Skip to main content

Full text of "The Republic"

See other formats 


I 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

IN  MEMORY  OF 

PROFESSOR  ALBERT  H.  MOWBRAY 
l88l— 1949 


# 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

Microsoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/daviesrepublicOOplatrich 


PLATO. 


Republic  of  Plato. 


THE  REPUBLIC    <*    ^    * 
*    *    #    ■*     OF  PLATO 

TRANSLATED  INTO  ENGLISH 

WITH  AN  ANALYSIS  AND  NOTES 

By  JOHN  LLEWELYN  DA  VIES,  M.A. 

AND 

DAVID  JAMES  VAUGHAN,  M.A. 

LATE  FELLOWS  OF  TRINITY  COLLEGE,  CAMBRIDGE 


"  Knowledge  is  earthly,  of  the  mind, 
But  Wisdom,  is  heavenly,  of  the  soul." 

Tennyson. 


A    L.  BURT  COMPANY,  PUBLISHERS 


GIFT    M 


53X3 

\dzo 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 


The  Dialogue  commonly  called  the  Republic  is  the  ac- 
knowledged masterpiece  of  the  large  collection  of  similnr 
compositions  which  have  come  down  to  us  as  the  works  of 
Plato.  These  works  have  made  the  ?wne  of  Plato  one  of 
the  most  familiar  names  in  history.  But  we  know  little 
about  Plato  himself  ;  astonishingly  little,  compared  with 
what  we  might  have  expected  to  knoW.  When  we  consider 
that  he  lived  in  a  peculiarly  historical  period,  concerning 
the  events  and  personages  of  which  we  have  an  unusual 
amount  of  information;  that  he  had  an  illustrious  repu- 
tation during  his  lifetime,  which  was  prolonged  to  au  ad- 
vanced old  age  ;  and  that  his  writings  were  very  numerous, 
and  have  reached  us  in  so  perfect  a  condition  as  to  show 
that  their  text  was  reverently  vatched  over  from  the  first : — 
it  cannot  but  seem  strange  that  the  record  of  his  life  is  so 
meager,  and  that  the  mutual  relations  of  his  writings  are 
involved  in  so  much  obscurity.  In  this  absence  of  materials 
for  a  biography  we  may  doubtless  find  one  token  of  the 
fastidious  reserve,  the  suppression  of  his  own  personality, 
which  is  eminently  characteristic  of  Plato. 

According  to  the  generally  received  opinion,  the  facts 
which  may  be  considered  as  certain  in  the  life  of  Plato 
suffice  for  little  more  than  an  outline,  and  even  this  cannot 
be  quite  firmly  drawn.  His  dialogues, — although  the 
scene  of  them  is  laid  in  his  own  time,  and  the  interloc- 
utors, by  a  singular  liberty,  are  often  well  known  and  liv-. 
mg  persons,  including  his  own  brothers, — hardly  contrib-ti 
ute  a  single  incident  or  fact  to  a  biographical  sketch.  I 
There  are  however  certain  Letters  professing  to  be  Plato's, 
which  give  much  information  as  to  his  acts  and  his 
motives,  especially  with  reference  to  the  actively  political 
portions  of  his  career.  These  Letters  have  of  late  years 
been  generally  believed  to  be  spurious,  the  most  important 

M68458C 


IV  INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 

of  them  being  supposed  to  be  written  by  disciples  of  Plata 
and  to  contain  more  or  less  that  is  true.  But  Mr.  Grote 
contends  strenuously  for  the  genuineness  of  these,  as  well 
as  of  other  writings,  included  in  the  traditional  canon  or 
list  of  Plato's  works,  which  modern  critics  have  rejected 
as  spurious.  Mr.  Grote,  in  his  zeal  to  take  Plato  down 
from  his  superhuman  pedestal,  may  be  somewhat  too  ready 
"to  attribute  to  him  the  compositions  which  have  been 
judged  unworthy  of  so  divine  a  philosopher ;  but  his 
masterly  discussion  will  certainly  reopen  the  question,  and 
probably  persuade  many  to  adopt  his  conclusion.  There 
would  then  be  less  hesitation  in  adding  the  interesting  par- 
ticulars contained  in  the  Epistles  to  what  we  otherwise 
know  of  Plato's  life  ;  whilst  the  more  sceptical  critics,  as 
has  been  said,  are  already  willing  to  admit  that  those 
particulars  may  in  great  part  be  authentic. 

The  date  of  Plato's  birth  is  variously  given  as  B.  c.  430, 
428,  and  427  ;  the  place  of  it  as  either  Athens  or  iEgina. 
He  is  said  to  have  died  in  B.C.  347.  He  lived  therefore  v> 
the  age  of  80  or  perhaps  of  83.  If  we  take  the  latest  date 
of  his  birth,  he  was  born  about  four  years  after  the  com- 
mencement of  the  Peloponnesian  War.  The  history  of 
Thucydides  includes  the  first  16  or  17  years  of  his  life  ; 
where  Thucydides  ends,  Xenophon  takes  up  the  narrative 
of  Grecian  affairs,  and  carries  it  on  for  48  years,  up  to  the 
battle  of  Mantinea  in  B.C.  362.  It  was  the  lot  of  Plato  to 
grow  up  to  manhood  in  the  midst  of  a  long  national  struggle, 
marked  by  various  fortunes  and  splendid  efforts,  which 
was  brought  to  a  close  at  last  by  the  complete  prostration 
of  his  country.  The  conquest  of  Athens  in  B.C.  403  was 
followed  by  the  short  rule  of  the  Thirty,  headed  by  Critias 
J  who  was  Plato's  uncle,)  and  I'heramenes.  The  arbitrary 
government  of  the  Thirty  was  overthrown  by  Thrasybulus, 
and  the  old  democracy  reestablished.  In  B.C.  399  occurred 
the  terrible  disgrace  of  the  trial  and  death  of  Socrates. 
For  the  next  half  century,  Athens  does  not  occupy  the 
most  conspicuous  place  in  Grecian  history,  but  bears  a 
creditable  part  in  the  movements  of  the  time  under  the 
I'Hflflnnn  nf  oMq  oommaaders  aueha-alphierates*  Ghab™0* 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE.  v 

and  Timotheus.  Agesilaus  the  King  of  Lacedaemon,  and 
Epaminondas  of  Thebes,  were  the  most  illustrious  and 
most  prominent  rulers  of  this  period,  leading  on  either 
side  in  the  vigorous  contest  which  is  best  known  by  the 
battles  of  Leuctra  (b.c.  371)  and  Mantinea  (b.  c.  362). 
After  the  battle  of  Mantinea,  the  most  important  feature 
in  Grecian  history  is  the  gradual  and  steady  rise  of  the 
power  of  Philip  of  Macedon.  Before  Plato  died,  Demos- 
thenes had  become  famous  through  his  orations  against 
Philip  ;  and  within  a  year  after  his  death  Philip,  by  the 
destruction  of  the  Phocians  at  the  end  of  the  Sacred  War, 
had  secured  his  supremacy  in  Greece. 

By  the  side  of  the  main  current  of  Grecian  affairs,  the 
history  of  Sicily  acquired  interest  and  importance  during 
this  same  half  century  under  the  rule  of  the  two  Dionysii 
and  Dion.  The  elder  Dionysius,  having  governed  with 
vigor  at  Syracuse  for  a  quarter  of  a  century,  died  in  B.C. 
367.  His  son  held  a  similar  authority  for  12  years,  when 
he  was  expelled  by  Dion,  who  after  four  years  of  rule 
was  in  his  turn  attacked  and  put  to  death. 

Living  in  such  an  age,  Plato  was  a  witness  of  a  singular 
variety  of  political  developments,  and  some  of  the  richness 
of  illustration  in  the  Republic  is  no  doubt  due  to  his  pecul- 
iar opportunities  of  observation.  But  he  himself  was  not 
suited  for  the  life  of  practical  politics.  He  had  every  ad- 
vantage of  training,  being  the  son  of  rich  parents,  robust 
in  health,  and  educated  in  all  the  accomplishments  of  the 
time  ;  and  he  must  have  been  compelled  to  discharge  the 
ordinary  duties  of  an  Athenian  citizen,  including  some 
military  service.  But  we  hear  of  no  more  decided  attempt 
to  enter  the  arena  of  Athenian  politics  than  that  for  which 
the  7th  Epistle  is  an  authority.  It  is  there  stated  that  he 
was  invited  by  his  relations  and  connections  amongst  the 
Thirty  to  take  some  part  in  public  affairs,  and  that  he  was 
desirous  of  doing  so  ;  but  when  he  saw  what  iniquities  the 
Thirty  were  perpetrating,  and  especially  when  he  saw  them 
once  trying,  but  vainly,  to  force  Socrates  to  do  an  injury 
to  a  citizen,  he  felt  himself  driven  back  into  a  private  life. 
He  had  the  same  desire  of  mixing  in  public  affairs  after 


vl  INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 

the  restoration  of  the  democracy,  but  then  again  he  saw 
harsh  things  done,  and  at  last  the  iniquitous  condemnation 
,  of  Socrates  entirely  repelled  him  from  politics. 
i  The  philosopher  whose  name  is  connected  with  these 
two  repulses  from  a  political  career  had  gained  an  ascen- 
dency of  singular  power  and  permanence  over  the  mind  of 
Plato.  When  Socrates  died,  Plato  was  28  years  old.  For 
eight  years  they  had  lived  in  close  intimacy  as  teacher  and 
pupil.  We  have  no  record  of  the  character  or  incidents  of 
this  connection.  But  Plato's  works  show  that  his  whole 
subsequent  life  was  formed  by  it.  He  devoted  himself  to 
philosophy,  and  made  it  his  one  purpose  to  walk  in  the 
path  of  inquiry  which  Socrates  had  opened  out  to  him. 
The  image  of  his  teacher  never  faded  from  his  mind. 
With  mixed  devotion  and  freedom,  he  uses  Socrates  in  his 
dialogues  as  the  exponent  of  all  his  own  views.  However 
distant  the  speculations  of  Plato  may  have  been  from  the 
homelier  thoughts  of  Socrates,  Plato  undoubtedly  believed 
that  he  was  faithfully  following  the  principles  or  method 
which  Socrates  had  taught  and  illustrated. 

After  the  death  of  Socrates,  B.C.  399,  Plato  withdrew 
to  Megara.  We  do  not  know  how  long  he  stayed  there, 
but  in  the  course  of  some  12  years  after  the  death  of  So- 
crates, he  is  said  to  have  traveled  to  Cyrene  and  Egypt, 
to  Italy  and  Sicily.  Whilst  he  was  in  Sicily,  he  made  ac- 
quaintance with  Dion  at  Syracuse,  and  probably  with 
Dionysins  the  elder.  According  to  a  strange  and  doubt- 
ful story,  Dionysius  caused  him  to  be  sold  into  slavery,  but 
(he  was  ransomed  at  ^Egina  and  then  returned  to  Athens. 
jThere  he  settled,  and  began  to  teach  philosophy,  about 
B.  c.  388—396. 

From  that  time  he  pursued  an  even  career,  with  only 
two  considerable  interruptions,  as  a  dignified  and  illustri- 
ous teacher,  for  about  40  years.  Like  Socrates,  he  re- 
ceived no  fees  for  his  instructions,  and  taught,  it  is  sup- 
posed, chiefly  through  conversation.  His  reputation  was 
higher  than  that  of  any  contemporary  philosopher,  and 
he  drew  many  pupils  about  him,  of  whom  the  n^t  famous 
was  his  great  rival  in  philosophy.  Aristotle. 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE.  vii 

Once  in  the  course  of  his  life  he  had  a  singular  call  to 
apply  his  political  science  to  the  government  of  a  state. 
When  the  elder  Dionysius  died,  he  was  succeeded  in  his 
power  by  his  son,  who  had  no  strength  of  character  and 
was  at  first  much  under  the  influence  of  Plato's  friend  and 
admirer  Dion.  The  opportunity  seemed  a  very  favorable 
one  for  establishing  a  state  on  sound  principles.  Dionysius 
was  ready  to  accept  advice,  Dion  was  urgent  in  his  en-\ 
treaties  that  Plato  would  come  to  guide  him,  and  Plato 
was  unwillingly  constrained  to  pay  a  visit  to  Syracuse  on 
this  errand.  The  story  of  this  visit  is  told  in  the  7th 
Epistle.  It  did  not  succeed.  Plato  may  not  have  shown 
much  tact  in  the  management  of  Dionysius ;  the  task- 
attempted  may  have  been  a  hopeless  one.  At  all  events 
Dionysius  did  not  long  continue  submissive  to  Dion  and 
Plato.  He  banished  Dion  from  Syracuse ;  and  after  a 
while  Plato,  though  not  himself  badly  treated,  returned  to 
Athens.  He  paid  a  second  visit,  however,  to  Dionysius,  in 
the  hope  of  doing  some  service  to  Dion,  but  he  was  again 
disappointed  ;  and  his  Syracusan  experiences  had  nothing 
but  what  was  painful  and  mortifying  to  look  back  upon. 

The  reader  of  the  Republic  is  not  obliged  to  enter  into 
the  difficult  question  as  to  the  order  and  arrangement  of 
Plato's  works.  A  second  Dialogue,  the  Timaeus,  connects 
itself  with  the  Republic,  and  a  third,  the  Critias,  with  the 
Timaeus,  so  as  to  form  a  trilogy  ;  but  the  Republic  is 
complete  in  itself.  It  offers  no  indication  of  its  date  of 
composition,  except  that  its  vigor, — especially  when  it  is 
compared  with  such  a  work  as  the  Laws,  probably  written 
in  Plato's  old  age, — speaks  of  the  prime  of  life  and  of 
intellect.  It  has  a  second  traditional  title,  Concerning 
Justice.  The  connection  of  the  two  titles  is  sufficiently 
explained  in  the  Dialogue,  which  tells  its  own  story  with 
simplicity  and  clearness.  An  inquiry  having  been  started 
as  to  the  nature  of  justice,  it  is  suggested  that  justice 
would  be  best  seen  in  a  perfect  State  or  Commonwealth, 
and  that,  when  so  discovered,  it  might  be  recognized  by 
analogy  in  the  individual  man.  Accordingly  the  ideal 
State  is  constructed  ;  and  when  this  process,  which  occu- 


Viii  INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 

pies  the  chief  part  of  the  work,  is  completed,  the  inquirers 
discover  justice,  and  its  nature  is  satisfactorily  ascer- 
tained. The  persons  who  take  part  in  the  conversation 
are  Socrates,  an  old  man  named  Cephalus  and  his  son 
Polemarchus,  Glaucon  and  Adeimantus,  Plato's  brothers^ 
and  Thrasymachus,  one  of  the  Sophists  of  the  time. 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 

Socrates  and  Glaucon,  having  gone  down  to  -d  t 
the  Piraeus  to  witness  the  first  celebration  of  a 
festival  lately  introduced  from  Thrace,  fall  in  with  Pole- 
marchus,  Adeimantus,  Niceratus,  and  some  other  friends, 
who  persuade  them  to  proceed  to  the  house  of  Cephalus, 
the  father  of  Polemarchus.  A  conversation  upon  the  sub* 
ject  of  old  age,  its  faults  and  its  trials,  carried  on  between 
Cephalus  and  Socrates,  introduces  the  question, — What 
is  Justice  ?  Cephalus  then  retires,  leaving  Polemarchus 
to  continue  the  discussion  with  Socrates. 

Polemarchus  begins  by  propounding  a  definition  of 
justice  given  by  Simonides,  who  makes  it  consist  in  re- 
storing to  everybody  what  is  due  to  him. 

The  question,  then,  is,  what  did  Simonides  mean  by  the 
term  "due?"  Apparently  he  meant  little  more  than 
"  appropriate  ;"  for,  according  to  him,  the  nature  of  the 
debt  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  relation  subsisting 
between  the  two  parties  ;  so  that,  in  reality,  he  makes 
jnstice  consist  in  doing  good  to  our  friends,  and  harm  to 
our  enemies. 

Socrates  then  asks  Polemarchus  to  define  the  term 
"  friends  ;  "  and  when  the  latter  replies  that  our  friends 
are  those  whom  we  regard  as  good  and  honest  men,  Socrates 
shows  that,  as  we  are  constantly  liable  to  misjudge  the 
characters  of  people,  we  must  maintain  either  that  it  is 
just  to  injure  the  good,  which  is  an  immoral  doctrine  ;  or 
else  that  it  is  occasionally  just  to  injure  our  friends,  which 
directly  contradicts  the  doctrine  of  Simonides. 

To  escape  from  this  dilemma,  Polemarchus  shifts  his 
ground,  and  states  the  theory  of  Simonides  thus  ; — It  is 
just  to  help  our  friends  if  they  are  good  men,  and  to  injure 

Dur  enemies  if  they  are  bad  Jn§H. — ~ — 

is 


x  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 

In  reply  to  this,  Socrates,  arguing  from  analogy,  shows 
that  to  injure  a  man  is  tantamount  to  making  him  less 
virtuous,  and  therefore  less  just.  But  how  can  a  just  man, 
by  the  exercise  of  his  justice,  render  the  character  of 
another  less  just  than  it  was  ?  The  idea  is  preposterous. 
Therefore,  the  definition  of  Simonides,  as  amended  by 
Polemarchus,  is  again  proved  to  be  incorrect. 

Hereupon  Thrasymachus  thrusts  himself  into  the  dis- 
cussion, and,  after  some  Hesitation,  defines  justice  as  tf/ the 
interest  of  the  stronger."  He  supports  bis  definition  by 
the  following  argument.  In  every  state  it  is  considered 
unjust  to  violate  the  laws  :  the  laws  are  framed  to  serve 
the  interests  of  the  government :  and  the  government  is 
stronger  than  its  subjects  :  therefore,  universally,  justice 
is  the  interest  of  the  stronger,  or,  might  is  right. 

But,  urges  Socrates,  a  government  often  makes  mis- 
takes, and  enacts  laws  which  are  detrimental  to  its  own 
interests  :  and,  according  to  Thrasymachus,  justice  requires 
the  subject  in  every  instance  to  obey  the  laws  of  the  land  : 
consequently,  it  is  often  just  for  the  subject  to  do  what  is 
prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  the  government,  that  is, 
what  is  not  for  the  interest  of  the  stronger.  Therefore, 
justice  cannot  be  defined  as  the  interest  of  the  stronger. 

To  avoid  this  conclusion,  Thrasymachus  retracts  his 
previous  admission,  and  explains  that,  properly  speaking, 
a  governor,  in  so  far  as  he  is  a  governor,  cannot  be  said 
to  make  mistakes ;  and  that,  therefore,  the  government, 
speaking  strictly,  always  legislates  to  its  own  advantage, 
while  justice  commands  the  subject  to  obey. 

Socrates,  in  reply,  demonstrates  that  every  art,  and 
therefore  the  art  of  government  among  others,  consults 
the  interests,  not  of  the  artist  or  superior,  but  of  thlTsub.- 
ject  or  inferior. 

Upon  this,  Thrasymachus  abruptly  turns  the.  discourse 
by  declaring  that  a  governor  treats  his  subjects  just  like 
the  shepherd  who  fattens  hi?  flock  for  his  own  private 
advantage  ;  and  that,  really,  injustice,  practised  on  an 
extensive  scale,  is  by  far  the  best  and  most  lucrative  course 
that  a  man  can  adopt, 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  xi 

Socrates  first  corrects  the  assertion  that  the  shepherd 
fattens  his  flock  for  his  own  private  advantage  ;  because  it 
follows  from  the  rule,  laid  down  by  Thrasymachus  him- 
self, that,  properly  speaking,  the  shepherd,  in  so  far  as  he 
is  a  shepherd,  considers  simply  the  good  of  his  sheep. 
Further,  how  can  we  account  for  the  fact  that  a  governor 
expects  to  be  paid  for  his  work,  except  on  the  supposition 
that  the  benefits  of  government  accrue,  not  to  the  gov- 
ernor, but  to  the  subject  ?  Indeed,  strictly  speaking, 
every  artist  is  remunerated,  mediately  by  his  art,  but,  im- 
mediately by  what  Socrates  calls  "  the  art  of  wages," 
which  generally  accompanies  the  others. 

Secondly,  he  turns  to  the  position  that  perfect  injustice 
is  more  profitable  than  perfect  justice,  and  elicits  from 
Thrasymachus  the  assertion  that  justice  is  mere  good 
nature,  whereas  jlnjustice  is  genuine  good  policy,  and^ 
therefore,  wise,  and  good,  and  powerful.  By  a  display  of 
verbal  ingenuity  he  forces  him  to  admit,  (1)  that  the  un- 
just man  tries  to  go  beyond  or  overreach  both  the  just  and 
the  unjust,  while  the  just  man  only  tries  to  overreach  the 
unjust  ;  (2)  that  every  one  who  is  skilful  in  an  art,  and 
therefore  wise  and  therefore  good,  endeavors  to  go  be- 
yond or  outdo,  not  the  skilful,  but  the  unskilled  ;  (3)  that, 
therefore,  the  good  and  wise  do  not  try  to  go  beyond  those 
who  are  like  themselves,  but  only  those  who  are  unlike 
themselves  :  whence  we  may  infer  that  the  just  man  is 
wise  and  good,  and  that  the  unjust  man  is  evil  and  igno- 
rant. He  then  proceeds  to  show  that  injustice  tends  U 
produce  strife  and  division,  while  justice  induces  harmony 
and  concord  ;  and  that  injustice  destroys  all  capacity  for 
joint  action  both  in  states  and  in  individuals,  and  is, 
therefore,  an  element  of  weakness,  not  of  strength. 

Finally,  Socrates  endeavors  to  show  that  J^he_jpjiJ,  lik 
the  eye  and  the  ear  and  every  other  thing,  lias  a  work  or 
function  to  perform,  and  possesses  a  virtue  by  which  alone 
itrcan  be  enabled  to  p^form'JJmt^mck^  This^  virtue  of 
^Mll^^^i^-JL^^<J5T~and?  therefore,  without  justice~^th"e — 
soul's  work  cannot  be  well  done,  and  the  soul  itself  cannot 
live  happily.     Hence  the  just  man  is  happy,  and  the  un- 


xii  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  \ 

just  man  is  miserable  ;  and,  therefore,  injustice  can  never 
>e  more" profitable  than  justice.  Still,  Socrates  admits  that 
these  arguments  are  not  conclusive  to  his  own  mind,  be- 
cause he  has  not  yet  discovered  the  real  nature  of  justice. 
-t»  j j  In  the  beginning  of  the  second  Book,  Glaucon 
and  Adeimantus  resume  the  ground  which 
Thrasymachus  has  resigned.  They  would  gladly  believe 
that  a  just  life  is  really  preferable  to  an  unjust  life  ;  but 
they  cannot  help  seeing  that  too  much  stress  has  been  laid 
by  the  eulogists  of  justice  upon  its  accidental  advantages, 
to  the  neglect  of  its  intrinsic  qualities.  Would  not  a  per- 
son be  quite  ready  to  commit  injustice,  if  he  could  be  sure 
of  never  suffering  from  the  injustice  of  other  men  ?  JLs 
not  justice  a  kind  of  compromise,  brought  about  by  the 
necessities  of  social  life  ?  Do  the  poets  ever  praise  it  in, 
and  for,  itself  ?  And,  assuming  the  existence  of  the  gods, 
how  do  they  regard  the  just  and  the  unjust  man  ?  May 
not  the  sins  of  the  latter  be  expiated  by  sacrifice  ;  andj  in 
that  case,  will  he  not  be  as  happy  as  the  just  man  in  the 
next  world,  and  is  he  not  much  happier  than  the  just  in 
the  present  life  ? 

Socrates  acknowledges  the  difficulty  of  the  question,  and 
proposes  to  examine  the  nature  of  justice  and  injustice  in 
a  wider  field,  and  on  a  larger  scale.  May  not  justice  be 
predicated  of  a  state,  as  well  as  of  an  individual  ?  And, 
if  so,  will  it  not  be  more  fully  developed,  and  therefore 
more  intelligible,  in  the  former  than  in  the  latter  ?  Let 
us  trace  the  rise  of  a  state,  and  then  we  shall  be  able  also 
to  trace  the  rise  of  justice  and  injustice. 

.Man.  isolated  from  his  fellow-men.  is  not  self-sufficient. 
Hence  the  origin  of  society,  and  of  the  state,  which  re- 
quires the  concurrence  of  four  or  five  men  at  least,  who 
establish  the  first  elements  of  a  division  of  labor,  which 
becomes  more  minute  as  the  members  of  the  community 
increase.  Thus  the  society  comprises  at  first  only  hus- 
bandmen, builders,  clothiers,  shoemakers.  To  these 
are  soon  added  carpenters,  smiths,  shepherds,  graziers. 
Gradually  a  foreign  trade  arises,  which  necessitates  in- 
creased production  at  home,  in  order  to  pay  for  the  im- 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  xiii 

ported  goods.  Production  carried  out  on  so  large  a  scale, 
iv ill  call  into  existence  a  class  of  distributors,  shops,  and  a 
currency.  Thus  the  state  requires  merchants,  sailors,  shop- 
keepers, and  hired  laborers. 

A  state,  thus  constituted,  will  be  well  supplied  with 
the  necessaries  of  life,  if  its  members  do  not  multiply  too 
rapidly  for  its  resources.  But  if  it  is  to  be  supplied  with 
the  luxuries,  as  well  as  with  the  necessaries,  of  life,  it 
must  contain  in  addition  cooks,  confectioners,  barbers, 
actors,  dancers,  poets,  physicians,  etc.  It  will  therefore 
require  a  larger  territory,  and  this  want  may  involve  it  in 
a  war  with  its  neighbors.  But  war  implies  soldiers,  and 
soldiers  must  be  carefully  trained  to  their  profession. 
Hence  the  state  must  possess  a  standing  army,  or  class  of 
Guardians. 

How  are  jjiese  Guardians  to  be  selected,  and  what 
qualities  must  they  possess  ?— They  must  be  strong,  swift, 
and  brave f  high-spirited,  but  gentle ;  and  endowed  with 
a  taste  for  philosophy. 

But  how  must  they  be  educated  ? — In  the  first  place,      ^ 
we  must  be  very  scrupulous  about  the  substance  of  ^q     (Jn 
stories  wliich  they  are  taught  in  their  childhood.     Nothing 
derogatory  to  the  dignity  of  the  gods   must   be   admitted 
in  these  tales.    They  must  not  be  taught  that  the  gods  wage 
war  against  one  another  ;  or  that  they  break  treaties  ;  or 
that  they  afflict  men  with  misfortunes  ;  or  that  they  appear 
in  a  variety  of  shapes  on  earth  ;  or  that  they  mislead  us  by 
falsehood.     Neither  must   they  be  encouraged    t$ookttt 
to  fear  death,  by  being  told  that  the  future  life  *  — .^ 

is  a  gloomy  one  :  nor  must  the  characters  of  great  men  be 
represented  to  them  in  an  unworthy,  or  ludicrous,  or 
sensual  light.  On  the  contrary,  truth,  courage,  and  self- 
control  must  be  inculcated  by  all  the  stories  that  are  em- 
ployed in  their  education. 

In  the  second  place,  the  form,  in  which  the  stories  are 
conveyed,  will  greatly  affect  The  nature  of  their  influence. 
Poetry  may  be  either  purely  imitative,  as  in  the  drama  ; 
or  purely  narrative,  as  in  the  dithyramb  ;  or  a  compound 
*f  Wi),  »«  in  fche  epio.     Now  the  same  person  cannot  do, 


xiv      -  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 

or  imitate,  a  great  number  of  things  successfully.  Hence, 
if  the  Guardians  are  to  study  imitation  at  all,  they  must 
only  be  allowed  to  imitate  men  of  high  and  exalted  char- 
acter. The  style  in  which  such  men  speak  and  write  is 
always  simple  and  severe,  and  very  sparingly  interspersed 
with  imitation.  Such,  therefore,  must  be  the  style  in 
which  the  Guardians  are  to  be  permitted  to  speak  them- 
selves, and  in  which  the  poets  who  superintend  their  edu- 
cation must  be  compelled  to  write. 

Again  ;  strict  regulations  must  be  enforced  with  refer- 
ence to  songs,  harmonies,  aad  musical  instruments.  No 
soft  and  enervating  music  is  to  be  admitted  into  the  per- 
fect state.  All  musical  instruments  must  be  excluded, 
with  the  exception  of  the  lyre,  the  guitar,  and  the  pipe. 
Similarly,  all  complex  rhythms  are  to  be  prohibited,  and 
only  the  simple  ones  retained.  And  the  object  of  all 
these  regulations  is  to  foster  and  develop  m  the  mincTs^of 
the  pupils  a  sense  of  beau^harmony,  and^pj^porfionL 
which  will  influence  their  whole  character,  ancTall  their 
intercourse  with  one  another.  ~"~"         >" 

Having  thus  discussed  mwS,  in  the  Greek  sense  of  the 
term,  Socrates  proceeds  in  the  next  place  to  discuss 
gymnastic.  The  diet  of  the  Guardians  must  be  simple  and 
moderate,  and  therefore  healthy.  This  will  make  them 
independent  of  the  physician's  advice,  except  under  pecul- 
iar circumstances.  And  here  we  must  remember  that  it 
is  a  mistake  to  regard  gymnastic  as  simply  bearing  the 
same  relation  to  the  body  that  music  does  to  the  mind. 
Rather  we  ought  to  say  that  gymnastic  develops  the 
spirited  element  of  our  nature,  just  as  music  develops  the 
philosophic  :  and  the  great  object  of  all  education  is  to 
tcmpef^ncl  blencT  these  two  elements  together  in  just  and 
harmonious  proportion. 

So  much  for  the  education  and  discipline  of  the  Guard- 
ians. Now,  obviously,  the  magistrates  of  the  state  must 
be  chosen  out  of  this  superior  class.  They  must,  indeed, 
be  the  oldest,  the  most  prudent,  the  ablest,  and  above  all 
the  most  patriotic  and  unselfish  members  of  the  body. 
These  are  the  true  Guardians  of  the  State  ;  the  remainder 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  xv 

are  to  be  called  Auxiliaries.  And  in  order  to  convince 
the  citizens  of  the  wisdom  and  justice  of  this  order  of 
things,  we  must  tell  them  a  story,  to  the  effect  that  they 
were  all  originally  fashioned  in  the  bowels  of  the  earth, 
their  common  mother  ;  and  that  it  pleased  the  gods  to 
mix  gold  in  the  composition  of  some  of  them,  silver  in 
that  of  others,  iron  and  copper  in  that  of  others.  The 
first  are  to  be  Guardians,  the  second  Auxiliaries,  the  third 
husbandmen  and  craftsmen  ;  and  this  rule  must  be  most 
carefully  observed  and  perpetuated,  otherwise  the  state 
will  most  certainly  perish.  . 

Finally,  we  must  select  a  camp  within  the  city  for  this 
army  of  Guardians  and  Auxiliaries,  in  which  they  are  to 
live  a  hardy,  frugal  life,  quartered  in  tents,  not  in  houses, 
supported  by  the  contributions  of  the  other  citizens,  and, 
above  all,  possessed  of  nothing  which  they  can  call  their 
own  :  otherwise  they  are  almost  sure  to  become  wolves, 
instead  of  watch-dogs. 

Hereupon  Adeimantus  objects  that  the  life   -r^.       Ttt  _^, 
of  this  select  body  of  Guardians  will  be  any-~ 
thing  but  a  happy  one. 

Perhaps  so,  replies  Socrates;  but  that  is  not  the  ques- 
tion. TKe  opject  of  the  true  legislator  isto make  the  en- 
tire state,  with  its  three  classes  of  Guardians,  Auxiliaries, 
and  Producers,  a  happy  one.  And  this  leadK&im  to  con- 
sider the  dntips_nf  the  rrnn.rdifl.rifi.  In  thqjjrrst  place, 
they  must  endeavor  to  remove  any  tendency  to  excessive 
wealth,  or  excesstvejpoverty,  in  the  other  members  of  the 
state.  In  the\i^ejynd  place,  they  must  be  on  their  guard 
ist  a  too  rapid  increase  of  territory.  In  the  third 
innovations  in  music  and  gymnastic  must  be 
Liionsly  put  down.  All  minor  regulations  may  be 
safely  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  magistrates  for  the  time 
being  ;  and  the  religious  rites  and  ceremonies  must  be 
referred  to  the  decision  of  the  Delphian  Apollo,  t  ^X^- 

And  now,  having  traced  the  rise  of  a  state  from  first' 
last,  Socrates  returns  to  the  question, — What  is  justice  ? 
And  In  what  part  of  the  state  are  we  to  look  for  it  ? 

The  state,  if  it  has  been  rightly  organized,  must  be  per. 


XVI  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 

fectly  good.  If  perfectly  good,  it  must  be  wise,  brnv*, 
temperate,  and  just.  Hence,  regarding  the  virtue  of  tb« 
state  as  a  given  quantity,  made  up  of  wisdom,  courage,. 
"  temperance  and  justice,  if  we  can  find  three  of  these,  we 
shall  by  that  very  process  have  discovered  the  nature  of 
the  fourth. 

The  wisdom  of  the  state  obviously  resides  in  the  sn»all 
class  of  Guardians  or  Magistrates.  The  courage  of  the 
state,  as  obviously,  resides  in  the  Auxiliaries,  and  consms 
essentially  in  ever  maintaining  a  right  estimate  of  what  U, 
or  is  not,  really  formidable. 

The  essence  of  temperance  is  restraint.  The  essence  of 
political  temperance  lies  in  recognizing  6rTe  right  of  the 
governing  body  to  the  allegiance  and  opedierice  of  the 
goyjernj3sL__.lt  does  not  reside  in  one  particulaFciass,  lika 
wisdom,  and  Courage,  but  is  diffused  throughout  the  entire 
state  in  the  form  of  a  common  consent,  or  harmony,  upon 
tliisTuBJecET  ThUS  We  have  lound  the  three  :  where,  then, 
is  the  fourth  ? 

After  eliminating  wisdom,  courage,  and  temperance, 
there  still  remains  a  something  which—enables  the  othei 
three  to  take  root  in  the  state,  and  preserves  them  intact 
therein.  This  something  must,  therefore,  be  justice.  It 
maybe  defined  as  that  which  teaches  everybody  to  attend 
toTTTi  own  business  without  meddling  in  that  of  other  peo- 
pTp^AyllinVi  fnsps  together  t^e  thrftfi  nlasRftH  in  the  stat4 
and  keeps  each  in  its  proper  place.  Conversely,  the  es* 
sence  of  political  injustice  lies  in  a  meddling,  restless 
spirit  pervading  the  three  classes,  and  leading  each  to 
mecTdle  with  the  offices,  tools,  and  duties,  of  the  other 

"  two. _z 

Let  us  apply  these  results  to  the  individual  man. 
,  What  is  found  in  the  state  must  be  also  found  in  th« 
individual.  For  how  could  it  enter  the  state,  except 
through  the  individual  members  of  the  state  ?  Hence  we 
should  expect  to  find  in  the  individual  man  three  pria- 
ciples,  corresponding  to  the  three  classes  of  the  state.  Let 
tis  see  whether  this  expectation  is  well  grounded. 

Two  contradictory  impulses,    coexisting  in  the  mind. 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EEPUBLIC.  xvii 

cannot  proceed  from  the  same  source.  A  thirsty  man  i* 
often  unwilling  to  drink.  Hence  there  must  be  two  prin- 
ciples within  him — one  prompting  him,  the  other  for- 
bidding him,  to  drink.  The  former  proceeds  from  ap- 
petite or  desire,  the  latter  from  reason.  Hence  we  have 
at  least  two  distinct  elements  in  the  soul — one  rational, 
the  other  irrational,  appetitive,  or  concupiscent. 

In  the  same  way  we  find  ourselves  obliged  to  distinguish 
a  third  element,  which  is  the  seat  of  anger,  spirit,  resent- 
ment, and  may  be  called  the  spirited,  or  passionate,  or 
irascible  element.  "When  there  is  any  division  between 
the  rational  and  the  irrational  principles,  this  third  prin- 
ciple always  arrays  itself  on  the  side  of  the  former.  Thus 
we  have  the  rational,  the  spirited,  and  the  concupiscent 
element  in  the  individual,  corresponding  to  the  (guardians, 
the  Auxiliaries,  and  the  productive  class,  in  the  state. 
Hence,  the  individual  is  wise,  in  virtue  of  the  wisdom  of 
the  rational  element ;  courageous,  in  virtue  of  the  courage 
of  the  spirited  element ;  temperate,  when  the  rational 
element  governs  with  the  full  consent  of  the  other  two  ; 
and,  finally,  just,  when  each  of  the  three  perforins  its  own 
proper  work,  without  meddling  with  that  of  the  others. 
And  will  not  this  inward  harmony  of  the  mind  show  itself 
outwardly  in  the  performance  of  all  those  acts  which  are 
ordinarily  considered  just,  and  in  the  studied  avoidance  of 
everything  unjust  ? 

Injustice,  on  the  other  hand,  disturbs  and  confounds 
the  functions  of  the  three  principles  ;  and  this  destruc- 
tion of  their  concord  and  harmony  shows  itself  externally 
in  a  variety  of  criminal  acts.  Justice,  then,  is  a  kind  of 
natural  harmony,  and  healthy  habit  of  mind  ;  whih 
justice  is  a  kind  of  unnatural  discord  and  disease. 
if  so,  surely  it  is  superfluous  to  inquire  which 
is  the  more  profitable  to  the  possessor. 

Having  arrived  at  this  point,  Socrates  is  proceeding  to 
describe  the  principal  varieties  of  mental  constituti,    .    ud 
political  organization,  when  he  is  interrupted     i>00K  y 
by   Polemarchus  and   Adeimantus,  who,  with    ^Uma^ 
the  concurrence  of  the  rest  of  the  party,  beg  him  to  ex- 


lisease.     Ai 

ch  of  ti;t   i  \u     I 


Xviii  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 

plain  in  detail  the  community  of  women  and  children, 
to  which  he  had  before  briefly  alluded.  With  great  re- 
luctance he  complies  with  their  request. 

The  women,  then,  according  to  Socrates,  are  to  be 
trained  and  educated  exactly  like  the  men.  For  the 
woman  is  just  as  capable  of  music  and  gymnastic  as  the 
man ;  and,  like  him,  she  displays  marked  ability  for  a 
variety  of  pursuits — the  only  difference  being  one  of  de- 
gree, not  of  kind,  caused  by  the  fact  that  the  woman  is 
weaker  than  the  man.  Those  women  who  give  evidence 
of  a  turn  for  philosophy  or  war,  are  to  be  associated  with 
the  Guardians  or  Auxiliaries,  are  to  share  their  duties,  and 
become  their  wives.  The  connections,  thus  formed,  are  to 
be  placed  entirely  under  the  control  of  the  magistrates, 
and  sanctified  by  religious  solemnities;  and  the  children 
aVe  ,te  be  separated  from  their  parents,  and  brought  upin 
astate-establishment.  In  this  way,  and  only  in  this  way, 
iiTit  possible  for  the  (juardians  and  Auxiliaries  to  lose  all 
sense  of  private  property,  and  thus  become  conscious  of  a 
perfect  unity  of  interest,  which  will  preserve  an  unbroken 
harmony  between  these  two  bodies  themselves,  and  be- 
tween the  individual  members  of  them. 

Socrates  then  proceeds  to  lay  down  rules  for  the 
early  initiation  of  the  children  into  the  art  of  war  ; 
for  the  treatment  of  the  cowards  and  of  the  brave ; 
for  the  plundering  of  the  dead,  and  the  erection  of 
trophies. 

Hereupon  Adeimantus,  while  admitting  that  such  a 
community  of  women  and  children  is  in  many  ways  highly 
desirable,  calls  upon  Socrates  to  show  whether,  and  how 
far,  such  a  state  of  things  is  practicable. 

To  this  Socrates  replies  by  reminding  Adeimantus,  that 
his  object  throughout  has  been  to  sketch  a  perfect  common- 
wealth, in  the  full  expectation  of  discovering  thereby  the 
nature  of  justice.  The  possibility  of  realizing  such  a 
commonwealth  in  actual  practice  is  quite  a  secondary 
consideration  which  does  not  in  the  least  affect  the 
soundness  of  the  method,  or  the  truth  of  the  results.     All 

mat  can  fairly  be  demanded  of  him  is,  to  show  how  the 

^  ■-■  ■  ■   ■       ■     ■  —  


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  xix 

imperfect  polities,  at  present  existing,   may  be  brought, 

"Just  been  described. 

To  bring  about  this  great  result,  one  fundamental 
cjiange  is  necessary,  and  only  one.  The  highest  political 
power  must,  by  some  means  or  other,  be  vested  in  philos- 
ophers.  To  obviate  the  opposition  which  this  paradox  is 
likely  to  encounter,  let  us  inquire  into  the  nature  of  the 
true  philosopher. 

In  the  first  place,  the  true  philosopher  is  devotedly  fond 
of  wisdom  in  all  its  branches.  And  here  we  must  care- 
f ully  distinguish  between  the  genuine  and  the  counterfeit 
lover  of  wisdom.  The  point  of  the  distinction  lies  in  this, 
that  the  latter  contents  himself,  for  example,  with  the 
study  of  the  variety  of  beautiful  objects  with  which  we 
are  surrounded,  whereas  the  former  is  never  satisfied  till 
he  has  penetrated  to  the  essence  of  Beauty  in  itself.  The 
intellectual  state  of  the  former  may  be  described  as 
opinion,  that  of  the  latter  as  real  knowledge,  or  science. 
For  we  have  two  extremes,  (1)  real  existence,  apprehended 
by  science,  and  (2)  the  negation  of  existence,  or  nonexist- 
ence, which  is  to  the  negation  of  knowledge,  or  ignorance, 
what  real  existence  is  to  science.  Intermediate  between 
real  existence  and  nonexistence  stands  phenomenal  exist- 
ence ;  and  intermediate  between  science  and  ignorance 
stands  opinion.  Hence  we  conclude  that  opinion  ftikftf! 
cognizance  of  phenomenal  existence.  Those  who  study 
^•eavexistence  must  be  called  lovers  of  wisdom,  or  philoso- 
phers ;  .those  who  study  phenomenal  existence  must  be 
called  lovers  of  opinion,  not  philosophers. 

Thus  we  have  learned  to  distinguish  between  1 

genuine  and  counterfeit  philosophers;  and,  -Book  VI. 
obviously,  the  former,  if  any  are  to  be  made  the  Guardians 
of  a  state.  Now  let  us  enumerate  the  characteristics  of 
the  true  philosophic  disposition.  They  are,  (1)  an  eager 
desire  for  the  knowledge  ofjilT real  existence  ;  (2)  hatred 
of  falsehood,  and  derbliecL  love  of  truth  ;  (3)  contempt 
for  the  pleasures''oT*the-Jbody  ;  (4)  indifference  to  money  ; 
(5)  high-mindedness  and  liberality  ;  (6)  justice  and  gentle- 


XX  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 

ness  ;  (7)  a  quick  apprehension,  and  a  good  memory  ;  (8) 
a  musical,  regular,  and  harmonious  disposition. 

Here  Adeimantus  objects  that,  though  he  cannot  deny 
the  force  of  the  arguments  of  Socrates,  still,  ij^  practice, 
he  finds  that  the  devoted  students  of  philosophy  always' 
become  eccentric  and  useless,  if  not  entirely  depraved. 

That  is  very  true,  replied  Socrates  ;  .but  on  whom  are  we 


+-np1«y  fhn  Vilnmn  nf  oiipVi   q   gfqfft0f  thipgsj      Not  On  phJlpS- 

opn^QmJ;  on  the  rWrarlftrl  condition  of  the  politics  and 
qip  pnlifimnng  nf  thfi  day,  ijjor.  in  the  present" -gtate~gf- 
things,  the  genuine  philosophic  disposition  is  liable  to  be 
corrupted  by  a  variety  of  adverse  influences  :  and  when 
those  who  might  have  proved  genuine  philosophers  have 
been  drawn  away  from  the  pursuit  of  philosophy,  their 
place  is  supplied  by  bands  of  worthless  and  incompetent 
students,  who  by  their  sophistry  and  absurdities  bring 
philosophy  into  general  disrepute.  The  few  who  continue 
steadfast  in  their  allegiance  to  philosophy,  resign  politics 
in  disgust,  and  are  well  content  if  they  can  escape  the  cor- 
rupting effect  of  contact  with  the  world. 

How  is  this  evil  to  be  remedied  ? — The  state  itself  must 
regulate  the  study  of  philosophy,  and  must  take  care  that 
the  students  pursue  it  on  right  principles,  and  at  a  right 
age.  And  now,  surely,  we  may  expect  to  be  believed  when 
we  assert  that,  if  a  state  is  to  prosper,  it  must  be  governed 
by  philosophers.  If  such  a  contingency  should  ever  take 
place  (and  why  should  it  not  ?),  our  ideal  state  will  un- 
doubtedly be  realized.  So  that,  upon  the  whole,  we  come 
to  this  conclusion  : — The  constitution  just  described  is  the 
best,  if  it  can  be  realized  ;  and  to  realize  it  is  difficult,  but 
not  impossible. 

The  inference,  then,  is  clear  ;  these  true  philosophers 
are  the  genuine  Guardians  of  the  ideal  state.  And  thus 
Socrates  is  led  to  resume  the  question  of  the  education  of 
the  Guardians.  He  had  before  mentioned  a  number  of  tests 
to  which  they  were  to  be  submitted,  previous  to  their 
being  invested  with  authority  as  magistrates.  He  now 
goes  on  to  say  that  they  must  be  exercised,  besides,  in  a 
variety  of  studies,  ascending  gradually  from  the  lowest  to 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  xxi 

the  highest,  in  order  to  test  still  further  their  intellect! 
and  moral  qualities. 

But,  what  are  these  highest  studies  ? — The  highest  of 
all  is  the  study  of  "  the  Good,"  whose  possession  is  bliudly 
coveTecTDy  all  men,  though  none  can  give  a  clear  account 
of  its  nature.  Is  it  not  obvious,  then,  that  the  Guardians 
of  the  state  must  study  this  Good  ?  For,  without  it,  how 
can  they  perform  the  duties  of  their  station  ? 

What  is  this  Good  ?  asks  Adeimantus.  Socrates  con- 
fesses that  he  cannot  answer  the  question  definitely.  He 
can  only  convey  his  notion  of  it  by  an  analogy.  In  the 
world  of  sense  we  have  the  sun,  the  eye,  visible  objects  : 
answering  to  which,  we  have  in  the  intellectual  world, 
the  Good,  Eeason,  the  Forms  or  archetypes  of  visi- 
objects,  or,  in  the  language  of  Socrates,  Ideas.  Or  we 
may  represent  the  same  conception  to  ourselves,  more 
precisely  thus.  There  are  two  worlds, — one  visible,  that 
is,  apprehended  by  the  eye  ;  the  other  intellectual,  that 
is,  apprehended  by  the  pure  intelligence.  Each  world 
comprises  two  subdivisions,  which  proceeding  from  the 
most  uncertain  to  the  most  certainv  are,  (A)  in  the  visi- 
ble world,  (1)  Images,  i.e.  shadows,  reflections,  et«.  ;  (2) 
Objects,  i.e.  all  material  things,  whether  animate  or  in- 
animate :  (B)  in  the  intellectual  world,  (1)  knowledge, 
attained  by  the  aid  of  assumed  premises  on  which  all  the 
conclusions  depend,  and  employing  by  way  of  illustration 
the  second  class  of  (A),  e.g.  Geometry  ;  (2)  knowledge, 
in  the  investigation  of  which  no  material  objects,  but  only 
the  essential  Forms  are  admitted,  and  in  which  hypotheses 
are  used  simply  as  a  means  of  arriving  at  an  absolute 
first  principle,  from  which  unerring  conclusions  may  be 
deduced.  Corresponding  to  these  four  classes,  we  have 
four  mental  states,  which,  again  proceeding  from  the 
most  uncertain,  are  (a)  Conjecture,  (b)  Belief,  (c)  Under- 
standing, (d)  Reason. 

And  now,  Socrates  proceeds,  to  understand     t>ook. 
the  real  import  of  such  an  education  as  we 
have  described,  let  us  figure  to  ourselves  a  number  of 
persons  chained  from  their  birth  in  a  subterranean  cavern, 


Kxil  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 

with  their  backs  to  the  entrance  of  the  cavern,  and  a  fire 
burning  behind  them,  between  which  and  the  prisoners 
runs  a  roadway,  flanked  by  a  wall  high  enough  to  conceal 
the  persons  who  pass  along  the  road,  while  it  allows  the 
shadows  of  things  which  they  carry  upon  their  heads  to 
be  thrown  by  the  fire  upon  the  wall  of  the  cavern  facing 
the  prisoners,  to  whom  these  shadows  will  appear  the 
only  realities.  Now  suppose  that  one  of  them  has  been 
unbound,  and  taken  up  to  the  light  of  day,  and  gradually 
habituated  to  the  objects  around  him,  till  he  has  learned 
really  to  appreciate  them.  Such  a  man  is  to  the  prisoners 
what  the  rightly-educated  ph ilosopherjs  to  thejiiaU_S  Of 
half-educated  men.  Tf  lie  returns  to  the  cavern,  and  re- 
sumes  his  old  seat  and  occupations,  he  will,  at  first,  be  the 
laughing-stock  of  the  place,  just  as  the  philosopher  is  the 
laughing-stock  of  the  multitude.  But  once  rehabituated 
to  the  cavern,  his  knowledge  of  the  objects,  which  throw 
the  shadows,  will  enable  him  to  surpass  the  prisoners  on 
their  own  ground.  In  the  same  way,  the  philosopher, 
when  once  habituated  to  intercourse  with  the  world,  will 
surpass  his  worldly  antagonists  in  the  use  of  their  own 
weapons.     This  we  must  compel  our  Guardians  to  do. 

To  carry  out  the  analogy  still  further,  just  as  the  whole 
body  of  the  released  prisoner  was  turned  round  in  order 
to  bring  his  eye  to  look  in  the  right  direction,  so  the  pur- 
pose of  education  is  to  turn  the  whole  soul  round,  in  order 
that  the  eye  of  the  soul,  or  reason,  may  be  directed  to  the 
right  quarter.  Education  does  not  generate  or  infuse  a 
nejv  principle ;  it  only  guides  and  directs  a  principle 
already  in  existence. 

How  is  this  revolution  of  the  soul  to  be  brought 
about  ? — By  the  agency  of  studies  which  tend  to  draw 
the  mind  from  the  sensuous  to  the  real, — from  the  visible 
to  the  invisible  and  eternal:  and  all  pursuits  which  ex- 
cite the  mind  to  reflect  upon  the  essential  nature  of  things 
will  product  this  result.  The  series  of  studies,  of  which 
this  may  be  predicated,  comprises,  (1)  Arithmetic  ;  (2) 
Plane  Geometry;  (3)  Geometry  of  three  dimensions:  (J) 
Astronomy,  pursued  abstractly  as  a  science  of  Motion  j 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  xxiii 

(5)  the  science  of  Harmonics  ;  (6)  Dialectic,  or  the  science 
of  real  existence. 

Having  finished  the  discussion  of  the  nature  of  right 
education,  Socrates  proceeds  to  lay  down  a  few  general 
rules  for  the  selection  of  the  persons  on  whom  such  an 
education  is  to  be  bestowed,  and  for  the  time  of  life  at 
which  each  branch  of  it  is  to  be  taken  up.  Above  all,  the 
study  of  Dialectic  must  not  be  begun  too  early  ;  other- 
wise it  will  certainly  be  perverted  to  a  bad  use.  And  ' 
here  the  discussion  of  the  perfect  state,  and  of  the  perfect 
man,  terminates. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  eighth  Book  So-  ~  vm 

crates  resumes  the  subject,  which  he  had 
just  commenced  at  the  end  of  the  fourth  Book,  when  he 
was  interrupted  by  Adeimantus  and  Polemarchua,  namely, 
the  principal  varieties  of  mental  constitution  and  political 
organization. 

All  conceivable  polities  may  be  reduced  to  five  great 
classes,  represented  by  aristocracy,  timocracy,  oligarchy, 
democracy,  and  despotism  or  tyranny.  Hence,  there  are 
also  five  great  classes  of  individual  character,  correspond- 
ing to  the  five  kinds  of  commonwealth.  For  (urges  So- 
crates) the  state  is  the  product  of  its  individual  citizens, 
and  therefore  the  character  of  the  former  is  to  be  traced 
in  the  character  of  the  latter. 

The  perfect  state  and  the  perfect  man,  i.  e.  aristocracy 
.  and  the  aristocratical  man,  have  already  been  discussed. 
At  remains  to  trace  the  origin,  and  describe  the  character, 
of  the  four  inferior  men  and  states. 

'Everything  that  has  had  a  beginning  is  liable  to  decay,  j 
Hence,  in  the  course  of  time,  divisions  will  arise  between 
the  three  classes  of  the  perfect  commonwealth,  and  be- 
tween the  members  of  the  classes  themselves.  The  result 
will  probably  be  an  accommodation  between  tEe  faction 
of 'the  two  higher  classes,  on  the  understanding  that  they 
shall  divide  the  .property  of  the  other  citizens,  and  reduce 
the~third'~cTass  to  the  condition  of  slaves  or  serfs.  The 
distinguishing  feature  of  such  a  state  will  be  the  prepond- 
erance of  the  spirit  element,  showu  in  a  warlike,  restless, 


xxiv  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 

and  ambitious  spirit ;  whence  Socrates  calls  it  timooracy 
or  timarchy,  the  government  of  honor. 

Corresponding  to  this  state,  we  have  the  timocratical 
man,  in  whom  the_  spirited  elemunL  and  the  ltrreTET'liormr 
are   also  predominant,    and  whom  we  may   represent  4,0 


ourselves  as   the  son  of  the  aristocratical  m 
seduced,  by  evil  influences,  from  the  purs 


example. 

"The  love  of  wealth,  which  entered 
grows  till  it  transforms  timocracy  into  oligarcl 
t^essence  of  which  consists  in  making  political  power  de- 
pend upon  a  property  qualification.  This  is  its  grand 
vice  ;  and  one  consequence  of  it  is  that,  in  such  a  com- 
monwealth, the  extremes  of  wealth  and  poverty  are  found 
side  by  side.  The  city  is  divided  into  two  sections,  the 
rich  and  the  poor,  who  hate  and  plot  against  one  an- 
other. 

Similarly,  we  may  represent  the  oligarchical  man  to 
ourselves  as  the  son  of  a  timocratical  man,  whose  career 
of  ambition  has  been  suddenly  cut  short,  and  whose 
son  has  consequently  been  deterred  from  the  pursuit  of 
honor,  and  become  devoted  to  the  pursuit  of  gain.  Like 
the  oligarchical  state,  he  is  a  prey  to  inward  divisions, 
though  he  keeps  up  appearances,  for  the  sake  of  improv- 
ing his  prospects  of  success  in  the  acquisition  of 
wealth. 

The  extravagant  love  of  riches,  which  pervades  the 
governing  body  in  an  oligarchy,  gradually  produces  a 
dangerous  class  of  poverty-stricken  men,  who  at  length 
appeal  to  arms,  expel  the  rich,  and  establish  an  equality 
of  civic  rights.  This  is  democracy.  Liberty,  degener- 
ating into  licence,  is  the  chief  feature  of  such  a  state. 

In  the  same  way,  the  democratical  man  is  one  in  whom 
the  licentious  and  extravagant  desires  have  expelled  the 
moderate  appetites  and  the  love  of  decorum,  which  he 
inherited  from  his  oligarchical  father.  Such  a  man  lives 
a  life  of  enjoyment  from  day  to  day,  guided  by  no  regula- 
ting principle,  but  turning  from  one  pleasure  to  another, 
just  as  the  fancy  takes  him.     All  pleasures  are  in  his  eyes 


«/tl 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  C     xxv 

equally  good,   and  equally  deserving  of  cultivation.     In 
short,  his  motto  is,  "  Liberty  and  Equality." 

The  extravagant  love  of  liberty,  which  marks  demo- 
cracy, prepares  the  way,  by  a  natural  reaction,  for  tyranny. 
The  future  tyrant  is,  at  first,  the  select  champion  of  the 
commonalty  in  the  contest  with  the  oligarchical  faction. 
Gradually  he  becomes  more  and  more  powerful,  and,  if 
he  is  banished,  soon  returns  with  an  accession  of  influ- 
ence :  next,  he  obtains  a  body-guard  under  specious  pre- 
tenses, and,  finally,  turns  out  a  consummate  tyrant. 

Lastly,    we   come  to  the  tyrannical  man.     t>  r-v- 

He  is  the  true  child  of  the  democratical 
man — one  in  whom  a  rn'n  Jn  nh^nrbinr  panfiinn  bar.  £r,nd 
ually  become  predominant,  which  takes  under  its  pro- 
tection' airrhe^Tower*appetites  and  desires,  and  ministers 
to  their  gratification.  He  is  full  of  all  kinds  of  cravings, 
which  he  is  ready  to  satisfy  at  the  expense  of  the  violation 
of  every  natural  tie.  Faithless,  unjust,  unholy,  this 
tyrannical  man  is  the  destined  tyrant  of  the  tyrannical 
state. 

Now,  as  state  is  to  state  in  point  of  happiness  or  mis- 
eiy,  so  is  man  to  man.     The  aristocrati_cal&ta4e~i»i 
ly   the   most   virtuous  and  the  happiest ;  the   tyrannical 
state   is  confessedly    the  most  wicked    and    miserable. 
Therefore  the  aristocratical  man  is  the  most  yirtuons  a,nd 
Ijappy ;  the    tyrannical    despot,   the    most  wickjecj  ancj 
wretched. 
^Ayain  ;  the  soul  of  man  contains,  as  we  have  found, 
^three  specific  principles,  the  rational  or  wisdom-loving, 
the  spirited  or  honor-loving,  and  the  appetitiyejpr^gain- 
loving.     There   are   likewise    three   species   of   pleasure,. 
^corresponding  to  these  three  principles.     Now  the  phi- 
Tftsopher  extols  wisdom  as  the  source  of  greatest  pleasure ; 
t^^a£lkl^i1^.,..-gl^-Ilj. --honor  j  the  lover  of  gain,  wealth, 
yfiich  of  the  three  is  right?    Which   of  the  three  can 
judge  most  correctly  ?    Obviously  the  philosopher  ;   be- 
cause not  only  is  he  alone  acquainted  practically  with  all 
the  three  classes  of  pleasure,  but  also  the  organ,  employed 
in  passing   judgment,  is  eminently  his.     Therefore  we 


XXVi  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 

conclude  that  the  pleasures  of  wisdom  occupy  the  first 
rank  ;  of  honor,  the  second  ;  of  riches,  the  third,  there- 
fore,  once  again  we  find  that  wisdom,  virtue,  and  happi- 
ness, are  inseparable. 

Again  :  who  can  tell  what  pleasure  really  is,  or  know  it 
in  its  essence,  except  the  philosopher,  who  alone  is  con- 
versant with  realities  ?  Hence  we  are  justified  in  assert- 
ing that  true  pleasure  can  only  be  then  attained,  when  the 
soul  is  attuned  to  harmony  under  the  governance  of  the 
wisdom-loving  or  rational  principle.  Hence  the  more 
reasonable  is  a  desire,  the  more  pleasurable  is  its  gratifica- 
tion. That  which  is  most  orderly  and  lawful,  is  also  most 
reasonable.  Now,  the  desires  of  the  aristocratical  man 
are  the  most  orderly  and  lawful ;  and  therefore  their  grati- 
fication is  attended  with  the  most  real  pleasure.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  desires  of  the  tyrannical  man  are  most 
remote  from  law  and  order  ;  and  therefore  their  gratifica- 
tion is  attended  with  a  very  inferior  amount  of  pleasure. 
Hence,  we  find  again  that  the  aristocratical  man  is  hap- 
pier than  the  tyrannical. 

And  now  we  are  in  a  position  to  criticize  the  doctrine 
advanced  by  Thrasymachus,  that  it  is  for  a  man's  advan- 
tage to  be  thoroughly  unjust,  so  long  as  he  can  evade  the 
penalties  of  his  crimes  by  keeping  up  the  appearance  of 
justice.  We  may  figure  to  ourselves  the  human  soul  under 
the  picture  of  a  man,  a  lion,  and  a  many-headed  serpen- 
tine monster,  combined  together  under  a  human  form. 
This  done,  we  may  say  to  the  man  who  declares  that  it  is 
expedient  to  commit  injustice,  that,  in  effect,  he  main- 
tains that  it  is  expedient  to  starve  and  enfeeble  the  man, 
and  to  feast  and  strengthen  the  lion  and  the  serpent.  But 
this  is,  unquestionably,  a  monstrous  hypothesis.  So  that,*' 
all  things  considered,  we  conclude  that  it  is  best  for  every- 
body to  be  governed  by  a  just  and  divine  principle,  which 
ought,  if  possible,  to  reside  in  a  man's  own  soul ;  but  if 
not,  it  must  be  imposed  from  without,  in  order  that  har- 
mony may  prevail  in  our  social  relations,  from  the  fact  of 
our  acknowledging  universally  the  authority  of  one  master. 
To  maintain  this  inward  and  outward  harmony  will  be  the 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC.  xxvii 

single  object  of  the  just  man,  who  will  model  himself  on 
the  pattern  of  this  perfect  commonwealth,  which  doubt- 
less exists  in  heaven,  if  not  upon  earth. 

In    the    tenth  Book,  Socrates  resumes   the    B  0    v 
subject  of  poetry,    and   imitation    generally. 
What,  he  inquires,  is  imitative  art  ? 

Take,  by  way  of  example,  a  bed  or  a  table.  We  have, 
(1)  the  Form  or  archetype  of  a  bed,  created  by  God,  (2) 
the  bed  itself,  made  by  the  manufacturer,  (3)  the  bed  as 
represented  by  the  painter,  which  is  a  copy  of  the  second, 
which,  again,  is  a  copy  of  the  first. 

In  the  same  way,  the  poet  imitates,  not  the  Forms, 
which  are  the  only  realities,  but  simply  the  phenomena  of 
daily  life,  and  the  opinions  prevalent  among  the  half- 
educated. 

Or,  again,  look  at  it  thus.  Every  manufactured  article, 
e.  g.  a  bridle,  gives  occasion  to  three  separate  arts ;  of 
which,  one  teaches  how  to  use  the  thing,  another  how  to 
make  it,  the  third  how  to  imitate  it.  The  user  alone  pos- 
sesses a  scientific  acquaintance  with  the  thing,  and  in- 
structs the  maker  how  to  make  it ;  the  latter,  therefore, 
possesses  correct  opinion.  On  the  other  hand,  the  imita- 
tor cannot  be  said  to  possess  either  science  or  correct 
opinion,  but  only  vague  notions,  about  the  things  which 
he  imitates.  ** 

Again  :  to  what  part  of  the  mind  does  imitative  art  ad- 
dress itself  ?  Certainly  not  to  the  rational  element,  which 
is  the  noblest  part  of  our  nature ;  but  to  some  inferior 
element,  which  he  is  always  ready  to  give  way  under  the 
pressure  of  calamity,  and  is  full  of  change  and  perturba- 
tion, and  which  therefore  offers,  in  return,  the  widest 
field  for  imitation.  For  a  tranquil  and  sober  temper  pre- 
sents small  attraction  to  the  imitative  poet,  and  will  not 
repay  the  trouble  of  imitation,  or  be  appreciated  by  those 
to  whom  the  poet  is  wont  to  address  himself. 

But,  worst  of  all,  Poetry  weakens  the  mind  by  leading 
ns*to "sympathize  too  deeply  with  the  afflictions  of  others, 
and  thus  rendering  us  unfit  to  bear  up  under  our  own 
troubles^  Therefore  we  are  compelled,  much  against  our 


XXviii  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC. 

will,  to  lay  down  the  rule,  that  only  hymns  in 
the  gods,  and  eulogies  of  great  men  and  noble  actions,  are 
to^fye  admitted  into  the  perfect  state.  For  it  is  no  easy 
task  to  become  a  good  man,  and  everything  which  opposes 
our  progress  in  virtue  must  be  scrupulously  avoided. 

This  subject  concluded,  Socrates  proceeds  to  discuss 
the  rewards  of  virtue,  which  are  infinitely  enhanced  by 
the  consideration  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  of  which 
he  here  subjoins  a  short  proof. 

To  everything  there  is  a  special  vice  of  infirmity 
attached,  by  which,  and  which  alone,  that  thing  can  be 
destroyed.  Thus,  blindness  destroys  the  eyesight,  mildew 
destroys  corn,  and  rot  destroys  timber.  .  The  peculiar  in- 
firmities, attached  to  the  soul,  are  injustice,  intemperance, 
cowardice,  ignorance.  Can  these  bring  about  the  dissolu- 
trbn  of  the  soul  ?  S"o,  certainly  not :  for  they  cannot 
destroy  the  soul  immediately,  as  a  disease  destroys  the 
body  ;  though  they  may  be,  mediately,  the  cause  of  a 
man's  being  put  to  death  by  other  people  ;  which  is  quite 
a  different  thing.  But  if  wickedness  cannot  destroy  the 
soul,  nothing  else  can  :  therefore  the  soul  is  immortal. 

And  now,  having  satisfied  ourselves  that  justice  is,  in 
itself,  the  just  man's  best  reward,  we  may  fairly  take  into 
account  the  honors  and  emoluments  which  gods  and  men 
bestow  upon  him.  For  we  cannot  doubt  that  he  is  loved 
by  the  gods,  and  that  all  the  dispensations  of  Providence 
are  designed  for  his  good,  even  when  they  seem  most  ad- 
verse. And  even  men  are  sure  to  love  and  honor  him, 
towards  the  close  of  his  life,  if  not  before.  Still,  all  these 
rewards  are  as  nothing  when  compared  with  those  which 
after  death  await  the  just.  To  illustrate  this,  Socrates 
narrates  the  fable  of  Er  the  son  of  Armenius ;  and  with 
this  story  the  Republic  closes. 


THE  KEPUBLIC  OF  PLATO. 


BOOK  I. 


I  went  down  yesterday  to  the  Piraeus  with  Glaucon  the 
ion  of  Ariston,  to  offer  up  prayer  to  the  goddess,  and  also 
from  a  wish  to  see  how  the  festival,*  then  to  be  held  for 
the  first  time,  would  be  celebrated.  I  was  very  much 
pleased  with  the  native  Athenian  procession;  though  that 
of  the  Thracians  appeared  to  be  no  less  brilliant.  We  had 
finished  our  prayers,  and  satisfied  our  curiosity,  and  were' 
returning  to  the  city,  when  Polemarchus  the  son  of  Ce- 
phalus  caught  sight  of  us  at  a  distance,  as  we  were  on 
our  way  towards  home,  and  told  his  servant  to  run  and 
bid  us  wait  for  him.  The  servant  came  behind  me,  took 
hold  of  my  cloak,  and  said,  "  Polemarchus  bids  you  wait." 
I  turned  round  *nd  asked  him  where  his  master  was. 
"There  he  is,"  he  replied,  "coming  on  behind:  pray  wait 
for  him."  "  We  will  wait,"  answered  Glaucon.  Soon  after- 
wards Polemarchus  came  up,  with  Adeimantus  the  brother 
of  Glaucon,  and  Mceratus  the  son  of  Nicias,  and  a  few 
other  persons,  apparently  coming  away  from  the  proces- 
sion. 

Polemarchus  instantly   began:  Socrates,   if   I   am  not 
deceived,  you  are  taking  your  departure  for  the  city. 

You  are  not  wrong  in  your  conjecture,  I  replied. 

Well,  do  you  see  what  a  large  body  we  are  ? 

Certainly  I  do. 

Then   either  prove  yourselves  the   stronger  party,   or 
else  stay  where  you  are. 

*  This  festival,  as  we  learr  from  a  remark  of  Thrasymachus 
(marginal  page  354),  was  in  honour  of  Bendis,  a  Thracian  god- 
dess, generally  identified  with  Artemis. 


2  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  L 

No,  I  replied;  there  is  still  an  alternative:  suppose  we 
persuade  you  that  you  ought  to  let  us  go. 

Could  you  possibly  persuade  us,  if  we  refused  to  listen? 

Certainly  not,  replied  Glaucon. 

Make  up  your  minds  then  that  we  shall  refuse  to  listen. 

Here  Adeimantus  interposed,  and  said,  Are  you  not 
aware  that  towards  evening  there  will  be  a  torch-race  on 
horseback  in  honour  of  the  goddess? 

On  horseback !  I  exclaimed :  that  is  a  novelty.  Will 
they  carry  torches,  and  pass  them  on  to  one  another, 
while  the  horses  are  racing?  or  how  do  you  mean? 

As  you  say,  replied  Polemarchus:  besides,  there  will 
be  a  night-festival,  which  it  will  be  worth  while  to  look  at. 
We  will  rise  after  dinner,  and  go  out  to  see  this  festival; 
and  there  we  shall  meet  with  many  of  our  young  men, 
with  whom  we  can  converse.  Therefore  stay,  and  do  not 
refuse  us. 

Upon  this  Glaucon  said,  It  seems  we  shall  have  to  stay. 

Well,  said  I,  if  you  like,  let  us  do  so. 

We  went  therefore  home  with  Polemarchus,  and  found 
there  his  brothers  Lysias  and  Euthydemus,  and,  along 
with  them,  Thrasymachus  of  Chalcedon,  and  Charman- 
tides  the  Paeanian,  and  Cleitophon  the  son  of  Aristonymus. 
Polemarchus's  father,  Cephalus,  was  also  in  the  house.  I 
thought  him  looking  very  much  aged;  for  it  was  long 
since  I  had  seen  him.  He  was  sitting  upon  a  cushioned 
chair,  with  a  garland  upon  his  head,  as  he  happened  to 
have  been  sacrificing  in  the  court.  We  found  seats  placed 
round  him ;  so  we  sat  down  there  by  his  side.  The  moment 
Cephalus  saw  me,  he  greeted  me,  and  said,  It  is  seldom 
indeed,  Socrates,  that  you  pay  us  a  visit  at  the  Piraeus: 
you  ought  to  come  oftener.  If  I  were  still  strong  enough 
to  walk  with  ease  to  the  city,  there  would  be  no  occasion 
for  your  coming  here,  because  we  should  go  to  you.  But 
as  it  is,  you  ought  to  come  here  more  frequently.  For  I 
assure  you  that  I  find  the  decay  of  the  mere  bodily  pleas- 
ures accompanied  by  a  proportionate  growth  in  my  ap- 
petite for  philosophical  conversation  and  in  the  pleasure 


[Book  I.  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  3 

I  derive  from  it.  Therefore  do  not  refuse  my  request, 
but  let  these  young  men  have  the  benefit  of  your  society, 
and  come  often  to  see  us  as  thoroughly  intimate  friends. 

To  tell  you  the  truth,  Cephalus,  I  replied,  I  delight  in 
conversing  with  very  old  persons.  For  as  they  have  gone 
before  us  on  the  road  over  which  perhaps  we  also  shall 
have  to  travel,  I  think  we  ought  to  try  to  learn  from  them 
what  the  nature  of  that  road  is, — whether  it  be  rough 
and  difficult,  or  smooth  and  easy.  And  now  that  you 
have  arrived  at  that  period  of  life,  which  poets  call  "the 
threshold  of  Age,"  there  is  no  one  whose  opinion  I  would 
more  gladly  ask.  Is  life  painful  at  that  age,  or  what 
report  do  you  make  of  it  ? 

I  will  certainly  tell  you,  Socrates,  what  my  own  experi- 
ence of  it  is.  I  and  a  few  other  people  of  my  own  age 
are  in  the  habit  of  frequently  meeting  together,  true  to 
the  old  proverb.  On  these  occasions,  most  of  us  give 
way  to  lamentations,  and  regret  the  pleasures  of  youth, 
and  call  up  the  memory  of  amours  and  drinking  parties 
and  banquets  and  similar  proceedings.  They  are  griev- 
ously discontented  at  the  loss  of  what  they  consider  great 
privileges,  and  describe  themselves  as  living  well  in  those 
days,  whereas  now,  by  their  own  account,  they  cannot  be 
said  to  live  at  all.  Some  also  complain  of  the  manner 
in  which  their  relations  insult  their  infirmities,  and  make 
this  a  ground  for  reproaching  old  age  with  the  many 
miseries  it  occasions  them.  But  in  my  opinion,  Socrates, 
these  persons  miss  the  true  cause  of  their  unhappiness. 
For  if  old  age  were  the  cause,  the  same  discomforts  would 
have  been  also  felt  by  me,  as  an  old  man,  and  by  every 
other  person  that  has  reached  that  period  of  life.  But,  as 
it  is,  I  have  before  now  met  with  several  old  men  who 
expressed  themselves  quite  in  a  different  manner;  and  in 
particular  I  may  mention  Sophocles  the  poet,  who  was 
once  asked  in  my  presence,  "  How  do  you  feel  about  love, 
Sophocles?  are  you  still  capable  of  it?"  to  which  he  re- 
plied, "  Hush !  if  you  please :  to  my  great  delight  I  have 
escaped  from  it,  and  feel  as  if  I  had  escaped  from  a 
frantic  and  savage  master."    I  thought  then,  as  I  do  now; 


4  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  t 

that  he  spoke  wisely.  For  unquestionably  old  age  brings 
us  profound  repose  and  freedom  from  this  and  other  pas- 
sions. When  the  appetites  have  abated,  and  their  force 
is  diminished,  the  description  of  Sophocles  is  perfectly 
realized.  It  is  like  being  delivered  from  a  multitude  of 
furious  masters  But  the  complaints  on  this  score,  as 
well  as  the  troubles  with  relatives,  may  all  be  referred  to 
one  cause,  and  that  is,  not  the  age,  Socrates,  but  the 
character,  of  the  men.  If  they  possess  well-regulated 
minds  and  easy  tempers,  old  age  itself  is  no  intolerable 
burden:  if  they  are  differently  constituted,  why  in  that 
case,  Socrates,  they  find  even  youth  as  irksome  to  them 
as  old  age. 

I  admired  these  remarks  of  Cephalus,  and  wishing  him 
to  go  on  talking,  I  endeavoured  to  draw  him  out  by 
saying:  I  fancy,  Cephalus,  that  people  do  not  generally 
acquiesce  in  these  views  of  yours,  because  they  think  that 
it  is  not  your  character,  but  your  great  wealth,  that  en- 
ables you  to  bear  with  old  age.  For  the  rich,  it  is  said, 
have  many  consolations. 

True,  he  said,  they  will  not  believe  me:  and  they  are 
partly  right,  though  not  so  right  as  they  suppose.  There 
is  great  truth  in  the  reply  of  Themistocles  to  the  Seri- 
phian  who  tauntingly  told  him,  that  his  reputation  was 
due  not  to  himself,  but  to  his  country; — "I  should  not 
have  become  famous,  if  I  had  been  a  native  of  Seriphus; 
neither  would  you,  if  you  had  been  an  Athenian."  And 
to  those  who,  not  being  rich,  are  impatient  under  old  age, 
it  may  be  said  with  equal  justice,  that  while  on  the  one 
hand,  a  good  man  cannot  be  altogether  cheerful  under 
old  age  and  poverty  combined,  so  on  the  other,  no  wealth 
can  ever  make  a  bad  man  at  peace  with  himself. 

But  has  your  property,  Cephalus,  been  chiefly  inherited 
or  acquired? 

Have  I  acquired  it,  do  you  say,  Socrates?  Why,  in 
the  conduct  of  money  matters,  I  stand  midway  between 
my  grandfather  and  my  father.  My  grandfather,  whose 
name  I  bear,  inherited  nearly  as  much  property  as  I  now 
possess,  and  increased  it  till  it  was  many  times  as  large; 


Book  1  ]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  5 

while  my  father  Lysanias  brought  it  down  even  below 
what  it  now  is.  For  my  part,  I  shall  be  content  to  leave 
it  to  these  my  sons  not  less,  but  if  anything  rather  larger, 
than  it  was  when  it  came  into  my  hands. 

I  asked  the  question,  I  said,  because  you  seemed  to  me 
to  be  not  very  fond  of  money :  which  is  generally  the  case 
with  those  who  have  not  made  it  themselves;  whereas 
those  who  have  made  it,  are  twice  as  much  attached  to  it 
as  other  people.  For  just  as  poets  love  their  own  works, 
and  fathers  their  own  children,  in  the  same  way  those 
who  have  created  a  fortune  value  their  money,  not  merely 
for  its  uses,  like  other  persons,  but  because  it  is  their 
own  production.  This  makes  them  moreover  disagreeable 
companions,  because  they  will  praise  nothing  but  riches. 

It  is  true,  he  replied. 

Indeed  it  is,  said  I.  But  let  me  ask  you  one  more 
question.  What  do  you  think  is  the  greatest  advantage 
that  you  have  derived  from  being  wealthy? 

If  I  mention  it,  he  replied,  I  shall  perhaps  get  few 
persons  to  agree  with  me.  Be  assured,  Socrates,  that 
when  a  man  is  nearly  persuaded  that  he  is  going  to  die, 
he  feels  alarmed  and  concerned  about  things  which  never 
affected  him  before.  Till  then  he  has  laughed  at  those 
stories  about  the  departed,  which  tell  us  that  he  who  has 
done  wrong  here  must  suffer  for  it  in  the  other  world; 
but  now  his  mind  is  tormented  with  a  fear  that  these 
atones  may  possibly  be  true.  And  either  owing  to  the 
infirmity  of  old  age,  or  because  he  is  now  nearer  to  the 
confines  of  the  future  state,  he  has  a  clearer  insight  into 
those  mysteries.  However  that  may  be,  he  becomes  full 
of  misgiving  and  apprehension,  and  sets  himself  to  the 
task  of  calculating  and  reflecting  whether  he  has  done 
any  wrong  to  any  one.  Hereupon,  if  he  finds  his  life  full 
of  unjust  deeds,  he  is  apt  to  start  out  of  sleep  in  terror, 
as  children  do,  and  he  lives  haunted  by  gloomy  antici- 
pations. But  if  his  conscience  reproaches  him  with  no 
injustice,  he  enjoys  the  abiding  presence  of  sweet  Hope, 
that  "kind  nurse  of  old  age,"  as  Pindar  calls  it.  For 
indeed,   Socrates,  those  are  beautiful  words  of  his,  in 


6  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  I. 

which  he  says  of  the  man  who  has  lived  a  just  and  holy 
life,  "  Sweet  Hope  is  his  companion,  cheering  his  heart, 
the  nurse  of  age, — Hope,  which,  more  than  aught  else, 
steers  the  capricious  will  of  mortal  men.*  There  is  really 
"a  wonderful  truth  in  this  description.  "And  it  is  this 
consideration,  as  I  hold,  that  makes  riches  chiefly  valu- 
able, I  do  not  say  to  every  body,  but  at  any  rate  to  the 
good.  For  they  contribute  greatly  to  our  preservation' 
from  even  unintentional  deceit  or  falsehood,  and  from* 
that  alarm  which  would  attend  our  departure  to  the  other 
world,  if  we  owed  any  sacrifices  to  a  god,  or  any  money 
to  a  man.  They  have  also  many  other  uses.  But  after 
weighing  them  all  separately,  Socrates,  I  am  inclined  to 
consider  this  service  as  anything  but  the  least  important 
which  riches  can  render  to  a  wise  and  sensible  man. 

You  have  spoken  admirably,  Cephalus.  But  what  are 
we  to  understand  by  that  veiy  quality,  justice,  to  which 
you  refer?  Are  we  to  define  it  as  neither  more  nor  less 
than  veracity  and  restitution  of  what  one  man  has  received 
from  another;  or  is  it  possible  for  actions  of  this  very 
nature  to  be  sometimes  just  and  sometimes  unjust?  For 
example,  every  one,  I  suppose,  would  admit,  that,  if  a 
man,  while  in  the  possession  of  his  senses,  were  to  place 
dangerous  weapons  in  the  hands  of  a  friend,  and  after- 
wards in  a  fit  of  madness  to  demand  them  back,  such  a 
deposit  ought  not  to  be  restored,  and  that  his  friend 
would  not  be  a  just  man  if  he  either  returned  the  weapons, 
or  consented  to  tell  the  whole  truth  to  one  so  circumstanced. 

You  are  right,  he  replied. 

Then  it  is  no  true  definition  of  justice  to  say  that  it 
consists  in  speaking  the  truth  and  restoring  what  one  has 
received. 

Nay  but  it  is,  Socrates,  said  Polemarchus,  interposing, 
at  least  if  we  are  at  all  to  believe  Simonides. 

Very  well,  said  Cephalus,  I  will  just  leave  the  discus- 
sion to  you.  It  is  time  for  me  to  attend  to  the  sacri- 
fices. 

*  A  fragment  from  a  lost  work  of  Pindar 


[Book  I.  lHE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  7 

Then  Polemrachus  inherits  your  share  in  it,  does  he 
not?  I  asked. 

Certainly,  he  replied,  with  a  smile;  and  immediately 
withdrew  to  the  sacrifices. 

Answer  me  then,  I  proceeded,  you  that  are  the  heir  to 
the  discussion; — What  do  you  maintain  to  be  the  correct 
account  of  justice,  as  given  by  Simonides? 

That  to  restore  to  each  man  what  is  his  due,  is  just. 
To  me  it  seems  that  Simonides  is  right  in  giving  this 
account  of  the  matter. 

Well,  certainly  it  is  not  an  easy  matter  to  disbelieve 
Simonides ;  for  he  is  a  wise  and  inspired  man.  But  what 
he  means  by  his  words,  you,  Polemarchus,  may  perhaps* 
understand,  though  I  do  not.  It  is  clear  that  he  does  noi 
mean  what  we  were  saying  just  now,  namely,  that  prop- 
erty given  by  one  person  in  trust  to  another,  is  to  be 
returned  to  the  donor,  if  he  asks  for  it  in  a  state  of 
insanity.  And  yet  I  conclude  that  property  given  in  trusty 
is  due  to  the  truster.    Is  it  not? 

Yes,  it  is. 

But,  when  the  person  who  asks  for  it  is  not  in  his  senses, 
it  must  not  be  returned  on  any  account,  must  it  ? 

True,  it  must  not. 

Then  it  would  seem  that  Simonides  means  something 
different  from  this,  when  he  says  that  it  is  just  to  restore 
what  is  due. 

Most  certainly  he  does,  he  replied;  for  he  declares  that 
the  debt  of  friend  to  friend  is  to  do  good  to  one  another, 
and  not  harm. 

I  understand:  the  person  who  returns  money  to  a  de- 
positor does  not  restore  what  is  due,  if  the  repayment  on 
the  one  side,  and  the  receipt  on  the  other,  prove  to  be 
injurious,  and  if  the  two  parties  are  friends.  Is  not  this, 
according  to  you,  the  meaning  of  Simonides? 

Certainly  it  is. 

Well:  must  we  restore  to  our  enemies  whatever  happens 
to  be  due  to  them  ? 

Yes,  no  doubt, — what  is  due  to  them:  and  the  debt  of 


8  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  L 

enemy  to  enemy  is,  I  imagine,  harm;  because  harm  is  at 
the  same  time  appropriate  to  such  a  relation. 

So  then  it  would  seem  that  Simonides,  after  the  manner 
of  poets,  employed  a  riddle  to  describe  the  nature  of  jus- 
tice; for  apparently  he  thought  that  justice  consisted  in 
rendering  to  each  man  that  which  is  appropriate  to  him, 
which  he  called  his  due.  But  here  let  me  intreat  you  to 
give  me  your  opinion.  Suppose  that  consequently  some 
one  had  asked  him  the  following  question :  "  That  being 
the  case,  Simonides,  what  due  and  appropriate  thing  is 
rendered  by  the  art  called  medicine,  and  what  are  the 
recipients?"  what  answer  do  you  think  he  would  have 
returned  us  ? 

Obviously  he  would  have  said  that  bodies  are  the  re- 
cipients, and  drugs,  meats,  and  drinks,  the  things  rendered. 

And  what  due  and  appropriate  thing  is  rendered  by  the 
art  called  cookery,  and  what  are  the  recipients? 

Seasoning  is  the  thing  rendered;  dishes  are  the  re- 
cipients. 

Good:  then  what  is  the  thing  rendered  by  the  art  that 
we  are  to  call  justice,  and  who  are  the  recipients? 

If  we  are  to  be  at  all  guided  by  our  previous  states 
ments,  Socrates,  assistance  and  harm  are  the  things 
rendered,  friends  and  enemies  the  recipients. 

Then,  by  justice,  Simonides  means  doing  good  to  our 
friends,  and  harm  to  our  enemies,  does  he? 

I  think  so. 

Now,  in  cases  of  illness,  who  is  best  able  to  do  good  to 
friends  and  harm  to  enemies,  with  reference  to  health  and 
disease  ? 

A  physician. 

And,  on  a  voyage,  who  is  best  able  to  do  good  to  friends 
and  harm  to  enemies,  with  reference  to  the  perils  of  the  sea? 

A  pilot. 

Well:  in  what  transaction,  and  with  reference  to  what 
object,  is  the  just  man  best  able  to  help  his  friends  and 
injure  his  enemies? 

In  the  transactions  of  war,  I  imagine, — as  the  ally  of  the 
former,  and  the  antagonist  of  the  latter. 


[Book  I.  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  9 

Good.  You  will  grant,  my  dear  Polemarchus,  that  a 
physician  is  useless  to  persons  in  sound  health. 

Certainly. 

And  a  pilot  to  persons  on  shore. 

Yes. 

Is  the  just  man,  also,  useless  to  those  who  are  not  at 
war? 

I  do  not  quite  think  that. 

Then  justice  is  useful  in  time  of  peace,  too,  is  it? 

It  is. 

And  so  is  agriculture,  is  it  not? 

Yes. 

That  is  to  say,  as  a  means  of  acquiring  the  fruits  of  the 
earth. 

Yes. 

And  further,  the  shoemaker's  art  is  also  useful,  is  it  not  ? 

Yes. 

As  a  means  of  acquiring  shoes,  I  suppose  you  will  say. 

Certainly. 

Well  then,  of  what  does  justice,  according  to  you,  pro- 
mote the  use  or  acquisition  in  time  of  peace  ? 

Of  covenants,  Socrates. 

And  by  covenants  do  you  understand  co-partnerships; 
or  something  different? 

Co-partnerships,  certainly. 

Then  is  it  the  just  man,  or  the  skilful  draught-player, 
that  makes  a  good  and  useful  partner  in  playing  draughts  ? 

The  draught-player. 

Well;  in  bricklaying  and  stonemasonry  is  the  just  man  a 
more  useful  and  a  better  partner  than  the  regular  builder? 

By  no  means. 

Well  then,  in  what  partnership  is  the  just  man  superior 
to  the  harp-player,  in  the  sense  in  which  the  harp-player 
is  a  better  partner  than  the  just  man  in  playing  music? 

In  a  money-partnership,  I  think. 

Excepting  perhaps,  Polemarchus,  when  the  object  is  to 
lay  out  money;  as  when  a  horse  is  to  be  bought  or  sold 
by  the  partners;  in  which  case,  I  imagine,  the  horse- 
dealer  is  better.    Is  he  not  ? 


10  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  I. 

Apparently  he  is. 

And  again,  when  a  ship  is  to  be  bought  or  sold,  the 
ship-wright  or  pilot  is  better. 

It  would  seem  so. 

That  being  the  case,  when  does  the  opportunity  arrive 
for  that  joint  use  of  silver  or  gold,  in  which  the  just  man 
is  more  useful  than  any  one  else? 

When  you  want  to  place  your  money  in  trust  and  have 
it  safe,  Socrates. 

That  is  to  say,  when  it  is  to  be  laid  by,  and  not  to  be 
put  to  any  use  ? 

Just  so. 

So  that  justice  can  only  be  usefully  applied  to  money 
when  the  money  is  useless? 

It  looks  like  it. 

In  the  same  way,  when  you  want  to  keep  a  pruning- 
hook,  justice  is  useful  whether  you  be  in  partnership  or 
not;  but  when  you  want  to  use  it,  justice  gives  place  to 
the  art  of  the  vinedresser  ? 

Apparently. 

Do  you  also  maintain  that,  when  you  want  to  keep  a 
shield  or  a  lyre  without  using  them,  justice  is  useful;  but 
when  you  want  to  use  them,  you  require  the  art  of  the 

/ldier  or  of  the  musician? 
I  must. 

And  so  of  everything  else:  justice  is  useless  when  a 
thing  is  in  use,  but  useful  when  it  is  out  of  use? 

iSo  it  would  seem. 
Then,  my  friend,  justice  cannot  be  a  very  valuable  thing 
if  it  is  only  useful  as  applied  to  things  useless.  But  let  us 
continue  the  inquiry  thus.  Is  not  the  man  who  is  most 
expert  in  dealing  blows  in  an  encounter,  whether  pugilistic 
or  otherwise,  also  most  expert  in  parrying  blows  ? 
Certainly. 

Is  it  not  also  true  that  whoever  is  expert  in  repelling  * 
a  disease,  and  evading  its  attack,  is  also  extremely  expert 
in  producing  it  in  others? 
I  think  so. 

*  Reading  ^vld^aadai  teal  "kaBeiv  obros,  *.  t.  A. 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  11 

And  undoubtedly  a  man  is  well  able  to  guard  an  army, 
when  he  has  also  a  talent  for  stealing  the  enemy's  plans 
and  all  his  other  operations. 

Certainly. 

That  is  to  say,  a  man  can  guard  expertly  whatever  he 
can  thieve  expertly. 

So  it  would  seem. 

Hence,  if  the  just  man  is  expert  in  guarding  money,  he 
is  also  expert  in  stealing  it.  c^~*\ 

I  confess  the  argument  points  that  way.  \ 

Then,  to  all  appearance,  it  turns  out  that  the  just  man 
is  a  kind  of  thief;  a  doctrine  which  you  have  probably  1 
learnt  from  Homer,  with  whom  Autolycus,  the  maternal  >J 
grandfather  of  Odysseus,  is  a  favourite,  because,  as  the 
poet  says,  he  outdid  all  men  in  thievishness  and  perjury. 
Justice  therefore,  according  to  you,  Homer,  and  Simonides, 
appears  to  be  a  kind  of  art  of  stealing,  whose  object, 
however,  is  to  help  one's  friends  and  injure  one's  enemies. 
Was  not  this  your  meaning?  ^ — 

Most  certainly  it  was  not,  he  replied;  but  I  no  longer 
know  what  I  did  mean.  However,  it  is  still  my  opinion 
that  it  is  justice  to  help  one's  friends,  and  hurt  one's 
enemies. 

Should  you  describe  a  man's  friends  as  those  who  seem 
to  him  to  be,  or  those  who  really  are,  honest  men,  though 
they  may  not  seem  so?  And  do  you  define  a  man's 
enemies  on  the  same  principle? 

I  should  certainly  expect  a  man  to  love  all  whom  he 
thinks  honest,  and  hate  all  whom  he  thinks  wicked. 

But  do  not  people  make  mistakes  in  this  matter,  and 
fancy  many  persons  to  be  honest  who  are  not  really 
honest,  and  many  wicked  who  are  not  really  wicked? 

They  do. 

Then  to  such  persons  the  good  are  enemies,  and  the 
bad  are  friends,  are  they  not  ? 

Certainly  they  are. 

And,  notwithstanding  this,  it  is  just  for  such  persons  at 
such  times  to  help  the  wicked,  and  to  injure  the  good. 

Apparently  it  is. 


12  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  L 

Yet  surely  the  good  are  just,  and  injustice  is  foreign  to 
their  nature. 

True. 

Then,  according  to  your  doctrine,  it  is  just  to  do  evil  to 
those  who  commit  no  injustice. 

Heaven  forbid  it,  Socrates :  for  that  looks  like  a  wicked 
doctrine. 

Then  it  is  just,  said  I,  to  injure  the  unjust  and  to  assisi 
,      .  the  just. 
l^|A*£<  j-     That  is  evidently  a  better  theory  than  the  former. 

'[ttC'l      In  that  case,  Polemarchus,  the  result  will  be  that,  in 

l5  ,    ,  j  those  numerous  instances  in  which  people  have  thoroughly 

^»0     /    mistaken  their  men,  it  is  just  for  these  mistaken  persons 

to  injure  their  friends,  because  in  their  eyes  they  are 

I    wicked;  and  to  help  their  enemies,  because  they  are  good. 

\    And  thus  our  statement  will  be  in  direct  opposition  to  the 

meaning  which  we  assigned  to  Simonides. 

That  consequence  certainly  follows,  he  replied.  But  let 
us  change  our  positions;  for  very  probably  our  definition 
of  friend  and  enemy  was  incorrect. 

What  was  our  definition,  Polemarchus? 

That  a  friend  is  one  who  seems  to  be  an  honest  man. 

And  what  is  to  be  our  new  definition? 

That  a  friend  is  one  who  not  only  seems  to  be,  but 
really  is,  an  honest  man;  whereas  the  man  who  seems  to 
be,  but  is  not  honest,  is  not  really  a  friend,  but  only  seems 
one.    And  I  define  an  enemy  on  the  same  principle. 

Then,  by  this  way  of  speaking,  the  good  man  will,  in  all 
likelihood,  be  a  friend,  and  the  wicked  an  enemy. 

Yes. 

Then  you  would  have  us  attach  to  the  idea  of  justice 
more  than  we  at  first  included  in  it,  when  we  called  it  just 
to  do  good  to  our  friend  and  evil  to  our  enemy.  We  are 
now,  if  I  understand  you,  to  make  an  addition  to  this,  and 
render  it  thus, — It  is  just  to  do  good  to  our  friend  if  he  is 
a  good  man,  and  to  hurt  our  enemy  if  he  is  a  bad  man. 

Precisely  so,  he  replied;  I  think  that  this  would  be  a 
right  statement 


Book  L]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO,  13 

Now  is  it  the  act  of  a  just  man,  I  asked,  to  hurt  any- 
body? 

Certainly  it  is,  he  replied;  that  is  to  say,  it  is  his  duty 
to  hurt  those  who  are  both  wicked,  and  enemies  of  his. 

Are  horses  made  better,  or  worse,  by  being  hurt  ? 

Worse. 

Worse  with  reference  to  the  excellence  of  dogs,  or  that 
of  horses? 

That  of  horses. 

Are  dogs  in  the  same  way  made  worse  by  being  hurt, 
with  reference  to  the  excellence  of  dogs,  and  not  of  horses  ? 

Unquestionably  they  are. 

And  must  we  not,  on  the  same  principle,  assert,  my 
friend,  that  men,  by  being  hurt,  are  lowered  in  the  scale 
of  human  excellence? 

Indeed  we  must. 

But  is  not  justice  a  human  excellence? 

Undoubtedly  it  is. 

And  therefore,  my  friend,  those  men  who  are  hurt  must 
needs  be  rendered  less  just. 

So  it  would  seem. 

Can  musicians,  by  the  art  of  music,  make  men  un»» 
musical  ? 

They  cannot. 

Can  riding-masters,  by  the  art  of  riding,  make  men  bad 
riders  ? 

No. 

But  if  so,  can  the  just  by  justice  make  men  unjust  ?  In 
short,  can  the  good  by  goodness  make  men  bad? 

No,  it  is  impossible. 

True;  for,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  it  is  the  property,  not 
of  warmth,  but  of  its  opposite,  to  make  things  cold. 

Yes. 

And  it  is  the  property  not  of  drought,  but  of  its  opposite, 
to  make  things  wet. 

Certainly. 

Then  it  is  the  property  not  of  good,  but  of  its  opposite, 
to  hurt. 

Apparently  it  is. 


N 


/' 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  L 


4   '  Well,  is  the  just  man  good  ? 

y  (I  0*   j      Certainly  he  is. 

Then,  Polemarchus,  it  is  the  property,  not  of  the  just 
j  man,  but  of  his  opposite,  the  unjust  man,  to  hurt  either 
I  friend  or  any  other  creature. 
L^  You  seem  to  me  to  be  perfectly  right,  Socrates. 

Hence  if  any  one  asserts  that  it  is  just  to  render  to  every 

man  his  due,  and  if  he  understands  by  this,  that  what  is 

due  on  the  part  of  the  just  man  is  injury  to  his  enemies, 

and  assistance  to  his  friends,  the  assertion  is  that  of  an 

unwise  man.    For  the  doctrine  is  untrue;  because  we  have 

_  discoyered  that,  in  TiofngtaTine,  js  it  just  to  injure  any  body. 

I  graiS  you  are  rlgnt  "*"      ■      "~ 

Then  you  and  I  will  make  common  cause  against  any 

one  who  shall  attribute  this  doctrine  to  Simonides,  or  Bias, 

or  Pittacus,  or  any  other  wise  and  highly-favoured  man. 

Very  good,  said  he;  I,  for  one,  am  quite  ready  to  take 

my  share  of  the  fighting. 

Pray  do  you  know  to  whom  I  refer  the  authorship  of 
this  saying,  that  it  is  just  to  help  our  friends,  and  hurt  eur 
enemies  ? 
To  whom? 

I  attribute  it  to  Periander,  or  Perdiccas,  or  Xerxes,  or 
Ismenias  the  Theban,  or  some  other  rich  man  who  thought 
himself  very  powerful. 
You  are  perfectly  right. 

Well,  but  as  we  have  again  failed  to  discover  the  true 
definition  of  justice  and  the  just,*  what  other  definition 
can  one  propose? 


While  we  were  still  in  the  middle  of  our  discussion, 
Thrasymachus  was,  more  than  once,  bent  on  interrupting 
,'the  conversation  with  objections;  but  he  was  checked  on 
each  occasion  by  those  who  sat  by,  who  wished  to  hear 
the  argument  out.  However,  when  I  had  made  this  last 
remark  and  we  had  come  to  a  pause,  he  could  restrain  him- 
self no  longer,  but,  gathering  himself  up  like  a  wild  beast, 
he  sprang  upon  us,  as  if  he  would  tear  us  in  pieces.    I  and 

*  %  Stuaioovvy  and  rb  Skaiov,  justice  in  the  abstract,  and  justice  in 
the  concrete  ;  or,  justice  as  a  quality,  and  justice  as  a  relation. 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  15 

Polemarchus  were  terrified  and  startled;  while  Thrasy- 
machus,  raising  his  voice  to  the  company,  said,  What 
nonsense  has  possessed  you  and  Polemarchus  all  this 
time,  Socrates?  And  why  do  you  play  the  fool  together 
with  your  mutual  complaisance?  No;  if  you  really  wish 
to  understand  what  justice  is,  do  not  confine  yourself  to 
asking  questions,  and  making  a  display  of  refuting  the 
answers  that  are  returned,  (for  you  are  aware  that  it  is 
easier  to  ask  questions  than  to  answer  them) ;  but  give  us 
an  answer  also  yourself,  and  tell  us  what  you  assert  justice 
to  be,  and  let  me  beg  you  to  beware  of  defining  it  as  the 
obligatory,  or  the  advantageous,  or  the^roirtablej.  or  the 
lucrative,  or  the  expedientjbut  whatever  your  definition 
iTiay  be,  let  it  be  clear  and  precise:  for  I  will  not  accept 
your  answer,  if  you  talk  such  trash  as  that. 

When  I  heard  this  speech,  I  was  astounded,  and  gazed 
at  the  speaker  in  terror;  and  I  think  if  I  had  not  set  eyes 
on  him  before  he  eyed  me,  I  should  have  been  struck 
dumb.*  But,  as  it  was,  when  he  began  to  be  exasperated 
by  the  conversation,  I  had  looked  him  in  the  face  first: 
so  that  I  was  enabled  to  reply  to  him,  and  said  with  a 
slight  tremble;  Thrasymachus,  do  not  be  hard  upon  us. 
If  I  and  Polemarchus  are  making  mistakes  in  our  ex- 
amination of  the  subject,  be  assured  that  the  error  is  in- 
voluntary. You  do  not  suppose  that,  if  we  were  looking 
for  a  piece  of  gold,  we  should  ever  willingly  be  so  com- 
plaisant to  one  another  in  the  search  as  to  spoil  the 
chance  of  finding  it;  and  therefore,  pray  do  not  suppose 
that,  in  seeking  for  justice,  which  is  a  thing  more  precious 
than  many  pieces  of  gold,  we  should  give  way  to  one 
another  so  weakly  as  you  describe,  instead  of  doing  our 
very  best  to  bring  it  to  light.  You,  my  friend,  may  think 
so,  if  you  choose:  but  my  belief  is  that  the  subject  is 
beyond  our  powers.  Surely  then  we  might  very  reason- 
ably expect  to  be  pitied,  not  harshly  treated,  by  such 
clever  men  as  you. 

*  Socrates  alludes  to  a  popular  belief,  that  any  one  meeting  a 
wolf  would  be  deprived  of  speech,  i_  the  wolf  happened  to  see 
him  before  he  saw  the  wolf.  Virgil  refers  to  this  superstition  iv 
a  well-known  passage,  Eclog.  ix.  53. 


16  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  I. 

When  he  had  heard  my  reply,  he  burst  out  laughing 
very  scornfully,  and  said : — 0  Hercules !  here  is  an  instance 
of  that  mock-humility  which  Socrates  affects.  I  knew 
how  it  would  be,  and  warned  the  company  that  you  would 
refuse  to  answer,  and  would  feign  ignorance,  and  do  any- 
thing rather  than  reply,  if  any  one  asked  you  a  question. 

Yes,  you  are  a  wise  man,  Thrasymachus,  I  replied;  and 
therefore  you  were  well  aware  that,  if  you  asked  a  person 
what  factors  make  the  number  12,  and  at  the  same  time 
warned  him  thus :  "  Please  to  beware  of  telling  me  that  12 
is  twice  6,  or  3  times  4,  or  6  times  2,  or  4  times  3 ;  for  I 
will  not  take  such  nonsense  from  you ; " — you  were  well 
aware,  I  dare  say,  that  no  one  would  give  an  answer  to 
such  an  inquirer.  But  suppose  the  person  replied  to  you 
thus : — "  Thrasymachus,  explain  yourself :  am  I  to  be  pre- 
cluded from  all  these  answers  which  you  have  denounced? 
What,  my  good  sir !  even  if  one  of  these  is  the  real  answer, 
am  I  still  to  be  precluded  from  giving  it,  and  am  I  to 
make  a  statement  that  is  at  variance  with  the  truth?  or 
what  is  your  meaning  ?  "  What  reply  should  you  make  to 
this  inquiry? 

Oh,  indeed!  he  exclaimed;  as  if  the  two  cases  were 
alike ! 

There  is  nothing  to  prevent  their  being  so,  I  replied. 
However,  suppose  they  are  not  alike;  still  if  one  of  these 
answers  seems  the  right  one  to  the  person  questioned,  do 
you  think  that  our  forbidding  it,  or  not  ,will  affect  his  de- 
termination to  give  the  answer  which  he  believes  to  be  the 
♦correct  one? 

Do  you  not  mean  that  this  is  what  you  are  going  to  do  ? 
You  will  give  one  of  the  answers  on  which  I  have  put  a 
veto? 

It  would  not  surprise  me  if  I  did;  supposing  I  thought 
right  to  do  so,  after  reflection. 

Then,  what  if  I  produce  another  answer  on  the  subject 
of  justice,  unlike  those  I  denounced,  and  superior  to  them 
all?    What  punishment  do  you  think  you  merit? 

Simply  the  punishment  which  it  is  proper  for  the  unen- 
lightened to  submit  to;  and  that  is,  I  conceive,  to  be  in- 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  17 

structed  by  the  enlightened.     This,  then,  is  the  punish- 
ment which  I,  among  others,  deserve  to  suffer. 

Keally  you  are  a  pleasant  person,  he  replied.  But,  be- 
sides being  instructed,  you  must  make  me  a  payment. 

I  will,  when  I  have  any  money,  I  replied. 

But  you  have,  said  Glaucon.  So,  as  far  as  money  is  a 
consideration,  speak  on,  Thrasymachus.  We  will  all  con- 
tribute for  Socrates. 

Oh,  to  be  sure!  said  he;  in  order  that  Socrates,  I  sup- 
pose, may  pursue  his  usual  plan  of  refusing  to  propound 
'an  answer  himself,  while  he  criticizes  and  refutes  the  an- 
swers given  by  other  people. 

My  excellent  friend,  said  I,  how  can  an  answer  be  given 
by  a  person  who,  in  the  first  place,  does  not,  and  confesses 
he  does  not,  know  what  to  answer;  and  who,  in  the  next 
place,  if  he  has  any  thoughts  upon  the  subject,  has  been 
forbidden  by  a  man  of  no  common  parts  to  give  utterance 
to  any  of  his  fancies?  No,  it  is  more  natural  that  you 
should  be  the  speaker;  because  you  profess  to  know  the 
subject,  and  to  have  something  to  say.  Therefore  do 
not  decline;  but  gratify  me  by  answering,  and  do  not 
grudge  to  instruct  Glaucon  and  the  rest  of  the  company 
as  well. 

When  I  had  said  this,  Glaucon  and  the  others  begged 
him  to  comply.  Now  it  was  evident  that  Thrasymachus 
was  eager  to  speak,  in  order  that  he  might  gain  glory,  be- 
cause he  thought  himself  in  possession  of  a  very  fine  an- 
swer. But  he  affected  to  contend  for  my  being  the  respon- 
dent. At  last  he  gave  in,  and  then  said:  This,  forsooth, 
is  the  wisdom  of  Socrates!  He  will  not  give  instruction 
himself,  but  he  goes  about  and  learns  from  others,  without 
even  shewing  gratitude  for  their  lessons. 
I  As  for  my  learning  from  others,  Thrasymachus,  I  re- 
plied, there  you  speak  truth;  but  it  is  false  of  you  to  say 
that  I  pay  no  gratitude  in  return.  I  do  pay  all  I  can ;  and, 
as  I  have  no  money,  I  can  only  give  praise.  How  readily 
I  do  this,  if  in  my  judgment  a  person  speaks  well,  you  will 
very  soon  find,  when  you  make  your  answer:  for  I  expect 
you  to  speak  well. 


18  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  L 

Then  listen,  said  he.  My  doctrine  is,  that  justice  is 
simply  the  interest  of  the  stronger.  Well :  why  do  you  not 
praise  me?  No,  you  refuse. 
Y  Not  so,  I  replied ;  I  am  only  waiting  to  understand  your 
meaning,  which  at  present  I  do  not  see.  You  say  that  the 
interest  of  the  stronger  is  just.  What  in  the  world  do  you 
mean  by  this,  Thrasymachus  ?  You  do  not,  I  presume, 
mean  anything  like  this, — that,  if  Polydamas,  the  athlete, 
is  stronger  than  we  are,  and  if  it  is  for  his  interest  to  eat 
beef  in  order  to  strengthen  his  body,  such  food  is  for  the 
1  interest  of  us  weaker  men,  and  therefore  is  just. 

This  is  scandalous,  Socrates:  you  understand  my  doc- 
trine in  the  sense  in  which  you  can  damage  it  most  easily. 
No,  no,  my  excellent  friend:  but  state  your  meaning 
more  clearly. 

So  you  are  not  aware,  he  continued,  that  some  cities  are 
governed  by  an  autocrat,  and  others  by  a  democracy,  and 
others  by  an  aristocracy? 
Of  course  I  am. 

In  every  city  does  not  superior  strength  reside  in  the 

ruling  body? 

j    Certainly  it  does. 

Y      And  further,  each  government  has  its  laws  framed  to 

rt-1  suit  its  own  interests;  a  democracy  making  democratical 

'     .  laws;  an  autocrat  despotic  laws,  and  so  on.     Now  by  this 

fly  procedure  these  governments  have  pronounced  that  what 

\\         ^is  for  the  interest  of  themselves  is  just  for  their  subjects; 

££    and  whoever  deviates  from  this,  is  chastised  by  them  as 

,  \cr\    guilty  of  illegality  and  injustice.    Therefore,  my  good  sir, 

r   .  my  meaning  is,  that  in  all  cities  the  same  thing,  namely, 

the  interest  of  the  established  government,  is  just.     And 

superior  strength,  I  presume,  is  to  be  found  on  the  side  of 

government.     So  that  the  conclusion  of  right  reasoning  is 

that  the  same  thing,  namely,  the  interest  of  the  stronger, 

is  everywhere  just. 

"  Now  I  understand  your  meaning,  and  I  will  endeavour 

X  to  make  out  whether  it  is  true  or  not.     So  then,  Thrasy- 

y  machus,  you  yourself  in  your  answer  have  defined  justice 

jlas  interest,  though  you  forbade  my  giving  any  such  reply. 


Book  I.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  19 

To  be  sure,  you  have  made  an  addition,  and  describe  it  as 
jhe  interest  of  the  stronger. 


Yes;  quite  a  trifling  addition,  perhaps. 

It  remains  to  be  seen,  whether  it  is  an  important  one. 
But  this  much  is  certain, — that  we  are  bound  to  examine 
into  the  correctness  of  your  doctrine.  For  we  both  admit 
that  justice  is  in  harmony  with  interest :  but  you  lengthen  _ 
this  mtothe  assertion  that  justice  is  the  interest  of  the 
stronger;  to  which  I  demur.  Therefore  we  are  certainly 
bound  to  study  the  subject. 

Pray  do  so. 

It  shall  be  done.  Be  so  good  as  to  answer  this  question. 
You  doubtless  also  maintain  that  it  is  just  to  obey  the 
rulers  ? 

I  do. 

Are  the  rulers  infallible  in  each  several  city,  or  are  they 
liable  to  make  a  few  mistakes? 

No  doubt  they  are  liable  to  make  mistakes. 

And  therefore,  when  they  undertake  to  frame  laws,  is 
their  work  sometimes  rightly,  and  sometimes  wrongly  done  ? 

I  should  suppose  so. 

Do  "  rightly  "  and  "  wrongly  "  mean,  respectively,  legis- 
lating for,  and  against,  their  own  interests?  Or  how  do 
you  state  it? 

Just  as  you  do.  "~~    """) 

And  do  you  maintain  that  whatever  has  been  enacted  | 
by  the  rulers  must  be  obeyed  by  their  subjects,  and  that  I 
this  is  justice?  ^^^ 

Unquestionably  I  do. 

Then,  according  to  your  argument,  it  is  not  only  just  to 
do  what  makes  for  the  interest  of  the  stronger,  but  also  to 
do  what  runs  counter  to  his  interest, — in  other  words,  the 
opposite  of  the  former. 

What  are  you  saying? 

What  you  say,  I  believe.  But  let  us  examine  the  point 
more  thoroughly.  Has  it  not  been  admitted  that,  when 
the  rulers  enjoin  certain  acts  upon  their  subjects,  tjhey  are 
sometimes  thoroughly  mistaken  as  to  what  is  best  for 
themselves;  and  that,  whatever  is  enjoined  by  them,  it 


20  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  t 

is  just  for  their  subjects  to  obey?  Has  not  this  been  ad- 
mitted ? 

Yes,  I  think  so,  he  replied. 

Then  let  me  tell  you,  that  you  have  also  admitted  the 
justice  of  doing  what  runs  counter  to  the  interest  of  the 
ruling  and  stronger  body  on  every  occasion  when  this 
body  unintentionally  enjoins  what  is  injurious  to  itself, 
so  long  as  you  maintain  that  it  is  just  for  the  subjects  to 
obey,  in  every  instance,  the  injunctions  of  their  rulers. 
In  that  case,  0  most  wise  Thrasymachus,  must  it  not 
follow  of  course,  that  it  is  just  to  act  in  direct  opposition 
to  your  theory?  For,  obviously,  it  is  enjoined  upon  the 
weaker  to  do  what  is  prejudicial  to  the  interest  of  the 
stronger. 

Yes,  indeed,  Socrates,  said  Polemarchus;  that  is  per- 
fectly clear. 

No  doubt,  retorted  Cleitophon,  if  you  appear  as  a  wit- 
ness in  Socrates'  behalf. 

Nay,  what  do  we  want  witnesses  for?  said  Polemarchus. 
Thrasymachus  himself  admits  that  the  rulers  sometimes 
enjoin  what  is  bad  for  themselves;  and  that  it  is  just  for 
their  subjects  to  obey  such  injunctions. 

No,  Polemarchus;  Thrasymachus  laid  it  down  that  to 
do  what  the  rulers  command  is  just. 

Yes,  Cleitophon ;  and  he  also  laid  it  down  that  the  inter- 
est of  the  stronger  is  just.  And  having  laid  down  these 
two  positions,  he  further  admitted  that  the  stronger  party 
sometimes  orders  its  weaker  subjects  to  do  what  is  preju- 
dicial to  its  own  interests,  and  the  consequence  of  these 
admissions  is,  that  what  is  for  the  interest  of  the  stronger 
will  be  not  a  bit  more  just  than  what  is  not  for  his  interest. 
y~  But,  said  Cleitophon,  by  the  interest  of  the  stronger  he 
meant,  what  the  stronger  conceived  to  be  for  his  own 
interest.  His  position  was,  that  this  must  be  done  by 
the  weaker,  and  that  this  is  the  notion  of  justice. 

That  was  not  wThat  he  said,  replied  Polemarchus. 

It  does  not  matter,  Polemarchus,  said  I:  if  Thrasy- 
machus chooses  to  state  his  theory  in  that  way  now,  let 
us  make  no  objection  to  his  doing  so. 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  21 

Tell  me,  then,  Thrasymaehus :  was  this  the  definition 
you  meant  to  give  of  justice,  that  it  is  what  seems  to  the 
stronger  to  be  the  interest  of  the  stronger,  whether  it  be 
really  for  his  interest  or  not?  Shall  we  take  that  as  your 
account  of  it  ? 

Certainly  not,  he  replied:  do  you  think  I  should  call  a 
man  who  is  mistaken,  at  the  time  of  his  mistake,  the 
stronger  ? 

^'Why  I  thought  that  you  said  as  much,  when  you  ad- 
mitted that  rulers  are  not  infallible,  but  do  really  commit 
some  mistakes. 

You  are  a  quibbler,  Socrates,  in  argument:  do  you  call, 
now,  that  man  a  physician  who  is  in  error  about  the  treat- 
ment of  the  sick,  with  strict  reference  to  his  error?  Or  do 
you  call  another  an  accountant,  who  makes  a  mistake  in  a 
calculation,  at  the  time  of  his  mistake,  and  with  reference 
to  that  mistake?  We  say,  to  be  sure,  in  so  many  words 
(hat  the  physician  was  in  error,  and  the  accountant  or  the 
writer  was  in  error;  but  in  fact  each  of  these,  I  imagine, 
in  so  far  as  he  is  what  we  call  him,  never  falls  into  error. 
So  that,  to  speak  with  precise  accuracy,  since  you  require 
such  preciseness  of  language,  no  craftsman  errs.  For  it 
is  through  a  failure  of  knowledge  that  a  rrmn  Qrrp,  and  tft- 
that  exten'fhe  is  no  crattsman;  so  that  whether  as  crafts- 
man, ur  philosopher,  or  ruler,  no  one  errs  while  he  actually 
is  what  he  professes  to  be :  although  it  would  be  universally 
said  that  such  a  physician  was  in  error,  or  such  a  ruler  was 
in  error.  In  this  sense  I  would  have  you  to  understand  my 
own  recent  answer.  But  the  statement,  if  expressed  with 
perfect  accuracy,  would  be,  that  a  ruler,  in  so  far  as  he  is  a 
ruler,  never  errs,  and  that,  so  long  as  this  is  the  case,  he 
enacts  what  is  best  for  himself,  and  that  this  is  what  the 
subject  has  to  do.  Therefore,  as  I  began  with  saying,  I 
call  it  just  to  do  what  is  for  the  interest  of  Th"e  stronger, 

Very  good,  Thrasymaehus:  you  think  me  a  quibbler,do 
you? 

Yes,  a  thorough  quibbler. 

Do  you  think  that  I  put  you  those  questions  with  a 


22  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  L 

mischievous  intent  to  damage  your  position  in  the  argu- 
ment? 

Nay,  I  am  quite  sure  of  it.  However  you  shall  gain 
nothing  by  it;  for  you  shall  neither  injure  me  by  taking 
me  unawares,  nor  will  you  be  able  to  overpower  me  by 
open  argument. 

I  should  not  think  of  attempting  it,  my  excellent  friend ! 
But  that  nothing  of  this  kind  may  occur  again,  state 
whether  you  employ  the  words  "  ruler  "  and  "  stronger  "  in 
the  popular  sense  of  them,  or  in  that  strict  signification  of 
which  you  were  speaking  just  now,  when  you  say  that  it 
is  just  for  the  weaker  to  do  what  is  for  the  interest  of  the 
ruler,  as  being  the  stronger. 

I  mean  a  ruler  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word.  So 
now  try  your  powers  of  quibbling  and  mischief:  I  ask  for 
no  mercy.    But  your  attempts  will  be  ineffectual. 

Why,  do  you  suppose  I  should  be  so  mad  as  to  attempt 
to  beard  a  lion,  or  play  off  quibbles  on  a  Thrasymachus  ? 

At  any  rate  you  tried  it  just  now,  though  you  failed 
utterly. 

Enough  of  this  banter,  I  replied.  Tell  me  this:  is  the 
physician  of  whom  you  spoke  as  being  strictly  a  physician, 
a  maker  of  money,  or  a  healer  of  the  sick  Take  care  you 
speak  of  the  genuine  physician. 

A  healer  of  the  sick. 

And  what  of  a  pilot?  Is  the  true  pilot  a  sailor  or  a 
commander  of  sailors  ? 

A  commander  of  sailors. 

There  is  no  need,  I  imagine,  to  take  into  the  account 
his  being  on  board  the  ship,  nor  should  he  be  called  a 
sailor;  for  it  is  not  in  virtue  of  his  being  on  board  that  he 
has  the  name  of  pilot,  but  in  virtue  of  his  art  and  of  his 
authority  over  the  sailors. 

True. 

Has  not  each  of  these  persons  an  interest  of  his  own? 

Certainly. 

And  is  it  not  the  proper  end  of  their  art  to  seek  and  pro* 
sure  what  is  for  the  interest  of  each  of  them  ? 

It  is. 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  23     i  jZl 

Have  the  arts  severally  any  other  interest  to  pursue  than  /  /^^t{ 
their  own  highest  perfection?  _  /        ..  * 

What  does  your  question  mean  ?  J/i 

Why,  if  you  were  to  ask  me  whether  it  is  sufficient  for  a 
man's  body  to  be  a  body,  or  whether  it  stands  in  need  of 
something  additional,  I  should  say,  Certainly  it  does.  To 
this  fact  the  discovery  of  the  healing  art  is  due,  because 
the  body  is  defective,  and  it  is  not  enough  for  it  to  be  a 
body.  Therefore  the  art  of  healing  has  been  put  in  re- 
quisition to  procure  what  the  interests  of  the  body  require. 
Should  I  be  right,  think  you,  in  so  expressing  myself,  or 
not? 

You  would  be  right.  i — 

Well  then,  is  the  art  of  healing  itself  defective,  or  does 
any  art  whatever  require  a  certain  additional  virtue;  as 
eyes  require  sight,  and  ears  hearing,  so  that  these  organs 
need  a  certain  art  which  shall  investigate  and  provide 
what  is  conducive  to  these  ends: — is  there,  I  ask,  any 
defectiveness  in  an  art  as  such,  so  that  every  art  should 
require  another  art  to  consider  its  interests,  and  this  other 
provisional  art  a  third,  with  a  similar  function,  and  so  on, 
without  limit ?  Or  will  it  investigate  its  own  interest?  Or 
is  it  unnecessary  either  for  itself,  or  for  any  other  art,  to 
inquire  into  the  appropriate  remedy  for  its  own  defects  be- 
cause there  are  no  defects  or  faults  in  any  art,  and  because 
it  is  not  the  duty  of  an  art  to  seek  the  interests  of  aught, 
save  that  to  which,  as  an  art,  it  belongs,  being  itself  free 
from  hurt  and  blemish  as  a  true  art,  so  long  as  it  continues 
strictly  and  in  its  integrity  what  it  is  ?  View  the  question 
according  to  the  strict  meaning  of  terms,  as  we  agreed:  is 
it  so  or  otherwise  ? 

Apparently  it  is  so,  he  replied. 

Then  the  art  of  healing  does  not  consider  the  interest 
of  the  art  of  healing,  but  the  interest  of  the  body. 

Yes. 

Nor  horsemanship  what  is  good  for  horsemanship,  but 
for  horses:  nor  does  any  other  art  seek  its  own  interest, 
(for  it  has  no  wants),  but  the  good  of  that  to  which  as  an 
art  it  belongs. 


24  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  ^Book  L 

Apparently  it  is  so. 

Well,  but  you  will  grant,  Thrasymachus,  that  an  art 
governs  and  is  stronger  than  that  of  which  it  is  the  art. 

He  assented,  with  great  reluctance,  to  this  proposition. 

\       ^Then  no  science  investigates  or  enjoins  the  interest  of 

\      the  stronger,  but  the  interest  of  the  weaker,  its  subject. 

\  To  this  also  he  at  last  assented,  though  he  attempted  to 
shew  fight  about  it.  After  gaining  his  admission,  I  pro- 
ceeded: Then  is  it  not  also  true,  that  no  physician,  in  so 
far  as  he  is  a  physician,  considers  or  enjoins  what  is  for 
the  physician's  interest,  but  that  all  seek  the  good  of  their 
patients?  For  we  have  agreed  that  a  physician  strictly 
so  called,  is  a  ruler  of  bodies,  and  not  a  maker  of  money; 
have  we  not? 

He  allowed  that  we  had. 

And  that  a  pilot  strictly  so  called  is  a  commander  of 
sailors,  and  not  a  sailor? 
\^.  We  have. 
'    Al^*  ]       Then  this  kind  of  pilot  and  commander  will  not  seek 
i*  and  enjoin  the  pilot's  interest,  but  that  of  the  sailor  and 

the  subordinate. 
^^   He  reluctantly  gave  his  assent. 

And  thus,  Thrasymachus,  all  who  are  in  any  place  of 
command,  in  so  far  as  they  are  rulers,  neither  consider  nor 
enjoin  their  own  interest,  but  that  of  the  subjects  for  whom 
they  exercise  their  craft:  and  in  all  that  they  do  or  say, 
they  act  with  an  exclusive  view  to  them,  and  to  what  is 
good  and  proper  for  them. 

When  we  had  arrived  at  this  stage  of  the  discussion, 
and  it  had  become  evident  to  all  that  the  explanation  of 
justice  was  completely  reversed,  Thrasymachus,  instead 
of  making  any  answer,  said, 

Tell  me,  Socrates,  have  you  a  nurse  ? 
Why?  I  rejoined:  had  you  not  better  answer  my  ques- 
tions than  make  inquiries  of  that  sort? 

Why  because  she  leaves  you  to  drivel,  and  omits  to 
wipe  your  nose  when  you  require  it,  so  that  in  consequence 
of  her  neglect  you  cannot  even  distinguish  between  sheep 
and  shepherd. 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OP  PLATO.  25 

For  what  particular  reason  do  you  think  so? 

Because  you  think  that  shepherds  and  herdsmen  regard 
the  good  of  their  sheep  and  of  their  oxen,  and  fatten  them 
and  take  care  of  them  with  other  views  than  to  benefit 
their  masters  and  themselves;  and  you  actually  imagine 
that  the  rulers  in  states,  those  I  mean  who  are  really 
rulers,  are  otherwise  minded  towards  their  subjects  than 
as  one  would  feel  towards  sheep,  or  that  they  think  of  any- 
thing else  by  night  and  by  day  than  how  they  may  secure 
their  own  advantage.  And  you  are  so  far  wrong  in  your 
notions,  respecting  justice  and  injustice,  the  just  and  the 
unjust,  that  you  do  not  know  that  the  former  is  really  the 
good  of  another,  that  is  to  say  the  interest  of  the  stronger 
and  of  the  ruler,  but  your  own  loss,  where  you  are  the 
subordinate  and  the  servant;  whereas  injustice  is  the 
reverse,  governing  those  that  are  really  simpleminded  and 
just,  so  that  they,  as  subjects,  do  what  is  for  the  interest 
of  the  unjust  man  who  is  stronger  than  they,  and  promote 
his  happiness  by  their  services,  but  not  their  own  in  the 
least  degree.  You  may  see  by  the  following  considera- 
tions, my  most  simple  Socrates,  that  a  just  man  every- 
where has  the  worst  of  it,  compared  with  an  unjust  man. 
In  the  first  place,  in  their  mutual  dealings,  wherever  a 
just  man  enters  into  partnership  with  an  unjust  man,  you  *r.  ^ 

will  find  that  at  the  dissolution  of  the  partnership  the  just    J^       H 
man  never  has  more  than  the  unjust  man,  but  always  less^. 
Then  again  in  their  dealings  with  the  state,  when  there  isyt 
a  property-tax  to  pay,  the  just  man  will  pay  more  and  the 
unjust  less,  on  the  same  amount  of  property;  and  when 
there  is  anything  to  receive,  the  one  gets  nothing,  while 
the  other  makes  great  gains.     And  whenever  either  of 
them  holds  any  office  of  authority,  if  the  just  man  suffers 
no  other  loss,  at  least  his  private  affairs  fall  into  disorder 
through  want  of  attention  to  them,  while  his  principles 
forbid  his  deriving  any  benefit  from  the  public  money; 
and  besides  this,  it  is  his  fate  to  offend  his  friends  and 
acquaintances  every  time  that  he  refuses  to  serve  them  at 
the  expense  of  justice.     But  with  the  unjust  man  every  y 
thing  is  reversed.    I  am  speaking  of  the  case  I  mentioned 


26  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  L 

just  now,  of  an  unjust  man  who  has  the  power  to  grasp 
on  an  extensive  scale.  To  him  you  must  direct  your  atten- 
tion, if  you  wish  to  judge  how  much  more  profitable  it  is 
to  a  man's  own  self  to  be  unjust  than  to  be  just.  And  you 
will  learn  this  truth  with  the  greatest  ease,  if  you  turn  your 
attention  to  the  most  consummate  form  of  injustice,  which, 
while  it  makes  the  wrong-doer  most  happy,  makes  those 
who  are  wronged,  and  will  not  retaliate,  most  miserable. 
This  form  is  a  despotism,  which  proceeds  not  by  small 
degrees,  but  by  wholesale,  in  its  open  or  fraudulent  appro- 
priation of  the  property  of  others,  whether  it  be  sacred  or 
profane,  public  or  private ; — perpetrating  offences,  which  if 
a  person  commits  in  detail  and  is  found  out,  he  becomes 
liable  to  a  penalty  and  incurs  deep  disgrace;  for  partial 
offenders  in  this  class  of  crimes  are  called  sacrilegious, 
men-stealers,  burglars,  thieves,  and  robbers.  But  when  a 
man  not  only  seizes  the  property  of  his  fellow-citizens  but 
captures  and  enslaves  their  persons  also,  instead  of  those 
dishonourable  titles  he  is  called  happy  and  highly  favoured, 
not  only  by  the  men  of  his  own  city,  but  also  by  all  others 
who  hear  of  the  comprehensive  injustice  which  he  has 
wrought.  For  when  people  abuse  injustice,  they  do  so  be- 
cause they  are  afraid,  not  of  committing  it,  but  of  suffering 
it.  Thus  it  is,  Socrates,  that  injustice,  realized  on  an  ade- 
quate scale,  is  a  stronger,  a  more  liberal,  and  a  more  lordly 
thing  than  justice ;  and  as  I  said  at  first,  justice  is  the  in- 
terest of  the  stronger ;  injustice,  a  thing  profitable  and  ad- 
vantageous to  oneself. 

When  he  had  made  this  speech,  Thrasymachus  in- 
tended to  take  his  departure,  after  deluging  our  ears  like 
a  bathingman  with  this  copious  and  unbroken  flood  of 
words.  Our  companions  however  would  not  let  him  go, 
but  obliged  him  to  stay  and  answer  for  his  doctrines. 
I  myself  also  was  especially  urgent  in  my  entreaties,  ex- 
claiming, Really,  my  good  Thrasymachus,  after  flinging 
us  such  a  speech  as  this,  are  you  intending  to  take  your 
leave,  before  you  have  satisfactorily  taught  us,  or  learnt 
yourself,  whether  your  theory  is  right  or  wrong  ?    Do  you 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  27 

think  you  are  undertaking  to  settle  some  insignificant 
question,  and  not  the  principles  on  which  each  of  us 
must  conduct  his  life  in  order  to  lead  the  most  profitable 
existence  ? 

Why  that  is  not  a  true  statement  of  the  case,  in  my 
opinion,  said  Thrasymachus. 

So  it  seems,  I  said,  or  else  that  you  are  quite  indifferent 
about  us,  and  feel  no  concern  whether  we  shall  live  the 
better  or  the  worse  for  our  ignorance  of  what  you  profess 
to  know.  But  pray  vouchsafe,  my  good  sir,  to  impart 
your  knowledge  to  us  also:  any  benefit  you  confer  on 
such  a  large  party  as  we  are  will  surely  be  no  bad  invest- 
ment. For  I  tell  you  plainly  for  my  own  part  that  I  am 
not  convinced,  and  that  I  do  not  believe  that  injustice  is 
more  profitable  than  justice,  even  if  it  be  let  alone  and 
suffered  to  work  its  will  unchecked.  On  the  contrary,  my 
good  sir,  let  there  be  an  unjust  man,  and  let  him  have 
full  power  to  practise  injustice,  either  by  evading  detection 
or  by  overpowering  opposition,  still  I  am  not  convinced 
that  such  a  course  is  more  profitable  than  justice.  This, 
perhaps,  is  the  feeling  of  some  others  amongst  us,  as 
well  as  mine.  Pray  then  convince  us  satisfactorily,  my 
highly-gifted  friend,  that  we  are  not  well  advised  in  valu- 
ing justice  above  injustice. 

But  how,  said  he,  can  I  persuade  you?  If  you  are  not 
convinced  by  my  recent  statements,  what  more  can  I  do 
for  you?  must  I  take  the  doctrine  and  thrust  it  into  your 
mind? 

Heaven  forbid  you  should  do  that  but :  in  the  first  place, 
abide  by  what  you  say,  or  if  you  change  your  ground, 
change  it  openly  without  deceiving  us.  As  it  is,  Thrasy- 
machus, (for  we  must  not  yet  take  leave  of  our  former  in- 
vestigations,) you  see  that  having  first  defined  the  meaning 
of  the  genuine  physician,  you  did  not  think  it  necessary 
afterwards  to  adhere  strictly  to  the  genuine  shepherd.  On 
the  contrary,  you  suppose  him  to  feed  his  sheep,  in  so  far 
as  he  is  a  shepherd,  not  with  an  eye  to  what  is  best  for 
the  flock,  but,  like  a  votary  of  feasting  who  is  going  to  give 
an  entertainment,  with  an  eye  to  the  good  cheer,  or  else 


28  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [BOOK  I 

to  their  sale,  like  a  money-maker,  and  not  like  a  shepherd. 
Whereas  the  only  concern  of  the  shepherd's  art  is,  I  pre- 
sume, how  it  shall  procure  what  is  best  for  that,  of  which 
it  is  the  appointed  guardian;  since  as  far  as  concerns  its 
own  perfection,  sufficient  provision  is  made,  I  suppose, 
for  that,  so  long  as  it  is  all  that  is  implied  in  its  title :  and 
so  I  confess  I  thought  we  were  obliged  just  now  to  admit 
that  every  government,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  government, 
looks  solely  to  the  advantage  of  that  which  is  governed 
and  tended  by  it,  whether  that  government  be  of  a  public 
or  a  private  nature.  But  what  is  your  opinion?  do  you 
think  that  the  rulers  in  states,  who  really  rule,  do  so  will- 
ingly? 

No,  I  do  not  think  it,  I  am  sure  of  it. 

What,  Thrasymachus,  do  you  not  observe  that  no  one 
consents  to  take  upon  himself  the  common  state-offices,  if 
he  can  help  it,  but  that  they  all  ask  to  be  paid  on  the 
assumption  that  the  advantages  of  their  government  will 
not  accrue  to  themselves,  but  to  the  governed  ?  For  answer 
me  this  question:  Do  we  not  say  without  hesitation,  that 
every  art  is  distinguished  from  other  arts  by  having  a  dis- 
tinctive faculty.  Be  so  good,  my  dear  sir,  as  not  to  answer 
contrary  to  your  opinion,  or  we  shall  make  no  progress. 

Yes ;  that  is  what  distinguishes  it. 

And  does  not  each  of  them  provide  us  with  some  special 
and  peculiar  benefit  ?  the  art  of  healing,  for  example,  giving 
us  health,  that  of  piloting  safety  at  sea,  and  so  on? 

Certainly  not. 

Then  is  there  not  an  art  of  wages  which  provides  us 
with  wages,  this  being  its  proper  faculty?  Or  do  you  call 
the  art  of  healing  and  that  of  piloting  identical  ?  Or,  if  you 
choose  to  employ  strict  definitions  as  you  engaged  to  do, 
the  fact  of  a  man's  regaining  his  health  while  acting  as  a 
pilot,  through  the  beneficial  effects  of  the  sea-voyage,  would 
not  make  you  call  the  art  of  the  pilot  a  healing  art,  would 
it? 

Certainly. 

Nor  would  you  so  describe  the  art  of  wages,  I  fancy, 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  29 

supposing  a  person  to  keep  his  health  while  in  the  receipt 
of  wages. 

No. 

Well  then,  would  you  call  the  physician's  art  a  mercen- 
ary art,  if  fees  be  taken  for  medical  attendance? 

No. 

Did  we  not  allow  that  the  benefit  of  each  art  was  pecu- 
liar to  itself  ? 

Be  it  so. 

Then  whatever  benefit  accrues  in  common  to  the  pro- 
fessors of  all  arts,  is  clearly  derived  from  a  common  use 
of  some  one  and  the  same  thing. 

So  it  would  seem. 

And  we  further  maintain,  that  if  these  persons  are  bene- 
fited by  earning  wages,  they  owe  it  to  their  use  of  the  art 
of  wages,  in  addition  to  that  which  they  profess. 

He  reluctantly  assented. 

Then  this  advantage,  the  receipt  of  pay,  does  not  come 
to  each  from  his  own  art,  but,  strictly  considered,  the  art 
of  healing  produces  health,  and  the  art  of  wages  pay;  the 
art  of  house-building  produces  a  house,  while  the  art  of 
wages  follows  it  and  produces  pay;  and  so  of  all  the 
rest; — each  works  its  own  work,  and  benefits  that  which 
is  its  appointed  object.  If,  however,  an  art  be  practised 
without  pay,  does  the  professor  of  it  derive  any  benefit 
from  his  art  ? 

Apparently  not. 

Does  he  also  confer  no  benefit,  when  he  works  gra- 
tuitously ? 

Nay,  I  suppose  he  does  confer  benefit.  ' 

So  far  then,  Thrasymachus,  we  see  clearly,  that  an  art 
or  a  government  never  provides  that  which  is  profitable 
for  itself,  but  as  we  said  some  time  ago,  it  provides  and 
enjoins  what  is  profitable  for  the  subject,  looking  to  his 
interest  who  is  the  weaker,  and  not  to  the  interest  of  the 
stronger.  It  was  for  these  reasons  that  I  said  just  now,  my 
dear  Thrasymachus,  that  no  one  will  voluntarily  take  office, 
or  assume  the  duty  of  correcting  the  disorders  of  others, 
but  that  all  ask  wages  for  the  work,  because  one  who  is  to 


30  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  t 

prosper  in  his  art  never  practises  or  prescribes  what  is  best 
for  himself,  but  only  what  is  best  for  the  subject,  so  long  as 
he  acts  within  the  limits  of  his  art :  and  on  these  grounds, 
apparently,  wages  must  be  given  to  make  men  willing  to 
hold  office,  in  the  shape  of  money  or  honour,  or  of  punish- 
ment, in  case  of  refusal. 

What  do  you  mean,  Socrates?  asked  Glaucon.  I  under- 
stand two  out  of  the  three  kinds  of  wages:  but,  what  the 
punishment  is,  and  how  you  could  describe  it  as  playing 
the  part  of  wages,  I  do  not  comprehend. 

Then  you  do  not  comprehend,  I  said,  the  wages  of  the 
best  men,  which  induce  the  most  virtuous  to  hold  office, 
when  they  consent  to  do  so.  Do  you  not  know  that  to  be 
ambitious  and  covetous  is  considered  a  disgrace,  and  really 
is  a  disgrace  ? 

I  do. 

For  this  reason,  then,  good  men  will  not  consent  to 
hold  an  office  of  power,  either  for  the  sake  of  money  or 
for  that  of  honour :  for  they  neither  wish  to  get  the  name  of 
hirelings  by  openly  exacting  hire  for  their  duties,  nor  of 
thieves  by  using  their  power  to  obtain  it  secretly;  nor  yet 
will  they  take  office  for  the  sake  of  honour,  for  they  are 
not  ambitious.  Therefore  compulsion  and  the  fear  of  a 
penalty  must  be  brought  to  bear  upon  them,  to  make  them 
consent  to  hold  office;  which  is  probably  the  reason  why 
it  is  thought  dishonourable  to  accept  power  willingly  with- 
out waiting  to  be  compelled.  Now  the  heaviest  of  all 
penalties  is  to  be  governed  by  a  worse  man,  in  case  of 
one's  own  refusal  to  govern;  and  it  is  the  fear  of  this,  I 
believe,  which  induces  virtuous  men  to  take  the  posts  of 
government;  and  when  they  do  so,  they  enter  upon  their 
administration,  not  with  any  idea  of  coming  into  a  good 
thing,  but  as  an  unavoidable  necessity, — not  expecting  to 
enjoy  themselves  in  it,  but  because  they  cannot  find  any 
person  better  or  no  worse  than  themselves,  to  whom  they 
can  commit  it.  For  the  probability  is,  that  if  there  were 
a  city  composed  of  none  but  good  men,  it  would  be  an 
object  of  competition  to  avoid  the  possession  of  power, 
just  as  now  it  is  to  obtain  it;  and  then  it  would  become 


Book  I.j  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  31 

clearly  evident  that  it  is  not  the  nature  of  the  genuine 
ruler  to  look  to  his  own  interest,  but  to  that  of  the  subject; 
so  that  every  judicious  man  would  choose  to  be  the  re- 
cipient of  benefits,  rather  than  to  have  the  trouble  of  con- 
ferring them  upon  others.  Therefore  I  will  on  no  account 
concede  to  Thrasymachus  that  justice  is  the  interest  of 
the  stronger.  However  we  will  resume  this  inquiry  here- 
after, for  Thrasymachus  now  affirms  that  the  life  of  the 
unjust  man  is  better  than  the  life  of  the  just  man;  and 
this  assertion  seems  to  me  of  much  greater  importance 
than  the  other.  Which  side  do  you  take,  Glaucon?  and 
which  do  you  think  the  truer  statement? 

I  for  my  part  hold,  he  replied,  that  the  life  of  the  just 
man  is  the  more  advantageous. 

Did  you  hear,  I  asked,  what  a  long  list  of  attractions 
Tharsymachus  just  now  attributed  to  the  life  of  the  unjust 
man? 

I  did,  but  I  am  not  convinced. 

Should  you  then  like  us  to  convince  him,  if  we  can  find 
any  means  of  doing  so,  that  what  he  says  is  not  true  ? 

Undoubtedly  I  should. 

If  then  we  adopt  the  plan  of  matching  argument  against 
argument, — we  enumerating  all  the  advantages  of  being 
just,  and  Thrasymachus  replying,  and  we  again  putting 
in  a  rejoinder, — it  will  be  necessary  to  count  and  measure 
the  advantages  which  are  claimed  on  both  sides;  and 
eventually  we  shall  want  a  jury  to  give  a  verdict  between 
us:  but  if  we  proceed  in  our  inquiries,  as  we  lately  did, 
by  the  method  of  mutual  admissions,  we  shall  combine  in 
our  own  persons  the  functions  of  jury  and  advocate. 

Precisely  so. 

Which  plan,. then  do  you  prefer? 

The  latter,  he  said. 

Come  then,  Thrasymachus,  said  I,  let  us  start  anew,  and 
oblige  us  by  answering:  Do  you  assert  that  a  perfect  in- 
justice is  more  profitable  than  an  equally  perfect  justice  ? 

Most  decidedly  I  do ;  and  I  have  said  why. 

Pray  how  do  you  describe  them  under  another  aspect? 


32  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  I. 

Probably  you  call  one  of  them  a  virtue,  and  the  other  a 
vice? 

Undoubtedly. 

That  is,  justice  a  virtue,  and  injustice  a  vice? 

A  likely  thing,  my  facetious  friend,  when  I  assert  that 
injustice  is  profitable,  and  justice  the  reverse. 

Then  what  do  you  say  ? 

Just  the  contrary. 

Do  you  call  justice  a  vice? 

No ;  but  I  call  it  very  egregious  good  nature. 

Then  do  you  call  injustice  ill  nature? 

No ;  I  call  it  good  policy. 

Do  you  think,  Thrasymachus,  that  the  unjust  are  posi- 
tively wise  and  good  ? 

Yes,  those  who  are  able  to  practise  injustice  on  the  com- 
plete scale,  having  the  power  to  reduce  whole  cities  and 
nations  of  men  to  subjection.  You,  perhaps,  imagine  that 
I  am  speaking  of  the  cut-purse  tribe;  and  I  certainly 
allow  that  even  deeds  like  theirs  are  profitable  if  they 
escape  detection:  but  they  are  not  worthy  to  be  considered 
in  comparison  with  those  I  have  just  mentioned. 

I  quite  understand  what  you  mean :  but  I  did  wonder  at 
your  ranking  injustice  under  the  heads  of  virtue  and  wis- 
dom, and  justice  under  the  opposites. 

Well,  I  do  so  rank  them,  without  hesitation. 

You  have  now  taken  up  a  more  stubborn  position,  my 
friend,  and  it  is  no  longer  easy  to  know  what  to  say.  If 
after  laying  down  the  position  that  injustice  is  profitable, 
you  had  still  admitted  it  to  be  a  vice  and  a  baseness,  as 
some  others  do,  we  should  have  had  an  answer  to  give, 
speaking  according  to  generally  received  notions;  but 
now  it  is  plain  enough  that  you  will  maintain  it  to  be 
beautiful,  and  strong,  and  will  ascribe  to  it  all  the  quali- 
ties which  we  have  been  in  the  habit  of  ascribing  to  justice, 
seeing  that  you  have  actually  ventured  to  rank  it  as  a 
portion  of  virtue  and  of  wisdom. 

You  divine  most  correctly,  he  said. 

Nevertheless,  I  must  not  shrink  from  pursuing  the  in- 
quiry and  the  argument,  so  long  as  I  suppose  that  you 


xtooK  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  33 

are  saying  what  you  think:  for  if  I  am  not  mistaken, 
Thrasymachus,  you  are  really  not  bantering  now,  but 
saying  what  you  think  to  be  the  truth. 

What  difference  does  it  make  to  you  whether  I  think  it 
true  or  not  ?    Can  you  not  assail  the  argument  ? 

It  makes  none.  But  will  you  endeavour  to  answer 
me  one  more  question?  Do  you  think  that  a  just  man 
would  wish  to  go  beyond  a  just  man  in  anything? 

Certainly  not:  for  then  he  would  not  be  so  charmingly 
simple  as  he  is. 

Would  a  just  man  *  go  beyond  a  just  line  of  conduct  ? 

No,  not  beyond  that  either. 

But  would  he  go  beyond  an  unjust  man  without  scruple, 
and  think  it  just  to  do  so,  or  would  he  not  think  it  just  ? 

He  would  think  it  just,  and  would  not  scruple  to  do  it, 
but  he  would  not  be  able. 

Nay,  that  was  not  my  question;  but  whether  a  just  man 
both  resolves  and  desires  to  go  beyond  an  unjust  man,  but 
not  beyond  a  just  man  ? 

Well,  it  is  so. 

But  how  is  it  with  the  unjust  man?  Would  he  take 
upon  himself  to  go  beyond  a  just  man  and  a  just  line  of 
conduct  ? 

Undoubtedly,  when  he  takes  upon  himself  to  go  beyond 
all  and  in  every  thing. 

Then  will  not  the  unjust  man  also  go  beyond  another 
unjust  man  and  an  unjust  action,  and  struggle  that  he 
may  himself  obtain  more  than  any  one  else? 

He  will. 

Then  let  us  put  it  in  this  form :  The  just  man  goes  not 
beyond  his  like,  but  his  unlike;  the  unjust  man  goes  be- 
yond both  his  like  and  his  unlike  ? 

Very  well  said. 

*  This  is  certainly  not  very  intelligible,  but  it  is  difficult  to 
detect  a  more  satisfactory  meaning  in  the  original,  which  appears 
to  be  only  a  play  upon  words,  probably  not  intended  to  be  seri- 
ous. It  may  be  as  well  to  mention  here,  that  we  have  not  con- 
stantly preserved  the  same  English  rendering  even  for  prominent 
Greek  words,  when  the  sense  appeared  to  be  more  completely 
conveyed  by  varying  the  translation. 


34  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  I. 

And  further,  the  unjust  man  is  wise  and  good,  the  just 
man  is  neither. 

Well  spoken  again. 

Does  not  the  unjust  man  further  resemble  the  wise  and 
the  good,  whereas  the  just  man  does  not  resemble  them? 

Why,  of  course,  a  man  of  a  certain  character  must  re- 
semble others  of  that  character;  whereas  one  who  is  of  a 
different  character  will  not  resemble  them. 

Very  good:  then  the  character  of  each  is  identical  with 
that  of  those  whom  he  resembles. 

Why,  what  else  would  you  have? 

Very  well,  Thrasymachus :  do  you  call  one  man  musi- 
cal, and  another  unmusical  ? 

I  do. 

Which  of  them  do  you  call  wise,  and  which  unwise  ? 

The  musical  man,  of  course,  I  call  wise,  and  the  un- 
musical, unwise. 

Do  you  also  say  that  wherein  a  man  is  wise,  in  that  he 
is  good,  and  wherein  unwise,  bad? 

Yes. 

Do  you  speak  in  the  same  manner  of  a  medical  man? 

I  do. 

Do  you  think  then,  my  excellent  friend,  that  a  musician, 
when  he  is  tuning  a  lyre,  would  wish  to  go  beyond  a 
musician  in  the  tightening  or  loosening  of  the  strings,  or 
would  claim  to  have  the  advantage  of  him? 

I  do  not. 

Would  he  wish  to  have  the  advantage  of  an  unmusical 
person  ? 

Unquestionably  he  would. 

How  would  a  medical  man  act?  would  he  wish  to  go 
foeyond  a  medical  man  or  medical  practice  in  a  question 
J)f  diet? 

Certainly  not. 

But  beyond  an  unprofessional  man  he  would  ? 

Yes. 

Consider  now,  looking  at  every  kind  of  knowledge  and 
ignorance,  whether  you  think  that  any  scientific  man 
whatever  would,  by  his  own  consent,  choose  to  do  or  say 


Book  IJ  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  35 

more  than  another  scientific  man,  and  not  the  same  that 
one  like  himself  would  do  in  the  same  matter. 

Well,  perhaps  the  latter  view  is  necessarily  the  true 
one. 

But  what  do  you  say  to  the  unscientific  person?  would 
he  not  go  beyond  the  scientific  and  the  unscientific  alike? 

Perhaps. 

And  the  scientific  person  is  wise  ? 

Yes. 

And  the  wise  man  is  good. 

Yes. 

Then  a  good  and  a  wise  man  will  not  wish  to  go  beyond 
his  like,  but  his  unlike  and  opposite? 

So  it  would  seem. 

But  a  bad  and  an  ignorant  man  will  go  beyond  both 
his  like  and  his  opposite. 

Apparently. 

Well  then,  Thrasymachus,  does  not  our  unjust  man  go 
beyond  both  his  like  and  his  unlike?  was  not  that  your 
statement  ? 

It  was. 

But  the  just  man  will  not  go  beyond  his  like,  but  only 
beyond  his  unlike  ? 

Yes. 

Consequently  the  just  man  resembles  the  wise  and  the 
good,  whereas  the  unjust  man  resembles  the  bad  and  the 
ignorant. 

So  it  would  seem. 

But  we  agreed,  you  know,  that  the  character  of  each  of 
them  is  identical  with  the  character  of  those  whom  he  re- 
sembles. 

We  did. 

Consequently  we  have  made  the  discovery,  that  the  just 
man  is  wise  and  good,  and  the  unjust  man  ignorant  and 
bad. 

Thrasymachus  had  made  all  these  admissions,  not  in 
the  easy  manner  in  which  I  now  relate,  them,  but  reluct- 
antly and  after  much  resistance,  in  the  course  of  which 
he  perspired  profusely,  as  it  was  hot  weather  to  boot:  on 


36  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  I 

that  occasion  also  I  saw  what  I  had  never  seen  before — 
Thrasymachus  blushing.  But  when  we  had  thus  mutually 
agreed  that  justice  was  a  part  of  virtue  and  of  wisdom, 
and  injustice  of  vice  and  ignorance,  I  proceeded  thus: — 

Very  good:  we  will  consider  this  point  settled:  but  we 
said,  you  know,  that  injustice  was  also  strong.  Do  you 
not  remember  it,  Thrasymachus?       ^ 

I  do,  he  replied;  but  for  my  part  I  am  not  satisfied 
with  your  last  conclusions,  and  I  know  what  I  could  say 
on  the  subject.  But  if  were  to  express  my  thoughts,  I  am 
sure  you  would  say  that  I  was  declaiming.  Take  your 
choice  then;  either  allow  me  to  say  as  much  as  I  please, 
or  if  you  prefer  asking  questions,  do  so:  and  I  will  do 
with  you  as  we  do  with  old  women  when  they  tell  us 
itories :  I  will  say  "  Good/'  and  nod  my  head  or  shake  it, 
as  the  occasion  requires. 

If  so,  pray  do  no  violence  to  your  own  opinions. 

Anything  to  please  you,  he  said,  as  you  will  not  allow 
me  to  speak.    What  else  would  you  have  ? 

Nothing,  I  assure  you:  but  if  you  will  do  this,  do  so; 
and  I  will  ask  questions. 

Proceed  then. 

Well  then,  I  will  repeat  the  question  which  I  put  to  you 
just  now,  that  our  inquiry  may  be  carried  out  continu- 
ously; namely,  what  sort  of  a  thing  justice  is  compared 
with  injustice.  It  was  said,  I  think,  that  injustice  is  more 
powerful  and  stronger  than  justice:  but  now,  seeing  that 
justice  is  both  wisdom  and  virtue,  and  injustice  is  ignor- 
ance, it  may  easily  be  shewn,  I  imagine,  that  justice  is 
likewise  stronger  than  injustice.  No  one  can  now  fail  to 
see  this.  But  I  do  not  wish  to  settle  the  question  in  that 
absolute  way,  Thrasymachus,  but  I  would  investigate  it 
jin  the  following  manner:  Should  you  admit  that  a  city 
may  be  unjust,  and  that  it  may  unjustly  attempt  to  enslave 
other  cities,  and  so  succeed  in  so  doing,  and  hold  many 
in  such  slavery  to  itself  ? 

Undoubtedly  I  should :  and  this  will  be  more  frequently 
done  by  the  best  city,  that  is,  the  one  that  is  most  com- 
pletely unjust,  than  by  any  other. 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OP  PLATO.  3? 

I  understand,  I  said,  that  this  is  your  position.  But 
the  question  which  I  wish  to  consider  is,  whether  the  city 
that  becomes  the  mistress  of  another  city,  will  have  this 
power  without  the  aid  of  justice,  or  whether  justice  wili 
be  indispensable  to  it. 

If,  as  you  said  just  now,  justice  is  wisdom,  justice  must 
lend  her  aid ;  but  if  it  is  as  I  said,  injustice  must  lend  hers. 

I  am  quite  delighted  to  find,  Thrasymachus,  that  you 
are  not  content  merely  to  nod  and  shake  your  head,  but 
give  exceedingly  good  answers. 

I  do  it  to  indulge  you. 

You  are  very  good:  but  pray  indulge  me  so  far  as  to 
say,  whether  you  think  that  either  a  city,  or  an  army,  or 
a  band  of  thieves  or  robbers,  or  any  other  body  of  men, 
pursuing  certain  unjust  ends  in  common,  could  succeed 
in  any  enterprise  if  they  were  to  deal  unjustly  with  one 
another  ? 

Certainly  not. 

If  they  refrain  from  such  conduct  towards  one  another, 
will  they  not  be  more  likely  to  succeed  ? 

Yes,  certainly. 

Because,  I  presume,  Thrasymachus,  injustice  breeds  divi- 
sions and  animosities  and  broils  between  man  and  man, 
while  justice  creates  unanimity  and  friendship;  does  it 
not? 

Be  it  so,  he  said,  that  I  may  not  quarrel  with  you. 

Truly  I  am  very  much  obliged  to  you,  my  excellent 
friend :  but  pray  tell  me  this ; — if  the  working  of  injustice 
is  to  implant  hatred  wherever  it  exists,  will  not  the  pres- 
ence of  it,  whether  among  freemen  or  slaves,  cause  them 
to  hate  one  another,  and  to  form  parties,  and  disable 
them  from  acting  together  in  concert?  ' 

Certainly. 

Well,  and  if  it  exist  in  two  persons,  will  they  not  quarrel 
and  hate  one  another,  and  be  enemies  each  to  the  other, 
and  both  to  the  just  ? 

They  will. 

And  supposing,  my  admirable  friend,  that  injustice  has 
taken  up  its  residence  in  a  single  individual,  will  it  lose 
its  proper  power,  or  retain  it  just  the  same  ? 


38  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  I. 

We  will  say  it  retains  it. 

And  does  not  its  power  appear  to  be  of  such  a  nature, 
as  to  make  any  subject  in  which  it  resides,  whether  it  be 
city,  or  family,  or  army,  or  anything  else  whatsoever,  un- 
able to  act  unitedly,  because  of  the  divisions  and  quarrels  it 
excites,  and  moreover  hostile  both  to  itself  and  to  every- 
thing that  opposes  it,  and  to  the  just?    Is  it  not  so? 

Certainly  it  is. 

Then,  if  it  appears  in  an  individual  also,  it  will  produce 
all  these  its  natural  results :  in  the  first  place  it  will  make 
him  unable  to  act  because  of  inward  strife  and  division; 
in  the  next  place,  it  will  make  him  an  enemy  to  himself 
and  to  the  just,  will  it  not" 

It  will. 

And  the  gods,  my  friend,  are  just  ? 

We  will  suppose  they  are. 

Then  to  the  gods  also  will  the  unjust  man  be  an  enemy, 
and  the  just  a  friend. 

Feast  on  your  judgment,  said  he,  to  your  heart's  con- 
tent: I  will  not  oppose  you,  or  I  shall  give  offence  to  the 
company. 

Be  so  good,  said  I,  as  to  make  my  entertainment  com- 
plete by  continuing  to  answer  as  you  have  now  been 
doing.  I  am  aware,  indeed,  that  the  just  are  shewn  to 
be  wiser,  and  better,  and  more  able  to  act  than  the  unjust, 
who  are  indeed,  incapable  of  any  combined  action.  Nay, 
we  do  not  speak  with  entire  accuracy  when  we  say  that 
any  party  of  unjust  men  ever  acted  vigorously  in  concert 
together ;  for  had  they  been  thoroughly  unjust,  they  could 
not  have  kept  their  hands  off  each  other.  But  it  is  ob- 
vious that  here  was  some  justice  at  work  in  them,  which 
made  them  refrain  at  any  rate  from  injuring,  at  one  and 
the  same  moment,  both  their  comrades  and  the  objects 
of  their  attacks,  and  which  enabled  them  to  achieve  what 
they  did  achieve;  and  that  their  injustice  partly  disabled 
■tfiem,  even  in  the  pursuit  of  their  unjust  ends,  since  those 
who  are  complete  villains,  and  thoroughly  unjust,  are  also 
thoroughly  unable  to  act.  I  learn  that  all  this  is  true,  and 
that  the  doctrine  which  you  at  first  propounded  is  not  true 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  39 

But  whether  the  just  also  live  a  better  life,  and  are  happier 
than  the  unjust,  is  a  question  which  we  proposed  to  con- 
sider next,  and  which  we  now  have  to  investigate.  Now, 
for  my  part,  I  think  it  is  already  apparent,  from  what  we 
have  said,  that  they  do*  nevertheless,  we  must  examine 
the  point  still  more  carefully.  For  we  are  debating  no 
trivial  question,  but  the  manner  in  which  a  man  ought  to 
live. 

Pray  consider  it. 

I  will.  Tell  me,  do  you  think  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a 
horse's  function. 

I  do. 

Would  you,  then,  describe  the  function  of  a  horse,  or  of 
anything  else  whatever,  as  that  work,  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  which  it  is  either  the  sole  or  the  best  instrument  ? 

I  do  not  understand. 

Look  at  it  this  way.  Can  you  see  with  anything  besides 
eyes? 

Certainly  not. 

Can  you  hear  with  anything  besides  ears  ? 

No. 

Then  should  we  not  Justly  say  that  seeing  and  hearing 
are  the  functions  of  these  organs? 

Yes,  certainly. 

Again,  you  might  cut  off  a  vine-shoot  with  a  carving 
knife,  or  chisel,  or  many  other  tools  ? 

Undoubtedly. 

But  with  no  tool,  I  imagine,  so  well  as  with  the  pruning 
knife  made  for  the  purpose. 

True. 

Then  shall  we  not  define  pruning  to  be  the  function  of 
the  pruning  knife  ? 

By  all  means. 

Now  then,  I  think,  you  will  better  understand  what  I 
wished  to  learn  from  you  just  now,  when  I  asked  whether 
the  function  of  a  thing  is  not  that  work  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  which  it  is  either  the  sole  or  the  best  instru- 
ment? 

I  do  understand,  and  I  believe  that  this  is  in  every  case 
the  function  of  a  thing. 


40  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  L 

Very  well:  do  you  not  also  think  that  everything  which 
has  an  appointed  function  has  also  a  proper  virtue?  Let 
us  revert  to  the  same  instances;  we  say  that  the  eyes 
have  a  function. 

They  have. 

Then  have  the  eyes  a  virtue  also  ? 

They  have. 

And  the  ears:  did  we  assign  them  a  function? 

Yes. 

Then  have  they  a  virtue  also? 

They  have. 

And  is  it  the  same  with  all  other  things? 

The  same. 

Attend  then:  Do  you  suppose  that  the  eyes  could  dis- 
charge their  own  function  well  if  they  had  not  their  own 
proper  virtue, — that  virtue  being  replaced  by  a  vice  ? 

How  could  they?  You  mean,  probably,  if  sight  is  re- 
placed by  blindness. 

I  mean,  whatever  their  virtue  be;  for  I  am  not  come  to 
that  question  yet.  At  present  I  am  asking  whether  it  is 
through  their  own  peculiar  virtue  that  things  perform  their 
proper  functions  well,  and  through  their  own  peculiar  vice 
that  they  perform  them  ill? 

You  cannot  be  wrong  in  that. 

Then  if  the  ears  lose  their  own  virtue,  will  they  execute 
their  functions  ill? 

Certainly. 

May  we  include  all  other  things  under  the  same  propo- 
sition ? 

I  think  we  may. 

Come,  then,  consider  this  point  next.  Has  the  soul  any 
function  which  could  not  be  executed  by  means  of  any- 
thing else  whatsoever?  For  example,  could  we  in  justice 
assign  superintendence  and  government,  deliberation  and 
the  like,  to  anything  but  the  soul,  or  should  we  pronounce 
them  to  be  peculiar  to  it  ? 

We  could  ascribe  them  to  nothing  else. 

Again,  shall  we  deelare  life  to  be  a  function  of  the  soul  f 

$>eddedJy>. 


Book  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  41 

Do  we  not  also  maintain  that  the  soul  has  a  virtue? 

We  do. 

Then  can  it  ever  so  happen,  Thrasymachus,  that  the 
soul  will  perform  its  functions  well  when  destitute  of  its 
own  peculiar  virtue,  or  is  that  impossible? 

Impossible. 

Then  a  bad  soul  must  needs  exercise  authority  and 
superintendence  ill,  and  a  good  soul  must  do  all  these 
things  well. 

Unquestionably. 

Now  did  we  not  grant  that  justice  was  a  virtue  of  the 
soul,  and  injustice  a  vice? 

We  did. 

Consequently  the  just  soul  and  the  just  man  will  live 
well,  and  the  unjust  man  ill? 

Apparently,  according  to  your  argument. 

And  you  will  allow  that  he  who  lives  well  is  blessed  and 
happy,  and  that  he  who  lives  otherwise  is  the  reverse. 

Unquestionably. 

Consequently  the  just  man  is  happy,  and  the  unjust  man 
miserable. 

Let  us  suppose  them  to  be  so. 

But  surely  it  is  not  misery,  but  happiness,  that  is  advan- 
tageous. 

Undoubtedly. 

Never  then,  my  excellent  Thrasymachus,  is  injustice 
more  advantageous  than  justice. 

Well,  Socrates,  let  this  be  your  entertainment  for  the 
feast  of  Bendis  ?  * 

I  have  to  thank  you  for  it,  Thrasymachus,  because  you 
recovered  your  temper,  and  left  off  being  angry  with  me. 
Nevertheless,  I  have  not  been  well  entertained;  but  that 
was  my  own  fault,  and  not  yours :  for  as  your  gourmands 
seize  upon  every  new  dish  as  it  gees  round,  and  taste  its 
contents  before  they  have  had  a  reasonable  enjoyment  of 
its  predecessor,  so  I  seem  to  myslf  to  have  left  the  ques- 
tion which  we  were  at  first  examining,  concerning  the  real 

*  See  the  note  on  page  1. 


42  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  I. 

nature  of  justice,  because  we  had  found  out  the  answer  to 
it,  in  order  to  rush  to  the  inquiry  whether  this  unknown 
thing  is  a  vice  and  an  ignorance,  or  a  virtue  and  a  wisdom ; 
and  again,  when  a  new  theory,  that  injustice  is  more  profit- 
able than  justice,  was  subsequently  started,  I  could  not 
refrain  from  passing  from  the  other  to  this,  so  that  at  pres- 
ent the  result  of  our  conversation  is  that  I  know  nothing: 
for  while  I  do  not  know  what  justice  is,  I  am  little  likely 
to  know  whether  it  is  in  fact  a  virtue  or  not,  or  whether 
its  owner  is  happy  or  unhappy. 


•  - ' 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  43 


BOOK  II. 

When  I  had  made  these  remarks  I  thought  we  had  done 
with  discussing:  whereas  it  seems  it  was  only  a  prelude. 
For  Glaucon,  with  that  eminent  courage  which  he  displays 
on  all  occasions,  would  not  acquiesce  in  the  retreat  of 
Thrasymachus,  and  began  thus :  Sj)cratesA^do  you  wish 
really  to  convince  us  that  it  is  on  every  account  better  to 
be  just  than  to  be  unjust,  or  only  to  seem  to  have  con- 
vinced us? 

If  it  were  in  my  power,  I  replied,  I  should  prefer  con- 
vincing you  really. 

Then,  he  proceeded,  you  are  not  doing  what  you  wish. 
Let  me  ask  you :  Is  there,  in  your  opinion,  a_clasa  of  good 
things  of  such  a  kind  that  we  are  glad  to  possess  them, 
not  because  we  desire  their  consequences,  but  simply 
welcoming  them  for  their  own  sake?  Take,  for  example, 
the  feelings  of  enjoyment  and  all  those  pleasures  that  are 
harmless,  and  that  are  followed  by  no  result  in  the  after 
time,  beyond  simple  enjoyment  in  their  possession. 

Yes,  I  certainly  think  there  is  a  class  of  this  descrip- 
tion. 

Well,  is  there  another  class,  do  you  think,  of  those 
which  we  value,  both  for  their  own  sake,  and  for  their 
results?  Such  as  intelligence,  and  sight,  and  health;  all 
of  which  are  welcome,  I  apprehend,  on  both  accounts.  ' 

Yes. 

And  do  you  further  recognize  a  third  class  of  good 
things,  which  would  include  gymnastic  training,  and  sub- 
mission to  medical  treatment  in  illness,  as  well  as  the 
practice  of  medicine,  and  all  other  means  of  making 
money?  Things  like  these  we  should  describe  as  irksome, 
and  yet  beneficial  to  us;  and  while  we  should  reject  them 
viewed  simply  in  themselves,  we  accept  them  for  the  sake 


44  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  II 

of  the  emoluments,  and  of  the  other  consequences  which 
result  from  them. 

Yes,  undoubtedly  there  is  such  a  third  class  also:  but 
what  then? 

In  which  of  these  classes  do  you  place  justice? 

I  should  say  in  the  highest;  that  is,  among  the  good 
things  which  will  be  valued  by  one  who  is  in  the  pursuit 
of  true  happiness,  alike  for  their  own  sake  and  for  their 
consequences. 

Then  your  opinion  is  not  that  of  the  many,  by  whom 
justice  is  ranked  in  the  irksome  class,  as  a  thing  which  in 
itself,  and  for  its  own  sake,  is  disagreeable  and  repulsive, 
but  which  it  is  well  to  practise  for  the  credit  of  it,  with  an 
eye  to  emolument  and  a  good  name. 

I  know  it  is  so:  and  under  this  idea  Thrasymachus  has 
been  for  a  long  time  disparaging  justice  and  praising  in- 
justice.   But  apparently  I  am  a  dull  scholar. 

Pray  then  listen  to  my  proposal,  and  tell  me  whether 
you  agree  to  it.  Thrasymachus  appears  to  me  to  have 
yielded  like  a  snake  to  your  fascination  sooner  than  he 
need  have  done;  but  for  my  part  I  am  not  satisfied_as 
yet  with  the  exposition  that" lias  been  given  of  justice  and 
injustice:  for  T  long  to  be  told  what  they  respectively  are, 
and  what  force  they  exert,  taken  simply  by  themselves, 
when  residing  in  the  soul,  dismissing  the  consideration  of 
their  rewards  and  other  consequences.  This  shall  be  my 
plan  then,  if  you  do  not  object:  I  will  revive  Thrasyma- 
chus's  argument,  and  will  first  state  the  common  view 
respecting  the  nature  and  origin  of  justice ;  in  the  second 
place,  I  will  maintain  that  all  who  practise  it  do  so  against 
their  will,  because  it  is  indispensable,  not  because  it  is  a 
good  thing;  and  thirdly,  that  they  act  reasonably  in  so 
doing,  because  the  life  of  the  unjust  man  is,  as  men  say, 
far  better  than  that  of  the  just.  Not  that  I  think  so  my- 
self, Socrates:  only  my  ears  are  so  dinned  with  what  I 
hear  from  Thrasymachus  and  a  thousand  others,  that  I 
am  puzzled.  Now  I  have  never  heard  the  argument  for 
the  superiority  of  justice  over  injustice  maintained  to  my 
satisfaction ;  for  I  should  like  to  hear  a  panegyric  upon  it, 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  45 

considered  simply  in  itself:  and  from  you  if  from  any  one, 
I  should  expect  such  a  treatment  of  the  subject.  There- 
fore IjdlL^n^tflfiJfiTi^lxjs^I  can  in  praise  of  ,a_n  unjust 
life,  and  I  shall  thus  give  you  a  specimen  of  the  manner 
"in "which  I  wish  to  hear  you  afterwards  censure  injustice 
and  commend  justice.  See  whether  you  approve  of  my 
plan. 

Indeed  I  do;  for  on  what  other  subject  could  a  sensible 
man  like  better  to  talk  and  to  hear  others  talk,  again  and 
again? 

Admirably  spoken!  So  now  listen  to  me  while  I  speak 
on  my  first  theme,  the  nature  and  the  origin  of  justice. 

To  commit  injustice  is,  they  say,  in  its  nature,  a  good 
thing,  and  to  suffer  it  an  evil  thing;  but  the  evil  of  the 
latter  exceeds  the  good  of  the  former ;  and  so,  after  the  two- 
fold experience  of  both  doing  and  suffering  injustice^  those 
who  cannot  avoid  the  latter  and  compass  the  former  find 
it  expedient  to  make  a  compact  of  mutual  abstinence  from 
injustice.  Hence  arose  legislation  and  contracts  between 
man  and  man,  and  hence  it  became  the  custom  to  call 
that  which  the  law  enjoined  just,  as  well  as  lawful.  Such, 
they  tell  us,  is  justice,  and  so  it  came  into  being;  and  it 
stands  midway  between  that  which  is  best,  to  commit 
injustice  with  impunity,  and  that  which  is  worst,  to  suffer 
injustice  without  any  power  of  retaliating.  And  being  a 
mean  between  these  two  extremes,  the  principle  of  justice 
is  regarded  with  satisfaction,  not  as  a  positive  good,  but 
because  the  inablljtyj^^  commit  injustice  has  renderecTTt 
valuable;  for  they  say  that  one  who  had  it  in  his  power  to 
T>e  unjust,  and  who  deserved  the  name  of  a  man,  would 
never  be  so  weak  as  to  contract  with  any  one  that  both 
the  parties  should  abstain  from  injustice.  Such  is  the 
current  account,  Socrates,  of  the  nature  of  justice,  and  of 
the  circumstances  in  which  it  originated. 

The  truth  of  my  second  statement — that  men  practise 
justice  unwillingly,  and  because  they  lack  the  power  to 
violate  it,  will  be  most  readily  perceived,  if  we  make  a 
supposition  like  the  following.  Let  us  give  full  liberty  to 
the  just  man  and  to  the  unjust  alike,  to  do  whatever  they 


46  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  1 

please,  and  then  let  us  follow  them,  and  see  whither  the 
inclination  of  each  will  lead  him.  In  that  case  we  shall 
surprise  the  just  man  in  the  act  of  travelling  in  the  same 
direction  as  the  unjust,  owing  to  that  covetous  desire,  the 
~-j  gratification  of  which  every  creature  naturally  pursues  as 
'  a  good?  only  that  it  isforced"  out  01  its  path  by  law,  and 
constrafneTT^to— Te^pecF  the  principle  of  equality.  That 
full  liberty  of  action  would,  perhaps,  be  most  effectually 
realized  if  they  were  invested  with  a  power  which  they 
say  was  in  old  time  possessed  by  the  ancestor  of  Gyges 
the  Lydian.  He  was  a  shepherd,  so  the  story  runs,  in 
the  service  of  the  reigning  sovereign  of  Lydia,  when  one 
day  a  violent  storm  of  rain  fell,  the  ground  was  rent 
asunder  by  an  earthquake,  and  a  yawning  gulf  appeared 
on  the  spot  where  he  was  feeding  his  flocks.  Seeing 
what  had  happened,  and  wondering  at  it,  he  went  down 
into  the  gulf,  and  among  other  marvellous  objects  he  saw, 
as  the  legend  relates,  a  hollow  brazen  horse,  with  windows 
in  its  sides,  through  which  he  looked,  and  beheld  in  the 
interior  a  corpse,  apparently  of  superhuman  size;  from 
which  he  took  nothing  but  a  golden  ring  off  the  hand, 
and  therewith  made  his  way  out.  Now  when  the  usual 
meeting  of  the  shepherds  occurred,  for  the  purpose  of 
sending  to  the  king  their  monthly  report  of  the  state  of 
his  flocks,  this  shepherd  came  with  the  rest,  wearing  the 
ring.  And,  as  he  was  seated  with  the  company,  he  hap- 
pened to  turn  the  hoop  of  the  ring  round  towards  himself, 
till  it  came  to  the  inside  of  his  hand.  Whereupon  he  be- 
came invisible  to  his  neighbours,  who  fell  to  talking  about 
him  as  if  he  were  gone  away.  While  he  was  marvelling 
at  this,  he  again  began  playing  with  the  ring,  and  turned 
the  hoop  to  the  outside,  upon  which  he  became  once  more 
visible.  Having  noticed  this  effect,  he  made  experiments 
with  the  ring,  to  see  whether  it  possessed  this  virtue;  and 
so  it  was,  that  when  he  turned  the  hoop  inwards  he  became 
invisible,  and  when  he  turned  it  outwards  he  was  again 
visible.  After  this  discovery,  he  immediately  contrived 
to  be  appointed  one  of  the  messengers  to  carry  the  report 
to  the  king;  and  upon  his  arrival  he  seduced  the  queen. 


Book  II.j  THE  REPUBLIC  OP  PLATO.  4? 

and,  conspiring  with  her,  slew  the  king,  and  took  posses- 
sion of  the  throne. 

If  then  there  were  two  such  rings  in  existence,  and  if 
the  just  and  the  unjust  man  were  each  to  put  on  one,  it 
is  to  be  thought  that  no  one  would  be  so  steeled  against 
temptation  as  to  abide  in  the  practice  of  justice,  and 
resolutely  to  abstain  from  touching  the  property  of  his 
neighbours,  when  he  had  it  in  his  power  to  help  himself 
without  fear  to  any  thing  he  pleased  in  the  market,  or  to 
go  into  private  houses  and  have  intercourse  with  whom 
he  would,  or  to  kill  and  release  from  prison  according  to 
his  own  pleasure,  and  in  every  thing  else  to  act  among 
men  with  the  power  of  a  god.  And  in  thus  following  out 
his  desires  the  just  man  will  be  doing  precisely  what  the 
unjust  man  would  do;  and  so  they  would  both  be  pur- 
suing the  same  path.  Surely  this  will  be  allowed  to  be 
strong  evidence  that  none  are  just  willingly,  but  only  by 
compulsion,  because  to  be  just  is  noTa  goocTto  tKeindi- 
vidual;  foT"all  violate  justice  whenever  they  imagine  that 
there  is^nothing  to  hinder  them.  And  they  do  so  because 
every  one  thinks  that,  in  the  individual  case,  injustice  is 
much  more  profitable  than  justice;  and  they  are  right 
in  so  thinking,  as  the  advocate  of  this  doctrine  will  main- 
tain. For  if  any  one  having  this  licence  within  his  grasp 
were  to  refuse  to  do  any  injustice,  or  to  touch  the  property 
of  others,  all  who  were  aware  of  it  would  think  him  a 
most  pitiful  and  irrational  creature,  though  they  would 
praise  him  before  each  other's  faces,  to  impose  on  one 
another,  through  their  fear  of  being  treated  with  injustice. 
And  so  much  for  this  topic. 

But  in  actually  deciding  between  the  lives  of  the  two 
persons  in  question,  we  shall  be  enabled  to  arrive  at  a 
correct  concluison,  by  contrasting  together  the  thoroughly 
just  and  the  thoroughly  unjust  man, — and  only  by  so 
doing.  Well  then,  how  are  we  to  contrast  them?  In  this 
way.  Let  us  make  no  deduction  either  from  the  injustice 
of  the  unjust,  or  from  the  justice  of  the  just,  but  let  us  sup- 
pose each  to  be  perfect  in  his  own  line  of  conduct.  First 
of  all  then,  the  unjust  man  must  act  as  skilful  craftsmen 


48  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  II 

do.  For  a  first-rate  pilot  or  physician  perceives  the  dif- 
ference between  what  is  practicable  and  what  is  imprac- 
ticable in  his  art,  and  while  he  attempts  the  former,  he 
lets  the  latter  alone;  and  moreover,  should  he  happen  to 
make  a  false  step,  he  is  able  to  recover  himself.  In  the 
same  way,  if  we  are  to  form  a  conception  of  a  consum- 
mately unjust  man,  we  must  suppose  that  he  makes  no 
mistake  in  the  prosecution  of  his  unjust  enterprises,  and 
that  he  escapes  detection :  but  if  he  be  found  out,  we  must 
look  upon  him  as  a  bungler;  for  it  is  the  perfection  of  in- 
justice to  seem  just  without  really  being  so.  We  must 
therefore  grant  to  the  perfectly  unjust  man,  without  any 
deduction,  the  most  perfect  injustice:  and  we  must  con- 
cede to  him,  that  while  committing  the  grossest  acts  of  in- 
justice he  has  won  himself  the  highest  reputation  for  jus- 
tice; and  that  should  he  make  a  false  step,  he  is  able  to 
recover  himself,  partly  by  a  talent  for  speaking  with  effect, 
in  case  he  be  called  in  question  for  any  of  his  misdeeds, 
and  partly  because  his  courage  and  strength,  and  his  com- 
mand of  friends  and  money,  enable  him  to  employ  force 
with  success,  whenever  force  is  required.  Such  being  our 
unjust  man,  let  us,  in  pursuance  of  the  argument,  placejjie 
just  man  by  his  side,  a  man  of  true  simplicity  and  noble- 
ness,  resolved,  as  2EschyTus  *  says,  not  to  seem,  but  to  he, 
good.  We  must  certainly  take  away  the  seeming;  for  if 
he  be  thought  to  be  a  just  man,  he  will  have  honours  and 
gifts  on  the  strength  of  this  reputation,  so  that  it  will  be 
uncertain  whether  it  is  for  justice's  sake,  or  for  the  sake  of 
the  gifts  and  honours,  that  he  is  what  he  is.  Yes;  we 
must  strip  him  bare  of  everything  but  justice,  and  make 
his  whole  case  the  reverse  of  the  former.  Without  being 
guilty  of  one  unjust  act,  let  him  have  the  worst  reputation 
for  injustice,  so  that  his  virtue  may  be  thoroughly  tested, 
and  shewn  to  be  proof  against  infamy  and  all  its  conse- 
quences; and  let  him  go  on  till  the  day  of  his  death, 
steadfast  in  his  justice,  but  with  a  lifelong  reputation  for 
injustice,  in  order  that,  having  brought  both  the  men  to 
the  utmost  limits  of  justice  and  of  injustice  respectively, 

*  Seven  against  Thebes,  574. 


Book  II. J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  49 

we  may  then  give  judgment  as  to  which  of  the  two  is  the 
.happier. 

GoodReavens !  my  dear  Glaucon,  said  I,  how  vigor- 
ously you  work,  scouring  the  two  characters  clean  for  our 
judgment,  like  a  pair  of  statues. 

I  do  it  as  well  as  I  can,  he  said.  And  after  describing 
the  men  as  we  have  done,  there  will  be  no  further  diffi- 
culty, I  imagine,  in  proceeding  to  sketch  the  kind  of  life 
which  awaits  them  respectively.  Let  me  therefore  de- 
scribe it.  And  if  the  description  be  somewhat  coarse,  do 
not  regard  it  as  mine,  Socrates,  but  as  coming  from  those 
who  commend  injustice  above  justice.  They  will  say  that 
in  such  a  situation  the  just  man  will  be  scourged,  racked, 
fettered,  will  have  his  eyes  burnt  out,  and  at  last,  after 
suffering  every  kind  of  torture,  will  be  crucified ;  and  jhus 
learn  that  it  is  best  to  resolve,  not  to  he.  hut  to  seem,  iusf. 
Indeed  those  words  of  iEschylus  are  far  more  applicable 
to  the  unjust  man  than  to  the  just.  For  it  is  in  fact  the 
unjust  man,  they  will  maintain,  inasmuch  as  he  devotes 
himself  to  a  course  which  is  allied  to  reality,  and  does  not 
live  with  an  eye  to  appearances,  who  "is  resolved  not  to 
seem,  but  to  be,"  unjust, 

Reaping  a  harvest  of  wise  purposes, 

Sown  in  the  fruitful  furrows  of  his  mind  ; " 

being  enabled  first  of  all  to  hold  offices  of  state  through 
his  reputation  for  justice,  and  in  the  next  place  to  choose 
a  wife  wherever  he  will,  and  marry  his  children  into  what- 
ever family  he  pleases,  to  enter  into  contracts  and  join  in 
partnership  with  any  one  he  likes,  and  besides  all  this,  to 
enrich  himself  by  large  profits,  because  he  is  not  too  nice 
to  commit  a  fraud.  Therefore,  whenever  he  engages  in  a 
contest,  whether  public  or  private,  he  defeats  and  over- 
reaches his  enemies,  and  by  so  doing  grows  rich,  and  is 
enabled  to  benefit  his  friends  and  injure  his  enemies,  and 
to  offer  sacrifices  and  dedicate  gifts  to  the  gods  in  magnifi- 
cent abundance:  and  thus  having  greatly  the  advantage 
of  the  just  man  in  the  means  of  paying  court  to  the  gods, 


50  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  It 

as  well  as  to  such  men  as  he  chooses,  he  is  also  more 
likely  than  the  just  man,  as  far  as  probabilities  go,  to 
enjoy  the  favour  of  heaven.  And  therefore  they  affirm, 
Socrates,  that  a  better  provision  is  made  both  by  gods 
and  men  for  the  life  of  the  unjust,  than  for  the  life  of  the 
just. 

When  Glaucon  had  said  this,  before  I  could  make  the 
reply  I  was  meditating,  his  brother  Adeimantus  exclaimed, 
You  surely  do  not  suppose,  Socrates,  that  the  doctrine  has 
been  satisfactorily  expounded. 

Why  not,  pray?  said  I. 

The  very  point  which  it  was  most  important  to  urge  has 
been  omitted. 

Well  then,  according  to  the  proverb,  "  May  a  brother  be 
present  to  help  one,"  it  is  for  you  to  supply  his  deficiencies, 
if  there  are  any,  by  your  assistance.  But  indeed,  for 
my  part,  what  Glaucon  has  said  is  enough  to  prostrate 
me,  and  put  it  out  of  my  power  to  come  up  to  the  rescue 
of  justice. 

You  are  not  in  earnest,  he  said:  pray  listen  to  the 
following  argument  also;  for  we  must  now  go  through 
those  representations  which,  reversing  the  declarations  of 
Glaucon,  commend  justice  and  disparage  injustice,  in 
order  to  bring  out  more  clearly  what  I  take  to  be  his 
meaning.  Now  I  apprehend  that  when  parents  and  others 
set  forth  the  duty  of  being  just,  and  impress  it  upon 
their  children  or  those  in  whom  they  feel  an  interest,  they 
do  not  praise  justice  in  itself,  but  only  the  respectability 
which  it  gives;  their  object  being  that  a  reputation  for 
justice  may  be  gained,  and  that  this  reputation  may  bring 
in  the  preferment,  the  marriages,  and  the  other  good 
things  which  Glaucon  has  just  told  us  are  secured  to  the 
just  man  by  his  high  character.  And  these  persons  carry 
the  advantages  of  a  good  name,  still  further ;  for,  by  intro- 
ducing the  good  opinion  of  the  gods,  they  are  enabled  to 
describe  innumerable  blessings  which  the  gods,  they  say, 
grant  to  the  pious,  as  the  excellent  Hesiod  tells  us,  and 
Homer  too;  the  former  saying,  that  the  gods  cause  the 
oak-trees  of  the  just 


Bock  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  51 

"  On  their  tops  to  bear  acorns,  and  swarms  of  bees  in  tne  middle  ; 
Also  their  wool-laden  sheep  sink  under  the  weight  of  their 
fleeces ;" * 

with  many  other  good  things  of  the  same  sort:  while  the 
latter,  in  a  similar  passage,  speaks  of  one, 

"  Like  to  a  blameless  king,  who,  godlike  in  virtue  and  wisdom, 
Justice  ever  maintains  ;  whose  rich  land  fruitfully  yields  him 
Harvests  of  barley  and  wheat,  and  his  orchards  are  heavy  with 

fruitage  ; 
Strong  are  the  young  of  his  flocks  ;  and  the  sea  gives  him  fish  in 

abundance."  f 

But  the  blessings  which  Musaeus  and  his  son  Eumolpus 
represent  the  gods  as  bestowing  upon  the  just,  are  still 
more  delectable  than  these;  for  they  bring  them  to  the 
abode  of  Hades,  and  describe  them  as  reclining  on 
couches  at  a  banquet  of  the  pious,  and  with  garlands  on 
their  heads  spending  all  eternity  in  wine-bibbing,  the 
fairest  reward  of  virtue  being,  in  their  estimation,  an  ever- 
lasting carousal.  Others,  again,  do  not  stop  even  here  in 
their  enumeration  of  the  rewards  bestowed  by  the  gods; 
for  they  tell  us  that  the  man  who  is  pious  and  true  to  his 
oath  leaves  children's  children  and  a  posterity  to  follow 
him.  Such,  among  others,  are  the  commendations  which 
they  lavish  upon  justice.  The  ungodly,  on  the  other  hand, 
and  the  unjust,  they  plunge  into  a  swamp  in  Hades,  and 
condemn  them  to  carry  water  in  a  sieve;  and  while  they 
are  still  alive,  they  bring  them  into  evil  repute,  and  inflict 
upon  the  unjust  precisely  those  punishments  which 
Glaucon  enumerated  as  the  lot  of  the  just  who  are  reputed 
to  be  unjust, — more  they  cannot.  Such  is  their  method 
of  praising  the  one  character  and  condemning  the  other. 

Once  more,  Socrates,  take  into  consideration  another 
and  a  different  mode  of  speaking  with  regard  to  justice 
and  injustice,  which  we  meet  with  both  in  common  life 
and  in  the  poets.  All  as  with  one  mouth  proclaim,  that 
to  be  temperate  and  just  is  an  admirable  thing  certainly, 

*  Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  281. 
f  Homer,  Odyssey,  xix.  109. 


52  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  II 

but  at  the  sanafi  lima  «  hard  and  an  irksome  one;  while 
intemperance  and  injustice  are  pleasant  things  and  of  easy 
acquisition,  and  only  rendered  base  by  law  and  public 
opinion.  But  they  say  that  honesty  is  in  general  less 
profitable  than  dishonesty,  and  they  do  not  hesitate  to 
call  wicked  men  happy,  and  to  honour  them  both  in  pub- 
lic and  in  private,  when  they  are  rich  or  possess  othr^r 
sources  of  power,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  treat  with  dis- 
honour and  contempt  those  who  are  in  any  way  feeble  or 
poor,  even  while  they  admit  that  the  latter  are  better  nun 
than  the  former.  But  of  all  their  statements  the  most 
wonderful  are  those  which  relate  to  the  gods  and  to  virtue ; 
according  to  which  even  the  gods  allot  to  many  good  men 
a  calamitous  and  an  evil  life,  and  to  men  of  the  opposite 
character  an  opposite  portion.  And  there  are  quacks  and 
soothsayers  who  flock  to  the  rich  man's  doors,  and  try  to 
persuade  him  that  they  have  a  power  at  command,  which 
they  procure  from  heaven,  and  which  enables  them,  by 
sacrifices  and  incantations  performed  amid  feasting  and 
indulgence,  to  make  amends  for  any  crime  committed 
either  by  the  individual  himself  or  by  his  ancestors;  and 
that,  should  he  desire  to  do  a  mischief  to  any  one,  it  may 
be  done  *  at  a  trifling  expense,  whether  the  object  of  his 
hostility  be  a  just  or  an  unjust  man ;  for  they  profess  that 
by  certain  invocations  and  spells  they  can  prevail  upon 
the  gods  to  do  their  bidding.  And  in  support  of  all  these 
assertions  they  produce  the  evidence  of  poets:  some,  to 
exhibit  the  facilities  of  vice,  quoting  the  words — 

"Whoso  wickedness  seeks,   may  even  in   masses  obtain  it 
Easily.    Smooth  is  the  way,  and  short,  for  nigh  is  her  dwelling. 
Virtue,  Heav'n  has  ordained,  shall  be  reached  by  the  sweat  of 
the  forehead,"  f 

and  by  a  long  and  up-hill  road ;  while  others,  to  prove  that 
the  gods  may  be  turned  from  their  nurpose  by  men, 
adduce  the  testimony  of  Homer,J  who  has  Bald; 

*  Bliaipai,   the   emendation    of    Muretus.    sppms   w^ fern  hie   *o 
Pidtpetv,  which  is  the  reading  of  Bekker  and  the  Zurich  Edition, 
f  Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  387. 
t  Iliad,  ix.  497. 


Book  It.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  53 

"  Yea,  even  the  gods  do  yield  to  entreaty  ; 
Therefore  to  them  men  offer  both  victims  and  meek  supplications, 
Incense  and  melting  fat,  and  turn  them  from  anger  to  mercy  ; 
Sending  up  sorrowful  prayers,  when  trespass  and  sin  is  com- 
mitted." 

And  they  produce  a  host  of  books,  written  by  Musgeus 
and  Orpheus,  children,  as  they  say,  of  Selene  and  of  the 
Muses,  which  form  their  ritual, — persuading  not  indi- 
viduals merely,  but  whole  cities  also,  that  men  may  be 
absolved  and  purified  from  crimes,  both  while  they  are 
still  alive  and  even  after  their  decease,  by  means  of  cer- 
tain sacrifices  and  pleasurable  amusements  which  they 
call  Mysteries:  which  deliver  us  from  the  torments  of  the 
other  world,  while  the  neglect  of  them  is  punished  by  an 
awful  doom. 

When  views  like  these,  he  continued,  my  dear  Socrates, 
are  proclaimed  and  repeated  with  so  much  variety,  con- 
cerning the  honours  in  which  virtue  and  vice  are  respec- 
tively held  by  gods  and  men,  what  can  we  suppose  is  the 
effect  produced  on  the  minds  of  all  those  young  men  of 
good  natural  parts  who  are  able,  after  skimming  like 
birds,  as  it  were,  over  all  that  they  hear,  to  draw  con- 
clusions from  it,  respecting  the  character  which  a  man 
must  possess,  and  the  path  in  which  he  must  walk,  in 
order  to  live  the  best  possible  life?  In  all  probability  a 
young  man  would  say  to  himself  in  the  words  of  Pindar,* 
"  Shall  I  by  justice  or  by  crooked  wiles  climb  to  a  loftier 
stronghold,  and,  having  thus  fenced  myself  about,  live  my 
life?  For  common  opinion  dedans  that  to  be  just  with- 
out being" aiso  thought  just,  is  no  advantage  to  me,  but 
only  entails  manifest  trouble  and  loss;  whereas  if  I  am 
unjust  and  get  myself  a  name  for  justice,  an  unspeakably 
happy  life  is  promised  me.  Very  well  then;  since  the 
outward  semblance,  as  the  wise  inform  me,  overpower? 
the  inward  reality,  and  is  the  sovereign  dispenser  of  feli- 
city, to  this  I  must  of  course  wholly  devote  myself:  I 
must  draw  round  about  me  a  picture  of  virtue  to  serve  as 
a  frontage  and  exterior,  but  behind  me  I  must  trail  the 

*  Thi3  passage  is  not  found  in  Pindar's  extant  works. 


54  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  II. 

fox,  of  which  that  most  clever  Archilochus  tells  us,  with 
its  cunning  and  shiftiness.*  Yes  but,  it  will  be  objected, 
it  is  not  an  easy  matter  alwa}rs  to  conceal  one's  wicked- 
ness. No,  we  shall  reply,  nor  yet  is  anything  else  easy 
that  is  great:  nevertheless,  if  happiness  is  to  be  our  goal, 
this  must  be  our  path,  as  the  steps  of  the  argument  indi- 
cate. To  assist  in  keeping  up  the  deception,  we  will  form 
secret  societies  and  clubs.  There  are,  moreover,  teachers 
of  persuasion,  who  impart  skill  in  popular  and  forensic 
oratory;  and  so  by  fair  means  or  by  foul,  we  shall  gain 
our  ends,  and  cajrry  on  our  dishonest  proceedings  with 
impunity.  Nay  but,  it  is  urged,  neither  evasion  nor  vio- 
lence can' succeed  with  the  gods.  Well,  but  if  they  either 
do  not  exist,  or  do  not  concern  themselves  with  the  affairs 
of  men,  why  need  we  concern  ourselves  to  evade  their 
observation?  But  if  they  do  exist,  and  do  pay  attention 
to  us,  we  know  nothing  and  have  heard  nothing  of  them 
from  any  other  quarter  than  the  current  traditions  and 
the  genealogies  of  poets;  and  these  very  authorities  state 
that  the  gods  are  beings  who  may  be  wrought  upon  and 
diverted  from  their  purpose  by  sacrifices  and  meek  sup- 
plications and  votive  offerings.  Therefore  we  must  be- 
lieve them  in  both  statements  or  in  neither.  If  we  are  to 
believe  them,  we  will  act  unjustly,  and  offer  sacrifices  from 
the  proceeds  of  our  crimes.  For  if  we  are  just,  we  shall, 
it  is  true,  escape  punishment  at  the  hands  of  the  gods,  but 
we  renounce  the  profits  which  accrue  from  injustice:  but 
if  we  are  unjust,  we  shall  not  only  make  these  gains,  but 
also  by  putting  up  prayers  when  we  transgress  and  sin,  we 
shall  prevail  upon  the  gods  to  let  us  go  unscathed.  But 
then,  it  is  again  objected,  in  Hades  we  shall  pay  the  just 
penalty  for  the  crimes  committed  here,  either  in  our  own 
persons  or  in  those  of  our  children's  children.     Nay  but, 

*  The  difficulty  of  this  passage,  which  appears  to  be  fairly 
chargeable  with  confusion  of  metaphors,  is  increased  by  our 
ignorance  of  the  fable  of  Archilochus,  to  which  reference  is  made 
hv  other  writers  as  well  as  Plato.  It  is  probable,  however,  that 
the  fox  is  here  simply  the  emblem  of  selfish  cunning,  an  applica- 
tion of  which  Archilochus  set  the  first  example  in  Greek  lit- 
erature. 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  55 

my  friend,  the  champion  of  the  argument  will  continue, 
the  mystic  rites,  again,  are  very  powerful,  and  the  absolv- 
ing divinities,  as  we  are  told  by  the  mightiest  cities,  and 
by  the  sons  of  the  gods  who  have  appeared  as  poets  and 
inspired  prophets,  who  inform  us  that  these  things  are  so. 

What  consideration,  therefore,  remains  which  should  in- 
duce us  to  prefer  justice  to  the  greatest  injustice?  Since 
if  we  combine  injustice  with  a  spurious  decorum,  we  shall 
fare  to  our  liking  with  the  gods  and  with  men,  in  this  life 
and  the  next,  according  to  the  most  numerous  and  the 
highest  authorities.  Considering  all  that  has  been  said,  by 
what  device,  Socrates,  can  a  man  who  has  any  advantages, 
either  of  high  talent,  or  wealth,  or  personal  appearance, 
or  birth,  bring  himself  to  honour  jnatinp,  iagtaad  of  smil- 
ing wheiThe  hears  it  praised  Indeed,  if  there  is  any  one 
who  is  able  to  shew  the  falsity  of  what  we  have  said,  and 
who  is  fully  convinced  that  justice  is  best,  far  from  being 
angry  with  the  unjust,  he  doubtless  makes  great  allowance 
for  them,  knowing  that,  with  the  exception  of  those  who 
may  possibly  refrain  from  injustice  through  the  disgust  of 
a  godlike  nature  or  from  the  acquisition  of  genuine  knowl- 
edge, there  is  certainly  no  one  else  who  is  willingly  just; 
but  it  is  from  cowardice,  or  age,  or  some  other  infirmity, 
that  men  condemn  injustice,  simply  because  they  lack  the 
power  to  commit  it.  And  the  truth  of  this  is  proved  by 
the  fact,  that  the  first  of  these  people  who  comes  to 
power  is  the  first  to  commit  injustice,  to  the  extent  of  his 
ability. 

And  the  cause  of  all  this  is  simply  that  fact,  which  my 
brother  and  I  both  stated  at  the  very  commencement  of 
this  address  to  you,  Socrates,  saying;  With  much  respect 
be  it  spoken,  you  who  profess  to  be  admirers  of  justice, 
beginning  with  the  heroes  of  old,  of  whom  accounts  have 
descended  to  the  present  generation,  have  every  one  of  you, 
without  exception,  made  the  praise  of  justice  and  condem- 
nation of  injustice  turn  solely  upon  the  reputation  and 
honour  and  gifts  resulting  from  them :  but  what  each  is  in 
itself,  by  its  own  peculiar  force  as  it  resides  in  the  soul  of 
its  possessor,  unseen  either  by  gods  or  men,  has  never,  in 


56  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  II 

poetry  or  in  prose  been  adequately  discussed,  so  as  ta 
shew  that  injustice  is  the  greatest  bane  that  a  soul  can 
receive  into  itself,  and  justice  the  greatest  blessing.  Had 
this  been  the  language  held  by  you  all  from  the  first,  and 
had  you  tried  to  persuade  us  of  this  from  our  childhood, 
we  should  not  be  on  the  watch  to  check  one  another  in 
the  commission  of  injustice,  because  every  one  would  be 
his  own  watchman,  fearful  lest  by  committing  injustice  he 
might  attach  to  himself  the  greatest  of  evils. 

All  this,  Socrates,  and  perhaps  still  more  than  this, 
would  be  put  forward  respecting  justice  and  injustice,  by 
Thrasymachus,  and  I  dare  say  by  others  also;  thus  ignor- 
antly  reversing,  in  my  opinion,  the  inherent  efficacy  of 
each.  For  my  own  part,  I  confess  (for  I  do  not  want  to 
hide  anything  from  you)  that  I  have  a  great  desire  to  hear 
you  defend  the  opposite  view,  and  therefore  I  have  exerted 
myself  to  speak  as  forcibly  as  I  can.  So  do  not  limit 
your  argument  to  the  proposition,  that  justice  is  superior 
to  injustice)  but  shew  us  what  is  that  influence  exerted  by 
each  of  them  on  its  possessor,  whereby  the  one  is  in  itserf 
a  blessing,  and  the  other  a  bane:  and  deduct  the  esti- 
mation in  which  the  two  are  held,  as  Glaucon  urged  you  to 
do.  For  if  you  omit  to  withdraw  from  each  quality  its 
true  reputation  and  to  add  the  false,  we  shall  declare  that 
you  are  praising,  not  the  reality,  but  the  semblance  of 
justice,  and  blaming,  not  the  reality,  but  the  semblance  of 
injustice;  that  your  advice,  in  fact,  is  to  be  unjust  without 
being  found  out,  and  that  you  hold  with  Thrasymachus, 
that  justice  is  another  man's  good,  being  for  the  interest 
of  the  stronger;  injustice  a  man's  own  interest  and  ad- 
vantage, but  against  the  interest  of  the  weaker.  Since 
then  you  have  allowed  that  justice  belongs  to  the  highest 
class  of  good  things,  the  possession  of  which  is  valuable, 
both  for  the  sake  of  their  results,  and  also  in  a  higher 
degree  for  their  own  sake, — such  as  sight,  hearing,  intelli- 
gence, health,  and  everything  else  which  is  genuinely 
good  in  its  own  nature  and  not  merely  reputed  to  be 
good, — select  for  commendation  this  particular  feature  of 
justice,  I  mean  the  benefit  which  in  itself  it  confers  on  its 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  57 

possessor,  in  contrast  with  the  harm  which  injustice  in- 
flicts. The  rewards  and  reputations  leave  to  others  to 
praise;  because  in  others  I  can  tolerate  this  mode  of 
praising  justice  and  condemning  injustice,  which  consists 
in  eulogizing  or  reviling  the  reputations  and  the  rewards 
which  are  connected  with  them;  but  in  you  I  cannot, 
unless  you  require  it,  because  you  have  spent  your  whole 
life  in  investigating  such  questions,  and  such  only.  There- 
f ore  do  not  content  yourself  with  proving  to  us  that  justice. 
is  Better  than  injustice;  but  shew  us  what  is  that  influence 
exerted  by  each  on  its  possessor,  by  which,  whether  gods 
and  men  see  it  or  not,  the  one  is  in  itself  a  blessing,  and 
the  other  a  bane. 

Much  as  I  had  always  admired  the  talents  both  of 
Glaucon  and  Adeimantus,  I  confess  that  on  this  occasion 
I  was  quite  charmed  with  what  I  had  heard;  so  I  said: 
Fitiy  Indeed  did  Glaucon's  admirer  address  you,  ye  sons 
of  the  man  there  named,  in  the  first  line  of  his  elegiac 
poem,  after  you  had  distinguished  yourselves  in  the  battle 
of  Megara,  saying: 

"  Race  of  a  famous  man,  ye  godlike  sons  of  Ariston." 

There  seems  to  me  to  be  great  truth  in  this  epithet,  my 
friends:  for  there  is  something  truly  god-like  in  the  state 
of  your  minds,  if  you  are  not  convinced  that  injustice  is 
better  than  justice,  when  you  can  plead  its  cause  so  well. 
I  do  believe  that  you  really  are  not  convinced  of  it.  But 
I  infer  it  from  your  general  character ;  for  judging  merely 
from  your  statements  I  should  have  distrusted  you:  but 
the  more  I  place  confidence  in  you,  the  more  I  am  per- 
plexed how  to  deal  with  the  case;  for  though  I  do  not 
know  how  I  am  to  render  assistance,  having  learnt  how 
unequal  I  am  to  the  task  from  your  rejection  of  my  answer 
to  Thrasymachus,  wherein  I  imagined  that  I  had  demon- 
strated that  justice  is  better  than  injustice;  yet,  on  the 
other  hand,  I  dare  not  refuse  my  assistance:  because 
I  am  afraid  that  it  might  be  positively  sinful  in  me,  when 
I  hear  Justice  evil  spoken  of  in  my  presence,  to  lose  heart 


<% 


58  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IT. 

and  desert  her,  so  long  as  breath  and  utterance  are  left  in 
me.  My  best  plan,  therefore,  is  to  succour  her  in  such 
fashion  as  I  can. 

Thereupon  Glaucon,  and  all  the  rest  with  him,  requested 
me  by  all  means  to  give  my  assistance,  and  not  to  let  the 
conversation  drop,  but  thoroughly  to  investigate  the  real 
nature  of  justice  and  injustice,  and  which  is  the  true 
doctrine  with  regard  to  their  respective  advantages.  So 
I  said  what  I  really  felt:  The  inquiry  we  are  undertaking 
is  no  trivial  one,  but  demands  a  keen  sight,  according  to 
my  notion  of  it.  Therefore,  since  I  am  not  a  clever  per- 
son, I  think  we  had  better  adopt  a  mode  of  inquiry  which 
may  be  thus  illustrated  Suppose  we  had  been  ordered 
to  read  small  writing  at  a  distance,  not  having  very  good 
eye-sight,  and  that  one  of  us  discovered  that  the  same 
writing  was  to  be  found  somewhere  else  in  larger  letters, 
and  upon  a  larger  space,  we  should  have  looked  upon 
it  as  a  piece  of  luck,  I  imagine,  that  we  could  read  the 
latter  first,  and  then  examine  the  smaller,  and  observe 
whether  the  two  were  alike. 

Undoubtedly  we  should,  said  Adeimantus;  but  what 
parallel  can  you  see  to  this,  Socrates,  in  our  inquiry  after 
justice. 

I  will  tell  you,  I  replied.  We  speak  of  justice  as  re- 
siding in  an  individual  mind,  and  as  residing  also  in  an 
entire  city,  do  we  not? 

Certainly  we  do,  he  said. 

Well,  a  city  is  larger  than  one  man. 

It  is. 

Perhaps,  then,  justice  may  exist  in  larger  proportions  in 
the  greater  subject,  and  thus  be  easier  to  discover;  so,  if 
you  please,  let  us.Jirp.t_  investigate  its  character  in  cities ; 
afterwards  let  us  apply  the  salne~rn7]uiry  tolhe  individual, 
looking  for  the  counterpart  of  the  greater  as  it  exists  in 
the  form  of  the  less. 

Indeed,  he  said,  I  think  your  plan  is  a  good  one. 

If  then  we  were  to  trace  in  thought  the  gradual  forma- 
tion of  a  city,  should  we  also  see  the  growth  of  its  justice 
or  of  its  injustice? 


Book  II.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  59 

Perhaps  we  should. 

Then,  if  this  were  done,  might  we  not  hope  to  see  more 
easily  the  object  of  our  search  ? 

Yes,  much  more  easily. 

Is  it  your  advice,  then,  that  we  should  attempt  to  carry 
out  our  plan  ?  It  is  no  trifling  task,  I  imagine ;  therefore 
consider  it  well. 

We  have  considered  it,  said  Adeimantus;  yes,  do  so  by 
all  means. 

Well  then,  I  proceeded,  the  formation  of  a  city  is  due, 
as  I  imagine,  to  this  fact,  that  we  are  not  individually  in- 
dependent, but  have  many  wants.  Or  would  you  assign 
any  other  cause  for  the  founding  of  cities? 

No,  I  agree  with  you,  he  replied. 

Thus  it  is,  then,  that  owing  to  our  many  wants,  and 
because  each  seeks  the  aid  of  others  to  supply  his  various 
requirements,  we  gather  many  associates  and  helpers  into 
one  dwelling-place,  and  give  to  this  joint  dwelling  the 
name  of  city.    Is  it  so? 

Undoubtedly. 

And  every  one  who  gives  or  takes  in  exchange,  what- 
ever it  be  that  he  exchanges,  does  so  from  a  belief  that  he 
is  consulting  his  own  interest. 

Certainly. 

Now  then,  let  us  construct  our  imaginary  city  from  the 
beginning.  It  will  owe  its  construction,  it  appears,  to  our 
natural  wants.    ._ 

Unquestionably.  * 

Well,  but  the  first  and  most  pressing  of  all  wants  is  that  w<* 
of  sustenance  to  enable  us  to  exist  as  living  creatures. 

Most  decidedly. 

Our  second  want  would  be  that  of  a  house,  and  our 
third  that  of  clothing  and  the  like. 

True. 

Then  let  us  know  what  will  render  our  city  adequate  to 
the  supply  of  so  many  things.  Must  we  not  begin  with  a 
husbandman  for  one,  and  a  house-builder,  and  besides 
these  a  weaver?    Will  these  suffice,  or  shall  we  add  to 


60  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO  [Book  IL 

them  a  shoemaker,  and  perhaps  one  or  two  more  of  the 
class  of  people  who  minister  to  our  bodily  wants? 

By  all  means. 

Then  the  smallest  possible  city  will  consist  of  four  or 
five  men. 

So  we  see. 

To  proceed  then:  ought  each  of  these  to  place  his  own 
work  at  the  disposal  of  the  community,  so  that  the  single 
husbandman,  for  example,  shall  provide  food  for  four, 
spending  four  times  the  amount  of  time  and  labour  upon 
the  preparation  of  food,  and  sharing  it  with  others;  or 
must  he  be  regardless  of  them,  and  produce  for  his  own 
consumption  alone  the  fourth  part  of  this  quantity  cf  food, 
in  a  fourth  part  of  the  time,  spending  the  other  three 
parts,  one  in  making  his  house,  another  in  procuring 
himself  clothes,  and  the  third  in  providing  himself  with 
*\  shoes,  saving  himself  the  trouble  of  sharing  with  others, 
and  doing  his  own  business  by  himself,  and  for  him- 
self? 

To  this  Adeimantus  replied,  Well,  Socrates,  perhaps 
the  former  plan  is  the  easier  of  the  two. 

Eeally,  I  said,  it  is  not  improbable;  for  I  recollect, 
myself,  after  your  answer,  that,  in  the  first  place,  no 
two  persons  are  born  exactly  alike,  but  each  differs  from 
each  in  natural  endowments,  one  being  suited  for  one 
occupation,  and  another  for  another.  Do  you  not  think 
so? 

I  do. 

Well;  when  is  a  man  likely  to  succeed  best?  When 
he  divides  his  exertions  among  many  trades,  or  wien_he 
devotes  'himself  exclusively  to  one? 

When  he  devotes  himself  to  one. 

Again,  it  is  also  clear,  I  imagine,  that  if  a  person  lets 
the  right  moment  for  any  work  go  by,  it  never  returns. 

It  is  quite  clear. 

For  the  thing  to  be  done  does  not  choose,  I  imagine, 
to  tarry  the  leisure  of  the  doer,  but  the  doer  must  be  at 
the  beck  of  the  thing  to  be  done,  and  not  treat  it  as  a 
secondary  affair, 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  61 

He  must. 

From  these  considerations  it  follows,  that  all  things  will 
be  produced  in  superior  quantity  and  quality,  and  with 
greater  ease,  when  each  man  works  at  a  single  occupa- 
tion, in  accordance  with  "his  natural  gifts,  and  at" "the' right 
moment,  without  meddling  with  anything  else. 

Unquestionably. 

More  than  four  citizens.  thenr  Adeimantus.  are  needed 
to  provide  the  requisites  which  we  named.  For  the  hus- 
bandman, it  appears,  will  not  make  his  own  plough,  if  it 
is  to  be  a  good  one,  nor  his  mattock,  nor  any  of  the  other 
tools  employed  in  agriculture.  No  more  will  the  builder 
make  the  numerous  tools  which  he  also  requires:  and  so 
of  the  weaver  and  the  shoemaker. 

True. 

Then  we  shall  have  carpenters  and  smiths,  and  many 
other  artisans  of  the  kind,  who  will  become  members  of 
our  little  state,  and  create  a,  population. 

Certainly. 

Still  it  will  not  yet  be^fery  large,  supposing  we  add  to 
them  neatherds  and  shepherds,  and  the  rest  of  that  class, 
in  order  that  the  husbandmen  may  have  oxen  for  plough- 
ing, and  the  house-builders,  as  well  as  the  husbandmen, 
beasts  of  burden  for  draughts,  and  the  weavers  and  shoe- 
makers wool  and  leather. 

It  will  not  be  a  small  state,  either,  if  it  contains  all 
these. 

Moreover,  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  plant  the  actual  city 
in  a  place  where  it  will  have  no  need  of  imports.^ 

No,  it  is  impossible. 

Then  it  will  further  require  a  new  class  of  persons 
bririg  from  other  cities  all  that  it  requires. 

It  will. 

Well,  but  if  the  agent  goes  empty-handed,  carrying 
with  him  none  of  the  commodities  in  demand  among  those 
people  from  whom  our  state  is  to  procure  what  it  requires, 
he  will  also  come  empty-handed  away:  will  he  not? 

I  think  so. 

Then  it  must  produce  at  home  not  only  enough  fox 


62  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IL 

itself,  but  also  articles  of  the  right  kind  and  quantity  to 
accommodate  those  whose  services  it  needs. 

It  must. 

Then  our  city  requires  larger  numbers  both  of  hus- 
bandmen and  other  craftsmen. 

Yes,  it  does. 

And  among  the  rest  it  will  need  more  of  those  agents 
also,  who  are  to  export  and  import  the  several  commodi- 
ties :  and  these  are  merchants,  are  they  not  ? 

Yes. 

Then  we  shall  require  merchants  also. 

Certainly. 

And  if  the  traffic  is  carried  on  by  sea,  there  will  be  a 
further  demand  for  a  considerable  number  of  other  per- 
sons  who  are  skilled  in  the  practice  of  navigation. 

A  considerable  number,  undoubtedly. 

But  now  tell  me:  in  the  city  itself  how  are  they  to 
exchange  their  several  productions?  For  it  was  to  pro- 
mote this  exchange,  you  know,  that  we~  i ormed.  tne  com- 
munity, and  so"  founded  ouT  stated 

Manifestly,  by  buying  and  selling. 

Then  this  will  give  rise  to  a  market  and  a  currency,  for 
the  sake  of  exchange.  ' 

Undoubtedly. 

Suppose  then  that  the  husbandman,  or  one  of  the  other 
craftsmen,  should  come  with  some  of  his  produce  into  the 
market,  at  a  time  when  none  of  those  who  wish  to  make 
an  exchange  with  him  are  there,  is  he  to  leave  his  occu- 
pation and  sit  idle  in  the  market-place, 
r  By  no  means:  there  are  persons  who,  with  an  eye  to 
this  contingency,  undertake  the  service  required;  and 
these  in  well-regulated  states  are,  generally  speaking, 
persons  of  excessive  physical  weakness,  who  are  of  no  use 
in  other  kinds  of  labour.  Their  business  is  to  remain  on 
the  spot  in  the  market,  and  give  money  for  goods  to  those 
who  want  to  sell,  and  goods  for  money  to  those  who  want 
to  buy. 

This  demand,  then,  causes  a  class  of  retail  dealers  to 
spring  up  in  our  city.     For  do  we  not  give  the  name  of 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  63 

retail  dealers  to  those  who  station  themselves  in  the 
market,  to  minister  to  buying  and  selling,  applying  the 
term  merchants  to  those  who  go  about  from  city  to  city? 

Exactly  so.' 

In  addition  to  these,  I  imagine  there  is  also  another 
class  of  operatives,  consisting  of  those  whose  mental 
qualifications  do  not  recommend  them  as  associates,  but 
whose  bodily  strength  is  equal  to  hard  labour:  these, 
selling  the  use  of  their  strength  and  calling  the  price  of  it 
hire,  are  thence  named,  I  believe,  I^rjed^abourers.  Is  it 
not  so? 

Precisely. 

Then  hired  labourers  also  form,  as  it  seems,  a  comple- 
mentary portion  of  a  state. 

I  think  so. 

Shall  we  say  then,  Adeimantus,  that  our  city  has  at 
length  grown  to  its  full  stature? 

Perhaps  so. 

Where  then^I  wonder,  shall  we  find  justice  and  injustice 
in  it?  With  which  of  these  elements  that  we  have  con- 
templated, has  it  simultaneously  made  its  entrance? 

I  have  no  notion,  Socrates,  unless  perhaps  it  be  dis- 
coverable somewhere  in  the  jnutual^rejations  of  these 
same  persons. 

Well,  perhaps  you  are  right.  We  must  investigate  the 
matter,  and  not  flinch  from  the  task. 

Let  us  consider  then,  in  the  first  place,  what  kinfljrf 
life  will  be  led  by  persons  thus  provided.  I  presume  they  j^tft**^ 
will  produce  corn  and  wine,  and  clothes  and  shoes,  and 
build  themselves  houses;  and  in  summer,  no  doubt,  they 
will  generally  work  without  their  coats  and  shoes,  while 
in  winter  they  will  be  suitably  clothed  and  shod.  And 
they  will  live,  I  suppose,  on  barley  and  wheat,  baking 
cakes  of  the  meal,  and  kneading  loaves  of  the  flour.  And 
spreading  these  excellent  cakes  and  loaves  upon  mats  of 
straw  or  on  clean  leaves,  and  themselves  reclining  on 
rude  beds  of  yew  or  myrtle-boughs,  they  will  make  merry, 
themselves  and  their  children,  drinking  their  wine,  wear- 


6*  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  II 


/ 


ing  garlands,  and  singing  the  praises  of  the  gods,  enjoying 
one  another's  society,  and  not  begetting  children  beyond 
their  means,  through  a  prudent  fear  of  poverty  or  war. 

Glaucon  here  interrupted  me,  remarking,  Apparently 
you  describe  your  men  as  feasting  without  anything  to 
relish  their  bread. 

True,  I  said,  I  had  forgotten : — of  course  they  will  have 
something  to  relish  their  food;  salt,  no  doubt,  and  olives 
and  cheese,  together  with  the  country  fare  of  boiled  onions 
and  cabbage.  We  shall  also  set  before  them  a  dessert,  I 
imagine,  of  figs  and  pease  and  beans;  and  they  may  roast 
myrtle-berries  and  beech-nuts  at  the  fire,  taking  wine  with 
their  fruit  in  moderation.  And  thus  passing  their  days  in 
tranquillity  and  sound  health,  they  will,  in  all  probability, 
live  to  an  advanced  age,  and  dying,  bequeath  to  their 
children  a  life  in  which  their  own  will  be  reproduced. 

Upon  this  Glaucon  exclaimed,  Why  Socrates,  if  you 
were  founding  a  community  of  swine,  this  is  just  the  style 
in  which  you  would  feed  them  up ! 

How  then,  said  I,  would  you  have  them  live,  Glaucon  ? 

In  a  civilized  manner,  he  replied.  They  ought  to  recline 
\  on  couches,  I  should  think,  if  they  are  not  to  have  a  hard 
life  of  it,  and  dine  off  tables,  and  have  the  usual  dishes 
and  dessert  of  a  modern  dinner. 

Very  good;  I  understand.  Apparently  we  are  consid- 
ering the  growth  not  of  a  city  merely,  but  of  a  luxurious 
city.  I  dare  say  it  is  not  a  bad  plan:  for  by  this  exten- 
sion of  our  inquiry  we  shall  perhaps  discover  how  it  is 
that  justice  and  injustice  take  root  in  cities.  Now  it 
appears  to  me  that  the  city  which  we  have  described  is 
the  genuine  and,  so  to  speak,  healthy  city.  But  if  you 
wish  us  also  to  contemplate  a  city  that  is  suffering  from 
inflammation,  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  us.  Some  people 
will  not  be  satisfied,  it  seems,  with  the  fare  or^the-mode 
of  life"  which  we  have  described,  but  must  have,  in  addi- 
tion, couches  and  tables  and  every  other  article  of  furni- 
ture, as  well  as  viands,  and  fragrant  oils,  and  perfumes, 
and  courtesans,  and  confectionery;  and  all  these  in  plen- 
tiful variety.    Moreover,  we  must  not  limit  ourselves  now 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  65 

to  essentials  in  those  articles  which  we  specified  at  first,  I 
mean  houses  and  clothes  and  shoes,  but  we  must  set 
painting  and  embroidery  to  work,  and  acquire  gold  and 
ivory,  and  all  similar  valuables :  must  we  not  ? 

Yes. 

Then  we  shall  also  have  to  enlarge  our  city,  for  our  * 

first  or  healthy  city  will  not  now  be  of  sufficient  size,  but  O^^P^ 
requires  to  be  increased  in  bulk,  and  filled  out  with  a° 
multitude  of  callings,  which  do  not  exist  in  cities  to  satisfy  U4-*-J  *^ 
any  natural  want;  for  example,  the  whole  class  of  hunters, 
and  all  who  practise  imitative  arts,  including  many  who 
use  forms  and  colours,  and  many  who  use  music,  poets 
also,  with  those  of  whom  the  poet  makes  use,  rhapsodists, 
actors,  dancers,  contractors;  lastly,  the  manufacturers  of 
all  sorts  of  articles,  and  among  others  those  which  form 
part  of  a  woman's  dress.  We  shall  similarly  require  more 
personal  servants,  shall  we  not?  that  is  to  say,  tutors, 
wet-nurses,  dry-nurses,  tire-women,  barbers,  and  cooks 
moreover  and  confectioners  ?  Swineherds  again  are  among 
the  additions  we  shall  require, — a  class  of  persons  not  to 
be  found,  because  not  wanted,  in  our  former  city,  but 
needed  among  the  rest  in  this.  We  shall  also  need  great 
quantities  of  all  kinds  of  cattle,  for  those  who  may  wish 
to  eat  them;  shall  we  not? 

Of  course  we  shall. 

Then  shall  we  not  experience  the  need  of  medical  men 
also,  to  a  much  greater  extent  under  this  than  under  the 
former  regime? 

Yes,  indeed. 

The  country^  too^X  pxesuaae,  which  was  formerly  ade- 
quateTlo  the  support  of  its  then  inhabitants  will  be  now 
too  small,  and  adequate  no  longer.    Shall  we  say  so? 

Certainly. 

Then  must  we  not  cut  ourselves  a  slice  of  our  neigh- 
bourXje rritory ,  if  we  are  to  have  land  enough  both  for 
pasture  and  tillage,  while  they  will  do  the  same  to  ours,  if 
they,  like  us,  permit  then' -elves  to  overstep  the  limit  of 
necessaries,  and  plunge  into  the  unbounded  acquisition  of 


66  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  H 

It  must  inevitably  be  so,  Socrates. 

Will  our  next  step  be  to  go  to  war,  Glaucon,  or  how 
will  it  be  ? 

As  you  say. 

At  ths  stage  of  our  inquiry  let  us  avoid  asserting  either 
that  war  does  good  or  that  it  does  harm,  confining  our- 
selves to  this  statement,  that  we  have  further  traced  the 
origin  of  war  to  causes  which  are  the  most  frutiful  sources 
of  whatever  evils  befal  a  state,  either  in  its  corporate 
capacity,  or  in  its  individual  members. 

Exactly  so. 

Once  more  then,  my  friend,  our  state  must  receive  an 
accession  of  no  trifling  extent,  I  mean  that  of  a  whole 
army,  which  must  go  forth  and  do  battle  with  all  invaders 
in  defence  of  its  entire  property,  and  of  the  persons  whom 
we  were  just  now  describing. 

How?  he  asked;  are  not  those  persons  sufficient  of 
themselves  ? 

They  are  not,  if  you  and  all  the  rest  of  us  were  right  in 
the  admissions  which  we  made,  when  we  were  modelling 
our  state.  We  admitted,  I  think,  if  you  remember,  that 
it  was  impossible  for  one  man  to  work  well  at  many  pro- 
fessions. 

True. 

Well  then,  is  not  the  business  of  war  looked  upon  as  a 
profession  in  itself? 

Undoubtedly. 

And  have  we  not  as  much  reason  to  concern  ourselves 
about  the  trade  of  war  as  about  the  trade  of  shoemaking? 

Quite  as  much. 

But  we  cautioned  the  shoemaker,  you  know,  against 
attempting  to  be  an  agriculturist  or  a  weaver  or  a  builder 
besides,  with  a  view  to  our  shoemaking  work  being  well 
done;  and  to  every  other  artisan  we  assigned  in  like 
manner  one  occupation,  namely,  that  for  which  he  was 
naturally  fitted,  and  in  which,  if  he  let  other  things  alone, 
and  wrought  at  it  all  his  time  without  neglecting  his 
opportunities,  he  was  likely  to  prove  a  successful  work- 
man,   Now  is  it  not  of  the  greatest  moment  that  the  work 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  67 

of  war  should  be  well  done?  Or  is  it  so  easy,  that  any 
one  can  succeed  in  it  and  be  at  the  same  time  a  husband- 
man or  a  shoemaker  or  a  labourer  at  any  other  trade 
whatever,  although  there  is  no  one  in  the  world  who  could 
become  a  good  draught-player  or  dice-player  by  merely 
taking  up  the  game  at  unoccupied  moments,  instead  of 
pursuing  it  as  his  especial  study  from  his  childhood  ?  And 
will  it  be  enough  for  a  man  merely  to  handle  a  shield 
or  any  other  of  the  arms  and  implements  of  war,  to  be 
straightway  competent  to  play  his  part  well  that  very  day 
in  an  engagement  of  heavy  troops  or  in  any  other  military 
service,  although  the  mere  handling  of  any  other  instru- 
ment will  never  make  any  one  a  true  craftsman  or  athlete, 
nor  will  such  instrument  be  even  useful  to  one  who  has 
neither  learnt  its  capabilities  nor  exercised  himself  suffi- 
ciently in  its  practical  applications. 

If  it  were  so,  these  implements  of  war  would  be  very 
valuable. 

In  proportion,  then,  to^  the  importance  of  the  work 
which  these  guardians  have  to  do,  will  it  require  peculiar 
freedom  from  other  engagements,  as  well  as  extraordinary 
sTuITand  attention.  ~ 

I  quite  think  so. 

Will  it  not  also  require  natural  endowments  suited 
to  this  particular  occupation? 

Undoubtedly. 

Then,  apparently,  it  will  belong  to  us  to  choose  out,  if 
we  can,  that  especial  order  of  natural  endowments  which 
qualifies  its  possessors  for  the  guardianship  of  a  state. 

Certainly;  it  belongs  to  us. 

Then,  I  assure  you,  we  have  taken  upon  ourselves  no 
trifling  task;  nevertheless,  there  must  be  no  flinching,  so 
long  as  our  strength  holds  out. 

No,  there  must  not. 

Do  you  think  then,  I  asked,  that  there  is  any  difference, 
in  the  qualities  required  for  keeping  guard,  between  a 
well-bred  dog  and  a  gallant  young  man? 

I  do  not  quite  understand  you. 

Why,  I  suppose,  for  instance,  they  ought  both  of  them 


68  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IL 

to  be  quick  to  discover  an  enemy,  and  swift  to  overtake 
him  when  discovered,  and  strong  also,  in  case  they  have 
to  fight  when  they  have  come  up  with  him. 

Certainly,  all  these  qualities  are  .required. 

Moreover,  they  must  be  brave  if  they  are  to  fight  well. 

Undoubtedly. 

But  will  either  a  horse,  or  a  dog,  or  any  other  animal, 
be  likely  to  be  brave  if  it  is  not  spirited  ?  *  or  have  you 
failed  to  observe  what  an  irresistible  and  unconquerable 
thing  spirit  is,  so  that  under  its  influence  every  creature 
will  be  fearless  and  unconquerable  in  the  face  of  any 
danger  ? 

I  have  observed  it. 

We  know  then  what  bodily  qualities  are  required  in 
omr  guardian. 

We  do. 

And  also  what  qualities  of  the  mind,  namely,  that  ha 
must  be  spirited.  * 

How  then,  Glaucon,  if  such  be  their  natural  disposition, 
are  they  to  be  kept  from  behaving  fiercely  to  one  another, 
and  to  the  rest  of  the  citizens? 

Really  it  will  be  difficult  to  obviate  that. 

Nevertheless,  they  certainly  ought  to  be  gentle  to  their 
friends,  and  dangerous  only  to  their  enemies:  else  they 
will  not  wait  for  others  to  destroy  them,  but  will  be  the 
first  to  do  it  for  themselves. 

True. 

What  then  shall  we  do?  Where  shall  we  find  a  charac- 
ter at  once  gentle  and  high-spirited?  For  I  suppose  a 
gentle  nature  is  the  opposite  of  a  spirited  one  ? 

Apparently  it  is. 

*  The  reader  will  gather  from  the  context  the  true  meanin  g  of  the 
important  word  thfioeidr/g.  We  have  adopted  the  word  "  spirited," 
as  the  received  and  the  least  objectionable  English  rendering  of 
it.  This  obliges  us  to  translate  6v/x6g,  in  the  same  sentence, 
"  spirit :  "  otherwise  "  anger  "  would  be  a  near  English  equivalent 
to  it.  A  reference  to  any  lexicon  will  show  the  difficulty  of 
conveying  the  force  of  Ov/xoeifyc  in  a  single  English  word  :  but  its 
meaning  is  sufficiently  indicated  by  Plato  himself. 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  69 

Nevertheless  a  man  who  is  devoid  of  either  gentleness 
or  spirit  cannot  possibly  make  a  good  guardian.  And  as 
they  seem  to  be  incompatible,  the  result  is,  that  a  good 
guardian  is  an  impossibility. 

It  looks  like  it,  he  said. 

Here  then  I  was  perplexed,  but  having  reconsidered 
our  conversation,  I  said,  We  deserve,  my  friend,  to  be 
puzzled;  for  we  have  deserted  the  illustration  which  we 
set  before  us. 

How  so? 

It  never  struck  us,  that  after  all  there  are  natures, 
though  we  fancied  there  were  none,  which  combine  these 
opposite  qualities. 

Pray  where  is  such  a  combination  to  be  found? 

You  may  see  it  in  several  animals,  but  particularly  in 
the  one  which  we  ourselves  compared  to  our  guardian. 
For  I  suppose  you  know  that  it  is  the  natural  disposition 
of  well-bred  dogs  to  be  perfectly  gentle  to  their  friends 
and  acquaintances,  but  the  reverse  to  strangers. 

Certainly  I  do. 

Therefore  the  thing  is  possible;  and  we  are  not  contra- 
dieting  nature  in  our  endeavour  to  give  such  a  character 
to  our  guardian. 

So  it  would  seem. 

Then  is  it  your  opinion,  that  in  one  who  is  to  make  a 
good  guardian  it  is  further  required  that  his  character 
should  be  philosophical  as  well  as  high-spirited? 

How  so  ?    I  do  not  understand  you. 

You  will  notice  in  dogs  this  other  trait,  which  is  really 
marvellous  in  the  creature. 
I     What  is  that? 

Whenever  they  see  a  stranger  they  are  irritated  before 
they  have  been  provoked  by  any  ill-usage;  but  when  they 
see  an  acquaintance  they  welcome  him,  though  they  may 
never  have  experienced  any  kindness  at  his  hands.  Has 
this  never  excited  your  wonder? 

I  never  paid  any  attention  to  it  hitherto;  but  no  doubt 
they  do  behave  so. 


70  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IL 

Well,  but  this  instinct  is  a  very  clever  thing  in  the  dog, 
and  a  genuine  philosophic  symptom. 

How  so,  pray  ? 

Why,  because  the  only  mark  by  which  he  distinguishes 
between  the  appearance  of  a  friend  and  that  of  an  enemy 
is,  that  he  knows  the  former  and  is  ignorant  of  the  latter. 
How,  I  ask,  can  the  creature  be  other  than  fond  of  learn- 
ing when  it  makes  knowledge  and  ignorance  the  criteria 
of  the  familiar  and  the  strange? 

Beyond  a  question,  it  must  be  fond  of  learning. 

Well,  is  not  the  love  of  learning  identical  with  a  philo- 
sophical disposition? 

It  is. 

Shall  we  not  then  assert  with  confidence  in  the  case  of 
a  man  also,  that  if  he  is  to  shew  a  gentle  disposition 
towards  his  relatives  and  acquaintances,  he  must  have  a 
turn  for  learning  and  philosophy? 

Be  it  so. 

Then  in  our  judgment  the  man  whose  natural  gifts  prom- 
ise to  make  him  a  perfect  guardian  of  the  state  will  be 
philosophical,  high-spirited^  swift-footedA L  and~l!Erpngr~ 

Undoubtedly  he  will. 

This  then  will  be  the  original  character  of  our  guar- 
dians. But  in  what  way  shall  we  rear  and  educate  them? 
And  will  the  investigation  of  this  point  help  us  on  towards 
discovering  that  which  is  the  object  of  all  our  specula- 
tions, namely,  the  manner  in  which  justice  and  injustice 
grow  up  in  a  state?  For  I  wish  us  neither  to  omit  any- 
thing useful,  nor  to  occupy  ourselves  with  anything  redun- 
dant, in  our  inquiry. 

Hereupon  Glaucon's  brother  observed,  Well,  for  my 
part,  I  fully  anticipate  that  this  inquiry  will  promote  our 
object. 

If  so,  I  said,  we  must  certainly  not  give  it  up,  my  dear 
Adeimantus,  even  though  it  should  prove  somewhat  long. 

Indeed  we  must  not. 

Come  then,  like  idle  story-tellers  in  a  story,  let  U8 
describe  the  education  of  our  men. 


Book  II.  J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  71 

Yes,  let  us  do  so. 

What  then  is  the  education  to  be?  Perhaps  we  could 
hardly  find  a  better  than  that  which  the  experience  of  the 
past  has  already  discovered,  which  consists,  I  believe,  in 
gymnastic  for  the  body,  and  music  for  the  mind. 

It  does. 

Shall  we  not  then  begin  our  course  of  education  with 
music  rather  than  with  gymnastic? 

Undoubtedly  we  shall. 

Under  the  term  music,  do  you  include  narratives,  or 
not? 

I  do. 

And  of  narratives  ther^  are  two  kinds,  the  true  and  the 
false. 

Yes. 

And  must  we  instruct  our  pupils  in  both,  but  in  the 
false  first? 

I  do  not  understand  what  you  mean. 

Do  you  not  understand  that  we  begin  with  children  by 
telling  them  fables  ?  And  these,  I  suppose,  to  speak  gener- 
ally, are  false,  though  they  contain  some  truths:  and  we 
employ  such  fables  in  the  treatment  of  children  at  an 
earlier  period  than  gymnastic  exercises. 

True. 

That  is  what  I  meant  when  I  said  that  music  ought  to 
be  taken  up  before  gymnastic. 

You  are  right. 

Then  are  you  aware,  that  in  every  work  the  beginning 
is  the  most  important  part,  especially  in  dealing  with  any- 
thing young  and  tender?  for  that  is  the  time  when  any 
impression,  which  one  may  desire  to  communicate,  is  most 
readily  stamped  and  taken. 

Precisely  so. 

Shall  we  then  permit  our  children  without  scruple  to 
hear  any  fables  composed  by  any  authors  indifferently, 
and  so  to  receive  into  their  minds  opinions  generally  the 
reverse  of  those  which,  when  they  are  grown  to  manhood, 
we  shall  think  they  ought  to  entertain? 

No,  we  §hall  not  permit  it  on  any  account. 


72  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [BOOK  II 

Then  apparently  our  first  duty  will  be  to  exercise  a 
superintendence  over  the  authors_of_fah1  es, .  selecting  their 
good  productions,  and  rejecting  the  bad.  And  the  selected 
fables  we  shall  advise  our  nurses  and  mothers  to  repeat 
to  their  children,  that  they  may  thus  mould  their  minds 
with  the  fables  even  more  than  they  shape  their  bodies 
with  the  hand.  But  we  shall  have  to  repudiate  the  greater 
part  of  those  which  are  now  in  vogue. 

Which  do  you  mean?  he  asked. 

In  the  greater  fables,  I  answered,  we  shall  also  discern 
the  less.  For  the  general  character  and  tendency  of  both 
the  greater  and  the  less  must  doubtless  be  identical.  Do 
you  not  think  so  ? 

I  do:  but  I  am  equally  uncertain  which  you  mean  by 
the  greater. 

I  mean  the  stories  which  Hesiod,  and  Homer,  and 
the  other  poets,  tell  us.  For  they,  I  imagine,  have  com- 
posed fictitious  narratives  which  they  told,  and  yet  tell,  to 
men. 

Pray  what  kind  of  fables  do  you  mean,  and  what  is  the 
fault  that  you  find  with  them  ? 

A  fault,  I  replied,  which  deserves  the  earliest  and  grav- 
est condemnation,  especially  if  the  fiction  has  no  beauty. 

What  is  this  fault? 

It  is  whenever  an  author  gives  a  bad  representation 
of  the  characters  of  gods  and  heroes,  like  a  painter  whose 
picture  should  bear  no  resemblance  to  the  objects  he 
wishes  to  imitate. 

Yes,  it  is  quite  right  to  condemn  such  faults:  but 
pray  explain  further  what  we  mean,  and  give  some  in- 
stances. 

In  the  first  place,  the  poet  who  conceived  the  boldest 
fiction  on  the  highest  subjects  invented  an  ugly  story, 
when  he  told  how  Uranus  acted  as  Hesiod  *  declares  he 
did,  and  also  how  Cronus  had  his  revenge  upon  him. 
And  again,  even  if  the  deeds  of  Cronus,  f  and  his  son's 
treatment  of  him,  were  authentic  facts,  it  would  not  have 
been  right,  I  should  have  thought,  to  tell  them  without 
*  Bwiod,  Thwgony,  154,  t  Ibid.    4so. 


Boo*  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  73 

the  least  reserve  to  young  and  thoughtless  persons:  on 
the  contrary,  it  would  be  best  to  suppress  them  alto- 
gether: or,  if  for  some  reason  they  must  be  told2  they 
should  be  imparted  under  the  seal  of  secrecy  to  as  few 
hearers  as  possible,  and  after  the  sacrifice,  not  of  a  pig  * 
but  of  some  rare  and  costly  victim,  which  might  aid  to 
the  utmost  in  restricting  their  number. 

Certainly,  these  are  offensive  stories. 

They  are;  and  therefore,  Adeimantus,  they  must  not 
be  repeated  in  our  city.  No :  we  must  not  tell  a  youthful 
listener  that  he  will  be  doing  nothing  extraordinary  if  he 
commit  the  foulest  crimes,  nor  yet  if  he  chastise  the  crimes 
of  a  father  in  the  most  unscrupulous  manner,  but  will 
simply  be  doing  what  the  first  and  greatest  of  the  gods 
have  done  before  him. 

I  assure  you,  he  said,  I  quite  agree  with  you  as  to  the 
impropriety  of  such  stories.  *, 

Nor  yet,  I  continued,  is  it  proper  to  say  in  any  case — 
what  is  indeed  untrue — that  gods  wage  war  against  gods, 
and  intrigue  and  fight  among  themselves;  that  is,  if  the 
future  guardians  of  our  state  are  to  deem  it  a  most  dis- 
graceful thing  to  quarrel  lightly  with  one  another :  far  less 
ought  we  to  select  as  subjects  for  fiction  and  embroidery, 
the  battles  of  the  giants,  and  numerous  other  feuds  of  all 
sorts,  in  which  gods  and  heroes  fight  against  their  own 
kith  and  kin.  But  if  there  is  any  possibility  of  persuading 
them,  that  to  quarrel  with  one's  fellow  is  a  sin  of  which 
no  member  of  a  state  was  ever  guilty,  such  ought  rather 
to  be  the  language  held  to  our  children  from  the  first, 
by  old  men  and  old  women,  and  all  elderly  persons:  and 
such  is  the  strain  in  which  our  poets  must  be  compelled 
to  write.  But  stories  like  the  chaining  of  Hera  by  her 
son,  and  the  flinging  of  Hephaestus  out  of  heaven  for 
trying  to  take  his  mother's  part  when  his  father  was  beat- 
ing her,  and  all  those  battles  of  the  gods  which  are  to  be 
found  in  Homer,  must  be  refused  admittance  into  our 
state,  whether  they  be  allegorical  or  not.  For  a  child 
cannot  discriminate  between  what  is  allegory  and  what  is 
*  A  pig  was  the  usual  victim  at  the  Mysteries. 


74  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IL 

not;  and  whatever  at  that  age  is  adopted  as  a  matter  of 
belief,  has  a  tendency  to  become  fixed  and  indelible,  and 
therefore,  perhaps,  we  ought  to  esteem  it  of  the  greatest 
importance  that  the  fictions  which  children  first  hear 
should  be  adapted  in  the  most  perfect  manner  to  the 
promotion  of  virtue. 

There  is  certainly  reason  in  this.  But  if  any  one  were 
to  proceed  to  ask  us  what  these  fictions  are,  and  what 
the  fables  which  convey  them,  how  should  we  answer 
him? 

To  which  I  replied,  My  dear  Adeimantus,  you  and  I  are 
not  poets,  on  the  present  occasion,  but  founders  of  a  state. 
And  founders  ought  certainly  to  know  the  moulds  in 
which  their  poets  are  to  cast  their  fictions,  and  from  which 
they  must  not  be  suffered  to  deviate;  but  they  are  not 
bound  to  compose  tales  themselves. 

You  are  right;  but  to  use  your  own  words,  what  should 
these  moulds  be  in  the  case  of  Theology  ? 

I  think  they  may  be  described  as  follows:  It  is  right, 
I  presume,  always  to  represent  God  as  he  really  is,  whether 
the  poet  describe  him  in  an  epic  or  a  lyrical  or  a  dramatic 
poem. 

Yes,  it  is  right. 

Then  surely  God  is  good  in  reality,  and  is  to  be  so  rep- 
resented. 

Unquestionably. 

Well,  but  nothing  that  is  good  is  hurtful,  is  it? 

I  think  not. 

And  does  that  which  is  not  hurtful  hurt? 

By  no  means. 

And  does  that  which  hurts  not,  do  any  evil? 

I  answer  as  before,  no. 

And  that  which  does  no  evil  cannot  be  the  cause  of  any 
evil  either? 

How  should  it  be? 

Well:  is  that  which  is  good  beneficial? 

Yes. 

Then  it  is  a  cause  of  well-being? 

Yes, 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  75 

J^hfiiL-ihat  which  is  good  is  not  the  cause  of  all  things, 
hut only_oi _whaii&  as  it  should  he,,  being  guiltless-of  origT 
inating-eYil 

Exactly  so. 

If  that  be  so,  then  God,  inasmuch  as  he  is  good,j3annot 
be  the  .cause  of  all  things,  according  to  the  common^aoc^ 
trine.  On  the  contrary,  he  is  the  author  of  only  a  small 
part  of  human  affairs;  of  the  larger  part  he  is  not  the 
author:  for  our  evil  things  far  outnumber  our  good 
things:  and  the  good  things  we  must  ascribe  to  no  other 
than  God,  while  we  must  seek  elsewhere,  and  not  in  him, 
the  causes  of  the  evil  things. 

That  seems  to  me  the  exact  truth. 

Then  we  must  express  our  disapprobation,  if  Homer,  or 
any  other  poet,  is  guilty  of  such  a  foolish  blunder  about 
the  gods,  as  to  tell  us  that  two  jars 

"  By  Zeus  at  his  threshold  are  planted  ; 
All  good  fortunes  the  one,  all  evil  the  other  containeth."  * 

And  that  he  for  whom  Zeus  mixes  and  gives  of  both, 
M  One  day  lighteth  on  evil,  and  one  day  meeteth  with  blessing : " 

but  as  for  the  man  for  whom  there  is  no  mixture,  but  who 
receives  of  one  sort  only, 

"  Him  over  God's  wide  earth  fell  ravenous  hunger  pursueth." 

Nor  must  we  admit  that 

*-'  Zeus  hath  been  made  unto  men  both  of  weal  and  of  woe  the 
dispenser." 

And  if  any  one  assert  that  the  violation  of  oaths  and 
treaties,!  of  which  Pandarus  was  the  author,  was  brought 
about  by  Athene  and  Zeus,  we  shall  refuse  our  approba- 
tion :  nor  can  we  allow  it  to  be  said  that  the  strife  and 
trial  of  strength  between  the  gods  J   was  instigated  by 

•  Iliad,  xxiv.  527.  f  Hiad,  11,  69. 

t  Iliad,  xx. 


76  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IL 

Themis  and  Zeus,  nor,  again,  must  we  let  our  young  people 
hear  that,  in  the  words  of  .ZEschylus, 

"  When  to  destruction  God  will  plague  a  house. 
He  plants  among  its  members  guilt  and  sin."  * 

But  if  a  poet  writes  about  the  sufferings  of  Niobe,  as 
uEschylus  does  in  the  play  from  which  I  have  taken  these 
lines,  or  the  calamities  of  the  house  of  Pelops,  or  the 
disasters  at  Troy,  or  any  similar  occurrences,  either  we 
,  '  must  not  allow  him  to  call  them  the  work  6f.jat_gocl, 
t  f  or  if  they  are  to  be  so  called,  he  must  find  out  a  theory  to 

i  tfrf  account  for  them,  such  as  ihatTfor  which  we  are  now 
searching,  and  must  say,  that  what  the  god  did  was 
righteous  and  good,  and  the  sufferers  were  chastened  for 
their  profit;  but  we  cannot  allow  the  poet  to  say,  that 
a  god  was  the  author  of  a  punishment  which  made  the 
objects  of  it  miserable.  No:  if  he  should  say  that  be- 
cause the  wicked  are  miserable,  these  men  needed  chas- 
tisement, and  the  infliction  of  it  by  the  god  was  a  benefit 
to  them,  we  shall  make  no  objection :  hftt  as  to  asserting 
that  God,  who  is  good,  becomes  the  author  of  evil  to  any, 
we  must  do  battle  uncompromisingly  for  the  principle, 
that  fictions  conveying  such  a  doctrine  as  this,  whether  in 
verse  or  in  prose,  shall  neither  be  recited  or  heard  in  the 
city,  by  any  member  of  it,  young  or  old,  if  it  is  to  be  a 
well-regulated  city;  because  such  language  may  not  be 
used  without  irreverence,  and  is  moreover  both  injurious 
to  us  and  self -contradictory. 

I  vote  with  you,  he  said,  for  this  law,  which  pleases  me. 

Then  one  of  those  theological  laws  or  moulds,  in  ac- 
cordance with  which  we  shall  require  our  speakers  to 
speak,  and  our  authors  to  write,  will  be  to  this  effect,  that 
God  is  not  the  author  of  all  things,  but  only  of  such  as  are 
good. 

You  have  proved  it  quite  satisfactorily,  he  replied. 

Well,  here  is  a  second  for  you  to  consider.  Do  you 
think  that  God  is  a  wizard,  and  likely  to  appear  for  spe- 
cial purposes  in  different  forms  at  different  times,  some- 
*  Jn  a  lost  Tragedy. 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  77 

times  actually  assuming  such  forms,  and  altering  his  own 
person  into  a  variety  of  shapes,  and  sometimes  deceiving 
us  and  making  us  believe  that  such  a  transformation  has 
taken  place ;  or  do  you  think  that  he  is  of  a  simple  essence, 
and  that  it  is  the  most  unlikely  thing  that  he  should 
ever  go  out  of  his  own  proper  form  ? 

I  cannot  answer  you  all  at  once. 

Then  answer  me  this:  If  anything  passes  out  of  its 
proper  form  must  not  the  change  be  produced  either  by 
itself  or  some  other  thing? 

It  must. 

And  is  it  not  the  case  that  changes  and  motions,  com- 
municated by  any  thing  else,  affect  least  the  things  that 
are  best?  For  instance,  the  body  is  changed  by  meat  and 
drink  and  exertion,  and  every  plant  by  sunshine  and  wind, 
and  similar  influences;  but  is  not  the  change  slightest  in 
the  plant  or  the  body  which  is  healthiest  and  strongest? 

Undoubtedly  it  is. 

So  of  the  mind,  is  it  not  the  bravest  and  the  wisest  that 
will  be  the  least  disturbed  and  altered  by  any  influence 
from  without. 

Yes. 

Moreover,  I  conceive  that  the  same  principle  applies  to 
all  manufactured  things,  such  as  furniture,  houses,  and 
clothes:  those  that  are  well  made  and  in  good  condition, 
are  least  altered  by  time  and  other  influences. 

That  is  true. 

So  that  everything  which  is  good  either  by  nature  or 
by  art,  or  by  both,  is  least  liable  to  be  changed  by  an- 
other thing. 

So  it  would  seem. 

But  surely  God  and  the  things  of  God  are  in  every  way 
most  excellent. 

Unquestionably. 

Then  God  will  be  very  unlikely  to  assume  many  shapes 
through  external  influence. 
rery  unlikely  indeed. 

But  will  he  change  and  alter  limself  ? 

Clearly  he  must,  if  he  alters  at  all,  {( 


78  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  1L 

Does  he  then,  by  changing  himself,  attain  to  something 
better  and  fairer,  or  to  something  worse  and  less  beauti- 
ful than  himself? 

Something  worse,  necessarily,  if  he  alters  at  all :  for  we 
shalT  not,  I  presumepaffirm  that  there  is  any  imperfection 
in  the  beauty  or  the  goodness  of  God. 

You  are  perfectly  correct;  and  this  being  the  case,  do 
you  think,  Adeimantus,  that  any  god  or  any  man  would 
voluntarily  make  himself  worse  than  he  is,  in  any  respect  ? 

It  is  impossible. 

Then  it  is  also  impossible  for  a  god  to  be  willing  to 
change  himself,  and  therefore  it  would  seem  that  every 
god,  inasmuch  as  he  is  perfect  to  the  utmost  in  beauty 
and  goodness,  abides  ever  simply  and  without  variation  in 
his  own  form. 

The  inference  is  inevitable,  I  think. 

Then,  my  dear  friend,  let  no  poet  tell  us  that 

"  Gods  in  the  likeness  of  wandering  strangers, 
Bodied  in  manifold  forms,  go  roaming  from  city  to  city."  * 

And  let  no  one  slander  Proteus  and  Thetis,  or  introduce 
in  tragedies  or  any  other  poems,  Hera  transformed,  col- 
lecting in  the  guise  of  a  priestess, 

"  Alms  for  the  life-giving  children  of  Inachus,  river  of  Argos."  f 

Not  to  mention  many  other  similar  falsehoods,  which  we 
must  interdict.  And  once  more,  let  not  our  mothers  be 
persuaded  by  these  poets  into  scaring  their  children  by 
injudicious  stories,  telling  them  how  certain  gods  go  about 
by  night  in  the  likeness  of  strangers  from  every  land ;  that 
they  may  not  by  one  and  the  same  act  defame  the  gods, 
and  foster  timidity  in  their  children. 

No,  let  that  be  forbidden. 

But  perhaps,  I  continued,  though  the  gods  have  no  ten- 
dency to  change  in  themselves,  they  induce  us,  by  decep« 

*  Homer,  Odyssey,  xvn,  485. 

f  Supposed  to  be  quoted  from  a  lost  play  of  iEschylus. 


Book  II.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  79 

tion  and  magic,  to  believe  that  they  appear  in  various 
forms. 

Perhaps  they  do. 

Would  a  god  consent  to  lie,  think  you,  either  in  word, 
or  by  an  act,  such  as  that  of  putting  a  phantom  before 
our  eyes? 

I  am  not  sure. 

Are  you  not  sure  that  a  genuine  lie,  if  I  may  be  allowed 
the  expression,  is  hated  by  all  gods  and  by  all  men  ? 

I  do  not  know  what  you  mean. 

I  mean,  that  to  lie  with  the  highest  part  of  himself,  and 
concerning  the  highest  subjects,  is  what  no  one  volun- 
tarily consents  to  do;  on  the  contrary,  every  one  fears 
above  all  things  to  harbour  a  lie  in  that  quarter. 

I  do  not  even  yet  understand  you. 

Because  you  think  I  have  some  mysterious  meaning; 
whereas  what*"!  mean  is  simply  this:  that  to  lie,  or  be  the 
victim  of  a  lie,  and  to  be  without  knowledge,  in  the  mind 
and  concerning  absolute  realities,  and  in  that  quarter  to 
harbour  and  possess  the  lie,  is  the  last  thing  any  man 
would  consent  to;  for  all  men  hold  in  especial  abhorrence 
an  untruth  in  a  place  like  that. 

Yes,  in  most  especial  abhorrence. 

Well,  but,  as  I  was  saying  just  now,  this  is  what  might 
most  correctly  be  called  a  genuine  lie,  namely,  ignorance 
T?^jjhlg,_n?  ffhe  Tninrl ...of  _  jjie^jjehirlefl  person.  For  the 
spoken  lie  is  a  kind  of  imitation  and  embodiment  of  the 
anterior  mental  affection,  and  not  a  pure,  unalloyed  falsity  ; 
or  am  I  wrong? 

No,  you  are  perfectly  right. 

Then  a  real  lie  is  hated  not  only  by  gods,  but  likewise 
by  men. 

So  I  think. 

Once  more:  when  and  to  whom  is  the  verbal  falsehood 
useful,  and  therefore  undeserving  of  hatred:'  Is"  11  l\bl 
when  we  are  dealing  with  an  enemy?  Or  when  those  that 
are  called  our  friends  attempt  to  do  something  mis- 
chievous in  a  fit  of  lunacy  or  madness  of  any  kind,  is  it 
not  then  that  a  lie  is  useful,  like  a  medicine,  to  turn  them 


80  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX 

from  their  purpose  ?  And  in  the  legendary  tales  of  which 
we  were  talking  just  now,  is  it  not  our  ignorance  of  the 
true  history  of  ancient  times  which  renders  falsehood  use- 
ful to  us,  as  the  closest  attainable  copy  of  the  truth? 

Yes,  that  is  exactly  the  case. 

Then  on  which  of  these  grounds  is  lying  useful  to  God  ? 
Will  he  lie  for  the  sake  of  approximation,  because  he 
knows  not  the  things  of  old? 

No;  that  would  be  indeed  ridiculous. 

Then  there  is  no  place  in  God  for  the  poet's  falsehood. 

I  think  not. 

Then  will  he  lie  through  fear  of  his  enemies? 

Par  from  it. 

Or  because  his  friends  are  foolish  or  mad? 

Nay,  said  he;  no  fool  or  madman  is  a  friend  of  the 
gods. 

Then  there  is  no  inducement  for  a  god  to  lie. 

There  is  not. 

In  every  way  then  the  nature  of  gods  and  godlike  beings 
is  incapable  of  falsehood. 

Yes,  wholly  so. 

God  then  is  a  Being  of  perfect  simplicity  and  truth,  both 
in  deed  and  word,  and  neither  changes  in  himself  nor  im- 
poses upon  others,  either  by  apparitions,  or  by  words,  or 
by  sending  signs,  whether  in  dreams  or  in  waking  mo- 
ments. 

I  believe  it  to  be  so  myself,  he  said,  after  what  you  have 
stated. 

Then  do  you  grant  that  a  second  principle,  in  accord- 
ance with  which  all  speaking  and  writing  about  the  gods 
must  be  moulded,  is  this:  That  the  gods  neither  meta- 
morphose themselves  like  wizards,  nor  mislead  us  by  false- 
hoods expressed  either  in  word  or  act  ? 

I  do  grant  it. 

Then  while  we  commend  much   in   Homer,   we   shall 
refuse  to  commend  the  story  of  the  dream  sent  by  Zeus 
to  Agamemnon,*  as  well  as  that  passage  in  iEsehylus,t 
where  Thetis  says  that  Apollo  singing  at  her  marriage, 
*  Iliad,  u.  1.  f  From  a  lost  play. 


Book  II.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  81 

"Dwelt  on  my  happy  motherhood, 
The  life  from  sickness  free,  and  lengthened  years. 
Then  ail-inclusively  he  blest  my  lot. 
Favoured  of  heaven,  in  strains  that  cheer'd  my  soul. 
And  I  too  fondly  deem'd  those  lips  divine 
Sacred  to  truth,  fraught  with  prophetic  skill ; 
But  he  himself  who  sang,  the  marriage-guest 
Himself,  who  spake  all  this,  'twas  even  he 
That  slew  my  son." 

When  a  poet  holds  such  language  concerning  the  gods, 
we  shall  be  angry  with  him,  and  refuse  him  a  chorus,* 
neither  shall  we  allow  our  teachers  to  use  his  writings  for 
the  instruction  of  the  young,  if  we  would  have  our  guard- 
ians grow  up  to  be  as  godlike  and  godfearing  as  it  is  pos- 
sible for  man  to  be. 

I  entirely  acquiesce,  said  he,  in  the  propriety  of  these 
principles,  and  would  adopt  them  as  laws. 

*  "  To  gite  a  chorus,"  was  to  authorize  and  supply  the  means 
of  a  stage  representation,  of  which  the  chorus  formed  the  most 
expensive  element. 
6 


.*  , 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IIL 


BOOK  IIL 

Concerning  the  gods,  then,  I  continued,  such,  as  it 
would  appear,  is  the  language  to  be  held,  and  such  the 
language  to  be  forbidden,  in  the  hearing  of  all,  from 
childhood  upwards,  who  are  hereafter  to  honour  the  gods 
and  their  parents,  and  to  set  no  small  value  on  mutual 
friendship. 

Yes,  he  said ;  and  I  think  our  views  are  correct. 

To  proceed  then:  if  we  intend  our  citizens  to  be  brave, 
must  we  not  add  to  this  such  lessons  as  are  likely  to  pre- 
serve them  most  effectually  from  being  afraid  of  death? 
or  do  you  think  a  man  can  ever  become  brave  who  is 
haunted  by  the  fear  of  death? 

No,  indeed,  I  do  not. 

Well,  do  you  imagine  that  a  believer  in  Hades  and  its 
terrors  will  be  free  from  all  fear  of  death,  and  in  the  day 
of  battle  will  prefer  it  to  defeat  and  slavery  ? 

Certainly  not. 

Then  apparently  we  must  assume  a  control  over  those 
who  undertake  to  set  forth  these  fables,  as  well  as  the 
others,  requesting  them  not  to  revile  the  other  world  in 
that  unqualified  manner,  but  rather  to  speak  well  of  it, 
because  such  language  is  neither  true,  nor  beneficial  to 
men  who  are  intended  to  be  warlike. 

We  certainly  must. 

Then  we  shall  expunge  the  following  passage,  and  with 
it  all  that  are  like  it : 

"I  would  e'en  be  a  villein,  and  drudge  on  the  lands  of  a 
master, 
Under  a  portionless  wight,  whose  garner  was  scantily  fur- 
nished, 
Sooner  than  reign  supreme  in  the  realm  of  the  dead  that 
have  perished."* 

*  Odyw«y,  zi.  489. 


BOOK  III.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO  83 

And  this ; 

"And   those  chambers  be  seen  both  by  mortal  men  and  im* 
mortals, 

Terrible,   dank,  and  mouldering,— even  to  gods  an  abhor- 
rence."* 

And, 

"  Well-a-day !     Truly  there  are,  yea  e'en   in  the  dwellings  of 
Hades, 
Souls    and    phantom    forms ;  but  no    understanding    is    in 
them."f 

And, 

«*  Wisdom  is  his  alone,  'mid  the  flitting  and  sha-^wy  phan- 
toms." % 

And, 

"Vanish'd  the  soul  from  the  limbs,  and  flew  to  the  nether* 
most  Hades, 
Sadly  her  destiny  wailing,  cut   off  in  the  ripeness  of  man- 
hood.'^ 

And, 

M  Gibbering,  under  the  ground  his  spirit  fled,  like  a  vapour."  | 

And, 

"  As  when  bats,   in  the  depth  of  a  cavern's  awful  recesses, 
Haply  if  one  fall  off  from  the  rock  where  they  hang  in 

a  cluster, 
Squealing  flutter  about,  and  still  cling  fast  to  each  other, 
Thus  did  the  ghosts  move  squealing  together."  Tf 

These  verses  and  all  that  are  like  them,  we  shall 
intreat  Homer  and  the  other  poets  not  to  be  angry  if  we 
erase,  not  because  they  are  unpoetical,  or  otherwise  than 
agreeable  to  the  ear  of  most  men;  but  because,  in  pro- 
portion as  they  are  more  poetical,  so  much  the  less  ought 
they  to  be  recited  in  the  hearing  of  boys  and  men,  whom 
we  require  to  be  freemen,  fearing  slavery  more  than  death. 

By  all  means  let  us  do  so. 

Then  we  must  likewise  cast  away  all  those  terrible  and 

*  Iliad,  XX.  64.  +  Iliad,  xxm,  103. 

1  Odyssev.  X.  495.  §  Iliad.  XVI.  856. 

(  Iliad,  xxm.  100.  If  Odyssey,  xxjv.  6. 


84  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III. 

alarming  names  which  belong  to  these  subjects,  the  Cocy- 
tuses,  and  Styxes,*  and  internals,  and  anatomies,  and  all 
other  words  coined  after  this  stamp,  the  mention  of 
which  makes  men  shudder  to  the  last  degree  with  fear. 
I  dare  say  that  for  some  other  purpose  they  may  be  use- 
ful :  but  we  are  afraid  for  our  guardians,  lest  the  terrors  in 
question  should  render  them  more  spiritless,!  and  effemi- 
nate than  they  ought  to  be. 

And  our  fears  are  not  groundless. 

So  then  we  are  to  discard  those  expressions,  are  we? 

Yes. 

And  to  speak  and  write  after  the  model  which  is  the 
reverse  of  this? 

Clearly  so. 

Then  shall  we  also  strike  out  the  weepings  and  the 
wailings  of  the  heroes  of  renown? 

Yes,  we  must,  if  we  strike  out  the  former. 

Just  consider,  whether  we  shall  be  right  or  not  in 
striking  them  out.  What  we  maintain  is,  that  a  good 
man  will  not  look  upon  death  as  a  dreadful  thing  for 
another  good  man,  whose  friend  he  also  is,  to  undergo. 

We  do  maintain  it. 

Then  if  so,  he  will  not  lament  over  such  a  person  as  if 
some  dreadful  disaster  had  befallen  him. 

Certainly  not. 

Moreover,  we  say  this  also,  that  such  a  man  contains 
within  himself,  in  the  highest  degree,  whatever  is  neces- 
sary for  a  happy  life,  and  is  distinguished  from  the  rest 
of  the  world  by  his  peculiar  independence  of  external 
resources. 

True. 

Then  it  is  less  dreadful  to  him  than  to  any  one  to  lose 
a  son,  or  a  brother,  or  worldly  wealth,  or  anything  else 
of  that  kind. 

Indeed  it  is. 

If  so,  he  is  also  less  likely  than  any  one  to  complain, 

*  The  etymology  of  these  words  connects  them  with  "  wailing," 
and  "  hateful." 

f  We  prefer  to  read,  with  Ast,  bdvpSrepoi.  But  6ep/j.6repot,  the 
reading  of  the  Zurich  Text,  might  be  rendered,  M  less  cool." 


Book  III.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  85 

and  will  rather  bear  it  with  all  meekness,  whenever  any 
such  calamity  has  overtaken  him. 

Yes,  quite  so. 

Then  we  shall  do  well  to  strike  out  the  dirges  put  in 
the  mouths  of  famous  men,  and  make  them  over  to  women 
(and  those  not  the  best  of  their  sex),  and  to  the  baser  sort 
of  men,  in  order  that  those  whom  we  profess  to  be  train- 
ing up  to  be  the  guardians  of  their  country  may  scorn  to 
act  like  such  persons. 

It  will  be  well  to  do  so. 

Then  once  more,  we  shall  request  Homer  and  the  other 
poets  not  to  represent  Achilles,  the  son  of  a  goddess,  as 
"  tossing  *  now  on  his  side,  and  now  once  more  on  his 
back,  now  on  his  face ;  n  and  then  as  rising  up  and  u  pacing 
in  frenzy  the  shore  of  the  waste  untameable  ocean ; "  nor 
yet  as  taking  in  both  hands  black  burnt-out  ashes,  f  and 
pouring  them  over  his  head;  nor  as  otherwise  indulging 
in  all  that  weeping  and  wailing  which  Homer  has  attrib- 
uted to  him:  and  not  to  describe  Priam,  whose  near 
ancestor  was  a  god,  as  making  supplication,  and 

"  Rolling  in  dung,  and  by  name  to  every  man  loudly  appealing ; "  % 

and  still  more  earnestly  we  shall  beg  them,  whatever 
they  do,  not  to  represent  the  gods  as  complaining  and 
saying,  £ 

"  Wretch  that  I  am !  who  bare  to  my  sorrow  the  bravest  of 
children."— § 

or,  if  they  will  not  so  far  respect  all  the  gods,  at  least  we 
shall  entreat  them  not  to  presume  to  draw  so  unlike  a  pic- 
ture of  the  highest  of  the  gods,  as  to  make  him  say, 

"  Well-a-day  !    Him  whom  I  love,  pursued  round  the  walls  of 

the  city, 
Thus  with  these  eyes  I  behold,  and  my  heart  is   troubled 

within  me."  fl 
And, 

"  Ah !  woe's  me  for  the  doom,  that  the  dearest  of  mortals, 

Sarpedon, 
Must  by  Patroclus,  Mencetius' son,  be  slain  in  the  combat." IT 

*  Iliad,  xxiv.  10.  f  Iliad,  xvm.  23. 

i  Iliad,  XXii.  168,  §  Iliad,  xvm.  54. 

f  Ilaid,  XXU.  168  \  Iliad,  xvi.  483. 


86  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III 

For,  if  my  dear  Adeimantus,  our  young  men  were  to 
listen  seriously  to  such  accounts,  instead  of  laughing  at 
them  as  unworthy  descriptions,  it  would  be  very  unlikely 
that  any  one  of  them  should  look  upon  himself,  that  is 
but  a  man,  as  above  such  behaviour,  and  rebuke  himself 
if  he  were  ever  betrayed  into  it,  either  in  word  or  act: 
nay  rather,  unchecked  by  shame  or  fortitude,  he  will  chant 
a  multitude  of  dirges  and  laments  over  even  trivial  mis- 
fortunes. 

You  speak  with  great  truth. 

But  he  ought  not  so  to  do,  as  we  have  just  been  taught 
by  our  argument;  to  which  we  must  give  heed,  until 
some  one  can  persuade  us  by  another  and  a  better  one. 

Certainly,  he  ought  not. 

Again,  our  guardians  ought  not  to  be  given  to  laughter, 
for  when  any  one  indulges  in  violent  laughter,  such  ex- 
cess almost  universally  invites  an  equally  violent  reaction. 

I  think  so. 

Then  if  a  poet  represents  even  men  of  any  considera- 
tion as  overcome  by  laughter,  our  approval  must  be  with- 
held; much  more  if  gods  are  so  described 

Much  more  indeed. 

That  being  the  case,  we  shall  not  allow  Homer  to  speak 
of  the  gods  in  such  terms  as  the  following: 

•'  Straight  'mid  the  blessed    gods  brake  forth  unquenchable 

laughter, 
When  they  beheld  Hephaestus  go  bustling  from  chamber  to 

chamber."  * 

We  must  not  sanction  such  language,  according  to  your 
principles. 

If  you  like  to  call  them  mine,  he  replied:  no  doubt  we 
must  not  sanction  them. 

But  again,  a  high  value  must  be  set  also  upon  truth. 
For  if  we  were  right  in  what  we  said  just  now,  and  false- 
hood is  really  useless  to  the  gods,  and  only  useful  to  men 
in  the  way  of  a  medicine,  it  is  plain  that  such  an  agent 
must  be  kept  in  the  hands  of  physicians,  and  that  unpro- 
fessional men  must  not  meddle  with  it. 

*  Iliad,  I.  599. 


Book  III. J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  87 

Evidently. 

To  the  rulers  of  the  state  then,  if  to  say,  it  belongs  of 
right  to  use  falsehood,  to  deceive  either  enemies  or  their 
own  citizens,  for  the  good  of  the  state:  and  no  one  else 
may  meddle  with  this  privilege.  Nay,  for  a  private  per- 
son to  tell  a  lie  to  such  magistrates,  we  shall  maintain  to 
be  at  least  as  great  a  mistake  as  for  a  patient  to  deceive 
his  physician,  or  a  pupil  his  training-master,  concerning 
the  state  of  his  own  body;  or  for  a  sailor  to  tell  an  un- 
truth to  a  pilot  concerning  the  ship  and  the  crew,  in  de- 
scribing his  own  condition  or  that  of  any  of  his  fellow- 
sailors. 

Most  true. 

Tf  then  the  authorities  find  any  one  else  guilty  of  lying 
in  the  city, 

"  Any  of  those  that  be  craftsmen, 
Prophet  and  seer,  or  healer  of  hurts,  or  worker  in  timber,"  * 

they  will  punish  him  for  introducing  a  practice  as  per- 
nicious and  subversive  in  a  state  as  in  a  ship. 

Yes,  he  said,  if  performance  follow  upon  profession. 

Once  more,  will  not  our  young  men  need  to  be  tem- 
perate ? 

Undoubtedly  they  will. 

And  does  not  sobriety,  as  generally  understood,  imply 
the  following  principal  elements:  first,  that  men  be  obe- 
dient to  their  governors ;  and  secondly,  th«,t  they  be  them- 
selves able  to  govern  the  pleasures  which  are  gratified  in 
eating,  and  drinking,  and  love? 

I  think  so. 

Then  we  shall  approve  I  imagine,  of  all  language  like 
that  which  Homer  puts  in  the  mouth  of  Diomedes: 

"  Friend,   sit  down  in  silence,  and  give    good  heed  to  my 
sayings,"  \ 

and  of  the  lines  that  follow, 

*  Odyssey,  xvn.  383. 

f  Iliad,  iv.  412.  The  second  clause  of  the  next  quotation  is 
from  the  same  book,  line  431,  but  the  first  clause  is  now  found 
in  book  in.  3.  Plato  himself  probably  quotes  from  memory,  as 
Strata*  i»  supposed  to  b«  doing. 


88  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IH. 

"  Wrath-breathing  march'd  the  Achaeans, 
Silently  dreading  their  captains  :  " 

and  of  every  thing  else  of  the  same  kind. 
Yes,  we  shall. 
But  can  we  approve  of  such  language  as  this, 

"  Drunken  sot,  who  the  face  of  a  dog  and  the  heart  of  a  deel 
hast,"  * 

and  of  what  follows,  and  all  the  other  insolent  expressions 
which  in  prose  or  in  poetry  are  put  into  the  mouths  of  in- 
feriors towards  those  in  authority? 

No,  we  cannot. 

Because,  I  imagine,  they  do  not  tend  to  promote  so- 
briety in  youth.  If  on  other  accounts  they  give  any  grati- 
fication we  need  not  be  surprised.     Is  this  your  opinion? 

It  is. 

But  tell  me:  when  the  wisest  of  men  is  represented  as 
saying  that  it  appears  to  him  the  finest  sight  in  the  world, 
when 

"  Tables  are  loaded 
Both  with  bread  and  with  flesh,  and  the  cup-bearers   draw 

from  the  wine-bowl 
Sparkling  draughts,  which  they  carry  around,  and  replenish 

the  goblets  ;  "  f 

do  you  think  that  being  told  this  will  aid  a  young  man  in 
acquiring  self-control?  or  this — 

"  'Tis  most   wretched  by  famine  to  die,  and  one's    doom  to 
encounter."  X 

Or  what  do  you  think  of  representing  Zeus  as  so  readily 
forgetting,  in  the  eagerness  of  his  desire,  all  that  he  had 
been  meditating,  as  he  watched  alone,  while  all  others, 
gods  and  men,  were  asleep ;  and  so  smitten  at  the  sight  of 
Hera,  that  he  would  not  even  defer  the  gratification  of  his 
passion  till  they  should  enter  into  their  chamber,  saying 
that  he  was  possessed  by  a  stronger  passion  than  even 
then,  when  at  first  they  met  without  the  knowledge  of 
their  dear  parents  ?    And  what  say  you  to  the  story  §  hoi* 

*  Iliad,  I.  225. 

i  Odyssey,  rx.  8.    This  is  said  by  Ulysses. 
Odyssey,  xn.    343.  §  Odyssey,  nil.  388. 


Book  III.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  89 

Ares  and  Aphrodite  were  bound  in  fetters  by  Hephaestus 
in  consequence  of  a  similar  proceeding? 

Upon  my  word,  he  replied,  such  stories  strike  me  as 
very  improper  to  be  told. 

But  whatever  acts  of  fortitude  under  all  trials  in  deed 
and  word  are  ascribed  to  men  of  renown,  these  we  will 
contemplate  and  listen  to,  as  for  instance, 

"  Smiting  his  breast,  to  his  heart  thus  spake  he  in  accents  of 

chiding, 
Patience,  I    pray  thee,    my  heart :   thou  hast    borne    even 

worse  provocation."  * 

Yes,  by  all  means. 

Further,  we  must  not  permit  our  men,  I  presume,  to  be 
receivers  of  bribes  or  lovers  of  money? 
Certainly  not. 
Then  we  must  not  sing  to  them  that 

"  Gods  are  persuaded  by  gifts,  by  gifts  dread  kings  are  per- 
suaded."! 

Nor  must  we  praise  Phoenix,  the  tutor  of  Achilles,  or  al- 
low that  he  spoke  with  wisdom  when  he  advised  him  J  to 
aid  the  Achaeans  if  he  received  presents  from  them,  but 
without  presents  not  to  dismiss  his  anger.  And  we  shall 
not  believe  or  allow  that  Achilles  himself  was  so  ava- 
ricious as  to  take  gifts  from  Agamemnon,  and  at  another 
time  to  give  up  a  dead  body  only  on  condition  of  receiving 
a  price  for  it. 

No ;  it  is  not  right  to  commend  such  stories. 

It  is  only  my  regard  to  Homer,  I  continued,  that  makes 
me  slow  to  assert  that  it  is  a  positive  sin  to  say  these 
things  of  Achilles,  or  to  believe  them  when  others  say 
them :  or  again,  to  believe  that  he  said  to  Apollo, 

"Thou,  far-worker,  hast  harmed  me,  no  god  so  destructive  as 

thou  art : 
Verily,  had    I  the  power,  I  would   take  vengeance    upon 
thee;"§ 

*  Odyssey,  XX.  17.  \  Supposed  to  be  from  Hesiod. 

%  Iliad,  IX.  515.  §  Iliad,  xxn.  15. 


90  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III 

and  that  he  behaved  in  so  refractory  a  manner  to  the 
river,*  who  was  a  god,  as  to  be  prepared  to  fight  with 
him;  and  that  he  said  of  the  hair  that  was  consecrated  to 
the  other  river  Spercheius, 

"  Fain  would  I  offer  this  hair  as  a  gift  to  the  hero  Patroclus,"  f 

who  was  then  a  corpse,  and  that  he  fulfilled  his  purpose; 
all  these  tales  are  not  to  be  believed.  And  again,  all  the 
stories  J  of  his  dragging  Hector  round  the  tomb  of  Patro- 
clus, and  of  his  immolation  of  the  captives  on  the  funeral 
pile,  we  shall  unhesitatingly  declare  untrue;  and  we  shall 
not  allow  our  young  men  to  be  persuaded  that  Achilles, 
the  son  of  a  goddess  and  of  Peleus, — who  was  a  most  dis- 
creet prince,  and  third  in  descent  from  Zeus, — and  the 
pupil  of  Cheiron,  that  wisest  of  teachers,  was  yet  such  a 
compound  of  confusions,  as  to  combine  in  himself  two 
such  opposite  maladies  as  mean  covetousness  and  arro- 
gant contempt  of  gods  and  men. 

You  are  right. 

Then  let  us  not  believe,  once  more,  or  allow  it  to  be 
said,  that  Theseus  the  son  of  Poseidon,  the  Peirithous 
the  son  of  Zeus,  went  forth  to  commit  so  dire  a  rape;  nor 
that  any  other  god-sprung  hero  could  have  ventured  to 
perpetrate  such  dreadful  impieties  as  at  the  present  day 
are  falsely  ascribed  to  them :  rather  let  us  oblige  our  poets 
to  admit,  either  that  the  deeds  in  question  were  not  their 
deeds,  or  else  that  they  were  not  children  of  gods;  but  let 
them  beware  of  combining  the  two  assertions,  and  of  at- 
tempting to  make  our  young  men  believe  that  the  gods 
are  parents  of  evil,  and  that  heroes  are  no  better  than 
common  men:  for,  as  we  said  above,  these  statements 
are  at  once  irreverent  and  untrue;  for  we  have  proved, 
I  believe,  that  evils  cannot  originate  with  the  gods. 

Undoubtedly  we  have. 

And  besides,  such  language  is  pernicious  to  the  hearers  ■. 
for  every  one  will  be  indulgent  to  vice  in  himself,  if  he  is 

♦Iliad,  xxi.  130.  f  Iliad,  xxm.  151. 

t  Iliad,  xxii.  394 ;  and  xxm.  175. 


Book  III.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  91 

convinced  that  such  were  and  still  are  the  practices  of 
those  who  are 

11  Kinsfolk  of  gods,  not  far  from  Zeus  himself, 
Whose  is  the  altar  so  ancestral  Zeus 
Upon  the  hill  of  Ida,  in  the  sky  ; 
And  still  within  their  veins  flows  blood  divine."* 

On  these  accounts  we  must  suppress  such  fables,  lest 
hey  engender  in  our  young  men  a  great  aptitude  for 
wickedness. 

I  entirely  agree  with  you. 

What  class  then  still  remains,  I  continued,  to  complete 
mr  description  of  the  kinds  of  narratives  which  may  or 
may  not  be  circulated?  We  have  already  .stated  what 
rules  must  be  regarded  in  speaking  of  the  gods,  and  the 
demigods,  and  heroes,  and  the  souls  of  the  departed. 

We  have. 

Then  the  mode  of  speaking  about  men  will  be  the 
remaining  subject,  will  it  not? 

Yes,  obviously. 

It  is  quite  impossible,  my  friend,  to  settle  this  at  the 
present  stage  of  our  inquiry. 

How  so? 

Because,  I  imagine,  we  shall  assert  that  in  fact  poets 
and  writers  of  prose  are  alike  in  error  in  the  most  impor- 
tant particulars,  when  they  speak  of  men, — making  out 
that  many  are  happy,  though  unjust,  and  many  just,  yet 
miserable,  and  that  injustice  is  profitable  if  it  be  not  found 
out,  whereas  justice  is  a  gain  to  your  neighbour,  but  a  loss 
to  yourself :  and  I  imagine  we  shall  forbid  the  use  of  such 
language,  and  lay  our  commands  on  all  writers  to  express 
the  very  opposite  sentiments  in  their  songs  and  their 
legends.    Do  you  not  think  so? 

Nay,  I  am  sure  of  it. 

Then,  as  soon  as  you  admit  that  I  am  right  in  that, 
shall  I  not  fnirly  maintain  that  you  have  admitted  th? 
very  proposition  which  is  the  subject  of  our  inquiry? 

Your  assumption  is  correct,  he  replied. 

*  From  the  Niobe  of  ^schylu* 


92  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IIL 

Then  must  we  not  postpone  coming  to  an  agreement  as 
to  the  terms  to  be  employed  in  speaking  of  men,  till  we 
have  first  discovered  the  real  nature  of  justice,  and  proved 
that  it  is  naturally  profitable  to  its  possessor,  whether  he 
have   the    character   of   being   just   or   not? 

You  are  perfectly  right. 

Let  us  then  here  close  our  discussion  of  the  subject- 
matter  of  narratives:  our  next  task,  I  imagine,  is  to  inves- 
tigate the  question  of  their  form;  and  this  done,  we  shall 
have  thoroughly  considered  both  what  ought  to  be  said, 
and  the  mode  of  saying  it. 

Here  Adeimantus  remarked,  I  do  not  understand  what 
you  mean  by  that. 

Well,  but  it  is  important  that  you  should,  said  I.  Per- 
haps you  will  see  it  better  when  I  put  it  in  this  way. 
May  not  all  the  compositions  of  poets  or  legend-writers 
be  described  as  narrations  of  past,  present,  or  future 
events  ? 

What  else  could  they  be? 

Then  does  not  the  author  obtain  his  object,  either  by 
narration  simple,  or  by  narration  conveyed  through  the 
medium   of   imitation,   or  by   a   mixture   of   both? 

This  also,  he  said,  still  requires  to  be  made  more  intel- 
ligible to  me. 

Apparently  I  am  a  ridiculously  unintelligible  teacher. 
I  will  therefore  proceed  like  a  man  who  has  not  the  gift  of 
making  speeches;  I  will  not  attempt  the  general  question, 
but  I  will  detach  a  particular  instance,  and  endeavour 
thereby  to  make  my  meaning  clear  to  you.  Tell  me  then, 
are  you  well  acquainted  with  the  beginning  of  the  Iliad,  in 
which  the  poet  tells  us  that  Chryses  besought  Agamemnon 
to  release  his  daughter,  and  that  Agamemnon  was  angry 
with  him;  whereupon  Chryses,  finding  his  suit  denied, 
prayed  to  his  god  to  avenge  him  on  the  Achaeans  ? 

I  am. 

You  know  then  that  down  to  the  lines, 

"  He  petitioned  all  the  Achaeans, 
Chiefly  the  twain  that  marshalled  the   host,  the  children  of 
Atreus," 


Book  III.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  93 

the  poet  speaks  in  his  own  person,  and  does  not  even  at- 
tempt to  divert  our  thoughts  into  supposing  that  the 
speaker  is  any  other  than  himself:  but  in  what  follows  he 
speaks  in  the  person  of  Chryses,  and  endeavours,  so  far  as 
he  can,  to  make  us  believe  that  it  is  not  Homer  who  is 
speaking,  but  the  aged  priest.  And  in  this  style,  as  nearly 
as  may  be,  he  has  constructed  all  the  rest  of  his  narrative 
of  the  Trojan  war,  as  well  as  of  the  events  that  took  place 
in  Ithaca,  and  throughout  the  Odyssey.  \ 

Just  so. 

It  is  equally  narration,  is  it  not,  whether  the  poet  is  re- 
citing the  occasional  speeches,  or  describing  the  inter- 
mediate events? 

Undoubtedly  it  is. 

But  when  he  delivers  a  speech  in  the  character  of  an- 
other man,  shall  we  not  say  that  on  every  such  occasion 
he  aims  at  the  closest  resemblance  in  style  to  the  person 
introduced  as  the  speaker? 

We  shall,  of  course. 

And  when  one  man  assumes  a  resemblance  to  another, 
in  voice  or  look,  is  not  that  imitation  ? 

Undoubtedly  it  is. 

Then  in  such  a  case  it  appears  that  both  Homer  and 
other  poets  carry  on  the  narration  through  the  medium  of 
imitation. 

Certainly  they  do. 

But  if  the  poet  nowhere  concealed  his  own  personality, 
he  would  have  completed  his  composition  and  narration 
wholly  without  imitation.  That  you  may  not  say  again 
that  you  do  not  understand  how  this  would  be,  I  will  tell 
you.  If  Homer, — after  saying  that  Chryses  came,  bring- 
ing his  daughter's  ransom,  in  the  character  of  a  suppliant 
to  the  Achseans,  and  above  all  to  the  kings, — had  con- 
tinued to  speak,  not  as  if  he  had  become  Chryses,  but 
as  if  he  were  Homer  still,  that,  you  know,  would  have 
been  not  imitation,  but  simple  narration.  The  story 
would  have  run  in  something  like  the  following  manner. 
I  shall  tell  it  in  prose,  for  I  am  no  poet.  The  priest 
came  and  prayed  that  the  gods  might  grant  to  the  Greeks 


94  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III. 

the  capture  of  Troy,  and  a  safe  return,  if  only  they  would 
release  unto  him  his  daughter,  accepting  the  ransom,  and 
reverencing  his  god.  And  when  he  had  thus  spoken,  all 
the  rest  were  moved  with  awe,  and  were  willing  to  con- 
sent; but  Agamemnon  was  wroth,  and  charged  him  to 
depart,  and  come  again  no  more,  lest  the  staff  and  the 
wreaths  of  the  god  should  avail  him  nought;  and  ere  his 
daughter  should  be  set  free,  he  said,  she  should  grow  old 
with  him  in  Argos;  so  he  bade  him  begone,  and  avoid 
provoking  him,  if  he  wished  to  reach  home  unhurt.  And 
the  old  man,  when  he  heard  it,  was  afraid,  and  went 
away  in  silence;  but  when  he  was  clear  of  the  camp  he 
prayed  much  to  Apollo,  calling  upon  the  god  by  his  titles, 
and  putting  him  in  remembrance,  and  asking  to  be  re- 
paid, if  ever  he  had  presented  an  acceptable  offering  to 
him  in  the  building  of  temples  or  the  sacrifice  of  obla- 
tions: in  consideration  of  which  things  he  prayed  that  he 
would  avenge  his  tears  upon  the  Achaeans,  by  shooting 
his  arrows  among  them.  In  this,  my  friend,  we  have 
simple  narration  without  imitation. 

I  understand,  he  said. 

I  would  further  have  you  understand,  tkat  the  opposite 
result  ensues,  when  you  strike  out  the  poet's  own  words 
that  stand  between  the  speeches,  leaving  only  the  alter- 
nate dialogue. 

Yes,  I  understand :  tragedies  are  a  case  of  this  sort. 

You  are  perfectly  right  in  your  supposition.  Now  I 
think  I  can  make  you  see  clearly  what  before  I  could  not, 
that  one  branch  of  poetry  and  legend-writing  consists 
wholly  of  imitation,  that  is,  as  you  say,  tragedy  and  com- 
edy; another  branch  employs  the  simple  recital  of  the 
poet  in  his  own  person,  and  is  chiefly  to  be  found,  I  imag- 
ine, in  dithyrambic  poetry;  while  a  third  employs  both 
recital  and  imitation,  as  is  seen  in  the  construction  of 
epic  poems,  and  in  many  other  instances,  if  I  make  you 
understand  me. 

Yes,  I  quite  comprehend  now  what  you  meant  by  that 
first  remark. 

Now  then  recall  what  we  said  previously;  which  was, 


Book  III.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  95 

that  having  settled  the  question  of  the  matter  of  composi- 
tion, it  only  remained  for  us  to  consider  the  manner. 

1  remember. 

This  then  was  precisely  what  I  meant;  that  it  was 
incumbent  on  us  to  come  to  an  agreement,  whether  we 
should  allow  our  poets,  in  telling  their  story,  to  employ 
imitation  exclusively,  or  partially,  (and  if  so,  by  what  cri- 
terion they  should  be  guided,)  or  not  at  all. 

I  divine,  said  he,  that  you  are  speculating  whether  we 
shall  admit  tragedy  and  comedy  into  our  city,  or  not. 

It  may  be  so,  I  replied :  and  it  may  be  that  other  claims 
will  be  questioned  besides  those  of  tragedy  and  comedy: 
in  fact,  I  do  not  yet  know  myself;  but  we  must  go  where 
the  argument  carries  us,  as  a  vessel  runs  before  the 
wind. 

You  are  quite  right. 

Here  then  is  a  question  for  you  to  consider,  Adei- 
mantus, — Ought  our  guardians  to  be  apt  imitators,  or 
not?  Or  does  it  follow,  from  our  previous  admissions, 
that  any  individual  may  pursue  with  success  one  calling, 
but  not  many;  or,  if  he  attempts  this,  by  his  meddling 
with  many  he  will  fail  in  all,  so  far  as  to  gain  no  distinc- 
tion in  any  ? 

That  would  undoubtedly  be  the  case. 

Does  not  the  same  principle  apply  to  imitation,  or  can 
the  same  person  imitate  many  things  as  well  as  he  can 
imitate  one? 

Certainly  he  cannot. 

It  is  very  improbable,  then,  that  one  who  is  engaged  in 
any  important  calling,  will  at  the  same  time  know  how  to 
imitate  a  variety  of  things,  and  be  a  successful  imitator: 
for  even  two  branches  of  imitation,  which  are  thought  to 
be  closely  allied,  are  more,  I  believe,  than  can  be  success- 
fully pursued  together  by  the  same  person ;  as,  for  in- 
stance, the  writing  of  comedy  and  of  tragedy,  which  you 
described  just  now  as  imitations,  did  you  not  ? 

I  did;  and  you  are  right  in  saying  that  the  same  per- 
sons cannot  succeed  in  both. 


96  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III. 

Nor  yet  can  a  man  combine  the  professions  of  a  reciter 
of  epic  poetry  and  an  actor. 

True. 

Nay,  the  same  actor  cannot  even  play  both  Tragedy 
and  Comedy;  and  all  these  are  arts  of  imitation,  are 
they  not? 

They  are. 

And  human  nature  appears  to  me,  Adeimantus,  to  be 
split  up  into  yet  more  minute  subdivisions  than  these,  so 
that  a  man  is  unable  to  imitate  many  things  well,  or  to 
do  the  things  themselves  of  which  the  imitations  are  like- 
nesses. 

Most  true. 

If  then  we  are  to  maintain  our  first  view  that  our  guar- 
dians ought  to  be  released  from  every  other  craft,  that 
they  may  acquire  consummate  skill  in  the  art  of  creating 
their  country's  freedom,  and  may  follow  no  other  occupa- 
tion but  such  as  tends  to  this  result,  it  will  not  be  de- 
sirable for  them  either  to  practise  or  to  imitate  anything 
else;  or  if  they  do  imitate,  let  them  imitate  from  very 
childhood  whatever  is  proper  to  their  profession, — brave, 
sober,  religious,  honourable  men,  and  the  like, — but  mean- 
ness, and  every  other  kind  of  baseness,  let  them  neither 
practise  nor  be  skilled  to  imitate,  lest  from  the  imitation 
they  be  infected  with  the  reality.  For  have  you  not  per- 
ceived that  imitations,  whether  of  bodily  gestures,  tones 
of  voice,  or  modes  of  thought,  if  they  be  persevered  in 
from  an  early  age,  are  apt  to  grow  into  habits  and  a 
second  nature? 

Certainly  I  have. 

Then  we  shall  not  permit  those  in  whom  we  profess  to 
take  an  interest  and  whom  we  desire  to  become  good 
men,  to  imitate  a  woman,  being  themselves  men,  whether 
she  be  young  or  old,  either  reviling  a  man,  or  striving  and 
vaunting  against  the  gods,  in  the  belief  of  her  own  felic- 
ity; or  taken  up  with  misfortunes,  and  griefs,  and  com- 
plaints: much  more  shall  we  forbid  them  to  imitate  one 
that  is  ill,  or  in  love,  or  in  labour. 

Exactly  so. 


Book  III.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  97 

Again,  they  must  not  be  permitted  to  imitate  slaves  of 
either  sex  engaged  in  the  occjpations  of  slaves. 

No,  they  must  not. 

Nor  yet  bad  men,  it  would  seem,  such  as  cowards,  and 
generally  those  whose  conduct  is  the  reverse  of  what  we 
described  just  now;  men  in  the  act  of  abusing  and  cari- 
caturing one  another,  and  uttering  ribaldry,  whether 
drunk  or  sober,  or  committing  any  of  those  offences 
against  others,  or  amongst  themselves,  of  which  tuck 
men  both  in  word  and  in  deed  are  wont  to  be  guilty.  I 
think  also  that  we  must  not  accustom  them  to  like* 
themselves  to  madmen,  in  word  or  in  act.  For  though  it 
is  right  they  should  know  m«r:6.  and  wicked  people  of  both. 
sexes,  they  ought  not  to  act  like  them,  nor  give  imitations 
of  them. 

Most  true. 

Again,  may  they  imitate  smiths  or  any  other  craftsmen, 
working  at  their  trade,  or  rowers  pulling  at  the  oars  in  a 
galley,  or  their  strokesmen,  or  arching  else  of  the  kind? 

Impossible,  he  replied,  since  they  are  not  to  be  per- 
mitted even  to  pay  attention  to  any  of  these  occupations. 

Once  more,  shall  they  give  imitations  of  horses  neighing 
and  bulls  bellowing,  or  of  roaring  rivers  and  sounding 
seas,  and  claps  of  thunder,  or  of  any  such  phenomena? 

Nay,  we  have  forbidden  them  either  to  be  mad  them- 
selves, Or  to  liken  themselves  to  madmen. 

If  then  I  understand  what  you  mean,  there  is  a  certain 
kind  of  style  in  narration  which  an  honourable  and  ac- 
complished man  will  adopt,  whenever  he  is  called  upon  to 
narrate  anything;  and  another  kind,  unlike  the  former,  to 
which  a  man  who  by  nature  and  education  is  of  the  oppo- 
site character,  will  on  such  occasions  always  adhere. 

Pray  what  are  the  two  kinds  ?  he  asked. 

The  former,  or  the  man  of  well-regulated  character, 
when  he  comes,  in  telling  a  story,  to  a  speech  or  action  of 
a  good  man,  will,  I  think,  like  to  report  it  as  if  he  were 
himself  the  subject  of  the  narrative,  and  will  not  be 
ashamed  of  this  kind  of  imitation,  preferring  to  imitate 
the  good  man  when  his  conduct  is  steady  and  sensible* 
7 


98  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IIL 

and  doing  so  less  frequently  and  faithfully  when  he  has 
been  thrown  off  his  balance  by  sickness  or  love,  or  it  may 
be  by  intoxication  or  some  other  misfortune:  but  when 
he  comes  to  a  character  that  is  unworthy  of  him,  instead 
of  being  willing  seriously  to  liken  himself  to  his  inferior, 
except  perhaps  for  a  short  time,  when  the  man  is  per- 
forming a  good  action,  he  will  be  ashamed  to  do  it,  partly 
because  he  has  had  no  practice  in  imitating  such  charac- 
ters, and  partly,  because  in  his  deliberate  contempt  for 
them  he  disdains  to  mould  and  cast  himself  after  the 
models  of  baser  men,  unless  it  be  for  mere  pastime. 

So  one  would  expect. 

Then  will  he  not  use  that  style  of  narration  which  we 
described  a  little  while  since  by  referring  to  the  poems  of 
Homer,  so  that  his  style  will  partake  both  of  imitation 
and  of  ordinary  narration,  the  former  however  making 
but  a  small  part  of  a  long  discourse?  Or  am  I  quite 
wrong  ? 

Nay,  you  describe  accurately  what  must  be  the  model 
of  such  a  speaker. 

Then  again,  the  man  who  is  not  of  this  character,  the 
more  contemptible  he  is,  will  be  the  more  inclined  to  omit 
nothing  in  his  narration,  and  to  think  nothing  too  low  for 
him,  so  that  he  will  attempt,  seriously  and  in  the  presence 
of  many  hearers,  to  imitate  everything  without  exception, 
even  the  phenomena  we  mentioned  just  now,  claps  of 
thunder  and  the  noise  of  wind  and  of  hail,  and  of  wheels 
and  pulleys,  and  the  sounds  of  trumpets  and  flutes  and 
pipes  and  all  manner  of  instruments;  nay,  even  the  bark- 
ing of  dogs,  the  bleating  of  sheep,  and  the  notes  of  birds: 
and  his  style  will  either  consist  wholly  of  the  imitation  of 
sounds  and  forms,  or  will  comprise  but  a  small  modicum 
of  narration. 

This  must  also  inevitably  be  the  case,  he  said. 

These  then  are  the  two  kinds  of  style  which  I  meant. 

True,  there  are  two  such  styles. 

Do  you  see  then  that  the  transitions  which  occur  in  one 
of  the  two  are  trifling;  and  if  you  can  adapt  a  suitable 
harmony  and  rhythm  to  the  style,  it  is  nearly  possible  for 


Book  III.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  99 

correct  recitation  to  proceed  without  change  of  style  and 
in  one  harmony, — the  transitions  being  inconsiderable, — 
and  also  in  a  similarly  unchanging  rhythm? 

That  is  precisely  the  case. 

Well,  and  does  not  the  other  kind  require,  on  the  con- 
trary, all  sorts  of  harmonies  and  rhythms,  if  in  its  turn  it 
is  to  be  appropriately  recited,  owing  to  the  infinite  variety 
of  its  transitions? 

Most  decidedly  it  does. 

Then  do  all  poets  and  all  who  narrate  anything  fall  into 
one  or  other  of  these  two  types  of  style,  or  else  into  one 
which  is  formed  by  blending  these  two  together? 

They  must. 

What  shall  we  do  then?  Shall  we  admit  all  the  three 
types  into  our  state,  or  only  one  of  them, — that  is  to  say, 
either  the  composite  type,  or  else  one  or  other  of  the  un- 
compounded  ? 

If  my  judgment  is  to  prevail,  we  shall  admit  only  the 
pure  and  simple  type  which  imitates  the  virtuous  man. 

Nevertheless,  Adeimantus,  there  is  an  attraction  about 
the  composite  type;  while  by  far  the  most  attractive  of 
all,  to  children  and  the  attendants  of  children  and  to  the 
vulgar  mass,  is  the  opposite  of  that  which  you  prefer. 

It  is  true. 

But  perhaps  you  will  say  that  it  is  not  in  harmony  with 
the  genius  of  our  commonwealth,  because  with  us  there 
is  no  twofold  or  manifold  man,  since  every  one  has  one 
Bingle  occupation. 

You  are  quite  right;  it  would  not  be  in  harmony. 

And  is  not  this  the  reason  why  in  a  state  like  ours, 
and  in  no  other,  we  shall  find  the  shoemaker  a  shoemaker, 
and  not  a  pilot  in  addition,  and  the  husbandman  a  hus- 
bandman, and  not  a  juryman  in  addition,  and  the  soldier 
a  soldier,  and  not  a  tradesman  in  addition;  and  so  on 
throughout  ? 

True. 

It  is  probable  then,  that  if  a  man  should  arrive  in  our 
city,  so  clever  as  to  be  able  to  assume  any  character  and 
imitate  any  object,  and  should  propose  to  make  a  public 


100  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  in. 

display  of  his  talents  and  his  productions,  we  shall  pay 
him  reverence  as  a  sacred,  admirable,  and  charming  per- 
ionage,  but  we  shall  tell  him  that  in  our  state  there  is  no 
one  like  him,  and  that  our  law  excludes  such  characters, 
and  we  shall  send  him  away  to  another  city  after  pouring 
perfumed  oil  upon  his  head,  and  crowning  him  with  wool- 
len fillets;  but  for  ourselves,  we  shall  employ,  for  the  sake 
of  our  real  good,  that  more  austere  and  less  fascinating 
poet  and  legend-writer,  who  will  imitate  for  us  the  style  of 
the  virtuous  man,  and  will  cast  his  narratives  in  those 
moulds  which  we  prescribed  at  the  outset,  when  we  were 
engaged  with  the  training  of  our  soldiers. 

We  shall  certainly  do  so,  if  it  be  in  our  power. 

Now  then,  my  dear  friend,  it  would  seem  that  we  have 
completely  done  with  that  branch  of  music  which  relates 
to  fabulous  and  other  narratives;  for  we  have  described 
both  what  is  to  be  said,  and  how  it  is  to  be  said. 

I  think  so  too. 

Then  our  next  subject,  I  continued,  is  that  of  melody 
and  songs,*  is  it  not? 

Clearly  it  is. 

Then  can  it  be  difficult  now  for  any  one  to  discover 
what  we  ought  to  say  about  them  and  their  proper  char- 
acter, if  we  are  to  be  consistent  with  our  previous  con- 
clusions ? 

Here  Glaucon  smiled,  and  said,  Then  I  am  afraid  that 
I,  Socrates,  do  not  come  under  the  term  "  any  one :  * 
that  is,  I  cannot  this  moment  come  to  a  satisfactory 
conclusion  as  to  what  kinds  we  must  sanction,  though 
I  have  my  suspicions. 

I  presume,  at  all  events,  you  feel  quite  able  to  affirm 

J  *  It  has  been  found  very  difficult  to  interpret  the  terms  of  an- 
cient music  in  those  of  the  modern  science.  The  reader  who 
'desires  to  learn  what  is  known  about  Greek  Music  may  refer  to 
the  article  on  that  subject  in  Dr  Smith's  Dictionary  of  Antiqui- 
ties. The  word  ap/uovla  has  been  rendered  in  the  text  by  its 
English  form  "  harmony  ;  "  but  it  will  be  seen  that  it  does  not 
strictly  correspond  in  sense  with  the  technical  acceptation  of 
the  English  word. 


Book  m.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  101 

so  much  as  this,  that  a  song  consists  of  three  parts,  the 
words,  the  harmony,  and  the  rhythm. 

Yes,  I  can  affirm  that. 

Then  I  presume  that  between  the  words  of  a  song  and 
words  not  set  to  music  there  is  no  difference,  so  far  as 
concerns  the  propriety  of  their  being  composed  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  types  which  we  lately  appointed,  and 
in  the  same  manner. 

True. 

And  you  will  grant  that  the  harmony  and  the  rhythm 
ought  to  follow  the  words. 

Undoubtedly. 

But  we  said,  you  know,  that  in  the  case  of  words  we 
did  not  require  dirges  and  complaints. 

No,  we  do  not. 

Which  then  are  the  plaintive  harmonies?  tell  me,  for 
you  are  musical. 

Mixed  Lydian  and  Hyperlydian,  and  such  as  are  like 
these. 

These  then  must  be  discarded:  for  they  are  useless 
even  to  women  that  are  to  be  virtuously  given,  not  to  say 
to  men. 

Quite  so. 

And  you  will  grant  that  drunkenness,  effeminacy,  and 
idleness  are  most  unbecoming  things  in  guardians. 

Undoubtedly  they  are. 

Which  of  the  harmonies  then  are  effeminate  and  con- 
vivial ? 

The  Ionian  and  the  Lydian,  which  are  called  *  lax/' 

Will  you  employ  these  then  my  friend,  in  the  training 
of  men  of  war? 

By  no  means:  and  if  I  mistake  not,  you  have  only  the 
Dorian  and  the  Phrygian  left  you. 

1  do  not  know  the  harmonies  myself,  I  said;  only  see 
you  leave  me  that  particular  harmony  which  will  suitably 
represent  the  tones  and  accents  of  a  brave  man  engaged 
in  a  feat  of  arms,  or  in  any  violent  operation,  who,  if  he 
fails  of  success,  or  encounters  wounds  and  death,  or  falls 
into  any  other  calamity,  in  all  such  contingencies  with 


102  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III. 

unflinching  endurance  parries  the  blows  of  fortune;  leave 
me  also  another  harmony,  expressive  of  the  feelings  of  one 
who  is  engaged  in  an  occupation  not  violent,  but  peaceful 
and  unconstrained; — it  may  be,  using  persuasion  and 
entreaty,  addressing  either  a  prayer  to  a  god,  or  instruc- 
tion and  advice  to  a  man;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  lend- 
ing *  himself  to  the  prayers  or  advice  or  persuasion  of 
another,  and  after  this  succeeding  to  his  wish;  and  not 
behaving  arrogantly,  but  acting  in  all  these  circumstances 
with  soberness  and  moderation,  and  in  the  same  spirit 
acquiescing  in  every  result.  Leave  me  these  two  har- 
monies, the  one  violent,  the  other  tranquil,  such  as  shall 
best  imitate  the  tones  of  men  in  adversity  and  in  prosper- 
ity, in  a  temperate  and  in  a  courageous  mood. 

Well,  said  he,  you  are  recommending  me  to  leave  pre- 
cisely those  which  I  just  mentioned. 

Then  we  shall  not  require  for  our  songs  and  instrumen- 
tal accompaniments  a  variety  of  strings,  or  an  instrument 
embracing  all  harmonies. 

I  believe  not. 

Then  we  shall  not  maintain  the  makers  of  harps  or 
dulcimers,  or  any  instrument  that  has  many  strings  and 
serves  for  many  harmonies. 

Apparently  not. 

But  will  you  admit  into  your  city  flute-makers  and 
flute-players?  or  am  I  right  in  saying  that  the  flute 
has  more  strings  than  any  other  instrument,  and  that 
the  panharmonium  itself  is  only  an  imitation  of  the  flute  ? 

Manifestly  you  are  right. 

Then  you  have  the  lyre  and  the  guitar  remaining,  which 
will  be  of  service  in  the  town;  while  in  the  country  the 
herdsmen  will  have  some  kind  of  pipe. 

So  at  least  the  argument  indicates  to  us. 

Surely  we  are  guilty  of  no  innovation,  my  friend,  in  pre- 
ferring Apollo  and  Apollo's  instruments  to  Marsyas  and 
his  instruments. 

No,  I  really  think  we  are  not. 

.Well,  I  protest,  said  I,  we  have  been  unconsciously 
*  Reading  mkxovra. 


Book  III.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  103 

purging  the   city,   which  we   said  just  now  was  in  too 
luxurious  a  condition. 

And  we  have  done  wisely. 

Come  then,  I  continued,  let  us  finish  our  purgation. 
Next  after  the  harmonies  will  follow  our  law  of  rhythms, 
to  the  effect  that  we  must  not  aim  at  a  variety  of  them,  or 
study  all  movements  indiscriminately,  but  observe  what 
are  the  natural  rhythms  of  a  well-regulated  and  manly 
life,  and  when  we  have  discovered  these  we  must  compel 
the  foot  and  the  music  to  suit  themselves  to  the  sense  of 
such  a  life,  and  not  the  sense  to  suit  itself  to  the  foot  and 
the  music.  But  what  these  rhythms  may  be,  it  is  your 
business  to  explain,  as  you  did  the  harmonies. 

Nay,  but  in  good  faith,  he  said,  I  cannot  tell.  I  cer- 
tainly could  say,  from  what  I  have  observed,  that  there 
are  three  principal  kinds  into  which  all  movements  may 
be  analyzed,  as  in  the  case  of  sounds  there  are  four  kinds 
into  which  all  harmonies  may  be  resolved:  but  which 
kinds  of  rhythm  express  which  kinds  of  life,  I  cannot  say. 

Well,  said  I,  we  will  call  in  Damon  to  our  counsels 
upon  the  question,  what  movements  are  akin  to  meanness 
and  insolence,  or  to  madness  and  other  vices,  and  what 
rhythms  are  to  be  left  as  expressive  of  the  opposite  quali- 
ties. But  I  fancy  that  I  have  heard  him  indistinctly  al- 
luding to  a  certain  complex  varlike  rhythm,  and  another 
that  was  dactylic,  and  a  third  heroic, — arranging  them 
I  know  not  how,  and  shewing  that  the  rise  and  fall  of 
each  foot  balance  one  another,  by  resolving  them  into 
short  and  long  syllables;  and  he  gave  the  name  iambus 
to  a  certain  foot,  if  I  am  not  wrong,  and  trochee  to  an- 
other, affixing  to  them  long  and  short  marks.  And  in 
some  of  these,  I  think,  he  would  blame  or  praise  the 
march  of  the  foot  no  less  than  the  rhythm,  or  perhaps 
the  two  taken  together :  for  I  cannot  speak  positively. . 
But  let  these  questions,  as  I  said  before,  be  referred  to 
Damon :  for  to  settle  them  would  require  no  short  dis- 
cussion;  or  do  you  think  differently? 

No,  indeed  I  do  not. 


104  fHE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III 

But  this  point  at  least  you  can  settle,  that  grace  and 
awkwardness  accompany  a  good  or  a  bad  rhythm? 

Of  course  they  do. 

And  good  and  bad  rhythm  are,  by  a  process  of  assimila- 
tion, results  of  a  good  style  and  its  opposite  respectively; 
and  the  same  may  be  said  of  good  and  bad  harmony,  that 
is  to  say,  if  rhythm  and  harmony  are  to  suit  themselves 
to  the  words,  as  was  asserted  just  now,  and  not  the  words 
to  them. 

No  doubt  they  must  suit  themselves  to  the  words. 

But  what  do  you  say  of  the  style  and  the  words? 
are  they  not  determined  by  the  moral  disposition  of  the 
soul? 

Undoubtedly  they  are. 

And  is  all  the  rest  determined  by  the  style? 

Yes. 

Then  good  language  and  good  harmony  and  grace  and 
good  rhythm  all  depend  upon  a  good  nature,  by  which 
I  do  not  mean  that  silliness  which  by  courtesy  we  call 
good  nature,  but  a  mind  that  is  really  well  and  nobly  con- 
stituted in  its  moral  character. 

Precisely  so. 

Then  must  not  our  young  men  on  all  occasions  pursue 
these  qualities,  if  we  intend  them  to  perform  their  proper 
work  ? 

Yes,  they  must. 

And  such  qualities,  I  presume,  enter  largely  into  paint- 
ing and  all  similar  workmanship,  into  weaving  and 
embroidery,  into  architecture,  as  well  as  the  whole  manu- 
facture of  utensils  in  general;  nay,  into  the  constitution 
of  living  bodies,  and  of  all  plants:  for  in  all  these  things 
gracefulness  or  ungracefulness  finds  place.  And  the 
absence  of  grace,  and  rhythm,  and  harmony,  is  closely 
allied  to  an  evil  style,  and  an  evil  character:  whereas 
their  presence  is  allied  to,  and  expressive  of,  the  opposite 
character,  which  is  brave  and  soberminded. 

You  are  entirely  right. 

This  being  the  case,  ought  we  to  confine  ourselves  to 


Booe  in.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  105 

superintending  our  poets,  and  compelling  them  to  impress 
on  their  productions  the  likeness  of  a  good  moral  char- 
acter, on  pain  of  not  composing  among  us;  or  ought  we 
to  extend  our  superintendence  to  the  professors  of  every 
other  craft  as  well,  and  forbid  them  to  impress  those  signs 
of  an  evil  nature,  of  dissoluteness,  of  meanness,  and  of 
ungracefulness,  either  on  the  likenesses  of  living  creatures, 
or  on  buildings,  or  any  other  work  of  their  hands;  alto- 
gether interdicting  such  as  cannot  do  otherwise  from 
working  in  our  city,  that  our  guardians  may  not  be  reared 
amongst  images  of  vice,  as  upon  unwholesome  pastures, 
culling  much  every  day  by  little  and  little  from  many 
places,  and  feeding  upon  it,  until  they  insensibly  accumu- 
late a  large  mass  of  evil  in  their  inmost  souls?  Ought  we 
not,  on  the  contrary,  to  seek  out  artists  of  another  stamp, 
who  by  the  power  of  genius  can  trace  out  the  nature  of 
the  fair  and  the  graceful,  that  our  young  men,  dwelling  as 
it  were  in  a  healthful  region,  may  drink  in  good  from  every 
quarter,  whence  any  emanation  from  noble  works  may 
strike  upon  their  eye  or  their  ear,  like  a  gale  wafting 
health  from  salubrious  lands,  and  win  them  imperceptibly 
from  their  earliest  childhood  into  resemblance,  love,  and 
harmony  with  the  true  beauty  of  reason? 

Such  a  nurture,  he  replied,  would  be  by  far  the  best. 

Is  it  then,  Glaucon,  on  these  accounts  that  we  attach 
6uch  supreme  importance  to  a  musical  education,  because 
rhythm  and  harmony  sink  most  deeply  into  the  recesses 
of  the  soul,  and  take  most  powerful  hold  of  it,  bringing 
gracefulness  in  their  train,  and  making  a  man  graceful  if 
he  be  rightly  nurtured,  but  if  not,  the  reverse?  and  also 
because  he  that  has  been  duly  nurtured  therein  will  have 
the  keenest  eye  for  defects,  whether  in  the  failures  of  art, 
or  the  misgrowths  of  nature;  and  feeling  a  most  just 
disdain  for  them,  will  commend  beautiful  objects,  and 
gladly  receive  them  into  his  soul,  and  feed  upon  them, 
and  grow  to  be  noble  and  good;  whereas  he  will  rightly 
censure  and  hate  all  repulsive  objects,  even  in  his  child- 
hood, before  he  is  able  to  be  reasoned  with;  and  when 
reason  comes,  he  will  welcome  her  most  cordially  who  can 


106  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  lit 

recognize  her  by  the  instinct  of  relationship;  and  because 
he  has  been  thus  nurtured? 

I  have  no  doubt,  he  said,  that  such  are  the  reasons  for 
a  musical  education. 

You  know,  I  continued,  that  in  learning  to  read  we  were 
considered  tolerably  perfect,  as  soon  as  we  could  be  sure 
of  recognizing  the  few  letters  there  are,  scattered  about  in 
all  existing  words,  and  that  we  never  treated  them  with 
disrespect  in  either  a  small  word  or  a  great,  as  if  it  did 
not  signify  to  notice  them,  but  were  anxious  to  distinguish 
them  everywhere,  believing  that  we  should  be  no  scholars 
till  we  were  thus  qualified. 

True. 

Is  it  not  also  true  that  we  shall  not  know  the  images  of 
letters,  as  reflected  either  in  still  water  or  in  a  mirror, 
until  we  know  the  letters  themselves,  because  the  knowl- 
edge of  both  the  reflections  and  the  originals  belongs  to 
the  same  art  and  study? 

It  is  perfectly  true. 

Tell  me  then,  I  pray  you,  to  pass  from  my  illustration 
to  the  things  illustrated,  shall  we  in  like  manner  never 
become  truly  musical,  neither  ourselves,  nor  the  guardians 
whom  we  say  we  are  to  instruct,  until  we  know  the  essen- 
tial forms  of  temperance  and  courage  and  liberality  and 
munificence,  and  all  that  are  akin  to  these,  and  their 
opposites  also,  wherever  they  are  scattered  about,  and 
discern  them  wherever  they  are  to  be  found,  themselves 
and  their  images,  never  slighting  them  either  in  small 
things  or  in  great,  but  believing  the  knowledge  of  the 
/forms  and  of  their  images  to  belong  to  the  same  art  and 
etudy  ? 

It  must  inevitably  be  so. 

Surely,  then,  to  him  who  has  an  eye  to  see,  there  can  be 
no  fairer  spectacle  than  that  of  a  man  who  combines  the 
possession  of  moral  beauty  in  his  soul  with  outward 
beauty  of  form,  corresponding  and  harmonizing  with  the 
former,  because  the  same  great  pattern  enters  into  both. 

There  can  be  none  so  fair. 

And  you  will  grant  that  what  is  fairest  is  loveliest? 


Book  III.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  107 

Undoubtedly  it  is.  y 

Then  the  truly  musical  person  will  love  those  who  com- 
bine most  perfectly  moral  and  physical  beauty,  but  will 
not  love  any  one  in  whom  there  is  dissonance. 

No,  not  if  there  be  any  defect  in  the  soul;  but  if  it  is 
only  a  bodily  blemish,  he  may  so  bear  with  it  as  to  be  will- 
ing to  regard  it  with  complacency. 

I  understand,  I  said,  that  you  have  now,  or  have  had,  a 
favourite  of  this  kind;  so  I  give  way.  But  tell  me  this: 
has  pleasure  in  excess  any  fellowship  with  temperance? 

How  can  it  have,  when  it  unsettles  the  mind  no  less 
than  pain? 

Has  it  any  with  virtue  generally? 

Certainly  not. 

Well;  has  it  anything  in  common  with  wantonness  and 
licentiousness  ? 

Most  assuredly  it  has. 

Can  you  mention  any  pleasure  that  is  greater  and  more 
violent  than  that  which  accompanies  the  indulgence  of 
the  passion  of  love? 

I  cannot;  nor  yet  one  that  is  more  akin  to  madness. 

But  is  it  not  the  nature  of  legitimate  love  to  desire  an 
orderly  and  beautiful  object  in  a  sober  and  harmonious 
temper  ? 

Certainly  it  is. 

Then  nothing  akin  to  madness  or  licentiousness  must 
approach  legitimate  love? 

It  must  not. 

Then  the  pleasure  in  question  must  not  approach  it, 
nor  must  a  lover  and  his  beloved,  whose  affections  are 
rightly  given  and  returned,  have  anything  to  do  with  it. 

They  must  not,  indeed,  Socrates. 

Apparently  then,  in  the  state  we  are  organizing,  you 
will  legislate  to  this  effect,  that  though  a  lover  may  be 
attached  to  a  favourite,  and  frequent  his  society,  and  em- 
brace him  as  a  son,  for  his  beauty  s  sake,  if  he  can  gain 
his  consent;  yet  in  other  matters  he  shall  so  regulate  his 
intercourse  with  the  person  he  affects,  as  that  he  shall 
never  be  suspected  of  extending  his  familiarity  beyond 


108  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III 

this,  on  pain  of  being  censured  for  vulgarity  and  want  of 
taste,  if  he  acts  otherwise. 

We  shall  do  so. 

Do  you  then  think  with  me  that  our  theory  of  music  is 
now  complete  ?  At  all  events,  it  has  ended  where  it  ought 
to  end:  for  music,  I  imagine,  ought  to  end  in  the  love  of 
the  beautiful. 

I  agree  with  you,  he  said. 

Gymnastic  will  hold  the  next  place  to  music  in  the  edu- 
cation of  our  young  men. 

Certainly. 

No  doubt  a  careful  training  in  gymnastic,  as  well  as  in 
music,  ought  to  begin  with  their  childhood,  and  go  on 
through  all  their  life.  But  the  following  is  the  true  view 
of  the  case,  in  my  opinion :  see  what  you  think  of  it.  My 
belief  is,  not  that  a  good  body  will  by  its  own  excellence, 
make  the  soul  good ;  but  on  the  contrary,  that  a  good  soul 
will  by  its  excellence  render  the  body  as  perfect  as  it  can 
be :  but  what  is  your  view  ? 

The  same  as  yours. 

Then  if  we  were  first  to  administer  the  requisite  treat- 
ment to  the  mind,  and  then  to  charge  it  with  the  task  of 
prescribing  details  with  reference  to  the  body,  contenting 
ourselves  with  indicating  no  more  than  the  general  princi- 
ples, in  order  to  avoid  prolixity,  should  we  be  doing  right  ? 

Quite  so. 

We  have  already  said  that  the  persons  in  question  must 
refrain  from  drunkenness:  for  a  guardian  is  the  last  per- 
son in  the  world,  I  should  think,  to  be  allowed  to  get 
drunk,  and  not  know  where  he  is. 

Truly  it  would  be  ridiculous  for  a  guardian  to  require  a 
guard. 

But  about  eating: — our  men  are  combatants  in  a  most 
important  arena,  are  they  not? 

They  are. 

Then  will  the  habit  of  body  which  is  cultivated  by  the 
trained  fighters  of  the  palaestra  be  suitable  to  such  per- 
sons? 

Perhaps  it  will. 


Book  III.]  "HE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  109 

Well,  but  this  is  a  sleepy  kind  of  regimen,  and  produces 
a  precarious  state  of  health.  For  do  you  not  observe  that 
men  in  the  regular  training  sleep  their  life  away,  and  if 
they  depart  only  slightly  from  the  prescribed  diet,  are 
attacked  by  serious  maladies  in  their  worst  form? 

I  do. 

Then  a  better  conceived  regimen  is  required  for  our 
athletes  of  war,  who  must  be  wakeful  like  watch-dogs,  and 
possess  the  utmost  quickness  both  of  eye  and  ear,  and 
who  are  so  exposed  when  on  service,  to  variations  in  the 
water  they  drink  and  the  rest  of  their  food,  and  to  vicis- 
situdes of  sultry  heats  and  wintry  storms,  that  it  will  not 
do  for  them  to  be  of  precarious  health. 

I  believe  you  are  right. 

Then  will  the  best  gymnastic  be  sister  to  the  music 
which  we  described  a  little  while  ago? 

How  do  you  mean  ? 

It  will,  I  imagine,  be  a  simple  moderate  system,  espe- 
cially that  assigned  to  our  righting  men. 

What  will  it  be  like? 

On  these  points  we  may  take  a  lesson  even  from  Ho- 
mer. You  know  that  at  the  repasts  of  his  heroes,  when 
they  are  in  the  field,  he  never  sets  fish  before  them, 
although  they  are  upon  the  shore  of  the  Hellespont,  nor 
yet  boiled  meat,  but  only  roast,  which  soldiers  could  of 
course  procure  most  readily:  for  anywhere,  one  may  say, 
there  is  less  difficulty  in  using  mere  fire  than  in  carrying 
about  pots  and  pans. 

Certainly. 

Neither  has  Homer,  if  I  remember  right,  ever  said  a 
word  about  sauces.  However,  this  is  as  well  known,  I 
believe,  to  all  that  are  in  training,  as  to  Homer,  that  a 
man  who  desires  to  be  in  good  condition  must  abstain 
from  all  such  indulgences :  is  it  not  ? 

They  do  know  it,  and  are  right  in  abstaining  from  them. 

Then  apparently,  my  good  friend,  you  do  not  approve 
of  a  Syracusan  table,  and  of  a  Sicilian  variety  of  dishes? 
if  you  hold  such  abstinence  to  be  rightr 

I  think  I  do  not, 


HO  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III. 

Then  you  also  disapprove  of  a  taste  for  the  damsels  of 
Corinth,  in  men  who  are  to  be  in  good  bodily  condition. 

Most  assuredly  I  do. 

Then  do  you  also  condemn  those  celebrated  delicacies, 
our  Athenian  confectionery? 

Of  course  I  do. 

In  fact,  it  would  not  be  amiss,  I  imagine,  to  compare 
this  whole  system  of  feeding  and  living  to  that  kind  of 
music  and  singing  which  is  adapted  to  the  panharmon- 
ium,  :and  composed  in  every  variety  of  rhythm. 

Undoubtedly  it  would  be  a  just  comparison. 

Is  it  not  true,  then,  that  as  in  music  variety  begat  dis- 
soluteness in  the  soul,  so  here  it  begets  disease  in  the 
body,  while  simplicity  in  gymnastic  is  as  productive  of 
health,  as  in  music  it  was  productive  of  temperance? 

Most  true. 

But  when  dissoluteness  and  disease  abound  in  a  city, 
are  not  law-courts  and  surgeries  opened  in  abundance, 
and  do  not  law  and  physic  begin  to  hold  their  heads 
high,  when  numbers  even  of  well-born  persons  devote 
themselves  with  eagerness  to  these  professions? 

What  else  can  we  expect? 

But  where  can  you  find  a  more  signal  proof  that  a 
low  and  vicious  education  prevails  in  a  state,  than  in  the 
fact  that  first-rate  physicians  and  jurymen  are  in  request, 
not  merely  among  base-born  mechanics,  but  even  among 
those  who  lay  claim  to  the  birth  and  breeding  of  gentle- 
men? Does  it  not  seem  to  you  a  scandalous  thing,  and 
a  strong  proof  of  defective  education,  to  be  obliged  to 
import  justice  from  others,  in  the  character  of  lords  and 
judges,  in  consequence  of  the  scanty  supply  at  home  ? 

Nothing  can  be  more  scandalous. 

Do  you  think  it  at  all  less  scandalous,  when  a  man 
not  only  consumes  the  greater  part  of  his  life  in  courts  of 
law  as  plaintiff  or  defendant,  but  actually  has  the  vul- 
garity to  plume  himself  upon  this  very  fact,  boasting  of 
being  an  adept  in  crime,  and  such  a  master  of  tricks  and 
turns,  of  manoeuvre  and  evasion,  as  always  to  be  able 


Book  III.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  Ill 

to  wriggle  out  of  the  grasp  of  justice,  and  escape  from 
punishment,  and  that  for  the  sake  of  worthless  trifles, 
not  knowing  how  much  nobler  and  better  it  were  so  to 
order  his  life  as  never  to  stand  in  need  of  a  sleepy  judge? 

Nay,  this  is  even  a  greater  scandal  than  the  other. 

And  do  you  not  hold  it  disgraceful  to  require  medical 
aid,  unless  it  be  for  a  wound,  or  an  attack  of  illness  in- 
cidental to  the  time  of  year, — to  require  it,  I  mean,  owing 
to  our  laziness,  and  the  life  we  lead,  and  to  get  ourselves 
so  stuffed  with  humours  and  wind,  like  quagmires,  as  to 
compel  the  clever  sons  of  Asclepius  to  call  diseases  by 
such  names  as  flatulence  and  catarrh. 

To  be  sure  these  are  very  strange  and  newfangled 
names  for  disorders. 

Such  as  did  not  exist,  I  imagine,  in  Asclepius's  time. 
So  I  infer,  because  at  Troy,  when  Eurypylus  was  wounded, 
his  sons  did  not  blame  the  woman  who  gave  him  a 
draught  of  Pramnian  wine,  with  a  plentiful  sprinkling 
of  barley-meal,  and  with  cheese  grated  over  it,  which  you 
know  would  be  thought  an  inflammatory  mixture,  nor  did 
they  rebuke  Patroclus  who  dressed  his  wounds. 

Certainly,  said  he,  it  was  a  strange  potion  for  a  man 
in  his  state. 

Not  if  you  consider  that  formerly,  till  the  time  of  He- 
rodicus,  as  we  are  told,  the  disciples  of  Asclepius  did  not 
employ  our  present  system  of  medicine,  which  waits  upon 
diseases  as  the  son  of  a  rich  man  is  waited  on  by  his 
attendant.  But  Herodicus,  who  was  a  training-master, 
and  fell  into  bad  health,  made  such  a  compound  of  physic 
and  gymnastic,  that  he  first  and  chiefly  worried  out 
himself,  and  then  many  others  after  him. 

How  so? 

By  rendering  his  death  a  lingering  one.  For  he  fol- 
lowed his  disease,  which  was  a  mortal  one,  step  by_  step, 
and  while  he  was  unable,  as  I  imagine,  to  cure  himself, 
he  devoted  his  whole  time  to  the  business  of  doctoring 
himself;  living  continually  in  torment,  if  ever  he  deviated 
from  his  usual  diet;  and  thus  struggling  against  death, 
was  brought  by  his  cleverness  to  old  age. 


112  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IK. 

A  noble  prize  for  his  art  to  win  him ! 

It  is  what  one  might  expect,  I  continued,  from  6, 
person  ignorant  that  it  was  not  because  Asclepius  did 
not  know,  or  had  not  tried  this  kind  of  medical  treatment, 
that  he  never  discovered  it  to  his  descendants;  but 
because  he  was  aware  that  in  all  well-regulated  communi- 
ties each  has  a  work  assigned  to  him  in  the  state,  which 
he  must  needs  do,  and  that  no  one  has  leisure  to  spend 
his  life  as  an  invalid  in  the  doctor's  hands:  a  fact  which 
we  perceive  in  the  case  of  the  labouring  population,  but 
which,  with  ludicrous  inconsistency,  we  fail  to  detect  in 
the  case  of  those  who  are  reputed  rich  and  happy. 

How  is  that?  he  asked. 

When  a  carpenter  is  ill,  I  replied,  he  expects  to 
receive  a  draught  from  his  doctor,  that  will  expel  the 
disease  by  vomiting  or  purging,  or  else  to  get  rid  of  it  by 
cauterizing,  or  a  surgical  operation;  but  if  any  one  were 
to  prescribe  to  him  a  long  course  of  diet,  and  to  order 
bandages  for  his  head,  with  other  treatment  to  corre- 
spond, he  would  soon  tell  such  a  medical  adviser  that  he 
had  no  time  to  be  ill,  and  that  it  was  not  worth  his  while 
to  live  in  this  way,  devoting  his  mind  to  his  malady,  and 
neglecting  his  proper  occupation:  and  then  wishing  the 
physician  a  good  morning,  he  would  enter  upon  his  usual 
course  of  life,  and  either  regain  his  health  and  live  in  the 
performance  of  his  business;  or,  should  his  constitution 
prove  unable  to  bear  up,  death  puts  an  end  to  his  troubles. 

Yes;  and  for  a  man  in  that  station  of  life  this  is 
thought  the  proper  use  to  make  of  medical  assistance. 

Is  it  because  he  had  a  work  to  do,  which,  if  he  failed 
to  perform,  it  was  not  worth  his  while  to  live? 

Manifestly. 

But  the  rich  man,  as  we  say,  has  no  appointed  work 
of  such  a  character,  that,  if  compelled  to  leave  it  undone, 
life  is  to  him  not  worth  having. 

No ;  it  is  supposed  he  has  not. 

Then  you  do  not  listen  to  Phocylides,  when  he  says, 
that  so  soon  as  a  man  has  got  whereon  to  live,  then  he 
ought  to  practise  virtue. 


Book  III.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  US 

Yes,  and  before  that  too,  I  should  think. 

Let  us  have  no  quarrel  with  him  on  this  subject,  said  I; 
but  let  us  inform  ourselves  whether  the  rich  have  to  prac- 
tise virtue  so  that,  if  they  do  not,  life  is  worthless  to  them; 
or,  whether  valetudinarianism,  though  an  obstacle  to  men- 
tal application  in  carpentering  and  the  other  arts,  forms 
no  impediment  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  precept  of  Phocy- 
lides. 

Nay,  in  very  truth,  I  believe  there  is  no  greater  im- 
pediment to  it  than  that  excessive  care  of  the  body  which 
extends  beyond  gymnastic:  for  it  is  alike  harassing  to  a 
man,  whether  he  be  engaged  in  domestic  business,  or 
serving  in  the  field,  or  sitting  as  a  magistrate  at  home. 

But  quite  the  worst  of  it  is,  that  it  is  a  grievous 
hindrance  to  studies  of  all  kinds,  and  reflection,  and 
inward  meditation,  being  ever  apprehensive  of  some 
headache,  or  dizziness,  which  it  accuses  philosophy  of 
producing;  and  therefore  in  so  far  as  virtue  is  practised 
and  proved  by  intellectual  study,  it  is  a  sheer  obstacle  to 
it ;  for  it  makes  a  man  always  fancy  himself  ill,  and  never 
lets  him  rest  from  the  pangs  of  anxiety  about  his  health. 

Yes,  that  is  the  natural  effect  of  it. 

Then  must  we  not  maintain  that  Asclepius,  knowing 
all  this,  revealed  the  healing  art  for  the  benefit  of  those 
whose  constitutions  were  naturally  sound,  and  had  not 
been  impaired  by  their  habits  of  life,  but  who  were  suffer- 
ing from  some  specific  complaint,  and  that  he  used  to  expel 
their  disorders  by  drugs  and  the  use  of  the  knife,  without 
interrupting  their  customary  avocations,  that  he  might 
not  damage  the  interests  of  the  state;  but  that  where 
the  constitution  was  thoroughly  diseased  to  the  core,  he 
would  not  attempt  to  protract  a  miserable  existence  by  a 
studied  regimen,  drawing  off  from  the  system,  and  again 
pouring  into  it  a  little  at  a  time,  and  suffer  his  patients 
to  beget  children,  in  all  probability  as  diseased  as  them- 
selves; thinking  medical  treatment  ill  bestowed  on  one 
who  could  not  live  in  his  regular  round  of  duties,  since 
such  a  person  is  of  no  use  either  to  himself  or  to  the  state  ? 
I 


114  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLAT^.  tBocK  III 

You  make  out  Asclepius  to  have  been  a  profound 
statesman. 

Clearly  so:  and  because  he  was  a  man  of  that  descrip- 
tion, his  sons,  as  you  must  have  observed,  proved  them- 
selves brave  men  in  the  battle  before  Troy,  and  also 
employed  the  healing  art  in  the  manner  I  have  described. 
Or  have  you  forgotten  that  when  Menelaus  had  been 
wounded  by  the  spear  of  Pandarus, 

"  Sucking  the  blood  from  the  gash,  they  laid  mild  simples 
upon  it."  * 

But  what  he  was  to  eat  or  drink  after  this,  they  no  more 
prescribed  in  his  case  than  that  of  Eurypylus,  knowing 
that  the  simples  were  sufficient  to  cure  men  who  before 
receiving  the  wounds  were  healthy  and  regular  in  their 
mode  of  life,  even  if  they  happened  to  drink  the  next 
moment  a  compound  of  meal,  wine,  and  cheese;  but  as 
for  the  constitutionally  diseased  and  the  intemperate, 
they  thought  the  existence  of  such  a  man  no  gain  either 
to  himself  or  to  others,  believing  that  their  art  was  not 
meant  for  persons  of  that  sort,  and  that  it  would  be 
wrong  to  attempt  their  cure,  even  if  they  were  richer  than 
Midas. 

The  sons  of  Asclepius  were,  by  your  account,  very 
shrewd  fellows. 

And  it  was  meet  they  should  be.  And  yet  the  trage- 
dians, and  Pindar,  dissent  from  us;  and  while  they  assert 
that  Asclepius  was  the  son  of  Apollo,  declare  that  he  was 
induced  by  a  bribe  of  gold  to  raise  to  life  a  rich  man  who 
was  already  dead,  which  was  indeed  the  cause  of  his 
being  smitten  by  a  thunderbolt.  But  we,  agreeably  to 
our  principles,  cannot  believe  both  these  statements  of 
theirs:  on  the  contrary,  we  shall  maintain,  that  if  he  was 
the  son  of  a  god,  he  was  not  covetous;  if  he  was  covetous, 
he  was  not  the  son  of  a  god. 

In  that,  he  said,  we  shall  be  perfectly  right.  But 
what  say  you,  Socrates,  on  this  point?  ought  we  not  to 
have  good  physicians  in  our  city?  Now  the  best  phy* 
•  Iliad  iv.  218. 


Book  nl.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  115 

sicians,  I  imagine,  will  be  those  who  have  had  the  largest 
practice  both  among  the  healthy  and  among  the  diseased; 
just  as  the  best  jurors  in  like  manner  will  be  those  who 
have  mixed  with  men  of  all  varieties  of  character. 

Decidedly,  I  replied,  I  am  for  having  good  ones:  but 
do  you  know  whom  I  consider  such  ? 

I  shall  if  you  inform  me. 

I  will  try  to  do  so:  but  your  question,  I  must  premise, 
spoke  of  two  dissimilar  things  in  the  same  words. 

How  so? 

Physicians,  it  is  true,  would  acquire  the  greatest  ex~ 
pertness  if  from  their  childhood  upwards  they  not  only 
studied  their  profession,  but  also  came  in  contact  with  the 
greatest  number  of  the  worst  cases,  and  had  personal 
experience  of  every  kind  of  malady,  and  were  naturally 
not  very  healthy.  For  it  is  not  the  physician's  body,  I 
imagine,  which  cures  the  bodies  of  others; — if  it  were,  it 
could  not  be  suffered  at  any  time  to  be,  or  to  become, 
diseased; — but  his  mind,  which  cannot  direct  any  treat- 
ment skilfully,  if  it  has  become,  or  always  was,  deprived. 

You  are  right. 

But  a  juror,  my  friend,  governs  mind  by  mind;  his 
mind  therefore  cannot  be  suffered  to  be  reared  from  a 
tender  age  among  vicious  minds,  and  to  associate  with 
them,  and  to  run  the  whole  round  of  crimes  in  its  own 
experience,  in  order  to  be  quick  at  inferring  the  guilt  of 
others  from  its  own  self-knowledge,  as  is  allowable  in  the 
case  of  bodily  disorders:  on  the  contrary,  it  ought  from 
his  early  youth  to  have  been  free  from  all  experience  and 
taint  of  evil  habits,  if  it  is  to  be  qualified  by  its  own 
thorough  excellence  to  administer  sound  justice.  And 
this  is  the  reason  why  good  people,  when  young,  appear 
to  be  simple  and  easy  victims  to  the  impositions  of  bad 
men,  because  they  have  not  in  their  own  consciousness 
examples  of  like  passions  with  the  wicked. 

Yes,  they  are  exceedingly  liable  to  such  imposition. 

Therefore,  to  make  a  good  juror  a  man  must  not  be 
young,  but  old;  and  his  knowledge  of  what  injustice  is 
should  be  acquired  late  in  life,  not  by  observing  it  as  an 


116  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  I/l 

inmate  of  his  own  soul,  but  by  long  practice  in  discern! v/s; 
its  baneful  nature,  as  it  exists  out  of  himself  in  the  soi  Is 
of  others;  in  other  words,  guided  by  knowledge,  not  yy 
personal  experience. 

Certainly,  that  would  seem  to  be  the  noblest  style  ©f 
juror. 

Yes,  and  a  good  one  too,  which  is  the  point  in 
question:  for  he  that  has  a  good  soul  is  good.  But  jour 
smart  and  suspicious  juryman,  who  has  been  guilty 
himself  of  many  crimes,  and  fancies  himself  knowing  and 
clever,  so  long  as  he  has  to  deal  with  men  like  himself, 
betrays  astonishing  wariness,  thanks  to  those  inward 
examples  which  he  has  ever  in  sight:  but  when  he  comes 
into  communication  with  men  of  years,  and  virtue,  he 
shews  himself  to  be  no  better  than  a  fool,  with  his  n?is- 
timed  suspicions,  and  his  ignorance  of  a  healthy  character, 
which  are  the  consequences  of  his  not  possessing  any 
example  of  such  a  phenomenon.  But  as  he  falls  in 
oftener  with  wicked  than  with  good  men,  he  seems  b/th 
to,  himself  and  others  to  be  rather  clever  than  foolish. 

That  is  most  true. 

It  is  not  them  in  a  man  of  this  stamp  that  we  must 
look  for  our  good  and  wise  juror,  but  in  one  of  the  former 
class.  For  vice  can  never  know  both  itself  and  virtue; 
but  virtue,  in  a  well-instructed  nature,  will  in  time  acquire 
a  knowledge  at  once  of  itself  and  of  vice.  The  virtuous 
man  therefore,  in  my  opinion,  and  not  the  vicious  man, 
will  make  the  wise  judge. 

I  quite  agree  with  you. 

Then  will  you  not  establish  in  your  city  tT  e  two  facul- 
ties, of  medicine  and  of  law,  each  having  the  character 
we  have  described,  to  bestow  their  services  on  those  only 
of  the  citizens  whose  bodily  and  mental  constitutions  are 
sound  and  good,  leaving  those  that  are  otherwise  in  body 
to  die,  and  actually  putting  to  death  those  who  are  nnrnr- 
ally  corrupt  and  incurable  in  soul  ? 

Yes,  he  said:  this  has  been  proved  to  be  the  bent 
course  both  for  the  patients  themselves  and  for  the  state. 

As  for  the  young  men,  I  continued,  it  is  clear  that 


Book  111.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  117 

they  will  be  cautious  how  they  incur  any  need  of  law,  so 
long  as  they  use  that  simple  kind  of  music  which,  as  we 
stated,  generates  sobriety  in  the  soul. 

Undoubtedly. 

If  then  the  accomplished  student  of  music  follow  this 
same  track  in  the  pursuit  of  gymnastic,  may  he  not,  if  he 
pleases,  so  far  succeed  as  to  be  independent  of  the  medical 
art  except  in  extreme  cases? 

I  think  he  may. 

Moreover,  in  the  exercises  and  toils  which  he  imposes 
upon  himself,  his  object  will  be  rather  to  stimulate  the 
spirited  element  of  his  nature  than  to  gain  strength;  and 
he  will  not,  like  athletes  in  general,  take  the  prescribed 
food  and  exercise  merely  for  the  sake  of  muscular  power. 

You  are  quite  right. 

Then,  Glaucon,  am  I  also  right  in  saying  that  those 
who  establish  a  system  of  education  in  music  and  gym- 
nastic, are  not  actuated  by  the  purpose  which  some 
persons  attribute  to  them,  of  applying  the  one  to  the 
improvement  of  the  soul,  the  other  to  that  of  the  body? 

Why  what  can  be  their  object,  if  this  is  not? 

Probably  they  introduce  both  mainly  for  the  sake  of 
the  soul. 

How  so? 

Do  you  not  observe  the  characteristics  which  distin- 
guish the  minds  of  those  who  have  oeen  familiar  with 
gymnastic  all  their  lives,  without  any  acquaintance  with 
music?  and  again,  of  those  whose  condition  is  the  reverse 
of  this? 

To  what  do  you  allude? 

To  the  roughness  and  hardness  which  mark  the  one, 
and  the  softness  and  gentleness  which  mark  the  other. 

0  yes.  Those  who  have  devoted  themselves  to  gym- 
nastic exclusively,  become  ruder  than  they  ought  to  be; 
while  those  who  have  devoted  themselves  to  music  are 
made  softer  than  is  good  for  them. 

We  know,  however,  that  rudeness  is  the  natural  prod- 
uct of  the  spirited  element,  which,  if  rightly  nurtured, 


118  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  LBook  IIL 

will  be  brave;  but,  if  strained  to  an  improper  pitch,  will 
in  all  probability  become  harsh  and  disagreeable. 

I  think  so. 

Well,  and  will  not  gentleness  be  a  property  of  the 
philosophic  temperament?  and  a  property  which,  if  too 
much  indulged,  will  produce  in  it  an  excess  of  softness; 
but  which  rightly  nurtured  will  render  it  gentle  and 
orderly  ? 

True. 

But  we  say  that  our  guardians  ought  to  combine  both 
these  temperaments. 

They  ought. 

Then  must  they  not  be  mutually  harmonized? 

Unquestionably. 

And  where  this  harmony  exists,  the  soul  is  both  tem- 
perate and  brave? 

Certainly. 

And  where  it  is  wanting,  the  soul  is  cowardly  and 
coarse  ? 

Very  much  so. 

Accordingly,  when  a  man  surrenders  himself  to  music 
and  flute-playing,  and  suffers  his  soul  to  be  flooded  through 
the  funnel  of  his  ears  with  those  sweet  and  soft  and  plain- 
tive harmonies  of  which  we  just  spoke,  and  spends  his 
whole  life  in  warbling  and  delighting  himself  with  song, 
such  a  man  at  the  outset  tempers  like  steel  whatever 
portion  of  the  spirited  element  he  possesses,  and  makea 
it  useful  instead  of  brittle  and  useless:  if,  however,  he 
relaxes  not  in  his  devotion,  but  yields  to  the  enchantment, 
he  then  begins  to  liquefy  and  waste  away,  till  the  spirit 
is  melted  out  of  him,  and  the  sinews  of  his  soul  are  extir- 
pated, and  he  is  made  "a  feeble  wielder  of  the  lance." 

Exactly  so. 

And  if  he  has  received  a  spiritless  soul  originally  from 
the  hand  of  nature,  this  result  is  soon  brought  to  pass: 
Hut  if  the  contrary,  he  so  enfeebles  his  spirit  as  to  render 
it  easily  swayed,  quickly  kindled  and  quickly  slaked  by 
trifling  causes.     Consequently,  such  persons,  instead  of 


Book  III.]         THE"  REPUBLIC  OF  PL^TO.  119 

being  spirited,  are  made  choleric  and  irritable,  and  the 
prey  of  morose  tempers. 

Precisely  so. 

Well,  but  if,  on  the  other  hand,  he  devotes  himself  to 
hard  labour  in  gymnastic,  and  indulges  to  his  heart's  con- 
tent in  good  living,  while  he  keeps  aloof  from  music  and 
philosophy,  does  not  the  excellent  condition  of  his  body 
at  first  inspire  him  with  self-confidence  and  spirit,  and 
make  him  surpass  himself  in  courage? 

Yes,  that  it  does. 

But  what  is  the  consequence  of  thus  engaging  in  this 
one  occupation,  to  the  total  exclusion  of  the  Muse's  in- 
fluence? Even  supposing  him  to  have  possessed  at  first 
some  taste  for  learning,  yet  if  that  taste  is  never  fed  with 
knowledge  or  inquiry,  and  takes  no  part  in  rational  dis- 
course or  any  intellectual  pursuits,  does  it  not  become 
weak  and  deaf  and  blind,  from  the  want  of  stimulus  and 
nourishment,  and  because  its  senses  are  never  thoroughly 
purged  ? 

Just  so. 

Consequently  such  a  man  becomes  a  hater  of  discus- 
sion, I  imagine,  and  an  illiterate  person;  and  abandoning 
the  use  of  rational  persuasion,  he  settles  all  his  business 
like  a  wild  beast  by  violence  and  roughness,  and  lives  in 
ignorance  and  awkwardness,  with  no  symmetry  and  no 
grace. 

That  is  exactly  the  case. 

To  correct  then,  as  it  would  appear,  these  two  exclu- 
sive temperaments,  the  spirited  and  the  philosophic,  some 
god,  as  I  for  my  part  shall  maintain,  has  given  to  men 
two  arts,  music  and  gymnastic,  not  for  soul  and  body 
distinctively,  except  in  a  secondary  way,  but  expressly  for 
those  two  temperaments,  in  order  that  by  the  increase  or 
relaxation  of  the  tension  to  the  due  pitch  they  may  be 
brought  into  mutual  accord. 

So  it  would  appear. 

Then  whosoever  can  best  blend  gymnastic  with  music, 
and  bring  both  to  bear  on  the  mind  most  judiciously,  such 
a  man  we  shall  justly  call  perfect  in  music,  and  a  master 


120  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IIL 

of  true  harmony,  much  rather  than  the  artist  who  tunes 
the  strings  of  the  lyre. 

Yes,  and  with  good  reason,  Socrates. 

Then  will  not  some  such  overseer  be  always  needed  in 
our  state,  Glaucon,  if  our  commonwealth  is  designed  to 
endure  ? 

Yes,  indeed,  such  an  officer  will  be  quite  indispensable. 

Such  then  will  be  the  outlines  of  our  system  of  educa- 
tion and  training.  For  why  should  one  enter  into  details 
respecting  the  dances  which  will  be  in  vogue  in  a  state 
like  ours,  the  hunting  and  field-exercises,  or  the  sports  of 
the  gymnasium  and  the  race-course?  It  is  tolerably  clear 
that  these  must  correspond  with  the  foregoing  outlines, 
and  there  will  be  no  further  difficulty  in  discovering  them. 

Perhaps  not,  he  said. 

Very  good:  then  what  will  be  the  next  point  for  us  to 
settle?  is  it  not  this,  which  of  the  persons  so  educated  are 
to  be  the  rulers,  and  which  the  subjects  ? 

Unquestionably  it  is. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  rulers  must  be  the 
elderly  men,  and  the  subjects  the  younger. 

True. 

And  also  that  the  rulers  must  be  the  best  men  among 
them. 

True  again. 

Are  not  the  best  agriculturists  those  who  are  most 
agricultural? 

Yes. 

In  the  present  case,  as  we  require  the  best  guardians, 
shall  we  not  find  them  in  those  who  are  most  capable  of 
guarding  a  state? 

Yes. 

Then  for  this  purpose,  must  they  not  be  intelligent  and 
powerful,  and,  moreover,  careful  of  the  state? 

They  must. 

And  a  man  will  be  most  careful  of  that  which  he  loves? 

Of  course. 

A,wi  **«ur§£]y  he  wiU  Levc  that  most  wkoM  Lntertfti  hi 


Book  III.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  121 

regards  as  identical  with  his  own,  and  in  whose  prosperity 
or  adversity  he  believes  his  own  fortunes  to  be  involved. 

Just  so. 

Then  we  must  select  from  the  whole  body  of  guardians 
those  individuals  who  appear  to  us,  after  due  observation, 
to  be  remarkable  above  others  for  the  zeal  with  which, 
through  their  whole  life,  they  have  done  what  they  have 
thought  advantageous  to  the  state,  and  inflexibly  refused 
to  do  what  they  thought  the  reverse. 

Yes,  these  are  the  suitable  persons,  he  said. 

Then  I  think  we  must  watch  them  at  every  stage  of 
their  life,  to  see  if  they  are  tenacious  guardians  of  this 
conviction,  and  never  bewitched  or  forced  into  a  forgetful 
abandonment  of  the  belief  that  they  ought  to  do  what  is 
best  for  the  state. 

What  is  this  abandonment  you  speak  of  ? 

I  will  tell  you.  Opinions  appear  to  me  to  quit  the 
mind  either  by  a  voluntary  or  involuntary  act;  a  false 
opinion  by  a  voluntary  act,  when  the  holder  learns  his 
error;  but  a  true  opinion  invariably  by  an  involuntary 
act. 

I  understand  the  notion  of  a  voluntary  abandonment, 
but  I  have  yet  to  learn  the  meaning  of  the  involuntary. 

Well,  then,  do  you  not  agree  with  me,  that  men  are 
deprived  of  good  things  against  their  will,  of  evil  things 
with  their  will?  And  is  it  not  an  evil  thing  to  be  the 
victim  of  a  lie,  and  a  good  thing  to  possess  the  truth? 
And  do  you  not  think  that  a  man  is  in  possession  of 
the  truth  when  his  opinions  represent  things  as  they 
are? 

Yes,  you  are  right ;  and  I  believe  that  men  are  deprived 
of  a  true  opinion  against  their  will. 

Then,  when  this  happens,  must  it  not  be  owing  either 
to  theft,  or  witchcraft,  or  violence? 

I  do  not  even  now  understand. 

I  am  afraid  I  use  language  as  obscure  as  tragedy.  By 
those  who  have  a  theft  practised  on  them,  I  mean  such  as 
are  argued  out  of,  or  forget,  their  belief,  because,  in  the 


122  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III. 

one  case  argument,  and  in  the  other,  time,  privily  carries 
off  their  opinion.    Now,  I  fancy,  you  understand? 

Yes. 

By  those  who  have  violence  done  to  them  I  mean  all 
whose  opinions  are  changed  by  pain  or  grief. 

That  too  I  understand,  and  I  think  you  are  right. 

And  those  who  are  bewitched,  you  would  yourself,  I 
believe,  assert  to  be  those  who  change  their  opinion  either 
through  the  seductions  of  pleasure  or  under  the  pressure 
of  fear. 

Yes;  everything  that  deceives  may  be  said  to  bewitch. 

Then,  as  I  said  just  now,  we  must  inquire  who  are  the 
best  guardians  of  this  inward  conviction,  that  they  must 
always  do  that  which  they  think  best  for  the  state.  We 
must  watch  them,  I  say,  from  their  earliest  childhood, 
giving  them  actions  to  perform  in  which  people  would  be 
most  likely  to  forget,  or  be  beguiled  of,  such  a  belief,  and 
then  we  must  select  those  whose  memory  is  tenacious, 
and  who  are  proof  against  deceit,  and  exclude  the  rest. 
Must  we  not? 

Yes. 

We  must  also  appoint  them  labours,  and  vexations,  and 
contests,  in  which  we  must  watch  for  the  same  symptoms 
of  character. 

Rightly  so. 

And,  as  a  third  kind  of  lest,  we  must  try  them  with 
witchcraft,  and  observe  their  behaviour;  and,  just  as 
young  horses  are  taken  into  the  presence  of  noise  and 
tumult,  to  see  whether  they  are  timid,  so  must  we  bring 
our  men,  while  still  young,  into  the  midst  of  objects  of 
terror,  and  presently  transfer  them  to  scenes  of  pleasure, 
trying  them  much  more  thoroughly  than  gold  is  tried  in 
the  fire,  to  find  whether  they  shew  themselves  under  all 
circumstances  inaccessible  to  witchcraft,  and  seemly  in 
their  bearing,  good  guardians  of  themselves  and  of  the 
music  which  they  have  been  taught,  approving  themselves 
on  every  occasion  true  to  the  laws  of  rhythm  and  har- 
mony, and  acting  in  such  a  way  as  would  render  them 
most  useful  to  themselves  and  the  state.     And  whoever, 


Book  III.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  123 

from  time  to  time,  after  being  put  to  the  proof,  as  a  child, 
as  a  youth,  and  as  a  man,  comes  forth  uninjured  from  the 
trial,  must  be  appointed  a  ruler  and  guardian  of  the  city, 
and  must  receive  honours  in  life  and  in  death,  and  be 
admitted  to  the  highest  privileges,  in  the  way  of  funeral 
rites  and  other  tributes  to  his  memory.  And  all  who  are 
the  reverse  of  this  character  must  be  rejected.  Such 
appears  to  me,  Glaucon,  to  be  the  true  method  of  select- 
ing and  appointing  our  rulers  and  guardians,  described 
simply  in  outline,  without  accuracy  in  detail. 

I  am  pretty  much  of  your  mind. 

Is  it  then  really  most  correct  to  give  to  these  the  name 
of  perfect  guardians,  as  being  qualified  to  take  care  that 
their  friends  at  home  shall  not  wish,  and  their  enemies 
abroad  not  be  able,  to  do  any  mischief;  and  to  call  the 
young  men,  whom  up  to  this  time  we  entitled  guardians, 
auxiliaries,  whose  office  it  is  to  support  the  resolutions  of 
the  rulers? 

I  quite  think  so,  he  said. 

This  being  the  case,  I  continued,  can  we  contrive  any 
ingenious  mode  of  bringing  into  play  one  of  those  season- 
able falsehoods  of  which  we  lately  spoke,  so  that,  pro- 
pounding a  single  spirited  fiction,  we  may  bring  even  the 
rulers  themselves,  if  possible,  to. believe  it,  or  if  not  them, 
the  rest  of  the  city? 

What  kind  of  fiction? 

Nothing  new,  but  a  Phoenician  story,  which  has  been 
realized  often  before  now,  as  the  poets  tell  and  mankind 
believe,  but  which  in  our  time  has  not  been,  nor,  so  far  as 
I  know,  is  likely  to  be  realized,  and  for  which  it  would 
require  large  powers  of  persuasion  to  obtain  credit. 

You  seem  very  reluctant  to  tell  it. 

You  will  think  my  reluctance  very  natural  when  I  have 
told  it. 

Speak  out  boldly  and  without  fear. 

Well  I  will;  and  yet  I  hardly  know  where  I  shall  find 
the  courage  or  where  the  words  to  express  myself.  I  shall 
try,  I  say,  to  persuade  first  the  rulers  themselves  and  the 
military  class,  and  after  them  the  rest  of  the  city,  that 


124  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III 

when  we  were  training  and  instructing  them,  they  only 
fancied,  as  in  dreams,  that  all  this  was  happening  to  them 
and  about  them,  while  in  reality  they  were  in  course  of 
formation  and  training  in  the  bowels  of  the  earth,  where 
they  themselves,  their  armour,  and  the  rest  of  their  equip- 
ments were  manufactured,  and  from  whence,  as  soon  as 
they  were  thoroughly  elaborated,  the  earth,  their  real 
mother,  sent  them  up  to  its  surface;  and,  consequently, 
that  they  ought  now  to  take  thought  for  the  land  in 
which  they  dwell,  as  their  mother  and  nurse,  and  repel  all 
attacks  upon  it,  and  to  feel  towards  their  fellow-citizens 
as  brother  children  of  the  soil. 

It   was   not    without    reason    that   you    were    so    long 
ashamed  to  tell  us  your  fiction.  • 

I  dare  say;  nevertheless,  hear  the  rest  of  the  story. 
We  shall  tell  our  people,  in  mythical  language:  You  are 
doubtless  all  brethren,  as  many  as  inhabit  the  city,  but 
the  God  who  created  you  mixed  gold  in  the  composition 
of  such  of  you  as  are  qualified  to  rule,  which  gives  them 
the  highest  value;  while  in  the  auxiliaries  he  made  silver 
an  ingredient,  assigning  iron  and  copper  to  the  cultivators 
of  the  soil  and  the  other  workmen.  Therefore,  inasmuch 
as  you  are  all  related  to  one  another,  although  your  chil- 
dren will  generally  resemble  their  parents,  yet  sometimes 
a  golden  parent  will  produce  a  silver  child,  and  a  silver 
parent  a  golden  child,  and  so  on,  each  producing  any. 
The  rulers  therefore  have  received  this  in  charge  first  and 
above  all  from  the  gods,  to  observe  nothing  more  closely, 
in  their  character  of  vigilant  guardians,  than  the  children 
that  are  born,  to  see  which  of  these  metals  enters  into  the 
composition  of  their  souls;  and  if  a  child  be  born  in  their 
class  with  an  alloy  of  copper  or  iron,  they  are  to  have 
no  manner  of  pity  upon  it,  but  giving  it  the  value  that 
belongs  to  its  nature,  they  are  to  thrust  it  away  into  the 
class  of  artisans  or  agriculturists;  and  if  again  among 
these  a  child  be  born  with  any  admixture  of  gold  or 
silver,  when  they  have  assayed  it,  they  are  to  raise  it 
either  to  the  class  of  guardians,  or  to  that  of  auxiliaries: 
because  there  is  an  oracle  which  declares  that  the  city 


Jook  III.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  125 

shall  then  perish  when  it  is  guarded  by  iron  or  copper. 
Can  you  suggest  any  device  by  which  we  can  make  them 
believe  this  fiction? 

None  at  all  by  which  we  could  persuade  the  men  with 
whom  we  begin  our  new  state:  but  I  think  their  sons, 
and  the  next  generation,  and  all  subsequent  generations, 
might  be  taught  to  believe  it. 

Well,  I  said,  even  this  might  have  a  good  effect  towards 
making  them  care  more  for  the  city  and  for  one  another; 
for  I  think  I  understand  what  you  mean.  However,  we 
will  leave  this  fiction  to  its  fate:  but  for  our  part,  when 
we  have  armed  these  children  of  the  soil,  let  us  lead  them 
forward  under  the  command  of  their  officers,  till  they 
arrive  at  the  city:  then  let  them  look  around  them  to 
discover  the  most  eligible  position  for  their  camp,  from 
which  they  may  best  coerce  the  inhabitants,  if  there  be 
any  disposition  to  refuse  obedience  to  the  laws,  and  repel 
foreigners,  if  an  enemy  should  come  down  like  a  wolf  on 
the  fold.  And  when  they  have  pitched  their  camp,  and 
offered  sacrifices  to  the  proper  divinities,  let  them  arrange 
their  sleeping-places.     Is  all  this  right? 

It  is.  <# 

And  these  sleeping-places  must  be  such  as  will  keep 
out  the  weather  both  in  winter  and  summer,  must  they 
not? 

Certainly:  you  mean  dwelling-houses,  if  I  am  not  mis- 
taken. 

I  do ;  but  the  dwelling-houses  of  soldiers,  not  of  moneyed 
men. 

What  is  the  difference  which  you  imply? 

I  will  endeavour  to  explain  it  to  you,  I  replied.  I 
presume  it  would  be  a  most  monstrous  and  scandalous 
proceeding  in  shepherds  to  keep  for  the  protection  of 
their  flocks  such  a  breed  of  dogs,  or  so  to  treat  them,  that 
owing  to  unruly  tempers,  or  hunger,  or  any  bad  propen- 
sity whatever,  the  dogs  themselves  should  begin  to  worry 
the  sheep,  and  behave  more  like  wolves  than  dogs. 

It  would  be  monstrous,  undoubtedly. 

Then  must  we  not  take  every  precaution  that  out  auxil- 


126  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  III. 

iary  class,  being  stronger  than  the  other  citizens,  may  not 
act  towards  them  in  a  similar  fashion,  and  so  resemble 
savage  monsters  rather  than  friendly  allies? 

We  must. 

And  will  they  not  be  furnished  with  the  best  of  safe- 
guards, if  they  are  really  well  educated? 

Nay,  but  they  are  that  already,  he  exclaimed. 

To  which  I  replied,  It  is  not  worth  while  now  to  insist 
upon  that  point,  my  dear  Glaucon:  but  it  is  most  neces- 
sary to  maintain  what  we  said  this  minute,  that  they  must 
have  the  right  education,  whatever  it  may  be,  if  they  are 
'to  have  what  will  be  most  effectual  in  rendering  them 
gentle  to  one  another,  and  to  those  whom  they  guard. 

True. 

But  besides  this  education  a  rational  man  would  say 
that  their  dwellings  and  their  circumstances  generally 
Should  be  arranged  on  such  a  scale  as  shall  neither  pre- 
vent them  from  being  perfect  guardians,  nor  provoke 
them  to  do  mischief  to  the  other  citizens. 

He  will  say  so  with  truth. 

Consider  then,  I  continued,  whether  the  following  plan 
is  the  right  one  for  their  lives  and  their  dwellings,  if  they 
are  to  be  of  the  character  I  have  described.  In  the  first 
place,  no  one  should  possess  any  private  property,  if  it 
can  possibly  be  avoided:  secondly,  no  one  should  have  a 
dwelling  or  storehouse  into  which  all  who  please  may  not 
enter;  whatever  necessaries  are  required  by  temperate 
and  courageous  men,  who  are  trained  to  war,  they  should 
receive  by  regular  appointment  from  their  fellow-citizens, 
as  wages  for  their  services,  and  the  amount  should  be 
such  as  to  leave  neither  a  surplus  on  the  year's  consump- 
tion nor  a  deficit;  and  they  should  attend  common  messes 
and  live  together  as  men  do  in  a  camp:  as  for  gold  and 
silver,  we  must  tell  them  that  they  are  in  perpetual  pos- 
session of  a  divine  species  of  the  precious  metals  placed 
in  their  souls  by  the  gods  themselves,  and  therefore  have 
no  need  of  the  earthly  ore;  that  in  fact  it  would  be  pro- 
fanation to  pollute  their  spiritual  riches  by  mixing  them 
iwith  the  possession  of  mortal  gold,  because  the  worlds 


Book  III.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  127 

coinage  has  been  the  cause  of  countless  impieties,  whereas 
theirs  is  undented:  therefore  to  them,  as  distinguished 
from  the  rest  of  the  people,  it  is  forbidden  to  handle  or 
touch  gold  and  silver,  or  enter  under  the  same  roof  with 
them,  or  to  wear  them  on  their  dresses,  or  to  drink  out  of 
the  precious  metals.  If  they  follow  these  rules,  they  will 
be  safe  themselves  and  the  saviours  of  the  city :  but  when* 
ever  they  come  to  possess  lands,  and  houses,  and  money 
of  their  own,  they  will  be  householders  and  cultivators 
instead  of  guardians,  and  will  become  hostile  masters  of 
their  fellow-citizens  rather  than  their  allies;  and  so  they 
will  spend  their  whole  lives,  hating  and  hated,  plotting 
and  plotted  against,  standing  in  more  frequent  and  in- 
tense alarm  of  their  enemies  at  home  than  of  their  ene- 
mies abroad;  by  which  time  they  and  the  rest  of  the  city 
will  be  running  on  the  very  brink  of  ruin.  On  all  these 
accounts,  I  asked,  shall  we  say  that  the  foregoing  is  the 
right  arrangement  of  the  houses  and  other  concerns  of 
our  guardians,  and  shall  we  legislate  accordingly;  or  not? 
Yte,  by  all  means,  answered  Glaucon. 


128  IHE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 


BOOK  IV. 

Here  Adeimantus  interposed,  inquiring,  Then  what  de- 
fence will  you  make,  Socrates,  if  any  one  protests  that 
you  are  not  making  the  men  of  this  class  particularly 
happy? — when  it  is  their  own  fault,  too,  if  they  are  not; 
for  the  city  really  belongs  to  them,  and  yet  they  derive  no 
advantage  from  it,  as  others  do,  who  own  lands  and  build 
fine  large  houses,  and  furnish  them  in  corresponding  style, 
and  perform  private  sacrifices  to  the  gods,  and  entertain 
their  friends,  and,  in  fact,  as  you  said  just  now,  possess 
gold  and  silver,  and  everything  that  is  usually  considered 
necessary  to  happiness;  nay,  they  appear  to  be  posted  in 
the  city,  as  it  might  be  said,  precisely  like  mercenary 
troops,  wholly  occupied  in  garrison  duties. 

Yes,  I  said,  and  for  this  they  are  only  fed,  and  do  not 
Teceive  pay  in  addition  to  their  rations,  like  the  rest,  so 
•that  it  will  be  out  of  their  power  to  take  any  journeys  on 
their  own  account,  should  they  wish  to  do  so,  or  to  make 
presents  to  mistresses,  or  to  lay  out  money  in  the  gratifi- 
cation of  any  other  desire,  after  the  plan  of  those  who  are 
considered  happy.  These  and  many  similar  counts  you 
leave  out  of  the  indictment. 

Well,  said  he,  let  us  suppose  these  to  be  included  in 
the  charge. 

What  defence  then  shall  we  make,  say  you  ? 

Yes. 

By  travelling  the  same  road  as  before,  we  shall  find,  I 
think,  what  to  say.  We  shall  reply  that,  though  it  would 
not  surprise  us,  if  even  this  class  in  the  given  circum- 
stances were  very  happy,  yet  that  our  object  in  the  con- 
struction of  our  state  is  not  to  make  any  one  class  pre- 
eminently happy,  but  to  make  the  whole  state  as  happy 
as  it  can  be  made.    For  we  thought  that  in  such  a  state 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  129 

we  should  be  most  likely  to  discover  justice,  as,  on  the 
other  hand,  in  the  worst-regulated  state  we  should  be 
most  likely  to  discover  injustice,  and  that  after  having  ob- 
served them  we  might  decide  the  question  we  have  been 
so  long  investigating.  At  present,  we  believe  we  are  form- 
ing the  happy  state,  not  by  selecting  a  few  of  its  members 
and  making  them  happy,  but  by  making  the  whole  so. 
Presently  we  shall  examine  a  state  of  the  opposite  kind. 
Now,  if  some  one  came  up  to  us  while  we  were  painting 
statues,  and  blamed  us  for  not  putting  the  most  beautiful 
colours  on  the  most  beautiful  parts  of  the  body,  because 
the  eyes,  being  the  most  beautiful  part,  were  not  painted 
purple,  but  black,  we  should  think  it  a  sufficient  defence 
to  reply,  Pray,  sir,  do  not  suppose  that  we  ought  to  make 
the  eyes  so  beautiful  as  not  to  look  like  eyes,  nor  the  other 
parts  in  like  manner,  but  observe  whether,  by  giving  to 
every  part  what  properly  belongs  to  it,  we  make  the  whole 
beautiful.  In  the  same  way  do  not,  in  the  present  in- 
stance, compel  us  to  attach  to  our  guardians  such  a  spe- 
cies of  happiness  as  shall  make  them  anything  but  guar- 
dians. For  we  are  well  aware  that  we  might,  on  the  same 
principle,  clothe  our  cultivators  in  long  robes,  and  put 
golden  coronets  on  their  heads,  and  bid  them  till  the  land 
at  their  pleasure ;  and  that  we  might  stretch  our  potters  at 
their  ease  on  couches  before  the  fire,  to  drink  and  make 
merry,  placing  the  wheel  by  their  side,  with  directions  to 
ply  their  trade  just  so  far  as  they  should  feel  it  agreeable; 
and  that  we  might  dispense  this  kind  of  bliss  to  all  the 
rest,  so  that  the  entire  city  might  thus  be  happy.  But 
give  not  such  advice  to  us:  since,  if  we  comply  with  your 
recommendation,  the  cultivator  will  be  no  cultivator,  the 
potter  no  potter;  nor  will  any  of  those  professions,  which 
make  up  a  state,  maintain  its  proper  character.  For  the 
other  occupations  it  matters  less:  for  in  cobblers,  incom- 
petency and  degeneracy  and  pretence  without  the  reality, 
are  not  dangerous  to  a  state:  but  when  guardians  of  the 
laws  and  of  the  state  are  such  in  appearance  only,  and 
not  in  reality,  you  see  that  they  radically  destroy  the 
whole  gtfttt,  as,  on  the  other  hand,  they  alone  can  create 


130  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  tt 

public  prosperity  and  happiness.  If  then,  while  we  aiu 
at  making  genuine  guardians,  who  shall  be  as  far  as  pos- 
sible from  doing  mischief  to  the  state,  the  supposed  ob~ 
jector  makes  a  class  who  would  be  cultivators  and  as  it 
were  jovial  feasters  at  a  holiday  gathering,  rather  than 
citizens  of  a  state,  he  will  be  describing  something  which 
is  not  a  state.  We  should  examine  then  whether  our  ob- 
ject in  constituting  our  guardians  should  be  to  secure  to 
them  the  greatest  possible  amount  of  happiness,  or  whether 
our  duty,  as  regards  happiness,  is  to  see  if  our  state  as  a 
whole  enjoys  it,  persuading  or  compelling  these  our  auxil- 
iaries and  guardians  to  study  only  how  to  make  them- 
selves the  best  possible  workmen  at  their  own  occupation, 
and  treating  all  the  rest  in  like  manner,  and  thus,  while 
the  whole  city  grows  and  becomes  prosperously  organized, 
permitting  each  class  to  partake  of  as  much  happiness  as 
the  nature  of  the  case  allows  to  it. 

I  think,  he  replied,  that  what  you  say  is  quite  tight. 

I  wonder  whether  you  will  think  the  proposition  that  is 
sister  to  the  last  satisfactory  also. 

What  may  that  be  ? 

Consider  whether  the  other  craftsmen  are  similarly  in- 
jured and  spoiled  by  these  agencies. 

What  agencies  do  you  mean? 

Wealth,  I  said,  and  poverty. 

How  so? 

Thus:  Do  you  think  that  a  potter  after  he  has  grown 
rich  will  care  to  attend  to  his  trade  any  longer  ? 

Certainly  not. 

But  he  will  become  more  idle  and  careless  than  he  was 
before  ? 

Yes,  much  more. 

Then  does  he  not  become  a  worse  potter? 

Yes,  a  much  worse  potter  too. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  he  is  prevented  by  poverty  from 
providing  himself  with  tools  or  any  other  requisite  of  his 
trade,  he  will  produce  inferior  articles,  and  his  sons  or 
apprentices  will  not  be  taught  their  trade  so  well. 

Inevitably. 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  131 

Then  both  these  conditions,  riches  and  poverty,  de- 
teriorate the  productions  of  the  artisans,  and  the  artisans 
themselves. 

So  it  appears. 

Then  apparently  we  have  found  some  other  objects  for 
the  vigilance  of  our  guardians,  who  must  take  every  pre- 
caution that  they  may  never  evade  their  watch  and  steal 
into  the  city. 

What  are  these? 

Wealth,  I  replied,  and  poverty;  because  the  former  pro* 
duces  luxury  and  idleness  and  innovation,  and  the  latter, 
meanness  and  bad  workmanship  as  well  as  innovation. 

Exactly  so.  But  on  the  other  hand,  consider,  Socrates, 
how  our  city  will  be  able  to  go  to  war,  if  it  possesses  no 
wealth,  especially  in  the  case  of  its  being  compelled  to 
take  the  field  against  a  rich  and  populous  state. 

Obviously,  I  replied,  against  one  such  state  it  will  be 
hard  for  it  to  carry  on  war,  but  against  two  it  will  be 
easier. 

How  so? 

In  the  first  place,  if  they  are  obliged  to  fight,  will  not 
their  antagonists  be  rich  men,  while  they  themselves  are 
trained  soldiers? 

Yes,  that  is  true  so  far. 

What  then,  Adeimantus?  Do  you  not  believe  that  one 
pugilist  trained  in  the  most  perfect  manner  to  his  work 
would  find  it  easy  to  fight  with  two  rich  and  fat  men,  who 
do  not  understand  boxing? 

Not  with  both  at  once,  perhaps. 

What  not  if  he  were  able  to  give  ground  till  one  of  his 
assailants  was  in  advance  of  the  other,  and  then  to  rally 
and  attack  him,  repeating  these  tactics  frequently  under 
a  burning  sun?  Could  not  such  a  combatant  worst  even 
more  than  two  such  antagonists  ? 

Indeed,  he  replied,  there  would  be  nothing  very  sur- 
prising in  it. 

And  do  you  not  think  that  the  rich  are  better  acquainted, 
both  theoretically  and  practically,  with  boxing,  than  with 
the  art  of  war? 


132  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 

I  do. 

Then  in  all  probability  our  trained  soldiers  will  find  no 
difficulty  in  fighting  double  or  treble  their  own  number. 

I  shall  give  in  to  you;  for  I  believe  you  are  right. 

But  suppose  they  were  to  send  an  embassy  to  one  of 
the  two  cities,  and  to  say,  what  would  be  true,  "  We  make 
no  use  of  gold  and  silver,  nor  is  it  allowed  among  us, 
though  it  is  among  you;  therefore  join  your  forces  with 
ours,  and  let  the  property  of  the  other  people  be  yours ; " 
do  you  think  that  any  person,  after  being  told  this,  would 
choose  to  wage  war  against  lean  and  wiry  dogs,  instead  of 
making  common  cause  with  the  dogs  against  fat  and 
tender  sheep? 

I  fancy  not.  But  may  not  the  accumulation  of  the 
wealth  of  the  other  party  in  one  city  be  fraught  with  dan- 
ger to  the  city  which  is  not  wealthy  ? 

I  congratulate  you,  I  replied,  on  your  idea,  that  it  is 
proper  to  describe  as  "  a  city  "  any  that  is  not  the  counter- 
part of  that  which  we  were  organizing.  **■ 

Why,  what  would  you  have? 

The  others  ought  to  be  called  by  some  grander  name: 
for  each  of  them  is  very  many  cities,  and  not  a  city,  as 
they  say  in  the  game.*  In  any  case,  there  are  two,  hostile 
one  to  the  other,  the  city  of  the  poor,  and  the  city  of  the 
rich;  and  each  of  these  contains  very  many  cities;  and  if 
you  deal  with  them  as  one,  you  will  find  yourself  thorough- 
ly mistaken;  but  if  you  treat  them  as  many,  and  give  to 
one  class  the  property  and  the  power,  or  even  the  persons 
of  another,  you  will  always  have  many  allies  and  few 
enemies.  And  so  long  as  your  city  is  governed  discreetly 
on  the 'principles  recently  laid  down,  it  will  be  very  large; 
I  do  not  mean  that  it  will  enjoy  that  reputation,  but  really 
and  truly  it  will  be  very  large,  even  if  its  army  consists 
of  no  more  than  a  thousand  men.  For  you  will  not  easily 
find  one  city  as  large  as  that,  either  among  the  Greeks  or 
among  the  barbarians,  though  you  may  find  many  cities 

*  We  are  told  by  commentators  that  there  Was  a  game  called 
•Cities,'  played  with  counters ;  but  the  rules  of  the  game  have 
not  been  preserved. 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  133 

which  seem  to  be  several  times  as  large.  Do  you  think 
differently  ? 

No,  indeed,  I  do  not. 

This  then,  I  continued,  will  also  serve  as  the  best  stan- 
dard for  our  governors  to  adopt,  in  regulating  the  size  of 
the  state,  and  the  amount  of  land  which  they  should  mark 
off  for  a  state  of  the  due  size,  leaving  the  rest  alone. 

What  is  the  standard?  he  asked. 

The  following,  I  conceive;  so  long  as  the  city  can  grow 
without  abandoning  its  unity,  up  to  that  point  it  may  be 
allowed  to  grow,  but  not  beyond  it. 

A  very  good  rule. 

Then  we  shall  lay  this  additional  injunction  upon  our 
guardians,  to  take  every  precaution  that  the  city  be  neither 
small  nor  in  appearance  large,  but  characterized  by  suffi- 
ciency and  unity. 

A  trivial  duty,  perhaps,  to  impose  upon  them. 

We  will  add,  I  continued,  another  yet  more  trivial  than 
this,  which  we  touched  upon  before,  when  we  said  that  it 
would  be  right  to  send  away  any  inferior  child  that  might 
be  born  among  the  guardians,  and  place  it  in  another 
class;  and  if  a  child  of  peculiar  excellence  were  born  in 
the  other  classes,  to  place  him  among  the  guardians. 
This  was  intended  to  intimate  that  the  other  citizens  also 
ought  to  be  set  to  the  work  for  which  nature  has  respec- 
tively qualified  them,  each  to  some  one  work,  that  so  each 
practising  his  single  occupation  may  become  not  many 
men,  but  one,  and  that  thus  the  whole  city  may  grow  to 
be  one  city  and  not  many  cities. 

Yes,  he  said,  this  a  smaller  affair  than  the  former. 

Eeally,  my  good  Adeimantus,  these  injunctions  of  ours 
are  not,  as  one  might  suppose,  a  number  of  arduous 
tasks,  but  they  will  all  be  inconsiderable,  if  the  guar- 
dians diligently  observe  the  one  great  point,  as  the  say- 
ing is,  though  it  should  rather  be  called  sufficient  than 
great. 

What  is  that? 

Education,  I  said,  and  rearing.  For  if  by  a  good  edu- 
cation they  be  made  reasonable  men,  they  will  readily  see 


134  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI 

through  all  these  questions,  as  well  as  others  which  we 
pass  by  for  the  present,  such  as  the  relations  between  the 
sexes,  marriage,  and  the  procreation  of  children;  in  all 
which  things  they  will  see  that  the  proverb  ought,  as  far 
as  possible,  to  be  followed,  which  says  that  "  among  friends 
everything  is  common  property." 

Yes,  that  would  be  the  most  correct  plan. 

And  indeed,  if  a  state  has  once  started  well,  it  exhibit! 
a  kind  of  circular  progress  in  its  growth.  Adherence  to 
a  good  system  of  nurture  and  education  creates  good  na- 
tures, and  good  natures,  receiving  the  assistance  of  a  good 
education,  grow  still  better  than  they  were,  their  breeding 
qualities  improving  among  the  rest,  as  is  also  seen  in  the 
lower  animals. 

Yes,  naturally  so.  To  speak  briefly,  therefore,  the  over- 
seers of  the  state  must  hold  fast  to  this  principle,  not 
allowing  it  to  be  impaired  without  their  knowledge,  but 
guarding  it  above  everything; — the  principle,  I  mean, 
which  forbids  any  innovation,  in  their  gymnastic  or 
music,  upon  the  established  order,  requiring  it,  on  the 
contrary,  to  be  most  strictly  maintained,  from  a  fear  lest, 
when  it  is  said  that  men  care  most  for  the  song 

"  Which  being  newest  is  sung,  and  its  music  encircleth  the 
singers,"  * 

it  might  perhaps  be  imagined  that  the  poet  is  speaking 
not  of  new  songs,  but  of  a  new  style  of  music,  and  novelty 
should  accordingly  be  commended.  Whereas  novelty 
ought  not  to  be  commended,  nor  ought  the  words  to  be 
so  understood.  For  the  introduction  of  a  new  kind  of 
music  must  be  shunned  as  imperilling  the  whole  state; 
since  styles  of  music  are  never  disturbed  without  affecting 
the  most  important  political  institutions:  at  least  so  Da- 
mon affirms,  and  I  believe  him. 

Pray  include  me  too  among  the  believers  in  this  doc- 
trine, said  Adeimantus. 

Then  to  all  appearance,  I  continued,  it  is  here  in  music 
that  our  guardians  should  erect  their  guard-house. 

*  See  Odyssey,  I.  351. 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  135 

At  any  rate,  said  he,  it  is  here  that  lawlessness  easily 
creeps  in  unawares. 

Yes,  in  the  guise  of  amusement,  and  professing  to  do  no 
mischief. 

No,  and  it  does  none,  except  that  gradually  gaining  a 
lodgement  it  quietly  insinuates  itself  into  manners  and 
customs;  and  from  these  it  issues  in  greater  force,  and 
makes  its  way  into  mutual  compacts:  and  from  com- 
pacts it  goes  on  to  attack  laws  and  constitutions,  dis- 
playing the  utmost  impudence.  Socrates,  until  it  ends  by 
overturning  every  thing,  both  in  public  and  in  private. 

Good,  said  I;  is  this  so? 

I  think  it  is. 

Then,  as  we  said  in  the  beginning,  must  not  our  chil- 
dren from  the  very  first  be  restricted  to  more  lawful 
amusements,  because  when  amusements  are  lawless,  and 
children  take  after  them,  it  is  impossible  for  such  children 
to  grow  into  loyal  and  virtuous  men? 

Unquestionably. 

Accordingly,  when  our  children,  beginning  with  right 
diversions,  have  received  loyalty  into  their  minds  by  the 
instrumentality  of  music,  the  result  is  the  exact  reverse 
of  the  former;  for  loyalty  accompanies  them  into  every 
thing  and  promotes  their  progress,  and  raises  up  again 
any  state  institution  which  might  happen  to  have  been 
cast  down. 

Yes,  that  is  true. 

Consequently  such  persons  make  the  discovery  even  of 
those  trifling  regulations,  as  they  are  held  to  be,  which 
had  all  been  lost  by  those  whom  we  described  before. 

What  regulations  do  you  mean? 

Those,  for  example,  which  require  the  young  to  main- 
tain a  decorous  silence  in  the  presence  of  their  elders, 
stooping  to  them,  and  rising  up  at  their  entrance,  and 
paying  every  attention  to  their  parents;  together  with 
regulations  as  to  the  mode  of  wearing  the  hair,  the  style 
of  dress  and  shoes,  and  personal  decoration  in  general, 
and  every  thing  else  of  the  same  kind.  Is  not  this  your 
opinion  ? 


i36  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV 

It  is. 

But  to  legislate  on  these  matters  would  be  foolish,  I 
think:  it  is  never  done,  I  believe;  nor  could  express  ver- 
bal legislation  on  such  points  ever  be  permanent. 

How  could  it  be  ? 

At  any  rate,  it  is  probable,  Adeimantus,  that  the  bent 
given  by  education  will  determine  all  that  follows.  For 
does  not  like  always  invite  like? 

Undoubtedly  it  does. 

And  so  we  should  expect  our  system  at  last,  I  fancy,  to 
end  in  some  complete  and  grand  result,  whether  this  re- 
sult be  good  or  the  reverse. 

We  certainly  should. 

On  these  grounds  I  should  not  attempt  to  extend  our 
legislation  to  points  like  those. 

What  good  reason. 

But  again,  do  tell  me,  as  to  those  common  business 
transactions  between  private  individuals  in  the  market, 
including,  if  you  please,  the  contracts  of  artisans,  libels, 
assaults,  law-proceedings,  and  the  impanelling  of  juries, 
or  again,  questions  relating  to  tariffs,  and  the  collection 
of  such  customs  as  may  be  necessary  in  the  markets  or 
in  the  harbours,  and  generally  all  regulations  of  the 
market,  the  police,  the  custom-house,  and  the  like;  shall 
we  condescend  to  legislate  at  all  on  such  matters  ? 

No,  it  is  not  worth  while  to  give  directions  on  these 
points  to  good  and  cultivated  men:  for  in  most  cases  they 
will  have  little  difficulty  in  discovering  all  the  legislation 
required. 

Yes,  my  friend,  if  God  enable  them  to  maintain  the 
laws  which  we  have  already  discussed. 

Otherwise,  he  said,  they  will  spend  their  lives  in  con- 
tinually enacting  and  amending  numerous  laws  on  such 
subjects,  expecting  to  attain  to  perfection. 

You  mean  that  such  persons  will  live  as  those  do  who 
are  in  bad  health,  and  yet,  from  their  want  of  self-re- 
straint, cannot  make  up  their  minds  to  relinomsh  a  per- 
nicious course  of  life* 

Prtciaely  §o, 


Book  IV.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  137 

And  truly  such  people  lead  a  charming  life!  always  in 
the  doctor's  hands,  they  make  no  progress,  but  only  com- 
plicate and  aggravate  their  maladies;  and  yet  they  are 
always  hoping  that  some  one  will  recommend  them  a 
medicine  which  shall  cure  them. 

Yes,  that  is  just  the  case  with  invalids  of  this  kind. 

Again,  is  it  not  charming  that  they  should  regard  as 
their  greatest  enemy  any  one  who  tells  them  the  truth, 
and  assures  them  that  till  they  give  up  their  drunkenness, 
gluttony,  and  debauchery,  and  laziness,  no  drugs,  nor 
any  use  of  caustic  or  the  knife,  nor  yet  charms,  or 
amulets,  or  any  thing  of  the  kind,  will  do  them  any  good  ? 

It  is  not  so  very  charming,  he  replied:  for  there  is  no 
charm  in  being  angry  with  one  who  gives  good  advice. 

You  do  not  seem  to  approve  of  such  people. 

No,  indeed,  I  do  not. 

Then,  if  so,  should  a  whole  city,  as  we  were  saying  just 
now,  act  in  a  similar  manner,  it  will  not  receive  your 
approbation;  and  does  it  not  appear  to  you  that  states 
do  act  like  such  individuals,  when  having  a  bad  form 
of  government  they  forewarn  their  citizens  not  to  dis- 
turb the  constitution,  under  pain  of  death  to  all  who 
attempt  to  do  so:  while  any  one  who  can  serve  them 
most  agreeably  under  their  existing  polity,  and  curry 
favour  by  fawning  upon  them  and  anticipating  their 
wishes,  being  also  clever  in  satisfying  these  wishes,  he 
forsooth  will  be  esteemed  an  excellent  man,  and  full  of 
profound  wisdom,  and  will  be  honoured  at  their  hands  ? 

Yes,  he  replied :  for  my  part,  I  see  no  difference  between 
the  two  cases,  and  I  cannot  in  the  least  approve  of  such 
conduct. 

On  the  other  hand,  do  you  not  admire  the  courage  and 
dexterity  of  those  who  are  willing  and  anxious  to  serve 
such  cities? 

I  do,  except  when  they  are  deluded  by  them  into  fancy- 
ing themselves  real  statesmen,  because  they  are  praised 
by  the  many.  f 

What  do  you  say?  Do  you  not  make  allowances  for 
them?  do  you  suppose  it  is  possible  for  a  man  who  knows 


138  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV, 

nothing  of  measurement,  when  many  other  equally  igno- 
rant persons  tell  him  that  he  is  six  feet  high,  not  to 
believe  it  himself  ? 

No,  that  is  impossible. 

Then  be  not  angry  with  them:  for  indeed  these  are  the 
most  amusing  people  in  the  world,  who  imagine  that  with 
their  everlasting  enactments  and  amendments  concerning 
the  matters  we  lately  described,  they  will  find  some  way 
of  putting  down  the  knaveries  that  are  practised  in  con- 
tracts, and  those  other  embarrassments  which  I  detailed 
just  now,  little  thinking  that  they  are  in  reality  only  cut- 
ting off  the  heads  of  a  Hydra. 

It  is  true,  they  are  no  better  employed. 

For  my  part,  therefore,  I  should  not  have  thought  it 
incumbent  upon  the  genuine  legislator  to  trouble  himself 
with  these  branches  of  law  and  government,  whether  his 
state  be  ill  or  well  organized;  in  the  former  case,  because 
such  regulations  are  useless,  and  do  no  good;  and  in  the 
latter,  because  some  of  them  may  be  discovered  by  any 
person  whatever,  and  others  will  follow  spontaneously  as 
a  result  of  previow  training. 


What  then,  he  asked,  still  remains  for  us  as  legislators 
to  do? 

And  I  replied,  For  us,  nothing:  but  for  the  Delphian 
Apollo  there  will  remain  the  most  important,  the  noblest, 
and  the  highest  acts  of  legislation. 

What  are  these? 

The  erection  of  temples  and  the  appointment  of  sacri- 
fices and  other  ceremonies  in  honour  of  the  gods  and 
demigods  and  heroes,  and  likewise  the  mode  of  burning 
the  dead,  and  all  the  observances  which  we  must  adopt, 
in  order  to  propitiate  the  inhabitants  of  the  other  world. 
These  are  subjects  which  we  do  not  understand  ourselves, 
and  about  which,  in  founding  a  state,  we  shall,  if  we  are 
wise,  listen  to  no  other  advice  or  exposition,  except  that 
of  our  ancient  national  expositor.  For  it  is  this  God,  1 
apprehend,  expounding  from  his  seat  on  the  Omphalos, 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  139 

at  the  earth's  centre,  who  is  the  national  expositor  to  all 
men  on  such  subjects. 

You  are  quite  right :  this  is  what  we  ought  to  do. 

Then  the  organization  of  our  state  is  now  complete,  son 
of  Ariston :  and  the  next  thing  for  you  to  do  is  to  examine 
it,  furnishing  yourself  with  the  necessary  light  from  any 
quarter  you  can,  and  calling  to  your  aid  your  brother  and 
Polemarchus  and  the  rest,  in  order  to  try  if  we  can  see 
where  justice  may  be  found  in  it,  and  where  injustice,  and 
wherein  they  differ  the  one  from  the  other,  and  which  of 
the  two  the  man  who  desires  to  be  happy  ought  to  possess, 
whether  all  gods  and  men  know  it  or  not. 

That  will  not  do !  exclaimed  Glaucon ;  it  was  you  that 
engaged  to  make  the  inquiry,  on  the  ground  that  you 
would  be  guilty  of  a  sin  if  you  refused  to  justice  all  the  aid 
in  your  power. 

I  recollect  that  it  was  as  you  say,  I  replied :  and  I  must 
so  do,  but  you  also  must  assist  me. 

We  will. 

I  am  in  hopes,  then,  that  we  may  find  the  object  of  our 
search  thus.  I  imagine  that  our  state,  being  rightly  or- 
ganized, is  a  perfectly  good  state. 

It  must  be. 

Then  obviously  it  is  wise  and  brave  and  temperate  and 
just. 

Obviously. 

Then  if  we  can  find  some  of  these  qualities  in  the  state, 
there  will  be  a  remainder  consisting  of  the  undiscovered 
qualities. 

Undoubtedly. 

Suppose  then  that  there  were  any  other  four  things, 
contained  in  any  subject,  and  that  we  were  in  search  of 
one  of  them.  If  we  discovered  this  before  the  other  three, 
we  should  be  satisfied:  but  if  we  recognized  the  other 
three  first,  the  thing  sought  for  would  by  this  very  fact 
have  been  found;  for  it  is  plain  that  it  could  only  be  the 
remainder. 

You  are  right. 


140  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV, 

Ought  we  not  to  adopt  this  mode  of  inquiry  in  the  case 
before  us,  since  the  qualities  in  question  are  also  four  in 
number  ? 

Clearly  we  ought. 

To  begin  then:  in  the  first  place  wisdom  seems  to  be 
plainly  discernible  in  our  subject;  and  in  connexion  with 
it  a  paradoxical  fact  presents  itself. 

What  is  that? 

The  state  which  we  have  described  is  really  wise,  if  I 
am  not  mistaken,  inasmuch  as  it  is  prudent  in  counsel,  is 
it  not  ? 

It  is. 

And  this  very  quality,  prudence  in  counsel,  is  evidently 
a  kind  of  knowledge:  for  it  is  not  ignorance,  I  imagine, 
but  knowledge,  that  makes  men  deliberate  prudently. 

Evidently. 

But  there  are  many  different  kinds  of  knowledge  in  the 
state. 

Unquestionably  there  are. 

Is  it  then  in  virtue  of  the  knowledge  of  its  carpenters 
that  the  state  is  to  be  described  as  wise,  or  prudent  in 
counsel  ? 

Certainly  not;  for  in  virtue  of  such  knowledge  it  could 
only  be  called  a  city  of  good  carpentry. 

Then  it  is  not  the  knowledge  it  employs  in  considering 
how  vessels  of  wood  may  best  be  made,  that  will  justify  us 
in  calling  our  city  wise. 

Certainly  not. 

Well,  is  it  the  knowledge  which  has  to  do  with  vessels 
of  brass,  or  any  other  of  this  kind? 

No,  none  whatever. 

Neither  will  a  knowledge  of  the  mode  of  raising  produce 
from  the  soil  give  a  state  the  claim  to  the  title  of  wise, 
but  only  to  that  of  a  successful  agricultural  state. 

So  I  think. 

Tell  me,  then,  does  our  newly-organized  state  contain 
any  kind  of  knowledge,  residing  in  any  section  of  the 
citizens,  which  takes  measures,  not  in  behalf  of  anything 
in  tke  state,  but  in  behalf  of  the  state  as  a  whole,  devising 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  141 

in  what  manner  its  internal  and  foreign  relations  may  best 
be  regulated  ? 

Certainly  it  does. 

What  is  this  knowledge,  and  in  whom  does  it  reside? 

It  is  our  protective  science,  and  it  resides  in  that  gov- 
erning class  whom  we  denominated  just  now  perfect 
guardians. 

Then  in  virtue  of  this  knowledge  what  do  you  call  the 
state  ? 

I  call  it  prudent  in  counsel  and  truly  wise. 

Which  do  you  suppose  will  be  the  more  numerous  class 
in  our  state,  the  braziers,  or  these  genuine  guardians? 

The  braziers  will  far  outnumber  the  others. 

Thtn  will  the  guardians  be  the  smallest  of  all  the  classes 
possessing  this  or  that  branch  of  knowledge,  and  bearing 
this  or  that  name  in  consequence? 

Yes,  much  the  smallest. 

Then  it  is  the  knowledge  residing  in  its  smallest  class 
or  section,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  predominant  and  ruling 
body,  which  entitles  a  state,  organized  agreeably  to  nature, 
to  be  called  wise  as  a  whole:  and  that  class  whose  right 
and  duty  it  is  to  partake  of  the  knowledge  which  alone  of 
all  kinds  of  knowledge  is  properly  called  wisdom,  is  natur- 
ally, as  it  appears,  the  least  numerous  body  in  the  state. 

Most  true. 

Here  then  we  have  made  out,  in  some  way  or  other,  one 
of  the  four  qualities,  and  the  part  of  the  state  in  which  it 
is  seated. 

To  my  mind,  said  he,  it  has  been  made  out  satisfac- 
torily. 

Again,  there  can  assuredly  be  no  great  difficulty  in  dis- 
cerning the  quality  of  courage,  and  the  class  in  which  it 
Tesides,  and  which  entitles  the  state  to  be  called  brave. 

How  so? 

In  pronouncing  a  city  to  be  cowardly  or  brave,  who 
•would  look  to  any  but  the  portion  of  it  which  fights  in  its 
defence  and  takes  the  field  in  its  behalf? 

No  one  would  look  to  anything  else. 

No;  and  for  this  reason,  I  imagine, — that  the  cowardice 


142  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV 

or  courage  of  the  state  itself  is  not  necessarily  implied  in 
that  of  the  other  classes. 

No,  it  is  not. 

Then  a  city  is  brave  as  well  as  wise,  in  virtue  of  a 
certain  portion  of  itself,  because  it  has  in  that  portion  a 
power  which  can  without  intermission  keep  safe  the  right 
opinion  concerning  things  to  be  feared,  which  teaches 
that  they  are  such  as  the  legislator  has  declared  in  the 
prescribed  education.     Is  not  this  what  you  call  courage? 

I  did  not  quite  understand  what  you  said;  be  so  good 
as  to  repeat  it. 

I  say  that  courage  is  a  kind  of  safe  keeping. 

What  kind  of  safe  keeping? 

The  safe  keeping  of  the  opinion  created  by  law  through 
education,  which  teaches  what  things  and  what  kind  of 
things  are  to  be  feared.  And  when  I  spoke  of  keeping  it 
safe  without  intermission,  I  meant  that  it  was  to  be  thor- 
oughly preserved  alike  in  moments  of  pain  and  of  pleas- 
ure, of  desire  and  of  fear,  and  never  to  be  cast  away. 
And  if  you  like,  I  will  illustrate  it  by  a  comparison  which 
seems  to  me  an  apt  one. 

I  should  like  it. 

Well  then,  you  know  that  dyers,  when  they  wish  to  dye 
wool  so  as  to  give  it  the  true  sea-purple,  first  select  from 
the  numerous  colours  one  variety,  that  of  white  wool,  and 
then  subject  it  to  much  careful  preparatory  dressing,  that 
it  may  take  the  colour  as  brilliantly  as  possible;  after 
which  they  proceed  to  dye  it.  And  when  the  wool  has 
been  dyed  on  this  system,  its  colour  is  indelible,  and  no 
washing  either  with  or  without  soap  can  rob  it  of  its  bril- 
liancy. But  when  this  course  has  not  been  pursued, 
3"ou  know  the  results,  whether  this  or  any  other  colour  be 
dyed  without  previous  preparation. 

I  know  that  the  dye  washes  out  in  a  ridiculous  way. 

You  may  understand  from  this  what  we  were  labouring, 
to  the  best  of  our  ability,  to  bring  about,  when  we  were 
selecting  our  soldiers  and  training  them  in  music  and 
gymnastic.  Imagine  that  we  were  only  contriving  how 
they  might  be  best  wrought  upon  to  take  as  it  were  the 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  143 

colour  of  the  laws,  in  order  that  their  opinion  concerning 
things  to  be  feared,  and  on  all  other  subjects,  might  be 
indelible,  owing  to  their  congenial  nature  and  appropriate 
training,  and  that  their  colour  might  not  be  washed  out 
by  such  terribly  efficacious  detergents  as  pleasure,  which 
works  more  powerfully  than  any  potash  or  lye,  and  pain, 
and  fear,  and  desire,  which  are  more  potent  than  any 
other  solvent  in  the  world.  This  power,  therefore,  to  hold 
fast  continually  the  right  and  lawful  opinion  concerning 
things  to  be  feared  and  things  not  to  be  feared,  I  define 
to  be  courage,  and  call  it  by  that  name,  if  you  do  not 
object. 

No,  I  do  not:  for  when  the  right  opinion  on  these, 
matters  is  held  without  education,  as  by  beasts  and  slaves, 
you  would  not,  I  think,  regard  it  as  altogether  legitimate, 
and  you  would  give  it  some  other  name  than  courage. 

Most  true. 

Then  I  accept  this  account  of  courage. 

Do  so,  at  least  as  an  account  of  the  courage  of  citizens, 
and  you  will  be  right.  On  a  future  occasion,  if  you  like, 
we  will  go  into  this  question  more  fully:  at  present  it  is 
beside  our  inquiry,  the  object  of  which  is  justice :  we  have 
done  enough  therefore,  I  imagine,  for  the  investigation  of 
courage. 

You  are  right. 

Two  things,  I  proceeded,  now  remain,  that  we  musli 
look  for  in  the  state,  temperance,  and  that  which  is  the 
cause  of  all  these  investigations,  justice. 

Exactly  so. 

Well,  not  to  trouble  ourselves  any  further  about  tem- 
perance, is  there  any  way  by  which  we  can  discover 
justice? 

For  my  part,  said  he,  I  do  not  know,  nor  do  I  wish 
justice  to  be  brought  to  light  first,  if  we  are  to  make 
no  further  inquiry  after  temperance;  so,  if  you  wish  to 
gratify  me,  examine  into  the  latter,  before  you  proceed  to 
the  former. 

Indeed,  I  do  wish  it,  as  I  am  an  honest  man. 


144  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IVt 

Proceed  then  with  the  examination. 

I  will;  and  from  our  present  point  of  view,  temperance 
has  more  the  appearance  of  a  concord  or  harmony,  than 
the  former  qualities  had. 

How  so? 

Temperance  is,  I  imagine,  a  kind  of  order  and  a 
mastery,  as  men  say,  over  certain  pleasures  and  desires. 
Thus  we  plainly  hear  people  talking  of  a  man's  being 
master  of  himself,  in  some  sense  or  other;  and  other 
similar  expressions  are  used,  in  which  we  may  trace  a 
print  of  the  thing.    Is  it  not  so  ? 

Most  certainly  it  is. 

But  is  not  the  expression  "  master  of  himself  "  a  ridicu- 
lous one?  For  the  man  who  is  master  of  himself  will 
also,  I  presume,  be  the  slave  of  himself,  and  the  slave  will 
be  the  master.  For  the  subject  of  all  these  phrases  is  the 
same  person. 

Undoubtedly. 

Well,  I  continued,  it  appears  to  me  that  the  meaning  of 
the  expression  is,  that  in  the  man  himself,  that  is,  in  his 
soul,  there  resides  a  good  principle  and  a  bad,  and  when 
the  naturally  good  principle  is  master  of  the  bad,  this 
state  of  things  is  described  by  the  term  "  master  of  him- 
self ; "  certainly  it  is  a  term  of  praise : — but  when  in  con- 
sequence of  evil  training,  or  the  influence  of  associates, 
the  smaller  force  of  the  good  principle  is  overpowered  by 
the  superior  numbers  of  the  bad,  the  person  so  situated  is 
described  in  terms  of  reproach  and  condemnation,  as  a 
slave  of  self,  and  a  dissolute  person. 

Yes,  this  seems  a  likely  account  of  it. 

Now  turn  your  eyes  towards  our  new  state,  and  you  will 
find  one  of  these  conditions  realized  in  it:  for  you  will 
allow  that  it  may  fairly  be  called  "master  of  itself,"  if 
temperance  and  self-mastery  may  be  predicated  of  that 
in  which  the  good  principle  governs  the  bad. 

I  am  looking  as  you  direct,  and  I  acknowledge  the 
truth  of  what  you  say. 

It  will  further  be  admitted  that  those  desires,  and  pleas- 
ures, and  pains,  which  are  many  and  various,  will  be 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  145 

chiefly  found  in  children,  and  women,  and  servants;  and 
in  the  vulgar  mass  also  among  nominal  freemen. 

Precisely  so. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  simple  and  moderate  desires, 
which  go  hand  in  hand  with  intellect  and  right  opinion, 
under  the  guidance  of  reasoning,  will  he  found  in  a 
small  number  of  men,  that  is,  in  those  of  the  best  natural 
endowments,  and  the  best  education. 

True. 

Do  you  not  see  that  the  parallel  to  this  exists  in  your 
state;  in  other  words,  that  the  desires  of  the  vulgar  many 
are  there  controlled  by  the  desires  and  the  wisdom  of  the 
cultivated  few? 

I  do. 

If  any  state  then  may  be  described  as  master  of  itself, 
its  pleasures  and  its  desires,  ours  may  be  so  character- 
ized. 

Most  certainly. 

May  we  not  then  also  call  it  temperate,  on  all  these 
accounts  ? 

Surely  we  may. 

And  again,  if  there  is  any  city  in  which  the  governors 
and  the  governed  are  unanimous  on  the  question  who 
ought  to  govern,  such  unanimity  will  exist  in  ours.  Do 
you  not  think  so? 

Most  assuredly  I  do. 

In  which  of  the  two  classes  of  citizens  will  you  say  that 
temperance  resides,  when  they  are  in  this  condition?  in 
the  rulers  or  in  the  subjects? 

In  both  I  fancy. 

Do  you  see,  then,  that  we  were  not  bad  prophets  when 
we  divined  just  now  that  temperance  resembled  a  kind 
of  harmony? 

Why,  pray? 

Because  it  does  not  operate  like  courage  and  wisdom, 
which,  by  residing  in  particular  sections  of  the  state,  make 
it  brave  and  wise  respectively;  but  spreads  throughout 
the  whole  in  literal  diapason,  producing  a  unison  be- 
tween the  weakest  and  the  strongest  and  the  middle  clans, 


}46  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 

whether  you  measure  by  the  standard  of  intelligence,  or 
bodily  strength,  or  numbers,  or  wealth,  or  anything  else 
of  the  kind:  so  that  we  shall  be  fully  justified  in  pro- 
nouncing temperance  to  be  that  unanimity,  which  we 
described  as  a  concord  between  the  naturally  better  ele- 
ment and  the  naturally  worse,  whether  in  a  state  or  in 
a  single  person,  as  to  which  of  the  two  has  the  right 
to  govern. 

I  fully  agree  with  you. 

Very  well,  I  continued:  we  have  discerned  in  our  state 
three  out  of  the  four  principles;  at  least  such  is  our 
present  impression.  Now  what  will  that  remaining  prin- 
ciple be  through  which  the  state  will  further  participate 
in  virtue  ? — for  this,  we  may  be  sure,  is  justice. 

Evidently  it  is. 

Now  then,  Glaucon,  we  must  be  like  hunters  surround- 
ing a  cover,  and  must  give  close  attention  that  justice 
may  nowhere  escape  us  and  disappear  from  our  view: 
for  it  is  manifest  that  she  is  somewhere  here;  so  look 
for  her,  and  strive  to  gain  a  sight  of  her,  for  perhaps 
you  may  discover  her  first,  and  give  the  alarm  to  me. 

I  wish  I  might,  replied  he;  but  you  will  use  me  quite 
well  enough,  if,  instead  of  that,  you  will  treat  me  as  one 
who  is  following  your  steps,  and  is  able  to  see  what  is 
pointed  out  to  him. 

Follow  me  then,  after  joining  your  prayers  with  mine. 

I  will  do  so ;  only  do  you  lead  the  way. 

Truly,  said  I,  the  ground  seems  to  be  hard  to  traverse, 
and  covered  with  wood:  at  all  events  it  is  dark  and  diffi- 
cult to  explore;  but  still  we  must  on. 

Yes,  that  we  must. 

Here  I  caught  a  glimpse,  and  exclaimed,  Ho!  ho! 
Glaucon,  here  is  something  that  looks  like  a  track,  and 
I  believe  the  game  will  not  altogether  escape  us. 

That  is  good  news. 

Upon  my  word,  said  I,  we  are  in  a  most  foolish  pre- 
dicament. 

How  so? 

Why,  my  good  sir,  it  appears  that  what  we  were  looking 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  147 

for  has  been  all  this  time  rolling  before  our  feet,  and  we 
never  saw  it,  but  did  the  most  ridiculous  thing.  Just  as 
people  at  times  go  about  looking  for  something  which 
they  hold  in  their  hands,  so  we,  instead  of  fixing  our 
eyes  upon  the  thing  itself,  kept  gazing  at  some  point  in 
the  distance,  and  this  was  probably  the  reason  why  it 
eluded  our  search. 

What  do  you  mean? 

This:  that  I  believe  we  were  conversing  of  it  together, 
without  understanding  that  we  were  in  a  manner  describ- 
ing it  ourselves. 

Your  preface  seems  long  to  one  who  is  anxious  for  the 
explanation. 

Well  then,  listen,  and  judge  whether  I  am  right  or  not. 
What  at  the  commencement  we  laid  down  as  a  universal 
rule  of  action,  when  we  were  founding  our  state,  this,  if 
I  mistake  not,  or  some  modification  of  it,  is  justice. 
I  think  we  affirmed,  if  you  recollect,  and  frequently  re- 
peated, that  every  individual  ought  to  have  some  one 
occupation  in  the  state,  which  should  be  that  to  which 
his  natural  capacity  was  best  adapted. 

We  did  say  so. 

And  again,  we  have  often  heard  people  say,  that  to 
mind  one's  own  business,  and  not  be  meddlesome,  is 
justice;  and  we  have  often  said  the  same  thing  ourselves. 

We  have  said  so. 

Then  it  would  seem,  my  friend,  that  to  do  one's  own 
business,  in  some  shape  or  other,  is  justice.  Do  you 
know  whence  I  infer  this? 

No;  be  so  good  as  to  tell  me. 

I  think  that  the  remainder  left  in  the  state,  after  elimi- 
nating the  qualities  which  we  have  considered,  I  mean 
temperance,  and  courage,  and  wisdom,  must  be  that 
which  made  their  entrance  into  it  possible,  and  which  pre- 
serves them  there  so  long  as  they  exist  in  it.  Now  we 
affirmed  that  the  remaining  quality,  when  three  out  of  the 
four  were  found,  would  be  justice. 

Yes,  unquestionably  it  would. 

If,  however,  it  were  required  to  decide  which  of  these 


148  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 

qualities  will  have  most  influence  in  perfecting  by  its 
presence  the  virtue  of  our  state,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
determine;  whether  it  will  be  the  harmony  of  opinion 
between  the  governors  and  the  governed,  or  the  faithful 
adherence  on  the  part  of  the  soldiers  to  the  lawful  belief 
concerning  the  things  which  are,  and  the  things  which 
are  not,  to  be  feared;  or  the  existence  of  wisdom  and 
watchfulness  in  the  rulers;  or  whether  the  virtue  of  the 
state  may  not  be  chiefly  traced  to  the  presence  of  that 
fourth  principle  in  every  child  and  woman,  in  every  slave, 
freeman,  and  artisan,  in  the  ruler  and  in  the  subject, 
requiring  each  to  do  his  own  work,  and  not  meddle  with 
many  things. 

It  would  be  a  difficult  point  to  settle,  unquestionably. 

Thus  it  appears  that,  in  promoting  the  virtue  of  a  state, 
the  power  that  makes  each  member  of  it  do  his  own  work, 
may  compete  with  its  wisdom,  and  its  temperance,  and 
its  courage. 

Decidedly  it  may. 

But  if  there  is  a  principle  which  rivals  these  qualities  in 
promoting  the  virtue  of  a  state,  will  you  not  determine  it 
to  be  justice? 

Most  assuredly. 

Consider  the  question  in  another  light,  and  see  whether 
you  will  come  to  the  same  conclusion.  Will  you  assign 
to  the  rulers  of  the  state  the  adjudication  of  law-suits? 

Certainly. 

Will  not  their  judgments  be  guided,  above  everything, 
by  the  desire  that  no  one  may  appropriate  what  belongs 
to  others,  nor  be  deprived  of  what  is  his  own? 

Yes,  that  will  be  their  main  study. 

Because  that  is  just? 

Yes. 

Thus,  according  to  this  view,  also,  it  will  be  granted 
that  to  have  and  do  what  belongs  to  us  and  is  our  own, 
is  justice. 

True. 

Now  observe  whether  you  hold  the  same  opinion  that 
I  do.  If  a  carpenter  should  undertake  to  execute  the 
work  of  a  shoemaker,  or  a  shoemaker  that  of  a  carpenter, 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  149 

either  by  interchanging  their  tools  and  distinctions,  or  by 
the  same  person  undertaking  both  trades,  with  all  the 
changes  involved  in  it,  do  you  think  it  would  greatly 
damage  the  state? 

Not  very  greatly. 

But  when  one  whom  nature  has  made  an  artisan,  or 
a  producer  of  any  other  kind,  is  so  elated  by  wealth,  or 
a  large  connexion,  or  bodily  strength,  or  any  similar  ad- 
vantages, as  to  intrude  himself  into  the  class  of  the  war- 
riors; or  when  a  warrior  intrudes  himself  into  the  class  of 
the  senators  and  guardians,  of  which  he  is  unworthy,  and 
when  these  interchange  their  tools  and  their  distinctions, 
or  when  one  and  the  same  person  attempts  to  discharge 
all  these  duties  at  once,  then,  I  imagine,  you  will  agree 
with  me,  that  such  change  and  meddling  among  these 
will  be  ruinous  to  the  state. 

Most  assuredly  they  will. 

Then  any  intermeddling  in  the  three  classes,  or  change 
from  one  to  another,  would  inflict  great  damage  on  the 
state,  and  may  with  perfect  propriety  be  described  as  in 
the  strongest  sense  a  doing  of  evil. 

Quite  so. 

And  will  you  not  admit  that  evil-doing  of  the  worst 
kind  towards  one's  own  state  is  injustice? 

Unquestionably. 

This  then  is  injustice.  On  the  other  hand,  let  us  state 
that,  conversely,  adherence  to  their  own  business  on  the 
part  of  the  industrious,  the  military,  and  the  guardian 
classes,  each  of  these  doing  its  own  work  in  the  state,  is 
justice,  and  will  render  the  state  just. 

I  fully  coincide,  he  said,  in  this  view. 

Let  us  not  state  it  yet  quite  positively;  but  if  we  find, 
on  applying  this  conception  to  the  individual  man,  that 
there  too  it  is  admitted  to  constitute  justice,  we  will  then 
yield  our  assent — for  what  more  can  we  say? — but  if  not, 
in  that  case  we  will  institute  a  new  inquiry.  At  present, 
however,  let  us  complete  the  investigation  which  we  un- 
dertook in  the  belief  that,  if  we  first  endeavoured  to  con- 
template justice  in  some  larger  subject  which  contains  it; 


150  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 

we  should  find  it  easier  to  discern  its  nature  in  the  indi- 
vidual man.  Such  a  subject  we  recognized  in  a  state,  and 
accordingly  we  organized  the  best  we  could,  being  sure 
that  justice  must  reside  in  a  good  city.  The  view,  there- 
fore, which  presented  itself  to  us  there,  let  us  now  apply 
to  the  individual;  and  if  it  be  admitted,  we  shall  be  satis- 
fied ;  but  if  we  should  find  something  different  in  the  case 
of  the  individual,  we  will  again  go  back  to  our  city,  and 
put  our  theory  to  the  test.  And  perhaps  by  considering 
the  two  cases  side  by  side,  and  rubbing  them  together,  we 
may  cause  justice  to  flash  out  from  the  contact,  like  fire 
from  dry  bits  of  wood,  and  when  it  has  become  visible  to 
lis,  may  settle  it  firmly  in  our  own  minds. 

There  is  method  in  your  proposal,  he  replied,  and  so 
let  us  do. 

I  proceeded  therefore  to  ask :  When  two  things,  a  greater 
and  a  less,  are  called  by  a  common  name,  are  they,  in  so 
far  as  the  common  name  applies,  unlike  or  like  ? 

Like. 

Then  a  just  man  will  not  differ  from  a  just  state,  so  far 
as  the  idea  of  justice  is  involved,  but  the  two  will  be  like. 

They  will. 

Well,  but  we  resolved  that  a  state  was  just,  when  the 
three  classes  of  characters  present  in  it  were  severally 
occupied  in  doing  their  proper  work :  and  that  it  was  tem- 
perate, and  brave,  and  wise,  in  consequence  of  certain 
affections  and  conditions  of  these  same  classes. 

True. 

Then,  my  friend,  we  shall  also  adjudge,  in  the  case  of 
the  individual  man,  that,  supposing  him  to  possess  in  his 
soul  the  same  generic  parts,  he  is  rightly  entitled  to  the 
same  names  as  the  state,  in  virtue  of  affections  of  these 
parts  identical  with  those  of  the  classes  in  the  state. 

It  must  inevitably  be  so. 

Once  more  then,  my  excellent  friend,  we  have  stumbled 
on  an  easy  question  concerning  the  nature  of  the  soul, 
namely,  whether  it  contains  these  three  generic  parts  or  not. 

Not  so  very  easy  a  question,  I  think:  but  perhaps 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  151 

Socrates,  the  common  saying  is  true,  that  the  beautiful 
is  difficult. 

It  would  appear  so;  and  I  tell  you  plainly,  Glaucon, 
that  in  my  opinion  we  shall  never  attain  to  exact  truth  on 
this  subject,  by  such  methods  as  we  are  employing  in  our 
present  discussion.  However,  the  path  that  leads  to  that 
goal  is  too  long  and  toilsome;  and  I  dare  say  we  may 
arrive  at  the  truth  by  our  present  methods,  in  a  manner 
not  unworthy  of  our  former  arguments  and  speculations. 

Shall  we  not  be  content  with  that?  For  my  part  it 
would  satisfy  me  for  the  present. 

Well,  certainly  it  will  be  quite  enough  for  me. 

Do  not  flag  then,  but  proceed  with  the  inquiry. 

Tell  me  then,  I  continued,  can  we  possibly  refuse  to 
admit  that  there  exist  in  each  of  us  the  same  generic 
parts  and  characteristics  as  are  found  in  the  state?  For  I 
presume  the  state  has  not  received  them  from  any  other 
source.  It  would  be  ridiculous  to  imagine  that  the  pres- 
ence of  the  spirited  element  in  cities  is  not  to  be  traced 
to  individuals,  wherever  this  character  is  imputed  to  the 
people,  as  it  is  to  the  natives  of  Thrace,  and  Scythia,  and 
generally  speaking,  of  the  northern  countries;  or  the  love 
of  knowledge,  which  would  be  chiefly  attributed  to  our 
own  country;  or  the  love  of  riches,  which  people  would 
especially  connect  with  the  Phoenicians  and  the  Egyptians. 

Certainly. 

This  then  is  a  fact  so  far,  and  one  which  it  is  not  diffi- 
cult to  apprehend. 

No,  it  is  not. 

But  here  begins  a  difficulty.  Are  all  our  actions  alike 
performed  by  the  one  predominant  faculty,  or  are  there 
three  faculties  operating  severally  in  our  different  actions? 
Do  we  learn  with  one  internal  faculty,  and  become  angry 
with  another,  and  with  a  third  feel  desire  for  all  the  pleas- 
ures connected  with  eating  and  drinking,  and  the  propa- 
gation of  the  species;  or  upon  every  impulse  to  action,  do 
we  perform  these  several  operations  with  the  whole  soul? 
The  difficulty  will  consist  in  settling  these  points  in  a  satis- 
factory manner. 


152  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 

I  think  so  too. 

Let  us  try  therefore  the  following  plan,  in  order  to  as- 
certain whether  the  faculties  engaged  are  distinct  or  iden- 
tical. 

What  is  your  plan  ? 

It  is  manifest  that  the  same  thing  cannot  do  two  oppo- 
site things,  or  he  in  two  opposite  states,  in  the  same  part 
of  it,  and  with  reference  to  the  same  object ;  so  that  where 
we  find  these  phenomena  occurring,  we  shall  know  that 
the  subjects  of  them  are  not  identical,  but  more  than  one. 

Very  well. 

Now  consider  what  I  say. 

Speak  on. 

Is  it  possible  for  the  same  thing  to  be  at  the  same 
time,  and  in  the  same  part  of  ity  at  rest  and  in  motion  ? 

Certainly  not. 

Let  us  come  to  a  still  more  exact  understanding,  lest  we 
should  chance  to  differ  as  we  proceed.  If  it  were  said  of 
a  man  who  is  standing  still,  but  moving  his  hands  and 
his  head,  that  the  same  individual  is  at  the  same  time  at 
rest  and  in  motion,  we  should  not,  I  imagine,  allow  this 
to  be  a  correct  way  of  speaking,  but  should  say,  that  part 
of  the  man  is  at  rest,  and  part  in  motion:  should  we  not? 

We  should. 

And  if  the  objector  should  indulge  in  yet  further  pleas- 
antries, so  far  refining  as  to  say,  that  at  any  rate  a  top  is 
wholly  at  rest  and  in  motion  at  the  same  time,  when  it 
spins  with  its  peg  fixed  on  a  given  spot,  or  that  anything 
else  revolving  in  the  same  place,  is  an  instance  of  the  same 
thing,  we  should  reject  his  illustration,  because  in  such 
cases  the  things  are  not  both  stationary  and  in  motion  in 
respect  of  the  same  parts  of  them;  and  we  should  reply, 
that  they  contain  an  axis  and  a  circumference,  and  that  in 
respect  of  the  axis  they  are  stationary,  inasmuch  as  they 
do  not  lean  to  any  side;  but  in  respect  of  the  circum- 
ference they  are  moving  round  and  round:  but  if,  whilo 
the  rotatory  motion  continues,  the  axis  at  the  same  time 
inclines  to  the  right  or  to  the  left,  forwards  or  backwards, 
then  they  cannot  be  said  in  any  sense  to  be  at  rest. 


Book  IV.  j  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  153 

That  is  true. 

Then  no  objection  of  that  kind  will  alarm  ns,  or  tend  at 
all  to  convince  us  that  it  is  ever  possible  for  one  and  the 
same  thing,  at  the  same  time,  in  the  same  part  of  it,  and 
relatively  to  the  same  object,  to  be  acted  upon  in  two 
opposite  ways,  or  to  be  two  opposite  things,  or  to  produce 
two   opposite   effects. 

I  can  answer  for  myself. 

However,  that  we  may  not  be  compelled  to  spend  time 
in  discussing  all  such  objections,  and  convincing  our- 
selves that  they  are  unsound,  let  us  assume  this  to  be 
the  fact,  and  proceed  forwards,  with  the  understanding 
that,  if  ever  we  take  a  different  view  of  this  matter,  all 
the  conclusions  founded  on  this  assumption  will  fall  to 
the  ground. 

Yes,  that  will  be  the  best  way. 

Well  then,  I  continued,  would  you  place  assent  and  dis- 
sent, the  seeking  after  an  object  and  the  refusal  of  it, 
attraction  and  repulsion,  and  the  like,  in  the  class  of 
mutual  opposites?  Whether  they  be  active  or  passive 
processes  will  not  affect  the  question. 

Yes,  I  should. 

Well,  would  you  not,  without  exception,  include  hunger 
and  thirst,  and  the  desires  generally,  and  likewise  willing 
and  wishing,  somewhere  under  the  former  of  those  gen- 
eral terms  just  mentioned?  For  instance,  would  you  not 
say  that  the  mind  of  a  man  under  the  influence  of  desire 
always  either  seeks  after  the  object  of  desire,  or  attracts 
to  itself  that  which  it  wishes  to  have;  or  again,  so  far  as 
it  wills  the  possession  of  anything,  it  assents  inwardly 
thereto,  as  though  it  were  asked  a  question,  longing  for 
the  accomplishment  of  its  wish? 

I  should. 

Again:  shall  we  not  class  disinclination,  unwillingness, 
and  dislike,  under  the  head  of  mental  rejection  and  re- 
pulsion, and  of  general  terms  wholly  opposed  to  the 
former  ? 

Unquestionably. 

This  being  the  case,  shall  we  say  that  desires  form  a 


154  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 

class,  the  most  marked  of  which  are  what  we  call  thirst 
and  hunger? 

We  shall. 

The  one  being  a  desire  of  drink,  and  the  other  of 
food? 

Yes. 

Can  thirst  then,  so  far  as  it  is  thirst,  be  an  internal 
desire  of  anything  more  than  drink?  That  is  to  say,  is 
thirst,  as  such,  a  thirst  for  hot  drink  or  cold,  for  much 
or  little,  or,  in  one  word,  for  any  particular  kind  of  drink  ? 
Or,  will  it  not  rather  be  true  that,  if  there  be  heat  com- 
bined with  the  thirst,  the  desire  of  cold  drink  will  be 
superadded  to  it,  and  if  there  be  cold,  of  hot  drink;  and 
if  owing  to  the  presence  of  muchness  the  thirst  be  great, 
the  desire  of  much  will  be  added,  and  if  little,  the  desire 
of  little:  but  that  thirst  in  itself  cannot  be  a  desire  of 
anything  else  than  its  natural  object,  which  is  simple 
drink,  or  again,  hunger,  of  anything  but  food? 

You  are  right,  he  replied;  every  desire  in  itself  has  to 
do  with  its  natural  object  in  its  simply  abstract  form,  but 
the  accessories  of  the  desire  determine  the  quality  of  the 
object. 

Let  not  any  one,  I  proceeded,  for  want  of  consideration 
on  our  part,  disturb  us  by  the  objection,  that  no  one 
desires  drink  simply,  but  good  drink,  nor  food  simply, 
but  good  food;  because,  since  all  desire  good  things,  if 
thirst  is  a  desire,  it  must  be  a  desire  of  something  good, 
whether  that  something,  which  is  its  object,  be  drink  or 
anything  else; — an  argument  which  applies  to  all  the 
desires. 

True,  there  might  seem  to  be  something  in  the  objection. 

Eecollect,  however,  that  in  the  case  of  all  essentially 
correlative  terms,  when  the  first  member  of  the  relation 
is  qualified,  the  second  is  also  qualified,  if  I  am  not  mis- 
taken;— when  the  first  is  abstract,  the  second  is  also 
abstract. 

I  do  not  understand  you. 

Do  you  not  understand  that  "greater"  is  a  relative 
term,  implying  another  term? 


Book  IV.J         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  155 

Certainly. 

It  implies  a  "less,"  does  it  not? 

Yes. 

And  a  much  greater  implies  a  much  less,  does  it  not? 

Yes. 

Does  a  once  greater  also  imply  a  once  less,  and  a  future 
greater  a  future  less  ? 

Inevitably. 

Does  not  the  same  reasoning  apply  to  the  correlative 
terms,  "  more  "  and  "  fewer,"  "  double  *  and  "  half,"  and 
all  relations  of  quantity ;  also  to  the  terms,  "  heavier  "  and 
*  lighter,"  "  quicker  "  and  "  slower ;  "  and  likewise  to 
"cold"  and  "hot,"  and  all  similar  epithets? 

Certainly  it  does. 

But  how  is  it  with  the  various  branches  of  scientific 
knowledge?  Does  not  the  same  principle  hold?  That  is, 
knowledge  in  the  abstract  is  knowledge  simply  of  the 
knowable,  or  of  whatever  that  be  called  which  is  of  the 
object  of  knowledge;  but  a  particular  science,  of  a  par- 
ticular kind,  has  a  particular  object  of  a  particular  kind. 
To  explain  my  meaning: — as  soon  as  a  science  of  the 
construction  of  houses  arose,  was  it  not  distinguished  from 
other  sciences,  and  therefore  called  the  science  of  build- 
ing? 

Undoubtedly. 

And  is  it  not  because  it  is  of  a  particular  character, 
which  no  other  science  possesses  ? 

Yes. 

And  is  not  its  particular  character  derived  from  the 
particular  character  of  its  object?  and  may  we  not  say 
the  same  of  all  the  other  arts  and  sciences  ? 

We  may. 

This  then  you  are  to  regard  as  having  been  my  mean- 
ing before ;  provided,  that  is,  you  now  understand  that  in 
the  case  of  all  correlative  terms,  if  the  first  member  of  the 
relation  is  abstract,  the  second  is  also  abstract;  if  the 
second  is  qualified,  the  first  is  also  qualified.  I  do  not 
mean  to  say  that  the  qualities  of  the  two  are  identical, 
as  for  instance,  that  the  science  of  health  is  healthy,  and 


156  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [BOOR  IV. 

the  science  of  disease  diseased;  or  that  the  science  of  evil 
things  is  evil,  and  of  good  things  good:  but  as  soon  as 
science,  instead  of  limiting  itself  to  the  abstract  object  of 
science,  became  related  to  a  particular  kind  of  object, 
namely,  in  the  present  case,  the  conditions  of  health  and 
disease,  the  result  was  that  the  science  also  came  to  be 
qualified  in  a  certain  manner,  so  that  it  was  no  longer 
called  simply  science,  but,  by  the  addition  of  a  qualifying 
epithet,  medical  science. 

I  understand,  and  I  think  what  you  say  is  true. 

To  recur  to  the  case  of  thirst,  I  continued,  do  you  not 
consider  this  to  be  one  of  the  things  whose  nature  it  is  to 
have  an  object  correlative  with  themselves,  assuming  that 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  thirst? 

I  do,  and  its  object  is  drink. 

Then,  for  any  particular  kind  of  drink  there  is  a  par- 
ticular kind  of  thirst ;  but  thirst  in  the  abstract  is  neither 
for  much  drink,  nor  for  little,  neither  for  good  drink  nor 
for  bad,  nor,  in  one  word,  for  any  kind  of  drink,  but  sim- 
ply and  absolutely  thirst  for  drink,  is  it  not? 

Most  decidedly  so. 

Then  the  soul  of  a  thirsty  man,  in  so  far  as  he  is  thirsty, 
has  no  other  wish  than  to  drink;  but  this  it  desires,  and 
towards  this  it  is  impelled. 

Clearly  so. 

Therefore,  whenever  anything  pulls  back  a  soul  that  is 
under  the  influence  of  thirst,  it  will  be  something  in  the 
soul  distinct  from  the  principle  which  thirsts,  and  which 
drives  it  like  a  beast  to  drink :  for  we  hold  it  to  be  impos- 
sible that  the  same  thing  should,  at  the  same  time,  with 
the  same  part  of  itself,  in  reference  to  the  same  object,  be 
doing  two   opposite  things. 

Certainly  it  is. 

Just  as,  I  imagine,  it  would  not  be  right  to  say  of  the 
bowman,  that  his  hands  are  at  the  same  time  drawing  the 
bow  towards  him,  and  pushing  it  from  him ;  the  fact  being, 
that  one  of  his  hands  pushes  it  from  him,  and  the  other 
pulls  it  to  him. 

Precisely  so, 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  157 

Now,  can  we  say  that  people  sometimes  are  thirsty,  and 
yet  do  not  wish  to  drink? 

Yes,  certainly;  it  often  happens  to  many  people. 

What  then  can  one  say  of  them,  except  that  their  soul 
contains  one  principle  which  commands,  and  another  which 
forbids  them  to  drink,  the  latter  being  distinct  from  and 
stronger  than  the  former? 

That  is  my  opinion. 

Whenever  the  authority  which  forbids  such  indulgences 
grows  up  in  the  soul,  is  it  not  engendered  there  by  rea- 
soning; while  the  powers  which  lead  and  draw  the  mind 
towards  them,  owe  their  presence  to  passive  and  morbid 
states  ? 

It  would  appear  so. 

Then  we  shall  have  reasonable  grounds  for  assuming 
that  these  are  two  principles  distinct  one  from  the  other, 
and  for  giving  to  that  part  of  the  soul  with  which  it  rea- 
sons the  title  of  the  rational  principle,  and  to  that  part 
with  which  it  loves  and  hungers  and  thirsts,  and  experi- 
ences the  flutter  of  the  other  desires,  the  title  of  the  irra- 
tional and  concupiscent  principle,  the  ally  of  sundry  indul- 
gences and  pleasures. 

Yes,  he  replied:  it  will  not  be  unreasonable  to  think  so. 

Let  us  consider  it  settled,  then,  that  these  two  specific 
parts  exist  in  the  soul.  But  now,  will  spirit,  or  that  by 
which  we  feel  indignant,  constitute  a  third  distinct  part? 
If  not,  with  which  of  the  two  former  has  it  a  natural 
affinity  ? 

Perhaps  with  the  concupiscent  principle. 

But  I  was  once  told  a  story,  which  I  can  quite  believe, 
to  the  effect,  that  Leontius,  the  son  of  Aglaion,  as  he  was 
walking  up  from  the  Piraeus,  and  approaching  the  northern 
wall  from  the  outside,  observed  some  dead  bodies  on  the 
ground,  and  the  executioner  standing  by  them.  He  im- 
mediately felt  a  desire  to  look  at  them,  but  at  the  same 
time  loathing  the  thought  he  tried  to  divert  himself  from 
it.  For  some  time  he  struggled  with  himself,  and  covered 
his  eyes,  till  at  length,  over-mastered  by  the  desire,  h« 
opened  his  eyes  wide  with  his  fingers,  and  running  up  to 


158  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 

the  bodies,  exclaimed,  "There!  you  wretches!  gaze  your 
fill  at  the  beautiful  spectacle ! " 

I  have  heard  the  anecdote  too. 

This  story,  however,  indicates  that  anger  sometimes 
fights  against  the  desires,  which  implies  that  they  are  two 
distinct  principles. 

True,  it  does  indicate  that. 

And  do  we  not  often  observe  in  other  cases  that  when  a 
man  is  overpowered  by  the  desires  against  the  dictates  of 
his  reason,  he  reviles  himself,  and  resents  the  violence 
thus  exerted  within  him,  and  that,  in  this  struggle  of  con- 
tending parties,  the  spirit  sides  with  the  reason?  But 
that  it  should  make  common  cause  with  the  desires,  when 
the  reason  pronounces  that  they  ought  not  to  act  against 
itself,  is  a  thing  which  I  suppose  you  will  not  profess  to 
have  experienced  yourself,  nor  yet,  I  imagine,  have  you 
ever  noticed  it  in  any  one  else. 

No,  I  am  sure  I  have  not. 

Well,  and  when  any  one  thinks  he  is  in  the  wrong,  is 
he  not,  in  proportion  to  the  nobleness  of  his  character, 
so  much  the  less  able  to  be  angry  at  being  made  to  suffer 
hunger  or  cold  or  any  similar  pain  at  the  hands  of  him 
whom  he  thinks  justified  in  so  treating  him;  his  spirit, 
as  I  describe  it,  refusing  to  be  roused  against  his 
punisher  ? 

True. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  any  one  thinks  he  is  wronged, 
does  he  not  instantly  boil  and  chafe,  and  enlist  himself  on 
the  side  of  what  he  thinks  to  be  justice;  and  whatever 
extremities  of  hunger  and  cold  and  the  like  he  may  have 
to  suffer,  does  he  not  endure  till  he  conquers,  never  ceas- 
ing from  his  noble  efforts,  till  he  has  either  gained  his 
point,  or  perished  in  the  attempt,  or  been  recalled  and 
calmed  by  the  voice  of  reason  within,  as  a  dog  is  called 
off  by  a  shepherd? 

Yes,  he  replied,  the  case  answers  very  closely  to  your 
description;  and  in  fact,  in  our  city  we  made  the  auxilia- 
ries, like  sheep-dogs,  subject  to  the  rulers,  who  are  as  it 
were  the  shepherds  of  the  state. 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  159 

You  rightly  understand  my  meaning.  But  try  whether 
you  also  apprehend  my  next  observation. 

What  is  it  ? 

That  our  recent  view  of  the  spirited  principle  is  exactly 
reversed.  Then  we  thought  it  had  something  of  the  con- 
cupiscent character,  but  now  we  say  that,  far  from  this 
being  the  case,  it  much  more  'readily  takes  arms  on  the 
side  of  the  rational  principle  in  the  party  conflict  of  the 
soul. 

Decidedly  it  does. 

Is  it  then  distinct  from  this  principle  also ;  or  is  it  only 
a  modification  of  it,  thus  making  two  instead  of  three  dis- 
tinct principles  in  the  soul,  namely,  the  rational  and  the 
concupiscent  ?  Or  ought  we  tor  say  that,  as  the  state  was 
held  together  by  three  great  classes,  the  producing  class, 
the  auxiliary,  and  the  deliberative,  so  also  in  the  soul  the 
spirited  principle  constitutes  a  third  element,  the  natural 
ally  of  the  rational  principle,  if  it  be  not  corrupted  by  evil 
training  ? 

It  must  be  a  third,  he  replied. 

Yes,  I  continued;  if  it  shall  appear  to  be  distinct  from 
the  rational  principle,  as  we  found  it  different  from  the 
concupiscent. 

Nay,  that  will  easily  appear.  For  even  in  little  children 
any  one  may  see  this,  that  from  their  very  birth  they  have 
plenty  of  spirit,  whereas  reason  is  a  principle  to  which 
most  men  only  attain  after  many  years,  and  some,  in  my 
opinion,  never. 

Upon  my  word  you  have  well  said.  In  brute  beasts 
also  one  may  see  what  you  describe  exemplified.  And 
besides,  that  passage  in  Homer,  which  we  quoted  on  a 
former  occasion,  will  support  our  view: 

•'  Smiting  his  breast,  to  his  heart  thus  spake  he  in  accents  of 
chiding." 

For  in  this  line  Homer  has  distinctly  made  a  difference 
between  the  two  principles,  representing  that  which  had 
considered  the  good  or  the  evil  of  the  action  as  rebukiug 
that  which  was  indulging  in  unreflecting  resentment. 


160  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 

You  are  perfectly  right. 

Here  then,  I  proceeded,  after  a  hard  struggle,  we  have, 
though  with  difficulty,  reached  the  land ;  and  we  are  pretty 
well  satisfied  that  there  are  corresponding  divisions,  equal 
in  number,  in  a  state,  and  in  the  soul  of  every  individual. 

True. 

Then  does  it  not  necessarily  follow  that,  as  and  whereby 
the  state  was  wise,  so  and  thereby  the  individual  is  wiser 

Without  doubt  it  does. 

And  that  as  and  whereby  the  individual  is  brave,  so 
and  thereby  is  the  state  brave;  and  that  everything  con- 
ducing to  virtue  which  is  possessed  by  the  one,  finds  its 
counterpart  in  the  other? 

It  must  be  so. 

Then  we  shall  also  assert,  I  imagine,  Glaucon,  that  a 
man  is  just,  in  the  same  way  in  which  we  found  the  state 
to  be  just. 

This  too  is  a  necessary  corollary. 

But  surely  we  have  not  allowed  ourselves  to  forget,  that 
what  makes  the  state  just,  is  the  fact  of  each  of  the  three 
classes  therein  doing  its  own  work. 

No;  I  think  we  have  not  forgotten  this. 

We  must  bear  in  mind,  then,  that  each  of  us  also,  if  his 
inward  faculties  do  severally  their  proper  work,  will,  in 
virtue  of  that,  be  a  just  man,  and  a  doer  of  his  proper 
work. 

Certainly,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind. 

Is  it  not  then  essentially  the  province  of  the  rational 
principle  to  command,  inasmuch  as  it  is  wise,  and  has  to 
exercise  forethought  in  behalf  of  the  entire  soul,  and  the 
province  of  the  spirited  principle  to  be  its  subject  and 
ally? 

Yes,  certainly. 

And  will  not  the  combination  of  music  and  gymnastic 
bring  them,  as  we  said,  into  unison;  elevating  and  foster- 
ing the  one  with  lofty  discourses  and  scientific  teachings, 
and  lowering  the  tone  of  the  other  by  soothing  address, 
till  its  wildness  has  been  tamed  by  harmony  and  rhythm  ? 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  161 

Yes,  precisely  so. 

And  so  these  two,  having  Loon  thus  trained,  and  having 
truly  learnt  their  parts  and  received  a  real  education,  will 
exercise  control  over  the  concupiscent  principle,  which  in 
every  man  forms  the  largest  portion  of  the  soul,  and  is  by 
nature  most  insatiably  covetous.  And  they  will  watch  it 
narrowly,  that  it  may  not  so  batten  upon  what  are  called 
the  pleasures  of  the  body,  ps  to  grow  large  and  strong, 
and  forthwith  refuse  to  do  its  proper  work,  and  even 
aspire  to  absolute  dominion  over  the  classes  which  it  hat 
no  right  according  to  its  kind  to  govern,  thus  overturning 
fundamentally  the  life  of  all. 

Certainly  they  will. 

And  would  not  these  two  principles  be  the  best  qualified 
to  guard  the  entire  soul  and  body  against  enemies  from 
without;  the  one  taking  counsel,  and  the  other  righting 
its  battles,  in  obedience  to  the  governing  power,  to  whose 
designs  it  gives  effect  by  its  bravery? 

True. 

In  like  manner,  I  think,  we  call  an  individual  brave,  in 
virtue  of  the  spirited  element  of  his  nature,  when  this  part 
of  him  holds  fast,  through  pain  and  pleasure,  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  Teason  as  to  what  is  to  be  feared,  and  what  is 
not. 

Yes,  and  rightly. 

And  we  call  him  wise,  in  virtue  of  that  small  part  which 
reigns  within  him,  and  issues  these  instructions,  and  which 
also  in  its  turn  contains  within  itself  a  true  knowledge  of 
what  is  advantageous  for  the  whole  community  composed 
of  these  three  principles,  and  for  each  member  of  it. 

Exactly  so. 

Again,  do  we  not  call  a  man  temperate,  in  virtue  of  the 
friendship  and  harmony  of  these  same  principles,  that  is 
to  say,  when  the  two  that  are  governed  agree  with  that 
which  governs  in  regarding  the  rational  principle  as  the 
rightful  sovereign,  and  set  up  no  opposition  to  its  au- 
thority? 

Certainly,  he  replied;  temperance  is  nothing  else  than 
this,  whether  in  state  or  individual. 
II 


162  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLAT6.  .Book  IV. 

Lastly,  a  man  will  be  just,  in  the  way  and  by  the  means 
which  we  nave  repeatedly  described. 

Unquestionably  he  will. 

Tell  me  then,  I  proceeded,  do  we  find  any  indistinctness 
in  our  view  of  justice,  which  makes  us  regard  it  as  some- 
thing different  from  what  we  found  it  to  be  in  the  state  ? 

I  do  not  think  so. 

Because  we  might  thoroughly  confirm  our  opinion,  if 
we  have  any  lingering  doubts  in  our  minds,  by  applying 
commonplace  examples  to  it. 

What  kind  of  examples  do  you  mean  ? 

For  example,  if  in  speaking  of  our  ideal  state,  and  of  an 
individual  who  in  nature  and  training  resembles  it,  we 
were  required  to  declare  whether  we  think  that  such  an 
individual  would  repudiate  a  deposit  of  gold  or  silver 
committed  to  his  charge,  do  you  suppose  that  any  one 
•would  think  him  more  likely  to  do  such  a  deed  than  other 
men  who  are  not  such  as  he  is? 

No  one  would  think  so. 

And  will  he  not  also  be  clear  of  suspicion  of  sacrilege, 
and  of  theft,  and  of  being  either  false  to  his  friends,  or  a 
traitor  to  his  country  ? 

He  will. 

Moreover,  he  will  be  wholly  incapable  of  bad  faith,  in 
the  case  of  an  oath  or  of  any  other  kind  of  compact. 

Clearly  he  will. 

Again,  he  is  the  last  person  in  the  world  to  be  guilty  of 
adultery,  or  neglect  of  parents,  or  indifference  to  the  wor- 
ship of  the  gods. 

Certainly  he  is. 

And  is  not  all  this  attributable  to  the  fact  that  each  of 
his  inward  principles  keeps  to  his  own  work  in  regard  to 
the  relations  of  ruler  and  subject? 

Yes,  it  may  be  entirely  attributed  to  this. 

Do  you  still  seek  then  for  any  other  account  of  justice 
than  that  it  is  the  power  which  creates  such  men  and 
such  states? 

No,  he  replied,  assuredly  I  do  not. 

Then  our  dream  is  completely  realized,  or  that  sus- 


Book  IV.  j  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  163 

picion  which  we  expressed,  that  at  the  very  commence- 
ment of  the  work  of  constructing  our  state  we  were  led  by 
some  divine  intervention,  as  it  would  seem,  to  a  kind  of 
rudimentary  type  of  justice. 

Yes,  it  certainly  is. 

And  so  there  really  was,  Glaucon,  a  rude  outline  of  jus* 
tice  (and  hence  its  utility)  in  the  principle  that  it  is  right 
for  a  man  whom  nature  intended  for  a  shoemaker  to  con- 
fine himself  to  shoemaking,  and  for  a  man  who  has  a  turn 
for  carpentering  to  do  carpenter's  work,  and  so  on. 

It  appears  so. 

The  truth  being  that  justice  is  indeed,  to  all  appear- 
ance, something  of  the  kind,  only  that,  instead  of  dealing 
with  a  man's  outward  performance  of  his  own  work,  it  has 
to  do  with  that  inward  performance  of  it  which  truly  con- 
cerns the  man  himself,  and  his  own  interests:  so  that  the 
just  man  will  not  permit  the  several  principles  within  him 
to  do  any  work  but  their  own,  nor  allow  the  distinct 
classes  in  his  soul  to  interfere  with  each  other,  but  will 
really  set  his  house  in  order;  and  having  gained  the  mas- 
tery over  himself,  will  so  regulate  his  own  character  as  to 
be  on  good  terms  with  himself,  and  to  set  those  three 
principles  in  tune  together,  as  if  they  were  verily  three 
chords  of  a  harmony,  a  higher  and  a  lower  and  a  middle, 
and  whatever  may  lie  between  these;  and  after  he  has 
bound  all  these  together,  and  reduced  the  many  elements 
of  his  nature  to  a  real  unity,  as  a  temperate  and  duly  har- 
monized man,  he  will  then  at  length  proceed  to  do  what- 
ever he  may  have  to  do,  whether  it  involve  the  acquisition 
of  property  or  attention  to  the  wants  of  his  body,  whether 
it  be  a  state  affair  or  a  business  transaction  of  his  own; 
in  all  which  he  will  believe  and  profess  that  the  just  and 
honourable  course  is  that  which  preserves  and  assists  in 
creating  the  aforesaid  habit  of  mind,  and  that  the  genuine 
knowledge  which  presides  over  such  conduct  is  wisdom; 
while  on  the  other  hand,  he  will  hold  that  an  unjust  action 
is  one  which  tends  to  destroy  this  habit,  and  that  the 
mere  opinion  which  presides  over  unjust  conduct,  is  folly. 

What  you  say  is  thoroughly  true,  Socrates. 


164  THE  HEPUBL1C  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 

Very  good:  if  we  were  to  say  we  have  discovered  the 
just  man  and  the  just  state,  and  wrhat  justice  is  as  found 
in  them,  it  would  not  be  thought,  I  imagine,  to  be  an  alto- 
gether false  statement. 

No,  indeed,  it  would  not. 

Shall  we  say  so  then? 

We  will. 

Be  it  so,  I  continued.  In  the  next  place  we  have  to 
investigate,  I  imagine,  what  injustice  is. 

Evidently  we  have. 

Must  it  not  then,  as  the  reverse  of  justice,  be  a  state  of 
strife  between  the  three  principles,  and  the  disposition  to 
meddle  and  interfere,  and  the  insurrection  of  a  part  of  the 
mind  against  the  whole,  this  part  aspiring  to  the  supreme 
power  within  the  mind,  to  which  it  has  no  right,  its  proper 
place  and  destination  being,  on  the  contrary,  to  do  service 
to  any  member  of  the  rightfully  dominant  class?  Such 
doings  as  these,  I  imagine,  and  the  confusion  and  bewil- 
derment of  the  aforesaid  principles,  will,  in  our  opinion, 
constitute  injustice,  and  licentiousness,  and  cowardice, 
and  folly,  and,  in  one  word,  all  vice. 

Yes,  precisely  so. 

And  is  it  not  now  quite  clear  to  us  what  it  is  to  act  un- 
justly, and  to  be  unjust,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  what  it  is 
to  act  justly,  knowing  as  we  do  the  nature  of  justice  and 
injustice  ? 

How  so? 

Because  these  phenomena  in  the  soul  are  exactly  like 
the  phenomena  of  health  and  disease  in  the  body. 

In  what  way? 

The  conditions  of  health,  I  presume,  produce  health, 
tnd  those  of  disease  engender  disease. 
I   Yes. 

In  the  same  way,  does  not  the  practice  of  justice  beget 
the  habit  of  justice,  and  the  practice  of  injustice  the  habit 
of  injustice? 

Inevitably. 

Now  to  produce  health  is  so  to  constitute  the  bodily 
forces  as  that  they  shall  master  and  be  mastered  by  one 


Book  IV.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  165 

another  in  accordance  with  nature;  and  to  produce  dis- 
ease is  to  make  them  govern  and  be  governed  by  one 
another  in  a  way  which  violates  nature. 

True. 

Similarly,  will  it  not  be  true  that  to  beget  justice  is  so  to 
constitute  the  powers  of  the  soul  that  they  shall  master 
and  be  mastered  by  one  another  in  accordance  with  nature, 
and  that  to  beget  injustice  is  to  make  them  govern  and 
be  governed  by  one  another  in  a  way  which  violates  nature  ? 

Quite  so. 

Then  virtue,  it  appears,  will  be  a  kind  of  health  and 
beauty,  and  good  habit  of  the  soul ;  and  vice  will  be  a  dis- 
ease, and  deformity,  and  sickness  of  it. 

True. 

And  may  we  not  add,  that  all  fair  practices  tend  to  the 
acquisition  of  virtue,  and  all  foul  practices  to  that  of  vice  ? 

Undoubtedly  they  do. 


What  now  remains  for  us,  apparently,  is  to  inquire 
frhether  it  is  also  profitable  to  act  justly,  and  to  pursue 
honourable  aims,  and  to  be  just,  whether  a  man  be  known 
to  be  such  or  not, — or  to  act  unjustly,  and  to  be  unjust,  if 
one  suffer  no  punishment,  and  be  not  made  a  better  man 
by  chastisement. 

Nay,  Socrates,  to  me,  I  confess,  the  inquiry  begins  to 
assume  a  ludicrous  appearance,  now  that  the  real  nature 
of  justice  and  injustice  has  presented  itself  to  us  in  the 
light  described  above.  Do  people  think  that  when  the 
constitution  of  the  body  is  ruined,  life  is  not  worth  having., 
though  you  may  command  all  varieties,  of  food  and  drink, 
and  possess  endless  wealth  and  power;  and  shall  we  be 
told  that,  when  the  constitution  of  that  very  principle 
whereby  we  live  is  going  to  rack  and  ruin,  life  is  still 
worth  having,  let  a  man  do  what  he  will,  if  that  is  except- 
ed which  will  enable  him  to  get  rid  of  vice  and  injustice, 
and  to  acquire  virtue  and  justice? 

Yes,  it  is  ludicrous,  I  replied;  still,  as  we  have  arrived 
at  this  point,  we  must  not  lose  heart,  till  we  have  ascer- 


166  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IV. 

tained,  in  the  clearest  possible  manner,  the  correctness 
of  our  conclusions. 

No,  indeed ;  anything  rather  than  lose  heart. 

Come  with  me,  then,  that  you  may  see  how  many  varie- 
ties of  vice  there  are,  according  to  my  belief,  looking  only 
at  those  which  are  worth  the  survey. 

I  follow  you :  only  tell  me. 

Well,  I  can  see  as  it  were  from  a  watch-tower,  now  that 
we  have  ascended  to  this  lofty  stage  in  the  argument,  that 
while  there  is  only  one  form  of  virtue,  there  are  infinite 
varieties  of  vice,  of  which  four  in  particular  deserve  to  be 
noticed. 

How  do  you  mean  ? 

It  would  seem  that  there  a?e  as  many  characters  of 
mind,  as  there  are  distinctive  forms  of  government. 

Pray  how  many  are  they? 

There  are  five  forms  of  government,  and  five  characters 
of  mind. 

Tell  me  what  these  are. 

I  will:  one  form  of  government  will  be  that  which  we 
have  been  describing,  and  it  may  be  called  by  two  differ- 
ent names;  should  there  arise  among  the  governing  body 
one  man  excelling  the  rest,  it  will  be  called  a  kingdom; 
if  there  be  more  than  one  of  equal  excellence,  it  will  be 
entitled  an  aristocracy. 

True. 

This  then  I  call  one  form:  for  whether  the  supreme 
power  be  in  the  hands  of  one  or  many,  the  important  laws 
of  the  state  will  not  be  disturbed,  if  their  training  and 
education  be  such  as  we  have  described. 

3o  we  may  justly  expect,  he  replied. 


Book  V.J  THU  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  Itf 


BOOK  V. 

Such  then  is  the  state  cr  constitution  which  I  call  good 
and  right,  and  such  is  the  good  man:  and  if  this  one  be 
right,  I  must  call  the  rest  bad  and  wrong;  applying  these 
terms  both  to  the  organization  of  states,  and  to  the  forma- 
tion of  individual  character;  and  the  vicious  forms  are 
reducible  to  four  varieties. 

Pray,  what  are  these  ?  he  asked. 

Hereupon  I  was  proceeding  to  speak  of  them  in  order, 
as  they  appeared  to  me  to  pass  severally  into  one  another ; 
when  Polemarchus,  who  was  seated  a  little  further  off 
than  Adeimantus,  put  out  bis  hand  to  take  hold  of  his 
brother's  dress  high  up  near  the  shoulder,  drew  him  to- 
wards himself,  and  leaning  forwards  whispered  a  few 
words  into  his  ear,  of  which  we  only  caught  the  following : 

Shall  we  let  him  off  then,  or  what  shall  we  do  ? 

Certainly  not,  said  Adeimantus,  beginning  to  speak 
aloud.  Whereupon  I  said,  Pray  what  may  that  be  which 
you  are  not  going  to  let  off  ? 

You,  he  replied. 

And  why,  pray?  I  further  inquired. 

We  have  an  idea  that  you  are  lagging,  and  stealing  a 
whole  section,  and  that  a  very  important  one,  out  of  the 
subject,  in  order  to  avoid  handling  it;  and  we  suppose 
you  fancied  that  we  should  not  notice  your  passing  it  over 
with  the  very  slight  remark,  that  every  one  would  see  that 
the  rule,  "  among  friends  every  thing  is  common  property/' 
would  apply  to  the  women  and  children. 

Well,  and  was  I  not  right,  Adeimantus? 

Yes :  but  this  word  "  right/'  like  the  rest,  needs  explana- 
tion. We  must  be  told  on  what  plan,  among  the  many 
possible  ones,  this  community  of  property  is  to  be  carried 
out.  Do  not  therefore  omit  to  tell  us  what  plan  you  pro- 
pose.   For  we  have  been  long  waiting  in  the  expectation 


168  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V 

that  you  would  specify  the  conditions  under  which  chil- 
dren are  to  be  begotten,  and  the  manner  of  rearing  them 
after  they  are  born,  and,  in  fact,  that  you  would  give  a 
omplete  description  of  the  community  of  women  and 
children  intended  by  you:  for  we  are  of  opinion,  that  the 
mode  of  carrying  out  this  idea,  according  as  it  is  right  or 
wrong,  will  be  a  matter  of  great,  or  rather  of  vital  import- 
ance, co  a  commonwealth.  So,  finding  that  you  are  taking 
in  hand  another  form  of  government,  before  you  have 
satisfactorily  settled  these  points,  we  have  come  to  the 
resolution  which  you  overheard,  not  to  let  you  go  till  you 
have  discussed  all  these  questions  as  fully  as  the  others. 

Add  my  vote  also,  said  Glaucon,  as  a  supporter  of  this 
motion.  ^ 

In  short,  Socrates,  said  Thrasymachus,  you  may  look 
upon  us  as  unanimous  in  this  resolution. 

What  a  deed  have  you  done!  I  exclaimed,  in  thus  lay- 
ing hands  upon  me.  What  a  large  question  are  you  again 
raising,  as  if  we  were  beginning  anew,  on  the  subject  of 
our  commonwealth!  I  was  rejoicing  in  the  idea  of  hav- 
ing already  done  with  it,  and  was  only  too  glad  that  those 
points  should  be  let  alone,  and  accepted  as  they  were 
then  delivered.  You  little  know  what  a  swarm  of  ques- 
tions you  are  rousing  by  calling  in  these  topics :  but  I  saw 
at  the  time  how  the  case  stood,  and  therefore  let  the  sub- 
ject go  by,  lest  it  should  occasion  us  endless  trouble. 

How?  exclaimed  Thrasymachus;  do  you  suppose  that 
we  are  come  here  on  a  gold-hunting  errand,  and  not  ex- 
pressly to  hear  a  philosophical  discussion  ?  * 

*  Xpvaoxoiiaovraq.  This  passage  has  been  explained  by  all  pre- 
vious commentators  to  signify.  "  Have  we  come  here  to  be  dis- 
appointed in  our  expectations  ?  "  xPvff0X0£'lvt  literally,  "  to  smelt 
gold."  being  taken  to  mean,  "to  embark  in  a  bubble  specula- 
tion.*' But  xPVGOXoelv-  i"  its  proverbial  sense,  appears  to  have 
meant.  "  to  do  anything  rather  than  the  matter  in  hand."  This 
may  be  gathered  from  a  passage  in  the  orator  Demarchus,  which 
we"  take  from  a  note  on  this  Proverb  in  the  Paroemiographi 
Grseci,  edited  by  a  Leutsch  and  Schneidewin  :  Tldliv  nap  Alax'i- 
VTjv  a,7ro<j>oiT7/od f  rrapd  tovtu)  6f/?nv  oTi  xPv(JOXoeiv  efiavdavev,  a?X  ov  to 
nnoKtipevov  amu  itpdrrziv  rj  7rdcr^f/v.  "  He  learnt,  under  the  instruc- 
tion of  JEwhi'ntRt  to  smelt  gold,  and  net  to  do  or  suffer  what  wai 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  169 

Yes,  one  of  reasonable  length,  I  replied. 

True,  Socrates,  said  Glaucon;  and  in  the  eyes  of  sen- 
sible people  their  whole  life  is  but  a  reasonable  time  for 
hearing  such  discussions.  So  never  mind  us;  but  pray 
do  not  grow  tired  yourself  of  stating  your  views  on  the 
subjects  about  which  we  were  asking,  I  mean,  as  to  the 
nature  of  this  community  of  wives  and  children,  which  is 
to  subsist  among  our  guardians;  and  as  to  the  training  of 
the  young,  in  the  interval  between  their  birth  and  educa- 
tion, which  is  considered  the  most  troublesome  business 
of  all.  Try  to  explain  to  us  on  what  principle  this  is  to  be 
conducted. 

It  is  no  easy  matter,  my  gifted  friend,  to  discuss  this 
question;  for  it  is  beset  by  incredulity,  even  more  than 
our  previous  doctrines.  In  the  first  place,  the  practica- 
bility of  our  plans  will  not  be  believed;  and  in  the  next 
place,  supposing  them  to  be  most  completely  carried  out, 
their  desirableness  will  be  questioned.  And  that  is  why  I 
feel  a  reluctance  to  grapple  with  the  subject,  lest  I  should 
be  thought,  my  dear  friend,  to  be  indulging  in  a  merely 
visionary  speculation. 

You  need  feel  no  reluctance,  he  replied :  for  your  audi- 
tors are  neither  stupid,  nor  incredulous,  nor  unfriendly. 

Upon  which  I  asked,  My  excellent  friend,  did  you  wish 
to  encourage  me  by  your  assurance? 

I  did. 

Then,  let  me  tell  you,  you  have  done  just  the  contrary. 
If  I  were  confident  of  my  own  knowledge  of  the  subject, 
your  encouragement  would  have  been  well  and  good;  for 
to  speak  on  the  most  momentous  and  interesting  topics  in 
the  company  of  intelligent  friends,  is  a  thing  that  may  be 
done  with  courage  and  safety,  if  one  really  knows  the  sub- 
ject; but  to  broach  a  theory  while  one  is  still  in  the  posi- 
tion of  a  doubting  inquirer,  as  I  am  going  to  do,  is  a 

set  before  him."  It  would  be  useless  to  speculate  as  to  what 
accident  brought  XPVOOXOE"LV  into  vogue  in  this  sense,  rather  than 
any  other  word  :  but  the  reader  will  observe  that  an  impetuous 
and  strongly-coloured  remark  of  this  kind  is  put  with  ethical 
propriety  into  the  mouth  of  Thrasymachus. 


170  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

slippery  course,  and  makes  me  afraid,  not  of  being  laughed 
at, — that  would  be  childish, — but  lest  1  should  miss  my 
footing  upon  the  truth,  and  falling,  drag  my  friends  down 
with  me,  and  that  upon  ground  on  which  a  false  step  is 
especially  to  be  dreaded.  I  pray  that  the  divine  Nemesis 
may  not  overtake  me,  Glaucon,  for  what  I  am  going  to 
say;  for  I  verily  believe  it  is  a  more  venial  offence  to  be 
the  involuntary  cause  of  death  to  a  man,  than  to  deceive 
him  concerning  noble  and  good  and  just  institutions. 
Such  a  risk  it  were  better  to  run  among  enemies  than 
among  friends;  so  that  you  are  happy  in  your  choice  of 
encouragement. 

At  this  Glaucon  laughed,  and  said,  Well,  Socrates, 
should  your  theory  do  us  any  harm,  our  blood  shall  not  be 
upon  your  head;  we  absolve  you  from  the  guilt  of  deceiv- 
ing us:  therefore  speak  boldly. 

To  be  sure,  I  replied,  the  law  tells  us  that,  when  a  man 
has  been  absolved  from  an  offence,  he  is  clean  even  in 
the  next  world;  and  therefore,  in  all  probability,  in  this 
world  also. 

Very  well  then,  let  not  this  fear  hinder  you  from  pro- 
ceeding. 

I  must  recur,  then,  to  a  portion  of  our  subject  which 
perhaps  I  ought  to  have  discussed  before  in  its  proper 
place.  But  after  all,  the  present  order  may  be  the  best; 
the  men  having  quite  played  out  their  piece,  we  proceed 
with  the  performance  of  the  women;  especially  since  this 
is  the  order  of  your  challenge. 

For  men  born  and  educated  as  we  have  described,  the 
only  right  method,  in  my  opinion,  of  acquiring  and  treat- 
ing children  and  wives  will  be  found  in  following  out  that 
original  impulse  which  we  communicated  to  them.  The 
aim  of  our  theory  was,  I  believe,  to  make  our  men  as  it 
were  guardians  of  a  flock. 

Yes. 

Let  us  keep  on  the  same  track,  and  give  corresponding 
rules  for  the  propagation  of  the  species,  and  for  rearing 


Book  V.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  171 

the  young;  and  let  us  observe  whether  we  find  them  suit- 
able or  not. 

How  do  you  mean  ? 

Thus.  Do  we  think  that  the  females  of  watch-dogs 
ought  to  guard  the  flock  along  with  the  males,  and  hunt 
with  them,  and  share  in  all  their  other  duties;  or  that  the 
females  ought  to  sta^  at  home,  because  they  are  disabled 
by  having  to  breed  and  rear  the  cubs,  while  the  males  are 
to  labour  and  be  charged  with  all  the  care  of  the  flocks? 

We  expect  them  to  share  in  whatever  is  to  be  done; 
only  we  treat  the  females  as  the  weaker,  and  the  males  as 
the  stronger. 

Is  it  possible  to  use  animals  for  the  same  work,  if  you 
do  not  give  them  the  same  training  and  education  ? 

It  is  not. 

If  then  we  are  to  employ  the  women  in  the  same  duties 
as  the  men,  we  must  give  them  the  same  instructions. 

Yes. 

To  the  men  we  gave  music  and  gymnastic. 

Yes. 

Then  we  must  train  the  women  also  in  the  same  two 
arts,  giving  them  besides  a  military  education,  and  treat- 
ing them  in  the  same  way  as  the  men. 

It  follows  naturally  from  what  you  say. 

Perhaps  many  of  the  details  of  the  question  before  us 
might  appear  unusually  ridiculous,  if  oarried  out  in  the 
manner  proposed. 

No  doubt  they  would. 

Which  of  them  do  you  find  the  most  ridiculous?  Is  it 
not  obviously  the  notion  of  the  women  exercising  naked, 
in  the  schools  with  the  men,  and  not  only  the  young 
women,  but  even  those  of  an  advanced  age,  just  like  those 
old  men  in  the  gymnasia,  who,  in  spite  of  wrinkles  and 
ugliness,  still  keep  up  their  fondness  for  active  exercises? 

Yes,  indeed :  at  the  present  day  that  would  appear  truly 
ridiculous. 

Well  then,  as  we  have  started  the  subject,  we  must  not 
be  afraid  of  the  numerous  jests  which  worthy  men  may 
make  upon  the  notion  of  carrying  out  such  a  change  in 


172  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

reference  to  the  gymnasia  and  music;  and  above  all,  in 
the  wearing  of  armour  and  riding  on  horseback. 

You  are  right. 

On  the  contrary,  as  we  have  begun  the  discussion,  we 
must  travel  on  to  the  rougher  ground  of  our  law,  intreat- 
ing  these  witty  men  to  leave  off  their  usual  practice,  and 
try  to  be  serious;  and  reminding  them  that  not  long  since 
it  was  thought  discreditable  and  ridiculous  among  the 
Greeks,  as  it  is  now  among  most  barbarian  nations,  for 
men  to  be  seen  naked.  And  when  the  Cretans  first,  and 
after  them  the  Lacedaemonians,  began  the  practice  of 
gymnastic  exercises,  the  wits  of  the  time  had  it  in  their 
power  to  make  sport  of  those  novelties.  Do  you  not 
think  so? 

I  do. 

But  when  experience  had  shewn  that  it  was  better  to 
strip  than  to  cover  up  the  body,  and  when  the  ridiculous 
effect,  which  this  plan  had  to  the  eye,  had  given  way  be- 
fore the  arguments  establishing  its  superiority,  it  was  at 
the  same  time,  as  I  imagine,  demonstrated,  that  he  is  a 
fool  who  thinks  anything  ridiculous  but  that  which  is  evil, 
and  who  attempts  to  raise  a  laugh  by  assuming  any  object 
to  be  ridiculous  but  that  which  is  unwise  and  evil ;  or  who 
chooses  for  the  aim  of  his  serious  admiration  any  other 
mark  save  that  which  is  good. 

Most  assuredly. 

Must  we  not  then  first  come  to  an  agreement  as  to 
whether  the  regulations  proposed  are  practicable  or  not, 
and  give  to  any  one,  whether  of  a  jocose  or  serious  turn, 
an  opportunity  of  raising  the  question,  whether  the  nature 
of  the  human  female  is  such  as  to  enable  her  to  share  in 
all  the  employments  of  the  male,  or  whether  she  is  wholly 
unequal  to  any,  or  equal  to  some  and  not  to  others;  and 
if  so,  to  which  class  military  service  belongs?  Will  not 
this  be  the  way  to  make  the  best  beginning,  and,  in  all 
probability,  the  best  ending  also? 

Yes,  quite  so. 

Would  you  like,  then,  that  we  should  argue  against 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  173 

ourselves  in  behalf  of  an  objector,  that  the  adverse  posi- 
tion may  not  be  undefended  against  our  attack? 

There  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not. 

Then  let  us  say  in  his  behalf,  "  Socrates  and  Glaucon, 
there  is  no  need  for  others  to  advance  anything  against 
you:  for  you  yourselves,  at  the  beginning  of  your  scheme 
for  constructing  a  state,  admitted  that  every  individual 
therein  ought,  in  accordance  with  nature,  to  do  the  one 
work  which  belongs  to  him."  "  We  did  admit  this,  I  imag- 
ine: how  could  we  do  otherwise?"  "Can  you  deny  that 
there  is  a  very  marked  difference  between  the  nature  of 
woman  and  that  of  man  ?  "  "  Of  course  there  is  a  differ- 
ence." "  Then  is  it  not  fitting  to  assign  to  each  sex  a 
different  work,  appropriate  to  its  peculiar  nature  ?  "  u  Un- 
doubtedly." "  Then  if  so,  you  must  be  in  error  now,  and 
be  contradicting  yourselves  when  you  go  on  to  say,  that 
men  and  women  ought  to  engage  in  the  same  occupa- 
tions, when  their  natures  are  so  widely  diverse  ?  "  Shall 
you  have  any  answer  to  make  to  that  objection,  my  clever 
friend  ? 

It  is  not  so  very  easy  to  find  one  at  a  moment's  notice: 
but  I  shall  apply  to  you,  and  I  do  so  now,  to  state  what  the 
arguments  on  our  side  are,  and  to  expound  them  for  us. 

These  objections,  Glaucon,  and  many  others  like  them, 
are  what  I  anticipated  all  along;  and  that  is  why  I  was 
afraid  and  reluctant  to  meddle  with  the  law  that  regulates 
the  possession  of  the  women  and  children,  and  the  rear- 
ing of  the  latter. 

To  say  the  truth,  it  does  seem  no  easy  task. 

Why  no:  but  the  fact  is,  that  whether  you  fall  into  a 
small  swimming-bath,  or  into  the  middle  of  the  great 
ocean,  you  have  to  swim  all  the  same. 

Exactly  so. 

Then  is  it  not  best  for  us,  in  the  present  instance,  to 
strike  out  and  endeavour  to  emersre  in  safety  rrom  the 
discussion,  in  the  hope  that  either  a  dolphin  *  may  take 
us  on  his  back,  or  some  other  unlooked-for  deliverance 
present  itself  ? 

*  In  allusion,  probably,  to  the  famous  story  of  Arion.  Hero- 
dotus, i.  24. 


174  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

It  would  seem  so. 

Come  then,  I  continued,  let  us  see  if  we  can  find  the 
way  out.  We  admitted,  you  say,  that  different  natures 
ought  to  have  different  occupations,  and  that  the  natures 
of  men  and  women  are  different;  but  now  we  maintain 
that  these  different  natures  ought  to  engage  in  the  same 
occupations.     Is  this  your  charge  against  us? 

Precisely. 

Truly,  Glaucon,  the  power  of  the  art  of  controversy  is  * 
very  extraordinary  one. 

Why  so? 

Because  it  seems  to  me  that  many  fall  into  it  even 
against  their  will,  and  fancy  they  are  discussing,  when 
they  are  merely  debating,  because  they  cannot  distinguish 
the  meanings  of  a  term,  in  their  investigation  of  any  ques- 
tion, but  carry  on  their  opposition  to  what  is  stated,  by 
attacking  the  mere  words,  employing  the  art  of  debate, 
and  not  that  of  philosophical  discussion. 

This  is  no  doubt  the  case  with  many:  does  it  apply  to 
us  at  the  present  moment? 

Most  assuredly  it  does;  at  any  rate  there  is  every  ap- 
pearance of  our  having  fallen  unintentionally  into  a  verbal 
controversy. 

How  so? 

We  are  pressing  hard  upon  the  mere  letter  of  the 
dogma,  that  different  natures  ought  not  to  engage  in  the 
same  pursuits,  in  the  most  courageous  style  of  verbal 
debate,  but  we  have  wholly  forgotten  to  consider  in  what 
senses  the  words  "  the  same  nature  "  and  "  different  na- 
tures "  were  employed,  and  what  we  had  in  view  in  our 
definition,  when  we  assigned  different  pursuits  to  different 
natures,  and  the  same  pursuits  to  the  same  natures. 

It  is  true  we  have  not  considered  that. 

That  being  the  case,  it  is  open  to  us  apparently  to  ask 
ourselves  whether  bald  men  and  long-haired  men  are  of 
the  same  or  of  opposite  natures,  and  after  admitting  the 
latter  to  be  the  case,  we  may  say  that  if  bald  men  make 
shoes,  long-haired  men  must  not  be  suffered  to  make 
them,  or  if  the  long-haired  men  make  them,  the  others 
must  be  forbidden  to  do  so, 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  175 

Nay,  that  would  be  ridiculous. 

Would  it  be  ridiculous,  except  for  the  reason  that  we 
were  not  then  using  the  words,  "  the  same  "  and  "  differ- 
ent," in  a  universal  sense,  being  engaged  only  with  that 
particular  species  of  likeness  and  difference  which  applied 
directly  to  the  pursuits  in  question?  For  example,  we 
said  that  two  men  who  were  mentally  qualified  for  the 
medical  profession,  possessed  the  same  nature.  Do  you 
not  think  so? 

I  do. 

And  that  a  man  who  would  make  a  good  physician  had 
a  different  nature  from  one  who  would  make  a  good  car- 
penter. 

Of  course  he  has. 

If,  then,  the  male  and  the  female  sex  appear  to  differ  in 
reference  to  any  art,  or  other  occupation,  we  shall  say 
that  such  occupation  must  be  appropriated  to  the  one  or 
the  other:  but  if  we  find  the  difference  between  the  sexes 
to  consist  simply  in  the  parts  they  respectively  bear  in 
the  propagation  of  the  species,  we  shall  assert  that  it  has 
not  yet  been  by  any  means  demonstrated  that  the  differ* 
ence  between  man  and  woman  touches  our  purpose;  on 
the  contrary,  we  shall  still  think  it  proper  for  our  guar- 
dians and  their  wives  to  engage  in  the  same  pursuits. 

And  rightly. 

Shall  we  not  proceed  to  call  upon  our  opponents  to 
inform  us  what  is  that  particular  art  or  occupation  con- 
nected with  the  organization  of  a  state,  in  reference  to 
which  the  nature  of  a  man  and  a  woman  are  not  the 
same,  but  diverse? 

We  certainly  are  entitled  to  do  so. 

Well,  perhaps  it  might  be  pleaded  by  others,  as  it  was 
a  little  while  ago  by  you,  that  it  is  not  easy  to  give  a 
satisfactory  answer  at  a  moment's  notice;  but  that,  with 
time  for  consideration,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  do 
so. 

True,  it  might. 

Would  you  like  us  then  to  beg  the  author  of  such 
objections  to  accompany  us,  to  see  if  we  can  shew  him 


176  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book    V. 

that  no  occupation  which  belongs  to  the  ordering  of  a 
6tate  is  peculiar  to  women? 

By  all  means. 

Well  then,  we  will  address  him  thus:  Pray  tell  us 
whether,  when  you  say  that  one  man  possesses  talents  for  a 
particular  study,  and  that  another  is  without  them,  you 
mean  that  the  former  learns  it  easily,  the  latter  with  diffi- 
culty ;  and  that  the  one  with  little  instruction  can  find  out 
much  for  himself  in  the  subject  he  has  studied,  whereas 
the  other  after  much  teaching  and  practice  cannot  even 
retain  what  he  has  learnt;  and  that  the  mind  of  the  one 
is  duly  aided,  that  of  the  other  thwarted,  by  the  bodily 
powers?  Are  not  these  the  only  marks  by  which  you 
define  the  possession  and  the  want  of  natural  talents  for 
any  pursuit? 

Every  one  will  say  yes. 

Well  then,  do  you  know  of  any  branch  of  human  in- 
dustry in  which  the  female  sex  is  not  inferior  in  these 
respects  to  the  male?  or  need  we  go  the  length  of  speci- 
fying the  art  of  weaving,  and  the  manufacture  of  pastry 
and  preserves,  in  which  women  are  thought  to  excel,  and 
in  which  their  discomfiture  is  most  laughed  at? 

You  are  perfectly  right,  that  in  almost  every  employ- 
ment the  one  sex  is  vastly  superior  to  the  other.  There 
are  many  women,  no  doubt,  who  are  better  in  many 
things  than  many  men;  but,  speaking  generally,  it  is  as 
you  say. 

I  conclude  then,  my  friend,  that  none  of  the  occupa- 
tions which  comprehend  the  ordering  of  a  state  belong  to 
woman  as  woman,  nor  yet  to  man  as  man;  but  natural 
gifts  are  to  be  found  here  and  there,  in  both  sexes  alike; 
and,  so  far  as  her  nature  is  concerned,  the  woman  is 
admissible  to  all  pursuits  as  well  as  the  man;  though  in 
all  of  them  the  woman  is  weaker  than  the  man. 

Precisely  so. 

Shall  we  then  appropriate  all  duties  to  men,  and  none 
to  women? 

How  can  we? 

On  the  contrary,  we  shall  hold,  I  imagine,  that  one 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  177 

woman  may  have  talents  for  medicine,  and  another  be 
without  them;  and  that  one  may  be  musical,  and  another 
unmusical. 

Undoubtedly. 

And  shall  we  not  also  say,  that  one  woman  may  have 
qualifications  for  gymnastic  exercises,  and  for  war,  and 
another  be  un warlike,  and  without  a  taste  for  gymnastics? 

I  think  we  shall. 

Again,  may  there  not  be  a  love  of  knowledge  in  one, 
and  a  distaste  for  it  in  another?  and  may  not  one  be 
spirited,  and  another  spiritless? 

True  again. 

If  that  be  so,  there  are  some  women  who  are  fit,  and 
others  who  are  unfit,  for  the  office  of  guardians.  For 
were  not  those  the  qualities  that  we  selected,  in  the  case 
of  the  men,  as  marking  their  fitness  for  that  office  ? 

Yes,  they  were. 

Then  as  far  as  the  guardianship  of  a  state  is  concerned, 
there  is  no  difference  between  the  natures  of  the  man  and 
of  the  woman,  but  only  various  degrees  of  weakness  and 
strength. 

Apparently  there  is  none. 

Then  we  shall  have  to  select  duly  qualified  women  also, 
to  share  in  the  life  and  official  labours  of  the  duly  quali- 
fied men;  since  we  find  that  they  are  competent  to  the 
work,  and  of  kindred  nature  with  the  men. 

Just  so. 

And  must  we  not  assign  the  same  pursuit  to  the  same 
natures  ? 

We  must. 

Then  we  are  now  brought  round  by  a  circuit  to  our 
former  position,  and  we  admit  that  it  is  no  violation  of 
nature  to  assign  music  and  gymnastic  to  the  wives  of  our 
guardians. 

Precisely  so. 

Then  our  intended  legislation  was  not  impracticable,  or 
visionary,  since  the  proposed  law  was  in  accordance  with 
nature:  rather  it  is  the  existing  usage,  contravening  this 
of  ours,  that  to  all  appearan.ee  eontravenes  nature* 
If 


178  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V 

So  it  appears. 

Our  inquiry  was,  whether  the  proposed  arrangement 
would  be  practicable,  and  whether  it  was  the  most  desir- 
able one,  was  it  not? 

It  was. 

Are  we  quite  agreed  that  it  is  practicable?  — 

Yes. 
•   Then  the  next  point  to  be  settled  is,  that  it  is  also  the 
most  desirable  arrangement  ? 

Yes,  obviously. 

Very  well;  if  the  question  is  how  to  render  a  woman 
fit  for  the  office  of  guardian,  we  shall  not  have  one  educa- 
tion for  men,  and  another  for  women,  especially  as  the 
nature  to  be  wrought  upon  is  the  same  in  both  cases. 

No,  the  education  will  be  the  same. 

Well  then,  I  should  like  to  have  your  opinion  on  the 
following  question. 

Pray  what  is  it? 

On  what  principle  do  you  in  your  own  mind  estimate 
one  man  as  better  than  another?  or  do  you  look  upon  all 
as  equal  ? 

Certainly  I  do  not. 

Then  in  our  ideal  state  which  of  the  two  classes  have, 
in  your  opinion,  been  made  the  better  men, — the  guar- 
dians educated  as  we  have  described,  or  the  shoemakers 
brought  up  to  shoemaking? 

It  is  ridiculous  to  ask. 

I  understand  you:  but  tell  me,  are  not  these  best  of 
all  the  citizens? 

Yes,  by  far. 

And  will  not  these  women  be  better  than  all  the  other 


women 


Yes,  by  far,  again. 

Can  there  be  anything  better  for  a  state  than  that  it 
should  contain  the  best  possible  men  and  women? 

There  cannot. 

And  this  result  will  be  brought  about  by  music  and 
gymnastic  employed  as  we  described? 

Undoubtedly. 


Book  V.j  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  179 

Then  our  intended  regulation  is  not  only  practicable, 
but  also  one  most  desirable  for  the  state. 

It  is. 

Then  the  wives  of  our  guardians  must  strip  for  their 
exercises,  inasmuch  as  they  will  put  on  virtue  instead  of 
raiment,  and  must  bear  their  part  in  war  and  the  other 
duties  comprised  in  the  guardianship  of  the  state,  and 
must  engage  in  no  other  occupations:  though  of  these 
tasks  the  lighter  parts  must  be  given  to  the  women  rather 
than  to  the  men,  in  consideration  of  the  weakness  of  their 
sex.  But  as  for  the  man  who  laughs  at  the  idea  of  un- 
dressed women  going  through  gymnastic  exercises,  as  a 
means  of  realizing  what  is  most  perfect,  his  ridicule  is  but 
"  unripe  fruit  plucked  from  the  tree  of  wisdom,"  *  and  he 
knows  not,  to  all  appearance,  what  he  is  laughing  at  or 
what  he  is  doing;  for  it  is  and  ever  will  be  a  most  ex- 
cellent maxim,  that  the  useful  is  noble,  and  the  hurtful 
base. 

Most  assuredly  it  is. 

Here  then  is  one  wave,  as  I  may  call  it,  which  we  may 
perhaps  consider  ourselves  to  have  surmounted,  in  our 
discussion  of  the  law  relating  to  women;  so  that,  instead 
of  our  being  altogether  swamped  by  our  assertion  that  it 
is  the  duty  of  our  male  and  female  guardians  to  have  all 
their  pursuits  in  common,  our  theory  is  found  to  be  in  a 
manner  at  one  with  itself  as  to  the  practicability  and 
advisableness  of  its  plan. 

Yes,  indeed,  he  replied,  it  is  no  insignificant  wave  that 
you  have  surmounted. 

You  will  not  call  it  a  large  one,  I  continued,  when  you 
see  the  next. 

Pray  go  on,  and  let  me  see  it. 

The  last  law  and  those  which  preceded  it  involve,  as  I 
conceive,  another  to  this  effect. 

What  is  it? 

That  these  women  shall  be,  without  exception,  the  com- 
mon wives  of  these  men,  and  that  no  one  shall  have  a 

#  The  original  is  given  by  Stobaeus  as  a  quotation  from  Pindar, 


180  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  t^ooK  V. 

wife  of  his  own:  likewise  that  the  children  shall  be  com- 
mon, and  that  the  parent  shall  not  know  his  child,  nor 
the  child  his  parent. 

This  law,  he  replied,  is  much  more  likely  than  the 
former  to  excite  distrust  both  as  to  its  practicability  and 
as  to  its  advisableness. 

As  to  the  latter,  I  said,  I  think  no  one  could  deny  that 
it  would  be  an  immense  advantage  for  the  wives  and 
children  to  be  common  to  all,  if  it  were  possible:  but  I 
expect  there  would  be  most  controversy  about  the  prac- 
ticability of  the  scheme. 

Both  points  might  very  well  be  controverted. 

Then  there  will  be  a  junction  of  discussions.  I  thought 
I  should  run  away  and  get  off  from  one  of  them,  if  you 
agreed  to  the  utility  of  the  plan,  so  that  I  should  only 
have  to  discuss  its  feasibility. 

But  you  were  found  out  in  your  attempt  to  escape:  so 
please  to  render  an  account  on  both  heads. 

I  must  submit  to  justice.  Grant  me  however  this  one 
favour:  permit  me  to  take  a  holiday,  like  one  of  those 
men  of  indolent  minds,  who  are  wont  to  feast  themselves 
on  their  own  thoughts,  whenever  they  travel  alone.  Such 
persons,  you  know,  before  they  have  found  out  any  means 
of  effecting  their  wishes,  pass  that  by,  to  avoid  the  fatigue 
of  thinking  whether  such  wishes  are  practicable  or  not, 
and  assume  that  what  they  desire  is  already  theirs;  after 
which  they  proceed  to  arrange  the  remainder  of  the  busi- 
ness, and  please  themselves  with  running  over  what  they 
mean  to  do  under  the  assumed  circumstances,  thus  aggra- 
vating the  indolence  of  an  already  indolent  mind.  So  at 
this  moment  I  too  am  yielding  to  laziness,  and  am  de- 
sirous of  putting  off  for  subsequent  investigation  the  ques- 
tion of  possibility;  and  for  the  present  assuming  the 
possibility,  I  shall  inquire,  if  you  will  give  me  leave,  what 
arrangements  the  governing  body  will  make  when  our 
rule  is  carried  out,  endeavouring  also  to  shew  that  in 
practice  it  would  be  the  most  advantageous  of  all  things, 
both  to  the  state  and  to  its  guardians.  These  points  I 
will  first  endeavour  to  examine  thoroughly  in  company 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  181 

with  you,  and  take  the  others  afterwards,  if  you  give  me 
your  leave. 

You  have  my  permission,  he  replied.  So  proceed  with 
the  inquiry. 

I  think  then,  I  proceeded,  that  if  our  rulers  shall  prove1 
worthy  of  the  name,  and  their  auxiliaries  likewise,  the 
latter  will  be  willing  to  execute  the  orders  they  receive, 
and  the  former,  in  issuing  those  orders,  will  themselves 
yield  implicit  obedience  to  our  laws;  and  in  whatever 
cases  we  have  left  the  details  to  them,  will  endeavour  to 
carry  out  their  spirit. 

So  we  may  expect. 

It  will  be  your  duty,  therefore,  as  their  lawgiver,  to 
select  the  women,  just  as  you  selected  the  men,  and  to 
place  them  together,  taking  care,  as  far  as  possible,  that 
they  shall  be  of  similar  nature.  Now  inasmuch  as  the 
dwellings  and  mess-tables  are  all  common,  and  no  one 
possesses  anything  in  the  shape  of  private  property,  both 
sexes  will  live  together,  and  in  consequence  of  their  indis- 
criminate association  in  active  exercises,  and  in  the  rest 
of  their  daily  life,  they  will  be  led,  I  imagine,  by  a  con- 
straining instinct  to  form  alliances.  Do  you  not  think 
this  will  be  inevitable? 

The  necessity  truly  will  not  be  that  of  mathematical 
demonstration,  but  that  of  love,  which  perhaps  is  more 
constraining  than  the  other  in  its  power  to  persuade  and 
draw  after  it  the  mass  of  men. 

Quite  so.  But  in  the  next  place,  Glaucon,  irregular 
alliances,  or  indeed  irregularity  of  any  kind,  would  be  a 
profanation  among  the  members  of  a  happy  city,  and  will 
not  be  permitted  by  the  magistrates. 

And  rightly  so. 

Manifestly  then  our  next  care  will  be  to  make  the  mar- 
riage-union as  sacred  a  thing  as  we  possibly  can:  and 
this  sanctity  will  attach  to  the  marriages  which  are  most 
for  the  public  good. 

Precisely  so. 

Then  tell  me,  Glaucon,  how  this  end  is  to  be  attained. 


182  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

For  I  know  you  keep  in  your  house  both  sporting  dogs, 
and  a  great  number  of  game  birds.  I  conjure  you,  there- 
fore, to  inform  me  whether  you  have  paid  any  attention 
to  the  intercourse  and  the  breeding  of  these  animals. 

In  what  respect  ? 

In  the  first  place,  though  all  are  well-bred,  are  there 
not  some  which  are,  or  grow  to  be,  superior  to  the  rest  ? 

There  are. 

Do  you  then  breed  from  all  alike,  or  are  you  anxious  to 
breed  as  much  as  possible  from  the  best  ? 

From  the  best. 

And  at  what  age?  when  they  are  very  young,  or  very 
old,  or  when  they  are  in  their  prime? 

When  they  are  in  their  prime. 

And  if  you  were  to  pursue  a  different  course,  do  you 
think  your  breed  of  birds  and  dogs  would  degenerate  very 
much? 

I  do. 

Do  you  think  it  would  be  different  with  horses,  or  any 
other  animals  ? 

Certainly  not.;  it  would  be  absurd  to  suppose  it. 

Good  heavens!  my  dear  friend,  I  exclaimed,  what  very 
first-rate  men  our  rulers  ought  to  be,  if  the  analogy  hold 
with  regard  to  the  human  race. 

Well,  it  certainly  does:  but  why  first-rate? 

Because  they  will  be  obliged  to  use  medicine  to  a  great 
extent.  Now  you  know  when  invalids  do  not  require 
medicine,  but  are  willing  to  submit  to  a  regimen,  we  think 
Jin  ordinary  doctor  good  enough  for  them;  but  when  it  is 
Necessary  to  administer  medicines,  we  know  that  a  more 
able  physician  must  be  called  in. 

True;  but  how  does  this  apply? 

Thus.  It  is  probable  that  our  rulers  will  be  compelled 
to  have  recourse  to  a  good  deal  of  falsehood  and  deceit 
for  the  benefit  of  their  subjects.  And,  if  you  recollect,  we 
said  that  all  such  practices  were  useful  in  the  character  of 
medicine. 

Yes,  and  we  were  right. 

Well  then,  it  appears  that  this  right  principle  applies 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  18b 

particularly  to  the  question  of  marriage  and  -propaga- 
tion. 

How  so? 

It  follows  from  what  has  been  already  granted,  that  the 
best  of  both  sexes  ought  to  be  brought  together  as  often 
as  possible,  and  the  worst  as  seldom  as  possible,  and  ,that 
the  issue  of  the  former  unions  ought  to  be  reared,  and 
that  of  the  latter  abandoned,  if  the  flock  is  to  attain  to 
first-rate  excellence;  and  these  proceedings  ought  to  be 
kept  a  secret  from  all  but  the  magistrates  themselves,  if 
the  herd  of  guardians  is  also  to  be  as  free  as  possible 
from  internal  strife. 

You  are  perfectly  right. 

Then  we  shall  have  to  ordain  certain  festivals,  at  which 
we  shall  bring  together  the  brides  and  the  bridegrooms, 
and  we  must  have  sacrifices  performed,  and  hymns  com- 
posed by  our  poets  in  strains  appropriate  to  the  occasion; 
but  the  number  of  marriages  we  shall  place  under  the 
control  of  the  magistrates,  in  order  that  they  may,  as  far 
as  they  can,  keep  the  population  at  the  same  point,  taking 
into  consideration  the  effects  of  war  and  disease,  and  all 
such  agents,  that  our  city  may,  to  the  best  of  our  power, 
be  prevented  from  becoming  either  too  great  or  too  small. 

You  are  right. 

We  must  therefore  contrive  an  ingenious  system  of  lots, 
I  fancy,  in  order  that  those  inferior  persons,  of  whom 
I  spoke,  may  impute  the  manner  in  which  couples  are 
united,  to  chance,  and  not  to  the  magistrates. 

Certainly. 

And  those  of  our  young  men  who  distinguish  them- 
selves in  the  field  or  elsewhere,  will  receive,  along  with 
other  privileges  and  rewards,  more  liberal  permission  to 
associate  with  the  women,  in  order  that,  under  colour  of 
this  pretext,  the  greatest  number  of  children  may  be  the 
issue  of  such  parents. 

You  are  right. 

And,  as  fast  as  the  children  are  born,  they  will  be  re- 
ceived by  the  officers  appointed  for  the  purpose,  whether 
men  or  women,  or  both: — for  I  presume  that  the  state- 


184  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

offices  also  will  be  held  in  common  both  by  men  and 
women. 

They  will. 

Well,  these  officers,  I  suppose,  will  take  the  children  of 
good  parents,  and  place  them  in  the  general  nursery  under 
the  charge  of  certain  nurses,  living  apart  in  a  particular 
quarter  of  the  city:  while  the  issue  of  inferior  parents, 
and  all  imperfect  children  that  are  born  to  the  others, 
will  be  concealed,  as  is  fitting,  in  some  mysterious  and 
unknown  hiding-place. 

Yes,  if  the  breed  of  the  guardians  is  to  be  kept  pure. 

And  will  not  these  same  officers  have  to  superintend 
the  rearing  of  the  children,  bringing  the  mothers  to  the 
nursery  when  their  breasts  are  full,  but  taking  every  pre- 
caution that  no  mother  shall  know  her  own  child,  and 
providing  other  women  that  have  milk,  if  the  mothers 
have  not  enough;  and  must  they  not  take  care  to  limit 
the  time  during  which  the  mothers  are  to  suckle  the  chil- 
dren, committing  the  task  of  sitting  up  at  night,  and  the 
other  troubles  incident  to  infancy,  to  nurses  and  attend- 
ants? 

You  make  child-bearing  a  very  easy  business  for  the 
wives  of  the  guardians. 

Yes,  and  so  it  ought  to  be.  Now  let  us  proceed  to  the 
next  object  of  our  interest.  We  said,  you  remember,  that 
the  children  ought  to  be  the  issue  of  parents  who  are  still 
in  their  prime. 

True. 

And  do  you  agree  with  me  that  the  prime  of  life  may 
be  reasonably  reckoned  at  a  period  of  twenty  years  for  a 
woman,  and  thirty  for  a  man  ? 

Where  do  you  place  these  years? 

I  should  make  it  the  rule  for  a  woman  to  bear  children 
to  the  state  from  her  twentieth  to  her  fortieth  year:  and 
for  a  man,  after  getting  over  the  sharpest  burst  in  the 
race  of  life,  thenceforward  to  beget  children  to  the  state 
until  he  is  fifty-five  years  old. 

Doubtless,  he  said,  in  both  sexes,  this  is  the  period  of 
their  prime,  both  of  body  and  mind. 

If  then  a  man  who  is  either  above  or  under  this  age 


BOOK  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  185 

shall  meddle  with  the  business  of  begetting  children  for 
the  commonwealth,  we  shall  declare  his  act  to  be  an 
offence  against  religion  and  justice;  inasmuch  as  he  is 
raising  up  a  child  for  the  state,  who,  should  detection  be 
avoided,  instead  of  having  been  begotten  under  the  sanc- 
tion of  those  sacrifices  and  prayers,  which  are  1|p  be  offered 
up  at  every  marriage  ceremonial,  by  priests  and  priest- 
esses, and  the  whole  city,  to  the  effect  that  the  children  to 
be  born  may  ever  be  more  virtuous  and  more  useful  than 
their  virtuous  and  useful  parents,  will  have  been  conceived 
under  cover  of  darkness  by  the  aid  of  dire  incontinence. 

You  are  right. 

The  same  law  will  hold  should  a  man,  who  is  still  of  an 
age  to  be  a  father,  meddle  with  a  woman,  who  is  also  of 
the  proper  age,  without  the  introduction  of  the  magis- 
trate: for  we  shall  accuse  him  of  raising  up  to  the  state 
an  illegitimate,  unsponsored,  and  unhallowed  child. 

You  are  perfectly  right. 

But  as  soon  as  the  women  and  the  men  are  past  the 
prescribed  age,  we  shall  allow  the  latter,  I  imagine,  to 
associate  freely  with  whomsoever  they  please,  so  that  it 
be  not  a  daughter,  or  mother,  or  daughter's  child,  or 
grandmother;  and  in  like  manner  we  shall  permit  the 
women  to  associate  with  any  man,  except  a  son  or  a 
father,  or  one  of  their  relations  in  the  direct  line,  ascend- 
ing or  descending;  but  only  after  giving  them  strict  orders 
to  do  their  best,  if  possible,  to  prevent  any  child,  haply  so 
conceived,  from  seeing  the  light,  but  if  that  cannot  some- 
times be  helped,  to  dispose  of  the  infant  on  the  under- 
standing that  the  fruit  of  such  a  union  is  not  to  be  reared. 

That  too  is  a  reasonable  plan;  but  how  are  they  to 
distinguish  fathers,  and  daughters,  and  the  relations  you 
described  just  now  ? 

Not  at  all,  I  replied;  only,  all  the  children  that  are 
born  between  the  seventh  and  tenth  month  from  the  day 
on  which  one  of  their  number  was  married,  are  to  be 
called  by  him,  if  male,  his  sons,  if  female,  his  daughters; 
and  they  shall  call  him  father,  and  their  child -^n  he  Shall 
call  his  grandchildren;  these  again  shall  call  nim  and  his 


186  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

fellow-bridegrooms  and  brides,  grandfathers  and  grand- 
mothers; likewise  all  shall  regard  as  brothers  and  sisters 
those  that  were  born  in  the  period  during  which  their 
own  fathers  and  mothers  were  bringing  them  into  the 
world;  and  as  we  said  just  now,  all  these  shall  refrain 
from  touching  one  another.  But  the  law  will  allow  inter- 
course between  brothers  and  sisters,  if  the  lot  chances  to 
fall  that  way,  and  if  the  Delphian  priestess  also  gives  it 
her  sanction. 

That  is  quite  right,  said  he. 

Such  will  be  the  character,  Glaucon,  of  the  community 
of  women  and  children  that  is  to  prevail  among  the  guar- 
dians of  your  state.  The  argument  must  now  go  on  to 
establish  that  the  plan  is  in  keeping  with  the  rest  of  our 
polity,  and  quite  the  best  conceivable  arrangement.  Or 
can  you  propose  any  other  course? 

Do  as  you  say,  by  all  means. 

Will  not  the  first  step  to  an  agreement  on  this  point 
between  us  be,  to  ask  ourselves  what  we  can  name  as  the 
highest  perfection  in  the  constitution  of  a  state,  at  which 
the  legislator  ought  to  aim  in  making  his  laws,  and  what 
as  the  greatest  evil;  and  the  next,  to  inquire  whether  the 
plan  we  described  just  now  fits  into  our  outline  of  the 
perfection,  and  is  out  of  keeping  with  our  sketch  of  the 
evil? 

Most  decidedly. 

Do  we  know  then  of  any  greater  evil  to  the  state,  than 
that  which  should  tear  it  asunder,  and  make  it  into  a 
multitude  of  states  instead  of  one?  Or  of  any  higher 
perfection  than  that  which  should  bind  it  together,  and 
make  it  one? 

We  do  not. 

Well,  then,  does  not  a  community  of  feeling  in  pleasure 
and  pain  bind  the  citizens  together,  when  they  all,  so  far 
as  is  possible,  rejoice  and  grieve  alike,  at  the  same  gains 
and  the  same  losses? 

Most  assuredly  it  does. 

And  does  not  isolation  in  these  feelings  produce  dis- 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  18? 

union,  when  some  are  much  pleased  and  others  equally 
grieved,  at  the  same  events  affecting  the  city  and  its 
inmates  ? 

Of  course  it  does. 

And  does  not  this  state  of  things  arise  when  the  words 
"  mine  "  and  "  not  mine  "■  are  not  pronounced  by  all  simul- 
taneously in  the  city?  and  when  there  is  the  same  dis- 
crepancy in  the  use  of  the  word  "  another's  "  ? 

Precisely  so. 

That  city  then  is  best  conducted  in  which  the  largest 
proportion  of  citizens  apply  the  words  "  mine  *  and  a  not 
mine  "  similarly  to  the  same  objects. 

Yes,  much  the  best. 

Or,  in  other  words,  that  city  which  comes  nearest  to  the 
condition  of  an  individual  man.  Thus,  when  one  of  our 
fingers  is  hurt,  the  whole  fellowship  that  spreads  through 
the  body  up  to  the  soul,  and  there  forms  an  organized 
unity  under  the  governing  principle,  is  sensible  of  the 
hurt,  and  there  is  a  universal  and  simultaneous  feeling  of 
pain  in  sympathy  with  the  wounded  part;  and  therefore 
we  say  that  the  man  has  a  pain  in  his  ringer;  and  in 
speaking  of  any  part  of  our  frame  whatsoever,  the  same 
account  may  be  given  of  the  pain  felt  when  it  suffers,  and 
the  pleasure  felt  when  it  is  easy. 

The  same,  no  doubt;  and  to  return  to  your  question, 
there  is  a  very  close  analogy  between  such  a  case  and  the 
condition  of  the  best-governed  state. 

Then  I  fancy  that,  when  any  good  or  evil  happens  to 
one  of  the  citizens,  a  state  such  as  we  are  describing 
will  be  more  likely  than  another  to  regard  the  affected 
member  as  a  part  of  itself,  and  to  sympathize  as  a  whole 
with  his  pleasure  or  his  pain. 

It  must  do  so,  if  it  be  well  ordered. 

It  will  now  be  time,  I  continued,  for  us  to  go  back  to 
our  state,  and  to  take  notice  whether  it  possesses  in  the 
highest  degree  the  qualities  to  which  our  inquiry  has 
unanimously  brought  us,  or  is  surpassed  therein  by  some 
other  state. 

We  had  better  to  do  so. 


188  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

Well  then,  other  states,  and  ours  like  the  rest,  contain 
magistrates  and  a  commonalty,  do  they  not  ? 

They  do. 

And  they  will  all  address  one  another  as  citizens? 

Of  course. 

But  besides  calling  them  citizens,  how  does  the  com- 
monalty in  other  states  style  its  magistrates? 

In  most  cases  it  styles  them  masters,  but  in  democra- 
cies simply  magistrates. 

But  in  our  state,  what  name  besides  that  of  citizens 
does  the  commonalty  bestow  on  the  magistrates? 

It  calls  them  preservers  and  auxiliaries. 

And  what  do  they  call  the  people  ? 

Paymasters  and  maintainers. 

And  in  other  states  the  magistrates  call  the  people, 
what? 

Servants. 

And  what  do  the  magistrates  call  one  another? 

Fellow-magistrates. 

And  ours? 

Fellow-guardians. 

Can  you  say  whether  in  other  states  a  magistrate,  speak- 
ing of  his  fellow-magistrates,  might  describe  one  of  them 
as  a  relative,  and  another  as  a  stranger? 

Yes,  many  might. 

And  in  so  doing,  does  he  not  regard  and  speak  of  the 
former  as  belonging  to  himself,  and  the  latter  as  not 
belonging  to  himself? 

He  does. 

Well,  could  any  of  your  guardians  regard  or  describe 
one  of  his  fellow-guardians  as  a  stranger? 

Certainly  not :  for  they  must  look  upon  every  one  whom 
they  meet  as  either  a  brother,  or  a  sister,  or  a  father,  or 
a  mother,  or  a  son,  or  a  daughter,  or  one  of  the  children  or 
parents  of  these. 

Excellently  said;  but  answer  me  one  more  question; 
shall  you  be  satisfied  with  instituting  family  names,  or 
shall  you  further  require  them  to  act  in  every  instance 
in  accordance  with  the  names, — enjoining  in  the  treat* 


Book  V.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  189 

ment  of  the  fathers,  all  that  it  is  usual  to  enjoin  towards 
fathers,  as  that  a  child  shall  honour,  succour,  and  be  sub- 
ject to  his  parents,  otherwise  it  will  be  worse  for  him  both 
before  heaven  and  before  men;  inasmuch  as  his  conduct, 
if  he  acts  differently,  will  be  an  outrage  upon  religion  and 
justice?  Will  you  have  these  commandments,  or  any 
others,  sounded  from  the  first  by  all  the  citizens  in  the 
ears  of  the  children,  with  reference  to  those  who  are 
pointed  out  to  them  as  fathers,  and  to  all  other  relations? 

These,  certainly:  for  it  would  be  ridiculous  if  family 
names  were  merely  uttered  with  the  lips,  without  actions 
to  correspond. 

This  then  is  the  state,  above  all  others,  in  which,  when 
good  or  evil  betides  an  individual,  every  member  will  with 
one  accord  apply  the  expressions  spoken  of  just  now, 
saying,  "  It  is  well  with  mine,"  or  "  It  is  ill  with  mine." 

Most  true. 

And  did  we  not  say  that  a  general  sympathy  in  pleasure 
and  in  pain  goes  hand  in  hfnd  with  this  mode  of  thinking 
and  speaking? 

Yes,  and  we  said  so  rightly. 

Then  will  not  our  citizens  be  remarkable  for  sharing  in 
the  same  interest,  which  they  will  call <c  mine,"  and,  having 
this  common  interest,  thereby  possess  in  a  remarkable 
degree  a  community  in  pleasure  and  pain? 

Yes,  in  a  very  remarkable  degree. 

Well,  is  not  this  owing,  among  the  other  features  of  our 
constitution,  to  the  fact  that  our  guardians  hold  their 
wives  and  children  in  common? 

Yes,  mainly  to  this. 

But,  if  you  remember,  we  admitted  this  to  be  the  high- 
est perfection  in  a  state,  comparing  the  condition  of  a 
well-ordered  state  to  the  relation  of  a  body  to  its  members 
in  the  matter  of  pleasure  and  pain. 

Yes;  and  we  were  right  in  our  admission. 

Then  we  have  discovered  that  the  highest  perfection  of 
the  state  is  due  to  the  community  of  wives  and  children, 
which  is  to  prevail  among  our  auxiliaries, 

Exactly  »o. 


190  "  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

And  in  this  arrangement  we  were ,  moreover  consistent 
with  our  former  conclusions;  for  I  believe  we  said  that 
all  private  property,  whether  in  houses,  or  lands,  or  any 
thing  else,  must  be  forbidden  to  our  guardians,  who  are 
to  receive  a  maintenance  from  the  rest  of  the  citizens, 
as  the  wages  of  their  office,  and  to  lay  it  out  in  common, 
if  they  are  destined  to  be  guardians  indeed. 

True. 

Well  then,  will  not  the  regulations  laid  down  before, 
and  still  more  those  we  are  now  describing,  make  men 
genuine  guardians,  and  prevent  them  from  tearing  the 
city  asunder  by  applying  the  term  "  mine  *  each  to  a  dif- 
ferent object,  instead  of  all  to  the  same,  and  by  severally 
dragging  to  their  several  distinct  abodes  whatever  they 
can  acquire  independently  of  the  rest,  and,  amongst  other 
things,  separate  wives  and  children,  thus  creating  exclu- 
sive pleasures  and  pains  by  their  exclusive  interests; 
causing  them,  on  the  contrary,  to  tend  unitedly  to  a  com- 
mon centre,  by  the  fact  of  holding  but  one  opinion  con- 
cerning what  is  their  own,  and  thus  to  be,  as  far  as  is 
possible,  simultaneously  affected  by  pleasure  and  pain? 

Precisely  so. 

Further,  will  not  all  lawsuits  and  prosecutions  disap- 
pear, so  to  speak,  from  among  them,  seeing  that  there 
is  nothing  which  a  man  can  call  his  own  except  his  body, 
all  other  things  being  common  property?  And  will  not 
this  deliver  them  from  all  those  feuds  which  are  oc- 
casioned among  men  by  the  separate  possession  of  money 
and  children  and  kindred  ? 

They  cannot  fail  to  be  rid  of  them. 

Moreover,  there  will  be,  by  rights,  no  actions  for  forci- 
ble seizure,  or  for  assault  and  battery  among  them.  For 
we  shall  probably  maintain  that  to  defend  oneself  againstj 
an  assailant  of  one's  own  age,  is  consistent  both  with 
honour  and  justice,  recognizing  the  necessity  of  taking 
care  of  the  person. 

Rightly  so. 

There  is  also  this  advantage,  I  continued,  in  such  a 
law:  if  any  one  should  happen  to  fall  into  a  passion  with 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  191 

another,  he  would  find  a  vent  for  his  anger  by  a  personal 
encounter,  and  thus  the  quarrel  will  be  less  likely  to  as- 
sume a  more  serious  character. 

Certainly. 

An  older  person,  however,  will  be  authorized  to  com- 
mand and  chastise  any  that  are  younger  than  himself. 

Clearly. 

And  surely  it  is  to  be  expected  that  no  younger  man 
will  presume  either  to  strike  or  otherwise  do  violence  to 
an  elder,  unless  the  magistrates  commission  him  to  do  so. 
Nor  yet,  I  think,  will  a  young  man  insult  his  seniors  in 
any  other  way;  for  there  are  two  warders  that  will  ef- 
fectually interpose,  namely,  fear  and  shame;  shame  re- 
straining him  from  laying  violent  hands  on  one  whom  he 
regards  as  a  parent,  and  fear,  lest  the  person  attacked 
should  be  succoured  by  the  rest,  in  the  character  of  sons, 
brothers,  and  fathers. 

Yes,  those  will  be  the  results  of  our  regulations. 

Then  in  every  way  the  laws  will  secure  mutual  peace 
among  our  men. 

Yes,  in  a  high  degree. 

But  if  the  men  of  this  class  be  free  from  internal  dis- 
sensions, there  is  no  danger  that  the  rest  of  the  citizens 
will  quarrel  either  with  them  or  with  one  another. 

No,  there  is  not. 

There  are,  moreover,  evils  of  a  very  petty  nature,  and 
so  mean  that  I  scruple  even  to  mention  them,  from  which 
they  will  be  exempt:  I  allude  to  the  flatteries  paid  by  the 
poor  to  the  rich,  and  those  embarrassments  and  vexations 
which  beset  men  in  rearing  a  family,  and  in  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  money  that  is  needed  for  the  bare  mainten- 
ance of  domestics, — now  borrowing  and  now  repudiating, 
and  by  indiscriminate  means  procuring  property  which 
they  place  in  the  hands  of  their  wives  and  servants,  and 
entrust  to  their  management; — all  the  troubles  that  these 
circumstances  occasion,  my  dear  friend,  are  obvious 
enough,  and  besides  they  are  ignoble,  and  do  not  de- 
serve to  be  described. 

True,  they  are  obvious  even  to  the  blind, 


192  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V, 

While  they  are  free  from  all  these  evils,  they  will  live 
a  life  more  blessed  than  that  blissful  life  which  is  the  lot 
of  conquerors  at  the  Olympian  games. 

How  so? 

Why,  the  happiness  ascribed  to  these  comprehends  but 
a  small  part  of  the  blessings  enjoyed  by  our  men,  whose 
victory  is  as  much  more  glorious  as  their  public  mainten- 
ance is  more  complete.  The  victory  they  win  is  the 
preservation  of  the  whole  state,  and  while  living  they  re- 
ceive crowns  and  privileges  from  their  country  in  the  shape 
of  maintenance  and  all  that  life  requires,  themselves  and 
their  children,  and  when  they  die  they  are  admitted  to  an 
honourable  interment. 

Yes,  indeed,  these  are  glorious  privileges. 

Do  you  remember  then,  I  continued,  that  some  time 
back  we  were  accused  by  some  objector  of  not  making 
our  guardians  happy,  because,  with  the  power  to  take  all 
that  the  citizens  had,  they  possessed  nothing  of  their 
own?  To  which  we  replied,  I  believe,  that  we  would 
consider  that  point  hereafter,  if  it  should  fall  in  our  way ; 
but  that  our  object  then  was  to  make  our  guardians  really 
guardians,  and  the  state  itself  as  happy  as  we  could,  with- 
out any  idea  of  fixing  our  attention  on  any  one  class,  and 
providing  happiness  for  it? 

I  remember. 

Well,  but  as  we  have  now  found  that  the  life  of  the 
auxiliaries  is  much  more  glorious  and  more  desirable  than 
that  of  Olympian  victors,  can  it  be  thought  that  the  life  of 
the  shoemakers  or  any  other  artisans,  or  that  of  the  agri- 
culturists, is  in  any  sense  comparable  to  it? 

I  think  not,  he  replied. 

However,  it  is  but  right  to  repeat  here  what  I  said  at 
the  time,  that  if  ever  our  guardians  attempt  to  make 
themselves  happy  in  such  a  way  that  they  cease  to  be 
guardians,  if,  instead  of  being  satisfied  with  a  life  merely 
moderate  and  stable,  such  as  we  think  the  best,  they  be- 
come possessed  with  a  silly  and  childish  notion  of  happi- 
ness, impelling  them  to  use  their  power  to  appropriate  all 
the  good  things  in  the  city,  they  will  discover  that  Hesiod 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  193 

was  truly  wise  when  he  said  that  in  a  certain  sense  "the 
half  is  more  than  the  whole."  * 

If  they  take  my  advice  they  will  abide  by  the  life  as- 
signed to  them. 

Then  you  concede  the  principle,  that  the  women  are  to 
be  put  tfpon  the  same  footing  as  the  men,  according  to 
our  description,  in  education,  in  bearing  children  and  in 
watching  over  the  other  jitizens,  and  that,  whether  they 
remain  at  home  or  are  sent  into  the  field,  they  are  to 
share  the  duties  of  guardianship  with  the  men,  and  join 
with  them  in  the  chase  like  dogs,  and  have  every  thing 
in  common  with  them  so  far  as  is  at  all  possible,  and 
that  in  so  doing  they  will  be  following  the  most  desirable 
course,  and  not  violating  the  natural  relation  which  ought 
to  govern  the  mutual  fellowship  of  the  sexes? 

I  do  concede  all  this,  he  replied. 

Then  does  it  not  remain  for  us,  I  proceeded,  to  deter- 
mine whether  this  community  can  possibly  subsist  among 
men,  as  it  can  among  other  animals,  and  what  are  the 
conditions  of  its  possibility? 

You  have  anticipated  me  in  a  suggestion  I  was  about 
to  make. 

As  for  their  warlike  operations,  I  suppose  it  is  easy  to 
see  how  they  will  be  conducted. 

How?  he  asked. 

Why,  both  sexes  will  take  the  field  together,  and  they 
will  also  carry  with  them  to  the  wars  such  of  their  chil- 
dren as  are  strong  enough,  in  order  that,  like  the  children 
of  all  other  craftsmen,  they  may  be  spectators  of  those 
occupations  in  which,  when  grown  up,  they  will  them- 
selves be  engaged:  and  they  will  require  them,  besides 
looking  on,  to  act  as  servants  and  attendants  in  all  the 
duties  of  war,  and  to  wait  upon  their  fathers  and  mothers. 
You  have  doubtless  observed  in  the  various  trades,  how 
the  children  of  potters,  :?or  example,  look  on  and  fetch 
and  carry  for  their  parer  3,  long  before  they  put  their  own 
hand  to  the  making  of  pots. 

Certainly,  I  have. 

*  Works  and  Days,  40. 
*3 


194  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

Shall  potters  then  shew  more  carefulness  than  our  guar- 
dians in  educating  their  children,  by  making  them  see  and 
practise  their  proper  duties  ? 

No,  that  would  be  indeed  ridiculous. 

Then,  again,  every  creature  will  fight  with  peculiar  cour- 
age in  the  presence  of  its  offspring. 

True:  but  there  is  considerable  danger,  Socrates,  in 
case  of  one  of  those  reverses  which  are  common  in  war, 
that  the  children  may  be  sacrificed  with  the  parents,  and 
so  the  rest  of  the  city  be  weakened  beyond  the  power  of 
recovery. 

That  is  quite  true,  I  replied.  But  let  me  ask  you,  in 
the  first  place,  whether  you  think  we  are  bound  to  take 
measures  to  avoid  every  possible  danger? 

By  no  means. 

Well,  if  danger  is  ever  to  be  encountered,  ought  it  not 
to  be  in  a  case  in  which  success  will  be  a  means  of  im- 
provement ? 

Manifestly  it  ought. 

And  do  you  regard  it  as  a  point  too  unimportant  to 
justify  the  risk,  whether  those  whose  manhood  is  to  be 
passed  in  the  profession  of  arms,  see  something  of  war  io. 
their  childhood,  or  not? 

Nay,  it  is  certainly  important  for  the  purpose  you  de- 
scribe. 

Then  it  must  be  a  fixed  rule  to  make  the  children 
spectators  of  war,  and  also  to  contrive  some  plan  for 
insuring  their  safety;  and  then  all  will  be  well,  will  it 
not? 

It  will. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  will  not  their  fathers  be  intel- 
ligent and  sagacious  judges,  so  far  as  men  can  be,  as  to 
what  campaigns  are  likely  to  prove  dangerous  and  what 
the  reverse? 

In  all  probability  they  will. 

If  so,  they  will  carry  their  children  to  the  latter,  while 
they  will  be  cautious  about  taking  them  to  the  former. 

Eightly  so. 

And  I  presume  they  will  set  officers  over  them,  not 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  195 

chosen  for  their  worthlessness,  but  men  qualified  by  ex- 
perience and  age  to  be  their  guides  and  tutors. 

It  is  fit  they  should. 

Still  we  must  admit  that  many  people  have  met  with 
results  contradicting  their  expectation. 

Yes,  very  frequently. 

Then,  to  meet  such  emergencies,  my  dear  friend,  we 
must  provide  our  children  from  the  first  with  wings,  to 
enable  them,  in  case  of  necessity,  to  fly  away  and  escape. 

What  do  you  mean? 

We  must  put  them  on  horseback  at  the  earliest  pos- 
sible age,  and  when  *  we  have  had  them  taught  to  ride, 
we  must  take  them  to  see  the  fighting,  mounted,  not  on 
spirited  animals,  or  good  chargers,  but  on  horses  se- 
lected for  speed  and  docility.  For  by  this  plan  they  will 
obtain  the  best  view  of  their  future  occupation,  and  at 
the  same  time  will  be  most  secure  of  making  good  their 
escape  in  case  of  need,  following  in  the  train  of  leaders  of 
mature  years.  _ 

I  think  your  plan  is  the  right  one/j 

To  come  now  to  the  rules  of  military  service,  I  pro- 
ceeded; on  what  footing  are  your  soldiers  to  be,  both 
among  themselves,  and  as  regards  the  enemy?  Tell  me 
whether  I  am  right  in  my  views  or  not. 

Let  me  know  what  they  may  be. 

If  one  of  the  soldiers  deserts  his  rank  or  throws  away 
his  arms,  or  is  guilty  of  any  such  act  of  cowardice,  must 
we  not  degrade  him  to  the  rank  of  an  artisan,  or  an  agri- 
cultural labourer? 

Decidedly. 

And  if  a  soldier  falls  alive  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  ought  we  not  to  make  a  present  of  him  to  any  one 
that  will  have  him,  to  do  what  he  pleases  with  his  booty? 

Yes,  by  all  means. 

But  if  a  soldier  highly  distinguishes  himself  and  gains 
himself  credit,  ought  he  not,  think  you,  in  the  first  place, 
while  the  army  is  still  in  the  field,  to  be  crowned  with  a 
*  Reading  6idaZafikvov$. 


196  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V 

garland  by  each  of  the  youths  and  children  in  turn, 
among  his  comrades  in  arms? 

Yes,  I  think  so. 

And  shaken  by  the  hand? 

Yes,  and  shaken  by  the  hand. 

But  I  suppose  you  will  hardly  extend  your  approbation 
to  my  next  proposition. 

What  is  that? 

That  he  should  kiss  and  be  kissed  by  them  all. 

Most  certainly  I  do;  and  I  would  add  to  the  law,  that 
during  the  continuance  of  the  campaign,  no  one  whom 
he  has  a  mind  to  kiss  be  permitted  to  refuse  him  the 
satisfaction;  in  order  that,  if  any  soldier  happens  to  en- 
tertain an  admiration  for  either  a  male  or  a  female  com- 
rade, he  may  be  the  more  stimulated  to  carry  off  the  meed 
of  valour. 

Good,  I  replied;  and  we  have  already  said  that  a  brave 
man  will  be  allowed  to  enter  into  marriage-relations  more 
frequently  than  others  will,  and  to  exercise  more  than 
the  usual  liberty  of  choice  in  such  matters,  so  that  as 
many  children  as  possible  may  be  obtained  from  a  father 
of  this  character. 

True,  we  did  say  so. 

Again  there  are  other  honours  with  which,  even  ac- 
cording to  Homer,  it  is  just  to  reward  those  young  men 
that  distinguish  themselves  by  good  conduct.  Homer 
says  that  Ajax  having  won  renown  in  the  war,  received 
by  way  of  distinction  "  whole  chines  of  beef ; "  *  it  being 
considered  that  an  honour  which,  besides  the  glory  of 
it,  would  augment  his  physical  strength,  was  peculiarly 
appropriate  to  a  brave  man  in  the  prime  of  his  manhood. 

A  very  just  idea. 

Then  in  this  point  at  least  we  will  follow  the  sugges- 
tion of  Homer.  We  too,  at  our  sacrificial  feasts  and  all 
similar  entertainments,  will  honour  our  meritorious  sol- 
diers, according  to  the  degree  of  merit  they  have  dis- 
played, not  only  with  hymns  and  the  privileges  we  h*vp 
just  stated,  but  also  with  "  goblets  full  to  the  brim,  and 
*  Iliad,  vu.  m 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  197 

meats  and  places  of  honour,"  *  intending  thereby  not  only 
to  do  honour  to  our  brave  men  and  women,  but  also  to 
promote  their  training. 

An  excellent  plan,  he  said. 

Very  good:  and  when  there  are  any  killed  in  a  cam- 
paign, shall  we  not  in  the  first  place  give  out  that  those 
who  fell  with  honour  belong  to  the  golden  race  ? 

Most  assuredly  we  shall. 

And  shall  we  not  believe  in  Hesiod's  doctrine,  that 
when  any  of  this  race  die, 

"They  into  spirits  are  changed,  earth-haunting,  beneficent, 

holy, 
Mighty  to  screen  us  from  harm,  and  of  speech-gifted  men  the 

protectors  J  "?f 

Yes,  certainly  we  shall. 

Shall  we  then  inquire  of  the  oracle  how  and  with  what 
distinctions  we  ought  to  inter  men  of  superhuman  and 
godlike  mould,  and  then  proceed  to  inter  them,  in  the 
manner,  and  with  the  ceremonies  that  the  oracle  pre- 
scribes ? 

Of  course  we  shall. 

And  for  the  future,  shall  we  regard  their  sepulchres  as 
those  of  superior  beings,  and  pay  them  the  due  respect 
and  worship?  and  shall  we  observe  these  same  practices, 
whenever  any  citizen,  who  has  been  esteemed  eminent  for 
his  bravery  during  his  life  time,  dies  of  old  age  or  from  any 
other  cause? 

Certainly,  it  is  but  just  to  do  so. 

Again,  what  will  be  the  conduct  of  our  soldiers  in  deal- 
ing with  their  enemies? 

In  what  respects? 

In  the  first  place,  take  the  custom  of  making  slaves. 
Does  it  seem  just  for  Greeks  to  make  slaves  of  the  free- 
men of  Grecian  cities?  Ought  they  not  rather  to  do 
what  they  can  to  prevent  the  practice,  and  to  introduce 
the  custom  of  sparing  their  own  race,  from  a  prudent  fear 
of  being  reduced  to  bondage  by  the  barbarians? 

*  Iliad,  YOl.  1«.  f  Works  and  Days,  121. 


198  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

The  latter  is  the  better  course  beyond  all  comparison. 

Then  it  is  better  also  not  even  to  have  Greek  slaves  in 
their  possession,  and  to  advise  the  other  Greeks  against 
the  practice. 

Decidedly  so:  their  thoughts  would  then  be  more 
turned  against  the  barbarians,  and  they  would  be  less 
likely  to  molest  one  another. 

Again;  is  it  well  to  strip  the  slain,  after  a  victory,  of 
any  thing  except  their  arms?  Or  does  not  the  practice 
offer  an  excuse  to  cowards  for  not  facing  those  who  are 
still  fighting,  so  long  as  they  can  pretend  that  they  are  in 
the  way  of  their  duty,  when  they  are  stooping  to  rifle  a 
dead  body?  and  have  not  many  armies  before  now  been 
destroyed  through  this  habit  of  pillaging? 

No  doubt  of  it. 

And  does  it  not  seem  a  piece  of  ignoble  avarice  to  plun- 
der the  dead,  and  is  it  not  the  sign  of  a  womanish  and 
petty  mind  to  regard  with  hostile  feelings  the  body  of  a 
dead  man,  when  the  real  enemy  has  flown  away,  leaving 
only  the  instrument  wherewith  he  fought?  Are  those  who 
thus  act  any  better,  think  you,  than  dogs  which  growl  at 
the  stones  that  have  been  thrown  at  them,  but  let  the  per- 
son who  threw  them  alone? 

No,  not  one  bit  better. 

Then  must  we  banish  the  practices  of  stripping  the 
dead,  and  interfering  with  the  removal  of  the  bodies  ? 

Yes,  we  must  indeed. 

Neither,  I  presume,  shall  we  carry  the  arms  of  our  ene- 
mies to  the  temples,  to  dedicate  them  there,  especially  the 
arms  of  Greeks,  if  we  care  to  cultivate  a  good  understand- 
ing with  the  rest  of  the  Greeks;  on  the  contrary,  we  shall 
be  fearful  of  desecrating  a  temple,  if  we  carry  to  it  such 
trophies  won  from  our  own  brethren ;  that  is  to  say,  unless 
the  god  of  the  oracle  shall  pronounce  a  different  judgment 

You  are  quite  right. 

Well,  I  continued,  and  how  will  your  soldiers'  behave 
towards  their  enemies  in  the  matter  of  ravaging  the  lands 
and  burning  the  houses  of  Greeks? 


Book  V.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  199 

I  should  like  to  hear  your  own  opinion  on  the  subject, 
he  replied. 

For  my  part,  then,  I  confess  I  disapprove  of  both  these 
practices,  and  should  only  allow  the  annual  crop  to  be 
carried  off.    Would  you  like  me  to  tell  you  my  reasons  ? 

I  should. 

It  appears  to  me,  that  as  there  are  two  names  in  use, 
war  and  sedition,*  so  there  are  two  things  representing 
two  distinct  kinds  of  disagreement.  In  the  one  case  the 
parties  are  friends  and  relations,  in  the  other,  aliens  and 
foreigners.  Now  when  hostility  exists  among  the  former, 
it  is  called  sedition;  when  between  strangers,  it  is  called 
war. 

There  is  nothing  unreasonable  in  what  you  say. 

Observe  whether  what  I  am  going  to  add  is  equally 
reasonable:  I  affirm  that  all  the  members  of  the  Greek 
race  are  brethren  and  kinsmen  to  one  another,  but  aliens 
and  foreigners  to  the  barbarian  world. 

True. 

Therefore  when  Greeks  and  barbarians  fight  together, 
we  shall  describe  them  as  natural  enemies,  warring  against 
one  another;  and  to  this  kind  of  hostility  we  shall  give 
the  name  of  war:  but  when  Greeks  are  on  this  sort  of 
footing  with  Greeks,  we  shall  say  that  they  are  natural 
friends,  but  that  in  the  case  supposed  Greece  is  in  a  mor- 
bid state  of  civil  conflict;  and  to  this  kind  of  hostility  we 
shall  give  the  name  of  sedition. 

I  quite  assent  to  this  view. 

Then  bear  in  mind,  I  said,  that  in  what  is  now  con- 
fessedly called  sedition,  wherever  this  state  of  things 
arises  and  a  city  is  divided,  if  each  party  ravage  the  lands 
and  burn  the  houses  of  the  other,  the  conflict  is  thought  a 
sinful  one,  and  both  parties  are  looked  upon  as  unpa- 
triotic; for  had  they  been  patriotic,  they  would  never  have 

*  The  word  ot&oi$,  here  translated  "  sedition,"  was  the  familiar 
term  for  the  party  warfare,  generally  between  an  aristocratic  and 
a  democratic  faction,  which  raged  with  extreme  violence  in  most 
Greek  states.  The  reader  is  requested  to  understand  the  word 
"sedition"  in  the  sense  of  civil  conflict,  or  the  antagonism  of 
domestic  factions. 


200  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V 

had  the  heart  to  mangle  their  nurse  and  mother.  But  it 
is  thought  that  the  victorious  party  cannot  in  fairness  do 
more  than  carry  off  the  crops  of  its  adversaries,  and 
ought  to  feel  that  they  will  one  day  be  reconciled  again, 
and  not  continue  at  war  for  ever. 

Yes,  he  said;  this  feeling  betokens  a  far  more  human- 
ized condition  than  the  other. 

Very  good,  and  is  not  the  city  you  are  founding  to  be  a 
Grecian  city? 

It  certainly  should  be. 

Then  will  not  its  citizens  be  gentle  and  humane? 

Certainly  they  will. 

And  will  they  not  be  patriotic  Greeks,  looking  upon  all 
Hellas  as  their  own  country,  and  sharing  with  their  fel- 
low-countrymen in  the  rites  of  a  common  religion? 

Most  certainly  they  will. 

Thus  regarding  all  the  Greeks  as  their  brethren,  will 
they  not  look  upon  a  quarrel  with  them  in  the  li^ht  of  j, 
sedition,  and  refuse  it  the  name  of  a  war? 

They  will. 

And  therefore  feel,  throughout  the  quarrel,  like  persons 
who  are  presently  to  be  reconciled? 

Exactly  so. 

They  will,  therefore,  correct  them  in  a  friendly  spirit, 
and  chastise  them  without  any  thought  of  enslaving  or 
destroying  them, — simply  as  schoolmasters,  not  as  enemies. 

Just  so. 

Then  being  Greeks,  they  will  not  devastate  Greece,  nor 
burn  houses,  nor  admit  that  all  the  men,  women,  and 
children  in  a  city  are  their  foes;  always  confining  this 
name  to  those  few  who  were  the  authors  of  the  quarrel. 
And  on  all  these  accounts  they  will  refrain  from  laying 
waste  the  land,  or  razing  the  houses,  because  the  owners 
are  in  most  cases  their  friends:  and  they  will  push  the 
quarrel  only  thus  far,  till  the  innocent  have  done  justice 
upon  the  guilty  who  plague  them. 

I  readily  admit,  he  said,  that  our  citizens  ought  to 
adopt  these  rules  in  their  conduct  towards  their  adver- 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  201 

saries;  while  I  would  have  them  behave  to  barbarians  as 
the  Greeks  now  behave  to  one  another. 

Then  are  we  to  add  to  our  enactments  a  law  forbidding 
our  guardians  either  to  ravage  lands  or  set  houses  on 
fire? 

Let  us  do  so,  he  replied;  and  let  us  assume  that  both 
this  and  our  former  regulations  are  right. 

But  I  really  think,  Socrates,  he  continued,  that  if  you 
be  permitted  to  go  on  in  this  way,  you  will  never  recollect 
what  you  put  aside  some  time  ago  before  you  entered  on 
all  these  questions,  namely,  the  task  of  shewing  that  this 
constitution  of  things  is  possible,  and  how  it  might  be 
realized.  For  in  proof  of  the  assertion  that,  if  it  were 
realized,  it  would  ensure  all  kinds  of  advantages  to  a  city 
which  was  the  seat  of  it,  I  can  myself  adduce  facts  which 
you  have  omitted,  as,  that  such  soldiers  would  fight  to 
perfection  against  their  enemies,  in  consequence  of  the 
unwillingness  to  desert  one  another  which  would  arise 
from  their  knowing  one  another  as  brothers,  fathers,  or 
sons,  and  using  these  endearing  names  familiarly;  and  if 
the  female  sex  were  to  serve  in  the  army,  whether  in  the 
same  ranks  with  the  men,  or  posted  as  a  reserve  behind, 
to  strike  terror  into  the  enemy  and  render  assistance  at 
any  point  in  case  of  need,  I  know  that  this  would  render 
them  quite  invincible:  moreover,  I  see  all  the  advantages, 
omitted  by  you,  which  they  would  enjoy  at  home.  But  as 
I  fully  admit  the  presence  of  all  these  merits  and  a  thou- 
sand others  in  this  constitution,  if  it  were  brought  into 
existence,  you  need  describe  it  no  further.  Rather  let 
us  try  now  to  convince  ourselves  of  this,  that  the  thing 
is  practicable,  and  how  it  is  practicable,  leaving  all  other 
questions  to  themselves. 

What  a  sudden  onslaught,  I  replied,  you  have  made 
upon  my  argument!  You  have  no  compassion  upon  my 
uneasy  loitering.  Perhaps  you  do  not  know  that  after  I 
have  barely  surmounted  the  first  two  waves,  you  are  now 
bringing  down  upon  me  the  third  breaker,  which  is  the 
most  mountainous  and  formidable  of  the  three;  but  when 


202  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

you  have  seen  or  rather  heard  it,  you  will  think  my  con- 
duct quite  excusable,  and  you  will  allow  that  I  had  good 
reasons  for  hesitating  and  trembling  to  broach  a  theory 
so  startling,  and  to  undertake  the  investigation  of  it. 

The  more  you  talk  in  this  strain,  he  said,  the  less  likely 
shall  we  be  to  let  you  off  from  explaining  how  this  consti- 
tution is  possible.  So  proceed  with  your  explanation,  and 
let  us  have  no  more  delay. 

•  Well,  then,  I  continued,  in  the  first  place  we  ought  not 
to  forget  that  we  have  been  brought  to  this  point  by  an 
inquiry  into  the  nature  of  justice  and  injustice. 

True:  but  what  of  that? 

Why  nothing.  But,  if  we  find  out  what  justice  is,  shall 
we  expect  the  character  of  a  just  man  not  to  differ  in  any 
point  from  that  of  justice  itself,  but  to  be  its  perfect  coun- 
terpart? Or  shall  we  be  content  provided  he  comes  as 
near  it  as  is  possible,  and  partakes  more  largely  of  it  than 
the  rest  of  the  world? 

The  latter: — we  shall  be  content. 

Then  the  design  of  our  investigation  into  the  nature  of 
justice  in  itself,  and  the  character  of  the  perfectly  just 
man,  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  his  existence,  and  like- 
wise into  the  nature  of  injustice,  and  the  character  of  the 
perfectly  unjust  man,  was  to  use  them  as  patterns,  so  that 
by  looking  upon  the  two  men,  and  observing  how  they 
stand  in  reference  to  happiness  and  its  opposite,  we  might 
be  compelled  to  admit  in  our  own  case,  that  he  who  re- 
sembles them  most  closely  in  character,  will  also  have  a 
lot  most  closely  resembling  theirs:  but  it  was  not  our 
intention  to  demonstrate  the  possibility  of  these  things  in 
practice. 

That  is  quite  true,  he  said. 

Do  you  think  any  the  worse  of  the  merits  of  an  artist, 
who  has  painted  a  beau  ideal  of  human  beauty,  and  has 
left  nothing  lacking  in  the  picture,  because  he  cannot 
prove  that  such  a  man  as  he  has  painted  might  possibly 
exist  ? 

No,  indeed,  I  do  not. 


Book  V]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  203 

Well,  were  not  we  likewise  professing  to  construct  in 
theory  the  pattern  of  a  perfect  state? 

Yes,  certainly. 

Then  will  our  theory  suffer  at  all  in  your  good  opinion, 
if  we  cannot  prove  that  it  is  possible  for  a  city  to  be 
organized  in  the  manner  proposed? 

Certainly  not. 

This  then  is  the  true  state  of  the  case:  but  if  for  your 
gratification  I  am  to  exert  myself  also  to  shew  in  what 
especial  way  and  on  what  conditions  our  ideal  might  best 
be  realized,  I  must  ask  you,  with  a  view  to  this  demon- 
stration, to  grant  over  again  your  former  admissions. 

Which  do  you  mean? 

In  any  case,  can  a  theoretical  sketch  be  perfectly  real- 
ized in  practice  ?  or  is  it  a  law  of  nature  that  performance 
can  never  hit  the  truth  so  closely  as  theory?  Never  mind 
if  some  think  otherwise;  but  tell  me  whether  you  admit 
the  fact  or  not. 

I  do  admit  it.      ♦ 

Then  do  not  impose  upon  me  the  duty  of  exhibiting  all 
our  theory  realized  with  precise  accuracy  in  fact:  but  if 
we  succeed  in  finding  out  how  a  state  may  be  organized 
in  very  close  accordance  with  our  description,  you  must 
admit  that  we  have  discovered  the  possibility  of  realizing 
the  plan  which  you  require  me  to  consider.  Shall  you  not 
be  content  if  you  gain  thus  much?  for  my  own  part  I 
shall  be. 

So  shall  I. 

Then  our  next  step  apparently  must  be,  to  endeavour 
to  search  out  and  demonstrate  what  there  is  now  amiss  in 
the  working  of  our  states,  preventing  their  being  regulated 
in  the  manner  described,  and  what  is  the  smallest  change 
that  would  enable  a  state  to  assume  this  form  of  constitu- 
tion, confining  ourselves,  if  possible,  to  a  single  change;  if 
not,  to  two;  or  else,  to  such  as  are  fewest  in  number  and 
least  important  in  their  influence. 

Let  us  by  all  means  endeavour  so  to  do. 

Well,  I  proceeded,  there  is  one  change  by  which,  as  I 
think  we  might  shew,  the  required  revolution  would  be 


204  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

secured;  but  it  is  certainly  neither  a  small  nor  an  easy 
change,  though  it  is  a  possible  one. 

What  is  it? 

I  am  now  on  the  point  of  confronting  that  very  state- 
ment which  we  compared  to  the  huge  wave.  Nevertheless 
it  shall  be  spoken,  even  if  it  is  to  deluge  me,  literally  like 
an  exploding  wave,  with  laughter  and  infamy.  Pay  atten- 
tion to  what  I  am  going  to  say. 

Say  on,  he  replied. 

Unless  it  happen  either  that  philosophers  acquire  the 
kingly  power  in  states,  or  that  those  who  are  now  called 
kings  and  potentates,  be  imbued  with  a  sufficient  measure 
of  genuine  philosophy,  that  is  to  say,  unless  political 
power  and  philosophy  be  united  in  the  same  person,  most 
of  those  minds  which  at  present  pursue  one  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  other  being  peremptorily  debarred  from  either, 
there  will  be  no  deliverance,  my  dear  Glaucon,  for  cities, 
nor  yet,  I  believe,  for  the  human  race;  neither  can  the 
commonwealth,  which  we  have  now  sketched  in  theory, 
ever  till  then  grow  into  a  possibility,  and  see  the  light  of 
day.  But  a  consciousness  how  entirely  this  would  con- 
tradict the  common  opinion  made  me  all  along  so  reluc- 
tant to  give  expression  to  it:  for  it  is  difficult  to  see  that 
there  is  no  other  way  by  which  happiness  can  be  attained, 
by  the  state  or  by  the  individual. 

Whereupon  Glaucon  remarked:  The  language  and  sen- 
timents, Socrates,  to  which  you  have  just  given  utterance, 
are  of  such  a  nature,  that  you  may  expect  large  numbers 
of  by  no  means  contemptible  assailants  to  rush  desper- 
ately upon  you  without  a  moment's  delay,  after  throwing 
off  their  upper  garments,  as  it  were,  and  grasping,  in  that 
state,  the  first  offensive  weapon  that  comes  in  their  way, 
to  do  signal  execution  upon  you:  so  that  if  you  fail  tof 
repel  them  with  the  weapons  of  argument,  and  make  your 
escape,  you  will  certainly  suffer  the  penalty  of  being  well 
jeered. 

Well,  I  said,  was  it  not  you  that  brought  all  this  upon 
me? 

Yes,  and  I  did  quite  right.    But  I  promise  not  to  desert 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  205 

you;  on  the  contrary,  I  will  assist  you  with  the  weapons 
at  my  disposal,  which  are,  good- will  and  encouragement; 
and  perhaps  in  my  answers  I  may  shew  more  address 
than  another.  Therefore,  relying  on  this  assistance,  en- 
deavour to  shew  to  the  incredulous  that  what  you  say  is 
true. 

I  must  make  the  attempt,  I  said,  since  you  offer  me 
such  a  valuable  alliance.  Now,  if  we  are  to  have  a  chance 
of  escaping  from  the  assailants  you  speak  of,  I  think  it 
essential  to  give  them  our  definition  of  "philosophers," 
and  shew  whom  we  mean,  when  we  venture  to  assert  that 
such  persons  ought  to  govern;  in  order  that,  their  char- 
acter having  been  made  thoroughly  apparent,  we  may  be 
able  to  defend  ourselves  by  demonstrating  that  it  is  the 
natural  province  of  these  men  to  embrace  philosophy,  and 
take  the  lead  in  a  state,  and  the  province  of  all  others  to 
let  philosophy  alone,  and  follow  the  lead  of  the  former. 

Yes,  it  is  a  fit  time,  he  said,  to  give  this  definition. 

Come  then,  follow  my  steps,  and  let  us  try  if  we  can  in 
some  way  or  other  satisfactorily  expound  our  notion. 

Lead  on. 

Will  it  be  necessary  to  remind  you,  or  do  you  remember 
without  it,  that  when  we  state  that  a  man  loves  some  ob- 
ject, we  are  bound  to  shew,  if  the  statement  be  correct, 
that  he  does  not  love  one  part  of  that  object  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  another,  but  that  he  takes  delight  in  the  whole  ? 

I  require  to  be  reminded,  it  seems:  for  I  do  not  quite 
understand  you. 

Such  a  confession,  Glaucon,  would  have  been  more  ap- 
propriate in  another  person.  A  man  of  your  amorous 
nature  ought  not  to  forget  that  a  boy-loving,  susceptible 
person  is  in  some  way  or  other  attracted  and  excited  by 
the  charms  of  all  who  are  in  their  bloom,  and  thinks  they 
all  deserve  his  attentions  and  addresses.  Is  not  this  the 
manner  in  which  you  behave  to  your  favourites?  You 
will  praise  a  boy  with  a  turned-up  nose  as  having  a  win- 
ning look;  the  hooked  nose  of  another  you  consider  king- 
like; while  a  third,  whose  nose  is  between  the  two 
extremes,  has  a  beautifully-proportioned  face:  the  dark, 


206  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V 

you  say,  have  a  manly  look,  the  fair  are  children  of  the 
gods :  and  who  do  you  suppose  coined  the  phrase  u  olive- 
pale  "  but  a  lover  who  could  palliate  and  easily  put  up  with 
paleness,  when  he  found  it  on  the  cheek  of  youth  ?  In  one 
word,  you  invent  all  kinds  of  excuses,  and  employ  every 
variety  of  expression,  sooner  than  reject  any  that  are  in 
the  flower  and  prime  of  life. 

If  you  wish,  replied  Glaucon,  to  found  on  my  case  an 
assertion  that  the  amatively  disposed  thus  act,  I  will  allow 
you  to  do  so  for  the  argument's  sake. 

To  take  another  illustration;  do  you  not  observe  that 
those  who  are  fond  of  wine  behave  in  a  precisely  similar 
manner,  finding  some  excuse  or  other  to  admire  every  sort 
of  wine? 

Yes,  certainly. 

And  you  doubtless  have  seen  how  persons  who  love 
honour  will  command  a  company,  if  they  cannot  lead  an 
army,  and  in  default  of  being  honoured  by  great  and  im- 
portant personages,  are  glad  to  receive  the  respect  of  the 
little  and  the  insignificant;  so  covetous  are  they  of  honour 
in  any  shape. 

Precisely  so. 

Then  answer  me  yes  or  no  to  this:  when  we  describe  a 
man  as  having  a  longing  for  something,  are  we  to  assert 
that  he  longs  after  the  whole  class  that  the  term  includes, 
or  only  after  one  part,  to  the  exclusion  of  another? 

He  longs  after  the  whole. 

Then  shall  we  not  maintain  that  the  philosopher,  or  the 
lover  of  wisdom,  is  one  who  longs  for  wisdom,  not  par- 
tially, but  wholly? 

True. 

So  that  if  a  person  makes  difficulties  about  his  studies, 
especially  while  he  is  young  and  unable  to  discriminate 
between  what  is  profitable  and  what  is  not,  we  shall  pro- 
nounce him  to  be  no  lover  of  learning  or  of  wisdom ;  just 
as  when  a  man  is  nice  about  his  eating,  we  deny  that  he 
is  hungry  or  desirous  of  food,  and  instead  of  describing 
him  as  fond  of  eating,  we  call  him  a  bad  feeder. 

Yes,  and  we  shall  be  right  in  doing  so. 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  207 

On  the  other  hand,  when  a  man  is  ready  and  willing  to 
taste  every  kind  of  knowledge,  and  addresses  himself  joy- 
fully to  his  studies  with  an  appetite  which  never  can  be 
satiated,  we  shall  justly  call  such  a  person  a  philosopher, 
shall  we  not? 

To  which  Glaucon  replied,  You  will  find  your  descrip- 
tion includes  a  great  number  and  a  strange  company. 
All  the  lovers  of  sights,  I  conclude,  are  philosophers,  be- 
cause they  take  pleasure  in  acquiring  knowledge;  and 
those  who  delight  in  hearing  are  a  very  singular  set  to 
reckon  among  philosophers, — those,  I  mean,  who  will 
never,  if  they  can  help  it,  be  present  at  a  philosophical 
discussion,  or  any  similar  entertainment,  but  are  unfailing 
attendants  at  every  Dionysian  festival,  whether  held  in 
town  or  country,  and  run  about  as  if  they  had  let  out  their 
ears  on  hire  to  listen  to  all  the  choruses  of  the  season. 
Are  we  then  to  give  the  title  of  philosophers  to  all  these 
people,  as  well  as  to  others  who  have  a  taste  for  any 
similar  studies,  and  to  the  professors  of  small  arts? 

Certainly  not,  I  replied:  we  must  call  them  counterfeit 
philosophers. 

And  whom,  he  asked,  do  you  call  genuine  philosophers? 

Those  who  love  to  see  truth,  I  answered. 

In  that,  he  said,  you  cannot  be  wrong:  but  will  you 
explain  what  you  mean? 

That  would  be  not  at  all  easy,  with  a  different  ques- 
tioner: but  you,  I  imagine,  will  make  me  the  admission  I 
require. 

What  is  it? 

That  since  beauty  is  the  opposite  of  deformity,  they  are 
two  things. 

Of  course  they  are. 

Then  since  they  are  two,  each  of  them  taken  separately 
is  one  thing. 

That  also  is  true. 

The  same  thing  may  be  said  likewise  of  justice  and 
injustice,  good  and  evil,  and  all  general  conceptions.  Each 
of  them  in  itself  is  one  thing,  but  by  the  intermixture  with 


208  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

actions  and  bodies  and  with  one  another,  through  which 
they  are  everywhere  made  risible,  each  appears  to  be 
many  things. 

You  are  right. 

By  the  help  of  this  principle,  then,  I  draw  a  distinction 
between  those  whom  you  described  just  now  as  lovers  of 
sights,  lovers  of  arts,  and  practical  persons,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  on  the  other,  those  about  whom  we  are  now 
inquiring,  to  whom  alone  we  can  rightly  give  the  name  of 
philosophers. 

Explain  what  you  mean. 

Why,  I  suppose  that  those  who  love  seeing  and  hearing 
admire  beautiful  sounds,  and  colours,  and  forms,  and  all 
artistic  products  into  which  these  enter;  but  the  nature  of 
beauty  in  itself  their  understanding  is  unable  to  behold  and 
embrace. 

Yes,  it  certainly  is  as  you  say. 

But  those  who  are  capable  of  reaching  to  the  indepen- 
dent contemplation  of  abstract  beauty  will  be  rare  excep- 
tions, will  they  not? 

They  will  indeed. 

Therefore  if  a  man  recognizes  the  existence  of  beautiful 
things,  but  disbelieves  in  abstract  beauty,  and  has  not 
the  power  to  follow  should  another  lead  the  way  to  the 
knowledge  of  it,  is  his  life,  think  you,  a  dreaming  or  a 
waking  one?  Just  consider.  Is  it  not  dreaming  when 
a  person,  whether  asleep  or  awake,  mistakes  the  like- 
ness of  anything  for  the  real  thing  of  which  it  is  a  like- 
ness? 

I  confess  I  should  say  that  a  person  in  that  predicament 
was  dreaming. 

Take  again  the  opposite  case,  of  one  who  acknowledges 
an  abstract  beauty,  and  has  the  power  to  discern  both  this 
essence  and  the  objects  into  which  it  enters,  and  who  never 
mistakes  such  objects  for  the  essence,  nor  the  essence  for 
the  objects;  does  such  a  person,  think  you,  live  a  dream- 
ing or  a  waking  life? 

A  waking  life,  undoubtedly. 

If  so,  shall  we  not  be  right  in  calling  the  mental  process 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  209 

of  the  latter  knowledge,  because  he  really  knows;  and 
that  of  the  former  opinion,  because  he  merely  opines? 

Yes,  perfectly  right. 

Well  then,  should  this  person,  whom  we  describe  as 
opining,  but  not  knowing,  grow  wroth  with  us,  and  con- 
tend that  what  we  say  is  not  true,  shall  we  be  able  to 
appease  his  indignation  and  gently  convince  him,  disguis- 
ing from  him  the  fact  that  he  is  in  an  unsound  state  ? 

That  were  certainly  desirable. 

Come  then,  consider  what  we  are  to  say  to  him.  Would 
you  like  us  to  make  certain  inquiries  of  him,  premising 
that  if,  he  really  does  know  anything,  we  shall  not  in  the 
least  grudge  him  his  knowledge? — on  the  contrary,  we 
shall  be  truly  glad  to  find  that  it  is  so.  But  answer  us 
this  question,  we  shall  say:  When  a  man  knows,  does  he 
know  something  or  nothing  ?  Be  so  good,  Glaucon,  as  to 
make  answer  in  his  behalf. 

My  answer  will  be,  that  he  knows  something. 

Something  that  exists,  or  does  not  exist? 

Something  that  exists:  for  how  could  a  thing  that  doea 
not  exist  be  known? 

Are  we  then  quite  sure  of  this  fact,  in  whatever  variety 
of  ways  we  might  examine  it,  that  what  completely  exists 
may  be  completely  known,  whereas  that  which  has  no 
existence  at  all  must  be  wholly  unknown? 

We  are  perfectly  sure  of  it. 

Good:  now,  if  there  be  anything  so  constituted,  as  at 
the  same  time  to  be  and  not  to  be,  must  it  not  lie  some- 
where between  the  purely  existent  and  the  absolutely 
non-exiBtent  ? 

It  must. 

Well  then,  as  knowledge  is  correlative  to  the  existent, 
and  the  negation  of  knowledge  necessarily  to  the  non- 
existent, must  we  not  try  to  find  something  intermediate 
between  science  and  ignorance,  if  there  is  anything  of  the 
kind,  to  correspond  to  this  that  is  intermediate  between 
the  existent  and  the  non-existent  ? 

Yes,  by  all  means. 
»   Do  we  speak  of  opinion  as  a  something? 


210  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

Undoubtedly  we  do. 

Do  we  consider  it  a  faculty  distinct  from  science  or 
identical  with  it? 

Distinct  from  it. 

Therefore  opinion  is  appointed  to  one  province  and 
science  to  another,  each  acting  according  to  its  own  pecu- 
liar power. 

Just  so. 

Is  it  not  the  nature  of  science,  as  correlative  to  the  ex- 
istent, to  know  how  the  existent  exists  ?  But  first  there  is 
a  distinction  which  I  think  it  necessary  to  establish. 

What  is  that? 

We  shall  hold  that  faculties,  as  a  certain  general  class, 
are  the  things  whereby  we,  and  every  other  thing,  are  able 
to  do  whatever  we  can  do: — for  example,  I  call  sight  and 
hearing  faculties,  if  you  happen  to  understand  the  special 
conception  which  I  wish  to  describe. 

I  do  understand  it. 

Then  let  me  tell  you  what  view  I  take  of  them.  In  a 
faculty  I  do  not  see  either  colour,  or  form,  or  any  of  those 
qualities  that  I  observe  in  many  other  things,  by  regarding 
which  I  can  in  many  cases  distinguish  to  myself  between 
one  thing  and  another.  No,  in  a  faculty  I  look  only  to  its 
province  and  its  function,  and  thus  I  am  led  to  call  it  in 
each  case  by  this  name,  pronouncing  those  faculties  to  be 
identical  whose  provinces  and  functions  are  identical,  and 
those  diverse  whose  provinces  and  functions  are  diverse. 
But  pray,  how  do  you  proceed? 

Just  in  the  same  way. 

Now  then,  return  with  me,  my  excellent  friend.  Under 
what  general  term  do  you  class  science?  Do  you  make 
it  a  faculty? 

Yes  I  do;  it  is  of  all  the  faculties  the  most  powerful. 

Well,  is  opinion  a  faculty ;  or  are  we  to  refer  it  to  some 
other  denomination? 

Not  to  any  other :  for  that  whereby  we  are  able  to  opine, 
can  only  be  opinion. 

Well,  but  a  little  while  ago  you  admitted  that  science 
and  opinion  are  not  identical. 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  211 

Why  how  could  a  sensible  man  identify  the  fallible  with 
the  infallible? 

Very  good:  so  we  are  clearly  agreed  that  opinion  is  a 
thing  distinct  from  science  ? 

It  is. 

If  so,  each  of  them  has  by  its  nature  a  different  prov- 
ince, and  a  different  efficacy. 

The  inference  is  inevitable. 

Science,  I  believe,  has  for  its  province  to  know  the 
nature  of  the  existent. 

Yes. 

And  the  province  of  opinion  is,  we  sa\,  co  opine. 

Yes. 

Does  opinion  take  cognizance  of  precisely  that  material 
which  science  knows?  In  other  words,  is  the  object- 
matter  of  opinion  identical  with  that  of  science  ?  or  is  that 
impossible  ? 

It  is  impossible,  after  the  admissions  we  have  made; 
that  is,  if  it  be  granted  that  different  faculties  have  dif- 
ferent provinces,  and  that  both  opinion  and  science  are 
faculties,  and  that  the  two  are  distinct, — all  which  we 
affirm.  These  premises  make  it  impossible  to  identify 
the  object-matter  of  science  and  that  of  opinion. 

Then,  if  the  existent  is  the  object-matter  of  knowledge, 
that  of  opinion  must  be  something  other  than  the  existent  ? 

It  must. 

Well  then,  does  opinion  exercise  itself  upon  the  non- 
existent, or  is  it  impossible  to  apprehend  even  in  opinion 
that  which  does  not  exist?  Consider — does  not  the 
person  opining  carry  his  thought  towards  something?  Or 
is  it  possible  to  have  an  opinion,  but  an  opinion  about 
nothing? 

It  is  impossible. 

Then  the  person  who  opines  has  an  opinion  about  some 
one  thing? 

Yes. 

Well,  but  the  non-existent  could  not  be  called  some  one 
thing;  it  might,  on  the  contrary,  with  the  greatest  truth 
be  styled  nothing. 


212  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

Just  so. 

But  to  the  non-existent  we  were  constrained  to  assign 
ignorance,  and  to  the  existent,  knowledge. 

And  rightly. 

Then  neither  the  existent  nor  the  non-existent  is  the 
object  of  opinio] 

No. 

Therefore  opinion  cannot  be  either  ignorance  or  knowl- 
edge. 

Apparently  not. 

Then  does  it  lie  beyond  either  of  these,  so  as  to  surpass 
either  knowledge  in  certainty  or  ignorance  in  uncer- 
tainty? 

It  does  neither. 

Then  tell  me,  do  you  look  upon  opinion  as  something 
more  dusky  than  knowledge,  more  luminous  than  ignor- 
ance? 

Yes,  it  is  strongly  so  distinguished  from  either. 

And  does  it  lie  within  these  extremes? 

Yes. 

Then  opinion  must  be  something  between  the  two. 

Precisely  so. 

Now  a  little  while  back,  did  we  not  say,  that  if  any- 
thing could  be  found  so  constituted  as  at  the  same  time 
to  be  and  not  to  be,  it  must  lie  between  the  purely  ex- 
istent and  the  absolutely  not  existent,  and  must  be  the 
object  neither  of  science  nor  yet  of  ignorance,  but  of  a 
third  faculty,  which  should  be  similarly  discovered  in  the 
interval  between  science  and  ignorance? 

We  did. 

But  now  we  have  discovered  between  these  two  a 
faculty  which  we  call  opinion. 

We  have. 

It  will  remain  then  for  us,  apparently,  to  find  what  that 
in  which  partakes  both  of  being  and  of  not  being,  and 
which  cannot  be  rightly  said  to  be  either  of  these  abso- 
lutely; in  order  that,  should  it  discover  itself  to  us,  we 
may  justly  proclaim  it  to  be  the  object  of  opinion;  thus 


Book  V.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  21 3 

assigning'   extremes   to   extremes,    and   means   to   means. 
Am  I  not  right? 

You  are. 

These  positions  -Lhen  being  laid  down,  I  shall  proceed 
to  interrogate  that  worthy  man  who  denies  the  existence 
of  anything  absolutely  beautiful,  or  any  "form  of  abstract 
beauty,  which  for  ever  continues  the  same  and  unchango 
able,  though  he  acknowledges  a  variety  of  beautiful  ob- 
jects,— that  lover  of  sights,  who  cannot  endure  to  be  told 
that  beauty  is  one,  and  justice  one,  and  so  on  of  the 
rest: — My  good  sir,  I  shall  say,  of  all  these  beautiful 
things,  is  there  one  which  may  not  appear  ugly?  Of 
all  these  just  things,  is  there  one  which  may  not  appear 
unjust?  Or  of  these  holy  things,  one  which  may  not 
appear  unholy? 

No,  answered  Glaucon:  they  must  inevitably  appear 
in  a  certain  sense  both  fair  and  foul,  both  just  and  unjust, 
both  holy  and  unholy. 

Again,  may  not  the  many  double  ihings  be  considered 
halves  just  as  well  as  doubles? 

Just  as  well. 

In  the  same  way,  have  the  things  which  we  describe  as 
great,  small,  light,  heavy,  any  better  claim  to  these  titles* 
than  to  their  opposites? 

No,  they  will  always  be  equally  entitled  to  either. 

Would  it  be  more  correct,  then,  to  predicate  of  those 
many  objects,  that  each  of  them  is,  or  is  not,  that  which 
it  is  said  to  be? 

You  remind  me  of  the  conundrums  with  a  contradic- 
tion in  them,  that  are  proposed  at  table,  and  of  the 
children's  riddle  *  about  the  eunuch  who  threw  at  the 
bat,  hinting  darkly  with  what  he  hit  it,  and  on  what  it 
sat:  for  the  things  in  question  have  the  same  ambiguous 
character,  and  one  cannot  positively  conceive  of  them  as 

*  The  riddle  is  thus  given  by  the  Scholiast :  "  A  tale  is  told, 
that  a  man  and  not  a  man,  seeing  and  not  seeing  a  bird  and  not 
a  bird,  seated  on  wood  and  not  on  wood,  bit  it  and  did  not  hit  it 
with  a  stone  and  not  a  stone.*'  It  is  partly  explained  in  the  text, 
and  we  leave  the  further  solution  of  it  to'  the  reader. 


814  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

either  being  or  not  being,  as  both  being  and  not  being 
or  as  neither. 

Can  you  tell  then,  said  I,  what  to  do  with  them,  or 
where  they  may  be  better  put  than  in  the  interspace  be- 
tween being  and  not  being?  For  I  presume  they  will  not 
appear  either  darker  than  the  non-existent,  and  so  more 
non-existent,  or  more  luminous  than  the  existent,  and 
therefore  more  existent. 

You  are  perfectly  right. 

Hence  we  have  discovered,  apparently,  that  the  mass 
of  notions,  current  among  the  mass  of  men,  about  beauty, 
justice,  and  the  rest,  roam  about  between  the  confines  of 
pure  existence  and  pure  non-existence. 

We  have. 

And  we  before  admitted,  that  if  anything  of  this  kind 
should  be  brought  to  light,  it  ought  to  be  described  as  th« 
object  of  opinion,  and  not  of  knowledge, — these  inter- 
mediate rovers  being  caught  by  the  intermediate  faculty. 

We  did  make  this  admission. 

Therefore,  when  people  have  an  eye  for  a  multitude  of 
beautiful  objects,  but  can  neither  see  beauty  in  itself,  nor 
follow  those  who  would  lead  them  to  it, — when  they  be- 
hold a  number  of  just  things,  but  not  justice  in  itself,  and 
so  in  every  instance,  we  shall  say  they  have  in  every  case 
an  opinion,  but  no  real  knowledge  of  the  things  about 
which  they  opine. 

It  is  a  necessary  inference. 

But  what,  on  the  other  hand,  must  we  say  of  those  who 
contemplate  things  as  they  are  in  themselves,  and  as  they 
exist  ever  permanent  and  immutable?  Shall  we  not  speak 
of  them  as  knowing,  not  opining? 

That  also  is  a  necessary  inference. 

Then  shall  we  not  assert  that  such  persons  admire  and 
love  the  objects  of  knowledge, — the  others,  the  objects  of 
opinion?  For  we  have  not  forgotten,  have  we,  that  we 
spoke  of  these  latter  as  loving  and  looking  upon  beautiful 
sounds  and  colours  and  the  like,  while  they  will  not  hear 
cf  the  existence  of  an  abstract  beauty  ? 

We  have  not  forgotten  it. 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  215 

Shall  we  commit  any  fault  then,  if  we  call  these  people 
philodoxical  rather  than  philosophical,  that  is  to  say, 
lovers  of  opinion  rather  than  lovers  of  wisdom?  And 
will  they  be  very  much  offended  with  us  for  telling 
them  so? 

No,  not  if  they  will  take  my  advice:  for  it  is  wrong  to 
be  offended  with  the  truth. 

Those  therefore  that  set  their  affections  on  that  which 
in  each  case  really  exists,  we  must  call  not  philodoxical, 
but  philosophical? 

iles,  by  all  means. 


216  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI 


BOOK  VI. 

Thus,  Glaucon,  I  said,  after  pursuing  a  lengthened  in- 
quiry we  have,  not  without  difficulty,  discovered  who  are 
true  philosophers  and  who  are  not. 

Yes,  he  replied;  probably  it  was  not  easy  to  abridge  the 
inquiry. 

Apparently  not,  I  said.  However  that  may  be,  I  think, 
for  my  part,  that  the  result  would  have  been  brought  out 
still  more  clearly,  if  we  had  to  speak  of  this  only,  without 
discussing  the  many  points  that  still  await  our  notice,  if 
we  wish  to  ascertain  wherein  the  superiority  of  a  right- 
eous over  an  unrighteous  life  consists. 

Then  what  are  we  to  do  next? 

We  have  only  to  take  the  step  next  in  order.  Since 
those  who  are  able  to  apprehend  the  eternal  and  immu- 
table, are  philosophers,  while  those  who  are  incapable  of 
this  and  who  wander  in  the  region  of  change  and  multi- 
formity, are  not  philosophers,  which  of  the  two,  tell  me, 
ought  to  be  governors  of  a  state? 

What  must  I  reply,  if  I  am  to  do  justice  to  the  ques- 
tion? 

Ask  yourself  which  of  the  two  are  to  be  thought  capa- 
ble of  guarding  the  laws  and  customs  of  states,  and  let 
these  be  appointed  guardians. 

You  are  right. 

Can  there  be  any  question  as  to  whether  a  blind  man, 
or  one  with  quick  sight,  is  the  right  person  to  guard  and 
keep  any  thing? 

There  can  be  no  question  about  it. 

Then  do  you  think  that  there  is  a  particle  of  difference 
between  the  condition  of  blind  persons,  and  the  state  of 
those  who  are  absolutely  destitute  of  the  knowledge  of 
things  as  they  really  are,  and  who  possess  in  their  soul 
no  distinct  exemplar,  and  cannot,  like  painters,  fix  their 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  217 

eyes  on  perfect  truth  as  a  perpetual  standard  of  reference, 
to  me  contemplated  with  the  minutest  care,  before  they 
proceed  to  deal  with  earthly  canons  about  things  beau- 
tiful and  just  and  good,  laying  them  down  where  they  are 
required,  and  where  they  already  exist  watching  over 
their  preservation? 

No,  indeed,  there  is  not  much  difference. 

Shall  we  then  appoint  such  persons  to  the  office  of 
guardians,  in  preference  to  those  who  not  only  have 
gained  a  knowledge  of  each  thing  in  its  reality,  but  in 
practical  skill  are  not  inferior  to  the  former,  and  come 
behind  them  in  no  other  department  of  excellence? 

Why,  if  these  latter  are  not  wanting  in  the  other  quali- 
fications, it  would  be  perfectly  absurd  to  choose  any 
others.  For  just  the  point  in  which  they  are  superior 
may  be  said  to  be  the  most  important  of  all. 

Then  shall  we  proceed  to  explain  how  the  same  persons 
will  be  enabled  to  possess  both  qualifications  ? 

By  all  means. 

If  so,  we  must  begin  by  gaining  a  thorough  insight 
into  their  proper  character,  as  we  said  at  the  outset  of 
this  discussion.  And  I  think,  if  we  agree  tolerably  on 
that  point,  we  shall  also  agree  that  the  two  qualifications 
may  be  united  in  the  same  persons,  and  that  such  char- 
acters, and  no  others,  are  the  proper  governors  of  states. 

How  so? 

With  regard  to  the  philosophic  nature,  let  us  take  for 
granted  that  its  possessors  are  ever  enamoured  of  all 
learning,  that  will  reveal  to  them  somewhat  of  that  real 
and  permanent  existence,  which  is  exempt  from  the  vicis- 
situdes of  generation  and  decay. 

Let  it  be  granted. 

Again,  I  said,  let  us  also  assume  that  they  are  en- 
amoured of  the  whole  of  that  real  existence,  and  willingly 
resign  no  part  of  it,  be  it  small  or  great,  honoured  or 
slighted;  as  we  shewed  on  a  previous  occasion,  in  speak- 
ing of  the  ambitious  and  the  amorous. 

You  are  right. 

Now  then  proceed  to  consider,  whether  we  ought  not  to 


218  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI 

find  a  third  feature  in  the  character  of  those  who  are  t« 
realize  our  description. 

What  feature  do  you  mean? 

I  mean  truthfulness,  that  is,  a  determination  never  to 
admit  falsehood  in  any  shape,  if  it  can  he  helped,  but  to 
abhor  it,  and  love  the  truth. 

Yes,  it  is  probable  we  shall  find  it. 

Nay,  my  friend,  it  is  not  only  probable,  but  absolutely 
inevitable,  that  one  who  is  by  nature  prone  to  any  pas- 
sion, should  be  well  pleased  with  everything  that  is  bound 
by  the  closest  ties  to  the  beloved  object. 

True,  he  said. 

And  can  you  find  any  thing  allied  to  wisdom  more 
closely  than  truth? 

Certainly  not. 

And  is  it  possible  for  the  same  nature  to  love  wisdom, 
and  at  the  same  time  love  falsehood? 

Unquestionably  it  is  not. 

Consequently,  the  genuine  lover  of  knowledge  must, 
from  his  youth  up,  strive  intensely  after  all  truth. 

Yes,  he  must  thoroughly. 

Well,  but  we  cannot  doubt  that  when  a  person's  desires 
set  strongly  in  one  direction,  they  run  with  corresponding 
feebleness  in  every  other  channel,  like  a  stream  whose 
waters  have  been  diverted  into  another  bed. 

Undoubtedly  they  do. 

So  that  when  the  current  has  set  towards  science,  and 
all  its  branches,  a  man's  desires  will,  I  fancy,  hover  around 
pleasures  that  are  purely  mental,  abandoning  those  in 
which  the  body  is  instrumental, — provided  that  the  man's 
fove  of  wisdom  is  real,  not  artificial. 

It  cannot  be  otherwise. 

Again,  such  a  person  will  be  temperate  and  thoroughly 
uncovetous :  for  he  is  the  last  person  in  the  world  to  value 
those  objects,  which  make  men  anxious  for  money  at  any 
cost. 

True. 

Once  more,  there  is  another  point  which  you  ought 
to  take  into  consideration,  when  you  are  endeavouring 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  219 

to  distinguish  a  philosophic  from  an  unphilosophic  char- 
acter. 

What  is  that? 

You  must  take  care  not  to  overlook  any  taint  of  mean- 
ness. For  surely  little-mindedness  thwarts  above  every- 
thing the  soul  that  is  destined  ever  to  aspire  to  grasp 
truth,  both  divine  and  hrjnan,  in  its  integrity  and  uni- 
versality. 

That  is  most  true. 

And  do  you  think  that  a  spirit  full  of  lofty  thoughts, 
*  and  privileged  to  contemplate  all  time,  and  all  exist- 
ence, can  possibly  attach  any  great  importance  to  this  life  ? 

No,  it  is  impossible. 

Then  such  a  person  will  not  regard  death  as  a  formid- 
able thing,  will  he? 

Certainly  not. 

So  that  a  mean  and  cowardly  character  can  have  no 
part,  as  it  seems,  in  true  philosophy. 

I  think  it  cannot. 

What  then?  Can  the  man  whose  mind  is  well-regu- 
lated, and  free  from  covetousness,  meanness,  pretentious- 
ness7~and  cowardice,  be  by  any  possibility  hard  to  deal 
with  or  unjust? 

No ;  it  is  impossible. 

Therefore,  when  you  are  noticing  the  indications  of  a 
philosophical  or  unphilosophical  temper,  you  must  also 
observe  in  early  youth  whether  the  mind  is  just  and  gentle, 
or  unsociable  and  fierce. 

Quite  so. 

There  is  still  another  point,  which  I  think  you  must 
certainly  not  omit. 

What  is  that? 

Whether  the  mind  in  question  is  quick  or  slow  at  learn- 
ing. For  you  can  never  expect  a  person  to  take  a  decent 
delight  in  an  occupation  which  he  goes  through  with  pain, 
and  in  which  he  makes  small  progress  with  great  exertion? 

No,  it  would  be  impossible. 

Again,  if  he  can  remember  nothing  of  what  he  has 


220  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VL 

learned,  can  he  fail,  being  thus  full  of  forgetf  illness,  to  be 
void  of  knowledge? 

No,  he  cannot. 

Then,  will  not  his  fruitless  toil,  think  you,  compel  him 
at  last  to  hate  both  himself  and  such  employment? 

Doubtless  it  will. 

Let  us  never  then,  admit  a  forgetful  mind  into  the 
ranks  of  those  that  are  counted  worthy  of  philosophy,  but 
let  us  look  out  for  a  good  memory  as  a  requisite  for  such 
admission. 

Yes,  by  all  means. 

Again,  we  should  certainly  say  that  the  tendency  of 
an  unrefined  and  awkward  nature  is  wholly  towards  dis- 
proportion. 

Certainly. 

And  do  you  think  that  truth  is  akin  to  disproportion, 
or  to  proportion  ? 

To  proportion. 

In  addition,  then,  to  our  other  acquirements,  let  us 
search  for  a  mind  naturally  well-proportioned,and  grace- 
ful, whose  native  instincts  will  permit  it  to  be  easily  TeoftcT 
apprehend  the  Forms  of  things  as  they  really  are. 

By  all  means. 

What  then?  Do  you  think  that  the  qualities  which  we 
have  enumerated  are  in  any  way  unnecessary  or  incon- 
sistent with  one  another,  provided  the  soul  is  to  attain 
unto  full  and  satisfactory  possession  of  real  existence? 

On  the  contrary,  they  are  most  strictly  necessary. 

Then  can  you  find  any  fault  with  an  employment  which 
requires  of  a  man  who  would  pursue  it  satisfactorily,  that 
nature  shall  have  given  him  a  retentive  memory,  and 
made  him  quick  at  learning,  lofty-minded  and  graceful, 
the  friend  and  brother  of  truth,  justice,  fortitude,  and  tem- 
perance ? 

No,  he  replied;  the  very  Genius  of  criticism  could  find 
no  fault  with  such  an  employment. 

Well,  can  you  hesitate  to  entrust  such  characters  with 
the  sole  management  of  state  affairs,  when  time  and  edu- 
cation have  made  them  ripe  for  the  task? 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  221 

Here  Adeimantus  interposed  and  said:  It  is  true, 
Socrates,  that  no  one  can  dispute  these  conclusions;  but 
still,  every  time  that  such  theories  are  propounded  by  you, 
the  hearers  feel  certain  misgivings  of  the  following  kind. 
They  fancy  that,  from  want  of  practice  in  your  method  of 
question  and  answer,  they  are  at  each  question  led  a  little 
astray  by  the  reasoning,  until,  at  the  close  of  the  discus- 
sion, these  little  divergences  are  found  to  amount  to  a 
serious  false  step,  which  makes  them  contradict  their 
original  notions.  And,  as  unskilful  draught-players  are 
in  the  end  hemmed  into  a  corner  by  the  skilful,  till  they 
cannot  make  a  move,  just  in  the  same  way  your  hearers 
conceive  themselves  to  be  at  last  hemmed  in  and  reduced 
to  silence  by  this  novel  kind  of  draughts,  played  with 
words  instead  of  counters.  For  they  are  not  at  all  the 
more  convinced  that  the  conclusion  to  which  they  are 
brought  is  the  true  one.  And,  in  saying  this,  I  have  the 
present  occasion  before  my  eye.  For  at  this  moment  a 
person  will  tell  you>  that  though  at  each  question  he 
cannot  oppose  you  with  words,  yet  in  practice  he  sees 
that  all  the  students  of  philosophy,  who  have  devoted 
themselves  to  it  for  any  length  of  time,  instead  of  taking 
it  up  for  educational  purposes  and  relinquishing  it  while 
still  young,  in  most  cases  become  exceedingly  ^  eccentric, 
not  to  say  quite  depraved,  while  even  those  who  appear 
the  most  respectable  are  notwithstanding  so  far  the  worse 
for  the  pursuit  which  you  commend,  that  they  become 
useless  to  their  country. 

When  he  had  said  this,  I  replied; — Then  do  you  think 
this  objection  untrue? 

I  am  not  sure,  he  answered;  but  I  should  be  glad  to 
hear  what  you  think  of  it. 

Let  me  tell  you,  that  I  hold  it  to  be  a  true  objection. 

How  then  can  it  be  right  to  assert  that  the  miseries  of 
our  cities  will  find  no  relief,  until  those  philosophers  who, 
on  our  own  admission,  are  useless  to  them,  become  their 
rulers  ? 

You  are  asking  a  question,  I  replied,  which  I  must 
answer  by  the  help  of  an  illustration, 


222  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VL 

And  you,  I  suppose,  have  not  been  in  the  habit  of 
employing  illustrations. 

Ah!  you  rally  me,  do  you,  now  that  you  have  got  me 
upon  a  subject  in  which  demonstration  is  so  difficult? 
However,  listen  to  the  illustration,  that  you  may  see  still 
better  how  stingy  I  am  with  the  work.  So  cruel  is  the 
position  in  which  those  respectable  men  are  placed,  in 
reference  to  their  states,  that  there  is  no  single  thing 
whose  position  is  analogous  to  theirs.  Consequently  I 
have  to  collect  materials  from  several  quarters  for  the 
imaginary  case  which  I  am  to  use  in  their  defence,  like 
painters  when  they  paint  goat-stags  and  similar  monsters. 

Figure  to  yourself  a  fleet,  or  a  single  ship,  in  which 
the  state  of  affairs  on  board  is  as  follows.  The  captain, 
you  are  to  suppose,  is  taller  and  stronger  than  any  of  the 
crew,  but  rather  deaf,  and  rather  short-sighted,  and  cor- 
respondingly deficient  in  nautical  skill;  and  the  sailors 
are  quarrelling  together  about  the  pilotage, — each  of  them 
thinking  he  has  a  right  to  steer  the  vessel,  although  up  to 
that  moment  he  has  never  studied  the  art,  and  cannot 
name  his  instructor,  or  the  time  when  he  served  his 
apprenticeship;  more  than  this,  they  assert  that  it  is  a 
thing  which  positively  cannot  be  taught,  and  are  even 
ready  to  tear  in  pieces  the  person  who  affirms  that  it  can : 
meanwhile  they  crowd  incessantly  round  the  person  of  the 
captain,  begging  and  beseeching  him  with  every  impor- 
tunity to  entrust  the  helm  to  them;  and  occasionally, 
failing  to  persuade  him,  while  others  succeed  better,  these 
disappointed  candidates  kill  their  successful  rivals,  or 
fling  them  overboard,  and,  after  binding  the  high-spirited 
captain  hand  and  foot  with  mandragora  or  strong  drink, 
or  disabling  him  by  some  other  contrivance,  they  remain 
masters  of  the  ship,  and  apply  its  contents  to  their  own 
purposes,  and  pass  their  time  at  sea  in  drinking  and 
feasting,  as  you  might  expect  with  such  a  crew;  and 
besides  all  this,  they  compliment  with  the  title  of  "able 
seaman,"  "  excellent  pilot,"  "  skilful  navigator,"  any  sailor 
that  can  second  them  cleverly  in  either  persuading  or 
forcing  the  captain  into  installing  them  in  command  of 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  223 

the  ship,  while  they  condemn  as  useless  every  one  whose 
talents  are  of  a  different  order, — having  no  notion  that  the 
true  pilot  must  devote  his  attention  to  the  year  and  its 
seasons,  to  the  sky,  and  the  stars,  and  the  winds,  and  all 
that  concerns  his  art,  if  he  intends  to  be  really  fit  to 
command  a  ship;  and  thinking  it  impossible  to  acquire 
and  practise,  along  with  the  pilot's  art,  the  art  of  maim 
taining  the  pilot's  authority  whether  some  of  the  crew  lik<? 
it  or  not.  Such  being  the  state  of  things  on  board,  do 
you  not  think  that  the  pilot  who  is  really  master  of  his 
craft  is  sure  to  be  called  a  useless,  star-gazing  babbler  by 
the  mariners  who  form  the  crews  of  ships  so  circum- 
stanced ? 

Yes,  that  he  will,  replied  Adeimantus. 

Well,  said  I,  I  suppose  you  do  not  require  to  see  my 
illustration  passed  in  review,  to  remind  you  that  it  is  a 
true  picture  of  our  cities  in  so  far  as  their  disposition 
towards  philosophers  is  concerned;  on  the  contrary,  I 
think  you  understand  my  meaning. 

Yes,  quite. 

That  being  the  case,  when  a  person  expresses  his 
astonishment  that  philosophers  are  not  respected  in  our 
cities,  begin  by  telling  him  our  illustration,  and  endeavour 
to  persuade  him  that  it  would  be  far  more  astonishing  if 
they  were  respected. 

Well,  I  will. 

And  go  on  to  tell  him  that  *  he  is  right  in  saying  that 
the  most  respectable  of  the  proficients  in  philosophy  are 
of  no  use  to  the  world;  only  recommend  him  to  lay  the 
fault  of  it  not  on  these  good  people  themselves,  but  upon 
those  who  decline,  their  services.  For  it  is  not  in  the 
nature  of  things  that  a  pilot  should  petition  the  sailors  to 
submit  to  his  authority,  or  that  the  wise  should  wait  at 
the  rich  man's  door.  No,  the  author  of  that  witticism  was 
wrong:  for  the  real  truth  is,  that,  just  as  a  sick  man,  be 
he  rich  or  poor,  must  attend  at  the  physician's  door,  so 
all  who  require  to  be  governed  must  attend  at  the  gate  of 
him  who  is  able  to  govern, — it  being  against  nature  that 
*  Reading:  rhlnQfi  liyec. 


224:  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VL 

the  ruler,  supposing  him  to  be  really  good  for  anything, 
should  have  to  entreat  his  subjects  to  submit  to  his  rule. 
In  fact,  you  will  not  be  wrong,  if  you  compare  the  states- 
men of  our  time  to  the  sailors  whom  we  were  just  now 
describing,  and  the  useless  visionary  talkers,  as  they  are 
called  by  our  politicians,  to  the  veritable  pilots. 

You  are  perfectly  right. 

Under  these  circumstances,  and  amongst  men  like 
these,  it  is  not  easy  for  that  noblest  of  occupations  to  be 
in  good  repute  with  those  to  whose  pursuits  it  is  directly 
opposed.  But  far  the  most  grievous  and  most  obstinate 
misconstruction,  under  which  Philosophy  labours,  is  due 
to  her  professed  followers;  who  are  doubtless  the  persons 
meant  by  the  accuser  of  Philosophy,  when  he  declares,  as 
you  tell  us,  that  most  of  those  who  approach  her  are 
utterly  depraved,  while  even  her  best  pupils  are  useless : — 
to  the  truth  of  which  remark  I  assented,  did  I  not  ? 

Yes,  you  did. 

We  have  explained  the  reason  why  the  good  are  use- 
less, have  we  not  ? 

Certainly  we  have. 

Would  you  have  us  proceed  next  to  discuss  the  ques- 
tion, why  the  majority  are  inevitably  depraved,  and  to 
endeavour  to  shew,  if  we  can,  that  of  this  also  philosophy 
is  guiltless  ? 

Yes,  by  all  means. 

Let  us  then  speak  and  listen  alternately,  recurring  to 
the  point  where  we  were  describing  what  ought  to  be  the 
natural  character  of  one  who  is  to  turn  out  a  perfectly 
accomplished  and  virtuous  man.  The  first  and  leading 
feature  in  such  a  person's  character  was,  if  you  recollect, 
truth,  which  he  was  bound  to  pursue  with  the  most 
absolute  devotion,  at  the  risk,  should  he  be  found  an 
impostor,  of  being  denied  all  share  in  true  philosophy. 

Yes,  we  said  so. 

Well,  does  not  this  point,  for  one,  run  strongly  counter 
to  the  received  opinion  upon  the  subject  ? 

Certainly  it  does. 

Then    shall    we   not    be    making    a    reasonably    good 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  225 

defence,  if  we  say  that  the  natural  tendency  of  the  real 
lover  of  knowledge  is  to  strain  every  nerve  to  reach  real 
existence ;  and  that  far  from  resting  at  those  multitudinous 
particular  phenomena  whose  existence  falls  within  the 
region  of  opinion,  he  presses  on,  undiscouraged,  and  de- 
sists not  from  his  passion,  till  he  has  apprehended  the 
nature  of  each  thing  as  it  really  is,  with  that  part  of  his 
soul  whose  property  it  is  to  lay  hold  of  such  objects,  in 
virtue  of  its  affinity  to  them ; — and  that  having,  by  means 
of  this,  verily  approached  and  held  intercourse  with  that 
which  verily  exists,  he  begets  *  wisdom  and  truth,  so  that 
then,  and  not  till  then,  he  knows,  enjoys  true  life,  and 
receives  true  nourishment,  and  is  at  length  released  from 
his  travail-pangs? 

The  defence  will  be  the  best  possible,  he  replied. 

Well,  will  such  a  person  be  tinged  with  any  love  of 
falsehood?  Will  he  not,  on  the  contrary,  be  imbued  with 
a  positive  hatred  of  it? 

He  will. 

Now,  if  truth  leads  the  way,  we  can  never  admit  that 
a  train  of  evils  follows  her  steps. 

Certainly  not. 

On  the  contrary,  we  shall  assert  that  she  is  attended 

*  yewf/oac  vovv  kcu  ahrfleiav.  We  have  here  translated  vow, 
"  wisdom."  For  vovg  is,  according  to  Plato,  sometimes  the  organ 
within  us  by  which  we  apprehend  the  highest  objects  of  knowl- 
edge, and  sometimes,  as  here,  the  knowledge  thus  obtained. 
In  the  same  way  Coleridge,  in  "The  Friend,"  after  defining 
reason  as  an  organ  bearing  the  same  relation  to  spiritual  objects, 
the  universal,  the  eternal,  and  the  necessary,  as  the  eye  bears  to 
material  and  contingent  phenomena,  goes  on  to  say,  •*  that  it  is 
an  organ  identical  with  its  appropriate  objects.  Thus  God,  the 
soul,  eternal  truth,  etc.,  are  the  objects  of  reason  ;  but  they  are 
themselves  reason.  We  name  God  the  supreme  reason  •  and 
Milton  says, 

1  Whence  the  soul 
Reason  receives,  and  reason  is  her  being.'  " 

Elsewhere  we  have  generally  translated  vovg  "  reason,"  or  "  pure 
reason;"  and,  as  Plato  oontrnsts  w"c  anddtavota,  w»  have  ven- 
tured to  translate  the  latter  by  the  word  "  understanding,"  as  the 
best  equivalent  in  the  nomenclature  of  modern  philosophy  sino»» 
the  time  of  Kant. 


226  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI. 

by  a  sound  and  just  disposition,  followed  in  its  turn  by 
sobriety. 

True. 

And  surely  we  need  not  repeat  our  demonstrations,  and 
marshal  over  again  the  remaining  retinue  of  the  philo- 
sophic character.  For  we  found,  as  you  doubtless  re- 
member, that  the  natural  accompaniments  of  the  preceding 
are  manliness,  loftiness  of  spirit,  a  quick  apprehension, 
and  a  good  memory.  Upon  this  you  objected,  that, 
though  every  one  will  be  compelled  to  assent  to  our 
conclusions,  still  when  one  comes  to  drop  the  argument 
and  turn  his  eyes  simply  to  the  persons  who  are  the 
subjects  of  it,  he  will  assert  his  conviction  that  a  few  are 
merely  useless,  the  majority  totally  depraved.  We  there- 
fore inquired  into  the  grounds  of  this  prejudice,  and  have 
now  arrived  at  the  question,  why  are  the  majority  de- 
praved? And  this  was  the  reason  why  we  took  up  again 
the  character  of  the  real  philosophers  and  found  ourse1"^ 
compelled  to  define  it. 

True. 

We  must,  therefore,  study  the  pernicious  influences 
which  destroy  this  character  in  many  persons,  and  from 
which  only  a  few  escape,  who,  you  tell  me,  are  styled 
useless,  though  not  depraved.  And  then  we  must  take 
into  consideration  the  natures  which  imitate  the  truly 
philosophical,  and  settle  down  into  the  same  pursuits, 
shewing  what  they  are  mentally,  and  how  they  enter  upon 
a  profession  which  is  too  good  and  too  high  for  them,  and 
commit  such  a  variety  of  blunders,  that  they  have  every- 
where and  with  all  the  world  attached  to  philosophy  the 
reputation  you  describe. 

But  what,  he  asked,  are  the  pernicious  influences  to 
which  you  refer? 

I  will  try  to  describe  them  to  you,  if  I  can.  Every  on« 
will  agree  with  us  in  this,  I  think,  that  such  a  character, 
possessing  all  those  qualities  which  we  assigned  to  it  but 
now  as  essential  to  a  full  capacity  for  philosophy,  is  of 
rare  and  uncommon  growth  amongst  men.  Or  do  you 
think  otherwise? 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  227 

No,  indeed  I  do  not. 

Then  consider  how  many  fatal  dangers  beset  these  rare 
characters. 

Pray  what  are  they? 

The  thing  which  sounds  most  marvellous  is  this,  that 
every  one  of  the  qualities  commended  by  us  has  a  ten- 
dency to  vitiate  and  distract  from  philosophy  the  soul 
which  possesses  it.  I  allude  to  manliness,  temperance,  and 
all  the  characteristics  which  we  have  discussed. 

It  does  sound  strange. 

And  then,  in  addition  to  this,  all  the  reputed  advantages 
of  beauty,  wealth,  strength  of  body,  powerful  connexions 
in  a  state,  and  all  their  accompaniments,  exercise  a  cor- 
rupting and  a  distracting  influence.  Now  I  have  given 
you  an  outline  of  my  meaning. 

You  have;  and  I  shall  be  glad  to  learn  it  more  in 
detail. 

Only  grasp  it  as  a  whole  aright,  and  it  will  present 
itself  to  you  in  a  clear  light,  and  my  previous  remarks  will 
not  appear  so  strange. 

What  do  you  tell  me  to  do? 

In  the  case  of  all  seeds,  and  of  everything  that  grows, 
whether  vegetable  or  animal,  we  know  that  whatever  fails 
to  find  its  appropriate  nourishment,  season,  and  soil,  will 
lack  its  proper  virtues  the  more,  in  proportion  as  it  is 
more  vigorous.  For  evil  is,  I  presume,  more  opposed  to 
what  is  good  than  to  what  is  not  good. 

Certainly. 

Hence  1  think  we  may  reasonably  conclude  that  the 
finest  natures  get  more  harm,  than  those  of  an  inferior 
sort,  when  exposed  to  an  ungenial  nutriment. 

Yes,  we  may. 

Then  may  we  not  assert,  Adeimantus,  that  minds,  natur- 
ally of  the  highest  order,  do  in  like  manner,  if  they 
happen  to  be  ill-trained,  become  peculiarly  wicked?  Or 
do  you  think  that  great  crimes  and  unalloyed  depravity 
spring,  not,  as  I  suppose,  from  a  splendid  character  ruined 
by  improper  treatment,  but  from  a  worthless  one;  and  that 


228  THE  REPUBLIC  OP  PLATO.  [Book  VI. 

a  feeble  nature  will  ever  produce  anything  great,  whether 
good  or  evil? 

No,  I  think  with  you. 

Well  then,  the  nature  which  we  appropriated  to  the 
philosopher,  must,  I  think,  provided  it  meets  with  proper 
instruction,  grow  and  attain  to  all  excellence;  but  if  it  be 
'sown,  planted,  and  nourished  on  an  ungenial  soil,  it  is 
sure  to  run  into  the  very  opposite  vices,  unless  some  deity 
should  providentially  interpose.  Or  do  you  hold,  with  the 
multitude,  that  there  are  certain  individuals  corrupted  by 
sophists  in  their  youth,  and  certain  Sr^i^d'cal  sophists 
who  corrupt  in  a  private  capacity  to  any  considerable 
extent?  Do  you  not  rather  think  that  those  who  hold 
this  language  are  themselves  the  greatest  of  sophists,  train- 
ing most  elaborately,  and  finishing  to  their  own  liking, 
both  young  and  old,  men  and  women? 

Pray  when  ?  ** 

Whenever  they  crowd  to  tVe  popular  assembly,  the 
law-courts,  the  theatres,  the  camp,  or  any  other  public 
gathering  of  large  bodies,  and  there  sit  in  a  dense  and 
uproarious  mass  to  censure  some  of  the  things  said  or 
done,  and  applaud  others,  always  in  excess;  shouting  and 
clapping,  till,  in  addition  to  their  own  noise,  the  rocks  and 
the  place  wherein  they  are  echo  back  redoubled  the 
uproar  of  their  censure  and  applause.  At  such  a  moment, 
how  is  a  young  man,  think  you,  to  retain  his  self- 
possession?  Can  any  private  education  that  he  has  re- 
ceived hold  out  against  such  a  torrent  of  censure  and 
applause,  and  avoid  being  swept  away  down  the  stream, 
wherever  it  may  lead,  until  he  is  brought  to  adopt  the 
language  of  these  men  as  to  what  is  honourable  and 
dishonourable,  and  to  imitate  all  their  practices,  and  to 
become  their  very  counterpart? 

It  is  the  sure  consequence,  Socrates? 

However,  I  proceeded,  we  have  not  yet  mentioned  the 
surest  influence  at  work. 

What  is  that?  he  asked. 

It  is  one  which  these  schoolmasters  and  sophists,  bring 
jnto  actual  practice,  if  their  words  fail  of  success.     For 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OP  PLATO.  229 

you  cannot  be  ignorant  that  they  chastise  the  disobedient 
with  disfranchisement,  and  fines,  and  death. 

They  do,  most  decidedly. 

Then  what  other  sophist,  think  you,  or  what  private 
instructions  of  an  opposite  tenor,  can  prevail  over  these 
influences  ? 

None  can,  I  imagine. 

No,  they  cannot,  I  said;  nay,  the  very  attempt  would 
be  mere  folly.  For  there  is  not,  has  not  been,  and  indeed 
there  never  can  be,  a  character  that  will  regard  virtue 
with  different  feelings,  if  trained  in  close  contact  with  the 
education  which  popular  assemblies  impart.  I  am  speak- 
ing humanly,  my  friend;  for  by  all  means  let  us  except 
Providence,  as  the  proverb  says.  For  you  may  be  well 
assured,  that  you  will  not  be  wrong  in  asserting  that  what- 
ever has  been  preserved,  and  made  what  it  ought  to  be, 
while  the  constitution  of  states  is  what  it  ia.  has  been 
preserved  by  a  divine  interposition. 

I  am  quite  of  that  opinion. 

Then  I  would  further  have  you  add  the  following  to  the 
list  of  your  opinions. 

What  is  it? 

That  all  those  mercenary  adventurers  who,  as  we  know, 
are  called  sophists  by  the  multitude,  and  regarded  as 
rivals,  really  teach  nothing  but  the  opinions  of  the  major- 
ity to  which  expression  is  given  when  large  masses  are  col- 
lected, and  dignify  them  with  the  title  of  wisdom.  As  well 
might  a  person  investigate  the  caprices  and  desires  of 
some  huge  and  powerful  monster  in  his  keeping,  studying 
how  it  is  to  be  approached,  and  how  handled, — at  what 
times  and  under  what  circumstances  it  becomes  most 
dangerous,  or  most  gentle — on  what  *  occasions  it  is  in 
the  habit  of  uttering  its  various  cries,  and  further,  what 
sounds  uttered  by  another  person  soothe  or  exasperate  it, 
— and  when  he  has  mastered  all  these  particulars,  by  long- 
continued  intercourse,  as  well  might  he  call  his  results 
wisdom,  systematize  them  into  an  art,  and  open  a  school, 
though  in  reality  he  is  wholly  ignorant  which  of  these 
*  Beading  e#'  oZf  Inbaraq. 


230  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  Vt 

humours  and  desires  is  fair,  and  which  foul,  which  good 
and  which  evil,  which  just  and  which  unjust;  and  therefore 
is  content  to  affix  all  these  names  to  the  fancies  of  the 
huge  animal,  calling  what  it  likes  good,  and  what  it  dis- 
likes evil,  without  being  able  to  render  any  other  account 
of  them, — nay,  giving  the  titles  of  "  just "  and  "  fair  "  to 
things  done  under  compulsion,  because  he  has  not  discerned 
himself,  and  therefore  cannot  point  out  to  others,  that 
wide  distinction  which  really  holds  between  the  nature  of 
the  compulsory  and  the  good.  Tell  me,  in  heaven's  name, 
do  you  not  think  that  such  a  person  would  make  a  strange 
instructor  ? 

Yes,  I  do  think  so. 

And  do  you  think  that  there  is  any  difference  between 
such  a  person  and  the  man  \,ho  makes  wisdom  consist  in 
having  studied  the  whim  and  pleasures  of  the  assembled 
many-headed  multitude,  whether  in  painting,  or  in  music, 
or  finally  in  politics?  For  though  it  be  true,  that  if  a  man 
mix  with  the  many,  and  ask  their  judgment  on  some 
poem,  or  other  work  of  art,  or  service  rendered  to  the 
state,  thus  putting  himself  in  their  power  further  than  he 
is  obliged,  he  finds  himself  *  irresistibly  compelled  to  do 
whatever  they  command;  yet  tell  me  if  you  have  ever  in 
your  life  heard  any  one  of  them  offer  an  argument  which 
was  not  ridiculous,  to  prove  that  what  the  multitude  com- 
mands is  really  good  and  fair?  » 

No ;  and  I  think  I  never  shall. 

Then  if  you  have  laid  all  this  to  heart,  *et  me  remind 
you  of  another  point :  will  it  be  possible  for  the  multitude 
to  tolerate  or  believe  in  the  existence  of  an  essential 
beauty,  as  opposed  to  the  multiplicity  of  beautiful  objects; 
or  in  the  existence  of  any  essential  Form,  as  opposed  to 
the  variety  of  its  particular  manifestations? 

Certainly  not. 

Then  the  multitude  cannot  be  philosophical. 

It  cannot. 

And  consequently  the  professors  of  philosophy  are  sure 
to  be  condemned  by  it. 

*  'H  Atofi^deta  av&yKTj.    The  origin  of  the  proverb  is  uncertaia, 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  231 

They  are. 

And  of  course  by  those  private  adventurers  who  asso- 
ciate with  the  mob,  and  desire  to  please  it. 

Clearly. 

Such  being  the  case,  what  salvation  do  you  see  for  a 
philosophic  character  that  will  enable  it  to  persist  in  its 
vocation  till  it  has  reached  the  goal?  Take  our  previous 
conclusions  into  your  consideration ;  we  agreed,  you  know, 
that  a  quick  apprehension,  a  good  memory,  a  manly  and 
a  lofty  spirit,  are  qualities  of  the  philosophic  character. 

Yes,  we  did. 

Then,  will  not  such  a  person,  from  his  childhood,  be  first 
in  everything;  especially  if  his  bodily  are  equal  to  his 
mental  endowments? 

To  be  sure  he  will. 

Then,  I  fancy,  his  friends  and  fellow-citizens  will  wish, 
when  he  grows  older,  to  use  him  for  their  own  purposes. 

Doubtless. 

Consequently  they  will  fall  down  at  his  feet  with  prayers 
and  compliments,  securing  and  flattering  by  anticipation 
his  future  power. 

Yes,  it  is  certainly  a  common  case. 

Then  how  do  you  expect  such  a  person  to  behave  under 
these  circumstances, — above  all,  if  he  happen  to  be  a  rich 
and  high-born  member  of  a  powerful  state,  and  of  a  tall 
and  goodly  presence  besides?  Will  he  not  be  full  of  ex- 
travagant hopes,  and  conceive  himeslf  competent  to  direct 
the  affairs  of  Greeks  and  foreigners,  and  make  that  an 
excuse  for  giving  himself  lofty  airs,  till  he  is  swollen  with 
self-importance  and  empty  senseless  conceit? 

Undoubtedly  he  will. 

While  he  is  in  this  frame  of  mind,  suppose  some  one 
approaches  him  gently,  and  tells  him,  what  is  quite  true, 
that  there  is  no  real  wisdom  in  him,  and  that  he  stands  in 
need  of  it,  and  that  without  slaving  for  its  acquisition  it 
cannot  be  gained;  do  you  think  it  an  easy  matter  to  gain 
his  attention  in  the  midst  of  such  evil  influences? 

No,  it  is  very  far  from  easy. 

If,  however,  I  continued,  tbanka  to  an  excellent  natur« 


232  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  Vt 

and  an  inborn  taste  for  philosophic  inquiry,  one  suib 
individual  shall  haply  take  heed,  and  allow  himself  to  be 
bent  and  drawn  towards  philosophy,  what  do  we  think 
will  be  the  behaviour  of  those  who  count  upon  losing  his 
services  and  his  companionship?  Will  they  leave  a  word 
unsaid,  or  a  deed  undone,  that  can  possibly  prevent  the 
pupil  from  yielding,  or  the  master  from  succeeding  in  his 
persuasions, — calling  in  private  machinations  and  public 
prosecutions  ? 

Of  course,  that  is  what  they  will  do,  he  replied. 

Will  it  be  possible,  then,  for  such  a  person  to  be  a 
student  of  philosophy? 

Certainly  not. 

Thus  you  see,  do  you  noc,  how  right  we  were  in  say- 
ing, that  in  fact  the  very  ingredients  of  the  philosophic 
character,  when  subjected  to  an  injurious  treatment,  are 
in  a  manner  the  causes  of  a  man's  falling  away  from  the 
pursuit  of  philosophy;  to  which  result  the  reputed  ad- 
vantages of  wealth,  and  all  outward  pomp  and  state,  like- 
wise contribute. 

Yes,  indeed,  it  was  a  true  observation. 

This,  then,  my  excellent  friend,  is  the  ruin,  such  and 
so  grievous  is  the  corruption  of  the  finest  character  with 
reference  to  the  noblest  pursuit, — a  character  too  which  is, 
besides,  rarely  to  be  met  with,  as  we  affirm.  And  in  the 
ranks  of  this  class,  beyond  a  doubt,  are  to  be  found  both 
those  men  who  inflict  the  greatest  injury  on  states  and 
individuals,  and  also  those  who  labour  for  their  good, 
when  the  tide  turns  that  way :  whereas  a  little  mind  nevei 
influences  in  any  great  degree  either  individuals  or  states. 

That  is  very  true. 

Thus  it  comes  to  pass  that  those,  who,  as  her  nearest 
[relatives,  are  most  bound  to  espouse  Philosophy,  fall  away, 
and  leave  her  desolate  and  inconsummate ;  and  while  for 
their  part  they  live  a  life  unsuited  to  them  and  unreal, 
Philosophy,  bereft  as  it  were  of  relatives,  is  exposed  to 
the  advances  of  a  different  class  of  persons  unworthy  of 
her,  who  bring  her  to  shame,  and  fasten  on  her  those 
reproaches,  with  which  you  tell  me  she  is  loaded,  to  the 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  233 

effect  that  her  associates  are  either  worth  nothing,  or,  as 
in  the  majority  of  cases,  deserving  of  heavy  punishment. 

Why  certainly  that  is  the  common  remark. 

Yes,  I  said,  and  a  natural  remark.  For  other  puny 
men,  seeing  this  field  open,  albeit  rich  in  grand  names 
and  showy  titles,  are  only  too  thankful  to  desert  their 
trades  and  rush  into  philosophy,  like  criminals  who  break 
out  of  prison  and  run  for  refuge  to  a  temple,  whenever 
they  happen  to  shew  remarkable  address  in  their  own 
despicable  profession.  For  though  all  this  is  come  upon 
philosophy,  nevertheless  the  rank  and  splendour  which 
she  still  retains  far  transcend  those  of  any  other  pro- 
fession; and  these  are  coveted  by  many  whose  natural 
talents  were  defective  from  the  first,  and  whose  souls  have 
since  been  so  grievously  marred  and  enervated  by  their  life 
of  drudgery,  as  their  bodies  have  been  disfigured  by  their 
trades  and  crafts.     Must  not  that  be  the  case? 

Certainly  it  must. 

And  does  their  appearance  strike  you  as  much  better 
than  that  of  a  little  bald-headed  tinker,  who  has  made 
some  money,  has  had  his  chains  just  knocked  off,  has  been 
washed  in  a  bath,  dressed  out  in  a  new  coat,  and  got  up 
as  a  bridegroom,  in  which  character,  owing  to  his  master's 
poverty  and  destitution,  he  is  on  the  point  of  marrying  his 
daughter  ? 

I  see  no  difference  at  all  between  the  two  cases. 

Then  what  may  we  expect  the  issue  of  such  a  match 
to  be  like?  Will  it  not  be  a  baseborn  and  worthless 
progeny  ? 

It  cannot  be  otherwise. 

Well,  and  when  those,  who  are  all  unworthy  of  instruc- 
tion, draw  near  and  hold  intercourse  with  her  beyond  their 
deserts,  how  must  we  describe  the  character  of  those  notions 
and  opinions  which  are  the  issue  of  such  a  connexion? 
May  they  not  be  called,  with  the  utmost  propriety, 
sophisms — a  spurious  brood,  without  *  one  trace  of  genuine 
insight  ? 

Yes,  precisely  so. 

*  Omitting  A£ iov. 


234  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book    VI. 

Hence,  Adeimantus,  I  continued,  those  who  worthily 
associate  with  philosophy  form  a  very  small  remainder, 
made  up,  I  conceive,  either  of  noble  and  well-trained 
characters,  condemned  to  exile,  who,  in  the  absence  of  all 
pernicious  influences,  have  been  true  to  thjir  nature,  and 
continued  stedfast  to  philosophy;  or  of  some  large-minded 
men,  bred  in  petty  states,  who  have  looked  down  with 
contempt  upon  the  politics  of  their  country.  Possibly,  too, 
a  small  section  may  have  come  to  her  from  other  pro- 
fessions, which  natural  gifts  have  justified  them  in  de- 
spising. Moreover,  the  bridle  which  curbs  our  friend 
Theages  may  be  equally  efficacious  in  other  instances. 
For  Theages  is  kept  in  check  by  ill-health,  which  excludes 
him  from  a  public  life,  though  in  all  other  respects  he  has 
every  inducement  to  desert  philosophy.  I  need  not 
mention  the  supernatural  sign,  which  restrains  me;  for  I 
fancy  it  has  been  granted  to  few,  if  any,  before  my  time. 
Now  he  who  has  become  a  member  of  this  little  band, 
and  has  tasted  how  sweet  and  blessed  his  treasure  is,  and 
has  watched  the  madness  of  the  many,  with  the  full  assur- 
ance that  there  is  scarcely  a  person  who  takes  a  single 
judicious  step  in  his  public  life,  and  that  there  is  no  ally 
with  whom  he  may  safely  march  to  the  succour  of  the 
just ;  nay,  that,  should  he  attempt  it,  he  will  be  like  a  man 
that  has  fallen  among  wild  beasts, — unwilling  to  join  in 
their  iniquities,  and  unable  singly  to  resist  the  fury  of  all, 
and  therefore  destined  to  perish  before  he  can  be  of  any 
service  to  his  country  or  his  friends  and  do  no  good  to 
himself  or  any  one  else; — having,  I  say,  weighed  all  this, 
such  a  man  keeps  quiet  and  confines  himself  to  his  own 
concerns,  like  one  who  takes  shelter  behind  a  wall  on  a 
stormy  day,  when  the  wind  is  driving  before  it  a  hurricane 
of  dust  and  rain;  and  when  from  his  retreat  he  sees  the 
infection  of  lawlessness  spreading  over  the  rest  of  man- 
kind, he  is  well  content,  if  he  can  in  any  way  live  his  life 
here  untainted  in  his  own  person  by  unrighteousness  and 
unholy  deeds,  and,  when  the  time  for  his  release  arrives, 
take  his  departure  antid  bright  hopes  with  cheerfulness 
and  serenity. 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  235 

Well,  said  Adeimantus,  he  will  certainly  have  effected 
before  his  departure  not  the  least  important  objects. 

Nor  yet,  I  rejoined,  the  most  important,  if  he  fail  to  find 
a  political  constitution  suited  to  him;  for  under  such  a 
constitution,  he  will  not  only  himself  reach  a  higher  stage 
of  growth,  but  he  will  also  secure  his  country's  welfare 
together  with  his  own. 

Well  then,  I  continued,  the  causes  of  the  prejudice 
against  philosophy,  and  the  injustice  of  this  prejudice, 
have  in  my  opinion  been  satisfactorily  disposed  of,  unless 
you  have  anything  to  add. 

No,  I  have  nothing  more  to  say  on  this  head:  but 
which  of  the  constitutions  of  our  time  is  the  one  that  you 
call  suited  to  philosophy? 

There  is  not  one  that  I  can  call  so:  nay,  what  I  com- 
plain of  is  precisely  this,  that  no  state,  as  now  constituted, 
is  a  worthy  sphere  for  a  philosophic  nature.  Hence  that 
nature  becomes  warped  and  deteriorated.  For  just  as  the 
seed  of  a  rare  exotic  when  sown  in  a  foreign  soil,  habitu- 
ally becomes  enfeebled  and  loses  its  essential  character, 
and  eventually  passes  into  a  common  plant  of  the  country ; 
so  this  kind  of  character  at  the  present  day,  failing  to  pre- 
serve its  peculiar  virtues,  degenerates  into  tendencies  that 
are  not  its  own:  but  if  it  could  only  find  the  most  perfect 
constitution,  answering  to  itself  as  the  most  perfect  of 
characters,  it  will  then  give  proof  that  it  is  the  true  divine 
type;  whereas  all  other  kinds  of  character  and  of  vocation 
are  merely  human.  Now  I  make  no  doubt  you  will  pro- 
ceed to  ask  me  what  this  constitution  is. 

You  are  mistaken,  he  said;  what  I  was  going  to  aslc 
was,  whether  you  were  thinking  of  this  constitution,  whose 
organization  we  have  discussed,  or  of  another. 

The  same,  I  replied,  in  all  points  but  one;  and  this  one 
point  was  alluded  to  during  the  discussion,  when  we  said 
that  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  constantly  present  in 
the  state  some  authority,  that  should  view  the  constitution 
in  the  very  light  in  which  you,  the  legislator,  viewed  it, 
when  you  framed  the  laws, 


236  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI 

True,  it  was  alluded  to. 

But  it  was  not  sufficiently  developed,  because  I  was 
alarmed  by  your  objections,  which  shewed  that  the  demon- 
stration of  it  would  be  tedious  and  difficult :  for  it  is  by  no 
means  the  easiest  part  of  the  discussion  that  is  left. 

What  is  that  part? 

To  shew  in  what  way  a  state  may  handle  philosophy 
without  incurring  utter  destruction.  For  we  know  that 
all  great  things  are  hazardous,  and,  according  to  the  pro- 
verb, beautiful  things  are  indeed  hard  of  attainment. 

Nevertheless,  he  said,  let  this  point  be  cleared  up,  in 
order  that  the  demonstration  may  be  complete. 

The  hindrance,  if  any,  will  arise,  not  from  want  of  will, 
but  from  want  of  power.  My  zeal,  at  any  rate,  you  shall 
see  with  your  own  eyes.  For  observe  at  once  with  what 
reckless  zeal  I  proceed  to  assert,  that  a  state  ought  to 
deal  with  the  pursuit  of  philosophy  on  a  plan  the  very  re- 
verse of  that  now  in  vogue. 

How  so  ? 

At  present,  those  who  pursue  philosophy  at  all  are  mere 
striplings  just  emerged  from  boyhood,  who  take  it  up  in 
the  intervals  of  housekeeping  and  business;  and,  after 
just  dipping  into  the  most  abstruse  part  of  the  study,  (by 
which  I  mean  Dialectic),  abandon  the  pursuit  altogether, 
and  these  are  the  most  advanced  philosophers;  and  ever 
afterwards,  if,  on  being  invited,  they  consent  to  listen  to 
others  whose  attention  is  devoted  to  it,  they  think  it  a 
great  condescension,  because  they  imagine  that  philo- 
sophy ought  to  be  made  a  mere  secondary  occupation; 
and  on  the  approach  of  old  age,  all  but  a  very  few  are  ex- 
tinguished far  more  effectually  than  the  sun  of  Hera- 
cleitus,*  inasmuch  as  they  are  not,  like  it,  rekindled. 

And  pray  what  is  the  right  plan?  he  asked. 

Just  the  opposite.  In  youth  and  boyhood  they  ought 
to  be  put  through  a  course  of  training  in  philosophy, 
suited  to  their  years;  and  while  their  bodies  are  growing 
up  to  manhood,  especial  attention  should  be  paid  to  them, 

*  Heracleitus  is  said  to  have  believed  that  the  sun  was  ex- 
tinguished every  evening  and  rekindled  every  morning. 


Book  VI. J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  23? 

as  a  serviceable  acquisition  in  the  cause  of  philosophy. 
At  the  approach  of  that  period,  during  which  the  mind 
begins  to  attain  its  maturity,  the  mental  exercises  ought 
to  be  rendered  more  severe.  Finally,  when  their  bodily 
powers  begin  to  fail,  and  they  are  released  from  public 
duties  and  military  service,  from  that  time  forward  they 
ought  to  lead  a  dedicated  life,  and  consecrate  themselves 
to  this  one  pursuit,  if  they  are  to  live  happily  on  earthy 
and  after  death  to  crown  the  life  they  have  led  with  a 
corresponding  destiny  in  another  world. 

Well,  indeed,  Socrates,  I  do  not  doubt  your  zeal.  But 
I  expect  most  of  your  hearers,  beginning  with  Thrasy- 
machus,  to  oppose  you  with  still  greater  zeal,  and  express 
their  unqualified  dissent. 

Do  not  make  a  quarrel  between  me  and  Thrasymachus, 
when  we  have  just  become  friends; — though  I  do  not 
mean  to  say  that  we  were  enemies  before.  I  shall  leave 
nothing  untried,  until  I  have  either  won  him  over  to  my 
way  of  thinking,  along  with  the  rest,  or  have  achieved 
something  for  their  good  in  that  future  state,  should  they 
ever  happen,  in  a  second  existence,  to  encounter  similar 
discussions. 

Truly  a  trifling  adjournment !  he  exclaimed. 

Rather  speak  of  it  as  a  nothing,  compared  with  all  time. 
However,  it  need  not  surprise  us  that  most  people  disbe- 
lieve in  my  doctrines;  for  they  have  never  yet  seen  our 
present  theory  realized.  No,  what  is  much  more  likely  is, 
that  they  have  met  with  proposals  somewhat  resembling 
ours,  but  forced  expressly  into  appearing  of  a  piece  with 
one  another,  instead  of  falling  spontaneously  into  agree- 
ment, as  in  the  present  case.  They  have  never  yet  seen, 
in  either  one  or  more  instances,  a  man  moulded  into  the 
most  perfect  possible  conformity  and  likeness  to  virtue, 
both  in  words  and  in  works,  reigning  in  a  state  as  perfect 
as  himself.    Or  do  you  think  they  have? 

No,  indeed  I  do  not. 

And  further,  my  dear  friend,  they  have  not  listened 
often  enough  to  discussions  of  an  elevated  and  liberal 
tone,  confined  to  the  strenuous  investigation  of  truth  by 


238  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI. 

all  possible  means,  simply  for  the  sake  of  knowing  it;  and 
which  therefore  will,  both  in  private  disquisitions  and  in 
public  trials,  keep  at  a  respectful  distance  from  those 
subtleties  and  special  pleadings,  whose  sole  aim  it  is  to 
prolong  debate,  and  elicit  applause. 

You  are  right  again. 

It  was  for  these  reasons,  and  in  anticipation  of  these 
results,  that,  notwithstanding  my  fears,  I  was  con- 
strained by  the  force  of  truth  on  a  former  occasion  to 
assert,  that  no  state,  or  constitution,  or  individual  either, 
can  ever  become  perfect,  until  these  few  philosophers, 
who  are  at  present  described  as  useless  though  not 
depraved,  find  themselves  accidentally  compelled,  whether 
they  like  it  or  not,  to  accept  the  charge  of  a  state, 
which  in  its  turn  finds  itself  compelled  to  be  obedient  *  to 
them;  or  until  the  present  sovereigns  and  kings,  or  their 
sons,  are  divinely  inspired  with  a  genuine  love  of  genuine 
philosophy.  Now  to  assert  the  impossibility  of  both  or 
either  of  these  contingencies,  I  for  my  part  pronounce 
irrational.  If  they  are  impossible,  we  may  fairly  be  held 
up  to  derision  as  mere  visionary  theorists.  Am  I  not 
right  ? 

You  are. 

If,  then,  persons  of  first-rate  philosophical  attainments, 
either  in  the  countless  ages  that  are  past  have  been,  or  in 
some  foreign  clime,  far  beyond  the  limits  of  our  horizon, 
at  the  present  moment  are,  or  hereafter  shall  be,  con- 
strained by  some  fate  to  undertake  the  charge  of  a  state, 
I  am  prepared  to  argue  to  the  death  in  defence  of  this 
assertion,  that  the  constitution  described  has  existed, 
does  exist,  yea  and  will  exist,  wherever  the  Muse  afore- 
said has  become  mistress  of  a  state.  For  its  realization 
is  no  impossibility,  nor  are  our  speculations  impracti- 
cable; though  their  difficulty  is  even  by  us  acknowledged. 

I  am  of  the  same  opinion,  said  he. 

But  are  you  prepared  to  say,  that  the  majority,  on  the 
contrary,  entertain  a  different  opinion  ? 

Perhaps  so. 

*  Reading  mTrjudv, 


Book  VI.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  239 

My  excellent  friend,  beware  how  you  bring  so  heavy  a 
charge  against  the  multitude.  No  doubt  they  will  change 
their  minds,  if  you  avoid  controversy,  and  endeavour  with 
all  gentleness  to  remove  their  prejudice  against  the  love 
of  learning,  by  shewing  them  whom  you  understand  by 
philosophers,  and  defining,  as  we  have  just  done,  their 
nature  and  cultivation,  that  they  may  not  suppose  you  to 
mean  such  characters  as  are  uppermost  in  their  own 
thoughts;  or  shall  you  venture  to  maintain  that,  even  if 
they  look  at  them  from  your  point  of  view,  they  will  enter- 
tain a  different  opinion  from  yours,  and  return  another 
sort  of  answer?  In  other  words,  do  you  think  that  an  un- 
malicious  and  gentle  person  can  quarrel  with  one  who  is 
not  quarrelsome,  or  feel  malice  towards  one  who  is  not 
malicious?  I  will  anticipate  you  with  the  declaration 
that,  in  my  opinion,  a  disposition  so  perverse  may  be 
found  in  some  few  cases,  but  not  in  the  majority  of 
mankind. 

I  am  myself  entirely  of  your  opinion,  he  replied. 

Then  are  you  not  also  of  my  opinion  on  just  this  point, 
that  the  ill-will  which  the  multitude  bear  to  philosophy  is 
to  be  traced  to  those  who  have  forced  .their  way  in,  like 
tipsy  men,  where  they  had  no  concern,  and  who  abuse 
one  another  and  delight  in  picking  quarrels,  and  are 
always  discoursing  about  person — conduct  peculiarly  un- 
suitable to  philosophy? 

Very  unsuitable. 

For  surety,  Adeimantus,  he  who  has  his  thoughts  truly 
set  on  the  things  that  really  exist,  cannot  even  spare  time 
to  look  down  upon  the  occupations  of  men,  and,  by  dis- 
puting with  them,  catch  the  infection  of  malice  and  hos- 
tility. On  the  contrary,  he  devotes  all  his  time  to  the 
contemplation  of  certain  well-adjusted  and  changeless 
objects;  and  beholding  how  they  neither  wrong  nor  are 
wronged  by  each  other,  but  are  all  obedient  to  order  and 
in  harmony  with  reason,  he  studies  to  imitate  and  resemble 
them  as  closely  as  he  can.  Or  do  you  think  it  possible 
for  a  man  to  avoid  imitating  that  with  which  he  reverently 
associates  ? 


240  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI 

No,  it  is  impossible. 

Hence  the  philosopher,  by  associating  with  what  is  god- 
like and  orderly,  becomes,  as  far  as  is  permitted  to  man, 
orderly  and  godlike  himself:  though  here,  as  everywhere, 
there  is  room  for  misconstruction. 

Indeed,  you  are  right. 

So  that,  if  he  ever  finds  himself  compelled  to  study 
how  he  may  introduce  into  the  habits  of  men,  both  in 
public  and  in  private  life,  the  things  that  draw  his  notice 
in  that  higher  region,  and  to  mould  others  as  well  as  him- 
self, do  you  think  that  he  will  prove  an  indifferent  artist 
in  the  production  of  temperance  and  justice  and  all  public 
virtue  ? 

Certainly  not. 

Well,  but  if  the  multitude  are  made  sensible  that  our 
description  is  a  correct  one,  will  they  really  be  angry  with 
the  philosophers,  and  will  they  discredit  our  assertion, 
that  a  state  can  only  attain  to  true  happiness,  if  it  be  de- 
lineated by  painters  who  copy  the  divine  original? 

They  will  not  be  angry,  if  they  are  made  sensible  of  the 
fact.     But  pray  how  do  you  mean  them  to  sketch  it? 

They  will  take  for  their  canvas,  I  replied,  a  state  and 
the  moral  nature  of  mankind,  and  begin  by  making  a  clean 
surface;  which  is  by  no  means  an  easy  task.  However 
you  are  aware,  that  at  the  very  outset  they  will  differ  from 
all  other  artists  in  this  respect,  that  they  will  refuse  to 
meddle  with  man  or  city,  and  hesitate  to  pencil  laws,  until 
they  have  either  found  a  clear  canvas,  or  made  it  clear  by 
their  own  exertions. 

Yes,  and  they  are  right. 

In  the  next  place,  do  you  not  suppose  that  they  will 
sketch  in  outline  the  form  of  their  constitution? 

Doubtless  they  will. 

Their  next  step,  I  fancy,  will  be  to  fill  up  this  outline; 
and  in  doing  this  they  will  often  turn  their  eyes  to  this 
side  and  to  that,  first  to  the  ideal  forms  of  justice,  beauty, 
temperance,  and  the  like,  and  then  to  the  notions  current 
among  mankind;  and  thus,  by  mingling  and  combining 
the  results  of  their  studies,  they  will  work  m  tne  true 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  241 

human  complexion,  guided  by  those  realizations  of  it 
among  men,  which,  if  you  remember,  even  Homer  has 
described  as  godly  and  godlike. 

You  are  right. 

And,  I  imagine,  they  will  go  on  rubbing  out  here  and 
repainting  there,  until  they  have  done  all  in  their  power  to 
make  the  moral  character  of  men  as  pleasing  as  may  be 
in  the  eye  of  heaven. 

Well,  certainly  their  picture  will  be  a  very  beautiful  one. 

Do  we  then,  I  continued,  make  any  progress  in  per- 
suading those  assailants,  who  by  your  account  were 
marching  stoutly  to  attack  us,  that  such  a  painter  of  con- 
stitutions is  to  be  found  in  the  man  whom  we  praised 
lately  in  their  hearing,  and  who  occasioned  their  displeas- 
ure, because  we  proposed  to  deliver  up  our  cities  into  his 
hands  ?  And  do  they  feel  rather  less  exasperation  at  being 
told  the  same  thing  now? 

Yes,  much  less,  if  they  are  wise. 

I  think  so  too ;  for  pray,  how  will  they  be  able  to  dispute 
our  position?  Can  they  deny  that  philosophers  are 
enamoured  of  real  existence  and  of  truth? 

No,  it  would  be  indeed  ridiculous  to  do  that. 

Well;  can  they  maintain  that  their  character,  such  as 
we  have  described  it,  is  not  intimately  allied  to  perfection  ? 

No,  they  cannot. 

Once  more;  will  they  tell  us  that  such  a  character, 
placed  within  reach  of  its  appropriate  studies,  will  fail  to 
become  as  thoroughly  good  and  philosophical  as  any  char- 
acter can  become:"'  Or  will  they  give  the  preference  io 
those  whom  we  discarded? 

Surely  not. 

Will  they  then  persist  in  their  anger,  when  I  assert  that, 
till  the  class  of  philosophers  be  invested  with  the  supreme 
authority  in  a  state,  such  state  and  its  citizens  will  find  no 
deliverance  from  evil,  and  the  fabulous  constitution  which 
we  are  describing  will  not  be  actually  realized? 

Probably  they  will  grow  less  angry. 

What  do  you  say  to  our  assuming,  not  merely  that  they 
are  less  angry,  but  that  they  are  perfectly  pacified  and 
16 


U2  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [IIoos:  VI 

convinced,  in  order  that  we  may  shame  them  into  acqui- 
escence, if  nothing  else  will  do? 

By  all  means  assume  it. 

Well  then,  let  us  regard  these  persons  as  convinced  so 
far.  But,  in  the  next  place,  will  anybody  maintain  that 
kings  and  sovereigns  cannot  by  any  possibility  beget  sons 
gifted  with  a  philosophic  nature  ? 

No  one  in  the  world  will  maintain  that. 

And  can  any  one  assert,  that,  if  born  with  such  a  nature, 
they  must  necessarily  be  corrupted?  I  grant  that  their 
preservation  is  a  difficult  matter;  but  I  ask,  is  there  any 
one  who  will  maintain  that  in  the  whole  course  of  time  not 
one  of  all  the  number  can  ever  be  preserved  from  con- 
tamination ? 

Who  could  maintain  that? 

Well  but,  I  continued,  one  such  person,  with  a  submis- 
sive state,  has  it  in  his  power  to  realize  all  that  is  now 
discredited. 

True,  he  has. 

For,  surely,  if  a  ruler  establishes  the  laws  and  customs 
which  we  have  detailed,  it  is,  I  presume,  not  impossible 
for  the  citizens  to  consent  to  carry  them  out. 

Certainly  not. 

And,  pray,  would  it  be  a  miracle,  beyond  the  verge  of 
possibility,  if  what  we  think  right  were  thought  right  by 
others  also  ? 

For  my  part  I  think  not. 

But  I  believe  we  have  quite  convinced  ourselves,  in  the 
foregoing  discussion,  that  our  plan,  if  possible,  is  the  best. 

Yes,  quite. 

So  that  the  conclusion,  apparently,  to  which  we  are  now 
brought  with  regard  to  our  legislation,  is,  that  what  we 
propose  is  best,  if  it  can  be  realized ;  and  that  to  realize  it 
is  difficult,  but  certainly  not  impossible. 

True,  that  is  our  conclusion,  he  said. 

Well,  then,  this  part  of  the  subject  having  been  labori- 
ously completed,  shall  we  proceed  to  discuss  the  questions 
still  remaining,  in  what  way,  and  by  the  help  of  what  pur- 


Book  VI.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  243 

suits  and  studies,  we  shall  secure  the  presence  of  a  body 
of  men  capable  of  preserving  the  constitution  unimpaired, 
and  what  must  be  the  age  at  which  these  studies  are  sever- 
ally undertaken? 

Let  us  do  so  by  all  means. 

I  have  gained  nothing,  I  continued,  by  my  old  scheme 
of  omitting  the  troublesome  questions  involved  in  the 
treatment  of  the  women  and  children,  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  magistrates;  which  I  was  induced  to  leave 
out  from  knowing  what  odium  the  perfectly  correct  method 
would  incur,  and  how  difficult  it  would  be  to  carry 
into  effect.  Notwithstanding  all  my  precautions,  the 
moment  has  now  arrived  when  these  points  must  be  dis- 
cussed. It  is  true  the  question  of  the  women  and  children 
has  been  already  settled,  but  the  inquiry  concerning  the 
magistrates  must  be  pursued  quite  afresh.  In  describing 
them,  we  said,  if  you  recollect,  that,  in  order  to  place  their 
patriotism  beyond  the  reach  of  suspicion,  they  must  be 
tested  by  pleasure  and  by  pain,  and  proved  never  to  have 
deserted  their  principles  in  the  midst  of  toil  and  danger 
and  every  vicissitude  of  fortune,  on  pain  of  forfeiting  their 
position  if  their  powers  of  endurance  fail;  and  that  who- 
ever comes  forth  from  the  trial  without  a  flaw,  like  gold 
tried  in  the  fire,  must  be  appointed  to  office,  and  receive, 
during  life  and  after  death,  privileges  and  rewards.  This 
was  pretty  nearly  the  drift  of  our  language,  which,  from 
fear  of  awakening  the  question  now  pending,  turned  aside 
and  hid  its  face. 

Your  account  is  quite  correct,  he  said;  I  remember 
perfectly. 

Yes,  my  friend,  I  shrank  from  making  assertions  which 
T  have  since  hazarded;  but  now  let  me  venture  upon  this 
declaration,  that  we  must  *  make  the  most  perfect  philoso- 
phers guardians. 

We  hear  you,  he  replied. 

Now  consider  what  a  small  supply  of  these  men  you 
will,  in  all  probability,  find.  For  the  various  members  of 
that  character,  which  we  described  as  essential  to  phi- 
*  Transposing  Qulamc  and  <j>i^oa6<^ov^ 


244  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI. 

losophers,  will  seldom  grow  incorporate:  in  most  cases 
that  character  grows  disjointed. 

What  do  you  mean? 

You  are  aware  that  persons  endowed  with  a  quick  com- 
prehension, a  good  memory,  sagacity,  acuteness,  and 
their  attendant  qualities,  do  not  readily  grow  up  to  be 
at  the  same  time  so  noble  and  lofty-minded,  as  to  consent 
to  live  a  regular,  calm,  and  steady  life:  on  the  contrary, 
such  persons  are  drifted  by  their  acuteness  hither  and 
thither,  and  all  steadiness  vanishes  from  their  life. 

True. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  steady  and  invariable  char- 
acters, whose  trustiness  makes  one  anxious  to  employ  them, 
and  who  in  war  are  slow  to  take  alarm,  behave  in  the 
same  way  when  pursuing  their  studies;  that  is  to  say, 
they  are  torpid  and  stupid,  as  if  they  were  benumbed, 
and  are  constantly  dozing  and  yawning,  whenever  they 
have  to  toil  at  anything  of  the  kind. 

That  is  true. 

But  we  declare  that,  unless  a  person  possesses  a  pretty 
fair  amount  of  both  qualifications,  he  must  be  debarred 
all  access  to  the  strictest  education,  to  honour,  and  to 
government. 

We  are  right. 

Then  do  you  not  anticipate  a  scanty  supply  of  such 
characters  ? 

Most  assuredly  I  do. 

Hence  we  must  not  be  content  with  testing  their 
behaviour  in  the  toils,  dangers,  and  pleasures,  which 
we  mentioned  before;  but  we  must  go  on  to  try  them 
in  ways  which  we  then  omitted,  exercising  them  in  a 
variety  of  studies,  and  observing  whether  their  character 
will  be  able  to  support  the  highest  subjects,  or  whether  it 
will  flinch  from  the  trial,  like  those  who  flinch  under  other 
circumstances. 

No  doubt  it  is  proper  to  examine  them  in  this  way. 
But  pray  which  do  you  mean  by  the  highest  subjects  ? 

I  presume  you  remember,  that,  after  separating  the  soul 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  245 

into  three  specific  parts,  we  deduced  the  several  natures 
of  justice,  temperance,  fortitude,  and  wisdom? 

Why,  if  I  did  not  remember,  I  should  deserve  not  to 
hear  the  rest  of  the  discussion. 

Do  you  also  remember  the  remark  which  preceded  that 
deduction  ? 

Pray  what  was  it? 

We  remarked,  I  believe,  that  to  obtain  the  best  possible 
view  of  the  question,  we  should  have  to  take  a  different 
and  a  longer  route,  which  would  bring  us  to  a  thorough 
insight  into  the  subject:  still  that  it  would  be  possible  to 
subjoin  a  demonstration  of  the  question,  flowing  from  our 
previous  conclusions.  Thereupon  you  said  that  such  a 
^taseatigations,  which,  to  my  own  mind,  were  deficient  in 
investigation,  which,  to  my  own  mind,  were  deficient  in 
exactness;  but  you  can  tell  me  whether  they  contented 
you. 

Well,  to  speak  for  myself,  I  thought  them  fair  in  point 
of  measure;  and  certainly  the  rest  of  the  party  held  the 
same  opinion. 

But,  my  friend,  no  measure  of  such  a  subject,  which 
falls  perceptibly  short  of  the  truth,  can  be  said  to  be  quite 
fair:  for  nothing  imperfect  is  a  measure  of  anything: 
though  people  sometimes  fancy  that  enough  has  been 
done,  and  that  there  is  no  call  for  further  investigation. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  a  very  common  habit,  and  arises 
from  indolence. 

Yes,  but  it  is  a  habit  remarkably  undesirable  in  the 
guardian  of  a  .state  and  its  laws. 

So  I  should  suppose. 

That  .being  the  case,  my  friend,  such  a  person  must  go 
round  by  that  longer  route,  and  must  labour  as  devotedly 
in  his  studies  as  in  his  bodily  exercises.  Otherwise,  as 
we  were  saying  just  now,  he  will  never  reach  the  goal  of 
that  highest  science,  which  is  most  peculiarly  his  own. 

What !  he  exclaimed,  are  not  these  the  highest  ?  Is 
there  still  something  higher  than  justice  and  those  other 
things  which  we  have  discussed? 

Even  so,  I  replied:  and  here  we  must  not  contemplate 


246  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  Vt 

a  rude  outline,  as  we  have  been  doing:  on  the  contrary, 
we  must  be  satisfied  with  nothing  short  of  the  most  com- 
plete elaboration.  For  would  it  not  be  ridiculous  to  exert 
oneself  on  other  subjects  of  small  value,  taking  all  imagin- 
able pains  to  bring  them  to  the  most  exact  and  spotless 
perfection;  and  at  the  same  time  to  ignore  the  claim  of 
the  highest  subjects  to  a  corresponding  exactitude  of  the 
highest  order? 

The  sentiment  is  a  very  just  one.  But  do  you  suppose 
that  any  one  would  let  you  go  without  asking  what  that 
science  is  which  you  call  the  highest,  and  of  what  it 
treats  ? 

Certainly  not,  I  replied;  so  put  the  question  yourself. 
Assuredly  you  have  heard  the  answer  many  a  time;  but 
at  this  moment  either  you  have  forgotten  it,  or  else  you 
intend  to  find  me  employment  by  raising  objections. 
I  incline  to  the  latter  opinion;  for  you  have  often  been 
told  that  the  essential  Form  of  the  Good  is  the  highest 
object  of  science,  and  that  this  essence,  by  blending  with 
just  things  and  all  other  created  objects,  renders  them 
useful  and  advantageous.  And  at  this  moment  you  can 
scarcely  doubt  that  I  am  going  to  assert  this,  and  to  as- 
sert, besides,  that  we  are  not  sufficiently  acquainted  with 
this  essence.  And  if  so, — if,  I  say,  we  know  everything 
else  perfectly,  without  knowing  this, — you  are  aware  that 
it  will  profit  us  nothing;  just  as  it  would  be  equally  profit- 
less to  possess  everything  without  possessing  what  is  good. 
Or  do  you  imagine  it  would  be  a  gain  to  possess  all  pos- 
■sessible  things,  with  the  single  exception  of  things  good; 
or  to  apprehend  every  conceivable  object,  without  appre- 
hending what  is  good, — in  other  words,  to  be  destitute  of 
every  good  and  beautiful  conception? 

Not  I,  believe  me. 

Moreover,  you  doubtless  know  besides,  that  the  chief 
good  is  supposed  by  the  multitude  to  be  pleasure, — by  the 
more   enlightened,   insight  ?  * 

Of  course  I  know  that. 

And  you  are  aware,  my  friend,  that  the  advocates  of 
*  $p6vqots.    Practical  wisdom,  or  insight. 


Book  ^  I.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  247 

this  latter  opinion  are  unable  to  explain  what  they  mean 
by  insight,  and  are  compelled  at  last  to  explain  it  as 
insight  into  that  which  is  good. 

Yes,  they  are  in  a  ludicrous  difficulty. 

They  certainly  are:  since  they  reproach  us  with  igno- 
rance of  that  which  is  good,  and  then  speak  to  us  the 
next  moment  as  if  we  knew  what  it  was.  For  they  tell 
us  that  the  chief  good  is  insight  into  good,  assuming  that 
we  understand  their  meaning,  as  soon  as  they  have  uttered 
the  term  "good." 

It  is  perfectly  true. 

Again:  are  not  those,  whose  definition  identifies  pleas- 
ure with  good,  just  as  much  infected  with  error  as  the 
preceding?  For  they  are  forced  to  admit  the  existence  of 
evil  pleasures,  are  they  not? 

Certainly  they  are. 

From  which  it  follows,  I  should  suppose,  that  they 
must  admit  the  same  thing  to  be  both  good  and  evil. 
Does  it  not? 

Certainly  it  does. 

Then  is  it  not  evident  that  this  is  a  subject  often  and 
severely  disputed? 

Doubtless  it  is. 

Once  more:  is  it  not  evident,  that  though  many  per- 
sons would  be  ready  to  do  and  seem  to  do,  or  to  possess 
and  seem  to  possess,  what  seems  just  and  beautiful,  with- 
out really  being  so;  yet,  when  you  come  to  things  good, 
no  one  is  content  to  acquire  what  only  seems  such;  on 
the  contrary,  everybody  seeks  the  reality,  and  semblances 
are  here,  if  nowhere  else,  treated  with  universal  con- 
tempt ? 

Yes,  that  is  quite  evident. 

This  good,  then,  which  every  soul  pursues,  as  the  end 
of  all  its  actions,  divining  its  existence,  but  perplexed  and 
unable  to  apprehend  satisfactorily  its  nature,  or  to  enjoy 
that  steady  confidence  in  relation  to  it,  which  it  does 
enjoy  in  relation  to  other  things,  and  therefore  doomed  to 
forfeit  any  advantage  which  it  might  have  derived  from 
those  same  things; — are  we  to  maintain  that,  on  a  sub- 


248  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI. 

ject  of  such  overwhelming  importance,  the  blindness  we 
have  described  is  a  desirable  feature  in  the  character  of 
those  best  members  of  the  state  in  whose  hands  every- 
thing is  to  be  placed  ? 

Most  certainly  not. 

At  any  rate,  if  it  be  not  known  in  what  way  just  things 
and  beautiful  things  come  to  be  also  good,  I  imagine  that 
such  things  will  not  possess  a  very  valuable  guardian  in 
the  person  of  him  who  is  ignorant  on  this  point.  And  I 
surmise  that  none  will  know  the  just  and  the  beautiful 
satisfactorily  till  he  knows  the  good. 

You  are  right  in  your  surmises. 

Then  will  not  the  arrangement  of  our  constitution  be 
perfect,  provided  it  be  overlooked  by  a  guardian. who  is 
scientifically  acquainted  with  these  subjects? 

Unquestionably  it  will.  But  pray,  Socrates,  do  you 
assert  the  chief  good  to  be  science  or  pleasure  or  some- 
thing different  from  either? 

Ho,  ho,  my  friend!  I  saw  long  ago  that  you  would 
certainly  not  put  up  with  the  opinions  of  other  people  on 
these  subjects. 

Why,  Socrates,  it  appears  to  me  to  be  positively  wrong 
in  one  who  has  devoted  so  much  time  to  these  questions, 
to  be  able  to  state  the  opinions  of  others,  without  being 
able  to  state  his  own. 

Well,  I  said,  do  you  think  it  right  to  speak  with  an 
air  of  information  on  subjects  on  which  one  is  not  well- 
informed  ? 

Certainly  not  with  an  air  of  information;  but  I  think 
it  right  to  be  willing  to  state  one's  opinion  for  what  it  is 
worth. 

Well,  but  have  you  not  noticed  that  opinions  divorced 
from  science  are  all  ill-favoured?  At  the  best  they  are 
blind.  Or  do  you  conceive  that  those  who,  unaided  by 
the  pure  reason,  entertain  a  correct  opinion,  are  at  all 
superior  to  blind  men,  who  manage  to  keep  the  straight 
path? 

Not  at  all  superior,  he  replied. 

Then  is  it  your  desire  to  contemplate  objects  that  ard 


Book  VI. J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  24P 

ill-favoured,  blind,  and  crooked,  when  it  is  in  your  power 
to  learn  from  other  people  about  bright  and  beautiful 
things  ? 

I  implore  you,  Socrates,  cried  Glaucon,  not  to  hang 
back,  as  if  you  had  come  to  the  end.  We  shall  be  con- 
tent even  if  you  only  discuss  the  subject  of  the  chief  good 
in  the  style  in  which  you  discussed  justice,  temperance, 
and  the  rest. 

Yes,  my  friend,  and  I  likewise  should  be  thoroughly 
content.  But  I  distrust  my  own  powers,  and  I  feel  afraid 
that  my  awkward  zeal  will  subject  me  to  ridicule.  No, 
my  good  sirs:  let  us  put  aside,  for  the  present  at  any 
rate,  all  inquiry  into  the  real  nature  of  the  chief  good. 
For,  methinks,  it  is  beyond  the  measure  of  this  our 
enterprize  to  find  the  way  to  what  is,  after  all,  only  my 
present  opinion  on  the  subject.  But  I  am  willing  to  talk 
to  you  about  that  which  appears  to  be  an  off-shoot  of  the 
chief  good,  and  bears  the  strongest  resemblance  to  it, 
provided  it  is  also  agreeable  to  you;  but  if  it  is  not,  I  will 
let  it  alone. 

Nay,  tell  us  about  it,  he  replied.  You  shall  remain  in 
our  debt  for  an  account  of  the  parent. 

I  wish  that  I  could  pay,  and  you  receive,  the  parent 
sum,  instead  of  having  to  content  ourselves  with  the 
interest  springing  from  it.  However,  here  I  present 
you  with  the  fruit  and  scion  of  the  essential  good.  Only 
take  care  that  I  do  not  involuntarily  impose  upon  you  by 
handing  in  a  forged  account  of  this  offspring. 

We  will  take  all  the  care  we  can ;  only  proceed. 

I  will  do  so,  as  soon  as  we  have  come  to  a  settlement 
together,  and  you  have  been  reminded  of  certain  state- 
ments made  in  a  previous  part  of  our  conversation,  and 
renewed  before  now  again  and  again. 

Pray  what  statements? 

In  the  course  of  the  discussion  we  have  distinctly  main- 
tained the  existence  of  a  multiplicity  of  things  that  are 
beautiful,  and  good,  and  so  on. 

True,  we  have. 

And  also  the  existence  of  an  essential  beauty,  and  an 


250  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VL 

essential  good,  and  so  on; — reducing  all  those  things 
which  before  we  regarded  as  manifold,  to  a  single  form 
and  a  single  entry  in  each  case,  and  addressing  each  as 
an  independent  being. 

Just  so. 

And  we  assert  that  the  former  address  themselves  to 
the  eye,  and  not  to  the  pure  reason;  whereas  the  forms 
address  themselves  to  the  reason,  and  not  to  the  eye. 

Certainly. 

Now  with  what  part  of  ourselves  do  we  see  visible 
objects? 

With  the  eyesight. 

In  the  same  way  we  hear  sounds  with  the  hearing,  and 
perceive  everything  sensible  with  the  other  senses,  do  we 
not? 

Certainly. 

Then  have  you  noticed  with  what  transcendent  costli- 
ness the  architect  of  the  senses  has  wrought  out  the  faculty 
of  seeing  and  being  seen? 

Not  exactly,  he  replied. 

Well  then,  look  at  it  in  this  light.  Is  there  any  other 
kind  of  thing,  which  the  ear  and  the  voice  require,  to 
enable  the  one  to  hear,  and  the  other  to  be  heard,  in  the 
absence  of  which  third  thing  the  one  will  not  hear,  and 
the  other  will  not  be  heard? 

No,  there  is  not. 

And  I  believe  that  very  few,  if  any,  of  the  other  senses 
require  any  such  third  thing.  Can  you  mention  one  that 
does? 

No,  I  cannot. 

But  do  you  not  perceive  that,  in  the  case  of  vision  and 
visible  objects,  there  is  a  demand  for  something  additional  ? 

How  so? 

Why,  granting  that  vision  is  seated  in  the  eye,  and  that 
the  owner  of  it  is  attempting  to  use  it,  and  that  colour  is 
resident  in  the  objects,  still,  unless  there  be  present  a 
third  kind  of  thing,  devoted  to  this  especial  purpose,  you 
are  aware  that  the  eyesight  will  see  nothing,  and  the 
colours  will  be  invisible. 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  251 

Pray  what  is  the  third  thing  to  which  you  refer? 

Of  course  I  refer  to  what  you  call  light. 

You  are  right. 

Hence  it  appears,  that  of  all  the  pairs  aforesaid,  the 
sense  of  sight,  and  the  faculty  of  being  seen,  are  coupled 
by  the  noblest  link,  whose  nature  is  anything  but  insignifi- 
cant, unless  light  is  an  ignoble  thing. 

No,  indeed ;  it  is  very  far  from  being  ignoble. 

To  whom,  then,  of  the  gods  in  heaven  can  you  refer  as 
the  author  and  dispenser  of  this  blessing?  And  whose 
light  is  it  that  enables  our  sight  to  see  so  excellently  well, 
and  makes  visible  objects  appear? 

There  can  be  but  one  opinion  on  the  subject,  he  replied : 
your  question  evidently  alludes  to  the  sun. 

Then  the  relation  subsisting  between  the  eyesight  and 
this  deity  is  of  the  following  nature,  is  it  not  ? 

Describe  it. 

Neither  the  sight  itself,  nor  the  eye,  which  is  the  seat  of 
sight,  can  be  identified  with  the  sun. 

Certainly  not. 

And  yet,  of  all  the  organs  of  sensation,  the  eye,  me- 
thinks,  bears  the  closest  resemblance  to  the  sun. 

Yes,  quite  so. 

Further,  is  not  the  faculty  which  the  eye  possesses  dis- 
pensed to  it  from  the  sun,  and  held  by  it  as  something 
adventitious  ? 

Certainly  it  is. 

Then  is  it  not  also  true,  that  the  sun,  though  not  iden- 
tical with  sight,  is  nevertheless  the  cause  of  sight,  and  is 
moreover  seen  by  its  aid? 

Yes,  quite  true. 

Well  then,  I  continued,  believe  that  I  meant  the  sun, 
when  I  spoke  of  the  offspring  of  the  chief  good,  begotten 
by  it  in  a  certain  resemblance  to  itself, — that  is  to  say, 
bearing  the  same  relation  in  the  visible  world  to  sight  and 
its  objects,  which  the  chief  good  bears  in  the  intellectual 
world  to  pure  reason  and  its  objects. 

How  so?  Be  so  good  as  to  explain  it  to  me  more  at 
length, 


252  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI, 

Are  you  aware,  that  whenever  a  person  makes  an  end  of 
looking  at  objects,  upon  which  the  light  of  day  is  shed- 
ding colour,  and  looks  instead  at  objects  coloured  by  the 
light  of  the  moon  and  stars,  his  eyes  grow  dim  and  appear 
almost  blind,  as  if  they  were  not  the  seat  of  distinct  vision  ? 

I  am  fully  aware  of  it. 

But  whenever  the  same  person  looks  at  object*  on 
which  the  sun  is  shining,  these  very  eyes,  I  believe,  see 
clearly,  and  are  evidently  the  seat  of  distinct  vision? 

Unquestionably  it  is  so. 

Just  in  the  same  way  understand  the  condition  of  the 
soul  to  be  as  follows.  Whenever  it  has  fastened  upon  an 
object,  over  which  truth  and  real  existence  are  shining,  it 
seizes  that  object  by  an  act  of  reason,  and  knows  it,  and 
thus  proves  itself  to  be  possessed  of  reason:  but  whenever 
it  has  fixed  upon  objects  that  are  blent  with  darkness, — 
the  world  of  birth  and  death, — then  it  rests  in  opinion,  and 
its  sight  grows  dim,  as  its  opinions  shift  backwards  and 
forwards,  and  it  has  the  appearance  of  being  destitute  of 
reason. 

True,  it  has. 

Now,  this  power,  which  supplies  the  objects  of  real 
knowledge  with  the  truth  that  is  in  them,  and  which  ren- 
ders to  him  who  knows  them  the  faculty  of  knowing  them, 
you  must  consider  to  be  the  essential  Form  of  Good,  and 
you  must  regard  it  as  the  origin  of  science,  and  of  truth,  so 
far  as  the  latter  comes  within  the  range  of  knowledge :  and 
though  knowledge  and  truth  are  both  very  beautiful  things, 
you  will  be  right  in  looking  upon  good  as  something  dis- 
tinct from  them,  and  even  more  beautiful.  And  just  as,  in 
the  analogous  case,  it  is  right  to  regard  light  and  vision  as 
resembling  the  sun,  but  wrong  to  identify  them  with  the 
sun ;  so,  in  the  case  of  science  and  truth,  it  is  right  to  re- 
gard both  of  them  as  resembling  good,  but  wrong  to  iden- 
tify either  of  them  with  good ;  because,  on  the  contrary,  the 
quality  of  tf/e  good  ought  to  have  a  still  higher  value  set 
upon  it. 

That  implies  an  inexpressible  beauty,  if  it  not  only  is 
the  source  of  science  and  truth,  but  also  surpasses  them 


Book  VI.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  253 

in  beauty ;  for,  I  presume,  you  do  not  mean  by  it  pleasure. 

Hush!  I  exclaimed,  not  a  word  of  that.  But  you  had 
better  examine  the  illustration  further,  as  follows. 

Shew  me  how. 

I  think  you  will  admit  that  the  sun  ministers  to  visible 
objects,  not  only  the  faculty  of  being  seen,  but  also  their 
vitality,  growth,  and  nutriment,  though  it  is  not  itself 
equivalent  to  vitality. 

Of  course  it  is  not. 

Then  admit  that,  in  like  manner,  the  objects  of  knowl- 
edge not  only  derive  from  the  good  the  gift  of  being  known, 
but  are  further  endowed  by  it  with  a  real  and  essential 
existence;  though  the  good,  far  from  being  identical  with 
real  existence,  actually  transcends  it  in  dignity  and  power. 

Hereupon  Glaucon  exclaimed  with  a  very  amusing  air, 
Good  heavens !  what  a  miraculous  superiority ! 

Well,  I  said,  you  are  the  person  to  blame,  because  you 
jompel  me  to  state  my  opinions  on  the  subject. 

Nay,  let  me  entreat  you  not  to  stop,  till  you  have  at  all 
events  gone  over  again  your  similitude  of  the  sun,  if  you 
are  leaving  anything  out. 

Well,  to  say  the  truth,  I  am  leaving  out  a  great  deal. 

Then  pray  do  not  omit  even  a  trifle. 

I  fancy  I  shall  leave  much  unsaid;  however,  if  I  can 
h^ly)  it  under  the  circumstances,  I  will  not  intentionally 
nvatce  any  omission. 

Pray  do  not. 

Now  understand  that,  according  to  us,  there  are  two 
powers  reigning,  one  over  an  intellectual,  and  the  other 
over  a  visible  region  and  class  of  objects ; — if  I  were  to  use 
tbfc  term  "  firmament *  *  you  might  think  I  was  playing  on 
thfl  word.  Well  then,  are  you  in  possession  of  these  as 
two  kinds, — one  visible,  the  other  intellectual? 

Yes,  I  am. 

Suppose  you"  take  a  line  divided  into  two  unequal  parts, 

*  The  play  upon  to  oparbv,  "  the  visible,"  and  ovpavbc,  "  heaven," 
cannot  be  represented  in  English.  The  meaniDg  apparently  is, 
'-**  I  do  not  use  the  term  ovpavdc,  lest  you  should  suppose  that  I 
wish  to  connect  it  etymologically  rvith  d/*W 


254  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  V. 

— one  to  represent  the  visible  class  of  objects,  the  other  the 
intellectual, — and  divide  each  part  again  into  two  seg- 
ments on  the  same  scale.  Then,  if  you  make  the  lengths 
of  the  segments  represent  degrees  of  distinctness  or  indis- 
tinctness, one  of  the  two  segments  of  the  part  which  stands 
for  the  visible  world  will  represent  all  images: — meaning 
by  images,  first  of  all,  shadows;  and,  in  the  next  place, 
reflections  in  water,  and  in  close-grained,  smooth,  bright 
substances,  and  everything  of  the  kind,  if  you  understand 
me. 

Yes,  I  do  understand. 

Let  the  other  segment  stand  for  the  real  objects  corre- 
sponding to  these  images, — namely,  the  animals  about  us, 
and  the  whole  world  of  nature  and  of  art. 

Very  good. 

Would  you  also  consent  to  say  that,  with  reference  to 
this  class,  there  is,  in  point  of  truth  and  untruthfulness, 
the  same  distinction  between  the  copy  and  the  original, 
that  there  is  between  what  is  matter  of  opinion  and  what 
is  matter  of  knowledge? 

Certainly  I  should. 

Then  let  us  proceed  to  consider  how  we  must  divide 
that  part  of  the  whole  line  which  represents  the  intel- 
lectual world. 

How  must  we  do  it  ? 

Thus:  one  segment  of  it  will  represent  what  the  soul  is 
compelled  to  investigate  by  the  aid  of  the  segments  of  the 
other  part,  which  it  employs  as  images,  starting  from 
hypotheses,  and  travelling  not  to  a  first  principle,  but  to  a 
conclusion.  The  other  segment  will  represent  the  objects 
of  the  soul,  as  it  makes  its  way  from  an  hypothesis  to  a 
first  principle  *  which  is  not  hypothetical,  unaided  by 
those  images  which  the  former  division  employs,  and! 
shaping  its  journey  by  the  sole  help  of  real  essential 
forms. 

I  have  not  understood  your  description  so  well  as  I  could 
wish. 

Then  we  will  try  again.    You  will  understand  me  more 
*  Omitting  to  before  in'  aptf*. 


Book  V.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  255 

easily  when  I  have  made  some  previous  observations.  I 
think  you  know  that  the  students  of  subjects  like  geo- 
metry and  calculation,  assume  by  way  of  materials,  in 
each  investigation,  all  odd  and  even  numbers,  figures, 
three  kinds  of  angles,  and  other  similar  data.  These 
things  they  are  supposed  to  know,  and  having  adopted 
them  as  hypotheses,  they  decline  to  give  any  account  of 
them,  either  to  themselves  or  to  others,  on  the  assumption 
that  they  are  self-evident;  and,  making  these  their  start- 
ing point,  they  proceed  to  travel  through  the  remainder  of 
the  subject,  and  arrive  at  last,  with  perfect  unanimity,  at 
that  which  they  have  proposed  as  the  object  of  investiga- 
tion. 

I  am  perfectly  aware  of  the  fact,  he  replied. 

Then  you  also  know  that  they  summon  to  their  aid  visi- 
ble forms,  and  discourse  about  them,  though  their  thoughts 
are  busy  not  with  these  forms,  but  with  their  originals, 
and  though  they  discourse  not  with  a  view  to  the  particular 
square  and  diameter  which  they  draw,  but  with  a  view  to 
the  absolute  square  and  the  absolute  diameter,  and  so  on. 
For  while  they  employ  by  way  of  images  those  figures  and 
diagrams  aforesaid,  which  again  have  their  shadows  and 
images  in  water,  they  are  really  endeavouring  to  behold 
those  abstractions  which  a  person  can  only  see  with  the 
eye  of  thought. 

True. 

This,  then,  was  the  class  of  things  which  I  called  intel- 
lectual; but  I  said  that  the  soul  is  constrained  to  employ 
hypotheses  while  engaged  in  the  investigation  of  them, — 
not  travelling  to  a  first  principle,  (because  it  is  unable  to 
step  out  of,  and  mount  above,  its  hypotheses,)  but  using, 
as  images,  just  the  copies  that  are  presented  by  things 
below, — which  copies,  as  compared  with  the  originals,  are 
vulgarly  esteemed  distinct  and  valued  accordingly. 

I  understand  you  to  be  speaking  of  the  subject-matter 
of  the  various  branches  of  geometry  and  the  kindred  arts. 

Again,  by  the  second  segment  of  the  intellectual  world 
understand  me  to  mean  all  that  the  mere  reasoning  procerst 
apprehends  by  the  force  of  dialectic,  when  it  avails  itself 


256  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VI 

of  hypotheses  not  as  first  principles,  but  as  genuine  hypo- 
theses, that  is  to  say,  as  stepping-stones  and  impulses, 
whereby  it  may  force  its  way  up  to  something  that  is  not 
hypothetical,  and  arrive  at  the  first  principle  of  every  thing, 
and  seize  it  in  its  grasp ;  which  done,  it  turns  round,  and 
takes  hold  of  that  which  takes  hold  of  this  first  principle, 
till  at  last  it  comes  down  to  a  conclusion,  calling  in  the  aid 
of  no  sensible  object  whatever,  but  simply  employing 
abstract,  self-subsisting  forms,  and  terminating  in  the 
same. 

I  do  not  understand  you  so  well  as  I  could  wish,  for  I 
believe  you  to  be  describing  an  arduous  task;  but  at  any 
rate  I  understand  that  you  wish  to  declare  distinctly,  that 
the  field  of  real  existence  and  pure  intellect,  as  contem- 
plated by  the  science  of  dialectic,  is  more  certain  than  the 
field  investigated  by  what  are  called  the  arts,  in  which 
hypotheses  constitute  first  principles,  which  the  students 
are  compelled,  it  is  true,  to  contemplate  with  the  mind 
and  not  with  the  senses;  but,  at  the  same  time,  as  they 
do  not  come  back,  in  the  course  of  inquiry,  to  a  first  prin- 
ciple, but  push  on  from  hypothetical  premises,  you  think 
that  they  do  not  exercise  pure  reason  on  the  questions 
that  engage  them,  although  taken  in  connexion  with  a 
first  principle  these  questions  come  within  the  domain  of 
the  pure  reason.  And  I  believe  you  apply  the  term  un- 
derstanding, not  pure  reason,  to  the  mental  habit  of  such 
people  as  geometricians, — regarding  understanding  as 
something  intermediate  between  opinion  and  pure  reason. 

You  have  taken  in  my  meaning  most  satisfactorily ;  and 
I  beg  you  will  accept  these  four  mental  states,  as  corre- 
sponding to  the  four  segments, — namely,  pure  reason  cor- 
responding to  the  highest,  understanding  to  the  second, 
belief  to  the  third,  and  conjecture  to  the  last;  and  pray 
arrange  them  in  gradation,  and  believe  them  to  partake  of 
distinctness  in  a  degree  corresponding  to  the  truth  of  their 
respective  objects. 

I  understand  you,  said  he.  I  quite  agree  with  you,  and 
will  arrange  them  as  you  desire. 


Book  VII.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO  267 


book  vn. 

Now  then,  I  proceeded  to  say,  go  on  to  compare  our  nat- 
ural condition,  so  far  as  education  and  ignorance  are  con- 
cerned, to  a  state  of  things  like  the  following.  Imagine 
a  number  of  men  living  in  an  underground  cavernous 
chamber,  with  an  entrance  open  to  the  light,  extending 
along  the  entire  length  of  the  cavern,  in  which  they  have 
been  confined,  from  their  childhood,  with  their  legs  and 
necks  so  shackled,  that  they  are  obliged  to  sit  still  and 
look  straight  forwards,  because  their  chains  render  it  im- 
possible for  them  to  turn  their  heads  round :  and  imagine 
a  bright  fire  burning  some  way  off,  above  and  behind  them, 
and  an  elevated  roadway  passing  between  the  fire  and  the 
prisoners,  with  a  low  wall  built  along  it,  like  the  screens 
which  conjurors  put  up  in  front  of  their  audience,  and 
above  which  they  exhibit  their  wonders.      ,-    - 

I  have  it,  he  replied. 

Also  figure  to  yourself  a  number  of  persons  walking  be- 
hind this  wall,  and  carrying  with  them  statues  of  men,  and 
images  of  other  animals,  wrought  in  wood  and  stone  and 
all  kinds  of  materials,  together  with  various  other  articles, 
which  overtop  the  wall;  and,  as  you  might  expect,  let 
some  of  the  passers-by  be  talking,  and  others  silent. 

You  are  describing  a  strange  scene,  and  strange  prison- 
ers. 

They  resemble  us,  I  replied.  For  let  me  ask  you,  in 
the  first  place,  whether  persons  so  confined  could  have 
seen  anything  of  themselves  or  of  each  other,  beyond  the 
shadows  thrown  by  the  fire  upon  the  part  of  the  cavern 
facing  them? 

Certainly  not,  if  you  suppose  them  to  have  been  com- 
pelled all  their  lifetime  to  keep  their  heads  unmoved. 

And  is  not  their  knowledge  of  the  things  carried  past 
them  equally  limited? 
*7 


258  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VII 

Unquestionably  it  is. 

And  if  they  were  able  to  converse  with  one  another,  do 
you  not  think  that  they  would  be  in  the  habit  of  giving 
names  to  the  objects  which  they  saw  before  them? 

Doubtless  they  would. 

Again:  if  their  prison-house  returned  an  echo  from  the 
part  facing  them,  whenever  one  of  the  passers-by  opened 
his  lips,  to  what,  let  me  ask  you,  could  they  refer  the 
voice,  if  not  to  the  shadow  which  was  passing  ? 

Unquestionably  they  would  refer  it  to  that. 

Then  surely  such  persons  would  hold  the  shadows  of 
those  manufactured  articles  to  be  the  only  realities. 

Without  a  doubt  they  would.  -* 

Now  consider  what  would  happen  if  the  course  of  natur* 
brought  them  a  release  from  their  fetters,  and  a  remedy 
for  their  foolishness,  in  the  following  manner.  Let  us  sup- 
pose that  one  of  them  has  been  released,  and  compelled 
suddenly  to  stand  up,  and  turn  his  neck  round  and  walk 
with  open  eyes  towards  the  light;  and  let  us  suppose  that 
he  goes  through  all  these  actions  with  pain,  and  that  the 
dazzling  splendour  renders  him  incapable  of  discerning 
those  objects  of  v/hich  he  used  formerly  to  see  the  shadows. 
What  answer  should  you  expect  him  to  make,  if  some  one 
were  to  tell  him  that  in  those  days  he  was  watching  foolish 
phantoms,  but  that  now  he  is  somewhat  nearer  to  reality, 
and  is  turned  towards  things  more  real,  and  sees  more 
correctly;  above  all,  if  he  were  to  point  out  to  him  the 
several  objects  that  are  passing  by,  and  question  him,  and 
compel  him  to  answer  what  they  are?  Should  you  not 
expect  him  to  be  puzzled,  and  to  regard  his  old  visions  as 
truer  than  the  objects  now  forced  upon  his  notice  ? 

Yes,  much  truer. 

And  if  he  were  further  compelled  to  gaze  at  the  light 
itself,  would  not  his  eyes,  think  you,  be  distressed,  and 
would  he  not  shrink  and  turn  away  to  the  things  which  he 
could  see  distinctly,  and  consider  them  to  be  really  clearer 
than  the  things  pointed  out  to  him  ? 

Just  so. 

And  if  some  one  were  to  drag  him  violently  up  the 


Book  VII.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  259 

rough  and  steep  ascent  from  the  cavern,  and  refuse  to  let 
him  go  till  he  had  drawn  him  out  into  the  light  of  the  sun, 
would  he  not,  think  you,  be  vexed  and  indignant  at  such 
treatment,  and  on  reaching  the  light,  would  he  not  find 
his  eyes  so  dazzled  by  the  glare  as  to  be  incapable  of  mak- 
ing out  so  much  as  one  of  the  objects  that  are  now  called 
true? 

Yes,  he  would  find  it  so  at  first. 

Hence,  I  suppose,  habit  will  be  necessary  to  enable  him 
to  perceive  objects  in  that  upper  world.  At  first  he  will  be 
most  successful  in  distinguishing  shadows;  then  he  will 
discern  the  reflections  of  men  and  other  things  in  water, 
and  afterwards  the  realities;  and  after  this  he  will  raise 
his  eyes  to  encounter  the  light  of  the  moon  and  stars,  find- 
ing it  less  difficult  to  study  the  heavenly  bodies  and  the 
heaven  itself  by  night,  than  the  sun  and  the  sun's  light  by 
day. 

Doubtless. 

Last  of  all,  I  imagine,  he  will  be  able  to  observe  and 
contemplate  the  nature  of  the  sun,  not  as  it  appears  in 
water  or  on  alien  ground,  but  as  it  is  in  itself  in  its  own 
territory. 

Of  course. 

His  next  step  will  be  to  draw  the  conclusion,  that  the 
sun  is  the  author  of  the  seasons  and  the  years,  and  the 
guardian  of  all  things  in  the  visible  world,  and  in  a  man- 
ner the  cause  of  all  those  things  which  he  and  his  com- 
panions used  to  see. 

Obviously,  this  will  be  his  next  step. 

What  then?  When  he  recalls  to  mind  his  first  habita- 
tion, and  the  wisdom  of  the  place,  and  his  old  fellow- 
prisoners,  do  you  not  think  he  will  congratulate  himself 
on  the  change,  and  pity  them  ? 

Assuredly  he  will. 

And  if  it  was  their  practice  in  those  days  to  receive 
honour  and  commendations  one  from  another,  and  to  give 
prizes  to  him  who  had  the  keenest  eye  for  a  passing  ob- 
ject, and  who  remembered  best  all  that  used  to  precede 
and  follow  and  accompany  it,  and  from  these  data  divined 


260  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         [Book  Vlt 

most  ably  what  was  going  to  come  next,  do  you  fancy  thfrf 
he  will  covet  these  prizes,  and  envy  those  who  receive 
honour  and  exercise  authority  among  them?  Do  you  nt»t 
rather  imagine  that  he  will  feel  what  Homer  describe^ 
and  wish  extremely 

"  To  drudge  on  the  lands  of  a  master, 
Under  a  portionless  wight," 

and  be  ready  to  go  through  anything,  rather  than  enter- 
tain those  opinions,  and  live  in  that  fashion? 

For  my  own  part,  he  replied,  I  am  quite  of  that  opinion. 
I  believe  he  would  consent  to  go  through  anything  rather 
than  live  in  that  way. 

And  now  consider  what  would  happen  if  such  a  man 
were  to  descend  again  and  seat  himself  on  his  old  seat? 
Coming  so  suddenly  out  of  the  sun,  would  he  not  find  his 
eyes  blinded  with  the  gloom  of  the  place  ? 

Certainly,  he  would. 

And  if  he  were  forced  to  deliver  his  opinion  again, 
touching  the  shadows  aforesaid,  and  to  enter  the  lists 
against  those  who  had  always  been  prisoners,  while  his 
sight  continued  dim,  and  his  eyes  unsteady, — and  if  this 
process  of  initiation  lasted  a  considerable  time, — would 
he  not  be  made  a  laughingstock,  and  would  it  not  be  said 
of  him,  that  he  had  gone  up  only  to  come  back  again  with 
his  eyesight  destroyed,  and  that  it  was  not  worth  while 
even  to  attempt  the  ascent?  And  if  any  one  endeavoured 
to  set  them  free  and  carry  them  to  the  light,  would  they 
not  go  so  far  as  to  put  him  to  death,  if  they  could  only 
manage  to  get  him  into  their  power? 

Yes,  that  they  would. 

"Now  this  imaginary  case,  my  dear  Glaucon,  you  must 
apply  in  all  its  parts  to  our  former  statements,  by  com- 
paring the  region  which  the  eye  reveals,  to  the  prison- 
house,  and  the  light  of  the  fire  therein  to  the  power  of  the 
sun:  and  if,  by  the  upward  ascent  and  the  contemplation 
of  the  upper  world,  you  understand  the  mounting  of  the 
soul  into  the  intellectual  region,  you  will  hit  the  tendency 


Book  VIL]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  261 

of  my  own  surmises,  since  you  desire  to  be  told  what  they 
are;  though,  indeed,  God  only  knows  whether  they  are 
correct.  But,  be  that  as  it  may,  the  view  which  I  take  of 
the  subject  is  to  the  following  effect.  In  the  world  of 
knowledge,  the  essential  Form  of  Good  is  the  limit  of  our 
inquiries,  and  can  barely  be  perceived;  but,  when  per- 
ceived, we  cannot  help  concluding  that  it  is  in  every  case 
the  source  of  all  that  is  bright  and  beautiful, — in  the 
visible  world  giving  birth  to  light  and  its  master,  and  in 
the  intellectual  world  dispensing,  immediately  and  with 
full  authority,  truth  and  reason; — and  that  whosoever 
would  act  wisely,  either  in  private  or  in  public,  must  set 
thif  Form  of  Good  before  his  eyes. 

To  the  best  of  my  power,  said  he,  I  quite  agree  with 
you. 

That  being  the  case,  I  continued,  pray  agree  with  me  on 
another  point,  and  do  not  be  surprised,  that  those  who 
have  climbed  so  high  are  unwilling  to  take  a  part  in  the 
affairs  of  men,  because  their  souls  are  ever  loath  to  desert 
that  upper  region.  For  how  could  it  be  otherwise,  if  the 
preceding  simile,  is  indeed  a  correct  representation  of  their 
case? 

True,  it  could  scarcely  be  otherwise. 

Well:  do  you  think  it  a  marvellous  thing,  that  a  per- 
son, who  has  just  quitted  the  contemplation  of  divine 
objects  for  the  study  of  human  infirmities,  should  betray 
awkwardness,  and  appear  very  ridiculous,  when  with  his 
sight  still  dazed,  and  before  he  has  become  sufficiently 
habituated  to  the  darkness  that  reigns  around,  he  finds 
himself  compelled  to  contend  in  courts  of  law,  or  else- 
where, about  the  shadows  of  justice,  or  images  which 
throw  the  shadows,  and  to  enter  the  lists  in  questions  in- 
volving the  arbitrary  suppositions  entertained  by  those 
who  have  never  yet  had  a  glimpse  of  the  essential  features 
cf  justice? 

No,  it  is  anything  but  marvellous. 

Right:  for  a  sensible  man  will  recollect  that  the  eyes 
may  be  confused  in  two  distinct  ways  and  from  two  dis- 
tinct causes, — that  is  to  say,  by  sudden  transitions  either 


262  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VII 

from  light  to  darkness,  or  from  darkness  to  light.  And, 
believing  the  same  idea  to  be  applicable  to  the  soul,  when- 
ever such  a  person  sees  a  case  in  which  the  mind  is  per- 
plexed and  unable  to  distinguish  objects,  he  will  not  laugh 
irrationally,  but  he  will  examine  whether  it  has  just  quitted 
a  brighter  life,  and  has  been  blinded  by  the  novelty  of 
darkness,  or  whether  it  has  come  from  the  depths  of  igno- 
rance into  a  more  brilliant  life,  and  has  been  dazzled  by 
the  unusual  splendour;  and  not  till  then  will  he  congratu- 
late the  one  upon  its  life  and  condition,  and  compassionate 
the  other;  and  if  he  chooses  to  laugh  at  it,  such  laughter 
will  be  less  ridiculous  than  that  which  is  raised  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  soul  that  has  descended  from  the  light  of  a 
higher  region. 

You  speak  with  great  judgment. 

Hence,  if  this  be  true,  we  cannot  avoid  adopting  the 
belief,  that  the  real  nature  of  education  is  at  variance  with 
the  account  given  of  it  by  certain  of  its  professors,  who 
pretend,  I  believe,  to  infuse  into  the  mind  a  knowledge  of 
which  it  was  destitute,  just  as  sight  might  be  instilled  into 
blinded  eyes. 

True;  such  are  their  pretensions. 

Whereas,  our  present  argument  shews  us  that  there  is  a 
faculty  residing  in  the  soul  of  each  person,  and  an  instru- 
ment enabling  each  of  us  to  learn;  and  that,  just  as  we 
might  suppose  it  to  be  impossible  to  turn  the  eye  round 
from  darkness  to  light  without  turning  the  whole  body,  so 
must  his  faculty,  or  this  instrument,  be  wheeled  round,  in 
company  with  the  entire  soul,  from  the  perishing  world, 
until  it  be  enabled  to  endure  the  contemplation  of  the  real 
world  and  the  brightest  part  thereof,  which,  according  to 
us,  is  the  Form  of  Good.    Am  I  not  right  ? 

You  are. 

Hence,  I  continued,  this  very  process  of  revolution 
must  give  rise  to  an  art,  teaching  in  what  way  the  change 
will  most  easily  and  most  effectually  be  brought  about. 
Its  object  will  not  be  to  generate  in  the  person  the  power 
of  seeing.  On  the  contrary,  it  assumes  that  he  possesses 
it,  though  he  is  turned  in  a  wrong  direction,  and  does  not 


Book  VII.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  263 

look  towards  the  right  qn  rter;  and  its  aim  is  to  remedy 
this  defect. 

So  it  would  appear. 

Hence,  while,  on  the  ovt  hand,  the  other  so-called  vir- 
tues of  the  soul  seem  to  resemble  those  of  the  body,  inas- 
much as  they  really  do  not  pre-exist  in  the  soul,  but  are 
formed  in  it  in  the  course  of  time  by  habit  and  exercise; 
the  virtue  of  wisdom,  on  the  other  hand,  does  most  cer- 
tainly appertain,  as  it  would  appear,  to  a  more  divine  sub- 
stance, which  never  loses  its  energy,  but  by  change  of 
position  becomes  useful  and  serviceable,  or  else  remains 
useless  and  injurious.  For  you  must,  ere  this,  have 
noticed  how  keen-sighted  are  the  puny  souls  of  those  who 
have  the  reputation  of  being  clever  but  vicious,  and  how 
sharply  they  see  through  the  things  to  which  they  are 
directed,  thus  proving  that  their  powers  of  vision  are  by 
no  means  feeble,  though  they  have  been  compelled  to  be- 
come the  servants  of  wickedness,  so  that  the  more  sharply 
they  see,  the  more  numerous  are  the  evils  which  they  work. 
Yes,  indeed  it  is  the  case. 

But,  I  proceeded,  if  from  earliest  childhood  these  char- 
acters had  been  shorn  and  stripped  of  those  leaden,  earth- 
born  weights,  which  grow  and  cling  to  the  pleasures  of 
eating  and  gluttonous  enjoyments  of  a  similar  nature,  and 
keep  the  eye  of  the  soul  turned  upon  the  things  below; — 
if,  I  repeat,  they  had  been  released  from  these  snares,  and 
turned  round  to  look  at  objects  that  are  true,  then  these 
very  same  souls  of  these  very  same  men  would  have  had 
as  keen  an  eye  for  such  pursuits  as  they  actually  have  fo* 
those  in  which  they  are  now  engaged. 
Yes,  probably  it  would  be  so. 

Once  more:  is  it  not  also  probable,  or  rather  is  it  not  a 
necessary  corollary  to  our  previous  remarks,  that  neither 
those  who  are  uneducated  and  ignorant  of  truth,  nor  those 
who  are  suffered  to  linger  over  their  education  all  their 
life,  can  ever  be  competent  overseers  of  a  state, — the  for- 
mer, because  they  have  no  single  mark  in  life,  which  they 
are  to  constitute  the  end  and  aim  of  all  their  conduct  both 
is  private  and  in  public;  the  latter,  because  they  will  not 


264  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VII 

act  without  compulsion,  fancying  that,  while  yet  alive> 
they  have  been  translated  to  the  islands  of  the  blest. 

That  is  true. 

It  is,  therefore,  our  task,  I  continued,  to  constrain  the 
noblest  characters  in  our  colony  to  arrive  at  that  science 
which  we  formerly  pronounced  the  highest,  and  to  set  eyes 
upon  the  good,  and  to  mount  that  ascent  we  spoke  of; 
and,  when  they  have  mounted  and  looked  long  enough, 
we  must  take  care  to  refuse  them  that  liberty  which  is  at 
present  permitted  them. 

Pray  what  is  that? 

The  liberty  of  staying  where  they  are,  and  refusing  to 
descend  again  to  those  prisoners,  or  partake  of  their  toils 
and  honours,  be  they  mean  or  be  they  exalted. 

Then  are  we  to  do  them  a  wrong,  and  make  them  live 
a  life  that  is  worse  than  the  one  within  their  reach  ? 

You  have  again  forgotten,  my  friend,  that  law  does  not 
ask  itself  how  some  one  class  in  a  state  is  to  live  extraor- 
dinarily well.  On  the  contrary,  it  tries  to  bring  about  this 
result  in  the  entire  state;  for  which  purpose  it  links  the 
citizens  together  by  persuasion  and  by  constraint,  makes 
them  share  with  one  another  the  benefit  which  each  in- 
dividual can  contribute  to  the  common  weal,  and  does 
actually  create  men  of  this  exalted  character  in  the  state, 
not  with  the  intention  of  letting  them  go  each  on  his  own 
way,  but  with  the  intention  of  turning  them  to  account  in 
its  plans  for  the  consolidation  of  the  state. 

True,  he  replied;  I  had  forgotten. 

Therefore  reflect,  Glaucon,  that  far  from  wronging  the 
future  philosophers  of  our  state,  we  shall  only  be  treating 
them  with  strict  justice,  if  we  put  them  under  the  addi- 
tional obligation  of  watching  over  their  fellow-citizens,  and 
taking  care  of  them.  We  shall  say:  It  is  with  good  rea- 
son that  your  compeers  elsewhere  refuse  to  share  in  the 
labours  of  their  respective  states.  For  they  take  root  in 
a  city  spontaneously,  in  defiance  of  the  prevailing  consti- 
tution; and  it  is  but  fair  that  a  self-sown  plant,  which  is 
indebted  to  no  one  for  support,  should  have  no  inclination 
to  pay  to  anybody  wages  for  attendance.     B\*t  in  youx 


Book  VII.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  265 

case,  it  is  we  that  have  begotten  you  for  the  state  as  well 
as  for  yourselves,  to  be  like  leaders  and  kings  of  a  hive, — 
better  and  more  perfectly  trained  than  the  rest,  and  more 
capable  of  playing  a  part  in  both  modes  of  life.  You  must 
therefore  descend  by  turns,  and  associate  with  the  rest  of 
the  community,  and  you  must  habituate  yourselves  to  the 
contemplation  of  these  obscure  objects.  For,  when  habit- 
uated, you  will  see  a  thousand  times  better  than  the 
residents,  and  you  will  recognize  what  each  image  is,  and 
what  is  its  original,  because  you  have  seen  the  realities  of 
which  beautiful  and  just  and  good  things  are  copies.  And 
in  this  way  you  and  we  shall  find  that  the  life  of  the  state 
is  a  substance,  and  not  a  phantom  like  the  life  of  our  pres- 
ent states,  which  are  mostly  composed  of  men  who  fight 
among  themselves  for  shadows,  and  are  at  feud  for  the 
administration  of  affairs,  which  they  regard  as  a  great 
boon.  Whereas  I  conceive  the  truth  stands  thus:  That 
city  in  which  the  destined  rulers  are  least  eager  to  rule, 
will  inevitably  be  governed  in  the  best  and  least  factious 
manner,  and  a  contrary  result  will  ensue  if  the  rulers  are 
of  a  contrary  disposition. 

You  are  perfectly  right. 

And  do  you  imagine  that  our  pupils,  when  addressed 
in  this  way,  will  disobey  our  commands,  and  refuse  to 
toil  with  us  in  the  state  by  turns,  while  they  spend  most 
of  their  time  together  in  that  bright  region? 

Impossible,  he  replied:  for  certainly  it  is  a  just  com- 
mand, and  those  who  are  to  obey  it  are  just  men.  No; 
doubtless  each  of  them  will  enter  upon  his  administra- 
tion as  an  unavoidable  duty, — conduct  the  reverse  of  that 
pursued  by  the  present  rulers  in  each  state. 

True,  my  friend;  the  case  stands  thus.  If  you  can  in- 
vent for  the  destined  rulers  a  life  better  than  ruling,  you 
may  possibly  realize  a  well-governed  city :  for  only  in  such 
a  city  will  the  rulers  be  those  who  are  really  rich,  not  in 
gold,  but  in  a  wise  and  virtuous  life,  which  is  the  wealth 
essential  to  a  happy  man.  But  if  beggars,  and  persons 
who  hunger  after  private  advantages,  take  the  reins  of 
the  state,  with  the  idea  that  they  are  privileged  to  snatch 


266  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VIL 

advantage  from  their  power,  all  goes  wrong.  For  the 
post  of  magistrate  is  thus  made  an  object  of  strife;  and 
civil  and  intestine  conflicts  of  this  nature,  ruin  not  only 
the  contending  parties,  but  also  the  rest  of  the  state. 

That  is  most  true. 

And  can  you  mention  any  life  which  contemns  state- 
offices,  except  the  life  of  true  philosophy? 

No  indeed,  I  cannot. 

Well,  but  the  task  of  government  must  be  undertaken 
by  persons  not  enamoured  of  it:  otherwise,  their  rivals 
will  dispute  their  claim. 

Unquestionably  it  must. 

Then  what  other  persons  will  you  compel  to  enter  upon 
the  duties  of  guardians  of  the  state,  if  you  discard  those 
who  understand  most  profoundly  the  means  of  attaining 
the  highest  excellence  in  the  administration  of  a  country, 
and  who  also  possess  honours  of  a  different  stamp,  and 
a  nobler  life  than  that  of  a  statesman? 

I  shall  not  discard  them,  he  replied;  I  shall  address 
myself  only  to  them. 

And  now  would  you  have  us  proceed  to  consider  in 
what  way  such  persons  are  to  arise  in  the  state,  and  how 
they  are  to  be  carried  up  to  the  light,  like  those  heroes 
who  are  said  to  have  ascended  up  to  heaven  from  the 
nether  world? 

Certainly  I  would  have  you  do  so. 

Apparently  this  is  a  question  involving  not  the  mere 
turning  of  a  shell,*  but  the  revolution  of  a  soul,  which  is 
traversing  a  road  leading  from  a  kind  of  night-like  day 
up  to  a  true  day  of  real  existence;  and  this  road  we  shall 
doubtless  declare  to  be  true  philosophy. 

Exactly  so. 

Then  must  we  not  consider  what  branch  of  study  pos- 
sesses the  power  required? 

Certainly  we  must. 

Then,   Glaucon,  can  you  tell  me  of  a  science  which 

*  The  allusion  is  to  a  game  played  with  shells.  In  the  next 
clause  read  iovoyg,  instead  of  ovaav. 


Book  VI1.J         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  267 

tends  to  draw  the  soul  from  the  fleeting  to  the  real? 
While  I  speak,  I  bethink  myself  that  we  certainly  said, 
did  we  not,  that  our  pupils  must  be  trained  in  their  youth 
to  war? 

Yes,  we  did  say  so. 

Then  the  science,  which  we  are  in  quest  of,  must  pos- 
sess this  feature  as  well  as  the  former. 

What  feature  ? 

That  it  can  be  turned  to  use  by  warlike  men. 

That  is  certainly  advisable,  if  it  be  practicable. 

Now  in  the  foregoing  discussion  we  were  for  training 
our  pupils  through  the  agency  of  music  and  gymnastic. 

True. 

Gymnastic,  I  believe,  is  engaged  upon  the  changeable 
and  perishing;  for  it  presides  over  the  growth  and  waste 
of  the  body. 

That  is  evident. 

Hence  gymnastic  cannot  be  the  study  for  which  we  are 
looking. 

No,  it  cannot. 

But  what  do  you  say  to  music,  considered  in  the  ex- 
tent in  which  we  previously  discussed  it? 

Nay,  he  replied,  music  was  only  the  counterpart  of  gym- 
nastic, if  you  remember:  for  it  trained  our  guardians  by 
the  influence  of  habit,  and  imparted  to  them,  not  science, 
but  a  kind  of  harmoniousness  by  means  of  harmony,  and 
a  kind  of  measuredness  by  means  of  measure;  and  in  the 
subjects  which  it  treated,  whether  fabulous  or  true,  it  pre- 
sented another  series  of  kindred  characteristics:  but  it 
contained  no  branch  of  study  tending  to  any  advantage 
resembling  the  one  of  which  you  are  now  in  quest. 

Your  memory  is  very  exact,  I  made  answer:  for  music 
really  did  possess  nothing  of  the  kind.  But,  my  excellent 
Glaucon,  where  are  we  to  find  the  thing  we  want?  All 
the  useful  arts,  I  believe,  we  thought  degrading. 

Unquestionably  wq  did:  yet  what  other  study  is  there 
still  remaining,  apart  from  music  and  gymnastic  and  the 
useful  arts? 

Come  then,  if  we  can  find  nothing  beyond  and  inde- 


268  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VIL 

pendent  of  these,  let  us  take  one  of  those  studies  which 
are  of  universal  application. 

Pray  which? 

That  general  one,  for  example,  of  which  all  arts,  trains 
of  thought,  and  sciences,  avail  themselves;  and  which 
is  also  one  of  the  first  things  that  every  one  must  learn. 

Tell  me  the  nature  of  it. 

I  allude  to  that  common  process  of  distinguishing  the 
numbers,  one,  two,  and  three.  And  I  call  it  briefly,  Num- 
ber and  Calculation.  For  may  it  not  be  said  of  these, 
that  every  art  and  science  is  compelled  to  crave  a  share 
in  them  ? 

Certainly  it  may. 

And  is  not  the  science  of  war  one  of  the  number? 

Beyond  a  doubt  it  is. 

To  take  an  example  from  tragedy,  I  proceeded;  Pala- 
medes  on  all  occasions  makes  out  that  Agamemnon  was 
a  very  ridiculous  general.  For  you  have  remarked,  have 
you  not,  that  he  claims,  by  the  invention  of  numbers,  to 
have  marshalled  the  ranks  of  the  army  at  Troy,  and  to 
have  counted  over  the  ships  and  every  thing  else, — as  if 
such  things  had  been  uncounted  before  his  time,  and  as 
if  Agamemnon  had  been  even  ignorant  how  many  feet 
he  had,  which  would  naturally  be  the  case,  if  he  did  not 
know  how  to  count  ?  Yet  what  do  you  think  of  Agamem- 
non as  a  general? 

He  was  a  strange  one  in  my  opinion,  if  this  story  be 
true. 

Then  can  we  help  concluding,  that  to  be  able  to  cal- 
culate and  count  is  a  piece  of  knowledge  indispensable 
to  a  warrior? 

Yes,  most  indispensable,  if  he  is  to  understand  how  to 
handle  troops  at  all,  or  rather,  if  he  is  to  be  anything  of 
a  man. 

And  does  your  notion  of  this  science  coincide  with 
mine? 

Pray  what  is  your  notion? 

It  seems  to  be  by  nature  one  of  those  studies  leading 
to  reflection,  of  which  we  are  in  quest;  but  no  one  ap' 


Book  VII. ]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  269 

pears  to  make  the  right  use  of  it,  as  a  thing  which  tends 
wholly  to  draw  us  towards  real  existence. 

Explain  your  meaning. 

I  will  endeavour  to  make  my  own  opinion  clear  to  you. 
And  you,  on  your  side,  must  join  me  in  studying  those 
things  which  I  distinguish  in  my  own  mind  as  conducive, 
or  not,  to  the  end  in  view,  and  express  your  assent  or 
dissent;  in  order  that  we  may  see  more  clearly,  in  the 
next  place,  whether  I  am  right  in  my  surmises  as  to  the 
nature  of  this  science. 

Pray  go  on  with  your  distinctions. 

I  will.  If  you  observe,  some  of  the  objects  of  our  per- 
ceptions do  not  stimulate  the  reflection  into  exercise,  be- 
cause they  appear  thoroughly  appreciated  by  the  percep- 
tion; whereas  others  urge  the  reflection  strenuously  to 
examine  them,  because  the  perception  appears  to  produce 
an  unsound  result. 

It  is  plain  you  are  talking  of  objects  seen  at  -  distance, 
and  painting  in  perspective. 

You  have  not  quite  hit  my  meaning. 

Then  pray  what  sort  of  objects  do  you  mean  ; 

I  regard  as  non-stimulants  all  the  objects  which  do  not 
end  by  giving  us  at  the  same  moment  two  contradictory 
perceptions.  On  the  other  hand,  all  the  objects  which 
do  end  in  that  way  I  consider  stimulants, — meaning  those 
cases  in  which  the  perception,  whether  incident  from  a 
near  or  a  distant  object,  communicates  two  equally  vivid, 
but  contradictory  impressions.  You  will  understand  my 
meaning  more  clearly  thus1. — Here  you  have  three  fin- 
gers, you  say, — the  little  finger,  the  middle,  and  the  third. 

Very  good. 

Well,  suppose  me  to  be  speaking  of  them  as  they  ap- 
pear on  a  "close  inspection.  Now  here  is  the  point  which 
I  wish  you  to  examine  with  reference  to  them. 

Pray  what  is  it? 

It  is  evident  that  they  are  all  equally  fingers:  and  so 
far,  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  one  we  are  look- 
ing at  be  in  the  middle  or  outside,  whether  it  be  white 
or  black,  thick  or  thin,  and  so  on.     For,  so  long  as  we 


270  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VII. 

confine  ourselves  to  these  points,  the  mind  seldom  feels 
compelled  to  ask  the  reflection,  what  is  a  finger?  Be- 
cause in  no  instance  has  the  sight  informed  the  mind 
at  the  same  moment,  that  the  finger  is  the  opposite  of 
a  finger. 

No,  certainly  not. 

Then,  naturally,  such  impressions  cannot  be  stimulating 
or  awakening  to  the  reflection. 

True. 

But  how  is  it,  pray,  with  the  relative,  sizes  of  the  fin- 
gers? Does  the  sight  distinguish  them  satisfactorily,  and 
does  it  make  no  difference  to  it,  whether  the  position  of 
one  of  them  be  in  the  middle,  or  at  the  outside?  And 
in  like  manner,  does  the  touch  estimate  thickness  and 
thinness,  softness  and  hardness,  satisfactorily?  And  is 
there  no  defect  in  the  similar  communications  of  the 
other  senses?  Or,  rather  do  they  not  all  proceed  thus? 
To  begin  with  the  perception  which  takes  cognizance  of 
hard  things:  is  it  not  constrained  to  take  cognizance  also 
of  soft  things,  and  does  it  not  intimate  to  the  mind,  that 
it  feels  the  same  thing  to  be  both  hard  and  soft? 

It  does. 

In  such  cases,  then,  must  not  the  mind  be  at  a  loss  to 
know  what  this  perception  means  by  hard,  since  it  de- 
clares the  same  thing  to  be  also  soft;  and  what  the  per- 
ception of  weight  means  by  light  and  heavy,  when  it 
informs  the  mind  that  the  heavy  is  light,  and  the  light 
heavy  ? 

Why  yes,  he  answered;  such  interpretations  will  be 
strange  to  the  mind,  and  will  require  examination. 

Hence  it  is  natural  for  the  mind  in  such  circumstances 
to  call  in  the  aid  of  reasoning  and  reflection,  and  to  en- 
deavour to  make  out  whether  each  announcement  is  single 
or  double. 

Undoubtedly. 

Should  it  incline  to  the  latter  view,  is  it  not  evident 
that  each  part  of  every  announcement  has  a  unity  and 
character  of  its  own? 

It  is  evident. 


BOOK  VII.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  271 

If  then  each  is  one,  and  both  together  make  two,  the 
mind  will  conclude  that  the  two  are  separable.  For  if 
they  are  inseparable,  it  could  only  conclude  that  they 
are  one,  not  two. 

True. 

Well;  the  sense  of  sight,  we  say,  gave  us  an  im- 
pression, in  which  the  sensations  of  great  and  small 
were  confounded,  instead  of  being  separated.  Am  I  not 
right  ? 

You  are. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  reflection,  reversing  the  process 
of  the  sight,  was  compelled,  in  order  to  make  the  sensible 
impression  clear,  to  look  at  great  and  small  as  things 
distinct,  not  confounded. 

True. 

Then  is  it  not  some  contradiction  of  this  kind  that 
first  prompts  us  to  ask,  "  What  then,  after  all,  is  greatness, 
and  what  smallness  ?  " 

No  doubt  it  is. 

And  thus  we  are  led  to  distinguish  between  objects  of 
reflection  and  objects  of  sight. 

Most  rightly  so. 

This,  then,  was  the  meaning  which  I  was  just  now  at- 
tempting to  convey,  when  I  said  that  some  objects  tend 
to  stimulate  thought,  while  others  have  no  bias  towards 
awakening  reflection, — placing  in  the  former  category 
everything  that  strikes  upon  the  senses  in  conjunction 
with  its  immediate  opposite;  and  in  the  latter,  everything 
of  which  this  cannot  be  said. 

Now  I  understand  you,  he  replied;  and  I  agree  with 
you. 

Well:  to  which  of  the  two  classes  do  you  think  that 
number  and  unity  belong? 

1  cannot  make  up  my  mind. 

Indeed!  Let  our  previous  remarks  help  you  to  a  con- 
clusion. If  unity,  in  and  by  itself,  is  thoroughly  grnsned 
by  the  sight  or  any  other  sense,  lik^  {^n  fiT»or«T  —  sno^re 
of,  it  cannot  possess  the  quality  of  drawing  the  mind  to- 
wards real  existence.    But  if  some  contradiction  is  always 


272  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VIL 

combined  with  it  in  all  its  manifestations,  making  it  ap- 
pear the  opposite  of  unity  quite  as  much  as  unity  itself,  in 
that  case  a  critic  will  be  immediately  required,  and  the 
mind  will  be  compelled  to  puzzle  over  the  difficulty,  and 
stir  up  the  inward  faculty  of  thought  to  the  investigation, 
and  put  the  question,  "  What,  after  all,  is  unity  in  itself  ?  " 
And  thus  the  study  of  the  unit  will  be  one  of  the  things 
which  turn  and  lead  us  to  the  contemplation  of  real  ex- 
istence. 

You  are  right,  said  he:  the  observation  of  the  unit  does 
certainly  possess  this  property  in  no  common  degree:  for 
the  same  thing  presents  at  the  same  moment  the  appear- 
ance of  one  thing,  and  an  infinity  of  things. 

Then,  if  this  is  the  case  with  the  unit,  is  it  not  also  the 
case  with  all  numbers  without  exception? 

Doubtless  it  is. 

Well,  but  calculation  and  arithmetic  treat  of  number 
exclusively. 

Certainly  they  do. 

And,  apparently,  they  conduct  us  to  truth. 

Yes,  in  a  manner  quite  extraordinary. 

Hence  it  would  appear  that  the  science  of  numbers 
must  be  one  of  the  studies  of  which  we  are  in  quest.  For 
the  military  man  finds  a  knowledge  of  it  indispensable  in 
drawing  up  his  troops,  and  the  philosopher  must  study  it 
because  he  is  bound  to  rise  above  the  changing  and  cling 
to  the  real,  on  pain  of  never  becoming  a  skilful  reasoner. 

True. 

But  our  guardian,  as  it  happens,  is  both  soldier  and 
philosopher. 

Undoubtedly  he  is. 

Therefore,  Glaucon,  it  will  be  proper  to  enforce  the 
study  by  legislative  enactment,  and  to  persuade  those  who 
are  destined  to  take  part  in  the  weightiest  affairs  of  state, 
to  study  calculation  and  devote  themselves  to  it,  not  like 
amateurs,  but  perseveringly,  until,  by  the  aid  of  pure  rea- 
son, they  have  attained  to  the  contemplation  of  the  nature 
of  numbers, — not  cultivating  it  with  a  view  to  buying  and 
selling,  as  merchants  or  shopkeepers,  but  for  purposes  of 


Book  VII.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  273 

war,  and  to  facilitate  the  conversion  of  the  soul  itself  from 
the  changeable  to  the  true  and  the  real. 

What  you  say  is  admirable.  * 

Indeed,  I  continued,  talking  of  this  science  which  treats 
of  calculation,  it  has  only  just  occurred  to  me  how  elegant 
it  is,  and  how  valuable  it  may  be  to  us  in  many  ways  in 
carrying  out  our  wishes,  provided  it  be  pursued  for  the 
sake  of  knowledge,  and  not  for  purposes  of  trade. 

How  so?  he  asked. 

Because,  as  we  were  saying  just  now,  it  mightily  draws 
the  soul  upwards,  and  compels  it  to  reason  about  abstract 
numbers,  steadily  declining  the  discussion  when  any  num- 
bers are  proposed  which  have  bodies  that  can  be  seen  and 
touched.  For  I  presume  you  are  aware  that  good  mathe- 
maticians ridicule  and  disallow  any  attempt  to  part  the 
unit  in  the  course  of  argument;  and  if  you  divide  it  into 
pieces,  like  small  change,  they  multiply  it  back  again,  and 
take  every  precaution  to  prevent  the  unit  from  ever  losing 
its  unity,  and  presenting  an  appearance  of  multiplicity. 

That  is  quite  true. 

Now  suppose,  Glaucon,  that  some  one  were  to  ask 
them  the  following  question: — My  excellent  friends,  what 
kind  of  numbers  are  you  discussing?  Where  are  the 
numbers  in  which  the  unit  realizes  your  description  of  it, 
which  is,  that  every  unit  is  equal,  each  to  each,  without 
the  smallest  difference,  and  contains  within  itself  no 
parts?    What  answer  should  you  expect  them  to  make? 

If  you  ask  me,  I  should  expect  them  to  say,  that  the 
numbers  about  which  they  talk,  are  only  capable  of  being 
conceived  in  thought,  and  cannot  be  dealt  with  in  any 
other  way. 

Then,  my  friend,  do  you  see  thai  this  science  is,  in 
all  likelihood,  absolutely  necessary  to  us,  since  it  evi- 
dently obliges  the  mind  to  employ  the  pure  intelligence  in 
the  pursuit  of  pure  truth? 

It  certainly  possesses  this  quality  in  an  eminent  degree. 

Again;  have  you  ever  noticed  that  those  who  have  a 
turn  for  arithmetic  are,  with  scarcely  an  exception,  natur- 
ally quick  at  all  sciences;  and  that  men  of  slow  intellect, 


274  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VIL 

if  they  be  trained  and  exercised  in  this  study,  even  sup- 
posing they  derive  no  other  benefit  from  it,  at  any  rate 
progress  so  far  as  to  become  invariably  quicker  than  they 
were  before? 

That  is  true. 

And  I  am  pretty  sure,  also,  that  you  will  not  easily  find 
many  sciences  that  give  the  learner  and  student  so  much 
trouble  and  toil  as  arithmetic. 

No,  certainly  you  will  not. 

Then  on  all  these  accounts,  so  far  from  rejecting  this 
science,  we  must  employ  it  in  the  education  of  the  finest 
characters. 

I  agree  with  you,  said  he. 

Then  let  us  consider  this  as  one  point  settled.  In  the 
second  place,  let  us  inquire  whether  we  ought  to  con- 
cern ourselves  about  the  science  which  borders  on  arith- 
metic. 

What  is  that?    Do  you  mean  geometry? 

Even  so,  I  replied. 

It  is  obvious,  he  continued,  that  all  that  part  of  it 
which  bears  upon  strategy  does  concern  us.  For  in 
encamping,  in  occupying  positions,  in  closing  up  and  de- 
ploying troops,  and  in  executing  all  the  other  manoeuvres 
of  an  army  in  the  field  of  battle  or  on  the  march,  it  will 
make  every  difference  to  a  military  man,  whether  he  is  a 
good  geometrician,  or  not. 

Nevertheless,  I  replied,  a  trifling  knowledge  of  geom- 
etry and  calculation  will  suffice  for  these  purposes.  The 
question  is,  whether  the  larger  and  more  advanced  part 
of  the  study  tends  at  all  to  facilitate  our  contemplation 
of  the  essential  Form  of  Good.  Now,  according  to  us, 
this  is  the  tendency  of  everything  that  compels  the  soul  to 
transfer  itself  to  that  region  in  which  is  contained  the  most 
blissful  part  of  that  real  existence,  which  it  is  of  the 
highest  importance  for  it  to  behold. 

You  are  right. 

Consequently  if  geometry  compels  the  soul  to  contem- 
plate r«al  existence,  it  does  concern  us;  but  if  it  only 


Book  VII.J         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  275 

forces  the  changeful  and  perishing  upon  our  notice,  it  does 
not  concern  us. 

Yes,  so  we  affirm. 

Well  then,  on  one  point  at  any  rate  we  shall  encounter 
no  opposition  from  those  who  are  even  slightly  acquainted 
with  geometry,  when  we  assert  that  this  science  holds  a 
position  which  flatly  contradicts  the  language  employed 
by  those  who  handle  it. 

How  so? 

They  talk,  I  believe,  in  a  very  ridiculous  and  poverty- 
stricken  style.  For  they  speak  invariably  of  squaring, 
and  producing,  and  adding,  and  so  on,  as  if  they  were 
engaged  in  some  business,  and  as  if  all  their  proposi- 
tions had  a  practical  end  in  view:  whereas  in  reality  I 
conceive  that  the  science  is  pursued  wholly  for  the  sake 
of  knowledge. 

Assuredly  it  is. 

There  is  still  a  point  about  which  we  must  be  agreed,  is 
there  not? 

What  is  it? 

That  the  science  is  pursued  for  the  sake  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  what  eternally  exists,  and  not  of  what  comes  for 
a  moment  into  existence,  and  then  perishes. 

We  shall  soon  be  agreed  about  that.  Geometry,  no 
doubt,  is  a  knowledge  of  what  eternally  exists. 

If  that  be  so,  my  excellent  friend,  geometry  must  tend 
to  draw  the  soul  towards  truth,  and  to  give  the  finishing 
stroke  to  the  philosophic  spirit, — thus  contributing  to 
raise  up  what,  at  present,  we  so  wrongly  keep  down. 

Yes,  it  will  do  so  most  forcibly. 

Then  you  must,  in  the  most  forcible  manner,  direct  the 
citizens  of  your  beautiful  city  on  no  account  to  fail  to 
apply  themselves  to  geometry.  For  even  its  secondary 
advantages  are  not  trifling. 

Pray  what  are  they  ? 

Not  to  mention  those  which  you  specified  as  bearing 
upon  the  conduct  of  war,  I  would  insist  particularly  upon 
the  fact,  of  which  we  are  assured, — that,  where  a  ready 
reception  of  any  kind  of  learning  is  an  object,  it  will  make 


276  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VII 

all  and  every  difference  whether  the  pupil  has  applied 
himself  to  geometry  or  not. 

Yes,  undoubtedly  it  will. 

Shall  we,  then,  impose  this,  as  a  secondary  study,  upon 
our  young  men? 

Yes,  let  us  do  so,  he  replied. 

Again:  shall  we  make  astronomy,  a  third  study?  or  do 
you  disapprove? 

I  quite  approve  of  it,  said  he.  For  to  have  an  intimate 
acquaintance  with  seasons,  and  months,  and  years,  is  an 
advantage  not  only  to  the  agriculturist  and  the  navigator, 
but  also,  in  an  equal  degree,  to  the  general. 

You  amuse  me  by  your  evident  alarm  lest  the  multitude 
should  think  that  you  insist  upon  useless  studies.  Yet  in- 
deed it  is  no  easy  matter,  but  on  the  contrary  a  very  diffi- 
cult one,  to  believe  that  in  the  midst  of  these  studies  an 
organ  of  our  souls  is  being  purged  from  the  blindness,  and 
quickened  from  the  deadness,  occasioned  by  other  pur- 
suits,— an  organ  whose  preservation  is  of  more  importance 
than  a  thousand  eyes;  because  only  by  it  can  truth  be 
seen.  Consequently,  those  who  think  with  us  will  be- 
stow unqualified  approbation  on  the  studies  you  pre- 
scribe: while  those  who  have  no  inkling  at  all  of  this 
doctrine,  will  think  them  valueless,  because  they  see  no 
considerable  advantage  to  be  gained  from  them  beyond 
their  practical  applications.  Therefore  consider  at  once 
with  which  of  the  two  parties  you  are  conversing:  or  else, 
if  you  are  carrying  on  the  discussion  chiefly  on  your  own 
account,  without  any  reference  to  either  party,  you  surely 
will  not  grudge  another  man  any  advantage  which  he 
may  derive  from  the  conversation. 

I  prefer  the  latter  course:  I  mean  to  speak,  put  my 
questions,  and  give  my  answers,  chiefly  on  my  own  account. 

Then  take  a  step  backwards,  I  continued.  We  were 
wrong  a  moment  ago  in  what  we  took  as  the  science 
next  in  order  to  geometry. 

What  did  we  take  ? 

Why,  after  considering  plane  surfaces,  we  proceeded 


Book  VIL]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  %ffl 

to  take  solids  in  a  state  of  revolution,  before  consider- 
ing solids  in  themselves.  Whereas  the  correct  way  is, 
proceed  from  two  dimensions  to  three;  which  brings  us, 
I  believe,  to  cubical  dimensions,  and  figures  into  which 
thickness  enters. 

True,  Socrates;  but  these  subjects,  I  think,  have  not 
yet  been  explored. 

They  have  not,  I  replied;  and  for  two  reasons.  In  the 
first  place,  they  are  difficult  problems,  and  but  feebly  in- 
vestigated, because  no  state  holds  them  in  estimation: 
and,  in  the  second  place,  those  who  do  investigate  them 
stand  in  need  of  a  superintendent,  without  whom  they 
will  make  no  discoveries.  Now,  to  find  such  a  person 
is  a  hard  task  to  begin  with;  and  then,  supposing  one 
were  found,  as  matters  stand  now,  the  pride  of  those  who 
are  inquisitive  about  the  subject  would  prevent  their 
listening  to  his  suggestio-is.  But  if  a  state,  in  its  cor- 
porate capacity,  were  to  pay  honour  to  the  study,  and 
constitute  itself  superintendent  thereof,  these  students 
would  yield  obedience,  and  the  real  nature  of  the  subject, 
thus  continuously  and  vigorously  investigated,  would  be 
brought  to  light.  For  even  now,  slighted  and  curtailed 
as  it  is  not  only  by  the  many,  but  also  by  professed 
inquirers,  who  can  give  no  account  of  the  extent  of 
its  usefulness,  it  nevertheless  makes  progress,  in  spite 
of  all  these  obstacles,  by  its  inherent  elegance;  and  I 
should  not  be  at  all  surprised  if  its  difficulties  were  cleared 
up. 

There  certainly  is  a  peculiar  fascination  about  it.  But 
pray  explain  more  clearly  what  you  were  saying  just  now. 
I  think  you  defined  geometry  as  the  investigation  of  plane 
surfaces. 

I  did. 

You  then  proceeded  to  place  astronomy  next  to  geome- 
try; though  afterwards  you  drew  back. 

Yes,  I  said,  the  more  I  haste  to  travel  over  the  ground, 
the  worse  I  speed.  The  investigation  of  space  of  three 
dimensions  succeeds  to  plane  geometry;  but  because  it  is 
studied  absurdly,  I  passed  it  over,  and  spoke  of  astron- 


278  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VII 

omy,  which  implies  motion  of  solid  bodies,  as  the  next  step 
after  geometry. 

You  are  right. 

Then  let  us  assign  the  fourth  place  in  our  studies  to 
astronomy,  regarding  the  existence  of  the  science  now 
omitted  as  only  waiting  for  the  time  when  a  state  shall 
take  it  up. 

It  is  a  reasonable  idea,  Socrates.  And  to  return  to  the 
rebuke  which  you  gave  me  a  little  while  ago  for  my  vulgar 
commendation  of  astronomy,  I  can  now  praise  the  plan  on 
which  you  pursue  it.  For  I  suppose  it  is  clear  to  every 
one,  that  astronomy  at  all  events  compels  the  soul  to  look 
upwards,  and  draws  it  from  the  things  of  this  world  to  the 
other. 

It  is  not  clear  to  me,  I  replied,  though  perhaps  it  may 
be  to  every  one  else :  for  that  is  not  my  opinion. 

Then  what  is  your  opinion? 

It  seems  to  me  that  astronomy,  as  now  handle*,  by 
those  who  embark  on  philosophy,  positively  makes  the 
soul  look  downwards. 

How  so? 

I  think  you  have  betrayed  no  want  o£  intrepidity  in  the 
conception  you  have  formed  of  the  true  nature  of  that 
learning  which  deals  with  the  things  above.  For  prob- 
ably, if  a  person  were  to  throw  his  head  back,  and  learn 
something  from  the  contemplation  of  a  carved  ceiling,  you 
would  suppose  him  to  be  contemplating  it,  not  with  his 
eyes,  but  with  his  reason.  Now,  perhaps  your  notion  is 
right,  and  mine  foolish.  For  my  own  part,  I  cannot  con- 
ceive that  any  science  makes  the  soul  look  upwards,  unless 
it  has  to  do  with  the  real  and  invisible.  It  makes  no  dif- 
ference whether  a  person  stares  stupidly  at  the  sky,  or 
looks  with  half-shut  eyes  upon  the  ground;  so  long  as  he 
is  trying  to  study  any  sensible  object,  I  deny  that  he  can 
ever  be  said  to  have  learned  anything,  because  no  objects 
of  sense  admit  of  scientific  treatment;  and  I  maintain 
that  his  soul  is  looking  downwards,  not  upwards,  though 
he  may  be  lying  on  his  back,  like  a  swimmer,  to  study, 
either  in  the  sea,  or  on  dry  land. 


Book  VII.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  279 

I  am  rightly  punished,  he  rejoined;  for  I  deserved  your 
rebuke.  But  pray  what  did  you  mean  by  saying  that 
astronomy  ought  to  be  studied  on  a  system  very  different 
from  the*  present  one,  if  it  is  to  be  studied  profitably  for 
the  purposes  that  we  have  in  view? 

I  will  tell  you.  Since  this  fretted  sky  is  still  a  part  of 
the  visible  world,  we  are  bound  to  regard  it,  though  the 
most  beautiful  and  perfect  of  visible  things,  as  far  inferior 
nevertheless  to  those  true  revolutions,  which  real  velocity, 
and  real  slowness,  existing  in  true  number,  and  in  all 
true  forms,  accomplish  relatively  to  each  other,  carrying 
with  them  all  that  they  contain:  which  are  verily  appre- 
hensible by  reason  and  thought,  but  not  by  sight.  Or  do 
you  think  differently? 
No,  indeed,  he  replied. 

Therefore  we  must  employ  that  fretted  sky  as  a  pattern 
or  plan  to  forward  the  study  which  aims  at  those  higher 
objects,  just  as  we  might  employ  diagrams,  which  fell  in 
our  way,  curiously  drawn  and  elaborated  by  Daedalus  or 
some  other  artist  or  draughtsman.  For,  I  imagine,  a  per- 
son acquainted  with  geometry,  on  seeing  such  diagrams, 
would  think  them  most  beautifully  finished,  but  would 
hold  it  ridiculous  to  study  them  seriously  in  the  hope  of 
detecting  thereby  the  truths  of  equality,  or  duplicity,  or 
any  other  ratio. 

No  doubt  it  would  be  ridiculous. 

And  do  you  not  think  that  the  genuine  astronomer  will 
view  with  the  same  feelings  the  motions  of  the  stars? 
That  is  to  say,  will  he  not  regard  the  heaven  itself,  and 
the  bodies,  which  it  contains,  as  framed  by  the  heavenly 
architect  with  the  utmost  beauty  of  which  such  works  are 
susceptible?  But  as  to  the  proportion  which  the  day 
bears  to  the  night,  both  to  the  month,  the  month  to  the 
year,  and  the  other  stars  to  the  sun  and  moon,  and  to 
one  another, — will  he  not,  think  you,  look  down  upon 
the  man  who  believes  such  corporeal  and  visible  ob- 
jects to  be  changeless  and  exempt  from  all  perturba- 
tion*; and  will  he  not  hold  it  absurd  to  bestow  extra- 


280  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VIL 

ordinary  pains  on  the  endeavour  to  apprehend  their  true 
condition  ? 

Yes,  I  quite  thL  k  so,  now  that  I  hear  you  suggest  it. 

Hence,  we  shall  pursue  astronomy  with  the  help  of  prob- 
lems, just  as  we  pursue  geometry:  but  we  shall  let  the 
heavenly  bodies  alone,  if  it  is  our  design  to  become  really 
acquainted  with  astronomy,  and  by  that  means  to  convert 
the  natural  intelligence  of  the  soul  from  a  useless  into  a 
useful  possession. 

The  plan  which  you  prescribe,  said  he,  is,  I  am  confi- 
dent, many  times  more  laborious  than  the  present  mode 
of  studying  astronomy. 

Yes,  I  replied;  and  I  imagine  we  shall  prescribe  every 
thing  else  on  the  same  scale,  if  we  are  to  be  of  any  use  as 
legislators.  But  to  proceed:  what  other  science  in  point 
can  you  suggest? 

I  cannot  suggest  any,  on  such  short  notice. 

Well,  motion,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  admits  of  certainly 
more  than  one  variety:  a  perfect  enumeration  of  these 
varieties  may  perhaps  be  supplied  by  some  learned  philos- 
opher. Those  which  are  manifest  to  people  like  us  are 
two  in  number. 

Pray  what  are  they? 

We  h&ve  already  described  one;  the  other  is  its  coun- 
terpart. 

What  is  that? 

It  would  seem,  I  replied,  that  our  ears  were  intended  to 
detect  harmonious  movements,  just  as  our  eyes  were  in- 
tended to  detect  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies;  and 
that  these  constitute  in  a  manner  two  sister  sciences,  as 
the  Pythagoreans  assert,  and  as  we,  Glaucon,  are  ready 
to  grant.  If  not,  what  other  course  do  we  take? 

We  take  the  course  you  mentioned  first:  we  grant  the 
fact. 

Then,  as  the  business  promises  to  be  a  long  one,  we 
will  consult  the  Pythagoreans  upon  this  question,  and  per- 
haps upon  some  other  questions  too, — maintaining,  mean- 
while, our  own  principle  intact. 

What  principle  do  you  mean? 


Book  VII.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  281 

Never  to  let  our  pupils  attempt  to  study  any  imperfect 
branch  of  these  sciences,  or  anything  that  ever  fails  to 
arrive  ultimately  at  that  point  which  all  things  ought  to 
reach,  as  we  said  just  now  in  treating  of  astronomy. ,  For 
you  can  scarcely  be  ignorant  that  harmony  also  is  treated 
just  like  astronomy  in  this, — that  its  professors,  like  the 
astronomers,  are  content  to  measure  the  notes  and  con- 
cords distinguished  by  the  ear,  one  against  another,  and 
therefore  toil  without  result. 

Yes,  indeed,  and  they  make  themselves  quite  ridiculous. 
They  talk  about  "  repetitions,"  and  apply  their  ears  closely, 
as  if  they  were  bent  on  extracting  a  note  from  their  neigh- 
bours: and  then  one  party  asserts  that  an  intermediate 
sound  can  still  be  detected,  which  is  the  smallest  interval, 
and  ought  to  be  the  unit  of  measure;  while  the  other 
party  contends  that  now  the  sounds  are  identical, — both 
alike  postponing  their  reason  to  their  ears. 

I  see  you  are  alluding  to  those  good  men  who  tease  and 
torture  the  chords,  and  rack  them  upon  the  pegs.  But 
not  to  make  the  metaphor  too  long  by  enlarging  upon  the 
blows  given  by  the  plectrum,  and  the  peevishness,  reserve 
and  forwardness  of  the  strings,  I  here  abandon  this  style, 
and  tell  you  that  I  do  not  mean  these  persons,  but  those 
whom  we  resolved  but  now  to  consult  on  the  subject  of 
harmony.  For  they  act  just  like  the  astronomers  j  that 
is,  they  investigate  the  numerical  relations  subsisting  be- 
tween these  audible  concords,  but  they  refuse  to  apply 
themselves  to  problems,  with  the  object  of  examining 
what  numbers  are,  and  what  numbers  are  not,  consonant, 
and  what  is  the  reason  .f  the  difference. 

Why  the  work  you  describe  would  require  faculties  more 
than  human. 

Call  it,  rather,  a  work  useful  in  the  search  after  the 
beautiful  and  the  good,  though  useless  if  pursued  with 
other  ends. 

Yes,  that  is  not  unlikely. 

In  addition  to  this,  I  continued,  if  the  study  of  all  these 
sciences  which  we  have  enumerated,  should  ever  bring  us 
to  their  mutual  association  and  relationship,  and  teach 


282  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         [Book  VII 

us  the  nature  of  the  ties  which  bind  them  together,  I 
believe  that  the  diligent  treatment  of  them  will  forward 
the  objects  which  we  have  in  view,  and  that  the  labour, 
which  otherwise  would  be  fruitless,  will  be  well  bestowed. 

I  have  the  same  presentiment,  Socrates.  But  the  work 
you  speak  of  is  a  very  great  one. 

Do  you  allude  to  the  prelude?  I  replied:  or  to  what? 
Surely  we  do  not  require  to  be  reminded  that  all  this  is 
but  the  prelude  to  the  actual  hymn,  which  we  have  to 
learn  ?  For  I  presume  you  do  not  look  upon  the  proficients 
in  these  studies  as  dialecticians. 

No,  indeed  I  do  not;  bating  a  very  few  exceptions  that 
have  fallen  in  my  way. 

But  of  course  *  you  do  not  suppose  that  persons  unable 
(to  take  a  part  in  the  discussion  of  first  principles,  can  be 
said  to  know  a  particle  of  the  things  which  we  affirm  they 
ought  to  know. 

No,  that  again  is  not  my  opinion. 

Then,  Glaucon,  have  we  not  here  the  actual  hymn,  of 
which  dialectical  reasoning  is  the  consummation?  This 
hymn,  falling  as  it  does  within  the  domain  of  the  intel- 
lect, can  only  be  imitated  by  the  faculty  of  sight;  which, 
as  we  said,  strives  to  look  steadily,  first  at  material  ani- 
mals, then  at  the  stars  themselves,  and  last  of  all  at 
the  very  sun  itself.  In  the  same  way,  whenever  a  person 
strives,  by  the  help  of  dialectic,  to  start  f  in  pursuit  of 
every  reality  by  a  simple  process  of  reason,  independent 
of  all  sensuous  information, — never  flinching,  until  by  an 
act  of  the  pure  intelligence  he  has  grasped  the  real  nature 
of  good, — he  arrives  at  the  very  end  of  the  intellectual 
world,  just  as  the  last-mentioned  person  arrived  at  the 
end  of  the  visible  world. 

Unquestionably. 

And  this  course  you  name  dialectic,  do  you  not? 

Certainly  I  do. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  release  of  the  prisoners  from 

*  Reading  alia  6y,  instead  of  all'  7]6tj. 

f  Adopting  Ast's  reading  oppav,  instead  of  bpufi,  and  removing 
ihe  comma  after  emxetpff. 


Book  VII.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  283 

their  chains,  and  their  transition  from  the  shadows  of  the 
images  to  the  images  themselves  and  to  the  light,  and 
their  ascent  from  the  cavern  into  the  sunshine; — and, 
when  there,  the  fact  of  their  being  able  *  to  look,  not  at 
the  animals  and  vegetables  and  the  sun's  light,  but  still 
only  at  their  reflections  in  water,  which  are  indeed  divine 
and  shadows  of  things  real,  instead  of  being  shadows  of 
images  thrown  by  a  light  which  may  itself  be  called  an 
image,  when  compared  with  the  sun; — these  points,  I  say, 
find  their  counterpart  in  all  this  pursuit  of  the  above- 
mentioned  arts,  which  possesses  this  power  of  elevating  the 
noblest  part  of  the  soul,  and  advancing  it  towards  the 
contemplation  of  that  which  is  most  excellent  in  the  things 
that  really  exist,  just  as  in  the  other  case  the  clearest 
organ  of  the  body  was  furthered  to  the  contemplation  of 
that  which  is  brightest  in  the  corporeal  and  visible  region. 

For  myself,  he  replied,  I  accept  this  statement.  And 
yet  I  must  confess  that  I  find  it  hard  to  accept:  though 
at  the  same  time,  looking  at  it  in  another  way,  I  find  it 
hard  to  deny.  However,  as  the  discussion  of  it  need  not 
be  confined  to  the  present  occasion,  but  may  be  repeated 
on  many  future  occasions,  let  us  assume  the  truth  of  your 
present  theory,  and  so  proceed  to  the  hymn  itself,  and 
discuss  it,  as  we  have  discussed  the  prelude.  Tell  us, 
therefore,  what  is  the  general  character  of  the  faculty  of 
dialectic,  and  into  what  specific  parts  it  is  divided,  and 
lastly  what  are  its  methods.  For  these  methods  will,  in 
all  likelihood,  be  the  roads  that  lead  to  the  very  spot  where 
we  are  to  close  our  march,  and  rest  from  our  journey. 

My  dear  Glaucon,  I  replied,  you  would  not  be  able  to 
follow  me  further,  though  on  my  part  there  should  be  no 
lack  of  willingness.  You  would  no  longer  be  looking  at 
the  similitude  of  that  whereof  we  speak,  but  at  the  truth 
itself,  in  the  shape  in  which  it  appears  to  me.  Whether  I 
am  right  or  not,  T  dare  not  go  so  far  as  to  decide  positively : 
but  I  suppose  I  am  warranted  in  affirming  that  we  are 
not  far  wrong. 

*  We  read  eti  adwafiia  pteneiv.  The  common  reading  is  kif 
hStrvafjLia^'/ii7TEiv,  which  can  scarcely  be  right. 


284  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         [Book  VIL 

Undoubtedly  you  are. 

And  may  I  not  also  affirm,  that  the  faculty  of  dialectic 
can  alone  reveal  the  truth  to  one  who  is  master  of  the 
sciences  which  we  have  just  enumerated;  and  that  in  no 
other  way  is  such  knowledge  possible? 

Yes,  on  that  point  also  you  are  warranted  in  speaking 
positively. 

At  any  rate,  I  continued,  no  one  will  contradict  us  when 
we  assert  that  there  is  no  other  *  method  which  attempts 
systematically  to  form  a  conception  of  the  real  nature  of 
each  individual  thing.  On  the  contrary,  all  the  arts,  with 
a  few  exceptions,  are  wholly  addressed  to  the  opinions 
and  wants  of  men,  or  else  concern  themselves  about  the 
production  and  composition  of  bodies,  or  the  treatment  of 
things  which  grow  and  are  compounded.  And  as  for  these 
few  exceptions,  such  as  geometry  and  its  accompanying 
sciences,  which,  according  to  us,  in  some  small  degree 
apprehend  what  is  real, — we  find  that,  though  they  may 
dream  about  real  existence,  they  cannot  behold  it  in  a 
waking  state,  so  long  as  they  use  hypotheses  which  they 
leave  unexamined,  and  of  which  they  can  give  no  account. 
For  when  a  person  assumes  a  first  principle  which  he 
does  not  know,  on  which  unknown  first  principle  depends 
the  web  of  intermediate  propositions,  and  the  final  con- 
clusion,— by  what  possibility  can  such  mere  admissions 
ever  constitute  science? 

It  is  indeed  impossible. 

Hence  the  dialectic  method,  and  that  alone,  adopts  the 
following  course.  It  carries  back  its  hypotheses  to  the 
very  first  principle  of  all,  in  order  to  establish  them  firmly ; 
and  finding  the  eye  of  the  soul  absolutely  buried  in  a 
swamp  of  barbarous  ignorance,  it  gently  draws  and  raises 
it  upwards,  employing  as  handmaids  in  this  work  of 
revolution  the  arts  which  we  have  discussed.  These  we 
have  often  called  sciences,  because  it  is  customary  to  do 
so,  but  they  require  another  name,  betokening  greater 
clearness  than  opinion,  but  less  distinctness  than  science. 

*  Reading  with  Ast  and  Stallbaum.  ovk  aXly  r^,  instead  of 


Book  VII.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  285 

On  some  former  occasion  we  fixed  upon  the  term  under- 
standing to  express  this  mental  process.  But  it  appears 
to  me  to  be  no  part  of  our  business  to  dispute  about  a 
name,  when  we  have  proposed  to  ourselves  the  considera- 
tion of  such  important  subjects. 

You  are  quite  right,  said  he:  we  only  want  a  name 
which  when  applied  to  a  mental  state  shall  indicate  clearly 
what  phenomena  it  describes. 

Indeed  I  am  content,  I  proceeded,  to  call  as  before  the 
first  division  science,  the  second  understanding,  the  third 
belief,  and  the  fourth  conjecture, — the  two  latter  jointly 
constituting  opinion,  and  the  two  former  intelligence. 
Opinion  deals  with  the  changing,  intelligence  with  the 
real;  and  as  the  real  is  to  the  changing,  so  is  intelligence 
to  opinion ;  and  as  intelligence  is  to  opinion,  so  is  science 
to  belief,  and  understanding  to  conjecture.  But  the 
analogy  between  the  objects  of  these  mental  acts,  and  the 
twofold  division  of  the  provinces  of  opinion  and  of  in- 
telligence, we  had  better  omit,  Glaucon,  to  prevent  bur- 
dening ourselves  with  discussions  -far  outnumbering  all  the 
former. 

Well,  I  certainly  agree  with  you  upon  those  other  points, 
so  far  as  I  can  follow  you. 

Do  you  also  give  the  title  of  Dialectician  to  the  person 
who  takes  thoughtful  account  of  the  essence  of  each  thing  ? 
And  will  you  admit  that,  so  far  as  a  person  has  no  such 
account  to  give  to  himself  and  to  others,  so  far  he  fails 
to  exercise  pure  reason  upon  the  subject? 

Yes,  I  cannot  doubt  it,  he  replied. 

Then  shall  you  not  also  hold  the  same  language  con- 
cerning the  good?  Unless  a  person  can  strictly  define 
by  a  process  of  thought  the  essential  Form  of  the  Good, 
abstracted  from  everything  else;  and  unless  he  can  fight 
his  way  as  it  were  through  all  objections,  studying  to 
disprove  them  not  by  the  rules  of  opinion,  but  by  those 
of  real  existence;  and  unless  in  all  these  conflicts  he 
travels  to  his  conclusion  without  making  one  false  step 
in  his  train  of  thought, — unless  he  does  all  this,  shall  you 
not  assert  that  he  knows  neither  the  essence  of  good;  nor 


286  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VII. 

any  other  good  thing;  and  that  any  phantom  of  it,  which 
he  may  chance  to  apprehend,  is  the  fruit  of  opinion  and 
not  of  science;  and  that  he  dreams  and  sleeps  away  his 
present  life,  and  never  wakes  on  this  side  of  that  future 
world,  in  which  he  is  doomed  to  sleep  for  ever  ? 

Yes,  he  said;  I  shall  most  decidedly  assert  all  this. 

Then  certainly,  if  you  ever  had  the  actual  training  of 
those  children  of  yours,  whose  nature  and  education  you 
are  theoretically  superintending,  I  cannot  suppose  that  you 
would  allow  them  to  be  magistrates  in  the  state  with 
authority  to  decide  the  weightiest  matters,  while  they  are 
as  irrational  as  the  strokes  of  a  pen. 

No,  indeed  I  should  not. 

You  will  pass  a  law,  no  doubt,  ordering  them  to  apply 
themselves  especially  to  that  education  which  will  enable 
them  to  use  the  weapons  of  the  dialectician  most  scien- 
tifically ? 

I  shall,  with  your  help. 

Then  does  it  not  seem  to  you  that  dialectic  lies,  like 
a  coping-stone,  upon  the  top  of  the  sciences,  and  that  it 
would  be  wrong  to  place  any  other  science  above  it,  be- 
cause the  series  is  now  complete? 

Yes,  I  believe  you  are  right,  he  replied. 

Hence,  I  continued,  it  only  remains  for  you  to  fix  upon 
the  persons  to  whom  we  are  to  assign  these  studies,  and 
the  principle  of  their  distribution. 

That  is  evidently  the  case. 

Do  you  remember  what  kind  of  persons  we  selected, 
when  we  were  choosing  the  magistrates  some  time  ago? 

Of  course  I  do. 

Well,  I  would  have  you  regard  the  qualities  we  men- 
toned,  as  so  far  entitling  their  owners  to  be  selected: 
that  is  to  say,  we  are  bound  to  prefer  the  most  steady,  the 
most  manful,  and,  as  far  as  we  can,  the  most  comely. 
But  in  addition  to  this,  besides  requiring  in  them  a  noble 
and  resolute  moral  nature,  they  must  also  possess  such 
qualifications  as  are  favourable  to  this  system  of  education. 

Pray  which  do  you  determine  these  to  be  ? 


Book  VII.]       THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  287 

They  must  bring  with  them  a  piercing  eye  for  their 
studies,  my  excellent  friend,  and  they  must  learn  with 
ease.  For  assuredly  severe  studies  try  the  mettle  of  the 
mind  much  more  than  bodily  exercises;  because  the 
labour  comes  more  home  to  it  in  the  former  case,  as  it  is 
limited  to  the  mind,  instead  of  being  shared  by  the  body. 

True. 

Then  we  must  include  in  the  objects  of  our  search  a 
good  memory,  a  dauntless  demeanour,  and  a  thorough 
love  of  work.  Else,  how  can  you  expect  to  induce  a 
man  to  go  through  with  his  bodily  labours,  and  to  learn 
and  practise  so  much  besides? 

No;  we  can  hold  out  no  inducement  to  a  man  who 
does  not  possess  talents  of  the  highest  order. 

At  any  rate,  I  continued,  it  is  certain  that  the  false 
view  of  philosophy  which  at  present  prevails,  and  the 
disrepute  into  which  she  has  fallen,  may  be  traced,  as  I 
said  before,  to  the  fact,  that  people  apply  themselves  to 
philosophy  without  any  regard  to  their  own  demerits: 
whereas  the  study  of  her  is  the  privilege  of  her  genuine 
sons,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  baseborn. 

What  do  you  mean  by  genuine? 

In  the  first  place,  he  that  would  study  her  must  not 
halt  in  his  love  of  work.  He  must  not  be  half-laborious, 
and  half-indolent,  which  is  the  case  when  a  man  loves 
exercise,  and  the  chase,  and  all  bodily  toil,  but  dislikes 
study,  and  feels  an  aversion  for  listening  and  inquiring, 
and  in  fact  hates  all  intellectual  labour.  On  the  other 
hand,  those  people  are  equally  halt  whose  love  of  work 
has  taken  the   opposite   form. 

What  you  say  is  perfectly  true. 

In  the  same  way,  may  we  not  affirm  that  a  soul  is 
crippled  with  reference  to  truth,  if,  while  it  hates  voluntary 
falsehood,  and  cannot  endure  it  in  itself,  and  is  exceed- 
ingly indignant  when  other  people  are  guilty  of  an  untruth, 
it  nevertheless  calmly  accepts  involuntary  falsehood,  and 
instead  of  being  distressed  when  its  lack  of  knowledge  is 
detected,  is  fain  to  wallow  in  ignorance  with  the  com- 
placency of  a  brutal  hog  ? 


288  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         Book  VI*.] 

No  doubt  you  are  right. 

Above  all,  I  proceeded,  we  must  watch  the  genuine  and 
the  baseborn  on  the  side  of  temperance,  fortitude,  loftiness 
of  mind,  and  all  the  separate  virtues.  For  whenever 
states  or  private  persons  have  no  eye  for  qualities  like 
these,  they  unwittingly  employ,  as  magistrates  or  as 
friends,  men  who  are  halt  and  illegitimate  in  one  or  other 
of  these  respects. 

Unquestionably  it  is  so. 

Hence  we,  on  our  side,  must  take  every  precaution  in 
all  matters  of  this  description.  For,  if  we  can  procure 
persons  sound  in  limb,  and  sound  in  mind,  and  train 
them  up  under  the  influence  of  these  lofty  studies  and 
severe  discipline,  justice  herself  will  find  no  fault  with  us, 
and  we  shall  preserve  our  state  and  constitution ;  whereas, 
if  we  select  pupils  of  a  different  stamp,  our  success  will  be 
turned  into  failure,  and  we  shall  draw  down  upon  philos- 
ophy a  still  heavier  storm  of  ridicule. 

That  would  be  indeed  a  disgrace. 

It  certainly  would.  But  very  likely  I  made  myself  ridic- 
ulous just  this  minute. 

How  so  ?  he  asked. 

I  forgot,  replied  I,  that  we  were  not  serious,  and  spoke 
too  earnestly.  For,  as  I  spoke,  I  looked  towards  Phil- 
osophy, and  seeing  her  assailed  with  unmerited  contumely, 
I  was  so  indignant,  and  so  angry  with  'those  who  are 
responsible  for  it,  that  I  believe  I  expressed  myself  too 
seriously. 

No,  indeed  you  did  not :  at  least,  in  listening,  I  did  not 
think  so. 

Well,  in  speaking,  it  struck  me  that  I  did.  But,  to  pro- 
ceed, let  us  not  forget,  that  it  will  be  impossible  in  this 
instance  to  select  persons  advanced  in  years,  as  we  did  in 
the  former.  For  we  must  not  be  persuaded  by  Solon  into 
thinking  that  a  man,  as  he  grows  old,  can  learn  many 
things.  On  the  contrary,  an  old  man  can  sooner  run 
than  learn;  and  the  wide  range  of  severe  labours  must 
fall  wholly  on  the  young. 

Unquestionably  so. 


Book  VII.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  JJS9 

Arithmetic,  therefore,  and  geometry,  and  all  the  branches 
of  that  preliminary  education  which  is  to  pave  the  way 
for  dialectic,  must  be  taught  our  pupils  in  their  child- 
hood;— care  being  taken  to  convey  instruction  in  such  a 
shape  as  not  to  make  it  compulsory  upon  them  to  learn. 

Why  so? 

Because,  I  replied,  no  trace  of  slavery  ought  to  mix 
with  the  studies  of  the  f  reeborn  man.  For  the  constrained 
performance  of  bodily  labours  does,  it  is  true,  exert  no 
evil  influence  upon  the  body;  but  in  the  case  of  the  mind, 
no  study,  pursued  under  compulsion,  remains  rooted  in 
the  memory. 

That  is  true. 

Hence,  my  excellent  friend,  you  must  train  the  chil- 
dren to  their  studies  in  a  playful  manner,  and  without  any 
air  of  constraint,  with  the  further  object  of  discerning 
more  readily  the  natural  bent  of  their  respective  characters. 

Your  advice  is  reasonable. 

Bo  you  remember  our  saying  that  the  children  must 
also  be  taken  on  horseback  within  sight  of  actual  war; 
and  that,  on  any  safe  occasion,  they  must  be  brought  into 
the  field,  and  made  to  taste  blood,  like  young  hounds  ? 

I  do  remember  it,  he  replied. 

Accordingly  we  must  make  a  select  list,  including 
every  one  who  has  displayed  remarkable  self-possession 
in  the  midst  of  all  these  labours,  studies,  and  dangers. 

At  what  age  must  that  be  done? 

As  soon  as  they  are  released  from  the  necessary  bodily 
exercises,  during  which,  whether  they  last  two  or  three 
years,  nothing  else  can  be  done.  For  weariness  and  sleep 
are  enemies  to  study.  And,  besides,  the  behaviour  of  each 
in  his  exercises  is  one  of  the  tests  of  character,  and  a  very 
important  one  too. 

Doubtless  it  is. 

After  this  period,  I  continued,  these  choice  characters, 
selected  from  the  ranks  of  the  young  men  of  twenty,  must 
receive  higher  hcuours  than  the  rest;  and  the  detached 
sciences  in  which  they  were  educated  as  children  must  be 
brought  within  the  compass  of  a  single  survey,  to  §h«w 


200  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  VII. 

the  co-relation  which  exists  between  them,  and  the  nature 
of  real  existence. 

Certainly  this  is  the  only  kind  of  instruction  which  will 
be  found  abiding,  when  it  has  once  effected  an  entrance. 

Yes,  and  it  is  also  a  most  powerful  criterion  of  the 
dialectic  character.  For  according  as  a  man  can  survey 
a  subject  as  a  whole  or  not,  he  is,  or  is  not,  a  dialectician. 

I   agree   with   you. 

Hence  it  will  be  your  duty  to  have  an  eye  to  those  who 
shew  the  greatest  ability  in  these  questions,  and  the 
greatest  firmness,  not  only  in  study,  but  also  in  war  and 
the  other  branches  of  discipline:  and  when  they  are 
thirty  years  old  and  upwards,  you  must  select  them  out 
of  the  ranks  of  your  picked  men,  and  raise  them  to 
greater  honours,  and  try  them  by  the  test  of  dialectic 
ability,  in  order  to  see  who  is  able  to  divest  himself  of  his 
eyes  and  his  other  senses,  and  advance  in  company  with 
truth  towards  real  existence.  And  here  it  is,  my  friend, 
that  great  caution  is  required. 

For  what  special  reason?  he  inquired. 

Do  you  not  perceive,  I  said,  what  an  immense  evil  at 
present  accompanies  dialectic? 

Pray  what  is  it? 

Insubordination,  I  replied,  with  which  I  believe  dialec- 
ticians to  be  tainted. 

Indeed  you  are  right. 

Are  you  at  all  surprised  at  the  fact,  and  do  you  make 
no  allowance  for  the  persons  in  question? 

Pray  explain  yourself. 

By  way  of  parallel  case,  figure  to  yourself  a  suppositi- 
tious child,  brought  up  in  the  midst  of  great  wealth,  and 
extensive  connexions  of  high  family,  and  surrounded  by  i 
[flatterers;  and  suppose  him,  on  arriving  at  manhood,  to 
learn  that  his  alleged  parents  are  not  his  real  parents, 
though  he  cannot  discover  the  latter.  Can  you  guess 
what  would  be  his  behaviour  towards  his  flatterers  and 
towards  his  spurious  parents,  first  while  he  was  ignorant 
of  tht  fact  of  his  substitution*  and  secondly,  when  ht 


Book  VII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  291 

became  aware  of  it  ?  or  would  you  like  to  listen  to  my  own 
conjectures  ? 

I  should,  he  replied. 

Well,  I  suspect  that,  so  long  as  he  is  ignorant  of  the 
truth,  he  will  honour  his  father  and  his  mother  and  his 
other  apparent  relations,  more  than  his  flatterers ;  and  that 
he  will  not  allow  the  former  to  want  anything  so  quickly 
as  the  latter;  and  that  he  will  be  more  likely  to  be  guilty 
of  insubordination  in  word  or  deed  and  of  disobedience  in 
important  things  towards  his  flatterers,  than  towards  his 
supposed  parents. 

Probably  he  will. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  suspect  that,  after  he  has  learned 
the  truth,  his  esteem  and  regard  for  his  parents  will  be 
diminished,  while  his  respect  for  his  flatterers  will  be 
heightened,  to  whom  he  will  now  listen  very  much  more 
than  before,  and  proceed  to  live  as  they  would  have  him 
live,  associating  with  them  undisguisedly,  and  wholly 
abandoning  all  concern  for  that  fictitious  father,  and  those 
pretended  relations,  unless  his  disposition  is  remarkably 
good. 

Your  description  is  perfectly  true  to  nature.  But  how 
does  this  comparison  bear  upon  those  who  apply  them- 
selves to  dialectic? 

I  will  tell  you.  We  have,  I  believe,  from  childhood  de- 
cided opinions  about  things  just  and  beautiful;  and  we 
have  been  bred  up  to  obey  and  honour  these  opinions,  just 
as  we  have  grown  up  in  submission  to  our  parents. 

True. 

Now  these  opinions  are  combated  by  certain  pleasurable 
pursuits,  which  flatter  our  soul  and  try  to  draw  it  over  to 
their  side;  though  they  fail  to  persuade  us,  if  we  are  at 
all  virtuous;  in  which  case,  we  honour  those  ancestral 
opinions,  and  continue  loyal  to  them. 

True. 

Well,  but  when  such  a  person  is  met  by f the  question, 
what  is  beauty? — and  having  given  the  answer,  which  he 
used  to  hear  from  the  legislator,  is  confuted  by  the 
dialectic  process;  and  when  frequent  and  various  defeats 


292  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         [Book  VII. 

have  forced  him  to  believe  that  there  is  as  much  deformity 
as  beauty  in  what  he  calls  beauty,  and  that  justice,  good- 
ness, and  all  the  things,  which  he  used  to  honour  most, 
are  in  the  like  predicament, — how  do  you  think  he  will 
behave  thenceforth  towards  his  old  opinions,  so  far  as 
respect  and  obedience  are  concerned? 

Of  course  he  will  not  pay  them  the  same  respect  or  the 
same  obedience  as  before. 

And  so  long  as  he  neither  honours  nor  acknowledges 
his  former  belief,  as  he  used  to  do,  while  at  the  same  time 
he  fails  to  discover  the  true  principles,  is  not  that  flattering 
life  the  only  one  to  which  he  will  be  likely  to  attach 
himself  ? 

It  is. 

In  other  words,  he  will  appear,  I  suppose,  to  have  aban- 
doned his  loyalty,  and  to  have  become  lawless. 

There  cannot  be  a  doubt  of  it. 

Well  now,  is  not  this  a  condition  of  the  students  of 
dialectic  a  natural  one,  and,  as  I  said  just  now,  does  it  not 
deserve  to  be  treated  with  great  forbearance? 

Yes,  and  with  pity  too,  he  replied. 

Then  in  order  that  you  may  not  have  to  feel  this  pity 
for  those  men  of  thirty,  must  you  not  use  every  precaution 
in  introducing  them  to  dialectic  ? 

Certainly. 

And  will  it  not  be  one  great  precaution  to  forbid  their 
meddling  with  it  while  young?  For  I  suppose  you  have 
noticed,  that  whenever  boys  taste  dialectic  for  the  first 
time,  they  pervert  it  into  an  amusement,  and  always 
employ  it  for  purposes  of  contradiction,  and  imitate  in 
their  own  persons  the  artifices  of  those  who  study  refuta- 
tion,— delighting,  like  puppies,  in  pulling  and  tearing  to 
pieces  with  logic  any  one  who  comes  near  them. 

They  do,  to  an  extravagant  extent. 

Hence,  when  they  have  experienced  many  triumphs 
and  many  defeats,  they  fall,  quickly  and  vehemently,  into 
an  utter  disbelief  of  their  former  sentiments:  and  thereby 
both  they  and  the  whole  cause  of  philosophy  have  been 
prejudiced  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 


Book  VII.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  293 

That  is  perfectly  true. 

The  man  of  more  advanced  years,  on  the  contrary,  will 
not  suffer  himself  to  be  led  away  by  such  madness;  but 
will  imitate  those  who  are  resolved  to  discuss  and  examine 
truth,  rather  than  those  who  play  at  contradiction  for 
amusement;  and,  as  a  consequence  of  his  superior 
discretion,  will  increase,  instead  of  diminishing,  the 
general  respect  for  the  pursuit. 

You  are  right. 

Again;  were  we  not  studying  precaution  throughout, 
when  we  said  some  time  back,  that  the  characters,  which 
are  to  be  initiated  into  dialectic,  must  be  stable  and  or- 
derly, in  opposition  to  the  present  system,  which  allows 
anybody,  however  unfit,  to  enter  the  field? 

Certainly  we  were. 

Would  it  suffice,  then,  for  the  acquisition  of  dialectic, 
that  a  man  should  continue  constantly  and  strenuously 
devoted  to  the  study, — resigning  every  other  pursuit  for 
it,  just  as,  in  its  turn,  he  resigned  everything  for  gym- 
nastic,— during  a  period  twice  as  long  as  that  which  he 
bestowed  on  his  bodily  exercises? 

Do  you  mean  six  years,  or  four? 

It  does  not  matter  much,  I  replied ;  say  five.  After  this 
you  will  have  to  send  them  down  again  into  the  cavern 
we  described,  and  compel  them  to  take  commands  in  war, 
and  to  hold  such  offices  as  befit  young  men,  that  they  may 
also  keep  up  with  their  neighbours  in  practical  address. 
And  here  again  you  must  put  them  to  the  test,  to  see 
whether  they  will  continue  steadfast  notwithstanding  every 
seduction,  or  whether  possibly  they  may  be  a  little  shaken. 

And  how  long  a  time  do  you  assign  for  this  ? 

Fifteen  years,  I  replied.  Then,  as  soon  as  they  are 
fifty  years  old,  those  who  have  passed  safely  through  all 
temptations,  and  who  have  won  every  distinction  in  every 
branch,  whether  of  action  or  of  science,  must  be  forthwith 
introduced  to  their  final  task,  and  must  be  constrained  to 
lift  up  the  eye  of  the  soul,  and  fix  it  upon  that  which  gives 
light  to  all  things;  and  having  surveyed  the  essence  of 
good,  they  must  take  it  as  a  pattern,  to  be  copied  in  that 


294  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         [Book  VII. 

work  of  regulating  their  country  and  their  fellow-citizeni 
and  themselves,  which  is  to  occupy  each  in  turn  during 
the  rest  of  life; — and  though  they  are  to  pass  most  of  their 
time  in  philosophical  pursuits,  yet  each,  when  his  turn 
comes,  is  to  devote  himself  to  the  hard  duties  of  public 
life,  and  hold  office  for  their  country's  sake,  not  as  a 
desirable,  but  as  an  unavoidable  occupation;  and  thus 
having  trained  up  a  constant  supply  of  others  like  them- 
selves to  fill  their  place  as  guardians  of  the  state,  they  will 
depart  and  take  up  their  abode  in  the  islands  of  the 
blessed.  And  the  state  will  put  up  monuments  to  their 
memory  at  the  public  expense,  and  offer  sacrifices  to  them, 
as  demigods,  if  the  Pythian  oracle  will  authorise  it,  or 
at  least  as  high-favoured  and  godlike  men. 

Like  a  sculptor,  Socrates,  you  have  finished  off  the 
leading  men  in  a  style  of  faultless  beauty. 

Say  leading  women  too,  Glaucon.  For  do  not  suppose 
that  my  remarks  were  intended  to  apply  at  all  more  to 
men  than  to  women,  so  long  as  we  can  find  women  whose 
talents  are  equal  to  the  situation. 

You  are  right,  he  said,  if  they  are  to  share  with  the 
men  in  everything  on  a  footing  of  equality,  according  to 
our  account.  {jl 

Well  then,  do  you  agree  that  our  theory  of  the  state 
and  constitution  is  not  a  mere  aspiration,  but,  though  full 
of  difficulties,  capable  of  realization  in  one  way,  and  only 
one,  which,  as  we  have  said,  requires  that  one,  if  not 
more,  of  the  true  philosophers  shall  be  invested  with  full 
authority  in  a  state,  and  contemn  the  honours  of  the 
present  day,  in  the  belief  that  they  are  mean  and  worth- 
less; and  that,  deeply  impressed  with  the  supreme  impor- 
tance of  right  and  of  the  honours  to  be  derived  from  it, 
and  regarding  justice  as  the  highest  and  most  binding  of 
all  obligations,  he  shall,  as  the  special  servant  and  admirer 
of  justice,  carry  out  a  thorough  reform  in  his  own  state. 

How  is  that  to  be  done  ? 

All  who  are  above  ten  years  old  in  the  city  must  be 
despatched  into  the  country,  and  their  children  must  be 
taken  and  bred  up  beyond  the  influence  of  that  common 


Book  VII.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  295 

character,  which  their  parents  among  others  possess,  in 
the  manners  and  laws  of  the  true  philosophers,  the  nature 
of  which  we  have  described  above;  and,  tell  me,  will  not 
this  be  the  quickest  and  easiest  way  to  enable  a  state  and 
a  constitution,  such  as  we  have  represented,  to  establish 
itself  and  prosper,  and  at  the  same  time  be  a  blessing  to 
the  nation  in  which  it  has  taken  root? 

Yes,  quite  so,  he  replied:  and  I  believe,  Socrates,  you 
have  stated  correctly  the  means  that  would  be  employed, 
if  such  a  constitution  were  ever  realized. 

And  have  we  not  by  this  time  discussed  to  satiety  this 
state,  and  the  individual  that  resembles  it?  For  I  pre- 
sume it  is  also  clear  what  sort  of  person  we  shall  expect 
him  to  be. 

It  is  clear,  he  replied;  and  the  present  inquiry  is,  I  be- 
lieve, concluded. 


296  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  Vlli, 


BOOK  VIII. 

Very  well ;  then  we  agree,  Glaucon,  upon  these  points, — 
namely  that,  if  the  constitution  of  a  state  is  to  be  carried 
to  perfection,  it  must  recognize  a  community  of  women, 
a__community  of  children,  and  of  education  in  all  its 
branches;  and,  in  like  manner,  a  community  of  pursuits 
in  war  and  in  peace;  and  that  its  kings  must  be  those 
who  have  shewn  the  greatest  ability  in  philosophy  and 
the  greatest  aptitude  for  war. 

Yes,  we  agree  so  far. 

In  addition  to  this,  we  also  admitted,  that  as  soon  as 
the  rulers  have  established  their  position,  they  are  to  take 
the  soldiers^  and  settle  them  in  dwelling-places  of  a 
certain  description;  in  which,  by  our  direction,  no  private 
rights  are  admitted,  but  which  are  the  common  property 
of  all.  And,  besides  determining  the  nature  of  their 
dwellings,  we  also  determined,  if  you  recollect,  how  far 
they  were  to  be  permitted  to  have  anything,  which  they 
could  call  their  own. 

Yes,  he  replied,  I  recollect  that  we  pronounced  against 
their  holding  any  such  property  as  is  commonly  held  at 
the  present  day,  and  decided  that,  in  their  capacity  of 
trained  soldiers  and  guardians,  they  ought  to  receive  in 
return  for  their  guardianship  year  by  year  from  the  other 
citizens -the  maintenance  required  by  their  position,  and 
devote  their  attention  to  the  whole  state  including  them- 
selves. 

You  are  right.  But,  now  that  we  have  concluded  this 
subject,  let  us  recall  to  mind  the  point  from  which  we  di- 
verged, in  order  that  we  may  resume  our  old  route. 

That  will  not  be  difficult,  he  replied.  You  were  talking 
pretty  much  as  you  are  now  doing, — giving  us  to  under- 
stand that  you  had  finished  the  discussion  of  the  com- 
monwealth, and  saying  that  you  applied  th«?  term  "good** 


Book  VIII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  29? 

to  such  a  state  as  you  had  then  described,  and  to  the  man 
who  resembled  it;  though,  as  it  would  seem,  you  had  it 
in  your  power  to  tell  us  of  a  still  more  excellent  state,  and 
of  a  still  more  excellent  man.  At  the  same  time,  you 
declared  that,  if  your  state  were  right,  all  others  must  be 
wrong.  Of  the  remaining  constitutions  I  remember  you 
mentioned  four  principal  varieties,  which  you  said  it 
might  be  worth  while  to  consider, — noticing  their  faults, 
and  observing  in  their  turn  the  men  who  resemble  them; 
in  order  that,  after  viewing  them  all  and  agreeing  as  to 
the  best  and  the  worst  man,  we  might  examine  whether, 
or  not,  the  best  is  happiest,  and  the  worst  most  wretched. 
And  on  my  asking  you  to  specify  the  four  constitutions, 
to  which  you  alluded,  we  were  interrupted  by  Polemarchus 
and  Adeimantus;  and  thereupon  you  took  up  the  discus- 
sion which  has  brought  you  to  this  point. 

Your  memory  is  perfectly  correct. 

Then  allow  me  to  grapple  with  you,  like  a  wrestler,  in 
my  old  attitude;  and,  when  I  repeat  my  former  question, 
exert  yourself  to  give  me  the  answer  which  was  then  upon 
your  lips. 

I  will  do  my  best,  I  replied. 

Well,  it  is  my  particular  desire  to  be  told  what  are  the 
four  constitutions  to  which  you  referred. 

I  shall  find  no  difficulty  in  answering  your  question. 
The  constitutions  to  which  I  allude,  and  to  which  in  fact 
special  names  have  been  given,  are  the  following.  First, 
we  have  the  constitution  of  Crete  and  Sparta,  which  has 
the  general  voice  in  its  favour?  Secon6Tln~order,  as  in 
estimation,  stands  oligarchy,  as  it  is  called,  a  common- 
wealth fraught  with  many  evils.  Then  comes  democracy? 
which  is  the  adversary  and  successor  of  oligarchy;  and, 
finally,  that  glorious  thing, ^fispotisnay-which  differs  from 
all  the  preceding,  and  constitutes  the  fourth  and  worst 
disease  of  a  state.  I  suppose  you  cannot  tell  me  of  any 
other  form  of  polity,  which  stands  conspicuously  by  itself 
in  kind?  For  I  believe  we  may  regard  as  minor  links  in 
the  series  just  given  all  principalities  and  purchased  sov- 
ereignties and  similar  constitutions,  which  are  to  be  found 


298  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.       [Book  VIII. 

fully  as  often  among  the  barbarians  as  among  the  Greeks. 

Yes,  we  certainly  hear  of  many  strange  instances  of 
them. 

Now  are  you  aware  that  the  varieties  of  human  character 
and  the  varieties  of  existing  constitutions  must  be  exactly 
equal  in  point  of  number?  Or  do  you  imagine  that  con- 
stitutions grow  upon  a  tree  or  rock,  instead  of  springing 
out  of  the  moral  dispositions  of  the  members  of  each  state, 
according  as  this  or  that  disposition  turn?  the  scale  as  it 
were,  and  drags  everything  else  in  its  wake? 

I  believe  the  latter  to  be  their  sole  origin. 

Consequently  if  there  are  five  varieties  of  commonwealth, 
there  must  be  also  five  varieties  of  mental  constitution 
among  individuals. 

Certainly. 

We  have  already  discussed  the  man  who  resembles  aris- 
tocracy, whom  we  rightly  affirm  to  be  both  good  and  just. 

We  have. 

Then  must  we  proceed  to  describe  those  inferior  men, 
to  wit,  the  contentious  and  ambitious  man,  answering  to 
the  Spartan  constitution ;  and  likewise  the  oligarchical, 
and  the  democratical,  and  the  despotic  man ;  in  order  that 
we  may  get  a  view  of  the  most  unjust  man,  and  contrast 
him  with  the  most  just;  and  so  may  complete  our  inquiry 
into  the  respective  merits  of  pure  justice  and  pure  injustice, 
so  far  as  the  happiness  or  misery  of  their  possessors  is 
concerned:  in  order  that  we  may  either  listen  to  Thrasy- 
machus  and  pursue  injustice,  or  yield  to  the  argument 
which  is  coming  into  view,  and  follow  after  justice? 

We  ought  by  all  means  so  to  do. 

Well  then,  as  our  practice  from  the  first  has  been  to 
examine  moral  characteristics  in  the  state  prior  to  doing 
so  in  the  individual,  because  such  a  method  conduces  to 
greater  clearness;  so,  if  you  please,  we  will  begin  on  the 
present  occasion  by  examining  the  ambitious  constitution 
— (I  do  not  know  of  any  other  name  in  use;  we  must  call 
it  Timocracy,  or  Timarchy) — and,  with  this  in  sight,  we 
will  proceed  to  examine  the  ambitious  man,  and  then  go 
on  to  oligarchy  and  the  oligarchical  man;  and  next,  after 


Book  VIII.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  299 

looking  at  democracy,  we  will  contemplate  the  demo- 
cratical  man;  and  lastly,  we  will  enter  into  a  city  which  is 
governed  by  a  despot  and  observe  it,  and  then  look  into 
the  soul  which  is  its  counterpart,  and  so  endeavour  to 
become  competent  judges  of  the  question  proposed. 

There  would  at  least  be  sound  reason  in  such  a  method 
of  observing  and  deciding. 

Come  then,  I  proceeded,  let  us  endeavour  to  describe 
how  tiniofiTflny  wi]l  grow  out  of  aristocracy.  May  we  not 
lay  downthe  rule,  that  cEangeT^Tn"  any  constitution 
originate,  without  exception,  in  the  governing  body,  and 
only  when  that  body  becomes  the  seat  of  dissensions  ?  For, 
so  long  as  it  continues  unanimous,  it  cannot  be  shaken, 
though  it  be  very  insignificant  in  point  of  numbers. 

Yes,  that  is  true. 

Then  pray,  Glaucon,  how  will  our  state  be  shaken,  and 
in  what  way  will  divisions  arise  either  between  the 
auxiliaries  and  the  magistrates,  or  in  these  bodies  them- 
selves? Would  you  have  us  pray  to  the  Muses,  like 
Homer,  to  tell  us,  "  How  first  division  entered,"  and  would 
you  have  us  describe  them  as  talking  in  tragic,  high-flown 
style,  playing  with  us  as  children,  and  jesting,  while  they 
pretend  to  speak  seriously? 

What  will  their  answer  be? 

Something  to  this  effect: — It  is  indeed  difficult  for  a 
state,  thus  constituted,  to  be  shaken.  But  since  everything 
that  has  come  into  being  must  one  day  perish,  even  a 
system  like  ours  will  not  endure  for  all  time,  but  must 
suffer  dissolution.  The  dissolution  will  be  as  follows: 
Not  only  the  vegetable,  but  also  the  animal  kingdom,  is 
liable  to  alternations  of  fertility  and  barrenness,  mental 
and  bodily;  and  these  alternations  are  coincident  with 
certain  cyclical  revolutions,  which  vary  in  each  case  in 
length  according  to  the  length  of  life  of  the  particular 
thing.  Now,  as  touching  the  fruitfulness  and  barrenness 
of  your,  own  race,  though  the  persons,  whom  you  have 
trained  to  be  governers  of  the  state,  are  men  of^ wisdom; 
yet7  in  despite  "75i^tTl5b^rVation~anH"calcuTO  they 
will  miss  the  propitio.ua  time.    It  will  give  them  th<fslip, 


r^ 


300  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         [Book  VIII 

and  they  will  beget  children  on  wrong  occasions.  Now 
the  cycle  of  a  divine  race  is  contained  in  a  perfect  number,* 
but  the  cycle  of  a  human  race  is  expressed  by  a  geomet- 
rical number,  on  which  depends  the  good  or  bad  quality" 
of  the  births.  And  when  your  guardians,  from  ignorance 
of  this,  arrange  unseasonable  marriages,  the  children  of 
such  marriages  will  not  be  well-endowed  or  fortunate. 
The  best  of  them  will  be  established  in  power  by  their 
predecessors;  but  nevertheless  they  will  be  unworthy  of 
it ;  and  having  entered  upon  the  functions  of  their  fathers, 
they  will  first  of  all  begin  to  slight  us,  in  defiance  of  their 
duties  as  guardians,  and  underrate  music  firstT  and  then 
gymnastic.  Thus  your  young  men  will  grow  up  worse 
educated;  and,  in  consequence  of  this,  magistrates  will 
take  office  who  will  fail  in  their  duty  of  discriminating 
Hesiod's  races  and  yours,  that  is  to  say  the  golden  and 
silver  and  brazen  and  iron.  And  this  mixture  of  iron  with 
silver  and  of  brass  with  gold  will  breed  inequality  and 
incongruous  irregularity;  and,  wherever  these  take  root, 
their  growth  always  produces  enmity  and  war.  So  that 
we  may  positively  assert  that  the  rise  of  such  a  genera- 
tion will  jrrv^r4ahly_b^_inark©4-by--divi8ionss 

Yes,  and  we  shall  allow  that  the  answer  of  the  Muses  is 
the  right  one. 

How  could  it  be  otherwise,  when  the  Muses  speak  ? 

*  eari  6$  tie'uj  (iev  ytwrjry  k.tX.  We  have  not  attempted  to 
translate  the  mathematical  passage  that  follows,  because  we 
found  it  wholly  impossible  to  do  so.  The  solutions  proposed  do 
not  seem  satisfactory.  We  venture  to  suggest  the  following 
partial  solutions  as  probable  :  Av^aetg  dwa/xevat  re  nal  dwaoTevdfievai, 
"  The  product  of  the  root  multiplied  by  its  square,"  or,  2x2'=8, 
3X32=27.  Tpe7f  airoardceic,  rirrapag  de  bpovc  Aajiovaai.  "Having 
received  three  times  the  middle  terms,  and  four  times  the 
extremes."  Thus,  2.  8,  3,  27  are  the  extremes ;  4  and  9  are  the 
middle  terms.  Therefore  we  have,  8+32+12+108=160,  and 
12+27=39.  Adding  in  8  and  27  from  above,  160+39+27+8= 
234.  'S2v  knirpiToq  7™fy«7V=4x234=312.  XlsLnradi  ov^vyei^  312+5= 
317:  rplq  avgrfleis,  317x3=951.  The  "two  harmonies  "  are  repre- 
sented by  a  square,  (tj?v  jiev  law  Ioclkic)  9,  which  multiplied  by  100 
(tmrov  ToaavTaKic)  gives  900  ;  and  by  a  rectangular  parallelogram, 
of  which  one  side  is  represented  by  3  (iao/^/07  fiev  ry) ,  the  other 
by  17  {Tvpofii/KTi) ,  because  3  X  17=51.  The  meaning  of  the  remainder 
we  cannot  even  guess  at. 


Book  VIII.J        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  301 

And  what  do  the  Muses  say  next?  he  asked. 

As  600-n  as  a  division  had  arisen,  the  two  parties  would 
be  likely  to  diverge  rapidly, — the  races  of  iron  and  brass 
inclining  to  money-making  and  the  acquisition  of  land 
and  houses,  of  silver  and  gold;  while  the  other  two  richly- 
endowed  races  would,  in  the  absence  of  all  poverty,  turn 
their  minds  to  virtue  and  the  ancient  constitution  of  things. 
But  the  violence  of  their  mutual  contentions  would  induce 
the  two  parties  to  come  to  an  agreement,  on  the  under- 
standing that  they  Srrorrtdnitvlo^Tnd  "appropriate  the  land 
and  houses,  and  enslave  their  formerly  free  wards,  friends, 
and  maintainers,  from  thenceforth  to  be  held  as  an  inferior 
tribe  and  as  servants,  and  apply  themselves  to  war  and 
their  own  protection. 

I  believe  you  have  described  correctly  the  passage  to 
timocracy. 

Then  will  not  this  constitution  be  a  kind  of  mean  be- 
tween aristocracy  and  oligarchy  ? 

Assuredly  it  will.  * 

Such  being  the  passage,  how  will  the  state  in  question 
conduct  itself  after  the  change?  Is  it  not  obvious  that, 
being  a  mean  between  its  former  constitution  and  oli- 
garchy, it  will  imitate  partly  the  one,  and  partly  the  other, 
besides  having  some  peculiarities  of  its  own? 

Precisely  so. 

Then,  in  the  respect  which  the  warrior  class  will  pay  to 
the  magistrates,  and  in  the  abstinence  of  that  class  from 
agriculture,  handicrafts,  and  all  other  pursuits  of  gain,  and 
in  the  establishment  of  public  messes,  and  devotion  to 
gymnastic  and  the  training  which  war  requires, — in  all 
such  points  it  will  imitate  the  former  constitution,  will  it 
not? 

It  will. 

But  in  its  fear  of  installing  the  wise  in  office,  because  the 
wise  men  in  its  possession  are  no  longer  men  of  sufficiently 
simple  and  sterling  stuff,  but  of  compound  nature,  and  in 
its  degenerate  inclination  towards  men  of  spirit  and  of  a 
narrower  character,  with  a  greater  turn  for  war  than  for 


302  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  VIII. 

peace,  and  in  the  value  which  it  set  upon  the  arts  and 
stratagems  which  war  calls  out,  and  in  the  incessant  hos- 
tilities which  it  carries  on, — in  most  of  these  points  it  will 
have  a  character  of  its  own,  will  it  not  ? 

It  will. 

x\gain,  I  continued,  such  persons  will,  like  the  members 
of  oligarchies,  be  covetous  of  wealth,  and  will  have  a  pas- 
sionate but  concealedjCfigajd  for  gold  and  silver,  from  the 
fact  of  their  owning  storehouses  and  private  treasuries,  in 
which  they  can  deposit  and  secrete  their  riches,  and  also 
walled  houses,  which  are  verily  private  nests,  wherein  they 
may  spend  with  a  lavish  hand  on  wives  or  any  other 
object  that  may  please  them. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

Hence,  while  their  covetous  nature  makes  them  prodigal 
of  other  people's  money,  they  will  at  the  same  time  be  par- 
simonious of  their  own,  because  they  value  it  and  have 
to  conceal  the  possession  of  it ;  and  they  will  enjoy  their 
pleasures  in  secret,  shunning  the  law  as  boys  shun  their 
father,  because  they  have  been  trained  not  by  persuasion 
but  by  force,  inasmuch  as  they  have  slighted  the  true  muse, 
that  goes  hand  in  hand  with  profound  philosophical  in- 
quiry, and  have  honoured  gymnastic  above  music. 

You  are  certainly  describing  a  constitution  which  is  a 
compound  of  good  and  evil. 

Yes,  it  is  a  compound,  I  replied:  but,  owing  to  the  pre- 
ponderance of  the  spirited  element,  there  is  one  thing  in 
particular  which  it  exhibits  in  thej clearegjL.colours,  and 
that  isjparty-spirit  and  the  love  of  distinction. 

Yes,~  decidedly- it  does.  

Such,  then,  will  be  the  origin,  and  such,  or  nearly  such, 
the  character  of  this  constitution,  if  we  are  satisfied  to 
sketch  a  theoretical  outline  of  its  form,  without  perfectly 
elaborating  it,  which  we  need  not  do,  because  we  can  dis- 
tinguish sufficiently  even  from  such  a  sketch  the  most  just 
and  the  most  unjust  man,  and  because  it  is  a  work  of  hope- 
less length  to  discuss  without  any  omission  every  constitu- 
tion and  every  character. 

You  are  right,  he  said, 


Book  VIII. j       THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  303 

Who  then  is  the  man  that  answers  to  this  constitution: 
what  is  his  origin,  and  what  his  character? 

I  imagine,  said  Adeimantus,  that,  as  a  man  of  party- 
spirit,  he  must  rather  closely  resemble  our  friend  Glaucon. 

Perhaps  so,  I  replied,  as  a  party-man ;  but  in  the  follow- 
ing points  I  do  not  think  that  his  nature  and  Glaucon's 
correspond. 

What  are  these  points? 

He  must  be  more  self-willed  than  Glaucon,  and  rather 
less  fond  of  literature :  still  he  must  be  studious,  and  fond 
of  listening,  but  no  speaker.  A  person  of  this  character 
will  not  despise  slaves,  like  the  perfectly  educated  man, 
though  he  will  behave  harshly  to  them  and  at  the  same 
time  gently  to  the  free-born.  He  will  also  be  exceedingly 
obedient  to  the  magistrates,  with  a,_p^a^oji^foxjii^tiQctiDn 
afld^Command,~io  which  he  lays  claim  not  on  the  ground 
of  oratory  or  any  thing  of  the  kind,  but  on  the  ground  of 
deeds  of  arms  and  exploits  congenial  to  war,  devoted  as 
he  is  to  bodily  exercise  and  field-sports. 

True,  this  is  the  character  of  the  corresponding  com- 
monwealth. 

In  addition  to  this,  will  not  such  a  person  in  his  younger 
days  despise  wealth?  but,  as  he  grows  older,  will  he  not 
be  always  paying  it  more  respect,  because  he  has  a  touch 
of  the  nature  of  the  money-lover,  and  because  his  virtue 
is  not  free  from  blemish,  owing  to  his  having  parted  from 
the  best  guardian? 

Who  is  that  guardian  ?  asked  Adeimantus. 

Rational  inquiry,  I  replied,  blended  with  music;  for  this 
alone  by  its  presence  and  indwelling  can  preserve  its  owner 
in  the  possession  of  life-long  virtue. 

It  is  well  said. 

Such  we  find  to  be  the  character  of  the  timocratic  young 
man,  who  resembles  the  timocratic  state. 

Very  true. 

Again,  his  origin,  I  proceeded,  may  be  traced  as  follows. 
He  is  the  youthful  son  of  an  excellent  father,  who  living, 
as  is  not  uncommon,  in  a  city  where  the  constitution  is 
defective,  avoids  honours  and  offices  and  litigation  and  all 


304  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  VIII. 

similar  marks  of  a  restless  spirit,  and  is  willing  to  suffer 
loss  rather  than  get  into  trouble. 

Pray  describe  the  formation  of  such  a  character. 

It  dates  from  the  time  when  the  son  listens  to  his 
mother's  complaint,  who  is  looked  down  upon  by  the 
other  women,  because  her  husband  is  not  a  member  of  the 
government,  and  who  also  sees  that  he  does^not  concern 
himself  much  about  money,  and  will  not  fight  and  raiFas 
a  litigant  in  the  law-courts  or  in  the  public  assemblies,  to 
all j^toh__things  he  exhibits  great  indifference;  and  who 
further  perceives  that  he  is  always  inwardly  reflecting,  and 
that  he  pays  no  great  respect  to  herself,  though  he  offers 
her  no  disrespect:  for  all  which  reasons  she  is  vexed,  and 
tells  her  son  that  his  father  is  nothing  of  a  man  and  culpa- 
bly inactive,  not  to  mention  all  the  other  choice  expressions 
which  women  are  in  the  habit  of  lavishing  on  such  men. 

Ay,  said  Adeimantus,  they  have  indeed  plenty  to  say 
that  is  quite  in  keeping  with  their  own  character. 

And  no  doubt  you  are  aware,  I  continued,  that  the 
servants  also  of  such  persons — servants  who  seem  to  have 
their  masters'  interests  at  heart — do  sometimes  privately 
make  similar  observations  to  the  sons;  and  that,  if  they 
see  a  man  in  debt  to  the  father,  or  wronging  him  in  any 
other  way,  and  no  proceedings  taken  against  him^they 
exhort  the  son,  when  he  is  grown  up,  to  take  revenge  on 
all  such  people,  and  be  more  of  a  man  than  his  father. 
Likewise,  when  the  son  goes  abroad,  he  hears  and  sees 
other  instances  of  the  same  thing.  He  hears  the  quiet 
and  unmeddlesome  called  simpletons  in  the  city,  and  sees 
that  they  are  held  in  small  esteem;  while  the  busybodies 
are  honoured  and  commended.  Thereupon  the  young 
man,  hearing  and  seeing  all  this,  and  on  the  other  hand 
listening  to  his  father's  conversation  and  narrowly  ex- 
amining his  pursuits  side  by  side  with  those  of  other  men, 
is  pulled  two  ways  by  two  influences.  On  the  one  hand 
his  father  is  watering. and  nursing  the  rational  element  in 
his  soul,  and  on  the  other  hand  every  one  else  is  watering 
\  and  nursing  the  appetitive  and  the  spirited  elements^  of  his 
/  nature;  and  because,  though  his  disposition  is  not  that  of 


Book  VIII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  305 

a  bad  man,  he  nevertheless  has  mixed  in  the  bad  society 
of  others,  he  is  drawn  by  these  combined  influences  into  a 
middle  ground,  where  he  delivers  up  the  government  of 
himself  to  that  middle  element  which  is  hot-tempered  and 
contentious,  and  turns  out  a  high-spirited,  ambitious  man. 

It  appears  to  me,  said  ha,  that  you  have  exactly  de- 
scribed the  production  of  such  a  character. 

Then  we  are  in  possession  of  die  second  constitution, 
and  the  second  man.  .  jK  v      ■ ■ ■ 


We  are. 


ession  qi 


Must  we  not  then,  to  use  the  words  of  ^Ischylus,  proceed 
to  describe 

"  Another  man  matched  with  another  state  "  ? 

Or  rather,  according  to  our  plan,  must  we  not  begin  with 
the  state? 

By  all  means,  he  replied. 

Well :  I  think  that  the  constitution  which  comes  next  in 
order  will  be  oligarchy. 

Pray  what  kind  of  constitution  do  you  mean  by  an 
oligarchy  ? 

A  constitution  grounded  upon  a  property  qualification, 
I  replied,  in  which  the  wealthy  rule,  while  the  poor  have 
no  part  in  the  government. 

I  understand. 

Ought  we  not  to  describe  the  first  steps  in  the  transition 
from  timarchy  to  oligarchy? 

We  ought. 

Well,  no  doubt  even  a  blind  man  could  find  out  how  the 
transition  is  brought  about. 

How? 

It  is  the  influx  of  gold  into  those  private  treasuries  that 
ruins  the  constitution  just  described.  For  the  first  result 
of  this  is  that  the  owners  invent  ways  of  spending  their 
money,  and  pervert  the  laws  with  that  intent,  and  disobey 
them  in  their  own  persons*  and  in  the  persons  of  their 
wives. 
It 


30G  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  VIIL 

It  would  be  strange  if  they  did  not. 

They  then  proceed,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  to  eye  one 
another  with  jealous  looks,  and  to  enter  upon  a  course  of 
rivalry,  which  stamps  the  same  character  on  the  general 
body  of  which  they  are  members. 

It  is  what  we  might  expect. 

And  thenceforth  they  press  forward  on  the  path  of 
money-getting,  losing  their  esteem  for  virtue  in  proportion 
as  the  esteem  for  ^wealth  grows  upon  therm  i<or  can  you 
deny  that  there  is  such  a  gulf  between~wealth  and  virtue, 
^that,  when  weighed  as  it  were  in  the  two  scales  of  a  balance, 
one  of  the  two  always  falls,  as  the  other  rises? 

That  is  quite  true. 

Consequently  when  wealth  and  the  wealthy  are  honoured 
in  a  state,  virtue  and  the  virtuous  sink  in  estimation. 

Obviously. 

And  what  is  honoured  at  any  time  is  practised,  and  what 
is  dishonoured  is  neglected. 

True. 

Hence,  instead  of  being  contentious  and  ambitious,  such 
persons  end  by  becoming  lovers  of  gain  and  covetous;  and 
while  they  commend  and  admire  and  confer  office  upon 
the  wealthy,  they  despise  the  poor. 

Assuredly  they  do. 

So  far  at  length  they  pass  a  law,  which  is  the  essence 
of  an  oligarchical  constitution,  by  whch  they  agree  upon 
a  certain  sum,  which  is  larger  or  smaller  according  to  the 
strength  of  the  oligarchical  principle,  and  forbid  any  share 
in  the  government  to  those  who  have  not  property  up  to 
the  stipulated  amount.  And  they  bring  about  these  meas- 
ures by  violence  with  arms  in  their  hands,  if  they  have 
not  previously  succeeded  in  establishing  the  proposed 
constitution  by  the  alarm  which  they  have  inspired?  Or 
am  I  wrong? 

No,  you  are  right. 

And  this,  in  a  word,  is  the  establishment  of  oligarchy. 

True :  but  pray  what  is  the  character  of  the  constitution, 
and  what  are  the  faults  which  we  attributed  to  it  ? 

Its  first  fault,  I  answered,  lies  in  the  very  nature  of  its 


Book  VltL]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  30? 

essential  law.  For  consider  what  wrould  be  the  result,  if 
we  elected  our  pilots  on  this  principle  of  a  property  quali- 
fication,— refusing  the  post  to  the  poor  man,  though  he 
were  a  better  pilot. 

We  should  make  sad  work  with  the  voyage,  he  replied. 

Does  not  this  apply  to  any  management  of  anything  else 
whatever  ?  * 
A     Yes,  I  think  so. 

Do  you  except  a  state  ?  I  asked ;  or  do  you  include  it  ? 

I  include  it  most  especially,  he  replied,  in  consideration 
of  the  superior  difficulty  and  importance  of  its  manage- 
ment. 

Then  here  is  one  of  the  faults  of  oligarchy,  and  that  a 
grievous  one. 

Evidently. 

Again:  is  the  following  fault  at  all  less  grievous  than 
the  first? 

What  is  it? 

Why,  that  such  a  city  must  necessarily  lose  its  unity 
and  become  two  cities,  one  comprising  the  rich,  and  the 
other  the  poor;  who  reside  together  on  the  same  ground, 
and  are  always  plotting  against  one  another. 

Why  this  fault,  I  am  sure,  is  quite  as  bad  as  the  former. 

Once  again:  it  is  certainly  not  a  commendable  thing 
that  they  should  be  incapable  (as  they  probably  will  be)  of 
waging  any  war; — the  fact  being  that,  if  they  arm  and 
employ  the  populace,  they  cannot  help  dreading  them  more 
than  the  enemy ;  whereas,  if  they  hesitate  to  employ  them, 
they  must  appear  veritable  oligarchs  in  the  actual  battle; 
to  which  we  must  add  that  their  love  of  money  renders 
them  unwilling  to  pay  war-taxes. 

You  are  right. 

Again;  to  return  to  a  point  against  which  we  were  in- 
veighing some  time  ago, — do  you  think  it  right  that  the 
same  persons  should  be  engaged  at  the  same  time  in  the 
various  occupations  of  agriculture,  trade,  and  war, — which 
is  the  case  under  such  a  constitution  ? 

No :  there  is  nothing  to  be  said  for  it. 
,  *  Reading  with  Ast  fonvocovv,  instead  of  //  nv^t 


//  st«* 


308  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         [Book  VIII. 

Now,  consider  whether  the  following  evil,  which  is 
greater  than  all  the  others,  is  not  admitted  by  this  con- 
stitution, and  by  none  of  the  preceding. 

What  is  it? 
r  I  allude  to  the  practice  of  allowing  one  person  to  sell  all 
property,  and  another  to  acquire  it, — the  former  ownt?r 
living  in  the  city  without  being  a  recognised  portion  of  the 
state,  either  as  trader,  artisan,  trooper,  or  foot-soldier; 
but  described  as  a  destitute  man,   ^nd  a  pauper. 

None  of  the  preceding  constitutions  admitted  such  a 
practice. 

To  say  the  least,  such  a  casualty  is  not  prohibited  in 
cities  whose  constitution  is  oligarchical.  Otherwise  it 
would  be  impossible  for  some  persons  to  be  extravagantly 
rich,  while  others  are  utter  paupers. 

True. 

Let  me  ask  you  to  examine  another  pent.  At  the  time 
when  such  a  man  was  spending  money  in  his  wealthy  days, 
was  he  one  whit  more  useful  to  the  state  for  the  pur- 
poses which  we  were  just  now  specifying?  Or  was  it  the 
case,  that  though  he  seemed  to  be  one  of  the  government, 
he  was  really  neither  governor  nor  servant  of  the  state,  but 
only  a  consumer  of  its  resources? 

The  latter  is  the  true  account,  he  replied.  He  seemed 
what  you  say;  but  he  was  really  only  a  consumer. 

Then  would  you  have  us  assert  that,  as  the  drone  grows 
up  in  the  hive  to  be  the  plague  of  the  bees,  so  also  does  such 
a  man  grow  up  as  a  drone  in  his  house,  to  be  the.  plague 
fcj         of  the  state? 

UncToTrtrtedly,  Socrates,  he  does. 

And  is  it  not  true,  Adeimantus,  that,  though  God  has 
provided  none  of  the  flying  drones  with  stings,  he  has 
made  only  some  of  these  walking  drones  stingless,  while  to 
some  he  has  given  formidable  stings?  and  that  while  the 
stingless  ones  end  in  an  old  age  of  beggary,  the  stinging 
drones,  on  the  contrary,  furnish  out  of  their  ranks  all  who 
bear  the  name  of  criminals? 

It  is  most  true. 

It  is  quite  clear  then,  that,  whenever  you  see  beggars  in 


Book  VIII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  309 

a  city,  you  may  be  certain  that  in  the  same  place  lurk 
thieves,  cutpurses,  temple-robbers,  and  the  instruments  of 
all  similar  crimes. 

True. 

Well,  and  in  oligarchical  states  do  you  not  see  beggars? 

Yes,  he  said ;  almost  all  are  beggars  except  the  governors. 

Then  is  it,  or  is  it  not,  our  opinion,  that  there  are  also 
many  evil  doers  in  such  states,  armed  with  stings,  whom 
the  magistrates  are  careful  to  keep  down  by  main  force? 

Certainly  it  is  our  opinion. 

Then  shall  we  not  assert  that  the  cause  which  produces 
such  persons  therein  is  want  of  education,  and  bad  train- 
ing, and  a  bad  condition  of  the  commonwealth  ? 

Yes,  we  shall. 

Well  then,  this,  or  something  like  it,  will  be  the  chav- 
acter  of  a  state  governed  by  an  oligarchy ;  and  it  will  con- 
tain quite  as  many  evils,  if  not  more. 

You  are  near  the  mark,  he  said. 

Then  let  us  close  our  account  here  of  this  common- 
wealth which  is  called  oligarchy,  and  which  takes  its 
governors  by  a  property  qualification;  and  let  us  pro- 
ceed to  examine  how  the  man  who  resembles  it  grows  up, 
and  what  he  is  when  he  has  grown  up. 

By  all  means  let  us  do  so. 

Tell  me  then, — is  the  transition  from  the  timocratic 
man,  whom  we  have  described,  to  the  oligarchical,  effected 
thus,  or  nearly  thus? 

How? 

The  timocratic  man  has  a  son,  who  at  first  emulates  his 
father  and  follows  his  steps;  and  then  suddenly  sees  him 
founder  on  the  state  as  on  a  sunken  rock,  and  his  property 
and  his  person  thrown  overboard, — sees  him,  after  com- 
manding his  country's  armies  or  holding  some  other  high 
office,  brought  to  trial,  damaged  by  lying  informers,  and 
either  put  to  death,  or  banished,  or  disfranchised,  and  all 
his  substance  taken  from  him. 

All  this  might  very  well  happen,  he  replied. 

Well,  my  friend,  the  instant  the  son  has  seen  and  felt 
this,  and  lost  his  property,  he  becomes  alarmed,  I  suppose, 


310  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  VIII 

and  thrusts  ambition  and  that  high-spirited  element  head- 
foremost from  the  throne  of  his  heart ;  and  heingjTiimh]pxL/ 
by  poverty  he  turns  to  money-getting,  maJo^-Jiiean^and 
petty  savings,  and  by  working  hard  accumulates  wealth, 
Do  you  not  think  that  such  a  person  does  then  instal  on 
that  throne  the/appetitive  and  covetous  element/ and  make 
of  it  an  eastern  monarch  within  himself,  adorning  it  with 
diadem  and  collar,  and  girding  the  scimitar  by  its  side? 

I  do,  he  answered. 

But  the  rational  and  the  high-spirited  elements,  I  think, 

he  sets  down  on  the  ground  below  it,  on  this  side  and  on 

r  h      that,  as  subjects  and  slaves, — forbidding  the  former  to  in- 

/         vestigate  or  reason  about  anything  save  how  to  multiply 

/riches,  and  forbidding  the  latter  to  admire  or  esteem  any- 

yy        thing  save  wealth  and  the  wealthy,  or  to  be  ambitious  after 

a  single  object  save  the  acquisition  of  riches,  and  whatever 

else  may  conduce  to  this. 

There  can  be  no  other  transformation  of  an  ambitious 
into  a  covetous  young  man  so  speedy  and  so  thorough. 

Then  tell  me,  is  such  a  person  oligarchical  ? 

Well,  at  any  rate  the  man  from  whom  he  is  by  trans- 
formation derived,  resembled  the  constitution  which  was 
the  antecedent  of  oligarchy. 

Let  us  examine  whether  he  will  resemble  oligarchy. 

Yes,  let  us. 

Well  then,  first  of  all,  will  he  not  resemble  oligarchy  in 
setting  the  highest  value  on  riches? 

Assuredly  he  will. 

And  also  in  the  fact  that  he  is  parsimonious  and  hard- 
working, satisfying  only  his  necessary  appetitiesy  and  refus- 
ing himself  all  other  expenses,  and  subjugating  his  other 
desires  as  idle. 

Exactly  so. 

In  other  words,  he  is  a  sordid  man,  making  a  profit  out 
of  every  thing,  and  given  to  hoarding :  one  of  those  persons 
who  are  positively  commended  by  the  great  body  of  men. 
Or  am  I  wrong  in  supposing  that  such  will  be  the  man 
who  resembles  the  constitution  we  have  just  described? 

If  you  ask  me,  I  think  you  are  right.    At  any  rate,  the 


Book  VIII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  311 

oligarchical  state,  as  well  as  the  person  under  discussion, 
values  money  above  every  thing. 

The  reason  being,  I  believe,  that  such  a  man  has  taken 
no  pains  with  his  education. 

I  fancy  he  has  not:  else  he  would  not  have  appointed, 
nor  would  he  so  highly  honour,  a  blind  leader  of  the 
chorus. 

Very  true.  And  now  let  me  ask  you  to  consider  whether 
we  must  not  assert  that  drone-like  appetites,  which  are 
either  beggarly  or  criminal,  grow  up  in  him  owit^  to  hia 
want^  of  educatiom^and  that  these  appetites  are  forcibly 
EeTd  down  by  other  prudential  considerations. 

Certainly  we  must  assert  it. 

And  do  you  know  where  you  must  look  in  order  to  see 
their  evil  deeds? 

Where? 

You  must  look  to  occasions  where  they  are  guardians  of 
orphans,  and  to  any  similar  accidents  which  put  it  com- 
pletely in  their  power  to  act  unjustly. 

True. 

Then  is  it  not  clear  from  this,  that  in  his  other  contracts, 
in  which  his  apparent  justice  secures  him  a  good  name, 
such  a  person  is  holdiqg_dowri_by  a  kind  of  constrained 
moderation  a  class  of  evil  appetites  that  are  within  him, 
whichjie^does^iiQtliaiiic  by  reason,  or  convince  that  it 
wouIcTbe  wrong  to  gratify  them,  but  which  circumstances 
and  his  own  apprehensions  teach  him  to  suppress,  because 
he  trembles  for  the  rest  of  his  substance? 

Yes,  it  is  quite  clear. 

Indeed,  my  friend,  I  am  quite  sure  that,  when  these 
people  have  to  spend  what  is  not  their  own,  you  will  find 
that  most  of  them  possess  the  appetites  akin  to  the  drone. 

Most  decidedly  they  do. 

Hence  such  a  person,  far  from  being  at  peace  within 
himself,  will  be  a  double-minded,  not  a  single-minded, 
man:  though  he  will  generally  find  his  lower  appetites 
vanquished  by  his  higher. 

True. 

And  for  these  reasons,  I  think,  such  a  ptrson  will  pre- 


312  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  V1IL 

sent  a  better  outside  than  many;  but  the  genuine  virtue 
of  a  soul  attuned  to  concord  and  harmony  will  fly  some- 
where far  away  from  him. 

So  I  think. 

And  no  doubt  the  parsimonious  man  makes  a  miserable 
rival  as  a  private  citizen,  when  a  prize  or  any  other  hon- 
ourable distinction  is  contested;  for  he  will  not  spend 
money  to  win  himself  renown  in  such  matches,  from  fear 
of  exciting  his  expensive  appetites  by  inviting  them  to 
share  in  the  struggle  and  the  rivalry ;  so  that  in  fact  he  fol- 
lows the  practice  of  an  oligarchy  in  employing  only  some 
few  parts  of  himself  in  his  wars,  and  in  most  cases  spares 
his  purse  and  submits  to  defeat. 

Exactly  so. 

Then  are  we  still  incredulous,  I  asked,  as  to  the  simi- 
larity and  correspondence  subsisting  between  the  oligarchi- 
cal state  and  the  parsimonious  money-hunter? 

Not  at  all,  he  answered. 


And  now  we  must  proceed,  I  should  suppose,  to  examine 
in  what  way  democracy  arises,  and  wfeitjs^rts  flharjacter 
wTie"Il  it  has  arisen  \  111  order  Lliat  once  again  we  may  dis- 
cover the  character  of  the  corresponding  man,  and  place 
him  by  our  side  for  judgment. 

Yes,  if  we  would  act  consistently,  we  must  take  that 
course. 

Is  not  the  transition  from  oligarchy  to  democracy 
brought  about  by  an  intemperate  craving  for  extravagant 
wealth,  which  is  publicly  acKnowIedged  to  be  the  greatest 
of  blessings,  and  the  attainment  of  which  is  considered  a 
duty, — the  transition  itself  taking  the  following  form? 

Pray  describe  it. 

Since  the  power  of  the  rulers  in  an  oligarchical  state  is, 
I  believe,  wholly  clue  to  their  great  wealth,  they  are  un- 
willing to  put  the  licentious  young  men"of  their  time  un- 
der  restraint,  to  the  extent  crf-renderihg  it  UTegal  foFthern 
to  run  through  their  property;  because  they  hope,  by  pur- 
chasing the  possessions  of  such  persons,  and  by  lending 


Book  VIII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  313 

money  to  them,  to  make  themselves  still  richer  and  more 
honoured. 

Most  unquestionably. 

And  is  it  not  manifest  by  this  time,  that  it  is  impossible 
for  the  ^citizens  of  a  .state  to  honour  wealthy  and  at  the 
same  time  acquire  a  proper  amount  of  temperance;  be-   L 
cause  they  cannot  avoid  neglecting  either  the  one  or  the 
other? 

It  is  pretty  well  manifest,  he  replied. 

Hence  the  rulers  in  such  states,  by  their  reckless  admis- 
sion of  unrestrained  licence,  not  unfrequentlv  compel  men 
of  noble  birth  to  hp^omp  pnnr 

Yes,  that  they  do. 

And  the  persons  thus  impoverished  lurk,  I  chould  sup- 
pose, in  the  city,  harnessed  and  armed  with  stings, — 
some  owing  debts,  and  others  disfranchised,  and  others 
labouring  under  both  misfortunes, — hating  and  plotting 
against  the  new  owners  of  their  property,  and  against  all 
who  are  better  off  than  themselves,  and  enamoured  of  re- 
volution.  ^/) 

-Tfippp  ^pjtalists,  on  the  other  hand,  keep  prying  after 
their  own  interest,  ahcT  apparently  do  not  see  their  ene- 
mies; and,  whenever  one  of  the  remainder  yields  them 
opportunity,  they  wound  him  by  infusing  their  poisonous 
money,  and  then  recover  interest  many  times  as  great  as 
the  parent  sum,  and  thus  make  the  drone  and  the  beggar 
multiply  in  the  state. 

Yes,  that  they  do. 

And  they  cannot  make  up  their  minds  to  extinguish  this 
great  evil,  either  by  that  cauterizing  operation  of  prohibit- 
ing people  from  disposing  of  their  property  at  their  own 
pleasure,  or  by  employing  another  method,  which  provides 
by  a  different  law  for  the  removal  of  such  dangers. 

Pray  what  law  do  you  mean? 

I  mean  one  which  is  next  best  to  the  former,  and  which 
constrains  the  citizens  to  apply  themselves  to  virtue.  For 
if  it  be  enacted  that  voluntary  contracts  be  as  a  general 
rule  entered  into  at  the  proper  risk  of  the  contractor,  people 


iS 


314  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  Vllt 

will  be  less  shameless  in  their  money-dealings  in  ih$  city, 
and  such  evils  as  we  have  just  now  described  will  r?e  of 
less  common  growth  therein. 

Yes,  much  less  common. 

But  as  it  is,  the  various  inducements  I  have  mentioned 
encourage  the  governing  body  in  the  state  to  handle  their 
subjects  in  this  ungentle  way.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we 
look  at  the  rulers  themselves  and  their  children,  do  we  not 
see  that  the  young  men  are  made  luxurious  and  indolent 
both  in  body  and  mind,  and  so  idle  and  effeminate  that 
they  cannot  resist  pleasure  and  encounter  pain? 

Unquestionably  they  are. 

And  that  their  seniors  are  indifferent  to  everything  ex- 
cept making  money,  and  as  careless  about  virtue  as  the  poor 
themselves  ? 

Certainly  they  are. 

In  this  state  of  things,  when  the  rulers  and  their  sub- 
jects encounter  one  another  either  in  travelling  or  in  some 
other  common  occupation,  whether  it  be  a  pilgrimage  or 
a  military  expedition,  in  which  they  are  fellow-sailors  or 
fellow-soldiers ;  or  when  they  are  witnesses  of  one  another's 
behaviour  in  moments  of  danger,  in  which  the  poor  can  by 
no  possibility  be  despised  by  the  rich,  because  it  often 
happens  that  a  rich  man,  nursed  in  luxury  and  surfeited 
with  abundance,  finds  himself  posted  in  battle  by  the  side 
of  some  lean  and  sunburnt  poor  man,  to  whom  by  his  la- 
boured breathing  he  betrays  his  sore  distress; — when,  I 
repeat,  all  this  takes  place,  do  you  imagine  that  these  poor 
men  can  avoid  thinking,  that  it-Js^feangh  their  own 
cowardice  that  such  incapable  people  are  wealthy,  or  tKat 
they  can  refrain  from  repeating  to  one  another,  when  they 
meet  in  private, — "  Our  governors  are  naught  ?  " 

STay,  I  am  quite  sure  that  they  do  so. 

Now  just  as  a  sickly  body_xenuires  but  a^  smaJLaiMiLUair 
al  impulse  from  without  to  bring  on  an  attack  of  illness, 
and  sometimes  even  without  any  external  provocation  is 
divided  against  itself;  so,  in  the  same  way,  does  not  this 
city,  whose  condition  is  identical  with  that  of  a  diseased 
body,  require  only  the  slighl-  excuse  of  an  external  allianco 


Book  VITI.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  315 

introduced  by  the  one  party  from  an  oligarchical  city,  or 
by  the  other  from  a  democratical,  to  bring  on  an  acute 
disease  and  an  inward  battle?  and  is  it  not  sometimes, 
eyen  wrtfaouT'sucli  external  influences,  distracted  by  fac- 
tions ? 

Most  decidedly  it  is. 

TWigpr^y,  tVipn,  T  tk^k,  g rises,  ^h^n^ver  the  p™r  win 
the  day^  killing  some  of  the  opposite  party,  expelling 
"others,  and  admitting  the  remainder  to  an  equal  participa- 
tion in  civic  rights  and  offices;  and  most  commonly  the 
offices  in  such  a  state  are  given  by  lot. 

Yes,  you  have  described  correctly  the  establishment  of 
democracy,  whether  it  be  effected  by  an  actual  appeal  to 
arms,  or  by  the  terrified  withdrawal  of  the  other  party. 

And  now  tell  me,  I  continued,  in  what  style  these  per- 
sons administer  the  state,  and  what  is  the  character  of  this 
third  constitution.  For  obviously  we  shall  find  the  corre- 
sponding man  marked,  to  a  certain  extent,  with  the  same 
features. 

True,  said  he. 

First  of  all,  are  they  not  free,  and  does  not  liberty  of 
acfaM  speech  abumid  In  llle-  Orfy,  and  has  not  a  man 
licence  therein  to  do  what  he  will  ? 

Yes,  so  we  are  told. 

And  clearly,  where  such  licence  is  permitted,  every  citi- 
zen will  arrange  his  own  manner  of  life  as  suits  his  pleas- 
ure.—-— 

Clearly  he  will. 

Hence  I  should  suppose,  that  in  this  commonwealth 
there  will  be  the  greatest  diversity  of  character. 

Unquestionably  there  will. 

Possibly,  I  proceeded,  this  constitution  may  be  the  most 
beautiful  of  all.  Embroidered  as  it  is  with  every  kind 
of  character,  it  may  be  thought  as  beautiful  as  a  coloured 
dress  embroidered  with  every  kind  of  flower.  And  per- 
haps, I  added,  as  children  and  women  admire  dresses  of 
many  colours,  so  many  persons  will  decide  in  favour  of 
this  commonwealth,  as  the  most  beautiful. 


316  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  VIU 

No  doubt  many  will. 

Yes,  my  excellent  friend :  and  it  would  be  a  good  plan  to 
explore  it,  if  we  were  in  search  of  a  commonwealth. 

Wbj,  pray? 

Bje£aus£.ii-«entains-every  kind  of  commonwealth  in_  con- 
sequence ojLthaiJjcence  of  wJbdch  I  spoke.;  and  perhaps  a 
peTsorrwlshing  to  f ouncf  a  state,  as  we  were  just  now  doing, 
ought  to  go  into  a  democratical  city,  as  a  bazaar  of  com- 
monwealths, and  choose  out  the  character  that  takes  his 
fancy,  and  then  found  his  state  according  to  the  choice 
he  has  made. 

We  may  safely  say  that  he  is  not  likely  to  be  at  a  loss  for 
patterns. 

Again,  consider  that,  in  this  state,  you  are  not  obliged 
to  hold  office  though  your  talents  may  be  equal  to  the 
task ;  and  that  you  need  not  submit  to  government,  if  you 
dislike  it,  or  go  to  war  when  your  fellow-citizens  are  at 
war,  or  keep  peace  when  they  are  doing  so,  if  you  do  not 
want  peace;  and  again,  consider  that,  though  a  law  for- 
bids your  holding  office  or  sitting  on  a  jury,  you  may  never- 
theless do  both  the  one  and  the  other,  should  it  occur  to 
you  to  do  so :  and  now  tell  me,  is  not  such  a  course  of  life 
divinely  pleasant  for  the  moment? 

Yes  perhaps  it  is,  he  replied,  for  the  moment. 

Once  more.  Is  not  the  meekness  of  some  of  those  who 
have  been  tried  in  a  court  of  law  exquisite?  Or  have  you 
failed  to  notice  in  such  a  commonwealth  how  men,  who 
have  been  condemned  to  death  or  exile,  stay  all  the  same, 
and  walk  about  the  streets,  and  parade  like  heroes,  as  if 
no  one  saw  or  cared  ? 

I  have  seen  many  instances  of  it,  he  replied. 

And  is  there  not  something  splendid  in  the  forbearance 
cf  such  a  commonwealth,  and  in  its  entire  superiority  to 
petty  considerations?  Nay,  it  positively  scorns  the  doc- 
trine, which,  when  we  were  founding  our  state,  "we  laid 
I  down  with  an  air  of  importance,  to  the  effect  that  no  one, 
>  who  is  not  endowed  with  an  extraordinary  nature,  can  ever 
/  become  a  good  man,  unless  from  his  earliest  childhood  he 
I    plays  among  beautiful  objects  and  studies  all  beautiful 


Book  VIII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  317 

things.  How  magnificently  it  tramples  all  this  underfoot, 
without  troubling  itself  in  the  least  about  the  previous  pur- 
suits of  those  who  enter  on  a  political  course,  whom  it 
raises  to  honour,  if  they  only  assert  that  they  wish  well  to 
the  commons. 

Yes,  he  said,  it  behaves  very  grandly. 

These,  then,  will  be  some  of  the  features  of  democracy,  ) 
to  which  we  might  add  others  of  the  same  family;  and  it 
will  be,  in  all  likelihood,  an  agreeable,  lawless,  particolour-  J 
ed  commonwealth,  dealing  with  all  alike  on  a  footing  of 
equality,  whether  they  be  really  equal  or  not.  ) 

The  facts  you  mention  are  notorious. 

And  now  let  me  ask  you  to  examine  the  character  of  the 
corresponding  individual.  Or  must  we  begin,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  common  wealth,  by  investigating  his  origin? 

Yes,  he  replied. 

Then  am  I  not  right  in  supposing  that  he  will  be  the 
_son  _ojt-4ke-^ptffs4mQnious  and  oligarchical  man,  bred  up 
under  his  lather's  eye,  and  in  his  father's  character  ? 

Doubtless  he  will. 

And  this  son,  like  the  father,  will  put  a  violent  constraint 
ugon  those  pleasures  within  him  that  tend  to  extravagance 
and  not  to  money-getting;  which,  you  know,  are  called 
unuecessary  pleasures. 

Clearly  he  will. 

Now,  that  we  may  not  ta^'  in  the  dark,  would  you  like 
us  first  to  define  the  necessary  and  unnecessary  appetites? 

\i  should. 

May  we  not  justly  apply  the  term  necessary  to  those 
ippetites  which  we  cannot  get  rid  of,  and  to  those  whose 
satisfaction  does  us  good?  For  our  nature  cannot  help 
feeling  both  these  classes  of  desires,  can  it? 

Certainly  it  cannot 

Then  we  shall  be  justified  in  predicating  necessity  of 
them. 

We  shall. 

Again :  shall  we  not  be  right,  if  we  assert  all  those  ap- 
petites to  be  unnecessary,  which  we  can  put  away  from  us 


,  habi 


318  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         [Book  VIIL 

by  early,  training;  and  the  presence  of  which,  beside^ 
never  does  us  any  good,  and  in  some  cases  does  positive 
harm? 

Yes,  we  shall  be  right. 

Would  it  not  be  as  well  to  select  an  example  of  the  ex- 
isting appetites  of  each  kind,  in  order  that  we  may  gain  a 
general  idea  of  them? 

Decidedly  it  would. 

Will  not  the  appetite  for  food,  (that  is  to  say,  simple 
bread  and  meat),  within  the  bounds  of  health  and  a  good 
habit  of  body,  be  a  necessary  appetite? 
think  so. 

The  appetite  for  bread  at  least  is  surely  necessary  by  a 
pT*      double  claim,  as  being  not  only  beneficial,  but  also 'indis- 
pensable to  the  support  of  life. 

Yes. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  appetite  for  meat  is  necessary, 
so  far  as  it  may  contribute  advantageously  to  a  good  habit 
ry      of  body. 
yf  Certainly. 

Again:  the  appetite  for  other  viands  of  a  less  simple 
kind,  of  whicn~byearly  correction  and  training  inT>st  people 
can  rid  themselves,  and  which  is  hurtful  to  the  body,  and 
hurtful  to  the  soul,  in  its  endeavours  after  wisdom  and 
temperance,  may  be  rightly  styled  an  unnecessary  appe- 
tite, may  it  not  ? 

Yes,  most  rightly. 

And  must  we  not  assert  that  the  appetites  of  this  second 
class  are  also  expensive,  whereas  the  others  contribute  to 
money-making,  because  they  are  a  help  towards  produc- 
tion ?  * 

Undoubtedly. 

Can  we  say  the  same  of  the  passion  of  love  and  the  other 
appetites? 

Yes. 

Now  did  we  not  describe  the  man,  to  whom  we  lately 
gave  the  name  of  "  drone,"  as  one  burdened,  with  those  ex- 
pensive  pleasures  and  desif esT~and  governed  by  the  un- 
necessary appetites;  while  we  described  the  man,  who  is 


Book  VIII.]       THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  319 

governed  by  the  necessary,  as  parsimonious  and  oligarchi- 
cal? 

Undoubtedly  we  did. 

Let  us  now  return,  I  continued,  and  explain  how  the 
nTjffif-raTnr.fl.1  man  is  transformed  into  the  democratical. 

How  is  it? 

I  would  have  you  suppose  that  the  commencement  of  a 
young  man's  transition  from  inward  oligarchy  to  democ- 
racy dates  from  the  moment  when,  after  being  brought  up, 
as  we  were  saying  just  now,  in  ignorance  and  parsimony, 
he  has  tasted  the  honey  of  the  drones,  and  made  acquain- 
tance with  fiery  and  terrible  wild  beasts,  who  are  able  to 
procure  him  all  kinds  of  pleasures,  of  a  varied  and  mani- 
fold nature.         " 

It  cannot  be  otherwise. 

And  may  we  say  that,  just  as  the  state  was  transformed 
by  the  assistance  afforded  by  a  foreign  alliance  to  one  of 
the  two  parties,  in  virtue  of  a  common  character;  so,  in 
the  same  way,  the  young  man  is  transformed  by  the  ana- 
logous assistance  from  without,  afforded  by  a  certain 
species  of  appetites  to  one  of  the  two  parties  present  with 
him,  in  virtue  of  a  real  affinity  and  similarity  ? 

Assuredly  we  may. 

And  should  the  "H^ar^1'^1  plement  .wjthin  him  be  sup- 
ported by  some  counter-alliance,  derived  perhaps  from  the 
father,  or  perhaps  "from  his  other  relations,  who  rebuke 
and  reproach  him,  then,  I  imagine,  there  ensues  a  genuine 
struggle  of  parties  and  an  inward  battling  with  himself. 

Undoubtedly. 

And  occasionally,  I  fancy,  the  democratical  Jntgiest 
yields  to_ihejoligarchicaX^and~CQrtain*of  the  appetltes-jare 
elihex^Sio.  pieces  or  expelled,  owing  to  the  presence  of  a 
sense  of  shame  in  the  young  man's  mind ;  and  order  is  once 
more  restored. 

Yes,  this  does  take  place  sometimes. 

But  some  new  appetites,  T  conning  akin  to  those  ex- 
pelled, are  privily  nursed  up,  and,  owing  to  the  lack  of 
science  in  his  father's  training,  become  numerous  and 
strong. 


320  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         [Book  V ILL 

Yes,  this  is  generally  the  case. 

And  these  appetites,  of  course,  draw  him  to  his  old  asso- 
dates,  and  by  their  secret  coinnTimTcatiolis  engender  in 
"him  a  multitude  of  others. 

Undoubtedly. 

And  finally,  I  imagine,  they  seize  upon  the  citadel  of  the 
young  man's  heart,  because  they  perceive  it  to  be  destitute 
of  sound  knowledge  and  beautiful  studies  and  true  theories, 
which  verily  keep  the  best  watch  and  ward  in  the  minds  of 
men  who  are  the  favourites  of  heaven. 

Yes,  quite  the  best. 

And  to  supply  their  place,  I  fancy,  false  and  presump- 
tuous theories  and  opinions  start  up  in  the  man,  and  secure 
this  post  aforesaid. 

That  they  do. 

Does  he  not,  in  consequence,  return  to  those  Lotos- 
eaters^  and  dwell  with  them  without  disguise;  and  iOiis 
relatives  send  any  assistance  to  the  parsimonious  element 
of  his  soul,  do  not  those  presumptuous  theories  close  the 
gates  of  the  royal  forffggglElthlii  him,  and  not  only  refuse 
an  entrance  to  the  actual  auxiliary  force,  but  even  decline 
to  admit  an  embassy  of  individuals  in  the  shape  of  admo- 
nitions from  elder  persons;  and  do  they  not  fight  in  person 
and  gain  the  day;  and  stigmatizing  the  sense  of  shame 
as  folly,  do  they  not  thrust  it  out  to  an  ignominious  exile, 
and  expel  temperance  with  insults  under  the  name  of  cow- 
ardice; and  do  they  not  prove,  by  the  aid  of  many  use- 
less appetites,  that  moderation  and  orderly  expenditure  are 
boorish  and  illiberal,  anT^b^nisirfhem  as  such  beyond  the 
border  ? 

Most  certainly  they  do. 

And  no  doubt,  when  by  the  discharge  of  these  virtues 
they  have  purified  the  soul  of  him  who  is  now  in  their 
power,  and  is  being  initiated  by  them  into  the  great  mys- 
teries, they  proceed  at  once  to  restore  insolence,  and  Dis- 
order, and  Licentiousness,  and  Shamelessness,  in  great 
splendour,  accompanied  by  a  numerous  retinue,  and  with 
crowns  on  their  heads,  extolling  them,  and  calling  them 
by  soft  names,  describing  Insolence  as  Good  Breeding,  and 


Book  VIII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  321 

Disorder  as  Freedom,  and  Licentiousness  as  Magnifi- 
cence, and  Shamelessness  as  Bravery.  Is  not  this,  I  asked, 
pretty  much  the  way  in  which  the  man  who  is  brought 
up  in  the  gratification  only  of  necessary  appetites  alters  so 
f arj^jii^jouth  *  as  to  liberate  from  servitude  and  control 
thlTunnecessary  and  injurious  pleasures? 

Yes,  very  evidently  it  is,  he  replied. 

From  that  day  forward  a  man  of  this  description  spends, 
I  should  suppose,  just  as  much  money  and  labour  and  time 
on  unnecessary  as  upon  n-cessary  pleasures.  But,  should 
liebe  so  fortunate  as  to  set  a  limit  to  his  wildness,  and,  as 
he  grows  older,  when  the  tumult  of  passion  has  mostly 
gone  by,  should  he  go  so  far  as  to  readmit  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent portions  of  the  banished,  and  not  surrender  himself 
wholly  to  the  invaders, — in  that  case,  it  is  the  habit  of  his 
life  to  make  no  distinction  between  his  pleasures,  but  to 
suffer  himself  to  be  led  by  the  passing  pleasure  which 
chance  as  it  were  throws  in  his  way,  and  to  turn  to  another, 
when  the  first  is  satisfied, — scorning  none,  but  fostering 
all  alike. 

Exactly  so. 

Yes,  I  proceeded;  and  whenever  he  is  told  that  though 
some  pleasures  belong  to  the  appetites  which  are  good  and 
honourable,  others  belong  to  the  evil  appetites ;  'and  that 
the  former  ought  to  be  practised  and  respected,  but  the 
latter  chastised  and  enslaved,  he  does  not  receive  this  true 
doctrine,  or  admit  it  into  his  castle.  On  the  contrary,  at 
all  these  assertions  he  shakes  his  head,  and  maintains  that 
jill  appetites  are  alike,  and  ought  io  -  ha  "equally -  respected. 

Yes,  this  is  precisely  his  condition,  and  his  behaviour. 

Hence,  I  continued,  he  lives  from  day  to  day  to  the  end, 
in  the  gratification  of  the  casual  appetite, — now  drinking 
Tiimself  drunk  To  The  sound  of  music,  and  presently  putting 
himself  under  training; — sometimes  idling  and  neglecting 
everything,  and  then  living  like  a  student  of  philosophy. 
And  often  he  takes  a  part  in  public  affairs,  and  starting  up, 
speaks  and  acts  according  to  the  impulse  of  the  moment. 
Now  he  follows  eagerly  in  the  steps  of  certain  great  gen- 
*  Reading  eif  r$v  tuv  ni)  &.vaynaiwv  k.tX 


322  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  VflL 

erals,  because  he  covets  their  distinctions;  and  anon  he 
takes  to  trade,  because  he  envies  the  successful  trader. 
And  there  is  no  order  or  constraining  rule  in  his  life;  but 
he  calls  this  life  of  his  pleasant,  and  liberal,  and  happy,, 
and  follows  it  out  to  the  end. 

Well,  said  he,  you  have  certainly  described  a  life  that 
might  be  led  by  a  man  whose  motto  is  Liberty  and 
Equality. 

Yes,  I  replied ;  and  I  conceive  it  to  be  also  a  multitudin- 
ous life,  replete  with  very  many  characters ;  and  I  imagine 
that  this  is  the  man  who,  by  the  beautiful  variety  of  his 
nature,  answers  to  the  city  which  we  described; — a  man 
whose  life  many  men  and  many  women  would  envy,  and 
who  contains  within  him  very  many  exemplars  of  common- 
wealths and  characters. 

True. 

What  then?  May  we  place  this  man  opposite  democ- 
racy, in  the  belief  that  he  may  be  rightly  addressed  as 
democratical  ? 

Be  it  so,  he  replied.  S 

It  only  remains  for  us,  I  continued,  to  descrme  the  most 
beautiful  of  all  commonwealths,  ant]  the  most  beautiful  0?" 

all  men,  that  is  to  s.-r  .  <>tism  and  the  despot. 

You  are  quite  right. 

Come  then,  my  dear  friend,  tell  me  in  what  way  des- 
potism arises.  That  it  is  a  transformation  of  democracy, 
is  all  but  obvious: 

iris: ' — 

Then  does  democracy  give  birth  to  despotism,  precisely 
in  the  way  in  which  oligarchy  gave  birth  to  democracy  ? 

Explain  this. 

The  thing  which  oligarchy  professed  to  regard  as  su- 
premely good,  and  which  was  instrumental  in  establishing 
it,  was  excessive  wealth ; — was  it  not  ? 

It -was: ' 

Well,  it  was  the  insatiable  craving  for  wealth,  and  the 
disregard  of  everything  else  for  the  sake  of  money-making. 
that  destroyed  oligarchy, 


Book  VIII.J        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  323 

True,  it  was. 

Then  may  we  say  that  democracy,  like  oligarchy,  is  de- 
stroyed by  its  insatiable  craving  for  the  object  which  it 
defines  to  be  supremely  good? 

And  what  according  to  you,  is  that  object? 

Freedom,  I  replied.  For  I  imagine  that  in  a  democrat- 
ical  city  you  will  be  told  that  it  has,  in  freedom,  the  most 
beautiful  of  possessions,  and  that  therefore  such  a  city  is 
the  only  fit  abode  for  the  man  who  is  a  freeman  by  nature. 

Why  certainly  such  language  is  very  much  in  fashion. 

To  return,  then,  to  the  remark  which  I  was  trying  to 
make  a  moment  ago:  am  I  right  in  saying  that  the  in- 
satiable craving  for  a  single  object  and  the  disregard  of  all 
else  transform  democracy  as  well  as  oligarchy,  and  pave 
the  way,  as  a  matter  of  course,  for  despotism? 

How  so  ? 

Whenever  a  democratical  city  which  is  thirsting  for 
freedom  has  fallen  under  the  presidency  of  a  set  of  wicked 
toastmasters,  and  has  quaffed  the  wine  of  liberty  untem- 
pered  far  beyond  the  due  measure, — it  proceeds,  I  should 
imagine,  to  arraign  its  rulers  as  accursed  oligarchs,  and 
chastises  them  on  that  plea,  unless  they  become  very  sub- 
missive, and  supply  it  with  freedom  in  copious  draughts. 

Yes,  that  is  what  is  done. 

And  likewise  it  insults  those  who  are  obedient  to  the 
rulers  with  the  titles  of  willing  slaves  and  worthless  fel- 
lows; while  the  rulers  who  carry  themselves  like  subjects, 
and  the  subjects  who  carry  themselves  like  rulers,  it  does, 
both  privately  and  publicly,  commend  and  honour.  Must 
it  not  follow  that  in  such  a  city  freedom  goes  all  lengths  ? 

Of  course  it  must. 

Yes,  my  friend;  and  does  not  the  prevailing  anarchy 
steal  into  private  nouses,  and  spread  on  every  side,  till  at 
last  it  takes  root  even  among  the  brute  creation? 

What  are  we  to  understand  by  this  ? 

I  mean,  for  example,  that  a  father  accustoms  himself  to 
behave  like  a  child,  and  stands  in  awe  of  his  sons,  and 
that  a  son  behaves  himself  like  a  father,  and  ceases  to 
respect  or  fear  his  parents,  with  the  professed  object  of 


324  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.         [Book  VIII. 

proving  his  freedom.  And  I  mean  that  citizens,  and 
resident  aliens,  and  foreigners,  are  all  perfectly  equal. 

You  are  right  as  to  the  results  of  such  a  state  of  things. 

I  have  told  you  some  of  the  results;  let  me  tell  you 
a  few  more  trifles  of  the  kind.  The  schoolmaster,  in 
these  circumstances,  fears  and  flatters  his  scholars,  and 
the  scholars  despise  their  masters  and  also  their  tutors. 
And,  speaking  generally,  the  young  copy  their  elders,  and 
enter  the  lists  with  them  both  in  talking  and  in  acting; 
and  the  old  men  condescend  so  far  as  to  abound  in  wit 
and  pleasantry,  in  imitation  of  the  young,  in  order,  by 
their  own  account,  to  avoid  the  imputation  of  being 
morose  or  domineering. 

Exactly  so. 

But  the  extreme  limit,  my  friend,  to  which  the  freedom 
of  the  populace  grows  in  such  a  commonwealth  is  only 
attained  when  the  purchased  slaves  of  both  sexes  are 
just  as  free  as  the  purchasers.  Also  I  had  almost  for- 
gotten to  mention  to  what  extent  this  liberty  and  equality 
is  carried  in  the  mutual  relations  subsisting  between  men 
and  women. 

Then,  in  the  words  of  iEschylus,  said  he,  shall  we  not 
give  utterance  to  that  which  is  already  on  our  lips? 

By  all  means,  I  replied.  I,  for  one,  am  doing  so,  when 
I  tell  you  that  no  one  could  believe,  without  positive 
experience,  how  much  more  free  the  domestic  animals 
are  under  this  government  than  any  other.  For  verily 
the  hound,  according  to  the  proverb,  is  like  the  mistress 
of  the  house;  and  truly  even  horses  and  asses  adopt  a 
gait  expressive  of  remarkable  freedom  and  dignity,  and 
run  at  any  body  who  meets  them  in  the  streets,  if  he 
does  not  get  out  of  their  way:  and  all  the  other  animals 
become  in  the  same  way  gorged  with  freedom. 

It  is  my  own  dream  that  you  are  repeating  to  me.  This 
often  happens  to  me  when  I  walk  into  the  country. 

Now  putting  all  these  things  together,  I  proceeded,  do 
you  perceive  that  they  amount  to  this,  that  the  soul  of  the 
citizens  is  rendered  so  sensitive  as  to  be  indignant  and 
impatient    at    the   smallest    symptom    of    slavery?     For 


Book  VIII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  325 

surely  you  are  aware  that  they  end  by  making  light  of  the 
laws  themselves,  whether  statute  or  customary,  in  order 
that,  as  they  say,  they  may  not  have  the  shadow  of  a 
master. 

I  am  very  well  aware  of  it. 

This  then,  my  friend,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  is  the  begin- 
ning, so  fair  and  gay,  out  of  which  despotism  grows. 

Gay,  indeed!     But  what  is  the  next  step? 

That  very  disease,  I  replied,  which  broke  out  in  oligarchy 
and  ruined  it,  appears  in  democracy  also  with  increased 
strength  and  virulence,  aggravated  by  the  licence  of  the 
place,  and  occasions  its  enslavement.  Indeed,  to* do  any- 
thing in  excess  seldom  fails  to  provoke  a  violent  reaction 
to  the  opposite  extreme,  not  only  in  the  seasons  of  the 
year  and  in  the  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms,  but  also 
especially   in   commonwealths. 

This  is  only  natural. 

Thus,  excessive  freedom  is  unlikely  to  pass  into  any- 
thing but  excessive  slavery,  in  the  case  of  states  as  well  as 
of  individuals. 

It  is. 

Hence,  in  all  likelihood,  democracy,  and  only  democ- 
racy, lays  the  foundation  of  despotism ; — that  is  to  say,  the 
most  intense  freedom  lays  the  foundation  for  the  heaviest 
and  the  fiercest  slavery. 

Yes,  it  is  a  reasonable  statement. 

However,  this,  I  think,  was  not  your  question:  you 
were  asking,  what  is  this  disease,  which  fastens  uopn 
democracy  as  well  as  upon  oligarchy,  and  reduces  the 
former  to  bondage. 

That  was  my  question. 

Well  then,  I  alluded  to  that  class  of  idle  and  extrav- 
agant men,  in  which  the  bravest  lead  and  the  more  cow- 
ardly follow.  We  compared  them,  if  you  recollect,  to 
stinging  and  stingless  drones,  respectively. 

Yes,  and  rightly  s(£ 

Now  the  presence  of  these  two  classes,  like  phlegm  and 
bile  in  the  body,  breeds  in  every  commonwealth  disturb- 
ance.    Therefore  a  skilful  physician  and  legislator,  just 


326  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  VIII 

like  a  cunning  bee-keeper,  must  take  measures  in  advance, 
if  possible,  to  prevent  their  presence;  but,  should  they 
make  their  appearance,  he  must  have  them  cut  out,  as 
quickly  as  possible,  along  with  the  combs  themselves. 

That  must  be,  without  a  doubt. 

Then  let  us  handle  the  matter  thus,  in  order  that  we 
may  see  more  distinctly  what  we  wish  to  see. 

How? 

Let  us  suppose  a  democratic  state  to  be  divided,  as  is 
really  the  case,  into  three  parts.  The  class  of  people  we 
have  described  constitutes,  I  believe,  one  of  these  divi- 
sions, and  is  generated  by  licence  in  a  democratical  as 
abundantly  as  in  an  oligarchical  state. 

True. 

But  it  is  much  more  keen  in  the  former  than  in  the 
latter. 

How  so? 

In  the  latter  it  is  despised,  and  excluded  from  office,  and 
therefore  proves  untrained  and  feeble.  But  in  democracy 
it  is,  I  conceive,  with  a  few  exceptions,  the  sole  presiding 
body;  and  its  keenest  members  speak  and  act,  while  the 
residue  sit  on  the  benches  round,  and  hum  applause,  and 
will  not  brook  any  opposite  statement:  so  that  all  the 
concerns  of  such  a  commonwealth  are,  with  some  trifling 
exceptions,  in  the  hands  of  this  body. 

Certainly. 

In  addition  to  this,  a  second  body  is  being  constantly 
severed  from  the  mass. 

What  is  it  like? 

If  all  are  occupied  in  amassing  riches,  I  presume  that 
those  who  are  most  orderly  by  nature  generally  become 
wealthiest. 

It  is  likely  to  be  so. 

Hence  I  conclude,  that  out  of  these  persons,  the  readiest 
and  most  copious  supply  of  honey  *  is  squeezed  for  the 
drones. 

To  be  sure:  how  could  honey  be  squeezed  out  of  the 
poor? 

*  Reading  /3/UVrerat  with  Ast  and  Stallbaum.  instead  of  QfarrU* 


Book  VII.J        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  32? 

And  they  are  called  wealthy,  which  means,  I  suppose, 
that  they  are  the  provender  of  the  drones. 

Pretty  nearly  so. 

The  third  class  will  consist  of  those  members  of  the 
commonalty  who  work  with  their  own  hands,  and  do  not 
meddle  with  politics,  and  are  not  very  well  off.  And  this 
class  is,  in  a  democracy,  the  most  numerous  and  the  most 
important  of  all,  when  collected. 

True;  but  it  will  seldom  collect,  unless  it  receives  a 
share  of  the  honey. 

And  therefore  it  always  does  receive  a  share;  with  this 
proviso,  that  its  leaders,  while  depriving  the  moneyed  class 
of  their  substance,  and  making  division  of  it  among  the 
commons,  manage,  if  possible,  to  keep  the  largest  share 
for  themselves. 

Undoubtedly,  with  that  proviso,  it  does  get  a  share. 

Now  these  despoiled  persons  are  compelled,  I  imagine, 
to  defend  themselves,  by  bpeaking  before  the  commonalty, 
and  acting  to  the  best  of  their  ability. 

Of  course  they  are. 

And,  for  this  behaviour,  even  if  they  do  not  desire  a 
revolution,  they  are  accused  by  the  opposite  party  of  plot- 
ting against  the  commons,  and  of  being  oligarchs. 

Undoubtedly. 

Therefore  in  the  end,  when  they  see  that  from  want  of 
information  and  in  consequence  of  the  artful  misrepresen- 
tations of  their  calumniators  the  commons  are  unwittingly 
bent  on  wronging  them,  from  that  moment  forward, 
whether  they  wish  it  or  not,  they  become,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  veritable  oligarchs.  For  this  evil,  amongst  others, 
is  engendered  in  them  by  the  sting  of  that  drone  of  which 
we  spoke. 

Yes,  precisely  so. 

Hence  arise  impeachments,  prosecutions,  and  trials, 
directed  by  each  party  against  the  other. 

Certainly. 

And  is  it  not  always  the  practice  of  the  commons  to 
select  a  special  champion  of  their  cause,  whom  they  main- 
tain and  exalt  to  greatness? 


328  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  VIII 

Yes,  it  is  their  practice. 

Then,  obviously,  whenever  a  despot  grows  up,  his  origin 
may  be  traced  wholly  to  this  championship,  which  is  the 
stem  from  which  he  shoots. 

That  is  quite  obvious. 

And  what  are  the  first  steps  in  the  transformation  of 
the  champion  into  a  tyrant?  Can  we  doubt  that  the 
change  dates  from  the  time  when  the  champion  has  begun 
to  act  like  the  man  in  that  legend  which  is  current  in 
reference  to  the  temple  of  Lycaean  Zeus  in  Arcadia? 

What  legend? 

According  to  it,  the  worshipper  who  tasted  the  one 
human  entrail,  which  was  minced  up  with  the  other 
entrails  of  other  victims,  was  inevitably  metamorphoced 
into  a  wolf.    Have  you  never  heard  the  story  ? 

Yes,  I  have. 

In  like  manner,  should  the  commons'  champion*  find 
the  populace  so  very  compliant  that  he  need  make  no 
scruple  of  shedding  kindred  blood, — should  he,  witt 
unrighteous  charges,  as  is  the  wont  of  such  persons,  prose- 
cute his  victims  and  render  himself  blood-guilty,  making 
away  with  human  life,  and  tasting  the  blood  of  his  fel- 
lows with  unholy  tongue  and  lips, — should  he  banish, 
and  kill,  and  give  the  signal  for  cancelling  debts  and 
redistributing  the  land;— is  it  not  from  thenceforth  the 
inevitably  destiny  of  such  a  man  either  to  be  destroyed  by 
hisenemies,  or  to  become  a  tyrant,  and  be  metamorphosed 
from  a  man  intolT^Folf? 

There  is  no  escape  from  the  alternative. 

Such  is  the  fate  of  the  man  who  is  at  feud  with  the 
moneyed  class. 

It  is. 

And  if  he  is  banished,  and  afterwards  restored  in  despite 
of  his  enemies,  does  he  not  return  a  finished  tyrant? 

Obviously  he  does. 

And  if  his  enemies  find  themselves  unable  to  expel 
him,  or  to  put  him  to  death,  by  accusing  him  to  the  state, 
in  that  case  they  take  measures  to  remove  him  secretly 
by  a  violent  end. 


Book  VIII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  329 

Yes,  that  is  the  usual  expedient. 

In  order  to  prevent  this,  those  who  have  gone  so  far 
always  adopt  that  notorious  device  of  the  tyrant,  which 
consists  in  asking  the  commons  for  a  body-guard,  in  order 
that  the  people's  friend  may  not  be  lost  to  them. 

Just  so. 

And  the  commons,  I  imagine,  grant  the  request;  for 
they  are  alarmed  on  his  account,  while  they  are  confident 
on  their  own. 

Just  so. 

Consequently,  when  this  is  observed  by  a  man  who  has 
wealth,  and  with  his  wealth  the  character  of  being  a 
hater  of  democracy,  forthwith,  in  accordance  with  the 
oracle  given  to  Croesus, 

"  By  the  pebbly  bed  of  the  Hermus, 
Flies  he,  and  halts  no  more,  nor  shuns  the  reproach  of  a  coward." 

Why,  he  would  not  have  the  chance  of  shunning  it  a 
second  time. 

And  those  that  are  arrested  are  given  up  to  death,  I 
imagine. 

Of  course  they  are. 

But  as  for  that  champion  himself,  it  is  quite  clear  that 
far  from  being  laid  with  "his  huge  form  hugely  pros- 
trate," he  has  overthrown  many  another  man,  and  stands  in 
the  chariot  of  the  state,  metamorphosed  from  a  champion 
into  a  consummate  tyrant. 

Yes,  there  is  no  help  for  it. 

Pray,  I  continued,  are  we  to  discuss  the  happiness  both 
of  the  man  himself,  and  of  the  city  in  which  such  a 
mortal  resides? 

By  all  means  let  us  do  so,  he  replied. 

Well,  in  his  early  days,  and  at  the  beginning  of  his  des- 
potism, has  he  not  a  smile  and  a  greeting  for  everybody 
that  he  meets,  and  does  he  not  repudiate  the  idea  of  his 
being  a  tyrant,  and  promise  largely  both  in  public  and  in 
private;  and  is  it  not  his  practice  to  remit  debts,  and 


330  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  Vlll. 

make  grants  of  land  to  the  commons  and  to  his  own 
partizans,  while  he  pretends  to  be  mild  and  gracious  to  all  ? 

It  cannot  be  otherwise. 

But  as  soon  as  he  has  relieved  himself  of  his  exiled 
enemies,  by  becoming  reconciled  to  some,  and  by  destroy- 
ing others,  his  first  measure  is,  I  imagine,  to  be  constantly 
exciting  wars,  in  ordpr  t-hnt  thQ  ^mnin""  mny  ntilTirl  jp_ 
need  of  a  leader. 

It  is  his  natural  course. 

Is  it  not  further  his  intention  so  to  impoverish  his 
subjects  by  war-taxes,  as  to  constrain  them  to  devote 
themselves  to  the  requirements  of  the  day,  and  thus  render 
them  less  likely  to  plot  against  himself  ? 

Manifestly  it  is. 

And  am  I  not  right  in  supposing  that,  should  he  suspect 
any  persons  of  harbouring  a  spirit  of  freedom  that  will 
not  suffer  him  to  reign  in  peace,  it  is  his  intention  to 
throw  them  in  the  way  of  the  enemy,  and  so  get  rid  of 
them  without  suspicion?  For  all  these  reasons  must  not 
a  tyrant  be  always  stirring  up  war? 

He  must. 

Then  is  it  not  the  obvious  result  of  such  a  course,  that 
he  gets  more  and  more  detested  by  the  citizens? 

Of  course  it  is. 

And  does  it  not  follow  that  a  few  of  the  boldest  of  his 
influential  partizans  speak  their  mind  fearlessly  to  him 
and  to  one  another,  and  find  fault  with  his  policy? 

So  one  would  expect. 

Now,  if  the  tyrant  is  to  keep  up  his  authority,  he  must 
put  all  these  people  quietly  out  of  the  way,  until  he  has 
left  himself  not  a  friend  nor  an  enemy  who  is  worth  any- 
thing. 

Certainly  he  must. 

Then  he  must  keenly  notice  who  is  manly,  who  high- 
minded,  who  prudent,  who  wealthy.  And  in  such  a  happy 
condition  is  he,  that,  whether  he  wishes  it  or  not,  he  is 
compelled  to  be  the  enemy  of  all  these,  and  to  plot  against 
them,  till  he  has  purged  them  out  of  the  city. 

What  a  glorious  purification ! 


Book  VIII.]        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  331 

Yes,  said  I,  it  runs  directly  counter  to  the  process  by 
which  the  physician  purges  the'body.  For  the  physician 
removes  what  is  bad,  and  leaves  what  is  good;  but  the 
tyrant  removes  the  good,  and  leaves  the  bad. 

\'/ny,  apparently,  1L  itj  lllij  unlji  ceufoo,  if  ke  wishes  to 
reign. 

In  fact  he  is  bound  in  the  chains  of  a  delightful 
necessity,  which  orders  him  either  to  live  amongst  persons 
the  majority  of  whom  are  good  for  nothing,  and  to  live 
hated  by  them,  or  else  to  cease  to  exist. 

That  is  the  alternative. 

Hence,  in  proportion  as  he  grows  more  and  more  de- 
tested by  the  citizens  for  such  conduct,  he  will  require  a 
more  numerous  and  a  more  trusty  body-guard,  will  he 
ttoTZT — 


Of  course  he  will. 

And  pray,  when  can  he  trust?  and  from  whence  will 
he  procure  faithful  retainers? 

Oh,  they  will  come  in  flocks  spontaneously,  if  he  pays 
them  their  wages. 

By  my  word,  I  believe  you  are  thinking  of  another 
miscellaneous  swarm  of  foreign  drones. 

You  are  not  mistaken. 

But  would  he  hesitate  to  enlist  recruits  on  the  spot? 

By  what  process? 

By  taking  their  slaves  from  the  citizens,  emancipating 
them,  and  enrolling  them  in  his  body-guard. 

Most  decidedly  he  would  not  hesitate:  for  indeed  such 
persons  are  really  his  most  trusty  adherents. 

A  tyrant  is,  indeed,  a  divinely  happy  creature,  according 
to  your  account,  if  he  adopts  such  men  as  friends  and 
faithful  adherents,  after  he  has  destroyed  those  former 
ones. 

Well,  he  certainly  does  take  this  course. 

And  do  not  these  comrades  of  his  admire  him  highly, 
and  do  not  the  young  citizens  associate  with  him,  while 
the  good  hate  and  shun  him? 

How  can  it  be  otherwise  ? 

It  is  not  without  reason,  said  I,  that  people  regard 


332  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  VIIL 

tragedy  on  the  whole  as  wise,  and  Euripides  as  a  master 
therein. 

Pray  why? 

Because,  among  other  remarks,  he  has  made  the  follow- 
ing, which  shews  a  thoughtful  mind, — "tyrants  are  wise 
by  converse  with  the  wise."  And  he  clearly  meant  by 
the  "wise,"  those  with  whom  the  tyrant  associates. 

Yes,  and,  as  one  of  its  numerous  merits,  tyranny  is  ex- 
tolled as  something  godlike,  by  the  other  poets  as  well  as 
by  Euripides. 

This  being  the  case,  the  writers  of  tragedy,  like  wise 
men  as  they  are,  will  excuse  us,  and  those  who  copy  our 
commonwealth,  for  refusing  them  admittance  into  the 
state,  because  they  are  panegyrists  of  tyranny. 

I  imagine  that,  at  any  rate,  all  polite  tragedians  will 
excuse  us. 

At  the  same  time,  I  believe,  they  will  make  the  round 
of  the  other  states,  gather  together  the  populace,  hire 
fine,  loud,  persuasive  voices;  and  so  draw  over  the  com- 
monwealths to  tyranny  and  democracy. 

To  be  sure  they  will. 

And  for  these  services  they  are,  moreover,  paid  and 
honoured,  by  tyrants  chiefly,  as  we  should  expect,  and  to 
a  smaller  extent  by  democracy.  But  in  proportion  as  they 
advance  higher  up  the  hill  of  commonwealths,  their  honour 
flags  more  and  more,  as  if  it  were  prevented  from  mount- 
ing by  loss  of  breath. 

Exactly  so. 

However,  this  is  a  digression.  Let  us  return  to  the  in- 
quiry, how  that  army  of  the  tyrant,  that  goodly,  large, 
diversified,  and  ever-changing  army,  is  to  be  supported. 

It  is  clear,  he  replied,  that,  if  there  be  sacred  property 
in  the  city,  the  tyrant  will  expend  it ;  and  that,  to  whatever 
extent  the  produce  of  such  sales  *  from  time  to  time  can 
be  made  available,  the  war-taxes,  which  the  commons  are 
compelled  to  pay,  will  be  proportionally  diminished. 

But  what  is  he  to  do  when  this  resource  fails? 

Evidently  he  will  draw  on  his  parent's  estate  for  the 

*  Reading  ra  top  airodtdofxevuv,  instead  of  rd  rwv  airodo/ievuv. 


Book  VIII.J        THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  333 

maintenance  of  himself  and  his  boon-companions,  his 
messmates  and  his  mistresses. 

I  understand  you.  You  mean  that  the  commonalty, 
that  begat  the  tyrant,  will  maintain  him  and  his  com- 
panions. 

It  cannot  avoid  doing  so. 

But  pray  explain  yourself,  I  proceeded.  Suppose  the 
commons  resent  this  notion,  and  assert,  that  it  is  unjust 
for  a  father  to  have  to  maintain  a#  grown-up  son,  since,  on 
the  contrary,  the  son  ought  to  maintain  the  father;  and 
that  they  had  begotten  and  installed  him  not  with  the 
intent,  that,  when  he  was  grown  big,  they  should  be  made 
the  slaves  of  their  own  slaves,  and  maintain  him  and  them 
with  a  mob  of  others,  but  with  the  intent  that,  under  his 
championship,  they  should  be  emancipated  from  *  the 
rich  men  of  the  state,  and  the  gentlemen,  as  they  are 
called; — and  suppose  they  now  bid  him  depart  out  of  the 
city,  together  with  his  friends,  "like  a  father  expelling  a 
son  from  home  along  with  some  riotous  boon-companions? 
What  then  ? 

Why  the  commons  will  then,  at  length,  most  certainly 
discover  how  feeble  they  are  in  comparison  with  the 
nursling  which  they  have  begotten  and  cherished  and  ex- 
alted, and  that,  in  rejecting  him,  they  are  the  weaker 
expelling  the  stronger. 

What!  I  exclaimed.  Will  the  tyrant  venture  to  lay 
violent  hands  on  his  father,  and  beat  him  if  he  refuses  to 
comply  with  his  wishes? 

Yes,  that  he  will,  when  he  has  taken  away  his  father's 
weapons. 

You  make  out  that  a  tyrant  is  a  parricide,  and  a  hard- 
hearted nurse  of  old  age;  and,  apparently,  the  govern- 
ment will  henceforth  be  an  open  and  avowed  tyranny; 
and,  according  to  the  proverb,  the  commons,  flying  from 
the  frying-pan  of  the  service  of  free  men,  will  have  fallen 
into  the  fire  of  a  despotism  exercised  by  slaves;  in  other 
words,  they  will  have  exchanged  the  vast  and  unseason' 

*  Reading  anb  t&v  it?lovoiuv,  instead  of  v*b  to>v  ttAoww, 


334 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        [Book  VIIL 


able  liberty  for  the  new  dress  of  the  harshest  and  bitterest 
of  all  slaveries. 

No  doubt  that  is  the  course  of  events. 

Well  then,  will  any  one  be  disposed  to  disagree  with  us, 
if  we  assert  that  we  have  discussed  satisfactorily  the  transi- 
tion from  democracy  to  tyranny,  and  the  character  of  the 
latter  when  established? 

We  have  done  so  quite  satisfactorily,  he  replied. 


w 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  335 


BOOK  IX. 

It  only  remains  for  us,  I  proceeded,  to  inquire  how  the 
democratical  man  is  transformed  into  the  tyrannical;  and 
what  is  the  character  of  the  latter  after  the  change;  and 
whether  his  manner  of  living  is  happy,  or  the  reverse. 

True,  this  case  is  still  remaining,  he  said. 

Then  do  you  know,  I  asked,  what  I  am  still  desiderating  ? 

What  is  it? 

1  think  that  the  number  and  nature  of  the  appetites  has 
not  been  satisfactorily  defined;  and  while  this  deficiency 
continues,  the  inquiry  upon  which  we  are  entering  will  be 
wrapped  in  obscurity. 

It  is  not  too  late  to  supply  the  deficiency,  is  it? 

Certainly  it  is  not.  Observe  the  peculiarity  which  I 
wish  to  notice  in  the  case  before  us.  It  is  this.  Some  of 
the  unnecessary  pleasures  and  appetites  are,  if  I  mistake 
not,  unlawful ;  and  these  would  appear  to  form  an  original 
part  of  every  man;  though,  in  the  case  of  some  persons, 
under  the  correction  of  the  laws  and  the  higher  appetites 
aided  by  reason,  they  either  wholly  disappear,  or  only 
a  few  weak  ones  remain ;  while,  in  the  case  of  others,  they 
continue  strong  and  numerous. 

And  pray  what  are  the  appetites  to  which  you  refer? 

I  refer  to  those  appetites  which  bestir  themselves  in 
sleep;  when,  during  the  slumbers  of  that  other  part  of 
the  soul,  which  is  rational  and  tamed  and  master  of  the 
former,  the  wild  animal  part,  sated  with  meat  or  drink, 
becomes  rampant,  and  pushing  sleep  away,  endeavours  to 
set  out  after  the  gratification  of  its  own  proper  character. 
You  know  that  in  such  moments  there  is  nothing  that  it 
dares  not  do,  released  and  delivered  as  it  is  from  any 
sense  of  shame  and  reflection.  It  does  not  shrink  from 
attempting  in  fancy  unholy  intercourse  with  a  mother,  or 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX. 

with  any  man  or  deity  or  animal  whatever;  and  it  does 
not  hesitate  to  commit  the  foulest  murder,  or  to  indulge 
itself  in  the  most  defiling  meats.  In  one  word,  there  is 
no  limit  either  to  its  folly  or  its  audacity. 

Your  description  is  perfectly  true. 

But,  I  imagine,  whenever  a  man's  personal  habit  is 
healthful  and  temperate,  and  when  before  betaking  himself 
to  rest,  he  has  stimulated  the  rational  part  of  him,  and 
feasted  it  on  beautiful  discussions  and  high  inquiries,  by 
means  of  close  and  inward  reflection;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  has  neither  stinted  nor  gorged  the  appetitive 
part  in  order  that  it  may  sleep  instead  of  troubling  with 
its  joys  or  its  griefs  that  highest  part,  which  may  thus  be 
permitted  to  pursue  its  studies  in  purity  and  independence, 
and  to  strain  forward  till  it  perceives  something  till  then 
unknown,  either  past,  present,  or  future;  and  when,  in 
like  manner,  he  has  calmed  the  spirited  element  by  avoid- 
ing every  burst  of  passion,  which  would  send  him  to  sleep 
with  his  spirit  stirred, — when,  I  say,  he  proceeds  to  rest, 
with  two  elements  out  of  the  three  quieted,  and  the  third, 
wherein  wisdom  resides,  aroused,  you  are  aware  that,  at 
such  moments,  he  is  best  able  to  apprehend  truth,  and 
that  the  visions,  which  present  themselves  in  his  dreams, 
are  then  anything  but  unlawful. 

I  perfectly  coincide  in  your  opinion. 

Well,  we  have  been  carried  too  far  out  of  our  way,  in 
order  to  make  these  remarks.  What  we  wish  to  recognize 
is,  that  apparently  a  terrible  species  of  wild  and  lawless 
appetites  resides  in  every  one  of  us,  even  when  in  some 
cases  we  have  the  appearance  of  being  perfectly  self- 
restrained.  And  this  fact,  it  seems,  becomes  evident  in 
sleep.  Pray  consider  whether  you  think  me  right,  and 
agree  with  me. 

Yes,  I  do  agree. 

Eemember  then  the  character  which  we  ascribed  to  the 
man  of  the  people.  The  history  of  his  origin  was,  I  believe, 
that  he  had  been  trained  up  from  early  years  under  the 
eye  of  a  parsimonious  father,  who  respected  only  the 
money-making  appetites,  and  despised  those  unnecessary 


Book  IX.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  337 

appetites  which  have  for  their  object  amusement  and  dis- 
play.   Am  I  not  right? 

You  are. 

By  intercourse  with  more  fashionable  men,  replete  with 
those  appetites  which  we  just  now  discussed,  he  had  run, 
like  them,  into  utter  riot,  in  detestation  of  his  father's  par- 
simony; but,  as  he  possessed  a  better  disposition  than  his 
corrupters,  he  was  drawn  in  two  directions,  and  ended  by 
adopting  an  intermediate  character;  and  while  enjoying 
every  pleasure  in  perfect  moderation,  as  he  imagined, 
he  lived  a  life  which  was  neither  illiberal  nor  unlawful, 
and  was  thus  transformed  from  an  oligarchical  into  a 
democratical  man. 

Yes,  this  was  and  is  our  opinion  touching  such  a  person. 

Well  then,  I  continued,  figure  to  yourself  that  this  man 
has  grown  old  in  his  turn,  and  that  a  young  son  is  being 
bred  up  again  in  his  habits. 

Very  good. 

Imagine  further,  that  he  takes  to  the  same  courses  that 
his  father  did — that  he  is  seduced  into  an  utter  violation 
of  law,  or,  to  use  the  language  of  his  seducers,  into  perfect 
freedom,  and  that  his  father  and  his  other  relations  bring 
support  to  these  intermediate  appetites,  which  is  met  by 
counter  support  on  the  other  side;  and  when  these  terrible 
sorcerers  and  tyrant-makers  have  despaired  of  securing 
the  young  man  by  other  spells,  imagine  that  they  contrive 
to  engender  in  him  some  passion,  to  champion  those  idle 
appetites  which  divide  among  themselves  all  that  offers 
for  distribution: — and  this  passion  you  may  describe  as 
a  kind  of  huge,  winged  drone:  for  how  else  can  you 
describe  the  passion  entertained  by  such  men? 

I  cannot  describe  it  otherwise. 

This  done,  the  other  appetites,  fraught  with  incense  and 
perfumes  and  garlands  and  wines  and  the  loose  pleasures 
which  form  part  of  such  convivialities,  begin  to  buzz 
around  this  drone,  and  exalt  and  nurse  him  to  the  utter- 
most, till  they  have  engendered  in  him  the  sting  of  desire ; 
and  from  that  moment  forward  this  champion  of  the  soul, 
with  frenzy  for  his  body-guard,  is  goaded  on  to  madness: 

22 


338  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX 

and  if  he  detects  within  himself  any  opinions  or  appetites 
which  are  regarded  as  good,  and  which  still  feel  a  sense 
of  shame,  he  destroys  them  or  thrusts  them  from  his 
presence,  until  he  has  purged  out  temperance,  and  filled 
himself  with  alien  frenzy. 

You  exactly  describe  the  generation  of  a  tyrannical  man. 

Is  not  this  the  reason  why  love  has  of  old  been  called 
a  tyrant? 

Probably  it  is. 

Also,  my  friend,  does  not  a  drunken  man  possess  what 
may  be  called  a  tyrannical  spirit? 

He  does. 

And  we  know  that  an  insane,  or  deranged  person,  ex- 
pects to  be  able  to  lord  it  not  only  over  men,  but  even 
over  gods,  and  attempts  to  do  so. 

Certainly  he  does. 

So,  my  excellent  friend,  a  man  becomes  strictly  tyran- 
nical, whenever,  by  nature,  or  by  habit,  or  by  both  to- 
gether, he  has  fallen  under  the  dominion  of  wine,  or  love, 
or  insanity. 

Yes,  precisely  so. 

Such  is  his  origin,  apparently,  and  such  his  nature :  but 
pray  how  does  he  live  ? 

As  they  say  in  the  game,  he  replied,  you  must  tell  me 
that. 

Be  it  so,  said  I.  Well,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  from 
henceforth  feasts  and  revels  and  banquets  and  mistresses, 
and  every  thing  of  the  kind,  become  the  order  of  the  day 
with  persons  whose  minds  are  wholly  under  the  pilotage 
of  an  indwelling  tyrant  passion. 

It  must  be  so. 

And  do  not  many  frightful  appetites,  that  abound  in 
wants,  shoot  up  by  their  side  every  day  and  every  night? 

Yes,  many  indeed. 

So  that  all  existing  revenues  are  soon  spent. 

Of  course  they  are. 

Then  follow  schemes  for  raising  money,  and  consequent 
loss  of  property. 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  339 

Undoubtedly. 

And  when  every  resource  has  failed,  must  not  those 
violent  appetites,  which  have  nestled  thickly  within,  lift 
up  their  voices?  And  goaded  on,  as  these  people  are,  by 
their  appetites,  and  specially  by  that  ruling  passion  under 
which  all  the  rest  serve  as  body-guard,  must  they  not,  in 
a  trenzy  of  rage,  look  out  for  some  man  of  substance  whom 
they  may  rob  by  fraud  or  violence? 

Yes,  indeed,  they  must. 

So  that  if  they  cannot  pillage  in  every  quarter,  they  are 
constrained  to  suffer  grievous  throes  and  pangs. 

They  are. 

Now,  just  as  the  inward  pleasures  of  later  growth  over- 
reached the  original  pleasures  and  took  away  what  be- 
longed to  them, — in  the  same  way  will  not  the  man  himself 
determine  to  overreach  his  father  and  mother,  though  he 
is  younger  than  they,  and  to  help  himself  at  their  expense 
out  of  his  father's  property,  if  he  has  expended  his  own 
share  ? 

Undoubtedly  he  will. 

And  if  his  parents  oppose  his  designs,  will  he  not 
attempt  in  the  first  instance  to  cheat  and  outwit  them? 

Assuredly  he  will. 

And  whenever  that  is  impossible,  will  he  proceed  to 
robbery  and  violence? 

I  think  so. 

Then  if  his  aged  father  and  mother  hold  out  against 
him  and  offer  resistance,  will  he  be  so  scrupulous  as  to 
shrink  from  playing  the  tyrant? 

I  am  not  altogether  without  my  fears  for  the  parents  of 
such  a  man. 

Nay  but,  Adeimantus,  I  beseech  you  to  consider  that 
his  attachment  to  his  unnecessary  and  unconnected 
mistress  is  new,  while  his  love  for  his  very  own  in- 
dispensable mother  is  old,  and  that  his  affection  for  his 
unnecessary  and  unconnected  friend  who  is  in  the  bloom 
of  youth,  is  of  recent  date  compared  with  that  for  his  very 
own  father,  his  oldest  friend,  failed  and  aged  as  he  is; 
and,  this  being  the  case,  can  you  believe  that  he  would- 


340  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX 

beat  his  mother  and  father  for  the  sake  of  his  mistress  and 
his  friend,  and  that  he  would  make  the  former  the  slaves 
of  the  latter,  if  he  brought  them  into  the  same  house? 

Upon  my  word  I  believe  he  would,  he  replied. 

Then  to  all  appearance  it  is  a  most  delightful  thing  to 
be  the  parents  of  a  tyrannical  son. 

Yes,  that  it  is. 

Well;  but,  when  the  property  of  his  father  and  mother 
begins  to  fail  the  son,  while  at  the  same  time  the  swarm 
of  pleasures  has  mustered  thick  within  him,  will  not  his 
first  exploit  be  to  break  into  a  house  or  strip  some  be- 
nighted traveller  of  his  clothes,  and  will  he  not  after- 
wards proceed  to  sweep  off  the  contents  of  some  temple? 
And  in  the  meantime  those  old  and,  in  common  estimation, 
just  opinions,  which  he  held  from  childhood  on  the  subject 
of  base  and  noble  actions,  will  be  defeated  by  those  opin- 
ions which  have  been  just  emancipated  from  slavery, 
aided  by  that  ruling  passion  whose  body-guard  they  form, — 
opinions  which,  so  long  as  he  was  subject  to  the  laws  and 
to  his  father,  and  while  his  inward  constitution  was  demo- 
cratical,  used  to  be  emancipated  only  in  the  dreams  of 
sleep.  But,  now  that  this  passion  has  become  his  absolute 
lord  and  master,  that  character,  which  used  to  be  his  only 
in  dreams,  and  at  rare  intervals,  has  become  his  constant 
waking  state.  There  is  not  a  dire  murder,  a  forbidden 
meat,  or  an  unholy  act,  from  which  he  will  restrain  him- 
self; but  this  passion  that  lives  and  reigns  within  him,  in 
the  midst  of  utter  disrule  and  lawlessness,  will,  by  virtue 
of  its  sole  supremacy,  seduce  its  possessor,  as  in  the  case 
of  a  state,  into  unbounded  recklessness,  to  procure  means 
for  the  maintenance  of  itself  and  its  attendant  rout,  which 
has  partly  made  entrance  from  without  as  a  result  of 
wicked  companionship,  and  partly  been  liberated  and  re- 
leased from  restraint  within  by  the  adoption  of  similar 
habits,  and  by  the  agency  of  the  passion  itself.  Or  am  I 
wrong  in  my  description  of  the  life  of  such  a  man? 

Xo,  you  are  right,  he  replied. 

And  if,  I  proceeded,  a  city  contains  only  a  few  such 
characters,  the  rest  of  the  population  being  sober-minded, 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  341 

these  people  quit  the  place  and  enlist  in  the  body-guard 
of  some  other  tyrant,  or  else  serve  as  mercenaries  in  any 
war  that  may  be  going  on.  But  if  they  live  in  a  time  of 
peace  and  quiet,  they  commit  many  small  mischiefs  on 
the  spot  in  the  city. 

Such  as  what,  pray? 

Such  as  theft,  burglary,  cutting  purses,  stealing  clothes, 
sacrilege,  kidnapping ;  and  sometimes  they  turn  informers, 
if  they  have  a  talent  for  speaking,  and  perjure  themselves, 
and  take  bribes. 

True,  these  are  small  mischiefs,  if  the  perpetrators  are 
few  in  number. 

Things  that  are  small,  I  replied,  are  small  compara- 
tively :  and  assuredly  all  these  mischiefs,  in  their  bearings 
on  the  corruption  and  misery  of  a  state,  do  not,  as  the 
proverb  says,  nearly  come  up  to  the  mark  of  a  tyrant.  For 
whenever  such  persons,  and  others,  their  close  retainers, 
become  numerous  in  a  state,  and  perceive  their  own  num- 
bers, then,  assisted  by  the  folly  of  the  commonalty,  these 
men  prove  the  parents  of  the  tyrant,  who  is  simply  that 
one  of  their  number  whose  own  soul  contains  the  mightiest 
and  hugest  tyrant. 

So  one  might  expect,  because  such  a  person  must  have 
most  of  the  tyrant  about  him. 

Consequently  if  the  citizens  yield  willing  obedience,  all 
goes  smoothly.  But  should  the  state  prove  refractory,  the 
tyrant  will  chastise,  if  he  can,  his  fatherland,  just  as  in  the 
former  case  he  chastised  his  mother  and  father;  and  to 
do  this,  he  will  summon  to  his  assistance  youthful  com- 
rades, under  whose  imperious  authority  he  will  hold  and 
keep  his  once-loved  mother-country,  as  the  Cretans  call 
it,  or  father-land.  And  this  will  be  the  consummation  of 
vhe  appetite  of  such  a  person. 

Assuredly  it  will. 

And  do  not  these  persons  display  the  same  character  in 
private,  even  before  they  attain  to  power?  In  the  first 
place,  in  their  intercourse  with  others,  is  it  not  the  case 
either  that  all  their  associates  are  their  flatterers  and 
creatures,  or  that,  if  they  want  anything  from  anybody, 


342  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX. 

they  go  down  on  their  knees  for  it,  and  do  not  blush  to 
assume  all  the  appearances  of  intimate  friendship,  whereas 
when  they  have  gained  their  point  they  become  distant 
and  estranged? 

Precisely  so. 

Thus  all  their  life  long  they  live  friendless,  and  always 
either  masters  or  slaves;  for  a  tyrant  nature  can  never 
taste  real  freedom  and  friendship. 

Certainly  it  cannot. 

Then  shall  we  not  be  right  if  we  call  such  persons 
faithless  ? 

Undoubtedly  we  shall. 

And  not  only  faithless,  but  also  supremely  unjust,  if  we 
were  right  in  our  former  conclusions  as  to  the  nature  of 
justice. 

And  certainly  we  were  right. 

Then  let  us  describe  summarily  the  most  wicked  man. 
He  is  one  whose  real  and  waking  state  is  the  very  coun- 
terpart of  the  ideal  and  dreamlike  description  which  we 
have  given. 

Exactly  so. 

Such  is  the  end  of  the  man,  who,  with  a  nature  pro- 
foundly tyrannical,  gains  absolute  power;  and  the  longer 
his  life  of  tyranny  lasts,  the  more  exactly  does  he  answer 
to  our  description. 

That  is  unquestionably  true,  said  Glaucon,  taking  up 
the  reply. 

That  being  the  case,  I  continued,  will  not  the  man,  who 
shall  be  proved  to  be  most  vicious,  be  thereby  proved  to 
be  also  most  miserable?  And  will  it  not  be  apparent  that 
the  man,  whose  tyranny  has  lasted  longest  in  the  intensest 
form,  has  really  been  for  the  longest  time  most  intensely 
vicious  and  miserable,  notwithstanding  the  variety  of  opin- 
ions entertained  by  the  mass  of  people? 

Yes,  that  much  is  certain,  he  replied. 

And  can  we  help  regarding  the  tyrannical  roan  as 
counterpart  and  representative  of  the  state  which  is  under 
the  sway  of  a  tyrant,  the  democratical  man  of  the  demo- 
cratical  state,  and  so  on  ? 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  343 

Unquestionably  we  cannot. 

Hence,  a?  city  is  to  city  in  point  of  virtue  and  happiness, 
so  also  is  man  to  man :  is  it  not  so  ? 

Undoubtedly  it  is. 

Then,  in  point  of  virtue,  how  does  a  city  under  a  tyrant 
stand  as  compared  with  a  city  under  such  a  kingly  govern- 
ment, as  we  at  first  described  ? 

They  are  the  very  opposite  of  one  another,  he  replied: 
one  is  supremely  virtuous,  and  the  other  supremely  wicked. 

I  shall  not  ask  you  which  is  which,  because  that  is  ob- 
vious. But  do  you  decide  the  question  of  happiness  and 
misery  in  the  same  way,  or  not?  And  here  let  us  not  be 
dazzled  by  looking  only  at  the  tyrant,  who  is  merely  a  unit 
in  the  mass,  or  at  a  few  of  his  immediate  retainers;  but, 
as  it  is  our  duty  to  enter  and  survey  the  state  as  a  whole, 
let  us,  before  giving  our  opinion,  creep  into  every  part  of 
it  and  look  about. 

Well,  your  proposal  is  a  just  one:  indeed  it  is  clear  to 
everybody,  that  a  city  governed  by  a  tyrant  is  the  most 
miserable  of  cities;  whereas  a  city  under  kingly  rule  is 
the  happiest  of  cities. 

Then  shall  I  not  do  right,  if,  in  discussing  the  cor- 
responding men,  I  make  the  same  proposal,  and  recognize 
only  his  verdict,  who  can  in  thought  penetrate  into  a 
man's  character,  and  look  through  it,  and  who  does  not, 
like  a  child,  scrutinize  the  exterior,  till  he  is  dazzled  by 
the  artificial  glitter  which  the  tyrannical  man  carries  on 
the  outside,  but  on  the  contrary  sees  through  it  all  thor- 
oughly? Suppose  I  give  it  as  my  opinion,  that  we  are 
all  bound  to  listen  to  the  judge,  who  is  not  only  capable 
of  passing  sentence,  but  has  also  lived  in  the  same  place 
with  the  person  in  question,  and  has  been  an  eye-witness 
of  his  goings  on  at  home,  and  of  his  beai^ng  towards  the 
several  members  of  his  family, — wherein  he  will  be  most 
thoroughly  stripped  of  the  theatrical  garb, — and  also  of 
his  behaviour  in  public  perils;  and  suppose  we  bid  him 
take  all  these  particulars  into  consideration,  and  then 
pronounce  how,  on  the  score  of  happiness  and  misery, 
the  tyrant  stands  as  compared  with  the  other  men? 


344  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX. 

This  proposal,  he  replied,  would  be  also  a  most  just  one. 

Then,  in  order  that  we  may  have  some  person  who 
will  reply  to  our  questions,  should  you  wish  us  to  claim  a 
place  among  those  who,  besides  being  competent  to  de- 
liver judgment,  have  before  now  encountered  people  of 
this  description? 

Yes,  I  should. 

Come  then,  let  me  beg  you  to  consider  the  question  in 
the  following  light.  Bearing  in  mind  the  similarity  that 
subsists  between  the  state  and  the  man,  examine  them 
singly  in  turn,  and  tell  me  the  circumstances  in  which 
each  is  placed. 

To  what  circumstances  do  you  refer? 

To  begin  with  the  state,  do  you  predicate  freedom  of 
slavery  of  one  which  is  under  the  dominion  of  a  tyrant? 

Consummate  slavery. 

And  yet  you  see  it  contains  masters  and  freemen. 

True,  it  does  contain  a  few  such  persons;  but  the  mass 
of  the  inhabitants,  I  might  say,  and  the  best  of  them  are 
reduced  to  an  ignominious  and  miserable  servitude. 

Now,  since  the  man  resembles  the  state,  must  not  the 
same  order  of  things  exist  in  him  also,  and  must  not  his 
soul  be  freighted  with  abundance  of  slavery  and  servility, 
— those  parts  of  it,  which  were  the  best,  being  enslaved, 
while  a  small  part,  and  that  the  most  corrupt  and  insane, 
is  dominant? 

It  must  be  so. 

If  so,  will  such  a  soul,  by  your  account,  be  bond  or 
free? 

I  should  certainly  say  the  former. 

To  return,  is  not  the  city,  which  is  enslaved  to  a  tyrant, 
utterly  precluded  from  acting  as  it  likes? 

Yes,  quite  so. 

Then  the  soul  also,  which  is  the  seat  of  a  tyranny,  con- 
sidered as  a  whole  will  be  very  far  from  doing  whatever 
it  wishes.  On  the  contrary,  it  will  be  always  dragged  by 
the  brute  force  of  passionate  desire,  and  will  be  filled  with 
confusion  and  remorse. 

Beyond  a  doubt. 


Book  IX.]         THE  REPQBLIC  OF  PLATO.  345 

And  must  the  city  which  is  the  seat  of  a  tyranny  be 
rich  or  poor? 

It  must  be  poor. 

Then  the  tyrannical  soul  also  must  be  always  poverty- 
stricken  and  craving. 

Just  so. 

Again:  must  not  such  a  city  and  such  a  man  be,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  a  prey  to  fear  ? 

Yes,  indeed. 

Do  you  expect  to  find  in  any  other  city  more  weeping 
and  wailing  and  lamentation  and  grief? 

Certainly  not. 

And  to  return  to  the  individual,  do  you  imagine  such 
things  to  exist  in  any  one  so  abundantly  as  in  this 
tyrannical  man,  who  is  maddened  by  appetites  and 
longings  ? 

Whj,  how  could  they? 

Looking  then,  I  suppose,  at  all  these  facts,,  and  others 
like  them,  you  have  decided  that  the  city  is  the  most 
miserable  of  cities. 

And  am  I  not  right  ? 

You  are  very  right.  But  once  more,  looking  at  the 
same  facts,  what  account  do  you  give  of  the  tyrannical 
man? 

I  should  say  that  he  is  quite  the  most  miserable  of  all 
men. 

There  you  are  no  longer  right. 

How  so? 

I  believe,  that  this  person  is  still  not  the  most  miser- 
able of  all. 

Then  who  is? 

You  will  perhaps  think  the  following  person  even  more 
miserable. 

Describe  him. 

I  refer  to  the  man  who,  being  tyrannical,  is  prevented 
from  living  a  private  life,  because  he  is  so  unfortunate 
as  to  have  the  post  of  tyrant,  by  some  mischance,  pro- 
cured for  him. 

I  infer  from  the  previous  remarks  that  you  are  right. 


346  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX 

Yes,  I  said;  but  you  must  not  be  content  with  surmises 
here :  on  the  contrary,  you  must  examine  the  subject  thor- 
oughly by  such  a  process  of  reasoning  as  we  are  pur- 
suing. For  surely  the  point  under  investigation  is  of  the 
highest  moment,  being  as  it  is  the  choice  between  a  good 
and  an  evil  life. 

That  is  perfectly  true. 

Observe,  then,  whether  I  am  right.  It  appears  to  me 
that,  in  examining  the  question,  we  ought  to  begin  our 
inquiry  with  the  following  considerations. 

What  are  they? 

We  must  begin  by  considering  the  individual  case  of 
those  private  members  of  cities  who  are  wealthy  and  pos- 
sess many  slaves.  For  they  have  this  point  in  common 
with  the  tyrant,  that  they  rule  over  many  persons.  The 
difference  lies  in  the  greater  number  of  his  subjects. 

Yes,  it  does. 

And  now,  are  you  aware  that  such  persons  are  confident 
and  do  not  fear  their  servants? 

Yes ;  what  should  make  them  fear  them  ? 

Nothing :  but  do  you  understand  the  reason  of  it  ? 

Yes;  it  is  because  all  the  city  supports  each  individual. 

You  are  right.  Well,  but  if  some  deity  were  to  lift  out 
of  the  city  a  single  individual,  possessed  of  fifty  slaves 
or  more,  and  were  to  plant  him  with  his  wife  and  children 
in  some  desert  along  with  the  rest  of  his  substance  and 
his  servants,  where  none  of  the  freemen  would  be  likely  to 
help  him,  would  he  not  be  seized,  think  you,  with  an  in- 
describable terror  lest  he  and  his  wife  and  children  should 
be  murdered  by  his  servants? 

Yes,  with  utter  terror,  I  think. 

And  would  he  not  be  compelled  from  that  time  forward 
to  coax  some  of  his  very  slaves,  and  to  promise  largely, 
and  emancipate  them  without  any  excuse  for  it?  In  fact, 
would  he  not  appear  in  the  light  of  an  abject  flatterer  of 
his  attendants  ? 

He  is  doomed  to  death  if  he  fails  to  do  so. 

But  what  if  heaven  had  surrounded  him  with  a  multi- 
tude of  other  neighbours,  who  would  not  endure  that  one 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  347 

person  should  claim  the  rights  of  a  master  over  another, 
but  punished  with  the  utmost  severity  any  such  person 
whom  they  caught  ? 

In  that  case  he  would  be,  I  imagine,  involved  still  further 
in  an  utterly  evil  plight,  because  he  is  hemmed  in  by 
a  ring  of  warders,  all  of  whom  are  his  enemies. 

And  is  not  the  tyrant  a  prisoner  in  a  similar  prison? 
For  if  his  nature  is  such  as  we  have  described,  he  is  re- 
plete with  multitudinous  terrors  and  longings  of  every 
kind;  and,  though  he  has  a  greedy  and  inquisitive  soul,  is 
he  not  the  only  citizen  that  is  precluded  from  travelling  or 
setting  eyes  upon  all  those  objects  which  every  freeman 
desires  to  see?  Does  he  not  bury  himslf  in  his  house, 
and  live  for  the  most  part  the  life  of  a  woman,  while  he 
positively  envies  all  other  citizens  who  travel  abroad  and 
see  grand  sights? 

Yes,  assuredly  he  does. 


Such  being  his  evil  condition,  I  continued,  a  larger  har- 
vest of  misery  is  reaped  by  that  person,  who,  with  an  evil 
inward  constitution  like  that  of  the  tyrannical  man,  to 
whom  you  just  now  ascribed  consummate  wretchedness, 
is  forced  out  of  private  life,  and  constrained  by  some  acci- 
dent to  assume  despotic  power, — thus,  undertaking  to  rule 
others  when  he  cannot  govern  himself,  just  like  a  person 
who  with  a  diseased  and  incontinent  body  is  compelled  to 
pass  his  life,  not  in  retirement,  but  in  wrestling  and  con- 
tending with  other  persons. 

Undoubtedly,  Socrates,  the  cases  are  very  similar,  and 
your  account  is  very  true. 

Then,  my  dear  Glaucon,  is  not  the  condition  of  the 
tyrant  utterly  wretched,  and  does  he  not  live  a  life  which 
is  even  more  intolerable  than  that  of  the  man  who,  by 
your  verdict,  lives  most  intolerably? 

Unquestionably,  he  replied. 

So,  whatever  may  be  thought,  a  very  tyrant  is  in  real 
truth  a  very  slave  in  the  most  abject  and  intense  shape, 
and  a  flatterer  of  the  most  vicious :  and,  so  far  from  satis- 


348  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX 

fying  his  cravings  in  the  smallest  degree,  he  stands  in 
utmost  need  of  numberless  things,  and  is  in  good  truth  a 
pauper,  in  the  eyes  of  one  who  knows  how  to  contemplate 
the  soul  as  a  whole ;  and  all  his  life  long  he  is  loaded  with 
terrors,  and  full  of  convulsions  and  pangs,  if  he  resembles 
the  disposition  of  the  state  over  which  he  rules:  and  he 
does  resemble  it,  does  he  not  ? 

Certainly  he  does. 

Then  we  shall  also,  in  addition  to  this,  ascribe  to  the 
man  what  we  stated  before, — namely,  that  he  cannot  help 
being,  and,  in  virtue  of  his  power,  becoming  more  and 
more  envious,  faithless,  unjust,  friendless,  impure,  and  the 
host  and  nurse  of  every  vice;  and,  in  consequence  of  all 
this,  he  must  in  the  first  place  be  unhappy  in  himself,  and 
in  the  next  place  he  must  make  those  who  are  near  him  as 
unhappy  as  himself. 

No  sensible  man  will  contradict  you. 

Then  pray  go  on,  I  proceeded,  and,  like  the  judge  who 
passes  sentence  after  going  through  the  whole  case,  de- 
clare forthwith  who  is  first,  in  your  opinion,  in  point  of 
happiness,  and  who  second,  and  so  on, — arranging  all  the 
five  men  in  order,  the  kingly,  the  timocratical,  the  oli- 
garchical, the  democratical,  the  tyrannical. 

Well,  he  said,  the  decision  is  an  easy  one.  I  arrange 
them,  like  choruses,  in  the  order  of  their  entrance,  in 
point  of  virtue  and  vice,  happiness  and  misery. 

Shall  we,  then,  hire  a  herald,  or  shall  I  make  proclama- 
tion in  person, — that  the  son  of  Ariston  has  given  his 
sentence  to  the  effect  that  he  is  the  happiest  man  who  is 
best  and  justest,  that  is,  who  is  most  kingly,  and  who  rules 
over  himself  royally;  whereas  he  is  the  most  wretched 
man  who  is  worst  and  most  unjust,  that  is,  who  is  most 
tyrannical,  and  who  plays  the  tyrant  to  the  greatest  per- 
fection both  over  himself  and  over  a  city? 

Let  such  be  your  proclamation,  he  replied. 

And  am  I  to  add  to  my  proclamation,  that  it  makes  no 
difference  whether  all  men  and  gods  find  out  their  char- 
acters, or  not? 

Do  so, 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  349 

Very  well,  I  proceeded;  this  will  make  one  demonstra- 
tion for  us.  The  following  must  make  a  second,  if  it  shall 
be  approved. 

What  is  it? 

Since  the  soul  of  each  individual  has  been  divided  into 
three  parts  corresponding  to  the  three  classes  in  the  state, 
our  position  will  admit,  I  think,  of  a  second  demonstration. 

What  is  it? 

It  is  the  following.  As  there  are  three  parts,  so  there 
appear  to  me  to  be  three  pleasures,  one  appropriate  to 
each  part;  and  similarly  three  appetites,  and  governing 
principles. 

Explain  yourself. 

According  to  us,  one  part  was  the  organ  whereby  a  man 
learns,  and  another  that  whereby  he  shews  spirit.  The 
third  was  so  multiform  that  we  were  unable  to  address  it 
by  a  single  appropriate  name;  so  we  named  it  after  that 
which  is  its  most  important  and  strongest  characteristic. 
We  called  it  appetitive,  on  account  of  the  violence  of  the 
appetites  of  hunger,  thirst,  and  sex,  and  all  their  accom- 
paniments; and  we  called  it  peculiarly  money-loving, 
because  money  is  the  chief  agent  in  the  gratification  of 
such  appetites. 

Yes,  we  were  right. 

Then  if  we  were  to  assert  that  the  pleasure  and  the  affec- 
tion of  this  third  part  have  gain  for  their  object,  would 
not  this  be  the  best  summary  of  the  facts  upon  which  we 
should  be  likely  to  settle  by  force  of  argument,  as  a  means 
of  conveying  a  clear  idea  to  our  minds,  whenever  we 
spoke  of  this  part  of  the  soul?  and  shall  we  not  be  right 
in  calling  it  money-loving  and  gain-loving?  '« 

I  confess  I  think  so,  he  replied. 

Again,  do  we  not  maintain  that  the  spirited  part  is 
wholly  bent  on  winning  power  and  victory  and  celebrity? 

Certainly  we  do. 

Then  would  the  title  of  strife-loving  and  honour-loving 
be  appropriate  to  it? 

Yes,  most  appropriate. 

Well,  but  with  regard  to  the  part  by  which  we  learn,  it 


350  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX 

is  obvious  to  every  one  that  its  entire  and  constant  aim  is 
to  know  how  the  truth  stands,  and  that  this  of  all  the 
elements  of  our  nature  feels  the  least  concern  about  wealth 
and  reputation. 

Yes,  quite  the  least. 

Then  shall  we  not  do  well  to  call  it  knowledge-loving 
and  wisdom-loving? 

Of  course  we  shall. 

Does  not  this  last  reign  in  the  souls  of  some  persons, 
while  in  the  souls  of  other  people  one  or  other  of  the  two 
former,  according  to  circumstances,  is  dominant? 

You  are  right. 

And  for  these  reasons  may  we  assert  that  men  may  be 
primarily  classed  under  the  three  heads  of  lovers  of  wis- 
dom, of  strife,  and  of  gain  ? 

Yes,  certainly. 

And  that  there  are  three  kinds  of  pleasures  respectively 
underlying  the  three  classes? 

Exactly  so. 

Now  are  you  aware,  I  continued,  that  if  you  choose  to 
ask  three  such  men  each  in  his  turn,  which  of  these  lives 
is  pleasantest,  each  will  extol  his  own  beyond  the  others? 
Thus  the  money-making  man  will  tell  you,  that  compared 
with  the  pleasures  of  gain,  the  pleasures  of  being  honoured 
or  of  acquiring  knowledge  are  worthless,  except  in  so  far 
as  they  can  produce  money. 

True. 

But  what  of  the  honour-lovbag  man  ?  Does  he  not  look 
upon  the  pleasure  derived  from  money  as  a  vulgar  one, 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  he  regards  the  pleasure  derived 
from  learning  as  a  mere  vapour  and  absurdity,  unless 
honour  be  the  fruit  of  it  ? 

That  is  precisely  the  case. 

And  *  must  we  not  suppose  that  the  lover  of  wisdom 
regards  all  the  other  pleasures  as,  by  comparison,  very  far 
inferior  to  the  pleasure  of  knowing  how  the  truth  stands, 

*  The  passage  is  undoubtedly  corrupt.  In  default  of  a  better 
emendation  we  have  adopted  the  proposal  of  Stallbaum,  who 
reads  //#  ohofitfa  instead  of  7roiv(ieda.  and  ovaac  na.w  iroppo,  instead 
of  ov  navv  Tr6ppu, 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  351 

and  of  being  constantly  occupied  with  this  pursuit  of 
knowledge ;  and  that  he  calls  those  other  pleasures  strictly 
necessary,  because,  if  they  were  not  necessary,  he  would 
feel  no  desire  for  them? 

We  may  be  certain  that  it  is  so,  he  replied. 

Then  whenever  a  dispute  is  raised  as  to  the  pleasures 
of  each  kind  and  the  life  itself  of  each  class,  not  in  refer- 
ence to  degrees  of  beauty  and  deformity,  of  morality  and 
immorality,  but  in  reference  merely  to  their  position  in  the 
scale  of  pleasure,  and  freedom  from  pain, — how  can  we 
know  which  of  the  three  men  speaks  most  truly  ? 

I  am  not  quite  prepared  to  answer. 

Well ;  look  at  the  question  in  this  light.  What  must  be 
the  instrument  employed  in  passing  a  judgment,  in  order 
that  such  a  judgment  may  be  correct  ?  Must  it  not  be  ex- 
perience, wisdom,  and  reasoning?  or  can  one  find  a  better 
organ  of  judging  than  these  ? 

Of  course  we  cannot. 

Then  observe.  Of  the  three  men,  which  is  the  best 
acquainted  by  experience  with  all  the  pleasures  which  we 
have  mentioned?  Does  the  lover  of  gain  study  the  nature 
of  real  truth  to  such  an  extent  as  to  be,  in  your  opinion, 
acquainted  with  the  pleasure  of  knowledge  better  than 
the  lover  of  wisdom  is  acquainted  with  the  pleasure  of 
gain? 

There  is  a  great  difference,  he  replied.  The  lover  of 
wisdom  is  compelled  to  taste  the  pleasures  of  gain  from 
his  childhood:  whereas  the  lover  of  gain  is  not  compelled 
to  study  the  nature  of  the  things  that  really  exist,  and  thus 
to  taste  the  sweetness  of  this  pleasure,  and  become  ac- 
quainted with  it:  rather  I  should  say,  it  is  not  easy  for 
him  to  do  this,  even  if  he  has  the  inclination. 

Hence,  I  proceeded,  the  lover  of  wisdom  is  far  superior 
to  the  lover  of  gain  in  practical  acquaintance  with  both 
the  pleasures. 

He  is  indeed. 

But  what  of  the  lover  of  honour?  Is  he  acquainted  with 
the  pleasure  of  wisdom  as  thoroughly  as  the  lover  of  wis- 
dom is  acquainted  with  the  pleasure  of  honour 't 


352  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX. 

Nay,  said  he;  honour  waits  upon  them  all,  if  each 
works  out  the  objects  of  his  pursuit.  For  the  rich  man  is 
honoured  by  many  people,  as  well  as  the  courageous  and 
the  wise;  so  that  all  are  acquainted  with  the  nature  of  the 
pleasure  to  be  derived  from  the  fact  of  being  honoured. 
Hut  the  nature  of  the  pleasure  to  be  found  in  the  contem- 
plation of  truth,  none  can  have  tasted,  except  the  lover  of 
wisdom. 

Then,  as  far  as  practical  acquaintance  goes,  the  lover  of 
wisdom  is  the  best  judge  of  the  three. 

Quite  so. 

Also  we  know  that  he  alone  can  lay  claim  to  wisdom  as 
well  as  experience. 

Undoubtedly. 

Once  more;  the  organ  by  which  judgment  is  passed  is 
an  organ  belonging,  not  to  the  lover  of  gain  or  of  hono 
but  to  the  lover  of  wisdom. 

What  is  that  organ? 

We  stated,  I  believe,  that  judgment  must  be  passed  by 
means  of  reasoning.    Did  we  not? 

We  did. 

And  reasoning  is,  in  an  especial  degree,  the  organ  of  the 
lover  of  wisdom. 

Certainly. 

Consequently,  if  wealth  and  gain  were  the  best  instru- 
ments for  deciding  questions  as  they  arise,  the  praise  and 
the  censure  of  the  lover  of  gain  would  necessarily  be  most 
true. 

Quite  so. 
i     And  if  honour,  victory,  and  courage,  were  the  best  in- 
i  struments  for  the  purpose,  the  sentence  of  the  lover  of 
honour  and  of  strife  would  be  most  true,  would  it  not  ? 

Obviously  it  would. 

But  since  experience,  wisdom,  and  reasoning,  are  the 
best  instruments, — what  then? 

Why  of  course,  he  replied,  the  praise  of  the  lover  of 
wisdom  and  of  reasoning  is  the  truest. 

Then,  if  the  pleasures  are  three  in  number,  will  the 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  353 

pleasure  of  this  part  of  the  soul,  by  which  we  learn,  be 
pleasantest?  and  will  the  life  of  that  man  amongst  us,  in 
whom  this  part  is  dominant,  be  also  most  pleasant? 

Unquestionably  it  will ;  at  any  rate,  the  man  of  wisdom 
is  fully  authorized  to  praise  his  own  life. 

And  what  life,  I  asked,  does  ihe  judge  pronounce  second, 
and  what  pleasure  second? 

Obviously,   the   pleasure   of   the   warlike   and  honour-i 
loving  man.    For  it  approaches  the  first  more  nearly  than 
the  pleasure  of  the  money-mpking  man  docs. 

Then  the  pleasure  of  the  lover  of  gain  is  to  be  placed 
last,  as  it  appears. 

Undoubtedly,  he"  replied.  5 

Thus  will  the  unjust  man  be  twice  in  succession  foiled, 
and  twice  conquered  by  the  ,:i.st.  And  now  for  the  third 
and  last  time,  address  yourself,  like  a  combatant  in  the 
great  games,  to  Olympian  Zeus,  the  Preserver,  and  observe 
that  in  the  pleasure  of  all  bu^  the  wise  man  there  is  some- 
thing positively  unreal  and  ungenuine,  and  slight  as  the 
rude  outline  of  a  picture,  as  I  think  I  have  been  told  by 
some  learned  man.  And  let  me  say,  that  a  fall  in  this 
bout  will  be  the  heaviest  and  most  decisive  of  all. 

Quite  so:  but  explain  yourself. 

I  shall  find  what  we  want,  I  replied,  if  you  will  re- 
spond while  I  prosecute  the  inquiry. 

Put  your  questions  by  all  means. 

Tell  me  then,  I  proceeded,  do  we  not  assert  that  pain  is 
the  opposite  of  pleasure? 

Assuredly  we  do. 

And  also  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  simultaneous 
absence  both  of  pleasure  and  of  pain  ? 

Certainly  there  is. 

In  other  words,  you  admit  that  there  is  a  point  mid- 
way between  the  two  at  which  the  mind  reposes  from  both. 
Is  not  that  your  meaning? 

It  is. 

Have  you  forgotten  the  language  which  people  hold 
when  they  are  ill  ? 

Give  me  a  specimen  of  it. 


354  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX. 

They  tell  us  that  nothing  is  pleasanter  than  health,  but 
that,  before  they  were  ill,  they  had  not  found  out  its 
supreme  pleasantness. 

I  remember. 

Do  you  not  also  hear  persons  who  are  in  excessive  pain 
sav,  that  nothing  is  so  pleasant  as  relief  from  pain  ? 

I  do. 

And  I  think  you  find  that,  on  many  other  similar  occa- 
sions, persons,  when  they  are  uneasy,  extol  as  supremely 
pleasant,  not  positively  joy,  but  the  absence  of,  and  repose 
from,  uneasiness. 

True,  he  replied;  and  perhaps  the  reason  is,  that  at 
such  times  this  relief  does  become  positively  pleasant  and 
delightful. 

In  the  same  way  we  might  expect,  that  when  a  person's 
joy  has  ceased,  the  repose  from  pleasure  will  be  painful. 

Perhaps  so. 

Thus  the  repose,  which  we  described  just  now  as  midway 
between  pleasure  and  pain,  must  be  now  one,  now  the  other. 

So  it  would  seem. 

Can  that,  which  is  neither  pleasure  nor  pain,  become 
both? 

I  think  not. 

Again,  pleasure  and  pain,  when  present  in  the  mind, 
are  both  of  them  emotions,  are  they  not  ? 

They  are. 

But  was  not  the  simultaneous  absence  of  pleasure  and 
of  pain  shewn  just  now  to  indicate  a  state  of  undoubted 
repose,  midway  between  the  two  ? 

It  was. 

Then  how  can  it  be  right  to  regard  the  absence  of  pain 
as  pleasant,  or  the  absence  of  pleasure  as  painful? 

It  cannot  be  right. 

Hence,  the  repose  felt  at  the  times  we  speak  of  is  not 
really,  but  only  appears  to  be,  pleasant  by  the  side  of  what 
is  painful,  and  painful  by  the  side  of  what  is  pleasant ;  and 
these  representations  will  in  no  instance  stand  the  test  of 
comparison  with  veritable  pleasure,  because  they  are  only 
a  species  of  enchantment. 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OP  PLATO.  355 

I  confess  that  the  argument  points  to  that  conclusion. 

In  the  next  place  turn  your  eyes  to  pleasures  which  do 
not  grow  out  of  pains,  to  prevent  your  imagining,  as  per- 
haps at  the  present  moment  you  might  do,  that  it  is  a  law 
of  nature  that  pleasure  should  be  a  cessation  of  pain,  and 
pain  a  cessation  of  pleasure. 

Pray  where  am  I  to  look,  and  what  pleasures  do  you 
mean? 

Among  many  others,  I  replied,  you  may,  if  you  will, 
take  as  the  best  example  for  your  consideration  the  pleas- 
ures of  smell;  which,  without  the  existence  of  any  previ- 
ous uneasiness,  spring  up  suddenly  in  extraordinary  in- 
tensity, and  when  they  are  over,  leave  no  pain  behind. 

That  is  quite  true. 

Then  do  not  let  us  be  persuaded  that  genuine  pleasure 
consists  in  the  release  from  pain,  or  that  genuine  pain 
consists  in  the  release  from  pleasure. 

No. 

But  it  is  certain  that,  speaking  roughly,  most  of  the  so- 
called  pleasures  which  reach  the  mind  through  the  body, 
and  the  keenest  of  them,  belong  to  this  species;  that  is  to 
say,  they  are  a  kind  of  release  from  pain. 

They  are.  " 

Does  not  the  same  remark  apply  to  those  pleasures  and 
pains  of  anticipation  which  precede  them  ? 

It  does. 

Now,  are  you  aware  what  the  character  of  these  pleas- 
ures is,  and  what  they  most  resemble? 

What? 

Do  you  believe  that  there  is  in  the  nature  of  things  a 
real  Above,  and  Below,  and  an  Intermediate? 

Yes,  I  do. 

And  do  you  imagine  that  a  person,  carried  from  below 
to  that  intermediate  position,  could  help  fancying  that  he 
is  being  carried  above?  And  when  he  is  stationary  in 
that  situation,  and  looks  to  the  place  from  whence  he  has 
been  carried,  do  you  imagine  that  he  can  help  supposing 
his  position  to  be  above,  if  he  ha*  not  see-  the  real 
Above  ? 


356  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  Book  IX.J 

For  my  own  part,  he  replied,  I  assure  you  I  cannot  imag- 
ine how  such  a  person  is  to  think  differently. 

Well,  supposing  him  to  be  carried  to  his  old  place, 
would  he  think  that  he  is  being  carried  below,  and  would 
he  be  right  in  so  thinking? 

Of  course  he  would. 

And  will  not  all  this  happen  to  him,  because  he  is  not 
acquainted  with  the  real  Above,  and  Between,  and  Below? 

Obviously  it  will.  *• 

Then  can  you  wonder,  that  persons  unacquainted  with 
truth,  besides  holding  a  multitude  of  other  unsound  opin- 
ions, stand  to  pleasure  and  pain  and  their  intermediate, 
in  such  a  position,  that  though  when  they  are  carried  to 
what  is  painful,  they  form  a  correct  opinion  of  their  con- 
dition, and  are  really  in  pain;  yet,  when  they  are  carried 
from  pain  to  the  middle  point  between  pain  and  pleasure, 
they  obstinately  imagine  that  they  have  arrh  ed  at  fulness 
of  pleasure, — which  they  have  never  experienced,  and  con- 
sequently are  deceived  by  contrasting  pain  with  the  ab- 
sence of  pain,  like  persons  who,  not  knowing  white,  con- 
trast gray  with  black,  and  take  it  for  white? 

No,  indeed,  I  cannot  wonder  at  it;  nay,  I  should  won- 
der much  more  if  it  were  not  so. 

Well,  consider  the  question  in  another  light.  Are  not 
hunger  and  thirst,  and  similar  sensations,  a  kind  of  empti- 
ness of  the  bodily  constitution? 

Undoubtedly. 

Similarly,  are  not  ignorance  and  folly  an  emptiness  of 
the  mental  constitution? 

Yes,  certainly. 

Will  not  the  man  who  eats,  and  the  man  who  gets 
understanding,  be  filled? 

Of  course. 

And  will  fulness,  induced  by  a  real  substance,  be  more 
true  or  less  true  than  that  induced  by  a  less  real  sub- 
stance ? 

Obviously,  the  more  real  the  substance,  the  more  true  is 
the  fulness. 

Then  do  you  think  that  pure  being  enters  more  largely 


Book  IX.]         THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  35? 

into  the  constitution  of  the  class  of  substances  like  bread 
and  meat  and  drink,  and  food  generally,  than  into  the 
constitution  of  that  species  of  things  which  includes  true 
opinion  and  science  and  understanding,  and  in  a  word,  all 
virtue?  In  forming  your  judgment  look  at  the  matter 
thus.  Do  you  believe  that  real  existence  is  essentially  the 
attribute  of  that  which  is  closely  connected  with  the  un- 
changing and  immortal  and  with  truth,  and  which  is  itself 
unchanging  and  immortal,  and  appears  in  substances  like 
itself ;  or,  is  it  rather  the  attribute  of  that  which  is  closely 
connected  with  the  changeful  and  mortal,  and  which  is 
itself  changeful  and  mortal,  and  appears  in  things  of  kin- 
dred mould  ? 

It  is  the  attribute  of  the  former  in  a  very  superior  de- 
gree, he  replied. 

And  does  science  enter  at  all  less  largely  than  real  ex- 
istence, into  the  substance  of  the  unchanging'' 

Certainly  not. 

Well,  does  truth  enter  less  largely? 

No. 

That  is  to  say,  if  truth  enters  less  largely,  real  existence 
enters  less  largely  also? 

Necessarily  so. 

Speaking  universally,  does  not  the  cultivation  of  the 
body  in  all  its  branches  contain  truth  and  real  existence 
in  a  less  degree  than  the  cultivation  of  the  soul  in  all  its 
branches? 

Yes,  in  a  much  less  degree. 

And  do  you  not  regard  the  body  itself  as  less  true  and 
real  than  the  soul? 

I  do. 

And  is  not  that,  which  is  filled  with  substances  more 
real,  and  which  is  itself  more  real,  really  more  filled  than 
that  which  is  filled  with  things  less  real,  and  which  is 
itself  less  real? 

Undoubtedly  it  is. 

Hence,  as  it  is  pleasant  to  a  subject  to  be  filled  with  the 
things  that  are  naturally  appropriate  to  it,  that  subject 
which  is  really  more  filled,  and  filled  with  real  substances, 


358  ME  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO,  [Book  IX 

will  in  a  more  real  and  true  sense  be  productive  of  true 
pleasure;  whereas  that  subject  which  partakes  of  things 
less  real,  will  be  less  really  and  less  securely  filled,  and 
will  participate  in  a  less  true  and  less  trustworthy  pleasure. 

The  conclusion  is  absolutely  inevitable,  he  replied. 

Those,  therefore,  who  are  unacquainted  with  wisdom 
and  virtue,  and  who  spend  their  time  in  perpetual  ban- 
queting and  similar  indulgences,  are  carried  down,  as  it 
appears,  and  back  again  only  as  far  as  the  midway  point 
on  the  upward  road;  and  between  these  limits  they  roam 
their  life  long,  without  ever  overstepping  them  so  as  to 
look  up  towards,  or  be  carried  to,  the  true  Above:  and 
they  have  never  been  really  filled  with  what  is  real,  or 
tasted  sure  and  unmingled  pleasure;  but,  like  cattle,  they 
are  always  looking  downwards,  and  hanging  their  heads 
to  the  ground,  and  poking  them  into  their  dining-tables, 
while  they  graze  and  get  fat  and  propagate  their  species; 
and,  to  satiate  their  greedy  desire  for  these  enjoyments, 
they  kick  and  butt  with  hoofs  and  horns  of  iron,  till  they 
kill  one  another  under  the  influence  of  ravenous  appetites ; 
because  they  fill  with  things  unreal  the  unreal  and  incon- 
tinent part  of  their  nature. 

Certainly,  Socrates,  said  Glaucon,  you  describe  like  an 
oracle  the  life  of  the  majority  of  persons. 

And  does  it  not  follow  that  they  consort  with  pleasures 
mingled  with  pain  which  are  mere  phantoms  and  rude 
outlines  of  the  true  pleasure,  and  which  are  so  coloured  by 
simple  juxtaposition  to  pain,  that  they  appear  in  each  case 
to  be  extravagantly  great,  and  beget  a  frantic  passion  for 
.themselves  in  the  breasts  of  the  foolish  people,  and  are 
made  subjects  of  contention,  like  that  phantom  of  Helen, 
for  which,  according  to  Stesichorus,  the  combatants  at 
Troy  fought,  in  ignorance  of  the  true  Helen? 

Such  a  state  of  things,  he  replied,  follows  as  a  matter  of 
course. 

And  now  to  coine  to  the  spirited  element.  Must  not 
the  consequences  be  exactly  similar,  whenever  a  man 
labours  for  the  gratification  of  this  part  of  his  nature, 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  359 

either  in  the  shape  of  jealousy  from  motives  of  ambition, 
or  in  the  shape  of  violence  from  love  of  strife,  or  in  the 
shape  of  anger  out  of  discontent,  while  he  pursues  after 
honour  and  victory  and  anger  to  his  own  satisfaction, 
without  reflection  and  without  sound  sense? 

The  consequences  in  this  case  also  must  necessarily  be 
similar. 

And  what  is  the  inference?  May  we  assert  confidently, 
that  of  all  the  appetites  wiih  which  the  gain-loving  and 
honour-loving  elements  are  conversant,  those  which  follow 
the  leading  of  science  and  reason,  and  along  with  them 
pursue  the  pleasures  which  wisdom  directs,  till  they  find 
them,  will  find  not  only  the  truest  pleasures  that  they  can 
possibly  find,  in  consequence  of  their  devotion  to  truth,  but 
also  the  pleasures  appropriate  to  them,  since  what  is  best 
for  each  is  also  most  appropriate? 

Yes,  no  doubt  it  is  most  appropriate. 

Hence,  so  long  as  the  whole  soul  follows  the  guidance  of 
the  wisdom-loving  element  without  any  dissension,  each 
part  can  not  only  do  its  own  proper  work  in  all  respects, 
or  in  other  words,  be  just;  but,  moreover,  it  can  enjoy  its 
own  proper  pleasures,  in  the  best  and  truest  shape  possible. 

Yes,  precisely  so. 

On  the  other  hand,  whenever  either  of  the  two  other  ele- 
ments has  gained  the  mastery,  it  is  fated  not  only  to  miss 
the  discovery  of  its  own  pleasure,  but  also  to  constrain  the 
other  principles  to  pursue  an  alien  and  untrue  pleasure. 

Just  so. 

Well,  the  further  a  thing  is  removed  from  philosophy 
and  reason,  the  more  likely  will  it  be  to  produce  such  evil 
effects,  will  it  not? 

Yes,  much  more  likely. 

And  that  is  furthest  removed  from  reason  which  is 
furthest  removed  from  law  and  order,  is  it  not  ? 

Quite  obviously. 

And  have  not  the  passionate  or  tyrannical  appetites 
been  proved  to  be  furthest  removed  from  law  and  order? 

Yes,  quite  the  furthest. 


360  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX. 

Whereas  the  kingly  and  regular  appetites  stand  nearest 
to  law  and  order,  do  they  not? 

They  do> 

Hence,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  the  tyrant  will  be  furthest 
from,  and  the  king  nearest  to,  true  and  specially  appro- 
priate pleasure. 

It  is  undeniable. 

And  therefore  the  tyrant  will  live  most  unpleasantly, 
and  the  king  most  pleasantly. 

It  is  quite  undeniable. 

And  pray  are  you  aware  of  the  extent  to  which  the  dis- 
comfort of  the  tyrant's  life  exceeds  that  of  the  king's? 

I  wait  for  you  to  tell  me. 

There  are  three  pleasures,  it  appears, — one  genuine,  and 
two  spurious.  Now  the  tyrant  has  trespassed  beyond  these 
last,  has  fled  from  law  and  reason,  and  lives  with  a  body- 
guard of  slavish  pleasures :  and  the  extent  of  his  inferiority 
is  hard  indeed  to  state,  unless  perhaps  it  may  be  stated 
thus. 

How? 

Reckoning  from  the  oligarchical  man,  the  tyrant  stands 
third,  I  believe,  in  the  descending  line;  for  the  demo- 
cratical  man  stood  between. 

Yes. 

Then,  if  our  former  remarks  were  true,  must  not  the 
pleasure  with  which  he  consorts,  be,  so  far  as  truth  is  con- 
cerned, a  copy  of  a  copy,  the  original  of  which  is  in  the 
possession  of  the  oligarchical  man? 

Just  so. 

Again,  reckoning  from  the  kingly  man,  the  oligarchical 
in  his  turn  stands  third  in  the  descending  line,  supposing 
us  to  identify  the  aristocratical  and  the  kingly  ? 

True,  he  does. 

Therefore  the  tyrant  is  thrice  three  times  *  removed 
from  true  pleasure. 

*  Let  A  =  the  kingly  pleasure,  B  —  oligarchical  pleasure, 
C  =  tyrannical  pleasure.  If  A  be  represented  by  1,  B  will  be 
represented  by  3.  But  A  :  B  ::  B  :  C.  Therefore  A  :  C  ::  1  :  9. 
And.  cubing,  A  t  C  ::  1  :  729.  The  whole  passage  is  obviously 
playful* 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  361 

Apparently  so. 

Then  it  seems  that  tyrannical  pleasure  may  be  repre- 
sented geometrically  by  a  square  number,  9. 

Exactly  so. 

And  by  squaring  and  cubing,  it  is  made  quite  clear  to 
what  a  great  distance  the  tyrant  is  removed. 

Yes,  to  an  arithmetician  it  is. 

Conversely,  if  you  wish  to  state  the  distance  at  which 
the  king  stands  from  the  tyrant  in  point  of  reality  of  pleas- 
ure, by  working  out  the  multiplication  you  will  find  that 
the  former  lives  729  times  more  pleasantly  than  the  latter, 
or  that  the  latter  lives  more  painfully  than  the  former  in 
the  same  proportion. 

You  have  brought  out  an  extraordinary  result  in  calcu- 
lating the  difference  between  the  just  man  and  the  unjust, 
on'  the  score  of  pleasure  and  pain. 

Well,  I  replied,  I  am  sure  that  the  number  is  correct, 
and  applicable  to  human  life,  if  days  and  nights  and 
months  and  years  are  applicable  thereto. 

And  no  doubt  they  are. 

Then  if  the  good  and  just  man  so  far  surpasses  the 
wicked  and  unjust  in  point  of  pleasure,  will  he  not  surpass 
him  incalculably  more  in  gracefulness  of  life,  in  beauty, 
and  in  virtue? 

Yes,  indeed  he  will,  incalculably. 

Well,  then,  I  continued,  now  that  we  have  arrived  at 
this  stage  of  the  argument,  let  us  resume  that  first  discus- 
sion which  brought  us  hither.  It  was  stated,  I  believe,  that 
injustice  is  profitable  to  the  man  who  is  consummately 
unjust,  while  he  is  reputed  to  be  just.  Or  am  I  wrong 
about  the  statement? 

No,  you  are  right. 

This  is  the  moment  for  arguing  with  the  author  of  this 
remark,  now  that  we  have  come  to  an  agreement  as  to  the 
respective  effects  of  a  course  of  injustice,  and  of  a  course 
of  justice. 

How  must  we  proceed  ? 

We  must  mould  in  fancy  a  representation  of  the  soul, 


362  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX. 

in  order  that  the  speaker  may  perceive  what  his  remark 
amounts  to. 

What  kind  of  representation  is  it  to  be  ? 

We  must  represent  to  ourselves,  I  replied,  a  creature  like 
one  of  those  which,  according  to  the  legend,  existed  in  old 
times,  such  as  Chimera,  and  Scylla,  and  Cerberus,  not  to 
mention  a  host  of  other  monsters,  in  the  case  of  which  we 
are  told  that  several  generic  forms  have  grown  together 
and  coalesced  into  one. 

True,  we  do  hear  such  stories. 

Well,  mould  in  the  first  place  the  form  of  a  motley  many- 
headed  monster,  furnished  with  a  ring  of  heads  of  tame 
and  wild  animals,  which  he  can  produce  by  turns  in  every 
instance  out  of  himself. 

It  requires  a  cunning  modeller  to  do  so;  nevertheless, 
since  fancy  is  more  plastic  than  wax  and  substances  as 
pliable  as  wax,  suppose  it  done. 

Now  proceed,  secondly,  to  mould  the  form  of  a  lion, 
and,  thirdly,  the  form  of  a  man.  But  let  the  first  be  much 
the  greatest  of  the  three,  and  the  second  next  to  it. 

That  is  easier:  it  is  done. 

Now  combine  the  three  into  one,  so  as  to  make  them 
grow  together  to  a  certain  extent. 

I  have  done  so. 

Lastly,  invest  them  externally  with  the  form  of  one  of 
the  three,  namely,  the  man,  so  that  the  person  who  can- 
not see  inside,  and  only  notices  the  outside  skin,  may 
fancy  that  it  is  one  single  animal,  to  wit,  a  man. 

I  have  done  it. 

And  now  to  the  person  who  asserts  that  it  is  profitable 
for  this  creature  man  to  be  unrighteous,  and  that  it  is  not 
for  his  interest  to  do  justice,  let  us  reply  that  his  assertion 
amounts  to  this,  that  it  is  profitable  for  him  to  feast  and 
strengthen  the  multifarious  monster  and  the  lion  and  its 
members,  and  to  starve  and  enfeeble  the  man  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  leave  him  at  the  mercy  of  the  guidance  of 
either  of  the  other  two,  without  making  any  attempt  to 
habituate  or  reconcile  them  to  one  another,  but  leaving 
th.°m  together  to  bite  and  struggle  and  devour  each  other. 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  363 

True,  he  replied,  the  person  who  praises  injustice  will 
certainly  in  effect  say  this. 

On  the  other  hand,  will  not  the  advocate  of  the  profit- 
ableness of  justice  assert  that  actions  and  words  ought 
to  be  such  as  will  enable  the  inward  man  to  have  the 
firmest  control  over  the  entire  man,  and,  with  the  lion  for 
his  ally,  to  cultivate,  like  a  husbandman,  the  many-headed 
beast, — nursing  and  rearing  the  tame  parts  of  it,  and 
checking  the  growth  of  the  wild;  and  thus  to  pursue  his 
training  on  the  principle  of  concerning  himself  for  all 
jointly,  and  reconciling  them  to  one  another  and  to  him- 
self? 

Yes,  these  again  are  precisely  the  assertions  of  the  per- 
son who  praises  justice. 

Then  in  every  way  the  panegyrist  of  justice  will  speak 
the  truth,  while  the  panegyrist  of  injustice  will  lie.  For 
whether  you  look  at  pleasure,  at  reputation,  or  at  advan- 
tage, the  panegyrist  of  the  righteous  man  speaks  truth, 
whereas  all  the  criticisms  of  his  enemy  are  unsound  and 
ignorant. 

I  am  thoroughly  of  that  opinion,  said  he. 

Let  us  therefore  try  to  win  him  over  mildly  (for  his  error 
is  involuntary),  and  let  us  put  this  question  to  him; — My 
good  friend,  may  we  not  assert  that  the  practices  which 
are  held  to  be  fair  and  foul,  are  fair  or  foul  according  as 
they  either  subjugate  the  brutal  parts  of  our  nature  to  the 
man, — perhaps  I  should  rather  say,  to  the  divine  part, — or 
make  the  tame  part  the  servant  and  slave  of  the  wild? 
Will  he  say,  yes?  or  how  will  he  reply? 

He  will  say  yes,  if  he  will  take  my  advice. 

Then  according  to  this  argument,  I  proceeded,  can  it  be 
profitable  for  any  one  to  take  gold  unjustly,  since  the  con- 
sequence is,  that,  in  the  moment  of  taking  the  gold,  he  is 
enslaving  the  best  part  of  him  to  the  most  vile  ?  or,  it  being 
admitted  that,  had  he  taken  gold  to  sell  a  son  or  a  daugh- 
ter into  slavery,  and  a  slavery  among  wild  and  wicked 
masters,  it  could  have  done  him  no  good  to  receive  even 
an  immense  sum  for  such  a  purpose;  will  it  be  argued  that, 
M  he  ruthlessly  enslaves  the  divinest  part  of  himself  to  the 


364  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX. 

most  ungodly  and  accursed,  he  is  not  a  miserable  man, 
and  is  not  being  bribed  to  a  far  more  awful  destruction 
than  Eriphyle,  when  she  took  the  necklace  as  the  price  of 
her  husband's  life? 

I  will  reply  in  his  behalf,  said  Glaucon:  it  is  indeed 
much  more  awful. 

And  do  you  not  think  that  intemperance,  again,  has  been 
censured  time  out  of  mind  for  the  reason  that,  during  its 
outbreaks,  that  great  and  multiform  beast,  which  is  so 
terrible,  receives  more  liberty  than  it  ought  to  have? 

Obviously,  you  are  right. 

And  are  not  the  terms,  selfwill  and  discontent,  used  to 
convey  a  reproof,  whenever  the  lion-like  and  serpentine 
creature  is  exalted  and  enhanced  out  of  all  harmony  ? 

Exactly  so. 

Again,  are  not  luxury  and  effeminacy  censured  because 
they  relax  and  unnerve  this  same  creature,  by  begetting 
cowardice  in  him? 

Undoubtedly  they  are. 

And  are  not  the  reproachful  names  of  flattery  and  ser- 
vility bestowed,  whenever  a  person  subjugates  this  same 
spirited  animal  to  the  turbulent  monster,  and,  to  gratify 
the  latter's  insatiable  craving  for  money,  trains  the  former 
from  the  first,  by  a  long  course  of  insult,  to  become  an  ape 
instead  of  a  lion? 

Certainly  you  are  right. 

And  why,  let  me  ask  you,  are  coarseness  and  vulgarity 
considered  discreditable?  May  we  not  assert  that  these 
terms  imply  that  the  most  excellent  element  in  the  person, 
to  whom  they  are  attributed,  is  naturally  weak,  so  that 
instead  of  being  able  to  govern  the  creatures  within  him, 
he  pays  them  court,  and  can  only  learn  how  to  flatter 
them? 

Apparently  so,  he  replied. 

Then,  in  order  that  such  a  person  may  be  governed  by 
an  authority  similar  to  that  by  which  the  best  man  is 
governed,  do  we  not  maintain  that  he  ought  to  be  made 
the  servant  of  that  best  man,  in  whom  the  divine  element 
is  supreme?    We  do  not  indeed  imagine  that  the  servant 


Book  IX.j  THE  BEPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  365 

ought  to  be  governed  to  his  own  detriment,  which  Thrasy- 
machus  held  to  be  the  lot  of  the  subject:  on  the  contrary, 
we  believe  it  to  be  better  for  every  one  to  be  governed  by 
a  wise  and  divine  power,  which  ought,  if  possible,  to  be 
seated  in  the  man's  own  heart,  the  only  alternative  being 
to  impose  it  from  without;  in  order  that  we  may  be  all 
alike,  so  far  as  nature  permits,  and  mutual  friends,  from 
the  fact  of  being  steered  by  the  same  pilot. 

Yes,  that  is  quite  right. 

And  this,  I  continued,  is  plainly  the  intention  of  law, — 
that  common  friend  of  all  the  members  of  a  state, — and 
also  of  the  government  of  children,  which  consists  in  with- 
holding their  freedom,  until  the  time  when  we  have  formed 
a  constitution  in  them,  as  we  should  in  a  city,  and  until, 
by  cultivating  the  noblest  principle  of  their  nature,  we 
have  established  in  their  hearts  a  guardian  and  a  sovereign, 
the  very  counterpart  of  our  own; — from  which  time  for- 
ward we  suffer  them  to  go  free. 

Yes  that  is  plain. 

Then  pray,  Glaucon,  on  what  principle,  and  by  what 
line  of  argument,  can  we  maintain  that  it  is  profitable  for  a 
man  to  be  unjust,  or  intemperate,  or  to  commit  any  dis- 
graceful act,  which  will  sink  him  deeper  in  vice,  though  he 
may  increase  his  wealth  thereby,  or  acquire  additional 
power  ? 

We  cannot  maintain  that  doctrine  on  any  ground. 

And  by  what  argument  can  we  uphold  the  advantages 
of  disguising  the  commission  of  injustice,  and  escaping  the 
penalties  of  it  ?  Am  I  not  right  in  supposing  that  the  man, 
who  thus  escapes  detection,  grows  still  more  vicious  than 
before ;  whereas  if  he  is  found  out  and  punished,  the  brute 
part  of  him  is  quenched  and  tamed,  and  the  tame  part  is 
liberated,  and  the  whole  soul  is  moulded  to  the  loftiest 
disposition,  and  thus,  through  the  acquisition  of  temper- 
ance and  justice  combined  with  wisdom,  attains  to  a  con- 
dition which  is  more  precious  than  that  attained  by  a  body 
endowed  with  strength  and  beauty  and  health,  in  the  exact 
proportion  in  which  the  soul  is  more  precious  than  the 
body? 


366  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  IX. 

Yes,  indeed,  you  are  right. 

Hence  I  conclude,  the  man  of  understanding  will  direct 
all  his  energies  through  life  to  this  one  object;  his  plan 
being,  in  the  first  place,  to  honour  those  studies  which  will 
impress  this  high  character  upon  his  soul,  while  at  the 
same  time  he  slights  all  others. 

Obviously. 

And  as  for  his  bodily  habit  and  bodily  support,  in  the 
second  place, — far  from  living  devoted  to  the  indulgence 
of  brute  irrational  pleasure,  he  will  shew  *  that  even  health 
is  not  an  object  with  him,  and  that  he  does  not  attach  pre- 
eminent importance  to  the  acquisition  of  strength  or  health 
or  beauty,  unless  they  are  likely  to  make  him  temperate; 
because,  in  keeping  the  harmony  of  the  body  in  tune,  his 
constant  aim  is  to  preserve  the  symphony  which  resides  in 
the  soul. 

Yes,  no  doubt  it  is,  if  he  intends  to  be  a  genuine  votary 
of  music. 

Will  he  not  also  shew  how  strictly  he  upholds  that  sys- 
tem and  concord  which  ought  to  be  maintained  in  the 
acquisition  of  wealth  ?  And  will  he  not  avoid  being  dazzled 
by  the  congratulations  of  the  crowd  into  multiplying  in- 
finitely the  bulk  of  his  wealth,  which  would  bring  him 
endless  trouble? 

I  think  he  will. 

On  the  contrary,  an  anxious  reference  to  his  inward 
constitution,  and  a  watchful  care  that  none  of  its  parts  be 
pushed  from  their  propriety  owing  to  a  superabundance 
or  scantiness  of  substance,  will  be  the  principles  by  which, 
to  the  best  of  his  ability,  he  will  steer  his  course  in  adding 
to,  or  spending  out  of,  his  property. 

Precisely  so. 

And,  once  more,  in  reference  to  honours, — with  the  same 
standard  constantly  before  his  eyes,  he  will  be  glad  to 
taste  and  partake  of  those  which  he  thinks  will  make  him 
a  better  man;  whereas  he  will  shun,  in  private  and  in 
public,  those  which  he  thinks  likely  to  break  up  his  ex- 
isting condition. 

*  Beading  Qavelrcu  with  Ast,  instead  of  (paiwjrai. 


Book  IX.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  36? 

If  that  is  his  chief  concern,  I  suppose  he  will  not  con- 
sent to  interfere  with  politics. 

By  my  faith,  you  are  wrong,  I  replied;  for  he  certainly 
will, — at  least,  in  his  own  city,  though  perhaps  not  in  his 
native  land,  unless  some  providential  accident  should  occur. 

I  understand,  he  replied.  He  will  do  so,  you  mean,  in 
the  city  whose  organization  we  have  now  completed,  and 
which  is  confined  to  the  region  of  speculation ;  for  I  do  not 
believe  it  is  to  be  found  anywhere  on  earth. 

Well,  said  I,  perhaps  in  heaven  there  is  laid  up  a  pattern 
of  it  for  him  who  wishes  to  behold  it,  and,  beholding,  to 
organize  himself  accordingly.  And  the  question  of  its 
present  or  future  existence  on  earth  is  quite  unimportant. 
For  in  any  case  he  will  adopt  the  practices  of  such  a  city, 
to  the  exclusion  of  those  of  every  other. 

Probably  he  will,  he  replied. 


368  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 


BOOK  X. 

Well,  I  continued,  I  must  say  that,  while  I  am  led  by 
a  variety  of  considerations  to  believe  that  we  were  un- 
questionably right  in  our  plans  for  organizing  the  state,  I 
feel  this  conviction  most  strongly  when  I  think  of  our 
regulations  about  poetry. 

What  was  the  nature  of  them? 

They  were  to  the  effect  that  we  ought  on  no  account  to 
admit  that  branch  of  poetry  which  is  imitative:  and  now 
that  the  specific  parts  of  the  soul  have  been  each  separately 
defined,  the  conviction  that  such  poetry  must  be  unhesi- 
tatingly refused  admittance,  is  to  my  mind  even  clearer 
than  it  was  before. 

Explain  what  you  mean. 

I  am  quite  sure  that  you  will  not  denounce  me  to  the 
tragedians,  and  the  whole  company  of  imitative  poets,  and 
therefore  I  do  not  mind  saying  to  you,  that  all  imitative 
poetry  would  seem  to  be  detrimental  to  the  understanding 
of  those  hearers  who  do  not  possess  the  antidote  in  a 
knowledge  of  its  real  nature. 

Pray  what  is  the  purport  of  your  remarks? 

I  must  speak  my  mind,  although  I  confess  I  am  checked 
by  a  kind  of  affectionate  respect  for  Homer,  of  which  I 
have  been  conscious  since  I  was  a  child.  For  of  all  those 
beautiful  tragic  poets  he  seems  to  have  been  the  original 
master  and  guide.  But  it  would  be  wrong  to  honour  a  man 
at  the  expense  of  truth,  and  therefore  I  must,  as  I  said, 
speak  out. 

By  all  means  do  so. 

Listen  then,  or  rather  reply. 

Put  your  questions. 

Can  you  give  me  any  account  of  the  nature  of  imitation 
generally?  For  I  assure  you  I  am  at  a  loss  myself  to 
understand  its  real  meaning. 


Book  X.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO,  369 

And  so  you  expect  me  to  understand  it. 

It  would  not  be  extraordinary  if  you  did;  for  it  often 
happens  that  shortsighted  people  make  out  objects  sooner 
than  quicksighted. 

True ;  but  in  your  presence,  if  I  did  make  a  discovery,  I 
should  not  have  the  courage  to  mention  it:  therefore  look 
yourself. 

Well,  is  it  your  wish  that  we  should  pursue  our  usual 
course  in  the  outset  of  our  investigation?  We  have,  I 
believe,  been  in  the  habit  of  assuming  the  existence,  in 
each  instance,  of  some  one  Form,  which  includes  the 
numerous  particular  things  to  which  we  apply  the  same 
name.    Do  you  understand,  or  not  ? 

I  do  understand. 

Then  let  us,  on  the  present  occasion,  take  any  one  of 
those  numerous  things  that  suits  your  pleasure.  For  ex- 
ample, if  this  instance  suits  you,  there  are,  of  course,  many 
beds  and  many  tables. 

Certainly. 

But  of  Forms  in  connexion  with  these  articles,  there 
are,  I  believe,  only  two,  one  the  Form  of  a  bed,  and  one 
that  of  a  table. 

Yes. 

Have  we  not  also  been  accustomed  to  say  that  the  manu- 
facturer of  each  of  these  articles  is  looking  at  the  Form 
while  he  is  constructing  the  beds  or  the  tables  which  we 
employ,  or  whatever  it  may  be  ?  For,  of  course,  no  manu- 
facturer constructs  the  Form  itself;  because  that  is  im- 
possible. 

Certainly  it  is. 

But  pray  consider  how  you  will  describe  the  following 
workman. 

To  whom  do  you  allude? 

I  allude  to  the  workman  who  constructs  all  the  articles 
which  come  within  the  province  of  the  whole  class  of 
artisans. 

You  are  talking  of  a  marvellously  clever  man. 

Wait  a  little,  and  you  will  have  better  reasons  for  saying 
so.  Besides  being  able  to  construct  all  manufactured 
•4 


310  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 

articles,  the  same  artisan  produces  everything  that  grows 
out  of  the  ground,  and  creates  all  living  things,  himself 
among  others;  and.  in  addition  to  this,  heaven  and  earth 
and  the  gods  and  all  the  heavenly  bodies  and  all  the  beings 
of  the  nether  world  are  his  workmanship. 

What  an  extraordinary  ingenious  person  you  are  de- 
scribing ? 

You  are  incredulous,  are  you?  Then  tell  me; — Do  you 
think  that  the  existence  of  such  an  architect  is  a  complete 
impossibility?  or  do  you  believe  that  in  one  way  there 
could,  and  in  another  way  there  could  not,  be  a  manu- 
facturer of  such  a  variety  of  things?  Do  y^u  not  perceive 
that,  in  a  kind  of  way,  even  you  yourself  could  construct 
this  multiplicity  of  objects? 

Pray  what  is  this  way  ?  I  asked.  ^ 

Far  from  being  difficult,  I  replied ;  it  is  a  rapid  method, 
and  admits  of  many  variations.  Perhaps  the  most  rapid 
way  of  all  would  be  to  take  a  mirror,  and  turn  it  round  in 
every  direction.  You  will  not  be  long  in  making  the  sun 
and  the  heavenly  bodies,  nor  in  making  the  earth,  nor  in 
making  yourself,  and  every  other  living  thing,  and  all  in- 
animate objects,  and  plants,  and  everything  that  we  men- 
tioned just  now. 

Yes,  we  can  produce  so  many  appearances,  but  assur- 
edly not  truly  existing  things. 

Right;  and  your  observation  is  just  to  the  point.  Now, 
in  my  opinion,  the  painter  also  belongs  to  this  class  of 
architects.    Does  he  not  ? 

Certainly  he  does. 

But  I  suppose  you  will  say  that  all  his  creations  are  un- 
real. And  yet  the  painter  too,  in  a  kind  of  way,  constructs 
a  bed.     Or  am  I  wrong? 

Yes,  the  painter  too  constructs  a  bed  in  appearance. 

But  what  of  the  manufacturer  of  beds?  Did  you  not 
certainly  say  a  minute  ago,  that  he  did  not  construct  the 
Form,  which,  according  to  our  doctrine,  constitutes  the 
reality  of  a  bed, — but  only  a  particular  lied  ? 

Yes,  I  did  say  so. 

Consequently,  if  he  does  not  construct  what  really  exists, 


Book  XJ  THE  HEPtTBLIC  OF  PLATO.  371 

must  we  not  say  that  he  does  not  construct  a  real  thing, 
but  only  something  like  the  reality,  but  still  unreal  ?  And 
if  any  one  were  to  describe  the  work  of  the  bed-wright, 
or  of  any  other  artisan,  as  perfectly  real,  his  account  of 
the  matter  would  be,  in  all  probability,  untrue,  would  it 
not? 

Yes,  in  the  opinion  of  those  who  are  versed  in  such  dis- 
cussions as  these. 

Then  let  us  not  be  at  all  surprised  at  finding  that  things 
as  substantial  as  a  bed  are  shadowy  objects  when  con- 
trasted with  reality.  i 

True. 

Should  you  like  us  to  employ  these  illustrations  in  ouj» 
inquiry  into  the  real  nature  of  an  imitator? 

If  you  please,  he  replied. 

Well,  here  we  have  three  sorts  of  beds;  of  which  one 
exists  in  the  nature  of  things;  and  this  we  shall  attribute, 
if  I  am  not  mistaken,  to  the  workmanship  of  God.  If  not, 
to  whom  can  we  attribute  it  ? 

We  can  only  attribute  it  to  Him,  I  think. 

The  second  is  made  by  the  upholsterer.    /. 

Yes. 

And  the  third  is  the  production  of  the  painter.    Is  it  not? 

Be  it  so. 

Thus  we  have  three  kinds  of  beds,  and  three  superinten- 
dents of  their  manufacture, — the  painter,  the  upholsterer, 
God. 

Yes,  three. 

Now  whether  it  was  that  God  did  not  choose  to  make 
more  than  one  bed,  or  that  by  a  species  of  necessity  he 
was  precluded  from  making  more  than  one  in  the  universe, 
he  has  at  any  rate  made  only  one,  which  is  the  absolute 
essential  Bed.  But  two,  or  more  than  two,  such  beds  have 
not  been  created  b}'  God,  and  never  will  be. 

How  so? 

Because,  if  God  had  made  only  two,  a  single  bed  would 
again  have  made  its  appearance,  whose  Form  would  enter 
into  the  other  two  in  their  turn;  and  this  would  be  the 
absolute  essential  Bed,  and  not  the  two. 


372  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 

You  are  right. 

Knowing  this,  I  should  suppose,  and  wishing  to  be  the 
real  maker  of  the  really  existing  bed,  and  not  a  certain 
indefinite  manufacturer  of  a  certain  indefinite  bed,  God 
created  a  single  such  Bed. 

It  seems  so. 

Then  are  you  in  favour  of  our  addressing  Him  as  the 
Creator,  for  example,  of  this  object? 

Yes,  he  replied,  it  is  but  just  to  do  so,  seeing  that  bf 
creation  He  has  made  both  this,  and  everything  else. 

And  what  of  the  upholsterer?  Must  we  not  style  him 
the  artificer  of  a  bed? 

Yes. 

May  we  go  on  to  call  the  painter,  the  artificer  and 
maker  of  this  same  article? 

Certainly  not. 

Then,  by  your  account,  what  is  he  with  .'eference  to  a 
bed? 

In  my  opinion  he  might  most  justly  be  styled  the  imi- 
tator of  that  of  which  the  other  two  are  artificers. 

Well,  then,  do  you  call  the  author  of  that  which  is  twice 
removed  from  the  thing  as  it  was  created,  an  imitator? 

Yes,  exactly  so. 

Hence,  since  the  tragedian  is  an  imitator,  we  may  pre- 
dicate of  him  likewise,  that  he,  along  with  all  the  other 
imitators,  is  the  third  in  descent  from  the  sovereign  and 
from  truth. 

So  it  would  appear. 

Then  we  are  unanimous  as  to  the  nature  of  the  imitator. 
But  answer  me  one  question  about  the  painter.  Do  you 
suppose  that  a  painter  attempts  to  imitate  the  originally 
created  object,  or  the  productions  of  the  artificer? 

The  latter,  he  replied. 

As  they  really  exist,  or  as  they  appear?  Define  Ois 
further. 

What  do  you  mean? 

I  mean  this :  when  you  look  at  a  bed  sideways,  or  in  front, 
or  from  any  other  position  whatever,  does  it  alter  its  iden- 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  373 

tity  at  all,  or  does  it  continue  really  the  same,  though  it 
appears  changed?     And  so  of  everything  else? 

The  latter  is  the  true  account:  it  appears  different,  but 
it  is  not  really  changed. 

Now  this  is  the  point  which  I  wish  you  to  consider.  To 
which  of  the  two  is  painting,  in  every  instance,  directed? 
Does  it  study  to  imitate  the  real  nature  of  real  objects,  or 
the  apparent  nature  of  appearances  ?  In  other  words,  is  it 
an  imitation  of  a  phantasm,  or  of  truth? 

Of  the  former,  he  replied. 

The  imitative  art,  then,  is,  I  conceive,  completely  di- 
vorced from  truth;  and,  apparently,  it  is  enabled  to  effect 
so  much,  because  it  only  seizes  upon  an  object  in  a  small 
part  of  its  extent,  and  that  small  part  is  unsubstantial. 
For  example,  we  say  the  painter  will  paint  us  a  shoemaker, 
a  carpenter,  or  any  other  craftsman,  without  knowing  any- 
thing about  their  trades;  and,  notwithstanding  this  igno- 
rance on  his  part,  let  him  be  but  a  good  painter,  and  if  he 
paints  a  carpenter  and  displays  his  picture  at  a  distance, 
he  will  deceive  children  and  silly  people  by  making  them 
think  that  it  really  is  a  carpenter. 

No  doubt  he  will. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  I  will  tell  you,  my  friend,  how  I  think 
we  ought  to  feel  in  all  such  cases.  Whenever  a  person 
tells  us  that  he  has  fallen  in  with  a  man  who  is  acquainted 
with  all  the  crafts,  and  who  sums  up  in  his  own  person  all 
the  knowledge  possessed  by  other  people  singly,  to  a  degree 
of  accuracy  which  no  one  can  surpass, — we  must  reply  to 
ouf  informant,  that  he  is  a  silly  fellow,  and  has,  apparently, 
fallen  in  with  a  juggler  and  mimic,  whom  he  has  been 
deceived  into  thinking  omniscient,  because  he  was  himself 
incapable  of  discriminating  between  science,  and  ignorance, 
and  imitation. 

That  is  most  true. 

And  now,  I  continued,  we  must  proceed  to  consider  the 
case  of  tragedy  and  its  leader,  Homer;  because  we  are 
told  by  some  persons,  that  dramatic  poets  are  acquainted 
not  only  with  all  arts,  but  with  all  things  human  which 


374  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X, 

bear  upon  virtue  and  vice,  and  also  with  things  divine. 
For,  to  write  well,  a  good  poet  must,  they  say,  possess  a 
knowledge  of  his  subject,  or  else  he  could  not  write  at  all. 
Hence  we  must  inquire,  whether  the  poets,  whom  these 
people  have  encountered,  are  mere  imitators,  who  have 
so  far  imposed  upon  the  spectators,  that,  when  they  behold 
their  performances,  they  fail  to  perceive  that  these  pro- 
ductions are  twice  removed  from  reality,  and  easily  worked 
out  by  a  person  unacquainted  with  the  truth,  because  they 
are  phantoms,  and  not  realities; — or  whether  our  infor- 
mants are  so  far  right,  that  good  poets  do  really  know  the 
subjects  about  which  they  seem  to  the  multitude  to  speak 
well. 

Yes,  we  must  by  all  means  investigate  the  matter. 

Well  then,  do  you  think,  that,  if  a  man  could  produce 
both  the  original  and  the  representation,  he  would  give 
himself  up  seriously  to  the  manufacture  of  the  representa- 
tions, and  make  this  the  object  of  his  life,  under  the  idea 
that  he  professes  a  most  noble  purpose? 

/  do  not  think  so. 

On  the  contrary,  if  he  were  truly  instructed  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  things  which  he  imitates,  he  would,  I  imag- 
ine, bestow  far  more  industry  upon  real  actions  than  upon 
the  imitations,  and  he  would  endeavour  to  leave  behind  him 
a  number  of  excellent  works,  as  memorials  of  himself,  and 
would  be  more  anxious  to  be  the  panegyrized  than  the 
panegyrist. 

I  agree  with  you,  said  he ;  for  the  honour  and  the  profit 
are  much  greater  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other. 

Now,  on  ordinary  subjects,  let  us  not  demand  an  ex- 
planation from  Homer  or  any  other  poet,  by  asking  why,  if 
any  of  the  ancient  or  modern  poets  were  adepts  in  the 
healing  art  and  not  mere  imitators  of  the  physician's  lan- 
guage, they  have  not  the  credit  of  having  effected  any 
cures  like  Asclepius,  or  of  having  left  behind  them  a  body 
of  scholars  in  physic,  as  Asclepius  left  his  descendants; 
neither  let  us  question  them  concerning  the  other  arts, 
which  may  be  dismissed  from  the  discussion.  But  con- 
cerning those  grandest  and  most  beautiful  subjects  which 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  375 

Homer  undertakes  to  treat,  such  as  war,  and  the  conduct 
of  campaigns,  and  the  administration  of  cities,  and  the 
education  of  man,  it  is  surely  just  to  institute  an  inquiry, 
and  ask  the  question,  thus ; — "  My  dear  Homer,  if  you  are 
really  only  once  removed  from  the  truth,  with  reference  to 
virtue,  instead  of  being  twice  removed,  and  the  manufac- 
turer of  a  phantom,  according  to  our  definition  of  an  imi- 
tator; and  if  you  used  to  be  able  to  distinguish  between 
the  pursuits  which  make  men  better  or  worse,  in  private 
and  in  public ; — tell  us,  what  city  owes  a  better  constitution 
to  you,  as  Lacedaemon  owes  hers  to  Lycurgus,  and  as  many 
cities,  great  and  small,  owe  theirs  to  many  other  legis- 
lators? What  state  attributes  to  you  the  benefits  derived 
from  a  good  code  of  laws?  Italy  and  Sicily  recognize 
Charon  das  in  this  capacity,  and  we  Solon.  But  what  state 
recognizes  you  ?  "    Will  he  be  able  to  mention  any  ? 

I  think  not,  replied  Glaucon:  at  least  we  are  not  told 
any  tale  of  the  kind  even  by  the  very  poets  who  claim  him 
as  their  ancestor. 

Well  then,  does  the  story  go  that  any  war  in  Homer's 
time  was  brought  to  a  happy  termination  under  his  com- 
mand, or  by  his  advice?  , 

No,  not  one. 

Well,  is  he  said  to  have  been,  like  Thales  the  Milesian 
and  Anarcharsis  the  Scythian,  the  author  of  a  number  of 
ingenious  inventions,  bearing  upon  the  useful  arts  or  other 
practical  matters,  which  would  convey  the  impression  of 
his  having  been  a  man  of  wisdom  in  the  active  duties  of 
life? 

No,  certainly  nothing  of  the  sort  is  said  of  him. 

Well  then,  is  it  reported  of  Homer  that,  though  not  a 
public  man,  he  nevertheless  in  his  lifetime  personally  con- 
ducted, in  private,  the  education  of  certain  disciples,  who 
used  to  delight  in  his  society,  and  handed  down  to  posterity 
an  Homeric  way  of  living;  just  as  Pythagoras  was  in  an 
extraordinary  degree  beloved  personally  as  a  companion, 
not  to  mention  that  his  successors,  who  to  this  day  call 
their  mode  of  living  by  his  name,  are  considered  to  a 
certain  extent  conspicuous  in  the  world? 


376  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 

No,  Socrates;  nothing  of  this  kind  either  is  reported  of 
him.  Indeed  if  the  stories  about  Homer  are  true,  the  edu- 
cation of  his  friend  Creophylus  might  possibly  be  thought 
even  more  ridiculous  than  his  name.  For  we  are  told  that 
even  Creophylus  *  neglected  Homer  singularly  in  his  life- 
time. 

"No  doubt  that  is  the  story.  But  do  you  suppose,  Glau- 
con,  that,  if  Homer  had  been  really  able  to  educate  men 
and  make  them  better,  from  the  fact  of  being  capable  not 
merely  of  imitating  but  of  knowing  the  subjects  in  ques- 
tion, he  could  have  failed  to  attract  to  his  side  a  multitude 
of  companions,  who  would  have  loved  and  honoured  him? 
For  so  long  as  Protagoras  of  Abdera,  and  Prodicus  of  Ceos, 
and  a  host  of  other  persons,  can,  as  we  see,  persuade  the 
men  of  their  day  by  private  intercourse,  that  they  will  be 
incapable  of  managing  their  own  house  and  city,  unless 
they  superintend  their  education;  and  so  long  as  the 
wisdom,  implied  in  this,  insures  to  these  teachers  an  affec- 
tion so  unbounded,  that  they  are  almost  carried  about  on 
the  shoulders  of  their  companions; — is  it  conceivable  that, 
if  Homer  and  Hesiod  were  really  capable  of  improving 
men  in  virtue,  they  should  have  been  suffered  by  their  con- 
temporaries to  travel  about  reciting  ?  Is  it  not  more  likely 
that  they  would  have  been,  hugged  more  closely  than  gold, 
and  constrained  to  stay  at  home  with  their  countrymen?  or 
else,  if  this  favour  were  refused,  that  they  would  have  been 

*  The  reading  erf  avrov  ekeIvov  can  scarcely  be  right.  The  only 
meaning  it  can  bear  is,  "  In  the  lifetime  of  that  very  man,"  i.  e. 
according  to  most  of  the  commentators,  Homer.  Then  of  e&  is 
superfluous.  But  irepl  avrov  and  eir'  avrov  eneivov  can  hardly  refer 
to  the  same  person  ;  and  as  nepl  avnbv  can  only  refer  to  Homer, 
£7r'  avrov  kiceivov  cannot  mean  Homer,  and  therefore  must  mean 
Creophylus.  Then,  retaining  eirl,  the  meaning  will  be,  "  In  the 
lifetime  of  Creophylus  himself,  when  Homer  was  alive."  But 
this  is  awkward,  and  objectionable.  Hence  we  must  read,  instead 
of  enl,  either,  ko  with  Ast,  or  else  cnrb  with  Heyne.  If  we  read 
and,  the  .meaning  of  the  passage  will  be,  that  Homer  was  very 
generally  neglected  in  his  lifetime,  "  beginning  from  Creophylus 
himself."  The  drift  of  the  whole  passage  is  this: — what  a  bad 
educator  must  Homer  have  been,  if  even  his  intimate  friend 
Creophylus  could  neglect  him.  The  joke  about  the  name  of 
Creophylus  is  not  very  obvious,  because  the  reading  is  uncertain. 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  377 

escorted  in  their  wanderings,  till  their  disciples  had  re- 
ceived a  satisfactory  education? 

I  believe  you  are  unquestionably  right,  Socrates. 

Then  must  we  not  conclude  that  all  writers  of  poetry, 
beginning  with  Homer,  copy  unsubstantial  images  of  every 
subject  about  which  they  write,  including  virtue,  and  do 
not  grasp  the  truth  ?  In  fact,  as  we  were  saying  just  now, 
will  not  the  painter,  without  understanding  anything  about 
shoemaking,  paint  what  will  be  taken  for  a  shoemaker  by 
those  who  are  as  ignorant  on  the  subject  as  himself,  and 
who  judge  by  the  colours  and  forms? 

Yes,  certainly  he  will. 

And  just  in  the  same  way,  I  fancy,  we  shall  assert  that 
the  poet,  as  well  as  the  painter,  lays  on  a  species  of  colours, 
in  the  shape  of  verbs  and  nouns,  to  represent  the  several 
professions,  of  which  he  only  understands  enough  to  be 
able  to  imitate  them ;  so  that  if  he  writes  in  metre,  rhythm, 
and  harmony,  about  shoemaking,  or  about  generalship,  or 
about  any  subject  whatever,  people  who  are  as  ignorant  as 
himself,  and  who  judge  merely  by  the  form  of  expression, 
look  upon  his  poetry  as  very  excellent.  So  powerful  is  the 
charm  which  these  musical  appliances  naturally  possess. 
For  I  suppose  you  know  what  a  poor  appearance  the  works 
of  poets  present,  when  they  have  been  stripped  of  their 
musical  colouring,  and  are  rehearsed  in  their  proper  naked- 
ness.   Doubtless  you  have  observed  the  fact. 

Yes,  I  have,  he  replied. 

Does  it  not  remind  one  of  the  withered  appearance  pre- 
sented by  the  countenances  of  those  who  have  once  been 
blooming  without  being  beautiful,  whenever  their  bloom 
has  deserted  them? 

Precisely  so. 

Now  let  me  ask  you  to  examine  the  following  point.  Ac- 
cording to  us,  the  maker  of  the  image,  that  is,  the  imitator, 
understands  only  the  appearance,  and  not  the  reality.  Is  it 
not  so  ? 

Yes. 

Do  not  let  us  leave  the  matter  half  explained,  but  let  us 
examine  it  satisfactorily. 


378  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 

Proceed. 

A  painter  by  our  account,  will  paint  a  bit  and  bridle, 
will  he  not? 

Yes. 

But  the  bridle  and  bit  will  be  made  by  the  saddler  and 
the  smith,  will  they  not  ? 

Certainly. 

Then  does  the  painter  understand  how  the  bit  and  bridle 
ought  to  be  shaped?  Or  is  it  the  case,  that  even  the 
makers,  the  smith  and  the  saddler,  are  ignorant  on  this 
subject,  which  is  only  understood  by  the  rider,  who  knows 
how  to  use  the  things  in  question? 

That  is  the  true  state  of  the  case. 

Then  may  we  not  assert  that  all  things  are  in  the  same 
predicament  ? 

What  do  you  mean? 

May  we  not  assert  that  each  single  thing  involves  three 
particular  arts, — the  province  of  the  first  being  to  use 
the  thing,  of  the  second  to  produce  it,  of  the  third  to  imi- 
tate it? 

Yes,  we  may. 

Are  not  the  excellence,  beauty,  and  correctness  of  every 
manufactured  article  or  living  creature,  or  action,  to  be 
tried  only  by  a  reference  to  the  purpose  intended  in  their 
construction,  or  in  their  natural  constitution? 

True,  they  are. 

Hence  the  man  who  makes  use  of  a  thing  must  neces- 
sarily be  best  acquainted  with  it,  and  must  in  the  course  of 
using  it  keep  the  maker  informed  as  to  the  success  or  failure 
of  its  performance.  For  example,  a  fluteplayer,  no  doubt, 
informs  a  flutemaker  about  the  flutes  which  he  employs 
in  the  exercise  of  his  art,  and  will  direct  him  how  they 
ought  to  be  made;  and  the  flutemaker  will  submit  to  his 
directions. 

Of  course. 

The  one  has  a  thorough  acquaintance  witn  good  and  bad 
flutes,  and  conveys  information  upon  which  the  other 
relies,  and  will  make  accordingly:  is  not  that  the  case? 

Yes,  it  is. 


Book  X.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  379 

Hence,  the  maker  of  the  instrument  will  entertain  a 
correct  belief  with  regard  to  its  beauty  or  badness,  by 
holding  communication  with  the  person  who  has  a  thorough 
acquaintance  with  the  subject,  and  by  being  compelled  to 
listen  to  his  instructions;  whereas  the  user  of  the  same 
instrument  will  possess  science  on  these  points. 
,     Exactly  so. 

But  which  of  the  two  will  the  imitator  possess  ?  Will  he, 
by  actually  using  the  things  he  describes,  know  scientific- 
ally, whether  his  productions  are  beautiful  and  right,  or 
not ;  or  will  he  entertain  correct  opinion,  from  being  com- 
pelled to  put  himself  in  communication  with  the  man  of 
real  knowledge,  and  to  submit  to  his  directions  as  to  the 
style  in  which  he  ought  to  work  ? 

Neither. 

That  is  to  say,  the  imitator  will  neither  know  scien- 
tifically, nor  entertain  correct  opinions  with  reference  to  the 
beauty  or  badness  of  the  things  which  he  imitates. 

It  seems  not. 

The  poetical  imitator  will  be  charmingly  wise  upon  the 
subjects  which  he  treats. 

Not  exactly. 

However,  he  will  go  on  imitating,  notwithstanding  his 
being  thoroughly  ignorant  as  to  what  constitutes  a  thing 
good  or  bad.  Nay,  apparently  he  will  copy  the  vague 
notions  of  beauty  which  prevail  among  the  uninformed 
multitude. 

Yes,  what  else  can  he  copy? 

Then,  to  all  appearance,  we  are  pretty  well  agreed  so 
far  as  this,  that  the  imitative  person  knows  nothing  of 
importance  about  the  things  which  he  imitates,  and  that 
therefore  imitation  is  an  amusement  and  not  a  serious 
business;  and  that  those  who  cultivate  tragic  poetry  in 
iambic  or  in  epic  verse  are  without  exception  in  the  high- 
est possible  degree  imitators. 

Exactly  so. 

Then,  in  the  name  of  heaven,  I  continued,  does  not  this 


380  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 

process  of  imitation  deal  with  something  twice  removed 
from  the  truth  ?    Answer  me. 

It  does. 

But  pray  how  do  you  describe  that  part  of  human  nature 
on  which  it  exercises  the  power  which  it  possesses? 

Explain  what  part  you  mean. 

I  will.  Objects  of  the  same  size,  I  believe,  appear  to  us 
to  vary  in  magnitude  according  to  their  distance  from  our 
eyes. 

They  do. 

And  things  which  look  bent  under  water  appear  straight 
when  taken  out  of  the  water;  and  the  same  objects  look 
either  concave  or  convex,  owing  to  mistakes  of  another 
kind  about  colours  to  which  the  eye  is  liable:  and  clearly 
there  exists  in  the  soul  a  kind  of  utter  confusion  of  this 
sort.  And  it  is  just  this  natural  infirmity  of  ours  which  is 
assailed  with  every  species  of  witchcraft  by  the  art  of 
drawing,  as  well  as  by  jugglery,  and  the  numerous  other 
inventions  of  the  same  sort. 

True. 

And  have  not  the  processes  of  measuring  and  count:ng 
and  weighing  made  their  appearance  most  agreeably  to 
aid  us  in  dispelling  these  tricks  of  fancy,  and  to  overthrow 
within  us  the  power  of  vague  notions  of  degrees  of  magni- 
tude, quantity,  and  weight,  and  establish  the  control  of  the 
principle,  which  has  calculated,  or  measured,  or  weighed? 

Undoubtedly. 

And  surely  this  must  be  the  work  of  the  rational  element 
in  the  soul. 

Yes,  certainly  it  must. 

But  when  this  element  after  frequent  measuring,  in- 
forms us  that  one  thing  is  greater  or  less  than,  or  equal  to, 
another  thing,  it  is  contradicted  at  the  same  moment  by  the 
appearance  which  the  same  things  present. 

Yes. 

Did  we  not  assert  the  impossibility  of  entertaining,  at 
the  same  time  and  with  the  same  part  of  us,  contradictory 
opinions  with  reference  to  the  same  things? 

Yes,  and  we  were  right  in  asserting  it. 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  38] 

Then  that  part  of  the  soul,  whose  opinion  runs  counter 
to  the  measurements,  cannot  be  identical  with  that  part 
which  agrees  with  them. 

Certainly  not. 

But  surely  that  part,  which  relies  on  measurement  and 
calculation,  must  be  the  best  part  of  the  soul. 

Doubtless  it  must. 

Hence,  that  which  contradicts  this  part  must  be  one  of 
the  inferior  elements  of  our  nature. 

Necessarily  so. 

This  was  the  point  which  I  wished  to  settle  between  us, 
when  I  said  that  painting,  or  to  speak  generally,  the  whole 
art  of  imitation,  is  busy  about  a  work  which  is  far  removed 
from  truth ;  and  that  it  associates  moreover  with  that  part 
of  us,  which  is  far  removed  from  wisdom,  and  is  its  mis- 
tress and  friend  for  no  wholesome  or  true  purpose. 

rnuuestionably. 

Thus  the  art  of  imitation  is  the  worthless  mistress  of  a 
worthless  friend,  and  the  parent  of  a  worthless  progeny. 

So  it  seems. 

Does  this  apply  only  to  the  imitation  which  addresses 
itself  to  the  eye?  or  may  we  extend  it  to  that  which  ad- 
dresses itself  to  the  ear,  which  I  believe  we  name  poetry? 

Probably  we  may. 

Well,  I  proceeded,  do  not  let  us  rely  only  on  the  prob- 
able evidence  derived  from  painting,  but  let  us  prosecute 
further  inquiries  into  that  very  part  of  the  intellect,  with 
which  the  imitative  art  of  poetry  associates  and  let  us  ex- 
amine whether  it  is  worthless  or  good. 

Yes,  we  ought  to  do  so. 

Let  us  state  the  case  thus.  The  imitative  art,  if  we  are 
right,  imitates  men  who  are  engaged  in  voluntary  or  invol- 
untary actions,  and  who,  according  to  the  result  of  their 
actions,  think  themselves  well  off  or  the  reverse;  and  who, 
in  the  midst  of  all  these  circumstances,  are  conscious 
either  of  joy  or  of  grief.  Is  *  there  anything  to  be  added 
to  this? 

*  V1  cannot  be  right.  The  old  reading  was  fj.  We  adopt  Ast'g 
correction ,  ty. 


382  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X 

No,  nothing. 

Now,  in  this  variety  of  circumstances,  is  a  man's  state 
one  of  unanimity  ?  Or  is  he  at  feud  and  war  with  himself 
in  his  actions,  just  as  he  was  at  feud  and  entertained  con- 
tradictory opinions  at  the  same  moment  about  the  same 
subjects,  where  his  sight  was  concerned  ?  But  I  remember, 
that  on  this  subject  we  need  not  come  to  an  agreement 
now;  for  we  settled  all  this  satisfactorily  in  the  past  con- 
versations, in  which  we  admitted  that  our  soul  is  fraught 
with  an  infinite  number  of  these  simultaneous  contradic- 
tions. 

We  were  right. 

Yes,  we  were,  I  continued.  But  there  was  something 
then  omitted,  which  I  think  it  is  now  necessary  to 
discuss. 

What  was  that? 

We  said,  I  believe,  at  the  time,  that  a  good  man,  if  he 
meet  with  a  misfortune,  like  that  of  losing  a  son  or  any- 
thing else  that  he  values  most  highly,  will  bear  it  more 
easily  than  any  one  else. 

Certainly  he  will. 

But  now,  let  us  further  examine,  whether  he  will  feel  no 
sorrow  at  all,  or  whether,  this  being  impossible,  he  will 
observe  some  kind  of  moderation  in  grief. 

The  latter  is  the  truer  account. 

Now  let  me  ask  you  a  question  about  him.  Do  you 
think  he  will  fight  against  his  grief  and  resist  it  most,  when 
the  eyes  of  his  equals  are  upon  him,  or  when  he  is  alone 
by  himself  in  solitude? 

He  will  do  so  much  more,  I  imagine,  when  he  is  observed. 

But  when  he  is  alone,  I  fancy,  he  will  venture  to  say 
much,  which  he  would  be  ashamed  to  say  in  the  hearing, 
of  another  person,  and  he  will  do  much,  which  he  would* 
not  like  any  one  to  see  him  doing. 

Just  so. 

Now  that  which  urges  him  to  resist  his  grief  is  reason 
and  law,  is  it  not  ?  while  that  which  prompts  him  to  indulge 
t  is  the  affliction  itself  ? 

True, 


Book  X.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  383 

But  when  there  are  two  opposite  attractions  in  a  man  at 
the  same  time  in  reference  to  the  same  thing,  he  must,  ac- 
cording to  our  doctrine,  be  a  double  *  man. 

Of  course  he  must. 

Is  not  one  part  of  him  prepared  to  obey  the  directions 
of  law? 

What  are  they? 

Law,  I  believe,  tells  him  that  it  is  best  to  keep  as  quiet 
as  possible  in  misfortunes,  and  check  all  feelings  of  dis- 
content; because  he  cannot  estimate  the  amount  of  good 
and  evil  contained  in  these  visitations,  and  at  the  same 
time  impatience  does  not  help  us  forwards;  and  because 
none  of  the  affairs  of  this  life  deserve  very  serious  anxiety, 
while  grief  stands  in  the  way  of  that  behaviour  which  we 
ought  to  adopt  in  our  troubles  without  a  moment's  delay. 

To  what  do  you  allude? 

It  is  our  duty  to  think  over  the  event  that  has  taken 
place,  and  to  arrange  our  affairs  to  meet  the  emergency  in 
the  way  which  reason  pronounces  best,  like  the  player  who 
moves  his  pieces  according  to  the  dice  which  he  has 
thrown:  and,  instead  of  hugging  the  wounded  part,  like 
children  after  a  fall,  and  continuing  to  roar,  we  ought  ever 
to  habituate  the  soul  to  turn  with  all  speed  to  the  task  of 
healing  and  righting  the  fallen  and  diseased  part,  thus 
putting  a  stop  to  lamentation  by  the  aid  of  medicine. 

Certainly  that  would  be  the  best  behaviour  under  mis- 
fortune. 

Then  the  better  part  of  us,  we  say,  consents  to  be  led 
by  such  reasoning. 

Obviously  it  does. 

On  the  other  hand,  shall  we  not  maintain,  that  the  ele- 
ment which  prompts  us  to  think  of,  and  grieve  over,  our 
misfortune,  and  which  has  an  insatiable  appetite  for  lamen- 
tations, is  irrational  and  idle,  and  the  friend  of  cowardice  ? 

Certainly  we  shall. 

This  being  the  case,  the  peevish  temper  furnishes  an  in- 
finite variety  of  materials  for  imitation ;  whereas  the  tem- 
per, which  is  wise  and  calm,  is  so  constantly  uniform  and 
*  Reading  tivo,  <j>afiev,  avTtf,  k.t.A 


484  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X 

unchanging,  that  it  is  not  easily  imitated ;  and,  when  imi- 
tated, it  is  not  easily  understood,  especially  by  a  general 
gathering  of  all  sorts  of  persons,  collected  in  a  theatre.  For 
these  people  witness  the  imitation  of  a  state  which,  if  I  am 
not  mistaken,  is  far  from  being  their  own. 

It  is,  unquestionably. 

Hence  it  is  clear,  that  the  imitative  poet  has,  in  the  na- 
ture of  things,  nothing  to  do  with  this  calm  temper  of  soul, 
and  that  his  wisdom  is  not  set  on  pleasing  it,  if  he  is  in- 
tended to  gain  a  reputation  in  the  world;  but  his  business 
is  with  the  peevish  and  changeful  temper,  because  it  is 
easily  imitated. 

That  is  clear. 

Then  we  shall  be  justified  now  in  laying  hands  on  him, 
and  placing  him  on  a  level  with  the  painter.  For  he  re- 
sembles the  painter  in  producing  things  that  are  worthless 
when  tried  by  the  standard  of  truth;  and  he  resembles 
him  also  in  this,  that  he  holds  intercourse  with  a  part  of 
the  soul  which  is  like  himself,  and  not  with  the  best  part. 
And,  this  being  the  case,  we  shall  henceforth  be  justified 
in  refusing  to  admit  him  into  a  state  that  would  fain  enjoy 
a  good  constitution,  because  he  excites  and  feeds  and 
strengthens  this  worthless  part  of  the  soul,  and  thus  de- 
stroys the  rational  part;  like  a  person  who  should 
strengthen  the  hands  of  the  dissolute  members  of  a  state 
and  raise  them  to  supreme  power,  and  at  the  same  time 
bring  the  educated  class  to  destruction.  Precisely  in  the 
same  way  we  shall  assert  that  the  imitative  poet  likewise 
implants  an  evil  constitution  in  the  soul  of  each  individual, 
by  gratifying  that  senseless  part  which,  instead  of  dis- 
tinguishing the  greater  from  the  less,  regards  the  same 
things  now  as  great,  and  now  as  small,  and  manufactures 
fantastic  phantoms  that  are  very  widely  removed  from 
truth. 

Exactly  so. 

But  still,  I  continued,  we  have  not  yet  brought  forward 
the  heaviest  count  in  our  indictment.     For  that  poetry 


Book  Jf.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  385 

should  be  able  to  damage  the  great  majority  even  of  good 
men,  is,  I  conceive,  a  crime  of  the  deepest  dye. 

Undoubtedly  it  is,  if  the  indictment  can  be  sustained. 

Attend,  and  then  judge.  The  best  of  us,  I  believe,  while 
listening  to  the  passages  in  which  Homer  or  one  of  the 
tragedians  represents  some  suffering  hero,  who  spins  out 
a  long  speech  in  his  lamentations,  or  perhaps  some  per- 
sons engaged  in  beating  their  breasts  and  bemoaning  them- 
selves in  song, — are  delighted,  as  you  know,  and  give 
ourselves  up  to  be  led  along,  and  sympathize  with  the  suf- 
ferer, and  earnestly  praise  as  a  good  poet  the  writer  who 
can  bring  us  as  much  as  possible  into  this  frame  of  mind. 

I  know  it,  of  course. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  whenever  sorrow  comes  home  to 
one  of  us,  you  are  aware  that  we  pride  ourselves  upon  the 
opposite  conduct ;  that  is,  we  glory  in  being  able  to  endure 
with  calmness,  because,  in  our  estimation,  this  behaviour 
is  manly,  while  the  other  which  we  praised  before  is 
womanish. 

I  am  aware  of  it,  he  said. 

Then  is  this  praise  rightly  bestowed?  I  mean,  is  it  right 
to  feel  pleasure  and  bestow  praise,  instead  of  being  dis- 
gusted, when  one  sees  a  man  behaving  as  one  would 
scorn  and  blush  to  behave  oneself  ? 

No,  indeed,  he  replied,  this  does  not  seem  reasonable. 

It  does  not,  said  I,  if  you  look  at  it  in  another  light. 

In  what  light? 

If  you  consider  that  the  part  which  is  forcibly  held 
down  when  those  calamities  of  our  own  occur,  and  which 
has  hungered  for  the  privilege  of  weeping  and  bewailing  it- 
self fully  and  without  stint,  because  it  is  its  nature  to  covet 
this  satisfaction, — is  the  very  part  that  is  fed  to  satiety  by 
the  poets,  and  delights  in  those  descriptions:  and  that, 
meanwhile,  that  part  of  us  which  is  naturally  the  noblest, 
from  not  having  been  sufficiently  trained  by  reason  and  by 
habit,  relaxes  in  its  watch  over  this  querulous  part,  because 
it  is  surveying  the  afflictions  of  others,  and  because  it  is  not 
discreditable  to  itself  to  praise  and  compassionate  another 
man,  who  professes  to  be  good,  though  his  grief  is  ill-timed. 


386  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X 

In  fact,  it  looks  upon  the  pleasure  as  so  much  clear  gain, 
and  will  not  allow  itself  to  be  deprived  of  it  by  a  contempt 
for  the  whole  poem.  For  it  is  given,  I  think,  only  to  a  few 
to  reflect  that  the  conduct  of  other  people  must  necessarily 
influence  our  own,  and  that  it  is  no  easy  matter,  after  feed- 
ing the  strength  of  the  principle  of  pity  upon  the  sufferings 
of  others,  to  keep  it  under  restraint  when  we  suffer  our- 
selves. 

That  is  most  true. 

Does  not  the  same  reasomn  j  apply  also  to  jokes  *  which 
you  would  yourself  be  ashamed  to  make,  but  which  in  comic 
representations,  or  even  in  private  life,  you  will  be  very 
well  pleased  to  hear,  and  will  not  hate  as  immoral, — acting 
in  this  just  as  you  acted  in  your  pity?  For  on  such  ac- 
casions  you  give  the  rein  to  that  element,  which,  in  your 
own  case,  you  check  by  reason,  when  it  would  fain  create 
laughter,  because  you  dread  the  reputation  of  a  buffoon; 
and,  having  thus  given  it  strength  and  spirit,  you  have 
often,  in  your  own  conduct,  been  unconsciously  seduced 
into  adopting  the  character  of  a  comic  poet. 

Very  true. 

And  in  the  case  of  love,  and  anger,  and  all  the  mental 
sensations  of  desire,  grief,  and  pleasure,  which,  as  we  hold, 
accompany  all  our  actions,  is  it  not  true  that  poetic  imita- 
tion works  upon  us  similar  effects?  For  it  waters  and 
cherishes  these  emotions,  which  ought  to  wither  with 
drought,  and  constitutes  them  our  rulers,  when  they  ought 
to  be  our  subjects,  if  we  wish  to  become  better  and  happier 
instead  of  worse  and  more  miserable. 

I  cannot  deny  it. 

Then,  Glaucon,  whenever  you  meet  with  eulogists  of 
Homer,  who  tell  you  that  he  has  educated  Greece,  and 
that  he  deserves  to  be  taken  up  and  studied  with  an  eye 
to  the  administration  and  guidance  of  human  affairs,  and  f 
that  a  man  ought  to  regulate  the  tenour  of  his  whole  life 
by  this  poet's  directions,  it  will  be  your  duty  to  greet  them 

*  Perhaps  the  best  correction  of  this  passage  would  be  to 
insert  a  note  of  Interrogation  after  nepl  t*v  yeWew,  end  r*»tor« 
mlffxvvy  inattad  of  aloxinuh 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  387 

affectionately  as  excellent  men  to  the  best  of  their  ability, 
and  to  admit  that  Homer  is  first  and  greatest  among  tragic 
poets;  but  you  must  not  forget,  that,  with  the  single  ex- 
ception of  hymns  to  the  gods  and  panegyrics  on  the  good, 
no  poetry  ought  to  be  admitted  into  a  state.  For  if  you 
determine  to  admit  the  highly-seasoned  muse  of  lyric  or 
epic  poetry,  pleasure  and  pain  will  have  sovereign  power 
in  your  state,  instead  of  law  and  those  principles  which, 
by  the  general  consent  of  all  time,  are  most  conformable 
to  reason. 

That  is  perfectly  true. 

Having  recurred  to  the  subject  of  poetry,  I  continued, 
let  this  defence  serve  to  shew  the  reasonableness  of  our 
former  judgment  in  banishing  from  our  state  a  pursuit 
which  has  the  tendencies  we  have  described:  for,  in  doing 
so,  we  were  yielding  to  reason.  But  that  poetry  may  not 
charge  us  with  being,  to  a  certain  extent,  harsh  and  rough, 
let  us  address  her  and  say,  that  there  is  a  quarrel  of  long 
standing  between  philosophy  and  poetry.    For  those  lines, 


and, 
and, 
and, 


That  yelping  cur,  which  at  its  master  barks,' 

"  Mighty  he  is  in  the  vain  talk  of  fools," 

"  The  lordly  mob  of  god  wise  folks," 

"  Poor  are  those  subtle  thinkers ; " 


and  a  thousand  others,  are  marks  of  an  old  antagonism 
between  the  two.  But  nevertheless  let  us  admit,  that,  if 
the  poetry  whose  end  is  to  please,  and  imitation,  can  give 
any  reasons  to  shew  that  they  ought  to  exist  in  a  well-con- 
stituted state,  we  for  our  part  will  gladly  welcome  them 
home  again.  For  we  are  conscious  of  being  enchanted  by 
such  poetry  ourselves;  though  it  would  be  a  sin  to  betray 
what  seems  to  us  the  cause  of  truth.  Am  I  not  right  in 
supposing  that  you,  my  friend,  are  enchanted  by  poetry, 
especially  when  you  contemplate  it  under  Homer's  guid- 
ance? 


388  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 

Yes,  I  am  powerfully. 

Then  is  it  not  just  that  the  sentence  of  exile  should  re- 
main in  force  against  poetry,  until  she  has  made  her  de- 
fence either  in  lyrical  or  in  some  other  measure  ? 

Certainly  it  is. 

And  I  suppose  we  shall  also  allow  those  of  her  patrols 
who  are  lovers  of  poetry  without  being  poets,  to  advocate 
her  cause  in  prose  by  maintaining  that  poetry  is  not  ODty 
pleasurable,  but  also  profitable  in  its  bearings  upon  govern- 
ments, and  upon  human  life:  and  we  shall  listen  favour- 
ably. For  we  shall  be  gainers,  I  presume,  if  poetry  can  be 
proved  to  be  profitable  as  well  as  pleasurable. 

Undoubtedly  we  shall  be  gainers. 

But  if  not,  why  in  that  case,  my  dear  friend,  we  must 
take  a  lesson  from  those  persons  who,  after  becoming  en- 
amoured of  an  object,  deny  their  passion  at  any  cost,  if 
they  think  it  injurious:  for  though  the  love  of  such  poetry 
which  has  grown  up  in  us  under  the  training  of  our  ad- 
mirable constitutions,  will  make  us  cordially  desirous  that 
it  should  appear  perfectly  excellent  and  true, — still,  so  long 
as  it  is  unable  to  make  good  its  defence  we  shall  protect 
ourselves,  as  we  listen,  by  inwardly  repeating,  like  a  charm, 
the  argument  which  we  have  just  brought  to  a  close,  and 
we  shall  be  on  our  guard  against  falling  anew  into  that 
childish  passion,  which  most  people  acknowledge.  At  any 
rate,  we  have  learned  that  we  must  not  make  a  serious 
pursuit  of  such  poetry,  in  the  belief  that  it  grasps  truth 
and  is  good:  on  the  contrary,  the  listener,  apprehending 
danger  to  the  constitution  within  him,  is  bound  to  be  on 
his  guard  against  it,  and  to  adopt  the  opinion  which  we 
have  expressed  on  the  subject. 

I  thoroughly  agree  with  you. 

Indeed,  my  dear  Glaucon,  the  choice  between  becoming 
a  good  or  a  bad  man  involves  a  great  stake, — yes,  a  greater 
stake  than  people  suppose.  Therefore  it  is  wrong  to  be 
heedless  of  justice  and  the  rest  of  virtue,  under  the  excite- 
ment of  honour,  or  wealth,  or  power,  or  even  of  poetry. 

T  agree  with  you,  he  replied,  at  the  conclusion  of  our 
inquiry ;  and  I  fancy  every  one  else  will  do  the  sarnet 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  389 

And  yet,  I  continued,  we  have  not  discussed  the  prin- 
cipal wages  of  virtue,  and  the  greatest  of  the  prizes  that  are 
held  out  to  it. 

If  there  are  others  greater  than  those  already  mentioned, 
they  must  be  of  extraordinary  magnitude. 

But  how,  I  replied,  can  anything  great  be  compressed 
into  a  brief  space  of  time?  And  the  whole  intervals  be- 
tween childhood  and  old  age  is  brief,  I  conceive,  compared 
to  eternity. 

Rather  describe  it  as  nothing. 

What  then  ?  Do  you  think  that  it  is  the  duty  of  an  im- 
mortal thing  to  trouble  itself  about  this  insignificant  inter- 
val,  and  not  about  eternity  ? 

I  think  it  ought  to  concern  itself  about  eternity:  but 
what  do  you  mean  by  this  ? 

Have  you  not  learned,  I  asked,  that  our  soul  is  immor- 
tal, and  never  dies? 

He  looked  at  me,  and  said  in  amazement, — No,  really, 
I  have  not ;  but  can  you  maintain  this  doctrine  ? 

Yes,  as  I  am  an  honest  man,  I  replied :  and  I  think  you 
could  also.    It  is  quite  easy  to  do  it. 

Not  to  me,  he  said:  at  the  same  time  I  should  be  glad 
to  hear  from  you  what  by  your  account  is  so  easy. 

Be  so  good  as  to  listen. 

Proceed,  by  all  means. 

Do  you  call  one  thing  good,  and  another  evil? 

I  do. 

And  do  we  hold  the  same  opinion  as  to  the  meaning  of 
the  two  terms? 

What  opinion  do  you  hold? 

I  hold  that  the  term  evil  comprises  everything  that  de- 
stroys and  corrupts,  and  the  term  good,  everything  that 
preserves  and  benefits. 

So  do  I. 

Again :  do  you  maintain  that  everything  has  its  evil,  and 
its  good?  Do  you  say,  for  example,  that  the  eyes  are 
liable  to  the  evil  of  ophthalmia,  the  entire  body  to  disease, 
corn  to  mildew,  timber  to  rot,  copper  and  iron  to  rust,  or, 


390  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X, 

in  other  words,  that  almost  everything  is  liable  to  some 
connatural  evil  and  malady? 

I  do. 

And  is  it  not  the  case  that,  whenever  an  object  is  at- 
tacked by  one  of  these  maladies,  it  is  impaired,  and,  in  the 
end,  completely  broken  up  and  destroyed  by  it? 

Doubtless  it  is  so. 

Hence  everything  is  destroyed  by  its  own  connatural 
evil  and  vice;  otherwise,  if  it  be  not  destroyed  by  this, 
there  is  nothing  else  that  can  corrupt  it.  For  that  which 
is  good  will  never  destroy  anything,  nor  yet  that  which  is 
neither  good  nor  evil. 

Of  course  not. 

If  then  we  can  find  among  existing  things  one  which  is 
liable  to  a  particular  evil,  which  can  indeed  mar  it,  but 
cannot  break  it  up  or  destroy  it,  shall  we  not  be  at  once 
certain  that  a  thing  so  constituted  can  never  perish? 

That  would  be  a  reasonable  conclusion. 

Well,  then,  is  not  the  soul  liable  to  a  malady  which  ren- 
ders it  evil? 

Certainly  it  is;  all  those  things  which  we  were  lately 
discussing, — injustice,  intemperance,  cowardice,  and  igno- 
rance,— produce  that  result. 

That  being  the  case,  does  any  one  of  these  things  bring 
about  the  dissolution  and  destruction  of  the  soul?  Turn 
it  over  well  in  your  mind,  that  we  may  not  be  misled  by 
supposing  that,  when  the  crimes  of  the  unjust  and  foolish 
man  are  found  out,  he  is  destroyed  by  his  injustice,  which 
is  a  depraved  state  of  the  soul.  No,  consider  the  case 
thus.  The  depravity  of  the  body,  that  is  to  say,  disease, 
wastes  and  destroys  the  body,  and  reduces  it  to  a  state  in 
which  it  ceases  to  be  a  body ;  and  all  the  things,  which  we 
named  just  now,  are  brought  by  their  own  proper  vice, 
which  corrupts  them  by  its  adhesion  or  indwelling,  to  a 
state  in  which  they  cease  to  exist.    I  am  right,  am  I  not? 

Yes. 

Then  proceed  to  examine  the  soul  on  the  same  method. 
Is  it  true  that,  when  injustice  and  other  vices  reside  in  the 
soul,  they  corrupt  and  wither  it  by  contact  or  indwelling, 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  391 

until  they  have  brought  it  to  death,  and  severed  it  from  the 
body? 

Certainly,  they  do  not  produce  that  effect. 

Well  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  irrational  to  suppose 
that  a  thing  can  be  destroyed  by  the  depravity  of  another 
thing,  though  it  cannot  be  destroyed  by  its  own. 

True,  it  is  irrational. 

Yes  it  is,  Glaucon;  for  you  must  remember  that  we  do 
not  imagine  that  a  body  is  to  be  destroyed  by  the  proper 
depravity  of  its  food,  whatever  that  may  be,  whether  mould- 
iness  or  rottenness  or  anything  else.  But  if  the  depravity 
of  the  food  itself  produces  in  the  body  a  disorder  proper 
to  the  body,  we  shall  assert  that  the  body  has  been  de- 
stroyed by  its  food  remotely,  but  by  its  own  proper  vice,  or 
disease,  immediately:  and  we  shall  always  disclaim  the 
notion  that  the  body  can  be  corrupted  by  the  depravity 
of  its  food,  which  is  a  different  thing  from  the  body, — that 
is  to  say,  the  notion  that  the  body  can  be  corrupted  by  an 
alien  evil,  without  the  introduction  of  its  own  native  evil. 

You  are  perfectly  correct. 

Then  according  to  the  same  reasoning,  I  continued,  un- 
less depravity  of  body  introduces  into  the  soul  depravity 
of  soul,  let  us  never  suppose  that  the  soul  can  be  destroyed 
by  an  alien  evil  without  the  presence  of  its  own  peculiar 
disease;  for  that  would  be  to  suppose  that  one  thing  can 
be  destroyed  by  the  evil  of  another  thing. 

That  is  a  reasonable  statement. 

Well  then,  let  us  either  refute  this  doctrine  and  point  out 
our  mistake,  or  else,  so  long  as  it  remains  unrefuted,  let  us 
never  assert  that  a  fever,  or  any  other  disease,  or  fatal  vio- 
lence, or  even  the  act  of  cutting  up  the  entire  body  into 
the  smallest  possible  pieces,  can  have  any  tendency  to 
destroy  the  soul,  until  it  has  been  demonstrated,  that,  in 
consequence  of  this  treatment  of  the  body,  the  soul  itself 
becomes  more  unjust  and  more  unholy.  For,  so  long  as 
a  thing  is  exempt  from  its  own  proper  evil,  while  an  evil 
foreign  to  it  appears  in  another  subject,  let  us  not  allow  it 
to  be  said  that  this  thing,  whether  it  be  a  soul  or  anything 
else,  is  in  danger  of  being  destroyed. 


592  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X 

Well,  certainly  no  one  will  ever  prove  that  the  souls  of 
the  dying  become  more  unjust  in  consequence  of  death. 

But  in  case  any  one  should  venture  to  encounter  the 
argument,  and  to  assert  that  the  dying  man  becomes  more 
depraved  and  unjust,  in  order  to  save  himself  from  being 
compelled  to  admit  that  the  soul  is  immortal,  I  suppose 
we  shall  infer  that,  if  the  objector  is  right,  injustice  is  as 
fatal  as  a  disease  to  its  possessor ;  and  we  shall  expect  those 
who  catch  this  essentially  deadly  disorder  to  die  by  its 
agency,  quickly  or  slowty,  according  to  the  violence  of  the 
attack ;  instead  of  finding,  as  we  do  at  present,  that  the  un- 
just are  put  to  death  in  consequence  of  their  injustice,*  by 
the  agency  of  other  people  who  punish  them  for  their 
crimes. 

Then  really,  said  he,  injustice  cannot  be  thought  such  a 
very  dreadful  thing,  if  it  is  to  be  fatal  to  its  owner ;  because 
in  that  case  it  will  be  a  release  from  evils.  But  I  am  in- 
clined to  think  that,  on  the  contrary,  we  shall  find  that  it 
kills  other  people  if  it  can,  while  it  endows  its  possessor 
with  peculiar  vitality,  and  with  sleeplessness  as  well  as 
vitality.  So  widely  and  permanently  is  it  removed,  to  all 
appearance,  from  any  tendency  to  destroy  its  owner. 

You  say  well,  I  replied.  For  surely  when  the  soul  can- 
not be  killed  and  destroyed  by  its  own  depravity  and  its 
own  evil,  hardly  will  the  evil,  which  is  charged  with  the 
destruction  of  another  thing,  destroy  a  soul  or  anything 
else,  beyond  its  own  appropriate  object. 

Yes,  hardly;  at  least  that  is  the  natural  inference. 

Hence,  as  it  is  destroyed  by  no  evil  at  all,  whether 
foreign  to  it  or  its  own,  it  is  clear  that  the  soul  must  be 
always  existing,  and  therefore  immortal. 

It  must. 

Well  then,  I  continued,  let  us  consider  this  proved.  And, 
if  so,  you  understand  that  the  souls  that  exist  must  be 
always  the  same.  For,  if  none  be  destroyed,  they  cannot 
become  fewer.  Nor  yet  can  they  become  more  numerous ; 
because  if  any  class  of  things  immortal  became  more 
*  Reading  tqvtq  instead  of  rovrov, 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  393 

numerous,  you  know  that  something  mortal  must  have 
contributed  to  swell  its  numbers;  in  which  case,  every- 
thing would  finally  be  immortal. 

True. 

But  reason  will  forbid  our  entertaining  this  opinion, 
which  we  must  therefore  disavow.  On  the  other  hand, 
do  not  let  us  imagine  that  the  soul  in  its  essential  nature, 
and  viewed  by  itself,  can  possibly  be  fraught  with  abun- 
dance of  variety,  unlikeness,  and  disagreement. 

What  do  you  mean? 

A  thing  cannot  easily  be  eternal,  as  we  have  just  proved 
the  soul  to  be,  if  it  is  compounded  of  many  parts,  and  if 
the  mode  jf  composition  employed  is  not  the  very  best. 

Probably  it  cannot. 

Now  the  immortality  of  the  soul  has  been  established 
beyond  the  reach  of  doubt  by  our  recent  argument,  to 
which  other  demonstrations  might  be  added:  but  to  un- 
derstand its  real  nature,  we  must  look  at  it,  not,  as  we  are 
now  doing,  after  it  has  been  marred  by  its  association  with 
the  body,  and  by  other  evils;  but  we  must  carefully  con- 
template it  by  the  aid  of  reasoning,  when  it  appears  in 
unsullied  purity;  and  then  its  surpassing  beauty  will  be 
discovered,  and  the  nature  of  justice  and  injustice,  along 
with  all  the  questions  which  we  have  now  discussed,  will 
be  far  more  clearly  discerned.  As  it  is,  we  have  given  a 
true  account  of  the  soul  in  its  present  appearance.  But 
we  have  looked  at  it  in  a  state  like  that  of  the  sea-god 
Glaucus;  whose  original  nature  can  no  longer  be  readily 
discerned  by  the  eye,  because  the  old  members  of  his  body 
have  been  either  broken  off,  or  crushed  and  in  every  way 
marred  by  the  action  of  the  waves,  and  because  extraneous 
substances,  like  shellfish  and  seaweed  and  stones,  have 
grown  to  him,  so  that  he  bears  a  closer  resemblance  to 
any  wild  beast  whatever  than  to  his  natural  self.  The 
soul,  as  we  are  contemplating  it,  has  been  reduced  to  a 
similar  state  by  a  thousand  evils.  But  we  ought  to  fix  our 
attention  on  one  part  of  it  exclusively,  Glaucon.   ' 

On  what  part? 

On  its  love  of  wisdom,  that  we  may  learn  to  what  it 


394  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 

clings,  and  with  what  it  desires  to  have  intercourse,  in 
virtue  of  its  close  connexion  with  the  divine,  the  immortal, 
and  the  eternal;  and  what  it  would  become  if  it  invariably 
pursued  the  divine,  and  were,  by  the  impulse  thence  de- 
rived, lifted  out  of  the  sea  in  which  it  now  is,  and  dis- 
encumbered of  the  stones  and  shellfish  and  that  uncouth 
multitude  of  earthy  and  rocky  substances,  with  which, 
because  earth  has  been  its  food,  it  is  now  overgrown  in 
consequence  of  those  banquetings  which  are  called  felici- 
tous. And  then  we  should  see  whether  it  is  essentially 
multiform  or  uniform,  or  otherwise  constituted,  and  how. 
But  at  present  we  have,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  discussed 
pretty  thoroughly  its  affections  and  manifestations  in 
human  life. 

Yes,  undoubtedly  we  have. 

And  have  we  not,  I  continued,  divested  ourselves  of  all 
secondary  considerations  in  the  course  of  the  argument; 
and,  without  introducing  the  rewards  and  the  reputation 
which  justice  confers,  as  you  said  that  Homer  and  Hesiod 
do,  have  we  not  found  that  justice,  taken  by  itself,  is  best 
for  the  soul,  also  taken  by  itself,  and  that  the  soul  is  bound 
to  practise  just  actions,  whether  it  possess  the  ring  of 
Gyges,  and,  in  addition  to  this  ring,  the  helmet  of  Hades, 
or  not? 

It  is  most  true  that  we  have  done  so. 

Then  may  we  now,  Glaucon,  proceed  without  offence 
to  take  into  account  those  great  and  abundant  rewards, 
which  justice,  along  with  the  rest  of  virtue,  wins  to  the 
soul  from  gods  and  men,  not  only  during  a  man's  lifetime, 
but  also  after  his  death? 

Yes,  he  replied,  undoubtedly  we  may. 

Will  you  repay  me  what  you  borrowed  in  the  course  of 
the  argument  ? 

Pray  what  did  I  borrow? 

I  granted  to  you  that  the  just  man  should  have  the 
reputation  of  being  unjust,  and  the  unjust  man  the  reputa- 
tion of  being  just.  For  you  were  of  opinion,  that,  even  if 
it  were  impossible  that  the  true  state  of  the  case  should  be 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  395 

concealed  both  from  men  and  gods,  still  this  ought  to  be 
granted  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  in  order  that  pure 
justice,  might  be  weighed  against  pure  injustice.  You 
remember,  do  you  not? 

Indeed,  I  should  be  in  fault  if  I  did  not. 

But,  now  that  judgment  has  been  passed  upon  them,  I, 
in  my  turn,  demand  in  behalf  of  justice,  that  we  should 
admit  the  estimation,  in  which  she  is  held,  to  be  what  it 
really  is,  both  among  gods  and  among  men ;  in  order  that 
she  may  receive  the  prizes  of  victory,  which  she  earns  by 
her  outward  appearance  and  bestows  upon  those  who  pos- 
sess her,  now  that  it  has  been  proved  that  the  blessings 
derived  from  really  being  just  are  given  by  her,  without 
any  deception,  to  those  who  truly  receive  her. 

Your  demand  is  a  just  one. 

Then  will  you  not  first  restore  to  me  this  admission, 
that  the  gods  at  least  are  not  mistaken  as  to  the  real 
character  of  the  just  and  the  unjust  man? 

We  will. 

That  being  the  case,  the  one  will  be  dear  to  the  gods, 
and  the  other  hateful  in  their  sight,  as  we  also  agreed 
originally. 

True. 

And  shall  we  not  agree  tnat  all  things  which  come  from 
the  gods,  come  in  the  best  possible  shape  to  the  man  whom 
they  love,  unless  some  past  sin  has  already  doomed  him  to 
a  certain  amount  of  suffering? 

Certainly  they  do. 

Hence,  in  the  case  of  the  just  man,  we  must  assume  that, 
whether  poverty  be  his  lot,  or  sickness,  or  any  other  re- 
puted evil,  all  will  work  for  his  final  advantage,  either  in 
this  life,  or  in  the  next.  For,  unquestionably,  the  gods 
can  never  neglect  a  man  who  determines  to  strive  earnestly 
to  become  just,  and  by  the  practice  of  virtue  to  grow  as 
much  like  God  as  man  is  permitted  to  do. 

No,  such  a  man  is  not  likely  to  be  neglected  by  one 
whom  he  resembles. 

But,  in  the  case  of  the  unjust  man,  must  we  not  entertain 
the  opposite  opinion? 


396  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X 

Certainly  we  must. 

Then  these  will  be  the  prizes  bestowed  by  the  gods  upon 
the  just  man. 

So  it  seems  to  me,  at  all  events. 

But  what,  I  continued,  do  men  bestow  on  him?  Does 
not  the  case  stand  thus,  if  we  are  to  set  down  the  truth? 
Do  not  those  clever  unjust  men  behave  like  runners  who 
run  well  from  the  starting-place  to  the  turning  post,  but 
flag  from  thence  to  the  goal?  They  start  off  briskly,  but 
end  by  making  themselves  ridiculous,  and  sink  away  crest- 
fallen and  uncrowned.  But  the  really  good  runners  receive 
the  prize  at  the  end  of  the  course,  and  are  crowned.  Is 
not  this  also  generally  the  case  with  the  just?  Towards 
the  close  of  every  action,  every  social  relation,  and  life 
itself,  do  they  not  gain  a  good  name,  and  win  the  prizes 
from  the  hands  of  their  fellow-men. 

Certainly  they  do. 

Then  will  you  suffer  me  to  say  of  them  what  you  said 
of  the  unjust  ?  For  I  shall  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  the 
just,  when  they  are  advanced  in  years,  hold  office,  if  they 
like,  in  their  own  city,  and  marry  into  what  families  they 
please,  and  wed  their  daughters  to  whomsoever  they  choose. 
In  a  word,  I  now  say  of  the  just  all  that  you  said  of  the 
unjust.  On  the  other  hand,  I  likewise  affirm  of  the  unjust, 
that  the  greater  part  of  them,  even  if  they  escape  detection 
in  their  youth,  are  found  out  and  turned  into  ridicule  at 
the  end  of  their  course;  and  that,  as  they  grow  old,  they 
are  insulted  in  their  misery  by  strangers  as  well  as  by  their 
fellow-citizens,  and  forced  to  submit  to  the  scourge  and 
finally  to  the  rack  and  the  heated  iron,  which  you  rightly 
described  as  barbarous  treatment.  Imagine  yourself  to 
have  been  told  by  me  that  they  undergo  all  those  inflic- 
tions. And  now,  as  I  said,  consider  whether  you  will 
suffer  me  to  speak  in  this  way. 

Undoubtedly  I  shall,  he  replied;  for  your  statement  is 
just. 

Such  then,  I  continued,  will  be  the  prizes,  the  rewards, 
and  the  gifts,  which  are  bestowed  on  the  just  man,  in  hi3 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  397 

lifetime,  by  gods  and  by  men,  in  addition  to  those  good 
things  which  justice  of  itself  placed  in  his  possession. 

Yes,  he  replied,  and  they  are  very  magnificent,  as  well 
as  very  certain. 

These,  however,  are  nothing,  in  number  or  in  magni- 
tude, compared  with  the  lot  that  awaits  the  just  and  the 
unjust  after  death.  And  this  must  be  described,  in  order 
that  we  may  award  to  each  the  complement  of  recompence, 
which  the  argument  is  bound  to  set  forth. 

Speak  on ;  there  are  few  things  that  I  would  more  gladly 
hear. 

Well,  I  will  tell  you  a  tale,  not  like  that  of  Odysseus  to 
Alcinous,*  but  of  what  once  happened  to  a  brave  man,  Er 
the  son  of  Armenius,  a  native  of  Pamphylia,  who,  accord- 
ing to  story,  was  killed  in  battle.  When  the  bodies  of  the 
slain  were  taken  up  ten  days  afterwards  for  burial  in  a 
state  of  decomposition,  Er's  body  was  found  to  be  still 
fresh.  He  was  carried  home,  and  was  on  the  point  of 
being  interred,  when,  on  the  twelfth  day  after  his  death,  as 
he  lay  on  the  funeral-pyre,  he  came  to  life  again,  and  then 
proceeded  to  describe  what  he  had  seen  in  the  other  world. 
His  story  was,  that  when  the  soul  had  gone  out  of  him,  it 
travelled  in  company  with  many  others,  till  they  came  to 
a  mysterious  place,  in  which  were  two  gaps,  adjoining  one 
another,  in  the  earth,  and  exactly  opposite  them  two  gaps 
above  in  the  heaven.  Between  these  gaps  sate  judges, 
who,  after  passing  sentence,  commanded  the  just  to  take 
the  road  to  the  right  upwards  through  the  heaven,  and  fast- 
ened in  front  of  them  some  symbol  of  the  judgment  that 
had  been  given ;  while  the  unjust  were  ordered  to  take  the 
road  downwards  to  the  left,  and  also  carried  behind  them 
evidence  of  all  their  evil  deeds.  When  he  came  to  the 
place  himself,  he  was  told  that  he  would  have  to  carry  to 
men  a  report  of  the  proceedings  of  that  other  world;  and 
he  was  admonished  to  listen,  and  watch  everything  that 
went  on  there.  So  he  looked,  and  beheld  the  souls  on  one 
side  taking  their  departure  at  one  of  the  gaps  in  the  heaven 
and  the  corresponding  gap  in  the  earth,  after  judgment 

*  That  is,  according  to  the  commentators,  not  a  long  story. 


398  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X 

had  been  passed  upon  them,-  while  at  the  two  other  gaps 
he  saw  them  arriving,  squalid  and  dusty,  or  pure  and 
bright,  according  as  they  ascended  from  earth,  or  descended 
from  heaven.  Each  soul,  as  it  arrived,  wore  a  travel- 
stained  appearance,  and  gladly  went  away  into  the  meadow 
and  there  took  up  quarters,  as  people  do  when  some  great 
festival  is  pending.  Greetings  passed  between  all  that 
were  known  to  one  another;  and  those  who  had  descended 
from  heaven  were  questioned  about  heaven  by  those  who 
had  risen  out  of  the  earth;  while  the  latter  were  ques- 
tioned by  the  former  about  earth.  Those  who  were  come 
from  earth  told  their  tale  with  lamentations  and  tears, 
as  they  bethought  them  of  all  the  dreadful  things  that 
they  had  seen  and  suffered  in  their  subterranean  journey, 
which  they  said  had  lasted  a  thousand  years;  while 
those  who  were  come  from  heaven  described  enjoyments 
and  sights  of  marvellous  beauty.  It  would  take  a  long 
time,  Glaucon,  to  repeat  at  length  the  many  particulars  of 
their  stories:  but,  according  to  Er,  the  main  points  were 
the  following.  For  every  one  of  all  the  crimes,  and  all  the 
personal  injuries,  committed  by  them,  they  suffered  ten- 
fold retribution  when  the  turn  for  it  came.  The  cycle  of 
punishment  recommenced  every  century,  because  the  length 
of  human  life  was  estimated  at  a  hundred  years, — -the 
object  being  to  make  them  pay  the  penalty  for  each  offence 
ten  times  over.  Thus,  all  who  had  been  guilty  of  a  num- 
ber of  murders,  or  had  betrayed  and  enslaved  cities  and 
armies,  or  had  been  accomplices  in  any  other  villainy,  were 
intended  to  undergo  tenfold  sufferings  for  all  and  each  of 
their  offences;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  those  who  had 
done  any  charitable  acts,  and  had  shewn  themselves  just 
and  holy,  were  meant  to  receive  on  the  same  principle  their 
due  reward.  With  regard  to  those  whose  death  followed 
close  upon  their  birth,  he  gave  some  particulars  which 
need  not  be  recorded.  But,  according  to  his  narrative,  the 
punishment  for  impiety,  disobedience  to  parents,  and  the 
murder  of  near  relations,*  was  unusually  severe;  and  the 

*  Reading  avrdxnpog,  a  conjecture  of  Ast,  instead  of  avToxetpa$, 
Perhaps  dg  ought  to  be  inserted  before  yoviaq% 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  399 

reward  for  piety  and  obedience  unusually  great.  For  he 
was  within  hearing,  he  said,  when  one  of  the  spirits  asked 
another  where  Ardiaeus  the  Great  was.  Now  this  Ardiaeus 
had  been  sovereign  in  a  city  of  Pamphylia,  a  thousand 
years  before  that  time,  and  was  said  to  have  put  his  aged 
father  and  elder  brother  to  death,  besides  committing  a 
number  of  other  wicked  actions.  The  spirit  to  whom  the 
question  was  addressed,  replied,  "  He  is  not  come,  aud  is 
not  likely  to  come  hither.  For  this,  you  must  know,  was 
one  of  the  terrible  sights  that  we  beheld.  When  we  were 
close  to  the  aperture,  and  were  on  the  point  of  ascending, 
after  having  undergone  all  our  other  sufferings,  we  sud- 
denly came  in  sight  of  Ardiaeus  and  others,  of  whom  the 
greater  part,  I  think  I  may  say,  had  been  despots ;  though  it 
is  true  there  were  also  a  few  private  persons,  who  had  once 
been  reckoned  among  enormous  criminals.  These  people, 
when  they  thought  themselves  sure  of  ascending  immedi- 
ately, were  repulsed  by  the  aperture,  which  bellowed  when- 
ever one  of  these  incurable  sinners,  or  anybody  who  had 
not  fully  expiated  his  offences,  attempted  to  ascend. 
Thereupon  certain  fierce  and  fiery-looking  men,  who  were 
in  attendance  and  understood  the  meaning  of  the  sound, 
seized  some  of  them  by  the  waist  and  carried  them  off; 
but  Ardiaeus  and  others  were  bound,  hand  and  foot  and 
head,  and  thrown  down,  and  flayed  with  scourges,  and 
dragged  out  by  the  wayside,  and  carded,  like  wool,  upon 
thorn-bushes;  and  those  who  were  passing  by  at  the  time 
were  informed  why  they  were  put  to  this  torture,  and  that 
they  were  being  carried  away  in  order  to  be  flung  into 
Tartarus.  We  had  already  gone  through  a  gre&t  variety 
of  alarms,  but  none  of  them  were  equal  to  the  terror  that 
then  seized  us,  lest  that  should  be  uttered  when  any 
of  us  tried  to  go  up ;  and  most  glad  we  all  were  to  ascend, 
when  it  was  not  heard."  This  will  convey  an  idea  of  the 
penalties  and  the  tortures;  while  the  rewards  were  pre- 
cisely the  opposite.  When  seven  days  had  elapsed  since 
the  arrival  of  the  spirits  in  the  meadow,  they  were  com- 
pelled to  leave  the  place,  when  their  time  came,  and  set  out 
on  the  eighth  day,  and  travel  three  days,  till  they  arrived 


400  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 

on  the  fourth  at  a  place,  from  whence  they  looked  down 
upon  a  straight  pillar  of  light,  stretching  across  the  whole 
heaven  and  earth,  more  like  the  rainbow  than  anything 
else,  only  brighter  and  clearer.  This  they  reached,  when 
they  had  gone  forward  a  day's  journey;  and,  arriving  at 
the  centre  of  the  light,  they  saw  that  its  extremities  were 
fastened  by  chains  to  the  sky.  For  this  light  binds  the 
sky  together,  like  the  hawser  that  strengthens  a  trireme,* 
and  thus  holds  together  the  whole  revolving  universe.  To 
the  extremities  is  fastened  the  distaff  of  Necessity,  by 
means  of  which  all  the  revolutions  of  the  universe  are  kept 
up.    The  shaft  and  hook  of  this  distaff  are  made  of  steel ; 

*  olov  rd  vTvo^iifiara  tuv  rpifjpuv.  We  must  remember  that,  in 
Greek  astronomy,  the  sky  was  regarded  as  a  solid  transparent 
vault  in  which  the  stars  were  fixed.  The  sides  of  this  vault,  ac- 
cording to  the  account  in  the  text,  are  held  together  by  a  straight, 
horizontal  belt  of  light,  "the  ends  of  whose  chains  are  fastened 
to  the  sky,"  that  is  to  say,  "  whose  ends  are  chained  to  the  sky." 
But  what  is  the  meaning  of  o'iov  ra  inzoi^upxira  ruv  rpif/puv  ?  Some 
commentators  take  ra  viroS-upara  to  mean  the  rowers '  benches, 
which  would  of  course  help  to  hold  the  sides  of  a  vessel  together. 
But  there  is  not  sufficient  authority  for  this  interpretation.  On 
the  other  hand,  how  can  "  a  straight  pillar  of  light  "  be  compared 
to  a  rope  passed  round  the  hull  of  a  ship  in  order  to  hold  its  tim- 
bers together, — which  is  another  interpretation  of  vird^ufia  ?  If 
this  interpretation  be  correct,  the  point  of  comparison  is  not  the 
appearance  presented,  but  only  the  effects  produced  by  this  pro- 
cess of  "  undergirding  "  or  "  f rapping."  At  any  rate,  it  seems 
certain,  from  a  passage  in  the  Laws  (945.  C),  that  the  word 
vKo(,6fiaTa  means  some  kind  of  rope  ;  and  perhaps  Schneider  is 
right  in  explaining  it  as  a  large  rope,  or  hawser,  passed  from 
stem  to  stern  in 'order  to  strengthen  a  vessel.  Still  this  is  not 
satisfactory,  though  we  are  unable  to  propose  any  better  explan- 
ation. 

In  what  follows,  a  rough  description  of  the  first  observed  phe- 
nomena of  astronomy  is  conveyed.  The  motion  of  the  whole 
distaff  represents  the  apparent  diurnal  revolution  of  the  heaven 
round  the  earth  as  centre  of  the  system.  The  seven  innermost 
whorls,  with  their  independent  motions,  represent  respectively 
the  orbits  of  Saturn,  Jupiter,  Mars,  Venus,  Mercury,  the  Sun, 
and  the  Moon.  The  outermost  whorl  with  its  "  variety  of 
colours,"  represents  the  fixed  stars. 

By  the  "  straight  pillar  of  light  "  Schleiermacher  understands 
the  Milky  Way,  Schneider,  the  axis  of  the  world.  Both  explan- 
ations are  unsatisfactory.  Probably  it  refers  to  some  old  Pytha- 
gorean theory  about  the  primitive  light.  See  Schneider's*  note 
on  the  passage,  in  his  translation  of  the  Republic. 


Book  X.J  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  401 

the  whorl  is  a  compound  of  steel  and  other  materials. 
The  natural  of  the  whorl  may  be  thus  described.  In  shape 
it  is  like  an  ordinary  whorl;  but  from  Er's  account  we 
must  picture  it  to  ourselves  under  the  form  of  a  large  hol- 
low whorl,  scooped  out  right  through,  into  which  a  similar, 
but  smaller,  whorl  is  nicely  inserted,  like  those  boxes 
which  fit  into  one  another.  In  the  same  way  a  third  whorl 
is  inserted  within  the  second,  a  fourth  within  the  third,  and 
so  on  to  four  more.  For  in  all,  there  are  eight  whorls,  in- 
serted into  one  another, — each  concentric  circle  shewing 
its  rim  above  the  next  outer,  and  all  together  forming  one 
solid  whorl  embracing  the  shaft,  which  is  passed  right 
through  the  centre  of  the  eighth.  The  first  and  outermost 
whorl  has  the  broadest  rim;  the  sixth  has  the  next  broad, 
est;  then  comes  the  fourth;  then  the  eighth;  then  the 
seventh ;  then  the  fifth ;  then  the  third ;  and  the  second  has 
the  narrowest  rim.  The  rim  of  the  greatest  whorl  exhibits 
a  variety  of  colours ;  that  of  the  seventh  is  most  brilliant ; 
that  of  the  eighth  derives  its  colour  from  the  reflected  light 
of  the  seventh ;  that  of  the  second  and  that  of  the  fifth  are 
similar,  but  of  a  deeper  colour  than  the  others;  the  third 
has  the  palest  colour;  the  fourth  is  rather  red;  and  the 
sixth  is  almost  as  pale  as  the  third.  Now  the  distaff  as  a 
whole  spins  round  with  uniform  velocity;  but  while  the 
whole  revolves,  the  seven  inner  circles  travel  slowly  round 
in  the  opposite  direction;  and  of  them  the  eighth  moves 
quickest,  and  after  it  the  seventh,  sixth  and  fifth,  which 
revolve  together :  the  fourth,  as  it  appeared  to  them,  com- 
pletes its  revolution  with  a  velocity  inferior  to  the  last- 
mentioned;  the  third  ranks  fourth  in  speed;  and  the 
second,  fifth.  The  distaff  spins  round  upon  the  knees  of 
Necessity.  Upon  each  of  its  circles  stands  a  siren,  who 
travels  round  with  the  circle,  uttering  one  note  in  one  tone; 
And  from  all  the  eight  notes  there  results  a  single  harmony. 
At  equal  distances  around  sit  three  other  personages,  each 
on  a  throne.  These  are  the  daughters  of  Necessity,  the 
Fates,  Lachesis,  Clotho,  and  Atropos;  who,  clothed  in 
white  robes,  with  garlands  on  their  heads,  chant  to  the 
music  of  the  sirens,  Lachesis  the  events  of  the  past,  Clotho 
26  -» 


£02  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X 

those  of  the  present,  Atropos  those  of  the  future.  Clotho 
with  her  right  hand  takes  hold  of  the  outermost  rim  of  the 
distaff,  and  twirls  it  altogether,  at  intervals;  and  Atropos 
with  her  left  hand  twirls  the  inner  circles  in  like  manner ; 
while  Lachesis  takes  hold  of  each  in  turn  with  either  hand. 
Now  the  souls,  immediately  on  their  arrival,  were  required 
to  go  to  Lachesis.  An  interpreter  first  of  "all  marshalled 
them  in  order,  and  then  having  taken  from  the  lap  of 
Lachesis  a  number  of  lots  and  plans  of  life,  mounted  a 
high  pulpit,  and  spoke  as  follows :  "  Thus  saith  the  maiden 
Lachesis,  the  daughter  of  Necessity.  Ye  short-lived  souls, 
a  new  generation  of  men  shall  here  begin  the  cycle  of  its 
mortal  existence.  Your  destiny  shall  not  be  allotted  to 
you,  but  you  shall  choose  it  for  yourselves.  Let  him  who 
draws  the  first  lot  be  the  first  to  choose  a  life,  which  shall 
be  his  irrevocably.  Virtue  owns  no  master :  he  who  hon- 
ours her  shall  have  more  of  her,  and  he  who  slights  her, 
less.  The  responsibility  lies  with  the  chooser.  Heaven 
is  guiltless."  Having  said  this,  he  threw  the  lots  down 
upon  the  crowd ;  and  each  spirit  took  up  the  one  which  fell 
by  his  side,  except  Er  himself,  who  was  forbidden  to  do  so. 
Each,  as  he  took  up  his  lot,  saw  what  number  he  had 
drawn.  This  done,  the  plans  of  life,  which  far  outnum- 
bered the  souls  that  were  present,  were  laid  before  them  on 
the  ground.  They  were  of  every  kind.  There  were  lives 
of  all  living  things,  and  among  them  every  sort  of 
human  life.  They  included  sovereignties,  of  which  some 
were  permanent,  and  others  were  abruptly  terminated  p,nd 
ended  in  poverty  and  exile  and  beggary.  There  were  also 
lives  of  famous  men,  renowned  either  for  beauty  of  person 
and  feature,  for  bodily  strength  and  skill  in  games,  or  else 
for  high  birth  and  the  merits  of  ancestors;  and  in  the 
same  way  there  were  lives  of  undistinguished  men,  and  like- 
wise lives  of  celebrated  and  uncelebrated  women.  But  no 
settled  character  of  soul  was  included  in  them,  because 
with  the  change  of  life,  the  soul  inevitably  becomes  changed 
itself.  But  in  every  other  respect  the  materials  were  very 
variously  combined, — wealth  appearing  here,  and  poverty 
there ;  disease  here,  and  health  there ;  and  here  again  a 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.        *         403 

mean  between  these  extremes.  This,  my  dear  Giaucon, 
is  apparently  the  moment  when  everything  is  at  stake 
with  a  man ;  and  for  this  reason,  above  all  others,  it  is  the 
duty  of  each  of  us  diligently  to  investigate  and  study,  to 
the  neglect  of  every  other  subject,  that  science  which  may 
haply  enable  a  man  to  learn  and  discover,  who  will  render 
him  so  instructed,  as  to  be  able  to  discriminate  between  a 
good  and  an  evil  life,  and  according  to  his  means  to  choose, 
always  and  everywhere,  that  better  life,  by  carefully  calcu- 
lating the  influence  which  the  things  just  mentioned,  in 
combination  or  in  separation,  have  upon  real  excellence  of 
life;  and  who  will  teach  him  to  understand  what  evil  or 
good  is  wrought  by  beauty  tempered  with  poverty  or 
wealth,  and  how  the  result  is  affected  by  the  state  of  soul 
which  enters  into  the  combination;  and  what  is  the  conse- 
quence of  blending  together  such  ingredients  as  high  or 
humble  birth,  private  or  public  life,  bodily  strength  or 
weakness,  readiness  or  slowness  of  apprehension,  and  every- 
thing else  of  the  kind,  whether  naturally  belonging  to  the 
soul  or  accidentally  acquired  by  it; — so  as  to  be  able  to 
fox'm  a  judgment  from  all  these  data  combined,  and,  with 
an  eye  steadily  fixed  on  the  nature  of  the  soul,  to  choose  be- 
tween the  good  and  the  evil  life,  giving  the  name  of  evil  to 
the  life  which  will  draw  the  soul  into  becoming  more 
unjust,  and  the  name  of  good  to  the  life  which  will  lead 
it  to  become  more  just,  and  bidding  farewell  to  every  other 
consideration.  For  we  have  seen  that  in- life  and  in  death 
it  is  best  to  choose  thus.  With  iron  resolution  must  he  hold 
fast  this  opinion  when  he  enters  the  future  world,  in  order 
^hat,  there  as  well  as  here,  he  may  escape  being  dazzled  by 
wealth  and  similar  evils;  and  may  not  plunge  into  usurpa- 
tions or  other  corresponding  courses  of  action,  to  the 
inevitable  detriment  of  others,  and  to  his  own  still  heavier 
affliction;  but  may  know  how  to  select  that  life  which 
always  steers  a  middle  course  between  such  extremes,  and 
to  shun  excess  on  either  side  to  the  best  of  his  power,  not 
only  in  this  life,  but  also  in  that  which  is  to  come.  For,  by 
acting  thus,  he  is  sure  to  become  a  most  hapny  Trt&p. 
To  return;  the  messenger  from  the  other  world  reported 


404  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 

that  on  the  same  occasion  the  Interpreter  spoke  to  this 
effect :  "  Even  the  last  comer,  if  he  chooses  with  discretion 
and  lives  strenuously,  will  find  in  store  for  him  a  life  that 
is  anything  but  bad,  with  which  he  may  well  be  content. 
Let  not  the  first  choose  carelessly,  or  the  last  despond." 
As  soon  as  he  had  said  these  words,  the  one  who  had 
drawn  the  first  lot  advanced,  and  chose  the  most  absolute 
despotism  he  could  find;  but  so  thoughtless  was  he,  and 
greedy,  that  he  had  not  carefully  examined  every  poirt 
before  making  his  choice ;  so  that  he  failed  to  remark  that 
he  was  fated  therein,  amongst  other  calamities,  to  devour 
his  own  children.  Therefore,  when  he  had  studied  it  at 
his  leisure,  he  began  to  beat  his  breast  and  bewail  his 
choice;  and,  disregarding  the  previous  admonitions  of  the 
Interpreter,  he  laid  the  blame  of  his  misfortune  not  upon 
himself,  but  upon  Fortune  and  Destiny,  and  upon  any 
body  sooner  than  himself.  He  was  one  of  those  who  had 
come  from  heaven,  and  had  lived  during  his  former  life 
under  a  well-ordered  constitution,  and  hence  a  measure  of 
virtue  had  fallen  to  his  share  through  the  influence  of 
habit,  unaided  by  philosophy.  Indeed,  according  to  Er's 
account,  more  than  half  the  persons  similarly  deluded, 
had  come  from  heaven;  which  is  to  be  explained  by  the 
fact  of  their  never  having  felt  the  discipline  of  trouble. 
For  the  majority  of  those  who  came  from  the  earth  did 
not  make  their  choice  in  this  careless  manner,  because 
they  had  known  affliction  themselves,  and  had  seen  it  in 
others.  On  this  account,  and  also  through  the  chances  of 
the  lot,  most  of  the  souls  exchanged  an  evil  destiny  for  a 
good,  or  a  good  destiny  for  an  evil.  But  if  a  man  were 
always  to  study  wisdom  soundly,  whenever  he  entered 
upon  his  career  on  earth,  and  if  it  fell  to  his  lot  to  choose 
anywhere  but  among  the  very  last,  there  is  every  prob- 
ability, to  judge  by  the  account  brought  from  the  other 
world,  that  he  would  not  only  be  happy  while  on  earth, 
but  also  that  he  would  travel  from  this  world  to  the  other 
and  back  again,  not  along  a  rough  and  subterranean,  but 
nlong  a  smooth  and  heavenly  road.  It  was  a  truly  won- 
derful Sight,  he  said,  to  watch  how  each  soul  selected  its 


Book  X.]  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  405 

life, — a  sight,  at  once  melancholy,  and  ludicrous,  and 
jtrange.  The  experience  of  their  former  life  generally 
guided  the  choice.  Thus  he  saw  the  soul,  which  had  once 
been  that  of  Orpheus,  choosing  the  life  of  a  swan,  because 
from  having  been  put  to  death  by  women,  he  detested 
the  whole  race  so  much,  that  he  would  not  consent  to  be 
conceived  and  born  of  a  woman.  And  he  saw  the  soul  of 
Thamyras  choosing  the  life  of  a  nightingale.  He  saw  also 
%  swan  changing  its  nature,  and  selecting  the  life  of  a 
man;  and  its  example  was  followed  by  other  musical 
animals.  The  soul  that  drew  the  twentieth  lot  chose  a 
lion's  life.  It  was  the  soul  of  Ajax  the  son  of  Telamon, 
who  shrunk  from  becoming  a  man,  because  he  recollected 
the  decision  respecting  the  arms  of  Achilles.  He  waa 
followed  by  the  soul  of  Agamemnon,  who  had  been  also 
taught  by  his  sufferings  to  hate  mankind  so  bitterly,  that 
he  adopted  in  exchange  an  eagle's  life.  The  soul  of 
Atalanta,  which  had  drawn  one  of  the  middle  .lots,  be- 
holding the  great  honours  attached  to  the  life  of  an  athlete, 
could  not  resist  the  temptation  to  take  it  up.  Then  he 
saw  the  soul  of  Epeus  the  son  of  Panopeus,  assuming  the 
nature  of  a  skilful  work-woman.  And  in  the  distance, 
among  the  last,  he  saw  the  soul  of  the  buffoon  Thersites 
putting  on  the  exterior  of  an  ape.  It  so  happened  that 
the  soul  of  Odysseus  had  drawn  the  last  lot  of  all.  When 
he  came  up  to  choose,  the  memory  of  his  former  sufferings 
had  so  abated  his  ambition,  that  he  went  about  a  long  time 
looking  for  a  quiet  retired  life,  which  with  great  trouble 
he  discovered  lying  about,  and  thrown  contemptuously 
aside  by  the  others.  As  soon,  as  he  saw  it,  he  chose  it 
gladly,  and  said  that  he  would  have  done  the  same,  if  he 
had  even  drawn  the  first  lot.  In  like  manner  some  of  the 
other  animals  passed  into  men,  and  into  one  another, — 
the  unjust  passing  into  the  wild,  and  the  just  into  the 
tame:  and  every  kind  of  mixture  ensued. 

Xow,  when  all  the  souls  had  chosen  their  lives  in  the 
order  of  the  lots,  they  advanced  in  their  turn  to  Lachesis, 
who  dispatched  with  each  of  them  the  Destiny  he  had 
selected,  to  guard  his  life  and  satisfy  his  choice.     This 


406  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PLATO.  [Book  X. 

Destiny  first  led  the  soul  to  Clotho  in  such  a  way  as  to 
pass  beneath  her  hand  and  the  whirling  motion  of  the 
distaff,  and  thus  ratified  the  fate  which  each  had  chosen 
in  the  order  of  precedence.  After  touching  her,  the  same 
Destiny  led  the  soul  next  to  the  spinning  of  Atropos,  and 
thus  rendered  the  doom  of  Clotho  irreversible.  From 
thence  the  souls  passed  straightforward  under  the  throne 
of  Necessity.  When  the  rest  had  passed  through  it,  Er 
himself  also  passed  through;  and  they  all  travelled  into 
the  plain  of  Forgetfulness,  through  dreadful  suffocating 
heat,  the  ground  being  destitute  of  trees  and  of  all  vege- 
tation. As  the  evening  came  on,  they  took  up  their  quar- 
ters by  the  bank  of  the  river  of  Indifference,  whose  water 
cannot  be  held  in  any  vessel.  All  persons  are  compelled 
to  drink  a  certain  quantity  of  the  water;  but  those  who 
are  not  preserved  by  prudence  drink  more  than  the  quan- 
tity: and  each,  as  he  drinks,  forgets  everything.  When 
they  had  gone  to  rest,  and  it  was  now  midnight,  there  was 
a  clap  of  thunder  and  an  earthquake;  and  in  a  moment 
the  souls  were  carried  up  to  their  birth,  this  way  and  that, 
like  shooting  stars.  Er  himself  was  prevented  from  drink- 
ing any  of  the  water ;  but  how,  and  by  what  road,  he  reached 
his  body,  he  knew  not:  only  he  knew  that  he  suddenly 
opened  his  eyes  at  dawn,  and  fc^vA  himself  laid  out  upon 
the  funeral-pyre.  * 

And  thus,  Glaucon,  the  tale  was  preserved,  and  did  not 
perish ;  and  it  may  also  preserve  us,  if  we  will  listen  to  its 
warnings;  in  which  case  we  shall  pass  prosperously  across 
the  river  of  Lethe,  and  not  defile  our  souls.  Indeed,  if  we 
follow  my  advice,  believing  the  soul  to  be  immortal,  and 
to  possess  the  power  of  entertaining  all  evil,  as  well  as  all 
good,  we  shall  ever  hold  fast  the  upward  road,  and  de- 
votedly cultivate  justice  combined  with  wisdom  ;  in  ordei 
that  we  may  be  loved  by  one  another  and  by  the  gods, 
not  only  during  our  stay  on  earth,  but  also  when,  like 
conquerors  in  the  games  collecting  the  presents  of  their 
admirers,  we  receive  the  prizes  of  virtue;  ano\  in  order 
that  both  in  this  life  and  during  the  journey  of  a  thou- 
sand years  which  we  have  described,  we  m?y  never  cease 
to  prosper. 


POPULAR  LITERATURE  FOR  THE  MASSES, 
COMPRISING  CHOICE  SELECTIONS  FROM  THE 
TREASURES  OF  THE  WORLD'S  KNOWLEDGE, 
ISSUED  IN  A  SUBSTANTIAL  AND  ATTRACTIVE 
CLOTH    BINDING,  AT   A    POPULAR    PRICE 


BURT'S  HOME  LIBRARY  Is  a  series  which 
Includes  the  standard  works  of  the  world's  test  literature, 
bound  in  uniform  cloth  binding,  gilt  tops,  embracing 
chiefly  selections  from  writers  of  the  most  notable 
English,  American  and  Foreign  Fiction,  together  with 
many  important  works  in  the  domains 
of  History,  Biography,  Philosophy, 
Travel,  Poetry  and  the  Essays* 

A  glance  at  the  following  annexed 
list  of  titles  and  authors  will  endorse 
the  claim  that  the  publishers  make 
for  it — that  it  ii  the  most  compre- 
hensive, choice,  interesting,  and  by 
far  the  most  carefully  selected  series 
of  standard  authors  for  world-wide 
reading  that  has  been  produced  by 
any  publishing  house  in  any  country,  and  that  at  prices 
go  cheap,  and  in  a  style  so  substantial  and  pleasing,  as  to 
win  for  it  millions  of  readers  and  the  approval  and 
commendation,  not  only  of  the  book  trade  throughout 
the  American  continent,  but  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
librarians,  clergymen,  educators  and  men  of  letters 
interested  in  the  dissemination  of  instructive,  entertaining 
and  thoroughly  wholesome  reading  matter  for  the  massesl 

[SE8  ffOW,OWING  PAGBS] 


BURT'S  HOME  LIBRARY.     Cloth.     Gilt  Top*.     Price,  SI. 33 


Abbe    Constantir..      By    Halevy. 

Abbot,  The.     By   Sir  Walter   Scott 

Adam   Bede.      By   George   Eliot. 

Addison's  Essays.  By  Joseph  Addison. 

-.Eneid   of   Virgil. 

^Esop's  Fables. 

Alexander,    the    Great,    Life    of.      By 

John    Williams. 
Alfred,     the     Great,     Life     of.     By 

Thomas   Hughes. 
Alhambra,   The.     Washington   Irving. 
Alice   in   Wonderland.    Lewis   Carroll. 
All    Sorts    and    Conditions    of    Men. 

By    Walter    Besant. 
Alton   Locke.     By   Charles,  Kingsley, 
Amiel's  Journal. 
Andersen's  Fairy  Tales. 
Anne  of  Geirstein.     Sir  Walter  Scott. 
Antiquary,    The.      Sir    Walter    Scott. 
Arabian  Nights'  Entertainments. 
Ardath.     By  Marie   Corelli. 
Arnold,  Benedict,  Life  of.  By  George 

Canning    Hill. 
Arnold's    Poems.     Matthew   Arnold. 
Around     the     World     in     the     Yacht 

Sunbeam.  By  Mrs.  Brassey. 
Arundel  Motto.  Mary  Cecil  Hay. 
At  the  Back  of  the  North  Wind.    By 

George   Macdonald. 
Attic   Philosopher.    Emile    Souvestre. 
Autocrat  of  the   Breakfast  Table.  By 

O.    W.    Holmes. 
Bacon's    Essays.      By    Francis    Bacon. 
Barnaby   Rudge.   By  Charles  Dickens. 
Barrack    Room    Ballads.    By    Rudyard 

Kipling. 
Beulah.    By  Augusta  J.  Fvans. 
Black  Beauty.     By  Anna  Sewell. 
Black  Dwarf,  The.   Sir  Walter  Scott. 
Black   Rock.     By   Ralph   Connor. 
Black  Tulip,   The.     By  Alex.  Dumas. 
Bleak   House.        By  Charles   Dickens. 
Blithedale     Romance,     The.     By     Na- 
thaniel Hawthorne. 
Bondsman,  The.     By  Hall   Caine. 
Book  of  Golden  De-ds.  By  Charlotte 

M.   Yonge. 
Boone,  Daniel,  Life  of.    By  Cecil  B. 

Hartley. 
Bride  of  Lammermoor.  By  Sir  Walter 

Scott. 
Browning's    Poems.     (Elizabeth.) 
Browning's  P?ems.     (Robert.) 


Bryant's  Poems.     W.   C.   Bryant. 
Burgomasters'  Wife.     George  Ebers. 
Burns'  Poems.    By  Robert  Burns. 
By  Order  of  the  King.  By  Hugo. 
Byron's   Poems.     By  Lord  Byron. 
Caesar,    Julius,    Life    of.      By    James 

Anthony    Froude. 
Carson,    Kit,    Life    of.      By    Charles 

Burdett. 
Cary's  Poems.  (Alice  and  Phoebe.) 
Cast  Up  by  the  Sea.     Sir  S.  Baker. 
Charles  Auchester.     By  E.  Berger. 
Character.     By   Samuel   Smiles. 
Charlemagne      (Charles     the     Great), 

Life   of.    By   Thomas   Hodgkin. 
Charles  O'Malley.  By  Charles  Lever. 
Chesterfield's     Letters.         By      Lord 

Chesterfield. 
Chevalier  de  Maison  Rouge.     By  Al- 
exander Dumas. 
Children    of   the   Abbey.     By   Regina 

Maria    Roche. 
Chicot  the  Jester.     By  Alex.  Dumas. 
Child's     History     of     England.       By 

Charles   Dickens. 
Christmas   Stories.    Charles   Dickens. 
Cloister  and  the  Hearth.     By  Charles 

Reade. 
Coleridge's   Poems.     By   S.   T.   Cole- 
ridge. 
Columbus,   Christopher,   Life  of.     By 

Washington  Irving. 
Companions    of   Jehu,    The.     Dumas. 
Complete  Angler.   Walton  &  Cotton. 
Conduct   of    Life.    R.    W.    Emerson. 
Confessions  of  an  Opium  Eater.     By 

Thomas  de   Quincey. 
Conquest  of  Granada.     By  Washing- 
ton Irving. 
Conquest    of    Mexico,    Vol.     I.       By 

Wm.  H.  Prescott. 
Conquest    of   Mexico.     VoL    II.      By 

Wm.  H.  Prescott. 
Conquest  of  Peru.     Vol.  I.     By  Wnk 

H.   Prescott. 
Conquest  of  Peru.    Vol.  II.  By  Wm. 

H.  Prescott. 
Conspiracy    of    Pontiac.     By    Francis 

Parkman,   Jr. 
Conspirators,  The.    Dumas. 
Consuelo.      By    George    Sand. 
Cook's  Voyages.   Captain  James  Coofe. 
Corinne.      By   Madame   de   Stael. 
Count  of  Monte  Cristo.     VoL  I.    Bf 
Alex  Dumas. 


BURTS  HOME  LIBRARY.    Cloth.    Gilt  Tops.    Price,  $1.25 


Count    of    Monte     Cristo.       Vol.     II. 
By   Alex.    Dumas. 

Countess    de    Charney.    Alex    Dumas. 

Countess  of   Rudolstadt.    Geo.    Sand. 

Country  Doctor.   By  H.   de   Balzac. 

Courtship  of  Miles   Standish.    By  H. 
W.    Longfellow. 

Cranford.      By   Mrs.    Gaskell. 

Crockett,  David.    An  autobiography. 

Cromwell,  Oliver,  Life  of.     By  Edwin 
Paxton  Hood. 

Crusades,  The.    By  George  W.   Cox. 

Daniel  Deronda.     By  George  Eliot. 

Data  of  Ethics.    By  Herbert  Spencer. 

Daughter  of  an  Empress.     By  Louisa 
Muhlback. 

David   Copperfield.    Charles  Dickens. 

Days  of  Bruce.   By  Grace  Aguilar. 

Deemster,  The.     By  Hall   Caine. 

Deerslayer,  The.    By  J.   F.  Cooper. 

Descent  of  Man.  By  Charles  Darwin. 

Discourses  of  Epictetus. 

Divine       Comedy,       The.         (Dante.) 
Translated  by  Rev.   H.  F.  Carey. 

Dombey    &    Son.    Charles    Dickens. 

Donal  Grant.     George  Macdonald. 

Donovan.     By   Edna   Lyall. 

Dove  in  the  Eagle's  Nest.     By  Char- 
lotte M.  Yonge. 

Dream  Life.     By  Ik  Marvel. 

Dr.   Tekyll  and  Mr.  Hyde.   By  R.   L. 
Stevenson. 

Duty.     By  Samuel  Smiles. 

East  Lynne.  By  Mrs.  Henry  Wood. 

Education.    By  Herbert   Spencer. 

Egoist.      By    George    Meredith. 

Egyptian   Princess.     George   Ebers. 

Eight  Hundred  Leagues  on  the  Ama- 
zon.    By  Jule3  Verne. 

Eliot's  Poems.     By  George  Eliot. 

Elizabeth  and  Her  German  Garden. 

Elizabeth    (Queen   of   England),    Life 
of.     Edward    Spencer    Beesly. 

EMe  Venner.     By  O.  W.  Holmes. 

Emerson's    Essays.      (Complete.) 

Emerson's  Poems.     R.  W.  Emerson. 

Essays  in  Criticism.  Matthew  Arnold. 
Essays  of  Elia.  By  Charles  Lamb. 
Evangeline.  By  H.  W.  Longfellow. 
Fair  Maid  of  Perth.  Sir  Walter  Scott. 
Fairly  Land  of  Science.  By  Arabella 
B.  Buckley. 


Faust.      (Goethe.) 

Felix  Holt.     By  George  Eliot. 

Fifteen  Decisive  Battles  of  the  World. 

By   E.    S.    Creasy. 
File    No.    113.      By    Emile    Gaboriau. 
First  Principles.     Herbert   Spencer. 
First  Violin.   By  Jessie   Fothergill. 
For  Lilias.     By  Rosa  N.  Carey. 
Forty-Five    Guardsmen.       Dumas. 
Foul  Play.     By  Charles   Reade. 
Fragments  of   Science.  John   Tyndall. 
Franklin,     Benjamin,     Life    of.       An 

autobiography. 
Frederick   the   Great   and   His    Court. 

By  Louisa  Muhlback. 
Frederick,    the    Great,    Life    of.      By 

Francis  Kugler. 
French  Revolution.  Thomas  Carlyle. 
From   the    Earth    to   the    Moon.      By 

Jules  Verne. 
Garibaldi,  General,  Life  of.  By  Theo- 
dore  Dwight. 
Gil  Bias.    A.  R.  Le  Sage. 
Gold  Bug,  The.     Edgar  A.  Pot,; 
Gold  Elsie.     By  E.  MarHtt. 
Golden  Treasury.  By  T.  Palgrave. 
Goldsmith's   Poems. 
Grandfather's     Chair.     By     Nathaniel 

Hawthorne. 
Grant,    Ulysses    S.,    Life    of.      By    J. 

T.   Headley. 
Gray's   Poems.     Thomas  Gray. 
Great  Expectations.     Charles   Dickens. 
Greek  Heroes.    Charles  Kingsley. 
Green   Mountain   Boys,   The.      By  D. 

P.  Thompson. 
Grimm's  Household  Tales. 
Grimm's   Popular  Tales. 
Gulliver's  Travels.     By  Dean   Swift. 
Guy  Mannering.      Sir  Walter   Scott. 
Hale,    Nathan,   the   Martryr    Spy.    By 

Charlotte   M.    Holloway. 
Handy   Andy.      By    Samuel    Lover. 
Hannibal,    the    Carthaginian,    Life   of. 

By  Thomas  Arnold. 
Hardy  Norseman.  By  Edna  Lyall. 
Harold      By   Bulwer-Lytton. 
Harry    Lorrequer.      Charles   Lever. 
Heart   of  Midlothian.   By   Sir  Walter 

Scott. 
Heir  of  Redclyffe.     By  Charlotte  M. 

Yonge. 
Heman'*  Poems.  By  Felicia  Hemans. 


BURT'S  HOME  LIBRARY.    Cloth.    Gilt  Tops.     Price,  $1.25 


Henry    Esmond.    W.    M.    Thackeray. 
Henry,   Patrick,   Life  of.   By  William 

Wirt. 
Hereward.     By   Charles   Kingsley. 
Heroes  and  Hero-Worship.     By  Thos. 

Carlyle. 
Hiawatha.   By  H.   W.   Longfellow. 
Hidden  Hand.     By  Mrs.   Southworth. 
History    of    Crime.      Victor    Hugo. 
History     of     Civilization     in     Europe. 

By  M.  Guizot. 
History  of  Our  Own  Times.     Vol.  I. 

By  Justin   McCarthy. 
History    of    Our    Own    Times.      Vol. 

II.     By  Justin   McCarthy. 
Holmes'  Poems.     By  O.  W.  Holmes. 
Holy  Roman  Empire.  James  Bryce. 
Homo    Sum.      By   George   Ebers. 
Hood's  Poems.     By  Thomas  Hood. 
House  of  the  Seven  Gables.     By  Na- 
thaniel  Hawthorne. 
Hunchback  of  Notre  Dame.  By  Victor 

Hugo. 
Hypatia.     By   Charles  Kingsley. 
Iceland  Fisherman.  By  Pierre  Loti. 
Idle  Thoughts  of  an   Idle  Fellow.   By 

Jerome  K.  Jerome. 
Iliad,    The.      Pope's    Translation. 
Inez.     By  Augusta  J.  Evans. 
Ingelow's    Poems.      Jean    Ingelow. 
Intellectual  Life.     P.  G.  Hamerton. 
In   the  Golden   Days.   Edna  Lyall. 
Ishmael.      By    Mrs.    Southworth. 
It  Is  Never  Too  Late  to  Mend.     By 

Charles    Reade. 

Ivanhoe.     By   Sir  Walter   Scott. 

Jane  Eyre.     By  Charlotte  Bronte. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  Life  of.   By  Sam- 
uel L.    Schmucker. 

Joan    of    Arc,    Life    of.      By    Jules 
Michelet. 

John   Halifax.    By  Miss  Mulock. 

Jones,    John    Paul,    Life    of.      James 

Otis. 
Joseph  Balsamo.     By  Alex.  Dumas. 

Josephine,    Empress    of    France,    Life 
of.     By  Fred  A.   Ober. 

Keats'  Poems.     By  John  Keats. 

Kenilworth.     By   Sir  Walter   Scott. 

Kidnapped.     By   R.   L.   Stevenson. 

King  Arthur  and  His  Noble  Knights. 
By  Mary  Macleod. 


Knickerbocker's  History  of  New 
York.      By   Washington   Irving. 

Knight  Errant.     By  Edna  Lyall. 

Koran,   The.     Sales  Translation. 

Lady  of  the  Lake.  By  Sir  W.   Scott. 

Lafayette,  Marquis  de,  Life  of.  By 
P.    C.    Headley. 

Lalla  Rookh.     By  Thomas  Moore. 

Lamplighter.      Marie    S.    Cummins. 

Last  Days  of  Pompeii.  By  Bulwer- 
Lytton. 

Last  of   the   Barona.   Bulwer-Lytton. 

Last  of  the  Mohicans.  By  James 
Fenimore  Cooper. 

Lee,  Gen.  Robert  E.,  Life  of.  By  G. 
Mercer    Adam. 

Lena  Rivers.     By  Mary  J.  Holmes. 

Les  Miserables.  Vol.  I.  By  Vic- 
tor   Hugo. 

Les  Miserables.  Vol.  II.  By  Vic- 
tor   Hugo. 

Life  of  Christ.     By  F.  W.  Farrar. 
Life    of    Jesus.      By    Earnest    Renan. 
Light    of    Asia.      Sir    Edwin    Arnold. 
Light    That    Failed,    The.      By    Rud- 

yard   Kipling. 
Lincoln,     Abraham,      Life     of.       By 

Henry   Ketcham. 

Lincoln's  Speeches.  By  G.  Mercer 
Adam. 

Literature  and  Dogma.  By  Mat- 
thew Arnold. 

Little  Dorrit.  By  Charles  Diet 
ens. 

Little  Minister,  The.  By  James 
M.    Barrie. 

Livingstone,  David.  Life  of.  By 
Thomas   Hughes. 

Longfellow's  Poems.  H.  W.  Long- 
fellow. 

Lorna  Doone.     R.  D.   Blackmore. 

Louise  de  la  Valliere.  Alex. 
Dumas. 

Lowell's  Poems.     J.  Rusell  LowelL 

Lucile.     By   Owen   Meredith. 

Macaria.     Augusta  J.   Evans. 

Macauley's      Literary      Essays.        By 

T.    B.   Macauley. 
Magic  Skin.    Honore  de  Balzac. 
Mahomet,      Life      of.        Washington 

Irving. 

Makers  of  Florence.  Mrs.  01i« 
phant. 

Makers  of  Venice.     Mrs.  Oliphsnt. 


BURT'S  HOME  LIBRARY.     Cloth.     Gilt  Tops.     Price,  $1.25 


Man  in  the  Iron  Mask.  By  Alex 
andre   Dumas. 

Marble  Faun.     N.  Hawthorne. 

Marguerite  de  la  Valois.  By 
Alexandre  Dumas. 

Marius,  The  Epicurean.  By  Walter 
Pater. 

Marmion.      By    Sir    Walter    Scott. 

Marquis  of  Lossie.  Geo.  Mac- 
donald. 

Martin  Chuzzlewit.  Charles  Dickens. 

Mary,  Queen  of  Scots,  Life  of. 
By  P.  C.  Headley. 

Master  of  Ballantrae,  The.  By  R. 
L.    Stevenson. 

Masterman  Ready.  Capt.  Mar- 
ryatt. 

Meadow   Brook.     Mary  J.   Holmes. 

Meditations    of    Marcus    Aurelius. 

Memoirs  of  a  Physician.  By  Alex- 
andre   Dumas. 

Micah  Clarke.     A.  Conan  Doyle. 

Michael   Strogoff.     Jules  Verne. 

Middlemarch.     By  George  Eliot. 

Midshipman  Easy.  Capt.  Mar- 
ryatt. 

Mill  on  the  Floss.  By  George 
Eliot. 

Milton's  Poems.     John  Milton. 

Minister's  Wooing,  The.  By  Har- 
riet Beecher  Stowe. 

Monastery.       Sir  Walter  Scott. 

Montaigne's      Essays.      Vol.      I.      By 

Michel  de  Montaigne. 
Montaigne's    Essays.      Vol.    II.      By 

Michel  de  Montaigne. 
Moonstone,    The.      By    Wilkie    Col- 
lins. 

Moore's   Poems.     Thomas   Moore. 
Mosses    from    an    Old    Manse.      By 
Nathaniel    Hawthorne. 

Murders  in  the  Rue  Morgue.  By 
Edgar   Allan   Poe. 

Mysterious   Island.     Jules  Verne. 

Napoleon     and     His     Marshals.       By 

J.  T.  Headley. 
Napoleon    B«naparte,    Life    of.      By 

P.   C.   Headley. 
Natural       Law      in      the      Spiritual 

World.        By    Henry    Drummond. 
Narrative    of    Arthur     Gordon     Pym. 

By  Edgar  Allan  Poe. 
Nature,      Addresses      and      Lectures. 

By  R.  W.  Emerson, 


Nelson,     Admiral     Horatio,     Life     of. 
By   Robert   Southey. 

Newcomes.     The.       W.    M.    Thack- 
eray. 

Nicholas   Nickleby.     Chas.   Dickens. 

Ninety- Three.     By  Victor  Hugo. 

Not     Like     Other     Girls.       By     Rosa 
N.  Carey. 

Odyssey,  The.     Pope's  Translation. 

Old     Curiosity     Shop.       Chas.       Dick- 
ens. 

Old      Mam'selle's      Secret.        By      E. 
Marlitt. 

Old   Mortality.      Sir   Walter    Scoit. 

Old    Myddleton's    Money.      By    Mary 
Cecil  Hay. 

Oliver  Twist.     By   Chas.   Dickens. 

Only    the    Governess.      By    Rosa    N. 
Carey. 

On  the  Heights.     B.  Auerbach. 

Oregon   Trail.      Francis    Parkman. 

Origin     of     Species.         Charles     Dar- 
win. 

Other      Worlds      Than      Ours.        By 
Richard    Proctor. 

Our    Mutual    Friend.    Chas.    Dickens. 

Page  of  the  Duke  of   Savoy.   Dumas. 

Past    and    Present.      Thos.    Carlyle. 

Pathfinder,  The.  By  James  F.  Cooper. 

Paul  and   Virginia.      St.    Pierre. 

Pendennis.      Wm.    M.    Thackeray. 

Penn,     William,     Life     of.       By     W. 
Hepworth     Dixon. 

Pere    Goriot.     Honore   de   Balzac. 

Peter,    the    Great,    Life    of.    By   John 
Barrow. 

Phantom       Rickshaw,       The.  By 

Rudyard   Kipling. 

Philip    II.    of    Spain,    Life    of.      By 
Martin  A.    S.   Hume. 

Pickwick    Papers.      Charles    Dickens. 

Pilgrim's    Progress.     John    Bunyan. 

Pillar   of   Fire.      J.   H.    Ingraham. 

Pilot,  The.     James  F.  Cooper. 

Pioneers,   The.     James   F.   Cooper. 

Pirate,  The.     Sir  Walter  Scott. 

Plain     Tales     from     the     Hills.       By 
Rudyard    Kipling. 

Plato's    Dialogues. 

Pleasures  of  Life.     Sir  J.  Lubbock. 

Poe's  Poems.     By  Edgar  A.  Poe. 

Pope's    Poems.      Alexander    Pope. 

Prairie,  The.     James  F.  Cooper, 


BURT'S  HOME  LIBRARY.    Cloth.     Gilt  Tops.    Price,  $1.23 


Pride  and  Prejudice.    Jane  Austen. 
Prince   of   the    House    of   David.      By 

Rev.   J.   H.    lngraham. 
Princess   of  Thule.     Wm.   Black. 
Procter's    Poems.      Adelaide    Procter. 
Prue  and  I.     George  Wm.   Curtis. 
Putnam,   General    Israel,   Life  of.    By 

George    Canning    Hill. 
Put    Yourself    in    His    Place.    Charles 

Reade. 
Queenie's  Whim.     Rosa  N.  Carey. 
Queen's   Necklace.      Alex.    Dumas. 
Quentin   Durward.     Walter   Scott. 
Rasselas.     Samuel   Johnson. 
Redgauntlet.     Sir  Walter   Scott. 
Red   Rover.     By  James   F.    Cooper. 
Regent's   Daughter.    By  Alex.   Dumas. 
Representative  Men.   R.  W.  Emerson. 
Republic  of   Plato. 
Reveries     of     a     Bachelor.       By     Ik 

Marvel. 
Richelieu,      Cardinal,     Life     of.       By 

Richard  Lodge. 
Rienzi.      By    Bulwer-Lytton. 
Robinson   Crusoe.     Daniel  Defoe. 
Rob  Roy.     Sir  Walter  Scott. 
Romance      of      Two      Worlds.  By 

Marie    Corelli. 
Romola.     By   George  Eliot. 
Rory  O'Moore.     Samuel  Lover. 
Rossstti's   Poems. 

Royal  Edinburgh.  Mrs.  Oliphant. 
Rutledge.  Miriam  Coles  Harris. 
Samantha    at     Saratoga.       By    Josiah 

Allen's   Wife. 
Sartor  Resartus.     Thomas  Carlyle. 
Scarlet  Letter.     Nathaniel  Hawthorne. 
Schonberg-Cotta     Family.       By     Mrs. 

Andrew  Charles. 
Schopenhauer's  Essays. 
Scottish   Chiefs.     By  Jane  Porter. 
Scott's   Poems.     Walter   Scott. 
Second  Wife.  The.     E.  Marlitt. 
Seekers  After  God.     F.  W.  Farrar. 
Self-Help.      By    Samuel    Smiles. 
Self-Raised.     By  Mrs.  Southworth. 
Seneca's   Morals. 
Sense     and      Sensibility.        By     Jane 

Austen. 
Sentimental        Journey.  Laurence 

Sterne. 
Sesame   and    LiUies.       John    Ruskin. 


Shakespeare's   Heroines.    Anna  Jamt- 

son. 
Shelley's    Poems. 
Shirley.     By  Charlotte  Bronte. 
Sing    of    the    Four.      By    A.    Conan 

.Doyle. 
Silas  Marner.     By  George  Eliot. 
Silence      of      Dean      Maitland.        By 

Maxwell    Grey. 
Sir  Gibbie.     George  Macdonald. 
Sketch  Book.     By  Washington  Irving. 
Socrates,   Trial  and  Death  of. 
Soldiers  Three.     Rudyard  Kipling. 
Spy,    The.      By   James    F.    Cooper. 
Stanley,     Henry    M.,     Life    of.       By 

A.  Montefiore. 
Story     of     an     African     Farm.       By 

Olive    Schreiner. 

Story  of  John  G.  Paton.  By  Rev. 
Jas.  Paton. 

St.  Elmo.     By  Augusta  J.  Evans. 

St.    Ronan's   Well.     Walter   Scott. 

Study  in  Scarlet     A.  Conan  Doyle. 

Surgeon's  Daughter,  The.  By  Sir 
Walter   Scott. 

Swineburne's   Poems. 
Swiss    Family    Robinson.      By    Jean 
Rudolph  Wyss. 

Taking    the     Bastile,    Alex.       Dumas. 

Tale  of  Two  Cities,  Chas.  Dick- 
ens. 

Tales        from       Shakespeare.  By 

Charles   and    Mary    Lamb. 

Tales  of  a  Traveller.  By  Wash- 
ington Irving. 

Talisman.     Sir  Walter  Scott. 

Tanglewood       Tales.  N.       Haw- 

thorne. 

Tempest  and  Sunshine.  By  Mary 
J.  Holmes. 

Ten  Nights  in  a  Bar  Room.  By  T.  S. 
Arthur. 

Tennyson's  Poems. 

Ten  Years  Later,     Alex.  Duma*. 

Terrible  Temptation.       Charles  Reade. 

Thaddeus  of  Warsaw.  By  Jane 
Porter. 

Thelma.    By  Marie  Corelli. 

Thirty    Years'    War.      By    Frederick 

Schiller. 
Thousand    Miles    Up    the    Nile.        By 

Amdia  B.  Edwards. 


BURT'S  HOME  LIBRARY.    Cloth.    Gtlt  Tops.     Price.  $1.23 


Three  Guardsmen.     Alex  Dumas. 

Three  Men  in  a  Boat.     Jerome. 

Thrift.     By   Samuel   Smiles. 

Throne  of  David.    J.  H.  Ingraham. 

Toilers  of  the  Sea.     Victor  Hugo. 

Tom   Brown  at  Oxford.     By  Thomas 
Hughes. 

Tom     Brown's     School     Days.       By 
Thos.  Hughes. 

Tour     of     the     World     in     Eighty 
Days.     By  Jules  Verne. 

Treasure     Island.       R.     L.     Steven- 
son. 

Twenty     Thousand     Leagues     Under 
the  Sea.     By  Jules  Verne. 

Twenty  Years  After.    Alex.  Dumas. 

Twice  Told  Tales.     N.  Hawthorne. 

Two  Admirals.     By  J.  F.  Cooper. 

Two    years    Before    the    Mast.      By 
R.  H.   Dana,  Jr. 

Uarda.    By  George  Ebers. 

Uncle  Max.    Rosa  N.  Carey. 

Unele    Tom's     Cabin.       By     Harriet 
Beecher  Stowe. 

Under  Two  Flags.     By  "Ouida." 

Utopia.    By  Sir  Thomas  Moore. 

Vanity  Fair.     Wu.  M.  Thackery. 

Vendetta.     By  Marie  Corelli. 

Vicar     of     Wakefield.       By     Oliver 
Goldsmith. 

Vicomte    de    Bragelonne.      By    Alex- 
andre Dumas. 

Views  A-Foot.     Bayard  Taylor. 
Vlllette.     By  Charlotte  Bronte. 

Virginians.    Wo.  M.  Thackeray. 
Waldon.    By  Heary  D»  Thoreau. 


Wandering   Jew,    The.      Vol.    I.      By 

Eugene  Sue. 
Wandering  Jew,  The.     Vol.   II.     By 

Eugene  Sue. 
Washington    and    His    Generals.     By 

J.  T.  Headley. 

Washington,    George.    Life    of.      By 

Jared   Sparks. 
Water  Babies.     Charles  Kingsiey. 
Water  Witch.     James  F.   Cooper. 
Waverly.     By  Sir  Walter  Scott. 
Webster,      Daniel,      Life      of.        By 

Samuel  M.  Schmucker. 
Webster's  Speeches.     (Selected). 
Westward  Ho.     Charles  Kingsiey. 
We  Two.     By  Edna  Lyall. 
White  Company.     A  Conan  Doyle. 
Whites  and  the  Blues.     Dumas. 
Whittier's  Poems.    J.  G.  Whittier. 
Wide,      Wide      World.        By      Susan 

Warner. 
William,     the     Conqueror,     Life     of. 

By  Edward  A.    Freeman. 
William,    the    3Hent,    Life    of.      By 

Frederick  Harrison. 
Window  in  Thrums.    J.  M.  Barrie. 
Wing  and  Wing.     J.   F.   Cooper. 
Wolsey,     Cardinal,     Life     of.         By 

Mandell   Creighton. 

Woman  in  White.    Wilkie  Collins. 
Won  by  Waiting.     Edna  LyalL 
Wonder  Book.     N.  Hawthorne. 
Woodstock.     By  Sir  Walter  Seott, 
Wordsworth's  Poems. 
Wormwood.    By  Marie  CoreHL 


1  '  DAY ' 
RETURN    CIRCULATION  DEPARTMENT 

TO— »    202  Main  Library 


LOAN  PERIOD  1 
HOME  USE 

2 

3 

4 

5                                      ( 

b 

ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 

Renewals  and  Recharges  may  be  made  4  days  prior  to  the  due  date. 

Books  may  be  Renewed  by  calling        642-3405 

DUE  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 

AU601WI 

riQfiULAI 

1      , 

\7Abfa 

DEC  0  8  20a 

\ 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  BERKELE 
FORM  NO.  DD6                                BERKELEY,  CA  94720             g 

YB  236% 


U.C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


cosmoflbbs 


>* 


*4