distributed,  the  lien  of 
the  judgment  relates  back  to  the 
time  of  its  entry  on  the  Judgment 
docket — Oil  Well  Supply  Co.  v. 
Cremin,  287  P.  414,  143  Okl.  «7,  68 
A.L.R.  1471— White  House  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Howard,  286  P.  327,  142  Okl. 
163. 

88.  Del.— In  re  .Harris'  Estate,  44  A. 
2d     18 — Brennan     v.     Wilmington 
Trust  Co.,  126  A.  42,  2  W.W.Harr. 
482. 

N.Y.— New   York  Central   E,  Co.  v. 

First  Nat.  Bank,  133  N.E.  908,  232 

N.Y.  330.     , 
69  C.J.  p  1249  note  51. 

The  heir  has  no  title  superior  to 
that  of  the  administrator  whenever 
it  becomes  necessary  for  the  admin- 
istrator to  sell  the  lands  in  the  proc- 
ess .of  administration,  and  the  lien 
of  a  judgment  against  a  legatee  does 
not  attach  to  property  passing  un- 
der a  will  either  in-  the  hands  of 
an  executor  or  of  purchasers  tinder 
him  at  a  valid  sale. — Whatley  v: 
Musselwhite,  5  S.E.2d  227,  189  Ga, 
91. 

89.  Del.— In   re   Harris'   Estate,   44 
A.2d  18. 

Miss. — Stone   v.    Townsend,    1    So.2d 

237,  190  Miss.  547. 
34  C.J.  p  587  note  18. 

90.  111.— Wickiser  v.  Powers,  57  N, 
E.2d  522,  324  IlLApp.  130. 

34  C.J.  p  587  note  19. 


§  478 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


be  treated  as  real  estate.91  Where,  however,  the 
doctrine  of  equitable  conversion  is  held  to  apply  at 
the  instant  of  the  testator's  death,  the  interest  pass- 
es as  personalty  and  is  not  subject  to  a  lien  against 
the  land,92  as  where  a  sale  of  land  is  directed  by  the 
will,  expressly  or  by  implication,  at  a  specified  time 
in  the  future.93  The  title  of  one  heir  to  realty  of 
the  deceased  set  off  to  him  by  the  probate  court  is 
not  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment  against  another 
heir.9* 

L  Remainders  and  Reversions 

Vested  estates  In  reversion  or  remainder  are  sub- 
ject to  the  lien  of  judgments  against  the  reversioner 
or  remainderman  or  against  the  ancestor  from  whom  the 
estate  Immediately  descended,  and  In  some  states  this 
is  true  of  contingent  remainders. 

Estates  in  reversion  or  remainder,  if  vested,  are 
legal  estates  subject  to  the  lien  of  judgments  against 
the  reversioner  or  remainderman95  or  of  judgments 
against  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  estate  immedi- 
ately descended;96  and  in  some  states  this  is  true 
of  contingent  remainders,97  although  elsewhere 
this  is  denied.98 

§  479.    Equitable  Interests  in  General 

a.  In  general 

b.  Equity  of  redemption 


a*  In  General 

The  lien  of  a  Judgment  ordinarily  does  not  attach 
to  an  equitable  title  or  interest  in  real  estate  held  by 
the  Judgment  debtor,  although  In  some  states  the  rule 
has  been  changed  by  statute  or  court  decision. 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  ordinarily  does  not  attach 
to  or  bind  an  equitable  title  or  interest  in  real 
estate  held  by  the  judgment  debtor,99  but  attaches 
only  to  real  property  in  which  the  judgment  debtor 
has  a  vested  legal  interest.1  In  several  states,  how- 
ever, this  rule  has  been  changed  by  statute,  or  by 
the  decisions  of  the  courts  assimilating  legal  and 
equitable  remedies,  so  that  an  equitable  estate  is  sub- 
ject to  the  lien  of  a  judgment;2  but  in  some  of  such 
states  it  is  held  that  a  judgment  is  not  a  lien  on  an 
equitable  interest  in  such  a  sense  as  to  affect  a  bona 
fide  purchaser  without  notice.3  It  has  always  been 
held  by  the  courts  of  chancery  that  for  their  purpos- 
es such  an  estate  is  just  as  much  bound  by  the 
judgment  as  any  legal  estate,  and  may  be  subjected 
to  its  satisfaction  through  the  process  of  equity.4 

b.  Equity  of  Redemption 

In  many  Jurisdictions  a  Judgment  debtor's  equity  of 
redemption  in  encumbered  property  or  his  right  to  re- 
deem property  from  Judicial  sale  or  foreclosure  of  a 
mortgage  is  subject  to  the  Hen  of  a  Judgment  against 
him. 


91.  Del. — In    re   Harris*   Estate,    44 
A.2d  18. 

92.  Iowa. — Krob    T.    Rothrock,    119 
N.W.  131— Beaver  v.  Ross.  118  N. 
W.   287,    140   Iowa  154,    20   L.R.A., 

.     N.S.,  65,  17  Ann.Cas.  640. 

93.  Minn. — Qreenman  v.  McVey,  147 
N.W.   812,   126   Minn.  11.  Ann.Cas. 
1915D  430. 

69  C.J.  p  1249  note  52. 

94.  Okl.— Oil    Well    Supply    Co.    v. 
Cremin,  287  P.  414,  143  OkL  57,  68 
A.L.R.  1471. 

95.  Ga. — Pound  v.  Faulkner,  18  S.E. 
2d  749,  193  Ga,  413. 

Kan. — Caple    v.    Warburton,    264    P. 

•    47,  125  Kan.  290. 

Neb.— Fisher   v.    Kellogg,    258   N.W. 

404,  128  Neb.  248. 
N.J. — Corpus   Juris   cited  in  Cowan 

v.  Storms,  2  A.2d  183,  185,  121  N. 

J.Law  336. 
Wis. — Qualley    v.    Zimmerman,    285 

N,W.  735,  231  Wis.  341. 
34  C.J.  p  593  note  72. 

96.  U.S.— Burton  v.   Smith,  Va.,   13 
Pet.  464,  10  L.Ed  248. 

97.  111. — Kenwood  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank  v.  Palmer,   209   IlLApp.   370. 

Pa.— Ogden    v.    Knepler,    1    Pearson 
145. 

98..   N.Y.— Jackson   v.   Middleton,    52 

Barb.  9. 
34  C.J.  p  593  note  75. 

99.    CaL — Homeland    Bldg.     Co.    T.  I 


Reynolds,  121  P.2d  59,  49  Cal.App. 
2d  176— Cook  v.  Huntley,  112  P.2d 
889,  44  CaLApp.2d  635— Helvey  v. 
Bank  of  America  Nat.  Trust  & 
Savings  Ass'n,  111  P.2d  390,  43 
Cal.App.2d  532— Corpus  Juris  cited 
in  Oaks  v.  Kendall,  73  P.2d  1255, 
1257,  23  Cal.App.2d  715— Poindex- 
ter  v.  Los  Angeles  Stone  Co.,  214 
P.  241,  60  CaLApp.  686. 

Fla.— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Peel,  145 
So.  177,  107  Fla.  413. 

N.J. — Cowan  v.  Storms,  2  A.2d  183, 
121  N.J.Law  336— McLaughlin  v. 
Whaland,  13  A.2d  573,  127  N.J.EO, 
393. 

N.M.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Sylvanus 
v.  Pruett,  9  P.2d  142,  146,  36  N.M. 
112. 

N.D. — Business  Service  Collection 
Bureau  v.  Yegen,  269  N.W.  46,  67 
N.D.  51. 

Tex. — Adams  v.  Impey,  Civ.App.,  131 
S.W.2d  288 — Gamer  v.  Love,  Civ. 
App.,  41  S.W.2d  356,  error  dis- 
missed. 

34  C.J.  p  594  note  79. 

Mortgagee  in  possession 

Statutory  judgment  lien  does  not 

attach  to   interest  of  mortgagee  in 

possession  who  has   foreclosed  and 

is  entitled  to  sale  if  owner  does  not 

pay. — Sugg  v.  Mozoch,  Tex.Civ.App,, 

293  S.W.  907. 

1.  CaL— Cook  v.  Huntley,  112  P.2d 
889,  44  Cal.App.2d  635— Helvey  v. 
Bank  of  America  Nat.  Trust  & 

916 


Savings    Ass'n,    111    P.2d    390,    43 
Cal.App.2d  532. 

2.  111.— Johnson  v.  Watson,  S3  NJE. 
2d  130,  309  IlLApp.  440. 

Iowa. — Johnson  v.  Smith,  231  N.W. 
470,  210  Iowa  591 — Everist  v.  Car- 
ter, 210  N.W.  559,  202  Iowa  498— 
Shedenhelm  v.  Cafferty,  156  N.W. 
340,  174  Iowa  195. 

Minn. — Rusch  v.  Lagerman,  261  N.W. 
186,  194  Minn.  469— Farmers'  & 
Merchants'  State  Bank  of  Thief 
River  Falls  v.  Stagjeberg,  201  N.W. 
612,  161  Minn.  413. 

Pa. — Department   of    Public    Assist- 
ance v.  Spurio,  Com.PL,  9  Fay.L.J. 
18. 
S.D.— Fridley  v.   Munson,    194   N.W. 

840,  46  S.D.  532,   30  A.L.R.   501. 
34  C.J.  p  -594  note  80. 
Superiority 

The  legal  lien  of  a  Judgment 
against  the  holder  of  the  beneficial 
or  legal  title,  as  disclosed  by  the 
record  chain  of  title,  is  superior  to 
the  equities  of  third  persons. — Miller 
v.  Kemp,  160  S.B.  203,  157  Va.  178,  84 
A.L.R.  980. 

3.  111.— Pease    v.    Frank.    105    N.B. 
299,  263  111.  500. 

34  C.J.  p  594  note  81. 

4.  N.J.— McLaughlin  v.  Whaland,  13 
A.2d  573,  127  N.J.EQ.  393. 

Va.— Miller  v.  Kemp,    160   S.E.   203, 

157   Va.    178,    84    A.L.R.    980. 
34  C.J.  p  595  note  82. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


479 


Formerly  at  common  law  an  equity  of  redemp- 
tion, being  regarded  as  a  mere  equitable  interest, 
was  not  an  interest  on  which  a  judgment  lien  at- 
tached,5 but  in  many  jurisdictions,  as  a  result  either 
of  statutes  making  judgments  liens  on  equitable  in- 
terests or  of  departures  by  statute  or  otherwise 
from  the  common-law  view  as  to  the  equitable  na- 
ture of  the  mortgagor's  interest,  the  mortgagor's  in- 
terest is  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment,6  and  the 
lien  cannot  be  cut  off  by  a  conveyance  of  the  equity 
to  a  prior  mortgagee.?  The  judgment  creditor  has, 
however,  no  lien  on  money  paid  by  the  mortgagor  to 
the  assignee  of  the  mortgage  in  excess  of  the 
amount  due  on  such  mortgage,8  or  on  the  proceeds 
of  the  sale  of  the  equity  of  redemption,9  although 
the  judgment  has  been  held  to  be  a  lien  on  the  pro- 
ceeds of  a  judicial  sale  of  the  interests  of  both  the 
mortgagor  and  mortgagee.10  A  judgment  obtained 
against  the  owner  of  an  equity  of  redemption  in 
mortgaged  premises,  after  a  decree  of  foreclosure 
but  before  the  sale,  has  an  equitable  lien  on  the  sur- 
plus moneys  produced  by  the  sale  ;11  it  is  otherwise 


where  the  judgment  was  recovered  after  the  prop- 
erty had  been  struck  off  to  the  purchaser.12  Ordi- 
narily, however,  where  land  covered  by  a  judgment 
lien  is  sold,  the  lien  remains  on  the  land,  and  does 
not  attach  to  the  fund  received.1^  Even  though  the 
equity  is  not  subject  to  the  lien,  the  land  passes 
under  the  lien  when  the  title  thereto  is  reinvested 
in  the  mortgagor  on  payment  of  the  mortgage 
debt.1* 

The  lien  attaches  to  the  equity  where  the  encum- 
brance is  created  by  a  transaction  lacking  the  essen- 
tials of  a  mortgage  at  law,  but  treated  in  equity  as 
a  mortgage,15  and  also,  it  seems,  where  it  is  creat- 
ed by  a  deed  absolute  in  form,  but  intended  by  the 
parties .  merely  as  a  security,16  although  the  last 
mentioned  transaction  does  not  come  within  the  rule 
in  jurisdictions  where  such  a  deed  is  held  to  pass 
the  legal  title.17  The  interest  of  a  grantor  in  a 
deed  of  trust  to  secure  a  debt  is  subject  in  some 
jurisdictions  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment  against 


5.    Miss.— Cantzon  v.  Dorr,  27  Miss.    7.    111.— Walters   v.    Defenbaugh,    90 
251.  111.  241. 


6.     Ga.— Kidd  v.   Kidd,   124    S.E.   45, 

158  Ga.  546,  36  A.L.R.  798. 
Iowa. — Everist  v.   Carter,    210  N.W. 

559,  202  Iowa  498. 
N.J.— McLaughlin  v.  Whaland,  13  A. 

2d  573,  127  N.JJSq.  393— Riverside 

Building-  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Bishop, 

131  A.  78,  98  N.J.BQ.  508. 
S.D. — American  Nat.  Bank  v.  Groft, 

229  N.W.  376,  56  S.D.  460. 
Va. — NefTs   Adm'r   v.   Newman,    142 

S.E.  389,  150  Va.  203. 
34  C.J.  p  595  note  84. 
Gale  of  debtor's  interest 

Judgment  created  no  lien  on  debt- 
or's equity  of  redemption  in  cotton 
for  which  negotiable  warehouse  re- 
ceipts were  in  pledgee's  hands  until 
Judgment  creditor  enjoined  negotia- 
tion thereof;  and  creditor's  rights 
in  debtor's  interest  in  price  of  cot- 
ton were  controlled  by  debtor's  con- 
tract to  sell  cotton,  title  to  which 
passed  to  buyers  before  creditor  en- 
Joined  negotiation  of  warehouse  re- 
ceipts, as  against  contention  that 
value  of  debtor's  interest  should  be 
•determined  by  value  of  cotton  when 
debtor  filed  exemption  claim  or 
amendment  thereto,  subsequent  rise 
in  value  being  for  buyers'  benefit 
Debtor's  interest  in  price  received 
from  buyers  of  cotton  was  exempt 
from  payment  of  creditor's  Judg- 
ment, notwithstanding  debtor  did  not 
file  exemption  claim  until  after  cred- 
itor began  suit  to  enjoin  negotiation 
of  warehouse  receipts  and  to  subject 
cotton  to  payment  of  judgment — 
Warrick  v.  Liddon,  160  So.  534,  230 
Ala.  253. 


8.  Ala.— Raisin     Fertilizer     Co.     v. 
Bell,  18  So.  168,  107  Ala.  261. 

9.  Iowa.— Sullivan  v.  Leckie.  14  N. 
W.  355,  60  Iowa  326. 

34  C.J.  p  595  note  87. 

ia    Md.— Brawner    v.    Watklns,    28 

Md.  217. 
N.C.— Edmonds   v.   Wood,    22    S.E.2d 

237,  222  N.C.  118. 

« 

11.  Mo.— McGuire  v.  Wilkinson,    72 
Mo.  199. 

N.Y.— Sweet  v.  Jacocks,  6  Paige  355, 
31  Am.D.  252. 

12.  N.T,— Sweet  v.  Jacocks,  supra. 
Where  the  mortgagor's  equity  of 

redemption  ceases  to  exist  as  an  in- 
terest in  the  land  after  the  day  of 
sale,  a  creditor  of  the  mortgagor  ob- 
taining Judgment  after  the  mort- 
gage foreclosure  sale  acquires  no  lien 
on  the  mortgagor's  interest  in  the 
mortgaged  land  or  equity  of  redemp- 
tion.—Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Biggs,  137 
A.  509,  153  Md.  50. 

13.  Iowa.— Sullivan  v.  Leckie,.  14  N. 
W.  355,  60  Iowa  326. 

S.C.— Columbia     Branch     Bank     v. 
Black,  7  S.C.Eq.  344. 

14.  Tenn. — Wamble  v.  Gant  79  S.W. 
801,  112  Tenn.  327. 

IB.    N.T.— Bowery     Nat     Bank     v. 

Duncan,  12  Hun  405. 
Pa.— Kinports  v.  Boynton,  14  A.  135, 

120  Pa.  306,   6  Am.S.R.  706. 


16.    S.D.— American    Nat.    Bank    v. 

Groft  229  N.W.  376,  56  S.D.  460. 
34  C.J.  p  595  note  91—41  C.J.  p  366 

notes  64,  65. 
Judgment  lien  as   not   attaching   to 

property     previously     transferred 

see  supra  §  474. 

Lands  received  in  exchange 

Where  landowner  executed  deeds, 
in  effect  mortgages,  his  equitable 
title  was  subject  to  lien  of  subse- 
quent judgments,  which  attached  al- 
so to  land  received  in  exchange 
therefor  and  to  proceeds  thereof 
over  amount  secured  by  deeds. — Ev- 
erist v.  Carter,  210  N.W.  659,  202 
Iowa  498. 

In  Georgia 

(1)  A  judgment  against  the  ven- 
dor in  a  security  deed  after  its  ex- 
ecution in  favor  of  a  third  person 
is  a  lien  on  his  interest  in  the  prop- 
erty    thereby     conveyed. — Kidd     v. 
Kidd,    124    S.E.    45,    158    Ga.    546,    36 
A.L.B.   798 — O'Connor  v.  Georgia  R. 
Bank,  48  S.E.  716,  121  Ga.  88— Shu- 
mate v.   McLendon,   48   S.E.    10,   120 
Ga.  396. 

(2)  It    has    been    held,    however, 
that  as  the  grantor  divested  himself 
of  the  legal  title,  he  had  no  Interest 
in   the   land  which  could  be  seized 
on  execution,  and  that  a  Judgment 
rendered   against    the    grantor   sub- 
sequent to  the  conveyance  could  not 
be  enforced  while  the  legal  title  was 
outstanding  and  unredeemed. — Phin- 
zy  v.  Clark.   62   Ga.   623 — Gibson  v. 
Hough,  60  Ga.  588. 

17.    N.J.-— McLaughUn    v.    Whaland, 

13  A.2d  573,  127  N.XBq.  393. 
34  C.J.  p  595  note  92. 


917 


§  479 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


him,18  although  not  so  subject  in  others,19  but,  in 
those  jurisdictions  where  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
does  not  attach  to  the  reversionary  or  equitable  in- 
terest of  the  grantor  in  such  a  deed  of  trust,  the 
judgment  creditor,  by  filing  a  bill  in  equity  for  that 
purpose,  may  secure  a  quasi  lien,  which  will  give 
him  an  interest  in  any  surplus  which  may  remain 
from  the  estate  after  discharging  the  trusts  and 
which  would  result  to  the  grantor's  benefit,  para- 
mount to  that  of  the  latter.2**  Where  the  trans- 
action is  an  absolute  conveyance  with  a  conditional 
agreement  for  reconveyance,  the  grantor  retains  no 
present  interest  in  the  realty,  and  a  judgment 
against  him  cannot  be  a  lien  thereon,21  although  in 
such  case  the  judgment  creditor  may  acquire  a  lien 
by  having  the  amount  necessary  to  pay  for  the  re- 
conveyance determined  and  paying  or  properly  ten- 
dering that  amount22 

A  judgment  lien  will  attach  to  the  debtor's  right 
of  redemption  from  a  sale  under  a  prior  judg- 
ment23 or  execution,24  or,  although  some  statutes 
have  been  construed  to  require  a  contrary  hold- 
ing,2^  from  a  sale  of  the  land  for  unpaid  taxes.26 
A  judgment  debtor's  right  of  possession  and  right 
to  redeem  after  foreclosure  of  a  mechanic's  lien  has 
been  held  not  subject  to  a  judgment  lien;27  and  a 
judgment  rendered  against  the  mortgagor  after  the 


foreclosure  sale  is  not  in  some  states  a  lien  on  a 
statutory  right  to  redeem  from  such  sale,28  but  in 
other  states  a  contrary  rule  has  been  adopted.29 

§  480.    Interests   of  Parties  to  Execu- 
tory Contract  of  Sale 

a.  Vendor's  legal  title 

b.  Vendee's  equitable  title 

a.  Vendor's  Legal  Title 

A  Judgment  recovered  against  a  vendor  of  land  after 
the  execution  of  a  contract  for  its  sale  but  before  the 
making  and  delivery  of  a  deed  generally  is  a  lien  on  the 
legal  title  remaining  in  him,  and  binds  the  land  to  the 
extent  of  the  unpaid  purchase  money;  but,  where  all 
the  purchase  money  has.  been  paid  at  the  date  of  the 
judgment,  the  lien  does  not  attach  to  the  mere  naked 
legal  title  in  the  vendor. 

While  in  a  few  jurisdictions  when  an  owner  of 
land  has  entered  into  an  executory  contract  of  sale 
no  lien  is  acquired  by  his  judgment  creditors  against 
the  land,30  especially  where  the  vendee  has  entered 
into  possession,31  the  rule  generally  followed  is  that 
a  judgment  recovered  against  a  vendor  of  land,  aft- 
er the  execution  of  a  contract  for  its  sale,  but  be- 
fore the  making  and  delivery  of  a  deed,  is  a  lien 
on  the  legal  title  remaining  in  him  and  binds  the 
land  to  the  extent  of  the  unpaid  purchase  money  ;32 
and  on  a  sale  under  such  judgment  the  sheriffs 


18.  Ga.— Kidd  v.  Kidd,  124  S.E.  45, 
158    Ga,    546,    36   A.L.R.    798. 

Iowa, — Everist  v.  Carter,  210  N.W. 
559,  202  Iowa  498. 

Minn. — Atwater  v.  Manchester  Sav. 
Bank,  48  N.W.  187,  45  Minn.  341, 
12  L.R.A.  741. 

Va.— NefTs  Adm'r  v.  Newman,  142 
S.B.  3&9,  150  Va.  203. 

34  C.J.  p  595  note  3. 

Trust  estates  and  legal  titles  as 
affected  by  judgment  lien  see  in- 
fra §  481. 

19.  U.S. — Freedman's      Savings       & 
Trust   Co.   v.    Barle,   D.C.,    4   S.Ct 
226.   110  U.S.   710,   28  L.Ed.   301. 

34  C.J.  p  595  note  4. 

20.  U.S. — Freedman's      Savings      & 
Trust    Co.    v.    Earle,   D.C.,    4    S.Ct. 
226,  110  U.S.  710,  28  L.Ed.  301. 

34  C.J.  p  596  note  5. 

21.  S.D.— American    Nat.    Bank    v. 
Groft,  229  N.W.  376,  56  S.D.  460. 

Heason  for  role 

In  such  a  transaction  the  judg- 
ment debtor  has  merely  a  contract 
right  which  may  enable  him,  on  the 
making  of  certain  payments,  to  ob- 
tain an  interest  in  the  realty;  and 
while,  perhaps,  in  a  sense,  he  may 
be  said  to  have  an  equitable  inter- 
est, he  stands  substantially  in  the 
position  of  the  vendee  of  realty  un- 
der an  executory  contract  who  has 
no  such  interest  in  realty  as  is 
subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment 


in  favor  of  his  creditors. — American 
Nat  Bank  v.  Groft,  supra. 

22.  S.D. — American    Nat    Bank    v. 
Groft,  supra. 

23.  Iowa.— Curtis     v.     Millard,     14 
Iowa  128,  81  Am.D.  460. 

24.  CaL— Stetson  v.  Sheehan,  200  P. 
387,  52  CaLApp.  353. 

26.  Cal.-— Helvey  v.  Bank  of  Ameri- 
ca Nat  Trust  &  Savings  Ass'n, 
111  P.2d  390.  43  Cal.App.2d  532. 

26.  W.Va.— Shipley     v.     Browning, 
172    S.B.    149,    114    W.Va.    409,    91 
A.L.R.   643. 

34  C.J.  p  595  note  94. 

Sand    forfeited    pending    creditor's 
rait 

Where  land  was  forfeited  to  state 
for  delinquent  taxes  while  creditors' 
suit  to  subject  land  to  judgment  lien 
was  pending,  right  of  redemption  of 
former  owner  remains  before  court 
in  creditors'  suit. — Early  v.  Berry, 
175  S.E.  331,  115  W.Va.  105. 

27.  Iowa. — Murray    v.    Kelroy,    275 
N.W.  21,  223  Iowa  1331. 

28.  I1L — Commerce     Vault     Co.     v. 
Barrett,    78   N.E.    47,    222   111.   169, 
113  Am.S.R.  382,  6  Ann.Cas.  652— 
People  v.  Barrett,  165  IlLApp.  94. 

29.  Or.— Kaston  v.  Storey,  80  P.  209, 
46     Or.     308,    114    Am.S.R.     871. 

30.  Iowa. — Johnson  v.  Smith,  231  N.. 
W.  470,  210  Iowa  591— Vander  wilt 

918 


v.    Broerman,    206    N.W.    959,    201 

Iowa  1107. 
Okl. — City  Guaranty  Bank  of  Hobart 

v.  Boxley,  270  P.  69,  132  Okl.  183. 
34  C.J.  p  598  note  32. 
Reason  for  rule 

A  vendor's  interest  in  land  after 
execution  of  unrecorded  contract  of 
sale  therefor  is  personal  property, 
and  not  real  estate  to  which  the  lien 
of  the  judgment  will  attach. — Cum-  - 
ming  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  202  N.W. 
556,  199  Iowa  667. 

31.  Ark. — State    Bank    v.     Sanders, 
170  S.W.  86,  114  Ark.  440. 

111.— Lynch  v.  Eifler,  191  IlLApp.  344. 
34  C.J.  p  598  note  33. 

32.  Ala. — Robinson    v.    Shearer,    99 
So.  179,  211  Ala.  16. 

Colo.— Corpus   Juris    cited  in    Chain 

O'Mines    v.    Williamson,    72    P.2d 

265,  267,  101  Colo.  231. 
Ga.— Latimer  v.  Tumlin,  74  Ga.  835. 
Minn.— Corpus  Juris  cited  In  W.  T. 

Bailey  Lumber  Co.  v.  Hendrickson, 

240  N.W.   666,   667,  185  Minn.   251. 
Neb. — Bauermeister  v.  McDonald;  247 

N.W.  424,  124  Neb.  142. 
N.D.— Battersby  v.  Gillespie,  222  N. 

W.  480.  57  N.D.  426. 
Tex, — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Peve- 

house  v.   Oliver  Farm   Equipment 

Sales    Co.,    Civ.App.,     114    S.W.2d 

658,  663. 
Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Heath 

v.    Dodson,    110    P.2d    845,    847,    7 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


480 


vendee  stands  precisely  in  the  situation  of  the  orig- 
inal vendor,  and  is  entitled  to  the  unpaid  purchase 
money.33 

The  mere  docketing  of  the  judgment,  however,  is 
not  notice  of  the  lien  to  the  purchaser  in  posses- 
sion, and  payments  subsequently  made  by  him  to  the 
judgment  debtor,  pursuant  to  the  contract,  without 
actual  notice  of  the  judgment,  are  valid  as  against 
the  lien  on  the  land,34  although  the  rule  has  been 
held  to  be  otherwise  where  the  vendee  pays  the  bal- 
ance of  the  purchase  money  to  the  vendor  with  ac- 
tual notice  of  the  judgment35  or  with  full  knowledge 
of  the  pendency  of  a  suit  against  the  vendor  which 
might  result  in  judgment  against  him.36  The  eq- 
uitable right  of  the  vendee  to  require  a  conveyance 
on  fulfilling  his  part  of  the  contract  is  not  cut  out 
or  set  aside  by  the  attaching  of  the  judgment  lien,37 


even  though  none  of  the  purchase  money  has  been 
paid.38  In  some  states,  however,  a  contract  for  the 
sale  of  lands  will  not  prevail  against  a  subsequent 
judgment  lien  unless  recorded,39  although  actual, 
possession  of  the  land,  on  the  part  of  the  vendee 
under  a  valid  contract,  .will  be  sufficient  to  secure 
his  equitable  rights  as  against  the  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment.40 It  is  not  an  unusual  practice  for  courts  of 
equity  to  control  the  operation  of  a  judgment  ob- 
tained against  a  vendor  subsequent  to  a  contract 
for  the  sale  of  lands,  and  where  the  unpaid  pur- 
chase money  is  brought  into  court  equity  may,  on 
a  proper  showing,  restrain  proceedings  to  enforce 
the  judgment  by  execution  sale  of  the  land.41 
WheVe  all  the  purchase  money  has  been  paid  at  the 
date  of  the  judgment,  there  remains  nothing  but  a 
naked  legal  title  in  the  vendor,  to  which  the  lien 
does  not  attach.42 


Wash.2d  4567 — Vandin  v.  Henry  Mc- 
Cleary  Timber  Co.,  289  P.  1016, 
157  Wash.  635. 

34  C.J.  p  598  note  34. 

Vendor's  interest  as  subject  to  at- 
tachment or  execution  see  the 
C.J.S.  title  Vendor  and  Purchaser 
§§  307,  308,  also  66  C.J.  p  1064 
note  66-p  1065  note  99. 

33.  Minn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  W. 
T.  Bailey  Lumber  Co.  v.  Hendrick- 
son,   240  N.W.  666,   667,  185  Minn. 
251. 

N.C. — Tomlinson    v.    Blackburn,     37 

N.C.  509. 
N.D.— Battersby  v/  Gillespie,   222  N. 

W.  480,  57  N.D.  426. 
Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Heath 

v.    Dodson,    110    P.2d    845,    847,    7 

Wash.2d  667. 
34  C.J.  p  599  note  35. 

34.  Md. — Caltrider  v.  Caples,  153  A. 
445,    160   Md.   392,   87  A.L.R.   1500. 

34  C.J.  p  599  note  36. 
36.    Wash.— Heath  v.  Dodson,  110  P. 
2d  845,  7  Wash.2d  667. 

36.  Ohio. — Lefferson    v.    Dallas,    20 
Ohio  St.  $8. 

37,  Md.— Caltrider  v.  Caples,  153  A. 
445,   160   Md.   392,   87  A.L.R.   1500. 

Tex. — Payne  v.  Bracken,  115  S.W.2d 

903,  131  Tex,  394. 
Wash. — Vandin   v.    Henry    McCleary 

Timber  Co.,  289  P.  1016,  157  Wash. 

635. 

:34  C.J.  p  599  note  38. 
Rights   of  vendee   not  displaced  or 

impaired  by  judgment  lien  against 

vendor  generally  see  infra  §  485. 
Parol  contract 

(1)  "One  who  occupies  under  a  pa- 
rol  contract  of  purchase  cannot  set 
up  as  against  the  judgment-creditor 
..of  the  parol  vendor  a  title  acquired 
after  the  enrollment  of  the  judg- 
-ment,  though  made  in  pursuance  of 
.an  antedating  parol  sale.  The 
:  rights  of  the  creditor  are  fixed  by 


the  condition  of  affairs  as  they  ex- 
isted at  the  time  of  the  inception 
of  his  lien,  and  cannot  be  varied  by 
any  subsequent  conveyance  which 
the  debtor  could  not  have  been  coerc- 
ed by  the  courts  to  make." — Niles  v. 
Davis,  60  Miss.  750,  753. 

(2)  It  has  been  held  that  a  pur- 
chaser   of   land    by    parol    contract, 
which  has  been  so  far  executed  as  to 
vest  in  him  the  right  to  compel  his 
vendor  to  execute  the  contract  in  a 
court    of    equity,    has    an    equitable 
right  in  the  land  which  a  court  of 
equity  will  fully  protect  as  against 
the  lien  of  a  subsequent  judgment 
creditor    of    the    vendor. — Farmers' 
Transp.  Co.  v.  Swaney,  37  S.E.  692, 
48  W.Va.  272— Snyder  v.  Botkin,  16 
S.E.  591,  37  W.Va.  355—34  C.J.  p  599 
note  38  [a]  (2). 

(3)  It    has    also    been    held    that, 
where  one  purchases  land  by  parol 
and  is  put  in  possession,  he  is  not 
protected  to  the  extent  of  the  pur- 
chase money  paid  as  to  subsequent 
judgments  against  the  vendor  until 
he  has  acquired  a  perfect  equitable 
title   by  paying  the   entire   price. — 
Fulkerson    v.    Taylor,    46    S.E.    309, 
102  Va.  314. 

(4)  An   equitable   title   held  by   a 
bona  fide  purchaser,  although  by  pa- 
rol contract,  who  has  paid  the  en- 
tire   purchase    money    and    received 
possession,  will  be  preferred  in  equi- 
ty to  the  liens  of  judgment  credi- 
tors  subsequently  acquired   against 
the  vendor,  provided  the  parol  con- 
tract relied  on  is  certain  and  definite 
in  its  terms,  and  is  sustained  by  sat- 
isfactory   proof. — Hurt's    Adm'x    v. 
Prillaman,  79  Va.  257 — Trout's  Adm'r 
v.    Warwick,    77   Va.    731 — Floyd   v. 
Harding,   28  Gratt.  401,   69  Va.  401. 
•Unrecorded  agreement 

Agreement  to  convey  land  need  not 
be  recorded  to  be  binding  between 
parties  and  against  judgment  ao 

919 


quired  after  execution  of  agreement. 
—Caltrider  v.  Caples,  153  A.  445,  160 
Md.  392.  87  A.L.R.  1500. 
Sufficiency  of  agreement 

In  absence  of  fraud,  creditor  of 
vendor  obtaining  judgment  after  ex- 
ecution of  agreement  to  convey  can- 
not raise  question  of  insufficiency  of 
agreement. — Caltrider  v.  Caples,  su- 
pra. 

38.  Md. — Hampson     v.      Edelen,      2 
Harr.  &  J.  64,  3  Am.D.  530. 

34  C.J.  p  599  note  39. 

39.  Minn. — Ferguson  v.  Kumler,   11 
Minn.  104. 

34  C.J.  p  599  note  40. 

Notice  of  third  party's  claim  tinder 
unrecorded  assignment  of  unrecord- 
ed contract  for  sale  was  held  of  no 
avail  after  judgment  against  ven- 
dor in  whom  title  appears  of  record. 
— Battersby  v.  Gillespie,  222  N.W. 
480,  57  N.D.  426. 

40.  Minn. — Baker  v.    Thompson,    31 
N.W.  51,  36  Minn.  314. 

34  C.J.  p  599  note  41. 

41.  U.S.— Lane  v.  Ludlow,  C.C.,  14  F. 
Cas.No.8,052,  2  Paine  591. 

42.  Cal.— Iknoian  v.  Winter,  270  P. 
999,  94  Cal.App.  223. 

Ind. — Vance  v.  Workman,   8   Blackf. 

306. 
Iowa. — Richardson  v.  Estle,  243  N.W. 

611,  214  Iowa  1007. 
Kan. — Elwell    v.    Hitchcock,    21    P. 

109,  41  Kan.  130. 
Neb.— Uhl  v.  May,  5  Neb.  157. 
N.T.— Brown  v.  Grabb,  51  N.E.  306, 

156  N.T.  447. 
Pa. — Schuler  v.  Kovatch,  28  Pa,DisL 

&  Co.  485,  17  Lehigh  Co.UJ.  147. 
Wash. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Heath 

v.    Dodson,    110    P.2d    845,    847,    7 

Wash.2d  667 — Lee  v.  Wrixon,  79  P. 

489,  37  Wash.  47. 
$4  C.J.  p  599  note  43. 
Trust  estates  and  legal  titles  gen" 

erally  see  infra  §  481. 


480 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Notes  for  balance  of  purchase  price.  If  a  part  of 
the  purchase  money  has  been  paid,  and  the  pur- 
chaser's note  given  for  the  balance,  the  lien  of  a 
judgment  will  still  attach  to  the  vendor's  interest;43 
but  if  the  note  given  for  such  balance  of  the  price 
is  transferred  before  maturity  to  a  bona  fide  holder 
for  value  without  notice,  the  real  estate  cannot  be 
subjected  to  the  payment  of  a  judgment  rendered 
against  the  vendor,  retaining  the  legal  title,  after 
such  assignment,44  although  it  has  been  held  oth- 
erwise where  the  judgment  was  obtained  by  the 
transferee  of  the  notes.45  Where  a  deed  reserving 
a  vendor's  lien  for  a  purchase-money  note  was  re- 
corded, and  such  lien  assigned  by  an  unrecorded 
instrument,  the  original  deed  was  notice  to  the  ven- 
dor's creditors  only  until  the  purchase-money  note 
was  outlawed,  and  liens  of  judgments  against  the 
vendor  secured  after  the  note  was  barred  by  the 
statute  of  limitations  are  superior  to  the  assignee's 
rights  under  the  vendor's  lien.46 

T).  Vendee's  Equitable  Title 

While  It  has  been  held  in  some  Jurisdictions  that  the 
Hen  of  a  Judgment  will  not  attacji  to  an  interest  in  land 
held  by  the  debtor  under  a  contract  for  its  purchase 
where  no  deed  has  been  made,  the  rule  is  otherwise  in 
jurisdictions  where  a  Judgment  is  a  iien  on  an  equitable 
estate  In  iand. 

In  pursuance  of  the  common-law  rule,  stated  su- 
pra §  479,  that  equitable  estates  are  not  subject  to 
the  lien  of  judgments,  it  has  been  held  in  several 
jurisdictions  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment  cannot  at- 
tach to  an  interest  in  land  held  by  the  debtor  un- 
der a  contract  for  its  purchase,  where  no  deed  has 
been  made,  although  part  of  the  purchase  money 
may  have  been  paid,  but  that  the  only  remedy  of 


the  judgment  creditor  is  in  equity.47  In  some  ju- 
risdictions, however,  where  by  statute  or  otherwise 
a  judgment  is  a  lien  on  an  equitable  estate  in  lands, 
it  is  the  rule  that  a  vendee  who  holds  under  a  con- 
tract of  purchase,  but  who  has  not  received  a  con- 
veyance, acquires  an  interest  on  which  a  judgment 
will  attach  as  a  lien  to  the  extent  of  such  interest 
as  measured  by  the  amount  of  his  payments  already 
made  and  by  his  improvements  on  the  premises,48 
and  this  rule  has  been  applied  not  only  where  the 
whole  or  a  part  of  the  purchase  money  has  been 
paid,49  but  also  where  no  payment  whatever  has 
been  made.5**  If  the  vendee,  before  completion  of 
the  purchase,  sells  and  assigns  his  interest  under 
his  contract  to  a  third  person,  the  land  will  not  be 
bound  in  the  hands  of  the  latter  by  a  judgment* 
thereafter  rendered  against  the  assignor,51  at  least 
not  where  the  contract  of  sale  or  assignment  was 
recorded.52  The  lien  created  by  entry  of  a  judg- 
ment against  the  vendor  does  not  attach  to  the  in- 
terest created  in  the  vendee  by  the  prior  contract  to 
purchase.53 

Conditional  sale  of  personalty.  Where  one  makes 
a  conditional  sale  of  personal  property,  retaining  the 
title  in  himself  to  secure  the  purchase  money,  a  fail- 
ure to  record  the  contract  as  required  by  statute  does 
not  render  the  property  subject  to  a  judgment  ren- 
dered in  favor  of  a  third  person  and  against  the 
vendee  of  the  personalty  prior  to  the  making  of  the 
conditional  sale.64 

§  481.    Trust  Estates  and  Legal  Titles- 

a.  In  general 

b.  Judgments  against  cestui  que  trust 


43.     Ga.— Bell    v.    McDuffle,    71    Ga. 

264. 

34  C.J.  p  600  note  44. 
4*.    Ga.— McGregor    v.    Matthis,    32 

Gte.  417. 
34  C.J.  p  600  note  45. 

45.  Ga. — Cooper  v.  Lynes,  111  S.E. 
425,  153  Ga.  85. 

34  C.J.  p  600  note  46. 

46.  Tex.— Price    v.     Traders'     Nat 
Bank,   Civ.App.,    195    S.W.   934. 

47.  CaL — Graves    v.    Arizona    Cent. 
Bank,   272   P.   1063.   205  Cal.  715— 
Oaks  v.. Kendall.  73  P.2d  1255,  23 
Cal.App.2d  715. 

S.D. — American  Nat.  Bank  v.  Groft, 
229  N.W.  376,  56  S.D.  460. 

34  C.J.  p  600  note  49. 

Vendee's  interest  as  subject  to  at- 
tachment or  execution  see  the  O. 
J.S.  title  Vendor  and  Purchaser  § 
315,  also  66  C.J.  p  1083  note  98- 
p  1085  note  42. 

48.  Ga.— Sloan    v.    Loftis,    120    S.E. 
781,  157  Ga.  93. 

Minn. — Farmers'  &  Merchants'  State 


Bank    of    Thief    River    Falls    v. 

Stageberg,  201  N.W.  612,  161  Minn. 

413. 
Va. — Mize  v.  Pennington  Gap  Bank, 

170  S.E.  594,  161  Va.  265. 
34  C.J.  p  600  note  50. 

Vendee  la  possession,  under  con- 
tract had  interest  subject  to  judg- 
ment lien,  and  creditor  attaching 
property  of  purchaser  under  con- 
tract had  valid  judgment  lien  en- 
forceable to  extent  of  interest  debtor 
had  in  premises  after  acquiring  title 
by  deed. — Joseph  v.  Donovan,  157  A. 
638,  114  Conn.  79. 
In  Pennsylvania 

Apart  from  statute,  a  judgment 
against  the  equitable  estate  which  a 
vendee  holds  under  articles  of  agree- 
ment for  the  stale  and  purchase  of 
land  attaches  to  and  binds  the  legal 
estate  the  instant  it  vests  in  the 
vendee,  this  doctrine  being  an  excep- 
tion to  the  general  rule  established 
in  Pennsylvania  that  the  lien  of  a 
Judgment  does  not  affect  a  subse- 
quently acquired  interest  of  the 

920 


debtor  by  revival. — Brumbach  v. 
Pearson,  13  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  762,  22* 
Berks  Co.L..J.  124,  44  York  Leg.Rec. 
21,  78  Pittsb.Leg.J.  451—34  C.J.  p  600 
note  50  [d], 

49.  Ga.— Ralston    v.    Field,    32    Ga.. 
453. 

34  C.J.  p  -601  note  51. 

50.  Iowa. — Rand   v.    Garner,    39    NL 
W.  515,  75  Iowa  311. 

51.  Ark. — Whittington   v.    Simmons,. 
32  Ark.  377. 

34  C.J.  p  601  note  53. 

52.  Pa.— Russell's    Appeal,     15     Pa.. 
319. 

W.Va. — Damron  v.  Smith,  16  S.R. 
807,  37  W.Va.  580. 

53.  Wash.— Heath  v.  Dodson,  110  P.. 
2d  845,  7  Wash.2d  667. 

Rights  of  vendee  not  displaced  or- 
impaired  by  subsequent  accruing 
of  judgment  lien  against  vendor* 
generally  see  infra  §  485. 

54.  Ga. — Commercial   Credit  Co.    of 
Georgia   v.    Jones   Motor  Co.,    167T 
S.E.  768,  46  Ga.App.  464. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  481 


a.  In  General 

As  a  general  rule,  the  lien  of  a  Judgment  does  not  at- 
tach to  the  mere  legal  title  to  property  existing  In  the 
judgment  debtor  when  the  equitable  and  beneficial  title 
is  in  another,  at  least  in  the  absence  of  an  estoppel. 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  does  not  attach  to  the 
mere  legal  title  to  property  existing  in  the  judgment 
debtor,  when  the  equitable  and  beneficial  title  is  in 
another,55  as  where  land  is  conveyed  to  the  judg- 
ment debtor  by  a  deed  absolute  in  form,  but  intend- 
ed merely  as  a  security,  or  subject  to  a  parol  agree- 


ment to  reconvey,56  or  where  there  is  a  mere  transi- 
tory seizin  of  lands  by  the  judgment  debtor  in  trust 
for  another,57  or  where  a  third  person  pays  the  pur- 
chase money,  but  the  deed  is  taken  in  the  name  of 
the  judgment  debtor,68  although  a  judgment  lien  on 
lands  cannot  be  defeated  'by  the  fact  that  the  pur- 
chase money  for  the  lands  was  paid  by  a  third  per- 
son subsequent  to  the  vesting  of  title  in  the  judg- 
ment debtor,  so  that  no  resulting  trust  was  creat- 
ed.^ 


55.  U.S.— TJ.  S.  v.  Certain  Lands  in 
Borough,  of  Brooklyn,  Kings  Coun- 
ty, N.  Y.  (Parcel  No.  6),  D.C.N.Y., 
44  F.Supp.  830. 

Cal.— McGee  v.  Allen,  60  P.2d  1026, 
7  Cal.2d  468— Spear  v.  Farwell,  42 
P.2d  391,  5  Cal.App.2d  111— Davis 
v.  Perry,  8  P.2d  514,  120  CaLApp. 
670— Iknoian  v.  Winter,  270  P.  999, 
94  CaLApp.  223. 

E*la. — Arundel  Debenture  Corporation 
v.  Le  Blond,  190  So.  765,  139  Fla. 
668 — Laganke  v.  Sutter,  187  So. 
586,  137  Fla.  71— Little  v.  Saffer, 
148  So.  573,  110  Fla.  230— First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Savarese,  134  So. 
501,  101  Fla.  480. 

111. — Mauricau  v.  Haugen,  56  N,B. 
3d  367,  387  111.  186— Macaulay  v. 
Dorian,  147  N.B.  793,  317  111.  126. 

N.Y.— In  re  O'Brien's  Estate,  26  N. 
Y.S.2d  519. 

N.C. — Jackson  v.  Thompson,  200  S.B. 
16,  214  N.C.  539. 

Okl. — City  Guaranty  Bank  of  Ho- 
bart  v.  Boxley,  270  P.  69,  132  Okl. 
183. 

Tex. — Berry  v.  Chadwick,  Civ.App., 
137  S.W.2d  859,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct — Garrison  v.  Cit- 
izens' Nat.  Bank  of  Hillsboro,  Civ. 
App.,  25  S.W.2d  231,  error  refused. 

Va.— Miller  v.  Kemp,  160  S.B.  203, 
157  Va.-178,  84  A.L.R.  980. 

Wash. — Heath  v.  Dodson,  110  P.2d 
845,  7  Washed  667. 

34  C.J.  p  596  note  6. 

Interest  of  grantor  in  deed  of  trust 
to  secure  a  debt  as  subject  to 
judgment  lien  see  supra  §  479  b. 

Personal  property 

Ala.— First  Nat  Bank  v.  T.  J.  Perry 
&  Son,  140  So.  614,  25  AUuApp.  6, 
certiorari  dismissed  140  So.  616, 
first  case,  224  Ala.  13,  and  cer- 
tiorari denied  140  So.  616,  second 
case,  224  Ala.  420. 

Registration,  statutes 

(1)  An  implied  or  resulting  trust 
is  not  within  the  registration  stat- 
utes.— In  re  Bosenberg,   D.CXTex.,   4 
F.2d  581. 

(2)  Statute  relating  to  the  record- 
ing '  of   deeds,   mortgages,   etc.,   does 
not    require    resulting   trusts   to   be 
recorded  to  be  valid  against  subse- 
quent judgment   creditors. — East  St. 
Louis  Lumber  Co.  v.  Schnipper,  141 
N.B.  542,  310  111.  150. 


Beneficial  interest  in  trustee 

Where  judgment  debtor  held  title 
to  land  as  trustee,  the  lien  of  the 
judgment  against  judgment  debtor 
individually  attached  only  to  his  ac- 
tual interest  as  a  cestui  que  trust. — 
Brown  v.  Hodgman,  19  S.B.2d  910, 
124  W.Va.  136. 

Transaction  held  to  vest  complete  ti- 
tle in  detrbor 

Wife  to  whom  husband  voluntarily 
executed  deed  to  qualify  her  as  sure- 
ty on  bail  bond  had  title  to  which 
lien  of  judgment  against  her  at- 
tached, and  not  mere  naked  legal 
title  with  equitable  title  remaining 
in  grantor,  even  though  parties  in- 
tended deed  was  not  to  be  recorded. 
— Parsons  v.  Robinson,  274  P.  528, 
206  Cal.  378. 

Judgment  against  superintendent 
of  banking  who  has  sued  as  receiver 
of  a  particular  bank  would  not  be 
lien  on  any  land  held  by  him  as 
receiver  of  some  other  bank. — Bates 
v.  Nichols,  274  N.W.  32,  223  Iowa 
878. 

Land  deeded  to  avoid  financial  diffi- 
culties 

Judgment  creditors  of  person  to 
whom  land  was  deeded  without  con- 
sideration and  who  held  entire  in- 
terest therein  as  trustee  for  gran- 
tor was  not  entitled  to  lien  against 
such  land,  notwithstanding  land  was 
deeded  to  such  person  to  avoid  finan- 
cial difficulty. — Kennedy  v.  Roff,  61 
P.2d  1041,  178  Okl.  71. 
In  Pennsylvania 

(1)  Prior  to   the  act  of  June   4, 
1901,   a  judgment  creditor  was   not 
entitled  to  the  protection  of  a  pur- 
chaser of  the  legal  title  against  an 
equitable  owner.     Such  act  changed 
the  law  by  providing  that  a  result- 
ing trust  arising  from  payment  of 
purchase  money  by  a  person  other 
than  the  one  taking  the  legal  title 
shall  be  void  as  to  bona  fide  judg- 
ment  or  other  creditors;    but  such 
act  is  not  applicable  to  trusts  aris- 
ing   where    a    conveyance    is    made 
without    any    consideration    and    it 
appears  that  the  grantee  was  not  in- 
tended to  take  beneficially. — Lough- 
ney  v.  Page,  182  A.  700,  320  Pa.  508 
—34  C.J.  p  596  note  6  [j]. 

(2)  The    statute    has    application 
only  to  one  particular  type  of  trust, 

921 


that  which  arises  by  reason  of  a 
payment  of  the  purchase  money  by 
one  person  and  the  taking  of  title 
in  the  name  of  another. — Davis  v. 
Commonwealth  Trust  Co.,  7  A.2d  3, 
335  Pa.  387 — Loughney  v.  Page,  su- 
pra—34  C,J.  p  596  note  6  [j], 

(3)  As  to  real  estate  to  which  the 
debtor   holds    only    the   bare   record 
title,  the  judgment  is  no  lien;    and 
a  judgment  creditor  of  a  trust  com- 
pany could  not  secure  a  lien  on  real- 
ty   held   by    the    trust    company    as 
trustee  for  others. — Fortna  v.  Com- 
monwealth Trust  Co.,  19  A.2d  57,  841 
Pa.     138 — Eavis    v.     Commonwealth 
Trust  Co.,  7  A.2d  3,  335  Pa.  387. 

(4)  So,  where  claim  against  trust 
company  for  unlawful  distraint  was 
nothing    more    than    a    common    or 
secondary  claim  against   the  assets 
of  the  trust  company  in  possession 
of  liquidating  trustees,  the  securing 
of  a  judgment  on  such  claim  could 
not  give  the  claim  a  higher  status 
than    it    primarily    had. — Davis    v. 
Commonwealth  Trust  Co.,  supra. 

(5)'  Other  cases. — Davis  v.  •  Com- 
monwealth Trust  Co.,  Com.PL,  46 
Dauph.Co.  297 — Gorniak  v.  Potter  Ti- 
tle &  Trust  Co.,  Com.PL,  91  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  279. 

56.  U.S. — U.  S.  v.  Certain  Lands  in 
Borough  of  Brooklyn,  Kings  Coun- 
ty, N.  T.  (Parcel  No.  6),  D.C.N.Y., 
44  F.Supp.  830. 

Tex. — Garrison  v.  Citizens'  Nat.  Bank 
of  HiUsboro,  Civ.App.,  25  S.W.2d 
231,  error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  596  note  7. 

57.  Minn. — Farmers'    &    Merchants* 
State  Bank  of  Thief  River  Falls  v. 
Stageberg,  201  N.W.  612,  161  Minn. 
413. 

34  C.J.  p  596  note  8. 

Lands  instantaneously  ^seized  as  not 
subject  to  judgment'  lien  general- 
ly see,  supra  §  476. 

58.  N.C. — Jackson  v.  Thompson,  200 
S.E.  16,  214  N.C.  539. 

Tex. — Garrison  .   v.     Citizens'     Nat. 

Bank    of    Hillsboro,    Civ.App.,    25 

S.W.2d  231,  error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  597  note  9. 

59.  S.C.— Ex    parte     Trenholm,     19 
S.C.  126. 

34  C.J.  p  597  note  10. 


481 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


In  some  jurisdictions,  however,  it  has  been  held 
lat  the  "beneficial  owner  may  be  -estopped  to  assert 
tie  against  the  lien  of  a  judgment  obtained  by  one 
rho  extended  credit  to  the  holder  of  the  legal  title 
ithout  knowledge  of  the  equities.60  When  the 
ttst  does  not  extend  to  the  entire  interest  in  the 
md,  as  where  the  title  is  taken  in  the  name  of  the 
iidgment  debtor  and  part  only  of  the  purchase  mon- 
y  is  paid  out  of  trust  funds  in  his  hands,  the  judg- 
lent  against  him  will  be  a  lien  on  the  land  to  the 
xtent  of  his  interest  thereinl61  Where  a  trustee 
olds  the  legal  title,  and  that  title  is  of  record,  a 
idgment  on  default  entered  simply  against  the 
rustor  does  not  affect  the  right  or  title  held  by  the 
rustee  or  the  beneficiary  for  whom  the  title  is  so 


b.  Judgments  against  Cestui  Que  Trust 

It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  against  a  cestui 
ue  trust  does  not  attach  as  a  Hen  on  his  equitable  es- 
ate,  but  under  some  circumstances  such  an  Interest  may 
e  subject  to  a  judgment  lien. 

Under  the  rule  denying  to  judgments  the  effect 
>f  liens  on  equitable  estates,  it  has  been  held  that  a 
udgment  does  not  attach  as  a  lien  on  the  interest 
>f  a  cestui  que  trust,  as,  for  instance^  where  land 
ias  been  purchased  with  the  money  of  a  judgment 
lebtor,  but  the  title  has  been  taken  in  the  name  of 
.  third  person;63  and,  in  some  jurisdictions  where 
i  judgment  is  held  to  be  a  lien  on  both  legal  and 
quitable  estates,  the  judgment  gives  no  lien  on  the 
and  so  purchased  if  the  transaction  was  i;i  fraud 


of  creditors.64  However,  a  distinction  has  been 
made  between  active  and  passive  trusts,  it  being 
held  that  where  the  legal  title  to  lands  is  in  trustees 
for  the  purpose  of  serving  the  requirements  of  an 
active  trust,  a  judgment  creditor  of  the  cestui  que 
trust  has  no  lien  and  can  acquire  none  at  law,65  al- 
though he  may  obtain  relief  in  equity,  on  a  bill  to 
subject  the  beneficiary's  interest  to  the  satisfaction 
of  his  judgment,66  but  that  the  equitable  estate  or 
interest  of  a  cestui  que  trust  may  be  subject  to  the 
lien  of  a  judgment  against  him  where  the  trust  is 
merely  a  dry  or  passive  one.67 

Termination  of  trust.  Where  a  trust  provides  for 
the  collection  of  income  up  to  a  certain  time,  and 
then  for  the  division  of  the  property  among  the  ben- 
eficiaries, the  trustee  having  no  power  to  sell  the 
trust  property,  judgments  which  have  been  recov- 
ered against  the  beneficiaries  will  become  liens  on 
their  interests  in  the  property  on  the  arrival  of  the 
time  of  division.68 


§  482. 


Leaseholds 


Leasehold  interests  are  bound  by  Judgment  liens 
where  such  Interests  are  treated  as  real  estate,  or  where 
statutes  expressly  so  provide. 

At  common  law  a  leasehold  interest  or  estate  in 
land  for  years  was  regarded  as  only  a  chattel  in- 
terest, and  therefore  not  subject  to  the  lien  of  a 
judgment,  and  this  view  is  still  held  in  some 
states  ;6d  but  in  others  leasehold  interests  are  re- 
garded and  treated  as  real  estate,  and  as  such  bound 
by  judgment  liens.70  Judgments  are  also  liens  on 


0.  Fla. — Arundel  Debenture  Corpo- 
ration v.  Le  Blond,  190  So.  765, 
139  Fla.  668 — Laganke  v.  Sutter, 
187  So.  586,  137  Fla.  71— Little  v. 
Saffer,  148  So.  573,  110  Fla.  230 
—First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Savarese,  134 
So.  501,  101  Fla.  480. 
Ja.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Pounds,  136 

S.E.  528,  163  Ga.  551. 
nothing  another  with  apparent  title 
to  real  property  as  creating  estop- 
pel generally  see  Estoppel   §  105. 
Creditor  held  not  entitled  to  lien 

A  judgment  creditor  had  no  lien 
.gainst  land  purchased  by  Judgment 
Lebtor  with  proceeds  of  land  de- 
rised  to  Judgment  debtor's  daughters 
>n  .ground  that  judgment  creditor 
lad  loaned  to  judgment  debtor  on 
itrength  of  his  holdings,  where  there 
Kras  no  recorded  deed  to  judgment 
lebtor  which  might  have  gone  into 
m  estimate  of  judgment  debtor's 
iolvency;  and  the  judgment  creditor 
iould  not  urge  lapse  of  time  and 
aches  of  daughters  in  not  bringing 
:heir  affairs  to  an  earlier  settlement 
md  not  having  accounts  filed  and  ap- 
proved and  proper  conveyance  of 
Lands  made  to  them,  where  there  was 


no  evidence  that  judgment  debtor 
denied  trust  or  refused  to  execute 
it,  and  if  he  had,  matter  would  still 
be  between  parties  to  trust. — Jack- 
son v.  Thompson,  200  S.E.  16,  214  N. 
C.  539. 

61.  Minn. — Martin  v.  Baldwin,  16  N. 
W.  449,  30  Minn.  -537. 

62.  Cal. — Schwartz  v.  Mead,  3  P.2d 
48,  116  CaLApp.  606. 

63.  Pa. — Loughney  v.   Page,   23   Pa. 
Dist    &   Co.    534,    affirmed    182   A. 
700,  320  Pa.  508. 

34  C.J.  p  597  note  12. 

64.  N.C.— Dixon    v.    Dixon,    81    N.C. 
323. 

34  C.J.  p  597  note  13. 

65.  U.S. — Brandies  v.  Cochrane,  I1L, 
5  S.Ct.  194,  112  U.S.  344,  28  KEd. 

•  760. 

34  C.J.  p  597  note  14. 

66.  U.S. — Freedman's      Savings      & 
Trust  Co.   v.    Earle,    B.C.,    4    S.Ct 
226,    110    U.S.    710,    28    L.Ed.    301. 

Va. — Coutts  v.  Walker,  2  Leigh  268, 
29  Va.  268. 

67.  Del.— -Doe  v.  T«aTOc,    9   Del.    648. 
34  C.J.  p  597  note  16. 

922 


68.  111.— - Moll    v.    Gardner,    73    N.E. 
442,  214  111.  248. 

69.  Cal.— Cook  v.  Huntley,  112  P.2d 
889,  44  Cal.App.2d  635. 

Okl.— Pauline  Oil  &  Gas  Co.  v. 
Fischer,  130  P.2d  305,  191  Okl.  346 
—First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dunlap,  254 
P\  729.  122  Okl.  288,  52  A.L.R. 
126. 

Pa. — Sheaffer  v.  Baeringer,  29  A.2d 
697,  346  Pa.  32. 

34  C.J.  p  593  note  77. 

Personal  property  as  subject  to  Judg- 
ment liens  generally  see  supra  § 
472. 

Incorporeal  hereditament 

Statutes  making  judgment  lien  on 
real  estate  does  not  apply  to  ordi- 
nary oil  and  gas  lease  which  is  an 
incorporeal  hereditament — Beren  v. 
Marshall  Oil  &  Gas  Corporation,  251 
P.  192,  122  Kan.  134. 

70.  N.T. — Henderson  v.  Tomb,  8  N. 
T.S.2d  612,  169  Misc.  737. 

34  OJ.  p  593  note  78. 

Real  property  as  subject  to  judg- 
ment liens  generally  see  supra  I 
472. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  484 


leasehold  interests  where  expressly  made  so  by  stat- 
ute™ 

§  483.     Priority  of  Liens 

A  judgment  creditor  has  a  right  to  strengthen  his 
lien  against  the  property  of  his  debtor  by  purchasing 
other  claims,  valid  or  invalid,  which  were  asserted  as 
superior  to  the  judgment  lien. 

A  judgment  creditor  has  a  right  to  strengthen  his 
lien  against  the  property  of  his  debtor  by  purchas- 
ing other  claims,  valid  or  invalid,  which  were  as- 
serted as  superior  to  the  judgment  lien.72 

The  priority  of  liens  as  between  judgments  gen- 
erally is  considered  infra  §  484;  as  between  judg- 
ments and  attachment  liens  in  Attachment  §  272; 
as  between  judgments  and  garnishment  liens  in  Gar- 
nishment §  183 ;  and  as  between  judgments  and  oth- 
er liens  or  conveyances  generally  infra  §  485. 

§  484.    —  Between  Judgments 

a.  In  general 

b.  As  against  after-acquired  property 

c.  Judgments  entered  on  same  day 

d.  Priority  by  superior  diligence 

e.  Judgments  for  future  advances 

f.  Judgments  for  purchase  money 

a.  In  General 

In  general  the  liens  of  different  judgments,  affecting 
the  same  property  take  rank  and  priority  according  to 
the  dates,  when  they  were  respectively  entered  or 
docketed. 

In  some  jurisdictions,  the  docketing  of  a  judg- 
ment is  necessary  in  order  that  the  lien  may  attach 


as  against  subsequent  judgment  creditors;73  in  oth- 
ers, a  prior  judgment,  whether  docketed  or  undock- 
eted,  has  priority  over  a  subsequent  judgment.74  In 
the  absence  of  countervailing  equities,  or  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  different  rule  by  statute,  and  sub- 
ject to  the  rules  hereinafter  stated,  the  liens  of  dif- 
ferent judgments  affecting  the  same  property  take 
rank  and  priority  according  to  the  dates  when  they 
were  respectively  entered  or  docketed,  the  elder  be- 
ing first  entitled  to  satisfaction,75  without  regard 
to  the. date  of  acquisition  of  the  land  to  which  they 
attach,76  and  the  same  rule  of  priority  obtains  as 
between  a  judgment  at  law  and  a  decree  in  equity 
where  the  law  requires  both  to  be  docketed  or  en- 
rolled.77 In  fixing  this  priority,  the  relative  posi- 
tion of  the  judgments  on  the  docket,  although  rais- 
ing a  presumption  as  to  their  seniority,  is  not  con- 
trolling.78 

Since  the  lien  of  a  judgment  is  dependent  on  the  * 
condition  of  the  record  at  the  time  of  its  entry,  it 
cannot  be  affected  by  a  subsequent  revival  of  an 
earlier  judgment,  giving  the  holder  thereof  rights 
which  did  not  exist  at  the  time  of  the  entry  of  the 
junior  judgment.79  If  the  last  of  three  or  more 
judgment  liens  in  the  order  of  their  succession  is 
superior  to  the  first,  but  inferior  to  the  second,  it 
gains  no  practical  advantage  from  its  superiority, 
because  it  could  not  be  preferred  to  the  first  without 
being  preferred  also  to  the  second,  to  which  it  is 
subsequent.80  In  some  jurisdictions  it  has  been 
held  that  a  subsequent  judgment  creditor  is  entitled 
to  priority  over  an  earlier  judgment  of  which  the 
docket  gives  no  notice,81  as  where  it  fails  to  dis- 


71.  U.S.— In  re  Day,  D.O.Md.,  22  F. 
Supp.  946. 

34  O.J.  p  593  note  78  [e]. 

72.  Mo. — Essey  v.  Bushakra,  252  S. 
W.  459,  299  Mo.  147. 

73.  La.— Robinson  v.  Cosner,  67  So. 
468.   '.36  La.  595. 

N..1  —Merchants'  &  Mfrs.'  Trust  Co. 

*    Rollins,   141  A.  265,  102  N.J.EQ. 

460. 
34  C.J.  p  601  note  55. 

74.  W.Va.— Amato  v.  Hall,   174  S.B. 
686,  115  W.Va.  79. 

34  C.J.  p  601  note  56. 

75.  D.C.— Ginder  v.  Giuffrida,  62  F. 
2d  877,  61  App.D.C.  338. 

Ga.— Herndon    v.    Braddy,    146    S.B. 

495,  39  Ga.App.  165. 
Iowa. — Paulsen  v.  Jensen,   228  N.W. 

357,  209  Iowa  453. 
La.— State  ex  rel.  Wall  v.  Coverdale, 

App.,    175    So.    492— Flaspoller   Co. 

v.  Sless,  6  La.App.  827. 
Md. — Messinger  v.  Bckenrode,  158  A. 

357,  162  Md.  68. 
Minn. — Lowe   v.   Reierson,   276   N.W. 

224,  201  Minn.  280. 


N.C. — Summers     Hardware     Co.     v. 

Jones,   23  S.E.2d  883,  222  N.C.  530 

— Dillard  v.  Walker,  167  S.B.   632, 

204  N.C.   67— Sugg  v.  Pollard,  115 

S.E.  153,  184  N.C.  494. 
34  C.J.  p  601  note  57. 
Statutory   provisions   construed   and 

compared 
La. — Lederman  v.   McCailum,  1  La. 

App.  552. 
Notice  of  lis  pendens 

The  absence  of  any  filing  of  a  no- 
tice of  lis  pendens  cannot  be  as- 
serted to  the  benefit  of  judgments 
obtained  after  the  original  judgment 
was  docketed. — Sugg  v.  Pollard,  115 
S.B.  153,  184  N.C.  494. 
Date  of  entry  on  judgment  docket 

controls 
Pa.— Citizens  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 

of  Lehighton  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 

20  PaJDist.  &  Co.  349,  15  Leh.L.J. 

302,   6   Som.Co.   368,  47  York  Leg. 

Reo.  167. 

76.  MdWMessinger    v.     Bckenrode, 
158  A.  357,  162  Md.  63. 

77.  Miss. — McKee  v.  Gayle,  46  Miss. 

923 


676— Briggs     v.     Planters'     Bank, 
Freem.  574. 

78.  Pa. — Glasgow    v.    Kann,     82    A. 
1095,  171  Pa.  262. 

34  C.J.  p  602  note  59. 

79.  Pa. — Young  v.  Young,  20  Pa.Co. 
45. 

Tex. — Harrison  v.   First  Nat.   Bank, 

Civ.App.,  224  S.W.  269. 
34  C.J.  p  602  note  60. 

80.  Pa. — Dowling  v.  Vallett,  70  Pa. 
Super.  481. 

34  C.J.  p  602  note  61. 

81.  U.S.— In   re   MacNulty,   D.C.Pa., 
4  F.Supp.  93. 

Pa. — Everett  Bank  v.   Hall,   10  A.2d 

115,  138  Pa.Super.  79. 
Judgment  against  married  woman 

A  judgment  on  a  confession  en- 
tered of  record  against  woman  twice 
married  in  her  first  married  name, 
entered  several  years  after  her  mar- 
riage to  second  husband,  did  not  af- 
ford such  "constructive  notice"  in 
public  record  as  to  give  judgment 
priority  over  a  subsequent  judgment 
on  a  mortgage  signed  by  woman  in 


§484 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


dose  the  Christian  name  of  the  debtor;82  but  the 
rule  has  been  held  not  to  apply  to  a  junior  judgment 
holder  who  fails  to  search  the  judgment  records  and 
hence  was  not  misled.83  Actual  notice  of  a  defec- 
tively entered  judgment  is  as  effective  to  give  pri- 
ority to  such  judgment  over  a  subsequent  judgment 
as  is  the  constructive  notice  given  by  the  judgment 
docket.8* 

Judgments  entered  at  same  term.  Where  the  doc- 
trine of  relation  to  the  first  or  last  day  of  the  term, 
as  discussed  supra  §  113,  prevails,  or  where  so  pro- 
vided by  statute,  there  is  no  priority  between  judg- 
ments entered  at  the  same  term  ;8&  but  even  where 
this  rule  has  been  given  statutory  form,  it  has  been 
held  not  to  affect  the  priorities  of  transcripts  of 
judgments  filed  in  a  county  other  than  that  in  which 
the  judgments  were  recovered.86  Where  the  doc- 
trine of  relation  does  not  apply,  and  in  the  absence 
of  statute,  the  priority  of  judgments  is  not  affected 
by  the  fact  that  they  were  rendered  at  the  same 
term.8? 

b.  As  against  After-Acquired  Property 

As  a  general  rule  there  Is  no  priority  between  Judg- 
ments as  to  property  acquired  by  the  judgment  debtor 
after  the  judgments  have  been  entered. 

Although  there  is  some  authority  to  the  con- 
trary,88 it  has  generally  been  held  that,  if  several 
judgments  are  entered  against  the  same  debtor  at 
different  times,  and  he  afterward  acquires  the  legal 
title  to  real  estate,  the  liens  of  the  several  judg- 
ments attach  together  on  the  property  at  the  same 
instant,  and  there  are  therefore  no  priorities  be- 
tween them;89  nor  can  one  judgment  creditor  ob- 


tain priority  by  obtaining  execution  and  sale  of  such 
property.90 

c.  Judgments  Entered  on  Same  Day 

As  between  judgments  entered  on  the  same  day,  In- 
some  Jurisdictions  there  is  no  priority  of  Hen.  In  others, 
priority  depends  on  priority  of  execution,  while  in  stilt 
others,  fractional  parts  of  the  day  may  be  considered. 

In  some  jurisdictions,  courts  are  bound  to  look 
to  the  fractional  parts  of  a  day  in  order  to  deter- 
mine the  priority  of  judgment  liens  where  several 
are  entered,  filed,  or  registered  against  the  same 
debtor  on  the  same  da}'.91  In  other  jurisdictions, 
the  rule  in  respect  of  such  judgments  is  that  the 
creditor  who  first  takes  out  execution  will  have  a 
preference.92  In  still  other  jurisdictions,  there  is 
no  priority  of  liens  between  judgments  entered  on 
the  same  day,  and,  when  the  fund  is  insufficient  to 
discharge  them  all,  they  are  to  be  paid  pro  rata,95 
unless  some  one  judgment  creditor  has  a  superior 
equity.94 

d.  Priority  by  Superior  Diligence 

Under  the  statutes  and  decisions  In  some  Jurisdic- 
tions, and  in  a  proper  case,  priority  may  be  gained  for 
a  judgment  by  a  creditor  exercising  superior  diligence 
in  obtaining  execution. 

Where  several  judgments  are  of  equal  rank  or 
date,  it  has  been  held,  as  discussed  in  Fraudulent 
Conveyances  §  451,  that  a  priority  is  gained  by  that 
creditor  who  exercises  superior  activity  and  dili- 
gence, as  where  one  is  the  first  to  discover  and 
avoid  a  fraudulent  conveyance  of  property  by  the 
common  debtor;  or  to  levy  an  attachment  on  the 
property,  as  considered  in  Attachments  §  272;  and 
one  who  by  supplementary  proceedings  discovers 


.surname  of  present  husband. — South 
Side  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Wright, 
32  A.2d  918,  153  Pa.Super.  83. 

82.  U.S.— In   re   MacNulty*  D.C.Pa., 
4  F.Supp.  93. 

83.  Md.— Messinger     v.     Eckenrode, 
158  A.  857,  162  Md.  63. 

84.  Pa. — Coral  Gables  v.  Kerl,   6  A. 
2d    275,    334    Pa*    441,    122    A.L.R. 
903. 

85.  Ga.— Bads    v.    Southern    Surety 
Co.,    173    S.B.    163,    178    Ga.    348— 
Herndbn  v.   Braddy,   146   S.B.  495, 
39  Ga-App.  165. 

34  C.J.  p  602  note  64. 

33.  S.C.— Farmers'  •  &  Merchants' 
Bank  v.  Holliday,  93  S.E.  833,  108 
S.C.  116. 

87.  -U.S.— Welsh  v.    Murray,    Pa.,    4 
Dall.  320,  1  L.Ed.  850. 

Md.— Anderson  v.  Tuck,  38  Md.  225. 

88.  Minn. — Lowe  v.  Reierson,  276  N. 
W.  224,  201  Minn.  280. 

34  C.J.  p  602  note  68. 


89.  N.C. — Summers  Hardware  Co.  v. 
Jones.  23  S.B.2d  883,  222  N.C.  530. 

N.D.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Zink  v. 

James  River  Nat  Bank,  224  N.W. 

901,  903,  58  N.D.  1,  67  A.L.R.  1294. 
34  C.J.  p  603  note  69. 

90.  N.D.— Zink  v.  James  River  Nat. 
Bank,  224  N.W.  901,  58  N.D.  1.  67 
A.L.R.  1294. 

91.  Neb. — Pontiac  Improvement  Co. 
v.  Leisy,  14  N.W.2d  384,  144  Neb. 
705. 

N.C. — Hood  ex  pel.  People's  Bank  of 
Burnsville  v.  Wilson,  179  S.B.  425, 
208  N.C.   120. 
34  C.J.  p  603  note  70. 
Consent  judgments 

Statutory  provision  that  liens  of 
all  Judgments  rendered  on  same 
Monday  shall  be  of  equal  priority 
does  not  apply  to  consent  judgments 
rendered  on  other  days,  rule,  "qui 
prior  est  in  tempore,  prior  est  in 
jure/'  applying  to  such  judgments, 
in  Absence  of  contrary  statutory 

924 


provisions. — Hood    ex    rel.     People's 
Bank  of  Burnsville  v..  Wilson,  supra. 

Where  order  of  rendering  not  shown 
When  it  is  not  shown  which  of 
three  judgments  rendered  by  default 
on  the  same  day  was  first  filed  by 
the  clerk,  they  should  be  treated  as 
filed  simultaneously  and  must  rank 
concurrently  in  surplus  proceeds  on 
foreclosure  of  mortgage. — Godchaux 
Sugars,  Inc./  v.  Leon  Boudreaux  & 
Bros.,  96  So.  532,  153  La.  685—34  C. 
J.  p  603  note  70  [c]. 

93.    Ind. — Hollcraft  v.   Douglass,    17 

N.B.  275,  115  Ind.  13*9. 
34  C.J.  p  603  note  71. 

93.  U.S. — McLean'  v.    Rockey,    C.C. 
Ohio,  16  F.Cas.No.8,891,   3   McLean 
235. 

34  C.J.  p  603  note  72. 

94.  Pa.— Appeal    of    Vierheller,     24 
Pa.  105,  62  Am.D.  365. 

34  C.J,  p  603  note  73. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  484 


property  of  the  judgment  debtor  in  the  hands  of 
third  persons  has  a  legal  preference  enforceable  in 
a  court  of  equity.95 

Priority  by  prior  levy.  In  some  jurisdictions,  par- 
ticularly where  the  statutes  so  provide,  priority  is 
given  to  judgments  in  the  order  in  which  execu- 
tions are  issued  thereon,96  such  priority  being  un- 
disturbed by  any  subsequent  judgment,  levy  of  'exe- 
cution, or  sale  thereunder.97  In  other  jurisdictions, 
however,  the  fact  that  an  execution  is  first  issued  on 
a  junior  judgment  does  not  give  the  lien  of  such 
judgment  priority  over  that  of  a  settlor  judgment 
against  the  same  land;98  but  priority  for  a  junior 
judgment  may  thus  be  gained  where  the  land  af- 
fected was  not  subject  to  the  lien  of  either  judg- 
ment.99 A  statute  requiring  the  recording  of  execu- 
tions on  the  general  execution  docket,  amended  to 
provide  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment  shall  date  only 
from  the  time  the  execution  is  so  recorded,  has 
been  held  to  have  no  .application  in  a  contest  be- 
tween mere  judgment  liens,  it  being  intended  for 
the  protection  of  third  persons.1 

Although  there  is  authority  to  the  contrary,2 
it  has  generally  been  held  that,  where  liens  of  judg- 
ment are  equal,  one  judgment  creditor  may  acquire 
a  priority  over  another  by  superior  diligence  in  ex- 
ecuting his  judgment.3  Thus,  where  there  is  no 
priority  between  the  liens  of  judgments  in  favor 
of  different  persons  and  against  the  same  defend- 
ant rendered  or  recorded  on  the  same  day,  it  has 
been  held  that  the  judgment  creditor  first  issuing 
execution  and  levying  on  the  debtor's  property  ac- 
quires a  prior  right  to  satisfaction;4  and  the  same, 
rule  has  been  applied  to  judgments  rendered  at  the 


same  term  where  such  judgments  are  equal  liens 
on  the  defendant's  real  estate.5  So  the  rule  has 
been  applied  in  a  case  where  two  liens  on  real  es- 
tate were  created  by  the  same  decree.6  Commence- 
ment of  a  suit  to  partition  the  property  will  not  pre- 
vent the  holder  of  a  judgment  lien  thereon  from 
obtaining  priority  over  another  judgment  creditor 
by  causing  execution  to  issue  and  levy  to  be  made 
after  institution  of  the  action,  where  the  other  cred- 
itor failed  to  do  so.7 

'Priority  between  judgments  as  against  equitable 
interests.  It  has  been  held  that,  if  several  creditors 
having  judgments  of  different  dates  resort  to  a' 
court  of  equity  for  satisfaction  out  of  an  equitable 
interest  of 'their  debtor  in  real  estate,  they  are  to 
have  satisfaction  out  of  the  fund  according  to  the 
order  of  their  judgments  in  point  of  time,  the  elder 
being  entitled  to  priority  over  the  younger.8  On 
the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  the  judgment 
creditor  who  first  files  his  bill  to  enforce  an  equita- 
ble lien  on  land  obtains  a  priority  in  relation  to  the 
land  named  in  his  bill,  and  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  action  be  prosecuted  for  the  benefit  of  all  the 
creditors.9 

e.  Judgments  for  Future  Advances 

In  some  jurisdictions  the  Hen  of  a  Judgment  for  fu- 
ture advances  Is  superior  to  Hens  attaching  after  the 
judgment  but  before  the  advances;  in  others,  it  is  supe- 
rior only  as  to  advances  made  before  the  subsequent 
lien. 

Some  decisions  hold  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
given  to  secure  advances  to  be  made  will  be  good 
against  intervening  liens  attaching  after  the  judg- 
ment but  before  the  advances.10  Under  other  de- 


95.  S.C. — Ex  parte  Roddey,  172  S.E. 
866,    171   S.C.   .489,   92  A.L.R.   1430. 

96.  Fla. — Blackstone  Holding-  Co.  v. 
Lawrence,  192  So.  19-8,  140  Fla,  703. 

N.J. — West  Hudson  County  Trust  Co. 

v.  Wichner,  187  A.  579,  121  N.J.Eq.. 

157— Swift    &    Co.    v.    First    Nat. 

Bank,  168  A.  827,  114  N.J.Eq.  417— 

Riverside  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v. 

Bishop,   131  A.   78,  98  N.J.Eq.  508. 
34  C.J.  p  603  note  77. 
Property  fraudulently  conveyed 

Where  a  judgment  is  a  lien  on 
property  fraudulently  conveyed,  it 
has  been  Intimated  that  a  junior 
creditor  who  first  takes  out  an  ex- 
ecution on  his  judgment  secures  a 
priority,  and  this,  although  a  senior 
creditor  had  previously  filed  his  bill 
in  equity  to  remove  the  fraudulent 
obstruction  to  the  enforcement  of  his 
lien. — Dunham  v.  Cox,  10  N.J.Eq. 
437,  64  Am.D.  460. 

,  97.    N.  J.— Swift  &  Co.  v.  First  Nat 
Bank,  168  A.  827,  114  N.J.EQ.  417. 


98.  Ga. — Eads    v.    Southern    Surety 
Co.,  173  S.E.  163,  178  Ga.  348. 

Md. — Messinger    v.    Eckenrode,     158 

A.  357,  162  Md.  63. 

Minn.— Lowe  v.   Reierson,   276   N.W. 

224,  201  Minn.  280. 
34  C.J.  P  604  note  78. 

99.  Iowa. — Kisterson  v.  Tate,  68  N. 
W.   350,   94   Iowa  665,    58   Am.S.R. 
419. 

N.J.— Lovejoy  v.  Lovejoy,  31  N.J.EQ. 
55. 

1.  Ga. — Corley-Powell    Produce    Co. 
v.  Allen,   157  S.E.  251,   42  Ga.App. 
641. 

2.  N.T.— Hulbert  v.  Hulbert,  111  N. 

B.  70,    216   N.T.    430, '  L.R.A.1916D 
661,  Ann.Cas.l917D  180. 

34  C.J.  p  604  note  81. 

3.  Mo. — City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Wall, 
124   S.W.2d   616,    235    Mo.App.   9. 

34  C.J.  p. 604  note  82. 

4.  Iowa.— Wilson  v.  Baker,  8  N.W. 
481,  52  Iowa  423. 

34  C.J.  p  604  note  83. 

925 


5.  Mo. — Bradley  v.  Heffernan,  « 
W.  763,  156  Mo.  653. 

34  C.J.  p  604  note  84. 

6.  Mo. — Shirley   v.    Brown,    80 
244. 


Mo 


7.  Ohio. — Shafer   v.    Buckeye    State- 
Bldg.  &  Loan  Co.,  App.,  45  N.E.2dT 
421. 

8.  Va.— Max  Meadows  Land  &  Im- 
provement Co.  v.  McGavock,  36  S. 
E.  490,  98  Va.  411— Haleys  v.  Wil- 
liams,   1    Leigh    140,    28    Va.    140> 
19  Am.D.  743. 

34  C.J.  p  604  note  86. 

9.  U.S. — Freednran's       Savings       &r 
Trust   Co.    v.   Earle,   I>.C.,    4    S.CL. 
226,  110  U.S.  710,  28  L.Ed.  301. 

34  C.J.  p  604  note  87. 

10.  Md. — Joseph  J.  Robinson  &  Co. 
v.  Consolidated  Real  Estate  &  Fire- 
Ins.  Co.,  55  Md.  105. 

34  C.J.  p  604  note  88. 


§484 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


cisions,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  to  secure  advances 
will  be  postponed  to  a  subsequent  bona  fide  lien, 
except  for  such  advances  as  have  been  made  be- 
fore the  attaching  of  the  subsequent  lien,11  at  least 
where  it  was  optional  with  the  creditor  to  make 
the  advances  or  not,  and  he  was  not  absolutely 
bound  to  do  so.12 

f.  Judgments  for  Purchase  Money 

The  mere  fact  that  a  judgment  is  for  purchase  mon- 
ey does  not  make  it  superior  to  judgments  for  other 
debts. 

The  mere  fact  that  a  judgment  is  for  purchase 
money  does  not  make  it  superior  to  judgments  for 
other  debts;18  and  a  judgment  recovered  or  con- 
fessed for  the  purchase  money  of  land  has  no  pri- 
ority over  older  judgments  which  attached  as  liens 
on  the  same  land  at  the  time  of  its  transfer  to  the 
debtor,14  unless  the  execution  and  delivery  of  the 
deed  for  the  land  and  the  giving  of  a  judgment  for 
the  purchase  money  were  inseparably  connected  as 
parts  of  the  same  continuous  transaction.1^  The 
judgment  of  a  transferee  of  a  bond  for  title  to 
land,  although  obtained  subsequent  to  a  general 
judgment  against  the  transferor  of  the  bond,  is 
superior  to  the  latter  judgment,  and  has  a  superior 
claim  to  the  fund  derived  from  the  sale  of  the  land 
covered  by  the  bond,  where  the  transfer  of  the 
bond  antedated  the  latter  judgment.1^  It  has,  how- 
ever, an  inferior  claim  to  a  fund  derived  from  the 
sale  of  land  of  the  transferor  not  covered  by  the 
bond  for  title.17 


§  485.    Between  Judgment  and  Convey- 
ances and  Other  Liens 

a.  Prior  conveyance  or  lien  generally 

b.  Subsequent  conveyance  or  lien 

c.  Contemporaneous  judgment  and  con- 

veyance or  lien 

d.  Judgment  for  purchase  money 

e.  Purchase-money  mortgage 

f.  Contemporaneous  mortgage  to  secure 

other  debts 

g.  Contracts  of  sale  and  vendor's  lien 
h.  Government  claims 

a.  Prior  Conveyance  or  Lien  Generally 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Prior  conveyance  or  lien  not  record- 

ed 

(3)  Effect  of  notice 

(1)  In  General 

Unless  otherwise  provided  by  statute,  a  Judgment 
lien  is  subordinate  to  prior  conveyances  and  encum- 
brances, and  all  existing  liens  and  equities  In  favor  of 
third  persons. 

Since,  as  discussed  supra  §  478,  the  lien  of  a 
judgment  attaches  only  to  the  actual  interest  of  the 
debtor  in  the  land,  the  general  rule  is  that  the  judg- 
ment Hen  is  subordinate  to  prior  conveyances  and 
encumbrances  and  all  existing  liens  and  equities  in 
favor  of  third  persons,18  except  in  those  cases 
where,  by  the  terms  of  a  statutory  provision,  a  judg- 


11.  Pa.— Appeal  of  Kerr,  92  Pa.  236." 
34  C.J.  p  604  note  89. 

12.  Pa. — Ter-Hoven  v.  Kerns,  2  Pa. 
96. 

S.C.— Walker  v.  Arthur,  30  S.C.EQ. 
397. 

13.  Va. — Kidwell  v.  Henderson,  143 
S.E.  336,  150  Va.  829. 

14.  Ga. — Graf  ton  v.  Toombs,  58  Ga, 
343. 

34  C.J.  p  605  note  91. 

15.  Pa. — Appeal   of   Snyder,   91  Pa. 
477. 

16.  Ga.— Hardy    v.    Truitt,    93    S.B. 
149,  20  GfeuApp.  529. 

17.  Ga. — Hardy  v.  Truitt,  supra. 

18.  U.S.— Whitaker  &  Co.  v.  Grable, 
C.C.A.Ark.,     109     F.2d '  710— North 
Alabama  Assets  Co.  v.  Orman,  C. 
C.A.AUL,   15   P.2d  909— In  re  Ros- 
enberg:, D.C.Tex.,  4  P.2d  581— Will- 
cox  v.  Goess,  D.C.N.Y.,  16  F.Supp. 
350. 

Ala.— Warrick  v.  Liddon,  160  So. 
534,  230  Ala.  253. 

Ark. — Holloway  v.  Bank  of  Atkins, 
169  S.W.2d  868,  205  Ark.  598— Car- 
roll v.  Evans,  79  S.W.2d  425,  190 
Ark,  611 — Snow  Bros.  Hardware 


Co.  v.  Ellis,  21  S.W.2d  162,  180 
Ark,  238 — Stallings  v.  Galloway- 
Kennedy  Co.,  283  S.W.  41,  171  Ark. 
24. 

Ga. — Herre  v.  Root  Mfg,  Co.,  159  S.E. 
574,  173  Ga,  163— Western  Union 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Brown  &  Ran- 
dolph Co.,  114  S.E.  36,  154  Ga, 
229. 

111.— Cutler  v.  Hicks,  268  IlLApp.  161 
— Commercial  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank  of  Springfield  v.  Murray,  246 
IlLApp.  355. 

Iowa, — Johnson  v.  Smith,  231  N.W. 
470,  210  Iowa  591— Everist  v.  Car- 
ter, 210  N.W.  559,  202  Iowa  498— 
Gumming  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  202 
N.W.  556,  199  Iowa  667. 

La. — Embry  v.  Embry,  127  So.  869, 
170  La.  363— Aertker  v.  John  W. 
Ball,  Inc.,  App.,  17  So.2d  309— 
Mitcham  v.  Mitcham,  App.,  195  So. 
107. 

Md. — White  v.  James  Robertson  Mfg. 
Co.,  187  A,  831,  170  Md.  691— Calt- 
rider  v.  Caples,  153  A,  445,  160  Md. 
392,  87  A.L.R.  1500. 

Miss. — Johnson  Hardware  Co.  v. 
Ming,  113  So.  189,  147  Miss.  551— 
Baldwin  v.  Little,  8  So.  168,  64 
Misc.  126. 

926 


Mo. — Castorina  v.  Herrmann,   104   S. 

W.2d  297,  340  Mo.  1026. 
Mont. — Piccolo    v.    Tanaka,     253    P. 

890,  78  Mont.  445. 
N.J.— Rutherford   Nat    Bank    v.    H. 

R.   Bogle   &  Co..    169   A.    180,   114 

N.J.EQ.  571. 
NT.T.— Moore    v.    Hushion,    284    N.Y. 

S.    331,    246    App.Div.    771,    781. 
N.C.— Helsabeck    v.    Vass,    146    S.E. 

•576,  196  N.C.  603. 
N.D. — Business      Service      Collection 

Bureau  v.  Tegen,  269  N.W.  46,   67 

N.D.    51— Smith   v.   Kornkven,    256 

N.W.   210,    64   N.D.   789— McKenzie 

County  v.   Casady,   214   N.W.   461, 

55  N.D.  475. 
Ohio.— Fulton  v.  Stump,  198  N.E.  47, 

50     Ohio     App.     295— -Williams     y. 

Johns,  170  N.E.  580,  34  Ohio  App. 

230— Miller  v.  Scott,   154  N.E.  368, 

23  Ohio  App.  50. 
Okl.— Riddle    v.    Grayson,    105    P.2d 

248,  187  Okl.  647. 
Pa.— Rubinsky  v.  Kosh,  145  A.   836, 

296    Pa.    285— First   Nat.    Bank  of 

Ashley  v.  Reily,   Com.Pl.f   37  Luz. 

Leg.Reg.  404 — Automobile  Finance 

Co.  v.  Anderson,  Com.PL,  27  West. 

Co.  227. 
Tex. — Payne  v.  Bracken,  115  S.W.2d 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  485 


ment  is  given  priority.19  Where  a  lien  is  general, 
it  must  be  subordinated  to  the  superior  equity  of  a 
prior  specific  lien,20  although  this  rule  cannot  avail 
against  a  specific  statute  to  the  contrary.21  The 
lien  of  a  subsequent  judgment  has  been  held  to  take 
priority  over  an  alleged  mortgage  lien  claimed  by 
one  whose  name  has  been  substituted  as  a  grantee 
without  authority  of  the  original  grantor  for  the 
purpose  of  defraudirig  creditors.22  A  mortgagee 
lending  money  for  construction  has  been  held  en- 
titled to  priority  over  subsequent  judgment  creditors, 


although  the  construction  was  on  a  lot  not  covered 
by  the  mortgage.23  Where  a  deed  is  to  a  dissolved 
corporation,  which  is  incapable  of  receiving  title, 
a  subsequent  judgment  has  a  lien  prior  to  the  in- 
terest* of  a  grantee  from  the  corporation.24 

Where  a  mortgage  given  to  secure  a  note  mis- 
takenly secures  only  a  small  portion  of  the  amount 
intended,  judgment  creditors  obtaining  judgments 
after  the  mortgage  is  recorded  have  a  lien  on  the 
mortgaged  land  subject  to  the  amount  stated  in  the 


903,  131  Tex.  394— -First  Nat.  Bank 
of  Amarillo  v.  Jones,  183  S.W.  874, 
107  Tex.  623 — Texas  Building  & 
Mortgage  Co.  v.  Morris,  Civ.App., 
123  S.W.2d  365,  error  dismissed — 
Lusk  v.  Farmer,  Civ.App.,  114  S. 
W.2d  677,  error  dismissed — Tinnin 
v.  Wilkirson,  Civ.App.,  40  S.W;2d 
889,  affirmed,  Com.App.,  58  S.W.2d 
69' — Sugg  v.  Mozoch,  Civ.App.,  293 
S.W,  907. 

Va. — C.  I.  T.  Corporation  v.  Guy,  195 
S.E.  659,  170  Va,  16— Commercial 
Savings  &  Loan  Corporation  v. 
Kemp,  140  S.E.  113,  149  Va.  68— 
New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ken- 
nedy, 135  S.E.  882,  146  Va.  197. 

W.Va. — Springston  v.  Powell,  169  S. 
E.  459,  113  W.Va.  638. 

Wis. — Lewis  v.  Wisconsin  Banking 
Corporation,  275  N.W.  429,  225  Wis. 
606 — Whitney  v.  Traynor,  42  N. 
W.  267,  74  Wis.  289. 

34  C.J.  p  605  note  4—40  C.J.  p  286 
note  81 — 41  C.J.  p  518  note  26,  p 
519  note  30,  p  520  note  33! 

Equitable  mortgage 

(1)  Equitable    mortgages    general- 
ly prevail   over  liens  of  subsequent 
judgments. — Reidy   v.  Collins,   26   P. 
2d    712,     134    CaLApp.    713 — 41    C.J. 
p  548  note  98. 

(2)  Instrument       assigning       and 
transferring   interest  in   estate,  and 
recorded  in  county  where  real  prop- 
erty was  located,  was  held  equitable 
mortgage,    entitled   to   priority   over 
judgment  lien  asserted  against  real- 
ty.— Gamble     v.     Consolidated     Nat. 
Bank  of  Tucson,  262  P.  612,  33  Ariz. 
117. 

<3)  Equitable  mortgage  created  by 
mortgage  assignee's  promise  to  ex- 
ecute new  mortgage  to  party,  with 
whom  assignee  had  pledged  mort- 
gage as  collateral  security,  if  per- 
mitted to  purchase  property  at 
mortgage  foreclosure  sale,  was  held 
superior  to  lien  of  assignee's  judg- 
ment creditor  acquired  after  fore- 
closure sale,  but  before  recordation 
of  new  mortgage. — Rutherford  Nat. 
Bonk  v.  H.  R.  Bogle  &  Co.,  169  A- 
180,  114  N.J.Eq.  571. 

Stipulation,  fixing  equitable  lien 

A  judgment  confirming  a  stipula- 
tion, in  partition  suit,  fixing  equita- 
ble lien  on  proceeds,  established 


existence  of  lien,  although  not  its 
priority  against  judgment  lien,  but 
judgment  creditor  not  showing  that 
judgment  was  docketed  before  stipu- 
lation fixing  equitable  lien  in  parti- 
tion suit,  or  that  stipulation  was 
fraudulently  entered  into,  is  not  en- 
titled to  priority. — Bennis  v.  Conley, 
231  N.Y.S.  635. 

A  judgment  on  a  note  secured  by 
a  second  mortgage  gives  the  judg- 
ment creditor  no  better  rights  in  re- 
spect of  the  property  than  the  judg- 
ment debtor  who  fails  to  redeem 
from  foreclosure  of  the  first  mort- 
gage, but  amounts  to  merely  a  gen- 
eral lien  on  the  land  of  the  debtor, 
subject  to  prior  liens,  and  gives  the 
judgment  creditor  the  right  to  levy 
on  land  to  the  exclusion  of  subse- 
quent adverse  interests  only. — Stiles 
v.  Bailey,  219  N.W.  537,  205  Iowa 
1385. 

Transfer  in  escrow 

Judgment  lien  did  not  attach  to 
land  which  defendant  had  before 
judgment  conveyed  under  deed  in  es- 
crow which  was  delivered  on  per- 
formance of  condition,  thereby  elim- 
inating interest. — Snow  Bros.  Hard- 
ware Co.  v.  Ellis,  21  S.W.2d  162,  180 
Ark.  238. 

Oral  contract  for  conveyance 

Where  parties  made  valid  oral  con- 
tract for  conveyances  of  real  es- 
tate in  consideration  of  extinguish- 
ment of  existing  indebtedness,  obli- 
gations of  parties  became  fixed,  and 
grantors  had  ho  interest  subject  to 
subsequent  judgment  lien,  regardless 
of  time  of  delivery  of  deed. — Rich- 
ardson v.  Estle,  243  N.W.  611,  214 
Iowa  1007. 
Defectively  registered  deed 

Where  notary  public  signed  certifi- 
cate of  acknowledgment  on  original 
deed  but  the  signature  was  omitted 
by  register  in  recording  deed,  the 
deed  was  entitled  to  registration  and 
had  priority  over  subsequent  judg- 
ment and  levies  of  execution  against 
the  grantor  of  the  land  described  in 
the  deed. — Tennessee  Barium  Corpo- 
ration v.  Williams,  133  S.W,2d  1015, 
23  Tenn.App.  398. 
Lien  for  rent 

(1)  A  landlord's  lien  for  rent  is 
ordinarily  paramount  to  the  lien  of 

927 


a  judgment. — Staber  v.  Collins,  10ft 
N.W.  527,  124  Iowa  543—36  C.J.  P 
506  note  9. 

(2)  Landlord's  lien  for  rent  relates 
back  to  levy  of  distress  on  landlord's 
recovering  judgment  and  takes  pre- 
cedence over  common-law  judgment 
rendered  after  levy,  but  before  judg- 
ment    for     landlord. — Corley-Powelt 
Produce  Co.  v.   Allen,   157   S.E.   251, 
42  Ga,App.  641. 
Assessment  liens 
W.Va. — Horn  v.  Charleston,  112  S.E.. 

239,  91  W.Va.  73. 
44  C.J.  p  806  note  57. 
Claims   against   decedents9   estates 
111.— Hartley    v.    Hartley,    7    N.E.2d 

906,  290  Ill.App.   92. 
34  C.J.  p  608  note  17  [e]. 

19.  N.D. — Federal  Farm  Mortg.  Cor- 
poration v.   Berzel,    291   N.W.   55 Or 
69  N.D.  760. 

34  C.J.  p  605  note  2. 

20.  Iowa. — Burns  v.  Burns,  11  N.W, 
2d  461,  233  Iowa  1092,   150  A.L.R. 
306. 

Md. — Garner  v.  Union  Trust  Co.  of 
Md.,  45  A.2d  106 — Jackson  v.  Coun- 
ty Trust  Co.  of  Maryland,  -6  A.2d 
380,  176  Md.  505— Union  Trust  Cov 
v.  Biggs,  137  A.  509,  153  Md.  50— 
Lee  v.  Keech,  133  A.  835,  151  Md. 

34,  46  A.L..K.  1488. 
41  C.J.  p  520  note  41. 

Where  mortgagee  was  mot  made  a- 
party  to  proceeding  in  which  con- 
tractor obtained  judgment  against 
owner  of  house  and  lot  with  recogni- 
tion of  builder's  and  materialman's 
lien  and  privilege  with  right  to  be 
paid  by  preference  and  priority  over 
all  other  creditors,  judgment  did  not 
affect  mortgagee's  rights  of  prefer- 
ence under  the  mortgage. — Officer  v.' 
Combre,  La.App.,  194  So.  441. 

21.  U.S.— In  re  Shapiro,  D.C.Md.,  34 
F.Supp.  737,  affirmed,  C.C.A-,  Schu- 
macher &  Seller  v.  Sandier,  118  F. 
2d  348. 

22.  N.M.— Scheer  v.    Stolz,    72   P.2d 
606,  41  N.M.  585. 

23.  Ohio. — Union    Savings    &    Loan 
Co.   v.   Gyro   Const.  Co.,    163   N.E. 

35,  29  Ohio  App.  287. 

24.  Or.-r Klorfine  v.  Cole,  254  P.  200, 
121  Or.  76, 


§  485 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


mortgage,  with  interest,25  but  the  owner  of  the 
note  has  the  right  to  credit  payments  made  by  the 
makers  on  the  unsecured  amount  as  against  the 
judgment  creditors.26  Where  the  true  owner  of 
land  is  estopped  to  assert  his  title  as  against  the 
grantee  in  a  deed  made  by  a  person  having  no  title, 
and  a  creditor  of  the  true  owner  reduces  his  debt 
to  judgment,  the  lien  thereof  is  superior  to  the 
"equity  of  a  third  person  having  neither  lien  nor  ti- 
tle from  the  true  owner.27  A  judgment  in  a  suit 
for  breach  of  a  covenant  in  a  deed  does  not  relate 
back  to  the  date  of  the  deed  so  as  to  take  priority 
over  a  mortgage  executed  subsequent  to  the  deed.28 
A  judgment  against  a  partner  for  an  individual  debt, 
since  it  binds  only  his  interest  in  the  firm  property, 
is  subordinate  to  junior  judgment  creditors  of  the 
partnership;29  and  the  same  rule  applies  as  to 
real  estate  of  the  firm,  the  legal  title  to  which  is 
in  the  name  of  the  partner  against  whom  a  judg- 
ment is  recovered  for  an  individual  debt.30 

Lien  for  wages.  Laborers'  liens  do  not  have  pri- 
ority over  judgment  liens  of  record  at  the  time  of 
an  employer's  insolvency,  where  the  statute  express- 
ly so  provides,31  or  where  the  statute  gives  laborers' 
liens  priority  over  purchasers  and  creditors  with 
notice,32  and  even  where  the  statute  gives  the  la- 
borer a  lien  and  not  merely  a  preference.33 

Mechanics'  liens.  A  judgment  lien  has  been  held 
•superior  to  a  prior  mechanics'  lien  which,  although 
•enforceable  under  the  doctrine  of  estoppel,  is  le- 
gally defective.34  Violation  of  a  building  ordi- 
nance has  been  held  not  to  affect  the  validity  of  a 
mechanics'  lien  so  as  to  give  a  judgment  creditor  the 
right  to  question  its  priority.35  Under  some  stat- 
utory provisions  the  only  judgment  which  can  have 
priority  over  a  mechanics'  lien  is  a  judgment  found- 
ed on  a  claim  based  solely  on  materials  furnished, 


labor  performed,  or  money  advanced  for  improve- 
ment of  realty.36 

Mortgages  to  secure  -future  advances.  A  mort- 
gage to  secure  future  advances  takes  priority  over 
a  judgment  obtained  after  the  advances  were 
made,37  but,  where  a  mortgagee  makes  optional  ad- 
vances after  notice  of  a  junior  judgment  lien,  his 
lien  for  such  advances  will  be  postponed  to  that  of 
the  owner  of  the  junior  judgment  lien.38  A  gran- 
tee in  a  deed  intended  as  a  mortgage  for  future  ad- 
vances has 'been  held  entitled  to  a  priority  over  sub- 
sequent judgment  creditors  of  the  grantor  as  to 
future  advances  made  after  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ments but  without  actual  notice  of  the  judgments.39 
The  filing  and  entry  of  a  judgment  has  been  held 
of  itself  insufficient  notice  to  the  judgment  debtor's 
mortgagee  holding  a  mortgage  for  future  advanc- 
es, as  respects  the  mortgagee's  right  of  priority  for 
advances  made  after  the  filing  of  the  judgment,40 
but,  where  the  mortgagee  has  actual  notice  of  the 
judgment,  the  latter  will  take  preference  over  sub- 
sequent advances,  where  the  mortgage,  while  given 
for  a  certain  sum,-  obligated  the  mortgagor  only  for 
money  actually  advanced  by  the  mortgagee.41  A 
mortgagee  holding  a  mortgage  for  advances  on  an 
incompleted  building  advancing  additional  money 
for  its  completion  and  taking  a  second  mortgage 
has  been  held  to  have  a  lien  superior  to  that  of  a 
subsequent  judgment  creditor  as  against  a  conten- 
tion that  the  advances  were  made  when  the  debtor 
was  insolvent.42 

Receivers.  A  judgment  against  a  receiver  which 
merely  fixes  the  amount  of  the  claim  is  not  entitled 
to  priority  over  other  creditors  who  have  proved 
their  claims;43  nor  is  a  judgment,  obtained  after 
the  appointment  of  a  receiver  in  an  action  which 
had  been  previously  instituted,  entitled  to  priority 


25.    N.C.— Lowery  v.  Wilson,   200  S. 

E.   861,  214  N.C.   800.       . 
•28.    N.C. — Lowery  v.  Wilson,   supra. 

•27.  Ga. — Equitable  Loan  &  Security 
Co.  v.  Lewman,  '52  S.E.  599,  124 
Ga.  190,  3  L.R.A..N.S.,  879. 

38.  Or. — Guild  v.  Wallis,  40  P.2d 
737,  150  Or.  69,  supplemented  41 
P.2d  1119,  150  Or.  69,  rehearing:  de- 
nied 42  P.2d  916,  150  Or.  69. 

29.  CaL—Whelan    v.    Shain,    47    P. 
57,  115  Oal.  326. 

47  C.J.  p  1013  note  50. 

30.  Ga. — Westbrook  v.  Hays,  14   S. 
E.  879,  89  Ga,  101. 

47  C.J.  p  1014  note  51. 

31.  U.S.— Pearsall  v.  Central  Oil  & 
Gas   Co.    of  America,   D.CXPa,,    28 
P.2d  716. 

99  C.J.  p  221  note  63. 


32.  Fla.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kirkby, 
32  So.  881,  43  Fla.  376. 

39  C.J.  p  221  note  64. 

33.  N.J. — Wright  v.  Wynockie  Iron 
Co.,    21   A.    862,    48   N.J.Eq..    29. 

34.  N.Y. — Fearing    v.    Siewers,    200 
N.Y.S.   440,   120   Misc.   720. 

35.  Pa.— Kessler   v.    Handel,    40   A. 
2d    926,   156    Pa.Super.    505. 

36.  N.T. — Corbin-Kellogg  Agency  v. 
Tasker,    289   N.Y.S.    156,    248   App. 
Div.   58. 

Judgment  for  premium  on  work- 
men's compensation,  policy  which 
was  docketed  before  liens  for  labor 
and  materials  were  filed  was  held 
not  entitled  to  priority  of  payment 
out  of  moneys  due  contractor  by 
owner  of  dwelling  which  contractor 
had  remodeled. — Corbln-K  e  1 1  o  g  g 
Agency  v.  Tasker,  supra. 

928 


Statutory  provisions  construed 
N.Y.— -Corbin-Kellogg       Agency       v. 
Tasker,  supra. 

37.  Pa. — Batten    v.    Jurist,    158    A. 
557,  306  Pa.  64,  81  A.L.R.  625. 

38.  Cal.— Reidy  v.   Collins,    26   P.2d 
712,  134  CaLApp.  713. 

39.  Iowa. — Everist  v.  Carter,  210  N. 
W.  559,  202  Iowa  498. 

40.  N.Y.— In  re  Harris'  Estate,  282 
N.Y.S.   571,   156  Misc.   805. 

41.  N.Y.— In  re  Harris*  Estate,  su- 
pra, 

42.  N.J.— -Active  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Apex 
Bldg.  Co.,   146  A.  353,   104  N.J.Eo;. 
569,  affirmed  Active  Mortg.  Co.  v. 
Henry  R.  Isenberg  Co.,  151  A.  904, 
106  N.J.EQ..  279. 

43.  S.C. — National  Bank  of  Augusta 
v.  Stillwell,  86  S.E.  21,  101  S.CI  4*53. 

53  C.J.  p  250  note  36. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§485 


where,  the  estate  being  that  of  an  insolvent,  the 
rights  of  creditors  are  fixed  at  the  date  of  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  receiver.44  Where  liens  have  at- 
tached on  commencement  of  the  suit  in  which  as- 
sets have  been  impounded  by  a  proceeding  begun 
before  proceedings  for  a  receivership,  a  judgment 
obtained  in  such  proceeding  after  the  appointment 
of  the  receiver  does  not,  by  reason  of  the  receiver- 
ship, lose  its  claim  to  priority.46 

(2)  Prior  Conveyance  or  Lien  Not  Recorded 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary  a  judg- 
ment Hen  is  subordinate  to  prior  conveyances  and  encum- 
brances even  where  these  are  not  recorded;  but  statu- 
tory provisions  generally  require,  expressly  or  by  con- 
struction, recording  of  such  conveyances  or  encum- 
brances if  their  priority  is  to  be  maintained. 

The  rule  that  a  judgment  lien  is  subordinate  to- 
prior  conveyances  and  encumbrances  and  all  exist- 


ing liens  and  equities  in  favor  of  third  persons  ap- 
plies, in  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary, 
even  though  the  previous  conveyance  has  not  been 
recorded.46  Some  recording  statutes  expressly  in- 
clude judgment  creditors  among  the  persons  as 
against  whom  a  prior  conveyance  will  be  void  un- 
less recorded;47  and,  even  where  the  statute  is  not 
so  specific  but  merely  provides  that  no  conveyance 
shall  be  good  or  effective  unless  recorded,48  or  un- 
less recorded  within  a  limited  time,49  or  that  a  deed 
shall  be  invalid  as  against  subsequent  creditors,  un- 
less duly  recorded,50  it  has  generally  been  held  that 
the  lien  of  a  judgment  is  to  be  preferred  to  a  con- 
veyance executed  before  the  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment but  not  recorded  until  afterward,  provided  the 
judgment  creditor  was  without  notice  of  the  con- 
veyance, as  discussed  infra  subdivision  a  (3)  of  thi? 
section.  Such  rule,  however,  does  not  apply  where 


44.  U.S. — E.  C.  Horn  Sons  v.  Hoff- 
man, CCJLPa,,  24  F.2d  162. 

45.  Mich. — Rickman  v.  Rickman,  146 
N.W.  609,   180  Mich.  224,  Ann.Cas. 
1915C  1237. 

N.J.— Ross  v.  Titsworth,  37  N.J.Eq. 
333. 

46.  U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Certain  Lands  in 
Borough  of  Brooklyn,  Kings  Coun- 
ty, N.  Y.,  (Parcel  No.  6),  D.C.N.Y., 
44  F.Supp.  830. 

Ark.— Carroll  v.  Evans,  79  S.W.2d 
425,  190  Ark.  $11. 

Cal.— Davis  v.  Perry,  8  P.2d  514, 
120  OaLApp.  670— Bank  of  Cotton- 
wood  v.  Henriques,  266  P.  836,  91 
Cal.App.  88. 

Ga. — Moncrief  Furnace  Co.  v.  North- 
west Atlanta  Bank,  19  S.B.2d  155, 
193  Ga.  440. 

Okl.— Harry  v.  Hertzler,  90  P.2d  656, 
185  Okl.  151. 

34  C.J.  p  607  note  12. 

47.  Ala.— Sutley  v.  Dothan  Oil  Mill 
Co.,  179  So.  819,  235  Ala.  475. 

Cal. — Sepulveda  v.  Apablasa.  77  P.2d 

530,  25  Cal.App. 2 d  390. 
Colo. — Donahue    v.    Kohler-McLister 

Paint  Co.,  254  P.  989,  81  Colo.  244. 
Minn.— In   re   Juran,    226   N.W.   201, 

178   Minn.    55 — Ferguson  v.  Kum- 

ler,  11  Minn.  104. 
N.D. — Agricultural    Credit    Corp.    v. 

State,  20  N.W.2d  78— Battersby  v; 

Gillespie,    222    N.W.    480,    67   N.D. 

426. 

34  C.J.  p  607  note  8  [a]. 
lUtroactive  effect 

(1)  Amendment  to  statute  to  pro- 
tect judgment  lien  creditors  against 
unrecorded   deed   was   held   not   re- 
troactive.— Fulghum   v.   Madrid,    265 
P.  454,  33  N.M.  303. 

(2)  An     act     making     unrecorded 
deeds  invalid  as  against  subsequent 
judgment  creditors  was  required  to 
be   construed   prospectively-  since   a 
retrospective  construction  would  de- 

49C.J.S.-59 


prive  holders  of  unrecorded  deeds  of 
vested  rights  in  realty  without  due 
process  of  law,  since  it  did  not  give 
holders  of  deeds  theretofore  execut- 
ed a  reasonable  time  to  comply  with 
statute,  and  hence  entry  of  Judg- 
ment on  Febr.  3,  1933,  did  not  give 
judgment  creditor  a  lien  against  land 
conveyed  by  Judgment  debtor  to 
third  person  in  1928,  notwithstanding 
deeds  were  not  recorded  until  1934. 
— Farmers  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Reading,  to  Use  of  Adams  v.  Berks 
County  Real  Estate  Co.,  5  A.2d  94, 
333  Pa.  390,  121  A.L.R.  905. 

48.  Ohio. — Jackson  v.  Luce,  14  Ohio 
514 — Mayham  v.  Coombs,  14  Ohio 
428. 

49.  U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Devereux,  N.C.,  90 
F.  183,  32  C.C.A.  564. 

50.  U.S. — Fooshee  v.   Snavely,   D.C. 
Va.,   58  F.2d  772,  affirmed,  C.C.A., 
58    F.2d   774,   certiorari   denied   53 
S.Ct  85,  287  U.S.  635,  77  L.Bd.  550. 

111. — Commercial  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank  of  Springfield  v.  Murray,  246 
Ill.App.  355. 

Miss.— Sack  v.  Gilmer  Dry  Goods 
Co.,  115  So.  339,  149  Miss.  296. 

N.C.— Baton  v.  Doub,  128  S.B.  494, 
190  N.C.  14,  40  A.L.R.  273.  - 

Tex. — Estelle  v.  Hart,  Com.App.,  55 
S.W.2d  510— Henderson  v.  Odessa 
Building  &  Finance  Co.,  Com.App., 
24  S.W.2d  393,  rehearing  denied  27 
S.W.2d  144— Howard  v.  Leonard, 
Civ.App.f  185  S.W.2d  490,  refused 
for  want  of  merit — Segrest  v. 
Hale,  Civ.App.,  164  S.W.2d  793,  er- 
ror refused — Bova  v.  Wyatt,  Civ. 
App.,  140  S.W.2d  601,  error  refused 
— Brinkman  v.  Tinkler,  Civ.App., 
117  S.W.2d  139,  error  refused- 
Christian  v.  Sam  R.  Hill  Lumber 
Co.,  Civ.App.,  113  S.W.2d.616. 

Va.— Cox  v.  Williams,  31  S.B.2d  312, 
183  Va.  152. 

929 


W.Va.— Harper  v.  McMillan,  188  S.B. 

479,  117  W.Va.  822. 
41  C.J.  p  547  note  96. 

Subsequent  creditor 

Under  a  statute  requiring  record- 
ing of  a  conveyance  within  a  certain 
time,  one  who  receives  a  note  as  a 
renewal  of  a  note  executed  prior  to 
the  conveyance  is  not  a.  subsequent 
creditor. — Little  v.  Mangum,  C.C.A. 
S.C.,  17  F.2d  44. 

An  equitable  title  acquired  inde- 
pendently of  the  legal  title  is  not 
subject  to  the  registration  statute 
so  that  the  superiority  of  the  equita- 
ble title  may  be  asserted  against  the 
judgment  creditor  of  the  holder  of 
the  legal  title,  even  though  the  cred- 
itor had  no  notice  thereof  at  the 
time  of  fixing  the  creditor's  lien. — 
Roeser  &  Pendleton  v.  Stanolind  Oil 
&  Gas  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  188  S.W.2d 
25.0*  error  refused. 

Priority  over  trust 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  a  record- 
ing statute  does  not  preclude  a  ces- 
tui  que  trust  from  asserting  his  su- 
perior equity  to  land  in  the  absence 
of  a  showing  that  the  trustee  has 
conveyed  the  legal -title  to  the  cestui 
que  trust  prior  to  the  time  that  the 
creditor    fixed    his    lien. — Roeser    & 
Pendleton   v.    Stanolind   Oil    &   Gas 
Co.,  supra— 34  C.J.  p  607  note  14  [a] 
(2). 

(2)  Even  though  the  legal  title  has 
been  transferred  to  the   cestui  que 
trust  if  the  deed  is  not  of  record 
at   the   time   the   creditor   fixes   his 
lien,  the  cestui  que  trust  may  assert 
his    original    equity    acquired    inde- 
pendently   of    the    lien    in    a    suit 
against  the  creditor,  as  the  statute 
requires  that  such  unrecorded  deed 
shall  be  treated  as  void. — Roeser  & 
Pendleton  v.  Stanolind  Oil  &  Gas  Co.. 
supra. 


§  485 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  judgment  is  obtained  against  a  grantor  whose 
title  is  not  recorded.51  A  subsequent  judgment  lien 
does  not  take  priority  where  the  statute  merely  pro- 
vides that  an  unrecorded  conveyance  shall  be  void 
as  against  "purchasers;"52  or  that  it  shall  be  void 
as  against  purchasers  and  encumbrancers  who  ac- 
quire title  by  an  "instrument"  duly  recorded;53  or 
that  it  shall  be  void  as  against  persons  who  in  good 
faith  have  acquired  a  transfer  or  lien  binding  the 
property;54  or,  according  to  some  authorities,  that 
it  shall  be  void  as  against  third  persons,55  although 
other  authorities  hold  that  the  term  "third  persons" 
includes  judgment  creditors.56  Under  a  statute  pro- 
viding that  deeds  shall  not  take  effect  as  to  credi- 
tors and  subsequent  purchasers  until  their  delivery 
for  record  and  shall  be  void  as  to  all  creditors  and 
subsequent  purchasers  whose  deeds  and  other  in- 
struments are  first  recorded,  a  prior  unrecorded 
deed  will  take  precedence  of  a  judgment  lien  un- 
less a  deed  based  on  the  judgment  is  recorded  be- 
fore such  prior  deed  is  recorded.57  Under  other 
statutes  an  unrecorded  deed  or  mortgage  takes  pri- 
ority as  against  a  subsequent  judgment  lien  if  it  is 
recorded  before  the  execution  sale,  and,  if  not  filed 
until  after  such  sale,  the  purchaser  at  the  execution 
sale  acquires  title.58  Where  land  was  sold  to  obtain 
money  to  pay  an  outstanding  mortgage,  the  deed 
and  mortgage  release  being  executed  before,  but  re- 
corded together  after,  the  vendor's  creditors  had 
secured  judgments  against  him,  the  purchaser's  title 
was  held  superior  to  such  judgment  liens.50 

The  fact  that  an  assignment  by  a  debtor  of  an  eq- 
uitable estate  to  an  assignee  holding  legal  title  was 
not  recorded  until  after  entry  of  a  judgment  against 
the  debtor  does  not  result  in  the  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment attaching  to  the  title  of  the  assignee  where 


the  judgment  debtor's  interest  could  have  been  sub- 
jected to  the  lien  of  the  judgment  only  by  proceed- 
ings in  the  chancery  court.60  A  statute  providing 
that  all  deeds  shall  take  effect  on  record  as  to  cred- 
itors' without  notice  means  creditors  of  the  grantor, 
not  of  the  grantee,  and  does  not  give  prior  judg- 
ment creditors  of  the  grantee  the  rights  of  bona  fide 
purchasers.61  Where  property  has  been  conveyed 
to  the  judgment  debtor  by  an  unrecorded  deed,  and 
thereafter,  when  the  judgment  creditor  sought  ex- 
ecution on  the  property,  the  grantor  conveyed  the 
premises  to  another  who  was  not  a  bona  fide  pur- 
chaser, the  debtor's  title  under  the  unrecorded  deed 
was  superior  to  the  title  of  the  second  grantee  as 
respects  the  judgment  creditor's  rights.62  A  statute 
providing  that  the  unrecorded  conveyance  of  an 
interest  in  land  is  void  as  against  a  judgment  lien 
has  been  held  not  to  apply  to  the  conveyance  of 
equities  requiring  the  aid  of  a  court  of  equity  to 
establish.63  Inscription  of  a  judgment  after  sale  of 
land  was  filed  for  record  but  before  the  sale  was 
actually  inscribed  in  the  conveyance  records  does 
not  operate  as  a  judicial  mortgage  so  as  to  give  the 
judgment  creditor  a  claim  to  the  land  prior  to  that 
of  the  purchaser.64 

Defective  conveyance.  Where  the  subsequent 
judgment  creditor  is  not  misled  or  his  rights  im- 
paired, a  defective  conveyance  prior  to  the  judg- 
ment may  be  corrected  thereafter,  as  where  by  mis- 
take the  land  described  in  the  original  deed  was 
not  that  intended  to  be  conveyed,65  especially  where 
the  grantee  went  into  immediate  possession  of  the 
property  he  intended  to  buy,66  and  it  has  been  held 
that  the  latter  rule  should  be  applied  where  the 
grantor  corrects  the  mistake  without  the  interven- 
tion of  equity.67 


51.  Minn.  —  Emerson  -  Brantingham 
Implement  Co.  v.   Cook,   206  N.W. 
170,    165    Minn.    198,   43   A.L.R.   41. 

34  C.J.  p  603  note  19. 

52.  U.S.— U.  S.  v.  Certain  Lands  in 
Borough  of  Brooklyn,  Kings  Coun- 
ty, N.  Y.   (Parcel  No.  6),  D.C.N.Y., 
44    P.Supp.    830 — U.    S.   v.    Certain 
Lands  Located  in  Town  of  Hemp- 
stead,  Nassau  County,  N.  Y.,  Dam- 
age   Parcel    211,    D.C.N.Y.,    41    F. 
Supp.  636. 

Iowa. — Brauch  v.  Preking,  258  N.W. 
893.  219  Iowa  556 — Grant  v.  Cher- 
ry, 201  N.W.  588,  199  Iowa  164. 

Kan.— Bennett  v.  Christy,  20  P.2d 
813,  137  Kan.  376. 

N.Y.— Fox  v.  Sizeland,  9  N.Y.S.2d 
350,  170  Misc.  390— Blum  v. 
Krampner,  28  N.Y.8.2d  62,  affirmed 
27  N.Y.S.2d  1000,  261  App.Biv. 
989,  reargument  denied  28  N.Y.S.2d 
707.  262  App.Div.  756.  • 

41  C.J.  p  521  note  49. 


53.  Cal.— Wolfe  v.  Langford,  112  P. 
203,  14  CaLApp.  359. 

34  C.J.  p  608  note  21. 

54.  U.S. — Webb  v.   United- American 
Soda  Fountain  Co.,  C.C.A.Ga.,  59  F. 
2d  329. 

34  C.J.  p  609  note  22. 

55.  Okl. — Oklahoma   State    Bank   v. 
Burnett,  U2  P.  1124,  65  Okl.  74. 

34  C.J.  p  609  note  23. 

56.  U.S.— McCoy  v.  Rhodes,  La.,   11 
How.  131,  13  L.Ed.  634. 

34  C.J.  p  609  note  24. 

57.  Neb. — Omaha     Loan     &     Bldg. 
Ass'n  v.  Turk,  21  N.W.2d  865,  146 
Neb.  859. 

34  C.J.  p  609  note  25. 

58.  Mo.— Rehm   v.   Alter,    199    S.W. 
170,  272  Mo.  452. 

34  C.J.  p  609  note  27 — 41  C.J.  p  547 
note  96  [f]. 

930 


59.  Tenn. — Anderson    v.    Robertson, 
192   S.W.   917,    137   Tenn.   182. 

34  C.J.  p  609  note  28. 

60.  N.J. — McLaughlin    v.    Whaland, 
13  A.2d  573,  127  N.J.Ba.   393. 

61.  111.— Sparrow  v.  Wilcox,   112  N. 
E.  296,  272  111.  632. 

62.  R.I.— Sundlun  v.   Volpe,    9   A.2d 
41,   63  R.I.  441. 

63.  Tex.— Sugg  v.  Mozoch,  Civ.App., 
293  S.W.  907. 

64.  La. — Wood   Preserving  Corpora- 
tion v.  Mitchell  Tie  &  Lumber  Co., 
App.,  167  So.  122. 

65.  Tex.— Hodges     v.     Moore,     Civ. 
App.,  186  S.W.  415. 

34  C.J.  p  609  note  30. 
S.    Tex. — Gauss-Langenberg        Hat 
Co.  v.  Allums,  Civ.App.,   184   S.W. 
288. 

67.    Idaho. — Feltham  v.  Blunck,  198 

P.  763,  34  Idaho  1,  9. 
34  C.J.  p  609  note  32. 


49     C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  485 


Delivery  to  a  stranger,  for  a  third  person,  of  an 
intended  deed,  of  which  delivery  such  third  person 
is  not  informed,  does  not,  by  relation,  when  such 
third  person  accepts  the  deed,  operate  to  defeat  a 
right  acquired  under  a  judgment  lien  against  the 
grantor  between  the  time  of  delivery  to  the  stranger 
and  acceptance  by  the  grantee.68 

(3)  Effect  of  Notice 

A  Judgment  lien  ordinarily  Is  subordinate  to  a  prior 
conveyance  or  encumbrance  of  which  the  judgment  cred- 
itor has  notice,  actual  or  constructive,  even  though  such 
conveyance  or  encumbrance  has  not  been  recorded. 

The  rule  that  a  judgment  lien  is  subordinate  to 
prior  conveyances  and  encumbrances  and  all  exist- 
ing liens  and  equities  in  favor  of  third  persons  gen- 
erally applies  where  the  judgment  creditor  has  actu- 
al or  constructive  notice  of  such  prior  conveyance, 
lien,  encumbrance,  or  equity.69  The  judgment  cred- 
itor is  generally  regarded  as  having  such  notice 
where  there  is  an  actual,  open,  and  notorious  pos- 
session of  the  premises  on  the  part  of  the  gran- 
tee70 or  his  tenant;71  but  the  judgment  creditor  has 
been  held  not  chargeable  with  notice  where  a  tenant 
in  possession  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  un- 
recorded deed  has  not  recognized  the  grantee  as  his 
landlord,72  or,  according  to  some  authorities,  even 


where  such  tenant  in  possession  has  agreed  to  hold 
under  the  grantee.7^  As  against  a  third  person  in 
possession  the  judgment  creditor  stands  in  the  re- 
lation of  a  subsequent  purchaser  as  far  as  notice 
of  the  rights  of  such  person  are  concerned,74  but 
such  possession  must  be  exclusive  and  unequivocal, 
and  does  not  constitute  notice  where  the  record 
owner  is  also  in  possession.75 

The  judgment  creditor  will  be  charged  with  no- 
tice of  a  previous  unrecorded  deed  if  he  had  knowl- 
edge of  such  fact  as  would  put  a  reasonable  man 
on  inquiry,  which,  if  diligently  pursued,  would  have 
led  to  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  the  land  did  not 
belong  to  the  judgment  debtor.76  It  has  been  held 
that  if  a  mortgage  is  recorded  within  the  time  pre- 
scribed by  law,  although  not  recorded  at  the  time 
of  recovery  of  a  judgment,  the  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment is  postponed  to  the  rights  of  the  prior  mortga- 
gee, without  regard  to  the  question  of  actual  notice 
of  the  mortgage.77 

Although  under  the  provisions  of  a  statute  an 
unrecorded  deed  may  be  absolutely  void  as  against 
a  subsequent  judgment  creditor  whether  or  not 
he  has  notice  of  it,78  statutes  which  make  the  lien 
of  a  judgment  creditor  superior  to  the  interest  of 
a  grantee  or  mortgagee  under  a  prior  unrecorded 


68.  Cal.— Hibberd    v.    Smith.    4    P. 
473,  67  Cal.  547,  56  Am.R.  726,  re- 
heard 8  P.  46;  67  Cal.  547,  56  Am. 
R.  726. 

69.  111. — Union  Bank  of  Chicago  v. 
Gallup,   148  N.B.   2,   317  111.   184. 

La, — Swan    v.     Moore,     14     La.Ann. 

833. 

34  C.JT.  p  607  note  5. 
Escrow  agreement 

Where  mortgagor's  escrow  deed 
conveying  title  to  second  mortgage 
holder*  and  trustee's  escrow  satis- 
faction of  third  mortgage  were  to 
become  absolute  on  failure  to  pay 
second  mortgage  by  date  specified, 
rights  of  second  mortgage  holder  un- 
der escrow  instruments  were  held 
superior  to  judgment  lien  of  assignee 
of  note,  originally  secured  by  third 
mortgage  who  took  with  knowledge 
of  facts.— Ruden  v.  Kirby,  241  N.W. 
791,  59  S.D.  -631. 
Recitals'  in,  recorded  deeds 

(1)  Where  recorded  deeds  and 
mortgage  contained  general  descrip- 
tion of  land  by  reference  to  its  ad- 
Joining  owners  and  to  river  which 
bound  land,  which  description  was 
sufficient  to  cover  entire  tract,  but 
contained  reference  to  prior  deeds 
which  did  not  embrace  entire  tract, 
subsequent  judgment  creditor  was 
put  on  notice  that  entire  tract  was 
intended  to  be  covered  and  could 
not  levy  execution  on  part  of  tract 
not  covered  by  prior  deeds  referred 


to.— Phcenix  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Kingston  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  112  S. 
W.2d  381,  172  Tenn.  335. 

(2)  Other    recitals    see    34    C.J.    P 
607  note  -5  [a], 

70.  111. — Mauricau  v.  Haugen,  56  N. 
B.2d    367,    387    111.    186— Carnes   v. 
Whitfield,    185    N.B.    819,    352    111. 
384— Doll  v.  Walter,  27  N.B.2d  231, 
305  Ill.App.   188. 

N.J.— Majewski  v.  Greenberg,  136  A. 

749,  101  N.J.Bq.  134. 
Or. — Thompson  v.  Hendricks,  245  P. 

724,  118  Or.  39. 
Tex. — Kelly-Springfield    Tire    Co.    v. 

Walker,  Civ.App.,    149    S.W.2d   195, 

error  dismissed,  judgment  correct 

— Siuton  State  Bank  of  Sinton  v. 

Odem,    Civ.App.,     75     S.W.2d     895. 
Va. — Floyd  v.  Harding,  28  Gratt.  401, 

69  Va.  401. 
34  C.J.  p  607  note  6f  p  610  oote  41. 

71.  Minn.— Wilkins  v.  Bevier,  45  N. 
W.   157,  43   Minn.   213,  19  Am.S.R. 
238. 

34  C.J.  p  611  note  42. 

72.  Minn. — Wilkins  v.  Bevier,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  611  note  43. 

731     Ala.— Griffin  v.  Hall  22   So.   156, 

115  Ala.  -647. 
34  C.J.  p  611  note  44. 

74.    111. — Union  Bank  of  Chicago  v. 

Gallup,   148  N.E.   2,   317   111.   184.  ' 
Possession   sufficient   to    require   in- 
quiry 

Possession  under  contract  of  pur- 

931 


chase,  alleged  to  be  fraudulent  as 
to  creditors,  was  held  sufficient  to 
put  subsequent  judgment  creditor  of 
record  owner  on  inquiry  as  to  his 
rights,  even  though  prior  to  con- 
tract he  had  been  a  tenant  of  record 
owner,  where  thereafter  his  posses- 
sion was  exclusive,  it  being  immate- 
rial whether  record  owner  claimed 
to  own  property. — Union  Bank  of 
Chicago  v.  Gallup,  supra. 

75.  111. — Union  Bank  of  Chicago  v. 
Gallup,  supra. 

76.  N.J. — Majewski     v.      Greenberg, 
136    A.    749,    101   N.J.Eq.    134. 

34  C.J.  p  610  note  40. 

77.  Md.— Knell    v.    Green    St.    Bldg. 
Ass'n,  34  Md.  67. 

78.  La. — State  ex  reL  Hebert  v.  Re- 
corder  of   Mortgages,    143    So.    15, 
175  La.  94. 

Tenn. — Washington's        Lessee        v. 

Trousdale,  Mart  &  Y.  385. 
34  C.JT.  p  610  notes  36,  38. 
Priority  determined  by  recording 

Where  third  persons  purchased 
judgment  debtor's  realty  Friday  aft- 
ernoon and  deed  was  mailed  to  re* 
corder's  office  on  Saturday  and  ar- 
rived there  Monday  morning  when 
it  was  filed  for  record,  but  the  judg- 
ment was  filed  for  record  Saturday 
morning,  purchaser  took  realty  sub- 
ject to  judicial  mortgage. — Robin  v. 
Harris  Realty  Co.,  152  So.  573,  178 
La.  946; 


§485 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


conveyance  usually  contain  the  proviso  that,  in  or- 
der to  be  entitled  to  priority,  the  judgment  creditor 
shall  be  without  notice  of  the  unrecorded  deed  or 
mortgage,79  and,  even  though  such  statutes  do  not 
contain  any  express  provision  as  to  notice,  it  has 
been  held  that  the  fact  of  such  notice  will  prevent 
the  judgment  creditor  from  obtaining  priority.80 
The  burden  of  proving  that  the  judgment  creditor 
had  notice  is  on  the  party  seeking  to  assert  rights 
as  against  him.81 

Notice  must  be  brought  home  to  the  judgment 
creditor  at  or  before  the  time  the  judgment  was 
rendered,82  or  at  or  before  the  time  his  judgment 
lien  attaches,  and  his  rights  are  not  affected  by  the 
fact  that  he  acquires  knowledge  of  the  prior  deed 
after  such  time.83 

Defective  deed.  Where  by  statute  a  judgment 
creditor's  lien  is  given  precedence  over  an  unrecord- 
ed deed  of  which  he  has  no  notice,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  equity  of  the  grantee  under  a  recorded 
deed  to  have  it  reformed  so  as  to  include  land  omit- 
ted from  the  description  therein  cannot  displace  the 
lien  of  the  judgment84  The  fact  that  a  mortgage 


of  which  the  judgment  creditor  has  notice  is  defec- 
tively acknowledged  has  been  held  not  to  affect  its 
superiority  over  a  subsequent  judgment,85  but, 
where  the  recording  of  an  improperly  authenticat- 
ed mortgage  is  regarded  as  no  record,  such  a  mort- 
gage is  postponed  to  a  judgment  lien  ;86  and  the  re- 
cording of  a  mortgage  which  is  not  only  defective 
but  contrary  to  law  will  not  make  the  mortgage  a 
lien  superior  to  that  of  a  subsequent  judgment,  as 
against  the  contention  that  the  subsequent  creditor 
had  constructive  notice  by  reason  of  the  recording, 
and  could  have  learned  the  true  situation  by  in- 
quiry.87 It  has  been  held  that  where  a  person  makes 
a  conveyance  of  land,  which  is  defective  by  reason 
of  a  wrong  description  of  the  premises,  the  lien  of 
a  judgment  against  the  grantor  subsequent  to  the 
conveyance  and  prior  to  the  reformation  of  the  deed 
will  not  attach  to  the  lands.88  A  judgment  creditor 
seeking  to  subject  to  his  judgment  lands  conveyed 
prior  thereto,  because  of  an  alleged  defect  in  the 
deed,  is  chargeable  with  such  information  as  was 
contained  in  the  deeds  and  furnished  by  the  records 
at  the  date  when  the  judgment  was  obtained.89 
Where  a  grantor's  judgment  creditor  was  not  made 


79.  Colo. — Donahue  v.  Kohler-Mc- 
Lister  Paint  Co..  254  P.  989,  81 
Colo.  244. 

Tex. — Segrest  v.  Hale,  Civ.App.,  164 
S.W.2d  793,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  609  note  34. 

Sufficiency  of  notice 

(1)  Whatever    charges    purchaser 
with  notice  as  to  possession  of  land 
charges  judgment  creditor  with  no- 
tice.— Majewski  v.  Greenberg,  136  A, 
749,   101  N.J.EQ.   134—34  C.J.  p  609 
note  34  [a]  (1). 

(2)  A    letter   from    the    judgment 
debtor  to  the  judgment  creditor  dis- 
closing the   facts   was   sufficient  to 
give    notice    of   debtor's   unrecorded 
deed,  barring  priority  under  record- 
ing  act. — Myers   v.   EBay  den,    257   P. 
351,  82  Colo.  98. 

(3)  Judgment     debtors'     recorded 
deed,  conveying  tract  of  land  to  bank 
receiver,      who      conveyed     smaller 
tracts  to  corporation  in  satisfaction 
of  its  equity  in  former  tract,  which 
receiver     took     in     satisfaction    of 
bank's  mortgages  on  smaller  tracts, 
did  not  give  judgment  creditor,  sub- 
sequently recording  judgment,  notice 
of  corporation's   claim   of   right   of 
subrogation  to  such  mortgages,  rec- 
ord  of  which  was   not  notice   that 
corporation  had  contributed  to  sat- 
isfaction thereof. — Sutley  v.  Dothan 
Oil   Mill  Co.,    179    So.   819,    235   Ala. 
475. 

(4)  Where  a  judgment  creditor  re- 
leased his  judgment  to   enable  the 
judgment  debtor  to  borrow  money  on 
a  mortgage,   the   judgment  creditor 
was  chargeable  with  notice  of  such 


mortgage  and  could  not  claim  prior- 
ity over  it  because  it  was  not  re- 
corded before  entry  of  his  subse- 
quent judgment. — Hutchinson  v. 
Bramhall,  7  A.  873,  42  N.J.Eq.  372. 

(5)  Other  cases  see  34  C.J.  p  «09 
note  34  [a]. 

Notice  "by  reference  in  other  convey- 
ance 

A  judgment  creditor  must  take  no- 
tice of  what  appears  on  face  of  deed 
in  chain  of  title  to,  or  executed  by 
one  having  record  interest  in,  land 
on  which  execution  is  levied,  but 
is  not  bound  to  inquire  into  collater- 
al circumstances  growing  out  of  con- 
veyances of  land  not  claimed  by  him. 
—Sutley  v.  Dothan  Oil  Mill  Co., 
179  So.  819,  235  Ala.  475. 
Assignee  of  judgment 

Where  a  judgment  creditor  as- 
signs a  prior  judgment  lien  not  hav- 
ing notice  of  an  unrecorded  mort- 
gage, his  assignee,  although  having 
notice  of  the  mortgage,  takes  pri- 
ority over  it. — McCandless  v.  Klau- 
ber,  155  S.B.  141,  158  S.E.  32. 

8a    Ark.— Carroll  v.  Evans,  79  S.W. 

2d  425,  190  Ark.  511. 
34  C.J.  p  610  notes  35,  37. 

81.  N.J. — Majewski  v.  Greenberg, 
136  A.  749,  101  N.J.Eq.  134. 

Tex. — Barnett  v.  Squyres,  54  S.W. 
241,  93  Tex.  193,  77  AmJ3.R.  854— 
Segrest  v.  Hale,  Civ.App.f  164  S.W. 
2d  793,  error  refused. 

34  C.J.  p  610  note  39. 

02.  Ala,— Sutley  v.  Dothan  Oil  Mill 
Co.,  179  So.  819,  235  Ala.  475— 

932 


Teaford  v.  Moss,  179  So.  817,  235 
Ala.  490. 

83.  Tex. — Bowles  v.   Belt,   Civ.App., 
159  S.W.  885. 

34  C.J.  p  611  note  45. 

84.  Minn. — Wilcox     v.      Leominster 
Nat.  Bank,  45  N.W.  1136,  43  Minn. 
541,  19  Am.S.R.  259. 

Tex. — Henderson  v.  Odessa  Building 
&  Finance  Co.,  Com^App.,  24  S.W. 
2d  393,  rehearing  denied  27  S.W.2d 
144. 

86.  Ark.— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Meri- 
wether  Sand  &  Gravel  Co.,  67  S. 
W.2d  599,  188  Ark.  642. 

86.  U.S.— Webb  v.  United-American 
Soda  Fountain  Co.,   C.C.A.Ga.,   -59 
F.2d  329. 

87.  U.S.— In  re  Shapiro,  D.CLMd.,  34 
F.Supp.  737. 

88.  Ind.— Wells   v.    Benton,    8    N.E. 
444,    108    Ind.    585,    rehearing    de- 
nied 9  N.E.  601,  108  Ind.  585. 

34  C.J.  p  607  note  7. 

89.  Va.— Blair  v.  Rorer's  Adm'r,  116 
S.B.  767,  135  Va.  1,  motion  denied 
43  S.Ct  704,  262  U.S.  234,  67  L.Ed. 
1206. 

Description,  of  property 

Va. — Blair  v.  Rorer's  Adm'r,  supra. 

Notation,  on.  record 

Under  the  statute  authorizing  and 
requiring  the  clerk  of  the  county 
court  to  record  deeds  and  contracts 
for  the  sale  of  real  estate,  a  no- 
tation on  the  margin  of  the  record 
of  &  deed,  signed  by  the  grantor  and 
acknowledged  before  the  clerk,  and 
purporting  to  correct  a  mistake  in 
the  description,  was  an  instrument 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  485 


a  party  to  a  suit  to  reform  and  correct  a  deed,  he 
is  not  bound  by  such  proceedings,  and  a  commis- 
sioner's deed  correcting  the  mistake  will  be  void  as 
to  him  when  not  admitted  to  record  until  after  the 
judgment  was  docketed.90 

Defective  recording.  Notice  to  a  subsequent  judg- 
ment creditor  is  not  imparted  by  an  illegal,  unsuc- 
cessful, or  incomplete  attempt  to  record  a  prior 
deed,91  but  a  mere  irregularity  in  recording  a  deed 
will  not  affect  its  priority.92  Where,  in  order  that 
an  instrument  evidencing  a  lien  on  real  estate  shall 
import  constructive  notice,  it  must  be  recorded  in 
the  proper  book  as  required  by  the  recording  act,  an 
instrument  recorded  in  the  wrong  book  does  not 
constitute  constructive  notice  as  to  a  subsequent 
judgment  creditor.93 

Trusts.  Judgment  creditors  have  been  held  not 
protected  against  trusts  of  which  they  have  no  no- 


tice, or  allowed  in  equity  to  hold  against  the  cestui 
que  trust.9*  Under  a  statute  providing  that  result- 
ing trusts  of  realty  shall  be  void  as  to  bona  fide 
purchasers,  mortgagees,  or  creditors  without  notice 
unless  a  written  declaration  of  trust  is  recorded  or 
ejectment  brought  by  the  real  owner,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  words  "without  notice"  are  to  be  con- 
strued with  "judgment  creditors"  and  hence  the  no- 
tice contemplated  is  actual,  and  not  constructive..95 

b.  Subsequent  Conveyance  or  Lien 

The  lien  of  a  Judgment  ordinarily  Is  superior  to  atl 
conveyances  of,  and  liens  on,  the  debtor's  property  which 
are  made  or  accrue  after  the  Judgment  lien  has  attached. 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  is  superior  to  all  convey- 
ances of,  and  liens  on,  the  debtor's  property  which 
are  made  or  accrue  after  the  judgment  lien  has  at- 
tached,96 provided,  however,  the  judgment  will  not 
prevail  against  a  subsequent  sale  or  lien  on  the 


entitled  to  be  recorded,  whether  con- 
sidered as  a  part  of  the  deed  or  as 
a  contract  describing  the  land  con- 
veyed by  the  deed,  and  constituted 
constructive  notice. — Blair  v.  Rorer's 
Adm'r,  supra. 

Parol  evidence  held  inadmissible 
to  show  intent  to  convey  property 
other  than  as  described  in  the  deed. 
— Blair  v.  Rorer's  Adm'r,  supra. 

90.  Va. — Blair  v.  Rorer's  Adm'r,  su- 
pra. 

91.  Ga. — Andrews    v.    Mathews,    59 
Ga.  466. 

Va.— Horsley  v.  Garth,  2  Gratt  471, 

43  Va.  471,  44  Am.D.  393. 
34  CUT.  p  611  note  46. 
Recording  under  wrong  name 

The  failure  of  register  of  deeds  to 
enter  on  grantor's  side  of  index  the 
name  of  "J.  Frank  Crowell"  and  in- 
stead indexing  deed  as  if  it  were  one 
from  "J.  L.  Crowell,"  who  was  the 
grantor  in  more  than  one  hundred 
conveyances  on  the  same  page,  did 
not  give  notice  to  grantor's  subse- 
quent judgment  creditor  that  title 
to  realty  was  no  longer  in  him,  and, 
in  absence  of  evidence  that  creditor 
had  knowledge  or  notice  of  trans- 
fer of  title  otherwise  than  shown 
by  record,  deed  was  not  indexed  and 
registered  with  respect  to  him.— 
Dorman  v.  Goodman,  196  S.E.  352, 
213  N.C.  406. 

92.  Va. — Carper     v.     McDowell,     $ 
Gratt.  212,  46  Va.  212. 

34  C.J.  p  611  note  47. 
•Omission  of  recitals 

The  failure  to  comply  with  a  stat- 
ute requiring  instruments  offered  for 
registration  to  contain  recital  des- 
ignating last  registered  instrument 
relating  to  property  embraced  in 
instrument  offered  for  registration 
and  setting  forth  book  and  page 
where  appears  last  registered  instru- 


ment did  not  render  registration  in- 
effective against  subsequent  judg- 
ment creditor. — Phoenix  Mut.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Kingston  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  112  S.W.2d  381,  172  Tenn.  335. 

93.  N.J.— Hadfleld    v.    Hadfield,     17 
A.2d  169,  128  N.J.EQ.  510. 

94.  111. — Leutenmyer    v.     McMahon, 
168  IlLApp.  642. 

Pa. — Shryock  v.  Waggoner,  28  Pa. 
430. 

95.  Pa. — Rochester     Trust     Co.     v. 
White,  90  A.  127,  243  Pa.  469. 

96.  U.S.— Pen-Ken   Gas   &   Oil  Cor- 
poration v.  Warfield  Natural   Gas 
Co.,    C.C.A,Ky.,    137   F.2d   871,    cer- 
tiorari  denied  64  S.Ct  431,  320  U. 
S.  800,  88  L.Ed.  483,  rehearing  de- 
nied 64  3.Ct.  634,  321  U.S.  803,  88 
L.Bd.  1089— Commercial  Credit  Co. 
v.  Davidson,  C.C.A.Miss.,  112  F.2d 
54— McAlpine  v.  Hedges,   C.C.Ind., 
21  F.  689. 

Cal. — Corporation  of  America  v. 
Marks,  73  P.2d  1215,  10  Cal.2d  218, 
114  A.L.R.  1162— Richardson  v.  Ab- 
ernathy,-  73  P.2d  1252,  23  Cal-App. 
2d  629. 

Colo. — Zigmond  v.  Cooper,  8  P.2d 
268,  90  Colo.  222. 

Del.— C.  L.  Pierce  &  Co.  v.  Security 
Trust  Co.,  175,  A,  770,  6  W.W.Harr. 
348. 

Fla. — Giddens  v.  McFarlan,  10  So.2d 
807,  152  Fla.  281— Orr  v.  Dade  De- 
velopers, 190  So.  20,  138  Fla.  122. 

Ga. — Ho  well  v.  Farmers  Bank,  196 
S.E.  387,  185  Ga,  768. 

Hawaii. — Nichols  v.  Wan  Chong  Sun, 
28  Hawaii  395. 

111. — Svalina  v.  Saravana,  173  N.E. 
281,  341  111.  236,  87  A.L.R.  821. 

Iowa.— Chader  v.  Wilkins,  284  N.W. 
183,  226  Iowa  417— Rogers  v.  Ruth- 
erford, 232  N.W.  720,  210  Iowa 
1313. 

La. — Es-at  v.  Kraus,  App.,  141  So. 
94. 

933 


Mont. — Commercial  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Jordan,  278  P.  832,  85  Mont 
375,  65  A.L.R.  968 — Isom  v.  Larson, 
255  P.  1049,  78  Mont  395. 

N.M.— Sylvanus  v.  Pruett,  9  P.2d  142, 
36  N.M.  112. 

N.C.— Keel  v.  Bailey,  198  •  S.E.  654, 
214  N.C.  159— Byrd  v.  Pilot  Fire 
Ins.  Co.,  160  S.E.  458,  201  N.C.  407. 

Pa. — Brumbach  v.  Pearson,  13  Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  762,  22  Berks  Co.  124, 
78  Pittsb.Leg.J.  451,  44  York  Leg, 
Rec.  21— First  Nat  Bank  of  Pitts- 
ton  v.  McGovern,  Com.Pl.,  35  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  177. 

Tex. — Collins  v.  Davenport,  Civ.App., 
192  S.W.2d  291— John  F.  Grant 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Hunnicutt,  Civ.App., 
143  S.W.2d  976— Williams  v.  Hed- 
rick,  Civ.App.,  131  S.W.2d  187,  er- 
ror dismissed,  judgment  correct. 

Wis. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  R.  F. 
Gehrke  Sheet  Metal  Works  v. 
Mahl,  297  N.W.  373,  376,  237  Wis. 
414. 

34  C.J.  P  611  note  48 — 40  C.J.  p  286 
note  83 — 41  C.J.  p  518  note  26,  p 
520  note  33—53  C.J.  p  250  note 
38. 

Lien  of  defaulting  Judgment  lien 
claimant  was  held  subordinate  to 
valid  liens  of  other  claimants  in  me- 
chanic's lien  foreclosure  suit  except 
certain  attachment  and  judgment 
lien.— Lorenz  Co.  v.  Gray,  298  P. 
222,  136  Or.  605,  rehearing  denied 
and  opinion  adhered  to  Lorenz  Co. 
v.  Day  &  Co.,  300  P.  949,  136  Or. 
605. 

Bill  of  sale  of  personalty 

A  debtor's  bill  of  sale  of  mules  to 
creditor  in  consideration  of  the  pre- 
existing debt  did  not  give  creditor 
right  to  mules  which  was  superior 
to  right  of  another  creditor  T7ho 
obtained  judgment  against  debtor 
prior  to  bill  of  sale,  where  preexist- 
ing debt  was  not  a  "valuable  consid- 


485 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


property  unless  it  has  been  docketed,  filed,  regis- 
tered, or  otherwise  made  a  matter  of  public  rec- 
ord, as  the  local  statute  may  provide,97  even  though 
the  purchaser  has  actual  notice  of  the  undocketed 
judgment98 

An  innocent  purchaser  is  protected  against  a 
judgment  erroneously  recorded  and  indexed,99  and 
a  judgment  docketed  under  the  wrong  name  does  not 
constitute  a  lien  on  the  property  as  against  a  gran- 
tee who  is  a  purchaser  in  good  faith.1  If  the  judg- 
ment is  actually  recorded,  the  fact  that  a  party  is 
ignorant  of  it  is  due  to  his  own  negligence,  against 
the  consequences  of  which  a  court  of  equity  cannot 
relieve  him  by  interfering  with  the  rights  of  others 
who  are  without  fault  ;2  and  under  the  rule  in  some 
jurisdictions  the  purchaser  of  realty  is  bound  to  as- 
certain at  his  peril  whether  there  are  judgments 
against  the  debtor.3  It  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment, although  docketed,  will  not  have  a  prior  lien 


on  a  mere  equitable  interest  in  lands  over  a  subse- 
quent bona  fide  purchaser  without  actual  notice 
from  the  holder  of  the  legal  title.4 

The  fact  that  no  execution  was  issued,  or  that  no 
levy  was  made  after  an  execution  was  issued,  has 
been  held  not  to  affect  the  priority  of  the  lien  of  a 
judgment  over  subsequent  deeds  and  mortgages,5 
except  in  so  far  as  failure  to  issue  execution  may 
result  in  postponement  of  the  lien,  as  discussed  in- 
fra §  486;  but  the  rule  is  otherwise  under  statutory 
provisions  requiring  the  entry  of  execution  in  or- 
der that  the  judgment  shall  have  a  lien  attaching 
to  the  property,6  and  a  partner  who,  for  cash  and 
in  good  faith,  buys  and  takes  a  transfer  of  his  part- 
ner's entire  interest  in  the  firm  after  a  third  person 
has  obtained  a  judgment  against  the  selling  partner 
individually  but  before  garnishment  or  other  col- 
lateral proceeding  is  taken  to  seize  the  selling  part- 
ner's interest  has  been  held  not  charged  with  the 


eration"  for  bill  of  sale  and  was  in- 
sufficient to  constitute  the  creditor 
a  "bona  fide  purchaser,"  and  mules 
and  other  personal  property  convey- 
ed by  bill  of  sale  amounted  to  much 
more  than  the  preexisting-  debt. — 
Duncan  v.  Jones,  Tez.Civ.App.,  153 
S.W.2d  214. 

A  deed  to  secure  borrowed  money 
paid  for  land  is  but  a  parol  mort- 
gage, and  as  such  is  inferior  to  a 
judgment  against  the  purchaser, 
and  a  sheriff's  sale  under  the  Judg- 
ment will  pass  a  clear  title  and  any 
surplus  left  after  satisfying  the 
judgment  belongs  to  the  purchaser, 
and  not  to  the  lender. — Fredericks  v. 
Corcoran,  100  Pa,  413. 
Judgment  prior  to  sale  by  receiver 

Where  grantee  obtained  decrees  re- 
scinding land  contracts  one  week  be- 
fore confirmation  of  sale  of  corpo- 
rate grantor's  realty  in  stockholder's 
receivership  suit,  purchaser  at  re- 
ceivership sale  was  held  to  take  with 
notice  of  liens  of  grantee's  decrees 
and  subject  to  grantee's  right  to  levy 
execution,  especially  in  absence  of 
publication  of  notice  to  creditors  aft- 
er liquidation  of  corporation  was  de- 
termined.— Eppes  v.  Dade  Develop- 
ers, 170  So.  875,  126  Fla*  353— State 
ex  rel.  Eppes  v.  Lehman,  147  So.  907, 
109  Fla.  331. 

Judgment  prior  to  assessment  lien 
Pa.— Oil  City  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n  v. 
Shanfelter,  29  Pa,Super.  251. 

Receivers'  certificates 

A  valid  and  subsisting  judgment 
lien  takes  precedence  over  receiv- 
ers* certificates  issued  for  money  to 
be  borrowed. — Lehman  v.  Trust  Co. 
of  America,  49  So.  502,  57  Fla.  473 
—63  O.J.  9  192  note  73. 

Assigned  of  lea>6 
A  Judgment  creditor's  lien  is  fi'i- 


perior  to  the  rights  of  an  assignee 
of  a  lease  where  the  assignment  was 
made  after  the  judgment  was  dock- 
eted,— Henderson  v.  Tomb,  8  K.Y.S, 
2d  612,  169  Misc.  737. 

97.    Ohio. — Van  Hoose  v.  French,  62 

N.E.2d  259,  75  Ohio  App.  342. 
Wash. — Choukas   v.   Carras,    81   P.2d 

841,  195  Wash.  659. 
Wis. — Wisconsin   Mortg.   &   Sec.   Co. 

v.  Kriesel,  211  N.W.  795,  191  Wis. 

602. 
34  C.J.  p  612  note  51—41  C.J.  p  547 

note   96—42   C.J.  p  769  note  62. 
Erroneous  indexing 

Where  judgment  against  landown- 
er was  not  indexed  on  judgment 
docket  under  his  name,  rights  of 
bank  which  subsequently  acquired 
deed  to  the  land  without  actual 
knowledge  of  judgment  were  superi- 
or to  lien  of  judgment — Wilson  v, 
First  Nat  Bank,  S8  P.2d  628,  184 
Okl.  518. 

Transcript  held  sufficient 
Ind. — Chadwick   v.    Louisville    Joint 

Stock  Land  Bank,  6  N.EL2d  741,  103 

Ind.App.  224. 

Piling  of  transcript  held  insufficient 
In  absence  of  some  step  beyond 
mere  filing  of  transcript  of  judg- 
ment, innocent  bona  fide  purchasers 
from  record  owner,  not  party  to  the 
judgment,  are  protected. — Castorina 
v.  Herrmann,  104  S.W.2d  297,  340  Mo. 
1026. 

Purchaser  charged  with  knowledge 

Where  judgment  is  entered  in 
name  of  judgment  debtor,  and  ex- 
ecution docket  shows  number  of 
cause  and  part  of  judgment  debtors, 
purchaser  from  judgment  debtor  is 
charged  with  knowledge  which  in- 
quiry would  have  disclosed. — Miller 

\  J.  I.  Case  Threshing  Mach.  Co., 

00  ?.  399,  149  Okl.  281. 

934 


98.  Mont.— Sklower  v.  Abbott  47  P. 
901,  19  Mont  228. 

34  C.J.  p  612  note  52. 

99.  Pa. — Jaczyszyn  v.  Paslawski,  24 
A.2d    116,    147    Fa.Super.    97. 

1.  N.Y. — Grygorewicz    v.    Domestic 
and  Foreign  Discount  Corporation, 
40  N.Y.S.2d  676,   179  Misc.   1017. 
A     Judgment     is     not     docketed 

against  any  particular  property,  but 
solely  against  a  name,  and  if  that 
name  is  incorrectly  set  forth,  the 
one  to  suffer  should  not  be  a  pur- 
chaser in  good  faith  but  rather 
judgment  creditor,  who  should  see 
to  it  that  the  docketing  is  in  the 
correct  name  of  the  debtor,  so  that 
a  judgment  docketed  against  Mary 
A.  Fender  did  not  constitute  a  lien 
on  real  property  of  Alice  Mary  Pen- 
der  and  it  did  not  constitute  con- 
structive "notice"  to  purchaser,  who 
acted  in  good  faith,  in  acquiring  title 
from  Alice  Mary  Pender. — Grygore- 
wicz v.  Domestic  and  Foreign  Dis- 
count Corporation,  supra. 

2.  Mo. — Bunn   v.    Lindsay,    7    S.W. 
473,  95  Mo.  250,  6  Am.S.R.  48. 

Pa. — Brumbach  v.  Pearson,  13  Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  762,  22  Berks  Co.  124, 
78  Pittsb.Leg.J.  451,  44  York  Leg. 
Rec.  21. 

S.  Wis.— R.  F.  Gehrke  Sheet  Metal 
Works  v.  Mahl,  297  N.W.  373,  237 
Wis.  414. 

4.  Kan.— Kirkwood    v.    Koester,    11 
Kan.  471. 

Miss.— Harper  v.  Bibb,  34  Miss.  472, 

69  Am.D.  397. 
Va. — Moore  v.  Sexton,  30  Gratt.  505, 

71  Va.  505. 

5.  N.J. — Vansciver  v.  Bryan,  13  N.J. 
a.  434. 

6.  Ga.— Swift  v.  Dowling,   107   S.B. 
49,  151  Ga,  449. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  485 


lien  of  such  judgment.7  A  mechanic's  lien  for  work 
commenced  before  a  judgment  was  entered  has^been 
held  entitled  to  priority  even  though  filed  after  judg- 
ment was  rendered.8  Where  the  property  against 
which  the  judgment  lien  is  sought  to  be  enforced 
did  not  stand  in  the  name  of  the  judgment  debtor, 
the  judgment  lien  will  be  subordinate  to  the  rights 
of  a  subsequent  purchaser  under  a  contract  for  deed 
entered  into  in  good  faith  and  for  a  valuable  con- 
sideration.9 

A  defect  in  a  mortgage,  in  failing  to  name  a 
mortgagee,  cannot  be  availed  of  by  a  subsequent 
judgment  creditor  of  the  mortgagor  before  levy  and 
sale  as  against  one  who  had  contracted  to  furnish 
the  money  for  the  payment  of  the  mortgage  debt  in 
consideration  of  his  being  subrogated  to  the  rights 
of  the  mortgagee.10 

Conveyance  in  trust  to  secure  specified  debts.  It 
has  been  held  that,  where  land  is  conveyed  in  trust 
to  secure  certain  specified  debts,  the  beneficiaries  of 
such  trust  deed  will  have  a  lien  on  the  land  so  con- 
veyed superior  to  that  of  ordinary  judgment  credi- 
tors.11 Where  a  deed  of  trust  is  executed  to  se- 
cure certain  debts,  and  thereafter  a  judgment  is 
rendered  against  the  grantor  who  contracts  with 
a  third  person  to  advance  the  amount  secured  by 
the  deed  of  trust  and  gives  him  a  mortgage  as  se- 
curity, on  payment  of  the  debts  secured  by  the  deed 
of  trust  it  becomes  inoperative  and  the  mortgagee 
cannot  be  subrogated  to  the  rights  of  the  cestui  que 
trust  so  as  to  gain  priority  over  the  judgment.12 

c.  Contemporaneous  Judgment  and  Conveyance 

or  Lien 

Where  a  Judgment  and  a  conveyance  OP  encumbrance 
are  entered  against  the  debtor  on  the  same  day,  the 
general  rule  Is  that  priority  of  right  will  be  determined 
by  priority  In  time. 

Where  a  conveyance  or  encumbrance  and  a  judg- 
ment against  the  grantor  are  entered  on  the  same 
day,  some  of  the  cases  hold  that  the  lien  of  the 


judgment  will  begin  from  the  earliest  hour  of  that 
day,  and  so  override  the  conveyance;13  but  the  gen- 
erally accepted  doctrine  is  that  fractions  of  the  day 
may  be  inquired  into,  and  priority  of  right  will  be 
determined  by  actual  priority  in  time,14  and  that,  in 
order  to  affect  lands  in  the  hands  of  a  purchaser, 
a  judgment  must  have  been  not  merely  simultane- 
ous with,  but  anterior  to,  the  conveyance.15  The 
precise  time  at  which  the  judgment  was  entered  may 
be  proved,  according  to  some  authorities,  by  evi- 
dence dehors  the  record,1*  although  other  authori- 
ties have  refused  to  adopt  this  rule.17 

Where  there  is  no  proof  of  the  actual  time  of 
rendition  or  entry  of  the  judgment,  it  has  been  held 
by  some  authorities  that  the  judgment  will  have  pri- 
ority over  a  conveyance  on  the  same  day,  the  pre- 
sumption being  that  the  judgment  was  rendered  or 
entered  at  the  earliest  hour  of  the  day  when  an  ac- 
tual rendition  or  entry  of  a  judgment  may  be  made 
in  the  usual  course  of  business,18  although  other  au- 
thorities hold  that  under  such  circumstances  the 
liens  are  equal.19  Under  the  rule  that  a  judgment 
lien  relates  back  to  the  first  day  of  the  term  at 
which  it  was  rendered,  a  judgment  lien  overreaches 
all  conveyances  or  encumbrances  on  the  debtor's 
lands  executed  on  or  after  the  first  day  of  the  term 
during  which  the  judgment  was  rendered.20  Where 
a  deed  is  received  for  recording  on  a  certain  day 
but  is  not  recorded  because  costs  of  registration  did 
not  accompany  it,  and  on  the  same  day  a  judgment 
is  docketed,  the  judgment  is  entitled  to  priority.21 

d.  Judgment  for  Pnrcliase  Money 

A  Judgment  given  or  confessed  for  the  purchase 
money  of  land  will  have  priority  of  lien  on  the  land  over 
subsequent  mortgages  or  other  encumbrances,  where  the 
giving  of  the  judgment  and  the  execution  and  delivery 
of  the  deed  for  the  land  were  simultaneous  or  parts  of 
the  same  continuous  transaction,  but  not  otherwise. 

A  judgment  given  or  confessed  for  the  purchase 
money  of  land  will  have  priority  of  lien  on  the  land 
over  subsequent  mortgages  or  other  encumbrances 


7.  oa.— Ivey    v.    Gatlin,    20    S.B.2d 
592,  194  Ga.  27. 

8.  pa.— Knoell  v.  Carey,  140  A.  522, 
291  Pa.  531. 

9.  Minn.— Roberts  v.  Friedell,  15  N. 
W.2d  496,  218  Minn.  88. 

10.  Iowa.— Watson  v.  Bowman,  119 
N.W.  623,  142  Iowa  528. 

41  C.J.  p  521  note  44. 

11.  Tenn. — Buchanan    v.    Kimes,    2 
Baxt   275. 

41  C.J.  p  519  note  29. 

12.  W.Va. — Hoffman  v.  Ryan,  21  W. 
Via.  415. 

13.  Del.— Hollingsworth  v.    Thomp- 
son, 5  Del.  432. 


Va. — Hockman  v.  Hockman,  25  S.B. 
634,  93  Va.  455,  57  Am.S.R/  816. 

41  C.J.  P  548  note  99  [a]. 

14.  U.S. — Fooshee  v.  Snavely,  D.C. 
Va.,  58  F.2d  772,  affirmed,  C.C.A., 
58  F.2d  774,  certiorari  denied  53 
S.Ct.  85,  287  U.S.  635,  77  LJEd.  550 
—Cohen  v.  Schultz.  C.C.A.N.J., 
43  F.2d  340. 

34  C.J.  p  612  note  60. 

16.  Pa,— Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Gor- 
man, 8  Watts  &  S.  304. 

16.  N.J.— Hunt    v.    Swayze,    25    A. 
850,  55  N.J.Law  33. 

Pa.__ Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Gorman,  8 
Watts  &  S.  304. 

17.  Tenn.— Berry    v.     Clements,     9 

935 


Humphr.  312— Murfree  v.  Carmack, 
4   Yerg.   270,   26   Am.D.   232. 

18.  Pa.— In   re   Boyer,   -51    Pa.    432, 
91  Am.D.  129. 

34  C.J.  p  613  note  64. 

19.  pa,— Home   Sav.  Fund  v.   King, 
173  A,  891,  113  Pa.Super.  400. 

34  C.J.  P  613  note  65—41  C.J.  p  519 
note  28,  p  548  note  99   [b],   [d]. 

20.  W.Va.— Smith     v.     Parkersbur* 
Co-Op.  Assoc.,   37  S.K    645,   48  W. 
Va.  232. 

34  C.J.  p  583  note  62. 

21.  U.S.— Fooshee   v.    Snavely,    C.C. 
A.Va.,   58   F.2d   774,   certiorari  de- 
nied  53   S.CL  85,   287  U.S.   685,   77 

550. 


§485 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


where  the  giving  of  the  judgment  and  the  execution 
and  delivery  of  the  deed  for  the  land  were  simul- 
taneous or  parts  of  the  same  continuous  transac- 
tion, but  not  otherwise.22  However,  a  judgment 
for  the  balance  due  on  the  purchase  price  of  realty, 
on  which  the  judgment  was  declared  to  be  a  spe- 
cific lien,  gives  the  judgment  creditor  no  lien  prior 
to  that  of  a  third  person  under  a  mortgage  execut- 
ed before  entry  of  the  judgment;23  and,  although 
the  judgment  debtor  may  not  be  permitted  to  claim 
homestead  as  against  a  purchase-money  judgment, 
such  fact  does  not  affect  the  rights  of  a  mortgagee 
acquiring  his  interest  in  the  property  before  the  en- 
try of  the  judgment.24 

e.  Purchase-Money  Mortgage 

A  mortgage  or  trust  deed  given  to  secure  the  pur- 
chase price  of  land  and  executed  simultaneously  with 
the  conveyance  has  priority  of.  Hen  over  judgments  ob- 
tained before  the  conveyance. 

A  mortgage25  or  trust  deed  given  to  secure  the 
purchase  price  of  land,26  and  executed  simultane- 
ously with  the  conveyance,27  has  priority  of  lien 
over  judgments  obtained  against  the  purchaser  an- 
terior to  the  conveyance,  whether  the  mortgage  is 
given  to  the  vendor  himself  or  to  a  third  person 
who  advances  the  purchase  money  for  the  vendee,28 
and  as  well  where  part  of  the  purchase  money  is 
paid,  and  the  mortgage  given  to  secure  the  balance, 
as  when  the  mortgage  is  given  for  the  whole  pur- 
chase money.29  Some  authorities  have  held  that 
the  mortgage  will  not  be  entitled  to  priority  unless 
it  is  recorded;30  others' that  the  mortgage  takes 
priority  over  a  prior  judgment,  even  though  it  is 
not  recorded  immediately,31  or  at  all,32  but  that  this 
rule  has  no  application  to  a  subsequent  judgment,33 
although  even  in  the  latter  case  some  authorities 


give  priority  to  the  unrecorded  mortgage.34  The 
fact  that  a  portion  of  a  mortgage  to  secure  the  pur- 
chase price  was  given  to  secure  the  mortgagee 
against  liability  on  his  indorsement  of  the  judgment 
debtor's  note  to  the  judgment  creditor  does  not  af- 
fect his  right  to  priority  over  the  judgment  creditor 
for  the  full  amount  of  the  mortgage  where,  in  a 
suit  by  the  judgment  creditor  to  set  aside  as  fraud- 
ulent a  conveyance  by  the  judgment  debtor,  no  per- 
sonal judgment  was  asked  against  the  mortgagee 
and  the  mortgagee  remained  liable  on  his  indorse- 
ment.35 

Mortgage  not  for  purcJiase  money.  A  mortgage 
to  an  attorney,  given  to  secure  payment  of  the 
amount  due  for  legal  services  rendered,  cannot  be 
considered  as  a  purchase-money  mortgage,  as 
against  a  prior  judgment  lien,36  nor  can  a  mortgage 
given  to  secure  not  only  the  balance  of  the  purchase 
price  but  also  debts  to  third  persons.87 

f .  Contemporaneous  Mortgage  to  Secure  Other 

Debts 

Where  a  Judgment  debtor  on  acquiring  property  ex- 
ecutes a  mortgage  to  secure  debts  other  than  for  the 
purchase  money  of  the  property,  a  Judgment  lien  takes 
precedence  over  the  mortgage. 

Where  a  judgment  debtor  at  the  same  time  he 
acquires  title  to  land  executes  a  mortgage  thereof  to 
a  third  person,  to  secure  any  debt  other  than  for 
the  purchase  money  of  the  land,  the  judgment  lien 
will  take  precedence  of  the  mortgage,38  but  there 
is  authority  to  the  contrary  where  such  mortgage 
was  given  as  part  of  the  one  continuous  transaction 
by  which  title  was  acquired.39 

g.  Contracts  of  Sale  and  Vendor's  Lieu 

'     In  general,  the  rights  of  a  vendee  are  not  affected 


22.  Pa. — Appeal    of    Snyder,    91    Pa. 
477. 

34  OJ.  p  613  note  68 — 40  C.J.  p  286 
note  85. 

23.  N.C.— Jarrett    v.     Holland.     196 
S.E.  314,  213  N.C.  428. 

24.  N.C. — Jarrett  v.  Holland,  supra. 

25.  Ind. — Peet   v.    Beers,    4    Ind.   46. 
34  C.J.  p  613  note  69—41  C.J.  P  529 

note  41. 

Defective  purchase-money  mort- 
gage* have  been  held  superior  to 
judgment  recovered  before  debtor  ac- 
quired title. — Groh  v.  Cohen,  149  A. 
459,  158  Md.  638. 

26.  Ga. — Achey  v.  Coleman,  19  S.E. 
710.  92  Ga,  745. 

34  C.J.  P  613  note  70. 

27.  Ark.— Western  Tie  &  Timber  Co. 
v.  Campbell,  169  S.W.  253,  113  Ark. 
57$,   575,   Ann.Cas.l916C   943. 

34  CU.  p  618  note  71. 


28.  Ark.— Western  Tie  &  Timber  Co. 
v.  Campbell,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  614  note  72. 

29.  Ga.— Protestant      Episcopal 
Church  of  Diocese  of  Georgia  v.  B. 
E.  Lowe  Co.,   63   S.E.  136,  131  G«u 
666,  127  Am.S.R.  243. 

34  C.J.  p  614  note  73. 

30.  Pa. — Appeal  of  Foster,  8  Pa.  79. 

31.  Ga. — Courson  v.  Walker,  21  S.E. 
287.  94  Ga,  175. 

La, — Hochereau    v.    Colomb,    27    La. 
Ann.  337. 

32.  111.— Roane    v.    Baker,    11    N.E. 
246,  120  111.  308. 

Tex. — Masterson  v.  Burnett,  66  S.W. 

90,  27  Tex.Civ.App.  370. 
34  C.J.  p  614  note  76. 

33.  IlL— Thorpe  v.  Helmer,  118  N.E. 
954,  275  111.  86. 

34  aX  p  614  note  77. 

936 


34.  va- — Cowardin   v.   Anderson,    78 
Va.   88. 

35.  Ky. — Lyon  v.   Lemaster,   109    S. 
W.2d  39,  270  Ky.  122. 

36.  Ind.— Yarlott  v.  Brown,  149  N.E. 
921,  86  Ind.App.  479. 

37.  Conn. — Joseph  v.   Donovan,    164 
A.  498,  116  Conn.  160. 

111. — Gorham   v.   Farson,    10   N.B.    1, 
119  111.  425. 

38.  N.C.— Weil  v.  Casey,  34  S.E.  506, 
125  N.C.  356,  74  Am.S.R.  644. 

34  C.J.  p  613  note  66. 
Mortgage  for  future  advances 

Lien  of  prior  judgment  against 
vendee  takes  priority  over  mortgage 
to  secure  future  advances,  given  by 
vendee  when  acquiring  title. — Fideli- 
ty Union  Title  &  Mortgage  Guaranty 
Co.  v.  Magniflco,  151  A,  499,  106 
N.J.EO.  559. 

39.  I1L— Christie  v.  Hale,  46  111.  117. 
34  OJ.  p  613  note  67. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  485, 


by  a  Judgment  recovered  against  the  vendor  subsequent 
to  the  execution  of  the  contract  of  sale,  nor  are  the  rights 
of  the  vendor  affected  by  a  Judgment  recovered  against 
the  vendee. 

The  rights  of  the  vendee  under  an  executory  con- 
tract for  the  sale  of  land  are  not  displaced  or  im- 
paired by  the  subsequent  accruing  of  a  judgment 
lien  against  the  vendor,40  especially  where  the  ven- 
dee is  in  possession  under  such  contract.41 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  creditor  of  the  vendee  is 
inferior  to  a  vendor's  lien  where  a  lien  is  expressly 
reserved  by  the  vendor  in  the  deed  or  contract  of 
sale42  or  is  reserved  under  a  statute,43  or  where 
the  vendor  has  retained  title  until  payment  of  the 
purchase  money,44  although  the  instrument  reserv- 
ing the  lien  is  not  recorded.45  It  is  also  the  general 
rule  that  the  vendor's  implied  lien  is  superior  to  that 
of  a  judgment  creditor,46  and  this  rule  has  been 
followed  by  some  courts  where  the  judgment  credi- 
tor had  no  notice  of  the  vendor's  lien.47  It  has  been 
held  in  some  jurisdictions,  either  in  compliance  with 
recording  statutes  or  otherwise,  that  a  vendor's  im- 
plied lien  is  inferior  to  that  of  a  judgment  creditor 
without  notice,48  and  is  superior  to  the  lien  of  the 
judgment  creditor  only  where  such  creditor  has  no- 
tice of  the  vendor's  lien,4*  and  that  a  vendor's  Hen 
is  inferior  to  a  judgment  lien  prior  in  time  and  duly 
recorded.50 
It  has  been  held  that  a  lien  stipulated  for  in  a 


separate  instrument,  both  the  deed  of  conveyance 
and  the  instrument  reserving  the  lien  being  re- 
corded, will  not  give  preference  to  the  vendor's  lien 
over  subsequent  judgment  creditors  of  the  purchas- 
er.51 In  a  jurisdiction  where  the  vendor's  implied 
lien  is  not  recognized  until  the  vendor  has  filed  a 
bill  to  fix  and  enforce  his  claim  on  the  land,  it  has 
been  held  that  any  creditor  of  the  purchaser  may 
attach  or  cause  execution  to  be  levied  on  the  land 
and  prevail  on  the  lien  thereof  over  the  vendor,52 
and,  although  the  land  has  been  reconveyed  to  the 
vendor  by  the  purchaser,  the  vendor  does  not  stand 
in  the  same  position  as  though  he  had  brought  an  ac- 
tion for  the  enforcement  of  his  implied  lien,  and, 
until  the  deed  of  reconveyance  is  recorded,  the  right 
of  a  judgment  creditor  of  the  purchaser  levying  on 
the  land  under  an  execution  will  be  superior  to  that 
of  the  vendor.53 

Where  a  vendor's  lien  is  prior  to  a  judgment  lien, 
a  subsequent  taking  of  a  deed  of  trust  to  secure  the 
vendor's  lien  notes,  and  foreclosure  of  such  deed, 
does  not  render  the  vendor's  Hen  a  subsequent 
lien.54  In  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  vendor's  lien,  a  judg- 
ment rendered  previously  but  not  recorded  until 
after  the  suit  was  commenced  cannot  be  reHed  on 
to  support  rights  claimed  by  the  original  vendor's 
wife  against  plaintiff.55  The  recording  of  an  ab- 
stract of  judgment  against  the  vendor  and  vendee  of 
an  executory  contract  of  sale  of  realty  does  not  im- 


40.    Ga. — Burr    v.    Toomer,    29    S.B. 

692,  103  Ga.  159. 

Md.— Cattrider  v.  Caples,  153  A.  445, 
160   Md.  392,   87  A.L.R.   1600— Kin- 

sey  v.  Drury,  126  A.  125,  146  Md. 

227. 
Neb.— Wehn  v.  Fall,  76  N.W.  13,  55 

Neb.  547,  70  Am.S.R.  344— Olander 

v.    Tighe,    61    N.W.    633,    43    Neb. 

344. 
N.J.-— Simonds  v.  Essex  Pass.  R.  Co., 

41  A,  682,  57  N.J.Eq.  349. 
Okl.— Scott-Baldwin  Co.  v.  McAdams, 

141  P.  770,  43  Okl.  161.  , 
Or. — May    v.    Emerson,    96    P.    454, 

52   Or.    262,   16   Ann.Cas.   1129,   re- 
hearing denied  96  P.  1065,  52  Or. 

262,  16  Ann.Cas.  1129. 
S.C.— Adickes  v.   Lowry,    12    S.C.   97 

— Massey  v.   Mcllwain,   11   S.C.Eq. 

421. 
Tenn. — Moore  v.  Pinning,  13  S.W.2d 

798,  158  Tenn.  374. 
W.Va. — Donnally  v.  Parker,  5  W.Va. 

301. 

34  C.J.  p  614  note  79. 
Vendee's  right  to  require  conveyance 

on  fulfilling  contract  not  defeated 

by  attaching  of  Judgment  lien  see 

supra  §  480. 
Parol  contract 

Where  a  parol  contract  to  convey 
is  afterward  executed  in  good  faith, 
.the  rights  of  the  vendee  are  not 


defeated  by  a  judgment  against  the 
vendor  rendered  after  the  making 
of  the  contract  but  before  execution 
of  the  conveyance. — Minns  v.  Morse, 
15  Ohio  568,  45  Am.D.  590. 

41.  N.Y.— Stillwell  v.  Hart,  57  N.T. 
S.    639,   40  App.Div.   112. 

34  C.J.  p  614  note  80. 

42.  Ky. — Likens    v.   Pate,    169    S.W. 
734,  160  Ky.  319. 

66  C.J.  p  1247  note  71. 

Vendor's    lieu   reserved   on   face    of 

conveyance 
Pa.— Miller   v.    Bucks,    92    Pa.Super. 

263. 
34  C.J.  p  $13  note  69  [o]. 

43.  Tenn.— Vaughn    v.    yaughn,    12 
Heisk.  472. 

44.  Ga.— American  Law  Book  Co.  v. 
Brunswick  Cross-Tie  &  Creosoting 
Co.,    77    S.E.    104,   12    Ga.App.    259. 

Ind.— Lagow   v.    Badollet,    1   Blackf. 

416,  12  Am.D.  258. 
66  C.J.  P  1247  note  73. 

45.  va.-- Snipe,  Cloud  &  Co.  v.  Re- 
pass,    28    Gratt    716,    69    Va.    716. 

40.  N.J.— Thatelbaum  v.  Neidorf, 
135  A.  57,  100  N.J.EQ.  236. 

Tex. — McKelvain  v.  Allen,  58  Tex. 
383. 

34  C.J.  P  614  note  81—66  C.J.  p  1247 
note  76. 

937 


47.  Ohio.—  Miller  v.  Albright,  53  N. 
E.  490,  60  Ohio  St.  48. 

66  C.J.  p  1248  note  77. 

48.  Iowa.  —  Spindler  v.  Iowa  &  O.  S. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  155  N.W.  271,  173  Iowa 
348. 

34  C.J.  p  614  note  82  —  66  C.J.  P  1248 

note  79. 

Simulated  purchaser's  creditors  ac- 
quiring and  recording  Judicial  m6rt- 
gages  against  all  his  property  with- 
out actual  knowledge  of  record  of 
simulated  '  sale  acquired  title  as 
against  simulated  vendor  holding 
unrecorded  counter  letter.—  State  ex 
rel.  Hebert  v.  Recorder  of  Mort-. 
gages,  143  So.  15,  175  La.  94. 

49.  Ky.—  Morford   v.    Browning,    11 
Ky.Op.  186. 

50.  Va.  —  Kidwell  v.  Henderson.   143 
S.E.  336,  150  Va.  829. 

51.  Pa.—  McLanahan    v.    Reeside,    9 
Watts  508,  36  Am.D.  136. 

52.  Tenn.  —  Hood    v.    Hogue,    175    S. 
W.    531,    131    Tenn.    421,    AnnXJas. 
1916D  383. 

53.  Tenn.  —  Hood  v.  Hogue,  supra. 

54.  Tex.  —  Shaw  v.   Ball,    Com.App.f 
23  S.W.2d  291. 


55.    Tex.  —  Button    v.     Kinsey, 
App.,  124  S.W.2d  446. 


Civ. 


§  485 


JUDGMENTS 


pair  the  right  of  a  prior  holder  in  due  course  for 
valuable  consideration  before  maturity  of  vendor's 
lien  notes  to  rescind  the  vendor's  lien  contract  and 
recover  possession  of  the  property.56  The  lien  of 
a  judgment  creditor  of  a  purchaser  under  a  land 
contract  has  been  held  subordinate  to  the  title  of 
the  grantor  to  whom  the  purchaser  reconveyed  in 
consideration  of  cancellation  of  notes  given  for  the 
purchase  price  of  the  land.57 

Rescission  of  the  contract,  after  a  judgment 
against  the  vendee  but  before  levy,  has  been  held 
not  to  affect  the  lien  of  the  judgment  creditor,  where 
the  judgment  lien  has  attached  before  the  rescis- 
sion.58 A  judgment  lien  attaching  to  realty  after  a 
vendor's  lien  has  been  barred  by  limitations  is  su- 
perior to  title  acquired  by  the  grantors  from  a  deed 
reconveying  the  property59  and  to  their  title  as  un- 
satisfied vendors  in  possession.60  A  judgment  in 
favor  of  an  original  vendor  establishing  a  vendor's 
lien  cuts  off  the  claim  of  a  subsequent  mortgagee 
named  in  a  trust  deed  so  that  a  purchaser  at  a  sale 
foreclosing  the  trust  deed  acquires  no  rights  in  the 
realty.61  Where  a  grantor  conveys  property  by 
deed  providing  for  revocation  of  the  transfer  on 
breach  of  a  condition  subsequent,  the  rights  of  the 
grantor  on  breach  of  the  condition  are  superior  to 
the  general  lien  of  a  judgment  against  the  grantee.62 

Creditor  purchaser  at  trust  sale.  It  has  been  held 
that  a  Vendor's  implied  lien  is  inferior  to  the  claim 
of  a  creditor  of  the  purchaser  who  acquired  a  spe- 
cific lien  on  the  property  under  a  deed  of  trust  and 
who  purchased  the  property  at  trust  sale.63 

It.  Government  Claims 
In   the   absence   of  statute;  ordinary  debts  due  the 


49    C.J.S. 

not    entitled    to    priority   over   a    prior 


government 
judgment. 

Ordinary  debts  due  to  a  state  government  have  no 
priority  over  judgment  liens  previously  attaching.64 
As  discussed  in  Bankruptcy  §  453,  the  statutory  pri- 
ority in  favor  of  claims  of  the  United  States  in  cases 
of  bankruptcy  or  insolvency  does  not  cause  such 
claims  to  override  judgment  liens  attaching  to  the 
debtor's  property  before  the  insolvency  or  before  the 
institution  of  bankruptcy  proceedings. 

§  486.    Postponement  of  Lien 

a.  In  general 

b.  Stay  of  execution;  appeal 

c.  Entry  of  satisfaction  without  actual 

satisfaction 

d.  Modification  of  judgment 

a.  In  General 

The  lien  of  a  Judgment  may  be  postponed  and  made 
subordinate  to  later  liens  by  failure  to  keep  the  Judg- 
ment alive  as  required  by  statute,  or  by  conduct  of  the 
judgment  creditor  amounting  to  fraud,  waiver  or  estop- 
pel. 

Unless  otherwise  provided  by  statute,65  where  a 
judgment  is  a  senior  lien  its  priority  is  not  lost  by 
mere  delay  in  enforcing  it,  in  the  absence  of  cir- 
cumstances warranting  an  inference  of  fraud,66  or 
unless  the  delay  amounts  to  gross  negligence  ;67  nor 
will  neglect  to  satisfy  a  judgment  out  of  the  debtor's 
personal  property  subordinate  the  judgment  lien  on 
the  debtor's  land  to  that  of  a  junior  judgment.68 
However,  the  postponement  of  a  judgment  lien  to 
a  junior  lien  will  result  from  anything  which  in- 
validates or  destroys  the  judgment6^  or  amounts  to 
a  satisfaction  of  it,70  or  from  conduct  on  the  judg- 
ment creditor's  part  which  amounts  to  fraud  on  the 
rights  or  interests  of  junior  lienors71  or  estops  him 


56.  Tex. — Goldenrod  Finance  Co.  v. 
Ware,    Civ.App.,    142    S.W.2d    614, 
error  dismissed*  judgment  correct. 

57.  Tex. — Thompson      v.      Mayhew 
Lumber  Co.,   Civ.App.,    103   S.W.Sd 
1005. 

58.  Ga,-— Stewart  v.   Berry,    10    S.B. 
601,  84  Ga,  177. 

59.  Tex. — Tates  v.  Darby,  131  S.W. 
2d  95,  133  Tex.  593. 

Judgment   filed  "before  vendor's   lien 

tarred 

A  judgment  lien  when  filed  attach- 
ed to  any  interest  of  judgment  debt- 
or, in  realty,  and,  when  superior  ven- 
dor's lien  became  barred  of  record  by 
limitation,  the  judgment  lien  im- 
mediately attached  and  became  the 
prior  lien  on  the  realty,  notwith- 
standing vendor's  lien  was  not  bar- 
red of  record  at  the  time  abstract 
of  judgment  was  filed. — Hughes  v. 
Hess,  Civ.App.,  166  S.W.2d  718,  re- 


formed in  part   172   S.W.2d  301,   141 
Tex.  511. 

60.  Tex.— -Yates  v.  Darby,   131  S.W. 
2d  95.  133  Tex.  593. 

61.  Tex. — Glasscock     v.      Travelers 
Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  113  S.W.2d  1005, 
error  refused. 

62.  Ind. — Royal    v.    Aultman-Taylor 
Co.,    19    K.B.    202,    116   Ind.   424,    2 
L.R.A.  526. 

63.  Tenn. — Fain  v.  Inman,  6  Helsk. 
5,  19  Am.R.   577. 

64.  Md. — Hollingsworth    v.    Patten, 
3  Harr.  &  M.  125. 

Mo.— Pinley  v.  Caldwell,   1  Mo.  512. 

65.  Failure  to  issue  execution 
Under  some  statutes  where  a  judg- 
ment   creditor   allows   more   than   & 
year   to    elapse    without   taking   out 
execution  on  his   judgment  its  lien 
will  become  inferior  to  the  liens  of 
other    judgments    which   have    been 

938 


kept  alive. — Southern  Mortg.  Guar- 
anty Corporation  v.  King,  77  S.W.2d 
810,  168  Tenn.  309 — 34  C.J.  p  604 
note  80. 


v.     Campbell,      8 


66.  Miss.— Foute 
Miss.  377. 

67.  Miss. — Robinson     v.     Green,     7 
Miss.  223. 

68.  Ind. — Leonard  v.   Broughton,   22 
N.E.  731,  120  Ind.  536,  16  Am.S.R. 
347. 

69.  Tenn. — Porter  v.  Cocke,  Peck  p 
30. 

70.  Ark. — Trapnall  v.  Richardson,  13 
Ark.  543,  58  Am.D.  338. 

Pa.— Moseby's   Appeal,    8   A.    165,    3 
Pa.Cas.  108. 

71.  GteL — Green    v.    Ingram,    16    Ga. 
164. 

Pa. — Kimmel's  Appeal,  91  Pa.  471. 
34  C.J.  p  615  note  91. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  486 


to  assert  his  priority,72  or  from  his  voluntary  re- 
lease of  his  lien  or  agreement  to  postpone  it,73  or 
from  conduct  constituting  a  waiver  thereof.74 

Under  a  statute  authorizing  a  junior  judgment 
lienholder  to  give  a  senior  judgment  lienholder  writ- 
ten notice  requiring  him  to  execute  his  judgment, 
and  depriving  him  of  his  priority  if  he  fails  to  do 
so,  failure  to  give  such  notice  is  deemed  acquies- 
cence in  the  delay,75  but,  where  such  notice  is  giv- 
en and  execution  is  sued  out  and  placed  in  the  hands 
of  the  proper  officer,  the  senior  judgment  creditor 
need  not  go  further  and  point  out  property  of  the 
debtor  subject  to  the  execution  in  order  to  pre- 
serve his  priority,76  and  a  junior  lienor  cannot  gain 
priority  by  finding  and  pointing  out  property  sub- 
ject to  execution.77  Where  the  purchaser  of  land 
fails  to  sue  within  the  time  required  by  statute  for 
bringing  an  action  for  specific  performance  of  the 
contract,  a  judgment  against  the  vendor,  acquired 
after  the  contract  was  made,  takes  priority  over  the 
rights  of  the  purchaser.78 

An  injunction  awarded  at  the  instance  of  a  stran- 
ger to  prevent  the  collection  of  a  judgment  by  sale 
of  the  property  levied  on  does  not  impair  the  lien 
of  the  judgment;  on  dissolution  of  the  injunction 
the  judgment  will  be  entitled  to  priority  as  against 
judgments  whose  liens  attached  during  the  injunc- 
tion.79 One  who  takes  a  mortgage  on  attached 
property  may  rely  on  the  failure  of  the  attaching 
creditor  to  file  his  judgment  lien  within  the  time 
required  by  the  statute.80  The  fact  that  a  judgment 
creditor  was  not  a  party  to  foreclosure  proceedings 
has  been  held  not  to  render  his  judgment  superior 
to  a  previously  recorded  mortgage.81  Where,  after 
a  judgment  is  obtained,  a  mortgage  is  released  of 
record,  the  judgment  creditor's  right  to  a  lien  and 
priority  become  fixed  when  the  mortgage  is  released, 
even  though  a  new  mortgage  is  recorded  later.82 


Where  the  holder  of  a  trust  deed  forecloses,  pur- 
chases at  the  trustee's  sale,  and  takes  a  purchase 
certificate,  and  in  the  meanwhile  a  judgment  lien 
attaches  to  the  property,  when  the  holder  surren- 
ders the  purchase  certificate  and  accepts  a  new  trust 
deed  the  judgment  lien  becomes  entitled  to  priority 
since  the  new  deed  is  not  a  continuation  of  the  old 
one.88  Where  a  mortgage  given  to  secure  valid 
notes  is  set  aside  because  of  invalidity  of  the  mort- 
gage, this  will  not  invalidate  or  affect  the  priority 
of  judgments  taken  on  the  notes  secured.84  Where 
a  sale  on  an  execution  is  set  aside  for  irregularity, 
and  the  land  is  ordered  to  be  resold  for  the  benefit 
of  the  purchaser,  the  lien  of  the  original  judgment 
continues  in  force  as  against  the  lien  of  any  inter- 
vening judgment.85  Where  a  mechanic  does  not 
pursue  his  remedy  by  a  lien  but  seeks  a  personal 
judgment,  such  judgment  will  rank  as  any  other 
judgment  rendered  on  a  personal  claim.86 

Failure  to  revive.  In  jurisdictions  where,  as  dis- 
cussed infra  §  494,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  will  not 
continue  unless  the  judgment  is  periodically  revived, 
the  lien  of  a  judgment  not  revived  within  the  stat- 
utory time  will  be  superseded  by  the  lien  of  junior 
judgments  in  full  original  life  or  which  have  been 
duly  revived,87  even  though  the  senior  judgment 
was  for  purchase  money.88  Priority  may  be  lost  by 
a  revival  improperly  accomplished.89 

b.  Stay  of  Execution;  Appeal 

A  stay  of  execution  has  been  held  to  have,  and  also 
not  to  have,  the  effect  of  postponing  a  judgment  Hen. 
An  appeal  does  not  affect  a  postponement  of  the  judg- 
ment to  judgments  or  liens  attaching  while  the  appeal 
Is  pending. 

An  extension  of  time  for  payment,  or  a  stay  of 
execution  on  a  judgment,  whether  by  agreement  of 
parties,  order  of  court,  or  injunction,  for  any  time 
short  of  the  statutory  period  of  limitations,  has 


72.  Neb. — Stannard  v.  Orleans  Flour 
&  Oatmeal   Milling  Co.,   140  N.W. 
636,  93  Neb.  389. 

34  C.J.  p  612  note  50. 

73.  N.Y. — Bronner    v.     Loomis,     17 
Hun  439. 

Pa. — Gardner's  Appeal,  7  Watts  &  S. 
295 — Quakertown  Building  &  Loan 
Assoc.  v.  Server,  11  Phila.  532. 

74.  B.C. — Gottschalk  Co.  v.  Live  Oak 
Distillery  Co.,  7  App.D.C.  169, 

34  C.J.  p  615  note  93. 

75.  U.S.— In   re  Gulf  port  Furniture 
Co.,    D.C.Miss.,    1    F.Supp.    489. 

76.  Miss. — Scharff  y.  Zimmerman,  60 
Miss.  760. 

77.  Miss. — ScharfC    v.    Zimmerman, 
supra. 


136 


78.  N.J.— Stack    v.    Sobocinski, 
A.  333,  100  N.J.EQU  414. 

79.  Ala.— Bartlett  v.  Doe,  6  Ala.  305, 
41  Am.D.  52. 

80.  Conn.— City      Nat.      Bank      v. 
Stoeckel,  132  A.  20,  103  Conn.  732. 

81.  Ind. — Hibben,  Hollweg  &  Co.  v. 
Western  &  Southern  Life  Ins.  Co., 
169  N.E.   693,  90  Ind.App.   683. 

82.  Tenn. — Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick  Co.,  30 
S.W.2d  253,   161  Tenn.   298. 

83.  Colo. — Home  Owners'  Loan  Cor- 
poration  v.    Meyer,    136    P.2d   282, 
110  Colo.  501. 

84.  U.S. — Lippincott   v.    Shaw   Car- 
riage Co.,  C.C.Ind.,  25  F.  577. 

85.  111.— McHany  v.  Schenk,   88  HI. 
357. 

939 


86.  Ga. — Love   v.    Cox,    68    Ga.    269. 

87.  Neb. — Glissmann  v,  Happy  Hol- 
low Club,   271   N.W.   431,    132  Neb. 
223. 

Pa. — Dime  Bank  of  Lansford  y.  Sum- 
mit Hill  Trust  Co.,  19  A.2d  738, 
341  Pa.  424. 

34  C.J.  p  615  note  99. 

88.  Fa.— Ruth's  Appeal,  54  Ba.  173. 

89.  Pa.— First   Nat.    Bank   &   Trust 
Co.   v.   Miller,   18S  A.   87,   322   Pa. 
473. 

Bights  of  creditors  asserting  pri- 
ority over  irregular  or  ineffective  re- 
vivals of  prior  creditors  are  substan- 
tive and  do  not  depend  on  terre  ten- 
ant's approval  or  disapproval,  action 
or  inaction. — First  Nat.  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Miller,  supra. 


§486 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


been  held  not  to  have  the  effect  of  postponing  the 
lien  of  the  judgment  to  other  and  junior  judgment 
liens,90  although  there  is  also  authority  to  the  con- 


Appeal.  An  appeal  from  a  judgment  does  not 
discharge  its  lien,  although  it  may  stay  its  enforce- 
ment; hence  it  does  not  postpone  the  judgment  to 
judgments  or  other  liens  attaching  while  the  ap- 
peal is  pending.92  Where  a  plaintiff  appeals  from 
an  award  in  his  favor,  and  recovers  a  judgment 
more  favorable  to  himself,  the  lien  of  such  judg- 
ment does  not  relate  back  to  the  date  of  the 
award.93  A  judgment  in  full  force  and  effect  at  a 
time  when  a  subsequent  mortgage  is  executed  with 
constructive  and  actual  notice  of  the  judgment  does 
not  lose  its  priority  by  reason  of  a  reversal  by  an 
.intermediate  court  and  the  final  affirmance  of  the 
judgment  by  a  higher  court  after  reversal  of  the 
intermediate  court94 

c.  Entry  of  Satisfaction  without  Actual  Satis- 
faction 

Entry  of  satisfaction  without  actual  satisfaction  may 
operate  to  postpone  a  judgment  lien. 

A  judgment  creditor  who  enters  satisfaction  of 
his  judgment,  or  permits  it  to  be  done,  although 
without  actual  satisfaction,  authorizes  others  to  con- 
sider the  property  as  unencumbered,  and  will  be 
postponed  to  their  rights  -or  liens.95  A  subsequent 
cancellation  of  the  entry  of  satisfaction  will  restore 
the  judgment  to  full  activity,  but  it  will  not  re- 
store its  priority  of  lien  as  against  purchasers  or 
encumbrancers  whose  rights  attached  after  the  en- 


try of  satisfaction  and  before  its  cancellation,9 * 
although  it  seems  that  the  priority  of  the  senior 
judgment  may  thus  be  regained  as  against  junior 
judgment  creditors  whose  judgments  were  recov- 
ered prior  to  the  entry  of  satisfaction,  and  who  were 
not  in  any  way  misled  by  such  entry.97 

<L  Modification  of  Judgment 

Under  statutes  so  providing,  modification  of  the  Judg- 
ment will  not  affect  the  lien  existing  under  it. 

A  statute  which  provides,  that  when  a  judgment 
is  modified  all  liens  under  it  shall  be  preserved  to 
the  modified  judgment  applies  to  judgment  liens  on 
personalty  as  well  as  to  those  on  real  property,98 
even  though  in  form  the  old  judgment  was  vacated 
and  a  new  one  entered.99  If,  on  the  revival  of  a 
judgment,  substantial  additions  are  made  thereto 
the  continuity  of  its  lien  has  been  held  to  be  broken 
in  favor  of  other  liens  existing  at  the  date  of  the 
revival.1 

§  487.    Proceedings  for  Determination  of  Pri- 
ority 

Conflicting  claims  to  priority  may  be  determined  in 
proceedings,  brought  for  that  purpose,  or  in  various  oth- 
er proceedings  In  which  the  question  may  appropriately 
be  considered. 

Conflicting  claims  to  priority  as  between  judg- 
ments, mortgages,  and  other  liens  may  be  deter- 
mined on  a  bill  in  equity  for  the  purpose,2  or  in  an 
action  or  suit  for  a  decree  declaring  the  conflicting 
liens  void3  or  plaintiffs  lien  superior,4  or  in  an  ac- 
tion by  one  claimant  against  another  to  fix  relative 
rights,5  or  in  a  suit  to  quiet  title  as  against  an  ad- 


90.  Ark.— Cook  v.    Martin,   87   S.W. 
625,   1024,    75   Ark.   40,   5  Ann.Cas. 
204. 

34  C.J.  p  615  note  2. 

91.  TT.S.— Winchester-Simmons      Co. 
v.    Phillips,    C.C.A.Miss.,    16    F.2d 
109. 

34  C.J.  p  615  note  3. 

92.  HL— Curtis  v.  Root,  28  111.  367. 
34  C.J.  p  615  note  4. 

93.  Pa. — Lentz  v.  Lamplugh,  12  Pa. 
344. 

94.  Ohio. — Maxwell    v.     Holmes,     1 
Ohio  N.P.,N.S.,  13. 

95.  Ala.— Mobile    Branch    Bank    Y. 
Ford,  13  Ala,  431. 

111.— Page  v.  Benson,  22  IU.  484. 
Miss.' — Parks  v.  Person,  Sm.  &  M.Ch. 
76. 

96.  Fa. — Beaver    Falls    Building    & 
Loan   Ass'n   v.    Frolmson,    30    Pa. 
DisL  &  Co.  489. 

34  C.J.  p  616  note  7. 

97.  Pa. — McCiine  v.   McCune,   30  A. 
577,  164  Pa.  611— In  re  McLane,  1 
Pa.Com.Pl.  317. 


W.Va.— Renick  v.  Ludington,  14  W. 
Va.  367. 

98.  Wash.— Smith  v.   De   Lanty,   39 
P.  638,  11  Wash.  386. 

99.  Wash.— Smith  v.  De  Lanty,  su- 
pra. 

34  OJ.  p  616  note  11. 

1.  Pa. — Early   v.   Zeiders,    7   Pa.Co. 
569. 

34  C.J.  p  616  note  12. 

2.  Miss. — Howard    v.    Simmons,    43 
Miss.  75. 

Va. — Irvine  v.  Randolph  Lumber 
Corp.,  69  S.B.  350,  111  Va.  408. 

34  C.J.  p  616  note  13. 

Pleading's  held  sufficient 

Ala. — Johnston  v.  Bates,  95  So.  375, 
209  Ala.  16. 

Petition  held  insufficient 

Ga.— Ivey  v.  Gatlin.  20  S.B.2d  592, 
194  Ga,  27. 

3.  Minn. — Powers  v.  Bunnell,  140  N. 
W.  748,  121  Minn.  152. 

34  C.J.  p  616  note  14. 

4.  Ind.— Bible  v.  Voris,  40  NJJ.  670, 
141  Ind.  569. 

34  C.J.  p  616  note  15. 

940 


Matters  to  be  alleged  and  proved 

Judgment  creditor  whose  judgment 
lien  attached  to  property  after  ven- 
dor's lien  had  been  barred  by  limi- 
tations held  not  required  to  allege 
and  prove  right  as  purchaser  for 
value  without  notice  as  against  ven- 
dors to  whom  reconveyance  was  at- 
tempted after  attachment  of  judg- 
ment lien,  in  attempt  to  revive  ven- 
dor's lien  under  original  note. — Yates 
v.  Darby,  Civ.App.,  103  S.W.2d  1007, 
affirmed  131  S.W.2d  95,  133  Tex.  593. 

5.    Colo. — Larson  v.  Ross,  50  P.  730, 
10  Colo.App.  267. 

Trespass  to  try  title 

Defendants,  in  trespass  to  try  ti- 
tle claiming  as  bona  fide  purchasers 
without  notice  of  judgment  in  favor 
of  plaintiff's  predecessor  in  title,  had 
burden  to  show  that  they  acquired 
land  for  value,  and  without  notice 
of  rendition  of  such  judgment. — Per- 
mian Oil  Co.  v.  Smith,  73  S.W.2d  490, 
129  Tex.  413,  111  A.L.R.  1152,  re- 
hearing denied  107  S.W.2d  564,  129 
Tex.  413,  111  A.L.R,  1152. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


488 


verse  claimant,6  or  on  a  rule  to  show  cause  why  the 
alleged  conflicting  lien  should  not  be  stricken  off,? 
.or  an  issue  framed  between  judgment  creditors  to 
test  the  validity  and  rank  of  their  respective  judg- 
ments,8 or  in  receivership  proceedings,9  or  in  pro- 
ceedings to  distribute  the  funds  raised  by  execution 
sale  of  the  property  affected.10  So  a  judgment  cred- 
itor, if  made  defendant  to  a  mortgage  foreclosure 
suit,  may  set  up  the  priority  of  his  lien  and  have 
it  determined.11  It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment 
creditor's  right  to  assert  priority  over  a  prior  judg- 
ment can  arise  only  on  distribution  of  the  funds 
from  the  sale  of  the. land  on  which  the  lien  is 
claimed.12 

As  a  general  rule  a  question  of  this  kind  should 
be  determined  from  the  records,  and  not  left  to  a 
jury  to  decide  by  extraneous  evidence,13  but  where 
the  issue  is  as  to  the  priority  of  a  judgment  on  a 
note  entered  by  confession,  the  note  having  author- 
ized any  attorney  to  confess  judgment,  it  has  been 
held  proper  to  permit  the  attorney  who  confessed 
the  judgment  to  testify  that  he  possessed  no  au- 
thority not  contained  in  the  note.14  Third  persons 
asserting  title  to  the  property  affected  by  the  judg- 
ment under  a  conveyance  thereof  from  the  judg- 
ment debtor  have  the  burden  of  showing  that  they 


are  innocent  purchasers  without  notice.15  In  a  suit 
to  establish  the  priority  of  a  judgment  lien  over  a 
warranty  deed,  the  burden  is  on  the  judgment  cred- 
itor to  prove,  affirmatively  that  the  deed  from  the 
debtor  was  not  delivered  before  the  transcript  of 
judgment  was  filed,16  and  he  must  prove  his  case 
by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.17 

§  488.    Transfer  of  Property  Subject  to  Lien 

a.  In  general 

b.  Successive  or  contemporaneous  trans- 

fers of  different  tracts 

c.  Subjection    of    vendor's    remaining 

property 

a.  In  General 

The  lien  of  a  Judgment  is  not  affected  by  a  trans- 
fer of  the  property  by  the  judgment  debtor  to  a  pur- 
chaser having  actual  or  constructive  notice  of  the  judg- 
ment. 

According  to  general  principles  and  apart  from 
any  statutory  provisions  to  the  contrary,  when  a 
judgment  lien  has  once  attached  to  land  it  remains 
until  legally  removed,  and  a  purchaser  from  the 
judgment  debtor  who  has,  actual  or  constructive  no- 
tice of  the  judgment  lien  will  take  the  estate 
charged  therewith18  to  the  extent  of  the  amount  of 


6.  Colo.— Floyd  v.  Sellers,  44  P.  373, 
7  Colo.App.  498. 

34  C.J.  p  616  note  17. 
Sufficiency  of  evidence 

In  action  to  quiet  title  wherein 
creditor  claimed  judgment  lien,  evi- 
dence that  party  who  obtained  judg- 
ment against  landowners  was  credi- 
tor's assignee  for  collection  held  not 
to  sustain  finding  that  creditor  did 
not  recover  Judgment  against  land- 
owners.— Weiner  v.  Luscombe,  66  P. 
2d  151,  19  Cal.App.2d  668. 

7.  La.— Merricfc   v.   McCausland,   24 
La. Ann.  256 — Larthet  v.  Hogan,  1 
La. Ann.  330. 

«.    Peu— Duffy  v.  Duffy,  6  Pa.Co.  161 
— Boyd  v.   Roberts,   2   Pa.Co.   535. 
34  C.J.  p  616  note  19. 

9.  Tex. — Murphy    v.    Argonaut    Oil 
Co.,  Com.App.,  23  S.W.2d  339. 

10.  Ga. — Colemau  y.   Slade,   75   Ga. 
61. 

•S.C. — Blohme  v.  Lynch,   2  S.B.  136, 

26  S.C.  300. 
34  C.J.  p  616  note  20. 

11.  Wash.— Book   v.   WUley,    35    P. 
1098,  8  Wash.  267. 

12.  Pa.— First  Nat.   Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  y.  Miller,   186  A.   87,   322  Pa. 
473. 

13.  Miss.— Johnson  v.  Bdde,  58  Miss. 
664— Burney  y.  Boyett,  2  Miss.  39. 

Pa.— Polhemus'  Appeal,  32  Pa.  328 
—Adams  y.  Bete,  1  Watts  425,  26 
Am.D.  79. 


Adndsslbllity  of  judgment 

As  against  strangers,  a  judgment 
is  admissible  in  evidence  as  show- 
ing the  fact  and  time  of  its  rendi- 
tion, when  those  facts  become  mate- 
rial in  fixing  its  rank  in  competi- 
tion with  other  liens. 
U.S. — Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Bouknight, 

S.C.,   70   P.   442,   17   C.C.A.   181,   30 

L.R.A.  823. 
N.J.— Naylor  v.  Mettter,  Ch.,  11  A. 

859. 

14.  Ind.— Bible  v.  Voris,  40  N.E.  670, 
141  Ind.  569. 

15.  Ga.— Ray    v.    Atlanta   Trust    & 
Banking  Co.,  93  S.E.  418,  147  Ga. 
265. 

16.  Iowa. — Richardson  y.  Estle,  243 
NYW.  611,  214  Iowa  1007. 

17.  Iowa. — Richardson  v.  Estle,  su- 
.  pra. 

Evidence  held  sufficient 

To  show  delivery  by  deposit  of 
deed  In  mail  before  transcript  of 
judgment  was  filed. — Richardson  v. 
Estle,  supra. 

18.  Ga. — Carlton  v.  Reeves,  122  S.E. 
320,  157  Ga.  602. 

111.— Erlinger  v.  Freed,  180  N.B.  400, 

347  111.  588. 
La.— Wunderlich  v.  Palmisano,  App., 

177      So.      843 — Thompson-Ritchie 

Grocery  Co.  y.  Gary,  135  So.  707,  17 

La.App.  270. 
Md.— Wilmer  v.  Light  Street  Savings 

941 


6  Building    Ass'n    of    Baltimore 
City,  122  A.  129,  143  Md.  272. 

Miss.-^Gerlach-Barklow    Co.    v.    El- 

lett,  111  So.  92,  145  Miss.   60. 
N.Y.— Newark  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brill, 

7  N.T.S.2d  773. 

NT.C. — Osborne  v.  Board  of  Educa- 
tion of  Guilford  County  ex  rel. 
State,  177  S.E.  642,  207  N.C.  SOS- 
Moses  v.  Major,  160  S.E.  890,  201 
N.C.  613. 

Tex.— Baker  v.  West,  36  S.W.2d  695, 
120  Tex  113. 

34  C.J.  p  616  note  25. 

Priority  between  judgment  and  sub- 
sequent conveyance  see  supra  5 
485  b. 

Discharge  of  lieu 

Under  some  statutes  any  person 
who  has  purchased  real  property, 
in  good  faith  and  for  a  valuable 
consideration,  and  has  been  in  pos- 
session of  the  same  for  four  years, 
holds  it  discharged  from  the  lien 
of  any  judgment  against  his  gran- 
tor.— Reynolds  y.  Hardin,  200  S.E. 
119,  187  Ga,  40—34  C.J.  p  616  note 
25  [nl. 

Sufficiency  of  notice 

Generally  the  purchaser  of  realty 
need  not  look  beyond  judgment  dock- 
et for  liens  thereon,  unless  it  shows 
something  that  should  reasonably 
put  him  on  inquiry,  which  would 
lead  to  knowledge  of  requisite  facts; 
but  he  id  affected  with  notice  of 
whatever  Judgment  record  reasona- 


§  488 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  judgment  as  recorded  at  the  time  of  his  pur- 
chase,19 although  the  amount  of  the  judgment  is 
larger  than  was  represented  to  the  purchaser  by  the 
judgment  debtor  at  the  time  of  the  transfer,2**  un- 
less the  judgment  creditor  will  waive  or  release 
his  lien.21  However,  the  lien  does  not  attach  to 
the  fund  received  from  the  sale.22 

Where  a  judgment  creditor  has  made  an  election 
to  receive  part  of  his  debt  out  of  the  proceeds  from 
the  sale  of  lands  on  which  his  judgment  was  a  prior 
lien,  he  cannot  afterward  enforce  the  lien  against 
the  land,23  and,  where  a  sale  of  the  debtor's  prop- 
erty is  effected  by  order  of  court,  it  is  competent 
to  direct  that  it  shall  be  sold  free  of  encumbrances, 
the  liens  being  then  transferred  to  the  fund.24  A 
purchaser  at  a  sheriff* s  sale  under  the  judgment  will 
succeed  to  the  rights  of  the  judgment  creditor  in 
these  respects.25  The  purchaser  of  property  against 
which  a  judgment  lien  has  attached  does  not  be- 
come personally  liable  for  the  amount  of  the  lien,26 
even  though  the  amount  of  the  lien  was  considered 
by  him  in  fixing  the  price  he  was  willing  to  pay.27 
However,  where  the  lien  attaches  to  personalty,  a 
purchaser  of  the  personalty  who  removes  it  from 
the  county  where  the  lien  attached  may  be  liable  to 
the  judgment  creditor  for  thereby  defeating  the 
lien.2*  It  is  not  within  the  power  of  the  judgment 
debtor  to  defeat  or  displace  the  judgment  lien  by 
repudiating  the  title  or  attorning  to  a  third  per- 


son,29 or  otherwise  transferring  his  interest,  to 
which  the  judgment  lien  has  attached.30  A  convey- 
ance expressly  subject  to  the  lien  of  all  mortgages, 
attachments,  and  judgments  of  record  is  subject 
only  to  such  judgments  of  record  at  the  time  of 
the  transfer  which  are  valid  liens.81 

Land  held  in  trust.  Under  some  statutes  a  judg- 
ment against  a  debtor  attaches  to  land  conveyed 
by  him  to  another  to  be  held  in  trust  for  him  and 
is  superior  to  a  mortgage  subsequently  executed  by 
the  debtor.32 

b.  Successive  or  Contemporaneous  Transfers  of 
Different  Tracts 

Where  property  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  Judgment 
(s  sold  or  encumbered  by  the  debtor  at  different  times 
to  different  persons,  the  general  rule  Is  that  there  is  no 
contribution  among  the  successive  purchasers  and  the 
property  is  liable  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Judgment  In 
the  inverse  order  of  alienation. 

Although  there  are  some  decisions  to  the  con- 
trary,83 where  lands  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judg- 
ment have  been  sold  or  encumbered  by  the  owner  at 
different  times  to  different  purchasers,  the  general 
rules  is  that  there  is  no  contribution  among  the  suc- 
cessive purchasers,  but  the  various  tracts  are  liable 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  judgment  in  the  inverse 
order  of  their  alienation  or  encumbrance,  the  land 
last  sold  being  first  chargeable,34  even  though  the 
last  purchaser  secures  a  conveyance  before  the  first 


bly  suggests,  and  notice  naturally 
leading  investigator  to  discovery  oJ 
judgment  and  debtor's  identity  is 
sufficient. — Lambert  v.  K-T  Transp, 
Co..  172  A.  180,  182  Pa.Super.  82. 
Assignment  of  interest  in  estate 

A  voluntary  assignment  by  heir 
to  another  heir  of  his  interest  in  an 
estate,  prior  to  institution  of  probate 
proceedings  wherein  estate  was  sub- 
sequently probated  and  wherein  in- 
terest assigned  was  distributed  to 
assignee,  did  not  exclude  judgment 
lien  against  interest  of  assignor  in 
property,  obtained  prior  to  assign- 
ment.— Walters  Motor  Co.  v.  Mus- 
grove,  75  P.2d  471,  181  Okl.  540. 
Improvements  fey  purchaser 
La.— Glass  v.  Ives,  126  So.  69,  169 

La.  809. 
34  aj.  p  616  note  25  [k]. 

1*.    N.T.— Haverly  v.  Becker,  4  N.Y. 

169. 
W.Va.— Bensimer    v.    Fell,    12    S.B. 

1078.    35    W.Va.     15,    29    Am.S.R. 

774, 

20.  N.Y.— Hfcverly  v.  Becker,  4  N.Y. 
169. 

21.  Colo. — Freeman  v.  Brockway,  50 
P.  32,  24  Colo.  441. 

N.Y.— Davis  v.  Tiffany,  1  Hill  642. 
34  C.J.  p  617  note  28. 


22.    Va,— Jones    v.    Hall,    15    S.E.2d 

108,  177  Va.  658. 
34  C.J.  p  617  note  29. 

Sale  of  timber 

Where  judgment  debtor  sold  tim- 
ber which  was  cut  and  removed  and 
judgment  creditor,  although  living 
within  about  five  hundred  yards 
of  the  timber,  took  no  steps  to  pre- 
vent its  removal,  and  there  was  no 
fraud  or  collusion  by  judgment  debt- 
or and  purchaser  of  the  timber,  and 
subsequently  Judgment  debtor's  land 
which  was  sold  by  other  creditors 
did  not  bring  sufficient  amount  to 
pay  judgment  creditor,  the  Judgment 
creditor  was  not  entitled  to  recover 
from  purchaser  amount  of  proceeds 
of  the  sale  of  timber  which  had 
been  paid  by  the  purchaser  to  judg- 
ment debtor. — Jones  v.  Hall,  supra. 

33.    Va. — Effinger  v.   Kenney,   23    S. 

B.  742,  92  Va.  245. 
34  C.J.  p  618  note  SO. 

24.  Minn. — Nelson  v.   Jenks,    52   N. 
W.  1081,  51  Minn.  108. 

S.C.— Garvin  v.  Garvin,  1  S.C.  55. 

25.  S.C.— Hart  v.  Felder,   4   S.C.Bq. 
202. 

14  C.J.  p  618  note  32. 

942 


26.  Mo.— Vogelstein  v.  Athletic  Min- 
ing Co.,  App.,  192  S.W.  760. 

34  C.J.  p  618  note  33. 

27.  Neb. — Lexington    Bank    v.    Sal- 
ling,  92  N.W.  318,  66  Neb.  180. 

34  C.J.  p  618  note  34. 

28.  Ala.— Haynes  Mercantile  Co.   v. 
Bell,    50   So.   311,   163   Ala.   326. 

29.  Ind.— Hawkins  v.  State,  25  N.B. 
818,  125  Ind.  570. 

34  C.J.  p  618  note  36. 

30.  Ga.— Kidd  v.  Kidd,   124  S.B.  45, 
158  Ga.  540,  36  A.L.R.   798— Fore- 
man v.  Pattison,   160   S.B.   662,   43 
Ga.App.    819— Ritchie    &   Wells    v. 
Irvin,  139  S.B.  910,  37  Ga.App.  280. 

Wash.— Heath   v.    Dodson,    110    P.2d 
845,  7  Wash.2d  667. 

31.  Ariz. — Security  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank   v.    McClure,    241   P.   515,    29 
Ariz.  325. 

32.  Ind. — Yarlott  v.  Brown,  149  N.B. 
921,  86  Ind.App.  479. 

33.  Iowa,— Massie     v.     Wilson,     16 
Iowa  390. 

34  C.J.  p  618  notes  37,  38. 

34.  Tex. — Nichols    v.    Cansler,    Civ. 
App.f    140    &W.2d    254,    error    dis- 
missed, judgment  correct. 

34  C.J.  p  618  note  39. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


488 


purchaser,35  and  although  the  lands  conveyed  were 
acquired  by  the  judgment  debtor  at  different  times 
and  from  different  sources,36  unless  the  order  of 
liability  is  affected  by  the  conduct  of  a  purchas- 
er37 or  is  broken  by  a  voluntary  release  by  the  judg- 
ment creditor  of  one  or  more  of  the  tracts.3^ 

It  has  been  held  that  the  release  of  the  lien  on  a 
portion  subsequently  conveyed  will  not  discharge  the 
lien  on  a  portion  previously  conveyed,  unless  the 
judgment  creditor  is  distinctly  notified  before  the 
release  of  the  prior  conveyance,  and  cautioned 
against  doing  any  act  by  which  the  rights  of  the 
grantee  in  such  prior  conveyance  will  be  dimin- 
ished.39 A  judgment  creditor,  having  released  or 
by  his  conduct  waived  or  lost  his  right  to  subject  the 
land  first  liable  to  satisfy  his  judgment,  is  not  en- 
titled to  subject  the  lands  next  liable  for  the  whole 
amount  of  his  judgment,  but  only  for  the  balance 
after  crediting  thereon  the  value  of  the  land  first 
liable.40  Where  the  judgment  creditor  himself  be- 
comes the  owner  of  one  of  the  tracts  of  land  liable 
to  the  lien  of  his  judgment,  the  other  having  been 
sold  to  a  third  person,  he  cannot  release  his  own 
tract,  with  the  effect  of  throwing  the  entire  burden 
of  the  judgment  upon  that  held  by  such  third  per- 
son.41 

Where  the  different  parcels  of  land  are  sold 
contemporaneously,  they  must  contribute  pro  rata 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  judgment42 

c.  Subjection  of  Vendor's  Remaining  Property 

While  the  sale  of  property  to  which  a  judgment  lien 


has  attached  does  not  divest  the  lien,  ordinarily  the  Judg- 
ment creditor  must  enforce  his  lien  first  against  prop- 
erty remaining  In  the  hands  of  the  debtor. 

Although  a  judgment  lien  is  not  divested  by  the 
subsequent  sale  or  encumbrance  of  the  land,  where 
only  part  of  the  judgment  debtor's  land  has  been 
sold43  or  mortgaged,44  the  general  rule  is  that  eq- 
uity will  require  the  judgment  creditor  seeking  to 
enforce  his  lien  to  proceed  first  against  that  por- 
tion remaining  unsold  or  unencumbered,  provided 
this  can  be  done  without  injustice  to  him  and  with- 
out involving  him  in  litigation  or  danger  of  loss,45 
and  the  rule  extends  to  a  purchaser  of  the  remain- 
ing land  from  the  debtor.4^  If  there  is  not  suffi- 
cient land  of  the  debtor  remaining  unsold  to  satisfy 
the  judgment  entirely,  the  creditor  is  entitled  in 
equity  to  resort  to  the  land  of  the  purchaser  or  en- 
cumbrancer to  the  extent  only  of  his  debt  which 
may  remain  unpaid  after  the  estate  of  the  debtor 
has  been  exhausted.47 

Where  part  of  the  land  has  been  mortgaged  and 
part  aliened  in  fee,  the  judgment  creditor  must  first 
proceed  to  sell  the  debtor's  equity  of  redemption  in 
the  mortgaged  lands  before  coming  on  the  property 
conveyed  in  fee.4 8  One  who  purchases  land  charged 
with  the  lien  of  a  judgment,  which  is  specifically 
except ed  from  the  covenants  of  warranty  in  the 
deed,  cannot  insist  that  his  grantor's  chattels  shall 
be  exhausted  before  such  land  is  sold  for  the  satis- 
faction of  an  execution  on  the  judgment.49  If  a 
judgment  creditor  voluntarily  releases  the  debtor's 
remaining  property,  of  sufficient  value  to  satisfy  the 


35.  N.Y.— Northrup    v.    Metcalf,    11 
Paige  570. 

Va.— -Rodgers  v.  M'Cluer,  4  Gratt.  81, 
45  Va.  81,  47  Am.D.  715. 

36.  Tenn. — Meek    v.    Thompson,    42 
S.W.  685,  99  Tenn.  732. 

37.  Ind. — Jenkins  v.  Craig,  52  N.E. 
423,  22  Ind.App.  192,  rehearing  de- 
nied 53  N.E.   427,   22  Ind.App.  192. 

34  C.J.  p  619  note  42. 

38.  N.C.—- Brown  v.  HaMing,    83   S. 
B.    1010,    170    N.C.    253,    Ann.Cas. 
1917C  548. 

Pa. — Snyder  v.  Crawford,  98  Pa.  414 
— Davis  v.  Wood,  1  Del.  Co.  382. 

39.  Pa. — Snyder  v.  Crawford,  98  Pa. 
414. 

40.  111.— Hurd  v.  Baton,  28  111.  122. 
N.T.-r-James    v.    Hubbard,    1    Paige 

228. 

Va.— Jones  v.  Myrick,   8  Gratt.  179, 
49  Va.  179. 

41.  N.C. — Wilson  v.  Beaufort  Coun- 
ty  Lumber   Co.,    42    S.B.   565,    131 
N.C.  163. 


43.    Ga. — Bleishel   v.   House,   52   Ga. 

60. 
Va. — Harman  v.  Obercjprfer,  S3  Gratt 

497,  74  Va.  497. 

43.  La. — Crichton  Co.  v.  Turner,  111 
So.  261,  162  La.  864. 

N.C. — Page    Trust    Co.    v.    Godwin, 

130  S.B.  323,  190  N.C.  512. 
34  C.J.  p  619  note  49. 
Duty  of  purchaser  to  protect  him- 
self 

A  judgment  creditor  owes  no  duty 
to  a  terre-tenant  of  land  bound  by 
his  judgment  to  prosecute  his  judg- 
ment against  other  lands.  The  terre- 
tenant  can  protect  himself  either  by 
giving  proper  notice  of  demand  that 
the  creditor  proceed  first  against 
other  property  of  the  debtor,  or 
by  obtaining  an  assignment  of  the 
judgment  to  himself.  If  the  terre- 
tenant  does  nothing  to  protect  him- 
self, he  is  not  in  position  to  object 
when  the  creditor  proceeds  against 
the  lands  which  he  holds. — Ruff  v. 
Barclay-Westmoreland  Trust  Co.,  79 
Pa. Super.  370. 

44.  N.C. — Brown  v.  Harding,   86   S. 

943 


B.    1010,    170    N.C.    253,    Ann.Cas. 

1917C  548. 

34  C.J.  p  619  note  50. 
Conventional  mortgage 

Law  requiring  judgment  creditor 
to  exhaust  debtor's  remaining  prop- 
erty before  reverting  to  that  con- 
veyed is  not  applicable  to  conven- 
tional mortgages. — Crichton  Co.  v. 
Turner,  111  So.  261,  162  La.  864. 

45.  N.C. — Brown  v.   Harding,    86   S. 
B.    1010,    170    N.C.    253,    Ann.Cas. 
1917C    548— Jackson    v.    Sloan,    76 
N.C.  306. 

S.C.— Clark  v.   Wright,    24    S.C.   526. 

46.  N.C. — Brown  Y.  Harding,  86  SJS. 
1010,   170  N.C.   253,   Ann.Cas.l917C 
548. 

47.  Va. — Blakemore  v.  Wise,  28  S.B. 
332,  95  Va.  269,  64  Am.S.R.  781. 

34  C.J.  p  619  note  53. 

48.  Va. — McClung     v.     Beirne,     10 
Leigh   394,    87   Va.    394,    34   Am.D. 
739. 

0.    Neb.— Wollam  v.  Brandt,   76  N. 
W.  1081,  56  Neb.  527. 


§  489. 


JUDGMENTS 


49    CJ.S. 


judgment,  he  cannot  proceed  against  the  portion 
previously  conveyed.50 

§  489.    Duration  of  Lien 

a.  In  general 

b.  Duration  as  against  judgment  debt- 

or 

a.  In  General 

A  judgment  lien  ordinarily  ceases  to  exist  after  the 
expiration  of  the  time  fixed  by  statute  for  its  continu- 
ance. 


Where  no  period  of  time  is  provided  by  statute 
for  the  continuance  of  the  lien  of  a  judgment,  the 
lien  ceases  when  the  right  to  sue  out  execution  on 
the  judgment  or  to  revive  it  by  scire  facias  is  barred 
by  the  statute  of  limitations:51  In  most  jurisdic- 
tions, however,  the  period  during  which  a  judgment 
continues  to  be  a  lien  is  restricted  by  express  stat- 
ute to  a  fixed  number  of  years  after  the  rendition  or 
docketing  of  the  judgment,52  and,  unless  the  time 
for  the  duration  of  the  lien  has  been  extended,  as 
considered  infra  §§  492-498,  the  lien  ceases  to  exist 
after  the  lapse  of  the  statutory  period,5^  although 


50.  La. — Crichton  Co.  v.  Turner,  111 
So.  261,  162  La.  864. 

51.  N.M. — Pugh      V.       Heating      & 
Plumbing  Finance  Corp.,  161  P.2d 
714,  49  N.M.  234. 

Tex. — Oakwood  State  Bank  of  Oak- 
wood  v.  Durham,  Civ.App.,  21  S.W. 
2d  586. 

34  C.J.  P  620  note  56. 

Time: 

For  revival   of   Judgment   see   in- 
fra §  542. 

Within    which    execution   may    is- 
sue see  Executions  §  66. 

52.  U.S. — Spurway     v.     Dyer,     B.C. 
Fla.,  48  F.Supp.  255. 

Ala.— McClintock  v.  McEachin,  20  So. 
2d  711,  246  Ala,  412— W.  T.  Rsuw- 
leigh  Co.  v.  Patterson,  195  So.  729, 
239  Ala.  309 — Second  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Allgood,  176  So.  363,  234  Ala,  654. 

Gal. — Long  v.  Thompson,  113  P-2d 
698,  45  Cal.App.2d  161. 

Colo. — Davis  Bros.  Drug  Co.  v.  Coun- 
ter, 225  P.  245,  75  Colo.  239. 

D.C. — Ginder  v.  Giuffrida,  62  F.2d 
877,  61  AppJD.C.  338. 

Fla.— B.  A.  Lott  Inc.  v.  Padgett,  14 
So.2d  667,  153  Fla,  304. 

HL— Normal  State  Bank  v.  Killian, 
48  N.B.2d  212,  318  IlLApp.  637,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  54  N.E. 
2d  539,  386  111.  449— Motel  v.  An- 
dracki,  19  N.E.2d  832,  299  Ill.App. 
166. 

Ind. — Town  of  New  Chicago  v.  First 
State  Bank  of  Hobart,  169  N.E. 
56,  90  IndiApp.  643. 

La.— State  ex  rel.  Federal  Land  Bank 
of  New  Orleans  v.  Bullock,  App., 
145  So.  380. 

Mo. — State  ex  rel.  McGhee  v.  Bau- 
mann,  160  S.W.2d  697.  349  Mo. 
232. 

K.C. — Sansom  v.  Johnson,  193  S.E. 
272,  212  N.C.  383. 

N.D.— Groth  v.  Ness,  260  N.W.  700, 
65  N.D.  580 — Lenhart  v.  Lynn,  194 
N.W.  937,  50  N.D.  87. 

Pa. — First  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  .v. 
Miller,  186  A.  87,  322  Pa.  473— 
Raub  Supply  Co.  v.  Brandt  Com. 
PL,  '27  DeLCo.  507— First  Nat 
Bank  v.  Coll*  Com.  PL,  59  York  Leg. 
Rec,  44. 


S.D. — McMahon  v.  Brown,  279  N.W. 
538,  66  S.D.  134. 

34  C.J.  p  620  note  57. 

tfot  ordinary  statute  of  limitations 

U.S.— In  re  Levinson.  I>.C.Wash., 
5  F.2d  75. 

Idaho. — Platts  v.  Pacific  First  Feder- 
al Savings  &  Loan  Assfn  of  Ta- 
coma,  111  P.2d  1093,  62  Idaho  340. 

111.— Smith  v.  Toman,  14  N.B.2d  478, 
368  111.  414,  118  A.L.R.  924. 

Wash. — Roche  v.  McDonald,  239  P. 
1015,  136  Wash.  322,  44  A.L.R. 
444. 

34  C.J.  P  620  note  57  [a],  p  624  note 
83. 

In  Georgia 

(1)  Under  Code  §  110-511,  and  sim- 
ilar statutes,  where  any  person  has 
in  good  faith  and  for  valuable  con- 
sideration   purchased    real    or    per- 
sonal property,  and  has  been  in  pos- 
session   of    it    for    four   years,    the 
property   shall    be    discharged    from 
the  lien  of  any  judgment  against  the 
person  from   whom  he  purchased. — 
Page  v.  Jones,   198   S.B.  63,  186  Ga. 
485 — 34   C.J.   p   620   note  57   [e]    (1). 

(2)  Statute  is  for  benefit  of  buyer 
and    not    vendor. — Calhoun    v.    Wil- 
liamson, 18  S.B.2d  479,  193  Ga.  314. 

(3)  Conveyance    in    payment    and 
discharge  of  existing  debt  is  "valu- 
able consideration."— Calhoun  v.  Wil- 
liamson, supra. 

(4)  Personal  residence  on  the  pur- 
chased 'realty    is    not    necessary.— 
Page  v.  Jones,  198  S.E.  63,  186  Ga. 
485. 

(5)  Possession    by    defendant     in 
fieri    facias    as    tenant   of   the   pur- 
chaser will  not  per  se  prevent  the 
possession  from  being-  that  required 
by  the  statute,  but  is  merely  a  cir- 
cumstance for  the   consideration   of 
the  jury  in  determining  bona  fides  of 
the  transaction  or  the  possession. — 
Page  v.  Jones,  supra — 34  C.J.  p  620 
note  57  [e]   (3). 

(6)  Where   defendant   in   fieri   fa- 
cias   was    parent    of    claimant    and 
resided  with  claimant   on   premises, 
whether  possession  was  held  joint- 
ly by   both   or  severally  by   either, 
and,  if  severally,  which  of  the  two 
had   possession   and   exercised   acts 

944 


of  ownership  over  the  property,  was 
for  jury. — Page  v.  Jones,  supra. 

(7)  Possession     must     be     actual, 
open,   notorious,   in   good   faith,   and 
exclusive,    and    to    make    possession 
such  as  would  displace  lien  of  the 
judgment    some    sort    of    notice    of 
adverse    possession    should    appear, 
or   at    least    such   circumstances  •  as 
to  put  the  plaintiff  in  fieri  facias  on 
inquiry,    such    as    visible    signs    of 
dominion. — Page    v.    Jones,    supra — 
34  C.J.  p  620  note  57  [el   (4). 

(8)  SVicts    that   defendant   in   fieri 
facias    exercised   acts   of   ownership 
over    premises,    even    though    with 
consent  of  claimant  and  that  actual 
holding  by  defendant  was  at  least  as 
much  for  defendant  as  for  claimant, 
would  not  authorize  finding  of  pos- 
session required  by  statute.— Page  v. 
Jones,  198  S.B.  63,  186  Ga.  485. 

(9)  Lien  of  judgment  was  not  di- 
vested by  four  years  of  possession 
where    person   in   possession    during 
such  time  did  not  have  title. — Games 
v,  American  Agr.  Chemical  Co.,  123 
S.B.  18,  158  Ga.  188. 

(10)  Knowledge    of    existence    of 
judgment   against   grantor,    did   not, 
standing  alone,  constitute  prima  fa- 
cie  evidence   of  mala  fides   on  part 
of    grantee,    if    transaction    was    in 
good  faith,  but  such  knowledge  was 
a    circumstance    which   Jury    should 
consider  along  with  other   evidence 
bearing  on  question  of  good  faith; 
statute    places    burden    of    proving 
good   faith   on   purchaser,    but   does 
not  encumber  purchaser  with  further 
burden  of  making  such  proof  while 
bearing   badge   of   fraud   solely   be- 
cause he  purchased  with  knowledge 
of     existence     of    lien. — Hardin     v. 
Reynolds,  6  S.E.2d  913,  189  Ga.  589. 

(11)  Other  cases  see  34  C.J.  p  620 
note  57  [e]. 

53.    Ariz. — Serasio  v.  Sears,  121  P.2d 

639,  58  Ariz.  522. 
Ark. — Lion  Oil  Refining  Co.  v.  Rex 

Oil  Co..   115   S.W.2d  556,   195  Ark* 

1021. 
Fla.— B.  A.  Lott,  Inc.,  v.  Padgett,  14 

So.2d  667,  153  Fla.  304. 
Md.— O'Neill  &  Co.  v,  Schulze,  7  A* 

2d  263,  177  Md.  64. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


the  duration  of  the  lien  is  fixed  at  a  period  much 
shorter  than  that  barring  action  on  the  judgment  it- 
self.54 The  time  fixed  by  statute  may  not  be  short- 
ened55 or  prolonged56  by  the  courts,  and,  as  con- 
sidered infra  §  510,  the  lien  cannot  be  enforced 
in  equity  after  it  has  ceased  to  be  enforceable  at  law 
by  the  expiration  of  the  statutory  period. 

A  statute  limiting  the  life  of  a  judgment  lien  docs 
not  apply  to  a  decree  establishing  a  specific  lien  on 
particular  property  or  ordering  its  sale57  or  to  a 
judgment  or  decree  for  the  foreclosure  of  a  mort- 
gage.58 

Application  of  statute  to  existing  judgments.  A 
statute  abridging  the  time  for  the  duration  of  judg- 
ment liens  may  constitutionally  apply  to  existing 
judgments,  where  a  reasonable  time  is  accorded  to 
the  holders  of  such  judgments  in  which  to  enforce 
their  liens.59  However,  it  has  been  held  that  such 
a  statute  cannot  apply  to  an  existing  judgment 
where  the  whole  of  the  new  period  of  limitation 
would  have  run  before  the  passage  of  the  act,  so 
that  its  lien  would  instantly  be  cut  off.60 

Judgments  in  -favor  of  state.    Statutes  limiting  the 


time  during  which  a  judgment  lien  shall  continue 
to  exist  have  been  held  to  be  applicable  to  judg- 
ments in  favor  of  the  state,61  although  there  is 
some  contrary  authority.62 

Transfer  of  judgment  to  another  court  or  coun- 
ty. Where  a  judgment  is  transferred  from  an  in- 
ferior to  a  superior  court  for  purposes  of  lien,  or 
a  transcript  of  it  is  filed  in  another  county,  it  is  the 
rule  in  some  states  that  the  statutory  period  be- 
gins to  run  against  the  lien  of  the  judgment  from 
the  date  of  such  transfer  or  filing,6^  but  in  other 
jurisdictions  the  lien  runs  from  the  date  of  the  orig- 
inal rendition  or  docketing  of  the  judgment,  nothing 
being  -added  to  its  duration  by  the  transfer.64 

Laches  as  barring  lien.  It  has  been  held  that  the 
lien  cannot  be  barred  by  the  equitable  doctrine  of 
laches.65 

b.  Duration  as  agains*  Judgment  Debtor 

Under  some  statutes  the  Hen  of  a.  judgment  continues 
against  the  judgment  debtor  although  it  may  have  ex- 
pired as  against  subsequent  purchasers  or  encum- 
brancers. 

Under  some  statutes  it  has  been  held  that,  al- 


Mo.— Woods  v.  Wilson,  108  S.W.2d 
12,  341  Mo.  479. 

Mont. — Marlowe  v.  Missoula  Gas  Co., 
219  P.  1111,  68  Mont.  372. 

Neb.— Rich  v.  Cooper,  286  N.W.  383, 
136  Neb.  463. 

N.C.— Cheshire  v.  Drake,  27  S.E.2d 
627,  223  N.C.  577— Lupton  v.  Ed- 
mundson,  16  S.E.2d  840,  220  N.C. 
188 — Barnes  v.  Cherry,  130  S.E. 
611,  190  N.C.  772. 

Olcl. — Burton  v.  Grissom,  238  P.  451, 
116  Okl.  46. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Delsman 
v.  Wilcox,  237  P.  973,  115  Or.  501. 

Pa.— Cusano  v.  Rubolino,  39  A.2d  906, 
351  Pa.  41 — Sanner  v.  Unique 
Lodge  No.  3,  Knights  of  Pythias 
of  Rockwood,  37  A.2d  576,  349  Pa, 
523 — Lewis  v.  Puchy,  44  Pa.Dist.  & 
Co.  482,  90  Pittsb.Leg.J.  259,  56 
York  Leg.Rec.  69 — In  re  Becker's 
Estate,  43  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  132,  58 
Montg.Co.  95 — Klein  v.  Anderson, 
39  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  139 — Curtze  v. 
Ostrow,  40  Pa-Dist  &  Co.  697,  22 
Erie  Co.  256 — In  re  Jeffries'  Estate, 
35  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  11,  19  Wash.Co. 
32 — Citizens  Bank  of  Barnsboro  v. 
Variali,  18  Pa,Dist  &  Co.  315— 
Bytheway  v.  Hill,  Com.Pl.,  24 
West.Co.L.J.  36— First  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Coll,  Com.PL,  59  Tork  Leg.Rec. 
44. 

S.C.— Harvey  v.  Gibson,  2  S.E.2d  385, 
190  S.C.  98. 

Tenn. — Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick  Co.,  30 
S,W.2d  253,  161  Tenn.  298. 

Tex. — Jackson  v.  Wallace,  ConxApp., 
49  C.J.S.-60 


252  S.W.  745— Burton  Lingo  Co.  v. 

Warren,    Civ.App.,    45    S.W.2d    750, 

error  refused. 
W.Va. — Robertson   v.    Campbell,    186 

S.E.  310,  117  W.Va.  576. 
34  C.J.  p  620  note  57,  p  622  note  75. 
Date   of  acquisition   of  property 

Judgment  lien  attaches  when  the 
judgment  is  docketed  and  continues 
for  five  years  from  such  docketing, 
and  does  not  continue  for  five  years 
from  the  time  of  subsequently  ac- 
quiring land,  under  some  statutes. — 
McGrath  v.  Kaelin,  225  P.  34,  66  Cal. 
App.  41. 

54.  Mont. — Marlowe  v.  Missoula  Gas 
Co.,  219  P.  1111,  68  Mont.  372. 

55.  Colo. — Davis   Bros.  Drug  Co.  v. 
Counter,  225  P.  245,   75  Colo.   239. 

56.  Ala. — I.  Trager  Co.  v.  Mixon,  157 
So.  80,  229  Ala.  371. 

Ind.— Petrovitch  v.  Witholm,  152  INT. 
E.  849,  85  Ind.App.  144.  , 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in,  Dels- 
man  v.  Wilcox,  237  P.  973,  115  Or. 

.     501. 

34  C.J.  p  621  note  58. 

57.  Neb. — Stanton  v.  Stanton,  18  N. 
•    W.2d  654,  146  Neb.  71. 

34  C.J.  p  621  note  62. 
Judgment  perfecting  mechanic's  lien 
Mo. — Rosenzweig    v.    Ferguson,    158 
S.W.Sd    124,    348    Mo.    1144. 

58.  N.T. — Wing  v.  De  la  Rionda,  25 
N.E.  1064,  125  N.T.  678. 

59.  S.C.— Henry    v.    Henry,    9    S.E. 
726,  31  S.C.  1. 

34  C.J.  p  621  note  66. 

945 


Lien  of  judgment  as  vested  right 
see  Constitutional  Law  S  271  b. 

60.  Va« — Merchants'  Bank  v.  Ballou, 
32  S.E.  481,  98  Va,  112,  81  Am.S.R. 
715,  44  L.R.A.  306. 

34  C.J.  p  622  note  67. 

Constitutionality  of  retrospective 
laws  affecting  'remedies  generally 
see  Constitutional  Law  §§  256-273, 
418. 

Impairment  of  obligation  of  contract 
by  laws  relating  to  judgment  liens 
see  Constitutional  Law  §  408.* 

61.  U.S:— II.  S.  v.  Harpootlian,  C.C. 
A.N.Y.,  24  P.2d  646. 

111.— Smith  v.  Toman,  14  N.E.2d  478, 

368  111.  414,   118  A.L.R.  924. 
34  C.J.  p  621  note  65. 

62.  Pa. — McKeehan      v.      Common- 
wealth, 3  Pa.  151 — Commonwealth 
v.  Graziadei,  Quar.Sess.,  92  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  35. 

34  C.J.  p  621  note  64. 

63.  Iowa. — Rand  v.  Garner,  39  N.W. 
515,  75  Iowa  311. 

34  C.J.  p  574  note  47,  p  622  note  69. 

64.  Colo.— Davis  Bros.   Drug  Co.  v. 
Counter,   225   P.  245,   75   Colo.   239. 

N.J.— Twist   v.   Woerst,    127   A.    578, 

101  N.J.Law  7. 
34  C.J.  p  574  note  48,  p*622  note  70.  . 

65.  W.Va. — Cunningham     v.     Birch 
River   Lumber   Co.,    109    S.B.    251, 
89  W.Va.  326. 

Laches  in  issuing  execution  see  In- 
fra §  493. 


I  490 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


though  the  lien  of  a  judgment  may  have  expired  as 
against  subsequent  purchasers  or  encumbrancers,  by 
the  lapse  of  the  statutory  period,  it  will  still  contin- 
ue, the  judgment  remaining  unsatisfied,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  levying  execution  against  the  judgment  debt- 
or or  his  heirs  or  devisees,66  or  a  grantee  without 
valuable  consideration.67  Other  statutes  confine  the 
execution,  under  such  circumstances,  to  the  person- 
al property  of  the  debtor.68 

|  490.    As  against  Junior  Judgments 

When  the  period  of  limitations  has  run  against  a 
judgment  lien,  it  yields  to  junior  Judgments. 

When  the  period  of  limitations  has  run  against 
the  lien -of  a  judgment,  without  its  revival,  it 'gives 
way  to  junior  judgments,  which  thereupon  succeed, 
in  their  order,  to  its  priority.69 

§  491.    Death  of  Judgment  Debtor 

A  judgment  lien  attaching  to  the  lands  of  a  judg- 
ment debtor  during  his  lifetime  continues  against  such 
lands  for  the  same  length  of  time  as  though  he  had  re- 
mained In  life,  unless  some  contrary  provision  is  made 
by  statute. 


A  judgment  lien  obtained  against  a  debtor  during 
his  lifetime  ordinarily  continues  against  his  lands  in 
the  hands  of  his  heirs  or  devisees  for  the  same 
length  of  time  as  though  he  had  remained  in  life.70 
In  some  jurisdictions,  however,  statutory  provisions 
have  been  enacted  which  extend  or  restrict  the  lien 
after  the  death  of  the  judgment  debtor,71  such  as  a 
provision  that  no  lien  on  the  realty  of  decedent  shall 
remain  for  more  than  a  year  after  his  death,  unless 
within  such  period  an  action  for  the  recovery  of 
the  debt  shall  be  brought  against  the  executor  or 
administrator  of  decedent  and  such  action  shall  be 
indexed,  etc.,72  or  a  provision  that  all  judgment 
liens  shall  continue  to  bind  the  real  estate  of  de- 
cedent during  the  term  of  five  years  from  his  death, 
and  after  the  expiration  of  five  years  the  judgments 
shall  not  continue  liens  on  decedent's  realty,  unless 
revived  by  scire  facias,  or  otherwise,73  or  a  provi- 
sion that,  when  the  judgment  creditor  is  delayed  be- 
cause of  the  death  of  defendant  either  from  issuing 
execution  or  selling  thereon,  the  time  he  is  so  de- 
layed is  not  to  be  considered  as  a  part  of  the  stat- 
utory period  during  which  the  lien  continues.74  To 


66.  Pa.— -Klein   v.   Anderson,    39   Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  139. 

34  C.J.  p  622  notes  71.  72. 

67.  N.Y.— Mohawk    Bank    v.    Atwa- 
ter,  2  Paige  54. 

68.  U.S.— Davis     v.     Davis,     W.Va., 
174  F.  786,  98  C.C.A.  494. 

Pa.— Miller  v.  Miller,   23  A.  841,   147 

Pa.  545,  548. 
Property    subject    to    execution    see 

Executions  §§   18-55. 

69.  Iowa. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in. 
Johnson    v.    Keir,     261    N.W.    792, 
795,  220  Iowa  69. 

34  CUT.  p  622  note  77. 

Decree  canceling'  Judgment  operat- 
ing as  judicial  mortgage  because  not 
timely  reinscribed  was  held  too 
broad,  and  should  have  been  limited 
to  cancellation  as  far  as  judgment 
operated  as  judgment  on  property 
in  which  relator  held  mortgage. — 
State  ex  rel.  Federal  Land  Bank  of 
New  Orleans  v.  Bullock,  La.App., 
145  So.  380. 
Expiration,  of  period  after  filing  an- 


Where  junior  judgment  creditor 
filed  bill  to  enforce  lien  and  senior 
judgment  creditor  answered  the  bill 
prior  to  expiration  of  the  period  of 
limitations,  the  subsequent  expira- 
tion of  the  limitation  period  did  not 
subordinate  the  lien  of  the  senior 
judgment  creditor. — Grinder  v.  Giuf- 
frida,  62  P.2d  877,  61  App.D.C.  338. 
70.  Cal. — Corporation  of  America  v. 

Marks,     73    P.2d    $215,    10    Cal.2d 

218,  114  A.L.R.  1162. 
Mo.— Grace   v.   Lee,   57   S.W.2d  1095, 

227  Mo.App.  766 — King:  v.  Hayes,  9 

S.W.2d  538,   223   Mo.App.  138. 


Neb.— Coipns  Juris  cited  in  Rich  v. 

Cooper,     286    N.W.    383.    385,  .136 

Neb.  463. 

34  C.J.  p  622  note  78. 
Judgment  against: 

Ancestor  as  lien  on  lands  in  hands 
of  heirs  see  Descent  and  Dis- 
tribution §  125  c. 

Executor  or  administrator  as  lien 
see    Executors    and   Administra- 
tors §   804. 
Presenting    claim    for    allowance    of 

judg  :ient  against  decedent  see  Ex- 
ecutors and  Administrators  §  398  c. 
71.     Fla. — Gilpen  v.  Bower,  12   So.2d 

884,  152  Fla.  733. 
Pa. — In   re   Higgins'   Estate,    188   A. 

831,  325  Pa.  106. 
34  C.J.  p  623  note  79. 
Scire  facias 

Bights  of  a  judgment  creditor 
claiming  a  lien  on  realty  in  the 
hands  of  a  decedent's  heirs  can  be 
determined  on  a  scire  facias  against 
the  heirs  and  such  rights  cannot 
be  summarily  fixed  by  a  proceeding 
against  the  administrator. — In  re 
Goeckel's  Estate,  198  A.  504,  131  Pa. 
Super.  36. 

Revival  of  lien  in  circuit  court 
Mo. — Wolford   v.    Scarbrough,    21    S. 

W.2d  777,  224  Mo.App.  137. 

73.  Pa. — Curtze  v.  Ostrow,  40  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  697,  22  Erie  Co.  256 — 
Conwell  v.  Capuzzi,  Com.PL,  21 
WestCo.L,.J.  289. 

Statutes    requiring   suit  within  pre- 
scribed  time  after  death  of  dece- 
dent  see  Executors   and  Adminis- 
trators §  732  b. 
Where  judgments  were  transferred 

to  county  in  which  decedent  owned 

946    . 


land,  within  year  after  decedent's 
death,  and  were  entered  of  record, 
but  decedent's  administrator  was  not 
substituted  as  party  defendant,  scire 
facias,  or  other  proceeding,  was  not 
begun,  and  judgments  were  not  in- 
dexed against  administrator,  liens 
expired  at  termination  of  one  year 
following  decedent's  death,  and,  on 
subsequent  sale  of  land,  judgments 
occupied  same  position  as  claims  of 
general  creditors. — In  re  Higgins' 
Estate,  188  A.  831,  325  Pa.  106. 

Scire  facias,  entered  in  judgment 
index  within  year  after  debtor's 
death  in  suit  by  creditor  against  him 
during  lifetime,  warning  administra- 
tor to  become  party  defendant,  re- 
tained lien  of  creditor's  claim 
against  land  fraudulently  conveyed. 
— American  Trust  Co.  v.  Kaufman, 
135  A.  210,  287  Pa.  461. 

73.  Pa. — Kefover  v.  Hustead,  144  A. 
430,  294  Pa.  474— Simmons  v.  Sim- 
mons,   28   A.2d   445,    150    Pa. Super. 
393,   affirmed  29  A.2d  677,   346   Pa. 
52 — Raub    Supply    Co.    v.    Brandt, 
Com.Pl.,   27  Del.Co.   507. 

Revival  must  be  within  five  years 
from  death  of  decedent  or  lien  is 
irretrievably  lost. — Shareff,  to  Use 
of  Olney  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Wolf, 
182  A.  115,  120  Pa.Super.  227. 

74.  What  constitutes  delay 
Judgment  creditor,  precluded  from 

Issuing  execution  against  land  by 
death  of  judgment  debtor  for  twelve- 
month period  is  "delayed,"  notwith- 
standing conveyance  by  debtor  before 
death. — Woods  v.  Primm,  C.C.A.I1L, 
13  F.2d  572. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  493 


preserve  the  lien  against  decedent's  estate  there 
must  be  a  compliance  with. the  requirements  of  the 
statute.75  ' 

Death  of  joint  tenant.  On  the  death  of  a  joint 
tenant  the  lien  of  a  judgment  against  his  interest  is 
extinguished.76 

§  492.     Extending  Lien 

The  life  of  a  Judgment  lien  ordinarily  may  not  be 
extended  except  for  the  causes  and  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed by  statute. 

In  the  absence  of  statutory  authority  the  lien  of 
the  judgment  ordinarily  may  not  be  extended  be- 
yond the  period  of  time  fixed  by  statutory  regula- 
tions.77 In  some  jurisdictions  the  statutes  specify 
the  causes  for  which  the  life  of  the  judgment  lien 
shall  be  extended,78  and  such  statutes  should  be 
strictly  construed79  and  the  lien  ordinarily  may  not 
be  extended  except  for  the  causes  and  in  the  man- 
ner prescribed  by  the  statute.80  A  statutory  pro- 
vision that  execution  may  be  had  on  real  estate 
after  the  expiration  of  the  statutory  period  for 
which  the  lien  continues  by  filing  a  notice,  sub- 
scribed by  the  sheriff,  describing  the  judgment,  the 


execution,  and  the  property  levied  on,  does  not  ex- 
tend the  original  lien  of  the  judgment.81 

Revival  of  judgment  distinguished.  The  right  to 
revive  a  judgment  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
right  to  keep  the  lien  of  the  judgment  in  life  in  that 
the  former  is  a  right  of  action  while  the  latter  is 
not82 

§  493.    Issue  and  Levy  of  Execution 

Unless  permitted  by  statute,  a  Judgment  creditor 
ordinarily  cannot  extend  the  Hen  of  a  Judgment  by  the 
issuance  and  levy  of  an  execution. 

In  several  states  the  statutes  prescribe  that  after 
the  lapse  of  a  certain  time  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
shall  be  lost,  unless  within  that  time  steps  have  been 
taken  to  enforce  it,  as  by  the  levy  of  an  execution 
on  property  of  defendant.83  Some  statutes  which 
prescribe  a  period  for  the  continuance  of  the  lien 
also  require  execution  to  be  taken  out  within  a 
certain  shorter  time,  as,  for  instance,  within  one 
year  after  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  in  order 
to  keep  the  lien  alive  during  the  whole  statutory 
period.84  Under  other  statutes*  failure  to  issue  an 
execution  within  such  shorter  period  does  not  de- 


75.  Pa. — In  re  Higgins'  Estate,  188 
A.  831,  325   Pa.  106. 

76.  Cal.— Zeigler  v.   Bonnell,   126  P. 
2d  118,  52  Cal.App.2d  217. 

111. — People's  Trust  &  Savings  Bank 
v.  Haas,  160  N.E.  85,  328  111.  468 
-— Spikings  v.  Ellis,  8  N.B.2d  962, 
290  Ill.App.  585. 

Wis. — Musa  v.  Segelke  &  Kohlhaus 
Co.,  272  N.W.  657,  224  Wis.  432, 
111  A.L.R.  168. 

Right  of  survivorship  see  Joint  Ten- 
ancy §§  1-4. 

77.  Tex. — Burton  Lingo  Co.  v.  War- 
ren, Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  750,  error 
refused. 

78.  Ind. — Petrovitch  v.  Witholm,  152 
N.E.    849,    85    Ind.App.    144. 

N.C. — Lupton  v.  Edmundson,  16  S.E. 
2d  840,  220  N.C.  188. 

Tenn. — Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Pulcher  Brick  Co., 
30  S.W.2d  253,  161  Tenn.  298. 

79.  N.C. — Cheshire  v.  Drake,  27  S.E. 
2d  627,  223  N.C.  577. 

80.  Ariz. — Serasio  v.  Sears,  121  P.2d 
639,  58  Ariz.   522. 

Idaho. — Platts  v.  Pacific  First  Fed- 
eral Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n  of  Ta- 
coma,  111  P.2d  1093,  62  Idaho  340. 

N.C. — Cheshire  v.  Drake,  27  S.E.2d 
627,  -223  N.C.  577— Lupton  v.  Ed- 
mnndsen,  16  S.E.2d  840,  220  N.C. 
188. 

Pa.— Citizens  Bank  of  Barnsboro  v. 
Variali,  18  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  315— 
Merchants  Banking  Trust  Co.  now 
to  Use  of  Federal  Deposit  Ins. 


Corp.  v.  Kaleda,  Com.Pl.,   41   Sch. 

L.R.  176,  60  York  Leg.Rec.  25. 
34  C.J.  p  625  note  90. 

Courts    cannot    dispense   with   re- 
quirements   essential    under    statute 
to  continue  judgment  lien. — Groth  v* 
Ness,  260  N.W.  700,  65  N.D.  580. 
Decree  in.  partition 

Where  interest  of  Judgment  lien- 
holder  in  share  of  one  cotenant  was 
averred  in  complaint  for  partition 
and  found  in  decree,  the  decree  in 
the  partition  proceeding  tolled  the 
running  of  the  statute  affecting  the 
limitation  of  'the  judgment  lien. — 
Wollschlaeger  v.  Erdmann,  61  N.E, 
2d  53,  390.  111.  266. 

•Where  statutes  provide  for  fixing 
lien  by  filing  abstract  of  judgment, 
it  was  unnecessary  for  judgment 
creditor  to  obtain  new  judgment  on 
judgment  not  dormant  to  obtain  new 
lien  after  termination  of  first  lien. 
— Burton  Lingo  Co.  v.  Warren,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  45  S.W.2d  750,  error  re- 
fused. 

81.  N.T.—^loyd  v.  Clark,  17  N.Y.S. 
848,  16  Daly  528. 

82.  Ga.— Tift  v.   Bank  of  Tifton,   4 
S.E.2d   495,    60    Ga.App.    563. 

Revival   of  .judgment   generally   see 
infra  §§  533-549. 

83.  Fla.— Massey        v.        Pineapple 
Orange    Co.,    100    So.    170,    87    Fla, 
874. 

,— Rich  v.  Cooper,  -286  N.W.  383, 
136  Neb.  463— Glissmann  v.  Happy 
Hollow  Club,  271  N.W.  431,  132 
Neb.  223. 

947 


Okl.— Price  v.  Sanditen,  38  P.2d  533, 

170  Okl.  75. 
34  C.J.  p  623  note  80. 
Necessity  of  execution  to  create  lien 

see  supra  §  468. 

84.  111.— Smith  v.  Toman,  14  N.R2d 
478.  368  111.  414,  118  A.L.R.  924— 
Svalina  v.  SarAvana.,  173  N.E.  281, 
341  111.  236,  87  A.L.R.  821— Meu- 
sel  v.  Bock,  234  Ill.App.  455. 
34  C.J.  p  624  note  81,  p  574  note  56 

[a]. 
Where  judgment  transferred 

A  judgment  lien  created  by  filing 
a  transcript  of  the  judgment  in  coun- 
ty where  realty  is  situated  may  be 
extended  beyond  a  year  from  the 
time  the  judgment  became  a-  lien 
only  by  the  issuance  of  an  execu- 
tion in  the  county  where  transcript 
was  filed,  and  such  extension  cannot 
be  accomplished  by  the  issuance  of 
an  execution  from  county  where 
judgment  was  originally  entered  di- 
rected to  county  where  transcript 
was  filed. — Reconstruction  Finance 
Corporation  v.  Maley,  C.C.A.I11.,  125 
F.2d  131. 

Failure  to  return  execution  within 
ninety  days  as  required  by  statute 
was  held  not  to  affect  a  judgment 
lien  on  real  estate. — Davis  Bros. 
Drug  Co.  v.  Counter,  225  P.  '245,  75 
Colo.  239. 

.Pendency  of  "bank's  mortgage  fore- 
closure  action,  filed  within  year  after 
entry  of  another  bank's  judgment 
against  ,  mortgagor,  was  sufficient, 
under  "lis  pendens  doctrine,"  to  -cre- 
ate equitable  lien  on  mortgaged  real- 


§  493 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


stroy  the  lien  but  subordinates  it  to  other  judg- 
ment liens  against  the  same  judgment  debtor.85 

In  the  absence  of  statutory  provision  therefor,  a 
judgment  creditor  generally  cannot  extend  his  lien 
by  issuing  and  levying  an  execution,  even  during 
the  continuance  of  the  lien,  and  if  the  sale  does  not 
take  place  until  after  the  expiration  of  the  statutory 
period  the  priority  of  lien  and  title  is  gone.86  How- 
ever, a  provision  for  so  extending  the  life  of  the 
lien  is  to  be  found  in  some  statutes,87  and  even  in 
the  absence  of  express  statute  to  that  effect  it  has 
been  held  that  the  levy  of  an  execution  during  the 
life  of  the  lien  has  the  effect  of  continuing  the  lien 
beyond  the  statutory  period  of  its  existence  and  un- 
til the  writ  is  executed88  If  the  statute  requires 
no  more  than  the  issue  of  an  execution,  it  is  satis- 
fied by  that  act,  although  the  sole  purpose  of  tak- 
ing out  the  writ  was  to  preserve  the  lien,  and  there 


was  no  expectation  of  collecting  the  money.89 

Laches  in  issuing  execution.  The  creditor  may 
take  all  the  time  allowed  him,  and  the  lien  of  a 
judgment  which  has  not  become  dormant  is  not  lost 
or  impaired  by  laches  in  issuing  execution.90 

§  494.    Revival  of  Judgment 

The  Hen  of  a  judgment  may  be  extended  by  a  re- 
vival of  the  judgment. 

Provision  is  sometimes  made  by  statute  for  the 
extension  of  the  statutory  period  for  the  continu- 
ance of  a  judgment  Ken  as  between  the  parties  to 
the  judgment  by  a  revival  of  the  judgment  by  scire 
facias  or  otherwise.91  Where  such  action  is  taken 
before  the  expiration  of  the  statutory  period,  the 
lien  of  the  judgment  is  continuous  from  the  date  of 
its  rendition  or  entry,  and  its  priority,  relative  to 
other  Hens,  is  preserved;92  but  where  a  period  is 


ty  as  far  as  Judgment  creditor  .was 
concerned,  and  such  judgment  con- 
stituted a  lien,  inferior  to  mortgage 
lien,  against  realty,  as  against  con- 
tention that  judgment  lien  was  lost 
by  failure  to  have  execution  issued 
within  such  year. — First  Nat.  Bank 
of  Marissa  v.  Heintz,  51  NJE.2d  333, 
320  IU.App.  403. 
la  Texas 

(1)  Originally  the  statute  required 
that     execution     be     issued    within 
twelve  months  after  the  date  of  the 
judgment  or  the  Judgment  would  be- 
come dormant. — Jackson  v.  Wallace, 
Com.App.,    252    S.W.    745 — Moore    v. 
Ray,  Civ.App.,  282  S.W.  671 — Gordon- 
Sewall    &   Co.   v.    Walker,    Civ.App., 
258  S.W.  233—34  C.J.  p  624  note  81. 

(2)  Under  a  later  statute,   execu- 
tion may  be  issued  on  the  judgment 
at  any  time  within  ten  years  after 
the    date    of    the    judgment. — Chris- 
tian v.  Sam  B.  Hill  Lumber  Co.,  Civ. 
App.,  113  S.W.2d  616. 

85.  U.S. — Jenkins  Petroleum  Process 
Co.  v.  Credit  Alliance  Corporation, 
C.C.A.Okl.,  83  P.2d  532. 

Ohio.— Waldock  v.  Bedell,  18  N.E.2d 

828,   59   Ohio  App.   520 — Bantell  v. 

Clark,  187  N.B.   781,  46  Ohio  App. 

131 — stone     v.     Equitable     Mortg. 

Co.,  158  N.E.  275,  25  Ohio  App.  382. 
OKU — Harris  T.  Southwest  Nat.  Bank 

of  Dallas,  Tex.,  271  P.  683,  133  Okl. 

152. 

34  aj.  p  624  note  82. 
Statutes  construed  together 
Ohio.— Waldock  v.  Bedell,  18  N.E.2d 

828,  59  Ohio  App.  520. 

86.  Ariz. — Ingraham  v.   Forman.   63 
P.2d  998,  49  Ariz.  29. 

m. — Holmes  v.  Fanyo,  63  N.E.2d  627, 

327  fcLApp.  JL 
K.C.— Cheshire  v.   Brake,   27    S.EL2d 

627,  -223   N.C.   577— Lupton  v.  Ed- 

mundsou,   16   S.E.2d  840,   220   N.C. 

188 — Osborne  v.   Board  of  Educa- 


tion   of    Guilford    County    ex    rel. 

State,    177    S.E.   642,    207   N.C.   503 

.— Hyman   v.    Jones,    171    S.E.    103, 

205  N.C.  266. 
N.D. — Depositors'     Holding     Co.     v. 

Winschel,    232    N.W.    599.    60    NJX 

71. 
34  C.J.  p  624  note  86. 

87.  U.S.— -Brockway  v.   Oswego  Tp., 
C.C.Kan.,  40  F.  612. 

34  C.J.  p  625  note  87. 

88.  Mo.— Wayland    v.    Kansas    City, 
12  S.W.2d  438.  321  Mo.  654. 

34  C.J.  p  625  note  88. 

89.  Ala.— McClarin  v.   Anderson,    16 
So.  639,  104  Ala.  2^1. 

Miss.— Murphy  v.  Klein,  15  So.  658, 
71  Miss.  908. 

90.  Fla. — Massey       v.        Pineapple 
Orange   Co.,    100    So.    170,    87   Fla. 
374. 

34  C.J.  p  624  note  85. 

91.  Tex. — Commerce    Trust    Co.    v. 
Ramp,  138  S.W.2d  531,  135  Tex.  84. 

34  C.J.  p  625  note  92. 
Revival   of  judgments  see  infra   §§ 
533-549. 

92.  Ark.— Waldstein     v.     Williams, 
142   S.W.   834,   101  Ark.  404,   37  L. 
RJL.N.S.,  1162. 

Pa, — Cusano  v.  Rubolino,  39  A.2d 
906,  351  Pa.  41— Kefover  v.  Hu- 
stead,  144  A.  430,  294  Pa.  474— 
Vaselenak  v.  Moxham  Nat  Bank, 
28  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  253,  85  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  691. 

34  C.J.  p  625  note  93,  p  684  note  60. 
Lien  continue*  for  additional  pe- 
riod of  ten  years, — Rayborn  v.  Reid, 
138  S.E.  294,  139  S.C.  529. 
Commencement  of  period  on  record- 
ing of  deed  1)y  terre-teuaaxt 
(1)  Under  .some  statutes,  when  a 
judgment  had  been  regularly  revived 
between  the  original  parties,  the  pe- 
riod of  five  years,  during  which  the 

948 


lien  of  the  judgment  continued,  com- 
menced to  run  in  favor  of  the  terre- 
tenant  from  the  time  that  he  had 
placed  his  deed  on  record  unless  the 
terre-tenant  was  in  actual  possession 
of  the  land  bound  by  the  judgment, 
by  himself  or  tenant. — Farmers  Nat. 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.'v.  Barrett  184  A. 
128,  321  Pa.  273 — Kefover  v.  Hustead, 
144  A.  430,  294  Pa.  474— Frank  Di 
Berardino  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Be 
Gregoria,  45  A.2d  378,  158  Pa.Super. 
516— Ellinger  v.  Krach,  28  A.2d  453, 
150  Pa. Super.  384,  affirmed  Simmons 
v.  Simmons,  29  A.2d  677,  346  Pa.  52 
—Petition  of  Miller,  28  A.2d  257, 
149  Pa.Super.  142— First  Nat  Bank 
v.  Tomechek,  13  A.2d  126,  140  Pa. 
Super.  101 — Everett  Hardwood  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Calhoun,  183  A.  659,  121 
Pa.Super.  451 — Miller  Bros.  v.  Boy- 
otz,  96  Pa.Super.  208— Lewis  v. 
Puchy,  44  Pa,Dist.  &  Co.  4S2,  90 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  259,  56  York  Leg.Rec. 
69 — Klein  v.  Anderson,  39  Pa,Dist. 
&  Co.  139. 

(2)  Where  land,  subject  to  a  val- 
id judgment  was  conveyed  by  deed, 
which  was  at  once  recorded,  lien  of 
the  judgment  bound  the  land  in  pos- 
session of  terre-tenant  for  a  period 
of  five  years  from  date  of  recording 
of  deed,  even  though  judgment  was 
not     subsequently    revived    against 
judgment    debtor    by     scire     facias 
within  five  years  of  entry  of  judg- 
ment— Simmons  v.  Simmons,  29  A.2d 
677,   846  Pa.  52— Behler  v.  Loch,   36 
A.2d   234,    154   Pa, Super.    399. 

(3)  A   scire   facias   proceeding   to 
revive  a  judgment  against  terre-ten- 
ants  would  be  excepted  from  the  op- 
eration of  the  act  of  1943  repealing 
the  act  of  1849   imposing  a  limita- 
tion of  lien  against  terre-tenanta  on 
a  revived  judgment  if  the  judgment 
sought  to  be  revived  was  a  lien  un- 
der the  act  of  1849  when  the  scire 
facias  was  issued. — Frank  Di  Berar- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


496 


prescribed  for  the  continuance  of  the  judgment  lien, 
and  the  right  to  enforce  execution  exists  for  a 
shorter  period  unless  such  right  is  revived  by  scire 
facias,  the  revivor  of  a  judgment  by  scire  facias 
within  the  time  prescribed  for  the  continuance  of 
the  lien  will  not  extend  the  statutory  period  as 
against  purchasers  or  encumbrancers  whose  rights 
accrued  subsequent  to  the  entry  of  the  original  judg- 
ment.93 

Revival  after  lien  has  expired.  After  a  judgment 
lien  has  expired,  the  period  during  which  the  lien 
of  a  revived  judgment  exists  is,  it  is  usually  held,  to 
be  computed  from  the  date  of  the  judgment  or  or- 
der of  revivor,  and  not  from  the  date  of  the  writ 
instituting  the  proceedings  for  its  revival.94  Ordi- 
narily the  lien  cannot  be  revived  so  as  to  overreach 
conveyances  or  encumbrances  subsequent  to  the  en- 
try of  the  original  judgment  and  prior  to  its  re- 
vival,95 but  it  has  been  stated  that  a  purchaser  of 
a  judgment  debtor's  land  at  a  time  when  the  judg- 
ment is  dormant  takes  the  land  subject  to  the  judg- 
ment lien  on  its  revival  by  scire  facias.96  It  has 
been  held  to  be  immaterial  that  the  purchase  was 
made  or  the  encumbrance  accepted  with  full  knowl- 
edge that  the  judgment  remained  unpaid,97  provided 
the  grantee  gave  valuable  consideration98  and  did 
not  collude  with  the  debtor  to  deprive  the  judgment 
creditor  of  his  lien  or  take  with  a  fraudulent  inten- 
tion toward  such  creditor.99  It  has  been  held  that 
a  dormant  judgment  does  not,  by  revivor,  become  a 


lien  on  land  acquired  by  the  debtor  after  its  original 
recovery,  unless  a  levy  is  made  thereon,  either  be- 
fore it  became  dormant  or  after  its  revivor.1 

§  495.    Suit  to  Enforce  Lien  or  to  Sub- 
ject Property;  Action  on  Judgment 

The  statutory  life  of  a  Judgment  lien  generally  Is 
not  extended  by  the  institution  of  action  to  enforce  the 
lien  or  by  a  creditor's  bill. 

Although  there  are  some  decisions  to  the  con- 
trary,2 as  a  general  rule  where  a  statute  fixes  a 
definite  limitation  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment  it  is1 
not  saved  or  extended  by  the  bringing  of  an  action 
to  enforce  the  lien,3  or  by  a  creditor's  bill,  where 
such  action  or  bill  remains  undetermined  when  the 
statutory  period  expires,4  especially  where  the  stat- 
ute expressly  prohibits  the  bringing  of  a  direct  ac- 
tion or  proceeding  for  the  purpose  of  prolonging  the 
lien.6 

Under  some  statutes  an  action  on  a  judgment  is 
the  only  means  of  extending  the  judgment  lien;6 
other  statutes  prohibit  its  extension  by  such  means.7 


§  496. 


Absence  of  Debtor  from  State 


Unless  extended  by  statute,  the  life  of  a  Judgment 
lien  is  not  prolonged  by  the  absence  of  the  Judgment 
debtor  from  the  state. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statutory  provision  therefor, 
the  absence  of  the  judgment  debtor  from,  the  state 
will  not  extend  the  duration  of  a  judgment  lien.8 


dino  Bldg  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  De  Gre- 
goria,  45  A.2d  378,  158  Pa. Super.  516. 
(4)  Straw  man  to  whom  realty  was 
•conveyed  after  debtor  paid  for  and 
took  title  to  realty  in  his  wife's 
name  held  not  a  "terre-tenant,"  and 
scire  facias  issued  to  revive  judg- 
ment creditor's  judgment  against 
debtor  did  not  fasten  record  lien 
upon  realty, — Loughney  v.  Bage,  182 
A.  700,  320  Pa.  508. 

93.  Fla. — Massey    v.    Pineapple 
Orange   Co.,    100   So.   170,   87'  Fla. 

.     374. 

Iowa. — Denegre    v.    Haun,    13    Iowa 

240. 
34  C.J.  p  626  note  94. 

94.  Ga. — Carter  v.  Martin,  142  S.B. 
277,  165  Ga.  890. 

Neb.— Glissmann    v.    Happy    Hollow 
Club,   271  N.W.  431,   132  Neb.   223. 
34  C.J.  p  585  note  2,  p  626  note  95. 

New  lien  arises  on  revival  of  judg- 
ment—Motel v.  Andracki,  19  N.E.2d 
832,  299  Ill.App.  166. 

95.  Md.— O'Neill   &   Co. '  v.   Schulze, 
7  A.2d  263,  177  Md.  64. 

Neb. — Oampagna  v.  Home  Owners* 
Loan  Corporation,  3  *N.W.2d  750, 
141  Neb.  429. 

N.M. — Pugh  v.  Heating  &  Plumbing 


Finance  Corp.,  161  P.2d  714,  49 
N.M.  234. 

Pa. — Cusano  v.  Kubolino,  39  A.2d  906, 
351  Pa.  41— First  Nat.  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Miller,  186  A,  87,  322 
Pa.  473— Petition  of  Miller,  28  A. 
2d  257,  149  Pa.Super.  142— Miller 
Bros.  v.  Boyotz,  96  Pa.Super.  208. 

34  C.J.  p  585  note  4,  p  626  note  95, 

96.  Fla. — Massey       v.        Pineapple 
Orange  Co.,    100   So.    170,    87   Fla. 
374. 

97.  N.Y.— Little  v.  Harvey,  9  Wend. 
157. 

98.  Del. — Raymond  v.  Farrell,  93  A. 
905,  28  Del.  394. 

N.Y.— Mohawk  Bank  v.  Atwater,  2 
Paige  54. 

99.  N.Y.— Pettit     v.      Shepherd,      5 
Paige  493,  28  Am.D.  437. 

1.  Ohio.— Smith    v.    Hogg,    40    N.B. 
406,  52  Ohio  St.  527. 

2.  U.S.— Ryan   v.    Kanawha   Valley 
Bank,  W.Va.,  71  F.   912,  18  C.C.A. 
384. 

34  C.J.  p  626  note  3. 

3.  Ahu — I.  Trager  Co.  v.  Mixon,  157 
So.  80,  229  Ala.  371— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  First  Nat  Bank  v.  Powell, 
155    So.    624,    626,   229    Ala.    178. 

949 


Neb.— Rich  v.  Cooper,  286  N.W.  383, 

136  Neb.  463. 
N.C. — Lupton  v.  Edmundson,  16  S.E. 

2d  840,  220  N.C.  188. 
34  C.J.  p  626  note  4. 
Enforcement  of  lien  after  expiration 

of  statutory  period  see  infra  §  511. 

Any  trickery  in.  obtaining1  continu- 
ance of  suit  to  enforce  judgment* 
lien  did  not  estop  defendants  to  as- 
sert that  judgment  expired  after 
continuance  was  obtained. — King-  v. 
Hayes,  9  S.W.2d  538,  223  Mo.App. 
138. 

4.  Ind.— McAfee  v.  Reynolds,  28  N. 
E.    423,    130    Ind.    33,    30    Am.S.R. 
194,  18  L.R.A.  211. 

34  C.J.  p  626  note  5. 

Lien  resulting  from  commencement 

of    creditors'    suit    see    Creditors 

Suits  §  84. 

5.  Wash.— Meikle  v.  Cloquet,   87  P. 
841,  44  Wash.  513. 

6.  Miss. — Grace    v.    Pierce,    90    So. 
590,  127  Miss.  831. 

34  C.J.  p  626  note  8. 

7.  Wash.— Ball    v.    Bussell,    205    P. 
423,  119  Wash.  206 — Meikle  v.  Clo- 
quet,  87  P.  841,  44  Wash.  613. 

8.  N.C. — Osborne  v.  Board  of  Educa- 


§  497 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Under  some  statutes,  a  debtor's  departure  from,  and 
residence  out  of,  the  state  after  judgment  recovered 
against  him  will  suspend  the  running  of  the  statute 
and  preserve  the  lien  of  the  judgment,  although  its 
enforcement  has  not  been  obstructed  thereby  and 
although  the  wording  of  the  statute  is  that,  if  by 
departing  from  the  state  a  person  shall  obstruct  the 
prosecution  of  a  right  which  had  accrued  against 
him,  the  time  of  such  obstruction  shall  not  be  com- 
puted as  a  part  of  the  time  within  which  the  said 
right  might  or  ought  to  have  been  prosecuted.^ 


§  497. 


Agreement  of  Parties 


The  life  of  a  judgment  lien  may  not  be  prolonged 
by  agreement,  unless  an  extension  fn  such  manner  Is 
authorized  by  statute. 

Except  where  a  statute  so  provides,10  a  judgment 
lien  cannot  be  extended  beyond  the  statutory  period 
by  an  agreement  between  the  judgment  creditor  and 
his  debtor,11 

§  498.    Matters     Preventing     Enforce- 
ment of  Judgment 

a.  In  general 

b.  Injunction,    adverse   proceeding,   and 

receivership 

c.  Effect  of  appeal 

a.  In  G-eneral 

A  stay  of  execution  or  of  further  proceedings  on  a 
judgment  ordinarily  extends  the  lien  of  the  Judgment. 

Although  there  are  decisions  which  hold  that  a 


stay  of  execution  or  of  further  proceedings  on  a 
judgment  does  not  suspend  the  running  of  the  stat- 
utes of  limitations  against  it,12  if  at  least  the  stay 
does  not  continue  beyond  the  period  fixed  by  the 
statute,13  as  a  general  rule  such  a  stay  does  ex- 
tend the  lien,  whether  the  stay  is  by  order  of  the 
court,14  or  by  specific  provision  included  in  the  rec- 
ord entry  of  the  judgment,15  or  by  act  of  the  leg- 
islature,16 and  whether  the  time  of  the  stay  of  exe- 
cution is  less  or  more  than  the  period  fixed  by  stat- 
ute for  the  expiration  of  the  lien  of  judgments.17 
The  latter  rule  is  sometimes  expressly  adopted  by 
statute.18 

A  state  of  war  has  been  held  not  ground  for  ex- 
tending the  lien  of  a  judgment  beyond  the  time  fixed 
by  law,19  at  least  where  there  is  no  proof  that  proc- 
ess could  not  be  issued  or  executed  during  the  war.20 

b.  Injunction,  Adverse  Proceeding,  and  Beceiv- 
ership 

The  lien  of  a  Judgment  ordinarily  is  extended  by  an 
injunction  restraining  the  issuance  of  execution,  but  the 
appointment  of  a  receiver  does  not  continue  the  lien. 

Although  there  are  decisions  to  the  contrary,21 
as  a  general  rule  the  fact  that  the  creditor,  at  the 
suit  of  the  judgment  debtor,  is  enjoined  from  issu- 
ing execution,  has  the  effect  of  prolonging  the  judg- 
ment lien  beyond  the  statutory  period;22  and  in 
some  jurisdictions  it  is  expressly  provided  by  statute 
that  the  time  covered  by  an  injunction  is  to  be  ex- 
cluded from  the  period  limited  by  law  for  the  dura- 
tion of  judgment  liens.23 


tlon    of    Guilford    County    ex    rel. 
State.    177    S.E.    642,    207   N.C.   503. 
Wash. — Hemen    v.    Rinehart,    87    P. 
953,  45  Wash.  1. 

9.  Va. — Lamon  v.  Gold.  79  S.E.  728, 
72   W.Va.    619,    51   L.R.A.,N.S.,   883. 

34  C.J.  p  627  note  13. 

10.  U.S.— Davis     v.     Davis,     W.Va., 
174  F.  786,  98  C.C.A.  494. 

34  C.J.  p  628  note  29. 

Fewer  than  all  the  debtors  la  a 
judgment  have  the  power  to  agree  by 
a  clear  and  unambiguous  paper  to 
the  extension  of  the  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment on  the  property  of  those  con- 
senting.— Second  Nat.  Bank  of  Al- 
toona,  for  Use  of  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  Philadelphia  v.  Faber,  2  A. 
2d  747,  332  Pa.  124. 

11.  Tenn. — Cardenhire  v.  King,  37  S. 
W.  548,  97  Tenn.  585. 

34  C.J.  p  6*3  note  30. 
Agreement    creating    new    Indebted- 
ness with,  lien  as  security 
The    parties    may    by    agreement, 
supported   by  a   valid  consideration, 
create  a  new  indebtedness  in  lieu  of 
the  Judgment  debt  and  preserve  the 
judgment    lien    for    the    balance    of 


its  statutory  life  as  security  for  the 
new  debt.— Kandoll  v.  Penttila,  139 
P.2d  616,  18  Wash.2d  434. 

12.  Mo. — Green     v.     Dougherty,     55 
Mo.App.  217. 

34  C.J.  p  627  note  14. 

13.  Ark. — Beloate   v.   New  England 
Securities   Co.,    193    S.W.    795,    128 
Ark.  215,  220. 

34  C.J.  .p  627  note  15. 

14.  Minn. — Wakefield   v.   Brown,    37 
N.W.  788,  38  Minn.  361,  8  Am.S.R. 

m. 

34  C.J.  p  627  note  16. 

15.  U.S. — Mercantile    Trust  -Co.    v. 
St  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  C.C.Ark., 
69  F.  193. 

34  C.J.  p  627  note  17. 

16.  Tex.— Hargrove  v.  De  Lisle,  32 
Tex.  170. 

34  C.J.  p  627  note  18. 
Allotment  of  homestead 
N.C. — Cleve  v.  Adams,  22  S.E.2d  567, 
222  N.C.  211. 

17.  U.S. — Mercantile    Trust    Co.    v. 
St  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  C.C.Ark., 
69  F.  193. 


950 


18.  Ind. — Applegate  v.  Edwards,   45 
Ind.  329. 

19.  Tenn. — Swanson    v.    Tarkington, 
7   Heisk.    612— Smart   v.   Mason,    2 
Heisk.  223. 

20.  Tenn. — Smart  v.  Mason,  supra. 

21.  Ohio.— Tucker  v.  Shade,  25  Ohio 
St  355. 

34  C.J.  p  627  note  23. 

22.  Wash. — Hensen  v.  Peter,  164  P. 
512,     95    Wash.     628,    L.R.A.1918F 
682. 

34  C.J.  p  627  note  24. 

23.  111. — Holmes  v.   Fanyo,   63  N.E. 
2d  249,  326  Ill.App.  624. 

N.C. — Cheshire  v.  Drake,  27  S.B.2d 
627,  223  N.C.  577— Lupton  v.  Ed- 
mundson,  16  S.E.2d  840,  220  N.C. 
188. 

Tenn. — Sweetwater  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Howard,  66  S.W.2d  225,  16  Tenn. 
App.  91. 
34  C.J.  p  627  note  25. 

Where  Judgment  creditor  iff  not 
restrained  by  injunction,  statute  is 
inapplicable. — Petrovitch  v.  Witholm, 
152  N.E.  849,  85  Ind.App.  144. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  499 


Adverse  proceeding.  In  some  jurisdictions  the 
life  of  the  judgment  lien  is  extended  by  an  adverse 
proceeding,24  provided  the  proceeding  is  adverse  in 
the  sense  of  restraining  the  sale,  by  analogy  to  an 
injunction.25 

Appointment  of  receiver.  The  appointment  of  a 
receiver  does  not  continue  the  lien  of  the  judgment 
beyond  the  statutory  period,26  although  it  has  been 
held  that  a  statute  providing  that  a  judgment  lien  is 
lost  if  execution  is  not  taken  out  within  a  certain 
time  does  not  apply  where,  during  such  time,  the 
property  of  the  judgment  defendant  is  in  the  hands 
of  a  receiver  in  another  action.27 

c.  Effect  of  Appeal 

An  appeal  or  writ  of  error  with  a  supersedeas  gen- 
erally extends  the  life  of  the  Judgment  lien. 

Although  there  is  some  authority  to  the  con- 
trary,28 it  has  been  held,  sometimes  by  virtue  of 
statutory  provisions,  that  an  appeal  or  writ  of  er- 
ror with  a  supersedeas  prolongs  the  judgment  lien 
beyond  the  statutory  period.29  Where  there  is  no 
supersedeas  an  appeal  does  not  of  itself  prolong  the 
life  of  the  lien;30  and  it  has  been  held  that,  where 


a  new  judgment  is  rendered,  it  merges  the  original 
judgment,  and  the  lien  dates  only  from  such  new 
judgment31 

§  499.    Loss,  Release,  or  Extinguishment  of 
Lien 

Various  matters  may  destroy  or  extinguish  the  lien 
of  a  judgment,  such  as  a  levy  on  personalty  of  the  Judg- 
ment debtor  or  the.  merger  of  the  lien,  but  ordinarily  the 
arrest  of  the  debtor  merely  suspends  the  operation  of 
the  lien. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  creditor  does  not 
lose  his  Hen  unless  it  is  by  some  act  of  his  own, 
either  of  omission  or  of  commission.32  Neverthe- 
less the  lien  of  a  judgment  may  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances be  subordinated,  or  entirely  lost,  by  sale 
under  order  of  court  free  from  liens,33  by  the  op- 
eration of  a  statute  divesting  the  lien,34  by  the 
termination  of  the  estate  or  interest  subject  to  the 
lien,  as  in  the  case  of  an  estate  for  life  or  a  lease- 
hold or  other  limited  interest,3*  by  a  foreclosure 
of  the  lien  in  statutory  proceedings  for  that  pur- 
pose,36 by  a  discharge  of  the  debtor  in  bankruptcy, 
as  considered  in  Bankruptcy  §  S82  b  (6)  (b),  or, 
where  a  statute  so  provides,  by  the  destruction  of 


24.  Tenn.— Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 1 
Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick  Co.,  30 
S.W.2d    253,    161    Tenn.    298. 

25.  Tenn.— Fidelity    &    Deposit    Co. 
of  Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick  Co., 
supra. 

Proceedings  held  not  adverse 

(1)  Facts     that    judgment    debtor 
subsequently  executed  mortgage,  and, 
under  chancellor's  order,  mortgaged 
property  was  sold  to  others,  disclos- 
ed no   "adverse   proceeding." — Fidel- 
ity  &   Deposit   Co.   of   Maryland  v. 
Fulcher  Brick  Co.,  supra. 

(2)  Voluntary    suit    in    equity    by 
judgment    creditor    for    enforcement 
of  judgment  will  not  extend  lien.— 
Bridges   v.   Cooper,   39   S.W.   723,   98 
Tenn.    394 — Gardenhire    v.    King,    37 
S.W.  548,  97  Tenn.  585. 

26.  U.S.— Savings    &    Trust    Co.    of 
Cleveland,  Ohio  v.  Bear  Valley  Ir- 
rigation  Co.,   C.C.Cal.,    89   F.   32. 

Pa. — Scott   v.    Waynesburg   Brewing 
Co.,  100  A.  591,  256  Pa.  158. 

27.  Tex. — Semplo  v.  Eubanks,  35  S 
W.  509,  13  Tex.Civ.App.  418. 

28.  Mo.— Christy    v.    Flanagan,    87 
Mo.  670. 

34  C.J.  p  628  note  32. 

29.  Cal. — Dewey   v.    Latson,    6    Cal 
130. 

34  C.J.  p  628  notes  83,  36. 

Appeal    as    release   or   discharge   ol 

lien  see  infra  §  509. 

Statutes  usually  provide  that 
where  the  judgment  creditor  is  pre 
vented  from  enforcing  his  judg 


ment  by  execution  by  the  operation 
f  an  appeal  or  writ  of  error,  the 
erm  of  the  pendency  of  the  appeal 
>r  writ  of  error  cannot  be  treated 

as    a   part   of   the    statutory   period 

allowed  for  the  continuance  of  the 
udgment  lien.— Adams  v.  Guy,  11 

S.E.  535,  106  N.C.  275—34  C.J.  P  628 

note  37. 

30.  Neb. — Harvey  v.  Gooding,  109  N. 
W.   220,   77  Neb.   289,   124  Am.S.JL 
841. 

34  C.J.  p  628  note  34. 

31.  Iowa.— Swift  v.  Conboy,  12  Iowa 

33.    Iowa.— Beatty  v.  Cook,  185  N.W. 

360,  192  Iowa  542. 
Miss. — Lucas    v.    Stewart,    11    Miss. 

231. 

34  C.J.  p  628  note  38. 
Effect  of  division  of  old  county  into 

new  county  see  Counties  §  34, 

failure  of  Judgment  creditor  to 
join  terre-tenant  when  lie  issues 
scire  facias  does  not  merge  and 
extinguish  lien  existing  by  virtue 
of  original  judgment— First  Nat 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Miller,  186  A. 
87,  322  Pa.  473. 
Issuance  of  general  execution 

Under  a  statute  prescribing  th 
kinds  of  executions,  and  declaring 
that  the  execution,  if  on  a  judg 
ment  to  enforce  a  lien  on  specifl 
real  property,  may  direct  a  sale  o 
all  the  interest  which  defendant  ha< 
therein  at  the  time  the  lien  attached 
the  issuance  of  a  general  executioi 
to  enforce  a  judgment  does  not  re 
lease  the  specific  lien  decreed  by  th 

951 


udgment.— Schultz    v.    Schultz,    113 
tf.W.  445,  133  Wis.  125,  126  Am.S.R. 
34. 

3.    or.— Petke    v.    Pratt,    123    P.2d 

797,  168  Or.  425. 
4  C.J.  p  629  note  40. 

34.  ina. — Houston    v.    Houston,     67 
Ind.  276. 

Lien  held  not  destroyed  by  amend- 
ment to  statute 

Caj. — Jones  v.  Union  Oil  Co.  of  Cal- 
ifornia, 25  P.2d  5,  218  Cal.  775. 

Ohio. — Cowen  v.  Wassman,  28  N.B. 
2d  201,  64  Ohio  App.  84. 

35.  Ark.— Snow  Bros.  Hardware  Co. 
y.    Ellis,   21   S.W.2d   162,    180   Ark. 
^38 

Minn.— Farmers'  &  Merchants'  State 

Bank    of    Thief    River    Falls    v. 

Stageberg,  201  N.W.  612,  161  Minn. 

413. 

34  C.J.  p  629  note  43. 
Renunciation  of  rig-lit  of  inheritance 

Where  recorded  judgment  against 
decedent's  daughter  and  her  husband 
was  obtained  prior  to  decedent's 
death,  daughter's  subsequent  renun- 
ciation of  her  right  of  inheritance 
did  not  destroy  judgment  lien  which 
attached  at  time  of  death  to  her 
interest  in  decedent's  realty.— 
Coomes  v.  Finegan,  7  N.W.2d  729, 
233  Iowa  448. 

38.    Conn. — Ives   v.    Beecher,    54    A. 

207,  75  Conn.  564. 
Tex.— Ives    v.    Culton,    Civ.App,,    197 

S.W.  619. 
Enforcement  of  lien  see  infra  §  511. 


499 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


the  record  of  the  judgment,37  Or,  under  some  stat- 
utes, by  failure  to  redeem  after  redemption  by  a 
junior  judgment  lienholder.88  The  lien  of  a  con- 
tingent judgment  against  the  land  of  a  deceased's 
guarantor  of  bonds  has  been  held  to  be  discharged 
where  the  coguarantors,  without  the  consent  of  the 
owners  of  the  land  subject  to  the  lien,  secure  an 
extension  of  time  for  payment  of  the  bonds.39 

On  the  other  hand,  the  lien  is  not  destroyed  by  the 
execution  of  a  forthcoming  bond,  or  a  bond  to  try 
the  right  of  property,40  by  the  performance  of  an 
unnecessary  act  by  another  creditor,41  by  the  with- 
drawal from  the  records  of  the  certificate  of  the 
judgment  on  which  the  lien  was  founded,42  or  by 
any  transfer  of  the  property  other  than  a  sale  free 
from  liens  under  order  of  the  court.43 

Arrest  of  debtor.  The  taking  out  of  a  body  exe- 
cution suspends  the  lien  of  the  judgment  on  lands,44 
but  does  not  absolutely  extinguish  it;  for  if  this 
process  fails  to  produce  satisfaction,  under  circum- 
stances which  permit  the  creditor  to  resort  to  oth- 
er remedies,  the  lien  of  the  judgment  on  lands  may 
then  be  enforced,  as  against  the  judgment  debtor 
himself,45  although  not  as  against  the  intervening 
rights  of  third  persons.46 

Levy  on  personalty.  As  far  as  the  rights  of  third 
persons  are  concerned,  a  levy  on  personal  property 
sufficient  to  satisfy  a  fieri  facias  is  an  extinguish- 
ment of  the  judgment  on  which  it  is  issued,  as  con- 
sidered infra  §  573,  and  the  judgment  therefore 


ceases  to  be  a  lien  on  real  estate,4?  even  where  the 
creditor  abandons  or  releases  the  levy,  fails  to  make 
the  money,  or  applies  it  to  other  debts,4^  although 
the  rule  is  otherwise  where  the  levy  is  insufficient 
to  satisfy  the  execution.49 

Merger.  It  has  been  held  that,  where  a  creditor 
has  obtained  a  lien  on  real  estate  by  judgment  at 
law,  if  he  subsequently  brings  an  action  of  debt 
on  hia  judgment  and  recovers  a  new  judgment,  he 
will  lose  his  first  lien,60  but  there  is  also  authority 
to  the  contrary.51  The  mere  fact  that  the  judgment 
creditor  purchases  lands  on  which  the  judgment  is 
a  lien  will  not  merge  the  judgment  lien  and  thereby 
prevent  it  fram  attaching  to  other  lands  of  the  judg- 
ment debtor;52  but  it  has  been  held  that,  if  a  judg- 
ment creditor  becomes  the  owner  of  the  land  on 
which  the  judgment  is  a  lien,  the  lien  as  to  that  spe- 
cific land  in  the  hands  of  his  grantee  becomes  ex- 
tinct in  the  absence  of  an  agreement  or  intention  to 
continue  it  manifested  at  the  time  he  became  own- 
er,53 although,  in  equity,  if  it  is  for  the  interest 
of  the  parties  that  the  Hen  shall  be  kept  alive,  it 
will  be  regarded  as  still  subsisting.54 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  if  two  estates  in 
the  same  property  shall  unite  in  the  same  person  in 
his  individual  capacity,  the  lesser  estate  shall  be 
merged  in  the  greater,  the  acceptance  by  the  holder 
of  a  judgment  lien  of  a  bill  of  sale  from  the  judg- 
ment debtor  conveying  personalty  as  security  for 
a  loan  has  been  held  not  to  merge  the  lien  of  the 
judgment  into  the  bill  of  sale.55 


37.  Fla.  —  Curry  v.  •  Lehman,   47   So. 
18,  55  Fla.  847. 

34  C.J.  P  629  note  46. 

38.  Ind.—  "Warford  v.  Sullivan,  46  N. 
E.  27,  147  Ind.  14. 

33.  wis.—  In  re  lobby's  Estate,  209 
N.W.  593,  190  Wis.  592. 

40.  Ala.  —  Campbell  v.  Spence,  4  Ala. 
543.  39  Am.D.  301. 

Pa.—  Taylor's  Appeal,  1  Pa,  390. 

41.  N.Y.—  Hulbert    v.    Hulbert,    111 
N.E.  70,  216  N.T.  430,  L.B.A.1916D 
661,  Ann.Cas.l917D  180. 

Tex.  —  Powell  v,  Dallas  County  Levee 
Imp.  Dist.  No.  6,  Civ.App.,  173 
S.W.2d  552,  error  refused. 

42.  Ala.—  Emrich    v.     Gilbert    Mfg. 
Co.,  35  So.  322,  138  Ala.  316. 

34  C.J.  P  579  note  «. 

43.  Or.—  Petke    v.    Pratt,    123    P.2d 
797,  168  Or.  425. 

Pa.  —  Matter  of  Gump,  13  Phila.  495. 
Transfer  of  property  subject  to  lien 

see  supra  8  488. 
lien,  on  property  conveyed  to  delbtor 


Where,  in  consummation  of  an  ex- 


change of  real  estate,  a  judgment 
debtor  conveyed  real  estate  on  which 
the  Judgment  was  a  lien  under  a 
contract  whereby  the  grantee  became 
the  principal  debtor  and  the  gran- 
tor became  surety  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  judgment  creditor 
who  released,  for  a  valuable  con- 
sideration, the  lien  of  the  judgment 
but  reserved  his  rights  against  the 
judgment  debtor,  it  was  held  that 
the  lien  was  not  discharged  as  to 
land  conveyed  to  the  judgment  debt- 
or.— Gatton  v.  Harmon,  275  P.  137, 
127  Kan.  825. 

Invalid  proceeding  of  executor  to 
sell  realty  of  devisee  did  not  remove 
lien  of  judgment  on  realty  in  hands 
of  devisee.— In  re  Syrcher*s  Estate, 
299  N.Y.S.  267,  164  Misc.  102. 

44.  Pa. — Freeman  v.  Huston,  4  Ball. 
214,  I  L.Ed.  806. 

34  C.J.  p  633  note  42. 

45.  Ohio. — Douglas   v.    Wallace,    11 
Ohio   42. 

34  C.J.  p  633  note  43. 

46.  TT.S.— Rockhtll    v.    Hanna,    Ind., 
15  How.  189,   14  L.Ed.   656. 

952 


47.  N.T. — Jackson  v.  Bowen,  7  Cow. 
13 — Ex    parte    Lawrence,    4    Cow. 
417,  15  Am,D.  886. 

48.  N.J.— Banta    v.    McClennan,    14. 
N.J.EQ.  120. 

34  C.J.  p  631  note  83. 

49.  N.T.— Muir   v.   Leitch,    7   Barb. 
341. 

50.  HI. — McDonald  v.  Culhane,  24  N~ 
E.2d  737,   303  Ill.App.  101. 

34  C.J.  p  632  note  21. 
Extension  of  lien  by  action  on  judg- 
ment see  supra  8  495. 
Merger  of  judgments  see  infra  8  561. 

51.  N.C.— Springs  v.  Pharr,  42  S.E.. 
590,  131  N.C.  191,  92  Am.S.R.  775.. 

34  C.J.  p  632  note  22. 

52.  Ind.— Caley  v.  Morgan,  16  N.E.. 
790,  114  Ind.  350. 

34  C.J.  p  632  note  24. 

53.  Pa. — Koons  v.  Hartman,  7  Watts* 
20. 

34  C.J.  p  632  note  25. 

54.  W.Va,— George  v.  Crim,  66  SJEL 
526,  66  W.Va.  421. 

55.  Ga. — Bostwick   v.   Felder,    App.,. 
35  SJB.2d  783. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  501 


§  500.    By  Release 

The  lien  of  a  Judgment  may  be  released  by  the  Judg- 
ment creditor. 

The  holder  of  a  judgment  may  release  the  lien  of 
the  judgment,56  even  by  a  parol  release.57  An 
agreement  to  release  the  lien  of  a  judgment  must 
be  of  a  precise  and  definite  character,  in  which  no 
dement  of  the  agreement  is  left  to  conjecture  or 
supposition.58  As  between  the  debtor  and  creditor 
a  release  by  the  creditor  of  part  of  the  lands  bound 
by  the  judgment  will  not  prevent  its  enforcement 
against  the  rest;59  but  the  holder  of  a  judgment 
lien  cannot  release  land  of  his  debtor,  taken  on  exe- 
cution on  a  junior  judgment,  so  as  to  preserve  his 
lien  for  its  full  amount  against  other  land  of  the 
debtor,  where  the  debtor  files  a  refusal  to  accept  the 
release.60 

Where  portions  of  the  land  have  been  sold  to 
different  purchasers,  or  encumbered  with  subsequent 
mortgages,  the  creditor  cannot  release  his  lien  on 
the  lands  primarily  liable,  or  release  or  surrender 
other  securities  primarily  liable,  without  releasing 
at  the  same  time  the  lands  in  the  hands  of  such  pur- 
chasers  or  encumbrancers,  at  least  in  proportion  to 


the  value  of  the  portion  first  liable;61  but  this  rule 
is  qualified  by  the  requirement  that  the  judgment 
creditor  shall  have  had  notice  of  the  subsequent 
sale  or  mortgage,  before  making  the  release,  and 
the  recording  of  a  mortgage  is  not  sufficient  no- 
tice.62 

A  release  by  an  executor  of  a  judgment  which  is 
a  lien  on  realty  is  valid,  where  it  is  supported' by  a 
sufficient  consideration,  and  no  fraud,  collusion,  or 
wasting  of  the  assets  of  the  estate  is  shown.63 

§  501.    Payment  or  Satisfaction  of  Judg- 
ment 

The  Hen  of  a  Judgment  ordinarily  Is  discharged  by 
the  satisfaction  of  the  Judgment. 

The  lien  of  the  judgment  ordinarily  is  discharged 
by  the  satisfaction  of  the  judgment,64  as  by  payment 
of  the  amount  due  under  it,66  although  not  by  a 
mere  unaccepted  tender66  or  an  unperformed  prom- 
ise of  payment.67  While  the  rule  has  been  laid 
down  that,  when  once  paid,  the  judgment  lien  can- 
not be  restored  or  continued  by  any  mere  agreement 
of  the  parties,68  although  equity  may  keep  it  alive 
for  the  benefit  of  a  surety  who  has  made  the  pay- 


56.    Ala. — Kaplan  v.  Potera,  105  So. 

177,  213  Ala.  334. 
111.— Quell  v.  Jachino,  17  N.B.2d  256, 

297  Ill.App.   650. 
ET.J. — National  Union  Bank  of  Dover 

v.  Havens,  156  A.  645,  100  N.J.Eq. 

218. 
Pa, — Bryn  Mawr  Trust  Co.  v.  Cole, 

159   A.    445,   306   Pa.   274— Hair  v. 

Gerton,   18S  A.   629,   124   Pa. Super. 

350. 

34  C.J.  p  629  note  52,  p  699  note  18. 
Release    of   judgment   see   infra    §§ 

563-565. 

Effect  of  mistake 

Where  assignee  of  judgment,  con- 
stituting prior  lien  on  land,  executed 
release  under  belief  that  if  release 
was  executed  title  would  be  accepted 
by  government  and  proceeds  would 
be  paid  over  to  assignee  without  de- 
lay, but  government  refused  to  ac- 
cept deed  and  resorted  to  condem- 
nation because  assignor  of  judgment 
asserted  that  cost  item  had  not  been 
assigned,  the  release  did  not  extin- 
guish the  assignee's  claim  to  priority 
and  assignee  was  entitled  to  receive 
payment  from  proceeds  of  land. — 
U.  S.  v.  168.8  Acres  of  Land,  Scot- 
land County,  D.C.N.C.,  35  F.Supp. 
734. 

Release  of  right  of  Joint  Judgment 

debtor 

College's  Inability  to  pay  sum  ad- 
vanced by  citizens  for  its  release 
from  judgment  and  judgment  credi- 
tor's extension  of  time  for  joint 
judgment  debtor  to  pay  balance  due 
thereon  was  sufficient  consideration 


for  joint  judgment  debtor's  release 
of  claim  of  right  to  subject  land  to 
payment  of  judgment  over  against 
college. — Rutherford  v.  Watson,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  52  S.W.2d  85,  error  refused. 

57.  Iowa.— Dalby    v.    Cronkhite,    22 
Iowa  222. 

34  C.J.  p  629  note  53. 

58.  Pa. — Everett  Hardwood  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Calhoun,  183  A,  659,  121  Pa, 
Super.  451. 

59.  N.Y.— Corpns  Juris  cited  in  In 
-re  James,  223  N.Y.S.  174,  183,  221 
App.Div.    321,    reversed    on    other 
grounds  In  re  James'  Will,  161  N. 
B.  201,  248  N.T.  1,  reargument  de- 
nied   162    N.E.    550,    248    N.Y.    623. 

34  C.J.  p  629  note  54. 

60.  Pa.— Fisler    v.    Stewart,    43    A. 
396,  191  Pa,  323,  71  Am.S.B.  769. 

61.  Va. — Jones  v.   Myrick,   8   Gratt 
179,  49  Va.  179. 

34  C.J.  P  629  note  55. 

62.  Pa.— Roebuck's    Appeal,    19    A. 
310,  133  Pa.  27. 

34  C.J.  P  630  note  56. 

63.  Ind.— McCleary  v.   Chipman,    68 
N.E.  320,  32  Ind.App.  489. 

Release  of  liens  by  executor  gener- 
ally see  Executors  and  Administra- 
tor S  181  c. 

64.  Ala,— Harrison  v.  Carpenter,  142 
So.  772,  225  Ala.  297. 

Payment,  satisfaction  and  discharge 
of  judgment  see  infra  §§  550^584. 

Acceptance  of  mortgage  in  full  sat- 
isfaction 

Pa.— First  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 

953 


Ford   City   v.    Stolar,    197   A.    499, 

130  Pa.Super.  480. 
Satisfaction  by  action  of  governor 

In  surety's  action  to  enforce  judg- 
ment lien  based  on  forfeiture  of  ap- 
pearance bond,  defendant  could  show 
satisfaction  of  judgment  by  govern- 
or's action  in  setting  aside  forfei- 
ture.— Harrison  v.  Carpenter,  142  So. 
772,  225  Ala,  297. 

65.  Gteu — Patterson  v.  Clark,  23  S.E. 
496,  96  Ga.  494. 

34  C.J.  p  630  note  60. 
Notation    of    partial    payment 

Judgment  creditor  did  not  lose  its 
lien  by  failing  to  make  due  notation 
on  the  record  of  its  abstracted  judg- 
ment of  the  amount  received  by  it 
from  a  sale  of  collateral  under  exe- 
cution, the  statutes  being  intended 
for  the  benefit  of  the  judgment  debt- 
or.— Gordon-Sewall  &  Co.  v.  Walker, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  258  S.W.  233, 

66.  N.Y.-— People  v.  Beebe,  1  Barb. 
379. 

34  C.J.  P  630  note  61. 

Where  judgment  was  not  docketed 
until  eight  days  after  the  tender 
of  heifers  involved  in  replevin  suit, 
tender  could  not  have  discharged 
lien  of  judgment — Levy  v.  Kurak,  52 
N.Y.S.2d  304. 

67.  Pa.— Krebs   v.    Heckler,    2    Leg. 
Rec.  363. 

34  C.J.  p  630  note  62. 

68.  La.— Adams   v.    Daunis,    29    La, 
Ann.  315. 

N.Y. — De   la  Vergne  v.   Evertson,   1 


r.Y.— De   la  Vergne  v.   E\ 
Paige  181,  19  Am.D.  411. 


501 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ment,69  it  has  been  held  that  as  between  the  parties 
themselves  the  lien  may  be  kept  alive  by  agreement 
of  the  parties  for  the  purpose  of  securing  further 
advances,  provided  the  rights  of  third  persons  are 
not  affected.70 

When  a  judgment  creditor  enters  satisfaction  of 
his  judgment  or  causes  an  execution  to  be  returned 
satisfied,  a  third  person  is  justified  in  treating  the 
real  estate  of  the  judgment  debtor  as  released  from 
the  lien  of  the  judgment;71  but  a  junior  judgment 
creditor  will  not  gain  priority  over  a  senior  judg- 
ment creditor  by  the  fact  that  there  has  been  an 
erroneous  entry  of  satisfaction  on  the  judgment  of 
the  latter  and  a  subsequent  order  of  the  court  strik- 
ing it  off,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that  the  junior 
creditor  has  been  misled  to  his  injury.72  Where 
an  agreement  between  the  judgment  debtor  and 
creditor  to  have  execution  on  the  judgment  returned 
satisfied  is  procured  by  misrepresentations  of  the 
judgment  debtor,  it  will  not  operate  as  a  release  in 
favor  of  a  purchaser  of  part  of  the  debtor's  land, 
who  had  no  notice  of  the  return.7^ 

Where  a  transcript  of  judgment  7ww  been  filed  in 
a  county  other  than  tliat  of  its  rendition,  the  lien 
in  the  county  where  the  transcript  was  filed  is  dis- 
charged by  satisfaction  in  the  county  where  it  was 
rendered,  and  not  by  the  filing  of  a  copy  of  the  dock- 
et of  the  clerk  of  that  county.74 

§  502.    Sale  under  Execution 

The  Hen  of  a  judgment  is  discharged  by  a  sale  of 


lands  under  execution  for  the  full  amount  of  the  Judg- 
ment. 

A  sale  of  lands  under  execution  for  the  full 
amount  of  a  judgment  extinguishes  the  lien  of  the 
judgment  on  which  the  execution  issued,75  and  al- 
though such  sale  is  only  in  partial  satisfaction  of 
the  judgment  it  discharges  the  lien  on  the  land  sold 
as  against  the  execution  purchaser.76  Where  land 
has  been  sold  in  part  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  and 
redeemed  by  the  judgment  debtor,  the  balance  of  the 
judgment  at  once  attaches  as  a  lien  on  the  property 
in  his  hands,77  but  when  redemption  is  made  by  a 
lienholder  the  land  does  not  again  become  liable 
for  the  unsatisfied  judgment78  If  a  judgment  cred- 
itor exhausts  all  the  real  property  of  the  debtor  by 
execution  sale,  and  part  of  the  judgment  remains 
unsatisfied,  and  the  debtor  afterward  acquires  other 
real  estate,  the  unsatisfied  part  of  the  judgment 
attaches  thereto  as  a  lien.79 

§  503.    Stay  of  Execution 

A  stay  of  execution    ordinarily  does  not  destroy  or 
suspend  the  Hen  of  the  Judgment. 

The  fact  that  a  judgment  is  rendered  with  a  stay 
of  execution,  or  that  a  stay  is  aftenvard  made  by 
order  of  court,  does  not  destroy  or  suspend  the  lien 
so  as  to  give  priority  to  intervening  creditors  or 
purchasers,80  and,  although  there  is  authority  to  the 
contrary,81  the  rule  has  been  applied  even  though 
the  stay  was  by  the  direction  or  with  the  consent 
of  the  judgment  creditor,82  as  well  as  to  a  direc- 


69.    "Wis. — German-American 


Sav. 


Bank  v.  Fritz,  32  N.W.  123,  68  Wis. 
390. 

70.  Pa.— Peirce    v.    Black,    105    Pa. 
342,  346. 

34  C.J.  p  630  note  65. 

71.  CaJL — City     Properties     Co.     v. 
Fitzmaurice.    183    P.    267,    42    Cal. 
App.  16. 

34  C.J.  p  630  note  68. 

72.  Pa. — McCune  v.   McCune,   30  A. 
577,  164  Pa,  611. 

73.  W.Va. — Renick  v.  Ludington.  14 
W.Va.   368,  affirmed  20  W.Va.  511. 

34  C.J.  p  630  note  70. 

74.  Cal. — City     Properties     Co.     v. 
Fitzmaurice,    183    P.    267,    42    Cal. 
App.  16. 

75.  U.S. — Pan    American    Life    Ins. 
Co.   v.    Mayfleld,   D.C.S.C.,   49   P.2d 
900,    affirmed,    C.C.A.,    Mayfleld   v. 
Pan  American  Life  Ins.*  Co.,  49  F. 
2d  906. 

34  C.J.  p  630  note  72. 
Effect  of  execution  sale  under: 
Judgment  against  mortgaged  lands 

see  Executions  §  291  b. 
Junior  judgment  see  Executions  § 
291  b. 


Judicial  sale  divests  Judgment  lien 
U.S.— In    re   Westmoreland,   D.C.Ga,, 

4  F.2d  602. 

Pa. — Borough  of  McDonald  v.  David- 
son,  193  A.   472,   128   Pa.Super.   38. 
Wbere    execution    sale    is    invalid 
the  lien  of  the  Judgment  is  not  af- 
fected. 
111.— Erlinger  v.  Freed,  180  N.E.  400, 

347  111.  588. 

Ind.— Touhey  v.  Touhey,  51  N.E.  919, 
151  Ind.  460,  68  Am.S.R.  233. 

76.  N.T. — Hewson     v.     Deygert,     8 
Johns.  333. 

77.  Iowa, — Peckenbaugh  v.  Cook,  16 
N.W.  530,  61  Iowa  477. 

34  C.J.  p  630  note  74. 

Lien     attaching     to     after-acquired 

property    generally    see    supra    § 

477. 

lien  during-  p«riod  of  redemption 

(1)  Under  statute  if  any  part  of 
original  several  Judgment  remains 
unsatisfied  after  first  sale  of  land, 
unsatisfied  portion  did  not  become 
lien  against  judgment  debtor's  in- 
terest in  premises  during  period  of 
redemption,  and  one  acquiring  title, 
Before  expiration  of  period  of  re- 
demption, from  Judgment  debtor,  by  j 

954 


making  redemption  original  sale,  took 
land  free  from  lien  of  original  Judg- 
ment under  which  it  was  sold. — Ev- 
ans v.  City  of  American  Falls,  li 
P.2d  363,  52  Idaho  7. 

(2)  Unpaid  portion  of  original 
Judgment  not  being  lien  against  land 
sold  under  it  during  period  of  re- 
demption, revival  of  such  portion  of 
deficiency  as  had  in  interim  been  im- 
providently  satisfied  was  not  lien.— 
Evans  v.  City  of  American  Falls,  su- 
pra. 

78.  Iowa.-— Hays  v.  Thode,   18  Iowa 
51. 

79.  Iowa. — Peckenbaugh  v.  Cook,  16 
N.W.  530.  61  Iowa  477. 

80.  Conn. — Hobbs   v.   Simmonds,    23 
A.  962,  61  Conn.  235. 

34  C.J.  p  631  note  86. 

Effect  of  stay  of  execution  on  com- 
mencement of  lien  see  supra  §  470. 

Operation  of  stay  as  extension  of 
lien  see  supra  §  498  a. 

81.  Miss.— Virden    v.    Robinson,    59 
Miss.  28. 

34  C.J.  p  631  note  88. 
2.    Ala. — Decatur    Charcoal    Chemi- 
cal   Works    v.    Moses,    7    So.    637, 
89  Ala.  538. 

34  C.J.  p  631  note  87. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  507 


tion  or  agreement  to  stay  execution  not  entered  of 
record.88 

§  504.    Injunction  against  Judgment 

The  Hen  of  a  judgment  is  not  destroyed  by  an  In- 
junction restraining  the  enforcement  of  the  Judgment 
unless,  the  injunction  is  made  perpetual. 

An  injunction  stops  an  execution,  but  the  lien  of 
the  judgment  is  not  lost  or  suspended  during  the 
continuance  of  the  injunction,84  even  though  the 
injunction  was  granted  on  the  condition  of  the  ex- 
ecution of  a  bond  furnishing  the  judgment  creditor 
additional  security  for  his  debt.85  A  perpetual  in- 
junction against  the  collection  of  a  judgment  will 
destroy  its  lien,86  but,  where  an  injunction  restrain- 
ing the  collection  of  a  judgment  is  perpetuated  as 
to  a  part  of  it  only,  the  Ken  of  the  part  not  affect- 
ed continues  from  the  date  of  the  judgment.87 

§  505.    Receivership 

The  effect  of  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  for 
the  judgment  debtor  on  the  lien  of  the  judgment  is 
considered  in  the  CJ.S.  title  Receivers  §  135,  also 
34  Corpus  Juris  page  631  note  95  and  53  Corpus 
Juris  page  129  note  93. 

Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 


§  506. 


Opening  or  Vacating  Judgment 


The  vacation  of  a  Judgment,  absolutely  and  finally, 
extinguishes  the  Judgment  lien;    but  the  lien  is  not  de- 


stroyed by  the  opening  of  the  Judgment  to  permit  a  de- 
fense. 

The  setting  aside  of  a  judgment  and  entering  of 
a  new  one  will  not  destroy  the  lien  of  the  first  when 
the  new  judgment  is  but  a  modification  of  the  first.88 
Opening  a  judgment  merely  to  let  in  a  defense  does 
not  destroy  its  lien;89  and,  where  the  judgment  is 
set  aside  for  irregularity  or  error,  the  court  may 
order  the  lien  retained  for  such  amount  as  plain- 
tiff may  ultimately  recover,  or  order  the  judgment 
to  stand  as  security.90 

The  lien  is  extinguished  where  the  judgment  is 
vacated  absolutely  and  finally,91  or  canceled  and 
stricken  off  the  record,92  or  reversed  on  appeal,  as 
considered  infra  §  509,  and  in  such  cases  the  court 
has  no  power  to  continue  the  lien  so  that  it  may 
attach  to  such  judgment  as  subsequently  may  be 
rendered.93  When  an  order  vacating  a  judgment 
is  set  aside  the  lien  is  revived  in  all  its  pristine 
vigor94  except  as  to  the  rights  of  third  persons  ac- 
quired in  the  meantime.95 

§  507.    Waiver  and  Estoppel 

The   lien   of  a  judgment  may  be  lost  by  waiver  or 
estoppel. 

A  judgment  creditor  may  waive,  or  may  be  es- 
topped to  assert,  the  lien  of  his  judgment.96  A 
judgment  creditor  may  waive  or  lose  the  benefit  of 
his  lien  by  failing  to  comply  with  the  conditions  of 
the  judgment,97  or  by  such  conduct  or  representa- 


83.  111. — Marshall   v.   Moore,    36   111. 
321. 

34  C.J.  p  631  note  89. 

84.  Miss.— Smith  v.  Everly,  5  Miss. 
178. 

34  C.J.  p  631  note  91. 
Operation  of  injunction  as  extension 
of  Hen  see  supra  §  498  b. 

85.  Tenn.— Overton       v.        Perkins, 
Mart.  &  Y.  367. 

34  O.J.  p  631  note  92. 

86.  W.Va.— Grafton  &  G.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davisson,    29    S.B.    1028,    45   W.Va. 
12,  72  Am.S.R.  799. 

87.  W.Va.— Grafton  &  G.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davisson,  supra. 

88.  Wash.— Smith  v.   De   Lanty,   39 
P.  638,  11  Wash.  386. 

34  C.J.  p  631  note  96. 

89.  Pa. — Giles    v.    Ryan,    176    A.    1, 
317  Pa.  65— Salus  v.  Fogel,  153  A. 
547,     302     Pa.     268— Markofski    v. 
Tanks,   146  A.  569,  297  Pa.  74. 

34  C.J.  p  631  note  97. 

Default  Judgment 

N.J. — Paterson   Stove   Repair  Co.   v. 

Ritzer,    8    A.2d    133,    123    N-J.Law 

145. 


90.  Iowa.— Bryant    v.    Williams,    21 
Iowa  329. 

34  C.J.  p  631  note  98. 
Allowing:  judgment  to   stand  as  se- 
curity see  supra  §  303. 

91.  U.S.— In  re   Syleecau   Mfg.   Co.. 
D.C.S.C.,   17  F.2d  503. 

N.Y. — Abrams  v.  Thompson,  167  N.B. 

178,  251  N.Y.  79. 
Pa.— Giles  v.  Ryan,  176  A.  1,  317  Pa. 

65— Brandt's  Appeal,  16  Pa.  343. 
34  C.J.  p  631  note  99. 

92.  Iowa. — Polk  County  v.   Kelson, 
43   N.W.   80— Polk  County  v.  Nel- 
son,   36   N.W.   911,   75   Iowa  648. 

93.  Neb. — Farmers'    Loan    &    Trust 
Co.   v.   Killinger.    65    N.W.    790,   46 
Neb.  677,  41  L.R.A.  222. 

94.  N.T.— Halpin  v.  Coleman,  73  N. 
T.S.  233,  66  App.Div.  37. 

34  C.J.  p  633  note  37. 

95.  N.Y.— King   v.    Harris,    34    N.Y. 
330— Halpin  v.  Coleman,   73  N.Y.S. 
233,  66  App.Div.  37. 

96.  Ga. — Law  v.   Coleman,   159   S.E. 
679,  173  Ga.  68. 

Minn.— Roberts  v.  Friedell,  15  N.W. 

2d  496,  218  Minn.  88. 

Claimant   to   land  levied   on   may 
avail  himself  of  waiver  or  release  by 

955 


plaintiffs  in  execution  of  lien  fixed 
by  decree  on  land. — Law  v.  Coleman, 
159  S.E.  679,  173  Ga.  68. 

Renunciation  of  privileges  secured 
by  lien  waives  the  lien. — Law  v. 
Coleman,  supra. 

Matters   not   constituting  waiver  or 
estoppel 

(1)  Judgment     creditor     did      not 
waive   or   release   judgment   lien   on 
automobile     by     authorizing     sheriff 
to  release  first  levy  of  execution. — 
Gerlach-Barklow    Co.    v.    Bllett,    111 
So.  92,  145  Miss.  60. 

(2)  Defense  of  waiver  of  lien   of 
judgment   as    to    personalty    covered 
by    bill    of    sale    by    acceptance    by 
holder  of  judgment   lien   of  bill    of 
sale  from  judgment  debtor  conveying 
personalty  as  security  for  an  inde- 
pendent   loan   was    not   available   to 
judgment   debtor. — Bostwick   v.    Fel- 
der,  Ga.App.,  35  S.E.2d  783. 

(3)  Other       matters. — B  a  n  k  e  r  s' 
Home    Building    &    Loan    Ass'n    v. 
Wyatt,     Civ.App.,     153     S.W.2d     216, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  162  S.W.2d 
694,  139  Tex.  173. 

97.    Colo. — Drake  v.  Gilpin  Min.  Co., 
27  P.  708,  16  Colo.  231. 


507 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tions  to  purchasers  or  subsequent  encumbrancers  as 
induce  the  belief  that  he  has  no  claim  on  the  land, 
or  has  abandoned  his  claim,  so  as  to  make  it  ineq- 
uitable that  he  should  thereafter  set  up  his  lien  in 
prejudice  of  their  rights.98 

On  the  other  hand,  the  lien  is  not  waived  or 
abandoned  by  the  mere  failure  to  enforce  or  to 
attempt  to  enforce  it  for  a  period  short  of  the 
statutory  bar,"  by  the  taking  of  a  mortgage  for 
the  same  debt,1  by  the  creditor's  acceptance  of  a 
sum  of  money  paid  to  him  by  the  clerk  of  the  court 
to  make  good  a  fault  or  omission  of  his  which  was 
supposed  to  have  invalidated  the  judgment,2  by  an 
unsuccessful  attempt  to  obtain  payment  from  an- 
other fund,3  by  filing  a  claim  against  the  estate  of 
a  deceased  debtor,4  from  the  fact  that  the  creditor 
brings  suit  in  equity  to  avoid  a  fraudulent  transfer 
of  the  debtor's  lands,5  or  causes  his  judgment  to  be 
docketed  in  another  county,6  or  because  purchasers 
of  the  land  after  judgment  was  entered  have  made 
improvements,  where  such  purchasers  were  bound 
to  know  that  such  judgment  was  unsatisfied,  and 
that  the  tax  deed  under  which  they  claim  was  not 
duly  recorded.7 

§  508.    Destruction,   Removal,   or  Con- 
cealment of  Property 

A  Judgment  lien  on  personal  property  may  be  ex- 
tinguished by  the  destruction,  removal,  or  concealment 
of  the  property. 

A  judgment  lien  on  personal  property  may  be 
destroyed,  so  that  it  cannot  be  enforced  against  the 
property  by  the  lienholder,  by  a  destruction  of  the 


property  itself,8  by  removing  it  from  the  state,9  by 
hiding  or  concealing  it,10  by  removing  it  to  other 
parts  of  the  same  county,  city,  or  state,  so"  that  a 
creditor  does  not  know  where  it  is,  although  it  is 
not  concealed,11  by  selling  to  a  bona  fide  purchas- 
er,12 or  by  any  other  act  of  interference  with  the 
property  to  such  an  extent  that  the  lien  on  it  is  lost, 
destroyed,  or  impaired,  and  cannot  be  enforced.13 

§  509.    Appeal  or  Writ  of  Error 

Unless  contrary  provisions  are  made  by  statute,  the 
lien  of  a  Judgment  ordinarily  Is  not  discharged  by  the 
pendency  of  an  appeal  or  writ  of  error. 

Except  where  provisions  to  the  contrary  are  made 
by  statute,14  the  general  rule  is  that  the  lien  of  a 
judgment  is  not  discharged,  but  the  right  to  enforce 
the  lien  is  merely  suspended,  by  the  pendency  of 
an  appeal  or  writ  of  error,  and  on  the  affirmance 
of  the  judgment  the  lien  is  restored  with  full  force 
so  that  no  priority  is  acquired  by  a  purchase  or  en- 
cumbrance made  while  such  appeal  or  writ  of  er- 
ror is  pending;15  and  by  statute  in  some  states  the 
lien  remains  unimpaired  until  the  judgment  is  re- 
versed or  modified  by  the  appellate  court16 

Where  a  judgment  is  vacated  or  reversed  on  ap- 
peal, the  lien  previously  acquired  is  destroyed;17 
but  a  simple  judgment  of  affirmance  does  not  dis- 
turb the  lien  of  the  judgment  from  the  time  of  its 
entry  below.18  Where  a  judgment  is  reversed  in 
part  and  affirmed  as  to  the  residue,  the  partial  re- 
versal will  not  affect  the  lien  of  as  much  of  the 
judgment  as  remains  unreversed.19  The  subsequent 
rendition  of  another  judgment  in  the  same  cause 
will  not  revive  the  lien  of  a  judgment  reversed  on 


98.  La. — Crichton  Co.  v.  Turner,  111 
So.  261,  162  La.  864. 

Minn.— Roberts  v.  Priedell,  15  N.W. 

2d  496;  218  Minn.  88. 
34  C.J.  p  632  note  6. 
Fnroliase  money 

Where  judgment  creditor,  obtain- 
ing special  lien  on  debtor's  land, 
sought  to  subject  purchase  money 
due  by  purchaser  from  Judgment 
debtor  to  payment  of  Judgment,  cred- 
itor thereby  waived  portion  of  orig- 
inal decree  fixing  special  and  general 
lien  on  land. — Law  v.  Coleman,  159 
S.E.  679,  173  Ga.  68. 

99.  Ala. — Clark  v.    Johnson,    61   So. 
84,  7  Ala.App.  507. 

34  C.J.  p  632  note  7. 

Necessity  of  execution  to  preserve 
lien  see  supra  5  468. 

Statutory  duration  of  lien  see  su- 
pra §  489. 

1.    N.T.— Muir  v.  Leitch,  7  Barb.  841. 

8.  S.C.— Hardln  v.  Melton,  4  S.E. 
805,  9  S.E,  423,  28  B.C.  38. 

3.  Pa,^— Connelly  v.  Withers,  9  Lane. 
Bar  117* 


4.     Ind. — Green  v.  Stobo,  20  N.E.  850, 

118  Ind.  332. 
B.     N.Y.— Wilkinson   v.    Paddock,    27 

N.E.  407,  125  N.Y.  748. 

6.  N.C.— Isler  v.   Colgrove,    75   N.C. 
334— Perry  v.  Morris,  65  N.C.  221. 

7.  U.S. — Hill    v.     Gordon,    C.C.Fla., 
45  F.  276,  appeal  dismissed  13   S. 
Ct.    1047,    149    U.S.    775,    37    L.Ed. 
963. 

a    Ala. — Clark  v.  Johnson,  61  So.  84, 
7  Ala.App.  507. 

9.  Ala.— Clark  v.  Johnson,  supra. 

10.  Ala. — Clark  v.  Johnson,  supra. 

11.  Ala. — Clark  v.    Johnson,   supra. 
34  C.J.  p  632  note  18. 

12.  Ala. — Clark  v.    Johnson,    supra. 

13.  Ala. — Clark   v.    Johnson,    supra. 

14.  N.Y.— Wronkow  v.  Oakley,  31  N. 
E.    521,   133   N.Y.    505,   28  Am.S.B. 
661,   16   L.R.A,  209,   28  AbbJST.Cas. 
409. 

34  C.J.  p  632  note  .31. 
Operation  as   extension  of  lien  see 
s.upra  $  498  c. 

956 


15.  Cal. — Stetson  v.  Sheehan,  200  P. 
387,   52    Cal.App.    353,   hearing  de- 
nied 200  P.  392,  186  Cal.  334. 

Okl.— Funk  v.   First   Nat.   Bank,    95 

P.2d  589,  185  Okl.  604. 
34  C.J.  p  633  note  32—3  C.J.  p  1262 

note  76. 

16.  N.C.— Black  v.  Black,  1$  S.E. 
412,  111  N.C.  300. 

3  C.J.  p  1262  note  78. 

17.  N.T. — Clinton    v.     South    Shore 
Natural  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.,  113  N.Y. 
S.  289,  61  Misc.  339. 

34  C.J.  p  633  note  33—3  C.J.  p  1263 
notes  81,  82. 

18.  Miss. — Montgomery  v.  McGimp- 
sey,  15  Miss.  557. 

34  C.J.  p  633  note  34. 

19.  Va, — Thomson  v.  Chapman,  2  S. 
E.  273,  83  Va.  215. 

W.Va. — Grafton  &  G,  K.  Co.  v.  Da- 
visson,  29  S.E.  1028*  45  W.Va,  12, 
72  Am.S.H.  799. 

34  C.J.  p  633  note  35. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  511 


appeal,  so  as  to  make  it  effective  from  the  date  of 
the  original  judgment20 

Appeal  from  justice's  judgment.  It  has  been  held 
that  the  lien  created  by  filing  or  recording  the 
transcript  of  a  justice's  judgment  is  destroyed  where 
an  appeal  is  entered  within  the  time  limited  by  law ; 
the  cause  then  goes  to  the  higher  court  for  new 
trial  and  judgment,  and  the  lien  of  that  judgment 
can  date  only  from  its  rendition,  and  does  not  re- 
late-back to  the  time  of  entry  of  the  transcript  of 
the  justice's  judgment;21  but  there  is  also  authority 
to  the  contrary.22 

§  510.     Remedies  of  Creditor  after  Termina- 
tion of  Lien 

After  the  lien  of  a  judgment  has.  expired  at  law  it 
may  not  be  enforced  in  equity,  but  the  judgment  itself, 
if  still  operative,  may  be  enforced,  as  by  execution 
against  the  property  of  the  Judgment  debtor. 

After  the  lien  of  a  judgment  has  expired  at  law  it 
may  not  be  enforced  in  equity28  or  made  the  basis 
of  a  creditor's  bill  or  a  bill  to  subject  property;24 
nor  can  the  lien  be  revived  or  continued  by  the 
mere  act  of  issuing  an  execution.25  Also  such  a 
lien  may  not  be  enforced  or  foreclosed  by  action,26 
at  least  as  against  an  inferior  lien.27  It  has  been 
held  that  the  lien  may  not  be  enforced  after  its  ex- 
piration even  though  the  action  was  begun  before 
its  expiration,28  although  there  is  also  authority 
to  the  contrary.29 


Unless  by  reason  of  statute  the  judgment  becomes 
inoperative  coincident  with  the  termination  of  the 
lien,  the  judgment  continues  a  valid  claim  against 
the  debtor,8**  and,  although  it  has  no  lien,  it  may 
be  filed  as  a  claim  against  his  estate  after  his 
death81  or  collected  by  means  of  an  execution- 
against  property  the  title  to  which  remains  in  the 
judgment  debtor;82  and  it  will  entitle  the  creditor 
to  redeem  from  a  sale  under  a  junior  judgment88" 
or  to  take  the  money  from  the  junior  judgment 
creditor  where  the  senior  lien  was  not  enforceable 
only  because  of  possession  by  a  bona  fide  purchaser 
for  value  for  the  statutory  period.84 

Any  wrongdoer  in  the  chain  of  acts  by  which  a 
judgment  lien  is  destroyed,  whether  his  act  results, 
directly  or  indirectly  in  the  destruction,  is  responsi- 
ble to  the  lienholder.85  A  cause  of  action  for  de- 
stroying a  judgment  lien  on  personalty  has  been? 
held  not  to  be  established  by  proof  of  mere  con- 
version.86 

§  511.    Enforcement  of  Lien 

a.  In  general 

b.  Proceedings  to  enforce  lien 

a.  la  General 

Where  authorized  by  statute,  the  Hen  of  a  judg- 
ment may  be  enforced  by  an  action  for  foreclosure,  and,, 
in  proper  cases,  the  lien  may  be  enforced  in  equity. 


20.  Neb.— Oliver  v.   Lansing,   77  N. 
W.  802,  57  Neb.  352. 

34  C.J.  p  633  note  36. 

21.  Mo.— Earl  v.  Hart,   1  S.W.   238, 
89  Mo.  263. 

34  C.J.  p  633  note  39. 

22.  111. — Dawson  v.  Cunning,  50  111. 
App.  286. 

N.C. — Dysart   v.    Brandreth,    23    S.B. 
966,  118  N.C.  968. 

23.  Ind.— Petrovitch  v.  Witholm,  152 
N.B.   849,'  85  Ind.App.  144. 

34  C.J.  p  621  note  59,  p  634  note  47. 
Foreclosure  after  expiration  of  lien 

see  infra  §  511  a. 

Representation,  of  amount  ad- 
vanced under  mortgage  subsequent 
to  judgment  lien  afforded  no  ground 
of  equitable  relief  for  lienor's  fail- 
ure to  enforce  lien  within  statutory 
period. — Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  of 
Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick  Co.,  30 
S.W.2d  253,  161  Tenn.  298, 

Sale  of  Judgment  debtor's  subse- 
quently mortgaged  property  to  oth- 
ers did  not  authorize  equity  to  ex- 
tend judgment  lien  beyond  statutory 
twelve  months.— Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.  of  Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick 
Co.,  supra. 

"Unfounded  donfcts  regarding  rights 
will  not  warrant  equity's  interven- 
tion to  **tead  judgment  lien  con- 


trary to  statute.— Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.  of  Maryland  v.  Fulcher  Brick 
Co.,  supra/ 

24.  Mo. — Lakenan  v.  Robards,  9  Mo. 
App.  179,  affirmed  81  Mo.  445. 

34  C.J.  p  634  note  48. 

25.  N.Y.— Roe  v.  Swart,  5  Cow.  294. 
Pa. — Stephen's  Appeal,  38  Pa.  9. 

26.  Ala. — Harrison  v.  Carpenter,  142 
So.  772,  225  Ala.  297. 

N.M.— Pugh  v.  Heating  &  Plumbing 
Finance  Corp.,  161  P.2d  714,  49 
N.M.  234. 

Va.— Blair  v.  Rorer's  Adm'r,  116  S. 
B.  767,  135  Va.  1,  motion  for  leave 
to  file  petition  for  writ  of  error 
denied  43  S.Ct.  704,  262  U.S.  234, 
67  L.Ed.  1206. 

34  C.J.  p  636  note  65. 

Remedies  of  creditor  after  termina- 
tion of  lien  see  supra  §  510. 

27.  Ind.— McAfee  v.  Reynolds,  28  N. 
E.  423,  130  Ind.  33,  30  Am.S.R.  194, 
18  UR.A.  211. 

34'OJ.  p  636  note  66. 

28.  Okl.— McGinnis    v.    Seibert,    134 
P.  396,  37  Okl.  272. 

34  C.J.  p  636  note  67. 
Extension  of  lien  by  suit  to  enforce 
see  supra  {495. 

29.  Tex,— Boyd  v.    Ghent,    64 
929,  95  Tex.  46. 

34  C.J.  p  636  note  68. 

957 


sa  Idaho.— Platts  v.  Pacific  First 
Federal  Savings  &  Loan  Ass'n  of 
Tacoma,  111  P.2d  1093,  62  Idaho* 
340. 

N.T. — Domestic  &  Foreign  Discount 
Corp.  v.  Beuerlein,  54  N.Y.S.2d? 
548. 

34  C.J.  p  634  note  50. 


31.    Ind.— Fisher 
Ind.  89. 


v.     Freeman,      65- 


32.  Mo.—Steele    v.    Reid,    223    S.W.. 
881,  284  Mo.  269. 

34  C.J.  p  634  note  -52. 
Time  for  issuance  of  execution  see 
Executions  §  66. 

33.  N.T. — Ex  parte   Peru    Iron    Co., 
7  Cow.  540. 

34.  Ga. — Jones    v.    Wright,    60    Ga~ 
364, 

35.  Ala. — Clark   v.    Johnson,    61    So- 
34,  7  Ala.App.  507. 

34  C.J.  p  634  note  55. 

Obstruction  of  legal  remedies  a» 
tort  generally  see  the  C.J.S.  title- 
Torts  §  45,  also  62  C.J.  p  1148 
note  1  et  seq. 

36.  Ala. — Clark  v.  Johnson,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  634  note  56. 

Contra  Teat  v.  Chapman,  56  So.  267,. 
1  AUuApp  491—34  C.J.  p  634  note- 
57. 


§  511 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


In  addition  to  a  sale  tinder  execution  of  prop- 
erty bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judgment,  as  considered 
in  Executions  §  33,  there  exists  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions a  statutory  method  for  enforcing  the  lien  by 
an  action  for  foreclosure.37  Under  its  jurisdiction 
to  enforce  liens,  as  considered  in  Equity  §  60,  and 
in  the  C.J.S.  title  Liens,  §  20,  also  21  Corpus  Juris 
page  118  note  36  et  seq  and  37  Corpus  Juris  page 
340  note  39  et  seq,  equity  may  in  proper  cases  en- 
force judgment  liens38  where  the  judgment  credi- 
tor has  no  adequate  remedy  at  law,39  and  statutory 
jurisdiction  to  enforce  judgment  liens  has  some- 
times been  conferred  on  courts  of  equity.40  The 
lien  of  a  judgment  may  be  enforced  in  equity  where 


it  is  not  possible  to  issue  an  execution41  or,  not- 
withstanding the  right  to  execution,  the  judgment 
creditor  is  impeded  from  realizing  thereon.4^ 

Redemption.  A  debtor  who  has  sold  his  interest 
in  the  realty  has  no  right  to  redeem  from  the  fore- 
closure of  the  judgment  lien.43 

b.  Proceedings  to  Enforce  Lien 

A  suit  to  enforce  a  judgment  lien  against  land  is 
not  a  suit  to  recover  the  land  or  a  suit  on  the  judg- 
ment. 

The  suit  of  a  judgment  creditor  to  enforce  his 
judgment  lien  against  the  land  is  not  a  suit  to  re- 
cover the  land  itself,44  nor  is  it  a  suit  on  the  judg- 


37.    Conn. — Merchants'        Bank 

Trust  Co.  v.  Pettison,  153  A.  789, 

112  Conn,  652. 
La, — Henry  v.  Roque,  App.,  18  So.2d 

917. 
N.M. — Pugh  v.  Heating:  &  Plumbing 

Finance    Corp.,    161    P.2d    714,    49 

N.M.  234. 

34  C.J.  p  635  note  63. 
Absence   of   ordinary   means 

Right  to  statutory  foreclosure  of 
lien  does  not  necessarily  exist  as 
long  AS  judgment  is  enforceable  by 
ordinary  means. — Pugh  v.  Heating  & 
PluijcMng  Finance  Corp.,  supra. 

78.  Via.— Smith  v.  Pattishall,  176 
So-  568,  127  Fla,  474,  129  Fla.  498. 

Te*— Baker  v.  West,  36  S.W.2d  695, 
120  Tex.  113— Mullins  v.  Albertson, 
Civ.App.,  136  S.W.2d  263,  error  re- 
fused— Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Fikes 
r.  Buckholts  State  Bank,  Civ.App., 
*.73  S.W.  957,  961. 

Enforcement  of  judgments  In  equity 
see  infra  §  587. 

Acceleration,   of   lien   on   default   in 

payment  of  taxes 
Where  judgment  giving*  plaintiff 
a  lien  on  mining  claims  provided 
that  failure  of  corporate  defendant 
owner  to  pay  taxes  assessed  against 
property  before  they  became  delin- 
quent should  accelerate  lien  and 
make  it  foreclosable  as  a  mortgage, 
plaintiff  had  right,  on  defendant's  de- 
fault in  paying  taxes,  to  foreclose 
lien,  and  such  foreclosure  would  not 
be  unconscionable  as  working  a  for- 
feiture in  view  of  defendant's  avail- 
able remedies. — Sparks  v.  Kowley 
Mines,  149  P.2d  673,  61  Ariz.  370. 

Effect  of  fraud  in  inducing  execu- 
tion, of  another  instrument 
Where  agreed  judgment  awarded 
attorney's  fee,  secured  by  lien  on 
property  of  client,  who  subsequently 
executed  notes  therefor,  attorney's 
alleged  fraud  in  inducing  execution 
of  trust  deed  securing  notes  did  not 
prevent  foreclosure  of  judgment  lien 
by  attorney's  transferees,  including 
associate  counsel  aiding  in  obtaining 


judgment. — Keels  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
Tex.Civ.App.,    71    S.W.2d   372. 

39.  Neb.— Rich  v.  Cooper,  286  N.W. 
383,  136  Neb.  463. 

Where  Judgment  creditor  has  legal 
lien  on  land  held  by  equitable  title, 
creditor  must  seek  aid  of  court  of 
equity  to  uncover  equitable  title.- 
Miller  v.  Kemp,  160  S.E.  203,  157 
Va,  178,  84  A.L.R.  980. 

40.  Ala.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Powell, 
155  So.  624,  229  Ala,  178. 

Va. — Sutherland  v.  Rasnake,  192  S.E. 
695,  169  Va.  257— McClanahan's 
Adm'r  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  96 
S.B.  453,  122  Va,  705. 

34  C.J.  p  635  note  64,  p  634  note  60 

m. 

Jurisdiction  extends  only  as  far  as 
may  be  necessary  to  satisfy  lien.— 
Tackett  v.  Boiling,  1  S.B.2d  285,  172 
Va,  326. 

living-  debtor 

Statute  applies  to  suit  brought  to 
subject  land  of  living  debtor  to  lien 
of  judgment  thereon,  and  has  no 
application  to  suit  in  equity  to  sub- 
ject lands  of  decedent  to  payment  of 
his  debts. — Morrison  v.  Morrison,  14 
S.K.2d  322,  177  Va,  417. 

Effect  of  death  of  Judgment  debtor 

pending"  suit 
After  death  of  judgment  debtor 
against  whom  suit  for  enforcement 
of  judgment  lien  on  his  real  estate 
was  pending  at  his  death,  it  is  prop- 
er and  necessary  to  require  a  settle- 
ment of  his  estate  in  such  suit,  if 
he  left  any  personal  property  ap- 
plicable to  the  payment  of  his  debts, 
but  such  settlement  is  merely  inci- 
dental to  the  accomplishment  of  the 
purpose  of  the  suit,  and  does  not  al- 
ter its  character,  although  it  is 
susceptible  of  enlargement  and  ex- 
tension to  a  purpose  not  strictly 
within  its  original  scope,  namely, 
sale  of  real  estate  to  satisfy  unse- 
cured indebtedness. — First  Nat.  Bank 
v.  De  Berriz,  105  S.B.  900,  87  W.Va, 
477,  j 

958 


Statutory  remedy  merely  cumulative 
Ala, — Ashley  v.  Thrasher,  146  So. 
807,  226  Ala.  313— Griffith  v.  First 
Nat.  Bank,  128  So.  595,  221  Ala,  311 
— Johnston  v.  Bates,  95  So.  375, 
209  Ala,  16—34  C.J.  p  635  note  62 
[a]. 

41.    Cal.— Wellborn  v.  Wellborn,  131 

P.2d    48,    55    Cal.App,2d    516. 
34  C.J.  p  634  note  60.« 

Mo  money  judgment 

Where  judgment  expressly  creat- 
ed lien  on  particular  property  but 
no  money  judgment  was  entered  in 
favor  of  lienholder,  and  no  require- 
ment made  for  sale  of  the  property, 
execution  would  not  lie  for  enforce- 
ment of  lien,  but  an  equitable  action 
was  required  to  enforce  it.— Wellborn 
v.  Wellborn,  supra. 

Znf oroement  in  probate  court  after 

death 

Where  judgment  debtor  conveyed 
to  another  all  his  title  in  certain 
land  prior  to  his  death,  nothing  re- 
mained in  his  estate  relative  to  land 
subject  to  orders  of  probate  court, 
and  hence  judgment  creditor  seeking 
to  enforce  his  judgment  lien  against 
land  did  not  have  to  seek  relief 
through  probate  court — W.  T.  Raw- 
leigh  Co.  v.  Childers,  Tex.Civ.App., 
132  S.W.2d  434. 

Where  execution  may  issue,  an 
equitable  action  is  unnecessary. — 
Corporation  of  America  v.  Marks,  73 
P.2d  1215,  10  Oal.2d  218,  114  A.L.R. 
1162—34  C.J.  p  634  note  60. 

42.  Tex.— Hull  v.   Naumberg,    20    S. 
W.   1125,   1   Tex.Civ.App.   132. 

;  C.J.  p  634  note  61. 
Remedies  in  equity  against  fraudu- 
lent   conveyance    see     Fraudulent 
Conveyances  §§  319-325. 

43.  Conn. — Meister   v.   Gale,    139   A. 
700,  107  Conn.  52. 

44.  Va, — McClanahan's      Adm'r      v. 
Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  96  S.B.  453, 
122  Va,  705. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  511 


ment.45  A  judgment  creditor  who  comes  into  a 
court  of  equity  to  enforce  his  lien  on  land  is  not 
asserting  an  equitable  right  or  seeking  equitable  re- 
lief; his  judgment  is  a  legal  lien.46  After  the 
death  of  the  judgment  debtor  the  lien  may  be  en- 
forced in  equity  without  revival  of  the  judgment47 
The  tender  to  the  senior  mortgagee  of  the  amount 
of  the  mortgage  debt  is  not  a  prerequisite  to  the 
foreclosure  of  a  junior  judgment  lien.48 


The  suit  must  be  brought  within  the  time  limited 
by  statute  ;49  and  laches  in  instituting  the  suit  may 
bar  relief.50  Such  notice  must  be  given  to  the  judg- 
ment debtor  as  is  prescribed  by  statute.61  Thus, 
where  required  by  statute,  the  judgment  creditor  in 
advance  of  suit  must  give  the  specified  notice  that 
suit  will  be  instituted.52  In  the  absence  of  special 
statutory  regulations,  the  general  rules  control  as 
to  parties53  and  pleadings.54  In  accordance  with 


45.  Tex. — Nichols    v.    Causler,    Civ. 
App.,    140    S.W.2d    254,    error   dis- 
missed, Judgment  correct. 

46.  Va. — Savings    &   Loan   Corpora- 
tion v.  Bear,  154  S.E.  587,  155  Va. 
312,     75     A.L.R.     980— Planary     v. 
Kane,  46  S.R  312,  102  Va.  547,  re- 
hearing denied  46  S.E.  681,  102  Va. 
547. 

47.  Neb. — Corpus  Juris  olted  in  Rich 
v.   Cooper,   286   N.W.   383,   385,   136 
Neb.   463. 

W.Va.— Maxwell   v.   Leeson,   40    S.E. 
420,  50  W.Va.  361,  88  Am.S.R.  875. 

48.  Tex. — Bstelle  v.  Hart.  Com.App., 
55  S.W..2d  510. 

49.  Wash.— Castanier  v.  Mottet,  128 
P.2d  974,  14  Wash.2d  615. 

Statute  inapplicable 

Statute  providing  that  no  action 
shall  be  brought  on  any  judgment 
against  a  defendant  within  nine 
years  after  rendition  thereof  without 
leave  of  court  applies  to  the  exten- 
sion or  renewal  of  a  judgment,  and 
not  to  an  action  to  enforce  a  lien 
established  thereby. — Lackender  v. 
Morrison,  2  N.W.2d  286,  231  Iowa 
899. 

Where  decree  of  distribution  of 
decedent's  estate  created  lien  in  fa- 
vor of  decedent's  widow  against  in- 
terests of  other  distributees,  and 
within  six  years  after  entry  of  the 
decree  a  partition  suit  was  institut- 
ed wherein,  after  defining  interests 
of  respective  parties  and  confirming 
widow's  lien,  all  lands  were  directed 
to  be  sold  at  public  auction,  parti- 
tion decree  initiated  new  rights  in 
favor  of  widow  as  regards  time  in 
which  she  was  required  to  brin.g  ac- 
tion to  enforce  her  lien,  as  against 
contention  that  partition  decree 
merely  constituted  a  recognition  of 
the  subsistence  of  a  lien  at  such 
time.— Castanier  v.  Mottet,  128  P.2d 
974,  14  Wash.2d  615. 

50.  Cal. — Christerson   v.   Chase,    257 
P.  889,  84  Cal.App.  165. 

Plaintiff  held  not  guilty  of  laches 

U.S.— Mills  v.   Smith,  C.C.AJnd.,   113 

F.2d    404,    certiorari   denied   Smith 

v.  Mills,   61  S.Ct.  73,  311  U.S.  692, 

85  L.Bd.  447. 

Md.— Wilmer  v.  Light  Street  Savings 

&    Building    Ass'n    of    Baltimore 

City,  122  A.  129,  143  Md.  272. 

51.  Va.— Sutherland  v.  Rasnake,  192 
S.B.  695,  169  Va,  257. 


Serving  copy  of  petition  to  sub- 
ject real  estate  to  judgment  lien  on 
defendants  is  material  only  in  de- 
termining priority  in  creditors' 
•ights. — Lawrence  v.  Stan  ton,  237  N. 
W.  512,  212  Iowa  949. 

52.  Va. — Sutherland  v.  Rasnake,  192 
S.B.  695,  169  Va.  257. 

Purpose  of  statute  providing  that 
no  bill  to  enforce  lien  of  judgment 
not  exceeding  twenty  dollars  shall 
be  entertained  unless  judgment  debt- 
or has  been  given  thirty  days'  notice 
that  suit  would  be  instituted  is  to 
spare  judgment  debtor  expense  of 
suit  brought  to  enforce  lien  of  judg- 
ment in  such  a  small  amount  until 
he  shall  have  been  given  a  final 
opportunity  to  pay  claim. — Suther- 
land v.  Rasnake,  supra. 

53.  N.C.— -Brown  v.   Harding,    89    S. 
EL  222,  171  N.C.  686. 

34   C.J.   p   634   notes   60    [b],   61    [a], 

p  635  note  62   [b]. 
Necessary  parties 

(1)  Where  land  had  been  convey- 
ed   by    judgment    debtor,    the    only 
necessary  parties  to  action  for  fore- 
closure of  lien  were  judgment  cred- 
itor and  grantee  of  judgment  debtor. 
N.C.— Flynn  v.  Rumley,  192  S.B.  868, 

212  N.C.  25. 

Tex. — Citizens'  Bank  v.  Brandau,  Civ. 
App..  1  S.W.2d  466,  error  refused. 

(2)  Where  judgment,  in  awarding 
divorce     and    certain     property     to 
wife,    imposed    lien    thereon    to    se- 
cure attorney's  fee,  and  wife  subse- 
quently executed  notes  therefor  se- 
cured   by    trust    deed,    children,    al- 
though living  with  wife  on  property 
as    homestead,    were    not    necessary 
parties  to  suit  to  foreclose  liens. — 
Keels    v.   First   Nat.   Bank,   Tex.Civ. 
App.,  71  S.W.2d  372. 

(3)  Other  cases.— White  v.  Glenn, 
Tex.Civ.App.,   138    S.W.2d   914,   error 
dismissed,    judgment    correct — 34    C. 
J.  p  634  note  61  [a],  p  635  notes  62 
[b],  64  [b]   (3),  <5)-<7),  (16). 
Proper  parties 

(1)  Fact    that    creditor's    bill    to 
subject  property  to  lien  of  recorded 
judgment  prayed  discovery  separat- 
ing debtor's  interest  from  coUwners 
authorized  joining  them  as  defend- 
ants.—Griffith   v.    First    Nat    Bank, 
128  So.  595,  221  Ala.  311. 

(2)  Judgment   creditor  seeking   to 
enforce  lien  against  debtor's  undivid- 

959 


ed  interest  in  land  was  not  entitled 
to  have  land  sold  for  division  among 
loint  owners,  and  the  joint  owners,, 
other  than  debtor,  were  not  "prop- 
er parties"  to  bill. — Hargett  v.  Hova- 
ter,  15  So.2d  276,  244  Ala.  646. 

(3)  Other  cases. — Decker  v.  Gil- 
bert, 80  Ind.  107—34  C.J.  p  634  note 
60  [b],  p  635  note  62  [b]. 

Intervention,  of  interested  persons 

(1)  Persons  beneficially  interested 
in  judgments,  not  already  parties  to 
actions  to  enforce  them,  may  come 
in  by  leave  of  court,  making  them- 
selves   parties. — Brown    v.    Harding, 
89  S.E.  222,  171  N.C.  686. 

(2)  In    suit    to    enforce    judgment 
lien    against    lands,    on    behalf    of 
plaintiff  and  all  other  lien  creditors 
of  defendant  who  will  make  them- 
selves   parties   on   the   usual   terms, 
one  has  a  right  to  file  his  petition, 
and  become  a  party  plaintiff,  with- 
out maintaining  a  separate   suit   to 
mature    his    bill,    since,    having   ac- 
quired jurisdiction  of  the  cause   on 
equitable  grounds,  the  court  may  go 
on  to  a  complete  adjudication  of  the 
rights  of  the  various  parties. — Kane 
v.   Mann,   24   S.B.   938,   93  Va.   239. 

Where  mortgagor's  rights  had 
been  cut  off  by  mortgage  foreclosure 
suit,  he  was  not  entitled  to  law  day 
in  subsequent  action  to  foreclose 
prior  judgment  lien. — Joseph  v.  Don- 
ovan, 164  A.  498,  116  Conn.  160. 

54.    N.C.— Adams   v.   Cleve,    10    S.E. 

2d  911,  218  N.C.  302. 
34  OJ.  p  635  note  63   [a]    (1).' 

Petition,  or  complaint 

(1)  The  existence  of  the  lien  must 
be  pleaded.— Roney   v.   Dothan   Pro- 
duce  Co.,    117   So.    36,   217   Ala.    475. 

(2)  Allegation  that  rents  and  prof- 
its    will     not     discharge     judgment 
within  five  years  is  not  required. — 
Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Feamster,  14  S- 
B.2d  619,   123  W.Va.   250 — Handly  v. 
Sydenstricker,  4  W.Va,  605. 

(3)  Petition   construed   as    one    to 
enforce   existing  judgment  lien  and 
not  to  establish  lien. — Stephenson  v. 
Lichtenstein,    160   P.   1170,    24   Wyo. 
417. 

(4)  Bill  alleging,  and  seeking  en- 
forcement   of,    paramount    lien    on 
property  under   recorded   judgments 
assigned  to  complainant  was  good  as 
bill  to  enforce  judgment  liens. — Me- 


§  511 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  general  rules  of  evidence  which  usually  apply 
in  proceedings  to  enforce  a  judgment  lien,55  where 
a  third  person  claims  ownership  of  the  property  on 
which  the  judgment  creditor  seeks  a  foreclosure  of 
the  judgment  lien/ such  third  person  may  not  show 
title  to  the  property  in  a  stranger  unless  he  con- 
nects himself  with  such  title.66 

Trial  or  Jtearing.  General  rules  ordinarily  apply 
to  the  trial  or  hearing  of  an  action  or  suit  to  en- 
force the  lien  of  a  judgment.57  The  merits  of  the 
cause  in  which  the  original  judgment  was  ren- 


dered will  not  be  considered;58  nor  may  the  va- 
lidity of  the  original  judgment  be  questioned59  un- 
less it  is  void.60 

Judgment  or  decree.  General  rules  usually  are 
applicable  to  the  judgment  or  decree  in  an  action  or 
suit  to  enforce  a  judgment  lien.61  A  sale  of  land 
for  the  payment  of  the  lien  should  not  be  decreed 
until  there  has  first  been  an  account  of  all  the 
liens  on  the  land  and  their  relative  priorities,  if 
any.62  A  sale  may  be  ordered  without  reference  to 
a  contingent  right  of  dower.6^  Where  the  statute 


Fry  v.  Stewart  121  So.  517,  219  Ala. 
216. 

(5)  Abstract     of     judgment,     the 
judgment,  and  an  assignment  there- 
of were  sufficiently  described  in  the 
petition  to  Inform  the  court  and  de- 
fendants of  the  nature  of  the  instru- 
ments  and   to   warrant   introduction 
of  such  instruments  in  evidence,  and 
abstract   of   judgment   was    not   re- 
quired to  be  attached  to  the  petition. 
—  Carver  v.   Gray,   Tex.Civ.App.,   140 
S.W.2d    227,    error    dismissed,    judg- 
ment correct. 

(6)  Held    insufficient  —  Citizens'    & 
Southern  Nat  Bank  v.  Georgia  Rail- 
road Bank,  159  S.E.  287,  43  Ga.App. 
387. 


N.C.—  Adams  v.  Cleve,  10  S.E.2d  911, 
218  N.C.  302. 

Issues,  proof,  and  variance 

(1)  Defendant  could,  under  gener- 
al denial,  prove  any  matter  tending 
to    show   that   plaintiff   had   no    en- 
forceable   lien.  —  Payne    v.    Bracken, 
115  S.W.2d  903,  131  Tex.  394. 

(2)  In    suit    to    enforce   judgment 
lien   against   grantor  of  realty  and 
corporation    to    which    realty    was 
conveyed  and  its  vendee,  equities  in 
favor  of  corporation  and  its  vendee 
could   be    established  under   general 
denial  without  pleading  facts  out  of 
which    they    arose,    notwithstanding 
equities   consisted   in  part   of  right 
to  assert  estoppel  as  against  grantor, 
since  land  was  subject  to  equitable 
rights  of  corporation  and  its  vendee. 
—  Payne  v.  Bracken,  supra. 

(3)  Where  defendants  pleaded  that 
land  was  their  homestead  on  and  af  t- 
•er  a  specified  date,  and  abstract  of 
judgment  had  been  filed  and  record- 
ed over  a  year  previously,  plea  lim- 
ited the  defensive  issue  and  admis- 
sion of  testimony  tending  to   show 
that  the  homestead  status  was  fixed 
and  attached   to   the   land   prior  to 
and    on    date    of   filing   of   the   ab- 
stract of  judgment  was  error.  —  Ste- 
venson v.  Wilson,  Tex.Civ.App.,  163 
S.W.2d  1063. 

(4)  Other  cases  see  34  C.J.  p  634 
note  61  [b]    (1),  (2),  p  635  note  63 
lal   (fc;. 


55.  N.C.— Metcalf  v.  Ratcliff,  4  S.B. 
3d  515,  216  N.C.  216. 

Tex. — Estelle  v.  Hart,  Com.App.,  55 
S.W.2d  510 — Carver  v.  Gray,  Civ. 
App.,  140  S.W.2d  227,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct— Dallas 
Land  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Sugg,  Civ.App., 
237  S.W.  955. 

34  C.J.  p  634  note  60  [d],  p  634  note 
61  [D]  <3)-(8). 

Presumptions 

(1)  It  will  be  presumed  that  the 
court    properly    set    aside    its    dis- 
missal in  the  original  action. — Hal- 
lam  v.  Finch,  195  N.W.  352,  197  Iowa 
224. 

(2)  Any  presumption  of  regularity 
is  not  sufficient  to  dispense  with  af- 
firmative  proof  of   compliance   with 
statutory  requirements  as  to  creation 
of    the    lien. — Chamlee    v.    Chamlee, 
Tex.Qiv.App.,    113    S.W.2d    290. 

Burden  of  proof 

(1)  In    general. — Estelte    v.    Hart 
Tex.Com.App.,   55   S.W.2d  510—34  C. 
J.  p  635  note  63  [a]   (3),  (4). 

(2)  Judgment  creditor  has  burden 
of  showing  that  lien  is  a  subsisting 
lien. 

Ala. — Roney  v.  Dothan  Produce  Co., 

117  So.  36,  217  Ala.  475. 
Tex, — Nichols    v.    Cansler,    Civ.App., 

140    S.W.2d    254,    error    dismissed. 

Judgment  correct 

(3)  Burden   of  proof  is   on   judg- 
ment creditor  to  sustain  allegations 
as    to    debtor's    ownership    of   prop- 
erty  on  which  lien  allegedly  exist- 
ed.— Horton   v.   Spears,   191   So.    622, 
238  Ala.  464. 

(4)  Where   judgment   creditor    es- 
tablishes prima  facie  case  of  owner- 
ship  by  Judgment  debtor   of  prop- 
erty,   a    third    person    claimant    of 
the  property  has  the  burden  of  go- 
ing forward  with  the  evidence  to  re- 
but the  prima  facie  case. — Horton  v. 
Spears,  supra. 

Sufficiency  of  evidence 

(1)  Evidence  held  sufficient 
Ala. — Horton  v.  Spears,  supra. 
Tex. — Carver  v.  Gray,  Civ. App.,   140 

S.W.2d  227,  error  dismissed,  judg- 
ment correct 

(2)  Evidence  held   insufficient — J. 
M.    Radford   Grocery   Co.   v.    Speck, 

960 


Tex.Civ.App.,    152   S.W.2d   787,    error 
refused. 

56.  Ala. — Horton  v.  Spears,   191   So. 
622,  238  Ala.  464. 

57.  N.C.— Metcalf  v.  Ratcliff,  4  S.E. 
2d  515,  216  N.C.  216. 

34  C.J.  p  635  note  63   [a]  (5),  (6). 
Questions  of  law  and  fact 

In  action  to  subject  certain  land 
to  payment  of  judgment,  evidence 
that  one  of  defendants  was  in  pos- 
session of  property  and  claiming 
some  iaterest  therein  presented  jury 
question  which  defeated  motion  for 
nonsuit  as  to  such  defendant — Met- 
calf v.  Ratcliff,  4  S.B.2d  515,  216 
N.C.  216. 

58.  Iowa.— Hallam  v.  Finch,  195  N. 
W.  352,  197  Iowa  224. 

59.  Kan.— Baldwin  v.  Baldwin,  96  P. 
2d  614,  150  Kan.  807. 

Tex. — McGehee  v.  Brookins,  Civ. 
App.,  140  S.W.2d  963,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct — Klier  v. 
Richter,  Civ.App.,  119  S.W.2d  100, 
error  refused. 

Variance  'between  pleadings  in  orig- 
inal suit  and  judgment 
Judgment  denying  foreclosure  of 
abstract  of  judgment  lien  on  ground 
that  there  was  variance  between 
pleadings  in  original  suit  where 
judgment  was  obtained  and  terms  of 
judgment  that  was  rendered  thereon 
was  error,  where  pleadings  in«origi- 
nal  suit  could  not  be  found  either  in 
transcript  or  statement  of  facts  in 
action  to  foreclose  lien,  and  were 
not  before  trial  court. — John  F. 
Grant  Lumber  Co.  v.  Hunnicutt  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  143  S.W.2d  976.' 

60.  Tex. — Klter  v.  Richter,  Civ.App., 
119  S.W.2d  100,  error  refused. 

Collateral  attack  for  want  of  juris- 
diction generally  see  supra  §§  421- 
427. 

Judgment  void  for  want  of  process 
N.C.— Adams  v.  Cleve,  10  S.B.2d  911, 
281  N.C.  302. 

61.  Description  of  land  in  judgment 
Tex. — White  v.  Glenn,  Civ. App.,   138 

S.W.2d  914,  error  dismissed,  Judg- 
ment correct 

62.  Va. — Gemmell  v.  Powers,  195  S. 
E.  501,  170  Va.  43. 

63.  Va.— Gemmell  v.  Powers,  supra. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  512 


so  requires,  before  ordering  the  sale  of  the  land 
to  satisfy  the  judgment,  it  must  appear  to  the  court 
that  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  real  estate  will  not 
satisfy  the  judgment  within  five  years;64  but  an  in- 
quiry as  to  rental  value  is  not  necessary  where  the 
bill  charges  that  the  judgment  lien  cannot  be  paid 
within  five  years  from  rental  proceeds  and  that 
charge  is  not  denied.65 

Where  the  land  is  subject  to  a  deed  of  trust  sub- 
ordinate to  the  lien  of  the  judgment,  the  judgment 
foreclosing  the  lien  and  ordering  sale  should  fix  the 
right  of  the  holder  of  the  deed  of  trust  to  satisfy 
the  encumbrances  and  retain  the  land.66  Under 
some  statutes  where  the  judgment  creditor  holds  a 
mortgage  on  realty  as  security  for  the  debt  that 
has  gone  into  the  judgment,  which  mortgage  is  a 
first  charge  on  the  property  mortgaged,  the  court 


shall  order  such  mortgaged  property  to  be  first  ap- 
plied to  the  debt  secured  by  it  and  a  foreclosure  of 
the  judgment  lien  shall  be  granted  only  as  to  the 
portion  of  said  judgment  that  shall  remain  unsatis- 
fied.^ 

Sale.  A  sale  is  not  void  because  of  a  defective 
description  of  the  land  in  the  judgment  of  fore- 
closure and  in  the  sheriff's  deed  under  the  foreclo- 
sure sale  ;68  nor,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  irreg- 
ularity in  the  conduct  of  the  sale,  is  the  sale  void 
because  the  price  was  grossly  inadequate.69  When 
real  estate,  divisible  in  parcels,  or  owned  in  sev- 
eralty,  is  sold  to  satisfy  a  judgment  lien,  authority 
to  sell  additional  parcels  is  exhausted  when  a  suf- 
ficient amount  has  already  been  realized  to  satisfy 
the  lien  and  the  costs  of  the  proceeding.70 


XV.  ASSIGNMENT  OP  JUDGMENTS 


§  512*    Assignability  of  Judgments 

a.  In  general 

b.  Particular  judgments 

a.  In  General 

As  a  genera!  rule,  a  Judgment  Is  as  assignable  as 
any  other  chose  in  action.  While  under  the  common  taw 
a  judgment  is  not  assignable  so  as  to  pass  the  legal  ti- 
tle to  the  assigneef  such  an  assignment  is  permissible 
by  virtue  of  statute  in  many  Jurisdictions. 

A  judgment  has  been  said  to  have  the  assign- 
able quality  of  a  chose  in  action,71  deriving  its  as- 
signability  from  the  fact  that  it  constitutes  a  debt 


or  property  right  made  of  record  in  favor  of  the 
party  who  obtains  the  judgment  against  his  adver- 
sary.72 At  common  law,  and  in  the  absence  of  stat- 
ute changing  the  rule,  a  judgment  is  not  assignable 
so  as  to  vest  the  legal  title  in  the  assignee;73  but 
such  an  assignment  operates  to  vest  an  equitable  in- 
terest in  the  assignee  which  the  law  will  protect,74 
if  it  is  made  in  good  faith75  and,  as  discussed  in- 
fra §  517,  for  a  valuable  consideration. 

While  judgments  have  been  spoken  of  in  general 
language  as  being  assignable,  apart  from  or  without 


Decree  of  sale  should  note  the  pos- 
sibilities   of   a    contingent   right   of 
dower. — Qemmell  v.  Powers,  supra, 
64.    Va.— Morris  v.  Gates,  20  S.E.2d 

118,  124  W.Va.  275. 
W.Va. — Abney-Barnes   Co.   v.   Davy- 

Pocahontas  Coal  Co.,  98  S.E.  298, 

83' W.Va.  292. 
Report  of  commissioner     • 
Va. — Gemmell    v.    Powers,    195    S.E. 

501,  170  Va.  43. 
6&    Va. — Gemmell  v.  Powers,  supra. 

66.  Tex.— Williams  v.  Hedrick,  Civ. 
App.,    131    S.W.2d    187,    error    dis- 
missed, judgment  correct 

67.  Conn. — Merchants'        Bank       & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Pettison,   153  A.  789, 
112  Conn.  652. 

68.  Tex. — Brinkman  v.  Tinkler,  Civ. 
App.,    117    S.W.2d    139,    error    re- 
fused. 

69.  Tex. — Brinkman  r.  Tinkler,  su- 
pra. 

70.  Va. — Peatress  v.  Gray,  27  S.E.2d 
203,  181  Va.  847. 

Rule  not  applicable 

The  rule  does  not  apply  vn«n  real- 

49  C.J.S.-61 


ty  involved  is  not  divisible  in  kind 
and  sale  of  the  whole  is  necessary 
to  provide  sufficient  funds. — Tackett 
v.  Boiling,  1  S.E.2d  285,  172  Va.  326. 
Questions  of  subrogation  or  pro- 
portionate liability  of  owners  in  sev- 
eralty  of  realty  Against  which  jiifcF" 
cial  proceedings  have  been  brought 
to  satisfy  lien  are  to  be  settled  be- 
tween parties,  in  absence  of  an 
agreement  between  them  or  an  ad- 
judication by  court  having  jurisdic- 
tion over  subject  matter  and  parties. 
— Tackett  v.  Boiling,  supra. 

71.  Minn. — Brown  v.  Reinke,  199  N. 
W.   235,   139   Minn.   458,   35  A.L.R. 
413. 

Tex.— Blanks  v.  Radford,  Civ.App., 
188  S.W.2d  879,  error  refused- 
McMillan  v.  Rutherford,  Civ.App., 
14  S.W.2d  132. 

Assignment  as  extinguishment  of 
judgment  see  infra  §  562. 

72.  Mo. — Popsicle  Corporation  of  U. 
S.   v.  Pearlstein,  App.,   168  S.W.fcd 
105. 

73.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In 
re  Dodge,  D.C.N.Y.,  9  F.Supp.  540, 
542. 

961 


111. — Stombaugh  v.  Morey,  58  N.B.2d 
545,  388  111.  392,  157  A.L.R.  254. 

Mo. — Popsicle  Corporation  of  XT.  S. 
v.  Pearlstein,  App.,  168  S.W.2d  105. 

34  C.J.  p  636  note  70. 

74.  U.S. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  In 
re  Dodge,  D.C.N.T.,  9  P.Supp.  540, 
542. 

Ky. — Turner  v.   Gambill,   121  S.W.2d 

705,  275  Ky.  330. 
Mo.— Boyd  v.  Sloan,  71  S.W.2d  1065, 

335  Mo.  163 — Popsicle  Corporation 

of  U.    S.    v.   Pearlstein,   App.,    168 

S.W.2d  105. 
Okl. — Owen     v.     Interstate     Mortg. 

Trust  Co.,  211  P.  87,  88  Okl.  10,  30 

A.L.R.  816. 
34  C.J.  p  636  note  71. 

"Judgment  is  ...  a  chose  in 
action  subject  to  sale  and  equitable 
assignment" — Shaw  v.  McKnight- 
Keaton  Grocery  Co.,  21  S.W.2d  269, 
271,  '231  Ky.  223. 

75.  Sanity   disregards   common-law 
rule  and  enforces  such  assignments 
if  they  are  made  in  good  faith  and 
for  a  valuable  consideration. — Stom- 
baugh v.  Morey,  58  N.E.2d  545,   388 
111.  392,  157  AX.R.  254. 


§  512 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


reference  to  any  statute,76  under  statutes  which  are 
now  in  force  in  practically  all  jurisdictions,  a  judg- 
ment, provided  it  is  final,77  may  be  assigned  so  as 
to  pass  the  legal  title78  and,  as  discussed  infra  §  522, 
give  the  assignee  the  right  to  enforce  it  in  his  own 
name,  although  even  now  the  assignment  may  be 
such  that  the  assignor  remains  the  equitable  own- 
er.79 

An  assignment  of  a  judgment  may  be  made  at 
any  time  after  its  entry  in  the  trial  court,80  even 
pending  an  appeal,81  although,  as  discussed  infra  § 
522,  it  cannot  be  enforced,  unless  and  until  the  ap- 
pellate procedure  is  finally  terminated  in  favor  of 
the  judgment. 

b.  Particular  Judgments 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  t<J  the  contrary,  a  judg- 
ment which  does  not  survive  to  the  personal  representa- 
tive of  the  beneficial  owner,  or  which  does  not  con- 
stitute a  debt  or  right  in  property  capable  of  being  re- 
duced to  possession,  is  not  assignable. 

In  accordance  with  the  general  rule  discussed  in 
Assignments  §§  5,  30,  which  sets  up  as  a  test  of  as- 
signability  of  a  chose  in  action  the  survivability  of 
the  chose  in  action,  in  the  absence  of  statutory  au- 
thority therefor,  a  judgment  which  does  not  sur- 


vive to  the  personal  representative  of  the  bene- 
ficial owner  is  not  assignable.82  Where  a  judgment 
is  considered  as  deriving  its  assignability  from  the 
fact  that  it  constitutes  a  debt  or  property  right,  as 
discussed  supra  subdivision  a  of  this  section,  a  de- 
cree which  in  no  sense  represents  a  debt  or  which 
creates  no  property  right  in  anything  capable  of 
being  reduced  to  possession  is  not  assignable.83 

A  decree  in  equity,  although  not  assignable  at 
law,  may  be  transferred  for  a  valuable  considera- 
tion, and  the  transfer  will  be  supported  by  a  court 
of  chancery.84 

Satisfied  judgments.  A  judgment  once  fully  paid 
off  and  satisfied  is  not  thereafter  capable  of  assign- 
ment.85 

Judgments  for  torts.  While,  as  discussed  in  As- 
signments §  32,  a  cause  of  action  for  a  tort,  which 
dies  with  the  party  and  does  not  survive  to  his  per- 
sonal representatives,  is  generally  not  capable  of 
passing  by  assignment,  after  such  cause  of  action 
has  been  merged  into  a  judgment  it  assumes  a  dif- 
ferent footing,  and  such  judgment,  sometimes  by 
reason  of  express  statutory  provision,  may  be  as- 
signed,86 and,  according  to  the  decisions  on  the 


76.  Fla. — Kahn  v.  American  Surety 
Co.  of  New  York,  162  So.  335,  120 
Fla.  50. 

Tenn. — State    ex    rel.    McConnell    v. 

Peoples    Bank    £    Trust    Co.,    12 

Tenn.App.   242. 

Judgment  is  property  capable  of 
transfer. — Anglo-California  Trust 
Co.  v.  Oakland  Rys.,  225  P.  452,  193 
Cal.  451. 

Decree  in,  partition  suit  allowing* 
solicitor's  fee  for  services  in  con- 
ducting proceeding  was  subject  to 
assignment  by  solicitor. — Bank  of 
Monticello  v.  L.  D.  Powell  Co.,  130 
So.  292,  159  Miss.  183. 

77.  Mo.— Deck  v.  Wright,   116  S.W. 
31,  135  Mp.App.  536. 

78-     Mont. — Genzberger     v.     Adams, 

205  P.  658,  62  Mont.  430. 
34  C.J.  p  636  note  73. 

Common-law  rule  bag  "been  re- 
pealed with  respect  to  judgments. — 
Boyd  v.  Sloan,  71  S.W.2d  1065,  335 
Mo.  163. 

Judgment  for  recovery  of  money 
Mo. — Popsicle   Corporation   of   U.    S. 

v.  Pearlstein,  App.,  168  S.W.2d  105. 
negotiability 

(1)  Under     some     statutes     judg- 
ments  are   transferable   by   indorse- 
ment or  written  assignment  in  same 
manner    as    bills    of    exchange    and 
promissory  notes. — WInn  v.  Armour 
&  Co.,    193    S.E.   447,    184   Ga,   769 — 
Franklin  v.  Mobley,  for  Use  of  Pat- 
rick,  Oa.App.,   36   SJE.2d   173. 

(2)  However,  they  are  not  negotia- 


ble  in  a  strict  commercial   sense. — 
Winn  v.  Armour  &  Co.,  supra. 

79.  N".J. — Combes    v.    Hoffman,     99 
A.  607,  87  N.J.BQ.  148. 

80.  Cal. — Bias  v.  Ohio  Farmers  In- 
demnity Co.,  81  P.2d  1057,  28  Cal. 
App.2d  14. 

81.  N.J. — National     Surety     Co.     v. 
.  Mulligan,  146  A.  372,  105  N.J.Law 

336. 
Tenn. — State    ex    rel.    McConnell    v. 

Peoples     Bank    &    Trust    Co.,     12 

Tenn,App.  242. 

Validity  of  assignment  is  not  af- 
fected by  pendency  of  appeal,  where 
enforced  after  affirmance. — Bias  v. 
Ohio  Farmers  Indemnity  Co.,  81  P.2d 
1057,  28  Cal.App.2d  14. 

82.  Judgment  for  taxes  due  on  land 
would    not   survive   to   the   personal 
representative  either  of  the  original 
county  collector  of  revenue  or  of  his 
successor,  and  hence  is  not  assign- 
able in  absence  of  statutory  author- 
ity.— State    ex   rel.    Gilkison   v.   An- 
drews,  Mo.App.,   133   S.W.2d  695. 

83.  Mo.— Popsicle  Corporation  of  U. 
S.  v.  Pearlstein,  App.,   168  S.W.2d 
105. 

Injunction 

A  decree,  enjoining  manufacture 
and  sale  of  frozen  suckers,  except 
under  license  from  owner  of  patents 
thereon,  was  of  such  personal  nature 
as  to  be  incapable  of  assignment  by 
such  owner  to  assignee  of  patents.—1 
Popsicle  Corporation  of  U»  S.  v. 
Pearlstein,  supra. 

962 


84.  U.S.— Coates    v.    Muse,    C.C.Va., 
5    F.Cas.No.2,918,    1    Brock.    551. 

85.  Miss. — Cook    v.    Armstrong,    25 
Miss.  63. 

N.Y.— Conor    v.    Hernstein,    29    N.Y. 

Super.  552. 
Pa. — Waters  v.  Largy,  5  Rawle  131. 

86.  Cal. — Pacific  Gas  &  Electric  Co. 
v.  Nakano,   87  P.2d  700,  12  CaL2d 
711,  121  A.L.R.  417— Salter  v.  Lom- 
bard!, 3  P.2d  38,  116  CaLApp.  602. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  State  ex 
rel.  Emerson  v.  City  of  Mound 
City,  73  S.W.2d  1017,  1022,  335  Mo. 
702. 

34  C.J.  p  637  note  79. 

Power  of  state 

"The  state  can,  in  the  absence  of 
constitutional  prohibition,  continue 
the  common-law  bar  to  the  assign- 
ment of  such  personal  tort  causes 
of  action,  and  remove  the  common- 
law  bar  against  the  assignment  of 
judgments  recovered  therein,  and  can 
as  a  condition  of  assignment  stamp 
upon  the  assigned  judgment  such 
character  as  it  sees  fit,  including  the 
character  of  an  ordinary  money 
judgment  free  of  tort  characteristics, 
and  as  if  the  judgment  had  been  re- 
covered in  an  action  of  debt." — la  re 
Dodge,  D.C.N.T.,  9  F.Supp.  540,  544. 

Fraud  and  deceit 

U.S. — Hastings  v.  Osborne,  C.C.A. 
Mich.,  131  F.2d  396,  certiorari  de- 
nied Osborne  v.  Hastings,  63  S.Ct 
982,  318  U.S.  785,  87  L.Bd.  1162. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  514 


question,  at  least  in  equity,87  in  the  same  manner 
as  any  other  judgment,  provided  the  judgment  has 
become  final  in  the  sense  that  the  action  in  which 
it  is  recovered  is  no  longer  pending  or  in  the  sense 
that  it  finally  determines  the  rights  of  the  parties 
to  such  action;88 

Statutory  prohibition.  The  legislature,  pursuant 
to  a  scheme  of  remedial  legislation,  may  prohibit 
the  assignment  of  a  judgment  which  is  ordinarily 
assignable.89 


§  513. 


Future  Judgments 


An  assignment  may  be  made  of  a  judgment  to  be 
recovered  in  the  future  if  the  cause  of  action  Itself  is 
assignable.  Such  an  assignment  becomes  operative  when 
the  judgment  Is  recovered. 

Where  the  cause  of  action  is  of  an  assignable 
character,  as  in  the  case  of  actions  ex  contractu, 
a  valid  assignment  may  be  made  before  the  rendi- 
tion of  the  judgment  which  will  become  operative 
as  soon  as  the  judgment  is  recovered.90  Where, 
however,  the  cause  of  action  is  in  tort,  there  can 
be  no  assignment  until  the  claim  has  been  merged 
in  an  actual  judgment,  even  though  a  verdict  has 
been  given  for  plaintiff,  as  discussed  in  Assign- 
ments §§  33,  36,  and  an  interest  in  a  judgment  to  be 
recovered  in  such  a  case  is  not  assignable,91  al- 


though it  has  been  held  in  some  cases  that  such  as- 
signment  before  judgment  gives  to  the  assignee  an 
interest  in  the  judgment,  when  perfected,  which  may 
be  enforced  in  equity,92  on  the  principle  that  in  eq- 
uity that  which  is  agreed  to  be  done  will  be  consid- 
ered as  done.98  The  assignment  of  the  verdict  and 
judgment  to  be  recovered  in  a  pending  action  for 
tort  has  also  been  supported  as  not  an  assignment 
of  a  mere  right  of  action,  but  of  property  having  a 
potential  existence,  that  is  to  come  into  existence  in 
the  future.94 

§  514.    Persons  Who  May  Assign  or  Pur- 
chase 

a.  Who  may  assign 

b.  Who  may  take  assignment 

a.  Who  May  Assign 

As  a  general  rule  a  Judgment  may  be  assigned  only 
by  the  beneficial  owner  thereof  or  by  his  duly  authorized 
agent. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  valid  assignment  of  a  judg- 
ment can  be  made  only  by  a  person  having  a  bene- 
ficial interest  in  such  judgment,9^  or  by  his  duly 
authorized  agent.96  If  regulated  by  statute,  only 
the  person  authorized  by  the  statute  may  make  an 
assignment97  Authority  to  assign  a  judgment  may 


Personal  Injuries 

U.S. — American   Surety  Co.   of  New 

York  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  C.C.A.MO., 

107  F.2d  685,  stating  Illinois  law. 
N.J.— Roth  v.  General  Casualty  & 

Surety  Co.,  146  A.  202,  106  N.J.Law 

516. 
N.Y.— Richard    v.    National    Transp. 

Co.,  285  N.Y.S.  870,  158  Misc.  324. 

87.  Mass.-— Brazill  v.  Green,  127  N. 
E.  535,  236  Mass.  93. 

88.  CaL— Pacific  Gas  &  Electric  Co. 
v.  Nakano,  87  P.2d  700,  12  CaL2d 
711,  121  A.L.R.  417.  t 

Assignment  of  judgment  to  be  recov- 
ered  in  tort  action  see  infra  §  513. 
Effect  of  pendency  of  appeal 

•  (1)  A  judgment  in  a  tort  action 
cannot  be  assigned  during  the  pend- 
ency of  an  appeal  therefrom. — Mil- 
ler v.  Newell,  20  S.C.  123,  47  Am.R. 
833. 

(2)  Such  an  assignment  is  invalid, 
since  the  judgment,  pending  appeal, 
is  not  "final*'  in  sense  that  it  deter- 
mines rights  of  parties  to  the  action. 
—Pacific  Gas  &  Electric  Co.  v.  Na- 
kano, 87  P.2d  700,  12  Cal.2d  711,  121 
A.L..R.  417. 

89.  Tenn. — Prime  v.  Dunaway,  50  S. 
W.2d  223,  164  Tenn.  396. 

Assignability  of  -compensation  award 
or  judgment  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  § 
388,  also  71  C.J.  p  924  notes  68-80. 


90.  Mich.— Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
Cook  v.  Casualty  Ass'n  of  America, 
224  N.W.   341,   842,  246  Mich.  278. 

34  C.J.  p  637  note  81. 

91.  N.J.— Seaman  v.   Mann,   168  A. 
833,  114  N.J.Ed.  408. 

Bights  of  creditors 

Assignment  of  moneys  to  become 
due  when  assignor's  personal  injury 
claim  was  reduced  to  judgment  was 
held  void,  with  respect  to  right  of 
assignor's  judgment  creditor  to  levy 
on  such  moneys. — Goldfarb  v.  Reich- 
er,  171  A.  149,  112  N.J.Law  413,  af- 
firmed 174  A.  507,  113  N.J.Law  399— 
34  C.J.  p  -637  note  84  [b]. 

92.  N.Y.— Richard       v.        National 
Transp.   Co.,    285   N.Y.S.    570,    158 
Misc.  324. 

34  C.J.  p  637  note  84. 

93.  111.— North  Chicago  St  R.  Co.  v. 
Ackley,    58   Ill.App.    572,    reversed 
on  other  grounds  49  N.E.  222,  171 
111.  100,  44  L.R.A.  177. 

94.  N.Y.— -Richard       v.        National 
Transp.    Co.,    285    N.Y.S.    870,    158 
Misc.  324. 

5  C.J.  p  893  note  6. 
Agreement  to  assign 

Such  an  agreement  has  been  en- 
forced as  an  agreement  to  assign. — 
In  re  Modell,  C.C.A.N.Y.,  71  F.2d 
148. 

Public  policy  is  not  violated  by 
such  am  assignment — Richard  v.  Na- 

963 


tional    Transp.   Co.,    285    N.Y.S.    870, 
158  Misc.  324. 

95.  Ark. — Brice   v.    Taylor,    9    S.W. 
854,  51  Ark.  75. 

34  C.J.  p  637  note  86. 
Tax  collector 

A  county  collector  of  revenue  has 
no  beneficial  interest  in  a  judgment 
for  taxes,  and  cannot  make  a.  valid 
assignment  of  such  judgment. — State 
ex  rel.  Gilkison  v.  Andrews,  Mo.App., 
133  S.W.2d  695. 
Reassignment  for  purpose  of  suit 

A  reassignment  of  a  contract  by 
the  assignee  to  the  assignor  merely 
for  the  purpose  of  suit  thereon,  con- 
veying to  the  assignor  no  beneficial 
interest  in  the  proceeds  of  the  liti- 
gation, obligates  the  assignor  to  re- 
assign to  the  obligee  the  judgment 
recovered. — In  re  Campbell's  Estate, 
299  N.Y.S.  442,  164  Misc.  632. 

96.  Mo. — Emory    v.    Joice,    70    Mo. 
537. 

34  C.J.  p  637  note  87. 

97.  Plaintiff  or  his  assignee 

(1)  One  who  was  county  collector 
of  revenue  at  time  of  rendition  of 
judgment  for  taxes,  in  suit  brought 
by  the  state  at  his  relation,  but  who 
had  gone  out  of  office  at  the  time 
of  assignment  of  such  judgment  to 
third  person,  had  no  control  over 
enforcement  or  collection  of  the 
judgment,  and  hence  was  not  a 
"plaintiff"  within  terms  of  statute 


§  514 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


be  conferred  by  power  of  attorney,98  which  need  not 
be  recorded  in  order  to  render  the  assignment  effec- 
tive as  between  the  parties,  the  recording  of  such 
power  being  material  only  where  notice  to  third  per- 
sons is  necessary.99  Where  a  contract  is  made  with 
an  agent  in  his  own  name  for  the  benefit  of  his 
principal,  he  is  the  real  owner  of  a  judgment  re- 
covered thereon  in  an  action  brought  by  him  in 
his  own  name,  and  has  power  to  dispose  of  it  for 
the  benefit  of  his  principal.1 

Subject  to  the  rule  as  to  the  necessity  of  a  bene- 
ficial interest,  any  person  who  is  the  actual  owner 
of  the  judgment,2  or  who  has  the  right  to  enforce 
and  collect  it,$  may  make  an  assignment  thereof. 
Thus  an  assignment  may  be  made  by  an  adminis- 
trator or  executor,4  a  bank,5  a  corporation^  or  its 
receiver,7  or  a  municipality.8  A  partner  may  as- 
sign in  the  name  of  the  firm  a  judgment  rendered 
in  favor  of  the  firm,9  and  a  joint  owner  of  a  judg- 
ment may  assign  his  undivided  interest  therein.10 

As  discussed  in  Attorney  and  Client,  §  93  c,  an 


attorney  at  law  has  no  implied  authority  as  such 
to  assign  a  judgment  recovered  in  favor  of  his  cli- 
ent 

b.  Who  May  Take  Assignment 

As  a  general  rule  any  person,  natural  or  artificial, 
may  become  the  assignee  of  a  judgment. 

As  a  general  rule,  any  person;  natural  or  artifi- 
cial, may  become  the  assignee  of  a  judgment.11 
While  ordinarily  the  payment  of  a  judgment  by  one 
primarily  liable  on  it  is  an  absolute  satisfaction,  al- 
though the  judgment  is  assigned  to  him,12  a  surety 
on  the  debt  for  which  the  judgment  was  recovered 
may  hold  the.  judgment  under  an  assignment,  after 
paying  its  amount,  if  his  intention  not  to  satisfy  the 
judgment  is  clear,13  and  the  same  rule  applies  to 
a  surety  on  an  obligation  given  in  payment  of  the 
judgment.14 

§  515.    Mode  and  Sufficiency  of  Assignment 

a.  In  general 

b.  Statutory  requirements 


authorizing  assignment  by  plaintiff 
or  his  assignee.  —  State  ex  rel.  Gilki- 
son  v.  Andrews,  Mo.App.,  133  S.W.2d 
695. 

(2)  Likewise,  one  who  was  county 
collector  of  revenue  at  time  of  as- 
signment of  tax  judgment,  but  was 
not  such  collector  when  suit  result- 
ing in  such  judgment  was  institut- 
ed, was  not  a  "party"  to  such  suit, 
and  hence  could  not  assign  the  judg- 
ment under  such  a  statute.  —  State  ex 
rel.  Gilkison  v.  Andrews,  supra. 

98.  Ind.  —  Caley  v.  Morgan,  16  N.E. 
790,  114  Ind.  350. 

99.  Ind.  —  Boos  v.   Morgan,   30  N.E. 
141,  130  Ind.  305,  30  Ara.S.R.  237— 
Caley  v.  Morgan,  16  N.E.  790,  114 
Ind.  350. 

I.    N.T.  —  Seymour  v.  Smith,  21  N.E. 
1042,  114  N.Y.  481,  11  Am.S.R.  683. 


2.  Change  of 

Where  the  judgment  creditor  has 
changed  its  name,  an  assignment 
by  it  in  its  new  name  has  been  sus- 
tained.— Leland  v.  Heiberg,  194  N.W. 
93,  156  Minn,  30. 

3.  Mo.  —  Garland  v.  H<arrison,  17  Mo. 
282. 

34  C.J.  p  637  note  93. 

4.  CaL  —  Low   v.    Burrows,    12    Cal. 
181. 

Me.—  Manson   v.    Peaks,    69   A.   690, 

103    Me.    430,   125   Am.S.R.    311. 
Joint  judgment 

Title  to  judgment  and  execution 
in  names  of  executors  vested  in  them 
jointly,  and  transfer,  without  consid- 
eration, by  one  in  representative  ca- 
pacity to  herself  in  individual  ca- 
pacity did  not  divest  interest  of  oth- 


er joint  owner. — Cox  v.  Staten,  147  S. 
E.  137,  39  Ga.App.  294. 

5.  Mont — Genzberger  v.  Adams,  205 
P.  658,  62  Mont.  430. 

34  C.J.  p  637  note  97. 
Proof  of  authority 

(1)  The    official   character  of  the 
persons   making  the  assignment,   or 
the  fact  that  they  were  authorized 
to   execute   it   in   the  name   of  the 
bank,  must  be  shown.    Merely  desig- 
nating them  as  officers  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  establish  their  official  char- 
acter.— Klemme  v.  McLay,  26  N.W. 
53,  68  Iowa  158. 

(2)  Purported  assignment  of  judg- 
ment to   plaintiff  as   receiver  of  a 
bank  by  individual   signing  assign- 
ment  as    "president"   was   incompe- 
tent to  prove  assignment,  even  if  it 
could   be   presumed   that   individual 
was  president  of  assignor  bank  and 
acting  as  such  at  time  of  purported 
assignment,    where    there    was    no 
proof  that  Individual  had  authority 
to     make     assignment — Cumberland 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Buchanan,  164 
S.W.2d  473,  291  Ky.  300. 

6.  Iowa.— Miller  v.   Cousins,   90  N. 
'    W.  814. 

34  C.J.  p  637  note  95. 
Foreign  corporation 

Foreign  corporation  having  capaci- 
ty to  sue  in  state  and  recover  val- 
id judgment  could  assign  judgment 
in  such  state.— Cook  v.  "  Casualty 
Ass'n  of  America,  224  N.W.  341,  246 
Mich.  278. 

7.  HL— Rogers   v.    Dimon,    106    HI. 
App.      201,     reversed  '  on     other 
grounds  -67  N.B.  968,  203  HI.  464. 

964 


8.  Miss.— Wilkinson   v.    Hutto,    12S 
So.  93,  157  Miss.  358. 

9.  N.Y.— Allen   v.   Clark,    21   N.Y.S. 
338,  affirmed  36  N.B.  345,  141  N.T. 
584. 

10.  Minn. — Hunter  v.    Mauseau,    97 
N.W.  651,  91  Minn.  124. 

34  C.J.  p  638  note  99. 

11.  Conn. — Rogers   v.    Hendrick,    82 
A.  586,  85  Conn.  260. 

34C.J.  p  638  note  2. 
Purchase  by  attorney  as  not  cham- 
pertous  see  Champerty  and  Main- 
tenance §  14. 
Municipal  Judgment 

It  is  not  contrary  to  public  policy 
for  sheriff  to  purchase  execution  and 
judgment  in  favor  of  a  municipal- 
ity when  motion  is  made  against  him 
for  failure  to  execute  it — Wilkinson 
v.  Hutto,  128  So.  93,  157  Miss.  358. 
Relatives 

A  son's  purchase  of  judgment 
against  his  father  is  not  ipso  facto  * 
fraudulent. — Bell  v.  Kates,  18  A.23 
556,  126  N.J.Law  90. 

12.  Ind. — Zimmermann    v.    Gaumer, 
53  N.B.  829,  152  Ind.  552. 

34  C.J.  p  638  note  3. 

Payment  by  joint  debtor  see  infra 
§  555. 

Satisfaction  of  judgment  by  assign- 
ment to  debtor  see  infra  §  562. 

13.  Iowa. — Anglo-American       Land, 
Mortgage  &  Agency  Co.  v.  Bush,  50 
N.W.  1063,  84  Iowa  272. 

34  C.J.  p  638  note  4. 
Effect  of  payment  by  surety  see  in- 
fra §  555. 

14.  N.Y.— Harbeck  v.  VandwWlt,  20 
N.Y.  395. 

34  C.J.  p  638  note  5. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  515 


a.  In  General 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  no  par* 
ticular  mode  or  form  is  required  to  give  effect  to  the 
assignment  of  a  judgment. 

It  has  been  said  that  a  judgment  may  be  assigned 
by  any  method  competent  and  sufficient  for  the  as- 
signment of  any  other  chose  in  action.1^  Accord- 
ingly, in  the  absence  of  statutory  directions  as  to 
the  mode  of  assigning  a  judgment,  no  particular 
form  of  assignment  is  necessary  to  give  effect  to 
such  an  assignment,16  as  long  as  the  assignment  is 
definite  and  absolute.17 

The  assignment  may  be  accomplished  by  a  writ- 
ing,18 as  by  an  indorsement  on  the  record,19  or  by 
a  separate  written  instrument20  which  need  not  be 


under  seal21  or,  as  discussed  infra  §  518,  recorded. 
The.  assignment  may  be  executed  under  a  power  of 
attorney.2*  In  all  such  cases,  however,  there  must 
be  a  delivery  of  the  instrument  of  assignment  to 
the  assignee  or  some  one  authorized  by  him  to  ac- 
cept it,23  except  where  an  assignment  is  not  de- 
nied.2* 

A  written  assignment  will  not  be  vitiated  by  mis- 
takes in  the  description  of  the  judgment  or  in  other 
particulars  if  it  is  capable  o'f  being  made  certain,25 
and,  if  an  entry  of  record  is  so  ambiguous  as  not 
to  show  whether  an  assignment  or  a  satisfaction  was 
intended,  it  may  be  explained  by  parol.2  6 

A  judgment  may  be  assigned  by  parol27  provided 


15.  Tex. — Blanks    v.    Radford,    Civ. 
App.,    188    S.W.2d    879,    error    re- 
fused— McMillan     v.     Rutherford, 
Civ.App.,  14  S.W.2d  132. 

Requisites,  modes,  and  validity  of 
assignments  generally  see  Assign- 
ments  §§  41-81. 

16.  No   formal  deed  of  assignment 
is     necessary. — Owen    v.     Interstate 
Mortg.  Trust  Co.,  211  P.  87,  88  Okl. 
10,  30  A.L.R.  816. 

Transfer  of  transcript 

Where  a  transcript  or  certificate 
of  the  judgment  is  filed  in  a  higher 
court  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a 
lien  on  real  estate,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  transfer  such  transcript  or 
certificate  in  order  to  effect  an  as- 
signment of  the  judgment — Travis 
v.  Rhodes,  37  So.  804,  142  Ala.  189. 

17.  Ala.— Pike  v.  Bright,  29  Ala.  332 
— Bain  v.  J.  A.  Lusk  &  Son,   109 
So.  187,  21  Ala.App.  442. 

Acknowledgment    of    indebtedness 

Where  printing  firm  executed  ac- 
knowledgment cf  indebtedness  to 
corporation's  Judgment  creditor, 
which  allegedly  "represented  and 
evidenced"  corporation's  judgment 
indebtedness,  judgment  creditor's  as- 
signment of  such  instrument  to  his 
wife  and  wife's  similar  assignment 
thereof  to  son  did  not  carry  with  it 
the  corporation's  judgment  indebted- 
ness or  right  to  collect  such  indebt- 
edness from  estate  of  corporations 
sole  stockholder,  notwithstanding 
alleged  intent  with  which  assign- 
ments were  made. — Allen  v.  National 
Bank  of  Commerce  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Providence,  19  A.2d  311,  66  RJ.  373. 

,  18.    Okl. — Owen  v.  Interstate  Mortg. 

Trust  Co.,  211  P.  87,  88  Okl.  10,  30 

A.L.R.   816. 

Xiegal  or  egnitable  Judgments 
Tex. — Blanks    v.    Radford,    Civ.App., 

188  S.W.2d  879,  .error  refused. 

19.    U.S. — Cavender    v.    Grove,    C.C. 
Ind.,  5  F.Cas.No.2,530,  4  Biss.  269. 
Pa, — Coon  v.  Reed*  79  Pa.  240. 
34  C.J.  p  638  note  7. 


20.  U.S. — Rufe  v.  Lynchburg  Com- 
mercial Bank,  Va,,  99  F.  650,  40  C. 
C.A.  27. 

34  C.J.  p  638  note  8. 
Assignment  before  signing1  of  Judg- 
ment 

Where,  after  hearing  on  a  con- 
tested garnishment  and  announce- 
ment by  the  court  of  a  finding  for 
plaintiff,  plaintiff  assigned  "the 
amount  recovered  by  me  this  day 
in  the  case  of  G.  P.  v.  C.  and  W.,  be- 
ing cause  145480,"  etc.,  he  intended 
to  and  did  assign  the  final  judgment 
and  not  a  chose  in  action,  nothing 
remaining  to  be  done  but  to  pre- 
sent such  Judgment  for  signature, 
although  appeal  was  thereafter  tak- 
en.— Premier  Wrench  Co.  v.  Pearson, 
225  P.  49,  129  Wash.  326. 
Judgment  as  included  in  sale  of 
property 

(1)  It  is  not  necessary  specifically 
to  include  a  judgment  in  bill  of  sale 
of  a  business   or  all   of  the  assets 
thereof,  where  Judgment  was  part  of 
such  business  or  assets. 

Colo.— Bright  v.  Schmitt,  231  P.  159, 

76  Colo.  320. 
Tex.— -Kahn  v.  Ilitzky,  Civ.App.,   107 

S.W.2d  1015,   error  refused. 

(2)  Writing     reciting     "sale"     of 
realty  by  one  having  only  a  judg- 
ment lien  thereon  to  judgment  debt- 
or  was   held    sufficient    to   transfer 
Judgment  lien. — Sowards  v.  Sowards, 
61  S.W.2d  609,  249  Ky.  742. 

Partial  assignment 
Kan. — Tharp    v.    Langford,    222    P. 
135,  115  Kan.  135. 

Proof  of  assignment 

Where  a  written  assignment, 
claimed  to  include  both  of  two  judg- 
ments recovered  by  the  Judgment 
creditor,  refers  to  but  one  of  them, 
it  was  held  that  the  presumption 
that  an  instrument  correctly  express- 
es parties;  intention  was  sufficient 
to  support  implied  finding  that  as- 
signment did  not  include  the  other 
Judgment — Welk  y.  Conner,  282  P. 
963,  102  Oal.App.  286. 


21.  Me.— Hayes  v.  Rich,   64  A.   659, 
101    Me.    314,    115    Am.S.R.    314. 

34  .C.J.  p  638  note  9. 

22.  Ind. — Boos   v.   Morgan,    30   N.E. 
141,   130  Ind.  305,   30  Am.S.R.  237. 

34  C.J.  p  638  note  11. 
Authority  to  assign  under  power  of 
attorney  see  supra  §  514. 

23.  111. — Williams  v.  West  Chicago 
St  R.  Co.,  85  IlLApp.  305. 

Presumption  as  to  delivery 

Where  Judgment  creditor  executed 
a  written  assignment  of  judgment 
in  blank  and  transmitted  it  to  its 
attorney  to  be  filled  out  and  deliv- 
ered on  receipt  of  money,  possession  - 
of  assignment  by  a  third  person 
raised  presumption  that  assignment 
was  properly  delivered  according  to 
instructions. — Power  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Tindall,  C.C.A.Ark.,  100  F.2d  463. 

24.  N.T.— Baker  v.   Secor.   7  N.Y.S. 
803,  4  Silv.Sup.  516. 

25.  Minn.— Willis  v.  Jelineck,   6   N. 
W.  373,  27  Minn.  18. 

34  C.J.  p  638  note  15. 
Judgment  sufficiently   described 
Tex. — Taylor  v.   American   Trust   & 

Savings  Bank  of  El  Paso,  Civ.App., 

265  S.W.  727. 
28.    Mo. — Emory    v.    Joice,    70    Mo. 

537. 
27.    La. — Elgutter  v.  McCarty,  App., 

167  So.  461. 
N.Y. — Manufacturers'    Trust    Co.    v. 

Rechtman,  268  N.Y.S.  104,  239  App. 

Div.  517,  affirmed  191  N.E.  603,  264 

NVT.  639. 
Okl. — Owen     v.     Interstate     Mortg. 

Trust  Co.,  211  P.  87,  88  Okl.  10,  30 

A.Li.R.  816. 
34  C.J.  p  639  note  18. 
Xiegal  or  equitable  Judgments 
Tex. — Blanks    v.    Radford,    Clv.App., 

188  S.W.2d  879,  error  refused. 
Manual  delivery 

While  a  judgment  may  not  be 
manually  delivered,  it .  may  be  as- 
signed by  parol. — Kahn  v.  Ilitzky, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  107  S.W.2d  1015,  error 
dismissed. 


§  515 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  intention  to  assign  and  the  terms  are  clearly 
shown,28  unless  the  statute  under  which  the  assign- 
ment is  made  prohibits  a  parol  assignment,29  or 
requires  the  assignment  to  be  in  writing.30  It  has 
been  held,  however,  that  a  judgment  on  a  written 
contract  must  be  assigned  in  writing  in  order  to 
constitute  a  valid  assignment,  so  that  the  judgment, 
when  satisfied  by  defendant,  will  operate  as  a  bar 
to  another  action  on  the  contract  against  defend- 
ant31 

An  assignment  by  delivery  merely  has  been  held 
insufficient  to  pass  even  an  equitable  title,32  al- 
though there  is  also  authority  to  the  contrary,33  and 
it  has  also  been  held  that  the  delivery  of  an  exe- 
cution with  intent  to  transfer  the  debt  for  a  val- 
uable consideration  is  a  sufficient  assignment  of  the 
judgment34 

In  ordsr  to  constitute  an  assignment  there  must 
be  enough  done  or  said  to  indicate  an  intention  to 
make  a  present  transfer,  as  distinguished  from  a 
mere  offer  or  purpose  to  do  so.35  An  assignment 
is  not  constituted  by  a  mere  authority  to  collect  the 
judgment36  or  by  an  order  to  pay  the  amount  there- 
of to  a  named  person.37 

Acceptance  by  assignee.  The  assignment  of  a 
judgment  is  not  effective  unless  accepted  by  the 
.assignee,38  although  subsequent  ratification  or  af- 
firmance thereof  is  sufficient  where  the  assignee 


was  ignorant  of  the  assignment  at  the  time  it  was 
made.39 

Notice.  In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  con- 
trary, a  valid  assignment  of  a  judgment  may  be 
made  without  notice  to  any  party  thereto,40  or  to 
any  other  person;41  but  it  has  been  held  that  an 
assignment  without  such  a  notice  vests  in  the  as- 
signee the  beneficial  interest  in  the  judgment,  the 
legal  title  remaining  in  the  assignor  in  the  nature 
of  a  trust  for  the  benefit  of  the  assignee.42 

Effect  of  mistake  of  law.  Since,  as  discussed  in 
Contracts  §  145,  a  mistake  of  law  does  not  relieve 
the  parties  to  a  contract  from  their  obligations 
thereunder  unless  an  unconscionable  advantage  is 
gained1  by  one  party  over  the  other,  a  mistake  by 
an  assignee  of  a  judgment  with  respect  to  the  pro- 
spective action  of  the  court  on  the  judgment  in  a 
pending  proceeding  seeking  the  enforcement  there- 
of does  not  invalidate  the  assignment  where  the 
assignor  acquired  no  unconscionable  advantage 
thereby.43 

Agreements  to  assign.  The  operation  and  effect 
of  an  agreement  to  assign  a  judgment  are  governed 
by  the  general  rules  relating  to  contracts.44  An 
executory  agreement  to  assign  a  judgment  for  a 
specified  price,  which  agreement  is  never  performed 
by  either  party,  does  not  amount  to  an  assignment,45 
and  does  not  vest  any  title  in  the  assignee.46  On 
breach  of  an  agreement  to  assign  the  aggrieved 


Performance  of  contract 

An  assignment  is  completed  and 
becomes  effective  on  compliance  by 
the  assignee  with  the  terms  of  the 
agreement  for  the  assignment  and 
notification  of  the  Judgment  debtor, 
notwithstanding  the  nonexecution  of 
a  written  assignment  —  Elgutter  v. 
McCarty.  La.App.,  167  So.  461. 

28.  Ky.  —  Thomas  v.  Sorter,  3  Bush 
177. 

29.  Ga.  —  Dugas   v.   Mathews,    9    Ga. 
510,  54  AmJ>.  881. 

Utah.—  Snow  v.  West,  110  P.  52,  37 
TJtah  528.       . 

30.  Ky.—  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  v. 
Sousley,  151  S.W.  353,  151  Ky.  39. 


Ga.  —  Franklin  v.  Mobley,  for  Use  of 
Patrick,  App.,   36   SJJ.2d  173. 

31.  Okl.  —  Automobile     Ins.     Co.     of 
Hartford,   Conn.,  v.  Lewis,   220  P. 
639.    93    OkL    280,    35    A.L.R.   1463. 

32.  Miss.  —  Parker  v.  Bacon,  26  Miss. 
425. 

33.  Ga.—  Franklin    v.     Mobley,   .for 
Use  of  Patrick,  App.,  36  S.B.2d  173. 

34.  Mass.  —  Dunn  v.  Snell,  15  Mass. 
481. 

35-    Ala.  —  Bain  v.  J.  A.  Lusk  &  Son, 
109   So.   187,   188,   21  AUuApp.   442. 


"The  owner  must  do  or  say  some- 
thing which  would  indicate  a  trans- 
fer of  his  claim  or  right  to  another." 
— Bain  v.  J.  A.  Lusk  &  Son,  supra. 

36.  Va.— Green    v.    Ashby,    6   Leigh 
135,  33  Va.  135. 

37.  Ky. — Thomas  v.  porter,  3  Bush 
177. 

38.  Ill.-r*Congregation   of  Resurrec- 
tion v.   Laibe,   152  IlLApp.  417. 

34  C.J.  p  63S  note  14. 

39.  N.Y.— Harbeck  v.  Vanderbilt,  20 
N.Y.  395. 

40.  111.— Knight  v.   Griffey,   43  N.E. 
727,  161  111.  85. 

Okl.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Robbins 
v.  Mid-West  Creamery  Co.,  162  P. 
2d  541,  543 — Owen  v.  Interstate 
Mortg.  Trust  Co.,  211  P.  87,  88  Okl. 
10,  30  A.L.R.  816. 

Tenn. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Wil- 
liams v.  Cantrell,  124  S.W.2d  29,  22 
Tenn.App.  443 — State  ex  rel.  Mc- 
Connell  v.  Peoples  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  12  Tenn.App.  242. 

34  C.J.  p  645  note  16. 
In  absence  of  bad  faith  the  text 

rule  is  to  be  followed. — Ciezynski  v. 

New  Britain  Transp.  Co.,  182  A.  661, 

121  Conn.  36. 

966 


Neither  statute  nor  equity  requires 
notice  of  assignment  of  a  judgment 
to  be  given  to  any  particular  person 
in  any  particular  manner. — Robbins 
v.  Mid-West  Creamery  Co.,  OkL,  162 
P.2d  541. 

41.  Okl. — Owen  v.  Interstate  Mortg. 
Trust   Co.,    211   P.   87,    88   Okl.   10, 
30  A.L.R.  816. 

42.  Conn. — Ciezynski  v.  New  Britain 
Transp.  Co.,  182  A.  661,  121  Conn. 
36. 

Effect  of  notice  to  Judgment  debtor 
see  infra  §  523. 

43.  Idaho. — Federal    Reserve    Bank 
of  San  Francisco  v.  Hansborough, 
292  P.  222,  49  Idaho  747. 

44.  La. — Continental    Supply   Co.   v. 
Browder,   124   So.   580,    11   La.App. 
631. 

Pa. — Penn  Discount  Corporation  v. 
Sharp,  189  A.  749.  125  Pa.Super. 
171. 

45.  U.S. — Rufe  v.   Lynchburg  Com- 
mercial  Bank,   Va.,    99    F.    650,    40 
C.C.A.  27. 

34  C.J.  p  640  note  40. 

46.  N.T. — Ithaca  Agricultural  Works 
v.  Eggleston,  4  N.Y.S.  933. 

34  C.J.  p  639  note  24. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  516 


party  is  entitled  to  recover  the  resulting  damages,47 
provided  he  has  performed,  or  is  ready,  willing  and 
able  to  perform,  on  his  own  part48  One  agreeing 
to  purchase  a  judgment  at  a  specified  sum  is  not 
entitled  to  an  assignment  if  he  has  defaulted  under 
the  agreement.49  The  mere  issuance  of  an  execu- 
tion at  request  of  the  judgment  creditor,50  or  an 
execution  sale  thereunder  to  one  refusing  to  accept 
title  to  the  seized  property,51  does  not  constitute  a 
breach  of  an  agreement  to  assign  a  judgment. 

What  law  governs.  The  validity  of  an  assignment 
of  a  judgment  is  determined  by  the  law  of  the 
state  in  which  the  judgment  is  recovered.52  Hence, 
an  assignment  of  a  judgment  made  in  conformity 
to  the  laws  of  the  state  where  the  judgment  was 
rendered  is  valid  everywhere.55 

b.  Statutory  Requirements 

Where  the  statute  authorizing  the  assignment  of  a 
Judgment  provides  a  mode  of  assignment,  its  require- 
ments must  be  followed  in  order  to  pass  the  legal  title 
and  secure  to  the  assignee  any  rights  which  depend  solely 
on  the  statute. 

Where  the  statute  authorizing  the  assignment  of 
a  judgment  provides  a  mode  of  assignment,  its  re- 
quirements must  be  followed  in  order  to  pass  the 
legal  title  and  secure  to  the  assignee  any  rights 
which  depend  solely  on  the  statute.54  Where,  how- 


ever, such  a  statute  does  not  expressly  exclude  oth- 
er modes,  it  is  regarded  as  cumulative  merely,  and 
does  not  prevent  the  making  of  an  assignment  in 
any  other  .way  which  is  recognized  as  sufficient  in 
equity.55 

§  516.    Equitable  Assignments 

No    particular   form    Is    necessary    to    constitute    an 
equitable  assignment  of  a  judgment. 

In  order  to  constitute  an  equitable  assignment  of 
a  judgment,  no  particular  form  is  necessary,56  it 
being  sufficient  that  the  assignee  has  such  evidence 
of  title  as,  although  it  does  not  pass  a  legal  title 
to  enforce  the  judgment  in  his  own  name,  authorizes 
him  to  receive  the  proceeds  thereof,  and  protects 
the  judgment  debtor  in  making  payment  to  him.57 
Thus,  provided  the  intent  to  assign  is  clear  and 
some  act  is  done  between  the  parties  amounting  to 
an  appropriation,  or  a  constructive  delivery,5*  an 
equitable  assignment  of  a  judgment  may  be  made 
by  a  writing,5^  or  by  parol,60  even  though  a  statute 
requires  a  writing  to  effect  a  legal  assignment  of 
a  judgment.61  Where  an  attempted  assignment  of 
a  judgment,  made  in  good  faith,  fails  of  its  legal 
effect  because  of  some  irregularity  or  informality, 
it  may  be  given  effect  in  equity  where  it  amounts  to 
an  equitable  assignment,62  and,  even  where  there 


47.  Measure  of  damages 
Judgment  creditor  who  was  ready, 

on  payment  of  consideration,  to  as- 
sign Judgment  to  defendants  who 
had  agreed  by  written  instrument 
to  pay  fixed  sum  therefor,  was  enti- 
tled to  damages  for  breach  of  agree- 
ment equal  to  stipulated  contract 
price,  and  not  excess  of  contract 
price  over  market  value  at  time  ac- 
tual delivery  was  to  be  made.— Penn 
Discount  Corporation  v.  Sharp,  189 
A.  749,  125  Pa.Super.  171. 

48.  Pa. — Penn  Discount  Corporation 
v.  Sharp,  supra. 

Tender  and  refusal  are  essential. — 
Continental  Supply  Co.  v.  Browder, 
124  So.  580,  11  La.App.  631. 

49.  Pa. — Penn  Discount  Corporation 
v.  Sharp,  189  A.  749,  125  Pa.Super. 
171. 

50.  La. — Continental    Supply  Co.   v. 
Browder,    124   So.   580,   11  La.App. 
631. 

51.  La. — Continental   Supply  Co.  v. 
Browder,  supra. 

52.  Mich. — Cook   v.    Casualty  Ass'n 
of    America,    224    N.W.    341,"    246 
Mich.  278. 

53.  Cal. — Tornauist   v.    Johnson,    13 
P.2d  405,   124   Cal.App.   634. 

Mich. — Corpus  Jurig  cited  in  Cook  v. 

Casualty  Ass'n  of  America,  224  N. 

W.  341,  246  Mich.  278. 
34  C.J.  p  639  note  29. 


54.  Wis. — Cowie  v.  Waukesha  Nat. 
Bxch.  Bank,  132  N.W.  900,  147  Wis. 
124. 

34  C.J.  p  640  note  52. 

Rights   and  liabilities   of  third  per- 
sons see  infra  §  526. 
Strict  compliance  with  the  statute 

is   essential. — Donham  v.  Davis,   187 

S.W.2d  722,  208  Ark.  824— McKim  v. 

Highway  Iron  Products  Co.,  29  S.W. 

2d  682,  181  Ark.  1121. 

Statutes  held  inapplicable 

Pa.— Citizens  Nat.  Bank  of  LeMgh- 
ton  v.  Kupres,  18  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
692,  affirmed  161  A.  466,  106  Pa. 
Super.  164. 

55.  Ark.— Davis  v.  Oaks,   60  S.W.2d 
922,  187  Ark.  601. 

Cal. — Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  Torn- 

duist  v.  Johnson,  13  P.2d  405,  124 

Cal.App,  634. 
Minn.— Brown    v.    Reinke,    199   N.W. 

235,  139  Minn.  458,  35  A.L.B.  413. 
Mo. — Popsicle  Corporation  of  XT.   S. 

v.  Pearlstein,  App.,  168  S.W.2d  105 

— Helstein  v.   Schmidt,   78   S.W.2d 

132,  229  Mo.App.  275. 
34  C.J.  p  641  note  53. 

Furpofe  of  statute  providing  for 
acknowledgment  of  assignment  of 
judgment  or  cause  of  action  and  fil- 
ing and  entry  thereof  with  papers 
of  cause  is  not  to  create  rule  of  evi- 
dence, but  one  of  registration  for 
purposes  of  notice,  and  is  not  in- 
tended to  prevent  acquisition  of  ti- 

967 


tie  to  Judgment,  either  legal  or  equi- 
table, in  any  other  lawful  manner. 
— Hunter  v.  B.  E.  Porter,  Inc.,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  81  S.W.2d  774. 
Statutory  method  held  not  exclusive 
Mo.— Boyd  v.  Sloan,  71  S.W.2d  1065, 
335  Mo.  163. 

56.  Ark. — Moore     v.     Robinson,     35 
Ark.  293. 

34  C.J.  p  639  note  30. 

57.  Miss. — Parker  v.  Bacon,  26  Miss. 
425. 

34  C.J.  p  639  note  31. 

58.  N.C. — Winberry    v.    Koonce,    .83 
N.C.  351. 

34  C.J.  p  £39  note  33. 

59.  Ky.— Shaw  v.   McKnight-Keaton 
Grocery    Co.,    21    S.W.2d    269,    231 
Ky.  223. 

60.  Ark.— Davis  v.  Oaks,  60  S.W.2d 
922,  187  Ark.  501. 

Ky. — Turner  v.  Gambill,  121  S.W.2d 
705,  275  Ky.  330— Shaw  v.  Mc- 
Knight-Keaton Grocery  Co.,  21  8. 
W.2d  269,  231  Ky.  223. 

34  C.J.  p  639  note  32. 

61.  Ga. — Franklin    v.     Mobley,     for 
Use  of  Patrick,  App.,  36  S.B.2d  173. 

62.  Minn. — Brown    v.    Reinke,     199 
N.W.  235,  139  Minn.  458,  35  AJUH. 
413. 

34  C.J.  p  639  note  35. 
Koncompliance  with  statute 

(1)  An  assignment  of  a  judgment 


§  516 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


bas  been  no  attempt  to  effect  an  assignment,  equity 
will  sometimes  give  effect  to  the  transaction  as  an 
assignment  in  order  to  protect  the  rights  of  the 
assignee.63  An  order  from  the  judgment  creditor 
to  his  attorney  to  pay  to  a  third  party  the  money 
collected  on  the  judgment  creates,  when  delivered  to 
the  attorney,  an  equitable  assignment  of,  and  a 
lien  on,  the  proceeds  of  the  judgment,64  even  though 
it  is  not  accepted  by  the  attorney.65  On  the  other 
hand,  an  order  on  a  court  clerk  to  pay  to  a  third 
person  the  amount  due  on  a  judgment  does  not 
amount  to  an  assignment,  since  such  order  cannot 
operate  until  the  judgment  has  been  extinguished 
by  payment66 

An  assignment  may  be  presumed  to  have  been 
executed  on  the  day  of  its  date.67 

Proof  of  assignment.  While  no  formality  is  re- 
quired in  an  equitable  assignment  of  a  judgment, 
when  the  fact  of  the  assignment  is  called  in  ques- 


tion, sufficient  evidence  of  title  must  be  produced 
to  protect  the  judgment  debtor  in  making  payment 
to  the  assignee  as  against  the  assignor,6®  and  evi- 
dence of  delivery  merely  has  been  held  insuffi- 
cient.^ The  fact  that  the  assignment  has  been 
filed  of  record  with  the  papers  will  not  dispense 
with  the  necessity  of  calling  the  subscribing  wit- 
ness to  prove  it70 

§  517.    Consideration 

As  a  genera!  rule,  aa  between  the  assignor  and  the 
assignee,  a  valuable  consideration  Is  essential  to  support 
an  assignment  of  a  judgment. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,71  as 
between  the  assignor  and  the  assignee,  or  persons 
claiming  under  them,  a  valuable  consideration  is 
essential  to  support  an  assignment  of  a  judgment72 
Any  consideration  sufficient  to  support  a  contract 
will  suffice  to  support  such  an  assignment,™  and 
the  rights  of  the  assignee  to  payment,  as  discussed 


in  any  form  passes  an  equity  which 
the  courts  will  recognize  and  pro- 
tect notwithstanding  it  fails  to  com- 
ply with  statute.— Brown  v.  Reinke, 
supra. 

(2)  An  assignment  of  a  judgment 
without  compliance  with  statute 
passes  the  equitable,  but  not  the  le- 
gal, title. — In  re  Hutcherson,  C.C.A. 
Ind.,  133  F.2d  959. 
63.  S.C.— Sutton  v.  Button,  1  S.E. 

19,  26  S.C.  33. 
34  OJ.  p  640  note  36. 
Compelling1  assignment 

Where  purchaser  at  tax  sale  re- 
covered judgments  against  tenant  in 
possession  for  use  and  occupation  of 
premises  and  owner  thereafter  sold 
premises  to  purchaser,  crediting  him 
with  all  he  was  entitled  to  under  the 
tax  sale,  purchaser  was  not  there- 
after entitled  to  hold  judgments 
against  tenant  and  would  be  directed 
to  assign  them  to  the  owner. — Pyle 
v.  Altshul,  4  A.2d  377.  125  N.J.EQ. 
143. 
On  avoidance  of  execution  sale 

Where  deed  under  void  execution 
sale  is  set  aside,  an  equitable  as- 
signment of  the  judgment  to  pur- 
chaser's vendee  results. — Jeffreys  v. 
Hocutt  142  SJB.  226,  195  N.C.  339. 
54.  Qa. — Stanford  v.  Connery,  11  S. 

B.  507,  84  Ga>  731. 
N.Y.— Hussey    v.    Culver,    6    N.T.S. 

466,  3  Silv.Sup.  126. 
65.    N.Y.— Hussey  v.  Culver,   supra. 
86.    Ind.— Teetor   v.    Abden,    2    Ind. 

183. 

67.  Iowa.— Weire   v.    Dayenport,    11 
Iowa  49,  77  Am.D.  132. 

68.  Cal. — Spencer  v.  California  Nat. 
Bank  of  Long  Beach,  36  P.2d  1073, 
1  Cal.2d  681. 

84  C.J.  p  640  note  42. 


69.  Miss. — Parker  v.  Bacon,  26  Miss. 
425. 

70.  Pa. — Himes  v.  Barnitz,  8  Watts 
39. 

71.  OaL — Curtin  v.  Kowalsky,  78  P. 
962,  145  Cal.  431. 

34  C.J.  p  640  note  45  [c]. 

.    Ala.— Bain  v.  J.  Al  Lusk  &  Son, 

109  So.   187,  21  Ala,App.  442. 
Okl. — Martin  v.  North  American  Car 

Corporation,   35  P.2d  460,  168  Okl. 

599. 
Assignment  "by  municipality 

Municipality  may  assign  judgment 
recovered  on  bail  bond  for  fair  and 
full  value. — Wilkinson  v.  Hutto,  128 
So.  93,  157  Hiss.  358. 
Consideration  held  insufficient 

Transfer,  of  judgment  to  clerk  and 
sheriff  to  secure  costs  in  other  oas- 
es was  held  void,  as  without  consid- 
eration or  promise  of  service  not 
their  duty  to  perform. — Bain  v.  J.  A. 
Lusk  &  Son,  109  So.  187,  21  AUuApp. 
442. 

73.    La. — Kentwood  $ank  v.  McClen- 

don,  93  So.   748,   152  La.  489. 
34  C.J.  P  640  note  45. 
Assignment  as  security  or  collateral 

(1)  An  assignment   given  as   col- 
lateral or  security  for  a  loan  is  bas- 
ed   on    a    sufficient    consideration. — 
State   ex  rel.   McConneU  v.  Peoples 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  12  Tenn.App.  242. 

(2)  It  Is  a  sufficient  consideration, 
even  though  given  to  secure  a  pre- 
existing debt— McMillan  v.  Ruther- 
ford,  Tex.Civ.App.,   14   S.W.2d   132— 
34  C.J.  p  640  note  45   [a]   (3). 

(3)  Because  of  this  it  was  unnec- 
essary   to    a    valid    assignment    of 
judgment  to  pay  notes  held  by  as- 
signee that  they  be  marked  paid  and 
delivered   to   assignor  to   constitute 

968 


consideration.— McMillan  v.   Ruther- 
'ord,  supra. 
Executed  contract 

Landowners'  assignment  of  a  pro- 
portional interest  in  judgment  recov- 
ered in  condemnation  action  as  se- 
curity for  payment  of  plaintiffs 
services  in  the  condemnation  action 
was  an  "executed  contract"  requiring 
no  consideration. — Rowe  v.  Holmes, 
146  P.2d  45,  63  Cal.App.2d  46. 
Failure  of  consideration 

Where  assignment  of  judgment 
was  consideration  for  cancellation  of 
mortgage,  reversal  of  judgment 
merely  for  modification,  leaving  judg- 
ment as  valuable  as  before,  was  not 
a  failure  of  consideration. — Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  San  Francisco  v. 
Hansbrough,  292  P.  222,  49  Idaho 
747. 
Fast  consideration 

Debtor's  antecedent  obligation  to 
his  assignee  was  held  not  to  con- 
stitute a  valuable  consideration  for 
the  assignment  of  a  judgment  ob- 
tained by  debtor. — London  &  Lan- 
cashire Indemnity  Co.  of  America  v. 
Cromwell,  190  S.B.  337,  118  W.Va. 
318. 
Proof  as  to  consideration 

(1)  Any  evidence  which  impeaches 
the    bona   fides    of    the    assignment 
puts   the   assignee  to   full   proof  of 
consideration.— Rettig  v.   Becker,   11 
Pa. Super.  395. 

(2)  Burden  is  on  assignee  to  prove 
payment      for      assignment. — Power 
Mfg.   Co.  v.  Tindall,   C.C.A^rk.,   100 
F.2d  463. 

(3)  Where  Judgment   creditor   ex- 
ecuted a  written  assignment  in  blank 
and   transmitted   it   to    its   attorney 
with  instructions  to  deliver,  on  re- 
ceipt of  certain  sum,  possession  of 
assignment  by   third  party,   created 


49    C.J  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  519 


infra  §  522,  or  otherwise,  are  not  affected  by  the 
fact  that  the  consideration  was  less  than  the  face 
of  the  judgment74 

§  518.    Recording 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  as  be- 
tween the  assignor  and  assignee,  filing  or  recording  Is 
not  essential  to  the  validity  of  an  assignment  of  a  Judg- 
ment. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  so  requiring,75  as  be- 
tween the  assignor  and  the  assignee,  filing  or  re- 
cording is  not  essential  to  the  validity  of  an  assign- 
ment of  a  judgment.76  Thus,  while  it  may  be  de- 
sirable that  the  assignment  of  a  judgment  appear 
of  record,  an  entry  thereof  on  the  records  of  the 
court  rendering  it  is  not  usually  necessary  to  com- 
plete the  assignment,77  the  mere  filing  thereof 
among  the  papers  in  the  case  being  sufficient,78  al- 
though under  some  statutes  recording  is  necessary 
as  against  third  persons.79  A  statute  requiring  as- 


signments to  be  recorded  refers  only  to  domestic 
judgments,  and  does  not  affect  the  proof  of  an  as- 
signment of  a  foreign  judgment.80 

§  519.    Operation  and  Effect 

a.  In  general 

b.  Assignment  as  security  or  for  collec- 

tion 

c.  Effect  of  fraud 

a.  In  General 

A  valid  assignment  of  a  Judgment  transfers  to  the 
assignee  all  of  the  rights  of  the  assignor  therein,  but  the 
assignee  stands  in  no  better  position  than  his  assignor 
In  relation  thereto. 

On  a  valid  assignment  of  a  judgment,  the  assignee 
succeeds  to  the  ownership  of  the  judgment  and  all 
the  rights,  interests,  and  authority  of  his  assignor 
therein,81  including  the  debt  or  claim  on  which  the 
judgment  is  based82  and  any  security  therefor,83 


presumption  that  such  sum  had  been 
paid. — Power  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Tindall, 
supra. 

(4)  In  such  a  case  the  assignee's 
burden  of  proving  payment  was  sus- 
tained by  production  of  assignment 
in  his  possession  and  recital  in  as- 
signment acknowledging  receipt  of 
consideration  of  one  dollar  and  other 
good  and  valuable  consideration  paid 
to  the  Judgment  creditor  by  the  as- 
signee.— Power  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Tindall, 
supra. 
Payment  "by  accommodation,  iudorser 

Accommodation  indorser  of  note, 
who  paid  judgment  entered  on  note 
against  himself  and  makers  and  who 
took  an  assignment  of  judgment 
from  judgment  creditor  was  owner 
of  judgment  as  an  assignee 'for  val- 
ue.—Cox  v.  Williams,  31  S.B.2d  312, 
183  Va.  152. 

74.  Minn.— Dalby  v.   Lauritzen,   107 
N.W.  826,  98  Minn.  75. 

34  C.J.  p  640  note  47. 

75.  Ark.— St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hambright,  112  S.W.  876,  87 
Ark.  242. 

Chattel  mortgage  recording  act 

An  assignment  of  an  interest  in 
a  judgment  to  secure  and  pay  an  in- 
debtedness of  a  judgment  creditor  is 
not  a  chattel  mortgage  within  mean- 
ing of  recording  statute. — Robbins  v. 
Mid-West  Creamery  Co.,  Okl.,  162  P. 
2d  541. 

76.  Minn. — Barnes  v.  Verry,  191  N. 
W.   589,   154   Minn.   252,   31  A.L.R. 
707. 

N.C.— In    re   Wallace,    193    S.E.    819, 

212  K.C,  490. 
Statute  bald  inapplicable 

A  statute  regulating  assignments 
of  causes  of  action, after  suit  and 
before  judgment  did  not  apply  to  as- 
signment of  judgment  terminating 


cause  of  action. — Pigford  Grocery 
Co.  v.  Wilder,  76  So.  745,  116  Miss. 
233. 

77.  Ky.— Fidelity  &  Deposit   Co.   v. 
Sousley,    151    S.W.    353,    151    Ky. 
39. 

34  C.J.  p  640  note  48. 

78.  Mo. — Tutt    v.    Couzlns,    50    Mo. 
152. 

34  C.J.  p  640  note  49. 
Court  record 

Transfer  of  a  judgment  becomes 
a  court  record  by  being  filed  with 
the  papers  in  the  suit  in  which  it 
was  rendered,  and  noted  on  the  mar- 
gin of  the  proper  minutes. — Surge  v. 
Broussard,  Tex.Clv.App.,  258  S.W. 
502. 

79.  Wash. — Premier  Wrench   Co.   v. 
Pearson,  225  P.  49,  129  Wash.  326. 

34  C.J.  p  640  note  50. 

80.  Mo. — Baker   v.    Stonebraker,    34 
Mo.  172. 

81.  Cal.— Richey   v.  Ziegler,    264   P. 
293,  89  Cal.App.  35. 

111. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Painter  v. 
Merchants  &  Manufacturers  Bank 
of  Milwaukee,  277  IlLApp.  208,  246. 

Miss. — Humphreys  County  v.  Cashin, 
101  So.  571,  136  Miss.  476. 

N.C. — Jones  v.  T.  S.  Franklin  Es- 
tate, 183  S.B.  732,  209  N.C.  585. 

Pa. — Marsh  v.  Bowen,  6  A.2d  783, 
335  Pa.  314. 

S.C.— Watts  v.  Copeland,  170  S.E. 
780,  170  S.C.  449. 

Tex. — Casray  Oil  Corporation  v.  Roy- 
al Indemnity  Co.,  CIv.App.,  165  S, 
W.2d  244,  affirmed  169  S.W.2d  955, 
141  Tex  33. 

W.Va. — Hines  v.  Fulton,  140  S.B. 
537,  104  W.Va.  561:  , 

34  C.J.  p  650  note  87. 

Declaration  of  right* 

(1)  If  the  judgment  is  one  which 

is   merely  declaratory   of  a  status, 

969 


the  assignee  thereof  acquires  no  in- 
terest in  the  property  in  respect  of 
which  the  judgment  was  rendered. — 
Cucullu  v.  Bilgery,  20  So.  662,  48  La. 
Ann.  1245. 

(2)  Thus  an  assignment  of  a  judg- 
ment which,  in  addition  to  awarding 
a  money  recovery,  declared  the  sta- 
tus of  the  assignor's  title  to  certain 
property  which  had  theretofore  pass- 
ed to  him  under  a  will  transferred 
the  money  judgment,  but  did  not 
transfer  the  assignor's  title  to  the 
property. — Ingram  v.  Jones,  C.C.A. 
Okl.,  47  R2d  135. 

82.  Cal.— North   v.    Evans,    36    P.2d 
133,  1  Cal.App.2d  64. 

111. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Painter  v. 
Merchants  &  Manufacturers  Bank, 
277  IlLApp.  208,  246. 
Miss. — Corpus  Juris   cited  in  Hum- 
phreys  County  v.  Cashin,   101   So. 
571,  573,  136  Miss.  476. 
N-.T.— Thomas    v.    Hubbell,    36    IT.Y. 
120— Rose  v.  Baker,   13  Barb.   230. 
S.C.— Watts    v.    Copeland,    170    S.B. 

780,  170  S.C.  449. 

Tex. — Casray  Oil  Corporation  v.  Roy- 
al Indemnity  Co.,  Civ.App.,  165  £l. 
W.2d  244,  affirmed  169  S.W.2d  955, 
141  Tex.  33. 
34  C.J.  p  650  note  88 — 5  C.J.  p  951 

note  14.      . 
Effect  of  vacation,  of  judgment 

If  an  assignment  of  a  judgment 
assigned  the  claim  on  which  it  rest- 
ed, notwithstanding  subsequent  va- 
cation of  judgment  on  appeal,  the 
assignor  could  not  complain  of  a 
levy  of  execution  against  the  claim, 
since  the  only  person  interested  un- 
der such  circumstances  would  be  the 
owner  or  assignee. — Johnson  v.  Dahl- 
quist,  225  P.  817,  130  Wash.  29. 

83.  N.Y.— Pattison  r.  Hull,    9    Cow. 
747. 


519 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


provided  the  claim  is  assignable.8*  The  effect  of 
such  an  assignment  is  to  divest  the  assignor  of  all 
interest  in,  and  all  control  over,  the  judgment,85 
even  though  the  assignment  is  a  fraud  on  credi- 
tors,86 and  the  assignor  cannot  thereafter  pass  title 
to  it  by  any  subsequent  assignment.87  The  death  of 
the  assignor  does  not  impair  the  rights  of  the  as- 
signee.88 The  assignment  of  a  decree  will  not  ne- 
cessitate making  the  assignee  a  party  to  further 
proceedings.89 

An  assignment,  however,  does  not  confer  on  the 
assignee  any  greater  right,  interest,  or  equity  than 
the  assignor  had,90  and  the  assignee  stands  in  no 
better  position  that  his  assignor  stood  at  the  time 
of  the  assignment.91  Hence,  if  the  latter  has  no 
title  to  the  judgment,  he  can  convey  none  to  the 
assignee92  whether  or  not  the  assignee  had  no- 
tice.93 It  has  been  held  that,  if  the  judgment  is 
void  in  the  hands  of  the  judgment  creditor,  it  is 
void  and  without  effect  in  the  hands  of  an  assignee 
for  value.94  However,  it  has  also  been  held  that, 
if  the  judgment  is  void,  the  assignment  neverthe- 
less transfers  the  original  debt  or  claim  on  which 
the  judgment  was  based.95 

Caveat  emptor.     An  assignment  of  a  judgment 


has  been  held  to  be  subject  to  the  rule  of  caveat 
emptor.96 

As  satisfaction  of  judgment.  Irrespective  of 
how  often  a  judgment  may  be  transferred,  it  does 
not  become  functus  officio,  where  the  intention  of 
the  parties  to  the  transfers  is  evidently  to  keep  it 
alive.97  If,  however,  as  discussed  infra  §  562,  a 
judgment  is  assigned  to  the  judgment  debtor  him- 
self, or  to  a  stranger  for  his  benefit,  the  judgment 
is  satisfied.  It  is  otherwise  where  the  judgment 
debtor  causes  an  assignment  to  be  made  to  a  third 
person  who  advances  the  funds  necessary  to  pay 
the  judgment  under  circumstances  showing  the  ab- 
sence of  any  intent  to  satisfy  the  judgment.98 

b.  Assignment  as  Security  or  for  Collection 

The  assignment  of  a  Judgment  as  security  for  a  debt 
confers  on  the  assignee  the  right  to  control  and  enforce 
the  Judgment  and  satisfy  his  claim  out  of  the  proceeds. 
An  assignee  for  collection  obtains  no  vested  right  In  the 
Judgment. 

A  third  person  taking  an  assignment  of  a  judg- 
ment as  collateral  security  for  a  debt  acquires  the 
right  to  control  and  enforce  the  judgment,99  and  to 
satisfy  his  claims  out  of  the  proceeds.1  However, 
where  a  judgment  is  assigned  to  secure  advances, 


84.  N.Y.— Pulver  v.  Harris,  52  N.Y. 
73. 

85.  W.Va.— Corpus    Juris     cited    1* 
Hines  v.  Fulton,  140  S.E.  537,  540, 
104  W.Va.  -561. 

34  C.J.  p  641  note  54. 
Bights  affalaurt  debtor 

Judgment  creditor  who  assigned 
judgment  for  value  could  not  at- 
tach fund  which  judgment  debtor 
claimed,  on  ground  that  assignee  al- 
legedly settled  Judgment  with  judg- 
ment debtor  for  sum  less  than  face 
value  of  judgment. — Posey  v.  Cocke, 
92  S.W.2d  4,  283  Ky.  177. 

86.  Tex. — Ford  v.   Rosenthal,   11   S. 
W.  28,  74  Tex  28. 

87.  CaL— Curtin  v.  Kowalsky,  78  P. 
962,  145  Cal.  431. 

34  C.J.  p  641  note  56. 
Priorities  between  assignees  see  in- 
fra §  529. 

88.  Conn.— Hamilton  v.  New  Haven, 
73  A.  1,  82  Conn.  208. 

89.  111. — Bonner  v.   Illinois  Land  & 
Loan  Co.,  96  111.  546. 

90.  U.S. — Christmas  v.  City   of  As- 
bury  Park,  D.C.N.J.,  53  F.Supp.  64 
— Turner    v.    Dickey,    D.C.Tenn.,    3 
F.Supp.  360,  affirmed,  C1C.A.,  Dick- 
ey v.   Turner,   64   F.2d  1012. 

Cal. — Parker  v.  Howe,  299  P.  553, 
114  CaLApp.  166— Arp  v.  Blake,  218 
P.  773,  63  CaLApp.  362. 

Iowa.— Mutual  Surety  Co.  of  Iowa  v. 
Bailey,  3  N.W*2d  627,  231  Iowa 
1238 — Roe  v.  King,  251  N.W.  81, 
217  Iowa  213. 


Tex.— Pegues  v.  Moss,  Civ.App.f  140 
S.W.2d  461,   error  dismissed— Dal- 
las Joint  Stock  Land  Bank  of  Dal- 
las v.  Lancaster,   Civ.App.,  122  S. 
W.2d    659,    error   dismissed. 
Wash.— Associated  Indemnity  Corpo- 
ration v.  Wachsmith,  99  P.2d  420, 
2  Wash.2d  679,  127  A.L.R.  531. 
Judgment  to  use  of  third  person 

Where  a  judgment  is  marked  to 
the  use- of  a  third  person,  the  use- 
plaintiff  is  merely  an  assignee  whose 
rights  are  no  greater  than  those  of 
the  judgment  creditor. — Sophia 
Wilks  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  to  Use 
of  v.  Rudloff,  46  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  535, 
affirmed  Sophia  Wilkes  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n,  to  Use  of  Wiehe  v.  Rud- 
loff, 35  A.2d  278,  348  Bsu  477. 

91.  Cal. — Clark  v.  Tompkins,  270  P. 
946,  205  Cal.  373. 

N\ J.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Manowitz 

v.  Kanov,  154  A.  326,  327,  107  N.J. 

Law  523,  75  A.L.R.  1464. 

Pa.-^Sophia  Wilks  Building  &  Loan 

Ass'n  to  Use  of  v.  Rudloff,  46  D.  & 

C.     535,    affirmed    Sophia    Wilkes 

Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  to  Use  of 

Wiehe  v.  Rudloff,  35  A.2d  278,  348 

Pa.  477. 

34  C.J.  p  641  note  58. 

Where  a  judgment  hag  "been  paid 
in  part  before  its  assignment,  the 
assignment  transfers  to  the  assignee 
the  judgment  creditor's  interest  in 
the  amount  unpaid. — Cutting  v.  Mul- 
la«ey,  181  N.W.  466,  191  Iowa  800. 

92.  CaL— Anglo-California  Trust  Co. 

970 


v.    Oakland   Rys.    225    P.    452,    193 
Cal.  451. 
34  C.J.  p  641  note  59. 

93.  Cal. — Anglo-California  Trust  Co. 
v.  Oakland  Rys.,  supra. 

94.  Ga. — Winn  v.  Armour  &  Co.,  193 
S.B.  447,  184  Ga,  769. 

95.  Cal. — Brown    v.    Scott,    25    Cal. 
189. 

96.  Cal. — Anglo-California  Trust  Co. 
v.    Oakland   Rys.,   225    P.    452,    193 
Cal.  451. 

Pa. — Berger  v.  Roberts,  Com.Pl.,  93 
Pittsb.Ler.J.  105. 

97.  N.Yi— Carpenter  v.   Andrews,    9 
N.Y.St.   427. 

Assignment  on  payment  by  joint 
debtor  see  infra  §  555. 

98.  Kan. — Benson  v.  Altenburg,   259 
P.   791,   124   Kan.   296,   modified  on 
other  grounds  261  P.  589,  124  Kan. 
571. 

99.  Pa. — Beale  v.  Mechanics'  Bank, 
5  Watts  529. 

34  C.J.  p  642  note  63. 

Right  of  assignee  generally  to  en- 
force judgment  against  debtor  see 
infra  §  522. 

1.    U.S. — Varnum    v.     Milford,    C.C. 

Ind.,  28  F.Cas.No.16,891,  4  McLean 

93. 

34  C.J.  p  642  note  64. 
Assignment  to  surety  on  appeal  bond 

Appellant's  assignment  to  sureties 
on  his  appeal  bond,  of  judgment  in 
his  favor  in  another  action  au- 
thorizing sureties  "to  collect  same 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


520 


the  assignee  cannot  include  within  the  lien  other 
advances  made  to  the  assignor,  as  to  which  there 
was  no  agreement  on  making  the  assignment.2  The 
assignee  obtains  no  better  rights  than  his  assignor 
had,  and  takes  the  judgment  subject  to  any  equi- 
ties or  disabilities  effective  against  it  in  the  tetter's 
hands.3  If  he  in  turn  sells  or  assigns  the  judg- 
ment, his  assignee  must  hold  it  subject  to  the  right 
of  the  original  owner  to  redeem  it  on  paying  the 
amount  for  which  it  was  pledged  as  security.4  On 
the  payment  or  release  of  the  debt  for  which  the 
judgment  was  pledged,  the  assignee's  rights  termi- 
nate by  operation  of  law,  and  the  judgment  reverts 
to  the  original  owner  without  a  reassignment.6 

One  taking  an  assignment  of  a  judgment  merely 
under  an  authority  or  as  a  power  to  collect  it  for 
the  assignor  has  no  vested  right  in  it  other  than  as 
the  assignor's  agent,  in  whom  the  ownership  re- 
mains.6 On  the  other  hand,  a  written  assignment 
giving  the  assignee  full  authority  to  collect  and  dis- 
charge the  judgment  and  binding  the  assignor  not 
to  do  so  is  a  valid  assignment.7 

An  assignment  to  an  attorney  for  the  purpose  of, 
inter  alia,  paying  his  own  fees  gives  him  an  inter- 
est in  the  judgment.8 


c.  Effect  of  Fraud 


Fraud  vitiates  an  assignment  of  a  Judgment  as  be- 
tween the  parties  to  the  assignment. 

As  between  the  parties  to  it  an  assignment  of  a 
judgment  may  be  vitiated  by  fraud  or  bad  faith,9 
but  the  judgment  debtor  cannot  impeach  the  as- 
signment for  fraud  unless  he  can  show  that  he  was 
injured  by  the  fraud.10 


§  520. 


Partial  Assignments 


A$  a  general  rule  a  partial  assignment  of  a  Judg- 
ment, while  valid  as  between  the  parties,  is  of  no  effect 
against  the  Judgment  debtor  unless  he  consents  thereto 
or  ratifies  it. 

While,  as  between  the  assignor  and  the  assignee, 
the  assignment  of  a  part  of  a  judgment  is  valid  and 
binding,  even  when  made  without  the  judgment 
debtor's  consent,11  as  against  the  debtor  a  judgment 
cannot  be  partially  assigned  without  the  debtor's 
consent,12  such  an  assignment  without  the  consent 
of  the  debtor  having  no  effect  against  the  debtor,18 
unless  it  is  subsequently  ratified  by  him.14 

In  accordance  with  the  general  rule  governing 
partial  assignments  of  choses  in  action,  as  discussed 
in  Assignments  §  39,  a  partial  assignment  will  not 
change  the  legal  title  to  the  judgment15  and,  except 


in  event  said  decree  be  affirmed,1 
entitled  sureties  to  collect  judgment 
In  full  before  expending  money  as 
sureties,  and  to  account  merely  for 
any  excess. — Humphreys  County  v. 
Cashin,  101  So.  571,  136  Miss.  476. 
2-  S.C.— Miller  v.  Klugh,  7  S.B.  £7, 
29  S.C.  124. 

3.  Pa.— Appeal  of  Datesman,  77  Pa. 
243. 

4.  N.Y. — Gray  v.  Green,  12  Hun  598, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  77  N.Y. 
615. 

Pa. — Poe  v.  Foster,  4  Watts  &  S. 
351. 

5.  U.S.— Taggart's    Case,    17    CtCL 
322. 

111. — Hossack  v.  Underwood,  55  111. 
123. 

6.  111.— Gallagher  v.  Schmidt,  144  N. 
E.  319,  313  111.  40. 

Neb. — Reed  v.  Occidental  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n,  241  N.W.  769,  122  Neb. 
817,  certiorari  denied  53  S.Ct  93, 
287  U.S.  623,  77  L.Ed.  640» 

34  C.J.  p  642  note  69. 

7.  Tex.— McMillan     v.     Rutherford, 
Civ.App.,.14  S.W.2d  132. 

8.  U.S. — Rufe    v.    Lynchburg    Com- 
mercial Bank,  Va.,  99  F.  650,  40  C. 
C.A.  27. 

Bight  of.  a««ignor  to  defeat  right* 

Landowners  who  recovered  judg- 
ment for  large  amount  in  eminent 
domain  action,  from  which  appeal 
was  pending  for  several  years*  could 


not,  by  settling  case  and  stipulating 
to  amount  of  final  judgment,  defeat 
plaintiffs  right  under  landowners' 
assignment  of  proportional  interest 
in  the  Judgment  as  security  for  pay- 
ment of  plaintiff's  fee  for  services  in 
the  condemnation  action. — Howe  v. 
Holmes,  146  P.2d  45,  63  Cal.App.2d 
46. 

9.    Colo. — Empire  Land  &  Canal  Co. 

v.  Engley,  33  P.  153,  18  Colo.  388. 
N.Y. — Thompson   v.   Jones,    8   N.Y.S. 

373,  55  Hun  268. 
34  C.J.  p  642  note  71. 
Fraud  as  ground  for  rescinding  or 

setting  aside  assignment  see  infra 

§  530. 
Dual  agency 

The  fact  that  the  attorney  who, 
drew  the  assignment  represented 
both  the  assignor  and  the  assignee 
did  not  vitiate  the  assignment. — 
Painter  v.  Merchants  &  Manufactur- 
ers Bank  of  Milwaukee,  277  IlLApp. 
208. 

Evidence  held  insufficient  to  show 
fraud. — Holley  v.  Shaw,  196  So.  863, 
143  Fla.  445. 
Purchaae  on  behalf  of  debtor 

Mere  failure  of  a  judgment  debt- 
or's agent  to  inform  judgment  credi- 
tor >that  agent,  in  purchasing  judg- 
ment is  acting  in  behalf  of  judg- 
ment debtor,  is  not  "fraud." — D&vis 
v.  Pennsylvania  Co.  for  Insurance  on 
Lives  &  Granting  Annuities,  103  P. 
2d  380,  187  OkL  436. 

971 


10.  La. — Long  v.  Klein,  35  La.Ann. 
384. 

34  C.J.  p  642  note  72. 

11.  Okl.— Holiday  Oil  Co.  v.  Fidelity 
&  Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland,  19  P.2d 
335,  162  Okl.  192. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  83. 
Extent  of  interest 

Court  presumes  that  assignment 
of  one  half  of  judgment  for  damag- 
es from  wrongful  sequestration  car- 
ried with  it  one  half  of  every  dol- 
lar recovered,  including  one  half  of 
portion  recovered  for  exemplary 
damages.— Dallas  Joint  Stock  Land 
Bank  of  Dallas  v.  Lancaster,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  122  S.W.2d  659,  error  dis- 
missed. 

12.  La.— Salter  v.  Walsworth,  App., 
167  So.  494. 

13.  Cal. — Buckeye    Refining    Co.    v. 
Kelly,  124  P.  536,  163  Cal.  8,  Ann. 
Cas.l913E    840— Ellis    v.    Superior 
Court  in  and  for  Riverside  County, 
33    P.2d    60,    138    Cal.App.    552. 

14.  Cal. — Buckeye    Refining    Co.    v. 
Kelly,  124  P.  536,  163  Cal.  8,  Ann. 
Oas.l913E    840— Ellis    v.    Superior 
Court  in  and  for  Riverside  County, 
33   P.2d   60,    138  Cal.App.    552. 

15.  Hawaii.— Arnold  v.  Bell,  27  Ha- 
waii 442. 

La. — Coxpua  Juris  quoted  in  Salter 
v.  Walsworth,  App.,  167  So.  494, 
496. 


§  520 


JUDGMENTS 


0.  J.  S. 


as  otherwise  provided  by  statute,16  cannot  be  en- 
forced "at  law  unless  the  judgment  debtor  consents 
thereto17  or  unless  the  assignment  is  ratified  by 
him.18  Thus  the  assignee  cannot  obtain  a  separate 
process  to  enforce  payment  of  the  part  assigned,19 
unless  the  judgment  debtor  has  ratified  the  assign- 
ment, as  by  voluntarily  paying  the  portion  of  the 
judgment  retained  by  the  judgment  creditor.20  The 
fact,  however,  that  a  judgment  creditor  has  agreed 
to  pay,  or  has  assigned,  part  of  the  judgment  to 
a  third  person,  is  no  reason  why  the  judgment 
debtor  should  not  be  compelled  to  pay  the  judg- 
ment;21 and,  if  the  debtor  refuses  to  consent  to  the 
assignment,  the  judgment  creditor  may  maintain  an 
action  at  law  on  the  judgment  for  the  full  amount 
thereof.22 

A  partial  assignment  to  which  the  judgment  debt- 
or has  assented  creates  a  distinct  and  separate  in- 
terest in  the  assignee,  which  the  debtor  is  bound  to 
recognize,23  and  which  cannot  be  destroyed  by  acts 
of  the  assignor  or  debtor,  or  both  ;24  it  is  not  a  joint 
obligation  extinguishable  by  performance  rendered 
to  either  the  assignor  or  the  assignee.25 

The  rule  against  partial  assignments  applies 
where  the  judgment  is  in  favor  of  joint  plaintiffs26 
or  against  joint  defendants.27  However,  where 
judgments  against  two  or  more  defendants  are  sev- 


eral and  not  joint,  they  may  be  separately  assigned28 
where  no  question  of  payment  by  either  debtor  has 
arisen.29 

In  equity.  It  has  generally  been  held  that  a  par- 
tial assignment  constitutes  an  equitable  assignment 
pro  tanto30  which  conveys  to  the  assignee  an  eq- 
uitable interest  in  the  judgment31  enforceable  in 
equity,82  although  the  doctrine  has  been  laid  down 
that  the  assignment  of  part  of  a  judgment  without 
consent  of  the  debtor  is  no  more  enforceable  in  eq- 
uity than  at  law.83 

§  521.    Rights  and  Liabilities  of  Parties 

An  assignee's  rights  with  respect  to  the  Judgment 
are  governed  by  any  conditions  or  reservations  contained 
in  the  assignment. 

The  rights  of  the  assignee  with  respect  to  the 
judgment  are  governed  and  controlled  by  any  con- 
ditions or  reservations  contained  in  the  assign- 
ment.84 

§  522.    As  to  Judgment  Debtor  in  Gen- 
eral 

a.  In  general 

b.  Right  to  enforce  judgment 

a.  In  General 

As,  a  general   rule  the  unrestricted  assignment  of  a 


Pa.— Allegheny     County    v.     Simon, 

Com.PL,  89  Pittsb.Leg.J.  131. 
34  C.J.  p  642  note  74. 

16.  Recording1 

(1)  In  some  jurisdictions  a  partial 
assignment   of  a  judgment  is   valid 
if  placed  on  the  record  as  provided 
by  statute. — Wheaton  v.  Spooner,  54 
N.W.  372,  52  Minn.  417. 

(2)  Such    tan    assignment    is    not 
valid    as    against    creditors    levying 
thereon,    unless    the    assignment    is 
placed  on  record  as  provided  by  stat- 
ute.— Wheaton  v.  Spooner,  supra, 

(3)  Necessity  for  filing  or  record- 
ing assignment  of  Judgment  gener- 
ally see  supra  §  518. 

17.  Hawaii— Arnold  v.  Bell,  27  Ha- 
waii 642. 

La. — Corpus  Juris   quoted  in.  Salter 
v.   Walsworth,   App.f    167   So.   494, 
496. 
Pa. — Allegheny     County    v.     Simon, 

Com.PL,   89   Pittsb.Leg.J.    131. 
34  C.J.  p  642  note  75. 
Right  to   split   cause   of  action   on 
partial  assignment  thereof  see  Ac- 
tions §  102  k. 
Season  for  rule 

The  judgment  debtor  should  not  be 
obliged  and  forced  to  withstand 
numerous  vexations  and  expensive 
proceedings  brought  at  various  times 
•by  different  persons  under  one  judg- 
ment. 


Colo.— McMurray  v.  Marsh,  54  P.  852, 

12  Colo.App.  95. 
La. — Salter  v.  Walsworth,  App.,  167 

So.  494. 
18-     La. — Corpus     Juris     auoted     in 

Salter  v.  Walsworth,  App.,  167  So. 

494,  496. 
34  C.J.  p  642  note  76. 

19.  Pa.— Hopkins  v.  Stockdale,  11  A. 
368,    117   Pa.    365— Appeal  of  Die- 
trich, 107  Pa.  174. 

Revival    of    judgment    by    assignee 
see  infra  §  537. 

20.  Okl.— Holiday    Oil    Co.     v.     Fi- 
delity &  Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland, 
19  P.2d  335,   336,  162  Okl.  192. 
"Judgment  debtors,  having  volun- 
tarily paid  £hat  portion  of  the  judg- 
ment    retained     by     the     assignors 
.    .    .    cannot  be  heard  to  complain 
of  the  partial  assignment  thereof. — 
Holiday  Oil  Co.  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.  of  Maryland,  supra. 

21.  U.S. — Aspen  Mining  &  Smelting 
Co.  v.  Wood,  Colo.,  84  F.  48,  28  C. 
C.A.  276. 

22.  Hawaii.— Arnold  v.  Bell,  27  Ha- 
waii 642. 

23.  Cal.— McGown  v.  Dalzell,  236  P. 
941,  72  CaLApp.  197. 

24.  Cal. — 'McGown  v.  Dalzell,  supra. 

25.  Cal. — McGown  v.  Dalzell,  supra. 

26.  Ark.— Hanks  v.  Harris,  29  Ark, 
323. 


27.  N.Y. — Whittemore  v.  Judd  Lin- 
seed &  Sperm  Oil  Co.,  27  N.E.  244, 
124    N.Y.   565,    21   Am.S.R.    708. 

28.  N.Y.— Whittemore  v.   Judd  Lin- 
seed &  Sperm  Oil  Co.,  supra. 

29.  N.Y. — Whittemore  v.  Judd  Lin- 
seed &  Sperm  Oil  Co.,  supra. 

30u    Ind.— Wood  v.  Wallace.  24  Ind. 

226. 
34  OJ.  p  643  note  87. 

31.  Ark.— Gebhardt  v.  Merchant,  105 
S.W.  1036,  84  Ark.  426. 

Ohio. — Pittsburg,  a,  C.  &  St.  L.  R. 
Co.  v.  Volkert,  50  N.E.  924,  58 
Ohio  St.  362. 

32.  Ark.— Gebhart  v.  Merchant,   105 
S.W.  1036,  84  Ark.  426. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  89. 

33.  Mo. — Loomls     v.     Robinson,     76 
Mo.  488. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  90. 

34.  Provisions  as  to  interest 
Landowners'    assignment    of    pro- 
portional interest  in  judgment  recov- 
ered in   condemnation  action  as   se- 
curity for  payment  of  plaintiff's  fee 
for  services  in  such  action,  provid- 
ing for  interest  from  entry  of  judg- 
ment at   same   rate  finally  awarded 
landowners   on  their  judgment,  was 
not  conditioned  on  receipt  of  interest 
by    landowners. — Rowe    v.     Holmes, 
146  P.2d  45,  63  Cal. App. 2 d  46. 


972 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


522 


Judgment   entitles  the  assignee  to   demand   and  receive 
payment  thereof. 

As  a  general  rule  a  judgment  debtor  is  in  no  po- 
sition to  complain  of  an  assignment  of  a  judgment 
against  him,35  unless  the  assignment  was  taken  for 
his  benefit  or  paid  for  with  funds  advanced  by  him 
for  that  purpose,3^  although,  as  discussed  infra  § 
524,  the  assignee's  rights  under  the  assignment 
may  be  subject  to  equities,  defenses,  and  agree- 
ments between  the  parties  to  the  judgment. 

The  assignment  of  a  judgment  transfers  to  the 
assignee  the  right  to  demand  and  receive  payment 
of  the  judgment,37  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  per- 
sons,38 including  the  assignor,39  unless  the  assign- 
ment is  subject  to  a  reservation.40  The  assignee's 
right  to  receive  the  full  amount  remaining  unpaid 
on  the  judgment  is  not  affected  by  the  amount  he 
paid  for  the  assignment,41  unless  he.  occupies  a 
fiduciary  relation  to  the  judgment  debtor42  or  has 
become  the  assignee  at  the  debtor's  request  and 
for  his  benefit,43  or  purchases  a  compromised  judg- 
ment at  the  amount  agreed  on  in  the  compromise,44 
in  which  cases  he  cannot  recover  more  than  the 
amount  paid  for  the  assignment  with  interest 


Where  a  surety  for  the  judgment  debtor  buys  the 
judgment  from  the  judgment  creditor  and  assigns 
all  of  his  claim  against  the  debtor,  his  assignee 
suing  as  plaintiff  in  interest  is  entitled  to  recover 
on  the  judgment  all  that  is  still  due  thereon  as 
between  the  principal  and  the  surety.45  The  as- 
signee of  a  judgment  which  was  paid  in  part  before 
the  assignment  is  entitled  to  demand  and  receive 
payment  of  the  unpaid  balance  only,46  since  in  such 
a  case,  as  discussed  supra  §  519,  the  effect  of  the 
assignment  is  to  transfer  to  the  assignee  the  judg- 
ment creditor's  interest  in  the  unpaid  balance. 

b.  Eight  to  Enforce  Judgment 

Although  at  common  law  the  assignee  of  SL  Judg- 
ment may  not  enforce  the  Judgment  at  law  In  his  own 
name,  he  may  use  the  name  of  the  Judgment  creditor 
for  such  purpose.  An  assignee  of  a  Judgment  is  usually 
permitted  by  statute  to  enforce  the  judgment  in  his  own 
name. 

It  has  been  stated  generally  that  an  assignment 
of  a  judgment  passes  to  the  assignee  all  rights  and 
remedies  for  collection  of  the  judgment  which  the 
assignor  possesses.47  At  common  law,  since  the 
assignment  of  a  judgment  does  not  pass  the  legal 


35.  La. — Kentwood  Bank  v.  McClen- 
don,  93   So.  748,   152  La.  489. 

Bights  of  intermediate  assignees 

Where  judgment  recovered  by  a 
bank  had  been  transferred  from  bank 
to  a  trustee  and  assigned  by  trustee 
to  a  second  person  as  trustee  for  a 
third  person,  in  action  on  judgment 
for  renewal  thereof  defendants  could 
not  complain  if  transfer  from  bank 
to  second  person,  as  trustee  for  third 
person,  was  invalid,  where  bank  and 
second  person  were  parties  plaintiff. 
— Bank  of  Blowing  Hock  v.  Mclver, 
9  S.E.2d  25,  217  N.C.  623. 

36.  Mo. — Argeropoulos     v.     Kansas 
City  R.  Co.,  212  S.W.  369,  201  Mo. 
A  pp.  287. 

37.  111. — People   ex  rel.   Farwell   v. 
Kelly,  12  N.E.2d  612,  367  111.  616. 

Pa. — Allegheny     County     v.     Simon, 

Com.Pl.,   89  Pittsb.Leg.J.  131. 
34  C.J.  p  643  note.  91. 

Assignee    hag    collectable   interest 
in    judgment. — Troendle    v.    Clinch, 
CaLApp.,  169  P.2d  55. 
Protection  of  debtor 

Assignment  of  judgment  to  third 
person  cannot  embarrass  judgment 
debtor  or  subject  him  to  hazard  of 
another  obligation  on  account  of 
judgment;  he  can  protect  himself 
by  applying  to  the  court  in  which 
the  judgment  was  obtained  for  a  dis- 
charge on  payment  of  the  debt  into 
court. — Jax  Ice  &  Cold  Storage  Co. 
v.  South  Florida  Farms  Co.,  109  So. 
212,  91  Fla.  593,  48  A.L.R.  957,  fol- 
lowed in  Central  Farmers'  Trust  Co. 
v.  Davis,  132  So.  695,  101  Fla.  832. 


38.  Pa. — Reynolds  v.  Reynolds  Lum- 
ber Co.,   34  A.   791,   175   Pa.  437. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  91. 

39.  N.C.— Hewett  v.  Outland,  37  N.C. 
438. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  92. 

40.  N.J.— Hudson    Mfg.    Co.    v.    El- 
mendorf,  9  N.J.Eq.  478. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  93. 

41.  Minn. — Dalby  v.  Lauritzen,   107 
N.W.  826,  98  Minn.  75. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  94. 

Adequacy  of  consideration  cannot 
be  questioned  by  the  judgment  debt- 
or.— Johnson  v.  Bearden  Plumbing  & 
Heating  Co.,  71  P.2d  715,  180  Okl. 
586. 

42.  N.Y.— Peck  v.  Peck,  17  N.H.  383, 
110  N.Y.  64. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  95. 

43.  111. — Campion   v.    Friedberg,    55 
IlLApp.  450. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  96: 

44.  S.C.— Sutton   v.  *Sutton,    1    S.E. 
19,  26  S.C.  33. 

45.  N.H.— Stavrelis  v.  Zacharias,  106 
A.  306,  79  N.H.  146. 

46.  Iowa. — Cutting  v.  Mullaney,  181 
N.W.  466,  191  Iowa  800. 

47.  Cal.— Michal  v.  Adair,   152  P.2d 
490,  66  Oal.App.2d  382. 

111.— Stombaugh  v.  Morey,  58  N.E.2d 

545,  388  111.  392,  157  A.L.R.  254. 
N.J.— Roth    v,    General    Casualty    & 

Surety   Co.,    146   A.   202,    106   N.J. 

Law  516. 
N.C. — Jones  v.  T.  S.  Franklin  Estate, 

183  S.B,  732,  209  N.C.  585. 

973 


Ohio.  —  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  West 
Penn  Rys.  Co.,  144  N.B.  51,  110 
Ohio  St.  51'6. 

Defenses  not  available  against  cred- 

itor 

A  mortgagor  was  not  entitled  to 
raise,  as  against  assignee  of  deficien- 
cy Judgment  on  foreclosure  of  mort- 
gaged property,  the  question  of  in- 
adequacy of  price  for  which  property 
was  sold  at  foreclosure  sale,  since 
mortgagee  could  have  enforced  den> 
ciency  judgment  against  mortgagor 
to  full  extent  of  deficiency,  and  there 
was  no  reason  for  denying  his  as- 
signee the  same  right.  —  Marsh  v. 
Bowen,  6  A.2d  783,  235  Pa.  314. 


lien  decree 


Surety  on  building  contractor's 
bond  as  assignee  of  materialxnan's 
lien  decree  against  property  owner 
was  held  entitled  to  enforce  decree 
with  like  effect  as  materialman,  un- 
less some  special  equity  existed, 
which  was  not  theretofore  capable 
of  being  put  in  issue,  and  which 
would  entitle  property  owner  to  re- 
lief by  way  of  equitable  set-off  or 
counterclaim  against  surety's  mon- 
ey demand.  —  Bear  v.  Standard  Acci- 
dent Ins.  Co.,  168  So.  18,  124  Fla. 
9. 
Person  secondarily  liable 

Where  decree  was  rendered  against 
individual  defendant  primarily  and 
banking  company  secondarily  and 
trust  company,  assuming  liabilities 
of  banking  company,  paid  judgment 
and  took  assignment  thereof,  the 
trust  company  was  not  precluded 


522 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


title,  the  assignee  may  not  sue  on  the  judgment, 
in  his  own  name  and  behalf,48  except  in  equity,49 
and  even  in  equity  it  has  been  held  that  the  assignor 
in  whose  name  the  judgment  or  decree  was  recov- 
ered must  be  made  a  party  to  the  suit.50  The  as- 
signment, nevertheless,  generally  vests  in  the  as- 
signee the  exclusive  right  to  control  the  judgment 
and  to  use  the  name  of  the  assignor,  independently 
of  the  latter's  consent,  for  the  purpose  of  enforc- 
ing his  rights,51  as  in  the  issuance  of  process  to 
collect  the  judgment,52  or  in  an  original  suit  there- 
on.53 Where  the  assignee  may  use  the  name  of  the 
judgment  creditor  to  enforce  the  judgment,  he  may 
also  use  the  name  of  the  creditor's  personal  repre- 
sentative after  the  latter's  death.54  It  has  been  held 
that,  if  the  assignee  may  sue  at  law  in  the  name  of 
the  judgment  creditor,  he  has  an  adequate  remedy 
at  law  which,  in  the  absence  of  other  equitable 
factors,  bars  him  from  proceeding  in  equity.56 

An  agreement  between  the  assignor  and  other 
Creditors  of  the  debtor  not  to  enforce  the  judg- 
ment is  binding  on  an  assignee  of  the  judgment  with 
notice.56 

Under  statutes.  Under  statutes  of  various  types 
the  assignee  of  a  judgment  is  usually  permitted 
to  sue  on  the  judgment  in  his  own  name,57  regard- 


less, under  some  statutes,  of  whether  or  not  a  legal 
title  has  passed  to  the  assignee.58  Under  such  stat- 
utes, after  an  assignment  which  transfers  the  legal 
title,  the  assignor  may  not  sue  thereon,59  and  the 
assignor's  death  does  not  deprive  the  assignee  of 
the  right  to  sue  in  his  own  name.60  If  the  statute 
makes  no  exception  in  case  the  assignee  is  an  at- 
torney at  law,  an  attorney  may  sue  in  his  own  name 
as  assignee,61  at  least  where  the  assignor  was  not 
his  client.62  A  statute  permitting  the  assignee  to 
sue  in  his  own  name  has  been  held  not  to  preclude 
him  from  suing  in  the  name  of  his  assignor,  if  he 
so  elects,63  and  the  rule  does  not  mean  that  the 
name  of  the  action  shall  be  changed,  but  it  does 
mean  that  the  proceedings  and  pleadings  subsequent 
to  the  assignment  shall  be  carried  on  in  the  name 
of,  or  at  least  by,  the  real  party  in  interest.64  Un- 
der a  statute  providing  that  the  trustee  of  an  ex- 
press trust  may  sue  without  joining  with  him  the 
person  for  whose  benefit  the  action  is  prosecuted, 
the  assignor  of  a  judgment  may  sue  as  trustee  for 
the  assignee  without  joining  the  assignee.65 

Assignment  pending  appeal.  An  assignment  of 
a  judgment  pending  an  appeal  therefrom  may  not 
be  enforced  unless  and  until  the  appeal  is  finally 
terminated  in  favor  of  the  judgment.66 


from  obtaining  judgment  over 
against  individual  defendant  on  the- 
ory that  it  was  a  "volunteer."  —  Wil- 
liams v.  Cantrell,  124  S.W.2d  29,  22 
Tenn.App.  443. 

48.    N.H.—  Stavrelis  v.  Zacharias,  106 

A.  306,  79  N.H.  146. 
34  C.J.  p  643  note  3. 
Right  to  sue  out  scire  facias  see  in- 

fra §  548. 


not  in  statutory  form 

(1)  Where    an    assignment    of    a 
Judgment    is    not    in    the    form    re- 
quired  by  a  statute  permitting  the 
assignee   to    sue   in   his   own   name, 
he  may   not   be   permitted  to  bring 
suit    on    the   judgment   in   his   own 
name.  —  Gambill  v.   Greenwood,  Ala., 
22  So.2d  903. 

(2)  Under  such   circumstances   an 
amendment    substituting    the    Judg- 
ment   creditor   as    plaintiff  may    be 
allowed.—  Heard  v.  Turner,  125  N.B. 
596,  234  Mass.  526. 

49.  Ala.  —  Moorer   v.   Moorer,    6    So. 
289,  87  Ala.  545. 

34  C.J.  p  644  note  4. 

50.  Ky.  —  Shaw  v.  McKnight-Keaton 
Grocery    Co.,    21    S.W.2d    269,    231 
Ky.  223. 

34  C.J.  p  644  note  5. 

51.  Ga.  —  Franklin     v.  'Mobley,     for 
Use    of    Patrick,    App.,    38    S.BL2d 
173. 

Substitution  of  parties 

Since  substitution  of  a  purchaser 
of  a  judgment  which  passed  to 


on  purchase  of  decedent's  business 
was  unnecessary!  notice  of  motion 
for  substitution  was  not  required, 
especially  as  judgment  was  by  de- 
fault for  want  of  appearance. — i 
Bright  v.  Schmitt,  231  P.  159,  76 
Colo.  329. 

52.  Tex. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  De 
Zavala   v.    Scanlan,    Com. App.,    65 
S.W.2d  489,  492. 

34  C.J.  p  644  note  6. 

53.  Ala. — Gambill  v.  Greenwood,  22 
So.2d  903. 

34  C.J.  p  644  note  7. 

54.  Ala. — Gambill  v.  Greenwood,  su- 
pra. 

55.  Ala. — Gambill  v.  Greenwood,  su- 
pra. 

Right  of  assignee  of  chose  in  ac- 
tion generally  to  sue  in  equity  see 
Assignments  §  125  b. 

56.  La. — Cusachs  v.  Dugue,  4  La.A. 
(Orleans)  132. 

57.  Conn. — Newman,  v.  Gaul,  129  A. 
221,  102  Conn.  425. 

111.— Johnson   v.   Watson,    33   N.B.2d 

130,  309  IlLApp.  440. 
Neb. — Exchange  Elevator  Co.  v.  Mar- 
shall, 22  N.W.2d  403. 
34  C.J.  p  636  note  73  [c],  P  644  note 
.  8. 

Right  of  assignee  to  issue  execution: 
Against  property  see  Executions 

§  14  b. 
Against   person   see   Executions    § 

418. 
Right   of   assignee    to    revive   judg- 

974 


ment  in  his  own  name  see  infra 
§  537. 

Right  of  assignee  to  sue  on  foreign 
judgment  see  Infra  §  878. 

58.  Bight  to  sue  in  assignor's  name 
conferred  on  assignee  by  a  power  of 
attorney  provision  in  an  absolute  as- 
signment does  not  prevent  assignee 
from  suing  in  his  own  name. — Rog- 
ers v.  Garde,  264  P.  951,  33  N.M.  245. 

59.  Okl. — Stein   v.    Scanlan,    127    P. 
483,    34    Okl.    801,    42    L.R.A.,N.S., 
895. 

6a    Conn. — Hamilton  v.  New  Haven, 

73  A.  1,  82  Conn.  208. 
Substitution  as  party  pendente  lite 

An  attorney  who  takes  an  assign- 
ment to  himself  of  the  judgment  in 
favor  of  his  client  may  properly  be 
substituted  in  his  client's  place  after 
the  latter's  death. — Potts  v.  Paxton, 
153  P.  957,  171  Cal.  493. 

61.  Conn. — Rogers   v.   Hendricfc,    82 
A.  586,  85  Conn.  260. 

62.  Conn. — Rogers  v.  Hendrick,  su- 
pra, 

63.  Conn. — Newman  v.  Gaul,  129  A. 
221,  102  Conn.  425. 


v.    Scanlan,    127    P. 
801,    42    L.R.A..N.S., 


64.  Okl.— -Stein 
483,    34    Okl. 
895. 

65.  N.C.— Chatham    v.    Mecklenburg 
Realty  Co.   105   S.E.  329,  180  N.C. 
500. 

66.  N.J. — National     Surety     Co.     v. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  523 


§  523.    As  Affected  by  Notice  to  Debtor 

a.  Necessity  for  notice 

b.  Form  of  notice 

c.  Effect  of  notice 

a.  Necessity  for  Notice 

The  Judgment  debtor  Is  protected  by  payments  he 
may  make  on  the  Judgment  to  the  Judgment  creditor 
before  he  has  notice  of  the  assignment  of  the  Judg- 
ment. 

Although,  as  discussed  supra  §  515,  as  between 
the  parties  thereto  notice  is  not  essential  to  an  as- 
signment, notice  to  the  judgment  debtor  is  neces- 
sary to  effectuate  the  assignment,67  and  until  such 
notice  is  given  a  perfect  and  indefeasible  title  to  the 
judgment  does  not  vest  in  the  assignee.68  Unless 
and  until  such  notice  is  given,  the  judgment  debtor 
is  not  bound  by  the  assignment,69  and  will  be  pro- 
tected, as  against  the  assignee,  with  respect  to  any 
payments  he  may  make  to  plaintiff  in  the  judg- 
ment,70 or  with  respect  to  any  release  or  satisfac- 
tion the  judgment  debtor  may  procure  from  the 
judgment  creditor  before  receiving  such  notice,71 
irrespective  of  whether  or  not  the  assignment  is  sub- 
sequently filed  or  recorded.72  However,  a  failure 
to  notify  the  debtor  will  not  subject  the  assignee  to 
merely  equitable  claims  of  the  debtor  which  accrue 
after  the  assignment  and  do  not  attach  to  the  judg- 
ment itself.73 

Payment  to  third  persons.  The  protection  extend- 
ed to  a  judgment  debtor  who  makes  payment  before 
notice  of  the  assignment  applies  only  where  the  pay- 


ment is  made  to  the  judgment  creditor;  when  the 
debtor  voluntarily  makes  payment  to  a  person  other 
than  the  holder  of  the  legal  title,  he  must  see  to  it 
that  he  pays  the  one  to  whom  he  is  really  indebted, 
and  payment  to  a  third  person  will  not  be  valid  as 
against  the  assignee,74  even  though  such  third  per- 
son is  in  equity  entitled  to  require  the  judgment 
creditor  to  account  to  him,  as  his  agent,  for  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  judgment.75 

b.  Form  of  Notice 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  how  notice  of 
an  assignment  of  a  Judgment  shall  be  given,  notice  of 
such  an  assignment  need  not  be  in  any  particular  form, 
provided  it  is  sufficient  to  Inform  the  debtor  that  the 
Judgment  creditor  Is  no  longer -the  owner  of  the  Judg- 
ment. 

Unless  a  statute  provides  how  notice  of  the  as- 
signment shall  be  given,76  the  notice  need  not  be 
in  any  particular  form ;  it  is  sufficient  if  it  advises 
the  debtor  that  the  person  who  recovered  the  judg- 
ment is  no  longer  the  owner  of  it  or  entitled  to  col- 
lect it,77  or  if  the  information  is  given  under  cir- 
cumstances and  in  terms  calculated  to  arrest  the 
attention  of  the  debtor  and  put  him  on  notice.78 
Direct  notice  of  the  assignment  is  unnecessary  if 
the  assignee  can  bring  home  to  the  debtor  knowl- 
edge of  such  facts  as  should  have  put  him  on  in- 
quiry,79 Notice  may  be  served  on  the  debtor  like 
ordinary  civil  process.80 

The  requirement  of  notice  imports  notice  by 
some  person  entitled  to  give  it  to  some  other  per- 
son entitled  to  receive  it.81 


Mulligan,  146  A.  372,  105  N.J.Law 
336. 

67.  Tenn.— State  ex  rel.  McConnell 
v.  Peoples  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  12 
Tenn.App.  242. 

aa.    Mo.— Boyd  v.   Sloan,   71   S.W.2d 

1065,   335    Mo.    163— Overlander   v. 

Withers,    App.,    148    S.W.2d    88— 

Price  v.  Clevenger,  74  S.W.  894,  99 

Mo.App.  636. 
Tenn. — State    ex    rel.    McConnell    v. 

Peoples    Bank    &    Trust    Co.,    12 

Tenn. App.  242. 

Title  becomes  indefeasible  on  no- 
tice   to    judgment    debtor. — Popsicle 
Corporation   of  XT.   S.  v.   Pearlstein, 
Mo.App.,  168  S.W.2d  105. 
KTonstatutory  assignment 

Assignee  was  held  to  have  inde- 
feasible interest  in,  judgment  as 
against  the  judgment  debtor  who  had 
notice  of  the  assignment  of  the  judg- 
ment, although  the  assignment  was 
not  attested  as  required  by  statute. 
— Boyd  v.  Sloan,  71  S.W.2d  1065, 
935  Mo.  163. 

453.    Mo.— Helstein  v.  Schmidt,  78  S. 

W.2d  132,  229  Mo.App.  275. 
Tenn. — State    ex    rel.    McConnell    v. 


Peoples    Bank    &    Trust    Co.,    12 
Tenn.App.  242. 
34  C.J.  p  646  note  29. 

70.  Idaho.— Houtz  v.  Daniels,  211  P. 
1088,  36  Idaho  544,  32  A.L.R.  1016. 

Mo.— Boyd  v.  Sloan.  71  S.W.2d  1065, 

335  Mo.  163. 
W.Va. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hines 

v.   Fulton,   140    S.B.    537,    542,    104 

W.Va.  561. 
34  C.J.  p  645  note  17. 

Presumption  is  that  plaintiff  in  a 
judgment  is  the  owner  of  it  and  the 
burden  is  on  the  one  who  alleges  the 
contrary. — McLamb  v.  Adams,  24  S. 
B.2d  -524,  222  N.C.  714— Brown  v. 
Harding,  86  S.E.  1010,  170  N.C.  253, 
Ann.Cas.l917C  548. 

71.  Gal. — Spencer  v.  California  Nat 
Bank  of  Long  Beach,  36  P.24  1073, 
1  Cal.2d  681. 

34  C.J.  p  645  note  18. 

72.  N.C. — McLamb  v.  Adams,  24  S.E. 
2d  524,  222  N.C.  714. 

Or. — Windsor  v.  Mourer,  147  P.  533, 
76    Or.   281,   rehearing   denied   147 
•   P.  1190,  76  Or.  281. 

73.  N.J.— Terney  v.  Wilson,  45  N.J. 
Law  282. 

975 


74u    N.Y. — Seymour     v.     Smith,     17 
Abb.N.Cas.    387,    affirmed    21   N.E. 
1042,  114  N.T.  481,  11  Am.S.R.  683. 
34  C.J.  p  646  note  31. 
Effect  of  payment  by  garnishee  with- 
out notice  of  assignment: 
Payment  before  judgment  see  Gar- 
nishment §  297. 

Payment  after  judgment  see  Gar- 
nishment §  294  b. 
76.    N.T. — Seymour  v.  Smith,  supra. 

76.  Statutory  provisions  control 
Wash.— Mottet    v.    Stafford,    162    P. 

1001,  94  Wash.  572. 

77.  La. — Succession  of  Delassize,  8 
Bob.  259. 

78.  Pa.— Guthrie  v.  Bashline,  25  Pa. 
80. 

34  C.J.  p  645  note  23. 

79.  Ohio. — Clark  v.  Baltimore  &  O. 
R.  Co.,  4  Ohio  S.  &  C.P.  173,  7  Ohio 
N.P.  647. 

34  C.J.  p  645  note  24. 

80.  La.— Aufeukolk  v.  Montegut,  29 
La.  Ann.    257 — Blondin   v.    Chris  to* 
phe,  13  La.Ann.  324. 

81.  Conn. — Ciezynski  v.  New  Britain 
Transp.  Co.,  1-82  A.  661,  121  Conn. 
36. 


§  523 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Assignment  on  record.  Although  there  are  ju- 
risdictions in  which  the  rule  does  not  prevail,82  the 
general  rule  is  that  entering  the  assignment  on  the 
judgment  record  or  appearance  docket,  or  filing  it 
among  the  papers  in  the  case,  is  not  constructive 
notice  to  the  debtor,  as  he  is  under  no  obligation  to 
search  the  records,83  even  though  a  statute  pro- 
vides that,  when  an  assignment  is  filed,  the  clerk 
shall  make  a  record  of  the  assignment.84 

c.  Effect  of  Notice 

After  the  Judgment  debtor  has  received  notice  of 
the  assignment,  the  assignee  will  be  protected  in  equity 
against  any  and  all  acts  of  the  parties. 

After  the  judgment  debtor  has  received  notice  of 
the  assignment,  the  assignee  will  be  protected  in 
equity  against  any  and  all  acts  of  the  parties.85 
Thus  the  debtor's  liability  to  the  assignee  will  not 
be  discharged  by  a  subsequent  pa}Tnent  made  to  the 
judgment  creditor,86  or  by  a  subsequent  release  giv- 
en him  by  the  judgment  creditor,87  and  the  judg- 
ment debtor  cannot  compromise  thereafter  with  the 
assignor  and  thus  defeat  the  claim  of  the  assignee,88 


although,  where  an  assignment  was  made  for  the 
convenience  and  benefit  of  the  assignor,  it  was  held 
that  a  subsequent  settlement  between  him  and  the 
judgment  debtor  was  valid  as  against  the  as- 
signee.8&  If  a  satisfaction  of  the  judgment  has 
been  entered  after  notice  of  the  assignment,  equity 
will  set  it  aside  as  fraudulent  at  the  suit  of  the 
assignee, 


90 


§  524.  As  Affected  by  Equities,  Defens- 
es, and  Agreements  between  Orig- 
inal Parties 

Generally  the  assignee  of  a  judgment  takes  subject 
to  equities  and  defenses  existing  between  the  judgment 
creditor  and  the  judgment  debtor  at  the  time  of  the 
assignment. 

In  accordance  with  the  rule  governing  assign- 
ments of  choses  in  action  generally,  as  discussed  in 
Assignments  §  114,  and  in  the  absence  of  any  es- 
toppel,91 the  assignee  of  a  judgment  takes  it  sub- 
ject to  all  the  equities,  defenses,  and  agreements 
existing  between  the  original  parties,92  at  the  time 


STotlce  "by  telephone 

In  order  to  establish  notice  by 
telephone  that  judgment  has  been 
assigned,  person  relying  on  such  no- 
tice must  prove  identity  of  person 
receiving  communication  and  that  it 
reached  person  sought  to  be  charged. 
— Ciezynski  v.  New  Britain  Transp. 
Co.,  supra. 

82.    Mo.— Helstein  v.  Schmidt.  78  3. 

W.2d  132,   229  Mo.App.  275. 
34  C.J.  p  645  note  26. 

Statutory  assignment 

(1)  Statutory  assignment  of  judg- 
ment   imparts    notice    when   attach- 
ed to  judgment,   or  on  indorsement 
thereof   on  margin  of  record. — Tutt 
v.   Couzins,    50   Mo.    152 — Weaver   v. 
Mitchell,    Mo.App.,    107    S.W.2d    945. 

(2)  Where  filed  assignment  of  an 
interest  in  a  Judgment,  potation  of 
which  was  made  on  Judgment  record, 
merely  stated  it  was  "subscribed  and 
sworn  to"  before  county  clerk,  with- 
out a  statement  that  judgment  credi- 
tor had  executed  the  assignment  "for 
the  consideration  and  purpose  therein 
mentioned"  as   required  by   statute, 
assignment    was    not    properly    ac- 
knowledged,  and  did   not   constitute 
notice  to  judgment  debtor  so  as  to 
make  it  liable  to  assignee  after  debt- 
or paid  judgment  to  judgment  credi- 
tor.—Donham   v.    Davis,    187    S.W.2d 
722,  208  Ark.  824. 

83.    Idaho. — Houtz  v.  Daniels,  211  P. 

1088,  36  Idaho  544,  32  A.L.R.  1016. 
JIL — Tarjan,   for  Use  of  Lefkow  v. 

National   Surety   Co.,   268   IlLApp. 

232. 


Iowa.— Miller     v.      Greenfield      Sav. 

Bank,  203  N.W.  236,  199  Iowa  1039. 

34  C.J.  p  645  note  27. 

84.  N.T. — Boyd    v.    Buffalo     Steam 
Roller    Co.,    149    N.T.S.     1050,     87 
Misc.  20,  affirmed  152  N.T.S.  1099, 
167  AppJDiv.  959. 

85.  W.Va. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
Hines  v.  Fulton,  140  S.E.  537,  542, 
104  W.Va.  561. 

34  C.J.  p  646  note  35. 

86.  Miss. — Moore    v.    Bed,     22     So. 
948. 

34  C.J.  p  646  note  36. 

87.  Colo.-— La  Fitte  v.  Salisbury,  95 
P.  1065,  43  Colo.  248. 

34  QJ.  p  646  note  37. 

88.  W.Va.— Hines  v.   Fulton,   140   S. 
E.  537,  104  W.Va.  '561. 

34  C.J.  p  646  note  38. 

89.  N.T.— Baker  v.   Secor,  7  N.T.S. 
803,  4  Silv.Sup.  516. 

90.  W.Va.— Hines  v.   Fulton,  140   S. 
E.  537,  104  W.Va.  561. 

Suit    continued    for    benefit    of    as- 
signee 

Collusive  entry  of  satisfaction  of 
judgment  or  decree  after  assignment 
will  be  set  aside  at  suit  of  assignee 
and  suit  prosecuted  in  his  name  for 
his  benefit,  regardless  of  whether 
judgment  or  decree  is  in  rem,  in 
personam,  or  both. — Hines  v.  Ful- 
ton, supra. 

91.  N.T*— Thompson  v.  Noble.  8  N. 
T.S.  373,  55  Hun  268. 

34  C.J.  p  646  note  41. 

Estoppel  as  affirmative  defense 

Title  by  estoppel  to  judgment, 
based  on  ignorance  of  claim  to  equi- 
table set-off  against  judgment,  was 

976 


an  affirmative  defense  required  to 
be  proved  by  assignee  sought  to  be 
enjoined  from  executing  judgment. — 
Jegglin  v.  Orr,  29  S.W.2d  721,  224 
Mo.App.  773. 

Estoppel  by  express  agreement 
Pa.— Appeal  of  Scott,  16  A.  430,  123 

Pa.  155. 
34  C.J.  p  647  note  48. 

Failure  to  take  advantage  of  de- 
fense in  due  time 

Md.— Doub  v.  Mason,  2  Md.  380. 

N.C. — Le  Due  v.  Slocomb,  32  S.E. 
726,  124  N.C.  347. 

34  C.J.  p  647  note  49. 

Prand  in  allowing  judgment  to  toe 

obtained 
Ohio:— Wright  v.  Snell,  22  Ohio  Clr. 

Ct   86,   12  Ohio  Cir.Dec.   308. 

Caches   in   permitting   judgment   to 

remain  of  record 
Ohio. — Wright  v.  Snell,  supra. 

92.  U.S. — Turner  v.  Dickey,  D.C. 
Tenn.,  3  F.Supp.  360,  affirmed,  C. 
C.A.,  Dickey  v.  Turner,  64  F.2d 
1012. 

Cal. — Parker   v.   Howe,    299    P.    553, 

114  CaLApp.  166. 
Fla. — Bear  v.  Standard  Accident  Ins. 

Co.,  168  So.  18,  124  Fla,  9. 
Ky.— Lemons  v.  Wilson,   172  S.W.2d 

67,  294  Ky.  439. 
N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Manowitz 

v.  Kanov,  154  A.  326,  327,  107  N.J. 

Law  523,  75  A.L.R.  1464. 
N:T.— Kelly   v.    O'Brien,    196    N.T.S. 

705. 
Or.— Parker*  v.  Reid,  273  P.  334,  127 

Or.  578. 
Tex.— Dallas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 


49    C.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  525 


of  the  assignment,93  whether  or  not  he  had  notice 
of  them,94  unless  they  arise  from  other  and  inde- 
pendent transactions.95  Thus,  as  discussed  infra  § 
568,  he  takes  the  judgment  subject  to  any  right  of 
set-off  which  existed  in  the  judgment  debtor  before 
the  assignment.  However,  the  assignee  is  not  af- 
fected by  any  equities 'which  would  not  affect  his 
assignor,06  and  issues  which  became  res  judicata 
by  rendition  of  the  judgment  may  not  be  raised 
again  against  the  assignee  of  the  judgment97 

Assignment  as  collateral:  An  exception  to  the 
general  rule  that  the  assignee  takes  subject  to  equi- 
ties and  defenses  has  been  made  in  the  case  of  an 
assignee  of  a  judgment  taken  as  collateral  security 
for  a  promissory  note,  who  has  been  held  to  take 
the  judgment  free  from  all  defenses  except  those 
which  might  be  set  up  against  the  promissory  note.98 

§  525.    As  between  Assignor  and  As- 
signee 

The  assignee  of  a  Judgment,  as  a  general  rule,  may 
hold  the  assignor  liable  for  subsequently  receiving  pay- 
ment or  entering  satisfaction  of  the  assigned  Judgment, 
or  for  breach  of  an  implied  warranty  of  title  or  validity. 

The  rule  generally  followed  is  that,  except  as  to 
defects  known  to  the  purchaser,99  there  is  an  im- 
plied warranty  on  the  part  of  the  assignor  of  a 
judgment  that  such  judgment  is  a  valid,  subsisting 


obligation  against  the  debtor  for  the  amount  speci- 
fied therein,1  that  the  assignor  is  the  owner  of  it,2 
and  that  no  payments  have  been  made  on  it  other 
than  such  as  he  discloses  at  the  time,3  although  in 
some  jurisdictions  the  implied  warranty  does  not 
extend  to  the  validity  of  the  judgment,  or  its  free- 
dom from  error  or  irregularity,4  especially  where 
it  is  agreed  that  the  assignor  is  in  no  event  to  be 
liable  on  the  assignment.5  No  implied  warranty 
arises  as  to  the  solvency  of  the  judgment  debtor,5 
and,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  express  agreement 
the  assignee  cannot  come  back  on  the  assignor  be- 
cause of  his  failure  to  make  the  amount  on  the 
judgment.7 

Where  the  assignment  is  by  the  judgment  credi- 
tor, he  cannot,  without  express  agreement,  limit  his 
liability  on  the  implied  warranty  merely  by  assign- 
ing "without  recourse."8  Where,  however,  an  as- 
signee of  a  judgment,  without  knowledge  of  any 
defect  therein  or  defense  thereto,  transfers  simply 
his  "right,  title,  and  interest,  without  recourse,"  he 
will  not  be  held  liable  on  such  implied  warranty.9 

The  implied  warranty  that  the  judgment  assigned 
is  valid  is  broken  by  the  transfer  of  a  voidable  judg- 
ment;10 hence,  as  discussed  infra  §  528,  where  the 
judgment  is  afterward  reversed,  vacated,  or  set 
aside,  the  purchaser  may  recover  back  the  price 
paid  for  the  assignment.  A  bona  fide  purchaser  of 


of   Dallas   v.    Lancaster,    Civ.App., 

122  S.W.2d  659,  error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  646  note  42. 
Failure   to   otrtain  modification 

Where  party  to  action  took  no 
steps  to  have  modified  a  judgment 
finding  that  codefendant  had  an  in- 
terest in  property,  he  as  assignee  of 
such  judgment  cannot  impeach  it  in 
suit  thereon.— McDaniel  v.  Belt,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  54  S.W.2d  592. 
Inchoate  rights 

Assignee  of  a  judgment  does  not 
take  subject  to  mere  inchoate  rights 
of  contribution  and  subrogation, 
which  have  not  become  complete  by 
payment  before  the  assignment.— Arp 
v.  Blake,  218  P.  773,  63  Cal.App.  362. 

93.  N.C.— In    re    Wallace,    193    S.B. 
819,  212  N.C.  490. 

Pa.— Marsh  v.  Bowen,  6  A.2d  783,  335 
Pa.  314. 

94.  N,J.— Corpus      Juris      olted     In 
Manowitz    v.    Kanov,    154    A.    326, 
327,    107    N.J.Law    523,    75    A.L.R. 
1464. 

34  C.J.  p  647  note  43. 

95.  -Iowa.— Isett   v.  Lucas,   17   Iowa 
503,  85  Am.D.  572. 

34  C.J.  p  647  note  44. 

Liability  of  assignee  as  surety 

Surety  on  property  owner's  lien 
release  and  supersedeaa  bonds,  sued 

49C.J.S.-62 


on  by  surety  on  building  contrac- 1 
tor's  bond  as  assignee  of  material- 
man's  judgment  against  owner,  could 
not  set  up  equitable  defense  based  on 
plaintiffs  liability  as  surety.— Bear 
v.  Duval  Lumber  Co.,  for  Use  and 
Benefit  of  Standard  Accident  Ins.  Co., 
150  So.  614,  112  Fla.  240. 

96.  111. — Thorpe  v.  Helmer,  113  N.B. 
954,  275  111.  86. 

97.  General  judgment 

When  issues  on  liability  of  as- 
sets of  a  mutual  insurance  corpora- 
tion and  those  of  one  group  of  pol- 
icyholders  for  payment  of  benefits 
due  members  of  other  classes  had 
become  res  judicata  by  a  general 
judgment  against  the  company,  an 
assignee  of  the  judgment  who  had 
obtained  a  Judgment  of  revivor  on  it 
could  look  to  all  assets  of  the  com- 
pany to  liquidate  his  judgment— Bai- 
ley v.  American  Casualty  Co.,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  119  S.W.2d  697. 

98.  Pa.— Levy  v.  Gilligan,  90  A.  647, 
244  Pa.  272.  . 

34  C.J.  p  647  note  47. 

99.  N.Y.— Furniss    v.    Ferguson,    34 
N%Y.  485— Furniss  v.  Ferguson,  1'5 
N.T.  437. 

34  C.J.  p  647  note  52. 

1.    La.— Collins   v.   Jones,  App.,   152 

So.  802.    . 
34  C.J.  P  647  note  55. 

977 


2.  N.Y. — Furniss  v.  Ferguson,  34  N. 
T.  485. 

34  C.J.  p  647  note  54. 

3.  N.C.— Camp  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Durham 
Fertilizer  Co.,  64  S.B.  188,   150  N. 
C.  417. 

34  C.J.  p  647  note  55. 

4.  in. — Hinkley  v.  Champaign  N«,t. 
Bank,    75    N.E.    210,    216    111.    559. 

34  C.J.  p  648  note  56. 

5.  Tenn. — Gore   v.    Poteet    50    S.W. 
754,  101  Tenn.  608. 

6.  Ky.— Anderson     v.     Bradford,     5 
J.J.Marsh.  69. 

Wash.— Hall  v.  Mathewson,   74  P.2d 

209,  192  Wash.  651. 
34  C,J.  p  648  note  58. 

7.  Ky. — Anderson  v.  Bradford,  5  J.J. 
Marsh.  69. 

Wash.— Hall  v.  Mathewson,   74  P.2d 

209,  192  Wash.  651. 
34  C.J.  p  648  note  59. 
a  Mich.— Lillibridge  v.  Tregent,  30 

Mich.  105. 
34  C.J.  P  648  note  60. 

9.  Iowa,— Miller  v.  Dugan,  86  Iowa 
433— Schofleld  v.    Moore,    31   Iowa 
241. 

10.  Mo. — Emerson  v.  Knapp,  75  Mo. 
'    App.  92. 

Va.— Arnold  v.  Hickman,  6  Munf.  15, 
20  Va.  15. 


§  525 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


a  judgment  from  an  assignee  takes  it  subject  to  any 
equities  between  the  judgment  creditor  and  his  as- 
signee.11 

The  assignor  is  liable  in  damages  to  the  assignee 
if  the  assignor  does  not  in  fact  own  the  judgment, 
or  if  it  has  been  extinguished  wholly  or  partially 
before  the  assignment,12  or  if  he  afterward  receives 
payment  of  the  judgment  or  enters  satisfaction  of 
it,13  or  if  it  is  reversed  or  set  aside  after  the  as- 
signment.14 The  rule  as  to  the  damages  recoverable 
in  case  of  breach  of  warranties  in  the  sale  of  chat- 
tels applies  to  breach  of  a  covenant  contained  in  the 
assignment  of  a  judgment,15  and,  therefore,  the  as- 
signee is  entitled  to  recover  the  difference  between 
the  value  of  the  judgment  as  it  was  and  its  value  if 
the  covenant  had  not  been  broken,16  or,  if  the  judg- 
ment is  entirely  lost  to  him,  the  amount  which  he 
paid  for  it,17  together  with  the  costs,  if  any,  paid 
by  him  in  defending  the  judgment.18  The  assignee 
of  part  of  a  judgment  is  entitled  to  recover  the 
amount  due  to  him  from  the  assignor  who  has  re- 
ceived a  conveyance  of  property  in  satisfaction  of 
the  judgment  debt19 

Instead  of  suing  the  assignor  for  damages  be- 
cause of  the  reversal  or  setting  aside  of  the  as- 
signed judgment,  the  assignee  may  continue  the 
original  action  to  a  final  decision  if,  notwithstand- 
ing such  reversal  or  vacation,  the  original  action  is 
still  pending.20 

Liability  of  assignee.  A  person  who  takes  in  form 
an  assignment  of  a  judgment  other  than  the  one 


contemplated  between  him  and  the  assignor  has  no 
right  to  it,  and  becomes  at  once  a  trustee  for  the 
person  entitled  thereto,  and,  his  trust  being  a  naked 
one,  a  court  of  equity  will  require  him.  at  once  to 
reconvey.21 

§  526.    As  to  Third  Persons 

It  is  generally  held  that  an  assignee  of  a  Judgment 
takes  It  free  from  latent  equities  of  third  persons  of 
which  he  has  no  notice  at  the  time  of  the  assignment. 

In  accordance  with  the  rule  supported  by  the 
weight  of  authority  with  respect  to  assignments  of 
choses  in  action  generally,  discussed  in  Assignments 
§  118,  many  authorities  hold  that  the  assignee  of  a 
judgment  takes  it  free  from  latent  equities  of  third 
persons,  not  parties  to  the  judgment,  of  which  he 
has  no  notice  at  the  time  of  the  assignment.22  Un- 
der this  rule  an  assignee  who  has  no  notice  that  his 
assignor  has  notice  of  an  unrecorded  conveyance 
made  before  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  is  not 
affected  by  the  notice  of  his  assignor.23  An  as- 
signee is  not  bound  by  an  agreement  of  which  he 
has  no  notice  between  a  stranger  to  the  judgment 
and  the  judgment  creditor24  or  judgment  debtor,25 
and  an  innocent  assignee  of  a  judgment,  without 
notice,  actual  or  constructive,  of  an  injunction  not 
yet  served  against  its  assignment,  has  been  held  to 
be  entitled  to  retain  the  judgment.26  To  protect 
himself  against  such  equities  the  assignee  must  also 
show  that  he  is  a  purchaser  in  good  faith  and  for 
a  valuable  consideration27  and  that  he  paid  the  pur- 
chase money  before  the  adverse  equity  was  assert- 
ed.2* 


11.  N.Y.— Cutts    v.    Guild,    57    N.Y. 
229. 

34  C.J.  p  649  note  63. 

12.  La. — Johnson    v.    Boice,    4    So. 
163,  40  LsuAnn.  273,  8  Am.S.R.  528. 

Mo. — Emerson  v.  Knapp,  75  Mo.App. 
92. 

13.  N.Y.— Booth  v.  Farmers'  &  Me- 
chanics' Nat.  Bank,  50  N.T.  396— 
Hochberg  v.  Montrose  Investment 
&   Loan   Corporation,    23   N.Y.S.2d 
387. 

34  C.J.  p  649  note  65. 

14.  Or.— King  v.   Miller,   97  P.  542, 
.   53    Or.    53.   affirmed   32    S.Ct   243, 

223  U.S.  505,  56  L.Ed,  528. 
Effect  of  reversal  of  judgment  after 
assignment  see  infra  §   528. 

15.  N.T.— Bennett  v.  Buchan,  61  N. 
T.  222 — Furniss  v.  Ferguson,  34  N. 
T.  485. 

16.  N.T.— Bennett  v.  Buchan,  61  N. 
Y.-222. 

34  C.J.  p  649  notes  69,  70  [a]. 

17.  La.— Corcoran  v.  Riddell,  7  La. 
Ann.  268. 

34  C.J.  p  649  note  70. 

18.  La. — Corcoran  v.  Riddell,  supra. 


19.  Colo. — Barnum  v.   Green,   57  P. 
757,  13  Colo.App.  254. 

20.  Or.— King  v.   Miller,   97   P.   542, 
53    Or.    53,    afflrmed   32    S.Ct.    243, 
223  U.S.   505,   56  L.Ed.  528. 

21.  N.Y.— Cutts    v.    Guild,    57    N.Y. 
229. 

22.  Ala. — Bain  v.  J.  A.  Lusk  &  Son, 
109    So.    187,    21  AUuApp.   442. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Bourquin 
v.   Feland,   117   P.2d   789,    791,    189 
Okl.    498— Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
State  ex  rel.  Barnett  v.  Wood,  43 
P.2d   136,   138,    171   Okl,   341. 
34  C.J.  p  649  note  76. 
Attorneys'  fee* 

Where  city  paid  into  court  sum 
awarded  to  defendants  as  attorneys' 
fees  on  abandonment  of  condemna- 
tion suit,  assignment  by  defendants 
to  one  attorney  could  operate  on 
balance  remaining  after  distribution 
without  prejudice  to  rights  of  other 
attorneys,  who  asserted  no  claim  to 
balance,  with  respect  to  validity 
and  fairness  of  assignment — City  of 
Los  Angeles  v.  Knapp,  60  P.2d  127, 
7  Cal.2d  168. 

978 


23.  Hiss.— Clark  v.  Duke,   59    Miss. 
575. 

24.  Pa. — Appeal  of  Hendrickson,  24 
Pa.  363. 

34  CLJ.  p  649  note  78. 

25.  N.J.— Starr  v.  Haskins,  26  N.J. 
EQL  414. 

26.  S.C. — Robertson  v.  Segler,  24  S. 
C.  387. 

27.  W.Va. — London     &     Lancashire 
Indemnity  Co.  of  America  v.  Crom- 
well, 190  S.B.  337,  118  W.Va.  318. 

34  C.J.  p  650  note  34. 

Creditors  of  Judgment  creditor 

As  between  several  creditors  of  a 
common  debtor,  who  had'  obtained  a 
judgment,  the  proceeds  of  which 
were  in  the  hands  of  a  receiver,  one 
creditor,  who  took  an  assignment  of 
part  of  the  judgment  without  notice 
to  the  other  creditors,  and  for  a  pre- 
existing debt  and  as  mere  collater- 
al therefor,  acquired  no  right  of  pri- 
ority over  the  other  creditors. — Zane 
v.  Brown,  8  A.2d  367,  126  N.JJSo;. 
200. 

28.  N.T.— Christie  v.  Bishop,  1  Barb. 
Ch.  105. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  527 


On  the  other  hand,  in  some  jurisdictions  the  doc- 
trine of  caveat  emptor  has  been  applied,  and  it  has 
been  held  that  the  assignee  occupies  no  better  po- 
sition in  this  respect  than  his  assignor.2^  In  any 
event,  the  assignee  is  chargeable  with  equities  of 
third  persons  of  which  he  has  actual  notice,3^  or 
such  constructive  notice  as  may  be  obtained  from 
an  inspection  of  the  record  of  the  judgment31 

As  affected  by  statute.  Since  a  statute  regulating 
the  assignment  of  a  judgment  is  in  derogation-  of 
the  common  law,  it  has  been  held  that  it  must  be 
strictly  complied  with  if  the  assignee  is  to  obtain 
protection  against  third  persons  subsequently  ac- 
quiring an  interest  in  the  judgment32 

Notice  to  judgment  debtor.  It  has  been  held  that 
the  assignee  does  not  take  title  as  against  a  creditor 
of  the  assignor  where  the  assignee  fails  to  give  no- 
tice of  the  assignment  to  the  judgment  debtor,33 
and  in  some  jurisdictions  there  are  statutes  which 


require  notice  to  be  given  to  the  debtor  to  make  the 
assignment  effective  against  third  persons.34  Un- 
der such  a  statute  the  giving  of  notice  to  the  debtor 
renders  it  effective  as  against  a  creditor  of  the  as- 
signor notwithstanding  the  assignee  fails  to  have  it 
recorded  or  judicially  recognized.35 

§  527.    Rights  Incidental  to  Assignment 

In  general  a  valid  assignment  of  a  Judgment  carries 
with  It  all  Incidental  or  collateral  rights,  remedies,  and 
advantages  existing  and  available  to  the  judgment  cred- 
itor as  such  at  the  time  of  the  assignment. 

A  bona  fide  purchaser  of  a  judgment  stands  in 
the  judgment  creditor's  shoes.36  Hence  on  a  valid 
assignment,  in  addition  to  succeeding  to  the  owner, 
ship  of  the  judgment  and  all  rights  and  interest 
therein,  as  discussed  supra  §  519  a,  the  assignee  al- 
so succeeds  to  all  incidental  or  collateral  rights,  rem- 
edies, and  advantages  existing  at  the  time  of  the  as- 
signment and  then  available  to  the  judgment  credi- 
tor,37 even  though  the  parties  to  the  assignment 


29.  Minn. — Gill  v.  Truelsen,  40  N.W. 
254,  39  Minn.  373. 

34  C.J.  p  650  note  81. 

30.  N.J. — Boice    v.    Conover,    61   A. 
159,  69  N.J.Eq.  580,  affirmed  65  A. 
191,  71  N.J.EQ.  269. 

N.Y. — Johnston    v.    A.    L.    Erlanger 

Realty  Corporation,  296  N.Y.S.  89, 

162  Misc.  881. 
34  C.J.  p  650  note  82. 
Lien  of  person,  furnishing1  consider- 
ation 

Evidence  in  suit  involving-  owner- 
shij  of  judgment  was  held  to  sus- 
tain court's  conclusion  that  sale  and 
transfer  of  judgment  was  to  assignee 
named  in  assignment  thereof,  not- 
withstanding claim  that  judgment 
was  bought  with  money  furnished  by 
assignee's  son,  and  that  assignment 
to  assignee  on  margin  of  judgment 
book  was  by  mistake;  hence  chancel- 
lor properly  awarded  assignees'  son 
a  mere  lien  on  the  judgment — Lem- 
ons v.  Wilson,  172  S.W.2d  67,  294  Ky. 
439. 
Prior  sale  of  debtor's  realty 

Assignee  of  judgment  with  notice 
of  sale  of  debtor's  land  prior  to 
judgment  was  not  bona  fide  purchas- 
er with  right  to  enforce  judgment 
against  land. — Johnson  Hardware  Co. 
v.  Ming,  113  So.  189,  147  Miss.  551. 

31.  Cal.— Hobbs    v.    Duff,    23    Cal. 
596. 

34  C.J.  p  650  note  83. 

33.  Ark. — Donham  v.  Davis,  187  S. 
W.2d  722,  208  Ark.  824— McKim  v. 
Highway  Iron  Products  Co.,  29 
S.W.2d  682,  181  Ark.  1121. 

33.  Tenn. — State  ex  rel.  McConnell 
v.  Peoples  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  12 
Tenn.App.  242.  j 


34.  La.— Folse  v.   Dale,    2    So.2d   6, 
197  La.  511. 

35.  La. — Folse  v.  Dale,  supra. 

36.  N.J.— Bell  v.  Kates,  18  A.2d  556, 
126  aUT.Law  90. 

37.  Cal.— Arp  v.  Blake,  218  P.   773, 
63  CaLApp.  362. 

111. — Stombaugh  v.  Morey,  58  N.E.2d 
545,  388  111.  392,  157  A.L.R.  254— 
People  ex  rel.  Farwell  v.  Kelly,  12 
N.E.2d  612,  367  111.  616— Eagle  In- 
demnity Co.  v.  Haaker,  33  N.E.2d 
154,  309  Ill.App.  406— Corpus  Juris 
cited  in  Painter  v.  Merchants  & 
Manufacturers  Bank  of  Milwaukee, 
277  IlLApp.  208,  246. 

Ky. — Lemons  v.  Wilson,  172  S.W.Sd 
67,  294  Ky.  439. 

Miss. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Hum- 
phreys County  v.  Cashin,  101  So. 
571,  573,  136  Miss.  476. 

N.J.— Bell  v.  Kates,  18  A.2d  556, 
126  N.J.Law  90— Roth  v.  General 
Casualty  &  Surety  Co.,  146  A.  202, 
106  N.J.Law  516. 

N.Y. — People  ex  rel.  Hirsch  v.  Weiss- 
brod,  33  N.Y.S.2d  580,  178  Misc. 
177. 

N.C. — Jones  v.  T,  S.  Franklin  Estate, 
183  S.E.  732,  209  N.C.  585. 

Ohio. — Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  West 
Penn  Rys.  Co.,  144  N.E.  51,  110 
Ohio  St.  516. 

Okl.-=-Gupton  v.  Western  Kennel 
Club,  145  P.2d  179,  193  Okl.  462. 

S.C. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Watts 
v.  Copeland,  170  S.E.  780,  781,  170 
S.C.  449. 

Tex. — Casray  Oil  Corporation  v.  Roy- 
al Indemnity  Co.,  Civ.App.,  165  S. 
W.2d  244,  affirmed  169  S.W.2d  955, 
141  Tex.  33. 

W.Va.— Hines  v.  Fulton,  140  S.B. 
537,  104  W.Va.  561. 

34  C.J.  p  650  note  90—5  C.J.  p  951 
note  14. 

979 


Right  to: 
Body   execution   see   Executions   § 

418 

Invoke   garnishment    see    Garnish- 
ment §  21  b. 
Issue  execution: 

Generally  see  Executions  §  14  b. 
After  death  of  assignor  see  Ex- 
ecutions §  65  a.. 

Maintain    supplementary    proceed- 
ings see  Executions   §   347. 
Benefit    of    appeal    or    supergedeas 
bond 

(1)  Right   to   sue   on   supersedeas 
bond  passes  as   incident   to   assign- 
ment of  judgment,  although  no  ref- 
erence  is  made   to   bond  in  assign- 
ment.— Cope  v.  Johnson,  251  P.   985, 
123   Okl.   43—34   C.J.   p   650   note   90 
[a]  (1). 

(2)  This  is  true  although  the  as- 
signment was  made  and  filed  before 
the  appeal  was  taken  and  the  bond 
executed. 

Fla. — Kahn  v.  American  Surety  Co. 

of  New  York,  162  So.  335,  120  Fla. 

50. 
Tex. — De    Zavala    v.    Scanlan,    Com. 

App.,  65  S.W.2d  489. 
Wash.— Wright    v.    Seattle    Grocery 

Co.,  172  P.  345,  101  Wash,  266. 

(3)  The  filing  of  supersedeas  bond 
by  garnishor,  appealing  from  judg- 
ment for  garnishee,  after  garnishee's 
assignment  of  portion   of  judgment 
awarding  it  attorneys'   fees   to  one 
of  its  attorneys  in  trust,   deprived 
assignee  of  right  to  Issue  execution 
on    judgment    pending    appeal,    but 
gave  him  right   to   proceed  against 
garnishor   and    surety    on    bond,    if 
appeal  were  not  prosecuted, with  ef- 
fect.— Oasray     Oil     Corporation     v. 
Royal  Indemnity  Co.,   Civ.App.,    165 
S.W.2d  244,  affirmed  169  S.W.2d  955, 
141 'Tex.  33. 


§  527 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J,S. 


may  have  agreed  otherwise  between  themselves,38 
including  the  lien  or  security  of  the  judgment  on 
specific  property,39  the  right  of  proceeding  with  an 
attachment  already  issued,40  and  the  right  where  the 
judgment  is  for  money  wrongfully  appropriated  to 
have  the  judgment  debtor  arrested.41  However,  in- 
dependent and  personal  rights  of  the  assignor  not 
incidental  to  his  status  as  judgment  creditor  in  the 
particular  judgment  assigned  do  not  so  pass  unless 


expressly  included  by  the  assignment.42  Thus  it 
does  not  confer  on  the  assignee,  unless  expressly 
provided  for,  the  additional  right  to  subject  to  lia- 
bility on  the  judgment  others  who  were  not  parties 
to  the  original  action,  although  the  assignor  might 
have  had  a  cause  of  action  against  them  but  fore- 
bore  to  pursue  it.43 

The  assignee  can  acquire  no  other  or  superior 
rights  than  those  vested  in  his  assignor;44   and,  if 


(4)  Bight  of  assignee  to  sue  on 
appeal  bond  in  his  own  name  see 
Appeal  and  Error  §  2083  a  (2). 
Uoad  to  discharge  garnishment 

The  right  to  bring  suit  on  a  bond 
given  to  discharge  a  garnishment 
•which  is  conditioned  that  the  bonds- 
men will  pay  the  money  judgment 
rendered  in  the  main  action  passes  as 
fin  incident  to  the  assignment  of 
the  judgment,  although  no  reference 
is  made  to  the  bond  in  the  assign- 
ment.— Conpway  v.  Carnall,  224  P. 
323,  101  Okl.  172. 
Decree  in  rem 

Assignment  of  decree  in  rem  car- 
ries with  it  the  money  decree  therein 
as  well  as  the  assignor's  right  to 
the  lien  created  by  an  attachment 
sued  out  and  levied  on  the  lands  de- 
creed to  be  sold  and  the  right  to 
enforce  this  attachment. — Hines  v. 
Fulton,  140  S.E.  537.  104  W.Va.  561. 
Indemnity  policy 
Cal. — Bias  v.  Ohio  Farmers  Indem- 
nity Co.,  81  P.2d  1057,  28  GaLApp. 
2d  14. 

.Xien  release  "bond 

Fla. — Bear  v.  Duval  Lumber  Co.,  for 
Use  and  Benefit  of  Standard  Ac- 
cident Ins.  Co.,  150  So.  S14,  112  Fla, 
240. 

iBiffhts  against  attorney  for  assignor 
Where  attorney  of  judgment  cred- 
itor collects  judgment  and  reduces 
the  fruits  of  the  judgment  to  his 
possession,  an  assignee  of  the  judg- 
ment has  all  rights  and  remedies  as 
against  the  attorney  that  the  assign- 
or had,  although  the  relationship  of 
.attorney  and  client  is  not  an  ftssign- 
.able  incident  of  a  judgment. — Ar- 
mour &  Co.  v.  Lambdin,  16  So.2d  805, 
154  Fla.  86. 

.Sight  to  set  aside  fraudulent  con- 

veyanoe  by  debtor 
Cal.— Michal  v.  Adair,  152  P.2d  490, 

66  Cal.App.2d  382. 

Stockholder's  statutory  liability 

Assignment  of  a  judgment  against 
A  bank  gave  to  assignee  a  right  of 
action  against  stockholder  to  en- 
force constitutional  and  statutory 
liability. — Eagle  Indemnity  Co.  v. 
Haaker,  33  N.E.2d  154,  309  Ill.App. 
406. 

3&    Wash.— Lewis  v.  Third  St  &  S. 

R.  Co.,  66  P.  150,  26  Wash,  28. 
44  C.J.  p  651  note  ftL 


39.  N.C.—  Little   v.    Steele,    199    S.E. 
282,  214  N.C.  343. 

Tex.  —  Casray      Oil      Corporation     v. 

Royal  Indemnity  Co.,  Civ.App.,  165 

S.W.2d  244,  affirmed  169  S.W.2d  955, 

141  Tex.  33. 
34  C.J.  p  651  note  92. 
Bight  to  enforce  or  foreclose  lien 
Conn.  —  Joseph    v.    Donovan,    157    A. 

638,  114  Conn.  79. 
Tex.—  Hicks  v.  Price,  Civ.App.,  81  S. 

W.2d  116. 

40.  U.S.  —  Nelson     v.     Century      In- 
demnity   Co..    C.C.A.Cal.,    65    F.2d 
765,   certiorari  denied  Century  In- 
demnity Co.  v.  Nelson,  54  S.Ct  120, 
290  U.S.  683,  78  L.Ed.  588. 

W.Va.—  Hines    v.    Pulton,    140    S.E. 

537,  104  W.Va.  561. 
37  C.J.  p  651  note  93. 


attachment  bond 

(1)  Assignee  of  judgment  may  en- 
force bond  given  to  release  attach- 
ed property  if  property  is  not  rede- 
livered  to  sheriff  for  sale  to  satisfy 
judgment  —  Nelson    v.    Century    In- 
demnity Co.,  C.C.A.Cal,,  65  F.2d  765, 
certiorari  denied  Century  Indemnity 
Co.  v.  Nelson,  54  S.Ct.  120,  290  U.S. 
6S3,  78  L.Ed.  5SS—  34  C.J.  p  651  note 
93  Ea]. 

(2)  Where    property    of    principal 
debtor    was    attached,    assignee    of 
judgment  in  trust  for  surety  on  bond 
given  to  release  attachment  by  one 
secondarily  liable  for  debt  should  re- 
sort  to   principal   debtor's   property 
before  resorting  to  property  of  prin- 
cipal in  attachment  bond  or  property 
of  others  secondarily  liable  for  orig- 
inal debt,  although  principal  debtor 
was   only   a   cojudgment   debtor   on 
face  of  judgment.  —  Nelson  v.  Century 
Indemnity    Co.,    C.CA.Cal.,    65    F.2d 
765,  certiorari  denied  Century  Indem- 
nity Co.  v.  Nelson,  54  S.Ct  120,  290 
U.S.  683,  78  L.Ed.  588. 

Collusive  entry  of  Judgment  on  at- 

tachment 

Where  the  claim  of  the  assignor, 
carried  into  a  decree  in  rem  against 
the  property  attached  after  the  as- 
signment, has  been  thereafter  fraud- 
ulently compromised  between  the 
debtor  and  -creditor  for  much  less 
than  the  amount  decreed  in  rem 
against  the  property,  and  the  sum 
agreed  on  fraudulently  paid  over  to 
the  assignor,  the  amount  to  which 
the  assignee  is  entitled  may,  in  his 
suit  to  set  aside  the  collusive  de- 

980 


cree,  be  corrected  on  the  record  of 
the  original  decree  in  the  cause,  and 
decreed  accordingly. — Hines  v.  Ful- 
ton, 140  S.B.  537,  104  W.Va,  561. 

41.  111.— Lasher   v.    Carey,    182    111. 
App.  147. 

42.  N.C.— Jones    v.    T.    S.    Franklin 
Estate,  183  S.E.  732,  209  N.C.  585. 

43.  N.C.— Hood  ex  rel.  United  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  v.  Richardson  Realty, 
191  S.E.  410,  211  N.C.  -582— Fidelity 
Security  Co.  v.  Hight,  189  S.E.  174, 
211  N.C.  117— Jones  v.  T.  S.  Frank- 
lin Estate,   183  S.E.  732,   209   N.C. 
585. 

Judgment  for  stockholder's  statutory 
liability 

(1)  Assignee  of  judgment  against 
estate  for  amount  of  a  bank  stock 
assessment  could  not  in  a  subsequent 
proceeding  bring  in  as  defendants  ex- 
ecutor of  estate  in  his  capacities  as 
an  individual  and  a  trustee,  even  if 
assignor  could  have  sued  them  orig- 
inally, where  any  rights  of  assignor 
as  against  executor  in  such  capaci- 
ties were  not  expressly  included  in 
assignment. — Jones  v.  T.  S.  Franklin 
Estate,  supra, 

(2)  The  assignment  of  a  judgment 
against  holder  of  bank  stock  which 
was  procured  under  statute  creating 
additional  stockholder's  liability,   as 
part    of    assets    of   insolvent    bank 
transferred  to  newly  organized  bank 
in  consideration  for  discharge  of  all 
debts  of  insolvent  bank,  did  not  con- 
fer on  assignee  right  to  subject  an- 
other   to    liability   on   judgment   as 
alleged  real  owner  of  stock. — Hood  ex 
rel.    United    Bank   &    Trust    Co.    v. 
Richardson  Realty,  191  S.E.  410,  211 
N.C.  582. 

(3)  Assignee  of  judgment  for  bank 
stock  assessment  was  held  hot  enti- 
tled to  reformation  of  judgment  so 
as  to  hold  defendants  liable  therefor 
as    real    owners    of    bank   stock   at 
time  of  assessment,  in  view  of  enact- 
ment of  statute  after  assessment  re- 
lieving holders  of  bank  stock  of  their 
double     liability.— Fidelity     Security 
Co.  v.  Hight,  189  S.E.  174,  211  N.C. 
117. 

44.  Kan.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pe- 
tersime  Incubator  Co.  v.  Ferguson 
103  P.2d  822,  825,  152  Kan.  259. 

N.J. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Mano- 
witz  v.  Kanov,  154  A,  326,  327,  107 
N.J.Law  523,  75  A.L.R.  1464. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  528 


the  judgment  was  fraudulently  or  wrongfully  en- 
tered or  obtained,  he  will  take  nothing  under  it.45 

The  distinction  as  to  what  does  and  what  does  not 
pass  as  incidental  to  the  assignment  is  in  some  in- 
stances difficult  to  draw.4$  Thus  it  has  been  held 
that  the  mere  assignment  of  a  judgment*  obtained 
Tjy  an  indorsee  against  the  maker  of  a  promissory 
note  does  not  transfer  to  the  assignee  of  such  judg- 
ment the  cause  of  action  theretofore  existing  against 
the  indorsers,47  and  it  has  been  held  that,  in  order 
for  a  right  to  pass  as  an  incident,  it  must  in  a  legal 
sense  constitute  a  security  for  the  debt,48  and  not 
l)e  a  mere  litigious  right  against  a  third  person  to 
recover  damages  for  an  injury  which  accrued  prior 
to  the  assignment,49  although  on  the  last  point  the 
•contrary  view  has  been  upheld,50  or  a  right  of  ac- 
tion for  a  fraud  of  the  judgment  debtor  with  re- 
spect to  an  agreement  in  pursuance  of  which  the 
judgment  was  entered.51 

Money  previously  collected  on  judgment.  While 
it  has  been  held  that  the  assignment  does  not  pass 
any  interest  in  money  which  the  sheriff  had  previ- 
ously collected  on  the  judgment,52  it  has  also  been 
held  that  if  at  the  time  of  the  assignment  the  sheriff 
holds  an  execution  on  the  judgment,  or  the  proceeds 
of  an  execution,  the  assignee  is  entitled  to  receive 
the  proceeds  on  notifying  the  sheriff  of  his  rights 


in  the  premises.53  If  the  assignee  permits  the  at- 
torneys who  recovered  the  judgment  to  issue  and 
control  an  execution  on  it  he  is  bound  by  the  act  of 
the  sheriff  in  paying  over  to  such  attorneys  the  mon- 
ey realized  on  the  execution.54 

§  528.    Effect  of  Reversal  or  Vacation  after 
Assignment 

Reversal  or  vacation  of  an  assigned  judgment  de- 
feats the  assignee's  rights  therein,  and  entitles  him  to 
a  return  of  the  consideration  paid  for  the  assignment, 
unless  he  has  assumed  ail  risks,  of  collection.  At  least 
In  equity,  he  becomes  entitled  to  the  proceeds  of  a  sec- 
ond Judgment  entered  in  the  case  in  favor  of  the  as- 
signor after  reversal  of  the  assigned  judgment. 

The  general  rule,  discussed  in  Appeal  and  Error  § 
1950,  that  on  the  reversal  or  vacation  of  a  judg- 
ment the  parties  to  the  suit  are  restored  to  their 
original  rights  and  liabilities  is  not  affected  by  the 
fact  that  the  judgment  is  in  the  hands  of  an  assignee 
for  value.55  The  assignee  stands  in  no  better  po- 
sition than  the  original  plaintiff,  and  the  judgment 
may  be  reversed,  vacated,  set  aside,  or  enjoined  in 
the  assignee's  hands  for  the  same  reasons  which 
would  justify  such  action  if  it  remained  in  the  hands 
of  the  original  plaintiff,56  and  on  a  reversal  or  va- 
cation the  assignee's  interests  are  defeated,57  except 
where  they  are  protected  as  against  the  assignor 
by  the  peculiar  terms  of  the  assignment.58 


N.T. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Niagara 
County  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
La  Port,  251  N*.T.S.  759. 

Pa.— Sophia  Wilks  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  to  Use  of  v.  Rudloff,  46  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  535,  affirmed  Sophia 
Wilkes  Building  &  -Loan  Ass'n  to 
Use  of  Wiehe  v.  Rudloff,  35  A.2d 
278,  348  Pa.  477. 

S.C. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Watts 
v.  Copeland,  170  S.B.  780,  782,  170 
S.C.  449. 

Wash. — Associated  Indemnity  Corpo- 
ration v.  Wachsmith,  99  P.2d  420,  2 
Wash.2d  679,  127  A.L.R.  531. 

34  C.J.  p  651  note  96. 

45.  S.C.— nCorpns    Juris    quoted    in. 
Watts  v.   Copeland,   170   S.B.   780, 
782,  170  S.C.  449. 

34  C.J.  p  651  note  97. 

46.  Va. — Commonwealth    v.    Warap- 
ler,   51   S.B.    737,   104  Va.   337,   113 
Am.S.R.    1039,    1    L.R.A.,N.S.,    149, 
7  Ann.Cas.  422. 

47.  Ind.— Cole   v.   Matchett,   78   Ind. 
601— Kelsey  v.  McLaughlin,  76  Ind. 
379— Ward  v.  Haggard,  75  Ind.  381. 

Effect  of  judgment  on  note  on  its 
negotiability  see  Bills  and  Notes  § 
20. 

48.  Va. — Commonwealth    v.    Wamp- 
ler,   51  S.B.   737.  104  Va.  337,   113 
Am.S.^l.    1039,    1    L.R.A.,N.S.,    140, 
7  Ann.Cas.  422. 

Wyo- — Heyer  v.  Kaufenberg,  277  P. 
711,  40  Wyo.  367,  63  A.L.R.  285. 


Independent  obligation 

Where  the  assignee  of  a  purchase- 
money  note,  which  is  a  first  lien  on 
the  land,  who  is  also  the  holder 
of  a  mechanic's  lien  judgment  which 
is  inferior  to  the  title  of  the  pur- 
chaser, assigns  such  judgment  with- 
out covenant  of  warranty,  the  as- 
signment does  not  carry  with  it  the 
legal  title  represented  by  the  pur- 
chase-money note. — Davis  v.  flert- 
man,  48  S.W.  50,  19  Tex.Civ.App.  442, 
error  refused. 

49.  Wyo. — Heyer     v.      Eaufenberg, 
277  P.  711.  40  Wyo.  367,  63  A.L.R. 
285. 

Va. — Commonwealth  v.  Wampler,  51 

S.B.  737,  104  Va.  337,  113  Am.S.R. 

1039,  1  L.R.A.,N.S.,  149,  7  Ann.Cas. 

422.  •  . 

34  C.J.  p  651  note  2. 
Expenses 

Judgment  creditor's  cause  of  ac- 
tion under  injunction  bond  for  ex- 
penses incurred  in  securing  dissolu- 
tion of  order  restraining  execution 
sale  did  not  pass  under  subsequent 
assignment  of  judgments. — Heyer  v. 
Kaufenberg,  277  P.  711,  40  Wyo.  367, 
63  A.L.R.  285. 

50.  Iowa. — Citizens'    Nat.    Bank    v. 
Loomis,  69  N.W,  443,  100  Iowa  266, 
62  Am.S.R.  571. 

34  C.J.  p  651  note  3.      . 

51.  N.Y. — Borst  v.  Baldwin,  30  Barb. 
180,  8  Abb.Pr.  351,  17  How.Pr.  585. 

.981 


52.  Ga. — Robinson  v.  Towns,  30  Ga. 
818. 

53.  111.— Bryant  v.  Dana,  8  III.  343. 
N.T. — Robinson  v.  Brennan*   11  Hun 

368— Muir  v.  Leitch,   7  Barb.   341. 

54.  Minn.— Gill   v.    Truelsen,    40    N. 
W.  254,  39  Minn.  373. 

55.  Conn. — Vila  v.  Weston,  33  Conn. 
42. 

34  C.J.  p  652  note  7. 

Assignment  as  inoperative 

N.Y.— White    v.    Hardy,    39   N.T.S.2d 

911,  180  Misc.   63,  affirmed  41  N.T. 

S.2d  210,  266  App.Div.   660. 
34  C.J.  p  652  note  7  Ca]. 

56.  Or.— King  v.  Miller,   97  P.   542, 
53  Or.  53,  affirmed  32  S.Ct.  243,  223 
U.S.  505,  56  L.Ed.  528. 

34  C.J.  p  652  note  8. 

Right  of  assignee  to  prevent,  open- 
ing or  vacating  of  judgment  see 
supra  §  285. 

57.  S.C. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Watts   v.   Copeland,    170    S.B3.   780, 
782,  170  S.C.  449. 

34  C.J.  p  652  note  9. 

Assignment  of  future  judgment 

N.T. — Van     der    Stegen    v.     Neuss, 

Hesslein  &  Co.,  276  N.-Y.S.  624,  243 

App.Div.  122. 

58.  S.C. — Corpus    Juris    auoted    in 
Watts  v.  Copeland,    170  S.E.   780, 
782,  170  S.C.  449. 

34  C.J.  p  652  note  10. 


§  528 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


It  has  been  held  that  the  assignee  seeking  to  en- 
force the  judgment  is  the  only  necessary  party  to 
an  action  by  the  judgment  debtor  to  enjoin  its  col- 
lection, the  assignor  not  being  a  proper  or  neces- 
sary part>%  as  he  no  longer  has  an  interest  in  the 
judgment.59 

Since,  as  discussed  supra  §  519,  the  assignment 
of  a  judgment  confers  on  the  assignee  all  rights  of 
the  assignor,  including  the  claim  or  cause  of  action 
on  which  the  judgment  was  based,  the  assignee  be- 
comes entitled,  at  least  in  equity,  to  the  proceeds  of 
a  second  judgment  entered  in  favor  of  the  assignor 
after  reversal  of  the  assigned  judgment60 

Recovery  of  consideration.  Where  the  judgment 
is  reversed  or  vacated  after  assignment,  the  assignee 
is  entitled  to  recover  the  price  paid  therefor  on  the 
ground  of  failure  of  consideration  or  breach  of  im- 
plied warranty61  except  where  he  has  undertaken 
to  assume  all  risks  of  collection.62 

§  529.    Priority  of  Assignments 

Priority  between  successive  assignees  for  value  and 
without  notice  is,  by  some  authority,  determined  by  the 
order  of  the  assignments,  the  first  in  time  being  first 
in  right;  but  other  authorities  accord  priority  in  the 
order  in  which  notice  of  the  assignments  is  given  to  the 
judgment  debtor. 

Where  a  judgment  is  regularly  assigned  for  value, 
the  rights  of  the  assignee  are  paramount  to  those  of 
a  subsequent  attachment  or  execution  creditor  of  the 
assignor,63  and  the  rightful  assignee  may  enjoin 
the  collection  of  the  judgment  by  one  who  claims 
under  a  simulated  assignment64 

In  so  far  as  notice  to  the  judgment  debtor  is  not 
necessary  to  the  validity  of  the  assignment,  as  dis- 
cussed supra  §  515  a,  such  assignments  take  priority 


in  the  order  in  which  they  are  made,  the  first  as- 
signee in  point  of  time  taking  priority  in  point  of 
right,65  regardless  of  the  order  in  which  such  no- 
tice is  given  or  the  fact  that  the  prior  assignee  has 
failed  to  give  notice  while  the  subsequent  assignee 
has,66  and  notwithstanding  the  later  assignment  was 
first  recorded  on  the  judgment  docket,67  unless  the 
first  assignment  is  tainted  with  fraud.68  According 
to  some  authority,  however,  priority  as  between 
successive  bona  fide  assignees  for  value  of  the 
same  judgment  is  determined  by  the  order  in  which 
notice  of  the  assignments  is  given  to  the  judgment 
debtor,  so  that  an  assignee  first  giving  notice  to  the 
debtor  may  take  priority  over  another  assignee 
whose  assignment  is  first  in  the  point  of  time.6* 
Under  this  rule,  if  the  subsequent  assignee  or  the 
creditor  has  not  perfected  his  right  by  notice  to  the 
debtor,  it  is  a  contest  between  equities  and  the  first 
assignee  must  prevail,  on  the  maxim  that  he  who 
is  first  in  time  is  first  in  right.™ 

Priorities  a"s  between  assignees  generally  are  con- 
sidered in  Assignments  §  91. 

Partial  assignments.  As  between  successive  as- 
signees of  portions  of  a  judgment,  their  rights,  if 
conflicting,  will  depend  on  priority  of  assignment, 
subject  to  their  compliance  with  the  directions  of 
the  statute  as  to  making  the  assignment  effectual.71 
Where  the  proceeds  of  the  property  bound  by  the 
judgment  are  insufficient  to  pay  all  the  assignees,  it 
has  been  held  that  they  take  pro  rata  and  not  by  pri- 
ority.72 An  assignment  of  a  judgment  which  ex- 
cepts  therefrom  a  specific  portion  thereof  previous- 
ly assigned  to  another  as  security  for  a  debt  is  not 
equivalent  to  an  assignment  subject  to  the  interest 
of  the  first  assignee.78  Where  a  judgment  is  as- 
signed as  security  for  an  obligation  to  the  assignee, 


v.    Kerr,    Civ.App., 


59.  Tex.  —  Ellis 
23  S.W.  1050. 

60.  Miss.  —  Humphreys     County     v. 
Cashin,  101  So.  571,  136  Miss.  476. 

61.  Or.  —  Cooper    v.    Sagert,    223    P. 
943,  111  Or.  27. 

34  C.J.  p  648  note  62,  p  652  note  12. 

62.  N.Y.—  Corpus     Jmis     cited     in 
White  v.  Hardy,  39  N.Y.S.  911,  915, 
180    Misc.    63,    affirmed    41   N.Y.S. 
2d  210,  266  AppJDiv.  660. 

Tenn.  —  Gore  v.  Poteet,  50  S.W.  754, 
101  Tenn.  608. 

63.  N.J.—  Bell  v.  Kates,  18  A.2d  556, 
126  N.J.Law  90. 

Ohio.—  Bailey  v.  Neale,  App.,  49  N.E. 

2d  103,  second  case. 
34  C.J.  p  652  note  15. 
As  against  prior  Judgment  creditor 

A  son,  purchasing  and  taking  as- 
signment of  judgment  against  his 
father  and  order  for  execution 
against  father's  wages  in  son's  true 


name,  and  informing  father's  prior 
Judgment  creditor  of  full  circum- 
stances and  details  of  purchase, 
which  was  made  without  father's 
knowledge,  is  entitled  to  whatever 
gain  he  reaped  from  bargain  as 
against  contention  that  he  was  not 
"bona  fide  purchaser"  because  of  con- 
structive fraud  arising  from  relation- 
ship of  father  and  son.— Bell  v. 
Kates,  18  A.2d  556,  126  N.J.Law  90. 

6fc  La.— Klein  v.  Dennis,  36  La. 
Ann.  284. 

Piotitious  claim  of  holder  of  legal 
title 

I1L — Painter  v.  Merchants  &  Manu- 
facturers Bank  of  Milwaukee,  277 
HLApp.  208. 

65.  N.Y.— Wappler  v.  Woodbury  Co., 
158  N.B.  56,  246  N.Y.  152. 

34  C.J.  p  652  note  17. 


«.    K.C.— -In    re  Wallace,    193 
819,  212  N.C.  490. 

982 


S.E. 


67.  N,C.  —  In  re  Wallace,  supra. 

68.  N.C.—  In  re  Wallace,  supra. 

69.  Cal.—  City    of    Los    Angeles    v. 
Knapp,   60  P.2d  127,   7  Cal.2d  168. 

Okl.—  Conms  Juris  quoted  in  Board 
of  Com'rs  of  Roger  Mills  County  v. 
King,  294  P.  101,  103,  147  Okl.  34. 

Pa.—  -Allegheny  County  -v.  Simon,. 
Com.Pl.,  89  PittsbXeg.J.  131. 

34  C.J.  p  652  note  18. 


a    Tenn.—  Dinsmore 
689. 


.  Boyd,  6  I*ea 


71.  Pa.— Fisher  v.  Knox,  13  Pa.  622. 
53  Am.D.  503. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  84. 

72.  Pa.— In  re  Barkley,  112  A.  113, 
268    Pa.    370— Moore's    Appeal,    9£ 
Pa.  309. 

73.  Neb.— Cahn  v.   Carpless  Co.,   85 
N.W.  538,  61  Neb.  512. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§531 


the  assignee  may  in  good  faith  compromise  and  set- 
tle the  judgment  for  less  than  the  face  amount 
thereof  as  against  a  subsequent  assignee  of  the 
judgment  creditor  whose  assignment  provides  that 
the  prior  assignee  is  to  pay  such  assignee  out  of  the 
proceeds  of  the  judgment  if  the  full  amount  of  the 
judgment  is  collected.74 

§  530.    Setting  Aside  Assignment 

The  assignment  of  a  judgment  may  be  set  asjde  in 
an  appropriate  proceeding  if  proper  grounds  therefor 
appear. 

An  action  will  lie  to  cancel  or  set  aside  an  as- 
signment of  a  judgment  if  proper  grounds  therefor 
appear.75  Such  an  action  will  lie  where  the  as- 
signment was  made  by  a  person  having  no  right  or 
authority  to  sell  the  judgment,76  or  was  procured  by 
false  and  fraudulent  representations  with  respect  to 
the  validity  of  the  judgment,  the  amount  due  on  it, 
or  the  property  available  for  its  satisfaction,  made 
by  either  party  to  the  other,77  or  where  it  was 
fraudulently  procured  for  an  inadequate  consider- 
ation,78 or  where  it  was  made  with  a  view  to  de- 
fraud creditors  of  the  assignor.79 

Mere  inadequacy  of  consideration  is  not  alone 
sufficient  to  warrant  vacating  or  setting  aside  the  as- 
signment ;80  but  the  amount  of  consideration  is  im- 
portant in  determining  whether  a  purchaser  from 
the  original  assignee  paid  value  so  as  to  come  with- 


in the  rule  in  favor  of  purchasers  in  good  faith  for 
value  and  without  notice,81  and  it  is  also  important 
on  the  question  of  notice  and  good  faith,82  unless 
the  assignee  has  waived  his  right  to  have  the  as- 
signment set  aside.83 

Vknue.  It  has  been  held  that  an  action  to  set 
aside  an  assignment  of  a  judgment  to  the  grantee 
of  land  of  the  judgment  debtor,  and  to.  reinstate  the 
lien  of  the  judgment,  must  be  brought  in  the  county 
where  the  land  lies,84  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  has 
been  held  that  an  action  to  set  aside  a  docketed 
judgment  is  not  one  for  the  recovery  of  an  interest 
in  land,  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  which  pro- 
vides that  such  an  action  shall  be  brought  in  the 
county  in  which  the  subject  matter  thereof  is  situ- 
ated.85 

Parties.  In  accordance  with  the  general  rule  dis- 
cussed in  Fraudulent  Conveyances  §  331  a,  a  mere 
creditor  of  the  assignor,  not  an  attachment  or  judg- 
ment creditor,  has  no  standing  to  maintain  an  ac- 
tion to  set  aside  the  assignment  as  a  fraudulent 
conveyance.86  The  assignee  must  be  made  a  party 
to  any  action87  or  motion88  to  set  aside  an  assign- 
ment. 

Evidence.  As  in  actions  generally,  only  proper 
evidence  should  be  admitted  in  actions  or  proceed- 
ings to  cancel  or  set  aside  assignments  of  judg- 
ments.89 


XVI.  SUSPENSION  AND  BEVIVAL  OF  JUDGMENT 
A.  IN  GENERAL 


§531.     Suspension  or  Stay  of  Proceedings 

a.  In  general 

b..  Time  for  making  order 


a.  In  General 

In    a    proper   case   the   enforcement    of   a   Judgment 
may  be  suspended  or  stayed. 


74.  Okl. — Exchange    Nat    Bank    of 
Tulsa   v.    Rogers,    268    P.   293,    131 
Okl.  129. 

75.  N.Y. — Seymour  v.  Smith,  21  N.B. 
1042,  114  N.Y.  481,  11  Am.S.R.  683. 

Pa. — Socks  v.  Socks,  1  Del.Co.  490. 

•76.     111.— Fadfleld    v.    Green,    85    111. 

529. 

.S.C.— Mayer  v.  Blease,  4  S.C.  10. 
34  C.J.  p  653  note  21. 

AV>  unauthorized  assignment  "by  an 
.-attorney  of  a  client's  judgment  for 
full  value  is  not  void,  but  only  void- 
able at  the  instance  of  the  client 
Alone.— McFry  v.  Stewart,  121  So. 
517,  219  Ala.  216. 

'77.    Mo.— Gottschalk  v.   ^ircher,    17 

S.W.  905,  109  Mo.  170. 
34  C.J.  p  653  note  22. 
:Praud  must  be  proved 
Neb.— Krelle  v.  Bowen,  259  N.W.  48, 

128  Neb.  418. 


78.  U.S. — Baker  v.  Wood,  Colo.,  15  S. 
Ct.    577,     157    U.S.    212,     39    L.Ed. 
677 — Lee  Line  Steamers  v.  Robin- 
son, Tenn.,  232  F.   417,   146  C.C.A. 
411. 

79.  Ga.— Taylor  v.  Jordan,   195   S.E. 
186,  185  Ga.  325. 

Fraud  held  lacking 
Ga. — Taylor  v.  Jordan,  195   S.B.  186,. 
185  Ga.  325. 

80.  U.S. — Lee  Line  Steamers  v.  Rob- 
inson, Tenn.,  232  P.  417,  146  C.C.A. 
411. 

83-    U.S.— Baker  v.  Wood,  Colo.,  15  S. 
Ct.  577,  157  U.S.  212,  39  LJEd.  677. 

82.  U.S. — Baker  v.  Wood,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  653  note  26. 

83.  Tex.— Hume    v.    John    B.    Hood 
Camp    Confederate   Veterans,    Civ. 
App.,  69  S.W.  643. 

34  C.J.  p  653  note  27. 

84.  N.Y. — Mahoney  v.   Mahoney,    23 
N.Y.S.  1097,  70  Hun  78. 

983 


85.  N.C. — Baruch  v.  Long,  23  S.B. 

447,  117  N.C.  509,  511. 
34  C.J.  p  653  note  29. 

88.    Mo. — Haynes  v.  Tyler,  App.,  123 

S.W.2d  609. 
Statute  inapplicable 

The  statute  relating  to  actions  on 
assigned  accounts  did  not  apply  to 
suit  to  set  aside  assignment  of  judg- 
ment against  plaintiff  on  ground  that 
assignment  was  scheme  to  prevent 
plaintiff  from  crediting  Judgment  on 
judgment  he  might  obtain  against  as- 
signor.— Haynes  v.  Tyler,  supra. 

87.  Ohio. — Mosholder  v.   Culbertson, 
134  N.B.  654r  103  Ohio  St.  489. 

88.  N.Y.— Avery  v.  Ackart,  46  N.Y. 
S.  1085,  20  Misc.  631. 

89.  Evidence  as  to  matters  not  in 
issue     should    not     be     admitted. — 
Haynes  v.  Tyler,  Mo.App.,  123  S.W.2d 
609. 


§  531 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


In  the  absence  of  statutory  prohibition90  the  en- 
forcement of  a  judgment  may  generally  be  suspend- 
ed or  stayed  by  the  operation  of  subsequent  proceed- 
ings taken  in  the  case,91  by  an  agreement  with  the 
creditor  obtained  fairly  and  in  good  faith,92  by  the 
death  of  plaintiff,93  or  by  an  order  of  the  court,  un- 
der statutory  authority  or  in  the  exercise  of  its  dis- 
cretionary power,  when  justified  by  the  circum- 
stances of  the  particular  case  and  necessary  to  do 
justice  between  the  parties.94 

Where  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  is  suspend- 
ed or  stayed  by  order  of  the  court,  the  order  may 
be  made  conditional  or  on  terms,95  which  must  be 
complied  with  to  render  the  stay  effective.96  If 
necessary,  the  stay  may  be  made  final  and  perpetu- 
al, as  •where  the  judgment  debt  has  been  paid  in 
full.97  The  order  of  suspension  may  give  leave  to 
apply  for  a  further  suspension,98  and  under  such 
circumstances  the  granting  of  a  second  extension 
does  not  constitute  an  amendment  of  the  judgment99 
but  serves  only  to  regulate  the  manner  in  which 
the  rights  fixed  by  the  judgment  shall  be  enforced.1 
Where  a  judgment  is  suspended  for  a  definite  period 
with  the  right  to  apply  to  the  court  for  an  extension 
thereof,  the  court  cannot  grant  the  extension  unless 
the  application  therefor  is  made  before  the  expira- 
tion of  the  time  of  the  original  suspension:2 

Moratorium.  A  judgment  debtor,  granted  a  mor- 
atorium subject  to  the  fulfillment  of  certain  condi- 


tions precedent,  may  not  stay  the  enforcement  of 
the  judgment  if  he  refuses  to  fulfill  such  condi- 
tions.3 

b.  Time  for  Making  Order 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  otherwise  providing,  a 
court  usually  cannot  order  the  suspension  of  a  judg- 
ment after  the  close  of  the  term  at  which  it  was  ren- 
dered unless  it  expressly  reserves  the  power  to  do  so  in 
the  entry  of  the  judgment  or  retains  jurisdiction  of  the 
case. 

Usually  the  suspension  of  a  judgment  cannot  be 
ordered  after  the  close  of  the  term  in  which  it  was 
rendered4  unless  the  power  to  do  so  is  expressly  re- 
served in  the  entry  of  the  judgment5  or  unless  the 
court  still  retains  jurisdiction  of  the  case.6  By  vir- 
tue of  statute,  however,  a  court  may  be  authorized 
to  order  the  suspension  of  a  judgment  at  any  time 
within  a  specified  period  after  the  end  of  the  term,7 
and,  where  the  court  does  so,  the  order  of  suspen- 
sion, entered  within  such  period,  has  the  same  force 
and  effect  as  though  it  had  been  entered  during  the 
term.8 

§  532.    Dormant  Judgments 

a.  In  general 

b.  Construction  and  operation  of  statutes 

c.  Issuance  of  execution 

d.  Return  or  entry  on  execution  and  rec- 

ord thereof 


90.  Ark. — Fernwood     Min.     Co.     v. 
Pluna,  213  S.W.  397,  138  Ark.  459. 

34  C.J.  p  655  note  55. 

91.  Ohio. — Commercial  Credit  Corp. 
v.  Wasson,  63  N.E.2d  560,  76  Ohio 
App.  181. 

34  C.J.  p  653  note  35. 
Application  for  new  trial  as  effecting 
suspension  or  stay  of  entry  or  en- 
forcement   of    judgment    see    the 
C.J.S.  title  New  Trial   $  128,  also 
34  C.J.  p  68  note  5,  46  C.J.  p  304 
notes  5-10. 
Stay  of: 
Execution: 
Generally  see  Executions  §5  139— 

141. 

On  judgment  in  justice's  court 

see  the  C.J.S.  title  Justices  of 

the  Peace  §   123,  also  35   C.J. 

p  702  note  72-p  704  note  92. 

Proceedings    in    actions    generally 

see  Actions  §5  131-137. 
Supersedeas  or  stay  of  proceedings 
by  or  pending  appeal  see  Appeal 
and  Error  §§  625-679. 

92.  U.S.— Milmine  v.  Bass,  C.C.Ind., 
29   F.   632,   affirmed  10   S.Ct.   1065, 
136  TJ.S.  630,  34  LuEd.  553. 

34  C.J.  p  653  note  36. 

93.  Xy.— Ritchey  v.  Buricke,  54  S.W. 
173,  21  KyJU  1120. 

34  C.J.  p  653  note  37* 


Death  of  party: 

As  abatement  of  action  see  Abate- 
ment and  Revival  §  114  et  seq. 

As  causing  dormancy  of  judgment 
see  infra  §  532. 

Survival  of  Judgment  on  see  infra 
§  534. 

94.  U.S.— Fowler    v.    Peet,    C.C.Pa., 
170  F.  620. 

34  C.J.  p  653  note  38. 
Equitable    relief    against    judgment 
see  supra  S§  341-400. 

95.  N.Y.— Potter  v.  Rossiter,  95  N. 
T.S.  1039,  109  AppJMv.  37. 

34  C.J.  p  654  note  39. 

96.  N.Y.— State  Bank  v.  Wilchinsky, 
119  N.Y.S.  131,  65  Misc.  162. 

34  C.J.  p  654  note  40. 

97.  Md. — Kendrick  v.  Warren  Bros. 
Co.,  72  A.  461,   110  Md.  47. 

34  C.J.  p  654  note  41. 

98.  N.Y. — Sponenburgh   v.    Glovers- 
ville,   87  N.Y.S.   602,  42  Misc.  563, 
affirmed  89  N.Y.S.  19,  96  App.Div. 
157. 

Ohio. — Cincinnati  R.  Co.  v.  Cincinnati 
Inclined  Plane  R.  Co.,  47  N.E.  560, 
56  Ohio  St  675. 

99.  N.Y. — Sponenburgh   T.    Glovers- 
ville,   87  N.Y.S.   602,  42  Misc.  563, 
affirmed  89  N.Y.S.  19,  96  App.Div. 
157, 

984 


!•    N.Y. — Sponenburgh 
ville,  supra. 


Glovers- 


2.  Ohio. — Cincinnati  R.  Co.  v.   Cin- 
cinnati  Inclined  Plane  R.   Co.,   47 
N.E.  560,  56  Ohio  St  675. 

3.  La. — Italian  Strawberry  Ass'n  v. 
Rusciano,  169  So.  525,  185  La.  500. 

4.  Colo.— Nordloh   v.    Packard,    101 
P.  787,  45  Colo.  515. 

Ohio. — Cincinnati  R.  Co.  v.  Cincin- 
nati Inclined  Plane  R.  Co.,  47  N.K 
560,  56  Ohio  St  675. 

Amending,  correcting,  reviewing, 
opening,  and  vacating  judgment 
after  expiration  of  term  see  su- 
pra S  230. 

5.  Ohio.— Cincinnati  R.  Co.  v.  Cin- 
cinnati Inclined  Plane  R.  Co.,  su- 
pra. 

6.  Tex. — U.  S.  &  Mexican  Trust  Co. 
v.  Young,   101  S.W.  1045,  46  Tex. 
CivJLpp.  117. 

34  C.J.  p  655  note  54. 

7.  Ya, — -ffitna    Casualty    &    Surety 
Co.   of  Hartford,   Conn.   v.   Board 
of  Sup'rs  of  Warren  County,   168 
S.B.  617,  160  Va.  11. 

8.  Va. — ^Btna  Casualty  &  Surety  Co. 
of '  Hartford,    Conn.    v.    Board    of 
Sup'rs  of  Warren  County,  supra. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


532 


e.  Acknowledgment    or    agreement    be- 

tween parties 

f.  Death  of  party  or  assignee 

a.  In  General 

.  Although  a  dormant  judgment  Is  temporarily  in- 
operative for  purposes  of  execution,  it  Is  a  valid  obliga- 
tion of  the  judgment  debtor. 

A  judgment  not  satisfied  or  barred  by  lapse  of 
time,  but  temporarily  inoperative  as  far  as  the  right 
to  issue  execution  is  concerned,  is  usually  called  a 
dormant  judgment.9  Such  a  judgment  has  validi- 
ty10 as  a  still  subsisting  debt  of  the  judgment  debt- 


or. 


11 


b.  Construction  and  Operation  of  Statutes 


Dormant  Judgment  statutes  are  to  be  strictly  con- 
strued and  generally  they  apply  only  to  final  Judgments 
for  money  which  are  enforceable  by  execution. 


The  dormant  judgment  statutes  which  exist  in  the 
various  jurisdictions  are  to  be  strictly  construed  and 
the  courts  generally  refuse  to  engraft  exceptions  to 
them  other  than  those  contained  in  the  statutes 
themselves.12  The  statutes  are  to  be  considered 
procedural  and  binding  on  all  judgment  creditors.13 
These  statutes,  however,  generally  do  not  impose  a 
limitation  on  the  enforcement  of  judgments  or  de- 
crees which  are  not  for  the  payment  of  money14 
or  which  are  not  enforceable  by  execution,1^  and 
they  do  not  apply  where  a  lien  exists  independent  of 
the  judgment  and  is  not  created  by  it.16 

Such  statute  will  not  run  against  a  judgment 
where  the  failure  to  comply  with  the  statute  is  jus- 
tified17 or  where  collection  is  prevented  without 
fault,18  nor  will  it  run  against  a  judgment  during 
an}'  time  when  it  is  impossible  to  enforce  it  by  final 
process19  or  until  the  judgment  becomes  final.20 


9.  Cal. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Da 
Arauje  v.  Rodriques,  123  P.2d  154, 
156,  50  Cal.App.2d  425. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  la.  Perry 
v.  Lebel,  76  P.2d  261,  263.  182  Okl. 
128.  ' 

34  C.J.  p  655  note  58. 
Effect  of  dormant  judgment  on  rights 
of  intervening  lienors  see  supra  § 
490. 
Issuance    of    execution    on    dormant 

judgment: 

Generally  see  Executions   §   7  b. 
As  justification  to  sheriff  see  Ex- 
ecutions §  66  b. 
Revival   of  dormant  judgment: 
As    condition    precedent    to    credi- 
tors'   suits    see    Creditors'    Suits 
§  46  a. 

Mode  of  see  infra  §§  543-548. 
Necessity   for   generally   see  infra 

§   533. 
Time    for,    and   limitation   on,    see 

infra  §  542. 

Presumption  of  payment  from  lapse 
of  time  see  infra  §  559. 

10.  Neb. — Purer  v.   Holmes,    102   N. 
W.  764,  73  Neb.  393. 

34  C.J.  p  658  note  3. 

11.  Okl. — Corpus      Juris      cited     in 
Shefts  v.   Oklahoma  .Co.,   137   P.2d 
589,  591,  192  Okl.  483. 

34  C.J.  p  658  note  4. 
Evidence  of  indebtedness 

A  dormant  judgment  is  evidence  of 
indebtedness. 
Qa. — Groves  v.  Williams,  68  Ga.  598 

— James  v.  Roberts,   191  S.E.   801, 

55  Ga.App;  755. 
Kan. — Douglass  v.  Loftus,  119  P.  74, 

85    Kan.    720,    Ann.Cas.m3A    378, 

L.R.A.191iB  797. 
13.    OkL — Thomas  v.  Murray,  49  P.2d 

1080,  174  Okl.  86,  104  A.L.R.  209. 
Construction  with  other  statutes 

The  statute  relating  to  dormancy 
of  judgment  and  execution  thereon  is 
not  in  pari  materia  with  statute  au- 


thorizing revival  of  a  judgment. — 
Gillam  v.  Matthews,  Tex.Civ.App., 
122  S.W.2d  348,  error  dismissed. 

13.  Okl. — State  ex  rel.  State  Com'rs 
of  Land   Office  v.  Weems,   16S   P. 
2d  629. 

14.  Ga.— Brown   v.    Parks,    9    S.E.2d 
897,  190  Ga.  540— Hall  v.  Findley,  4 
S.E.2d  211,  188  Ga.  487. 

Neb. — Stanton  v.  Stanton,  18  N.W.2d 

654,  146  Neb.  71. 
34  C.J.  p  656  note  64. 

15.  Ga. — Cleveland  v.   Cleveland,   30 
S.E.2d  605.  197  Ga.  746. 

34  C.J.  p  656  notes  65-68. 

16.  Ga. — Collier  v.  Bank  of  Tupelo, 
10  S.E.2d  62,  190  Ga.  598. 

Lien,  created  by  contract 

If  a  lien  is  created  by  contract  and 
no  judgment  is  necessary  to  make 
good  or  establish  it,  the  statute  as  to 
dormant  judgments  does  not  apply. — 
Carter-Moss  Lumber  Co.  v.  Short, 
18  S.E.2d  61,  66  Ga.App.  330, 

17.  Tex. — Grissom    v.    F.    W.    Heit- 
mann    Co.,     Civ.App.,     130     S.W.2d 
1054,  error  refused. 

18.  Ga. — Oliver  v.  Boynton,  138  S.E. 
795,  37  Ga.App.  13. 

19.  Neb. — State  v.   Royse,    91   N.W. 
559,   8  Neb.,  Unoff.,  262. 

34  C.J.  p  656  note  72. 

An  injunction  against  enforcing  a 
judgment  suspends  the  running  of 
the  statute. — Morgan  v.  Massillon 
Engine  &  Thresher  Co.,  Civ.App.,  274 
S.W.  255,  error  denied  277  S.W.  78, 
115  Tex.  146. 

20.  Okl.— Price    v.    Sanditen.    88    P. 
2d  53$,  170  Okl.  75. 

34  C.J.  p  656  note  72  [a]. 

Appeal   from  Judgment   or  order  in 

separate  cause  of  action 
(1)  Where  only  one  party  appeals 
from  a  judgment  on  separate  causes 
of    action,    such    judgment    becomes 

985 


final  as  to  the  parties  not  appealing, 
within  the  rule  as  to  the  issuance  of 
execution  to  prevent  a  judgment 
from  becoming  dormant. — Noble  v. 
Empire  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App., 
20  S.W.2d  849,  affirmed  Empire  Gas 
&  Fuel  Co.  v.  Noble,  Com.App.,  36  S. 
W.2d  451. 

(2)  Similarly,    the    statute    is    not 
tolled    by    an    appeal    from    a    final 
order,    or  judgment   rendered  subse- 
quent to  the  principal  judgment  and 
on  issues  ancillary  to  the  issues  of 
the   principal  judgment. — Hoskins   v. 
Peak,   228  P.  478,  100  Okl.   124. 

(3)  However,  where  recovery  in  a 
cross  action  depends  on  recovery  in 
the  main  action,  the  judgment  in  the 
cross    action    does    not    become   dor- 
mant by  the  failure  to  issue  execu- 
tion   until    after    the    disposition    of 
the   appeal    in    the    principal   action. 
— Noble  v.  Empire  Gas  &  Fuel  Co., 
Tex.Civ.App.,  20  S.W.2d  849,  affirmed 
Empire    Gas    &   Fuel   Co.    v.    Noble, 
Com.App.,  36  S.W.2d  45,1. 

Motion  for  new  trial 

The  statute  begins  to  run  from 
the  date  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  is 
overruled  and  not  from  the  date 
of  a  Judgment  entered  before  the 
overruling  of  such  motion. — Price 
v.  Sanditen,  38  P.2d  533,  170  Okl. 
75. 

Grant  of  writ  of  error 

A  judgment  does  not  become  final 
so  as  to  start  the  statute  running, 
where  a  writ  of  error  is  granted,  al- 
though the  application  for  such  writ 
is  not  made  within  the  statutory 
time  allotted  therefor  and  although 
the  lower  court  renders  judgment  de- 
claring that  such  writ  was  improvi- 
dently  granted  and  that  the  higher 
.court  was  without  jurisdiction  to 
do  so. — Long  v.  Martin,  Civ.App.,  260 
S.W.  327,  error  dismissed  278  S.W. 
1115,  114  Tex.  581. 


§  532 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


It  has  been  held,  however,  that  a  party  by  delay  in 
taking  out  a  mandate  from  an  appellate  court,  when 
he  is  entitled  to  it  after  the  judgment  has  become 
final,  cannot  prevent  the  judgment  from  becoming 
dormant  within  the  statutory  period.21 

c.  Issuance  of  Execution 

Under  some  statutes  a  judgment  becomes  dormant 
when  a  specified  period  of  time  elapses  without  the  Is- 
suance of  an  execution  or  without  the. issuance  of  a  sub- 
sequent execution  when  a  former  execution  remains  un- 
satisfied. 

While  at  common  law  a  judgment  lost  its  force 
as  a  lien  on  the  judgment  debtor's  realty,  and  no 
execution  could  be  issued  thereon  when  it  had  lain 
dormant  for  a  year  and  a  day,22  under  the  statutes 


in  many  jurisdictions,  judgments  become  "dormant," 
that  is,  incapable  of  execution  by  ordinary  process, 
if  a  specified  length  of  time,  generally  Considerably 
greater  than  the  common-law  period,  is  allowed  to 
elapse  without  the  issuance  of  an  execution,  or  with- 
out the  issuance  of  a  subsequent  execution  when  a 
former  execution  remains  unsatisfied.23  The  proper 
issuance  of  an  execution  or  of  successive  executions 
is  usually  sufficient  to  arrest  the  running  of  the  stat- 
ute and  to  prevent  the  judgment  from  becoming 
dormant2*  and  may  keep  the  judgment  alive  indef- 
initely25 or,  as  discussed  infra  §  854,  until  it  is 
barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations.  This  is  true 
even  though  the  execution  is  returned  without  a 
levy,26  or  although  the  sheriff  merely  makes  a  levy 


21.  Tex. — Long  v.  Martin,  supra. 

22.  Cal. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Da 
Arauje  v.  Rodriques.  123  P.2d  154, 
156,  50  Cal.App.2d  425. 

Del.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Crook,  174 

A.  369,  6  W.W.Harr.  281. 
N.M.— Otero  v.  Dietz,   37   P.2d   1110, 

39  N.M.  1. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Perry 
v.  Lebel,  76  P.2d  261,  263,  182  Okl. 
128. 

34  C.J.  p  655  note  59. 
23.-   Ala. — McClintock    v.    McEachin, 

20   So.2d   711,   246   Ala.   412. 
Cal. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in    Da 
Arauje  v.  Rodriques,  123  P.2d  154, 
156,  50  Cal.App.2d  425. 
Kan. — Rodgers    v.     Smith,     58     P.2d 
1092,  144  Kan.  212— Butler  v.  Rum- 
beck,  56  P.2d  80,  143  Kan.  708. 
Neb.— Rich  v.  Cooper,  286  N.W.  383, 
136  Neb.   463— Glissman  v.  Happy 
Hollow    Club,    271    N.W.    431,    132 
Neb.  223. 
N.M.— Otero  r.  Dietz,  37  P.2d  1110,  39 

N.M.  1. 

Okl.— Bartlett  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Morri- 
son, 81  P.2d  318,  183  Okl.  214. 
34  C.J.  p  655  note  63. 

The  purpose  of  the  statute  is  to 
clear  real  estate  of  liens  within  what 
has  been  construed  by  the  legisla- 
ture as  a  reasonable  time  for  a  judg- 
ment to  remain  a  lien  on  such  prop- 
erty, and  such  statute  is  not  a  stat- 
ute of  limitations  which  must  be 
pleaded  before  advantage  can  be  tak- 
en of  it. — Kline  v.  Falbo,  56  N.E.2d 
701,  73  Ohio  App.  417. 

Under  Plorida  lav,  a  judgment  is 
not  "dormant"  after  three  years. — 
Spurway  v.  Dyer,  D.C.Fla.,  48  F.Supp. 
255. 
In  Texas 

(1)  If  no  execution  is  issued  with- 
in ten  years  after  the  rendition  of 
a  judgment  the  judgment  becomes 
dormant,  but  if  the  first  execution  is 
issued  within  the  ten-year  period,  the 
judgment  does  not  become  dormant, 
unless  ten  years  elapse  between  the 
issuance  of  executions  thereon  and 
execution  may  issue  at  any  time 


within  ten  years  after  the  issuance 
of  the  preceding  execution. — Gartin 
v.  Furgeson,  Civ.App.,  144  S.W.2d 
1114. 

(2)  Under  the  prior  statute,  the 
first  execution  had  to  be  issued  with- 
in twelve  months  after  the  rendition 
of  the  judgment,  but  the  provisions 
as  to  the  issuance  of  successive  ex- 
ecutions thereafter  were  similar  to 
the  present  statute. — Commerce 
Trust  Co.  v.  Ramp,  138  S.W.2d  531, 
135  Tex.  84 — Grissom  v.  P.  W.  Heit- 
mann  Co.,  Civ.App.,  130  S.W.2d  1054, 
error  refused— McClaflin  v.  Winfield, 
Civ.App.,  279  S.W.  877— Long  v.  Mar- 
tin, Civ.App.,  260  S.W.  327,  error  dis- 
missed 278  S.W.  1115,  114  Tex.  581— 
34  C.J.  p  655  note  63  [e]. 

24.    Neb.— Filley  v.   Mancuso,   20  N. 

W.2d  318,  146  Neb.  493. 
N.M.— Otero  v.   Dietz,   37   P.2d   1110, 

39  N.M.  1. 

Okl. — Guarantee   Inv.   Corporation  v. 
Killian.  67  P.2d  939.  180  Okl.  74— 
Lowrey  v.  Bolinger,  9  P.2d  20,  155 
Okl.    245— Ashur  v.   McCreery,   300 
P.  767/150  Okl.  111. 
Tex. — Blanks    v.    Radford,    Civ.App, 
188  S.W.2d  879,  error  refused— Gar- 
tin   v.    Furgeson,   Civ. App.,   144    S. 
W.2d  1114— Grissom  v.  F.  W.  Heit- 
mann    Co.,    Civ.App.,    130    S.W.2d 
1054,  error  refused. 
34  C.J.  p  657  note  80. 

A  single  execution  issued  against 
a  codefendant  has  been  held  to  be 
sufllcient  to  keep  a  judgment  alive  as 
against  each  judgment  debtor  where 
the  judgment  is  predicated  on  the 
joint  liability  of  the  defendants. — 
Korber  v.  Willis,  274  P.  239,  127  Kan. 
587. 
Inaccuracies  in  writ 

(1)  Since  mistakes  in  its  recitals 
will  not  vitiate  a  writ  of  execution, 
as  long  as  the  judgment  can  be 
identified,  the  issuance  of  execution 
inaccurately  reciting  the  date  of  the 
judgment,  without  misleading  the 
parties,  and  the  failure  of  the  wril 
to  recite  a  partial  payment  on  behalf 
of  the  judgment  debtors,  will  not 

986 


render  the  execution  ineffective  to 
keep  the  judgment  alive.— Korber  v. 
Willis,  supra. 

(2)  Recital  '  and  description  of 
udgment  in  execution  generally  see 
Executions  §  73. 

A  statute  providing  a  method  of 
reviving1  a  judgment  by  scire  facias 
does  not  pertain  to  a  judgment  cred- 
itor's right  of  enforcement  or  the 
matter  of  keeping  his  judgment  alive 
by  merely  having  executions  issued 
as  provided  by  statute. — Commerce 
Trust  Co.  v.  Ramp,  138  S.W.2d  531, 
135  Tex.  84. 
Assignee 

The  issuance  of  execution  or  of 
successive  executions  on  a  judgment 
by  one  having  an  interest  therein 
as  assignee  prevents  such  judgment 
from  becoming  dormant. — Rodgers  v. 
Smith,  58  P.2d  1092,  144  Kan.  212— 
Tharp  v.  Langford,  222  P.  135,  115 
Kan.  135. 
Voidable  execution 

(1)  An    execution    irregularly    is- 
sued, which 'is  voidable  but  not  void, 
is  sufficient  to  prevent  the  judgment 
from   becoming   dormant. — Cabell    v. 
Orient  Ins.  Co.,  55  S.W.  610,  22  Tex. 
Civ.App.  635. 

(2)  However,  a  voidable  execution 
will  not,  as  against  a  direct  attack, 
prevent  a  judgment  from  becoming 
dormant. — Patton  v.  Crisp  &  White, 
Tex.Civ.App.,    11    S.W.2d    826,    error 
dismissed. 

Order  of  sale 

Although  an  order  of  sale  is  usual- 
ly considered  an  execution  within  the 
statute,  the  force  of  an  execution 
cannot  be  attributed  to  it,  if  both 
the  judgment  and  the  order  of  sale 
provide  otherwise. — Carlton  v.  Hoff, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  292  S.W.  642. 

25.  Tex. — Commerce    Trust    Co.     v. 
Ramp,    138    S.W.2d    531,    135    Tex. 
84. 

34  C.J.  p  657  notes  80,  86. 

26.  Tex— Riddle    v.    Bush,    27    Tex. 
675. 


49    0.  J.  S. 


JUDGMENTS 


532 


and  advertises,27  or  although  the  writ  is  afterward 
quashed,28  or  although  the  execution  is  levied  on  de- 
fendant's homestead.29  However  the  mere  com- 
mencement of  garnishment  proceedings  within  the 
statutory  period  does  not  toll  the  running  of  the 
statute,  where  during  the  pendency  of  such  proceed- 
ing and  before  service  of  the  writ  the  statutory  pe- 
riod expires.30  Similarly  ancillary  proceedings  oc- 
curring prior  to  the  dormancy  of  a  judgment  do  not 
prolong  its  life,  in  the  absence  of  the  issuance  in 
connection  therewith  of  an  execution  or  some  equiv- 
alent writ,  seeking  to  enforce  the  judgment,  within 
the  statutory  time.31 

Delivery  of  writ  for  enforcement  to  proper  offi- 
cer. The  general  rule,  discussed  in  Executions  §  67, 
that  the  writ  of  execution  must  be  actually  or  con- 
structively delivered  to  the  sheriff  or  other  proper 
officer  before  it  can  properly  be  said  to  have  been 
issued  applies  to  the  issuance  of  the  execution  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  dormant  judgment  statutes.32 
Thus,  in  order  to  prevent  a  judgment  from  becom- 
ing dormant,  there  must  be  an  unconditional  deliv- 
ery of  the  execution  to  an  officer  for  enforcement  in 
the  manner  provided  by  law,33  and  merely  showing 
that  an  execution  was  sent  to  the  sheriff,  without 
showing  how  it  was  sent,  by  whom  it  was  sent,  or 
whether  or  not  it  was  received  by  the  sheriff,  does 
not  prevent  the  judgment  from  becoming  dormant34 


d.  Return  or  Entry  on  Execution  and  Record 
Thereof 

Where  the  statute  so  requires,  entries  on  the  execu- 
tion must  be  properly  made  and  recorded  within  the 
statutory  time  to  prevent  the  dormancy  of  the  judg- 
ment. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  so  requiring  it  is  not 
necessary,  in  order  to  prevent  a  judgment  from  be- 
coming dormant,  to  have  the  execution  recorded  or 
the  return  thereof  entered.35  Under  some  statutes, 
however,  the  mere  issuance  of  an  execution  will  not 
suffice  to  keep  a  judgment  alive;  but  it  becomes 
dormant  if  seven  years  elapsed  from  the  time  of  the 
last  entry  on  the  execution  by  an  authorized  officer 
and  the  recording  of  such  entry  on  the  execution 
docket.36  This  requires  the  entry  and  recording  of 
a  sufficient  indorsement  on  the  execution  at  least  as 
often  as  once  in  every  seven  years37  unless  the 
statute  has  been  arrested  by  the  active  conduct  of 
proceedings  to  vacate  or  enjoin  the  judgment38 
The  entry  which  will  avail  to  keep  the  judgment  in 
force  may  be  a  written  and  signed  statement  of  the 
officer  that  the  writ  is  placed  in  his  hands  with  or- 
ders to  collect  the  money,  or  a  return  or  other  prop- 
er indorsement,  of  a  character  to  show  that  the  cred- 
itor is  still  endeavoring  to  enforce  it,39  but  it  must 
in  all  cases  be  made  by  an  officer  authorized  to  levy 


27.  Tex. — McClaflin  v.  Winfleld,  Civ. 
App.,  279  S.W.  877. 

28.  Miss. — Nye     v.     Cleveland,     Si 
Miss.  440. 

29.  Ala,— McClarin  v.  Anderson,   16 
So.  C39,  104  Ala.  201. 

30.  111.— Ring:  v.  Palmer,  32  N.E.2d 
956,  309  Ill.App.  333. 

31.  Kan.— First  Nat.  Bank  of  Nor- 
ton  v.   Harper,    169   P.2d   844,   161 
Kan.  536. 

32.  Tex. — Parlin  &  Orendorff  Imple- 
ment   Co.    v.    Chadwick,    Civ.App., 
4  S.W.2d  133. 

34  C.J.  p  657  note  79. 
Beason  for  mle 

The  term  "issue,"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  statute,  means  more  than 
the  mere  clerical  preparation  and 
attestation  of  the  writ,  and  requires 
that  it  should  be  delivered  to  an 
officer  for  enforcement. — Schneider 
v.  Dorsey,  74  S.W.  526,  96  Tex.  544 — 
Cotten  v.  Stanford,  Tex.Civ.App.,  147 
S.W.2d  930. 

33.  Tex. — Harrison     v.     Orr,     Com. 
App.,  296  S.W.  871,  modified  on  oth- 
er  grounds    10    S.W.2d   381. 

Instructions  to  hold  and  return  writ 

without  levy 

(1)  The  issuance  of  an  execution 
to  the  sheriff  with  instructions  to 
hold  and  return  it  without  making 
a  levy  usually  will  not  prevent  the 


judgment  from  becoming  dormant. — 
Commerce  Trust  Co.  v.  Ramp,  138 
S.W.2d  531,  135  Tex.  84— Harrison  v. 
Orr,  Tex.Com.  App.,  296  S.W.  $71, 
modified  on  other  grounds  10  S.W.2d 
381. 

(2)  However,  if  the  sheriff  cannot 
find  any  property  of  defendants  sub- 
ject to  the  writ,  such  instructions 
will  not  have  such  effect,  and  the 
issuance  of  the  execution  will  pre- 
vent the  Judgment  from  becoming 
dormant. — R.  B.  Spencer  &  Co.  v. 
Harris,  Tex.Civ.App.,  171  S.W.2d  393. 

34.  Tex. — Cotten    v.    Stanford,    Civ. 
App.,  147  S.W.2d  930. 

35.  Okl.— Guarantee    Inv.    Corpora- 
tion  v.   Killian,    67   P.2d   939,    180 
Okl.     74 — Dodson     v.     Continental 
Supply  Co.,   63   P.2d  582,   175   Okl. 
587 — Miller  v.  J.  I.   Case  Thresh- 
ing  Machine   Co.,   300   P.   399,   149 
Okl.  281. 

23  C.J.  p  377  note  92. 

36.  Ga.--Citizens'  Bank  of  Plains  v. 
Hagerson,  140  S.E.  48,   37  Ga.App. 
282 — English  v.  Williams,  116  S.E. 
40,  29  Ga.App.  467. 

34. C,J.  p  657  note  88. 

37.  Qa, — Booth  v.  Williams,   2   Ga. 
252— English  v.  Williams,  116  S.E, 
40,  29  Ga.App.  467— Neely  v.  Ward, 
107    S.E.    79,    26    Ga.App.    588. 

QB7 


Absence  from  state 

A  statute  providing  that  in  certain 
cases,  the  time  of  defendant's  ab- 
sence from  the  state  shall  not  be 
counted  in  his  favor  does  not  refer 
to  the  period  of  time  in  which  a 
judgment  becomes  dormant  when  not 
sept  in  life  in  any  manner  specified 
by  law,  since  his  removal  from  the 
state  does  not  prevent  a  Judgment 
creditor  from  keeping  the  Judgment 
in  life.— Tift  v.  Bank  of  Tifton,  4 
S.E.2d  495,  60  Ga.App.  563. 
Judgments  held  dormant 
Ga, — A.  B.  Farquhar  Co.  v.  Myers,  21 
S.E.2d  432,  194  Ga.  220 — Latham 
&  Sons  v.  Hester,  181  S.E.  573,  181 
Ga.  100 — Odum  v.  Peterson,  153  S. 
B.  757,  170  Ga.  666— Bryant  v. 
Freeman,  16  S.E.2d  113,  65  Ga, 
App.  -590 — James  v.  Roberts,  191  S. 
E.  301,  55  Ga.App.  755 — Minter  v. 
Felder,  190  S.E.  273,  55  Ga.App. 
785.' 

Judgments  held  not  dormant 
Ga. — Pope  v.  XJ.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guar- 
anty Co.,  35  S.E.2d  899— Page  v. 
Jones,  198  S.E.  63,  186  Ga.  485 — 
Franklin  v.  Mobley,  for  Use  of 
Patrick,  App.,  36  S.B.2d  173. 

38.  Ga.— Eagle  &  Phenix  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Bradford,  59  Ga.  385. 

39.  Ga. — prendergast  v.  Wiseman,  7 
S.E.  228,  80  Ga.  419. 

34  C.J.  p  658  note  91. 


§  532 


JUDGMENTS 


49     C.J.S. 


and  return  the  execution.40  Where  the  entries  are 
regularly  made  they  are  sufficient  to  prevent  the 
judgment  from  becoming  dormant  although  the 
execution  is  voidable  but  not  void,41  or  although 
the  writ  is  afterward  quashed42  or  levied  on  prop- 
erty not  then  owned  by  defendant,4  3  or  although  the 
levy  is  dismissed  by  the  court.44  The  time  when 
the  record  on  the  execution  docket  was  made  by  the 
clerk  must  appear  from  an  inspection  of  such  dock- 


If  there  is  no  compliance  with  the  statute  as 
to  recording  entries  on  the  execution  dockets,  the 
recordation  of  facts  on  the  public  dockets  of  the 
courts,  showing  a  bona  fide  public  effort  to  collect 
the  debt,  may  prevent  the  judgment  from  becom- 
ing dormant.46 

e.  Acknowledgment  or  Agreement  between  Par- 
ties 

The  running  of  a  dormancy  statute  may  be  arrested 
by  an  acknowledgment  of  the  Judgment  and  promise 
to  pay  it,  or  by  an  agreement  of  the  parties  as  to  the 
issuance  of  execution. 


The  running  of  a  dormancy  statute  against  a. 
judgment  may  be  arrested  by  an  acknowledgment 
of  the  judgment  and  a  promise  to  pay  it,  or  by  aa 
agreement  of  the  parties  as  to  the  issuance  of  exe- 
cution.47 In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  con- 
trary,  however,  a  mere  partial  payment48  or  a  pay- 
ment of  the  costs  of  the  action  to  the  clerk49  will 
not  prevent  the  statute  from  running.  An  agree- 
ment to  stay  execution  on  a  final  judgment  does  not 
prevent  the  judgment  from  becoming  dormant  if 
execution  is  not  issued  within  the  statutory  peri- 
od.™ 

f  .  Death  of  Party  or  Assignee 

Usually  a  Judgment  -becomes  dormant  on  the  death- 
of  a  party,  although  the  death  of  an  assignee  or  of  a 
party  acting  In  a  representative  capacity  does  not  have- 
this  effect. 

Usually  a  judgment  becomes  dormant  on  the 
death  of  a  party  thereto,61  so  that  ordinarily  the 
death  of  a  judgment  creditor  will  have  this  effect,52" 
even  though  the  deceased  creditor  is  one  of  two  or 


40.  Ga. — Oliver  *  v.    James,     62    S.E. 
73,  131  Ga.  182. 

34  C.J.  p  658  note  92. 

41.  Ga,— Smith  v.   Rust,   5    S.E.   250, 
T9  Ga,  519. 

42.  Ga, — Westbrook   v.   Hays,    14    S. 
B.  879,  89  Ga.  101. 

43.  Ga.— Long  v,  •Wight,   9  S.E.  535, 
82  Ga.  431. 

44.  Ga.— Banks    v.    Zellner,    3     S.E. 
304,  77  Ga,  424. 

45.  Ga.— Oliver  v.  James,  62  S.E.  73, 
131  Ga.  182. 

46.  Ga, — Ryals    v.    "Widencamp,    190 
S.E.     353,     184     Ga.     190— Citizens' 
Bank  of   Plains    v.    Hagerson,    140 
S.E.  48,  37  Ga.App.  282. 

An  unrecorded  levy  and  sale  do  not 
prevent  the  dormant  judgment  act 
from  running,  although  the  funds 
arising  from  the  sale  were  retained 
by  the  sheriff  on  another  execution 
against  the  same  party  and  paid 
over  to  the  holder  of  the  other  exe- 
cution, if  the  funds  were  not  so 
applied  by  an  order  of  the  court 
appearing  on  its  public  dockets. — 
Citizens'  Bank  of  Plains  v.  Hager- 
son,  supra. 
Effort  to  enforce  execution 

(1)  If  there  is  a  bona  fide  effort  to 
enforce  execution  made  within  the 
statutory  time,  the  judgment  does 
not  become  dormant,  although  such 
enforcement  is  prevented  by  court 
proceedings. — Pie  v.  Hardin,  195  S.E. 
165, '  185  Ga.  331 — Ryals  v.  Widen- 
camp,  190  S.E.  353,  184  Ga.  190 — 
Towers  v.  City  Land  Co.,  121  S.E. 
701,  31  Ga.App.  612. 

<2)  If  the  legality  of  a  levy  of 
execution  is  duly  contested  and 


no  action  in  opposition  to  such  con- 
test is  taken  until  the  statutory  pe- 
riod expires,  there  is  no  such  bona 
fide  public  effort  to  enforce  collec- 
tion in  the  court,  so  as  to  toll  the 
statute  and  prevent  dormancy. — A.  B. 
Farquhar  Co.  v.  Myers,  21  S.E.2d 
432,  194  Ga.  220. 

(3)  A  con  test -of  the  legality  of  a 
levy  of  execution  as  against  one  par- 
ty does  not  prevent  the  dormancy  of 
the  judgment  as  against   those  who 
are  not  parties  to  the  contest,  even 
though  the  pendency  of  the  contest 
may  keep  the  judgment  from  becom- 
ing dormant  as  against  the  "contest- 
ing party. — Rogers  v.  Jordan,  132  S. 
E.  233,  35  Ga.App.  131. 

(4)  The    filing   of  an    equity   suit 
in  aid  of  execution  does  not  prevent 
the  statute  from  running  where  the 
suit    is    abandoned    pursuant    to    a 
compromise  agreement,  since  the  rule 
that  statutes  of  limitations  will  not 
be  suspended  by  the  commencement 
of  a  suit   that  is   voluntarily  aban- 
doned,    discontinued,     dismissed,     or 
not  proceeded  with  for  a  considera- 
ble period  of  time,  is  applicable  to 
such  statute. — General  Discount  Cor- 
poration v.   Chunn,   3    S.E.2d   65,   188 
Ga.  128. 

The  payment  of  costs  and  the  is- 
suance of  execution  to  the*  levying 
officer  after  the  rendition  of  judg- 
ment, in  the  absence  of  anything  fur- 
ther, are  not  bona  fide  public  efforts 
to  enforce  execution  so  as  to  prevent 
the  judgment  from  becoming  dor- 
mant.— U-Driv-It  System  of  Macon 
v.  Lyles,  30  S.E.2d  111,  71  Ga,App.  70, 
followed  in  30  S.E.2d  114,  71  Ga. 
App.  74. 

988 


47.  U.S. — Beadles    v.    Smyser,    Okl.» 
28  S.Ct.  522,  209  U.S.  393,  52  L.Ed. 
849. 

34  C.J.  p  $58  note  96. 
Amicable    scire    facias    see    infra    §> 
548. 

48.  Ga.— Blue  v.  Collins,  34  S.E.  598,, 
109  Ga,  341. 

34  C.J.  p  658  note  97,  p  624  note  83. 

49.  Ga,— Lewis  v.  Smith,  27  S.E.  162, 
99  Ga,  603. 

50.  Tex. — Commerce     Farm     Credit 
Co.  v.  Ramp,  Civ.App.,  116  S.W.23 
1144,  afilrmed  Commerce  Trust  Co- 
v.  Ramp,  138  S.W.2d  531,  135  Tex. 
84. 

Season,  for  role 

An  agreement'  to  stay  "execution  on 
a  final  judgment  for  a-  specified  time 
constitutes  an  agreement  to  forego- 
such  portion  of  the  statutory  period 
within  which  execution  may  issue. — 
Commerce  Farm  Credit  Co.  v.  Ramp, 
Civ. App.,  116  S.W.2d  1144,  affirmed 
Commerce  Trust  Co.  v.  Ramp,  138  S. 
W.2d  531,  135  Tex.  84. 

51.  Kan. — Manley   v.    Mayer,    75    P. 
550,  68  Kan.  377— Ballinger  v.  Red- 
head, 40  P.  828,  1  Kan.App.  434. 

Okl.— Jersak  v.  Risen,  152  P.2d  374, 
194  Okl.  423. 

Death  of  party  as  suspending  judg- 
ment see  supra  §  531. 

Survival  of  judgment  see  infra  § 
534  a. 

52.  Kan.— Johnsson  v.  Erickson,  196 
P.    435,   108    Kan.    580 — Gilmore   v. 
Harpster,   133  P.  726,   90  Kan.  405 
— Updegraff   v.    Lucas,    93    P.    630, 
76    Kan.    466— Newhouse    v.    Heil- 
brun,    86   P.   145,    74   Kan.   282,    10 
AnruCas.  955. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  534 


more  judgment  creditors  under  a  joint  judgment.53 
However,  a  judgment  obtained  by  a  party  acting  in 
a  representative  capacity  does  not  become  dormant 
on  his  death.54  Moreover,  judgments  may  be  pre- 
vented from  becoming  dormant  by  the  issuance  of 
executions  at  the  instance  of  one  having  an  interest 
in  them  as  assignee,  even  though  a  judgment  credi- 
tor dies.55  Also  a  judgment  debtor's  death  will 


usually  render  the  judgment  dormant,66  and,  al- 
though it  has  been  held  that  where  a  judgment  debt- 
or, under  a  joint  and  several  judgment,  dies  such 
judgment  is  not  ipso  facto  dormant,57  it  has  been 
held  that  such  judgment  does  become  dormant  on 
the  death  of  such  debtor.58 

Death  of  assignee.    An  assigned  judgment  will 
not  become  dormant  on  the  death  of  the  assignee.5^ 


B.  REVIVAL  OP  JUDGMENTS 


§  533.     Necessity 

When  a  judgment  has  become  dormant,  it  cannot  be 
enforced7  until  it  has  been  duly  revived. 

When  a  judgment  has  once  become  dormant,  it 
cannot  be  enforced  until  it  has  been  duly  revived,  as 
provided  by  the  statute.60  Generally  speaking,  the 
necessity  for  reviving  a  judgment  arises  only  where 
the  judgment  creditor  seeks  to  extend  the  lien  of 
the  judgment61  or  to  issue  execution  thereon.62  As 
discussed  infra  §  849,  the  fact  that  a  judgment  has 
not  been  revived,  and  so  has  become  dormant,  does 
not  prevent  the  maintenance  of  an  action  on  it 
where  plaintiff  does  not  seek  to  maintain  its  lien, 


and  is  no  obstacle  to  writ  of  inquiry68  or  to  an 
amendment  of  the  judgment  nunc  pro  tune.64 

A  judgment  which  is  not  dormant  needs  no  reviv- 
al.65 Accordingly  a  revival  is  unnecessary  as  long 
as  a  judgment  is  kept  from  becoming  dormant  by 
the  timely  issuance  of  executions,  as  discussed  su- 
pra §  532,  and  there  has  been  no  change  of  par- 
ties,66 and  the  right  to  enforce  the. executions  is  en- 
tirely unobstructed.67 

§  534.    Death  of  Party 

a.  Survival  of  judgment 

b.  Revival  of  judgment 


53.  Okl.— Drew  v.  Thurlwell,  48  P. 
2d   106G,    173   Okl.   405,   100   A«L.R. 
806— Jones    v.    Nye,    156    P.    332, 
56  Okl.  578. 

54.  Okl.— Perry    v.    Lebel,    76    P.2d 
261,  182  Okl.  128. 

Action,  for  wrongful  death. 
•  A  judgment  obtained  by  deceased's 
administratrix  in  favor  of  the  estate 
in  an  action  for  wrongful  death  does 
not  become  dormant  on  death  of  the 
administratrix. — Perry  v.  Lebel,  su- 
pra. 

55.  Kan. — Thorp  v.  Langford,  222  P. 
135,  115  Kan.  135. 

56.  Tenn. — Anderson  v.  Stribling,  15 
Tenn.App.  267. 

57.  Okl.— Tucker  v.  Gautier,  164  P. 
2d  613. 

58.  Kan. — Masheter  v.  'Lanning,  100 
P.2d  682,  151  Kan.  604. 

,59.    Okl.— Sanditen   v.   Williams,    49 

P.2d  224,  173  Okl.  330. 
60.    U.S.— Atlantic      Trust     Co.     v. 

Dana,  C.C. A.Kan.,  128  F.  209. 
Ala.— Second  Nat.  Bank  v.  Allgood, 

176  So.  363,  234  Ala.  654. 
Ga. — U-Driv-It  System  of  Macon  v. 

Lyles,    30    S.E.2d   111,   71   Ga.App. 

70,   followed  in   30   S.E.2d  114,   71 

Ga.App.  74. 
Kan. — First  Nat  Bank  of  Norton  v. 

Harper,    169    P.2d    844,    161    Kan. 

536. 

Pa.— Union    Nat.     Bank    of    Jersey 
'Shore  v.   Budd,  33  PaJMst.  &  Co. 

140. 
Tex. — Commerce  Farm  Credit  Co.  v. 

Ramp,   Civ.App.f   116   S.W.2d  1144, 


affirmed    Commerce    Trust    Co.    v. 

Ramp,    138    S.W.2d    531,    135    Tex. 

84. 
34  C.JT.  p  655  note  58  [a]  (1),  p  658 

notes  3  [b],  4  [b]  (c),  6. 

Writ  of  attachment  sur  judgment 
not  being  a  writ  of  execution  was 
not  within  statute  authorizing  exe- 
cutions on  judgments' for  selling  per- 
sonalty within  five  years  from  entry 
of  Judgment  without  reviving  it. — 
Croskey  v.  Crosk«y,  160  A.  103,  306 
Pa.  423. 

61.  Ga,— Fowler  v.  Bank  of  Ameri- 
cus,   40  S.B.  248,   114  Ga.   417. 

Pa, — Sanner  v.  Unique  Lodge  No.  3, 
Knights  of  Pythias  of  Rockwood, 
37  A.2d  576,  349  Pa.  523— Second 
Nat.  Bank  of  Altoona,  for  Use  of 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Philadel- 
phia v.  Faber,  2  A.2d  747,  332  Pa. 
124. 

Duration  of  lien  see  supra  §§  489- 
498. 

62.  Ala. — Second  Nat  Bank  v.  All- 
good,   176   So.   363,   234  Ala,   654. 

Ga, — Palm«r  v.   Imnan,   55   S.B.   229, 

126  Ga.  519. 
Okl. — Shefts  v.  Oklahoma  Co.,  137  P. 

2d  589,  192  Okl.  483. 
Issuance    of    execution    on    dormant 

Judgments  see  Executions  §  7. 
Bevival  on  judgment  debtor's  impris- 
onment 

Where  a  judgment  debtor  was  con- 
victed of  murder  and  confined  in  the 
penitentiary,  the  conviction  deprived 
him  of  all  civil  rights,  and,  before 
an  execution  could  be  issued  thereon, 

989 


the  judgment  would  have  to  be  re- 
vived.— Ashmore    v.    McDonnell,    16 
P.    687,   reheard  18   P.   821,   39  Kan. 
669. 
63.    Pa, — Cookson  v.  Turner,  8  BInn. 

416. 
34  C.J.  p  659  note  10. 

.    Ala.— Allen  v.  Bradford,   3  Ala. 

281,  37  Am.D.  689. 
Ga.— Williams    v.    Merritt,    !34    S.E. 

1013,  109  Ga,  217. 

65.  La,— State  ex  rel.  Brock  v.  Clan- 
cy,  152   So.  331,   178  La.   687,  cer- 
tiorari  denied  Brock  v.  Wainer,  54 
S.Ct.    773,    292    U.S.    640,    78    LJBd. 
1492 — Hassler  v.  Brinker,  App.,  142 
So.  730. 

Mo.— Kelly  v.   City  of   Cape   Girar- 

deau,    89   S.W.2d  693,   230   Mo.App. 

137. 
Okl.— Sanditen  v.  Williams,  49  P.2d 

224,  173  Okl.  330. 
34  C.J.  p  658  note  2. 
Judgment  in  petttory  action 

Under  statute  providing  that  all 
Judgments  for  money  shall  be  pre- 
scribed within  ten  years  from  their 
rendition,  but  that  any  person  in- 
terested may  have  them  revived  be- 
fore they  are  prescribed,  a  Judgment 
in  a  petitory  action  recognizing  and 
confirming  title  to  land  need  not  be 
revived  and  reinscribed. — Roussel  v. 
New  Orleans  Ry.  &  Light  Co.,  93  So. 
758,  152  La.  517.  * 

66.  Miss,— Locke  v.  Brady,  30 
21. 

34  C.J.  p  659  note  13, 

67.  Miss. — Locke  v.  Brady,  supra. 


§  534 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


a.  Survival  of  Judgment 

Generally  a  judgment  does  not  abate  on  the  death 
of  a  party  but  survives  in  favor  of  or  against  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  deceased. 

While  it  has  been  said  that  at  common  law  a 
judgment  does  not  survive  a  defendant  against 
whom  it  is  rendered,68  it  is  the  general  rule,  some- 
times by  virtue  of  express  statutory  provision,  that 
a  judgment  does  not  abate  on  the  death  of  a  party 
and  that  such  judgment  survives  in  favor  of  or 
against  the  representatives  of  the  deceased.69  In 
the  absence  of  a  provision  therein  to  the  contrary,  a 
statute  providing  for  survival  of  a  judgment  after 
death  of  a  party  applies  to  all  judgments  without  re- 
gard to  the  character  of  the  action  on  which  they 
are  founded.70 

b,  Revival  of  Judgment 

Revival  of  a  judgment  is  necessary  where  It  be- 
comes dormant  as  a  result  of  death  of  a  party,  but  re- 
vival is  not  required  If  the  judgment  does  not  become 
dormant. 

Ordinarily,  where  a  judgment  does  not  become 
dormant  on  the  death  of  a  party,  no  revivor  thereof 
is  necessary  to  render  it  enforceable.71  On  the  oth- 
er hand,  if  the  judgment  becomes  dormant  by  rea- 
son of  death  of  one  of  the  parties,  it  must  be  re- 
vived within  the  time  prescribed  in  the  revivor  stat- 
utes,72 and  it  has  been  held  that  a  dormant  judg- 
ment, which  is  not  revived  or  renewed  pursuant  to 
statute,  dies,73  although  it  has  also  been  held  that 
the  statutory  method  of  revivor  is  not  indispensable 
and  that  the  judgment  may  be  renewed  by  an  ac- 


tion to  recover  a  second  judgment  thereon  com- 
menced within  the  time  in  which  revivor  may  be 
had.74 

Without  reference  to  whether  or  not  a  judg- 
ment becomes  dormant,  it  has  been  held  under  some 
statutes  that  the  death  of  plaintiff  after  affirmance 
of  judgment  on  appeal  does  not  make  revival  neces- 
sary.75 A  judgment  that  has  been  revived  against 
the  personal  representative  of  a  deceased  defendant 
need  not  again  be  revived  on  the  death  of  such  rep- 
resentative.76 It  has  also  been  held  that,  where 
the  judgment  debtor  dies  during  pendency  of  a  suit 
to  enforce  the  judgment,  it  is  unnecessary  to  revive 
the  judgment  against  the  heirs  or  personal  repre- 
sentatives of  deceased  in  order  to  prosecute  the 
suit.77  While  it  is  the  rule,  apart  from  statute,  that 
execution  may  not  issue  after  the  death  of  a  party 
to  the  judgment  without  first  reviving  the  judgment, 
as  discussed  in  Executions  §  65,  the  lien  of  a  judg- 
ment continues  after  the  death  of  the  judgment 
debtor,  as  discussed  infra  §  491,  and  may  be  en- 
forced in  equity  without  revival  of  the  judgment,  as 
considered  supra  §  511. 

Joint  parties.  The  interest  and  rights  of  joint 
plaintiffs  are  joint  and  not  several,  and  on  the  death 
of  one  the  judgment  becomes  dormant  and  cannot 
be  enforced  at  the  instance  of  the  living  plaintiff  or 
plaintiffs  without  a  revival  of  the  judgment.78 
Where,  however,  a  judgment  is  obtained  against 
joint  debtors,  and  one  of  such  debtors  dies,  it  is  un- 
necessary for  the  judgment  creditor  to  revive  the 
judgment  in  order  to  enforce  it  against  the  remain- 


«8.  Tenn. — Pickens  v.  Scarbrough,  46 
S.W.2d  58,  164  Tenn.  75. 

Effect  of  death  of  party  on  cause  of 
action  after  final  -Judgment  and 
pending  appeal  or  other  proceeding 
for  review  see  Abatement  and  Re- 
vival §§  127,  128. 

€9.    Colo. — Ahearn  v.   Goble,   7   P.2d 

409,  90  Colo.  173. 
Mo. — Lyon  v.   Lyon,   12   S.W.Sd   768, 

223  Mo.App.  452. 
Tenn. — Anderson     v.     Stribling,     15 

Tenn.App.  267. 
1  C.J.  p  169  note  65. 

3>eath  pending  appeal 

La. — Castelluccio  v.  Cloverland  Dairy 

Products  Co.,  115  So.  796,  165  La. 

606,    conformed   to    8    La.  App.    723 

— -Williams  v.  Campbell,  App.,  185 

So.  683. 
Tex. — Wootton  v.  Jones,  Civ. App.,  286 

S.W.  680. 

Heath  after  affirmance 
Mo.— Vitale    v.    Duerbecfc,    92    S.W. 

2d  691,  338  Mo.  556. 

70.  Tenn. — Pickens  v.  Scarbrough, 
46  S.W.2d  58,  164  Tenn.  75. 


71.  Okl.— Tucker  v.  Gautier,  164  P, 
2d  613. 

Death  of  party  as  rendering  judg- 
ment dormant  see  supra  §  532  f. 

Judgment  obtained  by  personal  rep- 
resentative 

Judgment  obtained  by  deceased's 
administratrix  in  favor  of  the  es- 
tate did  not  become  dormant  on 
death  of  administratrix:  and  did  not 
have  to  be  revived. — Perry  v.  Lebel, 
76  P.2d  561,  181  Okl.  128.  . 

72.  Kan. — Masheter  v.  Lanning,  100 
P.2d  682,  151  Kan.  604. 

Okl.— Jersak  v.  Risen,  152  P.2d  374, 
194  Okl.  423— Drew  v.  Thurlwell, 
48  P.2d  1066,  73  Okl.  405,  100  A.L. 
R.  806— Jones  v*  Nye,  156  P.  332, 
56  Okl.  578. 

Death  of  a  party  as  ground  for  re- 
vival see  infra  §  536. 

Pending  appeal 

Where  Judgment  is  recovered  in 
the  lower  -court  and,  pending  appeal, 
plaintiff  dies,  although  the  judg- 
ment does  not  abate  it  must  be  re- 
vived within  the  time  prescribed  by 
statute,  and  unless  revived  the  Judg- 

'990 


ment  dies.  If  the  statutory  period 
for  revival  of  a  judgment  expires, 
the  appeal  will  be  dismissed.— Atch- 
ison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fenton,  153 
P.  1130,  54  Okl.  240. 

73.  Kan. — Masheter  v.  Lanning,  100 
P.2d  682,  151  Kan.  604. 

Okl.— Drew  v.  Thurlwell,  48  P.2d 
1066,  73  Okl.  405,  100  A.L.R.  806 
— Jones  v.  Nye,  156  P.  332,  56  Okl. 
'578. 

74.  Okl.— Drew  v.   Thurlwell,   48   P. 
2d   1066,    173   Okl.   405,    100    A.L.R. 
806 — Phillips   v.   Western   Electric 
Co.,  236  P.  425,  108  Okl.  274— Jones 
v.  Nye,   156  P.   332,   56  Okl.   578. 

75.  Mo.— Vitale   v.    Duerbeck,    92    S. 
W.2d  691,  338  Mo.  556. 

76.  Kan. — Postlethwaite    v.     Bdson, 
187  P.  688,  106  Kan.  354. 

77.  Tenn. — Anderson  v.  Stribling,  15 
Tenn. App.  267. 

78.  Okl. — Drew  v.   Thurlwell,   48   P. 
2d  1066,    173   Okl.'  405,    100   A.L.R. 
806. 

34  C.J.  p  660  note  62  [b]. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


537 


ing  defendant  or  defendants,  since  the  liability  is 
both  joint  and  several.79 

§  535.     Right  to  Revive 

In   the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise,  a 
dormant  judgment  may  be  revived  as  a  matter  of  right. 

Since,  as  discussed  supra  §  532,  a  dormant  judg- 
ment is  a  valid  obligation  of  the  judgment  debtor, 
ordinarily  it  may  be  revived  in  a  proper  case,80  at 
least  under  statutes  expressly  providing  therefor.81 
In  the  absence  of  statutory  inhibition,  a  dormant 
judgment  may  be  renewed  as  a  matter  of  right82 
by  appropriate  proceedings,  such  as  scire  facias, 
as  discussed  infra  §  548,  or  suit,  as  considered  infra 
§§  849-887.  However,  the  revival  of  a  judgment  so 
as  to  prolong  its  life  is  sometimes  expressly  pro- 
hibited by  statute.83 

§  536.    Grounds  for  Revival 

The  general  ground  for  revival  of  a  Judgment  is  that 
it  has  become  dormant  without  being  satisfied. 

The  general  ground  for  revival  of  a  judgment  is 
that  it  has  become  dormant  without  being  satisfied.84 
It  is  sufficient  ground  for  proceedings  to  revive  a 
judgment  that  there  has  been  a  change  of  parties  by 
death,  as  discussed  supra  §  534,  that  the  lien  of  the 
judgment  has  expired  or  is  about  to  expire,85  that 


an  execution  issued  and  levied  under  the  judgment 
failed  to  produce  satisfaction  because  the  proper- 
ty seized  did  not  belong  to  the  judgment  debtor,  or 
was  not  subject  to  execution,  or  because  the  exe- 
cution purchaser  failed  to  get  possession,86  or  that 
the  judgment  debtor  has  wrongfully  caused  the  exe- 
cution to  be  returned  satisfied.87 


§  537. 


Who  May  Revive 


Proceedings  for  revival  of  a  Judgment  ordinarily 
should  be  brought  in  the  name  of  the  plaintiff  in  the 
original  Judgment,  although  an  assignee  may  aue  in  hi* 
own  name  if  the  statute  so  permits. 

Proceedings  to  revive  a  judgment  ordinarily 
should  be  brought  in  the  name  of  plaintiff  in  the 
original  judgment88  or  in  the  name  of  the  person 
for  whose  use  the  judgment  was  entered,8^  although 
even  in  the  latter  case  it  has  been  held  that  the  pro- 
ceedings must  be  in  the  name  of  the  nominal  plain- 
tiff.90 If  the  revival  is  in  the  name  of  a  nominal 
plaintiff,  the  usee  may  be  deemed  the  real  plaintiff 
and  treated  as  such.91 

It  has  been  held  that  the  owner  of  a  judgment  has 
the  right  to  invoke  the  process  of  revivor.92  Pro- 
ceedings for  revival  may  also  be  maintained  by  sure- 
ties, or  a  joint  defendant,  on  paying  the  judgment 
debt,93  by  the  original  plaintiffs  trustee  in  bank- 


79.  Okl.— Harber  v.    McKeown,    169 
P.2d  759. 

34  C.J.  p  660  note  62. 

Revival  against  Joint  defendants  see 

infra  §  538. 
Proceeding1  against  estate 

Actions,  instituted  within  statutory 
time,  against  deceased  judgment 
debtors'  estates  on  rejected  claims, 
filed  with  administrators  within  time 
given  by  notice,  for  amount  of  joint 
and  several  judgment  for  money 
only,  were  proper  and  not  subjact  to 
dismissal  on  ground  that  one  Judg- 
ment debtor's  death  rendered  judg- 
ment dormant  and  that  failure  to 
revive  it  within  year  thereafter  ex- 
tinguished judgment  and  lien  thereof. 
—Tucker  v.  Gautier,  Okl.,  164  P.2d 
613. 

80.  Okl, — Aaron  v.  Morrow,  50  P.2d 
674,  174  Okl.  452. 

34  C.J.  p  658  note  5. 

81.  Okl.— -Aaron  v.  Morrow,  supra. 
Tex.— White  v.  Stewart,  Civ.App.,  19 

S.W.2d    795,   error   refused. 

82.  Ga.— Hagins   v.   Blitch,    65    S.E. 
1082,  6  Ga.App.  839. 

83.  Iowa.— Equitable   Life    Ins.    Co. 
of  Iowa  v.  Condon,  10  N.W.2d  78, 
233  Iowa  567. 

Time  of  operation  of  statute 

(1)  Such  a  statute  has  been  held 
not  to  apply  to  a  judgment  on  a 
contract  made  before  its  enactment. 


—Kelleher  v.  Wells,  151  P.  823,  87 
Wash.  323 — 34  C.J.  p  659  note  21. 
(2)  This  rule  applies  even  though 
the  judgment  is  not  rendered  until 
after  the  passage  of  the  statute. — 
Foley  v.  Kelleher  158  P.  982,  92 
Wash.  314— Fischer  v.  Kittinger,  81 
P.  551,  39  Wash.  174. 

84.  Okl. — Aaron  v.  Morrow,  50  P.2d 
674,  174  Okl.  452. 

Tex.— White  v.  Stewart,  Civ.App.,  19 
S.W.2d  795,  error  refused. 

85.  Tex. — Masterson    v.    Cundiff,    58 
Tex,  472— De  Witt  v.  Jones,  17  Tex. 
620. 

86.  Cal.— Thompson  v.  Cook,  143  P. 
2d  107,   61  Cal.App.2d  485. 

34  C.J.  p  659  note  30. 

87.  Mich.— McRoberts    v.    Lyon,    44 
NVW.  160,  79  Mich.  25. 

3.    Ala. — Casey  v.  Co'oledge,  175  So. 

557,  234  Ala.  499. 
34  C.J.  p  659  notes  35,  36,  p  660  notes 

42,  43. 
Parties  plaintiff  in  particular  actions 

or  proceedings   see  infra   §§    543- 

548. 
Defunct  corporate  plaintiff 

A  special  statutory  proceeding  to 
revive  a  dormant  judgment  could  be 
maintained  in  the  name  of  the  orig- 
inal plaintiff,  notwithstanding  corpo- 
rate functions  of  such  plaintiff  had 
meantime  lapsed,  because  revivor  of 
judgment  in  name  of  defunct  corpo- 

991 


ration  would  not  prejudice  judgment 
debtor.— Foster  Screen  Co.  v.  Brigel, 
Ohio  App.,  31  N.E.2d  699. 

TTnited  States  having  recovered 
judgment  against  lessees  of  public 
Land  under  lease  for  benefit  of  irri- 
gation district  was  proper  party  to 
sue  for  renewal  of  judgment,  espe- 
cially where  there  was  no  allegation 
that  there  were  any  net  profits  for 
distribution  to  water  users. — Schodde- 
V.  U.  S.,  aC.A.Idaho,  69  F.2d  866. 

Md.— Clark  v.  Digges,  5  Gill  109. 
34  C.J.  p  659  note  34. 

90.  Me.— Calais  v.  Bradford  51  Me. 
414. 

34  C.J.  p  659  note  35. 

91.  Mo.— Seattle  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gerardt. 
214  S.W.  189. 

34  C.J.  P  659  note  36. 

92.  Kan.— Rodgers  v.  Smith,  58  P.2d 
1092,  144  Kan.  212. 

Ownership  established 

Administrator  who  was  also  parent 
and  trustee  of  residuary  legatees  had' 
sufficient  ownership  of  judgment  re- 
covered by  administrators  to  insti- 
tute revivor  proceeding  after  his 
discharge  as  administrator,  where* 
all  other  interested  parties  assigned 
their  interests  to  him.— Rodgers  v. 
Smith,  supra. 

93.  111. — Bogden  v.  Milauckas,  40  N. 
B.2d  91,  313  IlLApp.  311. 

34  C.J.  P  659  note  87. 


§  537 


JUDGMENTS 


O.J.S. 


ruptcy,94  or  by  the  personal  representatives,95  heirs, 
or  devisees96  of  a  deceased  judgment  creditor. 

In  some  states  a  judgment  in  favor  of  personal 
representatives  may  be  revived  by  their  successors 
in  office.97  A  proceeding  to  revive  a  judgment  en- 
tered in  favor  of  a  partnership  should,  after  the 
death  of  one  partner,  be  brought  in  the  name  of  the 
surviving  partner  alone.98  Where  the  judgment 
was  obtained  by  a  surviving  partner  as  such,  he 
alone  may  revive  it.99  A  married  woman  may  re- 
vive a  judgment  against  her  husband  which  was  en- 
tered in  her  favor  before  they  were  married.1 

Assignees.  While  equitable  title  alone  may  not 
permit  an  assignee  to  procure  the  revival  of  a  judg- 
ment,2 the  subsequent  acquisition  of  legal  title  may 
give  him  such  right,3  but  in  case  of  partial  assign- 
ment of  a  judgment  the  assignee  may  not  obtain  a 
separate  process  to  revive  the  part  assigned.4 
As  a  general  rule,  proceedings  to  revive  a  judg- 
ment which  has  been  assigned  must  be  brought 
in  the  name  of  the  original  plaintiff,5  except  where 
a  statute  provides  otherwise,6  as  where  the  statute 
authorizes  such  proceedings  to  be  maintained  in  the 
name  of  the  real  party  in  interest,?  in  which  case 
it  may  be  revived  in  the  name  of  the  original  cred- 
itor if  living8  or  in  the  name  of  the  assignee.9 
Even  though  a  statute  provides  that  the  revival 
should  be  in  the  name  of  the  original  plaintiff  suing 


for  the  use  of  the  assignee,  a  judgment  obtained  by 
revival  in  the  name  of  the  assignee  will  not  be  treat- 
ed as  void  where  the  court  rendering  it  has  juris- 
diction.^ It  has  been  held,  independently  of  statu- 
tory authorization,  that  proceedings  to  revive  a 
judgment  may  be  maintained  in  the  name  of  the  as- 
signee of  a  judgment  creditor  where  such  creditor 
has  gone  out  of  business.11 

§  538,    Against  Whom  Revival  May  Be 

Had 

a.  In  general 

b.  Joint  defendants 

a.  In  General 

AH  parties  to  the  original  Judgment  must  be  made 
parties  to  a  proceeding  to  revive  It,  and,  If  the  original 
judgment  debtor  Is  dead,  the  representatives  whose  prop- 
erty rights  will  be  affected  must  be  joined. 

All  parties  to  the  original  judgment  must  be  made 
parties  to  a  proceeding  to  revive  it,12  and,  in  par- 
ticular, the  original  judgment  debtor,  if  living,  must 
be  made  a  defendant13  Under  statute,  it  has  been 
held  that  a  dormant  judgment  may  be  revived 
against  a  defunct  corporate  defendant.14  A  judg- 
ment debtor  who  has  paid  a  judgment  may  not  re- 
vive it  against  a  mortgagee  or  judgment  creditor 
who  had  a  lien  at  the  time  of  payment,  or  prior  to 
the  act  by  which  it  is  sought  to  affect  the  lien.15 


34.    U.S. — Brown  v.  Wygant,  App.D. 

C.,   16   S.Ct   1159,   163  U.S.   618,  41 

L.Ed.  284. 
Ala. — Casey  v.  Cooledge,  175  So.  557, 

234  Ala.  499. 

93.    Ala.— Casey  v.  Cooledge,  supra. 
Kan. — JSourman  v.   Bourman,   127  P. 

2d  464,  155  Kan.  602. 
OkL-r-Jersafc  v.  Risen,  152  P.2d  374, 

194  Okl.  423. 
34  C.J.  p  659  notes  39,  40. 

96.  U.S.— Fordson  Coal  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son, C.C.A.Ky..   2   F.2d  466. 

"Successor" 

Statute  authorizing  the  revival  of 
a  judgment  by  the  "successor*'  of  a 
deceased  plaintiff  applies  only  to  the 
enforcement  of  the  Judgment  for  the 
direct  benefit  of  the  estate  of  the  de- 
cedent or  his  devisees. — Fordson  Coal 
Co.  v.  Jackson,  supra. 

97.  Miss. — Brown     v.     Bonner,     45 
Miss.  10. 

24  C.J.  P  896  note  78. 

98.  111. — Linn  v.   Downing,   74   N.B. 
729,  216  111.  64. 

34  C.J.  p  660  note  41. 

99.  Miss. — Copes   v.    Fultz,    9    Miss. 
623. 

3*    Pa.— Kincade  v.  Cunningham,  12 
A.  410,  118  Pa.  501. 

2.    HI.— Central  Illinois  Co.  v.  Swan- 
son,  8  N.E.2d  371,  290  ULApp.  165. 


3.  111.— Central  Illinois  Co.  v.  Swan- 
son,  supra. 

Rights  of  parties  under  assignment 
of  Judgment  see  supra  §§  521,  522. 

4.  Pa.— Hopkins  v.  Stockdale,  11  A. 
368,   117   Pa.    365— Appeal   of  Die- 
trich, 107  Pa.  174. 

5.  Ala. — My  rick  v.  Womack,  120  So. 
300,  23  Ala.App.  32. 

Fla.— McCallum   v.    Gornto,    174    So. 

24,  127  Fla.  792. 
34  C.J.  p  660  note  44. 

6.  Ala. — My  rick  v.  Womack,  120  So. 
300,  23  Ala.App.  32. 

34  C.J.  p  644  note  8. 
Indorsement  of  assignment 

(1)  Under    some    statutory    provi- 
sions, a  dormant  judgment  may  be 
revived  in  the  name  of  an  assignee 
when  assignment  is  in  writing,  not- 
withstanding assignment   is  not  in- 
dorsed   on    execution    docket    or   on 
margin  of  record   of  Judgment  and 
attested   by   clerk. — Gambill  v.  Cas- 
simus,  22  So.2d  909,  247  Ala.  176. 

(2)  Under  other  provisions,  an  as- 
signee may  not  revive  judgment  in 
his   name    where    he   has   failed    to 
comply  with  a  requirement  that,  on 
transfer   of  judgment,   the  transfer 
be  indorsed  on  the  execution  docket 
or  on  margin  of  the  record  of  the 
judgment  in  the  court  where  judg- 
ment was  rendered  or  in  the  office 

992 


of  the  probate  judge  where  a  certifi- 
cate of  the  judgment  was  recorded. — 
Myrick  v.  Womack,  120  So.  300,  23 
Ala.App.  32. 

7.  Ala. — Myrick  v.  Womack,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  660  note  46. 

8.  Neb.— -Vogt  v;   Binder,   107  N.W. 
383.  76  Neb.  361. 

34  C.J.  p  660  note  47. 

9.  Neb.— Moline  Milburn  &  Stoddart 
Co.  v.  Van  Boskirk,  111  N.W.  605, 
78  Neb.  728. 

34  C.J.  p  660  note  48. 

10.  Ga. — Chapman  v.  Taliaferro,   58 
S.E.  128,  1  Ga.App.  235. 

11.  Tex. — Mayhew    Lumber    Co.    v. 
Nash,  Civ.App.,  268  S.W.  1050. 

12.  Ga. — Funderburk    v.    Smith,    74 
Ga.  515. 

34  C.J.  p  660  note  51. 

Parties  defendant  in  particular  ac- 
tions or  proceedings  see  infra  §§ 
543-548. 

13.  Pa.— Righter  y,    Rittenhouse,    3 
Rawle  273. 

14.  Tex. — Simmons    v.    Zimmerman 
Land    &   Irrigation   Co.,    Civ.App., 
292  S,W.  973. 


15. 


N.J.—  Stout  v.  Vankirk,  10 
a.  78. 


N.J. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  538 


Terre-tenants  may  and  should  be  joined  as  defend- 
ants.16 

'  After  death  of  judgment  debtor.  As  a  general 
rule,  on  the  death  of  a  judgment  debtor,  the  judg- 
ment should  be  revived  against  the  representatives 
whose  property  rights  will  be  affected  by  revivor.1? 
If  the  revivor  would  affect  only  personal  property, 
the  proceedings  should  be  taken  against  the  de- 
ceased debtor's  personal  representatives,1*  but  if 
the  revivor  is  intended  to  affect  real  property  which 
passed,  on  the  death  of  the  judgment  debtor,  to  his 
heirs  or  devisees,  then  it  should  be  revived  against 
such  heirs  or  devisees,19  even  though  their  estate 
vested  after  the  lien  of  the  judgment  was  lost  or  in- 
terrupted.20 Where  the  judgment  is  ,to  affect,  or 
does  affect,  both  personalty  and  real  estate,  it  should 
be  revived  against  both  the  personal  representatives 
and  the  heirs.21  A  judgment  against  personal  rep- 
resentatives may  be  revived  against  their  successors 
in  office,22  but  a  judgment  against  an  executor  or 
administrator  cannot  be  revived  after  his  death 
against  his  own  personal  representative23  unless 


such  judgment  was  binding  on  him  in  his  individual 
capacity.24 

1).  Joint  Defendants 

A  judgment  may  be  revived  against  all  the  Judgment 
debtors  In  the  original  judgment;  but  there  is  a  con- 
flict of  opinion  as  to  whether  or  not  It  may  be  revived 
against  one  of  several  joint  debtors  without  joining  the 
others. 

A  judgment  creditor  is  entitled  to  revive  his  judg- 
ment against  all  the  judgment  debtors  in  the  orig- 
inal judgment  as  it  appears  of  record.25  According 
to  some  decisions,  where  the  judgment  was  recov- 
ered against  two  or  more  defendants  jointly,  pro- 
ceedings for  its  revival  must  be  against  them  all,  if 
living.26  However,  on  the  ground,  as  discussed  su- 
pra §  440,  that  a  judgment  against  joint  defendants 
is  the  joint  and  several  obligation  of  each  and  not 
merely  a  joint  obligation,  it  has  been  held  that  a 
judgment  may  be  revived  and  enforced  against  one 
of  several  judgment  debtors  without  bringing  in  or 
giving  any  attention  to  the  others.27  Under  either 
rule  where  one  defendant  pleads  such  matter  as 


16.  Ind.-- Hill  v.  Button,  47  Ind.  592. 
Pa. — Pursht  v.  Overdeer,  3  Watts  & 

S.  470. 

Wife  as  terro-tenant 

Where  wife's  property  is  acquired 
before  creditor  obtains  judgment 
against  husband,  then  wife  is  not 
"terre-tenant"  under  statute. — South 
Central  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Mi- 
lani,  150  A.  586,  300  Pa.  250. 

17.  Neb.— Dougherty  v.   White,   200 
N.W.  884,  112  Neb.  675,  36  A.L.R. 
425. 

34  C.J.  p  660  notes  53,  54. 
Ho  administrator  appointed 

Under  some  statutes,  a  judgment 
may  be  revived  against  administrator 
or  heirs  if  there  is  no  administra- 
tion.— Pickens  v.  Scarbrough,  46  S. 
W.2d  58,  164  Tenn.  75. 

18.  Neb. — Dougherty   v.   White,    200 
N.W.  884,  112  Neb.  675,  36  A.L.R. 
425. 

34  C.J.  p  660  note  53. 

Final  decree  for  maintenance  or 
alimony  could  be  revived  against  the 
representatives  of  deceased.— Angllm 
v.  Anglim,  299  N.W.  346,  140  Neb. 
133. 
Ho  revival  against  heirs 

Under  some  statutes,  a  judgment 
in  personam,  under  which  no  specific 
lien  on  real  estate  was  acquired 
during  the  lifetime  of  the  judgment 
debtor,  cannot  be  revived  and  en- 
forced against  the  heirs. — Miller  v. 
Taylor,  29  Ohio  St.  257-^Tones  v. 
Kampman,  15  Ohio  Oir.Ct.,N.S.,  395, 
34  Ohio  Cir.Ct  569. 

19.  Neb.— Dougherty   v.  White,    200 
49  C.  J.S.-63 


N.W.   884,  112  Neb.  675,  36  A.L.R. 
425. 
34  C.J.  p  660  note  54. 

20.  Del. — Raymond  v.  Farrell,  93  A. 
905,  28  Del.  394. 

21.  Neb. — Dougherty   v.   White,    200 
N.W.  884,  112  Neb.  675,  36  A.L.R. 
425. 

22.  Miss. — Brown     v.     Bonnerr     45 
Miss.  10. 

24  C.J.  p  896  note  78. 
Invalid  appointment 

Where  an  administrator  de  bpnis 
non  was  appointed  by  a  court  having 
no  jurisdiction  to  make  such  ap- 
pointment, a  revivor  against  such 
administrator  is  Absolutely  void. — 
Paul  v.  Butler,  282  P.  732,  129  Kan. 
244. 
In  Alabama 

(1)  Under  statute,   decree  against 
personal  representative  of  deceased 
administratrix  for  settlement  of  for- 
mer administration  may  be  revived 
against  administratrix  de  bonis  non 
of   deceased   administratrix. — Cowan 
v.  Perkins,  107  So.  *6,  214  Ala.  158. 

(2)  Prior  to  enactment  of  the  stat- 
ute,   it  was  held   that  a  judgment 
against  an  administrator  could  not 
be  revived  against  the  administrator 
de   bonis   non,    since   there   was   no 
privity  between  the  two. — Brothers  v* 
Gunnels,    18    So.    3,    110    Ala.    436— 
Bobo  v.  Gunnels,  8  So.  797,  92  Ala. 
601. 

23.  Kan. — Mendenhall    v.    Robinson, 
44  P.  610,  56  Kan.  633. 

24.  U.S.— -Coates    v.    Muse,    C.C.Va., 
5  F.Cas.Ne.2,916,  1  Brock  529. 

24  C.J.  p  896  note  84. 

993 


25.  Tex. — Gerlach  v.   Du  Boae,  Civ. 
App.,  210  S.W.  742. 

26.  I1L — Columbia   Hardwood   Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  B.  Kopriwa  Co.,  62  N.B. 
2d  23,  326  Ill.App.  423. 

34  C.J.  p  660  note  >60. 
Corporation  and  individual 

In  action  to  revive  a  joint  Judg- 
ment against  corporation  and  an  in- 
dividual, wherein  only  the  individual 
defendant  was  served  with  process 
and  answered  averring  that  plaintiff 
did  not  seek  to  revive  Judgment 
against  the  corporation  and  no  an- 
swer was  made  to  such  allegation 
showing  that  corporation  had  been 
dissolved  or  other  matters  that 
would  preclude  revival  against  the 
corporation,  a  Judgment  reviving 
the  judgment  against  the  individual 
defendant  only  was  erroneous.— Co- 
lumbia, Hardwood  Lumber  Co.  v.  B. 
Kopriwa  Co.,  supra. 

27.  Kan. — Richardson  v.  Painter,  102 
P.  1099,  80  Kan.  574,  133  Am.S.B. 
224. 

34  C.J.  p  660  note  62. 
judgment  In  solldo 

Where  assignee  of  judgment  in 
solido  sought  to  revive  the  judgment 
only  against  one  party  and  not 
against  remaining  in  solido  obligors, 
mere  failure  to  revive  judgment  as 
against  the  other  judgment  debtors 
could  not  be  construed  as  a  conven- 
tional or  tacit  discharge  of  .the  Judg- 
ment debtor  sued,  since  Instrument 
seeking  to  revive  the  judgment  oper- 
ated as  ah  express  reservation  by 
plaintiff  of  his  rights  against  such, 
debtor. — Converse  v.  Victor  &  Pre- 
vost,  22  So.2d  737,  208  La.  47. 
34  C.J.  p  660  note  62  [c]. 


§  538 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


constitutes  a  bar  to  the  action  against  himself  only, 
and  of  which  his  codefendants  could  not  take  ad- 
vantage, such  a  defendant  may  be  discharged  and 
the  judgment  revived  against  the  other  defendant 
or  defendants.28 

If  one  of  two  or  more  joint  judgment  debtors  are 
dead,  the  judgment  may  be  revived  against  the  sur- 
viving judgment  debtor  or  debtors,29  or  against  both 
the  surviving  debtor  and  the  personal  representa- 
tive of  the  deceased  debtor,30  or  against  the  per- 
sonal representative  of  the  deceased  debtor  with- 
out joining  the  other  defendant,31  although  it  has 
been  said  that  at  common  law  it  cannot  be  revived 
against  the  personal  representative.32 

§  539.    Judgments  Which  May  Be  Re- 
vived 

All  Judgments  within  the  terms  of  statutes  authoriz- 
ing revival  may  be  revived,  and  ordinarily  it  is  required 


that  the  Judgment  be  valid,  final,  and  for  a  definite  sum 
which  has  not  been  fully  paid  or  satisfied. 

All  judgments  within  the  terms  of  a  statute  pro- 
viding for  revival  may  be  made  the  subject  of  a 
proceeding  for  that  purpose.33  Ordinarily,  in  order 
to  be  subject  to  revival,  a  judgment  must  be  in  the 
nature  of  a  final  judgment34  for  a  definite  sum,35 
and  in  some  jurisdictions,36  although  not  in  oth- 
ers,37 the  judgment  must  originally  have  been  capa- 
ble of  enforcement  by  execution.  It  must  also  be  a 
valid  judgment38  which  has  not  been  fully  paid  or 
satisfied,39  or  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations,40 
or  reversed.41 

Subject  to  these  conditions,  there  may  be  a  re- 
vival of  a  judgment  which  is  merely  erroneous42  or 
which  has  been  suspended  by  injunction,43  or  to  re- 
view which  a  writ  of  error  is  pending44  or  the  lien 
of  which  has  expired.45  Also,  in  a  proper  case,  pro- 
ceedings may  be  brought  to  revive  a  default  judg- 
ment,46 a  delivery  bond  judgment,47  a  stay  bond 


28.  I1L — Columbia   Hardwood .  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  E.  Kopriwa  Co.,  62  N.E. 
2d  23,  326  Ill,App.  423. 

34  C.J.  p  661  note  £3. 

29.  Mo. — Gierster  v.  Stephens,  App., 
74  S.W.2d  88. 

34  C.J.  p  661  note  64. 

Necessity  of  revival  on  death  of  one 

of  several  joint  debtors  see  supra 

§  534  b. 
Estate  insolvent  or  nonexistent 

Where  one  of  defendants  ia  dor- 
mant judgment  is  dead,  leaving  no 
estate,  or  his  estate  is  insolvent 
Judgment  may  be  revived  as  to  sur- 
viving defendants  only. — Rogers  v. 
Jordan,  132  S.E.  233,  35  Ga.App.  131. 

30.  Pa. — Dowling    v.    McGregor,    91 
Pa.     410 — Stoner    v.     Stroman,     9 
Watts  &  S.  85. 

31.  U.S. — U.  S.  v.  Houston,  D.C.Kan., 
48  P.  207. 

34  C.J.  p  661  note  66. 

32.  W.Va. — Greathouse  v.  Morrison, 
70   S.B.   710,    68  W.Va.   714. 

33.  Ariz.— McBride  v.  McDonald,  215 
P.  166,  25  Ariz.  207. 

Judgment  of  territorial  court 

Under  statute  authorizing  the  re- 
newal by  affidavit  of  any  Judgment 
directing  the  payment  of  money, 
which  has  heretofore,  or  may  here- 
after, be  duly  docketed  in  the  office 
of  the  clerk  of  any  superior  court 
of  the  state,  a  Judgment  entered  and 
docketed  in  the  district  court  of  a 
territory  prior  to  statehood  may  be 
so  renewed. — McBride  v.  McDonald, 
supra. 

34.  Va. — Series   v.   Cromer,   13   S.B. 
859,  88  Va.  426. 

34  C.J.  p  661  note  69. 

35.  HI.— Chestnut    v.    Chestnut,    77 
I1L  346. 

34  C.J.  p  661  note  70.  i 


Judgment  payable  in  installments 

The   fact  that  a  lump-sum  judg- 
ment awarded  a  divorced  wife  was 
payable  in  installments  did  not  take 
from  it  the  character  of  finality. 
Kan. — Bourman  v.  Bourman,  127  P. 

2d  464,  155  Kan.  602. 
Neb.— Anglim   v.    Anglim,    299   N.W. 
346,  140  Neb.  133. 

36.  Tex. — Farmers'    Nat.    Bank    v. 
Crumley,   CivJLpp.,    204    S.W.    358. 

34  C.J.  p  661  note  72. 

37.  U.S. — Lafayette  County  v.  Won- 
derly,  Mo.,  92  P.  313,  34  C.C.A.  360. 

34  C.J.  p  661  note  71. 

38.  Mo.— Coombs  v.  Benz,  114  S.W. 
2d    713,    232    Mo.App.    1011. 

34  C.J.  p  661  note  73. 

The  repeal  of  statute  permitting 
recovery  of  deficiency  Judgment  did 
not  preclude  revivor  of  dormant  de- 
ficiency Judgment  regularly  obtained 
many  years  prior  thereto.— McCor- 
mack  v.  Murray,  274  N.W.  383,  133 
Neb.  125. 

39.  N.J.— Schneider  v.  Schmidt,  136 
A.   740,  101  N.J.EQ.   140. 

34  C.J.  p  661  note  74. 
Judgments  held  not  satisfied 

(1)  Revivor  could  not  be  resisted 
on  ground  that  Judgment  had  been 
satisfied  by  a  levy  where  levy  yielded 
payment  of  only  small  part  of  Judg- 
ment— Schneider  v.  Schmidt,  supra. 

(2)  Where,    after    tort    Judgment 
was  affirmed,  judgment  creditor  in- 
stituted action  of  debt  on  the  appeal 
bond   against   Judgment   debtor   and 
his  surety,  and  obtained  a  debt  Judg- 
ment against  debtor  and  his  surety, 
and,  after  execution .  was  issued  on 
debt  Judgment,  surety  paid  the  debt 

udgment  and  obtained  assignment  of 
tort  Judgment,  the  satisfaction  of 
debt  Judgment  did  not  extinguish  the 

994 


tort  Judgment  so  as  to  preclude  sure- 
ty as  assignee  from  reviving  such 
Judgment  on  theory  that  surety  re- 
ceived nothing  by  the  assignment. — 
Bogden  v.  Milauckas,  40  N.E.2d  91, 
313  IlLApp.  311. 

4Q.    N.M. — Browne  &  Manzanarea  Co. 

v.  Chavez,  54  P.   234,   9  N.M.  316. 

Judgment  held  not  barred  so  as  to 
preclude  revivor. — Rayborn  v.  Reid, 
138  S.E.  294,  139  S.C.  529. 

41.  Ind.— Mills  v.  Conner,  1  Blackf. 
7. 

42.  Neb. — McCormack     v.     Murray, 
274  N.W.  383,  133  Neb.  125. 

34  C.J.  p  662  note  78. 

43.  Va. — Richardson        v.        Prince 
George  Justices,  11  Gratt  190,  52 
Va.  190. 

34  C.J.  p  £62  note  79. 

44.  Pa.— Boyer    v.    Rees,    4    Watts 
201. 

45.  Pa.— Cusano  v.  Rubolino,  39  A. 
2d  906,  351  Pa.  41. 

34  C.J.  p  662  note  81. 
Under  validating  statute 

A  statute  authorizing  the  reinstate- 
ment of  liens  and  Judgments  on  tax 
and  municipal  claims  which  have  lost 
their  lien  is  in  the  nature  of  a  ''val- 
idating statute"  and  hence  must  be 
restricted  to  claims  and  Judgments 
which  have  lost  their  lien  at  the  date 
when  the  statute  takes  effect,  and  it 
cannot  be  extended  to  claims  and 
Judgments  the  liens  of  which  are 
thereafter  lost  by  inaction  and  neg- 
lect—Petition of  Miller,  28  A.2d  257, 
149  Pa.Super.  142. 

46.  S.C. — State  Bank  v.  McRa,  29  S. 
C.L.  639. 

47.  Ark.— Eddins  v.  Graddy,  28  Ark. 
500. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  540 


judgment,48  a  tort  judgment,49  or  a  judgment  which 
has  been  transferred  from  one  county  to  another 
county.50  A  judgment  or  decree  in  a  case  of  equi- 
table cognizance  is  deemed  to  be  within  a  statute 
authorizing  a  revivor  of  judgments.61  A  probate 
judgment  or  decree  may  be  revived  in  some  juris- 
dictions52 but  not  in  others.53  It  has  been  held  that 
a  judgment  of  revivor  cannot  be  revived.54 

§  540.     Defenses  or  Grounds  of  Opposition 

a.  In  general 

b.  Payment,    release,    satisfaction,    dis- 

charge, and  set-off 

c.  Existence  and  validity  of  judgment 

d.  Defenses  by  heirs,  executors,  admin- 

istrators, and  terre-tenants 


a.  In  General 

In  proceedings  to  revive  a  Judgment,  no  Inquiry  in- 
to the  merits  Is  permitted,  and  defenses  are  generally 
limited  to  matters  arising  after  the  entry  of  the  Judg- 
ment. 

As  a  rule,  in  a  proceeding  to  revive  a  judgment, 
no  inquiry  into  the  merits  is  permitted,55  and  no 
matter  may  be  pleaded  in  defense  which  was,56  or 
might  have  been,57  set  up  in  defense  to  the  original 
action,  or  which  might  have  been  interposed  as  a  de- 
fense to  a  prior  proceeding  to  revive  the  same  judg- 
ment.58 In  other  words,  defenses  as  to  matters 
arising  prior  to  entry  of  judgment  ordinarily  are  not 
available  in  a  proceeding  for  revival.59 

On  the  other  hand,  proper  and  sufficient  matters 
of  defense,  arising  after  the  entry  of  judgment,  may 
be  urged,60  and,  as  considered  infra  subdivisions  b 


48.  Neb.— Baker  Steel  &  Machinery 
Co.  v.  Ferguson,  290  N.W.  449,  137 
Neb.  578,  131  A.L.R.  798. 

49.  Mich. — Nathan  v.  Rupcic,  6  N.W. 
2d  484,  303  Mich.  201. 

Statute  retroactive 

The  statute  providing  that  any 
judgment  in  tort  heretofore  Or  here- 
after rendered  and  of  record  in  any 
court  of  record  in  state  may  be  sued 
on  and  renewed  within  the  time  and 
as  provided  by  law  applies  to  judg- 
ment recorded  prior  to  its  effective 
date  as  well  as. after  its  effective 
date. — Nathan  v.  Rupcic,  supra, 

50.  Pa.— Shotts  &  Co.  v.  Agnew  & 
Barnett,  81  Pa.Super.  458. 

51.  Ky. — Hughes  v.  Shreve,  3  Mete. 
547. 

Miss.— McCoy  v.  Nichols,  5  Miss.  31. 
Revivor  of  decrees  in  equity  general- 
ly see  Equity  §  621. 

52.  Ala. — Sharp  v.   Herrln,    32  Ala, 
502. 

34  C.J.  p  662  note  86. 

53.  Ark. — Rose  v.  Thompson,  36  Ark. 
254. 

54.  Mo. — Gregory    Grocery    Co.    v. 
Link,    25   S.W.2d  575,  224   Mo.App. 
407. 

55.  Al«u— Quill  v.  Carolina  Portland 
Cement  Co.,  124  So.  305,  220  Ala. 
134. 

Ga.— McRae  v.  Boykin,  App.,  35  S.E. 
2d  548,  certibrari  denied  66  S.Ct. 
1024— Fielding  v.  M.  Rich  &  Bros. 
Co.,  169  S.E.  383,  46  Ga.App.  785. 

Neb.— Krause  v.  Long,  192  N.W.  729, 
109  Neb.  846. 

Pa.— First  Nat  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Bethlehem  v.  Laubach,  5  A.2d  139, 
333  Pa,  844 — Stanton  v.  Hum- 
phreys, Com.PL.  27  DeLCo.  694 — 
Davis  v.  Tate,  Com.Pl.,  26  Brie  Co. 
141 — Jacobson  v.  McCormicfc,  Com. 
PI.,  38  Luz.Leg.Reg.  355— Gorniak 
v.  Potter  Title  &  Trust  Co.,  Com. 
PI.,  91  Pittsb.Leg.J.  279— Com. 
Dept.  of  Public  Assistance  v.  Mik- 


lish,    Com.PL,    27    West.Co.    237— 

Uhlinger    v.     Burin,     Com.Pl.,     22 

WesLCo.  146. 
34  C.J.  p  662  note  89. 
Bight  to  execution 

Only  defenses  against  scire  facias 
are  matters  involving  right  to  have 
judgment  executed. — In  re  Rubin,  C. 
C.A.I1L,  24  F.2d  289,  certiorari  de- 
nied Rubin  v.  Midlinsky,  49  S.Ct. 
13,  278  U.S.  609,  73  L.Bd.  535. 
Waiver  of  objection 

After  trial  conducted  throughout 
by  both  plaintiff  and  defendant  on 
theory  that  merits  may  be  inquired 
into,  it  is  too  late  to  raise  objection 
that  merits  cannot  be  inquired  into. 
— Frick  Co.  v.  Nickler,  23  Pa.Dist. 
44. 

56.  Ariz.— Miller  Rubber  Co.  of  New 
Tork   v.    Peggs,    132    P.2d    439,    60 
Ariz.  157. 

Del. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Woods  v. 

Spoturno,  183  A.  319,  323,  7  W.W. 

Harr.      295,     reversed     on     other 

grounds  Spoturno  v.  Woods,  192  A. 

689,  8  W.W.Harr.  378. 
Pa.— Wilcox  v.  Du  Bree,   8   Pa.Dist 

&  Co.  591. 
34  C.J.  p  £62  note  89. 

57.  Del.— Corpus     Juris      cited     in 
Woods    v.    Spoturno,    183    A.    319, 
323,  7  W.W.Horr.  295,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  Spoturno  v.  Woods, 
192  A.  689,  8  W.W.Harr.  378. 

Ohio.— McAllister    v.    Schlemmer    & 

Graber  Co.,  177  N.B.  841,  39  Ohio 

App.  434. 
Pa. — Jacobson   v.    McCormick,    Com. 

PL,  38  Luz.Leg.Reg.  355. 
34  C.J.  p  662  note  89 — 24  C.J.  P  895 

note  69. 

Question  of  jurisdiction  cannot  be 
litigated  on   scire  facias   to   revive 
judgment— Ruth  v.  Durando,  170  A. 
582,  166  Md/83. 
Lack  of  jury  trial 

Defendant  will  not  be  allowed  to 
defend  on  the  ground  that  a  jury 

995 


trial  was  not  granted  in  the  orig- 
inal action. — Nathan  v.  Rupcic,  6 
N.W.2d  484,  303  Mich.  201. 

58.  Pa.— Moll  v.  Lafferty,  153  A.  657, 
302  Pa,  354. 

Payment 

Payment  before  a  previous  Judg- 
ment of  revival  cannot  be  shown. — 
Trader  v.  Lawrence,  37  A.  812,  182 
Pa.  233— Merchants  Oil  Co.  v.  Herb, 
Pa.Com.PL,  14  Northumb.Leg.J.  295. 

59.  Pa.— First  Nat.    Bank   &   Trust 
Co.  of  Bethlehem  v.  Laubach,  5  A. 
2d  139,  333  Ba,  344. 

60.  Pa. — Cusano  v.  Rubolino,  39  A. 
2d  906,  351  Pa.  41— Smith  v.  Bald 
Hill    Coal    Co.,    23    A.2d    466,    343 
Pa.  899,  138  A.L.R.  859— Biffert  v. 
Giessen,  14  A.2d  130.  339  Pa,  60— 
First  Nat.  Bank   &  Trust  Co.   of 
Bethlehem  v.  Laubach,  5  A.2d  139, 
333  P«u  344— Brusko  v.   Olshefski, 
13   A.2d    916,    140    Pa.Super.    485 — 
Miller  Bros.  v.  Keenan,  90  Pa.Su- 
per. 470 — Bell  v.  Fitzgerald,   Com. 
PL,    31   DeLCo.    3— Davis   v.    Tate, 
Com.PL,    26   Brie   Co.    141-^Tacob- 
son  v.  McCormick,  Com.  PI.,  38  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  355 — Kasperunas  v.  Kas- 
per,   Com.PL,   84   Luz.Leg.Reg.   303 
— Krzykwa  v.  Krzykwa,  Com.PL,  15 
Northumb.Leg.J.       117— Merchants 
Oil  Co.  v.  Herb,  ConouPL,  14  North- 
umb.L.J.  295— Merchants  Oil  Co.  v. 
Herb,    Com.PL,    14    Northumb.L.J. 
266— Sausage  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rometo, 
Com.PL,     86     Pittsb.Leg.J.     105— 
Leonard    v.     Rutan,     ConuPL,    18 
Wash.Co.  40, 

Failure  to  serve  process  in  revivor 

proceeding 
Ga.— American  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hodges, 

154  S.B.   653,  41  Ga,App.  717. 

On  scire  facias  to  revive  a  revived 
Judgment,  the  only  defenses  available 
are  matters  arising  since  its  entry. 
—O'Connor  v.  Flick,  118  A.  431.  274 
Pa,  521. 


§  540 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


and  c  of  this  section,  the  nonexistence  or  invalidity 
of  the  judgment  sought  to  be  revived,  or  its  pay- 
ment, release,  satisfaction,  or  discharge  may  con- 
stitute good  defenses. 

Particular  defenses  permitted.  Defendant  may 
show  that  his  position  with  respect  to  the  judg- 
ment is  that  of  a  surety  only,61  or  that  the  proceed- 
ings are  prematurely  brought,62  and,  as  discussed 
infra  §  542,  the  statute  of  limitations  may  also  be 
used  as  a  defense.  Persons  made  defendant  to  a 
scire  facias,  founded  on  a  judgment  against  a  cor- 
poration, on  the  allegation  that  they  are  stockhold- 
ers and  personally  liable  for  its  debts,  may  show 
that  they  are  not  stockholders,  or  that  the  debt  on 
which  the  judgment  was  recovered  was  not  of  the 
kind  for  which  stockholders  are  liable.63  It  is  also 
permissible  to  plead  specially  the  incapacity  of 
plaintiff  to  maintain  the  proceeding.64 

Particular  defenses  not  available.  Numerous  par- 
ticular defenses  urged  in  proceedings  for  revival  of 
a  judgment  have  been  held  unavailable.65  A  gen- 
eral denial  of  each  and  every  allegation  of  the  writ 
not  admitted  in  the  answer  is  not  a  form  of  defense 
permitted  in  such  a  proceeding.66  It  is  not  per- 
missible to  show  in  defense  want  of  considera- 
tion,67 coverture  of  defendant,68  usury,6*  fraud  in 
procuring  the  original  judgment,70  duress  in  the 


procuring  of  a  prior  revival  of  the  judgment,71  or 
recovery  of  another  judgment  on  the  same  debt72 
Other  matters  disallowed  as  defenses  include  the 
pendency  of  an  action  of  debt  on  the  judgment,73 
or  of  probate  court  proceedings  incidental  to  a  claim 
based  on  the  judgment,74  or  the  pendency  of  an  ap- 
peal in  a  suit  to  enjoin  enforcement  of  the  judg- 
ment75 or  of  an  appeal  by  plaintiff  from  judgment 
in  his  favor.76  The  assignment  of  the  judgment  to 
a  third  person,77  the  existence  of  liens  on  a  judg- 
ment,78 and  adverse  possession79  are  other  unavail- 
able pleas.  Where  the  motion  for  revival  is 
brought  promptly,  under  all  the  circumstances  of 
the  case,  the  daim  of  laches  may  be  disallowed.80 
Except  in  some  jurisdictions,81  it  is  not  a  valid 
objection  to  a  proceeding  to  revive  that  at  the  time 
of  its  commencement  plaintiff  could  have  proceed- 
ed by  execution.82  The  unauthorized  discharge  of 
the  judgment  debtor  from  arrest  under  an  execu- 
tion is  not  a  defense  to  an  action  to  revive  the 
judgment  on  which  the  execution  was  issued.83 

fc.  Payment,  Eelease,  Satisfaction,  Discharge, 
and  Set-Off 

In  defense  to  a  proceeding  to  revive  a  Judgment, 
it  may  be  shown  that  the  judgment  was  paid,  released, 
satisfied,  or  discharged,  but,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute 
to  the  contrary,  it  is  not  proper  to  Interpose  a  set-off 
or  counterclaim. 


Defense,  rejected 

Defendant,  obtaining  judgment  on 
plea  that  former  judgment  against 
him  was  res  adjudieata,  cannot  set 
up  second  judgment  as  defense  in 
suit  to  revive  former  judgment — 
Polk  v.  8.  H.  Churchill  &  Co.,  Tex. 
CivJLpp.,  286  S.W.  900. 

61.  Ohio. — Nestlerode    v.    Foster,    8 
Ohio  Cir.Ct  70,  4  Ohio  Cir.Dec.  385. 

62.  Wash. — Tacoma    Nat    Bank    v. 
Sprague,  74  P.  393,  33  Wash.  285. 

63.  Pa. — Wilson,   McBlroy  &  Co.  v. 
Pittsburgh    &   Toughiogheny   Coal 
Co.,  43  Pa.  424. 

64.  Mo.— Seattle    Mfg.    Co.    V.    Ger- 
ardi,  214  S.W.  189. 

34  C.J.  p  679  note  58. 

65.  Ga. — McRae  v.  Boykin,  App.,  35 
S.E.2d  548,  certiorari  denied  66  S. 
Ct  1024. 

Pa. — Bank  of  Wesleyville  v.  Wagner, 

Com.Pl.f  21  Brie  Co.  175. 

The  unauthorized  removal  of  a 
phllfl  to  a  foreign  country,  with  the 
knowledge  and  consent  of  the  ex- 
ecutor of  the  mother's  estate,  is  not 
a  sufficient  ground  for  refusing  the 
executor's  application  to  revive  a  di- 
vorce judgment  awarding  alimony 
and  adjusting  property  rights  of  the 
deceased  mother. — Ghumos  v*  Chu- 
mos,  146  P.  420,  93  'g*".  83. 

66.  U.S. — Wonderly     v.      Lafayette 
County,  C.C.MO.,  77  F.  665,  affirmed 


Lafayette  County  v.  Wonderly,  92 
F.  313,  34  C.C.A.  360. 

67.  Pa. — Kincade  v.  Cunningham,  12 
A.    410,    118    Pa.    501— Mulligan  v. 
Devlin,  12  Pa.Co.  465 — Krzykwa  v. 
Krzykwa,    Com.PL,    15    Northumb. 
Leg.J.  117. 

68.  Pa. — Eiffert    v.    Giessen,    14    A. 
2d   130,   339   Pa.    60 — Sausage   Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Rometo,  Com.PL,  86  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  105. 

34  C.J.  p  662  note  94. 

69.  Pa. — Lysle  v.  Williams,  15  Serg. 
&  R.  135— Bickel  v.  Cleaver,  13  Pa. 
Co.  314. 

70.  Neb.— -Krause  v.  Long,  192  N.W. 
729,  109  Neb.  846. 

34  C.J.  p  664  note  25  [a]. 

71.  Pa. — Trader  v.  Lawrence,  37  A. 
812,  182  Pa.  233. 

72.  N.C.— McLean  v.  McLean,  90  N. 
C.  530. 

73.  U.S. — Lafayette  County  v.  Won- 
derly,   Mo.,    92    F.    313,    34    C.C.A. 
360. 

74.  Kan. — Rodgers  v.  Smith,  68  P.2d 
1092,  144  Kan.  212. 

75.  Wash. — Foley  v.  Kelleher,  158  P. 
982,  92  Wash.  314. 

76.  La.— Weiller  v.  Blanks,  1  McG. 
296. 

77.  111. — Greene  v.  Schwing,  187  HL 
App.  635. 

996 


Ohio. — Foster  Screen  Co.  T.  Brigel, 
App.,  31  N.E.2d  699. 

Assignor  as  proper  person  to  in- 
stitute revival  proceedings  see  su- 
pra §  537. 

78.  Ohio. — Foster  Screen  Co.  v.  Bri- 
gel, supra. 

79.  111.— Smith  v.   Stevens,    24  N.E. 
511,  133  111.  183. 

80.  Cal. — Thompson  v.  Cook,  143  P. 
2d  107,  61  Cal.App.2d  485. 

81.  N.T. — Harmon     v.     Dedrick,     3 
Barb.  192. 

Tex.— White  v.  Stewart,  Civ.App.,  19 

S.W.2d    795,    error   refused. 
Action  Blmilar  to  revival 

Generally,  suit  on  judgment  by 
scire  facias  proceedings  or  action  of 
debt  will  not  lie,  unless  judgment 
has  become  dormant  because  of  fail- 
ure to  have  execution  issued,  but 
action  similar  to  revival  may  be 
brought  on  judgment  which  is  not 
dormant,  when  it  wauld  give  holder 
of  Judgment  additional  advantage  to 
which  he  is  legally  entitled  under 
circumstances. — Elliott  v.  San  Benito 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  137 
S.W.2d  1070. 

82.  Md.— Lambson    v.     Moftett,     61 
Md.  426. 

34  C.JT.  p  663  note  4. 

83.  N.C.— Ballard  v.  Averitt,  1  N.C. 
69. 

34  C.J.  p  663  note  20* 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  540 


In  defense  to  a  proceeding  to  revive  a  judgment, 
defendant  may  plead  that  it  has  been  paid84  wholly 
or  in  part,86  or  he  may  plead  the  presumption  of 
payment  arising  from  lapse  of  time,8^  or  both  pay- 
ment and  presumption  of  payment.87 

Release,88  such  as  a  voluntary  release  of  the 
judgment  without  full  payment,89  discharge,90  sat- 
isfaction,91 and  accord  and  satisfaction92  may  also 
be  pleaded. 

Set-off  or  counterclaim.  Ordinarily,  in  a  pro- 
ceeding for  revival  of  a  judgment,  a  set-off93  or  a 
counterclaim94  is  not  a  proper  defense,  unless  it  is 


proved  that  the  item  offered  as  a  set-off  was  ac- 
cepted and  acknowledged  by  plaintiff  as  a  credit  on 
the  judgment  in  suit;95  but  under  some  statutes 
proceedings  to  revive  a  judgment  are  subject  to  a 
counterclaim  based  on  contract.96 

c.  Existence  and  Validity  of  Judgment 

In  defense  to  a  proceeding  for  revival  of  a  Judgment, 
it  Is  proper  to  plead  nul  tiel  record  or  to  deny  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Judgment  or  to  show  that  it  is  absolutely 
void. 

As  a  general  rule,  in  defense  to  a  proceeding  for 
revival  of  a  judgment,  the  plea  of  nul  tiel  record, 
or  the  denial  of  the  existence  of  the  judgment,97 


84.  111. — Blakeslee's    Storage   Ware- 
houses v.  City  of  Chicago,  11  N.B. 
2d  42,  292  Ill.App.  288,  affirmed  17 
N.E.2d   1,    369   111.   480,   120   A.L.R. 
715— Dulsky  v.  Lerner,  223  Ill.App. 
228. 

Md.— O'Neill  &  Co.  v.  Schulze,  7  A. 
2d  263,  177  Md.  64. 

Neb.— Baker  Steel  &  Machinery  Co. 
v.  Ferguson,  290  N.W.  449,  137  Neb. 
578,  131  A.L.R.  798. 

Okl.— Corpus  Juris  cited  ia  Shefts  v. 
Oklahoma  Co.,  137  P.2d  589,  592, 
192  Okl.  483. 

Or. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Stephens 
v.  Stephens,  132  P.2d  992,  993,  170 
Or.  363. 

Pa,— Smith  v.  Bald  Hill  Coal  Co.,  23 
A.2d  466,  343  Pa.  399,  138  A.L.R. 
859— Eiffert  v.  Oiessen,  14  A.2d  130, 
339  Pa.  60— City  Nat.  Bank  of 
Wichita  Palls,  Tex.,  now  for  Use 
of  Newhams  v.  Atkinson,  175  A. 
507,  316  Pa.  526— Moll  v.  Latterly, 
153  A.  557,  302  Pa.  354— Shelinski 
v.  Obrekes,  97  Pa-Super.  340— Tay- 
lor v.  Tudor,  83  Pa.Super.  459— Mc- 
Mahon  v.  Pietro,  Com.Pl.,  42  Lack. 
Jur.  162— Merchants  Oil  Co.  v. 
Herb,  14  Northumb.Leg.J.  295— 
Merchants  Oil  Co.  v.  Herb,  14 
Northumb.Leg.J.  266— S  a  u  s  a  g  e 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rometo,  Com.Pl.,  86 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  105— Leonard  v.  Ru- 
tan,  Com.PL,  18  Wash.Co.  40. 

34  C.J.  p  662  note  91,  p  663  notes  11, 
12. 

85.  Or. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Ste- 
phens   v.    Stephens,   132   P.2d    992, 
993,  170  Or.  363. 

S.C. — Anderson  v.  Gage,  23  S.C.L.  319. 

86.  Pa,— Camp  v.  John,  102  A.  285, 
259  Pa.  38. 

84  C.J.  p  663  note  13,  p  666  note  49. 

87.  Del. — De  Ford  v.   Green,   40  A. 
1120,  15  Del.  316. 

88.  111.— Albert    Pick  Co.   v.   Valos, 
64   N.E.2d   319,    327   IlLApp.    404— 
Blakeslee's  Storage  Warehouses  v. 
City    of    Chicago,    11    N.B.2d    42, 
292  IlLApp.  288,  affirmed  17  N.E.2d 
1,    369    111.    480,    120   A.L.R.    715— 
Dulsky  v.  Lerner,  223  IlLApp.  228. 

Md.— O'Neill  &  Co.  v.  Schulze,  7  A. 
2d  263,  177  Md.  64. 


Pa. — Leonard  v.  Rutan,   Com.PL,   18 

Wash.Co.  40. 
34  C.J.  p  662  note  91. 

89.  N.C.— Salisbury  First  Nat  Bank 
v.  Swink,  39  S.B.  962,  129  N.C.  255. 

34  C.J.  p  663  note  15. 

90.  111.— Bank    of    Edwardsville    v. 
Raffaelle,   45    N.E.2d    651,    381    111. 
486,    144   A.L.R.   401— Albert   Pick 
Co.   v.   Valos,    64   N.B.2d   319,    327 
IlLApp.  404— U.  S.  Brewing  Co.  of 
Chicago  v.  Epp,  247  Ill.App.  315. 

Neb.— Baker  Steel  &  Machinery  Co. 
v.  Ferguson,  290  N.W.  449,  137  Neb. 
578,  131  A.L.R.  798. 

Ba.— Cusano  v.  Rubolino,  39  A.2d 
906,  351  Pa,  41— Smith  v.  Bald 
Hill  Coal  Co.,  23  A.2d  466,  343  Pa, 
399,  138  A.L.R.  859— Adelson  v. 
Kocher,  36  A.2d  737,  154  Pa.Super. 
548— First  Nat  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
of  Ford  City  v.  Stolar,  197  A.  499, 
130  Pa.Super.  480— Shelinski  v. 
Obrekes,  97  Pa.Super.  340— Taylor 
v.  Tudor,  83  Pa, Super.  459 — Bell  v. 
Klein,  Com.PL,  35  Luz.Leg.Reg.  72 
— Merchants  Oil  Co.  v.  Herb,  Com. 
PL,  14  Northumb.Leg.J.  266— Stan- 
ton  v.  Humphreys,  Com.PL,  27  Del. 
Co.  594. 

34  OJ.  p  662  note  91. 

Effect  of  discharge  in  bankruptcy  on 
Judgments  see  Bankruptcy  §  563. 

91.  111.— Bank    of    Edwardsville    v. 
Raffaelle,   45   N.E.2d   651.    381    111. 
486,    144   A.L.R.    401— Albert    Pick 
Co.  v.  Valos,  64  N.E.2d  319,  327  111. 
App.    404— U.    S.    Brewing    Co.    of 
Chicago  v.   Epp,   247   IlLApp.    315. 

Okl.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  Shefts  v. 
Oklahoma  Co.,  137  P.2d  589,  592, 
192  Okl.  483. 

Pa. — Adelson  v.  Kocher,  36  A.2d  737, 
154  Pa,Super.  548— First  Nat  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.  of  Ford  City  v.  Stolar, 
197  A.  499,  130  Pa,Super,  480— Tay- 
lor v.  Tudor,  83  Pa.Super.  459 — 
Stan  ton  v.  Humphreys,  Com.PL,  27 
DeLCo.  594— Bell  v.  Klein,  Com.PL, 
36  Luz.Leg.Reg.  72— Merchants  Oil 
Co.  v.  Herb,  Com.PL,  14  North- 
umb.Leg.J. 266. 

34  C,J.  p  662  note  91. 

Tail-ore  to  complete  purchase 
With    respect    to    satisfaction    of 

997 


judgment,  defendants  could  not  urge, 
after  twenty  years,  liability  against 
complainants  for  failure  to  complete 
purchase  at  sheriff's  sale  of  property 
Levied  on. — Schneider  v.  Schmidt  136 
A.  740,  101  N.J.EQ.  140. 

92.  111.— Albert   Pick    Co.    v.    Valos, 
64   N.E.2d    319,    327    IlLApp.    404— 
Blakeslee's  Storage  Warehouses  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  11  N.E.2d  42,  292 
IlLApp.  288,  affirmed  17  N.E.2d  1, 
369  111.   480,   120  A.L.R.   715— Dul- 
sky v.  Lerner,   223   IlLApp.   228. 

Md.— O'Neill  &  Co.  v.   Schulze,   7  A. 

2d  263,  177  Md.  64. 
34  C.J.  p  663  note  17. 

93.  Neb.— Baker  Steel  &  Machinery 
Co.  v.  Ferguson,  290  N.W.  449,  137 
Neb.  578,  131  A.L.R.  798. 

Pa. — Wilcoac  v.  Du  Bree,   8  Pa.Dist 

&  Co.  591. 
34  C.J.  p  663  note  18. 

94.  Neb.— Baker  Steel  &  Machinery 
Co.  v.  Ferguson,  290  N.W.  449,  137 
Neb.  578,  131  A.L.R.  798. 

34  C.J.  p  663  note  18. 
Adjudicated  claim 

Pa.— Moll  v.  Lafferty,  153  A.  557,  302 
Pa,  354. 

95.  Pa,— Bishop  v,   Goodhart   19  A. 
1026,    135   Pa,    374— Wilcox  v.   Du 
Bree,  8  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  591. 

Effect  of  agreement 

"Set-off  or  counterclaim  is  not  a 
defense  to  a  proceeding  to  revive  a 
dormant  Judgment  unless  there  has 
been  an  agreement  to  apply  it,  in 
which  event  it  is  treated  as  a  pay- 
ment"— Baker  Steel  &  Machinery  Co. 
v.  Ferguson,  290  N.W.  449,  451,  137 
Neb.  578,  131  A.L.R.  798. 

96.  N.M.— Bailey  v.   Great  Western 
Oil  Co.,  259  P.  614,  32  N.M.  478,  55 
A.L.R.  467. 

97.  111. — Bank    of    Edwardsville    v. 
Raffaelle,    45    N.E.2d   651,    381   III 
486,    144   A.L.R.    401— Albert    Pick 
Co.  v.  Valos,  64  N.E.2d  319,  327  111. 
App.       404 — Blakeslee's       Storage 
Warehouses  v.  City  of  Chicago,  11 
N.E.2d    42,    292    IlLApp.    288,    af- 
firmed 17  N.E.2d  1,  3-69  111.  480,  120 
A.L.R.  715— U.   S.  Brewing  Co.  of 


§  540 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tinder  which  defendant  may  show  the  judgment's 
invalidity,98  is  permissible.  It  is  also  a  good  de- 
fense that  the  judgment  is  absolutely  void,"  as  for 
want  of  jurisdiction,1  or  because  of  the  invalidity 
of  the  statute  on  which  it  was  based,2  provided,  in 
some  jurisdictions,  the  judgment  record  shows  af- 
firmatively that  it  is  void,8  although  in  other  juris- 
dictions, die  record  may  be  impeached  in  the  revival 
proceedings,4  at  least  with  respect  to  the  return  of 
an  officer  to  the  service  of  a  summons.6  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  not  a  good  defense  that  the  judg- 
ment was  irregular5  or  erroneous.7 


d.  Defenses  by  Heirs,  Executors,  Administra- 
tors, and  Terre-Tenants 

Generally,  any  defenses  which  would  have  been  open 
to  the  original  defendant  may  be  pleaded  by  heirs,  ex- 
ecutors, administrators,  or  terre-tenants  in  a  proceed- 
ing against  them  to  revive  a  Judgment. 

As  a  general  rule,  heirs,  executors,  administra- 
tors,8 or  terre-tenants9  may  plead  any  defenses 
which  would  have  been  open  to  the  original  defend- 
ant Such  defendants  may  deny  the  character  in 
which  they  are  sued.10  Except  in  some  jurisdic- 


Chicago  v.  Epp,  247  ULApp.  315 — 
Dulsky  v.  Lerner,  223  ULApp.  228 

Md.— O'Neill  &  Co.  v.  Schulze,  7  A. 
2d  263.  177  Md.  64. 

Neb.— Baker  Steel  &  Machinery  Co 
v.  Ferguson,  290  N.W.  449,  137  Neb, 
578,  131  A.L.R.  798. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Shefts  v. 
Oklahoma  Co.,  137  P.2d  589,  592 
192  Okl.  483. 

Pa. — Cusano  v.  Rubolino,  39  A.2d 
906,  351  Pa.  41— City  Nat  Bank 
of  Wichita  Falls,  Tex.,  now  for 
Use  of  Newhams,  v.  Atkinson,  175 
A.  507,  316  Pa.  526— Adelson  v, 
Kocher,  36  A.2d  737,  154  Pa. Super. 
548— First  Nat  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
of  Ford  City  v.  Stolar,  197  A.  499, 
130  Pa.Super.  480— Shelinski  v. 
Obrekes,  97  Pa. Super.  340 — Taylor 
v.  Tudor,  83  Pa.Super.  459 — Barn- 
hart  v.  Herring,  Com.PL,  54  Pa. 
Dist  &  Co,  526 — Stanton  v.  Hum- 
phreys, Com.Pl.,  27  Del.Co.  594 — 
McMahon  v.  Pletro,  Com.PL,  42 
Lack. Jur.  162 — Bell  v.  Klein,  Com. 
PL,  35  Luz.Leg.Reg.  72 — Merchants 
Oil  Co.  v.  Herb,  Com.Pl.,  14  North- 
umb.Leg.J.  266 — Sausage  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Rometo,  Com.PL,  86  Pittsb.Leg. 
J.  105. 

34  OJ.  p  662  note  91—53  C.J.  p  639 
note  59  [a]. 

98.  Neb.— Lashmett  v.  Prall,  120  N. 
W.  206,  83  Neb.  732. 

34  C.J.  p  662  note  91. 

99.  Neb. — Baker  Steel  &  Machinery 
Co.  v.  Ferguson,  290  N.W.  449,  137 
Neb.  578,  181  A.L.R.  798. 

34  C.J.  p  663  note  21. 


of  validity 
Validity  of  a  judgment,  which  was 
attacked  by  an  answer  to  a  scire  fa- 
cias proceeding  to  revive  It  could 
be  settled  by  such  proceeding  in 
court  which  rendered  original  judg- 
ment— Carson  v.  Taylor,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  261  S.W.  824. 

1.    Wash.— Waterman  v.  Bash,  89  P. 

656,  46  Wash.  212. 
33  C.J.  p  663  note  21. 
Jurisdiction,  over  person 

(1)  Defendant  may  defend  on 
ground  that  he  was  not  served  and 
did  not  appear  in  original  suit. — Mc- 
Rae  v.  Boykin,  GfeuApp.,  35  S.B.2d  548, 
certiorari  denied  66  S.Ct  1024. 


(2)  Testimony  of  plaintiff  and  re- 
turn of  'constable  were  sufficient  to 
sustain  Judgment  of  revlvor,  as 
against  contention  that  original  judg- 
ment was  void  for  want  of  Jurisdic- 
tion.— Kinyoun  v.  Reinsh,  289  N.W. 
382,  137  Neb.  325. 

2.  U.S. — Board  of  Com'rs  of  Hert- 
ford County  v.  Tome,  N.C.,  153  F. 
81,  82  C.C.A.  215. 

3.  Okl.— Corpus  Juris  died  in  Shefts 
v.  Oklahoma  Co.,  137  P.2d  589,  592, 
192  Okl.  483. 

34  C.J.  p  664  note  23. 
Service  of  process 

Record  of  return  of  officer  who  ef- 
fected service  of  process  in  original 
suit  held  not  subject  to  contradiction. 
111.— Albert  Pick  Co.  v.  Valos,  64  N. 

E.2d    319,    327   ULApp.   404. 
Pa. — Taylor  v.    Tudor,    83   Pa.Super. 

459. 

4.  Neb. — Johnson  v.  Carpenter,   108 
N.W.  161,  77  Neb.  49. 

34  C.J.  p  664  note  24. 

5.  Neb.— Haynes  v.  Aultman,  54  N. 
W.  511,  36  Neb.  257. 

34  C.J.  p  664  note  24  [a]. 

Ariz.— Miller  Rubber  Co.  of  New 

York  v.   Peggs,    132   P,2d  439,    60 

Ariz.  157. 
Pa.— Smith  v.  Bald  Hill  Coal  Co.,  23 

A.2d   466,   343   Pa.   399,   138  A.L.R. 

859 — Jacobson  v.  McCormlck,  Com. 

PL,  38  Luz.Leg.Reg.  355. 
34  C.J.  p  664  note  25. 
Particular  irregularities  disregarded 

(1)  Failure    to    file    affidavit    re- 
quired  by  rule   of  court   on   entry 
of  original  Judgment  and  fact  that 
one  of  several  parties  plaintiff  was 
deceased  at  time  of  such  entry,  are 
not   available   as    defenses  in   scire 
facias    proceeding. — Smith    v.    Bald 
Hill  Coal  Co.,   23  A.2d  466,  343   Pa, 
399,  138  A.L.R.  859. 

(2)  Fact  that  record  of  Judgment 
against  two  defendants  referred  to 

[udgment  against  "defendant"  was 
held  not  to  prevent  revivor  of  Judg- 
ment—Van Home  v.  Harford,  6  N. 
B.2d  887,  289  ULApp.  121. 

Tex. — Ulmer   v.    Frankland,   Civ. 
App.,  27  S.W.  766. 
34  C.J,  p  664  note  25.  •  i 

998 


8.  U.S.— McKnight  v.  Craig's  Adm'r, 
B.C.,  6  Cranch  183,  3  L.Ed.  193. 

34  C.J.  p  664  note  27. 
Disoliarge 

Since  allegation  that  Judgment  was 
destroyed  is  equivalent  to  allegation 
of  discharge,  if  probate  proceedings 
allowing  judgment  as  claimed 
against  estate  destroyed  judgment, 
that  defense  could  be  interposed  in 
proceeding  against  heirs  to  revive 
Judgment— Wolford  v.  Scarbrough, 
21  S.W.2d  777,  224  Mo.App.  137. 
Payment 

Where  estate  had  no  means  of  pay- 
ing judgment  against  it,  and  one  of 
two  executors  bought  judgment  with 
own  money  and  had  it  assigned  to 
third  person  who  issued  scire  facias 
thereon,  naming  both  executors  and 
also  heirs  as  defendants,  plea  of  pay- 
ment by  the  executors  did  not  estop 
the  executor  who  had  bought  the 
judgment  from  showing  that  it  was 
in  fact  paid  but  that  it  was  intended 
to  be  kept  alive  for  his  use. — McKer- 
rahan  v.  Crawford,  59  Pa.  390. 

9.  Pa. — Roberts     v.     Williams,      5 
Whart  170,  34  Am.D.  549. 

34  C.J.  p  664  note  27. 

Pleading*  to  merits  by  terre-tenant 
in  scire  facias  to  revive  judgment 
is  not  permitted. — South  Central 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Milani,  150 
A.  586,  300  Pa.  250— Bell  v.  Yontos, 
46  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  636,  44  Lack.Jur. 
83,  57  Tork  Leg.Rec.  53. 
Validity  of  original  Judgment 

(1)  In    scire    facias    to    revive    a 
judgment  a  terre-tenant  may  moke 
no  inquiry,  into  the  validity  of  the 
original    judgment,   as   long  as   the 
original  judgment  stands  unimpeach- 
ed.7-Smith  v.  Bald  Hill  Coal  Co.,  23 
A.2d  466,  343  Pa.  399,  138  A.L.R.  859. 

(2)  Terre-tenants  could  set  up  no 
defense  attacking  validity  of  original 
judgment  which  appeared  to  be  reg- 
ular on  Its  face. — Adelson  v.  Kocher, 
36   A.2d   737,   154  Pa.Super.   548. 

1C.    Ky. — White   v.   Brown,    1   Dana 

104. 
Pa. — Miners    Nat   Bank   of  Wilkes- 

Barre  v.  Dukas,   Com.Pl.,  32  Luz. 

Leg.Reg.  229. 
34  C.J.  p  664  note  28. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  542 


tions,11  an  heir  or  administrator  may  plead  want  of 
assets  or  "nothing  by  descent."12 

A  plene  administravit,  when  supported  by  the 
facts,  may  be  sufficient  in  a  proceeding  to  revive  a 
judgment  against  a  personal  representative,1^  bnt 
such  a  plea  is  bad  on  demurrer  where  it  appears 
that  there  is  real  estate  which  might  be  sold  to  pay 
debts,  since  the  administrator  is  bound  to  sell  such 
real  estate  for  that  purpose.14  To  a  scire  facias  to 
revive  a  judgment  against  a  testator,  executors  may 
not  plead  that  they  have  not  accounted  to  the  sur- 
rogate,16 although  such  a  plea  has  been  considered 
good  as  against  a  scire  facias  issued  on  a  judgment 
against  the  executors  themselves.16  Personal  rep- 
resentatives may  not  defend  on  the  ground  that  a 
note,  on  which  the  judgment  is  based,  was  signed 
by  deceased  as  an  accommodation  maker.17 

A  terrertenant  may  plead  that  the  judgment  was 
never  a  lien  on  his  land,18  or  that  the  judgment 
debtor  had  parted  with  title  to  the  realty  before 
the  entry  of  the  judgment,19  or  that  the  lien  has 
been  extinguished.20 

§  541.    Jurisdiction  and  Venue 

At  a  general  rule,  proceedings  to  revive  a  Judgment 
should  be  brought  In  the  court  In  which  the  Judgment 
was  rendered. 

A   proceeding  to   revive   a   judgment  must  be 


brought  in  the  court21  and  county22  wherein  it  was 
rendered.  The  rule  applies  even  where,  under  stat- 
utory authority,  a  transcript  of  the  judgment  is  filed 
in  a  court  of  another  county,28  or  in  another  court 
of  the  same  county,24  or  where  a  transcript  of  a 
judgment  of  •  a  federal  court  is  filed  in  a  state 
court,25  unless  the  statute  providing  for  the  trans- 
fer authorizes  a  revivor  in  the  court  to  which  the 
transfer  is  made.26  However,  in  the  case  of  judg- 
ments of  inferior  courts  removed  by  transcript  to  a 
superior  court,-  jurisdiction  to  revive  the  judgment 
has  been  held  to  reside  in  the  latter  court27 

§  542.    Time  for  Revival 

a.  In  general 

b.  Computation  of  period  of  limitation 

a.  In  General 

A  Judgment  may  and  should  be  revived  within  the 
time  limited  by  law. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  may  and  should  be 
revived  within  the  time  limited  by  law.28  As  dis- 
cussed in  the  C.J.S.  title  Limitations  of  Actions  § 
102,  also  34  CJ.  p  665  notes  41,  42,  the  general  law 
as  to  the  limitation  of  actions  does  not  apply  to  pro- 
ceedings to  revive  a  dormant  judgment,  except  in  a 
few  jurisdictions.  Such  proceedings  are  governed 
only  by  the  special  statutory  provisions,  if  any,  ap- 
plicable to  proceedings  of  that  character,^  Such 


11.  Miss. — Commercial  Bank  v.  Ken- 
dall, 21  Miss.  278. 

34  C.J.  p  664  note  29. 

12.  Ga. — Fulcher  v.  Mandell,  10  S.E. 
582,  83  Ga.  715. 

34   C.J.  p  664  note  80 — 24  C.J.  p  896 

note  71. 

Application  of  executor  to  orphans' 
court,  representing1  that  property  of 
decedent  is  insufficient  to  pay  debts, 
will  not  bar  scire  facias  to  revive  a 
judgment  entered  before  application 
was  made. — Howell  v.  Potts,  20  N.J. 
Law  1. 

13-    Tenn. — Cox  v.  Cox,  2  Yerg.  305. 
24  C.J.  p  896  note  71  [b]. 

14.  vt.— Bates    v.    Kimball,    1    Aik. 
95.  , 

15.  N.Y. — Clark  v.  Sexton,  23  Wend. 
477. 

16.  N.Y. — Clark  v.  Sexton,  23  Wend. 
477. 

17.  Pa.— Eiftert  v.  Giessen,  14  A.2d 
130,  339  Pa.  60. 

18.  Pa. — Cusano  v.  RuboUno,  39  A, 
2d  906,  351  Pan  41— Bell  v.  Tontos, 
46  PaJDist.  &  Co.  -636,  44  Lack.Jur. 
83,  57  York  Leg.Rec.  53. 

34  C.J.  p  664  note  32. 

19.  Pa, — Cusano  v.  Rubolino,   39  A, 
2d  90$,  351  Pa.  41. 


20.  Pa, — Cusano  v.  Rubolino,  supra. 
34  C.JT.  p  664  note  32. 

21.  ill. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in.  Van 
Home    y.     Harford,     280     Ill.App, 
576,  579. 

Kan. — Corpus  Juris  Quoted  in  Rodg- 
ers  v.    Smith,   58   P.2d  1092,    1096, 
144  Kan.  212. 
34  OJ.  p  664  note  34. 

Action  of  debt  held  not  within  rule. 
— Koenig  v.  Marti.  Tex.Civ.App.,  103 
S.W.2d  1023,  error  dismissed — Burge 
y.  Broussard,  Tex.Civ.App.,  258  S. 
W.  502. 

22.  Neb. — Case  Threshing*  Mach.  Co. 
v.  Bdmisten,  122  N.W.  891,  85  Neb. 
272. 

23.  111.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Van 
Home  v.  Harford,  280  Ill.App.  576, 
579. 

34  C.J.  p  665  note  36. 

24.  111.*— Van  Home  v.  Harford,  280 
IlLApp.  576. 

25.  Neb. — Holmes  v.  Webster,  152  N. 
W.  312,  98  Neb.  105. 

26.  111. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Van 
Home  v.  Harford,  280  Ill.App.  576, 
579. 

34  C.J.  p  665  note  38. 

27.  Neb. — Garrison   v.   Aultman,    30 
N.W.  61,  20  Neb.  311. 

34  C.J.  p  665  note  39 

999 


Revival  of  judgments  in  justice  of 
the  peace  courts  see  the  C.J.S.  ti- 
tle Justices  of  the  Peace  §  120,  al- 
so 34  C.J.  p  665  note  39;  35  C.J. 
p  689  note  93  et  seq. 

28.  Ala.— -Quill  y.  Carolina  Portland 
Cement  Co.,   124   So.   305,   220  Ala. 
134. 

Cal. — Betty  v.  Superior  Court  of  Los 
Angeles  County,  116  P.2d  947,  18 
Oal.2d  619— Pacific  Gas  So  Electric 
Co.  v.  Elks  Duck  Club,  103  P.2d 
1030,  39  Cal.App.2d  562. 

Ga. — James  v.  Roberts,  191  S.B.  301, 
55  Ga.App.  755. 

La, — Fritz  Jahncke,  Inc.,  v.  Fidelity 
Deposit  Co.  of  Maryland,  135  So. 
32,  172  La,  704. 

Mo. — Excelsior  Steel  Furnace  Co.  v. 
Smith,  App.,  17  S.W.2d  378. 

Pa,— Petition  of  Miller,  28  A.2d  257, 
149  Pa. Super.  142 — Lukac  v.  Morris, 
Com.PL,  7  Sch.Reg.  241. 

Tex. — Zummo  Packing  Co.  v.  Cotham, 
Civ.App.,  .135  S.W.2d  177,  affirmed 
155  S.W.2d  600,  137  Tex.  517— Min- 
gus  v.  Kadane,  Civ.App.,  125  S.W. 
2d  630,  error  dismissed,  judgment 
correct. 

34  C.J.  p  £63  note  7. 

29.  U.S. — Spurway  v.  Dyer,  D.C.FUu, 
48  F.Supp.  255. 

Ala. — Quill  v.  Carolina  Portland  Ce- 


§  542 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


special  statutory  provisions  are  valid80  and  may  be 
given  a  retrospective  operation.81 

Motions  to  revive.  In  some  jurisdictions,  the 
statute  of  limitations  applicable  to  an  action  or  writ 
of  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  will  also  bar  a 
motion  for  the  same  purpose.82  Where  there  is  a 
special  statute  applicable  to  such  motions,  the  mo- 
tion must  be  made  within  the  time  limited,38  but  it 
has  been  held  that,  where  the  motion  to  revive  is 
under  a  statute  which  imposes  no  restriction  as  to 
time,  the  court  has  no  authority  to  insert  such  a  re- 
striction.84 


b.  Computation  of  Period  of  Limitation 

The  period  of  limitation  for  revival  of  a  Judgment 
ordinarily  begins  to  run  from  the  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment or  other  time  specified  by  statute,  and,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  provision  to  the  contrary,  proceedings  must 
be  begun  before  the  last  day  of  the  period  unless  the 
running  of  the  statute  has.  been  toiled. 

As  a  general  rule,  the  limitation  of  the  time  of 
bringing  proceedings  for  the  revival  of  a  judg- 
ment begins  to  run  from  the  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment,85 or  other  time  specified  by  statute,86  such  as 
from  the  time  when  the  judgment  first  becomes 
dormant,87  or  an  execution  might  first  be  issued  on 


ment    Co.,    124    So.    805,    220    Ala. 

134. 
Idaho.— Tingrwall    v.    King   Hill    Irr. 

Dist,  155  P.2d  605. 
La.— Mulling  v.  Jones,   114   So.   725, 

164  La.  894. 
Mich.— Nathan  v.   Rupcic,    6  N.W.2d 

484,  303  Mich.  201. 
N.J. — Trustees  for  Support  of  Public 

Schools   v.   Ott   &   Brewer   Co.,    37 

A.2d  832,  135  N.J.Eq.  174. 
N.C.— Hetcalf   v.    Ratcliff,    1    S.E.2d 

565,  215  N.C.  243. 
Okl. — Thomas    v.    Murray,    49    P.2d 

1080,  174  Okl.  36,  104  A.L.R.  209. 
Pa. — Stanton  v.  Humphreys,  Com.Pl., 

27  DeLCo.  594. 
34  C.JT.  p  665  note  43. 
Statutes  not  in  par!  materia 

The  statute  relating  to  dormancy 
of  judgment  and  execution  thareon 
is  not  in  par!  materia  with  statute 
authorizing  revival  of  a  judgment, 
so  that  provision  that  a  Judgment  on 
which  no  execution  is  issued  does 
not  become  dormant  until  ten  years 
after  its  rendition  does  not  render 
nugatory  provision  that  an  action  to 
revive  or  for  debt  must  be  brought 
on  the  judgment  within  ten  years 
after  date  of  rendition  and  both  pro- 
visions must  be  given  effect — Gillam 
v.  Matthews,  Tex.Civ.App.,  122  S.W. 
2d  348,  error  dismissed. 
Type  of  Judgment  affected 

(1)  Generally,  statutes  relating  to 
revival  of  judgments  have  reference 
to  money  judgments  capable  of  en- 
forcement by  execution,  and  are  not 
generally  regarded  as  imposing  time 
limitation   on   enforcement  of  judg- 
ments which  are  not  for  payment  of 
money  or  which  are  not  enforceable 
by  execution. — Kelly  v.  City  of  Cape 
Girardeau,    89    S.W.2d    693,    230   Mo. 
App.  137. 

(2)  Judgment   in   mandamus    pro- 
ceeding to  enforce  collection  of  acre- 
age tax  for  drainage  district  bonds 
was  a  "money  judgment"  within  pre- 
scription of  ten   years. — Perkins  v. 
Clancy,  146  So.  748,  176  La.  787. 
Particular  limitations  lield  applica- 
ble 

(1)  Generally. — SharefC,  to  Use  of 
Olney  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Wolf,  182 
A.  115,  120  Pa.Super,  227. 


(2)  The  limitation  of  one  year  for 
revivor   of   actions   has   no  applica- 
tion   to    revivor    of    dormant    judg- 
ment.— Rich  v.  Cooper,  286  N.W.  383, 
136  Neb.  463. 

(3)  Suit  to  revive  judgment  which 
gave  incorrect  middle  initial  of  judg- 
ment debtor  and  to  have  person  nam- 
ed in  original  judgment  and  revived 
judgment  decreed  to  be  the  same  per- 
son, was  governed  by  ten-year  stat- 
ute  of  limitations  and  not  by  five- 
year  statute  which  applies  to  action 
to    reform    an    instrument — Jaubert 
Bros.    v.   Landry*   La.App.,    15    So.2d 
158. 

The  term  "issue"  of  execution  in 
statute  of  limitations  for  revival  of 
judgments  means  more  than  the 
mere  clerical  preparation  and  attes- 
tation of  the  writ  and  requires  that 
it  should  be  delivered  to  an  officer 
for  enforcement — Gotten  v.  Stanford, 
Tex.Civ.App.,  147  S.W.2d  930. 

30.  Idaho.— Bashor  v.  Beloit,  119  P. 
55,  20  Idaho  592. 

31.  Neb.— Atkinson  v.  Uttley,  154  N. 
W.  247,  98  Neb.  722. 

34  C.J.  p  666  note  45. 

38.    Ohio.— Bartol  v.  Bckert,  33  N.E. 

294,  50  Ohio  St  31. 
34  C.J.  p  666  note  46. 

33.  Kan. — Kansas  &  Texas  Coal  Co. 
v.  Carey,  70  P.  589,  65  Kan.  639. 

34  C.J.  p  666  note  47. 

34.  Neb.— Hunter  v.  Leahy,  24  N.W. 
680,  18  Neb.  80. 

34  C.J.  p  666  notes  48,  49. 

35.  U.S.— Terby  v.  Kerr,  C.C.A.Tex., 
143  F.2d  58. 

Ark. — Cabler  v.  Anderson,  16  S.W.2d 
179,  179  Ark.  364. 

111.— Motel  v.  Andraeki,  19  N.E.2d 
832,  299  IU.App.  166. 

Iowa. — Lacfcender  v.  Morrison,  "2  N. 
W.2d  286,  231  Iowa  899. 

La,— Perkins  v.  Clancy,  146  So.  748, 
176  La,  787— Fritz  Jahncke,  Inc., 
v.  Fidelity  Deposit  Co.  of  Mary- 
land, 135  So.  32,  172  La,  704— Bai- 
ley v.  Louisiana  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
105  So.  626,  159  La,  576. 

Md.— O'Neill  &  Co.  v.  Schulze,  7 
A.2d  263,  177  Md.  *4. 

Mo. — In  re  Jackman's  Estate,  124  S. 
W.2d  1189,  344  Mo.  49— Kelly  v. 

1000 


City  of  Cape  Girardeau,  89  S.W.2d 

693,   230  Mo.App.   137— Longlett  v. 

Eisenberg,  TO  S.W.2d  317,  222  Mo. 

App.  805. 
Mont — State  v.  Hart  Refineries,  92  P. 

2d  76fl,   109  Mont   140,   123  A.L.R. 

655. 
Pa. — Szusta  v.  Krawiec,  36  Luz.Leg. 

Reg.  183. 
Tex. — Zummo  v.  Cotham,  155  S.W.2d 

600,  137  Tex.  517— Gillam  v.  Mat- 
thews,   Civ.App.,    122    S.W.2d    348, 

error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  666  note  50. 
Strict  construction  of  statute 
Tex. — Commerce  Trust  Co.  v.  Ramp, 

138  S.W.2d  531,  135  Tex.   84. 
Reversal 

Statute  prescribing  money  judg- 
ments ten  years  after  rendition  runs 
from  date  of  rendition  in  tried  court, 
or  in  appellate  court  after  reversal. 
— Carlile  v.  Huckaby,  La, App.,  154 
So.  462. 
Signing  of  Judgement 

Suit  to  revive  judgment  which  was 
commenced  more  than  ten  years  after 
judgment  was  given,  but  within  ten 
years  after  judgment  was  signed, 
was  not  prescribed,  since  signing  of 
judgment  constitutes  "rendition  of 
the  Judgment",  within  statute  pro- 
viding for  prescription  of  judgments 
by  lapse  of  ten  years  from  rendition 
thereof.— Viator  v.  Heintz,  10  So.2d 
690,  201  La.  884. 

36.  Ga. — James  v.  Roberts,  191  S.E. 
301,  55  GcuApp.  755. 

Tex. — Mingus  v.  Kadane,  Civ.App.f 
125  S.W.2d  630,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct 

34  C.J.  p  666  note  51. 

37.  Ga, — James  v.  Roberts,  191  S.E. 
301,  55  Ga.App.  755. 

Kan. — Butler   v.    Rumbeck,    56    P.2d 

80,  143  Kan.  708. 
Neb.— Baker  Steel  &  Machinery  Co. 

v.    Ferguson,    290    N.W.    449,    137 

Neb.  578,  131  A.L.R.  798. 
Okl.— Thomas    v.    Murray,    49    P.2d 

1080,  174  Okl.  86,  104  A.L.R.  209. 
Dormant  judgments  generally  see 

supra  §  532. 
Effect  of  appeal 

Under  a  statute  which  permits  re- 
vivor within  one  year  after  a  judg- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


542 


the  judgment,88  or  from  the  time  of  issuance  of  the 
last  execution  on  the  judgment.89  Under  some 
statutes,  where  the  judgment  has  once  been  re- 
vived, the  limitation  period  runs  from  the  date  of 
the  revival,40  but  other  statutes  bar  a  revival  after 
lapse  of  the  prescribed  period  commencing  from  the 
date  of  rendition  of  the  judgment  notwithstanding 
the  judgment  has  once  been  revived  within  the  pe- 
riod.41 In  a  case  where  a  terre-tenant  is  involved, 
the  period  of  limitations  commences  from  the  date 
of  the  recording  of  the  terre-tenant^  deed42  or  from 


the  time  of  taking  of  possession  of  the  land  by  the 
terre-tenant.48 

While  the  running  of  the  statute  ^of  limitations 
for  revival  of  a  judgment  may  be  interrupted  by 
some  sufficient  cause,44  in  the  absence  of  such  inter- 
ruption,  the  right  to  institute  the  proceeding  will 
expire  on  the  last  day  of  the  statutory  period,45 
or,  if  that  day  is  dies  non,  on  the  next  succeeding 
business  day.46  Ordinarily,  the  statute  is  saved  by 
beginning  the  proceedings  within  the  limited  time,47 
although  the  judgment  of  fevivor  does  not  follow 


ment  becomes  dormant,  where  a 
judgment  has  been  appealed,  the  lim- 
itation on  a  motion  for  revivor  does 
not  begin  to  run  until  the  mandate 
has  come  down  from  the  appellate  to 
the  trial  court. — Aaron  v.  Morrow,  50 
P.2d  674,  174  Okl.  452. 

38.  D.C. — Brown  v.  Allan  B.  Wolker- 
&  Co.,  26  F.2d  545,  58  App.D.C.  173. 

Docketing  Judgment  in  superior  court 
Where  municipal  court  Judgment 
was  docketed  in  supreme  court,  pe- 
riod within  which  revival  could  be 
had  began  with  the  docketing  in 
the  supreme  court-— Brown  v.  Allan 
E.  Walker  &  Co.,  supra. 

39.  Tex. — Gartin   v.   Furgeson,   Civ. 
App.,    144   S,W.2d  1114— Mingus  v. 
Kadane,   Civ.App.,   125   S.W.2d   630, 
error  dismissed,  Judgment  correct. 

34  C.J.  p  666  note  51  [b]— 24  C.J.  P 

896  note  78  [e]. 

Action,  similar  to  revival,  such  as 
action  against  decedent's  heirs  to 
subject  property  formerly  owned  by 
decedent  to  payment  of  Judgment 
against  him,  is  not  barred  by  limita- 
tions until  lapse  of  ten  years  from 
issuance  of  last  execution  on  Judg- 
ment—Elliott v.  San  Benito  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  137  S.W. 
2d  1070. 

40.  D.C, — Brown  v.  Allan  B.  Walker 
£    Co.,    26    F.2d    545,    58    App.P-C. 
178. 

La.— Interstate  Electric  Co.  v.  Smith, 
App.,  180  So.  178,  overruling  Mitch- 
ell v.  Brodnax,  App.,  164  So.  426, 
and  McDaniel  v.  Smith,  127  So.  108, 
13  La.App.  61. 

Mo.— Gregory  Grocery  Co.  v.  Link,  25 
S.W.2d  575,  224  Mo.App.  407. 

34  C.J.  p  666  note  51  [a]. 

41.  Ala,— Mobile   Drug  Co.   v.   Mc- 
Cullough,  112  So.  238,  215  Ala.  682. 

42.  Pa,— First  N*t.   Bank  &  Trust 
Co.   v.   Miller,   186  A.   87,   822  Pa. 
473— Kefover   v.    Hustead,    144   A. 
430,  294  Pa.  474— EUinger  v>  Krach, 
28    A.2d    453,    1W    Pa.Super.    3*4, 
affirmed  Simrions  v.  Simmons,  29 
A.2d  677,  346  Pa.  52— Simmons  v. 
Simmons,  28  A.2d  445,  150  Fa-Su- 
per. 393,  affirmed  29  A.2d  677,  346 
Pa.  52— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Torai- 
chek,    IS   A.2d   126,   140    Pa.Super. 


101— Freeman    v.    Jones,    Com.Pl., 
26  WestCo.  195. 

Extending  lien  by  revival  of  Judg- 
ment see  supra  §  494. 
Failure  to  name  terre-tenant  as  par- 

ty 

Judgment  creditor  had  five  years 
from  time  of  recording  of  terre-ten- 
ant's  deed  to  revive  as  against  terre- 
tenant,  notwithstanding  revival 
against  Judgment  debtor  failed  to  in- 
clude terre-tenant  whose  deed  was 
on  record  at  time  of  such  revival. — 
Farmers  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Reading,  to  Use  of  Nolan,  v.  Barrett, 
184  A.  128,  321  Pa,  273. 

43.  Pa.— First  Nat.   Bank   &  Trust 
Co.   v.   Miller,   186   A.    87,   322   Pa. 
473 — Everett     Hardwood     Lumber 
Co.  v.  Calhoun,  183  A.  659,  121  Pa. 
Super.  451. 

44.  U.S. — Bingham  v.  Fordson  Coal 
Co.,  C.C.A.Ky.,  26  F.2d  346. 

La. — Brock   v.    Edwards,    App.,    159 

So.  607. 
34  C.J.  P  666  note  52. 


Causes  held  insufficient 

(1)  Seizure  of  property  under  scire 
facias  did  not  suspend  prescriptive 
period   against   Judgment,    statutory 
revival  being  exclusive. — McDaniel  v. 
Smith,    127   So.    108,    13    La.App.    61. 

(2)  Order  of  referee  in  bankruptcy, 
which  could  not  be  construed  as  ad- 
judication  that    Judgment    be    paid, 
did  not  interrupt  running  of  limita- 
tion statute.— Yerby  v.  Kerr,  C.C.A. 
Tex.,  143  F.2d  58. 

(3)  Fraudulent  concealment  of 
property  and  false  representations 
made  to  Judgment  creditor  by  Judg- 
ment debtor  as  to  extent  of  his  prop- 
erty, whereby  Judgment  creditor  fail- 
ed to  issue  executions  or  to  revive 
Judgment  did  not  toll  limitations  on 
Judgment  where  no  proceedings  were 
had  in  aid  of  execution.— Thomas  v. 
Murray,  49  P.2d  1080,  174  OkL  36, 
104  A.L.R.  209. 


(4)  Neither  an  appeal  nor  superse- 
deas  bond  filed  on  appeal  to-lied  stat- 
ute of  limitations.— State  v.  Hart  Re- 
fineries, 92  P.2d  766,  109  Mont  140, 
123  A.L.B.  555—34  C.J.  P  666  note  52 

ra.  • 

1001 


Injunction 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  issuance 
of  temporary  injunction,  preventing 
levy  and  sale  under  execution  issued 
on  dormant  Judgment,  does  not  inter- 
rupt running  of  limitations  on  Judg- 
ment—Commerce Trust  Co.  v.  Ramp, 
138  S.W.2d  531,  135  Tex.  84. 

(2)  However,  it  has  also  been  held 
that  injunction  against  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  Judgment  stays  the  run- 
ning of  the  statute  against  it. — Hut- 
sonpiller   v.    Stover,    12    Gratt    579, 
53  Va.  579—34  C.J.  P  666  note  52  Id]. 
45.    Pa.— Appeal  of  Lutz,  16  A.  858, 

124  Pa.  273. 
g.C. — Blohme  v.  Schmancke,   61  S.E. 

1060,  81  S.C.  81. 
43.    pa. — Appeal  of  Lutz,  16  A.  858, 

124  Ba.  273. 
47.    Mo.— City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Miller, 

App.,  155  S.W.2d  565. 
34  C.J.  p  666  note  56. 
Filing  petition 

(1)  Where  time  limitation  within 
which  petition  must  have  been  filed 
had  not  expired  on  date  of  filing  of 
petition  but  had  expired  before  date 
of  filing  of  motion  made  by  plaintiff 
at  subsequent  term  of  court  to 
amend  writ  of  scire  facias  and  for 
order  directing  perfection  of  personal 
service  on  defendant  court  had  Juris- 
diction to  amend  writ  and  order 
service  perfected.— Stahle  v.  Jones, 
3  S.E.2d  861,  60  Ga.App.  397. 

(2)  Where  petition  for  writ  of 
scire  fiacias  to  revive  Judgment  was 
filed  and  court  order  directing  that 
the  writ  issue  was  obtained  within 
limitation  period,  right  to  revival 
of  Judgment  was  not  barred  merely 
because  of  clerk's  failure  to  issue 
writ  within  period.— City  of  St.  Lou- 
is v.  Miller,  Mo.App.,  155  S.W.2d  565 
—City  of  St  Louis  v.  Miller,  145  S. 
W.2d  504,  285  Mo.App.  987. 
Suing1  out  or  issuance  of  writ 

Where  prsecipe  was  filed  with  pro- 
thonotary  who  prepared  writ  and  de- 
livered it  within  five-year  period  to 
plaintiff's  attorney,  to  procure  serv- 
ice by  acceptance,  writ  was  "sued 
out"  or  "issued"  within  statute  re- 
quiring scire  facias  to  be  "sued  out" 
or  "issued"  within  five  years,  al- 
though acceptance  of  service  was 


542 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


until  after  the  expiration  of  the  statutory  period,48 
but  in  some  jurisdictions  the  statutes  expressly  lim- 
it the  time  for  making  or  rendering  the  order  or 
judgment  of  revivor,  as  distinguished  from  the  com- 
mencement of  the  proceedings.49 

Death  of  party.  In  some  states  the  death  of  a 
judgment  defendant  starts  the  running  of  a  new 
period  of  limitations,  and  proceedings  to  revive  the 
judgment  must  be  brought  within  a  limited  time 
after  that  event,50  at  least  where  the  revival  is  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  representatives  of  defend- 
ant.51 In  other  states  the  death  of  the  judgment  de- 
fendant does  not  interrupt  the  statute,  but  the  re- 
vival proceedings  must  be  instituted  within  the  pe- 
riod originally  limited  after  the  rendition  of  the 
judgment52  Under  some  statutes,  the  death  of  a 


judgment  plaintiff  introduces  a  new  limitation  pe- 
riod within  which  his  representatives  may  revive  a 
judgment  without  the  consent  of  the  judgment  debt- 
or.^ 

§  543.    Mode  of  Revival 

The  mode  of  revival  of  a  judgment  fs  sometimes  pro- 
vided for  by  statute,  and  generally  revival  must  be  ac- 
complished by  means  of  a  Judicial  proceeding  involving 
notice  and  an  opportunity  to  be  heard. 

The  mode  of  reviving  a  judgment  is  sometimes 
provided  for  by  statute,54  and  in  some  jurisdictions 
it  has  been  held  that  the  prescribed  methods  are  ex- 
clusive,55 but  in  other  jurisdictions  the  statutory 
procedure  is  merely  cumulative  and  not  mandatory 
or  exclusive.56  Informal  methods  of  revival  have 


not  returned  until  after  five-year  pe- 
riod— Luzerne  Nat.  Bank  v.  Gosart, 
185  A.  640,  322  Pa,  446. 

48.  Mo.— In    re    Jackman's    Estate, 
124  S.W.2d  1189,   344   Mo.  49. 

34  C.J.  P  666  note  56. 

49.  OkL— Bartlett    Mortgage   Co.   v. 
Morrison,  81  P.2d  318,  183  Okl.  214 
— Edward   Thompson  Co.  v.   Bris- 
tow.  244  P.  429,  116  Okl.  243. 

34  C.J.  p  666  note  55. 

50.  Va. — Cox  v.  Caskie,  82  8.E.  118, 
116  Va,  388. 

34  C.J.  p  666  note  57. 
Za  Pennsylvania 

(1)  Where  judgment  debtor,  owner 
in  fee  of  lot  died  in  1936,  and  deed 
conveying  lot  was  recorded  in  1938, 
scire  facias  proceeding  in  1943  to  re- 
vive judgment  against   grantees   as 
terre-tenants,  brought  more  than  sev- 
en  years   after   death   of  judgment 
debtor  but  within  five  years  of  re- 
cording of  deed,  was  too  late,  since, 
under  Fiduciaries  Act  which  was  ap- 
plicable and  not  act  of  1849,  lien  was 
lost  in  1941  from  failure  to  revive  it 
within  five-year  period  of  the  debt- 
or's    death. — Frank     Di     Berardino 
Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  De  Gregoria, 
45  A.2d  378,  158  Pa. Super.  516. 

(2)  Under   statute   providing  that 
unless  revived  within  five  years  from 
death  of  judgment  debtor  judgment 
should    not    constitute    lien   against 
real  estate,  judgment  may  be  revived 
after  five  years  from  death  of  judg- 
ment debtor,  although  thereafter  it 
will  not  constitute  lien  against  real 
estate. — Shareff,    to    Use    of    Olney 
Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Wolf,   182  A. 
115,  120  Pa.Super.  227. 

51.  Okl.— Jackson  v.    Scott    173    P. 
70,  70  Okl.  85. 

52.  Va, — Barley  v.  Duncan,  13  S.B.2d 
294,  177  Va.  192. 

34  C.J.  P  667  note  59. 
General  statute  inapplicable 

General  statute,  providing  for  ex- 
clusion of  period  of  one  year  from 


death  of  any  party,  from  computa- 
tion of  time  within  which  proceeding, 
to  preserve  any  right  or  remedy, 
must  be  commenced,  was  held  not  to 
modify  statute  of  limitations  rela- 
tive to  the  bringing  of  scire  facias 
on  a  judgment — Barley  v.  Duncan,  13 
S.E.2d  298,  177  Va,  202— Barley  v. 
Duncan,  13  S.E.2d  294,  177  Va,  192. 

53.  Okl.— Jersak  v.  Risen,  152  P.2d 
374,  194  OkL  423. 

Appointment  of  executrix 

Mere  fact  that  special  administra- 
tor of  deceased  plaintiff's  estate 
could  have  been  appointed  and  ob- 
tained revivor  of  dormant  judgment 
within  year  after  plaintiff's  death 
was  insufficient  reason  for  holding 
invalid  the  revivor  thereof  within 
year  after  appointment  of  executrix 
of  plaintiff's  will.— Jersak  v.  Risen, 
supra. 

54.  Kan. — Bourman  v.  Bourman,  127 
P.2d  464,  155  Kan.  602. 

Okl.— Jersak  v.  Risen,  152  P.2d  374, 

194  Okl.  423. 
Reference  to  procedure 

Statute  providing  that  dormant 
judgments  may  be  revived  in  same 
manner  as  is  prescribed  for  reviving 
actions  before  judgment  refers  to 
procedure  rather  than  to  the  substan- 
tive right  of  revivor. — Bourman  v. 
Bourman,  127  P.2d  464,  155  Kan.  602. 
Belief  provided  by  common-law  writ 

Statute  requiring  revival  of  origi- 
nal judgment  where  execution  sale  is 
irregular  and  purchaser  fails  to  ob- 
tain possession,  judgment  so  revived 
to  have  same  effect  as  would  original 
judgment  of  date  of  revival,  is  in- 
tended to  afford  relief  provided  for 
by  common-law  writ  of  scire  facias 
pertaining  to  revival  of  judgments. — 
Continental  Nat  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Salt  Lake  City  v.  John  H.  Seely  & 
Sons  Co.,  77  P.2d  355,  94  Utah  357, 
115  A.L.R.  543. 

55.  Ala.— Gant  v.  Gilmer,   18  So.2d 
542,  245  Ala.  686. 

1002 


Kan. — Denny  v.  Ross,  79  P.  502,  70 

Kan.  720. 
Ohio.— Kline  v.  Falbo,  56  N.B.2d  701, 

73  Ohio  App.  417. 
S.D.— McMahon  v.  Brown,   279  N.W. 

538,  66  S.D.  134. 
Tex. — White  v.  Stewart,  Civ.App.,  19 

S.W.2d  795,  error  refused. 

Other  methods  held  ineffective 

(1)  Action  for  fraud  and  deceit — 
Thomas  v.  Murray,  49  P2d  1080,  174 
Okl.  36,  104  A.L.R.  209. 

(2)  Issuing  writs  of  execution. 
Ga. — U-Driv-It     System     of     Macon 

v.    Lyles.    30    S.B.2d    111,    71    Ga. 

App.  70,  followed  in  30  S.E.2d  114, 

71  Ga.App.  74. 
La. — Park  v.   Markley,  App.,   17  So. 

2d  459,  rehearing  denied  18  So.2d 

73. 
Tex. — Commerce  Farm  Credit  Co.  v. 

Ramp,   Civ.App.,    116   S.W.2d   1144, 

affirmed    Commerce    Trust    Co.    v. 

Ramp,    138    S.W.2d    531,    135    Tex. 

84. 

(3)  Order  granting  leave  to  issue 
execution  on  judgment — M^Mahon  v. 
Brown,  279  N.W.  538,  '66  S.D.  134. 

(4)  Filing  judgment   in   court   of 
another  county. — Kline  v.  Falbo,   56 
N.E.2d  701,   73  Ohio  App.  417. 

(5)  Ex      parte     orders. — Park     v. 
Markley,   La.App.,   17   So.2d  459,  re- 
hearing refused  18  So.2d  73. 

(6)  Statutory  procedure   for   con- 
testing claim  against  decedent's  es- 
tate.—Gant  v.  Gilmer,  18  So.2d  542, 
245  Ala.  686. 

(7)  Chancery  decree  declaring  law 
judgments  valid  and  payable  by  debt- 
or's administrator,  and  establishing 
judgments  as  liens  on  debtor's  estate. 
— Blair   v.    Rorer*s   Adm'r,    116    S.B. 
767,  135  Va,  1,  motion  denied  43  S. 
Ct  704,  262  U.S.  234,  67  L.Ed.  1206. 

56.    Okl.— Tucker  v.  Gautier,  164  P. 
2d  613. 


49     C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  544 


been  permitted  in  some  cases  without  reference  to 
statute.57 

Generally  a  revival  of  a  judgment  is  deemed  to  be 
a  judicial  act,  in  the  sense  that  it  requires  the  ac- 
tion of  the  court  in  some  form  of  proceeding  in- 
volving notice  to  the  adverse  party  and  an  oppor- 
tunity to  contest  the  application,58  and  a  judgment 
cannot  be  revived  by  a  mere  parol  promise  to  pay 
it.5&  The  revival  of  a  judgment  by  a  written  agree- 
ment of  the  parties  properly  filed  and  entered  of 
record,  as  discussed  infra  §  548,  is  authorized  by 
some  statutes.  Where  requirements  as  to  notice 
and  opportunity  to  be  heard  are  complied  with,  a 
revival  may  be  brought  about  in  a  collateral  ac- 
tion ;60  but  a  judgment  will  not  be  kept  alive  by 
supplementary  proceedings  thereon61  or  by  the 
amendment  of  the  judgment  nunc  pro  tune.62 

Ordinarily  relief  by  way  of  revivor  may  be 
awarded  only  on  personal  service,63  although,  under 
statute,  it  has  been  held  that  in  reviving  a  judg- 
ment against  a  nonresident  defendant  the  law  is 
satisfied  by  service  by  publication,6*  and  does  not 


require,  nor  can  the  courts  insist  on,  actual  notice 
to  local  counsel.65  A  judgment  of  revival  may  be 
entered  on  default.66 

It  has  been  held  that  a  proceeding  to  revive  a 
money  judgment  is  not  a  new  suit,  but  is  a  part  of 
the  original  action.67 


§  544. 


Action  to  Revive 


In   some   jurisdictions   a   judgment   may   be   revived 
by  a  formal  action  brought  for  thajt  purpose. 

In  a  number  of  jurisdictions  a  judgment  may  be 
revived  by  a  formal  suit  or  action  brought  for  that 
purpose,68  and  such  an  action  may  be  brought  even 
where  a  summary  method  of  revival  has  been  pro- 
vided by  statute.69  Some  statutes  providing  a  rem- 
edy by  action  of  revivor  have  been  held  to  supersede 
the  remedy  of  scire  facias70  and  to  furnish  die  only 
permissible  means  of  reviving  a  judgment.71 

In  an  action  to  revive  a  judgment,  it  is  sufficient 
and  necessary  that  the  proper  persons  are  made  par- 
ties,72 that  process  is  properly  served,78  and  that 


57.  Kan. — Burris  v.   Reinhardt    242 
P.  143,  120  Kan.  32. 

Action,  similar  to  revival  lies 
against  decedent's  heirs  to  subject 
property  formerly  owned  by  decedent 
to  payment  of  judgment  against  him. 
— Elliott  v.  San  Benito  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.,  Tex.Civ.App.,  137  S.W.2S  1070. 

58.  111.— -Industrial    Nat     Bank    of 
Chicago    v.    Altenberg,    64    N.E.2d 
219,   327  I11.APP.  337. 

N.M.— Bell  v.  Kyle,   274  P.  1068,   33 

N.M.  656. 
Tex. — Schluter  v.  Sell,  Civ.App.,   194 

S.W.2d  125. 
34  C.J.  p  667  note  62. 
Mode  of  revival  of  equity  decrees  see 

Equity  §   621. 

.  Mortgagee  is  not  entitled  to  notice 
of  proceedings  to  revive  judgment 
against  mortgagor. — Fox  v.  Seal,  Pa., 
22  Wall.  424,  22  L.Ed.  774. 

59.  111.— Ludwig    v.    Huck,    45     111. 
App.,  651. 

60.  Kan. — Kothman    v.    Skaggs,    29 
Kan.  5. 

34  OJ.  p  667  note  63. 

61.  N.D. — Merchants'   Nat   Bank  v. 
Braithwaite,   75   N.W.   244,   7  N.D. 
358,  66  Am.S.R.  653. 

62.  Ala.-— Allen  v.  Bradford,  3  Ala. 
281,   37  Am.D.  689 — State  v.  Ham, 
69  So.  253,  13  AfcuApp.  648. 

34  C.J.  p  667  note  65. 

63.  Iowa. — Mudge  v.  Livermore,  123 
N.W.  199,  148  Iowa  472. 

In  rem  proceeding 

Statutory  proceeding  to  revive  dor- 
mant judgment  is  not  one  "in  per* 
sonam"  and  hence  service  of  notice 
of  proceeding  to  revive  may  be  made 


outside   the    state. — Shefts    v.    Okla- 
homa Co.,  137  P.2d  589,  192  Okl.  483. 

64.  Ohio. — Sears  v.  Weimer,  55  N.B. 
2d  413,  143  Ohio  St.  312. 

34  C.J.  p  667  note  67. 

Personal  service  in  original  action 

Revivor  of  judgment  may  be  made 
on  service  by  publication  only  where 
personal  service  originally  was  made 
on  judgment  debtor. — Sears  v.  Wei- 
mer, supra. 

65.  Kan.—Hartz    v.    Fitts,    132    P. 
1187,  89  Kan.  751. 

66.  Pa.— Middleton  v.  Middleton,  106 
Pa.  252. 

67.  La. — Jaubert    Bros.    v.    Landry, 
App.,  15  So.2d  158. 

Defunct  corporation 

Proceeding  to  revive  dormant  judg- 
ment was  not  such  a  "new  action" 
that  right  to  maintain  such  proceed- 
ing would  be  affected  by  fact  that 
functions  of  judgment  creditor  as  a 
corporation  had  meantime  lapsed. 
— Foster  Screen  Co.  v.  Brigel,  Ohio 
App.,  31  N.E.2d  699. 
Scope  of  proceeding- 
Validity  of  assignment  of  dormant 
judgment  could  not  be  adjudicated 
in  proceeding  to  revive  it — Baker 
Steel  &  Machinery  Co.  v.  Ferguson, 
290  N.W.  449,  137  Neb.  578,  131  A. 
L.R.  798. 

68.  N.M. — Bailey  v.   Great  Western 
Oil  Co.,   259    P.  614,    32   N.M.  478, 
55  A.L.R.  467. 

34  O.J.  p  667  note  71. 
ZTatare  of  action 

Action  for  revivor  under  statute 
is  not  new  action,  but  proceeding  in 
aid  of  execution  on  old  judgment — 

1003 


Evans  v.  City  of  American  Falls,  11 
P.2d  363,  52  Idaho  7. 

Cross  action  could  be  regarded  as 
an   action  to   revive   dormant   judg- 
ment— Commerce  Trust  Co.  v.  Ramp, 
138  S.W.2d  531,  135  Tex.  84. 
69.    Neb.— Keith   v.   Bruder,    109    N. 
W.    172,    77    Neb.    215— Hayden   v. 
Huff,   87  N.W.   184,    62   Neb.  375. 
70L    Idaho. — Evans  v.  City  of  Ameri- 
can Falls,  11  P.2d  363,  52  Idaho  7. 
34  C.J.  p  668  note  77. 
Scire  facias  to  revive  judgments  see 
,  infra  §  548. 

71.  Idaho.— Tingwall   v.    King   Hill 
Irr.  Dist,  155  P.2d  605. 

La. — Park  v.  Markley,  App.,  17  So. 
2d  459,  rehearing  refused  18  So.2d 
73. 

72.  Pa, — Szusta  v.  Krawlec,  Com.Pl., 
36  liuz.Leg.Heg.  183. 

Utah.— Campbell   v.   Peter,   162   P.2d 

754. 
34  C.J.  p  668  note  72. 

Assignee  of  judgment  obtained  by 
assignee  of  note  against  maker  was 
"real  party  in  interest"  entitled  to 
maintain  action  to  renew  judgment, 
although  payee  of  note  testified  that 
any  money  collected  on  judgment 
would  belong  to  him. — Campbell  v. 
Peter,  supra. 
Several  defendants 

In  action  for  revivor,  whole  judg- 
ment must  be  revived  in  entirety 
against  all  the  several  defendants. 
— Bvans  v.  City,  of  American  Falls, 
11  P.2d  363,  €2  Idaho  7. 

73.  Iowa. — Mudge  v.  Liverxnore,  123 
N.W.  199,  148  Iowa  472. 

34  C.J.  p  668  note  73. 


§  545 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


the  pleadings  are  sufficient.74  The  general  rules 
concerning  evidence  in  civil  actions  are  to  be  ob- 
served.75 Reviver  in  such  an  action  may  be  based 
on  the  consent  given  in  open  court  by  counsel  for 
defendant76  The  judgment  of  revival  should  be  in 
proper  form.77  Costs  are  not  enforceable  against 
defendant  as  a  personal  obligation  where  the  judg- 
ment revived  is  one  in  rem.78 


§  545. 


Action  of  Debt 


Revival  of  a  Judgment  usually  may  be  accomplished 
by  an  action  of  debt  on  the  judgment. 

An  action  of  debt  on  a  judgment. is  usually  a 
proper  form  of  proceeding  effectually  reviving  the 
judgment,79  even  where  a  special  remedy  for  the 
revival  of  judgments  is  provided  by  statute.80  A 
judgment  in  such  an  action  is  not  rendered  void  by 


the  joinder81  or  nonjoinder82  of  unnecessary  par- 
ties. 


§  546. 


Motion  to  Revive 


In  some  jurisdictions  the  revival  of  «  Judgment  may 
be  ordered  on  motion,  application,  or  affidavit,  provided 
the  Judgment  debtor,  or  person  against  whom  revival  is. 
sought,  Is  given  due  and  sufficient  notice  of  such  mo- 
tion or  application  and  an  opportunity  to  contest  It. 

In  some,83  but  not  all,84  jurisdictions  the  revival 
of  a  judgment  may  be  ordered  on  motion,  applica- 
tion, or  affidavit,  provided  the  judgment  debtor,  or 
person  against  whom  the  revival  is  sought,  is  given 
due  and  sufficient  notice  of  ,such  a  motion  or  appli- 
cation and  an  opportunity  to  contest  it86  As  a  gen- 
eral rule  this  remedy  is  not  a  substitute  for*  but  is 


74.  Ind. — Flynn  v.  Northam,   89  N. 
E.  326,  44  Ind.App.  833. 

34  C.J.  p  668  note  74. 

Demurrer  to  affirmative  defense 
sustained  because  of  absence  of  ma- 
terial allegations. — Campbell  v.  Pe- 
ter. Utah,  162  P.2d  754. 

75.  La. — Brock  v.  Edwards,  App.,  159 
So.  £07. 

34  C.J.  p  668  note  75. 
Burden  of  proof 

In   a   suit    by   assignee    to    revive 
dormant    judgment,    which    was    de- 
fended    on     ground     that     plaintiff 
agreed  to  pay  it  as  part  of  consider- 
ation for  conveyance  of  land  to  him, 
burden  was  on  defendants  to  prove 
such  defense. — Whitehead  v.  Weldon, 
Tex.Civ.App..    264    S.W.    958. 
Evidence  held  admissible 
La. — Brock    v.    Edwards,    App.,    159 

So.  607. 

Evidence  held  sufficient 
111. — Layne    v.    Colegrove,     63    N.E. 

2d  530,  327  IlLApp.  204. 

Variance  between  pleadings  and 
proof  held  not  shown. — Wilson  v. 
Walters,  151  P.2d  685,  66  Cal.App. 
2d  1. 

76.  Tex. — Teel   v.    Brown.    Civ.App., 
185  S.W.  319. 

77.  I1L — Bismarck  Hotel  Co.  v.  Tyr- 
rell, 47  N.E.2d  544,  318  IlLApp.  230. 

Omission,  of  certain  debtors 

Where  order  of  revivor  contains  no 
decretal  language  against  certain 
Judgment  debtor,  only  inference 
which  can  be  drawn  from  omission 
is  that  of  payment  and.  consequent 
presumption  of  discharge  and  re- 
lease.— Evans  v.  City  of  American 
Fails,  11  P.2d  363,  52  Idaho  7. 

78.  La. — Henry  v.   Roaue,  App.,   18 
So.2d  917. 

79.  Mo* — Excelsior     Steel     Furnace 
Co.  Y.  Smith,  App.,  17  S.W.2d  378. 

Tex. — Austin   v,  Conaway,    Civ.App., 


283  S.W.  189— Surge  v.  Broussard, 

Civ.App.,  258  S.W.  502. 
34  C.J.  p  655  note  60,  p  668  note  80 

—24  C.J.  p  896  note  78  [c]   (2). 
Actions  on  judgments  generally  see 

infra  §   849. 

80.  Idaho.— Bashor  v.  Beloit,  119  P. 
55,  20  Idaho  592. 

34  C.J.  p  668  note  80. 

81.  Tex. — Burge  v.    Broussard,   Civ. 
App.,  258  S.W.  502. 

82.  Tex. — Burge  v.  Broussard,  supra. 

83.  Okl. — Shefts    v.    Oklahoma   Co., 
137  P.2d  589,   192   Okl.  483. 

34  O.J.  p  668  note  81. 
Partial  revival 

Where  assignee  is  entitled  to  re- 
vival of  unpaid  judgment  it  should 
be  revived  in  its  entirety. — Orchard 
&  Wilhelm  Co.  v.  Sexson,  229  N.W. 
17,  119  Neb.  370,  followed  in  Askew 
v.  Sexson.  229  N.W.  19,  119  Neb. 
369. 
Bsmedy  for  void  execution  sale 

Purpose  of  statute  providing  that, 
under  stated  circumstances,  the  court 
must,  on  motion,  revive  a  judgment 
is  to  restore  a  creditor,  whose  judg- 
ment has  been  satisfied  of  record 
because  of  error  of  law  which  has 
deprived  him  of  the  property  applied 
to  its  payment,  to  the  position  he 
occupied  before  void  execution  sale. 
— Betty  v.  Superior  Court  of  Los  An- 
geles County,  116  P.2d  947,  18  Cal.2d 
619. 

Simultaneous  use  of  soire  facias 
and  motion  for  revival  is  unneces- 
sary.— Cabler  v.  Anderson,  16  S.W. 
2d  170,  179  Ark.  364. 

S4.    Tenn.— Fogg  v.   G-ibbs,    8   Baxt 

464. 
Wis. — Ingraham  v.  Champion,  54  N. 

W.  398,  84  Wis.  235. 

85.    Gal. — Thompson  v.  Cook,  127  P. 

2d  909,  20  Cal.2d  564. 
Ky.— Baker  v.  Davis  Adm'r,  299  S.W. 

172,  22-1  Ky.  524. 

1004 


Okl. — Richardson  v.  Barnhart,  162  P. 
2d  1021— Dunlap  v.  Bull  Head  Oil 
Co.,  29  P.2d  108,  167  Okl.  277. 

34  C.J.  p  6*9  note  83. 

Affidavit  unnecessary 

Notice  of  hearing  of  motion  to  re- 
vive a  dormant  judgment,  served  per- 
sonally on  judgment  debtor  in  anoth- 
er state,  was  not  void  on  ground  that 
no  affidavit  to  obtain  such  service 
was  filed  as  in  case  of  service  by 
publication. — Richardson  v.  Barnhart, 
Okl.,  162  P.2d  1&21— Shefts  v.  Okla- 
homa Co.,  137  P.2d  589,  192  Okl.  483. 

Effect  of  appearance 

A  judgment  debtor,  who  received 
notice  of  motion  to  revive  dormant 
judgment  two  days  before  hearing, 
could  not  complain  that  he  was  not 
given  a  "reasonable  time"  where  he 
appeared  in  person  and  asked  no  con- 
tinuance.— Shefts  v.  Oklahoma  Co., 
supra. 

Form  of  notice 

Notice  for  revival  of  judgment  is 
not  such  "writ"  or  "process"  as  is 
required  by  constitution  and  statute 
to  run  in  name  of  state. — Dunlap  v. 
Bull  Head  Oil  Co.,  29  P.2d  108,  167 
Okl.  277. 

Irregular  issuance  of  notice 

(1)  Where  notice  of  application  for 
revivor  of  judgment  was  signed  and 
delivered  to  sheriff  by  attorney  for 
judgment   creditor  instead   of   by   a 
clerk  of  district  court  as  required  by 
statute,  motion  to  quash  service  was 
improperly  overruled,  and  judgment 
should  not  have  been  revived. — Kle- 
ma  v.  Neuvert,  135  P.2d  557,  156  Kan. 
633. 

(2)  Quashing  of  service  of  appli- 
cation to   revive   dormant  judgment 
was  not  error,  where  notice  waCs  not 
issued  by  clerk  as  a  summons  would 
be    Issued    and    delivered    to    sheriff 
and  served  as  prescribed  by  statute. 
— Smith  v.  Henry,  1*24  P.2d  448.  155 
Kan.  289. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  548 


in  addition  to,  an  action  on  the  judgment86  or  bill 
of  revivor,87  and  has  been  regarded  as  a  continua- 
tion of  the  original  suit88  A  motion  to  revive  a 
judgment  is  to  be  distinguished  from  one  to  obtain 
leave  to  issue  execution,  as  stated  in  Executions  § 
59  b  (2)  (a). 

General  rules  of  procedure  on  motions,89  such  as 
with  respect  to  the  determination  of  the  application 
and  issuance  of  orders  thereon,90  usually  apply  to 
motions  to  revive  a  judgment 

In  a  proceeding  brought  under  a  statute  the  stat- 
utory procedure  should  be  strictly  followed,91  but 
minor  irregularities  will  not  affect  the  validity  of 
the  proceeding.92 

Revival  after  death  of  debtor  or  creditor.  It  has 
been  held  that  if  revival  is  sought  against  the  heirs 
of  a  deceased  judgment  debtor,  plenary  proceedings 
must  be  brought,  and  it  is  not  permissible  to  pro- 
ceed by  motion  or  rule.93  Under  some  statutes, 
however,  on  the  death  of  the  judgment  creditor  the 
judgment  may  be  revived  on  motion.94 

§  547.    — -  Summons  to  Show  Cause 

Under  some  statutes  revivor  of  judgment  may  be 
had  by  means  of  a  proceeding  commenced  by  a  sum- 
mons to  show  cause  why  the  Judgment  should  not  be 
revived. 

The  proceeding  prescribed  by  some  statutes  for 
reviving  a  judgment  partakes  both  of  the  nature  of 


a  formal  action  and  of  a  scire  facias,  since  it  is  be- 
gun by  a  summons,  but  requires  defendant  to  show 
cause  why  the  judgment  should  not  be  revived  or 
enforced,  as  the  case  may  be.96 

§  548.    Scire  Facias 

*     a.  In  general 

b.  When  remedy  lies 

c.  Necessity  for,  and  requisites  of,  writ 

d.  Application  and  affidavit 

e.  Service  and  return 

f.  Amending  and  quashing  or  vacating 

writ 

g.  Parties 
h.  Pleading 
i.  Evidence 
j.  Trial 

k.  Judgment 
I.  Execution 
m.  Amicable  scire  facias 

a.  In  General 

In  some  Jurisdictions,  although  not  in  others,  a  judg- 
ment may  be  revived  by  means  of  a  writ  of  scire  facias 
which  Is  a  Judicial  writ  to  afd  in  the  recovery  of  a  judg- 
ment debt,  and  the  proceeding  is  most  widely  regarded 
as  a  continuation  of  the  suit  In  which  the  Judgment  was 
obtained  rather  than  as  an  original  action. 

At  common  law  the  remedy  by  scire  facias  was 
confined  to  judgments  recovered  in  real  actions.96 


86.  Mont— Haupt  v.  Burton,   55   P. 
110,  21  Mont  572,  69  Ara.S.R.  698. 

34  C.J.  p  669  note  84. 

87.  Neb.— Keith  v.  Brudder,  109  N. 
W.  172,  77  Neb.  215. 

88.  Tenn.— Williams  v.  Cantrell,  124 
S.W.2d   29,    22    Tenn.App.   443. 

89.  Idaho. — Evans   v.   Humphrey,   5 
P.2d  545,  51  Idaho  268. 

34  C.J.  p  668  note  81  [a],  [b]. 
Piling* 

Failure  to  file  affidavit  and  motion 
for  revival  of  Judgment  was  waived, 
in  absence  of  seasonable  objection. — 
Evans  v.  Humphrey,  5  P.2d  545.  51 
Idaho  268. 

90.  Idaho. — Evans  v.  Humphrey,  su- 
pra. 

Okl.— Richardson  v.  Barnhart,  162  P. 

2d  1021. 
Evidence 

(1)  Evidence     held    admissible.-— 
Casey  v.  Cooledge,  175  So.  557,  234 
Ala.  499. 

(2)  Evidence  held  sufficient — Holi- 
day Oil  Co.  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co. 
of  Maryland,  19  P.2d  335,  162  OkL 
192. 

Appeal  from  ruling  of  clerk  of  court 
Where  the  motion  is  properly  be- 
fore a  judge  on  appeal  from  a  re- 


fusal of  clerk  of  court  to  revive  the 
judgment,  the  judge  may  grant  the 
motion,  or  may  reverse  and  remand 
the  case  with  directions.— Martin  v. 
Briscoe,  55  S.E.  782,  143  N.C.  353. 
Description  of  parties 

Order  of  revival  of  Judgment  giv- 
ing name  of  plaintiff  in  caption  and 
defendants  sufficiently  described  par- 
ties.— Evans  v.  Humphrey,  5  .  P.2d 
545,  51  Idaho  268. 
Service  on  attorney 

Service  of  notice  of  revivor  of 
Judgment  on  attorney  for  party 
against  whom  revivor  is  sought  is 
sufficient  to  give  trial  court  juris- 
diction.— Richardson  v.  Barnhart, 
Okl.,  162  P.2d  1021. 

91.  Ariz,— Fay  v.   Harris,    164    P.2d 
860. 

Compliance  held  sufficient 

Ariz. — Fay  v.  Harris,  supra— McBride 

v.  McDonald,  215  P.  166,  25  Ariz. 

207. 

92.  Ariz.— Fay   v.  Harris.   164   P.2d 
860. 

Erroneous  statement  of  balance 
due  on  judgment,  easily  corrected 
from  data  set  forth  in  affidavit,  and 
trifling  error  in  computation  of  in- 
terest did  not  render  affidavit  insuffi- 
cient— Fay  v.  Harris,  supra. 

1005 


failure  to  verify 

An  affidavit  of  renewal,  subscribed 
and  sworn  to  before  proper  notary, 
was  sufficient,  even  though  not  con- 
firmed in  a  separate  affidavit,  verified 
positively  by  the  person  making  it. 
—McBride  v.  McDonald,  215  P.  166, 
25  Ariz.  207. 

93.  Ind. — Faulkner  v.   Larrabee,   76 
Ind.  154. 

La. — Reynolds   v.    Horn,    4    La.Ann. 
187. 

94.  Okl.— Holden   v.    Barringer,    144 
P.2d  964,  193  OkL  411. 

34  C.J.  p  668  note  81  [c],  p  669  note 

93. 
Payment  of  tax  on  Judgment 

Motion  to  revive  judgment  in  name 
of  deceased  judgment  creditor's  sole 
legatee  is  merely  special  statutory 
proceeding  to  give  life  to  dormant 
judgment,  and  is  not  an  "action  or 
suit  for  the  collection"  of  judgment 
within  statute  requiring  prior  pay- 
ment of  intangible  taxes,  and  hence 
order  of  revivor  prior  to  such  pay- 
ment was  proper.— Holden  v.  Barrin- 
ger, supra. 

95.  B.C. — Cberaw    &    C.    R.    Co.    v. 
Marshall,  18  S.E.  247,  40  B.C.  69. 

34  C.J.  p  669  notes  94,  96. 
86.    Iowa.— Von  Puhl  y.  Rucker,   6 
Iowa  187. 


§  548 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


The  writ  of  scire  facias  was  first  permitted  to  re- 
vive a  personal  judgment  by  the  Statute  of  West- 
minster II,97  which  authorized  and  required  a  scire 
facias  in  all  cases  where  plaintiff  desired  to  sue  out 
an  execution  on  his  judgment  after  the  expiration 
of  a  year  and  a  day  from  its  final  recovery.98  In 
many  states  the  provisions  of  this  statute  have  been 
adopted  as  a  part  of  their  common  law,  or  incorpo- 
rated in  their  statutes,  so  that  the  proper  method  of 
obtaining  a  revival  is  by  a  proceeding  begun  by 
the  issue  of  a  scire  facias  requiring  defendant  to 
show  cause  why  the  judgment  should  not  be  re- 
vived and  its  lien  continued,99  although,  as  dis- 
cussed in  Executions  §  66,  the  new  acts  have  gen- 
erally extended  the  time  within  which  execution 
may  issue  without  revival  by  scire  facias. 

In  some  jurisdictions  it  has  been  held  that  scire 
facias  is  the  only  mode  of  reviving  a  judgment.1 


In  other  jurisdictions,  however,  the  writ  has  been 
abolished  by  code  or  statute,  either  expressly2  or 
impliedly,  as  by  providing  for  one  form  of  action 
and  not  authorizing  scire  facias.3 

Nature  and  scope  of  proceeding.  A  scire  facias 
to  revive  a  judgment  is  a  judicial,4  but  not  an  orig- 
inal,6 writ.  Although  it  is  in  the  nature  of  an  ac- 
tion because  defendant  may  plead  to  it,6  and  has 
been  held  to  come  within  the  meaning  of  "action" 
in  statutory  provisions  relating  to  actions,7  and  in 
some  cases  has  been  classified  in  substance  as  a  new 
action,8  it  is  more  widely  held  that  a  proceeding  by 
scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  is  not  an  original 
proceeding,  but  a  mere  continuation  of  the  former 
suit,9  or,  in  other  words,  it  is  merely  a  supplemen- 
tary remedy  to  aid  in  the  recovery  of  the  debt  evi- 
denced by  the  original  judgment.10  It  has  been 
stated  that  in  a  scire  facias  proceeding  to  revive 


Pa.  —  Stewart    v.    Peterson,    63    Pa, 

230. 

Scire  facias: 

Nature  of  writ  generally  see  the 
C.J.S.  title  Scire  Facias  §  3,  also 
56  C.J.  p  867  note  10-p  869  note 
33. 

To  enforce: 
Alimony    decree    see    Divorce    § 

271. 
Judgments  generally  see  infra  § 

588. 
To  obtain  leave  to  issue  execution 

see  Executions  §  59  b. 
Deceased  Judgment  debtor 

At  common  law  Judgment  became 
unenforceable  by  execution  on  death 
of  Judgment  debtor,  but  Judgment 
could  be  revived  by  scire  facias  di- 
rected to  heirs  and  enforced  against 
realty  owned  by  Judgment  debtor  at 
time  of  his  death.  —  Coats  v.  Veeders- 
burg  State  Bank,  38  N.E.2d  243,  219 
Ind.  675. 

97.  U.S.—  Spurway  v.  Dyer,  D.C.Fla., 
48  F.Supp.  255. 

34  O.J.  p  655  note  60,  p  669  note  99. 

98.  U.S.  —  Spurway  v.  Dyer,  supra. 
Del.—  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Crook,  174 

A.  369,  6  W.W.Harr.  281. 
3.4  C.J.  p  669  note  1. 

99.  U.S.  —  Spurway  v.  Dyer,  D.C.Fla., 
48  F.Supp.  255. 

Pa,  —  Wilcox  v.  Du  Bree,   8  Pa.Dist 

&  Co.  591. 
Utah.—  Continental     Nat     Bank     & 

Trust  Co.  of  Salt  Lake  City  v.  John 

H.  Seely  &  Sons,  77  P.2d  355,  94 

Utah  357,  115  A.L.R.  543. 
34  C.J.  p  669  note  2. 
Statute  held  applicable  to  Judgments 

on  tax  trod. 


Pa.—  Petition  of  Miller,  28  A.2d  257, 
149  PtuSuper.  142. 

1.  Mo.—  Bick  v.  Dixon,  129  S.W.  254, 
148  Mo.  703  —  Armstrong  v.  Crooks, 
83  Mo.App.  141. 


2.  Idaho.— Bashor  v.  Beloit  119  P. 
55,  20  Idaho  592. 

3.  N.M.— De  Baca  v.  Wilcox,  68  P, 
922,  11  N.M.  346. 

34  C.J.  p  670  note  6. 

4.  Md. — Brooks    v.    Preston,    68    A. 
294,  106  Md.  693. 

34  OJ.  p  670  note  7. 

5.  Pa. — Cusano   v.   Rubolino,    89   A. 
2d  906,  351  Pa,  41. 

Utah.— Continental  Nat  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  Salt  Lake  City  v.  John 
H.  Seely  &  Sons  Co.,  77  P.2d  355,  94 
Utah  357,  115  A.L.R.  543 

34  C.J.  p  670  note  8. 

6.  D.C.— McMullen  v.  Waters,  295  F. 
1008,  54  APP.D.C.  187. 

34  C.J.  p  670  note  9. 

7.  U.S. — Browne    v.    Chavez,    N.M., 
21  S.Ct  514,  181  U.S.  68,  45  LJBd. 
752. 

34  C.J.  p  670  note  10. 

8.  Mass. — Perkins  v.  Bangs,  92  N.B. 
623,  206  Mass.  408. 

34  C.J.  p  670  note  11. 

9.  Ala.— Quill  v.   Carolina  Portland 
Cement  Co.,  124  So.  305,  220  Ala. 
134. 

Fla.— B.  A.  Lott  Inc.,  v.  Padgett  14 

So.2d  667,  153  Fla.  304— Massey  v. 

Pineapple  Orange  Co.,  100  So.  170, 

87  Fla.  374. 
Ga, — Fielding  v.  M.  Rich  &  Bros.  Co., 

169   S.E.  383,  46  Ga.App.  785. 
Mo. — State  ex  reL  Buder  v.  Hughes, 

166  S.W.2d  516,  350  Mo.  547— In  re 

Jackman's  Estate,  124  S.W.2d  1189, 

344   Mo.  49— City  of  St  Louis  v. 

Miller,  .  145    S.W.2d   504,    235    Mo. 

App.  987. 
Pa.— Harr  v.  Deeter,  31  Pa.Dlst   & 

Co.    702,    5    Sch.Reg.    205— Bell    v. 

Borys,    Com.Pl.,    44    1/ack.Jur.    44, 

56  York  Leg.Rec.  202. 

1006 


Utah.—  Continental     Nat     Bank     & 

Trust  Co.   of   Salt   Lake    City  v. 

John  H.   Seely  &  Sons   Co.,  77  P. 

2d    355,    94    Utah   357,    115   A.L.R. 

&43. 
Va.  —  American  Ry.  Express  Co.  v.  F. 

S.    Royster    Guano    Co.,    126    S.E. 

678,  141  Va.  602,  affirmed  47  S.Ct. 

355,  273  U.S.  274,  71  L.Ed.  642. 
34  C.J.  p  670  note  12. 

Where  scire  facias  is  used  after 
death  of  defendant  in  judgment  to 
charge  person  not  party  to  Judgment 
with  payment  of  it  by  execution  to 
be  issued  thereon,  scire  facias,  al- 
though it  usually  partakes  of  the 
nature  of  an  action,  is  continuation 
of  proceeding  already  begun,  and  is 
in  nature  of  rule  to  show  cause  why 
execution  should  not  issue.  —  First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Crook,  174  A.  369,  6  W. 
W.Harr.,  Del.,  281. 

10.    Ala.—  Quill  v.  Carolina  Portland 

Cement  Co.,  124  So.  305,  220  Ala. 

134. 
111.  —  Bank   of  Edwardsville  v.   Raf- 

faelle,  45  N.E.2d  651,  381  111.  486, 

144  A.L.R.  401. 
Pa.  —  Cusano    v.    Rubolino,    39    A.2d 

906,  351  Pa.  41. 
Utah.—  Continental     Nat     Bank     & 

Trust   Co.    of   Salt   Lake   City  v. 

John  H.  Seely  &  Sons  Co.,  77  P.2d 

355,  94  Utah  357,  115  A.L.R.  548. 
34  C.J.  p  671  note  13. 


statements 

(1)  Scire  facias  is  a  writ  for  re- 
vival of  a  Judgment  which  has  come 
to   enjoy  the   dignity  of  a  lien  on 
realty  so  that  execution  may  issue  on 
revived  Judgment  —  Spurway  v.  Dyer, 
D.C.Fla.,  48  F.Supp.  255. 

(2)  Scire  facias  is  only  a  step  in 
the  original  cause  of  a  remedial  na- 
ture to  effectuate  the  lien  already  in 
existence.  —  B.  A.  Lott  Inc.,  v.  Pad- 
gett 14  So.2d  667,  153  Fla.  304. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  548 


a  judgment  the  only  question  to  be  determined  is 
whether  or  not  plaintiff  has  a  right,  as  against  de- 
fendant, to  have  the  judgment  executed.11 

b.  When  Remedy  Lies 

The  remedy  of  sclre  facias  lies  to  revive  dormant 
judgments  and  may  be  pursued  even  though  there  is  a 
present  right  to  issue  execution  on  the  judgment  or 
there  is  available  another  means  of  rendering  the  judg- 
ment effective. 

The  remedy  of  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment 
lies  where  the  judgment  has  become  dormant,12  as 
for  failure  to  issue  execution  within  the  time  speci- 
fied by  statute.13  The  judgment  creditor  may  pur- 
sue the  remedy,  however,  even  though  he  has  a 
present  and  immediate  right  to  issue  execution  on 
the  judgment,14  and  in  some  jurisdictions,16  al- 
though not  in  others,15  it  may  be  resorted  to  al- 
though an  execution  has  already  been  issued,  pro- 
vided it  has  not  resulted  in  full  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment  When  an  execution  has  issued  under 
which  property  of  defendant  has  been  levied  on, 
and  there  is  not  sufficient  to  discharge  the  debt,  a 
scire  facias  issued  afterward  should  be  special  quoad 
residuum.17 

A  judgment  against  one  who  dies  subsequent  to 
its  rendition  may  be  revived  against  his  personal 
representative  by  scire  facias,18  and  it  has  been 
held  that  this  is  the  only  mode  in  which  the  judg- 
ment may  be  enforced  against  the  estate.19 

The  remedy  by  scire  facias  is  not  rendered  un- 
available by  the  existence  of  other  remedies  or 


means  of  making  the  judgment  effective,20  but  may 
be  pursued  concurrently  with  them,21  although,  as 
discussed  supra  §  544,  some  statutes  providing  for 
revivor  of  judgment  by  action  have  been  held  to 
supersede  the  proceeding  by  scire  facias.  In  the 
few  jurisdictions  where,  as  discussed  infra  subdivi- 
sion k  (1)  of  this  section,  a  judgment  of  revival 
is  deemed  to  be  a  new  judgment,  and  where,  as  fur- 
ther discussed  infra  §  549,  such  new  judgment  bars 
recovery  on  the  original  judgment,  each  successive 
writ  of  scire  facias  must  be  founded  on  the  judg- 
ment which  immediately  preceded  it.22  In  other 
jurisdictions  it  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  of 
revivor  cannot  be  revived  by  scire  facias,23 

A  scire  facias  has  been  held  not  to  lie  to  revive 
a  judgment  which  has  been  fully  satisfied  as  to 
principal,  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  in  the  collec- 
tion of  interest  claimed  to  be  due.24  A  scire  facias 
against  the  heirs  and  terre-tenants  of  the  judg- 
ment debtor  will  not  reach  property  never  owned 
by  the  latter,  but  inherited  by  his  children  after  his 
death  from  a  third  person.25  It  has  also  been  held 
that  judgments  entered  by  confession  under  a  war- 
rant of  attorney  cannot  be  revived  by  scire  facias.26 

Consolidation  of  judgments.  In  a  proceeding  by 
scire  facias  several  judgments  may  be  consolidated, 
where  all  of  them  are  for  the  use  of  plaintiff,  al- 
though some  of  them  were  obtained  in  the  names  of 
other  persons,27  or  where  the  judgments  are  all 
against  the  same  defendant,  although  one  of  them 
is  also  against  another  person:28 


11.  111. — Smith  v.  Stevens,  24  N.B.  • 
511,  133  111.  183— Blakeslee's  Stor- 
age Warehouses  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
11  N.E.2d  42,  292  IlLApp.  288,  af- 
firmed 17  N.E.2d  1,  369  111.  480,  120 
A.L.R.  715. 

Pa. — Bell  v.  Yontos,  46  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
636,  44  Lack.Jur.  83,  57  York  Leg. 
Bee.    53— Cameron  v.  Wallace,    24 
Pa.Dist  &  Co.  42,  44  Lanc.L.Rev. 
597,  49  York  Leg,Rec.  78. 
Error  in  classifying-  judgment  to 
prouate  court  cannot  be  corrected  in 
proceedings   against   heirs   of  judg- 
ment  debtor  to    revive   judgment.— 
Wolford    v.    Scarbrough,    21    S.W.2d 
777,  224  Mo.App.  137. 

la.  Fla.— Massey  v.  Pineapple 
Orange  Co.,  100  So.  170,  87  Fla. 
374. 

•Ga.— Fielding  v.  M.  Rich  &  Bros.  Co., 
169  S.E.  383,  46  Ga.App.  785. 

13.  U.S. — Spurway  v.  Dyer,  D.CFla., 
48  F.Supp.  265. 


14,  U.S.— Brown 
Ohio  Canal  Co. 
4  Hughes  584. 

34  C.J.  p  671  note  14. 


v.    Chesapeake    & 
C.C.Md.,  4  F.  770, 


Correction  of  record 

Where,  from  examination  of  rec- 
ord, plaintiff's  right  to  execution 
seems  to  be  extinguished,  but  in  fact 
it  is  not,  plaintiff  may,  by  scire  fa- 
cias, bring  defendant  before  court, 
and,  on  proper  showing,  have  entry 
on  record  vacated  or  made  to  con- 
form to  the  facts,  and  obtain  ex- 
ecution on  original  judgment. — Conti- 
nental Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  of 
Salt  Lake  City  v.  John  H;  Seely  & 
Sons  Co.,  77  P.2d  355,  94  Utah  357, 
115  A.L.R.  543. 

15.  Ark.— Trapnall  v.  Richardson,  13 
Ark.  543,  58  Am.D.  338. 

34  C.J.  p  671  note  15. 

16.  Miss. — Buckner     v.     Pipes,     56 
Miss.     366— Locke    v.     Brady,     30 
Miss.  21. 

17.  N.J.— StUle  r.  Wood,  1  N.J.Law 
139. 

18.  Ark.— -Brearly  v.  Peay,   23  Ark. 
172. 

24  C.J.  p  895  note  66. 

Personal  representative  as  proper 
or. necessary  party  see  infra  sub- 
division g  (2)  of  this  section. 

1007 


19.  Tenn.  —  Gwin  v.  Latimer,  4  Yerg. 
22. 

24  C.J.  p  895  note  67. 

20.  111.—  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Chicago 
v.  Craig,  31  N.E.2d  810,  308  IlLApp. 
377. 

21.  U.S.  —  Lafayette  County  v.  Won- 
derly,  Mo.,  92  F.  313,  34  C.C.A.  360. 

34  C.J.  p  671  note  19. 

22.  Pa.  —  Custer  v.  Detterer,  3  Watts 
&  S.  28  —  Collingwood  v.  Carson,  2 
Watts  &  S.  220-i-Calhoon  v.  New- 
Ion,  40  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  123. 

23.  Mo.  —  Gregory     Grocery    Co.     v. 
Link,   25   S.W.2d   575,   224   Mo.App. 
407. 

24k  111.—  Blakeslee's  Storage  Ware- 
houses v.  City  of  Chicago,  11  N.E. 
2d  42,  292  IlLApp.  288,  affirmed  17 
N.E.2d  1,  369  111.  480,  120  A.L.R. 
715. 

25.  Md.—  Adams  v.  Stake,  10  A.  444, 
67  Md.  447. 

26.  Pa.—  Jones  v.  Dillworth,  63  Fa. 
447. 

27.  Pa.—  Appeal  of  Reed,  7  Pa.  65. 


28.    Pa,—  Appeal    of 
,     137,  129  Pa.  268. 


Yeager,    18    A. 


§  548 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


c.  Necessity  for,  and  Requisites  of,  Writ 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Recital  and  identification  of  original 

judgment 

(1)  In  General 

In  a  scire  facias  proceeding,  it  fa  essential  to  the 
revival  of  the  judgment  that  a  writ  be  issued  setting 
forth  ail  the  facts  on  which  the  right  of  revivor  de- 
pends, and  calling  'on  the  defendant  to  show  cause  why 
execution  should  not  be  issued  against  him;  but  irreg- 
ularities not  going  to  the  Jurisdiction  will  be  waived  If 
an  objection  Is  not  seasonably  made.  An  alias  or  pluries 
scire  facias  may  issue  in  a  proper  case. 

In  a  proceeding  by  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judg- 
ment the  issuance  of  a  writ  of  scire  facias  is  essen- 
tial to  the  validity  of  the  judgment  of  revival.29 
As  discussed  infra  subdivision  h  (1)  of  this  section, 
the  writ  takes  the  place  and  performs  the  office  of 
a  declaration.  Although  it  has  been  held  that  the 
same  particularity  is  not  required  in  the  writ  as  in 
stating  a  cause  of  action  in  the  original  complaint,30 
it  is  well  settled  that  the  writ  should  set  forth,  at 
least  in  substance,  any  fact  on  which  plaintiffs  right 
to  have  his  judgment  revived  depends.31  Accord- 
ingly it  should  show  the  legal  title  of  plaintiff  to 
have  execution  on-the  judgment,32  and  name  or  cor- 
rectly describe  the  parties  to  be  charged,33  the  court 
from  which  it  issues  and  to  which  it  is  returnable,34 
and,  as  discussed  infra  subdivision  c  (2)  of  this  sec- 
tion, the  judgment  on  which  it  is  founded. 

The  writ  must  also  state  the  purpose  for  which 
it  is  issued,  or  the  demand  against  which  defendant 
is  required  to  show  cause,35  and  the  amount  for 
which  it  is  issued,36  and  should,  in  conclusion,  call 


on  defendant  to  show  cause  why  execution  should 
not  issue  against  him.37  On  the  other  hand,  the 
writ  need  not  aver  the  performance  of  all  things 
essential  to  the  validity  of  the  judgment,38  or  nega- 
tive matters  of  defense,3^  or  allege  that  execution 
had  not  been  issued  within  a  year  and  a  day  or  the 
statutory  period,  if  any,  substituted  therefor.40 

Death  of  defendant  and  survivorship.  A  scire 
facias  against  one  of  the  three  defendants  in  a  judg- 
ment, which  does  not  aver  the  death  of  the  others 
and  the  survivorship  of  the  one  pursued,  is  bad  on 
demurrer.41  A  scire  facias  against  an  executor  to 
revive  a  judgment  against  the  testator  should  con- 
tain a  suggestion  of  the  death  of  the  judgment  debt- 
or,42 and  also  show  the  appointment  of  defendant  as 
his  executor.43  A  scire  facias  against  the  adminis- 
trator of  a  joint  debtor  who  survived  the  other 
debtors  should  aver  the  survivorship.44 

Where  heirs  or  terre-tenants  involved.  It  has 
been  held  that  the  terre-tenants  ought  to  be  named, 
and,  if  all  are  not  named  in  the  writ,  it  may  be 
pleaded  in  abatement,46  but  it  has  also  been  held 
that  a  scire  facias  against  terre-tenants  may  be  ei- 
ther general  against  all  the  terre-tenants,  or  against 
certain  named  parties  as  terre-tenants,  and  al- 
though it  is  necessary  that  all  be  summoned,  it  is 
not  necessary  that  they  be  named  in  the  scire 
facias.46  It  has  also  been  held  that  a  scire  facias 
which  issues  against  the  heirs  and  devisees  of  one 
deceased  and  does  not  name  them,  but  only  de- 
scribes them,  is  not  bad  on  that  account.47  In  the 
case  of  heirs  or  terre-tenants  the  writ  should  specif- 
ically describe  the  lands  sought  to  be  charged,48 


29.  Mo.— Longlett  v.  Eisenherg,   10 
S.W.2d  317,  222  Mo.App.  805— Arm- 
strong v.  Crooks,  83  Mo.App.  141. 

Pa. — Brooks  v.  Caruthers'  Estate, 
Com.PL,  23  WestXJo.  138. 

30.  Tex. — Delaune  v.  Beaumont  Irr. 
Co.,  Civ.App..  136  S.W.  $18. 

31.  Pa. — Andrews    v.    Sullenberger, 
Com.PL,  25  WestCo.  93. 

Va. — American  Ry.  Express  Co.  v.  F. 
3.  Royster  Guano  Co.,  126  S.B. 
678,  141  Va.  602,  affirmed  47  S.Ct 
355,  273  U.S.  274,  71  L.Ed.  642— 
White  v.  Palmer,  66  S.E.  44,  110 
Va.  490. 

34  C.J.  p  672  note  33. 

Nonpayment 

HI.— Jacobs  v.  Lucas,  270  ULApp. 
123. 

32.  111.— Smith  v.   Stevens,   24  N.E. 
511,  133  111.  183. 

34  C.J.  p  672  note  34. 
Capacity  of  use-plaintiff 

Where,  on  scire  facias  to  revive 
judgment  it  appeared  that  one  of 
defendants  paid  judgment  and  took 
assignment  in  name  of  another, 


who  was  use-plaintiff,  fact  that  use- 
plaintiff  did  not  appear  as  trustee 
was  immaterial,  where  it  was  ad- 
mitted that  he  was  merely  agent  or 
trustee  of  defendant  who  paid  judg- 
ment.—City  Nat.  Bank  of  Wichita 
Falls,  Tex.,  now  for  Use  of  Newhams 
v.  Atkinson,  175  A.  507,  316  Pa.  526. 

33.  Miss.— Pickett     v.      Pickett,     2 
Miss.  267. 

Tenn.— Dougherty       v.       Hurt,       6 
Humphr.  430. 

34.  Ark.— Anthony  v.  Humphries,  9 
Ark.  176. 

35.  Pa. — In  re  Cake,  40  A.  568,  186 
Pa.  412. 

34  C.J.  p  672  note  41. 

36.  Md.— McKnew  v.  Duvall,  45  Md. 
501. 

34  COT.  p  672  note  42. 

37.  Ind.— Davidson  v.  Alvord,  3  Ind. 

34  C.J.  p  672  note  4'3. 

L    Miss.— Commercial  Bank  v.  Ken- 
dall, 21  Miss.  278. 
34  CJT.  p  672  note  38. 

1008 


39.    D.C.— Starkweather  v.  West  End 

Nat  Bank,  21  App.D.C.  281. 
34  C.J.  p  672  note  39. 
40-    HL— Albin  v.  People,  46  111.  372. 
Ohio. — Weaver  v.  Reese,  6  Ohio  418. 

41.  Ind. — Graham  v.  Smith,  1  Blackf. 
414. 

42.  Ind.— Walker  v.  Hood,  5  Blackf. 
266. 

34  C.J.  p  672  note  45. 

43.  Ind. — Walker  v.  Hood,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  673  note  46. 

44.  Ind, — Graham      v.      Smith,      1 
Blackf.  414. 

45.  Md. — Thomas  v.  Farmers'  Bank 
of  Maryland,  46  Md.  43. 

43.    Miss.— Hughes  v.  Wilkinson,  28 
Miss.  600. 

47.  Tenn. — Seawell   v.    Williams,    5 
Hayw.  280. 

34  CJ.  p  673  note  50. 

48.  Md.— Lang    v.    Wilmer,    101    A. 
706,   131  Md.  215,  2  A.L.R.  1698. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  51. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


548 


an3  show  when  the  terre-tenant's  title  to  the  land 
vested49  or  that  the  heir  is  in  possession  of  lands  of 
which  his  ancestor  died  seized,50  but  it  need  not 
allege  proceedings  taken  ineffectually  against  the 
personal  representatives.51  Where  heirs  are  only 
liable  jointly  with  the  personal  representative,  un- 
less the  ancestor  has  been  dead  a  year  without  the 
appointment  of  such  representative,  a  failure  to  al- 
lege that  a  year  has  passed  without  such  appoint- 
ment renders  a  writ,  brought  against  the  heirs  alone, 
fatally  defective  on  demurrer.52 

Informalities  in  the  writ  or  irregularities  not  go- 
ing to  the  jurisdiction  may  be  cured  by  the  statute  of 
jeofails,53  or,  in  the  absence  of  seasonable  objec- 
tion, will  be  deemed  to  be  waived.54  They  cannot 
be  taken  advantage  of  by  a  stranger  to  the  judg- 
ment.55 

Alias  and  pluries  writs.  An  alias  or  pluries  scire 
facias  may  issue  where  service  of  the  first  writ  was 
not  effected,56  where  it  was  served  on  some  of  the 
joint  defendants  and  returned  not  served  as  to  the 
others,57  or  where  plaintiff  desires  to  proceed 
against  an  additional  party,  such  as  terre-tenant,58 
executor,59  or  administrator.60  An  alias  or  pluries 
scire  facias  may  also  issue  where  plaintiff  is  non- 
suited on  the  first  scire  facias.61 

(2)  Recital   and   Identification   of   Original 

Judgment 
A  writ   of  scire  facias  should   completely  and  cor- 


rectly describe  the  judgment  sought  to  be  revived;  but 
only  a  material  variance  in  the  description  wilt  render 
the  writ  vulnerable  to  a  plea  of  nul  tiel  record. 

As  a  general  rule  it  is  necessary  that  the  scire 
facias  shall  correctly  set  forth  and  describe  the 
original  judgment  on  which  it  is  founded,62  and  this 
requirement  is  applicable  to  an  amicable  scire  facias 
as  well  as  to  other  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judg- 
ment.63 Thus  the  judgment  must  be  described  with 
respect  to  the  amount  of  the  recovery,6*  the  date 
of  the  judgment,65  the  parties  plaintiff  and  defend- 
ant,66 and  the  court  in  which  it  was  entered;67  but 
it  is  sufficient  that  the  original  judgment  is  substan- 
tially described68  with  such  certainty  that  defendant 
must  know  what  judgment  is  meant.69 

A  mere  immaterial  variance  or  irregularity  in  the 
description  of  the  judgment,  which  does  not  tend 
to  mislead,  will  not  avoid  the  scire  facias;70  but 
where  the  variance  between  the  original  judgment 
and  the  writ  is  material  it  will  be  fatal  on  a  plea 
of  nul  tiel  record71  and  will  break  the  continuity  of 
the  lien.72 

d.  Application  and  Affidavit 

Application  for  a  writ  of  scire  facias,  although  gen- 
erally unnecessary,  is  not  Improper,  and  may  be  re* 
quired  after  the  lapse  of  a  designated  period  of  time 
from  the  rendition  of  the  judgment. 

While  generally  the  writ  of  scire  facias  may  issue 
without  any  application  to  the  court,78  it  is  entirely 
proper  that  a  petition,  motion,  prsecipe,  or  other  ap- 


49.  Md.— Warfield  v.  Brewer,  4  Gill 
265. 

50.  S.C.— Whiting  v.  Pritchard,  30  S. 
C.L.  304. 

51.  Va. — Rogers  v.  Denham,  2  Gratt 
200,  43  Va.  200. 

52.  Ky. — Huey   v.    Redden,    3    Dana 
4S8. 

53.  Miss.— Locke  v.  Brady,  30  Miss. 
21. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  56. 

54.  Pa.— Pyles  v.  Bosler,  22  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  10. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  56. 

55.  Pa. — In  re  Dougherty,  9  Watts  & 
S.  189,  42  Am.D.  326. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  57. 

56.  Ga.— Ellis  v.  McCrary,  183  S.E. 
823,  52  Ga.App.  583. 

34  C.J.  p  674  note  69. 

57.  U.S. — Baker  v.  French,  D.  C.,  2 
P.Cas.No.767,  2  Cranch  C.C.  539. 

34  C.J.  p  674  note  70. 

58.  Pa.— Simmons    v.    Simmons,    28 
A.2d    445,    150    Pa.Super.    393,    af- 
firmed  29   A.2d   677,   346   Pa.   52. 

34  C.J.  p  674  note  72. 

59.  N.C.— Borden  v.  Thorpe,  35  N.C. 
298. 

34  C.J.  p  674  note  73  [a]  (1). 

49  C  J.S.-64 


60.  Pa.— -Boy  v.  Patton,  18  Pa.Dist. 
52. 

34  C.J.  p  674  note  73  [a]  (2). 

61.  N.C.— Trice  v.  Turrentine,  35  N. 
C.  212. 

62.  Okl.— Noyes  v.  French,  94  P.  546, 
20  Okl.  515. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  59. 

63.  Pa. — Appeal  of  Worman,   20  A. 
415,  110  P*u  25. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  59  [a]. 
Amicable  scire  facias  generally  see 
infra  subdivision  m  of  this  section. 

64.  Pa. — Swank  v.  Dickson,  Com.Pl., 
9  Som.Co.  72. 

Va. — American  Ry.  Express  Co.  v.  F. 
S.  Royster  Guano  Co.,  126  S.B.  678, 
141  Va.  602,  affirmed  47  S.Ct.  355, 
273  U.S.  274,  71  L.Ed.  642. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  60. 

65.  Ark. — Bolinger    v.     Fowler,     14 
Ark.  27. 

Pa. — Swank  v.  Dickson,  Com.Pl.,  9 
Som.Co.  72. 

Va. — American  Ry.  Express  Co.  v.  F. 
S.  Royster  Guano  Co.,  126  S.E.  678, 
141  Va.  602,  affirmed  47  S.Ct  355, 
273  U.S.  274,  71  L.Ed.  642. 

66.  Pa. — Swank  v.  Dickson,  Com.Pl., 
9  Som.Co.  72. 

Va. — American   Ry.    Express    Co.   v. 

1009 


F.  S.  Royster  Guano  Co.,  126  S.E. 
678,   141  Va,  602,  affirmed  47  S.Ct. 
355,  273  U.S.  274,  71  L.Ed.  642. 
34  C.J.  p  673  note  62. 

67.  Ky. — Coleman     v.     Edwards,     4 
Bibb  347. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  €3. 

68.  Pa. — Landon    v.    Brown,    28    A. 
921,  160  Pa.  538. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  64. 

69.  Mo. — Andrews    v.    Buckbee,     77 
Mo.  428. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  65. 

70.  Pa. — Landon  v.  Brown,  28  A.  921, 
160  Pa.  538. 

34  C.J.  p  673  note  66. 

71.  Md. — Moore  v.  Garrettson,  $  Md. 
444. 

34  C.J.  p  674  note  67. 
Variance  "between  writ  and  prwcipe 
Pa. — Klein  v.  Anderson,   39   Pa.Dist, 
&  Co.  139. 

72.  Pa. — In  re  Dougherty,  9  Watts  & 
S.  189,  42  Am.D.  326. 

73.  Mo.— City  of  St.  Louts  v.  Miller, 
145  S.W.2d  504,  235  Mo.App.  987— 
Longett    v.    Eisenbergr,    10    S.W.Sd 
317,  222  Mo.App.  805. 

34  C.J.  p  674  note  81. 


§  548 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


plication  should  be  filed,74  and,  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions, the  writ  cannot  issue  to  revive  a  judgment 
after  the  lapse  of  a  designated  time  from  its  rendi- 
tion except  on  leave  of  court  first  obtained  on  a  mo- 
tion or  other  application  supported  by  an  affidavit 
that  the  judgment  remains  in  force  and  unsatis- 
fied.™ Where  the  allegations  of  the  affidavit  are 
sufficient  to  repel  the  presumption  of  payment  aris- 
ing from  lapse  of  time,  the  scire  facias  may  be  or- 
dered as  a  matter  of  right,76  although  it  has  been 
held  that,  after  the  lapse  of  twenty  years,  defendant 
must  have  notice  of  the  motion  and  affidavit,77  and 
the  court  may  exercise  its  discretion,  and  allow  or 
refuse  the  motion,  as  may  seem  proper  in  the  case.78 
Although  an  affidavit  is  required,  an  objection  on 
the  ground  of  its  omission79  or  that  the  affidavit  is 
defective80  should  be  made  in  limine,  or  it  will  be 
held  to  have  been  waived. 

e.  Service  and  Return 

As  a  general  rule,  there  can  be  no  valid  judgment 
on  a  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  unless  the  writ 
was  served  on  the  persons  sought  to  be  bound  by  the 
revived  judgment. 

As  a  general  rule  there  can  be  no  valid  judg- 
ment on  a  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  unless 
the  writ  was  served  on  defendants81  and  on  heirs, 


terre-tenants,  or  other  persons  sought  to  be  bound.82 
If  defendant  is  within  the  jurisdiction,  the  service 
must  be  personal,83  and  after  the  manner  of  serv- 
ing a  writ  of  summons,84  but  constructive  service 
may  be  sufficient  where  defendant  cannot  be 
found.85  Where  the  judgment  to  be  revived  is 
against  two  defendants  jointly,  the  scire  facias  must 
be  served  on  both.86  Defendant  may  waive  a  defect 
or  failure  in  the  service  of  process  by  conduct 
which  indicates  submission  to  the  court's  jurisdic- 
tion.87 

Service  on  nonresidents.  Where,  as  dis.cussed  su- 
pra subdivision  a  of  this  section,  the  proceeding  by 
scire  facias  for  reviving  a  personal  judgment  is 
treated  as  merely  a  continuance  of  the  original  suit, 
jurisdiction  duly  obtained  in  the  original  suit  over 
the  person  of  defendant  will  endure  for  the  revival 
of  the  judgment,88  and  if  defendant  is  a  nonresi- 
dent the  service  may  be  constructive.89  If,  how- 
ever, the  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  is  treat- 
ed as  a  new  action  for  debt  on  the  judgment  and 
there  is  no  appearance  by  the  judgment  debtor  and 
he  resides  in  another  state,  service  on  him  in  such 
other  state  does  not  give  the  court  jurisdiction  to 
render  a  judgment  of  revivor,90  even  though  the  re- 
vival is  sought  in  a  court  in  the  state  in  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered  at  a  time  when  the  defend- 


74.  Mo.— City  of  St  Louis  v.  Miller, 
145  S.W.2d  504,  £35  Mo.App.  987. 

34  C.J.  p  675  note  82. 
Applications  held  sufficient 

(1)  Generally. 

U.S. — Brooks    v.   Oaruthers,    D.C.Pa., 

25  F.Supp.  413. 
111.— Hemphill  v.  Trgovic,  80  N.E.2d 

121,  225  IlLApp.  310. 
34  C.J.  p  675  note  82  [a]. 

(2)  Petition  held  sufficient  despite 
failure  to  set  out  original  judgment 
in  h«c  verba  or  to   allege   date  of 
entry  of  forfeiture  of  defunct  cor- 
porate defendant's  right  to  do  busi- 
ness.—Simmons  v.  Zimmerman  Land 
&  Irrigation  Co.,  Tez.Civ.App.,  292  3. 
W.  973. 

75.  Tenn.— Keith  v.  Metcalf,  2  Swan 
74. 

34  C.J.  p  675  note  83. 

76.  Tenn.— Keith  v.  Metcalf,  supra. 

77.  Tenn. — Keith  v.  Metcalf,  supra. 

78.  Tenn. — Keith  v.  Metcalf,  supra. 

79.  Tenn. — Fogg  v.   Gibbs,    8   Baxt. 
464. 

34  C.J.  p  675  note  87. 

80.  111.— Hemphill  v.  Trgovic,  <60  N. 
BL2d  121,   325  Ill.App.  310. 

34  CU.  p  675  note  87. 

81.  111. — First  Nat  Bank  of  Chicago 
v.  Craig,  31  N.E.2d  810,  308  IlLApp. 
377. 


Pa. — Szusta  v.  Krawiec,  Com.Pl.,   36 1  der    service    defective. — City    of    St, 


Luz.Leg.Keg.  183. 
34  C.J.  p  675  note  88. 

"Defendant,"  as  used  in  statute,  re- 
fers to  the  defendant  in  the  original 
suit  against  whom  the  Judgment  was 
rendered. — State  ex  rel.  Buder  v. 
Hughes,  166  S.W.2d  516,  350  Mo.  547. 
Time  of  service 

Some  statutes  prescribe  that  serv- 
ice of  the  writ  be  made  a  specified 
number  of  days  prior  to  the  com- 
mencement of  the  term  of  court  dur- 
ing which  the  writ  is-  returnable. — 
Fielding  v.  M.  Rich  &  Bros.  Co.,  169 
S.E.  383,  46  Ga.App.  785. 
82.  Mo. — State  ex  rel.  Buder  v. 

Hughes,    166    S.W.2d  516,   350   Mo. 

547. 
Pa. — Klein  v.  Anderson,  39  Pa.Dist  & 

Co.  139. 
34  C.J.  p  375  note  89. 

A.  purchaser  of  timber  rights  from 
Judgment  debtor  was  not  a  terre- 
tenant  and  hence  was  not  entitled 
to  service  on  revival  of  judgment  In 
scire  facias  proceeding. — Havens  v. 
Pearson,  6  A.2d  84,  334  Pa.  570,  122 
A.L.R.  512. 

The  purchaser  of  deed  of  trust  on 
property  against  which  benefits  were 
assessed  in  condemnation  proceeding 
was  not  owner  of  title  to  property, 
and  failure  to  serve  purchaser  with 
writ  of  scire  facias  to  revive  judge- 
ment assessing  benefits  did  not  ren- 


Louis  v.  Koch,  Mo.App.,   156  S.W.2d 
1. 

83.  Ga. — Stable   v.    Jones,    3    S.R2d 
861,  60  Ga.App.  397— Fielding  v.  M. 
Rich  &  Bros.  Co.,  169  S.E.  383,  46 
Ga,App.  785. 

I1L — U.  S.  Brewing  Co.  of  Chicago  v. 

Epp,  247  IlLApp.  315. 
34  C.J.  p  675  note  90. 
Service  held  accepted  by  defendant 
Pa.— Luzerne  Nat.   Bank  v.    Gosart, 

185  A.  640,  322  Pa.  446. 

84.  Mo. — Andrews    v.    Buckbee,     77 
Mo.  428. 

34  C.J.  p  675  note  91. 

S3.    Ark.— Waldstein     v.     Williams, 

142  S.W.  834,  101  Ark.  404,  37  L.R. 

A..N.S.,  1162. 
34  C.J.  p  675  note  99. 

86.  D.C.— Lyon  v.  Ford,  20  B.C.  530. 

87.  111.— Albers  v.  Martin,  45  N.E.2d 
102,  316  IlLApp.  446— U.  S.  Brew- 
ing Co.  of  Chicago  v.  Epp,  247  ILL 
App.  315. 

88.  Tex.— Collin  County  Nat  Bank 
V.  Hughes,  220  S.W.  767,  110  Tex. 
362. 

89.  111. — Bank    of    Edwardsville    v. 
Raffaelle,    45    N.E.2d    651,    381    111. 
486,  144  A.L.R.  401. 

34  C.J.  p  675  note  99. 

90.  Tex.— Collin   County  Nat.   Bank 
v.  Hughes,  220  S.W.  767,  110  Tex. 
362. 


1010 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


548 


ant  was  resident  therein,91  and  it  is  immaterial  that 
the  court  which  rendered  the  judgment  and  in 
which  the  revival  is  sought  was  a  federal  court92 
A  revival  of  a  judgment  for  purposes  of  execution 
by  scire  facias  without  service  of  the  scire  facias 
on,  or  appearance  by,  defendant,  who  was  outside 
the  state,  cannot  operate  to  remove  the  statutory 
bar  of  the  law  of  another  state,  in  which  he  resides, 
and  in  which  the  action  on  the  judgment  is 
brought.93 

Return  of  service.  The  officer's  return  should  set 
forth  correctly  the  facts  of  the  service,94  but  may 
be  aided  by  reasonable  intendments.95  In  a  proper 
case  the  return  may  be  corrected  or  amended.96 

f .  Amending  and  Quashing  or  Vacating  Writ 

A  writ  of  scire  facias  for  the  purpose  of  reviving  a 
Judgment  may  be  amended  for  the  purpose  of  correcting 
irregularities,  but  amendments  which  will  deprive  an  ad- 
verse party  of  some  substantial  right  will  not  be  al- 
lowed. An  Insufficient  writ  may  be  quashed. 

A  writ  of  scire  facias  for  the  purpose  of  reviving 
a  judgment  may  be  amended  as  in  the  case  of  other 
such  writs,  and  its  amendment  is  governed  by  simi- 
lar rules.9?  Amendments  are  not  permitted,  how- 
ever, which  prejudice  the  opposite  party  or  deprive 
him  of  some  substantial  right,9*  such  as  the  defense 
afforded  by  a  statute  of  limitations.99  The  writ 
may  be  amended  with  respect  to  informalities  or  ir- 
regularities1 or  to  make  it  conform  to  the  record  of 
the  judgment,2  but  not  as  against  parties  not  served 
with  the  writ.*  An  amendment  alleging  that  a  judg- 


ment which  was  not  dormant  at  the  time  the  scire 
facias  was  sued  out  has  become  dormant  pending 
the  scire  facias  will  not  prevent  the  dismissal  of 
the  scire  facias.4 

Quashing  or  vacating  writ.  The  writ  of  scire 
facias  may  be  quashed  on  motion  for  failure  to  state 
a  legal  cause  of  action;5  for  want  of  the  support- 
ing affidavit  of  nonpayment  of  the  judgment,6  when 
that  is  required  by  law,  as  discussed  supra  subdivi- 
sion d  of  this  section;  for  disability  or  defect  of 
parties;7  or,  under  statute;  where  it  was  issued 
against  a  person  in  military  service.8  While  the 
merits  of  plaintiffs  claim  will  not  be  decided  on  a 
motion  to  quash  the  writ  on  jurisdictional  grounds,9 
if  a  scire  facias  has  been  improperly  issued  and  a 
judgment  rendered  thereon,  it  is  still  competent  for 
the  court  to  review  both  on  motion.10 

g.  Parties 

(1)  Parties  plaintiff 

(2)  Parties  defendant 

(1)  Parties  Plaintiff 

Generally  the  plaintiff  named  In  the  original  Judg- 
ment, or  his  legal  representative  or  successor,  should 
be  the  plaintiff  in  a  scire  facias  proceeding  to  revive 
the  Judgment;  but,  where  statutes  authorize  assignees 
or  real  parties  in  Interest  to  sue,  an  assignee  of  a  Judg- 
ment may  Institute  the  proceeding  In  his  own  name. 

As  a  general  rule,  plaintiff  in  a  proceeding  by 
scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  should  be  the 
same  person  who  was  plaintiff  in  the  original- judg- 


91.  Tex — Collin   County  Fat  Bank 
v.  Hughes,  supra,  I 

92.  Tex^— -Collln  County  Nat  Bank 
v.  Hughes,  supra, 

93.  U.S.— Owens  v.  McCloskey,  La., 
18  S.Ct.  693,  161  U.S.  642,  40  L.Ed. 
837 

Ga.— Frank  v.  Wolf,  87  S.B.  697,  17 
Ga.App.  468. 

94.  pa,— Chahoon  v.  HoUenback,  16 
Serg.  &  R.  425,  16  Am.D.  587. 

34  C.J.  p  675  note  94. 

95.  Tex.— Polnao  v.    State,    80   S.W. 
381,  46  Teac.Cr.  70. 

All  presumptions  are  in  favor  of 
the  sheriffs  return  on  the  writ  of 
scire  facias.— O'Neill  &  Co.  v. 
Schulze,  7  A.2d  263,  177  Md.  64. 

96.  U.S.— Mandeville    v.    McDonald, 
D.C.,  16  F.Cas.No.9,013,  3  Cranch  C. 

C.  631. 
Md.— Berry  v.  Griffith,  2  Harr.  &  G. 

337,  18  AmuD.  309* 
97-    pa.— Salberg  v.   Duffee.   21   Pa. 

Dist  &  Co.  144. 
34  C.J.  P  674  note  76. 
Amendment  of  scire  facias  generally 


see  the  C.J.S.  title  Scire  Facias  § 
9,  also  56  C.J.  p  873  nptes  14-31. 
Amendment  as  to  time  of  return, 

Where  it  appears  that  service 
of  the  original  writ  was  not  per- 
fected, it  is  amendable  in  order  to 
make  it  returnable  to  a  subsequent 
term.— Stahle  v.  Jones,  3  S.B.2d  861, 
60  Ga.App.  397— Fielding  v.  M.  Rich 
&  Bros.  Co.,  169  S.B.  383,  46  Ga.App. 
785. 

98.  Pa.— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Tomi- 
chek,   13   A.2d   126,    140   Pa.Super. 
101. 

99.  D.C.— Lyon  v.  Ford,  20  D.C.  530. 
Pa.-— First  Nat   Bank  v.   Tomichek, 

13  A.2d  126,  140  Pa.Super.  101. 

1.  Md. — Garey   v.    Sangston,   20   A. 
1034,  64  Md.  31. 

34  C.J.  p  674  note  77. 

2.  pa. — Salberg    v.    Dufltee,    21    Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  144— Miners  Nat  Bank 
v.  Butler,  Com.Pl.,  37  Luz.Leg.Reg, 
314. 

34  C.J.  P  674  note  78. 

8.    D.C.— Lyon  v.  Ford,  20  D.C.  530, 
4i    Ga. — Shepherd  T.   Ryan,    53    Ga. 


5.    va. — Evans  v.  Freeland,  3  Munf. 

119,  17  Va.  119. 
34  C.J.  p  683  note  43. 

-Lansing  v.  Lyons,  9  Johns. 


563. 


84. 
N.C.— Hintoa  v.  Oliver,  19  N.C.  -519. 

7.  Pa.— McCabe   v.   U.    S.,   4   Watts 
325. 

34  C.J.  P  683  note  46. 

8.  Pa. — Moyer  v.  McNulty,  22  Pa.Co. 
153. 

9.  u.S. — Brooks   v.    Caruthers,   D.C. 
Pa.,  25  F.Supp.  413. 

1C.    Miss.— Locke  v.  Brady,  30  Miss. 

21. 

34  C.J.  p  683  note  48. 
ranting  appropriate  reltef 
On  petition  to  strike  scire  facias 
from  record  on  ground  that  proceed- 
ing had  not  been  commenced  within 
five  years  from  death  of  Judgment 
debtor,  court  had  Inherent  power  to 
order  that  revival  should  not  create 
lien  against  real  estate  although  pe- 
titioner did  not  so  pray. — Shareff,  to 
Use  of  Olney  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Wolf,  182  A,  115.  120  Pa.Super.  227. 


1011 


§  548 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


mcnt11  or  his  legal  representative.12  Where  one  of 
a  firm  of  partners  has  died  after  the  rendition  of  a 
judgment  in  favor  of  the  firm,  scire  facias  to  revive 
the  judgment  is  properly  brought  by  the  surviving 
partner  and  not  by  the  surviving  partner  and  the 
personal  representative  of  the  deceased  partner.13 
A  judgment  rendered  in  favor  of  a  public  trustee 
may  be  revived  by  scire  facias  in  the  name  of  his 
successor  when  appointed.14  Where  the  disability 
of  coverture  exists,  the  husband  must  join  with  the 
wife  although  she  recovered  judgment  before  the 


marriage 


15 


After  assignment  of  judgment.  Where  a  statute 
provides  that  assignees  may  bring  actions  in  their 
own  names,  assignees  of  a  judgment  may  sue  out 
scire  facias  for  its  revival.16  In  those  code  states 
where  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  is  still  in 
use,  it  seems  that  the  assignee  may  sue  out  the  writ 
in  his  own  name  under  the  code  provision  as  to  the 
maintenance  of  actions  by  the  real  party  in  inter- 
est.17 In  the  absence  of  such  statutory  authoriza- 
tion, scire  facias  to  revive  an  assigned  judgment 
should  be  prosecuted  in  the  name  of  the  assignor.18 

(2)  Parties  Defendant 

(a)  In  general 

(b)  Joint  defendants 

(a)  In  General 
Persons  who   are   not  parties  to  the  Judgment  and 


who  are  not  beneficially  interested  in  the  property  in- 
volved  are  not  necessary  parties  to  a  scire  facias  to 
revive  the  Judgment. 

Persons  who  are  not  parties  to  the  judgment  and 
who  are  without  beneficial  interest  in  the  property 
involved  need  not  be  made  parties  defendant  to  a 
scire  facias  to  revive  the  judgment;19  but  persons 
whose  interests  may  be  adversely  affected  by  the 
proceedings  are  necessary  parties.20 

Death  of  judgment  debtor.  Where  the  judgment 
debtor  dies,  and  it  is  sought  by  the  proceeding  to 
reach  personalty  only,  it  is  generally  held  proper  to 
bring  scire  facias  against  the  executor  or  adminis- 
trator alone,  without  joining  the  heirs  or  devisees.21 
Where  real  property  only  is  involved,  it  is  proper 
in  some  jurisdictions  to  bring  scire  facias  against 
the  heirs  or  devisees  and  terre-tenants  alone,  with- 
out joining  the  executor  or  administrator.22  In  oth- 
er jurisdictions  the  scire  facias  is  properly  brought 
against  the  personal  representatives  alone,  notwith- 
standing the  judgment  binds  only  land,  and  the 
heirs,  devisees  and  terre-tenants  are  not  necessary 
parties,28  although  they  may  be  proper  parties;24 
but  according  to  some  authority,  if  it  is  sought  to 
revive  a  personal  judgment  against  the  land  of  the 
deceased  debtor,  the  heirs  and  terre-tenants  must  be 
joined  with  the  personal  representative.25  In  a  few 
jurisdictions  it  has  been  broadly  held  that  it  is  not 


11.  Pa.— McKinney    v.    Mehaffey,    7 
Watts  &  S.  276. 

34  C.J.  P  676  note  6. 
Persons    who   may   revive   generally 
see  supra  §  537. 

12.  Ala. — Birmingham  Ry.,  Light  & 
Power  Co.  v.   Cunningham.   37   So. 
689,  141  Ala.  470. 

34  C.J.  p  676  note  7. 

13.  111. — Linn   v.   Downing,    74   N.E. 
729,  216  111.  64. 

14.  Miss. — Mathews    v.    Mosby,    21 
Miss.  422. 

15.  N.Y. — Johnson    v.    Parmely,    17 
Johns.  271. 

34  C.J.  p  676  note  10. 

16.  Mo.— Reyburn  v.  Handlan,  147  S. 
W.  846,  165  Mo.App.  412. 

•34  C.J.  p  676  note  11. 
Sufficiency  of  record 

Record  was  sufficient  to  show  that 
assignee  of  judgment  was  actual 
"bona  fide  owner  of  Judgment  when 
assignee  commenced  scire  facias 
proceeding  to  revive  the  Judgment — 
Molner  v.  Arendt,  55  N.E.2d  407,  8"" 
Ill.App.  289. 
In  MUBOuri 

(1)  After  the  death  of  an  assignor 
of  a  Judgment  a  scire  facias  to  re- 
vive may  not  be  maintained  in  his 


name  to  the  use  of  the  assignee,  un-  i 
der  the  statutes.— Goddard  v.  Delan- 
ey,   80   S.W.   886,  181  Mo.   564. 

(2)  However,  the  personal  repre- 
sentatives of  the  assignee  suing  in 
the  name  of  the  assignor  may  be 
deemed  the  "parties"  plaintiff  and 
their  capacity  to  sue  and  their  in- 
terest in  the  subject  matter  of  the 
action  challenged  in  the  same  manner 
as  that  of  other  plaintiffs. — Beattie 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gerardi,  Mo.,  214  S.W. 
189. 

17.  U.S.— Wonderly     v.      Lafayette 
County,  C.C.MO.,  74  F.  702. 

Tex.— Henry  v.  Red  Water  Lumber 
Co.,  102  S.W.  749,  46  Tex.Civ.App., 
179. 

18.  W.Va.— Wells  v.  Graham,  20  S.B. 
576,  39  W.Va.  605. 

34  C.J.  p  643  note  3,  p  676  note  13. 

19.  Mo.— City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Koch, 
App.,  156  S.W.2d  1. 

34  C.J.  P  676  note  15. 

Persons  against  whom  Judgment  may 

be  revived  generally  see  supra  § 

638. 

20.  D.C.— McMullen  v.  Waters,    295 
F.  1008,  54  App.D.C.  187. 

Innocent  purchaser 

Before  real  ectate,  subject  to  Judg- 
ment lien,  which  has  passed  into 

1012 


ownership  and  possession  of  innocent 
purchaser,  can  be  subjected  to  ex- 
ecution issued  in  scire  facias  pro- 
ceeding, purchaser  must  have  been 
made  party  to  that  proceeding. — Mc- 
Mullen v.  Waters,  supra. 

21.  Mo.— MoMey  v.  Wade,  178  S.W. 
504,    192    Mo.App.    26— Stewart   v. 
Gibson,  71  Mo.App.  232. 

Death  of  one  of  several  Joint  tenants 
see  infra  subdivision  g  (2)  (b)  of 
this  section. 

22.  U.S. — Walden  v.  Craig.  Ky.f   14 
Pet.  147,  10  L.Bd.  393. 

34  C.J.  p  677  note  16. 

23.  Del.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Crook, 
174  A.  369,  6  W.W.Harr.  281. 

34  C.J.  p  677  note  18. 

24.  Del.— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Crook, 
supra. 

25.  Md. — Lang    v.    Wilxner,    101    A. 
706,    131   Md.   215,   2   AJL.R.   1698. 

34  C.J.  p  677  note  19. 

TT&der  the  English  practice  where 
a  judgment  had  been  entered  in  a 
personal  action  against  a  single  de- 
fendant who  had  die*  before  execu- 
tion issued,  the  scire  facias  was  first 
issued  against  the  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator of  deceased  defendant, 
and*  where  it  was  sought  to  subject 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


548 


permissible  to  join  personal  representatives  and 
heirs  as  parties  defendant  to  a  scire  facias  to  revive 
a  judgment,26  while  in  other  jurisdictions  the  per- 
sonal representative,  heirs,  and  terre-tenants  may 
and  should  all  be  joined  in  the  action,  where  their 
respective  interests  are  involved.27 

Terre-tenants.  It  has  frequently  been  held  that, 
in  order  to  revive  the  lien  of  a  judgment  as  against 
land  which  is  in  the  possession  of  a  terre-tenant,  he 
must  be  made  a  party  to  the  scire  facias.28  Accord- 
ing to  other  decisions,  however,  where  a  judgment 
is  revived  by  scire  facias  against  the  original  de- 
fendant, it  is  not  necessary  to  include  as  parties 
terre-tenants  or  persons  of  similar  status;29  but 
where  the  original  defendant  is  dead  the  terre-ten- 
ant must  be  made  a  party  to  the  scire  facias  to  re- 
vive,30 although  it  has  also  been  held  that  he  need 
not  be  made  a  party  even  in  the  latter  case.31 

Within  the  meaning  of  the  foregoing  rules  a 
terre-tenant  is  one  who  has  an  estate  in  the  land, 
coupled  with  the  actual  possession,  which  he  de- 
rived mediately  or  immediately  from  the  judgment 
debtor  while  the  land  was  bound  by  the  lien.32 

(b)  Joint  Defendants 

A  scire  facias  to  revive  a  Joint  Judgment  must  be 
brought    against    all    of   the   Joint   defendants   who  are 


alive,  and,  except  as  otherwise  provided  by  statute, 
where  one  Joint  defendant  Is  dead  the  writ  should  be 
brought  against  the  surviving  defendants  and  the  heirs 
or  presonal  representatives  of  the  deceased. 

A  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  against  two 
or  more  defendants  must  go  against  them  all,  if 
living,33  at  least  where  the  judgment  is  joint,84 
although  it  has  been  held  that,  where  the  judgment 
is  joint  and  several,  plaintiff  may  elect  as  to  which 
of  the  defendants  he  will  have  it  revived.35  Ex- 
cept in  some  jurisdictions,36  and  except  where  one 
judgment  debtor  has  been  discharged  from  further 
liability  on  the  judgment,37  plaintiff  cannot  drop  one 
defendant  and  proceed  against  the  others,38  and  if 
he  discontinues  his  scire  facias  as  to  any  of  the  par- 
ties it  operates  as  a  discontinuance  of  the  whole 
proceeding.39  If  plaintiff  desires  to  revive  a  judg- 
ment against  one  or  more  defendants  without  join- 
ing all,  his  remedy  is  by  an  action  of  debt  on  the 
judgment,  not  a  scire  facias.40  Where  a  judgment 
was  rendered  against  a  f  emme  sole  who  later  mar- 
ried, it  has  been  held  that  the  writ  of  scire  facias 
must  be  sued  out  against  both  husband  and  wife.41 

After  death  of  one  defendant.  The  common-law 
rule  that  if  one  joint  defendant  had  died  the  writ 
should  be  against  the  survivors  and  the  heirs  or  per- 
sonal representatives  of  deceased42  still  prevails  in 
many  jurisdictions,43  but  under  some  statutes  scire 


lands  to  execution  process,  although 
the  scire  facias  also  issued  against 
heirs  and  terre-tenants  of  deceased 
defendant,  it  could  not  issue  against 
them  until  after  a  return  of  nihil 
against  personal  representative  of 
deceased  defendant — First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Crook,  174  A.  369,  6  W.W. 
Harr.,  Del.,  281. 

86.     Miss. — Barnes  v.  McLemore,  20 

Miss.  316. 
N.Y.— Strong  v.  Lee,  44  How.Pr.  €0, 

affirmed  2  Thorn ps.  &  C.  441. 

S7.    111. — Reynolds    v.   Henderson,    7 

111.  110. 
34  C.J.  p  677  note  21. 

38.  D.C.— -McMullen  v.  Waters,  295 
P.  1008,  54  App.D.0.  187. 

Pa. — First  Nat.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Miller,  186  A.  87,  322  Pa.  473— 
Simmons  v.  Simmons,  28  A.2d  445, 
150  Pa. Super.  393,  affirmed  29  A. 
2d  677,  346  Pa.  52. 

34  C.J.  p  678  note  39. 

Extending  lien  of  judgment  by  re- 
vival generally  see  supra  §  494. 

Praudulant  grantee  is  not  necessary 

party 

N.C.— Lee  v.  Eure,  93  N.C.  5. 
Pa. — Lyon   v.   Cleveland,    33   A.   143, 

170  Pa.  611,  '60  Am.S.R.  782,  30  L. 

R.A,     400— Raub     Supply     Co.     v. 

Brandt,  Com.Pl.,  27  DeLCo.  507. 


>.    -Fla.— B.   A.   Lott,   Inc.,   v.   Pad- 
gett,  14  So.2d  *67,  153  Fla.  304. 
34  C.J.  p  678  note  40. 

30.  Iowa.— Von   Puhl   v.    Rucker,    6 
Iowa  187. 

34  C.J.  p  679  note  41. 

31.  Ky. — Griffith  v.  Wilson,    1   J.J. 
Marsh.  209. 

34  C.J.  p  679  note  42. 

5.    Tenn.— Carney  v.  Carney,  200  S. 

W.  517,  138  Tenn.  -647. 
34  C.J.  p  679  note  43—62   C.J.  p  737 

notes  34,  36-38. 
"Terre-tenant"  defined  generally  see 

Estates  §  1  c. 

\.    Colo.— Allen  v.  Patterson,  194  P. 

934,  69  Colo.  302. 
34  C.J.  p  677  note  24. 

34.  D.C. — Lyon  v.  Ford,  20  D.C.  530. 
34  C.J.  p  677  note  25. 

35.  N.C.— Patterson    v.    Walton,    26 
S.E.  43.  119  N.C.  500. 

36.  Ala.— Hanson  v.   Jacks,   22  Ala. 
549. 

Ind. — Davidson  v.  Alvord,  3  Ind.  1. 

37.  Mo. — Long  v.  Thormond,  £3  Mo. 
App.  -227. 

38.  Ark.— Greer   v.    State   Bank,    10 
Ark.  455. 

34  C.J.  p  677  note  30. 

Judgment  of  revival  against  part  of 

defendants  see  infra  subdivision  k 

(1)  of  this  section. 

1013 


39.    D.C. — Crumbaugh   v.    Otterback, 

20  D.C.  434. 
34  C.J.  p  678  note  31. 

4a    Colo.— Allen  v.  Patterson,  194  P. 

934,  69  Colo.  302. 
34  C.J.  p  678  note  32. 

41.  Ind. — Campbell    v.    Baldwin,    <5 
Blackf.  364. 

Mass.-— Haines    v.    Corliss,    4    Mass. 
659. 

42.  XT.S.—U.  S.  v.  Houston,  D.C.Kan., 
48  F.  207. 

34  C.J.  p  678  note  34. 
Revival  of  realty  judgment 

Under  old  English  practice,  where 
(plaintiff  sought  to  subject  decedent's 
real  estate  to  execution  process,  scire 
facias  Issued  against  surviving  de- 
fendant and  heirs  and  terre-tenants 
of  deceased  defendant,  surviving  de- 
fendant was  required  to  show  cause 
why  his  personal  property  and  half 
of  his  real  estate  should  not  be  sub- 
jected to  execution  process,  and  heirs 
and  terre-tenants  were  required  to 
show  cause  why  half  of  deceased's 
land  should  not  be  subjected  there- 
to; but  deceased  defendant's  person- 
al representative  was  not  proper  par- 
ty.—-First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Crook,  174  A. 
369,  6  W.W.Harr.  Del.,  £81. 
43.  Tex. — Rowland  v.  Harris,  Civ. 

App.,  34  S.W.  295. 
34  C.J.  P  67«6  note  35. 


§  548 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


facias  may  be  brought  against  either  the  surviving 
judgment  debtors  or  the  personal  representatives  of 
the  deceased  judgment  debtor  alone.44 

k  Pleading 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Issues,  proof,  and  variance 

(1)  In  General 

Since  a  writ  of  sdre  facias  serves  as  both  summons 
and  declaration,  the  filing  of  a  petition  is  unnecessary; 
the  defendant  should  demur  to  the  writ  or  plead  mat- 
ters of  defense  available  to  him. 

A  scire  facias  performs  the  double  function  of  a 
summons  and  a  pleading;45  the  writ  takes  the  place 
and  performs  the  office  of  a  declaration,46  and  there- 
fore it  is  not  necessary  for  plaintiff  to  file  with  it  a 
declaration  or  petition  or  rule  defendant  to  plead,47 
although  it  is  entirely  proper  that  a  petition  should 


be  filed,  as  is  discussed  supra  subdivision  d  of  this 
section.  A  good  plea  or  answer  on  the  part  of  de- 
fendant must  be  met  by  a  proper  replication,48  but 
an  insufficient  answer  is  vulnerable  to  plaintiffs  de- 
murrer.49 

Defendant's  pleading.  As  is  discussed  supra  sub- 
division a  of  this  section,  a  scire  facias  to  revive  a 
judgment  is  an  action  in  the  sense  that  defendant 
may  plead  to  the  writ ;  and  he  may  and  should  de- 
mur50 or  plead  all  matters  of  defense  that  he  has,51 
as  in  an  ordinary  suit52  The  plea  to  a  writ  of 
scire  facias,  sued  out  to  revive  a  judgment,  is  to 
the  writ,  and  not  to  the  petition,  if  any,  filed  there- 
with.53 

In  some  states  an  affidavit  of  defense  is  required 
in  a  proceeding  of  this  character.54  Such  affidavit 
should  contain  a  complete  statement  of  material  al- 
legations sufficient  to  constitute  a  valid  defense;55 


Persons  to  "be  Joined  with  survivor 

On  death  of  one  of  two  joint  de- 
fendants in  a  judgment  binding-  land, 
scire  facias  was  properly  brought 
against  surviving  defendant  in  the 
judgment  and  personal  representa- 
tive of  deceased  defendant,  and, 
while  deceased  defendant's  heir 
might  also  have  been  made  a  defend- 
ant in  such  proceeding,  she  was  not  a 
necessary  party;  where  executor  or 
administrator  of  such  deceased  de- 
fendant was  sole  -party  defendant, 
his  duty  was  to  notify  heirs  or  dev- 
isees or  terre-tenants  claiming  under 
him  of  proceedings,  and  they,  on  ap- 
plication, should  be  permitted  to  ap- 
pear and  defend. — First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Crook,  174  A.  869,  6  W.W.Harr.  DeL, 
281. 

Insolvency  of  deceased's  estate 

In  scire  facias  to  revive  alleged 
dormant  judgment  against  all  de- 
fendants except  one,  who  had  died, 
and  whose  estate  was  insolvent, 
court  did  not  err  in  overruling  de- 
murrer to  petition  because  it  did  not 
seek  judgment  as  against  all  defend- 
ants, especially  where  judgment  was 
not  dormant  as  to  deceased  defend- 
ant.— Rogers  v.  Jordan,  182  S.EL  233, 
35  Ga.App.  131. 

Husbaad  and  wife 

Where  judgment  was  against  hus- 
band and  wife  for  her  antenuptial 
debt  on  death  of  husband  scire  fa- 
cias might  be  issued  against  his 
executor. — Burton  v.  Rodney,  5  Del. 
441. 

44.  Va,— Greathouse  v.  Morrison,  70 
S.BL  710,  68  W.Va.  714. 

45.  111. — Van  Home  v.  Harford,  280 
IlLApp.  57S. 

Mo.— City  of  SL  Louis  v.  Miller,  145 

S.W.2d    504,    235    Mo.App.    987. 
3*  C.J.  p  £79  notes  44,  45. 


46.  Mo.— City  of  St  Louis  v.  Miller, 
supra. 

34  C.J.  p  679  note  45. 
Contents  of  writ  see  supra  subdivi- 
sion c  of  this  section. 

47.  Tex. — Simmons    v.    Zimmerman 
Land  &  Irrigation  Co.,  Civ.App.,  292 
S.W.  973. 

34  C.J.  p  679  note  46. 

48.  Ark.— Humphries  v.  Anthony,  12 
Ark.  136. 

34  C.J.  p  679  note  48. 
Implication  held  properly  stricken 
Pa. — cusano  v.  Rubolino,  39  A.2cl  90«, 
351  Pa.  41. 

49.  Qa. — McRae  v.  Boykin,  App.,  35 
S.E.2d  548,  certiorari  denied  66  S. 
Ct  1024. 

50.  Pa.— Bell  v.  Borys,  45  Pa.Dist.  & 
Co.    197— Bell    v.    Borys,    Com.Pl., 
44  Lack.Jur.  44,  56  York  Leg.Rec. 
202. 

34  CJ.  p  679  note  51. 
Motion  to  quash  see  supra  subdivi- 
sion f  of  this  section. 

51.  D.C.— McMullen  v.  Waters,   295 
F.  1008,  54  App.D.C.  187. 

Pa, — Bell  v.  Tontos,  46  Pa.Dist  & 
Co.  636,  44  LaclLjur.  83,  57  York 
iLeg.Rec.  53 — Harr  v.  Deeter,  31  Pa. 
Dist.  &  Co.  702,  5  Sch.Reg.  205— 
Miners  Nat  Bank  of  Wilkes-Barre 
v.  Dukas,  Coxn.Pl..  32  Luz.-Leg.Reg. 
229. 

34  C.J.  p  679  note  52. 

Defenses  to  revival  proceedings  gen- 
erally see  supra  §  540. 

Answer  held  insufficient 

(1)  Generally. — Marsh  v.  Bowen,  6 
A.2d  783,  335  Pa*  314. 

(2)  Statement     in     certificate     of 
original   trial   Judge   to   bill   of   ex- 
ceptions cannot  be  corrected  by  way 
of  answer  to  scire  facias  proceeding 
to    revive    dormant    judgment. — Mc- 
Rae   v.   Boykin,    Ga.App.,    35   fl.B.2d 
54<8,  certiorari  denied  66  S.Ct  1024. 

1014 


52.  Ark.— Ward  v.  Sturdivant,  132  S. 
W.  204,  96  Ark.  434. 

53.  Mo.— Glidden-Felt    Mfg.    Co.    v. 
Robinson,    143   S.W.   1111,   1"63*  Mo. 
App.  488. 

54.  Pa. — Cusano  v.  Rubolino,   39  A. 
2d    906,    351    Pa.    41 — Stanton    v. 
Humphreys,  Com.Pl.,  27  Del.  594r- 
First    Nat.    Bank   of    Scranton    v. 
Brown,  Com.PL,  45  Lack.Jur.  267— 
Miners  Nat.  Bank  v.  Butler,  Com. 
PI.,  37  Luz.Leg.Reg.  814. 

CJ.  p  679  note  55. 

Torre-tenants 

(1)  In    scire    facias    to    revive    a 
judgment,  Judgment  may  be  entered 
against   terre-tenant  as   against  de- 
fendant for  want  of  a  sufficient  affi- 
davit of  defense. — Cusano  v.  Ruboli- 
no, 39  A.2d  906,  351  Pa.  41. 

(2)  However,  some  inferior  court 
decisions  apparently  have  held  that 
it  is  not  necessary  for  a  terre-ten- 
ant to  file  an  affidavit  of  defense  to 
prevent     judgment    being     rendered 
against  lands  held  by  him. — Salberg 
v.    Duflee,    21   Pa.Dist    &  Co.    144— 
Bell  v.  Yontos,  46  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  633, 
44  Lack.Jur.  83,  57  York  Leg.Rec.  53 
— Harr  v.  Deeter,  31  Pa.Dist.  &  C|o. 
702,  5  Sch.Reg.  205. 

(3)  Affidavit  of  defense  admitting 
conveyance  to  defendants  of  interest 
in   the   real   estate   of   original    de- 
fendant after  date  of  original  Judg- 
ment showed  that  defendants   were 
terre-tenants.— Adelson  v.  Kocher,  36 
A.2d  737,  154  PsuSuper.  548. 

55.  Pa. — O'Connor  v.   Flick,    118   A. 
431,  274  Pa.  £21— Howells  v.  How- 
ells,    26    Pa.Dist    &    Co.    423,    84 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  170,   35   Sch.L.R.   163, 
2    Sch.Reg.   229 — Bank  of  Wesley- 
ville  v.  Wagner,  Com.PL,   21  Erie 
Co.  175— 'First  Nat  Bank  of  Scran- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  548 


but  the  insertion  of  matter  raising  only  questions 
of  law  is  erroneous.56 

As  discussed  supra  §  540,  proper  forms  of  the 
general  issue  are  nul  tiel  record  and  payment;  and, 
as  considered  supra  §  542,  the  statute  of  limitations 
may  also  be  pleaded  in  defense. 

(2)  Issues,  Proof,  and  Variance 

Under  the  plea  of  nul  tiel  record,  which  questions 
the  existence  and  validity  of  the  Judgment,  the  only 
proof  permitted  is  that  afforded  by  an  inspection  of  the 
record,  while  the  plea  of  payment  confines  proof  to 
matters  concerning  the  satisfaction,  release,  or  dis- 
charge of  the  judgment. 

While  the  plea  of  nul  tiel  record  is  said  to  raise 
but  one  question,  namely,  whether  there  is  such  a 
record  of  the  judgment  as  that  set  out  in  the  writ,57 
and  this  question  is  to  be  determined  on  an  inspec- 
tion and  examination  of  the  record58  without  the 
aid  of  evidence  aliunde,69  yet  it  has  also  been  held 
that  under  this  plea  defendant  may  show  the  judg- 
ment to  be  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  where  this 
is  manifest  from  an  inspection  of  the  record,60  and 
may  take  advantage  of  a  failure  to  describe  the 
judgment  properly,  or  of  a  wrong  statement  as-  to 
the  court  in  which  it  was  rendered;61  but  mere 
errors  or  irregularities  cannot  be  taken  advantage 
of  under  this  plea.62 

Where  the  liability  of  terre-tenants  is  involved, 


under  the  strict  construction  given  some  statutes 
nothing  may  be  tried  except  the  questions  whether 
the  land  was  bound  by  the  judgment,  and,  if  at  one 
time  the  land  had  been  bound,  whether  the  lien  had 
been  lost;63  the  question  of  adverse  title  may  not 
be  introduced  at  the  trial.64 

Plea  of  payment.  Under  the  plea  of  payment  the 
evidence*  must  be  confined  to  matters  going  in  sat- 
isfaction, release,  or  discharge  of  the  judgment65 
Under  such  a  plea  defendant  may  prove  any  form 
of  satisfaction  or  release  of  the  judgment,66  as  well 
as  an  accord  and  satisfaction  ;67  he  may  show  a  pri- 
or agreement  as  to  the  mode  of  discharging  the 
judgment,68  or  an  agreement  to  cancel  it  on  an 
event  which  has  since  occurred69  or  to  restrict  its 
lien,70  but  not  a  mere  voluntary  promise  on  the 
part  of  plaintiff  to  forbear  enforcing  the  judg- 
ment.71 

i.  Evidence 

On  a  sclre  facias  satisfactory  proof  may  and  should 
be  offered  concerning  the  existence  and  validity  of  the 
original  Judgment,  and  the  liability  of  heirs  or  terre- 
tenants;  payment  or  release  may  be  shown  by  competent 
evidence. 

On  a  scire  facias  proof  of  the  original  judgment 
is  proper  and  necessary;72  but,  where  this  proof 
is  made,  the  judgment  will  be  sustained,  with  re- 
spect to  its  regularity  and  validity,  by  the  ordi- 


ton  v.  Brown,  Com.Pl.,  45  Lack. 
Jur.  267. 

34  C.J.  p  $79  note  55  [b]. 

Affidavits  bold  sufficient 

111. — Jacobs  v.  Lucas,  270  Ill.App. 
123. 

Pa.— Masters  v.  Masters,  Com.PL,  27 
WestCo.L.J.  107. 

Affidavits  held  insufficient 

Pa. — Cusano  v.  Rubolino,  39  A.2d 
906,  361  Pa.  4  I—O'Connor  v.  Flick, 
118  A.  431,  274  Pa.  521— Brusko  v. 
Olshefski,  13  A.2d  916,  140  Pa, Su- 
per. 485 — Miller  Bros.  v.  Keenan, 
50  Pa. Super.  470 — Security-Peoples 
Trust  Co.  v.  Polaszewski,  Com.Pl., 
47  Brie  Co.  '20— McMahon  v.  Pietro, 
•Com.Pl,,  42  Lack.Jur.  162 — Jacob- 
:son  v.  McCormick,  Com.Pl.,  38  Luz. 
Leg.Reg.  '355 — Miners  Nat  Bank 
..of  Wilkes-Barre  v.  Dukas,  Com.PL, 
32  Luz.Leg.Reg.  229 — Sausage  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Roraeto,  Com.Pl.,  86  Pittsb. 
Leg.J.  105— Uhlinger  v.  Bur\n, 
Com.Pl.,  22  West.Co.L.J.  146. 


56.  Pa. — Cusano  v,  Rubolino,  39 
2d  906,  351  Pa.  41— Meyers 
Stern,  54  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  657. 

*7.  111.— Waterbury  Nat  Bank 
Reed,  83  N.E.  188,  231  IlL  246. 
34  C.J.  p  680  note  60. 

*58.  Md. — Hager  Y.  Cochran,  7 
462,  66  Md  253. 

.34  C.J.  p  680  note  61. 


Determination    by    court    see    infra 

subdivision  j  of  this  section. 
Sufficiency  of  record 

Judgment  was  properly  revived,  as 
against  plea  of  nul  tiel  record,  on 
evidence  consisting  of  excerpts  from 
judge's  common-law  docket  and  law 
record  showing  existence  of  judg- 
ment notwithstanding  judgment 
docket  contained  no  record  of  judg- 
ment.— Van  Home  v.  Harford,  6  N.B. 
2d  887,  289  Ill.App.  121. 

59.  TJ.S.— King    v.    Davis,    CC.Va,, 
13-7  F.  198,  affirmed  157  F.  67$,  $5 
C.C.A.  -348. 

34  CJ.  p  680  note  62. 

60.  Del.— Frankel   v.   Satterfield,   19 
A.  898,  14  Del.  201.      ' 

34  C.J.  p  680  note  63. 
Joint  liability 

Under  contention  in  affidavit  of 
merits  that  original  court  had  no 
jurisdiction  to  enter  judgment  jthat 
was  several,  defendant  was  permit- 
ted to  show  that  power  or  warrant  of 
attorney  under  which  judgment  was 
confessed  was  joint,  while  the  judg- 
ment entered  pursuant  to  it  was  sev- 
eral.— Dulsky  v.  Lerner,  223  IlLApp. 
228. 

61.  Ala.— Barrow  v.  Pagles,  6  Ala. 
462. 

34  C.J.  p  680  note  64. 

1015 


62.  Pa. — Barber  v.  Chandler,  17  Pa. 
48,  55  Am.D.  533. 

34  C.J.  p  650  note  85. 

63.  Pa. — South  Central  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Milan!,  150  A.  586, 
300  Pa.  250. 

64.  Pa.— South   Central  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Milani,  supra. 

65.  N.J.— Barle  v.  Earle,  20  N.J.Law 
'347. 

34  C.J.  p  &80  note  6$. 

68.    Pa.— Smith  v.  Coray,  46  A>  «55, 

196  Pa.  602. 
34  C.J.  p  680  note  67. 

67.  Md.— McCullough     v.     (Franklin 
Coal  Co., -21  Md.  25$. 

Pa. — Steltzer   v.   Steltzer,   10   Pa.Su- 
per.  310. 

68.  Md. — Downey    v.    Forrester,    8-5 
Md.  117. 

69.  Pa,— Hartzell  v.  Reiss,   I  Binn. 
289. 

70.  Pa.— Sankey  v.  Reed,  12  Pa.  95. 

71.  Pa.— Codding  v.  Wood,  3  A.  455, 
112    Pa.    371— Ladd   v.   Church,    6 
Phila,  591. 

72.  Ga.— Hagins  v.   Blitch,    65    S.E. 
1082,  6  Ga.App.  839. 

3*  C.J.  (p  680  note  73. 


§  548 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


nary  presumptions,73  and  the  revival  ordinarily  will 
be  ordered  unless  good  cause  to  the  contrary  is 
shown.74  However,  as  against  heirs  it  is  error  to 
render  judgment  without  proof  that  they  inherited 
assets.75  Also  the  establishment  of  the  liability  of 
a  party  as  a  terre-tenant  requires  proof  of  facts 
outside  the  record,76  such  as  his  acquisition  of  title 
to  the  land  after  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  and 
while  the  judgment  was  a  lien  on  it,77  and  such  a 
party  may  show  a  release  or  restriction  of  the  lien 
of  the  judgment.78  Payment  or  release  may  be 
shown  by  any  competent  evidence,79  and  to  disprove 
a  plea  of  payment  a  sheriff's  return  on  an  execu- 
tion showing  satisfaction  in  full  may  be  contra- 
dicted.80 

The  court  will  take  into  consideration  a  pre- 
sumption of  payment  which,  in  some  states,  arises 
merely  after  the  lapse  of  a  certain  number  of 
years,81  and  in  others  after  the  passage  of  a  pe- 
riod, prescribed  by  statute,  without  the  issuance  of 
an  execution.82  The  judgment  creditor  has  the 
burden  of  overcoming  such  presumption,83  and  the 
judgment  debtor  may  introduce  competent  evidence 
to  meet  the  judgment  creditor's  attempt  to  rebut 
the  presumption.84 

j.  Trial 

The  question  raised  by  a  plea  of  nul  tiel  record  Is 
tried  by  the  court  whereas  the  plea  of  payment  entitles 
the  parties  to  a  Jury  trial. 


The  question  raised  by  a  plea  of  nul  tiel  record 
is  to  be  determined  by  the  court;85  and,  as  consid- 
ered supra  subdivision  h  (2)  of  this  section,  the  de- 
cision is  made  on  the  basis  of  what  is  ascertained 
from  an  inspection  and  examination  of  the  record. 
Defendant  is  not  entitled  to  a  jury  trial  under  his 
plea  of  nul  tiel  record,86  but  the  plea  of  payment 
raises  a  question  of  fact  which  ordinarily  must  be 
submitted  to  the  jury.87  The  court  may  withhold 
determination  of  a  motion  for  judgment  for  want 
of  a  sufficient  defense  until  adjudication  of  defend- 
ant's rule  to  open  the  judgment  sought  to  be  re- 
vived.88 In  a  proper  case,  the  court  may  direct  a 
verdict89  or  set  aside  a  verdict  returned  by  the 


k.  Judgment 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  By  confession  or  default 


opening,    or    vacating 


73.  Mo.— Glidden-Felt    Mfg.    Co.    v. 
Robinson*   143   S.W.   1111,  163   Mo. 
App.  488. 

34  C.J.  p  680  note  74. 

74.  Pa,— In  re  Miller.  90  A.  T7,  243 
Pa,  328. 

34  C.J.  p  680  note  75. 

75.  Tex.— Schxnidtke  v.  Miller,  8  S. 
W.  638,  71  Tex.  103. 

76.  Pa. — Kinports  v.  Kinports,  1  Pa, 
Co.     610— Miners     Nat.     Bank     of 
Wilkes-Barre  v.  -Dukas,  Com.Pl.,  32 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  '229. 

77.  Pa. — Klnports  v.  Boynton,  14  A. 
135,  120  Pa,  306,  6  Am.S.R.  706. 

34  C.J.  p  680  note  78. 

78.  Pa. — Silverthorn    v.     Townsend, 
37  Pa.  263— Sankey  v.  Reed,  12  Pa, 
95.    ' 

79.  Pa.— McKee   v.    Russell,    112   A. 
151,  269  Pa.  45— Earnhardt  v.  Her- 
ring, -54  Pa.Dist  &  Co.  $26. 

34  C.J.  p  £80  note  80. 

80.  Mich.— McRoberts    v.    Lyon,    44 
N.W.  160,  7$  Mich.  25. 

81.  Pa. — First  Nat  Bank  v.  Bank  of 
Pittsburg,   99   Pa,Super.   600^-Cole- 
man  &  Stahl  v.  Weimer,  86  Pa.Su- 
per. 303— Coleman  &  -Stanl  v.  Wei- 
mer, 83  Pa.Super.  252. 

Presumption    of    payment    of    judg- 
ments generally  see  infra  §  659. 


82.  Ala.— Quill  v.  Carolina  Portland 
Cement  Co.,   124   So.  305,   220  Ala. 
134. 

83.  Ala, — Quill  v.  Carolina  Portland 
Cement  Co.,  supra, 

Degree  of  proof  for  rebuttal 

Presumption  of  payment  of  judg- 
ment unclaimed  for  twenty  years 
must  be  overcome  by  clear  and  sat- 
isfactory proof  in  scire  facias  sur 
judgment  to  collect  it.— First  Nat 
Bank  v.  Bank  of  Pittsburgh,  99  Pa. 
Super.  600 — Coleman  &  Stahl  v.  Wei- 
mer, 86  Pa. Super.  303 — Coleman'  & 
Stahl  v.  Weimer,  83  Pa-Super.  252. 

84.  Pa. — Coleman  &  Stahl  v.  Wei- 
mer, 8*6  Pa.Super.  303. 

85.  IlL— Waterbury    Nat    Bank    v. 
Reed,  83  N.E.  188,  231  111.  246. 

84  C.J.  p  680  note  82. 

88.    HI.— Eau   Claire  Bank  v.   Reed, 

(83  N.E.  820,   232  111.   238,  122  Am. 

S.R.  66. 

87.    Pa. — Rosenthal   v.    Grlmlisk,    84 
Pa,Super.  426 — Coleman  &  Stahl  v. 
Weimer,  £3   Pa.  Super.  252— Calvey 
Motor  Co.  v.   Brogan,  Com.PL,   33 
Luz.Leg.Reg.  333. 
34  C.J.  p  680  note  85. 
Agreement  of  partieg 

Whether  rights  of  judgment  credi- 
tor depended  on  alleged  oral  agree-] 

1016 


(3)  Amending, 
judgment 

(1)  In  General 

Ordinarily  the  Judgment  on  scire  facias  Is  that  the 
original  Judgment  be  revived  and  that  the  plaintiff  have 
execution  thereof,  although  in  some  Jurisdictions  a  new 
Judgment  Is  rendered  for  the  amount  due. 

Ordinarily,  on  determining  the  issues  in  a  scire 
facias  proceeding  to  revive  a  judgment,  the  court 
may  and  should  enter  final  judgmental  but  if  the 

ment  that  Judgment  should  remain  of 
record  as  security  for  judgment 
debtor's  obligation  or  on  understand- 
ing of  parties  at  time  judgment  was 
revived  by  prior  amicable  scire  fa- 
cias was  for  jury. — Security  Trust 
Co.  of  Pottstown  T.  Stapp,  X  A.2d 
236,  382  Pa,  9. 
Evidence  sufficient  for  jury 
Pa,— Brady  v.  Tarr,  21  A.2J  131,  145 
Pa.Super.  316. 


Pa, — Mifflin  Motor  Co,  v.  Peffer, 
18  Pa-Dist.  &  Co.  66. 

89.  Ga, — Rogers  v.  Jordan,  132  S.E. 
233,  35  Ga.App.  131. 

90.  Pa,— Wilson    v.    Wilson,    20    A. 
•644,  137  Pa,  269. 

Judgment  non  obataate  veredicto 
was  justified  where  evidence  of 
agreement  to  release  lien  of  judg- 
ment was  so  indefinite  that  it  would 
be  pure  conjecture  to  state  that  an 
agreement  had  been  reached. — Ever- 
ett Hardwood  (Lumber  Co.  v.  Cal- 
houn,  133  A.  659,  121  Pa.£uper.  451.  - 
Verdict  held  supported  by  evidence 
Pa.— Brady  v.  Tarr,  21  A.2d  131,  145 

Pa,Super.  316. 

91.  m&.— McCallum   v.    Gornto,    174 
So.  24,  1*7  Fla.  792. 

Pa. — Brooks    v.     Caruthers*    Estate, 
Com.Pl.,  23  WestCo.UJ.  138. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


548 


judgment  oh  which  the  scire  facias  was  issued  is  a 
nullity  no  final  judgment  may  be  based  thereon  and 
the  proceeding  should  be  dismissed.92 

Since  in  most  jurisdictions  a  scire  facias  to  re- 
vive a  judgment  is  only  the  continuation  of  an  ac- 
tion, as  discussed  supra  subdivision  a  of  this  sec- 
tion, and  the  object  and  effect  of  the  judgment  on 
the  scire  facias  are  to  revive  the  judgment  as  it 
formerly  existed  and  to  reinvest  it  with  the  same 
attributes  and  conditions  which  originally  belonged 
to  it,  as  considered  infra  §  549,  the  proper  form  of 
judgment,  in  such  jurisdictions,  is  that  the  original 
judgment  be  revived93  and  that  plaintiff  have  exe- 
cution thereof,94  with  costs  in  both  the  original  ac- 
tion and  the  proceeding  to  revive.95  In  many  juris- 
dictions it  is  improper  to  render  a  new  judgment  for 
recovery  of  a  specific  sum;96  nor  is  plaintiff  enti- 
tled to  damages  for  delay  in  execution;97  but, 
where  the  judgment  contains  the  proper  statements, 
additional  words  adding  nothing  to  its  effectiveness 


may  be  treated  as  surplusage.98  In  a  few  states, 
however,  the  practice  is  to  enter  a  new  judgment, 
quod  recuperet,  for  the  amount  then  due,  includ- 
ing the  principal  and  accrued  interest  on  the  original 
judgment.99 

In  order  to  be  valid,  the  judgment  on  scire  facias 
must  closely  follow  the  original  judgment,1  particu- 
larly as  to  the  names  and  descriptions  of  the  par- 
ties,2 unless,  by  reason  of  an  assignment  of  the 
judgment3  or  the  death  of  one  of  the  parties,4  the 
parties  to  the  scire  facias  differ  from  those  to  the 
original  judgment,  it  being  necessary  that  the  judg- 
ment contain  proper  restrictions  or  limitations  when 
given  against  other  persons  than  the  original  de- 
fendant, as  heirs  or  terre-tenants.5  The  entire 
judgment,  and  not  merely  a  part  thereof,  must  be 
revived.6 

Where  scire  facias  remains  merely  a  judicial  writ, 
by  reason  of  its  not  having  been  converted  into  an 
action  by  appearance  and  plea  of  defendant,  a  fail- 


Quashing  or  vacating  writ  generally 

see    supra    subdivision    f    of   this 

section. 
Objection  as  to  time  of  entry  held 

waived 
111.— Albers  v.  Martin,  45  N.E.2d  102, 

316  111.  A  pp.  446. 

92.  U.S.— -U.  S.  v.  Ewing,  D.C.Miss., 
19  F.2d  378. 

93.  Md.— Ruth   v.    Durendo,    170   A. 
582,  166  Md.  83. 

34  O.J.  p  680  note  90. 

94.  u.S. — Brown  v.  Chesapeake  &  O. 
Canal    Co.,    C.C.Md.,    4    F.    770,    4 
Hughes  584. 

D.C.— McMullen  v.  Waters,  295  F. 
1008,  -54  App.D.C.  187. 

Pla.— MeCallum  v.  Gornto,  174  So. 
24,  127  Fla.  792— Massey  v.  Pine- 
apple Orange  Co.,  100  So.  170,  87 
Fla.  374. 

34  C.J.  p  681  note  91. 

95.  U.S.— Brown  v.  Qhesapeake  &  O. 
Canal    Co.,    C.C.Md.,    4    F.    770,    4 
Hughes  584. 

•Fla.— MeCallum  v.  Gornto,  174  So. 
24,  127  'Fla.  792— Massey  v.  Pine- 
apple Orange  Co.,  100  So.  170,  87 
Fla.  374. 

34  C.J.  p  681  note  92. 

96.  111.— Eau  Claire  Bank  v.   Reed, 
83  N.E.   820,   232  HI.  258,  122  Am. 
S.R.  66. 

34  C.J.  p  681  note  93. 

97.  Iowa. — Vredenburgh  v.  Qnyder,  6 
Iowa  39. 

98.  Mo.— Gregory    -Grocery    Co.     v 
Link,   25   S.W.2d   575,  224  Mo.App 
407.          '      . 

84  C.J.  p  681  note  96. 
Surplusage   in   judgments   generally 
see  supra  §  84. 

99.  Pa.— Fehr    v.    Worden,    19    Pa 


Dist.  &  Co.  631,  37  Dauph.Co.  381 1 
—Commonwealth  Trust  Co.  of 
Harrisburg  now  to  Use  of  Baker 
v.  MacDonald,  Oom.Pl.,  51  Dauph. 
Co.  22. 

14  C.J.  P  681  note  97. 

Compounding  interest 

(1)  Judgment    creditor    has    right, 
n    entering    revival    judgment,    to 

charge  interest  on  aggregate  amount 
of  principal  and  interest  embodied  in 
previous  judgment— Bailey  v.  Bai- 
ley, 12  A.2d  577,  338  Pa.  221. 

(2)  On  revival,  prior  to  maturity 
of   debt,   of  judgment   confessed  on 
bond  calling  for  payment  of  interest 
at  time  of  principal,  interest  could 
not  be  included  so  as  to  become  part 
of  principal  and  bear  interest.— Moll 
v.  Laffierty,  153  A.  '557,  '302  Pa.  354. 

(3)  Compounding  interest  on  Judg- 
ments generally  see  Interest  §   68. 
Joint  debtors 

On  scire  facias  to  revive  judgment, 
judgment  must  be  modified  in 
amount  to  conform  to  amount  paid 
by  one  of  original  defendants  as  con- 
sideration for  assignment  of  Judg- 
ment, since  original  defendant  who 
paid  judgment  must  not  be  reim- 
bursed in  greater  amount  than  he 
was  reauired  to  pay.— City  Nat.  Bank 
of  Wichita  Falls,  Tex.,  now  for  Use 
of  Newhams,  v.  Atkinson,  175  A,  507 
316  Pa.  526. 

In.  Vermont 

(1)  Rendition  of  a  new  Judgmen' 
together   with   interest   is   provided 
for   by   statute.— Slayton   v.   Smilie, 
2*  A,  871,  66  Vt  197—34  C.J.  p  -681 
note  97  [a], 

(2)  Prior    to   the   statute   interes 
could  not  be  recovered. — Hall  v.  Hall 
8  Vt  156—34  C.J.  p  681  note  95. 

1017 


.    Pa,— Worman's  Appeal,  20  A,  415, 

110  Pa.  25. 
4  O.J.  p  681  note  98. 
Mare   errors   and  irregularities   in 
udgment  of  revival  and  in  writ  of 
cire   facias   and  supporting  motion 
papers  did  not  affect  validity  of  such 
udgment. — Cabler  v.  Anderson,  16  S.  • 
W.2d  179,  179  Ark.  364. 

2.  W.Va. — Zumbro  v.    Stump,   IS   S. 
B.  443,  38  W.Va.  325. 

34  C.J.  p  681  note  99. 

3.  Mo. — Reyburn  v.  Handlan,  147  S. 
W.  846,  165  Mo.App.  412. 

34  C.J.  p  681  note  1  [a], 

4.  N.C.— Roberson   v.    WooUard,    28 
N.C.  90. 

34  C.J.  p  681  note  1  [b]. 

5.  Pa. — Baumgardner  v.   Baumgrard- 
ner,   9  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.   243. 

24  O.J.  P  89-6  note  76—34  C.J.  p  682 

note  2. 
la  rem  Judgment 

Judgment  against  terre-tenant  is 
not  against  him  personally  but  mere- 
ly against  realty  owned  or  held  by 
as  terre-tenant. — Cusano  v.  Ru- 
bolino,  39  A.2d  906,  351  Pa,  41— Adel- 
son  v.  Kocher,  36  A.2d  Y37,  154  Pa, 
Super.  548—34  €.J.  p  682  note  2  [a] 
(1). 

a    Idaho. — Evans  v.  City  of  Ameri- 
can Bfclls,  11  P.2d  S63,  «2  Idaho  7. 
34  C.J.  «p  6*77  note  27. 
Several  defendants 

The  whole  judgment  must  be  re- 
vived in  its  entirety,  against  all  of 
the  several  Defendants.  If  a  judg- 
ment creditor  desires  to  pursue  one 
ef  several  defendants  separately,  he 
must  do  so  by  suit. — Evens  v.  City  of 
American  Falls,  supra. 


§  548 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ure  to  enter  a  fiat  thereon  within  a  year  and  a  day 
after  its  issuance  operates  as  a  discontinuance,7 
and  an  order  of  fiat  cannot  be  subsequently  made 
except  on  a  new  writ,8  which,  as  discussed  supra  § 
542,  should  be  sued  out  within  the  statutory  period 
after  the  last  renewal  of  the  life  of  the  judgment. 

Joint  defendants.  As  discussed  supra  subdivision 
e  of  this  section,  judgment  in  a  scire  facias  proceed- 
ing is  not  valid  without  service  on  defendant  or 
proper  notice  to  him;  and  in  case  of  joint  defend- 
ants, some  of  whom  are  not  served,  it  is  error  to 
render  judgment  against  all  or  against  those 
served,9  or  some  of  those  served.10  It  has  been 
held  that,  on  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment 
against  two  persons  jointly,  it  is  erroneous  to  enter 
final  judgment  against  one  before  plaintiff  has  ma- 
tured the  case  against  the  other  also,  so  that  a  joint 
judgment  may  be  entered  against  both;11  but  it  has 
also  been  held  that  a  joint  scire  facias  to  revive  a 
judgment  does  not  necessarily  require  a  joint  judg- 
ment, but  that  the  judgment  that  plaintiff  have  exe- 
cution may  be  several,  against  each,12  and  in  fact 
should  be  so  where  one  is  liable  individually  and  the 
other  in  a  representative  character.13 

(2)  By  Confession  or  Default 

In  a  proceeding  by  scire  facias  to  revive,  judgments 
may  be  entered  against  the  defendant  on  his  confession 
or  default. 

In  a  proceeding  by  scire  facias  to  revive,  judg- 
ment may  be  entered  against  defendant  on  his  con- 
fession14 or  default.15  Plaintiff,  moreover,  has  been 
held  entitled  to  costs,  even  though  he  allowed  the 


judgment  to  become  dormant  and  defendant  did  not 
contest  the  proceeding.16 

Except  in  some  jurisdictions,17  the  rule,  both  at 
common  law  and  under  some  statutes,  is  that  two 
returns  of  nihil  to  a  writ  of  scire  facias  are  equiva- 
lent to  a  return  of  scire  feci;  that  is,  the  court 
thereupon  acquires  jurisdiction  of  defendant,  and 
may  proceed  to  give  judgment  by  default.18  In  such 
case,  however,  as  well  as  in  the  case  of  other  re- 
vivals by  default,  or  by  confession,  the  judgment 
may,  on  good  cause  shown,  be  opened  to  enable  de- 
fendant to  present  his  defense,  as  discussed  infra 
subdivision  k  (3)  of  this  section.  The  operation 
and  effect  of  a  revival  on  two  returns  of  nihil  are 
discussed  infra  §  549. 

(3)  Amending,  Opening,  dr  Vacating  Judg- 
ment 

A  judgment  of  revival  secured  In  a  proceeding  by 
scire  facias  may,  In  a  proper  case,  be  amended,  opened, 
or  vacated. 

In  a  proper  case  the  judgment  of  revival  may 
be  amended,19  but,  except  in  some  jurisdictions,20 
the  original  judgment  cannot  be  amended  or  cor- 
rected in  scire  facias  proceedings  to  revive  it.21 

Opening  or  vacating  judgment.  A  judgment  on  a 
scire  facias  will  be  opened,  vacated,  or  set  aside 
only  where  legally  sufficient  grounds  therefor  are 
established.22  Judgments  of  revival  entered  amica- 
bly,23 or  by  confession24  or  default,25  may  be 
opened  for  cause  shown  to  let  in  a  defense,  and,  un- 
der some  circumstances,  may  be  stricken  from  the 


7.  D.C. — Collins  v.  McBlair,  29  App. 
D.C.  354. 

Scire  facias  as  judicial  writ  see  su- 
pra subdivision  a  of  this  section. 

8.  D.C — Collins  v.  McBlair,   supra, 

9.  Va. — Early  v.  Clarkson,  7  Leigh 
85,  34  Va,  «3. 

34  C.J.  p  682  note  4. 

ia    McL— WHkln  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Melvin, 

81  A.  879,  116  Md.  97. 
34  C.J.  p  632  note  5. 
11.    Va.— Early  r.  Clarkson,  7  Leigh 

83,  34  Va.  83. 
Ifl.    Ky.— <Jray  v.  McDowell,  S  T.B. 

Mon.  501. 

13.  Ky. — Gray  v.  McDowell,  supra. 

14.  Pa.— McPherson  v.  CJole,   87  A. 
708,  240  Pa.  444. 

34  C.J.  p  682  note  13. 

15.  Fla. — McOaltam  v.    Gornto,    174 
So.  24,  127  Fla.  792. 

Pa. — Stanton  v.  Humphreys,  Com. 
PL,  27  DeLCo.  594— Nuss  v.  Kern- 
merer,  Com.Pl.,  17  -Leh.L.J.  379,  52 
York  Leg.Rec.  16 — Gornlak  v.  Pot- 
ter Title  &  Trust  Co.,  Com.Pl.,  91 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  279. 


Vt.— Balthel   v.    Hall,   135   A.   3,    100 

Vt.  109. 

34  €.J.  p  682  note  14. 
Terra-tenant 
Pa. — Cusano  v.  Rubolino,  39  A.2d  906, 

351  Pa.  41. 

16.  -Fla.— McCallum   Y.    Gornto,    174 
So.  24,  127  Fla.  792. 

17.  Tenn. — Boyd    v.    Armstrong,    1 
Terg.  40. 

18.  'U.S. — Brown  v.  Wygant,  App.D. 
C.,   1-6  S.Ct  1159,   163  U.S.  618,  41 
L.Ei  284. 

34  C.J.  p  682  note  18. 

19.  Mo. — City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Koch, 
App.,  156  S.W.2d  1. 

34  C.J.  p  683  note  25. 
Amendment  of  Judgments  generally 
see  supra  "5  236. 


Mo. — City  of  St  Louis  v.  Koch,  su- 
pra. 

20,  Pa. — Maus    v.    Maus,    6    Watts 
31-5. 

34  C.J.  p  6*3  note  26. 

21.  Md.— Clark  v.  Dlgges,  5  GUI  109. 
34  C.J.  p  683  note  27. 

1018 


22.  111. — Hemphill  v.  Trgovic,  60  N. 
E.2d  121,  325  IlLApp.  310. 

Pa.— Eiffert  v.  Giessen,  14  A.2d  130, 
339  Pa.  60 — Greensburg  Building  & 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Dell,  Oom.Pl.,  22 
WestCo.L.J.  299.  . 

Opening  and  vacating  judgments 
generally  see  supra  §  265. 

23-  Pa. — Oozpns  Juris  quoted  in. 
Second  National  Bank  of  Altoona, 
for  Use  of  -Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of  Philadelphia  v.  Faber,  2  A.2d 
747,  749,  322  Pa.  124. 

34  C.  J.  p  ft84  note  52. 

Amicable  scire  facias  generally  see 
Infra  subdivision  m  of  this  sec- 
tion. 

Xnsnlflcieiifc  evidence  of  fraud 

Pa. — Keystone  Nat.  Bank  of  Man- 
helm,  now  to  Use  of  Balmer  v. 
Deamer,  18  A.2d  510,  144  Pa.Su- 
per.  J52. 

24.  Pa.— McPherson  v.  Cole,  -87  A. 
708,  240  Pa,  444. 

34  C.J.  p  652  note  15. 

26.  Md. — Jones  v.  George,  $0  A. 
635,  80  Md.  294. 

34  C.J.  p  682  note  IS. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  549 


record.26  Where  a  default  judgment  may  be  en- 
tered after  two  returns  of  nihil  to  the  writ  of  scire 
facias,  as  is  considered  supra  subdivision  k  (2)  of 
this  section,  defendant  may  afterward,  by  audita 
querela,27  or,  under  the  modern  practice,  by  mo- 
tion,28 open  the  judgment  and  present  his  defense.29 

L  Execution 

The  court  may  control  the  Issuance  of  execution  on 
a  revived  Judgment  to  the  extent  necessary  to  do  Jus- 
tice to  the  parties. 

The  trial  court  has  the  power  to  control  the  is- 
suance of  any  execution  on  a  revived  judgment  to 
the  extent  that  may  be  necessary  to  do  justice  to 
the  parties.30  Ordinarily  the  execution  may  be 
levied  on  the  same  property  bound  originally  by  the 
judgment,31  but,  where  the  revival  is  had  against 
the  administrator  of  a  deceased  defendant,  the  exe- 
cution is  leviable  on  the  assets  in  his  hands.32  A 
waiver  of  inquisition  given  on  the  original  confes- 
sion of  judgment  will  be  available  on  execution  aft- 
er the  revival.33  Plaintiffs  failure  to  serve  one  of 
two  defendants  with  the  writ  of  scire  facias  cannot 
be  alleged,  in  an  affidavit  of  illegality  interposed 
to  the  levy  of  execution,  by  the  party  served.34 

m.  Amicable  Scire  Facias 

An  amicable  scire  facias  to  revive  a  Judgment  is 
a  written  agreement,  signed  by  the  Judgment  debtor  or 
person  to  be  bound  by  the  revival,  In  the  nature  of  a 


writ  of  scire  facias  with  a  confession  of  Judgment  there- 
on. 

Under  the  practice  in  at  least  one  state,  an  amica- 
ble scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  is  a  written 
agreement,  signed  by  the  judgment  debtor  or  person 
to  be  bound  by  the  revival,35  in  the  nature  of  a  writ 
of  scire  facias  with  a  confession  of  judgment  there- 
on, which  must  be  duly  docketed,36  but  which  re- 
quires no  judicial  action  on  the  part  of  the  court.37 
When  such  an  agreement  is  duly  made  and  entered, 
it  has  all  the  force  and  effect  of  a  judgment  ren- 
dered on  an  adverse  or  contested  writ  of  scire  facias, 
as  considered  infra  §  549,  although,  as  discussed 
supra  subdivision  k  (3)  of  this  section,  it  may  be 
opened,  for  cause  shown,  to  permit  defendant  to 
enter  a  defense.  Several  judgments  against  the 
same  person,  owned  by  the  same  creditor,  may  be 
consolidated  and  revived  in  one  amicable  action  of 
scire  facias.38  Where  a  judgment  against  decedent 
has  ceased  to  be  a  lien  on  his  land  by  reason  of 
lapse  of  time,  it  cannot  be  renewed  against  the  ad- 
ministrator by  acquiescence  of  the  latter.39 

§  549.    Operation  and  Effect  of  Revival 

A  Judgment  of  revival  is  binding  until  set  aside, 
and  in  most  Jurisdictions  Is  invested  with  the  same 
force  and  effect  as  the  original  Judgment. 

A  judgment  rendered  on  a  scire  facias  to  revive 
a  judgment  is  binding  until  properly  set  aside.40  It 


26.  Pa.— Handel  &  Hayden  Building 
&  (Loan  Assoc.  v.  Elleford,  101  A. 
951,  258  Pa.  143. 

34  C.J.  p  682  note  16. 
Signature  to  agreement 

Where  only  two  of  a  number  of 
Joint  judgment  debtors  signed  agree- 
ment to  revive  judgment  amicably, 
and  had  expected  remaining  judg- 
ment debtors  to  sign  also,  but  such 
others  did  not  sign,  judgment  was 
properly  stricken  on  petition  of  one 
of  those  who  signed. — Second  Nat 
Bank  of  Altoona,  for  Use  of  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  Philadelphia  v.  -Fa- 
ber,  '2  A.2d  747,  332  Pa.  124. 

27.  Hd. — Jones  v.  George,  30  A.  -635, 
80  Md.  294. 

34  C.J.  p  68.3  note  19. 

28.  Md. — Jones  v.  George,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  683  note  20. 

29.  Fla. — Barrow  v.   Bailey,  '5  (Fla. 
9. 

Pa. — Maltland  v.  Landis,  1  Pa.Co. 
144. 

30.  Pa.— Marsh    v.    Bowen,    6    A.24 
783,  335  Pa.  314. 

Revival  judgment  as  basis  for  writ 
of  execution  generally  see  Execu- 
tions §7e. 


31.  Ga. — Seals  v.  Benson,  6  S.E.  182, 
81  Ga.  44. 

34  C.J.  p  '6-83  note  35. 
Property  subject  to  execution  gener- 
ally see  Executions  §   18. 
Belay  in  entering  Judgment 

Where  judgment  was  entered  on 
scire  facias  nearly  nineteen  years 
after  issuance  of  writ,  court  improp- 
erly dissolved  attachment  sur  judg- 
ment on  ground  that  delay  was  con- 
trary to  convenience  and  public  pol- 
icy.—Croskey  v.  Croskey,  160  A.  103, 
306  Pa.  423. 

32.  Md. — CWllmer  v.   Trumbo,  <88  A. 
259,  121  Md.  44-5. 

34  C.J.  p  -683  note  36. 

33.  Pa. — Building  &  'Loan  Assoc.  v. 
Flanagan,  1  Pa,  Com.  PL  122. 

34    Ga. — American     Nat     Bank,    v. 

Hodges,    154   S.E.    653,   41   Ga.App. 

•717. 
Affidavits  of  illegality  generally  see 

Executions  §5  147-150. 

35.  Pa. — Corpus  Juris  auoted  In 
Second  Nat  Bank  of  Altoona,  for 
Use  of  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Philadelphia  v.  'Faber,  2  A..24  747, 
749,  332  Pa.  124 — Schmidt  v.  Zaj- 
kiewicz,  Com.Pl.,  38  Luz.Leg.Reg. 

1019- 


342 — Krzykwa   v.    Krzykwa,    Com. 

PI.,   15  Northumb.Leg.J.   117. 
34  C.J.  p  684  note  49. 
Bevival  against  terra-tenants 
Pa. — Merchants    Banking    Trust   Co. 

now  to  Use  of  'Federal  Deposit  Ins. 

Corp.   v.   Kaleda,   Com.Pl.,   41   Sch, 

L.R.  176,  60  York  OL.eg.Rec.  25. 

36.  Pa. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Second  Nat  Bank  of  Altoona,  for 
Use   of  Federal  Reserve  Bank   of 
Philadelphia  v.  Faber,  2  A.2d  747, 
•749,  332  Pa.  124. 

34  C.J.  p  684  note  50. 

37.  pa. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     In 
Second  Nat.  Bank  of  Altoona,  for 
Use   of  Federal  Reserve  Bank   of 
Philadelphia  v.  'Faber,  2  A,'2d  747, 
749,  332  Pa.  124. 

34  C.J.  p  684  note  51. 

38.  Pa. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     In 
Second  Nat  Bank  of  Altoona,  for 
Use   of  'Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Philadelphia  v.  Faber,  3  A.24  747, 
•749,  332  Pa.  124. 

34  C.J.  p  6S4  note  53. 

39.  S.C.— Brantley  v.  Brittle,  51  S.EL 
5-61,  72  S.C.  179. 

40.  Pa.— Moll  v.  Lafferty,  153  A.  557, 
302  Pa.  354. 

34  C.J.  p  684  note  £4. 


§  549 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


is  not  subject  to  collateral  attack,41  except  on  the 
ground  of  lack  of  jurisdiction,42  it  being  a  nullity 
when  rendered  by  a  court  or  judge  without  juris- 
diction.43 It  is  conclusive  of  all  matters  which  were 
or  might  have  been  pleaded  in  the  revival  proceed- 
ings.44 

The  revival  of  a  judgment  by  regular  proceed- 
ings reinvests  it  with  all  the  effect  and  conditions 
which  originally  belonged  to  it,  and  which  have 
been  wholly  or  partly  suspended  by  lapse  of  time, 
'change  of  parties,  or  other  cause,45  and,  as  consid- 
ered supra  §  494,  it  continues  the  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment on  real  property  beyond  the  period  when,  by 
statute,  without  such  revival,  it  would  expire.  The 
revival,  however,  adds  nothing  whatever  to  the  va- 
lidity or  effect  of  the  judgment,46  and  cannot  be 
invoked  as  curing  any  fault  or  defect  which  is  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  render  it  void,47  although  it 


cuts  off  defenses  which  might  have  been  made  to 
the  original  judgment  before  the  revival.48  The 
judgment  on  the  scire  facias  to  revive  is  no  bar  to 
an  action  of  debt  on  the  original  judgment,49  and  a 
judgment  for  defendant  on  an  insufficient  and  de- 
fective scire  facias  is  no  bar  to  another  for  the  same 
cause.50 

However,  in  the  few  jurisdictions  where,  as  con- 
sidered supra  §  548  k  (1),  a  new  judgment  is  ren- 
dered on  a  scire  facias  to  revive  .a  judgment,  an  ef- 
fect somewhat  different  from  that  given  the  original 
judgment  is  sometimes  accorded  a  judgment  of  re- 
vival.51 In  such  jurisdictions  it  has  sometimes  been 
held  that  the  new  judgment  may  be  valid  and  en- 
forceable, even  though  the  original  judgment  was 
void;52  and  a  recovery  on  the  scire  facias  is  a  bar 
to  a  subsequent  recovery  against  defendant  on  the 
original  judgment,53  except  where  the  original  de- 


41.  Ark. — Cabler  v.  Anderson,  16  S. 
W.2d  179,  179  Ark.  364. 

Pa. — Kasperunas  v.  Kasper,  Com.Pl., 

'34  IjUz.Leg-.Reg-.  $03. 
34  C.J.  p  684  note  55. 

42.  Colo.— Salisbury  v.  La  Fitte,  123 
P.  124,  22  Colo.A.  90. 

Va.— White  v.  Palmer,  66  S.R  44,  110 
Va.  490. 

43.  Ky. — Baker     v.     Davis*     Adm'r, 
299  S.W.  172.  221  Ky.  524. 

34  C.T.  p  684  note  57. 

44i  Pa. — Quaker  City  Chocolate  & 
Confectionery  Co.  v.  Warnock  Bldg. 
Ass'n,  32  A.2d  5,  347  Pa.  186. 

*4  C.J.  p  684  note  58. 

45.  Fla. — Tedder  v.  Morrow;  131  So. 
387,  100  Fla.  14-86. 

111.— Motel  v.  Andracki.  19  N.E.2d 
832,  299  IlLApp.  166. 

Pa. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Second 
Nat.  Bank  of  Altoona,  for  Use  of 
Federal  Reserve  .  Bank  of  Phila- 
delphia v.  Faber,  2  A.2d  747,  749, 
332  Pa.  124 — Corpus  Juris  quoted 
in  Peoples  Nat  Bank  of  Ellwood 
City  v.  Weingartner,  33  A.2d  469, 
471,  153  Pa.Super.  40— Miller  Bros, 
v.  Boyotz,  96  Pa.  Super.  208 — 
Brooks  v.  Caruthers'  Estate,  Com, 
PL,  23  WestCo.L.J.  138. 

34  C.J.  p  684  note  59. 

Effect  of  statute 

(1)  Statute   according  same  force 
and    effect   to    revival   judgment   as 
that  of  original  judgment  is   to  be 
liberally  construed. — Betty  v.  Superi- 
or Court  of  Los  Angeles  County,  116 
P.2d  947,  18  Cal.2d  -619— Hitchcock  v. 
Caruthers,  34  P.  627,  100  Cal.  100 — 
Thompson  v.  Cook,  143  P.2d  107,  61 
Cal.App.2d  485. 

(2)  'Under  such  a  statute,  creditor 
on  revival  of  judgment  was  entitled 
to  writ  of  execution  within  five  years 
thereafter  as  matter  of  right — Bet- 


ty v.  Superior  Court  of  Los  Angeles 
County,  supra. 

(3)  Statute  requiring  revival  of 
original  judgment  where  execution 
sale  is  irregular  and  purchaser  fails 
to  obtain  possession  contemplates 
that  original  judgment  shall  be  ren- 
dered operative,  rather  than  that  any 
new  judgment  shall  arise,  and  that 
execution  shall  issue  on  original 
judgment  —  Continental  Nat.  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.  of  Salt  -Lake  Qity  v.  John 
H.  Seely  &  Sons  Co.,  77  P.2d  355,  94 
Utah  '357. 

Death  of  party 

Bevivor  of  judgment  becoming 
dormant  on  death  of  party  thereto 
restores  judgment  to  full  force  and 
gives  it  effect  for  ensuing  five  years, 
without  execution,  to  same  extent  as 
revivor  of  judgment  which  has  be- 
come dormant  for  want  of  execu- 
tion.— Jersak  v.  Risen,  152  P.2d  374, 
194  Okl.  423. 


Objectives  and  effects  of 
by  scire  facias  and  action  on  judg- 
ment are  wholly  different  —  Second 
Nat  Bank  v.  Allgood,  176  So.  363, 
234  Ala.  654. 

Judgment  debtor's  obligation. 

If  at  time  of  judgment  debtor's 
conveyance,  lien  of  judgment  has  al- 
ready expired  against  him,  no  reviv- 
al proceedings  on  original  judgment 
can  operate  so  as  to  bind  land  in 
hands  of  purchaser,  although  person- 
al obligation  of  judgment  debtor  re- 
mains unimpaired.  —  Ellinger  v. 
Krach,  28  A.2d  453,  150  Pa.Super. 
384,  affirmed  Simmons  v.  Simmons, 
29  A.2d  677,  346  Pa.  52. 

'    Fla.  —  Tedder  v.  Morrow,  131  So. 

887,  100  Fla,  1486. 
Pa.  —  Davis  v.  Tate,  Com.PL,  26  Brie 

Co.  141. 
34  C.J.  p  685  note  61.  j 

1020 


Mere  right  to  execution  given 
Ala.— Mobile    Drug    Co.    v.     McCul- 

lough,  112  So.  238,  215  Ala.  -682. 

In      rem      judgment     cannot      be 
changed  into  a  personal  one  by  re- 
vival.— Franek  v.  Turner,  114  So.  148, 
164  La.  532. 
Amount 

Where  a  judgment  valid  in  its 
origin  is  fraudulently  renewed  for 
more  than  the  balance  unpaid  on  it, 
it  will  still  be  valid  for  the  amount 
actually  due. — Arnold  v.  House,  12  S. 
C.  600. 
47.  U.S. — U.  S.  Y.  Bwing,  D.C-Miss., 

19  »F.2d  378. 
Mo. — Coombs    v.    Benz,    114    €.W.2d 

713,  232  Mo.App.  1011. 
Ohio. — Porter  v.  Toops,  App.,  62  N.B. 

2d  769. 
34  C.J.  p  685  note  61. 

A  nullity  revived  is  still  a  nullity. 
—Peoples  Nat  Bank  of  Ellwood  City 
v.  Weingartner,  33  A.2d  469,  153  Pa. 
Super.  40. 

4&     Md.— Doub  v.  Mason,  2  Md.  380. 
Pa. — Stanton  v.  Humphreys,  Com.Pl., 

27  Del.Co.  594. 
Philippine. — Compania  Gen.  de  Taba- 

cos  v.  Martinez,  29  Philippine  51'5. 

49.  U.S.— ^Lafayette  CJounty  v.  Won- 
derly,  Mo.,  92  F.  '313*,  34  C.C.A.  360. 

34  C.J.  p  '685  note  64. 

50.  Ky. — Huey  v.    Redden,    3   Dana 
488. 

Philippine. — Compania  Gen.  de  Taba- 
cos  v.  Martinez,  29  Philippine  515. 

51.  Pa. — Lyons  v.   Burns,  '20   Phila. 
412 — In   re   Sivak's   Estate,    Orph., 
94  Pittsb.Leg.J.  235. 

34  C.J.  p  685  notes  67-69. 

52.  Pa. — Mayer    Furniture     Co.     v. 
Putt  3  PaJDist  &  Co.  542. 

34  C.J.  p  685  note  68. 

53.  Pa.— Le    Bar   v.    Patterson,    187 
A.  278,  123  Pa.Super.  491. 

34  C.J.  p  685  note  £9. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


550 


fendant  is  not  a  party  to  the  proceeding.64  It  has 
also  been  held  that  a  scire  facias  may  issue  on  the 
original  judgment  against  a  terre-tenant  who  is  not 
a  party  to  the  former  judgment  of  revivor.55 

An  amicable  scire  facias,  duly  made  and  entered, 
has  all  the  force  and  effect  of  a  judgment  rendered 
on  an  adverse  or  contested  writ  of  scire  facias.56 


A  revival  on  two  returns  of  nihil,  which,  as  dis- 
cussed supra  §  548  k  (2),  is  a  form  of  revival  by  de- 
fault, does  not  stop  the  running  of  the  statute  of 
limitations  in  another  state,  where  defendant  re- 
sides, or  support  a  new  action  against  him  in  an- 
other state.57 


XVTL  PAYMENT,  SATISPAOTION,  AND  DISCHARGE  OP  JUDGMENT 


§  550. 


Persons  to  Whom  Payment  May  Be 
Made 


As  a  general  rule,  payment  of  a  Judgment  must  be 
made  to  the  plaintiff  of  record  or  to  his  duly  authorized 
agent,  and,  where  there  are  several  Judgment  creditors, 
payment  may  be  made  to  any  one  of  them. 

As  a  general  rule,  payment  of  a  judgment  may 
and  must  be  made  to  plaintiff  of  record,58  or  to  his 
duly  authorized  agent,59  or  attorney  as  discussed  in 
Attorney  and  Client  §  99.  However,  when  a  judg- 
ment is  recovered  by  one  person  for  the  use  of  an- 
other, payment  may  be  made  to  the  beneficial  own- 
er,60 and  it  is  in  fact  the  duty  of  the  judgment  debt- 
or to  make  payment  to  him  where  the  debtor  has 
notice  that  the  judgment  belongs  to  him,61  al- 
though, on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that,  if 
the  debtor  pays  it  to  a  third  person  who  he  assumes 
is  beneficially  entitled  to  receive  it,  he  acts  at  his 
own  peril.62  If  the  person  for  whose  use  the  judg- 
ment is  recovered  is  a  fictitious  person,  then  the 
debtor  is  justified  in  treating  the  nominal  plaintiff 
as  the  real  owner  and  proceeding  to  settle  the  de- 
mand with  him,63  Where  the  court  directs  pay- 
ment of  the  judgment  to  plaintiff  only  on  the  debtor 


obtaining  indemnification  against  the  claims  of  oth- 
ers interested  in  the  fund,  the  debtor  is  not  protect- 
ed by  such  payment  if  he  fails  to  secure  such  indem- 
nification.64 

Where  the  judgment  has  been  assigned  to  a  third! 
person,  the  debtor,  after  notice  of  the  assignment, 
must  pay  to  the  assignee;65  but  a  judgment  debtor 
who  learns  that  the  judgment  has  been  assigned 
acts  at  his  peril  in  the  payment  thereof  to  any  par- 
ty as  assignee  without  ascertaining  the  facts,66  and 
he  cannot  rely  on  the  statement  of  the  attorney  for 
the  original  judgment  creditor.67  Where  a  judg- 
ment is  recovered  by  one  not  the  record  owner  of 
realty  for  injury  thereto,  the  judgment  debtor,  be- 
fore payment  of  the  judgment,  may  demand  proper 
releases  from  all  persons  who  may  have  an  interest 
in  the  realty.68  Payment  of  the  amount  of  the 
judgment  to  a  creditor  of  the  judgment  plaintiff, 
under  process  of  garnishment,  will  discharge  -it  pro 
tanto,  as  discussed  in  Garnishment  §  294. 

//  there  are  several  judgment  creditors,  payment 
may  be  made  to  one,  with  the  effect  of  discharging 
the  whole  obligation,69  unless  notice  is  given  the 


54.  Pa. — Le  Bar  v.  Patterson,  supra. 

55.  Pa, — Zerns    v.    Watson,    11    Pa, 
260. 

34  C.J.  p  £85  note  70. 

56.  Pa. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    la 
Second  Nat.  Bank  of  Altoona,  for 
Use   of   Federal   Reserve   Bank   of 
Philadelphia  v.  Faber,  2  A.2d  747, 
749,   332   Pa.  124— Doran  &  Ely  v. 
Hohn,   22   Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  719. 

34  C.J.  p  684  note  51. 
Accord  and  satisfaction. 

'Fact  that  judgments  entered  by 
confession  had  been  amicably  re- 
vived did  not  estop  party  to  revival 
from  seeking  to  open  confessed  judg- 
ments which  had  been  discharged  in 
fact  by  accord  and  satisfaction. — 
Peoples  Nat.  Bank  of  Bllwood  City 
v.  Weingartner,  33  A12d  469,  153  Pa. 
Super.  40. 

57.  U.S. — Owens  v.  McCloskey,  iLa., 
1-6    S.Qt.    693,    161   U.S.    642,   40   L. 
Ed.  837. 

34  C.J.  p  683  note  23. 

B8.     Cal.— Hogan   r.   Superior   Court 


of  California  in  and  for  City  and 
County  of  San  Francisco,  241  P. 
584,  74  Cal.App.  704. 

Pa. — Dotterer  v.  Nothstein,  Com.Pl., 
20  Leh.X..J.  188. 

34  C.J.  p  6'S5  note  72. 

Payment  of  judgment  where  judg- 
ment creditor  is  infant  see  In- 
fants §  124. 

Payment  to  lienor 

Where  judgment  debtor  paid  a 
portion  of  judgment  to  one  asserting 
a  lien  thereon  who  was  entitled  to 
no  part  of  the  judgment,  judgment 
creditor  could  elect  to  sue  either  the 
party  to  whom  payment  was  im- 
properly made  or  the  judgment  debt- 
or.— Schreiber  v.  American  Employ- 
ers' Ins.  Co.,  38  N.T.S.2d  250,  265 
App.Div.  167,  affirmed  49  N.E.2d  627, 
290  N.T.  678. 

59.  Idaho. — Vermont  Loan  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  McGregor,  58  P.  399,  6  Ida- 
ho 134. 

34  C.J.  p  685  note  74. 

1021 


60.  Ga.— Dyal  v.  Dyal,  16  S.E.2d  S3, 
&5  Ga,App.  359. 

34  C.J.  j>  68<6  note  75. 

61.  Cal. — Weiner  V*  Luscombe,  66  P. 
2d  151,  19  Cal.App.2d  668. 

34  C.J.  p  686  note  76. 

62.  Ala.— Mervine  v.  Parker,  18  Ala. 
241. 

63.  Ala,— McGehee    v.    Ginidrat,     20 
Ala,  95. 

64.  Tex.— Trujlllo  v.  Piarote,  S3   S- 
W.2d  466,  122  Tex.  173. 

65.  Miss.— Moore  v.  Bed,  22  So.  948. 
34  C.J.  p  686  note  79. 

66.  S.D.— La  Penotiere  v.  Kellar,  1ST 
N.W.  382,  29  S.D.  496. 

34  C.J.  p  686  note  80. 

67.  S.D.-r-La  Penotiere  v.  Kellar,  su- 
pra. 

68.  Utah. — Ludlow  v.  Colorado  Ani- 
mal By-Products  Co.,  137  P.2d  $47, 
104  Utah  221. 

69.  Neb. — American  Fire  Ins.  Co.  r. 


§  550 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


debtor  by  one  of  such  creditors  not  to  pay  the  other 
more  than  his  proportion  of  the  judgment70  One 
of  the  creditors  may  compound  or  compromise  with 
the  debtor  his  own  interest  in  the  judgment  without 
the  consent  of  the  others,71  but  cannot  accept  less 
than  the  whole  amount  in  full  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment.72  Where  two  causes  of  action  by  differ- 
ent plaintiffs  against  the  same  defendant  are  im- 
properly joined  and  a  verdict  for  one  sum  is  ren- 
dered in  favor  of  both  plaintiffs,  its  payment  to  the 
parties  jointly  or  to  their  attorney  of  record  will 
discharge  defendant  from  liability  to  both  on  ac- 
count of  all  matters  alleged  in  the  petition.73 

Payment  into  court  may  satisfy  the  judgment 
where  it  is  so  provided  in  the  judgment  itself,74  or, 
as  discussed  infra  §  552,  where  the  payment  is  made 
at  the  instance  of,  or  is  accepted  by,  the  judgment 
creditor. 


§  551. 


Clerk  of  Court  or  Other  Officer 


In  the  absence  of  special  authority,  the  clerk  of  the 
court  has  no  right  to  receive  money  from  the  Judgment 
debtor  in  satisfaction  of  a  judgment.  Where  a  sheriff 
or  other  ministerial  officer  holds  a  writ  for  the  collec- 
tion of  a  judgment,  the  amount  may  be  properly  paid 
to  such  officer. 

It  is  a  general  rule  that  the  clerk  of  the  court  in 
which  a  judgment  has  been  rendered  has  no  right 
to  receive  money  from  the  judgment  debtor  in  sat- 


isfaction of  the  judgment  without  special  author- 
ity,75 such  as  authority  conferred  expressly76  or  im- 
pliedly77-by  statute. 

Sheriff  or  other  officer.  The  amount  due  on  a 
judgment  may  properly  be  paid  to  a  sheriff  or  other 
ministerial  officer  who  holds  a  writ  for  the  collec- 
tion of  such  judgment,78  and  the  judgment  debtor 
will  be  protected  in  such  payment,  even  though  the 
money  may  never  come  to  the  hands  of  his  credi- 
tor.79 An  effectual  payment  cannot  be  made  to  the 
sheriff  when  he  has  no  writ  in  his  hands,80  or  when 
the  return  day  of  the  writ  has  expired,81  unless 
such  payment  is  ratified  or  accepted  by  the  credi- 
tor.82 The  resignation  and  subsequent  insolvency 
of  one  of  the  plaintiffs  who  was  a  party  to  a  judg- 
ment as  sheriff  furnish  no  excuse  for  defendant  to 
withhold  payment  of  the  judgment  to  his  successor 
in  office.83 

§  552.    Mode,  Medium,  and  Sufficiency  of  Pay- 
ment 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  for  the  payment  of 
money  can  be  satisfied  only  in  money,  unless  the  judg- 
ment provides  for,  or  the  owner  of  the  judgment  agrees 
to,  some  other  mode  of  payment. 

Except  where  a  judgment  by  its  own  terms  pro- 
vides otherwise,84  a  judgment  for  the  payment  of 
money  can  be  satisfied  only  in  money,85  unless  the 


Landfare,    7*   N.W.    1068,   56   Neb, 
482. 
34  C.J.  p  686  note  83. 

70.  Tenn.— Brwin   v.  .Rutherford,    1 
Yerg.  169. 

34  C.J.  p  686  note  £4. 

71.  Ala. — Penn  v.  Edwards,  50  Ala. 
63. 

72.  CaL — Haggin  v.  Clark,  61  CaL  1. 

73.  Ga. — Georgia  R.  &  Banking  Co. 
v.  Tice,  52  S.B.  916,  124  Ga.  459,  4 
Ann.Cas.  200. 

74.  Mo. — Bucknam  v.  Bucknam,  151 
S.W.2d  1097,   347   Mo.   1039. 

34  C.J.  p  686  note  88. 

75.  Ga. — Bank     of     Georgetown     v. 
Ault  31  Ga.  359— Wilcher  v.  Wil- 
liams, 127  S.E.  795,  33  Ga.App.  797. 

Mont — Corpus  Jurig  cited  in  Paulich 
.  v.  Republic  Coal  <Qo.,  33  P.2d  514, 

515,  97  Mont.  224. 
34  C.J.  p  68*6  note  91. 
Powers  and  duties  of  clerks  of  courts 

with  respect  to  receipt  of  money 

generally  see  Clerks  of  Courts  §§ 

40-42. 


the  clerk  of  court  in  made 
•the  agent  of  the  judgment  creditor  to 
receive  money  due  on  the  judgment, 
-a  payment  thereof  to  the  clerk  is 
not  a  satisfaction  of  the  judgment. 
—Rushing  v.  Thomas,  Tex.Civ.App., 
<3  S.W.2d  323— Whitesboro  v.  Dia- 
mond, Tex.Civ.App.,  75  S.W.  S40.  | 


76.     Ala. — Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.  of 

New   Tork   v.  Terry,   159    So.   822, 

230    Ala.    125 — Hayes   v.   Waldrop, 

108  So.  333,  214  Ala.  534. 

34  C.  J.  p  686  note  92. 

Statutory  agent  of  judgment  creditor 

N.C.— Dalton  v.   Strickland,   179   S.E. 

20,  208  N.C.  21. 
Court  order 

Although  defendant  was  held  au- 
thorized by  statute  to  pay  the 
amount  of  a  judgment  into  court, 
an  order  for  payment  of  money  into 
court  in  satisfaction  of  judgment  en- 
tered during  previous  term  was  not 
without  court's  jurisdiction  as  mod- 
ification of  original  judgment.- 
Blake  v.  Cuneo,  111  P.2d  4*5,  188  OkL 
533. 
77.  Neb.— McDonald  v.  Atkins,  14  N. 

W.  532,  13  Neb.  568. 
34  C.J.  p  687  note  93. 

73.    N.C.— Bailey   v.    Hester,    8   S.E. 

164,  101  N.C.  538. 
34  C.J.  p  6i87  note  94. 

79.  Ind.— Beard  v.  Mm  1k an,  68  Ind. 
231. 

80.  N.C.— Bailey   v.   Hester,    8   S.B. 
164,  101  N.C.  538. 

34  C.J.  p  687  note  9*6. 

8L    Va.— Chapman    v.    Harrison,    4 

Rand.  -336,  25  Va.  33*. 
34  C.J.  p  687  note  97. 

1022 


82.  Ala. — Henderson      v.      Planters' 
&  Merchants'   Bank   of   Ozark,    59 
So.  493,  178  Ala.  420— Chapman  v. 
Cowles,  41  Ala.  103,  91  Am.D.  508. 

83.  -La. — State    v.    Judge    Dist    Ct., 
13  La.  542. 

84.  U.S.— Wheeler    v.    Taft,    C.C.A. 
La.,  279  F.  415. 

Alternative  judgment 

An  offer  to  return  logs  to  their 
owner  while  still  on  his  land  from 
which  they  were  cut,  and  his  subse- 
quent treatment  of  them  as  his  own, 
were  sufficient  to  satisfy  a  judg- 
ment for  recovery  of  the  logs  or  the 
value,  thereof,  although  no  tender 
with  the  logs  present  was  shown. — 
Less  v.  Grismore-Hyman  Co.,  251  B. 
W.  673,  158  Ark.  1. 
Delivery  of  stock 

Where  defendants  made  no  reason- 
able effort  to  obey  judgment  ordering 
delivery  of  stock  to  plaintiff  within 
ten  days,  they  could  not  take  advan- 
tage of  plaintiff's  effort  to  secure  the 
stock  as  excuse  for  noncompliance, 
especially  where  they  had  withheld 
the  stock  from  plaintiff  for  approx- 
imately five  years.— Haggott  v. 
Plains  Iron  Works  Co.,  218  P.  909, 
74  Colo.  37. 

,    'La. — State    v.    Johnson,    60    So. 
702,  132  La.-  11. 
34  C.J.  jp  68*7  note  2. 


49    O.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  552 


owner  of  the  judgment  chooses  to  accept  property, 
securities,  or  some  other  thing  of  value,8^  such  as 
real87  or  personal88  property,  a  mortgage  on  the 
debtor's  property,8*  an  assignment  of  the  debtor's 
property  in  trust,90  the  debtor's  bond,91  a  claim  on 
a  third  person,92  the  performance  of  certain  condi- 
tions by  the  debtor,9^  or  the  payment  by  the  debtor 
of  other  claims  or  obligations  on  behalf  of  plain- 
tiff.** 

In  order  that  the  acceptance  of  something  other 
than  money  may  operate  as  a  satisfaction,  there 
must  be  a  positive  and  express  agreement  to  accept 
the  substitute  for  direct  payment  of  the  judgment.96 
The  mere  fact  that  the  judgment  creditor  possesses 
assets  of  the  debtor  does  not  require  him  to.  apply 
them  in  satisfaction  of  the  judgment,96  although  if 
he  does  so  apply  them  the  judgment  will  be  extin- 
guished pro  tanto.97  A  judgment  plaintiff  in  lawful 
possession  of  lands  on  which  his  judgment  is  a  lien 


has  not  the  right  to  apply  the  rents  and  profits 
therefrom  to  the  satisfaction  of  his  judgment,  as 
against  the  owner,  who  is  not  a  judgment  defend- 
ant98 

As  a  rule,  no  satisfaction  of  the  judgment  arises 
from  the  acceptance  of  collateral  security  for  its 
payment99  except  where  the  Judgment  creditor  cov- 
enants and  agrees  never  to  enforce  the  judgment.1 
Thus  a  judgment  ordinarily  is  not  satisfied  by  the 
giving  of  a  promissory  note  or  other  negotiable  in- 
strument,2 or  renewal  thereof,3  even  though  the  in- 
strument is  that  of  a  third  person,4  unless  it  is  paid5 
or  there  is  an  agreement  that  its  acceptance  is  to 
operate  as  absolute  payment,6  or  unless  the  judg- 
ment is  on  an  obligation  payable  in  notes.7 

Where  a  judgment  plaintiff  has  secured  the  pay- 
ment into  court  of  money  belonging  to  defendant 
sufficient  to  satisfy  the  judgment,  it  is  error  to  re- 
quire payment  into  court  of  further  sums  owing  to 


Bank  notes 

(1)  Bank  notes  are  not  cash,  and 
cannot  be  brought  into  court  as  such 
in  payment  of  a  Judgment,  although 
the   bank   issuing   the   notes   be   the 
holder  of  the  Judgment. — State  Bank 
at  Trenton  v.  Qoxe,  «  N.J.Law  172,  14 
Am.D.  417. 

(2)  A  statute  of  one  state  requir- 
ing a  bank  recovering  a  judgment  to 
accept    its    bank    notes   in   payment 
thereof    is    inapplicable    in    another 
state  where  execution  of  the  judg- 
ment is  sought,  and  the  sheriff  may 
refuse   to    receive   such   bank   notes 
in  payment  of  the  Judgment. — Wood- 
son  v.  Bank  of  Gallipolls,  4  B.Moru, 
Ky.,  203. 

Payment  by  check  was  insufficient 
to  constitute  "payment"  within  stat- 
ute providing  for  giving  of  satisfac- 
tion piece  on  payment  of  Judgment. — 
Altenau  v.  Masterson,  292  N.Y.S.  299, 
161  Misc.  433.  .  ' 

86.  Mo. — Corpus      Juris      cited      in 
Osage   Land   Co.   v.    Kansas   City, 
187  S.W.2d  193,  197,  '353  Mo.  1196. 

34  O.J.  p  687  note  3. 

87.  Cal. — Musser  v.  Gray,  31  P.  56'8, 
3  Cal.Unrep.Cas.  '639. 

34  <XJ.  p  687  note  4. 

88.  Mo. — Osage  Land  Co.  y.  Kansas 
City,  187  S.W.2d  193,  353  Mo.  119-6. 

'34  C.J.  p  687  note  4. 

89.  Minn.— Walker  v.  Crosby,  35  N. 
W.  475,  38  Minn.  34. 

Assignment  of  mortgage 

Where  payee  of  notes  took  an  as- 
signment of  mortgage  and  satisfied 
the  notes  on  Its  books,  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  notes  extinguished  judg- 
ments confessed  on  the  notes  as  val- 
id obligations  and  amicable  revivals 
of  the  judgments  did  not  render 
them  enforceable. — Peoples  Nat. 


Bank  of  Bllwood  City  v.  Weingart- 
ner,  33  A.2d  469,  153  Pa. Super.  40. 

90.  N.Y.— Hawley     v.     Mancius,     7 
Johns.Ch.  174. 

91.  111.— Cox  v.  Reed,  27  111.  433, 
34  C.J.  p  687  note  7. 

The  execution,  of  a  replevin  "bond 
is  not  a  satisfaction  of  the  judgment. 
Ind.— Sheets  v.  Roe,  2  Blackf.  195. 
Ky.—Williams    v.    Isaacs,    256    S.W. 

19,  '201  Ky.  158.   . 

92.  Ala. — Pharis    y.    Leachman,    20 
Ala.  662. 

93.  Pa.— Potter  v.   Hartnett,    23   A. 
1007,  148  Pa.  15. 

34  C.J.  p  687  note  9. 
mstaUment  payments 

(1)  Inasmuch   as   time    is    clearly 
made    the    essence   of   a   stipulation 
providing  that,   if   installment  pay- 
ments on  a  judgment  should  not  be 
made  when  due,  the  creditor  should 
be  at  liberty  to  enforce  payment  of 
the  full  amount  remaining  due,  the 
court    is   without   power    to    compel 
him  to  accept  payment  of  an  install- 
ment after  Its  due  date. — 'Friedman  v. 
Such,    220   N.Y.S.    855,    219  App.Div. 
'330. 

(2)  When      defendants      breached 
agreements    to   make   monthly   pay- 
ments  to   be   applied   on   judgment, 
plaintiff  had  right  to  return  security 
given    for    agreement    and    look    to 
judgment  alone. — Armstrong-  y.  Van 
Dyke,   198  N.W.  915,  227  Mich.  *0& 

94.  U.S. — Medford    y.    Dorsey,    CC. 
Pa.,  16  !F.Cas.No.9,390,  2  Wash.CC. 
467. 

34O.J.  p,  687  note  10. 

95.  Pa.— Olyphant    Bank    r.    Borys, 
3*  A-2d  '823,  155  Pa, Super.  49. 

34  C.J.  p  687  note  11. 

1023 


96.  Ala. — Garrett  v.  Mayfleld  Wool- 
en Mills,  44  So.  1026,  153  Ala,  602. 

97.  S.D.— Custer     City     First     Nat. 
Bank  v.  Calkins,    81  N.W.   732,   12 
S.D.  411. 

'34  C.J.  p  687  note  13. 

96.    Iowa. — Boggs  y.  Douglass,  75  N. 

W.  185,  105  Iowa  -344. 
99.    Mich. — Armstrong  v.  Tan  Dyke, 

198  N.W.   915,   227  Mich.   308. 
34  C.J.  p  688  note  15. 
1.    Ga.— -Chambers    y.    McDowell,    4 

Ga.  185. 
a.    N.Y.— Altenau  v.   Masterson,   292" 

N.Y.S.   299,   161  Misc.   433. 
Pa. — Olyphant  Bank  v.  Borys,  36  A- 

2d  823,  155  Pa. Super.  49. 
Va. — Gemmell    v.    Powers,    195    8.SL. 

501,  170  Va.  43. 
34  C.J.  -p  688  note  16. 

3.  Va. — Gemmell  v.  Powers,  supra, 
34  C.J.  p  6-88  note  17. 

4.  W.Va. — Sullivan  y.    Saunders,    6$ 
S.B.  497,   66  W.Va,   350,  42  L.R.A., 
N.S.,  1010,  19  Ann.Cas.  480. 

5-    Ind.— Phillips    v.    Bast,    IB    Ind.. 

254. 
34  C.J.  p  6&8  note  19. 

6.  W.Va. — Sullivan  y.   Saunders,    6fr 
S.B.  497,   66  W.Va.   350,  42  L.R.X,. 
N.S.,  1010,  19  Ann.Cas.  480. 

34  C.J.  p  688  note  20. 
Note  and  deed  of  trust 

When  holder  of  judgment  based  on* 
foreclosure  of  note  and  deed  of  trust 
accepted  new  note  and  deed  of  trust 
on  the  same  premises,  the  Judgment 
was  paid  and  Judgment  debt  was 
merged  into  the  new  note. — Krausa 
v.  West,  Tex.Civ.App.,  123  S«W.2d 
946,  error  dismissed,  judgment  cor* 
rect 

7.  La.— Roberts  y.  Stark,  3  (La.  Ann. 
71. 


§  552 


JUDQMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


defendant  from  third  persons;8  and,  where  the 
whole  amount  of  the  judgment  is  paid  into  court 
and  accepted  by  the  judgment  creditor,  he  cannot 
afterward  return  it  to  the  clerk  on  the  ground  that 
there  is  more  due  him.9  A  deposit  made  with 
plaintiff  as  a  security  on  which  defendant's  right  of 
appeal  is  conditioned  under  a  stipulation  for  its  re- 
payment in  case  of  the  appeal  going  in  favor  of  de- 
fendant does  not  constitute  payment  of  the  judg- 
ment.10 An  application  of  payments  to  a  judgment 
cannot  be  changed  when  it  will  affect  the  rights 
and  interests  of  third  persons.11 

Interest  and  costs.  There  can  be  no  complete 
satisfaction  of  a  judgment  "by  payment  unless  the 
payment  covers  interest,  if  any,12  and  the  costs 
chargeable  against  defendant,18  even  though  the 
amount  of  the  costs  is  not  inserted  in  the  judg- 
ment14 Under  some  statutes,  however,  it  has  been 
held  that  a  judgment  creditor's  acceptance  of  pay- 
ment of  a  judgment,  without  protest  or  reservation 
as  to  interest  not  given,  operates  as  a  release  there- 
of.15 

Payment  with  borrowed  tnoney.  Ordinarily, 
where  a  judgment  debtor  borrows  money  with  which 
to  pay  off  a  judgment  against  him,  and  uses  the 
money  for  this  purpose,  the  judgment  becomes  satis- 
fied,16 but,  except  in  some  jurisdictions,17  a  judg- 
ment debtor  may  agree  with  one  who  lends  him 
money  for  such  a  purpose  that  the  judgment  shall 
not  be  satisfied  by  payment  to  the  holder  thereof,  but 
shall  be  transferred  to  the  lender  as  security  for 
the  loan,18  and  a  similar  arrangement  may  be  made 


for  the  protection  of  one  who,  by  becoming  surety 
for  a  debtor,  aids  the  latter  in  procuring  money  with 
which  to  pay  a  judgment  creditor.19 

Place  of  payment.  The  fact  that  the  payment  in 
satisfaction  of  a  judgment  is  made  in  a  county  oth- 
er than  that  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered 
will  not  alter  the  effect  of  the  payment.20 

Payment  to  attorney  or  officer.  The  right  to  ac- 
cept anything  else  as  a  substitute  for  money  in  sat- 
isfaction of  the  judgment  is  confined  to  the  owner 
himself,  and  does  not  belong  to  his  attorney,  as  dis- 
cussed in  Attorney  and  Client  §  106,  or  to  the  clerk 
of  the  court,21  or  to  a  sheriff  or  other  officer  holding 
process  for  its  collection.22  The  handing  of  money 
by  a  junior  judgment  creditor  to  the  sheriff  for  the 
purpose  of  purchasing  a  senior  judgment  and  of 
preventing  a  sale  thereunder,  and  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  paying  the  judgment,  does  not  operate  as  a 
satisfaction.28  Where  a  receiver  is  appointed  in 
proceedings  to  collect  a  judgment,  only  the  amount 
remaining  after  deduction  of  his  expenses  and  fees 
from  the  amount  received  by  him  is  applicable  as 
payment  on  the  judgment24 

§  553.    Tender 

An  unaccepted  tender  of  the  amount  due  on  a  Judg- 
ment is  not  of  itself  a  satisfaction  of  the  judgment. 

An  unaccepted  tender  of  the  amount  due  on  a 
judgment  is  not  of  itself  a  satisfaction  of  the  judg- 
ment or  a  discharge  of  its  lien;25  but  it  gives  the 
debtor,  on  paying  the  money  into  court,  a  right  to 
apply  to  the  court  to  restrain  execution  and  enter 


8.  Neb. — Montgomery     y.     Dresher, 
149  N.W.  311,  97  Neb.  104. 

9.  Or. — Portland     Constr.     Co. 
O'Neil,  32  P.  764,  24  Or.  54. 

10.  N.T. — Persons    v.    Gardner,    106 
N.Y.S.  316,  122  App.Div.  167. 

11.  Pa.— Chancellor    v.    -Schott,     2$ 
Pa*  68. 

12.  111. — Feldman  v.  City  of  Chica- 
go, 2  N.E.2d  102,  8$3  111.  247— COIN 
pus    Juris    quoted    in    Tracey    v. 
Shanley,    3$    NJBJ.2d    753,    756,    311 
HLApp.  529. 

La.— Breeland  v.  Kenner,  App.,  174 
So.  678. 

Mo.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  City  of 
S.t  -Louis  v.  Senter  Commission 
Co.,  124  S.W.2d  1180,  1184,  343  Mo. 
107-5. 

34  C.J.  p  688  note  30. 

13.  La,— Breeland  v.  Kenner,  App., 
174  So.  678. 

Mo.— City  of  St  Louis  v.  Senter 
Commission  Co.,  124  S.W.2d  1180, 
343  Mo.  1075. 

31  C.J.  p  688  note  31. 

Waiver 
By  discharging  judgment  of  rec- 


ord on  payment  of  principal  sum  and 
costs,  except  fee  for  execution  of 
writs  outstanding,  judgment  credi- 
tor waived  payment  of  that  item. — 
Stebbins  v.  Friend,  Crosby  &  Co., 
241  N.W.  315,  1-85  Minn.  33'6. 

14.  S.D.— Stakke  v.  Chapman,  S3  N. 
W.  261,  13  S.D.  '269. 

Costs  of  appeal 

The  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  en- 
tered on  a  verdict  prior  to  the  taxing 
of  costs  of  appeal  granted  to  abide 
the  event  does  not  deprive  plaintiff 
of  the  right  to  recover  such  costs. — 
Greenberg  v.  Strauss,  221  N.T.S.  «29, 
220  App.Div.  736. 

15.  La. — Grennon    v.    New    Orleans 
Public  Service,  136  So.  309,  17  'La. 
App.  700. 

8.    Ga.— Patterson  v.  Clark,  23  S.E. 
496,  96  Ga.  494. 

17.  Ohio.— Unger  v.  iLeiter,  32  Ohio 
St.  210. 

18.  Ga.— Patterson  v,  Clark,  23  S.E. 
496,  96  Ga.  494. 


Wash.  —  Lachner    v.    Myers, 
109'5,  121  Wash.  172. 


208    P. 


19.  Ga.  —  Patterson  v.  Clark,  23  S.E. 
496,  96  Ga.  494. 

20.  Ky.—  Allen  v.   Burks,   7  Ky.Op. 
444. 

21.  Ala.—  Aicardi     v.     Bobbins,     41 
Ala.  541,  94  Am.D.  614. 

34  C.J.  -p  688  note  38. 

22.  U.S.  —  McFarland  v.  Gwin,  Miss., 

3  How.  717,  11  L.Ed.  799. 

34  C.J.  p  689  note  39—57  C.J.  p  787 

notes  60,  61. 

Bule  applied  to  bank  notes 
Ky.—  Woodson  v.  Bank  of  Galllpolis, 

4  B.Mon.  203. 

34  C.J.  p  -689  note  «9  [a]—  57  g.J.  p 
787  note  $0. 

23.  Ind.  —  Strange  v.  Donohue,  4  Ind. 
327. 

24.  N.T.—  Binswanger  v.  Hewitt,  140 
N.T.S.  143,  79  Misc.  425. 

25.  N.T.  —  Jackson   v.   Law,   5   Cow. 
248,  affirmed  9  Cow.  641. 

34  C.J.  p  689  note  42. 


1024 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


555 


satisfaction  of  the  judgment.26  In  order  that  the 
rules  relating  to  tender  may  be  available,  there  must 
be  a  legal  tender27  of  the  full  amount  due.28  It 
has  been  said  that  an  offer  to  pay  a  judgment  is  not 
an  admission  of  liability  and  is  not  a  tender  except 
in  the  limited  sense  of  a  step  in  compelling  the 
satisfaction  of  a  judgment.29 

§  554.    Payment  by  Joint  Party  or  Third  Per- 
son 

Whether  or  not  payment  by  a  joint  debtor,  surety, 
stranger,  or  officer  operates  as  a  satisfaction  and  ex- 
tinguishment of  a  judgment  as  to  all  concerned  is 
discussed  infra  §§  555-558. 

Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 


§  555.    Payment  by  Joint  Debtor 

a.  In  general 

b.  Assignment  of  judgment 

a.  In  General 

Generally  the  payment  of  a  Judgment  by  one  of  two 
or  more  joint  defendants  extinguishes  the  Judgment  as 
to  all. 

Payment  of  a  judgment  by  one  of  two  or  more 
joint  defendants  usually  operates  as  a  satisfaction 
and  extinguishment  of  the  judgment  as  to  all,30  re- 
gardless of  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  the  trans- 
action,31 and  even  where  the  judgment  is  against 
joint  tort-feasors  ;32  and  there  are  authorities  hold- 
ing that  the  rule  applies  to  judgments  on  negotiable 
paper.33 


26.  Okl. — Richardson  v.   Marrs,   110 
P.2d  606,  188  Okl.  451. 

34  C.J.  p  6S9  note  43. 

27.  Cal. — Rauer's  Law  &  Collection 
Co.  v.  Sheridan  Proctor  Co.,  181  P. 
71,  40  Cal.App.  524. 

34  C.J.  p  O'SO  note  44. 

28.  111.— Tracey  v.  Shanley,  3-6  N.E. 
2d  753,  311  I11.A.PP.  529. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in,  City  of 
St.  Louis  v.  Senter  Commission 
Co.,  124  S.W.2.d  ll'SO,  1184,  343  Mo. 
1075. 

34  C.J.  p  689  note  45. 
poll  amount  not  ascertainafcle 

A  plaintiff  in  judgment  is  not  re- 
quired to  accept  a  certain  sum  in 
full  payment  of  judgment  and  costs 
when  he  does  not  know,  and  cannot 
know  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
care  before  the  sheriff's  sale,  that 
the  sum  is  sufficient  for  full  'pay- 
ment.— Parker  v.  Holstead,  Tex.Com. 
App.,  25.">  S.W.  724. 

29.  Pa. — Bt'rgen  v.  Lit  Bros.,  45  A. 
2d  373,  15S  Pa.Super.  469,  affirmed 
47  A.2d  671,  354  Pa.  '535. 

Tender  as  admission  of  liability  gen- 
erally see  the  C.J.S.  title  Tender  § 
51,  also  62  C.J.  P  684  note  77-p  685 
note  90. 

30.  U.S. — Apple     v.     Owens,     C.C.A. 
Tex.,  48  F.2d  807. 

Ga. — Register  v.  Southern  States 
Phosphate  &  Fertilizer  Co.,  122  S. 
E.  323,  157  Ga.  561,  answers  to 
certified  questions  conformed  to 
122  S.E.  652,  32  Ga.App.  86. 

Mo.— PHelps  v.  Scott,  30  S.W.2d  71, 
•325  Mo.  711,  71  A.«L.R.  2,90— 
Schuchman  v.  Roberts,  133  S.W.Sd 
1030,  234  Mo.App.  509. 

N.C.— Hoft  v.  Mohn,  2  S.E.2d  23,  215 
N.C.  397. 

Okl. — Martin  v.  North  American  Car 
Corporation,  35  P.2d  460,  168  Okl. 
599. 

Tex. — Hadad  v.  Ellison,  Civ. App.,  283 
S.W.  193. 

40  C.J.S.-35 


Va. — Grizzle  v.  Fletcher,  105  S.E. 
457,  127  Va,  663. 

W.Va. — Greenbrier  Valley  Bank  v. 
Holt,  171  S.E.  906,  114  W.Va.  363. 

34  C.J.  p  689  note  47. 

Contribution  between  joint  debtors 
generally  see  Contribution  §  9. 

Payment  of  debt  by  joint  debtor  as 
affecting  his  right  to  collect  it 
from  his  codebtors  by  execution 
see  Executions  §  11. 

Release  or  discharge  of  joint  debtor 
on  partial  payment  see  infra  § 
564. 

Satisfaction  of  one  of  several  judg- 
ments on  same  cause  of  action 
against  different  persons  see  infra 
§  576. 

Subrogation  of  joint  judgment  debt- 
ors generally  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
Subrogation  §  19,  also  60  C.J.  p 
732  note  39-p  733  note  42. 

31.  Tex.— Walston     v.     Price,     Civ. 
App.,  159  S.W.2d  548— Williams  v. 
Hedrick,  Civ.App.,  131  S.W.2d  187, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct. 

34  C.J.  p  &89  note  48. 

32.  Cal. — Games    v.    Pacific    Gas   & 
Electric   Co.,   69   P.2d   99-8,   21  CaL 
App.2d  568,  rehearing  denied  70  P. 
2d  717,  21  Cal.App.2d  S6'8— Salter  v. 
Lombard!,  3  P.2d  38,  116  CaLApp. 
602. 

N.J.— Manowitz    v.    Kanov,     154    A. 

326,    107    N.J.Law    523,    75    A.L.R. 

14*4. 
N.Y. — Farber    v.    Demino,    173    N.B. 

223,  254  N.Y.  363,  followed  in  G.  A. 

Baker  &  Co.  v.  Polygraphic  Co.  of 

America,    193    N.E.    265,    265    N.Y. 

447,    reargument   denied    193   N.E. 

294,  265  N.Y.  508. 
Pa. — Bergen  v.  Lit  Bros.,  47  A.2d  371 

— Anstine  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 

43  A.2d  109,  352  Pa.  547— McShea 

v.  McKenna,  95  Pa.Super.  338. 
Tex.— Callihan    v.    White,    Civ.App 

139  S.W.2d  129. 

1025 


Va.— McLaughlin  v.  Slegel,  185  S.E. 
873,  166  Va.  374. 

34  C.J.  -p  689  note  49. 

Release  of  joint  tort-feasor  as  re  • 
lease  of  others  see  the  -C.J.S.  titlo 
Release  §  50,  also  53  C.J.  p  125:; 
note  20-p  1266  note  5. 

Satisfaction  of  judgment  against  one 
tort-feasor  as  discharging  other 
joint  tort-feasors  see  infra  §  761. 

Rule  is  grounded  on  principle  that 

for  a  single  injury  there  can  be  but 

one  recompense. 

U.S. — Eberle  v.  Sinclair  Prairie  Oil 
Co.,  C.C.A.Okl.,  120  'F.2d  746,  135 
A.L.R.  1494. 

Mo. — Hunter  -Land  &  Development 
Co.  v.  Caruthersvllle  Stave  &  Head- 
ing Co.,  9  S.W.2d  531,  223  Mo.App. 
132. 

N.Y.— Collins  v.  Smith,  8  N.Y.S.2d 
794,  255  App.Div.  '665. 

Ohio.— Smith  v.  Fisher,  App.,  32  N. 
E.2d  561. 

A  payment  into  court,  if  not  collu- 
sive, by  one  of  several  joint  tort 
feasors,  of  the  amount  of  the  judg- 
ment recovered  against  them,  will 
discharge  the  remaining  tort  feasor. 
—Collins  v.  Smith,  8  N.Y.S.2d  794, 
255  App.Div.  665. 

Defendants  not  in  par!  delicto 

If  defendants  jointly  liable  on  a 
tort  judgment  are  not  in  pari  delicto, 
they  are  not  joint  tort-feasors  with- 
in the  rule,  so  that,  if  the  parties  in- 
tend to  keep  the  judgment  alive,  pay- 
ment by  one  of  them  will  not  extin- 
guish it. — Central  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 
v.  Cohn,  264  S.W.  641,  150  Tenn.  375. 

33.    Tex. — Cauble     v.     Cauble,     Qiv. 

App.,  283  S.W.  914. 
34  O.J.  p  690  note  50. 

Payment  of: 

Judgment   on  bill  or  note   by  In- 

dorser  see  Bills  and  Notes  §  472 

e  (3). 
Note  by  one  joint  maker  s«e  Bills 

and  Notes  *  449  b  (2), 


§  555 

b.  Assignment  of  Judgment 

Generally,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  con- 
trary, a  joint  defendant  on  paying  the  Judgment  may 
not  take  an  assignment  of  it  to  himself  or  to  a  third 
person  for  his  benefit  so  as  to  wield  it  against  his  co- 
defendant. 

As  a  general  rule,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  to 
the  contrary,  it  is  not  competent  for  one  of  the  joint 
defendants  on  paying  the  judgment  to  take  an  as- 
signment of  it  to  himself,34  or,  unless  under  special 
circumstances,  to  a  third  person  for  his  benefit,35 
so  as  to  wield  it  against  his  codefendant,  and  it  is 
none  the  less  extinguished  by  the  payment,  al- 
though such  an  assignment  is  made,36  unless,  ac- 
cording to  some  authorities,  the  payment  was  not 
intended  to  have  that  effect.37  This  general  rule  is 
not,  however,  applicable  to  judgments  against  the 
maker  and  indorser  of  a  negotiable  instrument,  as 
discussed  in  Bills  and  Notes  §  472  e  (3),  or  against 
a  principal  and  surety  generally,  as  discussed  in  the 
C.J.S.  title  Subrogation  §  SO,  also  34  CJ.  p  690  note 
7 1-p  691  note  76,  and  60  CJ.  p  749  notes  63-65. 

Notwithstanding  the  general  rule,  it  has  been  held 
that,  where  a  judgment  is  paid  by  one  of  the  de- 
fendants and  is  assigned  for  his  benefit,  he  acquires 
the  right  to  use  the  judgment  as  a  security  for  the 
payment  of  the  amounts  properly  due  from  the  oth- 
er judgment  debtors,38  such  right  to  be  exercised 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


only  after  an  affirmative  showing  to  the  court  and  a 
determination  of  the  indebtedness  of  the  other  de- 
fendants.39 The  order  in  which  the  money  was  paid 
and  the  assignment  executed  does  not  control,  if 
they  constituted  one  transaction  and  the  intent  was 
to  constitute  an  assignment;40  and  the  mere  fact 
that  an  attorney  for  a  joint  judgment  debtor  pays 
the  judgment,  without  the  knowledge  of  his  client, 
and  obtains  an  assignment  to  a  third  person,  is  not 
proof  that  satisfaction  was  intended.41 

In  some  jurisdictions  the  extinguishment  of  a 
judgment  paid  by  one  joint  and  several  debtor  may 
be  prevented  by  a  substantial  compliance  with  a 
statute  providing  for  an  assignment  of  such  judg- 
ment to  a  trustee  for  such  debtor's  benefit.42  In 
other  jurisdictions,  by  virtue  of  statute,  where  a  Co- 
defendant  in  a  judgment  on  an  obligation  on  which 
all  are  liable  as  principals  pays  the  judgment  in  full 
and  takes  a  written  assignment  thereof,  reciting 
that  he  has  paid  the  judgment  in  full  and  authoriz- 
ing the  clerk  to  cancel  the  judgment  of  record  as 
to  the  defendant  paying  it,  the  codefendant  is  not 
released;43  but,  if  a  codefendant  pays  a  judgment 
with  the  money  or  funds  of  both  defendants,  it  is  an 
extinguishment  of  the  judgment  as  to  all,  so  that, 
where  such  codefendant  takes  an  assignment  of  the 
judgment  to  himself,  he  or  any  subsequent  trans- 
feree can  be  prevented  from  enforcing  it.44 


34.  Mo.— -Phelps  v.  Scott  30  S.W.2d 
71,    325    Mo.    711,    71    A.L.R.    290. 

XC.— Hoft  v.  Mohn,  2  S.E.2d  23,  215 

N.C.  397. 
Tex.— Hadad  v.  Ellison,  Civ.App.,  2S3 

S.W.  193. 

34  C.J.  P  690  note  54. 
Assignment  of  Judgment: 

Generally  see   supra    §§    512-530. 

To    Judgment   debtor    as    effecting 

satisfaction   see    infra    §    562. 
Contribution  between  Joint  tort-feas- 

ors  generally  see  Contribution  §  11. 
Reason  for  role 

A  creditor's  right  to  Have  its  debt 
paid  by  any  or  all  of  those  Joint- 
ly and  severally  liable,  without  re- 
gard to  the  equities  between  them, 
is  merged  in  the  Judgment  obtained 
by  the  creditor  and  ought  not  in 
equity  to  be  acquired  by  any  one  or 
more  of  the  judgment  debtors  for  en- 
forcement against  the  others. — Hoft 
v.  Mohn,  2  S.B.2d  23,  215  N.C.  397. 

35.  OkL — Martin  v.  North  American 
Car   Corporation,    35   P.2d   460,   168 
Okl.  599. 

34  C.J.  p  690  note  55. 

36.  Mo.— Phelps  v.  Scott,   30  S.W.2d 
71,  325  Mo.  711,  71  A.L.R.  290. 

N.Y. — Harvey  v.  Harvey,  48  N.Y.S.2d 

238,  183  Misc.  475. 
34  C.J.  p  690  notes  54,  55. 

87.    Neb.— Ohio  Nat.  Lif e  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Baxter,  2&*  N.W.  530,  139  Neb.  648. 


N.J. — Brown   v.    White,    29    N.J.Law 
514. 

38.  Cal.— National  Bank  of  Califor- 
nia  v.   Los   Angeles  Iron   &   Steel 
Co.,  -84  P.  466,  468,  2  CaLApp.  £59. 

Neb. — Exchange  Elevator  Co.  v.  Mar- 
shall, 22  N.W.2d  403. 
Failure  to  take  assignment 

Where  a  Joint  Judgment  debtor 
pays  the  entire  indebtedness,  and 
neither  takes  an  assignment  from 
the  creditor,  nor  proceeds  under  stat- 
ute relating  to  contribution  in  such  a 
case,  the  payment  constitutes  satis- 
faction not  only  as  to  such  debtor, 
but  also  as  between  him  and  his  co- 
obligors. — Tucker  v.  Nicholson,  84  P. 
2d  1045,  12  Cal.2d  427. 

39.  Cal.— National  Bank  of  Califor- 
nia  v.    Los   Angeles   Iron   &   Steel 
Co.,  84  P.  466,  468,  2  Cal.App.  659. 

34  C.J.  p  690  note  60. 

40.  Cal. — Adams  v.  White  Bus  Line, 
195  P.  389,  184  Cal.  710. 

41.  N.T.— International     R.     Co.     v. 
Pickarski,  186  N.Y.S.  319,  114  Misc. 
349,    affirmed    191   N.T.S.    932,    199 
App.Div.  953. 

42.  N.C.— Scales  v.  Scales,  11  S.E.2d 
'5-69,  218  N.C.  553. 

New  right  and  exclusive  remedy 

The  statute  providing  a  method 
by  which  a  Judgment  paid  by  one. or 
more  Judgment  debtors  Jointly  and 

1026 


severally  liable  may  be  kept  alive 
creates  a  new  right  and  provides  an 
exclusive  remedy. — Hoft  v.  Mohn,  2 
S.E.2d  23,  215  N.C.  397. 
What  constitute*  substantial  compli- 
ance 

(1)  A  Joint  obligor  must  pay   the 
entire   debt  or  more  than  a  propor- 
tionate part  before  he  may  demand 
of  the  Judgment  creditor  the  trans- 
fer of  the  Judgment  to  a  trustee. — 
Jones  v.  Rhea,  151  S.E.  255,  198  N.C. 
190. 

(2)  However,  the  fact  that  the  Co- 
defendant  pays  a  sum  smaller  than 
the  amount  of  the  Judgment  in  full 
satisfaction  thereof  does  not  deprive 
him  of  the  statutory  method  of  keep- 
ing the  Judgment  alive  as  against  the 
nonpaying  debtors. — Scales  v., Scales, 
11  S.E.2d  569,  218  N.O.  553. 

(3)  An  assignment  which,  in  effect, 
is  to  the  paying  codefendant  itself, 
is  insufficient  to  keep  the  Judgment 
alive.— Hoft    v.    Mohn,    2    S.E.2d    23, 
215  N.C.  397. 

43.  Ga, — Register        v.         Southern 
States  Phosphate  &  Fertilizer  Co., 
122  S.E.   323,  15'7  Ga,  561,  answers 
to  certified  questions  conformed  to 
122  S.E.  652,  32  Ga.App.  86. 

44.  Ga. — Register        v.        Southern 
States  Phosphate  &  'Fertilizer  Co., 
supra, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  557 


§  556.    Payment  by  Surety 

Usually  payment  of  a  judgment  by  a  surety  ex- 
tinguishes it  at  law. 

Ordinarily  a  payment  of  the  judgment  by  a  sure- 
ty will  extinguish  it  at  law,4^  unless  the  judgment  is 
preserved  for  his  benefit  by  statute;46  but  if  the 
judgment  is  rendered  against  both  principal  and 
surety  payment  by  the  surety  does  not  necessarily 
extinguish  it.47 

§  557.    Payment  by  Stranger 

Generally  a  judgment  creditor  .need  not  accept  pay- 
ment from  a  stranger  not  having  an  interest  in  the  judg- 
ment, yet,  if  he  does,  the  Judgment  is  kept  alive  for 
the  benefit  of  the  stranger  and  is  not  extinguished  where 
there  is  an  understanding  to  that  effect. 

Although  a  judgment  creditor  is  not  bound  to 
accept  payment  from  a  stranger 4$  unless  the  stran- 
ger has  an  interest  in  property  seized  in  satisfac- 
tion of  the  judgment,49  yet,  where  he  does  accept 
such  payment,  he  is  precluded  from  further  recov- 
ery,50 and  the  judgment  will  be  kept  alive  for  the 
stranger's  benefit,  rather  than  extinguished,  when,51 
and  only  when,52  there  is  an  intention  and  agree- 
ment or  understanding  to  this  effect. 

It  has  been  held,  in  this  connection,  that  it  is  not 
necessary  that  this  intention  and  agreement  should 
be  evidenced  by  a  formal  and  valid  assignment  of 


the  judgment,53  although  there  is  some  authority 
to  the  contrary.54  On  the  other  hand,  the  taking 
of  an  assignment  affords  unequivocal  evidence  of  an 
intention  not  to  satisfy  the  judgment55  unless  it  is 
taken  so  long  after  the  payment  as  to  evidence  the 
fact  that  it  was  only  an  afterthought.5 •  Such  an 
assignment  is  valid  and  the  judgment  remains  unex- 
tinguished  in  favor  of  a  person  in  whose  behalf  it  is 
obtained,  as  well  where  his  credit  is  accepted  as  the 
consideration  of  the  assignment  as  where  it  is  for  a 
payment  in  cash  made  by  him.57 

The  assignment  may  be  taken  in  the  name  of  a 
third  person,58  and  where  this  is  done,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  injury  the  judgment  will  not  be  declared 
paid  because  of  simulation.59  If  the  debtor  joins 
with  a  stranger  in  paying  off  the  judgment,  taking 
an  assignment  to  his  attorney,  the  assignment  will 
be  valid  as  to  the  stranger,  although  void  as  to  the 
debtor.60  Where  the  judgment  is  against  a  stran- 
ger to  a  cause  of  action  ex  delicto,  its  satisfaction 
by  such  stranger  is  not  an  extinguishment  of  such 
cause  of  action.61 

Who  is  stranger.  A  judgment  is  deemed  to  be 
paid  by  the  judgment  debtor  himself,  rather  than 
by  a  stranger,  and  hence  to  be  satisfied,  rather  than 
kept  alive,  where  it  is  paid  by  another  person  with 
money  furnished  by  the  judgment  debtor,62  or 


45.  Ark. — Chollar  v.  Temple,  '30  Ark. 
238. 

Ohio. — Commercial  Casualty  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Knutsen  Motor  Trucking  Co., 
173  N.B.  241,  36  Ohio  App.  241. 

l»a.~ ^Fidelity  Deposit  Bank  of  Derry 
v.  Stewart,  48  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  618, 
25  West.Co.'L..T.  143— Grunt  v. 
Grant,  Com.Pl.,  20  Brie  Co.  244. 

Tex, — Key  v.  Oales,  Civ.App.,  280  S. 
W.  2i86. 

34  C.J.  p  690  note  69. 

Subrogation  of  sureties  to  rights  of 
creditor  generally  see  the  Q.J.S.  ti- 
tle Subrogation  §§  47-56,  also  60 
C.J.  p  740  note  5-p  770  note  08, 
and  34  C.J.  p  690  note  71-p  691 
note  76. 

Pro  tanto  satisfaction. 

Ark. — Carroll  v.  Swicord,  9  S.W.2d 
783,  177  Ark.  1193. 

Cal. — Kane  v.  Mendenhall,  56  P.2d 
49-8,  6  Cal.2d  749. 

46.  Idaho.— -Agren  v.  Staker,  267  P. 
460,  46  Idaho  36. 

34  C.J.  p  690  note  70. 

47.  Mo. — Schuchman  v.  Rdberts,  133 
S.W.2d  1030,  234  Mo.App.  509. 

48.  N.-C. — James  v.  Markham,  38  S. 
E.  917,  128  N.C.  380. 

34  C.J.  p  691  note  77. 

49.  Tex. — Holstead   v.   Parker,   Civ. 
App.,  238  S.W.  287. 

34  C.J.  -p  691  note  78. 


50.  Va.— Forbes  v.  Wyatt,   129   S.E. 
491,  143  Va.  802. 

51.  Cal.~Salter  v.  Lombard!,  3  P.2d 
3S,  116  CaLApp.  -602. 

Tex.— Williams  v.  Hedrick,  Civ.App., 
131    S.W.2d    187,    error   dismissed, 
judgment  correct 
34  C.J.  p  691  note  79, 
Right  of:    • 

Assignee  of  judgment  to  issue  ex- 
ecution see  Executions  §  14. 
Stranger  to  be  surrogated  to  rights 
of  creditor  on  paying  judgment 
see  the  C.J.S.  title  Subrogation 
§  38,  also  34  C.J.  p  691  notes  79, 
80,  and  -60  C.J.  p  907  note  79-p 
820  note  52. 

Tfce  intention,  of  t&«  payor  controls 
as  to  whether  a  judgment  is  extin- 
guished by  payment  of  the  amount 
of  the  judgment  and  costs  by  a 
stranger  to  the  action. — Hughes  v. 
McElwee,  185  S.E.  6--8S,  117  W.Va. 
410. 

52.  Okl.— Bobier  v.  Horn,  222  P.  238, 
95  Okl.  -8. 

Pa. — Seligman  &  Co.  v.  Kearns,   81 

Pa. Super.  413. 
Tex. — Williams  v.  Hedrick,  Civ.App., 

131   .S.W.2d    187,    error    dismissed, 

judgment  correct. 
34  C.J.  P  691  note  80. 

53.  S.C. — Sutton    v.    Button,    1    S.E. 
'19,  26  S.C.  33. 

34  C.J.  p  692  note  81. 

1027 


5*    Mo.— St.     Francis     Mill     Co.     v. 

Sugg,  83  Mo.  476. 
55-    Cal. — Salter  v.  Lombard!,  3  P.2d 

38,  116  CaLApp.  602. 
34  C.J.  p  692  note  83. 
Written  assignment 

The  'purchase  of  a  judgment  by  a 
stranger  to  it  does  not  extinguish 
it  where  the  purchaser  takes  a  writ- 
ten assignment  stating  that  the 
judgment  should  continue  in  effect 
and  promptly  asserts  his  rights  as 
judgment  creditor. — Williams  v.  Hed- 
rick, Tex.Civ.App.,  131  S.W.2d  187, 
error  dismissed,  judgment  correct. 

56.  N.Y.— Dowling  v.  Hastings,   105 
N.B.  194,  211  N.Y.  199. 

34  C.J.  p  692  note  84. 

57.  N.Y.— Harbeck  v.  Vanderbilt,  20 
N.Y.  395. 

58.  La. — Hunter  v.  Chicago  Lumber 
&  Coal  Co.,  100  So.  35,  156  La.  19. 

59.  La. — Hunter  v.  Chicago  Lumber 
&  Coal  Co.,  supra. 

60.  N.Y.— Harbeck  v.  Vanderbilt.  20 
N.Y.  395. 

61.  N.Y.— Atlantic  Dock  Co.  v.  New- 
York,  53  N.Y.  64. 

34  C.J.  p  692  note  87. 

82.    Ala. — Hogan     v.     Reynolds,     21 

Ala.  56,  56  Am.D.  236. 
34C.J.  p  69  2  note  88. 


558 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


where  the  person  making  the  payment  is  acting  as 
the  agent,63  attorney,64  or  trustee65  of  the  judg- 
ment debtor,  even  though  the  agency  is  undisclosed 
and  the  person  making  the  payment  is  ostensibly  a 
stranger.66 


§  558. 


Payment  by  Officer 


Ordinarily  payment  of  a  judgment  by  an  officer  with- 
out legal  compulsion  or  request  by  the  judgment  debtor 
operates  to  extinguish  It,  unless  there  is  an  assignment 
of  the  judgment  to  the  officer  or  the  debtor  waives  the 
benefit  of  the  payment  as.  satisfaction. 

Where  the  amount  of  a  judgment  is  paid  by  a 
sheriff  or  other  officer  without  any  demand  or  re- 
quest on  the  part  of  the  judgment  debtor,  the  judg- 
ment is  extinguished,  and  such  officer  cannot  keep 
it  alive  for  his  own  reimbursement67  unless  he  takes 
an  assignment  of  the  judgment  in  his  own  name,  or 
to  a  third  person  in  trust  for  himself,68  or  the  debt- 
or waives  the  benefit  of  the  payment  as  satisfac- 
tion.69 However  it  has  been  held  that  the  judg- 
ment is  not  extinguished  where  the  sheriff  or  other 
officer  is  compelled  to  pay  it  by  legal  proceedings,70 
or  where  he  pays  a  judgment  recovered  against 
himself  for  his  failure  to  enforce  the  first  judg- 
ment,71 unless  defendant  adopts  the  payment  and 
insists  on  it  as  a  satisfaction.72 

§  559.    Evidence  of  Payment 

a.  Presumptions  and  burden  of  proof 

b.  Admissibility 

c.  Weight  and  sufficiency 

a.  Presumptions  and  Burden  of  Proof 

(1)  Presumptions 

(2)  Burden  of  proof 


(1)  Presumptions 

(a)  In  general 

(b)  From  lapse  of  time 

(a)  In  General 

In  the  absence  of  other  proof  It  will  be  presumed 
that  a  judgment  has  not  been  paid. 

It  will  be  presumed  that  a  judgment  has  not  been 
paid,  in  the  absence  of  other  proof73  and  in  the 
absence  of  lapse  of  time  sufficient  to  raise  a  pre- 
sumption of  payment,  as  discussed  infra  subdivision 
a  (1)  (b)  of  this  section.  However,  payment  or  sat- 
isfaction may  be  presumed  from  the  conduct  of  the 
judgment  creditor.74  Where  a  satisfaction  piece 
was  given,  the  presumption  arises  that  it  was  given 
on  payment  of  the  judgment75  Some  statutes  pro- 
viding that  a  presumption  of  payment  of  the  judg- 
ment shall  arise  from  the  fact  that  the  execution 
has  not  been  returned  according  to  law  apply  only 
in  a  proceeding  against  the  sheriff  or  his  sureties.76 

(b)  From  Lapse  of  Time 
aa.  In  general 

bb.  Computation  of  time 

aa.  In  General 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise,  It 
Is  generally  held  that,  where  twenty  years  have  elapsed 
since  the  rendition  of  a  Judgment,  without  any  acknowl- 
edgment of  It  or  attempt  to  enforce  it,  SL  presumption 
of  law  arises  that  the  judgment  has  been  paid. 

At  common  law,  where  twenty  years  have  elapsed 
since  the  rendition  of  a  judgment,  without  any  proc- 
ess on  it,  or  any  acknowledgment  of  it  or  attempt  to 
enforce  it,  there  is  .a  presumption  of  law  that  it  has 
been  paid.77  A  similar  rule  has  been  enacted  by 


Direct  payment  by  judgment  credi- 
tor with  borrowed  money  see  su- 
pra §  552. 

63.  Tex. — Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Hart  v.  Harrell,  Oiv.App.,  17  S.W. 
2d  1093,  1094. 

34  C.J.  p  *692  note  89. 

64.  Mich.— Rogers   v.   Welte,   2S   N. 
W.  86,  61  Mich.  258. 

N.T.— Gotthelf  v.  Krulewitch.  138  N. 
Y.S.  75$,  153  App.Div.  746. 

65.  Pa.— Keller  v.   Leib,    1  Penr.   & 
W.  220. 

Tex.— Williams  v.  Hedrick,  Civ.App., 
131  S.W.2d  187,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 

98.  U.S.— Lillie  v.  Dennert,  Mich., 
232  F.  104,  146  C.C.A.  296. 

67.  Tenn.— liintz     v.     Thompson,     1 
Head  456,  73  Am.D.  182. 

34  C.J.  p  -692  note  93. 

68.  N.C.— Heilig  v.   Lemly,  74  N.C. 
.      250,  21  Am.R.  489. 

34  C.J.  p  692  note  94. 


69.    Ala. — Mooney  v.  Parker,  18  Ala. 

708. 
TO.    Ind. — Burbank    v.    Slinkard,    53 

Ind.  493. 
Mass. — Allen  v.  Holden,  9  Mass.  133, 

6  Am.D.  46. 

71.  N.H.— Cheever  v.  Mirrick,   2  N. 
H.  376. 

34  C.J.  p  692  note  97. 

72.  Ala.— Poe  r.  Dorrah,  20  Ala.  288, 
56  Am.D.  196. 

73.  U.S. — Campbell   v.    American    & 
Zell  Co.,  129  F.  491,  affirmed  138  'F. 
531,  '71  C.C.A.  55,  certiorari  denied 
26  S.Ct.  747,  199  U.S.  607,  '50  L.Ed. 
331. 

Presumption  of  payment  generally 
see  the  C.J.S.  title  Payment  §  98, 
also  48  C.J.  p  687  note  7  et  seq. 

74.  La.— Bethany  v.  His  Creditors.  7 
Rob.   *1— Abat   v.    Buisson,    9    La. 
417. 

The  making-  of  an  award  for  dam. 
ages   in  receivership  proceeding  did 

1028 


not  raise  presumption  that  award 
was  paid  in  full. — Mathewson  v.  Col- 
pitts.  188  K.B.  601,  2:84  Mass.  581. 

75.  N.T. — Booth  v.  Farmers'  &  Me- 
chanics' Nat.  Bank,  50  N.Y.  396. 

76.  Va. — Paxton  v.  Rich,  7  S.B.  531, 
85  Va.  378,  1  L.R.A.  -639. 

77.  Pa.— Ott  v.  Ott,  166  A.  556,  ail 
Pa.    130 — Brady   v.    Tarr,    21    A.2d 
131,   145  Pa.Super.  316— First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Bank  of  Pittsburgh,  99  Pa. 
Super.    600 — Coleman    &    Stahl    v. 
Weimer,   86  Pa. Super.  303 — Krzyk- 
wa  v.  Krzykwa,  Com.Pl.,  15  North- 
umb.L.J.  230. 

34  C.J.  p  692  note  6. 

Presumption  of  payment  from  lapse 

of    time    generally    see    the   C.J.S. 

title  Payment  §  101,  also  48  C.J.  p 

•690  note  56-p  600  note  65. 
Basis  of  rule 

This  presumption  is  based  on  the 
common  sense  theory  that  the  judg- 
ment creditor  would  have  normally 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  559 


statute  in  several  of  the  states,™  although,  under 
some  of  the  statutes,  the  presumption  of  payment 
arises  after  the  lapse  of  only  ten  years.79  Such 
5tatutes  are  not  retrospective,8^  and,  where  they  so  • 
provide  they  do  not  apply  to  judgments  other  than 
those  of  courts  of  record.81 


Ordinarily,  the  presumption  of  payment  applies  as 
well  between  the  parties  to  the  judgment  as  be- 
tween plaintiff  and  subsequent  creditors,82  but  it 
applies  only  to  judgments  for  the  payment  of  mon- 
ey,83 including  judgments  for  a  contingent  liabil- 


taken  steps  to  proceed  against  the 
debtor  for  the  collection  of  the  Judg- 
ment before  such  a  period  of  time 
had  been  permitted  to  elapse;  if  the 
judgment  has  not  in  fact  been  paid, 
it  is  only  reasonable  and  fair  to  put 
the  burden  of  the  explanation  on 
him  who  was  entitled  to  the  money. 
— Roemer  now  to  Use  of  Kendig  v. 
•Lancaster  County,  190  A.  347,  126  Pa. 
Super.  11 — 34  C.J.  p  692  note  6  [a]. 
Strength  of  presumption 

(1)  Presumption  of  payment  after 
twenty  years  is  very  strong  and  is 
favored  in  law  as  tending  to  the  re- 
pose  of  society  and  discouragement 
of  stale  claims. — In  re  Lief  over's  Es- 
tate, 122  A.  273,  278  Pa.  196— Krzyk- 
wa r.  Krzykwa,  Pa.Com.PL,  15  North- 
umb.L.J.  230. 

(2)  This  presumption  is  strength- 
ened as  time  passes  on. — In  re  Lefev- 
er's      Estate,      supra— Krzykwa      v. 
Krzykwa,  supra. 

(3)  Conclusiveness  of  presumption 
generally  see  infra  subdivision  c  of 
this  section. 

Presumption  not  abandoned 

Defendant  testifying  to  payment 
of  indebtedness  did  not  abandon  pre- 
sumption of  payment  by  virtue  of 
lapse  of  over  twenty  years  since  en- 
try of  Judgment— Ott  v.  Ott,  166  A, 
556,  311  Pa.  130. 

78.  N.Y. — In  re  Murray's  Estate, 
288  N.Y.S.  346,  248  App.Div.  167, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  5  N.E. 
2d  717,  272  N.Y.  22-8— In  re  Walton 
Ave.,  New  York  City,  276  N.Y.S. 
809,  243  App.Div.  587 — Sanchez  v, 
Spitzka,  48  N.Y.S.2d  184,  1-33  Misc. 
413 — In  re  Ballenzweig's  Estate, 
22  N.Y.S.2d  541,  174  Misc.  1109— 
Mo  ran  Towing-  &  Transp.  Co.  v. 
Fleming,  2*5  N.Y.S.2d  41,  affirmed 
27  N.Y.S.2d  431,  261  App.Div.  978, 
affirmed  38  N.E.2d  231,  2-S7  N.Y. 
571. 
84  C.J.  p  693  note  7. 

Statute  applies  to  foreign  judg- 
ments as  well  as  to  Judgments  ren- 
dered within  state. — Baio  v.  Man- 
gano,  '6  N.Y.S.Sd  763,  169  Misc.  155, 
reversed  on  other  grounds  9  N.Y.S. 
2d  276,  256  App.Div.  831,  reargument 
denied  10  N.Y.S.2d  676,  256  App.Div, 
930. 
City 

(1)  Statute  establishing  conclusive 
presumption  of  payment  of  Judgment 
after  twenty  years  was  held  applica- 
ble to  a  city,  in  its  governmental  ca- 
pacity.—Gewertz  v.  Berry,  180  N.E. 
251,  258  N.Y.  505. 


(2)  City  and  its  officers  could  not 
waive  the  provisions  of  the  statute 
— Application  of  -Long  Island  R.  Co. 
22  N.Y.S.2d  706,  174  Misc.  1037,  af- 
firmed 25  N.Y.S.2d  1005,  261  App.Div 
914,  reargument  denied  27  N.Y.S.2d 
441,  261  App.Div.  987. 
Subsisting  obligation 

Notwithstanding  statute  declaring 
that  every  Judgment  shall  be  deemed 
satisfied  after  the  expiration  of 
twenty  years,  such  a  Judgment,  if  in 
fact  unsatisfied,  is  a  subsisting  obli- 
gation.— Pensinger  v.  Jarecki  Mfg. 
Co.,  136  N.E.  641,  78  Ind.App.  569. 

79.  MO.— Mayes  v.  Mayes,  116  S.W. 
2d  1,  342  Mo.  401— Kansas  City  v. 
Field,   194  S.W.   39,  270   Mo.   500— 
Hedges  v.  McKittrick,  App.,  153  S. 
W.2d  790— City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Die- 
tering,  App.,  27  S.W.2d  711. 

In  Alabama 

(1)  A  Judgment  is  presumed  to  be 
paid  after  ten  years  without  execu- 
tion taken  thereon,  but  the  presump- 
tion does  not  become  conclusive  until 
after  twenty  years. — Gilmer  v.  Gant, 
24   So.2d  414,    247   Ala.   347— McClin- 
tock  v.  McEachin,  20   So.2d  711,  246 
Ala.  412— Hays  v.  McCarty,   195   So. 
241,  239  Ala.  400. 

(2)  The  presumption  is  a  substan- 
tial statutory  right  accorded  to  debt- 
or in  a  stale  Judgment  as  a  shield 
to  defeat  recovery,  rather  than  mere- 
ly   an    administrative    presumption 
having    only    the    office    of    shifting 
burden  of  proceeding  with  the  evi- 
dence.— Gambill  v.  Qassimus,  22   So. 
2d  909,  247  Ala.  176. 

(3)  Unless  the  statutory  presump- 
tion of  satisfaction  Is  overcome  by 
proof   that  payment   or   satisfaction 
has  not  been  made  the  Judgment  is 
functus  offlcio. — Gilmer  v.  Gant,  su- 
pra. 

80.  Colo.— Jones     v.     Stockgrowers* 
Nat.  Bank,  67  P.  177,  17  Colo. App. 
79. 

34  C.J.  p  693  note  8. 

81.  N.Y. — Dieffenbach    v.    Roch,    20 
N.E.    560,    112    N.Y.    621,    2   JUR.A. 
829,  16  N.Y.Civ.Proc.  172. 

Judgment  of  inferior  court 

The  statute  does  not  apply  to  Judg- 
ment of  inferior  court,  unless  tran- 
scripted. — Jennings  v.  Loucks,  297  N. 
Y.S.  £93,  163  Misc.  791. 

82.  Pa. — Van  Loon  v.  Smith,  103  Pa. 
238. 

Third  persons 

Statutory  presumption  of  payment 
of  Judgment  from  failure  to  issue 

1029 


execution  for  ten  years  from  rendi- 
tion of  Judgment  or  date  of  last  exe- 
cution issued  protects  third  persons 
oven  against  revived  Judgment  or 
judgment  renewed  by  action  thereon, 
—Second  Nat.  Bank  v.  Allgood,  176 
So.  363,  234  Ala.  654. 
Only  as  to  third  persons 

In  some  Jurisdictions  during  the 
period  of  dormancy  of  a  judgment, 
there  is  no  presumption,  ii*  favor  of 
defendant,  that  the  Judgment  has 
been  paid,  but  such  presumption  ex- 
ists only  as  to  third  persons. — Hag- 
ins  v.  Blitch,  6'5  S.B.  10:82,  £  Ga.App. 
839—34  C.J.  p  658  note  94. 

83.  Mo. — Mayes  v.  Mayes,  App.,  104 
S.W.2d  1019,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  116  S.W.2d  1,  342  Mo.  401. 

N.Y.— In  re  Walton  Ave.,  New  York 
City,  278  N.Y.S.  204,  244  App.  125, 
affirmed  In  re  Opening  of  Walton 
Ave.  from  Bast  One  Hundred  and 
Sixty-Seventh  Street  to  Tremont 
Ave.  in  Borough  of  Bronx,  City  of 
New  York,  200  N.E.  295,  270  N.Y, 
513— Baio  v.  Mangono,  6  N.Y.S.2<1 
763,  169  Misc.  155,  reversed  on  oth- 
er grounds  9  N.Y.S.2d  276,  256  A'pp* 
Div.  831,  reargument  deniejl  10  N. 
Y.S.2d  676,  256  App.Div.  930. 

34  C.J.  p  693  note  10. 

Orders  allowing1  certain  amounts 
as  fees  of  attorneys  who  represented 
trustees  in  suit  for  authorization  for 
sale  of  trust  property,  and  ordering 
that  such  amounts  be  paid  from  pro- 
ceeds of  sale,  were  orders  for  the 
payment  of  money  with  respect  to 
text  rule.— Hedges  v.  McKittrick, 
Mo. App.,  153  S.W.2d  790. 

Statutory  presumption  held  inappli- 
cable 

(1)  To  so-called  Judgment  in  pro- 
ceedings   commenced    by    surviving 
trustees  to  compel  an  accounting  by 
a   deceased   trustee's   administratrix 
for   deceased's   acts  and   for  a  con- 
struction of  a  will. — In  re*  Van  Nos- 
trand's    Will,    29    N.Y.S.2d    857,    177 
Misc.  1. 

(2)  To  final  order  in  habeas  cor- 
pus  -proceedings    in   supreme    court, 
where  such  final  order  was  not  dock- 
eted.—Warren  v.  Garlipp,  216  N.Y.S. 
466,  217  App.Div.  55. 

(3)  To   moneys   paid  by  city  into 
court    in    condemnation    proceedings 
on  awards  to  unknown  owners,  such 
moneys    being    trust    funds. — In    re 
Rochester  Ave.  in  City  of  New  York, 
268  N.Y.S.  736,  241  App.Div.  614,  af- 
firmed 191  N.E.  587,  264  N.Y.  607,  re- 


559 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ity,84  and  is,  therefore,  not  applicable  to  judgments 
in  rem,85  or  to  judgments  awarding  the  possession 
of  property,86  foreclosing  a  mortgage,87  declaring  a 
vendor's  lien  on  land,88  or  foreclosing  a  tax  lien,89 
without  the  adjudication  of  personal  liability.  Like- 
wise, the  presumption  is  inapplicable  to  a  judg- 
ment which  by  its  terms  is  not  collectable,90  or,  it 
seems,  to  a  judgment  allowing  a  claim  by  an  as- 
signee,91 or  to  an  order  of  court,  made  in  proceed- 
ings to  sell  land  of  an  habitual  drunkard,  which 
finds  that  he  is  indebted  to  a  certain  person  in  a 
named  sum.92 

As  a  general  rule,  the  lapse  of  any  number  of 
years  fewer  than  twenty,  or  other  number  fixed  by 
the  statute,  will  not  raise  a  presumption  of  law  that 
the  judgment  has  been  paid;93  but  the  ruaning  of  a 
shorter  period  of  time,  when  accompanied  by  cor- 
roborative or  persuasive  circumstances,  may  be  sub- 
mitted to  a  jury  as  ground  for  a  presumption  of 
fact94  In  some  jurisdictions  a  presumption  of  pay- 
ment arises  after  the  time  when  the  judgment  has 
become  dormant,  even  though  such  time  is  less  than 
twenty  years,95  and  it  has  also  been  held,  without 
reference  to  provisions  specifically  fixing  the  time 


after  which  the  presumption  of  payment  arises,  that 
a  rebuttable  presumption  of  payment  may  take  ef- 
fect when  no  execution  has  issued  within  the  peri- 
od when  an  execution  may  issue  without  leave  of 
court96 

bb.  Computation  of  Time 

The  period  after  which  a  judgment  is  presumed  to 
have  been  paid  begins  to  run  from  the  time  Judgment 
is  entered  or  other  time  fixed  by  the  statute,  and  may 
be  extended  by  various,  acts  tolling  the  period,  such  as 
commencement  of  proceedings  to  collect  the  Judgment. 

The  period  after  which  a  judgment  is  presumed  to 
have  been  paid  begins  to  run  from  the  time  the 
judgment  is  entered  up,97  or,  under  some  statutes, 
from  the  date  of  original  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment,98 or  from  the  time  when  the  judgment  credi- 
tor is  first  entitled  to  a  mandate  to  enforce  it;99 
but,  where  a  judgment  by  its  terms  is  not  immedi- 
ately collectable,  the  period  begins  to  run  from  the 
time  that  it  becomes  collectable.1 

Although  there  is  authority  to  the  contrary,2 
it  has  been  held  that  a  statute  declaring  that  a  judg- 
ment shall  be  presumed  to  be  paid  after  the  lapse 
of  a  certain  time  is  a  statute  of  limitations.3  In 


argument  denied  193  N.E.  291,  285  X. 
T.  503. 

(4)  To  renewal  of  note,  given  by 
defendant  to  plaintiff  to  secure  re- 
lease of  defendant  from  such  judg- 
ment 'against  him  and  another.  — 
Night  &  Day  Bank  of  St.  Louis  v. 
Hill,  Mo.App..  2-74  S.W.  491. 

84.  Mo.—  Hedges       v.       McKittriek, 
App.,  153  S.W.2d  790. 

Pa.—  Camp   v.   John,   102  A.   285,   259 
Pa,  38. 

85.  N.Y.  —  In      re      Van      Xostrand's 
Will,   29  X.Y.S.2d  857,  1T7   Misc.  1. 

86.  N.T.  —  Van          Rensselaer         v. 
Wright  25  N.E.  3,  121  N.Y.  626. 

87.  N.Y.  —  Barnard  v.  Onderdonk,  98 
N.Y.  158. 

88.  Ala.—  Moore  v.  Williams,  29  So. 
795,  129  Ala.  329. 

89.  N.Y.—  In   re   Walton   Ave.,   New 
York  City,  27S  N.Y.S.  204,  244  App. 
Div.  125,  affirmed  In  re  Opening  of 
Walton  Are.  from  East  One  Hun- 
dred and  Sixty-Seventh  St.  to  Tre- 
raont   Ave.    in   Borough   of   Bronx, 
City  of  New  York,  200  N.B.  295,  270 
N.Y.  513. 

90.  Pa.  —  Roemer,    now    to    Use    of 
Kendig   v.    Lancaster    County,    190 
A.  347,  126  Pa.Super.  11. 


In  action  in  1936  to  revive  1901 
judgment  for  damages  to  land  from 
laying  out  of  street  not  actually 
opened  until  1933,  where  statute  gov- 
erning condemnation  proceedings 
provided  .  that  damages  awarded 
should  not  be  paid  until  streets  were 


actually  opened,  rule  that  judgment 
is  presumed  to  have  been  paid  after 
twenty  years  was  inapplicable. — Roe- 
mer, now  to  Use  of  Kendig  v.  Lan- 
caster County,  supra. 

91.  Mo. — Elsea  v.  Pryor,  87  Mo.App. 
157. 

92.  N.Y.— Sheldon  v.  Mirick,  39  N.E. 
647,  144  N.Y.  498. 

93.  N.Y. — In   re   Murray's   Estate,    5 
X.E.2d  717,  2*72  N.Y.  228. 

Pa. — Roemer,  now  to  Use  of  Kendig, 
v.  Lancaster  County,  190  A.  347, 
126  Pa.  Super.  11. 

34  C.J.  p  693  notes  19,  21. 

94.  U.S.— Renwick   v.   Wheeler,    C.C. 
Iowa,  4S  P.  431. 

34  C.J.  p  693  note  22. 

95.  Neb.— Wright  v.  Sweet,  4  N.W. 
1043,  10  Neb.  190. 

34  C.J.  p  693  notes  17,  20. 

93.  N.Y. — Manger  v.  Golding,  210  X. 
Y.S.  703,  214  App.Div.  786— Part- 
ridge v.  Moynihan,  110  N.Y.S.  539, 
59  Misc.  234,  20  N.Y.Ann.Cas.  272. 

Leave  of  court  for  issuance  of  exe- 
cution after  lapse  of  time  general- 
ly see  Executions  §  59  a  (2). 

97.  Pa.— Ott  v.  Ott,  166  A.  556,  311 
Pa.  130. 

34  C.J.  p  694  note  23. 

98.  Mo. — Mayes  v.   Hayes,   116  S.W. 
2d  1,  342  Mo.  401— Hedges  v.  Mc- 
Kittrick,    App.,    153    S.W.2d    790— 
City    of    St.    Louis    v.    Dietering, 
App.,  27  S.W.2d  711. 

Bight  to  reject  terms 

Fact    that    city   reserved   right   to 


reject  terms  fixed  by  condemnation 
judgment  did  not  stay  running  of 
period  from  date  of  rendition  of 
judgment.— City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Die- 
tering, supra. 
99.  N.Y.— In  re  Elm  St  in  City  of 

New  York,   14-6  N.E.   342,   239  N.Y. 

220 — Application  of  Long  Island  R. 

Co.,  22  X.Y.S.2d  706,  174  Misc.  1037, 

affirmed  25  N.Y.S.2d  1005,  261  App. 

Div.  914,  reargument  denied  27  N. 

Y.S.2d  441,  261  App.Div.  987. 
34  C.J.  p  694  note  24. 

The  words  "mandate  to  enforce  it,11 
as  used  in  the  statute,  refer  to  an 
execution  issued  to  a  sheriff,  or  a 
like  command  to  one  in  a  ministerial 
office. — In  re  McEnery's  Estate,  279 
X.Y.S.  187,  155  Misc.  337. 

1.  Pa. — Roemer,  now  to  Use  of  Ken- 
dig   v.    Lancaster    County,    190    A. 
347,  126  Pa.Super.  11. 

2.  Mo. — Mayes   v.  Mayes,  App.,   104 
S.W.2d    1019,     reversed    on    other 
grounds,  116  S.W.2d  1,  342  Mo.  401 
— Chiles   v.   Buckner   School   Dist., 
77  S.W.  82,  103  Mo.App.  240. 

Mere  rule  of  evidence 

Presumption  of  payment  arising 
from  fact  that  judgment  was  more 
than  twenty  years  old  does  not  bar 
the  debt  as  does  the  statute  of  limi- 
tations, but  it  is  merely  a  rule  of 
evidence  affecting  the  burden  of 
proof. — In  re  Grenet's  Estate,  2  A.2d 
707,  332  Pa.  Ill— Brady  v.  Tarr,  21 
A.2d  131,  145  PsuSuper.  316. 

3.  N.Y. — In  re  Murray's  Estate,  5  N. 
E.2d    717,    272    N.Y.    228— Baio    v. 


1030 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  559 


this  view  the  running  of  the  statute,  or  of  the  com- 
mon-law period  of  twenty  years,  may  be  interrupt- 
ed by  a  stay  of  execution,4  by  an  injunction  re- 
straining the  collection  of  the  judgment,5  by  the 
disability  of  the  party  from  infancy,6  by  the  in- 
stitution of  special  or  collateral  proceedings  to  col- 
lect the  judgment,  or  uncover  property  subject 
to  it,7  by  the  issuance  of  scire  facias  or  other  proc- 
ess to  revive  the  judgment,8  or  by  the  judgment 
debtor's  payment  on  account  of  the  judgment  or 
acknowledgment  of  the  debt9 

It  has  also  been  held  that  the  running  of  the 
period  necessary  to  create  the  presumption  of  pay- 
ment may  be  tolled  by  the  debtor's  absence  from 
the  state,10  although,  where  the  statutory  presump- 
tion of  payment  is  conclusive,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  period  will  not  be  extended  by  such  absence,11 
notwithstanding  another  statute  which  provides  that 
the  time  limited  for  the  commencement  of  an  action 
shall  not  include  the  time  during  which  such  person 
is  absent  from  the  state;12  and,  in  any  case,  the 
absence  of  the  judgment  creditor  does  not  affect  the 
running  of  the  statutory  period.13  The  period  is  not 


stayed  by  the  mere  filing  of  a  claim  against  the  debt- 
or's estate,14  or  by  the  operation  of  a  statute  ex- 
tending the  time  for  commencement  of  an  action 
for  a  certain  period  after  the  death  of  the  person 
against  whom  the  cause  of  action  exists.15 

(2)  Burden  of  Proof 

As  a  general   rule,  the  burden  of  proving   payment 
of  a  judgment  rests  on  the  person  claiming  payment. 

As  a  general  rule,  the  burden  of  proving  payment 
of  a  judgment  rests  on  defendant  or  other  person 
claiming  payment,16  except  where  a  prima  facie 
case  of  payment  has  been  made,17  where  the  judg- 
ment is  dormant,18  or  where  such  a  period  of  time 
has  elapsed  as  to  raise  a  presumption  of  payment,1^ 
in  which  case  the  burden  of  proving  nonpayment, 
or  of  overcoming  the  presumption  of  payment,  rests 
on  plaintiff  or  the  person  seeking  to  enforce  the 
judgment. 

b.  Admissibility 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  To  support  or  rebut  presumption  of 

payment 


Mangano,  6  N.Y.S.2d  763,  169  Misc. 
155,  reversed  on  other  grounds  9  N. 
Y.S.2d  276,  256  App.Div.  831.  reur- 
gument  denied  10  N.Y.S.2d  676,  256 
App.Div.  930. 
34  C.J.  p  694  note  26. 


4.     S.C.~ 
483. 


-Klnsler   v.    Holmes,    2    B.C. 


5.  Va. — Hutsonpiller  v.  Stover,  12 
Oratt.  579,  53  Va.  579. 

0.  S.C. — McQueen  v.  Fletcher,  25  S. 
C.Eq.  1'52. 

7.    N.Y. — In  re  Murray's  Estate,  5  N. 

E.2d  717,  272  N.Y.  228. 
Pa. — Pennsylvania  Co.  for  Insuranc- 
es on  Lives  and  Granting  Annui- 
ties v.  Youngman,  171  A.  594,  314 
Pa,  277. 

34  C.J.  p  694  note  30. 
Time  to   sue  and  limitations  in  ac- 
tion on  judgment  generally  see  in- 
fra §  854. 
Acquisition  of  jurisdiction 

Recovery  on  surrogate's  decree  for 
costs  against  decedent  was  barred 
by  limitations,  where  twenty  years 
elapsed  before  surrogate's  court  ac- 
quired jurisdiction  in  proceedings  for 
enforcement  of  decree. — In  re  McESn- 
ery's  Estate,  279  N.Y.S.  187,  155 
Misc.  337. 

3.  Pa. — Croskey  v.  Croskey,  160  A. 
103,  306  Pa.  423. 

9.  N.Y.— -In  re  Murray's  Estate,  288 
N.Y.S.  346,  24-8  App.Div.  167,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds  5  N.B.2d 
71'7,  272  N.Y.  228— Arizona  'Fire 


Ins.   Co.   v.  King,  14  N.Y.S.2d  783, 

172  Misc.  165. 
Garaishee  execution 

Where  payments  were  made  under 
garnishee  execution  out  of  funds  be- 
longing to  the  debtor  on  account  of 
creditor's  judgment,  statutory  pre- 
sumption of  payment  of  judgment  by 
the  expiration  of  twenty  years  was 
not  applicable. — Moran  Towing  £ 
Transp.  Co.  v.  Fleming,  25  N.Y.S.2d 
41,  affirmed  27  N.Y.S.2d  431,  261  A*pp. 
Div.  978,  affirmed  38  N.E.2d  231,  287 
N.Y.  571. 

10.  S.C. — Latimer  v.  Townbridge,  29 
S.E.    634,    52    S.C.   193,    68   Am.S.R. 
893. 

11.  Mo. — Mayes  v.  Mayes,  11-6  S.W. 
2d  1,  342  Mo.  401. 

12.  N.Y.— Brinkman  v.  Cram,  161  N. 
Y.S.    965,    175    App.Div.    372,    af- 
firmed 122  N.E.  877,   225  N.Y.   720. 

13.  Mo.— Mayes  v.  Mayes,  App.,  104 
S.W.2d    1019,    reversed    on    other 
grounds  116  S.W.2d  1,  342  Mo.  401. 

14.  N.Y. — In    re    Ballenzweig's    Es- 
tate,   22    N.Y.S.2d    541,    174    Misc. 
1109 — In  re  McEnery's  Estate,  279 
N.Y.S.    187,    155    Misc.    337— In    re 
Amarante's  Estate,  266  N.Y.S.  559, 
148  Misc.  825. 

34  C.J.  p  694  note  33  [b]. 

15-  N.Y.— Matter  of  Hoes,  170  N.Y. 

S.  543,  183  App.Div.  38. 
33  C.J.  p  694  note  33. 

15.  Ala. — Grayson    v.    Schwab,    179 
So.  377,  235  Ala.  398. 

La. — State  ex  rel.  Leary  v.  Hughes, 
App.,  185  So.  69. 


TJtah.-^Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Marks 
v.  Marks,  100  P.2d  207,  210,  98 
Utah  400. 

34  C.J.  p  694  note  34. 
Burden  of  proof  with  respect  to  pay- 
ments generally  see  the  C.J.S.  ti- 
tle Payment  §   93,  also  48  C.J.  p 
680  note  20-p  683  note  69. 
Within  period  of  twenty  years  aft- 
er recovery  of  judgment,  the  burden 
of  proving  payment  is  on  the  debtor 
after  which  period:  the  burden  rests 
on  the  creditor.— Brady  v.  Tarr,  21  A. 
2d  131,  145  Pa.Super.  316. 

Defendant*  claiming  payment  in 
personalty,  must  prove  not  only  de- 
livery to  plaintiff,  but  also  the  lat- 
ter's  consent  to  accept  it  as  payment 
of  the  judgment. — Bauman-George 
Piano  Co.  v.  Matthews,  4  La. App.  334. 

17.  La. — State     ex     rel.     Leary     v. 
Hughes,   App.,    185    So.    59. 

18.  Neb.— Hill   v.   Feeny,   134   N.W, 
921,  90  Neb.  791. 

19.  Ala.— Gilmer  v.    Gant,    24    So,2d 
414,  247  Ala.  347— Gambill  v.  Cas- 
simus,  22  So.2d  909,  247  Ala.  176 — 
Hays  y.  McCarty,  195  So.  241,  239 
Ala.  400— Second  Nat.  Bank  v.  All- 
good,  176  So.  363,  234  Ala.  654. 

La.— State  ex  rel.  Leary  v.  Hughes, 
App.,  185  So.  69. 

Pa. — In  re  Lefever's  Estate,  122  A. 
273,  278  Pa,  196—  Gilmore  v.  Alex- 
ander, 112  A.  9,  268  Pa,  415— Brady 
v.  Tarr,  21  A.2d  131,  145  Pa,Super4 
316. 

34  C.J.p694note36. 


1031 


§  559 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


(1)  In  General 


Competent   and    relevant   evidence   may   be    received 
to  prove  payment  of  a  Judgment. 

As  a  general  rule,  all  competent  and  relevant  evi- 
dence may  be  received  to  prove  payment  of  a  judg- 
ment.20 The  evidence  admissible  to  prove  payment 
includes  parol  evidence,21  a  written  receipt  or  other 
paper  passing  between  the  parties,22  an  entry  on  the 
records  of  the  court,23  and  the  return  and  receipts 
on  the  execution,24  but  not  evidence  of  the  acts  of 
the  parties  prior  to  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,25 
although  it  has  been  held  that  an  agreement  en- 
tered into  prior  to  the  date  of  a  judgment,  as  to  the 
mode  of  its  discharge,  but  which  was  not  to  be  exe- 
cuted until  afterward,  and  all  payments  made  in 
pursuance  of  such  agreement,  are  admissible  in  ev- 
idence in  support  of  a  plea  of  payment.26  .  The  fact 
that  a  mortgagor  was  permitted  to  occupy  the  prem- 
ises as  a  tenant  after  foreclosure,  and  that  at  his 
death  he  left  considerable  property,  does  not  tend 
to  show  payment  of  the  deficiency  judgment.27 

Evidence  that  the  judgment  has  not  been  paid,28 
including  evidence  contradicting  or  explaining  a 
written  receipt,29  ordinarily  is  admissible,  but  an. 
account  book  of  a  deceased  attorney  is  not  of  it- 
self competent  evidence  of  the  fact  that  such  attor- 
ney did  not  receive  a  payment  on  the  judgment.30 
In  some  jurisdictions,  however,  where  through  lapse 
of  time  a  conclusive  presumption  of  payment  is  cre- 


ated, evidence  to  prove  nonpayment  is  inadmis- 
sible.31 At  least  in  connection  with  other  circum- 
stances, evidence  that  no  execution  was  issued,32 
or  that  one  issued  was  not  returned,33  is  admissible 
on  the  question  of  payment 

(2)  To   Support  or   Rebut   Presumption   of 
Payment 

Generally,  any  competent  evidence  which  tends  to 
support  or  rebut  the  presumption  of  payment  of  a  judg- 
ment is  admissible  on  an  issue  of  payment,  but  in  some 
jurisdictions  the  evidence  admissible  for  this  purpose  is 
prescribed  by  statute. 

In  some  jurisdictions,  the  evidence  which  may  be 
relied  on  to  rebut  the  presumption  of  payment  aris- 
ing from  lapse  of  time  is  prescribed  by  statute,34 
and,  if  the  presumption  is  declared  by  the  statute 
to  be  conclusive,  only  its  existence  may  be  attacked, 
and  it  may  not  be  shown  in  rebuttal  of  the  presump- 
tion that  the  judgment  was  not  actually  paid.35  On 
the  other  hand,  where  the  presumption  of  payment 
is  not  conclusive,  it  may  be  rebutted  by  any  compe- 
tent and  satisfactory  evidence  that  there  has  been 
no  payment  in  fact.36 

To  repel  the  presumption  of  payment  there  may 
be  shown  the  pursuit  of  a  continued  course  of  legal 
proceedings  to  enforce  the  judgment,37  such  as  the 
issue  and  return  of  an  execution  unsatisfied  within 
the  time  limited,38  the  revival  of  the  judgment39  or 


20.  Pa.— First  Nat  Bank  v.  Bank  of 
Pittsburgh,  99  Pa.Super.  600. 

21.  Cal. — Can  trail  v.  "Waterman,  232 
P.  997,  70  Cal.App.  184. 

Ky. — First  Nat  Bank  of  Jackson  v. 
Reynolds,  143  S.W.2d  721,  283  Ky. 
837. 

34  C.J.  p  694  note  37. 

Admissibility  of  evidence  of  pay- 
ments generally  see  the  C.J.S.  ti- 
tle Payment  §§  112-119,  also  48  C. 
J.  p  717  note  90-p  725  note  41. 

22.  Tex.— Citizens     State    Bank    of 
Clarinda,  Iowa,  v.  Del-Tex  Inv.  Co., 
Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d  450,  error  dis- 
missed, judgment  correct. 

34  CJ.  p  694  note  38. 

23.  Mass.— Cote     v.     New     England 
Nav.    Co.,    99   N.E.    972,    213    Mass. 
177. 

34  C.J.  p  694  note  39. 
Entry    of    satisfaction    as    evidence 
generally  see  infra  §  583. 

24.  Iowa. — Singer  v.  Given,  IS  N.W. 
S58,  61  Iowa  93. 

34  C.J.  p  695  note  40. 

Return  on  execution  as  evidence  of 

satisfaction  generally  see  infra  § 

573. 

25.  Del. — Lofland  v.  McDaniel,  41  A. 
«882,  17  Del.  416. 

Me.— Bird  v.  Smith,  84  Me.  63,  56  Am. 
D.  635. 


26.  Md. — Downey    v.    (Forrester,    35 
Md.  117. 

27.  N.Y. — Seaman  v.  Clarke,  78  N.T. 
S.  171,  75  App.Div.  345. 

28.  Tex. — James  v.  Midland  Grocery 
&  Dry  Goods  Co.,  Civ.App.,  146  S. 
W.  1073,  error  denied,  Sup.,  147  S. 
W.  xv. 

34  C.J.  p  695  note  44. 

29.  Md. — Hughes     v.     O'Donnell,     2 
Harr.  &  J.  324. 

N.J.— Earle  v.  Earle,  16  N.J.Law  273. 

SO.  Iowa. — Shaffer  v.  McCrackin,  5'8 
N.W.  910,  90  Iowa  578,  48  Am.S.R. 
465. 

31.  N.Y.— In  re  Elm  St.  in  City  of 
New  York,  146  N.E.  342,   239  N.Y. 
220.    . 

32.  N.Y. — Jacoby  v.  Stephenson  Sil- 
ver Min.  Co.,   6  N.Y.S.-  371,  3  Silv. 
Sup.  130. 

33.  N.Y. — Gassner  v.  Sandford,  4  N. 
Y.Super.  440. 

34.  Mo.— Hedges       v.       McKittrick, 
A-pp.,  153  S.W.2d  790. 

34  C.J.  p  695  note  49. 

35.  N.Y.— In  re  Elm  St  in  City  of 
New  York,   146  N.E.  342,   239  N.Y. 
220. 

Conclusiveness   of  presumption  gen- 

1032 


erally   see   infra  subdivision   c   of 
this  section. 

sa  Ala. — Gambill  v.  Cassimus,  22 
So.2d  909,  247  Ala.  176. 

Pa. — Pennsylvania  Co.  for  Insuranc- 
es on  Lives  and  Granting  Annui- 
ties v.  Youngman,  171  A.  594,  314 
Pa,  277— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bank 
of  Pittsburgh,  99  Pa.-Super.  600. 

34  C.J.  p  69'5  note  50. 

37.  Pa. — Pennsylvania    Co.    for    In- 
surances   on   Lives    and    Granting 
Annuities    v.     Youngman,     171    A. 
594,  314  Pa.  277. 

Service  of  interrogatories 

As  regards  presumption  of  pay- 
ment of  judgment  entered  in  1910, 
and  on  which  suit  was  brought  in 
1931,  attachment  issued  in  1910  must 
be  treated  as  though  issued  in  1913, 
when  interrogatories  were  served, 
and  as  having  same  evidential  effect 
as  if  existing  writ  had  been  discon- 
tinued and  new  writ  issued. — Penn- 
sylvania Co.  for  Insurances  on  Lives 
and  Granting  Annuities  v.  Young- 
man, supra. 

38.  Tenn. — Black    v.    Carpenter,     & 
Baxt.  350. 

39.  Ark, — Brearly  v.   Peay,    23   Ark. 
172. 

N.Y.— Mower  v.  Kip,  2  Eclw.  165,  re- 


49    C.J.S, 


JUDGMENTS 


§  559 


attempt  to  revive  it40  by  scire  facias  or  other  proc- 
ess,41 and  other  evidence  which  satisfactorily  ac- 
counts for  the  delay  of  the  creditor  in  enforcing 
payment,42  such  as  proof  of  the  impossibility  of 
proceeding  for  its  collection  by  reason  of  the  clos- 
ing of  the  courts,43  the  poverty  of  the  judgment 
debtor,44  or  his  absence  from  the  state.45 

The  existence  of  the  presumption  of  payment  may 
also  be  attacked  by  evidence  of  the  making  within 
the  twenty  years  or  other  statutory  period  of  par- 
tial payments46  or  of  a*  distinct  acknowledgment  of 
the  judgment  as  an  existing  debt,47  made  to  the 
creditor,48  his  agent  or  attorney,49  or  even  to  a 
stranger,50  provided  it  is  intended  to  be  communi- 
cated to  or  to  influence  the  conduct  of  the  credi- 
tor,51 although  an  admission  will  not  be  as  readily 
implied  from  language  casually  addressed  to  a  stran- 
ger as  when  addressed  to  the  creditor  in  reply  to  a 


versed   on   other   grounds  -6   Paige 
88. 
Pa. — James  v.  Jarrett,  17  Pa.  370. 

40.  Pa.— In  re  Miller,  90  A.  77,  243 
Pa.  328. 

41.  Pa. — Croskey  v.  Croskey,  160  A. 
103,  306  Pa,  423. 

Circumstance  to  "be  considered 

In  scire  facias  proceeding  to  re- 
vive and  continue  the  lien  of  a  judg- 
ment, the  issuance  of  prior  writ  of 
scire  facias  to  revive  Judgment  was 
a  circumstance  to  be  considered  with 
other  evidence  in  rebutting  presump- 
tion of  payment  arising  from  fact 
that  judgment  was  more  than  twen- 
ty years  old. — Brady  v.  Tarr,  21  A.2d 
131,  145  Pa.Super.  316. 

42.  Conn. — Judson  v.  Phelps,   89  A. 
161,  87  Conn.  495,  1  A.L.R.  768. 

Pa. — Pennsylvania  Co.  for  Insuranc- 
es on  Lives  and  Granting  Annui- 
ties v.  Youngman,  171  A.  59-1,  314 
Pa.  277. 

43.  Ark.— Woodruff    v.    Sanders,    15 
Ark.  143. 

44.  N.Y.— Boyd   v.    Boyd,    29   N.Y.S. 
7,  9  Misc.  161. 

45.  N.Y.— -Brinkman  v.  Cram,  161  N. 
Y.S.  965,  175  App.DJv.  372,  affirmed 
122  N.B.  877,  22-5  N.Y.  720. 

Pa.— Pennsylvania  Co.  for  Insuranc- 
es on  Lives  and  Granting  Annui- 
ties v.  Youngman,  171  A.  594,  314 
Pa.  277. 

46.  N.Y. — In  re  Murray's  Estate,  288 
N.Y.S.    346,    248   App.Div.    167,   re- 
versed on  other  grounds,  5  N.E.2d 
717,  272  N.Y.  228. 

Pa.— Ott  v.  Ott,  16-6  A,  556,  311  Pa. 

130. 

34  C.J.  p  695  note  57. 
Voluntary  or  involuntary  payment 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  the  rule 
is  not  restricted  to  a  voluntary  pay- 
ment but  includes  payments  on  judg- 
ment by  virtue  of  garnishment — 


Moran  Towing  &  Transp.  Co.  v. 
Fleming,  2-5  N.Y.S.2d  41,  affirmed  27 
N.Y.S.2d  431,  261  App.Div.  978,  af- 
firmed 38  N.E.2d  231,  287  N.Y.  571. 
(2)  It  has  also  been  held,  however, 
that  a  payment  through  legal  coer- 
cion will  not  rebut  the  presumption, 
although  a  voluntary  payment  will 
do  so. — Arizona  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  King, 
14  N.Y.S.2d  7-83,  172  Misc.  165. 

47.  N.Y. — Arizona   Fire   Ins.    Qo.    v. 
King,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  695  note  58. 
Nature  of  acknowledgment  required 
Acknowledgment  of  judgment  debt 
within  exception  in  statute  creating 
presumption  of  satisfaction  of  judg- 
ment after  twenty  years  .  is   distin- 
guished from  that  necessary  to  con- 
stitute .  new   or   continuing   contract 
under    statute    of    limitations. — Ari- 
zona <Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  King,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  695  note  58  [a]. 

48.  Pa. — Gregory  v.  Commonwealth, 
15  A.  452,  121  Pa.  611,   6  Am.S.R. 
804— Bby  v.  Bby,  5  Pa.  435. 

49.  N.Y. — Arizona   Fire   Ins.    Co.   v. 
King,    14    N.Y.S.2d    783,    172    Misc. 
165. 

Pa. — Gregory   v.    Commonwealth,    15 
A.  452,  121  Pa,  -611,  6  Am.S.R.  804. 

50.  Pa. — Gregory  v.  Commonwealth, 
supra. 

51.  N.Y.— In   re   Kendrick,    13   N.B. 
762,  107  N.Y.  104. 

52.  Pa. — Gregory  v.  Commonwealth, 
15  A.  4'52,  121  Pa,  -611,   6  Am.S.R. 
804— Appeal  of  Bentley.  99  Pa.  500. 

53.  N.Y. — Arizona   Fire   Ins.   Co.   v. 
King,    14    N.Y.S.2d    783,    172    Misc. 
165. 

34  C.J.  p  695  note  64. 

54.  N.Y.— Arizona   Fire   Ins.    Co.   v. 
King,  supra. 

55.  Pa. — Gregory  v.  Commonwealth, 

1033 


demand  for  the  debt.52  The  acknowledgment  or  ad- 
mission need  not  be  accompanied  by  a  promise  to 
pay  ;53  nor  need  it  specify  the  amount  or  character 
of  the  judgment  debt,54  and  in  some  jurisdictions,55 
although  not  in  others,56  it  is  of  no  consequence  that 
it  is  accompanied  by  a  refusal  to  pay.  Evidence 
tending  to  support  the  presumption  of  payment,  or 
to  explain  and  contradict  evidence  given  in  rebut- 
tal of  such  presumption,  should  be  admitted.67 

c.  Weight  and  Sufficiency 

The  fact  of  payment  or  nonpayment  of  a  Judgment 
should  be  established  by  a  fair  preponderance  of  the 
evidence,  but,  where  there  is  a  presumption  of  payment 
from  lapse  of  time,  evidence  in  rebuttal  thereof  should 
be  particularly  strong  and  convincing. 

Ordinarily  a  fair  preponderance  of  the  evidence 
is  sufficient  to  establish  or  disprove,  as  the  case  may 
be,  payment  of  a  judgment.58  The  mere  fact  that 

15   A.  452,   121  Pa,   611,   6  Am.S.R. 
804. 

50.  S.C. — Stover  v.  Duren,  34  S.C.L. 
448,  51  Am.D.  634 — McQueen  v. 
Fletcher,  34  S.C.Eq.  152.  . 

57.  N.Y. — Jacoby  v.  Stephenson  Sil- 
ver Min.  Co.,  6  N.Y.S.  371,  3   Silv. 
Sup.  130. 

Pa. — Van  Loon  v.  Smith,  103  Pa.  238. 

58.  La. — Bauman-George    Piano    Co. 
v.  Matthews,  4  La.App.  334. 

Pa. — Coleman  &  Stahl  v.  Weimer,  86 
Pa. Super.   303— Krzykwa  v.  Krzyk- 
wa,  Com.Pl.,  15  Northumb.L.J.  230. 
34  C.J.  p  696  note  68. 

i  TM  <»t  ftntiftl    or   presumptive    evi- 
dence 

The  extinguishment  of  a  judgment 
by  payment  may  be  established  by 
presumptive  or  circumstantial  evi- 
dence as  well  as  by  positive  proof. — 
State  ex  rel.  Leary  v.  Hughes,  La. 
App.,  1'85  So.  -69. 
Evidence  of  payment  held  snfflcieut 

(1)  Generally. 

Ala. — Gambill  v.  Cassimus,   22  So.2d 

909,  247  Ala.  176. 
Ark. — Less   v.   Grlsmore-Hyman  Co., 

2-51  S.W.  673,  158  Ark.  1. 
Cal. — Cantrall-  v.   Waterman,   232   P. 

997,  70  CaLApp.  184. 
Ky.— 'First  Nat.  Bank  of  Jackson  v. 

Reynolds,  143  S.W.2d  721,  2-83  Ky. 

837. 
Pa. — Coleman  &  Stahl  v.  Weimer,  86 

Pa. Super.  303. 
34  C.J.  p  696  note  68   [a],   [d]. 

(2)  To    establish    a    prima    facie 
case. — State  ex  rel.  Leary  v.  Hughes, 
•La.App.,  185  So.  69. 

(3)  To    show    that    part    payment 
was      not      voluntary. — Sanchez     v. 
Spitzka,    48   N.Y.S.2d   184,    183   Misc. 
413 — Arizona  -Eire  Ins.  Co.  v.  King, 
14  N.Y.S.2d  783,  172  Misc.  165. 
Evidence  of  payment  held  insufficient 

(1)  Generally. — Exchange  Elevator 


§  559 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


a  judgment  is  of  record  and  appears  unsatisfied  is 
not  conclusive  evidence  that  it  is  unpaid.59 

To  rebut  presumption  of  payment.  In  the  absence 
of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,60  the  presumption  of 
payment  of  a  judgment  from  the  lapse  of  time,  un- 
der statute  or  apart  therefrom,  is  not  conclusive,61 
but  may  be  rebutted  by  any  competent  and  satisfac- 
tory evidence,  as  discussed  supra  subdivision  b  (2) 
of  this  section.  However,  the  evidence  to  rebut 
the  presumption  must  be  strong  and  convincing,62 
particularly  after  the  death  of  the  debtor  ;63  and  the 
party  alleging  nonpayment  must  bring  forward  evi- 
dence sufficient  to  produce  a  reasonable  conviction 
that  the  judgment  has  not  been  paid,64  or  establish 
facts  from  which  nonpayment  may  be  clearly  in- 
ferred,65 although,  if  such  evidence  is  introduced, 
it  is  sufficient  to  rebut  the  presumption,  even  though 
it  would  be  of  no  avail  against  the  general  statute 
of  limitations.66  A  mere  showing  of  poverty  or 
failure  in  business  on  the  part  of  the  judgment  debt- 
or will  not  alone  rebut  the  presumption  of  satisfac- 
tion,67 but  proof  of  his  insolvency  or  entire  inabil- 


ity to  pay  during  the  whole  period  is  sufficient  evi- 
dence in  rebuttal.68  At  common  law,  the  absence  of 
a  judgment  debtor  from  the  state  in  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered  is  a  circumstance  to  be 
weighed  with  other  evidence  in  determining  wheth- 
er or  not  the  presumption  of  payment  from  lapse 
of  time  is  rebutted,69  although  it  is  not  of  itself  suf- 
ficient to  repel  the  presumption,70  but  such  absence 
will  not  rebut  the  presumption  where  it  is  not  in- 
cluded in  the  exceptions  to  a  statute  raising  a  con- 
clusive presumption  of  payment  after  the  lapse  of 
a  prescribed  period.71 

§  560.    Payment  as  Question  of  Law  or  Fact 

Where  there  is  conflicting  evidence  on  the  question 
of  payment  of  a  judgment,  the;  issue  Is.  one  of  fact  to 
be  submitted  to  a  jury;  but,  where  sufficient  time  has 
elapsed  to  raise  a  presumption  of  payment,  the  court 
must  determine  whether  matters  relied  on  to  rebut  the 
presumption  are  of  sufficient  force  to  accomplish  that 
purpose  if  established. 

Where  there  is  conflicting  evidence  on  the  ques- 
tion of  payment  of  a  judgment,  the  issue  is  one  of 
fact  to  be  submitted  to  a  jury.72  However,  where 


Co.  v.  Marshall,  Neb.,  22  N.W.2d  403 
—34  C.J.  p  696  note  68  [b],  [e],  [fj. 

(2)  To   show   full   satisfaction   of 
judgment  debt. 
Mass. — Matthewson    v.   Colpitts,    188 

N.E.  601,  284  Mass.  581. 
pa. — Olyphant  Bank  v.  Borys,  3$  A. 

2d  823,  155  Pa.Super.  49. 

59.  Ind. — Kiefer    Drug    Co.    v.    De 
Lay,  115  N.E.  71,  63  Ind.App.  639. 

60.  Mo.— Mayes  v.  Mayes,  116  S.W. 
2d  1,  342  Mo.  401— Hedges  v.  Mc- 
Kittrick,  App.,  153  S.W.2d  790. 

N.T. — Gerwitz  v.  Berry,  180  N.B. 
251,  258  N.T.  505— In  re  Elm  St  In 
City  of  New  York,  146  N.E.  342, 
239  N.T.  220— In  re  Murray's  Es- 
tate, 288  N.T.S.  -346,  248  App.Div. 
167,  reversed  on  other  grounds  5 
N.E.2d  717,  272  N.T.  228— In  re 
Matter  of  Hoes,  170  N.T.S.  543,  183 
App.Div.  38 — Sanchez  v.  Spitzka,  48 
N.T.S.2d  184,  183  Misc.  413— Ap- 
plication of  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  22, 
N.T.S.2d  706,  174  Misc.  1037,  af- 
firmed 25  N.T.S.2d  1005,  261  App. 
Div.  914,  reargument  denied  27  N. 
T.S.2d  441,  261  App.Div.  987— Mor- 
an  Towing  &  Transportation  Co.  v. 
Fleming,  25  N.T.S.2d  41,  affirmed 
2-7  N.T.S.2d  431,  261  App.Div.  978, 
affirmed  38  N.E.2d  231,  287  N.T. 
571. 

34  C.J.  p  696  note  69. 
In  Alatema 

Lapse  of  ten  years  without  issu- 
ance of  execution  on  judgment  raises 
rebuttable  presumption  of  payment, 
but  this  presumption  becomes  con- 
clusive after  twenty  years. — Gambill 
v.  Cassimus,  22  So.2d  909,  247  Ala. 
176— Hays  v.  McCarty,  195  So.  241, 


239    Ala.    400 — Patterson   v.   Weaver, 
114  So.  301,  216  Ala.  686. 

61.  Ind. — Pensinger  v.  Jarecki  Mfg. 
Co.,  136  N.E.  641,  78  Ind.App.  569. 

Pa. — in  re  Lefever's  Estate,   122  A. 

273,  278  Pa.  196. 
34  C.J.  p  696  note  69  [a],  [b]. 

62.  Ala.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Gambill   v.    Cassimus.   22   So.    909, 
910,  247  Ala,  176. 

Pa, — Gregory  v.  Commonwealth,  15 
A.  452,  121  Pa,  611,  6  Am.S.R.  504 
—First  Nat  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Pitts- 
burgh, 99  Pa.Super.  600— Coleman 
&  Stahl  v.  Weimer,  86  Pa. Super. 
303. 

Requisites  and  sufficiency  of  proof 

(1)  Presumption    of    payment     is 
equivalent   to   direct   proof  of   pay- 
ment and  prima  facie  obliterates  the 
debt,   and  is  so  strong  that  it  will 
prevail  unless  overcome  by  clear  and 
decisive    proof    to    the    contrary. — 
Gambill   v.    Cassimus,    22    So.2d   909, 
247  Ala,  176. 

(2)  Presumption    of    payment    is 
alona  sufficient  to  defeat  recovery  if 
no  promise  to  pay  or  no  payment  on 
account  has  been  made  within  twen- 
ty years.— Ott  v.  Ott,  166  A.  556,  311 
Pa,  130. 

(')  Presumption  may  be  overcome 
by  affirmative  proof  that  judgment 
has  not  been.  paid. — In  re  Lefever's 
Estate,  122  A.  273,  278  Pa,  196-^First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Pittsburgh,  99 
Pa,Super.  600—34  Q.J.  p  696  note  71 
[a]  (3). 

(4)  Other  statements  of  rule. — 
Pennsylvania  Co.  for  Insurances  on 
Lives  and  Granting  Annuities  v. 

1034 


Toungman,  171  A.  594,  314  Pa.  277— 
34  C.J.  p  696  note  71  [a]. 
S3.    Pa.— First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bank  of 
Pittsburgh,  99  Pa,Super.   600. 

64.  Ala,— Gambill    v.    Cassimus,    22 
So.2d  909,  247  Ala.  176. 

Evidence   held   insufficient   to    over- 

come  presumption 
Ala. — Gambill  v.  Cassimus,   supra. 
Pa. — In   re  Lefever's  Estate,   122   A. 

273,  27-8  Pa.  196. 
34  C.J.  p  696  note  71  [b]-[d]. 

65.  Ala.— Gambill    v.    Cassimus,    22 
So.2d  909,  247  Ala.  176. 

66.  Pa. — Gregory  v.  Commonwealth, 
15  A.  452;  121  Pa,  611,   6  Am.S.R. 
S04. 

34  C.J.  p  696  note  72. 

67.  Me. — Jackson  v.  Nason,    38   Me. 
85. 

34  C.J.  p  696  note  73. 

68.  Or. — Beekman  y.  Hamlin,   31  P. 
707,  23  Or.  313. 

34  C.J.  p  696  note  74. 

69.  Mo. — Cobb  v.  Houston,    94   S.W. 
299,  117  Mo.App.  645. 

70.  Mo. — Cobb  v.  Houston,   supra, 

71.  Mo. — Cobb  v.  Houston,  supra. 
N.T.— Brinkman  v.  Cram,  161  N.T.S. 

965,  175  App.Div.  372,  affirmed  122 
N.E.  877,  225  N.T.  720. 

72.  Pa. — Pennsylvania  Co.  for  Insur- 
ances on  Lives  and  Granting  An- 
nuities  v.   Toungman,    171   A.   594, 
314  Pa,  277— Ott  v.  Ott,  166  A.  5'56, 
311  Pa.  130. 

34  C.J.  p  696  note  78. 

Payment  as  question  of  law  or  fact 
generally  see  the  C.J.S.  title  Pay- 
ment §  125,  also  48  C.J.  p  729  note 
8S-p  732  note  39. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  561 


sufficient  time  has  elapsed  to  raise  a  presumption  of 
payment,  as  discussed  supra  §  559  a  (1)  (b),  and 
there  is  no  proof  of  circumstances  accounting  for 
the  delay,  the  question  is  not  an  open  one  for  the 
jury,78  it  being  a  preliminary  question  of  law  for 
the  court  to  determine  whether  matters  relied  on  to 
rebut  the  presumption  are  of  sufficient  force  to  ac- 
complish that  purpose  if  established.74 

§  561.    Merger  of  Judgments 

a.  In  general 

b.  Cumulative  judgments 

a.  In  General 

Under  some  circumstances,  a  judgment  may  be  dis- 
charged or  extinguished  by  merger  of  title  with  the 
property  against  which  it  constitutes  a  lien,  but  the  in- 
terest of  the  creditor  to  keep  the  Hen  alive  may  pre- 
vent such  merger. 

Where  a  judgment  debtor  buys  in  the  title  ac- 
quired on  an  execution  sale  under  the  judgment,  the 
judgment  is  discharged,75  and  a  junior  judgment 
will  succeed  to  its  priority  of  lien.76  Similarly, 
where  the  judgment  creditor  acquires  title  to  prop- 
erty against  which  the  judgment  constitutes  a  lien, 
the  judgment  ordinarily  is  regarded  as  merged  in 
the  title,  at  least  with  respect  to  such  property,77 
although  since  a  judgment  is  a  general  lien  on  all 
the  debtor's  real  estate,  as  discussed  supra  §  455, 
it  does  not  merge  when  the  creditor  acquires  title 


to  a  particular  portion  of  the  lands  subject  to  the 
judgment,  but  may  ordinarily  be  enforced  against 
the  remaining  lands.78  The  rule  as  to  merger  does 
not  apply,  however,  where  it  is  to  the  interest  of  the 
creditor  to  keep  the  lien  alive,  and  in  such  case  his 
intention  to  prevent  a  merger  may  be  presumed.™ 
There  is  ordinarily  no  merger  of  a  judgment  when 
additional  security  for  the  same  debt  is  given,  such 
as  a  mortgage,80  or  bill  of  sale,81  or  where  a  bond 
for  payment  is  given  on  an  execution  sale.82  How- 
ever, where  the  creditor  takes  an  assignment  of 
property  in  trust  to  pay  his  own  debt  and  those  of 
certain  other  creditors  and  enters  on  the  execution 
of  the  trust  and  pays  a  portion  of  the  debts,88  or 
where  he  accepts  a  deed  of  property,  not  as  security, 
but  as  a  conveyance,84  he  cannot  afterward  proceed 
to  enforce  the  judgment. 

b.  Cumulative  Judgments 

There  is  a  conflict  of  opinion  whether  or  not  a  Judg- 
ment used  as  a  cause  of  action  for  the  recovery  of  an- 
other judgment  is  merged  in  the  subsequent  judgment. 

When  a  judgment  is  used  as  a  cause  of  action  for 
the  recovery  of  another  judgment,  the  question 
whether  or  not  the  first  judgment  is  merged  in  the 
subsequent  judgment  is  one  on  which  it  has  been 
acknowledged  that  there  is  much  conflict  of  opin- 
ion.85 Some  decisions  hold  that  ordinarily  merger 
is  effected,86  but,  under  some  decisions  on  the 


73.  Iowa. — Hendricks    v.    Wall  is,    7 
Iowa  224. 

Pa. — Cope  v.  Humphreys,  14  Serg.  & 
R.  15. 

74.  Pa.— In  re  tLefever's  Estate,  122 
A.    273,    278   Pa.    196— Krzykwa   v. 
Krzykwa,  Com.Pl.?  15  Nor  thumb.  L. 
J.  230. 

34  O.J.  p  697  note  81. 

Where  the  question  of  credibility 
is  not  in  issue,  whether  plaintiff's 
evidence  is  sufficient  to  overcome  the 
presumption  that  a  twenty-year-old 
judgment  has  been  paid  is  for  the 
court. — In  re  Lefever's  Estate,  122 
A.  273,  278  Pa.  196. 

75.  Cal. — MeCarty    v.    Christie,     13 
Cal.  79. 

'Effect  of  execution  sale  on  liens  gen- 
erally see  supra  §  502. 

70.  Cal. — MeCarty  v.  Christie,  su- 
pra. 

TV.  S.C.— Gardner  v.  Coker,  192  S.E. 
151,  184  S.C.  190. 

34  C.J.  p  697  note  86. 

Merger  of  estates  generally  see  Es- 
tates §  123. 

78.  Ind.— Caley  v.  Morgan,  16  N.E. 
790,  114  Ind.  350. 

34  C.J.  p  69'7  note  85. 

Extinguishment  of  liens  generally 
see  supra  §  499. 


79.  Ind. — Hancock  v.  Fleming,  3  N. 
E.  254,  103  Ind.  533. 

34  C.J.  p  697  note  87. 

Title  held  in  different  capacities 

Where  a  partnership  buys  a  judg- 
ment against  certain  real  estate, 
which  thereafter  is  conveyed  to  the 
partners  as  tenants  in  common,  the 
judgment  is  not  merged  in  the  title 
so  as  to  release  a  subsequent  in- 
dorser  on  the  note,  which  formc-a 
the  basis  of  the  judgment,  from  lia- 
bility on  a  judgment  against  himself, 
without  some  evidence  that  such  a 
merger  was  intended. — Lazaran  v. 
Semans,  79  Pa. Super.  356. 

80.  Md. — Johnson  v.  Hines,   61  Md. 
122. 

Minn. — Presley    v.    Lowry,     2    N.W. 

61,  26  Minn.  158. 
34  C.J.  p  697  note  88. 
Acceptance  of  collateral  security  as 

payment  see  supra  §   552. 

81.  Ga. — Bostwick    v.    Felder,    App., 
35  S.E.2d  783.' 

82.  Ky. — Green    v.    Farmers    State 
Bank,  121  S,W.2d  685,  275  Ky.  270. 

83.  N.Y. — Hawley     v.     Mancius,     7 
Johns.  Ch.  174. 

84.  N.Y.-^Matter  of  'Fourth  Avenue, 
11  Abb.Pr.  189. 

Pa.— -Fidelity  Deposit  Bank  of  Der- 


ry  v.    Stewart,   48  Pa.Dist   &  Co. 
618,  25  WestCo.  143. 

85.  111.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mc- 
Donald v.  Culhane,   24  N.B.2d  737, 
73S,  303  IlLApp.  101. 

Ind.— Gilchrist  v.  Cotton,  14«8  N.R 
435,  S3  Ind.App.  415,  rehearing  de- 
nied 148  N.E.  92*8,  83  Ind.App.  415. 

Utah.— Adams  v.  Davies,  156  P.2d 
207,  10'7  Utah  579. 

34  C.J.  p  697  note  93. 

Merger  by  affirmance  of  judgment 
see  Appeal  and  Error  §  1857. 

86.  111. — Corpus  Juris  gooted  in  Mc- 
Donald v.  Culhane,   24  N,E.2d  737, 
738,  303  IlLApp.  101. 

Tex. — Myers    v.    Southard,   Civ. App., 

110  S.W.2d  1185. 
34  C.J.  p  697  note  94. 
Merger  of  causes  of  action  generally 

see  infra  §  599. 

Effect  of  merger 

Under  the  doctrine  of  "merger  of 
judgment,"  in  a  second  judgment,  the 
cause  of  action  changes  Its  nature 
when  reduced  to  judgment,  ceases  to 
exist  as  an  independent  liability,  and 
is  transferred  into  obligations  cre- 
ated by  the  judgment  thereon;  the 
lesser  security  is  absorbed  by  the 
greater  security  and  the  lesser  -ceas- 
es to  exist,  but  the  greater  is  not  in- 


103$ 


§  561 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


question  the  foregoing  rule  is  not  inflexible,87 
and  its  application  depends  on  the  intention  of 
the  parties  and  the  circumstances  of  the  particular 
case.88  So  it  has  been  held  that  the  rule  of  merger 
will  be  applied  only  where  the  ends  of  justice  re- 
quire its  application,^  and  where  an  inferior  secur- 
ity or  indebtedness  passes  into  one  of  superior  de- 
gree,90 and,  even  if  the  judgments  are  considered 
as  merged,  the  doctrine  will  not  be  allowed  to  im- 
pair the  security  of  judgments  as  liens.91 

Other  decisions  hold  that  the  doctrine  of  merger 
does  not  apply  to  a  judgment  on  which  a  new  judg- 
ment is  recovered,  and  that  the  first  judgment  is  not 
extinguished  without  satisfaction  of  the  second,92 
especially  where  the  judgments  are  recovered  in 
different  states,93  or  where  the  second  judgment  is 


auxiliary  or  collateral  to  the  first.94 

Whichever  may  be  the  correct  rule,  as  applied  by 
courts  of  law,  judgments  will,95  or  will  not96  be 
treated  by  a  court  of  equity  as  merged  where  this  is 
necessary  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  litigants. 

Judgment  against  administrator.  The  lien  of  a 
judgment  is  not  released  or  divested  by  the  recovery 
of  a  judgment  against  the  administrator  of  the  de- 
ceased judgment  debtor.97  Where  plaintiff  recovers 
a  personal  judgment  against  an  administrator,  and 
then  recovers  on  such  judgment  a  judgment  on  his 
bond,  the  judgments  are  not  merged.98 

Forfeiture  of  forthcoming  or  delivery  bond.  In 
several  states,  where  by  statute  the  forfeiture  of  a 
forthcoming  bond,  or  bond  for  the  delivery  of  prop- 
erty under  levy,  creates  per  se  a  new  judgment  on 


creased. — Adams  v.  Davles,  156  P.2d 
207,  107  Utah  579. 

Cause  of  action  as  basis  for  judg- 
ment 

The  rule  that  one  Judgment  may 
merge  in  another  is  applicable,  if  at 
all,  to  cases  in  which  one  judgmen 
is  used  as  a  cause  of  action  on  which 
another  Judgment  is  obtained. 
111.— Doerr  r.  Schmitt,  31  N.B.2d  971 

375  III.  470. 
Utah. — Adams    v.    Davies,    156    P.2d 

207,  107  Utah  579. 

Judgment  by  confession  on  note 
was  merged  in  deficiency  judgment 
subsequently  obtained  against  mak- 
er in  proceeding  to  foreclose  mort- 
gage securing  notes  given  as  collat- 
eral for  the  original  note. — McDonald 
v.  Culhane,  24  N.K2d  737,  303  IlLApp. 
101. 

Garnishment  Judgment 

Judgment  that  plaintiff  was  al- 
lowed a  stipulated  sum  in  full  pay- 
ment of  any  claims  against  associa- 
tion in  receivership  extinguished  a 
garnishment  Judgment  and  any  lien 
incident  thereto  which  plaintiff  had 
theretofore  obtained,  since  Judgment 
previously  obtained  in  main  suit 
against  insurance  association  was 
merged  in  judgment  of  Instant  suit 
and  the  garnishment  Judgment  was 
extinguished  by  payment  of  the  main 
Judgment. — Myers  v.  Southard,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  110  S.W.2d  1185. 

87.    Utah.— Adams  v.  Davies,  156  P. 

2d  207,  107  Utah  579. 
34  C.J.  p  697  note  95. 
Judgment  as   creating  new   debt  or 

old  debt  in  new  form  see  infra  § 

600. 

Necessity  of   more  than,  one  Judg- 
ment 

Generally,  one  Judgment  is  suffi- 
cient, but  courts  will  not  go  beyond 
reason  of  -rule  to  hold  that  Judg- 
ment is  merged  in  subsequent  Judg- 
ment obtained  thereon,  if  more  than 


one  is  necessary.  Wolford  v.*  Scar- 
brough,  21  S.W.2d  777,  224  Mo.App 
137. 

88.  Utah.— Adams  v.  Davies,  156  P. 
2d  207,  107  Utah  579. 

89.  Ind.— Gilchrist  v.  Cotton,  148  N. 
E.  435,   83  Ind.App.  415,  rehearing 
denied   148    N.E.   928,    83    Ind.App. 
415. 

Utah. — Adams  v.  Davies,  156  P.2d 
207,  107  Utah  579. 

90.  Ind. — Gilchrist  v.  Cotton,  148  N. 
E.  435,   83  Ind.App.  ,415.  rehearing 
denied    148    N.EL    928.    83    Ind.App. 
415. 

Utah.— Adams  v.  Davies.  156  P.2d 
207,  107  Utah  579. 

91.  Utah. — Adams  v.  Davies,  supra. 

92.  N.C.— Springs  v.   Pharr,   42   S.E. 
590.  131  N.C.   191,   92  Am.S.R.   775. 

34  C.J.  p  697  note  96—15  C.J.  p  1395 
note  52. 

93.  Cal. — Ballentlne       v.       Superior 
Court  in  and  for  San  Mateo  Coun- 
ty,   158   P.2d    14,   26   Cal.2d   254. 

Mass. — Moore  v.  Justices  of  Munici- 
pal Court  of  City  of  Boston,  197 
N.E.  487,  291  Mass.  504. 

Mo. — Wolford  v.  Scarbrough,  21  S.W. 
2d  777,  224  Mo.App.  137. 

34  C.J.  p  697  note  97—15  C.J.  p  1395 
note  53. 

Satisfaction  of  one  of  several  judg- 
ments on  same  cause  of  action  see 
infra  §  575. 

94.  Mo.— Wolford  v.  Scarbrough,  21 
S.W.2d   777,    224   Mo.App.    137. 

34  C.J.  p  698  note  98. 

Probate  court  Judgment  allowing 
Judgment  as  claim  against  estate 
was  in  aid  of  former  judgment  and 
did  not  destroy  its  vitality.— Wol- 
ford  v.  Scarbrough,  supra. 
96.  111. — McDonald  v.  Culhane,  24  N. 

B.2d  737,  303  IlLApp.  101. 
Estoppel 

One  holding  Judgment  by  confes- 
sion on  note,  who  subsequently  fore- 
closed mortgage  securing  collateral 

1036 


notes  given  to  secure  the  original 
note,  obtained  deficiency  judgment 
against  maker,  and  obtained  issuance 
of  execution  on  such  deficiency  judg- 
ment, was  estopped  from  insisting 
that  the  judgment  by  confession  was 
not  merged  in  the  subsequent  defi- 
ciency Judgment. — McDonald  v.  Cul- 
hane, supra. 

Where  declaratory  Judgment,  estab- 
lishing husband's  obligation  and  ef- 
fecting property  settlement  was 
adopted  by  subsequently  entered  di- 
vorce decree  as  part  of  the  decree, 
the  declaratory  Judgment  became 
merged  in  divorce  decree,  and  did  not 
continue  as  a  separate  judgment 
which  would  support  supplementary 
proceedings  for  an  accounting  and 
enforcement  of  declaratory  Judgment. 
—Turner  v.  Ewald,  174  S.W.2d  431, 
295  Ky.  764. 

96.  111. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Mc- 
Donald v.  Culhane,  24  N".E.2d  737, 
738,  303  IlLApp.  101. 

Utah.— Adams    v.    Davies,    156    P.2d 

207,  107  Utah  579. 
W.Va.— Batten   v.    Lowther,    81    S.B. 

821,  74  W.Va.  167. 
34  C.J.  p  698  note  99. 
Purpose  of  second  suit 

Prior  judgment  is  not  merged  in 
subsequent  decree  based  on  judg- 
ment in  suit  brought  for  purpose  of 
collecting  judgment. — Wolford  v. 
Scarbrough.  21  S.W.2d  777,  224  Mo. 
App.  137—34  C.J.  p  697  note  95  [b]. 

97.  Oal.— In  re  Wiley,  71  P.  441,  138 
Cal.  301. 

Mo. — Wolford  v.  Scarbrough,  21  S.W. 
2d  777,  224  Mo.App.  137. 

Operation  and  effect  of  judgment 
against  administrator  or  executor 
generally  see  Bxecutors  and  Ad- 
ministrators 8  800. 

98.  N.T. — Townsend  v.  Whitney,   75 
N.Y.  425. 

N.C.— McLean  v.  McLean,  90  N.C. 
530. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  563 


the  bond,  it  has  been  held  that  the  original  judgment 
is  merged  in  such  statutory  judgment  and  thereby 
satisfied,"  unless  such  bond  is  unauthorized.1 
However,  in  jurisdictions  where  the  forfeiture  of 
such  a  bond  gives  a  right  to  take  or  enter  a  new 
judgment,  but  does  not  of  itself  amount  to  a  judg- 
ment, there  is  no  merger  of  the  original  judgment 
on  the  mere  forfeiture  of  the  bond,  but  only  on  the 
entry  of  the  new  judgment.2 

§  562.    Assignment  as  Extinguishment 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  Is  extinguished  by 
its  assignment  to  the  Judgment  debtor,  or  to  a  stranger 
for  his  benefit. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  is  satisfied  by  its 
assignment  to  the  judgment  debtor,3  or  to  a  stranger 
for  his  benefit,4  unless  the  debtor  waives  his  right 
to  have  it  canceled,5  or  manifests  an  intention  that 
the  lien  of  the  judgment  shall  continue  for  the  ben- 
efit of  another.6  However,  the  judgment  is  not  sat- 
isfied by  an  assignment  to  a  person  who,  although 
liable  for  the  debt  evidenced  by  the  judgment,  is  not 
a  party  to  the  judgment,7  or  who  occupies  the  posi- 
tion of  a  surety  only,8  or  who  is  an  officer  of  a  cor- 
poration which  is  the  judgment  debtor.9  An  unper- 


formed agreement  to  assign  a  judgment  is  not  a  sat- 
isfaction thereof.10 

§  563.    Release  or  Discharge 

a.  In  general 

b.  Necessity  and  sufficiency  of  considera- 

tion 

a.  In  General 

A  Judgment  creditor  may  ordinarily  abandon  or  re- 
nounce his  Judgment,  or  reiease  and  discharge  it;  but 
he  cannot,  by  so  doing,  affect  the  interest  of  other  judg- 
ment creditors  without  their  consent. 

A  judgment  creditor  ordinarily  may  abandon  or 
renounce  his  judgment,11  or  release  and  discharge 
it.12  The  release  may  be  made  by  the  equitable 
owner  of  the  judgment,13  or  by  one  of  several  joint 
owners,  as  far  as  affects  his  interest;14  but  in  the 
latter  case  the  release  does  not  affect  the  share  or 
interest  of  other  parties  in  whose  name  judgment 
was  recovered,15  unless  they  have  expressly  author- 
ized it.16 

The  release  of  a  judgment  may  be  avoided  for 
fraud  or  deceit  practiced  in  obtaining  it.17 


99.  U.S. — Brown  v.  Clarke,  Miss.,  4 
How.  4,  11  L.Ed.  850.  • 

34  C.J.  p  608  note  4. 

Effect  of  forfeiture  of  forthcoming 
or  delivery  bond  generally  see  Ex- 
ecutions §  116  b. 

1.  Ky.— Tanner   v.   Grant,    10    Bush 
362. 

Miss. — Ben  ton  v.  Crowder,  15  Miss. 
185. 

2.  Va.— -Rhea  v.  Preston,  75  Va.  757. 
34  C.J.  p  698  note  6. 

3.  N.Y, — Harvey  v.  Harvey,  48  N.T. 
S.2d  238,  183  Misc.  475. 

Pa.— Fidelity  Deposit  Bank  of  Derry 

v.   Stewart,  48  PaJDist.  &  Co.  618, 

25  West.Co.  143. 
Tex.— Huffffins  v.  Johnston,  Civ.App., 

3    S.W.2d   937,   affirmed   35    S.W.2d 

688,  120  Tex.  21 — Hadad  v.  Ellison, 

Civ.App.,  283  S.W.  193. 
34  C.J.  p  698  note  8. 
Assignment  of  judgments: 

Generally  see  supra  §§  512-530. 

To  persons  paying  judgments  see 

supra  §§  555-558. 

4.  S.C.— Owings  v.  Graham,  113  S,E. 
279,  120  S.C.  408. 

34  C.J.  p  698  note  9. 
Assignment  as  security 

Where  a  tenant  in  common  of 
land  executed  a  note  to  bank  and 
tenant  at  the  same  time  agreed  with 
bank  that  he  would  use  a  portion  of 
the  proceeds  of  the  note  to  procure 
an  assignment  to  the  bank  of  a  judg- 
ment which  was  a  lien  on  the  land 
as  collateral  security  for  the  note, 
assignment  when  so  procured  operat- 


ed to  satisfy  the  judgment  and  no 
execution   could   be   issued   thereon. 
— Edmonds  v.  Wood,   22   S.E.2d   237, 
222  N.C.  118. 
B.    Md.— McGraw  v.  Union  Trust  & 

Deposit   Co.,    104   A,    286,    132   Md. 

502. 

6.  Wash.— Lachner  v.  Myers,  208  P. 
1095,  121  Wash.  172. 

7.  111. — Thomas  v.  Home  Mut.  Bldg. 
Loan  Ass'n,   90  N.E.   1081,  243  111. 
550. 

34  C.J.  p  698  note  11. 

8.  W.Va,— O'Keefe  v.  Eclipse  Poca- 
hontas   Coal  Co.,   115   S.E.   579,    92 
W.Va.  519. 

34  C.J.  p  698  note  12. 
Effect  of  payment  by  surety  gener- 
ally see  supra  §  556. 

9.  111.— O'Keefe  v.  Eclipse  Pocahon- 
tas  Coal  Co.,  supra. 

34  C.J.  p  698  note  13. 

10.  Colo. — Crotser  v.  Lament,  70  P. 
695,  18  Colo.App.  167. 

11.  Ky.— Ramage     v.     Clements,     4 
Bush  161. 

34  C.J.  p  699  note  16. 

12.  Cal. — In   te   McLellan's    Estate, 
94   P.2d   408,    35   Cal.App.2d  18. 

Mo. — City  of  St.  Louis  v.  S enter 
Commission  Co.,  124  S.W.,1180,  343 
Mo.  1075.  'feJ 

34  C.J.  p  699  note  17.  *^ 

Authority  of  attorney  to  satisfy  or 
discharge  judgment  see  Attorney 
and  Client  $  99. 

Release  of  judgment  lien  see  supra 
§  500. 

1037 


A  Judgment  on  a  sealed  instrument 
cannot  be  released  except  by  a  seal- 
ed instrument. — Shriver  v.  Oarlin  & 
Fulton  Co.,  141  A.  434,  155  Md.  51, 
58  A.L.R.  767. 
Attorney's  fees 

Where  judgment  was  entered  in 
favor  of  plaintiff's  attorneys  for  at- 
torney's fees  as  part  of  costs,  al- 
though not  provided  for  in  note  sued 
on,  voluntary  release  by  attorneys 
satisfied  judgment  for  fees.— Koontz 
v.  Clark  Bros.,  *227  N.W.  584,  209 
Iowa  62. 
What  law  governs 

A  release  of  a  judgment  is  govern- 
ed by  the  law  of  the  state  where 
it  is  executed  and  delivered,  al- 
though the  judgment  was  rendered 
in  another  state. — Beam  v.  Barnum, 
21  Conn.  200. 

13.  111. — Pease  v.  Sanderson,  59  N.E. 
425,  188  111.  597. 

34  C.J.  p  699  note  22. 

14.  Ala. — Penn  v.  Edwards,  50  Ala. 
63. 

34  C.J.  p  699  note  23. 

15.  Puerto  Rico. — Rivera  v.  Sun  Life 
Assur.    Co.,    10    Puerto    Rico    Fed. 
89. 

16.  Okl. — Gasper  v.   Mayer,   43   P.2d 
467,  171  Okl.  457. 

17.  Ind. — Wray  v.  Chandler,  64  Ind. 
146. 

34  C.J.  P  699  note  21. 

legal  or  constructive  fraud  is 
sufficient  to  avoid  a  release  of  a, 
judgment,  so  that  it  'is  unnecessary 


§  563 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


Issuance  of  execution.  If  an  execution  is  issued 
for  the  full  amount  of  the  judgment,  a  levy  errone- 
ously made  thereunder  for  a  lesser  sum  does  not 
constitute  a  release  of  part  of  the  judgment18 

Absolute  or  conditional  release.  An  instrument 
cannot  properly  be  construed  to  be  an  absolute  re- 
lease where  its  terms  show  that  the  judgment  is  to 
be  kept  alive  and  in  force  for  certain  purposes.19 
Where  a  judgment  debtor  obtains  possession  of  a 
discharge  of  the  judgment,  without  complying  with 
the  conditions  on  which  it  was  to  be  delivered,  and 
the  discharge  is  not  filed  with  the  clerk,  or  satisfac- 
tion entered  on  the  record,  the  judgment  remains  in 
full  forced 

Release  as  condition  to  payment.  A  judgment 
debtor,  under  a  judgment  in  an  action  brought  by 
the  holders  of  outstanding  unrecorded  instruments, 
is  entitled  to  have  such  releases  from  the  spouse  of 
a  holder,21  or  from  the  holder  of  record  title,22  as 
shall  be  necessary  to  prevent  payment  for  a  second 
time,  before  he  is  required  to  pay  over  the  money 
due  under  the  judgment. 

b.  Necessity  and  Sufficiency  of  Consideration 

Th?  release  of  a  judgment  must  be  supported  by 
a  consideration.  The  authorities  are  not  uniform  as  to 
whether  or  not  a  judgment  may  be  discharged  by  part 
payment. 

The  release  of  a  judgment  must  be  supported  by  j 


a  consideration,23  and,  where  there  is  a  valid  con- 
sideration, the  release  is  binding.24 

In  accordance  with  the  general  rule,  and  the  ex- 
ceptions thereto,  as  to  the  effect  of  partial  payment 
of  a  debt  or  demand  which  is  liquidated  or  certain 
and  which  is  due,  as  discussed  in  Accord  and  Satis- 
faction §§  26-35,  it  has  been  held  that,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  statute  providing  otherwise,25  a  judg- 
'ment  is  not  discharged  by  a  part  payment  under  a 
parol  agreement  that  such  payment  shall  be  accept- 
ed in  full  satisfaction,26  or  by  a  part  payment  and 
an  ordinary  written  receipt  "in  full/'27  and  that  the 
release  of  a  judgment  for  less  than  the  amount  due 
is  without  consideration  as  to  the  balance  and  should 
be  set  aside  pro  tanto.28  .  It  has  also  been- held, 
however,  that  a  judgment  is  discharged  on  part  pay- 
ment under  a  lawful  agreement  that  it  shall  be  ac-  • 
cepted  in  full  satisfaction,29  at  least  if  the  agree- 
ment is  evidenced  by  a  sealed  instrument  acknowl- 
edging satisfaction,30  or  if  the  partial  payment  is 
accompanied  by  an  additional  consideration,  either 
in  the  shape  of  a  thing  of  value  or  of  some  act  bur- 
densome or  inconvenient  to  the  debtor  and  possibly 
beneficial  to  the  creditor.31    Where  the  debtor  can- 
not pay  the  judgment  in  full  and  the  creditor  is  un- 
able to  enforce  collection,  the  acceptance  by  the 
creditor  of  a  sum  less  than  the  amount  due  under 
:he  judgment  in  full  settlement  thereof  has  been 
held  to  be  binding  on  him.32    If  the  part  payment 


that  actual  or  positive  fraud  be  pres 

ent. — Purcell  v.   Robertson,   8  S.E.2 

$81,  122  W.Va.  2S7. 

Fraud  held  not  shown 

Okl. — Davis  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.  for 
Insurance  on  Lives  &  Granting  An- 
nuities, 103  P.2d  3SO,  1S7  Okl.  436 

la  Cal.— Hogan  v.  Paddon,  267  P, 
392,  91  CaLApp.  606. 

What  constitutes  discharge  of  Judg- 
ment whereby  execution  thereon 
is  rendered  nullity  see  Executions 
§  11  c  (3). 

19.  Mo. — Hempstead   v.   Hempstead, 
32  Mo.  134. 

20.  N.Y. — Crosby    v.    Wood,    6    N.Y. 
369. 


21.  Utah. — Ludlow  v.  Colorado  Ani- 
mal By-Products  Co.,  137  P.2d  347, 
104  Utah  221. 

Belease  as  condition  of  payment  gen- 
erally 

Pa.— Dotterer  v.  Nothstein,   Com.Pl., 
20  Leh.L.J.  188. 

22.  Utah.— Ludlow  v.  Colorado  Ani- 
mal By-Products  Co.,  137  P.2d  347, 
104  Utah  221. 

23.  Ind.— Plunkett  v.  Black,  19  N.B. 
537,  117  IncL  14. 

34  C.J.  p  699  note  20. 
Consideration   for  agreement   to  re- 
lease see  infra  §  565. 


Tne  release  of  a  claim  that  has 
no  legal  value  is  not  consideration 
for  the  exoneration  of  a  judgment. — 
Huntingdon  County  v.  Spyker,  118  A. 
501,  274  Pa.  570. 

24.    U.S.— Eagle   Oil    Co.    v.    Sinclair 

Prairie    Oil    Co.,    D.C.Okl.,    24    F. 

Supp.  612,  affirmed,   C.C.A.,   105  F. 

2d  710. 
Iowa,— Warman  v.  Hat  Creek  Ranch 

Co.,  207  N.W.  532,  202  Iowa  198. 
Tenn. — Going  v.  Going,  8  Tenn.App. 

690. 

An  acknowledgment  of  indebted- 
ness given  by  a  third  person  to  a 
ludgment  creditor  in  consideration  of 
the  release  of  those  liable  under  the 
judgment  binds  the  assignees  of 
such  acknowledgment  so  that  they 
cannot  recover  on  the  judgment. — 
Allen  v.  National  Bank  of  Commerce 
&  Trust  Co.  of  Providence,  19  A.2d 
311,  66  R.I.  373. 

85.    N.C.— Boykin    v.    Buie,    13    S.E. 

879,  109  N.C.  501,  503. 
34  C.J.  p  699  note  29. 

26.  Mass. — Smith  v.  Johnson,  112  N 
E.  644,  224  Mass.  50. 

:4  C.J.  p. 6 99  note  30. 

27.  Colo. — Madeley  v.  White,   31  P. 
181,  2  Colo.App.  408. 

Me.— Bailey  v.  Day,  26  Me.  88.  | 

1038 


2a    Mo. — Kelley  v.  Kelley,  App.,  290 

S.W.  624. 
X.J. — Gillman   v.   Sorventino,   130   A. 

442,  101  N.J.Law  447,  affirmed  133 

A.    919,    102    N.J.Law    715— Berry 

Bros.  v.  Paul,  134  A.  119,   99  N.J. 

Eq.   558. 
Tex, — Oviett    v.    Warner,    Com.App., 

288  S.W.  434. 
Release  by  one  of  joint  creditors 

Such  release  given  by  one  of 
several  joint  "  judgment  creditors 
does  not  constitute  a  release  or  sat- 
isfaction of  the  Judgment  except  as 
to  the  amount  paid  therefor. — Rice  v. 
Barkman,  249  Ill.App.  127. 
>.  Mo.— City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Sen- 

ter    Commission    Co.,    124    S.W.2d 

1180,  343  Mo.  1075. 

f-    Pa- — Hendrick    v.    Thomas,    106 
Pa.  327. 
34  C.J.  p  700  note  32. 

31.  Iowa. — Stoutenberg  v.  Huisman. 
61  N.W.  917,  93  Iowa  213. 

34  C.J.  p  700  note  33. 

32.  La.— Reinecke  v.   Pelham,   App., 
199  So.  521. 

Finality  of  judgment 

Statutes  providing  that  an  agree- 
ment to  compromise,  sell,  or  cancel 

final  judgment  for  less  than  the 
amount  thereof  is  void  if  the  par- 
ties are  unaware  that  the  judgment 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  564 


is  made  by  a  third  person,33  or  if  it  is  in  pursuance 
of  a  compromise  of  a  dispute  respecting  the  effect 
of  the  judgment,34  such  payment  has  been  held  to 
discharge  the  judgment. 


§  564. 


Joint  Debtors 


At  common  law  a  release  given  to  one  of  several 
joint  Judgment  debtors  on  his.  paying  his  proportionate 
share  of  the  Judgment  or  on  other  consideration  re- 
leases the  Judgment  as  to  all. 

At  common  law  a  release  given  to  one  of  several 
joint  judgment  debtors  on  his  paying  his  proportion- 
ate share  of  the  judgment  or  on  other  considera- 
tion,36 or  under  seal,36  releases  the  judgment  as  to 
all,  unless  the  other  joint  debtors  consent  to  such 
separate  release.37  In  some  jurisdictions,  however, 
either  by  force  of  statute  or  the  settled  rulings  of 
the  courts,  it  is  competent  for  the  creditor  to  hold 
the  other  defendants  liable  on  the  judgment  after 
having  released  one.38 

In  the  absence  of  a  clear  indication  of  a  contrary 
intention  such  a  statute  will  not  be  held  to  be  retro- 
spective,39 and  therefore  does  not  apply  to  judg- 
ments rendered  before  it  became  effective;40  but 
such  a  statute  has  been  held  to  apply  to  judgments 
rendered  subsequent  to  the  statute  on  obligations  in- 


curred prior  thereto.41  Under  some  statutes,  a  re- 
lease or  discharge  in  favor  of  one  of  several  codebt- 
ors  in  solido  discharges  the  others,  unless  the  credi- 
tor expressly  reserves  his  rights  against  the  latter, 
but,  where  the  creditor  does  make  such  reservation, 
he  cannot  recover  from  the  remaining  debtors  more 
than  their  proportionate  share.42 

It  has  been  stated  that  the  judgment  creditor  may 
release  the  judgment  as  to  one  or  all  of  the  judg- 
ment debtors,  as  he  sees  fit,43  and  that  the  question 
whether  or  not  a  release  of  a  judgment  given  to  one 
of  several  joint  debtors  will  release  the  judgment  as 
to  the  others  depends  on  the  intention  of  the  par- 
ties as  shown  in  the  release.44  Thus,  where  the  in- 
strument shows  an  intention  to  limit  the  release  to 
one  or  more  of  the  joint  judgment  debtors  and  to 
proceed  for  the  balance  against  the  others,45  as 
where  the  instrument  releases  one  debtor  from  all 
liability  or  liens  "so  far  as  he  is  concerned/'46  or 
where  the  creditor  expressly  reserves  the  right  to 
enforce  the  judgment  as  to  the  others,47  it  has  been 
held  that  the  judgment  is  not  released  as  to  the  re- 
maining judgment  debtors;  but  according  to  some 
authorities  such  a  reservation  is  without  effect48 

In  some  jurisdictions,49  but  not  in  other  jurisdio 


has  become  final  do  not  invalidate 
an  agreement  under  which  a  judg- 
ment creditor  accepts  a  sum  less 
than  the  amount  due  under  the  judg- 
ment in  full  settlement  thereof, 
where  both  parties  know  that  the 
Judgment  is  final. — Reinecke  v.  Pel- 
ham,  supra. 

33.  Pa.— Fowler  v.  Smith,  25  A.  744, 
153  Pa.  639. 

34  C.J.  p  700  note  34. 

34.  Pa. — Hendrick    v.    Thomas,    106 
Pa.  327. 

34  C.J.  p  700  note  35. 

35.  U.S.— Barnett  v.  Conklin,  C.C.A. 
Mo.,  268  F.  177. 

34  C.JT.  p  700  note  36. 

Where  the  Judgment  is  not  a  joint 
judgment,  the  rule  is  inapplicable. — 
Whaley  v.  Matthews,  287  N.W.  205, 
136  Neb.  767. 

36.  Mass.— Brooks  v.  Neal,  112  N.B. 
78,  223  Mass.  467. 

37.  Ga. — Powell  v.  Davis,  60  Ga.  70. 

38.  Wash. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in. 
Johnson   v.    Stewart,    96   P.2d   473, 
476,  1  Wash.2d  439. 

34  C.J.  p  701  note  44. 

Agreement  to  release  see  infra  §  565. 

33.  Colo. — Ducey  v.  Patterson,  86  P. 
109,  37  Colo.  216,  119  Am.S.R.  284, 
9  L.R.A.,N.S.,  1066,  11  Ann.Cas. 
393. 

34  C.J.  p  701  note  45. 

40.  Colo. — Ducey  v.  Patterson,  su- 
pra. 


41.  D.C.— Bunch  v.  U.  S.,  40  App.D.C.  | 
156. 

42.  Louisiana  statute  construed 
N.T. — Moore  v.  Hanover  Nat.  Bank, 

80    N.T.S.   448,    80   App.Div.    67. 
34  C.J.  p  700  note  39  [b]. 

43.  Wash.— Robertson   v.   Wise,    279 
P.   106,  152  Wash.  624. 

44.  Tex.— Pennington     v.     Bevering, 
Civ.App.,    9    S.W.2d    401,    affirmed, 
Com.App.,  17  S.W.2d  772.      ' 

A  release  of  a  defendant  not  a 
Judgment  debtor,  expressly  providing 
that  those  defendants  who  are  Judg- 
ment debtors  are  not  thereby  re- 
leased, does  not  discharge  the  lat- 
ter from  all  liability,  where  the 
amount  paid  by  the  former  is  less 
than  the  amount  of  the  judgment, 
.since  the  intent  of  the  parties  must 
be  given  effect. — Kirby  v.  Fitzgerald, 
89  S.W.2d  408,  126  Tex.  411. 

45.  Tex.— Pennington    v.     Bevering, 
Com.App.,    17    S.W.2d    772— Pegues 
v.  Moss,  Civ.App.,  140  S.W.Sd  461, 

'  error  dismissed. 
Wash.— Johnson  v.  Stewart,  96  P.2d 

473,  1  Wash.2d  439. 
intent  shown 

A  release  as  to  particular  defend- 
ants, under  a  Joint  and  several  judg- 
ment, reciting  that  the  judgment  is 
satisfied  and  should  be  discharged 
as  against  the  named  defendants, 
shows  an  intention  to  release  only 
such  defendants,  without  relinquish- 
ing the  rights  and  lien  as  against 

1039 


the  other  defendants,  which  Inten- 
tion should  be  given  effect,  so  that 
the  release  should  not  be  extended 
for  the  benefit  of  a  third  party. — 
Johnson  v.  Stewart,  supra. 

46.  Tex. — Pennington     v.     Bevering, 
Com.App.,  17  S.W.2d  772. 

47.  111.— Van  Meter  v.   Gurney,  251 
IlLApp.  184.     • 

Tex. — Warner  v.  Northwestern  Fire 
&  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  Civ.App.,  281 
S.W.  1113,  reversed  on  other 
grounds  Oviett  v.  Warner,  Com. 
App.,  288  S.W.  434. 

34  C.J.  p  700  note  39. 

48.  Colo. — Ducey    v.    Patterson,    86 
P.   109,   37   Colo.    216,    109   Am.S.R. 
284,    9    L.R.A.,N.S.,    1066,    11    Ann. 
Cas.    393. 

34  C.J.  p  700  note  40. 

49.  U.S.— Barnett  v.  Conklin,  C.C.A. 
Mo.,    268   F.   177,   certiorari   denied 
41    S.Ct.    375,    255    U.S.    570,    65    L. 
Ed.  791. 

Colo. — Ducey    v.     Patterson,     86     P. 

109,  37  Colo.  216,  119  Am.S.R.  284, 

9    L.R.A.,N.S.,    1066,     11    Ann.Cas. 

393. 

Becelpt  of  sum  less  than  amount  of 
Judgment 

The  satisfaction  of  a  claim  against 
several  joint  tort-fesasors  for  a  sum 
less  than  the  amount  of  the  judg- 
ment thereafter  recovered  against 
all  has  been  held  not  to  discharge  the 
remaining  tort-feasor  under  such 
judgment— Gillespie  v.  Brewer, 
,  10  So.2d  197. 


565 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


tions,50  the  rule  expressed  in  the  foregoing  par- 
agraph as  to  the  effect  of  the  release  of  one  joint 
judgment  debtor  as  a  release  of  all  has  been  held 
applicable  where  the  judgment  was  rendered  in  an 
action  sounding  in  tort.  The  release  of  the  other 
joint  judgment  debtors  also  results  where  one  of 
the  debtors  is  released  by  operation  of  law,  as  in 
the  case  of  a  surety  relieved  from  liability  by  an 
unauthorized  extension  of  time  to  his  principal.51 

§  565.    Agreement  to  Release  or  Satisfy 

A  judgment  creditor  may  make  a  valid  and  bind- 
ing agreement  to  release  and  satisfy  the  judgment  on 
terms  other  than  receiving  payment  of  its  amount,  pro- 
vided there  is  consideration.  If  the  contract  is  execu- 
tory, the  Judgment  is  not  released  until  the  contract  is 
performed. 

Provided  there  is  consideration,52  a  judgment 
creditor  may  make  a  valid  and  binding  agreement, 
either  at  the  time  the  judgment  is  entered,53  or  sub- 


sequently,  to  release  and  satisfy  it  on  other  terms 
than  receiving  payment  of  its  amount,  as  where  he 
agrees  to  accept  real  or  personal  property,  services, 
the  transfer  of  another  debt,  or  an  exchange  of  se- 
curities.54 If  the  consideration  is  already  vested, 
the  agreement  itself  operates  in  law  as  a  satisfaction 
of  the  judgments;55  but,  if  the  contract  is  execu- 
tory, there  is  no  release  of  the  judgment  until  it  is 
performed,56  and,  while  the  creditor  cannot  rescind 
it  without  good  cause,57  the  debtor  is  bound  to  per- 
form its  conditions  punctually  and  fully,  in  default 
of  which  the  creditor  is  remitted  to  his  original 
rights  under  the  judgment,58  unless  punctual  per- 
formance is  waived.59 

It  has  further  been  held  that,  while  an  agreement, 
whereby  defendant  promises  to  discontinue  the  de- 
fense of  a  cause  and  plaintiff  promises  to  accept  a 
designated  amount  in  full  satisfaction  of  any  judg- 
ment thereafter  to  be  rendered,  is  supported  by  suf- 


Tort-feasor's    payment    as    reducing1 

judgment  against  other 
Joint  tort-feasor  is  entitled  to  have 
judgment  rendered  against  him  re- 
duced by  amount  paid  by  cotort- 
feasor  for  his  own  acquittance. — 
Black  v.  Martin,  292  P.  577,  88  Mont. 
256. 

50.  Ky.— Brown  v.   Little,   170   S.W. 
168,  160  Ky.  765. 

51.  Ind. — Gipson  v.  Ogden,   100  Ind. 
20. 

Va.— Baird  v.  Rice,  1  Call.  18,  5*  Va. 
18,  1  Am.D.  197. 

52.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 
Grant  v.  Reeves,  158  P.2d  479,  481, 
195  Okl.  414— Corpus  Juris  cited  in 
Home  Owners*  Loan  Corporation  v. 
Thornburgh,  106  P.2d  511,  512,  187 
Okl.  699. 

34  C.J.  p  701  note  48. 
Consideration    for    release    or    dis- 
charge see  supra  §   563  b. 
Release  of  judgment  on  partial  pay- 
ment see  supra  §  563  b. 
An  actual  forbearance  by  a  judg- 
ment  debtor  to   prosecute  an   unen- 
forceable   claim    against    the    judg- 
ment creditor  is  not  consideration  for 
the    latter's    agreement    to    satisfy 
the    judgment.— Corcanges    v.    Chil- 
dress,  Tex.Civ.App.,  280  S.W.  892. 
Consideration  held  ifig^fflffiftnt 
OkL — Home    Owners'   Loan   Corpora- 
tion v.  Thornburgh,   106  P.2d  511, 
187  Okl.  699. 
Tex.— Corcanges    v.    Childress,    Civ. 

App.,  280  S.W.  892. 
34  C.J.  p  701  note  48  [b], 

53.  N.C.— Haatfy  v.  Reynolds,  69  N. 
C.  5. 

Okl.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Grant 
,v.  Reeves,   158  P.2d  479,   481,   195 
Okl.  414. 

54.  Okl.— Corpus    Juris    Quoted    in 


Grant  v.  Reeves,  158  P.2d  479,  481, 

195  Okl.  414. 
34  C.J.  p  701  note  50. 
Acceptance  of  substitute  for  money 

as  payment  see  supra  §  552. 

federal  agricultural  conservation 
payments  received  by  a  judgment 
debtor  do  not  constitute  rent  with- 
in a  contract  whereby  the  judgment 
debtor  agrees  with  his  judgment 
creditor  to  convey  to  the  latter  cer- 
tain realty  and  rents  due  him  in  con- 
sideration of  the  creditor's  undertak- 
ing to  release  and  satisfy  the  judg- 
ment, so  that  the  judgment  creditor 
is  not  entitled  to  such  payments. — 
Cooke  v.  Harrington,  287  N.W.  837, 
227  Iowa  145. 

55.  Idaho. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Woods  v.  Locke,  289  P.  610,  612,  49 
Idaho  486. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Grant 
v.  Reeves,  158  P.2d  479,  481,  195 
Okl.  414. 

34  C.J.  p  701  note.  51. 

56.  Conn. — Corpus   Juris   quoted   in 
Kranke   v.    American   Fabrics   Co., 
151  A.  312,  314,  112  Conn.  58. 

Idaho, — Corpus      Juris     quoted      in 

Woods  v.  Locke,  289  P.  610,  612,  49 

Idaho  486. 
OkL — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Grant 

v.    Reeves,    158   P.2d  479,   481,   195 

Okl.  414. 
34  C.J.  p  701  note  52. 

A  judgment  is  an  "obligation;" 
within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  de- 
fining an  executory  accord  as  an 
agreement  embodying-  a  promise  to 
accept  at  some  future  time  a  stip- 
ulated performance  in  satisfaction  of 
any  claim,  cause  of  action,  contract, 
or  obligation,  etc.,  so  that,  where  a 
udgment  creditor  and  a  judgment 
debtor  enter  into  such .  agreement  to 
satisfy  the  judgment  and  the  debt- 
or performs  his  part  of  the  contract, 

1040 


the    creditor   is    bound    thereby   and 
cannot    recover   on    the   judgment. — 
Kingman   Hardware  Co.   v.   Connors, 
58   N.Y.S.2d    700,    186    Misc.    90. 
Compelling-  release 

TKe  court  should  compel  the  judg- 
ment creditor  to  release  or  satisfy 
the  judgment,  including  attorney's 
fees  and  costs,  where  the  judgment 
debtor  has  performed  his  part  of 
an  agreement  with  such  creditor  for 
the  release  and  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment. — Cooke  v.  Harrington,  287 
N.W.  837,  227  Iowa  145. 

57.  Conn. — Corpus  Juris    quoted   in 

Kranke    v.   American    Fabrics    Co., 

151    A.    312,    314,    112    Conn.    58. 
Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Grant 

v.   Reeves,   158   P.2d   479,    481,    195 

Okl.  414. 
34  C.J.  p  701  note  53. 

58.  Conn. — Corpus   Juris    quoted    in 

Kranke   v.    American   Fabrics    Co., 

151  A.  312,  314,  112  Conn.  58. 
Idaho. — Corpus      Juris      quoted      in 

Woods  v.  Locke,  289  P.  610,  612,  49 

Idaho  486. 
Okl.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Grant 

v.   Reeves,    158   P.2d   479,    481,    195 

Okl.  414. 

34  C.J.  p  701  note  54. 
Payment  in  installments 

(1)  A    judgment    debtor's    default 
under  an  installment   contract   com- 
promising the  judgment  restores  the 
Judgment    to    its    original    condition 
as    a    present   ,  obligation    less    the 
amount   paid. — Kranke   v.    American 
Fabrics  Co.,  151  A.  312,  112  Conn.  58. 

(2)  Other  holdings   see   34  C.J.   p 
701  note  54  [a]. 

59.  Mo. — Schwiete    v.     Guerre,     15  & 
S.W.    402,    175   Mo.App.    687. 

Okl.-H0orpus  Jnris  quoted  in  Grant 
v.  Reeves,  158  P.2d  479,  481,  195- 
Okl.  414. 


49    C.J.J3. 


JUDGMENTS 


566 


ficient  consideration,  if  the  other  elements  of  accord 
and  satisfaction  are  present,60  and  is  enforceable 
when  fully  executed,  even  though  it  is  made  prior  to 
the  rendition  of  judgment,61  such  agreement,  while 
executory,  cannot  be  enforced.62  The  successors  of 
a  judgment  creditor  need  not  secure  the  consent  of 
the  judgment  creditor's  attorneys  before  consummat- 
ing an  agreement  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  judg- 
ment, even  though  they  know  of  the  inclusion  of  the 
attorney's  fees  in  the  judgment.63 

Joint  judgment  debtors.  A  valid  agreement  be- 
tween a  judgment  creditor  and  one  of  several  joint 
judgment  debtors  calling  for  the  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment  as  to  all  debtors  is  binding,64  and  a  debt- 
or, not  a  party  to  the  agreement,  may  rely  thereon, 
although  such  agreement  is  a  contract  under  seal;65 
but  the  minds  of  the  parties  must  meet  as  to  the  re- 
lease of  all  the  debtors.66  However,  an  agreement 
by  one  joint  judgment  debtor  to  satisfy  a  judgment, 
if  executory,  does  not  release  the  remaining  debtor 
until  it  is  fully  performed.67 


§  566.    Set-Off  of  Judgment  against  Judgment 

a.  In  general 

b.  Power  of  court 

c.  Discretion  of  court 


one  judgment   may   be  set   off 


a.  In  General 

As    a    general    rule, 
against  another. 

As  a  general  rule,  one  judgment  may  be  set  off 
against  another,68  since  a  party  should  not  be  per- 
mitted to  collect  a  judgment  in  his  favor  leaving 
unpaid  a  judgment  against  him.69 

b.  Power  of  Court 

Courts. have  inherent  power  to  order  the  set-off  of 
mutual  judgments. 

The  courts  have  power  to  order  the  set-off  of  mu- 
tual judgments.70  This  power  formerly  belonged 
exclusively  to  courts  of  equity,71  and,  of  course,  still 
continues  in  them;72  but  it  has  long  been  recog- 
nized as  one  which  may  be  exercised  equally  by 
courts  of  law,  proceeding  on  equitable  principles.73 
Although  in  some  jurisdictions  a  set-off  of  judg- 


60.  Ala. — Zorn    v.    Lowery,    181    So. 
249,  236  Ala.  62. 

61.  Ala. — Zorn  v.  Lowery,  supra. 

62.  Ala. — Zorn  v.  Lowery,  supra. 

63.  Ind. — Berry  v.  State  Bank  of  Ot- 
terbein,    103   N.E.   922,   99   Ind.App. 
655. 

64.  D.G. — Fowler      v.      Washington 
Loan  &  Trust  Co.,   289   F.   622,   53 
App.D.C.  224. 

Release  or  discharge '  of  joint  judg- 
ment debtors  see  supra  §  564. 
Agreement  for  settlement  construed 
An  agreement  between  a  judgment 
creditor  and  one  of  several  joint 
judgment  debtors,  reciting  a  settle- 
ment of  the  judgment,  and  contain- 
ing an  agreement  by  the  creditor  to 
have  satisfaction  entered,  shows  that 
the  settlement  satisfied  the  judgment 
as  a  matter  of  fact  against  all  de- 
fendants, and  not  only  as  against  the 
defendant  who  was  a  party  to  the 
settlement. — Fowler  v.  Washington 
Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  supra. 

65.  D.C. — Fowler      y.      Washington 
Loan  &  'Trust  Co.,  supra. 

66.  Tex. — Mesa    Production    Co.    v/ 
SafCel,  37  S.W.2d  191. 

67.  Okl.— Grant  v.  Reeves,  158  P.2d 
479,  105  Okl.  414. 

68.  Neb.— Vanderlip   v.   Barnes,   163 
N.W.  856,  101  Neb.  573. 

N.T. — Neenan  v,  Woodside  Astoria 
Transp.  Co.,  184  N.B.  744,  261  N. 
T.  159 — D'Aprile  v.  Turner-Looker 

49O.J.S.-66 


Co.,  204  N.Y.S.  566,  209  App.Div. 

223,  reversed  on  other  grounds 

147  N.B.  15,  239  N.T.  427,  38  A.L.R. 

1426. 
Set-off  of  judgments  in  favor  of  or 

against  executor  or  administrator 

see  Executors  and  Administrators 

§  805. 

The  doctrine  of  equitable  set-off 
is  recognized  as  between  judgments. 
— Montalto  v.  Teckley,  54  N.B.2d  421, 
143  Ohio  St.  181. 

Offsetting  judgments  is  one  mode 
of  satisfaction. — Clancy  v.  Reid-Ward 
Motor  Co.,    170   S.W.2d   161,   237  Mo. 
App.  1000. 
Fro  tanto 

Where  in  the  same  judgment  the 
parties  are  condemned  to  pay  each 
other  money,  the  two  judgments 
should  be  made  to  offset  pro  tanto. 
— Luderbach  Plumbing  Co.  .v.  Its 
Creditors,  46  So.  359,  121  La.  371. 

69.  U.S. — Taylor  v.  Calmar  S.  S.  Co., 
D.C. Pa.,  35  F.Supp.  335. 

70.  Mich. — Corpus   Juris    quoted   in 
Franklin  Co.  v.  Buhl  Land  Co.,  250 
N.W.  299,  300,  264  Mich.  531. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Clancy  v. 
Reid-Ward  Motor  Co.,  170  S.W.2d 
161,  164,  237  *Mo. App.  1000. 

Okl.— Johnson  v.  Noble,  65  P.2d  502, 
179  Okl.  256,  121  A.L.R.  474— 
State  ex  rel.  Barnett  v.  Wood,  43  P. 
2d  136,  171  Okl.  341. 

Tex. — Citizens  Industrial  Bank  of 
Austin  v.  Oppenheim,  Civ.App.,  118 
S.W.2d  820,  error  dismissed. 

Wis. — Black  v.  Whitewater  Commer- 
cial &  Savings  Bank,  205  N.W.  404, 
188  Wis.  24. 

34  C.J.  p  701  note  57. 

1041 


71.  Ala. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ex 
parte  Cooper,  103  So.  474,  212  Ala. 
501. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Frank- 
lin Co.  v.  Buhl  Land  Co.,  250  N.W. 
299,  300,  264  Mich.  531. 

34  C.J.  p  702  note  58. 

72.  U.S.— Shinholt   v.    Angle,    C.C.A. 
Tex.,  90  F.2d  297. 

Ala.-7-Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Bx 
parte  Cooper,  103  So.  474,  212  Ala, 
501. 

Mich. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Frank- 
lin Co.  v.  Buhl  Land  Co.,  250  N.W. 
299,  300,  264  Mich.  581. 

Mo.— Helsteln  v.  Schmidt,  78  S.W.2d 
132,  229  Mo.App.  275. 

Ohio.— Montalto  v.  Yeckley,  54  N.B. 
2d  421,  143  Ohio  St.  181. 

34  C.J.  p  702  note  59.      * 

73.  Ala. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Ex 

parte  Cooper,  103  So.  474,  212 'Ala. 
501. 

Cal. — California  Cotton  Credit  Cor- 
poration v.  Superior  Court  in  and 
for  Madera  County,  15  P.2d  110  S, 
127  CaLApp.  472. 

Mich.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Frank- 
lin Co.  v.  Buhl  Land  Co.,  250  N.W. 
299,  300,  264  Mich.  631. 

N.J.— Kristeller  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
197  A.  17,  119  NJT.Law  570. 

Pa. — Pierce,  to  Use  of  Snipes,  v. 
Kaseman,  192  A.  105,  326  Pa,  280— 
Keystone  Nat  Bank  to  Use  of  Bal- 
mer  v.  Deamer,  Com.PL,  32  Berks 
Co.L.J.  124,  affirmed  Keystone  Nat 
Bank  of  Manheim,  now  to  Use  of 
Balmer  v.  Deamer,  18  A.2d  540,  144 
Pa,  Super.  52. 

34  C.J.  p  702  note  60. 


§  566 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


ments  is  authorized  by  statute,74  the  power  to  or- 
der it  does  not  fundamentally  depend  on  statutes, 
but  is  independent  of  them;75  it  rests  on  the  general 
and  inherent  jurisdiction  and  control  of  courts  over 
their  judgments,  process,  and  suitors.76 

The  recognized  remedy  at  law  by  motion  is  so 
convenient,  speedy,  and  inexpensive,  that  the  courts 
have  shown  no  disposition  to  restrict  unnecessarily 
the  exercise  of  this  power.77  In  difficult  or  com- 
plicated cases,  however,  a  court  of  law  will  not  act, 
but  will  remit  the  parties  to  equity,78  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  a  court  of  equity  with  relation  to  set-offs  be- 
ing more  extensive  than  that  of  common-law 
courts.™ 

Staying  proceedings  until  recovery  of  judgment. 
When  the  party  claiming  the  benefit  of  a  set-off  can- 
not avail  himself  of  the  right  in  the  trial  of  the  ac- 
tion, the  cause  may  be  continued  or  execution  stayed, 
if  justice  so  requires,  until  the  claimant  obtains 


judgment,  which  may  then  be  set  off  against  the 
other.** 

c.  Discretion  of  Court 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise,  the 
set-off  of  mutual  Judgments  Is  not  demandable  as  of 
right,  but  rests  In  the  discretion  of  the  court. 

Although  it  has  been  said  that,  while  a  court  of 
law  allows  the  setting  off  of  judgments  ex  gratia,81 
a  party  applying  to  a  court  of  equity  is  entitled  to  it 
as  a  matter  of  right,82  or  that  in  every  proper  case 
a  set-off  should  be  granted  as  of  right83  without  re- 
gard to  any  distinction  between  the  powers  of  courts 
of  law  and  courts  of  equity,84  the  rule  generally  fol- 
lowed is  that  the  set-off  of  judgment  against  judg- 
ment, unless  given  by  statute  as  a  matter  of  right,85 
is  not  demandable  as  of  course,  but  rests  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  court,86  regardless  of  the  procedure 
adopted  by  the  party  seeking  the  relief.87 

Such  discretion  is  not  an  arbitrary  one,  but  is 
controlled  by  established  principles  of  equity.88 


74.  Ga. — Odom  v.  Attaway,  162  S.E. 
279,  173  Ga.  883. 

^0. — Helstein  v.  Schmidt,  78  S.W.2d 

132,  229  Mo.App.  275. 
Tenn. — Mack  v.  Hugger  Bros.  Const. 

Co.,  10  Tenn.App.  402. 
34  C.J.  p  703  note  61. 

75.  Mich. — Corpus    Juris    quoted   in 
Franklin  Co.  v.  Buhl  Land  Co.,  250 
N.W.  299,   300,  264  Mich.  531. 

Mo.— Helstein  v.  Schmidt,  78  S.W.2d 

132,  229  Mo.App.  275. 
Tex. — Citizens    Industrial    Bank     of 
Austin  v.  Oppenheim,  Civ.App.,  118 
S.W.2d   820,    error  '  dismissed. 
\Vis. — Black  v.  Whitewater  Commer- 
cial  Savings   Bank,   205   N.W.  404, 
188  Wis.  24. 
34  C.J.  p  703  note  62. 

"The  power  of  the  court  to  order  a 
set-off 'of  judgments  does  not  rest 
upon  statutes;  it  rests  upon  the 
common  law." — Goldman  v.  Noxon 
Chemical  Products  Co.,  175  N.B.  67, 
68,  274  Mass.  526. 
Chancery  court 

Jurisdiction  to  set  off  judgments 
against  each  other  exists  in  chancery 
court  independent  of  statute  and  is 
inherent  in  the  court,  but  the  power 
exists  to  apply  the  statutes  in  proper 
cases. — Montalto  v.  Yeckley,  54  N.E. 
2d  421,  143  Ohio  St  181,  affirming  57 
N.E.2d  144,  73  Ohio  App.  480. 

76.  Mich. — Corpus   Juris    quoted   in 
Franklin  Co.  v.  Buhl  Land  Co.,  250 
N.W.  299,   300,  264  Mich.  531. 

Neb.— Boyer  v.  Clark,  3  Neb.  161, 
modified  on  other  grounds  10  N.W. 
709,  12  Neb.  215,  41  Am.Il.  763. 

N.J.— -Kristeller  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
197  A.  17,  119  N.J.Law  570. 

34  C.J.  p  703  note  63. 

77.  Mich. — Corpus   Juris    quoted    In 
Franklin  Co.  v.  Buhl  Land  Co.,  250 
N.W.  299,  300,  264  Mich,  531. 


Minn. — Temple  v.  Scott,  3  Minn.  419. 
Procedure  to  compel  set-off  see  infra 

§  569. 
7a    W.Va.— Walker  v.  Gamble,  82  S. 

E.  1014,  74  W.Va.  706. 
34  C.J.  p  704  note  66. 

79.  Cal.— Hobbs  v.  Duff,  23  Gal.  596. 
34  C.J.  p  704  note  67. 

80.  N.H.— Hovey  v.  Morrill,  61  N.H. 
9,  60  Am.R.  315. 

34  C.J.  p  704  note  68. 

81.  Ala.— -Scott  v.  Rivers,  1  Stew.  & 
P.  24,  21  Am.D.  646. 

N.Y. — Simson  v.  Hart,  14  Johns.   63. 

82.  Cal.— California     Cotton    Credit 
Corporation   v.    Superior  Court    in 
and   for  Madera   County,    15   P.2d 
1108,  127  CaLApp.  472. 

34  C.J.  p  704  note  70. 

83.  Cal. — Haskins  v.  Jordan,   55   P. 
786,  123  Cal.  157. 

84.  Cal. — Haskins  v.  Jordan,  supra. 

85.  Ala. — Ex  parte   Cooper,   103   So. 
474,  212  Ala.  501. 

80.  Kan. — Heston  v.  Finley,  236  P. 
841,  118  Kan.  717. 

Mass. — Old  Colony  Trust  Co.  v.  Na- 
tional Non-Theatrical  Motion  Pic- 
ture Bureau,  174  N.E.  723,  274 
Mass.  377. 

Mo.— Helstein  v.  Schmidt,  78  S.W. 
2d  132,  229  Mo.App.  275. 

Neb.— Boyer  v.'  Clark,  3  Neb.  161, 
modified  on  other  grounds  10  N.W. 
709,  12  Neb.  215,  41  Am.R.  763. 

N.J.— Needles  v.  Dougherty,  34  A.2d 
396,  124  N.J.Bq.  108. 

N.T. — Neenan  v.  Woodside  Astoria 
Transp.  Co.,  184  N.E.  744,  261  N. 
Y.  159. 

Ohio.— Montalto  v.  Yeckley,  54  N.E.2d 
421,  143  Ohio  St.  181. 

OkL— Wldick  v.  Phillips  Petroleum 
Co.,  70  P.2d  474,  180  OkL  432— 

1042 


Johnson    v.    Noble,    65     P.2d    502. 

179  Okl.  256,  121  A.L.R.  474— State 

ex   rel.   Barnett  v.  Wood,   43    P.2d 

136,  171   OkL  341. 
Pa.— Kisthardt,  to  Use  of  Puhak  v. 

Betts,    183   A.    923,    321    Pa.    270. 
Wash. — Spokane  Sec.  Finance  Co.  v. 

Bevan,  20  P.2d  31,  172  Wash.  418. 
34  C.J.  p  704  note  74. 
Judicial  policy 

Judgments  are  set  off  as  a  matter 
of  judicial  policy,  and  not  as  a  mat- 
ter of  right. — Black  v.  Whitewater 
Commercial  &  Savings  Bank,  205  N. 
W.  404,  188  Wis.  24. 

No  absolute  right  to  set  off  judg- 
ments exists,  but  is  a  matter  of 
grace,  and  whether  set-off  should  be 
decreed  rests  in  sound  discretion  of 
court  to  which  application  is  made. 
— Black  v.  Whitewater  Commercial  & 
Savings  Bank,  supra. 

"Relief  in  equity  by  setting  off  one 
judgment  against  another  is  granted, 
not  of  right,  but  in  the  exercise  of 
discretion." — Beecher  v.  Peter  A. 
Vogt  Mfg.  Co.,  125  N.E,  831,  833,  227 
N.Y.  468— National  Chautauqua 
County  Bank  of  Jamestown  v.  Reyn- 
olds, 299  N.Y.S.  263,  265,  164  Misc. 
653,  affirmed  4  N.Y.S.2d  176,  254  App. 
Div.  646. 

87.  N.Y. — De  Camp  v.  Thomson,   54 
N.E.   11,   159  N.Y.  444,   70  Am.S.R. 
570. 

34  C.J.  p  705  note  75. 
Procedure   to   obtain   set-off  see   in- 
fra §  569. 

88.  N.J.— Kristeller    v.     First    Nat. 
Bank,   197  A.   17,  119  N.J.Law  570 
— Needles    v.    Dougherty,    34    A.2d 
396,  134  KJ.EQ.  108. 

N.Y. — National  Chautauqua  County 
Bank  of  Jamestown  v.  Reynolds, 
299  N.Y.S.  263,  164  Misc.  .653,  af- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  568 


Therefore  a  set-off  should  be  allowed  only  when, 
in  view  of  all  the  circumstances,  equity  and  good 
conscience  require  it  to  be  made,89  substantial  jus- 
tice will  be  promoted  thereby,90  and  the  rights  and 
interests  of  third  persons  will  not  be  infringed91 
Thus  even  when  the  set-off  may  legally  be  made,  if 
the  court  sees  that  injustice  will  be  done  by  granting 
the  order  of  set-off,  it  will  be  refused,92  as  where  a 
third  person  is  the  equitable  owner  of  the  judgment 
which  would  be  diminished  thereby,93  or  where  it 
would  infringe  on  any  other  right  of  equal  grade,94 
or  where  it  would  prejudice  the  rights  of  a  bona  fide 
assignee  of  the  judgment95  or  of  the  demand  on 
which  one  of  the  judgments  was  rendered.96  % 


§  567. 


Persons  Entitled  to 


To   entitle   a   person   to   have  one  Judgment  set  off 


against    another,    he    must    be   the    real    and    beneficial 
owner  of  the  judgment. 

To  entitle  a  person  to  have  one  judgment  set  off 
against  another,  he  must  be  the  real  and  beneficial 
owner  of  the  judgment;97  it  is  not  enough  that  it 
stands  in  his  name,  if  it  is  for  the  use  of  another.98 
On  the  other  hand,  equitable  owners  of  judgments 
may  set  them  off,  although  other  parties  appear  as 
the  nominal  plaintiffs  or  defendants.99 

§  568.    Judgments  Subject  to 

a.  In  general 

b.  Judgments  of  different  courts 

c.  Judgments  between  different  parties 

d.  Judgments  for  costs 

e.  Assigned  judgments 


firmed  4  N.Y.S.2d  176,  254  App.Div. 
646. 

Okl. — Widick  v.  Phillips  Petroleum 
Co.,  70  P.2d  474,  180  Okl.  432— 
Johnson  v.  Noble,  65  P.2d  502,  179 
Okl.  256,  121  A.L.R.  474— State  ex 
rel.  Barnett  v.  Wood,  43  P.2d  136, 
171  Okl.  341. 

ra.— Kisthardt,  to  Use  of  Puhak  v. 
Betts,  183  A.  923,  321  Pa,  270. 

34  C.J.  p  705  note  76. 

Other  statements 

(1)  Setting    off    of    judgments    is 
governed  by  equitable  considerations. 
— Heston  v.   Finley,   236   P.   841,   118 
Kan.  717. 

(2)  Power  to  order  set-off  of  Judg- 
ments must  be  exercised  in  accord- 
ance with  general  principles  of  jus- 
tice and  equity. — Goldman  v.  Noxon 
Chemical  Products  Co.,  175  N.B.   67, 
274  Mass.  526. 

(3)  Court's  discretion  must  be  ex- 
ercised   in    accordance    with    sound 
principles    of    equity    jurisprudence. 
— Montalto    v.    Yeckley,     54    N.B.2d 
421,  143  Ohio  St.  181. 

(4)  Matter    of    set-off    of    mutual 
Judgments    is   question  of   equitable 
remedy   addressed    to    sound   discre- 
tion of  trial  court. — Citizens  Indus- 
trial Bank  of  Austin  v.  Oppenheim, 
Tex.Civ.App.,    118    S.W.2d   820,    error 
dismissed. 

89.  pa. — Pierce,  to  Use  of  Snipes,  v. 
Kaseman,  192  A.  105,  326  Pa.  280— 
Dahl  v.  Auberle,  4  Pa.Super.  627, 
40  Wkly.N.C.  386. 

Tex. — Citizens    Industrial     Bank    of 
Austin  v.  Oppenheim,  Civ.App.,  118 
S.W.2d   820,   error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  705  note  77. 
Effect  of   constitution,  or  statutes 

A  set-off  should  be  allowed,  when 
justice  requires  it,  unless  the  court 
is  compelled  to  refuse  it  in  obedi- 
ence to  some  provision  of  the  consti- 
tution or  statutes. — Rookard  v.  At- 
lanta &  C.  Air  Line  R.  Co.,  71  S.B. 
992,  89  S.C.  371. 


Equities   existing1  at  time   of  appli- 
cation 

Generally  countervailing  equities 
to  be  considered  should  be  equities 
existing  at  time  application  for  set- 
off  of  judgment  is  made. — Black  v. 
Whitewater  Commercial  &  Savings 
Bank,  205  N.W.  404,  188  Wis.  24. 
Intention  to  appeal 

It  has  been  held  that  it  is  no 
cause  for  refusing  a  set-off  that  one 
party  intends  to  appeal  from  the 
judgment  against  him. — Sowles  v. 
Witters,  C.C.Vt.,  40  P.  413. 

90.  N.J. — Needles   v.   Dougherty,    34 
A.2d  396,   134  N.J.Eq.   198. 

Okl.— Widick  v.  Phillips  Petroleum 
Co.,  70  P.2d  474,  180  Okl.  432. 

Pa.— State  Mutual  Benefit  Society  v. 
Jackson,  13  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  167, 
20  DeLCo.  192,  78  Pittsb.Leg.J. 
159. 

S.C.— Rookard  v.  Atlanta  &  C.  Air 
Line  R.  Co.,  71  S.B.  992,  89  S.C. 
371. 

34  C.J.  p  705  note  78. 

91.  Kan.— -Heston  v.  Finley,    236  P. 
841,  US  Kan.  717. 

Tex, — Citizens  Industrial  Bank  of 
Austin  v.  Oppenheim,  Civ.App.,  118 
S.W.2d  820,-  error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  705  note  79. 

92.  N.J. — Needles   v.  Dougherty,    34 
A.2d   396,  134  N.J.Bq.   108. 

Okl.— Widick  v,  Phillips  Petroleum 
Co.,  70  P.2d  474,  180  Okl.  432. 

pa. — state  Mutual  Benefit  Soc.  v. 
Jackson,  13  Papist.  &  Co.  167, 
20  DeLCo,  192,  78  Pittsb.Leg.J. 
159. 

S.C.— Rookard  v.  Atlanta  &  C.  Air 
Line  R.  Co.,  71  S.B.  992,  89  S.C. 
371. 

Tex. — Cocke  v.  Wright,  Com.App.,  39 
S.W.2d  590. 

TKfts, — Black  v.  Whitewater  Commer- 
cial &  Savings  Bank,  205  N.W.  404 
188  Wis,  24. 

34  C.J.  p  706  note  80. 


External  facts 

The  right  of  set-off  will  be  denied 
where  facts,  external  to  the  judg- 
ments themselves,  make  a  set-off  in- 
equitable.— Citizens  Industrial  Bank 
of  Austin  v.  Oppenheim,  Tex.Civ.- 
App.,  118  S.W.2d  820,  error  dismissed 
— Cocke  v.  Wright,  Tex.Civ.App.,  23 
S.W.2d  449,  affirmed,  Com. App.,  39 
S.W.2d  590. 

93.  S.C.— Meador  v.   Rhyne,  45   S.C. 
L.  631. 

94.  Okl.— Widick  v.   Phillips   Petro- 
leum Co.,  70  P.2d  474,  180  Okl.  432. 

Tex. — Citizens  Industrial  Bank  of 
Austin  v.  Oppenheim,  Civ.App.,  118 
S.W.2d  820,  error  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  706  note  82. 

Bffect  of  attorney's  lien  on  right  to 
set-off  see  Attorney  and  Client  § 
232. 

Judgment  against  township 

Bank's   judgment   on  counterclaim 

on   township's   overdue   improvement 

note    could    not    be    set    off   against 

judgment  against  bank  for  amount  of 

township's  general  deposit  account. 
•Township  Committee  of  Piscata- 

way  Tp.  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  168  A. 

757,   111  N.J.Law  412,   90  A.L.R.  423. 

95.  Okl. — State    ex    rel.    Barnett    v. 
Wood,    43    P.2d   136,    171    Okl.    341. 

34  C.J.  p  706  note  84. 

96.  Mass. — Makepeace  v.   Coates,    8 
Mass.  451. 

S.C.— Meador  v.  Rhyne,  45  S.C.L.  631. 

97.  Cal.— Harrison  v.  Adams,  128  P. 
2d  9,  20  Cal.2d  646. 

KT.j. — Needles  v.  Dougherty,  34  A.2d 

396,  134  N.J.Bq.  108. 
34  C.J.  p  706  note  93. 

98.  S.C.— Meador  v.  Rhyne,  45  S.C.L. 
631. 

99.  Cal. — Harrison  v.  Adams,  128  P. 
2d  9,  20  Cal.2d  646. 

Ga. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Sheffield 
v.  Preacher,  165  S.B.  742,  743,  175 
Ga,  719,  84  A.L.R.  1159. 

34  C.J.  p  706  note  95. 


1043 


§  568 

a.  In  General 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


In  order  that  a  Judgment  may  be  set  off  against 
another  judgment,  it  must  be  a  valid,  subsisting,  and 
enforceable  Judgment,  consisting  of  a  final  adjudication 
for  the  payment  of  money. 

In  order  that  a  judgment  may  be  set  off  against 
another  judgment,  it  must  be  a  valid,1  subsisting,2 
and  enforceable3  judgment,  consisting  of  a  final  ad- 
judication4 for  the  payment  of  money.5  If -the  two 
judgments  meet  these  requirements,  the  nature  of 
the  respective  claims  on  which  they  were  recov- 
ered,6 the  question  whether  such  claims  could  have 
been  set  off,7  and  the  manner  in  which  the  judg- 
ments were  recovered8  are  immaterial,  as  is  also, 
except  in  certain  cases,9  the  fact  that  an  execution 
has  been  issued. on  one  or  both  of  the  judgments.10 

Judgments  in  tort.  Two  judgments  recovered  in 
actions  of  tort  may  be  set  off.11  Also  there  may 


be  a  set-off  of  a  judgment  recovered  in  an  action  ex 
contractu  and  one  recovered  in  an  action  ex  de- 
licto.12  The  set-off  may  be  refused,  however,  if  it 
is  equitable  to  do  so,18  as  where  the  party  asking 
the  set-off  is  the  tort-feasor  and  the  tort,  for  which 
judgment  was  recovered,  is  of  a  character  which 
implies  an  intent  to  injure,14  or  where  the  exemp- 
tion laws  would  be  defeated.15 

b.  Judgments  of  Different  Courts 

As  a  general  rule,  where  the  party  seeking  the  set- 
off  moves  for  it  in  the  court  where  the  Judgment  r gainst 
himself  subsists,  such  court  has  power  to  order  the 
Judgment  of  another  court  set  off  against  its  own. 

As  a  general  rule,  where  the  party  seeking  the 
set-off  moves  for  it  in  the  court  where  the  judg- 
ment against  himself  subsists,  such  court  has  power 
to  order  the  judgment  of  another  court  set  off 
against  its  own,16  even  though  it  was  recovered  in 


1.  Utah. — Cox  v.   Dixie   Power  Co., 
18  P.2d  916,  81  Utah  94. 

34  C.J.  p  706  note  96. 

2.  S.D.— Citizens'  State  Bank  of  Ar- 
lington v.  Security  Inv.  Co.,  246  N. 
TV.  652,  61  S.D.  159. 

34  C.J.  p  707  note  97. 

3.  Mich. — Franklin  Co.  v.  Buhl  Land 
Co.,   250   N.W.   299,    264   Mich.   531. 

Wash. — Reichlin  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 

51  P.2d  380,  184  Wash.  304. 
34  C.J.  p  707  note  98. 
Failure  to  issue  execution 

The  fact  that  execution  had  not 
been  issued  within  one  year  on  judg- 
ments rendered  against  present  de- 
fendant as  garnishee  in  former  suit 
did  not  prevent  their  allowance  as 
offsets. — Watts  v.  Gibson,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  33  S.W.2d  777. 

4.  s.D. — Lee   v.    Sioux  Palls   Motor 
Co.,  274  N.W.  614,  65  S.D.  401. 

Wash.— Reichlin  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
51  P.2d  380,   184  Wash..  304— Spo- 
kane   Sec.    Finance   Co.   v.   Bevan, 
20  P.2d  31,  172  Wash.  418. 
34  C.J.  p  707  note  .99. 
Time  for  appeal 

A  judgment  on  which  execution 
has  been  issued,  without  being  stay- 
ed, and  from  which  no  appeal  has 
been  taken,  although  time  therefor 
has  not  yet  expired,  may  be  set  off 
against  another  Judgment. — Haskins 
v.  Jordan,  55  P,  786,  123  Cal.  157. 

5.  Mich.— Franklin  Co.  v.  Buhl  Land 
Co.,   250  N.W.   299,   264   Mich.  531. 

Wash. — Reichlin  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 

51   P.2d   380,    184   Wash.    304. 
34  C.J.  p  707  note  1. 

6.  N.H.— Shapley  v.  Bellows,  4  N.H. 
347. 

34  C.J.  p  707  note  2. 
Set-off    of    alimony    judgment    see 
Divorce  §  251  c  (2)  (f). 

7.  Mich.— Franklin  Co.  v.  Buhl  Land 
Co.,  250  N.W.   299,   264   Mich.   531. 


Wash.— Reichlin  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 

51  P.2d  380,  184  Wash.  304. 
34  C.J.  p  707  note  3. 

8.  Ala. — Haskins   v.    Jordan,    55    P. 
7£6,  123  Cal.  157. 

34  C.J.  p  707  note  4. 

9.  R.I. — Hopkins  v.   Drowne,   41   A. 
1010,  21  R.I.  80. 

34  C.J.  p  707  note  5. 

10.  Wis. — Torton  v.   Milwaukee,    L. 
S.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  21  N.W.  516,  23  N. 
W.  401.  62  Wis.  367. 

34  C.J.  p  707  note  6. 

11.  N.T. — Neenan   v.   Woodside  As- 
toria   Transp.    Co.,    184    N.E.    744, 
261  N.T.   159 — Simson  v.  Hart,   14 
Johns.  63. 

12.  U.S.— Turner    v.     Dickey,     D.C. 
Tenn.,  3  F.Supp.  360,  affirmed,  C.C. 
A.,  Dickey  v.  Turner,  64  F.2d  1012. 

111.— State  Bank  of  St  Charles  v. 
Burr,  14  N.B.2d  611,  295  IlLApp. 
15. 

Mich.— Franklin    Co.    v.    Buhl    Land 
Co.,   250  N.W.   299,  264  Mich.   531. 
Pa. — Pierce,    to    Use    of    Snipes,    v. 
Kaseman,  192  A.  105,   326  Pa.  280. 
Wash.— Reichlin  v.  First  Nat  Bank, 
51  P.2d  380,  184  Wash.  304— Spo- 
kane Sec.  Finance  Co.  v.  Bevan,  20 
P.2d  31,  172  Wash.  418. 
Wis. — Black  v.  Whitewater  Commer- 
cial &  Savings  Bank,  205  N.W.  404, 
188  Wis.  24. 
34  C.J.  p  708  note  9. 

Judgments  arising  from  same  sub- 
ject matter  may  be  set  off,  even 
though  one  is  based  on  contract  and 
the  other  on  tort. — Dalton  State 
Bank  v.  Bckert,  282  N.W.  490,  135 
Neb.  500. 
Particular  judgments 

(1)  Liability  on  money  judgment 
for  criminal  conversation  and  alien- 
ation of  affections  may  be  set  off 
against  liability  on  judgment  for 
money  due  under  notes. — Turner  v. 

1044 


Dickey,  D.C.Tenn.,  3  F.Supp.  360, 
affirmed,  C.C.A.,  Dickey  v.  Turner,  64 
F.2d  1012. 

(2)  Judgment  for  landlord  for  rent 
may  be  set  off  against  judgment  of 
tenant  for  conversion  of  fixtures  by 
landlord. — Franklin  Co.  v.  Buhl  Land 
Co.,  250  N.W.  299,  264  Mich.  531. 

(3)  Set-off    of    judgment    in    con- 
tract  against  judgment  in  tort  for 
negligence   not  involving  willful   in- 
jury is  generally  allowed. — Pierce,  to 
Use   of  Snipes,  v.  Kaseman,   192  A. 
105,  326  Pa.  280. 

13.  U.S.— Reed    v.    Smith,    C.C.N.J., 
158  F.  889,  891. 

Wis. — Black  v.  Whitewater  Commer- 
cial &  Savings  Bank,  205  N.W.  404, 
188  Wis.  24. 

14.  Pa. — Leitz    v.    Hohman,     56    A. 
868,  207  Pa.  289,  99  Am.S.R.  791— 
Ream     v.     Nickolls,     Com.PL,     85 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  813. 

34  C.J.  p  708  note  11. 

15.  Cal.— California    Cotton     Credit 
Corporation   v.    Superior   Court    in 
and  for   Madera  County,    15    P.2d 
1108,  127  CaLApp.  472. 

Kan. — Treat    v.   Wilson,    70    P.    892, 

65  Kan.  819. 
Tex. — Dallas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 

of   Dallas   v.   Lancaster,    Civ.App., 

122  S.W.2d  659,  error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  708  note  12. 
Judgment  for  seizure  of  exempt  prop- 
erty 

Judgment  based  on  ordinary  debt 
cannot  be  set  off  against  judgment 
obtained  for  value  of  exempt  person- 
al property  wrongfully  seized  and 
sold  on  execution  or  attachment, 
since  the  latter  judgment  takes  the 
place  of  the  exempt  property. — 
Whiteday  v.  Roberts,  43  P.2d  422, 
171  Okl.  466. 

16.  .Ga. — Piedmont  Sav.   Co.  v.  Da- 
vis,  190   S.B.  386,   55  Ga.App.  386. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  568 


an  inferior  court17  or  in  another  state,18  or  even 
though  one  judgment  is  in  a  state  court  and  the 
other  in  a  federal  court.19  In  some  jurisdictions 
resort  to  equity  is  necessary  to  obtain  a  set-off  of 
judgments  which  have  been  recovered  in  different 
courts.20 

c.  Judgments  "between  Different  Parties 

In  order  that  one  Judgment  may  properly  be  set 
off  against  another,  it  is.  necessary  that  there  should  be 
mutuality  of  parties,  unless  there  are  circumstances 
making  it  equitable  to  set  off  judgments  in  which  the 
parties  are  not  the  same. 

In  order  that  one  judgment  may  properly  be  set 
off  against  another,  it  is  necessary  that'  there  should 
be  mutuality  of  parties,21  unless  there  are  peculiar 
circumstances  making  it  equitable  to  set  off  judg- 
ments in  which  the  parties  are  not  the  same,22  as 
when  the  difference  in  parties  is  with  respect  to  the 
nominal  parties,  and  not  the  real  parties  in  inter- 
est.23 If  there  are  joint  plaintiffs  or  defendants  in 
one  of  the  judgments,  it  cannot  ordinarily  be  set  off 
against  a  judgment  in  which  only  one  of  them  is 
concerned,24  without  the  consent  of  the  persons  who 
arc  parties  to  only  one  of  the  judgments,25  although 
some  of  the  authorities  permit  it  where  each  of  the 


joint  defendants  is  liable  for  the  whole  amount  of 
the  judgment;26  and  the  set-off  is  proper  where  one 
of  them  is  liable  only  in  the  character  of  a  surety,27 
or  is  a  nominal  or  formal  party,28  or  where  the 
owner  of  the  judgment  held  singly  is  insolvent,29 
or  even  where  one  of  the  owners  of  the  joint  judg- 
ment is  insolvent,30  provided  there  is  an  apportion- 
ment of  interest  between  him  and  the  other  own- 
er.31 

Judgments  in  individual  and  representative  capac- 
ities. A  judgment  against  a  person  in  his  individual 
capacity  will  not,  as  a  general  rule,  be  set  off 
against  a  judgment  in  his  favor  in  his  representa- 
tive capacity;32  but  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the 
applicant  against  a  cestui  que  trust  has  been  set  off 
against  a  judgment  recovered  by  the  trustee  against 
such  applicant.33 

d.  Judgments  for  Costs 

A  judgment  for  costs  may  be  set  off  against  a  Judg: 
ment  recovered  by  the  adverse  party. 

A  judgment  for  costs  may  be  set  off  against  a 
judgment  recovered  by  the  adverse  party,34  pro- 
vided the  costs  are  liquidated  or  taxed  at  the  time,35 
they  belong  to  the  party  seeking  the  set-off,36  he 


Pa. — Pierce,    to    Use    of    Snipes    v. 

Kaseman,  192  A.  105,  326  Pa.  280. 
34  C.J.  p  7u8  note  18. 
Judgment  transferred  from  another 
county 

Set-off  being  merely  form  of  sat- 
isfaction, judgment  may  be  set  oft 
against  judgment  transferred  from 
another  county,  satisfaction  of  judg- 
ments, as  distinguished  from  ques- 
tions of  their  validity,  being  within 
control  of  court  of  county  to  which 
judgment  was  transferred. — Pierce, 
to  Use  of  Snipes  v.  Kaseman,  supra. 

17.  N.Y.— Kimball  v.  Hunger,  2  Hill 
364. 

34  C.J.  p  708  note  19. 

18.  Minn.— Barnes  v.  Verry,  191  N. 
W.  589,  154  Minn.  252. 

34  C.J.  p  708  note  20. 

19.  U.S.— Reed    v.    Smith,    C.C.N.J., 
158  F.  889,  890. 

34  C.J.  p  709  note  21. 

20.  Ark. — Weast      v.     Wickersham, 
195   S,W.   685,   136  Ark.  541. 

34  C.J.  p  709  notes  22,  23. 

21.  U.S. — U.   S.  ex  rel.  Johnson  v. 
Morley   Const.    Co.,    C.C.A.N.Y.,    98 
F.2d   781,    certiorari  denied  Mary- 
land Casualty  Co.  v.  U.  S.  for  Use 
and  Benefit  of  Harrington,  59  S.Ct 
244,  305  U.S.  651,  83  L.Ed  421. 

Ala.— Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.    v. 

Echols,  105  So.  651,  213  Ala,  490. 
Kan.— Heston  v.  Finley,  236  P.  841, 

118  Kan.  717. 
Neb.— Boyer   v.    Clark,    3   Neb.    161, 

modified  on  -  other  grounds   10  N. 


W.  709,  12  Neb.  215,  41  Am.R.  763. 

N.H.— -Rowe  v.  Langley,  48  N.H.  391. 

N.Y.— Hamilton  v.  Royal  Indemnity 
Co.,  209  N.Y.S.  670,  124  Misc.  744— 
Broadway  Bookbindery  v.  Oulfree 
Printing  Corporation,  199  N.Y.S. 
194. 

Okl — Johnson  v.  Noble,  65  P.2d  502, 
179  Okl.  256,  121  A.L..R.  474— Cor- 
pus Juris  cited  in  State  ex  rel. 
Barnett  v.  Wood,  43  P.2d  136,  17 
Okl.  341. 

34  C.J.  p  709  note  25. 

22.  Idaho. — Richards  v.   Jarvis,   2*58 
P.  370,  44  Idaho  403. 

34  C.J.  p  709  note  26. 

23.  Me.— Collins  v.  Campbell,  53  A, 
S37,  97  Me.  23,  94  Axn.S.R.  458. 

34  C.J.  p  709  note  27. 

24.  Mass. — Simmons  v.  Shaw,  52  N. 
E.  1087,  172  Mass.  516. 

34  C.J.  p  709  note  28. 

25.  Cal.— Corwin   v.   Ward,    35   Cal. 
195,  95  Am,D.  93. 

Me. — Collins  v.  Campbell,  53  A.  £37, 
97  Me.  23,  94  AmS.R.  458. 

26.  S.D. — Sweeney  v.   Bailey,   64  N. 
.    W,  1&8,  7  S.D.  404. 

34C.J;  p  ,709  note  30. 

27.  Mich.— Bennett  v.  Hanley,  51  N. 
W.  88-5,  91  Mich.  143. 

34  C.J.  p  709  note  31. 

28.  Ohio.— Pike   v.    Sheve,    11    Ohio 
Dec.   (Reprint)   891,   30  Cinc.L.Bul. 
305. 

Tenn. — Rutherford  v.  Qrabb,  5  Yerg. 
112.. 

1045 


29.  Minn.— Hunt  v.  Conrad,  50  N.W. 
614,  47  Minn.  557,  14  L.R.A.  '512. 

N.Y.— Simson  v.  Hart,  14  Johns.  63. 

30.  Mo. — Fulkerson  v.  Davenport,  70 
Mo.  541. 

31.  Mo. — Fulkerson     v.     Davenport, 
supra. 

32.  Ga.— Daniel  v.  Bush,  4  S.E.  271, 
80  Ga.  218. 

34  C.J.  p  709  note  36. 

33.  Cal.— Hobbs  v.  Duff,  $3  Cal.  696. 

34.  Ark.— Sims  v.   Miller,   236   S.W. 
828,  151  Ark.  577. 

Colo. — Wallace  Plumbing  Co.  v.  Dil- 
lon, 213  P.  130,  73  Colo.  10. 

Mich.— Jones  v.  O'Donnell,  290  N.W. 
375,  292  Mich.  189. 

N.Y.— Prindle  v.  Rockland  Transit 
Corporation,  32  N.Y.S.2d  156,  263 
Ap-p.Div.  873,  appeal  denied  94  N* 
Y.S.2d  411,  263  Aj>p.Div.  1010— 
Braum  v.  Finger,  113  N.Y.S.  573. 

Utah. — Morgan  v.  'Fourth  Judicial 
District  Court  of  Wasatch  County, 
141  P.2d  886,  105  Utah  140. 

3*4  C.J.  p  710  note  39. 

Set-off  of  costs  generally  see  Costs 
§§  431-434. 

35.  Ind.— George  v.  Williams,  37  N. 
E.2d  21,  109  Ind.App.  623. 

31  C.J.  p  710  note  40. 

38.  Ala.— Hamrick  v.  Town  of  Al- 
bertville,  155  So.  87,  228  Ala.  666. 

Ga. — Hollomon  v.  Humber,  179  S.E. 
365,  180  Ga.  470. 

34  C.J.  p  710  note  41. 


568 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


appears  in  the  same  capacity  in  the  two  judgments,37 
the  debts  are  mutual,38  and  the  judgment  recovered 
by  the  adverse  party  is  not  exempt  from  attach- 
ment, levy,  and  sale.39  A  set-off  of  a  judgment  for 
costs  against  another  judgment  may  be  refused 
where  it  would  be  inequitable.40  A  set-off  of  a 
judgment  for  costs  has  been  refused  against  a  judg- 
ment obtained  in  another  court  and  assigned  to  a 
third  person,  in  the  absence  of  pleading  and  proof 
of  equitable  grounds  for  such  relief.41  Where  a 
creditor's  bill  is  dismissed  with  costs,  such  costs 
cannot  be  set  off  against  the  judgment  on  which 
the  bill  was  founded.42 


e.  Assigned  Judgments 

(1)  Set-off  of  assigned  judgment 

(2)  Set-off  against  assigned  judgment 

(1)  Set-Off  of  Assigned  Judgment 
Where  a  Judgment  debtor  becomes  the  assignee  of 
a  judgment  against  his.  creditor,  he  may  have  it  set  off 
against  the  Judgment  against  himself,  unless  such  a  set- 
off  is  inequitable. 

Where  a  judgment  debtor  becomes  the  assignee 
of  a  judgment  against  his  creditor,  he  may  have  it 
set  off  against  the  judgment  against  himself,43 
unless  there  are  special  circumstances  in  the  case 
rendering  the  set-off  inequitable.44  A  judgment 
debtor  may  purchase  a  judgment  against  his  judg- 
ment creditor  for  the  particular  purpose  of  using  it 
as  a  set-off45  provided  the  purchase  of  judgment 


Protection  of  attorney's  lien  in  case 
of   set-off    of   judgment    for   costs 
see  Attorney  and  Client  §  232. 
Payment  by  third  person 

It  has  been  held  that  the  payment 
of  costs  by  a  third  person  does  not 
defeat  the  rfght  to  set  off  a  judgment 
for  costs. — Morgan  v.  Fourth  Judi- 
cial District  Court  of  TVasatch  Coun- 
ty, 141  P.2d  8-86,  105  Utah  140. 
37.  Ala.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Perkins,  56  So.  105,  1  Ala.App.  376. 
Md.— Willis  v.  Jones,  57  Md.  362. 
SS.  Ala.— Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Perkins,  '56  So.  105,  1  Ala.App.  376. 
Pa. — Melloy  v.  Burtis,  4  Pa.Co.  613. 

39.  S.C.— Rookard    v.    Atlanta   &   C. 
Air  Line  R.  Co.,  71  S.E.  992,  SO  S.C. 
371. 

34  C.J.  P  710  note  44. 

40.  U.S. — Cornell  v.  Gulf  Oil  Corpo- 
ration, D.C.Pa.,  35  P.Supp.  448. 

Seaman's  Judgment  for  maintenance 

and  cure 

Shipowner  was  not  entitled  to  set 
off  its  judgment  for  costs  allowed  on 
appeal  to  supreme  court  against  sea- 
man's judgment  for  cure  and  mainte- 
nance.— Taylor  v.  Calmar  S.  S.  Co., 
D.C.Pa.,  35  F.Supp.  335. 

41.  Tex. — Missouri,   K.  &  T.  R.   Co. 
of  Texas  v.  Cassinoba,-99  S.\V.  888, 
44  Tex.Civ.App.  625. 

42.  N.J. — Brisley  v.  Jones,  5  N.J.Eq. 
512. 

N.Y.— Mickles  v.  Bray  ton,  10  Paige 
138. 

43.  Cal. — Harrison  v.  Adams,  128  P. 
2d  9,  20  Cal.2d  646. 

Ga. — Piedmont  Sav.  Co.  v.  Davis,  190 
S.E.  386,  55  Ga.App.  386. 

111. — Silverman  v.  City  Engineering  & 
Construction  Co.,  252  IlLApp.  275, 
affirmed  170  N.E.  250,  338  111.  15i— 
Young  v.  Young,  -32  IlLApp.  109 

N.Y. — National  Chautauqua  County 
Bank  of  Jamestown  v.  Reynolds, 
299  N.Y.S.  263,  164  Misc.  653,  af- 
firmed 4  N.Y.S.2d  176,  254  App.Div. 
646 — (Ford  v.  Stuart,  19  Johns.  342. 


Okl.— Johnson  v.  Noble,  -65  P.2d  502, 
179  Okl.  256,  121  A.L.R.  474. 

Pa. — Pierce,  to  Use  of  Snipes  v. 
Kaseman,  192  A.  10'5,  326  Pa.  280— 
Welliver  v.  Fox,  4  Pa,Dist.  197. 

S.D.— Lee  v.  Sioux  Falls  Motor  Co., 
274  N.W.  614,  65  S.D.  401. 

34  C.J.  p  710  note  50. 

Sound  discretion  of  court 
A  judgment   obtained   by  assignee 

by  purchase  may  be  set  off  against 

judgment  against  assignee  in  sound 

discretion     of     court— Montalto     v. 

Yeckley,  54  N.E.2d  421,  143  Ohio  St. 

181. 

Mutuality 

(1)  In  order  for  an  assignee  of  a 
judgment    to    use    It    as    a    set-off 
against  a  judgment  against  him,  mu- 
tuality is  essential,  that  is,  the  judg- 
ments   must    be    between    the    same 
parties  in  the  same  right — Harrison 
v.  Adams,  128  P.2d  9,  20  Cal.2d  646. 

(2)  In    determining    whether    de- 
mand   of    assignee    of    a    judgment 
against   assignee's   creditor,  and   the 
creditor's  judgment  against  assignee 
are   "mutual"   so  that  they  may  be 
set    off    against    each    other,    equity 
will  look  to  the  real  parties  in  inter- 
est.— Harrison  v.  Adams,  supra. 

44.     Kan.— Bouchey  v.  Gillllan,  26  P. 

2d  451,  138  Kan.  404. 
Tex. — Citizens     Industrial    Bank    of 

Austin  v.  Oppenheim,  Civ.App.,  118 

S.W.2d   820,   error  dismissed. 
34  C.J.  p  710  note  51. 
Lien 

The  court  will  not  except  the 
amount  claimed  as  a  lien  on  the  as- 
signed judgment  where  the  assignee 
had  no  notice  thereof. — Hill  v.  Brink- 
ley,  10  Ind.  102. 
Particular  circumstances 

(1)  Where  judgments  were  ob- 
tained against  widow  on  notes  exe- 
cuted by  her  as  accommodation  mak- 
er for  her  husband  and,  after  settle- 
ment of  judgments  had  been  made 
by  husband's  estate,  husband's  heirs 

1046 


obtained  assignments  of  judgments 
against  widow  for  purpose  of  defeat- 
ing widow's  claim  to  unpaid  dower, 
the  right  to  set  off  such  judgments 
against  dower  would  be  denied. — 
Needles  v.  Dougherty,  34  A.2d  396, 
134  N.J.Eq.  108. 

(2)  The    assignee    of   a   judgment 
cannot  use  it  as  a  set-off  to  defeat 
the  debtor's  exemption. — State  Mutu- 
al Benefit  Soc.  v.  Jackson,  13  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  167,  20  DeLCo.  192,  78  Pittsb. 
Leg^J.  159. 

(3)  A  trustee  against  which  a  di- 
vorced wife  recovered  judgment  for 
past-due   alimony  after  trustee  had 
failed  to  comply  with  divorce  decree 
ordering  alimony  to  be  paid  out  of 
income    of   trust    funds    payable    to 
husband    could   not    have    deficiency 
judgment  against  husband  and  wife, 
purchased  by  trustee,  set  off  against 
wife's    judgment,     especially    where 
trustee    purchased    judgment    at    a 
time  when  it  knew  it  was  uncollecta- 
ble,  and  wife  had  been  compelled  for 
years    to    be   an    object    of   charity, 
since    wife's    judgment   dedicated    a 
fund  for  her  support,  and  it  was  en- 
titled to  the  same  protection  as  if  it 
had  been  awarded  against  husband. 
—National  Chautauqua  County  Bank 
of  Jamestown  v.  Reynolds,  299  N.Y. 
S.   263.   164  Misc.  -653,  affirrne.d  4  N. 
Y.S.2d  176,  254  App.Div.   646. 

45.     Minn. — Barnes  v.  Verry,  191  N. 

W.   589,    154   Minn.   252,   31  A.L.R. 

707.  ! 

Okl.— Johnson  v.  Noble,  65  P.2d  502, 

179  Okl.  256,  121  A.L.R.  474. 
34  O.J.  p  711  note  53. 
Time  of  purchase 

The  fact  that  judgment  against 
plaintiff  was  purchased  by  defend- 
ant during  pendency  of  suit  in  na- 
ture of  creditor's  bill  brought  by 
plaintiff  as  judgment  creditor,  to  en- 
force collection  of  his  judgment 
against  defendant,  did  not  preclude 
court  in  its  sound  discretion  from 
permitting  set-off  of  judgment  pur- 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


568 


against  his  judgment  creditor  is  bona  fide.46  The 
ussignee  of  the  judgment  to  be  used  as  a  set-off 
must,  however,  be  the  absolute  and  beneficial  owner 
vf  the  judgment  in  order  to  enable  him  to  use  it  as 
a  set-off.47  After  a  person  has  assigned  a  judg- 
ment recovered  by  him,  he  cannot  use  such  judg- 
ment as  a  set-off  against  a  judgment  recovered 
iigainst  him48  unless  his  judgment  has  been  reas- 
.signed  to  him.49 

(2)  Set-Off  against  Assigned  Judgment 

As  a  general  rule,  one  judgment  may  be  set  off 
against  another  although  the  latter  Judgment  has  been 
assigned  to  a  third  person  for  value,  except  where  the 
assignee's  equities,  are  prior  or  superior. 

On  the  principle  that  the  assignee  of  a  judgment 
takes  it  subject  to  all  equities  between  the  original 
parties,  one  judgment  may  be  set  off  against  anoth- 
er, as  a  general  rule,  although  the  latter  judgment 


has  been  assigned  to  a  third  person  for  value,50 
especially  where,  because  of  the  insolvency  of  the 
assignor  at  the  time  of  the  assignment,  the  party 
claiming  the  right  of  set-off  had  no  other  means  of 
collecting  his  debt,51  or  where,  in  anticipation  of  an 
application  to  make  the  set-off,  the  assignment  was 
made  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  the  right.52  Al- 
though it  has  been  held  that  the  right  of  set-off 
against  the  assignee  is  not  defeated  because  he  took 
without  knowledge  of  such  right,53  there  is  no  doubt 
that  the  position  of  the  party  seeking  the  set-off  is 
much  stronger  where  the  assignee  has  notice  of  a 
judgment  against  his  assignor  such  as  may  be  set 
off  against  the  assigned  judgment54  or  where  such 
person  has  no  notice  or  knowledge  of  a  prior  assign- 
ment of  the  judgment  against  himself.55 

The  right  of  set-off  must  have  existed  at  the  time 
of  the  assignment;56  there  can  be  no  right  of  set-off 


chased  by  defendant  against  plain- 
tiff's judgment  a.gainst  defendant. — 
Montalto  v.  Yeckley,  54  N.E.2d  421, 
143  Ohio  St.  181. 

46.  N.J. — Needles  v.  Dougherty,  34 
A.2d  396,  134  N.J.Bq.  108. 

Ohio.— Montalto  v.  Yeckley,  '54  N.E. 
2d  421,  143  Ohio  St.  181. 

Okl. — Johnson  v.  Noble,  6-5  P.2d  502, 
179  Okl.  256,  121  A.L.R.  474. 

Conditional  purchase 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  the  judg- 
ment cannot  be  set  off,  where  it  was 
purchased  with  the  sole  purpose  of 
being  used  as  a  set-off  and  with  an 
agreement  to  reassign  it  if  a  motion 
for  such  set-off  should  be  refused. — 
Cornell   v.   Donovan,    13   N.Y.St.   704, 
affirmed    13    N.Y.St.    741—34    C.J.    p 
711  note  64. 

(2)  It  has  al«o  been  held  that  the 
fact  that  payment  for  the  assigned 
judgment  is  made  conditional  on  the 
assignee's  ability  to  set  it  .off  does 
not  deprive  him  of  the  right  to  the 
set-off. — Brown  v.  Lapp,  89  S.W.  304, 
28  Ky.L.  409 — McBrayer  v.  Dean,  3S 
S.W.  508,  100  Ky.  398,  18  Ky,L.  847. 

Consideration 

(1)  An  insolvent  debtor  cannot  ob- 
ject to  want  of  consideration  for  the 
assignment   of  a  judgment  obtained 
against  him  which  the  assignee  has 
obtained    for    purposes    of   set-off. — 
People  v.  New  York  Ct  of  C.  PI.,  13 
Wend.,  N.Y.,  649,  28  Am.D.  495. 

(2)  The   fact   that   defendant   pur- 
chased judgment  against  plaintiff  far 
below  its  face  amount  did  not  pre- 
clude  court   from   permitting  set-off 
of  such  judgment  against  plaintiff's 
Judgment  against  defendant,  but  the 
low    price    was    a   fact   which    trial 
court  could  take  into  consideration  in 
exercising    its    discretion. — Montalto 
v.   Yeckley,   54  N.E.2d  421,   143   Ohio 
St.  181. 


47.  Cal. — Harrison  v.  Adams,  128  P.  | 
2d  9,  20  Cal.2d  646. 

Kan.— Bouchey    v.    Gillilan,    26    P.2d 

451,  138  Kan.  404. 
'.J. — Needles  v.  Dougherty,  34  A.2d 

396,  134  N.J.Eq.  108. 
N.Y.— Porter    v.    Davis,     2    How.Pr. 

30. 
Ohio.— Montalto  v.  Yeckley,   54  N.E. 

2d  421,  143  Ohio  St.  181. 
34  C.J.  p  711  note  56. 
Necessity     of     beneficial     ownership 

generally  see  supra  §  &67. 

48.  N.Y.— Swift   v.  Prouty,   64  N.Y. 
545. 

Vt.— Day  v.  Abbott,  15  Vt.  632. 
Where  an  interest  assigned 

Where  defendant  In  action  for  re- 
covery of  possession  of  realty  recov- 
ered money  judgment  against  plain- 
tiff under  occupying  claimants  act, 
and  assigned  an  interest  in  that 
judgment  to  third  persons,  and  plain- 
tiff brought  action  on  supersedeas 
bond  given  by  defendant  to  stay  exe- 
cution of  judgment  for  possession, 
the  judgment  under  the  occupying 
claimants  act  could  be  offset  by  de- 
fendant against  judgment  in  flavor  of 
plaintiff  on  supersedeas  bond  only  to 
extent  of  defendant's  interest  in  the 
judgment  under  the  occupying  claim- 
ants act. — Amber?  v.  Claussen,  98  P. 
2d  927,  186  Okl.  482. 

49.  Kan. — Turner    v.    Crawford,    14 
Kan.  499. 

Pa. — Jacoby  v.   Guier,   6   Serg.  &  B. 
448. 

50.  U.S.— Turner     v.     Dickey,     D.C. 
Tenn.,  3  F.Supp.  360,  affirmed,  C.C. 
A.,  Dickey  v.  Turner,  64  P.2d  1012. 

Cal_- Arp  v.  Blake,  21-8  P.  773,  63  Cal. 

App.  362. 
Ga.— -Sheffield   v.   Preacher,   165    S.E. 

742,    743,    1'75    Ga.    719,    84    A.L..R 

1159 — Odom   v.   Attaway,    162   S.E. 

279,  173  Ga.  883. 
111. — Silverman   v.    City   Engineering 

1047 


Const.    Co.,    170   N.E.    250,    338    111. 

154. 
Kan. — Petersime     Incubator     Co.     v. 

•Ferguson,    103    P.2d   822,    152   Kan. 

259. 
Mass. — -Goldman   v.    Noxon   Chemical 

Products     Co.,     175    N.E.     67,     274 

Mass.  526. 
Pa. — Kisthardt,   to  Use  of  Pubok  v. 

Betts,  183  A.  923,  321  Pa.  270. 
Wash. — Spokane   Sec.  Finance  Co.  v. 

Sevan,  20  P.2d  31,  172  Wash.  418. 
34  C.J.  p  711  note  60. 
Portion  of  Judgment 

Portion  of  judgment  for  exemplary 
damages  from  wrongful  sequestra- 
tion was  subject  to  offset  by  deficien- 
cy judgment  while  judgment  for 
damages  was  in  mortgagor's  hands 
and  remained  subject  to  offset  in 
hands  of  assignee  who  purchased  the 
judgment  subsequent  to  rendition  of 
deficiency  judgment  against  mortga- 
gor.—Dallas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 
of  Dallas  v.  Lancaster,  Tex.Civ.App., 
122  S.W.2d  659,  error  dismissed. 

51.  Cal.— Arp  v.  Blake,   218   P.   773, 
63  CaLApp.  362. 

111. — Silverman   v.    City   Engineering 

&    Construction    Co.,    252    111. App. 

275,  affirmed  170  N.E.  250,  338  111. 

154. 
Neb. — Sherwood  v.  Salisbury,  299  N. 

W.  185,  139  Neb.  $38. 
34  C.J.  p  711  note  61. 

52.  Iowa. — Hurst  v.  Sheets,  14  Iowa 
322. 

34  C.J.  p  711  note  62. 

53.  N.J. — Hendrickson  v.  Brown,   39 
N.J.Law  239. 

54.  Cal. — Coonan  v.  Loewenthal,    81 
P.  527,  147  Cal.  218.' 

34  C.J.  p  711  note  64. 

55.  Ariz. — Martin    v.    Wells,    28    P. 
958,  3  Ariz/  355. 

Mich.— Finn  v.  Corbitt,  36  Mich.  318. 

50,    Qa. — Corpus      Jtuis      cited     In 


568 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


of  the  judgments  until  both  exist  ;57  and  the  court 
will  refuse  to  allow  a  set-off  to  the  prejudice  of  an 
assignee  for  value  and  in  good  faith  whose  equities 
are  prior  or  superior  to  those  of  the  part}'  seeking 
the  set-off.58  It  has  been  held  that  an  assignment 
of  a  demand  before  the  entry  of  judgment  on  it 
gives  to  the  assignee  a  superior  equity  to  that  of  a 
party  claiming  a  right  to  set  off  a  judgment  previ- 
ously recovered  against  the  assignor,  and  prevents 
the  right  of  set-off  from  accruing,59  and  this  has 
also  been  held  to  be  true  where  a  judgment  was  as- 
signed before  the  recovery  by  the  judgment  debtor 
of  a  judgment  in  another  action  against  the  former 
judgment  creditor.60  However,  these  rules  are 
sometimes  relaxed  and  a  set-off  allowed  where  the 
circumstances  render  it  equitable  to  do  so,61  as 
where  the  assignee  took  with  notice  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  judgment62  or  pendency  of  the  action,63 
as  the  case  may  be,  or  delayed  filing  his  assignment 
or  making  himself  a  party  to  the  record.64  Where 
a  judgment  is  rendered  in  favor  of  two  judgment 
creditors,  and  one  of  them,  in  good  faith  and  for 
value  assigns  his  interest  to  the  other,  the  judgment 
debtor  has  no  right  to  set  off,  as  against  the  as- 
signee, a  judgment  against  the  assignor  purchased 
from  a  third  person  before  the  assignment.65 

The  purchase  by  a  judgment  creditor  of  another 
judgment  owned  by  his  debtor  and  sold  on  execu- 
tion on  the  former  judgment  does  not  extinguish 


both  judgments,  but  makes  the  purchaser  the  judg- 
ment creditor  with  respect  to  the  judgment  so  sold.65 

Effect  of  special  fund  for  payment.  A  party  en- 
titled to  set-off  of  judgments  against  each  other, 
having  subject  to  his  control  a  special  fund  primari- 
ly applicable  to  the  satisfaction  of  his  judgment  or 
decree,  will  not  be  permitted  to  avail  himself  of  his 
right  to  set-off  against  the  assignee  of  the  judgment 
or  decree  against  him  until  such  special  fund  is  ex- 
hausted,67 and  then  only  for  any  balance  of  his  de- 
mand which  may  remain  unsatisfied.68 

§  569.    Proceedings  to  Obtain 

As  a  general  rule,  a  person  seeking  a  set-off  of  Judg- 
ment against  Judgment  should  apply  to  the  court  in 
which  the  judgment  against  himself  was  recovered. 
While  the  application  for  a  set-off  ordinarily  may  be 
made  by  motion,  a  set-off  may  also  be  obtained  in  ar> 
ordinary  civil  action  or  suit  in  equity. 

A  person  seeking  a  set-off  of  judgment  against 
judgment  should  apply  to  the  court69  in  which  the 
judgment  against  himself  was  recovered,70  although 
it  has  been  held  that  judgments  in  cross  actions 
may  be  set  off,  when  the  parties  in  interest  are  the 
same,  by  the  court  in  which  one  or  both  of  the  ac- 
tions are  pending,71  and  that  a  court  of  equity  has 
jurisdiction  to  set  off  mutual  judgments  without  re- 
gard to  the  courts  in  which  the  judgments  were 
rendered.72 

The  application  for  a  set-off  ordinarily  may  be 


Sheffield  v.  Preacher,  135  S.B.  742, 

743,  175  Ga.  719,  '84  A.-L.R.  1159. 
Miss. — Turnage  v.  Riley,  158  So.  785, 

172  Miss.  83. 
Mo.— Helstein  v.  Schmidt,  78  S.W.Sd 

132,  229  Mo.App.  275. 
34  C.J.  p  712  note  66. 

57.  Wash. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in 
Spokane    Security    Finance   Co.    v. 
Sevan,   20   P.2d  31,   32,   172  Wash. 
418. 

34  C.J.  p  712  note  67. 

58.  Cat— Murphy  v.  Davids,   215  P. 
1040,  '62  CaLApp.  63. 

Ga. — Sheffield  v.   Preacher,    165   S.E. 

742,  175  Ga.  719,  £4  A.L.R,  1159. 
Kan.— Heston  v.  Finley,   236  P.  841, 

118  Kan.  717. 
Miss.— Turnage  v.  Riley,  158  So.  7iS'5, 

172  Miss.  -83. 
34  CJ.  p  712  note  68. 

Assignee  without  notice 

Where  assignee  acquires  judgment 
for  valuable  consideration  without 
notice  of  existence  of  judgment 
against  assignor,  a  set-off  against 
judgment  held  by  assignee  may  be 
denied. — State  ex  rel.  Barnett  v. 
Wood,  43  P.2d  136,  171  Okl.  341. 

59.  Miss.— Turnage  v.  Riley.  158  So. 
785,  172  Miss.  83. 

Wash. — Corpus   Juris    cited   in   Spo- 


kane Sec.  'Finance  Co.  v.  Sevan,  20 
P.2d  31,  32,  172  Wash.  418. 
34  C.J.  p  712  note  69. 

60.  N.Y.— Kelly  v.  City  of  Yonkers, 
274  N.T.S.  7'81.  242  App.Div.  798. 

34  C.J.  P  712  note  70. 

Statute  providing  that  cross  judg- 
ments may  be  offset  against  each 
other  was  inapplicable  where  one  of 
judgments  was  assigned  two  years 
before  the  other  was  rendered. — Hel- 
stein v.  Schmidt  78  S.W.2d  132,  229 
Mo.App.  275. 

61.  Mo. — Ford  v.  Stevens  Motor  Car 
Co.,  232  S.W.  222,  209  Mo.App.  144. 

34  C.J.  p  712  note  71. 

62.  Ind. — Lammers  v.   Goodman,  69 
Ind.  76. 

63.  Mo. — Ford  v.  Stevens  Motor  Car 
Co.,  232  S.W.  222,  209  Mo.App.  144. 

64.  Pa. — Skinner  v.  Chase,  $  Pa.Su- 
per.  279. 

65.  Iowa. — Schultz  v.  Sylvester,  169 
N.W.  179,  184  Iowa  859. 

66.  La. — Kentwood  Bank  v.  McClen- 
don,  93  So.  748,  152  La,  489. 

67.  W.Va. — Payne   v.  Webb,   2   S.B. 
330,  29  W.Va.  627. 

68L    W.Va. — Payne  v.  Webb,  supra. 


69.  Tex. — Harris  v.  Ware,  Civ.App., 
144  S.W.2d  -647. 

Intervention  of  court  necessary 

A  judgment  debtor  cannot,  without 
intervention  of  the  court,  set  off  the 
judgment  of  his  creditor  with  a  judg- 
ment in  debtor's  favor  against  the 
creditor,  such  intervention  being  nec- 
essary in  order  that  there  may  be  an 
adjudication  of  question  of  mutual 
liability  and  other  equitable  rights 
involved. — Harris  v.  Ware,  supra. 

Character  of  proceeding 

A  proceeding  to  set  off  judgments, 
whether  by  motion  or  action,  is  equi- 
table in  character.— Bouchey  v.  Gilli- 
lan,  26  P.2d  451,  138  Kan.  404. 

70.  Cal.— Harrison  v.  Adams,  128  P. 
2d  9,  20  Cal.2d  646. 

Minn.— Barnes    v.    Verry,    191    3ST.W. 

5-S9,  154  Minn.  252,  31  AJL.R.  707. 
N.J.— Kristeller  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 

197  A.  17,  119  N.J.Law  J570. 
34  C.J.  p  713  note  79. 

71.  Me.— Peirce  v.  Bent,  69  Me.  -381. 
N.M.— Scholle  v.  Pino,  54  P.  -335,  9  N. 

M.  393. 

72.  Mich. — Robinson  v.   Kunkleman, 
75  N.W.  451,  117  Mich.  193. 

34  C.J.  p  713  note  81. 


1048 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


569 


made  by  motion,73  and  notice  given  to  the  opposite 
party74  and  all  other  parties  whose  rights  and  in- 
terests are  affected.75  On  such  motion  no  formal 
pleadings  are  necessary.™  The  right  to  set  off  one 
judgment  or  decree  against  another  on  motion  or 
summary  application  exists  only  in  those  cases 
where  the  debts  on  both  sides  have  been  finally 
liquidated  by  judgment  or  decree.77 

In  addition  to  the  remedy  by  motion,  a  set-off  of 
judgments  may  also  be  obtained  in  an  ordinary  civil 
action78  or  suit  in  equity.79  A  formal  action  or  a 
bill  in  equity  is  proper  where  the  rights  of  the  par- 
ties are  complicated  or  not  definitely  fixed,  or  where 
there  are  intervening  equities,80  and  in  such  a  case 
the  court  may  meanwhile  protect  the  rights  of  the 
parties  by  enjoining  the  collection  of  one  or  both 


of  the  judgments  or  otherwise.81 

The  denial  of  a  motion  to  set  off  judgments  is  not 
a  bar  to  an  action82  or  suit  in  equity83  to  compel 
such  set-off.  In  a  proceeding  to  set  off  judgments 
the  court  may  not  impose  conditions  affecting  the 
amount  of  'either  judgment,84  although,  where  a 
portion  of  a  judgment  has  been  assigned  under  cir- 
cumstances giving  the  assignment  precedence  over 
the  set-off,  the  rights  of  the  assignee  will  be  pro- 
tected.85 , 

Time  of  application.  An  application  to  have 
judgments  set  off  should  be  made  at  the  earliest 
practicable  opportunity,  and,  if  delayed  until  the  in- 
terests of  third  persons  have  intervened,  the  set-off 
may  properly  be  denied,86  but  it  would  appear  that, 


73.  Ga. — Odom  v.  Attaway,  162  S.B. 
279,  173  Ga.  883— Piedmont  Sav.  Co. 
v.  Davis,   190  S.B.  386,  '55  Ga.App. 
386. 

Mo. — Corpus  Juris  cited  In  Helstein 

v.  Schmidt,  78  S.W.2d  132,  136,  229 

Mo.App.  275. 
N.Y.— Neenan    v.    Woodside    Astoria 

Transp.   Co.,    184   N.E.   744,   261  N. 

Y.  159.* 
Okl. — Johnson  v.  Noble,  65  P.2d  502, 

179  Okl.  256,  121  A.L.R.  474. 
S.D.— Lee   v.  Sioux  Palls  Motor  Co., 

274  N.W.   614,  65  S.D.  401. 
Tenn. — Mack  v.  Hugger  Bros.  Const. 

Co.,  10  Tenn.App.  402. 
34  C.J.  p  713  note  -82. 
Special  motion 

Motion  for  set-off  of  cross  Judg- 
ments against  each  other  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  special  motion,  and  one 
made  in  summary  proceeding. — Hel- 
stein v.  Schmidt,  78  S.W.2d  132,  229 
Mo.App.  275. 

74.  Ga. — Odom  v.  Attaway,  162  S.E. 
279,  170  Ga,  883. 

Mo.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Helstein 
v.  Schmidt,  78  S.W.2d  132,  136,  229 
Mo.App.  275. 

S.D. — Lee  v.  Sioux  'Palls  Motor  Co., 
274  N.W.  614,  65  S.D.  401. 

34  C.J.  p  713  note  83. 

75.  Mo.— Hclstcln  v.  Schmidt,  78  S. 
W.2d  132,  229  Mo.App.  275. 

Notice  to  assignee 

It  has  been  held  that  the  fact  that 
one  asking  sot-oft  of  cross  Judgments 
against  himself  and  another  had  no 
knowledge  of  assignment  of  Judg- 
ment against  him  by  such  other  or  of 
assignee  thereof  did  not  affect  right 
to  notice  of  assignee  in  absence  of 
estoppel.— Helstein  v.  Schmidt,  su- 
pra, 

76.  Jnd. — Quick  v.  Durham,  16  N.E. 
601,  115  Ind.  302. 

34  C.J.  p  714  note  84. 

77.  Ohio. — Barbour       v.       National 


Bxch.   Bank,   33  KB.   542,   50  Ohio 
St.  90,  20  L.R.A.  192. 
34  C.J.  p  714  note  85. 

78.  Minn. — Lindholm  v.  Itasca  Lum- 
ber Co.,  65  N.W.  931,  64  Minn.  46. 

34  C.J.  p  714  note  8-7. 

Pleading1 

Averments  in  supplementary  an- 
swer to  petition  for  leave  to  set  off 
Judgment  on  note  against  judgment 
for  maker  that  consideration  for  note 
failed,  as  petitioner  knew  when  he 
took  it  from  payee,  were  held  not  to 
warrant  opening  of  former  Judg- 
ment, where  no  testimony  was  of- 
fered in  support  thereof  and  they 
were  denied  and  explained  in  peti- 
tioner's replication.— Pierce,  to  -Use 
of  Snipes  v.  Kaseman,  192  A.  105, 
326  Pa.  280. 

79.  Okl.— Johnson  v.  Noble,  65  P.2d 
502,  179  Okl.  256,  121  A.L.R.  474. 

34  C.J.  p  714  note  88. 

"The  determination  of  the  matter 
of  the  set-off  of  one  judgment 
against  another  pertains  to  a  court 
of  equity." — Spokane  Sec.  Finance 
Co.  v.  Bevan,  20  P.2d  31,  32,  172 
Wash.  418. 

A  reference  to  a  master  to  try 
questions  of  fact  may  be  made  on  a 
bill  to  set  off  judgments. — Hackett 
v.  Connett,  2  Bdw.,N.Y.,  73. 

Election  to  pay  court  officers 

In  suit  to  set  off  judgment,  peti- 
tioner's election  to  pay  amount  due 
court  officers  has  been  held  not  to 
prevent  set-off  of  Judgment  as 
against  other  parties. — Odom  v.  At- 
taway, 162  S.B.  279,  173  Ga.  883. 

Sufficiency  of  evidence 

(1)  Evidence    held   sufficient. — Mc- 
Intosh  v.  Mclntosh,  234  N.W.  234,  211 
Iowa  750. 

(2)  Bvidence  held  insufficient. 
Ala. — Andrews   v.    Sessoms    Grocery 

Co.,  193  So.  104,  238  Ala.  640. 

1049 


Ga. — Taylor  v.  Jordan,  195  S.B.  186, 
185  Ga.  325. 

80.  N.Y.— Neenan   v.    WoodsJde   As- 
toria   Transp.    Co.,    184    N.B.    744, 
261  N.Y.  159. 

34  C.J.  p  714  note  89. 

81.  U.S.— Frye-Bruhn  Co.  v.  Meyer, 
Alaska,  121  F.  533,  58  C.C.A.  529. 

Set-off  as  ground  of  equitable  relief 
against  judgment  generally  see  su- 
pra §  370. 

Staying  collection  of  one  judgment 
until  recovery  of  another  see  su- 
pra §  566  b. 

88.  N.Y.— Pignolet  v.  Geer,  24  N.Y. 
Super.  626,  19  Abb.Pr.  264. 

83.  Ala.— Scott  v.  Rivers,  1  Stew.  & 
P.  24,  21  Am.D.  646. 

34  C.J.  p  714  note  92. 

84.  U.S. — Owens      Co.      v.      Officer, 
Minn.,  244  F.  47,  156  C.C.A.  475. 

34  C.J.  p  714  note  93. 

86.     U.S. — Owens   Co.   v.   Officer,   su- 

pra. 
S.C.— Ex  parte  Wells,  21  S.E.  334,  43 

S.C.  477, 

96.    Kan.— Heston  r.  'FJnley,   236  P. 

841,  118  Kan.  717. 
34  C.J.  p  714  note  95. 
Delay  held  not  to  bar  suit 
111. — Silverman   v.    City   Engineering 

&    Construction    Co.,    252    IlLApp. 

275,  affirmed  170  N.B.  250,  338  111. 

154.      • 
Application  prior  to  Judgment 

The  trial  court  was  authorized  to 
determine  defendant's  right  to  set  off 
a  judgment  at  a  hearing  held  after 
judgment  in  instant  case  had  been 
entered,  notwithstanding  defendant's 
•application  for  order  to  show  cause 
pursuant  to  which  the  hearing  was 
held,  was  made  prior  to  judgment, 
before  the  right  of  set-off  had  ac- 
crued under  statute.— Lee  v.  -Sioux 
Falls  Motor  Co.,  274  N.W.  614,  65  S. 
D.  401, 


§  569 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


if  no  such  interests  intervene,  the  application  may 
be  granted  at  any  time  while  the  judgments  remain 
valid  and  enforceable  demands.87  A  set-off  of  a 
judgment  on  motion  will  not  be  refused  merely  be- 
cause the  party  has  neglected  an  opportunity  to  set 
off  the  subject  of  the  judgment,  or  the  judgment  it- 
self, on  the  trial,88  although  it  has  been  held  other- 
wise where  it  is  attempted  to  enforce  the  set-off  in 
equity89  or  by  pleading  it  as  such  in  an  action  on 
the  other  judgment.90 

Tender  or  payment  of  difference.  A  judgment 
creditor  may  have  a  lesser  judgment  held  by  him 
set  off  against  a  larger  judgment  against  him  with- 
out a  tender  or  payment  of  the  difference.91 

Intervention  is  sometimes  allowed  in  a  proceeding 
to  set  off  judgments.92 

Order  or  judgment.  Adverse  judgments  between 
the  same  parties  are  extinguished  only  by  an  order 
of  the  court,  by  some  act  of  the  parties  themselves, 
or  some  action  of  the  officer  having  both  executions 
for  collection.93  A  set-off  judgment  may  be  modi- 
fied by  the  court  in  a  proper  case.94 


§  570. 


Operation  and  Effect 


The  allowance  of  a  set-off  cf  judgment  acafnst  judg- 
ment extinguishes  them  both  if  they  are  equal  fn 
amount,  or  satisfies  the  smaller  judgment  in  full  and 
the  larger  proportionately. 

The  allowance  of  a  set-off  of  judgment  against 


judgment  extinguishes  them  both  if  they  are  equal 
in  amount,  or  satisfies  the  smaller  judgment  in  full 
and  the  larger  proportionately.95  If  the  set-off  is 
refused,  it  leaves  the  rights  of  the  parties  as  be- 
fore96 and  does  not  prejudice  the  right  of  one  of 
them  to  require  the  sheriff  to  set  off  executions  in 
his  hands  on  the  two  judgments.97  Where  a  judg- 
ment recovered  against  a  principal  is  allowed  in  set- 
off  against  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the  surety,  it  is 
not  thereby  extinguished,98  but  the  transaction, 
amounts  to  an  assignment  of  it  to  the  surety.99 

Remittitur  and  release.  The  party  holding  the 
larger  judgment  may  be  ordered  to  enter  a  remit- 
titur  on  his  judgment  for  the  amount  of  the  smaller 
judgment,1  and  the  party  moving  for  the  set-off  may 
be  required  to  execute  a  release.2 

§  571.    Set-Off  of  Judgment  against  Claim 

a.  In  general 

b.  Assigned  judgments  and  claims 

a.  In  General 

Subject  to  some  exceptions,  a  Judgment  may  be 
pleaded  as  a  set-off  in  an  action  between  the  same  par- 
ties on  a  different  claim  or  demand,  provided  it  is  valid, 
in  force,  and  unsatisfied. 

Subject  to  some  exceptions,3  a  judgment  may  be 
pleaded  as  a  set-off  in  an  action  between  the  same 
parties  on  a  different  claim  or  demand,*  provided  it 


87.  Cal.— Hobbs  v.  Duff,  23  CaL  596. 
34  C.J.  p  714  note  96. 

88.  Pa, — Kisthardt,  to  Use  of  Puhak 
v.  Betts,  l'S3  A.  923,  321  Pa,  270. 

34  C.J,  p  715  note  97. 

89.  U.S. — Anglo-American   Provision 
do.  v.   Davis  Provision  Co.,  C.C.N. 
Y.,  112  F.  5'74,  appeal  dismissed  24 
S.Ct.  93,  191  U.S.  376,  48  -L.Ed.  228. 

Tex. — Cocke  v.  Wright,  Com.App.,  "39 

S.W.2d  590. 
93.    Ind.— Ault  v.   Zehering,   38  Ind. 

429. 

91.  Cal.— Nash  v.  Kreling,  69  P.  418, 
136  Cal.  627. 

Ind.— Shirts  v.  Irons,   54  Ind.   13. 

92.  U.S. — Cathay    Trust    v.    Brooks, 
China,  193  P.  973,  114  C.C.A.  125. 

34  C.J.  p  715  note  2. 

93.  Me.— Herrick  v.  Bean,  20  Me.  51. 

94.  Ga. — Hollomon   v.    Humber,    179 
S.R  365,  180  Ga.  470. 

95.  Me. — Peirce  v.  Bent  69  Me.  381. 
34  C.J.  p  715  note  5. 

96.  Me.— Gould  v.  Parlin,  7  Me.  82. 

97.  Me. — Gould  v.  Parlin,  supra. 
Set-off   of   executions    generally   see 

Executions  §  335. 

98.  Me.— Herrick  v.  Bean,  20  Me.  51. 


99.    Me. — Herrick  v.  Bean,  supra. 
i;    Ala. — Scott  v.  Rivers,  1  Stew.  & 
P.  24,  21  Am.D.  646. 

2.  N.J. — Schautz  v.  Kearney,   47  N. 
J.Law  56. 

3.  La. — Perrara  v.  Polito,  App.,  167 
•So.  120. 

34  C.J.  p  715  note  13. 
Suit  for  wrongful  attachment  or  exe- 
cution 

(1)  In    mortgagor's    suit    against 
mortgagee   for  damages   for   wrong- 
ful sale  of  horse  and  wagon  under 
execution    on    mortgage    which    had 
been  'paid,   mortgagee  was  held  not 
entitled  to  set  off  against  such  claim 
amount   of  judgment  previously  ob- 
tained by   mortgagee  against  mort- 
gagor.— -Ferrara  v.  Polito,  supra. 

(2)  A  judgment  obtained  in  a  suit 
other  than  the  attachment  suit  can- 
not   be    set     off    against    damages 
claimed  for  a  wrongful  attachment. 
—Imperial     Roller    Milling     Co.     v. 
Cleburne   First   Nat    Bank,    27   S.W. 
49,  5  Tex.Civ.App.  686. 

Suit  by  municipality 

It  has  been  held  that  in  a  suit  by 
a  municipality  the  sureties  on  the 
bond  of  an  insolvent  defaulting  sher- 
iff cannot  set  off  against  his  indebt- 

1050 


edness  to  a  municipality  the  amount 
of  a  judgment  held  by  them  against 
the    municipality. — Schmidt    v.    City 
of  New  Orleans,  33  La.Ann.  17. 
4.    Ark. — Strauss   v.    Missouri    State 

Life   Ins.    Co.,   66   S.W.2d    999,    1S£ 

Ark.  286. 
111.— State    Bank    of    St.    Charles    v. 

Burr,  22  N.E.2d  941,  372  111.  114. 
Iowa. — Kramer  v.  Hofman,  257  N.W. 

361,  218  Iowa  1269. 
Kan. — Read  v.  Jeffries,  16   Kan.  534. 
N.Y.— Jung    v.    Allison,    276    N.Y.S. 

361,   154  Misc.  79— Godfrey-Keeler 

Co.    v.    Regent    Laundry    &    Dry 

Cleaning    Corporation,    9    N.Y.S.2d 

£40. 
N.C.— McClure  v.  Fulbright,  146  S.B. 

74,  196  N.C.  450. 
Wash.— Reichlin  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 

51   P.2d  380,   184  Wash.   304. 
34  C.J.  p  715  note  12. 
Claim  on  contract 

A  judgment  may  be  set  off  against 
a  claim  on  a  contract. — Vanderlip  v. 
Barnes,  163  N.W.  '856,  101  Neb.  573. 

A    judgment    for    costs    may    be 
pleaded  against  a  claim. 
W.Va.— York  v.   Meek,   123   S.B.   225, 

96  W.Va.  427. 
Wis.— Kuchera  v.  Kuchera,  196  N.W. 

828,  182  Wis.  457. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  571 


is  valid,6  in  force,  and  unsatisfied.6  Where  a  judg- 
ment is  so  pleaded,  a  recovery  by  plaintiff  will  ei- 
ther extinguish  the  judgment  or  satisfy  it  pro  tanto 
according  to  its  amount  with  relation  to  plaintiff's 
claim;7  but  where  a  party  offers  a  judgment  to- 
gether with  certain  notes  and  accounts  under  a  plea 
of  payment,  all  of  which  are  allowed,  and  the  notes 
and  accounts  alone  amount  to  a  larger  sum  thafl 
the  claim  against  him,  the  judgment  remains  in  full 
force.8 

Setting  up  opponent's  right  to  set-off.  Regard- 
loss  of  whether  or  not  a  party  has  the  right  to  plead 
the  set-off  of  his  opponent,9  there  is  no  rule  of  law 
prohibiting  him  from  setting  up  his  opponent's  judg- 
ment and  asking  that  it  be  credited  against  his 
claim.** 

Judgment  between  different  parties.  The  s£t-off 
of  a  judgment  against  a  claim  cannot  be  allowed  un- 
less there  is  a  substantial  identity  of  the  parties.11 
A  joint  judgment  debt  cannot  be  set  off  against  a 
separate  debt,12  nor  can  a  separate  judgment  debt  be 
set  off  against  a  joint  debt;13  but  a  judgment 


against  two  parties,  each  of  whom  is  severally  lia- 
ble for  it,  may  be  set  off  against  the  individual 
claim  of  one  of  them,14  and  a  judgment  for  one  par- 
ty may  be  set  off  against  a  claim  against  two  par- 
ties, for  which  each  is  severally  liable.15 

b.  Assigned  Judgments  and  Claims 

The  assignee  of  a  judgment  may  use  it  by  way  of 
set-off  In  an  action  brought  against  him  by  the  debtor 
in  the  judgment,  provided,  in  some  jurisdictions,  he 
acquired  the  judgment  before  the  commencement  of  the 
action. 

The  assignee  of  a  judgment  may  use  it  by  way  of 
set-off  in  an  action  brought  against  him  by  the  debt- 
or in  the  judgment,16  provided,  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions,17 but  not  in  others,18  he  acquired  the  judg- 
ment before  the  commencement  of  such  action,  and 
provided  also,  in  some  jurisdictions,  the  assignment 
is  in  writing  so  that  it  is  a  legal,  rather  than  a  mere 
equitable,  assignment.19 

In  an  action  by  the  assignee  of  a  claim,  a  judg- 
ment recovered  by  defendant  against  the  assignor 
after  the  assignment  may  not  be  relied  on  as  a  set- 
off  or  counterclaim20  unless  there  are  circumstances 


5.  Ark. — Strauss  v.  Missouri  State 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  66  S.W.2d  299,  188 
Ark.  286. 

Presumption  of  validity 

In  action  on  life  policies,  where 
insurer  claimed  set-off  of  judgment 
rendered  against  beneficiary  in  fed- 
eral court  in  foreclosure  suit,  such 
judgment  was  presumed  to  be  valid 
under  Federal  Equity  Rule  and  be- 
cause court  was  of  superior  jurisdic- 
tion.— Strauss  v.  Missouri  State  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  supra. 
Valid  underlying-  indebtedness 

Party  invoking  judgment  regular 
on  its  face  as  set-off  against  claim 
need  not  show  valid  underlying  in- 
debtedness, in  absence  of  clear  and 
satisfactory  proof  by  defendant  of 
fraud.— Yungclas  v.  Yungclas,  239  N. 
\V.  22,  213  Iowa  413. 

e.    Ala.— Dempsey,   for  Use   of  Ste- 

verson  v.  Gay,  148  So.  438,  227  Ala. 

20. 
N.Y.— City   of   Tonkers   v.   Maryland 

Casualty    Co.,    293    N.Y.S.    69,    250 

App.Div.  71S. 
34  C.J.  p  715  note  14. 
Appeal 

(1)  A   judgment   may   be   a   valid 
counterclaim,     although    an     appeal 
from  it  is  pending. — Dowdell  v.  Car- 
py,  70  P.  167,  137  Cal.  333—34  C.J.  P 
715  note  14  [a]. 

(2)  It  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment from  which  devolutive  appeal 
has   been   taken  may  be  pleaded  in 
compensation. — 'First    State    Bank   & 
Trust  Co.  v.  Oraziano,  120  So.  223,  9 
La,  App.  726. 


Satisfaction,  of  record 

The  fact  that  plaintiff  refused,  aft- 
er suit  was  instituted,  to  satisfy  of 
record  judgment  which  had  been 
paid,  has  been  held  not  to  sustain 
plea  of  set-off  or  recoupment. — 
Denxpsey,  for  Use  of  Steverson  v. 
Gay,  148  So.  438,  227  Ala.  20. 
7.  N.Y. — Compound  &  Pyrono  Door 

Co.  v.  Keil,  268  N.Y.S.  1'54,  240  App. 

Div.  908. 

34  C.J.  p  716  note  15. 
a    Ohio.— Piatt  v.  St.  Clair,   6  Ohio 

227. 

9.  Tex. — Brady-Neely  Grocer  Co.  v. 
De   Foe,    Civ.App.,   169   S.W.   1135. 

34  C.J.  p  716  note  17. 

10.  Tex. — Brady-Neely  Grocer  Co.  v. 
De  Foe,  supra. 

11.  Utah.— Reeve   v.   Blatchley,    147 
P.2d  861. 

34  C.J.  p,716  note  19. 

12.  N.Y. — Lush   v.   Adams,    10   N.Y. 
Civ.Proc.  60. 

13.  N.Y. — Lush  v.  Adams,  supra. 

14.  Kan.— Read  v.  Jeffries,  15  Kan. 
534. 

Tex.— Patten    v.    Hill    County,    Civ. 

App.,  297  S.W.  918. 
34  C.J.  p  716  note  22. 
Judgment  for  tort 

County  not  assenting  to  partner- 
ship's assignment  of  claim  against 
it  to  one  partner  has  been  held  enti- 
tled to  set  off  judgment  for  tort 
against  partner  and  partnership. — 
Patten  v.  Hill  County,  supra. 
Lack  of  personal  liability  as 'to  some 
items 

In  action  for  breach  of  agreement 

1051 


to  enter  into  partnership  and  for 
damages  for  conversion  of  property, 
plaintiff  has  been  held  not  entitled 
to  complain  of  entry  of  judgment  in 
favor  of  defendant  in  sum  estab- 
lished by  prior  judgment  as  debt 
owed  defendant  by  plaintiff  and  an- 
other jointly,  because  such  amount 
contained  items  for  which  plaintiff 
was  not  personally  liable,  where 
plaintiff  made  no  attempt  to  have  ju- 
ry find  sum  for  which  he  was  per- 
sonally liable,  and  had  made  no  ef- 
fort to  modify  judgment  in  prior  ac- 
tion.— Sanders  v.  O'Connor,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  98  S.W.2d  401,  error  dismissed. 

15.  Ill, — State  Bank  of  St.   Charles 
v.  Burr,  22  N.B.2d  941,  372  111.  114. 

16.  Pa. — Keagy    v.    Commonwealth, 
43  Pa.  70. 

34  C.J.  |p  716  note  23. 

17.  Neb. — Simpson    v.    Jennings,    19 
N.W.  473,  15  Neb.  -671. 

34  C.J.  p  716  note  24. 

18.  Tex. — Parrott  v.  Underwood,  10 
Tex.  48. 

19.  S.C.— Harrel  v.  Petty,  45   S.C.L. 
373. 

20.  N.Y. — Jacobs     v.     Tannenbaum, 
274    N.Y.S.   772,    242    App.Div.    833, 
appeal  dismissed  198  N.E.  567,  268 
N.Y.  705. 

34  C.J.  p  716  note  27. 

Mortgage  foreclosure  proceeding* 

Mortgagors  have  been  held  not  en- 
titled to  use  their  foreign  judgment 
against  mortgagee  for  fraud  in  ex- 
change of  land  for  mortgaged  land 
as  counterclaim  in  foreclosure  pro- 
ceeding by  assignee  of  mortgage. — 


§  572 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J,S. 


calling  for  a  relaxation  of  the  rule,21  as  where  the 
assignor  is  insolvent  and  the  judgment  was  recov- 
ered without  knowledge  of  the  assignment.22 
Where  the  assignee  of  a  claim  is  not  the  beneficial 
owner  thereof,  defendant  may  set  off  a  judgment 
against  his  assignor.28  In  an  action  by  assignees 
for  the  benefit  of  creditors  in  their  own  right  on  an 
indemnity  contract  for  an  employee's  defalcation, 
judgments  rendered  against  the  assignor  have  been 
held  not  pleadable  as  offsets.24 

§  572.    Set-Off  of  Claim  against  Judgment 

a.  In  general 

b.  Against  assigned  judgments 


a.  In  General 

Subject  to  some  exceptions,  In  an  action  or  other 
proceeding  to  collect  a  judgment  the  debtor  may  set 
off  any  legal  demands  against  the  plaintiff  wh'ch  he 
owned  at  the  time  of  the  bringing  of  the  suit,  and  on. 
which  he  could  have  brought  a  suit  in  his  own  name. 

Although  in  some  jurisdictions  it  has  been  held 
that,  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement  therefor,2*  a 
claim  not  reduced  to  judgment  may  not  be  set  off 
against  a  judgment,26  it  is  generally  held  that,  in 
an  action  or  other  proceeding  to  collect  a  judgment,, 
the  debtor  may  set  off  any  legal  demands  against 
plaintiff  which  he  owned  at  the  time  of  the  bringing 
of  the  suit,  and  on  which  he  could  have  brought  a 
suit  in  his  own  name,27  unless  the  claim  proposed 


Moore  T.  Southwell,  156  So.  631,  116 
Fla.  700. 

21.  Mich.— Bacon  v.  Reich,  80  N.TV. 
278,  121  Mich.  480,  49  L.R.A.  311. 

22.  Mich. — Bacon  v.  Reich,  supra. 

23.  Tex. — Koudsi  v.  Mathiwos,  Civ. 
App.,  147  S.W.2d  585. 

Vendor's  lien  notes 

In  action  on  vendor's  lien  notes  by 
assignee  who  was  not  beneficial  own- 
er  thereof,  maker  was  entitled  to  off- 
set a  judgment  obtained  against 
maker  as  surety  on  supersedeas  bond 
of  payee-assignor. — Koudsi  v.  Mathi- 
wos, supra. 

24.  Wis. — John  v.  Maryland  Casual- 
ty Co.,  242  N.W..201,  207  Wis.  589. 

Different  liability 

Judgments  were  not  pleadable  as 
offsets,  since  the  subject  matter  of 
the  action  brought  by  plaintiffs  was 
the  liability  of  defendant  to  plaintiffs 
by  virtue  of  its  indemnity  contract 
issued  to  plaintiffs,  and  the  liability 
sought  to  be  set  off  was  that  owing 
by  defendant  to  plaintiffs  as  succes- 
sors of  their  assignor. — John  v. 
Maryland  Casualty  Co.,  supra. 

25.  W.Va.— Lilly  v.  £ox,  56  S.E.  900, 
61  W.Va.  547. 

2&  Pa. — Keystone  Nat  Bank  of 
Manheim,  now  to  Use  of  Balmer 
v.  Deamer,  18  A.2d  540,  144  Pa.Su- 
j>er.  '52 — Kramer  v.  Moss,  90  Pa. 
Super.  550 — Continental  Mining  & 
Smelting  Corp.  v.  Duncan,  Com.Pl., 
9  Fay.LuJ.  95 — Latrobe  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  v.  Kahley,  Com.Pl.,  6  «Fay.L.J. 
242 — Dickel  v.  Tyson,  Com.Pl.,  50 
Lane. Rev.  •  163 — Heyer  -  Kemner, 
Inc.,  v.  Sachs,  Com.Pl.,  57  Montg. 
Co.  73 — Neff  v.  -Schmier,  Com.Pl., 
27  North.Co.  131— Sanders  v.  Krat- 
er,  Com.PL,  57  York  Leg.Rec.  33 — 
Hubler  v.  Drescher,  Com.Pl.,  55 
York  Leg.Rec.  133. 
34  C.J.  p  716  note  32. 

Ordinarily  demand  must  be  re- 
duced to  judgment  before  It  can  be 
set  off  against  judgment. — Parker  v. 
Reid,  273  P.  334,  137  Or,  578. 


27.  U.S. — Coffey  v.  Lawman,  C.C.A. 
Tenn.,  99  P.2d  245 — Atlantic  Refin- 
ing Co.  v.  U.  S.,  Ct.CL,  42  F.2d  342, 
certiorari  denied  51  S.Ct.  34,  2" 
U.S.  859,  75  L,Ed.  760. 

Ark.— Parker  v.  Baker,  114  S.W.2d 
23,  195  Ark.  761. 

CaL— Harrison  v.  Adams,  128  P.2d 
9,  20  Cal.2d  646 — Machado  v.  Borg- 
es,  150  P.  351,  170  Cal.  501. 

111.— State  Bank  of  St.  Charles  v. 
Burr,  22  KE.2d  941,  372  111.  114. 

Ind.— Brower  v.  Nellis,  33  N.E.  672, 
6  Ind.App.  323. 

Ky. — Congoleum-Nairn,  Inc.,  v.  M. 
Livingston  &  Co.,  78  S.W.2d  781, 
257  Ky.  573. 

La.— Hart  v.  Polizzotto,  131  So.  574, 
171  La.  493,  answers  conformed  to 
136  So.  598,  16  La.App.  444— Meri- 
wether  v.  Dorrity,  104  -So.  1'87,  158 
La.  405— Sliman  v:  Mahtook,  136 
So.  749,  17  La.App.  635. 

Miss. — Bettman-Dunlap  Co.  v.  Gertz, 
116  So.  299,  149  Miss.  892. 

N.M.— Bailey  v.  Great  Western  Oil 
Co.,  259  P.  614,  32  N.M.  478,  55  A. 
L.R.  467. 

Tex. — Harris  v.  Ware,  Civ.App.,  144 
S.W.2d  647. 

Va. — Dickenson  v.  Charles,  4  S.B.2d 
351,  173  Va.  393. 

34C.J.  p  716  note  33. 

Right  of  judgment  debtor  to  set  off 
claim  as  ground  for  injunction 
against  execution  of  judgment  see 
supra  §  370. 

Claim  changed  into  judgment 
,  Fact  that  form  of  claim  filed  as 
set-off  changed  into  judgment  during 
pendency  of  action  did  not  prevent 
set-off. — Gill  v.  Richmond  Co-op. 
Ass'n,  34  N.E.2d  509,  309  Mass.  73. 

Commnnity  property 

Judgment  for  wife  has  been  held 
not  community  property,  subject  to 
offset  of  husband's  debts  to  judgment 
debtors. — Douglas  v.  Smith,  Tex.Civ. 
App.,  297  S.W.  767. 

Discharge  in  bankruptcy 

Where  judgment  creditor  had  ob- 
tained discharge  in  bankruptcy, 

1052 


judgment  debtor,  assignee  of  judg- 
ment creditor's  notes,  could  not  set 
off  notes  against  judgment  which: 
had  been  assigned. — Bacher  v.  Lord, 
296  P.  1109,  88  Colo.  443. 

In  proceeding  in  aid  of  execution,. 

judgment  debtor  could  obtain  an 
e  Quit  able  set-off  of  any  financial  ob- 
ligation due  from  judgment  creditor 
arising  subsequent  to  the  action  and' 
presently  capable  of  ascertainment 
and  judicial  determination  by  the 
court — Southern  Surety  Co.  of  New 
York  r.  Maney,  121  P.2d  295,  190  OkL 
129. 

Judgment   debtor  held  not   owner 

of  claim  asserted  as  set-off. — Ran- 
dolph Junior  College  v.  Isaacks,  Tex. 
Civ.App.,  140  S.W.2d  459. 

Partnership  indebtedness  not  aris- 
ing from,  or  connected  with,  transac- 
tion in  which  note  was  given  cannot 
be  set  off  against  judgment  thereon. 
— Porter  v.  Kahl,  Tex.Civ.App.,  12  S. 
W.2d  674. 

Pleading  and  proof 

In  action  by  passenger  for  injuries, 
court  properly  refused  to  credit  judg- 
ment against  bus  company  with  sum 
paid  on  passenger's  hospital  fees, 
where  pleading  and  proof  were  not 
sufficiently  specific. — South  Plains 
Coaches  v.  Behringer,  Tex.Civ.App., 
32  S.W.2d  959,  error  dismissed. 

Time  of  application 

An  automobile  dealer,  attempting 
to  defeat  finance  company's  right  to 
apply  amount  of  "dealer's  reserve," 
held  by  such  company  as  additional 
security  against  loss  on  automobile 
mortgages  taken  over  by  it  from 
dealer,  to  reduction  of  dealer's  obli- 
gations to  company,  has  been  held 
not  entitled  to  application  thereof  as 
credit  on  principal  amount  of  judg- 
ment recovered  by  company  in  its  ac- 
tion against  dealer  for  amount  due 
on  such  mortgages,  before  addition 
of  interest  or  attorney's  fees — Franz- 
en  v.  Universal  Credit  Co.,  Tex.  Civ. 

p.,  132  S.W.2d  148,  error  dismissed, 
judgment  correct. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  572 


to  be  set  off  is  unliquidated  or  disputed,28  or  is  a 
joint  claim  where  the  judgment  is  several  or  vice 
versa,29  or  the  right  of  set-off  has  been  concluded  by 
a  former  judgment,30  or  the  effect  of  the  set-off 
would  be  to  attack  and  impair  a  judgment  regularly 
entered  in  another  action,31  or  unless,  except  under 
the  statutes  of  some  jurisdictions,32  it  could  have 
been  pleaded  in  defense  to  the  action  in  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered.33  The  dismissal  of  a  cred- 
itor's suit  on  the  ground  that  the  judgment  creditor 
is  indebted  to  the  judgment  debtor  on  a  note  in  an 
amount  equal  or  greater  than  the  amount  of  the 
judgment  does  not  satisfy  the  judgment.34 

Assigned  claim.  It  has  been  held  that  a  judg- 
ment debtor  may  set  off  claims  against  the  creditor 
which  were  acquired  after  assignment  of  the  judg- 
ment to  a  third  person  but  prior  to  notice  to  the 
debtor  of  the  assignment.35  In  order  for  an  as- 
signee of  a  claim  to  use  it  as  a  set-off  against  a 
judgment  against  him,  the  assignee  must  be  the 
beneficial  owner  of  the  claim.36 

Claim  of  federal  government.  Under  the  federal 
-  statute,  31  U.S.C.A.  §  227,  it  has  been  held  that  the 
federal  government  is  required  to  reduce  to  judg- 
ment a  claim  sought  to  be  set  off  against  a  judgment 


debt  due  by  it  whenever  the  judgment  creditor  de- 
nies the  claim  or  refuses  to  consent  to  the  set-off.37 

Claim  of  municipal  corporation.  Under  some 
statutes  a  municipal  corporation  may  compel  the  set- 
off  of  its  claim  against  a  judgment  creditor  as 
against  the  judgment  debt  due  by  it,  where  the  judg- 
ment creditor  fails  to  authorize  a  set-off.38 

b.  Against  Assigned  Judgments 

As  a  general  rule  the  assignee  of  a  Judgment  takes 
it  subject  to  the  right  of  the  defendant  to  set  off  against 
it  any  valid  claims  which  he  has  against  the  assignor, 
and  which  would  be  good  as  a  set-off  against  the  judg- 
ment in  the  assignor's  hands. 

As  a  general  rule  the  assignee  of  a  judgment 
takes  it  subject  to  the  right  of  the  debtor  to  set  off 
against  it  any  valid  claims  which  he  has  against  the 
assignor,  and  which  would  be  good  as  a  set-off 
against  the  judgment  in  the  assignor's  hands,39  al- 
though it  has  been  held  that  the  assignee  will  be 
protected  if  he  had  no  notice  of  the  judgment  debt- 
or's right  to  a  set-off.40  According  to  some  cases 
the  judgment  debtor  can  set  off  only  such  claims  or 
demands  as  accrued  to  him  or  were  acquired  by  him 
before  receiving  notice  of  the  assignment  of  the 
judgment,41  and  not  those  accruing  or  acquired  with 


28.  La. — Zibilich  v.  Rouseo,  103  So. 
260,  157  La.  936. 

Tex. — Dallas  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank 
of  Dallas  v.  Lancaster,  Civ.App., 
122  S.W.Sd  -659,  error  dismissed. 

34  C,J.  p  716  note  34. 

29.  U.S.— Cobb     v.     Haydock,     C.C. 
Conn.,     6     F.Cas.No.2,923,     Brunn. 
ColLCas.  91,  4  Day  472. 

30.  Ark. — Turley  v.  Gorman,  202  S. 
W.  822,  133  Ark.  473. 

Ky. — Campbell  v,  Mayhugh,  15  B. 
Mon.  142. 

31.  Mass. — Carter       v.       Exchange 
Trust  Co.,  10-S  N.E.  359,  220  Mass. 
543. 

34  C.J.  p  717  note  37. 

32.  Ky.— Bishop  v.  Bishop,  173  S.W. 
130,  162  Ky.  769. 

34  C.J.  p  717  note  38. 

33.  111. — Tegrtmeyer    v.    Tegrtmeyer, 
53    N.E.2d   487,    321   Ill.App.   573. 

Or.— Parker  v.  Reid,  273  P.  334,  127 

Or.  578. 
Tex. — Porter  v.  Kahl,  Civ.App.,.  12  S. 

W.2d  674. 
34  C.J.  P  717  note  39. 

34.  Neb.— 'Lashmett  v.  Prall.  120  N. 
W.  206,  83  Neb.  732. 

35.  Cal. — Harrison  v.  Adams,  128  P. 
2d  9,  20  Cal.2d  646. 

Claims  against  assigned  judgments 
see  infra  subdivision  b  of  this  sec- 
tion, 

36.  Cal. — Harrison  v.  Adams,  supra. 
Claim,  assigned  for  collection 

Allowing  a  judgment  debtor  to  set 
off  against  judgment  creditor's  claim, 


a  claim  assigned  to  the  judgment 
debtor  for  collection  would  violate 
rule  requiring  mutuality  of  parties 
in  order  to  authorize  set-oft. — Harri- 
son v.  Adams,  sirpra. 

37.  D.C.— Hines  v.  U.  S.  ex  rel. 
Marsh,  105  P.2d  85,  70  App.D.C. 
206.. 

Insurance  judgments 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  statutes 
giving  administrator  of  veterans'  af- 
fairs   discretionary   power   to   deter- 
mine  questions   regarding  insurance 
benefits   due   veterans   does   not  au- 
thorize     set-off      by      administrator 
against     insurance     judgments     and 
does  not  take  them  out  of  operation 
of  statute  relating  to  set-off. — Hines 
v.  U.  S.  ex  rel.  Marsh,  supra. 

(2)  It    has    also    been    held    that 
where    comptroller    general    of    the 
United  States  had  three  distinct  op- 
portunities to   reduce  claim  against 
veteran  to  judgment  so  as  to  obtain 
set-off    against    insurance    judgment 
in  favor  of  veteran  but  failed  to  ex- 
ercise opportunity,   the  court  would 
not    grant    another    opportunity    to 
have  the  court  determine  the  ques- 
tion.—Hines  v.  U.  S.  ex  rel.  Marsh, 
supra. 

3a  Pa.— City  of  Pittsburgh  v.  Grib- 
bin,  51  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  587,  92 
Pittsb.Leg.J.  433. 

Claim  for  taxes 
A  rule  by  a  city  to  show  cause  why 

a  judgment  awarded  as  damages  for 

property  taken  in  a  street  improve- 

1053 


merit  should  not  be  a  set-off  against 
a  claim  for  delinquent  city  taxes  and 
costs  was  made  absolute,  where  the 
unpaid  taxes  included  taxes  on  real 
estate  other  than  that  involved  in 
the  viewers'  report—  -City  of  Pitts- 
burgh v.  Gribbin,  supra. 
'.  Cal.  —  Harrison  v.  Adams,  128  P. 
2d  9,  20  Cal.2d  646—  Arp  v.  Blake, 
24-8  P.  750,  78  CaLApp.  713. 
N.Y.—  Keon  v.  Saxton  &  Co.,  178  N. 
E.  679,  257  N.Y.  412,  reargument 
denied  ISO  N.E.  340,  258  N.Y.  578. 
34  C.J.  p  717  note  41. 

Counterclaim  against  assignee  of 
judgment  does  not  permit  of  recov- 
ery of  more  than  assignee's  claim.  — 
Keon  v.  Saxton  &  Co.,  supra. 


TTnliquidatedl 

(1)  It  has  been  held,  in  a  suit  on  a 
judgment   by  an   assignee,    that   an 
unliquidated    claim    against    the    as- 
signer  for  breach  of  contract  was  not 
allowable    as    a    statutory    set-off.  — 
Hall   v.   Wilder   Mfg.    Co.,    293    S.W. 
7-60,  316  Mo.  812,  -52  A.L.R.  723. 

(2)  It    was    also    held,    however,. 
that,   where   a  nonresident  assignor 
was  real  party  in  interest,  defendant 
might  be  permitted  to  show  right  to- 
equitable     set-off     for     unliquidated 
claim.—  Hall  v.  Wilder  Mfg.  Co.,  su- 
pra. 

40.  Tex.  —  Porter  v.   Kahl,  Civ.App.,. 
12  S.W.2d  674. 

34  C.J.  p  717  note  42. 

41.  I1L—  Himrod   v.    Baugh,    85    111- 
435. 


§  573 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


knowledge  of  the  assignment.42  It  has  also  been 
held,  however,  that  when  the  judgment  creditor  is 
insolvent  a  court  of  equity  will  allow  the  set-off  in 
cases  where,  although  the  right  thereto  had  not 
actually  accrued  at  the  time  of  the  assignment,  yet 
a  liability  then  existed  under  which  a  right  of  set- 
off  against  the  insolvent  subsequently  accrued.43 
It  has  also  been  held  that  in  an  action  on  a  judg- 
ment in  the  name  of  a  judgment  creditor,  for  the 
benefit  of  an  assignee  of  the  judgment,  defendant 
cannot  set  off  a  debt  due  to  him  from  the  assignee.44 

§  573.     Satisfaction  by  Execution  or  Enforce- 
ment 

a.  Levy  of  execution 

b.  Sale  on  execution 

c.  Payment  of  execution 

d.  Return  of  execution 

e.  Arrest  of  defendant  on  capias  or  exe- 

cution 

a.  Levy  of  Execution 

The  levy  of  an  execution  on  sufficient  personal  prop- 
erty of  the  judgment  debtor  to  pay  the  Judgment  amounts 
prima  facie,  and  as  long  as  the  levy  continues,  in  force, 
to  a  satisfaction  of  the  judgment,  as.  between  the  par- 
ties thereto.  A  levy  of  execution  on  real  estate,  as  a 
general  rule,  does  not  amount  even  prima  facie  to  a 
satisfaction  of  the  judgment. 

The  levy  of  an  execution  on  sufficient  personal 
property  of  the  judgment  debtor  to  pay  the  judg- 
ment amounts  prima  facie,  and  as  long  as  the  levy 
continues  in  force,  to  a  satisfaction  of  the  judgment, 
as  between  the  parties  thereto.45  If  the  judgment 
creditor  denies  the  actual  satisfaction  of  the  judg- 
ment, the  burden  is  on  him  to  prove  that  the  execu- 


tion and  levy  for  some  sufficient  reason  failed  to 
result  in  payment  of  the  judgment.46  Since  a  levy 
of  execution  on  real  estate  of  the  judgment  debtor 
does  not  interfere  with  the  title  or  possession  of 
the  debtor,  it  does  not  amount  even  prima  facie  to  a 
satisfaction  of  the  judgment.*?  It  is  otherwise  if 
the  creditor  takes  and  retains  possession  of  the 
land,48  or  if  it  is  set  off  and  delivered  to  him  under 
an  elegit  or  otherwise.49 

The  presumption  of  satisfaction  of  a  judgment 
from  levy  on  personal  property  is  rebutted  by  proof 
that  defendant  was  not  in  fact  deprived  of  his  prop- 
erty as  the  result  of  the  levy;50  that  he  tortiously 
or  fraudulently  recovered  it  from  the  possession  of 
the  officer;51  that  it  was  taken  under  a  senior  exe- 
cution or  other  prior  lien52  or  otherwise  removed 
from  the  possession  of  plaintiff  or  the  officer  by 
process  of  law;53  that  the  property  levied  on  did 
not  in  fact  belong  to  defendant54  or  was  insufficient 
to  satisfy  the  judgment,55  or  generally  that  the 
property  could  not  be  made  available  for  the  satis- 
faction of  plaintiff's  claims,56  without  any  fault  or 
negligence  on  his  part,57  although  if  it  is  lost  or 
wasted  by  the  fault  or  neglect  of  the  sheriff,  the 
rule,  except  in  some  jurisdictions,58  is  that  the 
judgment  is  satisfied.59  A  levy  on  real  property 
cannot  be  deemed  a  satisfaction  where  its  enforce- 
ment is  prohibited  by  a  decree  of  court.60 

Release  or  surrender  of  levy.  If  property  levied 
on  under  execution  is  abandoned  or  surrendered  or 
restored  to  the  judgment  debtor,  either  on  his  giv- 
ing collateral  security  or  voluntarily  by  the  creditor, 
so  that  the  latter  derives  no  benefit  from  his  execu- 
tion, there  is  no  satisfaction  of  the  judgment,61 


Tex. — Townsend   v.    Quinan,   47   Tex. 
1. 

42.  Md. — Berry  v.   Protestant   Epis- 
copal   Church    Convention,    7    Md. 
564. 

Mass.— Avery  v.   Russell,    125   Mass. 
S71. 

43.  Cal. — Coonan   v.   Loewenthal,  18! 
P.    527,   147   Cal.    218,    109   Am.S.R. 
128. 

Tex.— Ellis  v.   Kerr,   Civ.App.,   23   S. 
W.  1050. 

44.  N.Y. — Raymond    v.    Wheeler,    9 
Cow.  295. 

45.  N.J.— Corpus      Jnris      cited     in 
Schneider  v.   Schmidt,   136   A.  740, 
741,  101  N.J.Eq.  140. 

34  C.J.  p  717  note  48. 

Levy  as  satisfaction  of  execution  see 

Executions  §  336. 

"A  levy  on  personal  property  under 
an  execution  is  not  an  absolute  sat- 
isfaction of  the  judgment." — Schnei- 
der v.  Schmidt,  136  A.  740,  741.  101  N. 
J.EQ.  140. 


46.  Ga.— Dowdell  v.  Neal,  10  Ga.  14S 
— Newsom  v.  McLendon,  6  Ga.  392. 

47.  Colo. — Xew  Zealand   Ins.  Co.  v. 
Maaz,  59  P.  213,  13  Colo.App.  493. 

Mich.— Ackerman  v.  Pfent,  108  N.W. 

1084,  145  Mich.  710. 
34  C.J.  p  718  note  51. 

48.  Vt.— Moore  v.  McMillan,  54  Vt. 
27. 

34  C.J.  p  718  note  52. 

49.  Del. — Hinesly   v.    Hunn,    5    Del. 
236. 

N.H.— Thomas  v.  Platts,  43  N.H.  629. 
Ba     N.J.— Schneider  v.  Schmidt,  136 

A.  740,  101  N.J.Eq.  140. 
34  C.  J.  p  718  note  54. 

51.  111.— Nelson  v.  Rockwell,  14  111. 
375. 

N.Y.— Mickles  v.   Haskin,    11  Wend. 
12-5. 

52.  N.J.— Schneider  v.   Schmidt,   136 
A.  740,  101  N.J.EQ.  140. 

34  C.J.  p  718  note  56. 

53.  111. — Peoria    Savings,    Loan     & 

1054 


Trust   Co.   v.  Elder,  45  N.E.   1083, 
165  111.  55. 
34  C.J.  p  718  note  57. 

54.  Cal. — Scherr  v.  Himmelmann,  53 
Cal.  312. 

55.  111.— Chandler    v.    Higgins,     109 
111.  602. 

34  C.J.  p  718  note  59. 

56.  N.H.— Whittemore  v.  Carkin,  58 
N.H.  576. 

34  C.J.  p  718  note  -60. 

57.  Va. — Saunders  v.  Prunty,   17   S. 
E.  231,  89  Va.  921. 

34  C.J.  p  71i8  note  61. 

5a    N.J.— Banta  v.  McClennan,  14  N. 
J.Ed.  120. 

59.  111.— Harris  v.  Evans,  81  111.  419. 
34  C.J.  p  718  note  63. 

60.  Ind. — Johnson  v.   State,   80   Ind. 
220. 

61.  N.T.— Schneider  v.  Schmidt,  136 
A.  '740,  101  N.J.BQ.  140. 

34  C.J.  p  718  note  66. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  573 


at  least  as  between  the  parties,  although  it  is  said  to 
be  otherwise  as  against  other  creditors  of  the  judg- 
ment defendant.62 

Levy  on  property  of  person  jointly  liable.  Ex- 
cept in  some  jurisdictions,63  a  joint  judgment 
against  two  defendants  is  prima  facie  satisfied  by 
levy  of  execution  on  the  property  of  one  of  them;64 
but  there  is  no  absolute  satisfaction  if  the  levy 
proves  unproductive  or  the  property  is  released  or 
restored  to  the  debtor,65  unless  the  other  defendant 
occupies  the  position  of  a  mere  surety,66  and  not 
even  then,  according  to  some  decisions.67  It  has 
been  held  that  a  plaintiff  who  has  recovered  sep- 
arate judgments  against  joint  trespassers  and  tak- 
en out  execution  on  one  of  them,  without  obtaining 
satisfaction,  cannot  maintain  an  action  on  any  of 
the  other  judgments.68 

b.  Sale  on  Execution  . 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Void  or  irregular  sale 

(1)  In  General 

Ordinarily,  where  property  of  the  debtor  Is  sold  on 
execution,  and  the  sale  stands,  the  judgment  Is  satis- 
fled  to  the  extent  of  the  net  proceeds  of  the  sale. 

Ordinarily,  where  property  of  the  debtor  is  sold 
on  execution,  and  the  sale  stands,  the  judgment  is 
satisfied  to  the  extent  of  the  net  proceeds  of  the 
sale.69  The  judgment  under  which  the  sale  is  made, 
as  distinguished  from  some  other  judgment,70  is  ex- 


tinguished by  the  sale  on  execution  and  the  pay- 
ment of  the  amount  bid  when  sufficient  to  cover 
the  amount  due  and  costs.71  It  is  sufficient  for  this 
purpose  if  the  money  is  actually  collected  by  the 
sheriff  or  paid  into  court.72  Also  the  judgment  is 
satisfied  where  plaintiff  receipts  the  execution,  even 
though  as  a  matter  of  fact  he  gives  credit  and  the 
purchaser  does  not  perform  his  obligation.7^  Usual- 
ly, if  the  judgment  creditor  himself  becomes  the 
purchaser  at  the  sale,  the  judgment  is  satisfied  in 
full  if  he  bids  the  whole  amount  due  him,  otherwise 
pro  tanto,74  provided,  in  jurisdictions  where  this  is 
necessary,  the  sale  is  reported  to,  and  confirmed  by, 
the  court,75  and  the  sheriff's  deed  is  executed  to 
the  judgment  creditor.76  In  the  absence  of  a  statute 
to  the  contrary,77  it  has  been'  held  that  the  fact  that 
the  value  of  the  property  purchased  by  the  judg- 
ment creditor  exceeds  the  amount  of  the  judgment 
does  not  render  such  purchase  a  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment  where  the  purchase  price  was  less  than 
the  amount  of  the  judgment.78  It  has  also  been 
held  that  a  redemption  from  a  sheriffs  sale  under  a 
prior  judgment  is  not  a  satisfaction  of  the  junior 
judgment  of  the  redeeming  creditor.™ 

Mortgaged  property.  The  facts  that  plaintiff 
causes  an  execution  to  be  levied  on  defendant's 
property  and  at  the  sale  thereunder  bids  a  sum  suf- 
ficient to  pay  his  judgment  and  costs  do  not  op- 
erate as  a  payment  of  his  judgment  where  the  prop- 
erty is  covered  by  a  mortgage  and  is  subsequently 


62.  Ga. — Newsom    v.    McLendon,    -6 
Ga.  392. 

34  C.J,  p  719  note  67. 

63.  Ark.— Walker  v.  Bradley,  2  Ark. 
578. 

64.  Miss.— Kershaw    v.     Merchants' 
Bank,  8  Miss.  386,  40  Am.D.  70. 

S.C.— Davis  v.  Barkley,  17  S.C.L,.  140. 
34  C.J.  p  719  note  69. 

65.  Pa.— Slater's  Appeal,  28  Pa.  169. 
Wis.— -Hyde  v.  Rogers,  17  N.W.  127, 

59  Wis.  154. 

66.  Cal,— Mulford    v.    Estudillo,    23 
Cal.  94. 

34  C.J.  p  719  note  71. 

67.  Wash.— Murray  v.  Meade,  32  P. 
780,  5  Wash.  693. 

68.  Mich. — Boardman    v.    Acer,     13 
Mich.  77,  87  Am.D.  736. 

69.  111. — Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 
Benj.    Harris    &    Co.    v.    Western 
Smelting  &  Refining  Co.,  54  N.B.2d 
900,  914,  322  Ill.Ap>p.  $09. 

Ind. — Richmond  v.  Marston,  15  Ind. 

134. 
34  C.J.  p  719  note  74. 

70.  111. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Benj.    Harris    &    Co.    v.    Western 
Smelting  &  Refining  Co.,  54  N.B.2d 
900,  914,  322  IlLApp.  609. 


Pa.— State  Bank  v.  Winger,  1  Rawle 
295,  18  Am.D.  633. 

71.  111. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Benj.    Harris    &    Co.    v.    Western 
Smelting  &  Refining  Co.,  54  N.E.2d 
900,  914,  322  IlLApp.  609.     • 

34  C.J.  p  719  note  76. 

72.  111.— Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Benj.    Harris    &    Co.    v.    Western 
Smelting  &  Refining  Co.,  54  N.E.2d 
900,  914,  322  IlLApp.  609. 

34  C.J.  p  719  notes  77,  78. 

73.  N.Y.— Briggs  v.  Simson,  60  N.Y. 
641. 

74.  111.— Corpus     JurU     quoted     to 
Benj.    Harris    &   Co.    v.    Western 
Smelting  &  Refining  Co.,  54  N.E.2d 
900,  914,  322  IlLApp.  609. 

34  C.J.  P  719  note  80. 

75.  Ala.— McGaugh     v.      Frankfort 
Deposit.  Bank,  38  So.  181,  141  Ala. 
434. 

76.  Mo. — Chaonia  State  Bank  v.  Sol- 
lars,    176    -S.W.    263,    190    Mo.App. 
2*84. 

34  C.J.  p  719  note  83. 

77.  Pa.— Union    Trust    Co.    of   New 

1055 


Castle  v.  Tutino,   44  A.2d  -556,   353 

Pa,  145. 

The  intent  of  the  legislature  in  en- 
acting the  Deficiency  Judgment  Act 
was  to  protect  judgment  debtors 
whose  real  estate  is  sold  in  execu- 
tion, by  requiring  plaintiff  to  give 
credit  for  value  of  property  he  pur- 
chased at  his  execution  and  not 
merely  to  credit  the  price  at  which 
it  was  sold. — Union  Trust  Co.  of  New 
Castle  v.  Tutino,  supra. 
Redemption  statute 

Where  property  is  redeemed  under 
redemption  statute  by  judgment 
creditor  and  the  value  of  the  prop- 
erty exceeds  the  amount  of  judg- 
ment, and  the  sum'  paid  for  redemp- 
tion, the  judgment  on  which  the 
right  of  redemption  is  based  is  satis- 
fied •  and  discharged. — Hughes  v. 
Young,  120  P.2d  396,  58  Ariz.  349,  13S 
A.L.R.  943. 

78.  Mo. — Sulzer  v.  Sulzer,   193  S.W. 
572. 

79.  N.T. — Van  Home  v.  McLaren,  8 
-  Paige  285,  35  Am.D.  685. 

Redemption  by  Judgment  creditor  as 
satisfaction  of  judgment  generally 
see  Executions  §  263  b. 


§  573 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


taken  thereunder  so  that  plaintiff  realizes  nothing 
on  his  judgment.80 

(2)  Void  or  Irregular  Sale 

If  a  sale  on  execution  Is  set  aside  or  held  to  be 
Invalid  by  reason  of  any  defects  or  irregularities,  the 
judgment  is  not  discharged.  The  authorities  are  divided 
on  the  question  as  to  whether  the  purchaser's  bid  is  a 
satisfaction  of  the  judgment  to  the  extent  of  the  sum 
bid,  where  the  sale  was  invalid  because  the  debtor  had 
no  title  to  the  property  sold. 

If  a  sale  on  execution  is  set  aside  or  held  to  be 
invalid  by  reason  of  any  defects  or  irregularities, 
the  judgment  is  not  discharged81  although  the  pur- 
chaser paid  the  amount  bid82  and  the  judgment  cred- 
itor's attorneys  signed  a  receipt  acknowledging  that 
judgment  was  satisfied.83  It  has  been  held  that, 
notwithstanding  the  invalidity  of  the  sale  and  its 
failure  to  satisfy  the  judgment,  the  debtor  may 
show  that  the  purchase  price  was  received  by  agree- 
ment in  satisfaction  of  the  judgment84 

Where  the  sale  was  invalid  because  the  debtor 
had  no  title  to  the  property  sold,  the  question 
whether  the  purchaser's  bid  is  a  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment  to  the  extent  of  the  sum  bid  is  one  on 
which  the  authorities  are  divided.85  In  some  juris- 
dictions the  judgment  is  held  to  be  satisfied,86  espe- 
cially where  the  judgment  creditor  himself  was  the 
purchaser.87  In  other  jurisdictions  there  is  no  sat- 
isfaction of  the  judgment  under  such  circumstanc- 
es,88 and  a  creditor  who  has  himself  purchased  the 
property  may  obtain  relief  in  a  court  of  equity;8^ 
but  a  remedy  in  equity  does  not  exist  when  the  title 
acquired  is  good  so  far  as  it  goes  but  does  not  con- 
fer the  quantum  of  estate  which  the  purchaser  ex- 
pected to  get  under  his  purchase.90  The  jurisdic- 


tion in  equity  is  not  taken  away  by  the  creation  of 
a  remedy  by  statute.91  Where  a  statutory  remedy 
exists92  it  should  be  liberally  construed.93 

A  sale  of  exempt  property  is  a  satisfaction  ac- 
cording to  some  authorities,94  but  not  according 
to  other  authorities.95 

c.  Payment  of  Execution 

A  judgment  is  satisfied  where  the  sheriff  or  other 
officer  holding  an  execution  on  the  judgment  and  au- 
thorized to  receive  payment  receives  a  sufficient  amount 
of  lawful  money  in  payment. 

A  judgment  is  satisfied  where  the  sheriff  or  other 
officer  holding  an  execution  on  the  judgment,96  and 
authorized  to  receive  payment,97  receives  a  suffi- 
cient amount  in  lawful  money  in  payment,98  wheth- 
er the  payment  is  lent  or  advanced  to  him;99  but 
where  money  is  paid  by  a  third  person  to  a  sheriff 
who  has  in  his  hands  an  execution,  with  the  ex- 
•pectation  and  intention  that  the  judgment  creditor 
shall  assign  to  him  the  judgment  on  which  the  exe- 
cution was  issued,  which  the  judgment  creditor 
does,  the  transaction  is  a  purchase,  and  not  a  pay- 
ment of  the  judgment.1 

d.  Return  of  Execution 

A  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  may  be  shown  by  an 
officer's  return  of  execution  certified  in  a  manner  pre- 
scribed by  law. 

A  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  may  be  shown  by 
an  officer's  return  of  execution  certified  in  the  man- 
ner prescribed  by  law.2  The  return  of  an  execu- 
tion "satisfied"  is  presumptive,3  or,  according  to 
some  of  the  cases,  conclusive,4  evidence  of  the  sat- 
isfaction of  the  judgment,  except  where  it  recites 
an  irregular  or  unauthorized  act  on  the  part  of  the 


80.    Mo. — Schneider  v.   Johnson,   147 

S.W.  538,  164-Mo.App.   639. 
SI.    U.S.— Favour  v.  Hill,  C.C.A.Ariz., 

123  'F.2d  77,  directive  order  denied 

136  F.2d  489. 
34  C.J.  p  719  note  86. 
Void  or  irregular  sale  as  ground  for 

vacation   of   entry   of  satisfaction 

see  infra  §  584. 
82.     U.S. — Favour  v.  Hill,  supra. 

33.  U.S. — Favour  v.   Hill,   supra. 

34.  Minn.— Shelley  v.  Lash,  14  Minn. 
498. 

€5.  Ark.— Sturdivant  v.  Ward,  119 
S.W.  247,  90  Ark.  321,  134  Am,S.R. 
32. 

34  C.J.  p  720  note  30. 

86.  Pa.— Tonge   v.   Kadford,    156   A. 
814,  103  Pa.Super.  131. 

34  C.J.  p  720  note  91. 

87.  Ala. — Thomas  v.  Glazener,  8  So. 
15S,   90  Ala.   537,  34  Am.S.R.  830. 

34  O.J.  p  720  note  91. 

88.  Ark.— Sturdivant  v.  Ward,  119  S. 


W.   247,   90  Ark.   321,   134  Am.S.R. 

32. 

34  C.J.  p  720  note  92. 
83.    111.— Bressler  v.  Martin,  24  N.B. 

518,  133  111.  278. 
34  C.J.  p  720  note  93. 

90.  Tenn. — Gonce  v.  McCoy,  49  S.W. 
754,  101  Tenn.  587,  70  Am.S.R.  714. 

34  C.J.  p  720  note  94. 

91.  Tenn. — Smith  v.  Taylor,  11  -Lea 
738. 

34  C.J.  p  720  note  95. 

98.    Cal. — Hitchcock  v.  Caruthers,  34 

P.  '627,  100  Cal.  100. 
34  C.J.  p  '720  note  96. 

93.  Cal. — Hitchcock     v.     Caruthers, 
supra — Cross  v.  Zane,  47  Cal.  -602. 

94.  Ala. — Johnson  v.  Motlow,  47  So. 
568,  157  Ala.  405. 

95.  Wash. — Calhoun  v.  Quinlan,  150 
P.  1132,  86  Wash.  547. 

96.  Okl. — Southern     Pine      Lumber 
Co.  v.  Ward,  85  P.  459,  16  Okl.  131, 

1056 


affirmed  28  S.Ct.  239,  208  U.S.  126, 
52  L.Ed.  420. 
34  C.J.  p  720  note  4. 

97.     Ala.— Chapman    v.    Cowles,    41 

Ala.  103,  91  Am.D,  508. 
34  C.J.  P  720  note  5. 
9a     N.C.— Motz    v.    Stowe,    -83    N.C. 

434. 

34  C.J.  p  720  notes  4,  7. 
99.    Ala. — Thompson   v.    Wallace,    3 

Ala.  132: 
34  C.J.  p  720  note  8. 

1.  N.Y.— Smith    v.    Miller,    25    N.Y. 
619. 

2.  Tex.— Citizens     State     Bank     of 
Clarinda,  Iowa,  v.  Del-Tex  Inv.  Co., 
Civ.App.,  123  S.W.2d  450,  error  dis- 
missed. 

3.  Md.— Parker  v.   Sedgwick,   5  Md. 
2-S1. 

34  C.J.  p  720  note  10. 

4.  N.a— Walters  v.  Moore,  $0  N.C. 
41. 

34  C.  J.  p  720  note  11. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


575 


officer.5  Where  the  officer  actually  received  satis- 
faction of  the  execution,  the  judgment  is  dis- 
charged, although  he  makes  no  return  on  the  exe- 
cution or  makes  a  false  return,6  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  no  satisfaction  is  shown  from  the  mere  fact 
that  an  execution  was  issued  and  never  returned.7 

e.  Arrest  of  Defendant  on  Capias  or  Execution 

The  arrest  and  Imprisonment  of  a  Judgment  debtor 
on  an  execution  or  a  capias  ad  satisfaciendum  do  not 
work  an  absolute  discharge  or  extinguishment  of  the 
judgment. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  otherwise,8 
the  arrest  and  imprisonment  of  a  judgment  debtor 
on  an  execution  or  a  capias  ad  satisfaciendum  con- 
stitute a  satisfaction  of  the  judgment  in  such  sense 
that,  while  the  imprisonment  lasts,  no  proceedings 
may  be  taken  against  his  property,9  and  no  incon- 
sistent remedy  may  be  maintained  by  the  judgment 
creditor  against  a  third  person,10  but  they  do  not 
work  an  absolute  discharge  or  extinguishment  of  the 
judgment11 

Release  or  escape  of  debtor.  At  common  law  the 
discharge  of  defendant  from  custody  under  a  capias, 
by  the  voluntary  act  of  plaintiff,  operated  as  an  ab- 
solute satisfaction  of  the  judgment,12  but  in  a  num- 
ber of  jurisdictions  this  rule  has  been  changed  by 
statutes  which  preserve  the  right  of  the  creditor  if 
the  debtor  is  voluntarily  discharged.13  Further 
proceedings  on  the  judgment  are  not  precluded  if 


defendant  regains  his  liberty  by  an  escape14  or  by 
operation  of  the  law.15 

Release  of  joint  debtor.  In  the  absence  of  a  stat- 
ute providing  otherwise,16  the  release  or  escape  of 
one  joint  defendant  who  is  imprisoned  discharges 
the  judgment  as  to  all  defendants.17 

§  574.    Other  Means  of  Satisfaction 

A  decree  against  an  administrator  may  be  satisfied 
by  the  distribution  of  the  estate  according  to  law. 

A  decree  against  an  administrator  may  be  satis- 
fied by  the  distribution  of  the  estate  according  to 
law.18  A  sale  by  a  creditor  to  a  debtor  of  an  exe- 
cution issued  on  a  judgment  satisfies  the  claim  of 
plaintiff.19 

Purchase  by  creditor  at  foreclosure  sale.  Where 
plaintiff  lent  money  to  defendant,  taking  a  deed  to 
land  subject  to  a  contract  to  convey  to  a  third  per- 
son on  payment  by  such  person  of  an  amount  equal 
to  the  sum  lent  defendant,  and  on  default  of  defend- 
ant obtained  a  judgment  against  him  for  such 
amount  and  foreclosed  the  land  contract  and  bought 
at  the  sale,  bidding  an  amount  equal  to  the  judg- 
ment against  defendant,  the  judgment  was  thereby  * 
satisfied,  the  creditor's  position  being  the  same  as 
that  of  a  mortgagee  buying  at  a  foreclosure  sale.20 

§  575.    Satisfaction  of  One  of  Several  Judg- 
ments on  Same  Cause  of  Action 

Where   two   judgments   are   recovered  on   the   same 


5.  Iowa. — Hawkeye  Ins.  Co.  v.  Luck- 
ow,  39  NVW,  923,  76  Iowa  21. 

34  C.J.  p  721  note  12, 

6.  Ind. — State    v.    Salyers,    19    Ind. 
432. 

34  C.  J.  p  721  note  13. 

7.  N.J. — Runyan  v.  Weir,  -8  N.J.Law 
286. 

&  Mass. — Crawford-Plummer  Co.  v. 
McCarthy,  116  N.E.  576,  227  Mass. 
350— Twining  v.  Foot,  S  Cush.  512. 

9.  Mich.— Baehr  v.  Decker,  274  N.W. 
339,  2SO  Mich.  590. 

N.Y.— Parascandola  v.  Auditore,  213 
X.Y.S.  463,  215  App.Div.  277,  ap- 
peal dismissed  152  N.E.  432,  242 
N.Y.  671. 

34  C.J.  p  721  note  16. 

10.  N.Y.— Beloit  Bank  v.  Beale,   34 
N.Y.  473. 

34  C.J.  p  721  note  17. 

11.  N.Y. — Parascandola  v.  Auditore, 
213   N.Y.S.   463,    215   App.Div.   277, 
appeal  dismissed  152  N.E.  432,  242 
N.Y.  571. 

34  C.J.  p  721  note  18. 

12.  Me: — Vesanen  v.  Pohjola,  36  A. 
2d  575,  140  Me.  216. 

34  C.J.  p  721  note  19. 

13.  Me. — Vesanen  v.  Pohjola,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  721  note  20. 

49C.J.S.-67 


Release  on  oral  direction 

It  has  been  held  that,  where  an 
execution  debtor,  on  his  promise  to 
•pay  weekly  installments,  was  re- 
leased from  imprisonment  on  the 
creditor's  oral  direction  to  the  jailer, 
the  judgment  was  not  satisfied,  or 
the  debt  discharged,  although  the 
statute  provides  for  the  debtor's  re- 
lease by  written  permission. — Vesan- 
en v.  Pohjola,  supra, 

14.  S.C.— Saunders  v.  McCool,  32  S. 
C.L.  22. 

34  C.J.  p  721  note  21. 

15.  Mich.-— Baehr  v.  Decker,  274  N. 
W.  339,  280  Mich.  590. 

34  C.J.  p  721  note  22. 

Discharge  for  refusal  to  pay  fees 

The  discharge  of  debtor  from  pris- 
on on  refusal  of  creditor  to  pay  pris- 
on fees  does  not  discharge  judgment. 
— Baehr  v.  Decker,  supra — 34  C.J.  p 
721  note  22  [d]. 
Insolvent  debtor's  act 

A  judgment  against  defendant  who 
is  in  custody  under  writ  of  capias  ad 
satisfaciendum  is  not  satisfied  by  de- 
fendant's discharge  under  insolvent 
debtor's  act — Baehr  v.  Decker,  su- 
pra. 
Invalid  process 

A  discharge  of -defendant  by  order 

1057 


of  the  court,  because  the  process  un- 
der which  he  was  detained  is  of  no 
validity,  does  not  satisfy  the  judg- 
ment.— Porrett  v.  Lauer's  Estate,  1*51 
N.W.  619,  184  Mich.  497—5  C.J.  p  517 
note  86. 

18L  UJ3.— Hunter  v.  U.  S.,  R.I.,  5 
Pet  173,  8  L.Ed.  86— U.  S.  v.  Stans- 
bury,  Md.,  1  Pet.  573,  7  lL.Ed.  267. 

Mass. — Raymond  v.  Butterworth,  1 
N.E.  126,  139  Mass.  471. 

17.  Mich.— Seitovitz  v.  London,   229 
N.W.  '590,  249  Mich.  567. 

34  C.J.  p  722  note  24. 

Beiease  with  plaintiff's  consent 

At  common  law,  release  with 
plaintiff's  consent  of  joint  defendant 
taken  under  capias  ad  satisfacien- 
dum, amounts  to  satisfaction  of 
judgment — Seitovitz  v.  London,  su- 
pra. 

18.  Mich. — Brown  v.  "Fletcher's  Es- 
tate, 109  N.W.  68-6,   146  Mich.  401, 
15    L.R.A.,N,S.,    632,    123    Am.S.R. 
632,  affirmed  28  S.Ct  702,  210  U.S. 
82,  £2  L.Ed.  966. 

19.  Ga.— Walker  v.  O'Neill  Mfg.  Co., 
58  S.B.  475,  128  Ga.  831. 

20.  Wash. — Magnoni  v.  Bono,  180  P. 
'888,  106  Wash.  600. 


§  575 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


cause  of  action  against  the  same  defendant,  there  can 
be  but  one  satisfaction,  and,  therefore,  the  payment  or 
discharge  of  either  judgment  satisfies  the  other,  except 
as  to  costs. 

Where  two  judgments  are  recovered  on  the  same 
cause  of  action  against  the  same  defendant,  there 
can  be  but  one  satisfaction,  and,  therefore,  the  pay- 
ment or  discharge  of  either  judgment  satisfies  the 
other,21  except  as  to  costs.22  Where  a  judgment  is 
rendered  on  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  another 
state,  a  payment  of  either  judgment  discharges  the 
obligation  of  the  other. judgment.23 

Where  one  of  the  judgments  is  for  a  smaller 
amount  than  the  other,  it  has  been  held  that  the  sat- 
isfaction of  the  smaller  does  not  satisfy  the  larger 
in  full,24  although  other  authorities  hold  that  it 
does,25  notwithstanding  an  agreement  between  the 
creditor  and  the  debtor  that  the  payment  of  the 
smaller  judgment  shall  be  only  a  pro  tanto  satis- 
faction of  the  larger  judgment;26  but  the  creditor 
cannot  be  deprived  of  his  right  to  elect  to  refuse 
satisfaction  of  the  smaller  judgment.27 


§  575.    Against  Different  Persons 

in  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  where 
several  judgments  are  rendered  against  different  per- 
sons for  the  same  cause  of  action,  payment  of  one 
of  the  judgments  is  a  satisfaction  of  all,  except  as  to 
costs. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,2* 
where  several  judgments  are  rendered  against  dif- 
ferent persons  for  the  same  cause  of  action,  pay- 
ment of  one  of  the  judgments  is  a  satisfaction  of 
all,29  except  as  to  costs,30  which  may  be  collected 
on  all  the  judgments,31  unless  a  statute  provides 
otherwise;32  but  where  several  persons  are  liable 
on  the  same  cause  of  action,  and  are  sued  in  the 
same  action,  and  separate  judgments  are  rendered 
against  each,  the  replevy  of  one  of  the  judgments 
is  not  a  merger  and  satisfaction  of  the  others.33 

§  577.    Operation  and  Effect  of  Satisfaction 

The  satisfaction  of  a  Judgment  by  one  primarily  li- 
able thereon  operates  to  extinguish  it  for  all  purposes, 
and  also  to  extinguish  the  original  debt  or  claim. 

The  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  by  one  primarily 
liable  thereon  operates  to  extinguish  it  for  all  pur- 
poses,34 notwithstanding  its  assignment  to  him  or  to 


21.     Ky.  —  Webber  v.  Commonwealth, 

07  S.W.2d  422,  265  Ky.  696. 
Xeb.—  -Luikart    v.    Mains,    267    N.W. 

168,  130  Neb.  907. 
X".Y.  —  Rossbach  v.  Rosenblum,  20  N. 

T.S.2d   725,    2SO   App.Div.    206,   af- 

firmed 31  N.B.2d  509,  284  N.Y.  745 

—In  re  James,  220  N.Y.S.  177,  128 

Misc.  528. 
Or.  —  Smith  v.   Rose,   265  P.   800,   125 

Or.  56  —  Harju  v.  Anderson,  225  P. 

1100,  111  Or.  414. 
Pa.—  Grant   v.   Plotts,    17  Pa.Dist.  & 

Co.    408,    22    Del.Co.    277,    46   York 

Leg.Rec.   151  —  Lutz  v.  Helm,  Com. 
.PL,  5  Sch.Reg.  190. 
Tenn.  —  Schoenlau-Steiner  Trunk  Top 

&  Veneer  Co.   v.   Hilderbrand,   274 

S.W.  544,  152  Tenn.  166. 
34  C.J.  p  722  note  30. 

"Although  a  person  may  pursue 
one  or  all  of  his  remedies,  ho  can 
have  but  one  satisfaction."  —  Davis  v. 
Lawhon,  52  S.W.2d  887,  889,  186  Ark. 
51. 


of  foreign  Judgment 

The  rule  stated  in  the  text  has 
been  applied  where  the  judgment 
paid  was  a  foreign  judgment  —  In  re 
James,  220  N.Y.S.  177,  128  Misc.  .528. 
22.  Pa.—  Grant  v.  Plotts,  17  Pa.Dist 

&  Co.  408,  22  Bel.Qo.  277,  46  York 

Leg.Rec.  151. 
34  C.J.  p  722  note  -31. 
Payment    of   one   judgment   and   all 
costs 

Where  receiver  of  insolvent  bank 
recovered  judgment  in  each  of  three 
separate  actions  on  different  sure- 
ty bonds  of  executive  officers  of  bank 
for  identical  losses,  surety  being 


same  on  each  "bond,  payment  of  judg- 
ment in  one  case  and  payment  of 
costs  in  all  cases  satisfied  judgments 
in  all.— Luikart  v.  Mains,  267  N.W. 
16-8,  130  Neb.  907. 

23.  Cal. — Ballentine       v.       Superior 
Court  in  and  for  San  Mateo  Coun- 
ty,  158  P.2a  14,   26  Cal.2d  254. 

24.  U.S.— Jos.    Riedel    Glass   Works 
v.  Keegan,  D.C.Me.,  43  •F.-Supp.  153. 

Conn. — Burkhardt  v.  Armour  &  Co., 
161  A.  385,  115  Conn.  249,  90  A.L. 
R.  1260. 

34  C.J.  p  722  note  32. 

25.  Ky.— Thomas  v.  Maysville  St.  R. 
&  Transfer  Co.,   124   S.W.  398,   136 
Ky.  446,  136  Am.S.R.  267. 

34  C.J.  «p  722  note  33. 

26.  Wash. — Larson  v.  Anderson,  182 
P.  957,  108  Wash.  157. 

27.  Conn. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in. 
Burkhardt   v.   Armour   &  Co.,    161 
A.    385,    115    Conn.    249,    90 'A.L.R. 
1260. 

34  C.J.  ,p  722  note  35. 

28.  N.J. — McKenna  v.   Corcoran,    61 
A,    1026,    70    N.J.Eq.    627,   affirmed 
71  A.  1134,   71  N.J.Eq.   303. 

34  C.J.  p  722  note  56. 

29.  Cal.— Black  v.  Bringhurst,  46  P. 
2d  993,  7  Cal.App.2d  711. 

Conn.— Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Burk- 
hardt v.  Arniour  &  Co.,  161  A.  385, 
388,  115  Conn.  249,  90  A.L.R.  1260. 

N.Y. — Sarine  v.  American  (Lumber- 
men's Mut  Casualty  Co.  of  Il- 
linois, 17  N.Y.S.2d  754,  2S8  App. 
Div.  653. 

Ohio. — Gholson  v.  Savin,  31  N.E.2d 
858,  137  Ohio  St.  &51,  139  A.L.R. 

1058 


75— Kuhnell  v.  Harvle,  27  Ohio  N. 

P..N.S.,  465. 
Or. — Cooper  v.  Sagert,  223  P.  943,  111 

Or.  27. 
Pa. — McShea  v.  McKenna,  95  Pa.Su- 

per.  338. 
W.Va. — Chewning  v.   Tomlinson,    141 

S.E.  532,  105  W.Va.  76. 
34  C.  J.  p  722  note  37. 

30.  Conn. — Burkhardt  v.  Armour  & 
Co.,    161  A.   385,   115   Conn.   249,    90 
A.L.R.   1260. 

W.Va. — Chewning  v.   Tomlinson,    141 

S.B.  532,  105  W.Va.  76. 
34  C.J.  p  723  note  38. 

31.  Mass.— Ryan  v.  Annelin,  118  N. 
E.  257,  228  Mass.  591. 

34  C.J.  p  723  note  58. 

32.  Wash. — Larson  v.  Anderson,  182 
P.  957,  108  Wash.  157,  159,  6  A.L.R. 
621. 

34  C.J.  p  7*3  note  39. 

33.  Ky.— Monticello    Nat.    Bank    v. 
Bryant,  13  Bush  419. 

34.  U.S.— Sandlin   v.    G*agg,    C.C.A. 
Okl,,    133    P.2d   114,   certiorari   de- 
nied 63  S.Ct.   983,  318  -U.S.   785,   87 
L.Bd.  1153. 

Cal. — Salveter  v.  Salveter,  53  P.2d 
381,  11  Cal.App.2d  335. 

•La. — Sweeney  v.  Black  River  Lum- 
ber Co.,  4  La.App.  244. 

Ohio. — State  ex  rel.  Faulkner  v. 
Kreinbihl,  14  Ohio  Sup-p.  49. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Martin  v.' 
North  American  Car  Corporation, 
35  P.2d  460,  462,  168  Okl.  599. 

Tex. — Myers  v.  -Southard,  Civ.App., 
110  S.W.2d  1185. 

34  C.J.  p  '723  note  43. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  579 


another  for  him,35  although  it  has  been  held  other- 
wise where  the  assignment  is  to  a  third  person  for 
such  person's  benefit36  Although  there  is  author- 
ity to  the  contrary,37  a  judgment  once  satisfied  can- 
not afterward  be  restored  or  kept  alive  by  the 
agreement  of  the  parties  that  it  shall  stand  as  se- 
curity for  other  debts  or  liabilities,  whether  to  the 
same  or  another  plaintiff.38 

Satisfaction  by  one  primarily  liable  also  extin- 
guishes the  original  debt  or  claim,39  and  in  an  ac- 
tion for  the  price  of  goods  sold  will  operate  as  a 
transfer  of  title  thereto,40  but  in  a  second  action 
which  is  not  between  the  same  parties,  or  does  not 
relate  to  exactly  the  same  claim  or  demand,  the  ef- 
fect of  the  satisfaction  can  extend  no  further  than 
the  issues  in  fact  litigated  and  determined  in  the 
action  wherein  the  judgment  was  recovered.41  By 
accepting  payment  of  a  judgment  and  acknowledg- 
ing satisfaction  thereof,  a  person  has  been  held  to 
admit  only  the  finality  and  conclusiveness  of  the 
judgment  as  between  the  parties  thereto.42 

§  578.    Recovery  of  Payments 

The  recovery  of  money  paid  on  a  judgment  or 


execution  in  general  is  considered  in  the  GJ.S.  ti- 
tle Payment  §  143,  also  48  C.J.  p  740  notes  78,  79, 
p  741  notes  80-84.  The  restitution  of  money  paid 
where  a  judgment  is  reversed  is  considered  in  the 
title  Appeal  and-Error  §§  1980-1985. 

Examine  Pocket  Parts  for  later  cases. 
§  579.    Entry  of  Satisfaction 

According  to  the  usual  practice,  when  a  Judgment 
Is  satisfied,  an  entry  acknowledging  or  certifying  that 
fact  should  be  made  on  the  record  or  Judgment  docket, 
although  it  has  been  held  that  such  entry  Is  not  essen- 
tial to  a  satisfaction. 

According  to  the  usual  practice,  when  a  judg- 
ment is  satisfied,  an  entry  acknowledging  or  certi- 
fying that  fact  should  be  made  on  the  record  or 
judgment  docket,43  although  it  has  been  held  that 
such  entry  is  not  essential  to  a  satisfaction.44  The 
entry  may  be  made  by  the  clerk  of  the  court  on  di- 
rection of  plaintiff  or  the  owner  of  the  judgment45 
or  his  attorney  of  record,46  or  on  the  return  of  an 
execution  "satisfied,"47  or  proper  evidence  of  re- 
lease,48 or,  under  statute,49  but  not  at  common 
law,50  on  receipt  by  the  clerk  of  payment.  The 
entry  of  satisfaction  by  the  clerk  is  a  mere  minis- 


Mltect  of  payment  by  joint  party  or 
third  person  see  supra  §§  554-558. 
"The  general  principle  is  well  set- 
tled that  a  satisfaction  of  Judgment 
is  the  last  act  and  end  of  the  pro- 
ceeding."—Broohier  v.   Brochier,   112 
l\2d  '60S,  -604,  17  Cal.2d  822. 

An  executed  compromise  and 'sat- 
isfaction of  judgment  through  au- 
thorized agent  of  judgment  creditor's 
assignee  was  binding  on  assignee. — 
Sandlin  v,  Gragg,  C.C.A.pkl.,  133  F. 
2d  114,  certiorari  denied  63  S.Ct.  983, 
318  U.S.  785,  87  L.Ed.  1153. 

Dormant  Judgment 

Payment  or  satisfaction  destroys 
integrity  of  a  dormant  judgment — 
Gilmer  v.  Gant  24  So.2d  414,  247  Ala. 
34'7. 

Error  regarding  amount 

Any  orror  regarding  amount  of 
judgment  is  cured  when  it  is  paid 
off  and  satisfied. — Clancy  v.  Reid- 
Ward  Motor  Co.,  170  S.W.2d  161,  237 
Mo.App.f  1000. 
judgment  adjudicating-  title  to  land 

It  has  been  held  that  the  satisfac- 
tion of  a  money  judgment  can  have 
no  effect  on  another  part  of  the  judg- 
ment adjudicating  title  to  land.— 
Johnstone  v.  Stondall  Land  &  Invest- 
ment Co.,  C.C.A.N.D.,  298  «F.  919. 

Payment  or  valuable  benefit 

Satisfaction  of  judgment  implies 
payment  or  valuable  benefit — In  re 
James,  223  N.Y.S.  174,  221  App.£>iv. 
321,  reversed  on  other  grounds  In  re 
James*  Will,  1«1  N.B.  201,  248  N.I. 


1,   reargument  denied    162  N.E.    550, 
248  N.Y.  623. 

35.  Okl. — Martin  v.  North  American 
Car  Corporation,  35  P.2d   460,   168 
Okl.  599. 

34  C.J.  p  724  note  44. 

36.  Wash.— Lachner    v.    Myers,    2&8 
P.  1095,  121  Wash.  172. 

34C.J.  p  724  note- 45. 

37.  Pa. — Merchants'    Nat    Bank   v. 
Mosser,  29  A.  1,  161  Pa.  469. 

34  C.J.  p  724  note  46. 

38.  Neb.— Ebel   v.    Stringer,    102   N. 
W.  4-66,  73  Neb.  249. 

34  C.J.  p  '724  note  47. 

39.  La.— Sweeney    v.    Black    Biver 
Lumber  Co.,  4  La. App.  244. 

34  C.J.  p  724  note  48. 

Notes 

The  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  on 

a    note    operates    to    extinguish    the 

note. — Pappas  v.   Cappell,   17  N.E.2d 

S537,    297   I11.APP.    301—34  C.J.   p   724 

note  48  [a]. 

Tax  debt 

Minn.— Walton  v.  Investment  Hold- 
ing Co.,  274  N.W.  239,  200  Minn. 
337. 

40.  jq-.Y. — pacific  Coast  Borax  Co,  v. 
Waring,    112   N.Y.S.   458,    128   App. 
Div.  66. 

41.  Mass.— Cote     v.     New    England 
Nav.    Co.,    99    N.E.    972,   213    Mass. 
177. 

34  C.J.  p  724  note  50. 

4ft.  Mo. — Bennett  v.  General  Acci- 
dent, -Fire  &  (Life  Assur.  Corp.,  2,55 
S.W.  1076,  213  Mo.APp.  421. 

1059 


43.  N.Y. — Sarine  v.  American  Lum- 
bermen's Mut.  Casualty  Co.  of  Il- 
linois,   17    N.Y.S.2d    754,    258    App. 
Div.  653. 

34  C.J.  p  724  note  57. 

44.  U.S.— Corpus     Juris     cited     in 
Sandlin   v.    Gragg,    C.C.A.Okl.,    133 
F.2d  114,  119.  certiorari  denied  $3 
S.Ct.    983,    318    U.S.    785,    87    L.Bd. 
1153. 

34  C.J.  p725  note  58. 

45.  Md.— Waters    v.    Engle,   63    Md. 
179. 

34  C.J.  p  725  note  59. 
Entry  on  order  of  court  see  infra  § 
581. 

46.  N.Y.— Wood  v.  New  York,  60  N. 
Y.S.  7-59,  44  App.Div.  299. 

34  C.J.  p  725  note  £0. 

47.  N.D.— Milburn-Stoddard  '  Co.     v. 
Stickney,    103    N.W.    752,    14    N.D. 
282. 

34  C.J.  p  725  note  62. 

48.  Mich.— Beekman  v.  Sylvester,  -66 
N.W.   1093,   109   Mich.   Ii83. 

49.  Ala. — Aicardi  v.  Bobbins,  41  AJa, 
541,  94  Am.D.  -614. 

N.C.— Dalton  v.  Strickland,  179  S.BL 
20,  208  N.C.  27. 

Authority  of  clerk  to  accept  pay- 
ment see  supra  §  551. 

50.  nL— Seymour  v.  Haines,  104  I1L 
557. 

ND. — Milburn-Stoddard  Co.  v.  Stick- 
ney, 103  N.W.  752,  14  N.D.  282. 


§  579 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


terial  act,51  although  where  such  an  entry  is  relied 
on  as  a  defense  it  has  been  held  that  strict  compli- 
ance with  the  statutory  provisions  is  required.52 

Payment  of  costs  may  be  made  a  condition  to  en- 
try of  satisfaction.53 

Satisfaction  pending  appeal.  The  fact  that  de- 
fendant has  taken  an  appeal  is  not  a  ground  for  ob- 
jecting to  the  entry  of  satisfaction  where  the  judg- 
ment is  satisfied  pending  the  appeal.54 

Partial  payments  on  a  judgment  should  be  credit- 
ed of  record.55 


§  580. 


Satisfaction  Piece 


A  satisfaction  piece  is  a  written  memorandum  ac- 
knowledging satisfaction  of  the  judgment  and  author- 
izing the  clerk  to  make  entry  thereof  on  the  roll. 

A  satisfaction  piece  is  a  written  memorandum  ac- 
knowledging satisfaction  of  the  judgment56  and  au- 
thorizing the  clerk  to  make  entry  thereof  on  the 
roll.57  It  must  identify  and  describe  the  judg- 
ment,58 be  duly  executed  by  the  judgment  creditor59 
or  his  attorney,60  on  the  request  of  the  judgment 
debtor  or  other  person  who  was  liable  to  pay,  and 
has  paid,  the  judgment,61  be  witnessed  or  otherwise 
proved,62  delivered  to  the  judgment  debtor,63  and 
entered  on  the  judgment  roll.64  Execution  and  ac- 
knowledgment of  a  satisfaction  are  acts  of  equal 
deliberation  and  solemnity  with  execution  of  an  in- 
strument under  seal65  and  discharge  the  judg- 


ment,66 although  the  consideration  therefor  is  less 
than  the  judgment67 

Construction.  A  written  instrument  filed  pursu- 
ant to  statute  governing  satisfaction  of  judgments 
ordinarily  should  not  be  extended  beyond  its  ex- 
press terms,  unless  such  a  construction  is  required 
by  some  well-recognized  rule  of  law.68 

§  581.    Proceedings  to  Compel 

a.  In  general 

b.  Form  of  proceeding 

c.  Parties  and  notice 

d.  Pleading  and  evidence 

e.  Trial  or  hearing 

f.  Determination  and  order 

g.  Appeal  and  costs 

a.  In  General 

Where  a  Judgment  creditor  has  received  actual  pay- 
ment of  the  judgment  or  any  equivalent  thereof,  or  the 
obligation  of  the  judgment  Is  otherwise  discharged,  but 
he  refuses  to  acknowledge  or  enter  satisfaction,  the 
court  having  control  of  the  judgment  may  compel  him 
to  satisfy  It,  or  may  order  satisfaction  to  be  entered 
officially. 

Where  a  judgment  creditor  has  received  actual 
payment  of  the  judgment  or  any  equivalent  there- 
for, or  the  obligation  of  the  judgment  is  otherwise 
discharged,  but  he  refuses  to  acknowledge  or  enter 
satisfaction,  the  court  having  control  of  the  judg- 
ment may  compel  him  to  satisfy  it,  or  may  order 
satisfaction  to  be  entered  officially.69  Such  action 


51.  U.S.— Cambers  v.  First  Nat 
Bank,  C.C.Or.,  144  F.  717,  affirmed 
156  'F.  482,  84  C.C.A.  292. 

34  C.J.  p  72-5  note  68. 

62.  Md.— Campbell  v.  Booth,  8  Md. 
107. 

53.  U.S.— Naretti  v.  Scully,  D.C.Pa., 
135  F.  828,  affirmed,  C.C.A.,  139  F. 
118. 

54.  Cal. — Buckeye    Refining    Co.    v. 
Kelly,  124  P.  536,  163  Cal.  8,  Ann. 
€as.!913E  840. 

55.  Minn. — Wolford  v.  Bo  wen,  59  N. 
W.  195,  57  Minn.  267. 

34  C.J.  p  725  note  72. 

56.  N.Y. — Booth  v.  Farmers'  &  Me- 
chanics' Nat   Bank,  50  N.Y.  396. 

34  C.J.  p  725  note  73. 
Receipt 

A  satisfaction  piece  is  a  receipt. — 
Becker  Steel  Co.  of  America  v.  Cum- 
mings,  D.C.N.T.,  16  F.Supp.  601. 

57.  N.T. — Beers   v.   Hendrickson,   29 
N.T. Super.    53,    modified   on   other 
grounds  45  N.T.  665. 

58.  N.Y.— Booth  v.  'Farmers'  &  Me- 
chanics' Nat.  Bank,   50  N.Y.   39-6. 

59.  N.Y.— Altenau  v.  Masterson,  292 
N.Y.S.  299,  161  Misc.  433. 

34  C.J.  p  725  note  76. 


60.    N.Y. — Altenau  v.  Masterson,  su- 
pra. 
34  C.J.  p  725  note  77. 

81.    N.Y. — Lindenborn  v.  Vogel,    115 

N.Y.S.  962,  131  App.Div.  75. 
34  C.J.  p  72-5  note  78. 
Preparation  and  costs 

(1)  A  judgment  debtor  demanding 
a  satisfaction  piece  is  bound  to  offer 
the  instrument  to  be  executed  to  the 
creditor,  and  to  offer  to  pay  the  ex- 
pense of  its  execution. — Pettengill  v. 
Mather,   16  Abb.Pr.,N.Y.,  399. 

(2)  Under  a  statute  providing  for 
the  execution  of  a  satisfaction  piece 
at  the  request  of  the  Judgment  debt- 
or, it  has  been  held  that  the  judg- 
ment  creditor's   attorney   cannot   be 
compelled  to  issue  an  executed  sat- 
isfaction   of    judgment    where    the 
judgment  debtor  did  not   present  a 
satisfaction  piece,  pay  judgment  In 
money,  or  pay  fees  allowed  by  law 
for    taking    acknowledgment. — Alte- 
nau   v.    Masterson,    092    N.Y.S.    299, 
161  Misc.  433. 

62.  N.Y.— Barley  v.  St  Patrick's 
Church  Soc.,  30  N.Y.S.  979,  81  Hun 
369. 

34  C.J.  p  725  note  79. 

1060 


63.  N.Y.— Barley  v.  St  Patrick's 
Church  Soc.,  supra. 

84.  N.Y. — Beers  v.   Hendrickson,   29 
N.Y.Super.    53,    modified    on    other 
grounds  45  N.Y.  «665. 

.34  C.J.  p  725  note  81. 

85.  N.Y.— People   v.    Devlin,    118   N. 
Y.S.  478,  63  Misc.  363. 

66.  N.Y. — People  v.  Devlin,  supra. 

67.  N.Y. — People  v.  Devlin,  supra. 

68.  Wash. — Johnson  v.    Stewart,    96 
P.2d  473,  1  Wash.2d  439. 

69.  Ala.-— Bradley  v.  Bentley,  1-67  So. 
294,  232  Ala.  114. 

111. — Louis  B.  Bower,  Inc.,  v.  Silver- 
stein,  18  N.E.2d  385,  298  IlLApp. 
145. 

Mo.— B.  F.  Goodrich  Rubber  Co.  v. 
Bennett,  281  -S.WV  75,  222  Mo.App. 
•510. 

Neb.— In  re  Mathews'  Estate,  279  N. 
W.  301,  134  Neb.  607. 

N.J.— Morss  v.  Allen,  199  A.  414,  120 
N.J.Law  203~-Corpns  Juris  cited  in 
•Luparelli  v.  U.  -S.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  188  . 
A.   451,   452,   117   N.J.'Law  342,   af- 
firmed 194  A.  185,  118  N.J.Law  565. 

N.Y.— Haubrich  v.  Haubfich,  40  N.Y. 
S.2d  954,  180  Misc.  73$,  appeal  dis- 
missed 46  N.Y.S.2d  £06,  267  App. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


581 


can  be  based  only  on  matter  arising  subsequent  to 
the  judgment,  not  for  causes  accruing  prior  to  its 
rendition  or  which  might  have  been  set  up  in  de- 
fense to  the  action70  or  which  were  litigated  and 
decided  on  a  previous  motion  or  other  proceed- 
ing,71 and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  motion  to  compel 
satisfaction  may  not  be  resisted  on  any  ground 
which  existed  at  the  time  the  judgment  was  ren- 
dered, and  which  might  have  been  urged  at  the  tri- 
al72 

The  duty  to  satisfy  of  record  a  judgment  or  de- 
cree, on  full  performance  by  the  party  bound  there- 
by, follows  as  a  necessary  incident  of  the  power 
of  the  court  to  enforce  its  orders73  and  prevent  an 
abuse  of  its  process,74  and,  therefore,  in  ordering 
satisfaction  on  an  application  therefor,  the  court 
acts  judicially.75 

Where  the  court's  power  to  order  a  judgment 
to  be  marked  satisfied  is  entirely  statutory,76  and 
the  statute  conferring  it  is  in  derogation  of  the 


common  law  and  deprives  a  party  of  trial  by  ju- 
ry, it  must  be  strictly  construed77  and  restricted 
to  cases  of  actual  payment  in  full,78  wherein  there 
is  no  substantial  dispute  about  the  facts.79  Inde- 
pendently of  such  statute,  however,  and  in  all 
cases  where  the  statute  does  not  apply,  the  court 
has  power  to  order  an  issue  to  try  whether  or  not 
the  judgment  has  been  paid  or  discharged,  and  if 
the  jury  find  that  it  has,  the  court  may  order  a 
perpetual  stay  of  execution80  and  defendant  may 
then  compel  plaintiff  to  enter  satisfaction.81 

Satisfaction  as  to  all.  The  court  should  never 
entertain  jurisdiction  of  a  motion  to  enter  satisfac- 
tion as  to  any  of  the  parties  to  the  judgment,  unless 
it  is  to  be  a  satisfaction  entirely  and  as  to  all.82 

Credit  of  partial  payments.  The  court  will  order 
partial  payments  on  a  judgment  to  be  credited  of 
record  on  proper  proceedings  for  that  purpose,83 
brought  by  a  person  entitled  to  such  relief.84 


Div..  872 — Brinn    v.    Wooding,    298 
N.Y.S.   971,   164   Misc.   850— Broun- 
Green    Co.    v.    Powell    Vocational 
Corporation,  28  N.Y.S.2d  836. 
N.C.— Dalton  v.   Strickland,   179  S.B. 

20,  208  N.C.  27. 
Ohio. — Mosher  v.  Goss,  Ohio  App.,  60 

N.B.2d  730. 

Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Gupton 
v.  Western  Kennel  Club,   145  P.2d 
179,  1'80,  193  Okl.  462. 
34  C.J.  p  725  note  85. 
Trader  statute 

Where  petition  to  have  Judgment 
marked  satisfied  on  theory  of  pay- 
ment was  under  statute  providing  for 
correction  of  errors  and  securing 
parties  against  abuse  of  process, 
such  statute  was  consfdered  with 
statute  relating  to  satisfaction  of 
Judgment. — Bradley  v.  Bentley,  167 
So.  294,  232  Ala.  114. 

70u     Cal. — Irvin  v.  Superior  Court  in 

and  for  Los  Angeles  County,  3.5  P. 

2d  642,  140  Cal.App.  622. 
111. — Burket     v.     Reliance     Bank     & 

Trust   Co.,   29   N.B.2d   297,   306   111. 

App.  663. 
34  C.J.  p  726  note  86. 

71.  Ind. — Palmer   v.   Hays,    13   N.B. 
882,  112  Ind.  289. 

34  C.J.  p  72-6  note  87. 

72.  Cal.— Haggin    v.    Clark,    12    P. 
478,  71  Cal.  444. 

111.— Frankel  v.  Stern,  50  Ill.Apj?.  54. 

73.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris     Quoted    in 

Gupton   v.   Western   Kennel   Club, 
145   P.2d   179,   180,   193  Okl.   462. 
84  C.J.  p  726  note  89. 

74.'  Okl. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Gupton  v.  Western  Kennel  Club, 
145  P.2d  179,  180,  193  Okl.  462. 

24  C.J.  p  726  note  90. 


75.  Okl. — Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 
Gupton    v.    Western   Kennel   Club, 
145   P.2d   179,   180,   193   Okl.   462. 

Or.— Herrick  v.  Wallace,  236  P.  471, 

114  Or.  520. 
34  C.J.  p  726  note  91. 

76.  Pa.— Metropolitan  Life   Ins.  Co. 
v.  Krivitsky,  Com.Pl.,  46  Pa,Dist.  & 
Co.  641 — Bridesburg  Bldg.  Ass'n  v. 
Bailey,    40    Pa.Dist    &   Co.    211— 
Metropolitan  !Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dris- 
coll,     Com.Pl.,     32     Del.Co.      53— 
Schantz   v.    Clemmer,    Com.Pl.,    21 
Leh.L.J.  394. 

34  C.J.  p  726  note  93. 

77.  Pa.— Hazleton    Thrift    &    Loan 
Corporation    v.    Kepping,     17    Pa. 
Dist.    &   Co.    6-66,    26    Luz.Leg.Reg. 
417. 

34  C.J.  P  726  notes  94,  9'5. 

78.  Pa. — Metropolitan  Life   Ins.   Co. 
v.  Krivitsky,  46  Pa.DIst  &  Co.  -641 
— American    Bankers    Finance   Co. 
v.  Majeski,  17  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  668, 
22  r>el.Co.  433— Hazleton  Thrift  & 
Loan  Corporation   v.   Kepping,   17 
Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  666,  26  Luz.Leg.Reg* 
417 — Koch,   to   Use  of  Witman  v. 
Ernesto,  Com.Pl.,  -34  Berks  Co.  13, 
5-5  York  Leg.Rec.  141. 

34  C.J.  p  726  note  96. 
Discharge  in  bankruptcy 

It  has  been  held  that,  where  a 
Judgment  is  automatically  dis- 
charged in  bankruptcy,  the  judgment 
will  not  be  marked  satisfied,  but  a 
rule  to  mark  the  Judgment  dis- 
charged will  be  made  absolute.— 
Claster  v.  Krauss  Bros.,  17  Pa.Dist. 
&  Co.  483,  35  DauphuCo.  362. 

79.  Pa.— Henry   v.    Henry,   Com.Pl., 

1061 


,28     Brie     Co.      149— Aponikas     v. 
Skrypkun,  Com.PL,  5  Sen. Reg.  1. 
34  C.J.  p  726  jiote  97. 

80.  Pa. — Reynolds  v.  Barnes,  76  Pa. 
427. 

34  C.J.  p  727  note  98. 

81.  Pa. — Reynolds  v.  Barnes,  76  Pa. 
427 — Homer  v.  Hower,  39  Pa.  126. 

82.  Cal. — Barnum  v.  Cochrane,  73  P. 
242,  139  Cal.  494. 

Miss.— Long  v.  Shackleford,  25  Miss. 
559. 

83.  Utah. — Cox  v.  Dixie  Power  Co., 
16  P.2d  916,  81  Utah  94. 

34  C.J.  p  727  note  1. 

Moneys  collected  on  execution 

Where  plaintiff,  after  first  trial, 
collected  moneys  on  execution,  but 
new  trials  were  granted,  defendant 
was  entitled  to  credit  on  Judgment 
finally  rendered  for  amount  so  col- 
lected.— Cox  y.  Dixie  Power  Co.,  su- 
pra. 
Judgment  on  mortgage  note 

Where  mortgagee  released  pur- 
chaser of  mortgaged  realty  from  all 
liability  by  reason  of  assumption  of 
and  agreement  to  pay  mortgage, 
original  mortgagors  have  been  held 
entitled  to  credit  on  judgment  taken 
against  them  on  mortgage  note  to 
extent  of  amount  paid  by  purchaser 
for  such  release. — Mosher  v.  Gross, 
Ohio  App.,  60  N.E.2d  730. 

An  entry  of  credit  on  a  Judgment 
by  order  of  court,  after  the  court  has 
adjourned,  has  not  the  same  effect 
as  a  remittitur. — Rowan  v.  People, 
IS  111.  159. 

84.  Ark.— Whiting  v.  Beebe,  12  Ark. 
421. 

34  C.J.  p  727  note  2. 


§  581 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


b.  Form  of  Proceeding 

(1)  Motion  or  rule  to  show  cause 

(2)  Civil  action  or  bill  in  equity 

(1)  Motion  or  Rule  to  Show  Cause 

As  a  general  rule,  an  application  to  compel  entry 
.of  satisfaction  of  a  Judgment  should  be  In  the  form  of 
a  motion  In  the  court  which  rendered  the  Judgment. 

As  a  general  rule,  an  application  to  the  court  to 
compel  the  entry  of  satisfaction  of  a  judgment 
should  be  in  the  form  of  a  motion,85  in  the  court 
which  rendered  the  judgment,86  and  entitled  as  of 
the  original  action.87  Also,  sometimes  by  virtue 
of  statutory  provision,88  a  motion  is  the  proper 
remedy  for  obtaining  credit,  or  satisfaction  pro 
tanto,  of  record  for  partial  payments.89  However, 
a  remedy  by  motion  provided  by  statute  in  cases 
where  any  payment  has  been  made  is  not  available 
when  defendant  has  not  made  any  payment,90  but 
seeks  rather  to  enforce  a  parol  contract  for  the  sale 
of  land  to  plaintiff  on  condition  that  the  judgment 
should  be  satisfied  as  part  of  the  purchase  price.91 

A  motion  to  have  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  en- 
tered of  record  on  the  ground  of  payment  since  its 
rendition  is  merely  a  motion  in  a  cause  .still  pend- 
ing, and  is  neither  a  special  proceeding  nor  a  civil 
action.92  While  it  has  been  held  to  be  a  legal  and 
not  an  equitable  proceeding,93  it  has  also  been  held 
to  be  a  proceeding  equitable  in  nature.94 


The  motion  should  be  to  set  aside  the  execution 
and  enter  satisfaction,  and  not  to  set  aside  the  exe- 
cution and  cancel  the  judgment.95  Sometimes  the 
motion  is  in  the  form  of  a  regular  complaint;96 
and  the  fact  that  it  is  denominated  a  "supplemental 
petition,"  instead  of  a  motion,  is  not  fatal.97 

Rule  to  show  cause.  Under  some  statutes  the 
remedy  is  by  application  for  a  rule  to  show  cause 
why  the  judgment  should  not  be  marked  satisfied  of 
record.98  Also  the  proper  mode  of  obtaining  cred- 
it on  a  judgment  for  a  partial  payment  has  been 
held  to  be  a  rule  to  show  cause.99 

Audita  querela.  Formerly  relief  was  granted  on 
audita  querela,1  and  perhaps  resort  may  be  had  to 
this  remedy,2  notwithstanding  the  existence  of  a 
remedy  by  motion,3  but  in  most  jurisdictions  the 
remedy  by  audita  querela  has  fallen  into  disuse  and 
is  now  obsolete,  the  more  convenient  and  less  ex- 
pensive remedy  by  motion  having  taken  its  place.4 

(2)  Civil  Action  or  Bill  in  Equity 

In    some  Jurisdictions  an   ordinary  civil   action   may 
be  brought  to  have  a  Judgment  declared  satisfied. 

In  some  code  states,  a  judgment  may  be  declared 
paid  and  satisfied  in  an  ordinary  civil  action  brought 
for  that  purpose,  without  regard  to  whether  the 
proceeding  is  at  law  or  in  equity,5  and  such  an  ac- 
tion and  a  motion  to  obtain  a  satisfaction  of  record 


85.    Cal.-<!ohn  v.  Cohn,  59  P.2d  969, 

7  CaL2d  1. 
111. — Burket     v.     Reliance     Bank     & 

Trust   Co.,    29   N.E.2d   297,    306   111. 

App.   563 — Louis  ES.  Bower,  Inc.  v. 

Silverstein,  18  N.E.2d  38'5,  298  111. 

App.  145 — Handel  v.  Curry,  254  111. 

App.  36. 
Neb.— In  re  Mathews'  Estate,  279  N. 

W.  301,  134  Neb.  607. 
K.Y.— -Haubrich  v.  Haubrlch,  40  N.T. 

S.    954,   180   Misc.    735,  appeal  dis- 
missed   4-6   N.Y.S.2d    506,    267   App. 

Dlv.  872. 
Or.— Herrick  v.  Wallace,  236  P.  471, 

114  Or.  '520. 
34  C.J.  p  727  note  4. 

At  common,  law  defendant  could  on 
motion  in  court  have  satisfaction  of 
judgment  entered  of  record. — Com- 
monwealth, for  Use  and  Benefit  of 
Bates,  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  £85,  251 
Ky.  280. 
Petition  or  motion 

A  proceeding:  under  statute  to  com- 
pel satisfaction  of  a  paid  judgment 
may  be  instituted  by  petition  or  mo- 
tion.— B.  F.  Goodrich  Rubber  Co.  v. 
Bennett  281  S.W.  75,  222  Mo.App. 
"110. 

88.    Neb. — In    re    Mathews'    Estate, 

279  N.W.  .301,  134  Neb.  607. 
14  C.J.  p  727  note  6. 


Time 

A  motion  to  cause  satisfaction  of 
the  judgment  to  be  entered  may  be 
made  without  waiting  for  execution 
to  be  issued. — Childs  v.  Franklin,  10 
Ala.  79. 

87.  Iowa. — Dunton    v.     McCook,     94 
N.W.  942,  120  Iowa  444. 

34  C.J.  p  727  note  7. 

88.  Ind. — Lapping  v.  Duffy,   65   Ind. 
229. 

N.C. — Brown   v.   Hobbs,   70   S.B.    906, 
154  N.C.  544. 

89.  Ala. — Saltmarsh    v.     Bower,     34 
Ala.    613— Mobile   Branch  Bank  v. 
Coleman,  20  Ala.  140. 

90.  N.C. — Brown   v.   Hobbs,  70   S.E. 
906.  154  N.C.  544. 


91.  N.C. — Brown 

92.  Mo. — Corpus 
B.  F.  Goodrich 
nett,  281  S.W. 
•510. 

N.C. — Foreman  v. 

93.  Mo. — Corpus 
B.  F.  Goodrich 
nett,  281  S.W. 
510. 

34  C.J.  p  727  note 


y.  Hobbs,  supra. 
Juris     quoted    in 
Rubber  Co.  v.  Ben- 
75,  77,  222  Mo.App. 

Bibb.  65  N.C.  128. 
Juris     quoted     in. 
Rubber  Co.  v.  Ben- 
75,  77,  222  Mo.App. 

13. 


34.  Ala. — Tennessee-Hermitage  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Hagan,  119  So.  4,  218  Ala. 
390. 

1062 


95.  I1L— Dibble  v.  Briggs,  28  111.  48. 
34  C.J.  p  727  note  14. 

96.  Ind. — Reeves  v.  Plough,  46  Ind. 
350. 

97.  Iowa. — Dunton  v.  McCook,  94  N. 
W.  942,  120  Iowa  444. 

96.     Pa. — O'Connor   v.   {Flick,    107    A. 

139,  ,2*65  Pa.  49. 
34  C.J.  p  7.28  note  17. 
99.     Md. — Grorsuch  v.  Thomas,  57  Md. 

334. 
34  C.J.  p  728  note  18. 

1.  Or. — Herrick  v.   Wallace,    236   P. 
471,  114  Or.  520. 

34  C.J.  p  728  note  20. 

2.  Mass. — Radclyffe    v.    Barton,    37 
N.E.  373,  161  Mass.  327. 

34  C.J.  p  728  note  21. 

3.  Mass. — Lovejoy    v.     Webber,     10 
Mass.  101. 

N.Y. — Baker  v.   Judges   Ulster  Com- 
mon Pleas,  4  Johns.  191. 

4.  Or.— Herrick   v.   Wallace,   236    P, 
471,  114  Or.  520. 

34  C.J.  p  728  note  23. 

5.  NrD. — Peterson  v.  First  &  Secur- 
ity  State  Bank  of  Crosby,   236  N. 
W.  722,  61  N.D.  1. 

Okl. — Thompson    v.    liindley,    101    P. 

2d  848,'  1-87  Okl.  175. 
34  C.J.  p  728  note  24. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  581 


have  been  held  concurrent  remedies;6  but  if  the 
facts  are  so  controverted  and  the  rights  of  third 
persons  so  involved  that  the  court  declines  to  deter- 
mine the  matter  on  motion  an  action  is  the  only 
proper  remedy.7 

Bill  in  equity.  Relief  usually  is  not  obtainable 
on  a  bill  in  equity  alleging  satisfaction,  since  the 
parties  have  a  full  and  complete  remedy  at  law,8 
although  in  some  jurisdictions  the  remedy  by  mo- 
tion and  that  by  bill  have  been  held  concurrent,9 
and  a  bill  will  lie  where  equitable  relief  is  also  asked 
which  cannot  be  had  on  motion  in  a  court  of  law,10 
or  where  complicated  and  difficult  questions  are  in- 
volved, in  which  cases  a  bill  in  equity  is  deemed 
the  most  appropriate  remedy.11 

c.  Parties  and  Notice 

Either  party  to  the  judgment,  or  a  person  having 
some  legal  or  equitable  interest  in  the  satisfaction  there- 
of, is  entitled  to  have  it  satisfied  of  record.  Notice  of 
motion  or  rule  to  compel  entry  of  satisfaction  should 
be  given  plaintiff  or  the  party  adversely  interested. 

Either  party  to  the  judgment,12  or  a  person  hav- 
ing some  legal  or  equitable  interest  in  the  satisfac- 
tion thereof,13  is  entitled  to  apply  to  the  court  in 
which  it  has  been  recovered  to  have  it  satisfied  of 
record.  Notice  of  a  motion  or  rule  to  compel  en- 
try of  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  should  be  given 
plaintiff  or  the  party  adversely  interested.14  The 
court  will  not  order  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  to  be 
entered  unless  all  the  parties  interested  therein  are 


brought  before  it  and  have  an  opportunity  to  be 
heard,15  and  an  order  made  without  notice  to  a 
party  in  interest  will  be  void.16  The  person  owning 
the  judgment  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  proceeding 
to  have  satisfaction  thereof  entered.17  An  action 
to  obtain  satisfaction  may  be  brought  directly 
against  an  assignee,18  joining  the  assignor19  and  the 
sheriff  holding  an  execution20  as  parties  defendant; 
but  where  the  proceeding  is  by  motion  or  rule,  it 
must  be  solely  between  the  original  parties  to  the 
judgment,  and  no  stranger  may  be  brought  in  or 
intervene.21 

d.  Pleading  and  Evidence 

General  rules  as  to  pleading  and  evidence  are  ap- 
plicable in  proceedings  to  compel  satisfaction  of  judg- 
ment. 

In  an  action  to  have  a  judgment  declared  satisfied, 
the  petition  or  complaint  must  clearly  allege  the 
fact  of  payment  or  the  other  circumstances  relied 
on  as  discharging  the  judgment,22  but  it  need  not 
allege  that  the  person  in  whose  favor  the  judgment 
was  obtained  was  the  legal  owner  thereof  at  the 
time  of  the  alleged  payment.23  A  reply  must  not 
depart  from  the  complaint.24  In  a  suit  for  an  ac- 
counting on  a  judgment,  it  has  been  held  that  the 
judgment  creditor  could,  without  pleading  it,  deny 
that  he  received  the  consideration  expressed  on  the 
face  of  a  release.25 

The  burden  of  proving  payment  is  on  the  party 


The  statute  of  limitations  has  been 
held  not  a  defense  in  an  action  to 
compel  entry  of  satisfaction. — Wil- 
son v.  Brookshire,  25  N.B.  131,  126 
Ind.  497,  9  L.R.A.  792— Palmer  v. 
Hayes,  13  N.B.  882,  112  Ind.  289. 

6.  Neb.— Manker   v.    Sine,   £6   N.W. 
840,  47  Neb.  738. 

7.  Kan. — Mayer  v.  Sparks,  45  P.  249, 
3  Kan.App.  602. 

8.  Mo. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
B.  F.  Goodrich  Rubber  Co.  v.  Ben- 
nett,  281  S.W.  76,  77,  222  Mo.App. 
510. 

X.Y. — Allgeler  v.  Gordon  &  Co.,  9  N. 

Y.S.2d  848,  170  Misc.   607. 
31  C.J.  p  728  note  28. 

9.  Ind.— McOuat  v.  Cathcart,  84  Ind. 
567. 

10.  N.Y.— -Allgeier  v.  Gordon  &  Co., 
9  N.Y.S.2d  848,  1*70  Misc.  607. 

34  C.J.  p  729  note  30. 
Enjoining  collection  of  paid  or  satis- 
fled  judgment  see  supra   §   355. 

11.  Fla. — Dr.  P.  Phillips  Co.  v.  Bil- 
lo,  147  So.  579,  109  Fla.  316. 

Pa. — Banks   v.    Jackson,   Oom.Pl.,   49 

Dauph.Co.  107. 
34  aJ.  p  729  note  31. 


12.  Ala.— Childs  v.  Franklin,  10  Ala. 
79. 

13.  N.Y.— Matter  of  Beers,  28  N.Y. 
Super.  643. 

34  C.J.  p  729  note  35. 
Subsequent  judgment  creditor 

It  has  been  held  that  a  subsequent 
judgment  creditor  of  defendant  is 
not  entitled  to  make  application  un- 
der a  statute  providing  that  persons 
concerned  in  interest  may  make  ap- 
plication to  have  Judgment  satisfied 
of  record. — Heidelbaugh  v.  Thomas, 
10  Wkly.N.C.,Pa.,  141. 
!4.  or. — Herrick  v.  Wallace,  236  P. 

471,  114  Or.  520. 
34C.J.  p  729  note '37. 
15.    N.Y.— Matter  of  Beers,  2S  N.Y. 

•Super.  643. 
34  C.J.  p  729  note  38. 
Assignee  of  Judgment 

Where  plaintiff,  against  whom  de- 
fendant recovered  judgment  for  costs 
on  appeal,  paid  judgment  pursuant  to 
garnishment  and  moved  to  have 
judgment  satisfied  of  record,  conten- 
tion that  judgment,  having  been  as- 
signed, could  not  be  ordered  satisfied 
in  absence  of  assignee's  being  a  par- 
ty to  proceeding,  could  be  raised,  if 
at  all,  only  by  assignee. — Mutual 

1063 


Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  of  Long 
Beach  v.  Corum,  60  P.2d  316,  16  Cal. 
App.2d  212. 

16.  N.Y. — Wheeler  v.  Bmmeluth,  24 
N.B.  285,  121  N.Y.  241. 

34  C.J.  p  729  note  39. 

17.  Ind. — Nelson  v.  Brown,   20  Ind. 
74. 

18.  Ind.— Shields  v.   Moore,   84  Ind. 
440. 

Okl. — Gupton     v.     Western     Kennel 
Club,  145  P.2d   179,   193  Okl.  462. 

19.  Ind.— Shields  v.  Moore,   84  Ind. 
440. 

20.  Ind. — Shields   v.   Moore,   supra. 

21.  Del. — Budd    v.    Union    Bank,    6 
Del.  4*55. 

34  C.J.  p  729  note  44. 

22.  Ind.— Holliday    v.    Thomas,    SO 
Ind.  398. 

34  C.J.  p  729  note  46. 

23.  S.C.— Kittles  v.  Williams,  41  S. 
E.  975,  -64  S.C.  229. 

34  C.J.  p  730  note  47. 

24.  Ind. — Palmer  v.  Hayes,  13  N.B. 
S82,  112  Ind.  289. 

34  C.J.  p  730  note  48. 

25.  Or. — CockerhaTm    v.    First    Nat 
Bank,  297  P.  363,  136  Or.  176. 


§  581 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


asserting  it;26  and  the  burden  of  proving  any 
ground  relied  on  affirmatively  in  opposition  to  the 
motion  falls  on  the  judgment  creditor.27  The  court 
will  not  compel  entry  of  satisfaction  unless  the 
evidence  in  support  of  it  is  entirely  clear,  certain,28 
and  uncontradicted.29  Likewise  a  credit  of  partial 
payments  will  not  be  ordered  unless  the  evidence  is 
clear  and  satisfactory.30  Under  some  statutes  the 
court  may  order  entry  of  satisfaction  without  the 
formal  showing  necessary  to  justify  the  clerk  of 
court  in  entering  satisfaction.31 

e.    Trial  or  Hearing 

A  motion  to  enter  satisfaction  of  a  Judgment  should 
not  be  decided  in  a  summary  manner  if  the  facts  re- 
lied on  are  seriously  disputed  and  controverted. 

Since  a  motion  to  enter  satisfaction  of  a  judg- 
ment is  a  substitute  for  the  ancient  writ  of  attdita 
querela,  if  the  facts  relied  on  are  seriously  dis- 
puted and  controverted,  the  court  should  not  under- 


take to  decide  the  question  in  a  summary  manner, 
but  should  direct  an  issue  to  be  tried  by  a  jury,32 
or  order  a  reference  to  ascertain  the  facts,33  un- 
less the  parties,  without  asking  for  a  jury  or  refer- 
ence, submit  the  issues  to  the  court  alone  for  trial.34 
In  some  jurisdictions  the  court  may  hear  and  de- 
termine the  issue  on  affidavits  and  counter-affida- 
vits,35 provided  they  are  not  in  contradiction  of  the 
record.36 

f .  Determination  and  Order 

Where  the  court  is  satisfied  that  the  judgment  has 
been  fully  paid  or  satisfied,  it  enters  an  order  direct- 
ing the  clerk  to  enter  satisfaction. 

Where  the  court  is  satisfied  that  the  judgment  has 
been  fully  paid  or  satisfied,  it  enters  an  order  direct- 
ing the  clerk  to  enter  satisfaction,37  and  such  an 
order  and  entry  are  a  matter  of  strict  right.38  Re- 
lief not  within  the  scope  of  the  motion  or  original 
order  to  show  cause  may  not  be  granted.39  It  is  not 


26.  Pa. — Fuhrman    y.    Fuhrman,    13 
Lanc.Bar    123. 

27.  Cal.— Wood   v.    Currey,    49   Cal 
359. 

34  C.J.  p  730  note  54. 

28.  Pa. — Hazleton    Thrift    &    Loan 
Corporation  v.  Kepping,  17  Pa.Dist 
&  Co.   666,   26  Luz.Leg.Reg.  417. 

34  C.J.  p  730  note  49. 
Full  and  satisfactory 

Court  will  not  order  satisfaction  of 
judgment  to  be  entered,  unless  proof 
of  payment  thereof  is  full  and  satis- 
factory.— Megaro  v.  Cordasco,  161  A. 
356,  10  N.J.Misc.  £08. 
AdmisoilJility 

Where  surety  on  bond  to  stay 
judgment  paid  personal  injury  judg- 
ment affirmed  on  appeal  and  took 
satisfaction  and  assignment  of  judg- 
ment, bond  by  which  surety  indem- 
nified defendants  against  liability  for 
personal  injuries  was  held  admissible 
on  motion  to  compel  entry  of  satis- 
faction of  judgment  notwithstanding 
movant  was  not  party  to  indemnity 
bond  and  surety  paid  judgment  un- 
der stay  bond. — Smith  v.  'Flail  River 
Joint  Union  High  School  Dist,  34 
P.2d  994,  1  Cal.2d  331. 
Sufficiency 

(1)  Evidence     held .  sufficient     to 
warrant  that  judgment   be  satisfied 
of  record. 
Cal. — Mutual  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 

of  Long  Beach  v.  Corum,  60  P.2d 

316,  1-6  €aLAjpp.2d  212. 
Iowa. — Taylor    v.    Helny,    232    N.W. 

695,  210  Iowa  .1320. 
La. — Ferris  v.  L.  J.  Patenotte  &  Son, 

App.,  12  So.2d  498. 
N.J. — Gttllman  v.  -Sorventino,   130  A. 

442,  101  N.J.Law  447,  affirmed  133 

A.    919,    102   N.J.Law  715.     ' 
N.Y. — Brinn  v.  Wooding,   298  N.Y.S. 

971,  164  Misc.  850. 


(2)  Proof  of  payment  held  not  suf- 
ficient to  justify  entry  of  satisfac- 
tion of  judgment. — Megaro  v.  Cord- 
asco, 161  A.  3'56,  10  N.J.Misc.  908. 

(3)  Evidence     held     sufficient     to 
show  particular  matters. — Thompson 
V.  Lindley,  101  P.2d  84:8,  187  Okl.  175. 

(4)  Evidence    held    insufficient    to 
show     particular     matters. — Federal 
Land  Bank  v.   Heath,   164   P.2d  125, 
160  Kan.  645. 

29.  N.Y.— Barker  v.  Crawford,  11  N. 
Y.S.  337. 

34  C.J.p  730  note  50. 
tTncontradictea  affidavit 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that  the  court 
may  not  declare  judgment  satisfied 
on  uncontradicted  affidavit  of  judg- 
ment debtor  that  judgment  was  paid. 
— Welk  v.  Conner,  282  P.  963,  102  Cal. 
App.  386. 

(2)  An  uncontradicted  affidavit  of 
payment,  however,  has  been  held  suf- 
ficient to  justify  the  relief  asked. — 
Bartikowski  v.  Lambert,  9  Kulp.,  Pa., 
493—34  C.J.  p  730  note  50   [a]. 

30.  Or. — Cockerham    v.    First    Nat. 
Bank,  297  P.  363,  136  Or.  176. 

Pa.— Bishop  v.  Good&art,  19  A.  1026, 

135  Pa.  374. 

In  suit  for  accounting,  under  evi- 
dence, judgment  debtor  was  held  not 
entitled  to  credit  allegedly  arising 
from  execution  sale  and  resale  to 
debtor. — Cockerham  v.  First  Nat 
Bank,  297  P.  363,  136  Or.  176. 

31.  Idaho. — Tanner  v.  Wood,   90  P. 
733,  13  Idaho  486. 

32.  111. — Louis    B.    Bower,    Inc.    v. 
Silverstein,  18  N.E.2d  385,  298  111. 
App.  145 — Handley  v.  Moburg,  266 
IlLApp.  &56 — Handel  v.  Curry,  254 
IlLApp.  36. 

Pa. — Koch,   to   Use    of   Whitman   v. 
Ernesto,  Com.PL,  34  Berks.Co.  13,  J 

1064 


.  55  York  Leg.Rec.  141— Henry  r. 
Henry,  Com.Pl.,  28  Erie  Co.  149— 
Henshaw  v.  Brown,  Com.Pl.,  87 
Pittsb.'Leg.J.  10,  2  -Fay.L.J.  50. 

34  C.J.  p  730  note  56. 

33.  N.T.— Haubrich  v.  Haubrich,  40 
N.Y.S.2d  954,  180  Misc.  73'5,  appeal 
dismissed  46  N.Y.S.Sd  506,  267  App. 
Div.  872. 

34  C.J.  p  730  note  57. 

34L  Cal. — Cohn  v.  Cohn,  59  P.2d  969, 
7  Cal.2d  1. 

34  C.J.  p  730  note  58. 

35.  Cal.— Cohn  v.  Cohn,  59  P.2d  969, 
7  Cal.2d  1. 

Or.— Herrick  v.  Wallace,  236  P.  471, 

114  Or.  520. 
34  C.J.  p  730  note  59. 

Affidavit  used  to  obtain  rule  to 
show  cause  why  judgment  should  not 
be  satisfied  of  record  cannot  be  used 
to  sustain  entry  of  satisfaction  of 
judgment. — Megaro  v.  Cordasco,  161 
A.  356,  10  N.J.Misc.  908. 

36.  Cal.— Haggin  v.  Clark,  12  P.  478, 
71  Cal.  444. 

34  C.J.  p  730  note  60. 

37.  Ark. — Davis  v.  Oaks,  60  S.W.2d 
922,  187  Ark.  .501. 

Cal. — Irvin  v.  Superior  Court  in  and 
for  Los  Angeles  County,  35  P.2d 
642,  140  CaLApp.  622. 

N.Y. — Brinn  v.  Wooding,  298  N.Y.S. 
971,  164  Misc.  850. 

Pa.— Union  Trust  Co.  of  New  Castle 
v.  Tutino,  44  A.2d  556,  353  Pa.  145 
— Sadow  v.  Brandwene,  Com.Pl.,  46 
Lack.Jur.  2-85. 

34  C.J.  p  730  note  61. 

38.  N.J. — Lawrence  v.  Dickey,  12  N. 
J.Law  368. 

39.  Mo. — Schneider  v.  Meyer,  56  Mo. 
475. 

Wash.— Hawks  v.  Votaw,  23  P,  442, 
1  Wash.  70. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  582 


proper  to  cancel  or  strike  off  the  judgment;40  but 
a  perpetual  stay  of  proceedings  may  be  granted.41 
An  order  of  court,  made  on  due  application  and 
hearing,  requiring  satisfaction  to  be  entered,  is  a 
judicial  act,  and  entitled  to  all  the  respect  due  to  a 
record,42  although  it  may  be  impeached  for  fraud 
or  collusion.43  Where  there  is  a  serious  contro- 
versy as  to  the  facts,  the  motion  may  be  dismissed 
and  the  parties  remitted  to  a  regular  action.44 
Where  the  court  declines  to  take  jurisdiction,  its 
overruling  of  the  motion  is  not  a  bar  to  an  applica- 
tion for  relief  in  equity;45  but  where  it  denies  the 
motion  after  a  hearing  the  determination  is  conclu- 
sive, as  to  all  matters  litigated  and  adjudicated,  in  a 
subsequent  proceeding  to  revive  the  judgment.46 

g.  Appeal  and  Costs 

An  order  entered  op  a  motion  to  compel  satisfac- 
tion of  a  judgment  is  appealable.  Costs  and  expenses 
of  a  successful  application  may  be  charged  to  the  party 
who  wrongfully  refuses  to  satisfy  the  judgment. 

An  order  entered  on  a  motion  to  compel  satisfac- 
tion of  a  judgment  is  appealable,47  and,  at  lease  in 
some  jurisdictions,  may  be  reviewed  by  certiorari.48 
An  intermediate  court  will  not  take  "jurisdiction  of 
an  appeal  while  an  appeal  to  a  higher  court  is  pend- 
ing.49 The  costs  and  expenses  of  a  successful  ap- 
plication for  satisfaction  may  be  charged  to  the  par- 
ty who  wrongfully  refuses  to  satisfy  the  judg- 
ment.60 

§  532.    Actions  and  Penalties  for  Failure 

to  Satisfy 

Under  some  statutes  an   action   may  be  maintained 


to  recover  a  penalty  or  damages  against  a  Judgment 
creditor  for  neglect  or  refusal  to  satisfy  a  judgment  of 
record  when  it  has  been*  paid. 

Under  some  statutes  penalties  are  provided 
against  a  judgment  creditor  who,  within  a  certain 
period  after  being  requested  to  do  so,  neglects  or 
refuses  to  satisfy  a  judgment  of  record  when  the 
judgment  has  been-  paid.51  Such  a  statute  is  penal 
and,  therefore,  according  to  the  familiar  rule  for 
the  construction  of  such  statutes,  is  not  to  be  ex- 
tended beyond  its  plain  terms.52  To  sustain  an  ac- 
tion on  the  statute  plaintiff  must  be  a  party  ag- 
grieved by  the  refusal  to  enter  satisfaction,^  the 
refusal  must  be  willful,  and  not  based  on  an  honest 
contention  that  the  judgment  has  not  been  paid,54 
and  the  failure  to  enter  satisfaction  must  be  due 
to  the  creditor's  own  fault  or  neglect,  not  to  that 
of  an  officer  over  whom  he  has  no  control.65  The 
action  is  justified  where  there  has  not  been  a  formal 
entry  of  satisfaction,56  although  it  will  not  be  sup- 
ported by  an  allegation  of. payment  before  entry 
of  judgment.57  The  form  of  action  may  be  either 
debt  or  assumpsit.58 

If  the  statute  awards  damages  instead  of  a  fixed 
penalty,  the  jury  are  at  liberty  to  consider  all  the 
circumstances  by  which  the  debtor  suffered  vexation 
and  inconvenience,59  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  plead 
or  prove  actual  damage  resulting  from  the  refusal 
to  enter  satisfaction.60  The  remedy  thus  provided 
is  exclusive  ;61  but  in  the  absence  of  such  a  statute 
an  action  for  damages  will  lie  for  the  same  pur- 
pose.62 

Action  on  the  case.  In  some  jurisdictions  an  ac- 
tion on  the  case  for  failure  to  satisfy  a  judgment 


40.  111.— Dibble  v.  Briggs,  28  111.  48. 
pa. — Reynolds  v.  Barnes,  76  Pa-  427. 

41.  Mich.-— Whitney     v.     McConnell, 
30  Mich.  421. 

N.Y. — Hamlin    v.    Boughton,    4    Cow. 
65. 

42.  Ark.— State    v.   Martin,    20   Ark. 
629. 

Pa. — Coyne  v.  Souther,  61  Pa.  455. 
34  C.J.  p  731  note  66. 
Judgment  at  law 

An  order  of  entry  of  satisfaction 
of  Judgment,  on  application  therefor, 
has  the  Qualities  of  a  judgment  at 
law.--Herrick  v.  Wallace,  236  P.  471, 
114  Or.  '520. 
43..  N.T. — Mandeville  v.  Reynolds,  68 

N.Y.  52$. 

44.  Minn.— Woodford    v.    Reynolds, 
30  N.W.  757,  36  Minn.  155. 

34  C.J.  P  731  note  «68. 

45.  Miss. — Long   v.    Shackleford,   25 
Miss.  559. 

46.  Neb. — Broadwater  v.  Foxworthy, 
77  N.W.  1103,  57  Neb.  406. 


47.  Or.— Corpus      Juris      cited      in 
Herrick  v.  Wallace,  236  P.  4'71,  473, 
114  Or.  520. 

34  C.J.  -p  731  note  71. 

48.  N.J.— Lawrence  v.  Dickey,  12  N. 
J.Law  368. 

49.  Mo. — Rosenberger   v.    Jones,    48 
Mo.App.  606. 

50.  N.Y. — Briggs    v.    Thompson,    20 
Johns.  294. 

34  C.J.  p  731  note  "74. 

51.  Wis. — Johnson  v.   Huber,    93  N. 
W.  826,  117  Wis.  58. 

34  C.J.  p  731  note  75. 

52.  Pa.— Marston  v.  Tryon,  17  Phila. 
245,  affirmed  108  Pa.  270. 

34  C.J.  p  731  note  76. 

53.  Pa.— Henry    v.    Sims,    1   Whart. 
187— Pierce  v.  Potter,  7  Watts   475. 

54.  Wis.— Johnson  v.  Huber,   03  N, 
W.  836,  11'7  Wis.  58. 

55.  Pa.— Bratton  v.   Leyrer,   12   Pa. 
Co.  651. 

1065 


56.  Pa.— Allen  v.  Conrad,  51  Pa.  4S7. 
34  C.J.  p  731  note«80. 

57.  Pa.— Lee    v.    Conrad,    1    Whart. 
108 — Braddee      v.      Brownfleld,      4 
Watts    474. 

5ft.    Pa.— Allen  v.  Conrad,  51  Pa.  487. 
34  C.J.  p  731  note  82. 
59.     Pa.— Allen  v.  Conrad,  supra. 
00.    Pa. — Henry   v.    Sims,    1    Whart. 

187. 
34  C.J.  p  731  note  84. 

61.  Pa. — Oberholtzer  v.  Hunsberger, 
1  Mona.  543, 

62.  N.D. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Pe- 
terson  v.    First    &   Security    State 
Bank  of  Crosby,  236  N.W.  722,  724, 
61  N.D.  1. 

34  C.J.  P  731  note  86. 
Proof  aft  to  amount 

Damages  could  not  be  allowed  for 
failure  to  satisfy  Judgments  of  rec- 
ord "without  proof  as  to  amount  of 
damages.— Taylor  v.  Heiny,  232  N.W. 
695,  210  Iowa  1320. 


583 


JUDGMENTS 


49    O.J.S. 


is  authorized  and  regulated  by  statute.63  The  dec- 
laration may  describe  the  judgment  as  being  for  a 
certain  sum  "with  costs,"  without  specifying  the 
amount  of  co-*s,64  but  a  variance  between  the 
amount  of  the  judgment  alleged  and  the  amount 
proved  is  fatal.65 

§  583.    Effect 

Ordinarily  a  satisfaction  of  a  Judgment,  entered  of 
record  by  the  act  of  the  parties,  Is  prlma  facie  evidence 
that  the  creditor  has  received  payment  of  the  amount 
of  the  Judgment  or  its  equivalent,  and  operates  as  an 
extinguishment  of  the  debt. 

A  satisfaction  of  a  judgment,  entered  of  record 
by  the  act  of  the  parties,  is  prima  facie  evidence 
that  the  creditor  has  received  payment  of  the 
amount  of  the  judgment  or  its  equivalent,66  and 
operates  as  an  extinguishment  of  the  debt67  and  a 
bar  to  further  proceedings  which  continue  on  the 
theory  that  the  judgment  remains  a  subsisting  ob- 
ligation,68 except  where  the  satisfaction  was  pro- 
cured by  fraud69  or  duress,70  or  without  considera- 
tion,71 or  on  a  condition  which  has  not  been  per- 
formed,72 or  was  entered  by  the  clerk  without  au- 
thority to  do  so.73  Thus,  unless  the  case  comes 
within  such  exceptions,  no  action  lies  on  a  satisfied 
judgment,74  and  no  further  execution  may  issue, 
even  with  the  consent  of  the  parties,75  until  the  sat- 
isfaction is  vacated  and  a  new  execution  awarded 
by  an  order  of  the  court  in  which  the  judgment  was 
rendered.76  It  has  been  held  that  the  entry  can- 


not be  impeached  or  inquired  into  collaterally.7^ 
Parties  to  an  action  cannot  defeat  a  master's  fees 
included  in  a  decree  by  filing  satisfaction  papers, 
\vhere  the  master  is  not  represented  or  consenting 
in  any  way  thereto.78 

Entry  without  notice.  An  entry  of  payment  or 
satisfaction  of  a  final  judgment  or  decree,  made  at 
a  term  subsequent  to  its  rendition,  is  not  binding 
on  a  party  in  interest,  nor  is  it  evidence  against  him, 
when  made  without  notice  to  him.79 

Entry  of  satisfaction  as  to  one  of  two  judgment 
debtors.  While  it  has  been  held  that  the  entry  of 
satisfaction  of  judgment  as  to  one  of  two  judgment 
debtors  satisfies  judgment  as  to  both,80  regardless 
of  intent,81  it  has  also  been  held  that  the  filing  of 
an  instrument  purporting  to  satisfy  judgment 
against  only  one  of  two  judgment  debtors  does  not 
operate  to  satisfy  the  judgment  as  to  the  debtor 
not  released  by  its  terms.82 

§  584.    Vacation  or  Correction 

a.  Power  of  court  or  clerk 

b.  Grounds 

c.  Proceedings 

d.  Effect  . 

a.  Power  of  Court  or  Clerk 

A  court  of  taw,  by  virtue  of  its  control  over  its  own 
records,  has  inherent  power  on  proper  application  to 
vacate  an  entry  of  satisfaction,  or  to  reverse  an  er- 
roneous entry  and  make  a  correct  entry  nunc  pro  tune. 


63.  Del. — Silver   v.    Bhodes,    2    Del. 
369 — Hendrixen    v.    Huey,    2    Del. 
301. 

Grounds  of  action  in  actions  on  case 
generally  see  Case,  Action  on,  §  5. 

64.  Del. — Silver   v.    Rhodes,    2    Del. 
369. 

65.  DeL— Lofland  v.  Cade,  8  Del.  222 
—Silver  v.  Rhodes,  2  Del.  369. 

66.  Pa. — City  Deposit  Bank  &  Trust 
Co.  v.  Zoppa,   9  A.2d  361,  336  Pa. 
379 — Bean  v.  Cement  Nat.  Bank  of 
Siegfried,  3  A.2d  1003,  134  Pa. Su- 
per. 281. 

34  C.J.  p  732  note  90. 
Not  conclusive 

Satisfaction  of  Judgment,  such  as 
judgment  entered  on  collateral  judg- 
ment note,  is  not  conclusive  of  pay- 
ment of  primary  obligation. — Win- 
ters v.  Wolfskill,  190  A.  395,  126  Pa. 
Super.  168. 

67.  Tnd. — Kennedy  v.  Eder,  139  N.E. 
372,  79  Ind.App.  644. 

Ohio.— Gholson   v.,  Savin,   31   N.E.2d 

858,   137   Ohio   St.   551,   139  A.L.R. 

75.       • 
Pa. — Bean'  v.   Cement  Nat.  Bank  of 

Siegfried,    3    A,2d    1003,     134    Pa. 

Super.  281. 
34  C.J.  p  732  note  91. 


Intention,  of  parties  is  controlling. 
—Winters   v.  Wolfskill,   190   A.    395, 
126  Pa.Super.  168. 
Judgment  of  condemnation 

Recorded  satisfaction  of  judgment 
of  condemnation  reciting  payment  in 
full  for  property  condemned,  al- 
though satisfaction  had  obviously 
been  altered,  required  finding  that 
full  payment  for  land  taken  had  been 
made,  in .  absence  of  proof  that  any 
alteration  was  made  after  execution 
of  satisfaction  almost  twenty  years 
before  petition  to  vacate  judgment 
was  filed. — Village  of  Palatine  v. 
Dahle,  53  N.E.2d  608,  385  111.  621. 

68.  Ky. — Brown  v.  Vancleave,  6  S.W. 
25,  86  Ky.  881,  9  Ky.L.  593. 

Md. — Shriver  v.  Carlin  &  Fulton  Co., 
141  A.  434,  155  Md.  51,  58  A.L.R. 
767. 

69.  Ind. — Kennedy  v.  Eder,  139  N.E. 
372,  79  IndLApp.  644. 

34  C.J.  p  732  note  93. 

70.  U.S. — Becker  Steel  Co.  of  Ameri- 
ca v.   Cummings,    D.C.N.T.,   16   F. 
Supp.  601. 

71.  Mo. — Boynton  v.  Boynton,  172  S. 
W.  1175,  186  Mo.App.  713. 

72.  N.T. — Anderson  v.  Nicholas,   27 
N.Y.Super.  630. 

1066 


73.  111. — Seymour  v.  Haines,  104  111. 
557. 

74.  Neb.— Ebel  v.  Stringer,  102  N.W. 
466,  73  Neb.  249. 

34  C.J.  p  732  note  98. 

75.  Tenn. — Trevathan  v.  Caldwell,  4 
Heisk.    535 — Bynum   v.    Murrell,,   8 
Humphr.  701. 

76.  Or. — Snipes    v.    Beezley,    5    Or. 
420. 

34  C.J.  p  732  note  1. 

77.  Md.— Tabler    v.    Castle,    22    Md. 
94. 

34  C.J.  p  732  note  5. 

78.  111. — German-A  m  e  r  i  c  <a  n    Sav. 
Loan  &  Bldg.  Ass'n  v.  Trainor,  127 
N.E.  719,  293  111.  483. 

79.  Ala. — Armstrong   v.    Harper,    65 
Ala.  523. 

80.  Ark.— Biggs  v.  Davis,  43  S.W.2d 
724,  184  Ark.  834. 

Mo.— Weston  v.  Clark,  37  Mo.  568. 
Pa. — McShea  v.  McKenna,  95  Pa.  Su- 
per. 338. 

81.  Ark.— Biggs    v.   Davis,    43    S.W. 
2d  724,  184  Ark.  834. 

82.  Cal. — Bank     of    America,     Nat 
Trust    &    Savings   Ass'n    v.    Duer, 
117   P.2d  405,   47   CXl.App.3d   100— 
Sun  Realty  Co.  v.  Rosenstein,  290 
P.    1053,    107   OaLApp.    484. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  584 


A  court  of  law,  by  virtue  of  its  control  over  its 
own  records,83  has  inherent84  power  on  proper  ap- 
plication to  vacate  an  entry-  of  satisfaction,^  or  to 
reverse  an  erroneous  entry  and  make  a  correct  en- 
try nunc  pro  tune;86  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  re- 
sort to  equity  in  order  to  obtain  relief.87 

A  court  of  equity  has  jurisdiction  to  vacate  an 
entry  of  satisfaction,88  but  it  sometimes  declines  to 
exercise  jurisdiction  on  the  ground  that  an  adequate 
remedy  at  law  exists.89 

Authority  of  clerk.  Since  the  duties  of  a  clerk 
are  ministerial  and -not  judicial,  he  has  no  author- 
ity to  vacate  an  entry  of  satisfaction  of  a  judg- 
ment,90 this  being  a  judicial  act.91 


b.  Grounds 

The  court  will  vacate  or  set  aside  an  entry  of  sat- 
isfaction of  a  Judgment  for  proper  cause  where  the 
rights  of  third  persons  have  not  intervened.  The  entry 
of  satisfaction  may  be  vacated  on  such  grounds  as  mis- 
take, fraud,  duress,  undue  influence,  and  the  lack  or 
failure  of  consideration  therefor. 

The  court  will  vacate  or  set  aside  an  entry  of  sat- 
isfaction for  proper  cause92  where  the  rights  of 
third  persons  have  not  intervened.93  Particularly 
the  court  will  vacate  an  entry  of  satisfaction  of  a 
judgment  in  pursuance  of  an  agreement  of  the  par- 
ties to  that  effect,94  or  where  it  was  entered  by  mis- 
take of  the  clerk  or  plaintiff,95  or  procured  by  mis- 
representation, fraud,96  duress,97  or  undue  influ- 
ence,98 or  where  it  appears  to  have  been  irregularly 
or  improperly  entered99  or  that  it  will  operate  to  the 


83.  Ky. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Commonwealth,  for  Use  and  Bene- 
fit of  Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d 

585,  586,  251  Ky.  280. 
"34  C.J.  p  732  note  8. 
County  courts 

Statute  requiring  county  courts  to 
keep  record  showing  dates  of  judg- 
ment and  satisfaction  thereof  vested 
such  courts  with  all  powers  neces- 
sary to  proper  and  complete  exercise 
of  supervision  and  control,  including 
power  to  purge  record  of  error. — 
Commonwealth,  for  Use  and  Benefit 
of  Bates  v.  Hall,  supra. 

A  municipal  court  has  been  held  to 
be  without  power  to  vacate  a  satis- 
faction piece. — People  v.  Fitzpatrick, 
71  N.Y.S.  191,  35  Misc.  45G. 

C4.    Ky.— Corpus     Juris     quoted    in 

Commonwealth,  for  Use  and  Ben- 
efit of  Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585, 

586,  251  Ky.  280. 
3i  C.J.  p  732  note  9. 

85-  111.— -Benik  v.  Benik,  5  N.B.2d 
620,  287  Ill.App.  631. 

Ky.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Com- 
monwealth, for  Use  and  Benefit  of 
Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585,  586, 
251  Ky.  280. 

3£d. — ijegrum  v.  Farmers  Nat.  Bank 
of  Annapolis,  24  A.2d  281,  180  Md. 
356. 

Mo.— Kelley  v.  Kelley,  App.,  290  S.W. 
624. 

Utah^George  Thatcher  Corp.  v.  Bul- 
len,  153  P.2d  655,  107  Utah  310. 

34  C.J.  p  732  note  10. 

86.  Ky. — Corpus    Juris     quoted     in 
Commonwealth,  for  Wse  and  Ben- 
efit  of  Bates   v.   Hall,    64    S.W.2d 

585,  586,  251  Ky.  280. 
34  C.J.  P  733  note  11. 

87.  Ky. — Corpus    Juris    quoted    in 
Commonwealth,  for  Use  and  Ben- 
efit of  Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585, 

586,  251  Ky.  $80. 

j^d. — Legum  v.  Farmers  Nat.  Bank 
of  Annapolis,  24  A.2d  281,  180  Md. 
356. 

34  C.J.  p  733  note  12. 


88.  S.D. — Piano  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son,  112  N.W.  149,  21  S.D.  300,  11 
L.R.A.,N.S.,    396r   130   Am.S.R.    722. 
=  C.J.  p  733  note  13. 

89.  111.— Hubbard     v.     National 
Stamping   &    Electric    Works,    213 
HLApp.  235. 

Mo. — Boynton  v.  Boynton,  172  S.W. 
1175,  186  Mo.App.  713. 

90.  111. — Hughes  v.  Streeter,  24  HI. 
647,  76  Am.D.  777. 

91.  111. — Hughes  v.   Streeter,   supra. 
Okl.— Lambert  v.   Hill,    73   P.2d   124, 

181  Okl.  225. 

92.  U.S. — Becker  Steel  Co.  of  Amer- 
ica v.   Cummings,   D.C.N.Y.,   16   F. 
Supp.  601. 

Cal. — Brochier  v.  Brochier,  112  P.2d 

602,  17  Cal.2d  822. 

Satisfaction  of  Judgment  may  "be 
avoided  for  any  cause  rendering  it 
inequitable  for  defendant  to  avail 
himself  of  the  entry  of  satisfaction. 
— Knaak  v.  Brown,  212  N.W.  431,  115 
Neb.  260,  51  A.L.R.  237. 

93.  U.S. — Becker  Steel  Co.  of  Ameri- 
ca  v.   Cummings,    D.C.N.Y.,    16   F. 
Supp.  601. 

94.  Ky. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in- 
Common  wealth  for  Use  and  Bene- 
fit of  Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585, 
586,  251  Ky.  280. 

N.Y.— Berdell  v.  Parkhurst,  6  N.Y.St. 
12. 

95.  Cal. — Kinnison  v.  Guaranty  Liq- 
uidating Corporation,  115  P.2d  450, 
18  Cal.2d  256. 

Ky. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Com- 
monwealth for  Use  and  Benefit  of 
Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585,  586, 
251  Ky.  280. 

Md. — Legum  v.  Farmers  Nat.  Bank 
of  Annapolis,  24  A.2d  281,  180  Md. 
356. 

Pa. — Personal  Finance  Co.  v.  Staf- 
ford, Com.Pl.,  28  Brie  Co.  143. 

34  C.J.  p  733  note  21. 

96.  III.— Paul  v.  Shukes,   56  N.B.2d 
141,  323  HLApp.  527— Benik  v.  Be- 
nik, 5  N.B.2d  620,  287  HLApp.  631. 

Ky. — Corpus  Corpus  quoted  in  Com- 

1067 


monwealth,  for  Use  and  Benefit  of 

Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585,  586, 

251  Ky.  280. 
Neb.— Marshall    v.    Howe.    230    N.W. 

446,  119  Neb.  591. 
34  C.J.  p  733  note  22. 
Constructive  fraud 

Creditor,  basing  settlement  of 
judgment  for  less  than  face  amount 
thereof  on  debtor's  ability  to  pay 
and  on  representation  that  there 
had  been  full  disclosure  regarding 
indemnity  insurance,  could  have  set- 
tlement vacated  on  subsequent  dis- 
covery of  undisclosed  insurance,  fail- 
ure to  disclose  such  insurance  con- 
stituting, in  equity,  constructive 
fraud. — Hernig  v.  Harris,  175  A,  169, 
117  N.J.Bq.  146. 

Evidence  held  sufficient  to  show 
fraud 

Mo. — Hunter  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  140 

S.W.  930,  160  Mo.App.  601. 
Wis. — Simon  v.  Lecker,  285  N.W.  406, 

231  Wis.  106. 
Evidence   held   insufltoient   to    show 

fraud 
Mo.— Kelley  v.  Kelley,   App.,    290   S. 

W.  624. 
S.D.— Murdy  v.  Murdy,  276  N.W.  728, 

65  S.D.  586. 
34  C.J.  p  733  note  22  [c], 

97.  U.S.— Becker  Steel  Co.  of  Ameri- 
ca v.  Cummings,  D.C.N.T.,  16  F. 

.     Supp.  601. 

Ind.— Stewart  v.  Annel,  62  Ind.  593. 

Ky. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Com- 
monwealth, for  Use  and  Benefit  of 
Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  5C5,  586, 
251  Ky.  280. 

98-  Ky. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Commonwealth,  for  Use  and  Bene- 
fit of  Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585, 
586,  251  Ky.  280. 

N.T. — Bergheim  v.  Hofstatter,  276  N. 
Y.S.  188,  243  App.Div.  568. 

34  C.J.  p  733  note  24. 

99.  Ky. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Commonwealth,  for  Use  and  Bene- 
fit &f  Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585, 
586,  251  Ky.  280. 

34  C.J.  p  733  note  25. 


§584 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S, 


disadvantage  of  a  third  person  having  a  lien  on  the 
judgment  or  entitled  to  be  protected  or  secured  by 
it* 

Likewise,  the  court  will  vacate  an  entry  of  satis- 
faction where  there  has  been  a  lack  or  failure  of 
consideration  therefor,2  or  where  there  has  been  a 
failure  to  perform  the  conditions  of  a  settlement 
between  the  parties  on  which  the  satisfaction  was 
based.3  Further,  the  court  may  vacate  the  entry 
where  there  was  a  want  of  authority  under  the  cir- 
cumstances to  make  it,4  as,  for  instance,  where  an 
unauthorized  entry  of  satisfaction  is  made  by  plain- 
tiff's attorney,6  the  clerk  of  the  court,6  sheriff,7  or 
one  of  two  joint  judgment  creditors.8  Also  a  false 
or  mistaken  entry  of  a  credit  may  be  ordered  cor- 
rected or  vacated.9 

Void  or  irregular  sale.  Where  property  is  sold 
under  execution  on  a  judgment  and  bought  in  by 


the  judgment  creditor,  or  the  proceeds  collected 
from  the  purchaser,  and  satisfaction  entered,  but 
the  sale  proves  to  be  invalid  or  is  afterward  vacat- 
ed, the  entry  of  satisfaction  will  be  stricken  off  on* 
the  application  of  the  creditor.10 

Absence  of  leviable  interest  in  property  sold* 
Where  the  execution,  judgment,  and  sale  are  all 
regular,  but  defendant  has  no  interest  in  the  prop- 
erty sold,  according  to  some  authorities,  plaintiff 
may  have  such  apparent  satisfaction  vacated,11  un- 
der the  power  of  the  court  to  correct  its  own  rec- 
ords,12 provided  plaintiff  acts  within  a  reasonable. 
time13  and  the  rights  of  third  persons  more  deserv-. 
ing  of  protection  have  not  intervened.14  A  direct-, 
ly  contrary  view,  however,  has  been  taken  by  other 
authorities,15  based  on  the  doctrine  that  there  is  no 
warranty  of  title  in  execution  sales,16  and  it  has 
been  held  that  a  mistake  by  the  judgment  creditor 
who  purchases  land  under  an  execution  as  to  the 


Order  without  notice 

(1)  Where  satisfaction  of  a  Judg- 
ment  is   entered  on   motion   of  de- 
fendant without  notice  to  the  Judg- 
ment creditor,  the  latter  has  his  rem- 
edy by  motion  to  set  aside  the  or- 
der and  entry  of  satisfaction.— Thom- 
as v.  Rock  Island  Gold  &  Silver  Min- 
ing Co.,  54  Cal.  578. 

(2)  An    order    of    satisfaction    of 
Judgment  on  stipulation  of  judgment 
debtor  and  strangers  to  suit,  without 
notice   to  Judgment  creditor  or  his 
attorneys  may  be  set  aside. — Shank 
v.  Lippman.  227  N.W.  710,  249  Mich. 
22. 

1.  111.— Paul  v.    Shukes,   56   N.E.2d 
141,  323  IlLApp.  527. 

Pa.— Peckville  Nat.  Bank  y.  Anthra- 
cite Trust  Co.,  17  Pa.Dist.  &  Co. 
15,  32  Lack.Jur.  138. 

34  C.J.  p  734  note  26. 

2.  Cal.— Argue   v.   Wilson,    40   P.2d 
297,  3  CaLApp.2d  645. 

Mo.— Kelley  v.  Kelley,  App.,  290   S. 

W.  624. 
Neb.— Knaak  v.  Brown,  212  N.W.  431, 

115  Neb.  260,   51  A.L.R.   237. 
Pa. — Steelton  Finance  Co.  v.  Kireta,« 

Com.Pl.,  46  Dauph.Co.  426. 
S.D.— Smith  v.  Blackford,  228  N.W. 

466,  56  S.D.  360. 
Utah. — George     Thatcher    Corp.     v. 

Sullen,  153  P.2d  655,  107  Utah  310. 
34  C.J.  p  734  note  27. 
Attachment  set  aside 

Satisfaction  ,by  assignee  of  mort- 
gage of  its  Judgment  against  guar- 
antor on  notes  did  not  constitute  ir- 
revocable .payment  of  notes,  prevent- 
ing subsequent  foreclosure  suit  and 
was  properly  vacated  where  bank- 
ruptcy court  set.. aside  attachment 
under  which  judgment  was  satisfied. 
—Smith  v.  Blackford,  228  N.W.  466, 
56  S.D.  360. 


Evidence  held  sufficient  to  show  lack 

of  consideration 
Okl.— Owens   v.   Lynch,   297   P.   223, 

147  Okl.  298. 
Wis.— Simon    v.    Lecker,    285    N<W. 

406,  231  Wis.  106. 
Evidence   held  insufficient  to   snow 

lack  of  consideration 
S.D.— Murdy  v.  Murdy,  276  N.W.  728, 

65  S.D.  586. 

3.  Md.— Waters  v.  Engle,  53  Md.  179. 
Pa. — Steelton  Finance  Co.  v.  Kireta, 

Com.Pl.,   46   Dauph.Co.  426. 
34  C.J.  p  734  note  28. 

4.  Mo. — Ekonomou.  v.  Greek  Ortho- 
dox Church  St.  Nicholas,  App.,  280 
S.W.  57. 

34  C.J.  p  734  note  29. 
TTnconstitutional  statute 

A  satisfaction  of  Judgment  en- 
tered pursuant  to  an  unconstitutional 
statute  will  be  stricken  oft. — Brides- 
burg  Bldg.  Ass'n  v.  Bailey,  40  Pa. 
Dist  &  Co.  211— Second  Nat.  Bank 
to  Use  of  Security-Peoples  Trust  Co. 
v.  Jiuliante,  Pa.Com.Pl.,  19  Erie  Co. 
518. 

5.  La. — People's  Homestead  &  Sav- 
ings Ass'n  v.  Worley,  185  So.  880, 
191  La.  453. 

N.D.— Business      Service     Collection 

Bureau  v.  Tegen,  269  N.W.  46,  67 

N.D.  51. 

34  C.J.  p  734  note  30. 
Authority  of  attorney  to  give  satisr 

faction  see  Attorney  and  Client  § 

99. 
Presumption  of  authority  held  not 

rebntted 
Pa. — Trostle  v.  Harbaugh,  16  Pa.Dist. 

&  Co.  18. 

6.  Ala.— Aicardi  v.  Bobbins,  41  Ala. 
541,  94  Am.D.  614. 

34  C.J.  p  734  note  31. 

7.  Ala.— Cook  v,  Bloodgood,  7  Ala. 
683. 

1068 


Okl.— U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co. 
v.  Collier,  24  P.2d  651,  165  Okl.  35.. 

8.  Cal.— Haggin  v.  Clark,  61  Cal.  1.. 
Mich.— Potter  v.  Hunt,  36  N.W.  58,  6S; 

Mich.  242. 

9.  Ind. — Brunner  v.  Brennan,  49  Ind; 
98. 

Iowa. — Indiana  State  Bank  v.  Har-. 
row,  26  Iowa  426. 

10.  Ky. — Corpus    Juris     quoted    ln^ 
Lucas'  Adm'r  v.  Stanley,  300  S.W. 
889,  890,  222  Ky.  374. 

34  C.J.  p  734  note  40. 

11.  Minn. — Ridgway    v.    Mirkovich, 
260  N.W.  303,  194  Minn.  216. 

Wis.— Hermance  v.  Braun,  285  N.W: 

733,  231  Wis.  357. 
34  C.J.  p  735  note  41. 
Subsequent  foreclosure  of  mortgage* 

It  has  been  held  that  execution 
sale  and  resulting  satisfaction  of" 
Judgment  could  not  be  vacated  on, 
ground  of  mistake  because,  realty* 
mortgage,  subject  to  which  property- 
was  purchased  at  execution  sale,  was. 
thereafter  foreclosed  and  property- 
lost  to  purchaser  at  execution  sale, 
because  of  failure  to  exercise  right 
of  redemption. — Ridgway  y.  -Mirko-^ 
vich,  260  N.W.  303,  194  Minn.  216:. 

12.  Vt.— Tudor  v.  Taylor,  26  Vt  444. 

13.  Wis. — Hermance  v.   Braun,    285; 
N.W.  733,  231  Wis.  357. 

14.  Wis. — Hermance  v.   Bwm,    su^ 
pra. 

15.  Ohio.— Vattier  v.  Lytle,   6  Ohio, 
477. 

34  C.J.  p  735  note  43. 

16.  Pa. — Freeman    y.    CaJ.dw.ell,    VH 
Watts  9. 

34  C.J.  p  735  note  44, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  584 


extent  of  the  debtor's  interest  is  not  ground  for 
setting  aside  the  satisfaction  after  the  sale  and  is- 
suance of  the  sheriffs  deed.17  Some  statutes  pro- 
vide that  the  sale  and  satisfaction  may  be  set  aside 
-when  the  judgment  on  which  the  execution  issued 
was  not  a  lien  on  the  property  sold,18  as  where  prop- 
erty sold  is  a  homestead;19  and,  independently  of 
statute,  a  satisfaction  may  be  vacated  where  it  re- 
sulted from  the  sale  of  a  homestead.20 

c.  Proceedings 

(1)  In  general 

(2)  Parties  and  notice 

(3)  Hearing  and  determination 

(1)  In  General 

An  application  to  set  aside  a  satisfaction  of  judg- 
ment ordinarily  is  made  by  mption  in  the  original  ac- 
tion for  an  order  canceling  the  entry  or  return  of  satis- 
faction, and  directing  execution  to  issue  for  so  much  of 
the  judgment  as  remains  unpaid. 

While  a  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  may  be  set. 
aside  by  an  action21  or  suit  in  equity22  brought  for 
that  purpose,  and  sometimes  scire  facias23  or  an  ac- 


tion on  the  judgment24  is  deemed  an  appropriate 
remedy,  yet  ordinarily  the  application  to  set  aside  is 
by  motion  in  the  original  action  for  an  order  can- 
celing the  entry  or  return  of  satisfaction,  and  di- 
recting execution  to  issue  for  as  much  of  the  judg- 
ment as  remains  unpaid.25  A  motion  to  set  aside 
the  satisfaction  is  properly  made  in  the  court  in 
which- the  judgment  is  of  record;26  but,  except  in 
some  jurisdictions,27  an  action  or  suit  for  this  pur- 
pose may  be  brought  in  another  court.28 

Time  of  application.  The  application  must  be  sea- 
sonably made,  so  as  to  clear  plaintiff  of  any  imputa- 
tion of  laches29  and  to  be  wifliin  the  time  limited  by 
statute  therefor.30 

.  (2)  Parties  and  Notice 

Proceedings  to  vacate  an  entry  of  satisfaction  may 
be  maintained  by  a  party  to  the  record,  or  by  an  as- 
signee of  the  judgment.  Notice  of  application  to  strike 
off  a  satisfaction  must  be  given  to  parties  interested 
unless  they  have  appeared. 

Proceedings  to  vacate  an  entry  of  satisfaction 
may  be  maintained  by  a  party  to  the  record,31  or 
by  an  assignee  of  the  judgment,32  but  not  by  a 


!7,    or. — Poppleton  v.  Bryan,  58   P. 

767,  36  Or.  69. 
34  C.J.  P  735  note  45. 

18.  Iowa. — Holtzinger    v.    Edwards, 
1  N.W.  600,  51  Iowa  383. 

19.  Iowa, — Jones  v.  Blumenstein,  42 
N.W.  321,  77  Iowa  361. 

20.  111.— Hubbell  v.   Canady,   58  111. 
425. 

34  C.J.  p  735  note  48. 
'21.    Ky. — Corpus     Juris    quoted    in 
Commonwealth,  for  Use  and  Ben- 
efit of  Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585, 
586,  251  Ky.  280. 
•34  C.J.  p  735  note  53. 
Exclusion  of  testimony  held  errone- 
ous 

In  action  to  annul  judgment  settle- 
ment, exclusion  of  testimony  con- 
cerning attorney's  false  representa- 
tions as  to  debtor's  residence  and 
iftnancial  responsibility,  was  held  er- 
roneous.— Deutsch  v.  Roy,  250  N.Y. 
;S.  664,  232  App.Div.  543,  followed  in 
250  N.Y.S.  669,  232  App.Div.  549. 
£2.  Col. — Kinnison  v.  Guaranty  Liq- 
uidating Corporation,  115  P.2d  450, 
18  Cal.2d  108. 

Ky. — Corpus   Juris   o,uot?d   in   Com- 
monwealth,   for   Use    and    Benefit 
of  Bates   v.   Hall,   64   S.W.2d   585, 
586,  251  Ky.  280. 
Mo.— Kelley  v.  Kelley,  App.f   290  S. 

W.  624. 

34  C.J.  p  735  note  54. 
(Conditions  precedent 

Creditor  settling  judgment  for  less 
than  amount  due  by  reason  of  con- 
cealment of  debtor's  assets  need  not 
return,  or  offer  to  return,  amount 
accepted  to  maintain  bill  to  vacate 


settlement.— Hernig  v.  Harris,  175  A. 

169,  117  N.J.E<i.  146. 

Pleading 

Execution  creditor,  suing  debtor  in 
equity  on  loss  of  property  purchased 
to  correct  record  showing  credit  on 
[udgment,  was  not  required  to  plead 
that  judgment  was  still  in  force. — 
Lucas'  Adm'r  v.  Stanley,  300  S.W. 
889,  222  Ky.  374. 

23.  Conn.— Cowles      v.      Bacon,      21 
Conn.  451,  56  Am.D.  371. 

34  C.J.  P  735  note  55. 

24.  Iowa. — Darrow    v.    Darrow,    43 
Iowa  411. 

34  C.J.  p  735  note  56. 

25.  Cal. — Kinnison  v.  Guaranty  Liq- 
uidating Corporation,  115  P.2d  450, 
18  Cal.2d  256 — Argue  v.  Wilson,  40 
P.2d  297,  3  Cal.App.2d  645. 

Ky.— Corpus  Juris  quoted  in  Com- 
monwealth, for  Use  and  Benefit  of 
Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585,  586, 
251  Ky.  280. 

Md. — Legum  v.  Farmers  Nat  Bank 
of  Annapolis,  24  A.2d  281,  180 
Md.  356. 

Mo.— Kelley  v.  Kelley,  App.,  290  S. 
W.  624. 

Neb.— Knaak  v.  Brown,  212  N.W.  431, 
115  Neb.  260,  51  A.L.R.  237. 

34  C.J.  p  736  note  57. 

26.  Ky.— Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 
Commonwealth,  for  Use  and  Ben- 
efit   of   Bates    v.    Hall,    64   S.W.2d 
585,  586,  251  Ky.  280. 

Neb.— Marshall   v.    Howe,    230    N.W. 

446,  119  Neb.  591. 
34  C.J.  p  736  note  64. 

27.  in. — Burney   v.   Hunter,    32   111 
App.  441. 

1069 


28.    U.S. — Miller    v.    Williams,    Va., 

258  F.  216,  169  C.C.A.  284. 
Iowa. — Darrow  v.   Darrow,    43    Iowa 

411. 

.    Md.— Wilmer  v.  Brice,  46  A.  322. 

91  Md.  71. 
pa. — city  Deposit  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 

v.  Zoppa,  9  A.2d  361,  336  Pa.  379— 

Bridesburg  Bldg.   Ass'n  v.   Bailey, 

40  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.   211— First  Nat, 

Bank  &  Trust  Co.  for  Use  of,   v. 

Bernstein,     Com.Pl.,     22     WestCo. 

229. 
34  C.J.  p  736  note  67. 

30.  *Pa. — Bell   v.    Gluckman,    39   Pa. 
Disk  &  Co.  165 — Niessen  v.  Loewe, 
30  Pa.Dist.  &  Co.  605. 

Wash.— Seattle  v.  Krutz,  139  P.  498, 

78  Wash.  553. 
34  C.J.  p  736  note  68. 

31.  Cal.— Clark  v.   Johnston,   193  P. 
864,  49  Cal.App.  315. 

34  C.J.  P  737  note  73. 

Attorney 

(1)  Where  satisfaction  of  amount 
due  under. mechanic's  lien  decree  was 
executed  by  plaintiff  and  filed  in  of- 
fice of  clerk  of  superior  court,  plain- 
tiff's attorney,  not  being  a  party  to 
suit,   was  without  standing  to   pre- 
sent petition  that  satisfaction  should 
be  set  aside.— PauJ  v.  Shukes,  56  N. 
E.2d  141,  323  I11.APP.  527. 

(2)  Motion  by  attorney  to  vacate, 
where    satisfaction    is    in    fraud    of 
his  lien  see  Attorney  and  Client   § 
231. b  (2). 

32.  Cal. — Brown   v.   Brown,    3   P.2d 
580,  117  Cal.App.2d  205. 

34  C.J.  p  737  note,*  74. 


§  584 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


stranger  to  the  record,33  except  where  he  was  the 
real  party  in  interest  and  the  satisfaction  was  a 
fraud  on  him.34  All  parties  affected  by  the  judg- 
ment or  claiming  under  or  in  relation  to  it  must  be 
made  parties  to  the  proceeding  to  set  aside.85  Also 
notice  of  an  application  to  strike  off  a  satisfaction 
must  be  given  to  the  parties  interested36  unless  they 
have  appeared.37 

(3)  Hearing  and  Determination 

A  motion  to  vacate  an  entry  of  satisfaction  of  Judg- 
ment may  be  determined  on  affidavits  or  depositions, 
unless  the  evidence  is  conflicting  on  material  questions 
of  fact.  Where  the  evidence  Is  conflicting,  the  party 
seeking  relief  should  be  remitted  to  an  action,  a  court 
of  equity,  or  an  issue  should  be  directed  for  a  jury. 

A  motion  to  vacate  an  entry  of  satisfaction  may 
be  heard  and  determined  on  affidavits38  or  deposi- 


tions,39 if  the  court  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion 
chooses  to  do  so.40  Where,  however,  the  evidence 
is  conflicting  on  the  material  questions  of  fact  aris- 
ing on  the  motion,  the  party  seeking  relief  should 
be  remitted  to  an  action,41  or  to  a  court  of  equity,42 
or  an  issue  should  be  directed  for  a  jury.43 

Regardless  of  the  mode  of  procedure  pursued,  to 
vacate  an  entry  of  a  satisfaction  of  a  judgment,  the 
remedy  sought  is  governed  by  equitable  rules,44 
involving  the  exercise  of  sound  discretion  by  the 
court,45  the  ultimate  question  being  whether  it  is 
inequitable  to  set  aside,  or  refuse  to  set  aside,  the 
entry  of  satisfaction.46  The  entry  of  satisfaction 
will  not  be  vacated  because  of  any  matters  antedat- 
ing the  judgment  or  affecting  the  original  transac- 
tion,47 or  where  the  rights  of  third  persons  are  prej- 
udiced,48 such  as  a  bona  fide  purchaser  of  property 


33.  Pa.— Appeal  of  Long,  19  A.  806, 
134  Pa.  641. 

34  C.J.  p  737  note  76. 

34.  Cal. — Clark  v.  Johnston,  193   P. 
864,  49  CaLApp.  315. 

34  C.J.  p  737  note  77. 

35.  Cal. — Kinnison  v.  Guaranty  Liq- 
uidating: Corporation,  115  P.2d  450, 
18  Cal.2d  256. 

Tenn. — Blackburn   v.    Clarke,   3   S.W. 

505,  85  Tenn.  506. 
34  C.J.  p  737  note  78. 
All  judgment  defendants 

In  a  suit  to  set  aside  satisfaction 
of  a  judgment,  all  the  judgment  de- 
fendants are  necessary  parties,  be- 
cause If  one  was  not  joined  the  sat- 
isfaction would  remain  valid  as  to 
him  and  hence  would  operate  as  re- 
lease as  to  all,  and  plaintiff's  decree 
would  thus  be  a  nullity. — Humberd 
v.  Kerr,  8  Baxt.,  Tenn.,  291. 

36.  Cal. — Thompson  v.  Cook,  127  P. 
2d   909,    20  Cal.2d   564— Spencer  v. 
Barnes,   43   P.2d   847,   6   Cal.App.2d 
35 — Brown   v.   Brown,    3   P.2d   580, 
117  CaLApp.  205. 

Ky. — Commonwealth,     for    Use    and 
Benefit  of  Bates,  v.  Hall,  64  S.W. 
2d  585,  251  Ky.  280. 
34  C.J.  p  737  note  79. 
Assignee 

To  set  aside  second  assignee's  sat- 
isfaction of  judgment,  on  ground 
that  judgment  had  been  previously 
assigned  to  another,  notice  must  be 
given  second  assignee. — Brown  v. 
Brown,  3  P.2d  580,  117  CaLApp.  205. 
Attorney 

(1)  It  has  been  held  that,  where 
an   attorney   is   retained,    service   of 
notice  of  a,  motion  to  vacate  a  satis- 

*  faction  must  be  made  on  him,  and 
not  on  the  party,  although  he  was 
only  constituted  attorney  to  confess 
judgment — Warden  v.  Eden,  2  Johns. 
Gas.,  N.T.,  121,  CoL  &  C.Cas.  137. 

(2)  Service  of  notice  of  motion  to 
set   aside   satisfaction   of   judgment 


and  issue  execution  on  attorney  not 
shown  to  be  judgment  debtor's  attor- 
ney of  record  was  not  notice  to  judg- 
ment debtor. — Spencer  v.  Barnes,  43 
P.2d  847,  6  Cal.App.2d  35. 

(3)  Testimony  that  certain  person 
said  he  was  attorney  for  defendant 
and  another  and  had  appeared  in  pro- 
ceeding before  court  in  pending  ac- 
tion as  attorney  for  such  parties  has 
been  held  not  competent  to  show 
that  he  was  defendant's  attorney  on 
whom  notice  of  motion  to  set  aside 
satisfaction  of  judgment  against  de- 
fendant might  be  served. — Spencer  v. 
Barnes,  supra. 
Opportunity  to  answer  and  be  heard 

Where  assignee  of  rights  of  plain- 
tiff in  mechanic's  lien  proceeding 
filed  petition  to  set  aside  satisfac- 
tion of  judgment  in  the  proceeding, 
court,  in  passing  on  another  peti- 
tion to  set  aside  the  satisfaction, 
should  not  have  considered  as- 
signee's petition  until  defendant  had 
had  opportunity  to  answer  and  be 
heard  concerning  merits  thereof. — 
Paul  v.  .Shukes,  56  N.E.2d  141,  323 
IlLApp.  527. 

37.  Cal. — Spencer  v.  Barnes,  43  P.2d 
847,  6  Cal.App.2d  35. 

Tenn. — Wilburn      v.      McCollom,      7 
Heisk.  267. 

38.  N.D. — Acme    Harvester    Co.     v. 
Magill,  106  N.W.  563,  15  N.D.  116. 

34  C.J.  p  736  note  58. 

39.  Cal.— Haggin   v.   Clark,    61   Cal. 
1. 

40.  N.Y.— Concklin  v.  Taylor,  68  N. 
Y.  221. 

41.  Ky.— Corpus     Juris     guoted    in 

Commonwealth,  for  Use  and  Bene- 
fit of  Bates  v.  Hall,  64  S.W.2d  585, 
586,  251  Ky.  280. 
34  C.J.  p  736  note  61. 

42.  Ky.— Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 
Commonwealth,  for  Use  and  Ben- 
efit of  Bates  v.  Hall,  $4  S.W.2d  585, 
586,  251  Ky/280. 

1070 


N.Y.— Greenfield  v.  Stern,  214  N.T.S. 

37,  126  Misc.  561. 
34  C.J.  p  736  note  62. 

43.  Ky. — Corpus     Juris     quoted     in 
Commonwealth,   for  Use  and  Ben- 
efit   of    Bates    v.    Hall,    64    S.W.2d 
585,  586,  251  Ky.  280. 

34  C.J.  p  736  note  63. 

44.  Neb. — Marshall  v.  Rowe,   230  K. 
W.  446,  119  Neb.  591. 

Okl. — Lambert  v.   Hill,    73    P.2d   124, 

181  Okl.  225. 
Pa. — City  Deposit  Bank  &  Trust  Co. 

v.  Zoppa,   9  A.2d  361,   336  Pa.   37fr 

— Steel  ton   Finance   Co.    v.   Kireta. 

Com.Pl.1,    46   Dauph.Co.    426. 
S.D.— Piano   Mfg.    Co.   v.    Thompson. 

112  N.W.  149,  21  S.D.   300,   11  L.R. 

A.,N.S.,   396,  130  Am.S.R.  722. 
Utah. — George     Thatcher     Corp.     v. 

Bullen,  162  P.2d  421. 
Wis. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in    Her- 

mance  v.  Braun,  285  N.W.  733,  734, 

231  Wis.  357. 

45.  Okl.— Lambert   v.   Hill.    73    P.2<J 
124,  181  Okl.  225. 

Ba. — Steelton  Finance  Co.  v.  Kireta, 
Com.PL,  46  Dauph.Co.  426. 

Discretion  held  not  abused 

Cal. — Coviello  v.  Moco  Fruit  Co.,  10P 
P.2d  76'5f  42  Cal.App.2d  637. 

46.  Neb.— Marshall  v.  Rowe,  230  N. 
W.  446,  119  Neb.  591. 

Okl. — Lambert  v.   Hill,  73   P.2d   124, 

181  Okl.  225. 
Wis. — Hermance  v.  Braun,  285  N.W. 

733,  231  Wis.  557. 
34  C.J.  p*  734  note  3-7. 

47.  Pa.— Appeal  of  Read,  17  A.  £21, 
126  Pa,  415. 

34  C.J.  p  734  note  38. 

48.  Neb. — Knaak   v.    Brown,    212    N. 

W.  431,  115  Neb.  260,  51  A.L.R.  237. 

Xntervener,  not  having  changed  po- 
sition in  reliance  on  entry  of  satis- 
faction, could  not  prevent  vacation 
of  entry  and  reinstatement  of  decree 
of  foreclosure. — Knaak  v.  Brown,  »u- 
pra, 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


385 


who  became  such  while  the  judgment  appeared  by 
the  record  to  be  satisfied  and  discharged.49  The 
entry  of  satisfaction  will  ndt  be  set  aside  where  it 
would  be  futile.50 

An  order  denying  a  motion  to  vacate  a  satisfac- 
tion of  judgment  has  been  held  to  bar  further  at- 
tack on  the  validity  of  the  satisfaction.51 

Conditions  of  relief.  As  a  condition  to  vacation 
of  satisfaction,  plaintiff  will  usually  be  required  to 
place  defendant  in  statu  quo,52  but  plaintiff  is  not 
required  to  restore  what  in  any  event  he  would  be 
entitled  to  retain,53  it  being  sufficient  to  credit  such 
sums  on  the  judgment54 

Order.  The  court  will  direct  the  entry  of  an  or- 
der vacating  the  satisfaction  of  judgment  where 
proper  cause  is  shown.55 

Review.     It  has  been  held  that  the  decision  of 


the  court  on  a  summary  motion  to  strike  off  an  im- 
proper satisfaction  is  the  decision  of  a  matter  of 
fact,  which  is  not  subject  to  review  on  writ  of  er- 
ror,56 and  can  be  reviewed  only  by  proceedings  in 
the  nature  of  a  writ  of  certiorari.57 

Costs.  In  an  action  to  set  aside  a  satisfaction, 
plaintiff  has  been  held  entitled  only  to  statutory 
costs.58  An  assignee  with  notice  of  prior  equities, 
who  enters  satisfaction,  will  be  charged  with  the 
costs  of  a  motion  to  vacate  the  entry  of  satisfac- 
tion.59 The  allowance  of  disbursements  is  not  au- 
thorized by  some  statutes.60 

d.  Effect 

When  an  entry  of  satisfaction  Is  vacated  the  Judg- 
ment Is  again  in  force. 

When  an  entry  of  satisfaction  is  vacated,  the 
judgment  is  again  in  force.61 


XVITE.  ENFORCEMENT  OP  JUDGMENTS 


§  585.    In  General 


AS  a  general  rule,  a  party  recovering  judgment  has 
the  right  to  proceed  to  enforce  it,  and  the  court  render- 
ing judgment  has  inherent  power  to  enforce  it  and  to 
make  such  orders  and  issue  such  process  as  may  be 
necessary  to  render  it  effective. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  party  recovering  a  judg- 


ment-has a  right  to  proceed  to  enforce  it62  Al- 
though it  has  been  held  that  the  judicial  function  of 
the  court  ceases  when  the  judgment  becomes  final 
and  that  the  duty  of  enforcement  devolves  on  the 
executive  department,63  the  generally  accepted  rule 
is  that  every  court  has  inherent  power  to  enforce 
its  judgments  and  decrees,64  and  to  make  such  or- 


49.     Neb. — Knaak  v.  Brown,  supra. 
34  C.J.  p  734  note  39. 
50-    Cal.— Lidberg  v.  E.  T.  Letter  & 
Son,   2  P.2d  526,  116  CaLApp.  312. 

51.  Or. — Herri ck  v.  Wallace,  236  P. 
471,  114  Or.  520. 

52.  Md. — Legum    v.    'Farmers    Nat. 
Bank  of  Annapolis,  24  A.2d  281,  180 
Md.  3.56. 

S.D. — 'Lovely  v.  Wangsness,  264  N.W. 

195,  *64  S.D.  43. 
34  C.J.  p  735  note  50. 

Where  the  status  guo  ante  cannot 
be  restored,  it  is  error  for  the  court 
having  jurisdiction  of  the  suit  to 
sustain  a  motion  to  set  aside  the 
satisfaction  and  cancellation  and  re- 
store the  judgment  to  its  original 
force. — Davis  v.  McCullers,  97  So.  8, 
132  Miss.  572. 

53.  Gal. — Gil  son   Quartz  Mining  Co. 
v.  Gilson,  47  CaL  597. 

34  C.J.  p  735  note  51. 

54.  Neb. — Grunden  v.  Skiles,  145  N. 
W.  341,  95  Neb.  124— Pox  v.  State, 
88  N.W.  176,  63  Neb.  185.  . 

55.  Wia. — Simon  v.  Lecker,  285  N.W. 
406,  231  Wis.  106. 

Order  held  not  entirely  erroneous 
Wis. — Simon  v.  Lecker,  2>85  N.W.  406, 
231  Wis.  106, 

56.  Pa. — Appeal  of  Long,  19  A.  806, 


134.  Pa.    641— Murphy   v.   Flood,    2 

Grant  411. 
57.    Pa.— Rand   v.   King,    19   A.    806, 

134  Pa.  641. 
34  C.J.  p  737  note  72. 

sa  N.D. — Business  -Service  Collec- 
tion Bureau  v.  Tegen,  269  N.W.  4-6, 
67  N.D.  51. 

59.  Cal.— Cramer  v.  Tittle,  21  P.  750, 
79  Cal.  332. 

ea  N.Y.— Concklin  v.  Taylor,  68  N. 
T.  221. 

61.  Ind. — Kennedy  v.  Elder,  139  N.B. 
372,  79  Ind.App.  -644. 

34  C.J.  p  737  note  82. 

62.  Pa. — Randall  v.  Fenton  Storage 
Co.,  182  A.  767,  121  Pa.Super.  62. 

All  means  given  by  law 

As  long  as  judgment  debt  remains 
unsatisfied,  all  means  given  by  law 
to  enforce  it  are  open  to  creditor.— 
Edwards  v.  Perrault,  129  So.  619,  170 
•La.  1011. 

erroneous  decree  may  be  enforced 
Ark.— Griffin  v.  Mitchell,  127  S.W.2d 

640,  197  Ark.  1175. 
Election 

Plaintiff  recovering  separate  un- 
equal judgments  against  corporation 
and  its  officer  for  malicious  prosecu- 
tion was  entitled  to  elect  to  proceed 
on  judgment  most  favorable  to  him, 


regardless     of    whether     defendants 
were   joint   tort-feasors. — Randall  v. 
Fenton  Storage  Co.,  182  A.  '767,   121 
Pa.Super.  '62. 
Pendency  of  appeal 

In  action  by  landowner  for  oil  roy- 
alties where  oil  company  admitted 
that  royalty  owner  had  unencum- 
bered title,  previous  objections  to 
which  had  been  removed  by  judg- 
ment from  which  no  suspensive  ap- 
peal had  been  taken,  oil  company 
could  not  resist  payment  of  royalties 
on  ground  that  time  for  a  devolutive 
appeal  had  not  expired  and  that,  if 
such  appeal  were  taken,  the  judg- 
ment might  be  reversed. — Irion  v. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  of  .Louisiana,  6  So. 
2d  143,  199  La.  36-3. 

63.  Ohio. — Long  &  Allstatter  Co.  v- 
Willis,  3  N.B.2d  910,  52  Ohio  App. 
299,    appeal    dismissed    Willis    v. 
Long  &  Allstatter  Co.,  2  N.B.2d  600, 
131  Ohio  St.  287. 

Loss  of  court's  jurisdiction  by  final 
disposition  of  cause  generally  see . 
Courts  §  94. 

64.  U.S. — 'Florida  Guaranteed  Secur- 
ities v.  McAllister,  D.C.Fla.,  47  IF. 
2d  762. 

Ala. — Jones  v.  Clity  o.f  Opelika,  4  So, 
2d  509,  242  Ala.  24,  followed  in  4 
So.2d  513,  second  case,  242  Ala.  24 
and  4  So.2d  514,  242  Ala.  29., 


1071 


§  585 


JUDGMENTS 


ders65  and  issue  such  process66  as  may  be  necessary 
to  render  them  effective,  and  this  power  is  not  af- 
fected by  the  fact  that  the  decree  is  final.6?  This 
power  lies  in  the  court  itself  to  be  exercised  with- 
out the  aid  of  a  fact-finding  body.68  The  rule  with 
reference  to  the  court's  loss  of  jurisdiction  over  its 
judgments  after  the  expiration  of  the  term,  as  dis- 
cussed supra  §  230,  merely  bars  the  court's  right  to 
alter,  modify,  or  change  them  but  does  not  preclude 
their  enforcement  as  originally  rendered.69 

Ordinarily  it  is  not  necessary  that  a  judgment  be 
served  on  any  party  to  the  cause  after  it  is  entered 
or  filed  ;70  but  under  some  statutes  a  judgment  oth- 
er than  a  judgment  for  money  or  for  the  possession 
or  sale  of  property  is  enforceable  by  service  of  a 
certified  copy;71  and,  as  discussed  infra  §  586, 
where  it  is  sought  to  enforce  the  judgment  by  con- 
tempt proceedings,  a  copy  of  the  judgment  should 
first  be  served  on  defendant.  A  joint  and  several 
judgment  may  be  enforced  by  the  judgment  creditor 
against  either  or  both  of  the  judgment  debtors.72 

It  has  been  held  that  a  judgment  may  not  be  en- 
forced in  favor  of  a  person  other  than  the  one  in 


whose  favor  it  is  rendered  unless  it  has  been  trans- 
ferred in  writing  to  such  person.73 

§  586.    Enforcement  at  Law 

a.  In  general 

b.  Auxiliary  remedies 

a.  In  General 

Proceedings  for  the  enforcement  of  a  Judgment  are 
governed  by  the  law  of  the  jurisdiction  in  which  they 
are  brought  and  by  the  law  in  force  at  the  time  such 
proceedings  are  had;  and  the  usual  method  of  enforce- 
ment, where  the  Judgment  is  for  a  sum  of  money,  is  by 
execution. 

Proceedings  for  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment 
are  governed  by  the  law  of  the  state  or  country  in 
which  they  are  brought,74  and  by  the  law  in  force 
at  the  time  such  proceedings  are  had.75  As  such 
laws  refer  only  to  the  remedy,  all  judgments  and 
decrees  are  taken  subject  to  such  changes,  before 
execution  thereof,  as  the  legislature  may  make  in 
the  procedure  for  their  enforcement.76  Jurisdiction 
to  enforce  a  judgment  does  not  exist  in  another 
court  of  equal  rank  with  that  in  which  the  judg- 
ment originated,  unless  authorized  by  statute;77 


Ark. — Husband  v.  Crockett.  115  §.W. 
2d  882,  195  Ark.  1031. 

Cal. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  la  Securi- 
ty Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v.  South- 
ern Pac.  R  Co.,  4'5  P.2d  268,  270,  6 
Cal.App.2d  585. 

Ga. — Lewis  v.  Grovas,  9  S.E.2d  282, 
62  Ga.App.  625. 

Idaho. — Oatman  v.  Hampton,  256  P. 
529,  43  Idaho  67,5. 

Ky. — Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Attorney 
General  v.  Furste,  157  S.W.2d  59, 
288  Ky.  -631. 

Mass. — Commonwealth  v.  Town  of 
Hudson,  52  N.E.2d  566,  3  To  Mass. 
535. 

Okl.— Wolfe  v.  Smith,  148  P.2d  161, 
194  Okl.  201. 

Pa. — Commissioners  of  Sinking-  Fund 
of  City  of  Philadelphia  v.  City  of 
Philadelphia,  IS 8  A.  314,  324  Pa. 
129,  113  A.L.R  202. 

Tex, — Grand  International  Brother- 
hood of  Locomotive  Engineers  v. 
Marshall,  Civ.App.,  157  S.W.2d  676 
— Porter  v.  Tolbert,  Civ.App.,  116 
S.W.2d  1158 — Burrage  v.  Hunt  Pro- 
duction Co.,  Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d 
1228,  error  dismissed — Hunt  Pro- 
duction Co.  v.  Burrage,  Civ.App., 
104  S.W.2d  84,  error,  dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  737  note  83. 

66.  Ala. — Jones  v.  City  of  Opelika,  .4 
So.Sd  509,  242  Ala.  24,  followed  in 
4  So.2d  513,  second  case,  242  Ala. 
28  and  4  So.2d  €14,  242  Ala,  29. 

Ark. — Husband  v.  Crockett,  115  S.W. 
2d  882,  195  Ark.  1031. 

Cal. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in.  Secur- 
ity .Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v.  South- 


ern Pac.  R  Co.,  45  P.2d  268,  270,  6 

Cal.A'pp.2d  58-5. 
Ind. — Dissette    v.    Dissette,    196    N.E. 

684,  208  Ind.  567. 
Tex. — International     Brotherhood     of 

Locomotive  Engineers  v.  Marshall, 

Civ.App.,  157  S.W.2d  -676— Porter  v. 

Tolbert,  Civ.App.,  116  S.W.2d  1158. 
34  C. J.  p  737  note  '84. 

66.  Cal. — Corpus    Juris     quoted     in 

Security  Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v. 

Southern  Pac.  R.  Co..  4'5  P.2d  268, 

270,  -6  Cal.App.2d  585. 
Ind. — Dissette   v.   Dissette,    196   N.E. 

684,  208  Ind.  567. 
Tex. — International     Brotherhood-  of 

Locomotive  Engineers  v.  Marshall, 

Civ.App.,    157    S.W.2d    676. 
34  C.J.  p  73-8  note  85. 

The  express  power  of  a  court  of 
record  to  enforce  its  judgments  by 
proper  process  should  not  be 
abridged  by  courts  in  absence  of  ex- 
press or  necessarily  implied  statu- 
tory authority. — -Wolfe  v.  Smith,  148 
P.2d  161,  194  Okl.  201. 

67.  Cal. — Corpus    Juris     quoted    in 
Security  Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v. 
Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  45  P.2d  2-68, 
270,  6  CaLA'pp.2d  £S5. 

"Wash. — De  Stoop  v.  Department  of 
•Labor  and  Industries  of  Washing- 
ton, 84  P.2d  706,  197  Wash.  140. 

34  C.J.  p  738  note  86. 

68.  Tex. — Burrage  v.  Hunt  Produc- 
tion Co..  Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d  1228, 
error  dismissed. 

69.  Ky. — Lincoln    Building   &   Loan 
Ass'n    v.    Humphreys,    118    S.W.2d 
736,  274  Ky.  359. 

1072 


70.  Wash. — Western  Security  Co.  v. 
Lafleur,  49  P.  1061,  17  Wash.  406. 

Notice   of   entry  see   supra   §    112. 

71.  Mont — Nepstad  v.  East  Chicago 
Oil    Ass'n,    29    P.2d    643,    96    Mont. 
183. 

Directing  codefeudant  to  pay  defend- 

ant 

Judgment  directing  codefendant  to 
pay  royalty  moneys  over  to  defend- 
ant is  enforceable  by  service  of  cer- 
tified copy  of  judgment  and  not 'by 
general  execution. — Nepstad  v.  East 
Chicago  Oil  Ass'n,  supra, 

72.  Kan. — Sloan  v.  Sheridan,   168  P. 
2d  545,  161  Kan.  425. 

Okl. — Tucker    v.    Gautier,     164    P.2d 
613. 

73.  Ga. — Franklin     v.     Mobley,     for 
Use  of  Patrick,  App.,  36  &E.2d  173 
— Arnold    v.    Citizens'    &    Southern 
Nat.  Bank,  170  S.E.  316,  47  Ga.App. 
2.54. 

Mode  and   sufficiency   of  assignment 
of  judgment  see  supra  §§  515-518. 

74.  Ark.— Husband   v.   Crockett,    115 
S.W.2d   882,    19-5   Ark.   1031. 

34  C.J.  p  738  note  90. 
What  law  governs  validity  of  judg- 
ment see  supra  $  14. 

75.  Cal. — Weldon   v.    Rogers,    90    P. 
1062,  151  CaL  432. 

34  C.J.  p  738  note  91. 

76.  111.— Williams    v.    Waldo,    4    111. 
264. 

77.  Pa. — Confmonwealth   v.    Shecter, 
95  A,  468,  250  Pa.  2-82. 

Jurisdictions     of     courts     generally 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


586 


and,  where  a  judgment  is  recovered  in  one  capacity, 
proceedings  to  enforce  it  must  be  brought  in  the. 
same  capacity.78 

Where  the  judgment  is  for  the  payment  of  mon- 
ey, the  usual  process  of  execution  will  ordinarily 
be  the  appropriate  method  of  collecting  it,79  unless 
the  right  to  issue  this  process  has  been  limited  or 
deferred  by  an  agreement  of  the  parties;80  but  the 
right  to  enforce  the  judgment  by  execution  is  sub- 
ject to  the  condition  thatv  the  judgment  must  be 
final,  and  that  the  amount,  if  uncertain,  must  be  as- 
certained in  a  proper  proceeding  before  the  writ 
may  issue,  as  discussed  in  Executions  §  6.  If  the 
judgment  is  rendered  in  pursuance  of  an  agreement 
of  the  parties  which  directs  a  particular  mode  of 
satisfying  it,  it  cannot  be  enforced  in  any  way  in- 
consistent with  the  agreement.81  While  service  of 
notice  on  defendant  is  necessary  in  an  independent 
action  to  enforce  a  judgment,  no  service  is  required 
when  the  proceeding  is  in  the  form  of  a  motion  to 
enforce.82  A  demurrer  to  a  petition  to  enforce  a 
void  judgment  is  properly  sustained.83 

Time  for  enforcement.  Generally,  a  judgment 
may  and  should  be  enforced  within  the  time  limited 
by  statute,  if  any,84  and  an  exception  to  the  limita- 
tion period  must  be  found  in  the  statutes  themselves 


and  cognate  sections.85  Under  some  statutes,  a. 
procedure  is  established  whereby  action  may  be  tak- 
en to  enforce  a  judgment  notwithstanding  the  lapse 
of  the  normal  period  of  limitations.86  Such  procer- 
dure  is  regarded  as  a  subsequent  step  in  an  action 
already  commenced  and  not  a  separate  proceed- 
ing.87 It  has  been  held  that  the  question  whether 
or  not  a  dormant  judgment  shall  be  enforced  is  a 
matter  within  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial 
court.88 

b.  Auxiliary  Remedies 

In  addition  to  the  remedy  by  writ  of  execution 
various  other  collateral  or  auxiliary  remedies  for  the 
enforcement  of  Judgments  are  recognized  or  established 
by  statute  in  various  jurisdictions. 

In  addition  to  the  remedy  by  writ  of  execution, 
various  other  collateral  or  auxiliary  remedies  for 
the  enforcement  of  judgments  are  recognized  or  es- 
tablished by  statute  in  various  jurisdictions,89  such 
as  attachment,  as  discussed  in  Attachment  §  12,  gar- 
nishment, as  discussed  in  Garnishment  §§  5,  12,  and 
supplementary  proceedings  as  considered  in  Execu- 
tions §§  345-402.  However,  a  court  of  one  state 
cannot  give  effect  to  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  an- 
other state  by  enforcing  any  of  the  collateral  rem- 
edies provided  in  the  state  where  the  judgment  was 
rendered,90  or  by  enforcing  remedies  provided  by 


over   Judgments   of  another   court 
see  Courts  §  496. 

78.  N.T. — Rodee  v.  Osrdensburg,  148 
N.Y.S.    826,   86   Misc.   229,   modified 
on   other  grounds   151  N.Y.S.   349, 
165  App.Div.  651. 

79.  Va. — Buchanan  v.  Buchanan,  197 
S.E.    426,    170   Va.   458,    116   A.L.R. 
68S. 

34  C.J.  p  738  note  95. 
Enforcement  of  judgment  by  execu- 
tion generally  see  Executions  §§  1- 
1-2. 
Only  method 

It  has  been  held  that  district  court 
on  its  law  side  can  enforce  judg- 
ment only  by  execution  through  its 
ministerial  officers. — McNary  v. 
Guaranty  Trust  Co.  of  New  York,  D. 
C.Ohio,  6  F.Supp.  616. 
Interest  in  partnership  property 

Holder  of  judgment  against  a  part- 
ner individually  may  by  proper  pro- 
cedure reach  judgment  debtor's  in- 
terest in  partnership  property  with- 
out resorting  to  statute  making  judg- 
ment against  partnership  on  service 
of  summons  on  individual  partner 
enforceable  against  partnership  prop- 
erty.—J.  C.  H.  Service  Stations  v. 
Patrikes,  46  N.Y.S.M  228,  181  Misc. 
401. 

80.  Ind. — Root    v.    Burton,    17   N.E. 
194,  115  Ind.  495. 

34  C.J.  p  738  note  96. 

49  O.J.S.-68 


81.  N.Y.  —  Potter  v.  Rossiter,   95  N. 
Y.S.   1037,   109   App.Div.   32. 

34  C.J.  p  738  note  99. 

82.  Tex.  —  Burrage  v.   Hunt  Produc- 
tion Co.,  Civ.App.,  114  S.W.2d  1228, 
error  dismissed. 

5.    Qa.  —  Thompson  v.  Allen,  128  S. 
E.  773,  160  Ga.  .535. 

94.    Cal.  —  Pacific  Gas  &  Electric  Co. 

v.  Elks  Duck  Club,  103  P.2d  1030, 

39  Cal.App.2d  562. 
Time  to  sue  and  limitations  in  action 

on  judgment  generally  see  infra  § 

854. 
Limitations  in  suit  in  equity  to  en- 

force judgment  see  infra  §  587. 

85.    Va.—  Barley  v.  Duncan,   13  S.E. 
2d  298,  177  Va.  202. 

88.  Cal.—  Pacific  Gas  &  Electric  Co. 
v.  Elks  Duck  Club,  103  P.2d  1030, 
39  Cal.A-pp.2d  562—  Tolle  v.  Doak, 
55  P.2d  542,  12  Cal.App.2d  195— 
Palace  Hotel  Co.  v.  Crist,  45  P. 
2d  415,  6  Cal.App.2d  690. 
Discretion  of  court 

Judgment  creditor  was  not  entitled 
as  matter  of  right  to  order  for  issu- 
ance of  writ  of  execution  on  showing 
that  prior  execution  was  issued  with- 
in five  years  after  judgment,  where 
twenty-one  years  had  elapsed  since 
judgment  was  rendered;  refusing  to 
issue  execution  was  not  abuse  of  dis- 
cretion under  circumstances.  —  Wil- 


liams  v.  Goodin,  «61  P.2d  507,  17  Cal. 

App.2d  62. 

87.    Cal. — Paias  v.  Superior  Court  in 

and  for  Alameda  County,   24  P.2d 

<567,  133  CaLApp.  525. 
Wot  action  or  special  proceeding1 

Procedure  authorized  by  statute 
for  enforcement  of  judgment  after 
five  years  constitutes  neither  "ac- 
tion" nor  "special  proceeding"  of 
civil  nature,  but  is  mere  subsequent 
step  in  action  or  special  proceeding 
already  commenced  which  is-  gov- 
erned so  far  as  time  within  which 
step  may  be  taken  is  concerned,  by 
•provisions  of  statute  specially  relat- 
ing thereto — Tolle  v.  Doak,  55  P.2d 
.542,  12  Cal.App.2d  195. 

86.  Cal.— Bank  of  America  N.  T.  & 
S.  A.  v.  Katz,  113  P.2d  759,  45  Cal. 
App.2d  138 — Williams  v.  Goodin, 
61  P.2d  '507,  17  Cal.App.2d  62— 
Faias  v.  Superior  Court  in  and  for 
Alameda  County,  2*4  P.2d  567,  133 
Cal.App.  525. 

Dormant  judgments  generally  see  su- 
pra 8  532. 

89.  N.Y.— Mills  v.  Thursby,  2   Abb. 
Pr.  432,  12  How.Pr.  3'85. 

34  C.J.  p  669  note  96,  p  738  note  1. 

Enforcement  by  mandamus  see  the  C. 
J.S.  title  Mandamus  §  97,  also  38 
C.J.  p  638  note  3-p  639  note  15,  p 
641  notes  55-63. 

90.  Vt — Sullivan       County       Frob. 


1073 


586 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


statute  in  the  state  where  enforcement  is  sought, 
•where  such  remedies  are  limited  by  statute  to 
domestic  judgments.91 

«  Contempt  proceedings.  As  a  general  rule,  as  dis- 
cussed in  Contempt  §  13,  mere  nonpayment  of  a 
money  judgment  or  decree  does  not  constitute  con- 
tempt of  court,  and  payment  cannot  be  enforced  by 
proceedings  and  imprisonment  for  contempt. 
Where,  however,  a  jtu'^ment  requires  of  a  party 
the  performance  of  any  act  other  than  the  payment 
of  money  or  delivery  of  real  or  personal  property, 
a  performance  of  such  act  may  be  enforced  by  pro- 
ceedings as  for  contempt;92  but,  as  in  contempt 
cases  generally,  as  considered  in  Contempt  §  57,  an 
application  to  punish  for  contempt  is  addressed  to 
the  discretion  of  the  court,93  and,  under  some  cir- 
cumstances, should  be  denied.94 

§  587.    Enforcement  in  Equity 

Although  it  Is  presumed  ordinarily  that  the  court 
•which  renders  a  judgment  is  competent  to  enforce  it 
•without  the  aid  of  equity,  the  rule  is  subject  to  numerous 
exceptions  under  which  the  power  cf  a  court  of  equity 
may  properly  be  invoked  where  the  legal  remedy  is  un- 
availing. 

Ordinarily  it  is  presumed  that  the  court  which 
renders  a  judgment  is  competent  to  enforce  it,  and 
equity  cannot  be  invoked  to  obtain  satisfaction.9^ 


This  rule,  however,  is  subject  to  numerous  excep- 
tions under  which  the  power  of  a  court  of  equity 
may  properly  be  invoked,96  as  where  the  object  is 
to  reach  equitable  interests  in  land,  not  subject  to 
execution,97  or  other  property  of  defendant  which 
cannot  be  made  available  in  the  ordinary  way,98 
or,  except  in  some  jurisdictions,99  where  the  judg- 
ment debtor  is  dead  and  recourse  cannot  be  had 
against  his  estate  without  the  aid  of  chancery.1 

Before  equity  will  grant  relief,  it  must  first  ap- 
pear that  complainant  has  recovered  a  judgment  at 
law,2  and  that  he  has  no  adequate  remedy  at  law,3 
or  that  his  legal  remedy  has  been  lost  without  any 
fault  or  laches  on  his  part,4  or  has  been  exhausted 
without  avail.5  On  such  a  proceeding  the  regular- 
ity of  the  judgment  will  not  be  inquired  into,6  al- 
though the  nature  of  the  original  cause  of  action 
may  be  investigated  if  its  character  would  have  any 
influence  on  the  action  of  a  court  of  equity  in  the 
premises.7  Complainant  must  of  course  show  him- 
self equitably  entitled  to  the  relief  which  he  asks,8 
and  his  petition  will  be  defeated  by  anything  show- 
ing that  it  would  be  unjust  or  unfair  to  grant  it.9 

Jurisdiction.  In  order  to  sustain  a  bill  in  equity 
for  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  at  law,  it  is  nec- 
essary that  defendant  should  be  subject  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court,1**  or,  if  he  is  a  nonresident, 


Judge  v.  Hibbard,  44  Vt.  597,  8  Am. 

B.  396. 

34  C.J.  p  739  note  5. 
Enforcement    of    foreign    Judgments 

generally  see  infra  §  892. 

91.     N.T.— Wood  v.  Wood,   28  N.Y.S. 
T54,  7  Misc.  579,  31  Abb.N.Cas.  235. 
34  C.J.  p  739  note  6. 

32.  Tex. — Corpus  Juris  quoted  in 
Kimbrough  v.  State,  Civ.App.,  139 
•S.W.2d  165,  168. 

34  C.J.  p  739  note  8. 

93.  N.Y. — Cochrane  v.   Ingersoll,    73 
N.Y,  613,  dismissing  appeal  13  Hun 
368, 

34  C.J.  p  739  note  10. 

94.  N.Y.— Potter  v.   Rossi ter,    95  N. 
Y.S.  1037,  109  App.Div.  32. 

34  C.J.  p  739  note  11. 

95.  Ala. — Henderson  v.  Hall,  32  So. 
840,   134  Ala.   455,   63  L.R.A.   673. 

34  C.J.  p  739  note  12. 

9a  tr.S. — McClaskey  v.  Harbison- 
Walker  Refractories  Co.,  JD.C.Pa.f 
46  P.Supp.  937,  reversed  on  other 
grounds,  C.C.A.,  138  P.2d  493. 

•Fla. — Corpus  Juris  cited  in  Smith  v. 
Pattishall,  176  So.  568,  574,  127 
Fla,  474,  129  Fla.  498. 

Tex. — Hunt  Production  Co.  v.  Bur- 
rage,  Civ.App.,  104  S.W.2d  84,  er- 
ror dismissed. 

34  C.J.  p  739  note  13. 


Creditors'  suits   see   Creditors'   Suits 

§§   1-87. 
Enforcement  of  lien  see  supra  §  511. 

97.     Miss. — Ferguson  v.  Crowson,  25 

Miss.  430. 
34  C.J.  p'739  note  14. 

93.     Ky. — Slaughter  v.  Mattingly,  159 

S.W.  980,  155  Ky.  407. 
34  C.J.  p  739  note  15. 

99.    Ark. — Branch  v.  Horner,  28  Ark. 

341. 
34  C.J.  p  739  note  16. 

1.  Mo. — King    v.    Hayes,    9    S.W.2d 
538.  223  MO.A-PP.  138. 

34  CJ.  p  739  note  17. 

2.  Iowa.— Ware   v.   Delahaye,  -64  N. 
W.  640,  95  Iowa  667. 

34  C.J.  p  739  note  18. 

Recovery  of  judgment  as  condition 

precedent    to    creditors'    suit    see 

Creditors'  Suits  §  42. 

3.  Iowa,— Mudge  v.   Livermore,   123 
N.W.  199,  148  Iowa  472. 

34  C.J.  p  739  note  19. 

4.  S.C. — Solomons  v.  Shaw,   25   S.C. 
112. 

5.  Ky.— Hartford    Fire    Ins.    Co.    v. 
Green,  138  S.W.2d  933,  2#2  Ky.  466 
—Shaw   v.   McKnight-Keaton   Gro- 
cery Co.,   21   S.W.2d  269,   231   Ky. 
223. 

34  C.J,  p  740  note  21. 

1074 


6.  Ga. — Schl^v  v.  Dixon,  24  Ga.  273, 
71  Am.D.   121. 

34  C.J.  p  740  note  22. 

7.  U.S.— Hassall   v.   Wilcox,   Tex.,    9 
S.Ct.   -590,    130    U.S.    493,    32    LEd 
1001. 

34  C.J.  p  740  note  23. 

8.  U.S. — Rhodes    v.    Farmer,    Miss., 
17  How.   464,   15  L.Bd.   152. 

34  C.J.  p  740  note  24. 
Evidence  held  insufficient 

In  an  equitable  action  to  enforce 
satisfaction  of  Judgment,  evidence 
was  held  not  to  warrant  judgment 
against  judgment  debtor's  sales 
agent  on  theory  that  it  owed  judg- 
ment debtor  certain  sum. — Rowan 
County  Lumber  Co.  v.  Kautz,  56  S. 
W.2d  1,  246  Ky.  732. 

Where  city  complied  with  decree 
requiring  it  to  maintain  a  certain 
flow  over  a  weir  to  compensate  for 
water  diverted,  fact  that  it  thereaft- 
er increased  diversion  did  not  de- 
prive it  of  benefits  of  decree,  but 
rendered  it  liable  for  excess  diver- 
sion.— Adirondack  Power  &  Light 
Corporation  v.  Qity  of  Little  Falls, 
265  N.Y.S.  567,  148  Misc.  191. 

9.  Va. — Snoad-  v.   Atkinson,   92   S.B. 
835,  121  Va.  182. 

34  C.J.  p  740  note  25. 
1<X    Ky. — Hartford  Fire  Ins.   Co.   v. 
Green,  138  S.W.2d  933,  282  Ky.  4-66. 
34  C.J.  p  740  note  26. 


49     C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  587 


that  the  particular  property  sought  to  be  subjected 
to  the  judgment  should  be  found  within  the  state.11 
Under  some  statutes,  where  a  court  of  equity  has 
once  acquired  jurisdiction,  it  may  decree  the  sale 
of  land  in  any  county.12 

Limitations.  Equity  will  not  entertain  a  bill  to 
enforce  a  judgment  after  the  statute  of  limitations 
has  run  against  the  judgment  at  law.13  Converse- 
ly, equity  may  entertain  a  bill  or  petition  to  enforce 
a  judgment  prior  to  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit- 
ed by  the  statute.14 

Process  and  parties.  The  proceeding  in  equity  is 
an  action  independent  of  that,  in  which  the  judgment 
was  rendered,  and  further  process  is  necessary.16 
An  assignee  of  a  judgment  may  file  a  bill  to  en- 
force it,16  or  he  may  file  a  motion  for  a  decree  over 
against  defendant.17  All  persons  having  interests 
in  the  particular  property  sought  to  be  subjected 
should  be  joined  as  parties.18 

Pleadings  and  evidence.  In  some  jurisdictions 
the  bill  or  petition  must  allege  that  plaintiff  has  re- 
covered a  judgment  against  defendant,19  that  exe- 
cution has  issued,  directed  to  the  county  in  which 
the  judgment  was  rendered  or  in  which  defendant 
resided  and  was  placed  in  the  -hands  of  an  officer 


authorized  to  execute  it,20  who  has  made  a  return  of 
no  property  found.21  The  bill  must  set  forth  fully 
the  judgment  on  which  it  is  based,22  but  plead- 
ing the  judgment  in  general  terms,23  or  alleging,  hi 
pleading  a  judgment  of  a  court  of  general  jurisdic- 
tion, that  it  was  recovered  in  a  named  court,  in  a 
designated  action,24  or  equivalent  averments,25  have 
been  held  sufficient.  The  bill  should  also  allege  the 
assignment  of  the  judgment,  if  any,  to  complain- 
ant;26 show  the  liability  of  respondent  to  satisfy 
it;27  and  negative  the  existence  of  an  adequate 
remedy  at  law.28  The  evidence  must  clearly,  estab- 
lish complainant's  right  to  the  relief  prayed.29 

Decree  and  relief.  If  the  proceeding  is  merely 
to  enforce  the  lien  of  the  judgment,  a  personal  de- 
cree for  the  payment  of  its  amount  will  not  be 
proper  ;30  but  otherwise  the.  decree  may  be  for  the 
aggregate  amount  of  the  original  judgment  with  in- 
terest and  costs,31  although  this  relief  may  not  be 
given  against  defendants  who  are  joined  merely  as- 
claiming  under  alleged  fraudulent  conveyances  from 
the  judgment  defendant.32  The  decree  should  gen- 
erally give  the  debtor  time  to  redeem  from  the  sale 
ordered,  although  this  is  not  indispensable  ;33  but  it 
should  not  undertake  to  adjust  equities  or  settle 
partnership  accounts  between  defendants.34  Com- 


11.  Ky. — Trabue  v.  Conners,  1  S.W. 
470,    84   Ky.   283,   8   Ky.L.   288— De 
Wolf  v.  Mallett,  3  Dana.  214. 

12.  W.Va.— -Laidley  v.   Reynolds,   52 
S.R  405,  58  W.Va.  418. 

13.  Minn.— Dole  v.  Wilson,  40  N.W. 
161,  39  Minn.  330. 

34  C.J,  p  740  note  29. 

14.  Tenn.-- Williams  v.  Cantrell,  124 
S.W.2d  20,  22  Tenn.App.  443. 

15.  Ky. — Dameron    v.    Osenton,     12 
Ky.Op.  723. 

16.  Tenn.— Williams  v.,  Cantrell,  124 
S.W.2d  29,  22  Tenn.App.  443. 

Prior  assignee 

Assignee  of  judgment,  who  was 
entitled  to  priority  over  second  as- 
signee, was  a  necessary  party  to  suit 
to  enforce  judgment  brought  by  sec- 
ond assignee. — Wappler  v.  Woodbury 
Co.,  158  N.BL  56,  246  N.Y.  152. 

17.  Tenn.— Williams  v.  Cantrell,  124 
S.W.2d  29,  22  Tenn.App.  443. 

18.  Kv. — Garrison   v.   Clark,    152   -S. 
W.  681,  151  Ky. '565.     , 

34  C.J.  p  740  note  31. 

19.  Ky. — Hartford   Fire   Ins.    Co.   v. 
Green,    138    S.W.2d    933,    282    Ky. 
466— Shaw     v.      McKnight-Keaton 
Grocery  Co.,  21  S.W.2d  269,  231  Ky. 
223. 

20.  Ky. — Hartford  Fire   Ins.   Co.   v. 
Green,  138  S.W.2d  933,  282  Ky.  466 
— Shaw   v.   McKnight-Keaton   Gro- 
cery  Co.,    21   S.W.2d  369,   231   Ky. 
223. 


Petition  held  sufficiently  specific  to 
disclose  that  judgment  was  rendered 
in  county  wherein  execution  was  is- 
sued.— Dade  Park  Jockey  Club  v. 
Commonwealth,  by  Auditor  of  Pub- 
lic Accounts,  69  S.W.2d  363,  253  Ky. 
314. 

21.  Ky. — Shaw  v.  McKnight-Keaton 
Grocery  Co.,  21  S.W.2d  269,  231  Ky. 
223. 

Allegations  held  sufficient 

A  bill  in  equity  seeking  to  enforce 
a  judgment  and  set  aside  alleged 
fraudulent  transfers  on  property 
need  not  allege  facts  showing  excuse 
for  delay  in  filing  the  bill  after  the 
elapse  of  ten  years  from  the  date  of 
the  last  execution,  it  being  sufficient 
simply  to  allege  that  the  judgment 
remains  unsatisfied. — Fleming  v. 
Fowlkes  &  Myatt  Co.,  85  So.  690, 
204  Ala.  284. 
Valid  return 

Statute  requiring  bill  to  enforce 
judgment  lien  to  state  that  writ  of 
fieri  facias  has  been  returned  "no 
property  found"  contemplates  valid 
return. — Lopinsky  v.  Preferred  Real- 
ty Co.,  163  S.E.  1,  111  W.Va.  553. 

22.  Ind. — Brookshire   v.    Lomax,    20 
Ind.  512. 

W.Va, — Dickinson  v.  Chesapeake  &  O. 
R.  Co.,  7  W.Va.  390. 

23.  Ky. — Hartford  Fire   Ins.   Co.  v. 
Green,  138  S.W.2d  933,  282  Ky.  466 
— Shaw  v.  McKnight-Keaton  Gro- 

1075 


eery   Co.,   21   S.W.2d   269,    231   Ky.. 
223. 

24.  Cal.— Blake  v.  Blake,  260  P.  937, 
86  Cal.App.  377. 

25.  Cal. — Blake  v.  Blake,  supra. 

26.  Ky. — Shaw   v.   McKnight-Keaton. 
Grocery  Co.,  21  S.W.Sd  269,  231  Ky. 
223. 

34  C.J.  p  740  note  33. 

27.  N.Y.— Smith    v.    Ballantyne,    10 
Paige  101. 

28.  U.S. — Knox    v.    Smith,    Tenn.,    4- 
How.  298,  11  L.Ed.  983. 

29.  111.— Turner   v.    Jenkins,    79    111- 
228. 

30.  Ky.— Peck   v.    Trail,    65    S.W.2d 
83,     251    Ky.     377— Shaw    v.     Me- 
Knight-Keaton   Grocery   Co.,   21   S.. 
W.2d    269,   231    Ky.   223— Smith   v. 
Belmont,   11  Bush    390 — Fanrier  v. 
Porch,  12  Ky.Op.  "633,  5  Ky.L,  933. 

34  C.J.  p  740  note  37. 
Enforcement    of    lien    generally    see- 
supra  §  511. 

31.  W.Va. — Douglass   v.    McCoy,    24 
W.Va.  722.      . 

34  C.J.  p  741  note  38. 

32.  Ala. — Lang    v.    Brown,    21    Ala. 
179,  56  Am.D.  244. 

•Fla. — Roper  v.  Hackney,  15  Fla.  323. 

33.  Va.— Crawford     v.     Weller,     2  a 
Gratt.  835,  64  Va.  835. 

34.  W.Va.— Kent  v.  Chapman,  18  W- 
Va.  485. 


588 


JUDGMENTS 


49    C.J.S. 


plainant  cannot,  by  a  petition  to  enforce  a  judg- 
ment in  his  favor  dismissing  an  action  for  an  in- 
junction and  an  accounting  and  awarding  him  costs, 
"have  an  issue  adjudicated  where  he  failed  to  ask 
for  any  affirmative  relief  and  none  was  granted 
liim  by  the  judgment.35 

§  588.    Scire  Facias  to  Enforce 

Scire  facias  may  be  used  as  a  process  for  obtaining 
the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  when  authorized  by 
statute  or  In  special  cases. 

Scire  facias  may  be  *  employed  as  a  process  for 
obtaining  the  enforcement  of  the  judgment  when 
authorized  by  statute,  or  in  special  cases,36  as  where 
the  judgment  includes  installments  of  a  debt  subse- 
quently to  accrue,37  or  where  it  embodies  an  ex- 
press condition  or  is  to  be  released  on  performance 
of  an  act  in  pais.38  In  a  proper  case,  the  writ  is 
available  to  the  assignee  of  a  judgment.39 

Since  scire  facias  is  a  judicial,  and  not  an  origi- 
nal, writ,  it  should  issue  from,  and  be  returned  to, 
the  court  which  rendered  judgment  and  has  posses- 
sion of  the  record.40  Generally  issues  which  were 
or  might  have,  been  raised  prior  to  entry  of  judg- 
ment will  not  be  considered  on  scire  facias  there- 
on;41 but  this  rule  is  inapplicable  if  the  invalidity 
of  the  judgment  clearly  appears  from  the  record.42 
The  question  whether  or  not  a  judgment  is  void 
on  its  face  may  be  properly  considered  on  a  mo- 
tion to  dismiss  and  quash  service  of  the  writ;43 
but  the  question  whether  or  not  the  allegations  of 
the  writ  comply  with  statutory  regulations  thereto 
should  be  raised  by  demurrer  and  not  on  motion  to 
•quash.44  Scire  facias  is  of  course  not  available  in 


jurisdictions  where  it  has  been  abolished  by  stat- 
ute.45 

Scire  facias  addressed  to  the  devisees  of  a  judg- 
ment debtor  is  in  the  nature  of  a  proceeding  in 
rem.46  The  writ  must  allege  that  the  debtor  was 
dead  at  the  time  it  was  issued,  that  he  left  a  will 
under  which  the  addressees  succeeded  to  his  realty 
as  his  sole  devisees,  and  describe  the  realty.47 

§  589.    Scire  Facias  to  Obtain  New  Execution 

Scire  facias  to  obtain  new  execution  is  discussed 
in  Executions  §  85,  and  scire  facias  to  revive  a 
dormant  judgment  supra  §  548. 

Examine  Pocket  Parts -for  later  cases. 
§  590.    Proceedings  to  Make  Parties 

Joint  debtors  not  originally  summoned  may  be  made 
liable  to  a  Judgment  by  being  summoned  in  accordance 
with  statutes  providing  therefor,  or  by  means  of  scire 
facias,  where  the  common -law  practice  prevails,  re- 
quiring them  to  show  cause  why  the  judgment  should 
not  be  effective  against  them. 

Where  judgment  has  been  recovered  against  one 
or  more  of  several  persons  jointly  indebted  on  a 
contract,  the  others  not  having  been  served,  it  is 
sometimes  provided  by  statute  that  the  judgment 
may  be  made  effective  against  those  defendants  not 
originally  served,  by  summoning  them  afterward  to 
show  cause  why  they  should  not  be  bound  by  the 
judgment.48  Such  proceeding  is  not  an  action  on 
the  judgment,49  or  one  to  enforce  such  judgment  ;50 
nor,  strictly  speaking,  is  it  an  action  on  the  original 
liability.51  It  is  a  statutory  proceeding  based  partly 
on  the  former  judgment  and  partly  on  the  original 


35.  Ind. — Wagner  v.  McFadden,  31 
NJS.2d  628,  218  Ind.  400. 

"36.    Tenn. — Corpus    Juris    cited    in. 

Williams   v.    Cantrell,    124    S.W.2d 

29,  32,  22  Tenn.App.  443. 
34  C.J.  p  741  note  44. 
.Necessity   of   scire   facias   or   other 
proceedings  before  issuing  execu- 
tion after: 

Death  of  party  see  Executions   $ 
85. 

Lapse  of  time  see  Executions  §  59. 
.Scire  facias  generally  see  the  C.J.S. 

title  Scire  Facias  §§  1-20,  also  56 

C.J.  p  866  note  1  et  seq. 
.Scire  facias  to  revive  judgment  see 

supra  §  548. 

37.    Ky.— Outen  v.  Mitchels,  1  Bibb 

360. 
34  C.J.  p  741  note  45. 

.38.  Pa. — Temjpleton  v.  Shakley,  107 
Pa.  370 — Montelius  v.  Montelius,  5 
PaX.J.  88. 

39.    Tenn.— Williams  v.  Cantrell,  124 
,     S.W.2d  29,  22  TenruApp.  443. 


40.  U.S. — Green  v.   Langnes,  C.CJL 
Wash.,  -82  F.2d  926. 

34  C.J.  p  741  note  47. 

Jurisdiction  and  authority  to  issue 
writ  generally  see  the  C.J.S.  title 
Scire  Facias  §  8,  also  56  C..J.  p  871 
notes  72-78. 

41.  Del.— Woods  v.  .Spoturno,  183  A. 
319,  7  W.W.Harr.  595,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  Spoturno  v.  Woods, 
192  A.  689,  8  W.W.Harr.  378. 

Pa. — Calvey  Motor  Co.  v.  Brogan,  33 
LuzXieg.Eeg.  272. 

42.  Del.— Woods  v.  Spoturno,  183  A. 
319,  7  W.W.Harr.  295,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  Spoturno  v.  Woods, 
192  A.  =689,  8  W.W.Harr.  378. 

43.  Del— Woods  v.  Spoturno,  183  A. 
319,  7  W.W.Harr.  295,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  Spoturno  v.  Woods, 
192  A.  689,  8  W.W.Harr.  378. 

44.  Del.— Woods  v.  Spoturno,  183  A. 
319,  7  W.W.Harr.  295,  reversed  on* 
other  grounds  Spoturno  v.  Woods, 
192  A.  689,  8  W.W.Harr.  378. 

1076 


45.    Idaho.— Bashor  v.  Beloit,  119  P. 

55,  20  Idaho  592. 
40.    D.C. — Waters  v.   Taylor,  584  OF. 

639,  52  App.D.C.  135, 

47.  D.C.— Waters  v.  Taylor,  supra. 

48.  Cal. — Carson  v.  Lampton,  73  P. 
2d  629,  23  Cal.App.2d  535. 

34  C.J.  p  741  note  50—33  C.J.  <p  1123 

notes  84,  85. 
Subsequent     proceeding     to     charge 

partners  not  served  see  the  C.J.S. 

title  Partnership  §  235,  also  47  C. 

J.  p  1013  notes  32-38. 

49.  N.Y.— Hofferberth  y.   Nash,   120 
N.Y.S.    317,    117   App.Div.    284,    af- 
firmed 84  N.E.  400,  191  N.T.  446. 

33  C.J.  p  1123  note  87. 
Action  on  statutory  joint  judgment 
see  supra  §  33. 

50.  N.Y.— Morey  v.  Tracey,  92  N.T. 
581. 

33  C.J.  p  1124  note  $8. 

51.  Wis.— Dill  v.  White,  9  N.W.  404, 
52  Wis.  456. 

!  C.J.  p  1124  note  89. 


49    C.J.S. 


JUDGMENTS 


§  591 


liability.52  While  the  statutory  proceeding  to  bind 
the  absent  debtor  has  been  held  to  be  exclusive,58 
it  has  also  been  held  to  be  merely  cumulative,  and 
not  exclusive  of  other  remedies,54  and  that,  there- 
fore, a  second  action  may  be  maintained  against  all 
the  defendants  to  the  original  action,  on  the  original 
cause  of  action  ;55  such  second  action  is  not  an  ac- 
tion on  the  original  judgment.56  Such  statutes  fre- 
quently contain  provisions  limiting  the  time  within 
which  the  new  parties  may  be  summoned.57 

Joint  debtors  not  originally  summoned  may  also 
be  made  liable  to  the  judgment  in  those  states  where 
the  common-law  practice  prevails  by  means  of  a 
scire  facias  requiring  them  to  show  cause  why  they 
should  not  be  so  bound.58  This  writ  i's  also  an  ap- 
propriate common-law  process  for  making  a  person 
a  party  defendant  to  the  judgment,  who,  since  its 
rendition,  has  become  chargeable  to  an  execution 
thereon,  or  in  some  way  accountable  for  the  assets 
of  the  original  defendant,  as  in  the  case  of  subse- 
quent purchasers,  heirs,  and  devisees.59  Where  a 
scire  facias  issues  to  make  one  a  party  to  a  judg- 
ment, the  trial  as  to  him  should  be  conducted  as  if 
no  judgment  has  been  rendered  against  his  code- 
fendant,  and  such  defendant  has  a  right  to  make 
every  defense  which  he  might  have  made  had  he 
been  served  with  summons  and  a  hearing  had  as  to 
him  at  the  same  time  that  the  cause  was  heard  as  to 
his  codefcndant.60 


§  591.     Scire  Facias  on  Justice's  Transcript 

Where  a  transcript  of  a  Justice's  Judgment  Is  en- 
tered In  a  court  of  record  for  purposes  of  lien  and  ex- 
ecution, a  scire  facias  either  to  revive  it  or  to  obtain 
an  execution  against  lands  must  issue  from  the  superior 
court. 

Where  a  transcript  of  a  justice's  judgment  is  en- 
tered in  a  court  of  record  for  purposes  of  lien  and 
execution  as  discussed  supra  §  129,  a  scire  facias 
either  to  revive  it  or  to  obtain  an  execution  against 
lands  must  issue  from  the  superior  court61  In  such 
a  proceeding  the  merits  and  the  validity  of  the  jus- 
tice's judgment  cannot  be  inquired  into,  if  want  of 
jurisdiction  is  not  apparent.-62  The  writ  should  be 
correctly  entitled  in  the  names  of  the  parties  to  the 
original  judgment,6^  and  should  show  the  rendition 
of  a  valid  judgment  by  the  justice,64  the  amount  due 
on  it,65  the  issue  and  rettrn  of  execution  on  it,  if 
any,66  and  that  the  transcript  was  duly  certified  by 
the  justice67  and  filed  or  recorded  in  the  superior 
court.68  If  the  scire  facias  appears  on  its  face  to  be 
valid,  a  motion  to  quash  it  will  be  overruled.69 

Defendant  may  deny  the  existence  of  the  judg- 
ment or  transcript,70  allege  its  alteration  in  a  ma- 
terial particular,71  or  deny  its  filing  in  the  superior 
court.72  The  allegation  that  he  has  lands  within 
the  county  which  are  subject  to  execution  must  be 
proved,73  unless  he  appears  and  suffers  judgment 
by  nil  dicit.74  The  issue  and  return  of  execution 
from  the  justice's  court  is  provable  by  producing  the 
original  execution  or  a  certified  or  sworn  copy.76 


52.  Cal. — Cooper  v.  Burch,  74  P.  37, 
140  Cal.  548. 

N.Y.— Hofferberth  v.  Nash,  102  N.T. 
S.  317,  117  App.Div.  284,  affirmed 
84  N.E.  400,  191  N.T.  446. 

53.  Cal. — Cooper  v.  Burch,  74  P.  37, 
140   Cal.    548— Tay   v.   Hawley,    39 
Cal.  D3. 

54.  N.Y.— Lane  v.  Salter,  51  N.Y.  1. 
33  C.J.  P  1124  note  92. 

55.  N.Y. — Oneida    County    Bank    v. 
Bonney,  4  N.JE.  332,  101  N.Y.  173. 

33  C.J.  p  1124  note  93. 

58.  N.Y.— Dean  v.  Eldridge,  29  How. 
Pr.  218. 

57.  Cal.— Christina  v.  Baker,   82  P. 
2d  722,   28  Cal.App.2d  412— Carson 
v.   Lam'pton,  73   P.2d   629,   23  Cal. 
App.2d  535. 

58,  Mont. — Kleinschmidt     v.     Free- 
man, 2  P.  27-5,  4  Mont  400. 

34  C.J.  p  741  note  51. 


59-    Tenn.— Carney  v.  qarney,  200  S. 

W.  517,  138  Tenn.  647. 
34  C.J.  p  742  note  52. 

60.  111.— Lasman   v.   Harts,   112   111. 
App.  82. 

Evidence  held  insufficient  to  sus- 
tain judgrment  against  party. — Arm- 
strong v.  Quill,  153  IlLApp.  81. 

61.  Ind.— Miller   v.    Shearer,    6    Ind. 
50. 

34  C.J.  p  742  note  54. 

62.  Del.— Hill  v.  Brown,  4  Del.  519. 
34  C.J.  p  742  note  55. 


63.     Ind. — Codding1 

Blackf.  601. 
34  C.J.  p  742  note  £6. 


v.      Moore,      5 


64.  Ind.— Roller  v.  Custer,  '6  Blackf. 
433. 

34  C.J.  p  742  note  57. 

65.  InO.— Orput  v.  Hardy,  6  Blackf. 
456. 


66.  Ind. — Shiel  v.  Ferriter,  7  Blackf. 
574, 

34  C.J.  p  742  note  59. 

67.  Ind.— Nevils      v.      Campbell,     7 
Blackf.  325. 

68.  Ind. — Nowland     v.     Jackson,     1 
Ind.  162. 

34  C.J.  p  742  note  61. 

69.  Ind. — Hoover    v.    Davenport,     5 
Blaokf.  230. 

70.  Ind.— Scott      v.      "Williams,      7 
Blackf.  370. 

71.  Ind. — Roller  v.  Custer,  6  Blackf. 
433. 

72.  Ind. — Bennett  v.  Jones,  7  Blackf. 
110. 

73.  Ind. — Shiel  v.  -Ferriter,  7  Blackf. 
574— Roller    v.    Custer,    -6    Blackf. 
433. 


74.  *   Ind. — Groves 
Blackf.  33. 

75.  Ind.— Henkle 
Blackf,  423. 


y.      McCabe,      8 


y.      German,      6 


See  Vol.  50  for  §§  592  to  End 


1077 


INDEX  TO 
JUDGMENTS 


See  Volume  Containing  End  o£  Text 
For  Complete  Index 


OF  VOLUME 


1079 


1O7  146