Full text of "The death of the Prussian Republic : a study of Reich-Prussian relations, 1932-1934"

See other formats

■■■■l™^^^^

iiiiillil

j!iii:iii;i!;

<L..

,f/*-^

"\%.- .

^:s

^^.^

:. /

"^..^

■' ■ f

^:^

:/■

<SJ

/yO^

BOOK 943.085.B388 ID c. 1

BECK # DEATH OF PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

3 T1S3 QD2212D3 5

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2011 with funding from

Boston Library Consortium IVIember Libraries

http://www.archive.org/details/deathofprussianrOObeck

^ H c; L

Florida State University Studies

p.. u
Number Thirty-one • ' '

The Death of the Prussian
Repubhc

A Study of Reich-Prussian Relations, 1932-1934

by
EARL R. RECK

THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Tallahassee
1959

«^t^:

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY STUDIES

Printed and bound in the United States of America
BY THE Rose Printing Company, Tallahassee, Florida

THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Published under the Auspices

The Research Council

The Florida State University

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

Betty Monaghan Watts, Chairman

Kenneth M. Shaver D wight L. Burton

Lee Rigsby Werner A. Baum

EDITOR
James Preu

Table of Contents

Preface vii

Ch. I. A New Germany and a New Prussia 1

Ch. II. Republican Prussia: Bastion of Democracy 33

Ch. III. Uhlan Politics 67

Ch. IV. Assault on Prussia 91

Ch. V. Preussen Contra Reich 121

Ch. VI. Niedergang des Rechtsstaats 147

Ch. VII. Prussia: Key to Hitler 167

Ch. VIII. The Nazification of Prussia 193

Ch. IX. The Death of Prussia 215

Notes 221

Bibliography 261

Index 273

PREFACE

When the kingdom of Prussia disappeared from the map in
1918, its place was taken by a republican state, one of the eighteen
states making up the new German republic. The state of Prussia
was far larger than any of the others. More than half of the territory
and population of Germany was comprehended within Prussia. By
virtue of its constitution it was designated a republic. During the
years from 1919 to 1923 it was in the vanguard of German demo-
cratic development, and the demise of Germany democracy was
made possible by its death. It was to a high degree the focus of the
semi-authoritarian regimes of Franz von Papen and Kurt von
Schleicher. Its fortunes intimately affected the acquisition of
power by Adolf Hitler and the conversion of his quasi-constitutional
regime into an authoritarian one. The administrative reforms of the
Nazis reduced Prussia from an entity to a name. World War II
has not restored the entity and has destroyed even the name. Prussia
no longer exists. But Prussianism itself has acquired the status of
a myth. That myth surrounds monarchical legends and misty memo-
ries of deeds of valor. But the saga of Prussian democracy has not
been told. It should be. Germany very much needs legends of
democratic leaders to place alongside those of the days of mon-
archy. This study presents a small segment of that saga.

The author's particular interests in the Prussia of Weimar de-
rived from his war-time days at Stanford University and his very
pleasant association there with Frau Rene Brand and Dr. Kurt
Bergel. From them he conceived an interest in the life and ways
of the Berliner, "zdh" and "praktisch," humor-loving, democratic
minded. From them also he derived a deep interest in the career of
Otto Braun, who from Berlin directed for twelve years an efficiently
functioning democratic government. The success of Braun's gov-
ernment for more than a decade posed the puzzling question of
the factors behind its ignominious downfall. A search for an
answer to this question has led the author deeply into the legal
history of the period as well as into the intricacies of day-by-day
politics. The legal history of a country does not provide the most
congenial waters for a foreign historian! If an apology be due for
the effort the author has made to traverse them, he can only plead
interest, even fascination. Particularly because of his residence in
the South, he found the efforts of Prussia to defend itself from

federal intervention into its internal aflFairs an interesting parallel
to contemporary events in this area. The parallel is, of course,
only a superficial one. Factors of legal background differentiate
affairs in Germany and the United States too sharply to justify
extensive comparison.

The author had been for some time engaged in his research
when the fine volume on the closing period of Weimar by Karl
Dietrich Bracher appeared. Where indicated, he has leaned on
it unashamed, believing that Bracher has often accumulated more
materials than he has fully evaluated. Most of Bracher's sources,
however, the author has seen at first hand, but the more restricted
scope of the present writer's enquiries has often placed variant
interpretations on the materials concerned. To Bracher's materials
he has added a careful examination of the unpublished files of the
United States Department of State, the official protocols of the
German cabinet and of the office of the German Foreign Minister,
of the protocols of the Prussian cabinet, of manuscript materials
deposited in the Library of Congress (Eher Verlag, Rehse Collec-
tion), and of extensive legal literature with which Bracher dealt
very lightly. He has sought to focus his story heavily upon the
fate of Prussia but has felt that this is intelligible only within a
framework which seeks to elucidate the events transpiring within
the Reich government at the same time.

Acknowledgments are due many from whom the author has
received help in his research. To Dr. Heinrich Briining, Dr. Hans
Schlange-Schoningen, Dr. Arnold Brecht, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht,
and former Chancellor Franz von Papen he is most grateful for
helpful and explanatory correspondence. To Dr. E. Taylor Parks
of the Historical Division of the Department of State grateful
acknowledgment of much kindly assistance and advice is due. Mrs.
Mary Ellen Milar and Mr. Clarence Holmes were most helpful with
respect to the use of unpublished State Department Files during
the summer of 1956. Dr. Carl Lokke and his staff in the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs of the National Ai'chives have since provided
much help. The author is also grateful to Drs. Paul Sweet and
Arthur Kogan for their help in using portions of the cabinet proto-
cols not yet deposited in the National Archives. Acknowledgment
is also gratefully made of the kindness of the officials of the Bundes-
archiv in Koblenz, particularly of Dr. Wolfgang Mommsen, in

vin

making available microfilms of portions of the Schleicher Nachlass
and portions of the Nachlass of Bill Arnold Drews. Similarly, the
the author has benefited from the cooperativeness of the
oflBcials of the Hauptarchiv in Berlin, particularly of Dr. Gerhard
Zimmerman, in making available the protocols of the Prussian
State Ministry. The author regrets that he could not obtain access
to the Franz Bracht Geschdftsnachlass in the Zentralarchiv in
Potsdam, but was assured by the officials there that it was of
minimal significance.

Gratitude is due Prof. Enno Kraehe of the University of Kentucky
for reading portions of the manuscript and to Prof. Victor S.
Mamatey of the Florida State University for a helpful review of
the entire manuscript. Any errors or inaccuracies which remain
are the sole responsibility of the author. The author also owes a
debt of gratitude to many others for their help in his work— to his
wife and daughter for their gift of many hours which might have
been shared in family pleasures; to his sister who has helped with
valuable suggestions in respect to style; to many other friends and
colleagues for their encouragement. In particular the author
would like to express appreciation to his colleague. Prof. Weymouth
T. Jordan, who sets the perfect example of the research professor,
to Professors Lawrence F. Hill, Harold J. Grimm, and Edwin A.
Davis for their friendship and encouragement, and to Miss Mari-
anne Ferlisi for her conscientiousness and proficiency in completing
a very difiicult typing task.

Successive grants of the Florida State University Research
Council in 1955, 1956, and 1957 made possible the purchase of
microfilm materials and research trips to Washington, D. C., with-
out which this study could not have been written. Special acknowl-
edgment is also due to the efficient and able assistance of the
Florida State University Interlibrary Loan service under Miss
Nancy Bird. The author never ceases to marvel at this modern
miracle of librarianship, which has opened for him during the
preparation of this manuscript the resources of the Library of
Congress and of the libraries of Harvard University, Duke Univer-
sity, the University of North Carolina, the University of Minnesota,
Chicago University, Ohio State University, Bryn Mawr College,
Columbia University, Stanford University, Yale University, the
University of California, the University of Wisconsin, Louisiana

State University, and of the University of Florida. Acknowledgment
is also due the kindly help of Miss Frances Haynes of the Reference
Division, Miss Mary J. Kennedy of the Documents Division, and
Mr. Reno W. Bupp of the Social Sciences Division of the Florida
State University Library. Helpful information and assistance in
respect to the holdings of the Hoover Institute and Library on War,
Revolution, and Peace were provided by Mrs. Agnes F. Peterson in
charge of the Central and Western European Collections there.

A very special note of acknowledgment is due the editorial
board of the Florida State Studies for their assistance in the publi-
cation of this book. To Editor James Preu for careful and pains-
taking review of the manuscript for style and content the author
owes particular gratitude.

Tallahassee, Florida Earl R. Beck

April, 1958

CH. I. A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA

The state of Prussia was born of strife and christened with
blood. Perhaps this could also be said of other states, but no
other name so quickly evokes an image of serried rows of steel
helmets, of stiffly-erect statesmen obdurately pursuing their will,
of the clicking of heels, the half-curtsy of deference to authority.
Every schoolboy knows— or at least hears— the saga of tiny Brand-
enburg in the sandy marsh lands of northeastern Germany and
how it evolved into the powerful Prussian nation which dominated
the Germany of the kaisers on the eve of World War I. Frederick
William I., "the drill sergeant of the North"; Frederick the Great,
the "Old Fritz" of enlightened despotism and Staatsraison; and
Bismarck, the personification of the influence in history of "Blood
and Iron"— all of these are among the most commonly known
figures of history.

But the average reader seldom learns that Prussia was more
than the kaisers, the Bismarcks, the Fritzs, and the Frederick
Williams. The sober industriousness of Prussians, their devotion
to honor and to honesty, their willingness to die for freedom as
they did in 1848 and in 1918 have received scanty attention. Yet,
between 1918 and 1932 the word "Prussia," which stood in the
past, whether rightly or wrongly, linked with despotism and mili-
tarism, became synonymous with social progress and democratic
government. Prussia was the "bulwark of republican Germany,"
the last bastion of her defense against the returning waves of
reaction and dictatorship. But at the end the bastions proved to
have been erected upon sand and tragedy wrote another fateful
chapter in German history. This is the story of that tragedy.

It is difficult to begin a story anywhere but at its beginning. This
is the story of the death of a state, but its last struggles reflected
the weaknesses of its origins and the shortcomings of its middle
age. A brief consideration of the process of gestation and matu-
ration cannot be avoided if one seeks to clarify the ultimate failure
of the repubhc of Prussia, a failure which has apparently been
linked by fate with the disappearance from the map of the very
name of Prussia itself.

The birth of the republic of Prussia accompanied that of the
Weimar Republic of which it was a constituent part. Much of

2 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

the story of its creation was interlocked with that of the birth of
the larger unit of government and both stories were conditioned
by the earlier history of the German state. Germany became a
nation late among the nations of Europe. It was made a nation
by the dynamic leadership of Prussian kings and statesmen. But
both Prussia and Germany became republics under circumstances
in which that dynamic leadership seemed absent. Republicanism
was born in Germany lacking the glamor of Bismarck's Reich and
strongly affected by German suspicions that it was an alien import
not suited to the soil to which it had been transplanted. And,
indeed, the Weimar Republic and the Prussian Republic which
was a part of it were, when created by Germans in the November
Revolution of 1918, not entirely a work of German hands. The
authorship of these republics may be attributed to a high degree
to an American, Woodrow Wilson, who dealt from three thousand
miles away with a situation which he did not fully understand.
Whether his actions were wise and the results good is debatable.

This is not the place to discuss the advantages or disadvantages
of monarchical government in pre- World War I Germany. That
it degenerated into arbitrary and ineffective government under
the flamboyant, temperamental, and irresponsible Kaiser WHliam
II is, however, scarcely debatable. During the military action of
the First World War the monarchy failed to serve as a mooring
stone. The kaiser was thrust into the background by the military
leaders of the state, and General Erich LudendorflF, not him-
self more balanced or more sensitive to the requirements of states-
manship than his legal master, became the virtual dictator of Ger-
many. Bolstered by the massive prestige of Field Marshal Paul
von Hindenburg, who had obtained the worshipful adoration of
all Germans by his victory at Tannenberg early in the war, Luden-
dorff masterminded the great "drive for peace" which the German
armies launched in the spring and summer of 1918. The "drive
for peace" crumpled before the stubborn resistance of allied forces
bolstered by American contributions of men and materials. In
October, 1918, the German government, already aware of waning
morale in the armies and in the workshops at home, began the
first of a series of improvised actions in the face of imminent
military collapse. The arbitrary government of the kaisers con-
verted itself into a parliamentary monarchy. For this purpose

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 3

William II appointed a cousin, Prince Max of Baden, to head a
cabinet which hoped by a promise of greater freedom to obtain
the support of socialists and liberals and reconstitute a solid front
against the enemy. This was followed by a number of constitutional
changes designed to implement that which had been done and to
assure the responsibility of the cabinet to the popularly-elected
Reichstag.

Germany was fated, however, not to have an opportunity to
test the success of constitutional monarchy. The military leaders
of the state succumbed to uncontrolled hysteria in the face of
setbacks on the field of battle. Although German armies were still
deep in France, German headquarters became the source of cres-
cendo demands that the Baden government immediately sue for
peace. Overwhelmed by the apparent urgency of these messages
from the military, the civilian authorities, on October 3rd, reluc-
tantly appealed for an armistice to the President of the United
States, Woodrow Wilson, who had recently restated in a series of
public speeches the principles that he believed should govern the
conclusion of a treaty of peace. ^

The nature of the message addressed to Wilson by Prince Max
reflected the inexperience of his government. He requested an
armistice on the basis of "the program laid down by the President
of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918,
and in his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his address
of September 27, 1918."- This was a most irregular diplomatic
procedure. It was true that the speech to Congress delivered by
Wilson on January 8, 1918, contained the enlightened blueprint
for peace known as the Fourteen Points. But five other addresses
had followed within the time limit of the German note. These
were delivered for domestic consumption in the midst of some
of the severest fighting of the war. They combined lofty principles
of peace with justice with severe excoriation of the war-time German
government. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the German
appeal was based upon the general concept of "peace with justice"
rather than upon specific and definable terms of peace. There
was never, as Germans later asserted, any clear pre-armistice
contract for peace. Actually, the surrender of the Germans in
World War I was not based upon appreciably better terms than
their "unconditional surrender" in World War II. This fact was

4 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

underscored in the negotiations which followed.

The American replies to the German notes were quite cautious.
The American who received Prince Max's surrender offer had
himself some of the qualities of the Prussians— an excessive sobriety
and sense of duty, a deeply-ingrained Weltanschauung, a stubborn
adherence to objectives and aims regardless of odds. Peace offers
from the cousin of Kaiser Bill did not impress the prophet of
democracy. On October 8th he replied to Prince Max stressing
the need for the immediate evacuation of allied territory and asking
"whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the consti-
tutional authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the
war." The President declared that the answer to this question was
"vital from every point of view."^ When Prince Max replied that he
spoke for the German people, Wilson again, on October 14th,
stressed the questionable basis of the existing government. Calling
attention to his speech on July 4th (which was not one of the two
specifically mentioned by the original German note, but was cer-
tainly included in those referred to by the language of the note),
Wilson pointed out that he had demanded, "The destruction of
every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and
of its single choice disturb the peace of the world. . . ." "The power
which has hitherto controlled the German nation," added the
American note, "is of the sort here described. It is within the choice
of the German nation to alter it."^ This warning was made still
more specific on October 23rd in the third American note to Ger-
many in which Wilson demanded armistice arrangements which
would make it possible for the Allies "to enforce any arrangements
that may be entered into and to make renewal of hostilities on the
part of Germany impossible." This was followed by the famous
statements in which Wilson suggested that the United States could
only deal with "the veritable representatives of the German
people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing
as the real rulers of Germany" and added that if the United States
dealt with "the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of
Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later . . .
it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender."^ Whether
Wilson actually sought the overturn of the monarchy in Germany
is debatable, but the language of his notes clearly invited a more
revolutionary government than that involved in the ministry of

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 5

Prince Max.

In spite of the doubts he expressed in regard to the nature of
the German government, Wilson and the other powers at war
with Germany eventually agreed to negotiate for armistice with
representatives of the Baden government. But Wilson's notes
had made it apparent to German leaders that the position of the
Kaiser constituted an obstacle to more favorable terms of peace.
Conservatives as well as liberals and socialists advocated the abdi-
cation of the Kaiser. Fearing trouble in Berlin, William II sought
refuge with the High Command at Spa. Monarchy and military
were, as a consequence, joined closely together in the face of the
German revolution of November, 1918.

Revolutions are seldom the result of carefully laid plans. The
German revolution of November, 1918 was no exception. It began
on October 30, 1918, with the mutiny of sailors at Kiel who pre-
ferred life regardless of victory or defeat to the quixotic quest
for a glorious death planned by their officers. Efforts to control
the mutiny on November 3rd brought armed revolts and a revolu-
tionary organization. Insurrection fanned out like a brush fire
across northern Germany while political leaders, impressing one
more with their caution than their daring, moved to follow the
people's will toward a new order,^

It was not clear at once, however, what the people really
sought. The insurrectionary movements of November 3-9 were
followed by the creation of soldiers' and workers' councils paral-
leling those created in Russia a year previously. These councils were
almost universally under Socialist leadership, but this Socialist
leadership was not a unified one. The German Social Democratic
Party had divided during the war over the issue of supporting
wartime revenue measures in the Reichstag. This division was
accentuated by the coming of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia.
By November, 1918, the seeds of the later Communist-Socialist
break had already been planted. As a consequence the revolu-
tionary movement of November brought immediate dispute as to
whether the spontaneously created workers' and soldiers' councils
should be regarded as temporary expedients awaiting a call for a
constitutional assembly or as a preliminary step toward a permanent
sovietized government.

In the midst of these events the old government of Prince Max

6 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

of Baden with the consent and assistance of a portion of the High
Command announced on November 9th the abdication of the
Kaiser. This was a measure of despair not officially approved by
the Kaiser himself. It appears, to the contrary, that he still hoped
to retain the right to rule in Prussia if not in all of Germany.'^ The
abdication decision failed utterly in its purpose, being taken too
late to save either the government of Prince Max or the Hohen-
zollem dynasty itself. On the same day on which he made this
announcement, the Imperial Chancellor turned over governmental
authority to Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, the leaders
of the Majority Socialists, the faction of the Social Democratic
Party which had advocated loyal support of the government during
the war. Baden hoped by this action to retain a chance for the
survival of monarchy in Germany. Ebert and Scheidemann on their
part accepted the transfer of governmental authority and proclaimed
the continuity of their new regime with the old, promising also
the maintenance of security and order. It was to the surprise and
anger of Ebert and one of those less-than-clearly-explicable events
of a revolutionary period that Scheidemann a few hours later pro-
claimed publicly that Germany was now a republic. For some
months afterwards, however, the issue between the erection of a
constitutionally regularized republican government or of a soviet
state based on revolution lay in doubt.

Republicanism in Germany was to be closely connected with
the action and inaction of the Social Democratic Party. This party
had, prior to World War I, combined tenets of Marxism and of
parliamentary democracy in an uncertain and instable amalgam.
Neither its "socialism" nor its "democracy" were clearly defined.
It derived its program not only from the teachings of Ferdinand
Lassalle, whose work antedated the arrival of orthodox Marxism
in Germany, but also from the philosophy of Eduard Bernstein,
one of the most outstanding "revisionists" of the original content of
Marxism. Neither before nor after the war did it present a clear-
cut program of the Marxian variety of Socialism. Nor was its usage
of the word "democracy" susceptible to standardized rules. Las-
salle, its proper parent, leaned toward an authoritarian monarchy
but advocated universal suffrage as a means by which that mon-
archy would be forced to serve the interests of the working class.
Later socialists varied in their exposition of the nature of the state

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 7

but generally agreed upon the desirability of universal suffrage
and its employment by the workers to obtain a share in the powers
of the state. The republican form of democracy, in contrast to the
concept of a democratic parliamentary monarchy, had played a
small role in Socialist literature. Indeed, the Social Democrats
never adopted a program of open hostility to the Bismarckian Reich.
They had wished to capture it, not to destroy it.^

Republicanism, therefore, arrived in Germany with few prepared
for its coming. It was an "improvisation" not created by passionate
proponents but accepted reluctantly by lukewarm adherents.^ Even
democracy itself, in its broadest sense, had attracted little enthu-
siasm during the war years. There was almost a vacuum during
that period as respects interests in, discussion of, and propaganda
for genuine democratization of the government. ^"^ Socialist depu-
ties in the Reichstag denounced the Ludendorff dictatorship, but the
patriotism of the great majority of the Socialists had left to a
few extremists the advocacy of revolution. The fall of Ludendorff,
the coming of Prince Max of Baden, had derived not from pressure
from below but from above. The moves that followed, resulting
in the creation of a German republic, found a strange alliance ex-
isting between uncertain and cautious Social Democrats on one
side and extreme Rightists on the other side who sought in demo-
cratic government an emergency solution (Notlosung) to the
crisis which they had created. ^^

The Revolution of November, 1918, in Germany, derived its
initial impetus fom the old ruling groups. It began with a move
toward parliamentary procedures initiated by a reactionary mon-
archy seeking to bolster its position in the face of crisis. It moved
from parliamentary monarchy to republicanism almost by accident,
with the revolutionary leaders divided in their counsels as respects
the advisability of the action. A third step seemed almost inev-
itable. This would have been the move from republicanism to a
soviet state on the Bolshevist model. That this third step was not
taken was in many respects remarkable.

The shadow of Bolshevism hovered close above the German
political scene during the fall and winter months of 1918-19. Only
a year previously a minority group in Russia had overturned a
brief and insecure parliamentary regime. That minority group,
the Russian Bolsheviks or Communists, had been nurtured upon

8 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

the tenets of orthodox Marxism and knew that their victory con-
troverted the normal expectations of their creed. Many of the
outstanding leaders, Lenin as well as Trotsky at the outset, con-
sidered that the harvest from the revolution which had been
planted in the infertile soil of an agricultural Russia would not
be secure unless attended by favorable winds from a Bolshevized
Germany. Their agents in Germany gave support to the left wing
of the German Social Democratic Party, which had separated from
the original party during the war to form the Independent Socialist
Party opposing the continued provision of war revenues. The
Independent Socialist Party, in turn, included at the outset the
extremist faction called the "Spartacists," a name derived from the
pen name of its leader, Karl Liebknecht. The creation of the
revolutionary soldiers' and workers' councils mentioned above had
been followed by the election of an executive committee {Voll-
zugsrat). The executive committee checked on the work of the
provisional cabinet, which had inherited the position of Max of
Baden. The revolutionary councils and their executive committee
had no legal standing. The provisional cabinet exercised authority
legally only insofar as it represented the perpetuation of the old
regime of the Kaiser. In both of these agencies the Independent
Socialists and the Majority Socialists (those who had remained
within the original party) shared authority equally. The Inde-
pendent Socialists advocated the erection of the soldiers' and
workers' councils into a permanent part of the government as
had been done in Russia a year earlier (although they disclaimed
slavish imitation). The Majority Socialists believed that this action
would involve a proletarian revolution probably accompanied by
bloodshed and certainly likely to postpone for some time the return
of stable conditions. This, they felt, would be for Germany, coming
as it would on the heels of war privation and defeat, an unmitigated
disaster. The Majority Socialists became, therefore, in many re-
spects, counter-revolutionists striving to reestablish law and order
and to check the course of revolution from its onward rush. Their
actions were basically wise and patriotic, but their solutions of
current problems laid heavy burdens on the shoulders of those
who sought to make republicanism effective in Germany.

During the course of events that followed, the Majority Social
Democrats moved cautiously. They were weary of war. They

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 9

were weary of violence. In spite of their "socialist" appellation,
they were fundamentally conservative. They had not been advo-
cating the end of all capitalism. They had not been advocating the
downfall of the monarchy. They had not been militantly anti-
militarist. For the sake of internal order and security they were
willing to sacrifice much. In all, during the months that followed,
they underwrote at least ten basic compromises with expediency,
or, as they have been described by post World War II critics,
improvisations designed to master the existing state of chaos. ^^
To use the terms "compromise" and "improvisation" need not
imply criticism. Politics is the science of compromise, and "impro-
visation" is the mark of the practicality of a politician. Some of
these improvisations were wise, even ingenious. But others con-
tained seeds of the ultimate catastrophe which resulted. For a
republic whose failure was in the last analysis closer to accident
than to the inevitable the burden of death lay in the shortcomings
of its origins.

The most fateful of the compromises made by the Social Demo-
crats was arrived at first. On November 10th, 1918, the provisional
president, Friedrich Ebert, appealed to the supreme commanders
of the regular army, Hindenburg and Wilhelm Groner, for military
support in case of a threat to Bolshevize Germany by way of coup
d etat. In this request a Social Democratic president revealed his
fears of his own erstwhile party colleagues, the Independent Social-
ists and the Spartacists, who were, indeed, hoping to seize power
in Germany as the Bolsheviks had in Russia. The extremity of
Ebert's apprehensions was indicated by the fact that he addressed
himself to the very heart of the old regime. The generals with
whom he spoke by telephone represented imperial Germany. Re-
publican Germany called upon Imperial Germany to prevent the
coming of Bolshevist Germany. Perhaps this was necessary, and
alternative solutions, such as the creation of a voluntary republican
guard, not feasible. But there was nothing in this step to send
tingles of pride down the spines of republicans or to swell the
hearts of young Germans in the classrooms of Weimar Germany.
Republicans, whose task it was to create new traditions for a new
society, sought instead the path of safety by preserving the old.

The generals acceded quickly to Ebert's request. There was
forged on November 10, 1918, an unwritten alliance between Ma-

10 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

jority Socialists and the German Reichswehr. The army had
achieved a major victory on the home front. Out of defeat it
emerged as the mooring stone of the new regime. It became im-
possible now for republican leadership in Germany to free itself
from the stigma of the treaties imposed by the victor powers. Those
responsible for the catastrophe watched complacently while their
scapegoats suffered from the consequences of a lost war.^^

The second compromise with expediency followed quickly on
the heels of the first. The election of an executive committee of
the workers' and soldiers' councils was accompanied by directives
designed to facilitate orderly transfer of authority. These orders
retained large sections of the old bureaucratic ofiicialdom in their
places and upheld the continuing validity of imperial laws until
they should have been replaced by new directives. The new leaders
of the state were more concerned with stability and order than
with reform. They wished to deal with the problems of a national
constitution and of a treaty of peace before turning to problems of
local administration. During this interim the revolutionary impetus
available for the needed top-to-bottom housecleaning of the state
was lost. Meanwhile, sentiment protecting the entrenched bureau-
cratic system increased. The fidelity to duty and the economic
functioning of the pre-war civil servants were stressed at Weimar.
In the long run officials below the rank of Oberprdsidenten, Regie-
run gsprdddent en, Polizeiprdsidenten, Landrdte, etc., the top level
of the officialdom, were virtually untouched by the advent of the
democratic state. As a consequence, the lesser officialdom, who
were in closest contact with the public, remained inwardly wedded
to concepts of authoritarianism. They were completely incapable
of demonstrating in their contacts with the man on the street the
democratic spirit which derives from the recognition by a govern-
mental official that he is the servant, not the master, of the public.
Weimar officialdom was a tightly-knit unit of bureaucrats with
little to distinguish them from the bureaucrats of the kaiser. When
opportunity came, many threw their influence to anti-democratic
movements and some violated the obligations of their office to give
aid and sustenance to the totalitarian cause.^^

Meanwhile, the Majority Socialists began a strong move to
bring about the resumption of regularized, constitutional govern-
ment. On November 14, 1918, three days after he had been named

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 11

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissioners, which repre-
sented the revolutionary soldiers' and workers' councils, Friedrich
Ebert summoned the well-known political theoretician, Hugo
Preuss, and commissioned him to prepare a draft for a demo-
cratic constitution for the newly-proclaimed German republic. Not
until the middle of December, however, did it become certain that
Germany would adopt a new constitution in a legal fashion by a
constitutional convention. This decision was made by the Con-
gress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils which met in Berlin from
December 16th to 21st. Although the Congress was not elected
in formal fashion it represented reasonably accurately the interests
and wishes of the country's organized laboring classes. By its actions
the Congress revealed that the German working class, like its lead-
ers, was fundamentally not revolutionary but conservative. The
vote for the calling of a constitutional convention barred the In-
dependent Socialists and Spartacists from any move to a soviet
state except by way of force.

The events that followed were intricate and many aspects of
the kaleidoscopic patterns which appeared are still fuzzy. Suffice
it to note that during the month of December the left wing Social-
ists and Spartacists had launched a series of harassments of the
provisional government, which had come under Majority Socialist
domination. Violence followed — bloody fighting in Berlin on De-
cember 6th and again on December 23rd and 24th. On December
29th the Independent Socialists resigned from the cabinet. Be-
tween January 6th and 13th came the "Spartacist uprising" in
Berlin, during which the Majority Socialists cashed the blank check
of support promised by the High Command in November. The
regular army units which answered their call moved harshly against
the Spartacists. Spartacist leaders Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Lux-
embourg were shot by the reactionary troops which had arrested
them. After these events there was no real possibility of reconcilia-
tion between the Majority Socialists and the Spartacists, who be-
came the Communist Party in the later period. From this time on
the Communists were to refuse their rivals the label of a "revolu-
tionary" party and to consider them the tools of their capitalist
opponents. Yet there are aspects of the events of the crowded
weeks of December and January, 1918-19, which indicate that
German Spartacists had moved in a very different fashion from

12 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

their Russian counterparts of the previous year. There was no
German Lenin or Trotsky and the events of the Spartacist Week
deprived German Communists of the leadership of those who had
guided their actions during the latter part of the war. Left with
dead martyrs but with dull and spiritless living leaders, the German
Communists became tiresome critics of the republic that was
created but not particularly dangerous ones.^^

Elections to the National Assembly to draw up a new constitu-
tion were held on January 19, 1919. Its first session convened in
Weimar on February 6. It completed its work with the election
of the first constitutional Reichstag on June 6, 1920. During this
period of time it governed Germany, drew up a constitution, and
concluded the treaties of peace with the enemies of the imperial
state.

The elections for the constituent assembly underscored how
slight were the changes in political alignment effected by war and
revolution. There were, of course, changes of party designations.
The Conservative Party, which had been the backbone of Wil-
helmian Germany disappeared, but its place was filled by the
German Nationalist People's Party. Like the other parties with
which it contended, the Nationalist Party represented a Weltan-
schauung, a philosophy of life, rather than a set of principles and
projected policy. It stood opposed to the "swinishness" of revo-
lution and republicanism. Essentially counter-revolutionary in
orientation, it had little influence on the decisions of the Weimar
Assembly. Nor did it frequently, during the years that followed,
exercise significant influence on government policy, but its spokes-
men did succeed in creating a breach between the concepts of
"nationalism" and "republicanism." Whatever chance it had for
really constructive leadership was lost after October, 1928, when
the party came under the control of the irascible, arrogant, and
superficial newspaper and film magnate, Alfred Hugenberg.^*^

Slightly left of the Nationalists stood the German People's
Party, which carried over a considerable portion of the strength
of the pre-war National Liberal Party. Representing conservative
business elements, it was to contribute heavily to Weimar foreign
policy through the role of its leader, Gustav Stresemann. Like the
Nationalists, the People's Party entered the Weimar era with reser-
vations as respects republicanism and a strong hostility to all that

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 13

smacked of socialism.

The creation of a Weimar Germany rested most largely upon
three major parties of the center and moderate left. The Catholic
Center Party, created during the days of the Kulturkampf when
Bismarck had threatened the position of the Catholic Church in
Germany, remained an association of many viewpoints and philoso-
phies bound together by a community of religion. Of little moment
in the revolutionary days preceding the Weimar Assembly, the
Catholic Center Party became thereafter the keystone of repub-
hcanism in Germany, in the long run far exceeding the Social
Democrats in significance.

Joining the Center and Social Democratic Parties in the so-
called "Weimar Coalition," which controlled the constitutional
assembly, was the German Democratic Party. This was a moderate
bourgeois party devoted to democracy and republicanism and
inclined to look with sympathy upon measures for social progress,
although it had been formed, in part, to help offset existing ten-
dencies toward outright socialization. A party of "many talents,"
the names of its leaders embraced some of the ablest men in
Germany. In the elections for the constituent assembly it polled
five million votes, but a little better than a year later it lost
more than half of its supporters, and further declines followed
precipitately.

Left of the Majority Socialists, of course, stood the Independent
Socialists. The Spartacists, now separate from them, boycotted the
elections for the National Assembly. From the Independents came,
in 1919, some significant criticisms of the projected constitution.
Most of the Independents were, however, soon absorbed into the
German Communist Party, which openly used the privileges of
democracy to seek its avowed objective of social revolution. In
many respects the Communists were a far more detrimental force
in Weimar Germany than the Nationalists, for no coalition arrange-
ment could be concerted in which they would take even temporarily
a constructive part in the formation of governmental policy.

The discussions of the constituent assembly at Weimar revolved
most largely around the draft constitution which had been drawn
up by Hugo Preuss in accordance with the wishes of Provisional
President Ebert.^^ Preuss had first won acclaim as a theoretician
for democracy in 1915 with his book, Das deutsche Volk und die

14 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Politik. Complaining in this work of the absence of poHtical ex-
perience on the part of Germans, Preuss advocated the provision
of such experience by the state. He doubted that, without state
assistance, the German people would be able, of themselves, to
move to the institution of democratic forms.

Preuss's less-than-optimistic viewpoint differed little from that
of the other leading wartime exponent of democratic ideals, Max
Weber, the sociologist. Weber had, like Preuss, criticized Bismarck
for leaving behind him "a completely powerless parliament." He
also emphasized the desirability of having the state give the lead
toward more responsible government. Democracy when it came,
he felt, should be accompanied by sociological alterations to sup-
port it. The fundamental changes needed could not be accom-
plished by the people alone and unaided. They would need, felt
Weber, a symbol of authority to assist in the process of transition.
This symbol would be a "plebiscitary dictator" wielding power with
the consent of all the people.

In 1918, Preuss, who had felt that the German people could
not, of themselves, create a democratic government, found himself
confronted with the task of creating a constitution which would
allow them to do so. For this purpose he appropriated the symbol
of a plebiscitary presidency which had been advocated by Weber.
The creation by Preuss, in his constitutional draft, of a presidential
position endowed with the support of millions of popular votes
but lacking some of the elements of the American presidency was
the third of the "compromises" or "improvisations" associated with
the Weimar experiment.^^

Preuss's conception of the office of the presidency found a
favorable reception in the constituent assembly. Serious opposition
derived only from the Independent Socialists, who advocated the
establishment of a directory to exercise executive authority.^^ The
definition of the duties and powers of the President was, however,
a more difficult question. Many aspects of the President's position
were closely related to the problem of the nature and method of
organization of the state. It will be well, therefore, to consider
this problem briefly before completing discussion of the Weimar
compromise involved in the office of the presidency.

No political theorist could view with satisfaction the pre-war
territorial division of Germany. Bismarck's Reich was created by

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 15

force of arms and represented historical compulsion rather than
logic and common sense. Even on a monarchical basis it was un-
sound. The size and population of Prussia gave it a hegemony within
the old Empire which robbed second and third ranking states of
their basic raison d' ctre. The Second Reich was an unequal part-
nership of the Hohenzollern dynasty with lesser dynasties holding
satellite positions or, as it has been phrased, a partnership of the
lions with the foxes and the mice. Centrifugal forces were held
in check by the threat of military force and by some special con-
cessions to the subordinate dynasties. One of these concessions
was the granting of a series of "reserved rights" (Reservatrechte)
involving legislative and administrative areas within which the
Reich promised not to intrude. Another was the privilege granted
to the princely houses of naming direct representatives to the
upper house of the pre-war parliament, the Bundesrat. The powers
of the Bundesrat were more properly negative than positive. It
held a consultative position with regard to current legislation. But
it also exercised a controlling vote in respect to the ultimate powers
of the federal government, the so-called "Execution" by which the
Lander, the states, were held to loyal and effective enforcement of
federal law, and the so-called "Dictatorship" by which an emer-
gency situation might be met by emergency action, including
military force if needed.-^

It was clear that such a state, created by historical improvisa-
tions growing out of monarchical relationships, ought to be basically
transformed in the establishment of a republic. In some quarters
there was real enthusiasm for reducing the size and importance
of Prussia, whose hegemony had not been an entirely popular
one. Sincerely democratic Germans leaned to the creation of a
unitary state, whereby the democratization of the administrative
apparatus would have been greatly facilitated. Preuss proposed
in the preliminary sketch which he submitted to the provisional
government, to divide the Reich into fourteen districts (to which
the joining of Germany by Austria would have added two more)
designated as "free states" (Freistaaten) . The provisional govern-
ment raised serious objections to this plan, and Preuss's draft con-
stitution discussed in the National Assembly retained the existing
territorial divisions of Germany, although the competency of the
central government was appreciably extended, the superiority of

16 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

federal law over state law specifically stated, and the right of the
federal government to introduce alterations in Lander boundaries
provided for. Preuss accompanied his draft with a strongly worded
memorandum setting forth the impossibility of maintaining a Prussia
which held four-sevenths of the territory of the Reich, unless it
were to hold hegemony within the state. -^

Preuss's advocacy of the destruction of Prussia unleashed a
storm of protest. Prussian conservatives called his draft "a product
of the study lamp," and the provisional government of Prussia
also protested, pointing out that it no longer constituted a threat
to democracy and that the dissolution of Prussia would only
increase existing tendencies to particularism.^^ South German
states added their protest against Preuss's draft, based largely on
the loss of the reserved rights accorded them by Bismarck. Preuss
even failed to obtain a mandate to the Constituent Assembly, as
did also Max Weber, the other spiritual father of the Weimar
Constitution.^^ The ultimate outcome was another compromise,
another improvisation, one which satisfied few but proved diflBcult
to correct. Prussia remained stretched across northern Germany
like a giant hand, with two-thirds of the Germans divided in their
allegiance to Reich and to Prussia. On the other hand, the proper
role of Prussia and of the other Lander was reduced to the areas
of internal justice, police action, education, religious life, and super-
vision of municipal arrangements. In all of these areas the Reich
had extensive rights of supervision and the privilege of extending
its own competencies if it deemed proper. ^^ The history of the
Weimar Republic saw a gradual but steady encroachment of federal
action upon the fields originally reserved for state authority.-^

Particularist opposition to the increased authority given to the
federal government by the constitution was partially allayed by
an effort to recreate in republican form the Bundesrat of the
Second Reich- The Reichsrat, which became the second house of
the republican parliament, was composed of representatives desig-
nated by the governments of the Lander. In this regard Prussia
formed an exception in that half of its Reichsrat representatives
were named by the government of her provincial subdivisions,
which were, in fact often larger and more populous than some of
the other Lander. The position of the Reichsrat was, however,
much less significant than that of the Bundesrat. Largely consulta-

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 17

tive in character, it had the right to present objections against
Reichstag legislation, but the lower house could uphold these laws
by a favorable vote of two-thirds of its members. The Reichsrat was
not vested with control over the powers of "Execution" and "Dic-
tatorship" as had been the old Bundesrat.^^

The question as to where this significant right of control over
these exceptional measures should repose was a very serious one
in the Weimar assembly. One obvious solution would have been
to place it in the hands of the Reichsrat. It is clear from the dis-
cussion above that this would have reenforced particularist ten-
dencies to which the democratic forces were opposed. An alterna-
tive proposal was that the usage of these powers should be subject
to the approval of the highest judicial organ to be created, the
Stoat sgerichtshof. This, however, ran contrary to German legal
practice, which drew a sharp line of separation between judicial and
political areas. It was, in fact, a considerable innovation when the
Weimar Constitution attributed to that court judicial competency
in regard to questions of constitutional disputes between Reich
and Lander. This protective measure was one of the factors which
brought acceptance of the final compromise in respect to the powers
of "Execution" and "Dictatorship." These were placed in the hands
of the President of the Reich. As a consequence, he was vested
in times of crisis with great power. By the power of "Execution"
he could use extraordinary measures, including military action if
needed, to compel a Land to execute loyally federal laws. By the
power of "Dictatorship" he could use the full powers of the State
to deal with the disturbance or a threat of disturbance of peace
and order. If the President chose to do so, he could ask the advice
of the Staat sgerichtshof before employing these measures. How-
ever, he was not obligated to do so. If he preferred, he could
proceed on his own authority, being required only to bring his
actions as quickly as possible to the attention of the Reichstag,
the lower house of the parliament, and to revoke them if the
Reichstag should disapprove. In the discussion of these aspects
of presidential authority the greater part of the controversy centered
around the relationship of state governments to federal authority.
The truly devastating consequences of entrusting the powers of
"Dictatorship" to the President occasioned little discussion in the
constitutional assembly.^^

18 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Thus, in the form of the state and in the position and powers
of the presidency the Weimar Constitution embodied two impro-
vised sokitions to the serious problem of transition from empire
to repubhc. They were a portion of a constitutional work of high
quality achieved within the space of three months' time by men
who had only a theoretical acquaintance with democratic govern-
ment. Not in themselves errors, they are to be evaluated most
properly as miscalculations by men who expected those who fol-
lowed them to work loyally in the spirit of the constitution they
created. This hope was not realized.

The remainder of the Weimar Constitution embraced, of course,
the normal arrangements of a parliamentary government with a
ministry commissioned by the President but responsible to the
Reichstag. The President's position in the parliamentary machinery
was substantially that of a king in a constitutional monarchy. He
was a kind of "master of ceremonies," whose function it was to
consult with party leaders at necessary times and determine upon
a political leader who could obtain a vote of confidence from
the Reichstag. As will be seen, von Hindenburg, the second Presi-
dent of the Weimar Republic, was to use this process of consulta-
tion and commissioning as a means by which he exerted far
greater influence upon governmental policy than had been in-
tended.^^ To many observers, however, the Weimar Republic was
a "party state," in which formally organized parties held life and
death control over the destinies of the people. This complaint
broadened with the onset of the depression and the accompanying
rigidity of party programs and policies.

It was most unfortunate that the Weimar Assembly was con-
fronted not only with the task of creating a new framework of
government but also with the conclusion of peace terms and
other problems relating to the transition from a state of war to
one of peace and orderly government. It is not difficult to under-
stand the unified opposition of all parties in the assembly to the
"injustice" of the Treaty of Versailles. In this area the heart
ruled the head, but with unfortunate consequences. The Paris
Peace Conference in many ways violated the spirit of Wilson's
Fourteen Points and of the principle of a "peace with justice,"
which he discussed in his wartime addresses. The protection of
the Fourteen Points had, as it were, been purchased by the proc-

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 19

lamation of a German republic. Now it appeared that the vic-
torious powers were deaHng with a repubhc at least as harshly
as they would have dealt with the Kaiser himself. They had not
even deigned to hear its representatives. The Treaty of Versailles
was, as Hitler later emphasized, a dictated one. The Allies chose
the beginning days of a new German republic as the time to depart
from all previous custom in international relations and deny Ger-
many's new leaders a reasonable hearing.

However, the defects of Versailles were heavily exaggerated in
Germany. The Wilsonian program had protected Germany from
outright division and from complete military occupation, and the
final form of the Treaty of Versailles promised the consideration
of revision in the future. Realism in 1919 should have made it
clear that someone was going to have to assume responsibility
for the treaty of peace. Realism should also have indicated that
oral expressions of indignation were not likely to free the repub-
lican signers of the treaty from the obloquy attached to their
action. Hence, realism might well have dictated an effort to
admit that the treaty was the inevitable consequence of a lost
war. Republican leaders might well have enumerated the gains
which their leadership had brought, over against the utter disaster
which confronted Germany when they assumed power. A few
republican leaders followed this policy, but most sought to outdo
the nationalists in their denunciations of the treaty. They even
considered the possibility of further resistance, but General Groner
—von Hindenburg had shirked the responsibility— indicated that
there was no hope of this. Few Germans were willing to point
out that many unpopular portions of the treaty— the loss of Alsace-
Lorraine, the creation of the Polish Corridor, the reparations
themselves— were direct outcomes of the armistice arrangement
concluded by the old imperial government. It seems reason-
able to suggest that a government which would have accepted
the treaty more gracefully, without the insulting gesture of defiance
made in Paris before the Allied representatives by the anti-demo-
cratic Brockdorff-Rantzau, might well have earned much more
quickly relief from some of the most patently unjust features.
Certainly the patient and reasonable attitude of the Adenauer
government after World War II contributed greatly to the reversal
of much severer peace terms. The reaction of democratic leaders

20 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

to Versailles was natural and understandable. Some imagination
and some real courage in the face of hostile public opinion might
have won great returns. ^^

From this nationalist attitude as well as from the consequences
of the Ebert-Groner bargain in behalf of public security late in
1918 derived the basic failure to reform the German military
establishment. The Weimar National Assembly made no effort
to republicanize the German army. Nor did it set into motion
reform efforts in the areas of agricultural land ownership and of
public education. In these areas reforms might well have con-
tributed vitally to the future of German democracy, but it must
be admitted that the exact nature of the needed reforms and how
they might have been effected are debatable.

There was little real popular sentiment antagonistic to the old
landowning aristocracy of Germany in 1919. Only the Communists
advocated full-scale socialization and their proposals were con-
sidered disruptive influences at a time when all others were
striving for stability. Division of the large landed estates east of
the Elbe River, the heartland of Germ.an "Junkertum," might well
have furthered possibilities of an invasion by the newly-recreated
state of Poland. And in the midst of food shortages, created in
part at least by the continuance of the Allied blockade of Germany
after the conclusion of the armistice, there was no great support
for any drive which would in any way endanger Germany's domes-
tic food supply sources.^''

Nor was there any real drive for educational reform. The
German school master was not an unpopular figure. Germans had
little understanding of or interest in the ideal of a common system
of secondary as well as elementary education for all. There was no
way by which the underlying philosophy of education could be
changed overnight. It may, however, be alleged that the spirit
of education is important along with the efficiency of the process,
and that greater attention could well have been devoted to seeking
means by which curriculum, pedagogy, and normal school prepara-
tion might give more emphasis to democratic ideals and practices. ^^

In the area of judicial theory and practice, reform also stopped
short. The supreme court (Staatsgerichtshof) of the Reich was
provided for in the constitution and implemented by a law of the
Reichstag in 1921, but legal definition of its disputed competency

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 21

was not attempted. The Reichstag left the determination of the
court's position in constitutional questions to the actions of the
president and of the court itself, even though it was clear before
1926 that there was a vacuum in the area.'*- Beyond the problem
of the competencies of the supreme court the Weimar republic
faced difficulties created by the retention of large sections of the
imperial judiciary. Weimar judges allowed newspapers to use
such terms as "Saustaat" and "Saurepublik" (swine state and swine
republic), "Schieber- und Judenrepuhlik" (republic of black mar-
keteers and Jews), and other libelous terms, to call republican
officials "bastards," to speak of the republican flag with profound
disrespect, and to sponsor the harshest anti-Semitism. The idea
that the judges held over from the days of the monarchy were
"untouchable" greatly impaired efi^orts to defend the republican
system. ^^

Nor was there serious consideration of alteration in the pro-
cedures and practices of the political parties themselves. Recogni-
tion of the origins and pre-war history of the German parties and
of the circumstances that shaped them into ideological associa-
tions rather than political parties provides understanding for their
positions during the Weimar period. But the feeling remains that
somewhere along the road at least a few imaginative leaders
might have appeared within the German parties; leaders who
could have brought Social Democrats to realize that the interests
of workers and industrialists were not diametrically opposed; leaders
who could have made Catholic Centrists realize that the days of
Bismarck and the Kulturkampf were past and that it was de-
sirable for Catholic and Lutheran church leaders to cooperate in
maintaining their confessional schools; leaders who could convince
Populist business leaders that a well-paid labor force provides a
country's best market; and leaders who could bring within the
Nationalist camp acceptance of the end of authoritarianism in
the age of mass democracy. It was the tragedy of Weimar that
such appeals to the common interest and to the welfare of the
generality were posed most basically by the groups which sought
selfish power for selfish ends.^*

Before the Weimar Assembly completed its work and resigned
its powers into the hands of a regularly elected Reichstag, there
was one final opportunity to give democracy a meaning and a

22 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

morale, to create for it that which one recent author has labeled
a "legitimation." Republicans had defended themselves vigorously
against Bolshevism in 1919. The events of the "Spartacist Week"
had been accompanied by numerous arrests. The Communist
leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembours; had been mur-
dered by the military groups on whose assistance the government
had called. The crime, the work of undisciplined rightist ex-
tremists, was never properly punished. In 1920 republicans were
confronted by a threat from the Right, from militarist and re-
actionary groups seeking to prevent execution of the army limita-
tions involved the Treaty of Versailles and, undoubtedly, also
to overthrow the republic. This so-called "Kapp Putsch" of March,
1920, derived its name from Wolfgang Kapp, an American-bom
son of a German emigree. Kapp had returned during the war,
helped to organize the "Fatherland Party," and became the major
civilian leader of what was substantially a military coup d'etat.
The efforts of Kapp and his co-conspirators resulted in the seizure
of Berlin and the erection of a rival government temporarily in
control of the seat of authority. A general strike sponsored by the
Social Democrats forced the putschists to admit defeat. But the
logical consequences of the event did not follow. General Hans
von Seeckt, the chief of the general staff, who had refused to use
regular army forces against the illegally constituted revolutionary
forces, was rewarded for his perfidy by being given supreme
command of the armed forces. ^^ And no one was hanged! If the
government had only hanged a dozen or so of the participants to
show that treason in a republic is as serious as treason in a mon-
archy, there would have been fewer who could have equated the
terms "democracy" and "lack of authority!" Nor did President
Ebert, who found it possible in 1923 to use his power of "Execu-
tion" against a Communist government in Saxony, find it possible
in 1920 to use it to force the reactionary state government of
Bavaria to surrender avowed traitors. Somehow German demo-
crats failed to recognize that democratic procedures do not require
a state to nurture within its breast the seeds of its own destruction.
This lesson, however, came with the harsh days of Hitler and
post World War II Germany has given evidence of its willingness
to proceed strongly against groups negating the foundations of
democratic and republican government.

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 23

The preceding pages have sketched the origins of a new Ger-
many after World War I. Much of this story is famihar, but post-
World War II reevaluation has added interesting viewpoints.
Many of the new generation of German historians have written
of this era in the blackness of disillusionment.^*^ It is to be hoped
that their healthy criticism will be accompanied by positive con-
tributions—by sympathetic biographies of republican leaders who
deserve the kindly brush of the artist for their efforts to create
something new and untried. No more challenging subjects could
be found for such studies than the lives of the republican leaders
of Prussia, who sought with some success to erect a democratic
framework of government in the homeland of Bismarck. A small
segment of this story is the purview of this study.

As is true of the history of any political subdivision, it is diffi-
cult to separate the story of Reich and Prussia. In the process
of constitution-making and governmental reform after World
War I their destinies were closely intertwined. The political con-
ditions in pre-war Prussia had been even less favorable to the
growth of democratic sentiment than those in Germany as a whole.
The Prussian government functioned under the Constitution of
1850 handed down (oktroyiert) by the king after the failure of
the revolution of 1848. Not only was the cabinet responsible to
the king rather than to the diet (Latidtag), but also the principle of
universal manhood suffrage was contravened by the arrangements
for the election of the lower house (Haus der Abgcordnefen).
Electors were divided into a three-class system according to their
tax contributions and each of these classes elected one-third of
the members of that body. Thus, in 1908 the votes of 293,000
electors in the upper class had the same influence as those of
1,065,240 in the second class and of 6,324,079 in the lowest class.
Voting was public and apportionment of representation very
faulty. Beyond this was the curtailment of democratic spirit in
a state controlled by the spirit of obedience to authority and
subordination to one's superior. In 1918 Prussia seemed likely to
be the most sterile ground in all of Germany for the development
of democratic government. ^'^

Until November 11, 1918, the history of the revolution in Prussia
and in the Reich as a whole was one. On that day the executive
committee of the workers' and soldiers' councils named a provisional

24 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

government for the state of Prussia. This government included
Paul Hirsch and Heinrich Strobel as chairmen, along with Otto
Braun, Eugen Ernst, and Adolf Hoffmann. Three days later a
sixth member, the lawyer, Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld, was added. This
government was created as had been that of the Reich by joint
agreement of the two sections of the pre-war Social Democratic
Party, the Majority Socialists and the Independent Socialists, who
shared equally in power. Not only did they have equal represen-
tation in the cabinet, but they also participated in a dual control
of the ministries, each minister having a co-minister from the
other party of the coalition. Hirsch, Braun and Ernst belonged
to the majority group; Strobel, Hoffman, and Rosenfeld to the
Independents. Of scarcely secondary importance were Konrad
Haenisch of the Majority Socialists, who shared with Hoffmann
control of the Ministry of Culture; Adolf Hofer of the Independ-
ents, who shared with Braun control of the Agricultural Ministry;
Emil Eichorn, an Independent, who became provisional chief of
police in greater Berlin; Dr. Albert Siidekum of the Majority
Socialists, who took charge of the Ministry of Finance, and Dr.
Rudolf Breitscheid of the Independents, who shared with Paul
Hirsch control of the Ministry of the Interior.^^

Most of these new leaders were men unknown to the general
public. Party stalwarts, whose task had been organizational work
and determination of principles, they had had no previous govern-
mental experience. It is not surprising that they found their new
tasks difficult and that they proceeded cautiously. In time some
of them emerged as significant political personalities. Others faded
back into the shadows from which they had emerged.

On November 13th the new government issued a proclamation
which set the pattern for much of its later action. Although it
proclaimed its determination "as quickly as possible to convert the
old Prussia, reactionary from top to bottom, into a fully democratic
constituent part of a unified, popular republic," it proceeded within
the same communication to hold in force the existing administra-
tive organization pending legal change. ^^ A day later it added a
specific admonition that the workers' and soldiers' councils were
not to interfere with the independence of the law courts and that
existing laws and ordinances were to remain effective until re-
scinded.*" In a more revolutionary mood were the proclamations

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 25

of November 15, 1918, which ordered the aboHtion of the old upper
chamber (Herrenhaus), the dissolution of the lower house {Haus
der Ahgeordneten ) , and revision of the educational system to elimi-
nate false and tendentious views of the origins of the war, of
militarism, of republicanism, of revolution, and of the present
government. ^^

The vacillation between fully revolutionary changes and the
retention of traditional arrangements continued in the period that
followed. The major target of governmental action was the prob-
lem of church schools and of religious instruction in the public
schools. Here, severe governmental action met with severe criti-
cism and the full enforcement of the government regulations was
withheld pending the establishment of constitutional government.'*^
Actions seeking the abolition of titles and reduction of the role of the
old officer group brought an early resignation from the govern-
ment on the part of Minister of War Scheuch.^^ Protests against
the dissolution of the old Haus der Ahgeordneten and the abolition
of the old Herrenhaus were published by the chief oflBcials of
those houses.^'* The royal family remaining in Prussia engaged in
a series of proclamations in which Princes Friedrich Leopold and
Adalbert took opposition to Prince Heinrich who stated that his
major loyalty still remained with the head of the ruling family.*^
Thus, in Prussia during the early days of the republic, there were
powerful elements wedded to the pre-war traditions of the state
who sought to impede the process of democratization.

Meanwhile, the Prussian government followed with attention
the course of events which had led to the calling of a national
constituent assembly. The decision of the congress of workers'
and soldiers' deputies providing for elections for the assembly
found rapid acceptance by the Prussian government. On December
13 it provided that elections for a constitutional assembly in Prussia
would take place a week after the national election. These were to
be held with universal, direct, and secret suflFrage under a system
of proportional representation.^^ Before the votes were actually
cast, however, the course of events in Prussia had again paralleled
those in the Reich as Independent Socialist members of the gov-
ernment withdrew on January 3, 1919. The government which
remained was composed solely of Majority Sociahsts with the
exception of one Democratic minister (Fischbeck, Minister of

26 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Commerce) and two non-party members. The Independents ex-
plained their withdrawal by pointing to the withdrawal of their
fellow party members from the central council in Berlin and also
stating that they considered unauthorized the replacement of Min-
ister of War Scheuch by the Director of the Demobilization De-
partment in the Prussian War Ministry, Col. Max Reinhardt.'*'^ Their
voluntary withdrawal was followed a day later by Minister of
Interior Eugen Ernst's dismissal of the Berlin police president, Emil
Eichorn, who was accused of furthering the disorder of the Sparta-
cists in ttie capital city. Eichorn refused to recognize the dismissal
and became a significant figure in the armed uprising of the Sparta-
cists in Berlin beginning January 5th. The Spartacist revolt was
suppressed only after the Reich government employed regular
army troops under the leadership of Gustav Noske."*^ This involved
heavy fighting in the taking of the Vorwdiis building, headquarters
of the leading Social Democratic newspaper, and the occupation
of the police presidency itself. Not until January 13th were fully
stable conditions restored.

The elections in Germany as a whole for the national consti-
tutional assembly took place on January 19th, those for the consti-
tutional assembly for the state of Prussia on January 26th. Election
statistics indicate a considerable parallelism in Reich and Prussia
although the fact that Catholic Center Party strength was less in
Prussia than in the Reich as a whole increased the proportional
strength in the Prussian returns of the Majority Socialists and of
the German Nationalists.^^ The Prussian elections were followed,
however, by action of the Prussian government postponing convo-
cation of the Prussian assembly until issues had been clarified
within the National Assembly.-"^

Such a step was made imperative by the possibility that the
National Assembly might of itself make an end to the old state
of Prussia. The constitutional draft by Preuss which incorporated
this change was, of course, altered under the influence of the
national provisional government so as to retain the old Lander,
but, as noted above, Preuss in a memorandum accompanying the
draft proclaimed that the maintenance of Prussia in its pre-war
territorial area was not feasible. The initial attitude of the Prussian
government, as expressed by Hirsch in the conference of the
representatives of the new states called to consider Preuss's draft,

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 27

was sharply critical of Preuss's proposal, declaring that it operated
entirely to the advantage of the South German states and to the
disadvantage of Prussia. If the Reich were to be unified, said
Hirsch, the process should be carried through completely— it should
become a unitarian state. ^^ A similar line was taken by the Min-
ister of Justice, Heine, in the sessions of the National Assembly,
where he pointed out that division of Prussia, particularly under
existing circumstances, would imperil the unity of the Reich as a
whole. ^^ Before the opening of the Prussian constituent assembly
on March 13 it was relatively certain that the national assembly
was not likely to set in motion drastic changes in respect to
Prussian territory.

By the time the constitutional convention of Prussia opened
its session, Prussia had been under a provisional government of
republican but quasi-legal character for exactly four months. Ac-
curate evaluation of its accomplishments would be extremely dif-
ficult. Many of the prominent personalities in this interim period
did not leave detailed records of their view of the events. The
clearest picture of the problems of the day is found in the memoirs
of Otto Braun, the Minister of Agriculture, Forests, and Public
Domains in this provisional cabinet. The difficulty of imposing
democratic viewpoints and policies upon the reactionary bureau-
cracy held over from the kaiser's day is compellingly sketched by
Braun. The serried rows of unfriendly faces, the artificially ex-
panded stacks of Akten awaiting the minister's attention, and the
passive resistance to actual accomplishment which confronted Braun
must have been duplicated in the other ministries. ^^ This kind of
opposition was accompanied by dangers of separatism in the
Rhineland, Hanover, and Schleswig-Holstein, by strike upheaval in
the Ruhr region, by Spartacist activity in Berlin and reactionary
plots in the eastern part of the state, and by problems of food
supply more severe than in some of the less populous portions of
the Reich. The accomplishments of the provisional government
in meeting these problems deserved the applause of the constitu-
tional assembly to which it reported, but little was received.
Instead it was subjected to sharp criticism both from Right and
from Left.

"The old Prussia is dead, long live the new Prussia," proclaimed
Minister-President Hirsch in opening the deliberations of the

28 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

constitutional assembly.^^ Most disrespectful, complained the Ger-
man Nationalist spokesman, Dr. Hergt, in answer. Hirsch fully
misunderstood and libeled the old Prussia. "With a deep sense of
gratitude," he added, "we recall that which the House of Hohen-
zollern accomplished, how its members themselves were examples
of the Prussian sense of duty, of Prussian thrift and simplicity, how
under their leadership was created a loyal and incorruptible official-
dom, the envy of the world, and how under their rule the Prussian
state was a model of order and authority.^^ The struggle between
the old Prussia and the new, thus signalled, extended long beyond
the sessions of the constituent assembly and found its ultimate
denouement in the events of 1932 and 1933.

The constituent assembly proceeded to elect by acclamation
as its president the Social Democrat Robert Leinert with the first
and second vice-presidencies being held by Center and Democratic
Party members respectively. This election indicated the formation
within Prussia of the Weimar Coalition referred to above. On
March 25th the results of discussions among the tliree parties were
indicated with the announcement of a new cabinet whose posts
were divided among them.^^ Otto Braun has related that the
formation and operation of such a ministry was by no means an
easy task. The non-Socialist, "bourgeois" parties had indicated their
unwillingness to enter singly into coalition with the Social Demo-
crats, and the broad basis of the Center Party, which rested upon
reactionary as well as liberal Catholic support, meant that many of
the governmental policies were the subject of severe dispute among
coalition members. ^^ Efforts to secure necessary reforms under
these circumstances were often doomed to failure.

Designation of a new provisional government now resting upon
the support of the constitutional assembly was followed shortly
afterward by the proclamation of an emergency provisional con-
stitution. Discussions of the permanent constitution, interrupted
by the events of the Kapp Putsch, were not completed until No-
vember 30, 1920. Thus, a year of provisional government had
passed, before the state of Prussia received its official constitutional
form. During that period the cabinet conducted affairs in respon-
sible relationship to the constitutional assembly, which acted the
role of the later Landtag. The first constitutionally chosen Landtag,
or state legislature, derived from the elections of February 21,

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 29

1921. Meanwhile, the events associated with the Kapp Putsch
had brought the resignations of Minister-President Hirsch and Min-
ister of the Interior Heine, who were replaced on March 29, 1920,
by Otto Braun and Carl Severing respectively.^^ These two Social
Democrats, "the strong men" of Prussia, gave color to the history
of republican Prussia, and their role is dealt with more extensively
in the following chapter. The executive decisions of the provisional
governments, however, formed a very vital role in the birth of
the Prussian Republic.

Much of the form of constitutional organization of the state of
Prussia was determined by the events of the national assembly. By
the Weimar Constitution Prussia lost her hegemony in the Reich.
Beyond the increased centralism of the government noted above
Prussia's influence was reduced by the assignment of half her votes
in the Reichsrat to her provinces and by the separation of the
position of head of state, the Reich President, from any connection
with the Prussian state. The constitution provided that a state
might not be divided contrary to its will until alter August 11,
1920, which by implication indicated that this would be possible
after that date. Still the disposition toward division appeared
relatively weak. Prussia was considered a necessary "corner stone"
of the Reich: the integrity of Prussia was needed to safeguard the
integrity of the Reich itself. However, Prussia, like the other
Lander, became subject to Reich surveillance of the enforcement
of Reich laws, and to the principle that Reich law took precedence
over Land law ("Reichsrecht bricht Landesrecht"). Against the
state of Prussia as well as against smaller states the Reich was em-
powered by the federal constitution to use force, if necessary, to
compel obedience to the federal government. For twelve years,
however, Prussia was noted for its loyal enforcement of Reich law
and her trustworthy cooperation with the shifting cabinets of the
Reich.

The creation by the national constitution of the position of
Reich President influenced the arrangements for the Prussian
executive. There was considerable strength vdthin the Prussian
assembly for the creation of a head of the state for Prussia also,
but majority opinion felt that the existence of such a post in Prussia,
which shared the national capital, would imperil the prestige of the
Reich President. ^^ As a consequence, there was no titular head

30 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

of state in Prussia. The Landtag, or state legislature, chose "without
discussion" the Minister-President, who then named the other
members of his cabinet. This procedure entailed considerable
uncertainty in respect to the operations of the cabinet system. The
Minister-President was, by the constitution, entitled to determine
"the guide lines" of policy, but in actuality had little control over
his fellow ministers. These might at any time resign or be subject
to a vote of lack of confidence without the resignation of the
Minister-President or the cabinet as a whole becoming necessary.
In turn the Minister-President might resign and some members of
his cabinet retain their positions. Each minister had also practically
autonomous responsibility within his own department. As a conse-
quence, the ministry in Prussia stood somewhere between a collegial
system and the Prime-Minister variety of cabinet. ^"^

The assembly was to all intents and purposes a unicameral
legislature chosen by universal, direct, and secret vote. Nothing
in the way of a representative chamber other than the Landtag
was envisaged by the original draft of the constitution. There was
to be a Finance Council composed partially of ex-officio members
and partially of representatives elected by the Landtag. In the
discussions in the constitutional assembly this Finance Council
fell by the wayside and was replaced by the establishment of a
Staatsrat (Council of State), which had a representative character
but was not considered a second house. Its functions were basically
consultative. It was entitled to offer advice in respect to projected
laws and to be consulted after laws were voted by the Landtag.
In the latter area it had a suspensive veto — a law passed by the
Landtag but rejected by the Staatsrat could not become effective
unless again passed by the Landtag by a two-thirds vote or ap-
proved by a popular referendum. One significant function of the
Staatsrat lay in the fact that its president, in conjunction with the
president of the Landtag, and the Minister-President, constituted
the "Committee of Tliree" (DreimdnncrkolJcgiutn) entitled to dis-
solve the Landtag and call for new elections. The Staatsrat was
significant, also, in that it was representative of the pro\ inces and
municipalities and, therefore, though its voice was a negative one,
could on occasion speak in behalf of local interests.*^ ^

Some objection may be offered to the title of this book
which deals with the Prussian Republic. Rather amazingly. Otto

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 31

Braun, who held the post of Minister-President of that state for
twelve years declares that the term republic was rejected in behalf
of the term "Freistaat" (free state) which rolled more easily from
the German tongue and rang more softly in German ears.^- Ac-
tually, the term "Freistaat" was used in the title of the constitution,
but the term "Republik" was used in the first article of the consti-
tution and this was not accidental. The term was specifically
chosen to prevent the return of the Hohenzollems, since it would
have been possible to label a parliamentary monarchy a "free
state" but not a "republic."^^ But Braun, himself, became the
most ardent helper in the republicanization of one of the most
reactionary of the German states and, although subject to much
valid criticism in respect to some of his policies and procedures,
emerges in the long run as one of the most capable of the German
democratic leaders. That tragedy wrote finis to his career and that
the strong man of Prussia abandoned the ramparts of his fortress
for the security of a Swiss villa does not affect the substance of
his achievement during a period when democracy still seemed
an attainable ideal. It is now appropriate, therefore, to examine
briefly the Prussia of Otto Braun.

CH. II. REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY

The history of the republic of Prussia is to a high degree the
biography of one man. That man was Otto Braun, variously referred
to as "the uncrowned king" or "the red tsar" of Prussia. Braun
was the Minister President of Prussia from 1920 until 1932 with
only brief interruptions in 1921 and 1925. His deposition from
that office and the events subsequent to that deposition form the
major substance of this volume. Some would count Carl Severing,
who served as Minister of Interior from 1920 to 1926 and 1930 to
1932, a co-partner in the history of the Prussian state. Partner he
was, but not upon the basis of equal political acumen or states-
manship.

Otto Braun, the republican, typified many of the better qualities
associated with traditional Prvissianism and only a few of its darker
characteristics. Born in 1872, he spent his pre-war years in the
city of Koenigsberg in East Prussia. Although he was of humble
origin, his career reflected an astonishing transformation from
printer's apprentice to Minister President, an accomplishment which
ought to have been one of the inspirational factors in a democratic
state. Not until 1932, however, when the days of democratic in-
spiration were well past, did two rather thin and not very colorful
biographies of Otto Braun appear. To these have been added
Braun's own autobiography and a handful of appreciative commen-
taries by contemporaries. A definitive biography of this important
statesman is still lacking.^

Braun's forte was not genius but sober factuality. He reflected
strongly the earnestness and intensiveness of his East Prussian
homeland, but he also typified its willingness to assume difficult
tasks and to master adversity. Honesty, loyalty, responsibility, a
strong sense of morality, modesty, shrewdness — these are some of
the characteristics attributed to Otto Braun. But there was more.
There was, in particular, a certain flexibility that few German
statesmen developed. Braun possessed a keen ability to analyze
political forces and to draw from this analysis the necessary con-
clusions. Contacts with party leaders and discussions in respect
to coalition policy he managed well. He led his own Social Demo-
cratic Party in Prussia into a series of compromises and adjustments
which the Communists labeled the policy of "the lesser evil" but

34 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

which represented the ultimate sacrifice in an effort to preserve
parhamentary government. Braun's whole career was blackened by
his premature flight from Germany in early 1933, and some of the
harsh criticism of this action by his opponents cannot be waved
aside.^ But Braun's flight was by and large consistent with his
earlier career. By 1933 there remained no longer in German politics
place for a convinced republican. German democratic statesmen
had been left in the lurch by those whose welfare they most sought
—the people themselves.

There is in this respect, however, a comment that cannot be
avoided. It is that few of the leading German statesmen had the
characteristics of great popular leaders. Braun was not an exception.
Although the stiff massive frame, the large semi-bald head, and
the shrewd eyes encircled by dark-framed glasses conveyed a deep
impression of solidity and reliability, there was not there the verve
and elan of a popular leader. Perhaps it was not to be expected.
Factual-minded democratic statesmen in Germany between the
wars had little to offer the public but explanations of unavoidable
compromises with necessity. Still it might be conjectured that a
Braun who had great oratorical ability and a sense of mass psychol-
ogy as well as the attributes possessed by the real Braun might
well have saved the republic from destruction.

Carl Severing's name is most closely linked with Braun's in
the government of Prussia. Like Braun he rose from a humble
position, apprenticeship in the metal trades, to high government
position. He was Prussian Minister of the Interior from 1921 to
1926 and from 1930 to 1933. Severing's great and unquestionable
services to the cause of Prussian democracy are discussed below.
He understood, very probably, more of the fire and drama of
politics than did Braun, but he lacked the equipoise of serenity
and strict self-control. He was also, it would appear, more narrowly
wedded to concepts of party position than was Braun. There was
in Severing a brusqueness and rigidity which served also to deny
him a role of broad leadership in the confused politics of the Beich
between the two World Wars. But in honesty, hard work, earnest
effort to accomplish democratic goals Severing, like Braun, left
Httle to be desired."^

Beside Braun and Severing worked a great number of resolute
and sincere ministers and civil servants whose accomplishments in

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 35

Prussia, although far from perfect, were of great importance. Most
of them stand in the shadows, their deeds unsung by their con-
temporaries and neglected by later historians. They, themselves,
have told us little of their problems. Particularly to be regretted
is the absence of memoirs by men like the Minister of Public
Welfare, Heinrich Hirtsiefer; the Minister of Culture, Carl Heinrich
Becker; and Ministerial Director Wilhelm Abegg in the Ministry
of the Interior, whose statements could throw much light in dark
places. One of those more clearly delineated is Albert Grzesinski,
who held the Ministry of the Interior between the two terms of
Severing, and who was also police-president of Berlin, 1925-6 and
1930-2. Grzesinski seems to have been a figure endowed with
considerably more "drive" than Severing himself but he was kept
from a role of greater prominence largely because of that drive
and the enmities it produced. On the surface it would appear that
much of the reform work often attributed to Severing belongs to
Grzesinski's term of office.^ Hermann Hopker-Aschoff stands forth
as the ablest Prussian Finance Minister of the period and Becker,
mentioned above, as the most notable Minister in the area of
education and cultural offices.*^ Special note should be given to
Arnold Brecht, Ministerial Director in the Ministry of Finance,
whose outstanding ability emerged in the period of crisis discussed
below and whose talents would undoubtedly have won him a minis-
terial post if the early demise of Prussia had not prevented it.'^
Beyond these there were, of course, many others — Hermann Badt,
the able Ministerial Director in the Interior Ministry, the early Min-
ister of Transportation, Rudolf Oeser; Adolf Grimme, who suc-
ceeded Becker in the Ministry of Culture; and Otto Klepper, who
headed the Finance Ministry after Hopker-Aschoff's resignation.^
The outstanding impression presented by the Prussian govern-
ment during the Weimar period was that of political stability.
There were actually only three occasions which might have been
counted "ministerial crises." These were in 1921, when the cabinet
of Center part)^ leader Adam Stegerwald found itself unable to
retain power more than a few months; in 1925, when the Great
Coalition in Prussia, discussed below, broke up and was replaced
by the Weimar Coalition; and in 1932, after the resignation of the
Braun cabinet. This steadiness of government leadership during
a period when Reich cabinets were changing so frequently is

36 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

explained by a number of factors. Most outstanding is the skill
of Otto Braun in the execution of coalition policy.

Braun's first cabinet, that of 1920, was based on the so-called
"Weimar Coalition" of Social Democrats, Democrats, and Centrists,
the three parties which had most strongly influenced the construc-
tion of the Weimar Constitution. This was replaced in late 1921
by the "Great Coalition" which added to the above parties repre-
sentatives of the German People's Party and thus brought together
the broadest possible combination of parties supporting republican
government. The divergence between the Marxist Social Demo-
crats and the People's Party, which was not only bourgeois but
also strongly influenced by big business, meant that the construc-
tion of the "Great Coalition" and its preservation through four
years of intense foreign and domestic problems was an almost
miraculous accomplishment. It signified the fact that the Social
Democrats in Prussia relinquished during that period a considerable
portion of their party objectives. With the exception of the founding
of the mining works sponsored by the Prussian government {Preus-
sische Bergwerke und Hiitten A.G. — "Preussag") and the entry
into the field of water rights and control ( Landesanstalt fur Wasser-
Boden- und Lufthygiene ) , there were no efforts to extend the
scope of government ownership. People's party cabinet members
and Landtag leaders exercised zealous supervision to eradicate
anything smacking of socialism from government policy. As it
was, they too had to suffer under government prohibitions of open-
air demonstrations during a lengthy portion of this period. These
restrictions were, of course, justified by the possibility of tension
between Communists and rightist groups, but were diflBcult to
explain away when they interfered with occasions of patriotic
celebrations or memorials of past heroes. The coalition was never
a really solid one— friction was endemic. Absence of evidence from
the side of the People's Party makes it impossible accurately to
assess responsibility for this friction, but Braun's ability to mix
firmness and concession is strikingly underscored in his memoirs.®

After 1925 Braun again governed on the basis of the Weimar
Coalition, although during part of that time he had, as he says,
"a majority of minus four plus fear of the opposition."^" During
this period, although opponents exaggerated the "redness" of
Prussia, there was an increase in the number of socialists in local

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 37

government posts with a corresponding move in the area of welfare
activities, and two rather dramatic steps by the central government
of Prussia — the creation of the Preussische Elektrische Aktiengesell-
schaft {"Preag") for the distribution of electric power and of the
Preussische Landesrentenbank, which provided long range credit
terms for settlements in agricultural areas. These moderate meas-
ures were the most that the Social Democrats could obtain support
for from their bourgeois coalition partners, the Centrists and Demo-
crats. On the other side, as will be noted, the Social Democrats
made extensive concessions to the particular objectives of their
partners.

Beyond the unusual flexibility of some of the party leaders in
Prussia several other factors aid in explaining the stability of the
government coalition. One of these was the position of the Catholic
Center Party in Prussia, where the large industrial population and
strongly Protestant character of a goodly portion of the state ren-
dered nugatory any effort by Catholics to dominate the government.
The Catholic-Social Democratic coalition, accompanied as it was
by the understanding and tolerance of Otto Braun, provided security
against action detrimental to confessional schools in strongly Catho-
lic regions. Then, too, Catholic chancellors of the Reich obtained
significant concessions on occasion by the threat of sabotaging
the coalition in Prussia. Perhaps the most outstanding of these
concessions was the withdrawal of Otto Braun from the second
presidential election of 1925 and his replacement by Marx, the
Center candidate. In the first election Braun had polled almost
twice as many votes as had Marx.^^

Another very significant factor in the stability of the Prussian
government was its clearly apparent efiiciency. Perhaps the most
vital key to that eflBciency was the administrative apparatus and
the police forces. This is not to say, of course, that the bureaucratic
offices had been brought into a state of orderly and economical
simplicity or that they had been divested of all reactionary elements.
But it does appear that the reconstruction of administrative per-
sonnel on the basis of a republican point of view was far more
thorough in Prussia than in the Reich as a whole.^^ The course of
events after July 20, 1932, proclaims this fact. And, beyond this,
is the general lack of scandal associated with the Prussian regime.
There were, of course, exceptions— the Sklarek scandal relating to

38 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

the city administration in Berlin is a notable one.^^ But peculations
were minor and the force of government action was directed strongly
against them when they appeared. As for the Prussian police, their
effectiveness and impartiality are probably best substantiated by
the complaints directed against them by both National Socialists
and Communists. The importance of the Prussian police in the
story of the death of republican Prussia justifies special considera-
tion here.

The Prussian police, numbering about 85,000, were under the
administration of the Minister of the Interior. Control over local
areas was delegated by him to subordinate officials, such as the
Police Presidents of the larger cities and the administrative oflScials
of the provinces. Like that of most European police, the armament
and equipment of the Prussian police exceeded the usual American
connotation of the term. Since there was no exact equivalent of
our national guard arrangements by which state governments could
meet conditions of riot or mass demonstrations, the use of police
forces for this purpose was probably an unavoidable alternative.
Early in his period of activity Severing made Dr. Wilhelm Abegg
his particular assistant in the area of police supervision, and Abegg
carried on in that capacity until the time of the coup of 1932.^^
Prussian police moved with severity against both right and left on
various occasions. The most outstanding of the actions against
the Communists occurred May 1, 1929, when police action against
an illegal demonstration in Berlin resulted in seven dead and almost
a hundred injured. The Communists named this the "Zorgiebel
May Day" after the then Social Democratic police president of
Berlin and swore permanent enmity against the "Social Fascists"
who were responsible for these "murders" of the working-class.^^
This antagonism was deepened in 1931 when Berlin police raided
and thoroughly searched the Communist party headquarters, the
Karl Liebknecht House. ^*^ An equally deep antagonism to the
Prussian police reposed in the hearts of the National Socialists,
since the "Schupos" enforced laws against Nazi speeches, took severe
action against rightist student groups, and engaged in a constant
series of raids of Nazi meeting places with attendant arrests and
confiscation of arms. Eventually pressure of the Prussian govern-
ment, based upon raids in Pomerania in 1932 which partially dem-
onstrated treasonable intentions on the part of the Nazis, resulted

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 39

in the prohibition of SA and SS formations which is discussed
below. Basically the actions of the Prussian police system do not
completely satisfy the observer. There is considerable evidence of
excessive severity on a number of occasions. There was an indica-
tion in 1931 that sections were not completely loyal to republican
viewpoints. ^'^ But judgment of police activity during such troublous
times is most difficult; by and large the Prussian police served the
cause of the republican state and were looked upon by many as
a counterpoise to anti-republican movements on the eve of the
crisis of 1932.

Police action reflected, of course, the determination of the
Prussian cabinet to preserve conditions of public order. Arnold
Brecht, former Ministerial Director in the Prussian government,
has summed up in defiant language the fight made by the govern-
ment against Fascist threats:

It was the democratic Prussian cabinet which, as early as November
1922, outlawed the National Socialist party of Prussia, and again in 1927
outlawed the Berlin party section, and which forbade Hitler to make
public speeches in Prussia from 1925 to 1928, until the failure of the
other states to follow this practice and the defeat of the Nazis in the
1928 elections led to discontinuance of the ban. It was the Prussian
cabinet which in 1928 led the vote in the Federal Council against the
building of the first pocket battleship ( the later Deutschland ) ; which, in
contrast to the Reich cabinet, forbade members of the Prussian civil
service to be members of the National Socialist party; which conducted
poUce action against the Nazis with comparative vigor. . . .

It is a moot question . . . whether the Prussian measures were always

wise and whether at the end the Prussian cabinet should have fought

with other than constitutional weapons; but its political fight against

fascism was sincere, and continued even after the Reich cabinet and the

cabinets of most other states had capitulated. 1 8

Little needs to be added to this summary except the commentary

that after-thoughts of several statesmen have suggested possible

means of more effective action. Most convincing is the narrative of

Albert Grzesinsld, who relates that he sought in late 1928 and early

1929 to secure from Severing the dissolution of the Stahlhelm,

the Nazi Party, and Communist Party and all camouflaged military

organizations appertaining to them.^^ Severing's effort to rebut

Grzesinski's criticism of his own failure to act at this time is far

from convincing. Both here and later Severing displayed a degree

of political caution which did not comport with his reputation for

firm decisive action.-*^ Whether dissolution of the Communist and

Nazi parties would have resulted in their disappearance is, of

40 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

course, dubious, but it would certainly have prevented them from
taking advantage of the privileges of democracy to work for its
overthrow. It would have alleviated, at least temporarily, the dif-
ficulties which Arnold Brecht, one of the officials of this troublous
period, has described in his interesting article portraying the
dilemma of democratic leaders confronted by anti-democratic ma-
jorities.-^ Grzesinski's suggestion of action probably came at the
last moment when really effective action might have been taken
and when the anti-democratic forces were sufficiently divided to
have made action effective. But Prussian democrats like those of
the Reich as a whole were reluctant to see the need to suspend
the accepted standards of democratic government in order to
preserve it from extraordinary dangers.

Nor were accomplishments in the field of agricultural reform
completely satisfactory. It might have been anticipated that a
government headed by a Social Democrat convinced of the urgent
need of agricultural reform in Prussia v/ould accomplish more in
this area than Otto Braun found possible. In this respect it has
already been noted that the earliest and most favorable period for
possible socialization was overshadowed by concern with the
Versailles treaty and fear that socialization would give Germany's
former enemies a wedge by which to increase reparations. In the
period that followed, Braun was handicapped by the necessity of
holding together the "Great Coalition" in Prussia in order to retain
governmental authority. Not until after 1925 was the Prussian
government free to pursue somewhat more intensively the increase
of "settlement" of small farmers in the East Prussian region. Even
under these circumstances the facts of advancement in this area
are striking. In all the years from 1885 to 1915, the old Prussian
government, labeled at times a "welfare state," had created only
1500 new farms for "settlers." In 1919 to 1921, the Prussian govern-
ment created 4739 new individual farming settlements {Siedler-
stellen ) with 44,000 hectares of area and 5466 extensions of existing
farm land holdings {Anliegersicdlungsstellcn) with 53,500 hec-
tares.-- By 1931 this number had increased to 42,642 new settle-
ments with 480,561 hectares of land.-^ Between 1921 and 1928,
21,075 new quarters for agricultural workers on estates {Werkwoh-
nungen) and 16,895 individual, privately owned, homes for agri-
cultural workers were built. -^ The Prussian government spent more

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 41

than double the amount monarchical Prussia had spent to assist
agricultural development and doubled the number of agricultural
schools available.-^ In 1932, of course, the Prussian government was
forced to agree that problems of agricultural colonization in the
East Prussian area would be the exclusive province of the central
government, as will be noted below.

In the area of education the Prussian government achieved a
notable expansion of its activities. Expenditures for the lower
schools (Volksschiden) were tripled between 1913 and 1931 and
those for higher schools were doubled. ^*^ This increased expendi-
ture of funds reflected the importance the government attached to
education. Unfortunately it is not possible to pay unalloyed tribute
to the accomplishments of the Prussian government in the educa-
tional field. Konrad Haenisch, the first post-war Minister of
Education, and Carl Heinrich Becker, the third, seem to have been
sincere and earnest seekers for reform. However, neither regarded
his task as a really revolutionary one requiring fundamental re-
vision- Becker, the abler of the two, reflected much of the academic
abstraction of the traditional German school master.^'^ Otto Boelitz,
who held the ministry from 1921 to 1925, belonged to the People's
Party and the nationalist tone of his own writings was reflected in
the nationalist character of many of the school texts used.-^ Adolf
Grimme, the last of the Ministers of Education, was probably
most practical-minded of the group but he arrived on the scene
too late and under circumstances too unfavorable to accomplish
radical revision of the system.-^ Basic reform efforts also ran
into the problem of religious concerns— with the Center Party, a
necessary partner in the government coalition, preferring cautious
moves in the area of education. Among the advancements made
during the period may be mentioned the extension of some elements
of a common curriculum into the area of secondary education,
although higher education remained still subject to class division
and still far short of the more democratic conception of an
"Einheitsschule" which would draw all students together into one
common program of secondary education. ^*^ Prussia also created
a system of Pddagogische Akademien or two-year normal schools,
separate from the universities, to provide teachers for the elemen-
tary schools, and these seem to have been more progressive than
the universities themselves. ^^ As for the universities Becker pro-

42 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

vided some of the most progressive-minded discussions of their
role in repubHcan Hfe of this period and struggled, although not
always too successfully, to defend republican professors and stu-
dents from the rising wave of reaction.^^ As one of those directly
concerned with the process notes, the reform of education during
the republican period was seriously handicapped by the close
intertwining of scholastic consciousness and the cultural heritage
and by the insecurity of the nation at large. ^^ But one cannot
escape the criticism that entrusting this vital area to a People's
Party candidate for five years and failing to insist upon fundamental
measures of change reflect one serious shortcoming in Braun's
political leadership. In his memoirs Braun half apologized for
this failure, offering as an excuse that the Reich delayed in estab-
lishing fundamental school laws, and that the coalition nature of
his government made educational reform difficult.^*

Balancing, in a sense, Braun's limited accomplishment in the
field of education, is his very unusual achievement in stabilizing
religious problems within the state. In 1929 the Prussian govern-
ment, headed by a Socialist, achieved what the Reich, often
under Catholic Center leadership, had been unable to accomplish,
the conclusion of a concordat with the Papacy. Signed on June
14 and ratified by the Landtag on July 9, the concordat pro\ided
increased subsidies for the church but contained no provisions
relating to elementary or secondary schools. ^^ As it was, it was
remarkable that Braun could secure ratification of the accord prior
to a similar regulation of affairs of the Protestant church. Indeed,
this action was strongly denounced by agencies of the Evangelical
(Lutheran) Church itself and of the German Nationalists and
People's Party.^^ Basically, it signified the liquidation of the last
remnants of Bismarck's Kulturkampf against the Catholic Church.^'^
Not until May 11, 1931, did the Prussian government sign the
corresponding treaty with the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church or-
ganization regulating state subsidies and assistance. Even then
this was accompanied by the stem warning of the Socialist leader
in the Staatsrat, Dr. Meerfeld, that attention should be devoted
to the simplification of administration of the evangelical church
and that a republican state could scarcely look with satisfaction on
the anti-republican "Stahlhelm-pastors" of that church.^^ In spite
of the fact that it was sponsored by a Social Democratic Minister

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 43

of Culture and that it contained provisions allowing the state some
check over the political reliability of higher church officials, the
Social Democrats abstained from the final vote of ratification.^®
It was, thus, in opposition to a portion of its own following that
the Braun cabinet achieved by 1931 a generally satisfactory settle-
ment of internal church policy.

Stern police action, a minor degree of socialization of industry
and agriculture, a moderate reform of education, and a partially
satisfactory legal stabilization of church-state relationships— these
are the outward accomplishments of the Braun government. All
are, however, to be measured against the starting point in one of
the most reactionary of the German states and against the moun-
tainous difficulties of a tumultuous post-war period. ^^ Eighteen
governments came and went in the Reich while Braun held oflSce
in Prussia. Spartacist week, Kapp Putsch, inflation, strikes, political
assassinations, Nationalist taunts and Communist insults, depression,
deflation— the catalogue of problems is scarcely begun. But a very
patient leader and a patient and experienced cabinet had accom-
plished much by 1932. That the leader and some of his colleagues
were, by then, weary of the striving against almost insuperable odds
is scarcely to be wondered at. It was most unfortunate that younger
and more aggressive leadership did not stand ready to fill their
shoes. But the youth belonged to those who sang siren songs of
action rather than the mournful dirge of self-control and hard work.

Reich and Prussia shared a common capital — the sprawling,
bawdy, cynically caviling city of Berlin in which every twenty-fifth
German found his home in 1932. Berlin was not a popular symbol in
that year of depression and hard times. Even many Berliners
shared in the antipathy to the city, counting the absence of normal
family life and broad social intercourse there an obstacle to the
fulfillment of creative talents. Part of the antipathy derived from
the feeling fh^JL the interplay of cultural influences had deprived
the Berliners of their national roots— there was a sense of "home-
lessness" (Heimatslosigkeit) which haunted patriotic Germans. For
Berlin reflected an atmosphere that was essentially foreign — a
bustling industrialization that Germans labeled "American" accom-
panied even by a pronounced taste for American Hterary and
dramatic productions. Provincials looked aghast at a city where
130,000 foreigners were in permanent residence; where 300,000

44 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

business enterprises flourished; where 1,342,800 citizens received
medical care from sociaHzed chnics; where society reflected a
multiplicity, an intermixture, and an atomization which defied the
understanding and repulsed the taste of the Miinchener, the Kolner,
the Konigsberger. But far beyond these items of outward appear-
ance Berlin was the symbol of governmental authority, both of
Reich and of Prussia, and to the dark designs of selfish politicians
the average German in 1932 attributed his sufferings and fears.

Berlin accorded far better with its status as a capital for the
state of Prussia than as a national capital. Its extensive industrial
population gave it a very large socialist-communist vote. Over half
of the members of its city council ( Stadtverordnetenversammliing ) ,
provided for by the Prussian law which revised the city's govern-
ment in 1931, belonged to one of these parties.^- It adhered
firmly to the support of the republic. Not even in February, 1933,
when almost all of Germany "went Nazi," did it provide a Nation-
alist majority.'^^ Far more the symbol of "Red Prussia" than of
the "Black Reich" it seemed to many Germans a dangerous home
for the government of the Reich. But because of its association
with the glorious history of the Hohenzollern Reich few even
dreamed of a removal of the government from the city. The answer
of those who were concerned with the problem was rather that
Berlin and Prussia must both be subjected to a "cleansing" process
(Sduberung) by which they should be rendered fit once again for
their traditional task of leadership.

From this nexus of governmental activity a sincere but ascetic
chancellor controlled the lines of political power in 1932. That man
was Heinrich Briining, a figure enigmatic to his contemporaries
and by no means clearly defined today.^'* His party, the German
Genter Party, had dominated the politics of the Reich under the
Weimar Republic. The "fourteen years of the first German republic"
were not years of Social Democratic control as often alleged by its
enemies. Paul Lobe, the Social Democratic President of the Reichs-
tag from 1920 to 1932, has put together an interesting analysis in
which he points out that during these fourteen years there were
only three Social Democratic chancellors, that Social Democrats
took part in only eight of the eighteen governments which were
formed, and that there was only one cabinet in which there was
a Social Democratic majority. This cabinet held office only four

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 45

months, and all of the cabinets together in which Social Democrats
took part were in office a total of three of the fourteen years of
the republic.'*^ In contrast, the Center party provided chancellors
for eight of the cabinets and members for every German government
prior to that of Franz von Papen.

The chancellorship of Heinrich Briining was in itself sign and
symbol of the crisis under which Germany lay in 1932. It had
come into being in March, 1930, after the collapse of the cabinet
of Hermann Miiller, which had been based since April, 1929, on
the so-called "Great Coalition" of the Social Democratic, Center,
Bavarian People's, Democratic, and People's Parties. Briining's
cabinet was created to master political, economic, and social
problems of an extraordinary nature and functioned with extraor-
dinary measures and policies. Its difficulties centered around
adjustment to depression conditions of great severity. '^^

The depression, which began in the fall of 1929 in the United
States, communicated itself quickly and with emphasis to Germany,
which was heavily indebted both in terms of long range and short
range credits to the United States. In Germany the depression
posed special problems because of the existence of the obligation
to pay reparations for World War I damages and because of the
heavy obligations attached to interest payments on foreign loans.
Some amelioration of Germany's position in respect to reparations
was attached to the conclusion of the Young Plan in 1929, but the
onset of the depression quickly began to make the projected
payments promised by this plan seem unrealistic. Accompanying
this problem in the field of foreign relations was the severe internal
problem of keeping the unemployment insurance fund liquid when
the number of jobless was sky-rocketing. There was also the diffi-
cult task of maintaining Germany's foreign trade at a time when
tariff walls hampered the free exchange of goods and when con-
sumer buying power was rapidly dropping throughout the world.
Germany's high level of industrial production made it vital for her
to export. But a large, well organized, influential and vociferous
agricultural section also demanded security against foreign agri-
cultural intrusions. Depression problems in Germany, therefore,
were highly complicated, involving the obligation to transfer large
sums of capital abroad each year, the obligation to safeguard
extensive social security arrangements, the need to assist in the

46 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

exportation of manufactured goods, and the pressure to assist and
protect domestic agriculture— and, of course, the effort to create
some solution to the mounting toll of business failures, bank
closings, and unemployment.

From first to last there were two basic methods by which to
deal with the economic crisis. One method would have been to
place major emphasis on Germany's own economy, to increase
governmental expenditures for the provision of work, and to extend
the area of governmental supervision and activity into many fields
previously regarded as reserved for private capital. This program
of increasing governmental spending in a time of economic con-
striction has been traditionally associated with the economic
policies of Sir John Maynard Keynes. There were many reasons
why Keynesian economics found little reception in Germany.
Perhaps most outstanding was the experience of the inflationary
period of the early 1920's which meant that measures of an infla-
tionary nature were likely to trigger an hysterical reaction. Of
almost equal weight was the fact that any kind of inflationary
scheme would reduce the exchange value of German currency and
make it still more difficult to accomplish the necessary transfer
of reparations and service on foreign debts. Another vital factor
was the fear of Marxism on the part of the non-Marxist parties.
The bourgeois parties had no inclination to increase by excess
governmental expenditures that which they regarded as already
an over-extended "welfare state" apparatus. On the contrary, they
were increasingly desirous of an Abbau, an "unbuilding" of social
insurance and welfare arrangements. In the long run, of course,
the National Socialists after 1933 were able to follow this infla-
tionary method of fighting the depression, making use of conceal-
ment and subterfuge to avoid fears of inflation, canceling many of
Germany's foreign obligations by unilateral action, and getting
rid of the Marxist "danger" by removing the Marxists from the
political arena. '^^

Meanwhile, however, between 1930 and 1933 the cabinet of
Briining and, to a lesser degree, the cabinets of Papen and
Schleicher followed a much more difficult and far more unpopular
alternative road out of the economic morass, that of governmental
deflation. This involved the reduction of governmental expenditures,
and with them, of taxes, so that German industry might be able

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 47

to reduce prices and thus retain a competitive place in the world
market. At the same time, however, it was necessary to provide
some governmental assistance to segments of the economy not
otherwise protected— particularly agriculture. All of this was com-
plicated by the fact that declining levels of business brought also
a rapid decline of government tax receipts so that the idea of tax
reduction proved more and more difficult. It has been well suggested
that Briining's program of the early 1930's was much like the
"austerity" program of Sir Stafford Cripps after the war. For the
Communists Briining was the "hunger chancellor." An American
reader might well find some Hues of similarity between Briining
and Herbert Hoover, noting that both stood for poHcies which had
much economic "know-how" behind them but which lacked
popular appeal.^®

The greater portion of Briining's program had been delineated
before he became chancellor. In the early months of 1930 the
cabinet of Hermann Miiller had confronted the unavoidable prob-
lems of balancing the budget and meeting the mounting costs of
unemployment insurance. The Social Democratic ministers of the
cabinet and Social Democratic leaders, such as Otto Braun, who
were experienced in other political fields, had reconciled themselves
to emergency steps to balance unemployment insurance expendi-
tures. This would have involved not only increased contributions
on the part of those insured but also a reduction of the state's
responsibility for deficits in the fund. They were countermanded
in their tendency to compromise with the "bourgeois" parties by
their owoi party directorate, which feared that any infringement
of unemployment compensation might lead to complete destruction
of the system and would, at any rate, result in an immediate loss of
votes to the Communists. The outcome was that the Social Demo-
crats, who by the elections of 1928 were the leading party in the
Reichstag, laid down governmental responsibility. They never re-
gained it. Between 1930 and 1933 the party which had exercised
a vital influence in the creation of the Weimar Republic and which
still commanded about a fourth of the popular votes recorded in
national elections played a purely negative role in governmental
policy.^^ As a consequence, the economic crisis was accompanied
by a political crisis of major proportions since the parties committed

48 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

to parliamentary government could no longer agree upon funda-
mental measures of governmental policy.

It was Briining who, in the last days of the Miiller cabinet, had
made seemingly desperate efforts to retain the Social Democrats
in a position of governmental responsibility. He led the compromise
eflForts which sought to make the contemplated modification of
unemployment compensation as palatable as possible. ^*^ But
Briining had already discussed the existing problems of financial
policy during an audience with von Hindenburg concerning the
acceptance of the Young Plan. The announcement which resulted
from that audience had stressed that the President was convinced
of the urgency of the financial situation and would make use of
"all constitutional means" to solve it.^^ With the fall of the Miiller
cabinet Briining was commissioned by von Hindenburg to form a
cabinet which the President "in view of the parliamentary difficul-
ties" considered need not rest "upon the basis of coalition relation-
ships.^^ The consequence was that for two years Heinrich Briining
headed a cabinet which derived its right to govern not from the
normal support of a parliamentary majority but from the extraor-
dinary powers of the Reich President wielded in what must be
regarded as a continuing state of crisis.

Briining's dependency upon the President was increased by
the results of the unfortunately premature dissolution of the
Reichstag in the summer of 1930.^^ The elections of September,
1930, appreciably narrowed the strength of moderate parties in the
center of the political spectrum and electrified the country with
the revelation of an unprecedented swing of political opinion to
the previously relatively unimportant National Socialist party.
Through the two years that followed, observers at home and
abroad watched the drama attached to the rivalry of two men
representing the antipodes of personality and political policy.

Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Briining were both products of the
first World War. But World War I had found Hitler, an unsuc-
cessful, self-educated, undisciplined unknown adrift in the flotsam
and jetsam of the Bohemian life of Munich to which he had come
from his native Austria. Briining, on the other hand, was already
on the eve of his doctoral degree at Bonn, applauded for his
brilliance in the field of economics but demonstrating some of his
later uncertainties and lack of complete self-confidence. ^■^ Both

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 49

men entered the war as volunteers, but the steadiness and self-
discipHne of Briining brought him the commission which Hitler's
hysteria denied him.^^ In the post-war period Hitler entered a little
known radical labor party and made it his own by demagogic
oratory and fervent fanaticism. Briining, on the other hand, served
in the Prussian Ministry of Welfare from 1919 to 1921, when he
became political and economic adviser to the Christian Trade
Unions in Germany. His associate, Adam Stegerwald, later wrote
that Briining's office hours stretched from 9:30 in the morning until
late at night. ^^ His sober appearance — he was nicknamed the
"chancellor with one suit of clothes" because of his predilection
for black— reflected self-discipline in all aspects of his life. An
American commentator reported that Briining's wildest emotion
was a passion for Plato and that his only vice was an excessive taste
for cigars. Unlike Hitler, whose speeches sometimes carried with
them an emotional impact approaching an orgasm, Briining spoke
calmly and imperturbably, and made his basic appeal to
reason rather than emotion.^'^ In many respects it might be said
that in these years of crisis Briining, with his measured tones, his
tightly-buttoned dark suit, his eyes remote behind thick glasses,
typified the sober judgment and abstemious self-control of the old
Germany, while Hitler, with comic-opera gestures, raucous voice,
and glaring eyes, represented the release of emotions long pent
up in the souls of the masses.

But Briining was the Richelieu of a puzzling and obscure
Louis XIII— Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg. In spite of the
extensive literature available the historian still awaits the definitive
life of this strange man. Perhaps it will never be written. For it is
hard for those who have erected a man into a god to examine the
ways of that god with objectivity. Hindenburg had been made a
symbol of Germany's military struggle in World War I, a rallying
point in time of national peril. Although one of the most respon-
sible agents in Germany's defeat, he had emerged with the faith
of the people in his person unshattered and had remained as the
major symbol of the sober and stable Reich of Bismarck. To that
symbol the German people rallied in the presidential elections of
1925 with a floodtide that bore down doubts about the marshal's
conversion to the cause of republican government. In the years
after 1925 Hindenburg made himself a new symbol— a svmbol of

50 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

the adjustment of the old to the new, a symbol of stability in the
midst of uncertainty, a symbol of calm in the midst of storm. An
English biographer has called Hindenburg "a wooden titan."^^
The designation appears appropriate. The student of the period
can find little to commend in the character or historical contributions
of von Hindenburg. In World War I his military decisions were
largely charted by Ludendorff. After World War I he himself gave
early support to the "stab in the back" legend of a German defeat
due not to military setbacks but to failure at home.^^ He accepted
a candidacy for presidency of a republican government although
he hated all that went with republicanism. He used the oflBce of
the presidency for an influence on political developments that
exceeded the constitutional limits of his prerogatives. And in the
final outcome he who swore an oath of fidelity to a republican
constitution became the key to its overthrow. Of personal intelli-
gence there was a moderate measure. Of genuine concern for his
fellow countrymen there was little. Of personal loyalty to his
associates there was none.^*' One has the feeling that von Hinden-
burg's less-than-completely-honorable role is still covered by Ger-
man historians and statesmen who fear that a "debunking" will
deprive Germany of one of the few symbols of greatness remaining.
But the commentary cannot be avoided that no symbol is of value
unless enabled by its true character to vdthstand all adverse
criticism. ^^

The recent life of von Hindenburg by Walter Gorlitz, although
it adds relatively little to that previously known, highlights the
influence of von Hindenburg on republican pohtics after 1925.^^
This influence was by no means the restricted role of a French
president or a British monarch. The German president was not
bound to any specific procedure in his efforts to bring forth a cabinet
capable of gaining Reichstag support. From first to last it is clear
from Gorlitz's account that Hindenburg used his presidential posi-
tion as a vantage point from which to influence poUcy, accompany-
ing his discussions with political leaders with a clear indication
of his own views and making use on a number of occasions of
personal letters to political leaders in order to shape policy. Hinden-
burg's course might be described as that of "moderate right." During
his first years in oflSce he was often attacked by extremists on the
right. In spite of this criticism he was, during that time, active in

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 51

the defense of those elements of national tradition which he
considered irrefrangible. The consequence was that he created an
impression of semi-objectivity, although his efforts paid little heed
to the opinions of the majority of his fellow-countrymen, who until
1930 voted center and moderate left. All of this adds up to a
reaffirmation of the commentary of Theodor Eschenburg that the
Weimar Constitution had created in the position of the Reich
President an "Ersatz-kaiser," a position exploited much in that sense
by von Hindenburg, who never dreamed of the role of an honorary
head of state such as that usually attached to truly parliamentary
regimes.®^ There was, however, virtually no challenging of Hinden-
burg's actions. The importance of the presidency gained by deficit
of healthy criticism. Ebert in his last year in office had been forced
to institute numerous libel processes to protect himself against
defamation.'^'* Von Hindenburg, his successor, moved in an aura
of unimpeachability. By the time of the Staatsgerichtshof proceed-
ings discussed below, the judges even warned against allusions to
the idea that he might have erred or done wrong. ^^

Hindenburg never found the normal course of parliamentary
procedure a satisfactory one. As early as 1929 he had jotted down
in respect to the formation of the Miiller cabinet the note that if
other methods of procedure failed, he might entrust the building
of a cabinet to a man in his confidence without party connections,
who would be provided "with the order of dissolution in his
pocket."^^ By 1930 he arrived at the implementation of that deci-
sion with the creation of the Briining cabinet. His acceptance of
Briining was furthered by the fact that Briining, in spite of his
Christian labor union experience, was considered to belong to the
more conservative wing of the Center party and by Briining's
wartime service as a "front-line oflBcer." Undoubtedly von Hinden-
burg also saw in Briining's views a respect for monarchical tradi-
tions and a tendency to favor conservative, authoritarian reform
which paralleled his own.^'^ Yet Briining denied at the outset
inclinations toward dictatorship.^^ And at no time during the period
of two years which followed does he appear to have advocated
constitutional reform intended permanently to deprive parliament
of its controlling position. He convinced his democratic contem-
poraries that he used extraordinary powers for temporary purposes
and intended to return to normal parliamentary pocedures when

52 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

possible.®^ Duing the course of his chancellorship, however,
Briining seems to have become more pessimistic in respect to repub-
lican government in Germany. By the fall of 1931 he seriously con-
templated the establishment of constitutional monarchy. He pro-
posed to make von Hindenburg regent (Reichsverweser) until his
death, at which time one of the sons of the Crown Prince would
have assumed the throne. This plan would have by-passed both
the former Kaiser and the Crown Prince, to both of whom objections
existed within Germany as well as abroad. It looked toward a
constitutional monarchy on the English model.'^*' As such it died
stillborn because of the opposition of von Hindenburg, who
dreamed of the restoration of a monarchy not constitutional in
character.

Several aspects of this confused period of the fall and winter
of 1931-2 remain unresolved. In 1947 Briining stated that von
Hindenburg had suffered a mental breakdown (einen geistigen
Zusammenbriich) in September, 1931. For ten days strict secrecy
was preserved and uncertainty in respect to the President's health
continued in the period that followed.'^ ^ In Briining's words,
"Hindenburg's mental strength varied. He was sometimes very
tired and did not understand the political situation. Then it fre-
quently happened that after a good long sleep he was quite well
and shrewd the next day."^- Although Briining's picture has been
questioned, his good faith is less subject to question than that of
his critics.'^^ As a consequence, it would seem that the chancellor's
plan for a constitutional monarchy in which Hindenburg would be
regent for his lifetime was projected at the most inopportune
moment possible. If this is considered along with Briining's own
indication that he withheld from his fellow-cabinet members news
of the president's illness and the details of his own negotiations
with the United States in respect to disarmament arrangements, a
picture begins to emerge of a cabinet based upon a "prime-minister"
basis rather than upon a collegial system.'^^ This impression is
strengthened by the protocols of the cabinet sessions. In one of
these, untoward pessimism in respect to Germany's financial con-
dition, voiced by Stegerwald, the Minister of Labor, led to the
breaking off of the open cabinet session and its continuance on a
very narrow basis. During this discussion at the ministerial level
(Chefbesprechung), Briining cautioned his fellow cabinet mem-

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 53

bers about their utterance in the plenary cabinet sessions — which
were, of course, in themselves considered secret.''^ Most of these
plenary sessions were, as a consequence, of a most perfunctory
nature. The impression is left that in the loneliness of great respon-
sibility in a time of urgent need Chancellor Briining had begun
to create for himself a strongly personal system of government in
which he made most of the basic policy decisions himself. One of
the most important of these decisions was that full attention to
internal political difficulties must be preceded by an outstanding
success in the field of foreign policy.'^*'

Closely related to these questions in respect to the inner work-
ings of the Briining cabinet are those questions relating to the roles
of the president's intimates and advisers. Of these, Schleicher has
come off most badly in the postwar period, probably largely be-
cause he did not have a chance to defend himself.

General Kurt von Schleicher had become during the 1920's the
major expert of the German army in respect to political affairs.
In the United States he would be denominated a "public relations
expert." In the Weimar Republic, however, Schleicher's principal
task was not so much to "sell" the army to the general public as to
steer its course through the complicated waters of parliamentary
politics. A joyful intriguer, the "creeping" general seems to have
possessed real ability to assess the strength of existing political
forces. Through mastery of the play and counterplay of person-
alities and parties he made himself a confidant of the President.
The fascinating story of his activities has received much attention
in postwar histories. Later phases of these activities play a vital
role in this account.'^ ^ It is not, however, clearly indicated that it
was Schleicher who kept von Hindenburg au courant of the course
of politics. His influence seems to have been sporadic rather than
constant. Who was it, who, probably by indirection and innuendo,
often formed the President's decisions, for it appears clear that
after the fall of 1931 the President was no longer capable of com-
pletely independent judgments? Probably this day-to-day direction
came through Otto Meissner, his State Secretary, whose memoirs
are among the most superficial and unsatisfactory of the postwar
crop. If so, Meissner's memoirs are more significant for what they
leave unsaid than for their actual contents!"^

54 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Regardless of these details, however, the fact remains that in
the early part of 1932 the course of German politics centered around
an octogenarian who was not always in complete possession of his
mental faculties and who lacked the breadth of background needed
to understand his fellow countrymen. A deuce made trump by his
associates, he became the means by which those men sought to
triumph in the complicated game of domestic politics. The efforts
to prolong his term of office, the decision, when this proved im-
possible, to prevail upon him for a renewed candidacy for office,
the constant reliance upon his emergency powers under the con-
stitution — all of these served to raise his prestige at a time when
his personal reliability was declining. That such a course of action
was accepted by all the political parties from the Socialists on the
left to the Nationalists on the Right, was a demonstration of the
lack of faith in the democratic process on the part of those who
professed support for it. Perhaps they were right — as Arnold
Brecht has explained it, they found themselves democrats in a
country where the majority had proved themselves undemocratic.*^^
And it appears that their maneuver almost succeeded in saving
at least a portion of the parliamentary system and of the concept
of a state of law. But one has the feeling that some consciences
might have rested more easily in the period that followed, if those
committed to democracy had held to their convictions, rejected
dependence on a used-up holdover of the monarchical era, and at
least given their fellow Germans the chance to vote in 1932 for
one truly democratic figure. That he would have been defeated is
probable. That his defeat would have been accompanied by the
election of Hitler is also probable. That the presidential position
might have given Hitler a better springboard from which to launch
his dictatorship than the one he obtained in early 1933 also cannot
be denied. But these were probabilities, not certainties, and defeat
under the flag of genuine convictions would have left a far better
after-taste for the Weimar era.

The tragedy of the presidential election is a well known story.
With Hindenburg's consent Briining sought to get approval of a
lengthening of his constitutional term of office. This required a
constitutional amendment, hence a two-thirds vote in its favor in
the Reichstag. Briining gained support for the idea from the Social
Democrats and the smaller bourgeois parties in the center as well

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 55

as from his own Catholic Center party. He was unable to obtain
agreement to lengthen the President's term from the Nationalists
and National Socialists, both of whom were hostile to his own chan-
cellorship. The consequence was that von Hindenburg was forced
to withstand a presidential election campaign in which many of
those who had supported him in 1925 now stood against him. In
his victory, which required a second campaign in view of his
failure by four-tenths of one per cent to carry an absolute majority
in the first campaign, Hindenburg provided a set-back to the
National Socialists who campaigned behind Hitler. But it was not
a very convincing one, attended as it was by the amassing by
Hitler in the second election of thirteen and a half million votes in
opposition to a great national hero. Most distressing to the ego of
the aged president was the fact that he owed his victory to Social
Democratic and Democratic supporters, who stood for a way of
life the Field Marshal abhorred. ^° That his reelection laid any
form of obligation upon him seems not to have occurred to him.
Very probably his advisers made shrewd choice of the newspaper
materials they read to him— one reads with cynical irony the hopeful
comment of the great jurist, Friedrich Giese, that Hindenburg
should be reelected as "the best guardian of the German consti-
tution!"®^ Von Hindenburg appears to have been far more moved
by irritation at the minor incidents of the election process than
impressed by the renewed expression of the faith of his countrymen
in his ability to safeguard them from disaster.

Meanwhile, the position of the great state of Prussia was of
momentous importance during these crisis days in the Reich. It
had become the major target of abuse both from the extreme right
and the extreme left. Stahlhelm leader Franz Seldte berated the
"Marxist Prussian government" and warned that "He who has
Prussia has Germany."®- Alfred Hugenberg, the despotic and dys-
peptic leader of the German Nationalists, barraged Briining with
demands for an alteration of the Prussian government. And the
National Socialist leaders made no secret of their hatred of Prussia.
Some of them went so far as to suggest that their "Third Reich"
would exchange the "foreign city" of Berlin for Munich as their
capital.®^ Nazi newspapers initiated in 1932 a cross-fire of mordant
criticism of Braun and Severing and harsh attacks upon Klepper,
the Prussian Finance Minister, Grzesinski, the Police President of

56 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Berlin, and Bernhard Weiss, the Vice-President of the BerHn
pohce.^* On the other extreme of the poHtical spectrum Com-
munist leaders denounced the "Social Fascists" in Prussia as being
as bad as Briining, who was, in turn, quite as bad as Hitler.^^ Yet
from the standpoint of democratic leaders Prussia's stability was an
anchor in a time of great uncertainty. None of the responsible
leaders of the day could envisage the possibility that Prussia's large
and efficient police organization might come into the hands of
irresponsible persons. To prevent this many sacrifices could be made.

The nature of the opposition to the Braun regime in Prussia
was underscored in the great plebiscite of August, 1931. Initiated
by the Stahlhelm, whose antagonism to the Prussian government
has been noted above, the plebiscite proposed to the voters the
dissolution of the Prussian Landstag last elected in 1928. Backed
by Stahlhelm, Nationalists and National Socialists at the outset,
this proposal gained late in July the support of the Communists,
who announced that they were making the vote a "Red Plebiscite"
against the government of Braun and Severing.^^ The plebiscite
gained its constitutional authorization by obtaining almost six
million signatures. In the final vote nine and three-quarter milHon
of an eligible twenty-six million voters cast their ballots in its favor.
Although it failed in its desired accomplishment, a majority of the
eligible voters being required, it cannot be doubted that its basic
impact was unfavorable to the Prussian government. As Bracher
points out and as Severing frankly detailed in his memoirs, the
Prussian government had thrown its weight heavily against the
plebiscite. Prussian officials were prohibited from expressing them-
selves in its behalf. Severe police action was taken against demon-
strations. Newspapers were required to carry the government's
explanation of its stand.^'^ As a consequence, the narrow margin
of success did not augur well for the regular elections to be held
during the following spring.

Meanwhile, neither Briining nor von Hindenburg looked with
favor on the Braun-Severing regime in Prussia. Briining had de-
fended it against the Stahlhelm plebiscite, but did so, he said, only
from party loyalty. He was privately highly critical of Braun and
repulsed the suggestion made shortly after the plebiscite that he
bring Severing into the Reich Cabinet and combine Reich and
Prussian administrations in the areas of police, finance, and justice.^^

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 57

Von Hindenburg was even more critical of the Braun regime than
was Briining. In 1930 he and Braun had had a serious disagreement
relating to a joint visit of the two leaders to the sections of the
Rhineland then being evacuated by the French. Hindenburg com-
plained in an open letter to Braun against the "unjustified" prohibi-
tion of tlie Stahlhelm by the Prussian government, which would
deprive it of the right to take part in the celebrations. The incident
itself was soon settled — the Stahlhelm prohibition was lifted after
its leaders had declared that they would conduct their activities in
accordance with Prussian regulations. But Braun regarded the
President's action as an unwarranted intrusion into the internal
affairs of Prussia motivated by a desire to destroy his governmental
coalition. Braun carried his complaints directly to the President,
by his own report in a firm and thorough manner, and von Hinden-
burg ended their conversation with the peace-making request that
in the future they talk out their differences.^^ Braun, for his part,
shelved his doubts about the President and became one of the
strongest backers of his reelection.

Von Hindenburg, however, was far from reconciled with Braun.
In July, 1931, he answered sympathetically complaints of the Crown
Prince in respect to the course of the Prussian government. He
promised on this occasion to use his influence to strengthen the
action of the Prussian government against the Communists and to
moderate its severity against groups on the right.^*^ He was, how-
ever, not satisfied with the results obtained by the time of his
reelection. In a private letter to Graf Westarp, the leader of the
"moderate right" at that time, he emphasized his intention to work
for a reconstruction of the Prussian cabinet after the election. If
this could not be accomplished prior to the Prussian Landtag elec-
tions, which "had to take place by May at the latest," he felt sure
that it could be done afterwards. ^^ It is clear from these commu-
nications that the Prussian leaders who supported von Hindenburg
in his reelection obtained neither gratitude nor help from him
as a result.

The new elections for the Prussian Landtag or legislature were
held on April 24, 1932, two weeks after the second vote for the
Presidency. The time had been set with the expectation that Hin-
denburg would give the Nazis a severe set-back and that the
moderate parties in Prussia could capitalize upon this loss of

58 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUGLIC

prestige. ^^ These hopes were disappointed. Two elections had
been necessary and the Nazis had gained heavily in the second one.
Now, on the eve of the Prussian vote, the Nazis proclaimed loudly
their adherence to the old Prussian traditions. "Prussia," said Goeb-
bels, the party's chief propagandist, "is more than a territorial con-
ception. Prussia is a political (staatspolitische) idea. . . . Training,
order, service to the whole (of the people), iron discipline, uncon-
ditional authority, political leadership, a strong army, a solid, sober
officialdom, the well-being of the land produced by the zeal of its
inhabitants and iron economy of its princes, education of the people
in Christian and national conceptions and, in spite of the fact that
the individual is bound to the law of the nation, a free sweep
(Freiziigigkeit) of the spirit, a liberalism of thought, a tolerance
among all religious beliefs . . . — all that is Prussia." And, added
Goebbels, "Prussia must again become Prussian. "^''

The results of these appeals to Prussian traditions were, indeed,
highlighted in the election figures. The Nazis gained in the Prussian
elections 8,008,000 votes. This would seem to indicate that they
were maintaining the increase registered in the second presidential
election. The Nazis now held 162 seats in the Prussian Landtag.
Their nearest rivals were the Social Democrats with 94. The only
other party which gained was the Communist, which obtained an
additional seat. The Center gained in popular votes but lost in
its representation.^'*

The consequence was that the Prussian government found itself
in the position occupied by the Reich government since September,
1930. A heavy representation of anti-parliament Nazis on the right
and anti-parliament Communists on the Left virtually negated all
possibility of orderly constitutional government.

This outcome was not entirely unanticipated. Two weeks before
the date set for the election, the old Landtag in its closing days
had adopted a change in the order of procedure regulating the
election of the Minister President. The Prussian constitution, as
noted above in chapter one, stated simply that the Minister Presi-
dent should be elected by the Landtag without discussion. It did
not provide exact procedures for this action so that the definition
of these procedures, as a consequence, rested within the preroga-
tives of the Landtag. Until April 9, 1932, the Minister President
had been chosen in a process resembling the popular election of

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 59

the Reich President, by which one vote was taken and if there
were a majority given to a candidate, he was elected. If no person
received a majority, then a second election was held in which the
person having the highest number of votes was declared elected.
Recognizing the probability that there would be a large National
Socialist upswing but hoping that this would not provide them
with an absolute majority in the Landtag, the Social Democratic
fraction proposed and carried in the Landtag an alteration by which
the election of the Minister-President required an absolute majority.
This was designed to prevent the Nazis from obtaining that office
unless they created a coalition with the Nationalists and the
Center.^^

The wisdom of the step is debatable. Much can be advanced
for and against the decision. The actual results must undoubtedly
have been anticipated— the formal resignation of the Braun govern-
ment, the failure to create a coalition capable of choosing a suc-
cessor, and the retention of the Braun government under the
constitutional provision that the cabinet which had resigned must
serve as a "care-taker" (geschaft^iihrende) government until it
had been replaced. Complaints that the action was unconstitutional
are unconvincing — it was originally justified by the statement of
Konrad Adenauer, then president of the Prussian Staatsrat, that
the earlier procedure was in fact unconstitutional, since it did not
necessarily effectuate the constitutional requirement that the
Minister-President have the confidence of the Landtag.®^ On the
other hand, the lateness of the decision and its clear purpose to
prevent a National Socialist candidate from being elected greatly
weakened the moral position of the Braun government in the period
that followed. Even Braun himself was dubious of the wisdom of
the action. It did not really help much to point out that the Ba-
varian Minister-President had been for the past two years the head
of such a "care-taker" government. But the alternative of allowing
unfettered control of administrative and police apparatus to fall
into the hands of the National Socialists was direful enough to
justify extreme measures. ^^

Election activities were accompanied by severe action of the
Prussian police against the National Socialists. On March 13,
Prussian police raided Nazi party offices and homes of Nazi leaders
in Berlin and throughout Prussia. The reason advanced was that

60 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

they had been informed that plans existed on the part of the Nazis
to seize control in the Reich if they obtained a plurality but not a
majority in the first presidential election. The police found what
they considered sufficient evidence to justify the action. ^^ The
American Embassy Counselor, however, discounted the extensive-
ness of the evidence and that which was presented in the news-
papers at the time is certainly not convincing.^^ The raids recalled
the "Boxheimer Incident" of the year before when police of Prussia
and Hesse had uncovered what they claimed to be considerable
materials indicating the illegal position of the National Socialists.
Brought to the stage of court proceedings against several of the
Nazi lesser lights, the incident resulted in a court decision indicating
insufficient evidence.^°^ It must, of course, be added that the
courts were strongly rightist in sympathy due to the failure of
judicial reforms discussed above. But, regardless of court decisions,
there was no doubt on the part of either the Braun or the Briining
governments of the radical intentions of the National Socialists.

As a consequence, the capital was rife with comments in respect
to plans of the Briining government to make use of the President's
emergency powers to take over control of the government of Prussia
by way of a commissioner of the Reich if a Nazi Minister-President
were elected.^^^ Briining has denied any intention to go so far as
this. His plans contemplated only the sequestration of police
authority in Prussia. However, regardless of the details of his real
plans, the discussion of the problem at this time and the many
mentions of the usage of a Reich Commissioner provided a back-
ground for Papen's action in July.^°- In actual fact, no new Min-
ister-President was elected; the Landtag proved completely in-
capable of action — its proceedings on May 25, 1932, culminating
in a terrific melee between the Nazis and the Communists, who had
called the National Socialists a "party of murderers."^°^ Braun
continued to be the titular Minister-President but was so much
disgusted by the whole state of aflFairs that he took "leave for
reasons of health" and left Heinrich Hirtsiefer as his representa-
tive.^^^ Severing, however, continued in his post of Minister of
the Interior, still directing the police strongly against excesses on
both right and left.

Meanwhile, the Reich already in a state of crisis reached the
apex of its difficulties. Briining emerged from the presidential elec-

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 61

tions convinced of the need for action against the National Sociahsts.
Contrary to the account in his recent letter to Rudolf Pechel of the
Deutsche Rundschau (it is difficult for men to remember this kind
of detail twenty -five years later), the cabinet record show^s that he
took a major lead toward the famous "S.A. Verbot," of April, 1932.
This was an order of the government requiring dissolution through-
out the Reich of the S.A. and S.S. formations of the Nazi party,
their surrender of arms to proper authorities, and the cessation of
their use of uniforms in public activities. ^^^ The background of
this decree has been much discussed recently. Among the inter-
esting disclosures is that the Reichswehr (regular army) officers,
Schleicher, von Hammerstein, and Groener, who was also in the
cabinet, had been working toward a solution whereby all of these
para-military organizations would be converted into sport societies
under Reichswehr sponsorship in the hope of divorcing them from
party connections, and, although not specifically stated, probably
in the hope of holding them ready for integration into the regular
army if the disarmament conference brought Germany a recog-
nition of her equality with France in the right to arm.^^^ Con-
viction of the growing seriousness of the Nazi menace and some
feeling on the part of the military that the Nazi organizations would
refuse to make national considerations secondary to those of their
party brought the action against them.^*^"^

The result was a storm of protest. Much of this was not sincere.
Both Nationalists and National Socialists were anxious to avail
themselves of any vantage point from which to attack Briining. The
one used here was that the action against the S.A. and S.S. had
been one-sided since it was not accompanied by a prohibition of
the "Reichsbanner," a para-military organization of the Social
Democrats. It was of no avail for government leaders to point out
that the Reichsbanner had not been found guilty of causing any
disturbances and that its leaders immediately announced that they
would voluntarily dissolve the military sections of their organi-
zation.^°^ Strong criticism of the government action emanated from
the Crown Prince, who deplored the loss of the "wonderful human
material" brought together in the Nazi agencies. ^°^ The President
was sufficiently disturbed about the situation to request materials
on the Reichsbanner. These were provided by Schleicher, who had
originally supported the S.A. Verbot but had by now relinquished

62 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

his favorable attitude. Von Hindenburg professed himself impressed
by this material — it was not regarded as meaningful by republican-
minded statesmen who examined it. The President wrote to Briining
asking whether the Reichsbanner should not also have been in-
cluded in the decree.^ ^° Briining refused to take action against
the Reichsbanner although steps were taken against Communist
"godless" societies.^ ^^ Action had been taken considerably earlier
against the "Red Fighters" (Rotfrontkampfer) of the Communists,
the equivalent of the S.S. and S.A.^^-

The climax of this frontal assault on the Briining government
came on May 10, 1932, when Groener defended his policies before
the Reichstag. Groener, never an able speaker and not in the best
of physical health at the time, was treated to a demonstration of
the art of heckling by the Nazis, who were indeed masters of
invective.^ ^^ The result was, as the Nazis exulted, that Groener
"white as chalk, without composure and without honor gave up the
field."^^^ On his retreat he met Schleicher, who told his former
patron that the army no longer had confidence in his ability to lead
them. With this action Schleicher wrote finis to his subordinate role
in the regular army circles and set himself in the position of supreme
policy-maker for military affairs. He was not yet, however, ready to
emerge from behind the curtains for his brief performance on the
center of the stage. Groener, who had held two cabinet positions,
resigned his post as Minister of War, retaining, however, the
Ministry of the Interior.^^° Clearly, however, the position of the
S.A. and S.S. had not yet been regulated definitively. The failure of
Briining to provide full and thorough support for Groener was an
indication that he did not wish to establish an unbridgeable chasm
between Center and Nazi parties, which were even then involved
in some discussion of a coalition ministry in Prussia. On the other
hand, von Hindenburg was most certainly not pleased with the
action which he by now conceived as a one-sided move against
organizations which stressed their patriotism.

At this time a second issue began to receive considerable public
interest and some attention in the cabinet sessions. This was the
plan long discussed of providing relief for unemployment by settling
small farmers on agricultural estates in the East. Discussions of the
budget earlier in the year had brought Briining's commentary that
no further taxes or reductions of social security provisions could be

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 63

contemplated unless the government could present concrete evi-
dence that these were offset by the reduction of unemployment.^ ^^
Projects for creation of work received much attention in the period
that followed. The Labor Ministry under Adam Stegerwald was
much interested in the solution of the question through "coloniza-
tion" in the East. There many of the large landed estates were
already so overburdened with debt obligations that there was no
conceivable way by which they could have been rendered eco-
nomically sound. The problems of agriculture in this eastern section
of the Reich had been entrusted in 1931 to a young minister of
conservative and aristocratic background but of very sound po-
litical instincts, Hans Schlange-Schoningen. He had found the
financial situation of the eastern estates chaotic beyond belief. With
great energy — and with great sums of Reich monies also — he had
attacked this problem of providing governmental support so that
mortgaged estates need not go on the block at a time of drastically
reduced values. But Schlange had found that many of these estates
were in such a serious financial position that nothing could avail. ^^"^
During the month of May a decree looking toward combining
problems of foreclosure of these excessively burdened farms with
the problem of unemployment was drafted by the Ministry of Labor
with some assistance by Schlange-Schoningen.^^^ The draft was
considered with considerable heat by the cabinet on May 20, 1932.
The protocol of the cabinet session indicates that there was a serious
question of competency between Stegerwald and Schlange which
Briining stated must be regulated by the two outside the cabinet
meeting. Schlange and Hellferich, the Finance Minister, were also
critical of the plan itself and no action was taken.^^^ Nevertheless,
in one of the cabinet leaks which seemed to occur on occasion at
this time, either this draft or one of its predecessors or successors
came into the hands of the strong defenders of the agricultural
interests of the eastern regions. Among those involved was von Gayl,
later Papen's Minister of the Interior, who was proved guilty of
direct falsehood in regard to his role in the matter in one of the
post- World War II squabbles about "who killed Cock Robin" — that
is, who sabotaged the Briining government. As Otto Meissner has
pictured the course of events, the conservative aristocratic land-
owners of East Prussia obtained knowledge of this contemplated
action and presented it to von Hindenburg in the blackest hues.^^^

64 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Although it was actually a very wise and proper scheme, some of
the opprobrium of the charge of "agricultural Bolshevism" levied
against it by its enemies seems to have held over into the post-war
period, for those involved are still anxious to disclaim connections
with it.

The exact effect of these two items can be exaggerated. From
the note to Graf Westarp at the time of his reelection, it is
clear that von Hindenburg was growing weary of his support of
Briining.^"" He was dissatisfied with the failure of Briining to
seek an extension of his cabinet to the right and with his reliance
upon Social Democratic support. Very probably the startling move
that came on May 30, 1932, was the maturation of plans long made.
It derived from the President's desire for a cabinet of the right,
which might hope to satisfy the Nazis and relieve pressure from
the Nationalists at the same time that it kept the aristocratic land-
owners happy and prepared for some constitutional revision to end
the disturbing necessity of dealing with selfish parties. It was ac-
companied by the worst possible combination of circumstances:
the President's absence from Berlin on a vacation at his estate at
Neudeck presented to him by a popular subscription sponsored by
conservative interests in 1927; his return to receive Briining in a
session in which he read him a prepared statement printed in the
huge letters that the President's failing eyesight required; his indi-
cation that he would no longer use his decree powers in Briining's
behalf — tantamount to a direct declaration of lack of confidence
in the Chancellor's leadership. ^^^ Briining, although he had re-
ceived the negative support of the Reichstag in votes just preceding
this, knew that he could not count upon its positive support of his
policies. The Social Democrats could and did refuse to vote down
actions taken by emergency decree in following their policy of the
"lesser evil" — it was a lesser evil to allow Briining to continue than
to open the way to Hitler. But they would not vote in behalf of the
decrees that carried increased taxes and reduced social security
benefits. As a consequence, Briining and his cabinet drew the logical
conclusion and resigned. A day later the President named a political
unknown, Franz von Papen, chancellor, and within a week a new
cabinet was in action, having almost no support in the Reichstag
but having the full support of von Hindenburg. With its term of
office a new era of history began. For Prussia, this was to be also

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 65

a new era and a tragic one, one from which it was to receive a
mortal wound.

The crisis in Prussia and Germany in 1932 was a many-faceted
one. Pohtically it involved a complete collapse of normal parlia-
mentary government due to an anti-democratic majority holding
the antipodes of political position. It also involved a conservative
tradition which had defined itself in various ways and means but
directed itself basically toward the reestablishment of more stable
political conditions by a return to constitutional forms existing
before the revolution of 1918, This conservative tradition was op-
posed to the republicanism of the 1920's but opposed also to the
equally revolutionary Nazi ideology. Those appealing to its tenets
hoped by the promise of de-parliamentarizing Germany, by a
strongly nationalist foreign policy, and by elevating the symbolic
position of the Reich Presidency, to drain ofiF from the National
Socialists those elements which had joined them in protest to the
open defects of republican governments^* In the long run, how-
ever, the conservatives were to offer visible confirmation of the
even greater poverty of the traditions they proclaimed.

Beyond this political aspect of the crisis there was the still
momentous crisis of depression, unemployment, and hunger. The
succeeding governments did not provide marked policy changes
in dealing with these problems. Actually, it appears that Briining's
measures, upheld and extended by Papen, were gaining some
favorable results. In the long run, however, the real benefits from
the upturn were to be obtained neither by Briining nor Papen, nor
Schleicher, who followed, but by Adolf Hitler.

There was also a crisis in the field of foreign relations, where
Briining had counted himself "a hundred meters from the goal"
of obtaining for Germany a favorable settlement in the questions
of reparation and disarmament. These problems were dropped
in the lap of a political ingenue, who handled them somewhat
ungently and not with full success.

And lastly, there was a crisis greater than all of these— the crisis
of the spirit. There is much of this story that will never be written
but must lie deep within the souls of its still living participants.
For the course of events indicates that in the face of mountainous
problems and disillusioning defeats, many of the strongest battlers
for democracy and parliamentary government had abandoned the

66 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

strus^gle. Undoubtedly some of them had met disappointments
beyond the bearing— Briining in respect to von Hindenbm:g for
example. Most disappointing o£ all must have been the feeling
that do what thev might their fellow-countnvTnen when handed
the voter's ballot to determine their own destiny used it to seek
someone else to do their thinking for them. The weariness and
frustration Hes bold-faced in the blank spaces of many of the
memoirs of the dav.

CH. III. UHLAN POLITICS

On June 2, 1932, a tall, lean, dapper individual, attired with
customary elegance befitting his wealth and social position looked
down along the conference table at his associates. He saw before
him the earnest and intense countenances of nine men whose role
in history was to be subjected to the most intense barrage of criti-
cism ever accorded a German cabinet. Five of them bore in their
names the coveted "von" that indicated they stemmed from titled
aristocracy of pre-war days. The others, although not of noble
families, had obtained eminence in the world of business. To one
side sat the bespectacled, self-assured bureaucrat, who spoke with
the voice of the man whose presence dominated the scene in spite
of his absence. For this was the first meeting of a purely "presi-
dential cabinet" composed of those who, in spite of their own
self-esteem, were political ciphers save for the support of former
Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, now in his eighty-fourth year,
just reelected for what could be a new seven-year term. And the
shadow of the absent President must have smiled as it looked down
upon the assembly, for here at last was a cabinet which he could
really call his— composed of his kind of men, doing his will \vdth
proper respect and devotion. Best of all, he who sat at the head
of the table was no longer a Briining, peering cautiously at the
President from behind thick glasses, but a scion of a family with
almost a thousand years of patented nobility, who stood stiflly and
firmly as befitted a former member of the General Staff and who
spoke the bold language of bygone days with a conviction seldom
to be found in these times of endless confusion.^

It was, indeed, the strangest item of all that it was Franz von
Papen who sat at the head of that table. He was a political unknown
in Germany who had been chosen to replace a chancellor respected
even by those who opposed him. It was insult added to injury
that Center Party chancellor Heinrich Briining found himself re-
placed by a man who had claimed membership within his own
party, who had pledged his word to the leader of that party, Mon-
signor Kaas, that he would not accept the mantle of succession,
and then had found that loyalty to the person of the President
overcame all political scruples.^ Even yet, in the face of a broad
postwar revelation of undercover machinations and pohtical intrigue,

68 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

the choice remains incomprehensible. Seemingly, someone made
an assessment of the political situation which was so faulty as to
be astounding in the enormity of its asininity. But such an egregious
error accords neither with the customary view of the character of
Kurt von Schleicher nor with that of Otto Meissner, who are blamed
for it. It would seem that the real motivation behind the choice
has not yet been discovered.

"Who is Franz von Papen?" was the question in 1932. Who was
he? and What was he? are the questions still to be answered today.
A typical product of the Westphalian agricultural nobility— this is
one easy answer to the questions.^ It assumes a set of characteristics
applicable to a particular class. It makes the individual a personi-
fication of social forces and deprives him of a separately definable
personality. In Germany it has the connotation of superficiahty—
lack of the traditional GriindUchkeit in government— and of arti-
ficial pretense. As such the designation was basically vaHd for
von Papen, but there were nuances that greatly affected later
events. The guess may be hazarded that it was these nuances in
the character of von Papen which the intriguers of 1932 failed to
assess.

Von Papen has given historians a most revealing view of his
life and personality in his memoirs. Seldom has an author found
such a virulently critical audience. The very title, in the German,
was a provocation to rebuke and ridicule — "Der Wahrheit eine
Gasse" or "a pathway for the truth." It was taken, with a slight
alteration, from a nineteenth century poem by Karl Theodor Koner
celebrating the heroic deeds of Arnold von Winckelried, the Swiss
infantryman who gathered into his own body the spears of the
Hapsburg cavalry so that his country might win freedom. What
von Papen meant to convey by it is not clear. But the basic con-
ception of martyrdom for a great ideal, the military jangle of its
lines, the sense of passionate nationalism, all of these were part of
the fabric of a man essentially a romantic in a world of practicality,
a twentieth century avatar of the days of banners, bugles, lancers,
and white chargers. Only in a German republic hopelessly en-
twined in political vagaries of the rarest order could he have be-
come chancellor.^

Papen's education and training were purely military. To a
career which began as an officer of the famous Uhlans, the mounted

UHLAN POLITICS 69

lancers of the Kaiser, more fit for the parade ground than for battle,
Papen brought a handsome appearance, a respect for discipline,
and a love for horseback riding. Through these he became a
royal page and later a member in the lower echelon of the famed
German General staff. The degree of intelligence which he brought
to these and later endeavors is disputable. The prime character-
istics that have attached themselves to him are superficiality, dilet-
tantism, and vacuity. The judgment thus made is correct but has
become exaggerated through repetition. Von Papen points out
that his acquisition of permanent membership on the General
Staff was a real accomplishment entailing hard work and ability.
Papen did not, of course, like some of his schoolmates at the War
Academy, von Hammerstein, von Fritsch, and von Bock, make a
real name in the military profession. Probably this was largely due
to the unfortunate outcome of what had seemed a very favorable
initial appointment— that of military attache to the United States
and Mexico.^

The detailed story of Papen's questionable role in the United
States during the early part of World War I cannot be told here.
By his own admission von Papen used the oflBce of military attache
to collect information on Canadian troop movements to France, to
further the return of former German nationals resident in the United
States for war service, providing them with forged passports for
this purpose, and to set up conspiracies to destroy Canadian rail-
road bridges used for the transport of troops.*^' Of these activities,
it might be said that the first function, the collection of information
by a military attache in a neutral country, was neither illegal nor
particularly reprehensible. The second action involving the forging
of passports violated domestic United States law and in itself
justified dismissal, but was a rather minor breach of morality. It
is with the third activity, the effort to bomb railroad bridges that
illegality and a very flagrant breach of ethical standards obtrudes.
To use the German embassy in the United States as the focal
point of plots for military sabotage in a neighboring friendly state
cannot be excused on the ground that he had not "endangered either
American lives or security"— it was more than just "in the strictly
legal sense. . .improper.'"^ Von Papen denies that any of his activi-
ties, concluded before the famous "Black Tom" explosion in New
Jersey, were related to it, and there appears no reason to doubt

70 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

this.^ There was, however, contemporary evidence not completely
conclusive in nature which indicated that not all of Papen's sabotage
e£Forts were directed to areas beyond the territorial limits of the
United States.^ Von Papen was, of course, acting under instruction
of his government and received considerable sums of money to
be used for his purposes. ^° His activities were not out of accord
with the standards of conduct of the government he represented.
But his expulsion from the United States in December, 1915, was
clearly justified upon ethical as well as upon legal grounds.

From the standpoint of the events of 1932 that which is impor-
tant in Papen's period as military attache in America is the ineptness
of his actions. The catalogue of errors is lengthy. He employed a
professed secret service expert, Paul Koenig, whom Papen still
admires although police investigation disclosed him to be a vain
and rather simple-minded fumbler.^^ Papen himself wrote checks
to agents under code terms but jotted their real names and some-
times the purposes of the expenditures on the stubs he retained!^^
Added to this was carelessness in private correspondence in which
he detailed far more of his activities than was wise. The most
egregious error of all was his failure to be sure that his diplomatic
immunity extended to his baggage during his return trip when
expelled from the United States. The British, who were probably
not acting in quite the most ethical fashion either, seized Papen's
baggage and found a whole group of embarrassing and incriminating
documents which they published and forwarded to the United
States for action.^ ^ The man who became chancellor of Germany
in June, 1932, had been until a month prior to that time under
indictment in the United States for liis effort in World War I to
organize an expedition to sabotage the Welland Canal. Although
the indictment was nolle prossed in May, 1932, the American
Secretary of State remarked to the British Ambassador in Washing-
ton that von Papen would not have been accepted as Ambassador
to the United States if appointed to that post!^'*

When Papen returned to Germany in 1916, he sought modifi-
cation of the submarine campaign, so that the United States would
not be drawn into the war. He met, by his own account, the oppo-
sition of top leaders, including the Kaiser, who felt that the German
background of the United States would prevent our entry into
open warfare. This expectation, of course, proved faulty, but von

UHLAN POLITICS 71

Papen was not in a position to derive advantage from his gift of
prophecy. He served out the war as an active staff officer in
Europe and later in the Near East.^^ When defeat came, Papen
found himself adrift. "The world I had known and understood,"
he says, "had disappeared. The whole system of values into which
I had integrated myself and for which my generation had fought
and died had become meaningless."^*^ Most of all, the life of the
Uhlan no longer accorded with the temper of the times.

Papen answered the problems of his existence by a return to
the land and an entrance into politics. Conservative by tempera-
ment, still a monarchist by internal conviction, unable and unwilling
to recognize or appreciate the real character of republican govern-
ment, its party system, or the functioning of parliament, Papen
chose in spite of all this to enter the ranks of the Center Party,
one of the major architects of republican government and policy.^'^
That this was possible is a reflection of the ideological character of
that party, which was throughout its history a federation of political
opinions rather than a single, unified bloc. Even then, Papen was
a "maverick" within its ranks, of some influence because of his
financial investment in Germania, the major party organ, but with-
out a personal following in the party.^^ The only distinction he
acquired in the decade of the 1920's resulted from his breaches of
party discipline. In 1925 Papen brought about the fall of the
short-lived Marx Cabinet in Prussia, based on the Weimar Coalition,
because he wished the Center to seek coalition on the right.
Telling of this incident with pride in his memoirs, Papen neglects
to add that his maneuver was extremely ill-advised. The result
was that the Center was merely placed in the position of having
to give renewed support to the Social Democrat, Otto Braun.^^ In
the presidential election of 1925 Papen opposed the candidacy of
the representative of his own party, Wilhelm Marx, and supported
that of von Hindenburg.^*^ Beyond these items of note there was
little in Papen's political career prior to 1932 that gave him
significance.-^

What was it, then, that attracted Meissner's and Schleicher's
attention to Papen when they began to contemplate the replacement
of Briining in the spring of 1932? Clearly it was not his forceful
character, for he was by his own account approached only after
Schleicher had made most of the preliminary arrangements.^^ It

72 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

would appear that one factor that prompted the choice was the
expectation that he would be a pliable puppet in the hands of
stronger personalities. His position within the Center Party also
played a part in the determination. Probably the conspirators
expected that Papen's choice would bring with it the support of at
least a small portion of the Center. To assert that Schleicher ex-
pected more than this would be to underestimate his political acuity.
But these factors are not sufficient to explain Papen's designation. It
might be guessed that a consideration of Hindenburg's position
and point of view played a part. Papen had recently earned
attention for his denunciation of the failure of the Center Party
to look for coalition to the right. In this he was echoing criticisms
voiced privately by the Chief Executive. In origins, appearance,
style of speech, and political outlook he was ideally qualified to
obtain the confidence of the President. The men who intended to
sponsor an experiment in government based upon the supreme
authority and the emergency powers of the President required the
full and unqualified allegiance of von Hindenburg. It is probable
that they, Schleicher in particular, saw in advance that Papen would
fulfill this objective— but not that he would fulfill it so well as to
displace Schleicher himself from his advisory role!^^

Exactly when Papen was chosen and cabinet dispositions ar-
ranged remains uncertain. Briining was informed by the French
ambassador a week before his fall that Papen was being mentioned
as his successor.-'* Goebbel's diary indicates that the setting up
of a new cabinet had begun by May 8th and that von Papen's and
Neurath's names were included as early as May 24th. ^^ But Papen
denies that he was informed prior to May 26th, when he was
summoned by Schleicher to Berlin. -*" On the following day he
consulted with Schleicher and von Hindenburg. The final sessions
with von Hindenburg and with Monsignor Kaas took place on
May 31st. "Why the President chose me as Chancellor, I do not
know," he stated later. "I can only say that I myself did not lift a
finger."^'^ If Papen's statement be true, and his absence from Berlin
during the critical period prior to May 26th seems to substantiate
it, he accepted the most responsible governmental position in
Germany without having himself had a decisive influence either
upon the basic personnel of his cabinet or upon the preconditions
of governmental policy. Erich Eyck has suggested that this action

UHLAN POLITICS 73

falls into the tradition of the cavalry officer who would direct the
orchestra of the state opera if commanded to do so by the kaiser.^^
Papen, called to office by von Hindenburg with appeals to his
sense of duty as an officer, broke with his party, shattered the
pledge he had just made to the official leader of that party, and
accepted a cabinet already determined upon at least in part and
private bargains made by Schleicher with the National Socialists.
And he does not seem even in the retrospect of events a quarter of
a century later to find such action unwise or improper. Clearly
Papen's political decisions were based upon highly personal stand-
ards of morality. The events that followed indicated that Papen
considered himself called upon by fate to head a crusade which
was to save Germany from disaster by a return to nineteenth
century conceptions of authority. One can only suggest that to
Papen these ideals were so real and binding that he did not
doubt their acceptance by the masses, who were, after all, less
than a generation removed from their benefits.^^

Schleicher, also, at times proclaimed doctrines reminiscent of
the nineteenth century. He was, however, far more realistic than
von Papen. His goal in creating the Papen cabinet, a cabinet
divorced from the existing political parties, was the hope that it
would gain support from the very vocal group criticizing the
parliamentary system. He also expected to neutralize the appeal
of the National Socialists. It may have been that he already
thought of creating division within their ranks. Probably he was
aware that Gregor Strasser, the most uncertain of Hitler's lieuten-
ants, was investigating coalition possibilities with Schleicher and
Briining and that rank-and-file Nazis were beginning to pant
after the fruits of victory.^° At any rate Papen's chancellorship was
well calculated to soothe the pique of von Hindenburg, who had
been increasingly irked at Briining's reluctance to "move right."^^
With this accomplished, a static position would be created in which
the President would continue to govern without the direct partici-
pation of the Reichstag. Under these circumstances the bandwagon
rise of the Nazis would crumple, and they could be brought to a
more reasonable view of the political scene by which they would be
willing to accept governmental authority without complete control
over the state. In the long run, however, Schleicher did not intend
to foster a permanent regime supported by a minor percentage of

74 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

the German population, nor did he contemplate the possibility of
reversing the whole process of historical development since 1918.^-
That Papen with these objectives in mind accepted the chancellor-
ship without reaching a clear understanding with von Schleicher
indicated Papen's political naivete. That Schleicher made use of
von Papen without troubling to explore the latter's political opinions
and objectives indicates Schleicher's gross underestimation of von
Papen's ambition and self-regard. ''^

The building of von Papen's cabinet was not difficult. It in-
volved none of the customary conferences and compromises with
party leaders. If there was one common requirement, it was that
of an inward yearning for the return to monarchy, a respect for
the place of "authority" in the field of government, a revulsion from
the recent tribulations of party bargaining and compromises. There
was in von Papen's cabinet not one convinced republican. Nor
was there one member of von Papen's cabinet who in his person
and career reflected the interests of the laboring classes in town
or country. They all belonged to an upper stratum which regarded
the position of the masses as secondary in the pursuit of state
policies. They were a "cabinet of gentlemen" as von Papen
defined it.^^

The strongest of those who faced Papen across "den grunen
Tisch" — if we exclude the conspirators Meissner and Schleicher,
—was Wilhelm Freiherr von Gayl.'^^ Cold and precise in manner,
he, like von Papen himself, gave evidence in his person of his
aristocratic background. There were, of course, no monocles in
the "monocle cabinet"— von Gayl wore dark-rimmed spectacles—
but the consciousness of high social status was reflected in the
manner and countenances of its members. Von Gayl was descended
from an old Prussian officer's family. In the postwar period he
had been the head of an East Prussian agricultural society and the
plenipotentiary of the province of East Prussia in the Reichsrat. In
the Papen cabinet he, along with Meissner and Schleicher, played a
prominent role made possible by the deficit of leadership on the
part of the chancellor.^^ Also of importance was Konstantin Freiherr
von Neurath, the career diplomat now become Minister of Foreign
Afi^airs. Since 1930 German ambassador in London, von Neurath
had earlier represented his country in Denmark and Italy. The
prevailing impression he left upon his colleagues was that of cold

UHLAN POLITICS 75

immovability. Nothing was able to shatter his calm or ruffle his
temper. He had entered Papen's cabinet with great reluctance and
only after a personal appeal from von Hindenburg, similar to that
which the president had made to von Papen.^^

The remaining members of Papen's cabinet were not impressive.
Freiherr Magnus von Braun, the General Director of the Raiffeis-
engesellschaft, an agricultural credit co-operative, became Minister
of Foodstuffs and Commissioner for the East. Labeled a Kappist by
the Socialists, he had been removed from an administrative post
in East Prussia in 1921 for accepting orders from a Kapp-appointed
superior. His published memoirs reflect the same sudden shifts
of thought, the arrogance of undisciplined superficiality found in
von Papen's apologia.^^ Papen's friend, Freiherr Eltz von Riibenach,
until then head of the Reich Railroad Directory in Karlsruhe, became
Minister of Post and Transportation. Von Riibenach's brother was a
Nazi deputy in the Prussian Landtag.^^ Graf Schwerin von Krosigk,
who had been Ministerial Director in the Finance Ministry, now
headed that ministry, having accepted his post after another one
of von Hindenburg's personal appeals. ^"^ Minister of Economics
was Professor Hermann Warmbold, who had held the same post
under Briining, resigning it only a month before the fall of the
Briining government. At his resignation Warmbold had referred to
differences in point of view with regard to economic policy. He
was considered extremely hostile to the trade unions, a strong
opponent of Adam Stegerwald, who had had considerable influence
in the Briining government.*^ Franz Giirtner, long-time Minister
of Justice for Bavaria and thus associated with the inconclusive
legal aftermath of Hitler's Beer Cellar Rebellion, became Reich
Minister of Justice and Hans Schaffer, president of the Reich In-
surance Office and one-time director of the Krupp enterprises,
became Minister of Labor.*^

Of some significance is the fact that two men mentioned promi-
nently for cabinet posts had rejected them. Carl Friedrich Goerdeler,
then chief mayor of Leipzig, and later the major leader of the
German resistance in World War II, refused the Ministry of Labor,
and Hermann Freiherr von Liininck, General Secretary of the
Rhineland Farmers' Union, destined for the Agricultural Ministry,
also found the proffered role undesirable.*^ Association or close
relationship with the Briining regime played a part in these deci-

76 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

sions— Goerdeler had been Commissioner for Price Reduction and
von Liinick belonged to the Center Party.^* Both men would have
been stronger than those who accepted, although not necessarily
more devoted to the interests of republican government.

Thus described, the cabinet of von Papen stands forth in its
blatant disregard of public opinion. It was a cabinet of "unknowns,"
of men without strong support from the organized parties, the labor
unions, the small farmers, or even the majority of the business
people. Papen later referred to it as a cabinet of "experts" and
it is true that most of its members had had bureaucratic experience
in fields associated with the ministries they headed. ^^ But few
of them could be described as "experts" in the sense of possessing
thorough and rigorous training or outstanding ability so that they
possessed the confidence and respect of the general public.

In 1932, however, Papen did not refer to his cabinet as a cabinet
of "experts," but as one of "national concentration.""^*^ This mystical
designation was supposed to imply a broad support by groups
on the right, with some connotation such as that attached to a
"Broad Front Ministry" or "Ralliement" in France, that normal
party diflFerences must be laid aside in time of crisis. This desig-
nation, universally condemned, found particular criticism on the
part of the German State Party, which pointed out that the nine-
teen and a half million Germans who had reelected von Hindenburg
did not have one representative in the cabinet.^'^ Narrowness, not
breadth, was the basic characteristic of the Papen govenment— a
Center Party spokesman referred to it as the "Kabinett der na-
tionalen Trennung"— the "Cabinet of National Division" rather than
concentration."^^ Reality, however, did not trouble the former
Uhlan. On June 4th he stressed that his government was "an
assembling of all the creative and preservative forces of the state,
in short of all national forces. ""^^ A little later, while at Lausanne,
he told the foreign press representatives that his government repre-
sented an assembly of "all the creative forces" of his country.^*^ On
June 20th he informed Stephen Lauzanne, the representative of
a Paris newspaper, "I represent here that which my predecessors
were not able to say of themselves, all the national forces of
Germany. France has accordingly in my person the guarantee for
the conclusion of a Franco-German agreement that it is all of
Germany which signs whatever I may sign."^^

UHLAN POLITICS 77

This was pure Papenese. Public expressions of other members
of the cabinet appear more cautious. Von Gayl, for example, on
June 9th addressed the Reichsrat over which he, as Minister of
the Interior, was privileged to preside. Noting "the now publicly
accepted designation of coirselves as reactionaries," von Gayl
declared that the members of the cabinet would bear it "with
dignity and some sense of humor" until its falsity had been
demonstrated. He stressed the closeness of the cabinet to the
life of the people and denied its intention to "recreate the past as
men rebuild ruins according to old plans and pictures." The whole
cabinet, he affirmed, wished to place itself "in warm love behind
the properly understood welfare of the broad laboring masses."
As for the form of the state, although the cabinet members were
monarchist, they did not intend to breach the republican consti-
tution under which they served. The future form of the state could
only be decided after the present time of crisis had been passed.^"
But von Gayl and other members of the cabinet did not hesitate
to express their opposition to the normal processes of democracy.
Von Gayl even made use of the traditional observance of the adop-
tion of the Weimar Constitution as an occasion on which to point
out its defects. It should be made, he said, "The point of departure
for progress toward a new political life."^^ Of the proposals made
by von Gayl more will be said later.

There would, however, appear to be a discrepancy between the
exaggerated, neo-romantic language of Papen in respect to his
government's program and place and the more sober and cautious
commentaries of von Gayl, von Schleicher, and others. Evidently
Papen took the toleration of his regime by the National Socialists,
arranged in advance by von Schleicher, to mean active support.
Very probably, in spite of his formal withdrawal from the Genter
Party after a bitter exchange with the party leader, Monsignor
Kaas, Papen still considered that he represented Genter groups. ^"^
Hence, in his own inexperienced eyes Papen had support from
Center all the way right, at the beginning of his regime.

Another partial explanation lies in Papen's repetitive usage of
the word "creative." His claim to represent all the "creative" forces
of the Reich reflected his belief that these lay solely on the right.
From first to last Papen was less concerned about numerical support

78 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

than was Schleicher. This fundamental difference led to the rfft
between them which occurred in November.

Papen's extravagant language was appropriated and bolstered
up by a conservative publicist, Walter Schotte, who became a kind
of official spokesman for the chancellor. ^-"^ Schotte was himself
a member of the famous Herrenklub, the pohtical "club" of the
nobility which gained such notoriety during the Papen era. Both
he and others associated with the club denied that it had had an
influence upon the fall of Briining or the forin-cition of the Papen
cabinet— "The Herrenklub as a cabinet-maker— that is a bad joke"^^
But Schotte could not deny that many members of Papen's cabinet
were members of or closely associated with this social organization
which discussed politics vigorously at its meetings. And more
important than the question of membership was the matter of the
spirit of the organization. The concept of an elite group set apart
from the masses, discussing the course of events from Olympian
heights of narrow class-conscious backgrounds, and rejecting the
premise that the voice of the people can be heard only through
the instrumentality of party organization — this was the legacy of
the Herrenklub to the "Herrenreiter in Politics."

Karl Dietrich Bracher has dealt extensively and most unsym-
pathetically with the von Papen-Schotte concept of a "New State"
designed to bridge the gap between republicanism and monarchy.^^
Unsympathetic as any convinced democrat must be over against the
sterotyped slogans of reactionary reformers, such as Papen and
Schotte, there are certain factors in the Papen program that had
some potentialities of success in 1932. First, it must be noted that
there was a widely-held belief that the extravagances of party
politics needed to be checked. ^^ Even sincere party leaders con-
fessed that the workings of the party system in Germany left
much to be desired. Papen and his colleagues sought to capitalize
on this. The basic concept of a "New State" was that it would be
freed from the incubus of the older system. There would again
be "authority" in government. This meant, baldly, a regime able
to act because it did not need to consult public opinion. To this
matter of by-passing the parties Papen and Schotte sought to add
vague concepts of "creative forces," an internal "Christian regenera-
tion," "personality," and "conservative revolution."^^ Many of these
phrases were virtually taken from the pages of Nazi propaganda

UHLAN POLITICS 79

but without the simpHfication of form which gave the National
SociaHsts strong mass support. By the fall of 1932 Schotte was
openly, although cautiously, challenging the right of the Nazis to
possession of some aspects of their ideology— notably their claim
that the only salvation of the Reich lay through the creation of a
"Third Reich."^*' There would seem, indeed, to have been some
possibility in 1932 that these appeals might win the allegiance of
some of those who had strayed into the Nazi camp in their search
for a government able to awaken faith in its stability. There was
no reason why the Nazis in 1932 should have had a monopoly of
the terms that rang bells in the inner recesses of the German mind.
But somehow Hitler and Goebbels managed to make more effective
use of them than did Franz von Papen! Nevertheless, Papen's
regime was not, in the long run, quite such a failure as it has been
pictured; and a little good fortune along the way might have
altered later judgments in regard to it.

The announcements of government policy made in early June
by the Papen government were accompanied by three steps of
very considerable importance. Two of these had been arranged
for by Schleicher before the cabinet was constituted. The very first
cabinet session of June 2 involved a discussion of the dissolution
of the Reichstag, scheduled to reconvene four days later. Schleicher,
clearly the dominating figure in these early cabinet sessions, took
the lead, suggesting the desirability of a postponement of the
date for new elections as long as possible, so that the cabinet would
have a chance to provide something of a record for itself. Meissner
alluded to the need for providing a reason for dissolution of the
Reichstag.^^ The decree of dissolution itself was issued on June
4th, based on the fact that the recent Landtag elections indicated
that the Reichstag composition no longer corresponded to public
opinion. How this justification could be reconciled with the legal
arrangements of Article 48 of the constitution, on which it was
based, is difficult to answer, but previous presidential decrees had
been founded on similarly shaky grounds.^-

The second major action of the Papen government was an effort
to balance the budget in the face of the broad variety of social
security payments to which Germany was now committed. Unem-
ployment insurance, "crisis support," welfare payments, pensions
for invalids and disabled war veterans, and other varieties of local

80 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

welfare payments placed a heavy burden upon state resources at
a time when the tax yield was declining. The slashing of these
payments by the Papen government, the requirement that need
for assistance be demonstrated, and the increase of the contribu-
tions to such purposes made by those still employed were harsh
measures. They gave the parties hostile to the government a strong
basis upon which to raise their cries against the "unfeeling" meas-
ures of the "reactionary barons."^^ In justice, however, it must be
stated that the Briining government itself could not and probably
would not have long delayed in adopting measures very similar
in nature. ^■^

On the same day, June 13th, on which the cabinet accepted
the proposals in respect to social insurance reform it began delib-
eration upon the provisions of a presidential decree lifting the
prohibition against the National Socialist military organizations, the
S.A and S.S. The cabinet discussions indicated that von Hinden-
burg was by now strongly opposed to the ban adopted under the
Briining regime.^^ The decree issued on June 16 allowed the
Lander to suspend periodicals publishing material damaging to
the interests of the state or containing false or distorted facts. The
Minister of the Interior of the Reich was empowered to request
such action from the Lander if he saw fit. Interesting is the dis-
cussion in the cabinet session, in which von Schleicher also proposed
a clause against political libel (Staatsverleumdung), but was op-
posed by von Gayl who regarded the action as premature. Schleicher,
as a consequence, withdrew his proposal.^'' The President accom-
panied the issuance of the decree unleashing the S.A. and S.S.
with a letter favoring it and stating his belief that conditions were
now sufficiently calm that political excesses need not be feared from
the softening of the regulation in respect to political bands. But
he warned that if this proved not to be the case, he would take
"every constitutional means against excesses of any sort."^'^

By the time these actions were taken, opposition newspapers
were speaking of the "Papenkreuz." A little later they added
the verse:

^'Papen finanziert. ( Papen finances,

Schleicher regiert. Schleicher rules,

Hitler diktiert." Hitler dictates. )^^

From the diary of the future Nazi propaganda minister, Goebbels,

UHLAN POLITICS 81

it is clear, however, that the Nazis had no intention of identifying
themselves too closely with the Papen government. It was "vacil-
lating and indolent {saumselig) ."^"^ Von Gayl, in particular, was
not only a "pure atheist," but also "weak, uncertain, without initia-
tive and without a joy in the assumption of responsibility.'"^'^ These
criticisms were, of course, made when the Papen government
appeared to be going slowly in effectuating the promise to restore
the S.A., but it would appear that from the Nazi side there was
never a real disposition toward alliance with Papen's "above-party"
government.

Meanwhile, the Papen government had also been much con-
cerned with problems of foreign policy inherited from the Briining
regime. The world disarmament conference had opened at Geneva
on February 2. Its sessions were accompanied by extensive con-
ferences in preparation for the other great assembly of that year—
the conference on reparations set to open a fortnight after Papen
gained office. Shortly before the resignation of his cabinet Briining
had made his famous speech in the Reichstag in which he pleaded
that he not be halted "a hundred meters short of the goal" in the
field of foreign policy. '^^ With these words ringing in the ears of
all Germans, there were none, from extreme right all the way to
extreme left, inclined to accept any compromise solutions of the
question as a victory.

During the last months of his government no one could have
exceeded Heinrich Briining in the intransigence of his opposition
to further reparations payments or a continuance of one-sided
German disarmament. At the disarmament conference he had
set the whole pattern of Germany's position at that conference
with his emphasis on the equality of right to arm.^- The German
representative at Geneva, Rudolf Nadolny, suggested that Germany
might well have countered the disarmament proposals of others
by proposing that they assume the obligations of Versailles. '^^ As
for reparations, early in the year Briining had told the British
ambassador in Germany that Germany would not be able to meet
reparations— then or later. '^^ Publication of this comment embar-
rassed both Germany and Great Britain, but there was a great deal
of British sympathy for the German demand for outright cancella-
tion of all reparations.'^^

82 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

By his own account, Papen, on the eve of participation in an
international conference which held the economic fate of Germany
in its hands, did not trouble to study the "Akten" of the foreign
office which would have given him the background of Briining's
preparation for the conference.'^ This omission left him open to
the criticism of his enemies, who found in it another demonstration
of his superficiality. The records, however, seem to indicate that
Briining had received a strong pledge of assistance by Great Britain
in respect to reparations, but that France and the United States
had by no means made such a commitment.'^'^ And even Great
Britain had cautioned Briining about the exaggerated tone of his
speech before the Reichstag and expressed the hope that he would
not for the present make additional statements on foreign policy. '^^
As for the United States, Secretary of State Stimson on at least
two occasions expressed American opposition to an outright can-
cellation of reparations which would leave the United States com-
pletely the loser in respect to war debts. He expressed the strong
American desire that Germany at least indicate the intention to
pay something sometime.'^ Briining, himself, on one occasion al-
luded to the possibility of Germany paying "some further capital
charge" as a "face-saving scheme."®^ Since World War II Briining
has stated that the sum agreed upon in principle was less than
five billion marks,"^^ but in July, 1932, he denied the intention of
paying anything, and broad sections of the German populace be-
lieved that he would have been able to avoid any payment.
Probably this was good politics, but it would seem to substantiate
the behef that Briining did not, in July, 1932, consider Germany
on the brink of peril from the National Socialists. Indeed, the later
story suggests that until Hitler was actually in power Briining was
seeking to outplay the others who hoped by political alliance to
"tame" the Nazis.

Whether von Papen himself should have attended the Lausanne
Conference is debatable. Neurath claimed shortly after assuming
the Foreign Ministry that Papen had promised him independent
responsibility in that area.^" Papen's attendance at Lausanne would
seem to run counter to that promise. Then, too, he occupied the
limelight completely. His ill-advised press conferences were strongly
criticized by his colleague, Schwerin von Krosigk, who claimed
that Papen had very early "let the cat out of the bag" in revealing

UHLAN POLITICS 83

Germany's willingness to make a final payment.**^

The conference at Lausanne has been subject to many mis-
interpretations and misconstructions in the years that followed it.
Basically, the groundwork for the German success there was laid
not by Briining or by any other German statesman but by the
existing economic crisis. American observers both then and later
believed that the degree of the crisis was exaggerated, that virtually
all German officials were engaged in "misery propaganda," designed
to emphasize Germany's economic helplessness.^^ Whether this
be true or not, there was no ignoring the fact that Germany's exist-
ing ability to earn foreign exchange had been drastically reduced.
Under these circumstances the transfer of interest, let alone prin-
cipal payments, on private debts held abroad was seriously im-
perilled. This consideration had a vital eflFect upon the position in
respect to reparations both of the United States and of Great
Britain. ^^ Although, as noted above, the diplomatic representatives
of the United States were not desirous of seeing Germany com-
pletely freed of reparations payments, their suggestion that European
representatives go ahead on their own to arrive at a complete
solution of the issue and present the results to the United States
was to all intents and purposes an invitation to a very radical revi-
sion.^^ At Lausanne the dynamics of action lay with the British
representatives, who in every stage of the conference provided the
motive power toward compromise solutions.

The German delegation, headed by the chancellor, went to
Lausanne without instructions or limitations on their freedom of
action. Of all the cabinet only von Gayl had ventured the opinion
that limitations set in advance might prove valuable during the
course of negotiations.^^ In the long run, however, the delegation
consulted the remainder of the cabinet at some length, making use
of a long distance telephone connected to a loudspeaker arrange-
ment, before accepting the final settlement.^^ Seemingly, although
the possibility of a final payment was mentioned in advance, there
was no consideration of the possible size of that payment or any
specific arrangement of advance strategy in respect to ancillary
goals such as the cancellation of the "war guilt clause" of the
Treaty of Versailles.

The conference divided naturally into two periods— that of the
"preliminaries" lasting until the French premier, Edouard Herriot,

84 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

absented himself for the second time for consultations in Paris on
July 2 and the period of real action after his return. It was during
the period of the "preliminaries" that von Papen made his major
effort to gain diplomatic fame by proffering two proposals to the
French. The most absurd of these was never completely set forth.
Presumably, it involved almost a merger of the general staffs of the
French and German armies to be accompanied by rectification of
Germany's border in respect to Poland. In this way both states
would gain a feeling of security, and the major grievance of German
nationalists would be alleviated.^^ A more nebulous scheme pre-
sented with airy irreverence out of the blue and accompanied with
an air of intrigue— Herriot was asked not to discuss it with the
English— could scarcely be imagined. It is little wonder that after
this Herriot expressed doubts as to whether von Papen could be
taken seriously.^^ The French premier was under no illusions
that a government based upon the support of a former field marshal
of the kaiser's army and "tolerated" by the most extreme revisionists
in Germany, the Nazis, was likely to implement an agreement
calling for common general staffs, nor was there any slightest
intention on the part of the French government to acquiesce in a
process of revision which would deprive France's ally, Poland, of
territory in behalf of France's most feared enemy. Seemingly, von
Papen believed that his own family connections with French circles
and his own fatuous references to "a common western culture"
would have meaning in diplomatic relations. ^^ The days of such
personal foreign policy were, indeed, long past.

The other proposal was more sensible but equally ill-advised
at the time it was made. This was that France and Germany coop-
erate in the economic reconstruction of Central Eastern Europe.^^
The French were mostly impressed by the superficiality of the
proposal. What von Papen had dealt with, Herriot said, "were not
essential measures or measures of reconciliation. They were minor
points, such as help for Austria, fixation [sic] of wheat prices, etc."^^
The French saw in Papen's plan no advantages. Damaging to
Germany was the implication that Germany, professing herself to
be virtually bankrupt, could, if she chose, find funds to help in
European reconstruction. Both this gesture and the general German
effort to join disarmament questions, then under discussion at a
separate conference, to the discussions at Lausanne, tended to give

UHLAN POLITICS 85

the French the opportunity to say, "The Germans can pay something
if they wa7it to."^*

Beyond these major false steps von Papen was responsible for a
number of minor peccadillos. One concerned an interview with a
certain M. Lauzanne (a remarkable pun on the name of the con-
ference) of the Paris Matin. In this von Papen was said to have
alluded prematurely to German willingness to make a final pay-
ment.^^ When von Papen referred to the interview during the
course of the conference and claimed that he had been misquoted,
MacDonald stressed the need to avoid publicity, adding that he
had had only one interview since the beginning of the conference
and left most of that to the public relations experts. ^^ Papen's
finance minister, Schwerin von Krosigk, later complained about
these interviews. Undoubtedly he exaggerated their significance,
but his complaint indicates that von Papen's own delegation was
critical of the conduct of its leader.^'''

The Lausanne Conference, therefore, was by no means a monu-
ment to the statesmanship of Franz von Papen. It was far more
a monument to the ability and forward-looking policies of Ramsay
MacDonald, the president of the conference. Clearly the British
had come to the conference with the well-defined objective of se-
curing for Germany the largest possible relief from the reparations
burden. They would have preferred a complete "stroke of the
sponge," which would have meant total cancellation. Total cancel-
lation was, however, impossible in view of the opposition of the
United States to such action and the fact that the French prime
minister, Herriot, pointed out that his government could not
survive such action. Therefore, the British representatives became,
as it were, disinterested intermediaries between the French and
German delegations, urging the former to reduce their demands
as far as possible and the latter to accept a reasonable figure.

The conference record indicates that the French entered the
conference asking a final payment of seven billion marks and
expecting to be able to hold to a figure of four billion marks. ^^
In the end the Germans, after extreme pressure by the British
and several lengthy conferences with the portion of the cabinet
in Berlin, signed for three billion marks. Having thus reduced their
total burden to about three-quarters of a billion dollars, the Ger-
mans had really gained a most significant victory. It would be unfair

86 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

to deprive the von Papen delegation of all credit for this. The
Germans presented their case adequately and held very stubbornly
to the lowest possible figure.^^ It may reasonably be doubted that
a delegation led by Briining would have achieved any better
financial result.

Moreover, the terms of payment were arranged in such a fashion
that Germany's capacity to pay would be considered, and there
was the distinct possibility that nothing would have been paid for
some time, even if a Hitler government had not arrived on the
scene to alter the entire situation. Furthermore, Germany recovered
full control of the Reichsbank and Reichsbahn (government rail-
roads) which had been guarantors of the Young Plan arrange-
ments.^"^^ Of course, the whole arrangement was made dependent
upon the attitude of the United States toward debts owed her by
France and Great Britain and this left the status of the situation
in doubt until these powers should have reached agreement. This
was not, as the German government pretended, proclaimed after
the conference was concluded, but was a definite portion of the
discussions within the conference itself. ^*^^

The most serious drawback from the German point of view was
that the agreement to pay a final sum was not accompanied by some
gesture in the political field which she could have exploited for
home consumption. Von Papen tried very hard, but not very skill-
fully, to obtain one. His best possibility was to obtain some conces-
sion in regard to the "War Guilt Clause" of the Treaty of Versailles.
According to one version of the conference action, there had been
agreement for a time that the French would permit von Papen
in his closing comments at the end of the conference to refer
obliquely to an end of the conditions that had led to reparations
payments. ^*^^ After Papen's ill-advised plan for joining the military
staffs of France and Germany, Herriot refused even to consider any
concessions in the political sphere other than a vague and com-
pletely useless political formula which he submitted himself.^^^
Undoubtedly, he feared that von Papen would use any opportunity
opened to him for more extravagant phrases than a French govern-
ment confronted by an uncertain parliament could justify.

Impressive in the German cabinet discussions in advance of the
final decision is the strong support for German acceptance by all
officials of the government concerned with finance. Both von

UHLAN POLITICS 87

Krosigk, the Minister of Finance, and Warmbold, the Minister of
Economics, emphasized the necessity of accepting tlie proffered
solution. They were strongly supported by Reichsbank President
Luther and, to a lesser degree, by Minister of Labor SchaflFer and
Minister of Agriculture von Braun. All of these considered the
question of political concessions of secondary importance. Von
Gayl, von Schleicher, and Meissner were strongly insistent upon
a political concession to appease opinion at home.^"'* Von Papen
returned, of coiu-se, to report to his colleagues on July 11th. In an
exculpatory and not completely accurate manner he pictured the
process which had led to a signature for three billion marks pay-
ments without specific political concessions. He recognized that
the results were, from the standpoint of internal politics, somewhat
"paltry," (diirftig), but believed the success of the conference
would aid in further political discussions with France as well as
in economic improvement. He was strongly backed by Warmbold,
who pointed out that even in view of the requirements of the
Hoover annuities, due until 1936, the Reich would gain a re-
duction. And the likelihood was for a delay during which the
German advantage would increase the longer the payments were
postponed. ^°^

Most of the other members of the cabinet found their way to
a justification of the conference results. Von Gayl, who continued
to speak with authority and decisiveness, announced that he could
not entirely agree with the results but that he believed the dele-
gation had accomplished all that was possible. He did not believe
von Papen should offer the President the resignation of the cabinet.
It was a "fated union" {"eine Schicksalsgemeinschaft") which must
remain to solve the great problems it faced.^*'^

Only von Schleicher was almost unreservedly critical. In spite
of the gains in the field of foreign policy and economic problems,
he felt that the cabinet had suffered "a severe defeat" by the results
of Lausanne. The handling of public relations had been very bad.
The German delegation had announced that Germany would not
pay because it could not pay. Later it had declared that it was
able to pay if political concessions were made by which Germany
received freedom of armament and again became a nation honored
among nations. These goals were not accomplished, but in spite
of this the delegation had agreed to payments. Now it must be

88 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

made clear that MacDonald had raised the question of pohtical
agreements (he did but on the basis of German guarantees for
French security not vice-versa) and that Herriot had first favored
them and then opposed them on his return from Paris. Von
Schleicher pointed out with heavy sarcasm that the only party in
the Reichstag which might be won to the support of the settlement
was the Social Democrats! He believed von Papen's suggestion of
oflFering to the President the resignation of the cabinet should be
carried out, so that the President, if he saw fit, might obtain better
support for his objectives by an alteration of cabinet personnel.
As for the negotiations underway in Geneva, it would now be
necessary for Germany to refuse discussion of any kind of com-
promise proposal whatever.^^"^

Others of the cabinet seconded Schleicher's comments about
the problem of public opinion, emphasizing the need for a press
campaign to clarify Germany's failure to obtain political conces-
sions (by laying it entirely at the door of French intransigence)
and to underscore the very valuable economic advances made.

Although in the official session no minister but Schleicher
backed the proposal to offer the resignation of the cabinet to von
Hindenburg, von Papen did so when he reported to the President.
On July 16th he was able to report to his colleagues that the
President not only had declared that resignation was completely
out of question, but had commissioned him to express his appre-
ciation to the cabinet for the hard work and the accomplishments
at Lausanne. ^*^^

Historically the Lausanne Conference was of great importance
although its basic decisions were neither ratified nor implemented.
To all intents and purposes it wrote finis to a period of postwar
history in which Germany had held an inferior status stigmatized
by the payment of considerable sums of money for having been
responsible for the First World War. Had Briining been able to
reap the fruits that fell to von Papen, he could undoubtedly have
rallied a strong popular support for his position. Very probably
he could have obtained the same monetary settlement that Papen
got and in addition might have been allowed by the French to
make a harmless statement about "the end of an era of disgrace"
which he could have used at home to claim a virtual retraction by
the allies of the "war guilt clause" of the Treaty of Versailles. But

UHLAN POLITICS 89

Briining was in the opposition at the time of the Lausanne con-
ference and with the aplomb of those who are not in power his
followers promptly announced that Briining would have paid
nothing.^°^ This was nonsense and if it was meant seriously, which
may be doubted, would indicate that Briining had taken the British
comments about cancellation too earnestly. His opposition, backed
by the still powerful Center Party, meant that von Papen had no
chance to broaden the basis of support for his government without
including the National Socialists. His efforts along these lines will
be discussed later. But Briining's opposition to Lausanne was a
part of the Center effort both in Reich and Prussia to negotiate
an alliance with the Nazis.

One other commentary may be ventured. Von Schleicher's
critical handling of Papen's action at Lausanne may well mark
the beginning of the rivalry between the two men to be underscored
in November. Von Papen's actions had revealed that he thought
and acted for himself and was subject to flamboyant gestures and
unstudied reversals of position. To Schleicher, the schemer, Papen,
the unpredictable adventurer, must have been revealed as dan-
gerous. But Papen emerged victorious, supported by his cabinet,
with von Gayl giving evidence of some intention of entering the
game of backstage maneuvers. The President had supported Papen
fully — although Meissner had been close to Schleicher's position
only a week earlier — and Schleicher no longer managed policy
alone.^^*' These initial doubts increased in the months that
followed.

Schleicher, of course, was correct in his belief that Lausanne
would be viewed at home as a German defeat. No organized po-
Htical party defended it.^^^ Even the communists used it as a
sign that only through rapprochement with Moscow could Germany
be freed of her reparations burden.^ ^^ And in spite of cabinet
statements about efforts to organize better public relations arrange-
ments, the von Papen government continued to have a hostile
press.^^^ This, however, seems to have troubled the chancellor
very little.

The man bom in the nobility, trained as an Uhlan, successively
military attache, front-line commander, and maverick Center Party
member had moved into the chancellorship with vigor and enjoy-
ment. He met obstacles like a steeple chaser hurdling the barriers.

90 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

He shrugged off public opposition and considered that with von
Hindenburg's support there was nothing to be concerned about.
Lausanne, a victory for Germany in foreign policy, was a defeat
in internal politics. But this need not hinder plans for the future.
Von Papen had in mind a change in internal political structure
which would render existing political opposition meaningless. The
ink was scarcely dry on his signature at Lausanne when von Papen
began to chart a course to divert public attention from this half
victory, half defeat. Sign and symbol of the old system was the
state of Prussia with a Social Democratic Minister President still
holding title to its leadership. And against the Prussian government
Papen now lowered his lance, closed his visor, and spurred his
charger. As he did so, he felt Bismarck and Frederick the Great
at his elbow, applauding his efforts to end "the dualism of Reich
and Prussia" which good monarchists had regarded as one of the
most disastrous consequences of the erection of the Weimar
Republic.

CH. IV. ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA

In the summer of 1932 the state of Prussia was a ship buffeted
by many storms; its captain was ill in quarters; its crew exhausted
from their struggle with the elements, stood ready to abandon
ship; only a few of the braver souls hoped to salvage the once-
proud vessel and preserve its mission of service to democratic
Germany,

The Prussian crisis was a many-faceted one. The government
of the state had long been the target of imprecations and obloquy
from the Right. Until the 1930's this criticism had emanated most
largely from the German Nationalists and, although disturbing,
had not been dangerous. The complaints of the old aristocracy,
the "feine Leute," as Goebbels later labeled them, gained shght
attention from the voters. Few were inclined to pay heed to the
Nationalist attacks on "Red Prussia." The coalition government had
given little indication of actual "redness" or even of highly pro-
gressive governmental policies. Undoubtedly the real cause of the
attacks of the German Nationalists was not so much the nature of
the government program as the monopolizing of governmental
positions by the governing coalition — the Social Democrats, Demo-
crats, and the Centrists.

The strong position of the personnel of these parties within
the governmental mechanism was not an unmixed blessing. These
officeholders had obtained their posts in incremental fashion. Some
of them were old in governmental service and fearful of a return
to a private life now unfamiliar to them. Others had obtained their
positions more recently but looked upon them as a just reward for
faithful party service. The bureaucratic instinct, the tendency "flns
Amt zu kleben" was strong within the ranks of the democratic
parties and added increased concern to their naturally cautious
approach to policy. Leading Social Democrats were to complain,
in the period that followed, that their party had been "bureau-
cratized" — it had lost its original will to fight for its beliefs and
ideals.^ It was, indeed, a rather spiritless Social Democratic leader-
ship and a vacillating Centrist leadership which faced their greatest
challenge in the summer of 1932.

A second point d'appui against the Prussian state derived
strength from the excessive concern of Germans for the precise

92 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

logic of governmental organization and system. The failure at the
Weimar Constitutional Assembly of Hugo Preuss's proposal for the
division of Prussia left German political relationships in a most
anomalous situation. No one could reconcile with logic the existence
within the German republic of a constituent state possessing two-
thirds of the nation's territory and three-fifths of the total popula-
tion. Nor could reasoning minds content themselves with the view
of a dual bureaucracy in one Haiiptstadt, the functions of Reich
and Prussian officials often duplicating one another and bringing
a clash of jurisdictions. Attacks on the basic nature of the Prussian
state were difficult for democrats to counter, for it was they who
had first favored a great reduction of Prussian hegemony within
the German nation. Pressure of circumstances — the dangers of
separation and national disunity followed by the clear advantage
of having a stable democratic administration within this large
subdivision of the Reich — soft-pedaled the democratic drive for
change. But Reichsreform, the problem of reorganization of German
political divisions, remained, seemingly, an unavoidable issue.

Arnold Brecht has provided a most interesting and useful sketch
of this highly complicated subject.- One of the leading officials of
the Prussian state at the time concerned, he reflects in his dis-
cussion the feeling of all sections of the government bureaucracy
that the existing system was basically unhealthy. Otto Braun had
himself, in 1927, taken his stand for change, although he opposed
the division of Prussia unless the other states made similar sacrifice.
The state he governed was, he said, a necessary core for the creation
of a unitary, democratic state. "Prussia," he asserted, "has always
declared that it will relinquish its political independence in favor
of a great German unitary state if the other German Lander will
do the same thing." But, noted Braun, no such willingness had
been shown. ^ The efforts of the South German states, on the other
hand, particularly of Bavaria, were directed toward an increased
federalism. The most stubborn opponent of the move toward the
unitary state was Prime Minister Heinrich Held of Bavaria, who
played a significant role in the discussions of reform.^

The advocates of a unitary state and those favoring a federal
one presented their contrasting proposals for change before the
sessions of the Governmental Reform Committee (technically
known as the "Constitutional Committee of the Lander Confer-

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 93

ence" — Verfassungsausschuss der Ldnuderkonferenz ) , which came
into existence in 1928. This committee was the result of the dis-
cussions of a Ldnderkonferenz, a conference of the constituent
states of the Weimar RepubUc, which met in January, 1928. The
final recommendation of the Reform Committee was approved in
June, 1930. It represented a compromise between the unitarists
and the federalists, entitled in somewhat pedantic bureaucratic
language "a differentiating total solution" {differenzierte Gesamt-
losung) of the reform question. This solution proposed a special
arrangement for the area of Prussia in contrast to that provided
for the South German Lander. The constituent provinces of Prussia
were to become Lander. Undersized states and territorial enclaves
were, after a transition period, to be joined to these new states.
Only Bavaria, Saxony, Wiirttemberg, and Baden were to remain
as they had been. However, the status of these new Lander created
from the Prussian provinces was not to be equal to that of the
existing Lander. The constitutions of these "new" Lander were to
be fixed by a simple law of the Reichstag and general supervision
over them was to be exercised by a federal administrative arrange-
ment involving the combination of Reich and Prussian ministries.
The position of the "old" Lander was "differentiated" from that of
the "new" in that the former retained control of their own consti-
tutions and of all administrative fields left them by the Weimar
Constitution and had, in respect to these matters, certain advantages
over the new units. ^

The foregoing description barely touches upon the features
of the reform plan. Substantially it represented a rather cumber-
some solution of problems strongly affected by psychological
factors. Although passed by a vote of 15 to 3 in the committee
concerned, it evoked no great enthusiasm on the part of the public.
Strongest opposition derived from Bavaria, which considered that
the plan by extending federal functions further menaced the inde-
pendent status of the several states. Strangely enough, this oppo-
sition to the committee proposal, voiced by Heinrich Held, the
Minister President of Bavaria, placed him in the position unusual
for a South German of having to advocate the maintenance of the
integrity of Prussia!^

On the other hand, many of those favoring Reichsrefomi pre-
ferred the simple method of combining Reich and Prussian Minis-

94 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

tries and naming the Reich President the chief of state of Prussia.
This solution appears to have originated "wath confirmed democrats,
but it reached partial fulfillment under confirmed reactionaries J

There were, of course, many shadings and variations of the
above plans and proposals. In any federal form of state organization
there are bound to be disagreements and difficulties concerning
the respective jurisdictions of the central government and of the
constituent states. This was particularly true in Germany because
its unification had been accompanied both by force and by com-
promise. As a consequence the republican Reich had inherited from
that of Bismarck a system which involved many uncertainly defined
limitations of functions on the part of states and of the central
government. The republican state was more centralist in nature
than the Bismarckian state. However, the bureaucracies of both
Reich and Lander were eager to retain as broad an area of activity
as possible. There were, as a result, a number of vexing disputes
between the competing agencies of government. It would be im-
proper for an outsider to render judgment in respect to such intri-
cate and esoteric matters, but it is impossible to avoid the question,
whether these disputes were so serious that the only solution lay
in a complete overhauling of the government organization.^ No
doubt such a reform would have resulted in great administrative
economies.^ On the other hand, political organizations develop
best in an evolutionary rather Chan a revolutionary process and
the continued agitation of this question as though it were a flaming
problem of direful urgency lent fuel to the fire of anti-republicans.
In the regime of von Papen their own advocacy of Reich reform
deprived his opponents of a clear and unequivocal ground for
opposition to Papen's actions in regard to Prussia.

As has been seen, the republican government of Prussia had
been made a target for criticism by the National Socialists as well
as by the Nationalists. The Nazis had particular reason to vent
their ire on the Braun government. Their party had been outlawed
in Prussia in 1922, and again, in part, in 1927; Hitler had been
forbidden to make public speeches there from 1925 to 1928;
Prussian civil servants were forbidden to be members of the Nazi
party; police action against the Nazis was strong during periods
when Reich laws such as the S.A. and S.S. prohibition were in
effect. Nazis had joined Communists in the Prussian Landtag in

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 95

the submission of numerous Antrdge requesting investigation of
the harshness and alleged injustice of Prussian police action. On
one occasion, Nazi deputy Wilhelm Kube claimed that the judicial
process against the Nazis in Prussia had been as bad as the Spanish
Inquisition!^*^ It would appear that one of the most important
factors leading the Nazis to accept Schleicher's bid for toleration
when the Papen regime was established was the promise that
changes would be made in the Prussian government.

Schleicher, on his part, was making no real concession when he
promised the Nazis to bring a change in the Prussian political
set-up. The Minister of War and other leading figures in the
military area were as eager for this result as the Nazis themselves.
Only shortly before the resignation of Briining, General von Ham-
merstein-Equord had commented that the Prussian and presidential
elections clearly indicated that "both governments (Reich and
Prussian) must be placed on an equal basis." Schleicher, himself,
was one of the most adamant opponents of what was labeled the
Reich-Prussian "dualism."^ ^

There was little that was really secret about the intentions of
the Papen government in respect to Prussia. It was well known
that one of its objectives would be the replacement of the Braun-
Severing regime in Prussia by an administration more pleasing to
the Right. Shadows of coming events could be seen at the first
meeting of the Papen cabinet when the State Secretary of the
Prussian Ministry of State, who had traditionally attended cabinet
sessions, was informed that he could attend these only when
matters of particular concern to Prussia were to be discussed.^^
Needless to say, his attendance was not renewed even when such
matters were on the agenda. As early as June 4 the Social Demo-
cratic organ, Vorwdrts, alluded to hints of a Reich Commissioner
for Prussia, and four days later the more objective but also
democratic Vossische Zeitung presented a thorough examina-
tion of the possibilities involved, arguing that efforts for consti-
tutional reform "am kalten Wege" would estop possibilities of
legal and proper reform. ^^ Both newspapers stated that legal
grounds for making use of a Reich Commissioner were lacking.
Nazi propagandist Goebbels, however, warned on June 11 that if
the approaching votes for the Minister-Presidency in Prussia proved

96 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

inconclusive, the new chancellor "would set a Reich Commissioner
before the noses of Severing, Hirtsiefer, and their associates,^*

It will be recalled that the legal situation involved the continu-
ance in ofBce as a "caretaker government" (geschdftsfiihrende Re-
gierung) of the cabinet of Braun after its resignation in May, but
that Braun himself had taken "leave" for reasons of health, desig-
nating Heinrich Hirtsiefer his representative. The newly elected
Landtag was unable to name a new Minister President because the
old Landtag had changed the order of procedure for the election
of that officer in such a way as to require an absolute majority,
and the Nazis were not able to muster enough votes to satisfy this
requirement. As a consequence, the Braun cabinet remained the
legal one, although it no longer commanded the support of the
Landtag. Nationalists and National Socialists labeled it unconsti-
tutional for a government to act without the confidence of the
Landtag and denied the right of the Braun cabinet to speak for
Prussia.^^ This point of view was also underscored on June 6
when von Papen wrote to the Nazi President of the Landtag, Hans
Kerrl, requesting him to secure an early session of that body so
that a "constitutional" government might be chosen. ^^ Both the
tone of von Papen's letter and its ignoring of the existing cabinet
hinted at the position later taken by the Reich before the Supreme
Court that the Braun government was not a legal government of
Prussia.

The Reich also endeavored to find a basis for action against
Prussia by creating a financial crisis for its government. The Briin-
ing government had engaged in respect to the Prussian budget of
1932 to provide 100 million marks for shares held by Prussia in
the German Bank for Rural Settlements {Deutsche Siedlungsbank) .
This promise was now voided by the Papen regime. ^'^ This left
a deficit in that amount in the Prussian budget, a financial crisis
which might have been exploited as grounds for federal intervention
if the state of Prussia had not taken heroic measures to fill the gap.
On June 8, the "caretaker government" by emergency decree ( taken
under the provisions of an earlier decree of the Reich President)
established a tax on the slaughtering of cattle and a reduction of
the salaries of civil servants by precentages ranging from 2/2 to 5%.^^
In this way it balanced its budget and prevented, for the time being,
action of the Reich against Prussia. Shortly afterward the von Papen

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 97

government became engaged with the problems of the Lausanne
Conference and the question was further postponed. The Nazis,
however, kept up a barrage of criticism demanding that the chan-
cellor "get tough" ("Papen, iverde hart!") with Prussia.^^

Actually, however, the Papen government was, at this time,
meeting more problems from the South German states than from
Prussia. It will be recalled that one of its early measures was the
lifting of the prohibition of the uniformed Nazi organizations, the
S.A. and the S.S. The South German states were strongly opposed
to this action and delayed for some time in removing local pro-
hibitions against the use of uniforms. While Papen was at Lausanne,
this question was raised in the cabinet and von Gayl noted that,
in contrast to Baden and Bavaria, Prussia would "present no diffi-
culties" in regard to these matters. At the same time the Reich
Minister of the Interior added an even more curious comment, one
destined to play a strange role in the Supreme Court proceedings
that came later. He had had, said von Gayl, "a thorough discussion"
of Prussian matters with Severing and the latter "had emphasized
that the government of the Reich would probably soon be forced
to set up Reich Commissioners in Prussia and some of the other
Lander.'"-^ That Severing would really express favor for such an
action seems incredible, but the manner in which the matter was in-
troduced into cabinet sessions a month before the action lends cred-
ibility to the possibility that von Gayl thought he did. After all. Otto
Braun had voluntarily left office and other Social Democrats were
saying that governmental authority by Rightists might convince
the people of the inability of those Rightists to govern. Von Gayl
repeated his story a second time four days later, and added that
Severing said he had refused to take part "in the campaign of
baiting" (Hetze) the cabinet. When von Gayl on this occasion
complained to Severing that the Prussian police proceeded much
more harshly against National Socialists than against Communists,
"Prussia had been surprisingly cooperative in the discussion."^ ^

All of this indicated, of course, that there was no real ground
for Reich intervention in Prussian affairs at the time that action
was taken. The very session of the Reich Cabinet during which
discussion of a Reich Commissioner was initiated was begun with
von Gayl's note that in respect to the emergency decrees of the
Reich the situation in Prussia had been satisfactory from the first

98 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

("In Preussen sei die Situation hinsichtlich der erwdhnten Verord-
nungen von Anfang an gut gewesen"). This session took place on
the same afternoon of Papen's long report of the results of the
Lausanne Conference— July 11. Von Gayl acted as a sort of master
of ceremonies for the proceedings. For his quite uncritical audience
he presented a view of shattered state authority in Prussia. The
eflForts of the Prussian police to combat the National Socialists, he
stated, made it impossible for them to take effective action against
the Communists. Prussian finances were in the disorder and the
state had to borrow from the Reichsbank to meet current needs.
Severing, the Prussian Minister of Interior, had muddied the po-
litical waters by an open statement implying criticism of the action
of the Reich in prohibiting for a week the appearance of the Social
Democratic organ Vorwdrts. In view of these factors, therefore,
Cayl felt that the psychological moment had arrived. The Reich
Chancellor should be named Reich Commissioner of Prussia. He
could, in turn, name subordinate commissioners. The police presi-
dent in Berlin must be removed and the Reich Commissioners once
named must remain until an administrative reform had been carried
through. Von Gayl reckoned with the probability of a complaint
before the supreme court, the Staatsgerichtshof, by the present
state government, but did not believe it would obtain success.^-

Von Gayl found little disagreement with his statements on the
part of other members of the cabinet. Schleicher added on behalf
of the plan the testimony of Gustav Noske, once a power among
the Social Democrats but now outside the party's inner circle,
that the renewed authority of the state was an urgent need. The
name of Franz Bracht, mayor of Essen, later to be designated the
major representative of the Reich in Prussia, also appeared at this
point as a witness to the same need. There was a passing reference
by Communications Minister von Eltz-Riibenach to Social Demo-
cratic-Communist discussions on the theme of "anti-fascism" but
nothing more specific. Of all the ministers only Minister of Labor
Schaffer seemed to be both surprised and shocked and to feel that
such action was premature. One item of interest was Schleicher's
comment that "a National Socialist leader" had urgently requested
that no prominent National Socialist be named a Reich Commis-
sioner in Prussia.^^

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 99

Of importance was the clearly uncertain casting about for justifi-
cation of the contemplated action. Giirtner, the Minister of Justice,
suggested the possibility of using the Prussian budgetary deficits as
an excuse. No other ground was suggested.-^ Nevertheless, a day
later a draft decree for the institution of the Reich Commissioner
was read and discussed in cabinet. Von Gayl was by now aware of
a meeting which had taken place on June 4th between Wilhelm
Abegg, a State Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, and the Com-
munist Landtag deputies Wilhelm Kasper and Ernst Torgler. This
information had been carried to him by Rudolf Diels, a lesser
ofiicial in the same ministry, who began his move toward promi-
nence in the National Socialist regime by reciting a highly colored
account of the interview. Diels claimed that Abegg discussed the
possibility of Social Democratic-Communist coalition. This was a
most unlikely story. Abegg was a member of the Democratic rather
than of the Social Democratic party. Of course, those seeking to
trump up a case against Prussia could allege that he had acted in
behalf of his Social Democratic superior. Even if Diels' story had
been true, there would have been nothing improper in Abegg's
action, but in the inflamed political situation existing such a charge
was equivalent to one of outright treason.-^

Seemingly the Reich was set to take action on July 12. Von
Gayl discounted dangers of a general strike, alluding to emergency
military action if needed and the existence of a "technical emer-
gency service" to combat any resistance by way of strike.^^ But
on July 13 Severing issued a strong public proclamation calling for
moderation and order and the Reich cabinet decided it needed to
postpone action. At the cabinet session on that day Meissner also
raised a point, to be of great legal significance later, whether it
would not be wise to present the Prussian government with a formal
complaint about its failure to act effectively against the Commu-
nists.-^ Such formal complaints (Mmigelriige) had always formed
a necessary prelude to the usage of the President's emergency
powers against a state, Reichsexekution, but none was to be issued
on this occasion. By July 16, however, all final doubts had been re-
moved and the way was clear at last for Papen's historic action. In
the discussion prior to this final decision the role of the great
industrialists appears in documentary form for the first time, with
the mention that Krupp, the munitions king, and Brandis ( Brandes ) ,

100 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

the chairman of the metal works in Stuttgart, favored a proclama-
tion of a state of siege for all Brandenburg.^^

When Papen summoned the leading ministers of Prussia's
caretaker government to meet with him on the morning of July 20,
1932, he was acting in the midst of a situation approaching civil
war. Since the repeal by his government of the ban on public
display of Nazi uniforms 99 persons had died in political conflict
and 1125 had been wounded. Sundays had been particularly im-
portant for politics — and for death. On June 26 the toll was 5 dead,
103 wounded; on July 3, 5 dead, 72 wounded; on July 10, 19 dead,
189 wounded; on July 17, 19 dead, 285 wounded."^ That a situation
existed which was not to be tolerated in an orderly state cannot
be denied. That this situation concerned itself particularly with
the area of Prussia, however, or that the weakness of the Prussian
government was a contributory factor are highly debatable. The
solution of this terrible problem was by no means simple and
uncomplicated. How does a government cope wdth the existence
of huge mass movements on the political extremes, mass move-
ments mutually hostile to one another and equally contemptuous
of law and order? Complete prohibition of such movements only
drives them underground and makes police surveillance more
difficult. Control action by police is bound to be sporadic and un-
certain. It is little wonder that many statesmen in Germany decided
that the only hope was that one of these movements might learn
moderation by government responsibility and government action
against its equally dangerous enemies. Nor was it to be wondered
at that the National Socialist movement which had at least prom-
ised legaHty of action and professed super patriotism should be
chosen in preference to the Communists, who openly proclaimed
in the Reichstag and the Landtage their adherence to Moscow
leadership. The government of von Papen had chosen this path
and its action against the state of Prussia was a part of its plan.
But the von Papen government also contemplated a diversion of
strength from the Nazis by depriving them of the major bases of
their political appeal.

The Papen coup of July 20, 1932, was, in its inception, well
organized, simple, and effective. A coup de theatre of great sig-
nificance, it should, perhaps, be described in dramatic terms, but
to do so would be to create a false picture. The essense of the coup

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 101

was false theater — "liam acting" which failed to convince its
audience and left them unstirred by the portents of the plot. The
impression created was that of a firm and secure state authority
proceeding against poseurs who "struck an attitude" but stood
weak and confounded by the force of their opponents.

The full powers needed for the action were obtained from the
President on July 16.^° On July 18 Papen extended an invitation
to Severing and Braun's representative, Hirtsiefer, to a "discussion"
at the Reich Chancellery. Although the institution of a Reich
Commissioner had been discussed for some time, Severing did not
expect this action to arrive in such an unpretentious manner. He
considered it probable that the discussion would deal with a letter
he had sent in the name of the Prussian State Ministry protesting
the drastic cuts in unemployment and crisis support by the state.
When he sent Ministerial Director Ludwig Nobis to inquire into
the nature of the conference, he received the answer that financial
and agricultural matters were to be discussed and that Prussian
Finance Minister Otto Klepper had also been invited to the con-
ference for this reason. At ten o'clock on the morning of July 20th
the three Prussian Ministers were present in the Reich Chancellery
to be confronted by the curtly imparted news that the President
in view of his concern for security and order in Prussia had made
use of paragraphs one and two of Article 48 of the Constitution
to establish the Reich Chancellor as Reich Commissioner for
Prussia. When Severing and his associates protested, they eventu-
ally received the answer that the action was taken in the name of
Staatsraison.^^ It was, indeed, unfortunate that the Prussian min-
isters could not have produced the protocols of the Reich cabinet
to underscore the hallowness of "the reasons of state" advanced by
von Papen.

Various shadings of statesmanship and stagecraft accompanied
the conference. Judas-like, Ministerial Director Nobis, who had
inquired so unsuccessfully into the nature of the conference, now
appeared on the side of Prussia's adversary. Severing and Hirt-
siefer made a strong stand against the charges implied in the action
of the Reich that the administration of Prussia had been misman-
aged and that conditions within Prussia were worse than those in
other parts of the Reich. Papen, still "the gentleman," assured the
Prussian ministers of his respect for their persons and requested

102 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

their cooperation in accomplishing an unavoidable action. Sever-
ing's answer provided the most dramatic aspect of the interview.
It would, he stated, be treasonable for a republican minister to
accept as legal such unconstitutional actions — he would "yield
only to force. "^-

Force was, indeed, at hand. It required only the issuance of a
second presidential decree to proclaim "a state of siege" for Berlin
and Brandenburg, with General von Rundstedt, the ranking military
commander in the area, as the designated executor of tliis order.
This action was carried out almost before the return of the Prussian
ministers to their oflBces — at eleven o'clock von Rundstedt called
Grzesinski, the chief of police in Berlin, to inform the latter of his
position and to request him to turn over police powers in an orderly
fashion. Grzesinski delayed his answer until he might consult with
Severing, but received little satisfaction from his superior. Seem-
ingly, Severing's private reaction to Fapen's coup was considerably
less defiant than his public one. By Grzesinski's account. Severing
supported the legality of Papen's actions and counseled the Berlin
Chief of Police to surrender his authority to von Rundstedt. Even-
tually Grzesinski pushed his refusal to yield his office to a point
sufficient to secure his own arrest and that of two subordinates — for
a sum total of an hour and a half. In this action a ridiculously small
contingent of Reichswehr soldiers participated.^^

Meanwhile, Severing himself received his successor by appoint-
ment of Reich Commissioner for Prussia von Papen, the former
mayor of Essen, Franz Bracht. Bracht was, the Commissional Min-
ister of Interior for Prussia later reported, cordially received by
Severing and arrangements were concerted by which Severing was
to yield his office at 8 o'clock that evening after a show of force. ^^
The latter turned out to be the former police president of Essen,
Kurt Melcher, who had meanwhile been named to Grzesinski's
place, and two other police officers. With Severing "yielding" to
this show of force, the first stage of Papen's coup was completed.

As seen from the above, the central events of this story unfolded
themselves in a most undramatic fashion. There was little of the
blaring of bugles or sound of the drums on the part either of Prussia
or of the Reich. A frosty, cynical interview in the offices of the
Reich Chancellor, a handful of soldiers, a trio of police had been
all that were required to overturn the administration of a great

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 103

state. The Reich had not even troubled itself to fulfill the agelong
bureaucratic traditions of the Germans by supplying the removed
Prussian ministry with a bill of particulars justifying the action.
Salus populi suprema lex esto — the classical explanation of earlier
dictators who had used the welfare of the people as a cloak for
their own ambitions — such again was Papen's excuse for an action
bearing harshly and unjustly upon honest and devoted public
servants. Papen's coup was in part legally justifiable, in part un-
constitutional, as will be seen. But in its origins and in the methods
of its execution it was totally and unmitigatedly immoral. No sanc-
timonious later-day rationalizations can render it otherwise.

On the other hand, the role played by the Prussian ministers
was far from inspiring. Only one member of the Prussian cabinet
has claimed that he had laid plans for resistance. Otto Klepper,
the Finance Minister, has pictured himself as a stormy petrel of
potential resistance. By Klepper's story he had learned of the
coming of Bracht to Berlin shortly before the twentieth and had
sought to effectuate a plan for resistance which had earlier been
discussed in the Prussian cabinet. He, Klepper, was to exchange
his post as Finance Minister for that of Severing, the Interior
Minister. The Prussian government would convert the Reichsbanner
into emergency police and oppose any intrusion of the Reich in
Prussia. Hindenburg was to be "discreetly neutralized," the Reich
cabinet and the leadership of the Nazi party to be arrested, and
the powers of government to be assumed by the Minister Presidents
of the five largest Ldnder\ This plan, claims Klepper, failed because
of the lethargic pusillanimity of Severing. ^^ Severing's excoriating
denunciation in his memoirs of Klepper's account carries convic-
tion.^^ Many minor aspects of Klepper's story suggest that it
belongs among the gray shadows of the memoirs of those men who
seek after the event to construct a role of importance they did not
fill at the time. On the other hand, it is equally clear that Severing
had been in the face of the events of July 20th neither a pillar of
cloud by day nor a pillar of fire by night. Nothing became quite so
ridiculous in the course of events as Severing's epigrammatic de-
fiance, "I yield only to force." As for Otto Braun, when informed
of the events, he considered a return to his oflBce but learned by
telephone that the Ministry of State was occupied by Reichswehr
troops and that he was forbidden to enter or to make use of his

104 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

official car. As a consequence, he took no official action at all until
July 22nd.3^

The correctness of the decision by the Prussian ministers neither
to seek to meet force by force nor to endeavor to oppose Papen's
action by a general strike has been much discussed. The arguments
of cold reason and common sense still throw the weight of their
authority on the side of Severing and his colleagues. The use of
the Prussian police against the Reichswehr troops who opposed
them would have meant, if the police had remained loyal as was
probable, a bloody and hopelessly abortive revolution punishable
as state treason. To have called to the assistance of the Prussian
police the Reichsbanner formations would have broadened the
conflict into civil war, with the Reich government possibly counter-
ing this by making use of the Nazi para-military organizations. To
have sought a new general strike in a time of depression would
have involved equal difficulties — besides the rank and file of the
Social Democracy seemed to be opposed. Any effort of resistance
would have strengthened the hands of the Communists who had
been begging for a common effort against fascism and would forge
rapidly ahead amidst the scenes of revolution they were seeking.
A new general election was less than a fortnight away and convinced
democrats could not help believing that the events of July 20th
would awaken the electorate to the perils on the right. And there
was, last and not least, the resort of the German Supreme Court, the
Staatsgerichtshof, where Prussian ministers felt confident the un-
constitutionality of Papen's actions would be affirmed.

That which opposes the logic of Severing and his cohorts is
neither clearly definable nor factually demonstrable. It is a pos-
thumous analysis which says that the body of German democracy
was not quite dead when Severing and his associates consigned it
to the grave. Built upon the bitter commentary of the younger
members of the Social Democracy at the time and of others at a
later period this afterthought proclaims that the directorate of the
Social Democrats lacked the daring and the drive which had once
characterized the party. ^"^ The man in the streets, runs the story,
waited for the call to move against his foes, but waited vainly.
Such action might well have found a fumbling Reich government
unprepared for opposition. Indeed, five months later Schleicher
shied from the possibility of civil war when those opposed were

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 105

less organized and more poorly armed than the Prussian police.
To have born aloft the torch of democracy by martial defiance of
reactionary opponents, to have offered a role of action to replace
the helpless passivity imposed upon German democrats during the
past fourteen years might possibly have served to recreate for
democratic forces a morale which had been virtually destroyed. At
the least it would have left a legend of golden deeds and of martyr-
dom for ideals. It does appear that the leaders of German democracy
"played it safe" in July, 1932, when there still remained an outside
chance to save democracy from destruction. But that this was to be
in the long run the last chance to prevent the demise of democracy
or that the consequences of its passing were to be as catastrophic
as came to be was by no means clear at that date. The pathway of
history lies at most of its junctures forked into numerous alternative
patterns, and it is far easier to see the trend of events from
the vantage point of later years than from the viewpoint of the
contemporary.

Moreover, it must be pointed out that the essence of an orderly
democratic society is respect for law. Those who opposed Papen
were those who also defended the normative state, the state wherein
the roles of the individual and of the government are defined by law.
Papen, who believed in Staatsraison, in the superiority of authority
to narrow concepts of legality, could well proceed to skirt the
edges of constitutional limitations. The Prussian ministers opposing
his action could use force only at the expense of a relinquishment
of their principles and the employment of the same concepts of
Staatsraison which they condemned. It was, therefore, within the
framework of their standards and ideals that the republican min-
isters met that which they considered unconstitutional action with
patience, offering only such resistance as would require their oppo-
nents to make an overt display of force, and appealing to the ju-
diciary to pronounce what had occurred an infringement of the legal
limits of organized government.

There are several rather curious aspects of the action of the
Reich. One of these was the failure to present the Prussian govern-
ment with a formal list of its deficiencies in the conduct of govern-
ment {Mdngelriige) . Presumably this was not done for fear of the
organization of concerted resistance to the cowp. At the same time,
Papen and his cohorts did not seem unduly troubled about such

106 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

a potentiality and their legal case would have been immensely
strengthened if this had been done. Similarly, the nature of the
decree imposing a Reich Commissioner upon Prussia was such as
to engender unnecessary resentment. Paragraph two of Article 48
of the Weimar Constitution gave the President of the Reich au-
thority to employ dictatorial measures when he considered that
existing conditions were such as to imperil public order and se-
curity. This paragraph established no other standards for such
action than the free judgment of the President himself. Practically
all that was done within Prussia itself during the period that fol-
lowed could have been accomplished under the aegis of this para-
graph. But the Papen government joined to this the first paragraph
of Article 48 which allowed the President to intervene in the affairs
of one of the constituent states when that state failed to fulfill its
requisite obligations within the framework of the Reich. The use
of paragraph one confronted the Prussian government with an
unnecessary charge of moral turpitude which added to the resent-
ment of the Prussian ministers at what they considered a violation
of legal principles a sense of outrage at the injustice of charges
directed at their persons. The rationale of this action can only
indicate that those responsible for the legal preparation for the
coup were aiming at a higher goal than a temporary sequestration
of Prussian governmental authority. That which was being sought
was fundamental governmental reform to be accomplished through
a quasi-legal process. Such an idea lay beyond the superficialities
of a Papen, who, long after the event and in the presence of all the
court action surrounding it, merely believes "the juris-consult of
my Chancellery certainly thought it wiser to take both for the
legal defense."-^" The more devious mind of Schleicher is clearly
apparent and with it the ingenious, but also ingenuous, legal sophis-
try of Carl Schmitt, the apostle of dictatorship.

The career of this fascinating genius of the plausible and the
opportune has been etched in venom by his one-time patron, Moritz
Bonn."*" Schmitt, says Bonn, was a Privatdocent in Strassburg until
the end of World War I. Left in the cold as respects academic
employment by the sundering of Alsace-Lorraine from Germany,
Schmitt found a position in Greifswald, but the Protestant atmos-
phere of the institution chilled the bones of the Catholic West-
phalian. Bonn, who had become on October 1, 1931, Rector Mag-

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 107

nificus of the Berliner Handelshochschule, brought Schmitt to
BerHn to occupy the chair once held by Hugo Preuss, the father
of the Weimar Constitution. The Rector recognized the great in-
tellectual gifts of his colleague — he had, he says, failed to conjure
with his colleague's boundless laziness, his eagerness for originality,
his intellectual stubbornness. As a consequence, Schmitt, who came
to Berlin singing paeans of praise for Preuss, fell into relationships
with the "Tatkreis" and the reactionary circles about von Schleicher.
By 1932 he was halfway along the road to the honorary position of
Staatsrat under Goring. Basically, says Bonn, "Like all weak char-
acters he yearned for the freeing deed; whether good or evil deed
was to him in the final outcome one."^^ In the events of July, 1932,
and following, Schmitt stands in the background weaving the
pieces of a tapestry of legal apology for the replacement of the
normative state by the authoritarian one.

Meanwhile, the scope of the action of the Reich rapidly broad-
ened. The original order of the President carried with it a lifting
of personal immunities guaranteed by Articles 114, 115, 117, 118,
123, 124, and 153 of the Constitution.^^ n j^^jg possible the
employment of the death penalty for treason, arson, floodings, sabo-
tage, bombings, etc. The very arrest of Grzesinski on the twentieth
was a violation of his parliamentary immunity as a member of the
Prussian Landtag.'*^ On the following day he was again arrested
along with vice-president of the Berlin police, Bernhard Weiss,
and Colonel Manfried Heimannsberg, the head of the Berlin "Pro-
tective Police" (Schutzpolizei) and a trial process against them
was set into motion by von Rundstedt.^^ Publication of the Com-
munist Rote Fahne was suspended for a week and that of the
Berliner 8-Uhr-Abendblatt for four days for criticism of actions
concerned.^ ^ When Prussian ministers failed to answer a summons
to attend a ministerial conference issued, as later explained, by a
typing error as though it were to be a meeting of the Prussian State
Ministry with von Papen as Minister President, they were removed
from office. ^^ The concern of the Prussian Ministers for legal form
was entirely justified. Papen replaced them with the State Secre-
taries of the respective ministries and convened the "cabinet" he
had created as though it were properly replacing the State Ministry
itself. As Reich Commissioner, he occupied the place of the Minis-
ter President; Franz Bracht served as Minister of Interior, replacing

108 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Severing; Hans Heinrich Lammers, later Hitler's close confidant,
served as Minister of Education. The other posts were held by
State Secretary Heinrich Holscher as Minister of Justice; State
Secretary Frank Schleusener as Minister of Finance; and State
Secretary Fritz Mussehl as Minister of Agriculture. At its first
session the commissional "State Ministry" named new representa-
tives to the Reichsrat. It also began a series of personnel changes
of staggering proportions. By the twenty-second the list of officials
removed included State Secretary Abegg in the Interior Ministry,
Ministerial Director Badt in the same ministry, State Secretary
Staudinger in the Ministry of Commerce, State Secretary Kriiger
in the Ministry of Agriculture, the Oberprdsidenten of Lower
Silesia, Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hesse Nassau, the Re-
gierungsprdsidenten of Frankfurt an d. Oder, Liegnitz, Magdeburg,
Merseburg, Liineburg, and Miinster, and the police presidents of
Konigsberg, Kiel, Cologne, Elbing, Hagen i. W., Kassel, Oppeln,
and Altona.^'^

But, while it was using the "big stick" in Prussia, the Papen
government proceeded rather cautiously elsewhere within the
Reich. At a Lander conference in Stuttgart on the 23rd Papen
declared he had no intention of destroying the federal character of
the Reich. There was good reason for him to display caution at
this time. South German states at the Lander conference voiced
their alarm at the coup against Prussia and carried a resolution
against the procedure."*^ The interim supervisory committee of
the Reichstag ( Vberwachungsausschuss ) met in spite of Nazi leader
Gregor Strasser's efforts to obstruct such action and demanded that
all Papen emergency decrees be withdrawn, including those against
Prussia.^^ And, on the twenty-third, the Staatsgerichtshof or Su-
preme Court began its consideration of the request of the Prussian
government for a temporary injunction estopping tlie action of the
Reich. The latter was, of course, a request with little outlook for
success. In spite of able pleading by Ministerial Director Brecht, by
the able jurist and expert on the Constitution, Gerhard Anschiitz,
and the well-known Bavarian legal authority, Hans Nawiasky, the
court could scarcely ignore the logic of the representations of the
Reich. In behalf of the Reich, Georg Gottheiner of the Interior Min-
istry pointed out that any temporary injunction would prejudge a
difficult and complicated point of law. If the court issued such an

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 109

injunction, it would be declaring that no emergency such as had
been proclaimed by the President of the Reich actually existed.
It would, therefore, be deciding in advance of the pleading of the
case in favor of Prussia. ^"^ The court accepted the logic of this
argument and refused to issue the injunction requested by the
state of Prussia.

Logically, of course, there was a reverse side to this coin. In the
decision of the Staatsgerichtshof that it must await the presentation
of complete legal briefs and arguments before it could render a
decision and that, therefore, no temporary injunction could be is-
sued, was involved a presumption of the legality of the Reich action
and a procedure by which the weight of proof of illegality rested
on those who opposed that action. Before the actual proceedings
in the case had opened, July had passed into August, August into
September, and September into October. "The hot summer days
between July and August, " remarked Julius Leber, the Social Demo-
crat, in his afterthoughts, "dug the grave of the Weimar democ-
racy."^^ Each day's delay in legal preparation did, in fact, provide
opportunity for the mulitplication of the changes of personnel
and of system in which the Commissional regime in Prussia
engaged. These actions on the part of those officials whose role
was still subject to pending legal review resulted in a situation
where no real possibility of a return to the "status quo ante Papen"
existed. Meanwhile, the legality of the position of the Commissional
regime became subject to increasing doubt. Before the case actually
came to trial, the deposed Prussian government had been joined
in its remonstrances by the governments of Baden and Bavaria and
the representatives of the Center and Social Democratic parties.
That which resulted was, in the description used by one observer
for such cases, a "Monstre prozess," a legal procedure accompanied
by all the drama of the stage, in this case, however, the notes of
tragedy predominating.^-

Von Papen himself held by the terms of the presidential decrees
concerned, the title of "Reich Commissioner for Prussia." All Reich
officials supervising the government of Prussia acted in his behalf
and subject to his authority. His role in this position tended to
duplicate that of the pre-war chancellors, who had been both
Chancellors of the German Empire and Minister Presidents of
Prussia. Papen probably delighted to think of himself sitting in the

no THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

chair which Bismarck had occupied and he often pictured his ob-
jective as a return to the situation existing prior to World War I
in order to indicate that his action was not revolutionary or unitarist
in nature and should not occasion great concern. ^^ But Papen's ap-
peal to traditionalism lacked the sense of gradualism which had
been a part of that tradition. The consequences were that his
policies were, indeed, revolutionary in character and opened the
door to even more revolutionary after-effects.

Von Papen's major representative in Prussia and the Reich
Commissioner for the Prussian Ministry of the Interior was Franz
Bracht. He had been chief mayor of Essen since 1924. He was a
member of the Center Party. He had received some mention as
Briining's successor in early June. He was well acquainted person-
ally with some of the cabinet members. ^^ Beyond these simple
facts the details of his character and background are most elusive.
As has been noted above, he had come to the attention of Meissner
as an advocate of Reich intervention in Prussia before such action
was taken. ^^ With his assumption of the post mentioned, be began
attendance at sessions of the Reich cabinet as well as that of Prussia
and took full part in its proceedings.^'' His utterances were directed
strongly toward the increase of Reich authority and imply con-
siderable friendship to the Nazi position. It would appear that he
was something of a maverick Centrist much of the same character
as von Papen. All in all, however, he remains largely a figure of the
shadows, serving later as Schleicher's Minister of Interior during
the latter's brief term as Chancellor and dying early in the Nazi era.

Bracht's announced purpose followed the oft-used line of "rais-
ing the state above parties." Police officials were not to take part
in any political functions in uniform. The use of Hilfspolizei ( auxil-
iary police) was rejected. All state officials were to be servants of
the whole and to think and act above parties — "Now it is necessary
again to write large the word state and to set up service to state and
nation as the sole objective of all our work," he proclaimed. ^'^ The
first steps in a series of reforms professedly directed to this end ante-
dated the elections of July 31st. By July 25th Bracht was able to
report to the Reich cabinet that he had almost completed the reor-
ganization of the police presidency in Berlin.^® A day later the
Prussian civil service officials were notified that they now had the
right to belong to the Nazi party. ^® Another day later Bracht by

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 111

emergency decree closed "a considerable number" of the offices of
the Laiidkreise ( counties ) and of district courts. The details of this
action he refused to publish because, he said, it was too complicated
for immediate publication in full and a publication in part would
lead to misunderstandings. •'^ It was, however, quite clear that
Bracht was moving toward an administrative reform of considerable
scope. The groundwork for such action had been laid by the Braun-
Severing government, but it was not to be anticipated that the end
results accomplished under the representative of a reactionary
Reich Commissioner would please democratic-minded observers.

The election of July 31 brought little increased support to the
Papen regime. The Communists inveighed against reaction in gov-
ernment, and the Social Democrats were outraged at the events in
Prussia. Center party leaders still seethed with resentment at the
cavalier treatment of Briining and were also heavily involved in the
cause of Prussia. The Nazis had no intention of according von Papen
praise for his achievements at Lausanne or his policies at home.
From the first the Nazis, who considered themselves part of a great
and vital mass movement, sought to hold at arm's length a cabinet
which talked in terms of abstract "authority." They recognized the
caustic effect of such charges as that of Vorwdrts on July 29: "The
National Socialists want to renew Germany. For this they have
opened the door of our country's antiquity and hauled out the dusty
figures of the past."

The only favorable reaction to the Papen government was that
advanced by the German nationalist leader, Alfred Hugenberg.
On July 25th the cabinet received a private letter from that worthy
in which he greeted the actions against Prussia with pleasure, noting
that the Braun government had not been properly in office. ^^ How-
ever, Hugenberg added to his praise a warning that the economic
decrees of June 14th failed to recognize "the psychological factors
in the situation." Hugenberg expressed his hope that the provisions
of these decrees would be moderated and suggested government
action to assist in the regulation of interest on loans from abroad
in private hands. Composed fifty per cent of criticism, fifty per cent
of praise, Hugenberg's letter could scarcely be construed as a
promise of support for the Papen government. With all the other
political leaders strongly hostile to Papen, there was no real way in
which public support for the cabinet of barons could have been

112 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

expressed if it existed. Certainly a vote for any of the existing parties,
with the possible exception of the German Nationalists, would have
seemed a mark of disapproval for the regime.

The results of the elections of July 31, 1932, recorded a new high
point for National Socialist strength. Almost fourteen million Ger-
mans voted for the party of Adolf Hitler. In this outcome was em-
bodied the nemesis of the Papen government. Based on the concep-
tion that party politics was harmful to the state and that state
"authority" should be above parties, the Papen regime had been
forced to conduct its affairs during the first two months of its term
in office in the presence of a virulent Reichstag campaign from the
results of which there was no conceivable way for it to derive
advantage. The voting strength of the National Socialists entitled
them by the normal process of parliamentary government to pro-
claim their right to tlie chancellorship— as they did. It was, there-
fore, imperative for the Papen government to do one of two things
—share their responsibility with the Nazis in order to gain popular
support or void the parliamentary system which Papen's concept
of the "New State" had already negated. It proved, however, to be
impossible to accomplish either alternative.

Shortly after the elections the Papen government began to retreat
from its original policy of relaxing controls over political terrorism.
Bracht, in dealing with existing difficulties before the cabinet, still
attributed to the Prussian police prejudice against the National
Socialists. ^^ Soon, however, the solicitude for the National Social-
ists, which had formed a part of earlier cabinet meetings, began to
be conspicuous by its absence. On August 9th von Papen declared
that there appeared to be an organized move underway to convince
the populace that only through putting Hitler into the chancellor-
ship could political terrorism be ended.^^ The cabinet determined
thereupon to issue an emergency decree visiting the death penalty
upon those who committed murder in political controversies and
severe penitentiary sentences upon those responsible for lesser in-
juries.''^ It was, of course, clear to the existing cabinet that a
clarification of the relationship of the National Socialists to the
government must be brought about. The decisive discussions of
this problem took place in the cabinet on August 10th.

By the time the cabinet arrived at this vital time for decision
its leading members had already indicated the probable results

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 113

ol the deliberations. Von Papen on the day after the elections
informed the Associated Press representative in Berlin that he had
no intention of seeking to build a parliamentary coalition. On
August 8th he added the comment that he would welcome the
participation of "suitable personalities" from the National Socialist
party in the cabinet if it could preserve its supra-party position. '^^
These comments indicated that the chancellor was not tremendously
disturbed by the election results. On the 10th he opened cabinet
discussions with a rather optimistic sketching of the situation. The
Nazis, he pointed out, had had the fullest opportunity to develop
their full voting strength. With all propaganda means possible at
their disposal they had been able to gain only thirty-seven and a
half per cent of the votes. It now appeared that they were seeking
by use of force to rectify the deficit in numbers. The National
Socialist press was openly proclaiming that only through a Hitler
cabinet could public order be restored. This situation, von Papen
admitted, was a dangerous one for the cabinet. The Right must
be brought to an accounting. It must, he felt, seek to find a middle
road between the retention of a presidential cabinet and the pres-
sure of the National Socialists for a partisan government. But von
Papen felt that the major tasks of the government — the constitu-
tional regulation of the relationship of Reich and Prussia, the re-
form of voting rights, the creation of a "first chamber," and admin-
istrative reform in Reich and Lander — would be greatly hampered
if Hitler became chancellor.

After von Papen, the other cabinet members presented their
views. Perhaps von Schleicher presented the alternatives most
clearly when he pointed out that the cabinet must now choose
between seeking to continue in unaltered form and bringing Na-
tional Socialists into its ranks. If the former alternative were fol-
lowed, he indicated, the cabinet must seek by positive action to
gain popular support. He was not, he said, overly fearful of the
prospect of continuing for a time with only minority support (that
of the Nationalists). He believed, he said, that police and army
would execute the orders of the government loyally. But he did
fear the possibility that a National Socialist-Center Party coalition
might be negotiated. Creation of such a coalition would add to
the present political crisis a presidential crisis since von Hindenburg
was unwilling to accept such a coalition government. By far and

114 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

away the best solution, felt Schleicher, would be participation of
the National Socialists in the present government, but it would
probably be difficult to achieve this, especially in respect to
Hitler, who would insist upon a position of leadership.

The most interesting aspect of the cabinet discussions was the
strong sentiment displayed against any very extensive participation
of the National Socialists in the government. Von Gayl, Neurath,
SchaflFer, Warmbold, Krosigk, and Giirtner seemed less than luke-
warm about the prospect. Von Gayl, for his part, was ready to
see the suspension of the newly elected Reichstag, an oktroyiert
election law raising the voting age, and a rather indefinite post-
ponement of new elections. This, of course, would be a "revolution
from above" but von Gayl seemed prepared to take the risks in-
volved. So also did most of the others mentioned. Warmbold and
Krosigk both indicated that economic prospects were favorable and
that greater public support might be anticipated as a consequence.
It would appear, therefore, that the historic negotiations between
the von Papen government and Hider in respect to the latter enter-
ing the cabinet were undertaken with a majority of the cabinet
members fully prepared for the failure of the negotiations and
anticipating that this would be followed by extra-constitutional
alterations in government carried through by action of the Reich
President. It is also to be noted that the disposition of affairs in
Prussia formed a vital part of the discussions, with a number of
cabinet members feeling that National Socialist entry into the
cabinet might halt the reforms that had been initiated. Strangely
enough, however, Papen's representative in Prussia, Bracht, believed
that the situation there could not be regulated successfully without
Nazi participation. Perhaps his attitude was influenced by National
Socialist mention of his name as an acceptable candidate for the
Prussian Minister-Presidency! It might be noted that Bracht was
consistently pro-Nazi in his position.^^

The negotiations between Hitler, Goring, and Ernst Rohm on
one side and Papen, Schleicher, and von Hindenburg on the other
took place between August 10th and 13th. They were hea\aly cov-
ered by the press at the time and the dramatic final scene in which
von Hindenburg received and dealt with Hitler as though he were
a subaltern reporting to his superior was detailed on the front pages
throughout the nation. As Papen later reported to the cabinet, it

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 115

had been clear by the close of his own discussions with Hitler that
the latter would not enter into the existing cabinet. The Nazi leader
had berated von Papen for the weakness of his actions against the
Marxist parties and declared that they could only be rooted out
"by fire and sword." Neither he nor any of his followers wished a
part in a Papen government, even though von Papen, on his own
authority, had offered Hitler the vice-chancellorship and indicated
that he would step aside when the Nazi leader proved his ability
to take over the top position. Hitler had not wished, said von
Papen, to see von Hindenburg, but von Papen had insisted in order
that Hitler might obtain the decision from the President's own
mouth.^'^ It was, therefore, von Papen who was responsible for
the painful scene in which Hitler confronted the aged Reich Presi-
dent to be treated in almost cavalier fashion and reproached for his
refusal to accept a subordinate role in the Papen government. Von
Hindenburg alleged that the Nazis had promised toleration of the
Papen regime and were now acting in bad faith in opposing it. He
told Hitler he could not reconcile with his conscience turning over
to the leader of one party the full powers of the state to be used
in a one-sided fashion. He threatened the use of extreme measures
against any effort to alter the situation by means of force. ^'^ All
in all, the interview constituted one of the most humiliating experi-
ences of Hitler's political career. It made him extremely cautious
during the process of negotiations later in the year.

The Papen cabinet greeted the news of the outcome of negotia-
tions with Hitler with composure and even satisfaction.*'^ Von Gayl,
who had been inclined from the first toward independent action,
made use of the occasion of the festival for the constitution, which
came in the midst of the conferences with Hitler, to expatiate
on the government's proposals for constitutional reform. Here, on
the day traditionally set aside for the celebration of the drafting
of the Weimar Constitution, von Gayl set forth the plans for an
alteration of the voting arrangements, the creation of a "first cham-
ber," and a rectification of the relationships between Prussia and
Reich. '^° The entire circumstances surrounding the Hitler-Papen
negotiations of August 10-13th indicated that Hitler was not actually
being offered even a fifty-fifty share in governmental decisions but
merely the opportunity to take a meaningless role in governmental
policies already "fix iind fertig" — to lend the weight of his electoral

116 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

prestige to the plans of those who professed to ignore election
resultsJ^ It is little wonder that the National Socialists rapidly
shifted ground after August 13th and became virulent opponents
of the Papen government. This opposition found its strongest outlet
in the criticism of the Reich Commissioner's position in Prussia.

Meanwhile, on August 3rd, the upper house of the German leg-
islature, the Reichsrat, met under the chairmanship of Minister of
Interior von Gayl. The meeting was preceded by unavailing efforts
of representatives of the Commissional regime in Prussia to obtain
admission to Reichsrat standing committees."- Representatives of
Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, Baden, Hesse, Hamburg, Lippe-Schaum-
burg, and most of the Prussian provinces presented their objections
to the effort to introduce representatives of the Reich Commissioner
into the sessions of the Reichsrat and announced that they were
taking part in the existing session only because the chair of Prussia
remained vacant and that only urgent and necessary business should
be undertaken until the decision of the Supreme Court became
known. '^^

The Bracht regime continued to seek Rightist favor by a strong
campaign against the Communists. On August 12th it engaged in a
series of house searches in all the large cities of Prussia.'^^ A week
later it made the first of a series of gestures in the area of morality
regulations by a decree against exhibitionism in public swimming
pools, theaters, etc., including a prohibition of beauty contests.'^^
Presumably this was meant to appeal to Catholic sentiments al-
though it seemed to have little effect in that regard. But lack of
public support did not prevent the Bracht regime from setting
forth at the end of August what Bracht called his "little administra-
tive reform" ("Heine Verwaltungsrejorm") by which sevent\^ ju-
dicial positions (Amtsgerichte) and fifty-eight county governments
(Landkreise) were eliminated."^ It was, of course, soon broadly

noised about that these reforms had been in finished form awaiting

only effectuation before the Braun-Severing regime had been dis-
placed. This circumstance added fuel to the Nazi fire of criticism.

Goebbels' personal declaration of war against the Papen regime
was announced in his diary on August 28th. "We must set ourselves
for a sharp and bitter struggle with the Reaction," he noted. It
intends "to live by the fruits of our work."^" Tlie first signs of this
opposition were found in the sessions of the Prussian Landtag which

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 117

opened on August 30th. There the Nazi deputies joined with Center,
Social Democratic, and Communist representatives in a series of
resolutions condemning the establishment of a Reich Commissioner
in Prussia and virtually directing the Prussian civil servants not to
feel themselves bound by the directives of these unconstitutionally
interposed authorities. '^^ Naturally, these resolutions reflected only
an agreement upon criticism of the Papen regime and not common
and coordinated action in any positive sphere. The tone of Nazi
speakers was similar to that of the bitter tirades launched by Goeb-
bels in Der Angriff after September 6th against "the fine folk" ( Die
feine Leute) now ruling Germany. For fourteen years, said Goeb-
bels, these "high class" people had sat in their club houses and
society homes and talked themselves blue in the face and now they
sought to reap the rewards of those who had done the fighting
against the Weimar system. He accompanied this general attack
with specific assaults on Bracht's "impossible administrative re-
forms" dreamed up by idealists at their work tables and on Papen's
economic program of early September.'^^

Bracher has called the situation existing in early September of
1932 one of the "isolation" of the Papen regime and one of a "power
vacuum."^*^ This analysis is not an entirely convincing one. The
Papen regime had been from the first, one built not upon any posi-
tive popular or legislative support but rather upon the personal
authority of the Reich President. That authority had not been
shattered by the events of August, 1932, but rather reenforced. The
humiliation forced upon Hitler and its acceptance with tones of
helpless indignation had evoked a considerable relaxation of the
situation. The strong moves of the Papen regime against political
excesses during the month of August had begun to obtain some
support even from originally hostile onlookers. ^^ Late in August
the Papen government was presented with its golden opportunity
for achievement. On August 9th, an hour and a half after the emer-
gency decree against political terrorism mentioned above had be-
come effective, an armed band of Nazi S.A. terrorists forcibly en-
tered the home of a Communist worker in Potempa, a tiny Upper
Silesian village, and beat him to death before the eyes of his
mother.^- Five of these terrorists were condemned to death by a
specially constituted court which deliberated in Beuthen from
August 19th to 22nd. For almost two weeks the Papen government

118 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

held fast to a firm stand for the execution of the judgment. As late
as August 28th Papen made a speech in Munich in which he vehe-
mently denounced the "lack of self-control" (ziigellosigkeit") of
Hitler and declared in strident tones, "When I today advocate in
opposition to Hitler the state of law, the community of the people,
and order in the leadership of the state, it is I and not he who
pursues the goals of millions of his followers in the struggle against
party domination, arbitrary government, and injustice." And, pro-
claimed Papen, "I am firmly determined to trample out the smoul-
dering Hame of civil war and to end the condition of political un-
rest and political deeds of violence . . ."^^ Five days later the Com-
missional government in Prussia announced the commutation of the
death penalties of the convicted murderers to life imprisonment.
Of this action Papen now states that it was a "grave political error."^^
Julius Leber, the Social Democrat, stated it better when he wrote
that the failure to execute the Nazis meant the execution of the
government instead. "^^

It is characteristic of Papen that he makes no mention in his
memoirs of von Hindenburg's influence upon this decision. But it
appears that it was the aged marshal's personal suggestion of clem-
ency that turned the tide.^*^ The Reich President had at the close
of the historic conference of August 13th extended the hand of
soldierly comradeship to Hitler after his lecture on patriotism and
good conduct. "^^ Now in the face of a deed of unspeakable sadism
von Hindenburg still found just cause for amnesty. The Nazis who
had committed murder could not have known that the Reich cabinet
had only an hour and a half before the deed established a death
penalty for such actions! In respect to the Beuthen affair von Hin-
denburg had once again proved to be a reed not a rod.

Von Hindenburg did, however, as early as the end of August
indicate that he would be willing to dissolve the Reichstag and post-
pone new elections beyond the constitutionally established limit of
sixty days. He also agreed with Papen that if federal control over
Prussia were threatened, the Reich Minister of the Interior should
be empowered to take over all police forces in the country. For
both of these steps he promised to give von Papen a blanket
authorization.^*

There remained, therefore, after September 2, 1932, a thin
chance for the success of the Papen regime. This was that it should

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 119

be able to generate a perceptible economic recovery and that it
should be able to accomplish at least a partial reform of the consti-
tutional basis of government. In the first of these it made some
progress. In the second it failed completely. In this failure the
weakness and indecision of von Hindenburg, the schemes and
intrigues of von Schleicher, and the indignant and partially suc-
cessful legal defense of its rights by the deposed Prussian govern-
ment played approximately equal parts.

CH. V. PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH

"Confusion, worse confounded" — only thus can be described
the pohtical situation existing in Germany in early September, 1932.
The Reichstag elections of July 31st had resulted in an anti-parlia-
mentary majority. The "revolutionary parties," the Communists and
National Socialists, held over half of the seats in the Reichstag.
The existing government had the narrov^^est kind of parliamentary
support. It had been created as a frank rejection of the signifi-
cance of parties and election votes. But Schleicher, the author of
this expression of authoritarianism, was now avidly seeking a
popular basis for a regime loudly proclaiming its right to ignore
the popular will. Papen, the chancellor, von Gayl, his strongest
aide, and others of the cabinet longingly eyed a more compre-
hensive Staatsstreich than that which they had undertaken in July
against Prussia. They were now beginning their three months' quest
for presidential support for measures transitional in nature designed
to prepare for a constitutional monarchy.

The man from whom Papen and his associates sought support
was thoroughly a monarchist. Neither affection for nor a sense of
loyalty to parliamentary institutions or the "state of law" bound
him from carrying out the measures suggested. Exactly why von
Hindenburg hesitated is difficult to say. Perhaps sometime later the
Hindenburg family archives will yield answers to this and other
troublesome questions.^ Meantime, the guess can only be hazarded
that a doddering, befuddled octogenarian, made cautious by his
recognition of his own mental obscurity, picked his way gingerly
through these troubled days. Personal feelings now weighed far
more heavily with him than an analysis of political factors or legal
considerations. Papen, his beloved "Franzchen," he clung to, al-
though by instinct he still sensed that Schleicher was the stronger
man. But his footsteps could not be led firmly down the path toward
monarchical restoration. To him the time seemed not yet right. He
was much troubled by the Nazi threats of bringing action to im-
peach him before the Supreme Court. ^ Very probably there also
remained a serious question as respects the choice of a ruler. The
longevity of the former Kaiser (he did not die until 1941) did not
serve well the interests of his dynasty. To return him to his throne
was impossible. To choose his son in his place was abhorrent to

122 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

the Field Marshal, who had already had cause to regret the halfway
support he had given in 1918 to the Kaiser's enforced abdication.
Then, too, the Crown Prince had considered campaigning against
von Hindenburg at the polls in February and continued his at-
tachment to the banner of the Nazis. Beyond tliis, he was con-
sidered too self-willed and meddlesome to make an acceptable
candidate for the throne. The seriousness of rumored plans for
his assumption of the throne in the fall of 1932 still appears du-
bious.^ The government of von Papen was, therefore, in Septem-
ber, 1932, an authoritarian government without a sense of true
authority, a monarchist-minded regime without a king to hear its
wishes, an anti-parliamentary government forced still to tread the
path and go through the motions of a parhamentary regime.

The month of September, 1932, brought significant developments
in both the national and Prussian arenas. On September 4th, the
Papen cabinet issued the decree designed to spur economic revival
and thus demonstrate "the positive accomplishments" which the
cabinet had talked about so much. The nature and consequences of
this "work-creation program" are both subject to some debate*
The measures taken were unusual and difficult to assess. Those busi-
nesses and individuals who paid in advance taxes of certain types
due in the period from October 1, 1932, to September 30, 1933, were
to receive tax certificates counting as a reduction of the tax con-
cerned. Thus, forty per cent of the turnover tax (Umsatzsteuer),
the trade tax (Gewerbesteuer), and the land and building tax
(Grundsteuer) and one hundred per cent of the transportation tax
(Beforderungssteuer) then in existence were to be subject to this
reduction. This, however, was a tax reduction whose benefits were
not to be immediately realizable. The tax certificates concerned
could, after 1934, be employed to pay taxes then falling due with
the additional advantage of a four per cent interest credit per
annum for the period during which the certificates were held. One
fifth of the total value of the certificates was realizable for tax pur-
poses during 1934 and each succeeding year. The interest sum in-
volved (Agio would be more properly used because it was a pre-
mium collected on the basis of the total original capital sum) had
to be collected during 1934 and each year following during the
five year period concerned or it would be lost.

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 123

The incongruities involved in the plan even within the fore-
going description are astounding. One got tax reduction only by
paying taxes promptly. The Reich reduced taxes but hoped and
expected to have more rather than less money available to spend,
since the actual reduction of revenue was postponed until 1934
when the tax certificates would become redeemable. The whole
scheme was a device designed to give a jog to business by a reduc-
tion of taxes and, at the same time, not make it necessary for the gov-
ernment budget to go into the red in the midst of depression condi-
tions. The tax reductions given were accompanied by moral pres-
sure to use these advantages for the expansion of business and
additional employment needed to assist recovery. If this were suc-
cessful, the tax reductions would, in the long run, not cost the gov-
ernment revenue but rather increase tax returns!

Although the tax certificates could not be converted directly
into cash, they could be discounted at the rate of 75% at the Reichs-
bank and, therefore, tended to acquire the character of legal tender.
This made it possible for those who acquired them to obtain credit
for purposes of business expansion, if they did what the government
wished, or to pay off old debts, if they did what the government
did not wish. There was no specific control device set up to make
sure that the credit obtained really contributed to the expansion
of business.

It will be noted that the benefits of this portion of the Papen
economic program were clearly directed toward larger scale busi-
nesses and entei-prises. Tax certificates were not issued in denomi-
nations smaller than 10 R.M. with this provision purposefully in-
cluded to prevent small farmers and businessmen from "cluttering
up the works" in respect to the tax reduction process.

There was a second aspect of the Papen program which was
not to remain in effect long but seriously influenced its public
reception. This was a procedure by which businesses adding men to
their payrolls received a bonus. Enterprises which could prove that
in the period from October 1, 1932, to September 30, 1933, they had
employed more men than in the quarter of the year from June to
August, 1932, were to receive for each extra man so employed a
subsidy of 400 R.M. This direct governmental aid to the creation
of work would not, however, actually cost the government money,
since it had to provide for each unemployed man a normal support

124 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

payment of 500 R.M. Closely associated with this was a provision
allowing those companies which hired more workers to reduce
wages below the oflBcial, legal wages of the day.

The last aspect of the Papen economic program was a move
toward a quota tariflF system for agricultural products, designed
to supplement the features of the program already described,
because the major benefits of the other portions of the program
would be felt by the industrial sector of the economy.

The whole plan, of course, gave evidence of the academic men-
tality of Papen's Economic Minister, Professor Hermann Warmbold,
its chief author. There was little to appeal to the general public in
its procedures. To the unemployed in town or country there was
offered only the vague hope that businesses and agricultural estates
might find it possible to increase employment. The reaction of the
business world itself was, however, favorable. There was a rise in
the stock market. Papen began to gain some very ardent support
among the great industrialists.^ It is ironic that the remaining
events of the Weimar period took place in the presence of gradually
improving economic conditions but that this improvement did not
really become perceptible to the public at large until, amidst vig-
orous and energetic programs of public works and relief, the Nazis
were able to capture credit for what had been well begun before
they assumed power. As for the Papen economic program, the extent
of assistance which it offered to recovery is quite debatable. The
tax certificate scheme anticipated a number of features of the svs-
tem of Mefo Certificates created later by Schacht to finance the
beginning of Germany's rearmament.® Both mortgaged future pros-
perity for the sake of more immediate economic goals. Both were
schemes for moderate and controlled inflation after a period of
severe deflation. Both sought to veil this process from the public
because of the past history of inflation in Germany, which might
trigger hysterical reactions. Undoubtedly Papen's tax certificates
added some momentum to the improvement of economic conditions
which had begun after Lausanne. But their effect was quite gradual
and they were not designed to cope with one of the most serious
aspects of the business cycle — the psychology of the public. The
Papen program seemed a strong demonstration of the truth of
Social Democratic charges that the government was hostile to the
worker and unconcerned with the welfare of the man-on-the-stieet.

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 125

That businesses received bonuses while workers faced the threat of
further salary cuts seemed to link barons and tycoons in an unholy
alliance.

Nor did the Papen government gain stature by the opera bouffe
attending the opening of the Reichstag. Papen had discussed his
economic program with the President at his estate in Neudeck on
August 29th. At that time the President had not only approved the
program but had given Papen the necessary authority for the dis-
solution of the Reichstag.'^ The President's action was taken in the
face of the clearly apparent fact that the von Papen government
would not be able to acquire a majority support. His decision
ignored the negotiations being carried on between the Center
Party and the National Socialist Party for a parliamentary coalition,
although both parties professed optimism as respects the outcome
of the consultations. Both National SociaHsts and Centrists sought
during the period immediately prior to the opening of the Reichs-
tag to stave oflF a dissolution decree. Their efforts had no effect
upon the President. He had decided long before this that he would
not accept any kind of coalition government which sought to base
itself upon the support of the Reichstag rather than that of the
Presidency. What the Papen government anticipated, therefore,
was a brief session of the Reichstag during which the initial for-
malities would be completed; the government would present its
report of past achievements and plans for future accomplishments,
and then dissolve the Reichstag if it failed, as anticipated, to re-
ceive support. Papen even had some hopes, undoubtedly unjusti-
fied, that the Reichstag might be prevailed upon to adjourn itself
for a six months' political truce.^

The Reichstag had its organizational meeting on August 30th.
The two hundred thirty Nazi deputies stood out from their party's
opponents by virtue of their youth as well as their uniforms. They
listened with disciplined attention while the opening speech, tra-
ditionally given by the oldest member of the Reichstag, was read
by Communist Klara Zetkin, who had flown back from a visit to
Moscow to gain this honor. Her monotonous cliches were inter-
rupted only by the gentle Zwischenrufe of the Nazis, "Das kommt
nur einmal" ( "That comes only once" — parodying a song popular
at the time). Then Hermann Goering, soon to replace Gregor
Strasser as the Nazi second-in-command, was elected President of

126 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

the Reichstag and business got underway. The various resolutions
were presented — among these, as was usual on such occasions,
several affirming lack of confidence in the government. Goering
expressed his trust that the Reich President would not, as rumor
had it, break his oath on the Constitution by shutting the Reichstag
out of governmental affairs. Recess was then taken for two weeks. ^

Formalities out of the way, the Reichstag proceeded quickly
to business on September 12th. During the consideration of the
order-of-business there came suddenly, and quite evidently by pre-
arrangement, a Communist proposal for ^n immediate vote upon
their own resolution of lack of confidence in the government. A
single objection in the Reichstag could have prevented the proposal
from being accepted. Goering, however, allowed no time for such
an objection. Quickly announcing that in the absence of objection
the Communist proposal was accepted, Goering then entertained
a motion for a half-hour adjournment of the session. ^'^

The cabinet had been caught flat-footed by the procedure. Von
Papen had not brought with him to this session the decree of dis-
solution already signed by the President. In anger and in haste he
dispatched a messenger to bring it. When the Reichstag reas-
sembled, he had the famous red portfolio in which such decrees of
dissolution were customarily conveyed to the Reichstag. But Goer-
ing refused his request to be heard, announcing that the \ote on the
Communist proposal had already begun and that discussion was,
therefore, out of order. Papen marched to the rostrum and placed
the decree of dissolution before Goerins;. The latter ignored it and
allowed the voting to continue. State Secretarv Planck of the office
of the Reich Chancellor came forward and shoved the decree clearly
into Goering's view. The latter continued to pretend not to see it.
White with rage, Papen and the cabinet as a whole left the Reichs-
tag. The voting was continued. By a vote of 512 to 42 the Commu-
nist resolution of lack of confidence was adopted. Upon this Goering
picked up the decree of dissolution, read it, and announced that it
was of no effect since the cabinet which had countersigned it was
no longer a legal one.^^

Goering maintained only a short time his pretense that the
Reichstag had not actually been dissolved. Although he had found
Center and Social Democratic deputies willing to participate in
the vote against the Papen regime, he did not find them prepared

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 127

to back Nazi leadership denying the vaHdity of the President's
decree. By the following day Goering accepted the legality of disso-
lution on the argument that even a cabinet which had fallen by a
parliamentary vote could legally countersign such a decree of dis-
solution. Under Social Democratic leadership the defense of the
position of the Reichstag was shifted from the Council of Elders,
whose session would have meant that the Reichstag had not been
dissolved, to the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Par-
liament, which was an interim committee unaffected by the disso-
lution order. ^- Had Goering continued with his efforts to renew
the full session of the Reichstag, the Prussian police stood ready,
under the authority of Reich Commissioner Bracht, to prevent the
assembly.^^ Perhaps it was knowledge of the readiness of the
government to take direct action which prevented Goering from
pushing further the fiction that the decree of dissolution was invalid.

These developments were by no means unrelated to the story of
affairs in Prussia. They underscored the fact that the Papen govern-
ment had, by early September, 1932, forfeited all real hope of ob-
taining popular support for its position. There was nothing within
the complex phrases of Papen's work-creation plan likely to bring
a tidal wave of pro-Papen votes at some future Reichstag election.
The nonsensical scene accompanying the dissolution of the Reich-
stag emphasized the deep rift between the "barons" and the Nazis.
The vote of lack of confidence indicated that eleven-twelfths of the
country's elected delegates were hostile to the government. Even
the pre-war Hohenzollerns would have hesitated to support such
an unpopular chancellor. Nevertheless, the Papen cabinet continued
to press for constitutional revision and Prussia stood in tlie center
of its proposals.

On the evening of the dissolution of the Reichstag, Papen made
on the radio the speech he had intended to present within the
legislative halls. His remarks punctuated by sharp thrusts at the
actions of the Nazis in the Reichstag and their continued failure
to think "above party," Papen indicated that the cabinet still
expected to bring into being a new era of German history. The
Papen cabinet proposed first and foremost to end the "Reich-Prus-
sian dualism" still existing. This would be followed by the steps
necessary to close the "liberal" era of politics and move to one of
greater security and stability for the state. ^"^

128 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Exactly how this was to be done Papen did not say. Crossed
out of the original draft of his speech was a statement promising
that only constitutional methods would be employed. Undoubtedly
the Papen regime had intended to use the coup against Prussia as
a springboard by which to "pack" the Reichsrat, the "upper
house" of the parliamentary establishment, with the delegates
named by the Commissional regime in Prussia. In this way Papen
and his cohorts had hoped to gain support of the Reichsrat for
constitutional reform. Even so, any action by the cabinet would
still have had to obtain the adherence of the Reichstag to be con-
stitutional, but the Papen cabinet evidently expected that the
meeting of the latter body could be indefinitely postponed and that
public sentiment might alter during this period of delay. Any such
prospects of effecting constitutional revision by a quasi-legal process
died stillborn with the violent opposition of the South German states
in the Reichsrat. There now remained two possible methods by
which the Papen cabinet might still achieve its objectives. If the
Supreme Court in the pending legal review of the federal action
against Prussia completely upheld the position of the Reich, then
the Prussian Reichsrat plenipotentiaries would be clearly and legally
under the direction of the Reich Commissioner. In this case it
might be possible to overcome South German objections to con-
sideration of constitutional reform by the Reichsrat. If this proved
impossible, the only alternative was to prevail upon the Reich
President to violate the Constitution by proroguing the Reichstag
and carrying constitutional reform into eflFect by his decree power.
The process of dissolution of the Reichstag in which the President
had just taken part augured well for this possibility. Von Hinden-
burg's decree of dissolution specified as the reason for its employ-
ment, that there was "danger that the Reichstag might demand the
withdrawal of my emergency decree of September 4th."^^ Yet, the
Constitution had specifically provided that if the Reichstag disap-
proved the decrees issued by the President under the aegis of
Article 48, they should be immediately revoked. In effect, therefore,
Hindenburg's action was a direct repudiation of the only constitu-
tional check upon his authority. By this action he had, as it were,
erected Article 48 into a separate constitution fully equal to the
Weimar Constitution itself. In so doing he was effectuating the
view of that article to be set forth by Carl Schmitt in the trial

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 129

before the Supreme Court in October. Furthermore, von Hinden-
burg in his dealings with the representatives of the Reichstag, par-
ticularly with Goering, both before and after the dissolution,
indicated his complete rejection of the parliamentary system. Some-
how, however, the narrow-minded and obstinate old man could not
quite follow his actions through to the logical conclusion of an
open breach with the process of partisan elections.

In Prussia, however, the puppet regime of Bracht moved ahead
toward constitutional revision "am kalten Wege" — by emergency
decrees which ignored legal limitations of authority. Early in Sep-
tember a decree for "administrative reform" recast the function of
the officials heading administrative subdivisions — the Oberprdsi-
clenten, Regiertingsprdsidenteji, and Landrdte. The general trend
was toward increasing the authority of these subordinate oflBcials
at the same time that they were tied more closely to the central
government of Prussia. Thus, they were freed to a considerable
degree from requirements for consultation with elected assemblies
and obtained increased supervisory powers. The Oberprdsident
became, as it were, the direct representative of the state government
within his province, having the right to supervise the activity of
all subordinate officials and the right and obligation to bring to
their attention the general policy of the state. In case of need he
had extensive powers of intervention. The Regierungsprdsidenteriy
who administered the next larsfer area of local government, were
also given increased authority. The officials supervising churches,
schools, direct taxes, domains and forests now became subordinates
of the Regierungsprdsident and he could coordinate their actions.
Administrative supervision of the lower schools was his prerogative;
administration of the higher schools {Gymnasia, Realgymnasia,
Oberrealschule, etc.), was the prerogative of the Oberprdsident.
Similarly, in the area of county government, the Landrat now acted
as the political officer of the state government and the supervisor of
the county's administration. County school boards, medical doctors,
and agricultural boards now had to report to the Landrat and fol-
low all his general directions. ^^

The consequence of this act was, of course, to reduce the
burden of minutiae which had rested upon the shoulders of the
Prussian Ministers. Aspects of the plan reflected preliminary work
done as early as 1926-7, but the scheme had been moldering in the

130 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

desks of the old government until revivified by Bracht. There was, of
course, the contemporary rumor that it had recently received re-
newed attention and support by Wilhelm Abegg, the State Secretary
in the Prussian Ministry of Interior, whose supposed negotiations
with the Communists formed part of the Reich justification for its
July coup] That which had been planned by democratic ministers,
however, took on a different color when sponsored by the Papen-
Bracht regime. Critics now noted that the new arrangements com-
ported well with the idea of a constitutional reform in which
Prussia would become a "Reichsland." In such a case the Prussian
ministries would be administered by their Reich counterparts and
the reduction of their work as respects Prussia would be a vital
necessity. This needed reduction had been achieved by the increase
in the authority of the Oberprdsidenten.^'^

Late in September Bracht brought pressure to bear seeking to
efFect a similar administrative reform in Berlin itself. Again, there
had been lengthy and detailed discussion of the recasting of the
subdivisions of the giant Hauptstadt. Dr. Heinrich Sahm, the chief
burgomaster, and the members of the Magistrat which advised him
were already engrossed in the preparation of a plan for reform
when Bracht acted. On September 20th, the Reich Commissioner's
representative announced that if Berlin itself did not by October
15th deal with the problem of a new administi-ative division of the
city and a change in the character of government of these districts,
he would do so by emergency decree. ^^ Sahm's group, by their
claim without reference to Bracht's "ultimatum," reported their plan
for administrative reform of Berlin a week later. The number of
districts was to be reduced from twenty to nine and separate dis-
trict assemblies were to be eliminated. The usage of unpaid citv
"councilmen" was also to be eliminated. ^^ This plan was carried
to the city parliament ( Stadtverordnetenversammlung ) , which sent
it to committee three times before it died its final death late in
November,^^

Meanwhile, Bracht continued his process of "Sduherung," the
"cleansing" of the Prussian bureaucracy, removing numerous officials
from ofiice and placing others in a status of "forced leave." Before
his actions finally arrived at the pending legal review, ninety-four
civil servants had felt the ax of the Reich Commissioner.-^ Many
of these served in ministries far removed from the task of preserving

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 131

peace and order — the Welfare Ministry, for example. Needless to
say, the major criterion for dismissal was not inefficiency but rather
connection with the parties which had formed the previous govern-
ing coalition.

Bracht's flair for the moral tone also continued. Criticism of his
"Bathing Suit Decrees" of late August did not disturb him. Early
in October he corroborated and extended his regulations by issuing
his ridiculous Badezwickelerlass. This required that all bathing suits
worn in public, whether by men or women, must be provided with
a "Zwickel," a triangular piece for reenforcement and modesty at
the appropriate point! Women's suits were required to cover com-
pletely the front portion of the body, must be cut close under the
arms, could not dip below the shoulder blades in the rear, and must
have "attached legs." Men's suits must not only be provided with
the all-important "Zwickel" but also had to have "attached legs."^^
While Communists expatiated on the rights, privileges, and advan-
tages of proletarian nudity, all other parties pegged pebbles of
varying size at the narrow-minded sanctimoniousness of the Com-
missional regime.^^

Newspaper prohibitions also continued, although they were not
pressed too severely with the exception of those against the Com-
munists. Vorwdrts, the Social Democratic journal, for example, lost
three days for asserting that the actions of the Reich government
were unconstitutional, but bounced back with stringent criticism
of its own prohibition. Other dailies felt the sting of the Commis-
sional regime. A Communist source later noted that 397 newspaper
prohibitions had been issued by Bracht, of which two-thirds were
directed against Communist newspapers. Nevertheless, the Bracht
regime did not exercise a censorship as severe as that later employed
by the Nazis, and open criticism of its action appeared in most of
the newspapers of the Center and Left.-"*

Meanwhile, a great deal of attention focussed on the actions of
the Prussian Landtag. The Papen government had avoided the
venom of party criticism in the Reichstag by dissolution, but it
could find no legal way to rid itself of the Prussian Landtag. And
there avid criticism of the functions of the Reich Commissioner
continued, although the Nazis made a remarkable change of posi-
tion. It will be recalled that Nazi Landtag President Hans Kerrl
had, ever since gaining his office in May, assumed a role of spokes-

132 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

man not only for the Landtag but also for the state of Prussia, on
the grounds that the Braun-Severing regime remained in office
illegally. Kerrl's pretensions comported well with the objectives of
the Papen government, which defended their removal of Braun and
Severing in July on the grounds, among other things, that they
were unconstitutionally in oflSce. Kerrl's request for the provision
of a Reich Commissioner for Prussia had, of course, proved embar-
rassing for the Nazis as they moved in August into opposition to the
Papen cabinet. Such things, however, never seriously troubled the
Nazis, who differed from the older political parties in their complete
unconcern for consistency or rationality. The Nazis had been prime
movers in the condemnation of the Commissional regime which
passed the Landtag in late August. This resolution carried with it
a directive to the Prussian civil servants freeing them from the re-
quirement of obedience to the Reich Commissioner. On September
19th, Kerrl, in company with Papen, was permitted to visit von
Hindenburg at Neudeck to inform him of the action of the Landtag.
The results were devastating. Von Hindenburg and Papen warned
of drastic steps if the Landtag resolution were not revised. ^^ Kerrl
returned to bring the Nazi delegation into the Landtag for a flat
reversal of their action. The Prussian civil servants were now told
they must obey all "constitutional" directives of the Reich Com-
missioner.-^

At the same time not all was gloom in the camp of the Prussian
Nazis. They had some hopes of electing a Reich Chancellor by the
vote of the Prussian Landtag! The Nazis were in an even more
serious process of negotiation for a coalition with the Center Party
in Prussia than in the Reich. If they succeeded and a National So-
cialist were elected Prussian Minister President by a legal vote of
the Landtag, then it would be possible for them to proclaim that
he should also be Reich Chancellor, so that there would be no
recurrence of Reich-Prussian dualism. In eflFect the Nazis would
be reversing the direction of the July coup under the Papen gov-
ernment.^'^ This scheme continued to be bruited about until late in
December, during" the Schleicher regime.

On October 10th, the long-heralded legal process before the
German Supreme Court, the Staatsgerichtshof, opened in Leipzig.
The courtroom was small and filled to overflowing. Students of law
rubbed shoulders with the greatest names in German jurisprudence.

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 133

The learned judges sometimes admonished impassioned pleaders
against "grandstand" performances. But all present seemed to real-
ize that a new chapter in German legal history was being written.
The great state of Prussia, its traditions older than those of Ger-
many itself, had called into question the legality of the actions of
the Reich. The complaints against the Reich bore by implication
not only upon the actions of the cabinet but also those of the
President. Joining Prussia in her complaints were the states of
Baden and Bavaria, the Prussian Landtag delegations of the Center
and Social Democratic parties, and a number of the displaced
Prussian Ministers pleading as individuals. The arguments on both
sides were presented with skill and eloquence. Yet, somehow, the
drama lacked substance and vitality. A great state was in its
death throes and could find no solace in its struggles but the stodgy,
over-ornate walls of this courtroom and the cold countenances of
the judges visibly appalled at the enormity of their task. These were
the settings of the most famous legal case in the history of German
jurisprudence, a case which may be said to have been the German
equivalent — in some respects — of Marbury vs. Madison or, per-
haps, McCullough vs. Maryland in the history of our supreme court.

The German Supreme Gourt or Staatsgerichtshof was established
by Article 108 of the Weimar Constitution. Determination of its
composition and procedure, however, rested not with the Consti-
tution but with the process of ordinary law. It was not a fixed court
with permanent personnel as is our Supreme Court, but basically,
an ad hoc establishment consisting of the president of the highest
regularly constituted court, the Reichsgericht, the three counsels of
that court (Reichsgerichtsrdte) , and representatives of the highest
courts in Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony.-^ It met in Leipzig in the
courtroom of the Reichsgericht, a "Schmuck" piece of the nineteenth
century ornamented with the coats-of-arms of German cities and
the portraits of princes. In the celebrated case of Preussen contra
Reich the presiding judge was Erwin Bumke, the Reichsgerichtsrdte
were Triebel, Schmitz and Schwalb, and the three additional judges
were von Miiller of Berlin, Giimbel of Vlunich, and Striegler of
Dresden.

The legal advocates pleading before this court were of a stature
that in itself raised the proceedings to the peak of judicial accom-
plishment. Representing the Reich was a strange and able company.

134 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

The presumptive head of the team was the facile, undaunted Minis-
terial Director Georg Gottheiner of the Interior Department, who
had single-handedly thwarted the issuance of a temporary ruling
by the court in July. A critic remarked that Gottheiner 's life must
have been spent in developing the calculated coldness of his tones,
the chill of which at times even reached the judges themselvesP^
No less a figure, however, was the mainspring of the Reich's legal
defense, Professor Carl Schmitt, whose career has already been
noted. Only a short time before the trial he had published his dif-
fuse but much cited work, Legalitdt und Legitimiidt, in which he
sought to assert that the "legitimacy" of the legislative powers of the
Reich Presidency held precedence over the mere "legality" of those
of the Reichstag.^" At Leipzig his pleadings were ably seconded
by two apostles, Professors Erwin Jakobi and Karl Bilfinger. After
the process was underway and at the direction of the court, they
were joined by a specially designated representative of the Reich
Commissioner, Ministerial Director Schiitze.

Opposing this team were equally able advocates. For Prussia
Ministerial Director Arnold Brecht brought an "Ethos und Pathos"
lacking in most of the others. ^^ He was seconded by Ministerial
Director Hermann Badt and supported by the famous professors
of constitutional law, Gerhard Anschiitz and Friedrich Giese. For
Bavaria the team consisted of Professor Hans Nawiasky, and the
tall and personable Staatsrat Heinrich von Jan; for Baden, Minis-
terial Director Hermann Fecht; for the Center Party, Professor Hans
Peters; and for the Social Democrats, the temperamental and
irascible Professor Hermann Heller.

This great array of talent indicated, as became later a source
of at least some justifiable complaint, that the case tried at Leipzig
in October, 1932, was basically not one unified legal process but
a number of legal actions artificially tied into one bundle. Tliere
was, first and foremost, the complaint of the deposed members of
the Prussian Ministry of State (in the name of the Ministry itself)
alleging that the presidential orders which were the basis for the
coup of July 20, 1932, were unconstitutional and should, therefore,
be declared void. Closely related to this, but often taking courtroom
discussion far afield, were the pleas of Baden and Bavaria, which
sought not only an answer friendly to Prussia in this case but a
court ruling on their conception that the federal character of the

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 135

Reich did not allow intrusions into the internal affairs of the states
of such a character that the continued existence of the separate
states should be imperiled. The representatives of the Center and
Social Democratic parties presented their pleas as friendly agents
for the civil servants within their ranks who were being displaced
by the Commissional government in Prussia, thereby threatening
their legal (wohl-erworbene) rights to their jobs. A critic later
complained that there were in all twelve different legal processes
involved and twelve different decisions. ^^

To the foreign observer the strangest aspect of Preussen contra
Reich is that the court failed to make its initial concern the definition
of its own jurisdiction, the determination of the competency of
the parties to the suits to appear before it, and the establishment
of regulations for procedure. This was somewhat unusual for a
German court, although not so much at variance with tradition as
would be such action by our supreme court! Undoubtedly it was
well intended. ^^ The importance of the questions raised indicated
the value of obtaining as broad scale a discussion as possible of the
legal issues concerned. Nevertheless, the general effect was to
convert a good deal of the proceedings into philosophical discus-
sions rather than specifically legal arguments and to place the court
in the rather undesirable position of finding it necessary in its
decision to exclude from its considerations the statements of the
majority of the parties to the suit against the Reich. This artificial
broadening of the scope of court action also encouraged the intro-
duction into the proceedings of extensive materials of a political
nature and gave grounds to allegations that the court was meddling
in politics. In fact, however, the court hewed very close to the
line of strict legal considerations during the proceedings and even
closer in its ultimate decision.

Some aspects of the detailed procedures of the court are of vital
concern to the chain of events leading to the legal demise of the
state of Prussia. Although the case itself and the decision of the
court find a place in the pages of all standard histories, the store-
house of information embodied in the pleadings has barely been
tapped. ^^

The case may best be considered under four major headings:
1. the debate on the nature of the Reich; 2. the debate on the nature
of the emergency powers of the President; 3. the consideration of

136 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

the specific issues involved in the Papen coup; and 4. the signifi-
cance of the case in respect to the theory and practice of judicial
review.

The debate in respect to the nature of the Reich, although
ancillary to the main proceedings of the case and not completely
dealt with in the court's ultimate decision, occupied a considerable
amount of the court's time and had significant influence upon the
court's decision and upon later politics. The representatives of
Baden and of Bavaria maintained that the existence of the Lander
preceded that of the Reich and that the Lander retained rights of
sovereignty which could not be infringed by the federal government.
The right of intervention by the Reich into the internal affairs of a
Land under Article 48, #1 (Reich Execution) could not extend to
actions which tended to impair the separate existence of the Land.
The Reich Commissioner set up by the decree of the President,
therefore, had no legal right to claim the sovereign functions of a
Land government or to claim to be the Land government. He could
not, maintained the South German states, represent the Land in the
Reichsrat, before the Reichstag or in official relations with other
Lander. Baden and Bavaria asked the court to state the validity
of their pleadings as a warning against efforts on the part of the
Reich to repeat the action it had taken in respect to Prussia. ^*^

The second problem, the debate over the emergency powers of
the President, claimed the major portion of the court's time and
concern. Both the arguments on the side of the Reich and those
in behalf of Prussia were significant and challenging. For the Reich,
Professors Carl Schmitt and Karl Bilfinger collaborated in the
presentation of a shocking piece of legal sophistry which anticipated
the pseudo-legal rationalizations of the era of the Third Reich.
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution contained five paragraphs.
The first two entrusted to the President of the Reich two classes
of emergency powers held over from the pre-World War I. period.
Paragraph one gave the President the so-called power of "Execution"
by which he might require a Land, if it did not live up to the
obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution or national laws,
to fulfill these obligations. The paragraph specifically stated that
this might be accomplished by force of arms if needed. Paragraph
two gave the President the so-called power of "Dictatorship" by
which he might, if conditions were such that law and order were

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 137

imperiled, take "the necessary measures to restore public safety
and order, and, if necessary intervene by force of arms." The
succeeding paragraphs provided for the power of the Reichstag to
abrogate such action if it deemed it desirable and to pass laws
regulating the usage of these powers, a provision of which no use
had been made. Schmitt and Billinger maintained that the first two
paragraphs had been meant to be complementary aspects of a single
purpose and action. Each paragraph was inextricably intertwined
with the provisions and purposes of the other. Their general intent
and outcome was to create for the President a "power position"
designed to fill a vacuum of authority in time of crisis. If a Land
government failed to maintain order and security within the limits
of the state which it governed, it was creating the conditions not
only for the use of paragraph two, but also of paragraph one, since
one of the legal obligations of the state was to maintain order and
security. Furthermore, there was an obligation for the Lander gov-
ernments to align themselves with the policy of the Reich ( "Einord-
nungspfiicht" ) . Divergencies might well lead to a nullification of the
aims and interests of the Reich; hence for a La7id government to
fail to conform its policies to those of the Reich constituted a
breach of the requirement that the Land government loyally execute
the laws of the Reich. Unlike the situation in the United States,
pointed out Schmitt, there was in Germany, "an awesome inter-
mingling of the powers of Reich and of Lander" ("ein furchtbares
Durcheinander von Reichs- und Landeskompetenzen").

As a consequence of the above considerations, Schmitt believed
that the powers of the President over against the Lander were most
extensive. He could make laws which the Lander executed, issue
special instructions to the Lander, take full control of the executive
powers of a Land, exercising them in the name of the Land con-
cerned, create a special dictatorial organization to effectuate his
will, and could even free Lander governments from the require-
ments of their own constitutions. In this latter statement Schmitt
was referring to the so-called Dietramszeller Decree issued by the
President on August 24, 1931, by which he empowered Lander
governments temporarily to take certain emergency actions pro-
hibited by their own constitutions. The general acceptance of this
decree and its usage by the various Lander, including Prussia, had

138 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

been one step in the forward movement of the concept of an
authoritarian Presidency.^^

The arguments of Schmitt and Bilfinger represented the cul-
mination of a trend of legal opinion for which the former was in
large measure responsible. This was the tendency to assign to the
drafters of the Weimar Constitution motives and purposes in respect
to Article 48 which had never played a part in the thoughts of
the constitution-makers themselves. ^^ There had been some intent
on the part of the delegates at Weimar to create in the office of
the presidency an'Ersatzkaiser," as had been noted above. But
there had been no thought of entrusting him with the powers of
a dictator for more than the briefest periods of time or to create
a possibility for him legally to overturn parliamentary government.
The usage of Presidential decrees under the "Presidential cabinet"
of Briining had often exceeded what would seem clear constitu-
tional justification. Perhaps the strongest case of "stretching" the
Constitution was the issuance of the Dietramszeller Decree referred
to above. Under Papen the tendency to expand still further the
conception of the President's decree power was shown both in the
coup against Prussia and the language of the decree dissolving the
Reichstag in September. Schmitt and Bilfinger were now at Leipzig
defining Article 48 in such a way that it became to all intents and
purposes a separate constitution entrusting total powers to the
President in a time of crisis or of failure of parliamentary govern-
ment. In their statements was involved the conception later em-
bodied in Nazi jurisprudence that there could be no legal review
of the actions of the President under Article 48. In them also were
the seeds of the conception of the "National State of Law" {"Na-
tionale Rechtstaat" ) , a legal fiction used by the Third Reich to
justify shelving all normal limitations on the authority of the state
on the grounds that these had no place in the face of national
necessities.^^

Like night and day was the contrast between the rationalized
position of Schmitt and Bilfinger and the coldly factual view of
Article 48 presented by the great expert on jurisprudence, Gerhard
Anschiitz. Anschiitz strongly opposed Schmitt's effort to bind to-
gether the processes of "Execution" and "Dictatorship." These had,
he noted, derived from different parts of the former constitution
of the Reich and remained separate. The process of "Dictatorship"

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 139

carried with it the privilege not attached to that of "Execution"
of suspending certain constitutional guarantees of the rights of in-
dividuals. Anschiitz also denied the accuracy of Schmitt's view that
the President could interpret Article 48 according to the situation
existing ("situationsgemdss"). In his view, and that of Friedrich
Giese, the other titan of German jurisprudence participating in the
procedure, there were four direct limitations of the President's
authority under Article 48:

1. It must be directly bound to the purpose sought (zweckge-
hundenheit) . If it were possible to prove that the President's use
of Article 48 was designed to serve a different purpose from that
set out by the provisions of the article, this, in Anschiitz's opinion,
was a subject for legal review, not a political question.

2. The President's action must be measured by the actual needs
of the situation he sought to meet (Verhdltnismdssigkeit). If the
President took actions beyond those which were necessary, he then
became guilty of exceeding his authority (Ermessensuberschrei-
tung) and this also could be reviewed.

3. The President's action must aim at the most moderate pos-
sible solution of the problem (Subsidariatdt). First should come a
warning, then milder means before the employment of extreme
measures.

4. The President's action must be directed only toward tempo-
rary outcomes (Vorldufigkeit). Permanent measures might not be
taken under Article 48. Indeed, there were certain areas which were
absolutely proof against the employment of Article 48 (Diktatur-
fest). These, in particular, were the areas of action within which
functioned the constitution-maker rather than the law-maker.
Most specifically, the authority granted the President under Article
48 did not entitle him to alter the division of competencies between
Reich and Lander. He did not have the power to infringe upon the
sovereignty of a Land or to designate the government of the Reich
Commissioner a Land government.**^

Anschiitz's discussion in some respects exceeded the usually ac-
cepted standards of judicial review in Germany. He admitted in
his arguments that he had been increasingly concerned with the
employment of Article 48 in the immediate past and that he felt
the need of greater safeguards.*^ The court was, in the long run.

140 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

to pass by some of the initial aspects of his presentation but to be
strongly influenced by its general nature and substance.

These more general considerations were closely tied in with the
particular events surrounding the coup against Prussia. Here the
nature of the process became exceedingly complex. Many trivial
items received as much attention as those of major importance. The
Reich's advocates pointed out, first and foremost, that there was a
situation in which peace and order were highly disturbed. There
existed virtually a state of war between National Socialists and Com-
munists at the time of the coup. In this situation the federal gov-
ernment had adopted policies strongly directed against the Com-
munists. The Reich maintained that Prussia had displayed "an inner
lack of independence" in its relations with the Communists, citing
as evidence of this fact the supposed negotiations between Minis-
terial Director Wilhelm Abegg in the Prussian Interior Ministry and
Ernst Torgler and Wilhelm Kasper of the Communist delegation
in the Landtag; the greeting expressed by Severing on the reap-
pearance of Vorwdrts after a period of prohibition — which seemed
to express disapproval of the action of the Reich; and an election
speech by Severing in which he had invited his auditors to "chase
out" the Reich government. The Reich also maintained that the
Prussian government because of its past record of severe action
against the National Socialists was unable to adjust to the policies
of the Papen government, which sought friendship with all "na-
tional" movements. And, in addition, the representatives of the
Reich repeatedly claimed that the Prussian government as a "care-
taker" (Geschaftsfiihrende) government was not even a fully legal
one. It held office only because the previous Landtag had in its
final session improperly altered the arrangements for the election
of a Minister President. This "caretaker" government did not have
the confidence of the Prussian Landtag and did not, therefore, have
a right to speak for Prussia in such a case as this. The Reich, said
its defenders, had a right to feel that the circumstances surrounding
the continuance in office of the Braun-Hirtsiefer-Severing govern-
ment were sufficiently questionable to prevent it from displa\'ing
the authority needed in these times of crisis and adequately dealing
with the maintenance of law and order. To fail to maintain law and
order in the state was in itself a violation of the obligations of the
slate as over against the federal government and, therefore, justffied

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 141

the use of paragraph one of Article 48 (Execution) as well as
paragraph two ( Dictatorship ).^-

Beyond these major aspects of the Reich case were a number
of minor issues — whether Severing had or had not suggested the
appointment of a Reich Commissioner; whether Otto Braun had
or had not sought information about the continued payment of his
salary after his removal; whether Berlin police chief Grzesinski had
or had not directed his police to avoid action in the Communist
quarters of the city; and other similar questions sometimes germane
to the case but often picayunish in character. The Reich's presenta-
tion of the factual background of the coup was so much a tissue
of improvised allegations as to have been humorous if the dispute
had not been so serious.

Prussian representatives countered the various charges carefully
and substantively. The negotiations between Abegg and the Com-
munists had not been secret ones designed for political coalition
but public ones seeking Communist moderation. Severing's greeting
to the Vorwdrts and his election speech against the government of
the Reich were part of the normal process of party politics. The
"caretaker" government in Prussia held office in perfectly legal
fashion — the newly-elected Landtag had voted down a proposal
to revert to the old order of procedure for the election of the
Minister President. Severing's discussion of the sending in of a
Reich Commissioner had opposed such an action — von Gayl, with
whom he had talked, must have misunderstood. The comment of
Grzesinski in respect to the Communists referred to an election
speech held not in Berlin but in Magdeburg, in which he had said
the Communists and Social Democrats could have formed a "unity
front" long ago if the Communists had been willing to accept
principles of law and order. Beyond all this, the difficulties in the
preservation of law and order were largely the result of the actions
of the Reich. The lifting of the prohibition against the use of
uniforms and against the S.A. and S.S. was chiefly responsible for
the disturbed situation existing. The government of Prussia had
an unimpeachable record of action against the Communists and had
been as recently as the Lander Conference of June 27th publicly
thanked by the Reich government for its cooperation. Conditions
in Prussia were no more disturbed than within other sections of
the Reich.^3

142 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

It is, of course, impossible to summarize within a few pages
a five-hundred-page court transcript. Preussen contra Reich pre-
sented to German legal thought a monumental exposition of the
two contrasting tendencies in the area of jurisprudence then con-
tending with one another for dominance. The Supreme Court was
confronted with a decision in which the wisdom of a Solomon would
have been required to escape criticism from both sides. And its
decision has been labeled a "Solomon decision" since it involved a
proposal about as catastrophic in its consequences as the sundering
of the disputed infant proposed by that ancient Hebrew king.^*
But to pass by the decision with the comment that it was to be
executed only with great difficulty is to do injustice to the deep
wisdom of the judges who made it. The court set a standard of
honesty of judgment and sincerity of purpose which has undoubt-
edly assisted in the post-war growth of the principle of judicial
review in Germany.

The court decision rendered on October 25th began by defining
the limitations of its action and the competency of the parties to the
suit.*^ The court declared that it could not comply with the request
of Baden and Bavaria and prescribe limitations for indefinite action
in future on the part of the Reich. In other words it rejected the
issuance of what would substantially have been an advisory opinion
interpreting the Constitution in advance of a specific legal process
dealing with specific actions and facts. Undoubtedly, it would have
been more proper for the court to have indicated at the outset that
it would not issue such an advisory opinion but the discussions of
the nature of the Reich before the court had been valuable ones
and had presented materials bearing closely upon the case being
considered.

The court also rejected the competency of the Social Democratic
and Center Party delegations of the Landtag to plead before the
court. Within the province of the Staatsgerichtshof lay only disputes
between the Reich and Lander, and the Landtag party delegations
were not competent to represent Prussia itself. Likewise, complaints
presented by the individual ministers removed were also rejected
as beyond the jurisdiction of the court, since these were disputes
within a Land. It is in this area of the court's decision that most
serious criticism can be presented. It would seem far better for

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 143

these extraneous matters to have been removed from the process
at the outset.

In the main case at issue the court's decision was clear, logical,
and courageous. It strongly asserted its right to review the actions
of the President under Article 48. It rejected the Reich's view that
the President's use of its provisions was subject only to his own
discretion. The court considered and rejected as faulty the whole
line of specious reasoning set up by the Reich for the employment
of paragraph one of Article 48 (Execution) against Prussia. It
found no reason given sufficient to justify a charge that Prussia had
failed to live up to its obligations with respect to the Reich.

By implication but far less clearly and definitely the court also
questioned the complete accuracy of the Reich's reasoning in respect
to the usage of paragraph two (Dictatorship). Here, however, it
found itself confronted by the clear and evident fact of a consider-
able disturbance of public order and security in Germany on July
20, 1932. And here it found also no strong limitations expressed
in regard to the President's discretion. Indeed, the objective critic
can scarcely avoid the judgment that for the court to have declared
the President's action invalid would have been a decision based on
politics not law. As the court itself expressed it, even if the Reich
were itself partially responsible for the difficult situation existing,
and the court was at certain points quite critical, it would not be
proper for the Staatsgerichtshof to weigh in judgment the decisions
taken by the government so long as they were covered by the
language of the Constitution. The Supreme Court believed that the
realm of action provided the President by the language of paragraph
two of Article 48 was very extensive. He was not restricted to ac-
tions purely of a police nature. If he felt that the situation with
which he was dealing required the removal of the Prussian govern-
ment as a whole, this was perfectly in order. The only restrictions
upon his actions were, first, that they must be temporary in effect
rather than permanent; and, second, that they could not extend into
the area which affected constitutional relationships of Reich and
Lander. As a consequence, the court ruled specifically that the
actions of the Reich during the early days of the coup were invalid
insofar as they implied the permanency of the removal of Prussian
officials. All actions relating to removals or retirements of civil
servants must be labeled temporary in nature. Furthermore, the

144 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Prussian State Ministry could not be removed even temporarily
from some of its functions. Specifically, it retained the rights of
sovereignty involved in the representation of Prussia in the Reichs-
rat, the Prussian Landtag, and in relationships with the other
Lander. All efforts of the Reich to intrude into these areas were
declared invalid.

From the analysis above it may be seen how far Papen deviates
from the truth when he says in his memoirs that the Supreme Court
found the coup of July 20th perfectly legal."^*^ Nazi legal apologists
were later to fulminate at the court's "political justice."^" The court
itself recognized that its decision entailed serious political problems.
It expressed the pious hope doomed to remain unfulfilled that Reich
and Prussia would cooperate in solving the problems resulting from
the division of functions it suggested. The critics, however, claimed
that in the place of the previous dualism there now existed a "trial-
ism" in Berlin of the government of the Reich, the government of
the Reich Commissioner for Prussia, and the so-called "sovereign
government" {Hoheitsregierung— usually used slightingly) of Prus-
sia!"*^ This situation v/as, of course, a virtually impossible one.
But it is scarcely possible to suggest how the Supreme Court follow-
ing a logical interpretation of the legal situation confronting it
could have come to a different answer. If the results were undesir-
able, the fault lay with the framers of the Constitution and with
the nature of governmental actions rather than with the court.^^

Perhaps the verdict of the Supreme Court justified the decision
of the Prussian government not to offer armed resistance to the
July coup. With it the defenders of legality came full circle in
their efforts to counter arbitrary action. They had had their day
in court and had not emerged empty-handed. The highest court
of the land specifically upheld their continued right to use the title
of sovereign government of Prussia and to represent the state in its
exterior relations. The court also specifically stated that all actions
of the Reich Commissioner must be temporary in nature. These
were not empty statements and should not have been so interpreted.
The court had actually given the government of the Reich and the
Reich President himself a most emphatic reproof. If there had
remained a spark of respect for the proper order of things within
the circle of those in authority, the Supreme Court decision might
well have kindled a candle in the darkness. But no such spark

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 145

remained — the Reich government and the Reich President himself
recognized no restraints upon their actions save those imposed
by considerations of expediency. As a consequence, the proceedings
before the Staatsgerichtshof remained merely a milestone on the
road to disaster. The last barriers to dictatorship which it sought
to raise were soon hurdled. The demise of democracy which re-
sulted was inseparably intertwined with the fate of the republic
of Prussia.

CH. VI. NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES

The Leipzig decision in the case of Preussen contra Reich was
one of the fundamental factors in the downfall of the Papen regime.
To be sure, the chancellor and his colleagues greeted it as though
it provided complete support for the coup in Prussia. They could
not, however, evade the clearly-affirmed right of the deposed Prus-
sian Ministry of State to reconstitute itself and continue its existence,
even though that existence might be labeled a "shadow" one. In
its ultimate consequences the Leipzig decision forced Papen to
actions patently illegal in nature, but the logical final step to author-
itarianism evaded him. Under Papen the old Rechtsstaat, the state
of fixed law and constitutional limitations, breathed its last, scarcely
lamented by its one-time defenders. But the new state of "national
necessities" and arbitrary law still waited restlessly in the wings
while a second "Zwischenlosung" was attempted — the interim re-
gime of von Schleicher.

Both Reich and Prussian cabinets in their public pronouncements
greeted the decision of the Supreme Court as a justification of their
positions in the controversy. In the secrecy of the Reich cabinet,
however, Papen pointed out to his colleagues that "it was urgently
necessary that something occur to weaken the disturbing influences
on public opinion" which were involved.^ Papen's private reaction
justified, therefore, the public proclamation of the Braun cabinet
that the Supreme Court had upheld the honor of the Prussian gov-
ernment and placed in question many aspects of the actions of the
Reich. Otto Braun, Carl Severing, and the other members of the
deposed Ministry of State in Prussia had, of course, taken advantage
of the Leipzig decision by holding official sessions and issuing press
releases.^ Although the press releases exploited to the full the em-
barrassment of the Reich government involved in the verdict of the
Supreme Court, the attitude of Braun and his Prussian colleagues
was basically mild and temperate in nature. Now that the court
had repudiated the portion of the coup which alleged the failure of
Prussia to meet its proper obligations, the Braun cabinet prepared
to assume in conciliatory fashion the very restricted role marked
out for it by the Leipzig tribunal — the representation of Prussia
in the Reichsrat, Reichstag, Landtag, Staatsrat, and Lander confer-
ences. They continued to protest against actions of the Commis-

148 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

sional regime lacking the temporary character required by the
Supreme Court, but gave no evidence of an intention to challenge
further the existence or effective power of the Bracht regime.^
Had the Reich been willing, there is little doubt that the Prussian
question might have been temporarily shelved in favor of more
pressing matters.

The Reich was not willing. It considered the elimination of
"Reich-Prussian dualism" the cornerstone of its policies for govern-
m.ental reform. There was little left for the Papen cabinet to hope
for if they failed to effectuate constitutional revision. The "barons"
had gained little ground by their economic policies. The bridge to
the Nazis was irreparably destroyed. In the olRng lay a parliamen-
tary election from which the cabinet could at best derive only
indirect advantage — there was no party friendly to it save the
German Nationalists and no stretch of imagination could conceive
of a Nationalist tidal wave at the polls. As a consequence, the only
path open to the cabinet was a continuance of its drive for a funda-
mental alteration of the governmental system. In the same session
of the cabinet mentioned above, in which Papen had criticized the
lack of "creative thinking" on the part of the Supreme Court, he
proceeded to indicate that he intended to place the Prussian Minis-
try of Welfare building at the disposal of the "caretaker ministry
of state" of Braun, but that he had told his representative, Dr.
Bracht, to decide "from case to case" how far he should go in pro-
viding the deposed ministers with the orientation in respect to the
conduct of current affairs in Prussia which they would need in order
to represent the state in the Reichsrat. Furthermore, decree action
to put aside remnants of Reich-Prussian dualism must follow within
a day or so. As for the press, he would inform them that the
court decision had had no influence on the government's reform
plans."*

On the evening followins; this cabinet session, Freiherr \on Gavl,
the Minister of the Interior restated the position of the cabinet at
the annual banquet of the Berlin press. His speech was an able
one. Artfully, Gayl again stressed the "federalist" position of the
cabinet. It had in mind, he stated, no alteration of the German
'Lander. It did not even plan to eliminate the tiny enclaves of
territory scattered about the German map like pieces of a patch-
work quilt. The intent of the Reich was solely to coordinate the

NIEDERGANG DES REGHTSSTAATES 149

policies of the Reich and of Prussia. The action begun on July 20th
he declared, had been justified by the decision of the Supreme Court
as a temporary solution of the problem of a unified policy in Reich
and Prussia. The Reich intended, continued Gayl, to proceed with
its plans. It had, however, no thought of imposing upon the German
people hasty solutions conceived by a "paper-thin ruling class"
(hauchdiinner Herrenschicht) or to ignore the wishes of the Ger-
man proletariat. It did stand against a return to the parliamentary
system of constantly shifting coalitions and proposed to alter the
Reichsrat or join it to an upper chamber representing occupations
in such a way as to restrain parliamentary excesses. It did propose
to raise the voting age and give an extra vote to the heads of families
and to war veterans. These steps would, however, be taken only
by instructions (Vorschriften) conceived on the basis of careful
evaluation (sorgfdltig Erwdgungen) . Gayl also promised a careful
administrative reform with respect to Reich civil services, noting
that plans were already in motion for such action in respect to the
Finance and Postal ministries.^

In spite of Gayl's efi^orts to calm alarms about hasty action, his
speech paid little heed to the normal requirements for constitutional
revision. On the Right, however, the government faced criticism
for hesitancy and delay. Reichsbank President Hans Luther pro-
claimed, "The specter of the counter-regime of Braun must be
removed, and at once."'^ Nationalist newspapers called for drastic
action. The Nazis, on their part, mocked the Papen government for
the "bold line" which the court decision had drawn across its
accounts, castigated the Braun government for building "golden
bridges" to the Herrenklub, and lampooned Papen for his "godly
order of things" which had resulted only in confusion.'^

The answer of the cabinet was a new emergency decree which
virtually ignored the Leipzig decision. Partially released to the press
a day before its official proclamation on October 29th, the new de-
cree extensively revised the Prussian administrative set-up. The
decree was issued in the name of the Commissional government
itself and was based on the Dietramszeller Decree of the President
of August 24, 1931. This had empowered Lander governments to
balance their budgets by extraordinary means, if necessary — they
were even freed from the restrictions of their own Lander constitu-
tions. The Commissional government of Prussia, which had been

150 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

prohibited by the Supreme Court from labehng itself a Land gov-
ernment, now used this authority to abohsh the Prussian Ministry
of Welfare, assigning its duties to the Ministries of Agriculture,
Economics, Finance, Education, and Interior. The roles of the other
Ministries were also greatly altered. Thus, the supervision of com-
mercial and technical schools previously under the control of the
Ministry of Commerce and Labor was transferred to the Ministry
of Education; the jurisdiction in respect to expropriation of property
formerly in the hands of the Ministries of Education, Justice, and
Finance was now transferred to the Ministry of Economics; the
right to make official changes of names was transferred from the
Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior; and the Ministry
of Commerce and Labor took over from the Ministry of Finance
the representation of the state of Prussia on the board of the Ger-
man Central Cooperative Credit Bank (Deutsche Zentralgenossen-
schaftskasse ) .^

On October 29th, before ihese changes were made, but not
before their intended scope had been leaked to the press, Otto
Braun, accompanied by von Papen and in the presence of the Presi-
dent's private secretary. Otto Meissner, met with von Hindenburg at
Neudeck. The President's words provided Braun with a rude shock!
As he listened, he must have asked himself how von Hindenburg
could, in the light of the newspaper reports of the day, maintain
that the Reich expected to stand "in every respect on the basis of
the decision" of the Supreme Court and request "a loyal effort" on
both sides for cooperation between the Braun government in Prus-
sia and that of the Reich Commissioner? As has been seen, Braun
had on earlier occasions spoken frankly to the President. This time
also he emphasized that the necessary loyalty to the decision would
have to be found on both sides. In plain words he also told von
Hindenburg that the Supreme Coiut had found the original decree
unconstitutional so far as it involved the usage of the Reich Execu-
tive and that this should be withdrawn. But Braun was shocked by
the fumbling manner of the man clearly in his dotage. He was
convinced that the President was completely under the thumb of
his advisers.^ He was right. His visit made no impression on the
President. Papen still spoke the language von Hindenburg under-
stood. Seemingly, Papen was still able to convince the President
as well as himself that he was not really breaching the constitution!

NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES 151

When Bavaria submitted formal protest against the pending changes
in Prussia, Papen repHed that nothing was being done which did not
comport with the Leipzig decision. ^^' Von Hindenburg, on his part,
seems to have felt no concern about constitutional aberrations until
Papen confronted him later in the month with a project requiring
a clear and unmistakable breach of his oath to support the Weimar
regime. Whether all of this was willful self-deception, outright
hypocrisy, or simply fuzzy thinking, it is not possible to say.

At any rate Braun's discussion with von Hindenburg achieved
no sign of respect for the Supreme Court's pronouncements. A day
later the reconstitution of the Commissional government in Prussia
was completed. Johannes Popitz, who had been Secretary of State
in the Reich Finance Ministry from 1925 to 1929, joined Bracht as
a special representative of the Chancellor in his capacity as Reich
Commissioner for Prussia. He also became, as did Bracht, a Reich
Minister-without-Portfolio. Reich Minister for Agriculture Freiherr
von Braun assumed direction of the corresponding ministry in Prus-
sia. Professor Wilhelm Kahler, a German Nationalist professor of
the University of Greifswald, became one of the first of the German
scholarly profession to lead in reinstituting authoritarian controls
over education as he assumed commissional supervision of that
area in Prussia. State Secretary Friedrich Ernst, until then com-
missional supervisor of bank matters, assumed control of the com-
bined ministries of economics and labor, and State Secretary Hein-
rich Holscher headed the Ministry of Justice in Prussia.^ ^

Technically, the language of the decree which resulted in these
changes was semi-constitutional. All of the above officials acted as
personal representatives of Papen in his capacity as Reich commis-
sioner for Prussia — which included all the ministries, of course.
However, the decree broke down the functions of government into
ministries with the designated appointees acting as Prussian Minis-
ters in all but name — and in the representation of Prussia before
the various internal and external government organs which the
authoritarian administration would prefer to ignore anyway. For
these actions the Reich had found a new if precarious pinion of
legal support — the commentary of the Supreme Court that it
was proper for the Reich to seek coordination of Reich and Prussian
policies. An official observer for the American embassy commented,
however, that these new decrees "flagrantly" violated "the spirit.

152 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

if not the letter, of the Supreme Court's decision" and were prob-
ably deliberately provocative. "In fact," he continued, "the suspicion
is somehow inescapable that von Papen and the political groups
behind him would welcome some rash retaliatory action by the
Prussian Ministers which might offer a pretext for the invocation of
Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution ... as this would
give the Reich Commissioner still wider powers and even make
possible the actual removal of the Prussian ministers from office. ^^

No such "rash action" followed! Otto Braun, indeed, noted before
the Berlin press representatives that there were those who wished
him to pound his fist on the table. Such action, he commented, was
all right on the beer table if the steins were heavy enough to resist
damage, "but I am not accustomed to the politics of the fist!"^^
Braun contented himself with the sending of a bitter letter to von
Hindenburg in which he again underscored the unconstitutionality
of the new measures in Prussia. The latter answered the complaint
by referring Braun's letter to Chancellor Papen! ^^

Meanwhile, the complex problems of the Papen cabinet acquired
added intricacy. On November 3rd, the transportation system of
Berlin was paralyzed by a strike of the Berlin Transport Workers
Union (Berliner Verkehrsgesellschaft). Opposed by the Social
Democratic and Free Labor Unions [Allgemeiner Deutscher Ge-
tverkscJiaftsbund ) , the strike based itself on the unnatural alliance of
Communist and National Socialist union members. While the propa-
gandists of each of the two extremist groups constructed artful
rationalizations of the strange state of affairs, the "reds" and the
"browns" stood shoulder to shoulder on the Berlin streets chanting
their requests for contributions to their respective strike funds! ^^
For the Nazis, of course, this was a period during which they were
emphasizing "socialist" aspects of their program in contrast to the
"reactionary" regime in control of the government.

The cabinet also heard that the Nazis were stepping up their
drive to acquire control in Prussia. Landtag President Kerrl had
not only called the Landtag to meet on the seventh, but had also
threatened the use of force if necessary. Members of the Reich
cabinet, however, were assured by Colonel Bredow, Schleicher's
representative at the session, that the army was ready for any
eventuality — there need be no fear of revolution.^®

The scheduled Reichstag elections took place quietly on Novem-

NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES 153

ber 6th. A million and a half of the Germans who had crowded
the polls on July 31st stayed home. The Nazis lost two million of
the huge volume of votes they had registered three months earlier.
Papen's supporters, the German Nationalists, gained 900,000 votes.
But his most virulent enemies, the Gommunists, also gained 700,000
votes.

The elections of November 6th should have marked a turning
point in the history of the Weimar Republic. In the words of Karl
Dietrich Bracher, "A possible turning point of political develop-
ment announced itself; the myth of the irrepressibility of the Na-
tional Socialist upward movement had suffered a severe defeat."
Bracher also points out that the Nazi setback was country-wide
and particularly accentuated in the larger cities. ^'^ Its meaning was
not, however, entirely clear then or now. The groups wedded to
the parliamentary system could, for the first time in four years,
breathe a little more easily. Although there had been additional
losses for them, they had been relatively small. On the other hand,
the Communist vote began, for the first time, to loom as portentous.
The parties associated with monarchism or "conservative authori-
tarianism," those basically friendly to Papen, had gained notably,
but had also undoubtedly reached their ultimate top level as they
were then constituted.^^ The National Socialists, in spite of decline,
still held a commanding position in the Reichstag. There remained
a non-democratic majority which prevented the normal functioning
ing of parliamentary government.

There were, basically, three possible courses of action now
open to the government. One was to march ahead along the path
already marked out — the path to constitutional reform. If this were
done, the cabinet could hope that the Nazis, chastened by defeat,
would decide to accept a secondary position in the government for
fear they would receive nothing. However, this action would, in
the long run, necessitate an open breach of the constitution and a
temporary rule by emergency measures supported by military force.
A second course of action involved the possibility that the National
Socialists, joined together by the emotionalism of the upsurge, might
be led to division in the cold light of politics and job-getting. If
this could be achieved, the section of the party which had backed
vague ideas of "action," "deeds," and "authority" might be willing
for the sake of patronage to accept the authoritarianism of a presi-

154 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

dential cabinet rather than that of party dictatorship. The third
course open to the government was to reverse its field, repeal at
least a portion of its emergency decrees, and seek a share along
with the Center in projected parliamentary coalitions with the Nazis.

Of these three possible courses only the last offered some promise
of preserving parliamentary democracy in Germany. Still more —
in the long run it was the move which would have been most likely
to have avoided the Hitler dictatorship.^^ But it was not even
seriously considered by the cabinet. In fact, the major fear of Papen
and his colleagues was that a parliamentary coalition of Centrists
and National Socialists might be created and the President con-
fronted with the choice of returning to the old system of shifting
coalitions, of flaunting the wishes of the majority, or of resigning.
This was, by virtue of the election results, no longer such a danger-
ous possibility as it had been. The Center and Nazi party repre-
sentation in the Reichstag no longer added up to a clear majority.
Support of other smaller groups, however, would probably not have
been difficult to obtain if "Black" and "Brown" had been able to
combine. Through the period of "negotiations" with the party
leaders that followed, the dominating factor was the recognition
that with Papen all search for support contemplated a one-way road
— not compromise and partnership but rather acceptance and
furtherance of policies already determined upon and initiated.

Papen's choice had been and remained a completion of reform
projects regardless of public opposition. In this his strongest sup-
porter was von Gayl, who had been the mainspring of plans for
constitutional revision. During the first cabinet meeting after the
elections Gayl came out flat-footedly against proposals that the
cabinet resign. The chancellor should, he said, announce on the
next possible public occasion that the cabinet had absolutely no
intention of giving way to any other government and thus providing
opportunity for the jangle of party politics (Parteikliingel) to
reappear. Nor did he agree with Papen's public statements that
his own person should not be an obstacle to a "national concentra-
tion." Gayl wanted Papen to stand fast. If the parties would not
agree to a toleration of the cabinet, then the Reichstag should be
dissolved and the government should go ahead on the basis of an
emergency political status {einen staatsrechtlichen Notstandes) — a
temporary dictatorship.^*^

NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES 155

Von Braun, von Neurath and Giirtner were close to von Gayl
in their opinions, but Schleicher advised caution. He agreed that it
was probable that a majority coalition could not be obtained. On
the other hand, he believed it important that this be made clear
to the public. The chancellor should be commissioned by the Presi-
dent to deal with the party leaders to see whether broader support
for the government could be found. Fundamentally, he added, this
was a question of the attitude of Hitler — none of his subordinates
was likely at this point to separate himself from the Fiihrer's leader-
ship and only through Nazi support or toleration could the political
position of the cabinet be materially strengthened. Schleicher's
views were strongly backed by von Krosigk, the Finance Minister,
and by the newly created Reich Ministers-without-Portfolio, Bracht
and Popitz, the leaders of the Commissional regime in Prussia.^ ^

There was in this same cabinet session the expression of the
view that Schleicher might be able to consult more readily with the
Nazis than Papen, and the ultimate agreement reached by the cabi-
net provided that he should be Papen's particular consultant in the
process. These negotiations got underway on November 13th.

The partial success of the Papen regime at the polls had not,
however, reduced the antipathy it encountered from all parties save
the Nationalists. Journals of every shading of political complexion
hurled their shafts at the "barons' regime." This criticism was un-
doubtedly intensified by the fear that constitutional reform was
about to be effectuated by force. The Reichsrat opened its sessions
on November 10th and promptly became the focus of strong cen-
sure of the course of events in Prussia. Prussia's constitutional
representatives had been restored their proper place and Dr. Brecht
used the occasion to denounce the Reich government for its failure
to abide by the Leipzig decision. The Commissional government in
Prussia, he charged, still designated itself as a substitute for the
official government; it still issued instructions under the letter heads
of the various ministries concerned; and it denied the legal Prussian
State Ministry the right to reoccupy its offices. These actions, added
Brecht, were justified by the Reich on the ground that they were
preliminary to constitutional reform, but this was a poor prepara-
tion. Such reform could not be effectuated upon the basis of para-
graph two of Article 48 of the Constitution. It required the advice
and consent of the Reichsrat.^-

156 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Von Gayl endeavored to answer Brecht and to divert discussion
of the problem of Prussia from the forum of the Reichsrat to the
privacy of personal negotiation but had little success. ^^ Prussia w^as
joined in its pleas for a loyal execution of the Supreme Court deci-
sion by Bavaria, Saxony, Wiirttemberg, Hesse, Hamburg, and the
separately represented Rhine Province. The question was then
turned over to the Reichsrat committee for constitutional questions
for investigation and report. This procedure was accompanied by
strong warnings against illegal constitutional revision.^'*

Nevertheless, the Papen-Brecht regime continued its ruthless
slashing at the civil service personnel in Prussia. On November
11th, the Welfare Ministry was liquidated and in an administrative
"economy" move 140 bureau posts abolished. Sixty-eight additional
civil servants were retired or placed on forced leave. These included
one under-secretary of state, nine assistant secretaries, thirty minis-
terial councillors, and twenty-six other high ministerial oiBcials. The
purge was strongly directed against school officials. It marked the
beginning of extensive intrusions of the commissional regime into
that area. It also marked a severe stroke against Social Democratic
officials— most of those remaining in the upper ranks were elimi-
nated. Details of the purge laid bare the hypocrisy of its justffica-
tion on the grounds of "economy." Thus, Dr. Hans Hirschfeld, who
had been a popular and completely satisfactory press representative
in the Interior Ministry, was placed on leave at the same time that
a new press post was created in the same ministry and filled with
an inexperienced man.^^

Papen began his negotiations with the parties on November 13th.
The Social Democrats, strangely enough, were among those receiv-
ing an invitation to meet with Papen. As he later explained, the
Center had criticized on previous occasions the complete exclusion
of the Social Democrats from the search for a "national concentra-
tion."^^ His invitation was rudely rejected. Although a small mi-
nority opposed the decision of the party directorate, the Social
Democracy as a whole could find no pathway to Papen in the face
of the Prussian coup and the aftermath of the Leipzig decision in
which Papen had showed no sign of concession, compromise, or re-
pentance.-^ From this time on, the situation in Prussia stood as an
insuperable barrier to cooperation between the Social Democrats
and both the Papen and Schleicher cabinets.

NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES 157

Papen's negotiations with the other parties was almost equally
fruitless. The Center rejected any "national concentration" based
on the existing cabinet and declared that if the Chancellor of a new
cabinet were to be a Nazi, than the dualism of Reich and Prussia
should be restored — in other words, they would not agree to Nazi
leadership of a cabinet having direct control both of the central
government and of Prussia.-*^ With the German Nationalists, the
German People's Party, and the Bavarian People's Party, the Chan-
cellor had some success. They agreed to the idea of a national
coalition and approved the continuance of the chancellorship of
von Papen.^^ But their favorable reaction meant little. All hinged
on Hitler and he flatly rejected coalition. Even worse, shying away
from a repetition of the embarrassment he had suffered in August,
the Nazi leader refused to negotiate personally with Papen and
carried on his dealings only in written form. The results were
devastating!

Papen's initial letter inviting Hitler to personal discussions was
phrased in such a way as to appear conciliatory but in fact sub-
stantially to repeat the conference basis set up in August. Many
lines were designed to put Hitler in a bad light before the public.
Quite evidently Papen intended to publish the correspondence he
was initiating. Thus, reviewing the course of events in August, von
Papen said, "You know how much I sought in many conferences
to find the solution best for our country." But, following this, he
recalled the refusal by the Reich President to give Hitler the chan-
cellorship. Then he added that a new political situation had been
created by the November elections and stated that the President
had commissioned him to see how much support he could obtain
for "the effectuation of the economic and political program which
the Reich cabinet has initiated." Although, said Papen, Hitler's
newspapers continued to demand their leader's chancellorship, he,
Papen, "being for the moment the responsible statesman at the
head of the government," felt that the leader of a great national
movement would not refuse to discuss the situation with him.^^

Hitler's response bears the mark of Goebbels' propagandist
talent. From beginning to close it slashed at Papen with irony and
venom. The effectiveness of the language used was indicated by the
failure of Papen to publish the correspondence, which appeared
only in the Nazi press at the outset. The repetition of Papen's

158 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

phrase in which the Chancellor had described himself as a states-
man, accompanied by quotation marks, was followed by the asser-
tion that a discussion of political cooperation was only possible if
favorable results were to be anticipated. Furthermore, added Hitler,
certain conditions must be met. Negotiations must be in written
form. Only thiis could Hitler protect himself from the misconstruc-
tions of oral conferences set forth in "official reports" by press and
radio. Papen must agree not to hide behind the coat-tails of the
President as he had in August. Hitler must be assured that the
chancellor was really the "responsible leader" of the government.
Furthermore, Hitler felt it necessary to state that if negotiations
were to be limited to the question of support for policies already
initiated, further discussion was useless. The policies of the Papen
cabinet he considered "in part as inadequate, in part as poorly
thought out, in part as completely useless and even dangerous." The
elections had revealed that the government had been able only
to increase the Communist vote and that of the splinter parties who
had no real value. Hitler criticized strongly Papen's invitation to the
Social Democrats to negotiate, and added that a coalition with the
Center was not feasible. Hitler pointed out that the best friend of
the Papen cabinet, Hugenberg, the leader of the German National-
ists, had before the election pictured such a combination as national
treason. In conclusion, said Hitler, picking up another of Papen's
phrases, he felt no bitterness at the outcome of the elections. Bitter-
ness he derived only from the spectacle of Papen's constant mis-
management of the country's government, a mismanagement which
day by day deprived the German people of their wealth and hopes
for the future.^ ^

Hitler's letter was received on November 16th. On the following
day the cabinet officially discussed the situation. This time the
sentiment for the resignation of the cabinet was much stronger.
It was agreed that the President should undertake the task of nego-
tiating with the parties and that his hands should be completely
freed by a clear indication that the existing cabinet would not be
an obstacle.^^ On the same day the cabinet resignation was offered
arid accepted. Probably Hindenburg regarded this as only a tempo-
rary maneuver. His final parting with Papen came later in the month
accompanied by considerable bathos. The press, however, from one
side of tfee political spectrum to the other poured out their jubilance.

NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES 159

their notes of joy restrained only by the fear that Papen might yet
return.

Now it was the Papen regime which was a "caretaker govern-
ment" until the creation of a new cabinet. Ironical was the comment
of Minister of Justice Giirtner that "the constitution recognizes no
limitation on the powers of a caretaker government. "^'^ The words
sat ill in the mouths of those who had used such a status as a justi-
fication for removing the Prussian cabinet in July. That Giirtner's
words were taken literally by his colleagues became clear on the
following day when an emergency decree of the Reich President
was issued definitively regulating the respective jurisdictions of the
Prussian Commissional and "Hoheits" regimes.

The President's decree appeared on the surface a sincere effort
to solve a difficult problem. The representatives of the Reich in
Prussia were to sign all orders with the words, "the Commissioner of
the Reich." The Rraun ministry was officially given the usage of
the Welfare Ministry building. The deposed ministers were oflBcially
recognized as having the right to represent Prussia in the Reichsrat,
Reichstag, Landtag, Staatsrat, etc. They were, however, excluded
from all the actual functions of the government. They were excluded
from the buildings of the ministries which they had formerly di-
rected. They were to be informed by the proper State Secretaries
of the Commissional government of such current operations of the
government as they would need to know for purposes of fulfilling
their task of "representing" the state. Particularly questionable was
the transfer to the Commissional government of the right of am-
nesty, which was usually considered among the "sovereign" rights
of a state.^^

There remained at the time of the President's decree a consid-
erable residuum of the antipathy to Reich-Prussian "dualism" which
had given the July coup its earlier support. The mid-November
issue of the Juristen-Zeitung contained a critique of the Leipzig
decision by the jurist Dr. Poetzsch-Heffter, who concluded that the
decision left the problem unsolved and that Prussia must yield to
the Reich. ^^ But the tide of politics had begun to change and
philosophical and legal concepts of "dualism" no longer bore so
heavy a weight as earlier. The President's decree evoked almost
universal criticism.

160 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

On the same day on which the President's decree was issued,
the Reichsrat accepted the report of its committee on constitutional
questions, which strongly criticized the measures of administrative
reform taken by the Reich in Prussia on October 29th and 30th.
These actions, declared the committee, went "far beyond the meas-
ures which were taken by the emergency decree of 20 July 1932."
Without on this occasion touching further on the question of the
legal grounds of this decree," the Reichsrat declared that such meas-
ures fundamentally altered the relationship between Reich and con-
stituent Lander and set forth its expectation that the Reich would
take the necessary measures to restore the proper equilibrium. A sec-
ond portion of the same resolution cautioned the Reich against "pre-
cipitate" reform measures and pleaded for its own inclusion in the
process of planning. In behalf of the Braun government, Arnold
Brecht also added a special stricture of the injustice of the Reich's
shabby treatment of Prussia in these past weeks. The Reich com-
pletely ignored the legal Prussian government in planning constitu-
tional reform, although the Braun government had always been
willing in the past to take part in planning such reform arrange-
ments. The decree of July 20th remained unchanged, Brecht noted,
in spite of the decision of the Supreme Court. The President's new
decree was, he added, "according to the viewpoint of the Prussian
State government not in accord with the decision of the Staatsge-
richtshof and creates further difficulties in the situation."^ ^

Brecht's criticism was echoed on the following day by Minister
President Braun in an official session of the Prussian cabinet. He
indicated that the President's decree would be made a matter of
special consideration before the Landtag, due to open its sessions
during the following week. At the same time, as noted above, the
written report of the Supreme Court on its October decision also
appeared, containing in its fuller exposition of the "grounds" for
the decision a number of more far-reaching criticisms of the actions
of the Reich than those found in the original oral report.^ ^

Protest against the President's decree also arose in the Prussian
Staatsrat, the legislative council which served as a quasi-upper
house for the state. There it was declared that the President's decree
intruded so far into the authority of the state that its independent
position within the Reich was no longer guaranteed. The consti-
tutional committee of the Staatsrat set in motion a new complaint

NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES 161

before the Supreme Court, with the proceedings in the hands of the
Staatsrat President, Konrad Adenauer.^^

Then, on the 24th, the Prussian Landtag renewed its sessions.
Dr. Hirtsiefer, Braun's representative and former head of the Wel-
fare Ministry aboHshed by the Commissional regime, reported on
the decision of the Supreme Court and again proclaimed the obli-
gation of the Reich to rescind those portions of the decree of July
20th which had been declared unconstitutional.^® The substance
of Hirtsiefer's criticism but not the language was also supported
by the Communists, who labeled the coup "the Fascist action of
July 20th." But the Commmiists had no kind words for Braun, "the
sick man on the Bosphorus," or the existing "conflict for offices and
rest rooms." They spent far more words in criticism of the "heroic
resolutions" of the Socialists for new cases before the Supreme Court
and of Braun's "office-boy letter" {"Dienstboten Brief") to Papen
than they did in criticism of the Commissional government.^^ Before
the Landtag arrived at a decision on the resolutions associated with
these debates, however, the Papen government had been replaced
by that of Schleicher. This did not occur, however, until Germany
had witnessed an event unusual even for those troublous times. Dr.
Schwalb, a member of the original Supreme Court, retired at the
end of November. The respected jurist made use of his new found
freedom from the restraints of his position to castigate in sharp
words the course of events since the Leipzig decision. If there were
a "trialism" in government existing in Berlin, he declared, this did
not emanate from the court's decision but rather from the improper
action of the Reich, which had completely failed to honor the
substance of the court's pronouncements.^^ Indeed, the end of the
Papen regime was accompanied by a chorus of condemnation of
its policies in Prussia in which joined almost every political party
and all of the functioning legislative bodies in Reich and Prussia.
Seemingly, however, Papen and his colleagues were impervious to
criticism on this score.

After the unfavorable outcome of the Hitler-Papen negotiations
noted above, and after the formal resignation of the Papen cabinet,
a two-v^^eek interval followed during which the President took into
his owTi hands the negotiations with Hitler. The course of these
negotiations is so well known as to require little attention here.
Hitler wished the creation of a presidential cabinet headed by

162 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

himself with the President's emergency powers at his disposal. The
President's letters, presumably the work of Meissner, contain many
of the same characteristics as those which Papen sent earlier in the
month. The President sought to exploit Hitler's boast of the strength
of his party with the challenge that he form a cabinet of a parlia-
mentary majority. The President's letters repeatedly noted that
the leader of a presidential cabinet must be a person in his special
confidence, with the clear implication that Hitler was not. The
President set forth five major conditions to be satisfied by a Hitler
government even if the Nazi leader achieved a majority, including
not only the right to approve the personnel of the cabinet but the
right to name his own candidates for the Ministries of War and
Foreign Affairs, the requirement that the new cabinet should imme-
diately announce an economic program, the preliminary agreement
that Reich-Prussian dualism should not be restored, and the guar-
antee of the retention of the full powers of the President under
Article 48. Again, it was crystal clear that the President preferred
things as they were and sought only the necessary "political foun-
dation" {"Untermauerung," as it had been labeled in the cabinet)
for the existing regime. Eventually, von Hindenburg again repulsed
Hitler's demands with a second denunciation of the Nazi request
for "exclusive" rights and a declaration that Nazi partisan rule
would only exacerbate the bitterness of existing political tensions. ^^

Indeed, it appears certain that von Hindenburg had launched
the series of negotiations with the Nazis not with the intent of a
compromise with Hitler and the creation of a Hitler cabinet but with
the sole purpose of once again presenting the public with clear
evidence that a parliamentary solution of the governmental crisis
was impossible.'*^ Under these circumstances it would then be
possible with far less danger of serious public reaction to carry out
the plans for constitutional reform set forth by Papen and Gayl.

The caretaker Reich cabinet met on November 25th to consider
the course of the negotiations. In the light of later events some
aspects of its deliberations are astounding! After Schleicher's report
on the negotiations with Hitler and a comment or so on the nego-
tiations then taking place with Center Party leader Monsignor Kaas,
Papen's close friend, the Minister of Transportation, Eltz-Riibenach,
stated his "firm conviction that the Reich Chancellor with his
idealism and his dynamism must be retained ... at the head of the

NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES 163

Reich cabinet." Schleicher, similarly, commented that only the
gain of a man like Hitler, who still had the support of one-third of
the German voters, would be a real gain for a presidential cabinet.
"If any other personality, perhaps one of neutral character, assumed
the leadership of the Reich Cabinet," said Schleicher, "this per-
sonality would perhaps at first find public support." But, added
Schleicher, "the support would nevertheless soon cease. '^"^

The cabinet was greatly concerned about possibilities of a
general strike or an armed Nazi uprising. Von Schleicher, however,
provided calming words: "In the Reichswehr there is no longer
enthusiasm for Hitler. All the questions which concern exceptional
military measures will be carefully considered again in the Ministry
of Defense today, the 25th of November, and again tomorrow. One
needs have no concern that anything will be found wanting here.
A strengthening of the Reichswehr, perhaps with the inclusion of
formations like the S.A., would in no way improve the apparatus,
but rather increase the difficulties."^^

These words stand in vivid contradiction to the report which
Schleicher brought to Papen a week later. The investigation of the
military situation to which Schleicher had alluded on the 25th took
place as scheduled. Lieutenant Colonel Eugen Ott, a staff ofiicer
in the War Ministry close in the personal confidence of Schleicher,
led the inquiry, which was designated rather strangely as a "Kriegs-
spiel" or "war game." This took the form of a colloquy among the
seven leaders of the major divisions of the Reichswehr, navy com-
manders, and representatives of the Prussian government (undoubt-
edly the Commissionai one), of the Prussian state police, and of
the "Technical Emergency Service" ( Technische Nothilfe ) designed
to provide functions interrupted by a general strike. The outcome
of the deliberations of the conference was a denial of the ability
of the armed forces to cope with civil war involving the Nazis and
the Communists, particularly in view of the possibility of Polish
intervention in the area of East Prussia. Nazi strength among large
sections of the younger officers of the army, doubts of the loyalty
of Prussian police in case of action against Communists in the
Rhine area, and lack of sufficient equipment on the part of the
"Technical Emergency Service" played a strong role in the un-
favorable report. ^^ The report stood in direct opposition to the
calming words of Schleicher on the 25th. Either it did not represent

164 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

a completely objective view of the situation or the Minister of
Defense had been amazingly ignorant of the existing status of the
armed forces under his command! Also somewhat questionable was
the assumption that Nazis and Communists would act together in
the event of civil war. It was true that the two parties had cooper-
ated in the Berlin Transport Workers' strike, joining not only in the
pleas for strike funds but also in some of the violence concerned.
To assume, however, that in the event of civil disturbance resulting
from a projected oktroijiert constitutional revision, Nazis and Com-
munists would join hands in disciplined resistance to the govern-
ment seems quite illogical.^'^ It is not possible for a non-
specialist to render judgment on the ability of the existing forces
to control popular revolt. It is, on the other hand, easy to under-
stand Papen's feelings. When Schleicher said on November 25th
that there was no need to worry about the army's ability to cope
with civil war and then completely reversed himself on December
2nd, the process did, indeed, appear a "double cross!"

Papen's plans in November for constitutional revision seem to
have been substantially the same as those originally conceived and
repeatedly alluded to by Minister of Interior von Gayl. There would
be a proroguing of the Reichstag, a temporary dictatorship based
on force, and constitutional revision by way of decree to raise the
voting age, establish a second house to ojffset the Reichstag, and
"increase the authority of the government." At the time it was also
indicated that Papen intended to dissolve all political parties and
their auxiliaries. Since the war Papen has avoided reference to this
item.'*^ The end goal toward which he intended to steer also re-
mains uncertain. He has frankly admitted his monarchism and his
intentions to work in its behalf. In November, however, the Papen
cabinet, which had often referred to this goal, was strangely silent
in regard to it.

Papen has himself on numerous occasions told the story of his
last days in oflBce. The story has never quite rung true. By his
account he met with von Hindenburg on December 1st and set
forth his plan to effectuate constitutional reform by emergency
decree. Schleicher presented the alternative plan of bringing about
a schism in the Nazi party and obtaining the support of the section
behind Gregor Strasser, until then Hitler's second-in-command. The
President responded that he did not beHeve Schleicher's plan had

NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES 165

much chance for success and declared in favor of Papen's project.
Papen, as a consequence, left the President with a full authorization
to proceed with his plans. After the conference he sought to re-
establish good relations with von Schleicher but encountered un-
disguised hostility. On conferring with Minister of Justice Giirtner
and Minister of Transportation Eltz-Riibenach, Papen discovered
that Schleicher had already talked with some of his colleagues
during the past several weeks and had alluded to the danger of
civil war in the event that constitutional reform should be put
into effect by decree. In a hastily-called cabinet session Schleicher
set forth the inadequacy of the army in such an event, and Lieu-
tenant Colonel Ott then reported the results of the Kriegsspiel
mentioned above. None of this material found its way into the
official protocols of the cabinet session and there is, as a conse-
quence, not even a vague reflection of the cabinet division in regard
to the issue. It is, indeed, clear that the session must have been
quite heated and that the full details were considered of too serious
an import for even the "Protokoll-fuhrer," the usually respected and
discreet official stenographers, to be present! Eventually Papen left
the cabinet session to seek renewed audience with Hindenburg and,
on failing to get Hindenburg to name a new Minister of War and
proceed regardless of risks, to request that the President entrust
Schleicher himself with the formation of a new government.'*^

In the events surrounding the final demise of the Papen regime
the fate of Prussia played a not unimportant role. The President's
instructions for negotiation for possible support had stressed the
necessity of preserving the measures which had marked the end
of the Reich-Prussian dualism. Von Gayl, the major architect of con-
stitutional reform, had considered the Prussian intervention the cor-
nerstone of the reform moves. ^° Yet in the ultimate downfall of
the Papen regime and the resultant departure of the chancellor and
von Gayl himself, it was Bracht and Popitz, the two major repre-
sentatives in Prussia, who brought strongest support to the hostile
position of von Schleicher. ^^ Both had reason to be concerned with
respect to the Nazi and Communist menaces — the dangers from
both sides were probably more intense in Prussia than in other parts
of the Reich. Both had given evidence of some sympathy for the
Nazi position. Popitz was later to serve the Third Reich for a time —
Bracht to be prevented from doing so by his premature death.

166 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Moreover, the major opposition to the cabinet had also centered
in Prussia and around Prussian questions. Thus, there had been the
implacable opposition of the Social Democrats, who rejected pleas
by Wilhelm Keil to move to a "toleration" of the Papen regime.
There was the determined opposition of the Communists who had
suffered most from the police regulations of the Commissional gov-
ernment. And Nazi strength, once far stronger in the South than
in Prussia, had now increased in Northern Germany. The Papen
cabinet sessions frequently recorded notes of possible rapproche-
ment with the South German states even when these were publicly
strong in opposition. Affairs in Prussia appeared far less favorable,
although the Reich was in a better position there for extra-consti-
tutional action.

It is scarcely too much to say that the Papen regime was wrecked
by its Prussian policies. In its efforts for constitutional reform the
Papen regime had brought the downfall of the state of law and of
respect for constitutional limitations and court decisions. It had
also thrust its sword deep into the heart of the Prussian state. As
Papen returned to private life, the state of Prussia lay moribimd.
He who took Papen's place was no physician possessed of a magic
elixir to restore its energy and vigor. Throughout the Schleicher
regime the state of Prussia, though mortally wounded, emitted
flickering signs of life. From Hitler it received the ultimate coup
de grace.

CH. VII. PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER

Kurt von Schleicher was a man of the shadows. The aura of
mystery which lay about him has not been fully dispelled by post-
war memoirs or documentary disclosures. To the contrary, there
has been a tendency to cover uncertainties of evaluation by stereo-
typed portraits of this strange figure. Both Schleicher and his
major confidant, General Kurt von Bredow, met death on the
"night of the long knives," June 30, 1934, when Hitler purged those
who menaced his position of power. As a consequence, Schleicher
has been outlived by those who had reason to hate him — Papen,
whom he made and unmade as chancellor; Meissner, who seeks a
a scapegoat upon whom to load all guilt for the intrigue in which
he, himself, undoubtedly played a significant role; and the vast corps
of republican enemies to whom Schleicher stood as the symbol for
a conspiracy which sabotaged all chance for a return to parliamen-
tary government. In spite of all, however, one cannot help feeling
that Schleicher, had he remained alive into the postwar period,
might well have presented a more convincing defense of his own
actions than is found in many of the plethora of exculpatory
memoirs which have overburdened the presses of recent years. ^

This is not to deny that Schleicher was the joyful intriguer, the
German "Cardinal Richelieu," the "political general," the "creeper"
hiding behind webs of conspiracy, as he has been pictured. His
role in the fall of Groner and the subsequent resignation of the
Briining cabinet, as discussed above, indicate his Machiavellism and
his lack of personal loyalty. The circumstances surrounding the fall
of Papen also smack of Byzantinism — the repeated assurances of
the reliability of the Reichswehr followed by the abrupt reversal
of this judgment after a Kriegsspiel led by the same officer who had
in May, 1932, produced the "documentary" evidence of the danger
of the Reichsbanner. No, it is clear that Schleicher's mind worked
in devious fashions and that new evidence is likely only to add to
the knowledge of the methods by which he gained information
and used that knowledge to move figures on the chess board of
politics.

There remains, however, the question whether the work of the
German "cardinal" might not have, under slightly altered circum-
stances, left his name surrounded by the atmosphere of success

168 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

which would have tempered the harshness of the judgments of his
critics. What motives moved this strange personaUty? Was it a
lust for power? But he preferred the power of the king-maker to
the prestige and responsibility of the king himself. Was it personal
profit? Of this there is no evidence. Was it jealousy or hatred? It
would appear, to the contrary, that Schleicher was removed from
the influence of petty emotions. This was a man who moved under
the impulse of a coldly logical assessment of the existing situation.
His goal would seem to have been two-fold: the creation of political
stability and the advancement of the interests of the regular army
to which he had devoted his life. These were not unworthy ob-
jectives. Their accomplishment lay in the long run only a little
beyond his reach. Those most responsible for his failure now lay
upon him the burden of their own responsibilities. In his lifetime,
however, he was a far stronger man than most of his posthumous
critics.

Whether a third objective — the reestablishment of the mon-
archy — should be added to the two mentioned above is a debatable
question. Schleicher was on the best of personal terms with the
Crown Prince. The latter greeted Schleicher cordially when he
assumed the chancellorship and provided him with bits of political
gossip supplied by his informants.- In the long run, however,
Schleicher moved toward this objective so slowly and hesitantly
as to raise doubt of his sincerity.

"A hunter of men" — so ran the critical description of von
Schleicher in one of the few biographies of this dark figure. The
description is inappropriate. The bold jaw, the stiff moustache, the
direct and piercing glance did, indeed, give evidence of a firm
and implacable will. But the suggestion that Schleicher sought out
his fellows only to destroy them builds too much upon the testi-
mony of his critics. Schleicher was possessed of an easy manner,
a sense of conviviality, an ability to meet friends and enemies alike
with apparent frankness and candor.^ The shiny bald head sur-
mounting a visage usually marked by a half-smile of irony was high
and broad. "Berlinisch" in his manner of speech and the wry humor
of his expression, von Schleicher reflected his long residence in the
German capital with its worldly wisdom, its cynicism, its familiarity
with the kaleidoscopic pattern of politics."* Well might the British
ambassador comment shortly after Schleicher's assumption of the

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 169

chancellorship, "The spectacle of a man of intelligence dealing
with such an intricate problem as the present political situation in
Germany, cannot fail to be stimulating."^

Perhaps a moment's recapitulation of Schleicher's role prior to
his chancellorship may serve to bolster the question mark which
this account would seek to attach to the stereotyped versions of
Schleicher's career. Schleicher's rise to a leadership of the "political
division" of the Reichswehr lies beyond the purview of this study.®
Suffice it to note that Schleicher's meteoric ascent to dominant
influence in the Reichswelir after World War I constituted one of
the most amazing chapters of Germany's postwar history. By fa-
vorable circumstances of friendship — most notably with Oskar
von Hindenburg and with General Wilhelm Groner, by the ability
to be on the scene at the right time with logical answers for difficult
questions, and by the keen ability to analyze existing political forces
and tensions, Schleicher had become, by the Briining era, the prime
mover behind Reichswehr policy. Essentially he was a shrewd poli-
tician encased by accident in the field-gray uniform of a general.
The German army after World War I had found itself in a new and
unaccustomed position— one requiring it to cope with parliamentary
politics. Life and death for the Reichswehr lay with the Reichstag.
Schleicher had established himself as the major expert for this
problem.

Schleicher's real heyday of political influence came with the
Briining era. He is commonly considered to have been the author
of the Briining government and of the whole conception of a presi-
dential cabinet which it embodied. By no means did he determine
the day-to-day policy carried out by Briining. This had not been his
purpose. He did, however, provide undergirding and support for
Briining's eflForts to secure revision of the armaments and reparations
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. He also sought to move
Briining to policy adjustments designed to conciliate rightist oppo-
sition. Basically, Schleicher conceived of a government of semi-
authoritarian character, but one which would have relatively broad
popular support. By early 1932 the Briining government had re-
vealed its inability to satisfy these requirements.'^ Briining himself
lacked the flair for popular appeal Schleicher was seeking. On one
occasion Schleicher had suggested that what Briining really needed
to do was to go to his office every day in a carriage drawn by four

170 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

white chargers!^ Briining had only the passive support of any
groups to the left of Center. Groups to the right of Center were, as
has been seen, alienated by the prohibition of the S.A. in April,
1932, and the rumors in May, 1932, of curtailment of government
assistance to heavily indebted East Elbian landowners. Regardless
of the wisdom or desirability of these actions, the simple fact
remains that in Schleicher's mind Briining had forfeited his raison
d'etre. The Reichswehr leader still sought the adherence to the
government of all groups professing nationalism, and Briining's final
months of office had greatly imperiled support of a presidential
cabinet by both Nationalists and National Socialists.

The consequence was the creation of the Papen government.
With this act Schleicher sought to mollify the Nationalists, obtain
the support of the National Socialists, and stabilize the relationships
between cabinet and presidency. Undoubtedly, he also purposefully
sought a weak man for the chancellorship, conceiving that in this
way he could secure his own control of policy. Schleicher had great
confidence in himself — he publicly described himself as a "strong
man."^ He felt certain that he could obtain Nazi support by con-
ciliation. Whether in June, 1932, he envisaged the possibility of an
ultimate Nazi government is uncertain.

Papen disappointed Schleicher. There was far less personal
appeal attached to Papen than to Briining. The gains at Lausanne
were deprived of all political value by inept handling of publicity.
The early actions of the cabinet — lifting of the S.A. prohibition,
the Prussian coup, slashing of unemployment payments — found
approval on the Right. But the July elections increased the urgency,
in Schleicher's view, of finding a ground for compromise with the
Nazis, and the course of the August negotiations between Hitler
and Papen shut off all possibilities in this direction. It would appear
that Schleicher may well have been unaware of plans for the obvi-
ously "staged" conference between Hitler and von Hindenburg,
which took place on August 13th. Werner von Rheinbaben describes
a scene on the evening of that conference which can only be ex-
plained on the basis of overwhelming anger on Schleicher's part.^*'
If the anger were not directed at Hitler, and later events would seem
to indicate this probability, the logical explanation is that Schleicher
was almost apoplectic at Papen's effort to "kill off" the Nazis by
directing von Hindenburg's prestige against them. Then, too, von

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 171

Gayl had emerged as a person of force in the Papen cabinet — in
its later period Papen was obviously leaning harder on his Minister
of Interior than an his Minister of Defense. Aside from these per-
sonal considerations, however, there was obviously no possibility for
a Papen cabinet to achieve its program save by a regime based on
force. Such an effort in December, 1932, would have undoubtedly
resulted in desultory if not in concerted and general civil war, would
have sabotaged the negotiations already underway toward lifting
the disarmament prohibition in Germany, would have rested the
authority of the government entirely upon the shoulders of a feeble
octogenarian, and would have undoubtedly strengthened the cause
of communism, already on the ascendancy. All of the logic of the
situation lay with Schleicher, who sought the fall of von Papen and
hoped still to gain the support of a part of the National Socialist
movement at the expense of Hitler.

It was under these circumstances that Schleicher emerged from
"behind the curtains," ascended the center of the stage, and stood
for his brief moment in history under the glaring light of publicity.
This transition was by no means a complete one. The cabinet proto-
cols became for his regime bare and meaningless — obviously little
real policy was being formulated by the cabinet as a whole.
Schleicher proceeded on the basis of personal negotiations, shying
away from witnesses and formal records. ^^ Significant problems
were referred to special committees — the important question of
colonization in East Prussia was under the purview of a committee
appointed for that question.^- Seemingly, Schleicher set up most
lines of policy himself. In January of the following year he com-
pletely ignored his cabinet when he brought Strasser before the
President. ^^ The impression is created, as a consequence, that the
Schleicher regime was far more a one-man government than had
been that of von Papen.

Schleicher retained most of the members of the Papen cabinet.
Franz Bracht moved in from the Prussian sphere to become Reich
Minister of Interior. Friedrich Syrup, who had been Reich Com-
missioner for the Voluntary Labor Service inaugurated under
Briining, became Labor Minister, and Giinther Gereke became
Reich Commissioner for Work Creation without assuming a cabinet
post. The personnel of the cabinet did not commend it strongly to
the public. Of the "barons," who had found universal obloquy, all

172 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

remained save Gayl and SchafFer. The appointments of Syrup and
Gereke seemed to promise a policy more considerate of the needs of
labor and of the unemployed. Although Syrup's work as Reich
Commissioner for the Voluntary Labor Service had not accom-
plished much, he had no disturbing background such as had his
predecessor, Hugo Schaffer, who had once served the Krupp enter-
prises and was, therefore, always suspect in the eyes of labor. ^^
Gereke, formally associated with a minority group, the Christian
Nationalist Farmers and Country People's Party, had been the
originator of plans for expanding labor opportunities by extensive
government expenditures.^^ But neither Gereke nor Syrup had any
real following and the retention of the majority of the old cabinet
seriously impaired Schleicher's hopes of obtaining some left-wing
support.

Actually Schleicher was in a most difficult predicament. The
process of negotiations with Hitler during the Papen period had
revealed that the Nazi leader was not to be won as a subordinate
partner in any government. Yet this would appear to have been
Schleicher's hope throughout the months from June to December,
1932. On the eve of his assumption of office the War Minister had
conceived an alternative plan. This proposed the division of the
Nazi Party by an attack on two points of weakness: 1. the job
hunger of the rank-and-file, now accentuated by the misgivings
attached to the November election losses, and 2. the inherent divi-
sion within party ranks between those who emphasized the "na-
tionalist" and those who emphasized the "socialist" aspects of the
party program. Schleicher's target was Gregor Strasser, who had
an unofficial designation as Hitler's chief lieutenant. Strasser's posi-
tion and personality rendered him particularly the focus of the two
weaknesses suggested above. As the major leader of the party's
organizational arrangements, a kind of "party secretary," he was
sensitive to the flood of depression sweeping through the ranks of
the "little people" of the party. As the principal and most eloquent
exponent of the vague socialist concepts attached to the part)'
program, Strasser looked askance at the approaches to the repre-
sentatives of heavy industry, which had filled the party coff^ers in
time of need during the spring and summer of 1932, but had robbed
the party of its hope for winning over industrial labor. By early
December the contributions of industry had run their course. Party

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 173

coffers were again empty — indeed, a debt of at least twelve million
marks worried the party leaders. This must be supplied either by
industry, which would expect further conciliations in the way of
policy statements, or by the state through patronage and unofficial
"slush funds." Strasser preferred the latter path and that path led
through Schleicher.^"

Schleicher, therefore, was confronted with a real opportunity to
accomplish his objectives. On the other hand, however, to do so
he would have to turn the course of government policy if not ninety
degrees at least forty-five. And this was not easy to accomplish. He
still held power as the head of a "presidential cabinet." He had
obtained that post not because the President was dissatisfied with
von Papen's policies, but because he, Schleicher, had proved that
these policies threatened civil war. The President s trust still rested
more heavily upon the "Uhlan" than upon the intriguing staff officer
who had replaced him. Schleicher, therefore, had to move cautiously
in his efforts to divest himself of the mantle of opprobrium with
which organized labor had invested the Papen government, of which
he himself had been a member. He could not suddenly "change the
guard" and move with vigor toward his objective. He confronted, as
a consequence, the dilemma of convincing Hindenburg that the
"gains" of the Papen government were to be preserved at the same
time that he sought to convince the public that the new regime was
no longer "reactionary." Tliis he might have accomplished in due
time if due time had been available. But the sands of the hour
glass were to run their course before the process of readjustment
was well underway. ^^

In the midst of Schleicher's plans Prussia occupied two mutually
contradictory roles — on the one side, it oflered the most logical
source of patronage with which to satisfy the job hunger of the
Strasser Nazis if Schleicher succeeded in gaining their support; on
the other hand, the continuance of the Commissional regime there
would deprive Schleicher of any real hope of reconciliation with
industrial labor because of the hostility of the Social Democrats.
The Prussian dilemma thrust itself forward within the early days of
the Schleicher regime and remained of significance until its demise.
In the long run Prussia proved the "key" by which Hitler unlocked
the gates to supreme power.

174 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

The Schleicher government began its work amidst guarded com-
ments of approval. Even the Nazis were slow to attack. As late as
October Goring had written in a syndicated article, "There is only
one man in the (Papen) government who has proved he possesses
capabilities justifying his high office. That man is Gen. Kurt von
Schleicher, Minister of National Defense."^ ^ So the Nazi waited.
So also did most other political groups. Perhaps the attitude of
the democratic forces was best summarized by the journalist, Carl
Misch, who noted that under Schleicher democracy cooled its heels
"in the waiting room," but added, after reviewing Schleicher's
career, "It is remarkable that this man at the present, after such
open failures and such incomprehensible reversals, now appears to
the overwhelming portion of the public a more reliable guarantor of
a peaceful development."^^ And the Social Democrats, although
officially repudiating toleration, left the columns of Vorwdrts re-
markably free of anti-Schleicher criticisms.-*^

On December 6th the Reichstag opened. All proceeded in order
except for the now almost customary Nazi-Communist fracas on the
second day. The most important issue discussed was a Nazi pro-
posal to alter the Constitution by making the President of the
ReicJisgericht the Reich President's representative in the event of
his incapacity or his being forced to surrender the office prior to
the close of his term. The failure of the Nazis to provide "grounds"
for their proposal lent credence to the explanation suggested by
the Socialists. The latter alleged that the resolution was designed
to remove one source of von Hindenburg's concern at the possi-
bility of a Nazi chancellor — that he might also in the event of the
President's sudden death take over that post. For different motives,
the clearly apparent need of providing precise regulation of the
quite possible contingency of an eighty-five year old president
being forced by illness to surrender his post, the Social Democrats
and most other groups voted the regulation into effect. Opposed
were only the Communists, who did not propose to follow the
Nazis' lead in this case, and the Nationalists, who objected to the
designation of Bumke as the President's representative after what
they considered the unfavorable verdict accorded in the case of
Preussen contra Reich.^^

The Reichstag also voted to demand the revocation of the
"social" portions of the emergency decree of September 4th, but

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 175

refused to accept Social Democratic and Communist sponsored
resolutions requiring the withdrawal of all of that decree as well as
the decrees of June 14th and September 5th. Following this rela-
tively brief period of action, the Reichstag adjourned sine die sub-
ject to recall by the Council of Elders which was its steering com-
mittee. The indefinite adjournment was a victory for the Schleicher
regime. At the time it was believed that the Nazis might be
moving toward toleration of the Schleicher government, since they
sponsored this action.-" Undoubtedly, however, a more serious
factor in the Nazi decision was their fear that if elections were held
too soon, the results might be unfavorable. Schleicher carried out
the wishes of the Reichstag, not only acceding to the formally passed
resolution for the withdrawal of those parts of the decree of Sep-
tember 4th which affected the social security arrangements, but also
revoking the entire decree of September 5th, which had permitted
employers to go below minimum wage requirements if they added
new employees. ^^ As regards relief arrangements, Schleicher per-
mitted the Center to begin planning a new "Winter Help" program.^*
The early days of the Schleicher regime certainly seemed to signal
a return to common sense in respect to social and economic policies.
Meanwhile, a political volcano had erupted in Germany. Schlei-
cher had heard the rumblings long before. It was in expectation of a
Nazi division that he had assumed the chancellorship in preference
to supporting Papen's plans for authoritarian rule. On December
8th, it seemed that his hopes were to be realized. Gregor Strasser,
announced the oflBcial Nazi news service, had taken a three weeks
"sick leave." All rumors giving a different explanation were cate-
gorically denied. However, the official news release was given the
direct lie by Strasser's letter of resignation, which followed shortly.
In the letter he returned to Hitler all party offices — he had been
"Party Organization Leader" — and his Reichstag mandate. He had
encountered, the letter further stated, hindrances in his work ema-
nating from the top echelon of the party; these hindrances, he
added, were of such a nature that he could not reconcile them with
the party's political viewpoint.-^ Thus, Schleicher had his desired
crisis in the Nazi Party. His slogan of cooperation with National
Socialism without Hitler assumed clear significance.-^ Strasser's de-
fection from the party hierarchy was followed shortly by that of
Gottfried Feder, once the leading economist and political theorist

176 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

of the party, but now no longer a leader of great moment. Although
the latter breach was soon repaired, the consequences of the
Strasser break could not be easily predicted. ^'^ Opposition papers
seized on the reports with an exultation they had not been able to
muster for years. "Der hohe Osaf," Vorwdrts said, using the mock-
ing nickname it had invented for Hitler, repaid faithful party
service with contumely and ingratitude.^^

It is not possible to determine whether Schleicher had a direct
hand in Strasser 's defection. But he was quick to seek advantage
from it. The government was optimistic about the prospects. The
division in the Nazi party, reported Meissner, was one "of serious
proportions."-^ Schleicher's plans were a well-publicized "secret."
He outlined them frankly to Otto Braun on December 8th when
the head of Prussia's "sovereign" but powerless State Ministry called
on him to discuss the future of the complicated "Prussian question."
Strasser was, said Schleicher, to be chosen Prussian Minister Presi-
dent and to enter the cabinet as Vice Chancellor. This was, of
course, the "bait" which had lured Strasser into folding his tents
and departing from the Hitler camp. Prussia was, in December, the
key to a hoped-for toleration of the Schleicher regime by a portion
of the Nazis, as it had been, in June, the key to toleration of the
Papen government. Naturally, Braun departed from Schleicher's
presence devoid of any hope that the political general intended to
restore constitutional government in Prussia. At the same time it
must be added that Braun, by his own record, made little show of
indignation or resentment — his conversation was that of the battle-
weary and disillusioned leader who most fervently desired his own
release from an uncomfortable, even ridiculous position.'^*' As for
Vorwdrts, it relegated mention of Braun's visit to an obscure note
hidden in a tiny corner of a page.^^

Braun had, however, before departing from Schleicher, warned
him of the shortcomings of the course he planned. The weight of
political influence in a party, he asserted, lay not in the bearers of
idealism and character but in the hands of those who controlled
party organization, newspapers, and treasury. These would, he
added, remain with Hitler. Braun's trenchant observations were
borne out in the days that followed.

It would appear that Schleicher's schemes might well have
succeeded had he moved rapidly to achieve them. In retrospect

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 177

it is possible to suggest that he had three weeks time within which
success was possible. By the end of the year a rip tide of unex-
pected strength had developed in the troubled waters of German
politics. But three weeks was not enough for Schleicher's plans.
He had not yet so much as set forth the official program of his
government when the Strasser break occurred. He well knew that
he would need not only Strasser's wing of the Nazi party, but sup-
port also from the Center and, if possible, a portion of the Social
Democrats. His hopes of obtaining these were not entirely illusory.
But for this he needed time and time he was not to have.

Moreover, Schleicher does not seem to have been fully com-
mitted to a pro-Strasser course. On December 12th, while the ramifi-
cations of the Nazi division were still uncertain, Schleicher received
Nazi Reichstag President Goring and Nazi Prussian Landtag Presi-
dent Kerrl and warned them that the election of a Prussian Minister
President would not lead to the suspension of the Commissional
regime in Prussia unless the successful candidate also became a
member of the Reich cabinet.^- A little later he put it acridly be-
fore the Reichswehr generals when he told them he could not
prevent the election of Goring as Minister President in Prussia if
the Center supported him. But, he added, "I can assure you that if
Goring becomes Minister President, he will sit on the little stool
where Braun now sits.^^ Probably Schleicher had some thoughts
that even yet the Hitler-Goring wing of the party might be forced
to a more conciliatory attitude.

Meanwhile, Schleicher had obtained a partial success in the field
of foreign policy. On December 11, 1932, Foreign Minister von
Neurath signed in behalf of Germany an armaments formula which
allowed Germany to return to the World Disarmament Conference
which it had boycotted since July. In basic form the agreement did
recognize Germany's equality of the right to arm. If there was,
unstated in the agreement, the understanding that Germany would
not make use of this concession to rearm for at least five years, this
did not prevent the government from claiming with justice a diplo-
matic victory and another step away from the restrictions of the
Versailles Treaty."^

The mid-month days of December were filled with Schleicher's
efforts to distance himself from the policies of the Papen regime.
The revocations of the emergency decrees of September 4th (in

178 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

part) and September 5th came on December 14th and 17th respec-
tively. On December 14th, Schleicher also sponsored in cabinet a
move to request the Braun government in Prussia to accede to pre-
viously made arrangements affecting the Preussenkasse. He saw no
objection to requesting the assistance of the "Sovereign government"
of Braun in this matter — he was not trying, he said, to wage
"prestige politics. "^^ On the same day the Communist Rote Fahne,
publication of which had been suspended since November 26th,
reappeared two days prior to the scheduled lifting of the prohibi-
tion. It repaid the courtesy by declaring "war on the Schleicher
dictatorship."^** At the same time Schleicher initiated formal ap-
proaches to the Social Democratic leaders through a middle man,
General von Bredow.^'^

But between Schleicher and the Social Democrats still lay the
Prussian question. It was not merely that Schleicher had participated
in the planning and execution of the rape of the Social Democratic
stronghold. The straws-in-the-wind indicated the likelihood of an
intensification of the drive of the Commisional regime to extend its
"cleaning" process into the area of education. Prussian Commissional
Minister of Education Kahler was stubbornly defending his policy
of requiring that religious instruction in the schools be "properly"
supervised, and the reaction of liberal-minded teachers forbode the
likelihood of a "purge" in that area.^^

The sessions of the Prussian Landtag reopened on December
14th. The resolutions lying over from the previous session were
voted upon first. Among those passed was a resolution brought by
the Committee of the Whole instructing the Reich Commissioner to
cease the appointment and promotion of officials; another by which
the Landtag questioned the financing of the Commissional govern-
ment and requested a report on the budgetary aspects of commis-
sional appointments; another by which the Landtag objected to the
promotion to the Police Presidency of Bielefeld of Regierungsrat
von Werder, who had been responsible for a night search of the
Reichstag not authorized by the Reichstag President; another di-
recting the Prussian State Ministry to oppose all efforts to reform
the organization of the Reich at the expense of Prussia; and a
general protest against the dictatorial regime in Prussia instituted
by von Papen. The Nazis even abstained from voting in order to
permit a Social Democratic resolution to pass directing that the

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 179

Braun Ministry be restored all of its rights needed to carry out the
will of the people of Prussia as represented in its Landtag. In
addition to adopting resolutions, the Landtag established com-
mittees to investigate the background of the original appointment
of the Reich Commissioner in Prussia and to investigate in how
far the personal policies of von Papen were being carried out
in Prussia. ^^

With sanctimonious reverence for the sacredness of constitu-
tional provisions, the Landtag Nazis lashed sharply at von Schlei-
cher. Prussia was not, declared Landtag deputy Kube, to be treated
di£Ferently from the other states. "We must rather demand," he pro-
claimed, "that the most sharply individualized personification of
German history is not to be treated like dirt ( en canaille ) , as it has
been for the last six months by Herr von Papen and Herr von
Schleicher." Schleicher, said Kube, denies that he will allow the
return of dualism, but, Kube added, addressing Hindenburg, "The
man, whom you have named, Mr. Reich President, is not the tsar
of all the Russians in Germany, but rather the highest official of
the German Republic, who is bound to a respect for the constitution
every bit as much as every other official of the German Republic."*^
Clearly, even the Hitler-loyal Nazis were beginning to thirst for
tangible returns, but privately Goebbels admitted, "if we had
Prussia, we would probably not know what we should begin to do
with it."^i

The Prussian question also occupied a prominent role in the
sessions of the Reichsrat, which opened on December 15th. Arnold
Brecht, the Reichsrat plenipotentiary of the "sovereign" government,
which controlled Prussia's external relations, had the unpleasant
task of "welcoming" the new Reich Minister of Interior. This was
none other than Franz Bracht, who had led the Commissional
regime prior to the Schleicher government! Bracht had followed in
his opening address the same line used by von Gayl, his predeces-
sor, in stating his desire to preserve the "individuality" of the
German Lander. Brecht answered that, putting aside the past
unpleasantness of Bracht's role in Prussia, he sincerely hoped that
Bracht's term in office as Minister of Interior would see the methods
of government emerging from those of "the time of need, in which
Article 48 of the Reich Constitution rules the hour" to "normal
paths of government."'^-

180 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

It was in the midst of these acrimonious agitations of the
Prussian question that Schleicher set forth in a radio address on the
evening of December 15th the program of his government. His
address was, by and large, an artful one."*^ His regime would take,
said Schleicher, the creation of labor as its motif. Schleicher sought
at one and the same time to reassure businessmen and landowners
that he would not abandon the protective policies of von Papen
and to convince labor and the unemployed that his government
would care for their needs. One might guess that Schleicher's words
were addressed almost as much to President von Hindenburg as to
the radio audience in general. There was a strong defense of the
President against the calumnious attack of Nazi general Litzmann,
who had made the opening speech at the Reichstag. There was a
warning that no regime could base itself permanently upon bay-
onets. References to the desirability of internal colonization in
eastern Germany were cushioned by comparison with the policies
of Frederick the Great. There were many allusions to the comradely
sense of mutual obligation which derived from military service.
There was justifiable pride in the accomplishments of the regime
in respect to disarmament. All of these were designed to appeal to
the heart of the Field Marshal.

Probably it was, at least in part, also, the opinion of von Hin-
denburg which determined Schleicher's statement of his Prussian
policy:

A word in respect to the Prussian question. I know quite well that
the final legal removal of Reich-Prussian dualism is not to be arrived
at today. But I know just as well that the dangerous situation which
made necessary the institution of a Reich Commisioner in Prussia is
still at hand for a long time to come.

A removal of the Reich Commissional regime can, accordingly,
only be considered when this dangerous situation no longer exists or
when, in place of the Reich Commissioner, other sufficient guarantees
may be created for a coordinated political leadership in Reich and
Prussia.44

Everything "schleichert," proclaimed Vorwdrts the day after
Schleicher's speech.'*^ Indeed, Schleicher began to get favorable
reception from circles other than the Strasser wing of the Nazis.
His most significant gain was the friendly attitude of Theodor
Leipart, the leader of the so-called "Free Labor Unions" ( A.D.G.B. ),
which were separate from although much influenced by the Social
Democratic Party. In his organ. Alarm, Leipart announced on De-

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 181

cember 23rd that he would not fight Schleicher— he preferred to
wait to see "Whether the deeds of the government correspond
to its words. "^^ The Social Democratic directorate itself, however,
rejected agreements with Schleicher. This stand of the Social
Democrats, much criticized in the post-war period, did, indeed,
reveal their lack of comprehension of the forces existing at the
time, but it should not be ignored that they were not the only
group to harbor the feeling that Schleicher was, at the moment, a
stronger menace to freedom than the Nazis. '*'^

Meanwhile, the Staatsgerichtshof was busily occupied with legal
complaints emanating from Prussia. On December 20th the Reichs-
gerichtsprdsident, Bumke, dispatched two of them. From both of
his decisions the Nazis drank bitter dregs. On the one side a Social
Democratic complaint against Nazis Landtag President Kerrl for
refusing to call the Landtag when the Social Democratic deputa-
tion had requested it was upheld. The verbal spanking involved
was accompanied by a rebuff to Nazi efforts to call into question
the change in the Landtag order of business which had required
an absolute majority for the election of the Prussian Minister
Presidency.*^ Bumke was also, at this time, in touch with Schlei-
cher in respect to possible emergency action to deal with the
existing crisis.*^ His role in general would seem to provide one
large stroke on the credit side of the ledger for the German
Judiciary.

Economic conditions were also improving. Beyond the lessening
of unemployment in the year-end period were such factors as
decrease of insolvencies, a rise in production, an increased liquidity
of finances. In the words of the American Consul General in Berlin,
". . . it is possible, from all the above factors and still other develop-
ments, to arrive at the conclusion that the crisis had definitely come
to an end in Germany, that the bottom had been reached, and that
the combination of objective economic influences is gradually gath-
ering strength for an ultimate movement in an upward direc-
tion . . ."^° A report from the same office, written in retrospect
several months later, was to say, "There is a general impression that
this betterment in the industrial and general economic situation
came as a direct result of the Schleicher Government which seemed
to bring promise of stability. There was a feeling that threatening
forces, whether from the right or the left, would be curbed under

182 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

this Government and that the opportunity for an approach to po-
h'tical stability was offered."^ ^

Christmas of 1932, therefore, found the Schleicher government
seemingly on the road to achieving its goal. The Nazi split had
occurred — there had even been an instance in which, to the glee
of opponents, eighty thousand copies of the Munich Illustrierter
Beohachter had had to be picked up after printing because of a
flattering, profusely illustrated tribute to Gregor Strasser.^- Schlei-
cher's initial approach to labor leaders had bom some fruit, although
the disciplined Social Democrats still resisted his overtures. Eco-
nomic conditions were getting better. A victory had been won in
the field of foreign policy. But the general of the bayonets kindled
little personal following. Like Papen, he could find no way of
developing support for his policies save through the mediation
of the old parties and these were inflexible in their viewpoints.

And, on December 19th, a "nightingale" sang.^^ Von Papen,
speaking before the Herrenklub which had symbolized his regime,
outlined in his usual cavalier style the policies he had followed and
the continuing need for governmental reform. All was supposedly
in tribute to Schleicher, who professed to be continuing Papen's
policies. Neutral observers, however, found in Papen's references
to his efforts for a coalition with the Nazis an oblique invitation to
the Hitler wing to take up the discussion of possibilities not with
Schleicher but with himself. Unimportant, said State Secretary
Planck of Papen's speech at the time — he's just a "busybody"
(Wichtigtuer) . No one takes him seriously.^"* One person takes
him seriously, answered a more prescient critic. The "old one"
listens. ^^ The "old one" did indeed listen and the "busybody" was
soon to sound the death knell for a regime which had begun so
favorably.

Two days after Christmas the Commissional regime in Prussia
began its heralded "Schulputsch" (coup against the schools). On
December 27th, the head of tlie Berlin school administration,
Christoph Konig, a Social Democrat, and twelve other high school
oflBcials were fired. By Social Democratic reckoning this brought to
seventy-five the total of able school administrators known for their
Social Democratic loyalty who had been dismissed, and all of this
in spite of Schleicher's appeals for Social Democratic support.^^
Little wonder that the Social Democrats looked askance at Leipart's

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 183

indications that he would not oppose Schleicher. ^^ Action against
the schools was followed by rumors of a general administrative
reform. '^^ On January 4, 1933, the Berlin "Physical Exercise School
of Adolf Koch" (KorperkuUiirschule) was closed largely on morality
grounds continuing the atmosphere begun by Bracht's famous
Zwickelerlass.^^

It is difficult to understand why Schleicher should have allowed
this renewed drive in Prussia to come at such an unfortunate time.
He was, in the early days of January, in the midst of his most
serious stage of negotiation with Gregor Strasser. He had even been
able to secure for Strasser an interview with von Hindenburg.^"
The diary of Hitler's propaganda expert, Goebbels, reflects the
intense fear which lay within the ranks of the Hitlerite Nazis in
respect to these negotiations.^^ It would have been a relatively
small concession to the Social Democrats to halt the school reform
movement in Prussia. It might have swung the balance in his favor
for some left-wing support. Perhaps he intended to use a promise
of such a move for bargaining purposes.

If so, Schleicher did not have the opportunity. On January 4,
1933, Papen met Hitler for the famous conference at the home of
Baron Kurt von Schroder. Von Schroder had returned from military
service in World War I to become a prominent banker in Cologne,
the honorary president of the stock exchange there. Widely ac-
quainted in the circles of the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area,
Schroder was also the leader of the "Herrenklub" of his home city.
He is alleged to have left the People's Party in 1932 and to have
drawn close to Nazi circles around Robert Ley. Schroder had heard
the "nightingale sing" at the pre-Christmas meeting of the Herren-
klub in Berlin and almost immediately set into motion the arrange-
ments by which the embittered former chancellor met the Nazi
leader, who, chastened by defeat at the polls, was now somewhat
more willing to compromise than he had been in August. ^-

The course of this famous conference is still a subject of debate.
Baron von Schroder, who heard part but not all of the conversations
between Hitler and Papen, alleges that Papen proposed a joint
government and that Hitler avoided direct comment on this, but
declared that if he became chancellor, the supporters of Papen could
become ministers. However, Hitler added that his plans contem-
plated elimination from public office of all Social Democrats, Com-

184 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

munists, and Jews and a reordering of the state to secure stability.®^
How far agreement was readied at this meeting cannot be firmly
stated. Nor can it be definitely established the extent to which von
Papen was in contact with von Hindenburg after the meeting.
Papen maintained that he had not had a part in coalition discussions
between January 5th and 22nd. Goring, who claimed to be in
charge of these negotiations on the Nazi side, supported Papen's
statement at the Nuremberg trial. ^^ On the other hand, Papen in
his pre-trial interrogations did admit that he was in friendly con-
tact with von Hindenburg in the interim period, and that he had
seen the President to inform him that he was not intriguing against
Schleicher.^^ The conclusion remains unavoidable, despite the post
World War H protests of the Papens, Pere et fils, that Papen set
into motion on January 4th a cross current designed to overturn the
Schleicher regime. °^

At the time, however, the meeting was not taken seriously.
Schleicher continued, quite leisurely it appears, his contacts with
party leaders — with Eduard Dingeldey of the German People's
Party on the 11th, with Alfred Hugenberg of the Nationalists on
the 13th, with Monsignor Kaas of the Center on the 16th. He did
not come off too well in these conferences. Hugenberg rejected
him out of hand — the others dealt with his proposals very
cautiously. ^'^

Meanwhile, Schleicher lost ground in an area where he might
well have made some progress. On January 6th, Otto Braun had a
new interview with the chancellor, Braun found the chancellor no
longer so secure in his self-esteem as he had been. He was not
happy in the Reich Chancellery, he told Braun. In the spring he
would move back to the Bendlerstrasse — the Defense Ministry.
"It won't take you that long," Braun had replied, if you keep on
"stirring up all the dogs against you." Braun confronted him with
a practical way out — Schleicher should revoke the emergency
decree concerning the Prussian Reich Commissioner. He, Braun,
would take up his job with a firm hand. They would dissolve the
Reichstag, dissolve the Landtag, postpone elections until spring, and
carry through unified action against the Nazi demands for power.
By spring the Nazis would have lost all their drive, the economic
crisis would have been mastered, and normal relations would have
returned.^^ Braun's suggestion was a good one, but it required one

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 185

thing that could not have been found — the support of the President.
Of course, Schleicher himself had no desire to permit the return
of a situation in which the Rightist groups, traditionally defenders
of the role of the military in Germany, would charge him with a
restoration of the old Reich-Prussian "dualism." Braun got no con-
cessions from the chancellor.

And, on the same day, Schleicher's rapprochement with labor
groups slipped a notch backward as Social Democratic leader Ru-
dolf Breitscheid talked Leipart out of further moves toward support
for the government.^^ This setback was followed a few days later
by an even more serious contretemps surrounding the agricultural
policy of the government.

On the morning of January 11th the directorate of the Reichs-
landbund, an organization of the great landowners, formulated a
sharply polemical attack on the cabinet's agricultural policy. Most
significant in the complaint were references to a need for the exten-
sion of quota arrangements, begun under Papen, and for further
protection against foreclosure of mortgages. These complaints were
accompanied by propagandist phrases reflecting the league's drift
to the Nazi party, as, for example, the statement that the govern-
ment had been responsible for the "exploitation of agriculture in
favor of the all powerful money interests of international export
industry and its adherents." The director of the league, Graf Eber-
hard von Kalckreuth, carried the complaints "of agriculture" to the
Reich President. He was accompanied by a friend of von Hinden-
burg, Hans Joachim von Rohr-Demmin, and the league's major
economic specialist, Heinrich von Sybel, a late convert to Nazism.
Details of the resultant conference vary. Certain it is that von
Hindenburg insisted on a careful hearing of the complaints of the
league and that von Schleicher, von Braun, the agricultural minister,
and Warmbold, the economics minister, came to deal with the
matter in the presence of von Hindenburg. Von Sybel related after-
ward that von Hindenburg not only furthered the demands of the
league, but also struck his fist on the table and addressed von
Schleicher in strong terms. "I request from you, Herr Reich Chan-
cellor von Schleicher, and as an old soldier you know that a request
is only the polite form of a command, that you call together the
cabinet this very night, draw up laws in the sense suggested [by
the Landbund] and present them to me tomorrow morning for

186 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

my signature." The protocol of the President's office does not reflect
such a severe ultimatum and, in actual fact, during the late evening
hours, after von Schleicher learned of the harsh form which the
league's directorate had taken for public criticism of his govern-
ment, the cabinet broke off relations with the league's directorate
with a sharp rebuke of its bad faith. '^*^

Nor do the events of the days immediately following reflect the
pessimism which would have been attendant upon such sharp action
by the President. The capital was rife with rumors of Strasser's
entrance into the cabinet on the 13th. On the 16th Schleicher told
his colleagues that Strasser was indeed ready to come but that
he doubted whether he would bring much support. He still had
hopes of the entry of Hugenberg and believed a Center Party
representative would come, although Monsignor Kaas himself had
indicated he did not wish to do so.^^ Bracht, the Minister of the
Interior, was still concerned about Prussian questions. He believed
it important for von Hindenburg to assume the duties of a Prussian
State President and for the Landtag to be dissolved. Bracht, for
his part, was ready to put off new elections until the following
October or November.^- One item of interest in the protocol of
this session is a series of different forms for the dissolution of the
Reichstag. Clearly the question of drafting a dissolution decree
which would avoid complaints of unconstitutionality was becoming
quite serious. ^^

Meanwhile, the Nazis by intense efforts had made a somewhat
more favorable showing in the elections in the little state of Lippe.
They could not, however, take much heart from these results.
Efforts to portray a renewal of the rapid rise of the party were
not very convincing.'^'*

The last two weeks of January are full of mystery despite all
efforts to fill the void. With every step of the path beset by booby
traps laid by those seeking exculpation and self-justification, the
historian moves uncertainly through many misty events. Schleicher's
project for colonization in eastern Prussia moved into the stage of
serious discussions on the sixteenth. These discussions were, how-
ever, not carried on by the full cabinet but by a special committee
for that purpose. '^^ That the government contemplated anything
really earth-shattering in this area is doubtful. There had developed
in 1932 a trend toward resettlement of agricultural lands in eastern

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 187

Prussia by experienced farmers and on the basis of larger individual
farms than those that were contemplated by labor leaders who
hoped to place large numbers of unemployed in that area. This
tiend continued in 1933.^**

Meanwhile, the public, if still interested in politics in the midst
of the disillusioning cross-currents, watched the battle of the peda-
gogues in Pi-ussia. The sessions of the Landtag saw one deputy
after another stand before the rostrum to denounce the cultural
policies of the Commissional regimeJ'^ Most of these deputies were
former school teachers or administrators. Strongest, of course, were
the complaints of the Social Democrats, who had been most affected
by the purge in the educational system. In some respects they were
justified. School teachers were being judged by their ability to
mouth exaggerated expressions of nationalism. Superficial rightists
were replacing sober teachers suspected of leftist sentiments. These
measures heralded in many respects the cultural niveau of the Third
Reich. This was underscored in the stiictures of Professor Wilhelm
Erik Nolting of Frankfurt a.M.'^^ The constant use of the word
"German" to shut out all foreign and, particularly, all Jewish influ-
ence was resulting in catastrophe, said Nolting. "In the wild ravages
of the barbarians much lies today trampled on the ground." The
Volksschulen, which the Social Democrats had built and filled with
light and air and happy children were worth, proclaimed Nolting,
a thousand Zwickel decrees. ^^ Bad scholarship now claimed extra-
ordinary rewards. A teacher who copied an article written in 1904
and used it as his own gained rapid promotion. *^'^ And Professor
Carl Schmitt with his famous "theory of the emergency powers of
the State" {Staatsnotrechtstheorie) "falls up the stairs," although
this is nothing but "a juggler's act of the reactionaries."*^^ But,
warned Nolting, we shall come again, and when we do, you shall
not expect to find us "more convenient coalition partners" as the
result of your lessons.^-

The note of realism here was significant of a growing tendency
within Social Democratic ranks toward sterner resistance measures.
But, as Nolting himself added, the Social Democrats still found
themselves in a war on two fronts — against fascism and against
"a feudal-reactionary wing." Against fascism the Social Democrats
continued to fight. But they were no longer so concerned. The
Nazis had still emerged from the Lippe elections with a "black

188 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

eye." "Indeed," stated Nolting, "we shall see to it that your move-
ment continues to move, but that it goes downhill. . . . Your power
of fascination is gone. You charm today neither the little bourgeoisie
nor the political power complex [in control of the state]. Your days
of disenchantment have begun. You are in the fall of your year."
On the other hand, proclaimed Nolting, "Between Herr Schleicher
and us lies July 20, 1932. Across this chasm can be built no bridge
of understanding and unity. ... By the coup against Prussia an
unalterable hostility has been set between us and him. . . . We are
not concerned with the individual ruling measures of Herr
Schleicher. They do not interest us much, whether they be sensible
or not. Herr Schleicher personifies for us a system, and against
the representatives of this system there is nothing on our part but
hostihty."^^

These were brave words but of little practical significance. The
Landtag adjourned itself on January 19th until February 15th.
During the events which followed the Social Democrats were more
largely observers than particpants. In only one narrow area did
they have another chance to express their concern over the course
of events on the eve of Hitler. In Berlin the controversy over
reorganization of the city's administrative divisions was revived.
On January 25th, the city magistracy turned over to the Ministry
of Interior, at long last, a completed plan for this purpose. This
was to no avail. Despite Social Democratic protests in the Stadt-
verordnetenversammhing, the city parliament, Minister of the In-
terior Bracht rejected the plan, and a regirding of the city's admin-
istrative form awaited the coming to power of the Nazis. ^■^

Nevertheless, the Commissional government of Prussia was far
from feeling completely secure in its position. The question as to
whether the right of amnesty rested with the Commisional regime
or with the official Prussian State Ministry (Braun government)
caused much concern. Closely joined to this was the more technical
issue of the proclamation of laws passed by the Landtag. Members
of the Commissional government were rather dubious in respect to
their right to proclaim such laws, but were also fearful that the
Braun government would exploit this function, if allowed to do so,
to the embarrassment of their Reich-sponsored rivals. Thus, the
deposed cabinet might submit laws to a plebiscite, which could
be used as a means of discrediting the Commissional regime. Appeal

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 189

to the president of the Supreme Court, Bumke, for clarification of
such problems was still pending at the time of the fall of the
Schleicher cabinet, although Schleicher hoped that direct negotia-
tion with the Braun government might make the court action
unnecessary.^^

The downfall of the Schleicher regime took form in the eight
days between January 22 and 30, 1933. On January 22, Papen with
the knowledge of the President and already acting in some respects
as his homo regius, his special intermediary, began negotiations with
Goring.^^ Whether this was the continuance of earlier actions or
separate from them is, after all, relatively unimportant. It would
appear that the National Socialists, who had earlier threatened the
initiation of an impeachment process against von Hindenburg, also
posed a threat at this time of pushing Reichstag investigations of
Osthilfe (government aid for landowners in Eastern Germany)
scandals into the household of the President. Shortly before, the
Reichstag budget commission, largely under Center pressure, had
begun to question the employment of funds for relief of agricultural
estates in the East. The taking of government assistance by some
of the wealthiest landowners of the section was alleged. It was
later charged that Oskar von Hindenburg was himself involved.
Whether this be true or not, the son of the President, whose influ-
ence on his father was indicated by the phrase describing him as
"the son not provided for in the constitution," conferred on the
22nd privately with Hitler and emerged from his conference far
more convinced of the desirability of a Hitler government than he
had been at the outset!^'^ Between the 22nd and the 28th the main
question at issue in the search for a Hitler-Papen combination was
the relative position to be occupied by the two men. It is another
indication of the character of the President and his immediate
advisers that the Schleicher cabinet knew little of the events in
motion and that genuine surprise reigned in government circles at
the time of the downfall.^^

Schleicher had come by January 23rd to the conclusion that the
only course of action for his government lay in the establishment
of a "state of emergency," by which the Reichstag would be dis-
solved, elections indefinitely postponed, and sharp governmental
control action undertaken against the National Socialists and Com-
munists. His conclusion was strengthened on the following day,

190 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

when the steering committee of the Reichstag, the Council of Elders,
refused to postpone the full sessions of that body beyond the end
of the month. On the 26th, he presented this proposed course of
action to von Hindenburg. The latter, with somewhat better
memory than he often had in these uncertain days, recalled to
Schleicher that the chancellor himself had onlv two months earlier
proclaimicd such a course an impossibility. Schleicher answered
that he, unlike Papen, would not have to fear a general strike, and,
as a consequence, a two-front war against both right and left.
Beyond this, he also contemplated a strengthening of the Reichs-
wehr by the addition of volunteers, alleging that this would not
cause difficulties with foreign powers in view of the favorable
action of the World Disarmament Conference already noted. ^^

Von Hindenburg cannot be too much blam.ed for rejecting
Schleicher's plans. There was, indeed, little evidence that Schleicher
was stronger by the end of January than Papen had been at the end
of November. The Social Democrats had rejected his toleration
proposals. They were bitterly attacking his Prussian policies. The
only major labor leader who had come to his side, Theodor Leipart,
had repented his course. Both Social Democrats and Center party
members had cooperated in the refusal of the Reichstag committee
to postpone its sessions. Otto Braun added a few days later sharp
public letters protesting against plans of treasonous nature. ^°
Indeed, it would appear that the Social Democracy, far too quiescent
in the earlier period, was beginning to bestir itself in the face of
that which they regarded as the coming decline of National So-
cialism. An authoritarian solution under Schleicher in January might
well have found them more prone to resistance than they had been
two months earlier. This, of course, does not dispose of the question
of the propriety of von Hindenburg's action in approving under-
cover negotiations directed against the existing cabinet. Nor does
it justify his confidence during those critical days in a man who
had been found by all sides a political novice, but who was en-
trusted by von Hindenburg with the details of arrangements for a
political coalition which had been regarded for years as a most
perilous one.

Von Papen had begun his negotiations with Hitler on the basis
of an equal sharing of power. He had been speedilv disabused of
notions that this was possible. By the 22nd it began to be clear

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 191

that von Papen would have to assume the vice-chancellor's position,
although von Hindenburg received this idea with great reluctance
and did not accept it until the 29th. In the end the President
agreed but only with two conditions attached, both of them in the
long run meaningless. One was that Papen should be present at
all conferences between Hitler and the President. This was prob-
ably a partial holdover from the original idea of a dual chancellor-
ship. The other was that von Papen should also be the Reich
Commissioner for Prussia, This could have been, with a different
kind of man from Papen, a safeguard of some value. Beyond this
von Hindenburg controlled and specified the appointment of von
Neurath as Foreign Minister, of von Blomberg as Minister of De-
fense, of von Krosigk as Finance Minister, of Eltz von Riibenach
as Minister of Transportation and of Seldte, leader of the Stahlhelm,
lor an undesignated cabinet post. On the other side of the bar-
gaining Hitler obtained the promise of new elections, which he
promised von Hindenburg would be the last to be held during his
chancellorship.®^

The play and counter-play of personalities and events in the
final determination of the Hitler regime are most interesting. It is
clear that the final agreement for a Hitler chancellorship came very
late. At the last cabinet meeting under Schleicher there was still
great fear that the new government to replace it would be led by
Papen and Nationalist Party head Hugenberg. The cabinet com-
missioned von Schleicher and sent von Neurath, as the oldest mem-
ber of the cabinet, along with him to carry their warnings of this
course to the President.®- To Schleicher, to von Hammerstein, and
to many republican-minded statesmen the specter of a returned
Papen was, at the end of January, 1933, more fearsome than the
shadow of a Hitler government. Schleicher and his associates
planned no putsch against the Nazis. They did discuss possible
action if Papen should return at the head of a new government.®^

In the determination of the Hitler regime the role of Prussia
had loomed large both at the presidential palace and at Hitler's
headquarters in the Kaiserhof. The President's advisers looked upon
Papen's position as Reich Commisioner for Prussia as a significant
safeguard against the total power of Hitler. The Nazi negotiators
regretted the necessity of making this concession but found in the
Prussian and Reich Ministries of Interior a recompense. In the long

192 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

run the Prussian Ministry of Interior was to prove far more signifi-
cant than that of the Reich, for it involved the actual and direct
control of police forces as well as an extensive bureaucratic system.
Prussia was to provide the Nazis power and patronage. With its
help the wounds of the Strasser break were laved and the embers
of enthusiasm reheated. Prussia remained for a time significant
under the Nazis. But it was the significance of a pawn not of a
castle, of a victim not of a victor, and the price of its significance
was death.

CH. VIII. THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA

"The victory of a party is a change of government. The victory
of a Weltanschauung is a revolution."^ So spoke Adolf Hitler in one
of the great mass demonstrations that followed the victory of Na-
tional Socialism. But the words were spoken in 1934 not 1933.
The victory was gained after January, 1933, not before. It was
Prussia which made the victory possible, which provided the ful-
crum by which opposition was overcome and the totalitarian state
launched.

It was, indeed, a strangely assorted group of men who assembled
themselves in the Reich Chancellery on January 30, 1933. He who
presided over the gathering was the strangest of all. The thousands,
nay millions, of words about him that have flowed from the pens of
innumerable writers since that day have failed to bring complete
clarity. One reads and understands the words but falls short of
comprehending the personality of the man about whom they were
written.

Here was a leader whose words won the support of millions,
but the nature of his fascination is indefinable. At short range view.
Hitler had little to win love or admiration. He was, of course,
neither stupid nor naive. He had a quick and ready intelligence,
could analyze situations keenly and strike through to solutions
rapidly. The vagaries of that intellect, however, have been strikingly
underscored in his wartime "table talk."- The charge of superficiality
leveled so frequently, and with justice, at von Papen falls quite as
heavily upon Hitler. Perhaps it may be suggested that the solutions
of most political problems are in themselves fairly simple. It is in
the choice of solutions and the justification of them that there lies
the complexity of counterbalancing facts and points of view. The
genius of Adolf Hitler was the divorcing of the solution from the
rational justification of the choice. For reason was substituted faith
and trust. Intuition directed the choice. Unquestioning faith
brought its acceptance. This has been labeled a "neo-romanticism."
Yet the man who employed these concepts was in many respects
no romantic, but rather a small-time politician, who had by the end
of January, 1933, seemingly passed the apex of his accomplishments.

Hitler was, perhaps, possessed of two distinct personalities.
Before the forum of the public he was the master of demagogic

194 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

oratory. From the depths of his own frustrations he developed the
talent of appealing to the frustrations of his auditors. But with this
he combined a vivid personification of pure will power, of deter-
mination allied with a hatred of obstacles in his path so intense that
it was clear that no scruples would prevent their violent eradication.
Nietzsche's "will to power" found personification in Adolf Hitler.
However, the demagogy of Hitler would not have sufiiced of itself
to give him victory. His other personality was that of the "machine
boss" in politics. Onlv the cleverest management of part)' forces
had made it possible for him to preserve his movement in the
troublous days after the November elections. The "machine boss"
had withstood the tlireat of a rival leader in the tvvo months pre-
ceding the formation of his cabinet. It was as a "macliine boss"
tliat he began his chancellorship and Herman Goring was his
"hatchet man."

Hitler had become chancellor not because the movement behind
him was increasing in strength but because it was weakening. In
August a Hitler cabinet had clearly and apparentlv boded ill for
all other political groups. The elan, the jrcchhcit, the unbridled
arrogance and uninhibited optimism of the National Socialists prog-
nosticated an over\\"helmin2; tidal wave of Nazi influence if Hitler
should become chancellor. It had been a service of the Papen
cabinet temporarily to moderate this clan, this arrogance. The Head
of the State, revered as a kind of deit)-, had expressed open disap-
proval of the ambitions of the part)' for monopolistic control of
state autliority. Some of the "band-wagon" adherents of National
Socialism had begun to question their support of the movement
during tlie enforced waiting period. The Nazis had suffered signifi-
cant reverses in the November elections. Then had followed the
Schleicher regime and the division of the Nazi movement. Somehow,
in January, 1933, National Socialism seemed far less formidable
than it had in August 1932. Of this fact clear evidence is found
in such speeches as that of the Social Democratic Landtag deput)%
Eric Nolting, who had proclaimed National Socialism to be "in the
fall of its year."-^

Post-mortem anal\sis indicates that this assessment was incor-
rect. The major Nazi losses in November, 1932, as over against Julv,
1932, had resulted not from defections to other parties but an
increased "stav-at-home" vote. The Strasser-Hider break had not

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 195

resulted in a real division of the party and had not seriously shaken
Hitler's position of leadership. All of the forces which had contrib-
uted to the rise of the party were still there unimpaired — the
economic upturn of the Papen-Schleicher regimes had not yet com-
municated itself significantly in the reduction of unemployment; the
scarcely-submerged sadism and rowdyism of the Nazi movement
had not been chastened by the determined discipline of govern-
mental controls; the activism of the movement still retained its
allure; Hitler had not lost in prestige by the arrangements for
coalition; rather he emerged with the chancellorship upon which he
had stubbornly insisted through months of discouragement and
despair.

Yet von Papen was not alone in his conviction in the early days
of the Third Reich that he had bound Hitler to his own chariot.
There was almost as much concern at the outset over the return
of Papen and the entrance of Alfred Hugenberg into the govern-
ment with joint portfolios of agriculture and economics as there was
in respect to Hitler.^ Hugenberg, the choleric leader of the German
Nationalist Party, had held that position since 1928. Many of the
Nationalists considered his leadership an unmitigated disaster for
their party. There is much truth in this belief. Hugenberg had
subdued all efforts to give the party a broader base. Like Schleicher,
he considered himself a "strong man." But unlike Schleicher this
little man with his ridiculous walrus-like moustache, his owlish
spectacles, his paunchy figure was a walking caricature of the misty
uncertainty and unreality atti'ibuted to the Nationalists by their
enemies.^ Like Papen he mouthed phrases reflecting the authori-
tarianism of nineteenth century Germany. The Schleicher regime,
he had said shortly before its fall, had been guilty of "politics of
delay and hesitation" {"Politik des Hinhaltens und Zauderns").^
It should, he emphasized, be replaced with a renewal of "the
authoritarian idea" set into motion with the Papen regime. His
entrance into the Hitler cabinet had been, however, in opposition
to the wishes of most of his party colleagues.'^

With Hitler in his cabinet were also other representatives of
the Papen regime — Neurath in the Foreign Ministr)', Krosigk in
the Ministry of Finance, Eltz-Riibenach in the Ministry of Trans-
portation, and Giirtner in the Ministry of Justice.^ The coalition
arrangements had been designed to remove specific areas of gov-

196 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

ernmental action from Nazi influence — each of the "conservative"
ministers would be a safeguard of the security of his particular
sphere of action from Nazi excesses. And Papen as vice-chancellor
was to temper Hitler's actions and preserve the significance of the
presidential position of authority.

None of these men, however, stood in complete opposition to
the basic principles of National Socialism. They disagreed not with
what Hitler advocated but with the manner by which he sought
to carry it out and the spirit of violence which undergirded his
movement. As a consequence, the conservative ministers of the
Hitler cabinet were in a most awkward position. It was almost
impossible for them to determine when to tighten the reins, to try
to pull up on the bit. For the time being, they could find little
fault in that which was done.^

The dynamism of the Nazis was quickly apparent — and the
shrewdness of its leaders, who, in the early months of the Hitler
regime, revealed themselves far more practical-minded than some of
their dogmatic demagoguery had presaged. He who follows the
pell-mell currents of government action during the late winter and
early spring months of 1933 must admire the energy and decisive-
ness displayed, much as he may condemn the policies which were
initiated. During this period Hitler set into motion imaginative
economic policies, took his first steps toward conquest of the Reichs-
wehr leadership, succeeded in neutralizing and eliminating rival
political parties and associations, won freedom from all restraints
imposed by the coalition nature of his cabinet, and began to set
the stage for conquests in the field of foreign policy. In these varied
actions Prussia was of signal importance.

The first cabinet meeting saw the beginnings of the discussions
of an enabling act designed to free the cabinet for the time from
the restraint of the Reichstag. Vice Chancellor and Reich Commis-
sioner for Prussia von Papen gave eager sponsorship to the sug-
gestion.^*^ Undoubtedly he was recalling his own advocacy of such
a step at the time of his earlier exodus from political leadership.
Just as undoubtedly he also considered the benefits of an enabling
act as redounding in the long run to his own advantage. He was
confident of his ability to control Hitler. He contemplated a gov-
ernment in which Hitler would be the "front" for himself, Hugen-

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 197

berg, and their conservative cohorts. He ought to have been quickly
disabused of this notion, but his awakening came slowly.

At the second cabinet meeting, on January 31, the problem of
Prussia played a leading role.^^ The cabinet went through the
motions of turning over to von Papen the supervisory position in
respect to the Commissional regime there which had formerly been
vested in the chancellorship. From this formal action the cabinet
moved to the problem of ending the dualism existing in respect
to the Prussian government. Hugenberg had long been a vociferous
critic of the Social Democratic leaders of that state. Now that he
had finally gained a post on the cabinet, he moved quickly against
his old enemies. It was, he stated, "urgently necessary to depose
as quickly as possible the so-called sovereign government of Braun."
He found no one disposed to dispute him. But there were compli-
cations. Hitler was, at this time, seeking or pretending to seek
coalition with the Center Party. Cabinet members noted that the
Center had expressed interest in the idea, but had conditioned their
negotiations for coalition in the Reich with the requirement that
these negotiations also contemplate a coalition in Prussia. This
cabinet meeting also saw the beginning of consideration of the
means by which the Prussian Landtag could be dissolved. Under
the Prussian constitution this required the approval of the "Drei-
mdnnerkollegium," or "Committee of Three," composed of the Prus-
sian Minister President, the President of the Landtag, and the
President of the Staatsrat. But Braun was still the "sovereign"
Minister President, and the President of the Staatsrat was the
staunch Centrist, Konrad Adenauer. As a consequence, it appeared
likely, Meissner believed, that the President would have to take
action on the basis of Article 48. Papen, however, still felt that it
would be better for Hindenburg to make himself the State President
of Prussia.

The Reichsrat reopened its sessions on the same day. The Nazi
Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm Frick, preserved the Gayl-Bracht
tradition of emphasizing his federalist point of view, underscored
by references to his Bavarian origin. The individual states of the
Reich, he stated, must be left "the necessary freedom, particularly
in cultural relationships." The Reich, however, must stand as a
unity over and against other countries, and these times of crisis,
he added, required a strong government. ^^ Similarly, the Prussian

198 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

plenipotentiary of the Braun regime, Arnold Brecht, answered Frick
as he had answered Bracht by expressing a pious hope that the
new government would be able to end unstable conditions and
return to normal channels of government.^ ^

Brecht's plea for a return to normal courses of government fell
on deaf ears. By the time he made this appeal there was a serious
debate in progress within the Reich government as to whether or
not new elections for the Reichstag should be held. One portion
of the cabinet was willing to prorogue the Reichstag and proceed
on authoritarian lines; the other portion desired new elections hop-
ing to obtain from them the majority needed to provide constitu-
tional authorization for dictatorial measures. The decision that new
elections should be held was a Nazi victory. It was gained only
with a promise by Hitler that there would be no further continua-
tion of the wearisome balloting. There was also a second promise
— that, regardless of election results, the personnel of the cabinet
would not be altered. ^^ The Nazis scored a second victory at the
same time. Von Hindenburg had requested that Hitler initiate the
negotiations with the Center Party mentioned above. Hitler now
succeeded in making it appear that the Center Party was not seri-
ously interested in entering the government. Monsignor Kaas, the
leader of the Center Party, later protested that Hitler had not
really sought to explore the possibility of coalition. ^^ His protest
was of no avail. It was clearly apparent that the National Socialists,
temporarily stymied by the authoritarian solutions of the fall and
winter months, had recovered their confidence and had launched a
drive for complete control of the government. To this renewed
dynamism of his party Hermann Goring provided a strong stimulus.

Goring held a position in the cabinet which seemed at the
outset unimportant. He was a Reich-Minister-without-Portfolio but
was entrusted with two commissional posts — one enabling him to
supervise air transport, destined later to be transformed into a
formal ministerial position; the other making him the Reich Com-
missioner for the Prussian Ministiy of the Interior. The latter post
gave him command of all police forces in Prussia, including those
of the city of Berlin. Goring was, therefore, in a more influential
position than any other Nazi. His direct control of enforcement
agencies provided the National Socialists with the fulcrum by which
their partnership in government was converted into a one-party

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 199

dictatorship. On February 1st, he began to move toward this
objective. The first step was an anti-Communist drive. In the
cabinet he was the mainspring of a prohibition directed against
Communist assembHes and demonstrations. He also told the Reich
Cabinet he intended to make extensive changes in the personnel of
the Prussian Ministry of Interior. ^° A day later he brought before
the cabinet a proposal to dissolve local assemblies in Prussia and
to set new elections for March 12th. ^'^

The discussion in the cabinet of Goring's proposal for new local
elections in Prussia is most interesting. It indicates that the defi-
nite date for new elections for the Prussian Landtag had already
been set (March 5th), although arrangements for its dissolution
had not yet been carried out. Goring's proposal was made under
circumstances indicating that it had not been previously discussed
either with Hugenberg or von Papen. Hugenberg, having already
made concession in respect to the holding of national elections,
which he had opposed, requested a day to think the matter over.
Papen announced he had no objection in principle, but that he
believed the matter was one for the discussion of the Prussian
cabinet rather than of the Reich cabinet. In this Papen began his
first effort toward retaining his supposed influence of moderation
on the course of government action. Goring had his way, however,
and a decree of February 4th set in motion the local elections he
desired, elections which would not only influence the composition
of the local assemblies but would also affect the composition of the
Staatsrat, the Prussian Council of State, which represented them in
the state government.

The deposed Prussian government of Otto Braun was, mean-
while, a thorn in the side of the new cabinet. Its Reichsrat pleni-
potentiaries irritated Frick by demanding to see the government's
declaration of policy. They played a hostile role in the Reichsrat
committees.^ ^ And, worst of all, their leader, Arnold Brecht, had
opportunity on February 2nd to pierce the soap bubble blown be-
fore the Reichsrat by Hitler himself.

Hitler's speech was a "federalist one." It contained comments
about the "cooperation of the Lander," promised not to centralize
for the sake of centralization alone, and indicated that the govern-
ment intended to retain the Lander, "these historical cornerstones
of the German Nation." Beyond this were the usual catch phrases

200 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

proclaiming trust in the "energy of the German people," the "zeal of
the German people," and "the abilities ' and "will to live" of the
German people. ^^ Brecht's answer was an emphasis on the historical
traditions of the Reichsrat, a house in which tradition was most
particularly maintained. The Reichsrat must be, he said, "the
counter-balance in the German clockworks." It should be the
"conscience" of the government in "restless and passionate times" —
"not a brake on energetic progress, but a brake on excesses of pas-
sion and of over-heated struggle." The work of the Reichsrat,
declared the Prussian plenipotentiary, was seriously impaired by
the abnormal situation existing in his state due to the intervention
of the Reich. Brecht expressed the desir^ of the Reichsrat that
constitutional normality be restored as quickly as possible and
added a note on Hitler's responsibility to act in behalf of the Reich
as a whole and in accordance with its constitution. ^°

Little doubt can exist that Brecht's words did not please the
Nazi Fiihrer. Brecht's speech in answer to Hitler was his swan-song.
Before the Reichsrat met again, the "sovereign" government of
Braun had been made to "disappear" as its enemies wished, and
the Prussian plenipotentiaries were puppets of the Reich. Nor was
the Reichsrat itself to be after this "a conscience" of the government
in troublous times.

Again, it was von Papen who, in cabinet on the day following
Brecht's speech, emphasized the necessity of getting rid of the
Braun government, which continued to use its "shadow-existence"
as a means to heckle the government of the Reich. To his previous
proposal that von Hindenburg make himself State President of
Prussia, Papen now added the suggestion that a special court be
created for constitutional questions. The court, he suggested, might
well consist of six members, three nominated by the Reichsrat and
three named by the President without nomination. State Secretary
Hans Heinrich Lammers in Hitler's Reich Chancellery suggested
that it might be easier simply to alter the personnel of the existing
Staatsgerichtshof by emergency decree. Meissner noted that either
procedure, the creation of a new court or alteration of the old
might be accomplished by emergency decree, but that the President
had refused on several occasions in the past to make himself State
President of Prussia.-^

By the time this discussion in cabinet took place, it was clear

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 201

that events were on the move in respect to Prussia. On February
2nd, the Commissional Minister of Education there, Wilhelm Kahler,
was removed. He had, of course, been a source of criticism not only
upon the part of the Social Democrats but also on the part of
the National Socialists. On the fourth, his place was taken by Bern-
hard Rust, destined to be one of the major National Socialist leaders
in the field of education. At the same time Hugenberg replaced
two holdovers of the earlier Commissional government, Freiherr
von Braun, who still functioned as Commissional Minister of Agri-
culture, and Ministerialrat Ernst, who had held the economics
portfolio in the Commissional regime. ^^

Desperately seeking to parry the clearly contemplated blow
against his awkward and undesirable but still constitutional position,
Otto Braun on February 3rd wrote the Reich President begging him
not to allow himself to be led into unconstitutional and illegal
actions against the Prussian government. When von Hindenburg's
reply was polite but negative, Braun sent a second letter on Febru-
ary 5th. This time the reply was not so polite. He could, the
President told Braun, get along without personal lectures. He found
no merit in Braun's suggestion that he consult the Staatsgerichtshof
before acting. Conditions in Prussia, he felt, were damaging to the
welfare of the state and must be put in order without delay.^^

Meanwhile, the Landtag, meeting amidst hectic scenes of rowdy-
ism and unrestrained heckling, rejected by a close vote the Nazi
proposal for dissolution. The Nazis spiced their advocacy of dis-
solution with a lengthy examination of their charge that the Braun
government had "stolen" state funds for election purposes. Landtag
debates revealed that Ministerial Director Ludwig Nobis in the
Prussian Ministry of Interior had been the source of information
in respect to the government "slush fund" for the Presidential elec-
tion of the previous spring. No memorandum accounting for this
expenditure had been found in the archives of the Prussian govern-
ment, said Nazi Landtag deputy Wilhelm Kube. But the "caretaker"
{"Geschdftsfiihrende") government of Braun had also been a "cash-
taking" {"Geschdftsmachende") government, and it was impossible
to let a government like this hold even a shadow position, when
it was far more proper that it be brought to legal accounting for
its misdeeds. ^^ However, the old governing coalition of Social Dem-
ocrats, State Party, and Center was joined by the Communists to

202 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

defeat the proposal of dissolution, the Communists suggesting with
some cogency that the Landtag, once dissolved, might fail to
meet again.^^

The refusal of the Landtag to dissolve itself had already been
anticipated by the negative decision in the same question on the
part of the "Committee of Three" — Otto Braun, the Minister Presi-
dent; Konrad Adenauer, the President of the Staatsrat; and Hanns
Kerrl, the President of the Landtag. ^^ On February 6, the antici-
pated action of the Reich President took place. The emergency
decree signed by von Hindenburg on that day was an open defiance
of the Leipzig decision of the Supreme Court. Based again on para-
graph one of Article 48, on the power of "Reich Execution" against
an insubordinate state government, the President's order specifically
transferred to the Reich those powers which had been left in the
hands of the Prussian state government by the October decision
of the Supreme Court. On the afternoon of the same day the "new
Committee of Three," with von Papen taking the place of Otto
Braun as Minister President, met and dissolved the Landtag. Papen
and Kerrl, the Landtag President, constituted the majority of the
committee voting for this action. Konrad Adenauer, the President of
the Staatsrat, attended the session, but refused to record a vote,
indicating that he believed the President's decree was unconstitu-
tional in terms of the Reich Constitution and that Papen as Reich
Commissioner could by no means be considered the Minister Presi-
dent in respect to the arrangements of Article 14 of the Prussian
Constitution which established the Committee of Three. ^'''

Once again the Braun government instituted proceedings before
the Staatsgerichtshof, accompanying their challenge of the Presi-
dent's decree with the varied correspondence which had flowed
between Reich and Prussia since the October decision.-^ The Prus-
sian protest was supported by critical letters to von Hindenburg
from Bavarian Minister President Heinrich Held.^^ On the 11th
Reichsgericht President Erwin Bumke was summoned to a confer-
ence with Hitler. Although the official announcement declared
the conference had no relation to the Prussian plea, one is inclined to
echo the incredulity of Vorwdrts, "Na also!"^^ Certainly the court
showed no disposition toward speedy action on the complaint.

Meanwhile, Goring was setting into motion severe measures
against political opponents. Vorwdrts encountered two prohibitions

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 203

in February, one for three days, a second designed to be longer
but the Nazi administrators sHpped up on a technicaHty.'^^ Com-
munist papers and demonstrations were prohibited. The poHce were
given clearly to understand that their arms were not to be employed
against National Socialist demonstrators regardless of their actions.^^
On February 14th, Goring began his "Sduberung" of the Prussian
administration, firing three district presidents (Regierungsprdsi-
denten), three district vice-presidents, and twelve police presi-
dents.^^ A day later aged and doddering Admiral Magnus von
Levetzow assumed the police presidency in Berlin, replacing Kurt
Melcher, who was "kicked upstairs" to become Oberprdsident of
tlie Province of Saxony.^^ On February 22nd, members of S.A. and
the Stahlhelm were called into service as auxiliary police. ^^ A day
later Goring added new changes in his "housecleaning" ("Grossre-
inemachen") in Prussia, as the Volkischer Beobachter called it.
Most seriously affected was the police section of the Prussian
Ministry of Interior, where State Secretary Ludwig Grauert assumed
leadership. This action was accompanied by the firing of thirteen
officials of that division. Changes in provincial administration also
continued with close friends of von Papen moving into high posts
in Miinster and Sigmaringen.^^

Beyond these changes of personnel, however, was also a change
in spirit. Goring ordered his police to support the S.A., the S.S.,
and the Stahlhelm to the fullest extent. He warned that disciplinary
measures would be taken against police who failed to make liberal
use of their weapons. Police in the Rhine Province were organized
on a para-military basis. His instructions in some cases went so far
that Neurath feared a breach of Treaty of Versailles regulations in
respect to the demilitarized zone.^^

These events were accompanied by growing but fruitless pro-
test. On the 16th the Reichsrat met with newly appointed Prussian
plenipotentiaries present. Dr. Ludwig Nobis received his reward
for his earlier prefidy in the form of the leadership of the delegation.
Bavaria, Baden and the Prussian provinces of Rhine Province,
Posen-West Prussia, Lower Silesia, Upper Silesia, Saxony, West-
phalia and Hesse-Nassau joined in protests of varied degrees of
stringency against the action involved in the President's decree
of February 6th. It was agreed that pending the decision of the
Supreme Court the Reichsrat should deal only with the most urgent

204 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

business of state.^^ For Minister of Interior Frick, as he expressed
it in cabinet, all of this simply meant the voluntary self-elimination
of the Reichsrat.'^^ The leader of the Bavarian People's Party,
Staatsrat Fritz Schalfer, also met with the Reich President to object
to the Prussian decree. As expected, he got no satisfaction.^" On
February 23rd the last organ of the old Prussian government, the
Staatsrat, protested through its constitutional committee against the
whole course of events in Prussia — the decree of February 4th
which had dissolved elected local assemblies, the President's de-
cree of February 6th, the police orders of Goring, which "publicly
create two kinds of law," and the public statement of the Reich
Commissioner's representatives that the resolutions of the Staatsrat
bore no legal meaning."^ ^ The Staatsrat also submitted protest be-
fore the Staatsgerichtshof, an action occasioning the commentary of
Communist Ernst Torgler, "Never have the words of Lassalle that
constitutional questions and questions of right are problems of
might better demonstrated their correctness."'*^

The president of the Staatsgerichtshof, Bumke, announced on
the following day that no decision could be made on the Prussian
protests until after the March 5th elections. ^^ What motivated the
delay is uncertain. It would seem that on this occasion any pre-
sumption of illegality on the part of the President's action, and such
presumption could scarcely be avoided since the decree of February
6th specifically set aside the court's decision, would have justified
an order temporarily restraining the holding of Prussian elections.
Although such an order would undoubtedly have been ignored, it
might well have helped to puncture the Nazi claims to strict legality
and constitutionalism on which so much stress was laid at this time.
As late as March 2nd there remained some concern within the
cabinet for the process of legality. Minister of Interior Frick re-
ported that Prussian Minister President Braun had agreed to vote
for a legal dissolution of the Landtag if the President would with-
draw his decree of February 6th.*'* The suggestion evoked little
interest in the cabinet.

Meanwhile, there had taken place on February 27th the famous
Reichstag fire. Little of mystery remains in regard to it today,
except the question as to why Goring, who spoke so frankly on
most subjects before the Nuremberg tribunal after World War II,
still denied authorship of the blaze. The fire provided the grounds

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 205

for the emergency decrees of February 28th, "against treason and
traitorous activity," and "for the protection of nation and state."
The latter decree embodied the varied restrictions of personal
liberties which made it possible in the week that followed prior
to the elections to execute a reign of terror against the enemies of
the existing cabinet, particularly against the Communists and Social
Democrats. Paragraph two of the second decree also contained the
provision empowering intervention by the Reich into the affairs of
a Land which failed to take the proper measures for the mainten-
ance of order and authority. In the cabinet meeting approving the
draft Papen provided for the first time a brake to the actions of
the cabinet. Fearing South German hostility to the proposal, he
did secure alterations in the form of the decree which required
the consent of the cabinet as a whole, rather than leaving such
action solely to the Reich Minister of Interior as originally
intended.^'^

But Papen's obstructive action was that of a feather not an
anchor. Efforts of Social Democrats to get him to restrain Goring's
actions in February brought the answer that he could do nothing.'*^
Publicly he gave no evidence of concern. To the contrary, his
speech in Munich on March 1, 1933, as the candidate of the "Black-
White-Red Election Bloc" (formed on February 10th by National-
ists, Stahlhelm, and "non-party personalities") was designed to
justify the whole course of events in Prussia and allay Bavarian
federalist fears. Even with Goring in the saddle Papen could still
talk of the days of Bismarck! He sought to distinguish between
the roles of Prussia and Bavaria — the distance of Bavaria from the
national capital, he stated, made its position in the Reich far dif-
ferent from that of Prussia. He repeated his earlier denunciations
of the Weimar Constitution. "In the years 1919-1920," he said, in
the presence of internal distress and external pressure, we copied
the forms of western democracy and therewith proclaimed our
bankruptcy of political creativeness." He denounced the "political
sterility, which in the morning affirms the defects of the Weimar
Constitution and in the afternoon its unalterability." Of inward
fears of the course of coming events Papen gave no hint either at
Munich or at Stuttgart, where he repeated his "federalist" point of
view two days later.'*^

206 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Two days before the scheduled March 5th elections the Nazis
brought before the courts their legal complaints against Braun and
Severing for the misuse of public funds. '^^ Under these circum-
stances no explanation by Otto Braun can fully justify his departure
from Germany prior to the elections. By his statement he had in-
tended to leave by train on the afternoon of the voting day for
Ascona in the southern part of Switzerland where his invalid wife
could find a more suitable climate and the attention of an old family
physician. After the Reichstag fire and the reign of terror which
followed, he altered his plans in order to bring his private car with
him into security from Nazi vandalism. As a consequence, although
his wife cast her vote and then came on by train, Braun himself on
election day crossed the borders into Switzerland.'*^ This "flight"
provided a propaganda windfall for the Nazis. Indeed, it does not
appear quite possible to accept Braun's explanation that the time
had passed when a few thousand Social Democratic voters would
alter the situation. One cannot escape the sorrow expressed by
Theodor Wolff, who later visited Braun in exile and found him
living not far from the famous statue of Socrates in Lugano. To
Wolff there was an unavoidable contrast between the resolute
death of Socrates before his enemies, which cast upon their heads
the endless reproach of history, and Braun's defenseless retreat and
calm pastoral existence in exile. ^^

The elections in Reich and Prussia ran an even course on
March 5th. In both the Nazis garnered some 43% of the seats in
the respective parliamentary bodies. In both the Social Democrats
lost some seats, more in Prussia than in the Reich. One startling
outcome was the rise in Communist Landtag seats in Prussia at a
time when nineteen seats were lost in the Reichstag. Clearlv, the
more resolute Communists had fallen heir to some of the Social
Democratic positions there. The Center held firm, actually showed
a slight gain in both Reich and Prussia. ^^ The results of these
elections were most remarkable not for the numbers and seats
written in the election reports but for the unwritten commentary
that in the midst of extreme pressure, involving the crudest of ter-
rorism, and of the impression of opponents, such as Braun, that they
now confronted a fait accompli on the part of their adversaries,
the government majority remained a very narrow and uncertain
one. It depended upon the continued alliance of National Socialists

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 207

and the "Kampffront Schwarz-Weiss-Rot'' On the other hand, the
opposition was divided and included large numbers of Communists,
who were already virtually excluded from political activity.

Between the elections of March 5th and the Enabling Act passed
on March 24th lies a brief period of less than three weeks. These
were marked not only by continued terrorism but also by the use
of emergency powers to sequestrate the authority of state govern-
ments hostile to the federal regime. Commissional governments
were established by tlie Reich in Hamburg, Bremen, Liibeck, Baden,
Bavaria, Saxony, and finally Wiirttemberg. These actions were
taken without warning, in a number of cases almost through a
process of coup d'etat. They were also carried out on the authority
of the Reich Minister of Interior alone, emphasizing how nugatory
were such corrections as that made by Papen in the decree of
February 28th, which had added the requirement that actions of
this sort must have the approval of the cabinet as a whole.^^ The
most significant outcome of the process was the elimination of South
German criticism of the regime, a criticism which had contained
some potential danger, because of its connections with monarchist
ideals centering around the Wittelsbach dynasty. The hollowness
of Papen's plaudits of federalism had been strikingly underscored
by March lOth.^^

The increase of the authority of the Reich government in other
states was accompanied by a still further consolidation of its
strong position in Prussia. In the communal elections of March 12th,
the National Socialists and the allied Black-White-Red-Election
Coalition obtained 113 of the 125 seats at issue in the Berlin parlia-
ment (Stadtverordnetenversammlung) and a majority of the seats
in the Prussian upper house, the Staatsrat.^* On March 14th, the
Reich named a "Commissioner for Berlin Relationships" and set
affairs into motion toward the creation of a new constitution for
the city's administration.^^ A week later Hitler and his cohorts
carried out the elaborate ceremony at the Garrison Church in Pots-
dam, designed to win the military leaders of the state and the Reich
President himself with its appeals to the traditions of Bismark and
of Frederick the Great and to "the spirit of Potsdam."^^ As the
Nazis rent asunder one after another the separate strands of Prussian
existence, they became increasingly fervent in their oral plaudits of
its traditions.

208 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Thus, for example, the Nazi President pro tern of the Prussian
Landtag, Karl Litzmann, opened its new sessions on March 22nd
with the proclamation, "Prussianism and National Socialism are
different expressions of the same thing; they are different expres-
sions of the same political manifestations in the life of the German
nation. "^'^ But the Nazis and their cohorts by a narrow margin
carried a resolution deposing the "Hoheitsregierung" of Braun and
entrusting state powers to the Reich Commissioners already exer-
cising them.^^ After this action it adjourned not to meet again
until the middle of May.

On March 23rd German parliamentarianism signed its own
death decree. The so-called Enabling Act {Gesetz zur Behebung
der Not von Volk iind Reich") passed by the Reichstag created a
dictatorship sanctioned by constitutional forms. By it the Reich
cabinet was not only entrusted with virtually unlimited power, but
also specifically freed from constitutional regulations so long as
the Reichstag and Reichsrat were not destroyed as institutions and
so long as the rights of the President were maintained. Nazi
legalists were later to point out that the term "Enabling Act" was
inaccurate in respect to the law. They suggested that it should be
called "a law for the leadership of the Reich" ("Reichsfiihrungs-
gesetz").^^ As they indicated, the law did to all intents and pur-
poses place the whole power of government into the hands of its
executive leaders. The rationale of the votes for this law recorded
by a number of the opposition parties lies beyond the proper purview
of tliis study. Suffice it to note that passage was obtained, not only
under conditions of pressure upon the members of the Reichstag,
including exclusion of Communist deputies, but also with four
"safeguards" contemplated in the act: 1. the proviso that the
Reichstag and Reichsrat must be retained; 2. the requirement that
the President's position remain undisturbed; 3. the limitation of
the act to four years' time; and 4. the limitation of the act to the
existing cabinet. ^"^ In the long run these safeguards proved utterly
meaningless. With its passage the Weimar Republic had legally
consented to its own destruction.^^

When the Republic of Prussia, which was a part of the Weimar
Republic, met its death is more debatable. Normal republican
government had not existed there since the July 20th coup launched
by von Papen. But the Leipzig decision had revived at least a

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 209

shadow existence for the Braun regime. Whether this legally con-
tinued after the Landtag resolution of March 21st would be a
highly debatable question. On March 31st, the Reich sought to
end all such debate, not only in respect to Prussia but also in re-
spect to the other Lander, by the passage of the "First Act for the
Coordination of Reich and Lander."

The act passed on Mcirch 31st and considerably altered and
extended on April 7th was designed to clothe with legality the
emergency actions taken in respect to the governments of the
Lander since July 20, 1933. Cabinet discussions on March 29th
revealed a strange dichotomy of attitudes toward the proposal on
the part of the conservative ministers. Hugenberg asked for delay —
he felt unable to decide so important a question so quickly. Blom-
berg, for some reason, also served as a "brake" — he wanted the
act labeled "temporary" and this was agreed upon. Papen, how-
ever, found the provisions of the act insufficient! He was anxious
to go further along the road of centralization and later helped to
draft stronger provisions.^"

This "first act for the coordination of Reich and Lander" con-
tained a number of interesting provisions. It empowered Lander
governments (now all under the control of Reich Commissioners
or dominated by Nazis) to vary from the regulations of their con-
stitutions. They, like the Reich government itself, could issue
decrees with the force of law without the consent of their respec-
tive assemblies. This was to all intents and purposes a repetition
of the President's "Dietramszeller Decree" of August 24, 1931, with
the exception that it was now based upon the provisions of the
Enabling Act rather than upon Article 48 of the Weimar Consti-
tution. All Lander assemblies, with the exception of the recently
elected Prussian Landtag, were dissolved and reconstituted without
new elections on the basis of the vote distribution recorded within
each respective Land in the March 5, 1933, elections. ^^

All of this and Papen, "the brake on Hitler," was still dissatis-
fied! He was one member (representing the Chancellor) of a four-
man committee, including also Professor Carl Schmitt, Minister of
Interior Frick, and Johannes Popitz, who became later the Prussian
Finance Minister, which worked out the provisions of the "Second
Act for the Coordination of Reich and Lander."^''' This act, adopted
on April 7th and more commonly known as "the Reichsstatthalter

210 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Law," removed the last possibilities for the Lander to represent
points of view diverging from those of the Reich. By its provisions
the Reich Chancellor was empowered to name personal repre-
sentatives called "Reichsstatthalter," who had extensive supervisory
powers over the administration of the Lander. The prototype of
the official was the Reichsstatthalter in charge of the administration
of Alsace-Lorraine prior to the First World War. Under Nazi usage
the ReicJisstatthalter were appointed by the President on nomina-
tion of the chancellor without consultation of the government.
Considered neither specifically Reich nor Lander officials, they
were regarded as agencies of the Reich, using, however, both Reich
and Lander powers. To all intents and purposes the Reichsstatt-
halter exercised the power once held by the princes of the respec-
tive Lander. Thus, each Reichsstatthalter had the right to name
and dismiss the executive head of the Land government he super-
vised. He could dissolve the Landtag and arrange for new elections,
and he aided in the making and revising of Land law, in which
process he could, for example, change the government if it set up
laws contrary to the will of the Reich or could seek to prevent such
action in advance by taking over the chairmanship of the Land
government. He also exercised rights of amnesty and a general
supervision over the work of all officials. It will be noted that this
position involved in the first place a legalization and constitu-
tionalization of the position formerly held by the Reich Commis-
sioners upon a temporary basis only. It will also be noted that,
although the position of the Reichsstatthalter was far more power-
ful than that of the Reich Commissioners, its creation follows in a
direct line from the actions of July 20, 1932.^^ In that direct line
the administrative reforms within the state of Prussia were also
of signfficance, for the position of the Reichsstatthalter within their
respective Lander was a close parallel to the supervisory roles
created by the Prussian Administrative Reform Act of September
3, 1932, for the Prussian Oberprdsidenten and Regierimsprdsidenten
(provincial and county executive heads ).^^

Prussia itself, however, was excluded from the provisions of
the Reichsstatthalter law. Prussia's "privileged position" under the
Coordination Acts meant that the Reich Chancellor, although he
exercised within Prussia the powers of a Reiclrsstatihalter, was not
considered actually to be one. Rather, Prussia was considered a

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 211

particular appendage of the Reich, a kind of "Hausmacht." The
chancellor appointed the Prussian Minister President and exercised
control over all functions of Prussian administration, but Prussia
was considered to have a closer relationship to the Reich than the
other Lander. ^"^

All of this was, of course, of greater psychological than legal
moment. For the time being some appearances of federalism were
retained. The Lander continued to have separate governments
although every means had been provided to assure uniformity
between them and the Reich. Prussia also continued to be spoken
of as though it remained an entity, and Nazi legalists, as well as
others, proclaimed its significance for the Reich in preserving unity
between East and West, between Germanic and Slavic elements
of the state.^^ All of this was sham, but the fiction was continued
until early in 1934.

With the passage of the ReicJisstatthalter law, von Papen re-
quested the President to terminate his (Papen's) position as Reich
Commissioner for Prussia. Outwardly he gave evidence of great
pride in the passage of the act. It was, he wrote Hitler, "the crown-
ing" of "the step taken on July 20th by the government I then
headed toward the removal of the dualism between Reich and
Prussia." Now Hitler would be in the position of Bismarck, able to
make conform in all respects the policies of Prussia and those of
the Reich.«9

On April 11th, Hitler by tlie powers of this act named Hermann
Goring Prussian Minister President. By April 22nd the Prussian cabi-
net was completed with Goring retaining the post of Interior Minister
as well as the Minister Presidency; Popitz as Finance Minister;
Kerrl, the Landtag President, as Minister of Justice; Rust as Min-
ister of Education. The posts of the Economics, Labor, and Agri-
culture Ministries were left vacant pending negotiations between
Goring and Hugenberg.'^'^ Four days later the Staatsrat met,
but Nazi control was narrow and no action was taken by it."^^ On
April 27th the infamous "Gestapo" was created by Goring. Until
then this agency had been a section (lA) of the headquarters of
the police presidency in Berlin. Now it became an independent
agency under the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. Under the leader-
ship of Rudolf Diels it provided whatever additional momentum
had been required to complete the Nazi dictatorship."^^

212 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

On May 18th the Prussian Landtag followed the Reichstag in
the act of self-destruction. The enabling act passed by it on that
day paralleled in all respects that of the Reich. Paul Szillat of the
Social Democrats played the role taken by Otto Wels in the Reichs-
tag as he spoke in opposition to the act. It was, of course, in vain.
The act was passed. "The act of liberation of July 20th," in the
words of Goring, had been carried over into orderly and constitu-
tional forms. "Prussia has returned to its old mission and its glorious
tradition, that of being the foundation and cornerstone of Germany,"
proclaimed the man most responsible.'^^

No less enthusiastic in his appreciation of Prussian traditions
was Goring four months later when he opened the ornate but in-
significant Staatsrat which he had created in defiance of the re-
quirement of the Prussian Enabling Act that the position of the
old Staatsrat should not be disturbed. The intervening months had
been filled with ruthless intrusions into the affairs of the Evan-
gelical Church, into the conduct of the schools, into all phases of
legal activities, and into the private life and thoughts of the Prus-
sians. Well might Goring proclaim on September 15th his disre-
gard for votes and democratic processes. Well might he also say
that he hoped by this new Staatsrat, which was to be a consultative
organ not concerned with votes and numbers, that he hoped also
to create for himself "a living union with the Prussian people."^"*

A week later all representative government was ended in Berlin
also. Increasingly the government of Berlin became like that of
Prussia itself a direct appendage of the Reich government. By March,
1934, Reich commissioners regulated directly all city business. '^^

Perhaps Goring carried his enthusiasm for Prussian affairs too far.
Hitler stayed away from the opening of Goring's "pet" Staatsrat.
Later, he pulled the Prussian Ministry of Interior out from under
him without notice and on January, 1934, liquidated the other Prus-
sian ministries. Goring, by Diels' account, was thunderstruck."^ All
of these actions, however, were part of a process culminating in the
assorted acts for the "New Reconstruction" (Neuaufbau) of the
Reich early in 1934. By these acts the federalism to which at least
oral tribute had been paid in 1933 was now disavowed. "The Ger-
man Reich of today," commented a Nazi apologist after the passage
of these acts, "rests no longer upon the German Lander nor upon
the German tribes, but rather upon the German people and upon

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 213

the National Socialist Party which comprehends and represents the
entire German nation."^'^ These words, written by the man who
was given credit for the origin of the Reichsstatthalter Law, repre-
sent the end of a long trend of political development. They marked
the definitive end of the Republic of Prussia. In the long run they
meant also the seemingly irrevocable demise of the Prussian state
itself.

CH. IX. THE DEATH OF PRUSSIA

Is Prussia really dead? If so, who was responsible for its death?
These are questions that cannot easily be answered. In spite of
their unitarism and desire for centralization, the Nazis continued
to speak of Prussia and its importance. The old boundaries, slightly
altered by minor administrative changes, remained on the map.
Prussia and the other Lander were dealt with as "cultural" entities.
Almost nothing remained, however, in the way of autonomous
government. The "Prussia" of the Nazis was an amorphous and
indefinable phantasm.

World War II greatly complicated the position of Prussia. The
invading armies from East and West sundered the state. Prussia
was further divided by the process of occupation. The occupation
arrangements established by Germany's conquerors split the pre-
war state into four parts. Although the four occupying powers
disagreed on many things, they were united in their attitude toward
Prussia. Hatred of "Prussianism" had served a propagandist purpose
during the war.^ The drive against "Prussianism" was probably the
consequence of two factors: one, a residuum of anti-Prussian feeling
held over from World War I, which made the word a more colorful
synonym for militarism; and, two, an outgrowth of the Nazi propa-
ganda of the first years of the Third Reich, when the National
Socialists were flaunting their "Prussianism" as a part of their effort
to establish a kinship with earlier German traditions. Beyond the
emotional hostility to Prussia on the part of the victors there lay,
of course, the evident necessity of providing within the respective
zones of occupation a more manageable administrative arrangement.

On February 25, 1947, therefore, the Allied Gontrol Council,
representing the four occupying powers, proclaimed the abolition of
the state of Prussia.- Their action was somewhat ambiguous. A
preamble of the act declared that the Prussian state had "de facto
ceased to exist." This was followed by the official abolition designed,
presumably, to make it certain that the state did not like the Phoenix
arise from its ashes. It was also accompanied by the gratuitous and
unnecessary comment that Prussia had "from early days" been "a
bearer of militarism and reaction in Germany." The truth of this
statement as respects the role of Prussia prior to World War I is
subject to some debate. The falsity of the statement as respects the

216 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

role of Prussia under the Weimar Republic is clearly apparent. Its
usage represented a very minor aspect of the negative attitude taken
by the occupying powers after World War II, which sought to color
the whole past history of Germany black instead of seeking to find
that in which Germans might take pride. Postwar politics would
have been far better served by an emphasis that it was not the
victors who imposed upon Germany the death of the historic state
of Prussia but the Nazis themselves, who had obtained power at
its expense.

Since the decision of the Control Council in early 1947, much
has transpired. The three zones of western Germany have been
joined together, first as a trizonal occupational area and later as
the Federal Republic of Germany, with its capital at Bonn. This
process was accompanied by a regrouping of the German Lander
of that area into nine new Lander. The new map of western Ger-
many, which resulted, was far more in accord with the dictates
of reason than any previous map of the region, but it varied greatly
from historic traditions. The West German government has been
granted sovereignty, the Basic Law drawn up partially under occu-
pation supervision becoming as a consequence the constitution of
the West German state, the Btmdesrcpublik.

As the name indicates, this state created in the midst of and
out of the pressures of the "Cold War," is a more federalist state
than was the Weimar Republic. This has resulted partially from a
natural revulsion against the consequences of Nazi contralism,
partially as a consequence of the increased weight within this West
German state of the South German Lander, which have been tra-
ditionally federalist in viewpoint, and partially from the desire
of West Germans to make possible an easier transition at some
future period toward a reunified Germany.^

In the Soviet Zone of Germany, transformed by the events of the
"Cold War" into the "German Democratic Republic," the four
Lander or parts of Lander once existing there have been replaced
with fourteen "districts," this arrangement reflecting the highly
centralist trend of that government.^ Germany is, therefore, split
into two states differing from each other not only in ideological
viewpoint but also in concepts of political organization.

It may be presumed that any future reunification of Germany
\ m be one in which the West German state, already possessing

THE DEATH OF PRUSSIA 217

sixty-nine per cent of the area and seventy-three per cent of the
population of Germany,^ will be dominant. It would appear prob-
able that such a reunification will, therefore, be accompanied by
an extension of the federalist concept of government into the East
German state. However, the addition of the East German area,
when it occurs, will add a number of new and intangible factors
to the problems of government. The relative strength of federalist
forces will probably be diminished. By prewar experience and
postwar training the political leaders in the East German area will
likely be critical of the looser bonds of union now existing. Their
criticism will be reinforced by the natural tendency to compensate
for the period of enforced division and by the need to counteract
widely dispersed communist sentiments in the area. Reunification
will also be accompanied by a strengthening of the influence of
the Social Democratic Party, traditionally centralist in viewpoint.
It is also likely that such a reunification will lead to the reemergence
in this area of reactionary elements driven underground by the
Communist regime. These may be expected to add their voice to
those already criticizing the libeling of Prussia's place in German
history.^ The final test of federalism in Germany and the ultimate
assessment of the actuality of Prussia's demise remains for the
future.

Meanwhile, however, postwar constitutional arrangements in
the Bundesrepublik have taken extensive note of the course of
events related in the earlier chapters of this book.''' The new gov-
ernment of West Germany is that of a federal republic. The nine
Lander exercise more extensive competencies than did the Lander
of the Weimar period. The powers of the federal government are
specifically listed and provision made for legal defense of the
Lander against improper intrusions of the central government. The
lower house of the parliament, the Bundestag, exercises the primary
legislative power, but the upper house, the Bundesrat, has a strong
restraining influence upon it. The role of the Bundesrat, represent-
ing the Lander, each of which has one effective vote in its decisions,
is strongly reminiscent of the agency of the same name under Bis-
marck's Reich. The federal president, the Bundesprdsident, is not a
popularly elected official. Rather, he is chosen by a federal conven-
tion, consisting of the members of the Bundestag and an equal
number of members elected by the legislative assemblies of the

218 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Lander on the basis of proportional representation. He can no
longer claim, or be held by his supporters to have, the powers of a
"plebiscitary dictator." It would appear that the specious arguments
of a Carl Schmitt could no longer find a point d'appui.

Moreover, the emergency powers held by the Reich President
under the Weimar regime, the powers of "Execution" and "Dic-
tatorship" do not rest in the hands of the Federal President of the
Bonn government. The power of "Execution" has been transformed
into the power of "Federal Compulsion" (Bundeszwang) and is
expressly subject to the prior approval of all the Lander through
the Bundesrat. Its usage is also made explicitly subject to the right
of constitutional review through the "Federal Constitutional Court"
(Bundesverfassungsgericht). The power of dictatorship has dis-
appeared from the constitution although various aspects of it in
strictly limited form appear in various places. Thus, the cabinet
or Lander governments may be empowered to issue certain decrees
having the force of law (Rechtsverordnungen) , but this requires
an act of empowerment by the Bundestag and individual approval
of such decrees by the Bundesrat. The Federal government can take
over the police of the Lander in time of emergency, but must re-
scind such action upon the demand of the Bundesrat. There is also
a provision by which the Federal President can declare a state of
"legislative emergency" in the event of the malfunctioning of the
lower house. In such case, again, the Bundesrat provides a check
upon the action of the government. As a consequence, it would ap-
pear impossible to have a new period of quasi-constitutional dic-
tatorship such as that in which von Hindenburg engaged from 1930
to 1933.

Furthermore, the sharply federalist feature of the Bundesrat,
which represents the individual Lander, would seem to pose an in-
superable barrier to efforts such as those of von Papen and von Gayl
to impose constitutional reform "am kalten Wege."

These safeguards are backed up by the clearly affirmed right
of judicial review incorporated in the Basic Law. The uncertainty
attached to the competency of the Staatsgcrichtshof in 1932 has
been eliminated in the creation of the Federal Constitution Court.
The sphere of action of this court is very broad. It judges as respects
final interpretation of the Basic Law, differences of opinion between
Bund and Lander as regards their special competencies and the

THE DEATH OF PRUSSIA 219

proper exercise of their respective authorities, the constitutionahty
of poHtical parties, the impeachment of the Federal President, and
a number of other items. The court of the Bonn government is
larger than that of the Weimar period. It is chosen partially by
the Bundestag, partially by the Bundesrat, and partially by popular
election. The first president of the court was a man who played a
significant role in the history of Prussia, Dr. Hermann Hoepker-
Ascholf, the former Prussian Finance Minister. Since the beginning
of its activities in 1951 the court has made a broad usage of its
power of judicial review, reviewing both federal and Lander laws.^
It has also employed its power to decide upon the constitutionality
of political parties. In 1952 it ruled against the Socialist Reich Party,
a neo-Nazi organization, and in 1956 against the West German
Communist Party.^ In the light of the events of the early 1930's
these decisions seem wise and proper. They leave a legal situation
far preferable to that of Weimar when the Communist Party was
held by the courts to be hostile to the state {staatsfeindlich) but
not illegal.

All of these factors argue that the experience of the Weimar
era has been valuable for the postwar era of Bonn. This is not to say,
of course, that Bonn is a new Weimar. Far from it. It has given evi-
dence of much greater stability and of a more realistic and practical
concept of democracy. But it is, of course, far too soon to predict
whether the changes made have been sufficient to augur more per-
manent success for the later trial of democracy than was enjoyed
by the former.

Nature abhors a vacuum and a nation abhors an historical
vacuum. Where such an historical vacuum exists, a nation creates
in its place myth. German historians until recently have been too
content to fill the chronicles of the past with the deeds of Bismarck
and Frederick the Great and to ignore the Karl von Rottecks, the
Arnold Ruges, the Stephen Borns, and the Gustav von Struves.
They have been far more critical of the defects of the men of Frank-
furt than of the equally significant shortcomings of the chancellors
under William II. They have tended often to apologize for von
Hindenburg while ruthlessly dissecting the vagaries of Briining.

In retrospect the Weimar period and particularly the history
of Prussia during that period do not emerge as days of shame.
Rather, the Weimar period is a story of earnest men striving des-

220 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

perately to achieve a goal made impossible by the weight of cir-
cumstances. It is a story in which few men are complete villains
or real heroes. Of all of them von Hindenburg stands most heavily
in the balance against the hopes of the democrats of the day. His
errors, however, were the errors of age, of mediocre intelligence, of
rigid inflexibility of point of view, of deluded egomania and mis-
guided patriotism, not those of personal lust for power or dreams
of world conquest. It is vital, however, thar von Hindenburg not
remain as the symbol of Weimar, but that the sym.bol be found in
the lives of the Otto Brauns, the Heinrich Briinings, the Carl
Severings, the Wilhelm Marxs, the Joseph Wirths, and of the many
others of the period who sought to transform democracy from vision
into reality. All of these men made errors. None were, perhaps,
democratic in the fully idealistic sense of the term. In the storv
of the death of Prussia the shortcomings of m.any men have been
written large. This has been true because crisis transforms small
faults into grievous weaknesses and the death of Prussia occurred in
a time of crisis. There remains a real need for nistorians who will
help to fill the vacuum of German history by positive reevalua-
tions— by new research into the lives of those who sought freedom
under ditBcuit circumstances, who strove for the political education
of their countrymen and waited vainly for the awakening of their
political consciousness.

Prussia has died in the postwar era that a new Germany may
live. It may well be that the traditions of a Prussia of Kadaver-
gehorsam (corpse-like obedience), Uhlans, and Junkers should
also die that a new tradition of a Prussia of hard-working, sober,
earnest and sincerely democratic statesmen may replace it. Otto
Braun, Carl Severing, Rudolf Hilferding, Carl Becker, Arnold
Brecht, Hermann Badt — all of these typify a tradition far more
worthy of the name of Prussia than do Frederick William I, Bis-
marck, and von Hindenburg. May a new generation of German
historians, those who are now searching the past with open and
critical eyes, seek more their ideal among the little men of the day
than among those who towered over the time by ruthless will and
autocratic actions. The old Prussia of "blood and iron" is dead. The
Republic of Prussia still lives as an experience and a tradition from
which a new republic and the new states that compose it may well
draw strength and pride.

FOOTNOTES
GIL I. A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA

1. For Prince Max's own account of the pressure brought upon him and
of his own opposition to the proposal see Schulthess' Europdischer Geschichts-
kalender, LIX, pt. 1, 492-6 — "Rechenschaftsbericht des Prinzen Max von
Baden." (Hereafter cited Schulthess) .

2. United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1918, Supplement 1, Vol. I, 337-8. Text of the addresses by Wilson are
given Ibid., 12-17 (to Gongress, Jan. 8, 1918); 108-13 (to Gongress, Feb. 11,
1918); 200-3 (in Baltimore, April 6, 1918); 233-7 (in New York, May 18,
1918); 268-71 (at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918); 316-21 (in New York, Sept.
27, 1918).

3. Ibid., 343.

4. German F.O. Note of Oct. 12, 1918, Ibid., 357-8; Wilson's reply
(through Lansing), Oct. 14, 1918, Ibid., 358-9.

5. Ibid., 381-3. The American background of the armistice negotiations
has been dealt with exhaustively by John L. Snell in two articles, "Germany
and the Fourteen Points," Journal of Modern History, XXVI 364-9 (1954) and
"Die Repubiik aus Versaumnisse," "Die Welt als Geschichte, Heft 3/4 (1955),
196-219. These demonstrate c^uite conclusively that Wilson did not clearly
intend to bring the overturn of the monarchy in Germany, although he did
regard tlie Baden government as one of sham democracy rather than as a
genuine move to a responsible government. If one puts together the content
of Snell's articles with the analysis presented by Eschenburg (see below, fn. 8),
it is clear that Wilson, an outsider, was pretty well informed of the weaknesses
behind the change in Germany involving the institution of the Baden govern-
ment and was anxious to force a more genuine revision. Both from Snell's work
and from statements of my colleague, Prof. Victor S. Mamatey ( The United
States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918), it seems quite certain that the
common implication that Wilson was demanding the establishment of a republic
is not supportable. But, as Snell says, many Germans came to this conclusion.
And, from the wording of the note, excoriating both "the military masters" and
"the monarchical autocrats" of Germany, this is an understandable conclusion.
The author would venture the guess that the American point of view was
quite uncertainly defined at this time, that Wilson was not at all certain that
the armistice bid was seriously meant, and that the contents of the note were
designed as much for public opinion in the United States and allied countries
as for the Germans. However all this may be, Wilson's notes were read as a
call for revolution and his influence on the origin of the German republic was
most significant.

6. For the detailed history of the events of the November Revolution see
such standard works as Ralph H. Lutz, Fall of the German Empire. 1914-1918
{Documents of the German Revolution), II, 463-548; Erich Eyck, Geschichte
der Weimarer Repubiik, I; Elmer Luehr, The New German Republic; the Reich
in Transition; S. William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy; a Political
History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933; Wladyslaw W. Kulski (under pseudo-
nym, W. M. Knight Patterson), Gcrmxiny from Defeat to Conquest, 1913-1933;
or the excellent chapter in Koppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany, Its History
and Civilization, Ch. XIV.

7. Schulthess, LIX, pt. 1, 432-50.

8. See the trenchant analysis of the background of this party by Koppel S.
Pinson, Modern Germany, Ch. X., 194-218.

9. This term is brilliantly explained by Theodor Eschenburg in his article,
later published in pamphlet form, "Die im.provisierte Demokratie der Weim.arer
Repubiik: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Wemarer Picpublik," Schweizer

222 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Beitrdge zur Allgemeinen Geschichte, Bd. IX (1951), 161-211. Much of
Eschenburg's theory and points of view are accepted and confirmed by the
work of Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik. Eine
Studie Zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie. (Zweite Auflage. )

10. Eschenburg in his "Die improvierte Demokratie" (see fn. 9 traces
the background of immediate pre-war sentiment for democracy in Germany and
finds it virtually non-existent. During the war there was a drive for the eHmi-
nation of the three class voting system in Prussia, but the sentiment for a
real democratization of the government was very narrow. Four major writings
(i.e., of Hugo Preuss, Das deutsche Volk und die Politik; Max Weber, Parla-
ment und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland; Robert Redslob, Die
parlamentarische Regierung in ihrer wahren und ihrer echten Form. Eine ver-
gleichende Studie iiber die Verfassungen von , England, Belgien, Ungarn,
Schweden und Frankreich; and Robert von Piloty, Das parlamentarische System,
eine Untersuchung seines Wesens and Wertes) held the field in respect to
democratic poUtical theory. The opposing side was more heavily represented
and external propaganda attacking monarchial government gained no influence
in Germany until the clear failure of the monarchy in prosecuting the war
(pp. 173-93).

11. Ibid., 161; Bracher, Auflosung, 17.

12. A number of these are suggested in Bracher's analysis. For the others
the author assumes personal responsibility.

13. The events of the Groner-Ebert negotiations are dramatically told by
John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: the German Army in Politics,
1918-45, 20-31. Wheeler-Bennett calls this the General Staff's "first peaceful
victory" in "the first round in their fight for rehabilitation — just twenty-four
hours after their admission of defeat." As a consequence, the amiy became
in the words of Eschenburg, "a monarchist island" in the democratic republic.
Although not outright reactionary, says Eschenburg, it was an unreliable in-
strument of republican government. "Die improvisierte Demokratie," 199-200.

14. See Bracher, Auflosung, Ch. VII. "Das Problem der Burokratie"; Oscar
Meyer, Von Bismarck zu Hitler. Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen, 116-7.
Eschenburg, "Die improvisierte Demokratie," 205-6, calls the republic "ein
politischer Uberbau iiber die alte monarchische Verwaltungsapparatur;" the
summit, he says, was democratized, the following remained authoritarian.
Arnold Brecht has alluded to the possibilities of "Bureaucratic Sabotage" of
governmental decisions in an article under that title in The Anrmls of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, CLXXXIX, 48-57 (January',
1937). However, it must be added that many of the democratic leaders found
the bureaucracy an efficient and, for the most part, loyal instrument. What
would seem to have been lacking is a matter of spirit more than of actual
function. Then, too, the bureaucracy assumed a more significant role in the
depression years, when there was an increased tendency to turn to the "experts"
(Spezialisten) and follow their suggestions. See Hermann Ullmann, In der
grossen Kurve. Fiihrer und GefUhrte, 7.

15. The poverty of German Communist leadership is strikingly underscored
in the best history of the party during the period, Ossip K. Flechtheim, Die
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlande in der Weimarer Republik; Communist
apologia for their activity is presented by Paul Merker, Deutschland, Sein oder
Nicht Sein? I. Band, Von Weirnar zu Hitler and Evelyn Anderson, Hammer or
Anvil; the Story of the German W orkingclass Movement.

16. For more detailed history of the Nationalists and other political parties
see Ludwig Bergstrasser, Geschichte der Politischen Parteien in Deutschland;
Pinson, Modern Germany.

17. Ebert summoned Preuss on November 14, 1918, and commissioned
him for this work. Preuss, like Ebert strongly convinced of the urgency of get-
ting a formal constitution into operation, set to work wth a will. His draft

A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA 223

was ultimately released on January 20, 1919. See Karl Polak, Die Weimarer
Verfassung. Ihre Errungenschaften und Mangel. Dritte Auflage, 23ff . ( Cited
hereafter "Polak.")

18. Ibid., 11-29. Eschenburg believes that the establishment of the Presi-
dency involved actually the creation of an "Ersatzkaiser" rather than a use of
either French or American forms. This was true after 1925 but was not quite
so clearly true prior to 1925. "Die improvisierte Demokratie," 204.

19. Wilhbalt Apelt, Geschichte der Weimarer Verfassung, 99; of. Harlow
James Heneman, The Growth of Executive Power in Germany. A Study of the
German Presidency, 27-34.

20. Friedrich Giese, Deutsche Staats- und Rechts-Geschichte. Grundriss zu
den Vorlesungen. Deutsche Rechtsgeschiclite und Verfassungsgeschichte der
Neuzeit, 167-8.

21. Polak, 24-6; Eyck, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik, I, 102-4. A
larger section of the mountainous literature relating to "Reichsreform" is de-
tailed in the following chapters.

22. Polak, 31; Eyck, Weimarer Republik, I, 81-3.

23. Eyck, Weimarer Republik, I, 89.

24. Ibid., 104; Rene Brunet, The New German Constitution, 59-69.

25. Eyck, Weimarer Republik, I, 104-5; Edmond Vermeil, Germany in the
Twentieth Century; a Political and Cultural History of the Weimar Republic
and the Third Reich, 33-5.

26. Eyck, Weimarer Republik, I, 105; Brunet, The New German Consti-
tution, 186-94; Polak, 33-4.

27. Apelt, Geschichte der Weimarer Verfassung, 100-1; 122-3; An early
comment by Konrad Fritsch in Die Funktionen des Reichsprdsidenten nach der
neuen Reichsverfassung vom 11. August 1919 verglichen mit den Fwiktionen
des ehemaligen deutschen Kaisers ( 1921 ) notes that the powers of the President
are actually greater than those of the Kaiser, but adds, "The increase of his
(the Reich President's) rights, however, means also an increase of his obUga-
tions." (67-71); Wilhehn Ziegler, Die Deutsche Natiarmlversammlung,
1919/1920, und Ihr Verfassungswerk, 262-3, calls the President's powers
"amorphous, juridically incomprehensible, and uncontrollable," but believes
that this failure to make accurate definition is true of much constitutional
legislation and indicates that limitations could have been established by the
law of the Reich.

28. See below, Ch. II, and Walter Gorlitz, Hindenburg, Ein Lebensbild,
258 ff.

29. Eyck's excellent chapter on Versailles, Weimarer Republik, I, 112 ff.,
is one of the most objective treatments of the subject to date by a German.
Both Eschenburg, "Die improvisierte Demokratie," 196, and Polak, Die
Weimarer Verfassung, 38, point out that Weimar really saved German unity
but that democratic leaders were not successful in obtaining the credit due
them for this accomplishment.

30. Eschenburg, "Die improvisierte Demokratie," 202, 208. Eschenburg
points out that moves to socialization were considered dangerous in view
of the opposition to the Versailles Treaty provisions, since socialized property
might have been claimed by the allies as a part of reparations. The importance
of the East Prussian landlords as "frontier defenders" also helped them in
retaining their property.

31. See Polak, 42; Pinson, Modern Germany, 414; R. H. Samuel and
R. Hinton Thomas, Education and Society in Modern Germany. As noted below.
Otto Boelitz, the Prussian Minister of Education for a considerable portion of
the Weimar period, did recognize the importance of the Einheitsschule and
strive to bring it into existence. See, e.g. his Die Bewegungen im deutschen
Bildungsleben und die deutsche Bildimgseinheit, 20-1, and Der Aufbau des
preussischen Bildungswesens nach der Staatsumwdlzung (tr. I. L. Kandel and

224 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Thomas Alexander, under title, Tlie Organization of Education in Prussia ■ ■ ■),
10, 13.

32. Apelt, Geschichte der Weimarer Verfassung, 169.

33. Polak, 44-6; c/., Bracher, Auflosung, 191-8.

34. E.g., SchifFer, Sturm iiber Deutschland, 233-42; Bracher, Auflosung,
Ch. Ill; Ullmann, In der grossen Kurve, 7-14. The sources on diis subject could
be nuiltiplicd almost to infinity.

35. Of this episode Gordon A. Craig, T/ie Politics of the Prussian Army,
1640-1945, 379, says, "The others had followed the line laid down by Seeckt
and there is no disguising the fact that Seeckt had been as insubordinate as
Liittwitz, even if in a somewhat diftcrent way. The Ebert Government then,
would have been fully justified if it had taken reprisals against the officer
corps and if it had sought, even at this late date, to start all over again and
create a truly republican anny. Moreover, an energetic effort in this direction
would probably have won wide support in Gennany in March 1920, for the
failure of the Kapp adventure was followed by a wave of anti-militarist feehng
in all parts of the coimtry. Yet nothing of the sort happened . . ."

36. Arnold Brecht, "Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik und die Po-
litische Wissenschaft," Zeitschrift fiir Politik, Heft 4, Jrg. 2 (Neue Folge),
292-308, criticizes, with some justice, Bracher's work for ignoring the positive
contributions of the men of Weimar. A similar note is found in Polak, 5-7.

37. For the best description of government and political conditions in
Prussia just prior to the war see Maurice Aubry, La Constitution Prussienne du
30. Novembre, 1920. These pour le Doctorat en Droit, 7-19.

38. Schidthess, LLX, pt. 1 (1918), 470-83. On November 27, tlie Pro-
visional Government of Prussia was reorganized with the following personnel:
"Political Cabinet" — Hirsch, Strobel, Braun, Eugen Ernst, Adolf Hoffmann,
Dr. Rosenfeldt. Ministries: Commerce, Fischbeck; associate ( Beigeordneter),
Hue. War: Scheuch; Under State Secretary Gohre. Public Works: Hoff; asso-
ciates, Paul Hoffmann, Brunner, Interior: Hirsch, Dr. Breitscheid, associate,
Eugen Ernst. Science, Art, and Public Education ( Wissenschaft, Kunst, und
Volksbildung) : Adolf Hoffmann, Haenisch. Finance: Dr. Siidekum, Simon.
Agriculture, Domains, Forests: Eraun, Hofer, Justice: Dr. Rosenfeldt; Wolfgang
Heine, Ibid., 525. See also Otto Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, zweite Auf-
lage, 42.

39. Schulthess, LXIX, pt. 1, 477-9.

40. Ibid., 483.

41. Ibid., 488.

42. Ibid., 525, 532.

43. Ibid., 573., 598.

44. Ibid., 516, 529.

45. Ibid., 516, 529.

46. Ibid., 595; LX, pt. 1, 23; Aubry, La Constitution Prussienne, 29-30.

47. Schulthess, LX, pt. 1, 1-2.

48. Ibid., 3-4.

49. Seats in the Prussian National Assembly were allotted as follows:

German National People's Party (Nationalists) 48 deputies

Germaji People's Party 24

Christian People's Party (Center) 85

German Democratic Party 65

Social Democratic Party 145

Independent Socialists 24

Smaller parties representing Schleswig-Holsteiners, Guelfs,

and Hanoverians 10

401

Aubry, La Constitution Prussienne, 34; Schulthess, LX, pt. 1, 16, 21.

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 225

50. Schulthess, LX, pt. 1, 72.

51. Ihid., 21.

52. Ibid., 109, 127; see also Brunet, The Netv German Constitutkm. 43-53.

53. Viyn Weimar zu Hitler, 43-5. Some of Braun's difficulty with the old
military leaders of the state is reflected in the correspondence of the head-
quarters of the Second Anny Corps (Abt Id, Nr. 67/9), Schleicher Nachlass,
Koblenz, 49ff .

54. Schulthess, LX, pt. 1, 121.

55. Ibid., 123.

56. The cabinet was as follows:

Minister-President— Paul Hirsch (Social Democrat)

Minister of the Interior— Wolfgang Heine (Social Democrat)

Minister of Justice— Dr. Am Zehnhoff ( Center )

Minister of Science, Art, and PubUc Education— Haenisch (Social

Democrat )

Minister of Finance— Dr. Siidekum (Social Democrat)

Minister of Agriculture— Otto Braun (Social Democrat)

Minister of Public Welfare— Stegerwald (Center)

Minister of Public Works— Oeser (Democrat)

Minister of Commerce and Industry— Fischbeck (Democrat)

Minister of War— Col. Reinhart (non party).

Ibid., 137.

57. Von Weimar zu Hitler, 56-7.

58. Hirsch is represented by Braun as lacking in energy. His role during
the Kapp Putsch was seriously questioned by his colleagues. Heine, on the
other hand, was a capable minister who resigned largely because of what
he considered unwarranted intrusions into his realm of action by his
own party directorate. See Ibid., 97-8; Carl Severing, Mein Lebensweg, Bd. I
{Vom Schlosser zum Minister), 275-80.

59. Aubry, La Constitution Prussienne, 47, 134-41.

60. Erich Eisemann, Die Regierungsbildung im Reich und in Preussen,
1919-1933, Dissertation . . . der Hamburgischen Universitat, 16-20.

61. Aubry, La Constitution Prussienne, 114-34.

62. Von Weimar zu Hitler, 38. A similar comment came from Hugo Preuss
in 1920 when he said, "The republic of Prussia is a combination of words
which does not roll easily from one's tongue." Quoted, Aubry, La Constitution
Prussienne, 191.

63. Aubry, La Constitution Prussienne, 60-5, 195.

CH. II. REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY

1. Biographies of Braun, both appearing in 1932, are by Hans Steffen and
Erich Kuttner. Braun's autobiography, Von Weimar zu Hitler, has been referred
to previously. Comment may be added that the use of Braun's autobiography
by careful historians should be restricted to the first or second editions (second
edition cited here on all occasions), see Ludwig Bergstrasser, "Textkritisches zu
den Erinnerungen von Otto Braun," Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXI, 656-7
(1951). See also sketch by Siegfried Marck, Grosse Menschen Unserer Zeit.
Portraits aus drei Kulturkreisen, 68-70 and comment by Albert Grzesinski,
Inside Germany, 113-5.

2. Siegfried Marck ( see N. 1 ) makes an interesting but not too convincing
comparison of Otto Braun, the statesman, and Otto Braun, the poet. Most
significant, however, is Marck's apparent feeling that Braun, the statesman,
fell short in his possession of "Phantasie" and "Leidenschaft."

3. On March 5, 1933, Braun left Germany for Switzerland, where he spent
the years of the Third Reich in exile. For Braun's own explanation of Ms
departure see Von Weimar zu Hitler, 450-3. Braun says that he had not in-
tended to "emigrate" when he left Berlin, but reached that decision with the

226 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

course of events under the Nazis. For a higUy critical view of Braun during
his exile see chapter entitled, "Das Exil und Sokrates," in Theodor Wolff,
Der Marsch durch zwei Jahrzehnte, 352-73.

4. Severing's memoirs, Mein Lebensweg, 2 vols., published in 1950, are
an exceedingly valuable source for the history of Prussia under the Weimar
Republic. They are, unfortunately, not free from asperity and some minor
distortions. Braun himself makes half criticism of Severing at points— e.g. Von
Weimar zu Hitler, 238-9. Oscar Meyer, Von Bismarck zu Hitler, 123, notes
that the energy of Severing, "ist wohl immer iiberschatzt worden." But even
such a fonner critic as Hans Schlange-Schoningen finds it necessary to pay
tribute to the honesty and sobriety of the Braun-Severing administration — Am
Tage Danach, 25-6.

5. See Grzesinski's Inside Germany and Braun's comments. Von Weimar
zu Hitler, 238-9.

6. For commentaries on Hopker-Aschoff see Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler,
352-4. Becker is dealt vdth below.

7. Brecht now in the United States and associated with the New School
for Social Research in New York has contributed a series of valuable studies
touching particularly upon Prussian affairs. Among them are his Prelude to
Silence, the End of the German Republic; Federalism and Regionalism in Ger-
many: the Division of Prussia; and The Art and Technique of Adm-inistration
in German Ministries. The author would particularly commend the latter to
American researchers who find the bureaucratic jargon of the Weimar period
highly confusing. For an appreciation of Brecht's broad contributions in the
area of political science, see C. J. Friedrich and Erich Hula's evaluations in
Social Research, XXI, 107-15 (April, 1954).

8. The author does not mean to imply by his listing that these were the
ablest men of the period. In the paucity of specialized works dealing with the
subject these men appear to have played significant roles although not always
completely commendable ones.

9. For comments indicating the difficulty of the combination, see Braun,
Von Weimar zu Hitler, 56, 59, 98-9, 112-6, 164-8, etc.

10. Ibid., 175.

11. Ibid., 170.

12. Oscar Meyer's comments, quoted in Chapter One, about the replace-
ment of top officials only and the continuance of lower officials in their places
applied particularly to Prussia. See his Von Bismarck zu Hitler, 116-7. But
the centering of the whole action of the von Papen government in Prussia
and the number of changes von Papen found necessary as a preparation for
monarchy indicates that the work of repubfican revision had been quite
extensive.

13. The Sklarek scandal involved fraudulent deliveries of goods to the
administration of Berlin culminating in a denunciation and trial of Gustav
Boss, the head biirgomeister, in 1930. Boss paid a fine. The Sklarek scandal
was tremendously exaggerated by the National Socialists because the Sklarek
brothers, who owned the factory producing the goods noted above, were Jews.
See Eyck, Weimarer Republik, II, 316-7. A critical view of Social Democratic
policy is given by Evelyn Anderson, Hammer or Anvil, 132. The Barmat case
of 1924-5 belongs more properly to Reich affairs than to Prussian.

14. Severing, Mein Lebensweg, I, 314. Braun also pays tribute to Abegg,
Von Weimar zu Hitler, 105.

15. See the discussions of the incident in Evelyn Anderson, Hammer or
Anvil, 128-31, and strong criticism of the Braun-Severing government Paul
Merker, Deutschland, Sein oder Nicht Sein?, I, 247-9. More objecti\-e discussion
of the incident is found in Eyck, Weimarer Republik, II, 220. Severing's own
account is marred by his omission of Zorgiebel's name and his somewhat un-
convincing explanation of his failure to go along with Grzesinski's proposal
for a prohibition of the Communist party. Severing admits tliat Braun was

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 227

rather enthused by the idea also, but says it could only have been effective
if it were made applicable to the Reich as a whole and accompanied by a
constitutional amendment to exclude election of Communist deputies. Mein
Lebensweg, II, 186-7.

16. Grzesinski, Inside Germany, 131.

17. Severing, Mein Lebensweg, II, 293.

18. Regionalism and Federalism, 21.

19. Inside Germany, 144.

20. See above, note 14.

21. "Democracy — Challenge to Theory." Social Research, XIII, 195-224
(June, 1946).

22. Hans Stetfen, Otto Braun, 26.

23. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 375.

24. Steften, Otto Braun, 21.

25. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 375.

26. Ibid., 376.

27. The most valuable source on the subject of reform of education is
R. H. Samuel and R. Hinton Thomas, Education and Society in Modern Ger-
many. For commentary on Becker, see pp. 13, 123.

28. Ibid., 12-13; 73-4. cf. Boelitz's Der Aufbau des preussischen Bildungs-
tvesens nach der Staatsumivdlzung as tr. by I. L. Kandel and Thomas Alexander,
imder the title. The Reorganization of Education in Prussia . . . , 20. BoeUtz,
however, was an ardent advocate of the Einheitsschule and of a freer spirit in
education. See e.g. his, Die Bewegungen Ira deutschen Bildungsleben und die
deutsche Bikhmgseinheit.

29. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 289-90; Eyck in his Weimarer Republik,
says that Grimme could not compare favorably with his predecessor ( II, 258 ) ;
Severing also praises Becker's ability, Mein Lebensweg, II, 42; but Braun
comments that Grimme turned the wheel of school politics more energetically
to the Left, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 227.

30. Samuel and Thomas, Education and Society in Modern Germany, 48.

31. Ibid., 55, 66.

32. Ibid., 123; Werner Richter, Reeducating Germany, 85.

33. Richter, Reeducating Germany, 65. Richter was undersecretary under
Becker and had charge of university affairs. A more favorable view of the
process of educational change than that of Richter or of Samuel and Thomas
is set forth by Thomas Alexander and Beryl Parker in The New Education in
the German Republic.

34. Von Weimar zu Hitler, 227-31.

35. Text in Schulthess, LXXX, 105-10.

36. Ibid., 135 (Protest of General Synod of Evangelical Church); 150
(comments of Nationalists and People's Party delegates).

37. See Becker's commentary before Landtag, Ibid., LXX, 48.

38. Ibid., LXII, 115; See also Eyck, Weimarer Republik, II, 258-9 on
church problems.

39. Schulthess, LXII, 133-4; cf. Braun's apology for the treaty and his
explanation that he had tried very hard to avoid its consummation. Von Weimar
zu Hitler, 335-6.

40. A general survey of Prussian government and services in 1930 is
given in W. Havel, Preussen nach dem Weltkriege. Aufbau und Wirken des
Freistaates Preussen in Wort und Bild.

41. Hennann Ullmann, Flucht aus Berlin, passim.

42. Friedrich Karl Steffin, Das Berliner Stadtverfassungsrecht. Seine Ent-
wicklung bis zur Gegenwart und seine geschichtliche Grundlagen, 211.

43. Brecht, Regionalism and Federalism, 35.

44. e.g., Eyck, Weimarer Republik, II, 319, "Von alien deutschen Reichs-
kanzlern ist Dr. Heinrich Briining am schwersten zu durchshauen."

45. Paul Lobe, Der Weg War Lang. Lebenserrinerungen von . . . Ehemals

228 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Prdsident des Deutschen Reichstags, 124-5.

46. See Bracher, Auflosung, 296 ff. and below, p. 85-6. Also see Hermarm
Ullmarin, In der Grossen Kurve, Fiihrer und Gefiihrte, 60-91.

47. See the study by the author, Verdict on Schacht: a Study in the
Problem of Political "Guilt" (Florida State University Studies, XX), Chs. IV, V.

48. In spite of its Communist tendenz the work by Paul Merker, Deutsch-
land, Sein oder Nicht Sein?, has value in respect to the economic picture. See
I, 184-5, 191-200 for some interesting aspects of Briining's program. Hjabnar
Schacht, Germany's economic "wizard," later claimed that Briining's economic
poUcy coincided with his own: Spruchkammer Proceedings against Hjalmar
Schacht, 2 August 1948-1 September, 1948, I, 42. At the time his position was
critical and his mordant volume Grundsdtze deutscher Wirtschaftspolitik, pub-
lished during Papen's chancellorship, decried all economic poHcy which failed
to heed what Schacht vaguely called "an unrestrained will to live" on the
part of the nation, 8.

49. Bracher, Auflosung, 296 ff. Bracher calls the action of the Social Demo-
crats "eine vollige Selbstausschaltimg der starksten demokratischen Partei" and
points out that within six months the last conceivable chance for a recon-
struction of the Great Coalition had been removed. Severing and Braun were
both in strong opposition to the action but Severing in his memoirs {Mein
Lebensweg, II, 238-9) stresses the importance of party discipline, while Braun
flatly declares the party leadership felt itself too dependent upon the trade
unionsCVon Weimar zu Hitler, 292). Cf. also Julius Leber, Ein Mann Geht
Seinen Weg. Schriften, Reden und Briefe. 218 ff.

50. Ibid., 298.

51. Schulthess, LXXI (1930), 67.

52. Ibid., 93; See also Bracher, Auflosung, 304 ff.

53. Braun's objective treatment of this action in which he criticizes both
the Social Democrats for their lack of a sense of responsibility and Briining
himself for hasty action is most convincing. Von Weimar zu Hitler, 305-6; cf.
Bracher 's thorough treatment, Auflosung, 330-47.

54. See sketch in Lutz, Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, Es Geschah in Deutsch-
land, 130; R. T. Clark, The Fall of the German Republic: a Political Study, 291;
Bracher, Auflosung, 307.

55. Konrad Heiden, Der Fuehrer. Hitler's Rise to Power. 84.

56. Harold Callender, "Germany's Ascetic Chancellor," New York Times
Magazine, Aug. 30, 1931, V,^l-2.

57. Ibid., T. R. Ybarra, "A New Strong Man for Germany," New York
Times Magazine, Aug. 3, 1930, V, 1-2; Harold Callender, "Men on Whom
Germany's Fate Depends," New York Times Magazine, Nov. 30, 1930, V, 10.

58. Title of excellent biography by John W. Wheeler-Bennett — Wooden
Titan. Hindenburg in Twenty Years of German History. 1914-1934.

59. Von Hindenburg in his 1920 memoirs, Aus Meinem Leben, concluded
with an appeal to the German youth in which he stated, "For the present a flood
storm of wild political passions and sounding oratorical expressions have
buried beneath them all of our former poHtical conceptions." But, he added,
"this flood will run its course again. Then, out of the eternally moving seas
of our national life will emerge that rock, on which once rested the hope of
our fathers, and on which almost half a century ago was founded by our
strength the future of the fatherland: the German kaiserdom." (303)

60. The scorching and not entirely trustworthy commentarv in Helmut
Klotz, The Berlin Diaries, May 30, 1932- January 30, 1933, 28, 30, in respect
to von Hindenburg is reflected in sources more trustworthy in nature, e.g.
Schwerin von Krosigk, Es Geschah in Deutschland, 140; Severing, Mein
Lebensweg, II, 337.

61. Briining, for example, beHeves that if von Hindenburg's mental and
physical powers had held out five years more the German ship of state would
not have gone aground, "Ein Brief," Deutsche Rundeschau, 70 Jg., 1-22 (July,

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA; BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 229

1947), 3. An exception is the commentary of Apelt, Geschichte dcr Weimarer
Verfassung, 423, on conditions during Hindenburg's presidency: "In this situa-
tion the Reich needed a statesman of great experience and clear awareness of
his goal, who in his inmost convictions stood firmly on the basis of the new
form of the state and was determined with all his strength to fortify it and
extend it, a man who possessed also the ability to grow with difficulties, to
make himself at home in the high demands of his office. Hindenburg was not
this man and so he fell, the more the situation threatened difficulty, more and
more into dependency upon irresponsible counselors, whom he found, corre-
spending to his post and his social relationships, on the extreme right. If,
indeed, his being called to the office of the Reich President was no stroke
of fortune for the Germans, tlien was the reelection of the aged and ill
man in the spring of 1932 an outstanding error. The verdict of history will
not be able to free the men who made this choice and he (the President)
lumself, who accepted it, from hesi\ry responsibifity."

62. Hindenburg. Ein Lebensbild, Gh. 6, "Der Reichsprasident."

63. "Die improvisierte Demokratie," 204 flF.

64. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler. 158-9.

65. See below, Ch. V.

66. Gorhtz, Hindenburg, 303.

67. Bracher, Auflosung, 307-8.

68. T. R. Ybarra, "A New Strong Man for Germany," New York Times
Magazine, Aug. 3, 1930, V, 1-2.

69. Krosigk, Es Geschah in Deutschland. 133. This was, of course, the
basic justification of the Social Democratic doctrine of "the lesser evil."

70. Bracher, Auflosung, 444-5; Wheeler-Bennett, Hindenburg, 353 if.;
Walter H. Kaufmann, Monorchism in the Weimar Republic, 205-6.

71. "Ein Brief." Deutsche Rundschau, 70 Jg., 1-22 ( Tuly, 1947), 7-8.

72. Letter to author, Feb. 23, 1957.

73. The negative position was set forth by Otto Meissner, Staatssekretdr
unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler; Der Schicksalsweg des deutschen Volkes von
1918-1945, wie ich ihn erlehte, 213-4; Gorhtz, Hindenburg, 348; Schlange-
Schoningen, Am Tage Danach, see also commentaries on the negative reac-
tions of Wilhelm Keil and Thomas Esser in Rudolf Pechel, "Der Briining
Brief," Deutsche Rundschau, 70 Jg., 252 (Sept., 1947). Schlange-Schoningen,
a member of Briining's cabinet, has recently stated that he considers the
President by that time simply completely superannuated (ein uralter Greis)
and recalls an incident in which he read before cabinet members and economic
leaders of the parties a short speech of thanks. All wondered whether he
would be able to complete it. Hindenburg, says Schlange, was "completely
used up mentally" ("geistig vollig verbrauchten" ) but still a decisive figure.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 5, 1957 — I am indebted to Dr. Schlange
for sending the article.

74. Briining, "Ein Brief" (See note 71), 8.

75. Reichskanzlei, Akten betreffend Kabinettsprotokolle, R. Min 2b, Bd.
108, March 17, 1932 (Captured German Documents, National Archives,
Serial No. 3598 H, entitled "Alte Reichskanzlei: Cabinet Protocols" — These
will be cited hereafter, "Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle," with the date of
the cabinet session). In reference to the secrecy of the sessions, it must of
course, be recognized that Briining probably realized that Schleicher was
collecting and using information supplied him by State Secretary Planck and
had even had Briining's telephone wire tapped. See Rumbold's comments.
Documents on British Foreign Policy ed. by E. L. Woodward and Rohan
Butler (hereafter cited "DBFP"), Second Series, III, 186, No. 136.

76. Schlange-Schoningen relates that Briining often postponed his dis-
cussion of internal difficulties awaiting the hoped for success in the field of
foreign poficy. "Zum Sturz des Kabinetts Briining," Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, June 5, 1957.

230 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

77. See the fascinating studies by Gordon Craig, The Politics of the
Prussian Army, and by Wheeler Bennett, Nemesis of Power, for a thorough
handling of Schleicher's role during this period.

78. Meissner blames Schleicher for all the troubles of 1932, see Staats-
sekretdr, 222-7. But the stories of the day indicated a prominent role for
Meissner himself. One of the humorous ones is related by Paul Lobe, the
long term president of the Reichstag noted for his sense of humor, and deals
with the story of the flood. After the long forty days and nights of rain, God
the Father, looking down at the deluge, says, "There's something moving
down there; what can it be?" Peter, making use of his telescope made by
Zeiss in Jena agrees, "Yes, there is still something there — it is Meissner!" ( Der
Weg war Lang, 117). More significant are the stories of the party leaders who
found Meissner often putting thoughts into the mind of the President, e.g.,
Wilhelm Keil, Erlebnisse Eines Sozialdemokraten, II, 446-7.

79. "Democracy — Challenge to Theory," Social Research, XIII, 195-224
(June, 1946).

80. The details are ably presented by Bracher, Auflosung, 443-80; The
correspondence between Briining and Hitler in respect to the alteration of the
constitutional arrangements for the President's term are reproduced in Adolf
Hitler, Hitlers Auseinandersetzung mit Briining, 73-94, in which the Nazis
take the role of good democrats horrified by the idea of a presidential choice
not based directly on the will of the people! Hindenburg might well have been
opposed also by the Crown Prince but the ex-Kaiser refused to allow his son
to stand in a republican election — see Paul Herre, Kronprinz Wilhelm, Seirie
Bolle in der Deutschen Politik, 203-7. Interesting and revealing comment is
found in the files of the U. S. Department of State. For example, on Feb. 17,
1932, John C. Wiley, Charge d' Affaires ad interim, reported to the Secretary
of State that von Hindenburg was disappointed by his failure to secure
support of the Stahlhelm, which conditioned such support on a "visible change
of policy," i.e., the elimination of Briining. Wiley did not believe the President
would yield to what the latter termed "outside dictation." (U.S., State
Department Files, GRC 862.00/2688, No. 1497). On Feb. 23, Ambassador
Frederic M. Sackett noted that the Nazi and Nationalist campaign to make
Hindenburg "the candidate of the Weimar parties" was achieving notable
sTiccess. "The former head of the Nationalist Party, Count Westarp," continued
Sackett, "has pubhshed a manifesto urging the election of von Hindenburg,
which bears the signatures of several hundred persons of prominence who
had voted for the President in 1925. Otherwise Right support for the Presi-
dent's candidacy is disappointing." Sackett to Secv. of State, U.S. State
Department Files, GC 862.00/2690, No. 1509. After the second election
campaign Sackett was told by many government leaders, such as Groener,
Piinder, etc. that Hindenburg was disappointed with the results. Sackett to
Secy, of State, April 13, 1932, No. 1650, U.S. State Department Files, FO
862.00/2724. In respect to this second round campaign a comment of the
Vossische Zeitung, April 11, 1932, is interesting: "Matters turned on April 10
much more on the position of Briining and Braun than in the first election. The
Hindenburg front of April 10th has become a block in support of the state
(der Staatsbejahung) which will outlive the tenth of April."

81. Vossische Zeitung, March 9, 1932.

82. Bracher, Auflosung, 381-2.

83. U.S. State Dept. Files, 1931, GP 862.00/2649, Memo of conversation
of Alfred W. K. Kliefoth with Rohm and Hanfstaengl, Dec. 5, 1931, end.
in Sackett to Secy, of State, Dec. 8, 1931, No. 1330.

84. Der Angriff, May 12, 1932, accuses Braun of having Prussian govern-
ment buy an estate at Rominten so he'U have a place to stay while hunting!;
May 17, 18, 20, against Klepper for appointment of friends to offices; June 3,
against Grzesinski and "Vize Weiss"; June 8, scandal story on Grzesinski and
second wife, reported as his mistress and as having accompanied him on

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 231

official trip to Vienna before marrying her; same issue, Weiss getting night
club concession for his brother, etc.

85. e.g. Paul Schwenk in the Landtag. Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsbenchte,
3 Wahlp., 295 Sitz., 12 Avr. 1932, 24896.

86. Braun, Von WeimaT zu Hitler, 328-31; Merker, Deutschland, Sein
oder Nicht Sein?, I, 249. Flechtheim notes that there was division over the
question of support and that the eventual decision was bad tactics, Die Kom-
munistische Partei, 175-6.

87. Bracher, Auflosiing, 386; Severing, Lehensweg, II, 276-96.

88. See letters of Erwin S. Planck, State Secretary in the Reich Chan-
cellerv, to von Schleicher, Aug. 11, Aug. 18, 1931. Schleicher Nachlass,
Koblenz, Bd. 17/III.

89. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 298-304.

90. Schleicher Nachlass, Koblenz, Bd. 17/III.

91. Bracher, Aufldsung 452-3, using document dated Feb. 25, 1932, cited
from archives of Graf Westarp.

92. U.S. State Dept. Files, Sackett to Secy, of State, Feb. 23, 1932,
No. 1509, GC 862.00/2690.

93. Der Angriff, April 13, 20, 1932.

94. Vossische Zeitung, April 25, 1932; Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 378.

95. See course of events in Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 3 Wahlp.,
285 Sitz., 12 Avr. 1932, 24894-900, 24916, and Drucksache, 3 Wahlp. 1 Tag.,
No. 8420. Cf. discussion in Erich Eisemann, Die Regierungsbildung im Reich
und in Preussen, 1919-1933, 37. Graf Westarp called the action "formally
permissible and legal but not to be reconciled with the sense of the consti-
tution." "Zur wahl der preuss. Minister-prasidenten," Deutsche Juristenzeitung,
XXXVII Jrg., 574-6 (1 Mai 1932).

96. Preussen, Landtag, Drucksache, 4 Wahlp., 1 Tag., Nr. 1203, 563-4.

97. e.g. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 380, declares the action "a deci-
sion thoroughly justified in itself" but having a bad effect for the ruling
parties when made so shortly before the elections; similar, Bracher, Aufldsung,
592-3. But the fair-minded and democratic Vossische Zeitung reported the
action on April 13, 1932, vmder the heading "Self-Protection of the Parliament,
Self-Protection of the State."

98. U.S. State Dept. Files, 1932, 862.00/2710, John C. Wiley Counselor
of the Embassy to Secy, of State, March 23, 1932, No. 1591; cf. DBFP, Second
Series, III, 108-9, Sir Horace Rumbold to Sir John Simon, No. 97, March
24, 1932.

99. Wiley, see note 98, notes, "Similar sensational disclosures by the
Prussian police in the past have invariably turned out to be comparatively
harmless affairs," and Rumbold is similarly skeptical. Part of the documents
were released by Severing and published. See Vossische Zeitung, April 6, 1932.

100. See lengthy commentary in DBFP, Second Series, II, 350-3, B. C.
Newton (Berlin) to Sir John Simon, No. 303, Nov. 27, 1931; Newton to
Simon, No. 307, Dec. 4, 1931, II, 359-61; Bracher, Aufldsung, 431-5.

101. Such a possibility was mentioned by both the British and American
ambassadors in Berlin. See DBFP, Second Series, III, 126-30, Sir Horace
Rumbold to Sir John Simon, No. 106, April 27, 1932; Sackett to Secy, of
State, No. 1693, May 3, 1932, U. S. State Dept. Files, GC 862.00/2742.
Probably due to this possibility there were indications that the Nazis were not
too eager to acquire control of the Prussian government at this time, e.g.
Sir H. Rumbold to Sir John Simon, Dec. 18, 1931, No. 317, DBFP, Second
Series, II, 374-8; also Sackett to Secy, of State, No. 1270, May 11, 1932, State
Dept. Files, FP 862.00/2751.

102. Meissner, Staatssekretdr, 225, says that Briining agreed at the time
that he took office in 1930 to accede to Hindenburg's wishes and end the
dualism of Reich and Prussia by bringing about in Prussia government above
parties like that in the Reich. Briining in a letter to the author, October

232 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

26, 1956, states, ". . . there was no need for a plan for a Staatsstreich like
that of Herr von Papen. The Reich government had other means than those
adopted by Herr von Papen for preventing the Nazis in Prussia from con-
troUing the state poHce. By decree, the Reich government could reduce the
Kostenbeitracge for the police in Prussia or any other state and could stop the
Ueberweisungen from [of] Reichssteuern to Prussia, which would have meant
the collapse of a Nazi government in Prussia. In case the Nazis made open
revolt, the Reich govemnient could at any time take over the Prussian police
temporarily and could appoint a 'commissar' with full powers to control the
Prussian government, on the precedent of 1923, when Ebert issued decrees
under Art 48 enabling the Reichsweh[r] commanders in Thuringia and Saxony
to remove Communist governments there. Whenever Art. 48 was invoked,
there had to be a clear disturbance of 'Ruhe und Ordnung.' " Similar action,
i.e., control of police, was also suggested by General Groener in conversation
with Sackett. See Sackett to Secy, of State, April 13, 1932, No. 1650, U.S.
State Dept. Files, FO 862.00/2724.

103. Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 4 Wahlp., 1 Tag., 2 Sitz.,
25 Mai 1932, 32-3; cf. account in Vossische Zeitung, May 26, 1932.

104. Braun says he took leave "with the firm intention never again to
return to office. Von Weimar zu Hitler, 396-7.

105. Briining's disclaimer, "Ein Brief" (see note 71), 4: "The dissolution
of the SS and the SA after Hindenburg's reelection in April, 1932, was decided
upon by the army and the Ministers of the Interior of the different states during
my absence in the campaign. In my opinion this step was premature . . ."
Briining's strong position in the cabinet session on April 13, 1932 is empha-
sized by his reference to difficulties during the election campaign. Reichskanzlei,
Kabinettsprotokolle, Bd. 108. It might also be noted that both at this session
and the one held on April 1, 1932, it was the government of Bavaria rather
than that of Prussia which was mentioned as being desirous of strong action.
The government of Baden contemplated even going beyond the scope of the
SA ban, viz., Paul J. Gray, Am. Vice Consul in Stuttgart to Secy, of State,
No. 642, April 15, 1932, U.S. State Dept. Files, GC 862.00/2731.

106. See report of interview of Dr. von zur Miiller with Dr. Adolf von
Carlowitz, a close collaborator of Schleicher's and Civil Reference Official for
special legal problems in the Wehrmacht, after July, 1932, "Dokumentation:
Zum Sturz Briining's," "Vierteljahrshefte fitr Zeitgeschichte, 1 Jrg. (1953),
261-88, 270. Von Hammerstein's strong support of Briining is underscored in
a conversation with the British ambassador in late Feb., 1932, see Sir H.
Rumbold to Sir John Simon, No. 95, March 1, 1932, DBFP, Second Series,
III, 100-2.

107. The detailed story of the considerations impelling tlie military to
this action is set forth by Gordon Craig in "Reichswehr and National Social-
ism: the Policy of Wilhelm Groener, 1928-1932," Political Science Quarterly,
XLIII, 194-229 (June, 1948), 219-29. An interesting sketch of Groener, "The
democrat in the general's coat," is found in Schwerin von Krosigk, Es Geschah
in Deutschland, 97ff. In re the unreliability of National Socialist organizations
for defense purposes, see report of Sir Horace Rumbold, April 20, 1932, No.
102, DBFP, Second Series, III, 121-2.

108. See report of conversation of B. C. Newton with Groener, Newton
to Sir John Simon, May 26, 1932, No. 113, DBFP, Second Series, III, 141-
"Many officers in the Reichswehr counted upon the dissolution of the Reichs-
banner as the logical sequence of my action against Hitler. When, however,
they submitted such evidence as the Defense Ministry possessed to Dr.
Meissner for the information of the President, this proved to be of the flimsiest
in a legal sense, and the Social Democratic party anticipated the decision
of the Government by abolishing their only organization of a quasi-military
character, namely tlie Reichsbanner organization into which members of
the Prussian police were transferred after they left the service."

REPUBLICAN PRUSSIA: BASTION OF DEMOCRACY 233

109. Herre, Kronprinz Wilhelm, 200.

110. Bracher, Auflosung, 492-3. Actually, in the cabinet session of May 3,
1932, Groener said that the President did not desire the prohibition of the
Reichsbanner. Schlange was in favor of a strong answer by Briining to the
President in the sense that letters of this sort interfered with the work of the
cabinet. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Bd. 109.

111. Bracher, Auflosung, 493, fn. 49.

112. 1929, Severing, Lebensweg, II, 186-7.

113. So Groener in conversation with Newton — "The strain, and especially
the assumption of responsibility for the abolition of the S.A. detachments, had
been telling on my health, and I addressed the Reichstag when I should have
been undergoing medical treatment." Newton to Simon, No. 113, May 26,
1932, DBFP, Second Series, III, 142.

114. Der Angriff, May 11, 1932.

115. See Gordon Craig's article, cited above, fn. 107.

116. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, "Vermerk iiber eine Chefbe-
sprechung in der Reichskanzlei," Feb. 20, 1932.

117. See Schlange's account in Am Tage Danach, 51-70.

118. Ibid., 68-71.

119. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Bd. 109, May 20, 1932. The
draft decree is a portion of the record.

120. "Dokumentation: zum Sturz Briining's," Vierteljahrahafte fur Zeit-
geschichte, 1 Jrg. (1953), 275-88. Von Gayl provided Hindenburg with that
which has been labeled a "Referenten-Vorentwurf," or preliminary draft, by
one of the experts concerned, but which is quite similar to the decree dis-
cussed in the cabinet. This latter had, however, found much opposition and
the final form of any decree would have been very different. In 1953 von
Gayl endeavored to present a picture by which the role of the agricultural
interests was much diminished. The documentary materials cited here direcdy
contradict him.

121. Staatssekretdr, 223-4. Meissner has pictured Schleicher as the only
figure responsible for that which followed, but comes in for particular refer-
ence in a contemporary memorandum by Graf Westarp cited in the "Doku-
mentation" above. Both Westarp and Schlange were indignant at what they
felt to be a falsification of Briining's agricultural program before the President
(see article cited, fn. 120, 287-8).

122. See above, n. 90. Also similar commentaries by Magnus Freiherr von
Braun, Von Ostpreussen bis Texas, Erlebnisse und zeitgeschichtliche Betrach-
tungen eines Ostdeutschen, 211-3, and Walter Schotte, Die Regierung Papen
Schleicher Gayl, 8, who complains of Briining's "Mangel an Psychologic."
Schotte's discussion of Briining's fall is quite thorough and pertinent. Later
documents have added little to it, see 5-33, and 91. The denial by Schleicher
of a part in the fall of Briining, found here, must receive some consideration.
How Httle aware Briining was of the President's changed viewpoint is indi-
cated by the British ambassador's report on April 13, 1932, that Briining
expected to remain in office "for some considerable time to come." DBFP,
Second Series, III, 114.

123. The scene has been described in many sources. This is the picture
also given in the cabinet session of May 30, 1932, in which the decision for
resignation was reached. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Bd. 109. of.
Schlange-Schoningen, Am Tage Danach, 73.

124. Whether all of the groups mentioned by Armin Mohler would fit into
the normal conception of the word "conservative" is somewhat doubtful.
Mohler's book is most interesting for its delineation of the complicated philo-
sophical problems confronting republican philosophers in the Weimar period!
Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland, 1918-1932. More specific and
more valuable in an understanding of the events of 1932-3 than Mohler's
general analysis is that of Klemens von Klemperer, Germany's New Con-

234 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

servatism; Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century, esp. 117-138.
See also the interesting exposition of the conservative viewpoint at this time
by Emil Daniels, "Politische Korrespondenz. Die Problematik der preussischen
und der franzosischen Wahlen." Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXVTI, 89-96
(Avr.-Juni, 1932).

CH. III. UHLAN POLITICS

1. Freiherr von Braun, the Minister of Agriculture under Papen, has most
clearly expressed the President's feelings when he said, "One may well assume
that Hindenburg from the outset accepted Briining more as a matter of
business than of personal feelings" but "in the company of his new cabinet
members he felt completely at home (wohl und zufrieden)." Von Ostpreussen
his Texas. Erlebnisse und Zeitgeschichtlichen Betrachtungen eines Ostdeutschen,
211, 228.

2. Von Papen's account of his assumption of office is given in his Memoirs,
151-9; see also below, p. 132ff.

3. Bracher, Aujlosung, 531 If.

4. Papen's Memoirs were greatly altered in their translation from the
German version, Der Wahrheit eine Gasse. Mr. Brian Connell, who did the
translation, engaged in unpardonable shiftings of material and improvement
of phraseology which give the English version a considerably better flavor
than the Gennan. The consequence is that the English reader may be a little
surprised at the severity of German reviews, e.g., Theodor Eschenburg, "Franz
von Papen," Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 1 Jrg., 153-69 (Apr. 1953);
Werner Conze, "Papens Memoiren," Hisforische Zeitschrift, CLXXV, 307-17
(1953); Erich Eyck, "Papen als 'Historiker,' " Deutsche Rundschau, 78 Jrg.,
1221-30 (1952). Rudolf Pechel has provided one of the most biting of the
numerous puns associated with Papen's career in his "Die Wahrheit in der
Sackgasse," Deutsche Rundschau, 78 Jrg., 1231-7 (1932).

5. See Memoirs, Ch. I. Eyck (fn. 4) has pointed out that Papen's view
of the history of this period is highly faulty.

6. Memoirs, Ch. III. Cf. testimony of June 14, 1946, International Military
Tribunal, Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal, XVI, 239, in which he claims opposition to all sabotage
( this source hereafter cited, "IMT." ) .

7. Memoirs, 53.

8. Ibid., 55-9.

9. On April 8, 1933, Charles Warren, a vddely known Boston lawyer and
lecturer on legal matters, wrote a personal letter to the Secretary of State ( in
view of the report that Papen was coming to the United States as one of tlie
representatives to conferences then being held in Washington) stating: "I
desire to call your attention to the fact that Captain von Papen was dismissed
from this country by President Wilson, that the records of the Department
of Justice and of the State Department show him to be a proven liar, and a
violator of our criminal laws. As Assistant Attorney General of the United
States from 1914 to 1918, I was in charge of the prosecution of all German
activities in this country. Captain von Papen was involved in the dynamiting
of the Vanceboro Bridge in 1915, in the conspiracy to dynamite the Welland
Canal in 1914-15, and in the forging of our United States passports; and if
he had not had diplomatic immunity, he would have been indicted in our
Federal Courts. After he left this country, evidence that he was involved
in other attempts to destroy property here was discovered and he was actually
indicted. After this country came into the war, and since the war, further
evidences of his activities, hostile to this country, have been obtained from
the British and from other sources.

His contemptuous reference to Americans in his captured correspondence
may also be recalled . . ." U. S. State Dept. Files, N. 550. SI Washington/ 18.

10. E.g. Neiv York Times, Jan. 16, 1916, ed., mentions expenditure of

UHLAN POLITICS 235

$5,000 in one month. Von Falkenhayn, says Papen, "sent me the order to
prevent, at all costs, American war material reaching the Western Front."
Memoirs, 44.

IL Koenig, says Papen, was "a completely reliable and most intelligent
fellow," Memoirs, 36; cf. Inspector Thomas J. Tunney, Throttled: the Detection
of the German and Anarchist Bomb Plotters, 33-8. Klotz, Berlin Diaries, 71-2,
has an even more exaggerated story of Papen's carelessness in America. This
is, however, at considerable variance with other accounts.

12. See facsimiles in H. W. Blood-Ryan, Franz von Papen, His Life and
Times, opp. 48, 50, 52, 60.

13. Memoirs, 53-4.

14. On June 1, 1932, Frederic M. Sackett, the American Ambassador in
Berlin, wrote to Washington for special instructions in view of Papen's World
War I background. He was told legal actions involving Papen still pended
and to deal with him "politely but somewhat distantly." U. S. Department of
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932, II, 293-5. A day later
Stimson added a note saying that the Justice Department had informed him
that the indictment of von Papen in re the Welland Canal matter had been
nolle pressed on March 8. Ibid., No. 64. Commentary of Stimson in re the
ambassadorship reported by Sir R. Lindsav, British Ambassador in Wash-
ington, to Sir J. Simon, June 1, 1932, BDFP,' Second Series, III, 148, No. 117.

15. See Memoirs, 50-90.

16. Ibid., 90; similar, Papen's testimony, June 14, 1946, IMT, XVI, 240.

17. Papen said at Nuremberg that he joined the Center Party because
"in this party I would be able to do much more in making adjustments in the
social sphere than among the Conservatives." Ibid. In his Memoirs, he says,
"I felt that a party with a religious background would be best able to insist on
those Christian principles which had been omitted from the Weimar Consti-
tution." (97) Probably neither statement was accurate. Certainly he didn't do
much to "make adjustments in the social sphere." More than likely the decision
was a chance, spur-of-the-moment one.

18. Papen details his acquisition of interest in Germania and his fight to
make it an organ reflecting his own opinions in hs usual frank manner of
presenting somewhat inappropriate actions as though they were perfectly proper
in Memoirs, 101-2.

19. Ibid., 106. Papen adds that he was, after this, excluded from all party
committees.

20. Papen believs his aid was "in the slender balance of forces, probably,
decisive." Ibid., 108.

21. Schwerin von Krosigk was in Paris at an economic conference when
Papen became chancellor. He was stormed at from all sides with the question,
"Who is Papen?", Es Geschah in Deutschland, 142. U.S. Ambassador Sackett
knew all the members of the Papen cabinet except Papen himself! U. S. Dept.
of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, II, 293-4, Sackett to Secy, of State, June 1,
1932.

22. Memoirs, 150-3; the British ambassador stated in regard to the choice
that it was "largely due to the fact that no candidate of any standing was
willing to take office." DBFP, Second Series, III, 166, Sir H. Rumbold to
Sir J. Simon, June 9, 1932, No. 129.

23. This conception is emphasized particularly by Freiherr von Braun,
Von Ostpreussen bis Texas, 230: "It was clear that this cavalier of the old
school, this elegant, distinguished-appearing, flexible, always likeable and
thoroughly frank man would please the Reich President to whom he was
always able to express himself without hindrance." In regard to the Center
Party support, Sir Horace Rumbold commented later that its loss was a
surprise to the President — this appears, however, quite doubtful in view of
Papen's indication that he was acting contrary to party directives. Probably the
President was not at all concerned about this. DBFP, Second Series, III, 151-2,

236 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir John Simon, June 4, 1932, No. 122.

24. Briining, "Ein Brief," Deutsche Rundschau, 70 Jrg., 10. It might be
noted that the American ambassador believed that Briining himself had realized
sometime in advance of his resignation his uncertain position and had himself
"precipitated a decision which his domestic foes would have preferred to
postpone." Papen, believed Sackett, was chosen "faute de mieux." Sackett
to Secy, of State, June 1, 1932, No. 1755, U. S. State Dept. Files, G/LS
862.00/2781.

25. Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, 94, 99, 100; Georg Schreiber in his
Briining-Hitler-Schleicher: Das Zentnim in der Opposition, 14, also empha-
sized length of preparation for the Papen government.

26. Memoirs, 150-1.

27. IMT, XVI, 243, Papen's testimony of June 14, 1946.

28. Weimarer Repuhlik, II, 483.

29. Significant here is the commentary by von Braun that Papen was not
an intriguer in the ordinary sense — he was sincere in his beliefs; he was
"Idealist vom reinsten Wasser." Von Ostpreussen, 230. A contemporary summed
up Papen's stand with the comment that his policies were marked by "ein
Hauch von Romantik und ein Zug von RitterUchkeit." Hennann Stegemann,
Weltwende: der Kampf um die Zukunft und Deutschlands Gestaltwandel, 156.

30. Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof, May 18, 1932, 98; commentary on insecurity
of party in Briining, "Ein Brief," Deutsche Rundschau, 70 Jrg., 9.

31. So von Braun, Von Ostpreussen, 211-2; Emil Daniels, "Politische Kor-
respondenz: die neue Regierung, die Wahlen zum Reichstag und die aus-
wartige Lage." Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXIX, 88-96 (July, 1932), 88.

32. Ambassador Sackett found evidence that Schleicher was seeking to
form a personal pohtical following. This was headed by Dr. Solf, former
ambassador to Japan; Dr. Jarres, chief mayor of Duisburg, and Dr. Eckner.
U. S. State Dept. Files, G/HS 862.00/2794, Sackett to Secy, of State, June 14,
1932, No. 1783. The interest of Schleicher in a parliamentary basis of support
is underscored in the November crisis of 1932 discussed in Chapter VL

33. Cf. Theodor Eschenburg, "Franz von Papen," Vierteljahrshefte fiir
Zeitgeschichte, 1 Jrg., 153-69 (Apr., 1953), 158-9.

34. Walter Schotte, Papen's apologist, in his book Die Regierung Papen,
Schleicher, Gayl, zweite Auflage, 79-81 and passim, tries to free the cabinet
from the Junker designation. To some degree his efPorts are justified. None
of the cabinet members belonged to the old Junkertum in its narrower sense.
Nevertlieless, all personified tlie separation from the masses, tlie idea of an
Oberschicht, as Schotte himself later described it, and a clear sense of social
distinction. Von Braun, who reported Papen's usage of the term, later tried
to separate the concept of "gentlemen" from that strictly attached to the
nobility. Von Ostpreussen, 208. As for Vorwdrts, it noted on June 2, 1932,
tliat this was the first cabinet since 1918 in which organized labor unions and
civil servants did not have one representative.

35. So Eyck, Weimarer Repuhlik, II, 489-90, and Keil, Erlebnisse eines
Sozialdemokraten, II, 462-7, with which the author would agree from the
cabinet records and from Gayl's activities during the legal processes that
followed the coup of July 20th.

36. Schotte, Die Regierung Papen, 79, points out that although von Gayl
was an East Prussian, he owned no land; see also von Braun, Von Ostpreussen,
237; Bracher, Auflosung, 533. It should be added that von Gayl's ability was
not directed toward republican goals. He was the mainspring behind the
Prussian coup discussed below. Some sources indicate that Schleicher would
have preferred a cabinet headed by von Gayl, but was not able to bring it
off, e.g., DBFP, Second Series, III, 164, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir John Simon,
June 9, 1932, No. 120. ^

37. See von Krosigk's sketch, "Der kaltgestellte Diplomat," in Es Geschah
in Deutschland, 310-7; von Braun, Von Ostpreussen, 238. Neurath's comments

UHLAN POLITICS 237

on the President's appeal, DBFP, Second Scries, III, 149-50, Sir H. Rumbold
to Sir John Simon, June 3, 1932, No. 120.

38. See Voriciirts, June 2, 1932. Von Braun's memoirs, Von Ostpreussen his
Texas have been frequently referred to here. His predecessor in office, Hans
Schlange-Schoningen, states that Braun's background of agricultural knowledge
was scanty — he was far more an expert in Genossenschaftswesen. Letter to
author, June 6, 1957.

39. Von Braun, Von Ostpreussen, 243 — adds that von Eltz-RUbenach
was the only one of Hitler's ministers who turned down the proffered Gold
Party Badge in 1937 and was fired as a consequence. Comment on his brother,
Vorwdrts, June 2, 1932.

40. Von Krosigk's memoirs, Es Geschah in Deutschland, although super-
ficial like those of von Braun and von Papen, do leave a greater impression
of a sense of human interest and "roots" in the life of the people. His position
in the cabinet was suggested by Hjalmar Schacht, although Schacht denies
that he was in any other way concerned with the Papen government or its
program. Letter to author, August 14, 1956.

41. Warmbold's resignation probably derived most directly from his
resentment of the intrusions of Carl Goerdeler, who had submitted at this
time a memorandum advocating an extensive work-creation program. The
memorandum was given directly to the President, seemingly without Briining's
knowledge, aldiough Warmbold believed Briining was involved. See Gerhard
Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die Deutsche Widerstandsbewegung, 51-2; Vor-
icdrts, June 1, 1932.

42. Von Braun, Von Ostpreussen, 238, 243; von Krosigk, Es Geschah in
Deutschland, 317-25; Bracher, Auflbsung, 534.

43. Vorwdrts, ]une 1, 1932.

44. Goerdeler's reason for refusal at this time, strange in view of his
later resistance activities, was that the Nazis should have been brought to
participation in the cabinet! Shortly before his execution in 1944, however,
Goerdeler wrote notes indicating he greatly regretted his rejection of the
post, believing he might have mastered the economic problems existing and
saved Gennany from Hitler! It should be added that his rejection of the
post had nothing to do with attachment to republican government or oppo-
sition to dictatorial measures. See Ritter, Carl Goerdeler, 55-8.

45. IMT, XVI, 243, testimony of June 14, 1946.

46. In letter to Kaas, "the synthesis of all truly national forces from what-
ever camp they may come." Schulthess, LXXIIl (1932), 96. The designation
of "concentration" seems to have come from early news interviews, see
Vossische Zeitung, June 1, 1932. Sackett notes that this was "a term hitherto
unfamiliar in German politics." Sackett to Secy, of State, June 1, 1932, No.
1755, U. S. State Dept. Files, G/LS 862.00/2781.

47. Vossische Zeitung, June 2, 1932.

48. Georg Schreiber, Briining-Hitler-Schleicher, Das Zentrum in der Oppo-
sition, 21.

49. Part of the official declaration of the government which also contained
a very ha'rsh condemnation of the Briining government for failing to honor
national goals, leaving the state finances in confusion, etc. Schulthess, LXXIII
(1932), 98-9; Schotte, Die Regierung Papen, 33.

50. Schotte, Die Regierung Papen, 34.

51. Ihid. This was a part of the much criticized interview discussed
below, p. 157.

52. Deutschland, Reichsrat, Niederschriften iiber die Vollsitzungen des
Reichsrats, Jrg. 1932, No. 280, 134-6, 9 June 1932. Schleicher spoke quite
similarly in his radio speech of July 26, 1932, including the comment, "The
catch phrase that 'Junkers and Generals' brought the fall of the Briining
government is an outright lie." Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 128-31. The
American ambassador, Sackett, commented on von Gayl's speech, that it

238 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

"probably intentionally — conveyed the impression that its author was a
soldier, a scholar, and a gentleman." Sackett, of course, was aware that it
did not convince von Gayl's opponents of this fact. Sackett to Secy, of State,
June 15, 1932, No. 1784, U. S. State Dept. Files, G/HS 862.00/2795.

53. Aug. 11, 1932, Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 139.

54. For the letters concerned, see Schreiber, Bruning, Hitler, Schleicher,
17-20.

55. Schotte's books included his earlier volume, entitled Die Regierung
Papen-Schlcicher-Gayl, referred to a number of times previously, and the
later volume, appearing prior to the November elections, entitled Der Neue
Stoat. The former is largely a defensive chronicle of events, while the latter
seeks to create a pseudo-pliilosophical backing for the Papen political con-
ceptions as they had developed by then.

56. Schotte, Die Regierung Papen, 16-19; similar comments in Werner
Freiherr von Rheinbaben, Viermal Deutschland. Aus dem Erleben eines See-
manns, Diplomaten, Politikers, 1895-1954, 296. All of this was, of course,
academic. Papen belonged to the club; he had published several well-known
articles in Der Ring, the periodical published by Heinrich Freiherr von
Gleichen, one of the leading spirits in the club, and Schleicher attended many
of the political sessions and festive occasions sponsored by the group. Whether
the club itself as an organization propagandized against Briining or for
Papen is immaterial.

57. Auflosung, 536-45.

58. See discussion. Ibid., Ch. Ill; Schiffer, Sturm iiber Deutschland,
233-42; Ullmann, In der grossen Kurve, 7-14; Walter Heynen, "Inland imd
Ausland: Biicher und Zeitschriftenschau," Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXIX,
175-8 (August, 1932); Emil Daniels, "Politische Korrespondenz: die neue
Regierung, die Wahlen zum Reichstag und die auswartige Lage," Ibid., 88-96
(July, 1932); Heinrich Herrfahrdt, Der Aiifbau des Neuen Staates, Vortrdge
zur Verfassungsrefonn, 7-13.

59. Bracher, Auflosung, 536-45; Schotte, Die Regierung Papen, 33-8; Die
neue Staat, passim. It must be admitted that von Schleicher had also stressed
the importance of "personality" in politics. In 1930 (dated Dec. 11) he wrote
a brief statement for Der Ring in which he said, "In a time when the radical
socialist movement threatens to destroy the state and economy, the conserva-
tive forces upholding the state must remain mobilized. Since, by common
consent, parliamentary arrangements no longer offer a suitable basis for
assembly, the joining of these forces must take place independently of the
parties in such a way as the HERRENKLUB has been developed. This "RING
OF PERSONALITY" directs itself against the collectivism of the time, both
as a political Weltanschauung and as a reality in the form of state socialism.
The RING recognizes tlie necessity of reform in state and society; it follows
long-range goals of national policy without special wishes for its group."
Schleicher Nachlass, Koblenz, Bd. 5.

60. Die neue Staat, 29 164-5.

61. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, June 2, 1932.

62. Bracher, Auflosung. 546-7; Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 97-9.

63. Ibid., 108-9; Bracher, Auflosung, 551-2. See lengthy discussion in
Vonvdrts, June 15, 1932, which indicated cuts of 15 per cent in pension
payments for invalids and sub-marginal wage-earners, 20 per cent for partially
disabled war veterans, 23 per cent for unemployment insurance pavnnents, 10
per cent for "crisis support," 15 per cent for welfare support payments, etc.
The cabinet session which dealt with this issue was routine, Reichskanzlei,
Kabinettsprotokolle, June 13, 1932.

64. See discussions above, pp. 96, 115, and Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsproto-
kolle, Feb. 20 and March 17, 1932. By the end of his term in office, however,
Briining had come to a recognition of the importance of providing some
assistance for the unemployed in a more spectacular fashion, e.g., Goerdeler's

UHLAN POLITICS 239

work-creation plan, see Ritter, Carl Goerdeler, 49-53, and cf. Vorwdrts, June
15, 1932, which stressed absence of factors justifying the cuts.

65. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, June 13, 14, 1932; cf. Bracher,
Auflosting, 550-1.

66. Ibid.

67. Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 110-1, June 16.

68. Vorwdrts — cartoons during Tune and July for "Papenkreuz;" verse,
July 16, 1932. Rheinbaben, VieTr7ial Deutschland, 294, relates another pun,
"Einst hatten wir einen Kanzler von Eisen (Bismarck) — jetzt haben wir einen
aus Pappe (Papen)."

69. Vom Kaiserhof, June 14, 1932, 110.

70. Ibid., June 14, 1932, 111; June 23, 1932, 116.

71. May 11, 1932, reported Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 79-87. In a rela-
tively friendly commentary on Briining's speech, Graf Westarp pointed out
that the last hundred meters to tlie goal might well not be easy ones and
tliat much caution and care would be needed to reach the desired objectives.
"Die letzten hundert Meter vor dem Ziele." Preussische Jahrbucher, CCXXVIII,
195-203 (April-June, 1932).

72. Opening speech in behalf of Gennan position, Feb. 9, 1932, Schulthess,
LXXIII (1932), 450-3.

73. Speech at disarmament conference, Feb. 18, 1932, Ibid., 436-7.

74. This was the report of the conversation as it went to the newspapers.
Ibid., 396. Rumbold's official report is somewhat more cautious, but Briining
does not seem to have denied the general intent of his statement. See DBFP,
Second Series, III, 12-3, Rumbold to Sir John Simon, Jan. 8, 1932, No. 10;
Rumbold to Simon, Jan. 10, 1932, 13-14, No. 12.

75. Ibid. The clearest statement of the British favor for cancellation was
made by Ambassador Lord Wilham Tyrrell in a note to the Foreign Office,
June 11, 1932, in which it is flatly stated that obtaining agreement by the
Germans to the payment of a fixed sum is unlikely and that the British favor
outright cancellation, Ibid., 172-3, No. 133. Tliis was repeated by Mac Donald
in a meeting with the French when he said "the coup d'eponge" would be in the
long run more convenient and wiser than scaling down reparations. Ibid., 173.
Notes of meeting in British Embassy on June 11, 1932, No. 134.

76. Der Wahrheit eine Gasse, 164 (not in English version).

77. The U. S. attitude is documented below, fn. 79; perhaps the clearest
expression of the French point of view is found in Premier Edouard Herriot's
comment to Norman Davis, "that the German contention that they would not
pay furtlier reparations was an immoral one . . .; that France had a just and
righteous claim for tlie restoration of her devastated regions." U. S. Dept.
of State, For. Rels., 1932, I, 134 ( in memo of conversation made by Mr.
Davis, May 22, 1932 ) .

78. Made by Sir John Simon to Neurath, see Simon to Rumbold, May 14,
1932, DBFP, Second Series, III, 139-40, No. 112.

79. I.e., in conversation with Fr. ambassador M. de Fleuriau, reported
Simon to Tyrrell, June 6, 1932, Ibid., 157-9, No. 125; Henrv L. Stimson to
Ambassador in G.B. (Mellon), June 1, 1932, U. S. Dept. of State, For. Rels.,
1932, I, 673-5.

80. Reported in Record of a Conversation in Geneva, April 23, 1932 (incl.
MacDonald, Sir J. Simon, Stimson, Norman Davis, Hugh Gibson), DBFP,
Second Series, III, 123-4, No. 103.

81. "Ein Brief," Deutsche Rundschau, 70 Jrg., 1-22 (July, 1947), 10.

82. Sir J. Simon to Mr. B. C. Newton in Berlin, June 6, 1932, DBFP,
Second Series, III, 152-4, No. 124.

83. Es Geschah in Deutschland, 143-5.

84. Ambassador in Germany, Sackett, to Secv. of State, July 30, 1932,
No. 1856, U. S. State Dept. Files, GRC 862.00/2818, and see below, Ch. VII.
Americans had been much impressed by a picture of Germany's economic

240 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

condition given in May by Vice Chancellor Dietrich, who painted an en-
couraging one. Sackett to Secy, of State, May 2, 1932, No. 1684 with end.
of memorandum by Alfred W. Kliefoth on Dietrich's remarks. Ibid., GG
862.00/2745.

85. Stimson in his conversations blamed the tendency of the British gov-
ernment to go overboard for cancellation on British circles who were seeking
to safeguard credits held in Germany. See references cited in fn. 80.

86. Suggestion that Europeans go ahead on their own emanated from
Parker Gilbert, agent of reparations commission. See DBFP, Second Series, III,
125, Sir R. Lindsay, Washington, to Sir John Simon, April 25, 1932, No. 105.
Also Undersecretary of State Castle, after the conference was over, took
strong exception to reported statements of Herriot that the United States had
indicated it would not make new arrangements for debts due it. See his
memo of conversation with German Ambassador von Prittwitz, June 29, 1932,
U. S., State Dept., For. Rels., 1932, I, 682-3.

87. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, June 13, 1932.

88. Ibid., July 5, 1932; cf. von Braun, Von Ostpreussen, 248.

89. Schotte, Die Regieriing Papen, 56-7; cf. Herriot's description — "His
conversations with Herr von Papen had been most extraordinary. Herr von
Papen had offered him a military understanding, cooperation of the two
General Staffs, and other things, which he had been asked not to repeat to
Mr. MacDonald." Great Britain and France, Notes of a Conversation held
July 5, 1932, DBFP, Second Series, III, 387, No. 175.

90. Ibid., "M. Herriot had formed an opinion and, after these conversations,
he had said to himself that he would not accept any pohtical clauses."

91. Schotte, Die Regierung Papen, 59-61.

92. Mentioned in cabinet discussions, June 25, 1932, Reichskanzlei, Kabi-
nettsprotokoUe; comments of Herriot, June 27, 1932, DBFP, Second Series,
III, 271, No. 148.

93. Ibid., 278, No. 150.

94. E.g., Herriot's comments, DBFP, Second Series, III, 175-7, No. 134.
See also Maurice Pernot's articles, "Images de Lausanne," Revue des Deux
Mondes, Series 8, X, 203-12, 434-44 (July 1, 15, 1932) and Paul Schmidt,
Statist auf diplomatischer BUhne, Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Aus-
■wdrtigen Amt mit den Staatsmdnnern Europas, 243-4.

95. Krosigk, Es Geschah in Deutschland, 143; DBFP, Second Series, III,
271, where Herriot says final payment was mentioned to Lauzanne; Schmidt,
Statist auf diplomatischer Biihne, 240-8.

96. DBFP, Second Series, III, 274-5, No. 149.

97. See fn. 95. There was, however, no criticism of Papen's position or
actions in the cabinet sessions by those who accompanied him and Paul
Schmidt had kind as well as critical words for his actions.

98. E.g., DBFP, Second Series, III, 310, No. 159; 317, No. 161; 323, 327,
No. 163; 333, No. 164.

99. The record in DBFP, Second Series, III indicates that, if am1:hing,
the German delegation had been so stubborn as to have broken up the con-
ference if British patience had not held it together.

100. Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, Appendix III, Ibid., 595-602,
See also recognition of these advantages in discussions in German cabinet,
Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, July 11, 1932.

101. E.g., see conversations of Great Britain and Germany, July 3, 1932,
DBFP, Second Series, III, 340 ff.. No. 166; also specific commentary of von
Papen in final plenary session, Ibid., 425, No. 186. It might be added that
there was little hope of cancellation of the war debts at this time and hence
of ratification of the Lausanne Agreement. See Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge
Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, 211-9.

102. Krosigk, Es Geschah in Deutschland, 144.

103. First ^draft of French formula, July 7, 1932, DBFP, Second Series,

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 241

III, 419-20; included with amendments as "Declaration" in "Final Act of
the Lausanne Conference," Appendix III, Ibid., 595; the negative reaction
of the cabinet to this French formula is seen in the sessions of July 7, 1932.
Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle.

104. Based on protocols of cabinet sessions of July 1, 5, 7, 1932, all of
which contained lengthy discussions of the problems involved. Ibid.

105. Ibid., July 11, 1932.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., July 16, 1932.

109. See Eyck, Weimarer Republik, II, 500; seemingly Briining did not state
this so flatly, but the strength of his criticism suggested he would not have
paid. Germania, July 9, 10, 1932.

110. Schleicher's minority position in the cabinet discussions must have
been quite disturbing. The events of November are discussed below, Ch. VI.

111. Note Rumbold's report of bad press regarding Lausanne, DBFP,
Second Series, III, 440-6, No. 191, 2, July 12, 13, 1932. Emil Daniels of the
Preussische Jahrbiicher, who reported that the Italian representative, fired
on his return from the conference by Mussolini, had said he signed because,
"11 ne faut pas etre plus Pape que Papen!" added that the Italians had signed
tlie "Gentlemen's Agreement" and gave a half defense of Papen's position.
"Politische Korrespondenz, Zwischen der Konferenz von Lausanne und den
Wahlen zum Reichstag." Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXIX, 179-91 (July-Sept.,
1932). Social Democratic opposition is mirrored in Keil's memoirs, Erlebnisse
eines Sozialdemokraten, II, 450. Schotte's defense in Die Regierung Papen,
47-55; Hermann Stegemann, whose view also tended to be conservative,
reported the events sympathetically in Weltivende, 157.

112. Die Rote Fahne, June 28, July 6, 7, 1932.

113. Numerous references in cabinet session of July 11, 1932. Reichs-
kanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle; but some of the difficulties involved are indicated
in von Krosigk's picture of von Neurath's complete inability to speak extem-
poraneously before the Reichstag Committee on Foreign AfFairs. Es Geschah
in Deutschland, 313.

CH. IV. ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA

1. Notably, Julius Leber, Ein Mann Geht Seinen Weg, 187-90; 242-3; see
also Wilhelm Keii's indictment of the sterility of the party, Erlebnisse eines
Sozialdemokraten, II, 457. As Kurt von Reibnitz expressed it, Marxism was
only "eine Kulisse" for the party; the party directorate had only one man
less than 50 years of age (Kurt Schumacher) and two-thirds of the delegation
in the Reichstag was over 50. Im Dreieck, Schleicher, Hitler, Hindenhurg, 40-2.

2. Federalism and Regionalism, in Germany: the Division of Prussia.

3. Deutscher Einheitsstaat oder Foderativsystem? 32-3; cf. comments
of Severing, Lebensweg, 11, 155.

4. See his Das preussisch-deutsche Problem, Erkldrung des Bayerischen
Ministerprasidenten. . . . Sitzung des Unterausschusses II der Landerkonferenz
vom 18. November 1929.

5. Summarized from Brecht, Federalism and Regionalism, 73-89.

6. See fn. 4.

7. This had been proposed to Otto Braun in 1928, but he felt it would
jeopardize the position of his government in Prussia, Leber, Ein Mann Geht
Seinen Weg, 227. It was later advocated by Braun himself in November,
1931, as a step to be taken by Briining, but the action was not acceptable to
von Hindenburg. Von Weimar zu Hitler, 354-5.

8. Dr. Brecht states in a letter to the author, Feb. 24, 1957, "The frictions
following from the dualism of powers in the federal and the Prussian govern-
ment in Berlin were by no means merely fictional. They were very real,
especially between the two bureaucracies." This, of course, is not to be

242 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

doubted. The point at issue, however, is whether the only answer was a
drastic alteration of the governmental organization. Undoubtedly similar
comment would be true witli respect to bureaucracies of states and federal
government in the United States, but the pattern of state boundaries estab-
Ushed by history has been respected. A contemporary account by Walter
Heynen suggested with some cogency, that in cases of confhct the ultimate
power of defining jurisdiction ( tlie "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" as it was labeled! )
should be in the hands of the Reich. "Vorarbeiten zur Reichsreform." Preus-
sische Jahrbucher, CCXXVII, 172-7 (Jan.-Mar., 1932).

9. Eugen Schiffer, for example, listed in some detail the great profusion
ol governmental agencies operative in that time of depression ( the "plurahsm"
of state forms), and suggested the great economies which could be effected
by refonn. Sturm iiber Deutschland, 270, 278ff.

10. Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 4 Wahlperiode, Bd. I, 4 Sitz.,
June 2, 1932, 153.

11. Thilo Vogelsang, ed., "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichs-
wehr, 1930-1933." Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeit geschichte, 2 Jrg., 397-436 (Okt.,
1954), 423.

12. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, June 2, 1932.

13. Carl Misch, "Die Preussenfrage," June 8, 1932.

14. "Die Frage Preussens" in Der Angriff.

15. Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 4 Wahlp., Bd. I, 4 Sitz., June
2, 1932, 105-7.

16. Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 101.

17. See review of situation in Sackett to Secy, of State, June 14, 1932,
No. 1783, U. S. State Dept. Files, G/HS 862.00/2794.

18. Ibid.; cf. Vorwdrts, Jmie 9, 1932.

19. Der Angrijf, June 14, 1932.

20. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, June 21, 1932.

21. Ibid., June 25, 1932; the minutes of the Prussian cabinet for June 21,
1932, also indicate the support given by the Prussian State Ministry to pro-
posals for increased military and naval expenditures. Again, the Reich gov-
ernment could find no real reason to quarrel with the attitude of the Prussian
cabinet in relation to "national" questions. See Preussen, Staatsministerium,
Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatsministeriums, Hauptarchiv, BerUn-Dahlem,
Rep., 90 Bd. 1932, 51-2 (Hereafter cited, "Sitzungen des Preussischen Staats-
ministeriums" ) .

22. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, July 11, 1832, 5:30 P. M.

23. Ibid.; Noske, himself, says that he had suggested in 1930 a partial
solution of the question of Reichsreform "am kalten Wege" and that he had
also known leading men of tlie "Schleicher, Bracht, and Popitz" government
since 1919 and that tins explained liis continuance in his position as Ober-
prasident of Hannover under the commissional regime. Erlebtes aus Aufstieg
und Niedergang einer Demokratie^ 300-1, 310.

24. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, July 11, 1932, 5:30 P. M.

25. Ibid., July 12, 1932; part of the story of Diel's action is reconstructed
from Severing, Lebensweg, II, 342, part from Diels's own account, Lucifer
ante Portas; . . . es spricht der este Chef der Gestapo, 150, and from the
later court proceedings. See comments also in Eyck, Weimarer Republik, II,
505-6.

26. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, July 12, 1932.

27. Ibid., July 13, 1932.

28. Ibid., July 16, 1932.

29. Statistics summarized in Vonvdrts, July 19, 1932.

30. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, July 16, 1932.

31. Severing, Mein Lebensweg, II, 348-9; the account of tliis inter\-iew
and of later occurrences is also found in Preussen (unofficial), Preussen contra
Reich vor dem Staatsgerichtshof . Stenogrammbericht der V erhandlungen vor

ASSAULT ON PRUSSIA 243

clem Staatsgerichtshof in Leipzig vom 10. his 14. und vom 17. Oktoher 1932,
19-20, et seq. and in Preussen, Landtag, Drucksachen, 4 Wahlp., 1932, No.
1203.

32. Ibid.; Papen's own story varying in some details, Memoirs, 189-90;
see also Bracher, Auflosung, 582-91.

33. Grzesinski, Inside Germany, 157-60.

34. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, July 20, 1932, 6:00 P.M. Bracht
also indicated he had made the date and arnmgements for the "show of force."

35. Otto Klepper, "Das Ende der Repubhk," Die Gegenwart, 2 Jrg., Nr.
17/18 (30 Sept. 1947), 20-22.

36. Mein Lebensweg, II, 352-3; Severing also wrote his own account of
the events, "20 Juli 1932," for Die Gegenwart, 2 Jrg., Nr. 13/14, 14-17 (31
Juli 1947).

37. Von Weimar zu Hitler, 407-8.

38. Leber, Ein Mann Geht Seinen Weg, 187-91, 241-3; of. Erich Matthias,
"Der Untergang der alten Sozialdemokratie 1933," Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeit-
geschichte, 4 Jrg., 250-86 (1956), 254-8. See also the lengthy and able
discussion of the subject in Bracher, Auflosung, 591-600.

39. Letter to the author, March 9, 1957. It was this aspect of the matter
that led Briining to say after the event, "It was in no way necessary to treat
so harshly a man like Severing, a man who has fought for fourteen years of
liis life as no other man has fought for the state and its authority." Vorwdrts,
July 21, 1932.

40. So Macht Man Geschichte. Bilanz eines Lebens, 327-31.

41. Ibid., 331.

42. Berliner Tageblatt, July 20, 1932, P.M.

43. Grzesinski, Inside Germany, 159.

44. Berliner Tageblatt, July 21, 1932, A.M., P.M.

45. Die Rote Fahne, July 31, 1932, carried editorial comment claiming
that the Communists had been the only source of resistance; Berliner Tageblatt,
July 22, 1932, P.M.; Vorwdrts, July 22, 1932.

46. Bracher, Auflosung, 586-7; Vorwdrts, July 26, 1932.

47. Vorwdrts, July 22, 1932; cf. listings in Sitzungen des Preussischen
Staatsministeriums, Rep., 90 Bd., 1932, 57-8.

48. Vortvarts, July 24, 1932.

49. Ibid, July 23, 1932; cf. Berliner Tageblatt, July 23, 24, 1932.

50. Vorwarts, July 23, 26, 1932. See also Reichsgerichtsrat Schwalb's expla-
nation, "Staatsgerichtshof fiir das Deutsche Reich." Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung,
XXXVII Jrg., 1152-3 (15 September 1932).

51. Ein Mann Geht Seinen Weg, 207.

52. Dr. von Campe, "Quo vadis justitia?" Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung,
XXXVII Jrg., 825-9 (1 July 1932). For commentary on legal aspects of the
request for temporary injunction see reports of Wolfgang Bretholz, Berliner
Tageblatt, July 23, 25, 1932. It might be noted that Ministerial Directors
Brecht and Badt were given rooms in the Welfare Ministry and retained their
salaries in the period which followed, while they were preparing the case for
the deposed government. See Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatministeriums,
Rep., 90 Bd., 1932, 63, July 29 [?].

53. Eyck, Weimarer Republik, II, 513.

54. Schotte, Die Regierung Papen, 6.

55. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, July 11, 1932, P. M.

56. Ibid., July 20, 1932.

57. Karl Siegmar Baron von Galera, Geschichte unserer Zeit, Bd. VII, Der
DuTchbruchssieg des Natinnalsozialismus, 1932-1933, 10.

58. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, July 25, 1932.

59. Der Angriff, July 26, 1932; about the same time Giirtner, the Reich
Minister of Justice, announced in the Reich cabinet that he was not going to
follow up the case involving the "Boxheimer Documents" uncovered by the

244 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

ousted Prussian government during the previous year. Reichskanzlei, Kabinetts-
protokoUe, July 28, 1932.

60. Berliner Tageblatt, July 29, 1932; this change had been proposed in the
sessions of the deposed government on December 23, 1931, but not carried
out. See Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatsministeriums, Rep., 90 Bd., 1932,
63, July 29 [?], 1932.

61. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, July 26, 1932.

62. Ibid., August 4, 1932.

63. Ibid., August 9, 1932.

64. Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 137-8.

65. Ibid, 136-7.

66. He did. however, on August 15th, require that Der Angriff print a
report admitting that an S.S. man which the newspaper had reported killed by
Communists and Social Democrats had actually been killed by the explosion of
a bomb which he himself had held in his right hand!

67. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Aug. 15, 1932.

68. Gorlitz, Hindenburg, 382.

69. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Aug. 15, 1932.

70. Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 139-40.

71. Von Papen denied this charge in a speech in Munich on October 12th,
Ibid., 177-80, but see Schleicher's comments in Bracher, Auflosung, 612-3.

72. Berliner Tageblatt, Aug. 3, 1932.

73. Deutschland, Reichsrat, Niederschriften iiber die Vollsitzungen des
Reichsrats, Jrg. 1932, 21st Sess, 2 August 1932, No. 329, 160-1.

74. Galera, Geschichte, VI, 10.

75. Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 141, Aug. 18-19.

76. Galera, Geschichte, VI, 11; cabinet discussions of August 15th indicate
that a more thorough and complete administrative reform was well into the
planning stage, Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe. Such a change had already
been contemplated under Severing. See comments on the eUmination of 60
Amtsgerichte by Dr. Haase, "Sprechsaal: Die Aufhebung von 60. preussischen
Amtsgerichten." Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg., 221-2 (Feb. 1, 1932).

77. Vom Kaiserhof, 152.

78. Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 4 Wahlp., Bd. I, 17 Sitz., Aug. 30,
1932, 1369-1452. The Nazi action was completely inconsistent with their first
reactions to the institution of the Reich commissioner. At that time Kerrl, who
was considered partiaUy responsible for the action in view of his correspondence
with Papen prior to the coup, expressed strong approval. Vorwdrts, July 22,
1932.

79. Der Angriff, Sept. 2, 1932.

80. Auflosung, 601 ff.

81. See comment of Wilhelm Keil in which he suggested that Social Demo-
crats should "swing about" ("lavieren") in respect to the Papen government.
Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten, II, 455.

82. The story of this deed has recently been more carefully documented
in Paul Kluke, "Der FaU Potempa," Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 5 Jrg.,
279-99 (Juli, 1957).

83. Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 146-9.

84. Memoirs, 200-1. At the time, however, Papen was half inclined to
accord with Hans Heinrich Lammers' strong plea before the commissional cab-
inet that the amnesty reduce the penalty to fifteen years' imprisonment. That
the other members of the commissional government did not accept this sugges-
tion was due most largely to their recognition that tlie reduction of a death
penalty to anything less than life imprisonment would be regarded as a com-
pletely novel act by the pubUc. Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatsministeriums,
Rep., 90 Bd., 1932, 102-5, Sept. 2, 1932.

85. Ein Mann Geht Seinen Weg, 88.

86. GorUtz, Hindenburg, 384. A record of the conversation in relation to this

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 245

subject is found in Niederschrift iiber die Besprechung in Ncudeck am Diens-
tag, dem 30. 8. 1932, Schleicher Nachlass, Bd. 17, IV.

87. Ibid., 382. Briining states that after the July 31st elections Gregor
Strasser told him the Nazis were planning to bring complaint against von
Hindenburg before the Supreme Court under Article 59 of the Constitution
and a move for his removal under Article 43. He believes that this had an
increasing influence upon von Hindenburg's actions ("Ein Brief," Deutsche
Rundschau, 70 Jrg., 13-15). However, it would appear that as late as November
von Hindenburg still considered direct action against the Nazis.
88. Niederschrift iiber die Besprechung in Neudeck am Dienstag, dem 30.8.
1932, Schleicher Nachlass, Bd 17, IV.

CH. V. PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH

1. Walter Gorlitz had access to the von Hindenburg archives in writing his
biography, but he passes over this period very lightly and the sycophancy of
his account raises some question as to whether tliere may not well have been
voluntary errors of omission.

2. Meissner related this threat at the cabinet meeting of September 14th
with the indication that the Center Party supported it ( Reichskanzlei, Kabi-
nettsprotokolle ) . Exactly how it would have been implemented if the Reich-
stag elections had simply been postponed indefinitely would seem, however, a
little uncertain.

3. See Herre, Kronprinz Wilhelm, 212; Kaufmann, Monorchism in the
Weimar Republic, 208 ff. Kaufmann embellishes his account with the dubious
details found in Helmut Klotz's Berlin Diaries. Perhaps the best indication of
Papen's plans is foimd in the Vorwdrts article of October 11, 1932, in which
statements of the Crown Prince are related to the effect that agreement existed
among Papen, Schleicher, von Hindenburg, and himself that, at the appropriate
time, von Hindenburg would retire; he, the Crown Prince, would become
regent and establish his authoritv with the help or the regular army, the fed-
eralized Schutzpolizei. and the 400,000 members of the Stahlhelm. At the same
time Prince Runprecht would set up a Wittelsbach dynasty on the Danube.
The answer of the government is given in Chartre in German v. Gordon, to Secy,
of State. Oct. 24, 1932. No. 1995,' U. S. State Dept. Files, ^862.00/2862 G.C. in
which Gordon says the government declared the article "nurely a product of
the imagination." On the other hand, the government did not deny that the
Crown Prince was making propaganda, although it denied connivance of the
cabinet or of the President.

4. Details and evaluations which follow are based on Kenyon E. Poole,
German Financial Policies, 1932-1939, 35-73: also U. S. Ambassador in Ger-
manv, Sackett, to Secv. of State, Sent. 12, 1932, No. 1913; Sept. 27, 1932, No.
1927. U. S. State Dent. Files 862.50/738. 740; Am. Consul General in Berlin
to Secy, of State, Voluntarv Report No. 592 by Raymond H. Geist, Sept. 22,
1932, Ibid.. 862.50/742; Dr. Max Schlenker, "Arbeitslosigkeit und Papen-
Programm, "Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXX, 25-35 (Okt., 1932); Dr. Walter
Treuherz, "Das Wirtschafts-programm der Regierung," Ibid., 51-63.

5. U. S. State Department files include a most enthusiastic approval of the
Papen government's action bv Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, forwarded by
Julius Forstmann of New York, Sept. 15. 1932, 862.00/2849.

6. See the author's Verdict on Schacht, 50-1.

7. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Aug. 31, 1932.

8. Ibid. Papen reported that his hopes for the lengthy adfoumment derived
from an interview with Goerdeler, who had in turn come to him directly from
a conversation with Briining. By Papen's report it would appear that Goerdeler
was making himself something of a personal intermediary between the govern-
ment and the party leaders.

9. Verhandluufren des Reichsta^es, VI. Wahlp., 1932, Bd. 454, 1 Sitz. 1-11.
Papen was to label this attentive reception of Zetkin in contrast with the later

246 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

refusal to let him, the Reich Chancellor, speak, "the prostitution of the Ger-
man Parliament." IMT. XVI, 255, Testimony of June 14, 1946. Sackett com-
mented on the disparity between the age of the Nazi and that of the other
deputies, No. 1902 to Secy, of State, Sept. 2, 1932, U. S. State Dept. Files,
GRC 862.00/2847.

10. VerJiandlungen des Reichstages, VI. Wahlp, 1932, Bd. 454, 2 Sitz.,
13-15.

11. See description by former Reichstag President Lobe, Der Weg War
Lang, 157; cf. Bracher, Auflosung, 627-30.

12. Schulthess, LXXIII, 158-64, Sept. 12-13, 1932.

13. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Sept. 12, 1932.

14. Sackett commented, "owing to the attendant circumstances, his delivery
was embittered, not to say passionate, and betrayed the depth of his resent-
ment against the Nazis." No. 1915 to Secy, of State, Sept. 15, 1932, U. S.
State Dept. Files 862.00/2844 GC. Anlage 2 of Reichskanzlei Kabinettspro-
tokolle, Sept. 12, 1932, contains complete speech of von Papen.

15. Verhandlungen des Reichstages, VI. Wahlp., 1932, Bd. 454, 2 Sitz., 15.

16. See VoTwdrts, Sept. 4, 1932; Vossische Zeitung, Sept. 3, 1932; also the
very valuable analysis included in Am. Consul General in Berlin to Secy, of
State, report of John H. Morgan, No. 655, Nov. 29, 1932, on administrative
changes to that point, U. S. State Dept. Files, 862.51/3534. Morgan based his
report on interviews with Senats-prasident Dr. von Leyden, the former Prus-
sian Minister of Finance, Dr. Hoepker-Aschoff, and Oberreigierungrat Dr.
Walter Adametz, all of whom had been closely associated with the reform proj-
ects. The project had been under discussion within the commissional govern-
ment since August 4, 1932, and had occasioned considerable discussion in the
commissional cabinet although most of its members favored the process of
centralization involved. See Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatsministeriums,
Rep., 90 Bd., 1932, 66-113.

17. See commentary in both Vonvdrts and Vossische Zeitung. From the
session of the Prussian State Ministry (Commissional) on Sept. 2, 1932, how-
ever, it would appear that Bracht was lukewarm about the proposals to make
Prussia a Reichsland. He also indicated that as yet the plans of the Reich for
reform were quite indefinite and said that Prussia ought to be given an oppor-
tunity to participate in making plans for the changes to be advocated. Sitzungen
des Preussischen Staatsministeriums, Rep., Bd. 90, 111-2.

18. Vorwdrts, Sept. 18, 22, 23, 1932.

19. Ibid., Sept. 28, 1932; cf., Berliner Tagehlatt, Sept. 28, 30, 1932.

20. Vorwdrts, Oct. 27, 28, Nov. 15, 19, 1932.

21. Statement of Dr. Brecht in later Supreme Court hearings, Preussen
contra Reich, 92, 274. The list of changes is recorded in the Sitzungen des
Preussischen Staatsministeriums, Rep., 90 Bd., 1932, 132-41, Oct. 4, 1932.

22. Vossische Zeitung, Oct. 3, 1932; see Preussen, Landtag, Drucksachen,
4 Wahlp., 1 Tag., 1932, Drks. Nr. 1146, 497.

23. Vorwdrts, on Oct. 4, 1932, set forth the waggish invitation, "Zvidck
mich am Zwickel!"—

Gerettet ist die Sittlichkeit,

Hoch lebe die Moral!

Bracht schliesst am deutschen Badekleid

Das letzte Nachtoval.

Keusch angeschnitten wird das Bein,

Kein Ausschnitt bleibt, der noch so klein,

Denn schimmert rosig wo die Haut,

So kriegt dich gleich am Wickel

Der Schup, der solch Laster schaut.

Da zwick mich doch am Zwickel!
Vom Nackenwirbel zum Popo

PREUSSEN CONTRA REICH 247

Erstreckt sich ohne Blosse
Dein Anzug. Unten am Trikot
Gibts noch zwei Gehrockschosse,
Wir preisen der Regierung Macht,

Wie brachtvoll hat dies Bracht vollbracht!
Er hat uns jeden Leberfleck
bedect und jeden Pickel.
Und juckt es, flehn wir voll Respekt:
O zwick niich mal am Zwickel!
cf. comments of Communist deputy Schwenk in the Landtag on the eadier
decree, Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungherichte, 4 Wahlp., Bd. I, 17 Sitz., 30 Aug.
1932, 1439-40 and of Communist deputy Kasper, who predicted on November
25th that the next government requirement would be the wearing of "safety-
pins to keep one's pants buttoned." Ibid., 22 Sitz., 1860.

24. Vorwdrts, Sept. 3, 1932; cf. comments of Communist deputy Kasper
in the Landtag, Nov. 25, Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 4 WaWp., 1 Tag.,
Bd. II, 22 Sitz., 1867.

25. See debates in Landtag, Ibid., 18, 19 Sitz., 1472-1638.

26. Communist deputy Koenen summed it up when he proclaimed, "Papen
and Bracht blew on the 20th of July and Severing and Braun disappeared. And
now Papen and Bracht blow again. They gave Herr Kerrl the task: take this
whistle and make the resolution ( directive to the Civil Servants ) disappear—
and this command with the whistle you have obeyed." Ibid., 19 Sitz., 22 Sept.
1932, 1956.

27. Cf. Vorwdrts, Sept. 20, 1932, "Landtag als Reichstagersatz."

28. The personnel of the Staatsgerichtshof would have been different if
it had been considering an impeachment of the president. In that case the
judges from Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony would have been replaced by ten
representatives chosen by the Reichsrat and Reichstag.

29. Carl Misch, "Profile von Preussen-Prozess," Vossische Zeitung, Oct. 14,
1932.

30. Legalitdt und Legitimitdt, 96-7, contrasts "parlamentarische Legalitat
with "plebiszitare Legitimat." A page later he declares that the Weimar Con-
stitution was not one single constitution but two and that he prefers the one
which emphasizes the power of the Reich President as an "extra-ordinary law
maker." There had already been, prior to the court's proceedings, a preliminary
skirmish on the part of the professors — see Prof. Dr. Carl Schmitt, "Die Ver-
fassungsmassigkeit der Bestellung eines Reichskommissars fiir das Land Preus-
sen," Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg., 953-8 (1 August 1932); Dr.
von Dryander, "Zum Verhaltnis vom Reichs — und Landesgewalt," Ibid., 958-
63; Prof. Dr. Ciese, "Zur Verfassungsmassigkeit der vom Reich gegen und in
Preussen getroffenen Massnahmen," Ibid., 1022-4 (15 August 1932); Prof. Dr.
Bilfinger, "Exekution, Diktatur und Foderalismus," Ibid., 1017-21.

31. See note 29.

32. Von Jan died only a month later, Berliner Tageblatt, Nov. 28, 1932.

33. Ernst Rudolf Huber, Reichsgewalt und Staatsgerichtshof, 11.

34. This is one of the strongest criticisms made by Huber in his venom-
dipped attack, Reichsgewalt, 11-17. Arnold Brecht in a letter to the author,
dated Feb. 24, 1957, states, "It was unusual to postpone the discussion of
jurisdiction to the end of the procedures before the Staatsgerichtshof. But
Bimike had no bad intention in proposing that first the facts of the case were
fully presented. The Staatsgerichtshof was not bound by strict rules of pro-
cedure. Bumke rightly foresaw that discussions of jurisdiction would indirectly
lead to a fuller discussion of the facts of the case, and thought it would be
simpler and better serve clarity and truth if the discussions began with the
facts and the motions of the parties."

35. The following is based heavily on the printed record, Preussen contra
Reich. The author strongly recommends the volume as an orientation in Ger-

248 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

man legal history of the period.

36. See in particular, "IV. Bundesstaatlicher Charakter des Reichs," Ibid.,
112-24.

37. Ibid., 130-4, 148-57, 175-81; Huber in Reichsgewalt, 71-3, points out
that only Bavaria had denounced the President's issuance of the Dietramszeller
Verordnung and had refused to make use of it. The purpose of the decree, of
course, was to allow necessary economies in order to balance state budgets.
See Graf Westarp, "Die rechts-politischen Wirkungen des Leipziger Urteils,"
Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg., 1378-84 (15 November 1932).^

38. Professor Nawiasky summed this up when he said that Schmitt's view
of the Constitution was interesting but strictly his own — it had nothing to do
with the intentions of the framers of the Constitution. Preussen contra Reich,
234-5.

39. The term "Nationale Rechtstaat" was invented by Otto Koellreutter.
In the bourgeois state of law, said Koellreutter, individual legal security was
the ideal; in the national state of law, the security of the national way of Ufe
took precedence. Der Nationale Rechtstaat zum Wandel der deutschen Staats-
idee, 34.5.

40. Preussen contra Reich, 302-7. The Staatsgerichtshof had rejected ten
months before this proceeding the implication that the President's powers were
not subject to judicial review. See Prof. Dr. Ludwig Waldecker, "Der Staats-
gerichtshof zu Art. 48 Abs. 2 RV." Die Justiz, Bd. VII, Heft 4 (Jan., 1932),
173-8.

41. Preussen contra Reich, 124.

42. Ibid., 30-40, 52-9, et passim.

43. Ibid., 12-27; 41-51; 61-6; et passim. Also of great significance as a
record of the Prussian side of the case is the "Denkschrift iiber die Vorginge
vom 20. Juli 1932 und iiber die Verfassungsstreitigkeit des Freistaats Preussen
gegen das Deutsche Reich." Preussen, Landtag, Drucksachen, 4 Wahlp., 1 Tag.,
1932, Drks. Nr. 1203, 532-79.

44. Thus, Anon., "Germany," Time, XX (Nov. 7, 1932), 21; cf. Bracher,
Aufiosung, 638-9,.

45. The decision is found in Preussen contra Reich, 492-517, in Dr. Schwalb,
"Das Urteil des Staatsegerichtshof fiir das Deutsche Reich in der Klage:
Preussen gegen Reich," Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg., 1336-9 ( 1
November 1932) and in Drucksache Nr. 1231, Pr., Landtag, Drucksachen, 4
Wahlp., 1 Tag., 1932, 594-617. The latter is particularly interesting because
it reproduces in parallel colvmins the oral and written opinion of the court and
reveals that the oral opinion, which was the basis for most of the pubUc reac-
tions of the time, did not begin to reflect the full e.xtent of the criticism of the
actions of the Reich found in the written decision. The latter was not released
until November 19th. Vossische Zeitung, Nov. 19, 1932.

46. Memoirs, 192.

47. E. g., Koelheutter, Der Nationale Rechtstaat, 27-8; Huber, Reichsge-
walt, 38-44, 69-71; Ernst Pogge, Das Verhdltnis Reich und Lander einst (nach
der Weimarer Verfassung) und jetzt (nach den Gesetzen der nationalen Erhe-
bung) . . ., 39-40.

48. Thus, Graf Westarp, "Die rechtspolitischen Wirkungen des Leipziger
Urteils," Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg., 1378-84 (15 Nov. 1932),
1383 and Richard Brabeck, Die Gleichschaltung Preussens; ein rechtshistorisches
Problem Deutscher Staatsfiihrung, 47.

49. One member of the court, angered at charges that the court's decision
was completely artificial, later made exactly the answer reproduced above.—
Dr. Schwalb. See Berliner Tageblatt, Nov. 30, 1932.

CH. VI. NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES

1. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Oct. 28, 1932.

2. See, e.g. Vorwdrts, Oct. 26, 28, 1932. It is interesting to note that the

NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES 249

protocols of the Prussian State Ministry, which up to this time had carried
the normal designation of that body, now begin on October 27 to carry the
superscription, "Sitzung der Kommissarischen Staatsreigierung," and the mem-
bers are no longer referred to as though they were replacing the former minis-
ters, but are designated, "die vom Herrn Reichskanzler mit der Fiihrung der
preussischen Ministerien betrauten Herren," etc. At this same meeting, Papen
noted, "The division of powers involved in the ( Leipzig ) decision is, of course,
most uncomfortable; the Reich government is, however, determined not to
allow the fonner Prussian State Ministry to talk itself into any exercise of
executive powers. It (the Reich government) will designate offices for the
Braun cabinet and tell it that all questions of dispute are to be dealt with only
through Reich Commissioner Dr. Bracht." Papen also added that the election
of a new Minister President by the Landtag was not hkely prior to the Novem-
ber Reichstag elections, and that even if one were elected, it might well be
tliat the functions of the commissional government would not be disturbed.
Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatsministeriums, Rep., 90 Bd., 1932, 147 If.

3. Vorwdrts, Oct. 26, 28, 1932; cf. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 415-6;
Severing, Lehensweg, II, 368-9.

4. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Oct. 28, 1932.

5. Schulthess, LXXIII, 189-91, Oct. 28, 1932; cf. Bracher, Auftosung, 658,

6. Berliner Tageblatt, Oct. 27, 1932; the American Charge in Germany
at the time summarized the situation nicely when he reported home, "It is an
undeniable fact that the enthusiasm with which Papen's plans were acclaimed
by Rightist political circles only several weeks ago has been appreciably and
perceptibly dampened. . . . Any concessions which von Papen may be con-
strained to make to the Braun Cabinet as a result of the Supreme Court's
decision will be interpreted in these circles as a sign of weakness, which may
prove fatal politically to a Chancellor who displayed such dashing and daring
spirit on assuming office." Charge, Gordon to Secy, of State, Oct. 28, 1932,
No. 2005, U. S. State Dept. Files, 862.00/2864 GC.

7. Der Angriff, Oct. 26, 27, 31, 1932.

8. Berliner Tageblatt, Oct. 28, 1932; valuable explanation is also found in
tlie authoritative dispatch, see fn. 16, Ch. V., from the American Consul Gen-
eral in Beriin, No. 655, Nov. 29, 1932, U. S. State Dept. Files, 862.51/3534.
The decree found some opposition within the commissional government itself.
State Secretary Dr. Scheidt, who had been commissional head of the Welfare
Ministry, raised the question of its legality and specifically noted for protocol
purposes that he withheld his vote. Sitzungen des Preussichen Staatsminister-
iums, Rep., 90 Bd., 1932. 157-60, Oct. 28/29, 1932.

9. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 415-6.

10. Berliner Tageblatt, Nov. 1, 1932.

11. Vorivarts, Oct. 31, 1932; Schulthess, LXXIII, 192, Oct. 31, 1932. In
the first session of the cabinet of the new commissional regime, Papen noted
that the changes represented "a close linking" ("Verklammerung") of the
commissional regime with the Reich and added one of his usual high-flown
predictions, "The Reich government and the commissional Prussian State
Government signify a battle-partnership (Kampfgemeinschaft), which is con-
vinced that history will pronounce it correct, and which will not let itself be
led astray in its fight for accomplishment {die Sache) and for the state." Sit-
zungen des Preussischen Staatsministeriums, Rep. 90 Bd., 1932, 161 ff., Nov.
1, 1932.

12. Am. Charge in Germany, Gordon, to Secy, of State, Nov. 2 1932, No.
2007, U. S. State Dept. Files, 862.00/2865 GC.

13. Vorwiirts, Nov. 4, 1932, A. M.

14. Ibid.; Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 418.

15. See comments in Bracher, Aufldsung, 644; Anderson, Hammer or Anvil,
148; Stampfer, Die Vierzehn Jahre der ersten deutschen Republik, 594; Diels,
Lucifer ante Portas, 173. These reports stand in contradiction to that of Merker,

250 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

who says the Nazis and the Communists were two independent armies ranged
against a common opponent, Deutschland, Sein oder Nicht Sein?, I, 266.

16. Reichskqnzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Nov. 3, 1932.

17. Bracher, Aufidsung, 645-56. This is an example of the kind of election
study which might profitably be made of earlier stages of political affairs in
Weimar Germany.

18. Entirely theoretical and, therefore, not subject to any empirical evalua-
tion is the thesis of Papen and other rightist leaders such as Krosigk that there
would have been a strong support in Germany for a party of the "moderate
right." Such a party, for example, might have been the German Nationalist
Party, if it had not been for the bull-headed leadership of Hugenberg. It will
be noted, however, that none of those who have discussed such a party were
figures likely to have commanded a much greater support than Hugenberg
himself! See Papen, Memoirs, 211.

19. cf. Bracher, Auflosung, 659.

20. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Nov. 9, 1932.

21. Ibid.

22. Deutschland, Reichsrat, Niederschriften iiber die Vollsitzungen des
Reichsrats, Jrg. 1932, 22nd Sess, 10 Nov. 1932, No. 349, 172.

23. Ihid., 172-3.

24. Ihid., 173; No. 375, 179. Papen had noted in the Nov. 10 session of
the commissional cabinet that he hoped the Reichsrat protest would be pre-
vented by a personal letter he had written to Braun! He appears, however, to
have been correct in his prediction that only one of the separately represented
Prussian provinces would join Prussia. Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatsminls-
teriums, Rep., 90 Bd., 1932, 167-76.

25. Berliner Tagehlatt, Nov. 12, 1932; Vossische Zeitung, Nov. 12, 1932; cf.
Hst of changes, Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatsministeriums, Rep., 90 Bd.,
1932, 167-76 and comment by Am. Consul General in Berlin to Secy, of State,
No. 655, Nov. 29, 1932, U. S. State Dept. Files, 862.51/3534.

26. This was the answer made by Papen to serious criticism of the exten-
sion of the invitation voiced by von Krosigk, Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe,
Nov. 17, 1932.

27. See Keil, Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten, II, 469-70, for the strong-
est criticism of the party course. Leber, Ein Mann Geht Seinen Weg, 89 ff., also
displays some sympathy, and Noske, of course, could be numbered among the
critics of the policy of the directorate.

28. Report of Papen at Reich cabinet meeting of Nov. 17, 1932, Reichs-
kanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe.

29. Ibid.

30. Text, Doc. 633D, IMT, XXXV, 223-4. The English translation in Con-
spiracy, VII, 106-7, is faulty.

31. Doc. 634D, IMT„ XXXV, 225-30; Conspiracy, VII, 107-11.

32. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Nov. 17, 1932. Papen says that he
suggested at this meeting that it would be better for the cabinet to remain
in office until a new government should be formed but that Schleicher in-
sisted that the President should have a free hand {Memoirs, 214). The pro-
tocol indicates that the suggestion of deferring formal resignation until the
formation of a new government emanated from von Gayl and that Papen
himself was the first to oppose the idea.

33. Ibid.

34. Deutschland, Reichstag, V erhandlungen des Reichstages, VII. Wahlp.,
1932, Bd. 455, Anlage No. 6. Even the commissional regime had some doubts
about the amnesty question all the way down to the end of January, 1933. See
Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatsministeriums, Rep., 90 Bd., 1933, 1-16, Jan.
10, 23, 1933.

35. "Zum Verfassimgsstreit Preussen gegen Reich." Deutsche Juristen-
Zeitung, XXXVII, 1373-8 (15 Nov. 1932).

NIEDERGANG DES RECHTSSTAATES 251

36. Deutschland, Reichsrat, Niederschriften iiber die Vollsitzungen des
Reichsrats, Jrg. 1932, 23rd Sess., 18 Nov. 1932, 188-9.

37. Berliner Tagehlatt, Nov. 19, 1932: Vossische Zeitung, Nov. 19, 1932,
P.M.

38. Berliner Tagehlatt, Nov.^ 24, 1932, P.M.; Galera, Geschichte, VII, 143.
As Arnold Brecht describes it, "This new suit dealt with about ten such con-
troversial points, many of them minor in character, but including such as
these: that the Prussian Ministers should not be assigned rooms in a special
building (the building of the Staatsrat), which had been done, but should be
permitted to use their legitimate office rooms in their respective ministries;
diat the mail addressed to them should be delivered to them and not to the
commissaries, so that it was not left to the commissaries to sort the letters as to
which were to be handled by them and which were to be forwarded to the
Ministers, but the other way round, that the Ministers received the mail
addressed to them (with or without the name given on the address) and then
forwarded those that dealt with subject-matter transferred to the commis-
saries to the latter; that the Great Seal of the State of Prussia was to be
handed over to the Ministers and not to be used by the commissaries, who
should use the Reich seal instead; that the right of pardon or of commutation
of sentence and the negative decision on petitions to that effect was a juris-
diction of the Ministers, not of the commissaries (this was a matter of some
consequence, because the execution of a criminal was pending and was stayed
because of the uncertainty whether the commissaries or the Ministers had to
exercise the right of pardon; the commissaries had rejected the plea for pardon,
but the attorney of the criminal questioned the legitimacy of this negative
decision) . . . these were relatively speaking minor political points, although
of some prestige weight." Letter to author, April 20, 1958.

39. Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 4 Wahlp., 1 Tag., Bd. II, 21 Sitz.,
1830-35, 24 Nov. 1932.

40. Ibid., 22 Sitz., 25 Nov. 1932, 1856-70; 1888-92.

41. Berliner Tagehlatt, Nov. 31, 1932.

42. Correspondence found in Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 203-13, Nov.
21-4; background and details from the Schleicher Nachlass are found in
Bracher, Auflosung, 662-6.

43. Hindenburg's strong desire to cling to Papen is documented by the
pathetic commentary recorded in the Schleicher Nachlass: "I come into an ever
more difficult situation. They are trying to take away the man in whom I
trust and force a ( different ) chancellor on me." Cited, Bracher, Auflosung, 667.

44. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Nov. 25, 1932.

45. Ibid. It will be noted that this duplicates the resassuring words of
Col. Bredow recorded on November 3rd.

46. The complete record is found in Georg Castellan, "Von Schleicher,
von Papen et I'avenement de Hitler." Cahiers d'Histoire de la Guerre (Pub-
lication du Comite d'Histoire de la Guerre), Numero 1 (Janvier, 1949), 15-39,
along with some valuable reports of French military attaches in Berlin; see
also Memoirs of von Papen, 220-2; Bracher, Auflosung, 674-5.

47. Bracher says that Ott believes the suggestion of Nazi-Communist
cooperation emanated from Papen, while other sources indicate the idea
derived from the Reichswehr itself. Auflosung, 674 fn. 88.

48. The suggestion is based on Briining, "Ein Brief," Deutsche Rundschau,
70 Jrg., 1-22 (July, 1947) and Meissner, Staatssekretdr, 245-6.

49. Papen, Memoirs, 222-4; as noted by Bracher, Auflosung, 672-6, Meiss-
ner's recollection of this period is so faulty that he places the report of Ott
and plans for authoritarian action on November 17th rather than December
2nd. Thus, the man who should be the best source of information on this
critical period reveals his complete inability to add the needed details. For
this reason, also, the author would be inclined to accept Papen's repudiation
of the accuracy of Meissner's protocol of the cabinet session which resulted

252 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

in his resignation. Papen denies that the entire cabinet was opposed to him
and the record of the earher sessions makes it appear extremely unHkely
that von Gayl, Eltz-Riibenach, and some of the others had changed their
position so quickly. See Thilo Vogelsang, ed., "Dokumentation, Zur Politik
Schleichers Gegemiber der NSDAP, 1932," Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte,
6 Jrg., Heft 1, 105-15.

50. See similar note in Emil Daniels, "Politische Korrespondenz: die kom-
menden Reichstagswahlen," Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXX, 85-95 (October,
1932), 89.

51. See commentary on Bracht's role in Ambassador in Germany, Sackett,
to Secy, of State, Dec. 5, 1932, No. 2063, U. S. State Dept. Files, GP
862.00/2877.

CH. VII. PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER

1. The only full-scale biography of Schleicher which has appeared dates
from the end of 1932: Kurt Caro and Walter Oehme, Schleichers Aufstieg:
ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Gegenrevolution. A political propaganda piece
directed against Schleicher, it has little research value. More sympathetic
is the character sketch in Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, Es Geschah in
Deutschland. Menschenbilder unseres Jahrunderts, 115-22. Beyond these,
the only lengthy sketch is found in the mordantly critical chapter in Wheeler-
Bennett, Nemesis of Power, 182-286.

2. See the intimate correspondence between Schleicher and the Crown
Prince, Schleicher Nachlass, Koblenz, Bd. 17/V and Bd. 69.

3. Cf. critical commentary of Caro and Oehme, Schleichers Aufstieg, 265;
Rheinbaben, Viermal Deutschland, 302-6; Braun, Vo7i Weimar zu Hitler, 431-9.

4. Schwerin von Krosigk, Es Geschah in Deutschland, 118-9.

5. DBFP, Second Series, IV, 99, Rumbold to Sir John Simon, Dec. 7,
1932, No. 44.

6. See review in Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, 182-220.

7. Cf. similar judgment by Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian
Army, 453-5.

8. Schwerin von Krosigk, Es Geschah in Deutschland, 119.

9. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, 237 fn. 3.

10. Viermal Deutschland, 303-4. See also von Schleicher's comment in a
letter to the editor of the Vossische Zeitung dated Jan. 30, 1934, that the
failure of the conference with von Hindenburg was due to the advice of the
President's "only influential adviser" ( Papen thinks this means him, but the
weight of probability points to Meissner). Thilo Vogelsang, ed., "Dokumen-
tation: Zur Politik Schleichers Gegeniiber der NSDAP, 1932," Vierteljahrshefte
fiir Zeitgeschichte, 6 Jrg., Heft 1, 89 (Jan., 1958).

11. Caro and Oehme, Schleichers Aufstieg, 266.

12. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Jan. 17, 1933; see also cautions
in regard to secrecy. Ibid., Dec. 14, 1932.

13. Bracher, Auflosung, 688 fn. 8.

14. Ibid., 552; U. S. Ambassador Sackett commented, "The new Minister
of Labor, Dr. Syrup, will not have to cope with the opposition of organized
labor as did his predecessor; he enjoys the confidence of the industrialists
as well as the trade unions." No. 2063 to Secy, of State, Dec. 5, 1932, U. S.
State Dept. Files, GP 862.00/2877.^

15. Bracher, Auflosung, 332, 625 fn. 108, 677. Gereke's plan proposed
decentralized "work-creation" projects sponsored by local governments on the
basis of non-interest-bearing credits. Its inflationary character cannot be
doubted. See Dr. Curt Hoff, "Gereke und sein Plan," Vossische Zeitung,
Dec. 5, 1932.

16. Strasser has always obtained rather friendly notice from non-Nazi
commentators. A recent assessment of his role states, "Strasser was certainly
no materialist in the Marxian sense of the word, even though his violent anti-

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 253

capitalism often came close to the position of the extreme Left. And if
Strasser was a Nazi, he was so in a very personal way, with his own hopes
and reservations. Ideologically, his place was . . . with neo-conservatism. In
his own terms, his world . . . was the world of 'allegiances,' of the 'we-idea,'
of conservatism.' " Klemens von Klemperer, Germany's New Conservatism,
137-8. Strasser 's brother. Otto, had deserted the party earlier, at which
time Gregor had taken a strong public stand as a "Hitler man." Kurt von
Reibnitz, Im Dreieck, Schleicher, Hitler, von Hindenburg . . . , 30. The
events of the break are, perhaps, still best detailed in Heiden, A History of
National Socialism, 205-22.

17. It would seem that the Hindenburg obstacle was Schleicher's chief
cause for caution and, as a consequence, the criticisms of Schleicher for his
hesitation are not well justified. Cf. Schlange-Schoningen, Am Tage Danach,
81-2, "With more determination, the possibiUty probably existed even yet to
avoid the worst. .. . But Schleicher let the short time which was given
him pass unused." Stegemann, Weltwende, 181-2: "Also, Schleicher was
by nature a player who planned on a long-range basis, and for this there
was really no longer time. The chancellor . . . knew how to awaken every-
one's hopes, but let the deed lie waiting."

18. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 9, 1932, B-1.

19. Vossische Zeitung, Dec. 3, 1932; cf. Bracher, Auflosung, 677.

20. See commentary of Friedrich Stampfer, Die Vierzehn Jahre der Ersten
Deutsche Republik, 600-1.

21. Deutschland, Reichstag, Verhandlungen, Bd. 455, VII. Wahlp., 2
Sitz., 23-31; cf. Sackett to Secy, of State, No. 2072, Dec. 12, 1932, U. S.
State Dept. Files, GRC 862.00/2880, which adds the comment that the
Nationalist counter-proposal of allowing the President to designate an Acting-
President was designed to pave the way for a regency.

22. Bracher, Auflosung, 679-80. Schleicher's optimism about the possi-
bility of Nazi toleration was expressed in the cabinet session of Dec. 7, 1932,
Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe.

23. Bracher, Auflosung, 680-1.

24. On Dec. 7, 1932, Schleicher informed the cabinet that he had turned
the social program of his government over to the suggestion of the Center
Party, but that he feared the plans underway for a "Winter Help" program
would require funds not available. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe. In the
long run, the "Winter Help" program was restricted to a subsidy arrangement
which reduced the cost of fresh meat; no free foods were supphed.

25. Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 220, Dec. 9; cf. Sackett to Secy of State,
No. 2070, Dec. 14, 1932, U. S., Dept. of State, Foreign Relations ( 1932, II,
321-3.

26. Gerhard Schultze-Pfaelzer, Deutsche Geschichte, 1918-1933. Vom
Zweiten Reich zum Dritten Reich, 301.

27. Bracher, Auflosung, 681.

28. See cartoons, Dec. 10, 11, 1932.

29. U. S. Ambassador Sackett to Secy, of State, No. 2071, Dec. 12, 1932,
U. S., Dept. of State, For. Rels., 1932, II, 320-1. An interesting but not
clearly identifiable letter (internal contents indicate it was given to von
Schleicher by the Grown Prince for information) dated Dec. 13, 1932, supplies
seme suggestions in respect to Schleicher's plans which do not agree with
those normally noted. In view of its significance, it seems worthwhile to quote
the pertinent sections in full: "The situation in respect to Gregor Strasser
is as follows: After my discussion yesterday of more than two hours alone
with Frick, it is clear to me that he will in extremity go with Strasser. Today,
as I waited in Gregor's home together with hJs brother-in-law Vollmut,
whom your imperial highness has seen with me, who follows your line
completely and asks to be recommended as a loyal follower, for a telegram
for today's publication, Frick once again said to me: "You know that I can

254 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

move out easily at any time (mit leichtem Gepack losziehen). I have my
own line to which I have committed myself; I'm not counting on anything
else.' That is clear and the stirring (Gahrung) among the good people of the
party is common. Much is being organized in regard to this. Gregor Strasser
has now traveled still further abroad, he telephones this evening from Rome.
He wiU be home on Christmas eve for his children's sake.

In the week after Christmas he will have the decisive discussion with
Hitler, the result of which will be sooner or later his exclusion from the party.
Hitler looks at the conflict falsely, minimizes his opposition and asserts that
if he gives him a special position in the Reich leadership, he will come around.
Of this there can be no talk.

There are, now, some variations possible. Either Strasser will not be
immediately cut off by Hitler, who often delays his action. This appears
possible only for a short time, since Strasser wants to clarify the situation.

Or, on the other hand, Strasser will be shut out (of the party), but will
defend himself. This appears extremely unlikely, not only because it contro-
verts the leadership principle, but also because it does not agree with Strasser's
character as I understand it. Let it be assumed then that he will be shut out
(of the party). Allow me to construct a kind of working hypothesis. If, for
example, Herr von Schleicher then summons him and offers him the post of
Reich Minister of Interior, and Herr Bracht that of Prussian Minister President
and Vice Chancellor, then much might be achieved in behalf of nationalist
sentiments. Herr von Schleicher must, of course, in every case make a
thorough job of it in order to be able to work effectively for the future, for
nothing can be done with half measures and he is only using up his own
prestige hke the rest. It would then be conceivable in a kind of pohtical
emergency, which is not difficult to justify, to dissolve aU political parties
and associations temporarily, with the advance knowledge of their leaders,
to issue a permanent prohibition of the Communist Party and take mifitary
measures against it, the other organizations, however, to be allowed to recon-
stitute themselves. In the interval, which needs only be very brief, Gregor
Strasser must step forward and take charge of the leadership of the party
either by his own appeal or that of Frick.

Then the division would almost certainly affect Hitler and not Schleicher.

The party which Gregor could bring to Schleicher as a positive support
of the government would certainly contain the best elements of the N.S.D.A.P.
Thereafter, it would, perhaps, be proper to set up elections for a National
Assembly.

Hitler, however, would then stand all at once far to the left.

Whether it is in the best interests of the matter that Strasser should see
your imperial highness and the chancellor shortly after Christmas, that is,
before the discussion with Hitler, I leave to you to decide. In any case I
request that your imperial highness as quickly as possible inform me by
letter about your attitude and that of General von Schleicher. Also, please
bum this letter." Schleicher Nachlass, Koblenz, Bd. 17/V.

30. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 431-3; Severing says he would have
opposed the meeting with Schleicher if he had had a chance to do so. Mein
Lebensweg, II, 376. It is to be noted that the arrangements in respect to
Prussia are different from those suggested in fn. 29.

31. Dec. 9, 1932.

32. Berliner Tageblatt, Dec. 13, 1932.

33. Thilo Vogelsang ,ed., "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichs-
wehr, 1930-1933," Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeit geschichte, 2 Jrg., 397-436 (Okt.,
1954), 429. But Schleicher had told Prussian Center Party Leader Dr.
Lauscher on Dec. 9, 1932, that he hoped to use the Prussian question to force
the Nazis to toleration, Vorwdrts, Dec. 9, 1932. How much weight is to be
given to his nachtrdglich justification of Aug. 5, 1933, that he had preserved
the best of relationships with Goring is more than a Uttle dubious. See Thilo

PRUSSIA: KEY TO HITLER 255

Vogelsang, ed., "Dokumentation: Zur Politik Schleichers Gegeniiber der
NSDAP, 1932," Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 6 Jrg., 1 Heft, 88-9
(Jan., 1958).

34. See despatches printed in U. S., Dept. of State, For Rels., 1932, I,
416-508, and final agreement, Ihid., 527-8.

35. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Dec. 14, 1932; in the commissional
government, however, there were a number of doubts expressed about nego-
tiation with the Braun regime. Bracht, however, from this point on works
rather strongly toward compromise arrangements. Sitzungen des Preussischen
Staatsministeriums, Rep., 90 Bd., 1932, 189, Dec. 13, 1932.

36. Rote Fahne, Dec. 14-15, 1932.

37. Bracher, Auflosung, 684.

38. Vorwdrts, Dec. 9, 1932.

39. Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 4 Wahlp., Bd. II, 1 Tag., 24, 25
Sitz., 14 Dez. 1932, 2022-5.

40. Ibid., 28 Sitz., 16 Dez. 1932, 2155-6.

41. Vom Kaiserhof, 225, Dec. 15, 1932.

42. Deutschland, Reichsrat, Niederschriften iiber die Vollsitzungen des
Reichsrats, Jrg. 1932, 26th Sess., 15 Dec. 1932, 204.

43. Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 223-31.

44. Ibid., 228.

45. Dec. 16, 1932, P.M.

46. Reported in Rote Fahne, Dec. 23, 1932. Another Communist source,
Merker, in Deutschland, Sein order Nich Sein?, I, 277, reports that Schleicher
told Leipart and Wilhelm Eggert, who accompanied him to the conference,
that he believed the previous government had cut wages too much and also
had spent too much money for Osthilfe. Merker varies somewhat from his
straight Communist hne in the half sympathy he displays for Schleicher.

47. Cf., Bracher, Auflosung, 684-5.

48. Vorwdrts, Dec. 20, 1932.

49. Bracher, Auflosung, 685.

50. Am. Consul General in Berlin to Secy, of State, Voluntary Report
No. 684, Wm. E. Beitz, Dec. 21, 1932, U. S. State Dept. Files, 862.50/748.

51. Am. Consul General in Berlin to Secy, of State, No. 1128, Feb. 3,
1933, U. S. State Dept. Files, 862.50/748; cf. favorable comments of Merker,
Deutschland, Sein order Nicht Sein?, I, 283.

52. See replica, Vorwdrts, Dec. 21, 1932.

53. Comment related by Theodor Eschenburg, "Franz von Papen," Vier-
teljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 1 Jrg., 153-69 (Apr,, 1953). 163.

54. Ibid. '

55. Ibid.

56. Vorwdrts, Dec. 27, 1932.

57. Repeated on Dec. 30, 1932, Schulthess, LXXIII (1932), 232-3.

58. Vorwdrts, Jan. 2, 3, 1933.

59. Ibid., Jan. 4, 1933.

60. Bracher, Auflosung, 688; Otto Meissner, Staatssekretdr, 251-2, adds
that von Hindenburg had expressed as a result of the conference his wdlling-
ness for Strasser to enter the government and to become vice-chancellor. He
also asserts that there was a wide support within the party for Strasser's
move, including Dr. Frick and a number of the party's "Gau leaders," but
that Hitler had squelched this by the discipUnary meeting at the Kaiserhof.
Meissner confuses the events of December (the disciplinary meeting at the
Kaiserhof) and January (the conference of Strasser with von Hindenburg).
This is one more example of the inaccuracy which renders Meissner's work
less valuable than it should be.

61. See entries of Jan. 3, Jan. 13, 1933, Vom Kaiserhof, 234, 241.

62. Bracher, Auflosung, 689-90. Schroder himself, however, dated the
inauguration of discussions of a conference with Hitler earher than the
speech before the Herrenklub, see Castellan, "Von Schleicher, von Papen, et

256 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

I'avenement d'Hitler," Cahiers d'Histoire de la Guerre, Numero 1, 33-4 (Jan.,
1949); Conspiracy, II, 992-4. Perhaps the cHnching evidence in respect to
the anti-Schleicher nature of this intrigue is given in the letter of Wilhehn
Keppler to Baron Schroder, dated Dec. 26, 1932, in which he wrote, "In con-
sequence of the events of August 13th, which the Fiihrer always took as a
personal defeat, his attitude in regard to von Papen was, for a long time,
very bad. I have always interceded with him for von Papen and against von
Schleicher; the feeling became better with time, and he is said to have taken
well the recently expressed wish ( for a conference ) ; I hope that your adroit-
ness will succeed in removing the last obstacles to the conference." Quoted,
Thilo Vogelsang, "Dokumentation: Zur Politik Schleichers Geginiiber der
NSDAP, 1932," Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 6 Jrg., 1 Heft, 86-7
(Jan., 1958).

63. Ibid.

64. IMT, IX, 390, 16 March 1946.

65. Conspiracy, Supp. B, 1455-6, Interrog. of Sept. 3, 1945; cf. Papen,
Memoirs, 232.

66. Bracher, Auflosung, 690-3; Eyck, Weimarer Repuhlik, II, 572-3.

67. Bracher Auflosung, 698; Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 11, 16, 20.

68. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 437-8.

69. Bracher, Auflosung, 699.

70. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 11-14; Bracher, Auflosung, 697-8; Gorlitz,
Hindenburg, 398-9.

71. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Jan. 16, 1933.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Bracher, Auflosung, 701-7.

75. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Jan. 17, 1933.

76. See summary by Am. Consul in Berlin to Secy, of State, No. 660 (by
Vice Consul Gray), Dec. 6, 1932, and Am. Consul in Berlin, Raymond H.
Geist to Secy, of State, No. 1272 (by Vice Consul C. T. Zawadzki), May 26,
1934, U. S. State Dept. Files 800.52/11/195.

77. Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 4 Wahlp., 1 Tag., 30-31 Sitz.,
18-19 Jan. 1933, 2349-2488.

78. Ibid., 2349-64.

79. Ibid., 2352.

80. Ibid., 2353.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., 2355.

83. Ibid., 2361-3.

84. Vorwarts, Jan. 25, 27, 1933.

85. Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatsministeriums, Rep., 90 Bd., 1933,
1-16, Jan. 10, 23, 1933.

86. Papen dates this specific commissioning, Jan. 28th, but the events
seem to indicate he was functioning in this capacity earlier. Memoirs, 239;
cf. Bracher, Auflosung, 708-9; IMT, IX, 246-7; XVI, 266-8; Bullock, Hitler, 233.

87. Bullock, Hitler, 233.

88. See report of French military attache, Feb. 2, 1933, in Castellan, "Von
Schleicher, von Papen, et I'avenement d'Hitler," Cahiers d'Histoire de la
Guerre, Nr. 1, 29-30 (Jan., 1949).

89. Meissner, Staatssekretdr, 253-6; Bracher, Auflosung, 710-4.

90. Vorwarts, Jan. 28, 1933.

91. See reports of Goring, IMT, IX, 247-9 (March 13, 1946); Papen, Ibid.,
XVI, 268-9 (June 17, 1946).

92. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Jan. 28, 1933, 11:00 A.M.

93. Bracher, Auflosung, 721-4.

THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA 257

CH. VIII. THE NAZIFICATION OF PRUSSIA

1. Hitler at Munich, March 19, 1934, quoted by Alan Bullock in "The
Political Ideas of Adolf Hitler," in Maurice Baumont, John H. E. Fried, and
Edmond Vermeil, ed.. The Third Reich, 350.

2. Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944. With an introductory essay of "The
Mind of Adolf Hitler" by H. R. Trevor-Roper.

3. Quoted above, p. 351; of. Center comment of much the same order:
"We do not yield. In the long run we also have a good sense of that which
is called an episode. We will also survive this one." Quoted in Gerhard
Schultze-Pfaelzer, Deutsche Geschichte, 1918-1933, 308. In the Landtag on
Feb. 4, Communist deputy Wilhelm Pieck labeled Hugenberg "the stronger
man in this government," joshed the Nazis on the way they had come to power,
and ended with the line, "That this government coalition will last long is
scarcely probable. . . . Von Papen ruled five months, von Schleicher two months,
and Hitler?" Sitzungsherichte, 4 Wahlp., 1 Tag., 32 Sitz., 2530-1.

4. See comments of Pieck, quoted fn. 3; Vorwdrts labeled the Hitler cabinet,
the "cabinet of big business" and played strongly on Hugenberg's position,
Jan. 30, 1933.

5. See essay in Schwerin von Krosigk, Es Geschah in Deutchland, 171-8.

6. Vorwdrts, Jan. 25, 1933.

7. Schlange-Schoningen, Am Tage Danach, 84.

8. Giirtner did not join the cabinet until the failure of the negotiations
with the Center discussed below, Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 30-1.

9. See Schwerin von Krosigk's picture of Hugenberg's attitude, Es Geschah
in Deutschland, 174-5.

10. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Jan. 30, 1933; this protocol has
been reprinted in Conspiracy, III, 270-5.

11. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle. This protocol has been printed
in DGFP, Series C, I, 5-8.

12. Niederschriften iiber die Vollsitzungen des Reichsrats, Jrg. 1933, 4th
Sess., 31 Jan. 1933, No. 60, 34.

13. Ibid.

14. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Jan. 31, 1933; cf. Meissner, Staats-
sekretdr, 270.

15. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 32-3; Bullock, Hitler, 234.

16. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Feb. 1, 1933, reprinted in DGFP,
Series C, 1, 15-17.

17. Ibid., Feb. 2, 1933; DGFP, Series C, I, 17-18 (in part).

18. See comments in cabinet, Feb. 2, 1933, Ibid.

19. Niederschriften iiber die Vollsitzungen des Reichsrats, Jrg. 1933, 5th
Sess., 2 Feb. 1933, Nr. 67, 38.

20. Ibid., 38-9.

21. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, Feb. 3, 1933.

22. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 38-9; cf. records of commissional cabinet
in Prussia, Sitzungen des Preussischen Staatsministeriums, Rep., Bd. 90, 1933,
17-20. Bracht returned to a ministerial directorate in the Ministry of the
Interior.

23. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 442-3; correspondence reviewed by
Volkischer Beobachter (Berlin Edition), Feb. 8, 1933.

24. Sitzungsherichte, 4 Wahlp., 1 Tag., 32 Sitz., 4 Feb. 1933, 2497-2500;
2511-17; the rather loose translation of Geschaftsmachende seems justified to
preserve the flavor of the original pun.

25. Ibid., 2543, 2547-52, 2532.

26. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 39; Paul Weymar, Adenauer, His Au-
thorized Biography, 96-7.

27. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 39; cf. Braun, Von Weimar zu Hitler, 44.
Even in this final analysis Braun advises moderation in the judgment set upon
"an unpolitical and over-aged man" who was "the victim of conscienceless.

258 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

intriguing advisers." The author's critical judgment of the decree is similar to
that in Apelt, Geschichte der Weimar er Verfassung, 437.

28. The complaint involved 11 typewritten pages and 10 pages of annex.
Vorwdrts, Feb. 8, 1933.

29. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 40.

30. Feb. 11, 1933.

31. Vorwdrts, Feb. 7, 23, 1933.

32. See report of U. S. Ambassador Sackett, Feb. 7, 1933, No. 2178, U. S.
State Dept. Files, GP 862.00/2902; Heiden, Der Fuehrer, 549.

33. Volkischer Beobachter (Berlin), Feb. 14, 1933.

34. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 47; cf. Diels, Lucifer ante Fortas, 214 ff.

35. Heiden, Der Fuehrer, 550.

36. Volkischer Beobachter (Berlin), Feb. 19/20, 23, 1933; YorwdHs,
Feb. 23, 1933.

37. See report of Sackett, Feb. 25, 1933, Telegram No. 26, U. S. State
Dept. Files, GP 862.00/2915; Heiden Der Fuehrer, 548; Reichskanzlei, Kabi-
nettsprotokoUe, Feb. 22, 1933.

38. Deutschland, Reichsrat, Niederschriften iiber die Vollsitzungen des
Reichsrats, Jrg. 1933, 6th Sess., 16 Feb. 1933, 41-4; Papen was, of course, the
official head of the Prussian deputation. His designation and that of other
ministers who were also members of the Reich Cabinet was a clear and open
violation of the Staatsgerichshof's decision. Sitzungen des Preussischen Staats-
ministeriums. Rep., 90 Bd., 1933, 21-8, Feb. 11, 1933.

39. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Feb. 16, 1933.

40. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 48.

41. Vorwdrts, Feb. 24, 1933.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., Feb. 25, 1933. Dr. Brecht relates that he and a Leipzig attorney
representing the Reich met with Bumke, who decided after a long discussion
and in spite of Brecht's warnings that it was technically impossible to consider
the case before the elections of March 5. Letter to author, April 20, 1958.

44. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, Mar, 2, 1933.

45. Ibid., Feb. 28, 1933, 11:00 and 4:15.

46. Keil, Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten, II, 472-3, 492.

47. Speeches reproduced in Franz von Papen, Appell an das deutsche
Gewissen. Reden zur nationalen Revolution, 51-79.

48. Volkischer Beobachter (Berlin), March 3, 1933.

49. Von Weimar zu Hitler, 450-3.

50. "Das Exil und Sokrates," Der Marsch dutch zwei Jahrzehnte, 352-73.

51. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 54.

52. Ibid., 55-6.

53. Again, from the cabinet protocol, Papen would appear to have been
a prime mover in the process. Reichskanzlei, KabinettsprotokoUe, March 7, 1933.

54. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 57.

55. Friedrich Karl Steffen, Das Berliner Stadtverfassungsrecht, 215.

56. Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 470; see speeches in
Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 60-6.

57. Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 5 Wahlp., 1 Tag., 1 Sitz., 22
Mar. 1933. 4.

58. Ibid., 14.

59. Emil Sommermann, Der Reichsstatthalter. Fine staatsrechtliche Unter-
suchung des zweiten Gesetzes zur Gleichschaltung der Lander mit dem
Reich, 16.

60. See Arnold Brecht, Prelude to Silence, 99, "Five Safety Valves for
Liberty."

61. It is, of course, debatable whether these actions marked a complete
end of the Weimar Republic. Apelt, Geschichte der Weimarer Verfassung,
439, believes so; for a longer but inconclusive examination of the question, see

THE DEATH OF PRUSSIA 259

Hans Schneider, Das Ermdchtigungsgesetz vom 24. Mdrz 1933 (Schnftenreihe
der Bundeszentrale fiir Heimatsdienst, 10). Nazi sources as late as 1934
claimed that the Weimar Constitution was still "formally" in effect. See
Helmut Nicolai, Der Neuaufbau des Reiches nach dem Fieichsreformgesetz
vom 30. January 1934 (Das Recht der nationalen Revolution, Heft 9), 31-2.

62. Reichskanzlei, Kabinettsprotokolle, March 29, 1933.

63. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 80-1; Sommermann, Der Reichsstatt-
halter, 18.

64. Ibid.; William Gueydan de Roussel, L'Evolution du Pouvoir Executif
en Allemagne (1919-1934). 143.

65. See study by Sommermann cited above and that by one of the authors
of the act, Carl Schmitt, Das Reichsstatthaltergesetz (Das Recht der nationalen
Revolution, Heft 3).

66. Cf. commentary of Am. Consul General in Berlin (report of John H.
Morgan, April 13, 1933), No. 1242, April 18, 1933, U. S. State Dept. Files,
GRC 862.01/91.

67. Schmitt, Das Reichsstatthaltergesetz, 10, 21-3; Gueydan de Roussel,
L'Evolution du Pouvoir Executif, 149; Sommermann, Der Reichsstatthalter,
47-9.

68. E.g., Sommermann, Der Reichsstatthalter, 62-3. The Nazis were, of
course, neither the first nor the last to allude to Slavic elements in the popu-
lation. The reference applied most particularly to the Silesian area. Probably
Slavicism within Germany was more a matter of psychology than of reality.

69. Doc. 3357 PS, IMT, XXXII, 232.

70. Schulthess, LXXIV, 97-102. The British Ambassador commented,
"That the Speaker of the Reichstag should be at one and the same time
Prime Minister in Prussia is a situation which could only exist in Hitlerite
Germany or in 'Alice in Wonderland.' " Rumbold to Sir John Simon, No. 28,
April 12, 1933, DBFP, Second Series, V, 36-7. Even before this time the era
of court procedures against illegal action had ended as the Prussian petitioners
before the Staatsgerichtshof had agreed to allow their suit to "rest" unpursued.
Letter of Arnold Brecht to author, April 20, 1958.

71. Schulthess, LXXIV (1933), 105.

72. Diels, Lucifer ante Portas, 16-17. Most of Diels' account, however, is
patently exculpatory and untrustworthy.

73. Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte, 5 Wahlp., 2 Sitz., 18 Mai 1933,
15-38.

74. Emst-Ewald Kunckel, Der Preussische Staatsrat; Gorings Arbeit am
Neubau des Reiches, 14-16, et seq.

75. Stefi^en, Das Berliner Verfassungsrecht, 225-6.

76. Lucifer ante Portas, 92.

77. Nicolai, Der Neuaufbau des Reiches, 18 flF.

CH. IX. THE DEATH OF PRUSSIA

1. See, for example, the book of S. D. Stirk, The Prussian Spirit: a Survey
of German Literature and Politics, 1914-1940, in which Stirk comes to the
conclusion that Nazism is really Prussianism in a new form and that the whole
war-time spirit of Germany reflects its "Prussianization." A similar, but even
less objective, study from the Soviet side is that by S. M. Lesnik, Was hat
Preussen Deutschland gegeben? (Deutscher Imperialismus und Preussentum).
It must be added that even those who defended Prussia's traditions, at least
in part, did not find themselves opposed to its division. See, e.g., Arnold
Brecht, Federalism and Regionalism in Germany: the Division of Prussia;
Wilhelm Ropke, The German Question, and The Solution of the German
Problem.

2. Tex-t, Beate Ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany under Occupa-
tion, 1945-1954, 210-211. General Lucius D. Clay called this act "the most
important act of the Control Council in this period." Decision in Germany, 144.

260 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

3. For the influence of occupation authorities on this process, see Clay,
Decision in Germany, 393-440. That South German federalism remains strong
is clear from a number of the essays in the collection published by the Institut
fiir Staatslehre und Politik e. V. in Mainz, Band 3. Verfassung und Verwaltung
in Theorie und Wirklichkeit. , . .

4. Edmond Vermeil, Germany in the Twentieth Century: a Political and
Cultural History of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, 275.

5. Ibid., 262.

6. See, e.g. Hans Joachim Schoeps, Das andere Preussen and, by the same
author. Das War Preussen. Zeugnisse der Jahrhunderte. Eine Anthologie.
Similar, Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, Die Tragik des Preussentums, who
finds the death of Prussia a kind of sacrifice for the good of Germany but
emphasizes its historic role in binding Eastern Germany to the West. It would
also appear that several periodicals are devoted almost entirely to this subject.

7. The following assessment has been greatly assisted by the articles
of John Brown Mason, "Federalism — the Borm Model," in Arnold J. Zurcher,
ed.. Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II, 134-153,
and Carl J. Friedrich, "Rebuilding the German Constitution, The American
Political Science Review, XLIII, 461-82, 704-20 (June, August, 1949).

8. Elmer Phschke, with the assistance of H. J. Hille, The West German
Federal Government, 110-20.

9. News letter to author from Dr. Walter Stahl of the Atlantik Briicke,
August 23, 1956; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 12699 (Jan. 17-24, 1953);
15086D (Sept. 8-15, 1956).

BIBLIOGRAPHY 261

J. Manuscript Materials and Unpublished Documentary Collections:

Bill Arnold Drews Nachlass ( Selections — on film). Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
A portion of the unpublished manuscript materials left by a former
Prussian Minister of the Interior much interested in and occupied with the
problem of administrative reform in Prussia.

Deutschland, Auswartiges Amt, Akten des Auswartigen Amts, Biiro des Reichs-
ministers, betreffend: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika (Captured German
Documents, National Archives, Serial No. 3087H). Records of the German
Foreign Office relating to the United States for this period. Of minor
significance in relation to this study.

Deutschland, Reichskanzlei, Akten betreffend Kabinettsprotokolle, R. Min. 2b,
1932-4 (Captured German Documents, National Archives, Serial No.
3598H, entitled "Alte Reichskanzlei: Cabinet Protocols). Unpublished
protocols of the German cabinet — a mine of valuable materials in reference
to German politics, a major source for this study.

Eher Verlag, Library of Congress. Although not a very significant manuscript
collection, the portion which relates to a projected history of the National
Socialist press has statistical significance.

Preussen, Staatsministerium, Sitzungsprotokolle des Preussischen Staatsminis-
teriums ( on film ) . Hauptarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem. Records of the Prussian
cabinet sessions. This shares with the records of the Reich cabinet a
significant place in the documentation of this monograph.

Rehse Collection, Library of Congress. A manuscript collection of minor
significance — of some value for the attention to the emergency decrees of
the Reich President.

Schleicher Nachlass ( Selections — on film ) . Bundesarchiv, Koblenz. This is
a most significant collection. The author was fortunate in having access
to the summary of the contents of this collection by Wolfgang Mommsen,
which is cited below.

Spruchkammer Proceedings against Hjalmar Schacht, 2 August 1948-1 Sep-
tember 1948. Tr. by the CoUasion Section, Intelligence Division, OMGWB,
Mimeo, 2 vols. ( German version, Protokoll der Berufsverhandlung gegen
Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, 2 August 1948-1 September 1948, Typescript).
Law Library, the Ohio State University. Employed in a previous mono-
graph, this source also had value in relation to the present study.

United States, Department of State, Unpubhshed Files, 1931-3. Historians
have lately been realizing the very significant value of the State Depart-
ment records in relation to the domestic history of foreign countries. The
detailed reports of highly specialized officials provided rich lodes of infor-
mation for this study.

2. Government Publications and Printed Documentary Collections:

Das demokratische Deutschland, Das demokratische Deutschland; grundsdtze
und richtlinien fiir den deutschen wiederaufbau im demokratischen, repub-
likanischen, foderalistischen und genossenschaftlichen Sinne. Herausgegeben
vom Hauptvorstand der Arbeitsgemeinschaft "Das demokratische Deutsch-
land," dr. Josef Wirth, dr. Otto Braun ... dr. Wilhelm Hoegner. Bern
und Leipzig: P. Haupt, 1945.

Deutschland, Reichsrat, Niederschriften ilber die Voll^tzungen des Reichsrats.
Jrg. 1932, 1933. Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1932, 1933.

Deutschland, Reichstag, Verhandlungen des Reichstags. Berlin: 1932-3.

Deutschland, verfassunggebenden deutschen Nationalversammlung, Verhand-
lung der verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung. Berlin:
1920.

Dokumente der deutschen Politik und Geschichte von 1848 bis zur Gegenwart:
ein Quellenwerk fiir die politische Bildung und staatsbiirgerliche Erziehung.
Vol. III. Die Weimarer Republik, 1919-1933. ed. Johannes Hohlfeld. Berhn:
Dokumenten-Verlag, Herbert Wendler & Co., 1951.

262 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Endres, Fritz, Hindenburg; briefe, reden, berichte. Ebenhausen bei Miinchen:

W. Langewiesche-Brandt [c. 1934].
Forsthoff, Ernst, Deutsche Geschichte seit 1918 in Dokumenten. Stuttgart:

A. Kroner [1938].
Hitler, Adolf, Hitlers Auseinandersetzung mit Briining. Miinchen: Verlag Frz.

Eher Nachf., 1932.
, Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944. With an introductory essay on "The

Mind of Adolf Hitler" by H. R. Trevor-Roper. London: Weidenfeld and

Nicholson, 1953.
International MiUtary Tribunal, Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War Criminals

Before the International Military Tribunal. Nuremberg, 14 November

1945-1 October 1946. 42 Vols. Nuremberg [By the Court], 1947-9.
Lutz, Ralph H., ed., Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918 (Documents of

the German Revolution), II. Stanford University, Cahfomia: Stanford

University Press, 1932.
Papen, Franz von, Appell an das deutsche Gewissen. Reden zur nationalen

Revolution. Oldenbourg i. O.: Gerhard Stalling [c. 1933].
Preussen contra Reich vor dem Staatsgerichtshof; Stenogrammbericht der

verhandlungen vor dem Staatsgerichtshof in Leipzig vom 10. bis 14. und

vom 17. Oktober 1932, mit einem vorwort von Ministerialdirektor dr.

Brecht. Berlin: J. H. W. Dietz., nachf., g.m.b.h., 1933.
Preussen, Landtag, Sammlung der Drucksachen der Preussischen Landtages.

Anlagen zu den Sitzungsberichten. 1932-3. Berlin: 1932-3.
Preussen, Landtag, Sitzungsberichte des Preussischen Landtages. 1932-3.

Berhn: 1932-3.
Ruhm von Oppen, Beate, Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945-

1954. Royal Institute of International Affairs. London: Oxford University

Press, 1955.
Schiiddekopf, Dr. Otto-Emst, ed.. Das Heer und die Republik. Quellen zur

Politik der ReichswehrfUhrung, 1918 bis 1933. Hannover und Frankfurt

am Main: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt O. Goedel, 1955.
Six, F. A., hrsgbr., Dokumente der Deutschen Politik. Berhn: Junker und

Diinnhaupt, 1940.
United States, Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi

Conspiracy and Aggression. 8 vols, plus Supps. Washington: G.P.O., 1946-8.
United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States:

Diplomatic Papers, 1931-3. Washington: G.P.O., 1946-1950.
, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series C, I. Wash-
ington: G.P.O., 1957.
Woodward, E. L. and Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy,

1919-1939. 2nd Series, II-V. London: H.M.S.O., 1947-1956.

3. Memoirs, Autobiographies, and Recollections:

Bonn, Moritz Julius, So Macht Man Geschichte. Bilanz eines Lebens. Miinchen:

P. List, 1953.
Braun, Magnus Freinherr von. Von Otspreussen bis Texas. Erlebnisse und

zeitgeschichtliche Betrachtungen eines Ostdeutschen. Stollhamm ( Oldb. ) :

Helmut Rauschenbusch Verlag [c. 1955].
Braun, Otto, Von Weimar zu Hitler. Zweite Auflage. New York: Europa

Verlag [c. 1940].
Clay, Lucius D., Decision in Germany. Garden City, New York: Doubleday

& Company, Inc., 1950.
Curtius, Juhus, Sechs Jahre Minister der deutschen Republik. Heidelberg:

Carl Winter Universitatsverlag, 1948.
Diels, Rudolf, Lucifer ante Portas; . . . es spricht der erste Chef der Gestapo . . .

Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1950.
Frangois-Poncet, Andre, The Fateful Years. New York: Harcourt Brace and

Co., 1949.

BIBIJOGRAPIIY 263

Goebbels, Dr. Joseph, Vorn Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei. Eine historische

Dorstellung in Tagehuctihldttern (vom 1. Januar 1932 bis zum 1. Mai 1933).

Miinchen: Zenh-alvcrlag der N.S.D.A.P., 1943.
, Wetterleuchten, Aufsiitze aus der Kampfzeit. 2. bd. "Der Angriff-."

Miinchen : Zentralverlati; der N.S.D.A.P., F. Eher Nachf., 1939.
Grzesinski, Albert, Inside Germany. New York: E. P. Diitton & Co., Inc., 1939.
Hindenburg, Paul von, Aus meincm Lehen. Leipzig 111. Volksausg., 1934.
Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf. Zwei Bande in einem Band. Ungekiirzte Ausgabe,

Miinchen: Zentralverlag der N.S.D.A.P., Frz. Eher Nachf., 1943. (Eng. tr.

by Ralph Mannheim. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company [c. 1943].)
Keil, Wilhelm, Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten. 2 bde. Stuttgart: Deutsche

Verlags-Anstalt, 1947-8.
Klotz, Dr. Helmut, ed., The Berlin Diaries, May 30, 1932-January 30, 1933.

New York: Wm. Morrow & Co., 1934.
Leber, Julius, Bin Mann Geht Seinen Weg. Schriften, Reden, und Briefe.

hrsgbn. V. seinen Freunden. Berljn-Schoneberg: Mosaik Verlag, 1952.
Lobe, Paul, Der Weg war Lang. Lebenserrinerungen von . . . Ehemals Prdsi-

dent des Deiitschen Reichstages. Berlin: Arani Verlag G.m.b.h. [c. 1954].

Earlier edition, Erinncnmgen eines Reichstagsprdsidenten. Berlin: Arani,

1949.
Ludecke, Kurt G. W., I Kneto Hitler, the Story of a Nazi Who Escaped the

Blood Purge. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938.
Meissner, Otto, Staatssekretdr unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler. Der Schicksals-

weg des deiitschen Volkes von 1918-1945, wie ich ihn erlebte. Hamburg:

Hoffmann und Campe Verlag [c. 1950].
Meyer, Oscar, Von Bismarck zu Hitler. Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen. New

York: Verlag Friedrich Krause, 1944.
Noske, Gustav, Erlehtes aus Aufstieg und Niedergang einer Demokratie. Offen-
bach-Main: BoUwerk-Verlag [1947].
Papen, Franz, Der Wahreit eine Gasse. Miinchen: Paul List Verlag [c. 1952],

Tr. by Brian Connell, Memoirs. London: Andre Deutsch, 1952.
Prittwitz und Gaffron, Dr. Friedrich von, Zwischen Petersburg und Washington.

Ein Diplomatenleben. Miinchen: Isar Verlag, 1952.
Rheinbaben, Werner Freiherr von, Viermal Deutschland. Aus dem Erleben

eines Seemanns, Diplomaten, Politikers, 1895-1954. Berlin: Argon Verlag

[c. 1954].
Schacht, Hjahnar, Abrechnung mit Hitler. Hamburg-Stuttgart: Rowohit Verlag

[c. 1948]. Tr. Account Settled. London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson,

Ltd., 1949.
Schlange-Schoningen, Hans, Am Tage Danuch. Hamburg: Hemmerich & Les-
ser, 1946.
Schmidt, Dr. Paul, Statist auf diplomatischer Biihne, 1923-1945. Erlebnisse des

Chefdolmetschers im Auswdrtigen Amt mit den Staatesmdnnern Europas.

Bonn: Athemaum Verlag, 1950.
Schwerin von Krosigk, Lutz Graf, Es Geschah in Deutschland, Menschenbilder

Unseres Jahrhunderts. Tiibingen und Stuttgart: Rainer WrmderHch Verlag

Hermann Leins, 1951.
Severing, Carl, Mein Lebensweg. 2 Bde. Koln: Greven Verlag [c. 1950].
Stimson, Henry L. and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War.

New York:' Harper & Brothers [c. 1947-8].
Thyssen, Fritz, I Paid Hitler. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc. [c. 1941].
Vv'olff, Theodor, Der Marsch durch zwei Jahrzehnte. Amsterdam: Albert de

Lange, 1936.

4. Legal Studies:

Anschiitz, Dr. Gerhard, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11. August
1919 mit Einleitung und Erlduterung. Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1921.

264 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Apelt, Willibalt, Geschichte der Weimarer Verfassung. Miinchen: Biederstein
Verlag, 1946.

Aubry, Maurice, La Constitution Prussienne du 30 Novembre 1920. These pour
le Doctorat en Droit ( Unlversite de Dijon — Faculte de Droit). Paris: Edi-
tions de "La Vie Universitaire," 1922.

Brabeck, Richard, Die GleicJischaltung Preussens: ein rechtshistorisches Prob-
lem deutscher Staatsfiihrung; inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der
Doktorwiirde einer Hohen Rechts — imd Staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultiit
der Universitat Koln. Koln: Dissertationsdruckerei Orthen, 1941.

Brunet, Rene, The New German Constitution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1922.

Eisenmann, Erich, Die Regierungsbildung im Reich und in Preussen, 1919-
1933. Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwiirde der philosophischen
Fakultat der Hamburgischen Universitat. Hamburg: [n.p.], 1934.

Fritsch, Konrad, Die Funktionen des Reichsprdsidenten (nach der neuen Reichs-
verfassung vom 11. August 1919 verglichen mit den Funktionen des ehema-
ligen deutschen Kaisers). Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Juristis-
chen Doktorwiirde des Rechts — und Staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultat an
der Universitat zu Greifswald. Stettin: Ernst Gentzensohn, 1921.

Giese, Friedrich, Deutsche Stoats- und Rechts-Geschichte. Grundriss zu den
Vorlesungen, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte und VeiiassungsgeschicJite der
Neuzeit. Frankfurter Grundrisse fiir das juristische Studium. Bd. I. Frankfurt
a.M.: Hirschgraben Verlag, 1947.

, Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches vom 11. August 1919. Taschenausgabe

fiir Studium und Praxis. Siebente erganzte und verbesserte Auflage. Berlin:
Carl Heyinanns Verlag, 1926; also achte Auflage, Berlin: Carl He\iiianns
Verlag, 1931.

Gueydan de Roussel, William, L'Eoolution du Pouvoir Executif en AUemagne
(1919-1934). Extrait de la Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique.
Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1935.

Held, Dr. Heinrich, Das preussisch-deutsche Problem. Erkldrungen des Batj-
rischen Minister-prdsidenten . . . Sitzung des Unterausschusses II der
Liinderkonferenz vom 18. November 1929. Miinchen: J. Schweitzer Ver-
lag, 1929.

Heneman, Harlow James, The Growth of the Executive Power in Germany: a
Study of the German Presidency. MinneapoHs: The Voyageur Press, 1934.

Herrfahrdt, Heinrich, Der Aufbau des neuen Staates. Vortrdge zur Vcrfassungs-
reform mit einem Plan fiir die Vbergangsregelung in Reich und Preussen.
Berlin: Verlag fiir Zeitkritik, 1932.

, Werden und Gestalt des Dritten Reiches. Berlin: Junker und Diinnhaupt

Verlag, 1933.

Hinrichs, Bernhard, Die Grenzen des Verfassungsautonomie der deutschen
Ldnder. Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1930.

Huber, Ernst Rudolf, Reichsgewalt und Staatsgerichtshof. Oldenbourg i. O.:
Gerhard StaUing [c. 1932].

Institut fiir Staatslehre und Politik, Mainz, Verfassung und Verwaltung in Theo-
rie und Wirklichkeit. Festschrift fiir Herm Geheimrat Professor Dr. Wilhelm
Laforet, anliisslich seines 75. Geburtstages. Bd. 3 der Veroffentlichungen
des Instituts. Miinchen: Isar Verlag, 1952.

Kaisenberg, Dr. Georg, Gleichschaltung der Ldnder mit dem Reich (Das Rccht
der nationalen Revolution, Heft 2). Berlin: Carl He\Tnanns Verlag, 1933.

Knight, Max, "The German Executive, 1890-1933. Stanford University: Hoover
War Library, 1952.

Koellreutter, Otto, Dcutsches Verfassungsrecht: Ein Grundriss. Berlin: Junker
und Diinnhaupt Verlag, 1938.

, Der Nationale Rechtstaat zum Wandel der Deutschen Staatsidee. ( Recht

und Staat in Gescliichte und Gegenwart, eine Sammlung von Vortriigen

BIBLIOGRAPHY 265

und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Gesamten Staatsvvissenschaften, 89^.
Tiibingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1932.

, Die nationale Revolution und die Reichsreform. (Das Recht der Nation-

alen Revolution, Heft 6). Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1933.

Medicus, Dr. Franz Albrecht, Programm der Reichsregierung und Ermdchti-
gungsgesetz. (Das Recht der nationalen Revolution, Heft 1). Berlin: Carl
Heymanns Verlag, 1933.

Monath, Armin, Obrigkeitsstaat und Volksstaat. Untersuchung des von Hugo
Preuss und anderen liheralen Staatsrechtlern geprdgten Gegensatzes zweier
Staatstypen. Ihre theoretische Haltharkeit und praktische Bewertung fUr die
Staatsrechtslehre des Dritten Reiches. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung
der juristischen Doktorwiirde der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlichen
Fakultiit der Philipps-Universitiit zu Marburg. Marburg-Lahn: Bauer, 1934.

Nicolai, Dr., Helmut, Der Neuafubau des Reiches nacJi dem Reichsrefortngesetz
vom. 30. Januar 1934. (Das Recht der nationalen Revolution, Heft 9). Ber-
lin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1934.

Pogge, Ernst, Das Verhdltnis Reich und Ldndcr eins-t (nach der Wcimarer Ver-
fassung) und jetzt (nach den Gesetzen der national Erhebung) ahgeschlossen
Friihjahr 1934. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwiirde
einer hohen Rechstswissenschaftiichen Fakultiit der Universitat Koln. Har-
burg-Wilhelmsburg: Fried. Priess' Buchdruckerei, Koln.

Polak, Dr. Karl, Die Weimarer Verfassung. Ihre Errungenschaften und Mangel.
Dritte verbesserte Auflage. Durch den Verfasser erweitertes Exemplar seines
Berichtes auf der 5. Sitzung des Verfassungsausscliusses des Deuschen Volks-
rates am 8. Juni 1948. Berlin: Kongress-Verlag G.m.b.h. [c. 1952].

Preuss, Hugo, Das deutsche Volk und die Politik. Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1915.

, Staat, Recht und Freiheit. Aus 40 Jahren Deutscher Politik und Ges-

chiclife. Tubingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Molir (Paul Siebeck), 1926.

Schmitt, Dr. Carl, Das Reichsstatthaltergesetz. (Das Recht der nationalen Revo-
lution, Heft 3). Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1933.

, Legalitdt und Legitimitdt. Miinchen und Leipzig: Verlag Duncker &

Humblot, 1932.

Schneider, Hans, Das Ermuchtigungsgesetz vom 24. Mdrz 1933. Bericht iiher
das Zustandekommen und die Anwendung des Gesetzes. ( Schriftenreihe der
Bundeszentrale fiir Heimatsdienst, 10). Bonn: Bundezentrale fiir Heimats-
dienst, 1955.

Sommermann, Dr. Emil, Der Reichsstatthalter. Eine staatsrechtliche Unter-
suchung des zweiten Gesetzes zur GleicJischaltung der Ldnder mit dem
Reich. Erlangen: Verlag von Palm & Enke, 1933.

Steffen, Friedrich Karl, Das Berliner Stadtverfassungsrecht, seine Entwicklung
his zur Gegenwart und seine geschichtliche Grundlagen .... Berlin: C.
Heymann, 1936.

Watkins, Frederick M., The Failure of Constitutional Emergency Powers Under
the German Republic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939.

Weber, Max, Gesammelte Politische Schriften. Miinchen: Drei Masken Verlag,
1921.

Ziegler, Wilhelm, Die deutsche Nationalversammlung, 1919/20 und ihr Ver-
fassungswerk. Berlin: Zentralverlag g.m.b.h., 1932.

5. Other Secondary Studies:

Alexander, Thomas, Tlie Prussian Elementary Schools. New York: The Mac-

millan Company, 1919.
and Beryl Parker, The New Education in the German Republic. New

York: The John Day Company [c. 1929].
Anderson, Evelyn, Hammer or Anvil: the Story of the German Workingclass

Movement. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1945.
Anrich, Ernst, Deutsche Geschichte, 1918-1939. 6 Aufl. Leipzig: Teubner, 1943.

266 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Amtzen-Schmitz, Johanna, Deutschlands Niedergang und Wiederaiifstieg, 1918-
1933. Streifiichter auf die Zeit vom Ende des Weltkriegs bis zum Aufbruch
der Nation. Miinchen: Pestalozzi Verlag, 1933.

Baumont, Maurice, John H. E. Fried, and Edmund Vermeil, eds., The Third
B.eich. A Study Pubhshed Under the Auspices of the International Council
for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies and with the Assistance of UNESCO.
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955.

Beck, Earl R., Verdict on Schacht: A Study in the Problem of Political "Guilt"
(Florida State University Studies, XX). Tallahassee, Florida: Florida State
University, 1955.

Bergstrasser, Ludwig, Geschichte der Politischen Parteien in Deutschland, 7
aufl. Miinchen: Gar Verlag, 1952.

Bloem, Walter, Hindenburg als Reichsprdsident. Berlin: C. A. Weller [c. 1936].

Blood-Ryan, H. W., Franz von Papen: His Life and Times. London: Rich &
Cowan, Ltd. [1940].

Boelitz, Otto, Die Bewegungen im deutschen Bildungsleben und die deutsche
Bildungseinheit. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1926.

Bopp, K. R., Hjalmar Schacht: Central Banker. Columbia: Universit>-- of Mis-
souri Press, 1939.

Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Die Auf.osung der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie
zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie. Zweite Auflage. Stutt-
gart und Dresden: Ring Verlag, 1957.

Braun, Otto, Deutscher Einheitsstaat oder Fdderativstjstem? BerUn: C. Hey-
mann, 1927.

Brecht, Arnold, Federalism and Regionalism in Germany: the Division of Prus-
sia. London: Oxford University Press, 1945.

, Prelude to Silence. The End of the German Republic. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1944.

and Comstock Glaser, The Art and Technique of Administration in Ger-
man Ministries. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940.

Breucker, Wilhelm, Die Tragik Ludendorffs: eine kritische Studie auf Grund
persbnlicher Erinnerungen an den General und seine Zeit. Stollham ( Oldb. ) :
H. Rauschenbusch [1953].

Bullock, Alan, Hitler: a Study in Tyranny. New York: Harper & Bros. [1952].

Caro, Kurt and Walter Oehme, Schleichers Aufstieg: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte
der Gegenrevolution. Berlin: Rowohlt [c. 1932].

Clark, R. T., The Fall of the German Republic: a Political Study. London:
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1935.

Conze, Werner, Die Weimarer Republik 1918 his 1933. Deutsche Geschichte
im Vberblick. Stuttgart: Peter Rossow, 1953.

Craig, Gordon A., The Politics of the Prussion Army, 1640-1945. Oxford: at
the Clarendon Press, 1955.

Ebenstein, William, The German Record: a Political Portrait. New York: Farrer
& Rinehart [c. 1945].

Eisler, Gerhart, Albert Norden, and Albert Schreiner, The Lesson of Germany.
A Guide to her History. New York: International Publishers [c. 1945].

Ermartli, Fritz, The New Gerviany: National Socialist Government in Theory
and Practice. Washington, D.C.: Digest Press, American University Grad-
uate School, 1936.

Eyck, Erich, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik. 2 bde. Erlenbach-Ziirich und
Stuttgart: Eugen Rentsch Verlag [c. 1954],

Fischer, Ruth, Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the Origins of the
State Party. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948.

Flechtheim, Ossip K., Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in der Wei-
marer Republik. Offenbach a.M.: Bollwerk-Verlag K. Drott, 1948.

Forkosch, Morris D., ed.. The Political Philosophy of Arnold Brecht. "That the
dignity of man is to be respected in every individual." Essays by Arnold
Brecht. New York: Exposition Press, 1954.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 267

Friedensburg, Ferdinand, Die Weimarer Revuhlik. Berlin: Carl Habel Vcrlags-
buchhandlung, 1946.

Frischauer, Willi, TJie Rise and Fall of Hermann Goering. Boston: Houghton
MilHin Company, 1947.

Gablentz, Otto Heinrich von der, Die Tragik cles Preiissentums. Miinchen:
F. Hanfstaengl, 1948.

Galera, Karl Siegmar, Baron von, Geschichte unserer Zeit. Bd. 7, Der Durch-
bruchssieg cles Nationalsozialismits. Leipzig: Nationale VcrlagsgescUschaft,
1932.

Gorlitz, Walter, Hindenbiirg. Ein Lebensbild. Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1953.

, A History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945. Tr. Brian Battershaw.

Intro. Walter Millis. New York: Praeger, 1953.

Halperin, Samuel William, Germany Tried Democracy; a Political History of
the Reich from 1918 to 1933. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company
[1946].

Hawel, Dr. W., Preussen nach deni Weltkriege. Aufbau und Wirken des Frei-
staates Preussen in Wort und Bild. Koln: Gilde Verlag G.m.b.h. [1930?].

Heiden, Konrad, Der Fuehrer: Hitler s Rise to Power. Tr. Ralph Mannheim.
Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1944.

, A History of National Socialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935.

Hemmerle, Eduard, Der Weg in die Katastrophe: von Bismarcks Sturz bis zum
Ende Hitlers. Miinchen: Kosel Verlag, 1948.

Herre, Paul, Kronprinz Wilhelm. Seine Rolle in der deutschen Politik. Miinchen:
Verlag C. H. Beck [c. 1954].

Heuss, Theodor, Hitlers Weg. Eine historisch-politische Studie iibcr den Na-
tionsozialismus. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1932.

Irmer, Wilhelm, Hindcnburg als Christ. Erinnerungen an den Reichsprlisiden-
ten. Berlin: Acker Verlag, 1938.

Kandel, I. L. and Thomas Alexander, tr., The Reorganization of Education in
Prussia. Based on Official Documents and Publications (Tr. of Otto Boelitz,
Der Aufbau des Preussischen Bildungswesens nach der Staatsumwalzung) .
Studies of the International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia Uni-
versity, No. 4. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Colum-
bia Univ., 1927.

Kaufmann, Walter H., Monarchism in the Weimar Republic. New York: Book-
man Associates [c. 1953].

Klemperer, Klemens von, Germany's Netv Conservatism: Its History and Di-
lemma in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1957.

Kosok, Paul, Modern Germany; a Study of Conflicting Loyalties. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press [c. 1953].

Kulski, Wladyslaw W. (imder pseudonym of W. M. Knight-Patterson), Ger-
many from Defeat to Conquest, 1913-1933. London: George Allen & Unwin,
Ltd., 1945.

Kunckel, Ernst Ewald, Der preussische Staatsrat. Gorings Arbeit am Neubau
des Reiches. Berlin: E. D. Mittler [1933].

Kuttner, Erich, Otto Braun. Leipzig: R. Kittler, 1932.

Lesnik, S. M. Was hat Preussen Deutschland gegeben? (Deutscher Imperialis-
mus und Preussentum). Berlin: Verlag der Sowjetischen Militarverwaltung
in Deutschland, 1946.

Loewenstein, Hubertus zu, The Germans in History. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1945.

Ludwig, Emil, The Germanics: Double History of a Nation. Boston: Little
Brown and Companv, 1941.
1957.

, Hindenburg. Tr. Eden and Cedar Paul. Philadelphia: The John C. Win-
ston Company [c. 1935].

268 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Luehr, Elmer, The New German Republic; the Reich in Transition. New York:

Minton, Balch & Company, 1929.
Marck, Siegfried, Grosse Menschen unserer Zeit. Portraits aus drei Kulturkrei-

sen. Meisenheim am Clan: Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, 1954.
Merker, Paul, Deutschland: Sein oder Nicht Sein?, I. Band, Von Weimar zu

Hitler. Mexico D.F.: "El Libro Libre," 1944.
Mohler, Armin, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland, 1918-1932;

Grundriss ihrer Weltanschauungen. Stuttgart: F. Vorwerk, 1950.
Plischke, Elmer, with the assistance of H. J. Hille, The West German Federal

Government. Bad Godesberg-Mehlem: Historical Division, Office of the

Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany,

1952.
Prittwitz und Gaffron, Friedrich Wilhelm von, Deutschland und die Vereinigten

Staaten seit dem Weltkrieg. Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1934.
Reibnitz, Freiherr, Kurt von, Im Dreieck Schleicher, Hitler, Hindenhurg. Man-
ner Des DeutscJien Schicksals. (on film) Dresden: Carl Reissner Verlag,

1933.
Richter, Werner, Reeducating Germany. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1945.
Ritter, Gerhard, Carl Goerdeler und die Deutsche Widerstandshewegung.

Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt [c. 1954].
Ropke, Wilhelm, The German Question. Tr. E. W. Dickes. London: George

Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1946.
, The Solution of the German Problem. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons

[c. 1946].
Samuel, R. H. and R. Hinton Thomas, Education and Society in Modern Ger-
many. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1949.
Schacht, Hjalmar, Grundsdtze Deutscher Wirtschaftspolitik. Oldenbourg i.O.

Gerhard StalUng [c. 1932].
Scheele, Godfrey, The Weimar Republic: Overture to the Third Reich. London

Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1946.
Schiller, Eugen, Sturm iiber Deutschland. Berlin: Verlag von Otto Liebmann

Verlag der Deutschen Juristenzeitung und des Deutschen Wohnungs

archivs, 1932.
Schoch, Karl Ritter von, Hindenburg, der Water des Vaterlandes. Liibeck

C. Coleman, 1932.
Schoeps, Hans Joachim, Das andere Preussen. Stuttgart: F. Vorwerk, 1952.
, Das War Preussen. Zeugnisse der Jahrhunderte. Eine Anthologie. KoLn:

Dr. Hans Peters Verlag [c. 1955].
Schotte, Dr. Walther, Der neue Staat. Berlin: Neufeld & Henius Verlag [c.

1932].
, Die Regierung Papen Schleicher Gayl. 2 ergantze Aufl. Leipzig. R. Kit-
tier [c. 1933].
Schreiber, Prof. Dr. Georg, Briining-Hitler-Schleicher. Das Zentrum in der

Opposition. Koln: Verlag der Kolner Gorreshaus A. G., 1932.
Schultze-Pfaelzer, Gerhard, Deutsche Geschichte, 1918-1933. Vom zweiten

Reich zum dritten Reich. Berlin: Otto Stollberg [1933].
Stampfer, F. Die 14 Jahre der ersten Deutschen Republik. Karlsbad: "Graphia,"

1936. (later edition, Die ersten 14 Jahre der Deutschen Republik. Offen-
bach-Main: Bollwerk Verlag, 1947.)
StelFen, Hans, Otto Braun. Berlin: H.P.V. ( Historischer-Politischer Verlag),

1932.
Stegemann, Hermann, Weltwende. Der Kampf um die Zukunft und Deutsch-

lands Gestaltwandel. Stuttgart, Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt [c. 1934].
Stirk, S. D., The Prussian Spirit: a Survey of German Literature and Politics,

1914-1940. London: Faber & Faber, LtcV, 1941.
Strasser, Otto, History in My Time. Tr. Dol ;las Reed. London: Jonathan Cape,

1941.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 269

Tunney, Thomas J., Throttled! The Detection of the German and Anarchist
Bomb Plotters. Boston: Small, Maynard & Company, Pub. [c. 1919].

Ullmann, Hermann, Flucht aus Berlin? Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag [c.
1932].

, 7/1 der grossen Kurve. Fiihrer und GefUhrten. Berlin: Riidiger Verlag,

1933.

Vermeil, Edmond, Germany in the Twentieth Century. A Political and Cul-
tural History of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1956.

Weymar, Paul, Adenauer, Plis Authorized Biography. Tr. Peter de Mendels-
sohn. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1957.

Wheeler-Bennett, John W., The Nemesis of Power: the German Army in Poli-
ties, 1918-1945. New York:^ St. Martin's Press, 1953.

, Wooden Titan: Hindenhurg in Tiventy Years of German History, 1914-

1934. New York: William Morrow & Co. [c. 1936].

6. Articles in Periodicals:

Anon., "Dokumentation: Zum Sturz Briinings." Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitges-
chichte, 1 Jrg., 261-88 (JuH, 1953).

, "Germany." Time Magazine, XX, 21 (Nov. 7, 1932).

, "Persons and Personages: Otto Braun, Prussian Prime Minister." Tlie

Living Age, CXLII,.137-40 (April, 1932).

, "The Prussian Plebiscite." Autlook and Independerat, CLVIII, 484 (Aug.

19,1931).

, "The Scare that Prussia Gave Gemiany." Literary Digest, 10 (August 22,

1931).

Bilfinger, Dr., "Der Zwischenfall im Reichstag im Lichte der Verfassung."
Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg., 704-9 (1 Juni 1932).

, "Exekution, Diktatur und Foderalismus." Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung,

XXXVII Jrg., 1017-21 (15 August 1932).

Bracher, Karl Dietrich, "Stufen totalitiirer Gleichschaltung: die Befestigung
der nationalsoziahstische Herrschaft 1933-34." Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeit-
gesehichte, 4 Jrg., 30-42 (Januar, 1956).

Brecht, Arnold, "Bureaucratic Sabotage." The Annals of the American Acad-
emy of Political and Social Science, CLXXXIX, 48-57 (January, 1957).

, "Democracy — Challenge to Theory." Social Research, XIII, 195-224

(June, 1946).

, "The New German Constitution." Social Research, XVI, 425-73 ( Decem-
ber, 1949).

Bredt, Prof. Dr. Joh. Victor, "Lausanne." Preussiche Jahrbiicher, CCXXVIII,
189-95 (Juni, 1932).

Eriining, Heinrich, "Ein Brief."' Deutsche Rundschau, 70 Jrg., 1-22 (Juh, 1947).

Bumke, Dr. (Erwin), "Reichsrecht oder Landesrecht." Deutsche Juristen-
Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg., 568-72 ( 1 Mai 1932).

Callender, Harold, "Germany's Ascetic Chancellor." New York Times Magazine,
Aug. 30, 1931, V, 1-2.

, "Men on Whom Germany's Fate Depends." New York Times Magazine,

Nov. 30, 1930, V, 10.

Campe, Dr. von, "Quo vadis justitia?" Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII
Jrg., 825-9 (1 Juli 1932).

Castellan, G., "Von Schleicher, von Papen et I'avenement de Hitler." Cahiers
d'Histoire de la Guerre ( Publication du Comite d'Histoire de la Guerre ) ,
Numero 1 (Janvier, 1949), 15-39.

Conze, Werner, "Papens Memoiren." Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXV, 307-17
(1953).

Craig, Gordon A., "Reichswehr and National Socialism: the Policy of Wilhelm
Groener, 1928-1932." Political Science Quarterly, XLIII, 194-229 (June,
1948).

Daniels, Emil, "Politische Korrespondenz; Deutschlands Lage im Spiegel sei-

270 THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

ner politischen Tagesliteratur." Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXVH, 187-92

(Feb., 1932).
, "Politische Korrespondenz; Die inneren Kampfe in Deutschland — Der

'Schopferische Plan' der Franzosen." Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXX, 280-8

(Dez., 1932).
, "Politische Korrespondenz: Die kommenden Reichstagswahlen." Preus-
sische Jahrbiicher, CCXXX, 85-95 (Okt., 1932).
, "Politische Korrespondenz: Die neue Regierung, die Wahlen zxim Reich-
stag und die auswartige Lage." Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXIX, 88-96

(Juli, 1932).
, "Politische Korrespondenz; Die problematik der preussischen und der

franzosischen Wahlen." Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXVIII, 89-96 (Apr.,

1932).
, "Politische Korrespondenz; "Quo Vadis?" Preussische Jahrbiicher,

CCXXX, 179-91. (Nov. 1932).
, "Politische Korrespondenz; Zum Zusammentritt des Reichstages." Preus-
sische Jahrbiicher, CCXXIX, 275-84 (Sept., 1932).

, "Politische Korrespondenz; Zwischen der Konferenz von Lausanne und

den Wahlen zum Reichstag." Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXIX, 179-91
(Aug., 1932).
Dryander, Dr. von, "Zum Verhaltnis von Reichs- und Landesgewelt." Deutsche

Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg., 958-63 (1 Aug. 1932).
Editor, "Von Papen." DieGegenwart, 2 Jrg., Nr. 3/4, 4-5 (28 Feb. 1947).
Erdmann, Karl Dietrich, "Die Geschichle der Weimarer Republik als Problem

der Wissenschaft." Vierteljahrschefte fUr Zeitgeschichte. 3 Jrg., 1-19 (Jan.,

1955).
Eschenburg, Theodor, "Die improvisierte Demokratie: Ein Beitrag zur Ges-

chichte der Weimarer Republik." Schweizcr Beiirdge zur Allgemeinen

Geschichte. Bd. IX (1951), 161-211. (Pubhshed in book form, Schloss

Laupheim, Wiirttemberg ) .
, "Franz von Papen." Vierteljahrshcfte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 1 Jrg., 153-69

(Apr., 1953).
Evck, Erich, "Papen als 'Historiker.' " Deutsche Rundschau, 78 Jrg., 1221-30

(1952).
Fay, Sidney B., "Germany Again Goes to tlie Polls." Current History, XXXVIII,

358-63 (Dec, 1932).
Friedrich, Carl J., "Arnold Brecht: Jurist and Political Theorist." Social Re-
search, XXI, 107-9 (April, 1954).
, "The Development of the Executive Power in Germany." The American

Political Science Review, XXVII, 185-203 (April, 1933).
, "Rebuilding the German Constitution." The American Political Science

Preview, XLIII,^461-82; 704-20 (June, August, 1949).
Giese, Prof. Dr., "Zur Verfassungsmassigkeit der vom Reich gegen und in

Preussen getroffenen Massnahmen." Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg.,

1022-4 (15 August 1932).
Haase, Dr., "Sprechsaal: Die Aufliebung von 60 preussischen Amtsgerichten."

Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII )rg., 221-2 ( 1 Februar 1932 ).
Heynen, Walter, "Inland und Ausland: Biicher und Zeitschriftenschau."

Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXIX, 175-8 (August, 1932).
, "Vorarbeiten zur Reichsreform." Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXVII,

172-7 (Feb., 1932).
Hula, Erich, "Arnold Brecht's Contribution to Comparative Government and

International Relations." Social Research, XXI, 110-5 (April, 1954).
Klepper, Otto, "Das Ende der Republik." Die Gegenwart, 2 Jrg., Nr. 17/18,

20-22 (3 September 1947).
Kluke, Paul, "Der Fall Potempa." Vierteljahrshcfte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 5 Jrg.,

279-99 (Juh, 1957).

BIBLIOGRAPHY 271

Matthias, Erich, "Der Untergang der alten Sozialdemokratie, 1933." Viertel-

jahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 4 Jrg., 250-86 (1956).
Papen, Franz von, Jr., "Franz von Papen: Brief an die Herausgeber." Die

Gegenwart, 2 Jrg., Nr. 9/10, 22 (31 Mai 1947) .

Pechel, Rudolf, "Die Wahrheit in der Sackgasse." Deutsche Rundschau, 78
Jrg., 1231-7 (1952).

Pernot, Maurice, "Images de Lausanne." Revue des deux Mondes, Huitieme

Periode, X, 203-12, 434-44 (1, 15 Juillet, 1932).
Pinon, Rene, "Chronique de la Quinzaine." Revue des deux Mondes, Huiteme

Periode, X, 709-18 (1 Aout 1932).
Poetzsch-HefFter, Prof. Dr., "Zum Verfassungsstreit Preussen gegen Reich."

Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg., 1373-8 (15 November 1932).
Schlenker, Dr. Max, "Arbeitslosigkeit und Papen-Programm." Preussische

Jahrbiicher, CCXXX, 25-35 (Okt., 1932).
Schmitt, Prof. Dr. Carl, "Die Verfassungsmassigkeit der Bestellung eines Reichs-

kommissars fiir das Land Preussen." Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII

Jrg., 953-8 (1 Aug., 1932).
Schultze-Pfaelzer, Gerhard, "Das Testament Hindenburgs." Die Gegenwart, 2

Jrg., Nr. 15/16 (31 August 1947).
Schwalb, Dr., "Das Urteil des Staatsgerichtshofes fiir das Deutsche Reich in

der Klage: Preussen gegen Reich." Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, XXXVII

Jrg., 1336-9 (1 November 1932).
, "Staatsgerichtshof fiir das Deutsche Reich." Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung,

XXXVII Jrg., 1295-6 (15 Okt., 1932).
, "Staatsgerichtshof fiir das Deutsche Reich." Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung,

XXXVII Jrg., 1152-3 (15 Sept. 1932).
Severing, Garl, "20. Juh 1932." Die Gegenwart, 2 Jrg., Nr. 13/14, 14-17 (31

Juhl947).^^
Snell, John L., "Die Republik aus Versaumnisse." Die Welt als Geschichte, Heft

3/4 (1955), 196-219.
, "Germany and the Fourteen Points." Journal of Modern History, XXVI,

364-9(1954).
Treuherz, Dr. V^alter, "Das Wirtschaftsprogramm der Regienmg." Preussische

Jahrbiicher, CCXXX, 51-63 (Okt., 1932).
, "Von Lausanne zur Weltwirtschafts-konferenz." Preussische Jahrbiicher,

CCXXIX, 197-213 (Sept., 1932).
Vogelsang, Thilo, "Dokumentation: Zur Politik Schleichers Gegeniiber der

NSDAP 1932." Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 6 Jrg., Heft. 1, 86-118

(Jan., 1958).
, "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr, 1930-1933." Viertel-
jahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 2 Jrg., 397-436 (Okt., 1954).
Waldecker, Prof. Dr. Ludwig, "Der Staatsgerichtshof zu Art. 48 Abs. 2 RV."

Die Justiz, Bd. VII, Heft 4 (Januar, 1932), 173-8.
Wells, R. H., "Reichsreform and Prussian Verwaltungsreform in 1932." Amer-
ican Political Science Review, XXVII, 237-43 (April, 1933).
Westarp, Graf, "Die Entwicklung zum Prasidialkabinett; eine verfassungs-

geschichthche Studie." Preussische Jahrbiicher, CCXXX, 1-15 (Okt., 1932).
, "Die letzten hundert Meter vor dem Ziele." Preussische Jahrbiicher,

CCXXVIII, 195-203 (Juni, 1932).
, "Die rechtspolitischen Wirkungen des Leipziger Urteils." Deutsche Juris-
ten-Zeitung, XXXVII Jrg., 1378-84 (15 November 1932).
, "Reichsprasident und Reichstag als Gesetzgeber." Preussische Jahrbii-
cher, CCXXX, 193-204 (Dez., 1932).
, "Zur Verfassungsreform : Reich und Preussen." Preussische Jahrbiicher,

CCXXXII, 144-55 (Mai, 1933).
, "Zur Wahl des preuss. Ministerprasidenten." Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung,

XXXVII Jrg., 574-6 (1 Mai 1932).

272 A NEW GERMANY AND A NEW PRUSSIA

Ybarra, T. R., "A New Strong Man for Germany." ISlew York Times Magazine,

Aug. 3, 1930, V, 1-2.^^
Zahn, Gerichtsassessor, "Die Reichstagsauflosungen." Deutsche Juristen-Zei-

tung, XXXVII Jrg., 841-5 (1 JuU 1932).

7. Newspapers:
Berliner Tagehlatt.
Der Angriff ( Berlin ) .
Die Rote Fahne ( Berlin ) .
Germania.

New York Times.

Volkischer Beobachter (Berliner Ausgabe).

Vorwdrts (Berlin).

Vossische Zeitung (Berlin).

8. Miscellaneous:

Keesing's Contemporary Archives.
Schulthess' Europdischer Geschichtskalender.

9. Guides to Archival Materials and Special Collections:

Boeninger, Hildegard R., The Hoover Collection on Germany. Collection Sur-
vey, No. 2. Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press
[c. 1952].

Epstein, Fritz T., "Washington Research Opportunities in the Period of World
War II.," American Archivist, XVII (1954), 225-36.

Lotzke, Helmut and Hans Stephen Brather, "Uhersicht iiher die Bestdnde des
deutschen Zentralarchivs Potsdam. ( Schriftenreihe des Deutschen Zen-
tralarchivs, Nr. 1). Berlin: Riitten & Loening, 1957.

Mommsen, Wolfgang, Die schriftlichen NachlUsse in den zentralen deutschen
und preussischen Archiven. Als manuskript gedruckt. (Schriften des Bundes-
archivs, I.) Koblenz: Bundesarchiv, 1955.

Nissen, Walter, "Das Schicksal der ausgelagerten Bestande des Preussischen
Geheimen Staats-Archivs und des Brandenburg-Preussischen Haus-Archivs
und ihr Heutiger Zustand," Archivalische Zeitschrift (hrsgbn. v. Bayrischen
Hauptstaatsarchiv, Miinchen) 49. Band (1954), 138-50.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. and the WDP staff under the direction of Fritz T.
Epstein, War Documentation Project, Study No. 1: Guide to Captured Ger-
man Documents, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; United States Air
Force, Air University, Human Resources Research Institute, 1952.

Zimmerman, Dr. Gerhard, "Das Hauptarchiv (ehernal. Preuss. Geh. Staats-
archiv) in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren." Der Archivar, Mitteilungsblatt
fiir das deutsches Archivwesen, VIII Jrg., 174-9 (Juli, 1955).

INDEX

Abegg, Wilhelm, Ministerial Director
in the Prussian Ministry of the In-
terior, 35, 38; conference with Com-
munist Landtag deputies, 99; re-
moved from office, 108; 130, 140-1

8-Uhr Abendblatt, BerHn newspaper,
suspension, 107

Adametz, Walter, Oberregierungsrat,
246 (fn. 16)

Adenauer, Konrad, President of Prus-
sian Staatsrat in 1932, post-World
War II West German Chancellor,
19, 59, 161, 197, 202

Administrative reform, in Prussia, 111,
116, 129-30, 149-50, 156, 182-3,
187, 199, 203, 211-13

Agriculture, problems of and policies
relating to, 20; reform policies in
Prussia, 40-1; in East Prussia, 62-4,
171, 185, 186-7, 189, 223 (fn. 30)

Alarm, Leipart newspaper, 180

Allied Control Commission, 215-6

Alsace-Lorraine, 19

Altona, 108

Amnesty, right of, 188, 210, 250 (fn.
34)

Angriff, Der, National Socialist news-
paper in Berlin, 117

Anschiitz, Gerhard, renowned expert
on the Weimar Constitution, 108;
defense of Prussia before Staatsge-
richtshof, 134, 138-9

Apelt, WilHbalt, quoted, 229 (fn. 61)

Ascona, Otto Braun in exile at, 206

Austria, proposal to include in German
state, 15

Baden, Prince Max of, 3-7, 221 (fn. 1 )

Baden, State of, 93; joins Prussia be-
fore Staatsgerichtshof, 109, 116,
133-4, 136, 142; opposition to pres-
idential decree of Feb. 6, 1933, 203;
commissional government in, 207;
232 (fn. 105)

Badezwickelerlass, 131, 187, 246 (fn.
23)

Badt, Hermann, Ministerial Director
in the Prussian Ministry of the In-
terior, 35; removed from office, 108;

^^ 134, 220, 243 (fn. 52)

"Basic Law" of the West German
Government, 216, 218

Bavaria, State of, reactionary govern-
ment of, 22; "care-taker" govern-
ment in, 59; position on Reichsre-

form, 92-3; joins Prussia in opposing
Papen coup, 109, 116, 133-4, 136,
142; 156, 197; opposes presidential
decree of Feb. 6, 1933, 202-3, 205;
commissional government in, 207;
232 (fn. 105), 248 (fn. 37)

Bavarian People's Party, 157, 204

Becker, Carl Heinrich, Prussian Minis-
ter of Education, 35, 41-2, 220, 227
(fns. 29, 33)

Bendlerstrasse, Reichswehr Ministry,
184

Berlin, importance of city, 43-4; Nazi
hostihty to, 55; and two bureaucra-
cies, 92; 98; removal of Police Presi-
dent of, 102; 107; reorganization of
Police presidency of, 110; reform
plans for, 130; 141, 144, 148; trans-
port workers' strike in, 152, 164;
168, 181; reform of school adminis-
tration in, 182-3; renewal of admin-
istrative reform proposals, 188; 198;
Nazi control of, 203, 207, 212; 226
(fn. 13)

Beuthen, 117

Bielefeld, 178

Bilfinger, Karl, pro-Reich legal expert
before the Staatsgerichtshof, 134,
136-8

Bismarck, Otto Von, German chancel-
lor under the Empire, 1, 13, 94, 110,

^^ 219-20

"Black Tom" Affair in World War I,

.< ^^

"Black-White-Red Election Coalition"

(Kamffront Schwarz - Weiss - Rot"),
205, 207

Boelitz, Otto, Prussian Minister of
Education, 41, 223 (fn. 31), 227
(fn. 28)

Bolsheviks, Russian, 5, 7

Bonn, Capital of post-World War II
West German State, 216, 219

Bonn, Moritz, Rector Magnificus of
Berliner Handelshochschule, 106

Bom, Stephen, German hberal, 219

Boss, Gustav, 226 (fn. 13)

Boxheimer Documents, 60, 243 (fn.
59)

Bracher, Karl Dietrich, 56, 78, 117,
153, 224 (fn. 36)

Bracht, Franz, Mayor of Essen, Reich
Commissional Minister of Interior
of Prussia under Papen, Reich Min-
ister of Interior under Schleicher,

273

274

THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

98, 102, 107; career, 110; 114, 117,
127, 130-1, 148, 155, 165, 171, 179,
186, 188, 197, 254 (fn. 29), 255
(fn. 35)
Brandenburg, 100

Brandes, Alwin, Steel industrialist, 99

Braun, Magnus, Freiherr von. Minister

of Agriculture under Papen, 75, 87,

151, 155, 185, 201, 234 (fn. 1)
Braun, Otto, Minister President of

Prussia, 1920-1933, in Prussian Pro-
visional Government, 24, 27-31,
33 ff., 47, 55; relations with von
Hindenburg, 57; relations with
Briining, 56-7; 59, 71; position on
Reichsreform issue, 92; head of
"care-taker" government, 96-7; at
time of Papen coup, 103-4, 116;
charges against at Staatsgerichtshof
hearing, 141; and Leipzig decision,
147-9; meets with von Hindenburg,
150-1; protests presidential decree
of Oct. 30, 1932, 152; protests presi-
dential decree of Nov. 17, 1932,
160-1; relations with Schleicher,
176-8; proposes collaboration with
Schleicher, 184-5; and the right of
amnesty, 188-9; charges Schleicher
plans treason, 190; opposition to of
Hitler cabinet, 199; appeals to von
Hindenburg, 201; and Nazi charges
of stolen funds, 201-2; offers legal
end to his government, 204; Nazi
charges against and flight of, 206;
Landtag officially ends regime of,
207-8; 220, 224 (fn. 38), 225 (fns.
56, 58, 2, 3) 228 (fn. 53), 230
(fn. 84), 235 (fn. 35) 241 (fn. 7),
250 (fn. 24)

Brecht, Arnold, Ministerial Director in
the Prussian Ministry of Finance,
35, 39-40, 54, 92, 108, 134, 155,
160, 179, 198, 199-200, 220, 222
(fn. 14); contributions to political
science, 226 (fn. 7); 241-2 (fn. 8),
243 (fn. 52), 247 (fn. 34), 251
(fn. 38), 258 (fn. 43)

Bredow, Colonel, later Major Ceneral
Kurt von, Schleicher's chief aide,

152, 167, 178, 251 (fn. 45)
Breitscheid, Rudolf, Independent So-

ciahst later Social Democratic Reich-
stag deputy, in Purssian Provisional
Government, 24, 224 (fn. 38)

Bremen, Commissional government in,
207

Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count Ulrich von,
German representative at the Paris
Peace Conference, 19

Briining, Heinrich, Reich Chancellor,
March 30, 1930-May 30, 1932,
chancellorship, 44-9; attitude toward
Braun-Severing regime in Prussia,
56-64; 66-7, 75, 80; foreign poHcy
of, 81-2; 86, 89, 96, 138; Schlei-
cher's disappointment with, 169-70;
171; estimate of career, 219-20; 228
(fns. 53, 61), 229 (fn. 75); plans
for Reich action in Prussia, 231-2
(fn. 102); fall of, 233 (fn. 122);
234 (fn. 1), 236 (fn. 24), 243
(fn. 39)

Brunner, Member of Prussian provi-
sional government, 224 (fn. 38)

Bumke, Erwin, Reichsgerichtsprdsident
and presiding judge of the Staats-
gerichtshof, 133, 174, 181, 189, 202,
204, 247 (fn. 34), 258 (fn. 43)

Bundesprdsident, post-World War II
Head of State of the West German
goverrunent, 217

Bundesrat, pre-World War I upper
house of German parliament, 15-17;
post-World War II upper house, 21'7

Bundesrepublik, Federal Republic of
Germany, post-World War II West
German State, constitution of, 217 ff.

Bundestag,, lower house of Bundesre-
publik parliament, 217

Bureaucracy, German, 10; Prussian,
24, 37, 91, 94, 96, 110-1, 130, 132,
143-4, 156, 203, 226 (fn. 12), 241-2
(fn.8)

"Caretaker" government, in Prussia,
140, 201; in Reich, 159

Center Party, German Catholic Party,
origin and pohcies, 13; 21; strength
in Prussia, 26; 37 ff.; 42; and Briin-
ing chancellorship, 44 ff.; 55, 58,
71, 76, 89, 91, 126, 156, 162, 201;
discussion of coaHtion with Nazis,
62, 113, 125, 132, 154, 157, 177,
197-8; in case of Preussen contra
Reich, 109, 111, 133-5, 142; and
Schleicher regime, 175, 177, 184,
186, 190; and elections of March,
1933, 206; 224 (fn. 49), 253 (fn
24)

Clay, General Lucius D., U.S. Military
Occupation Commander, on aboli-
tion of Prussia, 259 ( fn. 2 )

"Cold War," 216

Cologne, 108

Colonization in East Prussia, 62-4,
185-7

"Commissioner for Berlin Relation-
ships," 207

INDEX

275

"Committee of Three" (Dreirminner-
kollegium) in Prussia, 30, 197, 202

Communists, German, origins, 13; gov-
errmient in Saxony, 22; 47; opposi-
tion to Braun regime in Prussia, 56,
58, 94-5; criticism of Lausanne Con-
ference, 89; supposed negotiations
with Social Democrats in Prussia,
98, 104, 140-1; civil war with Nazis,
100; 126; and commissional regime
in Prussia, 104, 107, 111, 116, 131,
161; and Berlin Transport Workers'
Strike, 152-3; and fall of Papen
government, 163-6; and Schleicher,
178, 189; 184; and Hitler govern-
ment, 199, 201-2, 205; gains of in
elections of March 5, 1933, 206-7;
in post-World War II West Ger-
many, 217, 219; estimate of, 222
(fn. 15); 254 (fn. 29)

Concordat of 1929, Prussian, 42

Congress of Workers' and Soldiers'
Councils, 11

Connell, Brian, 234 (fn. 4)

Conservative Party, pre-World War I,
12

Council of People's Commissioners, 11

Cripps, Sir Stafford, 47

CrowTi Prince, See HohenzoUem,
Crown Prince William

Davis, Norman, 239 (fn. 77)

Democrats, German (see also State
Party, German), 13, 91, 99, 224
(fn. 49)

Depression, See Economic conditions
in Germany

"Dictatorship" (under Article 48, #2
of Weimar Constitution), 15, 17,
138-9, 143, 218

Diels, Pvudolf, oflBcial in Prussian Min-
istry of Interior, later head of
Gestapo, 99, 211-2

Dietramszeller, Decree, Emergency
Decree of Reich President, August
24, 1931, 137-8, 149, 209, 248
(fn. 37)

Dingeldey, Eduard, leader of German
People's Party, 184

Disarmament ( See also World Dis-
armament Conference), 65, 81

Dreimdnnerkollegium. See "Commit-
tee of Three"

East Prussia, agriculture in, 171, 223
(fn. 30)

Ebert, Friedrich, Social Democratic
leader, first President of the Weimar
Repubhc, 6; bargain with General

Groner, 9, 20; commissions Pr'euss
to prepare draft of Weimar Consti-
tuition, 11; 51; 222 (fns. 13, 17),
224 (fn. 35), 236 (fn. 32)

Economic conditions in Germany, 45-
6, 65, 79-80, 122-5, 181, 238 (fn.
63), 239-40 (fn. 84)

Education and educational reform, in
post-World War I Germany, 20; in
Prussia, 25, 41-2, 129, 156, 178,
182, 187, 201, 212, 227 (fns. 28,
29, 33)

Eggert, Wilhelm, Free Labor Union
Union leader, 255 (fn. 46)

Eichorn, Emil, Pohce President in Ber-
lin, 24, 26

Einheitsschule, 41, 227 (fn. 28)

Elbing, new PoHce President in, 108

Eltz-Riibenach, Freiherr von. Minister
of Transportation under Papen, 75,
98, 162, 165, 191, 195, 252 (fn. 49)

Enabling Act (Gesetz zur Behebung
der Not von Volk und Reich), 196,
207-9

Enabling Act, in Prussia, 212

Ernst, Eugen, member of Prussian
Provisional Government, later Police
President of BerHn, 24, 26, 224
(fn. 38)

Ernst, Friedrich, State Secretary in
Ministry of Economics made Com-
missional Minister of Economics in
Prussia, 151, 201

Eschenburg, Theodor, 51, 221-2 (fns.
9, 10)

Evangelical Church, in Prussia, 42-3;

« 212

"Execution," See "Reich Execution"

Eyck, Erich, 72

Falkenhayn, General von, 235 (fn. 10)

"Fatherland Party," 22

Fecht, Ministerial Director Hermann,

representative of Baden before

Staatsgerichtshof, 134
Feder, Gottsfried, leaves Nazi Party

hierarchy, 175
Federal Compulsion (Bundeszwang),

218
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundes-

verfassungsgericht), 218
Federal Republic of Germany, 216
"First Act for Coordination of Reich

and Lander," 209
Fischbeck, Otto, Prussian Minister of

Commerce, 25, 224 (fn. 38), 225

(fn. 56)
"Fourteen Points," 3, 18

276

THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Frankfurt am Main, Assembly of 1848,
219

Frankfurt an der Oder, Regierungs-
prdsident at, 108

Frederick II, the Great, Prussian king
(1740-88), 1, 207, 219

Frederick William I, Prussian king
(1713-40), 1, 220

Free Labor Unions, 152, 180

Frick, Wilhelm, Reich Minister of In-
terior under Hitler, 197, 204, 209,
255 (fn. 60)

Garrison Ghurch, Potsdam, 207

Gayl, Wilhelm, Freiherr von. Minister
of Interior under Papen, 63, 74, 77,
80-1, 83, 87, 89, 97; leadership in
coup against Prussia, 98-9; 114-5,
141, 148-9, 154-6, 162, 164-5, 171-
2, 179, 197, 218, 233 (fn. 120), 236
(fns. 35, 36), 237-8 (fn. 52), 252
(fn. 49)

Gereke, Giinther, Reich Commissioner
for Work Creation under Schleicher,
171-2, 252 (fn. 15)

German Bank for Rural Settlements,
96

German Central Cooperative Credit
Bank (Deutsche Zentralgenossen-
schaftskasse), 150

"German Democratic Republic" (East
German Communist State), 216

Germania, Center Party newspaper, 71

Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von
Volk und Reich, 196, 207-9

Gestapo, 211

Ciese, Friedrich, expert on the Wei-
mar Constitution, 55; supports Prus-
sia before the Staatsgerichtshof,
134, 139

Gilbert, Parker, agent of Reparations
Commission, 240 (fn. 86)

Goebbels, Joseph, Nazi propaganda
expert, 58, 72, 79-80, 91, 95, 116-7,
157, 179, 183

Coerdeler, Carl Friedrich, Chief May-
or of Leipzig, German resistance
leader during World War II, 75-6,
237 (fns. 41, 44), 245 (fn. 8)

Gohre, Member of Prussian Provision-
al Government, 224 (fn. 38)

Goring, Hermann, Nazi leader, nego-
tiations with Papen, 114; leads
Reichstag opposition to Papen,
125-7; sees Schleicher, 177; negoti-
ations with Papen, 189; importance
in early Hitler government, 194,
198-9, 204-5; Minister President in
Prussia, 211-2; 254 (fn. 33)

Gorlitz, Walter, 50

Gottheiner, Georg, Ministerial Direc-
tor in Reich Ministry of Interior,
Representative of Reich before the
Staatsgerichtshof, 108, 134

"Governmental Reform Committee,"
92

Grauert, State Secretary Ludwig, Com-
missional head of police in Prussian
Ministry of Interior, 203

"Great Coalition," in Prussia, 35-6,
40; in Reich, 45

Grimme, Adolf, Prussian Minister of
Education, 35, 227 (fn. 29)

Groner, General Wilhelm, Reich War
Minister under Briining, 9, 61-2,
169, 222 (fn. 73), 232 (fns. 102,
108), 233 (fns. 110, 113)

Grzesinski, Albert, Prussian Minister
of Interior, 1926-30, Pohce Presi-
dent in Berlin, 1925-6, 1930-2, 35,
39, 55, 102, 107, 141, 224 (fn. 49)
226 (fn. 15), 230 (fn. 84)

Giimbel, judge on the Staatsgerichts-
hof, 133

Giirtner, Franz, Minister of Justice
under Papen, Schleicher, Hitler, 75,
99, 114, 155, 159, 165, 195, 243-4
(fn. 59)

Haenisch, Konrad, Minister of Cul-
ture in Prussian Provisional Govern-
ment, 24, 224 (fn. 38), 225 (fn. 56)

Hagen i. W., Police President of, 108

Hamburg, opposition to Papen coup,
116, 156, commissional government
in, 207

Hammerstein-Equord, General Kurt
von. Chief of Army General Staff,
61, 95, 191, 232 (fn. 106)

Hanover, 27

Hanoverians, 224 (fn. 49)

Heimannsberg, Colonel Manfried,
Commander of Berlin Schutzpolizei,
107

Heine, Wolfgang, Prussian Minister of
Justice, 27, 29, 224 ( fns. 38, 56 )

Held, Heinrich, Prime Minister of Ba-
varia, 92-3, 202

Helfferich, Karl, Minister of Finance
under Briining, 63

Heller, Professor Hermann, represent-
ative of Social Democratic Party
before Staatsgerichtshof, 134

Hergt, Oskar, NationaHst Party leader,
28

Herrenklub, 78, 149, 182-3, 238 (fn.
56), 255 (fn. 62)

INDEX

277

Herriot, Edouard, French Premier,
83-6, 239 (fn. 77), 240 (fns. 89,
90, 92, 93, 95)

Hesse, opposition of to Papen coup,
116, 156

Hesse-Nassau, Olwrprdsidcnt of, 108

HilferdinsT, Rudolf, Reich Finance
Minister, 220

Hindenburg, Field Marshal Paul von,
President of the Weimar Republic,
1925-34, 2, 9, 18-19; career, 49-55;
and fall of Briining, 61-6; and von
Papen, 67, 71-3; and Lausanne Con-
ference, 88-9; 103; conference with
Hitler, 114-5; pardon for Potempa
murders, 118; and Papen reform
projects, 121 ff., 128-9; visited by
Kerrl at Neudeck, 132; meets with
Otto Braun, 150-1; and November
negotiations with Hitler, 157-62;
and Papen's plans for constitutional
revision, 164-6; designation of emer-
gency successor to, 174; Nazi's at-
tack in Prussian Landtag, 179;
Schleicher seeks support of, 180;
his continued friendship for Papen,
182; his support of Reichslandbund,
185; and fall of Schleicher, 189-92;
relation to early Hitler government,
194, 198, 207; appeal to by Braun,
201; decree against Prussian govern-
ment, Feb. 6, 1933, 203-4; 218;
final balance of career, 220; 228
(fns. 59, 61), 229 (fn. 73), and
presidential election of April, 1932,
230 (fn. 80); 253 (fn. 17); Nazi
criticism of, 257 (fn. 3); Braun on,
257-8 (fn. 27)

Hindenburg, Oskar von, son of the
Reich President, 169, 189

Hirsch, Paul, Minister President in
Prussian Provisional Government,
24, 26-7; resignation, 29; 224 (fn.
38), 225 (fns. 56, 58)

Hirschfeld, Hans, press representative
in Prussian Ministry of Interior, 156

Hirtsiefer, Heinrich, Prussian Minister
of Pubhc Welfare, 35, 60, 96, 101,
140, 161

Hitler, Adolf, Nazi leader and Reich
Chancellor, 19; career, 48-9; and
Presidential election of April, 1932,
54-6; 64-5; 79; action against by
Prussian government, 94; and elec-
tions of July, 1932, 112-3; negotia-
tions with Papen in August, 1932,
114-6, 118; in November, 154-5,
157-9; negotiations with von Hin-
denburg, 161-3; 170-1; and the

Strasser break, 172, 175-6; 173; 179;
background of cabinet, 182-4, 189-
92; character and nature of govern-
ment, 193-6; negotiations with Cen-
ter Party, 197-8; speech before
Reichsrat, 199-200; at Garrison
Church, 207; Papen letter to, 211;
relationship to Goring, 212;; 253-4
(fn. 29)

Hofer, Adolf, co-Minister of Agricul-
ture in Prussian Provisional Govern-
ment, 24, 224 (fn. 38)

Hoff, member of Prussian Provisional
Government, 224 (fn. 38)

Hoffmann, Adolf, Minister of Educa-
tion in Prussian Provisional Govern-
ment, 24, 224 (fn. 38)

Hoffmann, Paul, in Prussian Provi-
sional Government, 224 (fn. 38)

HohenzoUern, Prince Adalbert, 25;
Prince Friedrich Leopold, 25; Prince
Heinrich, 25; Crown Prince Wil-
helm, 57, 61, 121-2, 168, 230 (fn.
80), 245 (fn. 3), 253-4 (fn. 29);
Wilhelm II, 2, 70, 121, 219

Holscher, Heinrich, Commissional Min-
ister of Justice in Prussia, 108, 151

Hoper-Ascnoff, Hermann, Prussian
Minister of Finance, later President
of Bundesverfassungsgericht, 35,
219, 246 (fn. 16)

Hue, Otto, in Prussian Provisional
Government, 224 (fn. 38)

Hugenberg, Alfred, German National-
ist Party leader, 12; hostility to
Braun - Severing government, 55;
support of for von Papen, 111;
negotiations with Schleicher, 184,
186; Schleicher's fears of, 191; and
Hitler government, 195-7, 199, 209,
211, 250 (fn. 18)

Industrialists, German, 99, 124-5
Independent SociaHsts, 24-6 (fn. 49)

Jakobi, Prof. Erwin, pro-Reich legal
expert before Staatsgerichtshof, 134

Jan, Staatsrat Heinrich von, represent-
ative of Bavaria before Staatsge-
richtshof, 134

Jarres, Karl, Chief Mayor of Duisburg,
236 (fn. 32)

Jews. 184

Judicial reform, 20; in Prussia, 111

Juristen-Zeitung, Deutsche, 159

Kaas, Monsignor, Center Party leader,
67, 72, 162, 184, 186, 198, 237,
(fn. 46)

278

THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Kahler, Professor Wilhelm, Commis-
sional Minister of Education in
Prussia, 151, 178; removed, 201

Kaiserhof, 191

Kalckreuth, Graf Eberhard von, direc-
tor of Reichslandbund, 185

Kapp Putsch, 22, 28

Karl Liebknecht House, 38

Kasper, Wilhelm, Communist deputy
in Prussian Landtag, 99, 140, 247
(fn. 23)

Kassel, removal of Police President
of, 108

Kail. Wilhelm, Social Democratic
Reichstag deputy, 166

Keppler, Wilhelm, 256 (fn. 62)

Kerrl, Hans, National Socialist Presi-
dent of Prussian Landtag in 1932-3,
96, 131-2, 152, 177, 181, 202; made
Minister of Justice in Prussia, 211.

Keynes, Sir John Maynard, British
economics expert, 46

Kiel, mutiny, 5; removal of PoHce
President of, 108

Klepper, Otto, Prussian Minister of Fi-
nance, 35, 55, 101; "resistance plot"
of, 103-4; Nazi charges against, 230
(fn. 84)

Koch, Adolf, 183

Koellreutter, Otto, Nazi legal theorist,
248 (fn. 39)

Koenen, Wilhelm, Communist deputy
in Prussian Landtag, 247 (fn. 26)

Koenig, Paul, Papen employee in
United States, 70

Koner, Karl Theodor, 68

Konig, Christoph, head of BerUn
school administration, 182

Konigsberg, removal of PoHce Presi-
dent of, 108

Krosigk, Graf Schwerin von. See
Schwerin von Krosigk

Kriiger, Hans, State Secretary in Prus-
sian Ministry of Agriculture, re-
moved, 108

Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Ger-
man munitions manufacturer, 75,
99, 172

Kube, Wilhelm, Nazi deputy in Prus-
sian Landtag, 95, 179, 201

Kulturkampf, 13, 21, 42

Lammers, Hans Heinrich, Commis-
sional Minister of Education in
Prussia, later State Secretary in
Reich Chancellery, 108, 200, 244
(fn. 84)

Landesanstalt fur Wasser- Boden- und
Lufthygiene, 36

Lausanne Conference, Germany and
the, 82-9, 97-8, 111, 126, 170, 241
(fn. Ill)

Lauscher, Albert, Prussian Center
Party leader, 254 (fn. 33)

Lauzanne, Stephen, editor of Le Ma-
tin, 76, 85

Leber, JuHus, Social Democratic lead-
er, 109

Legalitdt und Legitimitdt, by Carl
Schmitt, 134, 247 (fn. 30)

Leinert, Robert, President of Prussian
Constitutional Assembly, 28

Leipart, Theodor, leader of A.D.G.B.,
180, 182, 185, 190, 255 (fn. 46)

Leipzig, decision of Staatsgerichtshof
at, 133-4, 138, 147, 149, 155-6, 159,
161, 208

Lenin, 8

Levetzovv, Admiral Magnus von. Po-
lice President in Berlin, 203

Ley, Robert, Nazi leader, 183

Leyden, Viktor von. Ministerial Di-
rector in Prussian Ministry of Inte-
rior, 246 (fn. 16)

Liebknecht, Karl, Spartacist (Commu-
nist) leader, 8, 11, 22

Liegnitz, removal of Regierungsprdsi-
dent of, 108

Lippe-Schaumburg, opposes Papen
coup, 116

Lippe, elections in, 186-7

Litzmann, General Karl, Nazi Reich-
stag and Prussian Landtag deputy,
180, 208

Lobe, Paul Social Democratic Reich-
stag President, 44

Lower Silesia, removal of Oberprdsi-
dent of, 108; protest of against
presidential decree of Feb. 6, 1933,
203

Liibeck, commissional government in,
207

LudendorflF, General Erich, 2, 7

Liineberg, removal of Regierungsprds-
ident of, 108

Liininck, Hermann, Freiherr von, Gen-
eral Secretary of Rliineland Farm-
ers' Union, 75-6

Luther, Hans, President of the Reichs-
bank, 87, 149

Lutherans, See EvangeUcal Church

Liittwitz, General Walther von, part-
ner of Kapp in 1920 Putsch, 224
(fn. 35)

Luxembourg, Rosa, Communist leader,
11,22

INDEX

279

MacDonald, Ramsay, British Prime
Minister, 85, 88

Magdeburg, removal of Regierungs-
prdsident of, 108; Severing's speech
at, 141

Mamatey, Victor S., 221 (fn. 5)

Mangehiige, 99, 105-6

Marx, Willielm, Center Party leader
and Reich Chancellor, 37; cabinet
in Prussia, 71; 220

Max, Prince of Baden, See Baden,
Prince Max of

Mefo Certificates, 124

Meissner, Otto, State Secretary in Of-
fice of the Reich President, influence
on President, 53; view of fall of
Briining, 63 If.; part in formation
of Papen cabinet, 68, 74; attitude
toward Lausanne Conference, 89;
and coup against Prussia, 99; 160;
attitude toward Schleicher, 167; on
Strasser break from Hitler, 176; and
Hitler cabinet, 197, 200; 230 (fn.
78), 232 (fn. 108), 233 (fi. 121),
251 (fn. 49), 252 (fn. 10), 255
(fn. 60)

Melcher, Kurt, PoUce President in
Berlin, 102, 203

Meerfeld, Dr. Sociahst leader in
Staatsrat, 42

Merker, Paul, 255 (fn. 46)

Merseburg, removal of Regierungs-
prdsident of, 108

Misch, Carl, of Vossische Zeitung, 174

Mohler, Armin, 233 (fn. 124)

Monarchism in Germany, 52-3, 164,
168, 207, 245 (fn. 3)

Miiller, Hermarm, Reich Chancellor,
45, 47, 51

Miiller, von, judge on Staatsgerichts-
hof, 133

Munich, lllustrierter Beobachter of,
182; speech of Papen at, 205

Miinster, removal of Regierungsprdsi-
dent of, 108; friend of Papen in
office at, 203

Mussehl, Fritz, Commissional Minis-
ter of Agriculture in Prussia, 108

Nadolny, Rudolf, German representa-
tive at World Disarmament Con-
ference, 81

Nationahsts, German Nationahst Peo-
ple's Party, origins, 12; 21, 28; op-
position to Braun in Prussia, 42-3,
44-6, 59; and fall of Briining, 61,
64; support of von Papen, 111-3;

148, 153, 157, 170; and Schleicher,
184, 191; and Hitler cabinet, 195,
205; 222 (fn. 16); 224 (fn. 49)

National Socialists, National Sociahst
German Worker's Party, 46; rise,
48-9; and Braun-Severing regime in
Prussia, 38-9, 44, 55-60; and fall of
Briining, 61-2, 64-5; and early poli-
cies of Papen government, 73, 75,
77-81; and coup against Prussia,
94-8, 100, 103-4, 110-2; negotia-
tions of with Center Party, 89, 113,
132, 164; and elections of July,
1932, 112; and August negotiations
with Papen, 113-6; conflict of with
commissional regime in Prussia,
116-8, 127, 131-2, 140, 148-9, 152,
178-9; threats of against von Hin-
denburg, 121, 189; in Reichstag,
September, 1932, 125-7; and elec-
tions of November, 1932, 153; and
November negotiations with Papen
government, 155-9, 161-2; and faU
of Papen, 163-6, 170-1; and plans
of von Schleicher, 172-3, 175-7,
182-6; and Lippe elections, 186-7;
and fall of Schleicher, 189-92;
strength of at assumption of power,
194-5; early actions in office, 196;
Prussian poHcies of, 197-213; 216;
neo-Nazis, 219

"National State of Law" ("Nationale
Rechtsstaat"), 138, 248 (fn. 39)

Nawiasky, Hans, Bavarian legal ex-
pert, 108, 134, 248 (fn. 38)

Nazis, See National SociaHsts

Neudeck, 125, 132, 150

Neurath, Konstantin, Freiherr von.
Minister of Foreign Affairs imder
Papen, 74-5, 82, 114, 155, 177, 191,
195, 241 (fn. 113)^^

"New Reconstruction" (Neuaufbau)'oi
the Reich, 212-3

Nietzsche, 194

Nobis, Ludwig, Ministerial Director
in Prussian Ministry of Interior, 101,
201

Nolting, Wilhelm Erik, Social Demo-
cratic deputy in Prussian Landtag,
187-8, 194

Noske, Gustav, Social Democratic
leader, 26, 98, 242 (fn. 23)

Nuremburg, trials at, 184, 204

Oeser, Rudolf, Prussian Minister of
Transportation, 35, 225 (fn. 56)

Oppeln, removal of Pohce President
of, 108

280

THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Osthilfe, 189

Ott, Lt. Col. Eugen, 163, 165, 251
(fns. 47, 49)

Pddagogische Akademien, 41

Papen, Franz von, Reich Chancellor,
June 1, 1932-Dec. 2, 1932; Reich
Vice-chancellor, Jan. 30, 1933-
August (?), 1934, 45-6; 60, 64
career and chancellorship, 67-90
coup against Prussia, 94-103, 106-7
nature of commissional government
in Prussia, 107-10; and elections of
July, 1932, 111-2; August negoti-
ations of with Hitler, 112-16; ef-
forts of for monarchical restoration,
121-2; economic program of, 122-5;
and the opening of the Reichstag,
125-7; proposal of to end Reich-
Prussian dualism, 127-8, 138; and
decision of Staatsgerichtshof, 147-9,
248-9 (fn. 2); conference with
Braun and von Hindenburg, 150-1;
organizes new commissional govern-
ment of Prussia, 151-2; renewed
negotiations of with Hitler, 154-8;
formal resignations of cabinet of,
158; and the Prussian question, 159;
fall of, 162-6, 167, 170-3; poHcies
of reversed by Schleicher, 177-8;
speech of before Herrenklub, 182-3;
meets with Hitler, 183-4; and fall
of Schleicher, 189-92; position of in
Hitler government, 193, 195-6; rela-
tionship of to enabling act, 196-7;
acts as member of Prussian Com-
mittee of Three, 202; favors changes
in Prussian administration, 203;
seeks to restrain Hitler, 205, 207-8;
and provisions of First Act for Co-
ordination of Reich and Lander,
209; ends position as Reich Com-
missioner in Prussia, 211; 218;
Charles Warren on, 234 (fn. 9);
U. S. diplomatic instructions in re,
235 (fn, 14); reasons of for joining
Center Party, 235 (fns. 17, 18);
and von Hindenburg, 235 (fn. 23);
247 (fn. 26), 249 (fn. 6), 250
(fns. 18, 24, 32)

Papen, Friedrich Franz von, son of
the Chancellor, 184

Paris Peace Conference, 18

Pechel, Rudolf, Editor of Deutsche
Rundschau, 61

People's Party, German, 12. 36, 42,
157, 184,224 (fn. 49)

Peters, Professor Hans, representative
of Center Party before Staatsge-

richtshof, 134

Physical Exercise School, 183

Pieck, Wilhelm, Communist deputy in
Prussian Landtag, 257 (fn. 3)

Planck, Erwin, State Secretary in the
Reich Chancellery, 182, 229 (fn.
75)

Poetzsch-Heffter, Dr., jurist, 159

PoHce, Prussian, 38-9, 56, 59-60, 94-5;
possible use at time of Papen coup,
104-5; 110, 112, 127, 163, 198-9,
203, 231 (fn. 99), 232 (fn. 108)

Polish Corridor, 19

Popitz, Johannes, State Secretary in
Reich Finance Ministry, Commis-
sional Minister of Finance in Prus-
sia, 151, 155, 165, 209, 211

Posen, 203

Potempa, 117

Potsdam, 207

President, of the Weimar Republic,
powers of, 17-18, 51 ff., 79, 128-9,
137-9, 143-4, 223 (fns. 18, 27),
248 (fn. 40); of post- World War II
West German State, powers of, 218

Preuss, Hugo, asked to prepare draft
of Weimar Constitution, 11; draft
of Weimar Constitution, 13-16; 26,
92, 107, 222-3 (fn. 17)

Preussen contra Reich, suit before
Staatsgerichtshof, 132-45, 147, 174

Preussenkasse, 178

Preussische Bergwerke und Hiitten A.
G. CPreussag"), 36

Preussiche Elektrische Aktiengesell-
schaft ("Preag"), 37

Preussische Landesrentenhank, 37

Prussia, German state of, under the
empire of WiUiam II, 14-15, 23;
Preuss's proposal for division of,
15 ff.; provisional republican gov-
ernment in, 24 ff.; constituent as-
sembly of, 1919, 28-31; history,
1920-1932, 33-66; Papen's part in
politics in, 71; target of Papen gov-
ernment, 91 If.; discussion of divi-
sion of, 92-4; plans for Reich Com-
missioner in, 95-6; political and fi-
nancial diflBculties of, 96-7; Papen
coup against, 98-103; and possibility
of resistance against coup, 103-5;
legal basis for coup against, 106-7;
early actions of commissional gov-
ernment in, 107-8; and plea for Su-
preme Court injunction, 108-9; con-
solidation of commissional regime
in, 109-10; Franz Bracht in, 110-1;
relationship of to Papen-Hitler nego-
tiations in August, 114; commis-

INDEX

281

sional regime of seeks to represent
in Reichsrat, 116; Landtag of con-
demns coup, 116-7; and Potempa
murderers, 118; and Papen plans
for Reich reform, 127-8; Bracht re-
form in, 129-31; Landtag session
in, 131-2; and case before Staats-
gerichtshof, 132-45; continued re-
form moves in, 147-52, 156; and
presidential decree of Nov. 17;
1932, 159-61; place of in fall of
Papen, 165-6; place of in Schlei-
cher's policies, 173, 176-8, 180,
184-5, 186, 188; opposition of Land-
tag ot commissional regime in, 178-
9; Schulputsch in, 182-3, 187; place
of in Papen-Hitler negotiations,
191-2; importance of in early Hitler
period, 196-9; Reich moves against
Braun regime in, 200-2; protests
against Hitler's actions in, 203-4;
flight of Otto Braim and elections
in, 206-7; end of Braun government
in, 208; under Reichsstatthalter law,
210-11; new cabinet in, 211; en-
abling act in and new Staatsrat in,
212; end of under Nazis, 213; posi-
tion of in World War II, 215; abo-
lition of by Allied Control Council,

"Prussianism," 1, 215

Reibnitz, Kurt von, 241 (fn. 1)

Reich Commissioner in Prussia — See
Prussia

"Reich Execution" (under Article 48
•#■1 of the Weimar Constitution),
15, 17, 22, 99, 101, 136-9, 143, 218

"Reich-Prussian dualism," 16, 90, 92-5,
148, 157, 159, 162, 165, 180, 185,
197, 231-2 (fn. 102), 241-2 (fn. 8)

Reichsbank, 86-7

Reichsbanner, Social Democratic para-
military organization, 61-2, 103-4,
167, 232 (fn. 108), 233 (fn. 110)

Reichsgericht, 133, 174

Reichsland, 130, 246 (fn. 17)

Reichslandbund, 185

Reichsrat, origins, 16-17; sessions of,
116, 128, 155, 160, 179, 197-200.
203-4

Reichreform, See "Reich - Prussian
dualism"

Reichsstatthalter law, 209-11

Reichstag fire, 204-5

Reichswehr, German regular army, 2,
6, 7, 9-10, 22, 53, 61-2, 102-4, 113,
163-4, 169, 177, 190, 196, 232 (fns.
102, 108)

Reinhardt, Colonel Max, Prussian War
Minister, 26, 225 ( fn. 56 )

Reparations, 19, 45, 65, 81-90

"Reserved Rights" of the German
states, 15

Rheinbaben, Werner, Freiherr von,
German diplomat, 170

Rhineland, 27

Rhine Province, 156, 203

Ring, Der (Herrenklub publication),
238 (fns. 56, 58)

Rohm, Ernst, Nazi leader, 114

Rohr-Demmin, Hans Joachim von, 185

Rosenfeld, Kurt, in Prussian Provi-
sional Government, 24, 224 (fn. 38)

Rote Fahne, Die, Communist news-
paper, 107, 178

Rotfrontkdmpfer, Communist para-
military organization, 62

Rotteck, Karl von, Gemian liberal, 219

Ruhr, 27

Rumbold, Sir Horace, British ambas-
sador to Germany, 168-9

Rundstedt, General Gerd von, 102

Rust, Bernhard, Commissional Minis-
ter of Education in Prussia, 201

S. A. Verbot (action of Reich govern-
ment against Nazi Storm Troopers),
61-2

Sahm, Heinrich, Chief Burgomaster of
Berlin, 130

Saxony, 22, 93, 108, 156, 203; com-
missional government in, 207

Schacht, Hjalmar. Reichsbank Presi-
dent, 124, 228 (fn. 48), 237 (fn.
40)

Schaffer, Staatsrat Fritz, of Bavarian
People's Party, 204

SchafFer, Hans, Minister of Labor
under Papen, 75, 87, 98, 114, 172

Scheidemann, Philipp, Social Demo-
cratic leader, 6

Scheuch, General von, Prussian Minis-
ter of War, 25-6, 224 (fn. 38)

Schiffer, Eugen, Democratic Party
leader, 242 (fn. 9)

Schlange-Schoningen, Hans, Commis-
sioner for Eastern Agricultural
Problem_s under Briining, 63, 229
(fns. 73, 75), 237 (fn. 38)

Schleicher, General Kurt von. Minister
of War under Papen, Reich Chan-
cellor, Dec, 1932-Jan., 1933, career,
53; and S.A. Verbot, 61-2; and
origins of Papen cabinet, 68, 71-4,
77, 79-80; and Lausanne Confer-
ence, 87-90; and move against
Prussia, 95, 98; 104, 110; on coali-

282

THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC

tion with the Nazis, 113-4; 119, 121,
132, 147; favors renewal of nego-
tiations with Nazis, 155-6; 162-3;
and end of Papen chancellorship,
163-6; character, 167-71; cabinet
and policies of, 171-2; efforts to
gain support of Strasser, 172-3,
175-6, 186; other efforts for sup-
port, 180-1, 184; and Prussia, 173,
176-9, 184-5, 188; fall of govern-
ment of, 182-3, 189-92, 194; 237
(fn. 52), 238 (fn. 59), 252 (fn.
10), 253 (fns, 17, 24, 29), 254
(fn. 33), 255 (fn. 46)

Schleswig-Holstein, 27, 108, 224 (fn.
49)

Schleusener, Fritz, Commissional Min-
ister of Finance in Prussia, 108

Schmitt, Carl, German jurist, career,
106-7; 128, 134, 136-9, 187, 209,
218

Schmitz, Reichsgerichtsrat, on Staats-
gerichishof, 133

Schotte, Walter, Papen apologist, 78-9,
236 (fn. 34), 238 (fn. 55)

Schroder, Baron Kurt von, Cologne
banker, 183, 255 (fn. 62)

Schwalb, Reichgerichtsrat, on Staats-
gerichtshof, 133, 161, 248 (fn. 49)

Schwenk, Paul, Communist deputy' in
Prussian Landtag, 247 (fn. 23)

Schiitze, Ministerial Director, repre-
sentative of Reich Commissioner be-
fore Staatsgerichtshof, 134

Schwerin von Krosigk, Graf Lutz,
Minister of Finance under Papen,
Schleicher, Hitler, 75, 82, 85, 87,
114, 155, 195, 235 (fn. 21), 250
(fn. 18)

"Second Act for the Coordination of
Reich and Lander," 209 S.

Seeckt, General Hans von. Chief of
Staff of German General Staff, 22,
224 (fn. 25)

Seldte, Franz, leader of the Stalhelm,
55, 191

Severing, Carl, Social Democratic
Minister of Interior in Prussia, ca-
reer, 29, 34-5; and Prussian police,
38-40, 60; Nazi attacks on, 55-6;
and Papen coup, 95-103; attitude of
toward resistance efforts, 103-5;
116; 132 charges against before
Staatsgerichtshof, 140-1; reaction to
Leipzig decision, 147 220, 226 (fns.
4, 5), 243 (fn. 39) 254 (fn. 30)

Sigmaringen, 203

Simon, Max, in Prussian Provisional
Government, 224 (fn. 38)

Sklarek scandal, 37-8, 226 (fn. 13)

Snell, John L., 221 (fn. 5)

Social Democrats, German, and World
War I, 5; policies and principles of,
6-11; 13, 21; in Prussian Provisional
Government, 24-31; in Prussian Poli;
tics, 1920-1932, 33-44; in Reich
politics, 44-5, 47; and presidential
election of 1932, 55; Communist
opposition to, 56; losses in Prussian
elections, 58; change in procedure
for election of Prussian Minister
President by, 59; and Reichshanner,
61-2; and fall of Briining, 64; and
Papen government, 71, 88, 90; posi-
tion of in Prussian bureaucracy, 91;
supposed negotiations of with Com-
munists, 98-9; and possibility of re-
sistance against coup in Prussia,
104-5; representation of before
Staatsgerichtshof, 109, 133-5, 141-2;
and elections of Julv, 1932. Ill; in
Prussian Landtag, 117, 161, 187,

201, 212; 124, 126, 131, 156; and
Schleicher, 174, 177, 180-2, 184,
187-8, 190; and Hitler government,
183, 194, 197, 201-2, 205-6, 212;
post World War II, 217; 224 (fn.
49), 228 (fn. 49)

Socialist Reich Party, 219

Socrates, 206

Solf, Wilhelm, 236 (fn. 32)

South German Lander, 93, 97, 108,
128, 136, 166, 205, 207, 216

Soviet zone of Germany, 216

Spa, High Command at, 5

"Spartacists" (later German Commu-
nists, q.v.), 8, 11-2, 22, 26-7

Staatsgerichtshof, German Supreme
Court, 17, 20-1, 51, 96-8, 104,
108-9, 121, 128, 132-45, 147, 151-2,
156, 160, 181, 189, 200-4 218, 247
(fns. 28, 34), 258 (fn. 38)

Staatsrat, Prussian, 30, 160-1, 199,

202, 204, 207, 211-2
Stadtverordnetenversammlung ( Berlin

city parliament), 44, 130, 188, 207

Stalhebn, 42, 55-7, 205

State-church relations in Prussia, 42-3

State Party, German (see also Demo-
cratic Party, German), 76, 201

Staudinger, State Secretary in Minis-
ter of Commerce in Prussia, re-
moved from office, 108

Stegerwald, Adam, Center Party Min-
ister President of Prussia in 1921,
35, 52, 63, 75, 225 (fn. 56)

Stimson, Henry L., U. S. Secretary of
State, 85, 240 (fn. 85)

INDEX

283

Strasser, Gregor, Nazi leader, 73, 108,
125, 164, 171-3, 175-7, 180, 182-3,
186, 194, 252 (fn. 16), 253 (fn.
29), 255 (fn. 60)

Stresemann, Gustav, leader of German
People's Party, 12

Striegler, judge on Staatsgerichtshof,
133

Strobel, Heinrich, in Prussian Provi-
sional Government, 24, 224 (fn. 38)

Struve, Gustav von, German liberal,
219

Stuttgart, Lander conference at, 108;
Papen speech at, 205

Siidekum, Albert, Minister of Finance
in Prussian Provisional Government,
24, 224 (fn. 38), 225 (fn. 56)

Supreme Court of Germany, See
Staatsgerichtshof

Sybel, Heinrich von, 185

Syrup, Friedrich, Reich Labor Min-
ister under Schleicher, 171-2, 252
(fn. 14)

Szillat, Paul, Social Democratic dep-
uty in Prussian Landtag, 212

Tannenberg, Battle of, 2

"Tatkreis," 107

Torgler, Ernst, Communist deputy in
Prussian Landtag, 99, 140

Triebel, Reichsgerichtsrat, on Staats-
gerichtshof, 133

Trotsky, 8

Tyrrell, Lord WilHam, 239 (fn. 75)

United States, federal-state relations

in, 137
Universities, in Prussia, 41-2
Upper Silesia, 117, 203

Verfassungsausschuss der Landerkon-

ferenz, 92 ff.
Versailles, Treaty of, 18-20, 81, 83,

86, 88, 177, 203, 223 (fn. 29)

Vdlkischer Beohachter, Nazi news-
paper, 203

Volksschulen, 41, 187

Vollmut, brother-in-law of Strasser,
253 (fn. 29)

Vorwdrts, Social Democratic news-
paper, 26, 95, 98, 111, 131, 140-1,
174, 176, 180, 202

Vossische Zeitung, Democratic news-
paper, 95

Warmbold, Professor Hermann, Min-
ister of Economics under Papen, 75,
114, 124, 185, 237 (fn. 41)

Werder, Freiherr von, Regierungsrat,
178

Westarp, Graf Kuno, Nationalist Party
leader, 57, 64, 230 (fn. 80), 231
(fn. 95), 233 (fn. 121)

Wheeler-Bennett, John W., 222 (fn.
13)

Wilhelm II, See HohenzoUem, Wil-
liam II

Wilson, Woodrow, President of the
United States, 2-4, 221 (fn. 5)

Winckelried, Arnold von, 68

"Winter Help," 175

Wirth, Joseph, Center Party leader
and Chancellor, 220

Wittelsbach dynasty, 207, 245 (fn. 3)

World Disarmament Conference, 177,
190

Wiirttemberg, 93; opposes Papen
coup, 116; 156; commissional gov-
ernment in, 207

Young Plan, 45, 86

Zehnhoff, Hugo am, in Prussian Pro-
visional Government, 225 (fn. 56)

Zetkin, Klara, Communist Reichstag
deputy, 125

Zorgiebel, Karl, Police President of
Berlin, 38, 226 (fn. 15)

Zwickel decree. See Badezwickelerlass

/ U^^l^

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Books

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "The death of the Prussian Republic : a study of Reich-Prussian relations, 1932-1934"

See other formats